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State of Nebraska ex rel. M. Lynne McNally and 

Keep the Money in Nebraska, relators, and 

Nebraska Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective 

Association, Inc., et al., relators-intervenors, 

v. Robert B. Evnen, Secretary of State of 

the State of Nebraska, respondent, and 

Dr. Richard Loveless, and Ann Zohner 

and Todd Zohner, wife and husband, 

respondents-intervenors.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 10, 2020. No. S-20-612.

1. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum. The right of initiative is precious to the people and one which the courts are zealous to 

preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter.

2. ____: ____. The power of initiative must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process, and provisions authorizing the initiative 

should be construed in such a manner that the legislative power reserved 

in the people is effectual.

3. Constitutional Law. A constitution represents the supreme written will 

of the people regarding the framework for their government.

4. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum. The people of 

Nebraska may amend their Constitution in any way they see fit, provided the amendments do not violate the federal Constitution or conflict 

with federal statutes or treaties.

5. Initiative and Referendum: Appeal and Error. The Nebraska Supreme 

Court makes no attempt to judge the wisdom or the desirability of enacting initiative amendments.

6. Initiative and Referendum: Intent. The interests that propel both 

proponents and opponents of initiative petitions may often involve selfinterest rather than the public interest. But a court’s focus in deciding 

whether an initiative petition reaches the voters must be on the actual 

law proposed by the petition, not on the motives that may lie behind 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

12/04/2020 08:09 AM CST
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it; the voters may consider those motives in deciding how they vote on 

the petition.

7. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum. A purpose of the 

language in Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, that “[i]nitiative measures shall 

contain only one subject” is to avoid logrolling, which is the practice 

of combining dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment 

so that voters must vote for or against the whole package even though 

they would have voted differently had the propositions been submitted separately.

8. Initiative and Referendum. Where the limits of a proposed law, having natural and necessary connection with each other, and, together, 

are a part of one general subject, the proposal is a single and not a 

dual proposition.

9. Constitutional Law: Initiative and Referendum: Intent. The controlling consideration in determining the singleness of a subject for purposes of article III, § 2, of the Nebraska Constitution is its singleness 

of purpose and relationship of the details to the general subject, not the 

strict necessity of any given detail to carry out the general subject. The 

general subject is defined by its primary purpose.

10. Initiative and Referendum. When initiatives are presented separately, 

even if on the same ballot, a voter has the option to vote for one initiative but not the other, even if the initiatives have some connection to 

one another. Because voters can vote differently on each separate initiative, single subject review should focus on the specific initiative being 

reviewed without reference to the content of another initiative that is 

submitted separately.

Original action. Writ of mandamus granted.

Andre R. Barry and John F. Zimmer, of Cline, Williams, 

Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, L.L.P., for relators.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, James A. Campbell, 

Solicitor General, Ryan S. Post, L. Jay Bartel, and Lynn A. 

Melson for respondent.

David A. Lopez and Kyle J. Gilster, of Husch Blackwell, 

L.L.P., for intervenor Dr. Richard Loveless.

Stephen D. Mossman, J.L. Spray, and Joseph A. Wilkins, of 

Mattson Ricketts Law Firm, for intervenors Ann Zohner and 

Todd Zohner.
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Jefferson Downing, of Keating, O’Hara, Nedved & Peter, 

P.C., L.L.O., for amicus curiae Gambling With the Good 

Life, Inc.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

and Freudenberg, JJ., and Welch, Judge.

Miller-Lerman, J.

NATURE OF CASE

M. Lynne McNally and Keep the Money in Nebraska (collectively McNally), along with other sponsors, filed three 

proposed ballot initiative petitions with Nebraska Secretary 

of State Robert B. Evnen (the Secretary). Generally, the first 

initiative would amend the prohibition against gambling contained in Nebraska Const. art. III, § 24, by permitting enactment of an exception which would authorize games of chance 

conducted within licensed racetrack enclosures; the second 

initiative would enact certain statutes and amend certain existing statutes to regulate games of chance operated by licensed 

gaming operators within licensed racetrack enclosures; and the 

third initiative would enact statutes that impose a tax on revenues from games of chance and specify how such taxes would 

be distributed.

After signatures had been collected, the Secretary received 

letters objecting to the initiatives and asking that they be 

withheld from the ballot due to claimed legal insufficiencies. 

Separate letters were received from Dr. Richard Loveless and 

from Ann Zohner and Todd Zohner.

The Secretary requested and received additional letters from 

the sponsors and from the objectors, and the Secretary thereafter granted the objectors’ request to withhold the proposed 

initiatives from the November 3, 2020, general election ballot. The Secretary generally determined that each initiative 

was facially invalid under the “single subject” provision of 

Neb. Const. art. III, § 2. The Secretary further determined that 

even if either the regulatory initiative or the tax initiative was 
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in itself legally sufficient, both initiatives should be withheld 

because all three initiatives have a common primary purpose.

After the Secretary announced his decision to withhold the 

initiatives from the ballot, McNally applied for leave to commence an original action in this court for a writ of mandamus 

requiring the Secretary to place the initiatives on the ballot. 

We granted leave, and based on McNally’s verified petition for 

writ of mandamus, we issued an alternative writ of mandamus 

requiring the Secretary to place the initiatives on the ballot or 

show cause why they should not be placed on the ballot. We 

expedited the proceeding and set a briefing schedule and date 

for oral argument.

During the pendency of this case, several parties intervened. Loveless and the Zohners intervened and essentially 

aligned with the Secretary. Nebraska Horsemen’s Benevolent 

& Protective Association, Inc.; Ho-Chunk, Inc.; and Omaha 

Exposition and Racing, Inc., intervened and essentially aligned 

with McNally. We have considered the arguments and claims 

of all parties, and within our disposition with respect to issues 

identified as raised by McNally and the Secretary, we have 

also considered arguments of all intervenors. Our disposition 

disposes of all claims asserted before us.

We exercise original jurisdiction under Neb. Const. art. V, 

§ 2, because this is a cause of action relating to revenue, in 

which the State has a direct interest, and because McNally has 

requested a writ of mandamus. See State ex rel. Loontjer v. 

Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014).

As we explain, we conclude that none of the initiatives is 

legally insufficient and that all three should be placed on the 

ballot. By separate order, the alternative writ is vacated; a writ 

of mandamus is issued by separate order ordering the Secretary 

to place all three initiatives on the ballot.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Three Initiatives.

In the verified petition for writ of mandamus, McNally 

alleges that the sponsors of the three initiatives at issue in this 
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case are Keep the Money in Nebraska, Nebraska Horsemen’s 

Benevolent & Protective Association, Ho-Chunk, and Omaha 

Exposition and Racing. McNally alleges that Keep the Money 

in Nebraska is a registered ballot question committee and 

that M. Lynne McNally is a resident of Lancaster County, 

Nebraska, who is a member of Keep the Money in Nebraska 

and the executive vice president of Nebraska Horsemen’s 

Benevolent & Protective Association. McNally alleges that on 

April 10, 2019, the sponsors filed with the Secretary the text 

of the three proposed ballot initiatives, along with the required 

object statements and sworn statements of sponsors, and that 

on July 3, 2020, the sponsors submitted sufficient and valid 

signatures for the petitions. McNally further alleges that in late 

July 2020, the Nebraska Attorney General sent the Secretary 

letters setting forth the ballot title and explanatory statement 

for each of the initiatives.

The first initiative, hereinafter referred to as “the 

Constitutional Initiative,” included the following object statement: “The object of this petition amends the Nebraska 

Constitution to state that laws may be enacted allowing for the 

licensing, authorization, taxation, and regulation of all forms of 

games of chance to be conducted by authorized gaming operators within licensed racetrack enclosures in the state.” The text 

of the Constitutional Initiative was set forth as proposing that 

Neb. Const. art. III, § 24, be amended to add a subsection (5), 

which would provide:

This section shall not apply to any law which is enacted 

contemporaneously with the adoption of this subsection or 

at any time thereafter and which provides for the licensing, authorization, regulation, or taxation of all forms of 

games of chance when such games of chance are conducted by authorized gaming operators within a licensed 

racetrack enclosure.

