UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-1128

KATHLEEN GARROW,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

ECONOMOS PROPERTIES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Walter D. Kelley, Jr.,

District Judge. (4:04-cv-00067-WDK)

Argued: May 24, 2007 Decided: July 11, 2007

Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Ann Katherine Sullivan, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, P.L.C.,

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Kevin E. Martingayle, STALLINGS

& BISCHOFF, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Melissa Morris Picco, CRENSHAW, WARE & MARTIN, P.L.C.,

Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Cara L. Griffith, STALLINGS &

BISCHOFF, P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

This appeal arises from an employment discrimination action

brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000(e)) et seq. (“Title VII”). Plaintiff-Appellant Kathleen

Garrow (“Garrow”) alleges that her employer, the Omni Hotel of

Newport News (“Omni” or “hotel”), owned by Defendant-Appellee

Economos Properties (“Economos”), terminated her on the basis of

sex. Finding that Garrow fails to present a prima facie case of

discrimination, we affirm.

I.

As always on a motion for summary judgment, we recite the

facts in the light most favorable to Garrow, the non-movant. See

Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234, 237 (4th Cir. 1995). Nicholas

Economos (“Nick”) and his brother Dennis Economos (“Dennis”) are

the principal owners of Economos Properties. Garrow was employed

by Economos in several positions, beginning as the Sales Manager

for the Omni in Newport News, Virginia in 1994. She left the

company in 1997 but returned in 1999 as the Director of Sales and

Marketing. At that time, Garrow became a member of the hotel’s

executive team and reported directly to its General Manager. Nick

Economos resides in Florida and delegates the day-to-day operations

of the hotel to the General Manager. In 2001, Lee Severino
3

(“Severino”) became General Manager and Garrow reported directly to

him.

Severino allegedly made a variety of hostile comments to and

about women during Garrow’s time under his management. For

example, he told Randy Kornegay, a male employee with no

housekeeping experience, who was promoted to Executive Housekeeper,

that “employees would respect a man before a woman.” J.A. 10, 260.

Severino also called women “cackling hens,” “whining women,” and

“balls and chains,” in a work context and during meetings. J.A.

10, 261, 270-74, 277, 287-88, 291, 553. He called one employee a

“tired old bat” and another a “lazy black bitch.” J.A. 10. He

also commented that only men could obtain business from women.

Despite these circumstances, it is undisputed that Garrow performed

at a high level during her tenure at Omni, as evidenced by the

revenue growth in her department and her promotion to the executive

team upon her return to the company. 

The sequence of events that culminated in Garrow’s termination

began when her husband was given the opportunity by his employer to

transfer to Florida. Garrow discussed with Nick the possibility of

becoming the General Manager of one of the Florida hotels. To

facilitate such a transfer, Garrow began training as an “Assistant

General Manager” at the Omni in Virginia while continuing to

perform her duties as Director of Sales and Marketing at the same

time. She was never formally promoted, nor did she receive a raise
4

in pay. Also during this period, Garrow trained a female employee

in the marketing department, Cheryl Johnson, in certain job skills

transferable to the Director of Sales and Marketing position. 

In 2002 and 2003, Nick Economos became concerned about the

hotel’s financial performance, especially in light of the

increasing conflict in Iraq. The previous Iraq war in 1991 had

caused significant financial problems for the hotel. Nick had

conversations about reducing costs at the hotel with Dennis and

Severino, and Severino made several proposals regarding labor

costs. Nick instructed Severino, whose job description included

managing payroll and personnel matters, to “do whatever is

necessary at your discretion [to get] those numbers . . . in line.”

J.A. 241. On February 14, 2003, Nick directed Severino to take

certain personnel actions to cut costs, and a list of the personnel

to be affected was created. This list has since been destroyed.

Nick made the decision to terminate Garrow at this time, according

to his testimony, because he was aware that she was planning to

leave the hotel to follow her husband to Florida. On February 14,

immediately following the conference call with Nick, Severino

called Garrow to terminate her. 

A month after her termination, Garrow filed a charge with the

EEOC. After completing the administrative process, she sued

Economos in June 2004 in the Eastern District of Virginia for

violating Title VII. The district court dismissed her suit for
5

failure to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. It is

her timely appeal that is before us. 

