SUMMARY

February 25, 2021

2021COA23

No. 17CA2132, Peo v Thomas — Constitutional Law — Fourth 

Amendment — Searches and Seizures — Motor Vehicles —

Warrantless Search — Community Caretaking Exception —

Exclusionary Rule — Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

A division of the court of appeals considers the novel question 

whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth 

Amendment’s warrant requirement permits a police officer to 

impound a vehicle whenever the driver is arrested and no one else 

is present to take custody of the vehicle. The division concludes

that the answer is “no.” Because the prosecution here did not show 

that the seizure furthered a valid community caretaking function, 

impounding the legally parked vehicle from a residential 

neighborhood was unreasonable. The evidence discovered during 

the subsequent inventory search of the vehicle was therefore 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
inadmissible. Accordingly, the division reverses the defendant’s 

convictions depending on that evidence.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA23

Court of Appeals No. 17CA2132

Jefferson County District Court No. 17CR248

Honorable Lily W. Oeffler, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kyle Christopher Thomas,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO

J. Jones and Yun, JJ., concur

Announced February 25, 2021

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel K. Mercer, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1

¶ 1 This case presents the novel question whether the community 

caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 

requirement permits a police officer to impound a vehicle whenever 

the driver is arrested and no one else is present to take custody of 

the vehicle. We conclude that the answer is “no.” Because the 

prosecution here did not show that the seizure furthered a valid 

community caretaking function, impounding the legally parked 

vehicle was unreasonable. The evidence discovered during the 

subsequent inventory search of the vehicle was therefore 

inadmissible. As a result, we reverse the judgment of conviction 

entered against defendant, Kyle Christopher Thomas, and we 

remand for further proceedings. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

¶ 2 Around midnight, Arvada Police Officer Brandon Valdez saw a 

vehicle roll through a stop sign and fail to signal a turn. The officer 

activated his overhead lights to stop the vehicle, and the vehicle’s 

driver promptly pulled it over to the right-side curb of a residential 

street. Thomas, the driver and sole occupant, provided his 

identification and the vehicle’s registration to the officer, but 

Thomas could not produce proof of current insurance. When the 
2

officer checked Thomas’s identification, the officer discovered an 

outstanding warrant for Thomas’s arrest for failure to appear in 

court regarding a “larceny” charge. The officer arrested Thomas. 

¶ 3 According to Thomas’s later testimony at a motions hearing, 

he asked the officer if he could call his wife — who co-owned the 

vehicle and was at their home a few blocks away — to pick up the 

vehicle. Officer Valdez did not deny that Thomas had made such a 

request. Instead, the officer testified that he did not ask Thomas 

whether Thomas’s wife could retrieve the vehicle because he did not 

know that Thomas was married. In any event, Thomas’s wife was 

not given the chance to pick up the vehicle from its parking space.

¶ 4 Evidence presented at the hearing showed that the Arvada 

Police Department had the following policy: “Whenever the driver of 

a vehicle is arrested, the officer will have the vehicle towed unless a 

properly licensed driver authorized by the vehicle owner is readily 

available to take control of the vehicle.” As Officer Valdez 

understood that policy, he was required to tow a vehicle any time 

the driver was arrested unless a licensed, authorized driver was

physically present to take the vehicle. Because Thomas was the 

only person present, Officer Valdez requested a tow. 
3

¶ 5 To prepare the vehicle for towing, Officer Valdez conducted an 

inventory search. He found a handgun, methamphetamine, a knife, 

and a blackjack. Based on that evidence, the prosecution charged 

Thomas with possession of a controlled substance with intent to 

distribute, three counts of possession of a weapon by a previous 

offender, and possession of an illegal weapon.1 

¶ 6 Thomas moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the 

inventory search as the fruits of an illegal seizure. As pertinent 

here, he argued that impounding the vehicle was unreasonable 

because (1) his wife was only a few blocks away and could have 

retrieved the vehicle and (2) the vehicle was legally parked on a 

residential street in his neighborhood, was not blocking any 

driveway, and was not obstructing traffic. The prosecution 

responded that police policy required the officer to tow the vehicle 

because Thomas had been arrested and no one else was present to 

take the vehicle. 