The second initiative, hereinafter referred to as “the 

Regulatory Initiative,” included the following object statement: “The object of this petition enacts a statute allowing 

all games of chance to be conducted by authorized gaming 
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operators within licensed racetrack enclosures in Nebraska and 

establishes a Nebraska Gaming Commission to regulate such 

gaming in Nebraska.” The text of the Regulatory Initiative 

was set forth as proposing the enactment of “the Nebraska 

Racetrack Gaming Act,” which included enactment of various 

statutory provisions to, inter alia, permit operation of games of 

chance by authorized gaming operators within licensed racetrack enclosures, define terms used within the proposed act, 

set forth regulations regarding operation of such games, create 

the “Nebraska Gaming Commission,” and set forth authority and duties of such commission. The text of the initiative 

also proposed to amend various existing statutes to include 

references to “games of chance,” “the Nebraska Racetrack 

Gaming Act,” “the Nebraska Gaming Commission,” and other 

language relevant to regulation of games of chance. Of particular note in this original action, the initiative proposed to 

amend existing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2704.20 (Reissue 2018), 

which currently provides: “Sales and use taxes shall not be 

imposed on the gross receipts from the sale, lease, or rental 

of and the storage, use, or other consumption in this state of 

purchases made by licensees of the State Racing Commission.” 

The Regulatory Initiative proposed to amend § 77-2704.20 by 

adding “or of purchases made by licensees of the Nebraska 

Gaming Commission.” The Regulatory Initiative also proposed to revise Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-3001 (Supp. 2019), which 

defines the term “mechanical amusement device” for purposes 

of the Mechanical Amusement Device Tax Act and which 

includes a list of devices that are excluded from the definition. The Regulatory Initiative proposed to amend § 77-3001 

to include in the list of exclusions, and therefore exclude from 

the definition, “gaming devices or limited gaming devices as 

defined in and operated pursuant to the Nebraska Racetrack 

Gaming Act.”

The third initiative, hereinafter referred to as “the Tax 

Initiative,” included the following object statement: “The 

object of this petition enacts a statute establishing an annual 

tax on gross gaming revenue generated by authorized gaming 
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operators of games of chance within licensed racetrack enclosures and directs the collection, enforcement, and distribution 

of revenue from such gaming tax.” The text of the Tax Initiative 

was set forth as proposing statutory language to, among other 

things, impose an annual gaming tax; define statutory terms; 

set the tax at 20 percent of gross gaming revenue; authorize 

the Nebraska Gaming Commission to collect, account for, and 

remit the tax; and provide that specific percentages of the tax 

imposed be remitted to the Compulsive Gamblers Assistance 

Fund, the State’s General Fund, the Property Tax Credit Cash 

Fund, and the county and/or the city or village in which the 

licensed racetrack enclosure is located. Of particular note to 

this original action, the Tax Initiative provided that 70 percent 

of the tax imposed was to be credited to the Property Tax 

Credit Cash Fund.

Secretary of State.

As indicated above, on August 7, 2020, the Secretary 

received separate letters from the objectors asking that the 

three initiatives be withheld from the ballot due to claimed 

legal insufficiency. After requesting and receiving additional 

letters from the objectors and from McNally and the other 

sponsors, the Secretary issued a letter dated August 25, 2020, 

in which he determined that the three initiatives should be 

withheld from the ballot, generally for the reason that the initiatives violated the single subject rule set forth in Neb. Const. 

art. III, § 2.

The Secretary set forth the reasoning for his decision in the 

letter. He began the analysis by determining that “the primary 

purpose for each [of the three initiatives] is the same: to permit previously prohibited games of chance to be conducted 

in the State of Nebraska.” He further stated that “without the 

Constitutional Initiative, neither the Regulatory Initiative nor 

the Tax Initiative serves any purpose.” But, he stated, even if 

there were separate primary purposes for each of the initiatives, the outcome would be the same. The Secretary then 

set forth law relating to the single subject rule. He stated that 
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in prior cases involving a single initiative, the question was 

whether the single initiative contained more than a single 

subject. But he noted that this case presented “a novel situation that has not been present in any case heretofore decided 

by the Supreme Court,” namely, a situation in which “a single 

general subject constitutes the primary purpose of all three of 

the initiatives.” The Secretary then reviewed each of the initiatives individually.

Regarding the Constitutional Initiative, the Secretary 

rejected certain arguments advanced by the objectors, but 

the Secretary found merit to an alternate argument advanced 

by the objectors regarding the Constitutional Initiative: that 

it contained a “‘hidden authorization’” of certain types of 

gambling on tribal lands in Nebraska. The Secretary agreed 

with the objectors’ reasoning that under the federal Indian 

Gaming Regulatory Act, permitting gaming activities by any 

organization in the State would require the State to negotiate 

with tribes to allow that type of gambling activity on tribal 

lands. The Secretary reasoned that the Constitutional Initiative 

would “likely . . . mislead voters into thinking that they are 

voting for an initiative that would prohibit the conduct of 

games of chance anywhere but at racetracks” but that instead, 

if the initiative were adopted, “gambling would not be limited 

to racetracks.” The Secretary determined that if the initiative 

were adopted, the legal implications under the Indian Gaming 

Regulatory Act were not merely speculative, and he noted that 

there were three tribal casinos in the State that could engage 

in additional types of gaming and that one of the sponsors 

of the initiatives was “affiliated with a tribal . . . casino in 

Iowa within a few miles of the Nebraska border that is not 

operating within a racetrack.” The Secretary found that the 

Constitutional Initiative creates the appearance that games 

of chance could be conducted only in racetrack enclosures. 

However, referring to State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 

973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014), the Secretary reasoned that given 

the implications under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the 

Constitutional Initiative was “likely to confuse voters,” “likely 
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to materially mislead voters,” and “create[] doubt about what 

action would be authorized.”

The Secretary concluded that the Constitutional Initiative 

“effectively puts forth dual proposals: (1) authorizing expanded 

gambling at tribal casinos and (2) authorizing expanded gambling at racetracks by authorized operators.” The Secretary 

stated that the first purpose was “hidden from the voters and 

impossible to ascertain from the text of the proposal.” He 

concluded that the Constitutional Initiative violated the single 

subject rule by “[p]utting forth dual propositions in a single 

proposal” and “not permit[ting] voters to express a clear preference on dual propositions.” Referring to the first proposal, 

the Secretary concluded that the Constitutional Initiative was 

“legally insufficient and for that reason [he would] withhold it 

from the ballot.”

Although the Secretary rested his decision regarding the 

Constitutional Initiative on the reasoning set forth above, he 

noted an additional argument by the objectors that the initiative 

violated the single subject rule because it had “two subjects, 

which are, first, permitting the conduct of games of chance by 

authorized operators, and second, that such activity is permitted only at racetracks.” The Secretary stated that this was a 

“strong argument” and that limiting gambling to racetracks was 

“not a benign purpose” but was “misleading.” However, the 

Secretary did not explicitly reject or accept this argument as a 

basis for his decision to withhold the Constitutional Initiative 

from the ballot.

Regarding the Regulatory Initiative, the Secretary noted 

that the opponents argued that the initiative violated the single subject rule by including multiple purposes, including 

authorizing games of chance at racetracks, creating a gaming 

commission, imposing a license fee, providing tax breaks to 

operators, and decriminalizing gaming activities. The Secretary 

reviewed precedent regarding initiatives setting forth a regulatory scheme and reviewed each of the parts of the Regulatory 

Initiative based on such precedent. As to most of the parts of 

the Regulatory Initiative, the Secretary determined that “[t]he 
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regulatory requirements set forth in the Regulatory Initiative 

have a natural and necessary connection to the general subject” of permitting previously prohibited games of chance. The 

Secretary specifically addressed the imposition of the $1 million licensing fee and determined it had a natural and necessary connection.

The Secretary, however, also reviewed portions of the initiative that provided “[t]ax breaks . . . which exempt purchases by 

licensees of the gaming commission from sales and use taxes 

and the mechanical amusement device tax.” The Secretary 

stated it was a “close question” whether such tax exemptions 

constituted a separate subject from the regulatory measures in 

the initiative. But the Secretary concluded that the “tax breaks 

[did] not have a natural and necessary connection to” a primary 

purpose of regulating gambling. The Secretary also noted that 

the tax exemptions were “not mentioned in the object statement” and that the sales and use tax exemption was “incorrectly 

stated in the introduction to the bill” as applying to the gaming 

commission rather than to licensees of the gaming commission. 

