es Q. Reber 

Chairman 

ComrVte n Overhead Reconnaissance 

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30 March 1964 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 

SUBJECT: Surrimary-of Results Obtained from 

Satellite SIGINT 

Attached for the information of COMOR is a report on the above 

subject prepared by the SIGINT Working Group. It will be the subject of 

consideration by COMOR at the 2 April meeting. 

Attachment: 

Subject Study 

Copies 2, 3 

4 

5 

6, 7, 8, 9 

10 

11, 12 

13, 14,15, 16 

44, 20 

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Summary of Results":04tained from•Satellite SIGINT 

Introduction. 

1. It is increasingly apparent that data collected by 

SIGINT satellites are of significant value, both qualitatively and 

quantitatively, to merit inviting to your attention at this time. 

The following sections of this paper are presented to summarize, 

utilizing specific examples, the contributions to the intelligence 

community made by the SIGINT satellite program. 

General Search 

2. The prime objective of the General Search portion 

of the SIGINT satellite .program is to collect data on new or 

unusual signals, particularly those in developmental stages prior 

to operational deployment. POPPY vehicles have been highly 

successful in fulfilling this objective. 

3. On 7 August 1961 POPPY provided the first, and to 

date the only intercept of the suspect ABM radar signal in the 

range which possibility emanated from the Sary 

Shagan area. Despite the fact that numerous additional attempts 

have been made to intercept this signal, no further intercepts have 

occurred. NSA has assigned the 

signal. 

to this 

4. More recently in February 1963 POPPY 

provided the first intercept of the Signal which may be a new x. 

addition to the surface-to—air missile defenses of the USSR. 

has a frequency of between 3, 000 and 3, 250 me and a PRF of 2, 000 mss. 

It is thought to be emanating from a tracking or guidance radar and 

may be related to the old SA-I. type system, although recently 

is now being considered one of the prime candidates for the SA-3 

system. Subsequent to the initial appearance of this emitter last 

February, numerous additional intercepts, apparently from the 

Moscow area, have been made by POPPY missions. 

5 was successful in intercepting the high 

interest Sary Shagan-related emitter in September and 

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October of 1963. Additionally, POPPY launched on 

11 January 1964, has the frequency capability of collecting"... 

and preliminary a.nalysiS indicates that it may already have done so 

on several occasions, 

6. POPPY has also furnished unique information on an 

S-band signal which may emanate from a guidance/target tracking 

radar and which appears to be a variant of the Numerous 

interesting,but apparently less significant than the foregoing signals, 

intercepts have been made by POPPY missions. 

7. POPPY systems have a significant capability to 

produce ROB information. Analysis of data from five POPPY 

missions has yielded approximately 10,000 identified target 

emitters. From these, locations have been derived for approximately 

1,000 emitters, about 300 of which were classified as new radar 

locations and inserted into the JCS SIOP. 

8. To date data from POPPY missions has furnished 

significant information on TALL KING locations in the interior of 

the USSR, which would be virtually impossible to obtain using 

conventional collection methods. POPPY location of specific TALL 

KING sites provided guidance and the basis for confirmation of 

1111•111.1111111intercept and location techniques, which in turn 

complements ESV reports of high interest signals from the Sary Shagan 

area (discussed below). 

10. Of recent significance was furhter information on the 

possible SA-3 related signal derived from data. 

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Using parametric information provided by the initial POPPY intercepts, 

data from was re-analyzed and found to contain at least two 

instances of Derived locations indicate that one emitter was 

approximately 65 miles north of Moscow and the other about 235 miles 

north of Moscow. The ability to obtain additional results through 

re-analysis of data, based on parameters furnished by tither 

types of vehicles, is a significant example of how one portion of the 

SIGINT satellite program serves to complement another. 

11. Finally, confirmation and/or identification of 66 TALL 

KING radar sites out of the 150 sites known or suspected in the Soviet 

Bloc on the periphery or in the interior has been derived from 

SIGINT satellite intercepts. 

Directed Coverage 

12. The secondary payload directed 'coverage missions 

designed for specific high priority targets have yielded especially 

valuable data and have great potential. 

a. 

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b,. COMINT 

(1) ' To date on a mission designed for 

COMINT collection, the probable location of a 

command data link 

emitter on Kildin Island computed from doppler 

measurements performed on 

collected by the NEW JERSEY I vehicle on 

1 August 1962 has been reported. 

(2) Although the data quality is 

extremely poor, NSA-is continuing analysis of 

data collected by NEW JERSEY II, Mission 7205, 

which was launched in January 1963, and it 

appears that there may be intercepts 

of sufficient length and quality to provide a 

limited number of additional locations. 

c. Radar 

(1) Of high interest in the intelligence 

community at the present time is the ABM 

associated/satellite tracking signal which 

has apparently been emitted from the Sary Shagan 

area, This signal was first intercepted by 

on 28 October 1962 durin,g 

valid ABM activity on the SSATC that involved a 

high altitude nuclear explosion. The WILD BILL, 

Mission 7216, which was configured especially 

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for this signal, was successful in intercepting 

on 26 June 1963, also during valid ABM 

activity on the SSATC. Three subsequent 

intercepts were made in September and October 

by the POPPY General Search Vehicle, Mission 

as previously mentioned, and two LONG 

JOHN vehicles designed for the _=;a made 

three intercepts in November and five in 

December, producing high quality data. Numerous 

intercepts of the same signals 

were accomplished during January and February 

of this year, utilizing the Naval Research 

Laboratory facility at the Chesapeake Bay Annex. 

(2) Other significant contributions 

by _directed .coverage packages are in the 12.5 pps 

signal intercepted by the WILD BILL vehicle in 

June 1963 in conjunction with the first satellite 

intercept, as well as the TALL KING 

locations produced from data collected by vehicles 

such as the TAKI, launched in December 1962. 

Conclusions 

13. SIGINT satellites have demonstrated an increasing 

responsiveness to the requirements for: 

a. General Search Capability wit14 

(1) Long life; 

(2) High probability of intercept; 

(3) Broad Band Coverage over the 

spectrum, with frequency and parametric 

resolution as required; 

b. ROB Capability. 

c. Directed Coverage Capability. 

14. From data thus far collected it has been possible to 

determine that there have been no apparent technological surprises 

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nor excursions into previously unused portions of the frequency 

spectrum. The data thus far collected from deep within the USSR 

has confirmed that the same equipments operationally deployed 

on the periphery are also noted throughout the interior,. thus 

providing penetration aids programs with a factual rather than an 

estimated base. Knowledge of the location and operating 

characteristics of defensive radars employed is estimated to 

produce an attrition factor reduction of as much as 50 per cent 

for penetration forces. 

15. On the basis of SIGINT satellite identified suspect 

areas, specific objectives have been generated into photographic 

missions, and as coordination techniques improve, it is anticipated 

that timely correlation of SIGINT and photography from all sources 

will be realized, 

16. Finally, the potential of SIGINT satellite systems is 

demonstrably outstanding, and in time is expected to meet the 

most exacting requirements of the intelligence community. 

17. Since the. USSR is increasingly aware of peripheral 

collection efforts, the SIGINT satellite program will enhance the 

probability of intercept of electronic systems now suspected of 

being deactivated because of, or beyond the intercept range of, 

peripheral efforts. 

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