IV. Recommendations for Program Redirectien.

‘There are no recomendations for redirection of the technical appresch
to the progran. Tt du believed that the develomment philosophy applied to this
Program is one which will give this country a satellite surveillance capability
in the shertest possible time and which will, at the same tine, provide presently .
unavailable intelligence information to national agencies early in the develoyment
Program,

In ‘the course of arriving at the current technical approaches for the
visual and ferret subsystems, many Promising improvenents or more sophisticated.
approaches, to sensing functions have become apparent. However, such inprovenents
would require additional state-ef-the-art work which can enly be supported with
Linited effort in the present program because of funding restrictions. If it is
Considered desirable to increase the effort devoted to obtaining improved sensors,
additional funding would be required in the program,





’ 0, Guidance and Altitude’ Control
ee  ince_Lontrol

Guidance and altitude control equipment must be designed so that the orbit

shape and this vehicle's vertical plane are sufficiently stable to provide acceptable
Pictorial intelligence, {SECRET)—

D. Resolution

The necessity for high resolution target portrayal requires that equipment
utilised for this Purpose be capable of resolving detail to detect airfield

and intercontinental missile launching sites. An ultimate capebility to detect
objects no more than 20! on a side is desired, (SECRET)

E. Mapping and charting

Pictorial data collected should be such that creation of accurate topographic
maps is possible, _(COMF)—

F. Electronic Intelligence
A capsbility of automatically detecting, recording and transmitting electro-

magnetic data of selected frequencies nust be provided, Initially, coverage on the UHF,

L and 8 frequency bands will be acceptable. Sufficient data should be transmitted to
permit location of source. (Reference VII 4.3.) SBCRET}

@. Weather Observation

A capability will be incorporated into this system to view cloud Coverage on
& sufficiently broad basis to aid weather forecasting. (Reference VII 4.3.) eonry

H. Self Destruction

Provisions for self destruction will be incorporated into the satellite. (CONF)
VIII. AVAILABILITY

Tals system should be available to operational units in 1965. -(sEcaer)—

/ef Gearge E. Price
/e/ Gabe C. Haxicins GEORGE’ E. PRICE
oy ; Maj. Gen. USAF

GABE C. HAWKINS

Director of Requirements

= --«
in document

‘clfecting the aetional of the United Stetes withia ispionage Lows;
1 OSE, Saction 95 and 704, The renanluien er evita af whe tsar sate tit the meenig of te Es Hind



— os
Gata obtainable from satellites was undertaken as part of the project effort. Com-
prehensive studies were conducted and advice was solicited from all knowledgable
branches of the Armed Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency regarding the accu-
racies required for satellite reconnaissance data to be wilitarily. useful.

The satellite reconnaissance progrea had not at this time entered the Air Force
administrative channels for establishing specific, formalised, requirements for and
undertaking an integrated development program leading to an operational weapon system.
During the life ef the program, effort had ranged from the mere study of a feasibility
concept in the very early days, through progressively more detailed state-of-the-art

studies of critical technical areas and engineering.analyses. However, by 1955, work
conducted in the program had resulted in sufficient information to insure:

1. That military requirements could be met for satellite obtained reconnaissance
data, and

2. That technical problems concerned with developing a militarjly useful recon-
naissance satellite were not insurmountable.

Accordingly, USAF General Operational Requirement No. 80 (SA-2c) for a Strategic
Reconnaissance Satellite Weapon System was published on 16 March 1955, (TABB). A GOR
is a formal Air Force document which states. an Air Force operational need for a specific
weapon system. It is prepared and issued to.the ARDO by the Directer of Requirements,
Headquarters USAF, Prior to issumce a GOR is coordinated throughout the Air Staff and
with appropriate major air commands. The GOR established as the operational objective
of the system the continous surveillance of preselected areas of the earth to determine
the status of a potential enemy's warmaking capability. It called for:

1. Pictorial resolution sufficient to detect airfield runways and ICBM launching
sites with an ultimate capability to detect objects no more than 20 feet on a aides

This document contains lntermation alfecting the a Espionage Laws,
18, U.S.C, Section 799 ond 704, the tonamlsion er toraicton ef which'ie cay manner fo'an vnewmoroe’ partes Lnerasithes Gy ae


Ship Project RAND,
2, 1946 (SECRET)

2. Lipp, J. B., R. M. Salter and R. 8. Wehner, Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for
Heaganaissance, The RAND Corporation, Report B-217,

3. Upp, J. EB. and R. M. Salter, Editers, Project Feed-Back — xt,
The RAND Corporation, Report R-262, me 1, 155k, 2 volumes taken

