OXCART CORONA

a NMI VI

• — ROL SIM-

• e• •-•

i 

• .46

•••• n •.0; •

'1.

: • TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF TOE OMR SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

April 27, 1965

. Bob -

Gene Pubini and I have prepared this

package for your information in connection

with possible discussions of NRO organization.

;3

B. McM

. qt/i
_ kios .

--Paget•

6-10.; A)

• TALKING PAM, 1110 ORGAMIZATION

SORIELSIASSI

A. The MAI on 2 Wm 1964, is a menorandum to the President,

recommended a Presidential Directive to

"...provide guidelines for the centralised direction,

menegament, and conduct of the Rational Reemmalasamee Program..."

Mang the nine specific features of this guidance as

recommended to the President, were:

Definition of the Estiowel Ramoonmaiseance Program

as a single program, national in character, for the development,

management, control and operation of all projects, both current

and long-range, for the collection of intelligence, mapping and

geodetic information through overflights..."

Designation of the Secretary of Defense as Executive

Agent for the Rational RINCOOSISSMICO Program..."

3. Establishment of the *0 as a separate operating

agency of the DoD, under a ISO responsible solely to the SecDef

(paraphrased) , and

5. A "coordinated, comprehensive budget for all elements"

of the *P.

The MAI further recommended that, if this guidance were

issued, within the framework of the 1110 the fallowing actions,

among new others, be undertaken:

Asst to the Department of Defense the "responsibility

for the management, over-all systems engineering, procurement

and operation of all satellite rsconnalssance systems."

Continued assignment to the Central Intelligence Agency

of the OXCART programa.

B. The Dant, Secretwv of Defense has concurred with the report

of the MAD, and has specifically stated his intention to

undertake the several detailed actions recommended by than for

imp

dy)

lementation. Okla of 2 June 1964, Cyrus Vance to McGeorge

Bun

-• •

:4••• Nots vi

g..

!;:::.,.).10 DOSS El': ???.Lt

s. $7, .
.4.

C. A , copy attadhed, dated 22 April 1965,

proposes tive which is consistent with the

recoasesndations of the MAI, and with comments and angsestions

made elseibere in the Board • s report.

The POW. version movers it 1, 2, 3, and 5/direr, with

similar, not always identical, wording, but does not cover all

items recommended by the P7113 for inclusion in a directive.

llabini goes beyond the latter, but not the spirit, of the Ma

in some details. Where the tiro versions overlap, they are

similar but not identical in wording.

MRM2sSmalammla

Direct responsibility far tfte **tape., °ovations Center is

an essential element of a strong centraLmulsomagement of the MRP.

The arguments are given in a memorandu• for record attached. This

issue is not touched directly by the PPM report; it appears

explicitly in the Pubini draft directive.

As isnuent tgn the DotjpfKesponsiik&Utv for setegite slirs •

their ' to over-all systems engineering, procurement

operations" • as recommended by the MAI, is also essential for a

strong and effective MRO. Satellite systems are too couples in

engineering and operation, and too costly in procurement, to allow

for divided responsibilities. The problems are well illustrated by

the divided emnagement of the CORONA system, whirl is still much as

described in the IMMO/mac to SecDef of January 28, 1964.

bseintardm •

That the Pdbini draft directive be used as a basis far re•

defining the charter of the MRO;

That the assignments of responsibility secommeoded by the

PF1AS be implemented.

Attachment

AS/ Brockway McMillan

23 April

4

 l965v

2 ,

ere 6 • FS(A)

•
. V.De

C*.:•,.TTRCIL S• et.

oft -ic (6)

1-upnnntrol

--tutx-SEeflEf--

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON. O. C. 20301

•

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

April 22, 1965

SURINNUOMM4POR TR* SSCRUNWO, DRUMS

SUEJSCI: Proposed Presidential Directive

The National ROCOMMUNIESIMI Program is s simile Proicom.-

national in character, for the development, managmemat, control,

and operation of all projects, both =rant and long range, for

the collection of intelligencevnapping and geodetic informatics

obtained through overflights (nesludingimetpharal reccenaismence

operations).

