/NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE inirtnervall

WASIINGTON, D.C.

C. g F.Cr. CF giCTOR July 15, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Bob Froehlke's Proposal on Defense Intelligence

Bob Froehlke has been asked by the Secretary of Defense

to take a look at possible reorganization or management changes

within the intelligence community which could lead to better

management of resources.

It is interesting to note that in his survey of the people

involved there was practically unanimous opinion that some

better way of coordination among the different intelligence

activities is necessary. Most of us are convinced that money.

could be saved by better coordination, by elimination of

unnecessary overlaps between programs, by better understanding

of the users requirements and more careful validation of these

requirements.

Although there are still rather large unresolved problems

facing the intelligence community as witnessed by recent discussions of ABM and MIRY, I think it is true that our intelligence

needs are in general being met in one way or another. The main

question then becomes whether or not we have too much duplication

and overlap among the various intelligence agencies and among•

the different intelligence data collecting systems. The charge

is heard and is seldom denied that the intelligence community

has an even poorer match between those people who state

intelligence requirements LA those who &re in charge of the

resources which must respona to these requirements than does

the defense community at large.

As long as we have a group of people stating requirements

without taking proper account of the cost of fulfilling them,

we leave ourselves open to the possibility of spending more

money than is warranted in satisfying these requirements.

Similarly, as long as we have no mechanism for conducting

trade-offs among different systems, each of which is partially

responsive to stated requirements, we are likely to spend more

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money than is necessary to do a reasonable job of satisfying

these requirements.

So, I start out with the same position which Bob Froehlke

has; namely, that something needs to be done to improve the

coordination among the different intelligence collection agencies

and to learn how to best apply our resources against the

evaluated requirements. I believe that some office at the OSD

level ought to be charged with the responsibility of carrying

out a DoD-wide review of intelligence programs. This review

would include programs for which I am responsible. Bob Froehlke

has made provision for this in his proposal. His proposal

would, as I understand it, have the three principal DoD intelligence activities report to a Special Assistant for Intelligence,

who would most likely be Bob Froehlke acting in a second capacity.

He would chair the intelligence board which would consist of the

heads of these three agencies. His plan also creates a Council

which he calls the Executive Council for Defense Intelligence.

In addition to the SecDef, DCI and the President's Science Adviser,

he would include Chairman, JCS and DOME on this Council. The

duties of the Council are not clear, but it appears that it is

meant to be an advisory body similar to PFIAB.

While I applaud the general idea of having someone at the

OSD level review the programs of all DoD-related intelligence

groups, I do not necessarily agree with Bob that the heads of

these agencies should report directly to the special assistant.

We have made many attempts in the past to get hold of the

intelligence problem. We have created the CIA, the NSA, and the

DIA. All these agencies are doing a good job within their

charters and if it were not for the money involved I think we

could continue to operate as we have in the past. However, we

must find some way of reducing overlap and eliminating unnecessary

duplication. Having all the DoD intelligence age:..;ies report

to a single man does not necessarily accomplish the desired

purpose. In general, a man in the line tends to defend his part

of the budg.:t and over a period of time becomes a proponent rather

:hen a cri:ic. I have always felt that OSD offices should remain

staff rather than line agencies, and thus preserve their role as

critic rather than proponents for their own programs. OSD has

remained fairly pure in this respect with the exception of DDR&E

being in the line for NSA. I do not believe we should compound

the problem by having another OSD office assuming a line function.

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It seems to me that the principal benefit which needs to

be accomplished is that of having someone in a position to

review and understand intelligence requirements and our

responses thereto. If this review office can develop the

necessary expertise, it can make value judgments as to which

programs ought to be supported and which dropped. Obviously,

this office must be staffed with the best possible people,

including people with a perspective to understand our national

requirements and sufficient technical knowledge to make value

judgments about the merits of different technical approaches

to satisfying these requirements. Thus we need some of the

best people in the nation to staff this office.

My recommendation is that we have someone such as a Special

Assistant for Intelligence in a staff position to review the

programs of all DoD agencies and to make recommendations to

the SecDcf concerning the allocation of resources to these agencies.

This Special Assistant for Intelligence could still be an added

duty to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) as

Bob Froehlke recommends. The difference between Froehlke's

recommendation and mine is that Froehlke proposes to direct

daily operations, which would require an ever-increasing staff,

'whereas my proposal is to have this position as a staff function

with adequate authority and responsibility.

Each of the agencies could be instructed to set up an

internal review function of its own, which would make trade-off

analyses among its own programs. These internal review staffs

would work closely with the OSD level review staff.

As for the Council, I am not sure how it compares to the

existing ExCom. By adding the Chairman of the JCS, we may get

JCS to approve the propoai-1. I understand JCS is favorably

inclined, but I doubt i JCS has thought cE.:ough the implications

of the proposal and the extent to which the new office would

' become involved in operational matters.

The non-DoD members of the Council may resist the change

because it appears to reduce their authority. The Chairman of

ExCom is a DoD man, but DoD influence is offset somewhat by two

non-DoD nen on the ExCom. With three DoD people on the Council,

the non-DoD people may feel that the plan is a stratagem for

DoD to get stronger control over the intelligence resources of

the country.

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To sum up - in spite of my apparent negative attitudes

about some of the specifics of the proposal, I believe that

something of this sort is overdue and that either this plan

or some variation on it should be seriously considered by the

SecDef.

One final word - my office has for a number of years been

able to move aggressively and I think very effectively on the

programs under its direction. Whatever evolves in the way of

new working arrangements should be brought about in such a way

as not to hamper the effectiveness of the office. I think the

current arrangement is a good example of the streamlined management which is being considered for sel► eral key programs in the

Pentagon. We should not replace the present management scheme

which works well with something new unless we are assured the

net gain is positive.

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cc: Dr. Seamans

Secy Packard

Mr. Froehlke

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Dr. Naka

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