J-S04006-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

EFRAIN GONZALEZ-PADILLA,

Appellant No. 744 MDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 3, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0001755-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, ALLEN, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2015

Efrain Gonzalez-Padilla appeals from the April 3, 2014 order denying 

him PCRA relief. We affirm. 

On August 8, 2012, Appellant was found guilty of possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver. We summarize the facts 

underlying Appellant’s conviction of the offense in question. At 

approximately 11:30 p.m. on November 1, 2011, Sergeant Brett Hopkins, 

Detective Ryan Mong, and Detective Adam Saul, all of whom were assigned 

to the Lebanon County Drug Task Force, were conducting an undercover 

investigation of the 9th and Mifflin Street area in Lebanon City. The 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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operation was initiated in response to complaints about open-air drug 

dealing. 

Sergeant Hopkins was in plain clothes and was standing on the corner 

of 9th and Mifflin Streets, which were lit by streetlights, when Appellant 

nodded at him. Detectives Mong and Saul were observing the interaction 

from a vehicle. Sergeant Hopkins approached Appellant and said that he 

wanted to purchase $50 worth of cocaine. He handed Appellant prerecorded currency consisting of two twenty-dollar bills and two five-dollar 

bills. 

Appellant crossed the street, spoke with a group of men, returned to 

Sergeant Hopkins, and told him that he would have to wait for the cocaine. 

After about one-half hour, Appellant motioned for the officer to follow him 

onto Partridge Street, a dark alley. After arriving in a secluded area, 

Appellant handed Sergeant Hopkins a knotted plastic bag containing what 

appeared to be crack cocaine. A chemical field test of the substance 

confirmed that the substance was cocaine. 

After the transaction, Appellant left the alley. Sergeant Hopkins 

radioed the other detectives to arrest Appellant and provided a description. 

Appellant was apprehended by Detectives Mong and Saul immediately 

thereafter. At the scene, Sergeant Hopkins identified Appellant as the male 

who sold him the crack cocaine. Police testified that they recovered two 

five-dollar bills from Appellant, and the bills matched the serial numbers of 

the two five-dollar bills used as the buy money by Sergeant Hopkins. 
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After his conviction, Appellant was sentenced on September 26, 2012, 

to two to four years imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal, but 

he did file a timely PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed, and after a 

hearing, relief was denied. Appellant presents these issues on appeal from 

the denial of PCRA relief. 

A. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct 

appeal as requested by defendant?

B. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to crossexamine the police officer regarding the denomination of 

currency found on defendant’s person at the of arrest where 

[the] testimony differed from [the police] report?

Appellant’s brief at 4. 

Initially, we outline the applicable principles regarding our review of 

the PCRA court’s determinations herein: 

 An appellate court reviews the PCRA court's findings of fact to 

determine whether they are supported by the record, and reviews 

its conclusions of law to determine whether they are free from 

legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of the 

PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level.

Commonwealth v. Freeland, 2014 WL 6982658, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). “The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding” for purposes of appellate review. 

Commonwealth v. Watkins, 2014 WL 7392224, 3 (Pa. 2014). 

Additionally,

To establish trial counsel's ineffectiveness, a petitioner 

must demonstrate: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; 

(2) counsel had no reasonable basis for the course of action or 
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inaction chosen; and (3) counsel's action or inaction prejudiced 

the petitioner. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Commonwealth v. 

Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).

Freeland supra 2014 WL 6982658 at 4. 

Appellant initially argues that he should have been afforded PCRA relief 

in the form of an appeal nunc pro tunc since “Defendant expressly requested 

Trial Counsel to file an appeal on his behalf. However, Trial Counsel failed to 

do so.” Appellant’s brief at 7. We observe that counsel is deemed ineffective 

per se if counsel fails to file an appeal requested by a defendant, and, in 

such circumstance, a defendant is automatically entitled to reinstatement of 

his appellate rights. Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1999). 