The Secretary stated that the descriptions were “misleading.” 

The Secretary further noted that the Tax Initiative provided 

for taxation of newly expanded gaming activities. He reasoned 

that “dividing the tax proposals between two initiatives, and by 

failing to disclose the tax breaks contained in the Regulatory 

Initiative,” the Regulatory Initiative created a condition confusing to voters and creating doubt as to the effect of the initiatives. The Secretary therefore concluded that the Regulatory 

Initiative was “not legally sufficient.”

The Secretary then stated that there was “an additional, 

separate basis for the legal insufficiency” of the Regulatory 

Initiative. He reasoned that because he had determined that 

the Constitutional Initiative must be withheld from the ballot, 

the Regulatory Initiative, which shared a primary purpose with 

the Constitutional Initiative and which had a natural and necessary connection to that primary purpose, would have “no purpose at all.” The Secretary concluded that if the Constitutional 
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Initiative were not on the ballot, adoption of the Regulatory 

Initiative “would be an idle act.”

Regarding the Tax Initiative, the Secretary noted that the 

objectors argued that it violated the single subject rule because 

it had two distinct and independent proposals: (1) to raise 

revenue by imposing an annual gaming tax and (2) to “distribute the bulk of the tax revenue for property tax relief.” The 

Secretary noted that the objectors indicated that other distributions of tax revenue “had a natural and necessary connection 

with the tax proposed, but that property tax relief is a separate 

topic included only to entice voters to vote in favor of the gaming tax.”

In reaction, the Secretary noted precedent in which this court 

determined that provisions for property tax relief included in 

other initiatives violated the single subject rule. The Secretary 

reasoned that “[w]ere the contents of the Tax Initiative contained in the Constitutional Initiative, the initiative would be 

legally insufficient and would be withheld from the ballot as 

logrolling.” The Secretary stated that the sponsors of the initiatives “attempt[ed] to avoid the prohibition against logrolling by 

setting forth the logrolling provisions in one of the Initiatives 

but not the others.”

The Secretary rejected McNally’s argument that “the property tax enticement” was proper because it was “contained 

in a separate initiative from that which expands gambling.” 

The Secretary instead reasoned that the primary purpose of 

all three initiatives was the same and that the provisions of 

the Tax Initiative, other than the property tax feature, had a 

natural and necessary connection to the extension of gambling. The Secretary reasoned that property tax relief had no 

natural and necessary connection to the expansion of gambling. The Secretary reasoned that whether the Tax Initiative 

had the same primary purpose as the other initiatives, or 

whether its primary purpose was taxation of gambling revenues, “the property tax relief provisions contained in the Tax 

Initiative constitute logrolling and violate the single subject 

rule.” Similar to his reasoning with regard to the Regulatory 
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Initiative, the Secretary reasoned that taxation provisions are 

“confusingly split between the Regulatory Initiative and the 

Tax Initiative.” The Secretary concluded that the Tax Initiative 

was legally insufficient.

Also similar to his reasoning with regard to the Regulatory 

Initiative, the Secretary concluded that there was an additional 

separate basis for the legal insufficiency of the Tax Initiative. 

He reasoned that because he had decided the Constitutional 

Initiative must be withheld, that without the Constitutional 

Initiative, adoption of the Tax Initiative “would be an idle act.”

The Secretary finally noted that the opponents raised certain constitutional challenges to the initiatives. However, the 

Secretary determined that it was not clear whether such challenges were “within the purview of a legal sufficiency review 

by the Secretary of State” and that the issues did not appear 

to be ripe for decision. He therefore expressed no opinion on 

those objections.

The Secretary stated in conclusion that “[p]art of the protection of the right of initiative is to assure that such petitions are 

neither misleading nor manipulative.” He concluded that based 

on his review and the reasons set forth in his letter, he would 

withhold all three initiatives from the ballot “unless otherwise 

ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction.”

Original Action for Writ of Mandamus.

After the Secretary withheld the three initiatives from the 

ballot, McNally filed this original action for writ of mandamus. 

We accepted jurisdiction and issued an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary to place the three initiatives on 

the ballot or show cause why they should not be placed on the 

ballot. We set schedules for briefing and oral argument. Several 

parties identified previously in the opinion intervened.

Summary of Issues Presented in This Action.

In response to our alternative writ of mandamus, the 

Secretary asserts that the issues presented in this original action 

are whether he correctly concluded that (1) the Constitutional 
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Initiative violates the single subject rule; (2) because the 

Constitutional Initiative must be withheld from the ballot, the 

Regulatory Initiative and the Tax Initiative must also be withheld from the ballot because they will have no effect without 

the Constitutional Initiative; (3) the Regulatory Initiative violates the single subject rule; and (4) the Tax Initiative violates 

the single subject rule.

McNally asserts that the Secretary incorrectly (1) applied the 

single subject rule by considering all three initiatives together, 

even though voters will vote on each separately; (2) determined 

that the Constitutional Initiative violates the single subject rule; 

(3) determined that the Regulatory Initiative violates the single 

subject rule; (4) determined that the Tax Initiative violates the 

single subject rule; and (5) determined that adoption of the 

Regulatory Initiative and the Tax Initiative without the simultaneous adoption of the Constitutional Initiative would be an 

“idle act.”

We note that the Secretary does not appear to dispute that the 

initiative petitions garnered sufficient signatures, nor does he 

appear to dispute the validity of the initiatives with respect to 

any other issue such as verification or submission by a specific 

date. We therefore presume such requirements were met and 

would not prevent placement of the initiatives on the ballot.

ANALYSIS

As set forth above, we issued an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary to place the three initiatives on 

the ballot or show cause why a peremptory writ requiring such 

action should not issue. The Secretary has responded to our 

alternative writ, and therefore, we must determine whether the 

Secretary has shown cause why we should not issue a peremptory writ requiring him to place any or all of the initiatives on 

the ballot.

The Secretary contends that all three initiatives should not be 

placed on the ballot. In his response to the alternative writ, the 

Secretary argues that the Constitutional Initiative violates the 

single subject rule because it has two subjects: (1) authorizing 
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games of chance and (2) limiting such activity to licensed 

racetrack enclosures. As an alternative second argument, the 

Secretary maintains that the Constitutional Initiative has the 

hidden purpose of authorizing games of chance on tribal lands. 

The Secretary argues that because the Constitutional Initiative 

must be withheld from the ballot, the Regulatory Initiative and 

the Tax Initiative must also be withheld from the ballot for the 

reason that they could not stand on their own because they 

would directly conflict with the current constitutional provision 

generally prohibiting games of chance.

The Secretary alternatively argues that if we determine 

the Regulatory Initiative and the Tax Initiative need not be 

withheld for this reason, each initiative in itself violates the 

single subject rule. The Secretary argues that the Regulatory 

Initiative, like the Constitutional Initiative, violates the single 

subject rule because it both authorizes games of chance and 

limits their operation to licensed racetrack enclosures. The 

Secretary also argues that the Regulatory Initiative violates the 

single subject rule because it includes provisions that would 

exempt licensees from sales and use tax and that would exempt 

authorized gaming devices from the Mechanical Amusement 

Device Tax Act; he argues that these tax-related topics do not 

have a natural and necessary connection to regulation of games 

of chance.

In considering the Tax Initiative, the Secretary maintains that 

because the sponsors have inextricably bound the Tax Initiative 

and the Regulatory Initiative together by including taxation 

issues in both, the propriety of putting the Tax Initiative 

on the ballot is entirely dependent on the placement of the 

Regulatory Initiative. The Secretary argues that because the 

Tax Initiative must be analyzed with the Regulatory Initiative, 

the Tax Initiative presents a problem of “logrolling” because 

voters who want to vote for the Tax Initiative in order to provide property tax relief would be forced to also vote for the 

Regulatory Initiative, which authorizes the activity to be taxed 

to provide funds for such property tax relief.
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In response, McNally generally argues that the single subject rule provides that voters must be allowed to cast separate votes on separate subjects and that because voters could 

vote for or against each separate initiative, the legal sufficiency of each initiative must be evaluated separately without 

reference to the other initiatives. McNally argues that if any 

initiative is legally sufficient in itself, it must be placed on the 

ballot whether or not either or both of the other ballot issues 

are legally sufficient. McNally argues that, viewed individually, none of the three initiatives violates the single subject 

rule and that therefore, each of the three initiatives must be 

placed on the ballot.

