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15 July 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 

SUBJECT: MOL "Posture" Paper 

This afternoon I completed the attached rough draft of a MOL 

"Posture" Paper. It leans heavily on Mr. Friedman's ISA Project 

No. 2, a paper prepared in 1964 for Dr. McMillan's use in connection with NSAM 216, and the "Eighteen Points. " Essentially, it 

advocates a conservative approach to MOL security and publicity. 

PA . WORTHMAN 

Colonel, USAF 

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WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED. 

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RECOMMENDED POLICY REGARDING 

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 

OF THE MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY PROGRAM 

1. THE MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY AND THE NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

o. 

o. 

The proposed Manned Orbiting Laboratory will have as its initial 

,51 

ct% objective the development and demonstration at the earliest time of 

an operationally useful high resolution manned optical system. MOL 

is scheduled to make its first manned reconnaissance flight in 1968. 

Since 1962, it has been the announced policy of the United States 

Government to "avoid situations, statements, or actions which, in the 

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context of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be 

exploited as evidence either of alleged U. S. aggressiveness or duplicity. it 

This policy has been advanced through carefully planned security measures: 

by never openly revealing the nature or extent of our satellite reconnaissance activities we have not forced other nations (particularly the 

USSR) to react publicly against our space overflights. 

Considering this background, what is the most favorable context 

for introducting the MOL program to the American and international 

public? Will growing world-wide interest and enthusiasm for manned 

space flight minimize the possibility of international protest? Or will 

the fact that MOL is a military spacecraft carrying military pilots 

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make it more objectionable internationally than current unmanned 

satellite reconnaissance activity? Will the USSR allege that MOL 

contains weapons? If so, how could or should the claim be countered? 

Will the growing tacit acceptance of unmanned satellite reconnaissance 

develop to a point where by 1968 MOL is entirely acceptable internationally? These questions must be answered with great care, since 

the answers will affect the success of MOL operations as well as the 

total national security. 

II. GENERAL BACKGROUND 

In recent years satellite reconnaissance has been the major source 

of United States strategic military intelligence of the Soviet Union and 

Communist China, supplying information upon which the United States 

has relied greatly in evaluating international military capabilities and 

in determining its own force structures. Satellite reconnaissance 

intelligence has been particularly important to the United States' evaluation of Soviet strategic missile and other offensive weapon capabilities 

and of Soviet and Chinese strategic military research and development 

programs. 

Denial of satellite reconnaissance information to the United States, 

or a reduction in the program's effectiveness, would have a significant 

adverse impact on United States national security. 

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III. BACKGROUND ON THE PROBLEM OF "LEGITIMIZATION" 

AND DISCLOSURE 

"Acknowledgment" of U. S. satellite reconnaissance capability has 

typically been treated in the past in terms of the problems of 

"legitimization" and disclosure. There has been extensive consideration within the Executive Branch of what United States policy toward 

legitimization and disclosure should be. 

NSAM 156, dated May 26, 1962, expressed the first formal U. S. 

concern about the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance (Tab A). 

Recognizing the great national security importance of the program, the 

President directed an inter-agency committee to formulate policies 

that would enable the U. S. to carry on an effective military program 

while at the same time permitting the nation to work for disarmament 

and international cooperation in space. Subsequent inter-agency 

discussions led to the issuance of NSC Action 2454, July 10, 1962 (Tab B). 

Many of its 18 policy points rested upon the premise that limited and 

regulated disclosure of the U. S. program would be required in order 

to persuade international opinion that satellite reconnaissance was 

lawful and did not violate national sovereignty. In part to this end, 

point 3 directed the public use of the terms "observation" or "photographic" 

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in lieu of "reconnaissance;" point 4 directed the release of appropriate 

data (e. g. , mapping information) that would help create public acceptance of space observation; point 6 directed that "where feasible" the 

U. S. should seek to have the legitimacy of space reconnaissance accepted; 

point 11 directed strict control over "public statements and backgrounding" on reconnaissance satellites; point 13 authorized discreet oral 

disclosures about the U. S. program to certain "allies and neutrals." 

There have been further inquiries within the Executive Branch on 

the subject. In January 1963, NSAM 216 initiated a study of whether 

the U. S. should formally disclose its program to the Soviets. The 

inter-agency committee concluded that no such action should be taken. 

In mid-1964 the same group again reviewed the question of disclosure 

in light of then-current statements by Khrushchev on satellite reconnaissance. Although a formal paper was not prepared, it was decided that 

no significant action should be taken other than to provide secret briefings on the U.S. and Soviet programs to high-level European allied 

leaders. This was done by the Director of Central Intelligence in 

September 1964. As part of the committee effort, initial drafts were 

prepared of "contingency" white papers for possible use in a public 

disclosure should this become necessary or advisable. 

