NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL

OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1262-15T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RORY EDWARD TRINGALI, 

Defendant-Respondent.

______________________________

Argued June 6, 2017 – Decided June 28, 2017

Before Judges Reisner, Koblitz and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, 

Indictment No. 11-04-0030.

1

Joseph Daniel Remy, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for appellant (Christopher 

S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Mr. 

Remy and Marie G. McGovern, Deputy Attorney 

General, of counsel and on the brief).

Lawrence A. Leven argued the cause for 

respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

REISNER, P.J.A.D.

 

1 The orders on appeal list the wrong indictment number, 08-03-

0037. That 2008 indictment was dismissed with the State's consent.

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

June 28, 2017

APPELLATE DIVISION
2 A-1262-15T1

The State appeals from an April 23, 2015 order dismissing the 

indictment, and from an October 7, 2015 order denying its motion 

to supplement the record. 

The trial court dismissed, on jurisdictional grounds, an 

indictment charging defendant with disrupting or impairing 

computer services, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(b), impersonating another for 

the purpose of obtaining a benefit for himself or injuring another, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a)(1), and conspiring to commit those offenses. 

The court later denied the State's motion to supplement the record 

with information concerning a civil case relating to the same 

events.

The State presents us with the following points of argument:

POINT I

WHILE THE TRIAL COURT INITIALLY STATED THE 

CORRECT PRINCIPLES OF LAW REGARDING 

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, IT ERRED IN 

REQUIRING A DIRECT NEXUS TO NEW JERSEY IN 

ISSUING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THEREBY 

CONTRAVENING THE PLAIN WORDING OF N.J.S.A.

2C:1-3(G)

POINT II

EVEN IF THE DIRECT NEXUS ANALYSIS WAS 

CORRECTLY APPLIED, THE STATE WOULD HAVE 

JURISDICTION OVER THE INDICTED OFFENSES

POINT III

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE STATE TO 

SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD WITH EVIDENCE OF 
3 A-1262-15T1

PERJURIOUS AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY THE 

DEFENDANT

According to the State's evidence, defendant, acting in 

Florida, caused a series of "spam" attacks to be made on a Utah 

website that was an integral part of the victim's New Jersey-based 

internet business, causing the business to incur over $100,000 in 

damages. The State also produced evidence that defendant 

engineered the spam attacks in part to exact vengeance on the New 

Jersey resident who operated the internet business. We hold that, 

as to both computer criminal activity and impersonation, the 

harmful result to the victim is an "element" of the offense, within 

the meaning of the territorial jurisdiction statute. N.J.S.A.

2C:1-3(a)(1) and -3(g). Because the State produced some evidence 

that the New Jersey resident, and the New Jersey corporation he 

operated, suffered harm in this State which was an element of each 

computer crime statute, New Jersey has territorial jurisdiction 

to prosecute defendant for those offenses. Accordingly, we reverse 

the April 23, 2015 order dismissing counts two and three of the 

indictment and we remand this matter to the trial court.

Because the parties neither briefed nor argued the section 

of the territorial jurisdiction statute concerning conspiracy, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(3), we do not address the dismissal of count 

one of the indictment. We remand that issue to the trial court 
4 A-1262-15T1

for further briefing and reconsideration in light of this opinion. 

In connection with that aspect of the remand, the State may submit 

to the trial court the materials which were the subject of its 

motion to supplement the record.2

I

 Based on the following evidence, in 2011 a grand jury indicted 

defendant on three counts: (1) second-degree conspiracy, N.J.S.A.

2C:5-2; (2) second-degree computer criminal activity, N.J.S.A.

2C:20-25(b) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6; and (3) second-degree 

impersonation, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. 

The State presented testimony from one witness, Christina 

McCarthy, a detective with the Division of Criminal Justice (DCJ). 

McCarthy based her testimony on information she learned during a 

conference call with other detectives and two individual victims, 

Michael Moreno and Justin Williams. The State also presented 

defendant's statement, made to DCJ investigators after his arrest. 

We begin by summarizing McCarthy's grand jury testimony. 

