DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 20330 

IMMMMINHUHRMI 

FEB 2 5 1969 

4 

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. SEAMANS 

TRRU DR. FLAX ax-a. 4400!... 

SUBJECT: MOL Program Alternatives 

On the opposite page is the proposed memorandum to 

Mr. Packard on MOL Program Alternatives. This differs from 

the version you reviewed in draft form only in (1) the 

Page 3 sub-section entitled "Additional Information"; and 

(2) the addition as Tab B of a tabular summary of financial/ 

 schedule/decision point considerations associated with the 

 options discussed in the memorandum. For comparison purposes, 

 Attachment 1 hereto contains the original version of the 

 "Additional Information" sub-section. 

The new sub-section has come about as a result of my 

 discussions today with the DDR&E Staff. Apparently, sometime 

 after Dr. Foster concurred in the draft yesterday afternoon, 

he and Dr. Tucker had some misgivings whether or not the memo 

made it perfectly clear that adoption of the four mannedmission program delayed for at least 11/2 years the acquisition 

of an unmanned capability (unless a deliberate decision to do 

IMPOINIMINOMINO. 

 otherwise was made prior to December 1970). Additionally, 

 they felt certain points made in Tab A should also be stated 

 in the basic memorandum. All of their thoughts have been 

 incorporated, and as of 1500 hours, DDR&E was again in agreement 

 with the memo. . . . I understand you and Dr. Foster 

 discussed this matter earlier today. 

I concur in the changes and recommend you sign the 

opposite page memorandum. 

.4 1 as• 

S T. STEWART 

ajor General, USAF 

Vice Director, MOL Program 
FY69 End Prgm 

& Prior FY70 FY71 Total 

$1237M $576M $565M $3037M 

1st 

Manned 

Launch 

Feb 72 

2nd 

Unmanned 

Launch 

Oct 73 

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RELEASE 1. JULY 2015 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 20330 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

FEB 2 6 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: MOL Program Alternatives 

During the February 19,DoD/BoB meeting, you requested: 

) financial particulars on a MOL Program that included only 

presently-planned three manned flights, with funding and 

schedule variations; and (2) information on a sustaining 

program which would minimize FY 70 funding. For comparison 

purposes, appropriate information on the present MOL Program 

is cited first. 

Preser_t Manned/Unmanned MOL Program: 

The DCP-approved MOL Program includes five reconnaissance 

_.ssio-zIs in total of seven launches -- two unmanned booster/ 

cructure/Gemini B qualification launches (no camera systems 

°arc° preceding three all-up manned and two all-up unmanned 

_Lights. Financial and schedule particulars are as follows: 

If program continuity and minimum cost transition into 

a follow-on phase are desired, the sixth reconnaissance mission 

(manned or unmanned) should be flown in the first half of 

CY 1974. Approximately 31/2 years lead time is the minimum 

required for procurement, fabrication, assembly, and test of 

the system; and commitment of FY 71 funds is required. Decisions 

3ard!..,- g this commitment must be made by December 1969 when 

FY 71 Budget Estimate is prepared. 

Three Manned-Mission MOL Program: 

A MOL Program of three manned missions (also preceded by 

::.Le two unmanned qual launches) on the same development and 

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manned flight schedule as the present manned/unmanned program 

would be as follows: 

1st 3rd 

FY69 End Prgm Manned Manned 

& Prior FY70 FY71 Total Mission Mission 

$1237M $551M $515M $2690M Feb 72 Jan 73 

The effects of varying the schedule on total program cost 

and FY 70/71 funding would be approximately as follows: 

1st 3rd 

FY69 End Prgm Manned Manned 

& Prior FY70 FY71 Total Mission Mission 

$1237M $590M $540M $2630M Dec 71 Oct 72 

$1237M $510M $550M $2780M May 72 Mar 73 

A three manned-mission MOL Program would be directed 

towards the program objectives approved by the President in 

1965, namely: semi-operational use to achieve 

resolution photography of significant targets; development of 

the necessary high resolution optical technology and a camera 

system for manned or unmanned use; the provision of a space 

facility for the possible development, test, and use of other 

military applications; and information on the extent of man's 

military utility in space. A three flight program would 

provide considerable progress toward demonstration of a mature, 

flexible, manned reconnaissance satellite system and should 

provide adequate confidence to proceed with an operational 

configuration for either a manned or unmanned follow-on system. 

The above FY 70/71 estimates do not include any follow-on 

activity. If continuity into a follow-on operational program 

is desired, a fourth reconnaissance mission should be flown in 

mid-CY 1973. This would require initiation of procurement in 

December 1969 and some FY 70 funding. 

