Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-2810 | June 24, 2024 Page 1 of 15

I N T H E

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Mark D. Stanley,

Appellant-Respondent

and

Karlynne D. Akos, Jeffrey H. Stanley, Kevin A. Stanley and Hire 

Holdings, LLC,

Appellants/Intervenors

v.

Lisa Stanley,

Appellee-Petitioner

June 24, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-DN-2810

Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court

The Honorable Christopher D. Kehler, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No.

43D04-2009-DN-242
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DN-2810 | June 24, 2024 Page 2 of 15

Opinion by Judge Bailey

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Mathias concur.

Bailey, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Lisa Stanley filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Mark Stanley and 

requested a division of the marital property pursuant to Indiana Code Section 

31-15-7-4.1 Mark’s siblings – Karlynne Akos, Jeffrey Stanley, and Kevin 

Stanley – and Hire Holdings, LLC (an Ohio corporation created by Mark and 

his siblings) (collectively, “Intervenors”) intervened in the dissolution 

proceedings to assert an interest in lake front property deeded to Mark in 

settlement of the estate of Karol Stanley (“Lake House”). Intervenors sought to 

establish that Mark holds four-fifths of the Lake House in trust for his siblings, 

and they requested findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule

52(A). The trial court concluded that the entirety of the Lake House is marital 

property and entered a final judgment upon that interlocutory order. Mark and 

Intervenors (collectively, “the Stanleys”) appeal, raising the issue of whether the 

judgment is clearly erroneous because estate and rental agreement documents

[1] 1 Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4 requires the trial court to divide all property of the parties, including property 

acquired by either spouse in his or her own right after the marriage and before final separation of the parties.
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collectively evince an express trust or because uncontroverted testimony of 

intent supports recognition of a resulting trust. We reverse and remand for 

further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Lisa and Mark married on May 26, 2006, and in 2011, they moved into the 

Lake House with Mark’s parents, Karol and Sasha Stanley. The Lake House 

had been acquired by a Stanley ancestor in the early 1900’s and was then 

owned jointly by Mark’s parents. Sasha died in 2011 and Karol died in 2015.

[3] Karol’s will left two parcels of real estate in equal shares to his five children: 

the Lake House (appraised at over $900,000) and a house in Ohio, which was 

in a state of disrepair (the “Banyon House”). Jeffrey and Mark served as corepresentatives of the estate. They and their siblings agreed that they needed to 

mortgage the Lake House and renovate the Banyon House for use as a rental 

property. Mark was the only one of the siblings without a mortgage and he 

agreed to obtain a mortgage using the Lake House as collateral.

[4] After consultation with the estate’s attorney, Laura Kaufman, the corepresentatives executed a deed transferring the Lake House to Mark and the 

remaining siblings executed consents to distribution. Mark obtained a $125,000 

mortgage; he used some of the funds to pay off Karol’s debt and some to 

renovate the Banyon House. The siblings also contributed some of their 

personal funds for renovation projects at both properties. In 2017, Jeffrey
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prepared and signed a rental agreement naming Mark and Lisa as tenants of the 

Lake House.

[5] In February of 2020, one of the Stanley siblings passed away, leaving a will that 

divided her interest in the Banyon House between her four remaining siblings 

and naming Karlynne as her residuary estate beneficiary. On August 26, 2020, 

the surviving siblings incorporated Hire Holdings and thereafter they registered 

Hire Holdings as a foreign corporation in the State of Indiana. On September 

10, 2020, Lisa filed her petition for divorce; she also obtained a temporary 

restraining order prohibiting transfer of marital assets. Mark subsequently 

transferred the Lake House by quit claim deed to Hire Holdings. The siblings 

individually, and on behalf of Hire Holdings, successfully moved to intervene in 

the dissolution action.

