This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CINDY LOU ESQUIVEL, 2 Petitioner-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 32,411 4 JERRY LAWRENCE ESQUIVEL, 5 Respondent-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Alisa A. Hadfield, District Judge 8 Lakins Law Firm, P.C. 9 Charles N. Lakins 10 Albuquerque, NM 11 for Appellant 12 Jerry Lawrence Esquivel 13 La Joya, NM 14 Pro se Appellee 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 GARCIA, Judge. 17 {1} Cindy Lou Esquivel (Petitioner) appeals fro m the district court’s child support 18 order and order regarding Petitioner’s motion to enforce marital settlement agreement 192 (MSA). Petitioner contends the district court erred in concluding that she took title to 1 a certain tract of land subject to tax liens that exceeded the value of the land because 2 she had constructive notice of those liens. Pe titioner also contends the district court 3 erred in modifying the child support oblig ation of Respondent following the parties’ 4 modification of the custody arrangement for their minor child (Child). We perceive 5 no error and affirm. 6 BACKGROUND 7 {2} Petitioner and Respondent were marriedon November 1, 2001, and divorced 8 on March 3, 2010. A final decree of divorce was entered on March 3, 2010, which 9 merged with the MSA entered into by the pa rties on that same date. Pursuant to the 10 MSA, the parties agreedthat Petitioner would take titleto a 6.803 acre tract of land 11 located in Socorro, New Mexico (the So corro Property). On May 3, 2010, Respondent 12 executed a deed transferring the Socorro Property to Petitioner. The deed is titled 13 “Quitclaim Deed” but states that the transfer is “with warranty covenants.” 14 {3} On April 16, 2012, Petitioner filed a mo tion to enforce the MSA, requesting an 15 order requiring Respondent to clear all liens on the Socorro Property or transfer to 16 Petitioner assets valued in the amount of the unpaid liens on the Socorro Property. 17 Petitioner argued that she was entitled to this relief because Respondent failed to 18 disclose the fact that multiple tax liens had been filed agains t him and burdened all 19 real property in which he held an intere st, including the Socorro Property. Petitioner 203 stated that she discovered the tax liens when she attempted—unsuccessfully—to sell 1 the Socorro Property. 2 {4} The district court held a hearing at which it heard argument from the parties 3 with respect to the Socorro Property and the issue of child support, which it had 4 reserved in a minute order. The distri ct court concluded that Petitioner had 5 constructive notice of the liens on the Soco rro Property and that the deed executed by 6 Respondent was a quitclaim deed, carryi ng with it no warranty covenants. With 7 respect to child support, the district c ourt concluded that Respondent was entitled to 8 a 50% abatement of child support during the months of June and July because the 9 parties had agreed that Child would resi de with Respondent during these two months. 10 DISCUSSION 11 A. Socorro Property 12 {5} Petitioner contends the district court erred in concluding th at she took title to 13 the Socorro Property subject to the tax lie ns because she had constructive notice of 14 those liens. She argues that the district c ourt’s conclusion is c ontrary to the language 15 of the MSA and the intention of th e parties in entering into the MSA. 16 {6} “Marital settlement agreements are contracts executed by divorcing spouses 17 setting forth the present and futureobligations of the parties.” Cortez v. Cortez , 2009- 18 NMSC-008, ¶ 1, 145 N.M. 642, 203 P.3d 857. When we are called upon to interpret 19 an unambiguous MSA as a matter of law, our review is de novo. See Smith & Marrs, 204 Inc. v. Osborn , 2008-NMCA-043, ¶ 10, 143 N.M. 684, 180 P.3d 1183. However, 1 when the interpretation of an MSA depends upon reasonable but conflicting 2 inferences to be drawn from events occurring or circumst ances existing before, during, 3 or after negotiation of the MSA, the interpre tation presents a question of fact which 4 we review for substantial evidence. See Garcia v. Garcia , 2010-NMCA-014, ¶ 17, 147 5 N.M. 652, 227 P.3d 621. “We resolve factual disputes and indulge reasonable 6 inferences in favor of the prevailing party.” Id. 7 {7} The MSA states that, as a compromise distribution of the community property, 8 Petitioner shall receive various items, incl uding the Socorro Property. The district 9 court concluded that Petitioner took title to the Socorro Property subject to the tax 10 liens, despite language to the contrary in the deed, becau se Petitioner had constructive 11 notice of those liens. Petitioner first argues that she did not have constructive notice 12 of the liens. She acknowledges that the liens were recorded, but contends that she was 13 not bound to search the record because she was not a subsequent purchaser for value. 