Opinion filed Sep tember 1 0, 2009



### In The 

# Eleven th Court of Appeals

___________ 

### No. 1 1- 08 -0 02 14 -CR

____ ____ __ DEM ETR ICE WA YN E P AR KER , A ppellant

V.
STA TE OF TEX AS , A ppellee

On App eal from the 32nd District Court

Nolan Coun ty, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 10685

O P I N I O N Demetr ice Way

ne Parke r appe als his conviction for the f irst deg ree felony

offe nse of po sse ssi on

of 40 0 g ra ms o r m ore of c oc a ine wi th t he int e nt t o d e liv e r. Ap pe lla nt p le a de d n olo

c on te nd e re to t

he of fe ns e a ft e r t

he tr ia l court de nie d his m oti on to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e . Purs ua nt t o a plea barg ain ag ree ment, the trial cour t sentence d appellant to twe nty y ear s confine ment and a f ine of $1 ,0 00 . In h is s ole a

pp e llate iss ue, app e lla

nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis motion to s uppress be cause police off icer s discovere d the coca ine as a re sult of illega lly detaining him a ft e r a tr a ff ic sto p. We a ff

ir m.The track ing is bad thro ugh m ost of the v ideo , and th ere a re als o occasional aud io p rob lem s. 1 2 Introduction On Aug ust 22, 2 0 0 7, appellant wa s a passe ng er in a vehicle be ing dr iven by Thomas Pimpt on. On that date, at 12:32 p.m., Department of Public Safe ty Trooper Todd Adkins stopped Pimpt on for spe eding . After conducting an investigation, Tr ooper Adkins arr ang ed for a drugdog to be brought to the s cene for the purpose of perf orming a free- air sniff around the stopped ve hicle. Depa rtment of Public Safety Trooper Be n Mueller, the c anine of fice r, ar rived at the scene with the drug dog at 1:50 p.m. The drugdog aler ted on the vehic le at 1:54 p.m., and, ther eaf ter, lawoffice rs found coc aine i n t h e t ru n k of the ve hicle. This appe al involves two primary issues: (1) whe ther Trooper Adkins had re asonable suspicion to detain appellant a nd (2) if so, whe ther the dur ation of appellant’ s detention was r easona ble. Back ground Trooper Adkins and Troope r Mueller testified at the suppre ssion hearing . Trooper Adkins testified that, on Aug us t 2 2 , 2 0 0 7 , at 12:32 p.m., he stopped Pimpt on for a speedingviolation on I nte rs ta te 20 a t a

bo ut m ile mark e r 2 32 . A t that tim e , Pimp ton wa s dr ivi ng a wh ite Do dg e Ma g num. Appellant wa s i n t h e front passe ng er se at of the ve hicle, and a juvenile was in the ba ckseat of the vehicle. T rooper

Adkins testified that Pimpt on was going 76 miles per hour befor e the stop. The stop was videotaped by a came ra in Tr ooper A dkins’s vehicle, a nd the State introduce d into evidence a copy of the video, which also contained audio, at the suppression hear ing. The re levant par t of the vid e o w a s p lay e d f

or the tr ia l c ourt

. 1 After stopping the vehicle, Trooper Adkins approa ched the driver’ s side of the ve hicle. He

re qu e ste d t o s e e P i mp t o n ’ s dr i v e r ’ s l i c e n s e
. P i mp t o nc o mp l i e d w i t h T r o o p e r

A d k i n s ’ s r e qu e s t. Howeve r, the manne r in which Pimpton produced his license raised suspicion in Troope r Adkins’s mind. Trooper A dkins testified that Pim pton had a “larg e bulg e” in his fr ont pants pocket, whic h Trooper Adkins believed w as Pimpton’s wallet. T ro o p er A dkins said that, instead of pulling the bulge out of his pocket, Pimpton “stuffed his hand in ther e, sat ba ck in h i s seat, [and] thum bed around to g et hi s li c e n s e o u t a s if h e w a s tr y in g to h id e s o me th in g in h is f r o n t p o c k e t f