[6] On April 24, 2023, Intervenors filed a pre-hearing memorandum. They

asserted the position that “distribution of the Real Estate to Mark was 

impressed with a trust for the benefit of himself and his four other siblings and, 

accordingly, that 4/5 of the Real Estate should be withheld and/or excluded 

from being considered marital property in this matter.” App. Vol. II, pgs. 45-

46. The memorandum described requirements for either an express trust or a 

resulting trust.

[7] The trial court conducted hearings on May 8 and May 25, 2023. Mark, Jeffrey, 

and Karlynne testified that they, together with their other siblings, had intended 

that Mark hold the Lake House for the benefit of all the siblings. The
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Intervenors submitted into evidence the 2017 lease, denominated a Real Estate 

Agreement, designating the “Stanley Family” as landlord and Mark and Lisa as 

tenants. The agreement provided, among other things, that Mark would pay 

the mortgage payments in lieu of rent payments, he would perform minor 

maintenance tasks, the family would be responsible for larger repairs, and the 

agreement would terminate in ten years.

[8] According to the testimony of his siblings, Mark had been appointed to obtain a 

mortgage because he was in the best financial position to do so; mortgage 

proceeds were to be used for family debts and renovations; and eventually, the 

Lake House would be transferred into either a holding company or family trust. 

The sibling testimony was in part corroborated by attorney Kaufman. She 

testified that, notwithstanding the execution of consents to distribution, there 

had been “no buyout of siblings” and no “swap of estate assets.” (Tr. Vol. II, 

pg. 59.) Rather, Mark had been deeded the Lake House “with no strings

attached” but in the context of family anticipation that there would be a rental 

arrangement and a transfer of the Lake House in the future when the siblings 

decided upon whether a holding company or family trust was the best course of 

action. (Id. at 61.) Kaufman clarified that she had advised the estate heirs that 

the conveyance to Mark was not equivalent to creation of a trust. Her 

understanding was that Mark would hold the Lake House as an

“intermediary.” (Id. at 48.)

[9] On August 22, 2023, the trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions 

thereon, and order. The trial court concluded that Intervenors had not met the
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burden of showing an express trust was created and declined to recognize a 

resulting trust because “precluding Lisa from having an interest in the Lake 

House would be neither equitable or just.” Appealed Order at 15. The trial 

court thus determined that the Property is a marital asset, in which Intervenors 

have no interest. On October 31, the trial court directed the entry of the order 

as a final judgment. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Intervenors requested special findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). In these circumstances, our standard of review is 

well-settled:

we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s 

findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.

Indianapolis Ind. Aamco Dealers Adver. Pool v. Anderson, 746 N.E.2d 

383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not disturb the trial 

court’s findings or judgment unless they are clearly erroneous.

Id. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks 

any reasonable inference from the evidence to support them.

Culley v. McFadden Lake Corp., 674 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of 

the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made. Carroll v. J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc., 738 N.E.2d 

1069, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied 761 N.E.2d 411 

(Ind. 2001). We will neither reweigh evidence nor judge the 

credibility of witnesses, but will consider only the evidence 

favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn therefrom. Anderson, 746 N.E.2d at 386; Gunderson v.

Rondinelli, 677 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
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Weiss v. Harper, 803 N.E.2d 201, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[11] As a preliminary matter, the parties point to claimed deficiencies in the factual 

findings and dispute whether the findings that were entered are adequate to 

permit meaningful appellate review.

“Special findings are those which contain all facts necessary for 

recovery by a party in whose favor conclusions of law are 

found.” Bowman v. Bowman, 686 N.E.2d 921, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1997). The findings are adequate if they are sufficient to support 

a valid legal basis for the trial court’s decision. Id. The purpose 

of special findings of fact is to provide reviewing courts with the 

theory on which the judge decided the case, so they should 

contain a statement of the ultimate facts from which the trial 

court determined the legal rights of the parties. Id. “On appeal, 

we construe the trial court’s findings together liberally in support 

of the judgment; however, we may not add anything to the 

special findings of fact by way of presumption, inference, or 

intendment.” Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Taylor, 589 N.E.2d 

267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied 600 N.E.2d 543 (Ind.

