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, August 6, 1969 

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Consideration of SALT on 

Thursday, August 7 

Apparently there is some misunderstanding amont those participating in the staffing of the subject to be discussed by you with 

the Executive Committee on August 7. It seems that our previous 

discussions and papers on this particular subject have led those 

participants to believe that the key issue for ExCom consideration 

is the "white II arms control satellite initiative. This is, of course, 

not the case. The only issue. as far as we, the NRO, are concerned, is that of the security and policy implications of the SALT 

activity with respect to the NRP. 

I have just had a long discussion with~-------~ who 

has been charged by I I with the staffing of a paper for 

Mr. Packard's and Mr. Nitze's use at this meeting. I find, unfortunately, that~----~has devoted :virtually his entire effort 

to establishing a position for Mr. Packard and Mr. Nitz.e on the 

arms control satellite initiative and has only tacitly treated the key 

issue of the security and policy implications as it related to the arms 

control sate Hite initiative. I was able, in my discussion with C 

~--~(who, incidentally, will now represent j I to 

Dr. Foster and ~---~ since I I had departed on 

leave), to assure him that the urgency and concern on the part of the 

NRO in this matter was one of informing the ExCom, as completely 

objectively as we can. that the current and anticipated activities of 

SALT are very likely to impinge on those of the NRP unless the 

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validity of U.S. policy on satellite reconnaissance is reaffirmed 

and some explicit guidance is provided those individuals involved 

in SALT, both during this period of preparing for negotiations or 

an agreement and during the negotiations themselves. 

agreed that our concern was certainly a relevant and important one 

and felt somewhat embarrassed that he had centered his activity in 

support of~-----~ around the lesser important (as far as we 

are concerned) and separable issue of an arms control satellite 

initiative. 

~----~ s conclusions on the arms control satellite proposal 

are quite similar to ours, Le .• that it displays some advantages as 

a credibl.e means of verification, that there are political dangers 

associated with its proposal, and most important. that a substantive 

discussion of the implications of its acceptance by the NSAM 156 

Committee. is a bit premature at this time. 

It is unfortunate that there has been this misunderstanding of the 

real issue. I feel we can correct this misunderstanding in the ExCom 

with a very informative discussion by you of NRO concern over the 

security and policy implications of SALT and perhaps a clarification 

in these discussions that the arms control satellite was simply pro• 

posed as one means of providing, much further downstream in the 

arms limitation talks, a credible cover for whatever actions the U.S. 

decided it must take with respect to the verification of any agreement. 

~--~-~intends now to adjust his thinking and revise whatever he 

prepares for Drs. Foster and ---~to likewise address the key 

issue for discussion at the ExCom meeting. 

agreed that our talking paper did represent an ~----~ 

reasonable and adequate discussion of the "key" issue, I suspect 

the format in which it was presented led to the confusion of issues. 

We continue to feel very strongly that there is a need for NSAM 

156 Committee review and consideration of the security and policy 

implications of SALT and would hope that such a review would result 

in a reaffirmation of the validity of established U.S. policy on satel·' 

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lite reconnaissance and definitive guidance to the participants in 

SALT as to just exactly how that prcpnratory nctivity and further 

n<!gotiatlons should proceed in tho light of this policy. 

\re have revised the text of the talking paper previously 

furnished for your use at the ExCom meeting in an attempt to 

more clearly relate the issue and correct the misunderstanding. 

Essentially, we have addressed only the issue in the main paper 

a:::d ha,..-e a;,penC:ed a SeiJa.rate "talker" on !he arms control satellite and the ''no elaboration" proposal as alternatives in verification. 

These papers are attached. We suggest that a copy of the 

revised papers be provided to Dr. DuBridge to replace the previous 

paper which Dr. Naka has already sent Dr. Steininger. 

We could also. if you desire,· deliver this afternoon a copy of 

the revised papers to Mr. Packard. Mr. Helms and Mr. Nitze. 

WILLIAM R. YOST 

Lt Colonel. USAF 

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The Issue 

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Should the ExCom encourage an NSAM 156 Committee consider<1tion of the security and policy implications of SALT with respect 

to the NRP, 

Background 

In early September 1968, the U.S. began preparations to enter 

negotiations, with the USSR, aimed toward reaching an agreement 

to limit strategic arms. The State Department proposed to enforce 

such an agreement by "maximum, or if necessary, exclu'sive 

reliance on national means of verification, meaning all types of 

observation. satellites, as well as other surveillance activities 

carried out by one side -- either unilaterally or in conjunction with 

its allies -- outside the territory or territorial waters of the other 

side." 

