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SUBJECf: SAIOB Program

1. General Bachnralmd Informatics

A. During the past several nontbs, deliberations concerning

the RAD aspects, the operational control, operational and/or latelligenee

requiremmets, data reduction and dissemination, location of radials',

technical capabilities and limitations, relationship to other collection

systems, organisation, etc. have taken plass. The following comments

summarise the highlights of the above mentiomed deliberations:

The situation must be such that the progress rill be

politically acceptable on a national mad on as imternstional basis. This

includes: favorable indoctrinstion of the public, operational and/or

executive caeca by an organisation that rill lied itself to the promotion of the peace time utilisation of SANDS as cell as to the expeditioui

and effective exploitation of the end results.

The RAD and operational aspects of SANDS are national

in nature in that the government can only afford oar program and the ea

results are of priority interest to the entire intelligence community.

Madam utilisation must be made of the many ecomomic and civilise uses

of the end results, such as peace time inspection, hommnitarian,

engineering end disaster surveys on a vorld-vide basis and the contributiome

that the program viii sake to space science. All of the above indicate

that the program should be under the executive control of a national or

Joint organisation that has an international growth potential.
'7"

2

political approval to accomplidh satellite reconnaissance

mill depend on the degree that the above comditions are amt. It Is felt

that the military and civilian requirements ee to type of 'overage are

compatible in that they can both be art at the se= tinseled with the

semi equipneet. The peaceful uses and propped& vans of the end

results my be the crux of the political soma problem. ar the

same =hen, the civilian uses of the end results mould serve as cover

liar Obtaining perndesion to obtain the nicer &staled gaiter, type of

infOrmetian. An additional cover mould be the combining at scientific

packages with a camera in $ larger vehicle.

The proves appears tote based on =realistic operational and intelligence requirements and emeggersted claims as

pertains to met= capabilities. infOrmetion concerning the prawns

has not bean =de readily available to the naticeal intelligence

community and the relationship of the program to all of the other

reccemaiseanoe intelligence programs is not knows. It is felt that

all of the above, coupled with an unwarranted emphasis on an early

operational ',stem, has retarded the research end development impacts

of the program am rill as the possibility of early availability of

useable end products. The SANDS intelligence requirements are based

on a capability rather than the job to be done tor a specific time

period. The perfOrmence of the E-2 package is such that it degrades

the advantages that are inherent in satellite type of operation and

requires very complex data reduction equipments that mould not normal,

be required.
"•1101.41.11.4••••nn•••••••••••••.01pm. •••• ••n••••••••

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Effective and expeditious exploitation of the Samos

material requires that the data reductioa be accompltshed simultaneously

by all interested minacies utilising reference material from all available

sources and programs. empbssis by the individual agencies will be

consistent with their priority area of interest and assigned roles and

missions. This indicates that existing facilities and agencies should

be used or that immemdiate action should be tahon to prepare an adequate

facility to accompaish this job.

The USAF has attempted to solve the peace time

reconnaissance problem in the same mummer that it has coped with war

time reconnaissance. As a result, it has not been !le gible swoosh to

react an a timely enough basis to changing concepts: change, political

situations; technological advancements; required changes is programming;

appropriations; organisation, procurement, etc.

(7) Other factors are special project clearances, lack

of continuity of experienced les. staff personal, lack of established

RED contacts with other organisation active is the field and the leek

of a single and fully knowledgeable office of responsibility 'Uhl*

Indeuerters, URAP.

B. Recommendation:

That executive responsibility of SANDS be placed under

the executive control of the JCS or a civilian agency.

That the RED phase and the operational phase of SAMOS

be one and the same. That the CRAP (ARDC) should continue BAD in this

area in response to national and JCS stated operational-intelligence

requirements.
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(3) That the possibility of accomplishing data reduction

at the Satellite Tracking Center a Joint

organisation composed of all interested intelligence agencies be

investigated. This would eliminate the Omaha early fix from the

Pragraek•

That the possibility of utilising the Reconnaissance

Technical Squadron facilities at Westowsr"and all other existing

facilities, as a national processing and data reduction center be

investigated.

That special emphasis on an expedited basis be

placed on the evaluation of Subsystem I. An expedited simulation

program with full participation by the intelligence community is

indicated. Due to lam development tine, the state of the art has

surpassed certain Subsystem I components and reevaluation of a number

of items of equipment is indicated. Sophistication and complexity

of Subsystem I equipment versus the relative simplicity and capabilities

of conventional equipments should be investigated an an item for item

basis.

That an up-to-date statement of satellite reconnaissanceintelligence requirements be prepared and mode known to the community.

The type, amount, and frequency of coverage required far specific time

periods should be stated.

That the compatibility of civilian and military

satellite reconnaissance requirements be studied. The study to include

frequency of coverage, types of coverage, timing of flights, timing of

release of end results, application to civilian uses, mmnmer of release,

utilisation instructions, etc.
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(8) That each Headquarters, USAF staff agency hone at least

one fully knowledgeable and cleared individual working in this area on a

lull-ties basis and that this individual be a member of the UBA?