Should any follow-on decision be deferred until after the 

first manned mission is flown, the fourth mission (manned or 

unmanned) could not occur before late CY 1975; and some FY 72 

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and sizable FY 73 funding would be required. Restart costs 

would probably be unusually high since most of the production 

and special environmental test facilities would be in a standby 

status and a majority of the trained technical work force 

would no longer be on the payroll. 

Minimum-Sustaining Program: 

The MOL Program presently has about 15,000 Associate 

Contractor and lst-tier Subcontractor personnel aboard (about 

85 percent of the peak wo. k force), and is spending at a rate 

of approximatei $550 million per year. 

A program to minimize FY 70 funding might entail a fifty 

percent reduction in work force, no new material purchases, 

etc. Approximately $275-300 million would be required in FY 70 

to maintain personnel competency and facility readiness. A 

delay of more than one year in development prior to the first 

manned flight would result and total program cost would increase 

more than $360 million. 

In order to maintain a capability to pick-up the present 

program pace at the beginning of FY 71, a smaller work force 

reduction would be appropriate, new material purchases limited, 

etc. Approximately $360 million would be required in FY 70 

for this alternate. The impact would be a one year stretchout 

in development prior to the first manned flight and a total 

program cost increase of approximately $360 million. 

Program Alternative 

As another alternative to the present manned/unmanned 

baseline program, consideration should be given to a four mannedmission MOL Program, with six rather than five month launch 

centers, as a means of protecting both operational and development 

options until formulation of the FY 72 Budget Estimate in 

December 1970. FY 70 costs are estimated to be only $5 million 

higher than those for the three launch program, and the total 

development program costs would be approximately $200 million 

less than the baseline program. Schedule and financial 

particulars for a four launch program are: 

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1st 

FY69 End Prgm Manned 

& Prior FY70 FY71 Total Launch 

$1237M $556M $545M $2835M Feb 72 

4th 

Manned 

Launch 

Sept 73 

Varying the schedule would have effect on total program 

cost and FY 70/71 funding similar to that shown for the three 

manned launch option. 

The interval between now and December 1970 could be devoted 

to systematic and comprehensive analyses of a variety of options: 

optimized unmanned systems using the MOL camera system; more 

efficient and effective MOL systems; other possible MOL 

applications and configurations, etc. Additionally, definition 

of longer term MOL Program objectives and phasing may benefit 

from further DoD and NASA studies of possible common objectives 

toward future long-duration manned space stations and logistic 

resupply systems. 

Also, much of the system ground qualification will be 

completed by the end of CY 1970, and optical performance 

confirmed. Decisions can be made at that time regarding 

operational configuration and deployment with minimum technical 

and financial risk. 

Additional information: 

The primary objective justifying the MOL program is the 

acquisition of resolution photography for technical 

intelligence uses. When the MOL program was approved by the 

President in 1965, only a manned capability was planned. In 

:966, an unmanned reconnaissance version was added to provide 

"l_nsurance" against possible foreign objections to manned 

overflight, unknown physiological problems, and/or to provide 

a lower cost option for recurring operational use. Therefore, 

both manned and unmanned systems are to be demonstrated in 

the present baseline program. A brief evolution of MOL Program 

objectives and scope, pros and cons of including an unmanned 

MOL system, and appraisal of program confidence are attached 

as Tab A. 

The "manned-only" options presented in this memo do noz 

eliminate the unmanned capability, but would delay its 

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availability up to lk years unless a decision were made prior 

to December 1970 to initiate that development. Such delay 

would be unfortunate only if serious political objections to 

manned overflight were raised during the initial MOL launches 

or if a manned flight disaster forced prolonged deferment of 

manned operations. However, unmanned systems, to be available 

for suzh contingencies, would have to be committed to 

production more than 3 years prior to such events. 

Systematic and comprehensive analyses of a number of 

follow-on MOL Program options have yet to be conducted. The 

delay associated with the manned-mission only options presented 

in this memo would permit further deliberate evaluation of 

manned and unmanned operational considerations and analyses of 

lower cost unmanned systems. In addition, each program option 

presented will demonstrate the key to unmanned capability -- 

c.peration of the very high resolution camera in an,autamatic mode. 

FY 70 expenditures of approximately $25 million for uniqueunmanned development effort is now planned in the baseline 

program to meet a mid-CY 1973 launch date. The manned-mission 

only alternatives would defer that expenditure until FY 72 

unless decisions regarding follow-on activity are made prior to 

December 1970. A tabular summary of all financial/schedule/ 

decision point considerations discussed in this memo is attached 

as Tab B. 

Recommendation: 

This memorandum was prepared jointly by the DDR&E and 

Air Force Staffs. Dr. Foster and Dr. Flax agree with me that 

the four manned-mission MOL Program is a more desirable 

alternative than the three mission program. It would protect, 

th minimum commitment, until December 1970 a continuing very 

resolution operational reconnaissance capability in the 

1970's, provide time in which to carefully assess other options, 

and sustain a minimum cost development program leading to 

manned or unmanned operational systems. 