¶ 7 The district court agreed with the prosecution and denied 

Thomas’s motion to suppress. The court reasoned that, because an 

 

1 The prosecution also charged Thomas with traffic violations. He 

does not challenge those convictions.
4

arrested person is unable to safeguard their vehicle, Officer Valdez 

needed to impound it for safekeeping.

¶ 8 Thomas was tried before a jury and convicted as charged. 

II. Standard of Review and Background Principles

¶ 9 Thomas maintains that the district court erroneously denied 

his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the inventory 

search. We agree. 

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 Review of a district court’s order regarding a defendant’s 

motion to suppress involves a mixed question of fact and law. 

People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 13. We defer to the district court’s 

factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence in the 

record, but we review de novo the court’s application of those facts 

to the law. Id. 

B. The Protection Against Unreasonable Seizures

¶ 11 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Allen, ¶ 15.2 A warrantless 

 

2 In the district court, Thomas cited both the Federal and the 

Colorado Constitutions, but he did not argue that the state 
5

search or seizure is presumed unreasonable and thus 

unconstitutional. Id. Because the touchstone of the Fourth 

Amendment is reasonableness, however, the warrant requirement is 

subject to several exceptions. Id.; People v. Cattaneo, 2020 COA 40, 

¶ 17. The prosecution bears the burden to prove that an exception 

to the warrant requirement applies. Allen, ¶ 15.

¶ 12 When an officer obtains evidence in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment, “the exclusionary rule ordinarily bars the prosecution 

from introducing that evidence against the defendant in a criminal 

case.” People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71, ¶ 10. The exclusionary rule 

applies both to illegally obtained evidence and to derivative evidence 

— often called “fruit of the poisonous tree.” People v.

Schoondermark, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Nardone v. 

United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939)). Thus, evidence 

discovered during an otherwise reasonable search ordinarily will be 

suppressed if the search resulted from an unreasonable seizure. 

 

constitution affords him any greater protection in this context. Nor 

does he develop such an argument on appeal. Therefore, we will 

treat the federal and state protections against unreasonable 

seizures as the same. See People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶¶ 15, 18-

21 (applying both provisions, without distinguishing them, when 

assessing the constitutionality of a vehicle seizure). 
6

See People v. Brown, 2018 CO 27, ¶¶ 17-18 (Brown II) (suppressing 

evidence discovered during inventory search where the predicate 

seizure was unreasonable); People v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, ¶ 32 

(Brown I), aff’d, Brown II. 

C. The Community Caretaking Exception

¶ 13 Under one exception to the warrant requirement, officers may 

seize and remove vehicles from the streets as part of their 

administrative community caretaking responsibilities, provided that 

the seizure conforms to standardized criteria limiting police 

discretion. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); 

Allen, ¶ 20; Brown II, ¶¶ 8-9. After impounding a vehicle, an officer 

may search the vehicle to inventory its contents, again provided 

that the search conforms to standardized criteria limiting police 

discretion. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); Allen, 

¶ 20; Brown II, ¶¶ 8-9. Such inventory searches “serve to protect 

an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure 

against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard 

the police from danger.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. 

¶ 14 Accordingly, the first question when analyzing the 

constitutionality of an officer’s decision to impound a vehicle is 
7

whether standardized criteria authorized the impoundment. See 

Allen, ¶¶ 20-21 (“[T]he existence of standardized criteria or policies 

is a necessary condition of the community caretaking exception to 

the warrant requirement . . . .”). If not, the seizure was 

unreasonable, and the analysis ends. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 21 (finding 

seizure unreasonable solely because “the People did not present any 

evidence at the motions hearing to establish that the officers 

[impounded the vehicle] in accordance with any written or oral 

standardized criteria or policies”). But the fact that a seizure 

conforms to standardized criteria is not sufficient to survive Fourth 

Amendment scrutiny. Brown II, ¶ 12; see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, 

Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.3(c), 

Westlaw (6th ed. database updated Sept. 2020) (“It is nonetheless 

possible . . . [that] an impoundment regulation could be deemed so 

irrational as to not fall within what the [Bertine] Court there 

characterized as the requisite ‘reasonable police regulations.’”). 