Reconnaissance Committee of the Aircraft and Weapons Board. That a

single office of responsibility for MAT reconnaissanceintelligence activities be established within the DCWO.
• •••••••• ••••!•• ••• • • • 1, ...el.* ....•••• • .• • -.

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2. Political Considerations 

A. (1) In order to preclude the possibility of controversial

issues resulting in untameable and/or untimely publicity; Joint participation and support by all agencies active in the area of interest is

necessary. This includes active participation of the entire intelligence

community in the research, development, personnel training, and evaluation

in the various aspects of the program and particularly the evaluation of

the end results - joint participation and support of the program would

eliminate such of the existing criticism and indecision and result in

expeditious action being taken in problem areas as they arise.

(2) The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) has

prepared an Operations Plan for Outer Space in order to provide guidance

for agencies participating in the national space program. The

question of the political frame-work for reconnaissance satellites

was considered as part of the above. The following task was

assigned to the State Department and accepted. "In anticipation of

the availability of reconnaissance satellites, study and proposed

actions which will place the uses of U.S. reconnaissance satellites

in a political and psychological context most favorable to the U.S."

The Department of State has set up a committee to discuss the issue

with various interested agencies.

(2b) The USAF has notified this office that studies by

the military departments and the Joint Staff are underway to determine

the possible application of satellite-produced information to civil

purposes and to evaluate each pudhipplication for its implication to

military, political, and psychological objectives of the United States.
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It is felt that the study should include such things as:

Wier what political conditions launchings

should be mode.

The type of coverage that could be released,

the timing of the release, and indicate areas of the varld that should

be covered and released for political reasons.

(3) To what international agencies the material shoulA

be released to, to include timeing as well as the types of coverage.

( ► ) The timing and kinds of publicity, domestic and

foreign.

(5) Plans far degrading classification and releasing

of coverage to other countries.

- (6) Study all types of future international participation.

(T) Time phasing for all of the above.

3.(a) It is felt that detailed discussions should be conducted

pertaining to the RAE and operational aspects visa vim policy and the

relationship of the Department of Defense and the State Department

respectively. At the present time SAMOS is a research and development

program aimed at obtaining Ansdamental data necessary for system

design, as well as for future operational employment. It is not

known what the quality ar quantity of the different payloads vill yield

and what degradations vill occur due to physical phenomena, electrical

transmissions, in-flight processing, ground read-out, the time it vill

take to obtain the desired amount and type of coverage, the spectrum

and level of detail of information that eon be extracted, reliability,

etc. The early flights are component test flights and more than likely
8

the results could not be released 'without possible barn to our

prestige because of their early research and development character.

Russian op.:Movements vim their Lunar shot is a consideration in this

area.

3.(b) It is recommended that a small and flexible joint working

group composed of OSDDRIE and Department of State, became active in

this area as soon as possible. Participation of the other DOD and/or

national agencies would be by invitation and based an their ability

to contribute to Ad Hoc type problems. It is felt that urgency exists

in the thorough investigation and study of the various problems and

areas involved and that no urgent need exists for immediate conclusions.

Any position arrived at must be a joint position, arrived at simultaneously.

A premature posibion by either of the responsible agencies would unnecessarily complicate and delay the project.

B. (1) The problem of political approval has become increasingly

more difficult and complex. Detailed discussions and guidance concerning

the following are required.

The most acceptable type of organisation to

control all of the various aspects of the program.

The most acceptable location for the organization.

( 0 ) Most effective use of the project in support of

national policy.

(d) Peace time applications such as disarmament,

inspection, all types of surveys and the degree that the project can

support the peace time deterrent concept.

• (e) The Russian thrust to bomb Mbrinegran and Pakistan sir

bases if they participated in future 16.2 flights and its allocation or

significance to U.S. launching bases and TU stations.

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3. Objectives for SAMOS

A. The national importance of timely intelligence is fully

recognized. In examining !meal SAMOS viii comtribute to satisfying

the intelligence needs of the coumtry the faltering points must be kept

in mind:

SANDS will compliment and supplement, but not necessarily

replace, other intelligence collection mete= sad techniques. It should

be considered as a very productive and timely adjunct to all other sources.

SANDS has two major unique characteristics (common to

satellite systems) vhich set it apart from other collection systems:

It is capable of unlimited geographic access with

the least risk of major political ramifications.

It is capable of high repetitive world-wide

collections in a very time responsive manner.

D. The SAMOS R&D effort is likely to produce, as a result

of its RAD testing, intelligence informatics of a great value which

viii be reflected in modification of the requirements. The system must

not be limited to the support of only military requirements but must be

basically responsive to national policies and with the idea in mind

to postpone the stringent assigoment of particular requirements fOr an

operating 'yet= until more is learned of system capabilities, information

processing methods, and the realistic require neots for the time period

under consideration.

C. Detailed intelligence requirements to be satisfied by

SAMOS will be passed to the program by duly constitute:Lc:thorny.
s

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Presently, this duly constituted authority is the Satellite intelligence Requirements Committee, a subcommittee of the United States

Intelligence Board. Depending upon state of the art considerations,

the SAMOS Program vill be addressed to developing sensors and related

equipments to permit the reconnaissance of:

Terrain and culture features of the earth's surface;

i.e., visual aspects by photos or other means.

