Air Force Space Policy to 1959

The expression of policy is not limited to Policy statements, It
is present too, at least by implication, in many decisions of an opera-
tional nature. Certainly the Air Force was moved bya Policy of careful
investigation in 1946 when it directea RAND to study the feasibility of
satellites and in 1947 when it instructed AMC to evaluate the studies.
But there was no doctrine at the time to define ‘the role that the Air

- Force should play in Space. In December 1947, sMc's approval of the

RAND studies and recommendation that the Air Force initiate a satellite
Project impelled Lt. Gen. Howard A. Craig, DCS/Materiel, to urge the
Chief of Start to define the Air Force Position on space, 27 On 15 Janu-
ary 1948, Gen. Foyt 8. Vandenberg, Vice Chier of Steff, signed the. fol-
lowing Space Policy Statement:

Cost--to insure development in critical components, if indicatea,
and to recommend initiation of the development phases of the proj-
ect at the proper time.

In the next nine years, 1948-57, the Air Force had no formally ap-

AX
We show Space program, but it never lost interest in the Possibility of

|

such @ progrem and never rescinded the Policy statement or 15 January
1948, Consequently when the nation's reaction to Sputnik made a national
space progran inevitable, the Air Force was in a position to develop from
Vandenberg's statement ® policy on space missions,



37

strongly to the Air Force. They meant that Dyna Soar could be manned
and utilized for reconnaissance, offensive, and defensive purposes at
altitudes beyond the atmosphere--and if necessary remain aloft indefi-.
“nitely as a satellite. Moreover, the vehicle's capacity for safe re-
entry and its use of conventional landing gear would permit it to
use the vast empire of ground facilities constructed by the Air Force
before the beginning of the space age. In brief, Dyna Soar might
serve as a transition between the existing Air Force and the Aerospace

' Force of the not so distant future.

The ever increasing value of Dyna Soar gave the Air Force much
the same potential for the future that the atomic submarine-Polaris
system gave the Navy. But in 1959 there was still no adequate booster
that could meet the eeronautical, missile, and space requirements of
the vehicle. In some ways Saturn seemed a logical booster candidate,
but the Air Force preferred the 1, 500, 000-pound-thrust. engine, On
the other hand, the Army was eager to marry Saturn and Dyna Soar, since
the big booster had no defined mission in 1959 beyond its early
developmental shots. Wernher von Braun made several proposals to
seal this marriage, and as @ result the Air Force almost lost a
Soar to NASA when the latter took over Saturn in October ps9. » ytth
the passing of this hazard, it seemed unlikely that the Air Force
would lose Dyna Soar in the future, ,

Up to this point there had still been no. selection of a contractor
for the manufacture of the Dyna Soar, and the Project seemed stalled

in negotiations between USAF agencies and interested industries. In


Army, Nevy, and Air Force on the basis of Competence and primary
interest. Under this arrangement, Midas and Samos were marked for
the Air Force, although formal transfer did not follow damediately,
Likewise Transit, a more recently planned Bavigational Project, would
&0 to the Navy and a Notus family of four commmication satellites

to the Amy,

The ruling practically removed ARPA from Pperticipation in
astronautics. The swing of the pendybm vas elmost complete from
February 1958 when the agency had possessed sole responsibility for
the national space program, The ruling also removed the Army from
booster @evelopment, Presumably, therefore, Saturn would go to the
Air Force,

For three reasons cogent to Administration leaders; the Air
Force did not get Saturn, First, thé military Space program had
retained no specific Tequirement for an engine with a 1, 500, 000-pound
thrust, Second, the civilian agency could place better claims on
Saturn as needed for long-term developaents. And third, the nature
of NASA's clain satisfied the Bureau of the Budget that there would
be no inmediate demands for increased allocations of funds. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff urged that Seturn be kept within the Department of
Defense, but tn vain, On 2) October 1959 the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Thomas 8, Gates, signed an agreement with Dr, Glennan for
the transfer of Saturn to NASA, and the President gave prompt epproval,

The actual transfer of Samos and Midas Occurred in late November _
1959. ‘To the surprise of many, ARPA also. relinguished Project



for support of various Projects in the civilian Pprogrea, In addition,
the Air Force carried on the following activities that bordered on
the space program:

Project FY 1959 Fy 1960
Dyna Soar $29,500,000 $35,000,000
HETS (Hypersonic Environment Test

System, formerly known as BRATS) 44,200,000 3, 900, 000
Study Requirement Progren 2,900,000 3, 300,000
Applied Research in Aerospace 27,800,000 42,600,000

Total $b, 300,000 $84, 800,000

In further evaluating USAF space activities, the importance of the
contribution made by the ballistic missile program must be recognized. .
For fiscal years 1954-59 the ballistic missile program budgets, in-
cluding Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman, totaled more than $5 billion.

For this ewe program the 1960 budget was more than $2 billion and for
1961 about $2 billion. How much of these suns may be considered
direct support of astroneutics is quite impossible to calculate.

Finally, the Air Force made available to ARPA and NASA the vast
USAF facilities that had been brought into existence to meet the tech-
nological requirements of aircraft and missiles, Again, an estimate of

its proportionate worth to the space progran is impossible, but without
this iumense capital investment--nearly $600 million in the Atlantic

Missile Range alone--the Space program would have been seriously

handicapped.
we
wy Ez ij


10

of the. Viking, Jong ago produced by Glenn L. Martin for naval participa-
tion in the White Sends experiments, The Air Forve, vith no adequate -
nommilitary missile at its dieposal, could do only one. of two things--.
recommend the production of a new rocket engine, an undertaking that
might interfere with the ballistic missile Progrem, or suggest the use
of an Atlas ICEM, which would be Qs objectionable as 2 Redstone. Un-
willing to risk interferences with the missile ‘Program, the Air Force
proposed an Atlas-boosted satellite, knowing that the Project would go
by default to the Navy.23

On 29 July 1955 the President announced that the Unites States, as
part of its Iay contributions, would attempt to launch a number of 21.
pound satellites without the use of military missiles, The Project,
known as Vanguard, although organized in the Department of Defense under
Navy management, would be divorced from military signiticance,1+

The U.8, decision to exclude the use of & military booster became
@ significant factor in the 1957 Soviet space victory. There vere two
reasons: first, the Navy turned to Martin for the Vanguard modification
St ® Sime when thet company vas engeged in a reorganisation of the Vik-
ing development teau; second, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
caused further delays because it had little enthusiagm for the space
Program, withheld "first importance” status from the Project, granted
"dribbling" support, end released funds at an inadequate rate,15

The day after the President announced Vanguard, the New York Times
noted that “the United States and Russia now Sppear to be in a race for

tos}



52

35.

36.

37

38.

39.

Statements by Lt Gen Samel E, Anderson, Comdr, ARDC, and Brig Gen
John A. Barclay, USA, CG/ABMA, in Hearings Before House Gate on
Science and Astronautics, 3 and 5 Feb 59. .

Memo (C) for DCS/P&P from Col Sydney G. Fisher, Asst D/Policy,

qibdt Definition of Aerospace, 20 Mar 594 mano’ (¢} for DCS/PP from
Col Richard H. Ellis, Asst D/var Plans, subj: Definition of
Aerospace, 26 Mar 593 AFM 1-2, Aerospace Doctrine, 1 Dec 59, p 6

Memo (S) for Gen Gerhart from Brig Gen Homer A. Boushey, D/AT,
subj: Air Force Missions In Space, 7 Jan 59.

Memo (S) for Gerhart from Lt Gen R.C. Wilson, Dsc/p, subj: Air
Force Missions in Space, 12 Jan 59; Air Staff Summary Sheet (S),
subj: USAF in Space, a Policy Statement, 30 Jan 593 memo (S) for
DCs/D. from Maj Gen Hewitt Vheless, D/Plans, subj: Air Force Objectives
in Space, 5 Feb 593 Hq SAC brochure (sy Strategic Air Command Space
» D, » Bq USAF
to Kelly Campbell, Starr Asst, House Cte on Appropriations, ns,
9 Oct 59; Johnson statement as cited in n 32.

Tross 20 Jan 59; as ited in note above; meno (5) for Gerhart from -
vheless, subj: Aerospace and National Security 1960-1970, 17 Jan 59;
memo (S) for Gerhart fron Martin, D, » Subj: USAF Responsi-
bilities in Aerospace, 17 Jan 593 ltr (S), Gerhart to It Gen
Exmett O{Denned, Jr, Dos/P, ns, 15 dan 294 meno (S) for D/ASEA from
Malcolm A, yre, subj: Advance gram Areas for tary
Space Systens, 14 Apr 59, and 2 incle; Purpose of Requirenents and

: for Military Space Program; ltr (S), Gen Thomas s.
Sehsvers Coase Sane, Mees ne, 9 15 ay 9p Mdadne penne?

‘er, son, ns 5% per
for Des /PeP, re Gen Powers itr,'19 Feb 59 Ite (3), Witee en

2 ns, 8 Jun 59,

Memo by Col Asa B, Gibbs, subj: Astronautics in the Air Force, nd
but evidently written shortly after Sputnik,

Memo (C) for vc/S from Col V.Y. Adduci, OLL, ns, 22 Hoy 573 memo (S)
for Maj Gen Jacob E. Snart, Asst VC/S from It Gen Donald L. Putt,
D /D, subj: Establishnent of a Directorate of Astronautics, 10
lec 57.
information

New York Mmes, 14 Dec 57; verbal/fron office of (/S through Col
John L. Martin, D/AT, 27 Jul 603; memo for All Directors

st al.
from Putt, subj: Cancellation of the Memorandum of 10 Dec 53, dtd

Memo (S) for Air Staff from Asst Vo/S, subj: Space Projects Involving
T Dafoe mene (8) tor Smart Prom Kaj Gon Joln Miliay
Asst DCS/D, subj: A Directorate of Advanced Weapons, 12 Mar 58,



50

15.

16.
17.

19.

Victor P. Petrov, "Sputnik Not So Secret,"
Mar 583 Report of the Teller Committee, 22 Oct 57 (8); John C.
» "CIA~Eyes and Ears of U.S. ," Baltimore Sun, 12 Jun 60.

Memo (C) for Secys of Army, Navy, and Air Force from Wilson, subj:
Earth Satellites, 28 Mar 55.

Memo (S) for Aset SOD (R&D) from Robert W. Cairns, Chan, Coordi~
nating Cmte of Gen Sciences, subj: Scientific Satellite Program in
the Department of Defense, 4 May 553 memo (S) for SAF from Gardner,
subj: Sclentific Satellite, 17 May 55; Rpt by Surveys and Investi-
gations Staff to House Cmte on Appropriations, "Project, Vanguard,"
in Hearings Before Subcmte of House Cute on Appropriations, 86th
Cong, 1st Sess, 2: st;

pé.

NSC 5520 (S), 25 May 55; New York Times, 30 Jul 55.

Memo (S) for Secys of Amy, Navy, and Air Force from Ruben B.

Robertson, Jr, eo SOD, subj: Technological Program for NSC 5520,
9 Sep 55; memo (C. for Asst SN (R&D) from Gardner, subj: Air Force
Missile Training Center, Patrick AFB, 10 Jan 563; Werner Buedler,

i Su (New York, 1957), pp 49~523
Hearings, "Project Vi g » 6 Oct 573 Clifford
C. Furnas (former Asst SOD » 1955-57), in New York Times,
16 Oct 57,

Hew York Tinos, 30 Jul 55,
"Project Vanguard,” Missiles and Rockets, Jul 55.

