T. 73r, "PIN, ""11,711 

NRO APPROVEDFOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY-2(/15 

t.-•• , 

kl-.L1 Ilam":o via BYEI'ilAN 

Co troi System 

GAMBIT 

May 16, 1967 

AN UNMANNED DORIAN SYSTEM 

The question of the cost of an unmanned DORIAN Reconnaissance 

Sdcellite System R&D Program vs the cost of the manned/unmanned 

MOL/DORIAN R&D Program has been raised. The answer (including FY 67 

funds) is approximately $1.7 - 1.8 billion for a purely unmanned 

program vs approximately $2.2 billion for the present combined manned/ 

unmanned program. However, these two programs are not directly 

cost-comparable in terms of timing, risk, quality and quantity of 

,roduct, and future potential; thus, a further understanding is 

:equired in order to evaluate the estimates in their proper context. 

The President approved the MOL program on August 25, 1965. While 

the general public announcement referred to MOL only as a program to 

determine the utility of military man in space, the President actually 

had approved four very specific program objectives contained in 

Secretary McNamara's recommendation to him: 

1. Semi-operational use at the onset to secure photography 

of significant targets at a ground resolution of 

better than the GAMBIT-3 unmanned 

satellite reconnaissance system which is now in its R&D 

flight test phase). 

2. To develop high-resolution optical technology and camera 

systems for either manned or unmanned use. This technology 

41-14( 

Pfigo .1.. o ) A pages 

Copy of ../...copies 

- SAFSL Control tfisiftMt. 

GAMPT 

, 

01,1,14.a1e1 
r•;73 

t,:3 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE-1 JULY 2015 . v.,41, • rtfr-a 

4 . 

Cog C,

j

;TtrAal LI t) u 

GAMBIT 

would both permit the resolution objective 

and also be aimed at ultimately achieving systems with 

even better ground resolution 

3. To provide an orbital facility for the development, test 

and use of other potential military space applications 

(such as: SIGINT; radar observation; ocean surveillance; 

etc.). 

4. To provide an experimental program for the determination 

of man's utility in assembling large structures, and in 

adjusting, maintaining and processing the output from 

complex military equipment in space. 

The MOL Program today is oriented toward the early achievement of 

resolution operational photography in a manned vehicle; the 

subsequent demonstration (when feasible) of a similar capability in an 

unmanned vehicle; the optical technology and orbital hardware necessary 

for the future achievement of photography 

and the development of an orbital facility for the test and use 

of other potential military space applications. Subsequent to the 

President's program approval, detailed contract definition activities 

and numerous technical analyses have consistently reaffirmed the 

feasibility of these fundamental goals and the order in which they are 

being pursued. 

In the early conceptual phase of the MOL/DORIAN Reconnaissance 

Satellite System, successful operation of the very high resolution 

(744) 8 j I 

irTn r "7A.11 14,1 eRIFIr!sn,77.117 

Laa l. aLl• 

C., I 

Page ...17f o f, pages 

Copy of 

SAYSL Control 

,2 //S.3, -4 

• 
Page dJ/k pages 

:GAF Control. 

Copy of co ies 

J 

2/m--3-6 7 

- 2 f7, 6-11 

r.f 

• - V 

NRO ApPROVEb FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

N.:11v4, lir Pr:.en r 7 I 04 

hi11,11 

CLrTiti-G1 

GAMBIT 

camera, with its attendant narrow field of view (approximately 1.4 miles 

diameter on the ground from orbital altitudes), in an unmanned satellite 

was not considered feasible. Continued investigation of the precision 

devices necessary for such an unmanned system (highly accurate -- on 

the order of 1/20 of one percent-- image motion sensing; image motion 

compensation across the entire format; remote on-orbit optical alignment 

and focus adjustment; and more precise automatic navigation) led to the 

conclusion that they were feasible, albeit technically quite difficult 

to achieve. 

The desire to also develop an unmanned system stemmed from several 

reasons. First, it could provide a continued national capability for 

very high resolution reconnaissance photography of otherwise denied 

territory should international objections or foreign threats prevent 

manned operations, or if man should prove physically unable to perform 

as expected in MOL for extended periods in orbit. Further, Dr. Hornig, 

the President's Scientific Advisor, believed it possible, from an 

operational standpoint, that an unmanned system would eventually be 

desired to complement the manned system by performing the more routine 

reconnaissance missions or missions undertaken during times of 

particular political stress. Thus, in view of these considerations, 

plus the apparent feasibility of developing the necessary automatic 

devices, an unmanned DORIAN system of maximum interchangeability with 

the manned system was added as the finaiphase of the MOL Research and 

Development Program. 
775 

NRO APFIROVED FOR 

RELEASE1 JULY 2015 ;r1; VIT'7;p,f IL? to 

, 

GAMBIT 

It was also immediately apparent that the incorporation in the 

MOL/DORIAN system of many of the precise automatic devices necessary for 

the unmanned system would enhance man's contributions to the 

reconnaissance mission by freeing him from routine equipment operations. 

