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DORIAN 

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HIGH RESOLUTION PHOTOGRAPHY 

VOLUME I - TEXT 

MOL Program Office 20 October, 1967 

TOTAL PAGES 57 

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HIGH RESOLUTION PHOTOGRAPHY 

Volume I - Text 

MOL Program Office 

The Pentagon 

Washington, D.C. 

'20 October 1967 

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INDEX 

Pre:ace 

PAGE 

iv 

J. Introduction 1 

I. 7 

III. 15 

IV. 20 

V. Naval Intelligence Objectives 25 

VI. Army Intelligence Objectives 28 

VII. Other Current Defense Objectives 33 

VIII. Elements of Information 38 

IX. 1970 System Capabilities 41 

X. Discussion 44 

Appendix - List of Illustrations 48 

NOTE: Illustrations referenced in this Volume are contained in 

Volume II. 

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iii 

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WASHINGTON 20330 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

20 October 1967 

PREFACE 

The oblective of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) Program is 

to secure resolution photography of targets significant to national security. This objective will be achieved through the 

development of the necessary high resolution optical technology and space 

flight vehicles for either manned or unmanned use.* 

The manned system is being developed and will be flown first because 

this gives a much higher assurance of meeting the objective at the earliest 

reasonable date. An unmanned system is also being developed to insure a 

national capability to acquire very high resolution photography, in what 

normally are otherwise denied areas, should international objections, 

foreign threats, or some now unknown man-in-space physiological limitation 

preclude manned operations. The contributions and potential of man in ap.• 

reconnaissance satellite, however, is a separate subject and is not dealt 

with further in this paper. 

The prospect of exploiting the MOL photographic product has stimulated 

a continuing study by the MOL Program Office of the means by which the 

system may best be employed and also of the utility of photography in this 

resolution class. Unfortunately, real-world examples of MOL/DORIAN-type 

photogranhv from the Sino-Soviet Rion have not been nlentifol in the past, 

Thus, study of the problem has 

been dependent, for the most part, on projections forward from current 

requirements and experience in overhead reconnaissance to the time period 

of a system which will supply photographic intelligence information not now 

available except in isolated instances. 

This paper summarizes some of the more significant results thus far 

of the MOL Program Office effort on the value of and need for very high 

resolution photography. Data and information have been accumulated through 

research of intelligence reports; from analysis of documents on resolution 

requirements published by the United States Intelligence Board and Department of Defense agencies (for example, by the Air Force Foreign Technology 

*NOTE: All overhead reconnaissance aspects of the MOL system and the fact 

that an unmanned system is also being developed in the program is BYENANSecurity Information under the BYEMAN code word designator DORIAN. 

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Division); by direct examination of current satellite, aircraft, and 

ground-source photography; and from informal discussions with intelligence 

analysts from interested organizations. 

In this paper, particular attention is directed toward practical 

examples of the ways in which very high resolution photography -- if it 

were available -- could be applied toward current high-priority intelligence 

objectives. No inference is intended that the MOL system will contribute 

to answering these particular and immediate questions; however, there is 

good. reason to believe that future problems will follow in the same pattern 

as new Soviet weapon systems appear and as other nations (for example, 

Communist China) develop intercontinental nuclear capabilities. 

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I. INTRODUCTION 

High Resolution Photography 

Early in the MOL Program Office effort, it became obvious that. there 

was no established and accepted definition in common use for so-called 

"high resolution" photograpi.y. The term generally is rather loosely applied 

and often pertains only to the standards of a particular individual or 

agency, or a specific source or type of photography. It did appear, however, 

that many intelligence interpreters and analysts tend to define two different 

general classifications, each of which is meaningful in its intended context 

with respect to high quality photography. 

One common classification is typified by the best pictures acquired 

from within the Sino-Soviet Bloc -- 

The resolutions of those having the most 

utility characteristically range from about 

1111111111 

Figure 1 is an example of_photography 

, with a resolution estimated at Figure 2 is a 

photograph taken during'a several years ago, with slightly 

better resolution. Figure 3 is an example from activities, 

again with a resolution in the range. The value of 

this class of photograph is evidenced by the definitive drawings and performance estimates produced by analysts from the details of components and 

subsystems seen in the photographs and by the accurate sizing of critical 

parts of the item displayed. Figure 4 is a reproduction of part of a drawing made from photography like that in Figure 3. The MOL system is being 

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falls within a resolution range of 

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developed to deliver a significant quantity of photography in this class 

of resolution. 

The other classification of high resolution photography in common 

use is related directly to the products of present and near-term growth 

Models of satellite collection systems. The range of this classification 

extends from the best satellite photography currently possible to that 

level calculated to yield a substantial increase in intelligence content. 

This viewpoint is expressed in USIB-D-33.16/8, a 1967 report documenting 

the results of a comprehensive survey of intelligence needs as. related to 

the most important Anti-Ballistic Missile problems. The report concluded 

that "High-resolution photography is the only means that equipment, configuration and dimensions can be obtained with high confidence in the absence 

of methods." With reference to current satellite photography, 

the document states, "The resolutions have not been good enough to date for 

adequate technical intelligence exploitation." The memorandum, dated 

24 :Kay 1967, to holders of USIB-D-33.16/8, lists the critical information 

needs and with reference to missiles contains this note: "Ground photography practically essential; KH-8 would haVe to be of less than to be 

of significant value." 

As a point of departure, for the purposes of this study, it appears 

reasonable to adopt these two classifications and to examine the way in 

which MOL photography will relate to them. Restated, they are: 

1. The "very high-resolution" class of photography, similar to. the 

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2. The "high-resolution" class which includes the very best of 

current satellite and high-altitude aircraft capabilities, but which also 

will extend to slightly level in the future. 

