IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-40736

Summary Calendar

JODY BLAKE; JAMES WILLIAM ELMORE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY;

JACKIE DOSS-ELMORE, individually and as Independent Administratix

of the Estate of James Hugh Elmore,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:09-CV-373

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal the district court’s summary judgment for

Defendants-Appellees. Appellants originally filed this suit in state probate

court, purportedly seeking a clarification on the marital status of Appellee

Jackie Doss-Elmore and James Hugh Elmore, deceased. Appellees removed the

case to federal court based on ERISA preemption. The district court held that

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 9, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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the suit was governed by ERISA and that Defendant-Appellee Metropolitan Life

Insurance Company’s determination of a common-law marriage between DossElmore and James Hugh Elmore was supported by substantial evidence in the

administrative record. We review the district court’s judgment de novo,

Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 2008), and affirm.

1. Plaintiffs-Appellants first argue that the district court erred when it

determined that ERISA preemption applied. They contend that the

determination of marital status was strictly a state law claim not subject to

ERISA. Moreover, they argue that pursuant to an unpublished Tenth Circuit

case, MetLife may not disregard conflicting information about marital status.

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The district court found that Appellants’ state law cause of action was

preempted under ERISA § 502(a) because it could have been brought under

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ERISA’s enforcement provision and no other legal duty supported the claim. See

Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210–14, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2496–98

(2004). The district court distinguished the Tenth Circuit case because under

those facts, the plan administrator knew of the pending state court suit and

disregarded it in violation of the plan, whereas here MetLife had already made

a final determination and distributed the funds before Appellants filed their suit.

For the reasons articulated by the district court, we agree. Appellants’ state law

cause of action was preempted because the declaration of marital status arose

from no separate duty and could have been brought under § 502(a) “to recover

benefits due” Appellants.

Smith v. New Mexico Coal 401(K) Personal Savings Plan, 334 F. App’x 150 (10th Cir. 1

2009) (unpublished).

 “A civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits 2

due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or

to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).

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2. Appellants next argue that the district court erred when it stated that

Appellants had bypassed the administrative process in favor of litigation.

Appellants also contend that the district court erred in its recitation of the facts

when it stated that MetLife had notified Elmore that his claim was denied and

provided both Blake and Elmore with the reasons for the denial. Appellants

appear to imply that these lapses in procedure violated the procedural

requirements of ERISA, providing for notice of adverse decisions and an

opportunity to an administrative appeal. Even assuming that MetLife failed to

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follow ERISA’s procedures, no remedy Appellants seek would result in a reversal

of the district court’s ruling. By pursuing their claim in federal court, including

arguing that MetLife’s procedural irregularities prejudiced them, Appellants

have already received any remedy due to them on these facts.

3. For their third issue, Appellants argue that the district court erred when

it reviewed MetLife’s determination of benefits for an abuse of discretion. First,

Appellants contend that MetLife is not the plan fiduciary as required to receive

an abuse of discretion review. And second, Appellants argue that MetLife’s

determination is entitled to no deference because of a conflict of interest. Both

arguments fail. Because of the functions MetLife performed with respect to the

plan, under Fifth Circuit law, MetLife is an ERISA fiduciary. See Reich v.

Lancaster, 55 F.3d 1034, 1047 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The authority to grant, deny, or

 Under 29 U.S.C. § 1133, every employee benefit plan must: 3

(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary

whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth the

specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood

by the participant, and

(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for

benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named

fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.

§ 1133.

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review denied claims can . . . make one a fiduciary.”). Therefore, MetLife’s

factual determination that Doss-Elmore and James Hugh Elmore were married

at the time of his death is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Appellants’

conflict of interest argument is immaterial here because MetLife did in fact pay

the benefits—just not to Appellants. A conflict may be significant when an

administrator refused benefits. The district court properly applied the abuse of

discretion standard.

4. Lastly, the Appellants argue that the district court erred when it held that

MetLife’s benefits determination was based on substantial evidence. “Under the

abuse of discretion standard, ‘[i]f the plan fiduciary’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious, it must prevail.’” Corry

v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 273 (5th Cir.

2004)). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a

preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 398 (quotation omitted). Appellants

argue that the letter denying benefits does not contain a sufficient rationale to

support the denial. However, we review MetLife’s determination based on the

facts in the administrative record, which contains all information made available

to the administrator. Id. at 398 n.12. And, we agree with the district court that

the evidence in the administrative record as a whole supports MetLife’s

determination.

AFFIRMED.

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