If this course of action is adopted, I 

MOL Program be funded at not less than $556 

4-- 

ROBERT C. 

recommend the 

million in FY 70. 

C. S (dt; 

SEAMANS, Jr. 

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1 

MISCELLANEOUS MOL PROGRAM INFORMATION 

I. MOL PROGRAM OBJECTIVES/SCOPE CHRONOLOGY: 

A. August 1965 Program Approved by the President: 

o Scope: Six launch manned-only program: one unmanned • 

qualification launch; one manned flight without camera; four 

manned missions with camera. 

o Objectives: early operational photography 

of significant targets (approximately better than 

G-3 then under development); development of very high resolution 

camera systems suitable for either manned or unmanned use; 

determination of the extent of man's military utility in space; 

provision of a space facility for the development, test and use 

of other possible military space applications. 

B. Why Only Manned Flights Proposed in 1965? 

o As a primary reason, it was not considered practically 

feasible to point the camera and track targets (for image motion 

compensation) with sufficient accuracy for an unmanned system. 

C. Program Scope Changed in Mid-1966: 

o Unmanned reconnaissance systems were added to the 

program. Seven launch present program established: two qual 

launches; three all-up manned recce missions; followed by two 

all-up unmanned recce missions. 

D. Why Were Unmanned Systems Added in 1966? 

o Automatic (e.g. unmanned) camera pointing and 

tracking now appeared more feasible and practical, albeit very 

difficult to achieve. 

o PSAC advocated the development of an unmanned system, 

feeling the U.S. would want both manned and unmanned capability 

in future (unmanned for "routine" operations). 

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o SecDef felt it would provide "insurance" hedges 

against foreign objections/threat or unknown man-in-space 

physiological problems, and also agreed with Mr. Schultz (then 

BoB Director) that unmanned system should be cheaper on 

recurring basis. 

o NOTE: See Section II for major pros/cons on an 

unmanned MOL. 

E. Why Then Still Continue Manned MOL and Why Fly it First: 

o To assure achieving the resolution goal and to provide 

a useful reconnaissance product at the outset. Flight crews 

expected to not only point and track with great accuracy, but 

also "tune" or manually operate other essential, advanced 

automatic camera devices. 

o To mature unmanned capability sooner through on-orbit 

flight crew diagnostics and controlled testing in various modes. 

II. WHY AN UNMANNED MOL: 

There follows brief pros/cons on past/present major points 

for including and/or continuing an unmanned version of MOL: 

A. Political/Military: 

o Possibility exists of international objections or 

foreign physical interference to manned MOL overflights 

(Sino-Soviet reaction to manned aircraft and unmanned drone 

overflights unmistakable in past). . . However, no objections 

so far to Gemini/Apollo overflights of Southern China. 

o Since MOL flights will not be at all covert (only 

mission classified), it could be assumed Sino-Soviet probably 

would physically interfere first with unmanned U.S. reconnaissance 

satellites (on premise U.S. would be less likely to protest or 

react). 

o A recent special National Intelligence Estimate for 

NRO concluded foreign physical interference with U.S. unmanned 

recce satellites unlikely unless prelude to general war 

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(analysis also noted that Soviets stopped protesting U.S. 

satellite overflights after USSR satellite recce program began 

in 1964). 

o Might be difficult for U.S. to disprove accusation 

MOL is bomb-in-orbit without revealing recce purpose to world. 

B. Physiological: 

o USAF and NASA space-medicine community agrees there 

now are no temporarily incapacitating or permanently damaging 

physiological barriers to 30-45 day manned flights (based on 

scale-up of 11-14 day Gemini/Apollo flights; space chamber 

tests; bed-rest/water-immersion space simulation tests, etc.). 

C. Technical: 

o Abandonment of unmanned system might result in 

reduction of emphasis on automatic devices necessary for 

unmanned capability. 

o Manned-only system advocates defend need for all 

automatic devices (pointing, tracking, alignment, focus, etc.) 

in system to fully exploit man's ability to evaluate, devise, 

adjust, etc. 

D. Insurance Against Manned Disaster: 

o Catastrophic loss of crew might result in extended 

delay in operational program if unmanned backup were not 

available. 

o Even though MOL will have very high mission crewsafety probability (.995), catastrophic loss always possible. 

Subsequent delay would depend on nature of disaster. However, 

unless unmanned systems are built, in parallel and available, 

no flexible backup will exist. 

E. Rate of Data Return: 

o Unmanned system to return film at 7-10 day intervals; 

manned at end of mission. Not timely. 

