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(&) NATIONAL RICONNAISSANCE OFFICE

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(11 1,i Itit 11.4 • 9 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Reinstatement of NRP Management Concepts - ACTION MEMORANDUM

The attached paper reflects the serious concern I have about the

current NRO management environment. I hope the paper vill be useful

to you in your consideration of the recently completed DOD Intelligence

reorganization study.

Although 7 have not been party to the planning for reorganization

of Defense Intelligence, I perceive a great potential impact upon the

NRO. Therefore, I have taken the liberty of preparing this summary of

my views and recommendations on NRO management concepts. In my judgment

there must be a conscious and positive decision soon either to reaffirm

the existing formal NRO charter, or to write a new one.

Should your judgment be that times have changed and that the special

management arrangements used by the NRO in the past are no longer desirable, I urge most strongly that this judgment be implemented in a may

thit clearly recognizes the major effect it could have upon our satellite

collection programs. if NRO management practices continue to gravitate

toward normalization without clear-cut direction, as they have during the

past year, the result will be a more costly and less efficient ov

reconnaissance program. Our attempts to accommodate piecemeal no

.nation this past year have severely strained our capability to p

our job. This is the bakis for my urging an early decision on t

management philosophy to be used by the NRO.

•

Atting Director

Attachment

Paper on Nilp

Management

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MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS

OP THE

NATlONAL RECCNNA1SSANCE PROGRAM

The National Reconnaissance Program has been cited by witting

observers as one of the most efficient organizations in the government

for managing the development and acquisition of major systems. The

success that the program has enjoyed is in large measure attributable

to the unique management concepts established in the initial years of

the aircraft and satellite reconnaissance business. These concepts are

now being challenged through organizational changes which both

explicitly and implicitly impact NRO management.

The concept of specialized management for the NRP means:

A rk%'RO who is a senior DOD executive, with the confidence

of the national leadership.

An unambiguous mission--the development and operation of

all U.S. reconnaissance satellites.

Requirements for collection and intelligence value assessments are established outside the NRO.

Overall program effort fenced by means of strong policy,

management protection, with the DiVRO reporting directly to top

management.

Resources, once decided upon by top management, ar* not

competitive with other Intelligence Community resources.

Management resources within the NRP are permitted to be

flexible (i.e., incrementally funded).

Manning is held to a bare minimum of very capable people

who are assigned numerous responsibilities.

Outside staff interactions are held to an absolute minimum.

Reporting, studies, and furnishing of information are held to a level

commensurate with minimum manning and top management approval. Checks

and balances for oversight are clearly defined and delineated.

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- The micnion and modun o ►arandi are prr • ived an important

and worth? of special trcatment, both internally an4 crt ernallv. The

bureauera..r iv villina to keep "hand.: off, " bayed cm a eangdm.i. that

top level ehreka and lalaneen and agfegua;ds am prevent.

Those who want to change the NRO--to normalize the way we do

business--have not in all cases realized that both our mission and our

organization are unique and that the management and decision process

should be treated accordingly. The principal differences between the

NRO and other intelligence programs are the fact that we are not a

manpower-intensive program and that we have a relatively small number

of very large programs. Management and resource decisions fall

essentially into two categories: 1) those decisions which should be

made on a routine basis by the DNRO, and 2) the system decisions which

by their very nature are so large that regardless of the organizational

and staff structure, the decisions will have to be made at the highest

levels. Therefore, staff reviews at lower levels can only tend to

prolong and confuse the decision process.

During the last four years there have been significant changes, as

listed below, which have diluted these management concepts and are

resulting in a growing normalization of the NRP. These changes are:

The establishment of intermediate levels of staff review,

which draw upon NRO manpower resources.

Significant increases in the interfaces with the Congress.

Decisions made walla by the Congress (such as the

HAC direction in FY 1978 to curt perations); decisions which,

heretofore, were made by a committe ExCom) with singular responsibility for the proper conduct of the NRP.

An increase of OMB involvement.

Demise of the ExCom, the dedicated top-level program review

forum for the NRO, the disestablishment of the simple, responsive,

working arrangements between the DNRO's staff and the ExCom. The Committee

on Foreign Intelligence and later the Policy Review Committee (Intelligence)

address the whole range of NrIP issues and require an extensive outside

staff involvement which is new to the NRP.

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The net result of the above normalization process is a disruptinn

of the DNRO's direct line management authority and responsibility dr.

originally encompassed in the NRO management concept. The impact of

this normalization is:

Additional layers of review, which require significant

new NRO Staff effort.

A proliferation of study activity which requires continuing

participation by the NRO Staff and its program offices, neither of which

are organized or manned for this requirement.

A subsequent dilution of the effort which can be devoted to

system development and operational management.

Uncertainties in the decision process, and the introduction

of review organizations which have no responsibilities for direct line

management.

A potential for increased costs and longer schedules for

deployment of system and technical compromise in their capabilities (due

to exposure of the program to a significantly greater number of people).

In summary, the NRO Staff, which has intentionally remained small

and selective, is hard pressed to satisfy peripheral requirements while

continuing to apply the required level of effort to our primary mission.

There is every evidence that the non-mission activities will continue to

grow and to demand more NRO Staff effort.

An appropriate vehicle for implementing the changes necessary to

reaffirm and restate streamlined management concepts and procedures for

the National Reconnaissance Office is through an update and reissue of

the NRP Charter.

TAD err

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