Lt Gen James M. Gavin, USA (Red) ar_apd Pesce in the Space. Ane
(New York, 1958), pp 14-153 Testimony by Maj Gen John B. Modaris,
TSA (ata), in Hearings Before House Cmte on Science and Astronautics,

Memo (S) for [27 Field, D/R&D from Col William 0. Davis, Dep. Comdr
Ope, AFOSR, subj: FAR SIDE Project Justification, 12 Jul 57;
Asronantics Srstene Inc., Pub C-100 (c), Condust of Tar Side Phase
Experinents, Sep 573 S.F. Singer, "Synoptic servat:
of the Upper Atmosphere," Nature, 20 Jul Shy from S.F. Singer,
ns, 24 Feb 56, in AFOSR files; memo for Col’/'T'7 Flickinger free
Gol. W.0. Davis, subj: Project MOUSE, 30 Jul 5k; itr (8), Brig Gen
H. F. Gregory, Comir, AFOSR to Maj Gen W.M. Morgan, Comin, CRC, ne,
17 Apr 57; AFOSR Status of Research Projects (3), dad amd Oct 56;
itr (8), Col W. 0. Davis to Comir, ARDC, subj: Coordination of
Project FAR SIDE, 25 Oct 573 ltr (C), Brig Gen Alfred D. Starbird,
DMA, AEC to Comdr, AFOSR, ns, 17 Apr 573 ltr (C), James H. .
SAF, to Secys of State and Interior, ns, 3 Jun 57; ltr (Cc), S/State
to SAF, ns, 21 Jun 57; AFOSR Management Rpt (c), FAR SIDE, 10 Oct 57.

of



56

TL.

72.
73.
Th.

15.
16.

78.
19.

82..

63.

Memo (8) for JCS fram Gates, Acting SOD, subj: Responsibility
and Organization for Certain Space Activities, 8 Oct 59; draft:
memo (8) for 60D from JCS, subj: Responsibility and Organization
for Certain Space Activities, 19 Oct 59.

Memo (8) for Gen Martin, D/Plens, DCS/P&P from Col Robert R. Row-
land, Dep D/Policy, subj: Agreement on Super-Boosters, 13 Nov 59.

Memo, for Asst See DOD (Comptroller) from Gates, Deputy SOD, ns,
1 Bec 59.

“Techuicel Sypport System Sumary," 10 Apr 59; New York Times
9 dua 59; DAF White House Information Brief, 12 aug GOe

ARDC RAP Project Card (8), 10. Oct 573 GOR 92, 12 May $5.

Memo tor Record (8) yy Lt Col Benjamin H. Ferrer, DCS/D, subj:
Boost-Glide Concept, 4 Nov 57; DCS/D Deve2opment Directive 9h (s),
sgd by Boushey, subj: Hypersonic Strategic Weapon. System, 25 Nov
573 memo (8) for VC/S from Swofford, Asst DCS/D, subj: Accelerate
DYNA SOAR Program, 14 Feb 58; memo (8) for C/S USAF from MacIntyre,
ns, 5:Jun 58; ltr, } Gen W. P. Fisher, Dep D/OLL to Rep.. James
P. 8. Devereux, ns, 16 Jun 58.

‘Ltn (8), Swofford, Actg Des/D to Comar, ARDC, subj: Selection of
Sontawetor for WE-464L (DYNA SOAR), 25°Jun 58.

Ltr (8), Anderson, Comdr, ARDC to Wilson, DC8/D, ne, ak Jul 58.

Memo for Record (S) by Col Ferrer, D/AT, subj: DYNA SOAR Meeting
with Mr. Horner on 2 Oct 58, dtd 6 Oct 58; memo (8) for c/s USAF
from Douglas, SAF, ns, 15 Oct 58; memo (s) for All Directors et al.
from Col J. R. Finton, Exec, DCS/D, subj: DYHA SOAR, 29 Oct 55;
memo (8) for SOD from Johnson, subj: DYNA SOAR, 7 Nov 50,“

Draft memo (S) by D/AT, 23 Oct 59, to be sent by SAF to SOD, subj:
Required Action on DYNA SOAR, se

Meno for Record by Ferrer, subj: DYNA SOAR Decision, 29 Sep 59; ltr,
Col George B. Munroe, Jr, Tech Exec, D/AT, to DC8/D, 18 Nov 59,
with 5 atchs and suggestion that DYNA SOAR item be submitted to

C/S USAF.

DYNA SOAR Chronology, in D/AT files,

Jones Baay, "DYNA SOAR Puts AF Back in Space," Missiles and Rockets,

16 Nov 598

" ”



ARPA-Army :

ARPA-USAP
ARPA-Arny
ARPA-Navy
ARPA-UGAF
ARPA-Army
ARPA-USAP

ARPA- Army
Anpa-vaar

Satellite Lamchings

4 Oct 1957 to 26 Rov 1959.
Code Neme Launch Date
Sputnik I 4 Oct 57
Sputaik IT 3 Nov 57
Vanguard (1) 6 Dec 57
Explorer (1) I 31 Jan 58
Venguard (2) 5 Feb 58
Explorer (2) 5 Mar 58
Vanguard (3) I 17 Mar 58
Explorer (3) II 26 Mar 58
Vanguard (1) 28 Mar 58
Sputnik ITT 15 May 58
Vanguard (5) 27 May 58
Vanguard (6) 2%6 Jun 58
“ eplorer (4) 12 26 Jul 58
Pioneer (1) 17 dug 58 |
"Explorer (5) ah dug 58
Vanguard (7) 2% Sep 58
Pioneer (2) I 11 oct 58
Beacon (1) 23 Oct 58
Pioneer (3) IT 8 Nov 58
Pioneer (4) 121 7 Dec 58
Score 18 Dee 58
Tunik I 2 Jan 59

Success
Orbital
orbital
Meanfunction
‘Orbital?
Malfunction


hei TG WALT E

would give new dimensions to meteorology. All three projects would

extend into space the vange of time-honored activities previously
earthbound. They were sure to be of inestimable value both for
civilian and military purposes.

There was also a most hopeful outlook for some of the purely
military projects of immediate significance, The Air Force Samos and
Midas were needed for reconnaissance, to help insure egainst surprise
attack by photographing unusual enemy activity and by detecting with
infrared technique the launchings of eneny ICBM's,

Yet the shadow of too-little-and-too-late continued to darken the
national program as avwhole. From the spring and sumer of 1955 until
October 1957 the Soviet Union and the United States were both supporting
satellite Projects, but the United States avoided a race with Russia,
and the Russians took first place. Between October 1957 and December
1959 the Soviet Union end the United States bvoth supported numerous
Space projects. Again the American Goyernment disavowed the idea of
& race with the Soviet Union, And since the latter had the great
advantage of high-thrust rockets, the Kremlin was able to be first in
many outstanding ventures. As 1959 arev to an end the United States and
the Soviet Union were both Planning to place a man in space as a step
toward the ultimate aim of a manned space station. It could only be
hoped that Russia would not once more be first,

Inevitably, and seemingly against the desires of the American
Government, we have been drawn into a race for Space. The Russian
challenge cannot be ignored without forfeiting our position as the leader
of the Free World. The prize is within our reach, but to grasp it ve

must have the heart for the race,



neither effort was the Air Force successful. There came to be a para-
dox: the more attempted the less accomplished.
Directorate of Advancea Technology

In November 1957, Col. Vv. Y.. Adduci, Assistant Director, Office of
Legielative Liaison, urged the Air Force "to Jump the gun on the Problen
of astronautics by appointing either & Director or Assistant Chief of
Staff for Astronautics," In view of the Growing opposition within Head-
quarters USAF to the further creation of assistant chiefs of staff there
was little Probability of Placing the Space agency at thet level. . Con.
ceivably, it could have been located in the Office of the Assistant Chier-
of Staff for Guided Missiles, where there was already some Capability for
the work. The Chief of state Gecided, however, to Place the agency under
the Deputy Chier or Staff / Development. 0a 10 December, General Putt
announced the establishment in the DCS/Development of the Directorate
of Astwoneuties, to be headed by Brig. Gen. Rumer A, Boushey,, 42

The Department of Defense reacted adversely to this action, Willien
Holaday, Defense Director of Guided Missiles, Publicly stated that the
Air Force “wanted to grab. the limelight end establish a position.” The
Secretary of Defense cupressed his opposition to use of the term "astro-
nautics" which seemed to him an Air Force bid for populer support.
Strong preasure on Headquarters USAF from above, verbal rather than
written, made it advisable on 13 December for General Putt to cancel his
memorandum of 10 December, #2



36

the midst of these delays, General White expressed dissatisfaction
with the lack of progress, and directed that the Project "get off.
dead center." Within a matter of days, lower echelons resolved the
remaining contractual difficulties, and on 9 Movember 1959 the
Secretary of the Air Force announced once more the choice of Boeing
and Martin as contractors, this time to manufacture respectively the
vehicle and the booster, There was widespread satisfaction within the
‘Air Force and elsewhere at the turn of events. As one civilian writer
expressed it, the Air Force “soared back" irito astronautics with an
: serodynemic and maneuverable space ship that would orbit the Earth

at a velocity of 14,000 mph, meet the needs. of reconnaissance and
‘benbing missions, intercept enemy satellites, and yo @ successful
reentry and safe landing at the will of the pilot.

the e 1957-'

The funding of the space program for fiscal years 1958-60 was
very complex. Since Sputnik came after the fiscal year 1958 eppropri-
ations were already in effect, adjustuents to the new requirements
were difficult. Later on, complexities increased with the multipli-
cation of space agencies and the transfer of funds emong them.

Bven within the Air Force it was difficult to unravel the tangle
of funding because in Preparing the budget Headquarters USAF did not
Gistinguish the space Program within the overall USAF program for
research and development. Nor did funding plans draw a sharp line
between seronautic and astronautic Projects. And finally, the space
program, though distinct from the missile Program, was dependent upon



THE THRESHOLD OF SPACE
(THB ATR FORCE IN THE NATIOMAL SPACE PROGRAM, 1945-1959)

In October 1957 the Soviet Union staked out for itself historical
‘primacy in space by leunching Sputnik I--the first man-made satellite
to orbit the Earth. This triumph vent to. Russia by default, for the
United States could have been first to place a satellite in orbit. To
many ‘mericans, it seemed that, more than anything else, our failure
was the result of national complacency, And there is mich in the ‘record
to support this explanation of events.

Space Work Prior to Sputnik

‘the will to trespass upon space 4s as old as mythology, but it re-
mained a fentasy until the Germans dramatized the power of rocketry
with the V-2 in‘World War II. It seemed clear that this propulsion, if
properly developed, could break the restrictions of Earth's gravity and
veach both orbital and escape velocities. Equally important for a space
vehicle was the rocket's independence of the atmosphere. Structurally
free of serodynamic requirements--unless needed for controlled reentry-.

. and breathing the oxygen of its own fuels, the rocket could travel to
literally unlimited distances in the near vacuum of space. At first it
seemed that to increase the size of the rocket engine would be to in-
crease the thrust proportionately, However, it was soon Spperent that
combustion flemes behave differently in chambers. of different dimensions, -



> \
\

Upon the personnel and facilities of AFEMD, which, to the concern of
its commander, had no managexial control over the 21 space projects
being developed for ARPA and wasa,63

jor. jtments ~Decenber 1:

In the spring of 1959, widespread dissatisfaction with the pro-
gress made by the space Progrem led to changes in organization that
were of far-reaching consequence. On 13 April 1959, Headquarters
USAF issued the equivalent of a charter that gave the Directorate of
Advancea Technology authority to coortinate within the Air Starr all
USAF space activities. The Assistant Chief of Stafr for Guided Mis-
siles retained no space responsibility except the coordination of
requirements for ballistic missile resources including boosters,
static test feeilities, and range and launch fecilities.°+

Still another change occurred on 9 November 1959 when Dcs/
Development redesignated the Director of Advanced Technology as the
Assistant for Astronautic Systems. ‘The Chief of Starr approved ‘the
shift to Assistant status in December but would not permit use of the
term Astronautic Systems. In his new position the Assistant for Ad-
vanced Technology had overall responsibility within DC8/De velopment
for policy guidance and Program direction in the broad areas of bal-
listic missiles or vehicles, ballistic missile warning and defensive
systems, and vehicles and a to operate in Space, including those
for detecting and tracking,

Simultaneously with these USAF orgenization changes, differences
emong the military services came into the open, In late April 1959 the

Chief of Naval Operations, "in a bold bid for a major share" in the


‘Atr Force space policy ceme to consist of four major assumptions,
First, any space program would depend upon & mushrooming space tech-
nology, and thatin turn required extensive research and development,
Second, because of its role in al) operations above the surface of the
Earth, ‘he Air Force held en inhetent right to a dominant role in apace
operations. Third, for the sake of clarity in military plans it was
necessary to define the Air Force mission in space operations. And
fourth, space would become more and more critical for the militery
_Security of the nation. This last point had been the beart of the 1955
GOR Mo. 60 that first called for a satellite Weapon system, 31 Gradually
the Department of Defense, and many members of Congress too, came to ac-
cept this same view. 32 :

