... : 

. Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O , 

.

,'./' ~ ... :... ~ ' 

. r. ~ .. 

: ' ~ • •• > 

·.,. .: lOP SECREf. · ,.,. · i1111111111i11111'11111m11J~~~l'!~~~1111111111111~11111111_ . ·-.. -. -~·7(T·-.--- .. -, .-. > ·~~ : 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY : · :· · · . ' ,;···l"' ,_,···.I WASHINGTON ae. D. c. I ·.,,,,' 

•. ·. ' : ·~ ,'.' ~ ' . 1 • . 

'OFFICE OF. THE. OIREC101r ' 

.· ·: . 

\ 

The Honorabl~ ~lexande~ Flax 

Director 

I 

' .1 t .• ~ ~ . 

National Reco~naissance 

Washington, n;. c. 

Office 

Dear Dr. Flax~. 

'•, 

. ' .·_,..;, 

. . 

J . : ... '. 

'> '" ..... 

Attached is a copy of the OXCART Deployment : 

Proposal prepared in briefing form. I sincerely 

hope you will ,f,.ave an opportunity to study it. ,~ 

,~··:' 

; I hope tq·discuss this· Proposal with I ; • .. 

Presid.nt S«?~n. ,. ···-; .,. '.-;,. · " . · 

; .~~·~ ·'I . _:.·: '.\. rJ 1

: ~.~~.t~ ~; ~~.:~\ ;'t ~ ·._:, .. \~·}:_J ~ 

. .

0,._ Sincerely, 

the::·"· 

'• ., • .. ., , 

'.:j-~r.. 

. •. 

. . ~.. / 

41 

.• . I 

"· 

, W. F. R~born :~ .. ; \ 

' l. !. ~ ~ .• ' ~ • Director 

'··:· :· 

' '. " ~· ' 

·': .. 

,'.... 

'>,'. , .. ·. ·.~ ·~ ' 

~t:tachment : ';· .. :.::, 

on I·:-· .,......,._. -· 

·.··.'' , . '• ,· 

,. ' 

< / .. ·, .. , 

•• )\I' 

'· . t_ 

.·: .. 

.. , .. 

· DIAXXJA CONTROLLED ... \.' 

I.··, 

.. :; BYE-0086-66/1 

Copy No. "f 5' 

Handle Via 

BYEMAN TALENT-KEYHOLE COMINT 

. Controls Jointly 

.,·.,, 

~:. 

· .. ; 
" ~ .. 

ii ' • }iAr:tD1..E: VIA BYt::MAN ' 

ct:ON'i'ROI.,; SYSTEM ONI..'( , . 

. ···, .... 

8\'·'!':~ ~~rt_~1;.'&r:j' 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O • Ill .._,,.. 'ltwf'w.Jlle.lr& ........ 

,I 

.I 

. I 

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL I 

WASHINGTON 25, D,C:. 

1%6 

.. 11 ···ss ;::>1-1.r 

1-I 09. 29 ; . 

29 April 1981 

ME~ZORANDUM FOR THE PRES I DENT 

SUBJECT: OXCART Deployment Proposal 

' \ 

.'. 

1. I want to invite your attention to the critical need 

for adequaie int~lligenc~ in order to detect a possible 

Chinese Communist strategic buildup in South China and North 

Vietnam which might lead ,to their direct involvement in the V~a~nam war. I· consider foreknowledge of.any Chinese intent ~o intervene ·in the Vietnam war to be ~o vital to the national 

interest that tbe full collection resources available to the 

United States G.Overnment should be committed to the acquisitl:ori of intelligf'-ice in this connection. 

. 2. The collection of intelligence to give early warning 

oi possible Chinese Communist intervention in the Vietnam war 

has been assigri$d highest priority by the Intelligence Community. It ls my conviction, shared by the United States 

:Intelligence Board, that high resolution overhead photography 

is a~sential to pbtain such ·intelligence. The Joint Chiefs 

of Staff likew'ise are on record that every me-ans be exploited . ,as a matter of highes~ priority to' obtain high resolution 

photographic coverage of ground force installations, major 

complexes, and key lines of communication in the South China 

and North Vietnam areas. The collection task involves adequate 

initial coverage and subsequent periodic coverage of 29 heavily 

def ended targets in North Vietnam and 137 targets in South . China. Present coverage is inadequate both as to extent and . timeliness. 

' . I 

3. Currently, satellite photographic missions are being 

programmed to achieve the maximum coverage of key targets. in 

South China and" North Vie.tnam. However, because of design 

characteristics of the vehicle and weather conditions in the 

. . BYE #009.4-66 

Copy 

f';f'll'l_ I 11111111!! ... • ' 

• 

HANOl..E VIA BYEMAN 

'CONTROL. SYSTa1 ONl..Y. . ' 

. ---~~... . . 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O as 
,., 

·.,.· 

• • HANOl..E'. VIA 

·co...,;iROl.. SYSTE 

BYE ,#0094-66 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05~9621 O 

N 

area, satellite photography has Bnly a ve~f limited Gapasility ~a p~avide the desired intelligence. fn South ehina, OftC 

(Chinese Nationalist) U-2 missions are being scheduled and it 

. . . . is e~p~~ie4, ~h~t they w~il ~rovide som~ useful coverage; h?wever, . t~e suPvivability of this aircraft against strengthened Chinese 

air defense facilities is pecoming increasingly doubtful. · 

·~ . 