5. of Contractor Evaluation Board, WS 11 Hq., ARDC, Western Development
8 Dado aS ea ae ee SLT



be Objectives of the Advanced Reconnaissance Systen

As amatter of general guidance the following may be considered the
intelligence ebjectives for the Advanced Recemnaissanoe System:

(1) Continuous reconnaissance (visual, electronic, or other) Ceverage of
the USSR and satellite nations, for surveillance purposes. Timeliness of receipt of the
Teco!

nnaissance
lution the ideal. In consideration of the requirement for earliest availability of the
Advanced Reconnaissance System, ‘the engineering progression and Air Force aceeptance
should be from the lesser to the greater resolution, .

(2) ‘the resolvable surface dimension detail showld be of the order of
100 feet or amaller, A capability of resolving detail to the degree that objects approxi—
tively identi, tinpstde can be positively identified is the optimm inverass et pee

tity weapon :
can be met, PE Many cther intelligence requirenents of larger surface dineusion sett
antomatLeally be satisfied, .

Ao The volume of intelligence delivered by this Advanced Reconnaissance

System will sere tecre2, the aysten, in order to be considered complete,
must include-a suitable associated data handling, recording, reduction, and filing aysten.
The earliest acceptable system must have for automatic data » filing
and storage. Final objective will be for Completely automatic data proce: interpre-
tation, presentation, and jeeminstion, All deta h systens conceived for the
Advan; o witha te yeten will be compatible with dgta handling equipeent tn te.
temporary use within the Community.

by the Advanced Reconnaissance System should be studied, While grosser accuracies can
be accepted as interin selutions, the finer accuracies should be Considered as the
optimum and the geal for ultimate Complete developnent.

(5) Thorough investigation ef 911 ible means of improving the intelli-
gence collection Capability of the Advanced Recenesissance Systems such as the application
Of store techniques to the analysis and interpretation of telerisisn rasp

—(skcREr)—



3. dn intelligence center is required for selecting, analyzing and storing
all reconnaissance information received from monitoring stations. —(SECRET) :

V. OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

A. Satellites will be employed singly or in numbers to insure desired coverage
of a selected area within a given period of time. (SRCRET}—

B. The satellite will be optimised for daylight visual coverage operations over
enemy territory; however, there is a requirement for obtaining this type of infor-
mation at night: and through weather. - Additionally, or on an alternate load basis it
will have a reund the clock electronic intercept capability.

c. This system will be used to obtain vieual data of various soales and therefore
the time required for complete coverage of an area will vary. Weather veiling of
surveillance areas may prolong this time period, SECRET}

VI. LIMITATIONS OF PRESENT SYSTEMS
Present pileted aircraft reconnaissance systems are limited as follows:
A. Inability to provide continuous surveillance. (GONF}-
B. Valnerability to detection. {eonF}-
G. Vulnerability to countermeasures. -(GONF)—
VII. OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE (ATRBORNE COMPONENT)

A. General

The following design aspects are of prime importance and must be given special
Consideration if the final product is to. be operationally suitable:

1. Reliability and longevity of all orbiting components.

2. A means of storing intelligence data until the vehicle is within secure
commnications range of monitoring sites,

3. The capability for alternate payload substitution prier to launching. (SECRET)
B. Ghoice of Orbit and Inclination Angle ,

1. The altitude and inclination sngle of the satellite will depend on the
intelligence requirenents of the specific mission, {SEGREP)-

2. The inclination angle should be.selective through 90 degrees. in angle
providing the most adequate daylight coverage of the USSR is desirable. ~(SzeRETy-



USAF PRIORITIE

Pall SSF vzerss


= em

declined to submit a proposal.
The three contractors conducted Design Studies between June 1955 and /
March 1956 and submitted these to the WDD. By special order no. 6 dated 5 March 1956,
WDD appointed an Evaluation Board to review the design studies. Board menbers were:
Colonel W. H. Baynes = Bq. AHDC

Lt/Ool R. 0. Holub = - sg. ANC
“Commander R. C. Truax(USH) WOD

Lt/Col W. G. King -

Lt/Col, V. M. Genes - Bq. ARDC
lst Lt R, 8, Washbum - Hq. AMC
Mr. RB. 8S. Blocker - Hq. AMC

The evaluation board completed the review and published a report on WA
20 March 1955.5 The board was aided by a Technical Advisory Group, composed of
scientists from WADC, RADC and AFCRC, and by an Air Materiel Command Special
Evaluation Group.

