m
d. Determine the effects of the above on MIDAS and prepare necessary
revisons to the MIDAS plans.

4. The proposed SAMOS interim operational capability should be located in
the area whese it is desired to establish the final operational facility
and control center, if appropriate, or can consist of an augmentation to
the R&D capability with Air Force Personnel rather than contractor per-
sonnel responsible for the operation. The plan for this capability mst

Teh other defense subsystem elements such an thood related to Enea’
Therefore, Soesttons of the folaowing types mst be considered in maicing
@ new plan for the interim operational capability: .

. be If not, or if there is serious qu
is it sound to reactivate a minute area of this large plant for tne
interin Operational equipment?

©. Should the entire complex be considered as basically a "peacetime"
operation with survivability of all or part of the equipment of little
importance.

de 1s it necessary cr deariahle to conlocate data handling and
Processing facilities with future control centers and should the SAMOS
and MIDAS control centers be integrated?

other commands participating as ne . guidance will be
provided by this ws on the questions in paragraph 4.
ROSCOE C. WILSON

L. General, USAF:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Development

a

3 eect comrai28



Reply to
Attn of:

SUBJECT:
TO:

emus CY)

Fs
iSite Y
ROY 14 June 1960
Revised SAMOS Development Plan
AFEMD
1. The attached letter, subject: (U) Exploitation of Initial saMos
data, dated 1 June 1960, rs USAF (AFDSD-AT. to ARDC,

2. The presentation of the revised SAMOS Development Plan shall be given
to the Air Force tic Missile Committee on or about 15 July 1960.
inis sane presentation shall be given to this headquarters price t that
date.

/s/

JAMES FERGUSON * : 1 Ateh *

Major General, USAF Ltr, subj: Exploitation

Vice Commander of initial SAMOS Data,
dtd 1 Jun 60 (s)

CO-73130



AFDSD-AT 1 June 1960
(U) Exploitation of Initial SAMOS Date

ARDC
IMFO TO: CINCSAC ADC ANC) 0 APEMD

1. By letter of 20 April 1960, the Diréctor of Defense, Research and
Engineering approved in principle the Researbh and Plans
for DISCOVERER, SAMOS AMD MIDAS, dated 15 January 1960. Separate
correspondence as‘ to specific changes and funds pertaining to this.
“pproval is being prepared; however, questions of operational command,
Operational facilities and user relationships for the SAMOS reconnais—
ance satellite contime to be matters of considerable discussion.

2. The Under Secretary of the Air Force directed on 27 May 1960 that
the B&D exploitation and operational plans for SAMOS be re-evaluated.
The Under Secretary stated that there is considerable technical un_
certainty as to the character and quality of the information that may
be obtained by the different payloads of this system and that the
operational interest and the character of the initial operational.
programe will be strongly conditioned by the results of the RED program,
He noted that a very elaborate plan had been originally conceived for
dai

. This delay
concern that the asoumptions on such items as technical capabilities,
schedules, data quality, frequency of coverage, payload reliability and
Lifetime, :compater requirements, optimum camera types, etc., are open
to considwrable question and can affect in a major my the type of
Operational system that will ultimately be required. If, as @ result
of the B&D experimental flight program, recovery rather than readout

operational requirements, then the required for handling
such dafa will be caly simpler than if complete reliance is alse
on readout to met these ; ts.

3. It is directed that a revised SAMOS Development Flan be prepared and
submitted as soon as

\&



oo

be Endeavor to achieve the earliest flight dates for the different
Payloads with priorities in this order: Photographic recovery, photo- :.
graphic readout, ferret. Consideration is to be given to possible delaying
elements and added insurance against such delays.

c. Make provision for the minkmin essential capability to handle in
* reasonable fashion any operational take from the R&D flights:

(1) Include facility details, schedules, costs, manpower, and
subsystem descriptions. °

(2) Initial readout is limited to two sites.
(9) Mo wide-band data links authori sed except Vandenberg-

(4) No provision is to be made for alternate satellite control
centers: control to be exercised criginally from Sunnyvale center.

"(SY Capability will be Limited to that required to handle one
operating readout satellite at a time. :

(6) System should be planned to permit growth capacity if RAD
ee eran romilts are promising and decision is made later to use readout
pr: . :

weld aah {7), Processign capabilgty should be adequate for recovered as

{G) Personnel statting anglraining ahtuld be gsared to the
modified progran . The present activiti in this regard appear to be
completely out of scale and out of phase time-wise.

(9) Provision will be made only for essential elements of sub—
system I. Complexity and computer requirements introduced into this
subsystem as a result of ferret payloads should be carefully reassessed.
The very limited value of posshble data from F-1 and F-2 militates against
sophisticated data handling systep/ Subsystem I appears to have been
greatly over-engineered, at least for the ferrent aspects of the Program.

(10) Computer Programming problems, schedules and computer re~
requirements for Photographic readout payloads will be re-evaluated to
determine whether it is reasonable to anticipate extensive pre-determined
Selective area coverage on request by intelligence in the RD flighte nex
Scheduled. The interin facility requirements should be Planned accordingly.

2 ed
it

mh CO 7-3128

/f