1992) (citation omitted).

Weiss, 803 N.E.2d at 205.

[12] The Stanleys argue that the trial court order is deficient in that it omits any 

reference to the intent of the siblings when they executed the deed to Mark. 

They contend that their intent was to create an express trust and they did so, as 

evidenced by the estate documents, a rental agreement, and their conduct. 

Lisa, in turn, argues that any deficiencies in the findings do not render the 

decision clearly erroneous because the evidence of record supports the trial 

court’s ultimate conclusions. However, she contends that the trial court failed
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to adequately address evidence of unclean hands, that is, Mark’s 

representations to mortgage lenders that the Lake House was his property. 

These claimed omissions do not preclude our review. We are able to discern 

the theory upon which the trial court’s decision rests; that is, the trial court was 

not persuaded that the Stanleys had established either an express or resulting 

trust. In reaching its decision, the court acknowledged admission of the rental 

agreement into evidence but did not rely upon the language of the document.

The trial court stated that it had “inferred” from Mark’s refusal to answer

questions related to fraud and the surrounding circumstances that his

applications for mortgages “could” have been fraudulent if the Lake House was 

held in trust. (Appealed Order at 8.) Finding the order adequate for appellate 

review, we turn to the merits.

[13] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 30-4-1-1(a): “A trust is a fiduciary 

relationship between a person who, as trustee, holds title to property and 

another person for whom, as beneficiary, the title is held.” A trust may be an 

express trust set forth in writing, or an implied trust, which is a “creature of 

equity, imposed to do justice.” Presbytery of Ohio Valley v. OPC, 973 N.E.2d 

1099, 1108 (Ind. 2012). In Indiana, implied trusts arise in two forms: 

constructive trusts and resulting trusts. Id. at 1109.2

2

Constructive trusts are generally imposed when legal title to property is obtained through wrongful means, 

such as fraud, duress, undue influence, or theft. Presbytery of Ohio Valley, 973 N.E.2d at 1109. Here, we need 

not consider whether a constructive trust was created because there has been no claim made that Mark 

gained title to the Property through wrongful means.
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[14] An express trust must be evidenced by a writing signed by the owner of the 

property, that is, the settlor. Id. at 1108 (citing Ind. Code § 30-4-2-1(a)). 

Certain terms, ascertainable with reasonable certainty from the writings, are 

essential to the creation of a trust, including: “(1) the trust property; (2) the 

settlor; (3) the identity of the trustee; (4) the identity of the beneficiary; and (5) 

the purpose of the trust.” Id. at 1109. The terms may be set forth in multiple 

writings, provided that they are sufficiently “referred to and connected with” 

the signed writing so that they may be read as a single transaction. Id. The 

burden of proof rests on the party seeking to impress a trust upon real property 

when another holds legal title. Id. at 1108. There must be a “clear and 

unequivocal demonstration of the settlor’s intent to create a trust” and such 

“heightened proof” is necessary to protect the sanctity of property ownership 

against trust claims not intended by the settlor. Id. at 1109.

[15] The Stanleys argue that they created an express trust with the aggregation of 

estate and lease documents. The documents prepared in the closing of Karol’s 

estate – the co-representatives’ deed, the closing statement, and the siblings’ 

consents to distribute – facially disclose conveyance of the Lake House to Mark. 

The consents acknowledge an unequal distribution, without consideration, and 

none of the documents include a specific reference to a trust or purpose for a 

trust.