The PCRA court, however, expressly rejected Appellant’s testimony at 

the PCRA hearing that he asked trial counsel to file a direct appeal. The 

PCRA court concluded that trial counsel credibly testified that Appellant did 

not ask him to file an appeal. The PCRA court noted that trial counsel stated 

at the PCRA hearing that he had a specific recollection of discussing the 

matter with Appellant after Appellant expressed unhappiness at sentencing. 

Counsel told Appellant that the jury verdict was unassailable and that the 

sentence was the only viable issue to appeal. Appellant then responded that 

he did not want to appeal his two-year sentence. 

Counsel also testified that after he received Appellant’s sentencing 

order, he sent Appellant a copy of it with a cover letter, written in Spanish, 

which explained Appellant’s appellate rights. Although Appellant stated at 
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the PCRA hearing that he sent a letter to counsel asking for an appeal, 

counsel testified that he never received a letter from Appellant requesting a 

direct appeal. Counsel further testified that, if he had received such a letter 

from Appellant, he would have filed an appeal. The trial court specifically 

found trial counsel’s testimony to be credible. Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/14, 

at 9. 

The record supports the trial court’s decision to credit trial counsel’s 

testimony that Appellant did not request a direct appeal instead of 

Appellant’s contrary testimony. That credibility determination therefore is 

binding on this Court. In light of this credibility determination, we must 

conclude that an appeal was not requested and that the PCRA court correctly 

denied reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights. Commonwealth 

v. Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706 (Pa.Super. 2011). 

Appellant’s second contention is that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance in failing to explore the fact that there was an 

inconsistency between the trial testimony, wherein police indicated that they 

recovered the two pre-recorded five-dollar bills from Appellant at the time of 

his arrest, and the police report, which stated that a ten-dollar bill was found 

on Appellant. As noted by the PCRA court, trial counsel was aware of this 

discrepancy. The assistant district attorney had informed trial counsel that 

the reference to a $10.00 bill in the police report was a typographical error, 

and that the officers actually recovered the two five-dollar bills that were 
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entered into evidence as exhibits. After consideration of the facts, 

argument, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief as to this 

allegation based upon pages nine through twelve of the trial court opinion 

authored on June 17, 2014 by the Honorable Bradford H. Charles. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/28/2015
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ENTE~N[)"FHElCOURT OF COMMON PLEAS LEBANON COUNTY 

PENNSYLVANIA 

lOI~ JUN ! 8 P 3: Oll 

CRIMINAL DIVISION 

CLERK OF COUli- LtBAN(l~1. Pt. 

COMMONWEALTH OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

v. 

EFRAIN GONZALEZ·PADILLA 

APPEARANCES 

NO. CP·38·CR·1755·2011 

Nichole Eisenhart, Esquire For Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 

Erin Zimmerer, Esquire For Efrain Gonzalez·Padilia 

MONTGOMERY & ZIMMERER 

OPINION BY CHARLES, J., June 17, 2014 

Efrain Gonzalez·Padilia (hereafter "DEFENDANT") filed a Petition 

for Post-Conviction Relief (PCRA) on September 13, 2013, alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial held on August 8, 2012. 

After hearing testimony from DEFENDANT, his trial counsel, and the 

arresting officers, we concluded that DEFENDANT's arguments simply 

had no merit. We therefore denied hi~ Petiti~n 'on Ap~iI ~,2014. For the . ., 

reasons that follow, we affirm our decision to deny DEFENDANT's PCRA 

Petition. 

