NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

BYE-40253-65 

cy 

111111111111111111111111141MNIN 

30 July 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MCMILLAN 

SUBJECT: Selection of DORIAN Payload Contractor 

1. Forwarded herewith is a management resources survey of 

 EKC conducted by SAFSP in order to provide a factual basis for 

 pending decisions concerning the DORIAN effort. 

sMININIENNI.11.11140 2. On the basis of this survey, and consideration of related 

factors, I have reached the following conclusions: 

1111Marm•••■•••■■•■•• 

••••••••■••••■•••■,...... a. EKC cannot handle both DORIAN and S-2. Even if the 

requirement for a parallel unmanned backup version were dropped, 

their estimated requirement for additional experienced manpower 

is completely beyond all reasonable expectation. Furthermore, 

DORIAN manpower estimates are based upon a planned sub-contract 

effort of 50%, which, on the basis of G-3 experience at EKC, I am 

convinced would result in an appreciable slip in the schedules 

presently contemplated. 

b. Even if they are allowed to drop S-2, I have serious doubt 

as to the EKC ability to handle DORIAN alone, without the unmanned 

backup. It seems clear that they cannot do it with a parallel unmanned version. 

■ 11111111 .1■1111111M 

BYE-40253/65 

c. The consortium proposed by EKC would not solve the basic 

 problem in a satisfactory manner, and would introduce other serious 

 problems. It would result in EKC doing considerably less than half 

the DORIAN i rk, and add a complicated and cumbersome management 

structure with the following undesirable characteristics: 

(1) It would be an inherently weaker management structure 

than a straight, prime-sub-contractor structure, more diffuse and 

larger, with each consortium member also having sub-contractors, 

some possibly in common, within this limited specialized area of 

industry. 

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC 

REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 

DOES NOT. ANIL% 

/ ~ 
Astsftb*Or, 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40253-65 

(2) It would add, to the total manpower directly involved, 

a large consortium committee. Injecting any committee into the 

direct management of this already complicated program would be 

most undesirable. The best of the apparently realizable program 

management structures will involve complex Air Force and Aerospace 

relationships. The injection of a payload consortium committee into 

this structure would invoke all of the worst characteristics of 

committee management with no actual gain to the overall program. 

In fact, due to the manpower required on the committee (estimated 

as 200 by EKC), this approach would require more, rather than less, 

total manpower. 

(3) I cannot see any appreciable difference in the proportion 

of the DORIAN work which EKC could do if the consortium approach 

is used. They would gain by not having to supervise so much subcontract effort, but they would lose by having to supply experienced 

personnel to the consortium committee. They evidently conclude 

that there is a net EKC advantage in this approach. I conclude that 

there is a net program disadvantage. 

(4) The consortium approach would require ad hoc improvisation to work out detailed procedures between all participants. 

This would be difficult enough due to the lack of complete program 

definition at the time the consortium would have to be established. 

It would be further complicated by the necessity of working within 

the special security provisions which would have to apply to most if 

not all participants, and by the necessity of careful and timely legal 

review as each step of the improvisation proceeds. (Although a 

consortium, per se, can be legal, this one seems loaded with 

possibilities for legal problems, such as anti-trust, etc. ,) Because of these considerations, I believe that appreciable program 

delays would be inevitable in the initial and early phases of the 

program effort. 

3. After full consideration of the attached report, and the factors 

mentioned above, and some points noted below, I recommend: 

a. EKC should not be allowed to drop S-2 to work on DORIAN. 

In support of this recommendation, I note the following significant 

facts: 

(1) The justification of both programs is intelligence data 

collection. The intelligence community is on positive, written record 

lilrele via BYRIAN 

CP/ad SySteill 
r". 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40253-65 

that the requirement against which the S-2 program is designed 

is both valid and urgent. In contrast, they are not similarly on 

record that the requirement against which the DORIAN program 

is designed even exists, and some senior intelligence officials 

have openly and emphatically stated that it does not. Any change 

which favors DORIAN over S-2 would tend to justify separate and 

unilateral S-2 action by the CIA, and would impair efforts to obtain 

intelligence community support for the DORIAN program. 

(2) The DNRO has made unequivocal commitments to the 

SecDef, the DCI, the FLAB and the PSAC that the EKC S-2 design 

is the best of the competing proposals, and that it has the greatest 

chance of meeting the stated requirements with the least risk, and 

that it should be developed as now scheduled. 

(3) Substantial funds have been obligated on the EKC S-2 

program. From August 1964 through August 1965, the NRO has 

obligated for S-2 work with EKC, Itek, FCIC, LMSC 

and GE. Of this total, the EKC share was For 

comparison, the nearest camera contractor was Itek, with 

(4) The heavy EKC funding has protected our capability to 

fly the S-2 system in April 1967. Any change in EKG's S-2 role 

will unquestionably cause a major slip in this schedule. I estimate 

that a change to Itek (for the Itek S-2 design) would involve, at the 

very least, a six to nine month slippage. Even if the EKC design 

were transferred to Itek, the slippage would be at least this much, 

very probably more. 

b. The consortium approach to DORIAN should not be used. 

Instead, a single prime payload contractor should have complete 

responsibility for both manned and unmanned versions of DORIAN, 

using sub-contractors as necessary. 

c. I recommend that Itek be selected as this prime payload 

contractor on the grounds that, with EKC eliminated due to conflict 

of other high priority effort, Itek is uniquely qualified for sole 

source selection by virtue of their extensive experience with unmanned satellite reconnaissance and their current knowledge and 

capability in the design and fabrication of reflective optics. 

3 

L via Mtn 

Contr51 System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40253-65 

d. I recommend that the EKC DORIAN design be transferred 

to Itek and be retained as the initial DORIAN concept. The entire 

MOL program justification has been based upon this particular 

design approach. It has been under intensive study much longer 

than Itek's DORIAN design, and has been formulated to greater 

depth of detail. Yet, since it is at present only a design, without 

associated fabrication of special facilities, tooling, or procurement, 

it could be transferred at this time with minimum attendant program 

slippage, if any at all. Furthermore, such a transfer would be 

perfectly ethical, and EKC, although they undoubtedly would not like 

it, would have no legitimate basis for complaint. EKC did not win 

any DORIAN competition, or on their own initiative propose anything 

which has resulted in their present DORIAN contract effort. We 

originated (and funded) the entire effort by issuing specific direction 

to them (by amendment to our advanced technology contract) to study 

the possible design of manned system. In view of their inability to 

proceed without dropping existing work, I can see no reason why we 

cannot transfer the present design in its entirety . 

e. I recommend that this selection be implemented as follows: 

(1) SAFSP will give Itek a written RFP defining the DORIAN 

manned and unmanned versions, and schedules, and concurrently 

direct EKC to deliver to SAFSP complete information concerning the 

EKC DORLAN design for turnover to Itek. The RFP will require 

proposal for the entire task, with Itek to make their own arrangements 

for necessary manpower and resource support from the other areas 

of the industry having applicable competence and capability. It also 

will require proposal in detail of the sub-contractor arrangements 

that Itek feels necessary and workable to do the entire job, including 

thariagement arrangements, identification of major sub-contractors, 

and including the type and proportion of the total planned effort to 

be undertaken by each. 

(2) After receipt of this proposal, SAFSP will conduct a 

special management resources evaluation of the proposed arrangements 

to verify the adequacy of present and planned capability. This evaluation 

will be conducted along the same lines as the evaluation just concluded 

at EKC, but with added emphasis on the management relationships 

between the proposed sub-contractors. 

4 

"7-t t7; 1:17 

4,t 

U 11A.4.4 

Handle via BYEMAN 

Control system 
OHN L. MARTIN, JR 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Director 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40253-65 

(3) Upon conclusion of this evaluation, SAFSP will 

inform Itek of any unsatisfactory aspects and allow them the 

opportunity to make corrective arrangements and revise their 

proposal. Upon receipt of a satisfactory proposal, and 

authorization (and funds) from you, SAFSP will take necessary 

administrative and security steps, and award the contract. As 

the work progresses and the program is further definitized, the 

contract will be amended as necessary by CCN - Supplemental 

Agreement procedures. 

Atch BYE-40252-65 

Handle via BYEMAN 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

Subject: Report of Survey Committee 

TO: SP-1 (Gen Martin) 

• lomumm 000gruan 

BYE-40252-65 

CV 1 

30 July 1965 

BACKGROUND 

1. The Committee was appointed by Gen Martin in letters to 

Col G T Smith, dated 13 and 15 July 1965 (Tab 1). On 16 July 

Gen Martin substituted Col F. N. Hand for Mr J Bender as a 

committee member. 

2. During July EKC officials had discussed with Dr McMillan the 

company's capacity to perform all work contemplated on G, G-3, 

S-2, D, U, and V. The general consensus of these discussions 

was that EKC did not have the capacity to do all this work on 

the time schedules contemplated. 

