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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Materials

REFERENCES : a. USIB-D-41. 12/11, 22 September 1964

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USIB-D-41. 12/12 (COMOR-D-7/31)

6 November 1964. Limited Distribution

USIB-M-359, 18 November 1964, Item 10

At its meeting on 5 November 1964 (reference b.), the United

States Intelligence Board (USIB) agreed to ask the Security Committee and

the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) to collaborate in

studying whether the present restraints on dissemination and handling of

T/KH material were overly restrictive or still necessary within the US

Government. Subsequently at its 18 November 1964 meeting (reference c. ),

the Board agreed to defer action on the Security Comcnittrie report

(reference a. which reviewed the procedures and standards within the

intelligence community for the control of sanitization and downgrading of

sensitive intelligence), until such time as results of the Security Committee/

COMOR study pursuant to reference b. could be considered in conjunction

with the recommendations of the Security Committee report in reference a.

COMOR's response to the Board directive in reference b. ,

prepared in consultation with the Security Committee, is attached at Tab A.

COMOR (except the State and Army Members) recommends USIB approval

of its recommendations in paragraph 2. thereto, including recommendations

that the materials and information derived from the present satellite

reconnaissance systems should continue to be subject to the special controls

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of the T/KH security control system, and that a revision of the 1962

TALENT Sanitization Manual be completed and published. The State and

Army Members' dissenting view is that the original reasons for comparementation have largely disappeared, and that the end product of KH-4

and KH-7 photography should be handled under normal security classifications and controls. A discussion of the majority COMOR view is

contained in paragraphs 3. through 8. of Tab A, while the reasons for the

State and Army dissent. are contained in the footnote to paragraph 2. in

Tab A.

As directed by the USIB, the Security. Committee also considered

the relaxation of T/KH controls. Its report is attached at Tab B. The

Security Committee concurs in the findings and recommendations of COMOR,

with the exception of the State and Army Members who dissent for the same

reasons as expressed by State and Army in the footnote to paragraph 2. of

the COMOR paper (Tab A). The Security Committee (except State and Army)

considers that the sensitive intelligence information involved is vital to the

national interest and that the T/KH System affords appropriate protection.

The majority view therefore supports the position that removal from the

System would greatly increase the possibility of compromise. The Security

Cominittee also notes that the proposed revision of the TALENT Sanitization

Manual by COMOR would be in accordance with its previous recommendation

in paragraph 9. c. of reference a. (reproduced in the Attachment to Tab B

hereto).

In addition to its comments on Tab A, the Security Committee

requests that its previous recommendations on definitions and sanitization

of COMINT set forth in paragraphs 9. a. and b. of reference a. (reproduced

in the Attachment to Tab B hereto) be approved by the Board.

5. Accordingly, USIB will be asked to consider at an early meeting

(probably 23 September) the following recommendations:

a. The recommendations on the subject by COMOR,

concurred in by the Security Committee, set forth in paragraph 2. of Tab A hereto, together with the dissenting view of

State and Army in the footnote to that paragraph.

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b. The additional and separate recommendations

by the Security Committee on definitions and sanitisation

of COMINT set forth in paragraphs 9. a. and b. of USIB-D41. 12/11, as reproduced in the Attachment to Tab B hereto.

Attachments

As stated

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MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Security Handling of Satellite

Reconnaissance Materials

REFERENCE: USIB-D-41.12/12; COMOR-D-7/31

Problem. To determine in response to the Board's injunction

whether the present products of satellite reconnaissance should be removed

from the special security controls of the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security

Control System (see reference).

Recommendation. COMOR recommends that:

The materials and information derived from

the present satellite reconnaissance systems, which are

now in the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System,

continue to be subject to the special controls of the T-KH

Security Control System.

The COMOR complete the revision of the

Sanitized= Manual and on behalf of the Board publish it to

replace the 1962 Manual (COMOR-D-7/1).

c. In its revision a principal aim of COMOR be

to facilitate and expand the use, within the intelligence

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community, of informed= drawn from these materials by

making the controls more precise and better suited to the

specific needs of the community.

The question of removing any of the products of satellite reconnaissance from the ICH compartment

be reconsidered by the Board one year hence.

As new satellite reconnaissance systems

come into existence, COMOR be instructed to advise the

Board in each instance prior to employment whether the

Board should place such materials into the KH compartment. *

*The minority view of the State Department and the Army is:

The original reasons for compa.rtmentation of the fact of the

satellite program (listed on page 6 of COMOR-D-7/33) have largely disappeared.