[16] In addition to the estate documents, the Stanleys submitted into evidence a Real 

Estate Agreement, which purportedly imposes upon Mark certain obligations as 

a tenant rather than sole owner of the Lake House. Lisa was identified as a co-
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tenant. The trial court made certain factual findings to support its rejection of 

the Real Estate Agreement as a trust document. That is, the trial court found 

that Lisa had not signed the agreement; it was unclear in what capacity Jeffrey 

had signed the lease; and there was no specification of who was included in the 

Stanley Family and was therefore a landlord. Finally, the trial court questioned 

the timing of Mark’s signature on the evidentiary exhibit because the copy 

submitted with the Motion to Intervene did not display Mark’s signature.

[17] In sum, the trial court considered the Real Estate Agreement and concluded 

that the document, individually or in conjunction with the estate documents, 

does not constitute an express trust. Although the documents may arguably be 

connected, they do not evince a clear and unequivocal intent of the beneficiaries 

of Karol’s estate to act as settlors creating a trust. The documents as a whole do 

not expressly set forth the identity of a settlor or settlors, trust purpose, identity 

of the trust, or the identity of each claimed beneficiary. The trial court did not 

clearly err in determining that the Stanleys had not met their burden to show 

that an express trust was created.

[18] The trial court also considered whether a resulting trust was created. A 

resulting trust is generally imposed in one of three circumstances: “(1) Where 

an express trust fails in whole or in part; (2) where an express trust is fully 

performed without exhausting the trust estate; (3) where property is purchased 

and the purchase price is paid by one person and at his direction the vendor 

conveys the property to another person.” Id. at 1109. A resulting trust arising 

under the first of these circumstances, implicated here, “is created by operation
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of law to give effect to the parties’ intentions when they have otherwise failed to

satisfy the statutory requirements for creating an express trust.” Id. The

settlor’s intent “is crucial to the resulting trust analysis.” Id.

[19] Lisa argues that, as a matter of law, the siblings’ intentions are irrelevant to 

whether a resulting trust exists because such a trust is a creature of equity and 

Mark had unclean hands.

The “unclean hands” doctrine demands that one who seeks relief 

in a court of equity must be free of wrongdoing in the matter 

before the court. Galloway v. Hadley, 881 N.E.2d 667, 678 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2008). The alleged wrongdoing must have an 

immediate and necessary relation to the matter being litigated. 

Id. For the doctrine of unclean hands to apply, the misconduct 

must be intentional. Id. The purpose of the unclean hands 

doctrine is to prevent a party from reaping benefits from his 

misconduct. Id. The doctrine is not favored by the courts and is 

applied with reluctance and scrutiny. Id.

Hardy v. Hardy, 910 N.E.2d 851, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). At the hearing, 

Mark refused to answer certain questions propounded to him, and Lisa did not 

testify. However, other testimony from family members and family friends 

suggests that Mark and Lisa were not at odds regarding the acquisition and 

encumbrance of the Lake House during their marriage. Lisa did not request 

that the trial court make a finding that Mark had unclean hands or that the 

alleged wrongdoing had an immediate and necessary relation to the matter 

being litigated, the inclusion of an asset within the marital estate. We thus turn
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to consider the evidence of an intention on the part of the siblings to create a 

trust rather than convey property to Mark as his sole property.

[20] Jeffrey testified that his parents intended that the Lake House, which had been 

in the Stanley family for generations, would “stay in the family.” (Tr. Vol. II, 

pg. 10.) He described a situation where, upon Karol’s death, the five siblings 

had jointly inherited one property needing substantial renovation and one 

property having substantial equity. Jeffrey testified that they decided the best 

course of action would be to mortgage the Lake House, use the proceeds to pay 

Karol’s debt and renovate the Banyon House for rental, and ultimately use the 

rental proceeds to maintain the Lake House. According to Jeffrey, Mark was in 

the best position to obtain a mortgage and that was the reason for deeding the 

Lake House to Mark individually. Jeffrey testified that the siblings contributed 

personal funds for the benefit of both properties.