r o m me .” Trooper Adkins testified that, when he was talking with Pimpton, a ppellant was e ating a hambur g er.T he tim es re f er enc ed in t

his opini on are a

pprox im at e tim es a s show n in the v ide o. 2 3 Tr oo pe r A dk ins sa id t

hat a pp e lla nt contin ue d to e a t th e hambu

rg e r “ ins te a d o f a c tua lly

pu tti ngit down like most people would have and pay ing attention to what was going on at the time.” Ap pe lla nt p ro vid e d a

n id e nti fi c a tio n c ard

to T ro op e r A dk ins

. The Dodg e Mag num was a r ental vehic le. Pimpton t old Trooper Adkins that the vehicle had been r ented in Abilene by his g irlfriend, Tony a Carr. Trooper Adkins asked Pimpton for the re ntal ag ree ment for the ve hicle. Pimpton and appella n t we re unable to find the re ntal ag ree ment in the vehicle. At 12:35 p.m., Pi mpton got out of the ve hicle at Tr ooper A dkins’s reque st. Trooper 2 Adkins and Pimpton walked toward the rea r of the D odg e Magnum. Trooper Adkins asked Pimpton, “[W ]here y ’all coming from? ” Pimpton responded that they had come from California . When asked by Trooper Adkins how long they

had bee n in California, Pimpton responded, “[T]hree da y s.” At 12 : 3 5 : 5 0 p
. m ., Trooper Adkins approa ched appellant to ask hi m whether he had f ound the re ntal agreeme nt. Ap pe lla nt w a s n ot l oo kin g fo r t

he re nta l a g re e me nt b ut w a s st ill e a tin g his hamburg er. Tr ooper A dkins believed that, by continu i n g t o ea t the hamburg er, a ppellant was attempting to avoid speaking with him. Trooper Adkins thought that appellant may have be en trying to hide something f

rom him. Trooper A dkins testified t h at , based on othe r stops he had ma de, app el l an t ’s co nduct was indicative “of a passeng er in the ve hicle not wantingto speak to me.” Appellant did not f

ind the renta l a g ree ment. I n response to que stioning by Trooper Adkins, appellant

s a id th a t h e an d Pi mp to n h a d b e e n in Ca li f o r n ia f o r f iv e d ay s
. T h u s , a

p p e ll an t a nd Pimpt on g ave conflicting statements about the leng th of the trip. At 12:37:25 p.m., P impton reca lled that the re n t al agr ee m en t m i ght be in the trunk. At 12:37:43 p.m., appellant unlocked the trunk from inside the vehicle. T rooper Adkins walked to the ba c k o f t he ve hic le

. At that time , Tr oo pe r Adkin s look e d thr ou g h the ba c k w ind ow s o f t he ve hic le for lug g ag e, and he saw that the vehicle did not contain the amount of lugg ag e that would have be en
ne c e ssa ry fo r a thr e e -d ay

or five-d ay trip to C a lif

or nia . T he la c k o f l ug g a g e wa s si g nif ic ant t o Trooper Adkins beca

use he w as aw are of ca ses involving seizures of la rg e amounts of na

rcotics a nd

curr ency wher e “not a lot of lugg ag e” had been taken. Pimpt on lifted the hatchba ck , re t ri eved paper work fr om the trunk are a, and then immediately closed the hatchba ck. B efor e Pimpton closed4

the hatchba ck, Troope r Adkins saw a box of “Tide soap” inside the trunk. Trooper Adkins testified that, in the past, he ha d seen “ Tide soap or soap boxes being use d to c ontain illega l narc otics try ing to mask the odors that the na rcotic w ould put off.” At 12:38:15 p.m., P impton located a renta l a g ree ment in the paper work that he had retrie ved from the trunk. H e hande d the re ntal ag ree ment to T ro o p er Adki ns. Trooper Adkins then asked Pimpt on, “[W ]ho rented it? ” In response , appellant told Tr ooper A dkins that his “gir lfriend did.” Pimpt on put the other paperwor k back in the tr