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17. SECREI 

During the years since the U. S. program was begun there have 

been a variety of partial disclosures: 

1. In 1960-61 (prior to NSC Action 2454) the first launchings of 

U. S. reconnaissance satellites were announced. 

2. The satellite reconnaissance program was discussed publicly 

by high-level government officials during the 1960-61 period. 

3. The U. S. has engaged in extensive "official" discussion of 

other uses of space "observation" or "photography;' e.g., weather, 

mapping, geodesy. 

4. There has been considerable press coverage referring to the 

possibility -- or to the fact -- that important U. S. intelligence information has been obtained from satellite reconnaissance. 

The Soviets have also taken limited steps that indicate an uncertain 

intention to have satellite reconnaissance accepted as lawful. As early 

as 1960, following the U-2 incident, Khrushchev implied that he would 

not object to satellite overflights of the Soviet Union. In the spring of 

1964 he stated privately to persons whom he had reason to believe 

would repeat or publicize his statements that the U. S. should cease 

U-2 reconnaissance of Cuba because satellites could be used instead. 

Referring to the Soviet program, he offered to "exchange" pictures 

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with the United States. Other Soviet officials have also commented 

favorably on satellite reconnaissance and have implied that it is a 

legitimate reconnaissance means. Most important perhaps is the fact 

that in the past two years the Soviets have in effect abandoned their 

early effort in the U. N. to condemn the use of space for military 

"spying or intelligence. 

In short, there has as of now been considerable public disclosure 

about the existence of both the U. S. and Soviet satellite reconnaissance 

programs. The existence of the program is common knowledge 

certainly among most of the world's interested governments and 

probably among many of their peoples. No significant recent efforts 

have been made by any nation explicitly to bar satellite reconnaissance. 

In a sense, therefore, a degree of legitimacy -- admittedly uncertain --

has been achieved. 

IV. THE PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE MANNED 

ORBITING LABORATORY: POSSIBILITY OF DISCLOSURE 

The growing tacit acceptance of unmanned satellite reconnaissance 

could be endangered by adverse international reactions to MOL. Would 

other countries, for example, acquiesce to unmanned satellite overflight and object to manned or military overflight? Could the reaction 

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be sufficient to bring all military satellite overflights under debate? 

Will MOL be caricatured as a weapon system? What precautionary 

steps can be taken now to avoid an international issue over the Manned 

Orbiting Laboratory? 

The United States' satellite reconnaissance program is a national 

program, conducted in secrecy. The character of the program is 

based on five major objectives developed in response to NSAM 156, 

expressing the desire to: 

1. "Maintain our freedom of action unilaterally to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations. " 

2. "Prevent foreign political and physical interference with the 

conduct of these operations. " 

3. "Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of the 

operations or end products of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance 

program. " 

4. "Avo id situations, statements or actions which, in the context 

of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be exploited as 

evidence either of alleged U. S. aggressiveness or duplicity. " 

5. "Facilitate the resolution of any conflicts which might arise 

between the essential technical and security requirements of the U. S. 

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satellite reconnaissance program and the international commitments 

and foreign policy objectives of the United States in a manner which is 

in the over-all bett interests of the national security of the United 

States. 

The primary objective, abstracting those listed above, is to 

forestall international or unilateral actions that would prevent the 

United States from using satellites for reconnaissance. This objective 

is not changed by the advent of MOL. 

Would we enhance the acceptability of MOL by private disclosure 

to hostile nations? There is great danger in disclosing MOL's 

essential secret - the high resolution of its photography - to hostile 

nations. Such a disclosure would arouse apprehensiveness over our 

intelligence capability and stimulate those nations -- especially the 

Soviets -- to renew their historic opposition. Disclosure is such an 

incredible action that the Soviet would presume -- naturally and 

logically -- that the true characteristics of a photographic system had 

been degraded to some extent. As a result, any announcement of high 

resolution photographic capability would have an unsettling influence 

upon hostile nations, with protest, camouflage, and even physical 

counteraction as possible responses. There is no point in announcing 
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a poor photographic capability, for the deception mould be recognized 

immediately. In short, there is no definable "good" accruing to the 

United States from a disclosure of the MOL mission. 

Do we enhance acceptability by public disclosure? The existence 

of a U. S. requirement for effective intelligence of the Sino-Soviet area 

is generally clear to the governments of the free world. In spite of 

this acceptance it is unlikely that the U. S. could gain widespread 

support in any international forum for a positive affirmation to conduct 

satellite reconnaissance, especially with the introduction of a manned 

vehicle. The newly emerging small nations are strongly nationalistic. 

Their representatives could view a Soviet/U. S. debate over manned or 

unmanned reconnaissance with quiet detachment, but if faced squarely 

with a vote on the "space rights" of their own nations they would very 

probably choose to affirm total sovereignty. Friendly, large nations 

are no exception to this rule; they simply enter the debate at an earlier 

point. Even arguments for "common defense" would normally yield in 

the face of arguments for sovereignty. The United States could, if 

necessary, debate the issue of free space in any forum without 

apprehension. But it should carefully avoid any situation which forces 

a nation-by-nation roll call on photographic overflight. 

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As in the case of private disclosure, public disclosure would have 

the additional effect of forcing hostile nations to react, since the 

announcement would be construed as a deliberate flaunting of a provocative capability. The Soviet reaction to U-2 overflight is well known; 

public disclosure could provoke Soviet leadership into placing the U-2 

and MOL in the same category. 

Does continued secrecy create a bad image of the United States? 

Secrecy does not mean illegality. The practice of conducting legal, 

secret operations in international waters and air space is well established. There is no reason for the United States to assume the lack of 

disclosure of details, timing, and results of satellite reconnaissance 

to be taken as a concession to illegality. The fact that these details 

are not disclosed becomes relevant only as the United States allows it 

to become relevant (for example, by reacting defensively to criticism 

in this regard). 

V. THE FEASIBILITY OF CONDUCTING MOL FLIGHT OPERATIONS 

WITHIN THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL POLICY 

From the foregoing discussion it can be Seen that private or public 

disclosure of the MOL capability is an irreversible step which would 

have profoundly adverse effects on enemies, allies, and neutrals. No 

force toward gain would be created by such action. 

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There is every reason, on the other hand, for operating MOL 

within the guidelines of existing national policy and within the carefullyordered security environment which already exists for military space 

programs. Such an environment enhances the achievement of the 

primary national objective indicated above, "...to forestall international 

or unilateral actions that would prevent the United States from using 

satellites for reconnaissance, " avoiding unnecessary provocation in the 

international arena. 

Successful achievement of this objective will require a firm position 

on several points. 

First, there must be determined governmental resistance to any 

suggestion that MOL requires elaborate justification. MOL requires 

no more public justification than any other military space projects. 

The United States has announced that it will have a military space program and it has one. The United States has never made a secret of the 

fact that a number of its space projects are under military control and 

have military objectives. MOL must be treated as part of the mainstream of a continuing U. S. military space program. 

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Second, and corollary to the above, the public information program associated with MOL must be kept modest, low-key, and carefully 

planned. Particularly at the time of program approval, it will be in 

the best interest of the program -- internationally -- to avoid fanfare. 

Contractor publicity must be controlled. All public information 

releases must continue to flow through a single DOD point-of-review 

--Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs. Public information 

stories will deal exclusively with the non-sensitive technological aspects 

of MOL, such as the booster system, the life support system, engineering for long life on orbit, launching 

technology, communication plans, biomedical experiments, etc. Operational goals will not be discussed in news releases. 

Third, the publicy-announced mission of MOL must continue to be 

expressed solely as "the investigation and development of manned 

orbital capabilities essential to the national defense." When pressed, 

the statement should be made that some aspects of MOL are unclassified; others are classified. The classified elements may be acknowledged periodically, under query, but will not be explicitly identified, 

discussed, or explained. 

Fourth, only one minor modification to NSC Action 2454 is required 

because of the special nature of MOL. Point 9: "The present practice 

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of not identifying individual military space launchings by mission or 

purpose is sound" must be waived for manned flight operations in light 

of the intense public interest in manned space launchings. While the 

press will be advised of launching dates, launchings will continue to be 

"closed. " 

Fifth, if subjected to intolerable international pressure) the United 

States maw re -affirm its abhorrence of orbiting weapons and advise 

that no U. a satellite -- operational or developmental -- carries weapons 

of any kind. In view of its present agreement to ban weapons of destruction from orbit, this re-affirmation is somewhat trivial in impact; the 

believers will believe and the accusers will remain unconvinced. 

Sixth, the tight security surrounding MOL's mission capability must 

persist regardless of comments and speculation (however accurate or 

inaccurate) by U. S. trade journals and the public press. Public information experience with unmanned satellite reconnaissance operations 

has shown that the most "devastating" publicity carries very little impact 

if completely ignored. 

