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1. 'Reference le made to the "Jngreament between the Secretary of.

Defense and the Director at Central latelligeace as Management of •

the National Steeetrealesance Program" signed 13 March 1901

Messrs McCone and Olipatrie, and to discussions held between the. !

Joint Chiefs se Stiff and Dr. McMillan ea 2 April 1963.,

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2.... :This ananerandens is to provide 'suggested discussion itenskfor

the meeting to be held between the Joint Chiefs .of Staff and.Ms,!, McNamara an April. 1%3 with the latest -01 clasifyin .e•Stals upsets

of the amr141t0 agreement seferoneed above... A's

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It is cleat from the rdereseed agomentent thet .the National Recce..

aaissance OfSee.. as a separate operating agency etthe Department

of Defense, is responsible for the development, operation.. sad initial

processing of all projects involving the collection of intelligence.r.,namapgdeg. and geodetic information by overflights over. "denied“

territory., It is not clear from the Agreement.- and it was not otem:,.

pletely. clairified-filgriacussion between Dr. McMillan and the Jot it•

Chiefs of Staff, as to what territories are considered "doodad" or who.

snakes the determination that they are classed as "denied" territories:

..Ith .41140,/ p that the .100, with its operating responsibilities. -.alt.

collect intelligence daring cold. limited. and general was over such. 70

denied territories. It is not clear when and how operational' coutter".:;;

of the NRO collectiin forces is transferred to the Joint Chiefs. of Stiff..,

or other,deeignated agencies. when the denied territories become . F

combat areas by win le of all escalation from cold to limited or general

ware It is not c' ox.11-: cerise of controlled response whether

a denied torch t•ec.s acombat area by virtue of escalation,

will not sudden., are% tc. •iezea.:d territory for political seasons.

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S. It la clear that the Director. :IRO rep,...o di to the Secretory of Delouse with guidance providee by the U.04 Intelligence

Hoard. It is not clear what, if any. sespoo,..'1,:i.Atic z Joint Chiefof of Staff have relative ta the National Reconakainanc4r ...AA or :deed

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It is clear that the Director of the NRO is responsible for the

planning and conduct of research and development of future national

reconnaissance program projects. Clt is not clear whether projects

such as bomb damage 11111041111220111 and post...Mack recoonaissance

are the responsibility of the NRO. It should be noted that the Joint

Chiefs of Staff have recently forwarded requirements for these • A.

capabilities to the Secretary of Defense. His letter which requested

that the Joint Chiefs *towline the national reconnaissance program .

Indicated that the NRO would implement such requirements. if -

approved. This would indicate that bomb damage assessment and

post strike reconnaissance systems are to be operated by the NRO.3

The points listed above appeared to be the major points which

need clarification as to the extent of responsibility of the National

Reconnaissance Office. There are. however, many lesser questions.

For mounple. paragraph III B states that the NRO responds directly

and solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities

established by the United States Intelligence Board. Is this a viable

system for the Commanders of unified and specified Commands and

the ICS in times of increased tension or armed conflict?

S. Paragraph III E and F indicate that users of intelligence information collected will be specified by the U313. Would this system work

satisfactorily for the =Mod and specified Commands and the JCS in

the event of a crisis similar to Cubs?

It is noted in paragraph V A t that the Director of NRO will establish

appropriate liaison with various agencies. There is no provision by

which the Director of NRO is charged with keeping the trait:ary departments fully informed on the nondntelligence results of the unique space

research and development experience which he gains through his operation of the only major space program within the Department of Defense.

In fact. he cannot do so unless it is in accordance with the security

policy established by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency..

(Reference paragraph III

It is noted that neither the referenced Agreement nor the DoD

Directive No. TS 5105.23 dated 14 June 1962 which originally established

the National Reconnaissance Officv define any responsibilities for the

=military departments other than to provide support as required by the

Director of NRO. In the case of other separate operating agencies of

the Department of Defense, there are pro? • :rex by which required

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support resources are reviewed by the military departments and. .

most cases, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

11. It is recognised that the National Reconnaissance Program is of

the highest national priority and that the NRO has in the past been very

successful. It is not the latent of the above questions to argue the

concept. The National Reconnaissance Program is growing in also,

in capability. and in importance. To insure that it receives maxis-num

possible support. its chute: should be clear. understood, and supportable

by this JCS.

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