lor

. • ,

4'1!

'is..; yka ir:t . .

•

U Air Ism boa

Lisboa

- 19 Noweiber 1949

I believe *pt this sifted* has resulted taut the

teLlaelis festers. Met, the pilPerere of tier gad the subeelueett

wiplootoo istereetiemel sitsotisc hos riCittral support er a farce

Su biting hos deprived Iteseereh a DeivIcsvont of its proper

11011.10. %Nadi the vest strides of esieno* applied to ear

*ilk here warred is the poet several years have aultdplied crap.

au the fields of seism which ore eseentiel le the Air Toros0

sod at the sow Ilse *vs renderedobsolete the asseerch and

estolspipat struetere *le served oils roll prior to World Ter II.

1064 toolioioal supericrity 10 mime ace metres gems.. re.

emelt to s voile* et eatectific bolds *ids earsees4 received

shitioteut Septa tom osseerelel cod esehedo seetives.

. .

lbsteter the Goma of lho,Oristinc riteetice, I holm

*0 saw restilial Wien, Gush re is recomeaded by the Ridetuair

OgotitAssip SA poososory It the lir Tome is to play its proper

port $e lor *Mood dolOnoo.

13* 01014$100 gRetatod to Imaginal) oith pour directive

Is .tok this vhole Preltion boo mode a thorough end easpiehenelyr

UsivetillstAto meelysie wider the able leedicoship or Oeniercl

O. A. isdersoo. I believe tbrt their finance. chit* is iftwal

wing* vtilt thyus of the Wow, Ocied.ttee, should be MOM Ps soon is preeticebles to pet the Air 1%wee on the runt of

Immo as4 Dololopoont prows ehish *11 better Wore err

pesitloh Sit tho *shawl Odd fir the Mere. U loop so me

imeis illosol of ogr poo4b2o opponent teektteelly, mad net loss

tarp but it le one* fell behind teehnicolir, it is et tileul.t to

NIP Irio 000l4 via c woo of the future.

Sineers3r,

1.1 (*owe C. Maw

WORN O. MCC

eingrav Ufa' compprom
Lazz,vaajitz

lusztaxi D DEIGLORDIT

rm

Taw) swiss AIR MR

IS Nova in r 1949

.10

•

•

•

•

•

291:1121

..,.. . •• .,

Pall

ell PROS= • • • • • . 1

0011001$20116 .. • • 4.4 • • • • • • • • • . • • • • 1

RS00:11111DOWI1S q; ••••••••• OOOOO 6

IWO A awes*aye Dnolopromil 1* toe USA?

'lb - Persommi

lob 0 Itsegmeeui

1101 Rierenooloo of ilniooteo Ridenour

aseattioo Ileueonendr time

Sib D - looreoe ot IntomeVou

. • :I.4... • '

•

1412111211

• ara...921•116•RVf ‘'.•;•• •
in T1 sue,

RNSEr, 01 AND. usysLormarr

INE

TINITLV 1 AIR POLICE

MIN=

So mite* the entire Desocreh and Affelepsent structure of tbe Air

. Forstis detemodno *bother or not it is edsonate to provide for the long

ihanieirmasprent and =priori, of Amerimms sir parer end to recoinond

Seheameary ohNni.e4

ccovusrms 

%, lhe Suited States Air Force is now dangerously deficient in its

..ttooldttr to immure the long tern development and superiority of Mariam

air overt

so The are 24:gang in the exploitation of solantiflo poesibillhum eat in the daillapsent of now taahnicyass to meet *tore military

sttesticees.

bo the mono! our technology as cppU*d to militia' pmrposem

la ties, Ads4Mste to imam long tern notional security.

a • ry tile not establishing that partuarehip with science neoesadrr to the exploitation of eolentific frontiers, batmen we are aline-

*Wit sr ignoring vital sagments Of our seams' tesbnioal remouroeso

do is rrs not providing an Wools** foundation within the nut

for tee ;sweetie" operation and healthy owe* or tho gemerdh mod

Vestaopmemt avracturso
2 The inadagurdes and fondstoantally stio' to featioro tagald

ootittiol of taxes prosent4 °firmed vitt gamine owl Onportillial

aim Dkosiopment activities. Prillaman Chess inadeqnseles sees

a. Leek of real conprebeneiCh throughint the Air Ares atilt*

foll role rod coops of Research and Development, and ocassomet

to prowkie eftsativs sopport.

bo No positdvs masking system is proddholvalihin the iirltarea!

