IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Micah Layton, :

Petitioner :

: No. 1003 C.D. 2020

v. :

: Submitted: November 15, 2021

Department of Human Services, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: December 28, 2021

Micah Layton petitions for review of the September 10, 2020 order of 

Secretary of Human Services Teresa D. Miller (the Secretary) of the Department of 

Human Services (the Department or DHS), which denied his request for 

reconsideration of a Final Administrative Action Order of the Bureau of Hearings and 

Appeals (BHA), dated August 6, 2020. The BHA affirmed the decision of

Administrative Law Judge Nadiola Logan-Thomas (the ALJ) that, in relevant part, 

concluded that the Department’s Bureau of Child Support Enforcement (BCSE) was 

entitled to seize Layton’s lottery winnings to cover arrears of Layton’s child support 

obligations. Upon review, we must affirm.

The relevant facts, as related in the ALJ’s findings, are as follows. Prior 

to November 24, 2008, Layton owed the Department an undisclosed sum of money 
2

for the maintenance of multiple children. (ALJ Adjudication, Certified Record (C.R.) 

at 26-31, Finding of Fact (F.F.) ¶1.) Two child support cases were brought against 

Layton in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, with Pennsylvania 

Automated Child Support Enforcement System (PACSES) case numbers 310004433 

and 825109711.1 (F.F. ¶2.) On November 24, 2008, with respect to PACSES case 

number 310004433, the court of common pleas ordered that Layton’s child support 

obligation be “set to a numerical value of zero due to lack of income or assets that 

can be levied for support, and arrears are suspended, without prejudice, effective 

September 15, 2008.” (F.F. ¶3 (quoting Order, 11/24/2008; C.R. at 13).) With 

respect to the other case, PACSES case number 825109711, the court of common 

pleas entered an order on December 24, 2008, to “administratively terminate arrears 

provision and remit arrears without prejudice to parties effective December 24, 

2008[,] pursuant to federal case closure regulation 45 [C.F.R. §]303.11(b)(1)[2]. . . .” 

(F.F. ¶4 (quoting Order, 12/24/2008; C.R. at 17).)

Sometime prior to January 6, 2020, Layton won lottery earnings in the 

amount of $4,807.00. (F.F. ¶5.) On January 6, 2020, the BCSE seized the entirety of 

Layton’s lottery winnings to cover arrears for both PACSES cases. (F.F. ¶6.) Two 

days later, on January 8, 2020, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

issued orders to reinstate Layton’s arrears on both PACSES cases, such that Layton’s 

lottery winnings could be intercepted. (F.F. ¶7.) On January 9, 2020, the Department 

mailed a letter to Layton, informing him that his lottery winnings were subject to 

1 The total amount of Layton’s child support obligations was not established in the record. 

(ALJ Adjudication at 5 (unpaginated); C.R. at 30.)

2 The cited provision of the federal regulation provides for closure of a child support case 

where “[t]here is no longer a current support order and arrearages are under $500 or unenforceable 

under State law.” 45 C.F.R. §303.11(b)(1).
3

attachment and that, if the winnings exceeded the amount of his arrears, then he 

would receive the balance of the lottery winnings. (F.F. ¶8.) Layton then appealed 

the BCSE’s seizure of his lottery winnings, and the ALJ held a hearing on May 22, 

2020. (F.F. ¶¶9-11.)

Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that the BCSE was entitled 

to seize Layton’s lottery winnings in connection with one PACSES case, but not the 

other. The difference between the cases, the ALJ stressed, was the language of the 

respective orders that the court of common pleas had entered on each case in 2008. 