Summary of Legal Determinations.

Immediately below, we set forth standards related to the single subject rule. As set forth below, we determine that each initiative must be analyzed individually for its legal sufficiency, 

and we thereafter analyze each initiative separately. Based 

on such analysis, we conclude that neither the Constitutional 

Initiative, nor the Regulatory Initiative, nor the Tax Initiative 

violates the single subject rule. We therefore conclude that 

the Secretary has not shown cause why we should not issue 

a peremptory writ requiring him to place the Constitutional 

Initiative, the Regulatory Initiative, and the Tax Initiative on 

the ballot.

Our Precedent Generally Sets Forth a Natural and 

Necessary Connection Test for the Single Subject 

Rule Found in Neb. Const. art. III, § 2.

[1,2] The people have the power to amend the Nebraska 

Constitution and enact statutes by the initiative process pursuant to Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, which provides in part: “The 

first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby 

laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted 

by the people independently of the Legislature.” We have 

repeatedly said that the right of initiative is precious to the 

people and one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the 
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fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter. Christensen 

v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018); Hargesheimer 

v. Gale, 294 Neb. 123, 881 N.W.2d 589 (2016); Stewart v. 

Advanced Gaming Tech., 272 Neb. 471, 723 N.W.2d 65 (2006); 

State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, 272 Neb. 295, 721 N.W.2d 347 

(2006); Loontjer v. Robinson, 266 Neb. 902, 670 N.W.2d 301 

(2003); State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 258 Neb. 199, 602 

N.W.2d 465 (1999). The power of initiative must be liberally 

construed to promote the democratic process, and provisions 

authorizing the initiative should be construed in such a manner 

that the legislative power reserved in the people is effectual. 

Stewart v. Advanced Gaming Tech., supra.

[3-6] A constitution represents the supreme written will of 

the people regarding the framework for their government. State 

ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 734 N.W.2d 290 (2007). 

The people of Nebraska may amend their Constitution in any 

way they see fit, provided the amendments do not violate the 

federal Constitution or conflict with federal statutes or treaties. State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, supra. This court makes 

no attempt to judge the wisdom or the desirability of enacting 

initiative amendments. Id. We agree with the statement elsewhere that

the interests that propel both proponents and opponents of 

initiative petitions may often involve self-interest rather 

than the public interest. But our focus in deciding whether 

an initiative petition reaches the voters must be on the 

actual law proposed by the petition, not on the motives 

that may lie behind it; the voters may consider those 

motives in deciding how they vote on the petition.

Bogertman v. Attorney General, 474 Mass. 607, 618-19, 53 

N.E.3d 627, 636 (2016).

[7] Among other matters related to initiatives, Neb. Const. 

art. III, § 2, provides that “[i]nitiative measures shall contain 

only one subject.” We have stated that a purpose of this language is to avoid logrolling, which is the practice of combining dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment so 
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that voters must vote for or against the whole package even 

though they would have voted differently had the propositions 

been submitted separately. Christensen v. Gale, supra.

[8,9] Like the majority of jurisdictions, we follow the natural and necessary connection test which we have set forth as 

follows: Where the limits of a proposed law, having natural 

and necessary connection with each other, and, together, are a 

part of one general subject, the proposal is a single and not a 

dual proposition. Id. The controlling consideration in determining the singleness of a subject for purposes of article III, § 2, 

of the Nebraska Constitution is its singleness of purpose and 

relationship of the details to the general subject, not the strict 

necessity of any given detail to carry out the general subject.

Christensen v. Gale, supra. The general subject is defined by 

its primary purpose. Id. Here, because the parts of the proposed 

Constitutional Initiative all relate to the same general subject, 

the expanding of games of chance, the Constitutional Initiative 

does not violate the single subject rule nor logrolling.

We note that this case appears to present an issue of first 

impression regarding application of the single subject rule 

when separate but related initiatives are reviewed for legal 

sufficiency. The Secretary argues in this case that because the 

three initiatives share a common primary purpose, they must 

be considered with one another when determining whether any 

or all of the initiatives violate the single subject rule. McNally 

disputes that the three initiatives have the same primary purpose, but argues that, in any event, each initiative must be analyzed individually to determine whether it violates the single 

subject rule. The parties appear to agree that our precedent 

does not address that issue.

[10] As noted above, a purpose of the single subject rule is 

to avoid forcing voters to vote for or against the whole package even though they would have voted differently had the 

propositions been submitted separately. When initiatives are 

presented separately, even if on the same ballot, a voter has 

the option to vote for one initiative but not the other, even if 

the initiatives have some connection to one another. Because 
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voters can vote differently on each separate initiative, we conclude and hold that single subject review should focus on the 

specific initiative being reviewed without reference to the content of another initiative that is submitted separately.

Finally, we note that the Secretary’s arguments rely in large 

part on language in an opinion in which we stated:

“a proposed municipal ballot measure is invalid if it 

would (1) compel voters to vote for or against distinct 

propositions in a single vote—when they might not do so 

if presented separately; (2) confuse voters on the issues 

they are asked to decide; or (3) create doubt as to what 

action they have authorized after the election.”

State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 1000, 853 N.W.2d 

494, 513 (2014) (quoting City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 282 

Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469 (2011)). The Secretary’s arguments 

focus in large part on asserting that the initiatives in this case 

are misleading and that they would “confuse voters” and “create doubt.” We take this opportunity to clarify the quoted language in State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra.

As is clear from the language quoted above, we were quoting City of North Platte v. Tilgner, supra, which set forth standards related to municipal ballot measures and the commonlaw rules that have been applied to such standards. In State ex 

rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra, we were considering constitutional 

amendments proposed by the Legislature and the separate 

vote requirement of Neb. Const. art. XVI, § 1, which governs 

constitutional amendments proposed by the Legislature. We 

referred to Tilgner, which described a natural and necessary 

test for the single vote requirement set forth in subsection (1) 

of the quoted language regarding municipal ballot measures. 

We concluded that the natural and necessary test for the single 

vote requirement for municipal ballot measures should also be 

used in connection with the separate vote provisions of Neb. 

Const. art. XVI, § 1, governing constitutional amendments 

proposed by the Legislature.

In State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra, we recognized that 

among the reasons for a single subject rule is that including 
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multiple subjects could confuse voters and create doubt, but we 

have not said that confusion or doubt are separate requirements 

for a legally insufficient measure or that they are required elements of the test to determine whether a measure violates the 

single subject requirement. As we noted above, in Christensen 

v. Gale, 391 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018), we said that the 

natural and necessary test described in State ex rel. Loontjer 

v. Gale, supra, for the separate vote requirement under Neb. 

Const. art. XVI, § 1, for constitutional amendments proposed 

by the Legislature is also an applicable framework to consideration of the single subject rule for initiatives brought under 

Neb. Const. art. III, § 2. Therefore, the natural and necessary 

test governs our single subject analysis in this case.

We apply the foregoing principles regarding the single subject rule to review the Secretary’s arguments regarding each 

of the three initiatives at issue in this case and to determine 

whether or not each initiative violates the single subject rule 

and is therefore legally insufficient.

Constitutional Initiative Does Not 

Violate Single Subject Rule.

In his response to the alternative writ, the Secretary argues 

that the Constitutional Initiative violates the single subject rule 

in two different ways, because (1) it both authorizes games 

of chance and limits them to racetrack enclosures and (2) in 

addition to authorizing games of chance at racetrack enclosures, it authorizes games of chance on tribal lands. Because 

we conclude that there is no violation of the single subject 

rule, we reject the Secretary’s arguments and conclude that the 

Secretary has not shown cause why the Constitutional Initiative 

should not be placed on the ballot.