14 We are not persuaded by the authority th at Petitioner relies upon and conclude that 15 there was substantial evidence supporting the district court’s decision. We note that 16 the liens at issue were recorded in 2007, during the course of the parties’ marriage, 17 and that Petitioner was aware of and workedto resolve various other tax issues. 18 {8} Petitioner next argues that the inclusion of the term “with warranty covenants” 19 in the deed transferring the Socorro Property to Petitioner “is consistent with the 205 unambiguous language of the [MSA] and th e fundamental principle of property 1 division in a divorce that each spouse is to have complete and immediate control over 2 his or her share of the community property awarded to them.” While a warranty deed 3 might have been consistent with the langua ge of the MSA, we ag ree with the district 4 court that a quitclaim deed was also cons istent with the language of the MSA, and 5 reflected Respondent’s intention that the Socorro Property would be a gift for his 6 stepchildren when they finished their schooling. 7 {9} We specifically note that the district court did not conclude that Petitioner is 8 responsible for paying the liens. On the c ontrary, Respondent remains responsible for 9 the liens and the district court ordered that he “should make every effort to clear [the] 10 tax liens on the Socorro Property.” While werecognize that the presence of the liens 11 makes the Socorro Property temporarily unmarketable, we are unabl e to conclude that 12 this lien, and how it is to be removed by Respondent, is in consistent with the language 13 of the MSA. Substantial evid ence exists to support the di strict court’s ruling that 14 addressed the tax lien existing against the Socorro Property that was distributed to 15 Petitioner. 16 B. Child Support 17 {10} Petitioner contends the district court erred in modifying Respondent’s child 18 support obligation. We review the setting of child support orders for an abuse of 19 discretion. See Styka v. Styka , 1999-NMCA-002, ¶ 8, 126 N.M. 515, 972 P.2d 16. We 206 determine that a district court has abusedits discretion “when it applies an incorrect 1 standard, incorrect substantive law, or its discretionary decision is premised on a 2 misapprehension of the law.” Klinksiek v. Klinksiek , 2005-NMCA-008, ¶ 4, 136 N.M. 3 693, 104 P.3d 559 (internal quotati on marks and citation omitted). 4 {11} The district court abated Respondent’s child support obligation by 50% for the 5 two months during which the parties agreedthat Child would reside with Respondent, 6 and averaged the abatement over a twelve -month period. A child support order may 7 be modified where there has been a substantial change in circumstances. See Mintz v. 8 Zoernig , 2008-NMCA-162, ¶ 18, 145 N.M. 362, 198 P.3d 861. The district court 9 specifically found a change in circumstances here, and then calculated child support 10 in accordance with the statutory guidelines. We note that the statutory guidelines 11 specifically allow for a partial abatement of child support for visitations of one month 12 or longer. See NMSA 1978, § 40-4-11.1(F)(1) (2008) (“The court may provide for a 13 partial abatement of child support for visitations of one month or longer[.]”). 14 {12} Petitioner argues that the district court abused its discretion because “[t]here 15 was no equitable basis for re ducing child support.” We disa gree. The parties originally 16 agreed that Petitioner would have primary custody of Child. The parties filed a 17 stipulated order on January 5, 2012, reflec ting their agreement to modify the custody 18 arrangement. The parties agreed that Petitioner would maintain primary custody of 19 Child upon her relocation to Kentucky, with Child spending the months of June and 207 July with Respondent in New Mexico. The parties agreed that child support was to be 1 modified to reflect this changed arrangement. We agree with the district court that this 2 change constitutes a substan tial change supporting a modification of child support and 3 perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s modification of child support. 4 CONCLUSION 5 {13} For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s child support order 6 and order regarding Petitioner’s motion to enforce the MS A. We evaluated this case 7 based upon Petitioner’s brief and Respondent’s failure to file an answer brief did not 8 negatively impact our decision. See Rule 12-312(B) NMRA (stating that “[i]f an 9 appellee fails to file an answer brief . . . the cause may be submitted upon the brief of 10 appellant”); Mannick v. Wakeland , 2005-NMCA-098, ¶ 39, 138 N.M. 113, 117 P.3d 11 919 (“[A]n appellee does not even have to file a brief, and the appellate court will 12 review the case in accordance with the same favorable view of the proceedings 13 below.”). 14

{14} IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

__________________________________ 16 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 17

WE CONCUR: 188 ____________________________ 1 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 2

____________________________ 3 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 4