F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT N ovembe r 9, 20 06 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

N o. 05- 1607 6
D. C. Docket N o. 02-02001 CV -H S-S ED W IN L. TH OMA S, as personal repre sentative of the Estate of Jam es E dwin Thom as, a deceased m inor, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant,
ve rs us E V E N FL O CO MP A

N Y , I N C. , ac or

por at ion , TOYS R’ US, INC., D ef en dants -Appe lle es . Appeal f rom the United State s District Court f o r th e N o rt h e rn D i s t r i c to f

A l ab a ma (N ove m be r 9, 200 6) Before AN DE RSO N and DU BIN A C ircuit Judg es, and VIN SO N, * District Judge. PE R CU RIA M:

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ *Honora ble C. Roge r Vinson, United States District Judge f or the Nor

thern District of F lorida, sitti ngby desig nation.2

T he appe al in thi s c as e ar ise s f ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to str ike
se ve ra l op ini ons of

fe re d by a n e xpe rt w itn es s onbe ha lf

of the pla int if

f- ap pe llant, E dw in L
. T hom as ( “ T hom as ”) , w ho f ile d th e unde rl y ing law sui t a s r ep re se ntativ e of the E state of

Jam es E dw in T hom as ( “ J. T
. ”)
. I n abr ie f m em or an dum opi nio n, the district court granted the defendants’ m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent after
co nc lud ing that i ts p re vio us e xc lus ionof the opi nio ns l ef

t T hom as w ithno
ev ide nc e in s uppo rt

of his c la im s. T hom as doe s no t c ha lle nge the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionr eg ar din g th e sufficiency

of the evidence bey ond h is expert’ s testim ony . Instead, he c hallenges the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to e xc lud e the e xpe rt ’ s te sti m ony , w hic h f orm ed the ba sis of the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s sum

m ar y j udgm en t r

uli ng. H e al so c ont en ds tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr one ousl y appl ie d R

ule 60( b) of

the F ed er al Ru le s of

Ci vil Pr oc ed ur e to h is p ost -j udgm en t M oti on t o A lte r, A m en d, or V ac at e, w hic h he
co nt en ds was fi le d p ur su an t t o R ul e 5 9 o f th e Fed eral Ru le s o f Ci vi l Pr oc edur e. Fo r th e rea so ns th atfol lo w, we affi rm . I. BAC KGR OUN D FA CTS At the hear

t of this case is the tragic death of f ive-m onth -old J.T ., who w as asphy xiated while left unattended sitting in a child restraint sy stem (“ CRS” )
man u f a c tu r e db y d e f

e n d a n tEv e n f

l o C o mp a n y, I n c . ( “Ev e n f l o ” ) , a n ds o l db y To ys3

R’ Us , I n c. (c o l l ec t i v el y “ t h e c o m p an i es ”) . Th o m as , a s re p re s en t at i v e o f J .T. ’s estate, sued the com

panies alleging various state law c laim s, including n egligence,
wanton ness, brea ch of w arranties, and violation of the A labam a E xtended Man uf act ur ers an d/ orst ric t l iabi li ty doc tri ne s. To support the claim s, T hom as propoun ded as an expert w itness Gary R. Whitm an , ase nio r en gin ee r w ithA RC CA , I nc . , w hic h Whitm ande sc ri be d a t hi s de posi tio n a s an “ en gin ee ri ng c onsu lti ng f irm spe ci al iz ing in the a re a of oc cu pant crash protection.” [ Whitm an De p. at 16]
. Whitm an opined th at the CRS wa s defectively

designed andsuggest ed that the seat’ s design allowed J. T. to m aneuver his body in suc h aw ay

a s to obs tr

uc t hi s a ir w ay . S pe ci fi ca lly , in re le vant p ar t, Whitm anc onc lud ed

a s f oll ow s: 3. One side of the har ness becam e disengaged and [J.T .] m oved su ch th athe ha d b ot h o f hi s l eg s o n o ne si de of t he cro tc h s trap. H is b ody sli d f or w ar d c au sin g th e harn es s ti e to l oa d a ga ins t hi s ne ck . This lo ad in g re su lt edin hi s as ph yxi at io n. 4. T he [ CR S] is de fe ct ive a nd unr ea sona bly dange ro us d

