### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-14-00192- CR

Christopher Law rence , Appellan t

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E DISTRI CT COURT O F CO MAL CO UNTY, 207 TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. CR2013 -54 3, H ONO RAB LE JACK H . RO B ISO N, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Christopher L awr ence was charg ed with two counts of ag g rava ted sexual assault
of K.H., who was y oung er than six y ear s o l d at t h e t i m e of the offe nses. See Tex. Penal Code 1 § 22.021(a) (1)( B) (i), (iii) (setting out elements of offe nses at issue), (a) (2)( B) (spec ify ing that
offe nse is ag g rava ted sexual assault if victim is y oung er than 14 y ear s old). The first count alleg ed
that L awr ence penetr ated K.H.’s an u s wi t h h is sexual org an or cause d K.H.’s anus to contac t his
sexual org an, and th e o t h er co u nt alleg ed that L awr ence penetr ated K.H.’s sexual org an with
his fing ers. See id. § 22.021(a) (1)( B) (i), (iii). During the trial, the district court admitted evidenc e
reg arding child pornog raphy that was discovere d on L awr ence ’s computers. At the end of the trial,

The indi ctment also alleg ed an additional count of ag g rav at ed sexual assault as well as a 1 char g e for continuous sexual abuse. Be fore the case was submitt ed to the jury , the State elec ted not to proce ed with the continuous-sexual-abuse char g e, and at the end of the g uilt or innocenc e phase of t he trial, the j ury d eter

mined that L awr ence was not g uilty of t he additional ag g rava ted-sexualassault cha

rg e.the jury found L awr ence g uilty of both counts and s en t en ce d h im to 30 y ear s’ imprisonment for

the first count and to 70 y ear s’ imprisonment for the second count. See id. § 22.021(e) (stating that
offe nse is first-deg ree felony ), (f) (providing that minimum sentenc e is 25 y ear s if victim is y oung er
than six y ear s old). The district cour t determined tha t those punishments would run concurre ntly

. On appea l, L awr ence contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidenc e
the information and files rec overe d from his computers. We will aff irm the district court’s judgme nt
of convic tion.

DISCUSSIO N

Evid ence of Child P ornography

I n a single i s s u e on appea l, L awr ence contends that the district court err ed by

a d m i t t i n g i n t o e v i d e n c e “ v id e o , p h o to g r a p h ic a n d d o c u me n ta r y e v id e n c e d e p ic ti n g c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y
. ” Specifica lly , L awr ence notes that during the trial the State in t ro d u ce d imag es and videos of child

pornog raphy that wer e rec overe d from his computers as well as a list of internet sear ches that wer e perf ormed on his computers and that contained g raphic sex u al terminolog y reg arding children.
Wh e n c h a ll e n g in g th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’ s r u li n g , L a w r e n c e c o n te n d s th a

t th e e v id e n c e o f th o s e e xtr a n e o u s
offe nses was impermissibly admitted as char acte r evidenc e contra ry to the direc tives of Rul e o f
Evidence 404(b). See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b). Moreove r, althoug h L awr ence acknow ledg es that the
Rule does allow for the admission of extraneous offe nses for limit ed purposes such as establishing
id e n ti ty , la c k o f a c c id e n t, a b s e n c e o f mi s ta

k e , in te n t, mo ti v e , o r a la c k o f o p p o r tu n it y o r im p o s s ib il it y ,

see id. R. 404(b)( 2) (setti n g o u t p ermissible uses for extraneous offe nses); see Sandoval v. State ,

2409 S.W .3d 259, 299 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (e x p l ai ning that “[e]vidence of an

extraneous offense may be admissi ble under Rule 404(b) to rebut” d ef en s e o f lack of opportunity

or impossibi lity ), L aw renc e contends that none of those exceptions to the g ener al rule applied. Specifica lly , he asser

ts that “the evidenc e was not admissible to rebut a defe nsive theory of lack of
intent since [he] denied that the offe nse occur red at all.” Fur

thermore , L awr ence contends that the
evidenc e was not “admissible to show motive beca use motive is not a require d el em en t o f t h e
offe nse.” Finally , L awr ence contends that the evidenc e was not admissible to establish his identity
beca use his identity as the alleg ed perpe trator “wa s never in question” and that it was not admissible

to rebut a defe nse “of lack of opportunity or impossibi lity ” or of “mistake or acc ident” beca use “[n] o
such cla im[ s] w[ ere ] m ade in this ca se.” 2

