L .M .M ., the da ug hte r, tur

ne d sixte e n in Ap ri l 20 05 , a nd S.D .M ., the so n, wi ll b e fi ft e e n in 1 September 2005. We will ref

er to the m other as “Moe” and the g randpa rents as “Ha

rold and Irene ” or “ the 2 g randpa rents.” 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00452- CV

In the Interestof L . M. M. and S. D. M.

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF WILLI AMSO N COUNTY , 395TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 01-1 272- F 395, HO NORAB LE MICH AEL JERGINS, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N This appea l arises f

r o m a tw e lv e - ye a

r c u stody battle betwe en L .M.M.’s and S.D.M.’s 1 pare nts, Rhonda Moe and John Malmquist. Moe appeals the trial c ourt’s orde r deny ing he r motion to modify , maintaining both pa rents as joint manag ing conservators with Malmquist having the r ight to deter mine the childre n’s primary residenc e, and putting restric tions and conditions upon Moe’s rig hts of possession and acce ss. Moe’s parents, Harold and I rene Moe, intervene d below, see king 2 to be appointed a s conser vators of the children, a

nd n ow join Moe as appe llants to challeng e the attorney ’s fe es aw arde d ag ainst themselves and Moe, jointly and sever ally , in f avor of Malmquist’s attorney and the c hildren’s a

ttor n ey ad l item. We will affirm the June 2004 order, but re verse an
awa rd of a ppellate attorney ’s fe es that wa s contained in a subsequent, void orde r.Th e re c or d pre se nts so me c on fu sio n ove r the e xac t modi fi c a tio ns so ug ht by Mo e . On its 3 fac e, her Second Amende d Petition to Modify Parent-Child R el a t i o n s h i p makes no mention of a re qu e st t o b e a

pp oin te d a s the c hil dr e n’ s so le mana g ingc on se rv a tor , a nd su c h a re qu e st w a s li ke wi se not made in her

prior motions to modify
. I nstead, her pe tition m akes a series of alleg ations about M a l m q u i s t ’ s b e h a

v i o r w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n— that he wo uld

dr ink and dr ive , ma ke dis pa ra g ingc omm e nts about Moe, a

nd abuse the childre n emotionally and phy sically

—and re quests that she be g iven the rig ht to determine S.D.M.’s primar y residenc e. Also, Moe testified that she wanted L .M.M. to live with Malmquist and S.D.M. to live with her. Ne verthe less, the cour t and other pa

rties re fer to Moe’s petition as a re quest that she be appointed sol e manag ing conservator of t he children. For example, in i ts f ind ing s o f f

a c t and c on c lus ion s o f l aw, the tr ia l c ourt sp e c if ic a lly fo un d th a t Mo e ’s “ re qu e st to be appointed a s sole manag ing conser vator of [L .M.M. a

nd S.D.M.] is not in t he best intere st of [t he childre n].” And, in his brief, Malmquist cites t o Moe’s petiti on as a “reque st that she be name d a s so le mana g ing c on se rv a tor of the c hil dr e n. ” Al tho ug h it do e s n ot a

pp e ar t hat Mo e a sse rt e d th is 2 P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND S i n ce t he fina l divorce de cre e wa s entere d in J uly 1994, both pare nts have filed mul tip le mot ion s to mod if y con ser vat orship and

bo th h a ve be e n h e ld i n c on te mpt on mul tip le
occa sions for violating c ourt order s pertainingto their pare ntal actions. Al so, both parents have
c on sis te ntl y

disput ed t hei r fi nan cia l r esp on si bi li ty for chi ldsupp ort , t he ch il dren ’s m edi cal ex pen se s, and the unpa id fee s owed to their pe rsonal attorne y s, the att o rn ey ad litem, and the c hildren’s thera pist. The trial court re cog nized that both parents—but particula rly Moe—have overlooke d the damag e this liti g ation has inflicted on their children and have, in f act, involved L .M.M. and S.D.M in the cross-f

ire. Th e ph a se of

lit ig a tio n at is su e be g an w ith an Apr il 20 03 mot ion that Mo e fi le d to reduc e her

child support obligation and collect her attorney ’s fees. She later filed seve ral amended motions t o additionally

reque st that the trial court hold Malmqui st in contempt, awar d her a dditional periods of posse ssion, awar d her the rig ht to deter mine S.D.M.’s primary

residenc e, and a

ppoint her as the c hildren’s sole mana g ing conser vator. The attorney ad litem inter vened se eking to enforc e 3re qu e st w ith in t he fo ur c or

ne rs of he r pe tit ion , for the purp os e of thi s app e a l, w e wi ll a ssume that a re qu e st b y Mo e to be the c hil dr e n’ s so le mana g ingc on se rv a tor wa s p ro pe rl y

be fo re the tr ia l c ourt
. At the conc lusion of the October 2003 hear ings, the children w ere temporar ily place d at 4 the T e xa s B a

p ti s t Ch il dr e n ’ s H o me , b y a g r e e me n t o f th e p arti e s , u n ti l a b e tt e r s o lution could be fo un d. On Oc tob e r 30, 20 03 , the c ourt or de re d tha t, u nti l th e Marc h 2 00 4 r e vie w h e ari ng , M a lmq uis t would reta in the rig ht to establish the children’s r esidenc e, but th e l o ca t i o n was limited to the g ra nd pa re nts ’ h ome , a

nd that Ma lmq

uis t w ou ld h a ve po sse ssi on on the f ir st, thi rd and fi ft h wee kends, as wel l as t h e winter holiday s, while Moe wa s to have only supervised visits twice a month at Kids Ex chang e once she c o m p l et ed her c ontempt sentence and beg an tre atment with a the ra pis t. 3 the prior or ders, hold the pa rents in contempt for t h ei r violations, enjoin them from further violations, and impose addit i o nal orde rs upon them. Malmquist responded, de ny ing Moe ’s alleg ations, seeking attorney ’s fe es, and a sking the court to deny Moe’s re quests. Har old and I rene Moe, the g randpa

rents, then f

iled a plea

in inter vention seeking that they be named sole ma nag ing
c on se rv a tor s o r j oin t ma

na g ingc on se rv a tor s and

that th e y re c ov e r the ir

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Ma lmq

uis t
and the a d li te m f

ile d a dd iti on a l mo tio ns to c oll e c t th e ir a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. After a four -day

hear ing in Oc tober 2003 a nd a thre e-da

y revie w hearing in March 20 04 , the tr ia l c ourt

ann ounc e d it s p ro po se d o rd e r, and the pa rt ie s re c on ve ne d in Ap ri l and May to 4 further discuss the details of wha t s h o uld be included in that orde r. The c ourt then sig ned a f inal
or de r o n Jun e 28 , 2 00 4, wh ic h ma int a ine d M oe and Ma lmq uis t a s jo int

mana g ingc on se rv a tor s w ith Malmq u ist having the rig ht to establish the children’s pr imary residenc e, but place d additional restric ti o n s o nM o e ’ s r ig h ts o f p o s s e s s io nan d

a c c e s s , an d

c o n d it io n e d

h e r r ig h ts o nc o n ti n u ed psy cholog ical tre atment. The June 2004 order al s o aw arde d attorney ’s fe es ag ainst Moe and the g randpa rents, jointly

and seve rally , in f

avor of the ad litem ( for $15,000) and Malmquist’s attorney4

(for $20,000, without mention of any fee s that might be inc urre d on appea l) and a war ded attorne y ’s fee s ag ainst Malmquist i n favor of the a d litem (for $5,000). I n Ju ly 2 0 0 4 , M o e f

il e d a mo ti o n f

o r r e c o n s id e r a ti o n an d

/o r f o r a n e w tr ia l, and Ma lmq uis t f ile d a mot ion to r e fo rm the jud g me nt to i nc lud e an a wa rd of a pp e llate a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. At a hea ring on J uly

23, 2004, the trial cour

t denied Moe’ s reque sts and stated that it would enter an
awa rd of $5,000 in favor of Malmquist’s attorney ag ainst Harold a

nd I rene in the event that they filed
an uns uc c e ssf

ul a pp e a l. A lth ou g h th e c ourt requ est e d at th a t ti me fo r M a lmq uis t’ s atto rn e y

to pr e pa re an o rd e r re fl e c tin g that awa rd , no su c h or de r a

pp e ars in the re c or d. Th e awa rd of a pp e llate fee s was not memorialized in writing until Oc tober 18, 2004, when the trial court issued a modified final order , which differ ed from the J une order only by its inclusion of the appellate attorney ’s fe es
awa rd. The pa

rties ag ree on appea l that the October 2004 order

is void because it was issued afte r the expiration of the cour t’s plenar y power and that t h e J une 2004 orde r controls. In November 2004, the trial cour

t issued findings of

fac t and conc lusions of law in re sponse to reque sts by Moe
and the g ra nd pa re nts
. Moe appe als, cha lleng ing the trial court’s order reg arding conser vatorship issues and attorney ’s fe es. Ha

rold and I rene also appea l, confining their challeng e to t he aw ard of attorney ’s fee s. Malmquist re sponds that the trial court c ommitt ed no abuse of discre tion reg ardingeither the
c on se rv a tor sh ip i ssu e s o r t he a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a

nd a sk s th is C ourt

to uph old the June 20 04 or de r in a ll
re sp e c ts. Ma lmq

uis t a lso ur g e s th a t, a lth ou g h th e Oc tob e r 2 00 4 o rd e r i s void , th e awa rd of a pp e llate attorney ’s fe es should be upheld as a temporar y order pursuant to sec tion 109.001 of the family code.5

