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DEPYTV U~D£R SECRETARY OF STATE. 

WASHINGTON 

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9 September 1968 

MEMORANDUM TO: DOD - Mr.·J)aul C. Warnke 

~r. Alexander II. Flax 

ACDA Mr. Adrian S. Fisher 

CIA - Mr • Carl Duckett . White House - Mr. Spurgeon Keeny 

Mr. Charles E. Johnson 

NASC - Mr. Edward C. Welsh 

NASA - Mr. Thomas O. Paine 

State - Mr. Thomas L. Hughes 

SUBJECf Meeting of NSAM 156 Committee 

Attached is a draft report which I wish to suhmit for 

consideration of the NSAM 156 Committee. I have roschedulod 

the meeting for Monday, September 16, at 3:30 p.m. ! 

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Enc 1 osure: . 

"Disarmament Aspects of 

Satellite Reconnaissance Policy" 

Charles E. Bohlen 

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DISARMAMENT ASPECfS.OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE POLICY 

THE PROBLEM 

The United States Government is prepared to enter negotiations with 

the USSR with the aim of reaching an agreement to limit strategic arms. 

The United States \l{ill propose that the agreement ~ould be enforced by 

maxf.'ll'ium~' , .or, if necessary, exclusive, reliance on national means of 

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verification, meaning all types of ob~ervation satellites, as well as other 

surveillance activities carried out by one side -- either unilaterally 

or in conjunction with its allies -- outside the territpry or territorial 

waters of the other side. 

The problem is to permit ,such negotiations to proceed on this basis', 

and, ' at ~he same time, develop a policy which will sustain, if not reinforce 

two basic objectives in regard to United States reconnaissance programs: 

(1) The maintenance of our freedom of action unilaterally 

to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations; and 

(2) The prevention of foreign political and physical interference with the conduct of these operations.l! 

DISCUSSION 

Introduction: The President has approved a United States position for 

',negotiation with the ,Soviets on limiting strategic arms, which includes the 

Y Seo "neport on Pol ~ tical and Informational Aspocts of Satollite 

Reconnaissanco Policy," NSAM 156 Committoo, Juno 30, 1962. 

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following provision: 

"VIII • vmu FICATION 

"Tho limitations described in paragraphs I through V 

are proposed to be verified by external [national J means." 

In other documents detailing the United States negotiation position, it 

is provided that efforts be 1ade to obtain Soviet "assent to "supplementary 

means" (Le., limited on-site inspections) of verification. 1I0wever, given 

the traditional Soviet opposition to on-site inspectiDns, the United States 

must be prepared -- and is prepared -- to rely exclu~ively on national means , 

of verification if there is to be an agreement in the vital field of strategic .., / 1'. 

arms limitations. 

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Indeed, it is only the development of such means which has made a realistic 

consideration of a limitation on strategic arms possihlo. Aside from likely 

Soviet objections to provision for on-si te inspections, national means of 

verification, in particular observation satellites, provide the only feasiblo 

means of policing an agreement of the type and scope the United States has 

in mind. Briefly put, the United States proposal would prohibit the initiation . 

of further c\7mstruction of fixed land-based offensive strategic missile 

launchers and sea-based carriers, would limit the further construction of ABMs 

to a set and equivalent number on each side, and would ban altogether landbased mobile launchers, both offensivo and defensive, and sea-based ABMs. It 

is apparent that on-site inspections could only playa supplementary ,role in 

the verification of such an agroement. 

At the same time, it is vital to United Statos security interests to 

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preserve the full integrity of its irtelligence operations, particularly, 

in this instanee. the unimpeded operation of observation satellites. The 

unique, value of observation satelli1es in this regard has been amply 

demonstrated in recen,t years. and needs no further elaboration. 

Since its inception in 1962; this Committee has established policy and. 

information guidelines which, it is believed, have effectively accomplished 

this purpose. However. it is evident that-these guidelines will have to be 

altered if the United States is to pursue the significant undertaking 'of 

reaching an agreement on limiting strategic missiles. We will have to discuss 

. "national means of verification" with the Soviets. Congress 

and our Allies will have to he cOllvince<\ thnt rolillllco on stich moans can 

effectively verify an agreement and thus safcguar(h Western security interests. 

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And the American public and press will have to be given similar. though less 

explicit, assurances. 