The Air Force naturally sought leadership in space military opera-
tions. In March 1958, Gen, Thomas D, White, Chier of staff, USAF,
reverting to Vandenberg's thene of 1948, wrote:33

For all practical Purposes air and space merge, form a
Continuous and indivisible field of operations. Just es in the

As a compact expression of air-space relationship, the Office of the
Chief of Staff introduced the term "aerospace,"3+ The meaning of the
word was not understood dnmediately either within the Air Force or
eleevhere.35 Confusion led’ the Aix Staft to ‘Beek a definition, and



prestige." The Air Force hoped to keep these missions for itself, and
the paper, signed by Richard E. Horner, Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Research and Development): recommended "thet the astronautical
Program be spproved and the necessary resources sought to implenent
1t."* Mr, Holaday received ‘the paper on 24 January but made no coment.
or reply. This Silence on the part of OSD vas @ disappointment to

*ihe Proposed program consisted of the following systems and subsystems:

I. 609, Ballistic Test and Related Systems
1. BRATS, Space Research and Experiments
2. Aerial Survey and Target Locating Systen (Recon)

Tl. 447, Mannea Hypersonic Research System
3- X-15, Space Research and Experiment
4. Advanced ic Research Aircraft (Manned Space Flight,
Space R&D,

ITI. 46%, Dyna Soar
3+ Manned Capsule Test (Manned Space Flight)
6. Conceptual Test (Manned Space Flight, R&D)
T- Boost Glide Tactical (Weapon Delivery)
8. Boost Glide Interceptor (Countermeasure)
9. Batellite Interceptor (Countermeasure)
10. Global Reconnaissance .
21. Global Bomber (Weapon Delivery)

IV. WB-317 L Satellite systen ;
12. Advanced Reconnaissance Satellite
13. Recoverable Data (Photo Capsule) (Recon)
14. 2h-hour Reconnaissance Systen .
ips Manned Strategic Btation (Weapon Dev and Recon)
+ Strategic Communications Station (Data Tranemission)

Vv. 499, Lunar Base System
17. ween) erasble Trajectory and Test Vehicle (Recon ana
Exper,
18. Nuclear Rocket Test {fesce Recon and moet}



19

essential to USAF space activities. -Of course the Amy and Navy too had
spece aspirations, and there developed a triservice struggle before the
Congressional coumittees. A further complication was the role of ARPA
in shaping military space Projects to meet the desires cf the Department
of Defense and the Administration, Tn March 1959 the Air Force argu-
ments before the congressional Committees were blunted by Roy 8. Johnson,
ARPA's director. He admitted a “possible” military need for lunar and
planetary bases, but only in the distant. future, “not in the span we are
working in nov." Jobnson wanted Current developments limited to Communi

" cation satellites of 3,000 pounds st altitudes of 22,000.miles and mili-
‘ary vehicles vith maneuverability to altitules of only 600 nites, 38

Hven in trying to establish a research and development program to

overcome the lost opportunities of 1953-57 the Air Force encountered
difficulties. Not only did the repiaity Of technological breakthroughs
preclude the assurance that any budget would be sufficient for the com-
ing year, but the Air Force was not a free agent in such matters. The
ure of the Budget iteele could arbitrarily impose cetlings. Moreover,
after February 1958, authority for space Projects was centralized in ARPA,
The Air Force therefore could do Little more then urge funds for long-
term projects; work to accelerate the production of Atlas, Titan, and Thor;
Proceed as swiftly as possible with near-space projects;. and fight for ;
fevoreble policies at high levels.39

USAF Plans and Projects, 1957-59

Within a matter of weeks efter Sputnik the Air Force vas engaged in
‘tho major undertakings related to space. The first was to establish a



Tas .

military space Program, urged the JCS to sanction a single military
space agency to coordinate all Pertinent facilities and. functions.

The Army concurred on the theory that space activities would transcend
the exclusive interests of any one service. The Air Force Chief of
Staff found the proposal Contrary to the established practice of
integrating weapons within unified commande,” In the midst of

these discussions ARPA recommended in June a Mercury Task Force to
assist NASA, and the Secretary of Defense requested JCS advice in
assigning operating vesponeibilities for several Projects, including ,
Midas and Sentry--the latter soon to be redesignatea as Samos. "on the
months that followed, the services held their positions, The Army and
Navy wanted a Mercury Task Force and @ Defense Astronautical icy
to control the space systems. The Air Force objected to both,

The discussion continued through the sumer of 1959. In September
the Secretary of Defense made three important decisions. .He disap-
proved the proposed Defense Astronautical Agency. He quashed the
move for a Mercury Task Force but as a substitute Selected Maj. Gen,
Donald N. Yates, USAF, Atlantic Missile Range coumander, to "direct
militery support" for the project.” 69 ‘And finally, McElroy reversed

among the three services, True, advanced research for missile
defense remained with ARPA, but booster developsent went to the Air
Force, and the development of Space payloads vas assigned to the

=————
“By 1960, General Yates had drawn up his plans for support
Organization that was a task force in everything but name,


control, direct, and relate the missile’ and epace programs. It was the
belief of some highly Placed officials that the Department of Defense
already had the capabilities to do this work. The need was for firm
Guidance rather than a complication of the omanizational framework.

The Secretary of Defense was not convinced. After some Gelay, while
considering the need for Congressional approval, McElroy established
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) on 7 February 1958. ‘The
new office was headed by Roy W. Johnson and, contrary to ‘the wishes of
the Joint Chiefs of Starr (JCS), vas mithorized to direct the research
and development projects within the Department of Defense that the /
_ Seeretary might assign to it. 25 In practice ARPA would then reassign
abe Projects on a contractual basis to the military departments, other
, Government agencies, or civilian institutions,

Although the White House and Department of Defense statements showed
that the Administration saw the need for a Space program, there was ag
yet no basic policy pronouncement to that effect. Then, on 26 March,
the President's Science Advisory Comittee affirmed that "space tech-
nology" was required by human curiosity, scientific knowledge, the
maintenance of national prestige, and the defense of the United States.2
This was the first official decdareticn by the Government that space was .
of military significance, but there was still no evaluation of space as
& realm of military operations.

On 2 April the President asked Congress to approve the establish-
ment of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to conduct,


58

atch
BALWARDS

chmn
cmte
CRC

GOR

intep

GLOSSARY

Army Ballistic Missile Agency

Atomic Energy Commission

Air Force Ballistic Missile Division
Assistant Chief of Starr, Intelligence
Air Force Office of Scientific Research
amendment

ARPA Order

Army Ordnance Missile Command.

Advanced Research Projects Agency

Advanced Reconnaissance System
attachment

Ballistic Weapons Research and Supporting Systen
Ballistic Missile Test System
Ballistic Research and Test System

chairman
committee
Cembridge Research Center

Division of Militery Applications
Department of Defense

General Operational Requirement
Hypersonic Environment Test System
interceptor

Man In Space
missile

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Council
navigation

Navel Ordnance Test Station

no subject

National Security Council

nuclear

Office of Legislative Liaison
Office of Secretary of Defense



should be doubled "to maintain our technological Superiority." In
December, Oaxdner deciarea ‘that $200,000,000 more was needed if the
Air Force was to meet the Soviet challenge.)

The warnings remained unheeded, and ‘Headquarters USAF was caught
between the high cost of defense and limited budgets. In this same

period, however, the Administration afforded a omall measure of reliet
by making no sharp distinction between "basic research" and “develop-
ment." Occasionally, the latter term could be used to cover work that
was essentially research, as was done with new engines and new fuels
needed for navigation and Communication satellites,6

In 8 more specific area of space planning high policy was less
lenient. On 15 March 1955, Headquarters USAF issued General Operational ,
Requirement (GOR) No. 8 calling for a satellite weapon system, By this
‘time RAND had long since abandoned its 1946-h7 thesis that the space ven-
ture would be chiefly of scientific value. In 1956 RAND proposed three
feasible projects of military significance--the Advanced Reconnaissance
System (ARS); the Man-in-Space (M8) Project, and the Ballistic Weapons
Research and Supporting Systen (BALWARDS). ‘The jatter, using Atlas, Aero-
bee, and Sergeant missiles, looked toward landings on the moon and flights
in the vicinity of Venus and Mars, Roth ARS and MIS were approved as pos-
sible projects. ‘The Air Staff also @pproved BALWARDS, but in May 1957

the interplanetary missions. In its new and shrunken version BALWARDS
became the near-space project know as the Ballistic Research and Test
System (BRATS),7



In the spring of 1958, ARPA, acting as the national space agency
Pro tempore, had organized its Space projects into four progrems--I:
Missile Defense Against ICEM's; II: Military Reconnaissance Satel-
lites; ITI: Develoyments for Application to Space Technology;” ana
IV: Advanced Research for Scientific Purposes.4 1+ was the intention
of ARPA to transfer only Program IV to NASA vhen the latter came into
being, but thie hope suffered a serious blov,.59

On 28 July the President decided to emphasize the civilian space
Program by giving to NASA such nonmmilitary projects as lunar probes
and scientific satellites initiated by ARPA, along with Project Van-
guard. In accordance with Executive Order No...10783, the transfer
began immediately after the activation of NASA on 1 October. Under
this arrangement NAGA got Program IV and out deeply into Progrem III
by claiming all those projects pertaining to Men in Space (redesignated
Project Mercury), special engines, satellite tracking, communications,

"Program TIT included eight projects:
1. Man in Space
2. Special Engines
3- Special Components for Space Systems
4. Project Argus
2+ Satellite Tracking and Monitoring Sy stens
6. Satellite Communications Relay, Meteorological Reporting, Navi-
gational Aid Systens
7. Bomb-Powered Rockets
8. Solid Propellants
tProgram IV included four projects: .
1. berries Program for Four Scientific Space Vehicles to be Launched
in 1958 |
2. AFBMD Program for Three Luner Probes
3. NOTS Program, a one-frane television with a mechanical scanner to
get"a first look at the other side of the moon"
4. Follow-on Program, vaguely defined as "nore of the same"

CONFIDENTIAL



Between January ana July 1958, Headquarters USAF ‘forvardea
numerous requests, Proposals, and draft space Programs to Horner with
the hope that he could obtain OSD Concurrence. But Horner did not
Convince his superiors of the need for the proposed program, Few of
these suggestions got beyond his office, vhere, it seemed to
Headquarters USAF, ‘they vere "overtaken by events.” % .

Nevertheless the USAF proposals vere not lost to the militesy
though reshuffled by ARPA, In the spring of 1958, Johnson took over
the Air Force Proposal. for Space Track, a 1, 500, 000~pound-thrust
single-chamber engine, nuclear Propulsion, the Advanced Reconnaissance
System, and the ‘three-phased satellite for man in space, along with
Others from the Amy and Navy. Although he redistributed the Projects

Project ( ) Date of Transfer to ARPA
i. nuclear explosion in exosphere. : % Apr 58
7 e Progrens
fanguerd

5+ Army and Air Force Ballistic Missile
6 poierped oe ioe eee ts of Space We
. 8 of ects leapons
Employment on Military Electronic Systems
gE Ruclear Bamb-Propelled Space Vehicle

gRER & BEE
%

S888 8 Bu.
BSSSs B Bw

The distribution of Space projects by ARPA follows:

Project : Assigned to
ToS tacing Rockets and Ground Instrumentation
for Argus . AFSWC & AFCRC



‘The ‘great change came in 1953 when Los Alamos Scientific Labora-
tory, after prolonged thermoauclear research, promised a fusion bomb
of auell size and high yield. This verhead could justify ICBM and
IREM delivery, and the Air Force was free at last to undertake, with
the consent of the Administration, an all-out ballistic missile progran.
Toe Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) entrusted the work to
ite Western Development Division (WDD), activated especially for that
Purpose in 1954 and subsequently redesignated Air Force Ballistic Mis-
sile Division (AFEMD). The program soon came to include the Atlas and :
Titan ICHM's end the Thor IRBM,

Even before 1954 there could have been plans for a Space progrem
utilizing the Army Redstone missile as booster in a multi-stage combine-
tion with small missiles. By 1954, or 1955 at the latest, there was an
inventory of at least 11 missiles in service or development suitable for
multi-stage vehicles. The Aray Redstone and Jupiter end the Air Force
Atlas, Titen, and Thor were 5 possible boosters to be combined with any
of the 6 small missiles then available'--1 belonging to the Air Force and §

Whe characteristics and 1957 status of these 11 missiles:

Missile Max Thrust Veloci- Alt, 1s Status sv
~~ “Gdatbe} “7Rsaye gatmmae 1257 Steme sv origin

Corporal 20,000 1,800 200 ma In service. Army
Aerobee 4,000 3,000 70 ma In service: Navy
Aerobee Hi 4,000 3,000 120 ma Inservice Air Force
Aerobee Hi 5,000 4, 500 160 ma In service Navy
Viking 20,000 4,500. 100 ma In service Navy
Sergeant 70,000 1,900 100 ma Dey & Pin Army
Redstone 15,000. 10,000 250 m Pin & Sy Army
Jupiter 165,000 15,000 1,500 mr Pan & Sy Ary
Atlas 300,000 15,000 5,500 mr Dev & Pin Air Force
Titan 300,000 15,000 5,500 mr Dev & Pan Air Force
Dev & Pin Air Force

Thor , 165,000 25,000 1,500 mr



and there vas no ensy ratio between the size and thrust of engines.)
Consequently, rocket engineering took its Place among the rigidly es-
tablished propulsion sciences, and the ong years of patient research
continued,

Immediately after the war the Army, Navy, and Air Force, moved
both by the German success with the V-2 at Peenemiinde and the less im-

White Sands Proving Ground and Holloman AFB, They used left-over V-2's
as well as new, inexpensive, and specially designed small missiles for
scientific exploration of the upper atmosphere, Progress was swift.

At the seme time the military services, and especially the Air Force,
turned to industrial contractors for the rocket-propelled ballistic mis~
sites that they could atzeady foresee as great vempons of the future,

As far as the Proposed intercontinental ana intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (ICEM's and IREM's) vere concerned, progress was slow because
of slim budgets and the cost of current military requirements. The
ICEM's and IREM's were too costly to serve as carriers of high explo-
sive bombs, and fission bombs were too costly to risk the inaccuracies
of unmanned delivery, Consequently, in 1947, Air Force hopes for a
progrem of long-range ballistic missiles had to be suspended ? ana could
not be resumed for a number of years. Even the early fusion bomb nodels
of 1952 and 1952 vere of no, help. Though their great redid of destruction
could be reconciled with the circular probable error (CEP) of missiles,
the bomb designs did not fit missile configurations.



om:
all space activities “except those projects primarily associated with
militery requirements." Though he did not sey what these requirements

were, 1% was clear that the military progran would be less important
27
than the civilian program,

- Congress acted with dispatch. On 29 July, the President signed
the National Aeronautics and Space Act (Public Law 85-568) creating NASA.

, 48m segments. The same “lew brought inte being a Rational Aeronautics and
Space Council (MASC), to advise the President on space matters, and a
Civilian-Militery Liaison Conmittes (C-MLc) as a bridge between the mili-
tary and civilian space agencies.

Meanvhile, on 3 July 1958-the National Security Council (NSC) aub-
mitted to the President a Policy statement on outer Space. The Council
stated that Russian superiority in astroneutics would create an imbalance
of power in favor of the Communist bloc. Moreover, there were immediate
military requirements for weather, Communication, and electronic counter-
measure satellites. In the more distant future the armed forces might
require satellites as bombardment vehicles, as maintenance and supply
depots for outer space vehicles, and as reconnaissance stations. The
President signed this paper on 18 pugust.”

Sy midsummer 1958 the Administration had established a space policy
that called for dual Programs, civilian and military. But the lines of
demarcation vere not sharp end there were certain to be wide areas of
Overlap, as well as Competition for prestige and, money,



bey

eee a bed a

Jo . _ SOMO Near A 5
. WT GT

12 additional studies suggesting a space program that was largely of
scientific interest.3

In December 1947 the Engineering Division of the Air Materiel Con-
mand (AMC) evaluated the. RAND 13 studies, concluded that @ satellite was
technically Possible, and recommended establishment of an Air Force satel-
lite project. Headquarters USAF was sympathetic but could do little in
the vay of support during the decade 1947-57, Distraction was attribut-
She im Pert to Lintted finds throughout the postvar years of recovery
and retrenchment, to Operati mal emphasis and requirements during the
Korean War, and, after 1953, to an Administration-Defense Department
Policy that atecoureged extensive investments in basic research, Although
‘there was no written directive against research, public ‘statements by high
officials served to deter the militery services fron Pursuing research and
development work as actively as they desirea,+

revolution was under wey. The air-breathing aircraft was approaching the
limit of its potentialities; the ballistic missile offered new orders of
velocity and range; and space--though only reluctantly recognized by some--
was opening up as a new vorld of adventure. Russia doastfully pursued ad-
vanced technology, and there vere frequent and verifiable reports of
Soviet space Plans. Some American voices warned against the passivity

of the United States, but they had little effect. In June 1955, Lt. Gen.
Donald L. Putt, DCE/Development, protested against the "small size of our
national effort in basic research," Two months later, Trevor Gardner,

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Research and Development), said that

ee



tems and of other space projects that might be sanctioned. But the
Prospects of getting Department of Defense approval for the agency were
Poor for the time being. Since space vehicles were> dependent upon bal-
listic missiles, Headquarters adopted the temporary solution of author-
izing the Assistant Chief of statt for Guided Missiles to coordinate
USAF space activities,43 ;
Not until 22 July 1958, after the National Security Council defined
the space Policy of the Administration, Could the Air Force obtain OsD
spproval of a UEAP space agency. Even then it eppeared that the use of
“astronautics" vould be impolitic, Accordingly, when General White es.
tablished the new office under DCS/Development on 29 July, effective 15
duly, he called it the Directorate of Advanced Technology , 4 General
Boushey beceme director of the new office, with functions as follows: 45

Doubtless Headquarters hoped to make the Directorate of Advanced
Technology the control Point for all Air Force space projects, However,
since the space Projects were dependent upon missiles, the space pro-
Gram would necessarily involve AFEMD, which in turn was in contact with
Headquarters through the Assistant Chief or Staff for Guided Missiles.

CONFIDENTIAL AE


4 Ay
ay +
a SONSDENTA

THE THRESHOLD OF SPACE;

THE AIR FORCE IN THE NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAM
. 1945-1959 : :

; i{u)

September 1960
USAF Historical Division Ifaison Office



finally, the Administration's tight. rein on funds prevented an
accelerated production of available boosters, slowed the development

of new boosters, and in general retarded the whole Program. Limi- ‘
tations on funds also held back research in such vital supporting areas
as nuclear-propelled rockets, hydrogen-oxygen second-stage engines,

and plasma and ion technology. These programs were of reat importance
for the future,

In the first tvo years that followed Sputnik, however, the American
Space program suffered most fron lack of sufficient thrust to lott large
payloads. Of the 6 Soviet vehicles launched during that time--the
Kremlin never admitted malfunctions--the payload increased from a mini-
mum of 184 pounds to & maximm on the second shot of 1,120 pounds. on
the other hand the Americans attempted 37 leunchings of which 19 were
either successful or partially successful. But the payloads ranged
from a mere 3.5 pounds on the first shot in December 1957 to a maximum
of only 372 pounds in 1959. Furthermore not one of the 19 American
loftings could equal the spectacular nature of the 6 Soviets shots,

The Russians could claim to have been first in space, first to send life
into space, first to send a missile into the depths of the soler systen,
first to impact the Moon, and first to photograph the far side of the
Moon,”

The Ruseien triumphs had great peychological-political significance,
Dr. Glennan admitted as much when be said on 2h September 1959 that
Americans still “play second fiddle in this space business:" The
President and the Security Council expressed the same view officially



« . yA Le od Kes

clear statement of the ultimate objective of a Space program or a systen-—
atic evaluation of the disparate aims of the suggested projects.

The basic goal of any national Space program, civilian or military,
must inescepably be the establishment of habitable stations in space.
But to think of going beyond the limits of interplanetary areas with
mid-twentieth century knowledge and techniques would be unrealistic
and verging on the fantastic. Even the small-scale enterprise beyond
the Earth would take man into an unknown realm of danger and adventure.
It could not be attempted without costly and carefully Prepared explora- -
tory projects to discover the nature of the space environment. and. to
test the feasibility of using space immediately for practical Purposes,
This idea was doubtless present in many minds long before. -Bputaik, but
it had seldom been expressed specifically before 1957. Ite absence as
& guiding principle in space policy may have contributed to the undisci-
plined efforts to counter the Russien success with a-frugal program.

ution of: a National e Policy, 1:

Top-level indifference to the importance of space was of long stand-
ing. In December 1948, Janes Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, Ppassingly
referred to a "military interest in ® possible Earth satellite," but. the
Department of Defense took no concrete actions in the years that followed,
In December 1954, another Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, was
told that the Russians might place a satellite in orbit before the Aneri-
cane could do so, and he replied, "I wouldn't care if they dia." pe.
tween 1954 and 1957 there were innumerable warnings, official and unof-
ficial, that the Soviets would attempt to leunch a satellite before the



; Program" of 10
Projects. Among these were five projects that pertained solely to space:
reconnaissance satellites; cislunar aystens; interplanetary systems; navi-
gation satellites; and communication satellites.2

Dating these sme tvo or three years before Sputuik, vhen Headquar-
tere USAF vas thinking in terms of GOR Ho. 80 anid RAND vas proposing
military space Projects, many Air Force officers in widely scattered
field units, and without coordinated plans, vere Likewise Concerning them-
selves with the seme problem, Small groups at Headquarters ARDC, at the
Ballistic Missile Division, at Holloman YB, end at Wright Air Development
Center (WADC) sensed danger in the Government's unwillingness to give the
new technology the urgent support they felt it deserved. Acting inde-
Pendently of Hendquarters USAF, the groups separately prepared a mmber
of papers advocating research plans that might. epan the next 15 or 20
years. Among other things, the proposed progrems called for organized
space experiments "at the earliest practicable date.” There were discus-
sions also of expendable and recoverable Earth orbiters, the latter to be
doth of the manned and umanned variety, @ manned. space station, and an
expendable vehicle for lunar landing.?

Thus, Prior to the leuneching of Sputnik in October 1957, Headquarters
USAF, together with RAND, ANC, ARDC, AFEMD, WADC, end other field units,
had evidenced a widespread interest in astronautics and a sophisticated
Grasp of its technology. Oa the other hand, at no level within the Air
Force, the Department of Defense, or the Miuinistratic had there been a



aT

Statement by Wilson, DCs/D, in Hearings Before House Cate on Science
and Astronautics, 4 Feb 60. :

Memo (8S) for Holaday from Horner, 24 Jan 58, Tab B.

Memo (8) for Swofford fram Col Martin, D/AT, subj: Rresentation for
Commanders * Conference, 5 Jan 59

Memo for Record (8) by Boushey, subj: Funding for NASA, 29 Jul 58.

Was! ace Letter, 2 Jun 59; NASA, Appropriation Summary FY
1959-1960; "A, 1961 Budget Program; memo by Maj Gen R. J.
Friedman, D/Budget, USAF, subj: Justification of FY 1961 Budget

Estimate, 15 Jan 60; The Bulgst of the United States Government for
Fe mating 30 Jun 1960, House 15, 3 Cong, Ist Sess;
Budget the United States Government for FY Ending 30 Jun 1961,
House Doc 255, Pt 1, Cong, 2d Sess.

Testimony by Medaris in Hearings Before House Cmte on Science and
Astronautics, 18 Feb 60.

Astronautics, Oct 59, pp 20-50; Proceddings of 24 Western National
American Astronautical Sciety, Los Angeles, 4-5 Aug

593; Horace Jacobs, ed, Advances in Astronautical Sciences, Vol 5
Advanced Propulsion and Power (New York, 1960), Pt in.

