AN AIR FORCE HISTORY

OF

SPACE ACTIVITIES

1945 1959

* * *

USAF HISTORiCAL DIVISION

LIAISON OFFICE

INUSSM
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Al AIR MRCS =TORY OF SPAM ACTInnig

1945 - 1959

RETURN. TO ARCHIVES

SPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION

HISTORICAL OFFICE (SSEH)

August 1964

TRAPHistorical Division Liaison Office

880-c:-64/ 50*
I

V. e a JR.

USAF Historical Division

Liaison Office

Covering the efforts of the United States from 194 to

September 1959 to wrestle with the unknovn ratifications of space,

this history includes both the civilian. and military activities.

An Mk Force of 1#1 , Activities presents a more detailed,

riergsent —a sIM-71460 under the title of

Threshold of Other acinographs co this subject M-Thr Air ce rn 1959-460, and (in drat) a sequel

for flea-year TW

The author of this history begins with the work of the early

pioneers in rocketry, the first satellite feasibility studies by

the military, and the relationship of the ballistic missile to the

space vehicle. Be reviews the Russian and M., space, Program

between 194 and 1957, during which efforts were made to create

space law and the Inited States chose to pursue a space-for-peace

policy. The Conservatism of . policy. makers. raised obstacles, but

there were space projecii, some, of them under the Mr Peirce.

After the shock of Sputnik- I, .the resheping of policy resulted

in the establishment of ARPA in the Deportment of Defense and NASA.

as the civilian space agency. The author tells of AltPA's supremacy

over the military services in 1958; its loss of control to MBA in

October 1958; NASA'e activities from then until July 1959; the •

position of the Mr Force after losing out to both ARPA and NASA;

and the Air Force's determination to cooperate with NASA, through

research, development, and use of its facilities.. Within the DOD

in 1959, authority for space research 'and developient was .transTerre& from ARPA to Men, interservice tension "taunted., the Air

Force struggled to regain lost projects and objected to Navy's appeal for a military space command, and the tide turned for the Air

Force when the Secretary of Defense decided in September to give

to it the responsibiliV for the development and launching of all

DOD space boosters and for management of Sentry, Midas, and Discov-,
CONTENTS

I. The State ot Rocketry, 1945-57 1.

The Datrgence of Rocketry as a Science 1

Pioneer Thinkers 2

The Great Work of Peeneauende 3

The Military *Jostle Program ,

The Postwar Attitude tommaResearch and Dtvelopment 9

lkaket-Engine Research 13

The 'Miter/, Services Plan for Space, 1945-57 25

The Russisn Space Program 25

Servicebbves toward Space Projects mod Policy, 194548 29

Resume of 1947..57 Rand Studies ' 39

AirForce Space Projects, 1948-57 43

The 145 Research Aircraft 44

Boil-.Robe--Brass Bell--Nywards .!-Dyna Boer 45

The Advanced Reconnaissance System (ARO) or VO4171 .46

Hypersonic Onvironment Test System... ...... 1 48

Mien-in4pace (MIS) WS,* 50

Propuisum .. 

54

The First Arly-Navy apace Project 55

Aiteicy of Specae-for-Peace--end its Meets 57

The First Concepts of Space Law . 58

First Efforts to Create tepee-elm, 1955-57 61

Lost Opportunities--Vanguard and Others . 68'

The President's Decision to Support a Space Project 69

Specifications. for Vanguard 0 71

The Unnecessary Delay . 75

Last Possibilities fors.U.S. "First" 77

A. Post-Sputnik Shaping of Policy 82

At First, Emotional Reactions 83

A Modified Space-for-Peace Policy 86

A Compromise Space Program stab., 93

Organising for the Military Space Program .99

AdvamcedReseardh Projects Agency 102

Director of Defense Research and Engineering 107

Activation of Directorate of Advanced Technology 109

Civilian Space Agencies ' 113

Hearings on the President's Proposed Space Agency.. 114

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 116

Organising Space Agencies under PL 85-568... 119

OrganisatiOn for Space at End of 1958.....`,. 122
VIM Eights Months of 'ARPA Supra:May la

.The Soviet Of .ARPA's „Program 124

Vanguarkand • Ikplorer I« 125

. Adr:17orok,PARifito . for; ROD. Approval 121

. Reccelenditions • of' the Adiisory Group on -Special .

Capabilities 127

The USAF Astronautical Program .of 24 January 1950 131

Last MAY Efforts to Save the Astronautical Program 133

The Rule and. Program of ARPA in 1958 1

AMA's Operating Procedures 136

The Astignment. of Projects to ARPA 138

ARiA's Assignment of Projects 141.

IX. NASA's First Program, October 1958 to July 1959 145

AMA's Claim to Border Projects 11,6

The President's Division of Space Projects 148

NASA's•First Nine Moths 149.

NASA-MAT Relations • 155

ARPA and the Military Program, October 1958 to July 1959 162.

TheMilitary Space Progrem--Second Phase 162

The Satellite Projects 164

The BOoster Program 168

The Tracking System 170

At the End of June 2959 174

AMA's Changing Status in DOD 175

Space Operations, October 1957 to July 1959 177

XI. Mr Fore. Space Policy and SupportingAction 1957-59 181

Military Reactions to the Space-for-Peace Policy 183

The Doatkine of Aerospace ifrr

The Navy-Air Force PER Disagreement 193.

A Time for Thicision 196

An Air Force Attempt to Force the Issue 197

The New's Appeal for a Space Command 198

ARPA's Move for a Mercury Joint Task Porce ...•••..., 199

McElroy's Decisions of 18 September 1959 200

205

226
TABLES

Testimony ofNeil N. McElroy, SOD, 27 November 1957 104

The Air Faroe Astronautical Program of 24 January 1958 132

Air Force Fund Status Summary, February 1958 135

NASA's Program for FY's 1959-60 151

ABPA's Program 163
I. TNN MATS Cl loam, 1915-57

Despite astronautical fancies during the centuries of mythology,

and even after the coming of respectable astronomy, it was not until the

latter part of the nineteenth century that there was any understanding of

her to launch amen-made object into spec*. Jules Urge was the first

writer to putfictional space travel on something of a rational heals.

In his book Pram the Earth to Mon he employed apiece of 1pecially designed. artillery to project a manned shell within grasp of lunar gravity.

His approach was fundamentally correct--the use of a ballistic missile--

but his "powerplant" imposed insuperable difficulties and provided no

means for a "soft landing."

It is surprising that a man of fern's imagination did not think of

using rockets because their behavior had been observed for generations.

Rockets had even been turned to military ends by Sir William Congreve,

and they played a spectacular, though ineffectual, role in the Napoleonic

wars and in the British-American war of 1822. Naturally the military

showed no enthusiasm for sweep= that did little more then frighten

inexperienced troops. There followed a century in which the military

were generally skeptical of soy practical use of rOcketsk

The ;mergence of Rocketry as a Science

Yron 1815 to 1900, rocketry was largely discarded except as a night

Ornament of fireworks for national holidays. Then, between 1900 and .

1930,• a numberOf reputable scientists and engineers voiced a new faith

in rocketry as a source ofpropulsián for missiles, aircraft, and even
2

spacecraft. Two. dheracteristics sad. the rocket the poverplant

for flight above the atmosphere. /first, blow with other reaction engines,

it did not depend upon friction forthe movement of its vehicle. It

pended solely upon the principle originally described by Sir Ileac Newton

in his third lays of motion: for every action there is an opposite and

equal reaction. Second, the rocket engine, unlike the other reaction

engines, was not sir breathing. It breathed the oxygen of its own fuel.

So long as the fuel was not exhausted, the . engine could function in the

near vacua:: of space quite as well as within the atmosphere.

Pioneer Thinkers

The significance-of rocketry was not understood until the pioneer

thinkers ofthe early twentieth century began to see . the implication*.

Among these thinkers, three were outstanding because they could express

.

their ideas in precise mathematical !Ursula*: ]Constantin Kduardoviteh

Ziolkoirsky, Robert Hutchings Goddardp, and Herman Oberth.

Siolkovsky, a reticent, self-taught Russian schelar„ was the first

to perceive the significance of the rocket as the only engine that would

permit s. deep penetration of space. In 1903, he published in the Russian

periodical Science Survey an article on rocket propulsion for space '

vehicles. Be supported hiorthesis with remarkable caleulptiOns in . mathemetics based upon a thorough kiecarledge of astronomy, physics, and chemistry as those sciences were then known. His work excited some interest

within a smal.11 almost esoteric group of compatriots. The publication •

of other learned articles during the next 10 years earned his increased

respect among Russian scientists, but his fame did not go far beyond his

own about*. Pew western Europeans knew Russian in the early 1900's,
and translations of Ziolkaysky's works were not impressive.

In 1919, Goddard, an Ameridan, prepared. his now famous report but

one largely disregarded at the time-•"A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes." He toe:, like ZiOlkovsky, supported his thesis methematically,

and be went the Russian one better by firings revolver Ina vacUue to

test the recoil and prove experimentally that Newton's third law of motion would be applicable to objects in space. Though he divotedmost of

his life to the promotion of rocketry, he woo few disciples. Se remained

almost unknown, both at home and abroed, and took his plops in the long

line of prophets without honor.

In Germany, Oberth fared somewhat better. In 1923, uninfluenced by

Goddard, be published his own scientifically developed thesis on rocketry--

The Rocket into Interplanetary S ce. No included designs for rocket-'

propelled vehicles and advocated the use of liquid fuels as superior to

the dry propellants previously employed. Almost at once there emerged

numerous enthusiasts st home and abroad who, with slight grasp of the subject, took up the somewhat premature hobby of space travel. In Europe

and America, space societies sprang into being, peopled by visionaries

.who eistook themselves for apace literati.

The Great Work of Peenemuende 

The German army, in the late 1920's, still trying to break its

Versailles straight jacket, was more realistic in its approach when it

became interested in rockets as possible weapons. In the dearth of practical and scientific knowledge, the soldiers of the Second Reich, though

possessing very limited facilities, determined to develop and prove the

worth of rocket engines.
In 1930, German military authorities selected Capt. Walter Dornberger,

a technologist of narked ability, to develop in utmost mammy a liquidp.

fUel rocket with a range exceeding that of existing artillery. Bomberger,

directly responsible to the chief of the German army, began his. work at

a small proving ground about 20 alles.froe Berlin. Si. Organisation consisted of a small staff of officerswbo directed s such larger number of

civilians. Six, years later, Dornberger moved his group to Peenemnende on

the Baltic Sea where he established the Rocket Zxperimental Station, dad*

lasted to the development of radically new weapons that, if successful,

1

would give Germany dcainance in Europe.

The near success of Peenlaueode is an lapressive tribute to the cum-.

potence of Bomberger and his staff. The-experimental station grew rapidly. At its peak it bad 18,000 employees, and its area covered 20 square

miles. The work was all-inclusive from basic reaseardh through developi.

sent, production, training of specialised troops, and eventually supplying the front formations with finishedweepons. Bomberger and many of

his associates seas always to have been aware of the full potentiality

of rockets. Thinking of developmental stages rather than of military or

..

scientific ends, the Peenemuende staff envisioned aprograa that would

move systematically from short-range missiles to an eventual goal of space

vehicles. Ultimate sup plies depended upOn the realisation of adaquate

powerplants and looked into the future for nuclear, ion, and proton

propellants.

Doroberger'a support was not lowillb but sufficient to permit swift

progress. In 1936, he reported the feasibility of liquid-fuel engines,

sod six year later, 3 October 1942, be conducted the first successful
launching of the AA missile, now generally referred to as the 4-2. It

demonstrated a velocity of about 3,60kmph and an altitude of 55 miles,

tar beyond the reach of air-breathing engines. The 4.2 was a long way

from the space vehicle or the satellite foreseen by Dornberger, but with

proper priority the missile could have supplied the Iasi government with

a possible war-winning wesipon. 2 The 4-2 might also have become a direct

priest to the United States, for Zugen Binger, a ltasi.employedscientist,

suggested that it be used as second stage of a boost-glide vehicle to be

launched in Germany against New bolt City.

Fortunately for the Allies, Hitler was long indifferent to the acme-

.

plishments of Peensmuende. It was not until the experience of Stalingrad

shook his self-confidence that be turned to "secret weapons" to save him.

On 13 June 194, a week after D-day far Operation Overlord, the Germans

fired the first of the 4-1 guided aissiles agaibet Inglmad. The moons

were disturbing, but they were much less so than the 4.2 rocket-propelled

ballistic missiles that began a bombardment of Prance, Belgium, and England on 8 September. By that time the Allied armies were well established

on the continent and within weeks would capture the more strategically

located missile bases, thereby. reducing the enemy threat. But Gen. Dwight

D. Zisenhower knew that six months earlier the 4-1 and especially the 4-2

might have endangered the Anglo-American invasion of ?rano,. 3

The collapse of Peenemuende began soon after the launching of the

4-2 offensive. 4/ eUttMU2 1914 MU war was sweeping toward the Iasi defeat.

The Russians raced through eastern Garmany and in January 194 threatened

Peenemuend.e. In the confusion of disaster, Doraberger could not save his

entire group, and a number of his employees, sane with 10 years' experienee,
6 4111111111111111

had no choice but to remain at the experimental station. A small section'

that fortunately included Dornbarger and sane of his most highly qualified

specialists escaped westward to the Rarts Wuntains. They took with then

invaluable papers and established anew installation that functioned only

in tbs sense of holding together scientists the might otherwise have been

scattered and-lost.

In the spring of . 105 the Missians occupied Peenannende. They transported to Russia 4,000 scientists and workers along with most of the

equipment, production facilities, aides manydocunents as they could find.

inside•the Soviet Union the Russians reconstituted Peenemuende in. a diminjibed version and operated it as a rocket research center. The captured

Germans manufactured nev models of the 7-2 and in this war between 106

and 108 supplied the Russians with missiles for at least 500 experimental

firings. Ay that time, the Soviets fat they had drained the Germans of

all possible contributory kncm2edse and, after a long period of isolation,

permitted their prisoners to return home. The Germens•remeined ignorant

of the Russian competence in the field of missile propulsion and knew

nothing of the Russian overall rocket program. 5

When the Aiericans overran the arts Mbuntains in Mir 1945, they

found quantities of the Peemommende records and, even more important,

some of the men responsible for the work. At once the U.S. Army seised

the documents, blueprints, and data and shipped them to the United States.

Scan afterwards the Argy initiated Operation Paperclip and brought to the

United States 180 of the scientists who had plowed leading roles at •

Peenenuende.

Raving thus scavenged the broken body of Peenemuende, the Russians
and Americans reacted very differently to the tests of their spoils.

The Soviet gOvernment understood that rockets would be of paramount importance in the future and directed their nascent program toward nothing more

definite, and nothing less inclusive, than the advancement of rocket

science rogardiess of its specific applicability. The result was that

by 1956 or 1957 the Amnions had a rocket engine--or possibly rocket

engines--withe, thrust that cools' laundh either missiles laden with atomic

warheads or heavily instrumented capsules to orbit the earth or explore

interplanetary space. The Americans, in contrast, had little topaeval

guidance or support and they fragmented their development of rocket engines

among &number of projects within a comprehensive but frequently unstable

missile program. The unfortansts consequence was that in 1956 and 1957

the United States had no rocket propulsion comparable to that enjoyed by

the Soviet Union.

The itilitaryllianile proven •

A missile is "any objeOt thrown, dropped, projected, or propelled,

or designed to be thrown, dropped4 projected, or propelled for the purpose of asking it strike a target. "6 According to this definition, ads.

silry is a genus of may subordinate species. Insofar as the word is

used attributively in the expression *guided missile progron"--oftan

shortened to %dulls prograe"-•it denotes the development of self..

propelled, unmanned vehicles, armoliwithearbeadeto be sent against

enemy targets and egUipped for guidance either by apreset device or

radio commend.

To shortcut throughthe semantics of listing "ballistic adasilaa
under the species of "guided aissiIes"--a confusing contradiction in

terms--it should be sufficient to say that the postwar "missile program"

came to include any wholly or partially guided missile using a turbojet,

=Wet, or racket powerplant or any combination of them. 'Mather t4ft

missiles were aerodynamic in structure was unimportant as far as the space

program was concerned. The important fact,, was that only one of the three

forms of missile propulsion could fUnction in areas above the operational

altitude of air-breathing engines. Therefore, those missiles designed

for trajectories passing through and continuing above the atmosphere had

to be propelled by rocket engines. These rocket-propelled vehicles were

generally referred to as "ballistic."

A quirk of history brought. together the ballistic missile program

on the one land and the satellite4peoe prOgrie on the other. In1945,

when the armed forces, along with the rest of the world, tried-to adjust

to the new era of technology, there Was still little thought, except in

very limited circles, of a near-future breakthrough into space. Certainly

in the spring and sorer, when the remnants of Peenmeuende were. being

Absorbed by the Russians and Americans, there was no American space program. In the early pert of 1946, both the Navy and the Air Force came

forward with satellite feasibility studies, but neither proposal reached

the stage of research and development; and in the years between 1946 and

1954 nothing was done to design and prOduce a rocket engine for satellite

purposes. In 1954 and 1955 the space age had assumed an imminence totally

leaking 10 years before. Since there was still no specially designed

satellite engine, the :services turned realistically tolthatinas or soon

would be available in the military missile program as it bed developed
since 1945.

Of course only the development of rocket engines is pertinent, and

that lies always within the more extensive program of "guilhodmissiles."

The problem then is to ferret out from a labyrinth of complexities the

decisions that delayed or hastened the research, development, and production of "ballistic Wallies" and to relate these decisionsteamlogical difficulties and national policies.

.The Postwar Attitude toward Research and. Development 

During World War II the Army Air Voices (MV) smith, Army Service

Perces (As'), particularly the Ordnance Department, sock sponsored anissile program: The accomplishments were ter less important than those of

Peeneenende. nevertheless both MP and AMP vent far enough in the development

of research and weepon carrying missiles to provide invaluable experience in

meeting the early poptmar demands that came an a consequence of the demon.:

started effectiveness of the V-1 and V.2.. Thepostvar program started

off well but soon ran into techoologics1 and funding difficulties. Pow.

arty was especially persistent amine without remeiy for almost a decade.

Indeed, lack of funds was one of the major reasons for the retarded developmeat of rocket engines.

The American shift trga a vartile to a peacetime way of life was

translated into an economy program for the military that 'Mounted to

austerity in some areas and to retrenchment in almost all others. In

April 1958, in the midst of American chagrin over the Sputnik incident,

Dr. Wernher von Braun, Director of the Development Operations Division,

Army Ballistic Missile Agency (AMA), attributed Russian success to the

Soviets' continued. postwar emphasis on military needs, whereas the United
10 11111111111111

.

.

States chose the production of consumer goods. 7

etrenchment is particularly damaging when applied to basic relearch,

where neglect, or even iiconiistency of effort, can result in time losses

for which crashiprogruma can offer no more than partial compensation at

best.8.

The defense research pro ran into trouble as soon as World War

II mdse.. The armed !Cross were disturbed--they usdamandintat the cutback eight lead to, but there was little they could do about it. An improvement followed the outbreak of the Korean War but did not survive the

conflict. After January 1953, military reeearch and development and the

position of scientists in goverment employ suffered further deterioration.

Meanwhile, Senator Joseph McCarthy, of Wisconsin, and his like were

in the heyday of their rampancy. Their vicious anti-intellectualiem ooinaided, in time only, with the more kindly jibes of Secretary of Defense

Charles E. Wilson, bent upon defending the administration's policy of

eoonopy and downgrading of research and development. Accepting the sufficiency 44 suiting 'mimeos, Wilson could see small justification for a

basic research that sight contribute to unforeseeable requirements in the

future. The Secretary became a tireless spokesman against "boondoggling

research. 119 One exempla of his frequently expressed opinions will show

10

his point of view:

In my own had I think of. . . gasearchend domalmamtg7 like

drilling fOr oil . . . . Its smart people in the oil business try

to drill their boles for oil in a likely place, so the money that is

given to the Defense Department for research and development, I like

to see spent in an area /Au!7 if successful . it viii be

of some use to us. And mien some other place in the nation's budget

could go the gooey for fundamental research, I don't know. I don't

care what happens to some Of the minor other things...
"1111111111111111 11

%Ile effect of McCarthy persecutions* and the administration's skeptical attitude toward research and development persuaded some very able.

and competent scientists to vithdrew voluntarily tram goverment service.

The harm done to the United States cannot be estimated but it vas not

negligible. These were protests at the time, but the voices of dissent--

some of them highly placed—were disregarded. Senator W. Stuart Symington;

James S. Douglas, then Under Secretary of the Air force; Gen. Metban1P.

Teining,.Chief of Staff, USAF; Gen. Tholes D. Whites Vice Chief of Staff,

USAF; and Lt. Gen. Donald 7.. Putt, Deputy Chief of Staff/Development,

were among the notables who warned that the United States could not match

Russian military superiority in numbers. National security depended upon

maintaining a superior techoology, which, in turbo required extensive and

unceasing research end development. Ite.Russian, ter their part were concentrating beevily upon &progressive program of research and development,

and their success seemed phenomenal. At least twice, in 1953 and again

in 1956, National Intelligence Estimates stated that the Soviets vould

have ICHK's by 1960 and that they already bad some missiles capable of

11

carrying nuclear warheads.

The warnings vere repeated at yet higher levels. On 24 September

1954 and again on 8 September 1955 the National Security Council (IISC)

declared that "basic and applied research must be kept ahrmist . of the

changing Soviet threat" and that Soviet possession of ICBM's before the

United States produced than "would have the gravest repercessions on the

security and cohesion of the free world." Paradoxically, the President

approved both ISC declarations, but the administration's policy remained

*Among the outstanding American scientists who suffered from Ntearthey--

istic aspersions were Dr. Harold. Urey, Dr. Rdwarill. Condon, and Der. Allen

V. Astin.
12

unchanged.12

The climax of protests came late in 1955 and early in 1956. Trevor

Gardner, Assistant Secretary of the Air loree (2114, spoke out strongly

against inadequate budgets for research and development. Se called for

the fiscal year 1957 outlay to be doubled to meet the challenge of Soviet

technology. Iii warnings ignored, Gardner resigned to show the intensity

of his conviction 13 .

To this criticism, Wilson invariably replied in the same tone. Undoubtedly the Russians did have atomic bombs, 200 divisions, and numerous

submarines: "So what? The final thing is, is there any reason for them

to go to mar mod if they did, would it be clear to Um that they mould

meet so such opposition that they mould really lose." Wilson based his

optiiimm an the Air Force, which he described as "the best in the world."

It would be tragic, he said, if the Air Force were second best. The Secretary saw the Air Ibroe equipped with currently available imagoes; be

showed little sign of seeing that without a strong and unending program

in basic research those weapons slat soon become obsolete and the Air

'brae weak.

On 8 February 1956, almost exactly five months after approving MSC's

latest call for an expanded research program, Eisenhower expressed astonishment at the camera of Americans because of Russian emcees. le was

sure that the United States was ahead of the Soviet Union in all important

aspects of "guided missiles.

,15 Vilma thereupon introduced anew if

uncomprebensible thmms. Nis argument ran that since missiles were *webslogically as well as militarily significant, they should not be overemphasised. Shortly afterwards, Donald A. ;parte*, Secretary at the Air
Force, said. that the U.S. investment* in military research and develop.

sent were more than adequate.

Rocket•Ingine Research

Between-19h5 and 1955 the Arty and the Air Force continued'Ae

wartime goal of developing both research and weep:la-carrying missiles.

The effect of V-2 in both fields of endeavor was to give an interest

in rocket propulsion that previously had too often been totally absent.

Bowyer, neither the high-altitude rocket research nor the .development

of engines for military missiles sought the ultimate in rocket significance. Bach program followed the of developing rocket engines

to meet specific requirements.

Of course in the high-altitude rocket research progrma there vas no

need for an engine with a very large thrust. At most, a research rocket

was expected to propel a payload of perhaps 1,000 ponnds to an altitude

of 200 or 250 Miles. In the program for military missiles, planning did

not exceed the concept of adjusting World War II experience to more

*The statistics for research and development are interesting. For fiscal years 1953, 1954, and 1955, the total inns for DOD research and development were respectively, .6 billion, 41.11 billion,

and 41.3 billion. The differe nce of $300 million between 1953 end 1955

is not great in postwar reckoning, so. there seam to be . on17 a slight

decrease in research and development spending. But• the significance

lies not in the loss of $300 million over a . period of three years but

that there wass no increase. Percentage-wise the RAF was making doable

the investment in research and development during these years. To

make the American effort commensurate with that of the RAP, the 1953 •

appropriations of $1.6 billion should not have decreased to $1.3 billion in 1955 but should have increased to $2.2 billion.
efficient metbatrot.immapoa :delivery. In 1945-46 ' 0e Army thought of

aiesiles as an'adjuict toartillexy; the Air Corse thought ors:L*411es

%4114101 . traditional airpower terms of altitude, range, and velocity.. Be- . , 

.traditional

name almost no target was sore than 5,000 . miles may and because the

Atomic Nnergy Commission soon undertodk to bring nuclear warheads well

below the 10,0001cmud,meight of-wartime. bombs, practically no thought

was given to the development of missiles mithegreaterrenge or a greater

capacity. The greatest powerplants envisioned did-net exceed the rewire-

. rents of intercontinental strategic missiles; that these requirements far

exceeded the range, altitude, velocity, and capacity of the V-2 is not

the point. It was the limitation imposed upon rocket-engine development

: by the missile programthet did no such, later on, to held back the pro- '

•gram for satellites and other space vebicles.

Allabealtitude :rOcket research vas conducted for the most part at the

%:- .4XXWm1White Sends Proving Ground in New,Nexico. Tbe White Sends experimenti, however, mere not limited to the Army, and both the Navy and Air

Force participated. •

.•Out of the yortlas missile effort there had come the WAC4orporal

with a maxima altitude of 70 miles and a paylOidaepasity of 25 pounds.

Its first flight occurred at White Sands on 26 September 1945. Dr tiat

time a few of the captured V62's were reaching the United States, and

they were entrusted to the Army for assembly and firing. Because of

their greater capacity, the. German missiles led to a waning interest in .

VAC•Corporal, but they also stimulated a sore ambitious Army-Navy-Air

!ores upper-atmompbere reseam.hlwoomm4 formulated in the late days of

19 ►5. Ordnance then coutraatedtbe General Niectric Company to conduct
15

the Y-2 experiments, awl on 16 April 1946, 03 representatives, assisted

by ecientipts from Peenemuende, fired aV-2 for the first time trim' Amer.,

16

icon soil.

Uprisese with the 4-2 soon showed a number of unanticipated shortcomings in the Missile. The airframe was clumsy and unneoessarily heavy

because of internal structural support. The tanks used wire already ohm.,

lets by iscricae standards sod wire a serious dreg on the nissile's'proficiency. MOreover, since the 1;2 did not lend itself to instrumentation,

useless ballast bed fregiently to be added to the payload with unpredictable effects on the missile's performence. An acceptable interim solu-'

tion was found in Project Dumper--mating the 4-2 within a

two stage missile—but the arrangement only emphasised the need for a

more satisfactory replacement. Moreover, the . supply of 74's was limited

and this fact too was instrumental in persuading research authorities to

call for a Om/4 designed missile at an early date. They vented one

eppromicatiLy is large as the 44 but amenable to instrumentation. In

August 106 the Masai MeteerchIsborstory.(111) contracted the Clem L.

Martin Company for an improved roast, 'biases Gelled. ilkisg. Also in

106, with the 'Ivy as cognisant agent, Douglas Aircraft Company begin

development of the smaller Aerobes.

Roth the Viking and AerObse were operational by 19118, and both had

rocket powerpleets. Both missiles were also dynamic eat uotlarveataua.

areas Ohmage, to nest the standards of new knowledge. In addition,

Aerobe', at the rawest of the Air 1Porcep, was produced in a different

version. bps 1955, known ei derobee•iti. All three missiles.• 1king, Aerobes, end derobee-Ii—were used to portonm experluents for the Arwhlali,
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17

indirectly of rocketry-,the use of atomic vespois. immediately after the

bombing of Hiroshima and Isgasaki io Menet 1945 * there was talk of a

marriage between a nuclear verheord and irmissile vehicle to create the

"ultimate esapon." Gen. H.B. Arnold, Commanding Generals AAllyexpressed

his conviction that the atomic booth would be integrated with guided mis

siles* and the.Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stated that the atomic and

missile programs should be deVeloped in such manner that each made Use

of the other. This was brave talk in the glow of victory,* but it carried

little weight in the repetition of post-VorldVer I efforts to "return

to normalcy."

In the late days of 1945 and throughout 1946, mar put oo paper a

comprehensive guided missile study program that included 28 Projects.

Three of the proposed missiles involved rocket propulsion—the Wagon,

dated Bates Aircraft (COnvair)22-774 that crilled . .for a rocket missile

with 204 range; the North Aaerialln Aviatioo 22-770 supersonic surfaceto-surfaoe* 500-mile-range, gliderodkat missile; and the Republic Aircraft ii.773, 1,300.02, supersonic missile that could be either ramjetor rocket-propelled. 27 Altogether,* it vas a pr pregnant with lepertent possibilities if carried through without serious inteccuptioes. But

serious intercuptioas were at hand.

In December 1946 the administration decrOed a cutback in spending

for defense research and development during fleet/ jeer 1947, though Os'

year vas already belf gone. The Air nevem then faced with the unhappy task of deciding 'here its own cuts ahead be made. The first

decision was a reduction in the missile 'research budget from $29 million

to $13 million. The next decision was to void out the least promising
missile projects and keep the remaining ones undor tbs accepted coil,

'--- 18'

Bince. experience at White Bands was already shoring the AL.2 less

satisfactory as sweep= carrier than ha•been believed and the Convair

MX-714 studies indicated a long development period, enthusiasm for the

rocket missile waned considerably. The requirement for fuel of high•spe,

elfin impulse not then available, guidance difficulties, and unsolved

problems of reentry indicated "a long series of Costly experiments" that

would eat deeply into the curtailed missile research and development funds.

On 6 Ma 1947, Maj. Oen. Benjamin W. Chidlem, Air Materiel Commands, wrote

the-commending general of the AA1:4

The Air Materiel Command and Aikr missile contractors for the

past six months have been carrying on detailed studies of the probable cost of developing gUided'aissiles. From these studies the

conclusion must be diem that the AAP program, While desirable and

technically sound, is Considerably overexpanded if vs are to carry

on with . . . gar presently reduce? budget. . . . 5j/ AAP pro

gram must be drastically cut. This ii believed best accomplished

by eliminating all the so-called "insurance" missiles such as subsonic missiles to perform' the sage mission as supersonics missiles

being developed. Also eliminated is the 5,000-mile-range rocket

which does not premise any tangible results in the next 8 to 10 years:

Lind the unpromising 1,500-mile rocket or ramjet missile of Republig,

The next month the Air 'Oree canceled its contracts for Republic NX-773

and Convair 14Z-774.29

By July 1947 the most important project remaining in the Air Yormv

missile program, as far as the later space program vas concerned, walithe

NX-770, which soon Gale to be known as Navaho. Its development was subsequently conditioned by four major amendments to the contract between

'1547 and 1950. In 1947 the plan was extended to cover three missiles--

the original 500-mile glide rocket missile plus a 1,500-mile missile and
#111111•1 19

a 5,000-mile missile depending upon resejets for cruising. In 1948 the

Air Force abandoned the glide missile and rewrote the contract,to provide

for three ramjet missiles with ranges of 1,000 miles, 3,000 miles, and

5,000 miles. In 1949 the contract specified 1611000-alle and a 1,700-

mile ramjet air-leunched missile mod a 5,900-mile missile with a type of

launching still undetermined. In 1950, at the suggestion of north Amencans the Navaho contract was changed again to provide fOr.a three-step

development beginning with a turbojet test vehicle, a 3,600-mtle-rooketlaunched, ramjet-propelled experimental missile, and the ultimate 5,900i.

mile version.

Despite the Air Force rejection of the rocket-powered glide missile

in 1948 and the change to ramjet engines for cruisieg, North American continued the rocket development as a Navaho booster unit. The vast became

an important contribution to the accumulation of experience with rocket

engines that, along with the accomplishments of the highoaltitude research

rockets, was indispensable to the lasr space projects.

In Aied11946, when the NI-170 contract was signed, North Menem)

was without talent in rocket engines. To hasten the buildup of skill in

this new field, the Air Force turned over to the contractor two T4 rocket

motors transported from Germany. They ware excellent guinea, pigs that

North American engineers could study and from which prepare a Chinese

copy'brought up to the standards of American industry. From that beginning it should be possible to turn out a new, lore efficient, and more

powerful engine. Between 1946 and 1953, Berth American developed three

rocket engines sod designed a fourth, and a comparison of thmi with the
Y-2 model reveals the progress being mode in rocketry :22

;Mime' Tested

na41414-1

(Chinese dopy

of. the V-2)

• ELB43-NA4

na434A-3

Purpose 

To propel a weapon missile

Experimentation with a rocket

engine brought up to the struc-..

turel standards of American

industry

Designed to have a thrust of

75,000 pounds and intended to

serve as the poverplant of

the glide missile

A mealler, lighter, and more

Thrust Pounds 

56,000 1946 at IA

56,E

81,000

1949

efficient version of the.

XLR43.NAml 130,000

41171.41144 A combination of 2 XLB43-NA.Ve

.•• ' to boost the lavabo 1,700-mile

missile 000 1953

ELN71-MAP3 Designed as a booster for the 1953 (in

5,500-mile Navaho -' boo, preliminary

design on4)

It is ironical that the success of North kserican in developing auxiliary rocket engines for various phases of Navaho should, along with

rocket development almemhere, have been one of the factors leading to the

eventual cancellation of the Navaho project. By. 1957, low-range, airbreathing missiles could be regarded only as standby meepone during the

waiting period fOr operational ballistic missiles. Unfortunately for

Navaho the.Air Force had another long-range, air-breathing misille,lnark,

which, though inferior in performance to Navaho, was considerably nearer

operational status. It was pointless to continue the development of both

*mho and Spark. Under the circumstances the Air Stria regretfUlly

cancelOd /lavabo, mindful of the great contributions North American had
21

made to the science of missiles and rocket engines.

The 1946 policy of retrenchment had not dimmed the Army's interest

in missiles, and especially rocket-propelled missiles, as adjuncts of

artillery. Then, atter 1949, When the Atomic Energy Commission made promising reports of lightweight atomic warheads in the beer Atture, the Army

initiated the Redstone ballistic missile, which, along with several other

missiles of the Rimy and Air Force, could be used to deliver the weapon.

Redstone, however, had a range of 175 miles, and this seemed to be

stretching the adjunct-to-artillery theory to cover a multitude of amh1-

tions. 23

The whole course of events—SmrthAmerican Aviation progress on

rocket engines, ARC promises for smiler atomic warheads, some favorable

Rand Corporation studies on the feasibility of ICBM's, the lengthening

range of the Army's ballistic missiles—induced the Air Force to reconsider the advisability of a program for long-range rocket missiles. As

milt as 1951 the Air Force turned to Convair and requested a comparative

study, to be completed within six months, on a rocket glide missile and a

rocket ballistic missile. There was not much doubt, as far as Convair

was concerned, what the recommendation would he. • Since 15018, Convair»

using its own funds--had continued small-scale work on MX-774, and the

1951 study insisted that a ballistic missile was featible. The AirForce

accepted Convair's judgaent and MX-774 became Atlas. Subsequently, breakthroughs occurred in quick succession. Development was far advanced in •

1957, and the missile reached the production stage in 1958.

Revival of the Air Force ICBM program was not premature. In 1952,

Los Alamos was speaking not only of mnall atomic warheads but of small
lighteeightthermonuclear (TN) warheads as veil. If the latter Were oar--

ried.tl-a long-range rocket of reasonable accuracy, it could become an

ideeiutrategic weapon. One year later the Teapot Committee, under Dr.

• John on Neumann, made a thorough study of ICBM potentialities and early

in 1954 recommended that the program be accelerated immediately to take

advantage of the new warheads. The Air Force reacted quickly. On 15

July the Mr Researchsnd Develgplent Commend (ABDC), as instructed by

Headquarters MAY, set up. the Western Develogment Division (WDD) at

Inglewood, Calif., for the primary purpose of pushing the ICBM program..

Under Brig. Oen. BerumrdA. Schriever, MD—which subsequently become

known as the Air /brae Ballistic Missile Division (ATED)--wits responsible for the management of Atlas research, development, and testing. In

MO 1955, imp responsibility wis increased to include the comparable,

though more sophisticated, Titan.

It was good to have the Air Force ballistic missile program revived,

andtheOperatiOn Castle thermonuclear shifts in 1954 seamed to confira the

policy of developing rockets tailored to meet specific needs. Coosa-

.

quently, since TM warheads promised to be small, the Air'Porce sponsored

correspondingly modest ICBM!s. Though the missiles were capable of intercontinental range and possessed velocities great enough to achieve earth

orbits if so desired, thrust was far less than that which the SoViete.

were developing for their misalle-tatellite programs.

Rocket propulsion received further impetus in 1955. In March 1954,

at the Prelident's request, the Selene* Advisory Committee (Office of

Defense Mobilisation) bad established the Technological Capabilities Panel

(TCP) to study the threat of surprise attack. Under the chairmanship of
23

Dr. James R. Zillion, the panel, often referred to as the Killian Committee,

*

 prepared an exhaustive report and submitted it to the President on

14 February 1955. Among other things, the report advocated an immediate

program for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (10NK's). The recommendation aroused some enthusiasm tor various service proposals for

=OK's, and the interest heightened a few months later when NBC recommended that lind- and ship-based ISBN's be considered essential to

national security ?5

In November 1955 the Secretary of Defense approved the Jupiter IRBK

as a joint Army-Navy development task and authorised the Air Force to

proceed with its own Thor IRBIL The Air Force promptly added this project to the other responsibilities of WDD. The Navy soon found that the

Jupiter would be unsatisfactory for shipboard use and, late in 1956,

obtained permission to withdrew from further participation in the project.

In January 195T, the Navy gained approval of Polaris, a solid-f0e1 ISBN

designed especially for submarine launching.26 Though Polaris itself

lacked intercontinental range, its mobility endowed the Navy for the

first time with what amounted to strategic airpower. It gave the Navy

a better position from which to argue roles and missions in the approach-

.

it* space age, but Polaris missiles were not to be diverted from INN

functions to serve as boosters in satellite launchings.

The following table lists the performance characteristics of the

*Other members were J.B. Fish, J.P. Baxter J.H. Doolittle, L.A.

DuBridge, L.J. Haworth, N.G. Holloway, Z.N. Lend, and S.C. Sprague,

consultant.
Viking

Aerobe*

Aerobes-8i

Redstone

Sergeant

Jupiter

Titan

mies4 •es that 'proved to be Important as "lift devices" for Satellites

. .

. .

.and-spmee vehicle projects between 1954 and 1959:

- . . .

ltiasila

. an

NI1C-1-

No of

Mires

Thrust Velocity:. lit

MSS stiamagsw,

-ornirsr--

154 (A) 1 21,000 4, 000 108

38 (A) 1 18,000 2,100 1949

1611 (A) 1 18,000 11,E 1955

175 (it) 1 78,000 3,500 1953

75 (It) 1 50,000 1,650 1956

1,500 (R) 1 150,000 10,E Nay

1957

1,500 (R) 150,000 10,000 Sep

1957

5000 (R) 11 360,000 18,000 Dec

1957

5,500 (R) 2 (1 of 360p000 18,000 Aug

300,000-lb

thrust; 1 of

60,000$

1958.
Lt. mac painAtm meRVICIS PIM FOR SPAM, 105-57

On the evening of 3 October 19426 that historic der when the first

V-2 vas successfully launched at Peenamende, Walter Dornberger, by then

a major general and director of the project, called together his chief

assistants and said:

The following points may be deemed of decisive significance in

the history of technology: we have invaded space with our rocket

and for the first time—mark this Well--re have used space as a

bridge between two points on earth; re have proved rocket propulsion

practicable for space travel. To land, sea, and air may now be

added infinite empty space as an area of future intercontinental

traffic, thereby acqpiring political importance. This third day of

October 1942, is the first of a new era of transportation--that of

space timvel.

So long as the war lasts, our most urgent task can only be the

rapid perfection of the rocket as a weapon. The development of possibilities ve cannot yet envisage Will be s.peacetime task. Then

the first thing rill be to find a safe means of landing after the

journey through space.

The defeat of Germany was theend of Mornbergar's works* Peennuende

but the significance of rocketry for 'space tramline not lost upon those

who had knowledge of the problem.

When the Suasion rent forward with their missile program in 1945,

they included span travel as veil as missile weaponryamong their hopes.

In the United States the Navy and Air Force--and eventually the Army--

became interested in space but received little encouragement from the

higher levels of government. Without support, the services could do

scarcely more the sketch a program as something to be desired.

The Russian sicl !Emma

The Russians handled their program with consummate skill. At the

ebd of the war they made no secret of their intentions to conduct "MI=
experimentaIsissile work with the aid of the Peenemuende scientists la•

pritoned.deep in the Soviet Union. In addition the Russians game their

own scientiste.adequate support to learn whatever the Germans bad to

.

.

towhead at the same time to go forwarilidth their own experiments as

rapidly as possible. Though they kept their progria flexible, swiveled

to imeet the exigencies of international politics, the Russians did not

deviate from the one unalterable aim ot furthering the interests of the

Soviet Union. Their method was scientific research in miesilry, and

. their three chief objectives were to strengthen the nation's military

prowess, enhance propaganda, and possibly in the end to prove the mate,

rialistic philosopky of communism by exhibiting life as universally indigenous to matter.2

As far as publicity was concerned, the Russian policy was "not to

release any detail until we have experimental results" of a broad nature,

meadow Soviet officia1.1 It was not until long afterwards that Westernauthorities learned that the Soviets undertook to develop a rocket-propelled intercontinental bomber in 1546; that they sent rockets to altitudes of 100 miles with payloads of 200 pounds in 1949; that their canine

passengers of atmosphere research rockets were recovered by parachute in

1951; and that they conducted a systematic investigation of lunar-landing

feasibility in 1953.4

Yet no Western statesman can plead a justifiable ignorance of the

general nature of the Russian missile program. On 23 JUly 1945, Life

published Peenemuende drawings of a large, manned space station, and

theft vol every reason to OuppOst that the Russians boa acquired

or whops more advanced drawings of the same concept. It was common
111111111111111S

Fledge that rooket-propelledmissiles and spacecraft were two aspects

of the same research problem in the thinking of German scientists in the

Russian prison camp. In October 1949, Karl T. Compton, then chairman of

the Research and Development Hoard, wrote Louis Johnson, Secretary of

Defense, and quoted an unidentified member of the board as saying:5

Although reports from behind the Iron Curtain are meager, those

which ve have indicate that the Russians are exploiting the missile

developments, which they inherited from the Germ's at high priority. They would be tools not to do so, now that the United States

is so definitely committed to the atomic blitz. It would be tragic

if we were to curtail our program now sod let the Russians get ahead

of us.

As time vent on, it became the policy of Macaw frequent/7 to remind the Russian people--and the world too, if it would listen--that the

Soviet government was vigorously supporting aproerem to develop a space

capability at an early date. The stress of information broadened 'ppmciably in 1950--and was a flood by 1555. In 1951 there were several reports, emanating from government sources, that the Soviet Union envisioned

a military space station and Earth satellite and that gene loOked toward

lunar landings within 10 or 15 years. This material could be found in

6

many reputable journals in the United States.

On 27 November 1953, A.R. Nesmeyanoveddressed a "World Peace Coo.

ferencein Vienna. As the official representative of the Kremlin, he

said that with available techniques it was possible to launch a•stellite

or send an object to the moon. Within days Pravda published the statement and discussed it with approving interest. In 1954 the U.S.S.R.

Academy of Sciences established the NiolkoWsky gold medal for outstanding

work in interplanetary communications. In April of the next year, the .

Presidium announced the creation of the Permanent Interdepartmental
28

COmmission on Interplanetary Communications "to coordinate and direct all

work concerned with solving the problem of mastering cosmic space." Si-.

multammuLly the Astronautics Section of the Central Aeroclub was argonLied "to facilitate the realisation of cosmic flights for peace#1

purposes." Even more indicative of a prospering space program were the

appeals of Radio Rbscow. Youthful volunteers were needed to help their

country in its efforts to undertake flights to the Moon.7.