Proposals were rated by the board on a basis of 500 points fer Technical
Evaluation, 300 pointe for Development and Production Aspects and 200 points for
System Menagenent Potential. All proposals were found by the board to be acceptable
but the degree of scooptebility varied considerable. In the opinion of the board,
the Lockheed proposal received the highest overall evaluation rating, as well as. the
highest Technical Evaluation rating. It was on this basis that Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation was chosen as prime contractor.

The following factors were considered in selecting the camera design for
the first engineering test photo system:

1. There are serious weight, space and auxiliary power limitations in the
early flight testing phases due to the power sources that are available, i.e., silver
sinc batteries. ; Battery power will eventually be replaced by either solar or melear
powered sources as they become available. These sources will greatly relax the

ose eB :-«

latermetion effecting the notional defence of the United Stetes messing of the Espionage Lows, Title
Tar USO eecion 05 ond Vous the tosemloton cr svatation'f which la omy manner to'an wear person is prohibited by low.



‘Revision of GOR 80 (+20) is Presently under consideration by the air staff.
The purpose of the revision is to up-date and better define the requirements for
the various sensing fumotions te be undertaken, It 1s expected that, when the
revised document is published, it will contain addenda for four separate sensing
sub-systens, i.e., visual, electronic, infrared, and & Rapping and charting
subsysten, ,



these studies is to determine whether a useful military intelligence system, utilising
am artificial earth satellite as @ carrier, can be foreseen with sufficient definitude
+ to indicate full development at this time. Maximm utilization of these design studies
in preparing the System Development Plan is directed,

@, One of the basic advantages of a satellite is its more-or-less unlimited
duration of flight, If we were to try to take full advantage of this flight duration
Capability, it would be necessary to achieve flight equipment relisbility far in
excess of that which is possible today. ‘here is @ point at which a balance can be
setelLite sen Gicerts sined at improving the reliability of flight cere fete ne
satellite, and the economy to be realised from the extended flight duration character-
istics of a satellite. The system design studies directed herein should result in a
suggested optimm systen flight time, for which in-flight components should be designed,

@. The proposed test program for the Advanced Reconnaissance System should be
mnie eo as to maximize the usefullness of the test vehicles to the scientific com
muni od Becosnelont ie ay to satisfy enviromental and engineering sess eee
the Advanced Reconnaissance System. The System Development Plan, should contain Provisions
for the fabrication and launching of "research laboratory uodels" of the satellite test
vehicle, capable of obtaining and tranemitting to earth Valuable scientific data on the
Space enviroment and astronomical bodies, Such vehicles should be planned for launching
early in the system test Program, with the first "research laboratory model" launching
Prior to 1 January 1959, if possible, :

vere: eee
|

rocctades Srtcen dete of te Unidos ihn the mooning of te Eslenepe Lev, The |
ony

This document eins intermett
its sien 793 at which

USC, Section 793 ead Pots the



2. Immediate. concentration of the reconnaissance satellite effort on high.
resolution.image ayatems aimed at the recognition of ground objects with character-
istic dimensions of 20 feet or less.

In 1957 the National Academy of Sciences - ARDC Study Group on Research and
Develorment Objectives for the USAF established a Joint Committee on Reconnaissance
which had the following membership: ;

Joseph V. Charyk, Chairman

Samuel Batdorf

Richard 8. Cesaro

W. J. Harris, Jr,

E. Rechtin :
The report of the study group discusses, among other things, the reconnaissance
mission and reconnaissance capabilities of satellites. Excerpts from that portion
of the report are included under TAB F. The committee report makes this recomen-

om

dation with respect to satellite reconnaissance:
“The reconnaissance satellite is the only system that is capable of
accomplishing the complete reconnaissance job. ‘The system appears
to be within or close to the present state-of-the-art and can uti-
lise booster units from the 107A program. It is recommended that

the earliest possible development of a-reconnaissance satellite be

pursued with vigor".

=~

5 -
—-~

‘This decument coatoins Information affecting the national defeme of United States within the
1a, UEC Section 795 ond 794, te woramlotion or roeleton of which in so'msttes joint chagitetind Site

Lows, Tithe
by few.