Hanson Pel@win, "Neglected Factor in the Space Race," New York Times
Megezine, 27 Jan 60; Jemes Hagerty, Jr, "U.8, Program Has Gone Far in

ths," special "Flight" sec in W ton Post, 22 May 60; Clarke
Rewloa, “We Can Catch the Russians in 9 Bailes and Rockets,
14 Dee 59.

Ltr, York to Ducender, Huuse Cute on Science and Astronautics, 30
Dec 59; George P, Sutton, Chier Scientist, ARPA, "The Military
Space Progrem for 1960," Astronautics, Nov 59; NBC 5918 (8), sud):
U.S, Policy on Outer Space, sppr by NBC 21 Jan 60 and by the
President’ 26 Jan 60.

NASA, International Satellite and Space Probe Summary, 15 Jul 60;
RASA, Progress Report (C), 1 Jan-1 Apr 60; NASA, United States and
Russian Satellites, Lunar Probes and Space Probes 19! 1958-1959.

AFBMD, Summary of Air Force Ballistic Missile Division Activities in
Space, Jun 60, .

Msg 39509, AFEMD to Hq USAF, 7 Jul 60.
Sutton, “The Military Space Program for 1960,"



and development without specific approval from ARPA. The. only
exceptions to this general rule were studies costing less than
$500,000, end the funding of some facility items such as buildings.
Between March and October 1958 al) the true space projects of the

* 86
Air Force, together with funds, passed either to ARPA or NASA,

Consequently the USAF budget allocations to near-space and space projects

for fiscal year 1959 fel from the total of $500 millica hopefully
projected in March to a mere $8.7 million. About half of this sum
was allocated to Dyna Soar end BRATS, end the renaining $4.7 million
to space studies and lesser items. For fiscal oad 1960 the total
fell again, this time to a paltry $2.2 million. . :
Funding vas simple during the planing stage for the fiscal year
1960 budget because ARPA and MASA covered almost the entire national
space program. The organizational changes of September-October
1959,. however, cmsed a heavy shift in 1960 monies among the agencies.
At once, NASA funding was almost doubled, ARPA funding vas reduced
by nearly four-fifths, and Air Force space funding vas multiplied by

"ihe tabulation of MASA funding for fiscal year 1959 follows:

Inherited from NACA $202, 100,000
Supplementary appropriations 128, 400,000
Transferred from ARPA 67,200,000
Transferred from USA (Jet Propulsion Lab) 4,000,000
Transferred from USN (Vanguard) 25,500,000
Transferred from USAF



We

28

important contributions.

In the first decade of the postwar period the Atr Force had sponsored
the aerodynamic, air-breathing Navaho missile to be equipped also with
& rocket booster. The latter was designed and produced by North
American Aviation, Inc. Though Navaho vas canceled in July 1957-the
booster engine was of high excellence and its modified versions became

the booster tor Gctstons) ana Jupiter as well as Atlas and Thor, Sometime.

before Sputnik the Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) bit upon the
idea of using yet another version of the Navaho engine in clusters of
eight to create a thrust beyond the requirements of warhead delivery,
In this way Saturn was a step toward Propulsion units intended specifi-
celly for space vehicles, In 1958, sea assumed the technical direction
of Saturn but reassigned the project to AOMC for actual development.
ARPA-NASA Partition of Projects

In July 1958 the military services found their space prospects
disheartening. They had lost managerial control of the development
of the vehicles. Still Greater discouragement was at hand. Through
‘She end of fiscal year 1958 the vhole progran bed been kept within the
Department of Defense. It was now certain that by January 1959 the
new civilian agency, NASA, under the direction of Dr. T. Keith Glennan
88 Administrator, vould claim not only the nonmilitary projects but
also those of borderline importence to both the military and civilian
progrems. The time had come, as the President and his scientific
advisers had Previously determined, for the services to surrender all
Space activities except the few that were “primarily associated with
military requirements."



and explicitly, but not publicly, when they acknowledged in January
1960 that the Russian “firsts" resulted in "substantial and enduring
gains in the Soviet prestige."

Yet despite the policy confusion and the technological handicaps
that prevailed during 1958 and 1959, the Americans made noteworthy
contributions to space science. Their success was due largely: to the
ingenuity of NASA, ARPA, Army, Navy, Air Force, and industrial
scientists who devised miniaturized instruments to fit the small payload
capacity of available rockets.

The 19 loftings vere divided unevenly among five projects--
Vanguard, Explorer, Pioneer, Score, end Discoverer. Their first
leunchings were attempted respectively on 6 December 1957, 31 January
1958, 17 August 1958, 18° December 1958, and 28 February 1959. Vanguard
alone had received officiel approval before Sputnik and was intended
to serve solely as a scientific contribution to ICY. Only 3 of its
11 shots were successful. Explorer was hastily conceived by the
Department of Defense, primarily as a counterbalance to the Russian
success and almost incidentally developed as a means of gathering
seientific information for IGY. Actually the project was essentially
that advocated by AEMA before Sputnik, namely orbiting a small satel-
lite with a Jupiter C missile. Of 8 attempted leunchings, 5 vere
successful. Pioneer was planned originally by ARPA as a 5-shot lunar
Probe to match the spectacular Soviet achievements. The first three
shote were contracted to the Air Force. The first malfunctioned at

launching, tbe second penetrated 70,000 miles into interplanetary space,

icine Sonn

a



among the three services, be did so on a contractual basis. ARPA
retained technical control of the vork, and the projects vere orgen-
ized and imown as ARPA's program,”
Tus Aix Force plans for a space program hed been taken over by
ARPA by the time that the Directorate of Advenced Technology came
into being. ‘The new sgency had little to supervise other than seven
Space studies and @ few near-space activities. The willingness, indeed
the determination, of ARPA to reassign most of the former USAF Space
Projects to Air Force field units on @ contractual basis did not
soften the fact that Headquarters USAF had lost its space program. 7
One of the more important of ARPA's early decisions was to continue
development of Saturn, This Ary project promised to be of great
significance for future military and civilian Space programs. It was
likewise one to vhich the Air Force had earlier made indirect but

2. Weapon System to Control Hostile Satellites
Nuclear Bomb-Propelled Space Vehicle
hk. Effects of Space Weapons ‘on Military Electronic
Systens ‘
5. WB-l17L
6. lunar Probes
& Reentry Studies
. High Energy Propellanter and Liguid Hydrogen.
Liquid Qxygen Propellants
9. Project Score (conceived in 1958 to broaiicast the
President's voice from space)
10. 1,500,000-pound booster
ll. Meteorological Satellite
12. Inflatable Sphere

* The seven items of the space s' program were: Strategical Orbital
Studies. (SR 161), Strategic Hed System Studies (SR 192), Global
Surveillance Studies (SR 176), 24-hour Reconnaissance Satellite
(SR 184), Lunar Observatory Study (SR 183), Strategic Interplanetary
Studies (SR 182), and Satellite Interceptor System Studies (SR 187).

BREE BORGER BE



belonging to the Army and Navy. Yet not 1 of the 11-had been designed
Specifically for space purposes. This fact, not infrequently “charged,
to a hit-or-miss ‘policy followed by the Department of Defense, con-
stricted the American Space payloads for a long time efter the space
Progrem began.

The Russians followed a quite different policy.. It seens certain
that they pursued atomic and missile programs sim taneously. Assuming
that sooner or later there would be a breakthrough to relatively small
thermonuclear weapons, the Soviets Produced a rocket engine that was
tailored neither as a carrier of thermonuclear varbeads nor as a booat-
er of space vehicles but one that could serve both purposes. The policy
may indicate poor plenning as far as the optimum ICBM is concerned, but
in 1957 it gave the Soviets a fine Space vehicle. The Russian rocket

engine possessed a thrust beyond anything then being planned for the
Awerican arsenal, including the Atlas’ and Titan, and permitted the use
of large payloads. ;

The failure of the Americans to develop either a high-thrust booster
or one specially designed for space vehicles did not mean that the mili-
teary departments had had no interest in space. In 1945 the Navy began a
study of satellite feasibility. The Project moved slowly, however, and
its completion was anticipated by a similar Air Force undertaking.

Barly in 1946, Headquarters USAF directed RAND to investigate the reasi-
bility of man-made satellites. In accordance with instructions, RAND
Completed a basic study in May 1946, and in February 1947 releasea



the meaning of the tem was expressed officially in AFA 1-2 in Decenber
1959:

?
H
}
i .
E
E
é
E
f

Testcelly the doctrine of aerospace expressed the thought that air-
Power end space Power are the sme thing and ahould be vested:inasingle
service which, vhatever its official title, would be the serospace force,
Space vehicles would be another category of vehicles to be employed in
the Tegions above the surface of the Barth to help deter var or, fail-
ing that, to help win the war,

Tate in 1958 the Air Force attempted to specify ite exact rule tn
"pece for the sake of long-range planning and develogment, and Head-
quarters listed 15 projects pertinent to Spece missions that should be
Mtr Force responsibiiities."57 te problem vas to have the missions
assigned. As the time approached for the first session of the 86th Con-
gress in January 1959, the Air Staff prepared @ policy statement that
emphasized reconnaissance, offensive, and defensive Space operations as

bases; target drone satellites; satellites for electronic counter-
measures; satellites as nevigation aids,



64. Memo (S) for Deputies from“Smart, subj: Responsibility for
Space Projects, 6 Apr Seer 2-1, subj: fan of ldveroet
Technology, DC3/D, 13 Apr 59,

65. Ltr, Wileon to A12 Directors gt aly; oubj: Batablishment of the”
Assistant for Astronautics Syetene” Dost, 9 Nov 59; DAP G) 4, 14

66. Memo (S) for JCS from CNO, subj: Single Military Agency to Coordi-
nate Facilities and Functions in the Field of Military Space, 22
Apr 59; Craig Lewis, “Navy Bids to Capture Major e Role,*
€: 3c datatge oe soyane Vane o cations 33

°: © and er ce Opera’ '»
May 59; memo (C) for DCS/P&P from Wheless, D/Plans, subj: Coordi-
nation of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations, 11 May 59; memo
(C) for JCS from c/s » Subjz Coordination of Satellite and
Space Vehicle Operations, 13 May 59,

" G1. Notes by JCS Secretaries (c), eubj: Coordination of Satellite and
Space Vehicle Operations, 25’ Jan 59.

68, Memo (c) for Dep D/Plans from Col C.J. Butcher, D/Plans, subj:

69. Ltr (8), T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, to Neil McElroy,
SOD, ns, 25 May 59; memo (8) for Maj Gen Ralph P. Swofford, Jr,
Asst DCS/D from Boushey, subj: Global Tracking, 1 Jun 59; Col Otto
Haney, D/Dev Prog, Comments on Letter of Dr. Glennan to SOD, 25 May
59, ata 4 sun 59 (c); itr (8), MacIntyre to D/ARPA, subj: Proposed
Reply to Dr Glennan Concerning DOD Support for Project MERCURY,

9 Jun 59; memo (S) for D/ARPA. froin Charyk, Asst SAF (R&D), subj:
World Wide Tracking Facilities, 23 Jun 59; memo (8) for Asst SAF
(R&D) fron Johnson, subj: World Wide Tracking Facilities, 24 Jun
593 ltr (8), Thomas S. Gates, Deputy SOD to Glennan, NASA, ns,
30 Jun 59; Memo for Record (8) by Col J. L. Martin, D/AT, subj:
Proposed Organization for Support of Project MERCURY, 17 Jul 59;
draft DOD directive, subj: Assignment of Responsibility for DOD
Support of Project MERCURY, 24 Jul 993 Washington Evening Star,

3 Oct 59. ,

70. Memo (C) for JCS from McElroy, subj: Coordination of Satellite and
Space Vehicle Operations, 18 Sep 593 memo (8) for D/AT from Wheless,
D/Plens, subj: Air Force Responsibilties to Other Elements of the
Department of Defense for Space Systems, 21 Sep 59; DOD News Release,
subj: Space Transfer to Services Planned, 23 Sep 59,



os

nae = 35
, SE ON ea

of 50 miles or more.