In reviewing the Secretary’s arguments regarding the 

Constitutional Initiative, we note that a review for legal sufficiency should focus on the actual text of the initiative. 

We therefore repeat the text of the Constitutional Initiative 

at this point. The initiative proposes to amend the existing 

Neb. Const. art. III, § 24, by adding another exception to the 
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prohibition against gambling by providing the following new 

subsection (5):

This section shall not apply to any law which is enacted 

contemporaneously with the adoption of this subsection or 

at any time thereafter and which provides for the licensing, authorization, regulation, or taxation of all forms of 

games of chance when such games of chance are conducted by authorized gaming operators within a licensed 

racetrack enclosure.

That is the entirety of the amendment proposed by the 

Constitutional Initiative.

The text of the amendment refers to games of chance within 

a licensed racetrack enclosure. The dissent is concerned that 

the racetrack where games of chance are located would serve 

as host and could profit therefrom. Regarding profit, we note 

that other subsections in art. III, § 24, such as subsection 2, 

limit the scope to charitable and community betterment; this 

Constitutional Initiative does not. We limit our analysis to the 

text of the Constitutional Initiative, which simply specifies the 

place of games of chance.

We first address the Secretary’s assertion that the 

Constitutional Initiative contains two subjects. With respect 

to the first manner of alleged violation, Neb. Const. art. III, 

§ 2, the Secretary asserts the Constitutional Initiative contains 

two subjects: (1) authorizing all forms of games of chance and 

(2) restricting those new forms of gambling to racetracks. The 

Secretary generally argues that authorizing games of chance 

is the primary purpose and that restricting games of chance 

to racetrack enclosures does not have a natural and necessary connection to authorizing games of chance. We find the 

Secretary’s reading of the one sentence proposed to be added 

to the Constitution to be an inaccurate application of the single 

subject rule.

By reviewing the proposed amendment in context, we 

believe the Secretary’s characterization of the initiative as 

having two subjects is inaccurate. Article III, § 24, of the 

Nebraska Constitution, which the Constitutional Initiative 
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proposes to amend, begins: “[e]xcept as provided in this section, the Legislature shall not authorize any game of chance 

or any lottery . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) This is an invitation 

to authorize expanded gambling by way of exceptions and, 

indeed, that has occurred. Both the people (through initiative) and the Legislature (by authorization) have accepted the 

invitation in art. III, § 24(1), to expand gambling. See art. III, 

§ 24(2) through (4). Art. III, § 24, has been amended to include 

exceptions which permit, inter alia, wagering on horses at racetracks and, separately, lotteries. The proposed Constitutional 

Initiative exception accepts the constitutional offer to expand 

gambling and would permit games of chance at racetracks.

By definition, an exception to art. III, § 24, is an expansion of gambling. When gambling is expanded, it naturally 

follows that the enlarged activity shall occur somewhere, 

hence the description “within a licensed racetrack enclosure.” See Bogertman v. Attorney General, 474 Mass. 607, 

53 N.E.3d 627 (2016) (discussing location in the context of 

expanded gambling). Gambling, i.e., wagering on horses, is 

already located “within a licensed racetrack enclosure.” Art. 

III, § 24(4)(a). We do not read the Constitutional Initiative to 

prevent games of chance being located at additional places by 

later amendments.

In the present case, the sponsors of the Constitutional 

Initiative concluded that the new gambling exception activity—which art. III, § 24(1), invites—should occur at racetracks 

where other gambling already occurs as a result of a previous 

exception. The Constitutional Initiative asks voters if they want 

games of chance to be permitted within racetrack enclosures. 

Voters who want games of chance nearby or elsewhere can 

vote against it.

Identifying and limiting the location of a new activity is 

a detail naturally and necessarily connected to its creation 

and not a separate subject. Christensen v. Gale, supra. Voters 

naturally want to know the locale of expanded gambling. We 

have said that provisions in a proposal must be closely related 

to be presented to the electorate for a single vote. State ex rel.
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Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014). The 

Constitutional Initiative meets these tests.

The Secretary argues that logrolling is occurring because 

there may be voters who might support authorization of new 

games of chance but who dislike the “favored treatment” given 

to racetracks and would be forced to vote for the racetrack 

limitation in order to authorize new games of chance. We do 

not read the proposal as vulnerable to the claim of logrolling. 

In State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. at 995, 853 N.W.2d 

at 510, we said that

logrolling is the practice of combining dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment so that voters must 

vote for or against the whole package even though they 

would have voted differently had the propositions been 

submitted separately. It is sometimes described as including favored but unrelated propositions in a proposed 

amendment to ensure passage of a provision that might 

otherwise fail.

The premise of these descriptions of logrolling is that the two 

propositions are unrelated. Logrolling has no application when 

propositions are related.

Under the Constitutional Initiative, each voter gets to decide 

whether authorization of games of chance is a sufficiently 

important goal that he or she will support the incremental 

expansion provided by this initiative. If so, he or she could 

vote for it. Or he or she could decide that the racetrack limitation is an unfavorable feature and therefore he or she could 

vote against it. When the parts have a natural and necessary 

connection, there is no logrolling. When an unattractive feature 

is paired with an attractive feature and they do not have a natural and necessary connection to one another, then logrolling is 

a problem. No logrolling occurs here.

We have observed that the provisions authorizing the initiative should be construed in such a manner that the legislative 

power reserved in the people is effectual. State ex rel. Loontjer 

v. Gale, supra; State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, 272 Neb. 295, 721 

N.W.2d 347 (2006). Elsewhere, discussing the single subject 
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rule, it has been cautioned that “defining the constitutionallyvalid topic too broadly would render the safeguards of [a single 

subject rule] inert. Conversely, the requirements of [a single 

subject rule] must not become a license for the judiciary to 

‘exercise a pedantic tyranny’” over efforts to change the law. 

PA Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Com., 583 Pa. 275, 

296, 877 A.2d 383, 395-96 (2005).

We have stated that the power of initiative must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process. State ex rel. 

Loontjer v. Gale, supra; State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, supra. 

Whether or not games of chance conducted at racetracks 

should become the law is for the people to decide.

We next consider the Secretary’s argument that the 

Constitutional Initiative violates the single subject rule because 

in addition to authorizing games of chance at racetrack enclosures, it also authorizes games of chance on tribal lands. We 

reject this argument. As we stated above, a legal sufficiency 

review should focus on the actual text of the proposed initiative. The Secretary’s argument rests on the notion that there is 

a “hidden” subject in the Constitutional Initiative that simply 

is not present in the text of the proposal. That is, the Secretary 

concludes that the initiative violates the single subject rule 

because it contains this second hidden subject.

When reviewing legal sufficiency, we do not speculate on 

the hidden motives or self-interest of the sponsors. By that 

same token, we do not speculate on the potential motives or 

self-interest of those who object to placing the initiative on 

the ballot. To the extent the proposed initiative might have 

repercussions that are not apparent from the text of the initiative, whether such repercussions are unintended consequences 

or ulterior motives, is an argument that should be made to the 

voters rather than to the Secretary or to a court conducting a 

legal sufficiency review. See Hargesheimer v. Gale, 294 Neb. 

123, 881 N.W.2d 589 (2016) (noting that referendum statutes 

provide for disclosure of sponsors and financial contributors so 

that voters can know who is backing the proposal and based on 
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that information make their own decisions whether the motives 

of the backers will affect their vote).

We need not delve into federal or tribal law in order to determine whether the amendment proposed by the Constitutional 

Initiative could have the effect on gaming in tribal casinos 

that the Secretary asserts. Such analysis is beyond the scope 

of preelection single subject review. It is not a subject set forth 

by the text of the initiative. To the extent the repercussions are 

as the Secretary asserts, that is a matter for opponents to present to voters who may decide the likelihood and desirability 

of such repercussions. Having rejected the arguments of the 

Secretary and also those of intervenors, we conclude that the 

Secretary has not shown cause why the Constitutional Initiative 

should not be placed on the ballot. We therefore will issue a 

peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the Secretary to place 

the Constitutional Initiative on the ballot.

Regulatory Initiative Does Not 

Violate Single Subject Rule.

