Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed February 9, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D21-790

Lower Tribunal No. 12-3787

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Brian Giller,

Appellant,

vs.

Jason Giller, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade 

County, Rosa C. Figarola, Judge.

Law Offices of Andrew B. Peretz, P.A., and Andrew B. Peretz (Ft.

Lauderdale), for appellant.

Jason B. Giller, P.A., Jason B. Giller and Hilary Schein, for appellees.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and MILLER, and GORDO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
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Appellant, Brian Giller, appeals a portion of an omnibus order 

adjudicating several motions filed by his adult children, appellees, Jason and 

Jamie Giller, in this trust litigation. We dismiss the part of the appeal directed 

at rulings compelling the production of responsive documents, overruling 

objections to production requests, requiring appellant to show cause as to 

why he should not be held in contempt of court, compelling corrected 

accountings, and granting entitlement to attorneys’ fees, as these rulings are 

nonfinal and nonappealable. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3); see also

Fisher v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 827 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2002) (“The Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review nonfinal orders is limited 

to those categories of orders identified in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 

9.130.”); Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 249 So. 3d 794, 794 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2018) (“With respect to the circuit court’s rulings on the contested discovery 

issues . . . these are nonappealable, nonfinal orders, and so we cannot 

exercise our appellate jurisdiction to consider them.”); McIlveen v. McIlveen, 

644 So. 2d 612, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (“We align ourselves with the other 

district courts of appeal, which have held that an order which only determines 

the right to attorney’s fees without setting the amount is a nonappealable, 

nonfinal order.”). Further, we dismiss the part of the appeal as moot that 

addresses the rulings restraining appellant, solely in his capacity as trustee, 
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from dissipating trust assets, as he is no longer the trustee. See Godwin v. 

State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992). We reverse, however, the portion of 

the order granting a prohibitive injunction against the trust itself, as it was not 

properly preceded by a motion for temporary injunction, and the trial court 

did not make the requisite findings supporting injunctive relief. See Cadillac 

Plastic Grp., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Martin Cnty., N.A., 590 So. 2d 1063, 

1063 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (“It is fundamental that a party must first file a 

complaint or allege a cause of action in a pleading for a temporary injunction 

before injunctive relief can be granted.”); Int’l Vill. Ass’n, Inc. v. Schaaffee, 

786 So. 2d 656, 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“Allowing a preliminary injunction 

to issue in the absence of a pending request for ultimate relief would be 

contrary to the purpose behind temporary injunctions . . . .”); see also Fla. R. 

Civ. P. 1.610(c) (“Every injunction shall specify the reasons for entry . . . .”); 

McCue v. Heritage Farms Prop. Ass’n, Inc., 141 So. 3d 672, 673-74 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2014) (“This court has long held that [rule 1.610(c)] requires the 

injunction to include specific findings regarding the likelihood of irreparable 

harm, unavailability of an adequate remedy at law, substantial likelihood of 

success on the merits, and considerations of public policy.”); City of 

Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advert. Co., 634 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 1994) (“Clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings 
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must support each of the four conclusions necessary to justify entry of a 

preliminary injunction.”). 

Dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.