'onion setorso the naodionaintoraotLon batmen **Olaf magi

v

6. yam? menreauent policies and procedure* *Leh throttle

effective amd eoonoonoal Resocrch and Darmlopmauts paridoolorir the

(1.) Personnel policies ars not demigod to support the

specialized requirements ter eeteetigle

.

and tsdhnleal personal Ps Roseardi end

mot function.

(2) Standard Air ?ore, repletion. *dab sae essloodthir ,

the ornaganant nod operatic* at incited.

liva4 or procurement orsenisetionsimetemeilf ietortere ,A;

mil ► the *ill/dent amnsomment end oparaties liseasset,fie

el

Yu

and Development satimittatte

()) Research and Development hostas asW4 Soboolegnitsail

diffmsad in as losistios waresicaN roJalthulhalthe

subordination of Research aml te9 Bh to dowtoadir

cparatimas.

tau nu ntosold to sore two a yogic& an in tialft, ItO Mow*

alai* Viet LS prkosaily a *Jabot an ands if ira; puma

2

Mtrkt-2-11-
—Th...-111 9-at-211

'wheels le ocntinaed, it is r oombot n "blob will radically decrees/ in

case e and sae potential as tochnology progresses beyond the familiar

boandrrioe of florid rar II. Current eophrsio ulna dey-to-dgy operstionel

and seteriel problems has been so grentre to rediosaly and adveree4

. -

albeit the long tams developerat of the Air Farce.

40 /he present inadequacies are so orrice thotwithin the femmeable More the United States Air Faroe will tend to lose combat offentives•

noes relative to tire potential ,sent'. It the progress of the Army and

Wavy anehle these eervioes to tete over reepooeibilities rhdlooted by *No

Qom,

the belones between our tuitional .ter cepobility end that of me possible

anew will turns been partially reeteredi hosannall inch an evenbselltr

goad inewkbaxir woken the total war potential of the United States ftr

the &Zarin" romans*

e. The USAF bee been trained to think in terms of target wets.

boyead the traditional limit. of:nesse toms. /his exporienoe Obonld

be stilised*

11. Nam weapons as the horison era more dowdy related tithe

tarsal a-Atm of the USAF and to the baste esientific and teohoicel skills

*Lob lappet ths Air Faroe then they are to the target eyeless of surfese

!crew end to *a 'bids supporting*** forooe. Aodn, the eslitft

advantages should be utilised- not Ashamed.

a. baring the interim period, shilo the Army end Misr mold be

taking over Thee bows abdicated by the Air ?seta, dapliostioe of troising

3

Olb

SIM
2,"

•

' -* Imaittni. *MAO* Mott* Mg iotsi l buotirmito itolairie '

,...

1011,44ort$ few oriklitmer ottlurtaotoorA, tookrlom 0111Oodtds .

'..-, .,. •

.

, . -.1.1

*Otos tottad to =plait itaky Ito, patant‘mt of IV algootiov

 „ - ......

40100, tta saw" sot &to stittattros tima oin bow tailsti to ate

ootPitom oestritortioi to Moro motion& straigili. last otrootrib "'

alknistadv to somildag Iwo On that Adak;Ia attobstito.

S. Agr osonant rat suectog Wolves Ike seretess co waist adt

Maslow* meal on Ito allocatisu otcparationd reapooribilitifam viit.t

spot to ors soaptams has ma nal et lading sigsdassomo. Emaintionny

protocol's and lagio Uutlinetalp Auto* Oat thP aorvica vamoosing

the andanitiau of Acabuicel ouiptiovor a aoralegto amdoratinding sithIa

a particular field sill b. t erica *MA austratio and oporatom eft

that field* In other lords, Ito current temaing Sty pfttliNritig 08001/1001412

not molls the prgedans regsrtGass of the *Shetlands a taly ow* Womb.