3. Two alternatives were discussed in these preliminary talks: 

a. One possibility.suggested by EKC was a consortium arrangement, under which several firms in the optical field would manufacture portions of the DORIAN payload. A central consortium would be 

responsible for design, planning, scheduling, interfacing, etc. The 

consortium's responsibilities would be limited to such functions, 

and Air Force and Aerospace Corporation personnel would assist in 

the over-all management, so as to ease the workload on the optical 

Blir141121i21111511 11 111 ii ii 11 1 1 1 1 

I °::11!e via PENN 

Y;Vgl 

d 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 _sEcRET-- BYE-40252-65 

industry. The consortium would be manned by 100 to 200 people 

drawn from the participating hardware contractors, and would be 

directed by either a contractor employee or an Air Force Officer. 

Tab 2 is a memorandum concerning Eastman's study of this arrangement. The Committee understands that this scheme was not well 

received by Secretary McNamara when first explained to him. 

b. Another possibility was suggested by Dr McMillan, who 

asked EEC whether they could do all the projects except S-2, if 

S-2 work were transferred to Itek. On 16 July and again on 19 July, 

EKC advised Dr McMillan that under certain conditions their answer 

would be in the affirmative. ,These conditions were: 

(1) First DORIAN flight would not be before April 1969, 

and it may not be possible on the first payload to obtain optimum 

performance. 

(2) Authority to proceed would be forthcoming immediately, 

and would include go-ahead on facilities, long lead items and unlimited overtime. 

(3) There must be capability for quick decisions on the 

part of the Government. 

(4) Secretaries McNamara, Vance or Illefla would verbally 

indicate to EKC an assurance that DORIAN was planned to be carried 

out through a flight schedule, and that the project was not to be 

terminated soon. 

SECRET 

Handle via BYEMAN 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

ugJJ 'u.Aw 

(5) G, G-3, U, V and Lunar Orbiter would not be transferred from EKC, and in future years similar levels of effort would 

be maintained at EKC, in order that the company might have such 

relatively less difficult work on which to train personnel for 

more advanced effort such as D. 

4. Dr McMillan advised Gen Martin that no decision in this matter 

would be reached for several weeks, and stated that in the interim 

he was interested in seeing this Committee report on EK's capability vs. requirements. 

5. The Committee visited Rochester on 191.22 July and met with EKC 

officials, principally Messrs Waggershauser, Simmons, Oder, Stevens, 

Spoelhof, Soebbing, Stein and Brown, The Committee's approach was 

to ley out a master schedule chart (Tab 3) -shoeing milestones for 

all the projects and then to examine EKC requirements and capacities 

in three areas: manpower, facilities, and make or buy. 

a. The Manned Dorian project used as the basis for this 

survey was the concept currently under study at EKC and on which 

they have briefed SAFUS and PSAC. This concept contemplates a six 

flight program with a first flight date in the second quarter of 

Calendar Year 1969. Subsequent flights are scheduled at four month 

intervals. Delivery of the flight articles occur four months prior 

to launch. The optical system is the Ross Corrector type with the 

SECRET 

Handle via HYMAN 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

two axis gimballed tracking mirror and equivalent 60" aperture.' 

Studies are still in progress to determine sizing trade offs 

between the primary mirror and tracking mirror. initial results 

from this investigation indicate that a 70 inch diameter circular 

tracking mirror together with a 70" primary will provide performance 

equivalent to a system with a 60 inch primary and an 84" elliptical 

tracking mirror. The 70-70 system would simplify certain of the 

problems associated with the tracking mirror. However, the overall 

manpower estimates remain essentially the same for either the 60"-84" 

or 70"-70" approach. 

b. During the team's visit, Dr Mallen reminded Mr Simmons 

that PSAC had insisted on an unmanned effort in parallel with. 

Mhnned Dorian. Solely for the purpose of estimating the workload 

involved in such a project, referred to herein as Unmanned Dorian, 

EKC proposed to use an unmanned system previously proposed to PSAC 

as a departure point, and arrive by faCtering at the required 

manpower, facilities and sub-contracting. Mr Simmons explained 

these ground rules to Dr McMillan by telephone on 22 July. The 

Committee chose to treat Unmanned Dorian as a separate subject, and 

its evaluation appears in paragraphrl 24, below. All other evaluations in this report(Teragraphs 6 through 23) are without regard to 

Unmanned Dorian. 

c. The S-2 project considered during the Committee's visit 

to Rochester was the original schedule of first launch in January 

1967, 8 launches in fl 67 and one perumalta thereafter, and the 

SECRET 

Handle via BYEMAll 

rnntrel System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

original EKC work statement. Upon the Committee's return to 

El Segundo, we found that two decisions had been made altering 

this concept. First, BffE0 had amended the flight schedule to 

first launch in April 1967, 2 launches in Fr 67 and 8 per year 

thereafter. Second, at an interface meeting with EKC and GE, 

Col Reran had decided to transfer work on the recovery system, 

the shell for the payload and all systems integration work from 

EKC to GE. This leaves EKC with the optical work and the film 

transport. The net effect of both the schedule reduction and the 

work transfer was to reduce EKC's manpOwer requirements on S-2. 

On 30 July EKC telephoned their estimate that the reduction would 

be about 10% initially, changing to a 10% increase in late 1966 

because of fabrication and assembly work. On the other hand, 

Col Reran estimated the reduction at approximately 15% across the. 

board. Both estimates are ROM. The Committee concluded that the 

reduction could be as much as 15% across the board. The discussion 

of manpower in paragraphs 6 through, 11, below, and the manpower 

figures shown in Tabs 4 and 5 accordingly are based on a 15% 

reduction in S-2 workload at EKC. 

d. The NASA Lunar Orbiter Program workload at EEC was taken 

into consideration by the Committee in evaluating company capacity. 

e. In accordance with its instructions, the Committee 

evaluated whether EKC was on schedule in connection with current 

contracts on 0, G-3, U, S-2 and D. 

SECRET 

Handle via BYEMM 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 -SECRET- BYE-40252-65 

MANPOWER 

6. Basic to a discussion of manpower capability is EKC's personnel 

management philosophy and practices. The Company has produced 

quality satellite reconnaissance payloads by using highly skilled 

personnel working under a team concept in which all members of the 

team know each other's skills and/or shortcomings. The concept is 

a projectized approach, modified in certain cases along functional 

lines. The concept enables work to be done by people with the 

right skills, management to be effected with a minimum Of documentation and cost, and high quality to be maintained. Moreover, the 

company has a conservative personnel policy under which people are 

hired selectively for the "lohg haul", trained carefully for 

initial assignments, and then moved up in career progression only 

after they have been well assimilated into the team concept and 

the overall company methods. This means that expansion of manpower cannot be done as rapidly as can be done, say, by a large 

airframe contractor such as North American, where employment peaks 

and valleys result from fluctuating workloads. Another contributin$ factor is the small Rochester labor market and the reluctance 

of potential employees to relocate from other areas to Rochester. 

7. This is not to say that expansion of EKC manpower is not 

possible. In 1962 Dr Oder's Special Projects Organization, together 

with supporting assembly people, numbered about 850 people, working 

on 698 BJ and GAMBIT. Growth was slow until the G-3 project began. 

-SECREI 

Handle Oa BHA! 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

-SEMBy August 1964 the strength was about 1000 people and currently 

(one year later) it is about 1500. Current planning calls for 

some 1800 to 1900 by 1966. The significant points are that such 

expansion is a slow process, it is attended by some risk of 

dilution of the team concept capability, and expansion cannot be 

maintained indefinitely, because of the company policy of retaining 

employees for long periods and the uncertainty that government 

reconnaissance business will continue to expand. In summary, one 

doesn't expand the capacity to produce high quality reconnaissance 

payloads by rapid mass hiring of people off the street. 

8. From the facts available to the Committee, it appears that the 

EKC manpower shortage will exist from the time of go-ahead on the 

full DOMAN effort, reach a maximum deficit in calendar year 1966 

and disappear by calendar year 1967. 

9. The total EKC manpower required to prosecute SAFSP projects 

includes people in various shops and other organizations not under 

direct control of Dr Oder's Special Projects Organization (SPO). 

The Committee felt, however, that the most critical manpower was in 

the SPO and the related assembly people, and accordingly the Committee 

studied that group. Tab 4 contains a series of manpower tables 

showing estimated requirements for this group through 1966 for each 

of the following projects: G, G-3, S-2, D, U, V and LOP. These 

requirements are firm for G, G-3, V and LOP, less firm for S-2 and 

U, and very rough order of magnitude (on the high side of probability) 

for D. Tab 5 is a graphic presentation of the project totals from 

SECRET Handle via BYEMAI 

P"trei !Vera 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

-SECRETBYE-40252-65 

the tables in Tab 4. Also plotted on the graph are three cumulative curves showing (1) total manpower requirements for all the 

projects, (2) total manpower requirements for all the projects 

except S-2, and (3) EKC's best estimate of manpower availability. 

The chart shows that in the second quarter of calendar 1966 the 

manpower availability falls some 690 people short of meeting total 

requirements and some 170 people short of meeting all requirements 

except S-2. Since the DORIAN requirements are on the high side of 

probability, more refined figures should reduce these shortages. 