For example: 

1. By viewing through both the twin tracking/acquisition 

scopes and the main optics, the astronauts would be able 

to apply the final "vernier" adjustments in pointing, 

image motion compensation, etc., to insure consistent 

maximum performance by the camera system. 

2. By observing alternate targets through the tracking/ 

acquisition scopes, the astronauts would be able to 

select and photograph the maximum number of cloud-free 

targets. (This is a significant factor since the SinoSoviet Bloc averages some 60 percent cloud-cover at all 

times. Analyses indicate that the manned system, with 

the astronauts performing a cloud avoidance function, 

would return approximately 15-25 percent more cloud-free 

photographs than would an unmanned system on identical 

missions). 

3. By observing alternate targets through the tracking/ 

acquisition scopes even when weather avoidance was not a 

concern, the astronauts would be able to selectively 

choose targets of highest intelligence value (for example, 

6iYEMPA 

Cc.ts: Sysiom 

di V /-7, Cy / 

Page X_ 0 A! pages 

Copy _L_ of I_ co ies, 

:Ain Control 611 

L. d ti 4 Its- 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

an erected missile on a launch pad, in lieu of a 

nearby "empty" pad. Analyses indicate that these 

transitory intelligence gathering opportunities occur 

rather infrequently -- only about 6 percent of the time --

and that the manned system would photograph 2-3 times as 

many such targets in a 30 day mission as would the unmanned 

version). 

4. By viewing selected targets through the tracking/ 

acquisition scopes, the astronaut could determine the beat 

viewing angle from which a target should be photographed 

(for example, if approaching a parked aircraft from the 

rear and needed intelligence could only come from examining 

the fore end, the astronaut could wait until he passed 

over and take a backward-look picture). 

5. By viewing photographed targets both through the tracking/ 

acquisition scopes and the main optics, the astronauts 

could immediately report successful target photography to 

the ground and thus assist the establishment of retargeting 

priorities for photographic operations on subsequent days 

(analyses indicate that this orbit-by-orbit verification 

of coverage can increase the number of unique targets 

photographed in a 30 day mission by approximately 10 percent 

over that possible in an unmanned system which would then 

return a film capsule each 7 or 8 days). 

--,17 .177',11:11 

Page lit pages 

Copy of co ies 

DAFSL Control' 

ii:51.3 / 

t • 
NRO ARPAOVED-FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 TE? erNr74 7217'," 

,O U P: 

L, Q.5 J U 

ack1-111 

PIMA ,5 

CorA--,1 

—u•k 

GAMBIT 

Some additional reconnaissance functions are possible and planned 

for the manned version which are not now incorporated in the unmanned 

system design. These include: the rapid verification and optimization 

on-orbit of optical system performance (possible by direct viewing 

through the main optics of the target being photographed); reporting 

and readout to the ground of intelligence information of a perishable 

nature (this involves on-board processing of film from the secondary 

camera and either on-board interpretation and verbal reporting or 

electronic transmission of the pictures to the ground); 

selection and use of alternate film 

(color, infra-red, etc.) in the secondary camera used in conjunction 

with the primary optical system. It is_of course,conceivable that 

these and other functions might be performed in the future by some 

automatic system or combination of systems; however, the possibility in 

the manned system to experiment with a wide variety of alternatives and 

techniques is attractive and valuable in both time and money, whether 

or not the function is ultimately performed by man or by automatic 

device. 

Further contributions to the early achievement of the reconnaissance 

objectives will be realized through man's ability to analyze on-orbit 

failures and malfunctions and either select alternative equipments and 

operating modes or replace directly with his own capability the 

function of failed equipment (for example, manually control the pointing 

W 

PLa 

Fj; 1.ro zeticAnAA1 

(1;pyrr„.1 

jaLmi 

Page _ _ o 61 1 : JP / pages 

Copy of op es 

SAFSL Control _ 

. r .5-- 
/ 

Page _Z of Zehages 

Copy -4-/- of popies 

SL Control 41::.7..21.14-3 

NRO APPIROV.ED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

flan via BYEMAN 

Control System 

GAMBIT 

of the main optics, or manually compensate for apparent image motion). The 

net result is an early and continued reliability advantage of the manned 

system over that of an automated and complex unmanned system. 

