0011,41111 Ocmclusions

The G

regarding the nature roup has reached a number of genera conclusions and recommendations

of the p flight which we feel the United rogram in the field of satellites and space

S

tates should undertake. They are as • follows:

1. There should be a sound, well-coordinated National proven leading • • into large sa

CO've all tellites. It should not be limited in scope but should' aspects of satellite and apace night. The Group that at least 10% of the Au:ding of such a program be devoted to •

relevant research and exploratory expeilmentation.

2. The first major step in the National program impressive pot ihould'exploit the

to be entialities of the MN boosters, which woad appear capable 

even for of satisfying most of the military satellite objectives

apace flight. The the long term, as will as many of the initial, problems ot Group r

vehicle development ecommends that a program emphasizing minimum effort be initiated immediately, with concurrent Planning for longer term exploitation, i stages of the MN vehicles. ncluding improved high speed

3. 

Th. larger ICBM's will make it possible to carry out elaborate militaz7 and other missions, including many studies in is an initial effort in this space medicine. 16-1171, direction and the G

tinuation, but 2.1E022441 that the roup s*ports ite-con- N

efforts toward the fullof the ICU ational program include alternative

military and non4ilitary applications. potentia/s for both

I. In all phases of the N

phOuld be org ational program the military and scientific needs anized so as to be mutually reinforcing; and the Group !moral/At that vehicles be specifically allocated as needed, for the variousi railitary and scientific uses. Details of such allocations should be determined by the Department of Defense in consultation with the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation.

The Group also makes the f

ollowing more specific comments and recommendations:

AU three of the military services have stated their support of a national s

acleartific needs. atellite and space flight program serving both military and

military, All three of the military services have stated that the highest priority; requirements for satellites are for Other common military requirements exist ?eLonnaissance and surveillance12

for sa llites as aids to navi- gation/ in communications, and for weather data collection (see Table II),

5

SECRET 
SECRET k

All three military services Presented short-term programs using an IMM

2

booster capable of launching 300 to 500-pound-satellites on about

00umile orbits. Prom the technical standpOint the Group considers both JUPITER and THOR equivalent for these purposes when havelbeeh developed to the point where they are sufficient4 rethliab eyle.

tipecific reconnaissance methods for the 300 to 500-pound satellites Included an Air Farce proposal using film recovery techniques and an Arm' proposal for television type reconnaissance. The latter

could be tested in a 100-pound satellite which mig be available

as the hest

nooner.

The Group recommendt test of both of these tee

es

tional allocation of potential vehicles in the thort-tdem program should also be made for scientific test purposes other •

military requirements and space exploration. The scale of the program should aim toward a launching capacity of at least 

aos a month- in 1959. It appears that,a great expansion of this rate will be required as soon

required. as feasible, and coordinated military Rimming 

is therefore urgently

5. Orbits of higher inclination than Base Florida (which those possible at Patrick Air Force is I limited to orbits of between 28 and ladegreees nclination) are essential ibr military 

applications and will requir launching sites which will make it possible to launch satellites into polar oebits. Camp Cooke is one such site. The facility requirements at Patrick, Cooke and possiblyelsew additional site and

4r here for the rapid expanding program must 'aimu be determined and ltaneonsly. The Group r implemented ecommends that, as one of the first steps in any enlarged satellite program,' steps be taken to activate Cooke or equivalent sites suitable Camp far polar orbit launchinge immediately.

6. The inventory of national resources in 

orbiting ueefUl payloads rocket systems capable of now or within the next several years include the VANGUARD, JUPITER V", JUPITER, TROR, ATLAS and TITAN. of these boosters will be coming into maturity The larger

about two years hence and should provide a capability of orbiting useful payloads up to abo

at

ut 3,00 

s

0 pounds

cions for unda at 300 milea altitude and escape velocity appli- m

payloads. Larger payload., will require that an

intensive research and development effort be directed toward siderabley larger propulsion Con. units or high- Propulsion should en

component development

energy

for maximu

propellants,

m capability should 

lay

Objective of attairdn

be focused 

on high-capacity turbospumps and combustion chambers toward

an rust or greater in a g a propulsion capability of 1 million pounds

program l

th,

single unit. The Group recommends that a formal,

leading to high thrust rocket engines be initiated.