¶ 15 Rather, even if a seizure complies with standardized criteria, 

the court must also ask “whether the impoundment and 

subsequent inventory serve an administrative community 
8

caretaking function.” Brown II, ¶ 12.3 Valid community caretaking 

purposes may include the need to remove vehicles that impede 

traffic or threaten public safety or convenience and the need to 

protect the vehicle and its contents against vandalism or theft. See 

id. at ¶ 14 (identifying such purposes where the driver was unable 

to drive his vehicle lawfully because his license was suspended); see 

also Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(identifying the same purposes in a case involving impoundment 

from the defendant’s driveway). 

¶ 16 To determine whether impounding a vehicle furthers some 

community caretaking purpose, courts should consider the totality 

of the circumstances, including whether the driver was arrested, 

the time and location of the arrest, whether the driver could 

produce proof of ownership, whether a licensed and authorized 

person was available to take custody of the vehicle, and whether an 

 

3 Because compliance with standardized criteria is not sufficient, in 

and of itself, to render a seizure of a vehicle reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment, we cannot follow People v. Milligan, 77 P.3d 

771, 776-77 (Colo. App. 2003), which rests on that mistaken 

premise. See People v. Garcia, 251 P.3d 1152, 1162 (Colo. App. 

2010) (a division of the court of appeals is not bound to follow 

another division’s ruling).
9

arrested driver could return promptly to the vehicle after posting 

bail. See Brown II, ¶ 13; LaFave, § 7.3(c) (“[I]t would appear that 

impoundment is generally impermissible where the driver has been 

arrested for such a minor offense [that the driver’s prompt release 

can be anticipated], at least until it appears that he will be unable 

to post collateral at the station or other appropriate place and thus 

will not be in a position to depart promptly with the car.”). 

III. Application

¶ 17 To reiterate, the evidence Thomas sought to suppress was 

discovered during the police’s inventory search of his vehicle 

following its impoundment. Because the impoundment gives rise to 

the need for and justification of an inventory search, the threshold 

inquiry when determining the reasonableness of an inventory 

search is whether the impoundment of the vehicle was proper. See

State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).

¶ 18 The record shows that Officer Valdez impounded the vehicle 

for purely administrative reasons, and the People do not justify the 

seizure as part of the officer’s duty to investigate criminal activity. 

Cf. People v. Delacruz, 2016 CO 76, ¶ 14 (describing a protective 

search of a car based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
10

and suspicion that an occupant may be armed and dangerous); 

People v. Zuniga, 2016 CO 52, ¶ 14 (describing automobile 

exception based on probable cause that the vehicle contains 

evidence of a crime). Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether the 

prosecution carried its burden to prove that the officer’s decision to 

impound Thomas’s vehicle was a reasonable seizure under the 

community caretaking exception. Because the prosecution 

provided no evidence that the seizure furthered some community 

caretaking purpose beyond the officer’s compliance with his 

department’s procedure, we conclude the prosecution did not carry 

its burden.4

¶ 19 Turning first to the interest in public safety and convenience, 

we note that officers may reasonably remove vehicles that are 

hazardous or disabled, that are parked illegally, that are blocking 

access to private property, or that are obstructing traffic on public 

 

4 Thomas argues that Officer Valdez did not follow the police 

department’s policy when he impounded the vehicle because 

Thomas’s wife was available to promptly pick up the vehicle. 

Thomas also argues that the department’s policy did not place 

meaningful limits on Officer Valdez’s discretion. We do not address 

those contentions because we agree with Thomas that the vehicle’s 

removal did not further any community caretaking function.
11

roads. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69 (listing circumstances 

justifying removing a vehicle); Pineda v. People, 230 P.3d 1181, 

1186 (Colo. 2010) (holding that officers reasonably removed a 

vehicle from the right-hand lane of a busy avenue after arresting 

the driver because “[n]o one was present to take possession of the 

vehicle, and the officers could not leave it blocking traffic”), 

disapproved on other grounds by Vaughn, ¶ 14; see also, e.g., United 

States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 785 (1st Cir. 1991) 

(expressing similar rationale).