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o Major value of MOL is technical intelligence against 

problems/solutions several years ahead -- a few weeks delay 

probably is not important. . . . However, if timeliness 

significant for tactical, crisis, or arms agreement monitoring 

reasons, provisions for a read-out system and daily data return 

are included in manned MOL system. 

F. Recurring Cost Comparison Data: 

o Unmanned system on comparable booster will always 

have at least a 4:3 orbital lifetime advantage and at least 

a 4:5 recurring cost advantage over manned system. 

o Simulator tests and analyses indicate manned system 

will return approximately same total number of cloud-free 

targets per mission; will return 2-21/2 times as many high-value, 

time-sensitive targets per mission; will average 10 percent 

better resolution pictures (manned system will have better 

pointing accuracy) even when unmanned system is working perfectly; 

and will average 30-100% better resolution pictures when automatic 

devices such as Cross-Format image motion compensation device 

or Image Velocity Sensor fail or malfunction. 

o Additionally, the manned system has unique additional . 

capabilities such as very high resolution photography 

optional black & white and color or other special 

film intermixes on same target; visual reconnaissance; etc. 

o Also camera has more resolution growth potential 

in manned system (Possible to increase effective focal length 

via a relay lens; however, field of view is greatly reduced 

and precise pointing/tracking capability of man would be 

required). 

III. PROGRAM CONFIDENCE APPRAISAL: 

High confidence in success at outset with manned missions • 

because only the MOL camera system can be considered advanced 

technology. The Laboratory, Gemini, and booster represent 

combinations of flight-proven hardware technology and/or 

off-shelf components; and very high spacecraft reliability/safety 

is expected. With regard to the camera system: 

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o Have already achieved necessary advanced optical test 

and manufacturing facilities. 

o Have already demonstrated ability to drive and control 

tracking mirror with necessary precision. 

o Have necessary low thermal-expansion optical materials 

at hand. 

o Test optics approaching flight quality. 

o Flight crew simulator tests have confirmed their 

ability to point and track with great precision. The required 

pointing accuracy (all error sources) is approximately 

2,000 feet; the flight crew is expected to routinely point with 

accuracy. The required tracking rate is 

or less per second to achieve the resolution goal; 

flight crew tests indicate manual tracking capability. . . 

With regard to pointing and tracking in the unmanned system, 

success is assumed but will not confirm ability to automatically 

point accurately enough until 1971, and may not confirm extent 

of automatic tracking capability until first manned MOL flight. 

o Other camera system component development is 

progressing in satisfactory manner. 

o Camera development program more than deliberately 

paced -- for funding reasons, it is 8-10 months behind one based 

on availability of camera system. MOL Program represents a 

more comprehensive camera development, test, and verification 

program than any other past or present satellite undertaking. 

o Finally, also confident of achieving resolution 

goal because the MOL camera demands only relatively modest 

overall camera system performance. The MOL camera relies more 

on a long focal length and large aperture combination than other 

systems currently in use or development. 

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.RELEAS 

ADMINISTRATION 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301 

19 February 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: Budget Issues on MOL, HEXAGON and Drones 

The Mayo paper reopens extremely complex issues which were 

addressed by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the 

Bilreau of the Budget, the Director of the National Reconnaissance 

Office and the Deputy Secretary of Defense individually and the ExCom 

collectively in arriving at the size of these programs. and their funding 

in the FY 1970 budget. 

By reopening these issues at the interdepartmental level, he has, 

as a consequence, reopened the issues within the DoD. As a result, 

you will be replowing the ground that Paul Nitze covered during the last 

formulation of the budget. 

Accordingly, we have summarized the. BoB paper and the previous 

positions of the appropriate elements of DoD on these issues in the 

attached paper. The comments contained therein were coordinated 

and updated at the staff level with the officer concerned. 

The current budg'et is as follows: 

Total Approved Program FY 69-74 

Launches/Vehicles Costs ($M) 

MOL 7 (lstlaunch FY71) 2515 

HEXAGON 16 (1st launch FY 70) 

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-r- Q 1967- 

BoB proposes cutting three major program (TAB "A"): 

I. MOL: Terminate, saving $800M in FY 69 and FY 70, 

with total saving of $2 billion. 

• 

2. HEXAGON; Terminate, saving in FY 70, and 

FY 70 - 17_74. (If CORONA and GAMBIT were 

held to 6 launches per year, there would be additional 

savings of 

3. Drones: Reduce number of 147-T (high altitude) and 

147-S (low altitude) drones to be procured in FY 69 

and FY 70, and terminate contract for 154 (new 

model high altitude) drones. Possible savings are 

$41. 7M in FY 69 and $25. 7M in FY 70. 

DDR&E, ASD(SA), DNRO, and JCS have previously 

provided material on the subjects of the BoB proposals. Their positions 

are appended as TABS; brief statements of all parties' rationale follow. 

