.11111. OS I IWTlON

JIIP4ECREi

11141.11.111.1 11 r. s •

)BINATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. • •

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR • .• • 25 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATIMER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, ASD(I)

SUBJECT: Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI)

- Task Force

This is in response subject,

23 February 1976. Colonel extension

53433, will represent the N n task force.

The National Reconnaissance Office is included in the

Executive Order of 18 February 1976 under the guise of

"special offices within the Department of Defense for the

collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance

programs." Unlike many intelligence organizations, the NRO

has not been covered by a National Security Council Intelligence

Directive, but rather by a joint DOD-CIA Agreement. It appears

most appropriate to update the organizational framework by

publication of a classified charter, signed by the Committee

on Foreign Intelligence. We will prepare a draft of this

document.

The attached papers contain comments which you requested

on the four draft papers.

1 Attachment

Draft Papers

42008111111" 11AL 101SONIOUSJI OP axicurme own sou IIXIMPTION ohm

stew POW •

00011' 01CLASSINII ON IMP INIT.
REVISION OF NSCIDS,

• 'gar"

The General Nilson recommended approach, that Executive Order

material be referenced, but not written into thetext of NSCIDS and,

that the NSCID numbering and titles be retained, appears to be the most

desirable way to proceed. This would make the NSCIDS shorter documents,

incorporating the broadest information. The lower level implementing

documents would then contain greater detail.
.ESTABLISHNENT OF A SERIES OF CFI DIRECTIVES•CFIDs)

There does not appear to be an overriding argument for selecting

either.proposed series designation for CFIDs over the other. Use of

the series designation which corresponds to the CFI responsibilities

assigned in the Executive Order of 18 February seems to provide for a

logical presentation and would result in fewer documents. Conversely,

adopting the schemes of aligning the CFIDs with NSCID numbering and

titling easily leads to expanding on the NSCIDs in a logical and consistent

way. This would allow the formulation of abbreviated NSCIDs, recommended

by General Wilson. On balance we tend to prefer the latter scheme.
NAN VIA

CONTROL SYSTEM

DRAFT CFID CONTINUING USIB ON A • TENPORARY BASIS

Continuation of the USIB on a temporary' basis is believed

essential to the smooth operation of the intelligence function.

Particularly important is continuation of the committee and

subcommittee functions, for it is through this mechanism that

the NRO receives its tasking. Proposed changes made at any

level in this structure must be carefully staffed and should

not be made precipitously. It is considered improbable that

this process could take place before I March 1976, and the

proposed CFID would alleviate the immediate problem.

Disestablishment . of the Intelligence Resources Advisory

Council is appropriate.

636/76 1WC H

11111111111 111111111111111111

CONTROL1111111263076

0121"-AJATOP COPIES

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
DRAFT CFID CONTINUING IR&D COUNCIL AS A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CFI

•••

The IRAD Council is a useful and valuable forum for all-source

discussion of projects relating to intelligence. This kind of forum

should preclude duplicative efforts from proceeding to the point where

valuable resources are wasted. The Council could be used in a direct

advisory capacity for new projects which impact on organizations

represented on the Council, and could serve to generate RAO interests in

areas not presently covered in any program.

The proposed CFID appears to cast the IUD Council in too structured

a role and at too high an organizational level to be as useful as it

might be. It is recommended that the Council be a sub-group or committee

of the USIB or its successor organization, and that the mission and

functions be recast to reflect the advisory role discussed above.

Finally, while the Council is a useful forum for information

exchange, the proposed organization structure (Para. 4b) may tend to

generate a plethora of studies and splinter groups which are of questionable

value when viewed in the context of limited resources and the prime reason

for the Couniil.