I n the fact portion of hi s brief, L awr ence notes that durin g a h ea ri n g held before the trial 2 started, the State indicated that it intended to discuss during its opening statement a video that was rec overe d from L awr ence ’s computers depicting a child perf orming oral sex on an adult man. When discussing its rea sons for why the State woul d be allowed to discuss the video, the district court stated that the video was alleg ed to have been part of the res g estae of the offe nse beca use L awr ence “showe d pornog raphy to the child on the -- on a computer and then -- that showed a child perf orming fellatio on a ma le and then a sked her to do it.” See P rible v. State , 175 S.W .3d 724, 731-32 (Te x
. Crim. App. 2005) (pr o v i d i n g t h at evidenc e of extraneous offe nses may be admitted as sametransac tion contextual evidenc e if crimes are intermix ed, blended with one another , or connec ted in
manner that they form indivisi ble transac tion). Howeve r, L awr ence asser ts that during the trial, K.H. denied in he r testimony that L awr ence showed he r the video on his c omputer and then asked her to pe rfor

m the act. Acc ording ly , L awr ence contends that the “State’ s justification for off ering this evidence was not supported by the complainant he rself.” Having revie wed the rec ord, it is not entirely clea r that K.H. did in fac t deny that L awr ence asked her t o re enact something afte r showing her a video. I n her testimony , K.H. testified that L aw re n ce inserted his fing ers into her vag ina and “put his private in my bottom.” Moreove r, i n response to a question by the State reg arding whether L awr ence did other sexual acts, K.H. explained that L awr ence “tried to put his private in my mouth.” Fur thermore , when asked if L awr ence showed her a ny pictures or videos wher e people did not have any clothes on, she a

nswere d, “kind of,” but explained that she could not “re member what the videos wer e.” R i gh t afte r answe ring that last
3As a preliminary matter, we note that it is not entirely clea r that L awr ence prese rved
th is is s u e f

o r a p p e a l. B e f

o r e th e tr ia l s ta

r te d , L a w r e n c e f il e d a mo ti o n in li mi n e a s k in g th a t a ll e v id e n c e
of extraneous offe nses be excluded until a hear ing is held to deter mine the admissibili ty of t h e
evidenc e. I n the motion, L awr ence ref ere nced Rules of Evidence 403, 404, 608, and 609. During
the hear ing on the motion, L awr ence arg ued that the evidenc e was “desig ned to inflame the jury , to impassion them on an extraneous offe nse. And, there fore , it’s far more prejudicia l than probative.”
After hear ing this arg ument, the district court overr uled the objection and s t ated that it found
the evidenc e “fa

r more probat i v e t h an prejudicia l.” On the following day , L awr ence expressed

conce rn reg arding the admission of information from one of his computers. Specifica lly , L awr ence
mentioned that one o f h i s comput ers was purcha sed from a pawn shop and that he wanted to be

cer tain that any information reg arding internet sear ches or downloads perta ined to activit ies

occur ring afte r the purcha se date, but the district co u rt explained that it did not have enoug h
information about the evidenc e at that point to make a ruling but encour ag ed L awr ence to lodge an objection i f neede d later. During the t rial, Detective Brian Morg an testi fied about the forensic analy sis that was perf

ormed on the computers, and exhibi ts rele vant to the analy sis we re admitted.
After questioning Offic er Morg an on voir dire , L awr ence explained tha t he was “re newing my
. . .

quest i o n , t he State asked, “Was the stuff that he was wanting y ou to do that y ou’re talking about with y our mouth,” and she answe red, “No.”