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I. FACTS 

On November 1, 2011 around 11 :30 p.m., Sergeant Brett Hopkins, 

Detective Ryan Mong, and Detective' Adam Saul of the Lebanon County 

Drug Task Force Were conducting an undercover investigation of the 9th 

and Mifflin Street area in Lebanon City in response to complaints about 

open air drug dealing. (8/8/2012 N.T. 17). Sgt. Hopkins was standing on 

the northwest corner of 9th and Mifflin Streets across from the Liberty 

Bar in civilian clothes when DEFENDANT nodded to him from across the 

street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 17). Det. Mong and Det. Saul remained in the 

vehicle as surveillance officers. Sgt. Hopkins crossed the street and told 

DEFENDANT that he was looking for $50.00 worth of "hard". (8/8/2012 

N.T. 17). DEFENDANT asked in broken English, "rock?" (8/8/2012 N.T. 

17-18). Sgt. Hopkins replied, "Yes," and DEFENDANT requested money. 

(8/8/2012 N.T. 18-19). 

Sgt. Hopkins explained at trial that the officers typically photocopy 

and pre-record the serial numbers of each of the bills they intend to use 

for their undercover purchases. They do so in the event that they are 

able to recover the buy money within a short period of time after the 

undercover sale so that they can link the sale to the defendant. 

(8/8/2012 N.T. 19). Exhibit 3 at trial identified the photograph of the 

$50.00 that Sgt. Hopkins possessed the night of November 1,2011. This 

$50.00 consisted of two $20.00 bills and two $5.00 bills. 

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After Sgt. Hopkins gave DEFENDANT the pre-recorded buy money, 

DEFENDANT crossed the street and began speaking with a group of 

men. (8/8/2012 N.T. 21). He returned fifteen minutes later and informed 

sgt. Hopkins that he would have to wait another 20 minutes. (8/8/2012 

N.T.21). When he returned, he motioned for Sgt. Hopkins to follow him 

west on Mifflin Street to Partridge Street - a nearby dark alley. 

(8/8.12012 N. T. 21-22).. After· traveling; south on Partridge Street, 

DEFENDANT handed Sgt. Hopkins a knotted plastic bag containing what 

Sgt. Hopkins suspected to be crack cocaine. (8/8/2012 N.T. 22). 

DEFENDANT torE) open the bag and sprinkled the substance into Sgt. 

Hopkins' hand. (8/8/2012 N.T. 22). A chemical field test of the 

substance confirmed the presence of cocaine. 

A local bar is located at the 9th and Mifflin Street intersection, and 

there were several people walking around in the area. (8/8/2012 N.T. 

26). However, there are several streetlights in front of the bar, and Sgt. 

Hopkins explained at t(ial that the lighting at the corner of 9th and Mifflin 

Streets was very good -at the time he was ·interacting With' DEFENDANT. 

(8/8/2012 N.T. 25). He explained that he was able to observe and talk to 

DEFENDANT for at least a half an hour. (8/8/2012 N.T. 25). Det. Mong 

explained that he was unable to identify DEFENDANT from his 

surveillance position while he was interacting with Sgt. Hopkins, but he 

was able to get a general idea of his clothing and build. (8/8/2012 N.T. 

30-31, 37). 

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After DEFENDANT provided Sgt. Hopkins with the cocaine, 

DEFEN DANT traveled south on Partridge Street and turned left onto 

Monument Street back towards 9th Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 24). Sgt. 

Hopkins immediately contacted the surveillance officers to describe 

DEFENDANT and his location. (8/8/2012 N.T. 24, 36). Det. Mong and 

Det. Saul were positioned in an area where they could observe 

DEFittiNDANJ.exit.MonumentStreet onto 9th Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 31); 

After the surveillance unit apprehended DEFENDANT and took him into 

custody, Sgt. Hopkins identified him as the same man who sold him 

cocaine on Partridge Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 18, 25). Similarly, Det. 

Mong identified the man he took into custody as the same individual who 

he saw walk down Mifflin Street with Sgt. Hopkins and then return into 

his field of view from Monument Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 37-38). Det. 

Mong testified that he did not see any other individuals in that area at 

the time DEFENDANT emerged from Monument Street. (8/8/2012 N.T. 

38). He explained that there was no possibility that he arrested any of 

the other rn-diliiduals on the ;street corner by mistake. (8/8/2:012N:-r.· 

38). 