'ermine spoomento matcrad intm. It thaftItore hammy islorstive that lbs

Odardavelop a Sechnlomi oodpotdoce thiSh sda ethetivelyvappart ito

strategic understanding*

6* Soand balance hatpins Ibroe-in-being m Inseardb mad Dordapeati$

bao *Atom .land. Only *eau& etebilitr add' oonttomity in ths

seen* and Developson$ Owen cau long tens isontinailr acttectiva fords

in-bog be edhlesod* lowsecritioes is current prolaate sml operaticani

strength oar be nedeseary in order' to estabLish en sandals leassdech

Developmemt'progres. reilura to lobe push eseriticoa OM be dissotroad to

lop( tern national setoritr*

•

. •

4
13,41.1R1.2.112

Aye Research and Development progren lost be stobilitod by

absorbing budgetary end personnel fluctuation' in other activities.

The road blocks ehich hove thus fee prevented the esteblisbnent

of en sdequeta Air Force Reeseroh rni Development struotare will °optima

to moist, regardless of policy stetenonts to the °outworn unless drestie

action is taken *hitch will !noire continues impetus behind the Reesereb

and Development ihnotiaa. It is imperative that mere rpooplitime and

stetements of pellet, be trrnelated into vigor= sation.

9. In the general ergo of men•genont, the Ridenour Report proposes a

nnater of corrective actions. Tl• ripe* in principle with the findinge and

reommemodetions of this report,* and wish to mepbsaime the following se

itudemental and urgent neoessitiess

A thorough crecheaLtng of tralar perscomml ooncepte, and major

lagerommunts in the saimotific and technical person of situelton.

The establishment of an effective orginisational Stan/WWI for

Semmearch and Development *thin the Lir Staff and field ganoies

10. In maw

21111.11UOLACJEM 111-IdgaLataikLIIM111181a.ganigillb and la

^r Ms Tows wed a*ianea. tar tiW1 p strongly

abet esrtein changes most be Rade within the Air Staff end field eseneless

s• estiblialument at a Deputy' Chief of Staff, Denelepsent, ibllawed by • pinged ocesolideliem of all Air Staff Iseetereth and

Development rettiritles seder this Depot,.

b. ausSide artablislront at a amoisreis and Development Comedy

fkellened by a phased amelepement of matteittes and ihnotteme to this C nmmtle

• Maar exesiptiLar • as rob D.
ailift_bilipbridied tat Vas eamslusiais of Orme*. 9 and

tifr; Arm art lar imgdsoestsd • on a aarella3r tiap4rasd plan of an min-

••

— 1141mr siMar t rembiltiasery nature, It* the portleolar purpose in

Wei et sift loss ling ar petting undo, berdwon the existing 'tractive

Wilingren6 nopeatatir at the Air ateriel Garai said in tbs Air Stan..

14apari ado be .land that tn. Canaltiimi stroasly billow. that onliy

WM. innsdisto eeteblisbment of the DOWD and tyre ass. rob mod

avolitsgasatOalored gin eamtinaing rnd appropriate emphasis be moorded

the Issas,* and Development activity. TO attleMPt oorrection only *MO

ininrove0 seflegpesot in tbe existing structure will be to perpetuate a oomAtiton 'blob bee more then convincingly demonetrated its dangerous

lnedequaelee.

74.. COOMPIRInt *lb °reenlist:Woe' dumps, nrnagement procedure*

opprepriets to Abe epeeislisetnotcre of Research. aid Development rettvii.

tine eboUld be initiated at once, vith respect to personnel, fp:41M's,,

bide.* supply and oontrctus; arrangements.

13. jkagijaguaggingo will moult only fras fat comprehension

of tbs prdamm 'base in top USAF poiltions'And by continuing adequate

espbseis on tin Reseirob and Development function of the USA?. • The Coe-

. mittes bap therefore concluded that all IISA7 general °Moors and their

immediate staff officers sbould ret d the Ridenour Report and this study

in entirely.

ANZItatiga

That the Mist of Staff approve Its above conansions in principle.

That perwonnal nontgemast practices as indicated in flab B be

instituted without daisy.

•

111:111XSII2

•

it
r " r C

Thst menagerent practices in the arose of budget and fiscal.

earttnal, proonrement and supply, tnd provision of facilities, re indicated

in Tab C, be instituted nil:host delay.