¶ 20 The evidence presented at the suppression hearing, however, 

showed that Thomas’s vehicle was legally parked on a residential 

street. The evidence did not show that the street was busy, that the 

vehicle was obstructing traffic, that it was dangerous or disabled, or 

that it was blocking any driveway. The prosecution presented no 

evidence that it was illegal, hazardous, or even unusual to leave a 

vehicle parked in that location. Without such evidence, the 

prosecution did not demonstrate any interest in public safety or 

convenience that justified removing Thomas’s vehicle. See Brown II, 

¶ 16 (finding impoundment unreasonable, in part because “[t]here 

was no suggestion that the car was impeding traffic or threatening 
12

public safety and convenience where it was stopped”); United States 

v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding 

that community caretaking exception did not permit impounding a 

vehicle where the driver “appropriately pulled over to the curb when 

he was stopped in a residential neighborhood,” and the vehicle was 

parked legally and did not pose a safety hazard); cf. People v. 

Camarigg, 2017 COA 115M, ¶ 21 (holding that impounding a 

parked vehicle was reasonable because “it was blocking a gas pump 

and likely to be a nuisance”). 

¶ 21 Next, the People contend that Officer Valdez needed to 

impound the vehicle to protect the vehicle “against danger or loss, 

or even false claims of loss” — even if it posed no threat to public 

safety and convenience. The People reference a discussion in 

Bertine in which the Court explained that inventory searches serve 

to protect an owner’s property “while it is in the custody of the 

police,” to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized 

property and to guard the police from any danger posed by the 

vehicle and its contents. 479 U.S. at 372-73 (emphasis added); id.

at 373 (“[T]he police were potentially responsible for the property 

taken into their custody.”); see also Brown II, ¶ 8; Pineda, 230 P.3d 
13

at 1185. The Court did not hold that protecting a vehicle against 

loss or protecting the police from danger posed by the vehicle 

justifies impounding the vehicle (i.e., taking it into police custody). 

Instead, the Court upheld the impoundment there because the 

police’s decision was guided by standardized criteria “related to the 

feasibility and appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle 

rather than impounding it.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375-76. 

¶ 22 Nevertheless, our supreme court in Brown II, ¶ 8, and Allen, 

¶ 19 — without distinguishing between seizures and inventory 

searches conducted pursuant to a community caretaking function 

— recently indicated that police may impound a vehicle to protect 

against danger, loss, and false claims of loss. Therefore, we must 

consider whether Officer Valdez was justified in impounding 

Thomas’s car to protect it from theft or vandalism. 

¶ 23 The People imply that impoundment for safekeeping is 

permissible any time the arrest of the driver would otherwise result 

in a lawfully parked vehicle being left unattended, regardless of any 

remaining circumstances. We are not persuaded. Cf. United States 

v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Opperman
14

‘cannot be used to justify the automatic inventory of every car upon 

the arrest of its owner.’”) (citation omitted).

¶ 24 The People identify no case holding that the police may always 

remove a lawfully parked vehicle for safekeeping whenever it would 

otherwise be left unattended. To the contrary, courts have 

recognized that “[t]he mere fact that [the] defendant’s vehicle would 

have been left unattended is insufficient to justify its 

impoundment.” People v. Spencer, 948 N.E.2d 196, 205 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2011); see State v. Fortune, 689 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Kan. 1984) (“If 

the person responsible for the vehicle desires that the vehicle be left 

lawfully parked upon the streets or that it be turned over to some 

other person’s custody, then, absent some other lawful reason for 

impounding the vehicle, his or her wishes must be followed.”); 

Manalansan v. State, 415 A.2d 308, 310-11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 

1980) (holding that the decision to impound the automobile was 

unreasonable where there was no indication that “when the 

appellant was arrested from his automobile that his automobile was 

not then at rest in a legitimate parking spot”); State v. McDaniel, 

383 A.2d 1174, 1179 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (“The 

common theme underlying these cases and others . . . is that 
15

something more must be shown to justify impoundment of a car 

than that it would otherwise be left unattended.”).

