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MOL /DORIAN PROGRAM 

I Importance of the Program_to the United States 

The United States has a vital need for intelligence information 

pertaining to activities /developments within the Sino-Soviet and other 

denied areas. For various intelligence purposes, the types, quality, 

and quantity of information to be collected vary considerably, and 

therefore, a multiplicity of programs are contributing toward the fulfillment of the overall objective. Of significant importance to the total 

intelligence picture is the need for very high-resolution photographic 

coverage primarily for technical intelligence purposes, and it is to this 

purpose that the MOL/DORIAN Program is oriented. This program will 

provide the United States with a capability to obtain ground resolution photography, imagery of a quality far surpassing that associated 

with our present base of photographic intelligence. 

II Contributions of Aerospace to the Program 

For the first three years following its inception in mid-1960, 

Aerospace Corporation personnel were engaged in studies of manned 

military space system technologies, vehicle and system concepts, costs 

and effectiveness. These studies were performed for a wide range of 

possible manned military missions. It became clear, as a result of 

these activities, that a justifiable manned program could only be 

defined in the context of a mission area fulfilling a national need, and 

that, furthermore, the presence of the man must demonstrably enhance 

the mission effectiveness. 

The results of the mission studies indicated that the reconnaissance 

area presented the most attractive possibility for a manned system 

definition consistent with the foregoing thinking, and in the fall of 1963, 

Aerospace Corporation initiated intensive efforts in analyzing all aspects 

of the reconnaissance mission area to determine where the inclusion of 
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man could permit the realization of performance capabilities 

unattainable in unmanned approaches. While these studies were not 

limited to photographic reconnaissance only, primary emphasis was 

placed on this area. 

It soon became clear that field-of-view limitations, precise 

image -motion-compens ation requirements, and across-the-format 

(geometric) smears associated with optical systems designed to achieve 

very high ground resolution presented technological 

limitations which could be circumvented by using man to perform 

acquisition, target centering and tracking functions. Detailed analysis 

of man's ability to perform these functions and the equipments necessary 

to permit this were then initiated. 

Concurrently with the foregoing, conceptual studies were 

accomplished by Aerospace Corporation to define an overall flight 

vehicle and system. These studies resulted in selection of an orbiting 

vehicle comprised of a modified Gemini spacecraft, a laboratory 

module, and a large.-aperture optical system, launch by a Titan III 

vehicle in the integral launch mode. 

In late 1963, the direction of these activities underwent a major 

change based on directions received from Washington. It was then the 

belief of DOD leadership that the first step should be of a more limited 

nature. Rather than working toward the development of an operational 

reconnaissance system, an experimental approach wherein the ability 

of man to perform critical mission-oriented functions could be demonstrated and assessed, was indicated as the•more appropriate initial 

program. 

For the next year, planning activities were oriented toward that 

goal. Considerable efforts were expended in detailed analysis of 

potential manned contributions to military space missions, again 

primarily in the reconnaissance area, and resulted in the definition of 

a group of primary experiments for the MOL Program. 

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During this time period Aerospace defined the technically 

directed industry studies pertaining to the definitions of the necessary 

experiments payloads and major vehicle subsystems. Simultaneously, 

vehicle systems and operations studies were continued toward this 

newly defined program objective, which resulted in generation of a 

Preliminary Technical Development Plan, a System Performance/ 

Design Requirements specification and formal definition of the program 

Phase Zero industry efforts. The Aerospace effort was also aimed at 

narrowing down the approaches requiring consideration by industry, 

and assuring a high caliber RFP input and efficient contractor effort. 

In order to accomplish this it was necessary to establish a sound 

system configuration and approach with growth potential, establish the 

perferable subsystems as to type, characteristics, and requirements 

to limit scope of contractor's investigations, identify potential critical 

problem areas requiring detailed investigation, establish long lead 

time and development items, define the major trade-off considerations 

required to be investigated by the contractors, delineate the environmental criteria to be utilized by the contractors in their studies, develop 

probable contractor cost estimates for Air Force budgeting/planning 

consideration, and assist in establishing system segment definitions 

and associate contractor roles and responsibilities. Additionally, continual system planning activity assured that necessary flexibility for 

growth for an effective operational capability was maintained in the 

design. 

The ability of an experiments-oriented program to justify the 

large dollar expenditures necessary for its conduct was again heavily 

questioned by Aerospace Corporation in late 1964. Analysis of man's 

ability to perform the defined critical mission functions, plus the results 

of simulations conducted as part of the industry studies leading to the definition of the experimental payloads, engendered a high degree of confidence 

that these functions could in fact be performed, and that little additional 

confidence in this premise could be obtained via actual space flight. 

Aerospace again argued that the dollar expenditure necessary to realize 

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a manned system could only be supported if it resulted in an operational 

high-resolution photographic reconnaissance system, and toward the 

end of 1964 this position finally prevailed. 

