NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

VISUAL-TALENT COVERAGE OF THE USSR 

IN RELATION TO SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT 

JANUARY 1959 - JUNE 1960 

CIA/RR-EIM-T1-60 

11 JULY 1960 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

-T-GP-5EC-REF CHESS 

ACKNCWLEDGMENT• 

The Office of Research and Reports wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center in publishing 

this report. 

ii 

TOP SECRET CHESS 
iii 

TOP SECRET CHESS 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

FOREWORD 

This report provides an estimate of the portions of the USSR that have 

been visually or photographically covered by ,Jestern intelligen-e sources 

during the period January 1959 to June 1960. The extent of this coverage 

is compared with the total area of the USSR, with the total area considered 

suitable for long-range missile deployment, and with the area of those established priority regions that are believed to be most suitable for missile 

deployment. Similar comparisons based on railroad route mileage are also 

presented. 

CHESS 
TOP SECRET CHESS NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

VISUAL-TAINT COVERAGE OF lab USSR IN RELATION TO SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT 

JANUARY 1959 - JUNE 1960 

I. Summary 

During the period January 1959 through June 1960, about 7.5 percent 

of the total land area of the USSR is covered by useable TALENT photography. 

Since about 45 percent of the terrain of the USSR is unsuitable for long - 

range.ballistic missile deployment (especially for deployment of the first 

few units), a more meaningful statistic is the coverage of Soviet land area 

suitable* for such deployment. About 13.6 percent of the suitable area has 

been covered by useable TALENT photography. 

Eight areas* (about 24 percent of the land area of the USSR) have been 

designated for priority search for deployed long-range ballistic missiles 

by the intelligence community. About 3.6 percent of the total of these areas 

is covered by useable TALENT photography. 

The intelligence community has concluded that the Soviet ICBM system 

depends very heavily on railroad transportation; therefore, the portion of 

the Soviet railroad network covered during this period is probably the most 

meanin3ful statistic. Useable TALENT coverage of the total rail route mileage 

amounts to about 11.5 percent, or about 8.5 percent of such mileage in the 

priority areas. Over 35 percent of the rail route mileage in priority area 

2 and more than 10 percent of priority areas 1 and 3 have been covered with 

useable TALENT. There has been no useable TALENT coverage of the other priority 

areas. 

In addition to this highly reliable TALENT coverage, certain portions 

of the USSR have been subject to observation by other Western intelligence 

sources. Although some 4.5 percent of the total land area of the USSR was 

observable** to these sources during the period, less than one percent of 

the area is estimated to have been observed**. The estimated observed coverage of suitable areas by these sources is about 1.5 percent, and such coverage of the priority areas is about 2 percent. Roughly 35 percent of the 

rail route mileage in the total land area, suitable areas, and priority areas 

of the USSR was traveled during this period, and it is estimated that useable observations were made along about 7 percent of the rail routes in these 

areas. 

* These areas are presented on the accompanying map. 

** Definitions mnfi method of calculation are presented below. 

TOP SECRET CHESS 
CHESS NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

In conclusion, it is estimated that more than 85 percent of the suitable area, 95 percent of the priority areas, and 35 percent of the rail route 

mileage in priority areas have not been observed or covered by useable TAI MIT 

during the period. In view of the large areas still uncovered and the limited 

number of ICBMs that are likely to be deployed so early in the Soviet Program, 

it is not surprising that none of these sites has been positively identified. 

II. Suitable and Priority Areas 

The total area of the USSR suitable for ICBM deployment is estimated 

to be 4,764,000 sq. miles. The area considered unsuitable for ICBM deployment is 45 percent of the total area of the USSR (3,647,000 sq. miles) and 

includes areas of continuous permafrost, high mountains, marshes, swamps, 

open bodies of water, towns trtul cities. Because of difficulties of construction and logistics, it is unlikely that any of the earlier long-range- missiles 

-would be deployed in such areas; these areas might be used only for some 

of the very last missiles deployed, if at all. The area assumed as unsuitable for long-range missile deployment is shown in the accompanying map. 

Iithin the USSR, eight areas have been recognized by the intelligence 

community as being of priority interest in the search for long-range missile 

launching sites. These eight areas are shown on the accompanying map. 

The intelligence community has concluded that the Soviet ICBM system 

depends very heavily on railroad transportation. If the launching facilities 

are filze.d, the railroad network is the prirnry means of logistic support; 

or if mobile, these facilities arc rail mobile. For this reason, the coverage of the Soviet railroad network, primarily in the priority areas, is probably the most meaningful of the various measures presented in this paper. 