unk. At 12:38:50 p.m., Trooper Adkins told Pimpt on that he was g oing to his vehicle to look at t he rental ag ree ment. Trooper Adkins also told Pi mpton that he would be r ece iving a war ning on the speeding , with no fine or penalty , and “if y ou’ll hold on tight just a sec ond, I ’ll be rig ht with y ou.” By 12:39:00 p.m., Trooper Adkins had decided that he wa s g oing to a sk for c onsent to sear ch the vehicle . At that time, Trooper Adkins believed that he had suff icient ar ticulable fa cts that g ave him r easona

ble suspicion to detain the occupa nts of the vehicle. When he re turned to his vehicle, Trooper Adkins reque sted war

rant a nd criminal history

information for Pimpt on and appe llant over his radio. At 12:40:00 p.m., while waiting for the war rant a nd criminal history

information, Troope r Adkins stated a number

of obser vations into h i s microphone, inc luding the f ollowing: (1) that appellant wa s acting “re al hesitant”; (2) that “they say they ’re coming from California ”; (3) that they

wer e in a third party renta l vehicle; (4) t hat P impton said his g irlfriend rented the vehicle; ( 5) that “they don’t have har d l y an y cl o t h es i n the vehicle – said they ’d bee n there a we ek”; a nd (6) that appellant wa s “re al ner

vous – shaking – his hands [were] shaking rea l bad.” At 12:41 p.m., Trooper A dkins rece ived the re quested wa rra nt info r mation. Neither Pimpton

no r a pp e lla nt h a d a ny ou tst and ingwa

rr ants . H ow e ve r, the y

bo th h a d le ng th y c ri min a l hi sto ri e s, including a

rre sts for a number

of drugoffe nses. The dispatcher ga ve Trooper Adkins the following

c ri min a l hi sto ry

fo r P imp ton : “ 19 91 – on e tr a ff ic of fe ns e ; 19 92 – on e po sse ssi on of c oc a ine ; [a

ud io interrupted] . . . manufa cture , d eli ver, posse ss controlled substance ; 2002 – two possession of marihuana ; one possession of a c ontrolled substance ; [ and] one evading arr est.” The dispatcher g ave Trooper Adkins the following criminal history for a ppellant: “one the ft of prope rty ; one possession of marihua

na under two ounces; two possession of mar ihuana unde r five pounds; one possession of a contr olled substance ove r one g ram; [and] one car rying pr ohibited weapon.” After rec eiving the5

criminal histories, at 12:44:10 p.m., Trooper Adkins reque sted backup over his ra dio. Depar tment of Pub lic Sa fe ty

Tr oo pe r B ill Whe a t r e sp on de d to the re qu e st. I n r e vie wi ngthe re nta l a g re e me nt, Tr oo pe r A dk ins no tic e d th a t Pim pto n w a s n ot n a me d in it. The renta l a g ree ment indicated that Tony a Carr had re nted the vehic le. The f act that Car

r wa s not in the ve hicle was signific ant to Trooper Adkins beca

use he ha d made other

stops involvi ng third party renta l vehicles that “ ha[d] y ielded lar g e amounts of na rcotics o r illega l drug money .” At 12:45:09 p.m., Troope r Adkins exit ed his ve hicle and then questioned Pimpt on as to whethe r he w as supposed to be driving the vehicle

. At 12:48:15 p.m., Trooper Adkins re quested c o n s en t from Pimpton to s ear ch the ve hicle. Pimp ton de nie d c on se nt t o se arc h. Tr oo pe r Ad kin s be lie ve d that he ha d su ff ic ie nt a rt ic ula ble fa c ts, including Pimpt on’s and appellant’ s criminal histories, to justi fy detaining Pimpt on and appe llant and wa iting on the a

rrival of a drugdog . Trooper

Adkins expl ained to Pimpton that he was g oing to arra ng e for a drugdog to be broug ht to the scene for the pur pose of pe rfor

ming a fre e-a ir sear ch around the vehicle. T rooper Adkins sear ched Pim pton and appellant for weapons. He did not find any wea pons or contra

band during t h e sear ches. Tr ooper Wheat arrive d at the sce ne, and Trooper Adkins apprised him of the situation. At 12 :51 p. m., Tr oo pe r A dk ins re tur ne d to his ve hic le and

a tte mpt e d to loc a te an ava ila ble canine office r. The vide o s hows that, from 12:53 p.m. until 1:11 p.m ., Trooper Adkins made numerous phone c al l s o n t he subjec t. He dete rmined that the c anine of fice r in Sweetwater wa s unavailable

