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May 19, 1967 

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 

SUBJECT: Manned Versus Unmanned MOL Cost Comparisons 

REFERENCE: Paper on "An Unmanned DORIAN System", 

dated May 16, 1967 

As part of the preparation of a new estimate of costs and schedules on a wholly unmanned DORIAN system, the following estimates 

on costs have been made. 

In the referenced paper, it is stated that total cost of the presently constituted bi-modal MOL Program is expected to be $2.2 

billion which is consistent with a recent congressional statement by 

Mr. McNamara. The corresponding cost of a wholly unmanned 

system, based on a 10-flight program, is stated at $1.7 - $1.8 

billion. These figures are quoted for Phase II beginning with 

September 1, 1966. To arrive at a figure of approximately $1.8 

billion for the unmanned system, the basic MOL estimate of 

14 April 1967 was used. It quoted a total of $2.4 billion for a program with a 18-month extension from the baseline. Since this 

figure is a rough order of magnitude estimate and since the program 

is presently being redefined to a 12-month schedule slip, a $2.2 

billion figure would seem appropriate and the costs of its individual 

segments approximated by a 10% reduction from those which make 

up the $2.4 billion. The specific cost figures used for the basic 

MOL and the unmanned programs are listed in Attachment #1. The 

estimates for the FY 68 requirements for the wholly unmanned 

system are listed in Attachment #2. They are based on a 1 July 1967 

termination of the Douglas and McDonnell contracts and a new competition for an orbiting control vehicle. 

MICHAEL I. YARYMOVYCH 

Technical Director 

MOL Program 

2 Atche 

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Attachment 1 

MANNED VS. UNMANNED MOL 

COST COMPARISONS 

From September 1966 

(Million Dollars) 

MOL 

(7 flights) 

Unmanned 

DORIAN 

Program 

(10 flights) Remarks 

Experiments 338 378 Includes 10 payloads 

at $8M 

Mission Module 306 275 

Laboratory Vehicle 836 150 Costs to 1 July plus 

Termination 44141 

New OCV --- 450 $250M plus 10 

Vehicles @ $20M 

Gemini B 235 50 Costs to 1 July plus 

Termination @ 15 

Titan III-M 332 390 Includes 10 Launch 

Vehicles at $20M 

Crew 12 --- 

1 

Test Operations 30 25 

Pre-MOL 3 - - - 

Ae rospace 70 60 

Other 42 40 

TOTAL 2204 1818 

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Attachment 1 

MANNED VS. UNMANNED MOL 

COST COMPARISONS 

From September 1966 

(Million Dollars) 

MOL 

(7 flights) 

Unmanned 

DORIAN 

Program 

(10 flights) Remarks 

Experiments 338 378 Includes 10 payloads 

at $8M 

Mission Module 306 275 

Laboratory Vehicle 

, 

836 150 Costs to 1 July plus 

Termination @ 43 

New OCV --- 450 $250M plus 10 

Vehicles @ $20M 

Gemini B 235 50 Costs to 1 July plus 

Termination @ 15 

Titan III-M 332 390 Includes 10 Launch 

Vehicles at $20M 

Crew 12 --- 

Test Operations 30 25 

Pre-MOL 3 --- 

Aerospace 70 60 

Other 42 40 

TOTAL 2204 1818 

. 

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Attachment 2 

FY 68 REQUIREMENTS FOR 

UNMANNED DORIAN PROGRAM 

Expe rime nts 125 

Mission Module 50 N 

Laboratory Vehicle 45 Termination 

New OCV 70 Compegion & Start 

Gemini B 15 Termination 

Titan III-M 55 

Other 25 

TOTAL 385 

Bze.,113q 2- 421 
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Attachment 2 

FY 68 REQUIREMENTS FOR 

UNMANNED DORIAN PROGRAM 

Expe rime nts 125 

Mission Module 50 

Laboratory Vehicle 45 Termination 

New OCV 70 Completion & Start 

Gemini B 15 Termination 

Titan III-M 55 

Other 25 

TOTAL 385 

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May 16, 1967 

AN UNMANNED DORIAN SYSTEM 

The question of the cost of an unmanned DORIAN Reconnaissance 

Satellite System R&D Program vs the cost of the manned/unmanned 

MOL/DORIAN R&D Program has been raised. The answer (including FY 67 

funds) is approximately $1.7 - 1.8 billion for a purely unmanned 

program vs approximately $2.2 billion for the present combined manned/ 

unmanned program. However, these two programs are not directly 

cost-comparable in terms of timing, risk, quality and quantity of 

product, and future potential; thus, a further understanding is 

required in order to evaluate the estimates in their proper context. 

The President approved the MOL program on August 25, 1965. While 

the general public announcement referred to MOL only as a program to 

determine the utility of military man in space, the President actually 

had approved four very specific program objectives contained in 

Secretary McNamara's recommendation to him: 

1. Semi-operational use at the onset to secure photography 

of significant targets at a ground resolution of 

(about better than the GAMBIT-3 unmanned 

satellite reconnaissance system which is now in its R&D 

flightiest phase). 

2. To develop high-resolution optical technology and camera 

systems for either manned or unmanned use. This technology 

GAMBIT 

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would both permit the resolution objective 

and also be aimed at ultimately achieving systems with 

even better ground resolution 

3. To provide an orbital facility for the development, test 

and use of other potential military space applications 

(such as: SIGINT; radar observation; ocean surveillance; 

etc.). 

s, 

4. To provide an experimental program for the determination 

of man's utility in assembling large structures, and in 

adjusting, maintaining and processing the output from 

complex military equipment in space. 

The MOL Program today is oriented toward the early achievement of 

resolution operational photography in a manned vehicle; the 

subsequent demonstration (when feasible) of a similar capability in an 

unmanned vehicle; the optical technology and orbital hardware necessary 

for the future achievement of photography 

and the development of an orbital facility for the test and use 

of other potential military space applications. Subsequent to the 

President's program approval, detailed contract definition activities 

and numerous technical analyses have consistently reaffirmed the 

feasibility of these fundamental goals and the order in which they are 

being pursued. 

In the early conceptual phase of the MOL/DORIAN Reconnaissance 

Satellite System, successful operation of the very high resolution 

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camera, with its attendant narrow field of view (approximately 1.4 miles 

diameter on the ground from orbital altitudes), in an unmanned satellite 

was not considered feasible. Continued investigation of the precision 

devices necessary for such an unmanned system (highly accurate on 

the order of 1/20 of one percent -- image motion sensing; image motion 

compensation across the entire format; remote on-orbit optical alignment 

and focus adjustment; and more precise automatic navigation) led to the 

• 

conclusion that they were feasible, albeit technically quite difficult 

to achieve. 

The desire to also develop'an unmanned system stemmed from several 

reasons. First, it could provide a continued national capability for 

very high resolution reconnaissance photography of otherwise denied 

territory should international objections or foreign threats prevent 

manned operations, or if man should prove physically unable to perform 

as expected in MOL for extended periods in orbit. Further, Dr. Hornig, 

the President's Scientific Advisor, believed it possible, from an 

operational standpoint, that an unmanned system would eventually be 

desired to complement the manned system by performing the more routine 

reconnaissance missions or missions undertaken during times of 

particular political stress. Thus, in view of these considerations, 

plus the apparent feasibility of developing the necessary automatic 

devices an unmanned'DORIAN system of maximum interchangeability with 

the manned system was added as the final'phase of the MOL Research and 

Development Program. 

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It was also immediately apparent that the incorporation in the 

MOL/DORIAN system of many of the precise automatic devices necessary for 

the unmanned system would enhance man's contributions to the 

reconnaissance mission by freeing him from routine equipment operations. 

For example: 

1. By viewing through both the twin tracking/acquisition 

scopes and the main optics, the astronauts would be able 

to apply the final "vernier" adjustments in pointing, 

image motion compensation, etc., to insure consistent 

maximum performance by the camera system. 

2. By observing alternate targets through the tracking/ 

acquisition scopes, the astronauts would be able to 

select and photograph the maximum number of cloud-free 

targets. (This is a significant factor since the SinoSoviet Bloc averages some 60 percent cloud-cover at all 

times. Analyses indicate that the manned system, with 

the astronauts performing a cloud avoidance function, 

would return approximately 15-25 percent more cloud-free 

photographs than would an unmanned system on identical 

missions). 

3. By observing alternate targets through the'tracking/ 

acquisition scopes even when weather avoidance was not a 

concern, the astronauts would be able to selectively 

choose targets of highest intelligence value (for example, 

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an erected missile on a launch pad, in lieu of a 

nearby "empty” pad. Analyses indicate that these 

transitory intelligence gathering opportunities occur 

rather infrequently -- only about 6 percent of the time --

and that the manned system would photograph 2-3 times as 

many such targets in a 30 day mission as would the unmanned 

version). 

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4. By viewing selected targets through the tracking/ 

acquisition scopes, the astronaut could determine the best 

viewing angle from which a target should be photographed 

(for example, if approaching a parked aircraft from the 

rear and needed intelligence could only come from examining 

the fore end, the astronaut could wait until he passed 

over and take a backward-look picture). 

5. By viewing photographed targets both through the tracking/ 

acquisition scopes and the main optics, the astronauts 

could immediately report successful target photography to 

the ground and thus assist the establishment of retargeting 

priorities for photographic operations on subsequent days 

(analyses indicate that this• orbit-by-orbit verification 

of coverage can increase the number of unique targets 

photographed in a 30 day mission by approximately 10 percent 

over that possible in an unmanned system which would then 

return a film capsule each 7 or 8 days). 

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Some additional reconnaissance functions are possible and planned 

for the manned version which are not now incorporated in the unmanned 

system design. These include: the rapid verification and optimization 

on-orbit of optical system performance (possible by direct viewing 

through the main optics of the target being photographed); reporting 

and readout to the ground of intelligence information of a perishable 

nature (this involves on-board processingk4 film from the secondary 

camera and either on-board interpretation and verbal reporting or 

electronic transmission of the pictures to the ground); 

selection and use of alternate film 

(color, infra-red, etc.) in the secondary camera used in conjunction 

with the primary optical system. It is.of courseconceivable that 

these and other functions might be performed in the future by some 

automatic system or combination of systems; however, the possibility in 

the manned system to experiment with a wide variety of alternatives and 

techniques is attractive and valuable in both time and money, whether 

or not the function is ultimately performed by man or by automatic 

device. 

Further contributions to the early achievement of- the reconnaissance 

objectives will be realized through man's ability to analyze on-orbit 

failures and malfunctions and either select alternative equipments and 

operating modes or replace directly with his own capability the 

function of failed equipment (for example, manually control the pointing 

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of the main optics, or manually compensate for apparent image motion). The 

net result is an early and continued reliability advantage of the manned 

system over that of an automated and complex unmanned system. 

There are other facets of the present MOL/DORIAN Program unique to manned 

space flight. For example, for the foreseeable futurep.we see no reasonable 

approach to achieving photosrsphy 

except via a man-controlled system on-orbit; the MOT, GEMINI/Laboratory, 

Booster coMbination can be used essentially without change in meeting this goal. 

The possible future resupply and reuse of equiinnent on-orbit, using manned 

rendezvous and docking techniques (as demonstrated in the GEMINI Program, and 

which are an integral part of the APOLLO Program), indicate potential for 

highly cost-effective long-duration missions in.any follow-on MOL Program. 

As indicated by Secretary McNamara in his recent testimony before the 

House Appropriations Committee, the MI, Program is estimated to cost $2.2 

billion (from the beginning of engineering development on 1 September 1966 

through the final R&D flight in 1972). . Seven'test flights are included: two 

unmanned launches in 1970 to. qualify the Gemini B, Laboratory and Mission 

Module structures, certain Subsystems, and the Titan TIM booster (which has 

seven-segment, solid rocket motors in contrast to the five-segment motors 

used by the TIIICX three manned missions, beginning in December 1970; and . 

two unmanned missions. Of the total cost, it is estimated that approximately 

$200 million is attributable to R&D associated with the unmanned version. 

If the manned portion of the MOL/DOBIAN Program were cancelled on 

July 1, 1967, two alternative approaches to the continued development 

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of an unmanned system are possible. The first would be to simply eliminate 

from the present program all sub-systems and hardware pertaining solely to 

the manned system (i.e.: terminate the GEMINI portign of the program; 

delete all life-support systems and man-operated equipment from the Douglas 

and General Electric Laboratory and Mission Module efforts). The second 

possibility would be to continue the camera system and booster developments 

(eliminating all man-safety considerations from the latter), cut back the 

GE Mission Module effort to only that necessary for an unmanned system, 

and design a completely new spacecraft and dat;] recovery system which have 

been optimized as an unmanned spacecraft. In both cases, the cost•from 

September 1, 1966 (including necessary termination costs for efforts now 

underway pertaining to a manned system) through a ten-flight R&D program, 

culminating in late 1973, is estimated to be approximately $1.7-$1.8 billion* 

In both cases, the first unmanned flight probably could occur at about end 

CY 70. 

It is our estimate, based upon experience in the. GAMBIT-3 Program 

(five flights have been completed_in the 8-launch R&D Program), that the 

absence of man increases the development risk and that at least ten unmanned 

DORIAN system R&D launches would be required to have a reasonable possibility 

bf achieving the same prograM maturity expected at the completion of the 

current Mai/DORIAN manned system R&D Program. Although many of the same 

automatic devices necessary for the unmanned version have been included in 

the manned system, it should be noted that many of the devices have either 

never before been used in orbital reconnaissance systems or else 

DORIPA. 

BYE MAN 

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represent large extrapolations in precision, accuracy, or other characteristics 

from the present technology base. While these devices can ultimately be made 

to perform reliably within desired tolerances, it is by no means certain as to 

how long it might take to achieve those results. Nor is it certain that an 

unmanned system will ever be as reliable as a manned system. For this reason, 

the risk of early achievement of resolution is .assessed as considerably greater in the unmanned system than.in the manned system. However, 

by initially including manned flights in the develiopment program, the 

resolution unmanned capability should be achieved earlier than through 

an independent nnmAnned development program. 

As indicated previously, the differential development cost for including 

a manned operating mode and a manned vehicle development as well as an 

unmanned operating mode in the MOL/DORIAN Program is estimated at approximately Woo million more than that required for an independent unmanned 

system. From a cost-effectiveness standpoint, if the weather avoidance 

compensation potential. of the manned system is realized to the extent of 

a plus 20 percent, this difference would.be almost entirely offset by the 

increased photography collected by the manned system. The additional 

benefits derived from astronaut selection of those targets of highest 

intelligence potential is not calcuable in terms.of dollars. 

IRIAN 

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From another standpoint, the cost differential should be viewed 

as greatly increased confidence in achieving the desired operational 

capability at the earliest possible date. To be more specific, if 

some of the automatic devices failed to function in the manned system, 

the net result would only be a certain reduction in the quantity and/or 

quality of photographic product; however, failure of the same devices 

in an unmanned system would mean total failure as a photographic reconnais• 

sance system. Since these devices do represent very advanced technology, 

it is believed their operation and test initially in a manned space 

system will reduce considerably the time required for them to meet 

design specifications with acceptable reliability. 

Last, the MOL laboratory module has sufficient flexibility to 

develop the equipment necessary for extremely high resolution photography 

as well as other military missions. New military missions, when 

validated, such as communications intelligence or ocean surveillance, 

can be added to the MOL Program by the fabrication of new mission 

modules and some minor modifications (control and operating equipment) 

to the laboratory mmdule; other elements of the system can be used without 

change. All of our studies of such applications validate that longer 

lifetimes on orbit and the use of the equipment will be greatly 

augmented by inclusion of manned missions in at least the development 

phase. 
Thus, in light of all of the preceding, it appears conclusive 

that the additional incremental development cost of developing a manned/ 

unmanned MOL/DORIAN system over that of an independent unmanned program 

is more than offset by both the.near term advantages and the long range 

potential. 

NRO APPRCIVED FOR 

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