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DIRSCTORATIL OP 'PIMA CC OSAPi

DEPieChT THE FORCE

AP UNIT POST OPPICS, LOS ANOai.U. CALIPORNIA 10045

•

4 NovemIns 1965

IMPLY TO

ATTN Ore

sum= e Comments on Alternate Mans enxent Arr em

Toe rector, NRO (Dr. Flax)

1. As requested by your 27 October memorandum on this subject,

here are my comments and recommendations on the 15 October

Task Group report on the above subject.

•

In any consideration of management arrangements for any projects

of the National Reconnaissance Program, I believe that the overall

objective should be, unequivocally, the strongest, most effective

management structure possible. I cannot see how any avoidable

degradation to this objective can be accepted responsibly, in the

light of the national importance of these projects, nor the basis of

any assignment be, instead, as has been proposed so often in past

discussions on this subject, one of maximum utilisation of resources,

or the equitable distribution of projects or tasks, or the preservation

of separate organisational identity and/or prerogatives of the pirtici-

, pating agencies.

I believe that the following principles are mandatory requirements of

any management plans under which the above objective can be met:

Overall project responsibility and corresponding authority,

including responsibility and authority for overall system engineering

and system integration, must be delegated to a single person who is

organisationally and geographically located and appropriately

chartered with respect to the resources involved, such that he can

effectively control all such resources as necessary to carry out this

overall responsibility.

This overall project management responsibility and authority

must be delegated to the person referred to above, as head of his

NRO element; no management responsibility or authority should be

retained by the parent agency as such (as, for instance, the Air Force

has no management responsibility or authority over NRO projects

assigned to SAFSP).

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The person having this overall responsibility, and any

(properly cleared) personnel he designates (from his office, his

SE/TD contractor or his supporting resources) must have unrestricted access to all contractors and facilities participating in

the project, and all information concerning all aspects of the project.

He must have authority to determine need-to-know, for these personnel,

for any information concerning the project, and authority to grant any

project clearances necessary fo rmation, to personnel he

determines to meet publishe earability requirements.

For projects where divided management is directed, the

person having this overall responsibility must be delegated corresponding authority over all participants in both agencies, established by

specific directives in each agency, to all personnel who are or may

be, concerned. •

4. In addition to the above basic considerations, the re are three

practical factors which bear on the question at hand:

Any management plan adopted should be considered' capable of

preventing the known difficulties which have periodically plagued the

management of the CORONA project during the last several years.

Although these problems have receded during periods of success, * •

they have flared up sporadically, usually, but not always, at times of

technical changes in the project, and when mission failures have

occurred. These problems have been caused by inter-agency difficulties.

which are the direct result of the present management arrangement for

this project. In this regard, even the most difficult of contractor interface problems can be less deleterious than an inter-agency impasse.

The former can be solved at the working level, but the latter cannot,

and the frequent escalation of working-level problems to higher echelons

inevitably results in serious delibitation of the overall project management, and prevents the attainment of -viable rapport which is essential

to effective joint endeavor.

The CORONA project is a very poor management model for any

new project. Both the circumstances which originally made split

management of this project necessary and the factors which made the

development eventually successful have long since vanished. The project

survives under the present management arrangement only because it has

gradually been developed into a high level of reliability, after considerable

difficulties spread over a number of years. It has reached this point

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and survives in spite of, not because of, its present management

.structure. This project development was initiated with a very

simple, single camera, and has very gradually evolved over more

than five years of flight and numerous difficulties into the present

two-camera payload, with an awdliary indexing camera and a dual

recovery capability. It is still extremely simple in comparison with,

and not at all representative of, the proposed system for which a manage-.

ment plan is presently being sought. There is no overall systems

engineering or overall system integration, aside from work performed,

without overall supervision, by a common contractor.

c. It should be noted that the interfaces on existing satellite reconreasons t these interfaces were se e 4. • 44. • ro e

have no necessary connection with selection of the interface for new

projects; what should govern this choice is how well the selected interface fits the type and complexity of the project in question; and whether

it will permit the most effective overall system engineering and

' .systems integration under the circumstances which must apply.

5. Before commenting on the alternate management plans, I have a few

observations on the report as a whole: I agree that the Task Group

identified alternatives that span the range of possibilities, and that

their report can serve a useful purpose in the task of defining a workable management plan. However, the overall effort of the Group was

marled by departing from its charter to consider its task as one of

developing "management approaches applicable to any system undertaking * * *," as noted in par IIa, rather than concentrating on the specific

project in question. In this, and other respects, the Group did not follow

the 11 August Agreement, which clearly considers this particular project

different from any other new project possibilities (in the latter case,

among other points, it specifies determination of sensor responsibility

by the Executive Committee; in the case of this project, it specifies that

the CIA will be responsible for the optical sensor subsystem after

certain events have transpired). The Task Group also considered

arrangements which are excluded by the Agreement, and in other

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instances, read things into the Agreement which simply are not there.

