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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

MEMORANDUM 

18 May 1967 

Colonel Worthman: 

As a result of Dr. Flax's agreement in 

principle on the realignment of MOL management--General Stewart sent this wire authorizing General Martin to defer signing the GE 

and Douglas "black" contracts in order to 

preclude their having to be reissued by 

General Keeling or whoever becomes Asst 

Director, MOL, for Procurement (we understand General Keeling will become General 

Ruegg's deputy in DCS/S&L, Hq USAF--

General Gerrity took AFLC, General Ruegg 

got the DCS/S&L job). 

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Ilvs 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (OSAF) 

AF UNIT POST OFFICE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90045 

13 April 1967 

REPLY TO 

ATTN OF: SP-1 

SUBJECT : Management Responsibility for Phase II MOL/DORIAN Activities 

at GE 

TO: DNRO (Dr. Flax) 

Director, MOL (General Ferguson) 

1. The purpose of this letter is to identify a basic problem concerning 

current management plans within the MOL/DORIAN Program as related 

to GE Phase II activities together with my proposed solution. 

2. Following is a statement of the basic problem: Current plans 

for the initiation and control of the Phase II MOL/DORLAN effort 

at GE are based on the issuing of two contracts at GE. That is, a 

"Black"contract issued by SAFSP and a "White" contract issued by 

the MOL SPO with joint management of these two contracts. Although 

these two contracts stand alone from a security point of view, they are 

not independent from a management consideration since neither alone 

represents a manageable entity. There is presently only one definitized 

Phase II task at GE and that is for the production of reconnaissance payload hardware, support equipment, and services for the payload. Joint 

management of the two contracts covering this single, closely integrated 

task is not only an impractical approach, but is inconsistent with the 

presently assigned responsibilities which delegate the development, 

acquisition and test of the sensor payload to the Director of Special 

Projects. Following is a discussion of this problem and my proposed 

solution. 

3. With the announcement of GE as the "Experiments Integrator" for 

the MOL Program it was initially assumed that there would be meaningful 

"white" tasks for GE other than those associated with the sensor payload. 

However, as the definition of the MOL Program progressed, other "white" 

tasks failed to materialize. The tasks that did evolve were explicitly 

associated with the high resolution optical system being supplied by EKC. 

These tasks included the production of payload hardware such as the 

tracking mirror gimbal and drive system together with the control and 

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navigation system for executing the pointing and tracking function of 

the sensor payload; the production and integration of the acquisition 

and tracking telescope system into the payload system; the production 

of all electrical, mechanical, and special alignment equipment AGE 

to support the above defined AVE; the production of the reconnaissance 

mission development simulator and the mission module simulation 

equipment; software for mission control and on-board operation of the 

payload and the operation of AGE and simulators; the provision of 

services as the in erface custodian of the EKC/GE interface and as the 

representative for the payload interface with DAC, T-IIIM, and MAC; 

the supporting of systems testing of GE equipment at EKC, DAC and 

VAFB; and the supporting of mission operations at the STC. In the 

absence of white experiments for GE to integrate into the MOL or 

meaningful "white" tasks for GE other than those associated with the 

sensor payload, my personnel, with limited MOL support,proceeded to 

divide and negotiate the GE sensor support tasks outlined above into 

"white" and "black" tasks and contracts using Program 206 experience 

as a guideline. Although the basic GE reconnaissance payload task is 

"black," experience shows that it is unnecessary to do all of the work 

in the "black. " In fact, it is highly desirable in any program to keep 

the "black" funding to a minimum. This is particularly true in the 

case of MOL where the total funds have been announced in the "white" 

and it may be difficult in the future to explain the disappearance of 

large amounts from this total into the "black" efforts. This difzision 

of the GE role between "black" and "white" resulted in two work statements each containing the same nine major tasks with the following 

division of effort and dollars between the two: 