That the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, be

established at ones.

Thot a phased end orderly consolidPtion of all Air Staff Researoh

and Development actdvitiess under the D08/D be D000mplished as sore as

practicable end in meth manor as to Japan no undue burden on the Mr

Staff.

That s Reserrolt end Development Co mend be established, in cadre

formes at owe.

7. That a 'hosed nod orderly resignment of fold Research end Thrielopmot setivittes sad Binations to the Research ard Development Coreand be

socomplished (*velr a period of time end in such menner as to impose no lashes

burden on the Mr Neteriel Coersand and on the Air Staff.

0. That a Task Faroe operating =ler the &migrated DOWD be eel*.

liabed at axe to mot out the time parsing and The detailed plans meow

eery to Implement the seemeardttione oonteined in petrographer 5 and 7

awe.

9. Set espies of tkr report of Ss 114sacs. Ccosittoe i the avert

of lb* revess$ Comeittoe be distrabetsd to IMF geserel °Moen as

de* iset eeslinuttel United Melee.
ihmtbed Nato Ai? Perm, twine tree sir to ofsdemorsayst le

ilinMalleftelanalammimoOth moms &female ofeolelion then got of mar

mdilimmle siam 10 • totalitarian stets ° vs mks *entreated oanstently with

immoimmgdzemmmiss

AO 20 nsfintsin a Itworin-bortng sepias oaf Imnediate end pocerfal

sotion4 mod

L. ID welds for a futuis force and ospebillty *13y abreast of

eslantifie and tambnalogical potential.

/bow two requirements are necessarily compile& and only the most

'sa,macs balance of snort ntU c dont:lately pAnritie for both contemporary

and itinre security.

/bear tmo requirements era cimilrr in that both must be can/dnucualy

setiefied. lb eliminate the Dmree-in-tsing in order to achieve more rapid

technological promos would be to take 0 suicidal risk under present

intermetiesal oenditions. Taselae„ to ofiminoto Research end Development

meld bs to destroy, ultimately, the continuity of effeetivenece of the

min-being.

It is obviate that the strategic forbore bearir: on e possible future

mmrstramay support a poserfhl e•phasis on maintaining the technical

euperiority of our =spans and techniques. 74 cannot hors told/ a Wore

war on the boas of manpower ami resources. sill in it only throagb

maperlar technology and superior atrotegy.

'!be algal/licence of these Sectors and the importance of r boalthy
Al2IIIIILI

Research and Ovellopmeot activity in the United States Air Force has

been generally recognised by those in responsible position,. However,

tbe . pressers of 4i-to-day operational, naterial and pelitleal problems

Las etteetively. prevented the implementation of a vigorous, reel proPerilddiNh produces results. In effeeS, the Air Pores has recognised

the pebbles bat, to date, has taken little effective action to rem*

existing deficiencies.

These conditions inevitably bring into focus the question of organic

motional structure suitable to the effective functioning of a Research

and Development activity. There is no doubt that almost any organisation •

can be made to rork it real cotrprehension, continuous attention, and willingness are present. However, the purpose of organization is to assist

in tho establishment of environmental coalitions which favor, rather than

retard, healthy tunotioninj of an activity. Organization alone cannot

solve the problem, but organisation may assist in the establishment of

clearer responsibilities and may bo instrumental in providing the continuing impetus necessary to achieve lonc, term objectives.

since this Committee has recoLmonded funoamontal organizational

changes, which it is anticipated ',ill be resisted in some areas, a sum

mary of reasons for these recommended changes is givon below:

1. There is no one general staff agency in the USAF today

responsible to the Chief of btaff for thinking abou the future.

It is spread across the board. If nobody does it because of the

pressure of today's business - no ono, or every one, is at fault.

This does not fix responsibility. If we accept the thesis that

we have two major obligations - tho one to operate an 4ir Force

in-being, and the other to provide an effective iir Force for the

future - then, on the basis of logic, we can hardly bury the'

responsibility for the Force of the future under the logistic

responsibility for the d ► ir Force of the present.

2

/)
xis p

The present organisation is not working satiofactorily.

This is generally r000gnimed. Th•t it con be made to work only

through management changes is pure hypothesis =supported by

experience.