After the officers arrested DEFENDANT, they transported him to 

Central Booking and searched him. (8/8/2012 N.T. 33). The officers 

recovered two $5.00 bills from DEFENDANT. These bills matched the 

serial numbers of the pre-recorded money that Sgt. Hopkins used to 

purchase the cocaine. (8/8/2012 N.T. 34). The police report mistakenly 

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states that the officers recovered a $10.00 bill from DEFENDANT. Prior 

to Trial, Assistant District Attorney Nichole Eisenhart spoke with 

DEFENDANT's trial counsel, Attorney John Gragson (hereafter "TRIAL 

COUNSEL"). She explained to him that the reference to a $10.00 bill in 

the police report was a typographical error, and that the officers actually 

recovered the two $5.00 bills entered as Exhibit 3. (4/3/2014 N.T. 15). 

As a res\Jlt of th~ abo've episode, DEFENDANT was charged with 

one count of -Delivery of a Controlled Substance and one count of 

PO'ssession of Drug Paraphernalia. On August 8, 2012, a jury found 

DEFENDANT guilty of Delivery of a Controlled Substance and not guilty 

of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. We imposed a sentence of 2-4 

years on DEFENDANT. At sentencing, when asked if he had anything to 

say, DEFENDANT responded with; [t]hat I am remorseful. That I am 

guilty." (8/8/2012 N.T. 3). DEFENDANT did not file an appeal. 

On September 13, 201.3, DEFENDANT filed a Petition for PostConviction Relief. After a Hearing on April 3, 2014, we concluded that 

DEFENDANT was not entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Relief 

Act, and we denied his Petition. DEFENDANT appealed to the Superior 

Court on May 1, 20.14. We author this Opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925 to address DEFENDANT's appeal. 

II. THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF ACT 

The Post-Conviction Relief Act (hereafter "PCRA") provides a 

process by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and 

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persons serving illegal sentences can obtain relief. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. 

The PCRA is the exclusive method by which collateral relief may be 

obtained in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242, 

1250 (Pa. 1999). To be eligible for relief, a PCRA defendant must prove 

the following elements by a preponderance of evidence: 

(1) That he has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this 

·:·; •. ,Common.w.ealth.and th.at he is serving a·sBntence for that crime; 

~ 

(2) That the conviction resulted from one of the enumerated errors 

listed in § 9543(a)(2) of the PCRA; 

(3) That the allegation of error has not previously been litigated or 

waived; and 

(4) That any failure to litigate the issue previously was not the result of 

a rational, strategic, or tactical decision by the Defendant or his 

counsel. 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543. 

When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised, 

additioMI principles apply'. Trial cciunsel is presum'ed :to b~ effective, ~nd . 

the Defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. 

Lewis, 708 A.2.d 497, 500 (Pa.Super. 1998); Commonwealth v. Williams, 

570 A.2d 75, 81 (Pa. 1990). In determining whether counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, the Court must first determine whether the issue 

underlying. the claim of ineffectiveness has even arguable merit. 

Commonwealth v. DiNicola, 751 A.2d 197, 198 (Pa.Super. 2000); 

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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 588 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Pa. 1991). If the 

. claim is without arguable merit, the Court's inquiry ends, as counsel will 

not be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless issue. Id. 

Even if the underlying claim is of arguable merit, the Defendant must 

establish that the course of action chosen by counsel had no reasonable 

basis designed to effectuate the Defendant's interest. Id. In addition, the 

Defendant must· also establish that but for counsel's deficient 

performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION 

DEFENDANT's PCRA Petition sets forth two allegations of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. DEFENDANT first argues that TRIAL 

COUNSEL was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal upon 

DEFENDANT's request. DEFENDANT also argues that TRIAL COUNSEL 

was ineffective for failing to properly cross examine and object to 

testimony regarding the officer's buy money. More specifically, 

DEFEN DANT stresses that the police recovered a $1.0.00 _ bill from him, 

,'-,:: .~'''~':''':~''., :",:,~-,' .~ .... -...... -.-. 

but the officer's buy money consisted of two $5.00 bills. After review of 

the record, we conclude that DEFENDANT's arguments have no merit. 