Electromagnetic emission; i.e., Ferret, Comint, other.

Within these broad reconnaissance areas the first priority

shall be to provide a broad base of coverage over designated large areas

of the earth. The resolution or nature of this broad coverage should be

compatible with providing this coverage at the earliest possible time.

There is the additional requirement to provide surveillance or observance

of selected areas on a "more sophisticated" basis in a repetitive Benner.

Also, sensors must be developed which can collect information which

will be useful in assessing technical accomplishments or capabilities

of specified nations. The timeliness of the development of tbese•

sensors must be emphasized. It must be recognized that the quantities

of equipment to process this sensed information is necessary and development must proceed. However, commitment of hardware to manufacture in

quantity shall be deferred.

Information collected of intelligence value during any

portion of the program, including initial R&D take, will be made available

to the intelligence community. It is considered to be a mandatory objective 

of the SAMOS R&D program to collect information of intelligence value as 

soon as practicable in the flight test program.
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PBOTOCIRAPELC WIREMINTS

1. There viii be a continuing requirement fOr three types of

photographic coverage. As time goes on, the accuracies sal detail

required rill become increasingly greater. In order of priority the

types of courage are listed below:

A. Basic Coverage 

Ninety percent coverage of the area of interest

is needed mow. The resolution or quality of the coverage should be

the best possible that can be obtained in the shortest period of

time. This coverage will be needed approximately every 6-12 months,

depending an the evaluation of the initial take.

This type of coverage at 20' resolution vill

provide information concerning the sew and unknown, allo y for the

target revisions, allow for extension of existing geodetic control,

and provide the Lamaist/ea that vill allow far more effective and

efficient planning as pertains to future operations. It is pointed

out at this time that as pertains to the Soviet Union and the

United States, the new and unknown has surprised and hurt us the

most. On the other hand, the greatest emphasis in our collection

efforts is on collecting more information about things ve already

know something about.

(3) This type of coverage, particularly of selected

areas would also be a top priority civilian requirement. It could

be used for road, agricultural, reforestretion, flood, etc., types

of surveys.

B. Mapping Coverage 

(1) One hundred percent coverage of the area of

interest is desired. Ninety percent coverage is usually considered
4.)

.... to be a successful mapping project. The coverage is required now.

The state of the art is such that resolution (100 11/mm) and geodetic

accuracy (300 feet) requirements should not delay efforts toward

obtaining the coverage. It is felt that this one time coverage would

fulfill the requirement for approximately 6-12 months. In the

meantime, evaluation of this initial take, improved guidance and/or

• weapons systems, technological developments, etc., will determine the

relative merits and timing for obtaining coverage with higher resolution and greater geodetic accuracies.

This type of coverage is needed for map and chart

revision, targetting, and will also provide information pertaining

to new construction, economic growth, cultural changes, etc.

This type of coverage would also fulfill a high

priority civilian requirement and lend itself to valuable peaceful

utilisation as well as propaganda and bargaining purposes.

C. Specific and Technical Type Coverage

111111111 

This type of coverage requires high quality (ground

resolut it IIIIIIIssm system resolution) and large scale

(1:150,000. Compared to other systems, the ground area covered is

relatively very small in relation to the amount of film used, therefore,

operation must be on a very select basis.

(2) This type of coverage of selected targets is required

now and would be used for detailed analysis of targets. This type of

coverage is also required for the prevention of technological surprise.

The frequency of coverage would be once approximately every 12 months.
Timing of the coverage and the targets to be covered should be dependent an the evaluation of the basic and mapping type of coverages.

(3) This type of coverage would have • relatively low

civilian priority. It would also be the type of coverage that evokes

the strangest type of diplomatic protest. Internationally, the

mapping type coverage would mare than likely be the most acceptable.

2. The advantages of satellite reconnaissance are that it can

cover large areas in short periods of time. The state of the art in

the camera development area is such that it is now possible to

capitalise an these advantages, i.e., camera performance need not

degrade the satellite performance. Utilizing the proper camera

equipments it is now possible to obtain basic cover and mapping

type coverage of the world effectively and efficiently and in the

most economical Bonner possible. Properly timeilend planned specific

type coverage can also be accomplished, in a worthwhile manner (time,

effort, and expense as compared to the relative value of the end results).

but it must be based on the evaluation of the basic and mapping type

coverage.
11

It. Employment (Exploitation) Considerations 

A. If SAMOS recomnalsaance is to provide significantly useful

results its employment met be centrally controlled in order to be

fully integrated with all elements of the national collection system.

This operation will include may technically correlated and operationally

unique tasks requiring an unusual type and degree of support.

E. A mission as important as this must be given every

opportunity to swami. Therefore, we must fully exploit on a

continuing basis the maximunlevels of American technology.

Coincident with the requirement for special and unique

equipment and techniques is the requirement for specially skilled

personnel to operate the equipment. Fisch of the advantage of

improved techniques and methodologies can be lost because of the

complexities attending the new operations if they come into conflict

with C.I. concept.

This system,in particular, involving as it does the use

of widely varying equipment systems and techniques, does not lend

itself to the "standard force" concept of operating personnel. Therefore,

careful consideration should be given to the utilization of very skilled

technical specialists in ccubination with experienced and sympathetic

operational personnel in every phase of the SAMOS system.