The order entered with respect to PACSES case number 310004433 stated that 

Layton’s arrears were merely “suspended, without prejudice,” due to Layton’s lack of 

income or assets, and that the “financial obligation is to be reviewed for further 

modification upon [Layton’s] obtaining employment, income[,] or assets that can be 

levied for support.” (ALJ Adjudication at 5 (unpaginated); C.R. at 30 (emphasis in 

original).) By contrast, with respect to PACSES case number 825109711, the court 

of common pleas issued an order to “administratively terminate arrears provision” 

pursuant to a federal regulation, because the arrears were “under [the] enforceable 

threshold.” Id. (emphasis in original). Because the former order merely suspended 

Layton’s arrears without prejudice, and specified that his obligation could be 

reinstated if he obtained assets that could be levied, the ALJ concluded that Layton 

was not “absolved” from the obligation, and “no rights or privileges of the 

Department were waived or lost to pursue the arrears at any given time.” Id. at 6. On 

the other PACSES case, however, Layton’s obligations were terminated rather than 

suspended; accordingly, the ALJ determined that the Department was not permitted 

to reinstate the arrears in connection with that case. Id.
4

Layton argued that, although section 4308 of the Domestic Relations 

Code, 23 Pa.C.S. §4308,3authorizes the interception of lottery winnings to cover 

child support arrears, the BCSE was not authorized in this instance because it seized 

his winnings on January 6, 2020, but the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 

County did not issue any orders reinstating his arrears until two days later, on January 

8, 2020. Thus, Layton argued, at the time of the seizure, he was not a delinquent 

obligor. The ALJ opined that the two-day gap was “inconsequential.” (ALJ 

Adjudication at 6; C.R. at 31.) Because there were, in fact, court orders reinstating 

Layton’s arrears, “the BCSE would have still been entitled so seize [Layton’s] lottery 

winnings on or after January 8, 2020.” Id. 

Accordingly, although the ALJ determined that it was erroneous to apply 

Layton’s lottery winnings to the PACSES case in which Layton’s obligations had 

been terminated, the BCSE was entitled to seize and apply the lottery winnings to the 

case in which Layton’s obligations had been merely suspended without prejudice. 

Because the total amount of Layton’s obligations was not specified in the record, 

3 Section 4308(a) of the Domestic Relations Code provides:

(a) Duty of Department of Revenue.--In the case of any person winning more than 

$2,500 in the Pennsylvania State Lottery, the Department of Revenue shall request 

[DHS] to make all reasonable efforts to determine if the winner is a delinquent 

support obligor prior to making any lottery winnings payment. If the winner is so 

found, the amount of any arrearages shall be deducted from the amount of lottery 

winnings and paid to the obligee in the manner provided in this title for the 

administration of support payments.

23 Pa.C.S. §4308(a). The statute further details the extent of the search that DHS is required to 

conduct to determine if the lottery winner is a delinquent obligor and the information that DHS is 

required to provide to the Department of Revenue. See 23 Pa.C.S. §4308(b)(1)-(2). DHS is then to 

“[r]equest the Department of Revenue to withhold from a lottery prizewinner the amount of any 

arrearage discovered . . . .” 23 Pa.C.S. §4308(b)(3).
5

however, the ALJ ordered the Department to reimburse Layton for any difference 

between the $4,807.00 seized and the amount of his arrears. Thus, the ALJ issued an 

order, dated June 24, 2020, sustaining Layton’s appeal in part and denying it in part. 

(C.R. at 25.)

On August 6, 2020, the BHA issued a Final Administrative Action Order 

affirming the decision of the ALJ. (C.R. at 24.) The BHA’s order specified an 

appeal deadline and the procedure for filing an appeal,4 but Layton did not file an 

appeal in this Court. Rather, Layton filed an application for reconsideration, which 

the Secretary received on August 21, 2020. (C.R. at 33-34.) On September 10, 2020, 

the Secretary denied Layton’s request for reconsideration. (C.R. at 37.) Layton then 

petitioned this Court for review of the Secretary’s denial of reconsideration.5

Layton argues that the ALJ erred in deeming it “inconsequential” that 

the BCSE seized his lottery winnings two days before the court of common pleas 

issued the order to reinstate his arrears. (Layton’s Br. at 8.) Because the seizure 

predated the reinstatement of his arrears, Layton contends that he was not a 

“delinquent support obligor” for purposes of 23 Pa.C.S. §4308 when the lottery 

winnings were seized. Id. The remainder of Layton’s argument consists of a 

quotation of the full text of 23 Pa.C.S. §4308. Id. at 8-11.