The Group also resongggs increased support for research and engineering delop- ve meats Witaliiiiii .energy propellants, storable pr basic technological fields opellants, and the other contributing to high performance rocket applications. An increased effort on the development long-lived Components will be of high significance in ofdetermini

highly reliable,

determining overall utility of satellites. the

6
I SECRET (

Unmanned (instrumented) explorations of the moon, Venus and Mars appear to be feasible within the capabilities of chemical propellants and

presently planned systems. Preliminary lunar- tests could be performed

within the capabity of the MtB14 systems and should be included in the early part of that program.

/fanned exploration of the moons Mars, and Venus nay ultimately be feasible within the capability of chemical propellant systems.

The X-15 project represents the most advanced current project leading

in the direction of manned space flight. While the Group did not

formally review the X-15 project, it observes that any manned space

flight program should draw on the experience of the X-15 program.

A preliminary presentation of the problem onirroti-satelLite missiles1

was presented to the Group by the Navy. The up feels that this

subject is in urgent need of Airther study by the military services..

11. The Navy also presented some consideration of the possibility of

airborne satellite launching. While the Group does not necessarily

indorse . this aoproach, a more complete study leading to clarification of this question would be desirable.

SECRET
Discussrou

•

General

The Group's first general conclusion is a logical c orollary of the Is points which it accepted at the outset, and which have been supported by all of the presentations of the Military Departments.

we The Nation needs a sound,

ll-coordinated, and firmly conducted program leading to large satellites and manned mace flight.

•

The N

ational interests require that certain devices be placed in operation at the earliest possible date. The Group has tried to show in this report how the moat useful, of these devices ter both military and scientific purposes can be realised at the earliest practicable dates.

The urgency of these projects has dictated the maximum possible use of existing equipment, particularly the large engines and other Components. How. ever the Group emphasizes that in a field as new as the one here considered it

this

is iizpossible to specify in detail the boat possible long-range programs. For reason, great emphasis must be placed on relevant research and experimentation of an exploratory nature. The Group therefore 

10 percent recommends that not less than of available Alois of the National program be devoted to these purposes.

The second general conclusion, and the one upon which the 

should be placed, calla for greatest emphasis

potentialities of the IR1314 

immediate action to take advantagee of the impressive

boosters. If the decision on this point is promp tly made, either THOR or JUPfl' could be used toplace 300 to 400-nd

on polar orbits at 200 nautical miles altitude by early 1959. pera

a payload capabilit would Moreover, such satiskr 

req the most ent of the military satellite urg uirements in the r

eccnnaissance and surveillance categories and with some

1 some time to come. • development might t care of many of the stated military re

quirements for

The 1RBM boosters are now well advanced in flight tests

ye

a degree of reliability adequate for satellite applications atan ttain

ld east

shoul

or more before eq aar uivalent status is reached with the ICBM. A 300 to b.00-pound

satellite payload seems to be about the minimum that would 

desired military applications with accommodate the

jectives. Such a payload adequate lifetime to accomplish the ob- capability would also accommodate many of necessary tests preliminary to manned spa er, some the recent ce flight. More of

the

studies confirm the practicability of extending the satellite

Of the IRBX booster to at least a thousand pounds by 1960.

One stud payloady concludes

capahilitr

that the LRBAl

i booster could probably launch a modified US-117L vehicle 1959 during and advocates a program merging this interim effort with the longer term

A1TAS-117L program with accompanying advantages in the latter developmen

Group, therefore attaches the greatest importance to lineedia te action i

t.. The

of using the earliest available 15231•1 1 n support

promise of yip

g earliest a boosters because such a program,has the results with relatively sllites beat

or '

reconnaissance, imple sate and has also significant promise of longer term benefits.

8

•

.

SECRET
SECRET ( •

The third general conclusion supports the program, and recommends _

continuation of the 16...11, simultaneous and complement 71.

. vehicle system to both ary

and non-military uses. 2191 mor

application of this

military missions require d e elaborate

ity, high evelopment of the maximum satellite payload caps- er altitude orbits more , precise fti ecise stabilization and - conol of the . satellite, and longer useihl, life With attendant increases in power and payload i

ncreases. The more elaborate scientific other experiments imp :requirements on the satellite vehicle. The 11:324 boosters, the ose similar

lon

largest resently entering test, have the g

litary 1003 reatest potential for both military and

:will be required as soon as 

as the second a tip in the Nationalprogram. available for advanced military applic These

ations

vehicles

,

!instru

eats mented soft landings on the moon,

:testa and expturiments with large animals, and other

development leading to space /light. Up to the present, significant ;limited support of the WS.7L project; 

of the more elaborate satellite systems has been 'confined to very

and the development phases

s

:project have emphasized th reccnnaiesance-surveillance aspectijof militaryy

aPPlicattene• The Poteoti es of 11:3-1171. for other impartaa.applications

the also also fields

greaterr in such things as communications, weather forecasting, and ny

and controlled pure science that would require an accurately .stabilised satellite vehicle. It i therefore clear that the National Iprog

rammust, while placing the highest

s

 Immediate priority upon isimsd from EBN boosters, also avoid stifling agy satellite satellites de. development that