—_

2. Pictorial data such that creation of accurate topographic meps is possible;

3. A capability to detect and looate electronic sources, initially in the UHF,
L and 8 frequency bands;

4. A capability to view cloud coverage over a sufficiently broad area to aid
weather forecasting. ,

The GOR was followed by the issuance of an ARDC System Requirement No. 5 dated
17 October 1955 (THB G). By this time responsibility for the program had been trans-
ferred internally within ARDC to the Western Development Division (WOD). Consequently,
the Systen Requirenent directed the WD to prepare a System Development Plan for
Syatem Yo. 117L, “Advanced Reconnaissance Systen". ,

_ A Development Flan for WS 117L was prepared on 2 April 1956 and forwarded te
Headquarters USAF where it was approved on 2) July 1956. Approval was follownd by
issuance of USAF Development Directive No, 85 for WS 1171 dated 3 August 1956 (TAB D).
The development of WS 117L proceeded under these directives until responsibility for the
system was transferred to ARPA by the Secretary of Defense, and ARPA CGrder No. 9-58 was
issued for the program on 30 June 1958,

In recent years, the program has undergone increasingly frequent reviews by both
military groups and soientific review groups. Generally these groups were keenly inter-
ested in both reconnaissance requirements and the capability of WS 117L to meet these
requirements. :

The program was presented to the Reconnaissance Panel of the USAF Scientific
Advisory Board which published a report on 28 May 1956 (TAB EB). This report made two
recommendations: : : :

1. Vigorous support and expansion of the Rome Air Development Oenter experi-
mental evaluation of the intelligence parameters of. the reconnaissance satellite.

‘The document contelas
38, U.5.C., Section 793



a *

The longer lenses would provide more R&D information as well as supply a closer
look at areas of interest which have already been covered by 6-inch photography.
In addition, studies have been underway to sort out the problems and design a
6-inch cartographic camera systen, to do precise mapping, however, some major
changes to the system, such as optical tracking and/or non-electrical readout
(film recovery), might be required, These are presently being looked at. TV
techniques are also being explored for applicability. (TAB a) .

Modifications presently planned for improving the first ferret test.
system include efforts to do the items listed below, not necesssrily in order
of priority:

1. Include CW indication,

2, Increase frequency coverage above 16,000 mes. ; .

3s Increase accuracy of pulse width (PW) and pulse recurrence frequency (Pir),

4, Include a low frequency analogue recording capability.

5. Provide a technical intelligence capability by discerning modulated
PW and PHF.

6 Instrument for signal alams.of a pre-set combination of selected
frequency, PW and PHF,

7. Provide for stop-start scans, ,

8, Improve technical intelligence capability.

In addition, new systems will be evolved to sense and record activity indi-
cations, provide H. F, video analogue systeas, and provide better lecation achemes.
Many of the modifications will be streamlined to be responsive te specific requirements
and short develepment time demands are part of what is commonly referred to in the
Air Force as the Quick Reaction Capability: (QRC) technique.

‘This decement conta
18, U.S.C, Section



— aa

syoten of wilti-satellites having mixed sensors, The B&D program required to achieve
this surveillance capability covers a period of years during witch time the sensing
techniques will. be gradually evolved to collect data in finer and finer detail.
Ordinarily, such development would be accomplished completely within the AHDC freme-
work and would result in a first operational system a mumber of years after initi-
ation,. It is recognised however, that W3 1I7L BAD effort can produce as a by-product
of its development testing, intelligence information of great value to a number of
national agencies. Therefore, the development program has ‘been planned to make .
maxisnm beneficial use of the reconnaissance date collected during the R&D phase,
The point here is a cautionary one of not judging the worth of the surveillance
system being develeped on the basis of the early intelligence by-products derived
from testing. This is a completely new medium and, at least initially, requires
carefully controlled experimentation with incremental improvenents which will eventu-
ally result in the more complex, higher regolution systens required for surveillance.
Development considerations must be kept parmount during the development program if
we are to achieve a true surveillance capability in the shortest over-all period ef
time.

In the spring of 1955, design study proposals were solicited from selected
contractors from industry. ‘The number of sources sclici ted was limited by the desire
to maintain a seoure program throughout the design and development program. Since
the ultimate purpose of WS 1I7L is to collect and disseminate intelligence infor=
mation, the capability of the prime contractor to provide an sir frame and engines did
not need to be the sole guide as to the type of contractors solicited. Therefore, ,
those solicited were Lockheed Aircraft Corperation, Radio Corporation of America,
Glenn L. Martin Company and Bell Telephone Laboratories. Bell Telephone Laberatories



: HEADQUARTERS
ATR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
Post Office Box 1395
Baltimore 3, Maryland
SR No. 5

17 October 1955

1. DIRECTED ACTION
Submission, upon request, to Headquarters ARDC ( Western Development Division)
of information necessary for the preparatien of « Syston Development Fler ee we
ing participating centers is directed:
a. Wright Air Development Center,

be. Air Force Gambridge Research Center.

