UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOE LENZIE TURNER, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

RICHARD GRANT, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 21-6151 

(D.C. No. 5:21-CV-00463-R) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MORITZ, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Petitioner Joe Lenzie Turner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the 

district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241 and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.1

 We affirm the dismissal of his 

petition and deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Turner is a federal prisoner proceeding under § 2241, a certificate of 

appealability is not a prerequisite to his appeal. See McIntosh v. United States Parole 

Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 810 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 29, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I 

Turner was initially sentenced in federal court on November 22, 2005, to 63 

months’ imprisonment for distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base. United 

States v. Turner, Case No. 1:05-cr-00095-JAR (E.D. Mo.) (“Turner I”). On 

December 20, 2005, he was released on bond, erroneously, to Missouri officials. On 

June 8, 2006, a Missouri state court sentenced him to two consecutive five-year terms 

of imprisonment, to be served concurrently with his federal sentence. He was 

paroled on a federal detainer and returned to federal custody on February 20, 2007. 

Upon arrival at the federal facility, Turner was told his state and federal sentences 

were being served consecutively, so he wrote a letter dated August 4, 2007, seeking 

clarification of his sentence. On September 6, 2007, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 

recalculated his sentence to reflect that his 63-month federal sentence in Turner I

began on November 22, 2005, the date it was imposed. On May 7, 2008, the federal 

court reduced the Turner I sentence to 60 months’ imprisonment pursuant to 

retroactive changes to the sentencing guidelines. Turner was released in 2009. 

Turner was arrested again on August 31, 2011, while on supervised release in 

Turner I. He was charged with drug offenses and pleaded guilty on April 5, 2013, to 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine 

hydrochloride. United States v. Turner, Case No. 1:11-cr-00103-JAR (E.D. Mo.) 

(“Turner II”). On June 17, 2013, he was sentenced to 21 months’ imprisonment for 

violation of his supervised release in Turner I and 240 months’ imprisonment for the 

new offense in Turner II, with the sentences to run concurrently. 

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On May 6, 2021, Turner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting four grounds for relief. At bottom, he sought an update 

of his “computation summary” to show part of his sentence in Turner I was served 

concurrently with his prior state sentence.2

 In ground one, he argued the BOP failed 

to update his “computation summary” to reflect a recalculation of his sentence and 

failed to recommend to the sentencing court that it amend its judgment in Turner I to 

reflect the “legal effect” of that recalculation. In ground three, he asserted ground 

one constituted a due process violation. In grounds two and four, Turner argued that 

the BOP’s denial of his application for a nunc pro tunc designation3

 extended his 

prison sentence and also caused various administrative detriments, such as a 

designation of a higher recidivism risk level. 

A magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Turner’s 

petition for lack of jurisdiction. As to grounds one and three, the magistrate judge 

determined that Turner could litigate the legal challenges to his sentence through a 

habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and because § 2255 provided an avenue for 

relief, the court lacked jurisdiction under § 2241. As to grounds two and four, which 

2

 We note here that although the BOP denied Turner’s request for a nunc pro 

tunc designation, he received that benefit nonetheless as his federal sentence in 

Turner I ran uninterrupted while he was in state custody. 

3

 Title 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) permits the BOP to “designate any available penal 

or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability 

established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or 

otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was 

convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable.” 

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challenged the execution of his Turner I sentence, the court determined that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider those claims because Turner was no longer in custody on a 

Turner I sentence. The sentence imposed after revocation of his supervised release 

had expired. Turner objected, but the district court accepted the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Turner appealed 

and filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

II 

To prevail on a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, “an appellant must show 

a financial inability to pay the required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, 

nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” 

DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). We review a district 

court’s dismissal of a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 de novo. Garza 

v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010). Because Turner appears pro se, we 

construe his filings liberally, but we do not serve as his advocate. See Garrett v. 

Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). 

A § 2241 petition attacks the execution of a sentence. Sandusky v. Goetz, 944 

F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2019). District courts only have jurisdiction to hear 

habeas petitions by petitioners who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 

laws or treaties of the United States.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). A federal prisoner generally may only challenge a 

conviction or sentence by filing a petition under § 2255 and may resort to a petition 

under § 2241 only if § 2255 would be “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of 

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his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 

2011). 

III 

Here, even construed liberally, Turner has not raised a reasoned, nonfrivolous 

argument on appeal. Therefore, our analysis of both his motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis and the merits of his appeal follow the same path. We address each of 

Turner’s arguments in turn.4

A. First Issue 

Turner first claims that “the petition should be read as a challenge to his 

present sentence to the extent that it has been enhanced by the allegedly invalid prior 

convictions.” Aplt. Br. at 6. He claims that his petition was not construed liberally 

and, if it had been read properly, “Petitioner would satisfy the ‘in custody’ 

requirement” as to grounds two and four of his petition, which pertain to the denial 

by the BOP of a nunc pro tunc designation as to Turner I. Id.

Turner’s argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, a habeas petitioner 

does not remain “in custody” after a sentence expires, even if that sentence is used to 

enhance a subsequent sentence. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. Turner was not “in 

custody” as to Turner I when the district court dismissed grounds two and four for 

4

 We also note that Turner makes novel arguments in his reply, such as an 

assertion that equitable tolling applies to his petition and arguments regarding the 

Administrative Procedures Act. Even assuming these arguments were properly 

before us, they are unpersuasive, and it is unclear how or why they are relevant to the 

issues on appeal. 