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BoB (BYE 11700-69) 

MOL's iesign resolution does not provide enough 

additional intelligence to justify its very high cost. 

1. GAMBIT-3 is competitive. 

2. SIGINT provides highly important information. 

3. Sizing of U. S. strategic forces is conservative, to 

gain an assured destruction, second-strike capability, 

and probably would not be affected in any significant 

way by MOL photography. 

4. Other precise information required (radar characteristics, 

weapons yield, accuracy, refine rates, operational 

doctrine) can be provided only by. SIGINT, RADINT, or 

HUMINT. 

5. MOL's high costs ($3.213 estimated) require termination. 

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DDR&E 

The value to DoD of MOL very high resolution photography 

combined with the mission flexibility of MOL justifies 

the expenditure of the remaining start-up costs ($1.813) 

and estimated follow-on annual operating costs ($100 - 

120 million per launch): 

• 

Very High Resolution (VHR) imagery, when combined with 

engineering principles and applicable technology can 

provide high confidence answers to questions up to 

several years sooner on performance and characteristics 

of foreign weapons, systems, equipment, and facilities. 

The Director, DIA adds that, in addition to technical 

intelligence, VHR also can make a substantial contributiOn. 

to the development of strategy and tactics for the employment 

of military forces. 

MOL additionally will have unique capability 

can make a significant contribution to 

policing arms limitations agreements, and has some 

intelligence coverage potential during crisis periods. 

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▪ Terminating the MOL program now will result in FY 70 

savings of $576M (not $800M) and total savings of $1. 8B 

(not $2. OB). 

▪ There is an unmanned configuration in the MOL program; 

thus GAMBIT does not have a unique advantage. 

GAMBIT-3 photography does not provide a resolution 

capability very close to MOL photography; the MOL by 

virtue of its much longer focal length and larger aperture 

will provide photographic resolutions approximately 

better than GAMBIT-3. 

▪ In their brief statement on Soviet strategic forces 

influencing U. S. calculations, BoB neglects consideration 

of tactical systems and threats, ignores the Chinese 

Communist threat completely, and focuses on "precise 

radar signal characteristics" as a determinant, If this 

is so, then no photographic reconnaissance, only SIGINT, 

is required. 

BoB implies that all issues have not been considered prior 

to preparation of their paper, referencing the DCI's 
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questioning of the benefit ofilphotography compared 

to GAMBIT'sII photography. All issues have been 

considered, and DDR&Es judgments and conclusions, 

set forth in the MOL DCP (5 Dec 68), were supported by 

the Secretary of the Air Force, the President's Scientific 

Adviser, the Director NRO, and ASD(C), and were approved 

by DepSecDef.' 

ASD(SA) 

Agree with BoB position as far as it goes, but offer that: • 

1. VHR photography development should continue as a 

future option for the NRP. 

2. Other considerations than intelligence apply: appeal of 

man in space; large sunk costs in MOL. Terminating 

MOL unrealistic option. 

3. An option involving MOL combined with the Apollo 

Applications Program (AAP) be considered; slowing 

down MOL optical development and cancelling Apollo 

Telescope Mount Solar observatory. Result is common 
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space capsule development, common launch system 

and an integrated flight schedule. VHR photographic 

capabilities introduced as developed and as national 

security needs dictate. This option would accomplish 

the most important near earth orbit manned flight 

objectives and provide more time to solve the optics 

developmental tasks left in MOL. Problems under" 

this option are (1) agencies involved probably prefer 

separation, (2) domestic and foreign political aspects 

of .combined military - non-military program, and (3) 

1958 Space Act would have to be amended concerning 

NASA's responsibilities. 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

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HEXAGON 

BoB (BYE - 11700/A-69) 

Photographic reconnaissance program includes two 

types of systems with overlapping capabilities. 

Surveillance: GAMBIT-3 and MOL 

Search: CORONA and HEXAGON 

Even after HEXAGON is operational there will be a need 

for 4 or 5 GAMBIT satellites each year for surveillance. 

Issue: given need for GAMBIT, does HEXAGON provide 

enough additional search to justify additional total costs? 

GAMBIT; CORONA combination is adequate to meet 

intelligence needs against Soviet/Chinese strategic force 

. ' 

capSbilities. Problem has thus narrowed to HEXAGON'S 

unique capabilities against ground force targets. 

1. G-3 is meeting 95-97 percent of ground forces target 

looks required annually and quarterly by USIB. If reauirement: 

increase, longer-life G-3 will be able to meet them. 

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HEXAGON has clearest added value against mobile 

ground force targets: 

4. HEXAGON may not provide an important, -unique 

capability for understanding manning levels. 

5. SIGINT and HUMINT provide complementary information 

about ground force targets. 

