UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4722

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JERMAINE BROWN, a/k/a Jeezy,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith, 

District Judge. (4:09-cr-00063-RBS-TEM-10)

Submitted: March 23, 2012 Decided: April 5, 2012

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Angela D. Whitley, THE WHITLEY LAW FIRM, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Timothy R. 

Murphy, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Robert E. 

Bradenham, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial, Jermaine Brown was convicted 

of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with 

intent to distribute cocaine base, distribution of cocaine base, 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution 

of cocaine base, cocaine, and marijuana, and two counts of 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). He appeals, 

contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

jury verdict on the firearm charges, and that the district court 

abused its discretion by instructing the jury that the 

Government was not required to use any specific investigative 

techniques. We affirm. 

Brown first contends the district court erred in 

denying his motions for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 29 because the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate 

that his possession of the firearms was “in furtherance of” a 

drug trafficking crime. A jury’s verdict must be upheld on 

appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support 

it. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In 

determining whether the evidence in the record is substantial, 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government, and inquire whether there is evidence that a 

reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 
3

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 

(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we do not review the credibility of the witnesses and 

assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in the 

testimony in favor of the government. See United States v. 

Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998).

To establish illegal possession of a firearm in 

violation of § 924(c), the government must prove that the 

defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of a 

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Brown does not 

contest that he possessed the firearms in question. We have 

construed the “in furtherance of” provision of § 924(c) to 

require “the government to present evidence indicating that the 

possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward a 

drug trafficking crime.” United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701,

705 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of the record convinces us that 

the jury heard sufficient evidence to find Brown guilty of the 

firearm offenses.

Brown also challenges the jury instruction in which 

the court advised the jury that the Government was not required 

to use any specific investigative techniques. He contends that 

this instruction amounted to an indirect comment on the weight 

of the evidence in violation of his due process rights and his 
4

right to a jury trial. The challenged instruction is very

similar to the instruction that was challenged and upheld in 

United States v. Mason, 954 F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1992). The 

instructions, viewed in their entirety, did not mislead the jury 

into believing that it could not consider and weigh the type of 

evidence that was presented. Rather, the instruction properly 

emphasized the Government’s burden of proof, but also noted that 

the Government was not required to prove its case in any 

particular manner. See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 719 

F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[U]ncorroborated testimony of 

one witness may be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.”).

We conclude that the instruction was proper, did not 

amount to a comment by the court on the weight of the evidence, 

and was not an abuse of discretion. See Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 

174 F.3d 394, 408 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing standard). 

Accordingly, we affirm Brown’s convictions. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED