[Cite as State v. Hilton, 2020-Ohio-4590.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 GREENE COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

ASHTON HILTON 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2019-CA-70 

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CRB-691 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Municipal Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 25th day of September, 2020. 

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DAVID M. MORRISON, Atty. Reg. No. 0087487, Xenia City Prosecutor’s Office, 101 

North Detroit Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

JAMES S. ARMSTRONG, Atty. Reg. No. 0020638, P.O. Box 20368, Dayton, Ohio 45420 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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DONOVAN, J. 
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{¶ 1} Ashton Hilton was convicted of petty theft in the Xenia Municipal Court, a 

misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), and was ordered to 

pay restitution to Melissa Caserta in the amount of $2,035. On appeal, he challenges 

the order of restitution. We hereby affirm the judgment of the municipal court. 

{¶ 2} Hilton was charged by way of complaint on May 17, 2019, and he pled no 

contest on September 9, 2019. At his plea hearing, defense counsel stated that Hilton 

pled no contest to the theft charge “with a stipulation and waiver and * * * ask[ed] that 

there be a hearing set for restitution.” The court advised Hilton that if he pled no contest, 

he was not admitting wrongdoing but was admitting the facts set forth in the citation and 

report, which the court would review, and if the court found that the facts set forth the 

elements of the offense, it would find him guilty. The court further advised Hilton that 

defense counsel indicated a willingness to stipulate that there were sufficient 

circumstances upon which the court could make a finding of guilt, and that the court would 

likely make that finding; Hilton indicated that he understood. The court advised Hilton 

that defense counsel had indicated her willingness to waive reading the factual bases for 

the charges into the record, and Hilton indicated his agreement. Hilton further signed a 

withdrawal of his jury demand. After accepting Hilton’s plea, the court scheduled a 

restitution hearing. 

{¶ 3} At the September 24, 2019 restitution hearing, Caserta testified that she and 

Hilton had agreed to be roommates, and she began moving her belongings into a home 

that Hilton was renting. She stated that she paid Hilton her half of the rent for March 

2019, but then told him on March 13, 2019 that she could not move in and that she would 

to have to start moving her stuff back out; a few days later, Hilton got an eviction notice. 
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{¶ 4} Caserta stated that she was thereafter unable to gain access to the home 

despite multiple attempts to do so. She stated that, on March 20, 2019, she entered the 

home through an unlocked window, and “almost all of [her] stuff that was there was gone.” 

Caserta contacted the police. She testified that her dishes, silverware, pots and pans, 

microwave, coffeepot, spices, bath towels, yarn, and an air conditioner were missing. 

Caserta also testified that she learned that Hilton was “selling this stuff on Facebook,” 

including her grandmother’s silver cutlery set, for which the box alone was worth two 

hundred dollars. 

{¶ 5} Caserta identified Court’s Exhibit I as a list she made of the items she had 

moved into Hilton’s home and was thereafter unable to retrieve. She stated that the 

corresponding dollar amounts were determined by locating “the same thing or something 

identical at a store,” “or whatever it would cost [her] to replace it.” There were also some 

items for which she had receipts. 

{¶ 6} On cross-examination, Caserta testified that she met Hilton on Facebook. 

She testified that, after she paid her share of the March rent, Hilton told her he needed 

money to pay the gas bill, and she gave him an additional $30. Caserta testified that 

when she attempted to contact Hilton to retrieve her belongings, he would say that he 

was not home, that he was leaving, or propose another day, “it was just one thing after 

another.” She stated that she was unable “to get access to the inside of the house 

because he kept locking the storm door and saying he wasn’t home.” Caserta testified 

that she observed two Facebook posts by Hilton to sell a roaster and silverware that 

belonged to her, and that there was another post that said Hilton had “a lot of stuff” to sell, 

“PM [private message] me for pics.” 
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{¶ 7} At the conclusion of the hearing, defense counsel stated that Hilton did not 

dispute “that there were items that were posted on Facebook” or “that there was money 

that exchanged hands here.” Defense counsel characterized the arrangement between 

Hilton and Caserta as “an oral agreement for a roommate.” Hilton’s position was that 

when he moved out when he was evicted, he left all of the remainder of Caserta’s items 

at the house when he moved out, and he did not know what had happened to them, “as 

is typical in an eviction type situation.” Defense counsel suggested that any dispute 

Caserta had about the items “would be a potential civil action between the two of them 

for some sort of a breach of oral contract.” Finally, defense counsel noted that Hilton 

had pled no contest to theft, was willing to accept the consequences, and understood that 

“some restitution” would be expected of him. 

{¶ 8} Hilton was sentenced on October 2, 2019. At the sentencing hearing, the 

court stated that it was ordering restitution in the amount of $2.035, which was “the 

amount listed in Melissa Caserta’s original police report witness statement.” The court 

also imposed a fine of $250 and sentenced Hilton to 180 days in jail, giving him credit for 

four days and suspending the remaining days on the condition that he have no similar 

violations within five years and successfully complete a term of probation not to exceed 

two years.” The court noted that it “found everything that Ms. Caserta said at that * * * 

restitution hearing to be truthful.” 