O- Holloman Air Development Center. Do
“mm iTeRvaLs Nee AT 12 YEAR
4. Rome Air Development Center DEL Aga rn AUTOMATICALL y
. 2 HR 5200.19

©. Arnold Engineering Development Center.

f. Air Force Missile Test Center,

&. Air Force Personnel and Training Research Center.
(UNCLASSIFIED)

2. GENERAL INFORMATION

a. Title: (UNCLASSIFIED) Advanced Reconnaissance System.

be System Nor 1171 .

O. Respensible Agency: Headquarters AKDO (Western Development Division) is
contained herein’ in ascondence “A ABD Go-ky tod 1 vnay 9e8, Toon

@, Target Dates:

(1) Submission of Systen Development Plan to Headquarters USAF: 1 April 1956,

Tais SR supersedes SR No. 5, dated 29 November 195k, title, "advanced Reconnaissance System.



Kt’ OM 6¢ Kee + TECH
ACK

AIR FORCE
BALLISTic
MISSILE
DIVISION

Bae
WS 117L VISUAL AND FERRET
(SECRET TITLE)

19 September 1958

EADQUARTERS
AIR
RESEARCH
AND
DEVELOPMENT
COMMAND



participated in these studies. The results of the studies are sumarized in
Figure 2 for 17-foot, 33-foot and 100-foot resolution.

The Ferret Subsystem is also being designed teward the leng range geal
of surveillance. ‘The early phases of the system provide the basic framework for
all of the future improvements and will do some things which ne other present
ferret system does, i.e., intercept and regerd vast mmbers of intercepts, rapidly
Process these data and relay information to the ground, all sutomatically. Initially,
the sensitivity and coverage of the system limits its over-all by-product use, how-
ever, modifications already underway, give promise of considerable improvements,

The major objectives of the ferret subsystem, as they relate to national
electronic intelligence objectives, are shown in Figures 3 through 7.
Til. Current Status of Visual and Ferret Subsystens.

Visual subsystem equipment in Gevelepmental model configuration will be
the six inch systen capable of resolving 100-foot objects on the ground. A study
Concerning locational accuracies of data frem the initial visual subsysten has just
been completed by Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corporation under Contract No.
AF 30(602)-1755. Conolusions of the study are based on the assumption that presently
expected accuracies will be met in the vehicle altitude and location in space as well
as in system design. Equations have been formulated which make it possible, with a
single picture, to locate any discrete point on the received'film to a CEP of 1500
feet, with reference to the North American datum, ‘This accuracy can be further
improved by statistical treatment of mltiple looks by the satellite at the same
peint and by reference to collateral geodetic data,

Lockheed has been asked to investigate the inclusion of longer focal
length lenses, possibly 18 inch or 2 inch fecal length, in the early vehicles,



stringent weight limitations imposed on the early photo systen design.

2. ‘he development time schedule is very short to achieve a reliable,
light weight, antomatic camera processing and readout system with proper ground
resolution.

3. The following major characteristics led to the selection of the strip
over the shutter type camera for the first series of tests:

a. Field of view: A strip camera covers the same ground swath as a °
frame camera with a lens covering a narrowed angle, This simplifies lens design,
particularly at the high resolution values required.

b. Depth of Focus: The 100 lines/mm resolving power of the system

- requires that the depth of focus be accurate to .001 inches. It is mech easier and
simpler te maintain this tolerance along the line of the elit than over an entire
square format. :

c. Shutter vibrations The vibration introduced inte a camera system
by a shutter is a degrading factor upon the resolution.

a. Simplicity ef Operations: The continuous film drive of-a strip
camera has ‘inherently more reliability then the step and repeat process of a frame
camera, Since image motion compensation is necessary the film must be moved at one
speed during exposure and another speed for re-cycle of a frame camera. This would
introduce complexity and lower reliability.

The undesirable characteristios of shutter cameras can probably be coped
with in the progressively advanced camera versions where more development time is
available and the weight of the package can be increased.

Simulated photographic interpretation analyses have been conducted peri-
oddoslly throughout the life of the development. Trained phote interpreters



2 eee

DEPARTMINT OF THE ATR FORGE
HEADQUARTERS, HITED STATES ATR FORCE
DIRECTORATE CF RESEARCH AMD DEVELOMtor

B.D. MO. 85
Date 3 August 1956
‘DEVELOPMENT DIREOTIVE

FoR:
(SHGL) WEAFON sysrmq 117L ADVANCED RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM

1. This Directive i, cable to GOR No. 80 dated 16 March 1955, and te the
Developmen eat Flan for Syeten io. IATL, dated 2 April'1956, approved by Headquarters
on 2% duly °

2. EBLATIVE IMPORTANCE. A Vital requirezent for the defense of the United
States is the earliest possible warning of 4 Soviet intention to attaek, This systen,
employing an orbiting satellite, can Provide at a reasonably early date, surveillance

Soviet e

event. Of equal importance is the need fer acquisition of accurate target information,
kept currently revised for effective Counter attack. ds by-product, Soviet knowledge
that they are under surveillance will, in itself, Provide a forceful deterrent to the
initdation of hostilities. This system is Presently assigned a 14 Priority and a 1-6
precedence rating, .