. At one point, Tr ooper Adkins thought that he would have to let Pimpton and appellant g o beca use he had been unable to find a ca nine offic er. H oweve r, at 1:10:40 p.m., Trooper Adkins loc a te d B e n M ue lle r, wh o w a s a c anin e of fi c e r in B ig Spr ing

. At the tim e of Tr oo pe r A dk ins ’s c a ll, Tr oo pe r M ue lle r w a s a

bo ut t hir ty or fo rt y min ute s awa y fr om t he sc e ne . T ro op e r M ue lle r a g re e d to dr ive to t he sc e ne to a ssi st T ro op e r A dk ins

. Tr oo pe r Whe a t dis c ov e re d that the re nta l a g re e me nt Pimp ton ha d pr ovid ed to Trooper Adkins was for

“a re d Fo rd Fusion.” W hile waiting for Tr ooper Mue ller to arr ive, T ro o p er Ad k i n s co n t ac t edAv i s t o d et er m i n e wh et h er P i mp t o nwa s au t h o ri z edt o dri v e t h e D o d ge Mag num. The mana g er at Avis told Trooper Adkins that Pimpton was not allowed to drive the vehicle.6

At 1: 5 0 p.m., Trooper

Mueller a

rrived a t the scene with his drug dog . Trooper Mueller testified that his dogwas tra ined to aler t on coca ine, her oin, methamphetamine, a nd marihuana . At 1:5 4 p .m. , T ro op e r M ue lle r’ s d ogpe rf or me d a fr e e -a ir sn if

f a ro un d th e Do dg e Ma g num. Trooper Mueller testified in detail about the results of the free -air sniff . He sa id that his dog a lerted to the driver’ s side of t he vehicle near t he bott om of t he door, the driver and passe ng er door s, and the bac k whee l w ell of the driver’ s side of the vehicle. Trooper Adkins testified that the dog ’s aler t

on the vehicle g ave the troopers pr obable c ause to sea rch the vehicle w ithout consent. The troope rs
sear ched the vehicle, and t hey found a larg e bagof powde red c ocaine in the Tide box t hat was in the trunk of the ve hicle. The y also found about $16,000 in the ve hicle. After the evidenc e wa s conclude d, the trial court denied appellant’ s motion t o suppress. The trial co u rt en t er ed finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law in support of its ruling . The trial c ourt

c on c lud e d, in r e le va

nt p art , a s f

oll ow s: 1. The tra ffic stop for

speedingwas re asonable and lawf ul.
2. The continued detention during which Trooper Adkins chec ked on the status of the ve hic le wa s r e a so na

ble and lawf ul. Th e ti me e la

ps e d b e fo re the c anin e un it arr ived at the sc ene w as re asonable and lawful. When the c anine unit aler ted on the vehicle, it g ave T rooper

Adkins probable c ause to c onduct a se arc h of the ve hicle.
On a pp e a l, a pp e lla nt co nte nd s tha t th e tr oo pe rs fo un d th e c oc a ine a s a re su lt o f u

nla wf ull y detaining him in violation of the Four th a nd Four teenth Amendments to the Un i t ed S tates Constit ution and Article I , section 9, of the Te x as Constitut ion. See U.S. C O N ST . amends. I V, XI V; T EX
. C O N ST . a

rt . I , § 9. Ap pe lla

nt state s in his br ie f t

hat “ [t]he na

rc oti c s in qu e sti on we re the fr

uit of an il le g a l de te nti on ” and

that “ [he ] wa s d e ta ine d fo r an a bs ur d le ng th of

tim e wi tho ut r e a so na

ble

su sp ic ion .” Th e re fo re , a pp e lla nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re ti on in den y inghis mot ion to s up pr e ss. Standard of Review A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is r eviewe d for an abuse o f d i s cr et ion. Ba le nti ne v . S

tat e , 71 S.W .3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). I n revie wing a trial court’s r uling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court must view the evidenc e in the light most favora ble to the trial court’ s ruling. Sta te v . Ke lly , 204 S.W .3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)