{¶ 9} The court’s order regarding restitution stated that the court had listened to 

the Caserta’s testimony and reviewed Court’s Exhibit I and the list of items attached to 

Caserta’s March 20, 2019 witness statement. A copy of page two of the witness 

statement was filed with the court’s order; the 17 items listed thereon totaled $2,035. 
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Court’s Exhibit I also lists multiple items, including a “Silver set, service for 12, from the 

victim’s grandmother was listed for $20 on [F]acebook – it is genuine silver in its original 

box with velvet lining; it’s worth thousands of dollars.” 

{¶ 10} Hilton asserts two assignments of error on appeal, which we will consider 

together: 

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE 

AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION. 

 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING RESTITUTION IN AN 

AMOUNT WHICH EXCEEDED THE STATUTORY AMOUNT OF THE 

PETTY THEFT OFFENSE FOR WHICH APPELLANT WAS CHARGED 

AND CONVICTED. 

{¶ 11} R.C. 2929.28 specifies the types of financial sanctions a trial court may 

impose in misdemeanor cases, including restitution. The statute states in pertinent part: 

* * * [T]he court imposing a sentence upon an offender for a 

misdemeanor, including a minor misdemeanor, may sentence the offender 

to any financial sanction or combination of financial sanctions authorized 

under this section. If the court in its discretion imposes one or more financial 

sanctions, the financial sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to this 

section include, but are not limited to, the following: 

(1) Unless the misdemeanor offense is a minor misdemeanor or 

could be disposed of by the traffic violations bureau serving the court under 

Traffic Rule 13, restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender's 

crime or any survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the victim's 
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economic loss. * * * 

If the court imposes restitution, the court shall determine the amount 

of restitution to be paid by the offender. If the court imposes restitution, the 

court may base the amount of restitution it orders on an amount 

recommended by the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation 

report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing 

property, and other information, provided that the amount the court orders 

as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by 

the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense. 

If the court decides to impose restitution, the court shall hold an evidentiary 

hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount 

of restitution. If the court holds an evidentiary hearing, at the hearing the

victim or survivor has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence the amount of restitution sought from the offender. 

R.C. 2929.28(A)(1). 

{¶ 12} As this Court has previously noted: 

“R.C. 2929.28(A)(1) grants broad discretion to the trial court to ‘base 

the amount of restitution it orders' on new information presented at the 

restitution hearing, which can be from the victim, the offender, a 

presentence investigation report, estimates, receipts, or ‘any other 

information.’ ” State v. Olson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25452, 2013-Ohio4403, ¶ 8. In turn, “we generally review a trial court's order of restitution 

under an abuse of discretion standard[.]” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. 
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Montgomery No. 26488, 2015-Ohio-3167, ¶ 11. 

“A trial court abuses its discretion when it orders restitution that does 

not bear a reasonable relationship to the actual financial loss suffered.” Id.,

citing State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24288, 2012-Ohio-01230, 

¶ 11. In addition, a court abuses its discretion if the award of restitution is 

not supported by competent, credible evidence in the record from which the 

court can discern the amount of restitution to a reasonable degree of 

certainty. (Citations omitted.) Olson at ¶ 33. 

“The evidence to support a restitution order can take the form of 

either documentary evidence or testimony.” (Citations omitted.) State v. 

Jones, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-80, 2014-Ohio-3740, ¶ 23. Moreover, 

“[t]he trial court is authorized to base the amount of restitution on an amount 

recommended by the victim.” State v. Pillow, 2d Dist. Greene No. 

07CA095, 2008-Ohio-6046, ¶ 148; R.C. 2929.28(A)(1). 

State v. Williams, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27072, 2017-Ohio-125, ¶13-15. In Williams,

we held that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it ordered the defendant to 

pay restitution in the amount of $5,250 for damage to a fence following her conviction for 

reckless operation of a vehicle. 

{¶ 13} As noted by the 6th District in State v. Wright: 

The Supreme Court of Ohio has established that a trial court can 

order any amount of restitution, “so long as it does not exceed the amount 

of economic loss suffered as a direct and proximate result of the 

commission of the offense.” State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248, 2013-Ohio-
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3093, 994 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 3. 

A trial court's restitution determination in a theft case is not restricted 

to a value that corresponds to the level on which the offense was 

predicated. State v. Scurlock, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1200, 2017-Ohio1219, ¶ 51. As a result, a restitution figure is not required to correlate to 

the same value classifying the degree of the theft offense. Rather, it should 

reflect the economic loss the victim sustained due to the offender's actions. 

Lalain at ¶ 27. 

Accordingly, although appellant pled guilty to a lesser offense of petty 

theft, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the voluntary plea deal did 

not operate so as to restrict the trial court in determining the amount of 

restitution. 

Wright, 6th Dist. Lucas L-17-1242, 2018-Ohio-2599, ¶ 13-15 (affirming restitution order in 

the amount of $29,549.84 on a petty theft conviction). 

{¶ 14} As noted above, Hilton stipulated to the items listed in Caserta’s witness 

statement, the list of items was filed with the court’s restitution order, and the items totaled 

$2,035. The trial court’s award of restitution was supported by competent, credible 

evidence in the record from which the court could have discerned the amount of restitution 

to a reasonable degree of certainty, and we find no abuse of discretion. Hilton’s 

assignments of error are accordingly overruled. 

{¶ 15} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

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FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur. 

Copies sent to: 

David M. Morrison 

James S. Armstrong 

Hon. Hon. Ronald C. Lewis