There are other facets of the present MOL/DORIAN Program unique to manned 

space flight. For example, for the foreseeable future, we see no reasonable 

approach to achieving photography of resolution 

except via a man-controlled system on-orbit; the MOL GEMINI/Laboratory/ 

Booster combination can be used essentially without change in meeting this goal. 

The possible future resupply and reuse of equipment on-orbit, using manned 

rendezvous and docking techniques (as demonstrated in the GEMINI Program, and 

which are an integral part of the APOLLO Program), indicate potential for 

highly cost-effective long-duration missions in any follow-on MOL Program. 

As indicated by Secretary McNamara in his recent testimony before the 

House Appropriations Committee, the MOL Program is estimated to cost $2.2 

billion (from the beginning of engineering development on 1 September 1966 

through the final R&D flight in 1972). Seven test flights are included: two 

unmanned launches in 1970 to qualify the Gemini B, Laboratory and Mission 

Module structures, certain subsystems, and the Titan IIIM booster (which has 

seven-segment, solid rocket motors in contrast to the five-segment motors 

used by the T-IIIC); three manned missions, beginning in December 1970; and 

two unmanned missions. Of the total cost, it is estimated that approximately 

$200 million is attributable to R&D associated with the unmanned version. 

If the manned portion of the MOL/DORIAN Program were cancelled on 

July 1, 1967, two alternative approaches to the continued development 

Frp7N 

ilEndL via BYEMAN 

C,Ttrol System 
via BYEMAN 

Control System 

GAMBIT 

g FJ4 c'e 

CUIL:=11/41.ZiL g 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE1 JULY 2015 

of an unmanned system are possible. The first would be to simply eliminate 

from the present program all sub-systems and hardware pertaining solely to 

the manned system (i.e.: terminate the GEMINI portion of the program; 

delete all life-support systems and man-operated equipment from the Douglas 

and General Electric Laboratory and Mission Module efforts). The second 

possibility would be to continue the camera system and booster developments 

(eliminating all man-safety considerations from the latter), cut back the 

GE Mission Module effort to only that necessary for an unmanned system, 

and design a completely new spacecraft and data recovery system which have 

been optimized as an unmanned spacecraft. In both cases, the cost from 

September 1, 1966 (including necessary termination costs for efforts now 

underway pertaining to a manned system) through a ten-flight R&D program, 

culminating in late 1973, is estimated to be approximately $1.7-$1.8 billion. 

In both cases, the first unmanned flight probably could occur at about end 

CY 70. 

It is our estimate, based upon experience in the GAMBIT-3 Program 

(five flights have been completed in the 8-launch R&D Program), that the 

absence of man increases the development risk and that at least ten unmanned 

DORIAN system R&D launches would be required to have a reasonable possibility 

of achieving the same program maturity expected at the completion of the 

current MOL/DORIAN manned system R&D Program. Although many of the same 

aatamatic devices necessary for the unmanned version have been included in 

the manned system, it should be noted that many of the devices have either 

never before been used in orbital reconnaissance systems or else 

" .. Zj;.: v!a HEM 

geritrol System 

-elgr-d /7 / 

Page -1 0074*pages 

Copy _11. of __e co ies 

SAFSL Control. 

{73 — 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

!adle via BYEMAN 

Control System 

GAMBIT 

represent large extrapolations in precision, accuracy, or other characteristics 

from the present technology base. While these devices can ultimately be made 

to perform reliably within desired tolerances, it is by no means certain as to 

how long it might take to achieve those results. Nor is it certain that an 

unmanned system will ever be as reliable as a manned system. For this reason, 

the risk of early achievement of resolution is assessed as considerably greater in the unmanned system than in the manned system. However, 

by initially including manned flights in the development program, the 

resolution unmanned capability should be achieved earlier than through 

an independent unmanned development program. 

As indicated previously, the differential development cost for including 

a manned operating mode and a manned vehicle development as well as an 

unmanned operating mode in the MOL/DORIAN Program is estimated at approximately $400 million more than that required for an independent unmanned 

system. From a cost-effectiveness standpoint, if the weather avoidance 

compensation potential of the manned system is realized to the extent of 

a plus 20 percent, this difference would be almost entirely offset by the 

increased photography collected by the manned system. The additional 

benefits derived from astronaut selection of those targets of highest 

intelligence potential is not calcuable in terms of dollars. 

= 1AN 4

via BYEMAN 

ef1rq--1 eve tar, 

Page if of JAges 

r. Copy of Z._ copies!. 