Percent Effort 

TASK 

WHITE BLACK 

System Engineering 11 89 

AVE 59 41 

AGE 99 1 

Training 60 40 

System Test (In-house) 45 55 

System Test (Out-of-house) Deferred Deferred 

On Orbit Operations 

Documentation 

Program Management 

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59 41 

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The above split-out of effort on a security basis meets all of the 

objectives of traditional "black" and "white" contracting as done 

within SAFSP, but the resulting contracts are not independent from 

a management point of view, e. g. , a unilateral technical direction 

in the "white" could change "black" work and subsequently incur costs 

which must be justified and paid in the "black, " or visa versa. The 

justification for overrun would therefore be very difficult to defend and 

justify in the black; one contract could not be terminated without 

terminating the other. The GE sensor support effort, although it has 

been split on a security basis into two contracts, should not be subjected 

to split management anymore than one would consider separate management of the "black" and "white" portions of the 206 Program. 

4. During the negotiations of the GE "Black" and "White" contracts 

I had always contemplated a single management agency for the two 

contracts. At that time I recognized that the efforts of the MOL SPO 

to obtain authority for "black" contracting, if successful, would 

probably place them in the management role for GE. However, it was 

evident that, if indeed this came about, there would have to be a transfer 

of responsibility for a major portion of the payload from SAFSP to MOL 

since all of the current GE work directly involves the sensor payload. 

5. It is my understanding from my discussions of the subject as well as 

all of the policy directives pertaining to MOL that I am responsible for 

the development, acquisition and test of the reconnaissance payload for 

MOL. In the discharge of this responsibility, I will be responsive to 

the technical specifications and interface requirements provided by the 

Deputy Director, MOL. Therefore, since all of the GE work pertains 

to the reconnaissance payload, to conform with this assignment of 

responsibility and to provide for management of the work at GE as an 

entity, both the present "black" and "white" contracts for GE should 

be executed and managed by the Director, SAFSP. 

6. Such a course of action requires no change in the present security 

direction. It does require some change in our security implementation 

plans as follows: change the "Black" Contract Security Guide to read: 

(1) SP participation in MOL is Unclassified, (2) SP may contract in 

the "white" for non-mission revealing effort. In addition "white" SP 

contracts would appropriately classifed (Secret, Confidential, Unclassified), 

the existence of an SP contract for MOL is unclassified, and the use of 

"Release of News Information Clause" (Standard SP Clause) which requires 

prior PCO written approval of any news release. 

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7. The MOL "Black" Financial Procedures (BYE-37613-65) would 

require no change, but a change would be required in the "white" 

financing to permit SAFSP to use "white" MOL funds. 

a. The DORIAN budget estimates submitted to by 

SAFSP would be expanded to include requirements for "white" 

MOL funds. 

b. Budget approvals for DORIAN received from 

would be expanded similarly to include "white" MOL funds. 

c. Budget Authorizations for "white" MOL funds would continue 

to be sent through AFSC channels to SSD in the same manner as present, 

except that the Budget Authorization document would identify that portion 

of the B/A which is to be used exclusively by SAFSP as well as that 

portion which is to be used exclusively by the MOL SPO. 

8. Since personnel manning for both AF and Aerospace in the MOL SPO 

has been built up on the assumption of a GE management role, I would 

expect that upon the implementation of this plan this source of manpower 

would be reassigned to the SAFSP military and Aerospace offices involved 

in the management of the GE eficirt. 

9. Upon receipt of approval to proceed with the Phase II contracts, 

I am prepared to take the necessary action outlined isbove and execute 

and manage both "black" and "white" contracts for the present GE 

tasks in the MOL Program. 

JOHN L. MARTIN, JR 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Director 

Copies to: 

Gen Stewart 

Gen Berg 

Col He ran 

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g Ag 

RAP 43-ci 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

DIRECTORATE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (OSAF) 

AF UNIT POST OFFICE. LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90045 

811.-Z6538-67 

REPLY TO 

ATTN OF: SP-1 20 April 1967 

SUBJECT Management Responsibilities for the MOL Program 

TO: Director, NRO (Dr. Flax) 

Director, MOL (General Ferguson) 

1. The purpose of this letter is to discuss problems related to the 

MOL program field management structure and presently assigned 

responsibilities within that structure, to identify workable alternatives, 

and to recommend changing to one of these alternatives before proceeding 

with the outstanding Phase II MOL contracts. 