II.

We turn now to the question of whether the district court

properly granted summary judgment to Economos on Garrow’s

discrimination claim. Summary judgment is appropriate only when

“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247

(1986). Summary judgment will be granted if the nonmoving party

“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Nguyen, 44 F.3d at

236.

We evaluate Title VII discrimination cases under a unique

framework at the summary judgment stage. A plaintiff may prove her

case in one of two ways: (1) by offering direct evidence of

discrimination under the ordinary standards of proof, or (2) under

the system of shifting evidentiary burdens established by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d
6

310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005). Because Garrow does not proffer direct

evidence of discrimination, we utilize the McDonnell Douglas

paradigm. 

The parameters of the McDonnell Douglas framework vary

somewhat depending on the type of discrimination that is alleged,

but all plaintiffs must first allege a prima facie case of

discrimination. To do so, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she is

a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action; (3) her performance met the employer’s

legitimate expectations at the time of the alleged adverse action;

and (4) the position in question either remained open or “was

filled by [a] similarly qualified applicant[] outside the protected

class.” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 354 F.3d 277, 285

(4th Cir. 2004). 

Here, it is uncontested that Garrow satisfies the first three

elements of the prima facie case. First, she is a woman, and

therefore a member of a protected class. Second, she clearly

suffered an adverse employment action when she was terminated from

her job at Economos. Third, Economos does not contest that Garrow

was an exemplary performer. It is the fourth and final prong of

the prima facie case, that the position remain open or be filled by

an individual outside the protected class, that prevents us from

allowing this case to proceed. 
1The district court assumed that Garrow’s position was the

Assistant General Manager position and based its analysis on this

fact. The Assistant General Manager position was not filled after

Garrow left the company. Even assuming that Garrow was not the

Assistant General Manager, as she argues, and was the Director of

Sales and Marketing, as we accept above, she still is not able to

satisfy the prima facie case. 

7

It is uncontested that Garrow’s position of Director of Sales

and Marketing was filled by Cheryl Johnson after Garrow was

terminated.1

 It is correct, as Garrow argues, that Johnson was not

officially promoted until after Garrow filed suit against Economos.

However, Johnson had been trained to fulfill the responsibilities

of the Director of Sales and Marketing position before Garrow left

the company. Johnson also began performing the duties of the

Director of Sales and Marketing position before she was officially

promoted. Garrow’s position therefore neither remained open nor

was filled by a person outside the protected class. Because Garrow

cannot present a prima facie case of discrimination, we need not
2Out of an apparent abundance of caution, the district court

analyzed Garrow’s dismissal as occurring as part of a reduction in

force (“RIF”) at the hotel, and Garrow argues this point on appeal.

This is significant because if we are confronted with allegations

of discrimination within the context of a reduction in force, we do

not apply the McDonnell Douglas framework as articulated in Hill,

354 F.3d at 285. In the RIF context, our framework for analysis is

modified. See Dugan v. Albemarle County School Bd., 293 F.3d 716

(4th Cir. 2002). 

We decline, however, to pursue this line of analysis, for two

reasons. First, the focus of Garrow’s complaint is on her

individual claim. Although she refers to the treatment of other

women by Severino, she appears to do so in the context of alleging

that Economos’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual. As

noted above, because Garrow fails to set forth a prima facie case,

we do not reach the question of pretext. Further, we find there to

be insufficient evidence that Garrow’s termination occurred as part

of a RIF. It is clear that Nick and Severino were both aware that

Garrow’s husband had accepted a job in Florida, and Garrow herself

had asked about the possibility of transferring to another hotel.

There is no evidence that Garrow’s termination was connected to any

of the other personnel actions taken by Economos, other than the

fact that they shared the common goal of reducing costs at the

hotel. The fact that Garrow was named on a “list” that also

included the demotions of other employees is not sufficient to

allege a RIF. 

8

reach her allegations of pretext.2 Therefore, we hold that summary

judgment was properly granted to Economos on this claim.

III.

 Because Garrow fails to make a prima facie case of

discrimination, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is

AFFIRMED.