Studies indicate that the Soviets have sufficient data to predict the probable

resolution capability of our photographic satellite systems. State understands

that NPIC concurs with this assessment. There is no analogy to COMINT;

opposition knowledge of the quality of the photo does not cut off the source.

The foregoing considerations are well known in the conununity

and this over-classification endangers the security of other compartmented

information.

c. Handling of the end product of KH-4 and KH-7 under normal

security classifications and controls would permit much needed wider access

on the part of Department officials and the timely dissemination of collateral

products of the photography to certain of its missions abroad. It would also

facilitate the use of such material as guidance for other collection efforts and

benefit Government research and scientific efforts generally.

d.' On-coming system product may well need compartmentation,

but that time is far enough ahead and the circumstances which will prevail then

so obscure that this consideration is not weighty on the present question.

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Discussion. The decision to place the products of satellite

reconnaissance in a special security compartment was made at the

Presidential level in 1960. There are approximately 20 thousand individuals

now cleared for T-KH, of which at least one thousand are located in the

to whom certain materials

are provided as authorised. All intelligence products of photographic and

SIGINT satellites are controlled by the TALENT Security Control System in

a compartment called KEYHOLE. From the beginning a manual has existed

for the guidance of the agencies in sanitising to the SECRET level information

obtained by satellite reconnaissance in order to meet the needs of the

Government.

That the United States is engaged in satellite reconnaissance

has been assumed by the press in the U.S. and by the USSR. By Presidential

direction chiefs of state of allied and neutral countries have been made aware

that such reconnaissance is going on. There has, 'however, been no official

U.S. confirmation that it is acquiring overhead photography of the USSR or in

some instances the territories of our allies.

5. There is no evidence that the USSR knows either the extent or

the quality of reconnaissance achieved. It is surmised that they would

suspect that from their knowledge of the state-of-the-art, we are achieving

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a resolution at least as good as the KH-4. SNIE 11-6-65, now in draft

form, deals with the Soviet Capabilities for Concealing Strategic Weapons

Program. It emphasizes the Soviet passion for secrecy and rationalizes

between pursuing this and a counteracting desire to flaunt strength for its

deterrent value. The SNIE notes many examples of Soviet efforts at

concealment and points out that these are directed more at protecting

details of systems rather than the existence of active weapons programs.

The draft estimate also indicates that Soviet concealment efforts are

unlikely to diminish and may increase. Detailed knowledge of U.S. capabilities might considerably further these efforts.

6. If the materials now subject to KH cornpartmentation were

removed from that compirtment and were classified TOP SECRET, a wider

dissemination could take place but the problems involved in handling any

volume of T-KH materials at a TOP SECRET classification only would be

so great that it would prove to be impracticable and unmanageable from an

administrative point of view. If they were classified SECRET, the handling*

would have to be NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATIONAMMININIIMMIW

eff***Naraibk else we would be confronted with difficult situations with

these countries who have already been the beneficiaries of some of these

materials. It would not be feasible to require them to maintain the system

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of compartmentation when it is not so handled in the U.S. If the decision

were to remove the materials from KH control, it should be classified

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 41111111111111111111111M

11111111111111.

7. Under this last classification there will be a greatly increased

number of individuals with access to the material which will increase the

possibility of materials or information falling into the hands of the USSR.

In that event there are at least two possibilities:

The certainty of the quality and scope of

•our achievement in reconnaissance might prompt the

USSR or other countries to take actions inimical to our

interests, includi.ng protests in the UN.

The USSR may also take political reprisals or direct physical ones designed to deny us

intelligence, such as shoot down, fogging of film,

camouflage, etc.

8. There are varying judgments of the likelihood of the possible

effects indicated above, but there is no certainty. COMOR believes that

these risks of embarrassment to the U.S. and denial of intelligence cannot

be ignored. In its view they need not be taken inasmuch as ways and means

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exist through clearances and revised sanitization procedures to meet the

needs of the U.S. Government. Therefore, it concludes that it is not

desirable to remove the materials from the KM compartment at this time.

\4. William A. Tidwell

Chairman

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SECURITY COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Security Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance

Materials

The Security Committee has considered the problem

presented by the Board as to whether the products of satellite

reconnaissance should be removed from the Special Security

Controls of the Talent-Keyhole Security Control System. The

Security Committee has also reviewed the findings and recommendations of the COMOR Committee in this matter.

The Security Committee accepts the fact that a large

portion of hard intelligence on denied areas available to the

United States today is obtained from the product resulting from

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satellite reconnaissance. The Security Committee further

accepts the fact that this information is vital to the intelligence

collection effort and loss would adversely affect the national

security.