III. TALE= Coverage 

The total area of the USSR covered by useable TALE= photography since 

January 1;59 has been calculated as 550,000 square miles. In making this 

calculation, linear photo milLage obtained byth- four :lost recent TALEITT 

missions was multipliJ,- 57 miles considered to be th.: width of effective 

coverage. The resultingfigure of ;Toss s,luar.2 mil- .gc -Tas then reduced to compnasate for varying aJLTL'23 Of Cloud .7=31' (11,2LLVy clouded area 

were assumed to have yielded only 25% coverage and scattered cloud areas 

7Z coverage). 

Table 1 presents data on the portions of the total area, suitable area 

and priority areas covered by useable TAIMIT during the period. 

2 

TOP SECRET CHESS 
TOP SECRET CHESS NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

Table 1 

Areas of the USSR Covered by Useable TALENT Photosraphy 

1959-June 1? 60 

Arca 

Total Land Area 

(Square :ales) 

Estimated TALErT Coverre 

(Square ialcs) (Percent) 

Total USSR 

Suitable for 

Deployment 

Priority .Areas 

Total 

Area 1 

Arca , 0 

Area ° J 

Areas. 4-3 

3,647,000 

4,764,000 

2,031,000 

1467,300 

315,600 

170,700 

1,126,900 

650,000 

650,000 

75,150 

10,750 

60,270 

4,130 

0 

7.5 

13.6 

3.6 

23., 

19.1 

2.4 

0 

Table 2 presents data on the portions of the rail route mileage covered 

by useable TALENT photoraphy. 

Table 2 

Rail Route Mileage of the USSR Covered by Useable TAM:NT Photography 

January 1959-June 1960 

Area 

Total Rail Route 

(Miles) 

Estimated TALENT Coverare 

Percent L 

Total USSR 75,300 8,750 11.5 

Suitable for 

Deployment 75,400 8,750 11.6 

Priority Areas 

Total 46,000 3,910 3.5 

Area 1 6,200 620 10.0 

Area 2 3,300 2,950 35.6 

Area 3 3,000 340 11.4 

Areas 4-3 2C,500 0 0 

TOP SECRET CHESS 
4 

TOP SECRET CHESS 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

IV. Non-TALENT Coverage 

A. Observable Area 

Large areas of the USSR have been subject to observation by travelers 

from the West during the period January 1959 to June 1960. The maximum area 

that could have been observed if ideal conditions prevailed -- that is, if 

there were absolutely no obstructions or limitations to vision along the 

routes traveled -- was calculated by multiplying the total route miles traveled 

by the width of the maximum observation belt. The observable belt for air 

travel is estimated to be 10 miles and for rail, water, and highway travel 

to be 5 miles. Table 3 presents data on the maximum observable areas for 

total USSR land area, suitable area, and priority areas. 

CHESS 

Table 3 

Maximum Observable Areas in the USSR 

January 1959-June 1960 

Total Area Maximum Observable Area 

Area (Sq. Mi.) Percent 

Total USSR 

Suitable for 

Deployment 

Priority Areas 

8,647,000 

4,764,000 

387,500 

368,000 

4.5 

7.7 

Total 2,081,000 220,800 10.6 

Area 1 467,800 12,000 2.6 

Area 2 315,600 33,000 

Area 3 170,700 13,900 8.2 

Area 4 195,600 58,200 29.3 

Area 5 290,700 52,100 17.9 

Area 6 469,800 39,900 8.5 

Area 7 108,000 8,400 7.7 

Area 8 62,800 3,300 5.3 

B. Estimated Observed Area 

The total area actually observed by travelers is estimated to be 

far less than the maximm observable arca based on route miles traveled, 

for conditions for observations are frequently far from ideal. Limiting 

factors considered in calculating the actual extent of the area observed 

arc as follows: 

I 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 TOP SECRET CHESS 

1. Visibility restrictions, including terrain, vegetation, rain, 

snow, fog, time of day (light or darkness), and man-made obstacles of various 

types. 

2. Limitation of vision to one side of the vehicle (nullified somewhat if the route is frequently traveled; applies least to auto travel). 

3. Limitation to air observation by altitude, cloud cover, and 

seat location. 

4. Speed of travel (particularly by train), which limits the time 

span for recognition of features, thus reducing the width of the area that 

can be effectively observed. 

5. 'Harassment by security personnel, which is particularly likely 

at points where sensitive installations might be Observed. 