As early as May 1955 the Air Force had issued GOR No. 92 calling
for a magnified version of the X-15. Development began under three
Separate projects known as the Bomber Missile or Bomi, soon to be
redesignated as the Rocket Bomber or Robo; the very high altitude
reconnaissance weapon system known as Brass Bell; and the boost-glide
research vehicle called Hywards. On 30 April 1957, Headquarters USAF
directed that these three Projects be brought together under the single

5
name of Dyna Soar, derived from dynamic soaring.

Sputnik had its effect here, too, and on 25 November 1957,
Development Directive No. 94 authorized ARDC to proceed with the work.
The boost-glide system promised a breakthrough beyond tbe speed,
range, and altitude of existing aircraft to accomplish manned missions
of strategic reconnaissance and bombing. After several months of
further plenning the Air Force announced on 16 June 1958 its selection —
of the Boeing end Megtin companies as dual contractors for the Dyna Soar

7
early design phase. By that time the Air Force could foresee the
importance of Dyna Soar:
It is intended that the DYNA SOAR program will constitute

@ major Air Force effort to develop a weapon system to succeed

turbojet-powered manned strategic bomber and reconnaissance

systems. Weapon systems growing out of the DYNA SOAR program
should complement other weapon systems Plenned for availability

in the same time period and although the program is to be undertaken

with the ‘strategic mission primarily in view, other. mission

potentials should not be overlooked. Weapon systems that evolve
from the DYNA SOAR development could Operate as aerodynamic, boost-

Glide vehicles, as short term satellites or satelloids, or as satel-

lites in relatively stable orbits. Further, they could be manned

or unmanned and, if unmanned, recoverable or unrecoverable. Combi-

nations of any of these vehicles could be included in the final
DYNA SOAR weapon system.



* —. )

In brief, Dyna Soar, though not then specifically a space vehicle,
could contribute techniques, Components, and equipment to the man-in-
space system as well as serial reconnaissance systens beyond the
capabilities of the X-15. At the same time, Dyna Soar would continue
to serve the traditional, strategic missions of the Air Force,

The new interest in Dyna Soar led to a telescoped schedule for
the project. Yet troubles remained. In addition to the ever present
problem of funding, there was ARPA's determination to take over USAF
Space projects and the certainty of ARPA-NASA partition of the space
Program. Thus there was the Possibility in the summer and sutumn of
1958 that Dyna Soar might be taken from the Air Force, and even pass
completely from military control. Such a shift vas averted by the
fact that Dyna Soar, though probably capable of orbital velocity, was
nevertheless of immediate importance because of its suborbital aspects.
a8 a military research vehicle,

Nevertheless, the early designs. submitted in April by Boeing
and Martin showed the full potentialities of Dyna Soer as an aerospace
vehicle, and the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) lent tur support to
the project. Gradually opposition Qwindled, both within the Department
of Defense and outside, and the Air Force was less constrained in its

advocacy of the boost-glide principle. By the late autumn of 1959,
Dyna Soar hed emerged as a possible Operational vehicle that might meet
the aerospace requirements of. the Air Force.

Dyna Soer was drawn as a manned, delta-wing, aeronautical vehicle
that ‘could be boosted into orbital velocity without loss of maneuver-
able reentry and controlled landing. ‘These characteristics eppealea



20.

25.

29.
30.

31.
32.

33.

3h.

‘CONFIDENTIAL.

pt

Astronautics, Nov 57.
New York Times, 5~6 Oct 57.
White House Press Release, 9 Oct 57.

Facts 2, 10-16 Oct 57; Kashington Post, 1 Nov 57; Facts on
File, St OsteS tov 57.

Rpt of Teller Gute, 22 Oct 573 ‘memo (S) for Lt Gen John Gerhart,
DCS/PAP from Brig Gen W. Martin, Dep D/Plans, ns, 31 Oct 573 Asst
C/S(I), Special Air Intelligence Estimate, The Soviet Earth Satel-
ite, 22 Oct 57; Memo for Record, D/Plans, ns but quoting ABMAts
Proposal; "A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development
Program, 10 Dec 1957," 4 Mar 58,

Trevor Gardner, "We Are Still Lagging," life, 4 Nov 57; A.N. Wechsler,
"How Good Are the Pentagon 'Czarst 7, Space Aeronautics, Feb 59;
Testimony by Dr T. Keith Glennan, Administrator, NASA, in Hearings
Before Preparedness Investigating Subomte of the Senate Cmte on

Armed Services, Missiles Ss ties, 30 Jan 59; memo (S)
for SOD from JCS, subj: Department of Defense Special Projects
Agency, 25 Nov 57, and JCS Memo (S) same subj, 6 Dec 573 PL 85-325,
12 Feb 58; DOD Directive 5105215, ARPA, 7 Feb 58,

oe President's Science Advisory Cmte, Introduction to Outer Space,
26 Mar 58.

Message of the President to Congress, New York Times, 3 Apr 58,

Ltr, Herbert F. York, Defense D/R&E to Charles F. Ducander, Chief
Counsel, House Cmte on Science and Astronautics, ns, 30 Dec 59,

NSC 5814/1 (8), U.S. Policy in Outer Space, 18 Aug 58.

Ltr (8), Brig Gen Alden R. Crawford, Chief, Engr Div, AMC to Dcs/M,
Hq USAF, subj: Project RAND, Satellite Vehicle, 8 Dec 47; memo (8)
for VC/S from Lt Gen H.A. Craig, D0S/M, subj: Tarth Sateslite
Vehicle, 12 Jan 48,

Statement by Joseph V. Charyk, U-SAF, in Hearings Before House Cnte
on Appropriations, 22 Mar 0. ,

Ltr, York to Ducander, 30 Dec 593 Statement by Roy i. Johnson, D/ARPA,
in Hearings Before House Cute on Sofence and Astronautics, Exec
Session, 2 Mar 59,

Gen Thomas D. White, C/S USAF, "Air and Space are Indivisible,” Air
Force, Mar 58.

Statement by Gen White in Hearings Before House Cmte on Science and
Astronautics, 3 Feb 59.

ei Ser



General Putt end his staff, some of whom felt that the plan had been
Pigeonboled to die--to be "overtaken by events," as was not infrequently
said of other Air Staff proposals.49
Pessimiem in the Air Staff deepened as the Policies of ARPA came

into silhouette during the spring of 1958, It was evident -soon after
T February that Jobnson, with the epproval of Secretary McElroy, would
organize and operate the agency as a "fourth service" or possibly as a

"special task force" within the Department of Defense. In either case
Johnson vould be independent of service wishes, but circumstances would
not permit him to escape the role of arbitrator of service differences.
Johnson's’ authority was further increased vben the President decreed

ARPA actualy served as the "national" space agency.

On 27 Merch, Johnson informed. the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Foree that in order to “cut red tepe" he would ignore normal:
channels of communication, bypass the service chiefs, and deal directly
with the Army Ballistic Missile Agency; the Naval Ordnance Test Station
(WTS), at Inyokern, Calif.; sod the Air Research and Development Com-
mand, including AFEMD and other centexs.52’

Certainly the services did not relish the Suspension of estab-
lished communication methods. The out-of-channel, approach, though soon
modified in some respects, gave ARPA a measure of control over Arny,
Navy, and Air Force units working on space Projects. But as far as the

Airy Force was concerned, Johneon's breakdown of space projects and his



550

56.

58.

60.

61.

62.

Mero (8) for Smart from Col L.F, Loeach, Secy/Air Staff, ns, 9 Jun

Memo (S) for D/ARPA from Horner, subj: Identification of UsaF

Research and Development Progran—Astronautics, 10 Apr 583 DOD

29 hay 1958, anatase Sf Manced Beseatch "0 he ao ae
3 4

AO 6, 10 Jun 58, and Taske 1. 2, and 3 on 16, 19, and 20 jm

respectively; 40 9, 30 Jun 58,

Memo (S) for Col Leon Booth, Special Asst, DCS/D from Lt Col
Francis J, Jr, subj: Air Staff Orientation, 10 Sep 58; memo
(S) for col £727 wvans Petr toed Jotm Re Ryan, golaet for
Space Syetens, ARDC, subj: 6 Space 583 AOts
10, 12, 23, 1h, 18,"and 19, dtd 26 dal, 25 ew 5
77 Wg, 29 bug 58; 40 17, & Sep 58, and Amd 1,’29 ser*ha-

Ltr (8), Gen Curtds E. LeMay, VC/S to Andereon, ARDC, na 9 May 583
neno s} for D/Rqut from pled subj: Air Force Space’ Actinttaes,
jan 59.

Statement Dr York, Chief Scientist, ARPA in Hearings Before
Subemte of Foce Gute on Appropriations, 23 Ape 58,

Oat Ser” TUE OTE, 1 Oct 585 AO 28, 29 Sep 58, and Aun 2, 6

Mea, 22am 59s 10, Aes Se POT gO Provan, Ariat
Heck, 22 Sun 595 40 2, Amd 5, 6 Oct 58; 40 12, dead 1° Oct 58;
40 10, Aunt 17, 13 Apr 59; 40°17, Aund 5, 13 Abe 59.

Memo for Comdr, AFEMD from Johnson, subj: Redefinition of WS-217L,
20 Sep 58; memo (S) for SAF from 12 Subj: Policy Relating to
the Official Identification of SEVTRY, and MIDAS, 12 Feb

394 AOts 38, Il, 48, 50, 58, 66, and 3, dtd 5 Bor, 17 Nov, 16 Dec,
and 19 Dec 587 22 dan, 10 Mar, and 29 Ape 59,

Memo (S) for SAF fron Gen Robert E. Greer, Asst C/S (G4) subj:
Brig ) ,
8, 11 Feb 59, and

,
Space Prograns and Projects, 4 dug 59; ltr (3),
sub, NASA and ARPA Spac.
‘st dnd Aden nt 6/3 USAF, 12 Feo 59. :



CONTENTS

Space Work Prior to Sputnik, re

een ee 1

Evolution of a National Space Policy, 1954-58, , , eee 8
Mr Force Space Policy to 1959........,, 0 ~~, 16
vee rtns and Projects, 1957-59... , 0... 1g
Directorate of Advanced Technology. Tee ee eee
AEA Meee rogram en APA 8
ARPA-NASA Partition of Projects |) 111005‘ ° 28
Major Read justments, April-December 59... . 31
Significance of X-15 and Dyna Soar... | 3h

Rating the Space Program, 1957-59. 38
Sbece Program in December 1959........, 5 43
Notes... 2...

TT eee eee eee eee, 4g
i ee 58

Appendix
Satellite Leunchings, 4 oct 1957 to 26 Nov 1959... 6


43

When all these factors are taken into consideration it is clearly

impossible to attempt even a rough financial estimate of what the Air
Force contributed to the national space program prior to 1960.

Space Program in December 1959
The record shows that between 1945 and the time of Sputnik in

October 1957 the military services were less conservative in their
attitude toward space than either the Office of the Secretary of De-
“fense or the Administration. Likewise, the Air Force seems to have

been ahead of both the Army and the Navy in space plans, If the projects
urged by RAND, AMC, and ARDC, and by some of the latter's development
centers, could have been generously supported the Soviets would

probably not have won first place for themselves in space.

“he Tecord shows also thet even afver Sputnik there yas.no imedi-
ately invigorated national space program. Months passed in which the
policy-meking officials of newly.created agencies adjusted to new
responsibilities. It seemed to the Air Force that the military space
requirements could meanwhile have been met by the Department of Defense
through existing capabilities and that there was no demonstrable need
to segment the progrem by the introduction of NASC, NASA, ARPA, and
other agencies.

Added to these complications was the apparent unwillingness of the
Government to accelerate the program sufficiently to admit the United States
was in a race with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Government insisted
that the space program should remain dedicated in large measure to
science, a policy that severely limited the military projects. And



Al

88
approximately 120. These same ratios held for the fiscal year
1961 budget, as show in the following table for the four-year period
1958-61:

Agency FY 1958 FY_1959 FY 1960 FY_1961

Arny 0 0) 0 0

Navy ° ° . 0 $ 1,300,000
Air Force $70,000,000 $ 8,700,000 $ 2,200,000 249,700,000
ARPA 83,000,000 331,700,000 307,000,000 67,000,000
NASA 0 384,000,000 535,600,000 915,000,000
AEC 54,000,000

(nue rocket prpin)

ARPA's total allocations for fiscal years 1959 and 1960 were $520
million and $445 million respectively. The differences between
these totals and those listed in the above table represent the work
done by ARPA in fields not related to astronautics.