Moreno is a resident of New Jersey and was an owner of a company 

 

2 Defendant's argument concerning the timeliness of the State's 

appeal is without merit and does not warrant discussion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2). We decline to address defendant's speedy trial argument, 

because it was not raised in the trial court and was not the

subject of a cross-appeal. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19-

20 (2009); State v. Eldakroury, 439 N.J. Super. 304, 307 n.2 (App. 

Div.), certif. denied, 222 N.J. 16 (2015).
5 A-1262-15T1

called MedPro, Inc. (MedPro). Williams is a resident of Utah and 

owns a company called Physicians Information Services. The men 

were in a business relationship in which Moreno sold cosmetic 

lasers and Williams fulfilled the orders they received. 

Moreno and Williams told the DCJ detectives that MedPro's 

email server received a large number of undeliverable email 

messages concerning emails that MedPro had not sent. This meant 

that someone was sending emails from MedPro's email address to 

email addresses that did not exist. As a result, the emails were 

returned to MedPro as undeliverable. In some instances, MedPro 

received as many as 100 undeliverable emails per minute. 

Other emails were sent to actual email addresses, and included 

a link to MedPro's website. The emails impersonated the identity 

of Moreno's business, in that they appeared to come from 

"Sales@MedProOnline.com." Because many of the recipients had no 

business to conduct with MedPro and correctly viewed the emails 

as spam, they complained to MedPro or its website manager that the 

emails were unwelcome. One individual who received the spam emails

both complained to MedPro and sent the emails to DCJ investigators. 

Due to all of the spam messages that appeared to be coming 

from MedPro, companies that monitor spam messages stopped internet 

traffic from going to MedPro's website. In fact, MedPro's host 

company, ABI, took MedPro offline to protect the company. 
6 A-1262-15T1

MedPro's email provider, Network Solutions, shut down MedPro's 

email, just as ABI took the website offline. 

MedPro did not have a physical store, so all of its business 

came from the website or email. In an effort to rectify the 

situation, MedPro changed its URL address, but the spam messages 

continued three more times, attacking each of the new websites. 

The fourth and final attack took place on February 2, 2007. The 

cost of changing URLs and other damages exceeded $100,000. 

During the conference call with McCarthy and the other DCJ 

investigators, Moreno and Williams identified Rory Tringali, from 

Miami Beach, Florida, as the suspected perpetrator. Tringali was 

a former business partner of Moreno and Williams, but he eventually 

became their competitor in selling cosmetic lasers. 

After the execution of a search warrant at his Florida 

apartment, defendant was arrested and gave a statement to two DCJ 

investigators. Defendant's statement constituted evidence that 

he had a powerful motive to harm his former partners, including 

"Mike Moreno." Defendant told the investigators that his former 

partners took over websites that he believed belonged to him, 

including the MedPro.com website, and then unfairly competed with 

his laser sale business. To put an end to what he believed was 

the misuse of "his" websites, defendant paid the webmaster to take 

down those websites, including the MedPro.com website. Defendant
7 A-1262-15T1

also admitted knowing that his former partners created new 

websites, which were then the victims of "massive" spam attacks. 

Defendant also made statements that could reasonably be construed 

as admitting his knowledge that the attacks did "huge" damage to 

the victims' business. 

Defendant initially denied that he was behind the spam 

attacks. However, later in his statement, he admitted that he 

conspired with a computer-savvy neighbor, Matt Wilner, to launch 

spam attacks on the MedPro.com website and several other websites 

being used by his former partners. According to McCarthy's grand 

jury testimony, Wilner was later arrested, pled guilty, and 

admitted that defendant paid him to attack the websites. 

In moving to dismiss the indictment, defendant submitted 

evidence that MedPro's website domain (MedPro.com) and email 

server were actually owned by Brooke Horan, a Utah resident, 

although Moreno's New Jersey business, MedPro, used that website 

to sell lasers to its customers. Defendant contended that 

defendant's cyberattack targeted the website and the server, 

rather than directly targeting MedPro. 