35 FUNDING INFORMATION. Because of fund Limitations #3,000,000 of Fr 1957
series Fonds are avaitiae to your Command to initiate tres development,

4. The above statements constitute a directive to initiate such dsvelopments.as-.
can be supported with the above fund Liuritations,

P-600

DOWNGRADED AT 12 yeag (al % Yn Setoen
INTERVALS, Noy AUTOMATICALLY R. L. JOHNSON
OECLASS oR Bnaae Colonel, USAF
/a/ WK . y Director of RED
f ; oefies, DCS/Development
SPENCER 8. HUNN

Colenel, Usar

Ohief, Program Control Division
Assistent for Development Programming
Office, DCS/Develepnent -



5. OTHER INFORMATION
a. SECURITY

Maintenance of Proper security of: this program is of paraneunt importance,
A basic guide te seeurity will be the following: all information which or

implies a date of operational availability for the Advanced Recomsaissance System; as

b. USB OF SCIENTIFIC CONSULTANTS

The bread greup of the engineering, physical, and geophysical sciences,
Mai seanoe Spore ee LY & develomant such as that contemplated inthe karanecy oon
naissance Systen, teanizes that ANDO make maximun use of the scientific and techeines

responsible for the Advanced eance System. Wherever possible, civilian
scientists who can contribute to the success of this project should be engaged in the
capacity of consultant to ARDC, and the results of their efforts made available to all
contractors on an equal basis.—{CONFIDENETAL,)-

CG. PRIORITY

Preparation of the Systen De t Plan directed herein will be carried
out under Priority 14, Precedence Tr-3.  (MOSarT

/s/ Don R. Ostrander

DOW B. OSTRANDER
Brigadier General, USAF
‘/a/ John A. Conor Assistant for Guided Missiles Systens

Deputy Coumander/Weapon Systems
JOHN A. CONNOR

Ghief, Program Centrol Division
Directorate of Systems Plans

This SR is Classified-sEcRET
a Be aie

el, par 230,

an

hel -werni> Bobet xrenreeory Biot

This document contal Information sitecting notional defence
18 OSE deaton 793 and 73a, the machetes Seceaneeia® of enmvtheclaed pecten fs presictied by

?
£
ri
i
af


II. Considerations and decisions to _ the current aj he

There ‘are ‘two underlying considerations to the WS 117L R&D program which
should be kept formost in mind in examining how well the system will satisfy the
intelligence needs of the country:

1. ‘The WS u7L will complement and supplement, but not replace, other
intelligence collection systems and techniques. It must be considered as a very
productive and timely adjunct to all other sources.

2. The WS 1171 has two major unique characteristics which sets it apart
froa ail other collection systens and specifies ite value:

a. It is capable of unlimited geegraphis access.
be It is capable of unlimited time access. :

These two features are fundamental and unique to all satellite eystens,
and provide the two ingredients which are basic to the requirements for surveillance.

The operational requirements and-goals stated in the various official docu-
mentation which esteblished the program and wrich have provided progran guidance to
date have been interpreted in the light af the above to mean that these ixportant
unique features should be exploited in a way which will contribute most to the over
all satisfactien of the national intelligence objectives within the context of all
sources of intelligence collection.

A third very important factor which should also be kept in mind is that
the WS 1I7L program is in the very early stages of develomment, and the primary
effort is directed toward developing in an orderly and timely way the capsbilities
which will eventaally accomplish the operational goele of survelllense through «

‘Tht docoment ants BB A Stetes within
Te" UlE:Co Socion 709 end’ 704, the tronemiuslen or revelation of wel Tavoar's bed belied Gs tow


ay

DEPARTMNT OF THE ALR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
DIRECTORATE OF REQUIREMENTS

YEAR GOR NO. _ 80 (Sk~20
} 2
DOWNGRADED AT 12 Toy
ATOMS 70 DATE: 16. March 1955

GEIERAL OPERATION EEQUIREMENT
R
A STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE WEAPON SYSTEM ASBORETY
I. PURPOSE ©