ICE/I :could fully exploit the next largest capability which will be available with the b

oosters. Not to recegnize this advanced need and support it now could ;cell bring on hewly p

enalties later. Early and effective

more

;elaborate satellite ayatema is necessary now if they are to be re

support of the the

; booster capability to launch them ie realized. ady when

IFor these reasons rille21{1.3 sons the Group rec that the National program include

and

alternati

milita

ve efforts leading to the d non-ry app evelopment of satellite payloads for military lications which could exploit the full 

potential of the ICBM, i

The fourth g - • eneral conclusion recognizes 

of the military and scientific par

the mutually reinforcing ts of the program. Advanced milital aspects

y develop..

meats depend 'upon advances in science.

! The 311414 tally necessity for intensive support of scienceparti

in this field is axiomatic. At the same time •

the pace of the engineering

cularly

development

of the basic boosters will be set p extensive and rimaril,y ty military necessity. They require expensive ground launching installations; range or safety patrols and precautions; and the are beset by ma 

be wrong to let the more y obvious and hazards in handling. But it would ny

immediate military necessities overshadow

the

discoveriespro by in the view of the Group, timely action. The proper action here, is to make specific allocations of satellite vehicles

det

for both military and scientific U393. Details of such allocations should be ermined by the Department of Defense drawing upon the experience and 

. the assistance Group so reconnende.

of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Science Foundation, and

•

SECRET

•
SECRET (

•

The Croup has made &number of norespecific comments and iii a recommendations mplification of the general conclusions discussed in the foregoing Most orthese specific Observations paragraphs.

are self-explanatory in their sumnary form.

- Among the specific recommendations the highest priority 

earliest possible development of is placed on the a military satellite of the 300-pOund class

pos

siblywithin one year. Such a satellite mief well givelkighly valuable and timely military information that means vi could be obtained by no other foreseeable in that periodi Two schemes were described to the Groups one biota hotographic an offers the chance of recovering photographic fi.Isq the other s basically a spot-scan television technique with radio to eartha transmission

The Group recommends testing of both of these tehniqu priority of the immediate program. c es as the highest

Per all of the military applications and for most of the scientific or

commercial uses of satellites a launching site iron which satellites can be placed on polar orbits is necessary. An latitude of orbit with inclination less than the

techniques. On the otter hand, it is possible to 

the launching site is possible, but it is impractictble with existing with inclination g

launch satellites on aqy or

reater than the Latitude of the launch site. However ground hazards from discarded rocket stages severely restrict the geogri

the

phic site that can be used. Mobile launching facilities are also similarly restricted, buts not to the same degree as large fixed base installations. ability of launc hing sites, the As to military vulnerapply to large military same considerations would seem to be in order as

missile launching sites.

The rocket syatems either now available, well advanced in developmen currently planned that could be adapted to er include a satellite launchers or space missions very wide variety of attractive combinations from the smallest VANGUARD and JUNO I (formerly called JUPITER like DC") with satellite 20 pounds at 200 miles altitude to payload of about

an improved TITAN supplemented

stages which should be capable of orbiting in excess of 10 by l

,000 pounds at 200 m

additionailes.

There are many ways 

Group has to appraise this rich assortment of possibilities. The

the however, considered first the propulsion and guidance performance of assortmen

characteristics, the useful weights

t, for upon. these 2 parameters mainly depend a satellite's' orbital , that it can carry, and its lifetime.

S

econdly, the Group has accepted the statements of the mili ry oe required applications, ta services considered 

partments for the methods proposed by the Hilitary Dedone, when meeting their needs, and has attempted to show what can best be it might be done seeded in theihture. with what is available, and what appears will be most

SECRET
Military Applications of Satellites

trams n)

The

in - the orderder fry ;

a

pplications given in Table II have been assembled by the Group

priority in which tip statements of the Military Departments ;would seem to place them.

