-1St NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.. MUIPME111111111

THE NRO STAFF January 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS '-i1- 54duicas has sosh..

SUBJECT: "Fact of" Activity Since September 1971

To the right is a detailed summary of recent activity

in the "fact of" areas of interest-for your review prior

to your scheduled meeting with Mr. Helms. The primary

focus on "fact of" since September his been through the

deliberations of the NSAM 156 Working Group. The COMIREX

study of Utilization of Satellite Photography has been

progressing at almost negligible pace since last summer

and has not yet significantly impacted upon the problem.

The SALT context is receiving primary attention today.

There will be a final 156 Working Group meeting during

the week of January 31. State does not know what the ultimate

disposition of the study will be. Our perceptions of the

key feelings are:

ACDA and State feel that "fact of" revelation

without constraints is best; that this will lead to an

eventual downgrading or declassification of the entire

effort; that diplomacy and negotiation will be better served.

NSC desires an iterative study of "fact of"

since apparently the President and Dr. Kissinger want to

move SALT through Congress and the public without protracted

debate at virtually any cost.

c. OST feels that caution should be exercised in

"fact of" and is apprehensive about dangers in this decision.

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NASA is cautious because of potential

association of reconnaissance with NASA's mission but

remains noncommittal in the 156 Group.

CIA backs "fact of" revelation and nothing

beyond; will oppose the idea of briefing the entire Congress.

NRO stated position calls for consultation with

Soviets and third countries first and nothing beyond "fact

of." The NRO Staff position is that the "slippery slope" is

very real and that "fact of" is the cornerstone of protection

of the scope and capability of the effort. The Staff also

feels that it will be difficult to keep SIGINT and photographic efforts separate once "fact of" is publicly discussed

by government spokesmen. JCS also holds these views,

informally.

OSD is generally supportive of the NRO but

will press to clarify legal aspects and to apprise the

entire Congress.

In summary, there appears to be an overwhelming desire

to move SALT through the Congress and the public scrutiny

without protracted debate- . There are many uncertainties

involved with the ultimate effectiveness of SALT verification when one considers the aros ct of

Congressmen and private individuals who would tend to be

.skeptical likely will remain skeptical no matter what the

depth of explanation. The Staff strongly urges that you

[

press for a reappraisal of Mr. Helms' view of revealing

the "fact of" simply to placate the expected reactions of

the uncleared Congress and the public. We feel that this

is an unrealistic step from which there is no withdrawal.

Major, USAF

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TOPIECRETA SUMMARY OF "FACT OF" ACTIVITY

SINCE SEPTEMBER 1971

At TAB A is the letter sent on September 1 to

Ambassador Johnson which requested that the NSAM 156

Group review the impact of the SALT ratification process

on the NRP.

Prior to the first Working Group meeting on this

question, there was considerable high-level discussion

of "fact of" policy. The DNRO spoke with several individuals, including Ambassador Johnson, regarding the urgency

and validity of the need to downgrade or declassify the

"fact of." These dialogs were stimulated by reactions to

the on-going COMIREX utilization study. Following a morning

meeting with Ambassador Johnson on September 30, the "fact

of" issue was raised at the ExCom that afternoon. It was

decided by the principals, at TAB B, that there was not a

pressing urgency to reveal the "fact of."

The essence of the ExCom discussion was relayed to

Ambassador Johnson in a letter, at TAB C, signed by

Mr. Packard on October 14. This letter advocated that

SIGINT systems should' be treated separately vis a vis

photographic systems in future "fact of" discussions and

that the 156 Committee should develop a policy to prevent

inadvertent disclosure of "fact of" during the SALT

ratification process.

There have been three working group meetings. The

"strawman" recommendations suggested by State follOwing the ,

initial meeting on October 21, at TAB D, introduced the

notion that Congress and the press should be informed that

national technical means include "information gathering

satellites."

Between the second meeting on November 2 and the

third meeting on November 11, there was a decided turnabout in views toward the "fact of." CIA's comments on

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-ToP-sEeRETthe initial recommendations, at TAB E, suggested that it

would be prudent to declassify the "fact of" but go no

further. These comments were somewhat opposed to the original NRO position and decidedly pleasing to State and ACDA.

Prior to the third meeting, we requested guidance

from the DNRO and Mr. Packard in line with Mt. Helms' altered

position. The guidance, at TAB F, indicated that there was

agreement with Mr. Helms' position, and that the U.S. should

check with the Soviets informally and with selected third

countries before going to the Soviets officially prior to

release of the "fact of."

The draft paper resulting from the.third meeting

on November 11, proposed several recommendations, at TAB Gs

which generally followed the changes introduced by the NRO.

The NSC representative disclaimed the recommendations, stating

that there was no in-depth analysis in the study to support

the release of "fact of." ACDA verbally opposed the constraints involving other countries stating that it would

hinder negotiations. They did not formally footnote the

third draft.

Formal comments to the third draft by the NRO, at

TAB H; by OST, at TAB I; and OSD, at TAB J; suggested that

the Soviet program should be explained concurrently - NRO;

suggested that the 156 Committee should frame a better

strategy and guidelines prior to concluding that "fact of"

should be revealed - OST; and suggest that legal aspects

should be examined, that•declassification of "fact of"

should only be accomplished if circumstances warrant, that

China and other countries be considered, that study should

be given to the merits of briefing the entire Congress

that the President be apprised of the 156 study, and that

in no case should public disclosure be made before

Congressional hearings - OSD.

Since General Allison, JCS (ACSAN), had participated

with Dr. Flax in earlier 156 policy discussions regarding

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SALT negotiations we apprised his staff of the present

process. General Allison requested that a draft letter

to the Chairman, JCS be prepared for his signature citing

his opposition to the revelation of the "fact of." This

draft was forwarded to General Allison in Vienna and so

far has not been signed.

The OSD response, cited above, was made final on

January 24. State informs that there will be a final meeting

of the 156 Working Group during the week of January 31 to

consolidate positions. Following this meeting a concrete

appraisal will be able to be formulated. It is expected

that the 156 paper will be sent to Dr. Kissinger rather

than to the President directly.

It is anticipated that there will be some form of

Verification Panel effort devoted to the entire subject of

SALT verification and ratification. The outcome of that

study will probably impact the "fact of" debate in a more

pronounced manner than the 156 Group effort. Both JCS and

OSD(SA) have informally told us that they would advocate

NRO Staff participation in the study.

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