HE~TTQRNEY GENERAL 

-XAS 

Honorable Doug Crouch 

District Attorney 

Tarrant County 

Fort Worth, Texas 

Dear Mr. Crouch: 

Opinion No. c-712 

Re: In the interpretation of the 

meaning of the term "nonresident", as same is used in Art. 

6687b, Vernon's civil Statutes, 

Sec. 3, paragraph 3, is there 

a presumption, rebuttable or 

otherwise, that a member of the 

armed forces of the United 

States, who has been required 

by his military duties to reside in the State of Texas for 

a period of more than 90 days, iis no longer a "nonresident"? 

In your recent letter requesting the opinion of this 

office concerning the above captioned inquiry, you state the 

following: 

"In recent months there has arisen in Tarrant County, 

a question of law which affects all of the police, prosecution 

and judicial agencies. The question involves the roper construction to be placed on the re uisites 

ing to the necessity of an indiv 9 dual who d-or veof Art. 6%87b pertainhicle to be licensed br the State of Texas. More sneclffcallv. 

the question involves the interpretation of the exemption pro-* 

visions of Par, 3, Set, 3, Art. 6687b as applied to persons 

who are members of the local military establishment, Carswell 

Air Force Base in Fort Worth, Texas,. 

"It seems that a custom has developed by which a 

person who is a member of the military establishment is con- 

-3434- 
Honorable Doug Crouch, page 2 (C-712) 

sidered to be a,resident of the State of Texas after he 

has resided in this state for a period of 90 days, and that 

after such time, he is not exempt from the licensing requirements of the State of Texas even though he may hold a 

valid operator's license issued by his home state. The rule 

of thumb has apparently been enforced without regard to whether the soldier is married or single or whether he resides 

on a military reservation or elsewhere." 

You thereafter ask the following question: 

"In the interpretation of the meaning of the term 

'nonresident", as the term is used in Art. 6687b, V.A. 

T.S., Sec. 3, Par.,Q, is there a presumption, rebumle 

or otherwise, that a member of the Armed Forces of the 

United States who has been required by his military 

duties to reside in the State of Texas for a period of 

more than 90 days, is no longer a 'nonresident'?" 

We have concluded that a negative answer must be 

given to the question posed. 

Paragraph 3, Section 3 of the Article 6687b, Vernonls 

Civil Statutes, makes the following exemption: 

"A nonresident who is at least sixteen (16) years of 

age and who has in his immediate possession a valid 

operator's license issued to him in his home State may 

operate,!a motor vehicle in this State only as an operator 

e . . . 

Section 1 (p) of the statute merely defines the term 

"nonresident" as used therein as 

sident of this State." 

"Every person who is not a reThe statute fails to give any definition of the meaning of "Resident," 

In determining the meaning of such terms as used in 

the particular statute, we must examine the context in which 

they are employed in that the terms have no fixed, exact meaning in the law. They may have a variety of meanings, depending 

upon the context in which they are employed as well a~st'he subject matter and purposes involved. 25 Am.Jur.2d 7, Domlcil, 

4; Switzerland Gen. Ins. Co. v. Gulf Ins, Co., 213 S.W.2d 161 

Sec. 

il$X,E'.'.App- IgYtl, error dism.); ~Hughes v. Illinois Public 

authorities 

tit a 

., 2 Ill,2d 374, 1.18 !ltiE,2d 14 (1954), and 

e . 

In view of the context in which the terms "resident" 

and "non-resident" are employed in the vehfele licensing statute 9 

-343.52 
Honorable Doug Crouch, page 3 (C-712) 

we have concluded that the terms should be construed in their 

natural and usual sense, 

as distinguished from a 

referring to the concept of a "domicil" 

"mere temporary residence." A "nonresident" is referring to one whose domicil is in his "home" 

state, and a "resident" is one whose domicil is in Texas, as 

distinguished from having a mere temporary residence in Texas. 

The statute expressly states that the "nonresident" has an 

"operator's license issued to him in his home state." Hence, 

the term "resident" is used synonymously m mcil". 25 

Am.Jur.2d P-10, Domicil, Sets. 6 and 7. 