. W e give g reat7

defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s finding s of historical fa cts, but we re view de novo the trial court’ s application of the law. W ie de v . S tat e , 214 S.W .3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Applicable Law A traf fic stop is a d et en t i on and must be re asonable under the United States and Te x as Constit u t i o ns. Da v is v . S tat e , 9 47 S.W. 2d

24 0, 24 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ); Sp igh t v . S tat e , 76 S.W .3d 761, 766 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). To be rea sonable, a traff ic stop must be temporar

y and last no lo n ger t h an i s n ece ssary to effe ctuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Roye r , 460 U. S. 491 , 5 00 (1 98 3) ; Da v is , 947 S.W .2d at 245. Reasonable ness is measure d in objective ter

ms by examining t he tot ality of the c ircumstance s. Oh io v . R ob ine tte , 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1 99 6) ; Spight , 76 S.W .3d at 765. D u r i n g a t r a f f i c s t o p , ano f

f i c e r h a s t h e r i g h tt o a s k

t h e dr i v e r

f o r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a va lid dri v er ’s license, infor

mation conce rning owner ship of the vehicle , proof of insurance , and information conce rning the destination and purpose of the trip. Kot he v . S tat e , 152 S.W .3d 54, 63 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Da v is , 9 4 7 S

. W

. 2 d a t 2 45 n. 6; Ca ra way v . S tat e , 255 S.W .3d 302, 307 (T e x. Ap p. —E a stl and

20 08 , n o p e t.) ; Lam be th v . S tat e , 2 2 1 S.W. 3 d

8 3 1 , 8 3 6 ( T e x. App.—For

t Worth 2007, pet. ref’d) . The off icer may also approa ch the passeng ers in the vehicle and ask them similar questions. Du ff v . S tat e , 546 S.W. 2d 28 3, 28 6 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 77 ); Freem an
v . S tat e , 6 2 S. W.3 d 8 83 , 887 -88 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 01 , p e t. r e f’ d) . T he of fi c e r m ay a lso chec k for outstanding war rants. Kothe , 1 52 S.W. 3d a t 63 ; Caraway , 255 S.W .3d at 308. While the of fi c e r i s awa iti nga

c omp ute r w arr ant c he c k, qu e sti on ing a bo ut ma tte rs unre la te d to the ini tia l tr a ff ic stop does not violate the Four th A mendment beca

use such questioning does not e x tend the duration of an initial valid stop. W ill is v . S tat e , 192 S.W .3d 585, 59 1 (T ex . App.—Tyler 2006, pe t. ref’ d). An offic er making a

traff ic stop is not required to investig ate the situation in a pa rticu l ar order

. Kothe , 1 52 S.W. 3d

a t 65 . F or

e xamp le , n o p e r s e ru le e xists that re qu ir e s “ an o ff ic e r i mme diate ly to obtain the driver’ s license a nd reg istration information and initiate the re levan t b a c k gr ound chec ks befor e askingquestions.” United States v. Brigham , 382 F.3d 500, 511 ( 5th Cir. 2004) . Only if the investigat i o n “unduly

prolong s” the de tention is the office r’s a ction unrea sonable unde r the circ umstances. Kothe , 152 S.W .3d at 65.8

When the rea son for the stop ha s been satisfied, the stop ma y not be used as a “ fi shing expedition” for unr elated c riminal activity