¶ 25 Consistent with Brown II, courts consider whether the totality 

of the circumstances demonstrates some appreciable risk that the 

vehicle would be vulnerable to vandalism or theft if it were left 

where it was parked, or whether some other factors support 

impoundment. See Brown II, ¶¶ 13-14; see, e.g., United States v. 

Staller, 616 F.2d 1284, 1290 (5th Cir. 1980) (impounding a lawfully 

parked vehicle was reasonable where “the officers were aware that a 

car parked overnight in a mall parking lot runs an appreciable risk 

of vandalism or theft”); United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 706 

(9th Cir. 2005) (impoundment was reasonable where the officer’s 

concerns about vandalism were reasonable, the vehicle was 

obstructing traffic, and the officer had probable cause to believe it 

contained illegal drugs); United States v. Andas-Gallardo, 3 F. App’x 

959, 963 (10th Cir. 2001) (impoundment reasonable where (1) there 

was no evidence suggesting how long it might take the defendant or 

a family member to retrieve the vehicle from a private commercial 

lot; (2) there was no evidence indicating how safe the vehicle would 

be if left unattended; and (3) there was the “distinct possibility” that 
16

it contained a firearm); Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d at 785 

(removing a vehicle from the shoulder of a busy highway was 

reasonable because it “would have been easy prey for vandals” and 

“would have posed a safety threat”).5

¶ 26 Indeed, regardless of whether the driver was arrested or cited, 

courts regularly reject the safekeeping rationale for removing a 

vehicle if the prosecution presented no particularized evidence that 

the vehicle would be vulnerable to vandalism or theft in its current 

location. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 968 F.3d 123, 127 

(1st Cir. 2020) (“No evidence suggests personal property was visible 

inside the car, and the officers do not claim that the car faced any 

greater threat than that faced by any other car lawfully parked in 

the neighborhood.”); Cervantes, 703 F.3d at 1141-42 (“[T]he 

government presented no evidence that the vehicle would be 

vulnerable to vandalism or theft if it were left in its residential 

location, or that it posed a safety hazard, and thus failed to meet its 

burden to show that the community caretaking exception applied.”);

Commonwealth v. Brinson, 800 N.E.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Mass. 2003) 

 

5 We mention these particular cases because the People rely on 

them in their answer brief. 
17

(“[U]nder a community caretaking analysis, impoundment of 

lawfully parked cars requires a showing of likelihood of threat or 

vandalism. There was no such showing here.”) (citation omitted); 

State v. Slockbower, 397 A.2d 1050, 1055 (N.J. 1979) (“When the 

instant defendant was apprehended, there appears by contrast to 

have been no reason why defendant could not have been permitted 

to park his car properly and lock it, just as he would have done if 

he had had any business in the neighborhood.”).

¶ 27 We agree with those courts from other jurisdictions that 

require particularized evidence of a likelihood of vandalism or theft 

to justify impounding the vehicle for safekeeping. Where officers 

can identify no reason to believe that the vehicle would be at 

unusual risk of vandalism or theft if it were left where it was 

parked, assuming the care and control of the vehicle and its 

contents “could only increase the risk of liability.” United States v. 

Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that “there is no 

tort for omission by state actors” with regard to protecting property 

from private injury); see Brown I, ¶ 24 (“Stated in the simplest 

terms, ‘[t]he state owes no legal duty to protect things outside its 

custody from private injury.’” (quoting Duguay, 93 F.3d at 353)). 
18

¶ 28 Here, the People justify the need to protect the vehicle on the 

sole basis that the vehicle would be left unattended at night. But 

the prosecution below presented no evidence that the vehicle’s 

location in the residential neighborhood (six blocks from Thomas’s 

home) made it vulnerable to vandalism. That is, the prosecution 

presented no evidence that parking a vehicle overnight in that 

location created an appreciable risk of vandalism or theft, or that 

Thomas’s arresting offense would cause the vehicle to remain 

unattended for an extended period of time before he could post bail. 

