--TIPSEGR ET •

•

"NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

21 June 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, NRO Program D

NRO Comptroller

SUBJECT: NRO Control of Aircraft Assets

The attached paper is self-explanatory.

Mr. Plummer has reviewed it and SS-5 of this office

is now preparing the implementing actions.

Robert D. Singel

•

Attachment

(Same Subj. and Cont. No.)

IDEALIST

Studies:

CONT"1-411.3046-

copy 3 op cow

PAGE OF PAGE

CLAINVOOON

oomr OCINANION Oaf

esesiataa as

mama onus isarmasmaleaTi.

WU Of 'NON

• • I•••• /••••
•

•

• 0

"INATIONALRECONNAISSANCEOFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

tiA

4.*•

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

6 May 1974

Jim,

Attached is the review of NRO interest in

aircraft. While I think this sets forth our position,

I am not really relaxed on the matter of a contingency

capability. What is in the paper is factual; it is

now the National Estimate position that our satellites

will not be neutralized. However, if at any time the

Soviets intended any drastic action, it seems to me

that they would utilize their capability to neutralize

as their first move. Granted we still have the U-2s

and SR-71s in the Air Force which we can call on but

we have seen the bureaucracy that, got involved in this

Mid-East deployment as compared to the one with NRO

assets which took two days. However, I don't think

we can muster the support to do other than recognize

the situation as it now stands. If this paper meets

with your approval, I will disseminate to the Program

Office and to Colonel Bailey.

Robert D. Singel

Attachment

NRO Control of Aircraft Assets

EE Ana .1 0 Elroy SNOW TAO ernert

II EcuNto Eb•EN • IN al.N•NON C• It

*84 NM DI CI

10A• MO DIU AMOY ON NAP DE1

OW O•

CONTROL. NO

COPY OF COPIES

PAGE OP PAGES
:34**

.*.e.%:•••

:•Ase

tw

•

::04rOt.

nn •:S1

IDEALIST Studies:

Cat

• •

----TOP-SECRET

NRO RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR

AIRCRAFT AND DRONE RECONNAISSANCE

Introduction 

This paper is divided into two main parts--the first

dealing with the operational aspects of air-breathing platforms

deployed over denied territories, and the second with the RDTU

aspects of these systems.

Air-breathing overflight vehicles available today include

the U-2 and SR-71 aircraft and the 147 Series drones. The NRO

presently "owns" only four aircraft--the U-2Rs assigned to the

CIA Office of Special Activities (OSA)--and these aircraft are

expected to transfer to the Air Force in 1974. Thus the NRO

soon will own no air-breathing assets.

Aircraft Operations 

The upper part of the chart at Tab A is intended to show

the aircraft and drone overflight process as it is specified

in the NRO 1965 Agreement. The blocks in yellow will drop out

when the OSA U-2R aircraft are turned over to the Air Force.

The blocks in red represent activities in which the DNRO has

a direct interest or responsibility and require a deliberate

approval or decision. This baseline case does represent the

present situation for the OSA-managed IDEALIST/TACKLE Chinese

peripheral flights and the JRC-managed OLYMPIC FIRE Cuban

flights. These flights are conducted on a routinely scheduled

basis and are relatively non-controversial. The point can be

made for these flights that maintenance of political presence

on Taiwan and over Cuba is as important as the intelligence

collected. For example, there is no plan for peripheral

photography of China following withdrawal of the U-2Rs.

The process for generating, approving, and executing

overflights in time of crisis or intense national interest

is considerably different from the norm. There appears to

be no one focal point for all overflight requirements short

of Dr. Kissinger. Specifically, all requirements for any

Mid-East overflight in the period from 1969 to the present •

-:!!'4..6

SET

Attachmencilm

COAIE HOI 3046-74

11•1•• • au. CONY Of COPIE S

S. • IN...0MA •n .11041 10

••• • ••• • ••••••• • •••1 •••••••n••• IMO PA'.' 1 0' PAGES "••• .4 In • • ••••• • U• Nam 80 •
•

CON THOS 4111113046-74

• •A II I.. .1110•1 • 01•11

041. M. YyK.1

g e v.... MIMI. •••••: I 1.116..•....•1

CA.•••Miti•i•••n••• 1..111•1111•

COO ",01 COPIT S

MAGI PAGI

-1111).-SECRET--

itself of all interest in air-breathing reconnaissance systems,

we will begin the steps necessary to:

Revise the 1965 Agreement.

Terminate activities no longer

needed.

Transfer operational responsibility and contingency planning for aircraft to the JCS.