FOrther evidence of Russian progress came in August 1955 during the

Sixth International Astronautical Congress at Copenhagen, sponsored by

tbe International Astronautical Federation. One of the two Russian

"observers," L.T. Sedov,' chairman of the Commission on Interplanetary

Comennicatioas, declared that "it will be possible to launch an artificial

Earth satellite within the next two years. The realisation of the Soviet

project can be expected in the comparatively near future." Sedov certainly did not speak without the knowledge and approval of his government,

and his statement was tantamount to an official announcement.

The Russians gave the 'world ample evidence of their space goal. Indeed the flow of information between 1951 and 1955 was s greph • of Russian

success, legible as a printed page at noon. /n August 1958 the President

of the United States approved an 1180 statement to the effect • that Soviet

space accempliebments should long have been obvious to woos, and a con- '4

gressional Committee concluded that "we did not need a spy system to give

to the technically qualified a clear forewarning of Soviet Progress."9

It was surely a serious failure of the intelligence communitylf it did

not min the highest authorities of the looming crisis. It was an equally

grave fault on the part of. the highest authorities if they received but

8
disregarded such a warning.

Servioe /tomes toward 8 Projects and Policy, 194548

The lack of an American space policy, or even a rocket policy, in

the first few years atter World War II compelled the ',perste services

once more to shift *lir themselves in adjusting to the changing order.

Aside from a keen interest in missiles as s. form of artillery, the Army .

Ground Forces seems to have had no immediate awareness of space as a

possible area of operations. The Navy and AM/USAi felt quite differently

about the feasibility of satellites, and they exhibited-s realistic desire

for space projects at the time when many civilian echelons expressed die-.

approval of such "impractical ideas."

In his final war report, 12 November 1945,. General Arnold. discussed

the possible and probable use of new weapons in the fUtUre--prOjectiles,

for instance, that might have a velocity of 3,000 miles per hour. In .

turn there vould be new weapons of defense, and they would necessitate

launching the projectiles nearer the target to give the a shorter time

of flight and make their detection and destruction sore difficult. Con10

tinning, he said:

We must be reedy to launch . . . fihe projectiles from unexpected directions. This can be done with true space ships, capable

of operating outside the earth's atmosphere. The design of such a

ship is all but practicable todgy; research will unquestionably

bring it into being within the foreseeable future.

Arnold's vision did not cause vide interest at the time, but before the

end of the year the AAP negotiated a contract with Douglas Aircraft Com.

pony for a study of intercontinental warfare and its instrumentalities.

On 1 March 1946, Douglas in turn organised Project Rand to fulfill these
responsibilities. In this rather indirect way, therefore, it is possible

to think-of Beal, which became : Rand Corporation on 1 November 108, as

having been established to investigate some of the possiblities of pene11

trating spice..

By the tine of the AM-Dangles contract the Navy, too, was interested

in space, and it moved ahead of the AAF in formalising a space program.

Through the summer of 1945s Comdr. Hervey Malls USN, and a few associates.

in the Electronics Division of the Bureau of Aeronimitics (BuAer), worked

with same of the material salvaged from Peenemuende. Mall suggested the

desirability of a satellite test program, and on 3 October 1945 be was

made chairmen of a BuAer Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space

Rocketry (CIFSR).

12

 Nall then opened discussions with Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology, Aerojet

Engineering Corporation, Martin Company, North American Aviation, and

Douglas. The talks led to contracts late in 1945 and early in 19k6 with

Guggenheim, Douglas-El Segundo, Martin, and North American for feasibilitystudy designs of space vehicles.

Within emitter of weeks CEFSR received several studies and chose

the one from Douglas as the most suitable. The concept called for the

development of a new rocket engine, using a fuel of liquid hydrogen and

oxygen. The vehicle design employed the engine in clusters to obtain

the desired thrust. The members of CUM were convinced that they hat

at hand a project of importance but one that would require general support in order to be approved by higher authorities.13

In March 1946, Hall approached the AAF representatives on the joint

AAF-BuAer Aeronautical Board and broached the subject of a possible
31

Navy-MV experimental space project. It vas mentioned at a meeting of

the board's Researdh and Development Committee on 9 April, and formal discussions were scheduled for the nett meeting on 14 Nfty. Prospects of a

satisfactory understanding seemed good.14

At this point Headquarters AAP became interested in the negotiations

from a policy viewpOint. The Air Staff agreed that if space were exploited

the operations 'would be an extension of strategic eirpower. Therefore •

the AAF should be the cognisant. service. To avoid a possible compromise

of the AAF position, it was essential to ihow a competence equal to that

of the Navy. To N.J. Gen. Curtis N. Lefty, Deputy Chief of Air Staff•or

Research and Development, fell the task of safeguarding the AAF position.

On 20 April 1946 he verbally requestedDouglas4konta Monica to have Project Rand personnel prepare a satellite feasibility study for-the AAY.

According to Douglas, the study lias needed within three weeks "to meet. a

pressing responsibility." In light of this deadline.the company assigned

about 50 of its ablest scientists and engineers to the task, regardless

of other activities.15

The - study, "Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling

Spaceship," was written under great pressure. A first draft of 2 Nay

showed inconsistencies that required overall revision, and on 12 Mats

Douglas officials hand-carried the paper to Headquarters AAF. There were

shortcomings that could not be corrected within the time allowed, but

none of these faults detracted from the superior quality of the study as

16 a Ocument of historical importance.

Replete with pertinent formulas and tables, the study proired to be

an engineering analysis of satellite feasibility. It showed conclusively
that in 1946 : American engineers using current techniques were qualified

to begin work on a space vehicle that could have orbited a WO-pound

satellite in 1951, six years before Sputnik. The first satellite would

have orbited for 10 days or more before slowing to the velocity of reentry, whereupon it would have been cocooned by friction tepperatUres.

Later versions, equipped with =Waving* and addend* control, could

have been brought back to Barth and landed safely. One of the more inportant aspects of the study was its discussion of the advantages of

liquid oxygen and alcohol fUel versus the possible use of liquid hydrogen

and oxygen, a'subject already treated in the Douglas 21 Segundo stud ► for

the Wavy.

Admittedly the utility of a satellite could not be explicitly defined

in 1946, but there were reasons to be optimistic. The time seemed not

altogether different from the years immediately preceding the first airplane flight in 1903. The Wright brothers certainly bed not foreseen

fleet! of 5-29's bombing Japan or air transports circling the globe. But

in 1946 it vas possible to envision some of the scientific and military

uses which a satellite could serve, and probably this appreciation of spaceship functions was far more accurate thee the most realistic prophesies

of airpower bad been at the end of the nineteenth century. It was plain,

said the report, that a satellite, being above the atmosphere, could make

4

The controversy was en old one, and in general the problem of handling

and storing liquid hydrogen had regarded as offsetting the advantage

of greater specific impulse. The Bend scientists followed the hypothesis

that banding and storing would be solved in time. They therefore submitted design =alms for the structure and performance of rockets using

both kinds of fuel. The hydrogen-oxygen-Powered rockets shoWed an impressive theoretical reduction in gross weight, and the writers urged that

"this evZ coMbinatice should be given serious consideration in any future s . (Douglas Apt 81I-11827, 2 Nay 3e6, p nr..)
33

invaluable.contributions to the study of cosmic rays, gravity, astronomy, .

the Earth's Magnetic fields, weather forecasting, advanced methods of

radio communication, space medicine, *and interplanetart travel. Minterily a satellite could serve either as a reconnaissance craft, a guidance

station to increase the accuracy of weapon-bearing missiles, Or a missile

itself to be brought down by remote control upon a chosen target. Finally,

and perhaps most important of all forthe immediate future of the country:

"The achieveMent of a satellite craft -by the United States would inflame

the-imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in

the world comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb."17

On 14 May 1946 the Research and Development Committee of the Aeronautical Board met. as scheduled end began an interservice debate for which

there could be no immediate conclusion. The Navy and AAF feasibility

studies were seen to be eminently practical, each in its way, and the

discussion turned not on which project'should be accepted but on the much

more difficult question of selecting a. cognisant agent for military space

activities. The AAF representatives insisted that service roles and missions gave the responsibility for intercontinental warfare to the AAF;

that space operations would be an extension of that responsibility; and

that by consequence the AAF was the agent of primary interest. The Navy

argued for a joint Navy-MP-civilian agency. Unable to agree, the cow.

mittee sent the question to theAeronautical Board where the consensus

was that JCS Would have to define roles and missions in space. The board

then appointed a special subcommittee to its Research and Development

Committee to coordinate ;pace activities pending a JCS pronouncement.

18

On 24 January 1947, after eight months of unrewarding discussion in
111111111111

the special subcommittee, the chierof War appealed directly to the

joint Research and Development Board (JRDB) to create an ad hoc astronsutics •panel•to.coordinate, evaluate, study, justify, and allocate all

Oases of the earth satellite vehicle program. This move toot the question to a such higher level sod opened the say fot the first statement of

. defense policy on space. The JRDB was directly responsible to the two

service secretaries and could largely determine policies of research and

development that vere of joint interest to the Army and IhOy. # Under the

chairmanship of Dr. lannever Bush, the board operated through six commits.

tees—electronics, guided missiles, atomic energy, medical science, geographical exploration, and aeronautics. Although the comeittees, like

the hoard itself, were under the chairmanship of distinguished civilian

scientists, the membership was predominantly military except in the supporting administrative offices and technical panels, vhich were sometimes

composed entirely of civilians.19

After JRDB received RuAer's appeal, the AAP protested that adequate

coordination was. already being done by the Aeronautical Board'sspoolui sigman.

mittee. Three months later, to preserve its own authority, the Aeronautical Board requested that it be recognised officially as the *pint to

coordinate space projects.

20

Maio was no decision for several months.

During that time, in September 1947, the Rational Security Act vent into

*

The Joint Research and Development Board was created by Rdhert P. Patterson and James Forrestal, Secretaries of the Army andAhvy, who vented a

high-level agency to consider research and development policy. They decided to take the Joint Committee on Rem Weapons and Equipment away from

the Joint Chiefs of Stan, reorganise it as JAMB, and asks it responsible

to the service secretaries. The first meeting of JRDB *es held on 3 JUly

1946.. (Minutes, 1st Mtg of JRDB, 3 Jul 46, v/statement of Rion Robert P.

Petterson„)
35

effect; AAP was separated froM the Army to become the United States .Air

Force; the Army, Bevy, and Air Force were brought together within the

National Military Establishment under the Secretary of Defense; and the

Joint Research and Development Board became the Research and Development

Board (RDB) with considersbly more authority and power.

In December 107 the Research and Development Bosrd rejected the

requests made by the Bevy and the Aeronautical Board. At the suggestion

of the Air Force, RDB directed its own Committee on Guided Missiles (03K)

to assume responsibility for coordination of satellite activities because

21

"an Earth Satellite is considered to be a:high altitude Guided Missile."

The transfer of satellite responsibilities to the OOK was not ft happy omen

for progress. VInnevar Bush, who continued to serve as chairman of RDB

until 5 October 1918, discounted long-range ballistic' missiles and satellites as "military dreams. " 22 A conservative thinker and, judging by his

own writings, of little imagination, Bush was nevertheless highly respected. Be exercised wide influence in RDB and indeed throughout the executive branch of the Goverment.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that the Committee on

Guided Missiles showed little interest in the Bevy and Air Force feasi- •

bility studies of /W. 106. On 3 February 108 the committee submitted

the space question to one of its supporting agencies, the Technical Evaluation Group (TKO, with a request for recommendations before 31 M&lh.*23

TIG was composed of five civilians--Dr. Y.A. Maclair, of Boil Telephone

Lahoratories, Inc., was chairmen, and the Other members were E.G. Stever,

Clauser, R.X. Porter, and L.J. Henderson. TEG was established by

CGM on 10 July 107 to make technical analyses of progress in the field

of guided missiles and assist COM in formulating an integrated program.

(03K Directive, subj: Formation.of a Technical Evaluation Group, 10 Jul

107.)
• The report, Natellite-Vektele Program, was reedy by. 29 March 1948.

Atter considering theinvy and . Airlorce feasibility studies, the group

concluded that both established tag possiblity of a satellite, but the

Navy's prOposal would necessarily be the more difficult since it did not

consider the use of existing techniques as the Air Force did. Moreover,

since neither the Mew nor the Air Force established ',military or seise-

•tific utility for a space vehicle "commensurate with the presently expected

cost, . . no satellite should be built until utility commensurate with

the cost is clearly established." Also TNO noticed that the Air Force,

still smarting.fras the reduced budgets of 1946 and 1947, was canceling

contracts for ballistic missiles whose rocket engines might serve also.

as lift devices for satellites. To develop a special satellite rocket

engine, as distinct from the engines of long-range aissiles, would make

a satellite program even more of a national luxury. The report therefore

24 recommended

that the only activity directed toward satellite vehicles as such be

a continuation of the Project RAND studies of the utility of : such a

vehicle. We believe, however that the Navy and USAF should jointly

sponsor and participate in these studies and that they ShOdld in-

. chide such experimental work on auxiliary power plants, electronic

apparatus, and the like as may be required.

Continuing, the report listed as desirable further studies of design and

experimentation on multistage rockets; test-pit development of liquid-.

hydrogen motors; very lightweight tanks and structures to the point at

full-scale static tests; guidance for long-range missiles; and hypersonic

and supereerodynamio research.

In reply to CM the three services concurred in the TZG report by

midsummw with the understanding that the Army would continue research

and development of short-ringe.ballietic missiles; the Navy would proceed
vith,the bydrogen.ozygen rocket engine being developed by DuAer as a possible satellite powerplent, but without fabricating a vehicle; and the:

Air Pores would follow Rend studies an long-range rockets in order to

determine the appropriate time to initiate development of °owlet. vehicles.

Ay these concurrences, the Army vent far toward ruling itself out of space,

the limy continued to claim an interest in space, aed the Air Force

asserted its right to decide when a complete satellite vehicle should be

developed. The =teemed to Confirm the service positions on 15 September 108 when it decided that Rand. would continua its satellite studies,

making them available to the Army and Navy as well as the . Air 'brae, that

each of the three services should continue its projects pertinent to space

as mentioned in their concurrences, and, - that there be no other space

activities for the time being. The committee then declared that its

deliberations "on this item be considered closed."25

The Research and Development Board was then in a position to submit

•

the following statement to the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, who

included it in his First (108) Report:26

The Earth Satellite Vehicle Proves, which was being carried

out independently by eschmilitary service, was assigned to the

Committee on Guided Missiles for coordination. To provide an integrated program with resultant elimination of duplication, the Committee recommended that current efforts in this field be limited

to studies and component designs; well-defined areas of such

research have been allocated to each of the three military departments.

For some time prior to and immediately after the RUB decisiOn of

Septeiber 1548 there were space activities that received no official

recognition. For instance, the Martin compeny claims to have completed

in 1547 detailed studies of a roast vehicle that, bed it been put on a

crash program, could have placed a 1,000-pound satellite in orbit by 1949
1944to*mpletion. If so, it cams to flower *oaths too late. Martin-

*:?dieglaipethat,"nobody was interested." Nobody could be interested at

the time because of current negotiations under way in the Aeronautical

-Board and the Joint Research and Development Board. Atter September 1548

the Martin report was obsolete.

Also in 1947 sane employees of Army Ordnance,. at White Bends Proving

Ground designed a space flight experiment that theoretically could have

landed:en object on the Moon. But the "stunt" was quickly 'shunted aside.

."On 20# February 1549, White Sands laduched a Project Bumper missile that

Nimrod to the'surirising altitude of • 50 miles. The event was only five

months after the BOB decision, and Brig. Gen. Philip G. Bleamore, in

command of White..Bands, cautiously said in an interview that "the flight.

.opens up new vistas for .. . exploration on the unknown regions of the

atmosphere," but be did not mention space .28

The cautious avoidance of public referenda to space bespoke the hesitancy of the time to admit that the space age was already something to

take into consideration. Probably the advent of the wheel, and certainly

the coming of the screw propeller also excited disbelief anddistrUst,

but caution had not prevented conquest of the lando seso and air and could

not prevent human ventures into space. The military services did not lose

interest in space when RDB decreed caution in 1548. Indeed all three

services bad become involved in space projects of one kind or another

long before the critical days of 1957. The Air Force especially was in

a favorable position to continue probing the possibility of sponsoring a

*See above, .p 15.
39

space program, and it took advantage of its opportunities.

The TIP report of March 1948 was not all that the Air Force could

have desired, but as it was modified by service COMIXTIOCOS and 'proved

by cam and RDB, it was far from unacceptable. Indeed in September . 1948 the

Air Force could.scarcely look back over the space negotiations of the previous two years without gratification. The timely Rend feasibility study

in 1946 more than balanced the Revy's earlier effort and permitted the

Air Force to argue with evidence in asserting its claim to be the service

of primary interest in space. The rejection by RDB of the Nawy's request

for an ad hoc astronautics panel probably forestalled the establishment

of a joint space agency to challenge the Air Force claia. The RDB acceptance of the definition of Earth satellites as high-altitude guided miselles bolstered the Air Force insistence that apace weapons were strategic

weapons. Moreover, RDB had authorised the Air Force to continue sponsoring Rand space studies, and these, combined with the pursuit of greater

altitude, range, NA speed, plus a growing knowledge of rocket potentialities, led inevitably to speculationaf what space projects could be under.

taken.

Resume of 1947-5T Rand Studies

Rand bad not vaited.for RDB to give its decisions before continuing

its work. On 1 February 1947 it released to the Air Force 12 new reports

supplementing the original one, covering such subjects as building, launch.

*

Jog, and orbiting of satellites. In general the reports clarified

Reports prepared by Rand and released 1 February 1947:

RA-15021 Flight Mechanics of a Satellite Rocket.

RA-15022, Aerodynamics, Gas Dynamics, and Heat Transfer Problems

(contd)
(contd)

of a Satellite Rocket.

NA.15023, Analysis of Temperature, Pressure, and Density of the Atmosphere Extending to Extreme Altitudes.

RA-15024, Theoretical Characteristics of Several Liquid Propellant

Systems.

RA-15025, Stability and Control of a Satellite Rocket.

RA-15026, Structural Weight Studies of a Satellite Rocket.

RA-15027, Satellite Rocket Powerplant.

DA-15028, Communication and Observation Problems of a Satellite.

1A-15029, Study of Launching Sites for a Satellite Projectile.

RA-15030, Cost Estimates for an Zxperiaental Satellite Program.

RA-15031, Proposed Type Specification for an Experimental Satellite.

RA-15032, Reference Papers Relating to a Satellite Study.

MM.

thinking on apace vehicles but did not define the utility of satellites.

On 25 September 1947 the Chief of. Staff, USA?, directed the Air Materiel

Commend (ANC) to evaluate the reports.

When AMC completed its evaluation of the studies in December 1947,

progress in guided missile research by the Navy, Air Force, and others

bad reached the point where the actual design and construction of a motelMows* already technically feasible, and same at ANC argued that a

satellite project should be initiated at once. Prompt action would pro-

.

• vide the necessary components by 1952. Lt. Oen. Howard•A. Craig, DCS/

Materiel at Headquarters USAF, was somewhat more conservative. He rec..,

ognised the feasibility of satellites at the time but also that they

were still economically too costly. This barrier, he felt sure, would

gradually pass as technological progress brought down the cost of various

components. He therefore urged the Chief of Staff to define the Air

Force position as officially establishing an interest in space. This

would guide. lover echelons that might become participents. 29 On 15 Jan-

-uary 1948, Oen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Vice Chief of Staff, signed the •
hl

following policy statement for the Air Force:

The IMP, as the Service dealing primarily with air weapons--

especially Strategic--has logical responsibility for the satellite.

Research and Development will be pursued as rapidly as progress in the guided missiles art justifies and requirements dictate.

T6 this end the problem will be continually studied with a view'

to keeping an optimum design abreast of the art, to determine the

military worth of the vehicle--considering its utility and probable

cost--to insure development in critical components, if indicated,

and to recommend initiation of the deirelopient phases of the project at the proper time. •

The Vandenberg statement followed close upon RLO's rejection of the

Mary's request fora joint astronautics.panel and its refusalto recog- •

nise the claims of the Aeronautidal.Board as the permanent agency to coordinate space activities. The statement antedated the TIO report by •

more than two mouths, however, and obviously served as the source for the

Air Force's paper of concurrence reserving its right "to determine the.

appropriate time to initiate development of complete vehicles. "*

During the next three years, Rand worked on satellite studies. The

technique of orbiting a vehicle offered fever theoretical difficulties

than did determination of utility. Not until 1950 did Rand optimistically

forecast the feasibility of a reconnaissance satellite. The next year a

Rind report vent so far as to advocate the development of such a vehicle

Carrying a payload of - television equipment.3

On the strength of Rand's 1950 forecast, set forth in a "preliminary

report," the Air Force gave its first space briefing to RDB, which proved

*There is also similarity between Vandenberg's comment that the military

worth of a vehicle must be considered in relation to its "utility and

probable cost" end the TEO report conclusion that neither the navy nor.

the Air Force could shorn sanitary utility for a space vehicle "commensurate with the presently expected cost."
AMP

• far more sympathetic than.it had been in the earlier (1947-48) discussions.

In seactiontaTtml:herEBAF satellite studies, the action of the board

11118 114=10100WDOSitiVe to be interpreted as a confirmation of the Air

Force as DOD-cognisant agent for space projects. The Air Force there- .

upon broadened Rand's specs activities to include component research and

design by industrial subcontractors.31

Another three years elapsed, 1951-54, during which the Air Force was

concerned primarily with the Korean conflict, the expansion of the cur-

.

rent military postures, and the revival of the ballistic missile program.

At the same time, it preserved an expectant interest in satellites. In

February 1954, Rand recommended that the Air Force develop a scientific

satellite as a preliminary step to eventual utilitarian satellites; and

in June 1955, in a supplemental report, Rand again urged the Alr Force

32 to support a scientific satellite because:

An artificial satellite circling the. earth for days or weeks Would

provide information which cannot otherwise be obtained and which

would enrich man's knowledge of the earth, the sun, and the universe to really unforseeable dimensions. Not to minimise the great

contributions to science.which the rocket. program has already made,

it may be permissible to say that it has allowed us only a glimpse

of the unknown, showing the tremendous possibilities '&14 would

li•with a continuous observation station in outer space.'

NO one in the Air Force would or could gainsay the desirability of

a scientific satellite, The difficulty, was that Rand's 1955 study recce:,

mended a project much more expensive than high-altitude research rockets

withoutprolising much more compensation than that already achieved at

..'The 11 scientific uses of a satellite, according to Rand, follow: solar

radiation measurements in ultraviolet and X-ray; electron density meas.

ursine* pressure density, and composition measurements; cosmic ray

measurements; albedo

on

o of the Barth; observation of meteors; measurements

of the variation of the Earth's magnetic field; artificial seeding of the

atmosphere; atmospheric drag measurements; goedetic measurements; and cosmic

and solar hi-frequency rad111.11.1
White Sands. It was not easy for the Air Force to reconcile a costly

scientific satellite with the need to preserve national security within

budgetary limitations. Moreover,, the Air Force was reaching out toward

space at the same time with a useful reconnaissance satellite as one of

its major objectives.

Air Force Mee Projects, 1948-57

By the summer of 1957 the Air Force had four projects, with numerous

subprojects,. that aimed either to approach the fringe of or go into space

with eeveral types of aircraft, satellites, or other space vehicles.-

There was a research aircraft destined for new rocket-aerodynamic investigations and a more advanced boost-glide vehicle that, rising above the

atmosphere, could serve as a spacecraft on reconnaissance or strategic

bombing mission and then return to the atmosphere to complete its flight

aerodynamically. In addition, there were plans for a reconnaissance

•

satellite sufficiently versatile to fulfill several fMnctions and a ballistic research cad test system that could include lunar landingi--if

approved. ,or course, behind all the plans for unmanned invasions of space

was the belief that eventually manned spacecraft would carry human obSerVeri on space missions. To Mention the conquest of space without

assuming man's presence there would have been almost ale unthinkable as

the conquest of the sea without sailors, or the conquest of continents

without adventurers to explore the new lands. Flan-in-space was sometimes

dismissed as a "stunt," but the concept remained as the conscious or unconscious raison d'etre of the space program, and the Air Force vas already speaking of avian-in-space project by 1956. Simultaneously the Air

Force continued to support the development of more advanced rocket engines.
Etch. of the space and near-space projects to which the Air Force vas

committed deserves a brief resume to indicate the extent of progress made

•

between 1948.and 1957.

The 17 124 Research Aircraft

As early.as 1942-43 there were sass in the AAF who foresaw that within a few years reaction:propulsion in one form or another would bring air`

power face to face with the hypothesis that no airplane could ever exceed

the speed of sound because the velocity would pile up impassable"air

drifts" against the wings and under surfaces of the craft. It was as

much to test the validity of the sound-barrier theory as anything else

that the AAF initiated the X or research series of aircraft 33

In 1944 the AAF contracted Bell Aircraft Company to build the Z.1.

It was to be a glide roast vehicle launched from B-29's at high altitude

and then put under its own propulsion with rocket engines of.6,000 pounds'

thrust, produced by Reaction Motors, Incorporated OW. The X-1 made

its first powered flight on 9 Decebber 1946 when it aehieved a speed of

Mach 0.9. Then on 14 October 1947 the X-1 broke the sound barrier, with

Capt. Charles. X. Yeager as pilot. Eventually the X-1 exceeded 1,000 mph,

bUt by that time there was a more advanced aircraft available.

Learning the lessons of the • X.-1, BelI . undertook the production of

the X-2 and delivered it to the Air Force in 1952. After several accidents and delaying misfortunes, the X-2 exceeded 2,000 mph and reached

an altitude of 126,000 feet. Meanwhile, the National Advisory Committee

!or Aeronautics (MA), the Air Force, and the Navy contracted with Bell

for the X-15, a rocket glide research aircraft intended to peas over into

the.near provinces of space. It would be equipped with an engine

I
•

producing 50,000 pounds of thrust, and in 1957 there were expectations

that the plane would eventually approach speeds of 4,000 mph and achieve

altitudes of 50 miles or more. If these capabilities could be realised,

the X-15 would enable the Air Force to test certain aspects of the principle of boost-glide.

211E1--Robo—Breas Bell--Hyvmrds-lea Soai

The Air Force was impressed by what it knew of Eugen Singer's suggestion that the V-2 be used as second stage for a boost-glide vehicle

that would be launched from Germany, rise above the atmosphere, and glide

back as a very-long-range bomber against New York. In 1948, Rand spoke

favorably of the idea, and some companies felt that it opened new areas

of development. In 1952, Bell, where Dr. Dordberger was now employed,

proposed a manned hypersonic boostglide bomber/reconnaissance system

that combined the Singer concept with the more recent Rand studies.34

In 1954 the Air Force contracted Bell for a limited study of the

boost-glide system. The conclusions were favorable, and on 12 May 1955

the Air Force issued General Operational Requirement (GOB) 92, which

called for a hypersonic strategic bombardment system, The next year the

Air Force called on Bell for a long-range boost-glide reconnaissance fess

ibility study. Bell called the bomber system Bomber Missile (Boni), whic

was soon changed to Rocket Bomber (Bobo). The reconnaissance study, whic

iras kept .separate from Bobo, received the nickname of Brass Bell. At

'about the same time ARDC proposed the development of a boost-glide research vehicle called Bywords. On 30 April 1957, Headquarters USAF directed ARDC to consolidate Robo, Brass Bell, end Boards into one project.35
During the spring and summer an ARDC ad hoc. committee, which inclnded representatives from JACA, Rand, end a few of the aircraft firms,

worked on the assignment. The committee adopted a realistic approach of

combining the three separate projects into a single program adjusted to

a schedule that would permit cancellation by the Air Force with minimum

cost should the concept prove impractical. The overall project, termed

Dyne Soar,' was organised as follows:

r Soar I !km Soar II Soar III

s BelTY (03)

1st Flight 1963 1966 1970

IOC 1969 1974

Velocity 18,000 floe 18,000 fps 25,000 fps

Altitude 350,000 ft 170,000 ft 300,000 ft

RBASe. 5,000 mi Ciramannfigation

of the globe

Operational Capability

The ad hoc committee completed its work on 24 August, and ARDC presented the plan to the Air Staff on 17 October 1957. By that time the

first Russian satellite had so changed the national outlook that Headquarters USAF directed ARDC to keep the project as described but telescope the schedule. Within weeks ARDC revamped the schedule:

36

Din Soar I pm Soar II pm Soar III

1st Flight 1962 1964 1965

IOC 1967 1968

The Advanced Reconnaissance System, (ARS) or WS-117L,

The boost-glide Brass Bell (Dyna Soar II), under the ARDC plan of

August 1957, was assigned the theoretical range of 5,000 miles, and thus

was not slated to be a satellite under its scheduled IOC date of 1969.

Howeve; out of the 1948-54 Rand studies had come recommendations for an 111/1111111
47 .

Advanced Redannaissence Bynum ABS) project, Which the Air Force

approVed.

Accepting as Valid the 1950 forecast thit a reconnaissance satellite

was feesibie07 General Putt, Director of Research and Development, =Ulm.

orised Rand on 19 December 1950 to enlist subcontractors to study and

design several componetts--anceleer auxiliary power unit, a television

camera, an attitude-sensing device, and other items. Rand accepted this

responsibility and called the project lien Bole (changed to Feed Hack in

1952).

37

 . In lkq► 1953, Headquarters URA? approved the Whom:tractors,

work and directed ARDC to take over from Rand that phase of the work,

which was than called the Satellite Component Study.4

In March 19540 Rank still working on Feed Hack, recomensdowl an immediate high priority for a photographic reconnaissance satellite as one

aspect of the project? Headquarters LEM, with the approval of the OSD

Coordinating Committee on Guided Missiles, then dirWoidARDC in August

1954 to proceed with development. Seven months later, 16 March 1955,

Headquarters issued GOR 80 for a Strategic Reconnaissance Weapon System,

and soon thereafter changed the name of Feed. Back to Pied Piper.

For its part, ARDC went forward with the Feed Back/Pied Piper plans

and tied the project to the Atlas missile for propulsion. At about the

same time, ARDC announced that from October 1955 to•April 1956 responsibility for ARS, or WS-117L as it Was also being called- would be shared

See above, p 41.

hinder the AMC system of numerical designation, the Satellite Component

Study was Project 11,-4091-40. In 1954 the system of numerical designation .

was changed and Project R-409-40 became Project 1115.
jointly by Wright Air Development Center (WADC) ami.NEWD. After April

1956,. AFIND would be responsible for managing the project.

- *Neanwhile.ARS ran into two difficulties. First, the economy policy

cutting research and development funds had crippled the project badly.

The most valiant .efforts of APIND, ARDC, and Headquarters USAF to win

interest and support came to nothing. Worse, top officials within the

offices of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force frowned

on the project in the spring of 1955, even cutting back on those funds

which otherwise would have been available. Thus, two years later, in the

summer of 1957, development officials were still trying to excite interest

in the project with tempting possibilities of ccubining ARS with Atlas

and Titan missiles as lift devices to place payloads of 1,900 pounds in

300-mile orbits, or 1,100-pound payloads in 600-mile orbits. At that

date, nothing could break the opposition of OSD. The Secretary of the

Air Toros showed academic interest but varued that insistence would create

unfavorable repercussions at high political levels.39

.8n:organic went, lest System 

Considering that Dyna Soar and ARS could both trace back their line.!

age falba early years after the war, tbe gypersoolo Xnvironaeut That 144ton

(Bets) was a late comer among Air Force space interests. It had its

igin in an ARDC proposal of 1956 that the United States should sponsor for

scientific purposes a ballistic orbital and lunar research and test eyetem. The proposal advocated three phases: first, boosting a 200-pound

payload to an altitude of 200 miles using Aerobee and Sergeant rockets;

*ARDC hoped to have high-level apprOval for the project as part of the

contribution by the Dbited States to the International Geophysical Year,.

scheduled for 1 July 1957-31 December 1958.
49

second, boosting a 500-pound perload to an altitude of 500 miles; and

:hird, sending a verload into orbital flight to permit bigh,opeed reentry

40

studies.

Tbe.Air Staff received the proposal with enthusiasm and concluded

that the project could be expanded far beyOnd the original concept. On

31 July 1956, Headquarters USAF directed ARDC to revise and develop the

plan into four phases that would include (1) hoc:Intim a test vehicle to

an altitude of 300-500 miles; (2) boosting a test vehicle to an altitude

between 1,000 and 2,000 miles; (3) coebining the first two vehicles into

a third thatsusing Atlas, would achieve Melt orbits and circumlunar

flight; and finally (Ii) employing a vehicle of yet higher performance to

permit lunar landings and interplanetary missions to the vicinity of Mars

and Venus.

41

ARDC rewrote the plan, called it Ballistic Weapons and Development

Supporting System (Palwards) or 118454L, and submitted it to Headquarters

USAF on 15 March 1957. The Air Stott was gratified, but OSAF expressed

opposition. Richard:R. Horner, Assistant Secretary OW inflamed the

Air Staff that the project was too radical and must be rejected: Nat this

time." . Headquarters USAF therefore hod no choice but to instruct ARDC

to revise. Halyards plans. Sinceastellite lunar and claimer references

were unpleasant, the third and fourth phases should be deleted.42

During the next seven months ARDC worked on the second revision,

designated the Balletic Research and Test System (Brats), and submitted

it to Headquarters USAF on 18 December. The plan was fora long-range

development, but by the end of 1957 the temper of the administration and

the country required something quick regardless of significance. So Brats,
like ARS, vas long neglected. When it was revived late in 1958, it was

redesignated Esixamoniclenvircument T

43

est System (MS). —

li•ZI-ili-apace , 029 •

In the early years of spume thinking, 1945-57i no respoosible person

believed that spacecraft would take human passengers to the stars. ;Von

with the most radical eystemi of propulsion, , the journeys time would be

too long. Yet no one conversant with the progress of rocket propulsion

could doubt that within afar years men could be projected into SPOI0e,

either in satellites orbiting Earth or in spaceships traveling through .

.

some portion; of the solar system. The question of man-in-space was, for

the sophisticated, essentially a question of whether man could survive in

the space environment once begot there. The success or failure of man

. • .

to explore and possibly to winder space depended upon a new science--

44

spice medicine.

NO science suddenly becomes part of human'. It evolves

gradually as one idea emerges from another like biological mutations in

successive generations. Space medicine grew with easy transition from

aviation medicine. As aircraft reached fartherand farther into the

heights above Barth, the human factor problems of high altitudes became

the human factor problems of space. In this way, biologists, physicians,

psychologists, and psychiatrists unwittingly began research in space modJoins while handling the problems of flight in the upper atmosphere.

The purpose of space medicine was to learn bow the spew environment

would affect the physiological and psychological behavior of human beings.

In 1945 no one could predict the cerdiovasadlar and respiratory effect,

of weigktlessness; the exact danger of ambient radiation; the reaction of
53.

the human body and its perceptual and decision-making functions to the

high G's of,leunching and the vacillating G's of reentry. Nor could anyone say whether the tangible loneliness of life in a space vehicle would

be psychologically bearable. Answers could be found only through patient

research. 45

Research in very-high-altitude environment began in 1946 when the

Aeramedica Laboratory at Wright-Patterson APB and the Matioal Institute

of Health decided to participate iv the White Bands upper-atmosphere experiments. They called on Holleman AFB, N. Mex., located near White Sande,

for local support. Eventually, for the sake of convenience, WrightPatterson established the Aeromedical Field Laboratory at Holleman. By

late 1951 overall planning for the wort was aresponsibility of ARDC's

Director of &men Factors.

The first task of the Air Force-Inatitute of Health group was to find

and master the techniques of sending /iVe specimens into space and effecting their safe recovery. At an early date some of the instrumented nose

cones that replaced the V-2 warheads bore fungus spores and fruit flies to

detect the effects of cosmic radiation. By 1948 small animals were sent

aloft in Aerobee capsules specially designed to control temperature and

pressure. Many of the experiments were annulled by takeoff accidents, and

even more were lost through faulty recovery methods. It was not until

1951 that a monkey was successfully launched, and returned. Nevertheless,

much was learned between 1946 and 1951 from electronicaUrgethered evidence about the behavior of animals at high altitudes .46

Desp'A the great accomplishments of space medicine between 1946 and
and 1951, the most successful projects were frequently ridiculed by

heavy-headed commentators. Their criticisms were neither a credit nor a

help to the United States, but their words of disapproval matched the

national policy of economy. Space medicine lagged from . 195l.until late

1957. Little was learned during those years except from the research aircraft of the Air Force and the Navy and from some unobtrusive high-alti-

-47 tude balloon flights.

The X-1 and X-2 operations showed clearly by the early 1950's that

it was time to think of means to sustain life in advanced, models and boostglide vehicles, plans which were under vey. Progress was made in . designing pressure suits, but little was done to provide a habitable cabin, a

prerequisite for journeys into space of more than a few hours.48 It was

in Connection with this necessity that the balloon flights were most

helpful.

Between 1952 and 1955, Bolloman's Space Biology Laboratory accomplished 78 successful ascents. Numerous small animals7-hemsters, mice,

and dogs—vent to altitudes of 100,000 feet or more, remained there for

several hours, and thereby tested the lethality of cosmic radiation.

Results convinced the scientists that the danger was less than anticipated,

and plans began for Project High Man, the use of balloons to take human

passengers to equal altitudes and remain there for a day or more. The

*

In .1951 the School of Aviation Medicine, Randolph APB, Tex. held the

first major international meeting on the subject of space medic ine. It

was a symposium on "The Physics and Medicine of the Upper Atmosphere."

Distinguished scientists came frog all over the world, and the published

proceedings remained the standard reference work in the field for a nUm-.

her of years.

*The X-1, X-2, and D-588-I.

•
53

project required larger and more elaborate capsules then those ever used

before. The first High Man flight occurred on 2 June 1957. Capt. Joseph

W. Nittinger reached an altitude of 95,000 feet and floated there for

hours, his capsule, instrumented for 25 experiments, serving a a space

laboratory. The second flight, on 19 August 1957, carried Maj. David

Simons to 102,000 feet, and the balloon remained aloft for more than 32

hours. These experiments proved the "adjustability" of man to the space

environment if provided with a habitable capsule.49

By 1956 the progress made in space medicine, the evidence acquired

from the balloon experiments, and the promise of AMID to have Atlas and

Titan Mars operational within a few years began to fit together nicely.

In February of that year, ARDC proposed that the ICBM's be modified to

accommodate a Man-inhabited capsule for orbiting, just as the V-2 had

been modified with nose cones for small life. Recovery was still the

most serious difficUlty. In March the Air Force approved plans for a

Manned Ballistic Rocket Research %ream and stirred interest in several

aircraft companies. In December both Avco Corporation and Martin submitted

unsolicited proposals. Others soon followed, and by April 1957 the Air

Force would have contracted for a ballistic capsule study had adequate

funds been available. Shortly thereafter the situation changed rather

radically, and that which had been "last" became "first" in national

interest. Believing that the time was auspicious, ARDC proposed °A

November 1957 that a group directed by the Aeromedical Laboratory undertake

The Navy had previously established its Stratolab, but for long periods

this project remained inactive. Also, the Nigh Man experiments were not

conducted by Air Force agencies alone; the. Navy supplied the helium, and

the Army sent two helicopters for tracking. In a limited way, Nigh Man

became an interservice project.
9 4

the development of a "life support capsule" as a "subaystem* nose lone in

an IOC The method seemed the quickest, simplest, and least costly way

of getting man in space.50

Propulsion

As space projects moved forward from speculation to feasibility

studies, and from feasibility studies into research and development status, the Air lerce became increasingly interested in more advanced types

of rocket engines than those current within the missile program. In 1955,

prophets of space spoke, for the most part, of Viking, Aerobee, AerObee-Hi,

Redstone* Sergeant, JOpiter, Thor, Atlas, and Titan. * ' Sy the summer of

1957, space propulsion requirements were obviously coming to maned those

of the missile. program. At that time UDC could thankfully mention, in

addition to the 12 current liquid-rocket engines of interest.or possible

interest to Air Porde space projects, 4 other liquid-engine development

and study projects already under way as well as 8 solid-engine projects. ♦

*See above, pp 13-24.

IThe following lists were presented in a SAD ad hen committee briefing on

29 July 1957 by Esra Katcher, Directorate of Laboratories, VADC:

12 Avellable Liquid-Rocket Engines 

System Thrust Pounds

Navaho

Lai33-1A-3. 415,000

LR71-NA4 240,000

Titan 300,000

Titan sustainer 55, 000

Atlas 300,000

Atlas sustainer do, 000

Thor 150,000

Redstone 75, 000

X-15 • 50,000

Boma= 35,000

Hustler 15,000

Rascal 12,000

Liquid, Rockets in Dew Sr

ONIPIIMID g.Ngx

150,000-lb IRPNA4DMN rocket engine

75,000-lb Nuclear-rocket study

1,000,000-lb rocket-engine study

8 Rocket-.engine Projects 

Thrust Poupds

X-17 50,000

Q-5 booster 48,200

Spark booster 132,500

Fe1000.1sumb 130,000

State of art

Goose

250,000

38,400

Matador booster 101,000

2d-stags 100,000

System 
55

The variety and therefore the choice of engines, either available or under

development and that could be used for a space program, was surprisingly

great.

The list, when considered in the light of Air Force Contributions to

the development of Aerobee-B1 and Navaho, is indicative of the debt thet

the Army and Navy, and indeed the nation as well, we to USAF pioneer efforts in the field.*51

•

Tile First Asay4favy alletproject 

Almost simultaneously with the Air Force decision in.the summer of

1954 to proceed with Project Feed Bea, which so soon became Pied Piper

and by 1955 was 118-117L or ABS, the Army and Navy,proposed jointly the

development of a satellite. It was the first time the Army had come forward to claim a foothold in space, and it was the first attempt on the

part of the Navy since the RDB decision of September 1948. Undoubtedly

the Air Fbrce did far more between 1948 and 1954 to promote a space program than the Army and Navy, and by.1954 there were very respectable Air

Force space projects being considered. Nevertheless, by one of the ironies of history, the Army-Navy proposal in 1954 was of more immediate prom.,

ise then anything the Air Force could offer because it depended upon the

use Of off-the-shelf components, produced as pert of the Army's ballistic

missile program.

*Nothher s list of "present" and "future" rocket engines also included both

the Project Rover nuclear-rodket study and the 1,000,000-pound engine

study. Both of them belonged far into the fUturil,.or so it seemed in

1957. Project Amer was a USAF-ANC attempt to determine by 1961.62 the

feasibility of a nuclear-rocket poserplant. Study on the 1,000,000-poundthrust engine had only recently begun, and though its eventual importance

could not be questioned, especially in the damning spece.age, it was not

immediately significant.
In 1954 there was a growing interest in "scientific satellites," and

Wernher von Braun propitiously suggested that the Army undertake the project. It would have been relatively simple and inexpensive to put together

a vehicle from on-the-shelf hardware of the Ordnande Department and then

launch it with a Redstone missile. After same consideration, Army headquarters decided that it would be advisable to make the project a threeservice undertaking. The levy accepted, but tbe Air Force was already

too deeply interested in getting the reconnaissance satellite under way.

The Army and Navy together therefore worked out during 195* and the early

part of 1955 a scheme to place a 5-pound inert slug in orbit as a scientific. project to prove the feasibility of satellites. The Redstone missile was selected as the booster with three upper stages of Clustered.

Loki rodketsa The project became known as Orbiter, and the launching

date was set for 1956.52

Thus, as early as l954, the Army, Navy, and Air Force were all

. actively engaged in sponsoring space projects. But attempts by :the *reed

force* to explore space were disapproved by the national administration

whOse space-for-peace policy aimed to.keep space free of military intrusion.
III. A POLICY OF SPACS-FC8-ICACE--ARD ITS ZIFILTS

Foreign policy and technology have always been closely related.

Sometimes the relationship has been positive at when governments have

challenged technology to produce new and secret weapons in the interest

of national prestige and security. Sometimes the relationship has been

negative in the sense that statesmen have sought to interdict new weapons

or restrict the cost of armaments in the interest of peace or economy. .