2. The problem may be stated summarily as follows: The present MOL 

program field management structure and assignment of responsibilities 

is seriously incompatible with the MOL program as it is presently 

defined. Some changes are mandatory in order to proceed further 

under the present assignment of responsibilities. (For one specific 

example, see my 13 April letter (BYE-66514-67) on the changes 

necessary to proceed with the GE Phase II contract.) Some other 

changes will be necessary as the program proceeds. However, even 

if these changes are made as the compelling circumstances arise, 

the resulting management structure will be seriously inadequate to 

cope with this program. For several reasons, outlined in the following 

paragraph, the evolution of the program through the Phase I effort has 

made obsolete the field management structure which was selected at 

the initiation of the program. For effective management of the program, 

this basic structure must be changed; piecemeal changes to the existing 

structure, while mandatory in order to proceed into Phase II under this 

structure, can never produce really effective management of this complex 

program. 

3. The problem exists for several related reasons. One of the main 

reasons is that the nature of the program which has evolved during the 

Phase I work is considerably different in several important respects 

from the program envisaged when the original program directives 

were written. At that time, the reconnaissance payload was thought 

of as an entity which would be developed and tested by the Eastman 

Kodak Company under the Director of Special Projects. This unit 

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would then be turned over to the Deputy Director, MOL who would be 

in charge of integration of this and other payloads into the overall 

MOL system. The concept presumed clean, definable system interfaces. In actuality, the reconnaissance payload which has evolved, 

together with closely related equipment, is much more complex and 

has very involved interfaces throughout the MOL system. Its 

manufacture is divided between the Eastman Kodak Company and the 

General Electric Company, with Itek serving as a sub-contractor to 

both. This division was made necessary by critical shortages of 

resources at the Eastman Kodak Company. The test flow is far more 

complex than originally contemplated. The original management 

structure was conceived when the MOL was a manned program only. 

Subsequent decisions concerning unmanned versions and program 

options have been superimposed on the original structure, resulting 

in some major managerial inconsistencies. As the Phase I effort 

has progressed, it has been obvious that some changes must be made. 

By mutual agreement, the Deputy Director, MOL and the Director of 

Special Projects have delayed proceeding with full implementation of 

some specific management aspects of existing directives in anticipation 

of some changes which the Deputy Director, MOL had recommended 

(with the concurrence of the Director of Special Projects). In the 

absence of approval of these recommendations there is no alternative 

but to proceed under the full provisions of these directives although 

this cannot solve the basic problem. Finally, it should be noted that, 

even under the most favorable definition of the payload and contractor 

structure, the original management concept was not desirable from 

some field management aspects. The actual evolution of the program 

has further accentuated the effect of these features. 

4. Major deficiencies of the present MOL program management 

structure, as I see them, are summarized below: 

a. The reconnaissance mission has been repeatedly stated to be 

the only reason that the MOL program exists; indeed, at the present, 

it is the only tangible mission of the program, yet the responsibility 

for the reconnaissance aspects is divided between the Deputy Director, 

MOL and the Director of Special Projects in such a way that it is not 

manageable in any sense as either a payload or a mission by either. 

No one individual in the field can be effectively responsible for 

accomplishment of this mission. 

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b. The present division of responsibilities is based upon 

differences in security ("black" versus "white") rather than upon' 

manageable entities. As a result, there is no manageable entity 

for which the Director of Special Projects is responsible. Although 

he is charged with extensive responsibility by some aspects of the 

present directives, these assignments are curtailed substantially 

by other provisions of the same directives, and the manner in which 

they have been interpreted and implemented in order to proceed with 

the program effort to date under the original organization and 

manning. A few examples will illustrate: The Director of Special 

Projects is charged with the development, acquisition, and test of 

the reconnaissance payload, yet a substantial part of this payload 

is covered by the "white" GE contract which has been planned for the 

Deputy Director, MOL to execute and manage. The first test of the 

entire assembly of hardware for which the Director of Special Projects 

is responsible "for development, acquisition and test" will occur at 

the Douglas plant, under the contract which has been planned for the 

Deputy Director, MOL to execute and manage. The Director of 

Special Projects is responsible for the "development of those elements 

necessary to use the MOL sensors in unmanned systems," yet the 

support module (containing data recovery systems) necessary for converting the manned MOL to an unmanned configuration is presently 

in the (deferred item) Douglas contract which has been planned for 

execution and management by the Deputy Director, MOL. 

