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j;irf NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR July 15, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Bob Froehlke's Proposal on Defense Intelligence 

Bob Froehlke has been asked by the Secretary of Defense 

to take a look at possible reorganization or management changes 

within the intelligence community which could lead to better 

management of resources. 

It is interesting to note that in his survey of the people 

involved there was practically unanimous opinion that some 

better way of coordination among the different intelligence 

activities is necessary. Most of us are convinced that money 

could be saved by better coordination, by elimination of 

unnecessary overlaps between programs, by better understanding 

of the users requirements and more careful validation of these 

requirements. 

Although there are still rather large unresolved problems 

facing the intelligence community as witnessed by recent discussions of ABM and MIRV, I think it is true that our intelligence 

needs are in general being met in one way or another. The main 

question then becomes whether or not we have too much duplication 

and overlap among the various intelligence agencies and among 

the different intelligence data collecting systems. The charge 

is heard and is seldom denied that the intelligence community 

has an even poorer match between those people who state 

intelligence requiremen and those who are in charge of the 

resources which ~ust r~~pond to these ~equi~ements than does 

the defense community at large. 

As long as we have a group of people stating requirements 

without taking proper account of the cost of fulfilling them, 

we leave ourselves open to the possibility of spending more 

money than is warranted in satisfying these requirements. 

Similarly, as long as we have no mechanism for condu9ting 

trade-offs among different systems, each of which is partially 

responsive to stated requirements, we are likely to spend more 

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money than is necessary to do a reasonable job of satisfying 

these requirements. 

So, I start out with the same position which Bob Froehlke 

has; namely, that something needs to be done to improve the 

coordination among the different intelligence collection agencies 

and to learn how to best apply our resources against the 

evaluated requirements. Ibe1ieve that some office at the OSD 

' 1evel-ought--to be charged with the responsibility of carrying 

out a DoD-wide review of intelligence programs. This review 

would include programs for which I am responsible. Bob Froehlke 

has made provision for this in his proposal. His proposal 

would, as I understand it, have the three principal DoD intelligence activities report to a Special Assistant for Intelligence, 

who would most likely be Bob Froehlke acting in a second capacity. 

He would chair the intelligence board which would consist of the 

heads of these three agencies. His plan also creates a Council 

which he calls the Executive Council for Defense Intelligence. 

In addition to the SecDef, DCI and the President's Science Adviser, 

he would include Chairman, JCS and DDR&E on ,this Council. The 

duties of the Council are not clear, but it appears that it is 

meant to be an advisory body similar to PFIAB. 

While I applaud the general idea of having someone at the 

OSD level review the programs of all DoD-related intelligence 

groups, I do not necessarily agree with Bob that the heads of 

these agencies should report directly to the special assistant. 

We have made many attempts in the past to get hold of the 

intelligence problem. We have created the CIA, the NSA, and the 

DIA. All these agencies arc doing a good job within their 

charters and if it were not for the money involved I think we 

could continue to operate as we have in the past. However, we 

must find some way of reducing overlap and eliminating unnecessary 

duplication. Having all the DoD intelligence agencies report 

to a single man does not necessarily accomplish the desired 

purpose. In general, a man in the line tends to defend his part 

of the budget and over a period of time becoF:es a proponent rather 

than a critic. I have always felt that OSD offices should remain 

staff rather than line agencies, and thus preserve their role as 

critic rather than proponents for their own programs. OSD has 

remained fairly pure in this respect with the exception of DDR&E 

being in the line for NSA. I do not believe we should compound 

the problem by having another OSD office assuming a line function. 

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It seems to me that the principal benefit which needs to 

be accomplished is that of having someone in a position to 

review and understand·intelT{gencerequirements and our 

·responses thereto. If this review office can develop the 

necessary expertise, it can make value judgments as to which 

programs ought to be supported and which dropped. Obviously, 

this office must be staffed with the best possible people, 

including people with a perspective to understand our national 

requirements and sufficient technical knowledge to make value 

judgments about the merits of different technical approaches 

to satisfying these requirements. Thus we need some of the 

best people in the nation to staff this office. 

My recommendation is that we have someone such as a Special 

Assistant for Intelligence in a staff position to review the 

programs of all DoD agencies and to make recommendations to 

the SecDef concerning the allocation of resources to these agencies. 

This Special Assistant for Intelligence could still be an added 

duty to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) as 

Bob Froehlke recommends. The difference between Froehlke's 

recommendation and mine is that Froehlke proposes to direct 

daily operations, which would require an ever-increasing staff, 

whereas my proposal is to have this position as a staff function 

with adequate authority and responsibility. 

Each of the agencies could be instructed to set up an 

internal review function of its own, which would make trade-off 

analyses among its own programs. These internal review staffs 

would work closely with the OSD level review staff. 

As for the Council, I am not sure how it compares to the 

existing ExCom. By adding the Chairman of the JCS, we may get 

JCS to approve the proposal. I understand JCS is favorably 

inclined, but I doubt if JCS has thought through the implications 

of the proposal and the extent to which the new office would 

become invo .ved in operational matters. 

The r -DoD members of the Council may resist the change 

because it appears to reduce their authority. The Chairman of 

ExCom is a DoD man, but DoD influence is offset somewhat by two 

non-DoD men on the ExCom. With three DoD people on the Council, 

the non-DoD people may feel that the plan is a stratagem for 

DoD to get stronger control over the intelligence resources of 

the country. 

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To sum up - in spite of my apparent negative attitudes 

about some of the specifics of the proposal, I believe that 

something of this sort is overdue and that either this plan 

or some variation on it should be seriously considered by the 

SecDef. 

One final word - my office has for a number of years been 

able to move aggressively and I think very effectively on the 

programs under its direction. Whatever evolves in the way of 

new working arrangements should be brought about in such a way 

as not to hamper the effectiveness of the office. I think the 

current arrangement is a good example of the streamlined management which is being considered for several key programs in the 

Pentagon. We should not replace the present management scheme 

which works well with something new unless we are assured the 

net gain is positive. 

cc: Dr. Seamans 

Secy Packard 

Mr. Froehlke 

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John L. McLucas 

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