• The Group also embrac'ed wide extremes of arrangements which it

considered workable, while dismissing what it "generally felt" to be

the best way to manage a project with no more specific justification

than "all things considered, despite its appeal, the Task Group does

not recommend this management arrangement" (1:11b(4). Yet, other

admittedly less desirable arrangements are treated in much greater

detail and considered feasible and workable. More effort apparently

was made to get agreement between the three Group members than to

justify the matters agreed upon. The range of these excursions and

the inconsistencies between the Group's stated conclusions and supporting

rationale is such as to render the fact of Task Group agreement, and its

recommendations, per se, of questionable value; the worth: of its conclusions and recommendations must be determined by the validity of

the stated supporting rationale, and not the fact of Group unanimity on

any particular point.

6. My judgment on the relative strength and weakness of the alternate

plans considered by the Task Group is summarised below (sub-paragraph

titles refer to corresponding titles within the report):

"Overall System Responsibilities in the NRO" (i. e. , •DNRO 

and NRO Staff.- I agree that this is totally unworkable and should

receive no consideration.

"Fully Integrated System Project Office"

I agree with the concept.

I agree with the Task Group that this is the best way to

manage a system project, and that there are no significant factors

mitigating against such an arrangement.

(3) For reasons which I note in the last paragraph of this

letter, I believe that in this concept, the total responsibility for the

system should be assigned to SAFSP.

c. "Co-System Project Directors"

(1) I cannot agree with this concept. The only way that the

DNRO can hold Co-SPD's "jointly and equally responsible" for overall

system matters, such as system engineering and integration, is to do

all overall jobs himself -- a patently impossible task. There is just no

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such thing as joint responsibility of different people in different

agencies of the government concerning management of different

aspects of a single project. This is not a responsible management

arrangement -- it is a retreat from it. There must be some one in

charge, with overall responsibility and commensurate authority over

all aspects of the system, and this person must be organisationally

and geographically located and chartered with the resources and time

to carry out the task. For a new project, unencumbered with historical

carry-over arrangements, I can see no rational basis for deliberate

selection of this type of management. The relatively elaborate detail

with which the Task Group presented this option only partially illustrates

the complexity that would be involved in attempting to implement this

scheme. And in spite of this involved arrangement, there still would not

be a single authorititive project manager, and no effective overall

system engineering and integration.

In working out their proposed assignment of responsibilities under this plan, the Task Group oversimplified some important

matt la, for instance, the proposed division of responsibilities at

IIIc(6). The proposed division is obviously based upon consi of relatively simple systems and interfaces; the •on-orbit

operation is not this clean-cut for new, more complex systems. -There

is too much interaction possible between payload, power, stabilisation,

programming, command and control, etc. And choosing a team chief

by mutual agreement for each orbital operation, as proposed, is utterly

absurd.

One of the biggest and most significant "cons" was omitted

entirely by the Task Group in par Mc(9): There is simply no way in

which responsible overall system engineering, system integration,

and project direction can be done under this plan.

d. "The Segregated System Project Office"

(1) As described in the report, this plan is the same as the

Co-SPD plan with two minor and two major modifications. The minor

modifications are the re-naming of the Co-SPD.of one agency as the

APD, and the assignment to the SPD of a Deputy SPD by the agency which

has the APD. The first major difference is the assignment of total

responsibility for the system to the SPD. The second major difference

is the assignment of responsibilities for specific sub-systems to

separate organisations who are "held responsible to" the SPD. This

sounds good, but the plan has a fatal flaw; there is simply no provision

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whereby it can be carried out in practice. The complete separation

across the country, between the SPD and the APD is the same

arrangement that presently exists in the CORONA project, which

greatly accentuates any discordant tendencies by emphasising

organizational positions and organizational prerogatives, even on

problems which should be simply solved. Even the designation of

the SPD as having overall project management is similar; the DNRO

previously designated SAFSP as having this overall responsibility,

but the tremendous separation of the two groups, and the restrictions

imposed by the CIA on access to payload data and contractors completely prevented the overall responsibility from being carried out in

practice. There is nothing in the plan as described that would

necessarily result in any difference in this case. If the DNRO cannot.

direct CORONA project level details, (such as making complete

payload technical data available at the STC during on-orbit operations,

as he tried but was unable to do except when he was personally present),

how can the lower level SPD be expected to do its

(Z) I do not see any virtue in the DSPD arrangement described

for this plan. The work which occasions his presence is being done

elsewhere, at his parent agency under the control of the APD, He is

at best a supernumerary liaison official, at worst just another echelon

to go through; it would be much better for the SPD and his people to have

direct access to the APD.

(3) The changes noted above do not solve the deficiencies of the

Co-SPD plan; the assignment of overall responsibility has been stated,

'-but in a way and under constraints which preclude it being effective.

The Co-SPD plan admits that no one is in effective overall charge; this

one claims that there is some one in charge, when., in actuality, he is

not.

e. "Assignment of FOSS Responsibilities"

(1) The Task Group ignored some aspects of overall systems

engineering and integration in recommending where the system interfaces should be established, and specifying that the stem

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contenders, with considerable variation between . the designs, and the

vehicle has not been selected, and essential overall systems engineering

has not yet been accomplished. it is certainly not obvious that the

camera module is the best interface approach; it is clear that it is

not the only workable approach.