10. The Committee asked EKC to identify which manpower skills were 

the most critical, i.e., most difficult to hire and assimilate into 

the team concept. EKC was initially reluctant to attempt such 

identification, since any expansion always involves shifting people, 

i.e., moving people with some experience into more responsible 

positions. EKC then agreed that if they forsee an over-all manpower shortage, they should be able to identify at least some 

examples of critical skills only and the probable shortages in 

these skills. The following examples were furnished the Committee: 

a. Photo Systems Engineering people - 7 more are required 

Immediately over and above planned availability. This increases to 

12 by the end of 1965 and 14 by the end of 1966. 

b. Optical Test Development Engineers - 6 more are required 

immediately, increasing to 14 by the end of 1965 and remaining at 

this level through mid 1966. 

Randle via BYEAMN 

Control system 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

c. Sub-strate Engineers (optical/mechanical) - The 

shortage is 4 immediately, remaining at that level through mid 1966. 

d. Optical peorists - The shortage is 3 immediately, remaining at that level through mid 1966. 

e. Thermal-optical Engineers - The shortage is 3 immediately, 

remaining at that level through early 1966. 

f. Optical Technicians - The shortage is 2 immediately, 

increasing to 7 in 1966. 

11. In summary, the Committee's opinion was that manpower is the 

most critical shortage and that under EIC policy and procedures this 

shortage prevents the company from prosecuting all the SAFSP projects 

on the time schedules indicated. 

111WILIE 

12. At the present time the Contractor is utilizing or in the 

process of readying for utilization (i.e., building 601 for S-2) 

approximately 301,000 square feet of floor space. This figure 

includes only the space utilized by the Contractor's Special Projects 

Organization and does not include space used on an intermittent and 

variable basis by other contractor departments that provide support 

to Special !Projects Operations. This space utilization is allocated 

SECRET Handle via BYEMAM 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

as follows: 

39,000 82 ft 

G-3 97,000 " 

V 8,000 

UPWARD 35,000 tt 

S-2 91,000 tt 

LOP 28,000 tt 

D MOO tt 

307,000 

13. To continue on with D, and do S-2 also, would require an 

additional 100,000 sq ft of floor space which will require a new 

building. This building will be needed within 12 months of program 

go-ahead and is not regarded as a pacing item. 

14. In any event (either with or in lieu of S-2) D will require, 

but may not be limited to, the following special test facilities 

and equipment, none of which are regarded as pacing items: 

Vertical Test Chamber (Optional) * 

Horizontal Test Chamber (Optional)* 

Payload Test Chamber 

Thermal Test Chamber 

Weight and Balance Machine 

Vibration Test Equipment. 

*NOTE: Optional means that EEC thought it might be possible to 

combine the Vertical and Horizontal Chambers. 

The above are mequired becaUse of the greater size of D over predecessor systems. (The Committee discussed the question of whether, 

in providing facilities for Dorian-1, SAFSP should provide for the . 

larger sizes of a possible follow-on Dorian-II. It was concluded. 

Handle via BYEMAr 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 SECRET BYE-40252650 

that the uncertainties of D-II and the probable substantial cost 

involved would argue against this course of action.). Because of 

the vibration problem, the vibration test equipment needs to be 

housed in a building separate from the building where assembling 

and other testing is accomplished. It is estimated that this building will have to be about 15,000 sq ft and is not included in the 

gross estimates for total program requirements. 

15. Should the Contractor do D in lieu of S-2 he would use building 

601, presently under modification for S-2. The Qoptractor would 

build adjacent to building 601 the vertical test facility (optional) 

which would be a tower about a hundred fee high and 25 to 30 feet 

square. He would also have to build the separate building (noted 

above) as housing for the vibration test equipment. This would be 

somewhat less than the total of 100,000 plus 9,000 estimated by the 

Contractor as his rough estimate for total space requirements to 

accomplish DORIAN in sizes up to 70 inches, but Contractor feels 

that he could fit the operation into building 601 and other available space although there would be inconveniences that would tend 

to degrade efficiency. 

16. In our opigiorrL the schedule for providing necessary facilities 

is very tight, but probably can be met. Therefore, facilities do 

not constitute a pacing item nor will they, by themselves, prevent 

EKC from performing successfully mall the programs considered in 

connection with this problem. 

SECRET Handle via Bilge 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

1T. The substance of the above comments was discussed with 

Mr Simmons. He indicated that there might be some unanticipated 

delays in the availability of the special test facilities and 

equipment, but the problems he mentioned were problems inherent 

in accomplishing D on the contemplated schedule and were not 

problems traceable to a facility shortage caused by a combination 

of S-2 and D. 

18. When questioned whether 100,000 sq ft in building 601 could be 

made available to accomplish D in lieu of the new building mentioned 

above, he stated that such might be possible and that management had 

been considering it. Of interest is that building 601 is nearly 

completed and that there appears to be ample space to not only meet 

the needs of S-2 (occupancy scheduled for 15 August 1965) but also 

the needs of D. Indicative of the depth of management consideration 

was a statement Mr Simmons made that the cafeteria, medical facilities, 

and other support requirements would be too small to handle the greater population density. 

WAKE OR BUY (Comparison of in-house effort on present and future 

programs) 

19. A comparison was made of the percentage of effort subcontracted 

on current programs with planned percentages,on future work. Comments 

are pertinent in the following areas: 

20. Sub-Contracting 

a. G (-16%) - This included majority of test equipment and 

Handle via BYERAN 

Cocci System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

--SECRETBYE-40252-0 

handling equipment as well as the following airborne components --

camera, regulated power supply, servos, signal gating modules, lens 

assembly, glass blanks. It should be noted that pacing items in 

early stages of (I program were subcontracted items. The Mixon Motor 

Speed Drive and the NMI Camera would have delayed the entire program 

if the associated contractor had not been several months late. In 

the case of the MSD the solution was to assume the tea in-house. 

b. G-3 (31%) - This also included the majority of the test 

equipment and hendling equipment. in addition, the following 

airborne components are on sub-contract: SHV, external structure, 

servos, oscillators, power conversion units, focus electronics, 

film drive electronics, cables, mftror blanks, cutter sealer assembly, 

weight &Wane* equipment, etc. It should be noted that it appears 

some of the major schedule problems' on this program are the result 

of the large subcontracted effort. 

c. S•2 (40%) - No breakdown-of type of items was obtained, 

but we assume at least the same type of items as on 3, with the 

addition of some of the more simple components. In addition, EXZ 

is giving consideration to subconttacting some of the mirror 

polishing. This talk has leen one of the most critical on 3, so 

Mr Simmons indicated it was very unlikely it would be subcontracted 

on 3-2. 

Handle via DOA ' 

Control System 
ME-40252-65 NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

cry 

d. D(50%) - Includes nearly all test and handling equipment, plus such items as: 

(1) MOL Module - Readout equipment, pointing and tracking telescope (and its related tracking mirror) which will be slaved 

to the optics module, TV camera, zoom lens, pointing and tracking 

display and controls, automatic check. 

(2) Camera/Optics Module - Movie camera, frame camera, 

mirror blanks, servos. 

e. D(40%) - Same comment as S-2. 

f. In general it appears that the increase in subcontracting 

on planned programs is a direct result of the manpower problem at 

EKC and manpower projections are based on this allocation. It would 

also appear that to subcontract'this amount of effort on programs 

like DORIAN and S-2 would definitely increase the already high risk 

involved. This conclusion is supported by the results to date of 

the increased sub-contracting for G-3, in comparison with G, and 

the attendant internal G-3 schedule slippages at ENC. 

21. DRAFTING. Following are the actual and/or planned percentages 

of subcontracted drafting effort: 

22% 

0-3 60% 

50% 

D 50% 

u 40% 

It should be noted that the Contractor has exceeded the original 

MET Handle via 8YEIJAN 

Control System 
BYE-40252-65 NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

SAFSP ceiling on subcontracted drafting effort for G-3 by over 

100%. In addition, the man-hours and cost for drafting effort are 

exceeding the original effort proposed by a considerable amount. 

Thus it appears that subcontracting drafting effort results in 

some inefficiency and would probably cause schedule delay on 

planned projects. 

22. FABRICATION & ASSEMBLY - Following are actuals and/or planned 

percentages Of this effort to be done out of house: 

16% 

G-3 25% 

s 45% 

D 45-50% 

V 30-35% 

From the above figures it is apparent that SAFSP requirements are 

exceeding EKC capacity in the fab and assembly area. However, in 

the past EKC has sub-contracted only the simpler, routine tasks in 

order to save their own capability for more critical tasks. With the 

higher percentages of sub-contracting shown above, the Committee 

could not be sure this practice would be continued, although 

Mr Simmons stated it was his goal. The chief impact of this 

increased sub-contracting would be a sharp increase in EKC production control workload, with the possibilities of some loss of 

tight control and some lesser capability to react quickly to 

production emergencies. 

CONTRACT SCHELULE STATUS 

23. In its terms of reference the Committee was charged with 

determining whether current contract work for G, G-3, U, S-2 and 

D is on schedule. The Committee queried both EKC officials and 

-SECRETRandle via INMAN 

flr.tret System 
ME-40252-65 NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

SAFSP project and procurement personnel. The current status and 

explanatory remarks for each of the projects is shown below. 

a. GAMUT. Essentially on schedule and no slippages 

are forecast. 

b. Ell. The following items are behind schedule as 

indicated, however EIC maintains that the launch schedule can 

still be met: 

(1) Formula sample lens: The 90% design release was 

due 15 Dec 64 but not completed until 7 April 65, a 12 week slip. 