To stay within the twentieth,century history of the United States,

technology of the early 1900's gave President Theodore Roosevelt the Great

White Fleet as a "big stick" to calm the troubled areas of the Pacific

and elsewhere. Ay 1914, technology had done much to bring Zurope to the

verge of and in May of that year President WoodrOw Wilson tried to

avert the coming crisis by. asking. for an end to the arms race. In 1921

the cost of technologically sodern navies was so great that President

Warren O. boding hitched American policy to enema moratorium as a substitute fOr collective security. In 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt

called On American technology to supply:the nation with 50,000 aircraft

annually to s curb Nazi power through intimidation or in battle. During

his two administration., 1945 to 1953, President Sorry 8. Trumen relied

upon the technology of nuclear weapons to thwart Soviet imperialia4 and

he was largely successful in doing so.

fly 1955 the space age was incontrovertibly at hand, and President

lisenbower undertook a unique maneuver. For the first time in history he

attempted to exclude militant imperialism from a locale that was still

57
58

technically inaccessible to man. NO enunciated a space-for-peace policy

that would have excluded varcraft from the are* in which ear:dynamic

vehicles could not operate. This policy obviously bad a profound effect

on the course of the American space program. Whether in the long view of

history.the policy would.be named vise or unwise, it constituted the intellantana medium, in which the program toot shape during its early nem

In brief, the space-for-peace policy was the frame of reference for

mumry.of the program's critical decisions between 1955 and 1959.

The First Concepts of S e Law

Spaceflight is inherently international. The phrase was used-in

testimony before. the Souse 'Select Committee on. Astronautics and Spade EV-

. ploration in the spring of 1958, but the ides, was far from-novel. Long

before Sputnik, legal scholars expressed the same thought in different

wort% but until spaceflight became theoretically pOssible, space was

4

nationally and internationally meaningless. It was with the first-perception of rocketry as a practical means of space propulsion that space

became a possible field of international rivalry and conflict.1

The international implications of spaceflight vere so obvious, indeed,

that the V-2 rockets in 1944 raised conjectures of possible complications

that might arise from the future use of long-range, high-altitude missiles.

The surmisings seemed unrealistic for the most part, however, until 11951

when John Cobb Cooper, member of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton Universith gave substance to theory in an erudite paper on "Sigh Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty."2 Thereafter many creditable.

articles appeared throughout the world, and classified documents on the

same subject began to accumulate in government filet.
59

Despite minor differences, there was general agreement on fundamentals

among scholars in the Vest, but not on bow the fundamentals could be obtained... If space Vas to be saved from the chaos of national rittalries,

it was necessary.to determine_ the extension of sovereignty in altitude,.

define airspace and outer space,• and establish tests for the legality of

future ownership of celestial bodies. With unwonted optimise the legal

specialists turned to history for guidance, but the appeal was. not

Few worthwhile signposts were at band.

The two important treaties on flight.throughaixepace--the 1919 Paris

Convention Relating to the Regulation of Airlkomigation and the 1944 Chi,.

cage Convention of International, Aviation,-neither•f which:was signed by

RusSia, recognised "the exclusive sovereignty" of each state in the airspace . above its territory.. Neither convention contained provisions directly

applicable to outer space, since the tern Was not-then within the vocabulary of international law.. It .appeared only that sovereignty, until arbitarily limited in the tutiire, would extend to indefinite distances beyond

they earthy. pro;ectedupitard either by parallel or radial verticals of at.

tional boundaries. 3

Either technique would impose serious obstacles on the exploration

.of space. Under the circumstances the most pressing requisite was to define airspace and outer space because the line between those two areas.

seemed most likely to be acceptable as the highest altitude of sovereignty.

*The Assigns were not allied to subscribe to the Paris Convention. In

104 they were invited to the Chicago Convention. They accepted the invitation, and their delegates left Moscow by air, but while they were

flying over Canada, approaching Chicago, they were recalled home without

explanation. (Bouse Bearings before the Select Cote on Astronautics and

Space Exploration, 1958, p 1281.)
The proponents of space lsw then turned boo* to the history of maritime

law for precedent and analogy. They pointed out that the lew of the pea

eVolved with the rise of nationalism. The age of discovery and the

Spanish-Portuguese-English rivalries of empire led first to unilateral

claims to the sea, or to the large areas of the sea, as pert of national

domains. Later the claims lapsed when the increasing number of strong

nations woldbited enforcement. Prom this situation came the doctrine

of the freedom of the seas, and this in tura was slightly modified by the

seaward extension of sovereignty within the range of coastal defense, or

as Justified by other considerations. The principle was crystalised by

the latter part of the eighteenth century in the "three-mile limit," and

it generall y persisted thereafter despite occasional attempts to extend

the distance. It was not unreasonable to hope that international agreements would recognise some specific distance above the earth as analogous

to the three-mile limit, beyond which there would be freedom of space comparable to freedom of the seas.

Along with these discussions many writers recognised that sooner or

later there would be the question of legality to space claims as there had

been to territorial claims in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Prom the time of Columbus and his immediate successors it was customary

for explorers to witness the colonial claims of their monarchs by leaving

upon the shores of new lands figures of the crown and cross as emblopme of,

sovereignty and state religion. The claims were further strengthened by

taking back to the homeland small quantities of soil and a few branches

of vegetation. A yet stronger claim Came with the establishment of colonial settlements, and in the twentieth century the Permanent Court of
1.1111.1114

International Justice decreed in the Norwegian-Danish dispute over Greenland that there must be also "the exercise . . . of sovereign authority."

Similar methods of imposing, ownership on celestial bodies would probably

'follow landings on the moon and planets,* aodi indicative of the spirit

of the twentieth century, several writers assumed that the first earth

visitors to astral realms would leave scientific instruments as symbols

of national claims.°

•

Such was the thinking.among the experts in international Dar on the

subject of spaceflight between 1950 and 1955. The fact that reputable

scholars were becoming concerned with the problem was noted in the Departbent of State, and this doubtless convinced some authorities that the

time had come to give official thought to the international significance

of space.

First Efforts to Create a Lsar, 1955-57 

Looking boa with the wisdom of hindsight, it is easy to see that the

years 1954 and 1955 were critical in the history of the world. It was

then that n9t only were decisions made on man's first ventures into space

butfoViet and American space policies were determined that directly affected the formUlation of space law.

The compelling force behind the earliest space project sponsored by

the American government was the plan of scientists to hold the International

4There were suggestions that a happier alternative would be for international law first to provide that, like Antarticai celestial bodies

would be subject to no one sovereign authority.

+When Lunik II reached the moon on 13-14 September . 1959 it planted on the

lunar surface metal pennants inscribed with the name and cost of arms of

the Soviet Union. However, the Russians made no colonial claims to the

moon at that time.
Geophysical Year (IGY). There was a long but.thin history behind the

scientific program. The scheme was an outgrowth, or perhaps an expansion*

of previous International Polar Years of which the first, had occurred on

1 August 1882 to 1 September 1883, when ►8 nations in the vicinity of the

Arctic Circle studied simultaneously and reported on various phenomena.

The results were interesting and encouraging, and a second International

Polar Year was undertaken during 1932-33, commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the first. A third international endeavor was slated for the

end of the next half century, 1982-83, but such great scientific strides

were taken between 1933 and 1953 that scientists were unwilling tomtit

for another 30 years. In the midst of preparatory conferences, the concept was broadened to become an International Geophywbutl Year, and the

time agreed upon was 1 July 1957 to 31 December 1958.6

In October 1954 a special committee of the International Council of

Scientific Unions (CSAGI) met in Rome. Here an almost crucial decision

was made to inclyde among the WY activities. the launching of small Betel-

' lites for scientific purposes.7 The determination. of WY scientists to •

explore space may have come as a shock to some officials in Washington,

because. it meant that the issue of the international significance of

space could no longer be ignored. The United States and the Soviet Union

were clearly the only nations capable both financially and technologically

to support the original experiment. Undoubtedly the Russians would gladly

1tt

offer . their cooperation to IGY authorities, and the United States could

scarcely afford to do otherwise.

On 15 April 1955 the Soviets announced the establishment of its

Special Commission for Interplanetary Communications. The meaning of the
63

move was plain. Since the commission vas given the responsibility of

designing and producing "a timote control Laboratory to circle the Mirth

as a satellite,"8 the.Aussien stikkownrt vas tantamount to an announCement

of a satellite program, and a boast that theworkams slreedy tar advanced.

fitly, outstanding &melon scientists spoke oonfidently of the

Soviet program, =ital., rockets Would be harnessed to place a satellite

in orbit. Later, other satellites would circle the noon, and these in

turn would be followed by radio-sounding spiceships and eventually by

• manned vehicles.9 The Soviet program was admirably bold, and its remarkable success in the next few years was lapressive evidence of straight

thinking in Mbecow.

Slaultaneously an American program, taking shape in high-level deliberations in Washington, was being delineated with circumspection. Since

a satellite circling the earth must unavoidably pass over foreign territories, it was necessary; thought the President and the Secretary of State,

to ingress upon the world that American space vehicles were peaceful. In

Yebrumey 1955 the President received assurance from his top scientific

advisers that no satellite as then conceived could be employed ea an offensive weapon. If the vehicle released a bomb it would not fall upon

the territory below, but would continue circling the earth in the wake of

the seteIlite. /° Sere was a clear distinction between aircraft of high

altitude and satellites. It followed that, as twitter of defense, the

sovereignty of a nation should extend upward through the area navigable

by aeronautical craft, but above that height_the area should be accepted .

as free of national boundaries because it was not amenable to offensive

weapon systems. If the point could be universally accepted in 1955, it
might serve as the basic canon in an international law prohibiting combat

above the atmosphere regardless of tut re technological progress in space

weaponry.

The next question confronting the President was the kind of propulsion to be used by the satellite. The Russians bad stated that they would

employ military missiles to orbit their satellites,'&nd the President

wanted to put that decision in contrast With American aims by rejecting

the use of military missiles to penetrate space. Re sought the advice of.

his highest political advisers, and in May 1955 they agreed that the American satellite should be orbited by nonmilitary rocket engines. neither

President Eisenhower nor his advisers feared the delay their idealism would

impose upon the American satellite project . by requiring the development of

a special "civilian" booster.

The President could have announced the satellite pro4ect at once but

apparently refrained for diplomatic reasons. In 1404y and June he was preparing for a "summit meeting" in Geneva, scheduled for 18-19 July. It

vas there he presented his "open skies" proposal to the Russians. His

move began a persistent effort on the part of the United States to tie in

space exploration with disarmament and the creation of an international

law that would keep space altogether free of maitary'rivalries.*

The Russians shoved little enthusiasm fOr the President's proposal.

The exchange of military blueprints was not likely to appeal to &maim

as imperialistic as the Soviet Union. Equally annoying, no doubt, was

the implication that they modify their frequently asserted claim to absolute sovereignty in the airspace above their homeland. On this point they

*See below, p 71.
65

remained adamant until success with their space program nada it advintegenus for them to'argue differently.13

The President was doubtless disappointed by the Russian rejection of

his inspection proposal. It meant also that he could not use the American

satellite in immediate negotiations with Moscow for the recognition of the

freedom of space. The time lad come, regardless elk/meow, to announce

publicly that the United States would launch a series of smalleatellites

entirely peaceful in nature, as one of the contributions the nation would

make to /OY. On 29 July 1955, one week after. the President's return from

the Geneva conference, an official statement came from the White Some

that the United States was indeed undertaking a satellite project for

scientific purposes. And, to prove the good intentions of the United

States, the satellite. would be launched by a specially developed nonmilitary rocket engine.1

4

So it was the public learned of the first government-sponsored scientific satellite. On 1 August 1955, likita Ihrushohav took advantage ot a

reception at the Swiss legation in *meow to express his willingness, and

the willingness of his nation, to "support" the American space effort if

the interests of hummnity could thereby be eerved. 15 These were fine •

words, but Russo-American cooperation in space projects was more easily

envisioned than achieved.

In the autumn and late winter of 1955-56 the United States conAucted

a meteorological study that entailed the lofting of balloon* !mammy

locations, including some in West Germany and Turkey. When the balloons

passed over Soviet territory the Buisians protested vigorously. They

claimed that the bidden purpose of the balloons, as well as the open-skies
proposal, was to obtain photogrePhs needed to make maps of Russia. The

United States denied intentions of espionage, but on 7 February 1956 the

Department of State decreed that no more balloons should be released.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said that he acted as emitter "of.

decent friendly relations." Re added, almost as a warning, that the most

reasonable interpretation of international law made the ownership of airspace and outer space "a disputable question.,16

The balloon incident showed that high-altitude flights were fraught

with international complications, and there was ao reason to suppose that

the Russians mould be more kindly disposed toward satellite overflights

of their territory, no matter how peaceful the Satellites might be. Moreover, the President's advisers were no longer as sure as they had been in

February 1955 that space and space vehicles were without military significance. The President was cognisant of these °bringing ideas and became

even more devoted to a space-for-peace formula. In his State of the Union

message on 10 January 1957, be expressed awillimgness to accept an international agreement to control reliably "the development of missiles and

satellites." Again, he linked together his space-for-peace with his hopes

for digereement.17

Four days later, Usury Cabot Lodge, the American sabwisarbor to the

United. Rations (N), presented snore detailed version of the same plan

to the General Assembly. The Russians made no direct reply. But in

•March and April, Soviet representatives argued for the prohibition of

. nuclear weapons, and they interpreted the term to .include rockets of.any

range if equipped with nuclear warheads. In this way the Soviets made

space control dependent upon the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Such
0

a prohibition, in Western opinion, wasalready unenforceable however because the Russians had rejected Eisenhower's doctrine of the open skies

and all other foras.of effective inspection..

18

On Wady 1957, Harold Stassen, the President's Special Assistant

for Disarmament and the American representative on the Disarmament thibcommittee of the =General Assembly, reiterated the need to establish

control over experimentation with objects traveling through outer-space--

this meant apparently both ballistic Missiles and satellites. He warned

that the situation was perilously close to that of 105-46 when, following the Hiroshima-lagasidzi bolbings, the rejection of the Baruch control.

plan lad led to an international race for atonic response Stassen hoped

the same mistake would not be made in the development of space vehicles,

which involved an equal, and perhaps en even greater, danger for mankind.

Se proposed a technical committee of the world's eminent scientists to

devise an inspection and detection system thmtwombi guarantee the peace.;

ful uses of space.

1

.9

Space pblitics in the United Rations did not go beyond that point

prior to Sputnik, but it had gone far enough to show the positions of the

United States and the Soviet Union.
IV. LOST OPPORTURTIT613--VOCKTARD MID OM=

Long before 1954 it was common knowledge that aeronautics, the

Belem of creating and operating aircraft, was limited by a ceiling.

Air-breathing engines would not operate above an altitude of approximately

140,000 feet. It was equally well known that rocket engines had no such

ceiling. Rockets developed a momentum that depended entirely on Newton's

third law of motion and were independent of the atmosphere as an oxidiser

for combustion, thereby removing all limits to the altitudes attainable.

Finally, there was • no law of physics to restrict either the rocket's

thrust or payload capacity. The rocket could be used to deliver warheads

against earthbound enemies or to propel vehicles into the depths of the

solar system and beyond. If Peenemuende and White Sands had any meaning

it was that astronautics--the science of designing, manufacturing, and

launching of spacecraft—was inevitable. If the Navy and Air Force fem.

sibility studies of 1946, and all the subsequent plane had any meaning,

it vas that the techniques of astronautics were rapidly being mastered.

These facts were abundantly clear when the Army and Navy proposed Project

Orbiter in 1954.

Nevertheless there were some who, even if they saw the inevitability

of space travel, could not see its importance. On 19 November 1954, Von

Braun warned that the possessor of the first space station would be in

position to rule Barth. The next day Secretary of Defense Wilson was

asked in a news conference if he agreed vith Von Braun. "No," said Wilson,

"I would rather keep my feet on the ground: figuratively speaking as well

4111111 n
9

as physically speaking. I don't lance that =pine knows bow you woad rule

the world With a space station. It id a little drew, I think." Two

Seeks later Wilson was reminded that the BUssiens might orbit a satellite

before the Americans. "I wouldn't Care if they did," he replied. 1

The President's Decision to Eupportabamproject

Even as Secretary Wilson argued that space was ',paradise for dreaming scientists, the situation was changing. It main March 1954 that

the President, to guard against a second Pearl Harbor, created the Tech.

nological Capabilities Panel under the cheirmanehip of Dr. ;Ames R.

Killian. In its report, submitted to the President on lh February 1955,

the panel dealt with many subjects, among thee the importance of space

vehicles in the near future as instruments of intelligence. 2

The Killian Committee had a thorough understanding of the technical

difficulties and possibilities of exploring space. The report pointed

out that large surveillance satellites would have to aftit the develop-,

sent of ICBM rocket engines, for nothing else at the time could supply

the required booster. thrust. On the other hand, small satellites weighing

5 to 25 pounds could be orbited by Bodatone engines, which would soon be

available in quantity. The total coat would be moderate. In what was

doubtless a reference to Orbiter the report stated optimistically that

a "project of this kind has been proposed by the Department of Defog's,

and may already be underway." In its concluding remarks on the subject,

the panel declared: "The new prestige that the world will accord the

nation first to launch an artificial earth satellite would better go to

*See above, pp 22-23.
the U.S. than to the USSR."

On 11 March 1955 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) transmitted

the Killian Report to the service secretaries. Ne requested a JCS position on the report that he could forward to the National Security Council,

already engaged in determining the kind of satellite program the United

States should support. The services were gratified that the panel indorsed the concept of a reconnaissance satellite. It seemed to sanction

the Air Force Feed Back and the Army-Navy Orbiter plans and indicated

that these projects had "a general alignment favored by the country's

highest scientific talent".3

It was while the Joint Strategic plans Coiattee (JSPC) studied the

panel's report that the Davy, on 23 March 1955, officially requested OSD

approval of Project Orbiter. The administration was just then in the

midst of formulating its space pOlicy, which was already being premised

on the space-for-peace thesis. The Secretary of Defense, acting in light

of the current trend, promptly quashed the Navy's proposal. On 28 March

he expressed his disapproval of Orbiter, and his directive to the three

service secretaries was so phrase& as seemingly to include Feed Dank as

yell :

4

• Because of iMportant policy questions involved, these departmental grogram' must be carefully considered and pally coordinated.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Development) is

assigned responsibility for such coordination. Further funds 411

not be committed for work in this area without his prior approval.

Wilson's memorandum was discouraging, but it did not deter the JCS

on 18 April 1955, in its comments on the panel report, from asserting a

military need for a surveillance satellite. The Joint Chiefs added that

to be useful the satellite would have to be much larger than the one being

4
71

considered bytbe Government.' Presumably the Secretary of Defense sent

the JCS comments 0 .or at least an abstract of them, to the National Security Council, still engaged in satellite deliberations.

The JCS opinions, however, were of little influence. On 26 N871955, .

NBC expressed its confidence in a space-for-peace policy. Though acknowledging the necessity of a specaprOject, the council ignored the JCS requirement for a surveillance vehicle. It called for the development of

a satellite divorced from military significance and lifted into orbit by

a nonmilitary booster. Thus, IOC determined the nature of America's first

space venture and cast aside the Orbiter project:6

The President approved the policy statement on 27,kgf., Yellowing a

delay of two months, while futile negotiations were under way with the

Russians over open skies, the White Howes announced on 29 July 1955 that

the United States would launch a series of small, purely scientific satellites in the course of mr. The military, for the sake of efficiency,

would have only managerial authority in contracting with industry for the

design . and production of the satellite components.

Specifications for Vanguard,

In a sense the White Souse announcement was premature. Although the

May rainy statement settled the type of satellite to be developed, the

means of propulsion and the managerial agency within the Departmentoof

Defense remained unsettled. Discussions, under the direction of Assistant •

Secretary of Defense Quarles, were proceeding among the three military

services and various important committees, but'decisiOns were still

pending.
In view of the responsibility assigned to his by Wilson's directive.

of 28 March, Quarles . hed turned at once to the Coordinating. Committee

on General Sciences for advice and guidance, stating thatthe project

would be a triservice effort but tied to IGY commitments.. Be also specified'thatthe satellite itself would be unclassified, although the

means of delivery could be classified.?

The committee submitted its report on ► May 1955. It expressed confidence in the feasibility of the satellite, urged continuation of the

study, and suggested that each of the three services prepare satellite

proposals within the brood outline. already determined. At once Quarles

directed each of the three services to submit plans and soon thereafter

created the eight-man, all-civilian ad hoc Advisory Group . on Special Capabilities--sometimes called the Stewart Committee for its chairman, Dr.

Romer J. Stewart—

•

 to consider and evaluate them. 8

Three weeks before the White Nouse announcement of 29 July the three

services submitted their separate' plane. The Army brought back Orbiter

with only minor modification. The Navy too urged Orbiter but, fearful of

its rejection because it called for the use of a military missile as booster,

suggested a backup plan based upon the use of Viking, the test vehicle

produced several years before for upper-atuosphere research. The Viking

was free of military connotations, and its thrust promised to lift a

sphere 20 inches in diameter and veighing 20 pounds into an orbit with

perigee of 150 to 200 miles.

*Other members of the group were: Drs. C.C. Fume, R.R. NeMeth, C.C.

Lauritsen, John B. Rosser Richard W. Porter, Joseph Kaplan and G.R.

Clement; Atbelstand 7. Spilhause as alternate; and Paul S. Smith and

Joseph C. Meyers as secretaries.
73

The Air Force faced a dilemma. Although vitally interested in the

exploration of space, it could do only one of two things, neither of

which seemed likely of acceptance: propose the use of Atlas or the developaent of a new nonmilitary rocket engine, either of which would almost

certainly interfere with the general progress of the ICBM program. In

the end the Air Force submitted plans for Project World Series and urged

employment of Atlas as the booster. Tbe Air Force was thus practically

ruled out of responsibility for the nation's first space program by circumstances and the Adainistration's prejudice against the use of a.

tary missile. 9

The characteristics of the three service proposals can be briefly

summ ►rised in tabular form:1

0

AESE alE Air Force

Booster Redstone Ming MISR

2d stage Lai Aerobee-81 AgOPe-Ri

3d stage Loki Aerate:1i .

Itth stage Loki

Thrust at sea

level

78,000 lbs 2700001bs . 330,000 lbs

Cost $18 aillion $20 million $16 million

ReadY date Late 1957 Mid 1957 Early 1958

On 4 August 1955 the ad hoc advleory group exit its report to Quarles.

There was a reasonable assurance that the United States could put a small

scientific satellite in orbit during IGY. Admittedly, Atlas would oive

the greatest performance margin and permit the largest payload. Sommer,

the group also thought that the Air Force plans vould interfere vtith the

ION program, and this involved "points of national policy outside the

competence of the group." As between the Army and Navy plans, the group

voted five to two in favor of Viking. Here again the advisability of
employing military boosters influenced the decision. The use of Redstone

would create problems of security and, since Redstone facilities and manpower were limited, might prove disadvantageous_ both to the missile and

satellite programs. Also, from a technical viewpoint, Viking required

only two additional staget whereas Redstone required three. The minority

favored Orbitor.because Redstone was larger than Viking, had fewer developsent problems, Was already entering flight-testing, and therefore would..

have the benefit of many tests before the time of satellite-leuiching,

11

With this report in hand, Quarles sought the advice of the Research

and Development Policy Council, composed of the three service assistant

secretaries (R&D) and high-ranking development officers of the Army, !levy,

and-Air Force. Queries was chairman. The council concurred in the recommendations of the advisory group, thought not unanimously. Army representatives insisted that Orbiter was the better plan since.it depended

upon the proved components of Redstone and was more likely to succeed than •

Viking. On 15 August the Army warned the Secretary of Defense that, because of time-consuming development requirements, the Viking plan might

enable. the. Soviets to launch the first satellite, an event of incalculable

12

effect on American prestige.

OW chose to ignore the Army's warning and on 9 September 1955•approve

the Viking plan, soon to be known as Vanguard.. OSD also instructed the

Army and Air Force to cooperate withythe Navy, under whose management the

project would be developed. Actually, the Navy served as project manager

with authority to contract with industry for the necessary components.

Simultaneously, OBD warned the three services on 19 September that they

13

could not develop any other satellite of their own.
75

Approval of the Viking plan meant that the prime contract vent to

Martin, who had first designed and produced the research vehicle. Another

contract went to General Electric to modify the Aerobee-Ri's 20,000-

pound-thrust Bermes engine into a27,000-pound-thrust first stage for

Vanguard. Aerojet was to adapt the Aerobee main engine into aVenguard

second stage. Either the Grand Central Rocket or the Allegheny Ballistics

Laboratory would design the third stage.14

The Unnecessary,

Rocket authorities considered the Vinguard concept to be technically

excellent. Bed it been apprOied two or three years sooner, it would have

sufficed to meet the temporary national needs: Undertaken as it was late

in 1955, the coppetitive element of the United States forging ahead of

the Soviet Union's space program made Vanguard a risky venture. TO be

successful, "eamething bad to be done within 2 years that had never been

done before in 2 years."

15

 Even so, Vanguard might have comae through on

schedule had it not bogged down in prejudice. The Department of Defense

did not consider Vanguard a project of "first importance" and allowed

only a "dribbling release" of roquisite funds.

16

There was protest, within the Department of Defense and elsewhere,

but it did not overcome the dominating indifference. In mid-August 19551

Quarles replaced Harold Talbot as Secretary of the Air Force, and he

brought to his new office the same caution that characterised his work

as Assistant Secretary of Defense (MD). On 22 November, Clifford C.

Fumes, chancellor of the University of Buffalo, succeeded Quarles as

Assistant Secretary of Defense. He was a scientist of repute and had

served on the Stewart Committee. Be was therefore highly qualified by
76

training and experience to appreciate the requirements of Vanguard. There

was hope that he might succeed in breaking through the wall of indifference.

Be failed, and resigned in protest. He later blamed Wilson for the "fi-.

nancial congestion" that held back Vanguard in spite of warning that

Russia would succeed in putting the first satellite in orbit. Furnas

said that Wilson adopted a "so what" attitude toward the program and

sidetracked Vanguard funds when they were most needed.17

Lover military echelons, and interested civilians too, became alarmed

by the program's slowdown. Tr0e, the Vanguard first stage was ready for

firing on 8 December 1956, and in the next five months there were six

other firings, all of them successful. In every case, however, the

'second and third stages were dummies. This vas a serious utter became

the success of Vinguard was dependent on all three stages. The situation

became more grave because of the mounting evidence that the Russians .

were preparing to launch their satellite at an early date. In June 1957,

F.J. Krieger of Rand predicted the first Soviet satellite would be launched

in the late summer or early autumn, suggesting 17 September as a probable

18

date because it would mark the centenary of Zioikovsky's birth.

During these same critical days there was much high-level haggling

over the cost of Vanguard. The original Navy estimate had been $15 to

$20 million. The total rose steadily, and in January 1957 the Bureau of

the Budget estimated that it would be $83.6 million. Arrangements halt

been made to fund $70. million, which left $13.6 million still to be provided. In April 1957 the Bureau of the Budget reestimated the cost,

raising it to $110 million, which left $40 million to be funded.

19

There were sharp arguMents within the Government on the advisability

of continuing the project. The Bureau of the Budget and the National

41101111110111. 4
41111.11"

Science Foundation were reluctant to invest more money. The Vanguard

proponents argued that the program could obtain information of importance

for missiles, especially on micrometeoric matter; that the scientific

community of the world would be shocked by such a retreat; and that cancellation would vitally affect the prestige of the United States. The

President turned to the Rational Security Council for advice. At its

meeting of 10 May 1957 the Council gave Vanguard a reprieve. The project could continue but without further elaboration. Indeed, if possible,

the cost should be cut.93

Last Possibilities for a U.S. "First"

The summer of 1957 was a period of anxiety for those who understood

the situation and dreaded the consequences of a Soviet "first" in space.

Until 4 October they hoped that either Washington wouldapprove an Army

project somewhat akin to Orbiter or that the Air Force's controversial

Project Far Side would succeed. Neither hope was realized.

Among the experts of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABM), acme

felt that the slowdown in Vanguard might persuade OSD to reconsider the

rejected. Orbiter plan, in part at least. The 1954 proposal to develop

a satellite project along with Redstone had the touch of reality. After

the selection of the Viking in 1955, A3(& continued its regular experiments, and these included the further development of the Jupiter-C. This

was a multistage missile based on the Redstone but intended as a test

vehicle for the Jupiter program.2

♦Work on the preliminary designs for Redstone started in 1950. Progress

was rapid after approval in the spring of 1951, but the first Redstone

operational unit as a field weapon system was not ready until May 1958.
78

Tbe Army attempted several times to obtain permission to use the

Jupiter-C as *means of.orbiting a satellite but in May 1956 was expressly

22 forbidden by OSD to do so. At least the Secretary of Defense did not

forbid continuation of thlipiter-C, and it was fired for the first time

on 20 Septeiber 1956 as ► three-stage vehicle with the Redstone as the

first stage. It lifted an 84-pound payload to an altitude of 680 miles

over a range of 3,300 miles. Van Braun and his associates realised at

once that had the 8 ►-pound payload been replaced by a fourth stage it

could have gone into orbit. The date of 20 September 1956,therefore

marked the existence of an American capability to place a satellite in

23

orbit, but the Government did not take advantage of its own resources.

The uneasiness of the Army increased in the summer of 1957 when the

Russians announced their develorment of long-range miselles, threatened

to use them in the Sues crisis, and in August demonstrated their possession

of an intercontinental ballistic missile. It was evident that the Soviets

had reached the frontier of outer space and were preparing to launch a

satellite. The tragedy of the situation, as seen by the Army and its las-.

mile team at ABM, was latersummarised by Lt. Gen. Jameslt. Gavin, then

Deputy Chief of the Office of Research and Development: "We had the

scientists and the industrial facilities to keep ahead of the Russians.

24

The failure vas in decision.making."

Though outwardly the Administration shoved no change of heart, there

vere rumors of uneasiness at high levels. Reports of this concern came

through to military field agencies and to some interested civilians. One

periodical expressed its belief as late as July that something would be

4

*This is what was later done for the first Explorer satellite.
. 11111111.0 79

done to permit the *au teem to show its competence :

25

Sulogised and advertised ad nauseam as mankind's greatest adventure there is still no assurance that any of the VARDUARD launchings

attAmtpted will be successful during the 18 months of the Ia. It's

the nature of the still-young state of the rocket art.

Ivan if VAMOUARD is ready by spring , it still may not be first.

Reports point to a Russian try within 10 weeks. And to the south

the Line missile team Lit Huntsville' everybody tries to ignore

may beat even that date.

Thus, untilalscnt the last minute there was expectation that the Administration would call on the Jupiter-C to outmaneuver the Russians. But -

days passed., and the ward that could have- given Americaprimacy in spacedid not pass from Washington to Huntsville.

There was yet one more opportunity for the United States to achieve

a spectacular though not a satellite success before the Soviets could capture the imagination of the world with Sputnik. Project Far Side was the

Air Force version. of a concept that slowly evolved from proposals made

in 1951 by Dr. S. Fred. Singer, of the University of Maryland, for further

research in the.upper atmosphere. 26 By 1951, Singer was talking about a

eliding orbital unaanned satellite of earth {louse) project, which expanded the

upper-atmosphere research from instrumented high-altitude rockets to

satellites. The idea win the interest of Col. William O. Davis, Air Force

• Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), ARDC, whoae enthusiasm equaled his

great detereination. 27

During the next two years there were widening discussions of Mouse.

Then, in 1956, Davis and Morton Alperin, also of, AFOSR, attended.the annual international astronautical conference in Rome. They heard the Russian representative speak of the Soviet plans for a satellite,• and, knowing

that Vanguard moved slowly, came to the conclusion that Mouse, if properly
4

80 1111.1111111

supported, might serve as an Mariam balance to the coming Russian enc-

. cest. With further thought, Davis drew up a modified version of Mouse.

1

project intended to gather at an altitude of 4,000 miles information of.

"vital interest to the Air Force." To overcome the drag of the lovek

atmosphere the rockets would be fired from balloons at an altitude of

28

100,000 feet. •

For a number of reasons, Far Side became controversial. It properly

supported, it would require perhaps as much as 7 percent of ARDC's.limited research funds for fiscal year 1957. There was also the emotion

of jurisdiction. Since Far Side, it approved, would be a geophysical

experiment, it rightfully belonged to the Air Force Cambridge Research

Center (ame) rather than ATOM, but Davis 'queetioned the: depth of AFCRC

interest in the project.' Be therefore faced' a dilemma. Be could either

abandon the project =proceed so quietly—some would say "furtively"--

that opposition would fade in the ignorance of vhat was being done. Be

chose the second approach, and until 15'March 1957, Lt. Gen. Thomas S.

29 Power, commander of ABDC, was not briefed on the subject..

By that time so much bed gone into the project that, as Davis had

foreseen, it was difficult*to withdrew. Despite charges of subterfuges+

The information gathered would pertain to magnetic fields, cosmic rip,

and the propagation of radio signals in extreme altitudes.

+For instance, coordination was not elvers open. The project was only

listed in AFOSR in July 96 as "Status of Research Proposals," but in September was listed as "accepted." When challenged on this point, Davis

said coordination was normal for an "unsolicited exploration research proposal." (Ltrs, B/Gen B.F. Gregory, COMMON to )1/Gen W.11. Morgan, COMAFCRC,

5 Apr 57, Morgan to Gregory, 17 Apr 57; ltr, Cal W.O. Davis to COMMIX,

25 Oct 57, subj: Coordination of Project Far Side..

It called for the tiring of six rockets in en upper-atentephere research

1
mismanagement, and "utter misdirection of basic research funds," ARDC

requetted the Air Staff to appeal to the Secretar), of the Air Force and

through him to the Department of State, the Department of the Interior,

and the Atomic Energy Catalonian to permit tests at Eniwetok. * fermission was granted in June 1957.

30

The first shot was fired at the end of September. It was a failure.

The balloon, carrying the rocket to be launched by radio, went up a few

thOusand feet and then suddenly fell into the sea. The second attempt,

on 4 October, was a near success. The balloon rose to 90,000 feet and

then began a slow descent. When it was down to 70,000 feet the crew made

a last-minute attempt to save the day and fired the rocket. Though it

became entangled with the collapsing balloon, the rocket was traced to

an altitUde of 370 miles. After that the instrument was silent.334

The next morning, newspapers around the world bannerliped the 184-

pound Russian Sputnik, the first manmade satellite in history.

*Actually Par Side survived only because of the contractor, Aeronutronic,

Inc., which duplicated the money allocated by the Air Force.. In June 1957

six balloons were delivered by Aeronutronic from which the rockets could

be fired, and the crew moved overseas for testing. At the same time Davis

was relieved of his duties at AFOSR and was succeeded by Cal. Eugene Wrier.

Despite the high qualifications of ColOnel LaVier, this shift reportedly

injured the morale of Par Side personnel.-

4In the third teat, on 6 October, a short in the firing mechanism triggered

the rocket, which could not be traced. In the fourth attempt, thelballoon

froze at 56,000 feet and shattered. The fifth attempt was on 19 Odtober.

The rocket was fired at 96,500 feet but was damaged in passing through

the balloon and sent back few signals. The sixth and last shot was on 22

October. Its signals were heard for eight minutes, which meant that the

rocket penetrated between 2,500 and 4,000 miles into space. Brig. Gen. L.F.

Gregory pointed out in justification of Far Side that, despite all the

criticisms that could be made, had the operation succeeded, it would have

offered a spectacular success to which the Administration, the Department

of Defense, the Air Force; and the American people would have been glad

to point on the unhappy mornftelaiger 1957.
=IL

V. A POST-SPOTNIE RESHAPING or POLICY

Sputnik marked a magnificent and historic advance in science. As

such, it deserved the congratulations thet the President of the United

States gaVe the Soviet government on 9 October 1957. No American wyuld

have felt other than kind envy had the first satellite been orbited by a.

.friendly power. But coming as it did from COmmuniit Russia, dedicated to

the "burial" of free man, the triumph created dismay everywhere outelde

the iron curtain. As a congressional committee phrased it: "we face the

terrifying prospect thatnuclear attack upon the United States can be

directed from Soviet bases." In addition, there was the per challenge

to America's weseinence in the world of technology, the loss of international prestige, and the fact th ►t Russia had staked.out for herself

primac ► in spece.1

In contrast with an early tendency toward "bysteria"--for so,.the

first hmerican reaction has been described--the shock and Surprise.of

Sputnik bad sine. benefiPent effects. The American "smug sense of superiority was shattered," and out of the national humiliation Dame &more calm

realisation that, among other things, there had to be a reexamination of

foreign and. domestic policies on questions of epace projects, defense

organisation, strategy, and the desirabilitY of a civilien-scientifV

space program thatwoull far exceed the little ambitions Of Vanguard.

Again quoting a congressiOnel committee, there wes widespread admission

that America's misfortune vas attributable only to indifference in the
83

pest on the part both of the people and the Government:2

Soviet Russia, ' ability to develop atomic sod hydrogen weapons

so soon after the United States did, should home been sensing enough

to galvanize our national efforts. Our intelligence of Soviet missile experiments should have hoisted higher the red flag of danger.

But until the American people reed about, and could see for themselves

if they cared to look, a luminous metal bell revolving in the heavens,

Russian progress in science and production was serious discounted.

Now the American people must respOnd to the fact that ve have

li g:mat and powerful rival in the most, complicated technical and industrial fields. They must respond, not in panic, not in diffuse

acrd wasteful motion, but in a cala and purposeful dedication to the

task of building up the nation's strength. Our country must be strong

and unexcelled in the weapons of war; it must use that strength in

the difficult, but unremitting, search for peace.'

Once the chagrin of Sputnik bad somewhat subsidedl the press demanded

and the Government attempted a judicious appraisal of the situation. In

the area of foreign affairs, the President decided upon, and Congress apprcrvol, a reassertion of the pre-Sputnik ispece-forleace policy, but qualified to accommodate a very restricted military program and a very Ambitious

civilian-scientific program. So the United Statet Came to sponsor a threefold space policy—international, military, and scientific. The three-fold

policy itself underwent considerable change between October 1957 and the

end of 1959, but always space-for-peace cola first, and to that end the

military program remained subordinate to the civi/ian.

At First, Emotional Reactions 

Throughout the American press and seemingly throughout the foreign

press as well, the first reaction to Sputnik was expressed in sharp criticism of the Administration. Editorials in the United States especially

condemned "tbe partial measures, hit or miss planning and confused organization that have marked our . . . work in this field."3
4

4

11111111111b

t

4

Opinion on Capita Hill was caustic in general, and the unfavorable

comments were not limited to representatives of one party. Senator

Symington warned that the position of the Tree World, would soon become

intolerable unless strong remedies were introduced by the Administration

without delezt. Senator Henry M. Jackson regarded Sputnik as a "devastating blow to the prestige,of the United States." Senator Styles Bridges

said it was time for tatericans "to be less concerned with . . the

height of the tail fin on the new car and to be more prepared to shed

blood, meat, and tears if this country and the free world are to survive."

At the level of the White House and the Cabinet there was a tendency,

said Newsweek, for officials "to hide behind the pretense of being undisturbed." Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams spoke of the accomplishment

as "outerspece basketball"; James Hagerty, presidential press secretary,

said Sputnik was unimportant because it had not caught the President unawares; soon-to-be-retired Secretary of Defense Wilson said the Russians

had performed a "neat scientific trick." On 9 October 1957 a White House

press release announced cryptically that the United States would not en-.

gage in a space race--and that the Vanguard schedule would not be accelerated: The statement was fat with unconcern. Yet again, on 3 November,

the 1,120-und Sputnik II, complete with dog, was casually dismissed by

Hagerty as being "no surprise to the President. "5

st. The press generally interpreted the Sputnik belittlement policy as

•

1

a sign of nervousness, and the interpretation was not altogether without

supporting evidence. Between 8 and 15 October the President and his ad,

visers held numerous conferences "looking toward a re-evaluation of the

missile program"--a comment thatperpetusted the confusion in many minds

affitiP 4
85

of missiles with satellite . In late October there was a mistaken report

that the third shot of Far Side had penetrated 4,000 piles into space.

Without waiting for verification, the Department of Defense embarrassingly

balled the "achievement" as proof of a vigorous program in research and

development. The press could also note that after Sputnik II the President

called ftrther conferences on the subject of the missile program..

Despite the President's assertion that the Vanguard schedule would

not be aocelerated, there were signs of acceleration. The Vanguard schedule had called for several test vehicle shots before attempting to fire

a genuine satellite vehicle. The first test vehicle shot wag scheduled

for early recamber 1957, and by November the Administration fastened upon.

this event and inflated it to portend the. actual launching of a satellite--

an undertaking for which SRL lacked the opportunity' for adequate technical

preparation. Of course, on 6 December the shot failed to orbit and the

United States was again humiliated unnecessarily.

By the end of the year the nation was beginning to accept the unpleasant fact that the space program hid lagged too long to catch up with the

Russians in the near future. The Presidential more reassuring than he

had ever been before when, on 9 January 1958, in the course of his State

of the Union message, he said quite simply that "most of us did not anticipate the intensity of the psychological impact upon the world o? the

launching of the first satellite."

Meanwhile, between the appearance of Sputnik I on 4 October 1957 and

the President's message to Congress on 9 January 1958, much thought bad

been given to the space policy that the United States would pursue in the

future.
A Modified Space-for-Peace Poliqr 1111111111111111

.The flights of.Sputnik around the earth brought into *harp focus the

earlier academic question of sovereignty in: space and its vidlation by'

spece.vehicles. There eel still no line of demarcation of areas to be

clotted or open to international traffic whether military or civilianscientific.

•

With perfect Aplomb, the Russians protested after• OctOber 1957 that

no one could accuse them of violating the rights of other nations by the

satellite moving overhead. Sputnik had not passed over any foreign territory; nivel; simply that foreign nations passed under the orbit of Sputnik.

Along with this casuistry, the Bussiane unofficially proposed in periodicals tbst an international agreement should limit sovereignty to sn altitwle

of 12 miles, or . at most 18. 6 The Americans were less precise in-their comia.

ments. ?or instance, Von Braun said there were no exadt division lines in

nature. The question of sovereignty would have to be settled by arbitrary

decisions, and he suggested, for no pezticular reason, that an altitude of

100 miles could be accepted as the 414140n between national sovereignty in

altitude and the free space from which military vehicles might be prohibited.

• • Be added that 300 miles or 1,000 miles would be equal/y acceptable. 7

 Bear

Atha. Nyman G. Rickover, Assistant Chief of Bureau of Ships for Nuclear . Pro- ,

pulsion, USN, was more military in his approach. He said:

8

The dividing line between allitary and civilian uses gf.spe017

could arbitrarily be set at the 4 4 MAXiMUR permissible altitude

for a missile of 12,500 miles . . . The dietance of 12,500 miles

is the maxis= distance a missile woad be required to travel. The

earth being 25,000 miles in circumference, 12,500 miles is the maxi-

*um distance between say two points on earth.*

*The statement was reasonable in 1957-58, but by 1960 it appeared that anti.

missile 4efenses sight make it necessary for the attacking missile to be sent 1

toward its target the long way round, a distance that could far exceed 12,500

miles. 4
87

•

Be added that delineation would reserve for each nation an area "analogous.

to the 3-mile limit for international waters." Such a. boundary for national

rights would not only insure ample altitude for IREK's and IOM's but

would be high enough to permit the employment of some military satellites

as veil.

. Both Ito Braun and Rickover deserved and received the highest respect,

but neither of them spoke for the U.S. Government. The President, of

course, was the arbiter of policy, and in reaching his deOisions, he was.

guided by his immediate advisers especially by Secretary of State Dulles

and by leaders of Congress.

During all the months of pre-Sputnik effort to define and support

a space-for-peace policy, the Government had not committed itself on details of space law or limits of sovereignty. The President, between 1955

and 1957, did nothing more officially than seek an international agreement, through the.United Rations, to limit the exploration of space to

peacefUl purposes and to tiOthis in if possible with 'anon toward dis

armament. Consequently, in October 1957 the President was free to continue

negotiations for a space lay 'without being hamstrung by previous commitments.. However, since the United States did not immediately protest the

flight of Sputnik aboye American territory, this silence could be interpreted as tacit admission that all space was free for scientific exploratioo since the Russians claimed that function for Sputnik. 9

The position of the President and the Secretary of State during the •

last few weeks of 1957 and far into 1958 seems to have been that for the

immediate future the United States should do no more than continuethe

effort to negotiate agreements to keep apace for peaceful purposes and to

countenance a space program at home demonstrating the nation's peaceful
4

4

4

intentions. At the same time, since cirmaestenaes demanded some form of 4

military propme, the President could jastigy it as necessary pending the

realisation of international contrOl. In doing so, he couldmppeal to•

"the charter of the United Nations, to which the Simians had sdbecribed4

4

for legal justification. Article 51 of the charter recognised the right

of. a nation to defend itself against attack from any direction, a piovision

10

as:applicable:to epees as it VW to land, sea, Mod sir.

The President received support in maintaining such a position from

.Congress even at the time when both houses were atteeptiog to fneure an

adequate space program for the Department of Defense. Throughout the

4

first six or seven months of 1958, many senators and.representatives expressed individually their approval of the Chiefthmoutive i s spece-for-

• peace policy. In June the Senate and Ebuse passed a concurrent resolution

"that the Ubited.States should strive through the United Nations" to reach

an international agreement "to beu2ish the use of outeropece for military

. purposes, provide for joint explorations of outerspace, and establish

'Methods to settle disputes which may arise." The resolution had the . support of both the Department of Stete and the Department of Defeose and

seemed to express a complete agreement between the executive and legislap.

tive brandies of the Government.11

After the exchange of American and Eussian vim in the General Assembly in January and April 1957 and Ehrold Stassen t s statement before tie.

Disarmament Subcommittee of the General Assembly in the United

_Nations took no further action on space for several months. Then, shaken

fraMtheir lethargy by Sputnik on 4 October, 20 nations joimmlwith the

4

!See above, pp 66-67. 4
89

United States on 11 October in bringing before the General Assembly a

draft disarmament resolution that called for the peacefUl uses of apace.

Without attempting di;finitions, the resolution implied that "outerspece"

agent the region shove and beyond the farthest altitude at which the

atmosphere could hinder the orbiting of satellites. Also, the silence

of the sponsoring nations on the subject of their sovereignty, like the

silence of the United States, could be interpreted as a concession that

space beyond the atmosphere was free.

In another one of the long intervals of patient waiting engendered

by the vast machinery of the United Rations the Russian and American

positions were made clear in a direct correspondence between President

Eisenhower and Eicolei A. Bulganin, nominal Prime. Minister of the Soviet

UniOn. On 11 December 1957, Wulganin proposed a suMmit meeting on . disarmament. On 13 January 1958 the President replied, urging again that

diatom:went begin by limiting the use of space to peaceful purposes.

Eisenhower warned that both the United States and the Soviet Union were

"using outerspace" for testing missiles designmi for military purposes.

Be thereby admitted that IBM's and ICBM's followed trajectories that

made them space weapons. This renewed tie-in of space vehicles with missiles opened the may for Bulganin to reply on 3 February that an agreement

to use space only for peaceful purposes could be reached without diffidulty

if the Western powers would ban fission and fusion weapons altogether and

liquidate foreign bases. 12 'So the argument wearbadk *here it had been 12

months before.

On 25 March 1958 the new Soviet ambassador to the United Rations,

Valerian A. Zorin, supported by the solid bloc of Communist state representatives, requested the General Assembly to include on its agenda an item
1111111111,

to. prohibit the use of "cosmic space for military purposes and to call

for the withdrawal of all troops from bases held. in foreign countries.

The United States countered on 2 September by requesting international

cooperation in space to parallel progress in disarmament. This sparring

was simply a repetition of old arguments. The Soviets wanted to use space

as a means of eliminating American military bases in Ample; the Americans

wanted to hold the bases pending an effective international control of

space ezploration.13

On 17 SepteMber the General Assembly compromised by placing the

Russian and American proposals under the single heading of "Questions of.

the Peaceful Use of Space" and submitting thug to its First Committee

(Political and Security) for consideration. Debate began 12 November

1958 and moved back and forth along the well-trodden arguments.14

Meanwhile the administration in Washington had determined upon new

tactics. On 18 September, Secretary Dulles addressed the General Assembly

and urged the prompt creation of an hi hoc committee to speed agreement

on the creation of a permanent agency: Ambassador Lodge repeated the request in the First Committee on 13 November, and 19 other nations supported

the proposal. At the ammo time, possibly to eppease the Russian delegates,

Ambassador Lodge rephrased the American policy on space and disarmament by

urging that the study of space should proceed regardless of any other pewtions. Be hoped that agreement on the peaceful use of specs might rams

international tensions and the need for armament.

15

The 19 nations were Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Denmark France,

Ouatemela, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zeal and,

Sweden, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Ningdoa, and Venezuela.
9

The Russians showed no sign of cooperation, and the President decided

to demonstrate the solidarity of American opinion in backing the Administration. Be turned to the joint cOngressional resolution of the previous

June and requested Lyndon B. Johnson, majority leader of the Senate, to

support the Administration's space-for-peace policy by addressing the'

16

General Assembly and affirming the nation's unity on the subject. Speaking in New York on 17 November, Johnson said that the Congress of the United

States had requested the President to appeal to the United Nations for international coOperation in space. Be assured the General Assembly that

there moms= differences "within our. Government, between our parties, or

among our people" on the need to keep space for peaceful exploration. Be

urged that there be no differences among the 81 UN members. Be concluded:/7

.Today, outerspaCe is free. It is unscarred by conflict. No

nation holds concession there. It must remain this way. We of the

United States do not acknowledge that there are landlords of outerspace ids) can presume to bargain with the nations of the earth on

the price . of access to this new domain. We must not--and need not--

corrupt this great opportunity by bringing to it the very antagonisms

which we may, by Courageovercome and leave behind forever through

a joint adventure into this new realm.

The address was effective, and the Russians indicated awillingness

to cooperate with the Americans in preparing a joint resolution without

reference to the military bases. Direct conversations between Lodge and

Zarin raised hopes of settlement. On 24 November, however, Lodge announced

that .though there was agreement on the need for en ad hoccommittee4 there

was disagreement on membership. The Soviets stood for an 11 .4member committee to include Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. The

Americans argued for representation in accordance with interest in space;

the Russians argued for a proportional representation by bloc. The First

Coimittee sanctioned an 18-member plan, and the General Assembly approved
4

92 01•111110

. the incision on 13 December. The Czechs, Poles, and Russians, joined by

the representatives of India and the United Arab Republic, refused.t&participate. because the &amnions vere excluded, and the 18-member committee

thus became a 13-member committee in actuality. It began wok in the

.spring of 1959 and submittal a report on 26 June that solemnised the usual.

platitudes and urged the creation of an autonomous organisation to deal

with space problems.

184

The 14thGeneral Assembly convened in September 1959 and began consideration of the report. Christian Herter, Secretary of State since 22

April, addressed the Asselibly much as Dulles had done a year before *Dd

•

asked the Russians to cooperate; Xesneteov, again the ranking Soviet

representative, responded favorably and proposed creation ot the Committee

on the Peaceful Uses of Outerspace as &permanent agency. On 12 December

the Assembly established this committee vith representatives from 24

states. x94

►Argentina, )butre144,. Belgium Brasil, Caned% France, Iran, Italy,

Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the UnitedUngdom, and the United States.

4The committee also emphasised the coordination of radio frequencies for

tracking, communications, and research purposes as the °first technical

area in vbich immediate international action sus-required, suggesting the

Intern ►tional Telecommunication Union (ITU), *US agency, as ameens

handling the problem. The ITU, vith representation from 80 nations, net

at Geneva in August-December'1959; but little vas done. .The United States

also focused attention co the World. Meteorological Organisation (BMO)

urged that it study the use of meteorological satellites. As a conse4nence,

ifl40 established a special penel'in 1959, vith thelinited States as'a

member. (Nouse Bearings before the Omte on Science h Astronautics, 86th

Con& 2d Sess, ReViev of tbis atAProgram, pp 28-32.)

fAlbania Argentina, Australia Austria, Belgium Brasil, Bulgaria, Conads. CseChoalovakia, Fe, ranc !Lowy, I;dia, Italy, Japan, Lebanon,

Mexico, Poiandl Rumania Sweden, the Soviet uniOn, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

4011111111,

4
93

No One Could any how long the Russians would coOperate with the committee they bad been instrumental in setting up.

A, Compromise Spam Program at Nome

Sieved as they were by the horrors of epossible space var,.the.President and his foreign policy adVisers clung tenaciously to the space-forpeace policy. The Chief Etecutive did not compromise this position .until

after Sputnik wheuhe. regretfully conceded the need for amilitary space

program—but one of small dimensions. Ne still hoped to focus world attention on heerica's interest in peace Oyemphasisiog the civilian-seientific.

program for the exploration of space. Sputnik compelled a compromised

space policy at home, but the extent of the compromise Was made clear 

only in the chronolOgy of events.

The statement of 9 October 1957 that the United States would not

engage in . a space race was not reassuring to the military. Then another

month passed before there was aoyindication from the White Nouse what

the national policy would be. Sputnik II* 3 November occasioned another

• outcry of protest from the press, and-four days later, President Eisenhower

addressed the nation by television. His intent was admittedly to reassure

the uneasy public on the advanced status of American weapons, particularly

missiles, and he announced the appointment of Dr. James IL Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to be Special Aifiet.

ant to the President for Science and Technology. Killian would be aided

by the Science Advisory Committee.20

The appOintment of KLUiszat this time appeared to recognise the

inevitability of sanitary space program. The President confirmed this

idea on.5 February 1958 in a press conference when he said the Depertment

1111111111111/

IIIIIIIIIIIOL
11

a

111.11111110

of Defense would continue" to control military space projects even after

21 • the-establishment of a civilian apace agency. At the same tine, the

President's Science Advisory Committee vas working on the first comprehensive statement of U.S. interests in space. Simultaneously, the

Department of Defenseaisumed that a military program vas cartels

'and planned accordingly.

On 26 *arch 1958 the advisory committee released a policy paper. It

listed three reesons.why space shoOld be explored: to acquire scientific

knowledge, further national prestige, and guarantee American military

strength. Ibis was the first tap-level indication of what policy would

prevail. On 2 April the President committed himself officially. Be. asked

Congress for a civilian agency, the National Aeronautics end Space Administration (NASA to conduct all space activities except those primarily

-associated with military requirements. The Presidential message was con22

firmatioU of a two-fold *pace program--one civilian and one military.

Congress debated the nature Of RASA for several mouths and did not

pass the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 until midsuimer. The

President approved it, PL 85-568, on 29 July, and the dual'spece progress

became statutory.

Meanwhtle, the Secretary of Defense initiated a move to make the military More sure of their space responsibilities. In Nerch19546 be sm.

gested that NBC's Planning Board consider the advisability of DSC ileuing

a national security policy on space. At once the board set up the Ad Hoc

Subcommittee on Space, which requested and received 'cements and assistance

from the National Science Foundation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the

three services, and other agencies throughout the Government. The product 4

11111,1111110

4111111111111
was the Prelisdnary U.S. Policy on Space, more convmnient3.y known as 11113C

2

5814/1, which the President approved on 18 August 1958.3

The do:anent set forth more em;plizitly than hitherto the purpose and

principles of the civilian end.silitary . programs,„ MC recognised that

space bed military significance. butvas nom oonoerned with the political

implications. It. X4111 politically dangerous tqg Aussies to remain' permanently superior to the United State, in astronautics, and the penetration.

. of space. made .it more necessary than ever to work-toward internationa•

control and.cooperation.. In . conclusion,. the coungil.mdvacated a sixepoint

policy: continue the IGY experiments;.recognise . thkinterest of the United

•

Nations ia niece; propose a series of bilateral arrangements vith •other

lotions,. Including Russia, to . regulate current setteities in space; invite

nations to participate on a reciprocal. basis..in U.S. scientific projectak proposeother projects for multilataral..perticipation; imd assist

other nations at the Tree World in their space projects.

Zt is importent to note the =moil's insistent* 143011 international

cooperation in spade, with the : emphasis on. reciprocal development of space

'cisme by the United States and other nations. 411 American contributions

to these activities would•came within the responsibility of NASA, and, in

a very limited but very real sense indeed, NASA wai certain to be an ad•

jametat. ths.Depertment of State..

By the late.summer of 1958, there were three documentxtbst, Ulan

together, expressed the: Administration's space poliCy..•the report of the

President!' Science Advisory Committeeon 26 ihircb4-the National Aaronsu-.

tics and Space Act of 29 July, and NBC's Preliminary U.S. Policy on Space

of 18 August. Nisch affirmed that there must be amilitary spaceprogram, •

►

•
but the overall tone vas that the Military program should be kept as small

as possible.

A fourth important document appeared in:March 1959--the•first Operations Plan of MSC's Operations COordinating Board.(0CB). The popet'vas

intended to guide and implement the national grogram. It recommended.

a foUr-point action to include analysis, incident by incident, ofinternotional legal issues as they developed; negotiation of international

agreements for a complete record of Satellite orbits and frequencies;

formulation of agreements with other nations as required for the peaceful

use of space; and prepare:Sion of world opinion psychologically and polite..

'ftally for the possible.lauSching of American reconnaissance Satellites.

In its general approach, the OCB Operstions Plan indicated a slight change

of thinking, at least within the confines of MSC, that Meant modification

of the space-for-peace policy along lines a little more favorable to the

By the time the OCB plan was finished,* therm had been many important

changes in the situation since August 1958 when the President bad approved

the preliminary policy statement. Both the military and scientific space'

programs had gained significant nev'data on the space environment, the

organisation of the civilian and military space programs had been completed,

and the international situation *demanded more than ever that the United

States regain its lost prestige. Under the circumstances, the /W.f.&

that the policy statement required a "complete review" and, with the

President's approval, entrusted the work to an ad hoc committee at the

ational Aeronautics and Space Council (BAW), which the Space Act of

19513-had brought into existence. 26

.

1

I

4

The ad hoc committee began its work in July, using as reference the. •
►e •

law

$

earlier-noted executive and legislative measures and then, in August

1959, MSC's National Security Paley or ISC 5906/1. This policy statement

affirmed the necessity from a national security Viewpoint of a specs pregrea that could support the scientific, military, and political ails of .

.the United States.2.7

In November 1959, WASC transmitted the report of . its ad hoc comn ittee

to SSC. The report urged a national space policy that would:

Carry out energetically a progress for the exploration and use

of outerspace by the United States, based upon a sound scientific and

technological: progress,. designed: (a) to achieve that enhancement

of scientific knowledge, military etrength, economic capabilities 

and political position which mey be derived through the advantage:sus

application of space technoloo—and through appropriate international

cooperation in related matters, and (b) to obtain the ►dvantages

which come from successful achievements in spade. '

In addition, the report declared that civil, scientific, and sanitary

epees projects had importmnt implications for national security, and it

regretted that the Soviet'si spectacular firsts"--vhich by then'included

the orbiting of a Sputnik with canine passenger, aninterplanetary.prObe,

and a lunar impact--had raised Russian international - prestige even above

the level attained in Oótober 1957. Though the full military significance

of space could not then be defined, it was apparent that space vehicles

would have to be employed to enforce whatever international agreements

might eventually be reached to prevent a specs warpand until then reconnaissance satellites could be i SafegUard against another Pearl Harbor

28

strategy.

The recommendations serve/MSC and MSC in their task of revising

thepolicy on space. The paper, MSC 5918/1,,was completed 12 January

1960 =deigned by the President on 26 January. It repromprWino great

ch•enge from all that had come before. It admitted the imports:we of space
98 111111111P

but. kept the emphasimon the civilian program. The Administration re-!

seined consistent in downgrading the military space effort from March

1955, with the initiation of Vanguard" through the first reactions.to

Sputnik, and across theaonthe of 1958 and 1959. The most important

change had came in )larch 1958 when the President's Science Advisory

Committee mdmitted need for a military programs but after that the. emphasis tarried on the same low plateau.

There vans however, tiaarked difference between expressions of eam

tional policy and,the actual implementation of that policy. Once a military spece_prograe became peraissables it gained a moment= from its

awn projects that did not completely respond to the brakes of policy.

As a results the status of the military program was far more advanced

in the summer and autumn of 1959 than the words of the•Mational Security

Council Papers could indicate.

The success of the military projects vas all the more remarkable

because the programs as a whole, became entangled lathe web of organising inside and outside the Department of Defense.

4
VI. mai= TOR TSII XILITAICC WHOA PROGRAM

The month between Sputnik I and Sputnik II, 4 OctOber to 3 November

1957, vas filled with criticism of the American missile-space programs.

The two verealmost identical in the public mind, and in truth, space

projects were and vould be for some time almost completely dependent

upon missile organisations and components. It was a critical hour in the

nation's history, and the demand for action was not to be ignored. Time

and again the question was raised as to why the missile-space programs

had failed to meet the crisis and how the programs could be vitalised to

carry forward the bUrden of catching up with Russia.

There was a tendencyamong some to attribute the failure to interseivice rivalry or "service bickerings." The President on more than one

occasion publicly declared that interservice rivalry must stop, and his

comment was so placed in context as to imply that this was the evil of

the W., Bole periodical* took up the cry to designate a . "Pentagon boss"

cmpeble of ending "service hankerings" and put the nation *heed of the

Soviet Union in technology./

A contrary viewpoint held that the failure to win first place in

'space was not due to."service bickerings" but to national policy. There

was no vigorous American space program in 1957 because of a preference

.4►In histilevision address to the nation on 7 aveiber the President

said, "Inter-service competition shall not be allowed to . . our

scientific and development progran." Again, in his State of Union .

message to Congress on 9 January 1958 he said: "I am not attempting today

to peel judgment on the charge of hereful service rivalries. But one thing

is sure. Whatever they are, Maritsa wants them stopped."
100

for economy, an insistence that space projects must offer returns commensurate vith 'cost, and a determination to.kierthe military out ofspece

for the sake of foreign relations. ,The decisions were made °Vier "period

of 12 years, 1945 to 1957, by the Research and Development Boardlthe

Deportment of Defense,. the Department of State, ani the White Nouse.

National policy said "no" both tolevy and AirForce specs sebitions in

1946-48, rejected Project Orbiter in 1955, dulled the Venguard effort for

two critical years, and refused permission for•AHMk• to launch a satellite.,

Therevas also widespread objection'to the-appointment of any more.

bosses. In 1957 many voices cried Out in Congressvin the armed forces,

and emong interested citizens to simplify rather then elaborate the missile . orgenizational,setup to which the space . program was certain to be

tied for - some time. Theneed vas not for more "czars" with overlappingdomains and authorities, bdt for right decisions. 2 Missile orgenization .

charts showed "bureau on top of bureau, committee on top of•comeitteev

office °clop of office ..... mita average unsophisticated, or even -•

sophisticated persouplt looked like the most complicated jigsaw pUzsle

•

thst ever was inveoted." The question then, in 1957, was whether the organisation was to boners simple or ems acnplez, whether the czars vere

to be overthrown or perpetuated. 3

Serious efforts were made to escape from the labyrinth. On 17 October,

0001212 Putt, DCO7Development at . Seadquarters USAF, acting on ordersTrca

higher authority, directed Lt. Oen. Sammall. Anderson, the commander of

ABMIC, to assemble an ad hoc committee to oonsider ways by which the Air

Force could amidst in countering vorld reactions to Sputnik I. The committee was composed of members of the Air Pore Scientific Advisory Board

(SAS) and the aircraft industry; plus a small group of ARDC personnel as
101

technical advisers. The committee met 21-22 October under the chairmanship of :Dr. Edward Teller. The two-day discussion produced an impressive

1 report that exhibited no shyness of the truth. In. the technological war

between the United States and the Soviet Union, the former had slipped ►

behind because of complacency and swollen bureaucracy. "To date, our

administrative and management practices. have not permitted either the

respoasible civilian or Armed Service agencies to establish a stable yet

imaginative R&D program." The committee's two recommendation .were

4

strongly phrased:

Consolidate the organisation and 'simplify the manigement

for the development and operation of ballistic missile and space

flight progrees from the Office of the Secretary of Defense on down,

including the efforts of all services.

'Put the ballistic missile and spece flight programs on a

maximum effort basis in all its aspeáts, without reservation as to

time, dollars, or people used. Most :important of all, provide a realistic assurance that the entire program has the priority of governmental and national interest required by the threat.

The Teller Report, which bore the signatures of same very distinguished

scientists and leading authorities* on missiles and satellites, was circulated on 28 botcher among high levels of the Department of Defense. By

coincidence, Trevor Gardner!s article "But We Are Still Legging," appeared

in Life one week later, on 4 November. Gardner, too, argued for a-simpli

fled organisational arrangement to meet aissile-space program requirements •

and for sapid !Uncle to support research and development. Since Gardner's

*List of members of the Teller Committee: Edward Teller, E.J. Barlow,

Bearer, K.J. Bossart, G.H. Clement, S.B. Doll, W.R. Dornbezger, X.

Ariake, C. Faulders, C.L. Forrest D.T. Griggs, M.D. Hunter, J. Isenberger,

T.O. Lanphier, O'Green, W.F. Parker, L.D. Ridenour, R.J. Sandstrom,

Sherman, W.M. Sith, E. Spraits E.A. Steinhoff, G.S. Triable, G.Z.

Valley, T.F. Walkovics R.N. Widmer, R.G. Wilson. Also attending were

representatives of WADC, MCP; AMID, and AFOSR.
4

102

forebodings hed already been tragically justified, he was not aperson

whose advice should have been ignored. On 7 November, within three days

of Gardner's article, the Secruity Pesources Panel of OM under the chairaanship of8. Rowan Gaither, submitted its report, Deterrence and Survival

in the.Nuclear Ame, which vent to PSC and therefore came - within the

ident's advisory circles. Along with the Rockefeller report, International

Seourity,.-the Military Aspect which appeared in January 1958, the Gaither

report was part of a rising tide of criticism of the Government's overly

complex and inadequately budgeted programs.

In the midst of this criticism and debate the President announced on

7 November his selection of Dr. K41 14•,1 as his scientific adviser. Insofar

as his tppointment indicated some form of a military space program, the

services were pleased. Insofar as the appointment might indicate making

the missile-space program more and more tosplex, the military were uneasy.

At the same time the Secretary of Defense, acting on the assumption that

there would be %. military space program, showed clearly that he too was

thinking of adding to the number of - military missile-space agencies. By

the end of 1957 it was evident that the age of the czars had not passed,

AdVanced Research Projects &elm -

On T August 1957, President Eisenhower announced the resignation of

Wilson and the nomination of Neil E. McElroy as Secretary of Defense. Toward the end of September, McElroy came to the Pentagon to familiarise himself with the job he would occupy on 9 October. Thereafter be visited 'some

of the major military installations, and on 4-5 October he was guest of the

*Gaither was former president of the Ford Foundation. His committee began its study in April 1957, but before it was completed be became ill

and was succeeded by two co-chairmen--Robert C. Sprague and William C.

Foster.
IC3

-Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Suritsvilles Ala. Aloig with Msj. Gen.

John B. *Maris, commanding general of ABNA * .endlOn Braun,. !Miro, was

among the first to learn of Sputnik Y. BO one could have ha& snore dramatic induction to high office. • (See testimony * p 104.) .

.Almost immediately McElroy found himself in the midst of a reorganisation that could not always be cleverly understood. Obedient to Presidential directions - the Secretary of Defense abolished his-Office of Special

Assistant for Guided Missiles and created in its place the Office of

Director of Guided Missiles to "direct all activities in the -Department

of Defense relating to research* development, engineering, production,-

and procurement of guided missiles." William Holaday, who hid been the

Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, headed the.nev office, Apparently

clothed, at the President's behest, with the authority of the Secretary.

of Defense in the field of guided missiles. Presumably his dui?, was to

override . service rivalries. At once, however, the Secretary of Defense

said that Holaday could not direct the work of the Services in the field

of guided missiles, and there were some questions on Capitol Bill on how

Holaday could be a director if he could not direct.. Boladay himself was.

vague about his authority and did notknow what his relationship was to

Dr. Killians.the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology.-

Malroy stated that he too vas uncertain what authority Dr. Killian.

5 • potsessed.

Though the post-Sputnik domains of authority were thus far from

sharply drawn, Balmy proceeded to plan for yet another czar within DOD

whose duty would be to unify the space project* scattered Soong the three

services. Be first spoke of this newly conceived "special projects" agency
of Weil 14 McElroy

-1621•1: 122/

Senator Symington: I know that you mile into the Department rot.

Defense, Mr. McElroy, just About the time that the Russians

launched Sputnig . . Were you surprised when they launched

the sputnik/

Secretary McElroy: I was very much surprised. In fact, I was

down at luntsville,having just spent the dey mpg

Jupiter*, and I am unlik:ly to forget the time that I heard about

the first Sputnik. It oertainly launched se into a job here an

certain wings. So that would be clear to me as long as I live.

Senator Symington: Do you remember that some people did not

seem to be particularly surprised?

Secretary Milroy: I do, and I suppose if I had been privy to

the intelligence knowledge that had been aroma in the community,

I would not have been so surprised, either. Jut I was very much

surprised.

Senator Symington: Well, I was surprised same people ware not

surprised; because when defense authorities came before our Subcommittee On Appropriation, last August, and asked !Crummy,

they said--I want to be sure I state it aorrectly--that this

.money was asked for so we meld "launch the first artificial

satellite.".

(Senate Bearings before the Preparedness Investigating Submits,

85th Cong, 1st & 2d Bess, assuE into Satellite and Missile'

Prowess, p 250.)
i.

p 1111111111Ps 105

when he appeared before a congressional committee on 20 to ember 1957.

Re said then that he would pace the agency at aline]. Move that of the

three services so that it could control interservice rivalry. The director

would then be responsible for ell military research and development efforts'

"in • the satellite and 'pace research field" sod for antiballistic. missiles.6

When Milroy sought the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he

-

found. oppositibn. The service chiefs didnot went the agency to have

devatopment and contractual authority, because they felt such an arrangement would hamper the transition of systems from development to operational

stab's. The need was for an offimewith authority to make policy deci

sloes. The services were quite capable of managing their research and

development if they could but be authorised to proceedirithAhe work.

The Joint Chief* *Omitted these Views to the Secretary on 25 November

1957?

.

McElroy overruled the JCS objections ant continued his plans for

the Advanced Research Projects Agency CARPAL as it had time come to be

called. The Secretary received fal support from the President, who asked

Congress to give ARM a budget but one that would be largely spent through

the technical and Procurement agencies of the Army,. Navy, and Air /brae.

8

NbIlroy wanted to act as quickly as possible. Thelational Security

Act amendments of 1949 had vested the Secretary of Defense with authority

to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate noncombatant fUnctions

after notifiing . Congress. On the advice of his General Counsel, McElroy

assumed he thereby had the authority to estiblishASIA 1 but the Senate

and Rouse did not agree to this interpretatioi. Without any desire to

9

hinder the Secretary, they questioned his right to set up ARPk. In
4

1

106.

I

order to assiatlkeprcqrs Congress included the following provision: in

Public La ► 85-325, Which the President apnroved on 12 Pebraarie 1958i

The Secretary:a Defense or his designee is =thorned to =-

age in such-advanced. projects essential to the Defense Department's

responsibilities in the fielkof basic and applied redeem,* and development whichpertain to weapons systems and military requirements

as the Secretary of Defense may determine atter consult ► ion with

the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and for ',period of one year from the

effective date of tbii Act, theSecretary of Defense or his designee is further authorised to engage in sUch advanced specaprojects

as may be designated by the President.

The purpose of authorising the ir ecetary to engage in advanced space projects for one yeervas to - insure the continuation of Project Vanguard and

other 'peaceful" space ventures that might emerge while : Congress decided

co the nature and organisation of the national space program. Co 11 Februaryi Congress also passed Public Lee 85-322 to provide for the transfer

of 00 million from the military services te ARPA1 this insuring the agencY

an independent budget.

Completely confident that Congress would empower him to adtivate

AIM Malroyhed established the agency on 7 Pebruary. At the same time

he ga ►e it abroad charter, with authority to direct such research and

development projects being performed within the Department of Defense as

the Secretary' sight assign. The charter further authorised ARP& to ar.

rangefor the performance of the work by other governmental agencies, in-.

eluding the threeeervices. It waS also possible for ARPA to contract

with individuals or institutions and acquire test facilities and equip10

went as approved by the Secretary of Defense..

Roy W. Johnsce beam= ARPA's firstilireeto . Re had first to

*Somewhat later liellroy gave ARPA specific reeponsibilities for research

and development activity on ballistic missile defense, propellant chemistry, and military Om*.

4
107

delineate the authority areas of his office and of the offices of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) and the DOD

Director of Guided Missiles, under Paul D. Foote and Noladay, respectively.

Johnson, Foote, and loladay recognised that the relationship of their

agencies had to be one of close interdependence to permit a constant eschew at informstion in their respective fields. lovevec, the relationship between ARM and the Director of Guided Missiles was made closer by

the fact that many of the vehicles and components employed by guided missiles and space vehicles were identical. On the other hand, both agencies

would be dependent for further primrose on the products in the broader

fields of research under the authority of the Assistant Secretary (a14).1/

Johnson organised ARM in three divisioos-•Einencial lianagement,

icy and Progress, and Technical Operations. le obtained a large part of

his staff by a contractual arrangemmtvith the Institute for Defense.

Analysis (IDA), * which provided a.unit of 40 persons herded by Dr. Norbert

F. York. The latter was already well known for his thermonuclear work at

Livermore Laboratory, and in ARPA be served as Johnson's chief scientist.

By 1W 1958, ARM was an operating organisation, and its chief weakness

was the.lsck of experience on the part of IM personnel with military

methods of procedure.

Director of Defense Research and Engineering 

At the.same time that plans were being made for ARPA, the President

ouvi . the Secretary of Defame were preparing to reorganise the Department

*IT was created in 1955 in contract between OSD and Maseachusetts Institute of Technology to supply qualified personnel for the Weapons Systems

Evaluation Group. MIT initiated the work and invited five other universities to participate. Ford Foundation. granted $500,000 for working

capital.
108

of Defense in away certain to influence the space prngrea. In his State

of the Union seesaw of 9 January 1958, Eisenhower, referring tO . interservice rivalry, said some weapons did not fit into any existing service

pattern and gave rise to "Nrisdictional dispute." He felt that the situation demanded important changes in the organisation of the Depertment

of Defense and stated hewould later send specific recommendations to

12

Congress.

Three months afterwards, on 3 April, the President submitted his request. He said that "separate ground; see and air warfare is gone forever"

and that peacetime activity of the military forces should be completely

unified. He wanted the authority of the Secretary of Defense to be "clear

and direct" in respect to the development of new weapons. Therefore, one

of his important points was the elimination of the Office of Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) . and in its place the esteblishment of.e Director of Defense Research and Engineering:IMMO, with

three major functions:13

first, to be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on

scientific , and technical matters; second, to supervise all research

and engineering activities in the Department of Defense, including

those of the Advanced Research Projects Agency and of the Office of

the Director of Guided Missiles; and third, to direct research and

angineering , activities that require centralised management.

. The-President apparently intended the Director of Defense Research and

Engineering to outrank the ARPA director as well as the Director of Guided

Missiles.

After doe deliberation Congress enacted Public Lair 8,-599) Department cof Defense Reorganisation Act of 1958. Aug its provisions was the

establishment of a Director of Defense Research and Engineering to be

appointed by the President and taking precedence within the Department of

4
109

Defense after the Secretary and Deputy SiOretary of Defense end the three

service secretaries. Ns would be the principal adviser to 801) on scien7

tific and technics/ matter.; supervise all research and engineering activities in DOD; and direct, control, assign, or reassign the research and

engineering activities deemed by the Secretary of Defense to require centralised management.• ' The President approved the act on 6 August 1958 and

on 2k December appointed Dr. TOOL as the first director of the new sewpqr.1

Activation of Directorate of Mid TecIntoldsy 

Prior to Sputnik I Air Force apace activities had been handled in

the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Development, with Brig. Gen.

&pier A. Boushey, Depts.*. Director of Research and Development, responsible

for the overall coordination of those projects that pertained to space.

On 22 November 1957, two days after Nicaroy publicly spoke of his

plant for ARPA in congressional bearings, C01. Y.Y. Adduci, Assistant

Director of the Office of Legislative Liaison, urged the Ali, Force "to

p the gun on the prOblem of astronautics by appointing either a Director

or Assistant Chief ofitaff for Astronautics." In view of the growlog

opposition within Beadquarters USAF to the creation of additional assistant chiefs of staff, there was little probability of placing an'agy enc

at that level. Conceivably, it could have been located in the Office of

the Assistant Chief of Staff fOr Guided Missiles, where there was already

some capability for the work.. The Chief of Staff dettided, however, to

place the agency under the DCS/Developmento and on 10 December, General

Putt announced the establishment of the Directorate of Astronautics, to

15 be headed by General Southey.
110 41111111111Pag

OSD reacted unfavorably. Holadey pUblic1y stated that the Air Force

%anted to grab the limelight and establish a position." The Secretary

of Defense expresso' his opposition to the use of the term "astronautics,"

which seemed to his =Air Porne bid for popular support. Strong pressure on Headquarters USAY ' from above, verbal rather than written,, made it

advisable on 13 December for Putt to cancel his directive of 10 Decelber.1(

Headquarters USAF, keenly aware of the need to centralise itnspece

activities in some one agency, regarded the cancellation of 13 December

as merely a postponement. The prospects of getting OSD approval, Weever,

was admittedly slight for the next. few months, and an interim measure

was needed. Since spode vehicles were dependent on ballistic missiles,

Headquarters adopted the temporary solUtion on 4 Mardb.190 of authorising

the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles to coordinate USAF spice

activities.17

At about the some time the DCS/Development suggested the advisability

of requesting OSD approval_of an Ali .- Force space agency. The Office of

the Chief of Staff was not averse but foresaw a long deley.- There were

weeks of negotiation between-the Air Force,- 0244 and ARPA. AS Aix Force'

space directorate, it was argued by the Air Staff, was needed to serve as

liaison with AREA,. and it would be equally needed as a means of contact

with the civilian.space agency then being provided by Congress. Plans

were carefully drawn, and on 22 July, after Congress had passed the

space act, Secretary Douglas formally rqqaestsd permission to activate

the direcitorate. Two days later Deputy SectetarY of DefenseAnarles

gave his approval. lien. then, the term "astronautics* was considered

impolitic for the military. On 29 July, General White issued General

Order 44, stating that "the verbal order of the Chief of Staff

1111=1
establishing the Directorate of Advanced Technology, Deputy Chief of Staff,

wan O 18 Development, effective 15 ally 1y7o, is confirmed."

There was no directorete charter at the time, but the DCS/Development

summarised the purpose of the agency in.a, 29 July memorandum:

19

To supervise at the Air Staff level the formulatiOn of the Air Force

Advanced, Technological Program; provide technical information and

advice to the Air Staff on the process of developments; maintain

Coordination with AMA, the Departments of the Army and Bevy and

other interested government agencies .

s

 and maintain liaison with

civilian educational institutions, laIdustry, and representatives

of foreign governments engaged in research and devilopmentactivities.

The same memorandum named General" Bousbey as director aed provided him

with a small staff. Boushey progptly organised hie directorate under

four assistants-4or Boost Glide Systems, Spice Projects and Systems

Studies Manned. -Military Space Systems, and Untanned' Military Space Sys- .

tems.

Doubtless Beedquezters Walloped to make the Directorate of Advaticed

Technology the control point for all Air Force space projects. !beaver,

since the space projects were dependent upon missile'', the space program

necessarily involved 1211104 atme main,point of contact withiblequerters

was through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles. Under the

circumstances it was imprudent to sever all ties between the guided misa

Bile office and the space program, and a reassignment of authority between

the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles and the Directorate of

AdVenced Technology was inevitable. On 6 April 1959 the Chief of Staff

rescinded the directive of 4 March 1958 and delegated responsibility for

coordinating and monitoring all Air Force space activities within the Air

Staff to the Directorate of Advanced dlogy. !however, thelssistant

Chief of Staff for Guided Missiles continued to retain responsibility for
coordinating the requirements for ballistic missile resources needed in

support of the space projects., including boosters and test facilities.

On 13 April a Headquarters office instruction defined the relationship

between the Directorate of AdvanCed Technology and other offices of the

Air Staffs ARPA, and NASA.2°
113

VII. CIVILIAN SPACE Aassmams.

Both houses of Congress were deeply disturbed by Sputnik I and Sputnik

II. The Russians appeared well on the way toward an ICBM-atomic-wax:capability that would permit direct attack on American cities and industry.

Equally disconcerting, from the viewpoint of the cold war strategy, was

the detrimental impact the Russian successes undeniably bad on the prestige of the United States. Moreover, the United States was far behind the

Soviets in'planning and conducting space activities --an important factor

in such areas as international law, foreign relations, and-hitherto unimagined weaponry of offense and defense, as well as a compelling appeal

to imagination through projects of such universal usefulness as meteorology

and navigation. In the yet vaster areas of pure science, space operations

seemed destined to be of incalculable importance to the whole human race

and its social structure.

Senators and representatives did not content themselves with expressions of astonishment, dismay, or incurable optimism. The situation was

serious, and Congress prepared for serious action. On 27 November 1957

the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on

Armed Services opened an investigation of the American missile and space

programs. On 6 February 1958 the Senate established a Special Committee

on Space and Astronautics. The House followed suit, establishing on 5

March its own Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration.

Meanwhile, both the Senate and House came to the assistance of the Department of Defense by cooperating with Secretary McElroy in establishing
114 11111111161

ARPA. This MOD agency assured the nation that there would be a military

• rpece program. No one could say at the time how much the program would

be curtailed by the civilian-scientific program still being debated in

1

White Souse and congressional circles.

By March 1958, Congress was conversant with several alternative pro-

'posals for the organization of space agencies by the executive branch, as

well as several ways in which the legislative branch could keep itself 1

informed. The congressional committees felt that the President had a

wide choice. He could entrust the entire space program to one of the

following: the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, a

new commission modeled on AEC, a department of science, or a coordinated

effort by the National Academy of Science and the. National Science Founds-

. tion. In exercising its own watchdog prerogatives, Congress could choose

between creating a new joint committee on space, adding space reeponsibil-

-

sties to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, or placing.the existent

Senate. and House ewe committees on a permanent basis.2

Congress had not gone beyond this point when the President's Science

Advisory Committee issued its statement of 26 March 1958. The paper

showed that the military space program was certain to be continued. It

showed also that an extensive civilian-scientific program would be undertaken

and that Congress "read be called upon tOestabliah. by law a civilian space

agency, or a complex of space agencies. The situation then moved rapidly

toward. its climax.

Hearings on the ?_resident's Proposed Space Agency

012 ' 2 April 1958 the President forwarded to Congress his recommendation

"that aeronautical and space science activities sponsored by the United

4

*See above, p 94.
OMR 115

States be conducted under the direction of a civilian agency, except for

those projects primarily associated with military requirements." He urged

Congress to create a National Aeronautics and Space Agency into which the

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (RAGA) would be absorbed as a

nucleus. In this 'my NASA would continue the aeronautical research functions of NACA and expand into the spade area. The new agency would be

headed by a director appointed by the President with the consent of the

Senate. President Eisenhower requested the creation also of a national

aeronautics and space board to advise him, -With representation from interested government agencies including the military. He added :3

It is contemplated that the Department of Defense will continue

to be responsible for space activitiee-peculiar to or primarily'

associated with military weapons systems or military operations.

Responsibility for other programs is to be assumed by the new agency.

The President clearly called for a space program that was split

between civilian-scientific interests and the military. It Was then up

to Congress to approve the. President's policy in such away as to insure

the security of the nation in space. 'This point, indeed, became the crux

of the long and interesting hearings conducted by the Senate and Noise

space committees. Congress could not forget that space exploration was

possible in 1958 because of missile develoments. Also, in 1958 Up militar ► controlled most of the personnel trained for research in space propulsion and vehicles as well as the materials needed for the future progrmi. For Congress, the most obvious And immediate problem was to deter

.

mine as exactly as possible the relationship between the civilian and

military programs.

During April and May a procession of distinguished. witnesses moved

before the congressional space committees. At first the-Consensus was
•

•

that NACA, with a few changes in its charter, would become NASA. The

scientists sanctioned such an arrangement. From their point of view a

civilian-scientific program was essential because the nonmilitary aspects

of space exploration were too important to be entrusted to O. purely military program. Only a civilian-scientific program eould insure a technically sound vOroach. Yet the scientists were also of one accord that

military interests should be safeguarded, and they spoke specifically of

reconnaissance and communication satellites. These witnesses were confident that military applications would follow automatically from a scientific

program. 5

The military and their representatives were in general agreement with

the civilian scientists, but they interjected a few cautious reservations.

Spokesmen for the Department of Defense approved the establishment of NASA

and spoke of it as being an extension of NACA into space. However, all

of them spoke out against excluding the Department of Defense from basic

research for service missions. This precaution would entail avoidance of

a rigid definition of weapon programs. Conceding that the nonmilitary

aspects of the national space program should be under civilian direction,

the point was made time and again that nothing should be done to prevent

the.Department of Defense from anticipating "reasonable requirements" and

:proceeding with the work limaediately. The military theme . was simply that

6

there should be two programs and they should be closely coordinated.

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of

Congress enacted on 16 July the : National Aeronautics and Space Act

of 1958. In an introductory declaration of policy and purpose, Congress

affirmed that the space activities of the United States were devoted to

1

4

4
117

peaceful ends and that responsibility for conducting this work was vested,

in a civilian agency. The authority of the agency was then qualified by

important exceptions. Activities primarily associated with weapon system

developments, military operations, or the defense of the United States--.

includingthe necessary research and development--"shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense." The act

authorized the President to determine which agency, civilian or military,

should have responsibility for specific projects.

7

The Space Act provided for three new agencies. Two of them were

wholly civilian--the National Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC) and

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The third agency,

the Civilian-Military Liaison Committee (C-MLC), was, as its name implied,

hybrid. The respective purpose of these agencies was to assist and advise

the President in space matters, to direct the civilian-iscientific spice

program, and to tie together the civilian and military program in "a two8

way street of information and decision making."

The council consisted of the President, Secretary of State, Secretary

of Defense, Administrator of NASA, Chairman of ABC, and four additional

members. appointed by the President--one from within and three from outside

the Government. NASC would assist the President to survey aeronautical

and space activities and "provide for effective cooperation between the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Detense."

9

NASA44 headed by a presidentially appointed administrator, received

authority to plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities;

arrange for participation in space activities by the scientific community;
4011111111ft

and.provide for the widest practicable dissemination of acquired information. .RASA was thus unmistakably an operational agency and would require

operating facilities as soon as activated. The need was met by absorbing

NACA, its personnel, and facilities. The act directed all other govern-

' meat departments and agencies to cooperate as required by NASA "in making

their services, equipment, personnel, and facilities available." The act

also stated that NASA, under the guidance of the President, could engage

in a program of international cooperation, a provision that gave a foreign

policy tie-in with the Department of Stste.10

The Civilian-Military Liaison Ommaittee would consist of a chairman

appointed by the President and a membership of unspecified number but

evally divided between representatives from NASA and DOD. The military

representatives in turn would be equally divided between OSD and each of

the three services. "The Administration gee and the Department of Defense, through the Liaison Committee, shall advise and consult with each

. other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions relating to

aeronautical and space activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities." In case of unresolved

disagreement between the Administrator of NASA and the Secretary of Defense,

11

either of them could refer the matter to the President for decision.

The train of witnesses from the Depertment of Defense had ably impressed on Congress the necessity of conducting research and development

for its own space projects. Congress in turn went to some length to insure DOD's freedom in this field, as explained in the Conference Report :12

The Congress recognizes that the development of aeronautics and apace

capabilities. is important both to peaceful purposes and to the defense of the United States and for the preservation of peace everywhere. It is the intent of Congress that the necessary freedom-to
M111111.1164 119

carry on research, development, and exploration be afforded both a

civilian agency and the Defense Establishment to insure the fUll

development of these peaceful and defense uses without unnecessary

delay, to exclude the possibility that one agency would be able to

preempt a field of activity so as to preclude the other *agency from

moving along related lines of development necessary to the full, ac.

complishment of its duties assigned under this act. At the same

time, such freedom to pursue activities should be so conducted ak

to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and expenditure. This

can be accomplished by providing for full cooperation betWeen the

civilian agency and the Department of Defense. It is clearly recognised that activities which are peculiar to or primarily associated, with weapons systems or military operations or to the defense

of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States)

shall be under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. However, because there is a gray area between civilian and military

interests' and unavoidable overlapping, it is necessary that machinery

be provided at the highest level of Government to make determinations

of responsibility and jurisdiction.

This act makes such provision by providing that the President,

assisted by an Advisory Council, shall make the actual determinations

in the assignment of new pogroms and projects. The act also provides that the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration and the Secretary of Defense can seek solutions to

questions of jurisdiction either directly or through a Civilian-Nilitary Liaison Committee to hold to a minimum the questions referred

to the President and the Council. •

OrgailzingAmmAgenciee under PL 85-568

The President approved the Space Act on 29 July 1958. Under its

terms it would become effective . on a convenient date within the succeeding

90 days. This allowed the President and his advisers 13 weeks, until* 26

October, in which to appoint the members of the space council and the top

RASA officials. Since C-NLC was a liaison committee between the Department of Defense and NASA, the appointment of its chairman could await the

actual activation of NASA.

