2014 UT App 262

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVID J. MULHOLLAND,

Petitioner,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES,

Respondent.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20140784-CA

Filed November 14, 2014

Original Proceeding in this Court

David J. Mulholland, Petitioner Pro Se

Suzan Pixton, Attorney for Respondent

Before JUDGES JAMES Z. DAVIS, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and

KATE A. TOOMEY.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 David J. Mulholland petitions for review of the Workforce

Appeals Board’s (the Board) decision denying him unemployment

benefits. We decline to disturb the Board’s decision.

¶2 The Board’s decision on a request for unemployment

benefits is a mixed question of fact and law that is more fact-like

because “the case does not lend itself to consistent resolution by a

uniform body of appellate precedent.” Carbon Cnty. v. Workforce

Appeals Bd., 2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “Because of the fact-intensive

conclusions involved at the agency level,” the Board’s

determination is entitled to deference. Id. “When a petitioner

challenges an agency’s findings of fact, we are required to uphold

the findings if they are supported by substantial evidence when
Mulholland v. Department of Workforce Services

viewed in light of the whole record before the court.” Stauffer v.

Department of Workforce Servs., 2014 UT App 63, ¶ 5, 325 P.3d 109

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶3 The Department of Workforce Services denied

unemployment benefits because it found that Mulholland

voluntarily quit his job without good cause. An administrative law

judge (ALJ) affirmed that denial, and the Board affirmed the

decision to deny benefits. “To establish good cause, a claimant

must show that continuing the employment would have caused an

adverse effect which the claimant could not control or prevent. The

claimant must show that an immediate severance of the

employment relationshipwasnecessary.” Utah Admin. CodeR994-

405-102. An adverse effect requires a showing of “actual or

potential physical, mental, economic,personalorprofessionalharm

caused or aggravated by the employment.” Id. R994-405-102(1)(a).

Good cause is not established if the claimant reasonably could have

continued working while looking for other employment, or had

reasonable alternatives to preserve the job. Id. R994-405-102(1)(b).

“The claimant’s decision to quit must be measured against the

actions of an average individual, not one who is unusually

sensitive.” Id. R994-405-102(1)(a).

¶4 Mulholland quit his job as a part-time tech associate at

Staples due to persistent problems with a supervisor. Although

Mulholland characterized his supervisor’s behavior as abusive and

harassing, he did not demonstrate an adverse effect that could not

be controlled or prevented and that necessitated immediate

severance, nordid he demonstrate that he could not have remained

employed while he sought other work. His problems with the

supervisor had been going on for roughly a year, but Mulholland

claimed that a precipitating event for his decision to quit was the

supervisor altering his time sheet to remove thirty minutes from

Mulholland’s time worked. This happened once, and it was

promptly addressed by the store manager, who obtained payment

for Mulholland and told the supervisor not to change the time

sheet again. Mulholland admitted that the supervisor did not

20140784-CA 2 2014 UT App 262
Mulholland v. Department of Workforce Services

change his time sheet again after that incident. However,

Mulholland continued to feel that his paycheck was not secure. In

his memorandum, Mulholland repeatedly asserts that the ALJ and

later the Board fabricated facts to support the denial of benefits.

These statements are inappropriate and also without merit because

the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the

record before us. Even if Mulholland had determined that he no

longer wanted to work at Staples as a result of his ongoing conflicts

with the supervisor, the Board’s determination that he failed to

demonstrate good cause to quit rather than remaining employed

while he looked for another job is entitled to deference.

Accordingly, we do not disturb the Board’s decision that

Mulholland did not demonstrate good cause to quit his job and

was not entitled to benefits. 

¶5 Where a claimant does not demonstrate good cause, “the

equity and good conscience standard must be considered. . . . If

there are mitigating circumstances or a denial of benefits would be

unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may be

allowed.” Id. R994-405-103(1). However, a claimant must have

acted reasonably in quitting. Id. A claimant’s actions may be

reasonable “if the decision to quit was logical, sensible, or

practical.” Id. R994-405-103(1)(a). Mulholland’s arguments that

benefits should be allowed are based upon his assertion that he

needed benefits to support his family. However, Mulholland

himself created that need by quitting his job without good cause.

We decline to disturb the Board’s decision that an award of benefits

was not merited under the equity and good conscience standard.

¶6 We decline to disturb the Board’s decision denying benefits.

20140784-CA 3 2014 UT App 262