! top of the - list. Within this gener category there is some differencee riority ng upon Wm primary service eg the sub.items dependi

or mission. But the urgent need intelligence data of the Soviet Union at the earliest datflthat 

With satellite techniques was stressed by all. seemspossible

I • Navy of the other military applications, particularly weather forecasts, commurications, and navigation will sometimes though pot always, be

the same satellite used for surveillance. This is also true for many off the scwith ien

t

ce ap

plications. The asibility of accanplishingsatellite-countermessure techniques

by satellites is not as clear as the use of satellites for 

coyermeasures against detection systems for ballistic missiles or other satellites.

A point stressed by the Navy in support ofiountermeasures against deserves emphasis hsrez satellites If the USSR develops a satellite surveillance system, they :will have attained the means, which they have never bere enjoyed, for continuous plots of surface vessels in all oceans, and fo

, formidable their large submarine thereby make even keeping more lltet3

4rmed space patrol applicationsare so dependent upon experience yet to be gains In high perf e propulsionsystems, apace medicine, and so on that little

scan be said about their potentials now except to recognize their:ultimate possibility.

On the basis of the presentations by the Military Departments the 

satisfied that a number of the proposed military Group is

applications of satellites now been demonstrated to be have sufficiently practicable to warrant irradiate and stantial support by the Department of Defense. The Group's gab.

mendations are believed to conclusions and recom- represent in general terms 

the broad point of military uses. But the the support it has given to justification for a National program of the magnitude indicated requires a considerably broader view. to look beyond the It is necessary immediate or direct military applications'in the or traditional, usage of the term. conventions/

The strongest point made by the Military Departments in support of military use is direct surveillance; but in a condition of declared War, for example

P

r be- tareen the USSR and the United States the Group has mime reservations on the 'at 

some types of surveillance, because 1. t e

ing

e under such conditions the question of *over acts" would have been determined and other methods requir

overflight could be used.

of satellites fori 

•

13

• MECRET
katellite reconnaissance or surveillance

ept aecret

p

see present epoch because this technique offers 

sommomise of . getting impor

therefore attractive in the

e prtant and timely int

cause 

elligence on the USSR with it could be used as a

revealing to the world

fbrcefhl poli IldnIn

Xtical weapon in 114 bj political riakabut also be- photographs of the Soviet Union many things that are now effective k Such employmenleadershi

technolo cal 

t would incident ally go far toward recovery of Natio nally gi

which has suffered momentarily, preatige or

Host of the other milt

applications have great potential non-miLi particulary as tools for science, weather forecasting tam7 , and communicattons.

.

However speculative the success of nom of the milit

for a p is convinced that there is ary.propmala may now program of the magnitude indicated.

seem to be, the Grou

more than adequate Justification

Man all of these points are be escaped that a conservatively weighed, the conclusion cannot cap ny National space program 

not do. •

must be substantial, must be immediately

authorized, and mat be firaky directed. Any half-hearted or diluted effort will

Grou To indicate same idea of the ma

p has in mind i finitude of a National program such Group fall bett as the

overall y

of individual members of the National ,.‘,.

_

NN,. W

. VV.v. for a three-3rear period for the

•
SECRET TABLE II

StrOkiftpF ktrfAta`'"APPLICAITONS

Sfated bYlifirtiirinapaViikents

r__,

Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Mapping Photographic, high resolution (20 ft.) Low resolution (100 ft') (Targets damage, post strike analy.) Paisly Warning against attack Electronic emissions (Ferret type) Ships and aircraft plots

Submarine detection via sono buoys

Communications

High frequency broad band relay,

Faectronic countermeasures, monistorinE

Army Navy Air Forms

Z ' X

z.

Weather and forecasts A.

x z

forecasts)

vA*Ldwide cloud cover, systems status, accurate

Navigation' (all weather)

Satellite countermeasures

x z z

Science directed toward military applications (Magnetic field for commun., atmospheric, •

• thermal, solar radiation, for weather research;

x z z

ionospheric observations; space biology, • • meteorite distribution; anti-missile research; air density)

wed space paiwol.

fe

SECRET
I •

I SECRET

RUMP SUMART or Aar, Nor AND AIR "CRCS PROPOSALS

While differing in details the Army, Navy, and Air Force advocate a coordi-

• hated and comprehensive National program leading to manned space vehicles, Their Presentations were based upon Arolwainous engineering and 114:dentine studies which were made

he Secretaryy of Defense, Director of Guided Missiles.

three services recognize •

efofferthteengdatrioeenal 

ths 

cpr

need 

egram

for the integration of the scientific . that wil lthereduce th:eriefskeserof

covery of American leadership in space

re_

glutton of Nealtional

elements

pace technology and. exploration.