II

In dismissing the indictment, the trial judge considered the 

Supreme Court's recent holding that territorial jurisdiction 

requires more than a connection between a defendant's New Jersey 
8 A-1262-15T1

"status" or "attendant circumstances" occurring in New Jersey. 

State v. Sumulikoski, 221 N.J. 93, 102-03 (2015). "As the language 

of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3 makes clear, . . . the various methods that 

allow for jurisdiction in a criminal case all require a direct 

nexus to New Jersey." Sumulikoski, supra, 221 N.J. at 102. 

Relying on State v. Streater, 233 N.J. Super. 537, 543 (App. Div.), 

certif. denied, 117 N.J. 667 (1989), the judge recognized that a 

direct nexus would consist of evidence that either the criminal 

conduct or its result occurred in New Jersey. 

The judge reasoned that, because defendant had the spam sent 

from outside New Jersey and shut down a Utah-based website, "and 

[because] there is no direct nexus to New Jersey regarding any 

conduct or results of the offenses charged," New Jersey had no 

territorial jurisdiction to prosecute defendant. According to the 

judge's analysis, the fact that a web-based New Jersey business 

depended on the Utah-based website, and the New Jersey business 

was harmed, did not suffice to confer jurisdiction on this State 

to prosecute defendant. We conclude that the judge took too narrow 

a view of the evidence and misapplied the pertinent statutes. 

A grand jury may base an indictment on the evidence the State 

has produced, as well as any reasonable inferences that may be 

drawn from that evidence. State v. N.J. Trade Waste Ass'n, 96 

N.J. 8, 27 (1984). In a grand jury proceeding, hearsay is 
9 A-1262-15T1

admissible. State v. Ferrante, 111 N.J. Super. 299, 304-05 (App. 

Div. 1970). In considering a motion to dismiss an indictment, the 

court should consider whether "there is some evidence establishing 

each element of the crime[,]" and should view that evidence in the 

light most favorable to the State. State v. Morrison, 188 N.J.

2, 12-13 (2006). 

A trial court should only dismiss an indictment on the 

"clearest and plainest" grounds and only when it is clearly

defective. Trade Waste Ass'n, supra, 96 N.J. at 18-19. We review 

a trial court’s dismissal of an indictment for abuse of discretion. 

State v. Gruber, 362 N.J. Super. 519, 527 (App. Div.), certif. 

denied, 178 N.J. 251 (2003). However, if the judge's decision 

rests on the interpretation of a statute, our review is de novo. 

Ibid. 

In this case, the legal issues can be resolved by comparing 

our State's statute concerning territorial jurisdiction with the 

pertinent computer-crime offenses charged in the indictment. In 

pertinent part, the jurisdiction statute provides:

a. Except as otherwise provided in this 

section, a person may be convicted under the 

law of this State of an offense committed by 

his own conduct or the conduct of another for 

which he is legally accountable if:

(1) Either the conduct which is an 

element of the offense or the result 
10 A-1262-15T1

which is such an element occurs within 

the State;

(2) Conduct occurring outside the State 

is sufficient under the law of this State 

to constitute an attempt to commit a 

crime within the State;

(3) Conduct occurring outside the State 

is sufficient under the law of this State 

to constitute a conspiracy to commit an 

offense within the State and an overt act 

in furtherance of such conspiracy occurs 

within the State;

. . . .

g. When the result which is an element 

of an offense consists of inflicting a harm 

upon a resident of this State or depriving a 

resident of this State of a benefit, the 

result occurs within this State, even if the 

conduct occurs wholly outside this State and 

any property that was affected by the offense 

was located outside this State.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a), (g) (emphasis added).]