The budget figures do not Give an adequate picture of the total
contributions made by the Air Force to space work and to the national.
Space program. In fiscal year 1959, ARPA reassigned nearly $300
million to ARDC for work on the Advanced. Reconnaissance System and
its subsystems and for applied research projects. Essentially the
seme thing was planned for fiscal, year-1960 before the breakup of
ARPA responsibilities. During fiscal year 1960, NASA likewise !
reimbursed the Air Force to the extent of approximately $100 million

In the same year ARPA reassigned only $64. i111i0n to the Amy and
$24.9 million to the Navy.



the glory of making the first major step toward interplanetary flight.
+ + « Soviet determination to achieve this objective was announced last
5 Apri "16 Most Americans, hovever, vere impervious to the Russian
threat, inexplicably skeptical of Soviet technology. The United States
van no race, When time passed and Vanguard obvioualy slipped from its
schedule, there was deep Concern amdng space protagonists. One period.
deal commented in July 1957:27

Bulogized and advertized ad nauseum as mankind's greatest ad-

venture, there is still no assurance that any of the VANGUARD

attempts will be successful during the 16 months of the Icy,

It's the nature of the still-young state of the rocket art,

Even if VANGUARD is ready 1t still may not be first. Reports

point to a Russian try within ten weeks. And to_the south

the . . ./ Army Ballistic Missile Agency or ABHA] team /vhich7

everybody tries to ignore may beat even that date,

In truth, as early as April 1956 ABMA hed begged for permission to
employ its Jupiter c* missile to launch a satellite, in view of Vanguard

delays and increasing evidence that the Soviets would be first in space--

States. The Army's Proposals were rejected by the Department of Defense,
presumably with the approbation of the Administration, still devoted as
it was to the policy of exploration for demonstrably peaceful purposes,18

Coincidentally with the rejection of ABMA's plan, the Far Side proj-
ect, directed by Col. Willian 0. Davis and nurtured quietly within the
*The Jupiter C was an experimental stage-rocket device consisting of a
Redstone booster and two stages of solid-propellant rockets, When
fired: in September 1956 it Teputedly traveled 3,300 miles, with a peak

i

altitude of 650-680 miles, and could have brought ite payload into
orbit if the final stage trajectory had been preset for that purpose.



44. Memo for SAF from Brig Gen Robert H. Warren, Military Asst, Dep
SOD, subj: Directorate of Advanced Technology, 22 Jul 58; DAF
GO 14, subj: Establishment of Directorate of Advanced Technology
(AFDAT), 29 Jui 58.

45e. ale Dirs st al. from Wilson, subj: Establishment of AFDAT,

46. Memo (S) for C/S USAF from Boushey, D/AT, subj: Function of AFDAT,
8 Dec 58; meno (5) for Asst VC/S from Maj Gen Charles M. McCorkle,
Asst C/S (Gf), subj: Function of AFDAT, 13 Jan 59.

47. Memo (S) for Asst C/S (GM) from Boushey, Dep D/R&D, subj: Missile
Hearing, 6 Dec 57; memo (S) for C/S USAF from J.H. Doolittle, Chun,
SAB, subj: Space Technology, 9 Dec 57; White, "Air and Space Are
indivisible."

48. Ltr (8), Col Spencer S. Hunn, DCS/D, to Comir ARDC, subj: Astronautics
Program, 5 Feb 1958; Comments by William Weitsen, Dep for Development,
Asst SAF (B&D) to H.L. Bowen, 12 Aug 60; telephone conversation with
Brig Gen Homer A. Boushey, Comdr, Arnold Engineering Dev Center,
by H. L. Bowen, 25 Aug 60.

49, Memo (S), for William Holaday, Defense (M, from Richard E. Horner,
Asst SAF (R&D), subj: Air Force Astronautical Development Program,
21, Jan 58; Boushey conversation, 25 Aug 60.

50. Statement by Neil McElroy, SOD, in Hearings Before House Cmte on
Appropriations, "The Ballistic Missile Program," 20-21 Nov 57;
DOD Directive 5105.15, ARPA, 7 Feb 583 nemo. (S for SOD fron.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, subj: Approval of Advanced Space
Projects, 24 Mar 58.

51. Memo for Secys/Army, Navy, and Air Force from Johnson, ns, 27 Mar 58.

52. ARPA Order (AO) 1-58, 2-58, and 3-58, 27 Mar 58; ltr (S), Johnson
to the President, ns, 19 Mar 58; ltr (8 » President Eisenhower to
SOD, ns, 2) Mar 58, .

534 Hist, ARDC, 1 Jan-31 Deo 58, Vol I, Sec I, p 18; memo (8) for
Gerhart from Boushey, subj: Air Force Mission in Space, 7 Jan 59.

She Memo (8) for Gen Anderson, ARDC from Boushey, subj: Astronautics
Program, 13 Feb 58; memo (S) for S00 from SAP, eubjy Requesting OSD
Approval of the Air Force Program as Presented 12 Nov 57, dtd i Feb
583 memo (8) for SOD from SAF, subj: Request for Approval of Plan
to Initiate Five Astronautic Projects, 1, Feb 58; memo (S) for SOD
from Asst SAF (R&D), subj: Request that USAF be Made Executive Agent
for Some Aspects of ARS, 21 Feb 58; memo (S) for Holaday from


59

Propulsion
reconnaissance

Secretary of the Army

Scientific Advisory Board

Secretary of the Air Force

satellite

Secretary of the Navy

Secretary of Defense
quiremen

Under Secretary of the Air Force

Wright Air Development Center
Wright Air Development Divisica
Western Development Division


13

a4

vem gee
van Hat

wt

Much of the press and Public interpreted this belittlement of the
Russian achievement as a sign of nervousness, and there was evidence to
support the interpretation. Between 8 and 15 October there took place
@ number of high-level Government conferences to reevaluate the whole
missile program, In late October, when there vas a report that the
third shot of the Far Side Project had penetrated 4,000 miles into
space, the Department of Defense hailed the erroneous claim as proof
of a vigorous progrem in basic research. And yet again, on 3 November
the 1,120-pound Sputnik IT, Complete with dog, was "no surprise to the
President," who nevertheless directed further conferences on rocketry.73

In these uneasy days the Secretary of the Air Force, Jemes H.
Douglas, called upon a committee of @istinguished scientists and USAF
officers headed by Dr. Raward Teller to propose a line of positive
action. The committee's report was completed 22 October 1957. Though
the report went to high levels of the Goverment, its recommendation for
© clovely unified progren was Gisrogirdat 13 fev of a diviéad prose
that, in the opinion of many, tended to dissipate rather than coneen-
trate the expanded pttort.,** .

The first major Organizational development came on 7 November 1957
When the President added to the existing structure by appointing Dr.
Jemes. R. Killian as Special Assistent for Science and Technology, On
12 November, Neil McElroy, the new Secretary of Defense, issued Defense
Directive 3210.1 emphasizing basic research, About the sane time, Mo-
Elroy decided “to correct previous errors" by creating a new agency to





3h hottie, : ss
Gi

Discoverer to the Air Force, something not mentioned in the September
13
decisions.

Significance of X-15 and Dyna Soar

During the two critical years of 1957-59 there were frequent
references to the X-15 and Dyne Soar, projects intended originally
to employ the boost-glide principle to teke man to the fringes of
spece and return him safely to the Earth,

The concept had been Suggested in the course of World War II by
Dr. Eugen Sénger-as a possible means for the Germans to bomb New York,
Soon after the war, the Air Force became interested in the principle
and insugurated the X series of research aircraft. with a small
Plane, the X-1, to test the epplicability of the theory. In time,
other X aircraft served the sane Purpose. Thege small planes, equipped
with rocket engines, vere taken aloft by large bombers and released
at high altitudes to reach yet higher altitudes under their own power.
When their fuel was exhausted the research aircraft glided back to
Earth. In 1954 the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (aca) signed a ‘contract with North
‘American for the X-15. Unveiled in October 1958 the X-15 was destined
to set new records in speed and altitude for manned aircraft. In less
than two years, test flights esteblished a speed of more than 2,000
mph, and en altitude of approximately 25 miles. The Air Force hoped
that new engines vould permit a speed of 4,000 mph and an altitude

NACA was absorbed by NASA in Oct 1958.

ee on



22 . (ems,

; . op peta. ~ :
Under the circumstances it was imprudent to sever all ties between the
guided missile. office and the space Progrem. A consequent division
of authority between the Assistant Chief of Stafr for Guided Missiles
and the Directorate °F ASesnewt Tesbpoleey rerulted sn & maber of
enubarrassing misunderstandings during ‘the succeeding months.

USAF Space Program and ARPA

At the seme tine that the Air Force was attempting to set up a
Headquarters space agency, the Air Staff studied the military implications
of Sputnik. The Spproaching space age Could well demand a new strategy,
for eventually astronautic Supremacy might nean the control of all the
land and sea areas of the Earth, The Free World could not concede such
® contingency to the Soviets and survive, Iti was time for a dynamic
patdonal program that would bring with it the recovery of American leader-
ship, te Howser aod Decenber 1957 the Air Force devoted much thought
to this need.

On 7 January 1958 the Departaent of Defense requested the three
services to list their Proposed space projects. It may. be that the
Department of Defense intended to use this information only to assist
ARPA in assigning development missions among the Amy, Navy, and Air
Force, The Air Force, however, at least at the staff level, interpreted
the request quite differently and believed that the Departuent of Defense
intended.to approve a USAF space progrea. ©

DCS/Development Completed the reply in tvo veeks, It listed 5 sys-
tems and 21 subsystems or Projects that encompassed a variety of military
missions "essential to the maintenance of our national position and


Ab, but a man's reach should exceed
his

grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?

~ Robert Browning


and the third malfunctioned also but not before traveling 963 miles
toward the Noon. Of the two shots Contracted by the Army, the first
vehicle fell back into the atmosphere and burned after reaching an
altitude of nearly 67,000 miles, and the second bypassed the Moon and
entered solar orbit. Thereafter Pioneer came under NASA control, and
in November 1959 9 sixth shot ended in malfunction at the time of
leunching. Score was a single shot Project, also conceived by ARPA
for Propaganda purposes to broadcast the President's voice in a
Christmas message from Space. Although Score was certainly not a
military project, it was not transferred to NASA, and, unlike Vanguard,
+4 was permitted to use a military rocket, the new At2as of the Air
Yorce.?

Project Discoverer was of a different order. Separated ‘from ARS
by ARPA in 1958, with AFEMD as contractor, it represented an im-
Portant stride forvard in the military space program. It was
painstakingly plannea to perform space research in Support of advanced
military reconnaissance. It could also be helpful in Preparing the
wey for man-in-space Projects whether civilian or military, It had
six main objectives: test of the satellite airframe and guidance system;
test of satellite stabilization equipment; control of satellite internal
environment; biomedical experiments with mice and small primates;
development of capsule recovery techniques; and test of ground support
equipment and personnel proficiency,

There was considerable overlapping in the Payload instrumentation
of the 19 lofted capsules. In general the five projects gathered
scientific information of great value. Knowledge was acquired on such



* EE conroctim _
meteorology, and navigation. The ARPA military program then consisted

of nothing more than Program I, Progrem IL, end the plans for a
nuclear-bomb-powered rocket, as a remnant of Progrem mt,

In September 1958, shortly before the activation of NASA, ARPA
redefined the Advanced Reconnaissance System and broke 2t down into
separate projects with different designations. The reconnaissance
aspect became Sentry. The vehicle tests, biomedical flights, and
recovery experiments were Grouped together as Discoverer. And the
infrared sensing system becane Midas. In the last months of 1958, ARPA
assigned toese three projects to ARDC-AFBMD with the usual contractual
arrangements. Between 19 December 1958 and 29 April 1959, HASA requested
ARDC to accept vesponsibility for Space Track research and development,
the design of an engine test stand at Edwards APB, and the construction
of fecilities at Eglin AFB for vertical space prives.