c. By far the predominant factor in the overall system engineering 

and technical direction is the reconnaissance payload and the related 

hardware, which is assigned to the Director of Special Projects, yet 

the "top-level overall general system engineering and technical 

direction" function is assigned to the Deputy Director, MOL, with 

the responsibility of the Director of Special Projects in this function 

described as both "secondary-level general system engineering and 

technical direction" and "detailed system engineering and technical 

direction. " This arrangement, in addition to other obvious deficiencies, 

results unavoidably in extensive overlapping of reconnaissance payload 

work between the two organizations, more total personnel than would 

be necessary under other management structures, and some unavoidable 

confusion with contractors who must deal with both organizations on the 

same work. 

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d. Although the closely related "black" and "white" contracts 

written to date have been carefully compared at the time of preparation 

to insure that they are consistent, the consistency obtained is, to a 

large degree, a paper consistency only. In practice, the direction 

given under one contract cannot avoid affecting to varying degrees, 

the work of the other (see my separate letter of 13 April (BYE-66514-67) 

on this situation as it pertains to the proposed GE Phase II contracts). 

Since separate organizations are responsible for each of these contracts, 

neither organization, in reality, can exercise effective management. 

e. The deficiencies noted above in the present management 

structure greatly accentuate obstacles which the MOL program faces 

on three counts: 

(1) The reconnaissance objective requires the attainment 

of the extreme edge of the state-of-the-art with a massive optical 

system far more complex than ever before attempted, with every 

facet of the development, assembly and test of this equipment 

critically important to any chance of success, with a far more involved 

contractor interrelationship than ever employed in any other satellite 

reconnaissance project, on a schedule which demands this success on 

the first flight. (Even if it were required only on the last flight of the 

present program, this schedule would greatly exceed any schedule ever 

attained by any other, far less ambitious, satellite reconnaissance 

program, where more than two dozen flights have been necessary even 

to approach far less demanding optical performance, with much smaller 

and simpler payload systems.) The present management fragments 

responsibility for this critical task. 

(2) The overall program is in serious financial difficulties 

even before starting most of the Phase II effort, as is evident from the 

estimates presented at the 14 April program review, and the financial 

limitations contained in current program guidance. These estimates 

are made up partly of negotiated effort (but not negotiated to the 

schedule which must be followed) and partly of estimates of the costs 

of deferred effort not yet negotiated at all. This deferred effort 

includes all of the mission module testing at the Eastman Kodak 

Company, and all of the combined testing at Douglas, and all of the 

Vandenberg and STC effort. This effort heavily involves the overlapping responsibilities of the two organizations under the present 

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management structure and program plans, and, under this 

structure, will necessarily involve separate "black" and "white" 

contracts split on the basis of security rather than manageable 

entity. Effective negotiation, and subsequent control of these 

costs will be impaired by this management approach. In addition to 

this deferred effort, the program will necessarily undergo many 

changes as a result of numerous problems encountered in such an 

ambitious undertaking. Many necessary changes have already been 

identified, but withheld pending completion of the Phase II contracts. 

The present management structure is awkward in respect to any 

effective change control; in this program where a large number of 

such changes will be unavoidable, the control of changes and the 

associated costs will be impaired by this management structure and 

division of program responsibilities. 

(3) The MOL program already has a serious problem in 

respect to its "black" aspects. It is unusually large for a single 

satellite program -- 2 to 3 billion dollars -- with very few flights . 

for such a large cost. In addition, it has been publicly announced, 

widely discussed, separately budgeted and defended before Congress 

in the "white: " Yet a large proportion of the total program costs will 

be spent on "black" contracts, and all of these funds must come from 

the publicly identified figures for the entire program. Under these 

circumstances, the effective management of the work for these disappearing funds would seem absolutely imperative. Yet the present 

management structure fragments responsibilities across all of the 

aspects of the program which most affect these costs. 