Provide for the call-up of

Air Force aircraft resources by the NRO

as agreed by the Secretary of the Air

Force.

If you believe the NRO still should retain an aircraft capability for denied area reconnaissance for contingency use or

for monitoring benign areas, we will initiate appropriate

actions. Because of the trend of the past several years,

these actions will require considerable negotiation.

Robert D. Singe.

Attachment

NRO Responsibilities

for Aircraft and Drone Reconnaissance

.

".. .
--NP-SECIET3 May 1974

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

:1.

. • . .

. . • ,

. 1 1

..,..ii MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER .%t..;

, 4; IMMIR SUBJECT: NRO Control of Aircraft Assets

-.1 gifin

4. NM

. • .:,1/4 :bA flini Attached is a paper which sets forth the arguments

...

-•. SEM for and against maintaining an aircraft capability in the

'il

11111 NRO. The general conclusion is that we should completely

...v

VIM terminate our interests and take the appropriate organize-

....*;! 11111 tional steps to clarify authorities and responsibilities as

.-

•• ..1 sms

, well as to clean up our organizational structure. These

.,,,3 ma steps would include revising the 1965 Agreement and termin-

'A IIIM ating the CIA aircraft program as well as some functions of

''4t an Program D. To accomplish this will require coordination

- ..!.

,.

with ExCom principals and PFIAB in regard to policy and with

. 1, IIIIII ..•! NM CIA, JRC, and the Air Force in regard to operations.

, MIMI The only major loss will be the losing of a continMB gency capability that is dependable. NRO assets have always ..*

- °Mill responded immediately and with the very best in photographic .

::: Ma or SIGINT equipment and have carried electronic warfare .

..:.-:. .41111111 equipment tailored to the specific job. Foresight and plan-

'''. ning were the hallmarks of these programs. However, current

. -; judgments that our satellites will operate in a benign environment coupled with political decisions not to penetrate

, EMI

- denied areas of the Soviet Union and China indicate no need

-%g

& ME that a major contingency capability exist. Monitoring oper-

. . . •'. ations that have been agreed to by both sides and which

MB require no speed of deployment certainly cannot be considered gill'!" to be a contingency. Denied area reconnaissance of countries .111111 not deemed politically forbidden generally fall into the area

slams of tactical intelligence although occasionally a need will

.. 

gam exist for this kind of capability, i.e., the Middle East

7 ' 'k•, situation.

It is suggested that you review the arguments in

the attachment. If you agree that the NRO should divest

IDEALIST Studies:

MAW of 0

CUI4V4, 01101 I Mil Ii/ fspy M• cam 40ILSECRET- ist Oat pet

V fee Of Cs. v NIPINV

1001111111 CS

Pear CONTROL N•71 1111301.

COPYJL COMES

PAGE.a..OF PAGES
• • .1 • • •II.••• •

.4.. •1•14.010.....•

I .1.. ..... NOM • • *OW • al ••••••n • . 1

..•• Ufa sal... • •••••••p•

0

•

-RP-SECRET- c1.11111P

•

originated at the approval level which circumvented the normal

approval chain. The lower part of the chart at Tab A shows

several different paths by which overflight requests have been

submitted and approvals granted. These are examples of what

has occurred; since there is very little formal documentation

in some of these cases, the actual process may have been different than shown.

This situation presents a potentially serious problem.

The mechanism leading to 40 Committee approval dates to the

U-2 shoot-down incident of 1 May 1960 and the subsequent

confusion within the U.S. Government on a consistent public

story for the conduct and control of overflights. Certainly

Dr. Kissinger in either his role as Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs (and, therefore, Chairman of

the 40 Committee) or as Secretary of State can and does establish the requirement for overflights. The operating agencies

of the DOD or CIA respond, but when requirements are generated

this way the DNRO has historically never been consulted nor

asked to give any advice, guidance, or direction. And yet

the DNRO is charged not only with overflight operations, but

also with contingency planning.

The NRO is in the aircraft operational business for

several reasons:

Because CIA was charged with denied area

reconnaissance and operated a fleet of U-2s and

OXCARTs at the time these operations were merged

with Air Force operations to form the NRO.

Because this responsibility was recognized in the 1965 Agreement--a "legal" requirement.

This recognition allowed the DNRO to use

covert assets for denied area reconnaissance in

order not to place the Air Force in a position of

allegedly committing military aggression.

It theoretically permits one agent to

present all overflight requests to the 40 Committee

and assures full coordination of assets and decision

makers.

It functionally concentrates overflights

in one organization.

It protects the covert nature of overflights.