At the end of June 1959. the Air Force was still without a space
Program of its own but was obligated to, support @ large part of the ARPA
Program and some RASA projects as well. The work made serious demands

* Space projects wholly or partly entrusted to AFEMD by mid~1959:

1. Discoverer 12. Willow

2, Sentry 13. Outer Space Weapon. Test

3. Midas 14. Centaur

4, 6-Hr Comm Sat 15. Saturn

5. QheHr Comm Sat 16. Manned Sat & Intep and

6. Deep Probes Inspec System

7. Transit Nev Sat 17. Geo-Astro-Physical Program
8. Tyros Cloud Cover 18. Hustler L
-9. Courrier Passive Amy Comm Sat 19. Aerojet Engine
10. HEIs 20. Delta

11. Mercury (Mis) al. Vega:



EL, tyro»

the use of ballistic missiles. Thus the space end missile programs
overiapped.”

Although the Air Force had long entertained space plans, up
to October 1957 little money had been allocated to the projects.
Through 30 June 1957, BALWARDS (BRATS) had received hardly anything;
the Advanced Reconnaiesance dystem got $4.7 million in fiscal year
1956 and $13.9 million in 1957. During these sane years the

: predecessors of Dyna Soar--Bomi-Robo, Brass Bell, and Hywards--
received minor allocations. The budget for fiscal year 1958, which
had come into effect three months before the advent of Sputnik,
allocated $2 milidon to Brats, $3 million to Dyna Soar and $65.8
million to the Advanced Reconnaissance Systen--an approximate total
of $70 million for space and near-space,”

In January 1958, three months after Sputnik, when the Air Force
presented ite first systematic Plans for a space program, Headquarters
Proposed that an extra $155 million be added to the original $70 million
to make a total of $225 million for fiscal year 1958. The additional
$155 million could be obtained from a reorientation of Less important
seronautical projects, from the DOD emergency fund, and from supple-
mentary appropriations of $61 million. However, since OSD ignored the
plan, the proposal was of importance only insofar as it indicated the
trend of USAF thinking and what might ave been,”

The emergence of ARPA in February 1958 chenged all these hopes.
Thereafter the Air Force could do no work on its own in space research

*Corresponding Army end Navy statistics have not been available.

Peep geet aie

eK



distribution of splintered parts were even more disturbing. For
exemple, in March 1958 he directed the Naval Ordnance Test Station

to develop a mechanical @round-scanning system to supplement the
launching of three lunar probes assigned to the Air Force.” In this
and other instances, Johnson abandoned the tested principle of concur=
rency used by AFEND in the rapid Gevelopment of ballistic missiles after
1953. Johnson, of course, saw the problem from the point. of view of his

own position and responsibilities, and presumably he was also under
strong pressure from each of the three services, The explanation of his
decisions is doubtless in ARPA files. It seemed to the Air Force that
his division of Project components obteined the efficient production of
parts at the expense of greater efficiency for the whole; there seemed
leo a probable loss of time. 8

Despite the turn of events the Air Force continued to hope and
work for a-space program of its own. During March and April, Headquar-
ters USAF vainly sought approval by civilian authorities of a program
that, in addition to the Advanced Reconnaissance System, vould include
& three-phased manned satellite to send consecutively a small animal,
& large animal, and a men into space; a hydrogen-oxygen engine of
150,000-pound. thrust; a 1, 300, 000-pound-thrust engine; and a nuclear
Propulsion system. ‘Thus the Air Force showed a keen consciousness
of three important aspects of space exploration--continued research in

FRejectea by ARPA as falling within the area of NASA responsibilities,
and designated Nova,



end of 1957. Sputnik I therefore did not come as a surprise to informed
people in or outside of the Government. In his State of the Union Mes-
sage delivered to Congress on 9 January 1958, the President himself
reflected the general indifference that had previously prevailed when
he admitted that "most of us did not anticipate the intensity of the
Psychological impact upon the world of the leunching of the first satel-
lite, wt

The failure to appreciate the importance of being first in space
is all the more unfortunate because the United States had already under-
‘taken to place'a satellite 4n.orbit in the near future. By 1955 the
three services were all thinking of a possible satellite, and the Axny
end Navy even requested official approval of their joint project, known
as Orbiter, to use a Redstone missile as a booster for a small payload.
At the seme time the Administration determined to develop a scientiric
Satellite as an American contribution to the International Geophysical
Year (IGY), scheduled for 2 July 1957-31 December 1958. This decision
prompted the. Secretary of Defense to Gisepprove Orbiter "in the interest
of IGY policies." He then directed the three services to submit Ppro~
posals for a scientific satellite that was dedicated wholly. to peaceful

ends 22

The Army and Navy united in Proposing a modified version of Orbit-
er, but once again this was ruled out. The use of Redstone, a-militery
missile, would create security problems and might suggest a motive that
was not purely scientific, Because of these objections the Navy pro-
posed on its own a backup vehicle that would utilize a modified version

egg aie parte cs
VOT Felts



61

(conta)
Source Code Name Launch Date Success
NASA-Navy Vanguard (8) 11 17 Feb 59 Orbitart
ARPA-USAF Discoverer (1)1 28 Feb 59 Orbital
ARPA-Amy Pioneer (5): Iv 3 Mar 59 Solar orbitt
ARPA-USAP Discoverer (2) 17 -13 Apr 59 Orbital
NASA-Navy Vanguard (9) 13 Apr 59 Melfunction
ARPA-USAF Discoverer (3) m 3 Jun 59 Malfunction
MASA-Navy Venguerd (10) 22 Jun 59 Malfunction
ARPA-USAP Discoverer (4) Iv 25 Jun 59 Malfunction
ARPA-Arny Explorer (6) 16 Jul 59 Destroyed
ARPArUBAT . (Pedder) 7 hug 59 Orbiteat
ARPA-UBAF Discoverer (5) v 13 aug 59 Orbitert
ARPA-Arny Beacon (2) Us dug 59 Malfunction
ARPA-USAF Discoverer (6) vr 19 dug 59 Orbital
USSR Lunik IT 12 Sep 59 Impacted Moon
ARPA-Navy Transit (1) 17 Sep 59_—- Malfunction
NASA-Navy Vanguard (11) IIT 18 Sep 59 Orbitalt
USER Lundk III 4 Oct 59 Photo of far side
of Moon
NABA-USAF Explorer (8) v 13 Oct 59 orbital?
USAF Discoverer (7) VII 7 Nov 59 Orbital
USAF Discoverer (8) VIII 20 Nov 59 Orbitaat
MASA-USAF Pioneer (6) 26 Nov 59 Malfunction

¥Arebic figures represent firings; Roman figures successful results except
for Discoverer. The Air Force carries Roman figures regardless of results,

Still in orbit at the close of 1959.


_ -PGNFIBENTIAL oz: 47

" subjects as cloud cover of the Earth; geodetic configurations; density
of microneteoric matter; the solar-Earth heating processes; the
magnetic fields of the Earth and Moon, including the discovery of the

_ Ven Allen radiation belte; a Wide field of radiation phenomena--cosnic
rays, ionizing radiation, and X-ray rediation from the sun; erosion of
exposed solar'celis; shifts in the external and internal temperatures
of the capsules; and biomedical environment.

There were even greater promises for the American program in 1960.
Vanguard and Score were finished, but Pioneer and Discoverer were still
important, and there were plans for additional Explorer study. NASA
contracted the Air Force for further Pioneer space probes. There was
a scheduled launching of a Thor-propelled planetoid into solar orbit
in March, It was to be sensitively instrumented to serve es a space
laboratory to expand the knowledge gained through the work of the two
previous’ years. Conceivably, Pioneer V, as it would be known if it
“were successful, might become one of the great "firsts" in the history
of science. The Air Force, independent now of ARPA, would continue
the wrk with Discoverer to perfect the technique of recovery and other
aspects of the advanced reconnaissance program.””

There were numerous other launchings scheduled in 1960. The Army's
Notus or Advent, as it had come to be known, operating satellites on
equatorial 24-hour orbits, would supply a reliable, all-veather, jan-
proof communication system, The Navy's Transit would fulfill the need
for an all-weather twentieth-century version of celestial navigation,
relying on artificial satellites rather than stars. And NASA's Tiros

_CONFIBENEAE: gg
ea . a .

Be


i.

2.

3.
he

5.

6.

Te

&

9

10.

49

For a discussion of this Problem, see John L. Chapman Atlas, the
si a Missile (New York, 1960), p 2h. _-

"Research and Rocket Roundup," Mar 57; Martin
Caidin, Sutton for Tomorrow Ces York, 1958), Pp 139-50; Study
da 1360 Self, AMC Div, The Development of Guided Missiles,

di .

RAND, RA-1502] through 15032 (8), Feb 47.

Ltr (8), Brig Gen Alden R. Crawford, Chief, Engr Div, AMC to DCS/M,
Fiq_ USAF, subj: Project RAND, Satellite Vehicle, 8 Dec 47; ltr,
Ralph C. Lens, Jr, D/Plans & Ops, WADD to Col Clyde D. Gasser, SAB,
Hq USAF, subj: Air Force Space Program, 7 Apr 60, and Atch 4, Rpt
(0), WADC Plans for Space Technology, 1955-58, w/App A (a brief
history); Press Conferences with Charles E. Wilson, SOD, New York
10 May and 7 Oct 53 and 16 Dec 54; Facts on File, 5-1. Jan

3 Addresses by Sen Stuart y 23 dun
33 and 21 Jul 54, and Statement in Hearings Before Senate Cmte on
Armed Services, 24 Feb 55.

Hee fore Lines. 4 dun 55; Addresses by Trevor Gardner, Asst SAF
RED), New ork Times, 12 Aug and 9 Dee 55,

DOD Rpt to House Cmte on Appropriations, Procurement Policies and
Practices, 21 Feb 56,

ARDC R&P Project Card (S), Abbreviated System Development Plan, 10
Oct 57; Lt Col F. J. Dillon dr, Project M House Rpt 1228,
86th Cong, 27 Jan 60; memo (S) for F: E. Horner, Asst SAF (R&D)
from Herbert. F, York, Chief Scientist, ARPA, subj: BALWARDS Vehicle,
13 May 583 DOD Study (8) Recommendation Against Transfer of CENTAUR
to NASA, 5 May 59; memo (s) for Hq ARDC from Hq USAF, subj: BALWARDS,
15 May 57; ARDC Study (S), HETS, 18 May 58,

RAND, RM/2002 (8), 26 Sep 57.

WADC Rpt (SRD), ‘The WADC Research Approach, 56 WORA-504, Aug 563
WADC Rpt (SRD), An Approach to Space Endeavor in Relationship to
Current and Future Capabilities of the U.S. Air Force, 57 WCRA~38,
Jan 573 WADC Technical Notes (SRD), An Estimate of Future Space
Vehicle Capability, WADC IN 57-22h, Jul 575 WADC Rpt, WADC Plans for
Space Tech, 1955-58.

Facts on File, 26-31 Dec 54; Wilson press conference, New York Times,
1c .



Air Force Office of Scientific Research (OSR), ARDC, almost succeeded,
It involved launching 8 missile trom @ balloon at an altitude of 100,000
feet to penetrate space for a distance of 4,000 miles with the purported
Purpose of gathering information of vital interest to the Air Force,
Despite charges of inadequate coordination, subterfuge, mismanagement,
and “utter misdirection of basic research funds," Colonel Davis persevered
with his plans. In the spring of 1957 be obtained Permission from the Air
Force, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission to con-
duet the operations from the Eniwetok Pacific Proving Ground. In Septen-
ber 1957 the first shot failed, There were five others to be made. On
4 October the second missile tangled vith the collapsing balloon at
70,000 feet, escaped from the wreckage, and reached a known altitude of
370 miles,29 ae

The next morning, newepepers of the world bannerlined the 18h-pound
Fuseien Sputnik. National and international coments on the Soviet vic-
tory were not Complimentary to the United States. Throughout the American
press there was general Condemnation of the “partial measures, hit or miss
Planning and confused orgenization that have marked our ++ + work in this
fie1a "20 ; .

A number of high-ranking U.3, officials attempted to belittie the
Russian satellite, Sputnik was unimportant because it was no surprise;
it was a "neat scientific trick"; it was an “outerspace basketball geme,"21
The same thought appeared to be implied in the White House announcement