Photography in this classification can be defined as generally falling 

within a resolution of 

The Experience Background 

For various reasons not germane to the thrust of this paper, the U.S. 

has become increasingly dependent upon satellite reconnaissance as the 

primary source of "hard intelligence" on activities of national security 

interest within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. With each increase in capability, 

there have been significant increases in the overall quality and confidence 

of our intelligence; and the intelligence community has been able to enter 

into and capitalize on important new and unanticipated areas of interest. 

The initial KB-4's in 1960 produced photographic resolutions of 20-1 O 

feet at the very best. By 1962-63, this capability had been improved to 

about 10 feet; and today, this search system provides best resolutions on 

the order of 8 feet. KH-7, the first so-called "high-resolution" surveillance system, produced about 4 foot resolution photography at the outset 

in 1963-64; and by 1966, when it had become a mature system, was occasionally 

providing photography at slightly better than two feet (average about three 

feet). The first KB-8, in 1966, returned a few photographs in the 

resolution range, and when mature, is expected to provide some photography in the range. (NOTE: The projected performance of 

satellite photographic reconnaissance systems in the 1970's is discussed 

later in this paper). 

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The relative growth in resolution capabilities of very high-altitude 

aircraft photographic reconnaissance systems has not been as spectacular 

as with the satellites; however, initial system capabilities were much 

higher. For example, early U-2 missions delivered some photography in 

the two-foot resolution class. High altitude aircraft presently operating 

in selected areas of the world are acquiring same pictures at 12-15 inches 

ground resolution, with a nominal quality approaching two feet. Figures 

5 and 6 are representative examples of current high-altitude aircraft 

photography. 

Thus, from the preceding, it is quite obvious that there is almost 

no real experience with the analysis of high altitude overhead photography 

of very high resolution taken over denied territory. However, there is 

considerable experience with very high resolution photography taken at 

ground level or from low altitudes by tactical reconnaissance aircraft. 

In this vein, it seems reasonable that meaningful projections can be 

made of the contributions which will be made by the MOL system, when 

available, in the collection of significant intelligence information. 

It also seems quite possible that such projections of the intelligence 

value of MOL photography may be somewhat conservative. On the basis of 

past experience with increasing levels of ground resolution, the analysts 

have generally found that any improvement in resolution brought with it 

unanticipated benefits. To quote from USIB-D-41.13/30, a December 1965 

document on the meaning of and need for higher resolution overhead photography, ". . . every time that resolution has improved in the past, we have 

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discovered things that we did not even know we needed to discover. We 

expect, therefore, that photography with very high ground resolution 

will give us important information that we cannot anticipate at this time." 

The Aloproach 

Discussions with elements of the Intelligence Community involved in 

developing estimates have high-lighted numerous questions, the answers to 

some of which will or could have a profound influence on decisions affecting 

the national security posture of the United States, depending on the nature 

and reliability of the answers. Currently in the forefront are the Tallinn 

defensive system, Moscow ABM deployment, the performance and mission capabilities of several new aircraft, the fractional orbital bombardment system, 

and various others. 

Several sections which follow will deal with some of these current 

problems as meaningful examples of postulating how photography of the MOL/ 

DORIAN range of resolution, if it were available, could provide much of the 

information now missing. These specific problems have been selected because 

of their currency and the general understanding of their importance to 

national security. By the time the MOL system is operational, there is no 

doubt that most of these questions will have been answered. However, as 

current problems are solved, new ones will undoubtedly appear. Advancing 

technology will undoubtedly engender new and improved weapon systems in 

Soviet Russia. Further, onehas only to look toward militant Communist 

China, with its expanding technological capabilities coupled with severe 

isolation from the Free World, to realize that the U.S. intelligence 

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collection capability will be taxed to the utmost'in the 1970's. 

Just as no inference is intended that the MOL system will contribute 

toward solving current intelligence information collection problems, neither 

is any inference intended that photography alone can or will provide all of 

the answers. Some questions cat be answered only with SIGINT information; 

others require a combination of overhead photography and SIGINT data; and 

a small portion cannot be answered by either type of information alone or 

in combination. 

With this background in mind, the next six sections of this paper deal 

with a few outstanding examples of current intelligence objectives and how 

photography in the resolution range which will be provided by the MOL System, 

if it were available, could contribute toward meeting them. 

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V. NAVAL INIqLIGENCE OBJECTIVES 

The threat posed by the naval forces of the U.S.S.R. and Communist 

China was for many years somewhat subordinate to the concern attached to 

the missiles, aircraft and ground forces of those countries. In the past 

two or three years, however, it has become quite obvious that both countries 

have embarked on programs designed to achieve a significant naval capability. 

At this time, the Soviet efforts are far more advanced, with systems entering 

or nearing the operational stage; however, the direction and apparent intent 

of the ChiCom naval development activity might ultimately be a more serious 

threat to our national security. This section discusses a few examples of 

current naval intelligence problems in relation to the role of high and very 

high resolution photography. 

Soviet submarines equipped with cruise missiles apparently have a 

primary mission of countering naval task forces. National Intelligence 

EstLmate 11-8-66, dated 20 October 1966, notes that all such submarines 

carry the SS-N-3 missile. Naval analysts are not able from current intelligence to construct an accurate model of the missile. One of the primary 

pur-Loses of such a model would be to determine its radar cross-section 

characteristics in order to aid in defensive measures against the missile. 

The missile is small and photography in the class will not be 

adequate; however, resolution pictures at several angles would be 

sufficient to postulate reasonable approximations of the small external 

details affecting the radar reflection characteristics. NIE-11-8-66 also 

predicts the possibility of a successor to the SS-N-3 within the next 10 

years with increased speed, range and accuracy. 

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Figure 48, with a resolution of about 24 inches, shows a Polaris-type 

submarine at Severodinsk. Photo interpreters state that they can detect 

missile launch tubes in the picture, but such information merely confirms 

the expected. From collateral high resolution photography, however, something entirely new was discovered. The missile launch tubes were measured 

very accurately and it was concluded that they were sized and built for a 

new ballistic missile, which is now the object of intensive search. Because 

of the size of the missile it probably cannot be definitely identified with 

out very high resolution photography, which at the same time would also 

permit some estimates of its performance and operational characteristics. 