5. Before outlining workable alternatives, I want to make two general 

observations which I believe should be taken into account. 

a. Division of management responsibility and authority on the 

basis of security is totally unworkable. This division must be based 

upon manageable entities. Unless this is done, "black" areas will 

be unavoidably larger than they need to be on the basis of security 

considerations alone, and even then the resulting management will be 

seriously impaired. No one can have any effective responsibility for 

the reconnaissance mission results. 

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b. Since the justification of the present program rests on the 

attainment of reconnaissance results at the extreme border of the 

state-of-the-art with a more ambitious and far more complex 

system than ever before attempted in the satellite reconnaissance 

field, it seems axiomatic that responsibility for the reconnaissance 

aspects should not be divided. Continuance of the program will require 

continued expectation of reconnaissance success as the development 

proceeds, and the results of the program are obviously going to be 

judged by the quality of the reconnaissance take obtained. Therefore, 

a single field management agency should be responsible for these 

results. 

6. Although each of the following three alternatives has some aspects 

that are undesirable from some points of view, I believe that each is 

workable, and that any one of them would be very much better than the 

present structure: 

a. Assign the Deputy Director, MOL complete field responsibility 

for all aspects of the MOL program, both "white" and "black. " This 

would require "black" contracting authority for the Deputy Director, 

MOL as previously recommended. It would not require any change in 

the "white" or unclassified MOL program. All changes would consist 

of transfers of "black" contracts and work, including associated 

military and Aerospace personnel, from the Directorate of Special 

Projects to the Deputy Director, MOL. It would result in two 

collocated organizations in the satellite reconnaissance business (but 

it should be noted that both organizations are already in this business, 

only neither can effectively manage its presently assigned responsibilities. ) 

b. Assign the Director of Special Projects complete field responsibility for all reconnaissance aspects, including the reconnaissance 

mission aspects of the astronauts training, and including system 

engineering and overall system test of any reconnaissance hardware 

or function. Assign the Deputy. Director, MOL responsibility for 

system engineering and system test of all non-reconnaissance program 

aspects including life support and safety-equipment for the crew. 

(If the payload was a self-contained unit, as originally conceived, this 

assignment of overall system test responsibility for the reconnaissance 

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aspects might not be mandatory. But in the actual case at hand, 

where the complex reconnaissance payload and associated equipment 

dominates the entire system, with hardware from the booster interface 

to the Gemini (or unmanned) capsule, it is essential.) This alternative 

would require no public announcement of change (other than admission 

that the Directorate of Special Projects is providing some (non-mission 

revealing) support to the MOL program), but it would require a substantial 

change in fact. The Deputy Director, MOL would retain responsibility 

for all of the announced objectives of the program (reconnaissance, of 

course, has not been announced). He would retain the contract for 

the Gemini capsule and a contract with Douglas for the basic "white" 

laboratory vehicle. This vehicle would be, in effect, transferred 

from a "white" status to a "black" status in much the same manner as 

is followed by the Directorate of Special Projects in converting a 

"standard" Agena into a "project-peculiar" Agena. The Director of 

Special Projects would be responsible for all contracts and work involving fabrication, installation, and test of the reconnaissance mission 

equipment. The Deputy Director, MOL would retain responsibility for 

all life support equipment, crew safety, all astronaut training except 

that training peculiar to the reconnaissance aspects of the mission, 

and basic laboratory vehicle and equipment such as power supply, 

stabilization subsystem, etc. Publicly, the Deputy Director, MOL 

would be in charge of the MOL flights. Actually, he would be in 

charge of all aspects of the flight except the reconnaissance aspects, 

which would be the responsibility of the Director of Special Projects. 

Decision to launch would require the concurrence of both. All field 

decisions concerning the reconnaissance mission would be the responsibility of the Director of Special Projects; all other field decisions would 

be the responsibility of the Deputy Director, MOL. In addition to 

transfer of appropriate military and Aerospace personnel from the 

Deputy Director, MOL to the Directorate of Special Projects, this 

alternative would require re-arrangement of some of the presently 

planned work at Douglas from the Deputy Director, MOL to the 

Director of Special Projects, and the Director of Special Projects 

would execute and manage both the "white" and "black" GE contracts. 