ue to its cr otc h stra

p be ing too lon g f

or it s in te nde d purp ose of res tra in in g t he lo wer t or so of a ch il d o f [J .T.’ s] si ze. . . . 5. T he [ CR S] is de fe ct ive a nd unr ea sona bly dange ro us d

ue to its cr otc h stra

p be ing too f

ar f or w ar d of the se at ba ck f or it s int en de d purp ose of

r es tr ai nin g th e low er

tor so o f a ch ild

of [ J. T.’ s] si ze. . . .
***4

7. T he [ CR S] is de fe ct ive a nd unr ea sona bly dange ro us b ec au se it s de sig n a llo w s th e carr ie r to b e posi tio ne d su chthat the inf an t i s pl aced in a ne ar upr ig ht sea te d p os it io n. 8. T he [ CR S] is de fe ct ive a nd unr ea sona bly dange ro us b ec au se it fa ils to inc or

por at e anon- pr oduc t w ar nin g c au tio nin g th e reader of the hazar d created by

placing an infant in a near upr igh t se at ed

pos iti on. Lett er fro m

Gary R. Whi tm an to Denn is Gol da si ch , Esq . (Ju ly 1, 20 03 ). The district court struck the re levant opin ions after concluding that they
we re unreliable. Based on this conclus ion and after finding that no other evidence
w oul d su ppor t T hom as ’ s c la im s, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d su m m ar y j udgm en t i n favor of the c om panie s. S ubse que ntl y , the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d T hom as ’ s M oti on to A lte r, A m en d, or

V ac at e the j udgm en t up on c onc lud ing that the m oti on s im ply at te m pt edto rear gu e is su es pre vi ou sl y ad dr es se d. II. ISSU ES 1. Whe the r the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n by

e xc lud ing Whitm an ’ s op ini ons. 2. Whe the r the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed w he n it gr an te d su m

m ar y j udgm en t i n favor of the c om panie s. 3. Whe the r the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n w he n di spos ing of Thom as’ s post -j udgm ent Motion to Alter, Am en d, o r Vacat e.5 III. S TAN DA RD S OF RE VIEW W e re vie wadis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to e xc lud e ex pe rt te sti m ony

f or abuse of dis cr et iona nd the re fo re de fe r to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ng unle ss i t i s

“ m anifestly

err oneous .” Ge n. E lec. Co. v . J oiner , 522 U
. S. 136 , 142 , 118 S
. Ct
. 51 2, 5 17 (19 97 ), quot ed

in Q uie t T

ec h. D C- 8, I

nc . v . H ure l-D uboi

s U K L td. , 326 F. 3d 1 333, 133 9- 40 ( 11th C ir
. 200 3)
. W e re vie wde ci sio ns t o gr an t or de ny
m oti ons fi le d un de r Ru le s 59 or 60( b) of the F ed er al Ru le s of

Ci vil P ro ce dur e fo r ab us e o f di sc ret io n a s wel l. Se e D rago v . J en ne , 453 F. 3d 13 01, 1305 (11t h Cir. 2006 ) (R ule 59) ; Ja ck

son v. Cr osby , 437 F
. 3d 1 290, 129 5 ( 11th C ir
. 200 6) ( Ru le 60 (b )), cert. denied , _

_ _ S. Ct . _

_ _ , 7 5 U.S .L. W. 3 1 7 2 (U .S . Oc t . 2 , 2 0 0 6 ). We
re vie wthe de ci sio n to gr an t the c om panie s sum

m ar y j udgm en t de novo , “ ap ply ing the sam e legal standards that controlled th e district court’ s decision.” Levinson v. R el ian ce Sta ndard L ife I

ns. Co
. , 24 5 F .3d13 21 , 13 25 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). Furthe rm or e, w e m ay

a ff irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t f or a ny r ea son
su pp or te d b y

th e rec or d. See , e. g. , Co ch ran v. U
. S. H ea lth Ca re F

in. A dm in. , 291 F. 3d 7 75, 778 n. 3 ( 11th C ir
. 200 2) ( ci tin g U nit ed Sta tes v . $12 1, 100 in U