SAYSL Control /344::=2.14.573 -1r / 
NROAPPROVEQVOR ,r,17.,..7,,, ry7.7.71;7.,7A7 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 ;1 il i , A ,.e.::, :4 ,. , L'J iii:n via P""'1l!'

.1 li 01 c;;;.:,2.- ,,iL:..--. id Lilgt.1441, 

ue:Li,:: -.1;■ ,,,;rri 

GAMBIT 

From another standpoint, the cost differential should be viewed 

as greatly increased confidence in achieving the desired operational 

capability at the earliest possible date. To be more specific, if 

some of the automatic devices failed to function in the manned system, 

the net result would only be a certain reduction in the quantity and/or 

quality of photographic product; however, failure of the same devices 

in an unmanned system would mean total failure as a photographic reconnaissance system. Since these devices do represent very advanced technology, 

it is believed their operation and test initially in a manned space 

system will reduce considerably the time required for them to meet 

design specifications with acceptable reliability. 

Last, the MOL laboratory module has sufficient flexibility to 

develop the equipment necessary for extremely high resolution photography 

as well as other military missions. New military missions, when 

validated, such as communications intelligence or ocean surveillance, 

can be added to the MOL Program by the fabrication of new mission 

modules and some minor modifications (control and operating equipment) 

to the laboratory module; other elements of the system can be used without 

change. All of our studies of such applications validate that longer 

lifetimes on orbit and the use of the equipment will be greatly 

augmented by inclusion of manned missions in at least the development 

phase. 

10 

Ae Ci1 tr3YEINI 

• .1;7r-nt.-1 

• " 

/ 

Paga.&_ofpages 

copy_t_of_j__co les 

SAF—SL Control 

-2//J_3' 6 7 
7 . - 

NRO APPROVED.F.OR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

r7•4', 

... • • . 

C104 

t. 

CCK:71 

GAMBIT 

Thus, in light of all of the preceding, it appears conclusive 

that the additional incremental development cost of developing a manned/ 

unmanned MOL/DORIAN system over that of an independent unmanned program 

is more than offset by both the near term advantages and the long range 

potential. 

11 

147 ,17/ Page_LL_OW16.2..pageS 

vp,rzr,4A1.• 

jiLiana -..,, • ' 4"i, 7•77. -:.:,% , ., Copy..../.._of_l__cs 

Cir54.— • -..;:<1 : , 7;F-SL COntrOl-UWEBagY Lriii ... J ....r.,....a. - ; 4 (Tv: •,, 

- 

N.,,..... 1-3r4-7- i/i.5- 3 -‘, / 
z 

0 

a, 

0 

U 

4.1 

J1 

H En 0 

_ 

ME■NM 

„ .. • •i411 4.0 / “ 

• 

r0 

IN 11111111111 1111/111111/1 

■Mil z 1111111 

iimmul LliJIBILIMIRIIII 

MINI IIIIIII IMO c 

m v 

v' MI I ME NM 

a cr., Ka IMO 

>. 

r1 ?:: 

. 

- 

-,. 

,- _ 

-, , 

r..) r-- 

c i 

z 

I NMI c 

Ell v 

EM. ‘c. 

INN 

■ , ■ INN 

IIIMI 

n . 

.. X in NMI INI 

2 

M 

i.,_ ih2 F.,_ 

- - 

C) 

c X ,:r 

Lig sl) z 

o c 

,t INIII Lil Lr' W rn 

=MI 2 

Ell NI 

Mill =I 

... 

-rc MI '14 M " ■MI 

IIIIII NM 

L.. 111111 _ 

EMI III 

N 

>- 

c' 

. NI r" bli ,..., • 

- 

. 

c 

Or.,-, c, 

..r im 

. — IN 

Ell t2 ,, 

i <..c H 

. 

. 41:i 

a 13 1 PI 

CaseA: Curre

nt MOL/DORIAN Mixed 

-Manned/Unmanned Program I 

1 Launch Schedule 

(DORIAN syste

m) 

Est. Cost 2 billion 

CaseB: WhollyUnmanned DORIAN 

Program 

Launch Schedule 

• 

Cra Est. Cost-$ 1. 7-

$1.8 billion 

a 

Ja 

; 

. 

At 

• 

C , 

S 

4 

o . 

: 

p 

Y'L 

4 

. 

— 

- 4 

i 

C.n 

I 

• 

.r 

• 

j 

r. 

I 

_ 

-e. 

n.izn 

DC . • 

' full e v 

0 

'UJ 

0 

0_ 

0 UK 

Z fr.<