. Da v is , 947 S.W .2d at 243 (quoting Ro bin e tte , 5 19 U. S. at 41 (Ginsburg , J ., concur ring )). Onc e an of

fice r conc ludes the i n v estig ation of the c onduct that initiated the stop, continued detention of a person is per

mitted only if there is reasona ble suspicion to believe that the person is violating the law. Fo rd v . S tat e , 158 S.W .3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 05 ); Da v is , 9 47 S.W. 2d a t 24 5. Re a so na

ble su sp ic ion e xists if

the of fi c e r h a s sp e c if

ic , a rt ic ula ble fac ts that, w hen combined with r ational infere nces from those fac ts, w ould le ad him to conclude that a par ticular pe rson ac tually

is, has been, or

soon will be eng ag ed in cr iminal a ctivity

. Cas tro v . S tat e , 22 7 S. W.3 d 7 37 , 74 1 (Tex . Crim . App . 2 00 7) ; Fo rd , 158 S.W .3d at 492. This is an objective sta nd ard that di sr e g ard s any

su bje c tiv e int e nt o f t

he of fi c e r m a kin g the stop a

nd loo ks so le ly

to whether an objective basis for the stop ex ists. Fo rd , 158 S.W .3d at 492. Whether the totality of the circ umstances is sufficie nt to support an office r’s rea sonable suspicion is a question of law that we revie w de novo. Ma dd

e n v . S tat e , 242 S.W .3d 504, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A d e te nti on

ba se d o n r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

mus t be te mpo ra

ry and la st no lo ng e r t

ha n is

nece ssary t o effectuate the purpose of the stop. Roye r , 460 U.S. at 500. Although the leng th of a detention may

rende r a tra ffic stop unre asonable , there is no rigid, br ight- line time limi tation. United States v. Sharpe , 4 70 U. S

. 67 5, 68 5 (19 85 ); Lov e v . S tate , 2 5 2 S. W. 3 d

6 8 4 , 6 8 7 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 08 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Be lc he r v . S tat e , 2 44 S.W. 3d

53 1, 53 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 07 , n o p e t.) . Ins tead, com mo n se ns e and or din ary human e xpe ri e nc e mus t g ov e rn ov e r r ig id

c r it e r ia

. S

harpe , 470 U.S. at 685; Love , 2 52 S.W. 3d a t 68 7; Belche r , 244 S.W .3d at 539. The

rea sonablene ss of the duration of a d et ention depends on w hether the police dilig ently

pursued a

me ans of inv e sti g a tio n that w a s li ke ly to c on fi rm

or dis pe l any

su sp ic ion s q

uic kly , d ur ingwh ic h ti me it was necessa

ry to detain the de fenda

nt. Sharpe , 4 70 U. S. at 68 6; Love , 2 52 S.W. 3d a t 68 7; Belche r , 244 S.W .3d at 539. Ap pli c ati on of L aw to F

ac ts Appellant does not c halleng e the leg ality of the orig inal traff ic stop f or speeding

. He f

ocuses on two periods of time in his br ief: 12:44 p.m. to 1:03 p.m. a nd 1:03 p.m. to 1:50 p.m. He argues that detaining him during both of the se per iods of time was “patently unrea sonable.” Appellant appar ently

contends that the pur

pose of the or i gi n al stop was satisfied at 12:43:18 p.m. after9

Trooper Adkins discovere d that neither he nor P i m p t o n had outstanding war rants and that, at that t i m e, T rooper

Adkins did not have re asonable suspicion to further de tain him. Theref ore, he contends that his detention after 12:44 p.m. was unlawful. The troopers di scover ed that the rental ag ree ment was for

the re d For d Fusion at 1:03 p.m. Appellant c ontends that this discovery did not g ive rise to re asonable suspicion to detain him and that, even if it had, the State ca nnot justi fy

the

e arl ie r d e te nti on

fr om 1 2:4 4 p. m. to 1:0 3 p. m. Th e State argue s th a t T ro op e r A dk ins ha d r e a so na ble suspicion to detain appellant a nd that the duration of appellant’s de tention was re asonable