It would not require any "black" contracting authority for the Deputy 

Director, MOL. It would preserve the publicly described MOL program, 

and it would divide responsibility between the two participating organizations along the lines of manageable entities, with a clear field responsibility for the reconnaissance results. 

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c. Assign the Director of Special Projects complete field 

responsibility for all aspects of the MOL program. This is the 

opposite of alternative 6a, but unlike that alternative, this one 

would require a publicly announced change in the program management, in addition to the actual internal transfer of the entire field 

organization to the Directorate of Special Projects, with subsequent 

re-arrangement. 

7. a. In addition to the alternatives outlined above, there are two 

other apparent alternatives which have been suggested before as 

possible solutions. These apparent alternatives are based on the 

concept that the Director of Special Projects could provide "black 

contracting services" to the Deputy Director, MOL, with the latter 

to be responsible for all work done under these "black" contracts. 

The provision of such "contracting services" would require a charter 

specifically defining the responsibilities of the Director of Special 

Projects, including consideration of each responsibility normally 

assigned by ASPR to the contracting officer which would in this 

case be assigned to the Deputy Director, MOL instead. Since the 

Director of Special Projects and the Deputy Director, MOL are 

actually assigned to two entirely separate management structures 

within the Air Force, a more explicit statement of the contracting 

officers' responsibilities would be required than for some other Air 

Force organizations within which this type of division may be made, 

particularly as they may differ by approved exception to ASPR, or 

official higher level interpretation of these and other pertinent 

directives. The two apparent alternatives which have been proposed 

on this basis are: 

(1) Assign complete responsibility for all aspects of the 

program to the Deputy Director, MOL except that the Director of 

Special Projects would be responsible for all MOL work done at the 

Eastman Kodak Company, and also would provide "black contracting 

services" to the Deputy Director, MOL for all other MOL work for 

which "black" contracts are required. (Although the Eastman Kodak 

Company is involved in the program at Douglas, at Vandenberg AFB 

and at the STC, these discussions have always apparently considered 

that management by the Director of Special Projects under such a 

scheme would be required only at the Eastman plant.) 

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(2) Assign complete responsibility for all aspects of the MOL 

program to the Deputy Director, MOL, including the work at the 

Eastman Kodak Company, with the Director of Special Projects to 

provide "black contracting services" for all "black" contracts. 

b. Under either of these approaches, the Director of Special 

Projects could not be responsible for negotiating the contract or 

changes to it, nor for its financial management since to do either 

requires changes in the work or its schedule. All such negotiations 

would have to be completely joint endeavors, and neither the Director 

of Special Projects nor the Deputy Director, MOL could effectively be 

responsible for the results. The Deputy Director, MOL would be 

responsible for determination of all changes, work approvals, etc. , 

but the Director of Special Projects would have to retain the exclusive 

responsibility to issue any direction to the contractor or approve any 

item relating to the contract. Without retention of this feature, the 

contractor would take action on the basis of discussions with various 

personnel from the offices of the Deputy Director, MOL, which would 

then be reflected in complete loss of contractual discipline essential to 

any effective management. 

c. The previously discussed problem with the GE contracts 

(my 13 April letter, BYE-66514-67) will illustrate how difficult this 

would be. In this case, there must be a "white" and a "black" contract, or else the entire effort must be "black. " (The latter course 

is not acceptable for two reasons: it would make a much larger 

portion of the publicly announced MOL funds be spent on "black" 

contracts, substantially increasing this problem, and it would be 

essentially impossible for the GE Company to handle because the 

MOL work represents the majority of the Company's work at the 

location where the MOL work is done.) As pointed out in the referenced 

letter, division of contracts on the basis of security inevitably results 

in such close interrelationship that direction given under the "white" 

contract can affect work done under the "black," and vice versa. 