The Secretary of Defense is •designatad as the sale

executive agent for all aspects of the National Reconnaissance

Progrma, including the managesent of all programs and the tasking

of other agencies to cooperate in touch programs.

/here shall be established within the Department of • •

Defense a Rational Reconaisemw4m0ffice to function as a separate

operating agency of the Department of Defense. This office is to

be beaded by a Director responsible solely to the Secretory of

Defense for discharging the Secretary's responsibility as executive

agent for the Rational Reconnaissance Program.

The Director of Central Intelligence is assigned the

following responsibilities:

In his capacity as Chairman, United States Intelligonce Board, to establish requirements and priorities for

intelligence collection and to communicate these to the Director

of the Rational Reconnaisesnce Office, to suave as a base for

scheduling and targeting the reconsaissencelaialdara of the

Nations/ Reconnaissance Program;

To review the intelligence collected by the Motional

Reconnaissance Proc ram to imam that it is responsive to the

requirements as established by OWstbited States ltitelliipmmelserd;

=MD 110M AUTOMATIC RVAADIN;;

-:r DIR. 5200.10 DOES 10T OW:
tom _

• c 6 (S)

4 c. To recommend to the President or to the Secretary

of Defense, as appropriate, steps for the improvement of such

collection;

To establish a research and development weemlimM=2:

within the Central Intelligence Agency, solely responsive to the

tasking instructions of the Director of the National Seeconalsemeoe

Office, to carry on research, epplaravory development, and advanced:

development, but not enginewins or operational development;

To review the budget of the National Reacnnaissence

Program each year before its presentation to the Bureau of the

Budget.

5, The Director of Central Intiallsenee Shall furtherbs . .

responsible for the prompt analysis, and reporting for appropriate:,

uses, of the photegrephia and signals intelligence obtained gone * • ..

tile National Rmconnaissance Progreso provided, however, that the

processing and analysis of SLUT infommation is carried en Shoe*•

the National Security Agency. The Director of Central bitelligenee-p.

Shall he responsible for the utilisation of such intelligence in -:

tbe preparation of national intelligence estimates.

The Central Intelligence Agency will be responsible for

Frovidina. the Secretary of Defense the security policy guidance

for the maIntenance of a uniform system of security mandates :

in the thole are of the National Reconnalessece Proven. •

The Director of the Joint Reconnaissance Center shall

'Oa designated as the Director of Operations of the National

ilecounaiseence Office, reporting to the Director of the national

toconnaissance Office. There shall be established within the . • .

Department of Defense a satellite and Aircraft Operations Office

=dor the direction of the Director, National Reconnalseance

Office, and under the management of the Director of Operations Y.

o. thc; National Recoonaissance Office, This office Shall be . .•

responsible for the scheduling, tackles, and control of all over',

flight operations approved by superior authorities, sod their

rapport %Aura this is required from the Unified end Specified •

Commands. .

7,77:777F.
S. Subject only to reviewbythe Secretary of Defense, the

Director, Rational Reconnalsomee . Offiate, will have complete .

authority to initiate, modify, redirect, or teammate all research

and development programs in the Rational Reconnaissance frowns,

including those carried on within all agencies in the United States.

To fulfill these functions, the Director of . the Ratiaaal Recces

miasmas Office shall establish within hi. officeaDireetor

Research and Development, at the sena organizational levels* the

Director of Operations, and shall assign to him the responsibility

far the formulation of research and development programs in both —...

the satellite and aircraft' fields and for insuring that effective.•.

employment is made of the eapabilities of &Lego:nal inteLligence •

• :

Agency in the areas of research, exploratory development, and

advanced development.