On 8 August 1958 the President selected Dr. T. Keith Glenna°, president of Case Institute of Technology, Cleveland, Ohio, and Dr. Hugh L.

Dryden, Director of NACA, as the administrator and deputy administrator
of NASA. On 4 September the President chose William A.M. Burden as the

fifth government member of the space council. At the same time the President appointed Drs. James EL Doolittle, Alan T. Waterman, and DetIrrill.

Brook as the . nongovernment members. On 31 October the President reassigned

William Boladay from Director of Guided Missiles to chairmanship of.C-MLC.

The Space Act did not specify how NASA was to be organised other than

to provide for an administrator and a deputy administrator. Glenman therefore had a free band in setting up the agency, and he acted with dispatch.

EA organised NASA into three divisiOns--Spece and Flight Development,

Aeronautical and Space Research, and Business Administration. On 1 October 1958, Glennan announced that NASA was prepared to discharge its

duties..13

Of the three agencies established by the Space Act, the Civilian

Military Liaison Committee vas the least yell defined,. and it become the

most difficult to orgenise. SinOe Congress did not fix the membership, it

was up to Glennan and McElroy to make the arrangement. After several conferences there was an agreement that the committee would be composed of

four representatives from NASA, one from OSD (ARPA),.and one each from

the Army, Navy, and Air Force. These eight, along with the chairman, gave

the committee nine members.14

On 12 September, McElroy asked the three services to recommend their

C-MLC representatives and alternates. The Air Force had already given

much thought to this, being deeply concerned by the fact that NASA would

absorb NACA along with much of the space program originally conceived by

the Air Force and still considered essential to its mission. Thus some 1

Air Staff officials felt that an Air Force general officer should be chairman 4
1

of C-MIC since the Air Force had apredasinant role in both aeronautics

and space. The suggestion was not received enthusiastically, and on 31

October, with Bbladay's selection as chairman, the Department of Detente

announced its committee representatives. *15

A much more difficult question concerned the scope of C-MLC's functions. The Space Act had been vague on this point, and it was generally

agreed that a charter or similar paper was necessary. The Joint Chiefs.

Crewe uneasy least the military be unable to convey their viewpoint to

the civilian agency, and therein they doubtless reflected the anxiety of.

the three services as well.- Negotiations begun in September resulted

in a first draft circulated among the services during the first week in

October. The Army, Navy, and Air Force all wanted a more convincing guarint.e of future cooperation between NASA and DOD. In addition, the Air

Force still argued fora USAF general officer as chairman.17

A series of high-level conferences ensued involving the service secretaries and the Director of ARIA. Out of these conferences came a compromise draft that reconciled the NASA-DOD viewpoints. The charter stated

that C-AMC would provide a channel for the exchange of information and advice betifeen NASA and ECG, encourage further NASA-DOD contact at appropri

ate levels, recommend courses of action in the event of differences between

RASA and DOD, and perform other duties as assigned by NASA or DOD. Teh

committee would meet once each month and report its conclusions to NASA

18

and DOD.

The military representatives were Roy W. Johnson, OSD; Maj. Oen. W.W.

Dick, Army; Vice Adm. R.B. Pixie, Navy; and Maj. Gen. R.P. Swofford, Air

Force. The NASA representatives, announced on 17 November 1958, were

0 Eugh L. Dryden, Abe Silverstein, Romer J. Stewart, and Ira H. Abbott.
The Armed Forces Policy Council (AFPC) approved these terms of reference on. 22 October, and this action, lathe opinion of the Director of

ARPA, was equivalent to ratification by DOD.19

The AFPC approval of the C4LC charter, and even the appointment of

Noladay as chairman, did not completely clarify the position of the committee in the overall structure of space organisations. It was impossible

to predict how the responsibilities of the committee would develop, and

during the formative period the Air Force needed a particularly sensitive

channel of contact to permit prompt action. Lt. men. Roscoe C. Wilson,

DCS/Development since March 1958, appointed a member of his staff to monitor C-1MLC activities for the USAF member of the committee. Re, in turn,

was supported by a designated officer from each of three directorates of

DCS/Development: Advanced Technology, Requirements, and Research and

Development.20

Though much thought vent into the organization of C-MLC and into the

selection of its members, between November 1958 and July 1959 the agency

functioned only as an atrophy. So unimportant were its . contributions to

the space program that its history can be largely ignored.

Organization for awl at End of 120

In October 1957 tbe'cry had been for a simplification of the missilespace complex within the Department of Defense. A. year later the missile

*The first C-MLC charter was a compromise and did not allow the committee

the scope of activity undoubtedly intended by the Space. Act. From. the

beginning it was largely ignored both by DOD and NASA, with most of the important issues being settled directly by the Secretary of Defense and the

Administrator, NASA. Al a consequence the minutes of C-MLC/s first eight

meetings, beginning 25 November 1958 and:continuing. through 18 June 1959,

exhibit a povertiof activity, add even after the beginning of fiscal year

1960, when a new charter•went into effect, there was little improvement. 4
123

complex had not been simplified, the military space complex had been elaborated, and in addition there was the newly created civilian complex.

Since the military were obligated to provide NASA with much of its logistic support, it was not always a simple matter to draw sharp lines between

the civilian anclmilitary space-missile organisations; it was even less

simple to draw sharp lines between the civilian and military space programs. The areas of overlap were very large and gray. The confusion inevitably resulting from the overlays of agencies and projects became

greater as the international situation kept alive the question of 'Anther

space was primarily a civilian responsibility to be usedfor peaceful purposes or primarily a military responsibility to provide national defense.

Under the circumstances there were endless opportunities for disagreements•

and rivalries that at any time might delay projects of vital interest to

the United States. In the latter part of 1958 the situation was far from

ideal, and it did not appreciably improve during the first six months of

1959.
VIII. EIG MONTRS OF ARPA SUPREMACY

When McElroy activated AMA on 7 February 1958, he intended it to be

either a "special task force" within the Department of Defense or possibly

a "fourth service" to direct and control the research and development

phase of the military space program. For at least a year it seemed that

ARPA might indeed continue indefinitely to function as a fourth service,

and during the first eight months of the period, February through September, it had a yet greater role, for it served as the civilian space agency

as well. The President himself confirmed this temporary overall authority.*

The Sources of ARPA's Program

In the hectic days after Sputnik, civilian authorities had not only

to determine high policy--questions of space-for-peace, of a single or

dual space program, of space agency organization—but also the kind of

projects to receive immediate emphasis. There were some who felt that •

neither Vanguard nor the Army-sponsored jupiter-C proposal had any inherent value except as a "spectacular first," and Sputnik had robbed them of

that. In the future the United States should forsake any project that

smacked of "second best" and concentrate on another "spectacular first"

as the only way to surpass Sputnik. Others argued that the United States

*In a memo to McElroy on 24 March the President approved the assignment

of scientific and military space projects to ARPA, as the Secretary had

set forth in a memo of 19 March. The President said: "I do so with the

understanding that when and if a civilian space agency is created, these

projects will be subject to review to determine which would be under the

cognizande of . the Department of Defense and which under the cognizance

of the nev agency."

1111111111111111

4
•

needed psychologically to get into spade at once, even though American

satellites could not equal for the time being the success of the Russlens.

1

The latter argument prevailed.

Vanguard and Rxploter 1

When reports of Sputnik first reached Redstone Arsenal, General /Maris

and Dr. Von Braun,•thought at once that their hitherto rejected Jupiter-C

project might now be acceptable. They immediately briefed their guest,

SOD Designate McElroy, and assured him the Army could place a satellite

in orbit within 60 to 90 days. On 7 October, Wilbur K. Brucker, Secretary

of the Army, recommended that the Secretary of.Defense approve an Army

program to launch a satellite within 120 days at a cost of 04.7 million.

2

This proposal was on McElroy's deak when he became Secretary of Defense

on 9 October.

The new Secretary, assuming that a military satellite would be tolcrated under the changing circumstancdh, asked Brucker to restudy. the proposal and, at the ssme time, suggest ways of assisting Vanguard. The

Army promptly discussed its project with Holadey, who was already review-

.

ing plans to accelerate the Vanguard schedule in an indirect way. The

Navy had planned to launch a Vanguard test vehicle (TV-3) late in 1957,

but without intending to orbit it. After Sputnik the date was set for

6 December, the objective of the launching was changed to achieve orbit,

and the test vehicle VAS advertised as a satellite. In view of these

Vanguard plans, Holaday urged that the Jupiter-C not be launched until

after 6 December. McElroy agreed, but on 8 November he authorised the

Army to proceed, knowing that the Jupiter-C could not be launched before

the Vanguard. 3
4

4

On 3 November 1957 the Russians successfully orbited Sputnik II, the

satellite weighing 1,120 pounds. One month later, 6 December, the Navy

attempted to orbit the Vanguard test vehicle with its 3.25-pound payload.

There was a mechanical failure in the propulsion system, and Vanguard

burst into flames two seconds after launching. There was some criticism

of the decision to turn a tent vehicle launching into a satellite launch116 "We pushed Vanguard too hard, and the project became aloes. t!

Meanwhile, the Army went forward with its Jupiter-C project, now designated Explorer. It was being planned as a "scientific satellite," and

objections no longer were there to using a military. missile, the Redstone,

as a booster. Launching occurred 31 January 1958, and a cylindrical satellite weighing 30.8 poUnds with a perigee of 217 miles, en Apogee of 1,093

miles, and an estimated life of 7 to 10 years was successfully orbited.

The at took place only 84 days after Nalroy's authoritation. The chief

value of Explorer I lies in its irrefutable confirmation that the United

States could have launched a satellite before the Soviet Union if the

Army bad received permission to make the try.

Explorer I •was a great boon to Army prestige. In this connection it

is interesting to note that the Army had the same advantage, in miniature,

over . the Navy and the Air Force that the Soviet Union had, over the United

States. The Army had an available missile with sufficient thrust to serve

as booster in lifting a small satellite into orbit. Plans for Project

Orbiter were based on that simple fact, and it was this same simple fact

that led McElroy to give ABNA responsibility for the first successful

American satellite. This did not imply that the Army had a carefully

thought-but space program but rather that the Army met a national crisis 4
1

10011rni

in one field by using a weapon developed for another field as an emergency

system of'propulsion. Secretary Brucker said much this same thing in testimony before a congressional committee at a later date: 5

The Army developed its broad capabilities, which are now being

used in space projects, as an inevitable result of its progressive

work and outstanding success in the field of military missiles. The

Army is gratified that as a result of this developed capability it

can . lend substantial support and assistance to the vital national

space program.

Air Force Requests for DOD Approval 

•

The Air Force was quite aware that McElroy's interest in Explorer

could bode ill for USAF interests. On 29 October 1957, while OSD was

still examining the Army's proposal, representatives of the Air Staff

briefed the Secretary of Defense on the background and current status of

the Adianced Reconnaitssance Satellite (ARS) or WS-1171 0 pointing out that

with a small increase in funds'for fiscal year 1959 the satellite could

be orbited in 1960. During the first two weeks of November the Air Force

submitted suggestions to the Armed Forces Policy Council and to the Secretary of Defense that a Thor-boosted recoverable photographic satellite

be launched in March 1959, that 12 Navaho boosters be utilised in various

combinations to orbit satellites with payloads varying from 75 to 2,000

pounds, and "that payloads of 28 to 270 pounds be sent to the moon within

the next 8 to 12 months. On 12 November 1957; Secretary of the Air Force

Douglas requested the Secretary of Defense to assign to the Air Force responsibility for all military satellites including, of course, WS-117L

which was to be accelerated. There was no answer to the Air Force papers

prior to the launching of Explorer I.

Recommendations of the Advisory Group on Special Capabilities 

On 6 September 1957, Noladay had written a memorandum to Dr. Stewart,
.1111.1*

chairman of the Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, evaluators and

selectors of the IOY satellite:*7

You and the members of your group constitute a unique body of

experience in satellite systems and the actual problems of their

development, having studied the possibilities before the announcement of the scientific satellite program, and having monitored its

progress from the beginning. You also considered the larger, longer

range possibilities such as VS-117L early in . 1956 and made certain

recommendations on it to the Department of Defense which fora number of reasons could.not be implemented at that time.

I feel that it may be timely to ask the group to help me by

preparing for the time when it will ultimately be necessary to decide

on a number of questions on Military applications of satellite techniques. The feasibility and timing of such applications seem to depend mainly upon_the capabilities of rocket systems, their availability, and, of course, upon the outcome of Project Vanguard, our first

venture in this field. 1

I should now therefore like to ask the Advisory group on Special

Capabilities to look again into the satellite plans and programs of

the military departments and submit your conclusions on the technical capabilities based on the beat available facts at this time . .

As to timing, I shall be , grateful if you could admit your main con

elusions by March 1958. '

The group held a meeting on 3 October, and the next defy its leisurely approach was disrupted by Sputnik. Holaday requested that the group "expedite its study in every possible way," and on 11 October the group asked

each of the three military services to submit recommendations as soon as

practicable.

8

The services replied in December with what may be called their first

official programs. They agreed that the Russian success should be countered by a U.S. national program that integrated scientific and military

elements "to avoid a dilution of effort," and they all looked toward manned space vehicles as the chief goal for the future. Otherwise each

service thought along the lines of its own traditions. The Army and Navy,

4

*See above, p 72. 4
being surface-minded, wanted the space program designed to support land

forces and fleets. The Air Force, on the contrary, thought of space as

an extension of the operational area of airpover.

The Army's immediate interest covered reconnaissance, meteorology,

mapping, geodesy, and navigation. Beyond this there should be deeper

probes into the solar system. In a three-year program, the Army suggested

16 Jupiter launchings that would provide a 20-pound reconnaissance satellite

by mid-19580 a 15-pound lunar shot by September 1958, a 120-pound lunar

shot with photography by January 1959, and a 50- to 100-pound lunar impact

sometime in 1959. Stretching out another dozen years to 1971, the Army

spoke of manned carriers propelled by Titan-like boosters with sundry combinations of high-speed stages. The estimated cost was $14 billion. The

Army. as strong in its opposition to a single-service military program,

though advocating a unified program to meet the legitimate needs of all

three services. The Army also opposed recognition of space operations as

an extension of strategic air activity. 9

The Navy stressed small satellites, not exceeding 300 pounds, to meet

immediate military requirements for communications, navigation, meteorology,

and reconnaissance. They could be launched either by improved Vanguards

or Thors in a schedule of 50 vehicles through 1961. Small, 10-pound satellites could also be advantageously launched from flying aircraft. The

long-term program included manned vehicles of the X-15 type, five lunar.

shots, and eventually 1,500-pound satellites using Titan-Vanguard combinations for propulsion. The cost was considerably but vaguely more than

$212 million.10

The Air Force suggested a short-term Thor-boosted 300-pound recoverable

►

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4

130

photographic-satellite by 1959. A long-term program, based on Atlas end

Titan miesiles in connection with WS-117L, included missions forpbotogrephy, ferret detection, infrared surveillance of aircraft and BMWs,

and eventually visual-surveillance with television. With program acceleration, a WS-117L 2,000-pound satellite on a, 300-mile orbit would be

possible by 1559. The great advantage of WS-117L was that it had been

under study since 1946 and under development since 1556: The weakness of

the Air Force paper was its lack of cost estimates.

Theadvisory group recognized valid military, scientific, and, eventually, commercial needs for satellites and.bellevel that the objectives

of the overall program would have to include manned spaceflight drawn from

the X-15 experience. The group urged both an imaeliateshort-range as

well as a long-range.program that would reach toward the genuinely spectacular. There were four major recommendations. First, plan for a strong

program of large satellites and manned flight. Second, take immediate

action to use the available potentialities of Vanguard and Jupiter-e to

launch very small satellites; as well as the Jupiter and Thor IBM's to

launch 300- to. 400-pound satellites by 1959. This. recommendation called

for a Thor-117L interim program while anticipating the Atlas-117L. Third,

W8-117L should be continued and given both military and nonmilitary application. The fourth recommendation urged that the scientific parts of the

*Already Jupiter-C was being called Juno I, a Redstone booster with three

clusters of Sergeants. JunolI was a JUpiter booster with three clusters

of Sergeants, and Juno III was a Jupiter booster with three clusters of

Vanguard Stage 3.

In evaluating WS-1171, the group noted the limited support given the project to date and emphasized the feasibility of using both the Thor- and

Atlas-boosted combinations for such nonmilitary and military purposes as

pure scientific exploration, communications, weather forecasting, etc., in

addition to the planned reconnaissance and surveillance tasks.
111141061. 131 •

national program should be carefully related and "mutually reinforced."12

The USAF Astronautical Program of 24 January

Anticipating the Stewart Committee's report by several days, Holaday

requested the Air Force--and presumably the Army and Navy too--on 7 January 1958 to suggest ways.of expediting the space effort. Holaday speccifically stated that the purpose of the paper was to assist the Director

of ARPA during the coming period of his indoctrination.

13

 The Directorate

of Research and Development prepared a summary statement on the Air Force

astronautical development program, listing 5 systems and 21 subsystems to

carry out 6 types of missions "essential to the maintenance of our national

position and prestige." (See Table, p 132.) Two areas were mentioned as

being of interest to both the military and scientific programs--space research and manned flight. Four other areas--reconnaissance, weapon delivery, data transmission, and countermeasures--were considered of military

interest only. The program covered a period of 10 years, and the cost

was estimated as an additional $61 million for fiscal year 1958 and $1.2

billion for fiscal year 1959. Assistant Secretary Horner forwarded the

proposal on 25 January and requested Holaday to approve it and grant the

required resources.

There was an unfortunate misunderstanding within Air Force circles

about the purpose of Holaday's request. DCS/Development and the Director

of Rasearch and Development thought the program should remain in and be

carried out by the Air Force. Horner, too, seemed to have made the same

assumption, else his request that Holaday approve the program and grant

the requisite funds was scarcely comprehensible. Holaday, on the other

hand, used the paper as he said be would--to assist Johnson during his
132

The Air Force Astronautical program of 24 January 

Subdivision Mission

I. 609 Ballistic • BRATS Space research

Test A Re--

lated Systems

Aerial survey and

target locating system

Reconnaissance

II. 447 Manned X-15 Space research

ftersonic Re- Advanced hypersonic Manned space

search System research aircraft flight

III. 464 Dyna Soar Manned capsule test Manned space flight

Conceptual test Mimed space flight

Boost glide tactical Weapon delivery

Boost glide interceptor Countermeasures

Satellite Interceptor Countermeasures

Global reconnaissance Reconnaissance

Global bomber Reconnaissance

IV.. 117 Satellite ABS & photo capsule

.Systems Recoverable data Reconnaissance

24-hr reconnaissance

system Reconnaissance

Global surveillance Reconnaissance;

space research

Manned strategic

station

Weapon delivery;

reconnaissance

Strategic communications station Data transmission

V. 499 Ia Manned variable tram Manned space flight;

system jectoryA.test

vehicle

Space research

Nuclear rocket test Space research

Ion propulsion test Space research

Lunar transport Manned space flight;

Space research

21. Manned lunar base Weapon delivery;

reconnaissance

4
MOW

indoctrination. Holaday therefore made no reply to Horner, which was

keenly disappointing to General Putt and his staff. There were some who

felt that the program had been pigeonholed to die--to be "Overtekeniby

events," as was said occasionally of later Air Force proposals.

Last USAF Efforts to Save the Astronautical Program

By the end of January it was plain that MCElroy would activate AREA

within a few days. It was also plain that ARPA would take over the military space research and development program unless McElroy could first be

persuaded to reconsider the. move. The Air Force then made three last at- .

tempts to limit ARPA's authority.

On 1 February 1958, Douglas harked back to his memorandum of 12 Novemher--still unanswered--in which he had asked that the Air Force have

responsibility for WS-117L satellites. Now, more than two months later,

he again addressed the Secretary of Defense, requesting that the latter

approve a draft paper containing the following paragraph and return it to

16

the Air Force as a directive:

In connection with the proposed establishment of ARPA, of which

you are aware; I desire that the foregoing projeCt for a military reconnaissance satellite, as accelerated in the proposal submitted to

me under date of November 12, 1957, be continued by.the Air Force.

However, no significant changes should be made in the program as so

approved without the specific approval of ARPA. Pending the definitive establishment of ARPA the Director of-Guided Missiles will have

directional authority in respect to the program.

Again there was no reply, and on 7 February McElroy activated ARPA..

For several weeks Johnson was too busy setting his new house in order

to exercise authority over the services. In this moment of respite, Douglas felt there was still the possibility of Waving the integrity of the

Air Force program. Once more, on 14 February, be approached McElroy and

requested authorization for the Air Force to undertake five projects

133

15
134 11111111es

closely related to, but more detailed than, the Thor-WS-117L proposals of

the previous November and December. These included ICBM nose-cone testing

using a Thor-Vanguard combination; a Thor7Hustler television satellite, to

be launched in September 1958, primarily for weather forecasting; a ThorVanguard satellite, with a first-flight date of July 1958, to carry out

reentry experiments; a Thor-Hustler scientific satellite to be launched

initially in October 1958; and a Thor-Vanguard launching for the purpose

of hitting the moon.

17

A week passed with no acknowledgment from the Secretary of Defense,

and on 21 February the Air Force made another try to save WS-117L for itself. This time Horner requested the Secretary of Defense to designate

the Air Force as executive agent for WS-117L since itsdevelopment plan

was already being readied. Indeed, a contract with Lockheed was being

supported from Air Force resources during fiscal year 1958. Provision for

the contract had been included in the original fiscal year 1959 budget,

but in the course of formulation the funds bad been deleted in favor of

ARPA. Horner hoped these funds would be returned to the Air Force, with

authority to proceed. 18

When McElroy replied on 24 February, he ignored Douglas' requests of

1 and 14 February. However, the Secretary of Defense approved the acceleration of WS-117L, but under the direction of ARPA. Also, he requested that

a fund status summary of Air Force space projects be submitted to ARPA.

The Air Force knew that development responsibility over USAF space projects

had passed to ARPA. Of course Headquarters USAF prepared the financial

statement and submitted it next day. (See summary, p 135.)

19

I

4
)

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135'

Air Force Fund Status Summary

February 1

(In Millions

►

Projects Under WayFunds Add Rants 

23911il . ffria 122§ FY2222

BRATS study (not yet approved 3.60 .50 20.00 177.50

by OSD)

X-15 study . 29.30 18.90 7.00 155.20

Dyne Soar 3.66 6.00 8.90 177.50

ABS (FT 1959 funds in ARPA

budget) 48.05 (96.00)8 2.00 245.00

Lunar base studies .70 .40 3.60 80.60

Technical development (including 90.00 110.90 14.50 214.10

1-million-lb-thrust rocket,

Yuman factors engineering,

electronic techniques, &

atmospheric physics)

Basic research (propulsion, 28.10 30.10 14.20

materials, geophysics, etc.)

Test & instrumentation 8.20 10.10 27.30

Center operations 5.00 30.00

Projects submitted OSD for

approval

Television satellites

Recoverable satellites

Scientific satellites

Moon impact

TOTAL 211.61 176.90 61.00 1,151.40

=Requested in the ARPA 1959 budget and not included in totals.

(Memo, B/Gen H.A. Boushey to C/S USAF, 28 Feb 58,

subj: Status of USAF Astronautics Program, vlincl,

Data Sheets.)
136

The Rule and Program of ARPA in

McElroy had ample opportunity in his first months in office to become

familiar with what the services had to offer and what they desired for the

Still nebulous space program. Before ARPA was activated in February 1958 ,

the Secretary experienced the disappointment of the Vanguard attempt on 6

December and another Vanguard failure on 5 February. On the other hand,

be was doubtless encouraged by the success of Explorer I on 31 January

and by plans for the continuation of that project. He had learned from

briefings, memorandums, conferences, and reports the potential capabilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in space activities, and he had also

the recommendations of the Stewart Committee to guide him in selecting

projects for assignment to ARRA.

ARPA's Operetin4, Procedures 

Johnson's approach to the services was not altogether a happy choice.

Although ARPA was established ostensibly to direct the research and development phase of military space projects, the activating DOD Directive No.

5105.15, of 7 FebruarY 1958, was couched in general terms: "The agency

shall be responsible for the direction or performance of such advanced

projects in the field of research and development as the Secretary of Detense shall, from time to time, designate by individual category." More

specifically, the agency was authorized to direct the assigned projects,

whatever they might be, by contractual arrangements with both government

and nongovernment agencies. Also, ARPA was authorized to acquire or construct facilities aseecessary. The Secretary of Defense thus remained

in a position to control the growth and responsibilities of ARPA by either

limiting the agency's responsibility t9 indivians all y assigned projects or 4

4

4
137

granting an overall authorisation for wide areas. The services of course

could do nothing but follow a "wait and see" policy while AKPA's true significance slowly unfolded.

There was one thing, however, of which both ARPA and the services

could be sure--in the specific areas of its eventual assignments, whatever

they might be, ARM would possess an authority superior to that of the Army,

Navy, or Air Force. For more than amonth4 Johnson did very little to

oho* what operating procedures he would employ. Then on 27 March 1958'

he sent nearly identical, memorandums of basic policy to each of the service secretaries. Though authorised to do.so, he would not in the near

future construct or acquire facilities, but he asserted his right to take

over service laboratories whenever he should deem it advisable. After

ARPA received project assignments from the Secretary of Defense, he would

reassign them among the services or perhaps outside the services—Whichevormight be conducive to greater efficiency. In pursuit of ARPA objectives). Johnson stated that he was free to deal directly with field agencies, completely bypassing service and command headquarters. He listed

the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, the Air Force Ballistic Missiles Division, other centers of the Air Research and Development Command, and the

Naval Ordnance Test Station (NOTS) at Inyokern, Calif., to which he would

issue directives from time to time "for technical and administrative

services."

The services did not relish Johnson's decision to act independently.

There was no question of his authority, but there was a question of the

wisdom of his decisions. To have a service, project assigned to ARPA and

then have it splintered into components for reassignment among service or
11111111111.1111 I

38

outside agencies might lead to increased efficiency in the development of

some parts, but it seemed unlikely that the project as a whole would benefit from dismemberment. Moreover, his policy of suspending established

methods of communication could lead to confusion, and it seemed to be at

least a partial transfer of indispensable field units from the control of

service headquarters to a fourth service. It was rather widely assumed 4

that this disregard for normal channels of communication came from Johnson's

IDA advisers who were "inexperienced with military methods , of procedure."

There is always another side of the coin. Johnson had great authority, but with it come corresponding difficulties. Though he could indeed

act independently as if chief of a fourth and superior service, his position within the Department of Defense made it necessary for him to act as

arbitrator in service differences over space. It is also right to mention

that Johnson did not get the idea of out-of-channel communications from •

his IDA advisers but from Secretary of the Army Brucker, who suggested

it as a "time-saving" device.

The out-of-channel communications did not work well. It neverthelvse

required most of 1958 for ARPA to concede and make amends. In. the end,

ARPA decided first to deal directly with ARDC rather than AFBMD and, somewhat later, to recognize the rights of Headquarters USAF.22

The Assignment of Projects to ARPA

Two months elapsed before any projects were actually assigned to ARPA,

but Johnson did not wait that long to assert his authority in the area of

space research and development.

McElroy's memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force on 24 February

1958 stated definitely that WS-1171, would be placed under ARPA. Four days

•

4

4
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611111116 139

later, Johnson gave evidence of his, right to speak for the Secretary of

Defense in matters pertaining to space. Expressing his own interest in

USAF's long-term claims to manned space flight and WS-1171,,, Johnson said

the Air Force should concentrate on these two fields even to the detrimeat of lower-priority projects. He wanted WS-117L accelerated but rejected the interim Thor-boosted version in favor of the Atlas version

23

and requested a clarification of the whole Air Force program.

Accordingly, Air Staff representatives briefed Johnson on 19 March

1958. The briefing covered unmanned systems, Dyne. Soar,. lunar base,

and manned satellites as a substitute for manned hypersonic research system. Explanations of WS-117L were limited to the Atlas version, and MIS

was still kept to the employment of a manned capsule in preference to con-

.

centration on Dyne Soar. Only the capsule method was considered capable

of putting a man in space ahead of the Russians.24

That same day, Johnson asked SOD-Presidential approval of three space

projects selected by ARPA. Project No. 1, to be assigned to AMA, called

for launchings--in August, November, and December 1958 and January 1959--

of a high-visibility "propaganda" satellite, an escape guidance experiment,

an IGY satellite, and a cloud-cover experiment. Project No. 2, to be

assigned to MOM, consisted of three lunar probes using a Thor booster,

part of Vanguard as second stage, and a solid rocket as third stage. Project NO. 3, to be assigned to ROTS, was the development and operation of a

mechanical ground-scanning system for the lunar probes.

25

McElroy sanctioned the projects within hours and forwarded Johnson's

request to the White House. Five days later, the President signified his

approval but carefully made the point that only for the time being ARPA
140 MUM

was acting as the national space agency. Upon the activation of a•ciVilian

agency; he warned, there would be a reevaluation and redistribution of proj-

,

sets. On 27 March 1958, Johnson was thus in a, position to issue ARPA

Orders (*0"s) Nos. 1, 2, and 3 to ABM, AFENI4 and MOTS to undertake the

development of the space vehicles, the lunar probes, and the scanning

26

system.

The buildup of the national space program began with .AO's 1, 2; and

3. Other projects passed to ARPA in quick succession. On 4 April, Argui,

the high-altitude atomic effects tests scheduled for the South Atlantic

area in the near future, became an ARPA responsibility though not technically part of the space program . 27 On 1 May another transfer was made by

an OSD directive that stated: 28

. . . all satellites and other outer space vehicle programs to be

conducted by the Department of Defense, including the VANGUARD series,

are hereby reassigned from the Director, Guided Missiles, to the Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency. The VANGUARD reassignment

specifically includes responsibility for preparatiowof the monthly

reports to the President on the progress in the International Geophysical . Yeer Satellite programs.

The Director, Guided Missilei will continue to be responsible

for iupport of the shove programs by necessary rocketry, launching

and other range facilities, and the like.

By the time that Vanguard became an ARPA project there was obvious

need . of a systematic way to record the transfers. On 17 May 1958 the

Department of Defense issued Directive No. 3200.5, which repeated the

February definition of ARM's authority and also served as the basic paper

to which all future transfers to ARPA would be recorded as inclosures.

AO's 1, 2, and 3 remained separate, but the Argus and Vanguard transfers

automatically became Inclosures 1 and 2. Between.then and October 1958

numerous other assignments were made, including WS-117L on 30 June. The
141

assignments covered the whole spectrum of u space-related" projects from

propellants to engines, electronic vehicles, tracking, defense against

ballistic missiles, and satellites-and space probes.

By the first of July it was possible to place ARPA's projects into•

three,broad areas: ballistic missile defense, chemical propellant research, and military'space, the last for the time being including some

projects destined for the civilian space agency. The frontiers of ARPA

had been drawn.

ARPA's Assignment, of Projects 

The. distribution of projects among the services began with AO's 1,

2, and 3. The system of formalizing the assignments was satisfactory and'

underwent no change. Between 19 March and 1 October 1958, ARPA issued 22

AO's, which in turn were subject to numerous amendments from time to title.

It was soon evident that Johnson wes.following through on his announced

policy of assigning, and even splintering, projects among the services

and other: agencies as he saw fit. The Air Force, in a last attempt to

preserve the integrity of its program, decided upon anew tactic. Rather

than appeal uselessly to the Secretary of Defense, an appeal should be made

*Projects tronsferred to ARPA, and the dates:

Argus (nuclear explosions in exosphere over South Atlantic) 4 Apr 58

All DOD approved satellite and outer space programs (with

Vanguard) 1 May 58

High-performance solid propellants 7 Jun 58

Minitrack doppler fence 20 Jun 58

USA and USAF ballistic missile defense projects except

Nike Zeus and BM WS 20 Jun 58

Studies of effects of space weapons employment on

military electronic systems go Jun' 58

Nuclear-bomb-propelled space vehicle 20 Jun 58

Superthrust rockets 20 Jun 58

9. W8-117L 30 Jun 58
to Johnson to assign the Air Force a revised USAF integrated program instead of its dismembered Parts. 29 In April, Headquarters had a plan conslating of four projects--an accelerated WS-117L.Advanced Reconnaleaance

Satellite, to be operational by March 1960; a . man-in-space capsule; a manned lunar base for intelligence observations of Barth and outer space;

and the continued development of the 300,000-. to 400,000-pound rocket

engine begun.in 1954; the 1,000,000-pound single-chamber engine begun

in 1957, and the ABC-USAF-sponsored nuclear-bomb-propelled vehicle. Maj.

Gen. Jacob E. Smart, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, forwarded the proposed

30

plan to Bonner for transmission to Johnson. The memorambmm rmaained

unsigned on Horner's desk until mid-Jzne. By that time it had been "overtaken by events" and was returned to General Smart.

In the meantime, ARRA'a breakdown : of programs and projects, and their

reassignment, continued. The Air Force received back from ARPA, on a contractual basis with ARDC and Arm, studies of satellite defense, effects

of space weapons on electronics, and the feasibility of nuclear-bombpropelled space vehicles. In addition, the Air Force also received assign,.

=ants for research in high-energy fuels, the development of W8-11718 and

Project Score. The latter was a propaganda stunt to send a complete Atlas

vehicle into orbit, equipped to broadcast a recorded Christmas message to

"the world" from the President.

The Air Force was pleased to have these assignments even as contracts

between ARPA and ARDC or ARPA and AFRO. Nevertheless, the Air Force was

seriously disturbed by ARPA's persistent splintering of projects into components, as for instance separating the three lunar shots from the development of a mechanical system to track them. The Air Force felt a keen

4
1

►

Number',-. Datworprifin

.1. SR 178 12 Feb.58.-

2. SR 181 10 Jul 58

3. SR 182 25 Jul 58

4. SR 183 4 Apr 58

'SR 184 24 Apr 58 24-hour reconnaissance satellite for continuous

surveillance of preselected areas on Earth.

SR 187 1 May 58 • Satellite interceptor tystim to eccbat'bOstile

satellites with early detection and elimination.

7.. SR 192 -29 Aug 58 Strategiolunaraystem-to determine feasibility

of using the moon for military purposes.

Objective:

Global surveillance system to determine design

of manned reconnaissance satellite system.

Strategic orbital system. to determine concept

for military operations in Earth orbital space.

Strategic interplanetary system to determine

military usageresearch for Vehicleand.test.

Lunar observatory as approach to manned oboes.--

vatory or:the moon, • - 

41111111111111 143

1 sense of loss in giving up to the Army the projects for the cloud-cover

-satellite. and•the'new 1.5 Million-pound cluitered ' engines. By midsuMmer

the-identity of the well-thought-out Air Force space program had been lost,

the : projects either assigned back to ARDC or AFBMD under ARM management

1 or scattered among other agencies. Indeed whenthe Directorate of Advanced

Technology came into being on 15•July 1958, the director, General Boushey,

had little to direct other than seven studies in a space study program de-

*teed since January:31

There was another matter resulting from the distribution of projects

that caused concern' in Headquarters USAF by the lite spring of 1958. The

• utcessful orbiting of Explorer I on 31 January--followed on 17-March by

. the successful orbiting of Vanguard I—planed the Air. Force: in an unfavorable position. The two satellites were most gratifying as.accomplish7

ments, but they left the Air Force as the only service that had not demonstrated an ability to launch a satellite despite the claim to preeminence

in space. Headquarters feared the situation would become "even more embarrassing" in'the next few months. The . only proMise of an early success,

after ARPA began distribution, was intbe . tbree lunar shots specified in

AO No. 2.

►
In April and Miay, Headquarters USAF thought of the lunar shots optimistically. There seemed a likely chance of success for either the first

or second try. In that event, the third shot, as an unnecessary duplication,.could probably be placed under WS-117L as a biological experiment 

Unfortunately, that is not the way the lunar probes turned out. The first

shot, on 17 August 1958, reached an altitude of only 40,000 to 70,000

feet. Before the second and third shots could be fired, the project passed from ARPA to NASA, which, like ABTA, operated in this instance through

AFBMD.. The second shot, on 11 October, reached an altitude of 70,700

miles,. and the third shot, on 8 November, went only to 963 miles.

The year 1958, whether during the period of ARPA's supremacy or

after the division. of the program with NASA, was not turning out well

for the Air Force. Not until 18 December did Air Force competence prove

.itself in space endeavors, for it was then that the Atlas missile of Project Score went into orbit.

4

4
111111111. 145

IX. NASA'S FIRST PROGRAM, OCTOBER 19)8 TO JULY 1959

During the first half of 1958 the services lost managerial control

of their space projects--but only to ARPA. At the same time it was evident that the activation of NASA, set for the early autumn, would bring

a day of reckoning, a day for the division of the national program between.

ARPA and the new civilian agency.

'The question that remained undecided during crucial weeks was where

to draw the dividing line between the military and civil programs.. There

were large areas of overlapping interests, projects which were of importance both for strategic and for scientific reasons. It would be a simple matter, of course, to make arbitrary decisions, to say which projects

were to be kept within the military program and which were to be transferred . to civilian control. But arbitrary distinctions between military

and civilian programs might not be wise from the viewpoint of national

interest. 'The nature of World War II and ` the international situation

that existed after the war blurred the linet between civilian and military

activities. Astronautics, whether civilian or military, whether aimed at

preparedness or peaceful pUrposes, would make.important contributions to

human welfare, to the political prestige of the United States, and to the

1

defensive and offensive strength of the nation.

The Space Act of 1958 provided both for military and civilian space

programs and for cooperation and coordination between the space agencies.

The aim Was to avoid undue duplication. The danger was in assignment of,

borderline projects to civilian management. Despite the best intentions
146

. to cooperate, the civilian agency would be motivated by scientific objectives devoid of the urgency required by defense.. Under the circumstances

it peeZed.better to keep the border projects under military control.

failing this, to tolerate some duplication rather than hold back the military use of vehicles for which there was no pressing need among civilians.

ARPA's Claim to. Border Projects 

From the President's message to Congress on 2 April 1958 it. was clear

that NACA would become the nucleus of NASA, and there would be a wide

overlap of civilian and military interests. With ARPA already serving

as the national space agency, it was expedient for Johnson, Director of

ARPA, and Dryden, Director of NACA, to establishli "jurisdictional committee" to determine as far as possible the ARPA and NASA areas of operations. Negotiations were in progress before the end of April. Johnson

made a strong effort to keep military losses to the minimum. As pro

tempore bead of the national space program, he organized ARPA's existing.

projects into four categories. Category I, Defense vs ICBM's, covered the

entire field except Nike-Zeus and MEWS. By their very nature, there was

no chance of Category I projects being transferred to NASA. Category II,

Military Reconnaissance Satellites, was little more than the Air Force

WS-117L program, and that too was certain to remain under DOD control.

Category III, Military Developments for and Applications of Space Technology, was "a collection of smaller items," which became the real bone

of contention between. ARPA and NACA (NASA). As Dr. York said before a

congressional committee on 23 April, "On our first go-rourdl and for our

own part, we /in ARPA7 list all these Leategory III project] as being

I
1147

military developments." Category IV, indisputably destined for NASA,

1 included the four satellite experiments of AO No. 1 being designed by

the Army; the three lunar probes of AO No. 2 entrusted to MEND and their

payloads being developed by MOTS; Project Vanguard; and the Explorer serp

I

►

ies for cosmic ray, solar, and astronomical measures as well assmeteor2

ological and biological research.

By the first week in May, ARPA and NACA agreed that the initial program for NASA would contain three principal areas of interest: use of

unmanned space vehicles instrumented to collect scientific information;

development of science, technology, and equipment required for manned

space flight; and research and development of componenti and techniques

needed to increase the national capability in space technology. 3

Throughout the remains of the spring and well into the summer of

1958, ARPA continued to hope and work for a strong military program. The

basic philosophy was that the United Stites could not permit, either from

a national or military standpoint, a foreign power to control space.

This condition overruled the argument that the military should attempt

no space exploration until it was possible to determine specific military

usefulness. As ARPA spokesmen pointed out, "A strong military research

and development program that will lead to manned and unmanned space orbiting weapon systems and space flight vehicles to permit military

*Category III included man-in-space; Operation Argus (the high-altitude

tests of atomic detonation effects held in the South Atlantic in the

autumn of 1958); satellite tracking and monitoring systems (which had

come to the fore in early spring discussions of celestial traffic control);

satellite communications relay, meteorological reporting, and navigational

aid systems; bomb-powered rockets; and solid propellants. These were

projects of mutual scientific and military interest, and the services

hoped to keep them in DOD.

p

1111•1111110
148

operation in ;mace can be the key to future.nationalaurvival."

ARPAhelieved . that-military space miseionsArouldlell into four

types: defensivemisoions to defend the United.States from IOHN46,.IREWs,

and.satelliteweapon carriers; offensive missions for:purposes of deterrence or strategic weapon delivery; information missions for surveillance,

communicatio%=weather observation, and space traffic control; and =space

bases for logistic purposes.

The President's Division of ace Projects 

Actually the militiury were fighting a lost cause. Under the Space

Act of • 1958• the President had authority to determine which' agency should

be responsible for specific projects. His policy of space-for-peace made

him reluctant to grant the military any space activity that could be considered of scientific interest, and when be signed the Space Act on 29

5

July, he made it clear that borderline projects would go to NASA.

• Two months later, on 1 October, when Dr. Glennan activated the civilian agency, the President Confirmed this decision in Executive Order

10783. He thereby transferred to NASA responsibility for:

The United States scientific satellite project (Project

VANGUARD)

Specific projects of the Advanced Research Projects Agency

opd of.tbe • Departient Of the Air Force whichxelate apace activities (including lunar probes, scientific eatellites, and sWer

000Pters) within. the A0%0 of the functionstevolving upon-thruet 

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the provisions

of the National Aeronautics and SpoceAct of 1958, and wbichsball

be more particularly described in one.or more supplementary Executive

orders hereafter issued.

With the exception of Project Venguard4 however, the specific Tmojsets entrusted to MA were not defined since the. "one or more sapplememtary Executive orders" were never issued. The =Union eetthledJUSA

I
149

claim practically any ARPA or USAF project remotely connected with astronautics provided the President did not disapprove. In October 1958, ARPA

lost control of Category IV, as had been expected, and also a large part

of Category III•which may also have been expected but was certainly contrary to military hopes. Still worse, it appeared probable that the

remainder of Category III might also pass to NASA in the near fUture.

*6

Along with its sweeping responsibility for space projects, NASA acquired extensive but scattered facilities. With the absorption of NACA,

it acquired the three research centers at Langley APB, Va.; Cleveland,

Ohio; and Moffett Field, Calif. In addition there was Wallops Island,

Va., and several other field offices. Within a matter of weeks the President also transferred to NASA most of the Army's interest in the Jet Propulsion Laboratory under the California Institute of Technology. At the

same time, that is within the. first two or three months of its existence,

NASA made at least two vain attempts to get part of the Army Ballistic

Missile Agency at Huntsville, but the President's reputed reply of "not

at this time" only postponed the answer ARPA feared would be affirmative

sooner or later.

7

NASA's First Nine Months

NASA's responsibility was to organize a space program considerably

broader than that required by ARPA or the three services. In undertaking

the work, Dr. Glennan, himself an outstanding scientist, had the assistance

*Actually, little of the original ARPA ”space" program remained in the

agency with the exception of WS-117L. But new projects were being discussed, and some were soon approved and placed under ARPA's authority,

so that by the end of October the agency could boast an 11-project program.
of Dr. Dryden . and the very•competent former. MACA staff. They were well

versed-in current space technOlogys-and many of thma/hed,served on a apecial*NACA committee.that anticipated NASA's early needs.by preparing a

report, submitted to Glenn= on 28 October 1958, to guide-tisfirst. efforts.

Entitled-"Pecommendations. to NASA for a National Civil Space Program," the

report emphasised the role that the physical and life. sciences would. play

in the exploitation' of spade and pointed out the importance of manned

space flight.' it called for close coordination with "civil . and military

ageneies."-'ihrelated work, but, since NASA's program. would be•largely one

of scientifio'intereet, there was nowhere in the report that sense!of urgency felt vithin•the armed forces.

8

Before the end of 1958, Glennanapproved a NASA prograa for fiscal

years 1959-60. (See program, p 151.) Among other things, it called for

numerousapace . science and advanced technology projects, the latter with

emphasis onthe..developmeot of boosters and vehicles. In operations, the

program would mean launching many-soanding rockets, 35 satellites,.? lunar'

probes, and 3 interplanetary probes.before July 1960. It- was an ambitious

undertaking.