The 18 September 1967 (Vol. I, Nr. 2) issue of the DIA weekly publication, Trends and Developments in Foreign Technology, Weapons and Systems, 

carried an analysis of the submarine shown in Figure 48 with an indirect 

coment on the inadequacies of presently produced resolutions in the statement that, "The entire data base on these units is derived from overhead 

photography and, therefore, any assessment of their capabilities must be 

considered as preliminary in nature." The CIA concluded, in their report 

Improvements in the Soviet Submarine Force (TCS-7367/67, 14 July 1967), that, 

"Over the next few years this expanded and more capable submarine force will 

tax U.S. capabilities to monitor Soviet submarine deployments and increase 

the problems of the U.S. antisubmarine warfare forces." 

One of the critical design problems in a submarine propeller is to 

obtain very "quiet" performance at as high a speed as possible. There are a 

number of possible design variations to solve the problem. From an intelligence point of view, an accurate assessment of the quietness of enemy 

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s.CaLf,ixines is important. Th., CIA report on the Soviet submarine force 

(TCE-7367/67) postulates ths, "Although the new SSBN probably will not 

be zu2h faster than existing Soviet nuclear submarines because of its large 

size, it may have a new, quir;er propulsion system . . ." This report goes 

on to say, ". . . the development of quieter submarines will impair the 

capability of U.S. land-based and seaborne submarine detection systems." 

Figure 49 shows a photograph produced by mission 4307 in which (much to 

the surprise of many people), the new Soviet SSBN Polaris-type submarine was 

seen with two propellers showing. Disappointingly, however, the resolution 

is so poor that design featurs pertinent to efficiency and quietness cannot 

be estimated to any acceptat! degree of confidence. 

Naval Intelligence Ana:1/,;ts believe that the critical examination of 

the combat equipment carried by naval task forces in photography of 

resolution can reveal much about their mission (whether offensive, defensive, 

anti-submarine or escort, for instance.) Launchers, missile types, search 

radars, fire control systems, torpedo systems, reload equipment and ECM are 

all photographic objectives in this resolution class. Once the details of 

ship configurations have been established from very high resolution photography, it would be possible to identify some of them with KH-8; but without 

the prior basic description, many details would probably be overlooked at 

the poorer resolution. 

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VI. ARMY INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES 

The Tallinn and ABM examples discussed earlier in this paper are 

characterized by their criticality to national defense planning in terms 

of their strategic import. The discussion that follows focuses on a 

different class of intelligence inquiry in which tactical and conventional 

war considerations are involved. Further, this section indicates how the 

introduction of very high resolution photography may transform much of the 

Army's effort that is now restricted to gross order of battle estimates to 

precise technical intelligence analysis. 

The KH-8 system, at its mature performance level, will provide the first 

breakthrough to answer Army scientific and technical intelligence requirements 

on new weapon systems under development on in test at the various Soviet and 

ChiCom facilities. Photography having resolution at about the 

level will provide useful information concerning ground force equipment 

in the sense that it can be more positively identified by generic type 

(i.e. tanks, trucks, AAA, field artillery, etc.). However, such equipment 

could still not be identified at these resolutions as to specific type of 

equipment (i.e. 152 mm gun-howitzer). Gross parameters will be possible 

for such items as tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers, 

artillery pieces, and other large pieces of military equipment. This, 

however, will not provide the detail necessary to accurately assess the 

performance and operational characteristics of the larger pieces of equipment, and will not provide any detail at all for the smaller weapons and 

weapon systems. Figure 50 is a good example of a target of interest to the 

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Army in which the NPIC analysis noted the presence of "probable" 152 mm and 

57/76 mm guns and 40-round rocket launchers. Figure 51 is a similar example 

of ground force equipment in which a variety of types are present. 

Procedures used today for producing the specific scientific and technical 

information of interest to the Army depend primarily on photographs 

In .other words, only those items the Soviets want the U.S. 

to see are shown, and those on which they still wish to maintain security 

are undoubtedly denied. In terms of time, this has usually meant that the 

Soviet equipment has been in the hands of field units 

for several years. Nevertheless, in many instances, the has 

been the first opportunity to view and photograph the equipment. It also 

has frequently meant that a similar but more sophisticated and newer item 

is already in production or well along in development. A resolution capability in a satellite system will allow the Army to reduce this 

intelligence time-lag by monitoring on a periodic basis all of the ground 

weapon R&D, test and production facilities. 

Army intelligence experts state that resolution photography 

will enable mensuration, description and functional designation of such items 

as an tubes, lighting devices, travel locks, radar feeds, wave guides, 

engne compartments, wheel or track width and size, bore evacuators, muzzle 

brakes, artillery trails, breech mechanisms, fin size and shape fueling 

locations, handling mechanisms and missile control surfaces. Detailed information on equipment components like those named is essential to the analyst 

to properly evaluate equipment early in its development cycle. 

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Higia resolution and very high resolution satellite photography will 

play an additional role in Army intelligence separate from technical 

intlligence considerations. In addition to knowing that the enemy has tanks, 

truk , artillery, etc. opposing him, the ground force commander should also 

know the type of tank and artillery. This additional information indicates 

the type of unit and firepower opposing him. Because of the size of most 

objects that provide the necessary indicators, most of this information 

cannot be derived with a reasonable degree of confidence from photography 

or worse resolution; but it can be, for the most part, extracted 

fro- photography in the range of ground resolution. Two target 

catgories are described - in more detail below to illustrate this point: 

1. Armor. Photography at about resolution will permit 

a fat:termination that armor is present, but additional detailed information 

is 1:ceded for more precise order of battle information. The type of armor 

mus-: bemown, and to determine this, tube length and diameter, muzzle 

loreCK type, mantle type and number and type of secondary armament must be 

identified. This information cannot be derived from ground 

resolution photography, but should be on ground-resolution 

phot ography. 

