NOTE: This material prepared by Colonel

Worthrnan at Mr. Friedman's

request - 11 Jan 65 - it was used

by Mr. Friedman in preparing a

paper for Mr. Vance on 13 Jan.

m
SECREI

MEMORANDUM Use of Satellite Coverage Under Changed Circumstances

New Paragraph 7. Renumber present 7. 

7. Use of Satellite Coverage Under Changed Circumstances.

a. Change in. U. S. Policy to Reduce Tensions. It is conceivable that under certain circumstances, the United States might

wish to take positive steps leading to a reduction in the probability

of a confrontation with Cuba over the overflight issue. Such cir- •

cumstances might include:

A new round of efforts to reduce East-West tensions

in which both sides take concrete steps to eliminate areas of

friction.

A fundamental change in U. S. policy toward Cuba

designed to bring Cuba back into the inter-American community.

A positive U. S. response to Cuban overtures to reduce

friction with her American neighbors such as a marked curtailment

of subversive activities in Latin America.

An attempt by the U. S. to dampen-down certain

potential crisis areas because of increased tension in other areas

(such as Vietnam or the Congo).

Rade

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b. Alternative Programs. If any of the above circumstances

apply, the U. S. could consider several actions to achieve the desired

results:

Reducing the stated requirement for interpretable

photography froM 90% every four weeks to a lower figure, or extending the time period of coverage. This would increase the risk of

offensive missiles escaping detection, but the actual increase in risk

may be difficult to measure and it may be relatively small. Moreover, we do not have 100% assurance of detection now. Such a reduction in the requirement would open up alternative areas of collection,

such as main reliance on KH-4 photogr

as required, with II-2 drones held on a standby basis only. The

charts at page above indicate the options available utilising

currently operational systems.

Providing essentially the same coverage as at present

but re-activating the KH-6 system, whose resolution (5 feet) is adequate to identify mobile missile deployments. The capabilities are

shown on this chart:

Ka-6 Coverage (Cloud-Free) and Costs

•

90% Coverage 90% Coverage 90% Coverage 75% Coverage

Eve 30 Da s Eve 4 D s E 0 Da Eve 60 Da

(15)*

*

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c. Discussion of Alternatives.

resolution of the KH-4 Del

increasing the frequency of nights of these systems p

marginal gains in utilizable coverage foir the costs involved. •

The KH-6 system, on the other hand, offers the prospect

of providing the required coverage (94% of Cuba, cloud-free, monthly)

with utilizable photography at a cost which is reasonable if other

benefits are considered. An orbit can be selected which will cover

from 2e north latitude to 24° south latitude. In addition to providing

full coverage of Cuba, such crisis areas as the Congo, Indonesia,

Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, and Southern China (in the area of Chinese

air-buildups on the South Vietnamese Border) can be covered with

5 foot resolution photography. This additional coverage alone would

go a long way toward justifying a involved.

(If 84% Cuban coverage monthly (cloud-free) were acceptable, the

ICH-6 system could provide even greater coverage of other world

areas -- from 34° north latitude to 340 south latitude. ) •

If present ICH- ography is reduced to the extent permissible by using the ICH-8, coats attributable to the KH-8 will

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Because of the inadequate
•

L. L.0

be reduced commensurately. Interesting trade-offs can be contemplated if Cuban coverage is varied to provide greater China coverage.

Similarly, costs for increased coverage of China which may be

necessary in the future can be absorbed by the new system.

d. Political Scenario. The manner in which the U. S. would

go about terminating U-2 flights over Cuba would depend in large

measure on the circumstances pertaining at the time the action was

•

contemplated. '

In those circumstances in which the U. S. took the initiative

in reducing tensions such as those in paragraphs 7. a(1), (2), and (4),

above, it would be necessary to satisfy two somewhat conflicting

objectives. On the one hand, the U. S. would hope to establish that

in ceasing the U-2 overflights, we were in fact making a meaningful

gesture toward reducing tensions. At the same time the American

_people and the Congress would have to be assured that the U. S. was

not taking undue security risks vis-a-vis Cuba. This could be

managed by establishing briefings of the Congressional leadership

on the adequacy of the substitute measures. Selected Allied could

also be briefed, perhaps as a follow-up to the earlier McCone

briefings. At the same time, we would take the public posture that

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the U. S. has adequate new techniques to assure itself against the

re-introduction of missiles, that cessation of the U-2 flights will

assist in reducing tensions and that a quid-pro-quo involving

Communist concessions are a part of the proposal. It would be

essential, of course, to avoid any impression that the U. S. was

retreating under duress.

e. Recommendations . The following recommendations are

made in light of the above considerations:

Ready the KH-6 system for utilization in the satellite

program. (Approximately 6 months is required)

Procure additional KB-6 sets to enable the system to

run on a 15 launch sets per year basis. (First year c

Present on the shelf capability would be exhausted about the time

new production comes in.

Begin as soon as possible KB-6 launches on a random

basis to gain operational experience with the system.

Prepare to phase out U-2 operations on a gradual basis

as the KB-6 is phased in if any of the circumstances in 7. a. above

dictates such action.

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(ii) Cloud-free KR-4 photography of about 78 per cent of Cuba could be

obtained monthly at an additional expense o

modification of existing KH-4 praetices.** Other options

following table:

shown in the

ally by a

VS ADDED COST PER YEAR

75% Coverage 75% Coverage

30 Eve 80 Days

KH-4 COVERAGE FROM WESTERN TEST RANGE

90% Coverage 90% Coverage 90% Coverage

Every 30 Days Eve 45

100% cloud- (38)

free photography

At least 70% (29)

cloud-free

photography

1/ Satellite Systems.

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mac:ii &id in. 4.4.4.

of 50 percent of Cuba from two laun hings per month. (Other world

sot

areas, including much of China, Southeast Asia, the Congo, Indonesia,

and thsaIIIIIINIIIIIMIMwould also be covered. )

are shown in the following table:

ERAGE FROM EASTERN2 TEST RANGE VS ADDED COST PER YEAR

100% cloud-fre

photography

87% Coverage 87% Coverage 87% Coverage 75% Coverage

30 Eve 45 Eve 60 Da s Eve 50 Da s

2/ For flights westbound from Western Test Range, double the costs

in each case.

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