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001 (W est 2002). The ad litem asser ts that the awa

rd of a d litem fee s ag ainst Moe and the g randpa rents, jointly

and seve rally , should be upheld.
CO NSE RV AT OR SHIP ISSU ES Although the J une 2004 order maintained Moe a

nd Malmquist as joint manag ing
conser vators with Ma lmquist having the exclusive r ight to de termine the child re n ’s p rimary
re sid e nc e , a s th e c a se ha d b e e n s inc e Au g us t 20 02 , it mod if ie d Moe ’s po sse ssi on

and a c c e ss r ig hts by adding restric tions and conditi o n s t o the terms. Where as the August 2002 order e mploy ed the family code’ s “standar d possession order,” as set forth in s ections 153.311 throug h 153.317, the J une 20 04 or de r state d tha

t “ the pr ov isi on s o f t

he Sta nd ard Pos se ssi on

Or de r a re no t a pp ro pr ia te in t

his
case and .
. . would not be in the childre n’s best intere st.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.311- .317 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004- 05). I nstead, the court cra fted an order that conditioned Moe’s r ights of po sse ssi on

and a c c e ss on her a tte nd ingthe ra py wi th D r. Th oma s L ow ry . T he c ourt or de re d th a t, thirty day s after Moe had “ beg un a re g ular c ourse of psy cholog ical tre atment with D r . Thomas L owry and [] provided proof

there of [to all parties],” she could eng ag e in supervise d visitation at Kids Ex chang e fr om 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on t he sec ond and four th Saturday s of ea ch month and, once
no tic e of he r t re a tme nt w ithDr . L ow ry

ha d b e e n p ro vid e d, sh e c ou ld have te le ph on e c on ta c t w ith the c hil dr e n. Th e c ourt

a lso pr ov ide d f

or the po ssi bil ity

of inc re a se d po sse ssi on

by Mo e if c e rt a in conditi o n s we re met. I t ordere d that, if Moe continued he r treatment with Dr. L owry , then as of Au g us t 1, 20 04 , she c ou ld have the c hil dr e n on the se c on d an d fou rt h Satu rd ay s f ro m 9: 00 a .m. to 10 :00 p. m., and

a s o f Se pte mbe r 1, 20 04 , fr om Sa tur da y a t 9:0 0 a .m. to Sun da

y a t 6:0 0 p. m. Th e se periods of posse ssion were to be supervise d by Har old Moe unt il September 15, 2004, and there afte rThose spec ific terms we re se t forth in an attac hment to the J une 2004 orde r. 5 6 could be unsupe rvised. Then, on Dec ember 1, 2004, assuming Moe continued tre atment with Dr. L owry , t he ter

ms of the family

code’ s standard posse ssion order would supe rsede the J une 2004 order , providing Moe with additional conser vatorship rights. All possibil ities of Moe’s incr ease d 5 po sse ssi on

we re , h ow e ve r, su

bje c t to he r co mpl ianc e wi th the or de r that sh e c on tin ue tr e a tme nt w ith Dr . L ow ry . A nd

the c ourt ord ered that D r. L ow ry sh ou ld c on su lt the c hil dr e n’ s th e ra pis t to

“ d e t e r m i n e t h e i mp a c t o f t h e i n c r e a s e d p o s s e s s i o n , ” an d “ [ i ] f D r . T h o m a s L o w r

y and the childre n’s counselor a g ree that any s p ec i fi c p er iod of possession is not in t he best intere st of the child or children, a

nd have stated so in writing, that period of possession is order ed [to] not occur .” Moe challeng es t he conservator ship order on two basic grounds: she urg es that the tr ia l c ourt a bu se d its dis c re tio n in

awa rd ingc e rt a in p ri vil e g e s to Ma lmq uis t and in i mpo sin g c e rt a in lim it a ti o n s o n h e r . M o r e s p e c if ic a ll y , M o e a s s e rts th a t th e tr ia l c o u r t a b u s e d it s discretion and violated the fa

mily code by (1) maintaining Malmqui st as j oint manag ing conservator with the rig ht to determine the children’ s primary residenc e becau se Malmquist has a history of abusing the children, making it impermissi ble for him to be the joint manag ing c onservator under se ction 153.004(b) of

the family

code, a nd by (2) g ranting Moe less than the standa rd possession order , as define d by

section 153.311 of the family code; by not awar ding Moe specific , enfor cea ble per iods of possession and a cce ss; and by making Moe’s visitation rig hts depende nt on the approva l of her
and the c hil dr e n’ s the ra

pis ts, wh ic h po se s the ri sk that he r pa re nta l r ig hts c ou ld b e un c on sti tut ion a lly d e n i e d b y de facto termination and which constitutes an im permissible deleg ation of t he trial c ourt’s7

authority to deter

mine conser

vatorship rig hts. Se e id
. § 153.004(b) (West Supp. 2004-05), § 153.311 (West 2002).
Stand ard of Review

I n deter mining issues of c onservatorship and possession and access, the pr imary consideration is alway s the best i ntere st of the child. See id . § 15 3. 00 2 ( Wes t 20 02 ); Lenz v. Lenz , 79 S.W .3d 10, 14 (Tex. 2002). Trial courts have broad discretion to de termine what is in a child’s best interest. Coleman v. Coleman , 109 S.W .3d 108, 110 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). A trial
c ourt ’s or de r mod if

y ing a joi nt mana g ing c on se rv a tor sh ip wil l not b e dis tur be d o n a pp e a l un le ss a clea r abuse of discretion is e stablished by the complaining party
. Echols v. Olivare z , 85 S.W .3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). T h i s is beca use conse rvatorship de terminations are “intensely fac t driven,” Lenz , 79 S.W .3d at 19, and the trial court is in the best position t o observe the wi tne sse s and

“ c an ‘f e e l’ the fo rc e s, po we rs , and inf lue nc e s that c ann ot be dis c e rn e d by me re ly
rea ding the rec ord.” Ec ho ls , 85 S.W .3d at 477. To demonstrate an abuse of discre tion, therefor e, the appe llant must show that the t rial cour t acted in a

n arbitra ry or unre asonable manner , or without ref ere nce to guiding pr inciples of law. Coleman , 109 S.W .3d at 110. As long as some evide nce of a substantive and probative char acte r exis ts to support the order , we will not substitut e our judg ment for that of the trial cour

t. Ec ho ls , 85 S.W .3d at 477.
Evid ence Be fore the Trial Court

Over the cour se of se vera l hear ings in October 2003 and Marc h 2004, the trial court hear d testimony

from over

two dozen witnesses, including many mental h ea l t h and educ ational8

profe ssionals, and conduc ted in came ra interviews with L .M.M. a nd S.D.M. c oncer

ning Moe ’s and M al m qu i s t ’s b eh av i o rs an d t h e fa m i l y ’s gen er al s i tu at i o n . T h e ov er al l t h em e t h at d ev el o p edt h ro u gh thi s we alt h of evide nce w as as f ollows: Moe and Malmquist have had a highly contentious
re la tio ns hip sin c e 19 94 , a nd the c hil dr e n h a ve su ff

e re d, a c a de mic a lly

and e mot ion a lly , a s a

re su lt. As state d b y

the c hil dr e n’ s the ra

pis t, the fa

mil y ha s b e e n in

“ pe rp e tua l c ri sis mod e ” fo r s e ve ra l y e a rs , and as de scribed by

Moe’s sister, “[Moe and Malmquist] don’t speak to e ach othe r, but they fig ht
eac h other throug h the kids.” Althoug h various c o u rt s have r epeatedly order ed the pa

rents to not dis pa ra g e the oth e r i n f

ro nt o f t he c hil dr e n, to n ot i nv olve t he chi ld re n in the c us tod

y and c hil d support disputes, and to maintain a consistent re g imen of counse ling f o r b o t h themselves and the children, both pare nts have fa iled to comply with these orde rs and have bee n held in contempt for the ir fa ilure s. Se ve ra l w itn e s s e s d e s c r i b e d M o e a s h a vin g ps y c ho log ic a l di so rd e rs , e xhibi tin g int e ns e and uncontr ollable ang er, obse ssing ove r thing s she believe s Malmquist has done wrong, a nd consistently

using the children a s wea

pons ag ainst Malmquist. Despite this, evidence w as pre sented that S.D.M. is protective of his mother a nd fee ls b o n d ed t o her, a nd that Moe loves her

children. Reg ar d in g M a lm qu is t, w it n e s s e s r e p e a te d ly

te s ti f ie d th a t h e h a s ana

u th o r it ar ia

na tt it u d e , u s es phy sical discipline, re lies on calling the sherif f’s de partment to re solve his disag ree ments with the children, a

nd is unable or unwilling to communicate with the children. O n the other ha nd, sever al witn e sses descr ibed Malmquist as being very involved at the childre n’s school, being attentive to and
conce rned a

bout their needs and successes, using appropriate methods of di scipline, and doing the best he c an in the diffic ult sit uations that Moe cr eate s betwee n him and the childre n.9 I n addition to genera l testimony about the par ents’ cha

rac teristics and the f

amily ’s sit ua tio n, the tr ial cou rt

a lso he ard

te sti mony

a bo ut s e ve ra l sp e c if

ic e pis od e s. Th is e vid e nc e is signifi ca n t beca

use the trial c ourt made se vera l comments on the rec ord that these e pisodes influence d its determinations about what c onservatorship arra ng ement wa s in the best interest of the children. Michelle He ckroth, a school counselor , testified about an inc ident that occur red betwee n Moe and L .M.M. on Ma y 19, 2003. Hec kroth testified that Moe wa s “loud and upset” and “ca used a sc ene” in front of the middle school, appa rently in response to L .M.M. having “flipped he r the bir d. ” Mo e sc re a me d at L .M .M . th a t sh e wa s “ wh ite tr a sh ” and , d esp it e Heck rot h’ s e ff or ts t o calm Moe dow n, her le vel of int ensity did not subside. Another school counselor, A ndrewKar bo, who also witnessed the sce n e, h ea rd Moe call L .M.M. a “bitch” and sawthat Moe wa s “out of
c on tr ol. ” He c kr oth

te sti fi e d th a t Mo e bla

me d M a lmq

uis t f or the oc c ur re nc e and , w he n H e c kr oth attempted to co u n sel her a bout this i ncident, Moe only wanted to talk a

bout Malmquist’s shortcoming s and continued to be littl e him in front of the children. At the end of the enc ounter, Moe said to Hec kroth, “it’s not over. She’ ll pay fo r this.” Hec kroth testified that Moe a nd L .M.M.’s relationship consist ed of “ a lot of hate , a lot of ang er” and that, in twenty -one y ear s of educ ation, she had “ne ver se en a mother deg rade her c hild like that.” Severa l w itnesses testified about an episode in Septe mber 2003, whe n Moe equippe d S.D.M
. w it

h a ta p e r e c o r d e r an d in s tr

u c te d h im to ta

k e it to M a lm qu is t’ s h o u s e , c o n c e a l it in a ba c kp a c k, pr ov ok e a fi g ht wi th Ma lmq uis t, and re c or d M a lmq

uis t’ s r e a c tio n. Mo e ’s ins tr uc tio ns to S
. D. M
. , whi ch she g ave w hen they wer e pra cticing using the device , wer e ca ug ht on tape. She10

admitted that it was her voic e on the t ape telling S .D.M. that, “whe n y ou g et t o court . . . y ou need to te ll
. . . a ll th e s tu f

f w e d o ” an d “ [y ]o u n e e d to te ll w h a t y o uh a te a b o u t l iv in g w it

h [M a lm qu is t]
.

. . . [H]e jus t sits ar ound and f— ing dr ink s. . . . We’ ll kic k his as s in c ourt if y ou jus t li ste n to me and just do what I

say .” She ac knowledg ed that this was a “ dir ec t v i o lation of the August 2002 order ,” but claimed she only did it to have evidenc e for the sheriff ’s depa rtment and that she “ didn’t think about . . . it endang ering [S .D.M.].” The trial court commented that he believed Moe ’s ac tions with the tape r ecor der w ere “evil, and I think my opinion’s important on that issue.” Ev ide nc e wa s a lso p r e se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt that Mo e ins tr

uc te d th e c hil dr e n to wr ite letters about Ma lmquist ’s shortcoming s and about their alleg ed pre fer ence to live with Moe. A counselor w ith Mothers Ag ainst Drunk Dr iving testified that, when Moe c ontact e d h e r with conce rns about Malmquist drinking a nd driving , she advised Moe to have the children w rite letters e x pressing their fe el i n gs , b u t did not intend for Moe to “c oach” or “pr ompt” them about what to wr ite. Moe admitted that she i nstructed the children to write the letters and that she knew it wa s in violation of the Aug ust 2002 order.