6. There is a penalty paid in resolution by substitution of 

HEXAGON for some of the GAMBIT missions. 

Neither mix (HEXAGON/GAMBIT or CORONA/GAMBIT) 

has an advantage in timeliness for crisis management. 

HEXAGONts 280-mile swath width option is a significant 

advantage (CORONA's is 130-mile), but is costly in film 

consumption. 

For equal annual cost of 4 HEXAGON and 4 GAMBIT, 

or 7 CORONA and 8 GAMBIT can be launched. The latter 

option more than meets reqUirements, although 4 HEXAGON 

will produce much more area coverage annually than 

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7 CORONA and surveillance requirement coverages by GAMBIT 

will be reduced somewhat. ' 1 i 

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• 

DNRO 

DNRO does not justify requirements, since he receives 

these from the USIB (TAB "B"). These requirements 

were reaffirmed by USIB D46.4/27 of 4 Feb 69. He does, 

however, provide cost estimates and assessments of 

technical performance and program risks. The DNRO 

comptroller has provided corrected cost figlires with the 

comment that many costs in BoB paper are incorrect, 

eased on a 1 March 1969 decision to terminate HEXAGON 

the following numbers apply: c/BoB pg 2. 

Annual Total FY 70 FY 1970-74 

Launches (FY 73) Budget Costs Costs 

ExCom Decision. 

HEXAGON 4 

GAMBIT- 3 4 

Alternative 

CORONA 

GAMBIT- 3 7 

1/ An additional savings of 

resulting in a total of 

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accrues from prior year funding, 

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The difference in FY 70 savings from the BoB figures is due 

to BoVs use of figur es relating to a 1 December 1968 decision 

to terminate . Note that the above figures include in assumption 

that no improvements will be made in CORONA. It should 

also be noted that any decision to delay HEXAGON results in 

a need to buy more CORONAs with likely costs higher than 

potential HEXAGON savings. 

DDR&E (BYE 78418-68) 

Three options available: 

1. Cancel HEXAGON, use seven GAMBIT and seven 

CORONA per year. Save FY 68-70, 

and FY 69-73. Lose significant benefits of 

HEXAGON in 19701 s. 

2. Austere HEXAGON. Three HEXAGON and four 

GAMBIT per year. Save in FY 70, and at least 

in FY 68-73 costs. Operating costs less 

than Option 1, but intelligence value much higher. 

a • 

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• 

3. Planned HEXAGON. Five HEXAGON and five GAMBIT 

per year. Costs more per year in outyears, 

but produces 30% faster and additional reconnaissance. 

DDR&E recommends Option• 2: 

• Better intelligence than Option 1. 

• 

Costs less than Option 3. 

Development costs for major improvements to CORONA 

would be roughly the same as those remaining for HEXAGON. 

HEXAGON resolution (2. 5 - 4 ft) markedly more productive 

than CORONA (7 - 10 ft). 

1. DIA, CIA, and NPIC studies indicate there is a 

"breakpoint" in resolution productivity in 3 - 5 ft 

range. 

2. More than half of targets covered by GAMBIT could 

be adequately covered by HEXAGON. 

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- Three major intelligence contributions unique to HEXAGON: 

I. More thorough search of Soviet Union/China to detect 

new activity or provide confidence that suspicious 

activity is not under way. 

2. Improve intelligence on ground forces through better 

and faster understai ding of force readiness, logistical 

support, and major redeployment. 

3. Enable detection and assessment of certain mobile 

forces such as ICBM's, IRBMT,s, tactical offensive 

and defensive missiles. 

We are unable to predict fully the expected value of radical 

new systems such as HEXAGON; GAMBIT, for example, 

provides intelligence on ground forces, although it was not 

originally designed for that. HEXAGON may be able to 

make such unexpected, significant, contributions. 

HEXAGON is in its third year of development, and 

development risk has been diminished. High risk areas 

are identified and under control. 

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HEXAGON will present more options for mixes of 

reconnaissance systems: 

1. HEXAGON plus MOL may allow termination of GAMBIT. 

2. HEXAGON could carry MOL-DORIAN optics; development 

would be $150-200M above and beyond current MOL 

development. 

3. HEXAGON can be modified, or more vehicles launched, 

to keep a vehicle aloft 90% of the time. This 

would provide crisis coverage within a week or several 

days. 

ASD(SA) 

• HEXAGON/GAMBIT program differs little in operating 

costs from BoB-proposed CORONA/GAMBIT program. 

Adding one additional annual GAMBIT launch to BoB 

program would make ExCOM program and BoB program 

equal-cost options in out-years. Thus issue is whether 

or not to spend about in start-up costs for 

HEXAGON in unexpended FY 68-70 funds) in 

order to change our satellite photography mix. 
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What does buy for us? 