The Secretary argues that the Regulatory Initiative violates the single subject rule for the same reason that the 

Constitutional Initiative does and for the additional reason that 

provisions addressing taxation have no natural and necessary 

connection to the regulatory scheme set forth in the initiative. 

We conclude that the Regulatory Initiative does not violate 

the single subject rule and that the Secretary has not shown 

cause why the Regulatory Initiative should not be placed on 

the ballot.

Below we consider various provisions of the Regulatory 

Initiative, but we initially quote section 4(2). Section 4(2) 

provides:

No more than one authorized gaming operator license 

shall be granted for each licensed racetrack enclosure 

within the state; provided that, it shall not be a requirement that the person or entity applying for or be granted 

such authorized gaming operator license hold a racing 

license or be the same person or entity who operates the 
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licensed racetrack enclosure at which such authorized 

gaming operator license shall be granted.

This language in the Regulatory Initiative indicates that 

although games of chance are to be located within a racetrack 

enclosure, the entity who operates such enclosure will not necessarily be the operator of games of chance.

The Secretary first argues that the Regulatory Initiative 

violates the single subject rule for the same reason he asserted 

in connection with the Constitutional Initiative, that is, it 

violates the single subject rule—because it both (1) authorizes games of chance and (2) limits operation of such games 

of chance to racetrack enclosures. However, the Regulatory 

Initiative does not in itself “authorize games of chance.” 

Instead, it states in part that “to the full extent permitted by 

the Constitution of Nebraska, including amendments to the 

Constitution of Nebraska adopted contemporaneously . . . , the 

operation of games of chance is permitted only by authorized 

gaming operators within licensed racetrack enclosures.” The 

Regulatory Initiative does not itself authorize games of chance 

and instead it recognizes that such authorization comes from 

the constitution and that the operation of the regulatory scheme 

it sets forth is effective only to the extent it is authorized by 

the constitution.

The subject of the Regulatory Initiative is a regulatory 

scheme for operation of games of chance that may at some time 

be authorized by the constitution, and among the features of 

that regulatory scheme is limiting operation of such games to 

racetrack enclosures. Because authorization of games of chance 

is not a subject of the Regulatory Initiative, the limitation to 

racetracks is not a second subject and instead is to be considered as one of the components of the regulatory scheme.

The Secretary does not argue, and we do not find, that 

the limitation to racetrack enclosures does not have a natural 

and necessary connection to regulation of games of chance. 

The Regulatory Initiative includes various other provisions 

related to regulation of games of chance, and in other cases, 

we have found that an initiative that purports to regulate a 
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specific subject may include diverse components related to that 

single subject.

We recently made this observation in Christensen v. Gale, 

301 Neb. 19, 33, 917 N.W.2d 145, 157 (2018), where we said:

[I]n City of Fremont v. Kotas, [279 Neb. 720, 781 N.W.2d 

456 (2010), abrogated on other grounds, City of North 

Platte v. Tilgner, 282 Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469 (2011),] 

we held that an initiative petition did not violate the single 

subject rule. Despite several components of the proposed 

measure dealing with the subjects of occupancy, licensing, electronic verification, government uses, resources, 

and penalties, and the application to both landlords and 

employers, we held that these subjects had a natural and 

necessary connection with each other and were part of the 

general subject of regulating illegal immigration.

In his letter, the Secretary rejected the objectors’ arguments 

that certain of the components of the Regulatory Initiative were 

not related to regulation of games of chance, and he does not 

assert in his response to our alternative writ that those components or other components of the Regulatory Initiative, other 

than those discussed below, caused the initiative to violate the 

single subject rule.

The Secretary does argue that the Regulatory Initiative 

violates the single subject rule because it contains provisions which (1) exempt licensees of the Nebraska Gaming 

Commission from sales and use tax, and (2) exclude gaming 

devices from the Mechanical Amusement Device Tax Act. He 

argues that these “tax breaks” do not have a natural and necessary connection to regulation of games of chance and that 

the sponsors recognized that taxation issues are not related to 

regulation because they included other tax-related issues in the 

separate Tax Initiative.

We disagree. Both tax-related provisions within the 

Regulatory Initiative have a natural and necessary connection 

to the regulation of games of chance. Whether operators and 

licensees are subject to sales and use tax and whether gaming 

devices authorized in the regulatory scheme are subject to the 
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mechanical amusement device tax are both issues relevant to 

regulation of games of chance. In the Regulatory Initiative, 

the sales and use tax exemption for licensees of the gaming commission is accomplished by amending a statute that 

already exempts licensees of the racing commission to include 

licensees of the gaming commission. See § 77-2704.20. The 

exclusion of gaming devices from the Mechanical Amusement 

Device Tax Act is accomplished by adding “gaming devices” 

defined in the gaming act to a list of items that are not subject 

to the tax and that list already includes “pickle card dispensing devices.” See § 77-3001. We think this indicates that these 

provisions are related to the regulation of games of chance in 

the same sense that the statutes proposed to be amended are 

part of the regulatory schemes for other forms of gambling—

horseracing and pickle cards, respectively.

We also reject the argument that including these tax-related 

provisions in the Regulatory Initiative rather than the Tax 

Initiative implicates the single subject rule. The mere fact that 

the provisions might also have some connection to the general 

subject of taxation does not mean that they do not also have 

a natural and necessary connection to the regulation of games 

of chance. In fact, if these provisions were included in the 

Tax Initiative, it would be arguable that they have even less 

connection to the purpose of that initiative than they do the 

Regulatory Initiative. Whether licensees are exempted from 

sales and use tax and whether gaming devices are subject to 

the Mechanical Amusement Device Tax Act are issues that 

seem to have only tangential connection to a tax initiative 

whose purpose is to impose a tax on the revenue of games of 

chance and provide for allocation for the revenue. Furthermore, 

the fact that a provision may have some connection to another 

subject, such as “taxation,” does not mean it does not have a 

natural and necessary connection to the subject of a specific 

initiative, such as “regulation.” Our analysis is not whether the 

provisions could better have been included elsewhere; we only 

consider whether they have a natural and necessary connection 
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to the regulatory purpose of the initiative, and we conclude 

that they do.

We reject the Secretary’s argument that the Regulatory 

Initiative violates the single subject rule, and we conclude that 

the Secretary has failed to show cause why the Regulatory 

Initiative should not be placed on the ballot. We will therefore 

issue a peremptory writ requiring the Secretary to include the 

Regulatory Initiative on the ballot.

Tax Initiative Does Not Violate 

Single Subject Rule.

The Secretary argues that the Tax Initiative violates the single subject rule. He generally argues that the Tax Initiative is 

“interwoven with—and entirely dependent on—the Regulatory 

Initiative.” We reject this argument and conclude that the 

Secretary has not shown cause why the Tax Initiative should 

not be placed on the ballot.

The Secretary argues that the Tax Initiative and the 

Regulatory Initiative are so “tightly intertwined” that they must 

be considered together for single subject analysis. However, as 

we discussed above, the purpose of the single subject rule is to 

allow voters to vote separately on different subjects. Because 

the voters can vote individually and differently on each initiative presented, a single subject review focuses on the specific 

initiative at issue.

Viewed in that manner, as we discussed in connection with 

the Regulatory Initiative, the fact that the tax-related provisions of the Regulatory Initiative and the Tax Initiative both 

have a connection to the general subject of taxation does not 

mean that by necessity they must, or even can, be included in a 

single initiative. Single subject analysis focuses on the subjects 

and provisions actually included in an initiative and not on 

provisions that might have been included or that are included 

in a separate initiative. Therefore, the fact that some tax-related 

provisions are included in the Regulatory Initiative is not relevant to our review of the Tax Initiative.
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The Tax Initiative imposes a tax on revenues from games 

of chance and sets forth how the tax collections will be distributed. The imposition of a tax and the distribution of that 

tax have an obvious natural and necessary connection to one 

another. If a voter is asked to approve a new tax, it is natural 

and necessary that the voter would want to know and control 

how the taxes so collected will be used. A voter is unlikely to 

support a tax if he or she does not know how the proceeds will 

be used. Therefore, viewing the Tax Initiative alone, it does not 

violate the single subject rule.