. S. Currency , 99 9 F .2d15 03 , 15 07 (11 th Cir . 19 93 )). IV. D ISCU SSIONWe h ave art ic ulate d th e thi rd pr on g a s re qu ir ing the te sti mony to “a ssi st[] the tr ie r o f f a c t, 1 throug h the application of scientific, technical, or specia liz ed ex pertise, to understand the evidenc e or to de termine a fac t in issue.” City of T uscaloosa v. Harc ros Chems., Inc. , 158 F .3 d 5 48 , 5 62 (1 1th Cir. 1998) , quoted in United States v. Frazier , 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 ( 11th Cir. 2004). “ T h e p arty o f

f e r i n g th e e x p e rt h a s th e b ur d e no f s at i s f yi n ge a c ho f

th e [ ] th r e e e l e m e n t s b y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.” Rink v. Chem inova, Inc
. , 400 F.3d 1286, 1292 ( 11th Cir.), c e rt. denied, 126 S. Ct . 419 (2005). In revie wingexpert testimon y for a dmissibi lity , courts ar e to judg e re liability based on, 2 amon goth e r f

a c tor s: (1 ) wh ethe r t

he e xpe rt ’s te c hn iqu e or

the or y c an b e or

ha s b e e n te ste d—

that is , whether the expert’s theory

can be challeng ed i n s o m e objec tive sense, or whether it is i nstead simply

a subjec tive, conclusory approa ch that ca

nnot rea son ab l y

be assessed f or re liability ; (2) whe ther the te chnique or theory has been subject to pee r revie w and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of e rror of the tec hnique or the or y wh e n a pp lie d; ( 4) the e x ist e nc e and ma int e na nc e of sta nd ard s and

c ontr ols ; and (5 ) wh e the r the te c hn iqu e or the or y ha s bee n g e ne ra lly a c c e pte d in the sc ie nti fi c c o m mun i ty. Fe d. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note (discussing the y ear 2000 amendments to the rule a nd 6 T he a dm iss ibi lity

of e xpe rt te sti m ony

is gove rn ed

by Ru le 702 of

the Fe de ra l R ule s of E vid en ce , w hic h pr ovi de s: If sc ie nti fi c, te ch nic al , or

oth er spe ci al iz ed

kno w le dge w ill a ssi st the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determ ine a fa ct in issue, a w itness qu alified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experie nce, tr ai nin g, or

e duc at ion , m ay

te sti fy the re to i n th e fo rm

of a n op ini on o r otherwise, if (1) the testim ony is based upo n sufficient facts or data , (2 ) the te sti m ony

is the pr oduc t of

r el ia ble pr inc ipl es a nd m ethods , an d ( 3) the w itn es s ha s a

ppl ie d th e pr inc ipl es a nd m ethods r el ia bly to the facts of the c ase. Fe d. R. E vid
. 702
. 1 Al t h o u g h th e i s s u e o f r el i ab i l i t y fa ct o re dh ea v i l y i n t o th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s decision andthe parties’ briefs, whether Whitm an’ s opin ions wouldoffer 2the re quirements of Daubert v. M errell Dow Pharm., Inc

. , 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. C t. 2786 (1993)).

7 as si st an ce t o t he tri er o f fac t i s o f gr eat er i m po rt f orth e p ur po se of t hi s o pi ni on . A t the ve ry

le as t, the te sti m ony

m ust he lp e xpl ai n “ m atte rs that are be y ond the understandi ng of the average lay person.” U

nit ed Sta tes v . H

en de rso n , 409 F
. 3d 1293 , 1304 (11th Cir. 2005) (aff irm ing th e district court’ s exclusion of expert testim ony regar ding the propriety

of a police off

icer throw ing hi s gun in to his car whe n “ [t]he is su e in [th e] case was n ot whet he r itwas p ro pe r po li ce p ro cedur e . . ., bu t wh et he r orno t [t he po li ce o ffi cer] actua ll y di d s o” ), cert. denied , 126 S
. Ct
. 13 31 (20 06 ). Mor eo ve r, a nd a lso c ru ci al to thi s op ini on, the e xpe rt te sti m ony ’ s pr oba tiv e value m ust no t be “ subs tantially

outweighed by

its potent ial to confuse or m islead the j ury ,” United States v. F razier , 387 F
. 3d 1 244, 126 3 ( 11th C ir
. 200 4) , be ar ing in m ind, of course, “ the powerf ul and po tentially

m isleading effect of e xpert evidence.” Id

. ; se e als o F ed
. R. E vid
. 403
. I n a ddi tio n, the opi nio ns m ust not be