Attachmenammum_

CON I 140t -74

cop.,

m ccwus

PA(.( 2 Of PAGES
MM. ••.•

I.e.** COI . •••

...11 ••1110 • ••.04 6.6111W1.1•••

INS* .1.1. toil • aft. • eV. •WIP 1111 •

•

It facilitates a coordinated U.S.

Government contingency plan.

Historically, the NRO has developed

the platforms, the sensors, the defensive subsystems, and the life support systems.

The intelligence collection problem has changed'considerably over the years. The vast capabilities of satellites

have greatly reduced the need for aircraft and drone overflights, and the foreign air defense environment has critically.

limited our flexibility to fly aircraft or drones when and

where desired. Of most importance is that these two factors,

plus foreign policy initiatives for closer ties with Russia and

China, virtually preclude aircraft overflights of those two

countries where intelligence needs are the greatest. In considering whether the ?RO should retain control of an aircraft

overflight capability, the following points are pertinent:

•

r.

For

Satisfies the 1965 Agreement and thereby

maintains clear lines of authority.

Provides a mechanism for aircraft versus

satellite collection system trade-offs.

c. Provides for coordinating aircraft and

'f satellite collection activities.

d. Provides for aircraft and satellite contingency planning by one interdepartmental group.

e. Provides for a quick-reaction capability.

to meet overflight needs (a need recently demonstrated

by the U-2 deployment fiasco).

Against 

Initiation of aircraft reconnaissance

proposals have recently been originating at top

echelons of Government rather than in the NRO.

Must rely on support assets of the Air

Force in accomplishing a deployment.

Attachment

cowl NW NO

• COPY 01 COPIES

PAI.1 __AI PAWS

PIP
c. Chances Clances of conducting a truly covert

mission over any territory we are vitally interested in is minimal.

Only the U.S. owns U-2s,

SR-71s, and 147 drones--and the world

knows it.

Detection is virtually

certain.

d. Without owning aircraft assets, there

is no apparent contribution which the NRO makes

to overflight operations.

Some of the factors which are presently unfavorable could

be corrected. For example, the provisions of the 1965 Agreement could be reapplied but it would require reaffirmation at

the highest levels. •

What would be necessary if the NRO were to divorce itself

totally from aircraft overflight operations? Major items

include:

Recognize the change to the 1965 Agreement.

This would require the concurrence of the DCI, the

Deputy Secretary of Defense (as the office of signature on the 1965 Agreement), and notice to the PFIAB

(they obtained the President's direction for the

1965 Agreement).

Formally transfer the operational responsibility to the JCS.

Transfer the aircraft contingency (cover

stories) planning function from the NRO to the JCS

for aircraft overflights. The NRO would retain the

satellite contingency planning function only and

would not need to be represented on the aircraft

committee.

Provide a mechanism, such as an NRO-JCS

agreement, for coordinating satellite and aircraft

coverage to include a provision for NRO call-up of

Air Force aircraft resources.

At

CON T 5401 N 3046-74

cup.. 0, cop.'s

par( 4 ot PAGES

COMM

•• ••••••• nn • Is

••••••• •liao• • •

I •.• •• .1 •••• ••••/ ...P.m*. • •••

••••• ••••••• •••••n•,, •

is

4.*

F4
pmaa_ty P6601 S

Atch CONTHOIN 046-74

• •.111.1" 1(502, s COP V 06 C DPI S

•AA:014 1nn •• n•ffi.

if.. • • • 1 OWN. •••n1. •1111.....• • D.

VII LW NW • .111.M •

ti

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 

The NRO has evolved and used streamlined management techniques for air-breathing system development which date to the

early days of the U-2 program and which have been used for the

U-2R, OXCART (and initially for the SR-71), and TAGBOARD programs as well as for system studies.

Some of the major features of this management method have

been:

Very direct lines of decision making and

resource allocation, from the ExCom through the

DNRO to the Program Director.

Covert contracting techniques. While the

basic provisions of law were adhered to, the Air

Force implementing management documents have been

waived and normal audits and inspections were

precluded.

c. Compartmented security controls. These

have kept all except people with a need-to-know

from becoming involved in the Program or its management.

The NRO normally has developed not only collection platforms, but also the associated optical and electronic sensors,

defensive subsystems, and life support systems. While the

1965 Agreement implies that the NRO has this development

responsibility, it is not specific as it is in the case of

spacecraft. The Program D Charter, at Tab B, is more explicit.

The TAGBOARD drone was the last NRO airframe acquisition

program, and recently only sensors, defensive subsystems, and

some life support developments have been pursued. For example,

Program D is developing the 70-inch optical bar camera.