[21] Kaufman testified that she had been the attorney for Karol’s estate and had 

participated in telephone conversations with Jeffrey as a co-representative of the 

estate. Kaufman testified that the siblings wanted their inherited property to be 

held “in trust” but were “not ready” to decide whether a family trust or creation 

of an LLC was best; her notes reflected that the decision was to be made “down 

the road.” (Id. at 47, 49.) According to Kaufman, there had been no exchange 

of assets, buyout of siblings, or transfer of funds to effect an equal distribution. 

The Lake House was deeded to Mark with “no strings attached” but with an 

expectation that future action vis-à-vis the Lake House would be taken. (Id. at 

61.)
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[22] Karlynne Akos testified to her understanding that Mark had been holding the 

Lake House “in trust” and effectively paying rent by making the mortgage 

payments. (Id. at 171.) She denied that she had intended that Mark be the sole 

owner of the Lake House and she clarified that Mark did not exclusively 

possess the property. According to Karlynne, the siblings had individual rooms 

at the Lake House and the extended family members used a Shared Key app to 

schedule vacation time at the lake. Karlynne had installed a lock on her room 

door. Karlynne further testified that she had used proceeds from the estate of 

her deceased sister to make improvements to the Lake House.

[23] Mark testified that he agreed with his siblings that he should obtain a mortgage 

on the Lake House because he was in the best position to do so. From the

$125,000 mortgage that Mark had obtained, he had paid Karol’s debts and

provided funding for repairs to the Banyon House. Mark’s understanding was 

that he would “hold [the Lake House] in trust until transfer at a later time.” (Id. 

at 234.) He testified that the siblings “kind of put a plan together” at their 

annual Fourth of July gathering in 2017. (Id. at 237.)

[24] In sum, it is clear that the siblings intended to convey the Lake House to Mark 

as a trustee for all the siblings, although the documents they executed did not 

expressly say as much. The trial court made no finding that the uncontroverted 

testimony lacked credibility. Rather, in this regard the trial court included in its 

order the following language denominated as a conclusion of law: “The Court 

believes that imposing a resulting trust, thereby precluding Lisa from having an 

interest in the Lake House, would be neither equitable or just.” (Appealed
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Order at 15.) But the Intervenors did not seek the exclusion of the Lake House 

in its entirety from the marital estate. Their asserted position was that one-fifth 

is includable in the marital pot.

3 The trial court’s order did not accurately 

reflect the petition before it. Focusing upon timing rather than the 

uncontroverted evidence of intent, the factual findings do not support the 

conclusion that a resulting trust failed to arise by operation of law.

Conclusion

[25] The factual findings support the conclusion that an express trust was not 

created. The findings do not support the conclusion that a resulting trust was 

not impressed upon the Property. The judgment is clearly erroneous in this 

regard.

[26] Reversed and remanded.

Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT MARK D. STANLEY

Andrew E. Grossnickle

Beers Mallers Backs & Salin LLP 

Warsaw, Indiana

3 We do not suggest that the Stanleys’ position is that Lisa should ultimately be awarded a portion of that 

one-fifth share of the Lake House. “Indiana's ‘one pot’ theory prohibits the exclusion of any asset in 

which a party has a vested interest from the scope of the trial court’s power to divide and award.” 

Wanner v. Hutchcroft, 888 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). However, although all property owned 

by the parties is includable, Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5(2)(B) permits the trial court to consider “the 

extent to which the property was acquired by each spouse through inheritance or gift.”
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS/INTERVENORS KARLYNNE D. AKOS,

JEFFREY H. STANLEY,KEVIN A. STANLEY, AND HIRE HOLDINGS,LLC

Randy J. Spitaels 

Kindig & Sloat, PC 

Nappanee, Indiana

Curtis E. Shirley

Law Office of Curtis E. Shirley, LLC 

Carmel, Indiana

Andrew E. Grossnickle

Beers Mallers Backs & Salin, LLP

Warsaw, IN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE LISA STANLEY

Jay A. Rigdon 

Scott E. Reust

Rockhill Pinnick LLP 

Warsaw, Indiana