The lens was to be available for test 15 Illy 65 but was not 

available until 7 June, a slippage of 3 weeks. 

(2) Thermal model. The 90% design release was due 

15 January 65 but was not completed until 7 April, an 8 week slip. 

The model was to be available for test without extermal structure 

on 5 April 65 and with external structure on 15 August 65. These 

availabilities are now forecast to be 30 July and 30 September, 

respectively, which are slippages, of 15 and 6 weeks. 

(3) Engineeringiridel. The 9011% design release was due 

15 January 65 but was not completed until 1 June, an 18 week slip. 

The first need lens was due to be available for test 15 August ft 

but is forecast to be available 8 September, a 3 week slip. The 

camera optical assembly #1 was due to be available for test 1 Sept 65 

but is forecast to be available 24 September, a 3 week slip. The 

camera optical assembly #2 was due to be available for' test on 

10 September but is forecast to be available 10 October, a 4 week 

slip. 

Hindle via HENAN 

Canhi System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

-SECRET-- 

ENE-40252-65 

(4) Reliability model. The 90% design release wasdue 

15 January 65 but was not completed until 1 June, an 18 week slip. 

The first need optics were due to be available for test on 

15 October 65. The availability is now forecast as 24 December, 

a 9 week slip. The camera optical assembly #2 was due to be 

available for test 20 January 66 but is now forecast to be'available 

28 January, a one week slip. The retrofitted reliability model was 

due to be available for test 15 April 66 but is now forecast to be 

available 29 April, a 2 week slip. 

(5) The above G-3 slippages were discussed with Col King, 

the project officer. HA made the point that there had been no pacing 

schedule problems on GAMBIT payloads, primarily because during most 

of the design and fabrication period there had been no other programs 

at EKC competing for manpower and facilities. With 0-3, however, 

the slippages noted above arise from such competition. Col King 

is generally pessimistic about meeting G-3 launch schedules and has 

under consideration several remedial steps to ease EKC's workload. 

Among these are changing the GE recovery vehicle from CFE (EEC has 

a sub contract with GE) to GFE (direct SAFSP contract with GE), 

eliminating the requirement for certain preliminary models which 

will not be available for test prior to first flight, and providing 

SAFSP assistance to EKD in management of sub-contracts. In Col King's 

opinion placing additional effort. such as DORIAN at MC would result 

in severe complication of the current G*3 difficulties. 

Handle via BYEMAN 

Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BNE-40252-65 

c. UPWARD. Current contract work is on schedule; however, 

SAFSP desires to begin allow contract immediately and EKC cannot 

begin for 1 to 2 weeks. 

d. VALLEY. No slippage from current contract schedule, 

however, the contract schedule had to be readjusted because VALLEY 

manpower was diverted to S-2. 

e. S-2. During the Committee's visit to Rochester, all 

discussions were based on the original S-2 schedule (first flight 

January 1967, 8 launches FY 67, 12 per year thereafter) and on the. 

original BAC work statement. On this basis the eoemittee found 

S-2 was behind schedule on the following items: 

(1) Thermal Model, Engineering Model and Pynanic 

amdlator Are 2 weeks behind schedule. There is a problem in 

getting the owtelvshelIreeolnIGR. 

(2) Electronic breadboarding and breadboard testing are 

2 weeks behind schedule. 

(3) The large thermal chamber (sub-contracted to Chicago 

Bridge & Iron) is three months behind schedule. 

(k) The Formula Sample Lens Assembly it 3-1/2 months 

behind schedule because of late delivery of meniscus glass blanks 

from Schott. 

Upon the Committee's return to El Segundo, we Were advised of a 

reduction in flight schedule and a reduction in the. BCC work statement as discussed in par 5c, above. The Committee's final assessment, 

concurred in by Col Reran, is that S-2 work at EKC is now on schedule. 

SECRET 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-o5 

f. DORIAN. No slippage from current contract schedule. 

LtCol Male concurs. 

UNMANNED DORIAN 

24. On 27 July 65, after the Committee had returned from Rochester 

tar El Segundo, EEC telephoned to the chairman their estimated 

requirements for menpower,,facilities and sub-contracting if an 

Unmanned Dorian project *ere to be undertaken roughly in parallel 

(not more than 6 months lag) with Manned Dorian. The estimates are 

rough order of magnitude, computed under the ground rules discussed 

in Paragraph 5b, above. 

a. Manpower. Estimated reduiremen6 are shown in Tab 6. 

The numbers shown in that tab represent p manpower requirement over 

and *Wee the requirements shown in Tabs 4 and 5 and discussed in 

paragraphs 6 through 11. Thus it is clear that EEC does not have 

the manpower Capacity to pursue an Unmanned Dorian effort in addition to the G, G-3, U, V, LOP and one of either 8-2 or D. 

b. Facilities. EEC; estimates that if Manned and Unmanned 

Dorian were running approximately concurrently, both could Mat be 

accommodated in building 601 without substantial modifications and 

relocations of company commercial business. In the event both of 

these versions of Dorian were undertaken in lieu of 8-2, the company 

would have to decide whether to alter building 601 or build a new 

building. Preliminary thinking points toward the latter course. 

In any event, facilities are not the pacing item in accomplishing 

either or both versions of Dorian. 

-SECRETBeadle via BYEIWAN 

Control System 
BYE-4C2.:2 65/ 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

c. SO-Contracting. The company estimates 50% or more of 

the Unmanned Dorian effort would have to be sub-contracted. This 

involves the same risks discussed in paragraphs 19 through 22, above. 

d. General. The rough order of magnitude measure of 

workload described above is a far different matter from actual 

workload which would result from a precise work statement and 

program plan. The above measure, however, served to convince the 

Committee that Unmanned Dorian on the time schedule contemplated 

is not possible at EKC. 

CONCLUSIONS: 

26. The Committee concluded that: 

a. EKC can perform G, G-3, U, V, S-2 and LOP on the time 

schedules currently contemplated. 

b. If Manned Dorian is added, S-2 would have to be dropped. 

c. With respect to EKC capacity under b, above: 

(1) The number of skilled people required exceeds the 

number required for a, above, so that a (reduced) shortage will 

still exist. 

(2) There would undoubtedly be some reduction in EKC's 

efficiency level, schedules and costs, across the total spectrum 

of SAFSP projects. EKC has stated they would devote close management attention to this matter and would insist on not compromising 

quality, even if schedules slipped or costs rose. 

Handle via BYEMAN 

Cetrol System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

-SEW- 

(3) There would be a very tight time schedule for 

providing facilities for D. Any delayed decisions, changes in 

concept, or construction problems would cause slippage in the 

D flight schedule. 

(4) There would be a high percentage of sub-contracting 

on U (40%) and D (50% or higher). This requires extra EKC management effort and increases the cost to the Government through costs 

and fees to both EKC and the subs. Of special import is the G and 

G-3 history, wherein most of the principal problems encountered 

were related to effort bought on subcontract. 

d. EKC could not perform the Unmanned Dorian project in 

addition to the workloads in either a or b, above, if the time 

schedule for Unmanned Dorian is roughly parallel to Manned Dorian 

(6 month lag). 

e. EKC is essentially on schedule under current contracts 

for G, U, D, and S-2 but is from 3 to 18 weeks behind contract 

schedule on elements of G-3. Although EKC maintains that this 

schedule slippage will not affect planned flight dates, the 

Committee concluded that all the slack has been used up and any 

new problems encountered from now on will probably result in launch 

schedule slippages. 

Handle via 8YEMAN 

Cartel System 
i 

ROY 

LtCol, USAF 

OHN 

"-d 

OH WALLACE 

Major, USAF 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 SECRET 

Aff5,/,..Ar 

G T SMITH 

Colonel, USAF 

Chairman 

F'NED HAND 

Colonel, USAF 

6 Tabs 

1 - Letter Orders 

2 - Memo on Consortium 

3 - Master Schedule 

4 - Manpower Tables 

5 - Manpower Chart 

6 - Manpower Table, Unmanned Dorian 

--sEeRET-- Handle via BYEMAN 

Control System 

ORRIN V PARDUE 

Major, USAF 
JOHN L. MARTIN, JR. 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Director of Special Projects 

BYE-40252-65 

3JLL 1965 

SP-1 

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GERALD T. SMITH 

SUBJECT: Management Resources Survey of Eastman Kodak Company 

1. You are hereby appointed Chairman of a committee to conduct 

subject survey. Members of the committee will be: 

Lt Colonel Roy Smith, 

Major John J. Keenan, 

Major Orrin Pardun, 

Major John Wallace, 

Major Ralph George, SP-3 

Mr. Jack Bender, SSJ 

2. Your committee will review existing and contemplated workloads 

at Eastman represented by the following projects: 

GAMBIT 

GAMBIT-3 

UPWARD 

S-2 

DORIAN 

You will assess Eastman's present capabilities with regard to both 

personnel and resources to accomplish the above projects on the 

schedules now contemplated, and further assess probable interactions between these projects. 