•••;•

•••.. • ,

9. The Director of the Rational ReconnalsseneeOffloe shall

prepare a coordinated, comprehensive budget for all aspects of

the National Reconnaissance Program and shall estalaishatiewl.:.

control and accounting procedure to insure that all facade expended

In support of the National Reconnaissimee Programers fully. .

amounted for and appropriately utilised by the agencies concerned.

The budget shall, in particular, show separately sloes funds to,

be applied to research and exploomonrydWivelopment, advent:4d .

development, engineering development, and operational develOpmeit;

lt shall show the portion of the funds for research and exploratory

development that are assigned to the Central Intelligence Agencyl

it is normally expected that this portion shall approximate MU -*

of the total budget for research and exploratory development. •

The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office shall report .

to the Secretary of Defense if he cannot make fill/ use of the -

resources of the Central Intelligence Agency far the conduct of

research and development projects, or if the fends allotted to

the Central InteILLIpmwmiAgmacy for these purposes cannot fully

. be utilized. The Secretary of Defense shall examine the situation

to detonates whether maximum possible use is being made of existing

resources of the Central Intelligence Agency, and, if appropriate s .

to authorize reprograming of these funds.

3

DO

• :. : ,•.

.....

.

1-....'' K...ri-ET

:cp les

mays.

e/D. 62-15' (8)
W. The Secretory of Defense shall endeavor to maintain a

close and eentinuteg cooperation with the Director of Central

Intelligence:

To beep his informed of his plans,

To insure that a most productive utilisation of

national resources and skill. is made in meting critical

intelligsece objectives,

c. To immure that opportunities are supplied to the

Director of Central Intelligumee to fulfill his monitoring-task

by periodically surveyimg the progress umde under the program.

The Secretary of Defense shall insure that personnel

of the Central Intelligence Agency are given an opportunity to

participate in the work of the National Recoonsissance Program

by direct easigement to offices work:lag under the direction of

the Director of the National Reconesissance Office. in this case,

these personnel Bill serve solely under the direction and super.

vision of the Director of the National Resomaissance Office

while they are so aniseed.

As an interim measure, the Central Inteltigeace Agency

shall continue the sanagaisot of the OXCART program under the

direction of the Director, National Reconnaissance Office.

13. Following the developenot stage, the responsibility

far the operational use of the OXCART and related facilities

shall be controlled by the Director, National Racennaissamce

Office, as indicated in Section 1 of this Directive.

/51

Eugene G.

4

RANDLE V:

CC Nrq.:

• . .

Pagrr.•

40 (^IS ()
. •

April 12, 1965

MRICRAIMINI FOR ItitCORD

SOBJRCT: Relation of the Satellite Operations Center to the MR0

The MRP, as defined, is a single program embracing operations

and R&D. The 1110 -was established to menage it - to maximise the

"take" from operations pressed by urgency and faced by severe

limitations, and to improve the operations and overcome limitations

by making best use ofilAW)masources.

The President's Board, in its report of 2 Nay 1964, in effect

stated the two premises: that the underlying problems still exist,

and that they merit extraordinary &nestles. The Board concluded

that a single MRP under central management is still &valid and

necessary approach to a solution. The Deputy Secretary of Defame

has accepted the recommendations of that report. The ClAbas not,

but is fairly well on record as accepting the premises.

With agreement on the premises, the main issue is the

substance of the solution to the problems described in the premises.

I don't believe that the administrative issue can be completely.

ignored, however. The President's Board is on record favoring a

strong centralised management, and an evident departure from this

standard will evoke a reaction. To ey mind, the same arguments

apply to both issues - which is to say that the President's Board

is right, and that a departure from good nanagment practice does

indeed weaken one's approach to the basic problems. The arguments

as they relate to the Operations Center can be expressed by talking

in terms of satellite photographic intelligence.

The basic concept of the ISO is that one office • or one

individual, the DURO - is responsible for delivering pictures to

the intelligence community, with related identifying data,

pictures of targets and areas as specified to him, having a

timeliness and quality that is limited only by natural causes, by

pre-given policies and priorities, and by budgetary constraints

that have been agreed upon.

r

.Li. eau: AJTOMA1X z.