This General Operational Requirement is in support of the Strategic Systems
Development Planning Objective 1955-1970. It is desired that devel. opment action
following this requirement result in a satellite weapen system capable of providing
continuous reconnaissance of the earth. (SR6RET}

II, OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE

The operatienal objective of this recqnnaissance system is continuous surveillance
of preselected areas of the earth to determine the status of a potential enemy's war-
making capability. (SECRET)

TIT. EMEMY EFFECTIVENESS ESTIMATES

Pertinent Soviet capabilities will be covered in detail in the GOR Intelligence
Summary, when published. Until that time the interim references are Air Intelligence
Studies FAIS 2-1, FAIS 2-2 and FAIS 2-3. ~(CoMr)-

IV. FRIENDLY SAVIRONMENT
A. General

—

It is desired that the satellite be launched from the Continental limits of
the United States and monitored from stations within the Western Hemisphere. -(SEGRET)

B. Ground Based Facilities

1. Facilities for launching this. system will be fixed, semipermanent type
installations, -(aBqnRT) ,

offecting the

‘This document conteias latermotion
18, U.E.C., Bection 793 ond 794, the



= aa

@. Mission

a.

(1) The primary operational mission of the Advanced Reconnaissance Systen
will be to provide Pioneer ang surveillance veconnajssance coverage
of the territories controlled ‘by the USSR and its allies. The aysten

Routine terrain, and photo
(a) prese target, aaPeing, Pioneer y weather,

(b) Bomb damage assesanent of high yield weapon strikes.

(2) An alternate and Ce-equal mission for the Advanced Reconnaissance
System will be to Provide and maintain continuous Comprehensive
surveillance of the electronic activities of the as a means of
securing basic Soviet intentions, intelligence, and capsbilities
intelligence. ‘he electronic reconnaissance (ferret) system should
be capable of:

(a) Sensing, coding, recording and retransmitting all significant :
electronic emissions on both a qualitetie ea quantitative basis.

(bo) The location of areas-of high electronic densities Compatible with
the resolution capsbilities obtainable.

(3) Each mission carries a firm requirement for a suiteble date
and processing Capability both in the vehicle and on the ground,

Physical Characteristics ‘ ;
The Advanced Reconnaissance System can’ be described as follows:

(1) A launching base which will consist of all facilities and equipment
necessary for the proper launching of the satellite vehicle,

(2) A satellite vehicle which will consist of the following sub-systens:

(a) Propulsion stage or stages necessary to boost the reconnaissance
payload to its orbital altitude and once at this altitude to

impart the velocity required to establish the satellite on its
orbit.

(b) Guidance and control equipment to (a) guide the vehicle from the
launching base to its: orbit and (b) establish and maintain the
reconnaissance payload in the correct attitude after it has been
Placed on orbit,



area

From mid-1951 to March 1954, RAMD continued intensive investigations of certain
critical elements of a reconnaissance satellite. Other contrastors and sub-contractors
participated in this phase of the RAND progran as follows:

1. Suitability of television for satellite reconnaissance -- Radio Corporation
of America, ,

2. Auxiliary power plants for vehiele-horne equipment -- Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing Company, Bendix Aviation Corporation, Frederic Flader, Inc., and Vitro
,_ Corporation, a conducted for ARC at Air Force request.

3. <Attitude-sensing and control for an orbiting vehicle; take-off guidance
system te place a vehicle in orbit -- North American Aviatdon.

In March, 1954, the results of eight years of effort on the part of RAND were
Presented in a final report on "Project Feed Back", as the prograa was then called?
RAND stepped out of the picture after presenting the final report, vhich included the
recommendation that the Air Force continue the program on a full-scale basis,

Meanwhile, in the latter part ef 1953, the Air Force established a research and
development project at Wright Air Development ‘Center for an advanced reconnaissance
system, ‘The project was assigned various numbers: Projeqt 409-40, Project MX-2226
and, finally, Project 1115. Under this project, numerous studies were initiated to
advance the state of the art in areas of importance to a satellite. Various con-
tractors and ARDC centers actively participated in the project. Oritical technical
areas which were intensively studied includeds ,Ruslear, solar and chemical energy
sources for auxiliary power to operate satellite equipment; component reliability
required for long-life satellite equipments acquisition and tracking of the orbiting
vehicle; and data acquisition, storage, tranemission and interpretation. Also, ex-
tensive and continuing investigation of military requirements for the type reconnaissance

—- worms

formation effecting the notional defense of Expleoage Laws,
td WEL Resion 793 nd Te hu Wocanhulen oF trelahen oF ‘Sicha ony mane foe is'ew eeuntnertend pecven 'presieied OY laws





USAF PRIORITH ES



I. HISTORY OF FORMULATION OF REQUIREMENTS FoR WS 107L

In 19h6 the Air Force directed Project RAMD to study the feasibility of arti-
fiolal earth-oircling satellites. ° A study was completed in May 19l)6 which concluded
that a large rocket would have sufficient performance to place several hundred pounds
of payload in orbit. The following year, 1947, additional studies were conducted
by RAND, which refined rocket performmce estimates and gave further insight into
operational aspects.