A. Failure to File a Direct Appeal 

At his PCRA Hearing, DEFENDANT explained that he wrote a letter 

to TRIAL COUNSEL asking him to file a direct appeal. (4/3/2014 N.T. 6-

7; Exhibit 1). He also explains that he spoke to TRIAL COUNSEL two 

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weeks prior to his trial about his interest in filing a direct appeal. 

(4/3/2014 N.T. 7). He therefore argues that because TRIAL COUNSEL 

failed to file his appeal, he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

TRIAL COUNSEL testified that he remembered DEFENDANT 

discussing hi's Post-Sentence' Motions and his desire to file an appeal 

prior to trial. (4/3/2014 N.T. 11-12). However, he also remembered 

spe.~~jngtoDEf=.E;NPANJ the.day oUria.!., WILen DEFENDANT indicated 

that he was dissatisfied with the verdict, TRIAL COUNSEL explained to 

him that he could not then appeal the jury verdict; he could only appeal 

the sentence. At that point, he asked DEFENDANT if he wanted to 

appeal. DEFENDANT indicated that he did not wish to appeal, and that 

he would accept the two year minimum sentence. (4/3/2014 N.T. 13-14). 

TRIAL COUNSEL also testified that when he received 

DEFENDANT's sentencing Order in the mail, he furnished it to 

DEFENDANT along with a letter written in Spanish indicating that he had 

10 days to file a Rule 720 Motion and 30 days to appeal. (4/3/2014 N.T. 

11-12;, Exhibit 2). i TRIAL COUNSEL explained that he never received a 

letter back from DEFENDANT, and had he received such a letter, he 

would have taken action. (4/3/2014N.T. 13). 

We find the testimony of TRIAL COUNSEL to be credible. It is' 

evident that TRIAL COUNSEL and DEFENDANT discussed the issue of 

an appeal on several occasions. TRIAL COUNSEL was clearly aware 

that DEFENDANT was considering filing an appeal. However, 

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DEFENDANT gave conflicting information regarding his desire to appeal. 

In part because of this conflicting information, TRIAL COUNSEL wrote 

and sent a letter to DEFENDANT advising him of his appeal options. 

DEFENDANT never responded .. All of the above suggests that TRIAL 

COUNSEL was ready and willing to file an appeal on DEFENDANT's 

behalf at his request. 

We conclude that TRIA.l COUNSEL never received instructions from 

DEFENDANT to appeal at or following his sentencing hearing. We find 

TRIAL COUNSEL's testimony on the appeal issue to be credible. We 

reject the credibility of DEFENDANT's. claim that he mailed a letter 

instructing TRIAL COUNSEL to appeal. Accordingly, DEFENDANT's first 

PCRA issue will be denied. 

B. Failure to Properly Cross Examine and Object to Buy Money 

DEFENDANT argues that the he was not carrying two $5.00 bills at 

the time of his arrest, and that the officers instead recovered a $10.00 

bill from him, as indicated in the police report. (4/3/2014 N.T. 8). He 

'.", ", ", .. 

notes that the marked money used by Sgt. Hopkins consisted of two 

$20.00 bills and two $5.00 bills, and therefore the fact that the officers 

may have recovered a $10.00 bill from DEFENDANT is significant 

because it indicates that Sgt. Hopkins may not have given DEFENDANT 

the buy money as he testified. TRIAL COUNSEL did not object to Det. 