Reg ardingMalmquist’s behavior, the tria l court hea rd testimony

about var ious incidents wher e Malmquist ca lled the sheriff ’s depar tment to resolve disputes w ith his children. The tw o mo st p ro min e nt o f t

he se inc ide nts inv olv e d S.D .M
. I n the fi rs t, Ma lmq uis t no tic e d that a

c hil d support chec k, written to him from Moe’s e mploy er, w as missing fr om his desk. S.D.M. denied having taken it. Two months later, Ma lmquist took S.D.M. to t he police station a bout the missing
c he c k, and

S.D .M . a dmi tte d to havin g take n it. Ma lmq uis t c la ime d h e wa

nte d to te a c h S. D. M. that, “if he did this l ater

in life, [the consequenc es] would be a lot wor se.” The office r who handled theSevera l witnesses testified about this episode, including Ma lmquist , police off icer s, the 6 c hil dr e n’ s th e ra

pis t, s c ho ol c ouns e lor s, and S.D .M
. 11 missing che ck incident testified that it is not unusual for pa rents to bring their childre n in to be talked to about bad beha

viors and that, on aver ag e, he talks to c hildren “two or three times a month” about
su c h matte rs . T he c hil dr e n’ s th e ra pis t, h ow e ve r, te sti fi e d that the us e of su c h a dis c ipl ina

ry ta c tic
wa s in tim idatin g to S .D .M ., ma de him fe arf ul, and de c re a se d h is r e sp e c t f

or a uth or ity fi g ur e s. The sec ond incident involving the she riff’ s depar tment occur

red in S eptember

2003, in connec tion with Moe’s equipping S.D.M. with the hidden tape re corde r. B y all acc ounts, one

6 morning befor e school, S.D.M. hid the tape r ecor der in his bac kpack, a nd Malmquist told him to take out the trash. S.D.M. ref

used, and Malmquist attempted to hurry up their morning routine by loading S.D .M .’ s bac kp a c k in to t he tr uc k w hil e a g a in t e lli ngS.D .M . to take ou t th e tr a sh . Wh e n S. D. M. be c a me ve ry

po sse ssi ve of

his ba g , M a lmq

uis t look e d insi de and fo un d the ta pe re c or de r. Ma lmq

uis t took it and the bag , g ave S.D.M. his lunch and books, told S .D.M. to wait outside for the bus, a nd locked the door . S.D.M. y elled and ba ng ed on the door, but Malmquist refused to let him bac k in. S.D.M. then threw something at the door a nd broke the window. Malmquist tol d him to st ay put and called the sheriff

’s department. The officer s arr ived, handcuffe d S.D.M., put him in the squad ca r,
and too k h im t o th e do wn town s ta tio n. Ma lmq uis t fo llo we d. Af

te r l e a vin g the statio n, Ma lmq uis t too k S
. D
. M
. f

o r an e m e r g e n c y s e s s i o n w i t h t h e c h i l dr e n ’ s t h e r a p i s t , an d t h e n t o o k h i m t o sc ho ol. Sc ho ol pe rs on ne l te sti fi e d th a t S. D. M. wa s u ps e t and sc are d to g o b a c k to Ma lmq uis t’ s. Ma lmq

uis t testified that, beca

use S.D.M. w as out of control, he believed it wa s appropr iate to g et the sher iff’s office involved.Th is i nc lud e d c on du c tin g ind ivi du a l, i n came ra int e rv ie ws wi th b oth L .M .M . a

nd S.D .M
. 7 Be cause their l iving arra

ng ement prefer ence s are not binding on the trial cour t, see Tex. F am. Code A n n . § 1 5 3
. 0 0 9 ( W e s t2 0 0 2 ) , a n d w e r e s p e c tt h e n e e d

f o r c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f

t h i s s e n s i t i v e t e s t i m o n y, the ir state d p re fe re nces wil l no t be re pe a te d h e re . We pr e su me the tr ia l c ourt c on sid e re d th is testimony , along with all of the other evidenc e, and af forde d it appropriate weig ht when dete rmining what wa s in the best interest of the children. Se e Gi lle sp ie v . G ill esp ie , 644 S.W .2d 449, 450-51 (Tex. 1982). 12

Finally , the issue of Malmquist’s alleg ed drinking -and- driving was a lso the subject of testimony , in response to Moe’s repe ated a ccusations that Malmquis t drives drunk with the children. Ma lmquist acknow ledg ed that he w as pulled over on Hallowee n night, 2001, f or driving 48 mph in a 45 mph zone. Accor ding to M alm quist, he was deta ined bec ause a nother man of

the
same name ha d a

n o uts tand ingwa

rr ant. B e c a

us e the po lic e int e nd e d to take him to t he st a tio n to clea r it up, Malmquist’s sister came to retrieve the childre n. Malmquist denied that the re ason for his sist er c oming wa s beca use he and his g irlfriend w ere too inebriated to drive . No DWIchar g es
wer e filed. A lthough Ma lmqu i s t admits to often having a mix ed drink in the e vening s when the children a re pr esent, he claims that he does not dr ink to the point of intox ication and that he never drives intox icated. Multiple witnesses c onfirmed that they have ne ver know n Malmquist to drink
and dr ive , th a t it

wo uld be inc on sis te nt wi th his c ha ra c te r to do so , a

nd that he dr ink s r e sp on sib ly in
so c ia l se tti ng s. The trial court also hear d testimony from key witnesses about their r ecommendations for a custody arr ang ement. I n October 2003, the children’ s therapist, Tammy Wanamaker , testified 7 that it wa s n ot i n th e c hil dr e n’ s bes t inte re st to co nti nu e the joi nt c on se rv a tor sh ip o rd e re d in Au g us t 2002 and that, thus far , they had not bee n able to ac hieve a healthy situation when both parents wer e inv olv e d. B ut, sh e te sti fi e d, bo th c hil dr e n h a ve e xpre sse d a de sir e to h a ve a

re la tio ns hip wi th b othOn appe al, no par ty asser ts that the g randpa

rents should h ave been a ppointed as 8 conser vators of the children. 13 pa re n t s , an d h e r g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h y i s t o t r y an d k e e p c h i l dr e n “ i n t h e h o m e s e t t i n g a ndtry to pr omo te the re la tio ns hip wi th b oth parent s. ” Wan a make r f

e lt that “ int e ns ive ” the ra

py wo rk wi th bo th M oe and

Ma lmq uis t w a s n e c e ssa

ry . U lti ma te ly , Wanamake r te sti fi e d tha t sh e “ wo uld lik e to see the children c ontinue to have c ontact with their pa rents. I think that supervised visitation may be he lpf ul f or awh ile , b ut I

wo uld lik e to, e ve ntu a lly , s e e the m be a ble to h a ve no ns up e rv ise d ti me with both parents.”

Malmquist t es t i fied that “ I ’m not a per fec t pare nt, but I try the best I

can, a nd I have n’ t ma de a

hund re d p e rc e nt o f t

he ri g ht c ho ic e s, no on e do e s . . . bu t I ’m no t he re to c on de mn my se lf . I thi nk I ’v e do ne a g re a t job ra isi ng the se kid s. . . . I g ot t he m tu tor s. . . . [Whe n L .M .M
. hid h er p rog ress re port], I went and g ot it. . . . [ I ] t ake the m to school early in the morning s for [S .D.M.’s] football practice and af ter I drop them off

, g o to work. And, normally , Idon’t g et home, mostly betwee n 5:30 and 6:00, and in the meantime, they ’re with [ my g irlfriend] doing the ir studies or pl aying or fishing or football pra ctice. . . . I don’t want to eliminate [Moe]. I believe the re ne eds to be supervise d visitation of some sort, and that happe ned bef ore, an d it worked out we ll.” M a l m qu i s t ’ s s i s t e r

t e s t i f i e d t h a th e s h o u l d

h a v e c u s t o dy. Mo e a c kn ow le dg e d th a t sh e ha d c ontr i b ut e d t o t h e c h i l d r e n ’ s e m oti on a l and

a c a de mic problems, but te stified that S.D.M. w anted to live with he r. She stated that, if she could n o t h ave custody of t h e ch i l d ren, her pre fer ence would be that they live with her pa

rents. Two of

Moe’s sisters, Moe’s a dult daug hter fr om a pre vious marriag e, and three of Ha rold and Irene ’s frie nds te sti fi e d th a t th e y

tho ug ht c on se rv a tor sh ip s ho uld be awa rd e d to the g ra

nd pa re nts
. 8On April 21, 2004, Dr. L owry wrote a letter to the c ourt stating, “ Ibeli ev e s h e ca n be 9 trusted with standard visitation.” 14

At the Marc h revie w hea

ring , sever al witnesses testified t h at Malmquist had made improvements. Dr. Elizabeth Holtzman, Malmquist’s psy cholog ist, testi fied that Malmquist was committed to the therape utic proce ss, understood the nee d to cha n ge h is authoritarian style, and demonstrated to he r that he c ould provide a stable environment for the children. Scott Matthew, a n assistant director

for Williamson C o u n t y J uvenile Servic es, testified that S.D.M. nee ded more discipline than Har ol d and Irene wer e providing and that, g iven his experience , it is better to not place children w it h t h e g randpa rents whe n there is a viable pa renta l option. Nancy

Gra ff, one of S.D.M.’s teac hers, testified that Malmquist had been s upportive of her effor ts to improve S.D.M.’s
aca demic per fo rm ance. Malmquist testified that he had be en attendingcounseling and par enting classes a nd rea ding pa

renting books; he felt the se thing s were helping him to be a better fathe r. Wan a make r t e sti fi e d tha t, sin c e Oc tob e r, Ma lmq uis t had imp ro ve d h is a

bil ity to c omm un ic a te wi th the children and had not phy sically disciplined S.D.M., although their relationship was stil l “roc ky .” Wanamaker

could not say

whether it would be better to lea

ve S.D.M. with Harold and I rene or move him to Malmqui st’s; she did not fee l it would benef it L .M.M. to be moved from he r g randpa rents’; and she f elt the childre n should not be separ ated. At the hea ring , Moe dec lined to offe r any direc t testimony
. And ot her w itnesses had lit tle to say a

bo ut Mo e be c a

us e he r inv olv e me nt wi th the c hil dr e n sin c e Oc tob e r ha d b e e n mi nim a l, g ive n th e tim e sh e sp e nt in ja il se rv ing he r c on te mpt se nte nc e and that, on c e re le a se d, sh e fa ile d to beg in counseling with Dr. L owry in order to see the childre n. Moe testified on c ross-examination that she had attended one se ssion with Dr. L owry , but she had not sc heduled another
. I rene Moe 915

and Moe’ s sister testified that they did not believe Moe pose d a dang er to the c hildren, that her vis itatio n did n ot n e e d to be su pe rv ise d, and

that th e c ourt ’s or de rs we re pr ima ri ly fo r t he purp os e of punishing Moe rathe r than prote cting the childre n.