3. Experience has shown that the wider the dissemination of any classified information the greater the possibility of

compromise due to the loss of control. Large volumes of sensitive intelligence information critically affecting the national

security, in order to be afforded adequate protection, must be

maintained within a system of compartmentation. This is necessary for the following reasons:

The need-to-know is clearly defined and

access controlled.

Higher standards of personnel and physical

security are maintained.

c. There is uniform security protection

throughout the community.

4. The recent revelations of espionage within the U. S.

Government critically affecting the intelligence collection effort,

have illustrated that rigid systems of compartmentation, as the

T-KH system, do afford greater protection. Because of compartmentation and the attending denial of access to T-KH material,

the product of satellite intelligence was not available to the principals of these cases. It must be presumed, therefore, that the

removal of classified information from a system of compartmentation subjects it to a greater chance of compromise.

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Although selected chiefs of state of allied and neutral

countries have been made aware of a U. S. reconnaissance program. there has been no official declaration to the Communist

Bloc. There has been no evidence on the basis of extensive

damage estimates conducted subsequently to the discovery of

espionage cases that the Soviets have been provided the products

of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program. The fact that the

Soviets can surmise that a particular intelligence collection effort

exists. such as overhead satellite reconnaissance, should not

justify any lessening of security safeguards of the information involved. If the intelligence collection method is highly productive,

then it warrants maximum security protection from possible compromise to protect against ,possible loss. The test, therefore. is

to the degree of security protection to be afforded is the measure

of how vital the intelligence effort is to the national interest and

the damage resulting if the particular intelligence effort is made

ineffective by opposition counteraction. The test should not be

whether the opposition may be aware of the existence of the

effort.

The Security Committee supports the findings of the

COMOR Committee that if the materials now subject to KH coznpartmentation were removed this would increase the possibility

of compromise of materials and might prompt the USSR or other

countries to take actions inimical to our interests, including

protests in the UN and direct reprisals.

7. The Security Committee recognizes that the product

of overhead reconnaissance must be made readily available to

all necessary users. It is the opinion of the Committee (except

State and Army) that the proposed revision of the Sanitization

Manual will provide adequate security protection and will make

the information available to those who require access. It is

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noted that the proposed COMOR revision of this Manual would

be in accordance with the previous Security Committee recommendation contained in paragraph 9.t. of USIB-D-41.12/11

(reproduced in the Attachment hereto). Accordingly, the

Security Committee (except State and Army) concurs in the

recommendations in paragraph 2 of the COMOR report. The

State Department and Army Security Committee Members

dissent from this recommendation for the same reasons as

expressed by the State Department and Army COMOR Committee

Members in the footnote to that paragraph.

8. In addition to the above, the Security Committee

requests USIB approval of its recommendations on definitions

and sanitization of COMINT contained in paragraphs 9. a. and b.

of US/B-D-41.12/11, which are reproduced in full in the attachment hereto.

1111111111

Attachment:

As Stated

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SECURITY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED

IN USIB-D-41.12/11, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1964

SUBJECT: "Review of the Procedures and Standards Within

the Intelligence Community for the Control of

Sanitization and Downgrading of Sensitive

Intelligence."

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RECOMMENDATIONS

"9. It is recommended that the Board approve:

"a. The following definitions:

.Sanitization - The effective concealment

in classified material of intelligence sources and

methods. A pre-requisite for sanitizition is the

existence or reasonable presumption of the existence

of a separate and logical, less sensitive source.

Information may not be reported in the sanitization

with a precision or exactness that exceeds the capability of the less sensitive source.

Decontrol - The removal of material

' from a system of compartmentation for sensitive

intelligence, provided it remains classified.

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Downgrading - The change of existing

classification to a lower level of classification.

Declassification - The complete

removal of classification. (This includes removal from a system of control. )

"b. The following statement of principles pertaining

to the sanitization of COMINT:

Extensive and/or precise facts and

figures leading back to COMINT source should

not be included in the sanitized material.

If sanitization is for a specific use and

not intended for broad dissemination, then an

appropriate caveat or control (as provided for in

DCID 1/7) should be placed upon the sanitized

material to ensure that it is disseminated and

used only for that intended purpose.

"(3) Material which is sanitized for broad

dissemination and use based upon classification

and need-to-know should be closely reviewed to

ensure that sanitization procedures followed

absolutely ensure source protection.

"(4) Focal points should be established

within each department and agency to authorize

and record the sanitization and downgrading of

COMINT. Information recorded would include

the name of the requester, the purpose of the

sanitization or downgrading, the document in

which the sanitized material is to be included,

and a copy of the sanitization.

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