15-756-cv Gonzalez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECO ND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PR OCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS CO URT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMEN T FILED WITH THIS CO URT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATA BASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMM ARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seco nd Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United Stat es Courthouse, 40 Foley Sq uare, in the City of New York, on the 27 th day of January, two thousand sixteen. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

-------------------------------------- -------------------- SONIA GONZALEZ, LUIS GONZALEZ, Plaintiffs-Appellants , 1

v. 15-756-cv

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee , OCWEN LOAN SERVICI NG, LLC, SAND CANYON CORPORATION, DALE M. SUGIMOTO, FABIOLA N. CAMPERI, MATTHEW A. ENGEL, WILLIAM S. SMITH, LEOPOLD and ASSOCIATES, OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, AMERICAN

1 Although the notice of appeal was signed on ly by Sonia Gonzalez, who is consequently listed on the docket as the sole appellant, Lu is Gonzalez is also deemed an appellant pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(2), which states that a pro se notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the signer and the signer’s spouse, unless the notice clearly indicates otherwise. The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the case caption accordingly.HOME MORTGAGE SERVICING, INCORPORATED, SOUNDVIEW HOME LOAN TRUST 2005-OPT3, HUNT LEIBERT JACOBSON, P.C., BENJAMIN T. STASKIEWICZ, S. BRUCE FAIR, Esq., JON DOE, JAN DOE, HINSHAW & CULBERTSON, LLP, VALERIE N. DOBLE, Defendants

.

-------------------------------------- -------------------- FOR APPELLANTS: Sonia Gonzalez, pro se , East Windsor, Connecticut.

FOR APPELLEE: Marissa Delinks, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Boston, Massachusetts. Appeal from a judgment of the United Stat es District Court for the District of Connecticut (Charles S. Haight, Judge ). 2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERE D, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment deemed to ha ve been entered on October 5, 2015, is

AFFIRMED. 3

Plaintiffs Luis and Soni a Gonzalez appeal pro se fr om the dismissal of their complaint charging Deutsche Bank Nationa l Trust Company (“Deutsche Bank”) and others with violating the Un ited States Constitution and the United Nations Declaration on

2 The Honorable Charles S. Haight, Jr., S outhern District of New York, sitting by designation.

3 Because no separate judgment was entered in this matter as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), a judgment is deemed to have been ente red 150 days after the di strict court’s May 6, 2015 ruling on plaintiffs’ “motion to reargue and request for judge to reconsider/articulate,” which th e district court construed as a motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); Fed. R. Ap p. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). However, because that calculation ends on Saturday, October 3, 2015 , we deem the judgment entered on Monday, October 5, 2015. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).3 the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as well as bank fraud, in forecl osing on their Windsor, Connecticut home. The district court sua spon te concluded that it l acked subject-matter jurisdiction. See Gonzalez v. Ocwen Home Loan Servicing, 74 F. Supp. 3d 504, 510

− 18 (D. Conn. 2015). We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012), and can affirm “on any basis supported by the record,” Scott v. Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying fa cts and procedural history of the case, which we reference only to explain our decision to a ffirm dismissal because plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doct rine and claim preclusion. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a fe deral-court plaintiff who complains of injuries caused by an adverse state-court judgment from seeking federal review and rejection of the state judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Fe ldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); ac cord Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009). T hus, insofar as plaintiffs here (1) contend that Deutsche Bank (a) lacked standing to pursue their home’s foreclosure in state court, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ (a)(2), 7, 13, 17

− 18, 36, or (b) fraudulently obtained title to the home, see id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 7, 13, 25; or (2) seek to recover for injuries caused by the state judgment, their claims are barred because the validity of the foreclosure was already fully adjudicated in the state-court proceeding. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Gonzalez, No.4 HHD-CV10-6011071-S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2010); see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014 ) (recognizing that Rooker-Feldman bars fraud claims asking “federal court to determin e whether the state judgment was wrongfully issued in favor of parties who, contrary to thei r representations to the court, lacked standing to foreclose,” which “would require the federa l court to review the state proceedings and determine that the foreclosure judgment was issued in error”); Ru sso v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 549 F. App’x 8, 9

− 10 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary orde r) (applying Rooker-Feldman bar to claims for injuries caused by state-cour t foreclosure judgment). Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed all of plai ntiffs’ claims seeking reconsideration of the foreclosure judgment. To the extent plaintiffs’ co mplaint can be liberally c onstrued to allege injury stemming from the same transact ion but not directly caused by the foreclosure judgment, their claims are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. Nevertheless, we affirm dismissal on the ground of claim preclusion. See O’Connor v. Pierson, 56 8 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that, under Connecticut law, “[c]laim preclusion prevents the pursuit of any claims relating to the cause of acti on which were actually made or might have been made” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these claims in Gonzalez v. Opti on One Mortgage Corporation, No. HHD-CV11-5035882-S (Conn. Super. Ct. 2011), and, thus, to th e extent the claims were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, they were nevert heless correctly dismissed as precluded.5 These rulings make it unnecessary for us to decide whether dismissal was also

warranted for failure to state a claim, failure to serve defe ndants, or failure to timely prosecute the action. We have considered all of plaintiffs’ re maining arguments and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DENY plaintiffs’ motion for reversal.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court