Evidence was a lso presente d at the Mar ch hea rin g t h at , d u ri ng the five months the children were residing at their g randpa rents’ house , L .M.M.’s behavior and ac ademic pe rfor

mance improved, althoug h she continued to strug g le with g rade s and m ad e p o or choic es for friends. O n the other ha

nd, S.D.M.’s attitude a

n d gr a d e s d e c lined drastica lly . Although the g randpa rents cla imed that he beha

ved we ll at home, his teache rs re ported that he had ang er ma nag ement proble ms, was fai lin g , w a s in

fr e qu e nt v iol a tio n o f t

he dr e ss c od e , a

nd that he tol d th e m he c ou ld g e t awa y wi th
any thi ngbe c a

us e his g ra

nd pa re nts wo uld

no t di sc ipl ine him
. Ana lys is A j oint manag ing conservatorship may be modified only

upon establishing that (1) the re ha s b e e n a

ma te ri a l and

su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e of c ir c ums tanc e s a

nd (2 ) the mod if

ic a tio n w ou ld be in the best intere st of the child. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 156.101 (West 2002 & Supp. 2004- 05). He re, Moe does not dispute that materia l a nd substantial c hang es to the family ’s circ umstances ha d o c c ur re d s inc e the Au g us t 20 02 or de r, bu t sh e a rgue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s June 20 04 or de r d id not modify

the conse rvatorship a

rra ng ement in a manner that was in t he best intere sts of L .M.M. and S.D.M. She sought to mo d i fy t h e August order to have Malmquist removed a s a joint manag ing
conser vator a nd herse lf appointed a s sole manag ing c onservator. Malmquist res p o n d s that, when consideringall of the e vidence befor e it, the t rial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moe ’s
mo t i o nt o m o d i fy

an d m ai n t ai n i n g t h e p ar en t s as j o i n tm an agi n g co n s er v at o rs wit h Malmquist having16

the rig ht to establish primary residenc e, while placing additional restric tions on Moe’s possession
and a c c e ss r ig hts
. Ma lm qu ist ’s rig

hts of p os se

ssi on an d a c c ess Moe base s her a

rg ument ag ainst Malmquist’s conservatorship on the presumptions established in Chapter 153 of the family

code. She argues t hat, whil e section 153.131 sets forth a pr e su mpt ion

in f a vo r o f b oth

pa re nts be ing name d a s jo int c on se rv a tor s, that w a s r e bu tte d in thi s c a se by evidenc e that Malmquist abuses t h e children. Se e id . § 153.004, .131. Moe’s a rg uments are , howeve r, without merit in this m odification proc eedingbeca use th e Texas Supreme Court has unequivoca lly

stated that t he presumptions of C hapter 153 do not apply

to Chapter 156 modification actions. In re V. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d 338, 343 (Tex. 2002) (pre sumptions i n Chapter 153 only g overn ori gi n al cust ody

deter minations). Accor dingly , in reg ards to Moe’ s first issue, the only question pr e se nte d f

or our r e vie w i s w he the r t

he tr ia l court a

bu se d its disc re tio n in deny ing Mo e ’s mot ion to
m o d i f y. Be cause Moe wa s the party asse rt i ng that Malmquist shoul d not be maintained a s joint conservator

with the rig ht to establish the children’s primary residenc e and that the arr ang ement should be modi fied, Moe car ried the burden of proof to establish by a prepondera nce of evidenc e that it would be injurio u s t o t h e ch i ldren to maintain Malmquist and that her a ppointment would be a positive improvement. Eason v. Eason , 860 S.W .2d 187, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Di s t.] 1993, no writ); Ogrydziak v . Ogrydziak , 614 S.W .2d 474, 477 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1981, no writ). She fa iled to satisfy this burden.17 Although se vera l witnesses testified that Malmquist phy sically disciplined the children, suc h as slapping L .M.M. acr oss the fac e or w restling S.D.M. to the gro u n d , none char acte rized thi s b eh av i o r as “abuse.” T he childre n’s thera pist testified that she did not believe Malm qu is t w a s p h y s ic a ll y a b u s in g th e c h il dr e n b u t s h e d id w o r r y th a t th e e xc h an g e s betwee n Malmquist and his son would become “[m]ore phy sical, m ay be more intense,” a s S.D.M. got lar g er and older. The therapist also acknow ledg ed that Moe ha d repor ted Malmquist to C hild Protective Service s on m u ltiple occasions, and that eac h case was re solved in Malmquist’s favor. F urther, Moe’s a lleg ations that Malmquist abuse d the childre n by drinking and driving wer e not cor roborated by the testimony , and m u ltiple witnesses testified that they had obser

ved Malmquist with the children a nd believed the y

had a g ood relationship. Whe n the tr ia l c ourt

a nn ounc e d it s o rd e r i n O c tob e r 2 00 3, he a dmo nis he d M a lmq uis t for his method of ha

ndling disputes by

resor ting to ei t h er phy sical discipline or the she riff’ s de pa rtme nt. He the n s a id t o M oe that [t]he me nta l, c ru e l and ha rm fu l abu se that y ou have inf lic te d ove r the se c hil dr e n is muc h mo re se ve re and

muc h mo re lif

e dama g ing tha

n a sla p in the fa c e . A kid

wi ll g et over a slap in the fa ce. I

don’t know that these kids will g et over the g arba g e y ou put them throug h, from [having ] t hem sig n the [court] documents and the letters . . ., from g iving your child a tape rec order
. . . . [and] calling [L .M.M.] white trash a nd a b i t ch i nfr o n to f h er

fr i en d s an d

h er s ch o o l m at es an d

h er t ea ch er s i s d i s gu s t i n g.
At the Marc h 2004 revie w hea ring , the cour

t expl ained that he could “unde rstand the c onflict b e tw e e n[M a lm qu is t’ s ] a

u th o r it ar ia

n , d is c ip li n e p e r s o n a li ty an d th e [g r an d

p ar e n ts ’ s o f

t a p p r o a c h ], . . . [but ] t hat’s not worki n g fo r [ S
. D.M.]” beca use S.D.M. needs some disc ipline, and “[Malmquist ’s] gone to [ Dr.] Holtz man, and he ’s done what I ’ve told him to do.”18 The re cord de monstrates s u ff i ci en tev i d en ce t o s u

p p o rt the trial cour

t’s deter minations that it was in the best intere st of the children to ma intain Ma lmquist as the joint conser vator with the ri g ht t o e sta

bli shthe c hil dr e n’ s p ri mary re sid e nc e and

de ny Mo e ’s mot ion to mod if

y . M oe fa ile d to
e sta bli shby a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that it wo uld be inj ur iou s to the c hil dr e n to ma int a in Ma lmq uis t in thi s p os iti on

or that it wo uld be an imp ro ve me nt to a

pp oin t Mo e a s th e c hil dr e n’ s so le manag ing c onservator. See E ason , 860 S.W .2d at 190. She also fa iled to show on appea l that the tr ia l c ourt a c te d in an arb itr ary or un re a so na ble mann e r, or

wi tho ut r e fe re nc e to guid ingpr inc ipa ls of law. See Colem an , 109 S. W
. 3 d at 1 1 0
. The trial c ourt, there fore , did not abuse its discretion. Se e Ec ho ls , 85 S.W .3d at 477. Moe’s f irst issue is overruled.
Mo e ’s rig hts of p os se

ssi on an d a c c ess I n her second, thi rd, and fourth is sues, M oe challeng es t he trial court’s modification of her joint conse rvatorship rig hts to possession of and ac cess to the c hildren. Moe a sserts that it was
err or for the trial court to a

war d her less than the standa rd possession order ; to not gra nt her spec ific, enfor cea ble per iods of possession and ac cess; and to c ondition her rig hts upon th e combined
a pp ro va l of

Dr . L ow ry

and the c hil dr e n’ s th e ra

pis t. Trial courts have discretion t o establish the t erms and conditions of conser vatorship. Gree n v. Gre en , 85 0 S.W. 2d 80 9, 81 2 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 93 , no wr it) ; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.193 (West 2002). This i n cludes the a uthority to determine the fre quency and duration of visits, as well as the limitations and saf eg uards to be pla ced on suc h visits. Hi ll v . H ill , 404 S.W .2d 641, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [ 1st Dist.] 1966, no writ). Tria l c ourts are not obligate d to order sta nd ard po sse ssi on ; if a court de te rm ine s tha t the sta nd ard po sse ssi on or de r i s n ot i n th e c hil d’ s b e st19

interest, then the c ourt ca n either de ny

possession and ac ce s s al toge ther or “ fashion an or der that restric ts posse ssion or acc ess so as to e liminate a ny dang er to the phy sical or e motional welfar e of the child.” In re W

alt e rs , 39 S.W .3d 280, 286 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.); see also In

r e R

. D

. Y. , 5 1 S. W.3 d 3 14 , 3 23 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 2001, pet
. de nie d) . T ri a l c ourt s, howeve r, ca

nnot deny a conse rvator’ s rig hts of possession and ac cess a bsent a finding that the child’s phy sical and e motional welfar e would be e ndang ere d by the possession and a cc es s , an d any lim i t a t i o n s p l a c e d o n s u c h r i g h t s c an n o t e xc e e d t h a t r e qu i r e d t o p r o t e c t t h e c h i l d ’ s b e s t in te re st. Ro os th v . R oo sth , 889 S.W .3d 445, 451-52 (Te x . App.—Houston [ 1 4 t h Dist.] 1994, writ denied)
.