. I 

: Heavy concentrations of air defenses have rendered many of the · highest priority target areas in North Vietnam relatively inacces'sible to U-2's. Drone missions into this area have . provided some coverage,·but the reliability of continued cover- . . age is uncertain~ I am of the firm belief, therefore, that we 

.cannot rely on the presently committed collection assets to 

provide the timely data base line and th~ subsequent periodic 

coverage we need to dete~mine change. I 

4. In Decembe:i;- 1965 ·the OXCART aircraft and systems 1 

including countermeasure defensive systems, were deemed 

operationally ready. This is the most advanced capability 

for col1ecting μ.;·~h resolution photography available to' the•' 

U.S. Governme~t~ · It is judged to be virtually immune to air ., · de:t!i~·n's:es ,in' the ~outh China and North Vietnam areas. ":.It is re~·dy for 'action and I be·l;i.eve it should be committed to help 

fill this urgent intelligence ~eed. The OXCART can be de~ 

ployed to a base in Okinawa and be ready for operational missions . ~pproximately three weeks from go-ahead . • I I " . • ~.:·;t. 11 

5J 1 An ob~~acle to achieving agreement ~o commit the 

.·OXCART vehicle bas been the belief that such a step might be · misinterpreted by the Chinese Communists as pr~paration by 

'· .. the U.S. for aggressive moves against China. The United States 

Intelligence Community and I do not share this belief. It is 

my view that the Chinese probably would soon come to regard 

the OXCART as another stage in a continuing U.S. collection 

program, and that they would not be led to take any drastic 

new military action unless there were other simultaneous U.S. 

overt actions which coul~ be interpreted by them as an intent 

to attack China. Barring the loss of an OXCART aircraft over 

Chinese territory, . I would not expect the Chinese to react in 

a way as to si~nificantly affect U.S. national interests. We 

have also a~sessed probable r~actions of other countries to 

the use of OXCART and I am attaching a Special National Intelli- , gence Estimate qn this overall subject. 

"•' 

'i 

_. ,·, '.. 

·.··.·. 

HANOL.E VIA BYEMA.N 

~N.T.ROJ.:. SYSTE:M ONL.Y, 

-2-

. Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O 
Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O 

.i.ANC?LE: VIA BY 

'.CONiROI.. SYSTEM 

BYE #0094-66 

--~·u; r-· r-vq l ""lei""' - ,'i •a !.J I' t • '" ri ll ua . ~t~rfa. a 

6. From, the standpoint of the urgengy of the intelligenoe · ~sqUi~@m~nt, X w~uld prefer to reaemmend to you that the . OXCART vehicle be committed as scjn as possible for operational 

missions over both South China and North Vietnam .. I am · presently proposing, however, immediate use of OXCART principally over North Vietnam with but minor penetration of South 

China. I am doing this because the GRC U-2's still offer some 

prospect of adequate coverage in the South China area and I 

believe it pr~dent to assure that this capability cannot fulfill the requirement before recommending full commitmerit of 

the OXCART in this politically sensitive area. In the event 

the GRC'U-2,· together with satellite photography, proves 

incapable of fuifilling the requirement, ·I would expect to . recommend to you the full operational commitment of the OXCART 

over South China. ' 

7. A factor which significantly affects the collection · of ove.rhea.d photography in South China and North Vietnam is 

the weather. The climate· in this area deteriorates sharply·· 

in the summer wonths from June through August. This condition 

limits the cap4bility of all overhead reconnaiss~nce assets.· 

At.the same time, however, it points up the need for a . relatively inv\Jlnerable, reliable, quick reaction capability, 

·.·such, as OXCARTy to maximize the exploitation of decreasing 

opportunities f-0r ph~tographic coverage during the summer ~­

months. 

·,'' 11, 

,'•' 

;i 

111 

8. In summary, ·then, I a~ re~ommending to you: 

a. That the OXCART vehicle b~ deployed • 

immediately to Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. 

b. That the OXCART vehicle be used as soon 

as possible following deployment for photographic 

coverage of highest priority intelligence targets 

.in North Vietnam. 

c. That the OXCART vehicle be held in 

readiness for backup photographi~ coverage of 

China should 'GRC U-2 and satellite missions 

1. '·.· 

... 

-3-

. ' 

. '.• 

I ' • 'HANDl..E VIA BYEMAN 

:CONTROt: SYSTEM ON!.."il 

'. 

pproved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O 

. ' . 

,. . 
' I 

'·' 

... 

}iA/'WLE VIA BYE:MAN 

t::ONTROI.. SYSTEM . ONI.. y 

I· 

BYE #0094-66 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O 

. :·. 

. ' 

·~ .. 

.,, 

prove incapable of fulfilling the intelligence requirem~nts. ,\ l 

9. I am attaching ai:iditional data to support .the conclusions and recommendations above. 

·.w. F. Raborn 

Director of Central Intelligence. < • \ ' ' 

Attachment~: 

A. · SNIE #10-2-66: "Reactions to· 

Certain US Courses of Action" ;, 

B. Briefing Book: "OXCART. 

Deplo_Ymen1: Proposal" ...•. ·. · .. ·· 

/' •' 

.. :• ':.:' :, 

• . ., , - '. ,,' '._,·: 

~. . ' ... ' 

1· .... ·.,, , .. ,, ...... ' 

.··'. 

' ~"; ' 

.. . ~ . ,, : 

. I . ., •, 

. : .... 

.. 

'• !! 

•• 

.. . . 

. ,\·.· 

! ' 

•, 

'HANOl..E: . VIA BY~VIAN 

:c:::oNTROX.: SYSTi:M .0.~J..:X: 

,, i·; '·' +'. 

•."• 

,I .. "• 

A roved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C0509621 O· .