3. I desire your verbal report not later than Friday, 30 July 1965, 

to be followed as soon as possible by a written report. 

C-4 n I Handle via BYEMAO 

.,,1 ' Control System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65- 

SP-1 15 July 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GERALD T. SMITH 

SUBJECT: Management Resources Survey of Eastman Kodak Company 

Reference my 13 July 1965 memorandum to you, subject as above, 

P-13674. Please add the following to the list of projects in 

paragraph Z: 

VALLEY - Advanced Studies 

JOHN L. MARTIN, JR. 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Director of Special Projects 

Handle via BYEMAN 

Control System 

P-13674. a 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

181114-- 8YE-40252-66 

SUBJECT: Proposed Consortium for DORIAN 

1. On 19 July 1965 Dr Oder of EK briefed Col Smith's group on 

the consortium proposal of EK for the accomplishment of the DORIAN 

program. Copies of his charts are attached. On 21 July Dr Oder 

made available for Col Hand's perusal the staff study prepared by 

EK on this matter, copy of which had been furnished to Dr Hainan 

and presumably passed on to Mi. McNamara. The mentioned charts are 

the inclosures to this staff study. Dr Oder did not want a copy to 

be made of the staff study but permitted Col Hand to take notes. 

The following comments are made on the basis of these notes and 

concurrent conversation with Dr Oder. 

2. In brief, the consortium contemplates a close working relationship betWeen Contractors having photographic satellite reconnaissance 

experience through a joint committee working closely with the 

Government in parceling out the work, establishing specifications 

and making interface decisions so that no one Contractor is given 

the total rmanonsibility and the available resources of all are 

utilized to the maximum extent. The staff study makes the comment 

that precedence exists for this type of arrangement and Dr Oder 

explained that Dr McMillan commented that a similar consortium was 

worked out between ITT, Bell Labs and RCA while Dr McMillan was 

at Bell. 

3. The study points out that even with a factor of 50% subcontracting, the in-house effort to do DORIAN would require 1,000 

man years of professional engineering and would requirs'over *00 

professional people. One of the alternate considerations was the 

possibility that DORIAN could be turned over to a large aerospace 

company, however it was concluded that the resulting recruitment 

of qualified technical people would probably disrupt the present 

satellite reconnaissance program. The study proposed as a feasible 

solution, the consortium of qualified members of the photo reconnaissance industry to be perhaps augmented with a non-photographic 

company that had experience and capability in Satellite reconnaissance. 

Handle via HEN 

• Control Systea 
SP[CAI, FArDIEG BYE-40252-65 NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

4. The consortium is planned to operate at two levels: the 

higher level in the area dealing in area of program coordination 

and subsystem engineering which they refer to in their charts as 

the PC & SE group; and the lower level to operate in the area of 

hardware engineering, manufacturing and design. A qualifying note 

was included that while higher level members of the consortium 

would participate, only one of the members would be responsible 

for pre-launch integration and test of the overall sgbsystem. 

5. The PC & SE group would work as an organized group regardless 

of company affiliation and would be composed of people from the 

various companies. The members would keep their respective companies 

advised of the actions of PC & SE group and identify the potential 

impact of PC & SE actions on the part of the hardware consortium 

being played by their company. The PC & SE group would suggest the 

expent to which their respective companies could, with authority by 

the Air Force, assist in a problem. 

6. Functionally, the PC & SE group will: 

a. Represent the consortium in dealing with the aerospace corp. 

b. Prepare program plans and schedules for the integration of 

DORIAN photo subsystem. 

c. Take the broad MOL/DORIAN requirements and specifications 

and derive specific component requirements. 

d. Develop subsystem design approaches for the guidance of 

' the hardware organizations. 

e. Negotiate documents and reach decisions to accomplish 

needed interfaces. 

f. The individual in charge of PC & SE group would, in 

addition to organizing and supervising the activities of the 

group, have the responsibility and authority to make the final 

decisions for the group. 

g. The PC & SE group is not to be the directive agency for 

out-of-scope work upon the hardware organization, but will render 

its output of out-of-scope work to the Air Force which after review 

by the Aerospace Corporation will provide contractual direction to 

the members of the consortium. 

2 

Handle via BYEMAN 

—SECRaigg1/41. MINS control system 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 SECRET 010M,01 CO?" Chiiikil\U iii GBYE-40252.65 

h. In the case of in-scope work, the PC & SE group deals 

directly with the hardware organizations. 

i. The hardware portion of the consortium would be less tightly 

managed and integrated than the PC & SE group. It presumes that the 

Air Force would assign hardware tasks after PC & SE definition. 

There would also be close cooperation between the companies concerned 

to assure the continued coordination of the integration test planning 

and detailed interface. 

T. The purpose of the consortium approach would be to relieve 

a number of the companies of manpower demands that they would face 

if they had the entire DORIAN responsibility. Under the consortium 

concept Air Force/Aerospace would have to assume responsibility, for 

such things as reliability analysis and design review of the integrated subsystems, establishing of uniform manufacturing and quality 

control procedures and surveillance thereof, review and approval of 

integration test plans and results, etc. 

8. The study indicated that a:capable senior Government individual 

would be assigned to direct the total activitjes of the consortium 

with power to act for DORIAN in resolving DORIAN matters arising 

within and without the consortium. 

9. The conclusions of the study were: 

Conclusion 1 - Only the consortium would be capable and 

strong enough to accomplish DORIAN. 

Conclusion 2 - That the consortium be established at two levels: 

a. PC & SE staffed from members of the consortium would: 

(1) Perform overall subsystem and technical planning and 

scheduling and interface management. 

(2) Conduct, coordinate, and render decisions on the 

following: subsystem engineering, conceptual design and prepare 

specifications and work statements. 

(3) Accomplish liaison with AF/Aerospace and members of 

the consortium and associate subsystem contractors. 

3 

ELL via BYEMAII 

SPECIAL EANRINC 4ntml System 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 SECRET gr.. .14 BYE-40252-65 

b. An interrelated and coordinated group of companies 

performing hardware engineering) manufacture, and test functions 

as well as the subsystem engineering and conceptual design functions 

as required and controlled by the PC & SE group. 

Conclusion 3- Will require enthusiasm, constructive and 

cooperative participation of the individual members; that the 

Government insure fair treatment of all companies. 

4 SPEN!. PANOIING Han Is via BRAN 

System 
JuklE So k465" 

CLASSICAL OPGAN1Z.ATION 

1--- L-0 C 14i a " 

1-4J 

0 

0 1• 

cr 

0 5 

LL csi 

O >- 

w 

0 

w 

I-U 

a. u) 

a w 0 

LY 

Z 
0 

koJ tj 

ri 

OPUN

ZI ATION 

0 0 

LL N 

>- W 

> 

0 

X aW 

CO 

< < 

0 

X LIJ 

Z X 
-SECRET-- 

OPG

rJ 

A,NIZATION 

Lia 

o0 U_ CS! 

0 ›- 

LLI 

>--' 0 

a_ w 

cn 

< 

O _f 

cc w 

z cc 

-SECRET- 
(5. 

t 

BYE-40252-65 

1.1., — 0,1 en I .ct -4E Oa CO 

IIH 

F1.43 

113 

Z 

C2. 

t.4.1 

I 

t-.0 

0 

Z 

0 

2 

141 

cf) 

7- 

(i) 

Bangle via ROAN 

Coln)! ;$iilli . 

SECRET 

aj 0 7 

Tz; 

UI 

u_ 1-- U. 

Z 

- 

1:1 

1 

.4-11 

0 

Qz" 

LIS 

(1) 

„ 

z 

7Ce" -

1-1-1 

1-41 

te 

4:1 

cx0 

c_., 

>- 

w 

0 

w 

• 0_ Cr) 

Ui < < 

0 -J CC U:1 Z 
BYE-40252-65 

I, 0 

4- c`l 

0 >" 

LL.1 

0 

CC 

0_ 

a co 

a a 

0 _1 

CC LLI 

Z 

Handle via InifAti 

Control Systeat 
BYE-40252-65 

JU

NE 30 1°5

65 cle z ,-,' 

6 

,-.„ Li) 

`-' 

t4-i Lo 

14) e- 1 e...) 

