United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 19-3692

___________________________

Gregory Rose

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant

v.

Mike Galbson, Judge, Osceola; Catherine Dean, Prosecutor, Osceola; Oilliey

Collins, Chief, Osceola Police Department; Terry, Detective, Osceola Police

Department; Chris Gillis, Detective, Osceola Police Department

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Jonesboro

 ____________

 Submitted: April 27, 2020

Filed: June 10, 2020

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Gregory Rose appeals the district court’s pre-service dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint, which claimed that he was unlawfully arrested and held in pre-trial

detention on criminal charges, and that he was defamed. The district court dismissed
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, concluding that Rose’s claim related to his

arrest was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and that his claim related to

his pre-trial detention failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution. The district

court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Rose’s defamation claim.

Upon de novo review, we conclude that Rose’s claim related to his arrest was

properly dismissed as time-barred. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388–89

(2007) (articulating the date of accrual for false arrest claims); Humphrey v. Eureka

Gardens Pub. Facility Bd., 891 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2018) (statute of limitations

in Arkansas for personal injury claims is three years). We conclude, however, that

Rose’s claim related to his pre-trial detention presents unsettled questions of law

unsuited for dismissal under section 1915A. See Stanko v. Patton, 228 Fed. Appx.

623, 626 (8th Cir. 2007) (unpublished per curiam) (expressing no view on merits but

vacating district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint under § 1915A and

remanding because claims were not frivolous). Such questions include whether

malicious prosecution is the most appropriate analogy for determining the accrual of

Rose’s claim and if so, what are the elements of such a claim. Compare Manuel v.

City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2018) (concluding that claim of

detention without probable cause is not analogous to tort of malicious prosecution

and thus accrued when plaintiff was released from custody) with Winfrey v. Rogers,

901 F.3d 483, 493 (5th Cir. 2018) (concluding that plaintiff’s claim of “arrest[]

through the wrongful institution of legal process” was analogous to malicious

prosecution and thus accrued “when his criminal proceedings ended in his favor”).

Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of Rose’s claim related to his pre-trial

detention, vacate the dismissal of his defamation claim, and remand for further

proceedings with instructions that the complaint be served on the defendants. In all

other respects, we affirm. We also grant Rose’s motions for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, and deny as moot his motion for appointment of counsel.

______________________________

-2-