So such ground has already been lost that vpsoial emphasis -

and continuing emphasis - must be placed upon the Research sad

Development activity to even partially regain a satisfactory :vsition.

4. The staff level of any nativity should be joverned by its

importance and not by the sise of the physical structure which it

serves or operates.

6. Specialised nanagement practices are required for efficient

Research and Development. When facing realities, these seem virtually

unattainable without centralised control of Research and Development

activities and without relief of Research mud Development from logistic

control.

6. from a purely praotical standpoint, the United States Air

Faroe is critically short of competent scientific and technical

personnel. It is likewise short of medical doctors. In order to obtain

and hold good doctors, the Air Surgeon's Office has been deliberately

elevated. The same practical logic would support the more fundamental

logic which supports the establishment of DOS/D.

T. The experience of industry convincingly shows the fallacy of

making a research activity subservient to production, sales or

operations.

12. interaction between strategy and scion** is a primary requirement for an effective Air Parse of the future. This interaction is not

now being achieved. • positive astern must be established whereby the

isteraetion is not a voluntary function of personalities but is an

absolute and automatic result of normal staff functioning. In the

opinion of the Oommittee, only the stature of a Deputy representing the

Research and Development activity can insure that this interaction will

be provided for and implemeated yore than upon a sporadic basis.

In working toward &balance between force-imp-being and Research and

Dowelopment. it is mandatory that certain major difference. in the nature

*e two reormiromonts be kept in mind. Recognition of these differences

OMR preside • olds for more effective administration. beds sxposisit for

a forom-M4ming of 46 groups will mot tor the oonbat aspnbility of 100

3

1-11-1111-11M11-2---

• ••
otalvalost groups. but it will buy a certain measure of combat capability -

roughly proportional to the else of the forces. On the other hand, funds

provided for three-fourths of the essential Research And Development on a

certain projeet may boy absolutely nothiag . if the additional nu.-fourth

is sot Also expended. An unfinished research projeot may be a total loss.

lluetuations in budget And personnel, while affecting is some dogrse thd

°spat:ley of a foroe.ia.being, any affect to a such more than proportional

degree the results of Research and Development programs winch are susceptible

to seat flgotuatione. Renee, stability is an overriding requirement in any

lesearah red Deveppment program which is ned.r vox.

lasemook as the Research and Development budget is a relatively minor

part of the total budget. it Usoome* immediately apparent that fluotuer

time in.amullability of personnel mad funds should be absorbed in these

activities whisb are.aseomiated with the force-4n/44nd: and not those

assosiated with the Air !Oros of the future. This policy should obtain at

least until war at definitely fo ►egmeable date has hem determined se

inevitable.

Ike Clossittes is aware that philosophical argssest sag limp presestedi

easiest ~WA of its susommovdaticas. Wore are equally strong Odle.

talkisal argamacts, is as egadade seas% whisk mar be wed as • *meter,

fisrevete to pkilesopkise on either posities trill serve es purpose is attels•

lag antis - apt ~gam sett* is sleas2,7 lailosteL Osiinittee by

rsesanatial seties whisk is believes will stimulate farther estisa and tint*

will previa* tie aseesserr esstbodeg Iapetus to the blat leesszek Mae

isesiapsout NOM..

4

11111--ttix11-Sak
.;;

1110,111.0dUts is turns, smears that briar emperienss with d

god iscalsrmsnt astivitif erdsmisobiomalL, aleystei above thil

111141611rsto Levet any he used as the basis for argansat eoutrary to the

ratommmodattoms Smatatmai is this report. the Committee has enp/ored

tip relationships sat fimstionLim of this previlna activity and finds

%little is essmos with that activity and the 'structure which is now protein& Ihmi efface Chink. ..moral Lefty formerly headed is referred to.

That mffimme did net reeemble the office of a Deputy Chief of Staff, Develop.

meat. as rionalised by this Committee is thntt

1. OOSOTA1 LOW. office was not a part of a homottenesus staff

structure at Deputy level. It wait a special office or a earbuacle.

G. General LeNses office aid not have concentrated uader it the

Itateareh matt Development staff activities of the MAP.

3. General Wises office was staffed with only a very few officers

sad weld not have handled the broad functions appropriate to a DCOD.