The problem, as presented by State, was to permit the negotiations to proceed on this basis and at the same time develop a policy 

v1,,.,ich would maintain U.S. freedom of action unilaterally to conduct 

reconnaissance satellite operations and prevent foreign political 

and physical interference with the conduct of these operations. 

The essentials of the State proposal were these: 

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1. Reclassification of the :fact that the U. s. is conducting satellite 

reconnaissance from Top Secret BYEMAN (or TALENT-KEYHOLE) to 

SECRET. 

2. Continuation of the present TALENT-KEYHOLE and BYEMAN 

security systems with regard to acquired intelligence, capabilities, 

and operations of reconnaissance satellites, 

3. Revelation to the Soviets that "national means of verification" 

includes the use of reconnaissance satellites. 

4. Establishment of a negotiating position based on the assumption 

that "one side will not impede the operation of the other's reconnaissance 

satellites, 11 

5. Providing NATO general information on the U.S. negotiating 

position on verification. 

6, Briefing Congress on the U.S. position on verification and 

capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement through national means. 

7. Maintaining a discreet position in response to press ·inquiries 

and in official public statements, with preparation to eventually acknowledge "maximum reliance on national means of verification" and the 

inclusion of the use of satellite photography in such means. 

On September 9, State submitted the proposal for NSAM 156 

Committee consideration. 

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The NRO reacted very quickly to this proposal, meeting with 

representatives of the CIA, JCS and NASA to develop opposition to 

the basic proposal and to suggest a.n alternative. 

On September 13, 1968, the USIB considered the security aspects 

of the State proposal and decided that "there should be no change in 

the classification of reconnaissance satellite operations or the information derived from them at this time. 11 

On September 16, 1968 the NSAM 156 Committee met, discussed 

the matter at some length, and arrived at no specific conclusion. 

Those in attendance reported that all parties were to prepare recommended guidelines and furnish them to State. 

On September 26, 1968 ACDA issued a proposed guidelines 

paper for comment by NSAM 156 Committee members. This paper 

was a decided improvement over the earlier {September 9) proposal. 

It did not ask for a downgrading of the security surrounding irthe fact 

of" satellite reconnaissance. It restricted the proposed discussions 

to 11information-gathering11 satellites, with no further definition 

authorized. Consultation "with Congress II was changed to "selected 

members of C'::mgr1::ss11 and was to be done on a classified basis. 

Constraints were placed on what might eventually be said to thE ~Jress, 

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.CONT:~GL 

with the statement for release limited to "the U.S. is prepared to 

place maximum reliance on national means of verification. 11 

Although some of the rationale expressed in the paper was objectionable, the NRO agreed that there had been a general improvement in 

concept. 

In late October 1968, the urgency of the negotiatfons dissipated, 

and SALT entered a waiting phase. 

On March 6, 1969, the President, in NSSM 28, directed the 

preparation of a U.S. position for possible strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Alternative options were to be 

developed by a steering committee under ACDA chairmanship for 

consideration in preparing the U.S. position. The options were to 

be accompanied by an evaluation of the strategic balance ·that would 

result, as well as by a discussion of possible Soviet reactions to 

each and likely U.S. response. A statement of principles and 

objectives was also to be developed for each option, together with 

proposed tactics for its use in relation to the proposal. 

On May 1, State submitted for NSSM 28 Steering Committee consideration a new paper which set forth the general guidelines for 

handling the question of observation satellites in connection with 

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SALT. The new paper was practically a word-for-word copy of the 

guidelines paper issued by ACDA on September 26, 1968. 

'On May 14, NASA formally urged NSSM 28 Committee consideration of a possible new Administration initiative in strategic arms 

limitation: bilateral negotiations on verification means to include 

the development and utilization of an open satellite system designed 

for the single purpose of verifying U.S. and USSR·adherence to 

treaty conditions, 'NASA was emphasizing the potential of this 

initiative in: 

1. avoiding disclosure of the existence, scope, utility or 

sophistication of the present overhead reconnaissance program, 

2. minimizing concern over international confrontation on 

this issue, 

3. providing an important bulwark to the unimpeded continuation of covert intelligence gathering activities, 

4. providing a reasonable overt basis for the possible challenges 

that might become necessary in the event treaty violations were discerned through any covert means. 