I f a tria l court dete rmines that it is in t he best intere st of the child to place restric tions
or c on dit ion s o n a

c on se rv a tor ’s ri g hts of po sse ssi on and a c c e ss, the n it is the c ourt ’s re sp on sib ili ty to specifica lly

define those terms in its decre e. In re A.P.S., 5 4 S. W. 3 d 4 9 3 , 4 9 9 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 01 , n o p e t.) ; Hi ll , 404 S
. W
. 2 d at 6 4 3 . The judg ment must state in clear and
un a mbi g uo us te rm s wh a t is re qu ir e d f or the c on se rv a tor

to c omp ly , a

nd the te rm s mu st b e sp e c if

ic enoug h to a llow the conser vator to enf

orce the judg ment by

contempt. In re A.P.S., 54 S.W .3d at 49 8; Ro os th , 8 89 S.W. 2d a t 45 2; se e als o I

n r e W alt e rs , 39 S.W .3d at 288. As in her f

irst issue, Moe relies on a Chapter 153 presumption to support her sec ond issue, claiming that she is entitled to the standard posse ssion order. See Tex. F am. Code Ann. § 153.137 (West Supp. 2004-0 5 ) (s t andard possession order constitutes presumptive minimum
a mou nt o f p os se ssi on

fo r pare nt name d as joi nt m ana g ingc on se rv a tor wh o is no t awa

rd e d r ig ht t o
e sta bli shc hi ld ren’ s pri mary

re sid e nc e ). B ut t

he su pr e me c ourt

ha s h e ld t

hat th e pr e su mpt ion s inT h e c o u rt s ta te d th a t M o e “ h a s h a d o p p o rtu n it ie s p r io r to th e h e ar in g in O c to ber, a s far 10 back a s almost 10 y ear s, to g o to the counseling . . . . And she ha s continually and willfully

ref used to do it, and I ’m not g oing to make it any more c onvenient for her now. I t’s Dr. L owry , and she c an either g o or she c annot g o. . . . But the g ate to visitation, [ Moe] has the key .” 20 Chapter 153 a

re only applicable in orig inal custody case s, not in modi fication procee dings suc h as this one, which ar e g overne d by Chapter 156. In re V. L.K. , 24 S.W .3d at 343. The trial c ourt was a ffor ded broa d discretion in establishing the t erms of
conser vatorship and it was not obligated t o order standard posse ssion. In re W alt e rs , 39 S.W .3d at 28 6. Mo re ov e r, the c ourt

e xpla ine d o n th e re c or d w hy the sta nd ard po sse ssi on

or de r w a s n ot i nit ia lly appropr iate in this case and it structure d the order s o that, within six months from the date of the 10 order , Moe would be entitl ed to standard possession, assuming she had esta blished and continued treatment with Dr. L owry . Thus, Moe’s claim that the trial cour t abused its discretion by

awa rding her le ss than the standar d possession order is without merit, and he r sec ond issue is overrule d.

Moe’s only

argument with reg ard to her third issue—that the t rial court err ed by not g iving he r spec ific, enf

orce able pe riods of possession—is that “[i] t has bee n repe at ed l y h eld t hat denials of spe cific pe riods of visitati o n s h o u ld only be orde red in the most extreme of circ umstances.” See Roosth, 889 S.W .2d at 451. Whil e we ag ree with this proposit ion, it does not support Moe’s claim beca use, in conditioning Moe’ s rig hts on her continued the rapy , she wa s not denied spe cific, e nforc eable periods of possession. To the contra ry , the cour

t’s order sets forth ver

y sp e c if ic te rm s o f h e r p os se ssi on and a c c e ss r ig hts
. The J une 2004 order stated that Moe had to (1) beg in treatment with Dr. L owry , (2) notify all the par

ties of such c ompliance, a nd (3) c ontin u e t h at t re at m ent for thirty day s. At that21

point, she was entitled to supervised visitation at Kids Ex chang e on spec ified date s and to telephone contac t with the children. The rea fter, be g inning in August 2004, as long a s she continued tre atment wi th D r. L ow ry , Mo e wa s e nti tle d to inc re a se d p e ri od s o f p os se ssi on and a c c e ss— wi th v e ry sp e c if ic times, dates, and loca

tions provided for—c ulminating i n a De ce mber 2004 re turn to standard possession. Acc ording ly , the terms of w hat Moe wa s require d to do in order to obtain and e nhance her r ights of posse ssion an d ac ce ss were unambig uous, specific , and enf orce able. More over, the fa mil y c od e e xpre ssl y

g ra nts tr ia l c ourt s a

uth or ity to o rd e r t

hat c on se rv a tor s “ pa

rt ic ipate in
coun s e li n g w it

h a me n ta l h e a lt

h p r o f e s s io n a l. ” T e x. F a m. Co d e A n n . § 1 5 3
. 0 1 0 ( a ) ( We s t 2002)
. The trial c ourt, there fore , did not abuse its discr etion by conditioning Moe ’s rig hts on her continued thera py with Dr. L owry . Her

third issue is overruled. F ina lly , M oe c ha lle ng e s th e c on se rv a tor sh ip arr ang e me nt o n th e g ro un ds that it permitted Dr. L owry

and the c hildren’s thera

pist to order that a pa

rticular pe riod of possession not
occur if the thera

pists mutually ag ree d that it would not be in the children’s be st interest and stated so in writing. She a sserts that this order pose s the threa t that the thera

pists could cause a de fac to termination of her

pare ntal rig hts by

ag ree ing that it would be in the children’s be st interest for Moe to be denied a ll periods of possession a nd acc ess; she urg es that g iving them the a bility to deny her all possession of and a cce ss to her childre n, without any cour t i n t ervention, violates her
c on sti tut ion a l rig hts a s a

pa re nt, see I n re M.S. , 115 S.W .3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003), and c onstitut es
an im pe rm iss ibl e de le g a tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s a

uth or ity to m a ke jud ic ia l de te rm inatio ns . We first addre ss Moe’s claim that the order empowered the thera pists to prevent her from “e ver a g ain see [i ng ] her own minor children.” I n raising t h i s i s s u e, Moe over looks theThe trial court’s order specific ally stated that, upon the thera pists’ written ag ree ment that 11 “any specific period of

possession is not in t he childre n’s best intere st, . . . that period of possession is ordere d [t o] not occur .” (Empha sis added.) 22 signific ant distinction between th e t er ms “possession” and “ acc ess.” Althoug h the terms ar e sometimes use d i n t er ch an g eably , they repr esent two diff

ere nt conce pts in the family code. In re W alt e rs , 39 S.W .3d at 284. The rig ht of acc ess permits a conser vator to a ppro ac h , comm unicate, and visit with the child, where as the rig ht of possession allows the conse rvator to e x erc ise control over the child to the exclusion of all others during a spec ified per iod. Id . Her e, the or der e mpowere d the thera pists to deny

Moe only

a per io d o f p o s s es s i o n , not acc ess. Moe holds the key to that 11 ability by attending her the rapy

sessions with Dr. L owry : As long a s Moe continues he r treatment with Dr. L owry , then she is, at a minimum, permitted ac cess to or visitation with her c hildren.

I n li g h t o f th e e v id e n c e th a t M o e h a d c a u s e d me n ta l an d e mo ti o n a l d a ma g e to he r children ove r the last dec ade, it wa s rea sonable for the trial cour

t to de termine that limitations needed to b e pla c ed on her r ig hts of po sse ssi on . F ur

the rm or e , th e lim itatio n it imp os e d s uf

fi c ie ntl y safe g uarde d ag ainst a de facto termination of Moe’s rig hts (1) by requiringthat the thera

pists agr ee to d e ny a pe ri od of po sse ssi on

and that th ey st ate the ir

a g re e me nt i n w ri tin g , ( 2) by lim iti ngthe ir rig ht to deny

possession to one particula r per iod at a time, and ( 3) by permitting the m to deny

Moe possession, not acce ss. B eca use the trial c ourt place d restric tions only on Moe’s rig hts of possession, rathe r than de ny ing he r all rig hts of possession and ac cess, her co n s t i t u t ional rig hts are not implicated by

the J une 2004 orde r. The que stion remains, howeve r, whe ther it was a proper ex er ci s e of the c ourt’s discretion to deleg ate a

uthority over Moe ’s rights of possession to the thera pists. Although we a

reS e e I n r e R

. D

. Y. , 92 S.W .3d 433 (Tex. 2002) (Just ice Hecht wr iting that petition for r eview 12 should be g rante d beca

use cour ts of appea ls disagr ee a

bout whether

it is p er m i s s i b l e t o order that conser vator’s possession rig hts are “solely at t he dis cre tion of a manag ing conservator,” and listi ng rele vant opinions). Contrary to the se case s, howeve r, in I n r e R

. D

. Y. , the Fir st Court of Appeals a ffirme d a 13 tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r t

hat g a ve the g ra

ndmot he r “ so le dis c re tio n” ov e r the mot he r’ s p os se ssi on

ri g hts 23 awa re of no oth e r c ourt

that ha s a ddre sse d th e iss ue of wh e the r a

c on se rv a tor ’s ri g ht t o p os se ss a
c hil d may be c on tin g e nt on a me nta l the ra pis t’ s a pp ro va l, oth e r c ourt s h a ve a dd re sse d w he the r i t is appropr iate to leave that deter mination within t he discre tion of another c onservator. 12 I n Hi ll , the Fir st Court of Appeals he ld that the trial court ab used its discretion by
makin g the fathe r’ s r ig ht t o v isi t hi s c hil dr e n c on tin g e nt up on se c ur ingthe wr itt e n p e rm iss ion of the ir mot he r, the mana g ingc on se rv a tor . 4 04 S.W. 2d a t 64 3; see also W

right v. W entzel , 749 S.W .2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1988, no writ) (tria l c ourt err ed by making mother’s visitation rig hts continge nt on father ’s conse nt). I n Ro os th , the Four teenth Court of

Appea ls simi larly

reve rsed
an order that g ave the mother “ complete discr etion to determine w hen, whe re, a nd if [the father] may have posse ssion of or ac cess to the c hil d re n , ” b ec ause this g rant of “ absolute discre tion” to the mother denie d the father a n ability to enforc e the judg ment by contempt. 889 S.W .2d at 452. The Te xar ka na Court of Ap pe a ls a lso re ve rs e d an o rd e r t hat c on dit ion e d th e mot

he r’ s p os se ssi on

ri g hts
on the father’s a g ree ment beca use it was “not suff

iciently specific .” In re W

alt e rs , 39 S.W .3d at 288; see also In reA.P.S. , 54 S.W .3d at 498 (trial c ourt abused disc re t i o n i n o rd eringthat mother wa s entitled to possession “at re asonable times and place s as d etermined by [father]” bec ause it g ave fathe r complete discretion over mother’s rig hts and denied mother ability to enforc e orde r by contempt). 13ba se d on the g ra ndmot he r’ s de te rm inatio n of wh e the r the mot he r wa s “ me nta lly and

ph y sic a lly c a p a b le o f e xe r c ising her visit a ti o nw it h th e c h il d
. ” 5 1 S. W. 3 d 3 1 4 , 3 2 3 n . 1 , 3 2 4 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)
. T h e co urt held this order w as not an a buse of discretion bec ause the mother could e nforc e it by filing a motion to m o d i fy

if she fe lt the g randmother

was a busing he r powe r to eva luate whe ther or not the mother was capa ble of e x erc ising her visitation rig hts. Id
. at 324. We ag ree with the Texarkana court’s state ment about

I n r e R

. D

. Y. that , “[ a] lt ho ug h a

jud g e c an r ig htf

ull y re str ic t th e c on dit ion s o f [v isi ta tio n] . . ., we re sp e c tf ull y disag ree . . . that g iving total discre tion, unenforc eable by contempt, to one conse rvator c onstitut es a me r e r e s tr ic ti o n o n th e c o n d it io n s o f v is it a tion.” In re A.P.S. , 5 4 S. W. 3 d 4 9 3 , 4 9 9 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