I. The requirement for complex non-standard equlpment,

specially skilled technical personnel and maxims security to perform

the mission at a modest level of effort, are not compatible with standard

Air Force organizational and operational concepts. The national Importance

of the project indicates that authorization to deviate fron standard

practice must be given as soon as possible.

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It is not possible, for instance, to take immediate

advantage of the state of the art improvements is equipment and

techniques on a mass production basis. The standardization of equipment necessary for force-wide use within the Air Force restrict us,

time-vise and money-vise, to maj r•equipment improvessnits, thorcughly

tested and programmed, and for the operation of which large numbers

of personnel must be trained. On the other hand, certain portions of

the system may be subject to some degree of standardization. These

must be individually examined and atandardizatioc should take ;lace

only when it is clearly apparent it will not inhibit the flexibility

and capability of the system.

Security of the operation is yet another complex problem.

For all these - the changing nature and detail of the national requirements,

the many unknowns surrounding the full utilization of the unique data

collected, the complex and experimental nature of the equipments comprising the system and the combination of special technical and

operating skills of the personnel required for sensible system operation -

the results, methods and techniques obtained and learned during the

planned R&D program, will provide a preliminary yardstick to determine

the firm future course of actions.

M. Therefore, the SANDS Empletyment Program should be guided by the

following considerations:

(1) Remain completely flexible to permit fulfillment of

changing requirements (compression of lead time between expression of

need and examination of flight results).
13 -

Retain ability to incorporate extremely complex

experimental equipment into its operations. This means that very close

contact vith ARDC developers is required.

Be staffed by specielly trained, technical personnel

in combination vith personnel experienced is reconnaissance and

intelligence operations. This indicates that a mixed civilian contractor, military R&D team is required.

(4) Integrate closely all elements of the system to

provide for high system response end to provide a means of applying

mmadasis security cover to the operation if this is deemed desirable.

Likewise, if it is possible that the program may go "vhite" at same

point in time, this compact integration of all system elements viii

provide the least risk of security compromise to other systems.
Distance visible )

on the earth 's )

carfare: 30(` mi.

Olt:t-oec.)

13c

1175 . ni. . :12; Et! .

600 t, :11t-;.4G

325 mi. 17t mi.

• Effective and efficient satellite operatics is dependent upon the

type and amount of coverage that ran be obtained by the airbcrne photo-

, graphic system. Iastsatanecus ^overage is the area of tne ?firth from

which usable info-mation ran potentially be collected by ft given sensor

in orbit. Iitstantaneous coverage from a given altitude -cas to poysleally

limited for a given sensor two coaolticns: (1) •.h maxim= slant

range of a sensor, and (Z) the aLaimum angle of incidence of the line

of sight to a point on the earth for adequstc sensiag inflroation.

These limitations are called range liwit•d and angle-Ltmiteo coverage.

The seeming devices • scd to generate surveillance data will be

limited in tou=r range . either by sigma/ pow-..r limitations r. r from

resolution cansidrrationo. roverage is neerssary

because of terrain enaracterioti,:a or eaospheric attenuations.

The effect of the var1,1c• angles of inclination -f the edge of

a fie/.: of view tc the surfa:e of the eartn is listed belcw. he

E-: a c ya. per .:0C mile cblive swim and far 17 Wile lertieal swath.

(Half angle of cover ( e '.ht len: Le 1.o-, sat-acted frim le- results

in aE.4;':.

:Nmher .f re::.. )

requirei for mom-)

plete earth cave $

age per day cx 'ri;

nuattr k)%) mi. /

(Pclar orb!t) )

14 2Sr. 75 7

The above figures indicate the high degree of compatibility between
satellite type of operation and the characteristics of a panoramic type

camera capable of covering large areas on each side of the flight path.

If it were required, or desired, tu maintain continuous point

surveillance and it was possible to obtain harisan-tc-horizon coverage,

eight satellites on four different polar orbits (300 miles) or a tote.

of 32 satellites would be required. This assumes that position of the

•

satellites in respect to each other can be rigi4ty controlle r: and

maintained.

For the case of sampling the complete earth every revolutizm, 3C crhttx

are required with one satellite in each. It is clear that the continuous

coverage for early warning requires as entirely different satellite

pattern from that of frequent :.sapling with a limited field of view.

As pertains to the E-r. with a 301D mile swath coverage rapnbility

and as it exists today with a 17 mile swatn or coverage capability, the

following information is listed. Basest an weather prediction studies

and providing for darkness, the estimated number of satellite days

required to obtain a coveragr probability of .9 is as follows:

PO Mile Swath 17 Mile Swath

Summer Winter Summer Winter

11 22 255 1141
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The nature of the earning problem is such that it should

not be allowed to confuse, Justify, or exert technical influence

an the reconnaissance satellite system. The various degrees of

warning not only imply, but are dependent to a large degree

on the known intentions of WI potential enemy. Therefore, it

cannot be designed far. On the other head, the importance of

early and reliable warning to the national defensive and

offensive efforts is recognised. In order to insure the highest

quality results, the indicators of the leminence of hostilities

should be derived from each and all of the following intelligence

categories: (a) scientific and technical, (b) economic, (c) political,

(d) military (air, ground and sea), (e) sociological, (f) geogrephic,

(g) transportation and telecommunications, (b) biographical.