1. Search. Four HEXAGON will cover 60-80 million 

square nautical miles annually; seven CORONA cover 

54-63 M sq. N. Mi. HEXAGON search at higher 

resolution, but generally, task of searching for new 

systems would be performed equally well by both. 

2. Surveillance. Commencing July 1969, longer-life 

(14-18 days) GAMBIT will provide 40-80% more camera 

actions per mission, and can provide required coverage 

with four or five of the longer missions. It appears 

that current surveillance mission could be performed 

equally well by either option (4 HEXAGON/4 GAMBIT 

or 7 CORONA/4 or 5 GAMBIT). 

- Intermediate-Resolution Surveillance. Difference 

between the two options is thus whether it is worth 

to have HEXAGON perform a new 

task (while simultaneously searching) rather than have 

that same task performed by two to three long-life 

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GAMBIT missions not needed for the current 

surveillance task. 

Major debate about HEXAGON's effectiveness turns on 

its utility for photographing ground forces, their installations, 

and their movements. 

1. Important during crisis periods. 

2. A few low-priority Soviet/Chinese ground force 

targets are not now covered by seven short-life 

GAMBIT missions. 

3. GAMBIT now covers 1964 major ground force targets: 

1083 annually and 322 quarterly. 

A few large ground force installations cannot be covered 

by GAMBIT in one pass; thus HEXAGON could offer. : 

.some improvement in, say, vehicle counts (although 

vehicle counts are thought to be quite good already). 

5. HEXAGON can provide more coverage of ground force 

units than GAMBIT, but at a lower resolution. It is 

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not clear whether this will be more positive than 

negative in assessing manning levels, since HEXAGON 

sees indicators more often than GAMBIT, but not as 

clearly: 

6. HEXAGON is clearly superior to GAMBIT for detecting 

unit movements, crisis or otherwise, but information 

is not available to decision-makers for several days, 

and cloud cover can be a problem for a satellite. 

Drones are available for crisis reconnaissance. 

Finally, using four HEXAGON and four GAMBIT 

launches annually, there will be only 175 days of 

coverage versus 230 days of coverage with seven 

CORONA and seven GAMBIT annually. To have a 90% 

probability that a HEXAGON would be aloft when a crisis 

began would require seven launches annually. 

HEXAGON might produce coverage of small, mobile 

ICBM's, which CORONA could not. But these could be 

detected by GAMBIT sampling of railroad yards and other 

transportation modes; a mobile ICBM in any significant 

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numbers would require one or more large support bases. 

HEXAGON would allow more precision about the number 

of such weapons, but this information would be marginally 

valuable to force planners. Photograph of a mobile system 

. would not be useful since it could not be targeted. 

.. . . 

Recommendation. If savings in FY 70 are necessary, 

HEXAGON's 1970 costs and its marginal utility make it 

a likely candidate for termination. Crucial U. S. intelligence 

objectives suffering from its termination are hard to find. 

The FY 68-74 costs are about If FY 70 

savings are not crucial, the conservative decision would 

be not to terminate, since HEXAGON may conceivably 

yield intelligence whose value we do not yet recognize. 

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DRONES 

BoB (BYE 11699-68) 

▪ Terminate the 154 drone as soon as possible and save 

$25M, rather than buying the 20 now scheduled (with 

delivery of last drone in November 1970). 

- Buy 12 147-T drones in FY 70 vice 24 and save $6. 8M, 

while providing full reconnaissance coverage of North Viet 

Nam through FY 70, even if SR-71 flights are suspended. 

Buying 12 (instead of 24 new scheduled) will avoid an 

excessive inventory if hostilities end. 

Buy 120 147-S drones in FY 69 vice 186 programmed and 

90 in FY 70 vice 156 programmed, at a savings of 

$35.8 million. This will provide for 100 percent coverage 

of NVN if manned tactical reconnaissance (RF-41 s) is 

continued, and 90 percent coverage if manned reconnaissance 

is discontinued, and avoids building an excessive inventory. 

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Secretary of the Air Force: (BYE 66791-68) 

147-T: Buy 36 drones in FY 70. 

Current SR-71 sortie rate appears to be maximum 

attainable due weather. Therefore impractical to expect 

increase to 110 sorties annually. 

147-S: Buy 240 drones in FY 70. 

Provides least costly means to build a hedge against 

loss of manned tactical reconnaissance south of 19°11, 

and builds inventory during hostilities. 

154: Keep program alive; buy 12 drones per year after delivery 

of 20 now contracted for. 

Program should be kept alive (better camera, better 

survivability, growth potential); continued production for 

at least 2 years is required to give reasonably flexible 

force level. 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: (JCSM-'728:6 ) • 

147-T: Buy 36 drones in FY 70. 

