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DIO We.

Augusrao,. 1960

gito

JOE:

Attached for your

records is the report of the

special panel which was the

basis of the briefing by

Dr. Land at the NSC meeting

on August 25.

die

G. . Kistakowsky

‘fri

•
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

REPORT OF A SPECIAL PANEL ON

SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

•

August 23. 1960

The concept of an artificial satellite orbiting around the earth has '

been associated, from the outset, with the thought that such a vehicle could

be used to maintain a continuous reconnaissance and surveillance over any

desired part of the globe. The original plan was to install a kind of

television camera in the satellite and to transmit its images by radio

techniques to a ground station where the signals would be reassembled into

a photograph. With such equipment, a systematic search was to be made

of the Eurasian land mass for airfields and other military installation.

large enough to be detected with the limited resolving power of such a system.

By repeated observations it was hoped that changes would be detected with

sufficient reliability to provide warning of imminent attack.

The appeal of this fundamentally straightforward approach lies in its

relative political unobtrusiveness; in the apparent power of television

techniques for making observations almost initantly available; in the prolonged utilisation of satellites in their orbits; and in the freedom from the

logistic intricacies of recovery techniques. At first sight, this "electronic

readout" appears to be the fully modern approach to reconnaissance. It has

deserved, and indeed bas bad the most careful study. As a result, we have

now arrived at a clear understanding of the technological problems which

remain to be solved. The initial SAMOS development project was aimed at

the electronic solution of these problem.; we shall shortly discuss the

difficulties.

Several years ago, it was realised that orbiting satellites might be used

for•Lhe detection of ballistic missile attack in a much simpler and more

direct method than television or photographic observation. While the hostile

missile is being launched, its engine is a very powerful source of infrared

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radiation, and this radiation can be detected, above the atmosphere, from

satellites many hundred miles away. The exploitation of this early-warning

scheme is going forward as Project MIDAS; it has been separated from the

TOCOZMILissaace project (SAMOS) and will not be discussed further in this

. paper. As a consequence of this separate development, the warning function

is no longer a primary requirement/or SAMOS.

Meanwhile, a much more urgent reconnaissance need has been pointed

out by the U. S. Intelligence Board. The overriding intelligence requirement

at the present time is information on the operational status of Soviet missile

launch sites. This requires photographs of very high resolution—high enough

to enable a skilled photo•interpreter to recognise and identify the objects of

interest in a missile launch site.

The exact resolution performance required for this purpose need not be

discussed here. Its technical specification is complicated and often controversia

One must realise, for example, that a system which will resolve 20 feet on

the ground will not permit a photo-interpreter to describe an object 20 feet

in length.

Up to now, there has been only one source for high-resolution photographs

of the Soviet missile installations, and that source has been eliminated with •

the grounding of the U. 2 aircraft. -Can we substitute a satellite as the

observing vehicle and obtain comparable results? More specifically, can we

look to SAMOS to yield results of the necessary quality within a short time?

Unfortunately, as far as electronic readout is concerned, the answer is

NO.

The essence of the problem is that a photograph which contains the .

amount of detail that is required to know the state of readiness and kind of

activity at a missile site must be made up of a fantastically large number of

bits of information--a number so large that there is not time enough to transmit

all of these bits of information from satellites to earth while the satellite is

over our own or friendly territory. It is to be expected during the next ten

years that the elaboration of satellite technology, the ease of keeping many

satellites in orbit, and improvements in our electronic arts, will ultimately

snake it feasible electrically to transmit detailed information about a given

on the earth. But what we must emphasise here today is that t is not

feasible now, and it is not likely to be feasible intime to give our country the

kind of reconnaissance it needs at once,. Therefore, while we recommend

continued research on these electronic readout programs, and the occasional
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orbital flights which are now planned, we must warn that we cannot rely on

the electronic readout approach for military purposes and urge that higher

operational priority be given to other Air Force developments which we are

about to discuss.

Physical recovery, in the air or in the sea, of a satellite that has cam?

plated a number of revolution. in orbit has become feasible. The improvement

of recovery techniques is going forward in the DISCOVERER project. One

can therefore consider the possibility of using advanced photographic

techniques which are capable of very high resolution, and of recovering the

exposed photographic film on or near the surface of the earth. The subsequent

processing and evaluation of the film can then be performed under the same

favorable conditions that are used in the best aerial photography.

While this approach may superficially appear clumsy and pedestrian

when compared with electronic readout, a detailed analysis will show its

performance to be distinctly superior in providing the kind of detailed information that is required for the study of operational missile sites. In fact,

we are convinced that this primary objective of satellite reconnaissance can

be realized most promptly and most effectively by the physical recovery of

film exposed in a high-resolution convergent stereo camera system. The

principles and techniques of this kind of photography are now well understood..

Therefore, if timely action is taken, we can expect to have an adequate

photographic payload by the time we have mastered the techniques for recovery.

Time is short. We should acquire information on Soviet missile launch

sites while they are under construction, in order to counter the deception and

concealment that can be used in a completed site. It will take a year and a

hark at best to fill the present gap in our reconnaissance ability. And we can

expect useful performance in 1962 only if we clearly establish high resolution

photography as the first goal of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program.

We are not unmindful of other objectives associated with SAMOS.

Photographic surveys of broad areas, in which extensive coverage is obtained

at the expense of reduced resolving power, have important uses. The detection and recording of electromagnetic transmissions by means of the

proposed "F" payloads will provide valuable information, espedslly in areas

of technical intelligence, of new aspects in communication links, in missile

defense systems, in navigational aids.