This, in turn, becomes a national long-tern (days-monthsyears) problem involving all intelligence agencies. Close

coordination of all activities and compatibility of all systems

is mandatory in order to provide on a timely basis the contributions

that SAMOS may make to the above intelligence categories. The

urgency of a threat of any situation is dependent on the degree that

it is supported by all of the above factors in addition to the extent

that counter actions have been takes during the build-up of the

situation.

3. The question of timeliness as pertains to the evaluation

of the SAMOS end products should be studied very carefully. As

pointed out previously, the advantages of satellite reconnaissance are
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such that in a very short period of time it can saturate soy sod all

data reduction aystems that are now in being. Complete sutan mtice of

the data reduction process could very easily hinder and slow down

the decision process particularly as pertains to the abort rano -

Short tern problems. Data reduction an a select basis end an

effective method to eliminate redundant material is required.
I A

3. S-1 Systems

The 1-1 is a strip canerawith a 6" focal length lens desigmed

to operate at 260 statute miles. With the 70 as format sad 100 11/mm AMAN a..,t014

•,..•rikA r. it is reasonable to expect a basic ground resolution of 100'. To realise

this 100' the IMC must be within 5% because of the long exposure time

of 1/25 second. This means altitudes must be accurately know (2 milts)

so the proper IMO cam be provided for. Since the orbit will be

elliptical this point should be studied carefully.

The 3-1 system is less complex and such more workable that the

2-2 system. Its design makes it a coverage tool. It is felt that it

has limited "seeing" of particular targets sines the final resolution

otter leadout will optimistically be 300'. Strip cameras are sot useful

for sipping but apprcad.mate measurements of mall objects detected is

possible. Barring weather considerations, this satellite could cower

Russia is twenty days. With weather, one satellite would obtain 160%

coverage is twenty days. According to weather study data, it would

require 200 days to get 95% of Russia covered, or require tea birds.

The quantitative aspects of the readout prOblas are sot as

critical as the 3-2 system. The qualitative aspects is terms of

degradation due to tranamissioa, reproduction, and system complexity

(reliability) are the some as for the E-2.

On the other hand there is as R&D advantage th carry-over

value is that the law formation, is flight processing, seaming, treammissiaa,

etc., are the same as the E-2. Partial success of the 2-1 program could

allow for evaluation mad More RAD guidance or terminstica of the readout

progrembefore the end of CY-1961.
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Recent studies show that recovery systems have gains is

information content over readout systems by factors betveea 260 sad

850, depending upon the film width used. Since recovery is best for

the recomnsissance content, it must be realized that it is more

important for accurate measurement and sapping considerations. The

Z-/ mad X-2 systems claim position accuracies good to one mile, usiag

a strip or paaormaic camera, sad a television readout with its

attendant sweep linearity problems. Zzperience indicates that this

figure is unrealistic.

The problems involved is programalag the operation of

these satellites are for the most part unkaown. Questions pertalaing

to "start-up" after computer failure sad the amount of potential

coverage lost during down time are still unanswered. It is not known

whether electronic tracking is accurate or timely enough for closely

scheduled "camera on" and "camera off" tines. The ability to evaluate

the ead results and correct for slit width, INC, focus, Yav, etc., are

attendant major problem areas.

The ccnpounding of all of the above mentioned problems in

the airborne systems has resulted is an equally complex ground data

handling system is an effort to correct meny of the anticipated

deficiencies.
••••n••n••

%•

feed-out Limitation Due to Scan Rate • f:" film per minute

No Read-Out Stations 3

•

Read-Out Time! Station 75 5p 25

(Min!Dky)

Film Read-Out/Day

Inches 396 300 150

Peet 33 25 12.5

Linear Miles:Day 1,Mo 930

Sq. Mi.. DAY b.7,4 31,620

Average Length of

Plight Line (Mil ► s) 2,000 k',000

Average Number of

Times 7ver riach

light Line to

Obtain 7::verage 1.07 2.25

Miamian 31ocke160°)

19.2 M Sq. Mi.

No. of Satellite

Days Required for

:Tverage =60 :.;a3

Weather Degradation

;0% ED8o 1332 e.iy5

Period Degradation

7ontro/ Degradation

Reliability 'Negradation

Film Site • 2.75"x12.5' (150")

150"4 • 51g .54 the au 7-e•:17-mile units it 1!:tr

54.54x17 2 930 ;linear miles forward direction

Single frame • 17 mi x 3.30 it or 15,810 sq. mi.
gtc-A1:72":" • • • • •

' '

C.)

In comparison a 70em recovery system w111 cover 27 8, 000 841-01!/d47

and 16,000 linear mi/dsoo. The number of satellite days required to

Obtain total coverage would be 72. Degraded 5 43% for weather the total

would be 144. Degradation due to period, control and reliability is

not as great or as critical because of the fever number of days required.

If the satellite is recovered in a 24-hour period, it will show a gain

of 6 to 18 because of the read-out limitations.