“ cum ulative or needlessly

tim e consum ing.” Frazier , 38 7 F .3dat 1 26 3. A
. Whitm an ’ s Q ua lif

ic at ion s A s an in iti al m atte r, w e ad opt the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s w el l- re as one d c onc lus ion that Whitm anis ane xpe rt qua lif ie d to r en de r opi nio ns f

our , f ive , se ve n and e igh t,Thomas does not challeng e the district court’s decision to strike W hitman’s opinion that the 3 CRS ’s buckle w as def

ectively des i gn ed d espi te over

whelmingevidenc e that the buc kle worke d proper ly
. Thus, that the harne ss “bec ame diseng ag ed” is simply a vague, common-se nse conc lusion 8 w hic h r el at e dir ec tly

to the de sig n of

the CR S. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ai lur e to discuss specifically

Whitm an’ s qualifications to offer opini on three, how ever,
w hic h in vol ve s an op ini on a s to the c au se of J. T
. ’ s de ath, c om

pli cate s our ab ili ty to r ev ie wit s de ci sio n f

or abuse of dis cr et ion
. R eg ar dle ss, the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t
er r in s tr iki ng Whitm an ’ s op ini on thr ee ; the re fo re , it is unne ce ssary

to ev al ua te it s de ci sio n r eg ar din g Whitm an ’ s r el ev an t qu al if ic at ion s, a nd w e m ak e no h old ing in th atreg ard
. B. Opinion Three T he dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound Whitm an ’ s op ini on thr ee unr el ia ble due to ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce e sta

bli shi ng e ith er

the m ethodo log y

Whitm anuti liz ed

or
w he the r Whitm anc or

re ct ly a dhe re d to the m ethodo log y se t f orth i n vari ous
ar tic le s he c ite d inhis le tte r re port. W e af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to str ike opi nio n th re e but

f or r ea sons m or e fundam en ta l t o th e pr inc ipl es gov er nin g th e ad m is si bi li ty of ev id en ce i n t he fed eral co ur ts . Whi tm an ’s op in io n t hr ee i s n ot ba se d o n p ers on al kn owl ed ge . The fi rs t t wo
s e n t e n c e s c o n v e y o b s e rv ab l e f a c t s th a tWh i t man , w h o w a s n o tp r e s e n ta tth e t i me of the incident, did not o bserve. H is kno wledge of these c ircum stances wa s 3based upon an infere nce that may or may not have be en esta

blished by

evidenc e in the re cord that the har ness was buc kled when J .T.’s car etake r left his pr esenc e and unbuckled when she re turned. Moreove r, the phra se unfa irly sug g ests that the buckle was in fact eng ag ed whe n Whit man could not possibly have known whether

that was true
. Thomas conc edes that, “in forminghis third opinion, Whit man relied in larg e par t upon the 4 corone r’s re port . . ..” Appe llant’s Br . at 23. 9 ind ir ec tly de ri ve d f ro m the ve ry sam e sour ce s T hom as sub m itt ed in oppo sit ionto the c om panie s’ m oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t, inc lud ing pho tog ra phs of the inc ide nt s ce ne , de posi tio ns, the c or one r’ s auto psy r ep ort, a nd r es pons es to discovery requests. T he district court could h ave struck these statem ents for that

