74ISNATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY (ERECTOR 6 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. EDWARD W. PROCTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR

FOR IN CIA

MR. CHAIRMAN, USIB

SUBJECT: Secrecy and Compartmentation Meeting, 24 March 1976

REFERENCE: A. DDI Memo, Same Subject, 16 March 1976

B. Draft Memo, Subject: Principles and

Guidelines for the Classification and

Control of Intelligence, 19 February 1976

I was unable to attend the scheduled 24 March meeting due

to the unexpected absence of the DNRO. I have, however,

enclosed comments for your consideration.

Charles W. Cook

1 Attachment

Comments on 19 Feb Draft Memo

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COMENTS ON 19 FEBRUARY

DRAFT NEHORAMUN

I. The NRO supports the principle of insuring appropriate access

to intelligence information by those who need that information. We

recognize that many aspects of our current security system now need

intensive review in order that the security system not serve as an

impediment to getting the necessary information to the appropriate people.

On the other hand, we believe that access to sensitive sources and methods

information should be on a strict need-to-know basis. We feel that needto-know security concerning the details of our systems is necessary to

insure effective collection in the future. •

The proposed principles and guidelines in the first paragraph

of the referenced paper are indeed new. The current principle for dissemination of intelligence infOrmation is need-to-know. The proposed principles,

with emphasis on trying to assign the lowest classification, will allow

intelligence information to flow to more people through broader access and

fewer dissemination controls.

As indicated in the paper, the principle of extra protection of

sources and methods should apply only to those aspects that significantly

affect their viability. We agree and think such information requires

strict application of the need-to-know princi le. In this regard, we

can review information currently held in .. hannels for, some

possible selective downgrading.
je_sEettr

We do believe there are sensitive mission revealing facts at

risk in some intelligence product decompartmentation proposals presently

being staffed in the community. This aspect should be carefully reviewed

and actions taken to retain the sensitive material De hannels.

II. We believe that ontrol System cool well be used as

a model system for other collection code word systems. Furthermore, we

believe that the security policy we espouse largely contains what is being

sought by the remedial procedures advocated in the memo. The security

policy that has made tpystem work is the strict adherence to

security procedures and guidelines, and insuring that all personnel

authorized access fOrmation understand the applicable security

principles, policy and procedures. Host of the failings of the present

security system, as indicated in the memo, appear to result from poor

security indoctrination and education. We believe that the aggressive

education suggested in the memo will help. We believe that rather than

initiating a completely new set of security principles and guidelines,

that old ones can and should be made to work.

We question whether many of the suggested remedial measures

mentioned in 'the raper will help this situation. For example, the signing

of secrecy agreements without procedures for insuring distribution of

information only to personnel who signed the agreement makes such agreements

• ineffective. Bore detailed . investigations of some SECRET cleared people

will only add to DIS workload. Establishment of a universal code word on

some intelligence information would appear only to complicate the present

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III. We strongly support providing intelligence data to appropriate

users but also strongly adhere to a belief for the need for protection of

sources and methods and certain capabilities associated thereto. We believe

that certain products and information can be decompartmented. We support

this particular effort and will rovide whatever assistance is dqsired to

explain the effectiveness of t ecurity control system, and our

security policies and philosophies.

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