2001, no pet.). 24 These c ases, howe ver, a

re dist inguisha

ble from the instant one in two, significa nt respe cts. First, the conflict that re sults from allowing one conser vator to have absolute discre tion
ov e r t he oth e r c on se rv a tor ’s ri g hts is r e a dil y a pp are nt b e c a

us e it g ive s an a dv e rs e pa rt y the ri g ht t o completely

deny possession and/or ac cess to the other . Her e, that is not the ca se bec ause the de c isi on -m a ke rs , th e the ra pis ts, are pr e su ma

bly ne utr a l th ir d p art ie s. Se c on d, the or de rs i n

t h e a b o v e -m e nti on e d c a se s d id n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y sp e c if y the te rm s upon which the de cision-maker could deny the conservator’ s possession or visitation rights. I nstead, the orde rs simply

stated t hat pos session could not occur unless the conse rvator obta ined the other ’s “wr itten permission,” Hi ll , 404 S.W .2d at 643, “c onsent,” W right , 749 S.W .2d at 234, or “ mutual ag ree ment,” In re W

alt e rs , 39 S.W .3d at 288. Thus, in thes e ca ses, absolute, unc onditional discretion was g rante d over the conser vator’s r ights of posse ssion and acc ess. Her e, on the other hand, the t h er ap i s t s we re n o tp er m i t t edt o d en y M o e as i n gl e p er i o d

o f p o s s es s i o n w i t h o u tfi rs tre ac h i n g a mut ua l, w ri tte n a g re e me nt t

hat it wa s in the c hil dr e n’ s be st int e re st to do so . Th is i s in a c c or d w ithM o e s t at es t h at h er fo u r i s s u es re gar d i n g t h e c o n s er v at o rs h i p o rd er co n s t i tu t e ach al l en ge 14 to twelve finding s of fa ct issued by the trial cour t in relation to that order . The re cord de monstrates su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt tho se fi nd ing s. Ma lmq uis t w a s a lso or de re d to pa y the a tto rn e y a d lit e m $5 ,0 00 , w hic h h e do e s n ot d isp ute 15 on a pp e a l. 25 what the f amily code r equire s a trial cour

t to find prior to de ny ing conser vatorship rig hts. See T e x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 53 .0 02 . Wh ile it m ay no t be a pp rop ri ate ina ll c a se s f

or the tr ia l c ourt

to de le g a te su c h a

uth or ity to t hir d p art ie s, he re the de c isi on -m a ke rs we re me nta l he a lthpr of e ssi on a ls
a pp oin te d b y

the c ourt , a

nd the tr ia l c ourt

ma int a ine d th e po we r t o r e vie w the ir de c isi on s if
c ha lle ng e d b y

the pa rt ie s. Th e te rm s o f t

his or de r ar e su ff

ic ie ntl y sp e c if

ic so a s to be e nf

or c e a ble by c on te mpt , and the tria l court, there fore , did not abuse its discretion in g ranting the t hera pists the right to deny Moe a spe cific pe riod of poss ession if they mutually ag ree d it was in the best intere st of the childre n. Moe’s four

th issue is overruled. 14
AT TOR NE Y’ S F EES The fina l order issued in June 2004 awa rded attorney ’s fe es ag ainst Moe and the g randpa rents, jointly

and seve rally , i n the following amounts: $15,000 for L aurie Nowlin, the attorney ad litem, and $20,000 for J o h n Ba rr et t, Malmquist’s attorney
. The June order w as 15

c on f i n e d t o t h e a t t o r

n e y s ’ w o r

k d u r i n g t h e t r i a l p h a s e a

n d d i d n o t m e n t i o n an y a p p e l la te fe e s. Malmquist, therefor e, filed a motion to ref orm the judg ment on J uly

20, 2004, seekingan attorne y ’s fee awa rd of $20,000, should Moe and/or the g randpa rents appe al. Moe re sponded with her ow n motion for rec onsideration, urgingthat the initial awar d of attorne y ’s fe es wa s unjust and thatTh e or de r state d tha t th e a pp e llate fe e s w e re awa

rd e d a g a ins t Mo e and

the g ra nd pa re nts , 16 joi ntl y and se ve ra lly , in

fa vo r o f Joh n B arr e tt, a

nd that th e aw ard

wa s “ c on dit ion e d o n th e purs uit by any or all of said parties of an ultimately unsucce ssful appea l.” I t a lso provided for a remittitur of $5,000 to Moe and the g randpa rents, jointly

and seve rally , “if a

n appea l is not perfec ted.” 26 Ma lmq uis t’ s mo tio n to a dd

a pp e llate fe e s sh ou ld b e de nie d b e c a us e $2 0, 00 0 wa s an unc on sc ion a ble
a mou nt. At a he ari ngon

July 23 , 200 4, the tr ia l c ourt

de nie d M oe ’s mot ion , a

nn ounc e d it

wo uld
awa rd Malmquist’s attorney

$5,000 in appellate f

ees, a nd asked that an orde r be pr epar ed to re flec t that pr on ounc e me nt. Th e on ly wr itt e n me mor ia lizatio n a pp e ari ngin t

he re c or d of th e July pronounce ment, howeve r, is a ref ormed final order issued on October 18, 2004, which wa s after 16 the trial cour

t’s plenar y power expired
. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 306a, 329b (reg ardingtimetables for plenar y power ). On a pp e a l, Mo e and the g ra

nd pa re nts c ha lle ng e the awa

rd s a sse sse d a g a ins t th e m in favor of both the ad litem a

nd Malmquist’s attorney , for both the tria l and appe llate phase s. They
ur g e (1 ) t hat e a c h o f t

he se awa rd s c on sti tut e d a

n a bu se of the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio n, (2 ) t hat it violated section 261.106 of the family code to a ssess Malmquist’s attorney ’s fe es ag ainst them, and (3) that the O ctober

2004 awa

rd of a ppellate f ees is void base d on th e ex piration of the c ourt’s plenar y power . Abuse of Discre tion Se c tio n 1 06 .0 02 of

the fa mil y c od e g ov e rn s th e awa

rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in

su its
a f f e c t i n g t h e p ar e n t
- c h i l d r e l a t i o n s h i p . T e x . F a m . C o d e A n n . § 1 0 6
. 0 0 2 ( W e s tS u p p . 2 0 0 4

- 0 5 )
. In such ca ses, we r eview the awa rd of attorney ’s fe es for

an abuse o f d i s cretion. Tul l v . Tu ll , 159Moe cla ims it was an abuse of discretion to assess “any ” fe es ag ainst her f or Malmquist’s 17 a tto rn e y and to a sse ss “ the g re a te r p or tio n o f” the fe e s a g a ins t he r f or the a d li te m. Th e y be lie ve the c ourt

awa rd e d f e e s a g a ins t th e m jo int ly and seve ra lly

be c a us e 18 Ma lmq uis t’ s att or

ne y ha s bee n una

ble to co lle c t a prio r jud g me nt ag a ins t Moe (f or $2 0, 00 0 in f

e e s) since 1997.

I rene testified that, including the $2,500 worth of a ttorney ’s fe es that they have paid for 19 Mo e in t he c ur re nt l iti g a tio n, the tot a l amo un t of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s th e y

have pa id o n M oe ’s be ha lf is a pp ro xima te ly

$4 2, 00 0, tha

t Mo e ha s p a id v e ry

lit tle of it b a c k, and

that t he y do no t e xpe c t he r t o reimburse them. She also testified that they purcha sed the mortg ag e on Moe’ s house in 2001; the 27 S.W .3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). There is no abuse of discre tion where an aw ard of attorne y ’s fe es is supported by the evidenc e. Id
. Moe’s only

argument in support of her c laim that the trial court a bused its discretion by awa rding attorney ’s fe es ag ainst her is that her al l ega t i o n s that Malmquist “batter[ed] the 17

c hil dr e n and [he r] a lle g a tio ns of c hil d a bu se we re no t on ly

br ou g ht i n g oo d f

a ithbu t w e re pr ov e n to be absolutely

true.” As discussed in re l ati on to the conser vatorship issues, the evide nce did not
corr oborate Moe’s a lleg ations of abuse , but instead was suff icient to suppor

t the trial court’ s finding tha t M a l m qu i s t h a d n o t e n g a g e d i n a p a t t e r n o r h i s t o r

y o f a b u s e t o w ar d s L
. M
. M. or S.D .M
. Ac c or d i n g l y , t h i s c l a i m d o e s n o td e m o n s t r a t e ana b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o no nb e h a l f

o f t h e t r i a l c o u rt
. Moe’s fif th issue is overruled. Ha ro l d and Irene , on the other ha nd, asser t severa l gr ounds for their c laim that the trial court a

bused its disc retion in a

war ding attorney ’s fee s ag ainst them in f avor of the ad litem and Ma lmq uis t’ s atto rn e y . T he y

ur g e that t h e se awa rd s c on sti tut e imp e rm iss ibl e sanc tio ns le vie d a g a ins t them in an attempt to collect f ees owed by their apparently insolvent daug hter, which ar e desig ned 18 to punish them for helping her f inancially and to di scoura g e them fr om being involved in further

19tot a l c os t of the loa n wa s $8 7, 92 5. Mo e te sti fi e d that Ha ro ld and I re ne do no t re qu ir e he r t o p ay re nt. On Octobe r 21, 2003, Malmquist filed a motion seeking (1) a judgme nt of attorney ’s fe es 20 in favor of hi s attorney , jointly and severally ag ainst Moe and the g randpa rents, and ( 2) the e ntry

of a mon e tary

sanc tio n a g a in st Haro ld a nd I re ne . T he June 20 04 or de r s ta te d th a t it c on sid e re d a ll motions befor e it , that the relief s oug ht by Malmquist was de nied in part a nd g rante d in part, and that all reque sted relief

“not expressly

g ra n t ed h erein is denied.” The J une orde r did not mention the sanctions soug ht by

Malmquist and, theref

ore, it denie d that relief

. 28 litigation re g ardingthe custody of their g randc hildren. Har old and I rene also urg e that the a war ds
we re an a bu se of dis c re tio n be c a

us e the a d lit e m and

Ma lmq uis t’ s atto rn e y

fa ile d to se g re g a te the ir fee s among Moe and them and betwe en diffe rent proc eeding s, actions, and motions; they urg e that they s h o u l d n o t b e responsible for any fee s incurre d prior to Aug ust 26, 2003, the date they intervene d. Finally , the g randpa rents challeng e the awa

rd of the ad litem’s fe es ag ainst them on the g rounds that there is no evidenc e or insufficient evidence that their conduc t made the a ppointment
o f t h e a d l i t e m n e c e s s a

r y. Attorney’s fee

s as sanctions Har old and I rene ’s ar g ument that the attorne y ’s fees were assessed aga inst them as an impermissible sanction is without merit beca use the trial c ourt did not a war d the attorney ’s fe es
as sanc tions. The court denied Malmquist’s motion to enter a moneta ry sanction ag ainst Harold a nd I rene and stated that the se fee s wer e awa rded ag ainst them “[p] ursuant to Section 106.002 of the 20 Texas F amily Code
. . . as rea sonable a nd nece ssary

attorney ’s fe es and e x penses.” Thus, rathe r than constituting an a

war d of sanc tions for any fee s that acc rued or

any conduct that oc cur red in prior litigation, the attorne y ’s fe es aw arde d in the J une 2004 orde r ar e mer ely a j u d gm ent t o collect the29

fee s that acc rued in the c urre nt phase of litig ati o n , wh i ch wa s initiated by Moe and in whic h the g randpa rents interve ned. Har old and I rene do not dispute that they wer e a pa rty to the instant case, a

nd they do not challeng e that the f

ee a mounts awarde d to either M al m q u ist’s attorney or the a d litem were
unrea sonable or unne cessa ry . I nstead, they

only dispute their re sponsibili ty for the fee s by claiming that the re cord de monstrat es n o ev idence or insufficie nt evidence to find that they have a ided, abetted, encour ag ed, or conspired with Moe i n the l itigation, or that their ac tions have bee n frivolous or in bad fa ith. Bec ause the se fe es we re not e ntere d as sanc tions, however, the re is no nee d for evidenc e of conspirac y or bad faith on their behalf. Rather, to a ffirm the a war d, there need only

be sufficie nt evidence in the rec o rd u p o n whi ch the tria l court could de termine the a war d was “re asonable .” In a suit aff ectingthe par ent-c hild relationship, this i s the only statutor i l y -def

ined require ment and trial c ourts are otherwise a ffor ded broa d discretion in deter mining the pr opriety

of an attorne y ’s fe es aw ard. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 106.002.