The space science program was very broad. It.covered..seven,great.

areas of research: the atmosphereof the.earth, moon, planets, and suns.

the ionosphere; energetic particles; the. electric. magnetic fields;

the gravitational fields; astronomy; and: biosciences.

Of course m.program that reached so far into scientific investigation was necessarily one of unceasing flux. Details of projects, and..

entire, projects, varied from., month to month, : almost from d4y . to . day. By

the Spring:of 1959 the program. in general content was,mbout what it had
tt

I

Ir

151

NASA's Program for FY's 1959-60 

1. Supporting activities

JPL funding-nondirected programs

University contracts and grants--long-term nonspecific

research

2. Space science program

Sounding rockets, numerous launchings

35.satellites

7 lunar probes

3 interplanetary probes

3. Application program

Meteorological satellite in connection with other

agencies

Communication satellite, to be at first a large balloon

or reflective type

24-hour satellite to be developed with AMA

Navigational satellite but details very indefinite

4. Advanced technology program

Vehicle technology

Boosters--recoverable

PrOpulsion

Man-in-space (MIS)

Human factors

Scout

5. Ground support

Tracking

Launchings

Guidance.

Structures.
1111111M

been in October, but the projects were more daring. NASA witnesses in

congressional hearings spoke of lunar impacts, lunar orbitingspand,soft

lunar landings as well as manned space...flight, all by the end of 1961.

In addition, there would behdeeper and deeper probes into space and the

development of moteorologicall communication, and astronomical observatory

satellites. Experience was soon to prove, however, that optimism outran

technoloa.9

I

I

4

If the space science program yes to earn the aura of reality, it hai

to be based upon the possession, or at least the prospects, of adequate

boosters and vehicles. Invested with authority by the.Spacet Act of 1958

to call for cooperation from any Federal agency, Glenn= cast aside completely the old taboo against the use of military rockets for the peaceful exploitation of space. Se informed the President that military rockets

would be used when needed and called upon DOD to supply him with requisite 4

information, services, equipment, facilities, and personnel.

10

 Since nei- I

ther the President nor the Secretary of Defense offered objection to Olennan's action, it was evident that military rockets could then be used for

scientific projects without travail of conscience.

The rockets immediately available to NASA were, however, of limited

usefulness. Vanguard ..seemed still unreliable and, along with the more

reliable Jupiter-C, offered small payload capacity. The combinations of

Jupiter and Jupiter-C as well as Thor-Able were equally hampered by technical shortcomings that prevented high-altitude orbiting. At the end of

the year NASA turned to Thor-Hustler (later redesignated Agena), a combination of Thor and Bell Aircraft's Rustler engine. It was the most powerful and most. welcome member of mut e first group of vehicles, but it could

JIM

I
NOM 153

not meet all of the requirements of en expanding programell

In January 1959, NASA listed three vehicles in a near-future second

group:and seven basic engines to be developed for the long-termsumgraa.

The second group included a modification of Thor-Able with guidance to •

become Thor-Delta and two Atlas combinations, one of which, Atlas-Hustler,

would lift a 3,000-pound payload. The seven basic engines included two

modifications--one a Vanguard and•the other a 61 000-pound storable-fuel

JPL engine--and five new ones. The latter ranged in thrusts from the

15,000-pound Pratt & Whitney to the 1.5 million-pound single-chamber

ItcxOurbtrne.

NASA devised various combinations of the seven engines to provide

four basic vehicles--Vega, Centaur, Saturn, and Nova. Saturn, being developed by ABPA4BNA4 would have a cluster of eight 188,000-pound engines

with a total thrust of 1.5 million pounds, and Nova would have a cluster

of four 1.5 million-pound single engines with a total thrust of 6 million

pounds.

Both the plans for the second group and for the seven basic engines

were very impresslie and constituted "a great leap forward"--at least on

paper--provided, of course, that delays could be avoided on the way. NASA

believed that between the fall of 1959 and the winter of 1961 it would be

possible to increase orbital payloads from 300 pounds at altitudes of 300

miles to 800 pounds at 22,000 miles. The payload for the long-range prospects was estimated to be 8,000 pounds at 300 miles.13

As part of the overall propulsion program, NASA included more futuristic projects. A number of nonchemicalsystems were based on nuclear

and electric engines; the latter included both ion and plasma rockets.
154 NMI

But no matter how promising they might be, the application of results

14

would be part of very long-term objectives.

In April 1959, Dr. Glennan stated that NASA scientists were "hard at

work on problems connected, with all our major military missiles--problems

concerned with warhead stability, stage separation, and high energy fuels,

to name a few. It is no exaggeration to say that just about every U.S.

aircraft and missile had benefitted importantly from NASA research."15

Certainly the NASA program did help the military, but not as an unmixed

blessing. NASA adopted a program with fine scientific objectives, but

the instruments with which the program was to be put into effect were

largely.military projects transferred to NASA authority. NASA's space

vehicles, whether already available or under development, were originated

by the military, sometimes in cooperation with NACA. NASA's research work

in fuels, and in nonchemical engines was a continuation of research begun

by the military. NASA's man-in-space or Mercury project was originally

an Air Force dream. Once these projects passed from military to civilian

control, even though their development continued and under efficient management, the emphasis shifted. They had one significance for the military,

another for NAS4,.and there was a tendency to slow down in just those aspects of the program in which defense was most interested.

The exploitation of apace is costly. If the United. States could not

afford to support two programs so that neitherwould interfere with the

other, there weresome who felt that national security demanded the survival of military projects, even if that meant elimination of civilian

patticipation.
155

NASA-USAF Relations

The creation of ARPA and NASA affected the Air ForOe unfavorably, since

its future might well depend upon a space role. To have the space program

taken over by ARPA was a serious blow, and to have the program again divided

with NASA.was yet more disturbing. Entirely outside the Department of De- .

tense, the leaders of the civilian agency thought neither in terms nor

interests of the military but pursued space flight and space exploration

as ends in themselves. Yet national defense was at stake.16

Favored by the President as an expression of space-for-peace, NASA

could often impose its will upon the Department of Defense and the military services. Furthermore, the Bureau of the Budget was the voice of the

President in matters of government finance, and in some ways became the

final arbiter in matters of space. It distributed its benedictions among

space projects and between the two space programs in accordance With the

White Rouse philosophy of economy and preference for the civilian agency. 17

The Air Force hoped for cordial relations with NASA as a matter both

of national and service interest, perpetuating if possible the excellent

cooperation that had always existed between itself and MCA. The space

agency seemed destined to play the major role in the American program for

years to come, and the future of the Air Force lay in space. Cooperation

could be beneficial to both. The Air Force could assist NASA with supporting facilities and experienced personnel, and NASA could assist the

Air Force in projects of mutual interest.

There were of course occasions of misunderstanding, but the Air Force

kept its goal of cooperation. This policy vas brought out clearly in

connection with the long-delayed WS-609BaLlistic kEssile Test System
156

(ENTS). In the summer of 1958 the Directorate of Research and Development suggested a joint USAF-NACA effort for the project, and the subsequent negotiations. betWeen the two agencies culminated in a USAF-NASA

Memorandum of Understanding on 31 October. It provided for USAF-NASA

cooperation in the development of a solid-rodket test vehicle that the

Air Force soon redesignated as the Hypersonic Environment Test System

(BETS) and NASA called Stout.

The Air Force hoped that the cooperation shown by NASA in connection

with NETS-ScOut would prevail generally, but unfortunately there were

other signs of strain. In addition to NASA's no-urgency attitude and nonmilitary security precautions, there were two major sources of. irritation--

NASA's interruptive demands on USAF facilities and resources used for ballistic missiles and NASA's tendency to assume proprietary rights in the

lunar system of the USAF space study program.

19

NASA's first contact with the Air Force came shortly after the agency's activation and was essentially in matters of logistics. Although

the space agency inherited the facilities of NACA, these were inadequate

to the vastly expanded requirements of the space projects. NASA thereupon proceeded to contract missile industry and civilian research centers

and to take over facilities owned by or contracted to other government

agencies.

20

By January 1959, NASA bad acquired the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, had

tried to take over AR NA, and was writing contracts with Rocketdyne and

the Space Technology Laboratories. Simultaneously, NASA received space

projects previously assigned by ARPA to AFRO. The transfer automatically

broadened NASA's grip, with some disruption of the USAF ballistic missile

program. The question for the Air Force and for ARPA too, was how to
157

share the missile-boosters with NASA and bow to determine the NASA-service

demands on missile industry and_test facilities without serious impairment

of the military weapon system program. As early as January 1959 the NASAARPA requirements for Atlas boosters generated major problems in scheduling. Also the launching of NASA space vehicles threatened to overtax the

21

Air Force facilities at Patrick and Vandenberg.

Thus at the beginning of the new year, NASA's enthusiasm, plus its

failure to appreciate military requirements, imposed strains on relations

with the Air Force. To ease the situation, Headquarters usAr at the behest of AMID sought a NASA-USAF agreement to apportion the demands being

made on USAF resources for ballistic missile research, development, production, and testing facilities. In turn, NASA professed fear that such

an agreement would interfere with the civilian space program and preferred

to negotiate at the level of the Secretary of Defense. At the end of fiscal year 1959 there VAS still no NASA-USAF agreement on these vital questions, and the military program felt the disadvantage of having a lower

22

priority than that of the civilian program.

In the weeks following ARPA's activation, when service projects were

being transferred to that agency by OSD decree, the Air For6e began a

space st6dy program. Its inspiration was a desire by Air Force leaders

to avoid in the age of space exploration the blind spot that had led to

the lapse of the ICBM program between 1547 and 1954. The need was to

look as far as possible into the future of space exploration and keep an

integrated concept of possible operations ahead of current requirements.

The means chosen to effect this aim was a relatively small progress
158 MUM

already sponsored by ARDC,

*

 with industry. 23

Immediately after Sputnik, Headquarters USAF authorised ARDC to undertake a study of military space applications and of the research and development to attain and support the requisite systems. The conclusion

was that there were three basic areas of permanent Importance—Earth

satellites, lunar control, and interplanetary exploration. In the next

few months, February-August 1958, the ARDC-industry effort produced seven

series of study requirements (SR's), six of which were organized as sub24 studies under three strategic systems:

Strategic Orbital Strategic Lunar Strategic Interplanetary

System System System 

SR 181, Strategic, SR 192, Strategic SR 182, Strategic

10 Jul 58 Lunar System, Interplanetary,

29 Aug 58 25 Jul 58

SR 178, Global Sur- SR 183, Lauer

veillance Observatory,

12 Feb 58

,

4 Apr 58

SR 187, Satellite

Interceptor System,

1 May 58

The seventh series, the 24-hour reconnaissance satellite studies, SR 184,

1958, was regarded as a possible support system--along with the photographic

satellite of WS-117L, the meteorological satellite, man-in-space, and Dyne

*The program was conducted on both a voluntary and funded basis. ARDC

from time to time released to industry general descriptions of an area

of probable future operational significance. Industry in turn'undertodk

studies to determine the kind of weapons likely to be required, considering technical feasibility, operational concept, facilities manpower,

training, methods of development, production schedules, and overall cost

estimates. The studies were then evaluated by ARDC, the School of Aviation Medicine, would-be interested cc:emends, Rand, Headquarters USAF,

and MACA. It was a complicated process, but the end results had been

useful.

I

I

I
159

Soar--for the Strategic orbital system.

The idea of a lunar base, vilidh was carefully evaluated in .SR 192 and

SR 183, bad already aroused strong interest in some USAF circles, and.a

lunar base had been listed as one of the five main divisions Of the Air

Force proposed astronautical program submitted to the Director of Guided...

Missiles on 25 January 1958. It was defended by General poushey, Deputy

Direotor. of Research . end Development, in congressional hearings during

April, when he claimed that the moon could be used at a launching site

for deeper . penitration of space, as a supply bass for earth satellites,

as an astrOndeiCal and meteorological . observatory, and as a means of wOrld •

•

vide surveillance that could be a deterrence to aggression. From time to

time other spokesman said essentially the same thing and warned that it

:. •

might well become a matter of urgency to claim the moon by landing there

,s.

' ahead of the RUssiani..25

The suggestion that a lunar base was militarily significant was Waal"

longed, but its scientific value could never once be denied. NaturallY

the strategic lunar system (SR 192) ancilunar observatory studies (SR:183)

excited interest among the NASA representatives at a RASA-USAF conference

on 13 November 1958. NASA asked that it be kept epprised • of the progress.

made by the whole space study program, particularly in the fields of over-

. • .

lipping interests. NASA wanted especiaily•tolnaorthe strategic lunar

system status and in return for this Air Force information,: offered full

26

reciprocation.•

.

In succeeding months, the strategic lunar system began to seem feasible with a logical extension of current techniques. In the spring of

1959 there was speculation that a manned lunar landing and return might
160

be possible by 1967, and a permanent lunar base by 1969. The estimated

cost was fixed at $8 billion and an annual operating cost after establisho

ment of the base of approximately $600 million. 

27

In accordance with the agreement of November 1958, NASA was kept in.

formed of progress but seemed less and less inclined to reciprocate. Grad.

ually a background of unhappy incidents in NASA-USAF relations built up.

In Much 1959, ARDC invited NASA to participate in contractor midpoint

briefings on SR 183. The response was markedly unenthusiastic, and .only

one NASA representative attended. Early in April, NASA created a Lunar

Exploration Group. The Army and Navy had representatiVes on the group

but not the Alr Force. A short time afterwards, on 17 April, to the surprise of the Air Force, NASA announced plans for long-range scientific ex28

ploration of the moon. It was at this same time that NASA representatives

were speaking confidently of lunar orbiting. and landings in their statements before congressional committees.

A few days later, at a scheduled Headquarters ARDC briefing by two

contractors working on the strategic lunar system studies, NASA representatives "injected" the remark that the lunar area was "exclusively NASA

property." This far-from-cooperative attitude by NASA in the lunar field

became more noticeable as weeks passed, and it came to cover much wider

area,. Although during the summer of.1959 NASA agreed to participate with

ARDC in briefing the Department of State'on space activities and programs,

NASA soon reneged. The stated explanation was that NASA must avoid the

impression of comprOmising its devotion to space-for-peace by seeming to

associate its program with the military.

29

 There were suggestions, however, that the Air Force's insistence upon urgency for the overall program
I 1011111bris 3.63.

was very irritating to NASA officials who, adjusting plans to budgets in

the 1958-59 period, could not conceive of a lunar base except as a 20-year

30

progrask•

Whatever the explanation, the trend in MASA-USAFrelationsthat de-

.

veloped over the space study program was discouraging. The men-in-space • ,

project had' already' transferred to NASA, and it looked as though NASA

'dad also take over the lunar exploration and base projects as vell, with

not so much as acknowledgement of indebtedness.

Headquarters USAF, however, made no compromise in its effort tO'better

relations as a long-term objective. In the spring • of 1960 it was Air Force:

policy, and of course ARDC policy as well, to adhere, to full cooperation

with NASA even "at the risk of our own programs. NASA must have the max-

!

imum possible access to ARDC's objectives and aims. in projects of mutual

interest."3/
X. ARPA AND THE MILITARY PROGRAM, OCTOI3ER 1958 TO JULY 1959

The loss of Category N and most of Category III projects, gave ARPA's

program the lean look of starvation. • See program, p 163.) One glance and

every bone in the skeleton was visible, but the shrinkage did not alter the

agency's position within the Department of Defense. In October 1958 the

agency still • operated under the original DOD directive of 7 rebruary--vhose

number had been changed to 3200.5 on 17 May. If AMA was criticized, sometimes with the audible hope that it might be short lived, Secretary McElroy's

reply was always the same: ARPA was a permanent addition.

In the course of the next eight or nine months the overall situation

changed. ARPA's program suffered a few more losses to NASA but generally

held its own, moved toward maturity in some projects, and gained several

new projects. The criticism of ARPA became more and more outspoken in

military circles, but the agency was also stoutly derendbk and these opinions were personal rather than official statements on the part of the Services. At the same time the position of ARPA shifted and slipped lover in

the DOD organizational structure.

The Military 3 e Program--Second Phase

After the division of projects with NASA, ARPA still did work in the

ballistic missile defense area, which in•one instance overlapped the space

program, and in the space program itself the agency continued active in

research and development for various satellites--six in late 1958 and early

1959. Also, ARPA vas instrumental in preparing the way for an effective tracking system and supported . booster.developments . as long as permitted to do so.

o: I
11111111111111111111111M

AMA's program,

163

Summer of Lip before NASA was

1. Missile defense except Nike-Zeus

and BMWS

Probable Program after Transfers 

to NASA

1. Missile defense except Nike,

Zeus and BMWS

Act 

2. Military reconnaissance satellite

WS-117L (being reorganised into,

three separate projects within

ARPA)

2. Military reconnaissance satellite

WS-117L •

2.1 advanced reconnaissance

satellite

2.2 photo capsule

2.3 24-br reconnaissance

2.4 manned strategic station

2.5 strategic communication satellite

2.6 global surveillance

Military developments for the application of space technology

3.1 man-in-space

3.2 special engines

3.3 special components

3.3.1 chemical batteries

3.3.2 nuclear reactor

3.3.3 solar batteries

3.3.4 telemetry (etc.)

3.4 Project Argus

3.5 satellite tracking (Space Track)

3.6 practical application of satellites

3.6.1 communications satellite

3.6.2 meteorological satellite

3.6.3 navigational satellite

3.7 bomb-powered rocket

3.8 solid propellants

Other advanced research projects. 4. Certain to be lost to NASA

4.1 ARMAPPL program

4.1.1 MAU balloon for density

4.1.2 ABMA scientific satellite

4.1.3 Army lunar probe

4.1.4 Army lunar probe

4.2 Three USAF lunar probes (one fired)

4.3 NRL gadget program to photograph

back side of moon

4.4 Follow-on program, a continuation of

the IGY work in

4.4.1 cosmic measurements

4.4.2 astronomical measurements

4.4.3 solar research

4.4.4. biological research

3. Certain to be lost to NASA except

for 3.5 satellite tracking and

3.6.3 navigational satellite
164 1

The Satellite projects,

Three of the six satellite types being sponsored by ARPA came from -

WS-117L. On 10 September 1958, Johnson redefined the Advanced Reconnaissance

System and broke it down into separate projects with different designations.

Previously the system designation had been changed from Pied Pipet to Sentry,

and now Johnson kept his name for the true reconnaissance satellite that employed

visual (photographic) and ferret (electromagnetic) methods of observation.

Be stripped away a series of experiments that had clustered around Sentry

and gathered them together as the function of another satellite, Discoverer.

This project was designed for vehicle and subwystem tests, biomedical

flights, and the mastery of recovery techniques. The infrared subsystem 4

of ARS then was redesignated as the Missile Defense 4larm Satellite (Midas).

• Its function was to detect ICBM's at practically the instant of their

launching and thereby appreciably advance the time of warning. All three

projects were assigned to ARDC-AFBMD with the usual contractual arrangement. These three satellites would depend initially upon Thor boosters

but eventually the operational versions would employ Atlas.1

A satellite strategic communication station had also been one of the

subsystems of WS-117L, but it was not until July 1958 that ARPA acted to

support the idea and instructed ARDC to prepare the plan. By that time

the Army and Navy too had submitted their communication satellite require2

meats, and a strong triservice interest was vested in the outcome.

The ARDC abbreviated development plan was completed on 26 August.

It called for a Worldwide communication system consisting of several Betellites in polar orbit and, later, four on equatorial orbit which, at altitudes of 22,000 nautical miles would equal the angular velocity of the
411111111111m

earth and appear stationary. The primary purpose of the system was to

alert the United States in a crisis of imminent hostilities, provide SAC

sufficient warningto mount a retaliatory strike force, and enable SAC to

exercise command and control over the strike force once it was airborne.

The Air Staff approved ARDC's plan and submitted it to ARPA on 30 September 1958.3

After cautious consideration Johnson approved the plan on 22 October

butmplintered the prOject, assigning vehicle development to ARDC and payload,to the Army Signal-Corps. Here, as in almost no other instance, the.

splintering became a major issue because Air Force interest in acommunication. satellite was widely different from that of the Army and Navy.

These two services wanted the equatorial satellite to improve the trunking

system for the .transmission of critical intelligence information to and

from Europe, the Middle Nast, and Far East. Such an aid to communication

would provide the Army and Navy with the best insurance of command and control for oversee weapons and forces. Since an equatorial, stationary satellite, orbiting at 22,000 miles, was certainly far beyond the capabilities

of the Unitand States in 1958, the Army and Navy wanted interim repeater

satellites orbiting the. equator at 2,000 miles. The Air Force had little

interest in any equatorial satellite, and none in a repeater, for this

satellite could cover only that territory between 75° 13 and. 75° N latitude.

The Air Force wanted a polar satellite that would cover areas of the world

4

The Air Force protested strongly to Johnson against his decision, and

*The repeater principle had been used in Project Score, launched 18 December 1958.

165

where SAC forces were flying.
01111111111ft

he conceded the need for an Army-Air Force working group to insure that

the Signal Corps designed a communication package meeting the needs of

all three services. In the discussions that followed the Army and Navy.

were in mutual support, and agreement with the Air Force was difficult.

The negotiations continued for weeks, with no settlement in sight. Johnson

broke the deadlock by stating on 6 March 1959 that SAC's need for a polar

satellite should be met at the earliest practicable date. His decision

resulted in an ARPA-sponsored communication satellite program consisting

of three major systems: the SAC polar satellite termed Steer that would

have its first test flight in 15 months, using an Atlas-Agena vehicle; an

interim delay-repeater satellite designated Courier; and a 24-hour global

communication satellite named Decree, to be developed sometime in the

future. 

5-

In the midst of these discussions, the long-dormant suggestion of a

navigation satellite rose to the level of ARPA approval. Both the Navy

and the Air Force expressed an interest in such a project when making their

recommendations to the Stewart Committee in December 19574anuary 1958. But

the Air Force did not include it in its' 25 January proposal, and the project

was generally regarded as one primarily supported by the Navy. The purpose

of the navigation satellite was to insure an instantaneous all-weather

system for determining the position of any point on the globe by passive

means. The receiving station, on ship or shore, or in the air, would

listen for a radio signal from the satellite as it came over the horizon.

The satellite would relay to the receiving station the signal for the

Doppler shift, the synchronous time, and the orbital parameters in effect.

The information would be sufficient to permit locating the circle of

4

•

4

4
aiNalft 167

position within 0.4 mile. The project had the name Transit. It was essentially simple, and in expectation of miniaturization, ARPA was thinking

at the end of fiscal year 1959 of employing it operationally as a piggyback payload on some prime satellite mission. During the research and

development stage, management was split between AFBMD and the Navy's Bureau

of Ordnance.

6

The sixth satellite project was the elaborated version of the cloud

cover experiment assigned to ABM by AO 1, on 19 March 1958. In succeeding

months it had been designated the Television Infra-Bed Observing Station

(Tiros) and was being developed to observe weather conditions in target

areas, refueling zones, landing fields, and ocean operating areas. It

would be for all intents an extension of weather aircraft operations. Its

payload mould consist of television cameras and photocells for infrared

detection. As the project expanded, the Army Signal Corps and the Air

Force Cambridge Research Center had been adMitted to participation. It

was a promising project, but in January 1959 Johnson informed JCS it would

be transferred to NASA.

7

In briefing JCS, Johnson dipped somewhat into the future. Be spoke

of a possible satellite for electronic countermeasures, of a space surveillance platform, and of a maneuverable recovery space vehicle (MRS V). The

latter would insure a means of attack, defense, and escape, and the ARPA

director expressed his confidence that in the end man-in-space would be

possible. In this connection he referred to the loss of the man-in-space

project to NASA but pointedly remarked that the Air Force's boost-glide

Dyne Soar would surpass the capabilities of Mercury. Here, indeed, was

potentially a manned space vehicle that could maneuver in and out of orbit,
4 AMA

remaining under sufficient pilot control to operate from and return to

8

It was gratifying to have Johnson's recognition of Dyne. Soar, but

to some USAF officials his remarks could have presaged its loss either

to ARPA or to NASA. ARPA saw the need of a manned maneuverable spacecraft

and could take over Dyna Soar for development if the Air Forde advanced

its orbital* capability. At the same time, NASA claimed to be the agency

for manned 'spaceflight and could demand the transfer of Dyne Soar if ARPA

took it as a manned space vehicle. As one Air Force officer said:

9

The Air Force-bas. been successfUl in retaining control of Dyne

Soar by apserting that it has less than an orbital flight capability.

This procedure has thus far succeeded in thwarting AMA's overtures

to take over ..thee program. The Director of ARPA has stated • that the

Dyna Soar program is the best approach toward the goalof Manned

space vehicles having a military capability. It is anticipated that

ARPA will develop some type of a man-in-space program patterned after

the Dyne Soar program. At the present time, ARPA is conducting investigative studies on advanced vehicle characteristics which would be

applicable to such a.progrem.

4

As a safeguard, the Air Force continued for some time to emphasise the

suborbital rather than the orbital characteristics of Dyne. Soar while going

forward with its development as rapidly as weak funding and strong opposi-

*10

*At the time that Johnson briefed JCS, January 1959, Dyne Soar seemed to

be moving forward rapidly. On 25 November 1957, DD 94 authorised ARDC

to proceed with Dyne Soar, and on 16 June 1958 the command announced the

selection of Boeing and Martin as dual contractors for the early design

phase. In April 1959, Boeing and Martin submitted designs, and SAB lent

full support. Gradually, opposition in OSD seemed also to be dwindling.

The Air Force felt more certain of its claims to Dyna Soar and by US

late autumn of 1959 was speaking without constraint of the boost-glide

vehicle as possibly meeting. USAF space requirements. (Draft memo by

D/AT, to be sent by SAF to SOD, 23 Oct 59, subj: Required Action on Dyne

Soar.)

predetermined fixed military bases.

tion within OSD permitted.
169

The Booster Program,

As the need for larger satellites became more pressing, the need for

more powerful boosters became more and more apparent. In the first six

months of 1959, ARPA still had two major propulsion development projects

under way—Saturn and Centaur. Saturn was the new name given to Juno

the 1.5 million-pound booster consisting of a cluster of eight engines.

It had begun with in-house studies by ABMA in April 1957, and on 15 August

1958, AO 14-59 directed the Army Ordnance and Missile Command (AOMC) to

develop the booster. On 19 May 1959, ARPA announced the selection of the

upper stages for the Saturn vehicle--a two-engine Titan for second stage

and a Centaur as third stage. The Titan would Contribute a thrust of

367,000 pounds, and Centaur would add 30,000 pounds. Before the end of

fiscal year 1959, there were prospects of using Saturn to launch USAF

11 strategic surveillance satellites.

Centaur promised great versatility and in 1959 was also being mentioned

as the third stage for Atlas or Titan in launching communication and several other kinds of satellites. Its wide usefUlness made Centaur applicable

to the civilian space program as well as the military, and in February there

were rumors--well substantiated--that NASA planned to take over Centaur

development at the end of fiscal year 1959. After a long series of negotiations between ARPA and NASA, the former agreed in April to transfer the

engine to NASA on 1 July. The shift was a blow to the military who believed the civilian agency would place the project on a slower schedule

than that advocated by ARPA and delay its availability for the military

projects. Several segments within the Depaz:ment of Defense continued to

argue against the decision, but to no avail. The transfer was effected on

schedule.12
3.70

The Tracking , Systea -

The satellite tracking and surveillance system was the most complicated of ARPA's projects in 1958 and 1959. The Air Force originated work

on the system in the unhappy days after Sputnik I and II, when it became

evident that the launching and flight of friendly and hostile space'objects required some. form of monitoring. From the viewpoint of national

security, it was essential to detect, identify, and if possible,. determine

13

the purpose of any satellite.

For want of better equipment, the Air Force turned to radar facilities

being developed to detect ICBM's. On 5 October 1957 the Millstone Hill

radar at Westford, Mass., prototype of stations to be used in the Ballistic

Missile Early Warning System (BMWS), became operational. Because it successfully tracked Sputnik, the station was believed the best available

means of tracking satellites and, along with facilities in Trinidad, became

the foundation in the slow buildup of a satellite tracking system.

On 3 December 1957, Headquarters USAF gave primary responsibility to

ARDC for coordinating satellite data from radio, radar, optical, and photographic coverage. ARDC, in turn, would transfer the data to the Naval

• Research Laboratory (HILL) and the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory.

This arrangement was the first move toward creating national procedures

for tracking space vehicles. Plans progressed rapidly and in January 1958,

Project Space Track got under way with ARDC's establishment of a filter

center at Air Force Cambridge Research Center.

1

 Shortly afterwards, six

other ARDC centers received contributory assignments. By early April 1958

the project was moving along smoothly. This success, and the growing

space program under ARPA, increased the complexities and requirements of
u11111111P 171

the project. The emerging plans for boost-glide vehicles and for reconnaissance, communication $ navigation, weather, and scientific satellites,

as well as hopes for lunar and interplanetary probes, meant a rapid increase in celestial traffic. On 19 JUne 1958, Headquarters USAF issued

GOR 170, Satellite Defense System, setting forth operatiOnal requirements

for a tracking and control system.

Meanwhile, the original Air Force-sponsored project was being expanded

by higher authority into a more comprehensive program. On 18 January 1958,

Soladay, who was still the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for Guided Missiles, directed the Secretary of the Navy to work for the

integration of all DOD tracking and surveillance agencies into a national

capability.15 Technically, the chief problem was that of dealing with the

"dark" or nonradiating bodies. In attempted solutions, NEL set up a triservice

committee which advised OSD that ARPA should establish a "surveillance

fence" across the United States. This could be done by utilizing Army and

Navy Doploc and Minitrack detection facilities already in existence or under

development between San Diego, Calif., and Ft. Stewart,. Ga. On 20 June 1958,

ARPA directed the Army and Navy to combine their facilities into a fence

16

along the southern border of the country.

The establishment of the fence created yet another problem--the need

to have an organization to operate the system. The Army and Navy wanted

a new triservice agency; the Air Force wanted responsibility assigned to

the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).

17

 Discussion continued

through the summer, and since agreement proved impossible, ARPA established

the Space Surveillance Task Force. It was composed of representatives

from the entire intelligence community. Its purpose was to study the
172

problem from the viewpoint of intelligence requirements as modified by

available techniques. The task force recognised the capabilities of the

Air Force intelligence agency, the USAF Space Track project, and the filter

center and pointed out that the Air Force had already solved the problem

within its own service framework. The next step was to plade the work on

a national basis.

18

At this point, the President signed the Space Act of 1958. No one

knew what NASA's attitude would be toward surveillance. The Air Force

hoped for cooperation, but Dr. Glennan promptly asked ARPA to transfer the

entire responsibility for developing the detection and tracking unit.

19

Johnson refused on the ground that military interests would be injured.

On 5 November 1958, Johnson informed ARDC that the time had come for

an interim control system. Johnson felt that the logical place was the

Air Force Cambridge Research Center and directed ARDC to develop the required control units. The data readout facilities of NRL and the Army's

Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) at Aberdeen, Md., would be made avail20

able as necessary. Johnson's decision in a sense acknowledged the great

progress mode between 18 January and 5 November 1958 by DOD to create a national space surveillance program, and his choice of the Cambridge center

as the site for the interim system pleased the Air Force. It did not

please the Army, Navy, or NASA.

Before the end of the month, ARDC set up a steering committee to work

with representatives from ARPA, USAF, NRL, and BRL. At the meetings, the

Anny and Navy representatives were openly critical of Johnson's approach.

Out of patience with tedious objectives, Johnson directed ARDC, on 19 December, to proceed with the program, and on 13 January 1959 issued ARPA's
• 111111111116 173

System Development Plan for Space Track. It called for an Interim Space

Surveillance System (ISSS) to be operational by March 1960, consisting of

a worldwide net of sensors feeding information to the Cambridge control center for data processing. Later, a formal National Space Surveillance System (Ness) could be worked out.

Meanwhile,folloving the NASA request of October 1958 for complete

control of detection and tracking, negotiations had been under way to devise

a method whereby the requirements of the civilian agency and the military

could be met. A DOD-NASA agreement was signed on 10 January 1959, recognizing the differences between the civilian and military needs. NASA was

primarily interested in information on flights pertaining to research and

development; ARPA was primarily interested in operational flights that

would be of significance for the intelligence community. It was therefore

agreed that NASA and ARPA would both operate detection and tracking stations with complete exchange of information. NASA assumed responsibility

for a three-station net, with stations in California, Australia, and South

Africa, and some Minitrack stations for polar and Mercury flights. The

Department of Defense was then left with responsibility for detection and tracking fkom_the Atlantic,..Pacific, end White Sands missile ranges, the east-west

Minitrack fence, and two additional stations--one in Japan and one in Spain.

Management of the national system was entrusted to an ARPA-NASA technical committee organized without service representatives. Moreover, the

committee worked directly with ARDC and Cambridge, bypassing Headquarters

USAF. The situation was far from satisfactory as far as the Air Force was

concerned. Nevertheless, great progress bad been made toward an effective

NSSS in which the Army and Navy were responsible for creating a more'
174

effective method of detecting and tracking noncooperating satellites and

22

the Air Force provided additional sensors and the control center.

At the End of June 1222

On 17 March 1959, OSD canceled DOD Directive 3200.5 under which ARPA

had operated since 17 May 1958, and issued a new DOD Directive 5105.15.

Though it revived" he number of the original directive of 7 February 1958,

it actually "wiped the slate clean" of the many changes of the past year.

It effected a redefinition of ARPA's program in a series of descriptive

inclosures, which grew to more than a dozen between March and July 1959.

Under the new directive, ARPA continued to operate in three areas,

though two of them were somewhat broadened beyond what they had been.

Missile defense was now termed defense against "extra atmosphere often-

'sive vehiclet," to include both space vehicles and ballistic missiles;

and propellant chemistry seem now in close alliance with vehicle materials.

The area of the military space prograp remained the same, but within it

there was considerable shift in projects.

The titles of the projects assigned to AREA under the new directive

reflected the progress being made in the apace program and its related

fields. Project Defender covered the activities of ARPA in-devising methode of defense against hostile missiles, satellites, and other space vehicles. Project Principle and Project Pontue pertained to propellant

chemistry and vehicle materials.

In the space program itself, there were 10 projects. Discoverer,

Midas, and Sentry were elements of the old W8-117L ARS, now separated as

the test experiment, infrared detection, and reconnaissance satellites

*Sentry was to be redesignated as Samos in August 1959.
al11111111111. 3:0

respectively; Notus and Transit were the communication and navigation sem

tellites; Sheppard was the space surveillance project; and Suzann was a

more recently approved space platform or orbital base from which to launch

advanced space missions. OSD had also approved a space electronic countermeasure project dubbed Somnium; added a requirement for Tribe, a series

of vehicles for special military space missions; and established Project

Longsight, a series of space studies and system analyses to supply DOD on

svcontinuous basis with suggestions of projects that should be initiated

to satisfy future military requirements. There was a strong similarity

between the stated purpose of Project Longsight and ARDC's space study program.

ARPA's Changing Status in DOD

For months in 1958, ARPA held a unique and powerfUl position in the

Department of Defense. The director was the voice of the Secretary of

Defense in matters of space research and development. Sometimes called a

"fourth service" or a DOD "task force," the agency had seemed--to JCS and

the services--sore like an arm of OSD reaching down into the operational

level of the military services.

The Army, Navy, and Air Fbrce felt from the beginning that ARPA should

not be permanent, but as time passed it was evident that ARPA was doing.=

excellent job, and the opposition of the Army and Navy vaned. They still

agreed with the Air Force in late 1958 and early 1959 that ARPA should go,

but they did not agree it should go soon. Navy spokesmen, for instance,

said that the Navy was not in the space vehicle business and was interested

much more in payloads, "in what goes into space," than in how the payloads

would get there. The implication was that the Navy was no longer disturbed
176. 11111111111111ft

by ARPA as a fourth Service since the agency had not attempted to interfere with matters pertaining strictly to the sea.23

The Air Force, on the other hand, was very much in the space vehicle

business since its missiles were being used as bOosters for so many satellite and space probe launchings. General Schriever was glad.to acknowledge

the good work done by ARPA but voiced sharp criticism of its disregard of

tested concepts of management, its practice of splintering projects

among. the ser*xos, and its failure to recognize the urgency of defining a military posture in space. In January 1959, Schriever did not hesitate to say that ARPA should be phased out at the end of fiscal year 1959.

The elimination of ARPA would leave DWI& to become the space policy agency

and permit the services to do their own research and devOlopment as they

had done for land, sea, and air requirements in accordance with definite

mission assignments.

After Dr. Herbert F. York's appointment as the first Director of Des

Tense Research and Engineering on 24 December 1958, there was confusion

as to whether Johnson outranked York or York outranketJohnson. The situation elicited some amused but unfavorable comment in congressional hear25

ings.

The question was not settled until 17 March 1959, when DOD Directive

5105.15 enumerated ARPA projects and vent on to say that they were "subject

to the supervision and coordination of the Director of Defense Research

and Engineering in the same manner as those of the military departments

and will be conducted in accordance with the priorities established by the

*See above, p 109.
177

Secretary of Defense." The directive thus slipped a new echelon between

the Secretary of Defense and ARPA.

In May 1959, York explained the arrangement in the course of testi-.

Ropy before a congressional committee. He said there were four basic,opersting agencies in the Department of Defense--the Army, Navy, Air Forcepand

ARPA--doing research and development either by in-house work or by contract

with outside agencies. DDRAE would supervise and coordinate all research

26

and development including that assigned to ARPA.

The changes brought about by the establishment of DDRAE were far

short of what the extreme critics of ARPA would have liked. But, whether

they meant a deliberate change in the attitude of OSD toward ARPA or not,

they certainly deprived the agency's director of some of the authority

given him in February 1958. Be was no longer the voice of the Secretary

of Defense in matters of space research and development. That authority

was now vested in York.

Space Operations, October 122/ to Est=

In the first 20 months of space operations, the Russians made four

successful launchings. They admitted no failures. The Americana on the

other hand attempted 26 launchings-21 earth satellites, 3 lunar probes,

and 2 interplanetary probes. Eight satellites entered orbit and 13 failed;

the three lunar probes failedl not exceeding 70,000 feet, 71,000 miles,

and 1,000 miles, respectively. One of the interplanetary probes reached

an altitude of 63,582miles, and the other went into orbit around the sun.

This record put the Americans far ahead of the Russians if numbers

alone counted. However, there were other factors to be considered. The

Russians payload began with 182 pounds for Sputnik I and increased in
178

Sputnik II to 1,120 pounds. Furthermore, the Russian launchings led to

important "firsts"--first to send a satellite in orbit around the earth;

first to send animal life in orbit around the earth; first to have an interplanetary probe place a satellite around the sun. The American weakness

was lack of thrust to send up large payloads, and the United States started

with a payload of 3.5 pounds and increased the weight eventually to a max27

imum of 372 pounds.

The Russian triumphs had great psychological-political significance.

Dr. Glennan admitted as much when he said in September 1959 that Americans

still "play second fiddle in this space buisiness." The President and the

National Security Council expressed the same view officially and explicitly,

but not publicly, when they acknowledged in January 1960 that the Russian

"firsts" resulted in "substantial and enduring gains in the Soviet pres28

tige."

Nevertheless, thanks to the ingenuity and devotion of NASA, ARPA, Army,

Navy, Air Force, and industrial scientists, the Americans made noteworthy

contributions to space science through the use of miniaturized instruments.

These were made specially to compensate for the nation's lack in rocketengine thrust power. The eight orbited satellites were distributed among

four projects--2 Vanguards, 3 Explorers, 1 Score, and 2 Discoverers.

Vanguard alone had received official approval before Sputnik and was

intended to serve solely as a scientific contribution to IGY. Explorer

was hastily conceivedl primarily as a countermeasure to the Russian Sputnik success. Incidentally, it too served to gather IGY scientific information though it depended for propulsion upon the use of a military missile

as the lift device. Project Score was the Christmas greetings satellite
MUM

successfully launched on 18 December 1958.

Of the fout projects, Discoverer was the first true military satellite.

Painstakingly prepared by MEND after being separated by ARPA from WS-117L,

it was instrumented to aid in the development of other military satellites.

It had six main test objectives: airframe and guidance subsystems, stabilization equipment, means of controlling the internal environment, reaction of mice and small primates to weightlessness, adequacy of capsule

recovery techniques, and proficiency of ground support equipment and

personnel.

29

Discoverer I and Discoverer II were successfully launched on 28 February and 13 April 1959. Discoverer II created a small international incident of rivalry, intrigue, and theft. The satellite vas the first to

contain a recovery capsule, equipped with a retro-rocket ejection mechanism. It was intended to permit recovery after a few passes around the

earth,. and the recovery task force, Consisting of nine C-119's, four RC-121's,

and three destroyers, was operating off Hawaii. Several attempts to trigger

the capsule failed. Not until the next day, during its seventeenth pass,

was the capsule ejected--and this was automatic. It came down reputedly

in a fjord northwest of Longyear City in the Spitsbergen Islands. The

islands were Norwegian, but under a provision of the 1920 Treaty of.Paris,

all signatory nations, including Russial had the right to exploit mineral

deposits there. Numerous Soviet mines existed in the region and the island

was inhabited by Russians in 1959. The capsule, therefore, fell almost in

Soviet laps. It was not surprising that neither the Americans nor the Norwegians could find the capsule, but they sa y evidence that the Russians

had found and shipped the prize home to their own space scientists. The

179
April issue of Current Intelligence Digest published the following comments on the incident:

A search party was immediately organised and the search continued

through 22 April with negative results. During the search in the

Spitsbergen area, a helicopter crew observed footprints in the snow

and evidence of a heavy object being dragged through the snow into

the entrance of a Soviet mine. The Air Attache in Oslo, Norway, reported that discussions with Colonel Tatum, Air Rescue Commander,

and Lt Colonel Metheson, Ann, revealed that Russian indigenous

personnel did retrieve the capsule on 15 April. The USAIRA, Oslo,

also reported that several days later, sRussian ice breaker was

sighted entering and departing Longyear City, Spitsbergen.
XI. AIR FORCE SPACE POLICY AND SUPPORTING ACTION,

1957-59

Perhaps the most disturbing thing about Sputnik was the paradox of

its undeniable importance and its imprecise significance. There was universal pride in the satellite and an intuitive understanding that history

was in labor with one of its great crises. Change was imminent, but without clairvoyance of what the change would be, the world strained with

anxiety for the future--and with nostalgia for the comfortable veva of

1

Earth.

In the conflict between the opponents and proponents of a military

space program, no one denied that a scientific program was essential because little was known about space; but for that same reason many denied

the need for a military program. To this argument the military replied

that despite existing ignorance of what space warfare would be, space, as

an area of operations, would eventually shatter the old-time concept of

land, sea, and air missions. In time, space weapons would erase existing

lines of responsibility. The United States must develop a. military 'page

competency parallel with scientific knowledge or one day find itself helpless under a devastating blow. The question was whether the nation should

seek merely the scientific exploration of space or both the exploration

and control of space. The military were careful to point out that capability to control space did not necessarily mean the abusive exercise of

2

that control.

In the late months of 1957 and early 1958, the military frankly

181
*182 1111111.11111M

admitted they could speak less fluently of space warfare than of infantry

maneuvers, of naval blockades, or of strategic bombing. They lacked the

experience. "There is a lot of scientific data that we can get from exploration of space," said General Sebriever in April 1958, but it is "Impossible, I would say now, for any man to predict exactly how important

space will be for military purposes, locking into the future, ' 20, 30, or

40 years.

ft3' In December 1959, an Air Force position paper commented:

Scientific and engineering contributions to the solution of

military problems have revolutionized warfare. The invention of

gunpowder, the steam engine, the submarine,. the airplane, the tank,

radar, nuclear weapons and the ballistic missile, to name only a

few examples, have had profound effect on military strategy and

the balance of power between nations.

The latest contribution and perhaps the greatest technological

change of all, is man's first step into space. It can be clearly

foreseen that military space systems will alter current military

concepts and strategies, even though the exact nature of their use'

and effect cannot be delineated over the long range. Recognizing

that the military potential of apace is of such significance that

within this century it may well determine the future history of

the world, the military must exploit this potential in the national

interest.

