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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WAMONGTON

OFFICE OF TI ANNOTANT SOCOCTARY March 24, 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Stewart

Director, NRO Staff

SUBJECT: Role of the DDNRO?

Over seven months have transpired since my coming aboard.

During this time I have exercised relatively little initiative

in formally defining my areas of interest and responsibility.

It has been particularly a period of education and orientation

during which it has seemed to me important to understand as

best I can Dr. Flax's working methods as well as your own and

to attempt to fit into them in the most useful way. I thought

perhaps it would be useful at this point to summarize the way.,

things look to me now. •

1. The United States Intellicence Board, 

Particularly COMOR and Its Subgroues. 

In my opening discussion with Dr. Flax on my arrival

he indicated that by virtue of his experience in RIO program

matters he would expect to take the iniative and carry the

responsibility. Re further indicated that by virtue of my

background he would look to me to pay special attention, on

his behalf, to matters related to the Board. Obviously, he

did not delegate this responsibility but rather was indicating

an area of emphasis.

As you review the last seven months in this regard,

you are aware that I have shown considerable interest in the

relations of COMOR and its subgroups to the NRO but have made

an effort, on principle, to facilitate and aid wherever possible your efforts and those of the Staff rather than to supplant

them. I could not ask for anyone to be more responsive in this

regard than you have been. I feel there has been noticable

improvement principally because of your initiatives with the

Chairman, COMOR and I here want to make special mention of your

work in the SIGINT field. You have insured my participation

in the Staff discussions on these questions to my satisfaction.

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As we look to the future and referring to

dis he COMOR relationship as it involves

an it has occurred to me that an improvemen

whic m g e instituted, and which I discussed briefly with

Paul Worthman, is that: on fairly major items which re e a

contribution from the NRO in COMOR (or MIS) matte would

submit to you either for your concurrence or would for

your signature a quote of the COMOR minute followed by amplification comments of his own with identification of the officers.'

or component elements of the NRO which need to.be involved in

seeking a solution of the problem. The presentation would

include substantive and procedural • •suggestions, the former

serving as a jumping-off place to move the problem along. If

it were preferred that this be prepared for your signature as

an instruction to component elements of the Staff, or even in

the other case obviously the action might go any of several

places. However, it seems to me that ould make sense and

be a convenience if we could look _ the coordinator

on such matters. Additionally, his e as coordinator would,

I believe, strengthen his competence in representing the final

views of the NRO; it would make him a much better negotiator

in the COMOR arena. If such a procedure were instituted or

if indeed some better idea can be contrived, I would consider

it useful to me to know what is o on and to participate

ex officio either bilaterally w with any Staff group

which would give me a better feel or e problem and the possible solutions as well as possibly permit me at an early date

to make some constructive suggestion.

The outcome of such deliberation, however, must

emanate as an exercise of your responsibility. By virtue of

our close working relationship, I would feel that the main

lines of ourposition would be satisfactory to me and there

should be no difficulty in identifying those matters which,

prior to or in the midst of negotiation, would require policy

guidance from Flax.

As you can see, this is in line with my'oral d scussion with you in trying. to correct the bad habit whi

and I have gotten into and which, as I said, I feel is

and must be corrected.

Mb paper is going to the Board, it seems to me

here ag st insure earliest possible receipt of the

papers to discussed so that both you and I have a chance

to read them and to move quickly to get a systematic, and if'

possible, appropriate Staff analysis and development of a

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briefing paper for Dr. Flax. My participation here again.

should not affect your responsibility for the preparation of

that paper for Flax.

Relationship between the SOC

and the Program Directors. 

Here again I at once recognize your responsibility.