If the concept of providing "black contracting services" were applied 

to this case, the Deputy Director, MOL would determine and issue 

instructions to the contractor concerning the "white" contract, and 

he would determine, but the Director of Special Projects would 

issue, instructions covering the "black" contract. It is extremely 

difficult to see how the Director of Special Projects could be really 

responsible for anything except lending his name to the "black" 

contract. It is obvious that the contractor personnel will not be able 

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determines and approves and what organization passes on such actions 

officially on work which has been administratively separated into two 

contracts on the basis of security. I do not believe that responsible 

and effective contract management can be realized under these circumstances. 

d. It should be noted that extension of the "contracting services" 

concept to cover both "black" and "white" contracts in such cases not 

only would not solve the problem but would introduce a further one: 

both organizations are known to have "white" contracts now, which 

include full normal management responsibility in each case. The 

introduction of an arrangement whereby the Director of Special 

Projects, on a "white" MOL contract, must provide the contracting 

officer and all official direction and approvals under the contract, but 

the Deputy Director, MOL provides all technical supervision and 

determines all technical direction would be extremely odd. It would 

be fully observable since the work in question is "white," and would 

be an obvious indication to the "white" world that something very 

strange is going on in the MOL program. 

e. In addition to the disadvantages noted above, such a course would 

be particularly undesirable for another reason. The satellite reconnaissance industry involves a relatively small number of contractors, 

who are already dealing with an involved NRO management of "black" 

contracts with close and even overlapping relationships between 

personnel, resources, and facilities. The Directorate of Special 

Projects is involved with each of the reconnaissance associated contractors in the MOL program: with GE both separately and in joint 

projects with another government agency; with EK separately, including joint use of major facilities between SP projects and the EK 

work for MOL; with Itek directly and in joint projects with another 

government agency, in addition to working with Itek as a sub-contractor 

to both GE and EK for reconnaissance aspects of the MOL program; and 

with all other contractors presently involved or likely to become 

involved in the reconnaissance aspects of the MOL program. In all 

cases other than the MOL, the existing NRO management structure 

has a contracting "service" and the technical responsibility centered 

in the same field organizational unit. A single individual in the field 

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can be (and is) held responsible for all aspects of each contract. To 

introduce into this area of industry, for managerre nt of work closely 

related to and, in some cases overlapping, other NRO work, a management structure with contracting "services" and technical and other 

management responsibilities separately chartered to two different 

management organizations cannot help but cause serious dilution of 

existing managerial discipline, with deleterious effects on the 

associated NRO projects as well as the MOL program. This would 

be an important consideration if all of the work in question was 

"white;" it would be even more serious in view of the interrela;tionship 

between the "white" and "black" contracting effort that is actually 

involved. 

8. I believe that each of the three alternatives outlined in par 6 is • 

workable, and that any one of them would be much better than the 

present structure. They are the only alternatives under which 

managerial integrity of the reconnaissance aspects can be obtained, 

and a single individual in the field be held responsible for the reconnaissance mission. Adoption of any of these alternatives would require 

major changes to both the present directives covering the MOL program 

and the present field organizational structure and assignment of military 

and Aerospace personnel. 

9. I do not believe that the apparent alternatives discussed in paragraph 

7 are workable in this program, and I have outlined the principal 

reasons for this conclusion. While the provision of "contracting services" 

can be dOne with "white" contracts for other programs under different 

organizational structures, it would be particularly inadequate for this 

program in this organizational structure with substantial "black" and 

"white" contractual interrelationships. 

10. As I stated in the executive session at the 14 April MOL Program 

Review, I believe that the program has another pressing problem in 

that the major program variables are incompatible as presently 

specified and that the objectives should be re-examined and re-ordered 

in terms of priority. However, the management problem must be 

solved before the program proceeds. I believe that revision of the 

present structure and assignment of responsibilities is imperative 

prior to the signing of the outstanding Phase II contracts and any 

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negotiation of the deferred items. I recommend that this revision 

be carried out by selection of one of the alternatives outlined in 

paragraph 6, to be followed in sequence by corresponding revision 

of program directives. Subsequent re-arrangement of field 

organization and personnel should be carried out by the Deputy 

Director, MOL and the Director of Special Projects, according 

to the alternative selected. 

JOHN L. MARTIN, JR 

Brigadier General, USAF Copies to: 

Director Gen Stewart 

Gen Bleymaier 

Gen Berg 

Col He ran 

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