Weather limits SR-71 sorties to about 68 per year, 

therefore planning on increasing SR-71 sorties over 

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BYE 77333-4501 
147-S: Buy 240 drones in FY 70. 

Build inventory at rate of seven per month during 

hostilities, which provides hedge against loss of manned 

tactical reconnaissance south of 190N by March 1970. 

Lower cost ($104. 8M) than Option 3 ($150. 8M), which 

provides hedge by August 1969. 

154: Keep prograM alive. Buy 12 drones per year after first 

20 delivered. 

Case for or against continued production of 154 drone 

should not be based only on predicted attrition and 

replacement costs. Analysis assumes that target coverage 

from I47-T or 154 is equally satisfactory/useful to photo 

interpreter. This is not valid since 154 optical bar 

camera has twice as good resolution as 147-T camera. 

Precise identification (discrimination within target type 

of known tyres) and target description (exact size and 

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NVN to 110 per year is impractical. Therefore only • 

feasible option is to plan on current high altitude drone 

sortie rate, with losses of 24 per year. 
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dimensions, detailed layout, analysis of components, 

construction details) each require one-foot resolution, 

which 154 provides and 147-T does not. Growth 

potential of 154 is high, adding possibility of improvement 

in survivability. Consideration of above factors makes 

it appear logical to continue production at present rate 

until operational experience is gained and program can 

be reviewed. 

• DDR &E 

Needs to know if I47-T camera can be replaced by 154's optional 

bar camera, and needs examination of TAGBOARD program to 

determine whether or not it will be used in actual operations. 

Cannot make valid choices of options until this data received. 

Submits following comments: 

147-H losses over: China may all have been caused by MIG's, 

which raises 147-T attrition factor. Much better camera 

in 154 provides 100% of precise identification requirements 

and 61% of description requirements, while 147-T provides 

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61% and 4% respectively 154 thus much more effective 

and hence more cost-effective. 154 also has greater 

swath width (45 nm) than does I47-T (25 nm). The 154 

has greater growth potential, while 147 series has been 

modified and improved to its practical limit. Cost 

figures shown ($1. 5 M per unit) are too low; $2. OM is 

probably better figure, giving 147-T. decided edge over 

154 in cost per target covered. If it is assumed that 

154's will not be replaced, however, 154 system becomes 

least costly of all systems. If an SR-71 is shot down, 

a re-evaluation of use of entire SR-7I system will be 

required. 

ASD(SA): 

147-T: Buy 24 drones in FY 70. 

Increased SR-71 sortie rate results in fewer drone 

losses; builds up inventory during hostilities as hedge. 

BOB option builds lower inventory, thus allowing fewer 

for special missions and new contingencies upon loss of 

manned tactical reconnaissance in NVN. 

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147-S: Buy 156 drones in FY 69 and FY y0 each. 

. Does not add to inventory already provided by conversion 

of 52 I47-NC drones. Provides smaller hedge against 

loss of manned tactical reconnaissance south of 19°N 

than approved program, but larger than BOB proposal. 

BoB proposal results in zero inventory if 100% coverage 

in current operations in maintained. 

154: Terminate program after 20 drones now on order are 

delivered. 

Nothing has happened which should change last year's 

decision to discontinue 154 production. The drone is 

currently planned for use only against South China. 

If Air Force attrition estimates are correct, then 20 

drones now programmed will provide 2 1/2 years of 

effort. If Air Force estimates are incorrect, then 147-T 

drones are more cost-effective, but 40 per year would be 

required for South China. The 154 is more adaptable to 

changes in air defenses, but these changes aren't expected 

prior to the late 70's. If changes occur sooner, then the 

production line can be re-opened. 

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Further investigation is required to ascertain amount of 

cost over-run, size of savings, and number of drones 

lost through early termination of contract. No recommendation can be made on early termination until these facts 

are known. 

Director, NRO: (BYE 13589-68) 

147-T: Buy 36 drones in FY 70. Rationale is same as Secretary 

of the Air Force. 

147-S: Buy 240 drones in FY 70. Rationale same as Secretary 

• 

of the Air Force. 

: `154: Continue prOgrath at 12 per year after first 20 are. 

delivered. 

It is not sound to use a single point value, assumed valid 

for all time, for drone and aircraft attrition. Experience 

shows how variable attrition can be. Does not concur 

'that only interceptor capability to be considered is that 

encountered in China (essentially MIG-I9s). Against 

advanced interceptors 154 could well remain invulnerable, 

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while 147's probability of survival could drop to 0.5 

or lower; advanced interceptcirs are in production in 

Soviet Union and may be expected to be encountered 

anywhere it suits the Soviets. 154's camera has higher 

resolution and swath width. 154 is less vulnerable to 

• 

SAM attrition. Finally, must consider a plausible range 

of tactical and political situations, not just one fixed 

situation. 

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