However, it is an area of great interest to me because I believe

it bears so critically on the operational achievement of the

requirements of the Board. I would hope wi he c

personalities, i.e., the substitution hat

there would be fewer sparks and more importantly

working relationship between the Director, SOC a

the West Coast. While friendly relations are desire e, how

ever, that is not the objective. What ram concerned about

is the recognition by all parties concerned of a viable, substantive relationship which includes not only the ready access

to information but the assured definition of responsibilities,

which at times have been in question, by you or if necessary

by Dr. Flax. It seems to me that in many areas we have discussed, you and I see very much eye to eye. We need to get,

in a patient way, both the Agency and the Program A to accept

a coordinating responsibility on the part of the NRO Staff--

the recent Carl Duckett instance being a case in point. It

seems to me there is an underlying current, disturbing to me,

which relates to the desires of the West Coast to limit the

activities of the SOC. Although I think I accurately recognize that this exists, I confess I cannot as yet define the

problems--let alone the solutions. In this case also it seems

to me that my role is one of keeping informed and consulting

with you. In general my objective must be to strengthen your

role rather than to intrude on it. Where I should intrude, I

normally would expect it to be as a result of our consultation.

Security. 

Although I have no strong native penchant in this

field, the last eleven years have forced me into constant

concern and some responsibility in security. I have taken

occasion to di uss security questions which have come across

my desk with At an appropriate point in security

discussions, as we in other questions, I feel that Staff

action can profit on occasion from consultation among several

of us. I might mention in this connection, though it relates

to all papers oing to Dr. Flax that I tly noticed a

paper fr Flax on the Dr ase. I discussed

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this wi explaining that, were I Flax, I would not

know automatically whether or not the Director of the Staff

was aware of this problem and had concurred in the recommendation. I feel that papers from the Staff going to Flax .

should be through the Director of the Staff and should be

initialed by either you or Worthman.

It seems to me also that in certain instances which

have to be decided case by case a determination should be

made as to whether there should be a concurrence. line for me.

4. NRO Mission and Functions in Staffing. 

It seems to me that we have worked out quite satisfactorily understandings on these questions; essentially you

carry the prime responsibility. My role is mainly the one

that I have been pursuing--aiding you wherever I usefully can.

National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

10111 To a greater degree the comments pertaining f44above are also applicable to NASA, explainable I think 1

large part by the fact that the NASA problem has a heavy

Sec Def aspect.

T. Film Processing: Production and R&D. 

I have interested myself in this subject in various

ways for a number of years--I suppose in part because it is so

closely related to the final acquisition of information. The

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OPIC question still is around though slumberin the R&D question I have recently gone into with Captaoe

I leave you

11111 to ch appropriate time but it seems me that

Capta hould be asked to re are an R&D brief in r

Flax a w ch 0 you and I an ould be present_

has pretty well sorted this eras of Westover an

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though he has not yet ground in the additional R&D efforts of

both CIA and Program A. You and I see eye to eye on this problem vis-a-vis Sheldon, quite apart from what final determination Flax may care to make.

Aircraft. 

I am very such interested in this area which

e U-2, the OXCART, the 8R-71, the drones, and the

e effort as you know to get-hold of a

having Flax briefed on it. I as afraid

that hasn't gone anywhere. Perhaps my confusion is shared

with regard to the NRO rem these areas though

varying from case to can as recently suggested

that there are problems in ese areas which he thinks

I could very well dig into. Nero again, however I, perhaps

mistakenly, feel that it isn't a question of me in the first

instance, it is a question of the Director of the Staff and

his Staff in which I am a contributor.

programs.,

I expose no secret to confess my shortcomings in

the engineering and technical and contracting aspects of our

programs. I guess at the moment I am in the role of a student

insofar as I can learn anything. I supposAJI tend to have

views predominantly in the management area/in the relations

with contractors.

10. Budget. 

Re where I am quite confused. As I

indicated t

' 

during one of our drinking bouts

up at Rochest , ve a feeling that he pre-empts certain

programmatic decisions where the initiative more rightfully

belongs in your hands though I cannot argue this very

intelligently.

Summary Comment. I as sure that some of my colleagues

either here or in the Agency would be prone, if they read the

foregoing, to find me not sufficiently aggressive in carving

out my role in the NRO. My thoughts above are as of the

moment and most certainly I am flexible. However as I have

told you on several occasions, I am very strong in my belief

in the importance of the role of the Director of the Staff

and I feel it is in the interests of a successful NRO that

that position be strengthened and depended upon. There.may

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arise occasions in which Flax wishes to pin a specific responsibility on me beyond what I gather to be his wish in regard

to my paragraph 1. It seems to me, however, that this is

something that must come about and cannot be contrived.

I would appreciate an opportunity to sit down with you

and discuss these notes soon.

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