As noted in the emphasized portions, to confer jurisdiction

under subsection (a)(1), either the conduct or the harmful result 

of the conduct must be "an element" of the offense with which a 

defendant is charged, and under subsection (g) the harmful result 

must likewise be an element. Ibid. In turn, "element" is defined 

in the Criminal Code as: 

h. "Element of an offense" means (1) such 

conduct or (2) such attendant circumstances 

or (3) such a result of conduct as
11 A-1262-15T1

(a) Is included in the description of 

the forbidden conduct in the definition 

of the offense;

(b) Establishes the required kind of 

culpability;

(c) Negatives an excuse or 

justification for such conduct;

(d) Negatives a defense under the 

statute of limitations; or

 (e) Establishes jurisdiction or venue;

[N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(h).] 3

For purposes of territorial jurisdiction, the State must 

prove that defendant's conduct or the result of that conduct 

occurred in New Jersey. "[T]o meet the requirement of territorial 

jurisdiction, the State must offer proof of 'conduct' or 'result,'

as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3, but cannot rely on relevant 

attendant circumstances." Sumulikoski, supra, 221 N.J. at 103.

Thus, for example, a teacher who engaged in sexual conduct with a 

student while on a school trip to Germany, cannot be prosecuted 

 

3 Territorial jurisdiction is, itself, an element of an offense, 

without which the State cannot prosecute a crime here. State v. 

Denofa, 187 N.J. 24, 36 (2006). However, it is a non-material 

element that need not be submitted to the jury unless there is a 

factual dispute about whether the crime occurred in New Jersey. 

Id. at 38, 38 n.6. A "[m]aterial element" is an element "that 

does not relate exclusively to . . . jurisdiction . . . or to any 

other matter similarly unconnected with (1) the harm or evil, 

incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining 

the offense . . ." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(i). 
12 A-1262-15T1

for that crime in New Jersey, even though "attendant circumstances" 

such as the teacher's supervisory status or the student's underage 

status would be elements of the crime. Id. at 95-96. 

Applying those principles, we first conclude that there is 

jurisdiction to prosecute defendant in New Jersey as to computer 

criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(b). In pertinent part, that 

offense consists of the following elements: 

A person is guilty of computer criminal 

activity if the person purposely or knowingly 

and without authorization, or in excess of 

authorization:

. . . .

b. Alters, damages or destroys any data, 

data base, computer, computer storage medium, 

computer program, computer software, computer 

system or computer network, or denies, 

disrupts or impairs computer services, 

including access to any part of the Internet, 

that are available to any other user of the 

computer services[.]

[N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(b) (emphasis added).]

A "[u]ser of computer services" includes but is not limited 

to a person, business, or "computer" that "makes use of any 

resources of a computer, computer network, . . . data or data 

base." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-23(o). "Access" is defined as "to instruct, 

communicate with, store data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise 

make use of any resources of a computer, computer storage medium, 

computer system, or computer network." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-23(a). 
13 A-1262-15T1

We agree with the trial judge that Moreno was "a user of 

computer services" whose business was disrupted when the 

MedPro.com website, through which MedPro conducted its online 

business, was shut down by spam attacks. However, we cannot agree 

with the judge's conclusion that there was an insufficient "direct 

nexus" between the crime and New Jersey. As indicated in 

Sumulikoski, we conclude that the "direct nexus" is to be found 

by considering the jurisdiction statute and the elements of the 

crime. 

Based on the evidence presented to the grand jury, there is 

jurisdiction to prosecute defendant in New Jersey for computer 

related crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25, because defendant knowingly 

engaged in computer activity which had the result of denying, 

disrupting or impairing the victim's access to "any part of the 

Internet." N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(b). Defendant targeted a web domain 

and email server, owned by an individual in Utah. However, that 

web domain and email server were directly connected to MedPro

because MedPro conducted all of its business through the MedPro.com 

website and email. 

Although defendant's conduct occurred in Florida, and its 

initial effect was to disrupt website domains and email servers 

owned by an individual in Utah, one of the intended and actual end 

results of the conduct was to cripple MedPro's access to internet 
14 A-1262-15T1

service. Hence, although his conduct took place in Florida, 

defendant both inflicted a harm on MedPro and deprived MedPro of 

a benefit, in this State. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(a)(1), -3(g). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 

defendant knew that Moreno operated MedPro and intended to disrupt 

Moreno's business, because he believed that Moreno conspired with 

Williams to steal defendant's business. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(g), 

it does not matter that the "property that was affected by the 

offense" - the MedPro.com website and the servers that hosted it

- were located in Utah. What matters is that "the result which 

is an element" of the offense consisted of "inflicting a harm upon 

a resident of this State or depriving a resident of this State of 

a benefit." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(g). 