11. 520.10 DOW NOT 'CPO

• 0411•1111•1/1
•

One can certainly ask whether this is a valid or useful

separation of responsibilities. Mr. Wane bass not accurately

distingelsbed Nam responsibilities, functions, and resources,

but be bas presented a chart that does not separate out the

specific responsibility just identified. Presumably be subsumes

it under his own statutory responsibility for delivering estimates.

It misbt be interesting for the DoD to press for a clarification

of this point, since in fact the military community uses pictures

directly, and the related data, for detailed messuremant, for

targetting, and for identifying. The delivery to the military of

primary data for these latter purposes appears to me to be a

function quite distinct from that of delivering estimates. Does

CIA recognise this function? If so, bow does Mr. NoCome plan

to insure its proper aecomplishmenti

Prom the point of view of Raososmoos, the particular

separation of responsibilities which the 1110 represents is a valid

cue. On the output side, the interface is very clew:, the product

is a definite aims, pictures and closely related data, having

qualities and properties that are relatively easy to judge against

standards that can be objective and fairly complete. In other

words, performance can be defined and evaluated.

The input side is somewhat more complex, but in drawing

an interface at the level of targetting;reqsirements and priorities,

one is nevertheless simply asking explicit • necessary function.

The response, in terms of orbit selections and camera decisions,

to requirements and priorities will inevitably be mode by people

who did not themselves wholly establish those requirements and

priorities. If the operation works at all, then, the only variables

are the timeliness with which orbit selectioes and camera decisions

can reflect changes in requirements or priorities, and their

sensitivity to subtle distinctions in priorities. I comet see

any real obstacle, under a separation of responsibilities, to

achieving the best in timeliness and sensitivity that is possible

under any arrangement.

The separation of responsibilities which the 1110 represents

is also a valuable one. It fixes attention on • definite final

product, pictures and related data, a product which is itself a

desideratum, because it is used by many people and for many purposes.

As noted, the product is capable of fairly objecti ton

111.111P
TOP SECRET

•

La

16.

against standards, and indeed against standards that are reasonably

appropriate to its final uses. by establishing this product as

a specific responsibility, one sets up the best mechanism we

fallible people know for getting good results - incentive.

It is infinitely easier to evaluate pictures than to evaluate

estimates. It is certainly good menersosnt, therefore, even of

the estimating process, to ask for good performauce of that part

of the process that can be broken out and evaluated, provided that

the standards of evaluation are appropriate to the desired end

result. In the present case, they easily can be.

Granting, :tom, that the IRO has bean assigned the specific

responsibility to deliver pictures in response to requirements,

why should the Satellite Operations Center be an integral part of

the organization? Indeed, with little change, the arguments just

cited for separating out the 1110 can also be read as favoring

a separation of the Op Center function within the DC. This is

not of course what Nr. Wove has proposed, since his charts

reject the whole concept of the NRO, but one could certainly cone

eider a situation in which the physical resources • the rooms,

desks, and most importantly the communications outlets, are

located at Langley, the Center is manned by CIA employees, and

these resources are "tasked" by the MO.

Against this arrangement, there are important arguments of

substance. The arguments relate to the efficient use of resources,

or alternatively, to the complexity, in fact, of the interface

between the Op Center and the other functional elements of the

NDO. The complexity of this interface is first manifest in the

primary function of the Op Canter of preparing and executing

mission plans. Acting under authority delegated from the DIING,

the Op Canter imposes tasks on other specialised and expert

elements of the NRO, tasks which result in data being returned and

hardware being committed. Although in principle perhaps irrelevant,

it is a fact that most of these tasks go to Air Force elements of .

the SRO. Almost all of the tasks result in the expenditure of

=money. Most of the tasks go to elements of the 1110 which have

important functions other than direct support of the Op Center.

