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-1St-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. i

February 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Release of Satellite Photography ' •

This memorandum is the NRO response to the February 3,

1973 memorandum to you from the Assistant Secretary for

Public Affairs. The question of whether or not to officially

admit to the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance has been considered very often in the interagency forum since the national

policy was established in 1962. Following each review it has

been decided that the release of the "fact of" satellite

reconnaissance would not accrue any long run benefit to

either the Government or the public and that an official

public disclosure would serve to, in the long run, draw out

most of the facts about the precise nature of the satellite

reconnaissance effort. The most recent decision to retain

the present policy was made last June by Dr. Kissinger after

considerable debate about the level of public disclosure

required for SALT ratification. The SALT agreements were

able.to be ratified by the Congress without open discussion

of the systems to be used for "national means of verification."

demand by the public or the media for proof of our verification adequacy never materialized.

As you are aware, the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance

is protected within the TALENT-KEYHOLE Control System. The

Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for maintenance

of this compartmented system. In order to publicly acknowledge

the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance and release the product,

the DCI must obtain the concurrence of the President. The

Secretary of Defense does not have the unilateral authority

to adopt Mr. Friedheim's recommendation.

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I recommend that prior to making your position final on

this matter you should discuss the issue directly with the

DCI. The DCI, under the present NRO arrangement, provides •

the security policy for the conduct of the National Reconnaissance

Program. If you desire to pursue Mr. Friedheilm's recommendation

further, I will be happy to brief you on the pro and con arguments which have been presented over

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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February 3, 1973

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PIJOIJC AFFAIRS

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)RANDUN FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Release of Special Photography

. Appropriate Air Force authorities have been the focal point

for consideration of this topic in each of several recent years.

Their files probably contain many of the pros and cons, particularly

in technical areas, and you may wish to draw upon those. On several

occasions we provided them input'on PA aspects.

. I support release of photography, providing appropriate

selection safeguards are established to prevent any inadvertint

damage to national security or personnel safety. There is nothing

so Credible to the public as a picture of how things really look.

The best historic example of this was the success of the McNamara •

photography display which proved to the public and our allies that

there were Soviet missiles in Cuba.

3. There are several traditionally-raised objections to release

of special photography.

• •

It would encourage neutralization and camouflage.

It compromises technology, schedules and overall capabilities.

•

••

Rather than "open skies" third nations including some

friends and allies would regard it as "spying." -

It would provide an illusion that we know everything and

need no other collection methods or on-site inspections.

It would complicate diplomacy.

f. It is the President's ace-in-the-hole and should be saved

for only the direst sort of emergency.

•

4. There are other, and I believe much stronger, reasons %shy this

photography should be used selectively during SecDef open Congressional

testimony this spring: •
•

. Priedheim

Assistant Secretary

•

•

2.

••• •

• •

Scores of Congressmen' and allied officials have seen it.

• bThe fact of" is the worst kept secret we have. It is '

widely known and regularly written about.

c.. There are ways to protect specific technical and schedule

capabilities. •

. d. Neutralization capabilities are being pursued as is

.camouflage. •

As the new SecDef you are moving from a beyond-Vietnam

period when government credibility was seriously questioned into a

time when you need a dramatic new way to show that we know what we

are talking about.

The precise statistics we produce every year in the Defense'

Report and in testimony, the precision with which we talked at SALT-tine

about Soviet missiles/submarines; and the fact that we can produce such

"artist's concepts" as the. attached on the building Soviet carrier all

i •

demonstrate how good our "national means of • verification" arc.

g. Most importantly, if we are to provide the American people

with the facts they need to support the defense budget and capabilities

necessary to maintain Nixon Doctrine detente for a generation of peace;

then we must make visible the now-invisible Soviet threat and the

momentum of Chinese weapons growth.

h. If this is, indeed, an era of non-confroniation, then no

nation need fear us and no nation need be upset if we take those steps

which are essential to make our informed-citizenry-democracy work.

If others have no need to do that under their own governmental systems,

then they can have our understanding of their situation with the

expectation on our part that they understand our situation. It's coexistence understood and tolerated by all sides.

S. . Ny recommendation is that rather th

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 an making this release a

dramatic Presidential and emergency event, the SecDef simply include in

his unclassified Defense Report and testimony Lon_of_st_tephotos weltaye

shown in recent ears at NATO. That would cross the bridge, enhance

credibi ty, make the deman s of detente visible, and meet our ultimate

responsibilities to the American public while still safeguarding national

.security.

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