### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Ja nua ry 24, 200 6 S es sio n

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . KAMAL MUHAMMAD

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-D- 2648 Seth Norm an, Jud ge

No. M2004- 03067-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 17, 2006

The a ppellant, Kama l Mu h am m ed
, was indi cted with sec ond offe nse driving under the influence

. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of the indicted offe nse. As a r esult, he wa s sentence d to eleven months and twenty -nine day s. All but seventy -five day s of the sente nce w ere suspended. The a ppellant cha lleng es his conviction on appe al, arg uing tha t the State failed to prove venue a nd that he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. We aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined.

J ere my Gourley , Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Kama l Muhammed.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ral a ndRe po rt e r; Ma rk A. F ulk s, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. J ohnson, District Attorney Gene ral; and Scott McMurtry , Assistant District A ttorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

On April 18, 2004, at a pproxi mately

9:40 p.m., Offi cer Coleman Womack of the Metropolitan Nashville Police De partment wa s on specia l assig nment doing D UI interdiction in the

are a of the Nashville Airport. Offic er Womack was tra veling along Donelson Pike when the

app e lla nt d ro ve tow ardhim a t a hig h r a te of

sp e e d. Of

fi c e r Wo ma c k tu rn e d ar ou nd so that he c ou ld follow and pace the appellant. Offic er Womack initiated a traff ic stop a fter he deter mined that the

app e lla nt w a s d ri vin g app ro xima te ly se ve nty mil e s- pe r- ho ur a nd wi tne sse d the app e lla nt’ s v e hic le cross the c enter

line.-2-

During the stop, Offic er Womack noticed the appellant’s blood-shot and watery ey es, slurre d speec h and an odor

of alcoholic bever ag es. Acc ording to the office r, the a ppellant admitted that he had consume d six beer s over the c ourse of the day at a party hosted by his br other. As the appe llant exit ed his car , he was unsteady on his fee t. Offic er W omack asked t he appellant to perf orm sever al fi e ld s ob ri e ty

ta sk s, the wa lk- a nd -tur n a ndthe on e -l e g g e d s ta nd . T he app ell ant wa s u na ble to

sa tis fa c torily

c omp le te the wa lk- a nd -tur n an d co mpl a ine d of a dis abil ity that wou ld not a llo w h im to stand on one leg . Offic er Womack rea d the appellant the implied c onsent law at that time and the appellant a g ree d to take a br eatha ly zer test.

Offic er Womack summoned a DUI office r to the scene

. Whil e they waited, Of fice r Womack closely observe d the appe llant for twenty minutes d u ring which the a ppellant did not reg urg itate, burp, coug h, chew g um or have anything in his mouth. Offic er Womack felt that the a ppellant was not capa ble of driving safe ly

. Serg eant Da vid Slessinger , a ce rtified DUI office r, ar

rived on the scene ne ar the intersec tion of Done lson Pi k e a n d I n te r s tate 4 0

. T h e ap p e ll a n t a d mi tt e d to O f f ic e r Sl e s s in g e r th a t h e had

c on su me d s ix be e rs ov e r the c ou rs e of the da y . Of

fi cer Sle ssi ng e r n oti c e d a n o do r o f a lc oh oli c beve ra ges about the appellant’s pe rson. The br eatha ly zer test indicated that the a ppellant had a breath-alcohol c ontent of .13 per cent.

At tr ia l, c ou nsel for th e appel la nt m ov e d to dis mis s th e c a se on the g ro un ds that th e Sta te failed to prove venue. T he trial court denied the motion. The appellant wa s convicted by a jury of

sec o n d o f f e n s e D U I a n d s e n te n c e d b y th e tria l c o u r t to e le v e n mo n th s a n d tw e n ty

- n in e d a y s

. The trial court suspended al l but seventy -five day s of the appe llant’s sentenc e. Subsequently , the

app e lla nt f

ile d a mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l, a rg uin g that t he Stat e fa ile d to pr ov e ve nu e a ndthat hi s sentenc e wa s ex cessive, among other thing s. After the denial of

the motion for new tr ial, the appellant a

ppeale d. On appe al, the following issues are prese nted for our revie w: (1) whe ther the Sta te fa ile d to pr ov e ve nu e ; a nd (2 ) wh e the r the app e lla nt r e c e ive d in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l.

