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A REPORT BY J-5 

FIRST CORRIGENDUM 

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES 

to the 

HOLDERS OF JCS 2283/384 

A Report by the J-5 on 

AN OFFER OF INSPECTION OF THE MANNED ORBITAL LABORATORY (MOL)(U) 

FIRST CORRIGENDUM 

At the request of the originator, holders are requested 

0/5 , 6, 

to insert the.attached revised pages 1,y, ?, and diS in 

the subject report and destroy the superseded pages in 

accordance with existing security regulations. 

R. C. FORBES 

J. E. MANSFIELD 

Joint Secretariat 

GROUP 1 

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ENCLOSURE 

DRAFT 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Subject: An Offer of Inspection of the Manned 

Orbital Laboratory (MOL) (U) 

1. (U) Reference is made to a memorandum* from the 3. 

Assistant Secretary of. Defense (International Security 2 

Affairs) for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, same 3 

subject, dated 8 October 1965, which forwarded a Department 4 

of State proposal** in which it is recommended "that the 5 

United States be prepared, if apprehensions over the MOL 6 

program seem to be building up seriously, as a result 7 

of allegations that the MOL is intended to carry weapons 8 

of mass destruction, to offer inspection of such vehicles 9 

before launch, on a basis of reciprocity." 10 

2. 4-9)-Although the political and psychological 11 

impacts of a United States proposal for verified inspec- 12 

tion are presented in the Department of State proposal, 13 

tho impact of our national security program is not 14 

adequately treated. Oe±itainly, before aiiy dibotisditiha 15 

are undertaken by the Department of State in the United 16 

Nations or at any international level, these security 17. 

implications require the most careful consideration, and 18 

the disadvantages must be evaluated against the possible 19 

political gains that might result. 20 

3. -(TO)- The United States policy regarding pre-launch 21 

inspection is clear and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe 22 

it to be consistent with our security interests. National 

Security Council Action 244 states: 

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"The US should note in connection with private 

disclosures that, except in some cases for specifically 

defined disarmament agreements, the US cannot agree to: 

a. Declarations of the precise purpose of all 

satellites, 

b. Declaration of the equipment of all satellites, 

c. General requirements for advance notification 

of all satellite launching and the tracks of satellites, 

d. Pre-launch inspection of the satellites, or 

e. A specific definition of peaceful uses of space 

which does not embrace unlimited observations." 

In furtherance of this policy the United States has on 

record with the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 

a proposal for pre-launching inspection of space vehicles 

as part of its general proposal on the freeze on nuclear 

delivery vehicles. The United States has said: 

uObservers would witness announced missile and 

space firings to ensure that the proper types and 

numbers of vehicles were being launched. It is our 

view that pre-launch inspection should consist of 

visual observation of the gross characteristics of 

the vehicle being launched." 

4. (TC) There are three possible Soviet reactions 

which could result from deviating from current US policy 

specifically for Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) -

rejection, delayed acceptance, or immediate agreement. 

On the basis of interim examination, the following general 

observations appear appropriate: 

a. Rejection. The United States would probably 

emerge with a higher prestige factor in the international arena. On the other hand, having indicated 

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should be expected that numerous additional proposals 

for "deviation" will be surfaced. 

b. The Delayed Acceptance. The Soviet Union could at 

first decline and then accept the proposal (and this 

option is open to them in the Department of State 

proposal) in which case, should they match their acceptance to the launch dates for MOL, they would regain any 

lost prestige and successfully expose or preclude US 

exploitation of at least a portion of the United States 

overhead reconnaissance program. 

c. Immediate Agreement. Should the Soviet Union 

agree immediately to such a proposal, the potential 

political gain or value to the United States would 

be questionable, and other gains minimal. This 

elective appears most disadvantageous to the United 

States. 

5. It would appear that at most the United States 

might gain some international goodwill and perhaps some 

further acceptance of the use of satellites for reconnaissance purposes. The technical and intelligence gains 

about the Soviet Union would be questionable. On the 

other hand, the Soviet Union, by acceptance, would also 

enhance its image and in addition, would gain intelligence 

and technologies, including detailed knowledge about our 

current capabilities. Additionally, the United States could 

conceivably be placed in a most awkward position with nothing 

to gain and much to lose if the proposal is seized 

upon and accepted by a third party. Inadequate consideration has been given to this possibility which merits the 

most careful analysis and s TCS .25/44 4,47 

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6. The preponderance of the Department of 

State arguments in favor 04: initiation of an offer to 

inspect the MOL prior to launch is centered around an 

attempt to assuage any international apprehension that 1.; 

might develop from adverse Soviet Union propaganda, and 

to enhance the image of the United States intentions in 

space. In the arguments opposing such an offer, the 7 

Department of State acknowledges that the proposal could 

jeopardize not only the MOL program, but seriously affect 

the entire United States National Reconnaissance Satellite 1C 

Program, even though the proposal is rejected by the 11 

Soviet Union. In view of the overriding importance of 12 

the National Reconnaissance Program to our national 1' 

security and the fact that it is our primary - and in some 14 

areas the only source of information with which to develop 15. 

critical intelligence about the Sino-Soviet Bloc, as well It 

as other areas world-wide, this capability must not be 1; 

jeopardized. if 

7. -(-8-)-The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend 1S 

that the pre-launch inspection offer of the MOL, as proposed 2( 

by the Department of State, be withdrawn from any further 2: 

consideration. 22 

8. (U) The extremely short time available for this 

response has not permitted detailed development of all the 2/ 

adverse impacts of such a proposal on our security interests. 2 

In the event such a study is desired, the Joint Chiefs of 2L 

Staff are prepared to undertake it. 2' 

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