I can see e camera sub-system cannot be

treated as we do now o re the camera contractor provides

the camera, with fine e control, and the OCV contractor

integrates it into the OCV, and provides coarse environmental control.

This arrangement is exactly in accord with the 11 August Agreement,

as well as successful current practice on a rather complex system;

it is also the simplest inter-agency interface that is consistent with the

Agreement.

I, therefore, do not agree with any of the three "options"

as written in par IVd of the report. CIA-OSP should be responsible

for the camera sub-system. SAFSP should be responsible for the RV

and OCV, and for integrating the camera sub-system and every thing

else into the OCV.

(4) The new system will use programmin d•an

con • - hick will be consistent 'th th

and equipment and associat • ,

the responsibility for di e operations at

f. "Summary-Conclusions"

Of the plans described in the report, I believe that only

the plan called "Fully Integrated System Project Office" can meet

the fundamental objective of responsible, effective overall management.

I do not agree with either of the two arrangements considered workable

by the Task Group; neither can possibly provide really effective management, in my opinion.

I do not agree with the Task Group on the responsibility

for the camera module. The CIA should be assigned the camera subsystem only, with SAFSP responsible for RV, OCV, and the integration

of all sub-systems, including integration of the camera sub-system,

into V. This is a workable technical interface, as proven on

and it is the simplest inter-agency interface since it avoids

rement for common contractors serving both the Air Force

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and the CIA, which, while of benefit in the absence of effective

overall system engineering and integration, has nevertheless

contributed substantially to the inter-agency conflicts and impasse

on the CORONA project. Moreover, it is the only arrangement fully

consistent with the 11 August Agreement.

7. On balance, I think that there are only two managerial approaches

to divided management of this project which have any chance of

meeting the objective described in'par 1 of this letter.

The first, which is described by the report as the "Fully

Integrated System Project Office, " involves assigning to SAFSP the

CIA personnel who would be responsible (to SAFSP, not the` CIA) for

the optical sensor sub-system. These personnel would serve in the

integrated project office at SAFSP on a normal inter-agency transfer

basis; joint service in the same sense as joint service in the JCS.

They would serve as individuals, fully and solely responsible to the

supervisors in their duty office, who would rate their performance of

duty exclusively.

The second approach is one which is not mentioned by the Task

Group report, in spite of the Group's obvious concern with the

preservation of organisational identity. This plan would be identical

with that described in par 7a, above, with this difference: the CIA

personnel would not be assigned to SAFSP, they would remain

assigned to the CIA, but they all would be co-located at SAFSP, wider

a CIA supervisor, who would be responsible to the SPD. The co-located

personnel would include all technical and contracting personnel who

work on the CIA responsibilities for the system development and

operation; all such CIA personnel located at contractor plants or other

facilities concerned (except the NRO Staff) would be responsible exclusively to the senior CIA person in the SPD. This plan would require

the complete delegation of the CIA responsibilities to their people

referred to above, including specific direction that they are to respond

to all direction received from the SPD. Periodic CIA-OSP review of

the results of this management would be obtained by the inclusion of

appropriate CIA officials in DNRO reviews of this project. Administrative matters only, such as audits, travel expenses, pay, etc. ,

would be handled by CIA-OSP. This plan would not be as effective as

that described'in par 7a, but it is the only workable alternative that I

can see. It would allow preservation of CIA organisational identity, if

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that is considered important enough to be worth some added

complication in management. If actually implemented as I have

described, it would do so in a manner which would preserve a. single

overall project manager. It permits assignment of responsibility for

engineering development of the sensor sub-system to the CIA component

located at SAPS?. This is unquestionably within the meaning of the

11 August Agreement, which uses the terms "the CIA or DOD components"

in specifying sensor development responsibility in par Dd.

d. I recommend the plan described in par ?a. I believe the plan

described in Tb is a less effective and less desirable alternative,

but acceptable, provided that it is implemented fully as described,

including full delegation of all technical and contracting responsibilities.

8. In addition to my views outlined above, I submit that the assignment

of project management responsibilities should never be made on the

basis of who thought of what idea first. It is not the identification of

the historical birth of ideas that is at issue; it is the effective management of the development and operation of a new, complex, satellite

reconnaissance system. Clearly, the only valid criteria are existing

experience, competence and resources of the type required for this job.

I agree completely with the 11 August Agreement's explicit stipulation

that the allocation of development responsibilities will be made "with

a view to ensuring that the development, testing and production of new

systems is accomplished with maximum efficiency by the component of

the government best equipped with facilities, experience and technical

competence to undertake the assignment." SAFSP represents almost

'the total of such facilities, experience and technical competence that

this government has in satellite reconnaissance, and is uniquely

qualified under these criteria for assignment of overall project responsibility and the other tasks I have recommended herein.

Brigadier General, USAF

Director

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