-SEGRIEF I/R-75/S -509

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20503

11136611111011111111.

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OCT 6 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES E. GOODBY

FROM: DONALD G. OGIL"Po'

SUBJECT: Study of U. S. National Space Policy

Attached are restated issues which OMB believes should be

considered by the Space Policy Working Group. In preparing

these issues, we have taken into consideration DOD, NASA,

and CIA comments on the study's outline. If these issues

are agreeable to you and the participating agencies, they

can form the basis for a major section on issues in the

Working Group's Report.

We also have some general comments on the group's work as

follows:

The outlines for Sections I and II represent a

reasonable framework for getting drafting efforts

initiated. We agree with your general approach

of trying to get working papers circulating as

socn as possible.

While we understand the point of view expressed

by you and by several agencies that it is difficult

at this time to identify crisply what alternatives

should be considered in the study, we believe that

development of alternatives is an integral part of

the task assigned the working group and that alternatives should be addressed as soon as possible.

In particular, an alternative for a future "single

system" (or even a single "space service as sug-

_,Aested by NASA) should be considered. This relates directly to the President's question about

the potential for converging civilian and military

technologies and programs.

CIASIMEDEY Donald G. Ogilvie

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The substantive information and technical capabilities needed

to address the issues reside in the operating agencies rather

than in OMB. OMB can play a useful role in formulating the

issues (as in the attachment), in critiquing the drafts prepared by the agencies, and in evaluating the information and

alternatives addressed by the working group, and we are prepared to do so. We are not, however, in a position in terms.

of manpower, experience, or information to prepare draft papers that address these issues.

Enclosure
Current Issues for Space Policy Working Group 

Although there is inevitably some overlap between the issues

identified below, we believe stating them as broad questions

with sub-sets may be helpful in providing perspective on the

many facets of the complex problems to be addressed and the

various interests at stake.

I. Definition of U. S. Objectives Pertaining to Earth 

Sensing from Space 

What are and should be the objectives of the U. S.

with respect to earth sensing from space? Military? Civilian?

Are the current objectives of civilian and

military earth sensing space programs consistent and compatible?

If not, how should objectives be restated?

II. Issues Related to National Security Objectives 

Is current U. S. policy which encourages operation

of an aggressive civilian earth sensing space program on an unclassified basis for the benefit of

all nations compatible with national security

interests?

Does open release of technical and operational

information pertaining to civilian systems

compromise U. S. classified technology?

Does open release of data and products acquired by the civilian systems provide unacceptable amounts and quality of military

intelligence (particularly targeting data)

to other nations?

Does the policy of open release jeopardize

continuing use of classified systems?

If there are risks inherent in the present

policy, to what extent are they offset by

present or potential political/economic

benefits provided by the civil earth sensing .

program?
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- If there are risks, do they stem from current

programs or are they only potential risks related to planned upgrading of civilian systems?

Have the thresholds set forth'in NSAM-156 allowed civilian programs to do too much? If so,

how can the U. S. retreat now? What would be

the political, international, legislative or

other consequences of a decision to retreat?

In what areas do civilian satellite systems produce

information of military or intelligence value?

Are the *reconnaissance-like" characteristics

of certain civilian activities (e.g., the LACIE

project to estimate foreign and U. S. wheat production) likely to increase international sensitivities to remote-Sensing activities and

thereby increase the risk of international objections to classified reconnaissance activities?

Does current U. S. policy of not explicitly admitting

the fact of reconnaissance remain valid in face of

widespread awareness?

What would be the national security consequences

of less stringent release policies and practices?

Of aiaassifying the fact of U. S. operation of

reconnaissance satellites and making data from

such programs (but not technology, products or

details of operations) available to the public

domain without attempting to conceal their

source? Of also releasing products but not

technology or details of operations? Of total

release?

If reconnaissance systems were to be declassified, which are candidates? Old, current,

new?

III. Issues Related to Civilian Objectives

What are the consequences of current policy restrictions on the use of advanced technologies

in terms of meeting civilian program objectives?

Are there unique characteristics in the technologies

being pursued in the civilian program which would

warrant their independent development in the absence

of policy constraints on the free availability of

technology and/or data from the ri l itary sector?
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If yes, wbat are these characteristics?

- In what applications, and for what purposes

are they important?

In the absence of constraints on the use of advanced

technology, would the technology used in the civilian

sector converge with that available in the military

program? •

What are the implications for the civilian program

of the expanding role of the Intelligence Community

in making earth resources assessments of foreign

areas? Is it necessary that satellite systems and

derived data supporting such intelligence analysis

be classified? If so, which systems and what data?

What would be the consequences (especially international) of classifying data from existing

and planned civil programs?

IV. Issues Related to Efficiency from National Perspective 

To what extent is there now duplication of technology

development effort between the civilian and military

programs because of restrictions on the availability

of technology from the latter?

Have the constraints on the development of

civilian technology (i.e., limits on spatial

resolution and quality of altimeter data) and

the different nature of the technologies being

developed for civil applications (i.e., the

emphasis on multispectral sensors) been effective in limiting duplication?

What cost savings would result from declassification of the fact of classified capabilities and

data?

- To what degree could civilian requirements be

satisfied by unclassified military systems

(impact on representative applications such as

agriculture, land use, water resources, etc.)?

What civilian information requirements could

not be met if only unclassified military reconnaissance systems were in use? How valuable

are they (marginal analyses)?

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In the absence of a decision to declassify the fact

of classified capabilities, is it feasible to make

unclassified data from classified sources more widely

available for civilian purposes? If yes, how? For

what specific applications?

Can and should there be only one national earth

sensing space satellite program to meet both civilian

and military objectives?

- If yes, how can convergence be accomplished?

- If no, what steps can and should be taken to

eliminate unnecessary duplication of research

and hardware?

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