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TOP SECRET TALENT-KEYHOLE 

--+S+-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ALLISON 

SUBJECT: Proposals for NAC Discussion 

This memorandum responds to a request from ~------~ 

for our review and comments on two papers prepared by ACDA. We 

will address two memoranda, "NAC Statement on SALT, 11 dated 

June 30, and nsALT Questions and Answers for Consultation" dated 

July L We will limit our comments to those areas directly affecting 

the National Reconnaissance Program, and to those areas of SALT 

directly affected by the National Reconnaissance Program. 

Specifically, we are extremely concerned with two elements of 

both papers: Disclosure of the fact of U.S. reconnaissance satellites, 

and incorrect assessments of the capabilities of NRP projects. 

You will recall that in a memorandum dated May 6, 1969, 

"Strategic Missile Talks; Related Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance 

Disclosure Policy, 11 U. Alexis Johnson forwarded a paper which contained the sentence "Aside from likely Soviet objections to provisions 

for on-site inspections, national means of verification, in particular, 

observation satellites, provide the onJy feasible means of policing an 

agreement of ±he type and scope the United States has in mind." From 

our limited view of the total collection capabilities of the U.S., we are 

prepared to accept the fact that NRP satellites, if permitted unimpeded operation, may provide valuable arms limitation information. It 

is our strong contention, however, that disclosure of our present or 

planned capabilities to NAC, Congress, the Soviets, and the public is 

an irreversible action that will result in confrontation and ultimate 

stand-down of the vital U.S. collection systems. The national policy 

concerning satellite reconnaissance was stated in 1962 by NSC 

Action 2454 and reaffirmed in 1966. Our primary concern is that the 

capability of the U.S. to operate reconnaissance satellites unilaterally 

will not be impeded or abridged ln any way. 

At Tab A are two "Q&A rs" which re pre sent unacceptable disclosure stdtements. First, the Q&A marked (1) should be dropped in its 

entirety from NAC discussions. We believe direct briefings of 

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selected heads of NATO governments would be more appropriate and 

vastly safer to our Program. This was done, to a limited degree, by 

Mr. McCone (DCI) in 1963. This brings up the Q&A marked (2) at 

Tab A. The answer provided by ACDA is incorrect. The facts are: 

At the request of the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee on satellite 

reconnaissance policy, and with Presidential approval, Mr. McCone 

briefed the heads of state of the United Kingdom, West Germany, the 

Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Norway and Denmark. Mr. McCone did 

not discuss capabilities, but stated four points; 

1. The U.S. is operating satellite reconnaissance systems. 

2. These systems are doing well. 

3. The information from these systems aid the common 

defense. 

4. The U.S. is prepared to continue unilateral operation 

of these systems. 

Our position with regard to Q&A (2) is the same as to (1). We 

should brief selected heads of state only on means and realistic capabilities. Further, we should not indiczte our willingness to accept 

exclusive reliance on 11 national means of verification. 11 

Our second concern is the two items at Tab B. The item marked 

(1) is erroneous. The NRP systems presently being considered for 

significant verification roles are in development, have never flown, 

and do not represent a 11 proven capability. 11 Further, we do not 

believe that any SALT option can only be verified by national means. 

No NRP system can ever be reasonably considered to provide the 

information obtainable through on-site inspections. We recommend 

the Answer be modified as shown at Tab B. 

The item marked (2), while it hedges on verification capabilities, 

is overly optimistic. We suggest that the inadequacy of present and 

planned systems to monitor certain agreements be more forcefully 

worded. 

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We are prepared to discuss with you both issues; disclosure of 

the fact of U.S. satellite reconnaissance and present and planned 

capabilities of NRP systems, at your request. 

~ 

l LENT-KEYHOLE COHTl'IOL SYSTEM 

R. MECEDA 

Captain, USAF 

Asst Deputy Director for 

Plans & PoJicy 

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