Using a panoramic recoverable system with the capability of a

150-mile swath, the comparison would be:

16,000 linear milesiday

2.4 M square miles/day

& satellite days would be required to obtain coverage

17 satellite days would be required if weather were considered

The degradation due to period, lack of control, and reliability

be

would/substantially less because of the wider area of coverage obtained

resulting it a fever numbet of vehicles requiring a fewer number cf

days to obtain coverage.
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Subsystem I 

The SANDS Processing Subsystem, SS I, has been under close scrutiny

by DEM during the past 12 months. The most fuedamental question of

this phase of the program centers on the matter of the realism of the

goals and concepts outlined by the Air Force in the "operation or

exploitation" of the system. It is recognized that the SANDS Program

(under its various designations) is • program of considerable tenure

with certain resources in place and =ay developments essentially

committed to completion. The guidance offered should be tempered

with this consideration.

The factors discussed in other sections of this paper under

Political considerations, Employment considerations, Objectives

and Requirements all have their direct impact on the nature and

direction of the SS I R&D program, as well as the manner in which

it Is planned to process the "take" from the R&D flights.

The development concepts and program goals for these two areas

are discussed =delineated below.

I. DEVELOPMSNT CONSIXERATICES AND GUIDANCE

It is of the highest priority for this system to satisfy critical

collection requirements at the earliest time. The means by which this

requirement Le met, so far as the agency operating the devices or the

development status of the system, is unimportant in satisfying the

requirement. Thus, there is latitude to depart from the classical

system development approaches and to depart from classical military

planning for the deployment of the systems particularly since:
• • • '74TCPOTM.% • ter: - • • . .

It is evident that the over-riding problem for at least the

ensuing few years viii continue to be the development problem due to the

uniqueness of the unattended satellite platform as • collection system.

This has required advances in the state of the art during the past years.

Mew of these advancements, although presently incorporated in the system

design, are yet not thoroughly proven and are critical to the satisfactory

routine performance of the system.

The nature of the intelligence mission requires flexibility

of operation with multi and/or adoptable sensors. It is improbable that

any model of sensor viii be serially produced in large quantities. Job

shop production and special handling win expected to key note the

preparation of sensors for some time to came.

C. The types of information, collectible, information rates,

scales and scope of photographic coverage, high coverage repetition

rates for both visual and electronic sensors, and the geo-time correlatable

nature of mixed sensor information, are relatively new and unique.

Carefully controlled experinentatice and study of both the collection

and the analysis functions muet be conducted during the RAD period

with test results to determine the best methods of employment and

information processing prior to the establishment of firs operational

doctrine and procedures. Dual development approaches are necessary in

many areas in order to optimize and/or assure success of the erase.

The selection of single approaches should be postponed until appropriate

feasibility and reliability can be demonstrated. Standardisation, design

freezes and, other "over control" during development can only inhibit the

efficient development of this unique systen.
- Nolawrialladibm4Vms

Although automated processes are important to statistical

analysis and mensuration, particularly as involved in triangulation,

bridging, etc., photographic interpretation is still very much an art

depending upon the experience, knowledge and skill of the technician.

Therefore, automated devices should provide assists to the P.I. in

numerical Moiling fields and cautiously avoid limiting his flexibility

in photo interpretation by Slaving his to an automatic cycling procedure.

The metes edgers of the development proem, the inability

to define full► the resuirements foe sauloitatioo of the eerstem, and

the requirement for flexibility in the sessorsves the strong Liti

indication that the SAMOS system rill have an NM complexion" far some

time to come and it not throughout its life. Thereftre, the stringent

assignment of particular requirements for sa "operating asters" should

be postponed until more is learned of system capabilities, information

processing methods and the realistic requirements for the time

period under consideration. However, maximum effort sad resources

nest be assigned to the task of collecting and disseminating without

delay the maximum possible amount at intelligence imfravation

throughout all phases of the development program'. Specifically,

this translates to the SS I Development Program in the following

meaner:

(1) Equipment to process the data collected.during

the R&D program is necessary and development must proceed. !layover,

commiteent of hardware to msnufacture in quantity vat be time phased

to meet only the collection capabilities described by the MAD launch schedUie
an $ non-time critical basis for through put.

System design and equipment developments must rosin

flexible enough to accommodate sensor changes of forme! and type without

major astir upheaval.

System design and equipment uevelopnent should not be

based upon premeture commitment to firm operational system requirements.

The program should remain geared to experimentation and controlled

testing to provide the basis for determining "worth" factors end future

operational planning exercises. The extremely costly operational

ground stations . and exploitation plan of SANDS must not impose rigidity

on future systems which viii more completely fulfill national

intelligence goals.

Development program should take into account needs of

intelligence uses in order that equipments developed and system outputs

will be useful to other elements of the intelligence community.

All extra Ar elements of the intelligence community

(Ax, Slimy, CIA, etc.) should participate in the system RAD simulation

and testing to better understand the system and to contribute to the

overall development goals and test evaluations.

2. MITIAL EXPLOITATION AND SUBSNMENT SANDS DIPLOYNENT

A. Outline or Initial Exploitation of RAD Take

The general SANDS exploitation plan can and should remain flexible

while the system "worth" factors are being experimentally determined.