4 Specifically, the BHA’s order states: “The appropriate party(ies), where permitted, may 

take issue with this Adjudication, and Order, and may appeal to the Commonwealth Court of 

Pennsylvania, within thirty (30) days from the date of this order.” (Final Administrative Action 

Order, 8/6/2020; C.R. at 24.) The order further provides instructions for the filing of an appeal, and 

specifies the parties that must be served with a copy of the appeal. The order additionally contains 

instructions for the filing of an application for reconsideration and specifies that “[t]his action does 

not stop the time within which an appeal must be filed to the Commonwealth Court.” Id.

5

“Our review of the Secretary’s denial of reconsideration is limited to considering whether 

the Secretary abused her discretion.” B.B. v. Department of Public Welfare, 118 A.3d 482, 485 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015).
6

The Department stresses that Layton did not petition for review of the 

BHA’s underlying Final Administrative Action Order; rather, he sought review of the 

Secretary’s denial of reconsideration. (Department’s Br. at 7.) As such, this Court 

must employ the abuse of discretion standard, which Layton has not addressed. The 

Department asserts that there is no indication that the Secretary abused her discretion 

in denying Layton’s request for reconsideration, and Layton has not argued to the 

contrary. Id. at 8-9. 

With regard to the validity of the seizure of Layton’s lottery winnings, 

the Department stresses that both it and the Department of Revenue have statutory 

obligations with respect to the interception of lottery winnings. Under section 

4308(a) of the Domestic Relations Code, 23 Pa.C.S. §4308(a), the Department of 

Revenue must request that the Department make all reasonable efforts to determine if 

the lottery winner is a delinquent support obligor.6 The Department of Revenue is 

then obligated to deduct the amount of any arrears, the Department argues, regardless 

of when the funds are intercepted or when the support order is issued. (Department’s 

Br. at 10.) According to the Department, the “timing of the intercept does not affect 

whether Mr. Layton’s lottery winnings must first go to cover arrears.” Id. 

The Department further argues that there is no statute of limitations or 

end date for the collection of arrears, unless the obligor’s arrears are permanently 

removed, with prejudice, by a court order. Id. Here, at least with respect to PACSES 

6 The Department also cites section 215 of The Fiscal Code, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 343, 

as amended, added by the Act of October 30, 2017, P.L. 725, which provides, in relevant part, that 

the Department of Revenue shall deduct from lottery winnings any amount of outstanding State tax 

liability, but only “after the Department of Revenue determines under 23 Pa.C.S. §4308 (relating to 

lottery winnings intercept) that either the lottery prize is not subject to a deduction for delinquent 

support or that, after deducting for delinquent support, prize amounts remain that can be subject to 

deduction for the amount of the outstanding State tax liability.” 72 P.S. §215(a)(1)(i).
7

case number 310004433, the Department stresses that Layton’s arrears were not 

permanently removed, but merely suspended without prejudice, such that the 

Department could reinstate the arrears if Layton received a sum sufficient to satisfy 

or partially satisfy the arrears. Id. Thus, when the Department conducted its inquiry 

under 23 Pa.C.S. §4308 to determine if Layton was a delinquent support obligor, its 

records in PACSES showed Layton’s arrears. (Department’s Br. at 11.) Thus, the 

Department of Revenue could not have issued the lottery winnings to Layton without 

violating its statutory duties. Id. Accordingly, the Department contends that, even if 

we could reach the substance of Layton’s challenge rather than merely his appeal of 

the denial of reconsideration, we still should affirm the Secretary’s order.

