IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–2104

Filed November 18, 2016

Amended November 29, 2016

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

PATRICK DANIEL WHITE,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, 

Marsha A. Bergan, Judge.

The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 

affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. DECISION OF

COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

Davis L. Foster of Foster Law Office, P.C., Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant 

Attorney General, Janet M. Lyness, County Attorney, and Elizabeth 

Dupuich, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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PER CURIAM.

This appeal presents the question whether a seizure occurred 

when a police officer pulled his patrol car into a defendant’s driveway

with its emergency lights flashing, approached the defendant on foot, and

directed the defendant to step down from his front porch onto the

driveway. The district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress

finding no seizure. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed. On 

our de novo review, we conclude the interaction was not consensual and 

therefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the district 

court judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background.

On October 7, 2013, police officer Alex Stricker was dispatched at 

approximately 11:30 p.m. in response to a reported hit-and-run collision. 

Because the caller provided a license plate number and description of the 

fleeing vehicle, Officer Stricker began driving toward the address listed 

on that vehicle’s registration.

As Officer Stricker approached the home in his patrol car, he saw a 

vehicle backed into an open garage that matched the description of the 

vehicle reportedly involved in the collision. Officer Stricker saw the 

defendant, Patrick White, standing outside the driver’s side door of the 

vehicle. Officer Stricker observed White leave the garage and begin 

walking toward the front door of the home. As White stepped onto his

front porch, Officer Stricker pulled into the driveway, activated his 

emergency lights, and parked his patrol car.

White did not go inside his home and instead remained on the 

porch. Officer Stricker exited the patrol car and started asking White 

questions. Officer Stricker was in uniform and displayed a badge and 

firearm. Officer Stricker then asked, “Can you step down here and talk 
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to me?” Receiving no immediate response, Officer Stricker took one step 

onto the porch and said, “I need you to step down here and talk to me, 

OK?” White followed Officer Stricker back onto the driveway. Officer 

Stricker used a flashlight on the ground to show where he wanted White 

to proceed.

Officer Stricker then questioned White about the reported collision. 

Officer Stricker detected the scent of an alcoholic beverage and noticed 

other signs of intoxication. White admitted to having consumed three 

drinks after work. Officer Stricker asked White to perform field sobriety 

tests in the driveway. Based on the results of those tests, White was 

arrested for operating while intoxicated.

White was charged by trial information with operating while 

intoxicated, third offense, a class “D” felony. See Iowa Code 

§ 321J.2(2)(c) (2013). White filed a motion to suppress any evidence 

obtained after Officer Stricker directed him to step off the porch and onto 

the driveway. White argued the officer’s conduct amounted to an 

unlawful seizure in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa 

Constitution.

Following a hearing, the district court denied White’s motion to 

suppress. The court rejected White’s constitutional argument that he 

was seized by Officer Stricker on his front porch, finding instead that “a 

reasonable person would not have felt compelled to yield to Officer 

Stricker’s request and statement to step off the porch to the driveway to 

speak with the officer.” The court reasoned,

Officer Stricker did not act to compel Mr. White to step down 

to the driveway. Officer Stricker was the only officer at the 

scene at that time. He had not drawn his weapon. He did 

not shine a flashlight in Mr. White’s face. He did not touch 
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Mr. White. He did not speak in a loud or demanding tone. 

He made no threats. Mr. White was close to the door of his 

house. He is a larger man than Officer Stricker. He was at 

his home. Mr. White could have turned around and entered 

the house and locked the door. The Court finds that, 

instead, Mr. White chose to step down to the driveway as 

requested just as he had earlier chosen not to enter his 

home when the squad car pulled into the driveway.

Following a trial to the court on the minutes of testimony, White 

was convicted of operating while intoxicated, third offense. He was 

sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed five years with all but 

thirty days suspended and was placed on probation for a period of three 

years.

White appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress should have 

been granted. We transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court 

of appeals affirmed. It essentially agreed with the district court and 

determined that “[u]p to the point where Officer Stricker observed White 

exhibiting signs of intoxication, the interaction between Officer Stricker 

and White was consensual and not a ‘seizure.’ ” One judge on the court 

of appeals panel dissented.

We granted White’s application for further review.

II. Standard of Review.

“We review alleged violations of the right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures de novo.” State v. Lindsey, 881 

N.W.2d 411, 415 (Iowa 2016). “In conducting our de novo review, we 

independently evaluate the totality of the circumstances as shown by the 

entire record.” Id. “[W]e will give deference to the factual findings of the 

district court, but we are not bound by them.” State v. Lowe, 812 

N.W.2d 554, 566 (Iowa 2012). Notably, in this case, the moment when 

White contends he was seized was recorded by a dash cam in Officer 

Stricker’s patrol car.
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III. Analysis.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 

that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. 

amend. IV. Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution also guarantees 

the right of Iowans “to be secure in their persons . . . against 

unreasonable seizures and searches.” Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. “We 

jealously guard our right to construe a provision of our state constitution

differently than its federal counterpart, though the two provisions may 

contain nearly identical language and have the same general scope, 

import, and purpose.” State v. Jackson, 878 N.W.2d 422, 442 (Iowa 

2016). Nevertheless, it is only necessary to reach the Fourth Amendment 

to decide this appeal. As we have recognized,

The Fourth Amendment’s protection against 

unreasonable intrusions on a person’s liberty arises when an 

officer seizes a person. A seizure occurs when an officer by 

means of physical force or show of authority in some way 

restrains the liberty of a citizen.