Army Program

ment Program for 14 years 

The Army proposes "A N

e

ational Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Develo xtending through 1971, and estimated to cost in the ! order of 14 billion dollars total.

1 :irThe early

ex first

phases of the Army program covering t 3 years is a 7).

ehicle Program based upon the JUPITER missile as first stage 

booster supple- ; merited by spinning clusters of rockets. The estimated cost of this part'of the regraal for the 3-year period is about $440 experimental reconnaissance million. It includes the 20-pound satellite June or September 1958, and a 500-pound satellite by January 1959. The Arsrlatizaates a capability for a 15-pound lunar • shot by June or September 1958 and a 120-pound lunar shot with lunar photographs 100

ty January 1959. Their estimate 

of a capability for lunar i ct mpa 50 to pounds is somettrain 1959. The longer term Parts:•of:.thaPAinie

with

s Ealegea irtedp :.• progriariticlaide-maruied carriers and ; TITAN with. various com would require more powerful boosters like binations of high-speed stages as do all other proposals.

Navy Program

.• The Navy stresses relatively light p vehicles for the short ran rogram. In their view most of the immediate mili Se part of the tary requirements can be : Ai/filled with payloads of 300 pounds or less.

:space•

• -*Ile likewise proposing an extensive National program for satellites vehicles, based upon booster rockets, the Na and Importance to the X-15 vehicle approach vy attach considerable as possibly the earliestes

method

id

of ob- taining manned earth-orbiting vehicles; and they e stimate that it might be 'achieved within 3 years. The.

 Navy also dvocats that mor attention e given engineer developments using even lighter a

 launch

e

 mechanismse

 and includeb

 within to their program 17 vehicles suggested by the Naval Ordnance Test Station for orbiting 10-pound :satellites. They also recormerrd vonermrent- d addition to the rocket Iminch developat. evelopment of the "fly-upl method in

20

41ECRET
•

•

SECRET (

As the short range part of the program t 50 .vehicle hrough schedule including 

satellites rangingom 10 pounds to 300 pounds, from

1961, the Navy proposes a

an akti-satellite demonstration and a f1y-up launch demonstration, for a total es ted cost

chedule 5 lunar shots and a firs They also propose as. inclusions in this but cost estimates are not

s

mann

ls

ed orbital flight with the X-15 technique yet available. s

The 40 to 300 pound satellites of the Navy

launched by improved VANGUARD vehicles for the smaller, and a program e

VANGUARD components for the ccgobination o would b f TIER and, larger satellites.

As the first part of a longer range program the 

1930-pound satellites using Navy proposes four 2TTAN-7ANGUARD combinations. Coat estimates for thi part of the program are not yet available. this

Air Force Program

The Air Force program emphasizes the largest, most 

elaborate satellites space vehicles which are based upon the ATLAS and TITAN missiles.

But th

and also suggest the possibility of a 300 using the =CR booster for availabilit7 dur .

recover

1959

able photographic satellite.?

The Air Forc Advanced Reconnaissance System s-3.3.7i, has been under intensi obj

nth*. si

ectives

nc

 of th

e aboutl, ough studies of p 1 fe is program include /ity were begun in 1946. The ig resolution hotographs expected to give an ultimate of 17 feet, ferret d emissions (up to 18,000 etection and locatio of various high megacycles) with initial accuracy of 60 miles

fre

and

quency

precision i

ecision later, infrared surveillance of aircraft and IOW% and ultimate visuall sur

veillance with television techniques of i mile or betterD

Under an accellerated program the Air Force estimates that the first of tat vehicles of this program could be ready during 1959 for launching 2,003-pound satellites at 300 mile altitudes. Including costs already incurred, this pro ram

Air AMC. cost estimates. Croup is n

ram

would probably cost about 200 million through 1959, but the not clear on

The Air Force estimate of (-recoverable

THOR is about $20 million in addition to the photographic satelte7cr use with e

cost of the boosters

li. for

mailable.

estimates .of costa for longer term e

lements of the Air Force suggestions are not . .

c

Che studies and development to to on 1113-un, cover almost every phase of the re

problem, lu

connaissance satellite

rea r power, solar cells and thei possible ding nuclear power, radio isotope

applications. The studies also go far into the accompgul g ground trackingg and communication facilities.

21