COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges McClanahan, Petty and Beales 

Argued by teleconference 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION∗

 BY 

v. Record No. 1922-07-1 JUDGE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN 

 JANUARY 4, 2008 

STEVEN D. BLOUNT 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH 

Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge 

Joshua M. Didlake, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellant. 

(Joyce L. Weddle, Deputy Public Defender; Office of Public 

Defender, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief. 

 The Commonwealth appeals an order of the trial court granting Steven D. Blount’s 

motion to suppress evidence. Because the Commonwealth failed to preserve the argument it 

now makes on appeal, we affirm the trial court. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Steven D. Blount was indicted for violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, possession of a firearm 

by a previously convicted felon, and violation of Code § 18.2-108.1, receipt of a stolen firearm. 

Officer R. Riddle of the Portsmouth Police Department stopped a vehicle in which Blount was 

riding as a passenger and discovered a weapon under the passenger seat.1

 Blount filed a motion 

 ∗

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 

1

 Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a passenger does not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile in which he has no ownership or possessory 

interest, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Commonwealth did not make that argument 

either at trial or on appeal. Thus, we will not consider the issue. 
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to suppress arguing the weapon was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial 

court granted the motion, and the Commonwealth filed this appeal pursuant to Code § 19.2-398.2 

II. ANALYSIS 

 We start with the premise that “warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a 

few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, and the Commonwealth has the 

heavy burden of establishing an exception to the warrant requirement.” Megel v. 

Commonwealth, 262 Va. 531, 534, 551 S.E.2d 638, 640 (2001) (citations omitted). Once the 

defendant establishes that the challenged search was conducted without a warrant, the 

Commonwealth has the burden to identify a specific exception to the warrant requirement that 

would justify the search. On appeal, the Attorney General does so, arguing the officer had a 

reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and that Blount was armed and 

dangerous therefore justifying the detention and frisk of Blount and the search of the vehicle, 

relying on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 

However, the Commonwealth failed to present this argument to the trial court. The prosecutor 

simply restated the evidence, without advancing any legal theory or citing any case law that 

would justify the police officer’s actions. In fact, the trial court, without any objection from the 

Commonwealth, framed the issue as whether there was “sufficient probable cause to look for the 

weapon.” The trial court further stated, again without objection, “[W]e have to have probable 

cause for there to be a seizure and a subsequent search.” According to the trial court, “I just 

can’t come to the conclusion that there is probable cause.” 3

 At no time did the Commonwealth 

 2

 The Commonwealth failed to include in its notice of appeal the certifications required 

by Code §§ 19.2-398(A)(2) and 19.2-400. 

 

3

 The probable cause standard is relevant to an analysis of whether there was probable 

cause to arrest Blount on a concealed weapons charge, but, on appeal, the Commonwealth does 

not make that argument. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 5A:20(e), we do not address this issue. 
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object to the trial court’s application of the probable cause standard or urge the trial court to 

apply the appropriate legal standard set forth in Terry and Long. 

 Pursuant to Rule 5A:18, the Commonwealth was required to present to the trial court the 

argument now made on appeal. 

Under this rule, a specific argument must be made to the trial court 

at the appropriate time, or the allegation of error will not be 

considered on appeal. A general argument or an abstract reference 

to the law is not sufficient to preserve an issue. Making one 

specific argument on an issue does not preserve a separate legal 

point on the same issue for review. 

Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 760, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (en banc) 

(citations omitted). Thus, “though taking the same general position as in the trial court, an 

appellant may not rely on reasons which could have been but were not raised for the benefit of 

the lower court.” West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Va. Mortgage & Real Estate Inv. 

Trust, 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1980). 

The Commonwealth’s argument is based on the application of a reasonableness standard 

– a standard the Commonwealth never asked the trial court to apply.4

 Thus, since the 

Commonwealth makes an argument on appeal that was never presented to the trial court, the 

Commonwealth’s argument is barred by Rule 5A:18. 

 For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

 4

 The Commonwealth failed to designate on brief where, in the record, the argument it 

now makes was preserved for appeal as required by Rule 5A:20(c).