Formal Security Procedure~. While not essential to the conduct of 

the disarmament talks, it would be highly desirable to downgrade the fact that" 

.. the United States conducts reconnaissance satellite operations from its present 

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classification of "TOP SECRET - TAl.ENT KEYIiOLE" to "UNCLASSIFIED". This action 

would greatly facilitate consultations with our Allies and with Con~ressj would 

ease the conduct of the negotiations themselves (e.g., in the preparation of 

reporting cables and the transmission of instructions); would simplify the 

preparation and dissemination of intelligence analysis; and would be necessary 

at some stage in prosenting tho proposed ar.rClcment to the press and public. 

The disclosure will hardly come as a surpriso to readers of tho Amorican press, 

. as this fact is becoming common knowledge'. 

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Otherwise, no· change in the present T-Kil and related classification 

satellite operations, and information relating to those operations, should 

continue to be subj~ct to the restrictions of existing classification systems. 

except where departures from these restrictions are presently permitted. It 

is important to preserve the present degree of secrecy concerning the 

effectiveness, e.g., the degree of photographic resolution, of observation 

satellites. And while the fact of observation satellite operations is common 

knowledge in the press,' it is equally important to safeguard the secrecy of . 

certain aspects of operations. 

Negotiations with the USSR. In previous reports, the recommendations 

of this Committoo have hoon hllsed on ono ovor-riding tactical consideration: 

to avoid an opon confrontation with the Soviets ovor the issuo of roconnaissance 

satellites. It has been reasoned that if the Soviets, who have knowledge of 

our satel1m operations, were not forced publicly to challenge th'ese operations, 

they would be more inclined tacitly to accept them. This has so far proven to 

be the case. 

The dangor of a confrontation has also boon diminished by the development 

by: the Soviets of their own, extensive, observation satellito program. I 

Even so, it is still sound pOlici to avoid a confrontation. There is 

some evidence that the. planned disarmament talks, while they will involve an 

exchange of views, wi 11 not undercut this policy; indeed, they could enhance 

the political and physical security of the United States observation satellite .. 

program • 

. , . In tho first instance, the United States has repeatedly communicated to 

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the Soviets its intention to place "maximum reliance on national means of 

verification." The Soviets must be fully aware of the meaning of this phrase, 

and, have given no indication that they object to the proposition. Secondly. 

the talks, if they result in an agreement, would have the effect of formalizing 

Soviet acceptance of the US program (and vice versa). No agreement would be 

possible without such acceptance. 

Leaving aside, for the purposes of this report, the question of how we 

handle tactically possible supplementary means of insp~ction, the Delegation 

is authorized, at a time of its choosing, to indicate to the Soviets that the 

term, "national means of veri fication." includes the use of observation 

satellites. No further effort should he made to define this tenn without 

instructions from" Washin,'!ton. The Delegation should establish a nORotiating 

history to the effect that our willingness to conclwle an agreement of this 

scopo' with maximum reliance on n'ati:onal means of verification is based on the 

assumption that one side wilf not impede the operation of the other's observation satellites. In discussing the withdrawal article. the Delegation sh'ould--

emphasize that any action hy one party which interferes significantly with the 

other's verification capabil i ty 'or otherwise affects the capability of the 

other party to verify compliance with the agreement would constitute one of the 

grolplds for w~thdrawal. While all of these points should be made in the , "' ...... ",'.J-' 

co~rse of discussions, the Delegation should bear in mind the desirability 

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of avoiding an unnecessary confrontation and should proceed with appropriate 

caution •. 

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In discussing our proposal with the Soviets, the Delegatio~ should 

avoid revealing the effectiveness of our satellite photography. This applies 

both to discussion of verification per se as woll as to the elaboration of 

our proposal which, in certain aspects!, could reveal indirectly more than we 

would wish to regarding our capabilities. The matter will be blurred somewhat by the introduction of proposals for on-site inspection in regard to 

certain gray areas, sUGh as ABM radars. And the Soviets can readily deduce 

a great deal concerning our excellent capabilities from numerous statements 

by United States officials concerning Soviet strategic forces. But this is 

a problem to which the Delegation will have to give careful attention. The 

best approach would be: (1) confine discussion of our positive capabilities 

for Wlilateral verification to generalities; and (2) limit discussion of 

details concerning our verification capabilities to those areas of the proposed 

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agreement where there is some doubt as to full effectiveness of unilateral means 

and concerning which we might want to propose supplQmentary means of verification. 