It is the opinion of the Committee that any argument against establish/Hat of a DelltD at this tine, because of experience with the formats

organisation, is nide valid argument.

The Committee desires to emphasise that sound policy pronouncements

with mope*, to **sear& and Developmeat have been continuously made by

the high cussed of the Air Perces and coordinative procedures have been

expounded which theoretically should product(' the desired result. In

spite of such pronouncements and theories at staff functioning, the evidence is overwhelming that the desired results have not been achieved'

5

33318 p -J1---
• .11 •• v: V I • , •

- • 4`.

The 00nmittee has recommended action which it believes will serve to

provide a positive force for the oontinuous implementation of those

mod policy statements.

iu eonalusion, the Committee wishes to emphasise that the pressure

of operating the Air Faroe-in-being must not be allowed to obscure the

at least equally important ftnotion of building for the future. Psyehologleally, it is natural to emphasise those funatians and duties which

show twilit/4a and tangible results. Recognising this inescapable fact,

it follows that increased incentive or motivation aunt be provided to

insure that the long tern Job, which promises only future and less concrete returns, is adequately performed.
-11-11111-1-1-1-1111

•

In the opiates of the movent COmeitton, one Of the meet Oribi*

eal difisieneise in the Bassani% and Development striatum of the

United 94stes Air Pore lies in the field of pereennel. Ors person..

eel Pgyourlaint Moires has not provided no sith adequate numbers of

scientifically and technicaLly trained personnel' es ham! not full,

utilised those we do have; and our personnel policies. have not been

conducive to keeping those we have on the jOb or fully effective on

the job.

The quality of Air Force Research and Development is dependent 41

the individual scientific and technical compotence of the personnel

performing or supervising the function.

The quantity of research and development work that can be performer

or supervised is directly related to the number of qualified people

engaged in the work.

It is evident to the Committee that a critical deficiency exists

within the Air Force in the scientific and technical personnel field.

Ineediate and vigorous action must be taken to alleviate the shortage,

and the most effective employment of the available talent must be

achieved.

It eight be well to paint out that for years se have recognised

that a esdical officer requires education and training beyond an undergraduate degree to perform his ocalceffectivaly. It has not been so

4

A
n I C T 

well understood, apparently, that a cocTarative degree of educating

and training is required to ::Mauro eamrotenee in other technical fields

of equal Importance to the Air Force.

Le have recognized also that is was not only desirable but mandatory that the special skills of medical officers be utilized in the

areas of their primary experience and training. It is not apparent

that the same common sense hus been fully applied in the assignment of

other highly qualified personnel. It must be acknowledged that a similar type of specialized procurement, assignment, and management policy

should ba applied to other scientific and technical personnel as we

now apply to medical officers.

In order to correct the near disastrous condition which presently

obtains with respect to research and develoment personnel, the Corsd.ttee

recommends that the following minimum steps be taken:

1. Catalog. the technically (gentled officers presently on duty

and on inactive reserve status. Catalog information should be in considerable detail, sharing educational specialties and degrees, academic

standing, experience in technical work, administrative aptitude, and

personal choices of fields of activity.

• 2. establish the policy that the utilization of technical ability

has overriding priority over any other official consideration in the

assignmeat of technically officers.

3. Mahe the asalgassate of technically kualified officers sobjest

to the approval of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, of the Air

Staff.

2

1-141-11-1-1-14-2
BAITArilER

4Belabligh the. palsy that positions of responsibilitt in the

direstien end manegssent of Reeeerch and Development activities

be cesupfed only by officers who are technically and adt*inistcatively

qualified* This policy must be implemented upon un evolutionary baais,

replacing unqualified affioerswith qualified officers or qualified

oivilians as rapidl 4

y as the supply of kualifisd personnel permits.

Talmo steps to insure that the nanagemeat of civilian professional employees is conducted, within existing statutory limits, to

obtain and retain the hidleat possible calibre of employees, and'to

eliminate substandard employees.

Prepare a long ronce plan of recuirecontu for technical per- .

simnel, both Ailitary and civilian, to propsrly moo existing and planned

facilities. Integrate thin plan into the overall Air Force budget and

slanning plans,

Institute n plegras for educating the officers required by the

long range nanning plan. This program should utilize AFIT to provide

education not available in civility. institutions.