Th e le g a l and

fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of th e evi den c e are fa c tor s to be c on sid e re d in whether the trial cour

t abused its discretion, but they are not independe nt g rounds of err or. Do y le

v . D oy le , 955 S.W .2d 478, 479 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 1997, no pet.). In revie wing the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence , we c onsider the e vidence in a light most favor able to the f inding to dete rmine whether a re asonable trier of

fac t could have formed a firm belief

or convic tion that its finding was true a nd we must disreg ard a ll evidence that a rea sonable fac tfinder could have disbelieved or found to have be en incr edible. In re J .L. , 1 6 3 S
. W
. 3 d 7 9, 85 (Tex. 2005). “Unde r traditional fa ctual suf f ic ie n c y s ta

n d ar d s , a c o u rt d e te r

mi n e s if a f

in d in g is s o a g a in s t th e g r e a t w e ig ht and30

pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e tha t it is m anif e stl y un jus t, s ho c ks the c on sc ie nc e , o r c le a rl y demonstrates bia s.” In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Al tho ug h th e g ra

nd pa re nts c la ime d to be a dv e rs e to M oe in t he c u r r e nt l i t i g a tio n, the ir testimony reve aled other

wise. When asked w hat Moe had done wrong as a pare nt, H arold testified that “the only

thing I can think of [is] talking a bout their fathe r and stuff li k e t h at i n front of the kids.” He w as aske d this q u es t i o n s everal times, but offer ed nothing further . The trial c ourt expressed surprise that, althoug h “g iv e n five opportunities,” H arold fa iled to mention either the tape

rec order incident involving S.D.M. or the sc hool inciden t , wh er e Moe screa med at and be littl ed L .M.M. I rene testified t hat she did not believe Moe posed a psy cholog ical dang er to the c hildren, that Moe’s visits with the children did not need to be supervised, and that the court’s limitations on Moe’s rig hts were imposed as p unishment. Moe’s sister ag ree d that “the g oal that [she, Moe, the g ra nd pa re nts ], and

oth e r f a mil y me mbe rs have ha d fo r the la st e ig ht y e ars is to have c us tod y of the se children r emoved f

r o m [ M a lmquist ] and restored to [Moe].” The other evidenc e conc erningwhether the g randpa

rents enc ourag ed Moe’ s previous litigation throug h their financ ial support is irreleva nt to t his iss ue be c a

us e the fe e s awa

rd e d in the June 20 04 or de r on ly pe rt a in to the a tto rn e y s’ wo rk in t h e c u r r e n ta c t i o n , w h i c h w a s b r o u g h tb y M o e an d t o w h i c h t h e g r an d

p ar e n t s w e r e a

p art y. B e c a us e the re is le g a lly su ff

ic ie nt, c re dib le e vid e nc e on wh ic h th e tr ia l c ourt

c ou ld deter mine that the g randpa

rents we re a ligne d with Moe in the curr ent litigation and bec ause the fee s
wer e not awa

rded a s sanctions, it was not an abuse of discretion for the tr ial court to dete rmine that it was “re asonable ” for Har old and I rene to be held jointly and seve rally

responsible for

the re sulting attorney ’s fe es ac crue d by Malmquist’s attorney

and the a d litem.Har old and I rene additionally claim that Malmquist’s attorney should have a llocated the 21 fee s betwee n the ad litem, in addition to Moe and themselves, a nd that the ad litem should have allocate d her f

ees aga i n s t M al m quist, in additi on to Moe and themselve s. But since no fee s were assessed a g ainst the ad litem, any failure to seg reg ate fees to the a d litem is i mmaterial. F urther, a po rt ion of the a d lite m’ s fe e s we re a sse sse d s e pa ra te ly a g a ins t Ma lmq

uis t, a nd so thi s a rgume nt i s a lso wi tho ut m e ri t. 31 Failure to segregate fee

s Har old and I rene also cha lleng e t h e at t orney ’s fe es aw ard on the g rounds that the attorney s failed to seg reg ate their fee s as betwe en Moe a nd themselves or betwe en var ious 21 proce eding s, actions, and motions. They urg e that it was a

n abuse of

discreti o n t o h old them responsible for any fee s that acc rued prior to their interve ntion into t he lawsuit on August 26, 2003.

Be cause Har old and I rene do not cite any authority in support of t heir claim that the attorney ’s fe es we re unr easona ble unless seg reg ated, this issue is waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1 (a pp e lla nt’ s b ri e f m

us t c on ta in “ a

c le ar a nd c on c ise argume nt
. . . w itha pp ro pr ia te c itatio ns to authorities). Fur

thermore , Har old and I rene do not appea r to have otherwise pr eser

ved er ror on the iss ue of wh e the r t

he tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re ti on by

awa rd ingun se g re g a te d f

e e s a g a ins t th e m. See Tex. R. App. P
. 33.1 (to prese rve a ppellate issue, pa

rty must present timely , specific objection,
re qu e st, or

mot ion and ob ta in r uli ngor re fu sa l to r

ule fr om t ri a l c ourt ); Villasenor v. Villasenor , 911 S.W. 2d 41 1, 42 0 ( Te x. App.— S an Anto nio 19 95 , n o w ri t) (c omp la int a bo ut f a ilure to s e g re g a te attorney ’s fe es wa s waived be cause not raised in open c ourt or specifically in motion for ne w trial). When the ad l i t em offe red te stimony of her attorney ’s fe es and a

n exhibi t in support of them, the g ra nd pa re nts did no t o bj ect on any

g ro un d, inc lud ingthe fa ilure to s e g re g a te fe e s. On c ro sse xami na tio n o f t he a d li te m, t

he ir c ouns e l e lic ite d te sti mo ny that, s inc e the g ra

nd pa re nts ’32

int e rv e nti on , th e a d li te m ha d ac c ru e d ab ou t $37, 00 0 in fe e s, a bo ut $15 ,0 00 of wh ic h p e rt a ine d to the motion to modi fy . This evidence supports the trial court’s awar d of $15,000 in favor of the a d litem, joint ly

and seve rally

ag ainst Moe and the g randpa rents, because that is the amount she testified had ac crue d since their inter vention on the issue re leva n t to their motion—the modification of
conser vatorship. L ikewise, whe n Malmquist’s attorney testified to his fee s, the g randpa rents did not object. Malmquist’s attorney stated i n response to their cross-examination that he was owe d over $30,000 for the c urre nt liti g ation. Although he d i d conce de that this amount cover ed the e ntire proce eding , beg inning with Moe’s m o t i o n filed a y ear befor e the g randpa

rents interve ned, the g ran dpare nts never a

rg ued to the trial c ourt that the fe es should be seg reg ated on this basis. And, in any event, the tr ial court only

assessed $20,000 in f

avor of Malmquist’s attorney

ag ainst Moe and the g ra nd pa re nts
. Fo ll o w in g b o th th e a d li te m’ s an d M a lm qu is t’ s a tt o r n e y ’ s p r e s e n tati o n o f f

ees, the
on ly argume nts ma de by Ha

ro ld an d I re ne on

the iss ue of

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s w e re (1 ) t

hat “ [Ma lmq

uis t] doesn’t nee d to be re war ded. . . . B eca use i f t hat happens, he’s going to be king of the world, and he’s g ot empower

ment problems and pr obl em s using his powe r and his author ity ” and ( 2) that interest should not be asse ssed on the awa rds. These arguments do not speak to whethe r it was er ror to n ot s e g re g a te the fe e s.

At the J uly

23, 2003, hear ing on the motion for rec onsideration of t h e J une 2004
or de r, Mo e ’s a tto rn e y

state d th a t “ the Court

ha s n o a uth or ity to a sse ss attor

ne y ’s fe e s or c os ts a g a ins t [Harold and Irene ],” to whic h the trial court asked, “Do y ou repr esent [t he g randpa rents]? ,” and she responde d, “No, not at th i s t i m e. ” The court said, “ then I don’t want to hea

r any argument about that. .
. . [L ]et

[the ir c ouns e l] a dd

re ss t hat.” Th e re a ft e r, the g ra

nd pa re nts ’ atto rn e y

state d th a t “ my33

instructions from [Harold and I rene ] wit h reg ard to the motion for r econside ration ar e to be ne utral about it, let the Court make whatever decisions it makes. . . . [T] hat’s all I have to sa

y about the motion for rec onsideration.” T he trial c ourt then ruled, stating that “the motion for rec onsideration is, in a ll re sp e c ts, de nie d. ” Al tho ug h Haro ld a nd I re ne su bs e qu e ntl y

a sse rt e d th e fa ilure to s e g re g a te
as an e rror

in a motion for new tr ial on J uly 26, 2004, this came a fter the ir counsel wa ived any err or at the hea ring
. I n a ny e ve nt, wh e n n on -p are nts int e rv e ne in s uit s a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- c hil d relationship, t hose par

ties are equally

subject to having attorney ’s fe es asse ssed ag ainst them, and the re is n o r e qu ir e me nt t

hat th e fe e s b e se g re g a te d b e tw e e n th e pa re nt al and non- pa

re nta l pa rt ie s. See Garner v. G arner , 673 S.W .2d 413, 415, 418 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1984, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (not abuse of

discretion to awa

rd attorney ’s fee s ag ainst mother and materna l gr andpar ents, wher e materna l gr andpar ents intervene d seekingcustody agai n s t wishes of mother, but c ustody was
awa rd e d to pate rn a l g ra

nd pa re nts ); Y ancey v. Koonce , 645 S.W. 2d

86 1, 86 4- 65 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 1983, writ ref