U:.z 

Li) en . . , 

tl 

1_41.,a' __.) c. Z LI) 

ca -Z ......1 >< "X 14, cn ---) .2 t.41 <r 0 .kcri 

r:-:•‘ ta ul Lil §.- 4...43 at = -- 

a/ = --, - a = Li) tf, 

0 O. ..-C t--) 

1-41 , . e.'"' j

14J " .....) ;•••--. Cil Ut n 7- -C74 C) c.. , 0 ....J gc.,( 241 CIC:./t L.1) 

Gk. F...= i..4.1 •Z • :1-i i7.4. 1 

C ct 4z t- CI 1-- cx /- Cr> pc 

— a CI 

t 

1/49 a a 

■9 0.1 CI 

as 

AL) 

rL'it 

L41 

Or) 

cn 

O 0 0 • 0 

410 o 0 

CI1 O 0 (..11 c■L 6-4.1 

.• 

C) +CC 2 
0 m

2 

8YE-40252-65 

C-4 

— 

1/49 

Os 

t 

k 

t 

0 0 • 0. 0 0 co r— ts) 

PRO4.SS IONA L 

1—* 

1 

Ctit 

L401 

<-2:1 

-SECRET-- Handle via HUMAN 

Centel 
BYE-40252-65 

in 

0 

w 

2 

Ak01 C

7-S C.' AND 

i2 

-SECRET-- Handle via IIYEMAN 

Control System 
. t41 4:7 

— 

" 5 

C 

0 GI 141 

12-r 

-2

47 1-e• 

0 Ch < 

\. 

s, a_ .41 v4t. 

Z•4" * 

"-.9 

...■■•■••••■■■■ 

0 

POT. 'SSIONAL 

BYE-40252-65 
S

MEL

UT 

iS Z 

c 2 

tJ 

<-7 

t1,1 

2 

C) 

cc) 

r 

4 0 

2 ae 

cc 5 

a. a 

p- 0 

c 

g 

•A 2 

SECRET 8,1E40252-65 

I 1.: ‘.11 L . 

1 

It c\ 

LU 

• > 

• 0 

X — 

a_ 

X CO 

< < 

- w 0- 

UJ 

CY 

Handle via IYEMAII 

Control System 
L.1.$ 

r 

)UNE 30 -1 ,0 65 

--SECRET- VE-40252-65 

. CI 
Handle Ws INMAN _sEgREF--- Control System 

BYE-40252-65 

JUNE 30196 C 

FOR CA

M

ERA 011 C,S 

• 

0 

fp 

• 

2 
BYE-40252-65 
T SECRET 

„UNE '!cj i945. 

BYE-40252-65 

z 

C) 

• SECRE1` Handle via BYEMAN 

Control System 
SECRET BYE-40252-65 

JUNE 30 1965 

' _ . 
SECRET 

BYE-40252-65 

J U NE 30 1965 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

1-EGRELI- BiE-40252-65 

EKC MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY 

On Hand 

& Hired 

CY 1965 CY 1966. 

3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 238_ 1

PROJECT 347 551 619 668 678 653 612 

QUALITY CONTROL 200 223 253 261 282 259 244 

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 113 134 159 159 175 190 195 

OPTICAL OPERATIONS 24 38 45 54 55 62 62 

FIELD OPERATIONS 33 39 62 61 59 57 55 

SUB-CONTR LIAISON 13 15 21 30 42 50 48 

ENGR SERVICES 192 297 344 385 411 385 384 

MATERIEL OPERATIONS 127 149 178 193 215 204 206 

PLANNING & SCHEDULING 34 47 49 55 52 58 55 

SERVICES 276 346 379 384 401 401 411 

PRODUCTION 168 249 245 259 272 269 289 

ORIGINAL TOTAL 1527 2088 2354 2509 2642 2588 2561 

ADJUSTMENT FOR RECENT 

REDUCTION IN S-2 

WORKLOAD (PAR 5c OF 

REPORT) fis -59 -80 -91 -92 -82 -67 

REVISED TOTAL 1495 2029 2274 2418 2553 2510 2498 

Handle via SUMAS 

Control System 
PitO.ACT NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

(G4146 ,79 fiffdifia431- 

AA A NIPOWM2 Rt-QUIREMLNT 

1965 1.66 DATt 7-1-65 

6 

1 2 6 

3 2 2 

12 

3 

12 

3 

1 1 

3 3 3 2 2 

1 237 211! 241 241 241 241 ,124 124 

GROUP 

P1ZOJEcT 

SuP&LIV iSloW 

t 

quinOrry Miont 

QUM ITV POW1201 

SUPav iSt ow 

4 Gj taktis 

11,1SPUTn2S 

Mal N leAL OPClartotiS 

!Wu 3 el fl4o- CHG12s 

Not Klima c1,4612s 

snes 4 sups 04as 

NON SCIENCI. 

MTh SWNU Tcals 

SPCCS 4 ms Treus 

ant AL OPEDATIoNc 

Ecos 

TU LIN 16 IAN 

EIPI D OIXIMTiculs 

lei N 

Tttlifl le LAN 

20M ESTERUPS, 

el f-D le AL 

Sie LIAISON 

Chl&its1U-Os 

c0MPLJTCD OMRATS. 

cNOINFFRc, 

ThenNi,64, ciAtis 

captieL 

cwovG st_RViec-c 

SOPCRVic,ION 

DRAFTSMAN 

±. ► 

DWI KT 4 I I ISO I 

LIBRARIAN 

MATU2i AI OPIZATioNSI 

CUPEQV pa la N 

!. • w0, 

STOPI( I 

PLANNIN&t SCLIFDDLI 

SUP/. ity1SION 

extIED Dt E2S 

21;.r a AIDS_ 

VI(Ts 

VICES 

I IJANCI Aj 

CLE I CAL 

ck PtAillsg-NT 

'4•P ■ !•• 

CoNTableT ADMitii 

DePainticTin iJ 

PQOut1CTIAN 

SU42 V iSioN 

PtiOORSS EttGalf41 

LiAtiDs 

tpc t Tfcgs 

rABDICAT012s 

C14.12.1CAl 

TOTAL 

TOOL Ulf!) 

2 2 2 

9 2 2 2 

1 1 1 1 

1 

1 

g 

1 1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

War 

AT WORK ON Ter&M WANG *wont) IQ 4Q 1Q 12WARKS 

fig/ 2.65 

1111E11111111111111 

3 3 

Ininnaannailaniall 1 

•wia ij

■ 

'Ai 

Handle vii NEN 

Control Sygtem 

: 

1 

2 

1 

31? 

1 

1 

1 

2 

19 

1 

1 

1 

2 

1 

3i 

1 

1 

5 

4 

5 

25 

5 

4 

5 

25 

5 

4 

5 

25 

5 2 

S 

25 

5 

4

5 

25 

1 

5 

4 

5 

25 

1 

2 

2 

12 

1 

2 

3 

1 
RELEA 

PROACT K (4-3) MANPOWM2 t2-QUIRWENT. 

1966 

GROUP WO T AT woag. t,4 AND + 141 asp -, 

ict 

14 • ON zru. 0 

14Q 1' 2,t 3,',; 14Q RigIVIA12,KS 

I? p • 

1 1 11 1' 10 

g UPt.IIV I S la W 8 8 8 9 , • . 

• 1 

. 4 0 

ADM Al ISTRATIoN r r, 

SOLIDITY • • 1,1 1,1 2 2•-• 2 2 2 

Q114LITY CONTROL 

• • • 1, 

4 I ° 1 2• 29 28 2d 2,', 28 28 28 

12 12 1- 111 15 15_ 15 15 15 

IN SPILCTOiN 22 22 23 _25 _22 22 22 22 

.1 i I• !: I V , 

, ■ , • 

V 

15 15 15 15 . lc ID 

U I i ■ I • 1 10 11 10 10 10 ] 0 1 10 

-$ ' 4 4 ' 3 _ 

SKCS 4 SIDI EN&Its c ___IL_ 5 5 5 5 5 

'.111 ,, 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 

MARI SINCE TL-6 hLi li h h 14 

SPICS±01510,16 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 

OPTIr Ai OPERATIONS 

-PtsiG,INE-D5 13 13 J.a 6 6 6 6 6 

UM' ((I IANR 

r 

1ii.0 OPOAT 1 MIS 

-cNaj t4-Qs Li LI 114 10 10 10 

l'elitki IC IANS 1 4 h 11 1 11 11 

pOe agEk REPS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

C.1.121Q.AL 1 3 3 3 3. _3 4 

Sio LIAISON 

lattli;.QS 7 8 7 7 7 

CO M PO N-Z OPPRATS. 