Under the facts submitted, we find no statutory authority to support the existence of any legal presumption that a 

serviceman required to reside in the state for a period of ninety 

days or more is no longer a 

the statute. Therefore, 

"nonresident" within the meaning of 

the question is controlled by the general law and common law decisions app1icable thereto. 

Virtually all of the authorities, not only $n Texas 

but elsewhere, hold that the law is settled that a,person in 

the military service is presumed to retain his domicil in the 

state from which he was"lnducted. The presumption is rebuttable 

and continues only unti$ such tlme'as he effectively abandons it 

and establishes a new domicil elsewhere. 21 A.L.R.2d 1163, 1180, 

Sec. 13; 25 Am.Jur.2d 29-30, Domicil, Sec. 39; Jones v. Jones, 

176 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943); Wilson v. W3%on, ltrm.2d 

212 (Tex.Civ.App. 1945); pippin v.~ Pipp$n, 193 S W 2d 236 (Tex. 

Civ.App. 1946); Lewis v. Lewis, m S . W e 2 d 277 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949); 

Klingler v. Klingler, 254 S W.2d 817 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953); Postle 

v. 08 e, . W * 2d 633 (Tex.Civ.App. 1955). 

The general rule dealing with the question of residence in the sense of domicil is summarized in 21 Tex.Jur.2d 

60-74, Domicil, and at Sec. 9, pg. 69, the law with respect 

to service personnel is stated as follows: 

"Although the fact that one is a soldier or 

sailor does not deprive him of the right to change 

his residence or domicil and acquire a new one, he 

does not acquire a new one merely by virtue of being 

stationed at a particular place in the line of duty. 

His domicil remains the same as that which he had 

when he entered the service, unless he shows a change 

by proof of clear and unequivocal intention. F'urthermore, the ordinary presumption that the place where a 

person actually lives is his domicil does not arise 

in the case of a ioldier in active service. This spe- 

-3436- 

,.,* 
Honorable Doug Crouch, page 4 (C-712) 

cial rule is based on the fact that a soldier's 

removal to another state is not voluntary, and his 

physical presence is likewise not necessarily voluntary, for he moves in pursuance to military orders." 

It is abundantly clear from the above cited texts 

and authorities that no hard and fast rule can be formulated 

with respect to the serviceman's domicil or residence status. 

Each case must be decided upon the peculiar facts presented 

with reference to objective evidence to support the serviceman's intention. Normally, his mere residence, together with 

family, on a military installation is insufficient to show a 

domicil within the State. 

It is therefore our opinion that: 

1. The term "resident" as used in Article 6687b, 

V.C.S., means "domicil" and the term "nonresident" as used in 

the statute refers to one who has his "domicil" elsewhere than 

in the State of Texas; 

2. MO legal presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, 

exists in Texas that a member of the armed forces of, the Wnited 

States, required by his military duties to live in Texas for a 

period of more than ninety days, is no longer a nonresident, as 

that term is used in Section 3, paragraph 3 of Article 6687b; 

3. There is a rebuttable presumption that such a 

person in the military service retained his domicil in the 

State from which he was inducted until such time R.S he is 

shown by clear snd WEquivoCal proof to have effectively abandoned it and established a domicfl elsewhere, 

SUMMARY 

The term "resident" as used in Article 6687b, V.C,S., 

means "domicil" and the term "nonresident" as used in the statute 

refers to one who has his "domicil" elsewhere than in the State 

of Texas; 

No legal presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, exists 

in Texas that a member of the armed forces of the United States, 

required by his military duties to live in Texas for a period 

of more than ninety days, is no longer a nonresident as that 

term is used in Section 3> paragraph 3 of Article 66&b; 

There is a rebuttable presumption that such a person 

in the military service retained his domicil in the State from 

which he was inducted until such time as he is shown by clear 

and unequivocal proof to have effectively abandoned it and 

-3437- 
Honorable Doug Crouch, page 5 (C-712) 

established a domicil elsewhere. 

Yours very truly, 

Waggoner Carr 

Attorney General 

By: 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

W. V. Geppert, Chairman 

Philllp Crawford 

w. 0. Schultz 

Ralph Rash 

Gordon Cass 

REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

By: T. B. Wright 

-3438-