This flexibility should not adversely effect the processing of the raw

intelligence collected and will provide the basis for the orderly
. • )

establishment of information flow requirements, mission planning

mechanisms and over-all system operational employment (frequency

of coverage, type of sensor control and phasing, utility of products

for other than "military ;Gemming" purposes). It is appropriate

that all payload flight data collected be handled as usefUl rem

intelligence data, beginning with the first payloads flown as R&D

flights and continuing throughout the planned test program, as well

as future follow-on flights. This material will be initially processed

(1) within a suitably prepared area in the ovssraeat owned Satellite

Test Center (STC) facility and the results of

the processing placed as as possible into channels

as source material for further exploitation by all intelligence users.

At the outset, ARDC will be the organisation responsible for system

development and test including the initial processing. At the earliest

feasible time during the system= test period, representatives of

the intelligence community should participate under ARDC cognisance to

assist in the early exploitation of the test results and participate

in the study and analysis work being conducted.

(1) This initial processing is defined as Phase I

process and which will be described subsequently in this document.

S. Plan for Initial Rxploitation and Subsequent SANDS Deployment

(1) General Exploitation

(a) The SAMOS Processing Subsystem (SS I) development

effort will provide the necessary equipments, techniques and methods

to insure that the capability for performing the Phase I processing

!unctions noted below is sufficient; such that execution of these
• I, •?...'":4..".;41fti...a.t..n :

h:1

!motions viii not limit exploitation of the satellite recomaissance

capability. It provides for the link between the SANDS collective

system, the network of syshmaspeuel copplexes end the intelligence

production agencies. The development program is established which

viii determine, through experimentation and test, the eventual

capability desired far the vassal concept of operations described herein.

This development program iaelndies a test and develop meat laboratory vhere

a program of controlled tests is presently being developed to accomplish

much of the work an SAMOS data processing techniques and analysis noted

above. This program should use both simulated inputs and real data

derived from the flight test program. The laboratory of test equipment

and skilled technical people will form a basic element in the processing

of all recce data gained through the RAD test program.

(b) There is strong, continuing political need to

disassociate the operating arpaisation from aggressive car combat

implications during and subsequent to the accomplishment of the RAD test

phase. Therefore, the executive amassment responsibility for the overall assembly, checkout, launch, tracking, commad-readout-recovery

Agitations of the system are to be vested is ARDC, which is a command

with no combat potential. There is foremen the possible need in

that period far the establishment of a National Satellite Informatics

Processing Center (NSIPC) Jointly staffed by all interest elements

of the intelligence community.

The realistic daterminatica of the need, as well as

the detalledplaming and progreadag for the ISM, should result
•

from the data and experience gained through the system experimentation,

simulation testing, and processing evaluations conducted during the

R&D program at the STC. ARDC's responsibility for the processing

function will extend through the complete R&D period (as executive

managers of the Joint participation program to reduce the R&D flight

data) to include the Joint preparation of Justification studies and

plans for the NSIPC. Within the context of a Joist operational Isrpc,

ARDC's responsibility vill revert solely to insuring the technical

functioning of the system.

(c) In this operational period the actual detailed

mission planning and intelligence processing vill be accomplished

within the National. Satellite Information Processing Center in

response to the general requirements imposed by the USD SIRC Committee

in Washington. Direct distribution to all Department of Defense

agencies of all satellite derived materials vill be made from the

NSIPC through their in-residence representatives. It is conceivable

that the SIRC organisation may eventually require a direct tie into

the NSIPC for the purpose of receiving slaved positional displays,

maintaining mission progress and a required means of receiving significant

video information.

C. Scope of SS I Processing

(1) Conceptually, the processing of SANDS derived data vill

be accomplished in three separate but related phases. Phase I is the

initial mission review processing which is tied to the SAMOS system

end is expbcted to be accomplished at the SANDS Center, at the STC
during the RAD programs and evenutally at the 11S1PC in the later phases.

Phases II and III and those processing fUlletaaas subs quest to Phu*

which are egpectAld.to be accomplished outside SAMOS Canter and within

the organisations of the mem diverse recipients of SAMOS informatics.

PheseI- !Unctions walla those required to

accomplish the steps below and to produce and disseminate the results

on a timely basis.

1. Rapid screening and interpretation of large

quantities of raw photographic and elint material for the selection

and culling out of tine-significant data. Such selection will be

based on a prior requests and on "significant changes" detection by

comparison of new data with previously collected SAMOS information,

graphics and other intelligence reference material.

2. Orderly processing, reproduction and dissemination

of select SAMOS source data as required by all the intelligence production

agencies for their own internal. exploitation.

1 Analysis of the collected, data to provide feedback

information required for efficient system operation and control. This

includes deriving and presenting infarction needed for quality control

of the positioning and sensory equipment as well as assessing over-all

mission

Phase II - processing and exploitation will produce:

1. Studies that result from detailed search, analysis,

and evaluation of all-sourceisaterial.

.2. Oraphies ouches topographic:maps, geodetic data

sheets and air navigation and target materiels.
sikrz.17,a,

•

(c) Mese III - Themerging of SAMOS with all source data

!Or enelyels and evaluations resulting in NIS , siTechnical Intelligence, etc.