From then through the summer of 1965, Aerospace Corporation 

was heavily engaged in design and systems analysis studies leading to 

the definition of the MOL/DORIAN Program. Utilizing parametric 

data on optical payload characteristics, developed through EastmanKodak and Aerospace Corporation analyses, systems analyses were 

conducted to optimize, within the launch vehicle constraints, the performance attainable as measured by resolution, mission duration and 

quantity of photographic take, and to demonstrate the advantages attainable 

via a manned approach. These studies directly resulted in the definition 

of the MOL/DORIAN flight vehicle concept and in the quantitative 

definition of the primary program objective as the achieving of theground resolution photography. Furthermore, the baseline system, 

as defined in the SPDR, incorporated sufficient flexibility for possible 

growth to improve mission economics and performance through a variety 

of potential alternative approaches. In response to questions raised at 

a National level, major technical and economic studies were completed 

which fully substantiated the baseline flight vehicle and launch site 

selection. These studies considered Saturn I and Titan III launch 

vehicles, Apollo and Gemini/MOL spacecraft, and operations from ETR 

and WTR. Briefings summarizing these efforts, presented at high 

levels of government during the summer of 1965, led to approval of the 

program by the President in August 1965. • 

Following program approval, Aerospace Corporation personnel 

contributed heavily to the detailed definition of the Phase I program and 

supported the Air Force System Program Office in establishing the 

necessary activities at the selected associate contractors. Detailed 

reviews of the contractor approaches and designs have been conducted 

on a continuing basis and technical directions provided to all aspects of 

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the program to ensure the development of an overall system compatible 

with mission objectives. The MOL Program utilizes Technical Working 

Groups, Interface Control Working Groups, and Technical Direction/ 

Program Review Meetings in accomplishing technical management. The 

Aerospace Corporation provides chairmanship of the Technical Working 

Groups and Technical Direction Meetings. Many of the Technical 

Working Groups are functionally oriented and serve to integrate activities across the multiple contractor structure. 

In late 1965, Washington requested that the feasibility and 

practicality of a parallel effort to develop an unmanned DORIAN system 

be investigated to ensure that the Country could retain this intelligence 

capability in the event that the use of the man was denied for any reason. 

Aerospace performed an in-depth appraisal of the technical feasibility of 

an unmanned DORIAN system, and during this study it was dem-o-nstrated 

that recent advances in navigation, pointing and IMC devices could 

result in an unmanned system providing comparable resolution performance. These devices were therfore included in both the manned and 

newly-defined unmanned vehicles in the MOL/DORIAN program. 

At this point, the need for a manned program again came under 

close scrutiny. If the resolution performance could be attained unmanned, 

then could the manned program be justified soley on the basis of earlier 

maturity of the unmanned system? Aerospace personnel therefore 

initiated a complete review of all aspects of the photographic reconnaissance operation to determine if there were primary mission functions 

other than acquisition and tracking, now automatable, that the man could 

.perform which would result in a significant, effectiveness advantage over 

the unmanned approach. Questions of increased total take due to man's 

performance of weather avoidance and target verification functions were 

subjected to rigorous statistical analyses, and while they could improve 

the mission effectiveness, the improvement was disappointingly low. 

The basic field-of-view limitation, it was then realized, had 

implications other than just a severe navigation and pointing requirement. 

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In effect, it results in the ability to contain but a single target within 

the field-of-view, as opposed to the multiplicity of targets containable 

within a single frame of lower-resolution, but wider field, photography. 

How then could photography of the right target at the right time be 

assured, considering that the presence of things or activities at the 

target which could yield vital technical intelligence information are 

highly transitory events ? This thinking led Aerospace to the definition 

of the active indicator concept, wherein the astronauts utilizing highpower acquisition telescopes could access targets other than those 

pre-programmed for the main camera. If activity was detected, they 

could redirect the main camera to these alternate targets thus 

enhancing the value of the technical intelligence information contained 

in the imagery. Analyses of the effectiveness of this mode have indicated 

that for an overall mission two to three times the number of active 

targets could be imaged by a manned system, and in the case of certain 

important, high-density, target clusters as many as six times. 

This concept was received by Dr. Flax and PSAC, with considerable interest and has since been subjected to considerable analysis in 

terms of the targeting programming problem and the nature of the 

necessary improved acquisition system. Additionally, simulators were 

fabricated and extensive exploratory simulations, using flight crew 

members as subjects, were conducted at Aerospace, and these tests have 

confirmed man's ability to perform the necessary visual target inspections. 

As a result, the improved acquisition system has been incorporated into • 

the baseline system and the mission planning software is being defined to 

include the capability for alternate target selection and programming. 

Early in 1966 it was apparent that program financial constraints 

and schedule considerations were such that significant changes in technical 

approach would be necessary. Accordingly, Aerospace identified areas 

which would enable reductions in program costs and which would have the 

least impact in reducing potential attainment of system objectives. In 

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addition to many hardware and test deletions, consideration was given 

to flight development schedules in terms of alternative sequencing 

and deletions of flights. These efforts contributed to changes including 

deletion of one mission simulator, reduction in complexity of development and test fixtures and devices, deletion of the laboratory environmental control system suit loop, simplification of the monitor and 

alarm system, deletion of two flights, and an adjustment in the launch 

schedule. 

More recently, Aerospace was asked to investigate the possibility 

of using the MOL/DORIAN 

under the constraint that no modifications to the hardware be made to achieve these 

capabilities. The results of Aerospace analyses indicated that these 

capabilities were attainable under this constraint, and based upon 

briefings presented to Major General Stewart in April 1967, the program 

received directions to insure the ability to incorporate these capabilities 

into the baseline, and define in depth the necessary software changes. 

Today the MOL/DORIAN Program is in Phase II engineering 

development, proceeding toward a date of December 1970 for the first 

manned flight. Aerospace Corporation is continuing in its role of 

providing general system engineering and technical direction of all 

aspects of the baseline program to ensure on-schedule and in-cost 

reAlization of program objectives. Studies of possible program growth 

avenues for enhancement of the primary mission objectives, as well 

as the possible utilization of MOL hardware for other military or NASA 

objectives, are underway on a continuous basis to provide overall 

longer-term direction to the program.