Offer to selected teci.nicslly outlified reserve officers and

civilians regular :dr Force corniezions in attr • ivo Ltrades. Obtain

legislation for this purpose if required.

Lan existing Research and Development agencies adequately rith

‘ palified rilitary :nil civilian peroonnol, limited only by the availability of zuch persormol.

Survey the positio•s a responsibility and authority in the

Reeua •ch and Iknfulepment otructure to roternine ut.ich pooition must

3
-1:11-11-11E1F .

be occupied military personnel for the beet Interest of the enrviss. "

Establish a Alloy that all other positions of authority and osepomniqo

bility will be oocupiod on the basis of sompetmacy only and my be

filled by either civilian or military personnel.

FroviAte for career advancement and positions of respecmdldliii"

for scientific and technically trained civilian porpoenel.

}timide for career opportunities for military scientifle and

technical personnel at least equal to the career opport .inity of the

general duty offioer.

4

DT STRICTI.12
lag

"UMW Qr piaweig Aivololion 'MIT= 

ft sass =Ea prinniples of management which apply to most

organisations are equally applicable to a Resenreh end Development

organisation. In addition, however, Research and Development management must be adapted to certain unique characteristics. The activities of Research and Development are nonrepetitive and hence not

dusceptible to the rigid .procedures which contribute to tho efficiency of a mass production industry. The results of Research and

Development are basically dependent upon the pioneering thought processes of individuals; an environment favoreble to ouch thought is

essential. The F.esearch and Development process is a long term continuous effort. The cost of specific research can never be accurately

predicted in advance. Eequirements for supplies abri seuipment often

cannot be foreseen until the need is at hand.

To bring the . jr Force Research and Development establishment

into satisfactory condition with respect to general principles and

with respect to the special characteristics stated above, the follow--

tug specific actions are fundamental:

1. Map

Letablish the policy that the noaearch and Development budget

will be planned and implemented on n lcmg term begin.

Vest the responsibility for budget planning and for

expenditure of all funds required in neoearch and Development, including

R LSTILIC D
RESThICTi,-D

•

peroonneI, facilities, auprliea, ar.d .r.Lintenances in the P.esoarch and

Develowynt eatabliahmnt.

Develop a Bina° accounting system for 3asearch and

Development funds.

} rovide flexibility • ithin the limit of the total Research

and Developcent budget.

2. IAZCILLVEVT !,UfFLT:

'lost in the Iv:march and 'Jevelopront . eatablishment the

responsibility for all contraetin4 for articles and services used only

by the Zosearch tInd jevelopment esta.lishment.

1'ree Research and OevAloment contraCting of unnc•essary

rules ;, nd regu]ations designed Primarily for quantity /reduction procurement.

c. Design and is a supply :oyster.. for Research and

Develoment which will efficiently serve its peculiar and unpredictable

requirement.

3. Eitautu:

Irepare and implement a long term Research and Development facilities Flan designed to provide efficiently required facilities as needed.

Include as an ineepaVable part of *NA planned fecilit;y

those elements of pleasant livigg conditions vhieh are essential to the

attrecti...1 of high oelibre personnel.

a. !thin the long term facility plan take drastic easegager

action to bring existing realities into a satisfastery eenditlen.

2

LA/1411,10
S.4_2

4SCUsqlq307WITCTIDRICI:

Ridenour Committee Reoommendation:

"The Air Institute of Technology should be 1:44:1 into a

grndunte school of engineering rankiew with the best

civilian schools in this cntegory, and oavAr4 specifics

objectives derived from the needs Jot the Air Force."

The present Committee desires to sta g:., its interpretation of this

recommendation. It is felt that tho fo1ios:11w speciiic factors and seeds

of the Air Force *all for high-caliher Arutunte-lirve4 instruction at the

Air nonce Institute ofTeohnolegyk

Security requirements in connection wits "slassified courses'

can be met more effectively in an Air Yol. oi**Aistituto rather than in a

Cit111,14 institution. To a certain extent., civilian univereities are

reluctant to undertake courses of inotruntion dealing with highly cleseifled mntters, escept in those oases wher,s *014, university is already engegad

in highly-olassified research.