. We first addre ss whether

Trooper Adkins had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant. The stop occurr ed at 12:32 p.m. Troope r Adkins ac ted re asonably in approa ching Pimpt on and appe llant and asking them for identification, information about the owne rship of the ve hicle, and inf ormation about their trip. Da v is , 9 47 S.W. 2d a t 24 5 n .6 ; Caraway , 2 55 S.W. 3d a t 30 7; Lam be th , 221 S.W .3d

a t 83 6; Freem an , 62 S.W .3d at 887-88. He also ac ted re aso n ab l y i n chec king f or outstanding

war rants and criminal histories. Kothe , 152 S.W .3d at 63. Withi n about ten minutes afte r the stop, Trooper Adkins learne d the cr iminal hist ory information. Thus, t h e record show s that Trooper Adkins conducte d his investigation of the speedingviolation in a diligent and timely fashion. Ba sed on his investigation of the traf fic off ense, Tr ooper A dkins discovere d a n u m b er of fa c ts that le d h im t o s us pe c t th a t Pim pto n a nd a pp e llan t w e re tr ans po rt ingna rc oti c s. Duri nghis testimony , Trooper Adkins identified a number of fac ts that r aised suspici o n s i n h i s mind: (1) testimony , P i m p ton did not take his wallet out of his pocket whe n he re trieved his license ; (2 ) a pp e lla nt c on tin ue d to e a t his hambu

rg e r; (3 ) P imp ton

and a pp e lla nt m a de c on fl ic tin g state me nts about the leng th of their California trip ; (4) the lack of lug g ag e in the vehic le; (5) the ve hicle wa s a third par

ty renta l vehicle; (6) the Tide soap box in the trunk of t he vehic le; and (7) Pimpt on’s and appellant’ s criminal histories. I n addition, at 12:40 p.m., Tr ooper Adkins stated into his microphone that appellant wa s acting rea lly nervous a

nd that his hands wer e shakingrea lly bad. Viewe d in isolatio n , s o m e o f the a bove fa cts might not support a r easona ble suspicion fi nd ing . H ow e ve r, c on duct that may be inn oc e nt w he n v ie we d in iso la tio n ma

y g ive ri se to

rea sonable suspicion whe n viewed in the lig ht of the totality of the circ umstances. W oo ds v . S tat e , 95 6 S

. W

. 2 d 3 3 , 3 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Ba sed on his experience , Trooper Adkins knew that

re nta l ve hic le s are us e d to tr a ff ic na rc oti c s; t hat de te rg e nts are us e d to mas k the od or of na rc oti c s;A ppel la nt a ls o re lie s on Par

ke r v. Stat e , 182 S .W .3d 923 ( T ex . C rim . A pp. 2006) . H ow ev er , th e is su e in Parker w as 3 w het her the de f enda nt ha d s ta nding to cont es t a se ar ch of a ve hic le

. T he c ourt did not addre ss w het her the of f ic er ha d re as onabl e sus pic ion t o de ta in t

he def enda nt. 10 an d t h at , i n ca s es i n v o l v i n g s ei z u re s o f l ar ge am o u n t s o f na rc o t i cs an d cu rr en cy , “n o t a lo to f l u ggage is t a ke n. ” Ap pe lla

nt’ s and Pimp ton ’s le ng thy c ri min a l hi sto ri e s in c lud e d nume ro us dr ugof fe ns e s. T h e c r im in a l h is to r ie s , w h e n c o mb in e d w it h th e o th e r f

a c ts , p r o v id e d s tr o n g s u p p o rt for Tr oo pe r A dk ins ’s c on c lus ion that he ha d r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

to d e ta in P imp ton

and a pp e lla nt. Ba sed on t h e totality

of the c ircumstance s, we c onclude that Tr ooper A dkins possessed specif ic,

art ic ula ble fa c ts that, w he n c omb ine d w ithra tio na l in fe re nc e s f

ro m th os e fa c ts, wo uld le a d him to

rea sonably

conclude that appel l an t wa s eng ag ing in c riminal activity and that, ther efor e, Troope r Ad kin s h a d r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

to d e ta in h im. Appellant re lies on the following case s to support his conte ntion that Trooper A dkins did not have re a so na

ble su sp ic ion to d e ta in h im: He rre ra v . S tat e , 80 S.W .3d 283 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 20 02 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Mc Qu ar te rs v. Sta te , 58 S.W .3d 250 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) ; and Ve al v . S tat e , 28 S.W .3d 832 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2000, pet. re f’d)

