ISI NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF June 20, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 11.1 W-um; has seen.

Attached is Mr. Helms' memorandum of 16 June 1972 to

USIB principals on the "Fact of satellite reconnaissance.

The memo emphasizes that there is to be no change in the

disclosure policies, even though the President made an unclassified reference to satellites in his transmittal of

the SALT agreement to Congress.

111111111111

Colonel, USAF

Attachment

40P4ECRETn100 Autouaw efrommimi

009 touSSC4vr lass If Sofa row APR ir

CONTWM. NO

COP, Or Cain

04.11 O Plat.
ilANDLE VIA TA-LEN --- TOP SECRET USIB-D-27.5/4

--RWAR,LS CONTROL 16 June 1972

Limited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT : Security Guidance Concerning National

Technical Means of Verification of

SALT Agreements

REFERENCE : USIB-M-621, 15 June 1972, item 3. a.

This memorandum is for your guidance and appropriate

action concerning the continuing importance of maintaining security

on satellite reconnaissance sources and methods, in view of the

Congressional and other open discussion of the verification aspects

of the SALT agreements.

The agreements and other official papers refer only to

"national technical means of verification", unamplified, with one

exception. The unclassified statement appearing in the Presidential

transmittal of the SALT agreements to Congress is as follows:

"The second paragraph of this Article

provides that each Party agrees not

to interfere with the national technical

means of verification of the other which

are operating in accordance with

paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision 

would/ for example, prohibit interference

with a satellite in orbit used for verification 

of this Treaty:! [underlining added'

T.OP SECRET TCS. 022-72

Mt CV
TOP SECRET

HANDLE VIA TAbENT=

--KETHetr CONTROL

US1B-D-27. 5 /4

16 June 1972

Limited Distribution

As you know, there has been considerable speculation in

the news media regarding the use of reconnaissance satellites as a

means of monitoring the terms of a possible Strategic Arms Limitation

Treaty and related agreements. The future success of any verification

action, however, will be dependent upon retaining the security and

integrity of the resources and methods available for verification.

Official U. S. disclosure policy regarding national means of verification

has been carefully considered at the highest level of Government and it

is essential that these verification means not be jeopardized by unauthorized disclosures which go beyond the limits which have been set.

In keeping with my statutory responsibilities for the protection

of intelligence sources and methods, therefore, I am asking that you

assure that all elements of the intelligence community under your

cognizance be reminded ts, provisions and restrictions

of the TALENT-KEYHO and other pertinent control

systems remain completel and will continue to be enforced

at all levels. It should be specifically and directly brought to the

attention of all concerned that: •

Official statements acknowledging "the fact of" satellite

reconnaissance must not be further discussed outside of the established

compartmented control systems.

Except for those specific officials who have been

authorized to deal with Congress and the public on this question, no

individual or official is authorized to expand, in any way, on formal

Executive statements nor can any additional information be furnished

or discussed in any manner.

c. All details bearing on the conduct of the U. S.

reconnaissance satellite program, its assets, capabilities, modus

operandi, results, products, and derived intelligence--past, present, or

future—continue to fall within the protection of the established compartmented security regulations and any disclosure outside of these

authorized channels calls for appropriate action.

Richard Helms

Chairman

- 2 - TCS41022-72

TOP SECRET