I n any event, other than mentioning these exchang es in the fac t section of his brief, L awr ence does not addre ss this topic further

. Moreove r, given our ultimate resolution that the di strict court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidenc e under Rule 404(b) for other purposes, we need not further addre ss this ruling by the district court. See Gaytan v. State , 331 S.W .3d 218, 225 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref ’d).
4403 objection that we discussed ear lier

. . . [t ]hat this is far more prejudicia l than probative,” and the

d i strict court overruled the objection. I n his testimony , Offic er Morg an ex tensively descr ibed t h e imag es and videos of child pornog raphy as well as the acc ompany ing internet sear ches that he found

on L awr ence ’s computers, but L awr ence made no objection during the office r’s testimony based on
Rule 404, did n o t m ake any further objections reg arding Rule 403, and did not reque st a running objection under either Rule. Moreove r, when L awr ence later testified himself, he admitted that he
had downloade d some of the c hild-pornog raphy files. Although L awr ence ’s motion in limine soug ht to preve nt the admission of evidenc e
under Rule 404(b) among other Rules, “motio n s in limine do not prese rve err or,” see Roberts v.
State , 220 S.W .3d 521, 533 (Tex. Cr i m
. Ap p
. 2 0 07), reg ardle ss of whether they are “g rante d or denied,” see Harnett v. State , 38 S.W .3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref ’d).
Acc ording ly , a party must object to the actua l admission of the evidenc e in order prese rve the err or
for appea l. Id. As set out a bove, when the evidenc e was offe red, L awr ence only objected on Rule
403 g rounds. S

ee R o b erson v. State , No. 02-08-00152- CR, 2010 Tex. App. L EXI S 6421, at *10 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth Aug

. 5, 2010, pet. ref ’d) (mem. op., not desig n at ed for publication) (explaining that objection under Rule 403 at trial did not prese rve for appea l complaint that evidenc e

was a dmitted in viol ation of Rule 404); Parmer v . State , 38 S.W .3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref

’d) (conc luding that issue reg arding admission of evidenc e under Rule 404(b) was

n ot prese rved beca

use no objection was made but addre ssing issue conce rning same eviden ce
under Rule 403); see also W ilson v. State , 71 S.W .3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that
defe ndant’s appellate co ntention must comport with specific objection made at trial); Broxton v.

5State , 909 S.W .2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (noting that objection stating one leg al theory

may not be used to support differ ent leg al theory on appea l). Moreove r, as set out above, L awr ence
did not object to the t estimony of Officer Morg an whe n the offic er w as describing the contents of
the files and sear ches that wer e rec overe d from the computers, see Mitchell v. State , 68 S.W .3d 640,
643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (explaining that if previously objected to evidenc e is introduc ed from
another source without objection, defe ndant may not challeng e admission on appea l); Luu v. State , 440 S.W .3d 123, 127 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (providing that party must object every time inadmissible evidenc e is offe red or request running objection and that any err or
in admission of evidenc e is cure d when evidenc e comes in without objection), and L awr ence himself
later a dmitted that he downloaded some of the files to his computer s.

I n any event, as L awr ence corr ectly points out, Rule of Eviden ce 4 0 4 generally prohibits the admission of “other crime[s], wrong [s] , or other act[s]

. . . to prove a person’ s char acte r
in order to show that on a particula r occa sion the person acte d in acc ordanc e with the char acte r,” but
the Rule does allow that ty pe of evidenc e to be admitted for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity , intent, prepa

ration, plan, knowledg e, identity , absenc e of mistake, or lack of acc ident.”

Tex. R. Evid. 404(b); see Dev oe v. State , 354 S.W .3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (explaining
that “evide nce ma

y be admissible when it has r eleva nce a part fr om char acte r conf

ormity ”). 3

For sexual-abuse case s involving minors, article 38.37 of the Code of Criminal Procedur e 3 p r o v ide s that “[n] otwithstanding” Rule of Evidence 404, “evide nce that the defe ndant h a s c o mm it te d
a separ ate” sexual offe nse perta ining to children, including the po s s ession or promotion of child pornog raphy , “may be admitted in the trial” of a defe ndant acc used of ag g rava ted sexual assault of a child “for any bear ing the evidenc e has on rele vant matters, including the char acte r of the defe ndant and acts perf

ormed in confor

mity with the char acte r of the defe ndant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc

. art. 38.37, § 2. By its terms, article 38.37 “super cede s in cer tain sexual abuse case s the application of”
6On appeal, courts revie w a trial court’s ruling reg arding the admis sion of evidence

under an abuse- of-discr etion standard. Prible v. State , 175 S.W .3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
“A t ri al court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitra ry or unrea sonable.” Gaytan v. Stat e , 331 S.W .3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref ’d). But a trial court does not ab u s e i t s
discretion if its ruling lies within “the zone of rea sonable disag ree ment.” Bigon v. State , 252 S.W .3d 360, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “A t ri al court’s 404(b) ruling admitting evidenc e is g ener ally
within this zone if there is evidenc e supporting that an extraneous transac ti o n i s rele vant to a
materia l, non-propensity

issue.” Dev oe , 354 S.W .3d at 469; see Rankin v. State , 974 S.W .2d 707,
719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on reh’ g ) (stating that extraneous-off ense evidenc e will g ener ally
be rele vant but purpose for which it is offe red might not be); see also Tex. R. Evid. 401 (providing
that evidenc e is rele vant if it tends to make fac t of conseque nce “more or less probable than it would
be without the evidenc e”)

. “I f the trial co u rt ’s ev i d entiary ruling is corr ect on any theory of law applicable to that ruling, it will not be disturbed.” Dev oe , 354 S.W .3d at 469.

Rule of Evidence 404(b). See Hitt v. State , 53 S.W .3d 697, 704-05 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref ’d) (discussing prior v ersion of statute). Acc ording ly , the evidenc e at issue in this case would seem to have been a dmissibl e under article 38.37.

Howeve r, befor e this ty

pe of evidenc e may be admitted under article 38.37, t he provision require s that the State “g ive the defe ndant notice of the state’ s intent to int roduce ” the e vidence in its case in chief “not later than the 30th day befor e the date of the defe ndant’s trial” and that the trial court “conduc t a hear ing out of the prese nce of the jury ” for the purpose of deter mining whether “the evidenc e likely to be admitted at trial will be adequa te to suppo rt a fi n ding by the jury that the defe ndant committed the separ ate offe nse bey ond a rea sonable doubt.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.37, §§ 2-a, 3. Although the rec ord in this case reve als that L aw re n ce re q u est ed notice of the State’s intent to introduce evidenc e under article 38.37, the rec ord does not show that the State provided not i ce t h at it intended to introduce the evidenc e at issue under article 38.37 or that a hear ing was held befor e the evidenc e was admitted. For these reasons, we limit our discussion to whether this evidence was a dmissibl e under Rule 404.
7As set out above, L aw re n ce was char g ed with two counts of ag g rava ted sexual

assault. The P en al C o d e s p ecifies that an individual commits that offe nse if he “ intentionally or knowingly

. . . cause s the penetr ation of the anus or sexual org an of a child by any means” or “ca uses
the anus of a

child to contact the . . . sexual org an of another person” and if “the victim is y oung er
than 14 y ear s of ag e.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.021(a) (1)( B) (i), (iii), (a) (2)( B) (emphas i s added).

Moreove r, althoug h not listed specific ally , “‘[i] ntent to arouse or g ratify sexual desire’ is an implicit
element of ag g rava ted s exual assault of a child.” Sarabia v. State , 227 S.W .3d 320, 323-24 (Tex

. App.—For

t Worth 2007, pet. ref

’d) (citing Ochoa v. State , 982 S.W .2d 904, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); s ee a l

s o Ochoa , 982 S.W .2d at 908 (explaining that “L eg islature did not intend that the
‘intent to arouse and g ratify ’ require ment” found in o t h er s t at u t es reg arding sexual crimes “be
excluded from proof of the elements of ag g rava t ed s ex ual assault”)

. Acc ording ly , the evidenc e establishing that the computers had been u s ed t o s ea rc h for and download imag es and videos of

u n d e r a g e g ir ls h a

v in g s e x w a s “ a d

mi s s ib le u n d e r r u le 4 0 4 ( b ) b e c a

u s e [i t] te n d [e d ] to s h o w A p p e ll a n t’ s
intent or motive to arouse or g ratify his sexual desire via” undera g e g irls. See Sarabia , 227 S.W .3d
at 324.