In view of the above limitations, the area observed by travelers 

was calculated by multiplying the maximum observable area by an estimated 

percentage of effectiveness of observation. The fact that many routes were 

traveled a number of times is taken into consideration in determining the 

percentage of effectiveness. The percentages used to estimate the portion 

of observable area actufoly Observed are as follows: 

Tyne of Travel Effective Observation (Percent) 

Air 15 

Rail 20 

Water 10 

Highway 35 

The estimated observed coverage for each type of area under consideration is presented in Table 4. 
C.Nt55 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

Table 4- 

Estimated Observed Area in the USSR 

January 1959-June 1960 

Area Square Miles Percent of Area 

Total USSR 71,900 0.8 

Suitable for 

Deployment 68,700 1.4 

Priority Areas 

Total 41,800* 2.0 

Area 1 2,300 0.5 

Area 2 5,800 1.8 

Area 3 2,600 1.5 

Area 4 11,900 6.1 

Area 5 10,500 3.6 

Area 6 6,500 1.4 

Area 7 1,500 1.4 

Area 8 600 1.o 

C. Railroad Route Mileage Traveled 

Table 5 presents data on the Soviet railroad route mileage traveled 

by Western observers during the period. The mileage traveled is also reduced 

for observational difficulties; to arrive at an estimate of useable traveler 

observations, the factor of 20 percent was used (see paragraph IV B above). 

* Numbers have been rounded; total is based on unrounded data. 

6 

CHESS 
TOP SECRET CHESS NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

Table 5 

Railroad Route Mileage of the USSR Traveled by Western Observers 

Adjusted for Effective Coverage 

January 1959-June 1960 

Area 

Total 

Miles 

Traveled Useable 

Miles Percent Percent 

USSR . 75,900 25,700 34 7 

Suitable for 

Deployment 75,400 25,100 33 7 

Priority Areas 

Total 46,000 16,94o 37 7 

Area 1 6,200 1,850 30 6 

Area 2 8,300 2,70o 33 7 

Area 3 3,000 790 26 5 

Areas 4-5 22,000 8,370 38 8 

Area 6 4,000 2,020 50 10 

Area 7 1,250 620 50 10 

Area 8 1,250 590 47 9 

V. Total Visual-TALENT Coverage 

In order to get an appreciation of total useable visual and TALENT coverc„.;e of the various areas of the USSR during the period, a range of values 

is estimated; the lower end of the rsnze reflects the useable TALEVT coverage 

and the upper end includes the useable visual coverage with an allowance for 

possible duplication. These estimates are presented in Table 6. 

7 

CHESS 
CHESS NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 

Table 6 

Useable Visual-TAL= Covcrac of the USSR 

January 1959-June 1960 

Lai Area Rail Route MileaGe 

Area (Percent) (Percent) 

USSR 7-3 12-18 

Suitable for 

Deployment 14-15 12-13 

Priority Areas 

Total 4-6 9-15 

Area 1 2-3 10-15 

Area 2 19-21 36-42 

Area 3 2-4 11-16 

Areas 4-5 0-5 0-3 

Area 6 0-1 0-10 

Area 7 0-1 0-10 

Area 3 0-1 0-9 

8 

TOP SECRET CHESS 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

22 June 2015 11 CECRET DCID No. 2/7 

(New Series) 

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 2/7 

COMMITTEE ON OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE (COMOR) 

(Effective 9 August 1960) 

- ALLEN W. DULLES 

Director of Central Intelligence 

'As distinguished from operational "early warning" information and other 

operational-support intelligence. 

• For purposes of this directive "denied areas" include all territory and territorial waters claimed by members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, as well as such other 

areas of priority intelligence interest as may be determined by USIB. 

—13ErgReiff•• 

COPY 219 

Pursuant to the provisions of NSCID Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6, and for the 

purpose of providing a focal point for information on, and for the 

r; coordinated development of foreign-intelligence' requirements for', over-

..., .-.... 

-. ..,,.... a*77,-, :..• .).:.•: :r.:•a. , ....•,,a .7.7.t •..,::ta aa._:,,. a .... .......• • 

. . 

Id areas 1 (including foreign Intelligence requirements during research 

and development phases of such projects and activities) a Committee on 

, _-_ Overhead Recormaissanee (COMOR) of the U.S. Intelligence Board is 

hereby esiablished. 

I„ For the purposes of this directive the term "overhead reconnaissance". includes all reconnaissance for foreign-intelligence purposes by 

satellite, or by any vehicle over denied areas, whether by photographic, 

ELINT, COMINT, INFRARED, RADINT or other means, but does not 

include reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct support of 

- - actively combatant forces. 

2. The Committee shall coordinate the adaptation of priority foreignintelligence objectives and requirements established by USIB, members 

of USIB, or other committees of USIB, to the capabilities of existing and 

potential overhead reconnaissance systems; and shall examine and make 

recommendations, as appropriate, on such related matters as dissemination and any special security controls required, but shall not undertake 

to provide operational guidance. (As pertains to COMINT, such special 

security controls shall not be less restrictive than those prescribed by 

COMINT regulations.) 

3. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) shall be 

composed of designated representatives of Intelligence Board departments and agencies. Representatives of other agencies may be invited 

by the Chairman to participate in selected discussions as agreed by the 

Committee. 

4. The Chairman of the Committee shall be designated by the Director 

of Central Intelligence in consultation with and with the concurrence 

of the Intelligence Board.