The Secretary argues that certain distributions provided in 

the Tax Initiative, particularly that 70 percent of the collected 

tax be distributed for property tax relief, constitute what single 

subject precedent has characterized as impermissible “logrolling.” For example, in State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 

973, 853 N.W.2d 494 (2014), we held that a proposed ballot 

measure violated the separate-vote provision of article XVI, 

§ 1, of the Nebraska Constitution, which governs proposals by the Legislature to amend the Constitution and which

Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 32, 917 N.W.2d 145, 156 

(2018), concluded “imposes the same requirements as the 

single subject provision under article III, § 2.” The measure 

at issue in State ex rel. Loontjer would have amended the 

Constitution by way of one proposal to permit slot-machinetype gambling on replayed horseraces and would direct tax 

revenue from that activity, as well as from live horseracing 

which was already allowed by the Constitution, to property 

tax relief and education funding. We determined in State ex 

rel. Loontjer that constitutional authorization of a new form 

of wagering lacked a natural and necessary connection to the 

measure’s proposal to the use tax revenues for property tax 

relief and education and that the only purpose of including 

such property tax relief in the same measure “was to enhance 

the odds that voters would approve the new form of wagering,” 

which effect we described as “logrolling.” 288 Neb. at 1004, 

853 N.W.2d at 515.
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As noted above in this opinion, we have described logrolling 

as “the practice of combining dissimilar propositions into one 

proposed amendment so that voters must vote for or against the 

whole package even though they would have voted differently 

had the propositions been submitted separately.” Christensen v. 

Gale, 301 Neb. at 31, 917 N.W.2d at 156. The Secretary’s logrolling argument requires that we look at all three initiatives, 

or at least both the Regulatory Initiative and the Tax Initiative, 

together and determine that inclusion of property tax relief in 

the Tax Initiative serves as an incentive for voters to approve 

the other initiatives in order to achieve such relief. We reject 

the Secretary’s argument.

As described above, logrolling means a situation in which 

voters are required to vote for or against the whole package 

even though they would have voted differently had the propositions been submitted separately. This concern is not present 

when, as here, the initiatives are submitted separately and voters may vote on each individually and can choose to vote for 

all three or only for those of which they approve. For example, 

a voter might not want to authorize expanded gambling and 

therefore vote against authorization and/or regulation, but vote 

for the tax initiative on the thought that if games of chance 

are authorized by the general electorate, the voter wants those 

activities taxed and the proceeds used for, among other things, 

property tax relief. The voter is not forced to vote for authorization in order to achieve property tax relief unless the voter 

believes authorizing games of chance is an acceptable way to 

achieve property tax relief.

The distribution of a tax has an obvious natural and necessary connection to the imposition of that tax and therefore both 

features are part of a single subject. Clearly, a voter would be 

highly unlikely to vote for a tax unless he or she knew and supported the purpose to which tax proceeds would be directed. 

We do not believe that including an attractive disposition of 

proceeds of the tax authorized by the initiative which imposes 

the tax can be viewed as a ploy to trick a voter into voting for 

imposition of the tax.
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We conclude that the Tax Initiative does not violate the 

single subject rule and that therefore, the Secretary has not 

shown cause why it should not be placed on the ballot. We will 

therefore issue a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the 

Secretary to place the Tax Initiative on the ballot.

CONCLUSION

The people have the power to amend the Nebraska 

Constitution and enact statutes by the initiative process pursuant to Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, which provides in part: “The 

first power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby 

laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted 

by the people independently of the Legislature.” We have 

repeatedly said that the right of initiative is precious to the 

people and one which the courts are zealous to preserve to 

the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter. We conclude that in response to our alternative writ, the Secretary 

has not shown cause why either the Constitutional Initiative, 

the Regulatory Initiative, or the Tax Initiative should not be 

placed on the ballot. We therefore vacate our alternative writ 

and by separate order issue a peremptory writ of mandamus 

ordering the Secretary to place the Constitutional Initiative, the 

Regulatory Initiative, and the Tax Initiative on the November 

2020 ballot.

Writ of mandamus granted.

Funke, J., and Welch, Judge, join in this opinion.

Papik, J., not participating.

Cassel, J., concurring.

In the lead opinion, I join the sections entitled “Nature 

of Case” and “Statement of Facts,” and the judgment of the 

court.

The court’s decision today is dictated by the seven words 

of article III, § 2, of the Nebraska Constitution stating, 

“Initiative measures shall contain only one subject.” That 

same section of the state Constitution reserves the power of 

initiative to the people. While this court has stated that the 
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power of initiative must be liberally construed to promote 

the democratic process, 1 it has also recognized that a procedural requirement found in the same section of the state 

Constitution in which the people reserved to themselves the 

power of initiative serves to define the scope of the initiative 

power. 2 This court must give “meaningful effect” to the selfimposed limitation on that power. 3

The words in a constitutional provision must be interpreted 

and understood in their most natural and obvious meaning 

unless the subject indicates or the text suggests that they are 

used in a technical sense. 4 It is also appropriate and helpful to 

consider the evil and mischief attempted to be remedied, the 

objects sought to be accomplished, and the scope of the remedy its terms imply. 5

A purpose of these seven words is to avoid voter confusion 

and logrolling, which is the practice of combining dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment so that voters 

must vote for or against the whole package even though they 

would have voted differently had the propositions been submitted separately. 6 I believe all members of the court agree with 

this purpose.

Where the limits of a proposed law, having natural and 

necessary connection with each other, and, together, are a 

part of one general subject, the proposal is a single and not a 

dual proposition. 7 The controlling consideration in determining 

the singleness of a proposed amendment is its singleness of 

1 See Stewart v. Advanced Gaming Tech., 272 Neb. 471, 723 N.W.2d 65 

(2006).

2 See State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, 272 Neb. 295, 721 N.W.2d 347 (2006).

3 See id.

4 Id.

5 See id.

6 Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018).

7 Id.
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purpose and the relationship of the details to the general subject. 8 The general subject is defined by its primary purpose. 9

The proposed amendment to article III, § 24, of the Nebraska 

Constitution states in relevant part, “This section shall not 

apply to any law . . . which provides for . . . all forms of 

games of chance when such games of chance are conducted 

by authorized gaming operators within a licensed racetrack 

enclosure.” Fundamentally, a majority of this court concludes 

that this language prescribes “what” (gaming) and “where” 

(racetracks), while our dissenting colleagues view the words 

as dictating “what” (gaming) and “who” (racetrack hosts). But 

I do not read “authorized gaming operators within a licensed 

racetrack enclosure” synonomously with either existing licensees or existing racetracks. Further, I do not read any of my dissenting colleagues to agree with the reasoning of the Secretary 

of State analyzing the Constitutional Initiative, the Regulatory 

Initiative, and the Tax Initiative as a single proposal. Nor do 

I view any member of this court as thinking it proper to consider, for purposes of article III, § 2, the effect of adoption of 

the initiative upon tribal gaming.

The primary purpose of the proposal is to provide another 

exception to the basic prohibition of games of chance, lotteries, and gift enterprises under article III, § 24(1). The detail 

of “where” is naturally and necessarily related to the “what.” 

Expansion of gaming presumes some location. The racetrack 

limitation merely specifies the place. This dictates that the proposal contains only one “subject” within the meaning of article 

III, § 2.

That is all the Secretary of State was required to determine, and our scope goes no further. The arguments for and 

against the wisdom and desirability of the proposal are for the 

people of this state to decide. Because only one subject was 

8 Id. 

9 Id.
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specified in the Constitutional Initiative, that proposal must go 

to the voters. 

I join the reasoning of my colleagues in the lead opinion regarding application of the single subject rule to the 

Regulatory Initiative and the Tax Initiative.

Heavican, C.J., Stacy, and Freudenberg, JJ., dissenting.

To the extent the plurality concludes there is just one subject 

presented in the Constitutional Initiative, we respectfully disagree. Because we discern two separate subjects with separate 

purposes, we conclude the initiative violates the single subject 

requirement of Neb. Const. art. III, § 2. We would deny the writ 

and allow the Secretary of State to withhold the Constitutional 

Initiative from the November 2020 ballot.