4 reason alone. Fed. R. Evid. 602 (requiring evid ence that a w itness has person al know le dge of

the f ac ts t o w hic h sh e te sti fi es ); se e als o Fe d. R. E vid
. 801 -0 7 (d is cu ss in g h ears ay ). I n a ddi tio n, he ar say

c onc er ns a sid e, Whitm an ’ s r ec itatio n of the ci rc um stanc es of

J. T
. ’ s de ath w oul d have be enc um ulativ e an d th er ef

or e w oul d no t ha ve a ssi ste d th e tr ie r of

f ac t. I n f ac t, the sug ge sti on o f Whitm an ’ s pr es en ce a t the inc ide nt w oul d be m isl ea din g and undul y pe rs ua siv e. F ed
. R. E vid
. 403
. T hom as ’ s a dm iss iona t or al a rg um en t tha t Whitm an ’ s so le obj ec tiv e w as to de m onstrate that the de sig n of the CR S w as unr ea sona

bly dange ro us unde r the circum stances, not to reconstruct the incident actually causing J.T. ’ s death, further supp orts this c onc lus ion
.In Bo nn e r v . Ci ty of Pric ha rd, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en ba nc), w e adopte d 5 as binding prec edent all of t he decisions of t he former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to Octobe r 1, 1981. We do not mean to sug g est that the evide nce in the rec ord establishes an inferenc e that the

6
“ ha rn e ss t ie ” c a

us e d J.T . to a sp hy

xiat e . We sim

ply no te that su c h e vid e nc e wo uld be ne c e ssa ry to allow either

Whit man or a

ny other person revie wing the evidenc e to dra w the conc lusion W hitman offe red. Notably , at oral argument, Thomas viewed the cause of death as undisputed, which fur ther belies any sug g estion that Whi tman’s testimony as to this fact would have bee n helpful. 10 T he thi rd se nte nc e of

fe rs a n op ini on a s to the c au se of J. T
. ’ s de ath. N oth ing about W hitm an’ s engineering backgrou nd appears to qualify him to offer such an op in io n. See Charleston Nat ’l B ank v. H ennessey 404 F.2d 539 , 541-42 (5th Cir. 1968 ) ( not ing the la ck

of e vid en ce that the c or one r, w ho l ac ke d m ed ic al tr ai nin g, 5
w as qua lif

ie d to of fe r anopi nio n a s to the c au se of de ath)
. Mo re ove r, to the e xte nt
m ed i ca l ex p er t i s e i s u n n ec es s ary, as wi t h th e f i rs tth re e s en t en ce s , Wh i t m an ’s
co nc lus ionc oul d have be enpr em ise d on ly upo n in fo rm at ione lse w he re a va ila ble to the tr ie r of

f ac t, w ho w oul d be f

re e to drawsim ilar or

dif fe ri ng c onc lus ion s ba se d u po n t he same evi de nc e. See , e. g. , B en ef it A ss’ n of

R y. E m plo ye es v . B el l , 46 F
. 2d 2 25, 226 ( 5thCi r. 193 1) ( “ [E ] xpe rt e vid en ce is not

ne ce ssary

w he re the fa ct s pr ove n are suc h a s to e nable or din ar y m ento re ac h ana tur al a nd i nte lli ge nt conclusio n by

rea sonin g logi cally

from cause to eff

ect. ”). 611

T he re fo re , the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to str ike opi nio n th re e, a lbe it fo r
re as ons dif

fe re nt f ro m tho se w e expr es s to day , did not c onst itu te a n a

buse of dis cr et ion
. C. O pin ion s F our

a nd F ive O pin ion s f

our a nd f ive a re m er el y

ge ne ra l c onc lus ion s r eg ar din g th e ef fe ct ive ne ss o f the CR S. T he y of fe r no a ssi stanc e to a

tr ie r of f ac t a tte m pti ng t o de te rm ine w he the r the a lle ge d de fe ct f orm ing the ba sis f

or the se e xc ee din gly broad statem ents contribu ted in any way to J.T .’ s death. I n other words, general conclusio ns that the CRS w as not effec tive in “ restraining the lower torso of a ch ild of [ J. T
. ’ s] siz e” sim

ply doe s no t su gge st tha t the CR S’ s de sig n w oul d a llo w J.T. to rep os it io n h is leg s i n s uc h a way th atwou ldcau se hi m

to asp hyxi at e. The r isk that th ese opinion s would m islead the jur y and unfairly

prej udice th e co m pa ni es far ex ceed s an y

pro ba ti ve va lu e, whi ch we vi ew as ni l. See , e. g. , Frazier , 387 F
. 3d at 12 66 ( ex cl udi ng an e xpe rt ’ s op ini on tha t the c ourt f ound “i mp r e c i s e a n du n s p e c i f