But we do not consider these objectives comparable is importance to

the task of getting, at the earliest possible date, high-resolution photographs

that will provide information about the operational status of missile sites, with

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detail nearly as good as that from the 17•2. We therefore recommend a

carefully planned program, with simplified management, and with primary

emphasis ens

High resolution stereo photography

Recovery techniques

Mindful of the urgency of this need for detailed photography, the Air

Force has greatly modified the initial SAMOS development plan. A number

of well conceived photographic recovery systems are now under study and

evaluation. These designs fall into two distinct categories:

A system to achieve maximum coverage with ground resolution

adequate to identify missile sites under construction, and

A system 'capable of photographing a large number of selected

installations with the higher resolution required for evaluation

of the operational status of a missile site.

We are convinced that with straightforward good management in the utilization

of components and technology now potentially available, the first of these .

systems could be placed in operation by late 1962; the higher resolution system

becoming operational about one year later. We therefore urge a resolute

concentration of effort on these two systems and a clear decision to assign

to this task a higher priority than to all other aspects together of the 'SAMOS •

program.

Since we must now rely upon the physical retrieval of satellite photographs

it is necessary that increased efforts be made to improve the reliability of .

recovery techniques. Recent achievements in the DISCOVERER program

are most encouraging. An alternative procedure, unproven operationally.

but most appealing in concept, involves the WM of a drag brake mechanism

to effect reentry. The applicability of this technique to the SAMOS recovery

operation should receive serious consideration.

Until recently, the operational aspects of recovery have been greatly

complicated by the obvious requirement for safety to restrict these activities

to the ocean areas. As a result of our increased confidence in the precision

of the recovery operation, the Air Force isnow studying the feasibilit y of .

effecting recovery oiter...land. Since this would signincamuy increase me

•
•

•

probability of success of the recovery operation, we heartily recommend

the supplies st Air Pewee alerts in this saga.

PROCESSING AND EVALUATION

The reconnaissance "take" of the proposed systems is recovered as

a set of latent images on photographic film. The intelligence yield that will

be extracted from these latent images is critically dependent on quality

factors in the chemical processing of the film and in the subsequent analysis

and interpretation of the finished photographs. We cannot emphasise too

strongly that much of the detailed information captured in the latent image

can be irretrievably lost unless first-rate work is done in the processing

laboratory and in the interpretation center.

In the purely technical domain, we must point out that the achievement

of optimism image-quality calls for the closest possible interaction between

individuals concerned with emulsion design and manufacture and individuals

concerned with processing techniques. If these two activities were to be

organised as separate and independent enterprises it is most unlikely, in our,

view, that the results would be the best obtainable.

A full awareness of these factors led to the special organisation of

processing and evaluation that was used in the handling of the U-2 films. Our

experience with the superior results obtained under that arrangement leads

us to recommend firmly that the same pattern be followed in preparing the

outpit of the proposed satellite reconnaissance systems. We further recommend

that this output be distributed by a centralised community laboratory.

WEATHER 

In aerial photo-reconnaissance operations, the state of the weather over

the target has long been a primary consideration. For satellite reconnaissance

operations, the sensitivity to weather is in some respects even worse. If

the target is obscured by clouds on.the first pass, the satellite may have

later opportunities to observe the target. But the times of subsequent passes

over the target are fixed by the orbit parameters. and the situation is less.

flexible than the scheduling of aircraft. Moreover, the weather over the

great majority of Soviet targets is very bad indeed. and the opportunities for

good photography are scarce,

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The program outlined in this discussion can succeed only if it is

closely integrated with the weather services that will be associated with

the TIROS project, with the Air Force' system, and with other

sources of weather data that may come into existence. Because of the short

reaction intervals that are necessary here, these arrangements will be

difficult to establish, and we recommend early attention to planning.

•

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our analysis of the investigations already carried out by the Air Force

leads us to the conclusion that from the array of important sutides a few

can now be extracted and integrated into a single simple and powerful •

program to give us the reconnaissance we need. Therefore, our recommendation is that the following selected components of the Air Force satellite

reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very high

priority.

A recoverable satellite-payload for high resolution coo.

vergent stereo photography.

To be recovered for the time being at sea.

To be recovered as soon as feasible on land.

To carry in some of the satellites camera and film

competent to identify with certainty missile sites both

in construction and after completion.

5. To carry in other satellites camera and film competent

to study the state of readiness, type of activity, and type

of missiles.

We recommend emphasis on the development of more advanced recovery techniques, particularly for land recovery.

We recommend that electronic readout techniques be given lower

pri:rity but be continued as a research project and that the extensive

program for a ground-based electronic readout system be cut back very

substantially and promptly.
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Also, the so-called "F" payloads for gathering electromagnetic intelligence should be given lower priority than that assigned to photography.

We further recommend that this program be managed with the

directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great success,

for projects of overriding priority. We suggest that this can best be

accomplished by a direct line of aornmand from the Secretary of the Air

Force to the general officer in operational charge of the whole . program,

with appropriate boards of scientific advisers to both the secretarial level

and to the operational level. The general officer in command would look

to *associated military boards for support in the execution of his plans. We

recommend this extraordinary type of organisation to execute the program

because we are convinced that the situation presents an unusual combination

of urgency and inherent amenability to a direct approach.

In addition, we recommend that the same organisation as was used in

the handling of the U-2 films be used for chemical processing of the recovered

film and that the output be distributed by • central community facility.

We also recommend that this program be closely integrated with the

weather services that will be associated with the TIROS project, with USAFIs

stem sad other sources of weather data.

PANEL ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

Dr. Edwin Ii. Land ) ChILIZUNII

Dr. William 0. Baker

Mr. Richard Bissell

Dr. Carl F. J. Overhage

Dr. Edward IC Purcell

Dr. Z. R. Killian, Jr. )