2. Field and Antiaircraft Artillery. Field and antiaircraft 

artillery (because of its supporting role in ground combat) are generally 

ides tifiable as a generic category in resolution photography. 

AAA is generally tailored to wheeled carriages identifiable by variable 

axle spacing; however, field artillery of different caliber often uses 

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the same carriage configuraiim. Prime examples are the Soviet 122 mm 

Al9 Corps Gun, the 152 mm Gt-Howitzer, and the 122 mm M38 and 152 mm DI 

How:Ltzers, all of which are :31: World War II vintage. More modern Soviet 

examples, the 122 mm D74 field gun and the 152 mm D20 gun Howitzer (mid 

1950's), repeat this practice. These weapons can only be readily discriminated as to caliber by means of accurate mensuration of tube lengths and 

diameters, identification of breach and recoil systems, and muzzle break 

and fire controls. Figures 52 and 53 show the kind of detail and resolutiorl being achieved on recent KH-8 photography. From these pictures, the 

'nature of the problem and the requirement for much higher resolution photography are obvious. 

With respect to discrimination of different types and models of artillery, 

the following discussion illustrates the intelligence analyst's problem. 

Attempts to precisely identify by model number the artillery weapons shown in 

Figure 50 (double arrow) were unsuccessful. The twelve weapons identified 

as "probable" 152 lam Gun-Howitzers were imaged in an apparent close-trail 

configuration with gun tubes apparently elevated to a high degree of elevation. When viewed in stereo, gun tubes could be seen (shadows can be 

discerned on the print). The precise point when the gun tube meets the 

shield could not be determined. Therefore, measurements were made of eleven 

of the shadows from the carriage wheels to the end of the gun tube. 

Based on the shadow measurements, the average length from the center 

point of the carriage wheels to the end of the gun tube was calculated to 

be Measurements of the apparent trails were The 

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trail length for both the 152 Gun-Howitzer (ML-20) and the 122 mm Corps 

Gun (A-19) is and the tubes on both can be elevated to 65 

degr:!es. All of the gun tubes of the weapons appear to be elevated substa-r!hially higher than 45 degrees. 

The measurements obtained from the photograph would eliminate the 130 

mm Field Gun (M-46) and the 152 mm Howitzer (M-10), since the maximum degree 

of elevation for the 14-46 is 46 degrees with a trail length of 

and the maximum tube elevation of the 14110 is 65 degrees with a trail length 

of only However, the 152 mm Gun-Howitzer (ML-20) and the 122 mm 

Corps Gun (A-19) have exactly the same configuration. The trail design and 

the location of the equilibrators are identical and both have limbers. Only 

the end of the gun tubes are different) but this detail could not be discerned 

on this particular KH-8 photography. Photography in the resolution range of 

is required in order to produce the detail necessary for this 

determination. 

In summary, very high resolution photography on the order of 

will enable ground force intelligence experts to conduct technical 

intelligence evaluations on Soviet ground force equipment without dependency 

At the same time there is a very useful role for this 

quality of satellite photography in refining the detail and accuracy of 

ground force order of battle information that is so crucial to planning by 

field commanders. 

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VII. OTHER CURRENT DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES 

Interviews with analysts in the Army, Navy, Air Force and Defense 

Intelligence Agency have produced a sampling of the many questions which 

det(s,rmine the objectives of our collection efforts, and which are amenable 

to ttack by means of high-resolution photography. Some of the most importank areas of intelligence interest and concern have been described in detail 

in the previous sections of this paper. This section briefly discusses some 

other typical problems. 

If the Soviets were to deploy multiple independent reentry vehicle 

warheads, the U.S. would be faced with a serious defense problem. It is 

therefore of great importance to know whether or not the U.S. must counter 

a Soviet MIRY threat, although there is no indication so far. that the Soviets 

have tested a warhead of this type. If they were to do so, the event would 

probably be detected from telemetry intercepts along the test route and near 

the impact area. The most important intelligence needed after such an alert 

would be the indication of successful completion of the development effort, 

and the beginning of an extensive deployment program. 

It is almost certain that the external configuration of the new warhead 

would differ from the old ones, but perhaps only to a small extent. The 

shape probably would be changed slightly in order to house a new payload, 

and some kind of a porting or venting arrangement for propulsion exhaust 

probably would be visible. The solution of this problem would be to examine 

the old missiles in great detail by high-resolution photography, and to 

detect by the same means any tell-tale differences in the new missiles. It 

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would also be of considerable benefit to relate, if possible, the new 

missiles to the telemetry intercepts in terms of time of launch, flight 

and impact. Once the new configuration was established in detail, it is 

very likely that KH-8 coverage would be of sufficient quality for recognizing 

the MIRV missiles and observing their deployment to the launch complexes. 

Figure 54 is photography of a vehicle that U.S. intelligence agencies term the OB-1 (SCRAG) and the Soviets described at the time 

of its display as an orbital bomber. The strategic value of a weapon system 

like the SCRAG is the subject of considerable controversy, although a recent 

RANI report (RM-5364-PR; August 1967) concludes that under certain assumptions 

there is logic in the capability implied in a multiple-orbit system. Telemetry intercept has confirmed that some kind of fractional-orbit device has 

been tested; however, this particular object may or may not be a real 

missile. Very high-resolution photographs from the test areas are needed in 

order to confirm its configuration and to estimate the performance. As 

in the MIRV problem, surveillance photography subsequently could probably 

detect its introduction into the operational missile forces. 

In a manner similar to the subjects of the preceding paragraphs, it 

will be important to continually watch for significant modifications to 

old missiles. Improvement changes might very well influence the performance 

of deployed missiles, and the task is to detect any program of retrofit into 

old silos. As an example, any retrofit of a new type guidance system could 

improve the accuracy of their missiles, thus directly influencing force 

structure considerations on both sides. 