The actions of the Op Center therefore mesh quite closely with,

and can indeed interfere with, other direct operating busloads of

from the Director,

3

the 1*0. These actions in fact merit, and 7:

r• "'VOL S

ntimming attention

• ".

from me.

IfILIC 1`)
Waldo/ of these interface problem in the fatten, --

can look farmed to a time atm Amy satellite projects are

-111.61.1.the National Itesensaissmnce Progeam, cattier then the

are um primary. Launch facilities, resovery forces,

• , f;icilitlas for tracking and *ambit sommend, will not •

be increased in proportion to the umber of active satellite

projects. All of the facilities and reemmas will be more

heavily burdened then today; this use mill have to be more

tightly scheduled than is necessary today, and more menagemot

attention viii be rapsired to miedmixe lastarfarenses. Desislans

of and actions by the Op Center will earreepooding4 became more

tightly hound to those of other elemate of the MO. In particular,

the mission planning by the Op Center will have to remolds* the

impact of potential schedaling interfareams an the primary

collection objectives and priorities of the sissies' baths gained.

It is worth noting that this kind of interference analysis is

already mammary at the Satellite Test Center, in Saris.

It doss not yet react very sharply on the Op Costae bemuse the

IMO programa are mall in umber and have priority over all ethers

In domande for support from the Satellite Test Center. It is a

sufficiently important and maples problem at the Test Canter,

however, to have merited the development of computer program

specifically for its support.

There is another and important kind of interface beams

the Op Center and the other fanatic= of the MO. There i.e a

considerable reservoir of expertise In the Op Center, deriving.

from its recorded MI remembered experience. Ile draw heavily and

regularly upon this reservoir in support of long teem operational planning and planning of research and development. (I have not

in this essay attempted to address the NO responsibilities of

the MOO Pomoelised studies by the Op Center are an important

part of our gamin activity, but we also regularly use the

Op canter personnel directly In other activities of study and consultation.

Ssamplas of the extant to vide* the Op Center's talents

era drawn upon for studies and planning are provided by the

recent analyses of satellite reconnaissance over Cuba, in support

4

-=.
p.

-

•

• •••• t:.1z..1. .

...•

vti

of MIK 311, and by similar analyses made In Gymnastics with DO •

regairnacts for coverage of South Chloe. bat:emetic on

clisatology and as weather experience case directly from the

Op Center's experts and monde.!sweating aselyses were directed

by the Op Center, and otedested in thes scow as the analyses

nonsally sods for ratssies pleenhe and orbit selection, SOINIWai • nen months of effort by the Op Center have been directly devoted

to these particular studies. Sbdlar studies, broader in cope • •!, and covering a wider variety of situations, -,17

for a year in comeestion with planning far

rlstes. I believe tist an objective swabs

planning, in conparisos to the CU hes used to support

their efforts to data on 1, would bring out ,.%

sharply the clue and Op Center as a reassess

in this kind of pleasing. It would also reveal, I believe, dot

the responsibility for the Op Center oarries with it a respocip •

bility for realise in system) planning • those cho must live with.

the results of their placing are inclined to look easefully at ..r!

what goes into it. In the long cue, this last is perhaps as

strong an argument as any other for retandus the Op Center as • 4

fully integrated amen of the 120.

t •

In on, I believe that it is not prostiosble even today se 4

to codify the f000ttoos of the Op Costars that they oft be

separated out as a distinct set of responsibilities assignable

to a separate sanagosint mit. The difficulties in this regead

will increase as the number and ocsplasity of satellite projects

in the National itecanosisseace Programa increase. As a prestisal

matter, physical and organisational separation of tits Op Caster

from the DIM and them IMO staff mould make efficient ammapsset .7

of satellite collection activities very difficult end would

deprive the of a reservoir of understanding and esperiamce •

that has beam of demonstrable value in the pleasing of research

and development. I me we that it would also wake more difficult

than is already the case the we of satellite photography in

direct support of ailitary requirements.

/5)

Brockway licti.U.laa

5