Moreove r, during the trial, evidenc e was introduced throu gh a rec ording of an
interview of L awr ence by the police, throug h the cross-e x amination of one of the State’s witnesses, throug h the testimony of witnesses called on behalf of L awr ence , and throug h L awr ence ’s testimony
that any inappropria te touching that occur red was unintentional or acc idental, occur red while he was sleeping , or was cause d by K.H. See Abshire v. State , 62 S.W .3d 857, 860 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2 0 0 1 , p e t. r e f

’ d ) ( e xp la in in g th a

t e v id e n c e o f e xtr a

n e o u s o f f e n s e s ma y b e u s e d to e s ta

b li s h “ e le me n ta l

8fac t” such as intent, to establish evidentiary fac t like motive, or to rebut defe nsive theories like

absenc e of mistake or

acc ident).
Prior to the trial, L awr ence was interviewe d by Detec tive David Schroede r. A copy

o f t h at interview was play ed for the jury during Offic er Schroede r’s testimony

. I n the intervi ew , L awr ence repe atedly asser ted that he did not touch K.H. in any manner but also repe atedly stated that
if he did touch K.H., he did so unintentionally or when he was aslee p. Specifica lly , he stated, “I f I
touched her, I did not do it when I was aw ak e. I cannot acc ount for when I was aslee p. I may
h av e. .
. . I was asleep that night.” Moreove r, L awr ence explained that one ti me he woke u p an d

rea liz ed that his ha

nds wer e on K.H.’s leg and that he was “af raid of what I did when I was aslee p. Okay

. I don’t know what Ido in my sleep, a nd I ’m scar ed shitless of i t.” Fur thermore , L awr ence

rec alled that “ther e is a g ood chanc e that it happene d” while he was aslee p but that “I know I did not
touch her in an intentional setting. I [di d] not intentionally touch[] her.” More specific ally near the
end of the interview a

nd when de scribing one incident, L awr ence stated as f ollows:

We w ere lay ing there

. I was lay ing the re, a t first. And then [K.H.], all j umpy , was like, “I want to lay down.” So, she came over and she was like, “Can I lay down with y o u ?” I w a s li k e , “ s u

r e
. ” So , I le t h e r u

n d e r th e c o v e r s , a

n d I le t h e r la

y th e r e
. I s ta

r te d to doze off, and I kind of pulled her closer to me, y ou kno w, b ec au s e y ou know contac t kind of fee ls nic e.
. . . I ’m a cuddler

. . . . And we w ere lay ing the re. And I was half doze d off, and I thought she g rabbe d my hand to pull me closer. And t he next thing I know, my hands wer e underne ath her pants. And then when my rea ction hit, my fing er was on top

. . . y ou know how a woman’s or a fema le’s vag ina is wher e it is at the very

top. When I rea liz ed my hand wa s there, I

y anked it bac k.

When L awr ence cross-e x amined Offic er Schroede r about the interview, the followi ng exchang e

occur red:

9Q: I n this case about the touching , [L awr ence ] say s over and over ag ain that what he

did was unintentional. Right? A: Subconsciously , he didn’t mea n to do it.

. . . Q: So does it make no diffe renc e that she pulled his hand w hile he wa s asleep?
A: I don’t believe that happene d. I think he minimi zed it.

After the s tate rested i t s ca s e, L awr ence called his stepfathe r, J eff L ewa llen, to the
stand to discuss what he saw on the day in question. Specifica lly , L ewa llen testified L awr ence was
aslee p on the couch and that K.H. “kept try ing to g et up there to lay with him. And he kept telling
her that, no, he wanted to lay by himself. And he finally dozed off by himself.” Moreove r, L ewa llen explained that K.H.’s mother place d K.H. beside L awr ence on the couch and then cover ed them up
with a bl an k et

. Next, L ewa llen stated that he saw L awr ence “g et up, telling [K.H.] , We don’t do things like that around here ” and that L awr ence p u s h ed K.H. awa y
. After L ewa llen finished

t es t i fy i ng , his wife and L awr ence ’s mother, Shirley L ewa llen, was called to the stand to testify

reg arding her rec ollections of the day in question. I n her testimony , she said that L awr ence was
aslee p on the sofa , t h at K. H. wanted to lay down beside him, that K.H.’s mother cover ed K.H.
with a blanket, that K.H.’s mother g rabbe d L awr ence ’s arm and place d it near K.H.’s waist, and that

L awr ence later stood up and stated that “[w]e do not do these things in this house” and that “[t] hey ’re
not allowed.” 4