c.NGJNf R.c, 

Tei4NiCiPiNs 

P 

, 

■ V ___ 44. !AT 

CORN; I SION 7 7 , /_. 7 7 7 7 

DMUS MAN i 6 142 3 30 30 25 25 

mega 1)14T # 1 I AlS0N 14 14 h Ii. • 3 3 3 3 

TPCIN IC I ANS 1 39 ILO 36 38 38 38 38 38 

Li BRAZIAN 

thATEI2 1 Al OKRATIoNS 

SU Pi2V 11110N 14 14 L Li Li 14 h h 

PRODUCT CON TR0 l 15 15 J.../. 18 18 18 18 18 

T00.CiaLl201 26 26 31 32 30 30 30 30 

1-001 eR at> i Sioev 

PLAN N IN& 4 SCIADOLINGL 

QUPt lay is ioN - ' 

c,c/-JEDDL Qs 

e.shriii AIDS 1 1 1 1 1 1 

21401(LSE2 V LC-E.S.. 1 

SE121/1CS 

clWANCIAl 7 7 

CLFQ I eta_ 7 IIIIIIIEVIIIIIHIIIIIIt'd 

SA- Pt AcEM1T intlIONLIMINIIIIIIIMMIE 

12EPoins 4 PROD 11 h L IL IL 14 

CONTRACT_ ADMIN._ 1____1 L 1 1 1 1 1 

DEPaniveTto N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 

PRO ullenT 10 N 

St1P12V 'SION h 14 8 7 7 7 7 7 

PRoef,$S fislaINFERs 1 16 17 11 1J 11 14 114 11 

I4ANDS 

AS&IMISII2.S # TfalS 30 30 62 46 6 46 46 46 

fABRICATOTZS 

C I. P12 I CA I andie via 8Y1 

1011,41 9 550 ' 559 602 583 560 V low isk- .,5 6 ,s-3k 770, 

a Ate 

NRO APPROVED FOR DATE 7-19-65 

NAN 
K12V IS IOW 4 

1) ■ 1 • , 

ar. 27 

3 

TUJOI ICIAWS 13 11 

MCUNIOAL OKATIONS 

MIABILITY 0104 10 

MATE! 3CM/4cF MIPS 

PUOTO WWI- /-146120%, 

SPi-eS4 SIDS ENGYs 

Purim SCIEW TQIIS 

MAUI SCIF14ff 1T-Cits 

SPFCS4 $TDS lulls 

Mirk_ OPRATIO1tS 

0,16I 14 f-C.05 

WIN I tlIANS 

flF1D OPERATInNS 

q-CIIIIIIY t Di t N11111211, 

QUAL ITV PONT12(11 

SitpaVISI ON 

INSPUTORS 11 11 

4 

1 

3 

10 

1 

3 

1:/441t•g-r-T2s 4 

SUPERVISION 

DRAFTSMAN 

jr-Clilel ANS 2 21 21 

Dvici DtsT 41 I 

ANS 

1 1 

1_16AIAN 

MAT121A1 OPfQATIONS 

SIJPE12V I q ION L. A' 

P24DUCT CONTROL 16 16 

ID— 10 

slog 2YISION 2 2 

SCLIEPULE_QS 5 5 

V I;-r 1 r AI DS 2 2 

VICCs 

_ PO 

Toot CR lb SToe V 

1 

0 weAA 0 i( 61 ;At) 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 PQOACT L MA14POWUZ Rk.QUIREMENT 

1965 1966 DATA 7-1-65 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

Nom ONS 

GROUP ism wow WAND lisalt0 i 

0 

4 4 

55 55 

3 _3 

8 8 

1 1 

340 341 

TPUN 1 I AN5 

120011ESTETZ REPS 

Cu-RIC AL 

Sie. LIAISON 

ts1G1t4&US 

CO M PEJ1TD ni4.11ATS 

was 

Ft tilkw e AL 

CLIFOIcAL 

g/r Pt AaAti.&N_T 

tt£POInS 4 12PROD 

CONTRbieT ADMIIJ 

DEP120.DIICIlow 

P12000 el') h( 

SOPF12 V iSioN 

156-o a_ss E1461ha% 

14Ati tt_a 

AW1A ell EPS # TCCIIS 

fAB2ICAT016 

_el 

- tron_ 

TML.

n 3Q 4Q 14 2Q 34 2.4 L 

3___:_ 2 2 

3 

25 213i 14 6 

31 29 

13 13 9 4 

1 5 5 

11 12 4 2 

4 

3 3 

4 5 2 2 

1 3 3 2 2 

1 

5 5 4 

34 24 16 10 

I I 

4 2 1 1 

16 10 10 5 

10 10 10 5 - 

2 2 2 1 

5 4 3 1 

2 1 1 1 

_1 1 1 1 

4 4 2 1 

55 50 24 

3 3 1 

8 5 1 

1 1 

A 2_ 

A 5 3 

15 

349 38 190 41,-' 

7r, 

CZIM AUKS 

• 

■ 

Randle via MAN

/ 

Control tystem 

9 9 

46 

_.2.120Jc.a 
50 360 495 660 

Bade via MAN 

4Scivirli 12c TfalS 

MillaCATolzs 

Ci_;1? I CAL 

TOTAL 1080 1185 - 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

(A:febw) 

PROACT MANPOWUR 12k-QUIREMNT(EsTIMATED) 

1965 1966 DATA 7/19/65 

GROUP 

Di/o 

Su 01,12Visinki 

cdCslplgl<QS 

4Q -, 2Q 3Q 4Q "MA". 

20 165 200 250 275 '305 F 315 

-BYE-40252765 .....•■■■■•••••, 

4- 

cuksiDiTyi 0/11, MY 

I 

CUNIIVISI ON 

PIM tig._&11S 

IMO T0114 

UCH ti I eAl 0K121%),PI 

Ralaii &1MJis 

MATU VIDICT- ;NOS 

NOM Pias 

LOS4STpt ;4GUS 

0 SCIF4n TIM 

7U ir-lift TABUS 

SPECS 1). 'WAS 

orrirAL it • TiONs 

;NritkiKoc, 

TgegbitejoIc 

ElEI P OPCRATIOn 

+kw wz412 

NAN to LAN5 

ROtlaS%a 19.05 

CLUtt C AL 

-4 

10 12 , 17, 22 

2 2 2 7 

30 32 , 

14 17 

4- 

24 LS 65 -95 - 105 

1 

1 

L IA I SAN 

0,161101“-CX 

onm (1MDATS. 

chiroNt-t2s 

T CJ Ni LANg 

1 5 10 20 30 30 

I CPS__ 3 62 92 130 165 

SUPgai I SION 

DRAFTS MAW 

ITCH bl JO i AN $ 

two pci 4 LI AlsoN 

LI 8 

MA7V2IAL OECRATioNs to 30 40 65 

CDPOVig ION 

PQODIWT 00Nikol 

SToov. CoNT0pt 

Toni C121b croft 

PLANN I NE, 4 Maui! 9 9 14 14 

SoglZyisioN 

c,cliEDDITI2s 

211` a AIDS 

ViCfs 

VICES 13 46 65 90 124 

Fitaweier 

rafairAL 

PLACP■APAT 

REPok7s 4 ,PPRoD 

CON7124E7_40M114 

DEPooDucTioN 

P0000 eTiON 4 20 25 31 62 

suPp2 v 'SION 

koecss ENaiNtig 

190 210 

as 90 

24 

160 190 

81 101 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 PROJL CT 

(U/90,44.0) 

MANPOW12 t&QUIREM1966

NT 

1965 DATE 7-19-65 

GROUP 

A i MD 

01,0•K 1411,141) 

014 

Anna 3Q /4C2 1Q 2Q 3Q )(Q REIMARKS 

P1QACT 

SUKI2VISInki 14 )4 

hiGthl“12S 5 20 1 

ADM tWIATQATION 0 0 1 2 

P. iii l'i 1 1 1 2 2 Eribini121141. 

. 

0, , I kW ■ 

:I ' • ■ 1 1 1 1 Mill 1 1 Mil 

, t ' 2 2 2 IiiiMMUNINNINPAMMOUP 4 A 

INSPECTORS 

TLCI-INIC1ANq 

1 iiiiioN 

TMINICAL OPCIATIONS 

111 

PLLIA1511 VW -EllaRS 

, 

1it I lo P 

klatn Seit-ka ;.14e 2 2 lys 2 2 2 

$941404 t44G2s 1 1 1 3 3 

MOTO SCINCI. Wlig 1 1 2 2 2 

MATO SCIENCrP ii.eus 1 2 

SPAS %MRS TLC41R I 1 2 

opTirAt OPRATioNc 

.p46th1F-coe% I 2 2 

WONItiiktiS _1 1 

Ell D OPCVATInt4g 

Pitimr-r-os 1 1 

1 . , ■ 

'AI. • !TL1111111! 1 1 1 1 1 

C1121CAL 1 

11111111111111 

Sp LIAISON 

• 11 I 

I II # $ O P ! i • 

.cNkitift-12 

-a-ci4NiCIANS 

eLVti CAL. 

ENWRiG SERV I 0,C.R 

SOWN I GiON 1 1 1 

DRA;TS M AN 11 11 5 5 5 6 6 6 

TC-C11NINANc, 1 1 4 12 13 u 13 13 

DW4 DisT 4 LI AiSopi 

LIBPARiAN 

filliial Al nP*RAlioNg 

SUPERVIclION 1 1 j. a_ 2 2 2 2 

PRODUCT CONTRol 3 3 3 6 10 16 16 16 

• 

- 9 I. ° I/ 

• • P ir I . 

PIM/N[116i SCI4fDUI or 

qUniaviSioN I 1 1 1 1 i. 

scuEDuLEkS 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 

2if.r zAlps 1 1 1 1 1 

Vicc.s 1 1 1 1 1 

EIRVia-s 

ClUtalelAJ 1 1 1 1 2 2, 2 2 

tin/10AL 8 8 8 114 17 20 20 20 

sir Pt 4cf_11;NT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

PEPIN/Ts 4 2EPRoD 1 1 1 1 1 

CONTRepj ADMig 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

DEpainucTiow 1 2 2 2 2 5 10 10 10 

PQOutieTIAN 

soK2ViSints1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 3 ' 1 PkocT_ss EtilGINEEI/s 2 2 2 3 5 7 7 7 

IAANDS 

Asc;_resi Fps # Tfo4s 1 4 4 4 6 15 15 15 15 

FABUicATot2s 

CM/ICAL Handle via BY 

14. I 

—'TOTAL. 614 &9 814 133 175 213 2- U4 2114 .. . ..1 ■:1— „_. . 