i c ” a n dth e r e f

o r e “ e a s i l y c o u l ds e rv e t o c o n f u s e th e ju ry,
an d m igh t w el l have m isl ed it ”) ; se e als o Fed. R. Evid. 403. Thus, the district
co ur t d idno t err in ex cl ud in g o pi ni on s fo uran d fi ve . D
. O pin ion s S ev ena nd E igh tNotably , Thomas beg an his argument by stating, “ This appea l focuse s solely on the sec ond 7 prongof the Rule 702 ana ly sis.” Appellant’s B r. at 20. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d o pin ion

se ve n ir re le va nt b e c a us e the do ll Wh itm an util ize d to 8 conduct the r eleva

nt test w as shorter and heavie r than J .T. Opinion eig ht would not assist t he trier of fa c t, t he dis tr ic t court c on c lud e d, be c a us e Whitman c ou ld n ot “ sa y wi th a ny de g re e of c e rt a int y whether the ca reg iver would have hee ded anywar nings pla ced on the CRS and . . . had not done any testing r eg ardingthe same.” Mem. Op. at 33 (e mphasis added)
. 12 T hom as c ha lle nge s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to str ike opi nio ns s ev ena nd eight as unreliable, but Thom as failed in his initial brief to challenge the district 7
co urt’ s a lte rn at ive , ind ep en de nt d ec isi on t o stri ke the m a s ir re le vant. 8 Co ns eq ue nt ly, we m

us t af fir m th e d is tri ctco ur t’s fi nd in g. See , e. g. , Maiz v. V ira ni , 253 F
. 3d 6 41, 674 -7 5 ( 11th C ir
. 200 1) ( hol din g th at the c ourt w oul d no t consider appellants’ argum ents when not raised in their initial brief on appeal). E
. Ru le s 59 and 6 0 Thom as contends th at the district court err ed by treating his Motio n to Alter, A m en d, or

V ac at e the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t a s aRu le 60( b)
m oti on i nst ea d of

aRu le 59 m oti on. T hom as f ai ls t o e xpl ai n th e sig nif

ic an ce of th is all eg ederro r, ho wev er, an d we s ee n on e. Although a footnote in the court’ s opin ion described Thom as’ s m otion as fa lli ng w ith in the sc ope of Ru le 60( b) , the c ourt e xpl ic itl y pr em ise d it s de nia l of the m otion on the axiom

that “ Rule 59(e) m oti ons m ay not be use d to ‘ re -l iti ga te old m atters, raise argum ent [sic] , or present evidence that could have been raised13

pr ior to the e ntr

y of j udgm en t. ’ ” C ivi l A ct ionN o. 02- cv -2 001- V E H , Me m . O p. D en y ing Mo tio n to A lte r, A m en d or V ac at e Judg m en t a t 2- 3 (N
. D
. A la
. O ct . 3, 2005 ) (e m

pha sis a dde d) ( quot ing M ic hae l L ine t, I

nc . v . V illage of W

el lin gto n, F la. , 408 F. 3d 75 7, 763 (11th Cir. 2005)). Thom as’ s argum ent, then, challenges onl y a n in co nse que nti al ty

pogr ap hic al e rr or

in a fo otn ote , a nd h e ha s f ai le d to de m on st rat e th atth is co ns ti tu te s an ab us e o f di sc ret io n. Ther efore, Thom as cannot m eet his burden of dem onstrating that the district
c o u rtab u s e di t s d i s c r e t i o n i n s t r i k i n g Wh i t man ’s o p i n i o n s a n d , c o n s e qu e n t l y, gr an tin g th e co m

panie s sum

m ar y j udgm en t, w hic h T hom as doe s no t othe rw ise challenge. I n additio n, T hom as has failed to dem onstrate that the district court ab us edit s d is cret io n i n d is po si ng of h is po st -jud gm en t m ot io n. Acco rd in gl y , we affi rm th e d is tri ctco ur t’s o rd ers an d i ts gra nt of s umm ary jud gm en t. AFFIRMED.