Current S~a.tus 

At its meeting on May 14, the NSSM 28 Committee approved the 

State proposal as a basis for drawing up instructions to the SALT 

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delegation and for planning consu.ltations with Congress and our 

allies. 

The alternative proposal for an Arms Control Satellite initiative 

was remanded to the NSAM 156 Committee for examination at a later 

date. 

Discussion 

It is apparent from our discussion with participants in NSSM 28 

activity that the Committee's concern with the basic rc_quirements 

of the various U.S. options for SALT has completely _overshadowed 

its recognition of the profoundly adverse effects that any disclosure 

of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program could have on the 

security of this nation, 

Once taken, the disclosure action is irreversible. No matter 

how much.the nation might regret its action, its options would be 

foreclosed. 

Disclosure does not enhance our negotiating position; in fact, 

it is counterproductive since our pers_istence in discussing satellite 

rec~nnaissance surfaces our heavy dependence on it and, by inference, indicates the limitations of our more conventional capabilities. 

Disclosure excites curiosity and in negotiations would elicit 

a pressure for more and more credibility. The path from a disl

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closure of "the fact of" to total revelation then becomes very short 

and swift. 

A disclosure of satellite reconnaissance could well prejudice 

and even tacitly outlaw other space intelligence techniques as well as 

ground collection methods. 

Disclosure affords the Soviets the high ground in the challenge 

to "continue negotiations or tolerate U.S. espionage II since we are 

almost uniquely dependent on satellite reconnaissance for our 

intelligence information and they are not. 

Disclosure would inevitably excite Soviet interest in protecting 

its sensitive targets. Disclosure would renew their interest in 

developing methods -- operational or standby -- of hampering or 

incapacitating our operations in a necessarily permissive environment. 

Most nations accept satellite overflight tacit!!"; they know it is 

being done and will not react unless confronted publicly with the 

fact. Disclosure is, in effect, a confrontation. It forces each nation 

to reassess its attitude toward U.S. satellite reconnaissance in terms 

of prestige, sovereignty and popular reaction. It is likely. that many 

neutrals would be forced by that public reaction to join the hostiles 

and to announce that henceforth their nations would not be overflown. 

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The Soviets could easily negotiate on one hand and sponsor a clamor 

of protest (in some neutral or non-allied nation) on the other. 

Friendly nations would be shocked by the disclosure and would feel 

that they had been sold short in negotiations with a common adversary. 

While disclosure could result in a possible gain in Congressional 

support for arms limitation negotiations because of the specific 

assurance regarding a reasonable basic U. S. capability to verify, 

it could also become a major political issue, irrespective of timing 

or degree of disclosure. It would undoubtedly trigger a clamor 

for information on related covert and clandestine operations and an 

apprehension and uneasiness over undisclosed aspects of the arms 

limitations negotiations. 

With the American public, disclosure could develop a knowledgeable support for U.S. intelligence collection activities or perhaps 

create widespread dismay over official confirmation of an espionage 

activity, especially with the well informed, vocal sector which will 

understand the viol:::..tion of the international intelligence code. Disclosure would certainly have a tremendously disruptive effect on the 

existing security control systems. 

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Recommendation 

We need a clear statement of policy which will permit the U.S. 

to continue, without foreign political or physical interference, to 

conduct a. unilateral satellite reconnaissance operation and at the 

same time, enable it to proceed in negotiations with the USSR 

toward reaching an agreement to _limit strategic arms. 

We are recommending, therefore, a review and consideration 

by the NSAM 156 Committee of the security and policy implications 

of SALT with respect to the NRP. We would expect such a review 

and consideration to provide for U.S. participants, both in preparatory SALT activity and negotiations with the USSR, a clear statement 

of U.S. policy on satellite reconnaissance and explicit guidance as 

to how U. S, SALT activity and negotiations must proceed in the 

light of this policy. 