A constitution represents the supreme written will of the 

people regarding the framework for their government, and 

the people may amend their Constitution in any way they 

see fit, provided the amendments do not violate the federal Constitution or conflict with federal statutes or treaties. 1

In 1998, the people of Nebraska amended art. III, § 2, to add 

the requirement that “[i]nitiative measures shall contain only 

one subject.” 2 The peoples’ power of initiative, and the selfimposed single subject limitation on that power, are of equal 

constitutional significance. 3 Just as courts must respect and 

give effect to the power the people have reserved to themselves 

to amend the constitution or enact legislation through initiative 

measures, courts must also give meaningful effect to the single 

subject requirement in art. III, § 2.

When analyzing the single subject requirement for voter 

initiatives under art. III, § 2, we apply the natural and 

1 State ex rel. Johnson v. Gale, 273 Neb. 889, 734 N.W.2d 290 (2007).

2 See 1997 Neb. Laws, L.R. 32CA.

3 See, e.g., State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, 272 Neb. 295, 721 N.W.2d 347 

(2006) (right to initiative and resubmission clause limiting that right have 

equal constitutional significance).
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necessary connection test. 4 Under that test, the inquiry is 

whether all of the provisions of an initiative have a “‘“natural 

and necessary connection with each other, and, together, are a 

part of one general subject.”’” 5 When there are separate provisions in a proposed constitutional amendment, they “must 

be closely related in purpose to be presented to the electorate 

for a single vote.” 6 This is so because “[w]ithout a unifying 

purpose, separate proposals in a ballot measure necessarily 

present independent and distinct proposals that require a separate vote.” 7

When analyzing the single subject requirement, we are 

mindful that its purpose is to “avoid voter confusion and 

logrolling.” 8 We have described logrolling as “the practice of 

combining dissimilar propositions into one proposed amendment so that voters must vote for or against the whole package 

even though they would have voted differently had the propositions been submitted separately.” 9 We also have described 

logrolling as “including favored but unrelated propositions 

in a proposed amendment to ensure passage of a provision 

that might otherwise fail.” 10 Generally speaking, logrolling is 

criticized because it leads to the adoption of measures which, 

when considered separately, do not enjoy true majority support, and it presents voters with the “Hobson’s choice” of 

either choosing to vote for a measure they dislike in order to 

secure passage of a measure they favor or, conversely, being 

4 See Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 917 N.W.2d 145 (2018).

5 Id. at 32, 917 N.W.2d at 156.

6 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, 288 Neb. 973, 1000-01, 853 N.W.2d 494, 

513 (2014).

7 Id. at 1003, 853 N.W.2d at 515.

8 Christensen v. Gale, supra note 4, 301 Neb. at 31, 917 N.W.2d at 156.

9 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 6, 288 Neb. at 995, 853 N.W.2d 

at 510.

10 Id.
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forced to vote against a measure they favor because it has been 

joined with a measure they disfavor. 11

The plurality and dissenting opinions do not reach separate 

results because they disagree on any of these fundamental 

principles of our constitutional single subject jurisprudence. 

Instead, we reach different results because we have different 

views regarding the “subject” of the initiative.

We have observed that “whether a proposed amendment’s 

provisions deal with a single subject matter depends on 

how narrowly or broadly the subject matter is defined.” 12

Consequently, the judicial exercise of defining the subject of 

a ballot initiative is a critical first step. To do so, a court must 

discern the “primary purpose” 13 of the initiative.

As it regards the Constitutional Initiative, the plurality 

appears to have accepted the sponsors’ framing of the initiative’s primary purpose. The sponsors describe their objective 

as amending the constitution to authorize “all forms of games 

of chance . . . within licensed racetrack enclosures in the state.” 

Similarly, the plurality defines the subject of the Constitutional 

Initiative as “ask[ing] voters if they want games of chance to 

be permitted within racetrack enclosures.”

We reject the notion that a sponsor’s articulation of an 

initiative’s purpose must control the court’s definition of the 

initiative’s subject. To give meaningful effect to the single 

subject requirement under art. III, § 2, courts cannot allow 

the general subject of a voter initiative measure to be defined 

at such a high level of abstraction that the primary purpose 

of the single subject requirement—to prevent logrolling—is 

frustrated.

11 See Richard Briffault, The Single-Subject Rule: A State Constitutional 

Dilemma, 82 Alb. L. Rev. 1629 (2019).

12 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 6, 288 Neb. at 1001, 853 N.W.2d 

at 514.

13 Christensen v. Gale, supra note 4, 301 Neb. at 32, 917 N.W.2d at 156.
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Courts and commentators alike have acknowledged the difficulty inherent in defining the subject of voter initiatives, 14

and we do not intend to suggest there is a simple mathematical 

or linguistic formula to correctly identify the subject of every 

initiative. Indeed, it has been suggested that when applying 

single subject rules, neither judges nor scholars have been able 

to define a “subject” with precision. 15

We do not write separately to propose any new test for 

discerning the subject of an initiative. Rather, we faithfully 

apply our precedent which states that “the general subject of a 

proposed ballot measure is defined by its primary purpose.” 16

When we review the Constitutional Initiative through this 

lens, we discern more than one purpose, and thus more than 

one subject.

The primary purpose of the ballot initiative is to amend the 

constitution to authorize “all games of chance” in Nebraska. 

This necessarily means it would authorize casino-style gaming. A secondary purpose of the amendment is to restrict that 

expanded gaming to only “licensed racetracks.” The plurality 

does not appear to disagree there are multiple proposals inherent in the text of the initiative, but it concludes there is a natural and necessary connection between authorizing expanded 

casino-style gaming on the one hand, and deciding where such 

expanded gaming should be located on the other hand. If the 

purpose of the provision to restrict expanded casino-style gaming to racetracks was only to identify a geographic location for 

such gaming, we would agree with our colleagues.

But the purpose of the provision restricting expanded casinostyle gaming to “within licensed racetracks” is not about geography. It is about money. This initiative does more than just 

14 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 11.

15 Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy 

and the Single Subject Rule, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 687 (2010).

16 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 6, 288 Neb. at 1002, 853 Neb. at 

514. Accord Christensen v. Gale, supra note 4.
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identify the location where expanded gaming will occur; it also 

limits the type of businesses that can profit from hosting such 

gaming in Nebraska, and thus creates in licensed racetracks 

a constitutionally protected monopoly on hosting expanded 

gaming. Hidden in the folds of the question whether to authorize expanded casino-style gaming in Nebraska is the separate 

question whether only racetracks should be given an exclusive 

constitutional right to host such gaming. That separate question 

has neither a natural nor a necessary connection to whether 

expanded casino-style gaming should be authorized in the first 

instance. It presents a separate subject which, under art. III, 

§ 2, must be put to the voters separately.

Combining the proposal to authorize expanded gaming with 

the proposal to limit such gaming to only licensed racetracks is a classic example of logrolling. Voters who may 

favor expanded casino-style gaming but oppose allowing only 

licensed racetracks to host and thus profit from such gaming 

are faced with an all or nothing proposition. Either they are 

forced to vote for something they oppose in order to obtain 

passage of what they support or, conversely, they are forced to 

vote against something they support in order to prevent passage of something they oppose.

The plurality finds a natural and necessary connection 

between expanded gaming and racetracks, because one form 

of gaming (horseracing) is already authorized at racetracks. 

Reasonable people can debate whether there is a natural connection between casino-style gaming and horseracing. But we 

can conceive of no natural and necessary connection between 

the proposal to authorize expanded casino-style gaming in 

Nebraska and the proposal to grant racetracks the exclusive 

constitutional right to host and thus profit from that gaming. 

Just as the favorable tax proposal in State ex rel. Loontjer 

v. Gale 17 was found to be a separate subject with no natural 

and necessary connection to expanded horse wagering, the 

17 State ex rel. Loontjer v. Gale, supra note 6.
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favorable racetrack proposal here has no natural and necessary connection to expanded casino-style gaming. Simply put, 

the Constitutional Initiative here violates the single subject 

requirement because it fails the natural and necessary test, and 

is quintessential logrolling.

We would hold that the Constitutional Initiative violates the 

single subject rule and would find the Secretary of State has 

shown cause why the Constitutional Initiative should not be 

placed on the November 2020 ballot.