VI. POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY FOR THE MOL 

PROGRAM 

A. GENERAL 

1. The United States should maintain the legal position that 

the principles of international law and 

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in outer space and, specifically, that outer space is free, as are the 

high seas. (NSC Action 2454) 

2. The United States should continue to avoid any position 

implying that reconnaissance activities in outer space are not legitimate. 

Similarly, we should avoid any position declaring or implying that such 

activities are not "peaceful uses. " (NSC Action 2454) 

3. It is recognized that the United States cannot entirely avoid 

or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, so that where feasible the U. S. 

should also seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the legitimacy 

of space reconnaissance. (NSC Action 2454) 

4. When confronted by specific international pressure to 

outlaw reconnaissance activities in space, the United States should continue to take a public stand for the legitimacy of the principle of reconnaissance from outer space, the precise form and extent of which would 

depend upon the circumstances of the confrontation. (NSC Action 2454) 

5. The United States should, to the extent feasible, seek to 

avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance" satellites, and where 

appropriate use instead such broader and neutral terms as "observation" 

or "photographic" satellites. (NSC Action 2454) 

B. The United States should not, at this time, publicly disclose 

the status, extent, effectiveness, or operational characteristics of its 

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reconnaissance program. (NSC Action 2454) 

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7. Strict control over public statements and backgrounding concerning reconnaissance satellites should be exercised to ensure 

consistency with the policy guide-lines suggested in these recommendations. (NSC Action 2 454) 

8. The United States should discreetly disclose to certain allies 

and neutrals selected information with regard to the U. S. space reconnaissance program, making each disclosure orally and at a time while 

impressing upon them its importance for the security of the Free 

World. Disclosures should be made in a manner that will preclude 

acquisition by the Communist Bloc of usable evidence of an official 

U. S. acknowledgment that we are conducting a satellite reconnaissance 

program. Proposals for such disclosures should include clearance by 

the National Reconnaissance Office. (NSC Action 2454) 

9. The United States should in private disclosures emphasize 

the fact Of our determination and ability to pursue such programs 

because of their great importance to our common security, despite 

any efforts to dissuade us. (NSC Action 2454) 

10. The United States should note in connection with private 

disclosures that, except in some cases for specifically defined disarmament agreements, the U. S. cannot agree to (a) declarations of the 

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precise purpose of all satellites, (b) declarations of the equipment of 

all satellites, (c) general requirements for advance notification of all 

satellite launchings and the tracks of satellites, (d) pre-launch *spection of the satellites, or (e) a specific definition of peaceful uses of 

space which does not embrace unlimited observation. (NSC Action 2454) 

B. SPECIFIC 

1. The United States should continue to preserve the security 

of the National Reconnaissance Program by conducting Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory development and operations within a carefully conceived 

and disciplined security environment consonant with the spirit of 

NSC Action 2454. 

2. The mission of MOL will be described solely as the investigation and development of manned orbital capabilities essential to 

national defense. When pressed, the statement may be made that some 

aspects of MOL are classified; others are unclassified. The classified 

elements may be acknowledged periodically, under query, but will not 

be explicitly identified, discussed, or explained. 

3. The MOL program will not be justified publicly. MOL is 

a logical element of a continuing U. S. military space program; as 

such, it requires no more public justification than any other space 

program. 

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4. Public information on MOL will be carefully planned at a 

modest, low-key level. This will be especially important at the time 

of program approval and prior to the first launchings. All public 

information releases or statements on MOL made by representatives 

of any Executive Department or Agency will process for approval 

through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs. 

Such news stories as are required will deal exclusively with nonsensitive technological aspects of MOL; operational goals will not be 

discussed. 

5. The present practice of not identifying individual military 

space launchings by mission or purpose is waived for MOL; however 

the policy of maintaining "closed" launchings for all military satellite 

flights will continue. 

6. All MOL launchings will be included on the U. S. portion 

of the United Nations registry of satellite launchings. 

7. MOL reconnaissance products will be controlled in the 

TALENT-KEYHOLE security system after exposure, during processin 

and throughout exploitation. The National Photographic Interpretation 

Center will exploit this product jointly with the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. 

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8. The United States will promote, within the bounds of 

security, the free exchange of bona fide non-sensitive data accruing 

from MOL experiments 

9. If subjected to intolerable pressure, the United States may 

re-affirm its abhorrence of orbiting weapons and advise that no U. S. 

satellite -- operational or developmental -- manned or unmanned --

carries weapons of any kind. 

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