’d n.r.e .) (not abuse of discre tion to award attorney ’s fe es aga i n s t b o th father and pater nal g randpa

rents, whe re latter interve ned see king c ustody o f ch ild in event that custody not
awa rd e d to fa the r) . Se c tio n 1 06 .0 02 pr ov ide s th e c ourt br oa d d isc re tio n in a su it a ff e c tin g a pa re ntchild relationship t o awa rd attorne y ’s fe es as it dee ms “rea s o n ab l e. ” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 106.002. There is no need to seg reg ate attorney ’s fee s for separ ate claims if they “ar ise from the same tra nsaction and a

re so inter related that their prosecution or def ense e ntails proof or de nial of essentially

the same f

acts.” Villasenor , 911 S.W .2d at 420. Her e, all issues raised in the under ly ing litigation—whethe r conc erningthe reque sts to modify conser vatorship or the r equests to hold Moe
an d M al m q u i s t in contempt for violating court orde rs—ce ntere d on what should be done in the34

child re n ’s best intere st and wer e, ther efor e, depe ndent on the same fac ts—those conce rning the pare nts’ actions and w hat the best home e nvironment would be for the childre n. Given the g randpa

rents’ f ailure to c ite supporting a uthority , their fa ilure to raise the iss ue be fo re the tr ia l court , an d the e xiste nc e of a uth or ity c on tr ary to the ir po sit ion , the tr ia l c ourt did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was reasona ble t o awa rd t he attorne y ’s fe es ag ainst Moe and the g randpa

rents, jointly

and seve rally , without seg reg ation of those fe es. Ad litem’s fee

s Ha ro ld a nd I re ne ’s fi na l gro un d for c omp la ini ngthat th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s discretion in assessingattorney ’s fe es ag ainst them, jointl y and seve rally

with Moe, is that they should not be responsible for any of the ad litem’s f ees beca use they did nothing to nec essitate the ad litem’s appointment or c ontinued involvement. Whil e we ag ree that an ad litem’s fe es should not be tax ed aga inst a party who was not responsible for any of t hose fees being incur red, see D awson
v . G ar c ia , 666 S.W .2d 254, 265 (T ex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ), we disag ree with the g randpa rents’ c ontention that they have no suc h responsibility in this case. The ad litem’s pur

pose was to r epre sent the children’ s best interests, which inc luded her w ork to deter

mine who should be appointed a nd/or maintained a s a conse rvator f or the c hildren. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.021 (West Supp. 2004-05) . The g randpa rents interve ned, see king appointment as the children’ s sole and/or joint mana g ing conser vators, there by

contributing to the need f or the a d litem’s continued involvement in the ca se. The gr andpar ents’ interve ntion required additional prepa

ration and time on the a d litem’s behalf, suc h as her having to org anize a home study for the g randpa

rents and ha

ving to prepar e cross-examinations of t hem and the m ultiple witnesses35

the y c a lle d o n th e ir

be ha lf . A lth ou g h th e g ra

nd pa re nts we re no t a c tin g in b a d f a ith , th a t is no t a require ment in order to hold them responsible for a portion of t he ad litem’s fees. See D awson , 666 S.W .2d at 265. Moreove r, as discusse d in relation to the seg reg ation of fe es, the a d litem’s testimony demonstrates that the only fee s assessed in he r favor aga i n s t Ha ro l d and Irene wer e those that
acc rued f

o l l o wi n g their interve ntion and in relation to their issue—the modification of
conser vatorship. Th is c a se is d ist inguis ha

ble fr om Minns v. Minns , which held it was an ab u s e of discretion for

the ad litem’s fe es to be a ssessed, jointly and severally , ag ainst the fathe r and the pater nal g randmother , who interve ned a s k in g to b e n a me d as a posse ssory

conser vator with visitation rig hts. 615 S.W .2d 893, 897-98 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism’d). The holding in Mi nn s wa s b a se d o n th e c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n th a t the grandmothe r w a s a “ su c c e ssf

ul” pa rt y beca use she wa s g rante d the re lief re quested in her petition. Id . at 898 (c iting Te x . R. Civ. P . 131 (succ essful par

ty to a suit shall recove r costs fr om adver sary )). Unlike the g randmother in Minns , here the gra

ndpare nts wer e ult imately not succe ssful, g iven t hat t hey wer e not appointed sole or joint manag ing c onserv at o rs h i p as re quested in their pe tition. Based on this and on the f acts that they contributed to the a d litem’s w ork and that the trial court only assessed the portion of the a d litem’s fee s that acc rued a fter the ir involvement and in r elation to the ir issue, it was rea sonable for the trial
c ourt to h old Ha ro ld a nd I re ne re sp on sib le fo r p art of the a d li te m’ s f

e e s. The trial c ourt did not abuse its d i s cr et i o n i n awa rding attorney ’s fe es in favor of Malmquist’s attorney

and the ad litem, ag ainst the g randpa rents and Moe , jointly

and seve rally , on the g rounds that the fe es constituted an imper missibl e s anction, that the f ees should have beenAlthough not de signated as the g randpa rents’ “ fourth” issue, it wa s the sole issue asser ted 22 in their supplemental brie f, following the three issues raised in their initial brief
. 36 seg reg ated, or

that the g randpa

rents did not contribute to t h e nee d for the a d litem. Harold and I rene ’s sec ond and third issues ar e over ruled.
F am ily Code section 261.106

I n Moe’s sixt h issue and in the g randpa rents’ f ourth issue, they

asser t that it viol ated 22 section 261.106 of the family code to a war d attorney ’s fee s ag ainst them beca use they are “immune” from the imposition of the fee s based on their “g ood faith . . . par

ticipat[i on] i n a judicial proc eeding arising from a

repor t, petition, or investigation of a lleg ed child abuse .” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 2 61 .1 06 (We st 2 00 2)
. Mo e and the g ra nd pa re nts ur g e that, b e c a

us e the y su pp or te d th e ir re qu e sts to be awa rded c onservatorship over Malmquist with alleg ations that Malmquist abused the childre n, they should be immuniz ed from paying any attorney ’s fe es incurr ed in litigatingthis custody battle. Neither Moe nor the g randpa

rents, howe ver, onc e mentioned this statute or cla imed immun ity be fo re the tr ia l c ourt , e ve n in Mo e ’s Motion for Rec onsideration ofAward of Attor ney’ s Fe es or in the g randpa

rents’ Motion for New T

rial , which was dedicated s olely to the challeng e of the attorne y ’s fe es. Ther efor e, er ror wa s not preser

ved on this issue. See Tex. R. App. P . 33.1. I n any event, the immunit y presc ribed by section 261.106 would not pr otect Moe or the g randpa

rents her e bec ause this litigation primar ily conce rned the modif

ic a ti o n of a c ustody

order ; it was not a “c hild a

buse case .” “The clea

r import of the prog ression of the [duty -to-re port] st atutes is that the le g isl a tur e int e nd e d to pr ote c t re po rt e rs of chi ld abu se f

ro m liabili ty for the act of

re po rti ng theab us e its e lf

, n o t f r o m c i v i l o r

c r i m i n a l l i a

b i l i t y g e n e r a l l y. State v. Harrod , 81 S.W .3d37

904, 908-09 (Te x . App .—Dallas 2002, pe t. ref’ d) (e mphasis added) (statute’s immunity does not
e xten d b e y on d a c t of

re po rt inga

bu se , a ssi sti ngin t

he inv e sti g a tio n o f a

bu se , o r t e sti fy

ingin a c hil d abuse tria l). Moe’s sixt h issue and the g randpa rents’ f ourth issue are overr

uled. Void Order after Expiration of P lenary P ower I nt h ei r f i n al ch al l en ge t o t h e a wa rdo f a t t o rn ey ’s fe es , M o e a n d t h e gr an d p ar en t s u rge t h a tt h e aw ar d

o f a p p e l l a t e f e e s i n f a v o r o f M a l m qu i s t ’ s a t t o r

n e y, a g a i n s tt h e m j o i n t l y an d s e v e r a l l y, should be reve rsed be cause it was containe d in a void order issued afte r the e x pirati o n o f t h e trial court’s ple nary

power . See Tex. R. C iv. P. 306a, 329b (reg ard i n g t i m etables f or plena ry power ). Ma lmq uis t a g re e s t hat th e Oct ob e r 2 00 4 r e fo rm e d o rd e r, wh ic h c on ta ine d th e $5 ,0 00 a pp e llate
awa rd, wa s void, but he asserts that the a war d should be upheld as a “tempora ry order ” under section 109.001. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.001( a) ( West 2002).

Section 109.001(a) provides that [n] ot later than the 30th da y afte r the date an appea l is pe rfe cted, on the motion of a ny party or on the c ourt’s own motion and afte r notice and hea ring , the cour

t may make any order nece ssary

to preser ve and prote ct the saf

ety and we lfare of the c hild during t h e p e n d e n c y

o f t h e a p p e a l a s t h e c o u rtm ay

d e e m n e c e s s a r y an d

e qu i t a b l e . In a dd iti on to o the r m a tte rs , a

n o rd e r m ay : . . . ( 5) re qu ir e pa y me nt o f r e a so na

ble a tto rn e y ’s fe e s and

e xpe ns e s.
Id . By its plain langua ge, this provision does not apply to preser ve the a war d of Malmquist’s appellate attorney ’s fees. Her e, af ter the a ppeal wa s perf

ecte d, there was no motion filed by any pa rt y or by the c ourt sua sponte seekingthe tempora ry awa rd of appellate attorney ’s fe es on M al m q u i s t ’s behalf. See id. Even if Ma lmquist ’s pre vious moti on, filed in J uly 2004, wer eMoe s t ates that he r fifth, sixt h, and seve nth issues reg ardingthe attorne y s constitute a 23 cha l l en ge to seve n finding s of fa ct issued by the trial cour

t in relation to that order . The re cord de mon str a te s su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt tho se fi nd ing s. 38 considere d as satisfying this re quirement, there was no notice g iven to the parties about a tempora ry order for a ppellate attorney ’s fe es and no he aringon the matter, a s require d by the s tatute. See id. Be cause there was no tempora ry order enter ed aw ardingMalmquist’s attorney appellate fee s and the Oc tober 2004 re formed or der that attempted to do so was void, we va cate the $5,000 in appellate f

ees awar ded in favor

of Malmquist’s attorney . Moe’s seve nth issue and the 23 g randpa rents’ f irst issue are sustained.
CO NC LU SION The trial court did not abuse its discr etion in issuing its fina l order of J une 28, 2004. The orde r issued on October 18, 2004, which attempted to add an a war d of appe llate fe es in favor of Malmquist’s attorney , is void. According ly , we a ffirm the June 2004 order in all respec ts and
vacate the Oc tober 2004 orde r.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear : Opinion by J ustice Patterson; ConcurringOpinion by

J ustice Pury ear Affir med in Part; Vac ated in Part Filed: August 31, 2005