An a ly sis

Venue

First, t h e appe llant complains that the trial court erre d by failing to gr ant the appe llant’s mot ion to d ism iss a t th e c los e of the Sta te ’s pr oo f. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e app e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e Sta te failed to prove venue in Da vidson County . The State disag ree s.

Article I , Section 9 of t he Tennessee Constit ution and Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Proce dure 18 pr ov ide that a n ac c us e d is ent itl e d to tr ia l in the c ou nty in w hic h th e of

fe ns e is c omm itt e d. Smith v. State, 607 S.W .2d 906, 907 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . Venue i s a j u risdictional matter a nd not an ele ment o f th e c r im e c h a r g e d

. St a te v

. H u tc h e r s o n , 7 9 0 S. W. 2 d 5 3 2
, 5 3 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 0 ) . The burden is on the pr osecution to prove tha t the offe nse wa s committed in the county provided in the-3-

indictment. Ellis v. C arlton, 986 S .W.2d 600, 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citing Har vey v. State, 376 S.W .2d 497, 498 (Tenn. 1964)). Venue may be shown by a preponde ranc e of t h e evidence which may

be either direc t or circumstantial. Ricky Har ris v. State, No. 03C01- 9611-CR-00410, 1998 WL 191441, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Apr. 23, 1998), pe rm. app. de nied (Te nn. 19 98 ) ( c iti ng Ho pp e r v . St a te , 3 26 S.W. 2d 44 8, 45 1 (T e nn

. 19 59 ))

. Slig ht e vid e nc e wi th r e sp e c t to

venue w ill be enoug h to car ry the burden of proof if that evidenc e is uncontra dicted. State v. Smith, 926 S.W .2d 267, 269 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The que stion of venue is for the jury to determine, and a jury is entitled to draw rea sonable inferenc es from proven facts a s to the issue of venue . See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 18(a); State v. J ohnson, 673 S.W .2d 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984)

.

An e xami na tio n o f the re c or d h e re in r e ve a ls tha t a t no tim e du ri ng the tr ia l did the Sta te a sk the direc t and important question, “Did these events occur in Davidson County , Tenne ssee? ” Ha d this been done, the re w ould be no issue on appea l. Neve rtheless, the proof e stablished that Offic er Coleman Womack worke d for the “ Metro Police De partment” and wa s assig ned to patrol the a rea
covering “ I ng lewood and East Nashville.” On the nig ht in question, Office r Womack wa s on patrol “in the Done lson area , around Donelson Pike, Mur fre esboro Road, Elm Hill Pike are a” “ in front of the airport.” More importa ntly
, Offic er Womack testified that the traff ic stop involving the appe llant

occur red ne ar the intersec tion of “Done lson Pi ke and I -40.” O ffice r Womack summo n ed Officer Slessinger

to the scene to administer the bre athaly zer test and Of fice r Slessinge r testified that he was not a ssigne d to a zone “ other than Davidson County .” We de termine from our e x amination of the

re c or d th a t th e re is s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e fo r the jury to i nf e r tha t th e of

fe ns e of DU I oc c ur

re d w ith in the bo un da

ri e s o f D a vid so n Co un ty . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

I neff ective A ssistance of Counsel

Next, the appellant complains that he wa s denied the r ight to ef fec tive assistance of counse l

a t tr ia l. Th e Sta te c on te nd s tha t the iss ue is wa ive d for fa ilu re to br ing it i n th e mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l.

We have repe atedly war ned that the decision to i nclude this issue on direc t appea l is “fraug ht with peril.” State v. Jim my L . Sluder, No. 1236, 19 9 0 W L 2 6 5 5 2
, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App., a t Knoxvi lle, Mar. 14, 1990), perm. app. denied, ( Tenn. 1990). T he def endant r isks having the issue

re so lve d f ina lly “ wi tho ut a n e vid e nti ary

he ari ng wh ic h, if

he ld, mig ht b e the on ly

wa y ha rm c ou ld be sho wn--a

prer equisite for r elief in inef fec tive trial counsel c laims.” J immyWay ne Wilson v. State, No. 909, 1991 WL

87245, at *6 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, May 29, 1991).