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Another question of considerable importance concerns the extent to 

which the Soviets may convert to solid-propellant missiles. Telemetry has 

detected two vehicles, termed KY-6 and KY-8, in launches from Kapustin Yar. 

They could be test vehicles for solid propellant stages or they could be 

new IRBM or submarine-launched types. The configuration differences would 

allow a proper determination, but the missiles are small and high-quality 

photography on the order of 'resolution will be needed to 

see the differences. 

The operational capabilities and limitations of the Soviet (and further 

in the future, the Chinese Communist) ICBM forces are of extreme interest to 

U.S. defense planners. SUch aspects as re-fire capability, reaction time, 

missile maintenance recycle periods, alert standby configuration and silo 

loading sequences could have a great influence on force structure and war 

pla considerations, if the cited factors were known. Figures 55, 56 and 57 

show a sequence seldom seen by U.S. intelligence experts -- silo loading 

operations in a two-day period at one.ICBM complex. The three photographs 

haps en to be on three different silo holes, but all three are of the same 

kind and covered at essentially the same time. The resolution in these 

photographs is on the order of two feet) and their value in the sense set 

forth here is extremely limited. The pictures would have to be in the 

category before very many significant operational details 

could be detected. 

There are at least 20 sites in the USSR having radars thought to be 

associated with ABM activity, most of them apparently of unfamiliar 

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arrangement, and some of which probably are R&D test installations. 

Figure 24, referenced in the earlier discussion of the Tallinn System, is 

a newly detected facility of this kind. Figure 58 is another example of 

such a new radar test area at Sari Shagan. The resolution of the picture 

is estimated to be about 24 inches. The antenna elements are beginning to 

show at this resolution, but much better quality pictures will be needed 

before any detailed description can be made, since this configuration does 

not relate to any other known model. The objective, of course, is to deduce 

its mode of operation and to produce clues for search and identification of 

Elint intercepts. 

National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-66, dated 17 November 1966, cites 

evidence that the Soviets are investigating over-the-horizon-detection radar 

techniques. The report states, "lie have no evidence now of an operational 

OHD system for detection of missiles, and we cannot tell when or even if the 

Soviets could develop . a sufficiently reliable system to warrant deployment." 

There are six sites in the USSR presumed to have OHD radars. The elements 

of these arrays are characteristically very small and the arrangements are 

complex. High resolution photography will be necessary, in addition to 

SIGINT data, to'derive an understanding of the system, to give some idea of 

how to pick the signal from the background noise, and especially to detect 

any new technological approaches. 

An attractive method by which a country's strategic air capability can 

be materially improved is the addition of stand-off air-to-surface missiles 

(ASM) to the long-range bomber force. For example, the capabilities of the 

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U.S. B-52 fleet were enhanced by the introduction of the HOUND DOG missile. 

In a similar manner, Soviet long-range bombers now carry missiles like the 

ASM-1 KENNEL shown in Figure 59. The intelligence problem is to analyze 

the capabilities, effectiveness and threat implications on our defense of 

ASM vehicles like those shown in Figure 59. The FTD resolution requirements 

doe ment cited in the New-Generation Aircraft section identifies the resolutions required for 14 individual measurements on an ASM missile that are 

nec(:ssary to produce an accurate technical analysis and evaluation. Of 

these 14 separate measurements (e.g., fuselage, wing, air inlet, radame, 

etc.)1 12 require photographic resolutions. 

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VIII. ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION 

The preceding six secti,T, have dealt with two current and pressing 

national intelligence objectives (Tallinn Defensive and Moscow ABM Systems), 

one overall category (New Generation Aircraft), and three general areas 

(Naval, Army, and miscellaneous Defense Objectives) with regard to the 

additional information which probably would be in hand were more photography 

in the "high" and "very high" resolution classifications available. 

Perhaps, at this point, it would be helpful to deal briefly with the 

need for these kinds of photography in a broad statistical sense. For 

this purpose, some material has been extracted from a 1965 study by USIB's 

Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), which was a rather thorough 

analysis of the meaning of higher resolution from the Intelligence Community's 

point of view. Early in the COMOR effort, a review was made of the thencurrent elements of information on which intelligence was required --

regardless of source -- and estimates made, where appropriate, of the 

photographic resolutions necessary to provide the desired information. 

The overall area of desired intelligence information was divided into 

eleven general categories (Missile R&D, Aviation, Nuclear Production, 

Submarines, Electronics, etc.). Each general category was further sub-divided 

into Essential Elements of Information (for example, type of silo, inner and 

outer dimensions, etc.), and the photographic ground resolutions required 

for identification/location and for mensuration purposes were identified. 

For example, under the general category of Missile Research and Development, 

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an Element of Information for ICBM hard silos was "type", this reportedly 

could be identified and/or located with five-foot resolution. Another 

Element of Information was Silo Dimension; to measure the inner and outer 

diameters of ICBM-type silos required_resolution. 

Approximately 850 items in the eleven categories were identified as 

Essential Elements_ of Information (EEI) along with the camera modes (stereo 

or mono) and photographic resolutions associated with them for identification 

and/or location objectives. Additionally, approximately 300 Essential 

Elements of Information associated with mensuration purposes were listed 

separately among the eleven categories along with the camera modes and 

required photographic resolutions. 

A survey of the 850 EEIs associated only with identification and/or 

location indicates that approximately 22 percent required photographic 

resolutions of for satisfaction; and approximately nine 

perc.nt required resolution. Likewise, approximately 39 

percent of the 300 mls associated with mensuration required photographic 

resolutions of and approximately 20 percent required 

resolution. 

Or, combining the two, approximately 26 percent of the more than 1150 

EEIs associated with identification and/or location plus mensuration required 

photographic resolutions of approximately 10 percent of 

the total required resolution. It should be noted that no 

inference is intended in this paper that each individual EEI is of equal 

value with all others. These statistical comparisons are only made to 

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provide an indication that a significant portion of the EEIs considered 

by the COMOR in 1965 did require very high photographic resolution to 

satisfy them. 