. The nature of the specific , 3 articula ble fa cts that wer e known to Trooper Adkins in this case distinguishes it from the c ases c ited by appellant. F or example, there was no evidence in the case s cited by appellant that the de tainees had leng thy

criminal histories that included a rre sts for drugoffe nses. We now addre ss whether the duration of appellant’ s detention was rea sonable. The drug dog

a le rt e d o n th e ve hic le a

bo ut se ve nty

min ute s a ft e r T ro op e r A dk ins dis c ov e re d th e c ri min a l hi sto ri e s. A seve nty -minute detention is not unrea sonable pe r se. Strau ss v . S tat e , 1 2 1 S. W. 3 d 4 8 6 , 4 9 2 ( T e x. App.—Amar illo 2003, pet. ref’ d) (A se venty -five- minute detention from the stop until the drugdog

arr ive d w a s n ot u

nr e a so na ble .) ; J os e yv . S tat e , 9 81 S.W. 2d

83 1, 84 0- 41 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist.] 1998, pet. re f’d) (A ninety -minute detention fr om the stop until the offic er s sear ched the vehicle was not unre asonable .). Rather, the rea sonablene ss of the duration of appellant’s de tention de pe nd s o n w he the r T ro op e r A dk ins dil ig e ntl y purs ue d a mea ns of inv e sti g a tio n th a t w a s li ke ly to confirm or

dispel his suspicions qui ckly

. Sharpe , 470 U.S. at 686. Afre e-a ir sniff by a tra ined drug dog is recog nized as a minimally intrusive method of investig ation for a n office r to confir

m or dispel11

his suspicions of the prese nce of narc otics. Se e Strau ss , 1 21 S.W. 3d a t 49 2; Josey , 981 S.W .2d at 841. Af te r P imp ton

de nie d c on se nt t o s e arc h th e ve hic le , T ro op e r A dk ins re tur ne d to hi s v e hic le

and a tte mpt e d to loc a te an ava ila ble c anin e of

fi c e r. Tr oo pe r A dk ins ma de nume ro us ph on e c a lls

over a n eig hteen- minute period in an attempt to find a ca nine offic er. H e dete rmined that the c anine office r in Sweetwater wa s unavailable . At 1:10:40 p

. m
. , he ca lled Trooper Mueller, a

nd Trooper Mueller a g ree d to assist him . At the time, T rooper Mueller wa s thirty or for ty minutes away

from the sce ne. Troope r Mueller arr ived wit h his drug dog at t he scene at 1:50 p.m. When the drug dog

arr ived at the scene , it quickly confirme d Trooper Adkins’s suspicions. The drugdog aler ted on the vehicle w ithin three or f

our minutes afte r ar

riving at the sce ne. Onc e the dru g d o g al er ted on the vehicle, T rooper

Adkins’s rea sonable suspi cion ripened into probable cause to sear ch the vehicle. Ha rri so n v . S tat e , 7 S.W. 3d

30 9, 31 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Di st. ] 199 9, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Josey , 981 S.W. 2d a t 84 6; Or tiz

v Sta te , 930 S.W .2d 849, 856 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.). We conc lude that Trooper

Adkins diligently

pursued a means of inve stigation that was likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly and that, there fore , the duration of appellant’s detention was r easona ble. See Love , 252 S.W .3d at 688. Be cause Trooper

Adkins had re asonable suspicion to detain appellant a nd beca use the du ra tio n o f a

p p e l l an t ’ s d e t e n t i o n w a s r e a s o n a b l e , t h e t r i a l c o u rt d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o nin denying a ppellant’s motion to suppress. We overrule appellant’ s sole issue. This Court’s Ruling We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

.

T E R RY M c C A LL

J USTI CE
September 10, 2009 Publis h. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Wright, C.J ., M c C a l l , J. , an d

S t r an g e , J.