AN 
(t/4//17) 

MANPOWCZ RCQUIREM&NT 

1965 1266 DATE 7-19-65 

GROUP AT 14•11t/ M WORK WAND heiliito

O 3Q 14Q. 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q QEMATZKS 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 PQOJCT T 

1 PGQJEcT 

SuMav s int,/ 

rtsiottst_as 

ADM al(ATRATintil 

MII 

QUALITY PONTINII 

SE1PRy ISI ON 

ENG) Nta_S 

Tf$,C11thenitis 

1 1 2 2 2 2 2 

12 12 114 18 18 18 18 

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 

MaiWLQAL OK12ATioNs 

16.1 Mit tw 

MATH 40I;Na .cI1615 - 4 11111 111111111 MUIMMIL 4 14 14 

NOR) setoia ;.welys 1 1 1 J. 1 1 

4 

MOTO SCIENCi T1 I 

sPirS 51D Tulls 

OPP OPF P AT ioNs 

4141 N 

neo IC IAN 

c_11 

1

D 0PQ/ititus 

461 NT4-12 s 

TP11N 10 1AN$ 

Roe a.STE.P. RFPS 

CLERICAL 

SUPERVISION 

DRAFTS MAN 

Tr-C14N le I Alt$ 

DW4 Dig 4 LIA1qoN 

iBRARIAN 

MAU-121AL OPERATIONS 

SUPil2V14 10 N 

PRODUCT CONTROL 

TOOL

p 

1 1 1 1 1 1 

4 4 7 7 7 7 7 

11 13 13 13 13 13 

eilb Si0( 

PLANN IN& 4 ge LIFDDI ► 

RyISION 

scti ED LERS 

NIF-r KG, AIDS 

PI-10TO %RV 

CR2V I as 

citawetAL 

CLE2 CAL 

S/' PiAcEMNT 

EitP0a3s 4 QPRoD 

CONTRACT ADS i1i 

PROutleTiciti 

SDPU2v tSioN 1 

Paoess EN6ltiffitS, 1 

LAAtips 

AS Ba-T2 s # Tfcks 

fAIMCATORS 

ClUi CAI 

TOTAL 54 54 61 69 73 , 73 

1 1 

1 

7 

2 2 2 

7 7 

2 2 

7 7 

1 3, 1 

1 1 1 

2 2 2 2 2 

1 

1 

1 

2 

7 

73 73 

1 

1 

2 2 

1 

1 

Handle via BYEMAll 

Cartel Systen 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

M40252-65 

PROJECT S-2 MANPOWER REQDTREMENT Date: 7-30-65 

The figures on the following page represent EKC's estimate 

as of 19 July, based on the original launch schedule and the original 

EKC work statement. 

Between 19 and 30 July, changes in both the launch schedule 

and work statement (see par 5c, of report) have reduced EKC's manpower 

requirements. The Committee assessed this reduction at approximately 15%. 

The EKC S-2 manpower requirements used by the Committee are 

therefore the following totals instead of the totals shown on the 

next page: 

1966 

33Q Q 2Q l_q 

332 455 519 521 462 382 

--JSEAEL_ tr Handle via BYEMAM 

r"" 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 PROACT 

O

MANPOWQ. REQUIREMENT 

1965 1966 DATA 7-)9-65 

GROUP 

tiato 

Ai maw. 

or., 

HAND 

ograk, 

4. 1.4111.0 3 Q it Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 14 Q lagrMARKs 

_P.120-1EcT 

SUKavistotsi ___6_ 6 

Pico hirt.V2S 9 79 8 13 1 9 162 n 99 

ADM WAWA:110N 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 

P 1. 1 iii Il 1 

QUALITY 00141/01 

PA ' I, 1 4 2 

thICAINLUS • 10 17 2 E. , 2 2 : '

•

A 1 52-65 

TLNIAIICIANS 2 3 • 8 

INSPLCMIIS 1 1___, 6 15 25 30 . 30 25 

TULL ti I eta_ OPOVIONS 

MAMMY -1402S , 1 10 18 18 18 li 

MATO SCIf NOF Was 1 7 7 7 

11 

pilot() genia FNt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

SPP$ i sirps eiain 1 .4 1 2 3 3 2 2 

PUOTO ScIENCS nogg , 1 

, 1 1 1- 1 1 1 1 

MATLI $011-Na 11GIS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , IBS 

SPRS IEriLS 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 

crick OPRAT1ONS 

.PlitiiNi-cas 1 i 22 h 5 

1 A , violielivis FAB S . 22 22 1 

EtR.D OP&QATI CAS ojr 1 2 14 14 I NT4-Rs 

TT-011N 101Ab15 

12oe“1:cTE12. RC.PS r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1. 1 

CI.E.Rta AL 

SAP LIAISON 

14162 N“.12s 1 1 3 7 , 12 12 10 8 

OnMPU4k ()MMUS 

.NOINEER.S 

11-CNNICIANg ,. 

C Ri 0 

Ptqa"a E VI e.C-S 

c,LIPV2V141ON 1 1 2 14 14 14 3 2 

DRAFTSMAN 12 12 37 50 55 55 /10 30 

'multi I c LA N5 lo 10 1 2 3 1 2 18 

DI,40 }ST 4 LJAigoN 6 6 h 

IBRAP IAN 

SUPEPVig ION 14 LI li h 14 14 4 

P1ZoporT CONTP.oi 1 14 5 7 114 17 17 15 13 

giook. Cora QM__ 2 2 3 6 7 7 7 

TOOL alfa ISIDM 

PLAN N IN& (SCUDDING 

SuPrAty IS ION 1 2 2 2 

schEDULEIL5 3 3 

2 

1 1 2 7 , 7 

12tEr 1 6, tons 2 2 2 2 2 

VIC.Fs 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

Vi Cf-S 

FIWANCIAL 14 14 5 5 4 h 1,9 14 

f LEIN CAL IL 34 /19 55 la 

gfc Pt 40.1Natir 

i 

2 3 3 3 3 

12EPoRTS 4-2i-PR OR 2 2 6 9 10 10 E 

CONTRACT AMAIN 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 

DEPIZothicjinN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 J. 

PROutiOTION 

3. 

114 

6 6 

g 4 it 2 iggSZINFf2S, 3 15 15 

..• , • 

AC4.1W IDS -Tfee44 4 4 , 

FABRICATORS Control System et&Q.ieu. , 

TOTAL a 4 200 21k 391 535 610 613 chit WA 

MI 
+CC 

&Minn! 

I MI !hill Itjaragmorilfirt 

ta 

1MLIMMEI WIWI 

ki Ammo 1111/11EIN 

NI rdi NEM= .rr ERE== ^ilin-MEliN 

11111 11 M MMIKIMMOPM111 MENIIMIRM: 

raWa 

lg -f MOP 

Mi MIMI 

NMI 1101111M 

ILI MN !MIME 

Elk MDIF MN MOM 

• 1 Nem. MMIMMM.IIMMIIM 

MIN Nig MIMMIVIIIMIIMMIMMEMEMMI 

-MIli. 16.-O IMMOMMIffiMEMMMWAMEMIIII 

rEPAIIIMMMEW.M_MMEthfrffIMMIFIru 

E-11610 Riabliii andmili Mingmatio 

• 1 a 

X 41 

0 U_ 

W 

>" 

0 --' 

W 

< QO 

0 Wo 

CC W 44 

hangeof Seale 

0 

(.4 

0 0 O 0 

tO p

O 8 

Z 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 BYE-40252-65 

PROJECT (Unmanned Dorian) REQUIREMENT (Estimated) 

DATE: 7/27/65 

1966 1967 

M'M 

"c44.4.41" 

1 Q 2 Q 3Q 4 @ 1 Q 2 Q 

PROJECT PEOPLE 144 175 218 240 266 275 I co 

QUALITY CONTROL 9 18 28 46 57 63 to 

TECHNICAL OPERATIONS 21 28 39 56 84 91 ie 

OPTICAL OPERATIONS 7 10 14 19 26 28 s 

FIELD OPERATIONS 2 2 2 6 12 14 I:3 

SUBCONTRACT LIAISON 1 4 8 16 28 28 15 

ENGINEERING SERVICES 55 81 112 146 166 182 lad 

MATERIAL OPERATIONS 8 27 35 56 74 78 10 

PLANNING & SCHEDULING 7 7 12 12 21 21 5- 

SERVICES 36 56 78 106 140 165 45- 

PRODUCTION 17 21 28 56 70 88 2 r 

TOTAL 307 429 574 759 944 1033 3411" 

ets44-Ge driele 

444- GtetA•414a0,1•vta 

Zg014*. Ott://4"vi47 

'3,444VV1a efig414 

444 G0A4X444 ofrow0 

/aA01401 1. lit Mai, 

llEatile via BYE MAN 

Control System