Likewise, no inference is intended that the list of approximately 

1150 Elements of Information was all-inclusive or that requirements would 

not change from time to time. The COMOR described their effort as exploring 

some of the critical elements that they perceived at the time. However, 

that effort did treat all of the general categories of required information 

and to a reasonable depth of detail. As an example of treatment in even 

more depth in a particular area, where the objective is largely technical 

intelligence, the AF Foreign Technology Division (see Section IV) recently 

listed 274 mensuration objectives in the analysis of photography of new 

aircraft, indicating that some 58 percent of these required 

resolution. 

Not too much importance should be attached to the rather precise 

percentages cited above. The nature and scope of requirements evolve 

with the passage of time, as does the ability to derive information from 

photography of varying resolutions. The main point is that a significant 

portion of strategic,' tactical, and technical intelligence objectives do 

require "high" and "very high" resolution photography to satisfy their 

information needs. 

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IX. PERFORMANCE CHARACTERIFTICS OF 1910 PHOTOGRAPHIC SATELLITES 

The case presented for 2ollecting very high resolution photography 

should be related now to performance estimates for the satellite systems 

which will be current in the early part of the next decade. Besides MOL, 

the KH-9 search system should be operational, and the KH-8 high resolution 

system will be fully mature. These complementary programs will constitute 

a formidable overhead collection capability operating in wide and versatile 

employment modes. 

The resolution achieved on the film during a satellite mission varies 

from the design-point value in a distribution influenced primarily by the 

target contrast presented tc the camera through widely diversified atmospheric haze conditions. Figure 60 shows the variation in resolution produced 

only by differences in target contrast -- all other factors being constant. 

A secondary factor is the slant range to the target as determined by the 

satellite altitude and photographic angle of obliquity. Figure 61 shows 

the relationship between angle of obliquity and resolution degradation. 

The effect of haze at oblique angles is apparent in the increased degradation 

of resolution as the angle of obliquity grows larger. The effect of perigee 

altitude on resolution is shown in Figure 62. 

Although system specification resolution usually is quoted at perigee, 

nadir, and 2:1 contrast ratio, most of the actual photographic opportunities 

experience a combination of conditions that are worse, while a very small 

fraction of the pictures, under unusually clear conditions, will be better 

than specification. 

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Excellent references upon which to base performance predictions can 

be found in the detailed analyses which have been made of all of the KH-7 

missions. The National Photographic Interpretation Center issues a 

Photographic Evaluation Report for each mission: Comprehensive analyses 

of all the readable photography from the majority of the KH-7 missions have 

been performed independently by the NPIC and by Eastman Kodak. These studies 

measured the ground resolutions achieved against targets in the photographic 

product. The effects of haze, altitude, obliquity and illumination were 

therefore present. Figure 63 is a smoothed plot of all the data from both 

sources showing the relative frequency of occurrence of the varying ground 

resolutions measured. Any specific area under the curve, when related to 

the entire area, will show the fraction of the total found to be in any 

given resolution range. It is apparent that the best examples from KH-7 

were judged to have a resolution of approximately while 20% of 

the total were better than 30 inches and 85% were better than 4 feet. 

A good prediction of both KI178 and MOL performance can be made by 

using KH-7 experience. Since the systems will operate in the same areas 

of the world at the same range of altitudes, the effects of haze, altitude, 

obliquity and illumination will be substantially the same. A plot similar' 

to Figure 63 can be constructed by taking the best performance case as a 

starting point and applying the same relative distribution curve as the 

KH-7 results. 

Figure 64 shows the performance range predicted in this manner for 

KH-8 in the 1970 period, at which time it will have reached maturity. It 

is estimated, therefore, that 6% of the mature KB-8 product will be 

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in resolution and 91% will be better than 24 inches. A 

significant improvement over KH-7 is apparent both at the best-performance 

level and in the quality of the total product. Virtually all of the KH-8 

photography will exceed 30 trwhes in quality, compared to only 20% from the 

KH-7 missions. 

Figure 65 is a similar )rediction for the MOL system, based upon the 

present specification requirement of ground resolution at 80 miles 

altitude, at nadir, and against a 2:1 contrast ratio target. Under the 

higher contrast conditions occasionally encountered, some pictures of 

ground resolution can be expected. At the other end of the scale, 

a negligible number will be poorer than in resolution. 

With respect to the two general definitions of resolution set forth 

in Section I, the projection in Figure 65 indicates that approximately 

58 percent of MOL photography will be in the "very high" classification 

. Essentially all of the remainder of MOL photography will 

meet or better the definition of "high" resolution photography 

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X DISCUSSION/SUMMARY 

Early in the MOL Program Office study, it became obvious that there 

was no established and accepted quantitative defintion of high resolution 

photography. However, it appeared that many interpreters and analysts 

tended to define two general resolution categories, which, for the purposes 

of the study, were formalized as follows: 

1. "Very high" resolution photography of the type obtained 

during (generally 

in a range of ; and 

2. "High" resolution photography representing the best obtainable 

from current and near-term satellite and high altitude aircraft systems 

(generally in a range of ._.1. 

It was also obvious that there is almost no real experience in the 

analysis of "high" resolution overhead photography taken over denied 

territory. However, there is considerable experience with "very high" 

resolution photography taken at ground level or from low altitudes. It 

therefore appeared reasonable that meaningful projections could be made of 

possible contributions by the MOL.system, if it were available today, in 

. meeting current intelligence information objectives, and thus achieve a 

better understanding of the MOL system potential. 

The examination of various current national intelligence objectives 

revealed numerous critical requirements for "very high" resolution 

photography . Further, a surprisingly large number of'the 

elements comprising these required at least "high" resolution photography 

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to satisfy their identification and/or mensuration requirements. It was apparent that the MOL system, which will deliver more 

than half of its photographs in the "very high" resolution category, and 

essentially all photographs at resolution, will 

constitute a major advancement in the national capability to collect vital 

intelligence information. 