Mong's testimony that he recovered two $5.00 bills from DEFENDANT's 

person, nor did he cross examine the officers on the inconsistency 

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between the police report and Det. Mong's testimony. Because of this, 

DEFENDANT argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

At the PCRA Hearing, TRIAL COUNSEL explained that he did not 

address the money denomination issue because he did not believe it had 

any merit. (4/3/2014 N.T. 14). He explained that Det. Mong testified that 

the officers recovered two $5:00 bills from DEFENDANT, and this 

te~tjmon.y.JD.i;ltGJleJ;LJh.eexbjb.it .tbatwasproduce.d. of th.e recorded money. 

(4/3/2014 N.T.15). TRIAL COUNSEL explained that in his experience, 

cross examination of a minor discrepancy such as the reference to a 

$10.00 bill in the police report "does not mean much to the jury." 

(4/3/2014 N.T. 17). Therefore, given all of the evidence, he explained 

that the better defense was that of mistaken identity. (4/3/2014 N.T. 16). 

While we find that TRIAL COUNSEL could have cross examined the 

police officers regarding the discrepancy, we conclude that such a line of 

questioning would have been pointless. We note that the detectives 

retained the money that was seized from DEFENDANT at the time of his 

arrest. The physical money seized remains in the detective's file today 

and a copy of the money seized from DEFENDANT at the time of his 

arrest was contained in the discovery packet that was turned over to 

defense counsel prior to trial. The file does not contain a $10.00 bill; it 

contains the two $5.00 bills with recorded serial numbers. Thus, 

physical evidence disclosed in discovery and available at trial supported 

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the Commonwealth's argument that recorded buy money was in the 

possession of DEFENDANT. 

It is true that Det. Mong's police report erroneously referenced a 

$10.00 bill instead of two $5.00 bills. It is also true that TRIAL 

COUNSEL could have attempted to impeach Det. Mong with the error in 

his report. However, Det. Mong discovered the error prior to trial and 

communicated it to the District Attorney's Office. The prosecutor then 

notified DEFENDANT prior to trial that the report narrative was 

inaccurate. We are confident that under these circumstances, the jury 

would have understood that sometimes typographical errors are made 

and would have viewed counsel's efforts to focus on this issue as little 

more than "grasping at straws." 

What is clear is that the money seized from DEFENDANT was 

retained as evidence. It was photocopied. The money was available for 

inspection by the jury. Making a big deal of the discrepancy in cash 

denominations would not have assisted DEFENDANT, and would have 

served only to reinforce for the jury the importance of the recorded buy 

money found in DEFENDANT's possession. 

We do not find TRIAL COUNSEL to be ineffectiv.e for failing to cross 

examine police regarding the discrepancy between the $10.00 mentioned 

in the police report and the $5.00 bills that were retained as physical 

evidence and clearly documented as the buy money seized from 

DEFENDANT. Even assuming, arguendo, that TRIAL COUNSEL could 

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somehow have been deemed negligent for failing to extensively crossexamine police regarding the discrepancy in the report, we are confident 

that such a line of questioning would have had no impact whatsoever on 

the jury's verdict. Accordingly, DEFENDANT's second PCRA argument 

was properly denied. 

III. CONCLUSION 

Neither of the PCRA issues presented by DEFENDANT have any 

merit whatsoever. Based largely upon our credibility finding in favor of 

TRIAL COUNSEL and against DEFENDANT, we conclude that 

DEFENDANT never asked' TRIAL COUNSEL to appeal following his 

sentencing. Thus, TRIAL COUNSEL cannot be deemed ineffective for 

failing to file an appeal. With respect to cross-examination of police, we 

conclude that it would have been pointless for TRIAL COUNSEL to crossexamine pOlice officers regarding a typographical error in the police 

report. This is especially true given that the actual funds seized from 

DEFENDANT were available for presentgtion. at trial and wer,e ; 1 

photocopied as evidence. 

Based upon the foregoing, we reject all of DEFENDANT's PCRA 

issues. It is with this comment that we will forward the above-referenced 

file to the Pennsylvania Superior Court for its analysis. 

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