‘In 1948, the DOD Research and Development Board approved Air Force sponsorship
of effort in the satellite field. At that time, RAND was requested by the Air Force
te continue investigating satellites, with emphasis on possible uses of such a vehi-
ole, and recommended appropriate satellite development programs.

During 1949 and 1950 RAND carried out comprehensive studies concerned with
satellite reconnaissance by means of television. These investigations culminated in
@ detailed report published by RAND in April, 1951, "Utdlity of a Satellite Vehicle
for Reconnaissance" .2 ;

Thies report, which was principally cencerned with a television reconnaissance
vehicle, discussed among other things the requirements for pictorial reconnaissance.
Gonclusfons. were that resolutions of 50 to 500 fect were acceptable depending on
the type of observations to be made, and that such resolutions were possible within
the state of the art. Further, it was concluded that bomb damage assesament would

require resolving power as low as 10 feet, which would probably be beyond the scope
of the system.



SR No. 5

(2) Operational time period of this systens Prior to 1965 through,
1970 (See par 5a). . :

e. Participation, Coordination, or Interest:

(1) Ady Materiel Command - (P).

(2) Ady Preving Ground Cosmand = (P).

(3) Ady Training Command - (P),

(4) Strategic Air Command - (0).

(5) Air Defense Coomand - (c).

(6) Gwe, USN ~ (r),

(7) C/s, Usa - (I),

(8) cla - (1),
under BPS ae Information: Funds for this program are carried for FY 1956
&- References:

(2) GOR Wo: 80 (84-20), dated 16 March 1955.

(2) DD Forn 613, title, “Advanced Reconnaissance System", Project No. 15,
dated 19 April 1955, ROS: DD-R&D/, e

(SECRET)
3. REQUIREMENT:
&. General Philosophy
to permit selection of the most effective appreach to an Advanced

In order
Recomnaissance Systen Concept which utilises an earth satellite as a systen platform, it
is essential that the existing and projected state-of-the-art in this field



i

‘WOLISSIED

CHa

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY -
DECLASSIFIED, DOD DIR 5200.10 ~

This material contains’ information
affecting the national’ defense of
the United States within the mean-~
ing of the Espiohage Lawg, Title 18,

U.8.C., Sections 793 and”79h, the”
* auanaiy— transmission or revelation of which
dn any manner to an unauthorized

‘person is prohibited by law.



~tsrenar)-
4

(3)

GUIDANCE
Three parallel system design studies on the "Advanced Reconnaissance System"

(a)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(a)

station. the alternate mission will require sensing equipaent
that is capable of detecting electromagnetic radiations instead
of physiographic features,

Information storage equipment with a Capability of routinely
storing the information gathered by the satellite vehicle until
it can be transmitted to a Ground receiving station, —

Transmitter equipment for trenamission of the collected recon-
naissance information, transmission and reception of any other
information that is required to properly operate the satellite
and its equipment,

Miscellaneous equipment required for the proper functioning of

the satellite; e.g., a transponder bescon to aid in the tracking

t the satellite by @ ground receiving station might conceivably
used,

4n auxiliary power ly to previde sufficient power for all af
the satellite's Reeds

Provision for self-destruction of the satellite vehicle upon .
of its operational usefulness,

The ground receiving station will consist of the following sub-systems:

(a)

(b)

(e)

(a)

(e)

Receiving equipment te (a) receive the tranmnitted’ reconnaissance
infomation, (b) enable vehicle tracking, and (c) any other infor.
mation trenamitted from the satellite,

Tranemitter equipment. to transmit any required information to the
satellite,

Information storage equipment that will retain the reconnaissance
information trananitted from the satellite until it is fully used,

Display equipment that will display the reconnaissance information
as it is received and; which can algo be used for viewing stored
information,

Other equipment that is required for the handling, interpretation
and dissemination of the reconnaissance data thet is received,

are currently being. conducted under Task No. 21010, Project No. 1115.



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