Although a great deal already is known on specific information which 

can be derived from very high resolution photography, in the past when 

resolution has improved we have discovered things that we did not even 

know we needed to discover. In that vein, it may be anticipated that the 

MOL class of satellite photography will provide additional important 

information not foreseen at this time. 

Past experience with both aircraft and satellite overhead photography 

verifies that photography of higher resolution makes it possible to derive 

additional information from related photography of lesser quality. Many 

objects can be interpreted indirectly from photography of lesser resolution 

because their "signatures" (i.e. deployment patters, general dimensions, 

or shape characteristics) closely match analyses of higher resolution 

photography. 

High or very high resolution photography is of considerable importance 

in establishing the degree of confidence in the information derived from 

photo interpretation. For example, it might be possible to postulate an 

object correctly in two-fOot ground resolution photography, but 

if the same object can be studied in ground resolution 

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photography, there is a significant increase in the confidence that the 

interpretation is in fact correct. 

Military and/or political situation estimates frequently are qualified 

according to their degree of certainty. Such terms as "probable," "suspect," 

"confirmed," etc., are in standard usage. Occasionally, a situation arises 

wherein there is some urgency attached to the ability to present publicly, 

or in diplomatic exchanges, compelling evidence of the facts. The use of 

photography for such purposes is recalled from the crisis in Cuba. In 

that instance, it was possible to employ low-altitude aircraft to secure 

very high resolution photography with an attendant high confidence factor 

in its interpretation. 

The picture in figure 66 is illustrative of a possible similar current 

situation. The objects in the center of this recent KH,.8 (approximately 

3-foot resolution) photography of an area outside Cairo, Egypt, were 

identified as "possible" Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) equipment 

associated with the Soviet SS-1 medium-range ballistic missile. No 

conclusions could be drawn as to whether or not missiles were mounted 

on the TEL equipment at this resolution. A better KH-8 nadir photograph 

might have sufficed to confirm or deny the "possible" TEL interpretation, 

and probably would have enabled an estimate as to the presence or absence 

of the missiles themselves. However, if the objects were indeed SS-1 TEL 

equipment and missiles, and the U.S. had elected to take some action 

involving a public or intergovernmental presentation of the evidence, much 

higher quality photography would have been essential. The MOL system 

would ideally fulfill a mission of this kind. 

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The representative examples of current intelligence objectives 

discussed in this paper emphasize the importance of the continuing effort 

to acquire information on the expanding technology of the Soviets. As 

the questions of the present are answered in varying degrees of satisfaction, 

new questions will undoubtedly arise. 

Even more important may be the task now developing for all intelligence 

information collection sources with regard to the status of Communist 

China. The evidence now available indicates that Chinese technology is 

progressing more rapidly than had been anticipated. The relative 

isolation of China places an added premium on overhead reconnaissance 

as a primary source of information. All of the arguments in favor of 

very high resolution photography as a means of meeting present urgent 

national intelligence objectives should apply to the surveillance of 

China with even more significance in the future. 

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APPENDIX: LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND FIGURES 

1. Mikoyan Variable - Geometry Aircraft, 

USSR, 8-9 July 1967. 

2. SA-2 (GUIDELINE) Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM), 

3. FAN SONG Radar Associated with SA-2 SAM System, May 1964. 

4. FTD Drawing of FAN SONG Radar (undated). 

5. Ha Noi Complex, North Vietnam, Mission BX-6716, Frame 735, 5X 

enlargement (40X inset), 21 August 1967. 

6. Hoz Lac Airfield, North Vietnam, Mission BX-6708, Frame 192, 9X 

enlargement, 13 July 1967. 

7. Overall view, Tallinn Probable Long-Range SAM (PLRS) Complex, Mission 

4306 (D157/17, X 84.5, y 9.5), June 1967. 

8. Tallinn Missiles, Sary Shagan, Complex A,.Site 3., Mission 4037 

D72/7, X 64.5, y 10.8), May 1967. 

9. Tallinn Missiles, Sary Shagan, Complex A, Site 3, Mission 4037 

(D72/7, X 64.5, y 10.8), May 1967. 

10. Tallinn Missiles, Sary Shagan, Complex A, Site 3, Mission 4306 

(D89/31, X 48.0, y 3.5), 30X enlargement, June 1967. 

11. Tallinn Missiles, Sary Shagan Complex A, Site 3, Mission 4307 

(D56/30, X 58.6, y 6.0), 20X enlargement, August 1967. 

12. Tallinn Missiles ("Mock-up"), Sary'Shagan Complex A, Site 3, Mission 

4307, (D56/30, X 58.0, y 6.0), 60X enlargement, August 1967. 

13. Tallinn Missiles, Sary Shagan Complex A, Site 4, Mission 4307 

(D56/30, X 58.3, y 5.0), 20X enlargement, August 1967. 

14. Tallinn Missiles, Sary Shagan Complex A, Site 4, Mission 4307 

(D56/30, X 57.9, y 4.8), 60X enlargement, August 1967. 

15. Tallinn Missiles, Sary Shagan Complex A, Site 3, Position 5, 

Mission 4307 (D56/30, X 58.6, y 6.3), 60X enlargement, August 1967. 

16. Tallinn Missile at Tallinn Launch Complex, Position C-5, Mission 4306 

(D157/17, X 84.5, y 9.5), June 1967. 

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17. Tallinn Missile at Tallinn Launch Complex, Launch Position C-3, 

Mission 4308 (D107/23, X 64.9, y 9.5), 70X enlargement, 26 September 

1967. 

18. Simulated KH-8 picture of NIKE-HERCULES. 

19. Simulated DORIAN picture of NIKE-HERCULES. 

20. Tallinn Complex Engagement Radar Site, Mission 4306 

(D157/17, X 84.0, y 12.2), June 1967. 