State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. 

Pickett, 573 N.W.2d 245, 247 (Iowa 1997)).

“Whether a ‘seizure’ occurred is determined by the totality of the 

circumstances.” State v. Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 2008) (citing 

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2113, 153 

L. Ed. 2d 242, 255 (2002)). “The Supreme Court has long recognized 

that not all police contacts with individuals are deemed seizures within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 

542, 546 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Pliska v. City of Stevens Point, 823 F.2d 

1168, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)); cf. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 82 (“Police 

questioning by itself, however, is generally not a seizure.”). Such 
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encounters remain consensual “[s]o long as a reasonable person would 

feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’ ” Lowe, 812 

N.W.2d at 570 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 683 N.W.2d at 547). 

We have recognized the presence of several factors that might suggest a 

seizure has occurred, which include

the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a 

weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person 

of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 

indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be 

compelled.

Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 842–43 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 

U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980)

(plurality opinion)). In other words, “objective indices of police coercion 

must be present to convert an encounter between police and citizens into 

a seizure.” Id. at 843; see also State v. Gully, 346 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Iowa 

1984) (“[T]here must be something uttered or done which would amount 

to an objective indication that the officer exercised some dominion over 

the person seized.”).

On our de novo review, having considered the suppression hearing 

testimony and the video evidence, and giving appropriate deference to the 

findings of the district court, we conclude that White was seized within 

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Stricker directed 

White to step off of the front porch and onto the driveway. We reach this 

conclusion for several reasons.

First, the flashing red and blue emergency lights on the top of 

Officer Stricker’s patrol car remained on from the time Officer Stricker 

pulled into White’s driveway until the time the field sobriety test was 

later conducted. While we have recognized that the use of emergency 

lights is not per se coercive, we have observed that emergency lights, 
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unlike ordinary headlights, can be coercive in the sense that they “invoke 

police authority and imply a police command to stop and remain.” 

Wilkes, 756 N.W.2d at 844; see also State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270, 

280–81 (Iowa 2012) (discussing an officer’s activation of his patrol car’s 

emergency lights).

Second, Officer Stricker parked his vehicle in the middle of White’s 

driveway before approaching White on foot. The patrol car blocked 

White’s vehicle in the garage and was parked approximately ten to fifteen 

feet from the front porch. In the past, we have considered the location of 

a patrol car in relation to the defendant’s vehicle. See Wilkes, 756 

N.W.2d at 844; see also Kurth, 813 N.W.2d at 277.

Third, after Officer Stricker approached White in uniform while

displaying a badge and firearm, he asked—and then insisted—that White 

return to his driveway and talk to him: “I need you to step down here and 

talk to me, OK?” The officer’s tone and step onto the defendant’s front 

porch would have indicated to a reasonable person that he could not 

proceed into his home and that compliance with Officer Stricker’s 

directive was now mandatory—especially in conjunction with the flashing 

emergency lights and nearby patrol car. This result is consistent with 

Fourth Amendment caselaw. Compare I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 

219–21, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1764–65, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 257–58 (1984) 

(concluding that no seizure occurred where federal agents “only 

question[ed] people” and took no additional steps to obtain answers), and

Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 571 (reasoning that no seizure occurred in part 

because “[t]here were no ‘commands’ ” and “only requests for 

information”), with Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494, 501–02, 103 

S. Ct. 1319, 1322, 1326, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 234, 239 (1983) (finding that 

a seizure occurred when two officers’ request “to accompany them to a 
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room” from a public concourse was made in conjunction with an

indication that the defendant was not free to leave), United States v. 

Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560, 566–67 (6th Cir. 2011) (concluding that, after 

the defendant had twice indicated he did not want to speak with police, a 

seizure occurred once he was instructed to “turn around and walk 

toward the officer”), United States v. Palmer, 603 F.2d 1286, 1288–89 & 

n.4 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that an officer’s second request to speak with 

an individual was “command,” based on “the tone of voice [the officer] 

used,” and amounted to a seizure), and Parker v. Commonwealth, 496

S.E.2d 47, 51 (Va. 1998) (concluding that a seizure within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment occurred when the officer drove his police cruiser 

from the street onto private property and stopped the cruiser “at the 

location where the defendant was standing”).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Officer Stricker seized 

White near the commencement of their encounter. This does not 

necessarily mean the motion to suppress should have been granted. 

Additional arguments were presented below that a seizure of White would 

have been justified based on the report he had committed a 

misdemeanor. However, the State does not present them to us as 

grounds for affirmance so we decline to address them.1

IV. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that White was seized in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution at 

the time when Officer Stricker directed White to step off of the front 

porch and onto the driveway. We therefore vacate the decision of the 

1The State does argue in a paragraph of its brief that any error in denying the 

motion to suppress would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, 

we are not persuaded on this record.

 
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court of appeals, reverse the district court judgment, and remand the 

case for further proceedings.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT 

COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.

This opinion shall be published.