If the military did not succeed in the two years since October 1957

in reaching a clear . conception of epace warfare, it was not for • vant of

trying. The effort was persistent, but the objective was too big.to be

seen without perspective. Army, Navy, Air Force, and JCS analysts attempted

time and again to foresee the role of the military in space but ended always

with nothing more than a laborious listing of satellite projects under development. A list of ship classes could not explain naval strategy or

tactics, or the significance of sea power, and lists of possible apace

vehicles did not explain, space strategy or tactics, or the significance

of space power. The best that could be done was to speak of the "military

uses of space."5

1
183 .1111111111m

The inability of strategists and tacticians to prepare handbooks on

space warfare in no Way detracted fruit the obviously great military significance of space. The Army, Mims and Air Force knew that sanehow, and

in some way, space would become the transcendent factor in preserving peace

or, failing that, in winning the war. That knowledge was the important

thing, and the DOD space projects were as much exploratory for military

ends as the scientific projects were exploratory for scientific ends.

In the first two years of their exploratory efforts the military were

keenly aware of the need to reconcile their requirements with a national

space policy that leaned more favorably toward the civilian-scientific

program. The services bad also to fortify their separate positions with

doctrine and with attempts to obtain assigbed roles and missions. The

prospects of space were limitless, and the services vied among themselves

for dominance.

6

Military Reactions to the Space-for-Peace Policy,

After January 1948, when General Vandenberg asserted that responsibility for satellites logically belonged to the Air Ftree, there was no fur.

ther policy statement on space prior to Sputnik. In the confusion that

followed Sputnik, the Air Force felt the need of a new statement, especially

as a talking paper for its representatives appearing before congressional

committees. The task of preparation fell to the Office of the Deputy Chief

of Staff/Development.

On 6 December 1957, DCS/Development forwarded to the Chief of Staff, USAF,

a policy statement that affirmed the loyalty of the Air Force to national

objectives and asserted that the control of space vas essential to national

security. Continuing, the paper declared that the Air Force was the logical
184

agency to achieve this military power because there could. be "no division,

Eg 221, between air and space; only one indivisible field of operations

above the surface of the larth."7

In referring to Air Force support of national objectives and the

desire to exploit the military advantages of space, the policy statement

fingered an unpleasant dichotomy from which the military could not escape

during the next two years. The national objective was expressed in the

President's space-for-peace policy, so phrased in pre-Sputnik days as to

exclude the military from those regions beyond the aerodynamic capabilities

of airpower. Had this same principle been part of the freedom of the seas,

the navies of the world would have been excluded from the oceans beyond the

three-mile limit. None denied the ideal of space-for-peace but the resultant restrictions did not jibe with the obligations of the military for

the security of the United States. From the beginning to the end, the

Army, Navy, and Air Force were united in expressing their acceptance of

space-for-peace as the national objective, but until international arrangements could guarantee that all nations would follow the same ideal, an

American capability to control space was essential to the liberty of free

people.

8

*Even before Sputnik the Air Force was aware that space bad serious implication for airpower. In the spring of 1957 the Air Force General Counsel

undertook a study of "air space" and "outer space" definitions, the

legality of satellites in transterritorial flight, and the legal complications of space defense. Of equal interest were the less cosmic subjects

of interservice rivalry, military budgets, and possible change(' in the

structure of the Air Force. The General Counsel moved slowly, however,

and in March 1958 VAS still weighing the advantages of various alternative

policies before recommending en official position. (Memo, Col R.L. Johnson,

Lev Div, DMZ to D/Plans, 15 May 57, subj: Future of Satellite Operations.)
185

In seeking to adjust their loyalty to the President's somewhat extreme position and their obligations to safeguard the defense of the United

States, the military did not criticise the space-for-peace policy but

sought rather to determine for themselves how effective international

space lex vas likely to be, how it would curtail their own activities,

and bow far they should go in presenting a case for military space projects.

In March 1958 the three services took advantage of their invitation

to assist the National Security ' Council in its preparation of the Preliminary United States Policy on Space (18C 5814/1). They expressed their

views and were at one in supporting the ideal of space-for-peace. They

were also at one in warning against emasculating the military program.

After its NBC recommendations, the Air Force undertook a second study,

for Air Force eyes only, on the feasibility of an international law for

apace and its effects on the military spice program. The task required

five months to complete, and DCS/Plans tad Programs drew upon the advice

of all interested Headquarters agencies as well as the Air University and

9

Rand Corporation.

On 22 August 1958 the Air Force "Study on Sovereignty over Outer

Space" was completed, and by 8 October it vas distributed among Headquarters offices with the recommendation that it serve as the basis for developing future studies by the Air Staff when called upon for comments or

actions related to an international law for space. It was Air Force doctrine, under this paper, that the Government should avoid committing itself

on any current issue. Time was needed to evaluate the totally new conditions being created by the space age. It seemed particularly unfortunate
186 11111110

for the Department of State to assume, as it was assuming, that silence

on space claims in relation to specific events, such as Sputnik's transit,

implied a general waiver of claims. Effective international control of

space conceivably. could come in the future, but it was a goal not a reality.

In supporting the President's policy, the military should urge and assist

in obtaining international cooperation in projects not pertinent to national

security, thereby contributing to the eventual attainment of the national

objective. At the same time the Air Force should seek approval of an adequate program of research and development andwork.toward the formulation

of projects to meet the scientific, commercial, and military needs of the

United. States. The military goal must always be the prevention of Soviet

dominance in space.

10

The passing months brought no variation in themes. The Government

continued to speak of space-for-peace, to negotiate in the United Nations

for acceptance of the policy, to find powerfUl support for the idea in

Congress and among the people generally. The military continued to face

the dilemma with the same uneasiness. On 2 May 1959 the Chief of Naval

Operations wrote to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:11

I have noted recent statements by members of Congress, and of

the Executive Department, with a generally. favorable and public reaction on "the peaceful use of outer space." I view with concern

the adverse effects on national security of an unrealistic or restrictive'international agreement to use outer space solely for peaceful

purposes. The U.S. Military Services have responsibilities which

require the use of outer space for research, development, and operation of weapons systems. Until en enforceable and positive guarantee of control in the use of space can be made, this will remain so.

The Joint Chiefs. on 22 May forwarded an elaboration of these vim to

the Secretary of Defense. It would be, they said, a most serious matter

to restrict the services in their use of space befdre an enforceable international control came into being. The current and future capabilitiew
187

of the armed forces should not be hampered by premature agreement* to keep

space for peace, and the JCS hoped that its opinions would be considered

12

before the United States committed itself to definite agreements. Seven

months later, in December 1959, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF,

13

Maj. Gen. Richard M. Montgomery, said essentially the same thing:

The President's announced policy is the exploration of

space and, therefore, this country's space programs, will be used

only for peaceful purposes, and for the good of mankind. Failing

that, however, the Air Force believes that there is a great potential in space from a military standpoint, and that this potential

-must be developed.

The Doctrine of Aerospace 

The service chiefs were not always in unanimous agreement on questions

of space. Nothing divided them more sharply than the USAF claim that the

continuum of air and space gave the Air Force the responsibility, under

accepted roles and missions, to become the service of primary interest

in space. This had been the argument, implicitly at least, in Vandenberg's

statement of January 1948. It was repeated in the policy statement of 6

December 1957. And again, in March 1958, the Chief of Staff, USAF, General

14

White, wrote:

For all practical purposes air and space merge, form a continuous

and indivisible field of operations. Just as in the past, when our

capability to control the air permitted our freedom of movement in

the land and seas. beneath, so, in the future, will the capability to

control space permit our freedom of movement on the surface of the

earth and through the atmosphere.

Though numerous Air Force officers repeated the same thought in public statements, in articles, and in classified papers during the succeeding

months, the doctrine of air-space continuum was not propagated systematically.

By the time 1958 was well advanced, ARPA and. NASA 'acquisitions and

actions had virtually wrecked the proposed USAF astronautics program of
188 MEP

25 January, and the Air Staff felt it was essential to undertake a counteroffensive to regain if possible some portions at least of its program.

There was need to reassert the doctrine of air-space continuum and define

it in terms that lent emphasis to the concept. The movement came to a

climax in the last days of 1958 when the Air Staff was preparing a talking

paper for the Chief of Staff in his scheduled appearances before congressional committees. This meant redoing the policy paper of 6 December 1957

with emphasis on what the Air Force had contributed to both the military

and scientific space programs during 1958, a. reassertion of the air-space

continuum doctrine, and a restatement of Air Force claims to overall responsibility for the develoment and control of space vehicles, granting

recognition of limited Army and Navy needs. The policy statement was completed on 30 January 1959 and was consonant with the accepted roles and

missions for operations on land and sea andin the air. It spoke of the

airspace continuum as "aerospace"--a term used for some time within a. few

Air Staff offices--and defined the term in such manner as to justify Air

Force claims as the service of primary interest there.15

On 3 February 1959, General White appeared before the House Committee

on Science and Astronautics. He expressed the desire of the Air Force to ,

promote the peaceful use of space for the benefit of mankind as sought by

the President. Pending effective measurt, o that end, however, White

declared that the right of the Free World to explore space depended upon

a "strong and capable deterrent aerospace force." He added:16

The Air Force has operated throughout its relatively short history

in the sensible atmosphere around the earth. Recent developments have

allowed us to extend our operations further away from the earth, approaching the environment popularly referred to as space. Since there

is no dividing line, no natural barrier separating these two areas,

there can be no operational boundry between them. Thus air and space

comprise a single continuous operational field in which the Air Force

must continue to function. The area is aerospace.

1
General White thus brought to the fore the old doctrine of air-space

continuum.

The significance of the definition was not missed, and the reaction

was less than unanimously enthusiastic. The criticism that rose within

the committee overflowed and spread far beyond the limits of the room.

The next day Representative Daniel J. Flood of Pennsylvania, in hearings

before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, allointd

himself the pleasure of sarcasm. Be epitomised the feelings of many Air

Force critics, both civilian and military in the following dialogue:17

Rep. Daniel Flood:

Boys, the Air Force has come up with a new phrase, "aerospace".

That is a beauty. Even Niacin-11 could not think that one up. That

means everybody is out of space and the air except the Air Force, in

case you don't know it. Has the Air Force, without consulting anytaken the Navy out of the air and space? . . .5The Air Force

bas now staked out a claim to "aerospace". That is their pigeon--

space and-air. Do you know about it ipi. Gateei . . . You Navy

people had better get into this space thing, because I have been

around here for a long time, and I have seen this happen in other

areas. You had better get back into space or you ' t aint" going to

be in space.

Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of the Navy:

We have a little thing called Vanguard which is doing pretty well.

Rep. Daniel Flood:

I know, I agree with you. But the honeymoon is over for the Air

Force. There will not be many aircraft around when the sons of the

flyboys go to the Air Academy. They have to have something to stay

in business. You had better get into there, or you won't be around.

General White did not retract the claim of the Air Force to aerospace.

The criticism at least accustomed all ears to the sound of the word, and

it made known the position of the Air Staff. The discussion continued

through the remainder of 1959 but gradually the comments lost sharpness.

In its final form, officially approved and incorporated in AFM 1-2,
190 mow

December 1959, the definition stated:

The aerospace is an operationally indivisible medium consisting

of the total expanse beyond the earth's surface. The forces of the.

Air Force comprise a family of operating systems—air systems ballis- tic missiles, and space vehicle systems. These are 'the fundamental

aerospace forces of the nation.

Logically the doctrine of aerospace expressed the thought that airpower and

space power are the same thing and should be vested in a single service which,

whatever its official title, would be the aerospace force. Space vehicles

would be another category of vehicles for employment in the regions above

the surface of the earth to help deter war or, failing that, to help yin

the war.

18

The Air Staff felt that the doctrine of aerospace epitomized USAF space

policy, completely adjusted to the accepted theory of roles and missions.

But a doctrinal pronouncement did not automatically correct the situation.

Historically and logically the Air Force claims could be justified, and

they could even be made to fit the Air Force needs and capabilities as projected into the 1960-70 decade—though prophecy was dangerous in an age of

technological change. Nevertheleasy the unhappy fact remained that in the

first part of 1959 the Air Force still bad no space program in being that

could justify claims to 'space leadership.19

The task confronting the Air Staff was to devise some way of persuading

OSD to assign space missions and projects to the Air Force to fill the vacuum created in 1958 by the losses to ARPA and NASA. There were two possible

approaches: to request a redefinition of service roles and missions not

yet updated to meet the demands of the space age * or to pursue a slower

*At the end of 1958 the binational responsibility of the Air Force derived

from three documents: the 1948 Key West functions paper DOD Directive 5100.1

of 16 Mar 1954, and its revision of 31 Dec 1958. The Key West Agreement was

prepared. without thought of the space age, and no changes had been introduced.

Nor were there provisions in 5100.1 to meet the current technological developments or the new political-military situation. (Ltr, Can T.S. Power to Gen

T.D. White, 9 Feb 59.) umaramms
101111.1111 191

course but accelerate development of specific aerospace hardware with the

approval of ARPA and NASA. To request clarification of missions without

possessing the hardware might provide the Army and Navy an excellent oppor20

tunity for refutation to the , permanent detriment of Air Force claims.

Headquarters USAF chose to move slowly, and General LeMay, Vice Chief, explained this approach in a letter of 17 March 1959 to General Power at SAC121

Specifically, ve intend to accelerate the development of aerospace hardware and intensify our efforts to obtain early official

sanction from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and

the Secretary of Defense for the Air Force to pursue these development projects . . . . While recognizing Army and Navy interest in

aerospace projects, we would seek to limit their participation to a

coordinating role. Furthermore, we are making every effort to place

qualified Air Force representatives in key positions of influence

in the Office of the Secretary of tefense and other governmental

organizations concerned with wpace activities.

The Navy-Air Force WR Disagreement 

In 1957 and the early part of 1958 the Army seemed to have better

space claims than the Navy. There was the undisputed fact that the Army

could have put a satellite in orbit before Vanguard; and there were the

impressive Explorer orbitings on 31 January, 26 March, and 26 July 1958.

Slowly the tide turned. There was the launching of Vanguard I on 17 March

1958 and the USAF success in placing the Project Score satellite (Atlas

missile) in orbit on 18 December 1958. Thus, the Air Force and Navy both

shoved a competence to equal that of the Army before the beginning of 1959.

If it bad not been for the Saturn booster project, the Army would have had

an insignificant space role for the future. Even with Saturn, the trend

was toward a Navy-Air Force race.

In the spring of 1959 the Chief of Naval Operations established an

ad hoc committee under Rear Adm. Thomas F. Connolly to determine the
92

Navy's astronautics policy. Three months later, CNO approved the Connolly

report. It called for a comprehensive program to enhance the "roles and

missions presently assigned to the Navy" and cited the Pacific Missile

Range (PMR) as a major contribution by the Navy to the national space ;cogram. At once CNO established in his office the Astronautics Operations

Division (Opr54) and the Astronautics Development Division (Op-76). At

the same time the Navy assumed a more aggressive attitude in the /ong22

standing dispute with the Air Force over PMR-Vandenberg AFB relations.

The Pacific Missile Range and Vandenberg vere in juxtaposition because

both were carved from an 86,000-acre strip of California coastland, formerly

the Army's den Cooke. In 1956 the Air Force obtained 67,000 acres of the

northern part of the tract as a training-operational area fo* ballistic

missiles. It was named Cooke AFB until redesignated for Vandenberg in

October 1958, and.it was placedunder the administrative and operational

control of ATIND'• lst Missile Division (later reassigned to SAC). Before

the end of 1957 the Air Force was constructing.Thor and Atlas. pads at

Vandenberg that could be:used either for training or operational purposes.

As soon as a military.space program seemed probable, it was evident that

Vandenberg offered special advantages for launching polar-orbiting betellites, since the boosters would pass over no land north of Antartic ► .

23

Meanwhile the Navy obtained permission from OSD in December 1957 to

combine the remaining southern part of Camp Cooke, totaling 19,000 acres,

with the Naval Missile Test Center, vhich had been operating at Pointidugu,

90 miles to tbssouth, since 1946. The Navy vould develop its new possession,

the Pacific Missile Range, aka national facility and companion to the Atlantic and White Sands missile ranges.

24
011111111sas 193

Since ENR would serve all agencies needing its special facilities,

the Navy and Air Force were certain to Overlap in operational activities

and interests. To forestall misunderstandings, Adm. Arleigh Burke, Chief

of Naval Operations, and General White, Chief of Staff, USAF, began negotiating early in 1958 for an agreement, which they signed 5 March. It provided for coordination in fixing radio frequencies, firing schedules, and

the avoidance of undesirable duOlication. Range safety remained with the

Navy or the Air Force depending upon the responsibility for tracking spier

cific missiles, but this provision was in contradiction with the Navy's

proprietary authority for flight preparation of missiles, control through

flight and impact, and operation of the range safety equipment.25

The agreement was of little benefit. The Navy formally opened the

Pacific Missile Range in June 1958, and at once Navy-Air Force misunderstandings began. The trouble started at the operational levels of AIR

and the lst Missile Division. Small questions, such • es basing a Navy drone

aircraft on Vandenberg, were followed by accusations and counteraccusations

of improper coordination and lack of cooperation. Other contentions involved the means of insuring safety for SOuthern Pacific Railway trains

passing through FMR-Vandenberg territories during missile-satellite launchings, the authority to reimburse the railway ccepapy for necessary interruption of its schedules, and the right of PMR to negotiate a unilateral

agreement with the railway regardless of objections either by the 1st Nis26

mile Division, SAC, or Headquarters USAF.

A much more serious misunderstanding arose in February 1959 when ARPA

directed the Air Force to launch Discoverer satellites on 28 February, 13

April, 3 June, and 25 June into polar orbits from Thor pads at Vandenberg.
194

The Discoverer trajectories passed over PMR territory. Each time for the

sake of safety, the Navy evacuated PMR, where work was proceeding on

two Atlas pads for the Samos and Midas projects, and the entire village

of Surf, located between PMR and Vandenberg A7B. The Navy also halted

Southern Pacific trains. The coat of these evacuations and delayed work,

which lasted for several hours or several days•depending on the countdown,

ran into considerable sums, and of course proved most annoying to the civilians affected. The Air Force felt that the evacuations were unnecessary

since it considered the odds to be 200,000 to 1 against fatalities. The

Navy's rebuttal was that the odds were only 20,000 to 1. The real point

at issue was responsibility for safety, a question complicated by the

contradiction implicit in the Burke-White agreement of March 1958.

For the Air Force the significance of the PMR controversy involved

not only the control of important facilities on the west coast but also

strategy, roles and missions, and the future, functions of the Navy and Air

Force in space.

28

 On 13 December 1958, General Poser wrote General White:29

The Navy appears to be using custodianship of the Pacific Missile Range to develop an ambitious space program centering on this •

range. The implications of Navy planning are not significant on the

surface but could be devastating. The . precedewtfor the control of

space could.be well established, yet easily disguised with the development of world-wide launch, tracking and control facilities. The

agency controlling ewe facilities will control the space missions.

Power citedtwo documents in support of his contention. A special OSD

committee report of 18 August 1958 recommended transfer of the southern

pert of Vandenberg to PMR, and an Aerojet Corporation report, prepared

under contract with PMR, recommended expansion of the range to include six

major divisions: Polar Orbit Range, Equatorial Orbit Range, Intercontinental

Range, Intermediate Range, Anti-Missile Range, and Extended Sea and Inland Range.

General Power's views seemed not without justification when Admiral
1.95

Burke said in January 1959 that the Navy with OSD concurrence had projected

a 15-year expansion plan for the PMR complex at an estimated total coat of

$l billion. The plan called for six separate tiring ranges--Sea Test, IREM,ICENF,

Polar Orbit, Equatorial Orbit, and Anti44lissilei4issile. 3° The'OSDjavy

plan was practically an unqualified adoption of Aerojet's recOmmendation.

To USAF officers at Vandenberg and at MR, it appeared that the Navy

was consistently trying to establish control over Vandenberg. This was

brought out in numerous proposals that followed in rather rapid sequence--

requests for the physical transfer of Vandenberg missile assembly buildings

to PMR, the move to acquire temporarily the use of Iwo acres from Vandenberg's area, the use of Vandenberg. airstrips by PMR aircraft. The contentions went on into the spring .31

With each week it became more and more evident that the Burke-White

paper of March 1958 was no longer applicable to a rapidly changing situation. The Navy then prepared a proposed triservice-NASA agreement. The

Air Force rejected it because its provisions threatened control of Vandenberg operations that "impugned directly oi.the future of the Strategic Air

Command in space." Negotiations continued, however, at the chief of staff

level. Before a satisfactory arrangement was reached, the dispute at MR

and Vandenberg became yet more unpleasant'in connection with the "Discoverer

crisis" in August 1959. Discoverers I and II were successfully launched

on 28 February and 13 April 1959, but Discoverer III and IV, launched 3

and 25 June, both failed to orbit. The Air Force wanted to move the exit

azimuth for future Discoverer launchings eastward to take advantage of the

earth's rotation. PMB's commander claimed that the shift would endanger

civilian life and property; the Air Force replied that the chance was 1 to
196

1,000,000. The question still remained unsettled when Admiral Burke and

General White signed the new Navy-USAF "Agreement for_Coordinated Peacetime Operation of the Pacific Missile Range" on 22 September. The agree-

*

ment represented a compromise in the Navy's favor, but the understanding

had already been "overtaken by events" that were favorable to the Air Force .32

A Time for Decision 

During the spring and early summer of 1959, interservice tension

mounted. The criticism of the doctrine of aerospace, the PMR dispute, end

the expressed desire of the Air Force to regain managerial control of research and development for its space projects were indicative of the prevalent restlessness. Moreover, it was time for changes in priority of

projects. Some of those accorded highest national priority for research

and development in January 1958--Thor, Jupiter, Jupiter-C, and Vanguard--

could be removed from the list in March 1959 as having passed beyond that

stage. On the other hand, Midas) Discoverer, and Sentry had advanced to

the place where they should be accorded highest priority status. Soon the

Secretary of Defense would have to make assignments of operational control

for these satellites. Clearly a time for decision was at hand.33

*The agreement listed area major responsibilities of the Navy--range

safety criteria, including approval of tafety plans, procedures, and

equipment for all missiles, satellites, and space vehicles launched at

PMR; coordination to prevent duplication of range facilities and equipment; and the provision, maintenance, and operation of.all common-use

facilities, including ground instrumentation and the equipment required

by joint tenancy agreements. 'Air Force rights were protected by the agreement to reserve for the service sponsoring the flight the control of flight

preparation, the launching devices, and the missiles, satellites, and

space vehicles themselves while in flight until the impact of missile or

until the.last-stage burnout of satellites and space vehicles.

4
197

AnAir Force Attempt:to Force the Issue

Although the Chief of Staff decided in the late winter of 1958 not

to request a redefinition of service roles and missions, the decision

did not preclude the request for operational assignments as satellite

projects approached the end of developeent. Since it had been seamed

that the Sentry reconnaissance satellite would eventually be plead under

USAF operational control, the Under Secretary of tbe Air Force informally

asked the Secretary of Defense on 26 February 1959 to approve the transfer

at once. The Secretary of Defense agreed to consider the transfer if an

official recommendation were made. By 15 Apri1.1959 the Under Secretary

of the Air Force had a recommendation from the Air Staff that the transfer

of Sentry from ARPA to USAF be effected 1 July.34

The request for operational control of Sentry was extended to cover

Midas too, and Headquarters USAF was optimistic. The field agencies, ARDC

and AFBMD, apparently were not aware of what was happening, and on 18 May,

General Schriever, ARDC's commander, wrote identical letters to Generals

Gerhart and Wilson containing the following paragraph:

35

It is important that we get all or part of the space mission

assigned to the Air Force as soon as possible including operational

as well as development aspects. The Air Force is expending a great

deal 9f time on space efforts much of which could be made more productive if the military space mission were clearly assigned. We could

then pursue both our development and operational space efforts more

aggressively. Moreover, such an assignment would do much to reduce

the extensive and detailed."assistance we have been getting frcei the

Department of Defense, and place us in a better position relative to

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. It would permit

us to plan and integrate our resources more effectively. It would

also do much to clear the air between the Services end reduce the

reactive efforts that take up so much of our time and keep us constantly off balance.

The two deputy chiefs of staff, in their reply to General Schriever,

did little more than hint at the situation developing in the pentagon.
198

Two weeks later, when Schriever attended a briefing there, be learned of

the effort the Air Force had made to recover some of its lost projects.

He learned also of a new position paper, completed 4 June, derived from

the doctrine of aerospace. It stated that the Air Force would seek management responsibility for the research and development projects vital to

space dominancy, request recognition as the executive agent of the Department of Defense for coordination and integration of research and develop-'

went facilities and resources, and ask assignment of space systems to SAC

and NORAD when operational,

The Navy's Appeal for a Space Command

The Army and Navy were aware, of course, of the Air Force move to

obtain assignment from the Secretary of Defense of Sentry and Midas, and

there was every reason to believe that, in view of McElroy's statement in

the Armed Forces Policy Council meeting, on 26 February, he would reach a

decision in the near future regarding the disposition of the two projects.

On 22 April 1959, Admiral Burke suggested to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

that the indivisibility of space and "the prospective magnitude of astronautical operations" required the establishment of a general military space

agency. It would be under the direction of JCS and responsive "to the

operational requirements of ARPA and NASA." Burke argued that the national

interests would be served if "all facilities and functions" applicable to

space vehicles and satellite operations, "including those of the three national missile ranges,"*were coordinated under a single ccamand.37

The proposal ran counter to Air Force thinking that satellites should .

be operated by the service of primary interest, and it struck sharply

against the doctrine of aerospace. The Chief of Naval Operations knew
199

that his recommendations would be opposed by the Air Force, but he also

knew that they would be approved by the Army and that he could count on

the old Army-Navy advantage of 2 to 1 in JCS recommendations. Burke was

therefore scarcely surprised when Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Chief of Staff, USA,

gave full concurrence. The admiral must also have expected General White's

objection to such a command taking over the "functions" of military space

operations. White argued that the responsibility should go to the unified

and specified commands. The Joint Chiefs referred the question to the

Joint Staff with a request for recommendations by 15 June.38

AMA's Move for a Mercury Joint Task Force

On 25 May, while the Joint Staff still considered the Navy's proposal,

Dr. Glennan requested DOD assistance in the tracking and communication program forMercury man-in-space flights. 39 Tbe Secretary of Defense handed

the question to a six-member ARPA-DDRAE-NASA committee that promptly turned

to the Navy's proposal for a joint military space command and the objections of the Air Force to such an organization. There was thus a direct

if unintentional connection between the Navy's proposal and ARPA's suggestion, after the joint committee completed its deliberations, for a Mercury

joint task force. The Air Force concurred with ARPA but assumed that the

task force would remain under ARPA, not JCS. The Air Force recommended

that, since the needed facilities were part of the Atlantic Missile Range,

the AMR commander should also serve as task force commander.

40

On 30 June the Department of Defense informed Glennan that the military would support Mercury with a task force and appointed Johnson, in

cooperation with Glennan to work out an initial plain. In a meeting of the

AMA, Army, Navy, and Air Force ed hoc group, all but the USAF representatives
200

advocated a task force under JCS that could also serve as the nucleus of

the space command proposed by the Navy. Despite Air Force protests, the

ad hoc group requested ARPA to prepare a paper with this recommendation

for service concurrence and presentation to the Armed Forces Policy Council for approval. The proponents of the task force held their point and

went so far as to draft and redraft a DOD directive to that effect even

after NASA signified a preference for a much simpler "coordination group"

41

under AMR's commander.

Suddenly the situation changed. As a result of NASA's recommendation

and same personal intervention at the OSD-OSAF level, on 24 July the ARPA

ad hoc group released a draft directive much nearer USAF desires. It designated Lt. Gen. Donald N. Yates, the AMR commander, as DOD representative

for Mercury support and made him responsible to the Secretary of Defense.

His additional duties included the preparation of plans to support the

operation; direction and control of assigned DOD facilities, forces, and assets; and the furtherance of DOD specific missions to aid the project

.42

Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense had shown something less than

enthusiasm for a joint space command.

McElroy's Decisions of 18 September 1222

In the midst of discussions concerning USAF's transfer request, Burke's

joint-command proposal and NASA's Mercury support requirements, McElroy on

29 May 1959 asked JCS to recommend assignment of operational•responsibility

for Sentry, Midas, Transit, and the interim satellite detection system.

McElroy asked that a reply be "expedited," but on 24 July the Joint Chiefs

informed him that they could not reach agreement, and the question then

came to lodge on his desk. After another three weeks, McElroy took a new
111111.11111111•111 201

approach. Be personally briefed the Joint Chiefs on 13 August, to inform

them of his "thinkidg." He deemed the scheduled satellite launchings up

through 1963 too few to justify a joint military astronautics command "at

the present time." He VAS also inclined to make the Air Force responsible

for all DOD boosters, with payloads divided among the three services. He

asked the Joint Chiefs for their "comments."

43

The result was the same--the Joint Chiefs could not agree. McElroy

then made the decision on his own. On 18 September the Secretary of Des

fense informed JCS that there would be no joint military space command;

that the Air Force ►as responsible for launching DOD's space boosters;

that the Air Force would have management responsibility for Sentry (Samos)

and Midas; and that the Army and Navy would have similar responsibility

for Courier and Transit respectively.

44

Two years after Sputnik the tide seemed to have turned in favor of

the Air Force, though the Secretary of Defense had not yet given the services managerial control of their research and development projects. There

was reason neither for optimism or depression, for none could say what would

be next. In the world of defense, as in the world of everything else, the

"last" decision is never final.

The progress made by the American space program during the first two

years after Sputnik could have been considered remarkable under different

circumstances. There was, however, a disturbing pattern in overall events.

For every cluster of small American accomplishments there was, without

fuss or furor, a surpassing Russianachievement. There was unpublicized

discontent within the National Security Council as evidenced by its policy
111111111•111111,

statement of January 1960. There was criticism, too on Capitol Hill,

and among columnists and journalists. An example was the editorial that

appeared in Time on 19 January 1959, just 17 days after the Russians launched

their Lunik I on an interplanetary probe that sent "the first man-made planet

circling the Sun with an estimated life of millions of years." Continuing,

Time commented:

Just when U.S. space achievements were beginning to make up for

Sputnik jolts to the U.S. pride and prestige, the Russians sent their -

Lunik soaring far beyond where any man-made object had ever penetrated

before. Once again the world marveled. at U.S.S.R.'s technological

prowess. Pressing an immediate question: Why is the U.S. still lagging in a race that may decide whether freedom has any future?

The answer to the question was not simple.

The basic element in the lag was the long period after World War II

when civilian authorities failed to comprehend that the life of the nation

could depend on an endlessly progressive technology. In the view of the

House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration:

45

In the space field, in fact, the military people have generally

shown far more foresight than the civilians, far more concern for

applied science although still slow to appreciate the values of basic

research. If the United States military mind was slow to grasp the

worth of scientific discovery in the years leading into World War II,

just the opposite has been true of the postwar decade. It is no accident, for example, that 60 percent of the physics doctorates in

the United States since World War II were at least partially subsidized by the Office of Naval Research.. Similar accomplishments could

be quoted for the Army and Air Force. In fact, the military often

had to hide valuable research work done under its aegis from the

vengeful eyes of civilian budget experts. If the sputniks caught

the United States by surprise, it was not for lack of warning

from our military scientists.

It was this scientific conservatism at policy-making levels of the

Government that gave the Soviets their head start in developing highthrust rocket engines to serve with equal ease either an ICBM or a space

program. Once handicapped by the Soviet time lead, there were technological

202
11111111Mier 203

factors that made American recovery seem slow indeed. Each new engine,

for instance, required countless manhours for its design, development,

construction, and testing. There was no easy ratio between chamber dimensions and thrust. General Wilson, DOS/Development, phrased it nicely when

be said: "Propulsion is the key to space use. Up to the present we have

not learned how to scale up a missile propulsion system to increase its

thrust. Thus, each program must be undertaken as a separate and distinct

development effort."46

Among the nontechnical factors of delay, none was more important than

the lack of a stimulating.and unifying national objective. Other than a

space-for-peace policy, the cry was seldom for anything more than the dull

motif of "catching up vith Russia." An exception was voiced by Representative James G. Fulton, of Pennsylvania, in discussions vith Livingston T.

Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Representative

47

Fulton:

17' want to ask about the space progrmi7 the administration is

entering into. Are they simply trying to catch up to Russia in some

fields or are they trying to keep ahead in others, or are ve really

going to have a program that I am for, of leapfrogging Russia? Would

it be possible for us to have a apace program that leapfrogged Russia

and moved ahead our own targets more or less independently of her propaganda? Why don't we do that? Why don't ve set targetkaboad 3 to 5

years, far-reaching and far-seeking constructive targets, and then

go ahead and reach them instead of looking to see bow Russia is running and then run doVo that street?

To these penetrating questions the representative of the State Department

replied: "I think it is a very constructive approach, sir."

The space-for-peace policy itself, though widely supported as an ideal,

was sometimes criticized sharply because it divided the American space program into two unsynchronized parts-onethat sought to move with the tempo

of military necessity and one that would progress with the philosophic calm
204

of pure science. Again to quote Tame/ many of the Administration's "scientific brains . . . proved to be nay-sayers and quibblers, among other things

stirring up a futile, irrelevant dispute over whether space is a civilian

or a military realm." Time regrettel that the President's high-minded

policy of space-for-peace did not stand up before the argument that great

military advantages would be won by the nation first to make space its own

"backyard."

These advantages seemed still irrefutable at the end of 1959, even

though the military could not yet envision space tactics and strategy as

clearly as Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell foresaw the tactics and strategy

of airpower when be bombed and sank the Ostfriesland off the Virginia shores

in 1921. True, Mitchell had behind him experiences of World War I. The

weakness of the military in 1959 lay in their inability to speak in more

definite terms than the "uses of space" and categories of offensive and

defensive spade ireapons. Yet nothing could refute the argument that space,

by its very immensity, was certain eventually to introduce new concepts of

warfare and weaponry. - .*

Be who comes second best in the space race will have no second chance

to win.

er
Notes to pages 4-17 205

CHAPTER I

Presentation to Air Council by W.E. Dornberger, 7 Dec 57, History of

Peenemunde.

W.D. Dornberger, ymg,.., James Cleugh & Geoffrey Halliday, trans (New

York, 1954), pp 16:17.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948), pp 258-60.

Dornberger, Hist of Peenemunde.

Statement by W. von Braun, 'Mk in House Bearings before the Select

Cmte on Astronautics & Space Exploration, 85th Cong, 2d Sees, (Hereinafter cited as McCormack Cmte), Astronautics and Space Exploration,

pp 19-20.

The United States Air Force Dictionary (Air University Press, 1956).

Von Braun before McCormack Comte, p 17.

Brochure, SAC Space Concepts, 13 Aug 59; Fred Whipple, "Interview,"

Missiles and Rockets, Mar 57.

Press Conf with'Charles E. Wilson, SOD, NY Times 13 May 53.

Press Cote with Wilson, NY 32121, 7 Jun 55.

J.H. Douglas, NY Times, 28 Apr 53; address by Sen Stuart Symington

Congressional cord, 23 Jun Re s, 53; Gen T.D. White, VC/8 USAF, NY Times,

21 May 55; LfGen D. L. Putt, DCS/D, USAF, NY Times, 14 Jun 55; HIE,

6 & 12 Nov 55.

MSC Action 915, 24 Sep 53, & 1433,•8 Sep 55.

Trevor Gardner, NY Times, 12 Aug & 9 Dec 55.

Wilson, NY Times, 7 Oct & 23 Nov 53.

NY Times, 9 Feb 56.

F.J. Malina, "Is the Sky the Limit?" Ordnance Jul-Aug 46; H.E.

Newell, Jr, High Altitude Rocket Research 11464 York, 1953), p 13.

17. The Development of the Navaho Missile by J.A. Neal, WADC Hist Br,

Jan 55, p 1; ltz;M/Gen B.W. Chidlaw, Dep CG/Engineering, AMC to CG
UMW

Notes to pages 18-28.

AAF, 6 May 47, subj: AAF GM Program, Doc 73 in AMC History of the

Development of Guided Missiles, 1946-1950, by M.R. Self.

Self, pp 42-43.

Ltr by Chidlaw, 6 May 47.

Memo, B/Gen T.S. Power, Dep AC/AS-3 to CO AAF, 16 Jun 57, subj: OperationalRqrmts (Priorities) for GM's, 1947-1957, in Self, Doc 76.

Neal, pp 1-15.

Ibid., pp 4, 28-31.

C.H. Donnelly, The United States Guided Missile Program, prep for

Preparedness Investigating Subemtrgrtanate Cote on Armed Services,

86th Cong, let Sess (Washington, 1959), pp 62-69.

Ltr, T. Gardner to Lewis Strauss, 14 Jul 54, ARDC GO 42, 15 Jul 54,

subj: Reorgn of Hq ARDC & Orgn of WDD.

Rpt of Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) of the Science Advisory

Cmte, Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack (Washington, 14 Feb 55),

passim.

26. Donnelly, pp 81-82.

Dornberger, hg, pp 16-17.

Ltr, Col L.A. Esill D/Warning & Threat Assessments, AC/I to M/Gen G.W.

Martin, D/Plans, 18 Dec 59, subj: Organization, Planning, & Control

of the Soviet Space Prog; interview, Mae Link, Max Rosenberg, & Lee

Bowen with B/Gen D.D. Flickinger, 25 May 61.

Staff Rpt, House Select Cmte on Astro & Space Exploration, Astronautics and its Applications (Washington, 1958) (Hereinafter cited as

Staff-Rpir-i 223.

NBC 5814/1, U.S. Policy on Outer Space, Anx Al The Soviet Space System,

18 Aug 58.

Memo K.T. Compton, Chmn/RDB to SOD, 31 Oct 59, subj: Progress Rpt

Study of GM Prog.

Wash Eipsnialf11,225 7 Sep 51; NY Times, 4 Oct 51; Wash part, 12 Oct 51.

TMreports multiplied during7aigit 12 months.

NSC 5814/1, Anx A; Staff Rpt, pp 217-37; House Rpt 1758, Select Cote

on Astro & Space Exploration, 85th Cong, 2d Seas, The National Space 
Notea to pages 28-36. 1111.111m

r

207

Progrem, App 5, passim; A.T. Zachringer, "Soviet Astronautics," Missiles & Rockets, Feb 57.

Staff Rpt, p 221;

MSC 5814/1; H Rpt 1758, p 31.

"General Arnold's Third Report," The War Reports of General of the

Am. George C. Marshall, General of igiNnsEN.N. Arnold and Fleet

Admiral Emelt J. Cial l (Philadelphia & New TOW,- 7 , p 4414

Ltr, R.C. Lent Jr, D/Planning, DCS/P&O, WADD to Col C.D. Gasser, SAB,

7 Apr 60, AF Space Prog, Alch 4; Eouglas Aircraft Co Contract W-33-038,

ac-14105; B/Oen B.H. Schriever, Briefing at Pentagon on ARDC, 24 Jan 54.

E.M. Emme, Aeronautics and Astronautics (Washington, 1961), p 61.

Rpt of Technical Evaluation Gp Satellite Vehicle Program (OM 13/70),

29 Mar 48 (Hereinafter cited as TEG Rpt); Capt C.W. Styer, Jr, USN,

& Ccmdr R.F. Freitag, USN, "The Now in the Space Age," U.S. Naval

Institute Proceedings, Mar 60.

Memo, Ch/BuAer to JRDB, 24 Jan 47, subj: Earth Satellite Vehicle, Incl.

A&B.

Rand RA-15000, First Quarterly Report, Jun 46, pp 6-17.

Ibid.; Douglas Rpt SW11827, Preliminary Design of An Experimental

World Circling Spaceship, 2 May 46.

Douglas Rpt SM-11827, pp 2, 9-16.

Memo, Re L.C. Stevens, Chmn/R&D Cmte, Aeronautical Bd to Aero Bd,

15 May p subj: Case No. 244--High Altitude Earth Satellite; Aero Bd

Minutes, 29 May 46.

Memo, Ch/BuAer to JRDB, 24 Jan 46; JRDB Rules of Orgn and Procedure,

7 Oct 46.

JRDB Minutes of 6th Mtg, 6 Mar 47, v/atch AAF Position Papers; memo,

L/Gen H.S. Vssdenberg,'SeniorAxmy Member of Aero Bd to JRDB, 13 Jun

47, subj: Satellite Agency.

4RDB Minutes of 6thittg; memo, RDB to Aero Bd, 9 Jan 48, subj: Earth

Satellite Vehicle.

Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (Nev York, 1949), pp 84-86.

CGK Minutes, 3 Feb 48, Item 10; ltr, F.L. Hovde, Chen/CGM to W.A.

McNair, Chmn/TEG, 6 Feb 48.

24. 12G Rpt.
1111111111Plates to pages 37-1194

25. Ltr, K/Gen E.B. Baylor, Ch/R&D Div, Ord Dept to Secy/COM, 26 Jul 48,

subj: Comments on MG Rpt; ltr, R/Adm D.V. Gallery, ACNO (Gil) to Secy/

COM, 8 Jul 48; ltr, MVGen F.O. Carroll, USAF Member/CGM to Chan/COM6

27 Jul 48, subj: Satellite Vehicle Prog; CGM Minutes, 15 Sep 48, Item

12.

First Report of the Secretary of Defense 12m1., App C, Rpt of the Exec

14-3PROS, p 129.

W.B. Bergen, Pres/Martin Co, quoted in Denver Post, 25 Sep 59.

E.A. Zell, Research D/Army Signal Corps, quoted in WashEvening 

Star, 28 Oct 58; account of incident in NY Tribune,-1876ct 60.

Ltr, B/Gen A.R. Cranford, Ch/Engr Div, AMC to DCS/M, EqUSAF, 8 Dec

47, subj: Project Rand Satellite Vehicle; memo, L/Oen E.A. Craig,

DCS/K to VC/S, 12 Jan 48, subj: Earth Satellite Vehicle.

Rand R-217, Utility, of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance (Project

Feed Back), Apr 51.

Memo, Col J.A. Dunning, Off of D/Plans to D/Plana, 28 Oct 57, subj:

USAF Satellite Prog.

Rend Ra-1194, Scientific Uses for a Satellite Vehicle 12 Feb 54; Rand

Rm-1500, Scientific Use of an Arti!icial OatelLitii—Z1 Jun 55.

Hist, AFFTC, Jan-Jun 58, pp 164-82.

34. Rend R-217.

35• R&R Project Card, ARDC to Ng USAF, 10 Oct 57, subj: Abbreviated System

Plan.

Memo, Col D.L. Ilse, Off of D/DevPlang to D/R&D, 18 Nov 57, subj:

Comments on Abbr System Dev Plan; M/R by Col B.E. Ferrer, 4 Nov 57,

subj: Boost Glide Concept; D/R&D Dev Directive (DD) 94, 25 Nov 57,

subj: Hypersonic Strategic Weapon System.

RCA-Rand RM-999, Progress Report (Project Feed Beck), 1 Jan 53.

Rand R-262, Project Feed Back Summary Report, Vols I & II, 1 Mar 54.

Eq ARDC Briefing to SAB Ad Hoc Cite on Advanced Weapons Tech &

Environment, am! Technology, 29 Jul 57, pp 17-21.

Hq ARDC HyperZEnvironment Test System Dev Plan, 18 MAy 59, p 1-1.

Ibid.

42. Memo, D/R&D to R.E. Horner, ASAF (R&D), 13 May 57, subj: BALWARDS

Vehicles; memo, Eq USAF to Eq, ARDC, 15 Msy 57, subj: BALWANDS.
Notes to pages 50-62. ill1111P

Memo, Eq USAF to Eq ARDC, 3 Feb 58, subj: BRATS; Eq ARDC Hyper-Environment Test System Supporting Plan, 13 Mar 59.

J.S. Banrahan & David Bushnell, Space and Biology (New York, 1960),

pp 3-14.

B/Gen D.D. Flickinger, D/Numan Factors, Hq ARDC, "Human Factor Problems in Space Flight," in Space Technology, an ARDC presentation to

MB, 29 Jul 57, pp 57-67.

AMC, History of Research in Space and Biodynamics, 1946-1958, pp 1-28.

Off of Asst/Bioastronautics, Eq ARDC, Capability & Rqrmts for Manned

Space Ops, 15 Dec 60.

Flickinger; memo, Gen T.S. Power, CINCSAC to C/S USAF, 13 Aug 58, subj:

SAC Space Policy.

Hist, ANDO, Jul-Dec 57, pp 29-52.

Nemo, Col J.L. Martin, Dep DAT to Off/LL, 10 Nov 59, subj: Project

Mercury, w/atch 1, Outline of History of USAF Man-in-Space; Ng ARDC,

Bioastronautics Capability & Rqrmts for Manned Space Ops, 15 Dec CO,

PP 4-5.