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Consultation. It will be important to assure our most important 

Allies (NATO members, Japan) that the proposal we are advancing wi 11 protect 

United States and Allied security interests, in regard to both the substance 

0; the proposal and the capability to verify effectively adherence to an 

agreemont through national means. In consultations with our Allies, we should 

initially not volunteer an explanation of the meaning of "national means of 

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verification" (this should be self-evident to our Allies, anyway) ,as these 

consultations should occur boi'ol"'o tho tnlks bogin. 1'10 should a.lso not 

initially indicate our willingness to accept, as a fall-back position, 

exclusive reliance on such means. However, once we have explored the 

question of verification with the Soviets, we should make our position 

explicit in regard tothe first point. 

The same considerations apply to consultations with Congress, and even 

more so. It will be important to hold these consultations at an early date, 

and' on a more candid basis than with our Allies ~ Otherwise the proposed talks 

could create misunderstanding and possible controversy. However, the precise 

timing and scope of these consultations is a matter to be decided by the 

Secretary of State. 

Presumably the briefing on our approach to, and the prob lem of, verifien· . tion would be limited to n group of key members of Congress, and would take 

place wi thin tho context of a general discussion of our disarmament proposal. 

The briefing could include a general, review of the findings of SNIE 11-13-68. 

These members of Congress should be /~dvised not to reveal publicly our 

approach to verification until a clearer picture of Soviet attitudes emerges 

from the talks. 

Statements to the Press and the Public. Although the likelihood of 

publicly provoking the Soviets into a confrontation over the operation of 

observation satellites should diminish once talks begin, it would still be 

. desirable to maintain initially, if possible, a discreet silence in public 

on this subject. The problem of verification will be tho object of socret 

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negotiations for some time to come, and, as indicated above, we will want 

to sound out Soviet attitudes before publicly commenting on the verification 

issue. 

Accordingly, we initially should not volunteer statements to the press 

concerning means of verification of a strategic arms limitation agreement. 

Our standard response to press inquiries should be that "the problem of 

verification is a matter currently under negotia~ion with the Soviet Union." 

Eventually, however, information concerning our negotiating position 

will probably leak to the press. At this stage, we should be prepared to 

acknowledge that "the United States is prepared to place maximum reliance 

on national means of verification." If, by this time, it is clear that no 

adverse Soviet reactiori ~ould be expected, we should also acknowledge that 

"national means" includes tho use of satellite photography. 

Any public statements by United States officials on this subject 

should follow the same guidelines set forth above for the press. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The Committee recommends the following: 

1. That the fact the United States is conducting operations of . , 

observation satellites be classified as "UNCLASSIFIED". If this recommendation is accepted~ the present report should be downgraded to a classification) 

of "TOP SECRET" in order to facilitato its usc as an instruction to our 

I Delegation- in the strategic arms 1 imi/tntion talks and" to Government spokesmen. 

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2. That the pres~nt classification system remain in effect in regard 

to the acquired intelligence, capabilities, and operations of observation 

satellites. 

3. That the Delegation explain to the Soviets that we understand 

"national means of veri fication" to include the use of observation satellites 

but avoid a'more' complete dofini tion of the term. At the same time, the 

Delegation should avoid disclosing informati?n which ,:would reveal the full 

capabilities of our observation satellites. 

4. That th~ Delegation, while avoiding a confr~n,tation, establish a " .. < 

negotiating histqry to the effect that our willingness'~o conclude an agre~ . .;,": ~ ,.'1,', 

ment of the typc> contemplated is based on the assumption tlwt one side will 

not impede the operation of tho other's observation satellites. The Dole,gation shOUld emphasize that any such effort by one side which significantly inter~ 

f~res with the other's verification capability would give the latter grounds , ..... ~.. .'."-J -' 

(or withdrawal from the agreement. 

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5. That we' initially inform NATO only in general terms of our 

, negotiating position on verification. Further disclosure will be necessary 

as the talks progross. 

6. That key memhers of Congress be given a briefing on our position 

on' verification and our capabilities for veri fying the proposed agreement 

through national means. They should be advised not to divulge publicly the 

information until soundings 'with the Soviets indicntothat this'is advisable • 

,', 7. That we initially maintain as discreet a position as possible in 

response to pross inquiries nnd in public statements by Unitod Stntos officials. 

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Our initial st::mdanl response, or statement, should he that "the problem of 

verification is a mattor currently under negotiation with the Soviot Union". 

Evontually" we should be prepared to acknowledge that "the United States i$ 

prepared to plac,e maximum rclian~e on national means of verification," and 

that such means includes the use of satellite photography~ 

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