I n his testimony , L ewa llen also explained that he believed t hat K.H.’s significa ntly older 4 b ro t her was s exually abusing her based on interac tions that he observed and based on a st atement that K.H. made to him about how her brother had been very roug h when he bathed he r and c aused
10During his own testimony , L awr ence stated that any inappropr iate touching was

u n in te n ti o n a l, w a s c a

u s e d b y K

. H

. , o r h a

p p e n e d w h il e h e w a s a s le e p
. Sp e c if ic a ll y , L a w r e n c e te s ti f

ie d
as follows whe n asked w hy K.H. wa s with him on t he sofa :

Q: How did K.H. c ome to be on that sofa with y ou?
A: I ’m not too certa in. But she alway s liked lay ing on the couch, espec ially whe n somebody was lay ing on it with her. I would cuddle with her, and [h er m other] was okay with it. But that night, I don’t know. I fell aslee p and -- I mean, I didn’t want her on the couc h beca

use she a sked. I

told -- I told them no, and I fell aslee p. An d t h en I woke up with her bumping me, and I don’t -- she was do i n g something weird, and I didn’t like it, so I pushed -- well, I didn’t push her, but I told her to g et off the couch a

nd, y ou know, g o play

or g o somewher e else

. Q: Why did y ou tell her to g et off the couch?
A: I think she was pulling my hand over he r. I wasn’t sure what it wa s for. I felt

-- I felt the ridg e of her pants, so that’s what woke me up. That, and the -- she kicked me on the shin; not hard, but just, like, squirming. Q: Did y ou ever

intend to touch her a t all?
A: No. Q: Now, y ou hear d y our testimony to Detec tive Schroede r. Right?
A: Yes. Q: Did y ou touch her

private a rea ?

her g enitals to bleed. Simi larly , Shirley also testified that she was conce rned that K.H.’s older brother was sexually abusing her beca use the two of them slept in the same bed at night, beca use he bathed her behind closed doors, and beca use K.H. told her that her brother scrubbe d her so hard that her bottom started ble eding

. 11A: I ’m not too sure if I did or not, to be honest. 5

Finally , during his closing a rg ument, L awr ence stated as f ollows:

A very important part of the s tatute i s the s t ate of mind of t he accuse d in this case , [L awr ence ]. They ’re asking y ou to find that [L awr ence ] intentionally or knowing ly did this.
And I think if y ou revie w the evidenc e and the witnesses, y ou’ll see that wasn’t there

. A l o t o f t i m e was spent when we watche d [t he interview]. I t was a long one. [L awr ence ] said, “I did touch her. My hand t o u ch ed t he top, but I didn’t mean to. As s o o n as I woke up, as soon as I felt it, I pushed her off.” He admitted to th e touching , but he didn’t do it on purpose.

I n light of t h e p re ce d ing, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing in evidenc e reg arding imag es and videos of child pornog raphy as well as
internet sear ches for child pornog raphy that wer e found on L aw re n ce ’s computers beca use that
evidenc e tended to prove L awr ence ’s intent to commit the offe nses char g ed and to disprove, among
other things, the defe nsive theories that any touching was cause d by K.H., occur red while L awr ence

was aslee p or otherwise unawa re, an d wa s done inadver tently or by acc ident. Acc ording ly , we

overr ule L awr ence ’s issue on appe al.

During the interview with the polic e, i n his testimony , and during his closing arg ument, 5 L awr ence also explained that he believed that K.H.’s mother had coac hed her to make the alleg ations ag ainst him beca

use he had b ee n involved in a sexual rela tionship with K.H.’s mother that had ended. Moreove r, in the interview to the police, in his opening and closing statements, and throug h his questioning of the State’s witnesses and his own witnesses, L awr ence also sug g ested that it was highly unl ikely that any abuse could have occur red beca use the home was too small to hide any improper activity and beca use there wer e other individuals in the room during the alleg ed incidents.

12CONCLUSION Having overr

uled L awr ence ’s iss u e o n appea l, we aff irm the district court’s judgme nt of conviction.

David Pury ear , J ustice

Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Goodwin, and B ourland
Affir med
Filed: Jul y

16, 2015
Do Not Publish

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