Indeed, the evidence presented at the hearing suggested that the 

vehicle would not have been left unattended for long because 

Thomas’s wife, the co-owner, was only a short distance away and 

could have taken custody of it.6 Cf. Andas-Gallardo, 3 F. App’x at 

963 (impoundment reasonable where, among other things, there 

was no evidence suggesting how long it might take the defendant or 

his family to retrieve the vehicle). Finally, the prosecution 

 

6 We do not suggest that Officer Valdez was required to wait with 

the vehicle until Thomas’s wife appeared. We note merely that the 

officer had reason to believe that the vehicle would not be left 

unattended for long if he simply left it locked and legally parked. It 

appears that the only reason the officer did not do so was his 

attempt to comply with the department’s impoundment policy.
19

presented no evidence that any peculiar characteristics such as 

broken windows or plainly visible valuables made the vehicle a 

tempting target for thieves. In any event, Thomas provided proof of 

ownership and testified that he asked the officer to allow him to call 

his wife to retrieve the vehicle from where it was parked, thereby 

assuming the risk of vandalism and theft if his wife did not do so. 

¶ 29 Given all this, we conclude that the prosecution failed to 

demonstrate that it was necessary to seize the vehicle to protect it 

against loss. Rather, the record indicates that Thomas could have 

safeguarded his vehicle in the same manner as any person who 

legally parks a vehicle in a residential neighborhood — by locking it 

until he or his wife retrieved the vehicle. 

¶ 30 Finally, we address the People’s argument that the officer 

needed to impound the vehicle because Thomas did not provide 

proof of current insurance and the vehicle could not lawfully be 

operated without valid insurance. See § 42-4-1409(1), C.R.S. 2020 

(providing that no person shall operate an uninsured motor vehicle). 

We reject this argument for two reasons. 

¶ 31 First, the prosecution offered no evidence of standardized 

criteria or policies requiring (or permitting) officers to impound 
20

uninsured vehicles. See Allen, ¶¶ 8, 21 (concluding that the seizure 

of a car due to the lack of proof of insurance was unreasonable 

where the prosecution did not present evidence that the seizure was 

done in accordance with standardized criteria or policies). Second, 

our supreme court in Brown II, ¶ 13, rejected a similar argument 

where the defendant could not lawfully remove the vehicle because 

his license had been suspended. After noting that the power to 

impound a vehicle pursuant to community caretaking 

responsibilities is distinct from the power to investigate illegal 

activity, the court held, “[a]lthough the officers may have reason to

suspect that the driver will unlawfully drive the vehicle upon their 

departure, the community caretaking exception . . . cannot support 

seizures on the basis of suspicion that the driver has committed, is 

committing, or will commit a crime.” Brown II, ¶ 15; see also People 

v. Quick, 2018 CO 28, ¶ 8 (same). Likewise here, the officer could 

not impound the vehicle solely on the suspicion that Thomas or 

someone else would later operate it without insurance. 

¶ 32 In sum, because neither the safekeeping rationale nor any 

other community caretaking function applied here, the prosecution 

failed to meet its burden to prove that the seizure of Thomas’s 
21

vehicle fell within the community caretaking exception to the 

Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Accordingly, the 

seizure was unreasonable, and the fruits of the subsequent 

inventory search should have been suppressed. See Brown II, ¶ 17. 

Given that the People offer no argument that admitting the 

contested evidence was harmless, we reverse. See Hagos v. People,

2012 CO 63, ¶ 11 (holding that the People bear the burden of 

establishing that an error of constitutional magnitude was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt). 

IV. Conclusion

¶ 33 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.7 

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE YUN concur.

 

7 Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal —

Thomas’s convictions for failure to stop a vehicle at a stop sign, 

turning without signaling, and failure to display proof of insurance 

— remain undisturbed.