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COMMENTS OF NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE HISTORY 

BY LT GENERAL LEW4lALLEN 

The history is very interesting and, perhaps of necessity, is 

based on the exchange of memoranda and written documents pertinent 

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to the time. However, in that process some undue attention may be 

given to bureaucratic squabbling at the expense of some perspective. 

For what it is worth, here is a personal, subjective view of some 

of that interesting period. There are perhaps three major factors ~ \ .- :d ( ' I 6....,. . of photo-recce to be considered: (a) quality-resolution mainly, not: 

color, stereo, shadow detail, etc.; (b) quantity-meaning broad area 

coverage; and (c) timeliness. There can be developed a logical 

description of requirements, as it relates to each factor, but in truth 

(as Katz would say) the developments have been driven by the 11 technological 

imperative 11 and the requiren1ent here caught up later. 

For instance, MOL was decided upon when DYNASOAR was 

cancelled, because it was felt one shouldn1 t cancel something without 

allowing some alternate program; and 1nany ,felt it was essential that ,, '.1 • 

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DOD have some kind of m.an-in- space effort if the aational commitrnent 

to Apollo was really going to generate a new era of manned space flight. 

Having decided on MOL, it took some time to decide what to do with 

it; and when nothing else made sense, the DORIAN mission was, in 

some sense, forced. The DORIAN camera specifications were actually 

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optimized to make maximum use of man1 s contribution and were 

substantially off-optimum for an unmanned application (e.g. focal 

length too long). Once DORIAN was essentially a fact, it was judged 

by some { Land Panel) that ii one were to have such a high-quality, 

manned system one must have an automated version for operation, 

in the event that man proved difficult. This led to unmanned MOL, 

a contradiction in terms and I think, in this case, the Land Panel 

led the Government dow:n aI: atrocious, illogical path based on 

irrefutable, scientific logic and no practical judgment. The unmanned 

version added greatly to the cost and complexity of MOL and, thus, 

to its cancellation. When cancellation of MOL began to be seriously 

considered, design studies were undertaken of an optimized unm.anned 

11 VHR11 system (you called it Hexador). This system was much less 

expensive than MOL, performed better and its potential was used 

as a basis for MOL termination. In fact, the argu:ment had gone 

full circle. On intelligence needs alone one had difficulty justifying 

the approximately $500 million for 11Hexador, n yet $1 billion had been 

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judged all right for MOL as a Lab and $2 billion for MOL/DORIAN, ,, 

but not $3 billion for the complex program that evolved and included 

the automated version. In other words, the true basis of the justification 

was the man. If it had not been for that "imperative, 11 it is likely 

that the course of action selected for factor (a) would have been 

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e-,.rolutionary improvement of GAMBIT, as indeed we ultimately 

:;:mrsued anyway. 

With regard to factor (b) you have that history about right, 

but it is useful to point-out that weighing a number of factors: 

(factors which have been sort of constant for 10 years and will remain 

so about 10 more) - - the size of Asia; the desire for about 3 1 resolution 

to identify vehicles; the fact that film is the only way; the size of big 

boosters (Titan Ill) - one reached a system description which was? 

and is, about II ultimate. 11 Its success has left factor (b) unfruitful 

for further dreams. 

Now ( c) - - you describe all of the early attempts, but recall 

t::-ie base of technology and the understanding of space recce was at a 

relatively very low level, so conclusion canr t be too profound. Still, 

(c) is a factor to inspire dreams. Many ideas were promoted; some 

sin-1ple, like several Corona on alert for rapid launch and call down -

i..'Tiplemented but never used - others com.plex and technically doubtful. 

However, as the enormous value of overhead recce became more 

appreciated, it was always the st::r;;at~gic concept which dominated -

tech...YJ.ological adva..'1.cement of Soviet weaponry - SALT - order of 

battle, etc. "C" was a factor to be worked on, but not worth much. 

The thing that changed was the development of the solid state 

array. SP had looked at similar approaches, but had been frightened 

of.f by the low-image plane resolution - CIA was not quite so leery. 

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but their original system thoughts were modest - - I believe to a very 

major degree that it was Land personally who made the big leap. 

Remember, at the time he was investing several hundred million 

of ( effectively) his personal fortune in the SX70 - - a device no one 

felt would work -- a device which took his remarkable inventions in 

filrn and used a very ambitious system of micro-electronics - plus 

bold optics and generated pictures in near real time. He had seen 

and made a major personal comr£1itment to a camera, which capitalized 

on several major new technological achievements to do the 11 impossible. 11 

· It was in that frame of mind that he challenged Les Dirks and said 

the elements are here: 

- solid state array 

- integrated circuits for complex data processing 

- large, fast optics - 100 11 f/2 

- gigabit/ sec data link 

- long-lived satellites 

- communications satellites 

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In his view those elements were the quantum leap - the challenge was 

to design the system to use them - the need would appear. From that 

point on, all arguments for alternate systems were basically irrelevant. 

The _!leed was never really there, in a sense, - - the "technological 

imperative" was the thing. As in VHR where the worth was apparently 

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never quite 500 million, but the man was the thing. A readout 

system really wasn't worth much, unless it had the elements above. 

I had the cynical view during much of this period (not really shared 

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by :\IcLucus or Schlesinger, I must say) that our worft on FROG 

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or SPIN-SCAN was for the purpose of showing that it was not mandatory 

to proceed with "K" -- I felt if 11K 11 were ended, FROG would not be 

far behind; and, of course, the concern with 11K" was quantitative -

cost, schedule, risk -- was it really worth all that? Mar1y felt not, hut 

felt obliged to generate alternatives, rather than only be negative. 

Since the argument is quantitative, I have sometimes felt that in the 

absence of Government m_easure s of merit, a test of Land's judgment 

on the matter could be the profitability of the SX70 so far that has 

got to be considered questiunable. 

Although I supported FROG and SPINSCAN institutionally, 

my heart wasn't in it -- they should not have gone forward, I had a 

conservative view of K, and still do, a remarkable technical vision, 

but one it is possible the country could do without~- In a profit-loss 1 ,. ' 

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environment it wouldn1 t make it _; like an SST - but that's conservation 

I guess. 

The view of history may not even be right, but it's very personal 

and like few things in one's life has shaped my views of many other 

t}.ing s. 

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P. S. A ren1arkable aspect of 11 K 11 history is the awesome effectiveness 

with which CIA and the Land Panel dedicated themselves to 

supporting 11 K 11 once Land made his basic commitment. The 

only parallel in history is the unified dedication of the Romans 

to the destruction of all Carthage. 

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