Ezra Kotcher, Off of D/Labs t WADC, "Vehicle Design," in S 12 TechnolgiE (presentation), pp 25-36.

Statement by R/Adm J.T. Hayward, ACNO (R&D) before McCormack Cote,

p 275.

CHAPTER III

H Rpt 1758, 85th Cong, 2d Sass, p 19.

J.C. Cooper, "High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty," Internaional Le; t Quarterly Review, Spring 58.

Sir A.D. McNair, The Law of the Air (London, 1953), App, pp 295-328;

Col. M.B. Schofield, USAF, -rcontrol of Outer Space," Air University

quarterly Review, Spring 58.

Space Law, a symposium prep at request of Sen L.B. Johnson, Chmn/Senate

Sp Cmte on Space & Astronautics, 85th Cong, 2d Sees, 31 Dec 58, passim;

Sir Geoffrey Butler & Simon MecColey, The Development , of International 

Law (London, 1958), pp 40-58.

". 5. Oscar Schacter, "Who Owns the Universe?" in Space Ig5 pp 8-17.

6. Wenner Buedeler, The International Geophysical Year (UNESCO, 1957),

pp 14-26, 48-49.
210 Notes to pages 62-72.

Joseph Kaplan, The IGY Rocket and Satellite Program (Washington,

1960), p 13.

'NY 22,mal, 16 Apr 55.

W.B. Hester, "Some Political Implications of Space Flight," Journal

of the British Interplanetary Society, Nov-Dec 55.

TCP Rpt Meeting the Threat, pp 146-47.

NSC 5520, 26 May 55.

R.W. Young, "The Aerial Inspection Plan and Air Sovereignty," George 

Washington Law Review Apr 56.

Mai H.J. Neumann

'

 USAF, "The Legal Status of Outer Space and the Soviet

Union," in apace 

pp 495-503. Newman cited A. Hislov and S.

Krylov, "State Sovereignty in Air Space," International Affairs (Moscow),

Mar 56:

NY Times, 30 Jul 55.

Facts on !la, 28 Jul-3 Aug 55, p 255.

NY Tame/ 8 Feb 56.

J.C. Cooper, "Legal Problems of Upper Space," Proceedings of American

Society of International kb 50th Annual Meeting, 25-28 Aug 56; NY

TIM, 11 Jan 57.

NY Tipegt, 15 Jan 57; Yearbook of the United Nations, 122g. (Nev York,

1957-4- p 100-101.

H Doc 372, 84th Congo 2d Sees, Rpt of President to Cong for 1957, U.S.

Participation in the United Nations pp 14-15.

CHAPTER IV

Press Cole with Wilson, NY Times, 21 Nov & 17 Dec 54.

TCP Rpt Meeting the Threat, pp 146-47.

Draft memo, SAF to SOD, 11 Apr 55, subj: TCP Rpt.

Memo C.B. Wilson to Secys Army, Navy, & AF, 28 Mar 55, subj: Earth

Sateilites.

Memo, JCS to SOD, 18 Apr 55, subj: TCP Rpt, JCS 1899/200.

6. NBC 5520, 2655
Notes to pages 72-78. 01111111,11

Memo, D.A. Quarles, ASOD (R&D) to Coordinating Cmte on Gen Sciences,

30 Mar 55, subj: Scientific Satellite; M/R, A.E. Lombard, Scientific

Adviser, D/R&D, 5 Apr 55, imbj: Scientific Satellite.

Memo, R.W. Cairns, Chmn/Coord Cmte on Gen Sciences to ASOD (R&D), 4

May 55, subj: Scientific Satellite Frog in the DOD; memo, D.A. Quarles.

to SAP, 17 May 55, vabj: Scientific Satellite; Rpt of AdBoc Advisory

Gp on Sp Capabilities, 4 Aug 55, App F.

Nemo, Col Joseph W. Williams, Dep Asst/Dev Prog to M/Gen B.C. Donnelly,

Sp Asst to C/8, 18 Mar 58, subj: Project World Series; Rpt of Ad Hoc

Advay Gp.

Rpt of Ad Hoc Advsy Gp.

Ibid.

/2. Paper prep by DOD for Nouse Select Cmte on Astro 81 Space ftploration,

85th Cong, 2d Bess (McCormack Cmte), pp 155-56; L/Gen J.M. Gavin (Rtd),

War and Peace in the Space Ast (New York, 1958), pp 14-15.

Memo, R.B. Robertson, ctg Dep SOD to Secya/Army, Navy, AP, 9 Sep

55, subj: Tech Prog for

Jr,

iSC 5520; memo J.B. McCandery, Dep ASOD

(R&D) to ASAP (R&D), 19 Sep 55, subj: IF Scientific Satellites; Statement by R/Adm J.T. Hayward, ACNO (R&D) before McCormack Cate.

"Project Vanguard," Missiles and Rockets, Jul 57.

Statement by W. von Braun before McCormack Cmte, p 63.

C.C. Furnas, ASOD (R&D), quoted in NY lam, 16 Oct 57.

C.C. Pumas, quoted in Facts on 1112, 10-16 Oct 57, p 331.

Rand RM-1922, A Casebook on Soviet Astronautics, Pt II, 21 Jun 57,

passim; ASTIA lioc AD 13300,-71;;Iet Space Flight Activities " a

discussion of the Rand space flight program, presented to AF&AB by

F.J. Krieger, 29 Jul 59.

Mead, P.P. Bundage D/BOB to the President, 30 Apr 57, subj: Project

Vanguard.

Ibid.; memo, J.S. Lay, Jr Nxec Secy/NBC to members of NSC, 3 KAY 57,

subj: U.S. Scientific Satelli te Prog; memo, C.E. Wilson to JCS &

Secys/Army, Navy, AF, 17 May 57, subj: U.S. Scientific Satellite Prog.

Von Braun before McCoraack Cate, pp 33-34, 66.

Statement by Gen Gavin before McCormack Cmte.

23. Von Braun before McCormack Cmte, pp 18-19, 34.
11111.110 Notes to pages 78-88.

Gavin before McCormack Cate, pp 184-85.

"Project Vanguard," Missiles and Rockets, Jul 57.

S.F. Singer, "Synoptic Rocket Observations in the Upper Atmosphere,

Nature, 20 Jun 53.

Memo Col W.O. Davis, ANSA to Col D.D. Flickinger, 30 Jul 54, subj:

Program Mouse.

Memo Col Davis to F.M. Field, D/B&D, 12 Jul 57, subj: Far Side Project

Justification.

Memo, Col B.H. Holzman, ARDC to M/Gen M.C. Demler, 20 Mar 57, subj:

Project Far Side.

Ltr, B/Oen A.D. Starbird, ARC to MOM, 17 Apr 57; ltr, U-Secy, Dept/

Interior to SAF, 21 Jun 57.

Aeronntronics System Pub C-100, 16 Sep 57, subj: Conduct of Far Side

Phase II Expers.

CRAFTER V

if Rpt 1371, 90th Rpt by Cmte on Govt Ops, 85th Congo 2d Sens, U.S.

Military Aid and Supply, Programs in Western Europe, p 31.

Ibid.; H Rpt 1121, 11th Rpt by Cmte on Oovt.Ops, 86th Con& lst Sess.,

Giinisation and Management of Missile Programs, pp 1-2.

Astronautics Nov 57. This ccament•as typical and could be supported

by re erences to numerous journals and periodicals.

Pacts on File, 10-16 Oct 57.

These and-other comments may be found in MY Tim", Wash pea, Facts

on !ay etc., for period 5 Oct-7 Dec 57.

G. Zadoroghnyi, "The Artificial Satellite and International Law,"

Sovetekalt Rossiia 17 Oet 57, trans by A.M. Jones, inlhareske,

PP 54011-6.

Von Braun before McCormack Cmte.

Statement by R/Adm Nyman G. Rickover before McCormack Otte, p 261..

Statement by Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser, Dept/State,. before McCormack

Cmte, pp 1269-75.

Dept/State Bulletin, 9 Jun 58.
Notes to pages 88-97. 213

B Rpt 1769, 85th Cong, Exploration of Outer Me., passim; S Rpt 1728,-

85th Cong, Peacefill Exploration of Space, passim,.

NY nes, 11 Dec 57, 11 Jan & 3 Feb 58.

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1958 (key York, 1959), pp 19-22.

Ibid.

15.. Ef Doc 104, 85th Cong, 2d Seas, Rpt of President to Cong for 1958,

U.S. Participation in the United Nations.

Ibid.

NY Tines, 18 Nov 58.

H Doc 104, 85th Cong; Dept/State study, "Major Elements of United States

International Consultative and Cooperative Activities in the Field of

Outer Space," in H Bearings before Cate on Science & Astronautics,

86th Cong, 2d Seas, Review of the Since pp 28-32; Yearbook

of the United Nations, 12227Nev York, pp24-26.8

Dept/State, "Major Elements . . . of Activities in Outer Space."

NY Times 8 Nov 57.

Ibid., 6 Feb 58.

Ibid., 13 Jan & 3 Apr 58; memo, JCS to SOD, 25 Nov 57, subj: DOD Sp

Projects Agency; Rpt of President's Science Adv Cate, Introduction

to Outer 26 Mar 58.

Memo, M/Gen J.B. Cary, D/Plans to C/S USAF, 26 Jun 58, subj: U.S.

Policy on Outer Space; memo, Col B.F. Norden Off of D/Plans to Gen

Cary, D/Plans, 19 Jun 58, subj: National Policy on Space; NSC 5814/1,

Preliminary U.S. Policy on Space, 18 Aug 58.

NSC 5814/1.

OCB Operation Plan for Outer Space, 18 Mar 59.

Memo, Col R.R. Rowland, Off of D/Plans to D/AT et al., 27 Aug 59,

subj: U.S. Policy on Outer Space, NSC 5814/1.

NSC 5901/1, A National Security Policy, 5 Aug 57.

28. Memo, L/Col E.N. Bohr:Ran, Off of D/Plans to C/S USAF, 18 Nov 59,

subj: Final Draft of U.S. Policy on Outer Space.
214 Notes to pages 99-110.

CHAPTER VI

Newsweek, 18 Nov 57.

Trevor Gardner, "But We Are Still Lagging," Life, 4 Nov 57.

Statement by Edwin L. Weisl, Ch Counsel/DOD, in S Hearings before

Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Cote on Armed Services, 85th

Cong, lst and 2d Sees (hereinafter cited as Johnson Subcmte), Inquiry

into Satellite and Missile Programs, p 220.

Rpt of Teller Ad Hoc Cate, ARDC, 28 Oct 57.

DOD Dir 5105.10, 15 Nov 57; Statements of Neil McElroy & W.M. Holaday

before Johnson gubcmte, pp 211-14, 346-49; H Rpt 1121, as cited in V,

n 2$ p 17.

Statement by Neil McElroy, in H Bearings before DOD Subcmte on Appropriations, 85th Cong, let Sees (hereinafter cited as Mahon Subcmte),

The Ballistic Missile Program, p T.

•

Memo, JCS to SOD, 25 Nov 57, subj: DOD Sp Projects Agency.

Memo, SOD to JCS, 6 Dec 57, subj: DOD Sp Projects Agency; H Doc 298,

85th Cong, 2d Seas, Comm from the President, "Proposed Additional

Authority for the Department of Defense," 7 Jan 58; McElroy before

Mahon Subcmte, p 7.

H Rpt 1121, pp 132-35. 4

DOD Dir 5105.15, 7 Feb 58, subj: ARPA.

Memo, P.D. Foote: W.M. Holaday, & R.K. Johnson to SOD, 7 Apr 58.

NY Times, 10 Jan 58.

Ibid., 4 Apr 58.

PL 85-599, DOD Reorganisation Act of 1958, appr 6 Aug 58; memo, M/Gen

B.C. Donnelly, Asst DCS/P&P to DCS/P&P, 4 Aug 58, subj: DOD Reorgn,

w/2 Inas; Facts on /111, 18-24 Dec 58.

Memo, Col V.Y. Adduci, Off/LL to VC/S, 22 Nov 57; memo, L/Gen D.L.

Putt, DCS/D to M/Gen J.E. Smart, Asst VC/S, 10 Dec 57, subj: Estbmt

of a Dir of Astronautics.

NY Times) 14 Dec 57; verbal info from Off of C/S thru Col J.L. Martin,

WAT to Lee Bowen, 27 Jul 60; memo, Putt to All Dire at al., 13 Dec

57, subj: Cancellation of the Memo of 10 Dec 57.

17. Memo, Asst VC/S to Air Staff, 4 Mar 58, subj: Space Projects involving

ICBM/IRBM's.
r

Notes to pages 111-118. 215

18. Memo, M/Gen J.S. Mills, Asst MOD to Can Smart, 12 Mar 58, subj: A

Dir of Advanced Weapons;aemo B/Gen R.H. Warren, Mil Asst/SOD to

SAF, 22 Jul 58, subj: Dir of IdNanced Technology; DAP GO 29 Jul

58, subj:. Eatbat of AFDAT.

19. Memo, L/Gen R.C. Wilson, DCS/D to All Dire et al., 29 Jul 58, eubj:

Estbmt of AFDAT.

20. Memo, B/Gen H.A. Boushey, D/AT to C/8 USAF, 8 Dec 58, subi: Functions

of AFDAT; memo M/Gen C.M. McCorkle, Asst (GM} to Asst VC/S, 13

Jan 59, subj: Function of AFDAT; memo, Smart to Deps at al. A 6 Apr

59, subj: Respons for Space Projects; R0I 21-14, 13 Apr 59.

CRAFTER VII

Memo, Eilene Galloway to Rep J.W. McCormack, 7 Mar 59, subj: Problems

of Cong in Formulating Outer Space Leg, in R Bearings before McCormack

Oats.

Ibid.

NY Tames, 3 Apr 58.

H Rpt 1758, 85th Cong, 2d Sees, The Nationalac program.

Statements before McCormack Cote, by H.L. Dryden, D/NACA, p 403; C.C.

Furnas, Chancellor, U. of Buffalo, pp 735-73; Lee DuBridge, Pres,

Calif Institute of Tech, pp 778-79; •• Pickering, DPPL, p 80 ► ;

J.A. Van Allen States Univ, Iowa, pp 864-65; W.S. Dornberger, Tech

Asst to Pres, Bel l Aircraft Corp, pp 1085-94.

Statements before McCormack Corte by M/Gen John B. Medarie, AOMC, p 167;

Riktu Hyman G. Rickover, AC/BuShips for Nuclear Propulsion pp 222,

230-31; R/Adm John T. Heyward, AC NO (R&D), p 276; L/Gen Donal d L. Putt,

DC4/D, USAF, pp 99-134; Wean Bernard A. Schriever, MAIM, pp 647-57;

H.F. York, Ch Scientist/ARPA, p 47; J.D. Doolittle, Chmn/NACA 4 p 928;

R/Adm W.F. Reborn, D/Sp Projects, USN, pp 885-909. See also ltr, D.A.

Quarles, Dep SOD to M.R. Sterns, D/BOB, 1 Apr 58.

FL 85-568, The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, appr 29

Jul 58.

REpt 1758.

PL 85-568.

Ibid.

11. Ibid.
•

216 Notes to pages 118-127.

H Rpt 2166, National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 Conf Rpt, 15

Jul 58, p 16.

NASA Release, 1 Oct 58.

Memo Malroy to Secys/Azmy, Navy, Al', 12 Sep 58, subj: The CivilianMilitary Liaison Cate.

Ibid.; M/R by M/Gen M.C. Dealer D/R&D, 23 Jul 58; memo, Eemler to

Xieri DCS/D„ Sep 58, subj: DOD-NASA Oren & Relationship; memo, Quarles

toe/says/Army, Navy, AF, 31 Oct 58, subj: C-MLC.

Memo, JCS to SOD, 22 Oct 58, subj: C-MLC, JCS 2283/17•

Memo, Seey/Army to WARRA, nd; memo, Seey/Navy to D/ARPA, nd; ASSS

by B/Gen H.A. Bousbey, Dep D/R&D, 8 oct 58; memo M/Oen R.P. Swofford.,

Asst DCS/D to Ads Aot/OSAT, 8 Oct 58 • ASSS, L/Gen R.C. Wilson, DCS/D

to All Dirs et al., 14 Oct 58, all same subj: Terms of Ref for C.•MLC.

Memo, J.H. Douglas, SAP to C/S USAF, 16 Oct 58, subj: Terms of Ref

for C-MLC; memo, Swofford to SAF, 24 Oct 58, aubj: Initial Mtg of

DOD Nominees to C-MLC; JCS 2283/18, Terms of Reference of C-MLC.

M/R by Maj H.C. Boward, 23 Oct 58, subj: C-MLC.

20. Memo, Wilson to D/AT et al., 29 Oct 58, subj: USAF Ada C-MLC Channels.

•

CHAPTER VIII •

Interview, Joseph Angell, Max Rosenberg, & Lee Bowen with L/Gen D.L.

Yates, 7 24ar 61..

H Rpt 1121, 86th Congo lst Seas, Organization and Management of Missile Programs, p 131.

Ibid. pp 131-32..

Yates interview.

Statement by W.M. Brucker, Secy/Army, in H Hearings before Cmte on

Science & Astronautics, 86th Cong, lst Seas, Missile Development and

Space Sciences p 200.

Astronautics Briefing to Armed Forces Policy Council by M/Gen J.S.

Mills, Asst DCS/D, 5 Nov 57; memo, M/Gen R.P. Swofford, /R&D

to R.E. Horner, A$AP (R&D), 22 Nov 57, subj: Proposed DOD

Jr,

idr of Sp

Projects; memo, Horner to SAF, Attn: Sp Asst/Armed Forces Policy Council, 12 Nov 57, subj: Outer Space Vehicles; memo, William Weitzen,

Off of ASAF (R&D) to Horner, 18 Dec 57, subj: Astronautic Planning;

memo, J, Dotaraak, SAF to NeAkMaroy, SOD. 12 Nov 571 subj: Responsfor M

X 

il Satellites.
Notes to pages 128-139.

1111111111111111111

1111111•1 217

Memo, W.A. Holaday, Sp Asst/SOD (GM) to Cbmn/Advs Gp on Sp Capabilities, 6 Sep 57, subj: Satellite Progs.

1.kmu), Exec Secy/Advsy Gp on Sp Cpblities to ASAP (R&D), 11 Oct 57,

subj: WS-117L.

9. Memo, J.H. Stewart, Cbmn/Adm Gp on Sp Cpblities to Holaday, 15 Jan

58, subj: Satellite Plans of the Mil Dept., v/incl, p 20; Col R.C.

Richardson, Asst/Long Range Objectives, DCS/P&P to M/Gen H.C. Donnelly,

Asst DCS/P&P, 14 May 58, subj: NSC Policy on Outer Space.

10. Memo, Stewart to Holaday, 15 Jan 58, incl, pp 20-21.

11. Ibid., P

Ibid., pp 3-12.

Memo, Holaday to SAF, 7 Jan 58, subj: Satellite Program.

Memo, Horner to Holaday, 25 Jan 58, subj: Air Force Astro Dev Prog.

Verbal comments by William Weitsen, Off of ASAP (R&D) to Lee Bowen,

12 Aug 60; tele con Lee Bowen with B/Gen H.A. Boushey, Comdr/Arnold

Engr Dev Center, 25 Aug 60.

Memo, Douglas to SOD, 1 Feb 58, subj: Recon Satellites, wlincl, draft

memo, SOD to SAP, subj: Prog for Mil Recon Satellite (WS-117L).

Memo, Douglas to SOD, 14 Feb 58, subj: Thor & WS-117L Frog.

Memo, Horner to SOD, 21 Feb 58.

Memo, McElroy to SAP, 24 Feb 58, subj: AF WS-117L Prog.

Memos, R.W. Johnson, DARPA to Secys/Army, Navy, & AF, 27 Mar 58.

Statement by Neil McElroy in It Hearings before DOD Subcmte on Appn,

85th Cong, 1st Sees, The Ballistic Missile Program, p 7; DOD Dir

5105.15, 24 Mar 58, subj: ARPA; memo Presidentto SOD, 7 Feb

58, subj: Approval of Adv Space Projects; memo, Johnson to Secy/Army,

27 Mar 58.

AO 2, Amnd 4, 29 Sep-58; AO 9, Amnd 5, 29 Sep 58, & Amnd 6, 11 Dec 58.

Memo, JohnsOn to SAP, 28 Feb 58, subj: Recon Satellites & Manned Space

Explor.

24. Memo, B/Gen H.A. Boushey, Dep D/R&D to M/Gen J.S. Mi11s, Asst DCS/D,

18 Mar 58, subj: Suggested Remarks for Col Oder at Presentation to

Roy W. Johnson, 1000, on 19 Mar 58; memo, Mills to VC/S USAF, 20 Mar

58, subj: Man in Space Prog; memos,M.A. McIntyre, OSAF to D/ARPA,
Notes to pages 139-149.

19' 58, subjs: Mama in Space Prog & WS-117L.

Memo, Johnson to SOD, 19 Mar 58, subj: Proposed ARPA Projects, v/3

incls, ABM Projects 1, 2, & 3.

Mew, McElroy to the President, 19 Mar 58, subj: ARPA's Proposed

Projects; ammo, the President to SOD, 2k Mar 58; AO's 1, 2, 43,

27 Mar 58.

Memo, D.A. Quarles, Dep SOD to D/ARPA, k Apr 58, subj: Argus.

Memo, Quarles to DARPA, 1 May 58, subj: Satellite Progs, Including

the Vanguard Series.

29. Memo, L/Gen D.L. Putt, DCS/D to C/S WAY, 3 Apr 58, subj: Bacon

Satellite.

32.

Memo, Bousbey to M/Oen J.E. Smart, Asst VC/8 USAF,. 2 Apr 58, subj:

USAF Astro Prog, v/incl, Proposed Memo, Horner to D/AREA, same subj.

Memo, L/Col F.J. Dillon, Jr to Col Leon Booth, Sp Asst/DCS/D, 10 Sep

58, subj: Air Staff Orientation; AO's 10-1k & 17-19, 25 Jul-29 Aug 58.

Ltr, Gen C.E. LeMay, VC/S USAF to L/Gen S.E. Anderson, CONABDC 9

mhy 58.

CHAPTER U

Ltr, Gen T.S. Power, CINCSAC to C/S USAF, 13 Aug 58, subj: SAC Space

Policy.

Statement by H.F. York, Ch Scientist/ANPA, in H. Bearings before Subcmte of Cmte on Appn, 85th Cong, 2d Sees, Department of Defense he

propriations„ pp 295-319.

3. Statement by H.L. Dryden, D/NACA, submitted to the McCormack Cmte,

PP 949-50.

k. R.S. Cesaro & Robertson Youngquist, "Strategic Space--Key to National

Survival," Statement at 5th Annual ABDC Science & Engineering Symposium, Hq ARDC, 22 Jul 58.

AD 28-59, 29 Sep 58.

AO 2-58, Amnd 5, 6 Oct 58; AD. 12-59, Amnd 1, 6 Oct 58, AO 10-59,

Amnd 7, 13 Apr 59; AO 17-59, Amnd 5, 13 Apr 59.

7. N/R by Mk, Paul L. Obeli, Analysis Div, Hq AMC, 24 Apr 59, subj:

AMA; bet Orders 10783 & 10793, 1 Oct & 3 Dec 58; Statement by T.K.

Glennan, A/NASA, in S Bearings before NASA Auth Subcmte of Cate on •

Aero & Space Science, 86th Cong, let Sees, (hereinafter cited as
Notes to pages 150-158. 219

Stennis Cmte), NASA Authorisation for Fiscal Year 120., Pt 1,

Scientific and TOinical Presentations, pp

Bpt. NACA Sp Cmte on Space Tech, 28 Oct 58, subj: Recommendations 

to NAS for a National ass. Program, Passim.

Stennis Cate, Pt 2, Program Detail for Fiscal Year 1960, passim.

Ltr, D.A. Quarles, Actg SOD to Glennan, 10 Dec 58; memo, Queries to

SecysiAray, Navy, & Al', 10 Dec 58, subj: Prelim Study of the Status

of the Large Rocket Prowl, w/Atch 1; NASA Rpt to the President, 27

Jan 59, subj: A National Space Vehicle Prog.

NASA Rpt tp the President, 27 Jan 59.

Stennis Cate, Pt 1, passim.

NASA Presentation to C-MLC, 15 May 59, subj: National Space Sciences

Prog.

Statements by W.E. Moeckel & J.E. Childs before Stennis Cate, Pt 1,

pp 36-40, 48-54.

Glennan before Stennis. Cate, Pt 1, p 6.

Memo, Col J.L. Martin, D/AT, to M/Gen R.P. Swofford, 5 Jan 59, subj:

Presentation for Comdrs Conf; ltr, H.F. York, DDE&E to C.F. Ducander,

Ch CounselAi Cate on Science & Astro, 30 Dec 59.

Martin to Swofford, 5 Jan 59.

M/R by L/C K.G. Lundell, 4 Jun 58, subj: System 609A BMTS; ltr, Dryden

to Boushey, 11 Jul 58; Memo of Understanding, 31 Oct 58, subj: Coop

between NASA & the Air Force in the Dev of a Solid-Rocket Test Vehicle;

ltr, L/Col J.R. Ryan, Astro Div, Mg ARDC to DCS/D, iblUSAF, 18 Dec 58,

subj: System 609A.

Stennis Cmte, Pt 2, pp 743-48; memo, Col G.B. Knight, USAF to M/Gen

W.P. Fisher, subj: Testimony by NASA Witnesses, 21 May 59.

Hint AMC's Ballistic Missile Center, Jan-Jun 59, I, pp I ji7, 48-52.

Ibid.. memo, Schriever to C/S USAF, 2 Feb 59, subj: NASA/AF Operating

Procedures.

Hist, AMC's Ballistic Missile Center, Jan-Jun 59, I, pp I, 48.52.

Chief of Staff's Policy Book, 1960, USAF and Related Space Activities,

Item 129, Tab E.

24. ARDC Presentation of a Plan for an Advanced, Integrated Space Study

Program, 30 Jun 58. Three of the study series had not been released
at this time, but they were sufficiently far advanced for ARDC.representatives to speak of them with a knowledge of their content.

491111111g11; 

Notes to pages 158-166.

Statement by Bousbey before McCormack Cote, p 525; SAC.brocbure 13

Aug 59, subj: SAC Space Concepts.

Memo, Col , E.X. Kiessling, Hq ARDC to L/Oen S.E. Anderson CO4ARDC,

17 Nov 58, subj: Space Study Program; note, Mej P.L. Chell, Analysis

Div, Hq AREC to Col E.K. Kiessling, Bq ARDC, 11 Dec 58, subjCSpace

Study Prog. vs NASA. The NASA programs for fiscal years 1959-60 were

outlined andattached to Chell's so-called "card."

ASSS by B/Gen D.E. Newton, Hq ARDC, 16 Feb 60, subj: DiscussiOn of

AF Study Prog with NASA, Tab A, Abstract; Maj Chell, Introduction

at AF-NASA Interchange of Into on Lunar Sub.% 16 Jun 60.

NASA Release 59-116, 17 Apr 59.

Memo, Maj Chell to Co] O.J. Poage, Ch/Mission Analysis Off, ARDC,

17 Dec 59.

mitt by Chell, 13 May 60, subj: Info Interchange with NASA (SR 183,

Lunar Observatory Studies).

Ltr Oen T.D. White, C/S USAF to L/Gen R.C. Wilson DCS/D, 14 Apr 60;

ltr, Co] N.C. Appold, Sp Asst for ABPA-MASA, Hq ARDC to Col R.D.

Curtin, AFBMD, 29 Apr 60.

CHAPTER X

1. Memo, Johnson to =AFRO, 10 Sep 58, subj: Redef of WS-117L; ARPA,

Space Technology Program Review V1 .82 12 (hereinafter cited as

ARPA Program Review) I, 201 ; Johnson Briefing for JCS, 10 Jan 59,

EN73: ARPA's Program (hereinafter cited as ARPA Program, 10 Jan 59);

Sup to Hq USAF Daily Staff Digest, 6 Mar 59.

2._ Ltr, Boushey to COMARDC, 11 Jul 58, subj: Comm & Navigation Satellites.

Ltr, Hq ARDC to D/AT, 10 Sep 58, subj: Abbr System Dev Plan 470L;

memo, Horner to D/ARPA, 30 Sep 58.

Memo, Johneon to Horner, 22 Oct 58, subj: Strat Comm System; ltr,

Scbriever to DCS/D, 3 Dec 58, subj: Mgt of Comm Satellite Prog; ARM

Program Review, II, 251-53; memo, M/Gen James Ferguson, D/Rqrmts to

Col J.E. Kelsey, 8 Feb 59, subj: ARPA Rqrmts Panel Mtg; M/R by Maj

B.C. Howard of D/AT, 10 Feb 59, subj: Comm Satellite; memo, Oen C.E.

LeMmy, VC/S to Daps et al., 6 Mar 59, subj: AF Position on Comm

Satellite Prog.

5. m/a by Maj Howard, 17 Dec 58, subj: Comm Satellite; ltr, Swofford to

COMARDC, 24 Dec 58, subj: Joint Army-AF Comm Satellite Dev Prog;

MEM

1111•1111,

29•
notes to pages 167-172. air

memo, Johnson to COMARDC, 6 Mar 59, sub,): Satellite Comm in Polar

Regions for SAC; AO 54-59, Amnd 1, 22 May 59.

ARPA Program, 10 Jan 59; ARPA prograM Review, I, 153-57.

Memo, R/Adm J.E. Clark, ARPA to COMARDC, 7 Jan 59, sub,): Launching

and Data Readout Planning for Cloud Cover Elver; ARPA Program, 10

Jan 59.

ARPA Program, 10 Jan 59.

Memo, Col R.H. Falls Off of D/Plans, DCS/P&P to Dep D/Plans, 20 Jan

59, sub,): Man-in-Space Prog.

M/R by L/Col B.H. Ferrer, 4 Nov 57, sub,): Boost-Glide Concept; DCS/D

DD94, 25 Nov 57, sub,): Hypersonic Strat Weapon System; M/R by Co/

Ferrers_Off of DAT, 6 Oct 58, sub,): DynasoarMtg with Mr. Horner on

2 Oct 58; memo Johnson to SOD, 7 Nov 58, sub,): Dyna Soar; memo, Col

J.R. Pinion, Been, DCS/D to All Dire et al., 7 Nov 58, sub,): Dyes Soar.

ARPA Program, 10 Jan 59; ARPA Progrmalilmig25 I, 21-87; memo, R/Adm

J.N. Clark, Actg D/ARPA to SAP (R&D), 12 Jun 59; sub,): Saturn Booster

for AF Space Progs.

Statement by L/Gen S.N. Anderson, COMARDC, quoted without ref in

DOD Staff Study, 5 May 59, sub,): Rees against Transfer of Centaur

to NASA; ltr, York to Glennan, 18 May 59; AO 19-59, Amnd 5, 30 Jun 59•

Ltr, Capt J.G. Lang, USN, Actg DCS/I, NORAD to AFCIN, 4 Jan 58, sub,):

Space Track.

ARP& System Dev Plan for Space Track (a resume), 13 Jan 59.

24/R by L/Col W.D. Pritchard, Ch, Test Instrum Div, Hq ARDC, 2 Sep 58,

sub,): Satellite Tracking & Surveillance.

AO 7-58 & 8-58, 20 Jun 58.

Meao,_L/Gen R.N. Lynn, VCOMADC to Can B.B. Partride, CINCNORAD, 8

Oct 58, subj: Mgt of Interim Satellite Detection and Tracking System,

w/incl, Background Info.

Memo, MiGen R.N. Watson, AFCIN to D/AT, 25 Aug 58, sub,): Space Vehicle

Surveillance Prog.

Memo, Col J.L. Martin of D/AT to NASA, 22 Oct 58, sub,): Tracking of

(NASA's) Inflatable Satellite; ltr, Johnson to Glennan, 5 Nov 58.

20. Memo, Johnson to COMARDC, 5 Nov 58, sub,): Satellite Detection and

Surveillance System Dev.
Notes to pages 173-184.

X/R by H&j B.C. Howard of D/AT, 21 Nov 58, subj: Space Surveillance;

AO 50-59, 19 Dec 58; ARPA System Dev Plan for Space Track, 13 Jan 59.

Memo, Boushey to Chmn/Air Def Panel Weapons Bd, 30 Apr 59, subj:

Space Surveillance.

Statements by L/Gen A.G. Trudeau, Ch, R&D, USA; V/Adm J.T. Hayward,

ACNO (R&D); & M/Gen B.A. Schriever, CCKAFPMD, in S Bearings before

Subcmte on Govt Orgn for Space Activities of Cate on Aero & Space

Sciences, 86th Cong, lst Seas, Investigation of Governmental als.

isation for aace Activities pp 236, Nes 315, & 416-17.

Memo, M/Gen H.T. Wheless, D/Plans to C/S USAF, 15 Jan 59, subj: ARPA

Progs; memo, L/Gen Wilson, DCS/D to L/Gen J.K. Gerhart, DCS/PAP, 12

Jan 59, subj: AF Mission in Space.

S Bearings, Investigation . . Space Activities p 137.

Ibid., pp 558-59.

Hanson Baldwin, "Neglected Factor in the Space Race," NY limb 17

Jan 60; James fiagerty, Jr, "U.S. Program Has Gone Far in 26 Months,"

Washi n last, 22 May 60; Clarke Nevlon, "We Can Catch the Russians

in e, Missiles & Rockets, 14 Dec 59.

MSC 5818, 26 Jan 59, subj: U.S. Policy on Space.

29. NASA, United States and Russian Satellites, Lunar Probes and

Probes,TOT-1959; APEC, of Air Force Ballistic

Division Activities in Space, Jun 60.

CHAPTER XI

Rouse Rpt 1758, 85th Cong, 2d Seas, The National ace Program.

Statement by Can Putt before McCormack Cate, p 123.

Statement by Gen Schriever before McCormack Cate, p 648.

D/AT, Proposed.Military Position on Space, Dec 59.

5. Memo, Horner to D/ARPA, 10 Nov 58, subj: AF Statement of Mil. Uses of

Space; WSZG Rpt 39, Mil Applications of Artificial Barth Satellites,

submitted. 13 Jun and considered by JCS 14 Jul 59. The references

could be continued indefinitely.

SAC brochure, SAC's Space Concepts, 13 Aug 59.

7. Memo, Boushey to Sp Asst to C/S USAF, 6 Dec 57, subj: Missile Bearing,

v/incl 1, policy.
Notes to pages 184-191. MEW 223

•

Putt before McCormack Cmte, pp 100-101.

Memo, B/Gen G.W. Martin, Dep D/Plans to Col R.A. Yudkin, War Plans

Div, 3 Mar 59, v/incl; memo, M/Gen H.C. Donnelly, Asst DCS/P&P to

D/Plans, 21 Mar 58, subj: Prep of a USAF Position on Sovereignty

Over Outer Space; Putt before McCormack Cmte, pp 99-136; memo, B/Gen

N.Y. Parrish, Asst/Coordinstion to D/Dev Prog at al., 9 May 58, subj:

Nil QUestionnalre; memo L/Col J.B. Ramey, Policy Div, D/Plans to

D/Ops et al., 12 Jun 58, subj: Policy Paper on Sovereignty Over Outer

Space v/1361; memo, Co]. S.G. Fisher, Asst Dep Oleos for Policy to

Asst/LR Objectives, 22 Aug 58, subj: Trans of Study on Sovereignty

Over Outer Space.

Memo, Fisher to Asst/LR Objectives,_22 Aug 58; memo, Col R.S. Abbey,

Policy Div to DCS/D et al., 8 Oct 58, subj: Study on Sovereignty Over

Outer Space.

Memo, CNO to Chmn/JCS, 2 May 59, subj: U.S. Mil Policy on Outer Space.

Memo, Cbmn/JCS to SOD, 22 May 59, subj: U.S. Mil Policy on Outer

Space.

Memo, M/Gen R.M. Montgomery, Asst VC/S USAF to M/Gen C.H. Donnelly,

Asst DCS/P&P, 16 Dec 59, subj: Draft Statement on AF Policy with

Regard to Space.

Gen T.D. White, C/S USAF, "Air and Space Indivisible," Air forcat,

Mar 58.

Memo, B/Gen G.W. Martin, Dep D/Plans to L/Gen J.K. Gerhart, DCS/P&P,

13 Jan 59, subj: USAF Respons in Aerospace; ltr, Gerhart to L/Gen

Emmet O'Donnel/, Jr, DCS/Pers, 15 Jan 59; memo, Col R.E. Richardson,

Asst/LR Objectives to M/Gen B.T. Wbeless, D/Plans, 25 Nov 58, subj:

AF Leadership in Space; USAF in Space, A Policy Statement, 30 Jan 59•

Statement by Gen White in H Hearings before Cote on Science & Astro,

86th Cong, let Sees, Missile Development and am'. Sciences, pp 73-74.

H Hearings before Subcmte of Cmte on Appn, 86th Congo lst Sees, DOD

Appropriations for 15tE, Pt 1, Policy Statements, pp 574-80.

Memo, Col R.N. Ellis, Asst Dep D/Plans for WP to Dep D/Plans for

Policy, 26 Mar 59, subj: Def of Aerospace* memo, Col S.G. Fisher,

Asst tep D/Plans for Policy to DCS/PIP, 20 Mar 59, same subj.

Memo, Wbeless to Gerhart, 17 Jan 59, subj: Aerospace Power and National Security, 1960-70.

Memo, Boushey to Gerhart, 7 Jan 59, subj: AF Mission in Space; memo,

Wheless to DCS/D, 5 Feb 59, subj: AF Objectives in Space.

Ltr, Lefty to Power, CINCSAC, 17 Mar 59•
224 Notes to pages 192-198.

Capt C.V. Styer, USN, & Ccmdr R.F. Freitag,_', "The Navy in the

Space Age," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Mar 60.

Boyd Hill, "The Inglewood Complex: Brawn and Heart of the AF Ballistic

Missiles," ANC Worldwide Apr 59; Hist, 1st Missile Div, Jan-Jun 59,

Vol I.

Styer & Freitag.

USN USAF Agreement for Coordinated Peacetime Operation of the Pacific

Missile Range, 5 Mar 58.

Hist, lst Missile Div, I, 126-52.

.Ibid.

28. Ltr, Col G.S. Curtis, Senior AF Rep at PMR to Col G.S. Brown, Exec

Off, let Missile Div, 13 May 59.

Ltr, Power to White, 13 Dec 58.

Signed Statement by Adm Arleigh A. Burke, CNO, 29 Jan 59, inserted

in H Hearings, DOD Appropriations for 3&., Pt 1, Policy Statements,

PP 736-39•

Hist, lst Missile Div, I, 126-52.

Ibid., pp 120-29, 138-40.

Memo, B/Gen J.F. Whisenand, USAF, to Chmn/JCS, 16 Feb 59, subj: Priorities for ai & Sat Progs, v/App, draft memo, SOD to Pres, same subj;

memo Donald A. Quarles, Actg SOD to NASC, 26 Mar 59, subj: Priorities

for gat Progs; Note by the Secys, Action on JCS 2012/135, J-5 2012/135/1,

19 Mar 59, subj: W8-117L Infrared Sat Prog; memo, Martin, Actg D/Plans

to C/S USAF, 15 Apr 59, subj: Priorities for BM & Sat Prog; memo, JCS

to SOD, 12 May 59, subj: Priorities for Space Frogs . memo, Wheless to

C/S USAF, 12 Mey 59, same subj; memo, McElroy to SeCys/Ar;y, Navy,

AF, 27 Apr 59, subj: Top Nat Priorities Progs.

ASSS, Col R.H. Ellis, Asst Dep D/Plans for WP to DCS/P&P, 17 Apr 59,

subj: Status of WS-117L; memo, Donnelly to VC/S, 17 Apr 59, subj:

Status of WS-117L.

Ltrs, Schriever to Gerhart & Wilson, 18 May 59.

Memo, Col Butcher to Dap D/Plans, 11 Jun 59, subj: Coord of Sat &

Space Vehicle Ops; ASSS, Wheless to DCS/D, 9 Jun 59, subj: Reply to

Gen Schriever.

37. Memo, Adm Burke to JCS, 22 Apr 59, subj: Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle

Ops, vAncl, draft memo, JCS to SOD, same subj.

29.

34.
Notes to pages 199-203. 225

Memo, C/S USAF to JCS, 12 May 59, subj: Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle

Ops; aescOleless to C/S DEAF, 14 May 59, subj: Navy Proposal for a

Single Mil Agency for Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle Ops.

Ltr, Glennan to McElroy, 25 May 59.

Memo, Boushey to Swofford, 1 Jun 59, subj: Global Tracking; Col Otto

Haney, Off D/Dev Plang, 4 Jun 59, subj: Comments on Ltr of. Dr. Glennan

to SOD.

M/R by Col John Martin, 17 Jul 59, subj: Proposed Orgn fortupport

of Project Mercury.

Draft DOD Dir, 24 Jul 59, subj: Asgmt of Reopens for DOD Support of

Project Mercury.

Memos, McElroy to JCS, 29 May 59, subja: Asgmt of Operational Respons

for an Interim Sat Early Warning System; Asgmt of Respons for an

Interim Sat Navigation System; Asgmt of Operational Respons for Phase

I of a Sat Region System; Asgmt of Operational Respons for an Interim

Sat Detection System. See also memo JCS to SOD, 24 Jul 59, subj:

Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle Ops; M/R by B/Gen G.W. Martin, 13 Aug 59.

Memo, McElroy to JCS, 18 Sep 59, subj: Coord of Sat & Space Vehicle

Ops.

H Rpt 1758, 85th Cong, p 8.

Statement by Wilson in H Hearings before Celts on Science & Astro,

86th Cong, 2d Seas, Review of the Ease Program, p 481.

Statements by Fulton & Merchapt in Review of the Space Program, p.11.
GLOSSARY

A' Administration

ABMA Army Ballistic Missile Agency

ACNO Assistant Chief of Naval Operations

Advey Advisory

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

Aero Aeronautics

ARM Air Force Ballistic Missile Division

AFCRC Air Force Cambridge.Research Center

AFIPTC Air Force Flight Test Center

AFMDC Air Force Missile Development Center

AFOSR Air Force Office of Scientific Research

AFPC Armed Forces Policy Council

AMC Air Materiel Command

Anx Annex .

AO ARPA Order

AOMC Army Ordnance Missile Command

ARM Air Research and Development Command

ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency

ARS Advanced Reconnaissance System

ASAF Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

ASOD .

Assistant Secretary of Defense

ASSS Air Staff Summary Sheet

Astro Astronautics'

Halyards Ballistic Weapons and Development Supporting System

714 Ballistic Missiles

Bows Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

BMTS Ballistic Missile Test System

Bami Bomber Missile

Brats Ballistic Research and Test System

BRL Ballistic Research Laboratory

BuAer Bureau of Aeronautics (Navy)

CEFSR Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility of Space

Rocketry

CGM Committee on Guided Missiles

C-MLC Civilian-Military Liaison Committee

D/AT Directorate of Advanced Technology

DD Development Directive

DEEM Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Def Definition

fps feet per second

GM Guided Missiles

GOR General Operational Requirement

BETS Hypersonic Environment Test System

IDA Institute for Defense Analysis

IGY International Geophypical Year

IOC Initial Operational Capability

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

JELS Joint Research and Development Board

JSPC Joint Strategic Plans Committee
MIS man-in-specs

Mouse Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of Earth

M/R Memo for Record

NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NASC National Aeronautics and Space Council

NIB National Intelligence Estimate

NORAD North American Air Defense Command

NOTS Naval Ordnance Teat Station

NRL Naval Research Laboratory

ESC National Security Council

OCB Operations Coordinating Board

OUN Office of Defense Mobilisation

OSAF Office, Secretary of the Air Force

OSD Office, Secretary of Defense

Plang Planning,

FMR Pacific Missile Range

F&O Flans and Operations

P&P Plans and Programs

Prog Program; Programming

RDB Research and Development Board

Robo Rocket Bo ►ber

SAB Scientific Advisory Board.

Sat Satellite

SOD Secretary of Defense

SR Study Requirement

TCP Technological Capabilities Panel

TEG Technical Evaluation Group

Tiros Television Infra-Red Observing Station

TN Thermonuclear

WADC Wright Air Develowent Center

WADD Wright Air Development,Id.vision

WDD Western Development Division

WP War Plans

WSEG Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
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