21. Tallinn Engagement Radar, Mission 4306 (D157/17, X 82.4, y 10.4), 

60k enlargement, June 1967. 

22. FTD Drawing of the Tallinn Engagement Radar, January 1967. 

23. NPIC Sketch of Tallinn Engagement Radar. 

24. Possible Electronic Facility Under Construction at 

USSR, Mission 4307 (D106/7, X 68.2, y 7.3), 20X enlargement, 

August 1967. 

25. Simulated KH-7 photograph of U. S. Radar. 

26. Simulated KH-8 photograph of U. S. Radar. 

27. Simulated DORIAN photograph of U. S. Radar. 

28. GALOSH Cannister 

29. GALOSH Cannister at Moscow ABM Complex E-24, Mission 4307 

(pass D26/24, X 80.6, y 12.2) 60X enlargement, 18 August 1967. 

30. Suspected Missile Components at Sary Shagan Complex B, Launch 

position C-3, Mission 4308 (pass D40/19, X 80.2, y 2.8), 90X 

enlargement, 22 September 1967. 

31. GA7.,OSH Cannister at Sary Shagan Complex B, Launch Positions 

3 and 4, Mission 4031 (Pass D88/7, X 70.8, y 16.5), 70X enlargement, 

Auzust 1966. 

32. Mc-;cow ABM Complex E-24, Mission 4306 (Pass D75/7, X 79.0, y 12.4), 

25 June 1967. 

33. Triad Radar, Moscow ABM Colirlex E-24, Mission 4028 (Pass 10D/28, 

X 52.8, y 19.3), May 1966. 

34. 60-foot Triad Antenna Dish, Moscow ABM Complex E-24, Mission 4028 

(Pass 10D/28, X 62.8, y 19.3), May 1966. 

DORIAN/GAMBIT/RUFF 

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40. FLAGON A and B, 

4306 (pass D8/14, X 73.3, y 11.2), 21 June 1967. 

41. Sukhoy FLAGON 

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35. 22-foot Triad Antenna Dish, Moscow ABM Complex E-24, Mission 4306 

(Pass D75/7, X 78.4, y 11.6), 20X enlargement, 25 June 1967. 

36. 40X enlargement of Figure 35. 

37. Mounted Triad Antenna Dishes, MoscoW ABM Complex E-24, Mission 4307 

(Pass D42/38, X 63.0, y 10.8), 20X enlargement, August 1967. 

38.. Doghouse Radar Transmitter. 

X 63.0, y 10.4), May 1966. 

39. Doghouse Radar Receiver, 

X '66.0, y 9.5), May 1966. 

Mission 4028 (Pass D10/22, 

Mission 4028 (Pass D10/22, 

USSR, Mission 

USSR, 8-9 July 1967. 

42. FOXBAT Fighter, USSR, Mission 4037 (Pass D/41/9, 

X 62.2, y 13.2), 40X enlargement, 25 May 1967. 

43. Mikoyan FOXBAT Fighter USSR, 

8-9 July 1967. 

44. Mikoyan FLOGGER Variable-Geometry Aircraft 

USSR, 8-9 July 1967. 

45. Unidentified Aircraft, USSR, Mission 4306 

(Pass A80/9, X 70.0, y 19.1), June 1967. 

46. Unidentified ChiCom New-Generation Aircraft (Sino-A) 

Mission 4308 (D86/32, X 82.4, y 15.0), 90X enlargement, September 1967. 

47. FLAGON A, USSR, Mission 4306 

(Pass D8/14, X 73.8, y 10.7), 21 June 1967. 

48. Nuclear (SSBN) Submarine, USSR, Mission 

4306 (Pass D11/27, X 56.5, y 12.1), June 1967. 

49. SSBN Submarine, USSR, Mission 4307 

(Pass D46/25, X 53.0, y 16.8) 40X enlargement, August 1967. 

50. Artillery Training Area, USSR, Mission 4306 (Pass D64/34, 

X 70.0, y 7.5), 24 June 1967. 

DORIAN/GAMBIT/RUFF 

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coNTF.: ,i;VS:EM - 5 JOINTLY -

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51. Army Barracks, USSR, Mission 4307 

(Pass D150/40, X 64.1, y 6.1) 20X enlargement, August 1967. 

52. Army Barracks, USSR, Mission 4307 (Pass D134/12, 

X 61.2, y 9.1) 40X enlargement, August 1967. 

53. Army Barracks, USSR, Mission 4307 (Pass D134/12, 

X 60.7, y 10.0) 40X enlargement, August 1967. 

54 SCRAG Orbital Bombardment Missile (MOBS/FOBS), 

7 November 1965. 

55 Tyue IIID Silo Loading, SS-11 Missile, 

Mission 4307 (Pass D10/24, X 50.8, y 16.4) 60X enlargement, 

17 August 1967. 

56. Tyne IIID Silo Loading, SS-11 Missile, 

Mission 4307 (Pass D26/28, X 49.3, y 4.0), 60X enlargement, 

18 August 1967. 

57. Type IIID Silo Loading, SS-11 Missile, 

1111 Mission 4307 (Pass D26/28, X 59.5, y 6.3), 60X enlargement, 

18 August 1967. 

58. Sary Shagan Radar R&D Site #2, Mission 4306 (Pass A14/15, X 60.7, 

y 7.8) 20X enlargement, June 1967. 

59. KENNEL ASM, USSR, Mission 4307 (Pass D91/28, 

X 53.7, y 12.6) 80X enlargement, August 1967. 

60. Relationship of Contrast to Resolution. 

61. Relationship of Obliquity to Resolution. 

62. Relationship of Altitude to Resolution. 

63. Measured KH-7 Performance. 

64. Estimated Mature KH-8 Performance. 

65. Estimated DORIAN Performance. 

66. Suspected SCUD (SS-1) Missiles, Cairo, Egypt, Mission 4306 (Pass 

D139/27, X 81.4, y 19.5), June 1967. 

DORIAN/GAMBIT/RUFF 51 

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