Defensive subsystem work for all U-2 aircraft, both NRO and

USAF has been erform • the C • of ELIA? althou h,
r

••• .•

•

COhl 1201 Allillawa674

Co.... 0. co..1.5

MAG. PArel

TOP. SF ET ••••••• o.:••• 16.66Y

. 66 .n• •• 1.0 • 1 .66

.6 11 . • ...Me •••••••••n 1 ••I

Wt. • ay, • 1.40 Ott

The absence of an NRO air-breathing system development

can perhaps be attributed to one of two main factors--either

vv14 fiscal pressures to keep the NRP budget down or, perhaps, no

7,,,mu compelling reason for these vehicles to collect intelligence

through overflight. The latter factor may have been dictated

by several previously established facts:

•

Satellites perform the intelligence

collection requirement well enough.

Although intelligence acquired is often

not significant, it is deemed politically necessary to show a U.S. presence.

c. The lack of support fOr denied area

penetration of major countries overrides the need

for intelligence.

3-1%-,;A • d. Since overflights can rarely be considered really covert, it matters little what agency

carries them out.

e. Finally, there are both aircraft and

drone assets available in the Air Force inventory

which can be called upon to fly missions when

needed.

s• ' e i

n• 1

Reasons for the NRO to be involved in air-breathing system

developments appear to be largely based on historical precedence:

The U-2, OXCART, and TAGBOARD were all

developed in the covert world, using streamlined

management methods.

The 1965 Agreement implied an NRO

responsibility.

Functionally concentrated all overflight systems development in one agency.

Permitted covert development of platforms for covert flights.

Attachment
...,••t• • •••••• •

•••••••••• • 1.•••••••11•••

•• • • •••• •••••••• •••••• •116104•11.% • •••11

1•7•• • to• ••n • • •1•••11. IN

For Retaining a Capability 

Historically • some of the most significant advances in electronic warfare have been made

by this program.

Historically, all denied area reconnaissance vehicles, with the exception of the 147 drone,

have been conceived and built under this program.

It maintains a well-established, effective, streamlined management development capability

for quick-reaction responses.

Keeping an in-being resource is perhaps

more efficient than terminating and re-establishing

it if needed in the future.

It can continue to serve to support the

U-2 and SR-71 fleets.

Can serve as a streamlined management

vehicle for non-BYEMAN studies for the Air Force.

Factors Against Retaining a Capability 

There is no pressing need today to

develop a new overflight system.

Development of air-breathing overflight

vehicles and subsystems by covert methods is

viewed as a dubious requirement at this time.

Aircraft development, operations, and

support funding has been deleted from the NRP.

Maintenance of a capability for unidentified future contingencies is costly and can

probably not be fully utilized for necessary tasks.

Today, there does not appear to be any compelling reason

for the NRO to maintain an aircraft or drone development capability. There are, however, several factors to be considered

in this decision.

Attachmen

046-74

cop., of S

P41.1 7 •ot rants
What would be required to terminate NRO aircraft and

drone activities? Major items include:

Since there are no platform developments under way, no action is required here.

.Defensive subsystem developments will

all be funded by the Air Force effective

1 July 1974. Future contract actions could be

accomplished through non-covert channels. Provisions would need to be made for the Air Force to

assume all U-2 and SR-71 management functions.

d. The ExCom and the PFIAB should be.

informed of the action.

Attachments

Tab A - Chart

Tab B - Program D Charter (BYE-12921-68)

Attachmen

CON MR NO 3 6-74

• • A s •• 0010 •010a co •Y of COPO S .• •• 25• II 0. 100 •0

•••• •••• 00I4 I "Ow loft all

.4••• Wiot ON I 410.• Mb 00 011 • PAM 1_01 PAGES
0 10

NICSININSSMICI

INS 111111tIONIR

..orap-seier-. 02k.Z

100113046-74 gel—

vismor. 11i....

«moo. asminwma.

saw s•

11111•••• ominvika, •

.0" MIN•11.0

74131:11.. •••••n••n n•••••••

MOO 1011•801110 WYNN

WON 40•••••n••n••

•••••• *IMO

.1111•111. •••n••

•••n.1.111M.

011011.00

oll...p.411111111•MMIM

•••n••

Aft1.111

eft ••••••• OM=

Has ..yen •IWIN.

.1n11.9.14011.

•••nn••••n•

••••n•n••n•••11

4.41•0

"=.

I MC ........m. "row. softer wo wawa eta.. II* a. swore ... *as Anwar waota

mature

MINT 1 INNINGS