Upon review, we agree with the Department that the Secretary’s order 

denying reconsideration must be affirmed. As the Department emphasizes, Layton’s 

argument does not acknowledge the procedural posture of the appeal that he has 

brought before us. Layton asserts a single basis upon which he believes that the ALJ 

erred; however, he overlooks that his appeal relates solely to the Secretary’s denial of 

his request for reconsideration.

It is well settled that the “decision to grant or deny a request for 

reconsideration is a matter of administrative discretion and, therefore, will be 

reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” Hudson v. Department of Public Welfare, 

508 A.2d 383, 387 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (citing Muehleisen v. State Civil Service 

Commission, 443 A.2d 867, 869 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982), aff’d, 461 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1983)). 

An abuse of discretion occurs “when the course pursued represents not merely an 

error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the 

law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will.” Payne v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Elwyn, 
8

Inc.), 928 A.2d 377, 379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Steller v. Pennsylvania 

Securities Commission, 877 A.2d 518, 523 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)). In a previous 

decision arising from the same agency and a similar procedural posture as the instant 

case, we noted that, in light of this standard, “our review of a decision denying 

reconsideration is extremely narrow.” Williams v. Department of Human Services

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1929 C.D. 2015, filed September 27, 2016), slip op. at 7 

(unreported).7

As the Department notes, Layton has made no attempt whatsoever to 

establish that the Secretary’s denial of his request for reconsideration amounted to an 

abuse of discretion. Apart from his one substantive assertion of error on the part of 

the ALJ, Layton has not offered any reason that reconsideration was warranted. Our 

review does not reveal any grounds upon which to conclude that the Secretary failed 

to apply the law, or that her decision was “manifestly unreasonable” or the “result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Payne, 928 A.2d at 379. Although Layton 

disagrees with the way that the law was applied below, he must show more than an 

“error of judgment,” or that the decision was “contrary to the decision that the 

appellate court would have reached.” Id. (quoting Steller, 877 A.2d at 523). He must 

establish an abuse of discretion, and he has failed to do so.

Although we might end our analysis here, we briefly note that we find 

no apparent error in the decision below. Although the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County did not formally reinstate Layton’s arrears on PACSES case 

number 310004433 until January 8, 2020, as the ALJ stressed, Layton had never been 

wholly relieved of his obligations in connection with that case. Rather, the court of 

7 Unreported decisions may be cited for their persuasive value in accordance with section 

414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
9

common pleas’ 2008 order in that case stated that Layton’s arrears were “suspended, 

without prejudice” due to his “lack of income or assets that can be levied for 

support,” but that the “obligation is to be reviewed for further modification upon 

[Layton’s] obtaining employment, income[,] or assets that can be levied for support.” 

(Order, 11/24/2008; C.R. at 13.) Upon his winning of the lottery, Layton then had 

assets that could be levied for support. Layton’s suspended arrears clearly were 

ascertained when DHS conducted its search for support obligations pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S. §4308(b)(1). Even if we were to conclude that Layton’s lottery winnings 

could not be seized until after the issuance of the order on January 8, 2020, a remand 

to that effect would certainly be followed by a determination that, pursuant to the 

January 8, 2020 order, the seizure is authorized. This is apparently what the ALJ 

meant in opining that the two-day gap between the seizure and the order reinstating 

the arrears was “inconsequential.” Despite Layton’s objections to that conclusion, we 

find no error in the substance of the ALJ’s reasoning.

In any event, the substance of the ALJ’s reasoning is itself 

inconsequential, because Layton has neither argued nor established that the 

Secretary’s order denying reconsideration amounted to an abuse of discretion. 

Because this is the only order that is encompassed within this appeal, we must affirm 

the Secretary’s order.

The Secretary’s order denying reconsideration is affirmed.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Micah Layton, :

Petitioner :

: No. 1003 C.D. 2020

v. :

:

Department of Human Services, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of December, 2021, the September 10, 2020 

order of the Secretary of Human Services, of the Department of Human Services,

denying reconsideration of the August 6, 2020 Final Administrative Action Order 

of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals, is AFFIRMED.

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge