Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-397 | August 17, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Andrew B. Arnett

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Henry A. Flores, Jr.

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tiawana M. Hughes,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 17, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-397

Appeal from the Johnson Superior 

Court

The Honorable Peter D. Nugent, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

41D02-1707-F3-32

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-397 | August 17, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] Tiawana M. Hughes appeals her sentence following her conviction for child 

molesting, as a Level 3 felony, pursuant to a guilty plea. Hughes raises a single 

issue for our review, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in its identification and weight of aggravators and mitigators used in 

sentencing Hughes.1 We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 1 and December 31, 2015, Hughes was living with her best 

friend’s grandparents and twelve-year-old foster daughter, A.S. On those dates 

Hughes performed oral sex on A.S. Hughes also had A.S. perform oral sex on 

her. About six months later, A.S. informed her foster mother of the 

molestations, and her foster mother informed the police.

[3] The State charged Hughes with child molesting, as a Level 3 felony. Hughes 

agreed to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement on the condition that she 

not serve more than five years executed in the Department of Correction. The 

 

1

 Hughes styles her argument on appeal as a challenge to the appropriateness of her sentence under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B). In response, the State argues that Hughes has waived her argument under Rule 7(B) 

because she makes no substantive argument that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and her character. We agree with the State that the substance of Hughes’ argument in her brief is not 

a Rule 7(B) argument. Rather, the substance of her argument is that the trial court improperly identified an 

aggravator, failed to properly identify a purported mitigator, and improperly weighed the aggravators and 

mitigators. We address the substance of Hughes’ actual argument accordingly.
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trial court accepted Hughes’ plea agreement. And, at the conclusion of the

ensuing sentencing hearing, the court stated as follows:

I think the only real aggravator is that you were in a position of 

trust with this twelve year old and you violated that position of 

trust. I think the mitigating circumstances are substantial. You 

have no criminal history, you ple[aded] guilty, or you owned it, 

which is big in this Court, you’re remorseful for what’s 

happening. You have the support system that cares about you 

and is ready to help. My problem is that[,] under the nature and

circumstance[s] of the case, it’s still a child molesting. A twelve 

year old child. And . . . it’s going to effect this young person for 

a long, long time . . . . I believe that you can benefit from 

counseling. . . . But . . . you cannot overlook the fact that there’s 

a child molesting. And so under the circumstances, what I’m 

going to do is find that the aggravators and mitigators cancel 

each other out. The stated term for a level 3 is nine years. It will 

be a nine year sentence[. O]f that nine, three will be executed at 

the Department of Correction[;] six will be suspended.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 22-23. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Hughes asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her. 

Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell 

v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the 

decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation 
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omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does 

any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a 

sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a 

sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating 

factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) 

enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly 

supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) 

considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on 

reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). However, the relative weight or value 

assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is 

not subject to review for abuse of discretion, id., and a trial court is under no 

obligation to explain why a proposed mitigator does not exist or why the court 

found it to be insignificant, Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014), trans. denied.

[5] Hughes asserts that the trial court abused its discretion for each of the following 

reasons: (1) “there was no evidence on the record . . . that Hughes had put 

herself in a position of trust with A.S.”; (2) the trial court’s identified mitigators 

“should have been given significant weight”; and (3) “the trial court failed to 

recognize another mitigating factor,” namely, “that Hughes would respond 

affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment.” Appellant’s Br. at 9.

[6] We cannot agree with Hughes’ assessment. First, “[a] position of trust exists 

where a defendant has ‘more than a casual relationship with the victim and has 
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abused the trust resulting from that relationship.’” Amalfitano v. State, 956 

N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

551, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)), trans. denied. “Generally, cohabitation 

arrangements of nearly any character . . . do in fact, and should, establish a 

position of trust between the adults and minors living or staying together.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). The record is clear that Hughes was twenty-eight 

years old when she was living with A.S., her best friend’s twelve-year-old foster 

daughter. The record thus supports the trial court’s finding that Hughes was in 

a position of trust over A.S.

[7] Hughes’ second argument—that the trial court failed to give appropriate or 

significant weight to the mitigators—is not properly before this court, and we 

do not consider it. E.g., Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d 

at 490-91). And Hughes’ third argument—that the trial court failed to identify 

as a mitigator that she would respond affirmatively to probation or short-term 

imprisonment—does not explain how that proposed mitigator “is both 

significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. 

The trial court “is not obliged to explain why it has found that the factor does 

not exist.” Id. Moreover, Hughes’s sentence consists of an executed term of 

three years, even though the plea agreement allowed the court to impose an 

executed term of five years. Hughes does not explain how an executed term 

less than that she had agreed to in her plea agreement was an abuse of the 

court’s discretion.
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[8] In sum, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced Hughes, and we affirm her sentence.

[9] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.