No. 87-556 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1988 

GYPSY-HIGHVIEW GATHERING SYSTEM, 

INC., a Montana corporation, 

Defendant and Appellant, 

THE MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF STATE LANDS, 

Plaintiff and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Teton, 

The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Selden S. Frisbee, Cut Bank Montana 

For Respondent : 

Tommy H. Butler, Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 3, 1988 

Decided: April 6, 1988 

Clerk 
Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

Gypsy-Highview Gathering System, Inc. (hereafter 

Gypsy-Highview) appeals the granting of summary judgment to 

'the Department of State Lands (hereafter department), which 

forces Gypsy-Highview to relinquish State of Montana oil and 

gas lease number 17,092-75 located in Teton County, Montana. 

Gypsy-Highview claims the summary judgment of the Ninth 

Judicial District Court is void since it contains no findings 

of fact or conclusions of law and also claims only the Board 

of Land Commissioners, not the department, can cancel the 

lease. We affirm. 

Gypsy-Highview was the assignee of an oil and gas lease 

on school trust land in Teton County entered into December 2, 

1975. The term of the lease was for ten years and as long 

after that as the lease produced commercial quantities of oil 

and gas. Commercial quantities were never produced from the 

lease, although some 100 gallons were produced while testing 

a well during the primary term of the lease. Gypsy-Highview 

has never paid any royalties on the lease. The department 

notified Gypsy-Highview on November 18, 1986 that its lease 

was terminated and that it had ten days under A.R.M. 26.3.214 

to request a hearing on the termination. No such request was 

made until December 4, 1986, which the department denied as 

not being timely. 

The department sued on February 17, 1987 seeking a 

recordable instrument from Gypsy-Highview surrendering the 

lease. The department requested a summary judgment under 

Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., while Gypsy-Highview moved to dismiss 

under Rule 12 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. The District Court heard 

arguments on October 16, 1987 and granted summary judgment to 

the department on October 21. The court ordered 
Gypsy-Highview to furnish a recordable instrument 

surrendering the lease and to inform the department of its 

selection of an appraiser in connection with the appraisal 

of the pipe and equipment. 

Gypsy-Highview argues first that the court's summary 

judgment is improper since it provides no findings of fact or 

conclusions of law. Rule 52 (a) , M.R.Civ.P., however, 

specifically states that findings and conclusions are 

unnecessary in Rule 56 motions as long as the court's order 

". . . specif [ies] the grounds therefor with sufficient 

particularity as to apprise . . . the appellate court of 

[its] rationale . . . " Recent decisions echo the principle 

that findings and conclusions are not required for Rule 56(c) 

summary judgment. See, Simmons v. Jenkins (Mont. 1988), 

P. 2d , 45 St.Rep. 328, 334; Lewis v. Department of 

Revenue (1984), 207 Mont. 361, 375, 675 P.2d 107, 114; Downs 

v. Smyk (1979), 185 Mont, 16, 19, 604 P.2d 307, 309. 

As mentioned above, the absence of genuine questions of 

material fact and the determination of whether the moving 

party is entitled to judgment is the appropriate standard of 

review. Sevalstad v. Glaus (Mont. 1987), 737 P.2d 1147, 

1148, 44 St.Rep. 930, 932. The department meets that burden 

by showing that the lease had never produced commercial 

quantities of oil and gas, that Gypsy-Highview personnel 

could point to no more than 100 gallons of production from 

the lease, and that the lease agreement provides that it 

shall end after ten years if no commercial quantities were 

being produced. The lease terms speak for themselves and 

under them no question of fact is presented and the 

department is entitled to a surrender of the lease. 

Gypsy-Highview's other argument is that its lease was 

not cancelled properly since the department notified 

Gypsy-Highview of the cancellation. Gypsy-Highview claims 
that the terms of the lease provide only the Board of Land 

Commissioners with the authority to terminate the lease. 

Paragraph 19 of the lease reads: 

It is understood and agreed that the 

lessor [State of Montana] hereby reserves 

the right to declare this lease forfeited 

and to cancel the same through the State 

Board of Land Commissioners upon failure 

of the lessee to fully discharge all the 

obligations provided herein, after 

written notice from said Board . . . 

Section 77-1-301, MCA, however, empowers the department 

to lease and manage state lands as directed by the Board of 

Land Commissioners. The Board has delegated such duties to 

the Commissioner of State Lands and the department, subject 

only to review by the Board. In this case, the Board 

reviewed the matter but never overrode the department's 

action. 

In Jeppeson v. Department of State Lands (1983), 205 

Mont. 282, 667 P.2d 428, this Court upheld summary judgment 

for the department when it, not the Board of Land 

Commissioners, gave notice to the lessee of grazing land that 

his lease had expired due to his failure to make timely rent 

payments. Summary judgment was held to be proper since the 

lease was cancelled by operation of law when the rent was 

unpaid, not by the actions of the department. Jeppeson, 667 

P.2d at 430. The same is true in this case--the lease 

expired because of Gypsy-Highview' s failure to produce 

commercial quantities of oil and gas during the primary term, 

not because of the department's actions. Since the lands 

granted to the state by the federal government for the 

support of public schools constitute a trust, the department 

has a fiduciary duty to manage them for the state's utmost 

advantage. Jeppeson, 667 P.2d at 431. The uncontroverted 

evidence shows that the department in this case cancelled a 
lease because of lack of production of oil and gas. It does 

not appear that the court erred by granting summary judgment. 

Affirmed . 

We concur: 

Justices / "