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lack of jurisdiction. Second, even construing this argument liberally, Turner has not 

explained how his prior sentences unlawfully extended his sentence in Turner II. We 

assume he believes that a nunc pro tunc designation in Turner I would somehow 

undermine the judgment in Turner II, but in Turner II, he received the applicable 

mandatory minimum for offenders with only one prior conviction for a serious drug 

conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (amended 2010). Moreover, he explicitly 

acknowledged that he was facing such a mandatory minimum in Turner II, and it was 

“due to the government’s willingness to file only one of the defendant’s prior 

convictions.” Turner II, Doc. No. 1349 (Nov. 19, 2015). Accordingly, everyone 

including Turner agreed that his mandatory minimum sentence would be triggered by 

one, and only one, prior conviction. Whether his prior sentence on that conviction 

ran concurrently or consecutively with another conviction would not have affected 

his sentencing in Turner II. 

B. Second Issue 

Turner next argues that the district court “erred in its ruling that it did not have 

jurisdiction.” Aplt. Br. at 7. He asserts “there is a live justiciable question” 

regarding the recalculation of his sentence in Turner I. Id. But the district court did 

not address justiciability. Even assuming there is a justiciable question here, the 

district court was without jurisdiction because Turner is not in custody under Turner 

I and Turner has not established that § 2255 is inadequate to test his incarceration in 

Turner II. Accordingly, his justiciability arguments are not persuasive. 

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C. Third Issue 

Turner claims that the district court “failed to consider a statement by the court 

that imposed Turner I concerning the purpose for which the sentence was 

recalculated and accepted the Respondents explanation of the recalculation which is 

contrary to the record.” Id. He fails to tell us what that statement was. The 

recalculation in Turner I appears to be due to retroactive application of amendments 

to the sentencing guidelines for crack-cocaine offenses. Alternatively, this argument 

could be construed as relating to the recalculation of Turner’s time served after his 

sentences were determined to run concurrently. Regardless of the approach applied, 

neither would affect the sentence in Turner II, which is the only sentence he is 

currently serving.

D. Fourth Issue 

Turner asserts the district court stated it never received copies of his 

administrative grievances despite him sending copies. He believes the district court 

adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation without considering his 

administrative grievances. Turner submitted those grievances with his objections, 

and the district court explicitly considered Turner’s objections before adopting the 

recommendation. Moreover, reviewing the grievances, we cannot see how they 

might show that Turner is entitled to relief. 

E. Fifth Issue 

Turner asserts “[t]he District Court[’s] adoption of the Appeals Administrators 

claim that because Petitioner was always in federal custody the BOP did not review 

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his sentence for a nunc pro tunc designation and denied his appeal is inconsistent 

with the record. In Turner I, Petitioner was released by the USM into the custody of 

the State of Missouri, without a writ.” Id. at 9. The magistrate judge noted not only 

that Turner was released on bond to Missouri officials, but also that the release on 

bond was in error. Moreover, the time in state custody ran concurrently with 

Turner’s federal sentence, so he spent no additional time in prison because of his 

state sentence or any erroneous release on bond. Turner fails to establish how further 

consideration of his release on bond would support his arguments for relief. 

F. Sixth Issue 

Turner argues that a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which he previously 

filed, is inadequate because the record in such a petition does not reflect that he 

served his federal and state sentences concurrently. He claims this petition must be 

granted to correct the underlying judgment in Turner I, presumably so that a future 

§ 2255 petition could be successful. This is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, 

Turner does not explain, nor can we discern, why he would be unable to make the 

same general arguments in a § 2255 petition that he makes now. He asks that the 

BOP be ordered to update his “computation summary” and that the BOP be ordered 

to recommend that the sentencing court in Turner I amend its judgment. In his reply, 

Turner makes a conclusory statement that he is challenging the BOP’s action rather 

than his sentence. But his request for relief appears targeted at the amount of time he 

is required to serve under his present sentence in Turner II, and nothing in his 

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arguments indicate why § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 

detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Prost, 636 F.3d at 580. 

Second, the relief Turner seeks does not appear to pertain to the manner in 

which his sentence is executed. Construing his brief liberally, Turner believes that 

the BOP was supposed to award him benefits like good-time credits, a lower security 

level designation, or certain privileges as if he had only one prior conviction. See

Hale v. Fox, 829 F.3d 1162, 1165 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that § 2241 is the 

appropriate vehicle for challenging prison disciplinary matters such as deprivation of 

good-time credits). No matter how liberally we construe his brief, however, we 

cannot discern what specific benefits Turner believes he lost or how an updated 

judgment or recalculation of his time would entitle him to those benefits. Turner 

does not provide any basis in law or BOP policy that would require prison officials to 

provide those benefits to someone who has multiple prior convictions even though all 

were served concurrently. Because Turner does not actually ask for these benefits or 

specify what they might be, he has not met his burden of showing why § 2255 is not 

the appropriate vehicle to obtain the amended judgment he appears to seek. 

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IV 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of 

Turner’s petition and DENY his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge 

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