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Verification and the Arms Control Satellite Initiative 

A major problem in preparing a basis for SALT is that of a 

credible means for verification of any agreement to limit strategic 

arms, There is little question that the U.S. must rely, to some 

degree, on the covert satellite reconnaissance program to provide 

this means. The concern then centers about any acknowledgement 

to the Soviets, either publicly or privately, of our reliance on this 

means for verification and the attendant requirement to disclose the 

existence, status, extent or effectiveness of the covert satellite 

reconnaissance program. 

An option to develop and employ an overt arms control satellite 

for the single purpose of verifying adherence to the conditions of any 

agreement would, if accepted, appear to offer several advantages. 

It would not require the revelation of the existence, scope or utility 

of our covert program. It could provide a reasonable overt basis 

for any necessary challenges on violations discerned through covert 

means, and thus provide a strong support to the unimpeded continuation of the covert program. If accepted as a reasonable venture in 

the SALT arena, it would minimize our concern oxer international 

confrontation on the issue of satellite reconnaissance. Its acceptance 

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and application would provide a step forward in increasing the tacit 

acceptance of satellite observation as a reasonable governmental 

operation. It would underline the U, S. commitment to the peaceful 

uses of outer space. 

The approach could essentially be one in which the U.S. would 

negptiate with the Soviets an Arms Control Satellite to be developed 

and operated (1) jointly by the two nations, or (2) bilaterally, like 

the US-USSR meteorological satellites, or (3) nationally, with each 

nation agreeing to build and operate its own. In each case, the U.S. 

development agency would be NASA. 

The satellite could be defined in terms of whatever emerged 

from the negotiations. Resolution -- always a critical question 

previously -- would be no problem here, and it is estimated that 

the USSR would propose some value between 2 and 10 meters. By 

working in this manner, outside the NRP, ACDA could avoid confronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or 

privately with the reality of a major U.S. intelligence collection 

program. Perhaps even more important -- if that is possible --

ACDA could also avoid domestic confrontation with Congress and 

the American public. Finally, if the initiative were successful, 

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the U.S. would have achieved a measurable step toward legitimatizing 

satellite observation at some to-be-negotiated level; if the discussions 

failed, they would do so without jeopardizing the NRP. 

An Alternative Approach 

Discussions concerning the U.S. capability to verify a SALT 

agreement have generally led to equating the term "national means 

of verification" with tbe covert satellite reconnaissance program. 

It is very likely, however, that the verification of any agreement 

would require the use of collection capabilities of the other programs supporting national intelligence needs, i.e., the CIP, the 

CCP and the CIAP. A disclosure of the details, or in some cases 

the existence. of any of these activities is of equally significant 

concern. 

Anoth.er option would appear appropriate in light of this concern --

that is, a proposal which permits negotiations to proceed without a 

definition of 11national means of verification. 11 The U.S. delegation 

would simply state that the U.S. is prepared to rely on unilateral 

verificatior . .::apabilities to an extent practicable for any specific 

strategic arms limitation agreement. The delegation would not be 

authorized to elaborate upon the verification capabilities. 

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The most significant advantage of this option is that if a limitation agreement could not be reached with the Soviet Union, national 

intelligence capabilities would not be disclosed, nor would operations 

be impaired. A revelation of the scope, utility or existence of 

covert/ clandestine elements of the national intelligence programs 

would not be required. This option would not force us to provide a 

basis for Soviet or third country challenges of U.S. collection 

activities. Such an option should be acceptable to the Soviet Union 

for generally the same reasons it is acceptable to the United States; 

sensitive and valuable intelligence collection activities remain undisclosed and unitnpaired. 

Initial SAt.T consultations with the NATO allies and Japan have 

been conducted. This option would permit further briefings to our 

allies on general verification capabilities until specific limitations 

have been negotiated with the Soviet Union, Similarly, specific 

verification cap3.bilities probably need not be discussed with the 

Senate prior to negotiating a tentative agreement with the Soviet 

Union. _This would correspond to previous approaches to Senate 

consultation (e.g. Outer Space Treaty). 

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It must be understood, however, that while this option affords 

an excellent position for the initiation of negotiations, it has. the 

disadvantage of forcing the revelation of some degree of verification 

details once an agreement has been reached and is ready for further 

NA TO consultation and Senate ratification. This advantage is 

inherent in any option which does not contain a means of verification 

which may be discussed openly. 

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