I n o the r w or ds , c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l ar e g e ne ra lly

mor e app ro pr ia te ly

ra ise d in a pe tit ion fo r po st- c on vic tio n re lie f rathe r tha n on dir e c t app e a l. Se e Sta te v. Carr uth e rs , 35 S.W. 3d51 6, 55 1 (T e nn . 200 0) ; see a lso Sta te v. An de rs on , 8 35 S.W. 2d60 0, 60 6 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1992). More over, onc e the merits of an ineff ective a ssistance of co u n s el cl aim have be en addre ssed on direc t appea l, the issue may not be re visited in a p ost-conviction proc eeding . See B ob by Al le n Joy ne r v . St a te , N o. 03 C01 -9 80 7- CR- 00 26 0, 19 99 WL 31 88 32 , a t *2 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , a t K no xvill e , M a y

19 , 1 99 9) , p e rm . a

pp . d e nie d, (T e nn . 1 99 9)

. Th us , the be tte r p ra c tic e is t o-4-

re se rv e the iss ue fo r a po st- c on vic tio n p ro c e e din g in the e ve nt the dir e c t app e a l is un su c c e ssf ul. Br andon, 2002 WL

31373470, at *2.

The a ppellant claims that trial counse l was ineff ective f or the following rea sons: (1 ) trial counsel fa iled to call him to testify at hi s sentenc ing hear ing; (2) t rial counsel did not fully explore the def ense; a nd (3) tria l counsel fa iled to properly pursue the motion to suppress.

This Court reviews a

claim of inef

fec tive assistance of counsel under the standar ds of B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930 (Tenn. 1975) , and Strickland v. Washing ton, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner has the bur den to p rove tha t (1) the a ttorney ’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt, and (2) the de fi c ie nt p e rf

or ma nc e re su lt ed in pr e

jud ic e to the de fe nd a nt s o a s to de pr ive him of a fa ir tr ia l. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Goad v. State, 938 S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) ; Butler v. State, 789 S.W .2d 898, 899 (Tenn. 1990) . The fa ilure to prove e ither deficiency or prejudice jus tifies denial of re lie f; the re fo re , the c ou rt ne e d not ad dr e ss the c omp on e nts in an y pa rt ic ula r o rd e r o r e ve n a dd re ss both if one is insufficient. Goa d, 938 S.W .2d at 370. I n order to e stablish prejudice, the petitioner must establish a “re asonable probability that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the pr oc e e din g wo uldha ve be e n d if fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob abil ity

is a pr ob abil ity

su ff ic ie nt t o undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

I n order to determine w hether

counsel provide d eff

ective as s i s tance , we e x amine whe ther

c ou ns e l’ s p e rf

or ma nc e wa s wi thi n th e ra ng e of c omp e te nc e de ma nd e d o f atto rn e y s in c ri min a l c a se s. Ba x ter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. The petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel’s c onduct fa lls wi thi n th e wi de ra ng e of a c c e pta ble pr of e ssi on a l a ssi sta nc e

. Str ic kla nd
, 46 6 U. S. a t 68 9; S ta te v. Honey cutt, 54 S.W .3d 762, 769 (Tenn. 2001) . Therefo re , i n o rd er to prove a def iciency , a petitioner must show “that counse l’s acts or omissions were so serious as to fall below an obje ctive standard of

rea sonablene ss under pre vailing pr ofessional norms.” Goad, 938 S.W .2d at 369 (c iting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).

Th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e pr e se nte d a t th e he ari ng on the motion f or new tr ia l to su pp ort hi s
c la im that tr ia l c ou ns e l wa s de fi c ie nt be c a us e the iss ue wa s no t r a ise d in the mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l. This issue is waived. Tenn. r. App. P . 3(e) ; State v. Meade , 942 S.W .2d 561, 566 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE