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-(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

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July 22, 1974

VS'

THE NRO STAFF

RANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER

BJECT: Discussion with the PFIAB

I, The memorandum at the right schedules you to meet with

Aamiral Anderson, Dr. Baker and his ad hoc study panel at

1100 on July 23. The right hand attachment is Admiral

Aiderson's original memo establishing the panel. The PFIAB

has asked that you be prepared to discuss the major contempory issues facing the NRP as well as your perceptions of the

ture of the NRP.

The contemporary issues facing the NRP stem from several

f ctors:

a. A changing character of the program in terms

its becoming an operational necessity to the intelligence

community;

II

b. The environment of the program in terms of a

m

ove toward normalization and a general relaxation of security; h

i'

c. Diluted management authorities within the NRP

spructure because of the creation of the ASD(I) and IC Staffs;

lIme

d. New vistas for application of NRP collection

rgely in the area of support for the tactical commanders.

Since it is apparent that the existing charter document,

e 1965 DOD-CIA Agreement, has-been superseded, a likely outof the PFIAB Study will be a reformed chartering document,

liTobably either a new agreement or an NSCID.

L

I. For several months this winter and spring I held Saturday

morning sessions with Colonels Wheeler, Blankenship, Hofmann,

and Coyle. Our aims were first to develop a better underitanding of the fundamental NRP management and operational

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issues and the factors influencing them; and second, to brainstorm potential NRO positions and develop a philosophy toward

approaching the issues. Indirectly these sessions influenced

the Staff's thinking and approach to the July ExCom Director's

Report, particularly Volume III, and the strawman imaging plan.

The papers at TABS A & B follow directly from these sessions.

Tli A was prepared by Fritz Hofmann and Bud Coyle and provides

g od background on the evolution to the current NRP management

environment.

The following are what we see as the broad contemporary

sues relating to the NRP:

Should the NRP be perpetuated as a single dedicited program structured to accomplish all national satellite

reconnaissance?

How much autonomy should be vested within the

m4nagement structure of the NRP under the DNRO?

i signed to the DNRO? a 

c. How much operational responsibility should be

d. How should the NRO be geared to assume responsilities in non-strategic intelligence collection?

How will the NRO acquire sufficient guidance in

t rms of future technology?

What form of security should be used to protect

the necessary classified aspects of the NRP?

We firmly believe that the_current philosophy and basic

structure of a dedicated NRP is the best way to prosecute effectively and economically a satellite reconnaissance program

in the future. In 1964, the PFIAB envisioned a high-level

decision process whereby a three-man ExCom would make the

*source allocation decisions unencumbered by advocacy and

bkreaucracy. It also envisioned a strong DNRO with sufficient

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ture, it must be strongly and authoritatively managed without

t

eal bureaucratic levels of review and with firm decision

a thority vested in a single manager, the DNRO. This aspect

of key importance since a successful satellite reconnais- 1 spnceeffort is of critical importance to the nation and one

wiich cannot be replaced by substitution of another kind of

411ection asset.

II TAB B is a point paper primarily prepared by Bud Coyle

Or your meeting tomorrow. The basic philosophy in the paper

suggests a continuation of the present national structure but

w*th more clear lines of authority and responsibility.

Although based upon contemporary issues the positions stated

in the paper will permit the U.S. satellite reconnaissance

ogram in the future to move fully into the near-real-time

ironment in support of the tactical commanders while

tanning a streamlined management and cost-effective structure.

of the key points are:

Strengthen the Staff's interagency character.

Maintain the two. main Program Office structure.

Control financial matters centrally in the NRO,

accountable to the DCI.

Report directly to the SecDef as executive agent.

e. Expand the present ExCom to include a third

member.

1

gout to manage the DOD/CIA NRP an a streamlined and unencumbred basis. Experience has shown that this approach was

i ealistic and has not been implemented in its pure form. A

t1tally monolithic NRP cannot effectively serve the changing

nteds of the nation. Many outside inputs are needed.

IIg On the other hand, we think that if satellite reconnaissince is to continue to be effective and economical in the

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Clarify the NRO/NSA operational relationship.

Balance operational/intelligence interface.

Refocus the NRO Staff's operational function.

Devote energy to support of the tactical

cders.

J. Maintain a strong technology and development

piogram under NRO control.

k. Continue use of compartmented security.

The determinations of this panel are crucial to the

management of satellite reconnaissance for the next several

ygars. Your mission with the panel can have a major influence

their findings. These papers should provide a good basis

r your preparing for this meeting. I suggest that you also

end an hour or more with me and Colonel Coyle prior to the

eting.

%

Brigadier General, USAF

Director

2. Attachments

'1. Crossroads Paper, 22Jul74

2. Point Paper

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THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

AT THE CROSSROADS

Management Evolution 1960-1974 

4 The National Reconnaissance Program is a most unusual progrpm--unlike any other. ForMally recognized by the President,

it operates under an informal charter that is in many respects

oLtdated. Attacked from without -and within since its inception,

i has nevertheless grown to be the single most impOrtant intel1 gence collection program of the United States Government. Its

d 1 agency composition has been both a source of problems and

provided a sanction from outside intrusion. Today the autonomous

1

structure of the organization is threatened more than ever before.

C#n the NRO survive? Under what arrangements? What must happen

guide the events that will shape or reshape the NRO? This

per addresses the major points of importance to the management

the NRO.

At the direction of the President on August 25,1960, the

Hittional Security Council forwarded to the Secretary of Defense

directions to apply streamlined management techniques to the

satellite reconnaissance program. Within DOD, the Secretary

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of Defense directed the Secretary of the Air Force to assume

di ct responsibility for satellite reconnaissance, reporting

di ectly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for review and

a royal. The Secretary also designated the ODDR&E as the

I

pAincipal staff agency to assist the Deputy Secretary.

11 In September 1961'the Secretary of Defense designated the

U er Secretary of the Air Force as his Assistant for Reconnaisspce, acting as the Secretary's direct representative both

hin and outside the Department of Defense. It was further

ected that the Assistant for Reconnaissance be given any

port he required from normal staff elements, although these

ff elements were not to participate in program matters. This

dOsignation accompanied distribution of the first memorandum of

agreement for the NRP, dated September 6, 1961.

The second NRP agreement was issued May 2, 1962. While

t e 1961 Agreement prescribed a program jointly managed by coelual DOD and CIA Directors, the new document called out only

o l e Director, from DOD. In June of that year DOD Directive

T 5105.23 was issued, which formally exempted the DNRO from

unsolicited outside assistance.

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The NRO prerogatives

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D (rector, DDR&E "deferred

were tested in March 1966, when the

NRO funds because

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el In its report to the President in May, 1964--which ultimaely resulted in the 1965 Memorandum of Agreement--the PFIAB

noted that the use of monitors by the Secretary of Defense and

• the Director of Central Intelligence to review the NRP interf 

H

ed with the direct chain of command between the DNRO and

Secretary of Defense. The 1965 Agreement is written in

which specify clear lines of communication between the

and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the

Bx6om. Noticable by its absence is 'reference to review by any

other monitoring office.

h wanted several questions answered before releasing them.

P llowing a visit by the DNRO, however, the offending DDR&E

randum was withdrawn.

The OSD Systems Analysis Office made three attempts to

apply normalized DOD management techniques to the NRP--in 1966,

1968 and 1969. In each case their proposals were rejected.

Today we are perhaps faced with greater pressures to change

than ever before. The overall driving force is the need to im-

.

pove the foreign intelligence collection effort. The forces

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at work are several and intermingled. The Blue Ribbon Defense

el addressed DOD intelligence problems; the President's

ter of November 5, 1971 and the creation of the Assistant

retary of Defense (Intelligence) have all had an effect.

On April 29; 1969'Secretary Laird signed a memorandum

assigning Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)

Froehike the additional duty of Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. Any thoughts.

that the staff entertained that Mr. Fr4hlke was not to be

cerned with the NRO were dispelled on May 5, when a second

from Mr. Laird announced that Mr. Froehike's responsibilities

ompass the NRP." While Mr. Froehlke attacked his assignment

with vigor, his relationship with the NRO worsened until the

iisue came to a head in December 1969. In a memorandum to

M. Packard, Dr. McLucas said "what Mr. Laird tells me and what

nIt knowing whether to respond to ExCom guidance, which our agreem ii nt clearly establishes, or whether to respond to Bob Froehlke's

idance, which is based on the assumption that our office is

jJst another component of DOD."

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apparently tells Bob Froehike puts us in an untendable position--
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' Dr. McLucas' concerns led to a briefing for Secretary

ird, Mk. Packard and Mr. Froehlke on Match. 19, 1970: At

t time Mr. Laird clarified that Dr. McLucas worked for

Packard and the ExCom; that Mr. Froehlke did not need

review the NRP internally; and that the NRO should provide

I ts of the sort provided excellently to the ExCom which would

pIrmit Mr. Froehlke to examine DOD intelligence issues in proper

h perspective. This served to ease the tense relationship, at

st temporarily.

Close on the heels of this confrontation came the report

the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, with an allegation that the

0 was somehow derelitt in its failure to report to Mr. Froehlke.

e influence of the Blue Ribbon report on subsequent changes

i the intelligence community is not very clear, but it 1 was

0

q During this time--starting in early 1969--Dr. McLucas,

P

a

a DNRO, established a pattern of frequent discussions with

Packard on NRO matters. Mr. Packard had an obvious understanding of the Program and had a strong interest in it. It

is also noteworthy that Mr. Packard's tenure pre-dated the

establishment of the position of Special Assistant for Intel-

".. .

ligence to the Secretary. Mr. Packard left in december 1971,

certainly detrimental to the concept of an autonomous NRO.

•

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and Mr. Mk. Kenneth Rush became the Deputy Secretary in February

].721 Mr. Rush never had the understanding of the details of

the Program that Mr. Packard had--and perhaps more importantly,

h4 entered DOD to find an already established ASD(I). We found

that Dr. Hall had a considerably greater influence on Mr. Rush

t n had been the case with Mr. Packard, and on occasion found

flicting guidance on NRO matters coming from the Deputy

S cretary's office.

The President's letter of November 5, 1971, contained the

encouraging words that the

P

to remain unchanged. This

hOwever, as subsequent events have shown. The letter was also

specific in assigning the DCI the responsibility for chairing

ail intelligence community advisory boards and committees;

. Schlesinger clarified with the President that this included

e NRP ExCom. While Mr. Helms had remained as the DCI the

om operated as it had for the previous several years. But

when Dr. Schlesinger arrived at CIA in early 1973, there was

al fundamental change in NRP management. No longer was the

Deputy Secretary of Defense--by now Mr. Clements--the ExCam

Chairman, and he backed away from active involvement in the

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management structure of the NRO was

appears to have had little effect,
NRP. Dr. Hall filled the void, attending ExCom meetings as

the DOD member--a role recognized in writing by the present

The position of the ASD(I) has become ever stronger in

of his influence on the NRP both through ExCom particiion and in day-to-day influence. And his staff, also, is

owing more involved with NRP matters. It is fictitious to

III 

ieve that the ASD(I) can operate independently as an ExCom

member from his role as the director of a staff which oversees

ail Department of Defense intelligence. The management concept

directed by the President, and reaffirmed by the President,

is being eroded. Two other factors which affect us today are

NICID No. 6, and the decision to decompartment satellite photogT

hy. The former because it gives NSA a role in tasking SIGINT

satellites; the latter because many consider the decision to

dlcompartment tantamount to normalization of the Program.

The problems we are experiencing today are symptomatic;

1

tIe task that needs to be done is to take a comprehensive look

1'

at the national environment today, the role of a National it

11!ficonnaissance Program and Office in that environment, and

ii

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evolve a strategy to cause the changes which need to be made.

Tb6 NRP is too vital to the national interest to permit its

gement to drift along an uncharted course.

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POINT PAPER

Organizational Structure 

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dedicated program responsible for conducting all satellite

- We believe that the NRP should continue as a single .frbaer,

reconnaissance in support of United States intelligence needs.

The NRP should continue to be structured as a national

program as opposed to becoming a solely Defense oriented

program.

There should be a strong interagency NRO Staff, manned

with appropriate representation from the military departments

and CIA supplemented by NSA and other agencies which have a

direct interest in the conduct of the NRP, such as the JCS.

There should be a strong Air Force program office

responsive to the interagency NRO entity. SAFSP should

continue to be this organization and should serve as the

primary systems integrator as well as being responsible for

development of satellite reconnaissance payloads and a

technology innovator. A strong CIA program office under

DDS&T should continue. This program office should be oriented

as to be more responsive to the DNRO. It should continue to

pursue a role as an innovator of technology and a developer

of satellite reconnaissance payloads. Its role as an operator

of satellite systems should be deemphasized. At the discretion

of the DNRO additional program offices may be added or deleted.

A Navy program office should be continued with a role to

include all satellite ocean surveillance. Other potential

program offices include: An Army program office responsible

to the NRO entity so that appropriate interfaces may be

developed to accomplish a battlefield surveillance role, and

an NSA program office oriented toward the operational interface

with the NRP and with a dominant role in controlling the APS.

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The NRO should be characterized as a corporate structure with a high level ExCom composed of the DCI; a designated

representative of the Secretary of Defense; and a third member

representing the President (such as the Deputy Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs from the White House).

The ExCom would serve as the board of directors and the DNRO

would serve as the chief executive officer for the conduct of

the NRP. The executive agent for the program should continue

to the Secretary of Defense and in that regard the DNRO would

be responsible for frequent reporting directly to the Secretary.

The normal working staffs of the ExCom principals should remain

outside the decision mechanism for the NRP and the DNRO's Staff

should serve as principal working interface with the ExCom

principals.

Management Authorities 

The DNRO should be permitted to optimize the NRP within

a streamlined decision making environment. He should receive

broad guidance from the ExCom with respect to resource allocation and should be held directly accountable to the Secretary

of Defense for the responsiveness of the NRP. The DNRO should

be also the Under Secretary of the Air Force since principal

support for the day-to-day operation of the program is provided

by the Air Force Systems Command and other components of the

Air Force.

The DNRO should be fully responsible

financial control of the NRP budget. In this

be accountable to the DCI for the NRP portion

intelligence budget with freedom to reprogram

necessary within the NRP.

for centralized

regard, he would

of the national

monies as

Outside review of the NRP by normal Government staff

agencies should be limited to only those agreed upon by the

DNRO.

With respect to the NRP, the DNRO should be a member

of USIB and IRAC as well as principal liaison for NRO technical

briefings to the members of Congress and their staffs.

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Operations 

NSCID 6 should be clarified in terms of sorting out

operational responsibilities of the DNRO and the DIRNSA.

DNRO should assure that NRP SIGINT satellites are comtible with the processing requirements of NSA. He should

so assure that tasking levies are commensurate with technical

pabilities of the satellites in order to optimize both colction and lifetimes of the various SIGINT satellite systems.

- Mission operations should be accomplished under definOive USIB guidance and at such time as operational pre-emption

IA; effected, requiring guidance from JCS or another operational

entity, the DNRO should assure that such pre-emption is in

consonance with the continued balancing of standing USIB

requirements and continued health of satellite payloads.

- The experience gained through SIGINT group

Operation should be applied to the operation of th

Found station with respect to NRO/intelligence commun ty

ordination.

With the phase-in lectronics and

tographic satellites, the on of the NRO

aff in the satellite operations area should be reoriented

ard providing a continual focal point for satellite operational status and the monitoring of overall operations with

•ftspect to USIB and tactical requirements. The NRO Staff

should be the non-advocate interface between the reconnaissance satellite operations and the intelligence community.

Applications 

- In addition to being responsible for the conduct of

all traditional satellite reconnaissance, the NRO should be

lionsidered as a synthesizer for the blending of satellites

lind requirements for the support of the tactical forces.

he DNRO in his dual capacity as Under Secretary of the Air

orce is in a unique position to do this. The NRO should

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tinue to perform its role as a non-advocate within the i telligence community for the optimization of satellite

pability and collection for support of national and also

t ctical intelligence.

The NRO should take the lead in assuring that NASA

m4intains full cognizance of NRP sensor application as well

a0 assuring that reconnaissance activities are not duplicated

within the Government.

- The NRO should be the major focal point for the IC/

J iS/Military Department interface with respect to the imme1

d ate application of NRP satellites to support the national

d cision-making in the battle management role.

T chnoloay

The NRP should continue aggressively and imaginatively

exploit technology and all operational resources and

cilities to develop and operate systems for satellite colloction of intelligence. The DNRO should continue to be the

principal agent responsible for studies and analyses leading

go the application of technology and also the intelligence

application of satellite borne sensors.

- Outside technology and application studies relating to

dhe NRP should be limited to those under the direct purview

St

the DNRO.

curitv 

- Compartmented security should be continued. Maximum

should be made of compartmented security commensurate with

needs to protect certain secrets and the awareness that

normal DOD security system cannot protect secrets for an

tended period of time.

J 111111111111111111 _ The stem should be made less accessitile to Gave , hat is, limited to only those

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aving a direct influence on the decision structure of the NRP.
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II this regard, more full use should be made of the data cont w ined within the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system which contains

a 1 pertinent data about satellite systems and their cepab lities except for costs, contract structure, and technical

c tract specifications.

- NRP streamlined management has been enhanced by the

rigorous security systems because of the control of access

t6 information which is made possible. The program managers

e control of contractor

to program because of the 

involvement outside

die intent of compartmented security, the management benefits

Si.e large and a better substitute has not yet been suggested.

Utmost care Ahould be taken by our Government to

otect the freedom to conduct satellite reconnaissance.

though it is generally agreed that Russia is comfortable

th the stabilizing balance of satellite reconnaissance, the

sser developed countries and China pose a political threat

lar to that posed by Russia in the early 1960s. The soluon created for the earlier threat was to maintain an

g ficial national silence about the program. This policy

today seems ludicrous because of the wide-spread knowledge

0 the "fact of the program. However, the policy has actually

served to preclude others from voicing political opinion about

the program. NASA has been experiencing some difficulty in

the international arena because of the publicized ERTS and

SKYLAB activity. The official U.S. position is that we will

tinue to conduct earth observations because it helps all

tries so observed. However, this claim could not be made

s-a-vis satellite reconnaissance. In addition, satellites

e very fragile and vulnerable even under , optimum freedom to

erste. Should an

y means ava e to collect much needed data, an

ultra-conservative security policy should be developed to

Protect the viability of the program.

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