The fact that defendant's conduct occurred in Florida does 

not deprive this State of jurisdiction, where, as here, there was 

a "direct nexus" between defendant's purposeful and illegal outof-state conduct and the intended harm his conduct caused to a New 

Jersey resident. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of count 

2 of the indictment, charging defendant with committing computer 

criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-25(b). 

Next, we address the impersonation charge. The relevant 

portions of the statute provide:
15 A-1262-15T1

a. A person is guilty of a crime if the 

person engages in one or more of the following 

actions by any means including, but not 

limited to, the use of electronic 

communications or an Internet website:

(1) Impersonates another or assumes a 

false identity and does an act in such assumed 

character or false identity for the purpose 

of obtaining a benefit for himself or another 

or to injure or defraud another[.]

. . . .

c. A person who violates subsection a. 

of this section is guilty of a crime as 

follows:

. . . . 

(3) If the actor obtains a benefit or 

deprives another of a benefit in the amount 

of $ 75,000 or more, . . . the actor shall be 

guilty of a crime of the second degree.

[N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a), (c).]

To be guilty of any grade of impersonation, a defendant must

engage in the act of impersonation, for the purpose of obtaining 

a benefit or injuring another. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a)(1). However, 

to be guilty of second-degree impersonation, the offense with 

which defendant is charged, the actor's unlawful conduct must also 

produce a specified result, i.e., depriving the victim of a benefit 

in an amount of $75,000 or more. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(c). To secure 

a conviction for second-degree impersonation, that element must 

be submitted to the jury. See State v. Federico, 103 N.J. 169, 
16 A-1262-15T1

174 (1986) (where a defendant is charged with first-degree 

kidnapping, failure to release the victim unharmed, which 

determines the grading of the offense, is an element that must be 

proven by the State and submitted to the jury); State v. Smith, 

279 N.J. Super. 131, 141 (App. Div. 1995).

"Statutory provisions . . . cannot be read in isolation.

They must be construed in concert with other legislative 

pronouncements on the same subject matter so as to give full effect 

to each constituent part of an overall legislative scheme." State 

v. Hodde, 181 N.J. 375, 379 (2004) (citations omitted). Reading 

the jurisdiction and impersonation statutes together in light of 

the legislative purpose, we conclude that the "result," consisting 

of the monetary harm to the victim, is an "element" of the crime 

of second-degree impersonation, within the meaning of the 

jurisdiction statute, even though its function is to establish the 

grade of the crime. See State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 608 (2013) 

(prohibiting the double counting of "[e]lements of a crime, 

including those that establish its grade"); see also State v. 

Fuentes, 217 N J. 57, 75 (2014) (noting that the Legislature has

"already considered the elements of an offense in the gradation 

of a crime" (citation omitted)). 

The clear legislative purpose of the jurisdiction statute, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3, is to extend this State's jurisdiction to results 
17 A-1262-15T1

as well as conduct, so long as either is an element of the offense. 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-3(g) emphasizes that the statute is aimed at harm

inflicted on residents of this State, even if the conduct is 

committed elsewhere and even if it involves property located 

elsewhere. Consequently, we infer that the Legislature intended 

the term "element" to have a broad meaning, consistent with the 

purpose of the statute. The legislative purpose is served by 

construing the jurisdiction statute as including "elements" that 

quantify the harm to the victim and determine the grading of the 

offense. That approach is consistent with Sumulikoski, which 

emphasizes the importance of results or conduct in determining 

territorial jurisdiction. Sumulikoski, supra, 221 N.J. at 103. 

In this case, defendant committed the impersonation, or 

arranged for it to occur, in Florida. However, the alleged 

injurious result - the infliction of over $100,000 in economic 

damage to MedPro - occurred in New Jersey. We therefore conclude 

that this State has territorial jurisdiction to prosecute 

defendant for the impersonation offense charged in count three of 

the indictment, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17(a), (c). 

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.