Sass specialised graduate-level ooarses In lie flats at

propulsion and windftnnei testing, for example - ass be given more attar.

tively and more efficiently at the Air rare. tasititute of Teehnologr.

close . 1rokimity to the Detest information, exporimestal test artiolisto

unique Air Pore• test facilities.

3, The opportunity to do a small amount of tsOhi*$ Is sin lapiw

tent factor in attracting techelool personnel of the %Me sad sallbet ateas4

to administer effectively Air Poroe research ooadra0,0 with triversiliies mei

various other research osrganisations.

11;11-ttlitirrir 111 VIIII
The present Committee assumes that thu Ridenour Report reoommemdation

/outs not imply Air Force participation in gradu •. .te ►level educational activi-.

tins in ell of the general soionoes, Ifund.blei%tr.1 vducetion is the proper

businefto of the universities of the Country ord general gradnate-level

mine:Alen for Air Porno officers enn be secured better by sending officers

to civilie4 inatitutions. Uowever, the Air Yorce Doted and should provide

sneeialised grnduhte•level courser; to fill the used* outlined above.

Thin Committee has not .valu.ited the present program of the Air Pore.

Institute of Technology . Therefore, no commit is offered on the extent to

which the orezent APIT undnrgrada .te educntionol program should be continued.

21aalfatt..0.1104i44 PfifisoADItt

Ridenour Committee Recommendntiona

"High-priority action should be token. to improve the utilisation

of military technical personnel, A Isirectorr•e of Technical

A • reonrel in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. Pereonna,

is sweated as a possible interim measure. pending a farther

study of the problem in connection with the Petablishment of a

Renearoh and Development Command."

The present Committee wishes to esphasile vigoroanky the urgent noel

for improved military technical personnel utilisation and policies. Tbs

fundamental requirement here is - again - one of personnel who understand

th' s pecialised nature of this problem. However. the Committee does not

wish to propose specific organizational me , suree within the Office of the

Deputy Chief of 3taff. Personnel, for accomplishing these objectives.

12/1112 A
•

3 97 1170PA1iolf

This Committee conducted its stalky comourrentay with the Ppeeial

Committee of the Soientifio Advisor) Board (Ridemomr Committes).,

tim addition to the formal members of the oresent Committee. there wens

available several members of the staff of Readquartore mr, Headquarters

Air University, and the Air War Coll ege to not n$ & Working Committee fet

the purpose of gathering additional information mad furnishing additional

assistance is the preper: . tion of the report.

Same menber of the Working Committee attended oaf* at , the Imagism,

conducted by the Special Committee of the Scientific Advisory Board.

A oomr of the transorietion of hearinge and each document made availnblo to the Special Committee of the Scientific A.PrisOrY BOOkid was 4,6114140

to this Committee for study.

Members of the Working Committee attended a conference on this eject

in Santa Monica. California, with tho Special Committee of the Scientific

Advisory Board and personnel from Yoridquart,ra USAF.

Numerous meetings of the Air Uhiveornit7 Committal, were held at both

Maxwell Air Farce Base ftrai 3ftadquarters DSAY for the oarp000 of dismission

and 'ILIA), of the subject and for interviews with personnel not included in

the group whioh aope4red before the Committee of tba Salentine Advisory

Board, such as Dr. X. T. Compton, Chiarmho of the Benearoh and BovoXsposo,

Board, Major General Gordon P. lnville. Director of Requirmmeote, Rend*

quarters, 1/3167, and Major General S. Jr. Anderson, Director of Plans and

Operations. HAsdquarters. USAF.

RA3TRISAV2 
4

In ardor to invostigat• a pbasi of Ilasearah and Dovolesamm. tai $0

conducted by an nativity whops prima., Somatic* is mat roommodio

was *ado by *sabers of the wafting Gassittop to Ste Solhoet of AVIMINMI111006101,1

Many students in the Air War Dollop bat, hod prnollisal oloo

Resnardh and Davelepnent in Readguartars UldruiledeSarters Air MOSmaidli

Cossood. including asaignsaato is various laboratories of Ito Iftisocalaks

Division, Air Materiel Oennowl, Conferanows with those pereonnsi aummilhot

additional excellent baakground for this study.

2

EAASSIS1,12