The subsystem I development program is limited in scope to the 

Phase I level of data processing. Subsystem I is being dowlinid and

developed as an entity to provide the government with the means to

centrally accomplish the Plisse I processing of SANDS collected data

in close bar with the other ground and control portions of the

SAMOS system in order to minimise total processing and communication

requirements and to insure most efficient SANDS system operations.

Although the capability being developed is an integrated system it

contains elements which can be implicated, if desired, in . a achesvent buying program far accomplishing elements of Mums II and III

type processing functions at diverse physical and orgenisatleoal

locations. The output products and formats of Masten I will be

in a form compatible with present and in-development unit equipments

far Phase II and Phase III processing. Where Phase II and Maas /II

processing operations are being developmentally aided by other procurement and development programs, AMC will continue to insure compatibility

of data flow between ',stems.

2. INPUTS TO PUSS I PROCASS110

A. This describes the impute resulting from the payloads presently

under development. The SUbsystem I development proms is plea gassed

to the BAD launch edbedule. Inputs into the center tram outside SAMOS
•

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1- ;4* • " • alliltlea to the satire* et the rev 

. ressanstaamass lateraatiea.

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.efselpf tar.tinelt Law Satenstion eel • thee

Wm. raeladel hems we also man photopephs

harlson shish east Us Interpreted to weertela the attitude i :...•

plathra at the tiae et - • ' • °arra operatlea. With the 36" twat

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regweta, eta.) way be smiswa throve the URI ilatellite

legelsownis Oardttoe dna Um. 

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. the yaw alwassas

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the sonter bus within atll be aseeratell at the Ill

'tjler.....:1113424% .

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r.f.,r, .. 'sik4it')Iit-"' :' 4.4, rolatOi. ..1• : :: .. .

• ••'. *Oh MINIS watts sad lath throe readmit stations soledusisesi,

• a total reedoet thee per day ot /I minutes will esiet. The antes , •

• . L sin be b3.• yfirobwirg 33,000-60,000 spree Riles it selected

Arad soveresebsteilita der at that tlaa.

(a) Pima the 811106 resovery prognos ea a tblit.lanal photopephie .•

Ingot to ilabizatun I sill be va to 30,000 1 at eves* uslevelassi 5* vide

hi. resolution (113 lias/ae) Ws.

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iltlibtagat lehlee owl *elanntr3P data. . tide sill laslain

•

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3. OUTPUTS OF PRASE I PROCESSING

A. The outputs of SAWS will be prepared for initial direct

dissemiastion to intelligence agencies in accordance with SIRC

directives. The system outputs will include:

(1) Transcriptions of the incoming records into formats

which will be usable without special equipment in intelligence

agencies for Phase II and Phase III processing. To provide

these the rat recon data is processed and screened for quality

and correlated with navigation data. The attitude information is

used to further refine the geographical position and the ferret data

is fully calibrated. These products vill include:

Titled duplicate transparencies of the original

photo records is both positive and negative fbrms.

Selected and titled photograpky on a 91" wide

format at approximately 20 lines/ms.

Minimum numbers of selected and titled rectified

and unrectifled prints.

Duplicates of ferret magmatic tape records.

Digital data will be encoded directly for use in user data processing

equipments.

(2) Initial screening and interpretations of the recon records.

This will be directed toward reporting significant information which

nay contribute to the determination of activity level of Soviet Bloc forces.

(3) Accurate positional data of ground control points used is

titling, indexing and inprovimg orbital data. •

PO' Reports of new and mum' activities derived from

electromagnetic intercept and visual data.
Collection control data based on directed intelligence

requirements and mission assessment for the programming of the SAMOS

sensors.

Quality control feedback including calibration data to

other sections of the SAMOS 'stem.

(r) Mission review reports and summaries.

k. PUNOTIOMAL MNZIP/TON

A. The major center factions seeded for Phase I processing to

produce the above outputs and to operate the over-mill system in an

orderly meaner include selected elemeats of:

t) Automatic data processing and amputation

2

3 not!winter: ummelation

1 Photo processing

Ferret analysis

(I) Display and intra-comaanication of information

Scheduling and control of informatics flow and

processing execution.

Cagstation of information relating to system

operation

(9) Storage and retrieval of information

PROD PROCESSING

A. Data collected by each pass of a photographic vehicle is

received at the SAMOS Center as a vire transmission from a TM station

or batches of primary records physically transported from the TM

stations and recovered capsule cannisters of unposed undeveloped high

resolution film. The information is transferred and recorded on film

(primary records). Merry of the °eater's operations and the seencies

it distributes source material to require photo data in different

fora and size than the 35ma 18" long 'triplets of the primary record.

It therefore, goes through a comber of processing steps upon receipt.
•

11. The SAN O8 recovery proven further moires the developing

and processing of large batches of 5" vide, high resolution film.

6. PECOPOORMINEINT

Photogrammetry is performed an COver fre ► photo vehicles to

aid in the identificstion of the areas photographed for the film

plotting, titling sad indeximg operations as yell as for feedback

to Improve the orbital information.

T. PROM INTERPROTATION

Cover obtained by photographic vehicles is scrammed and

interpreted by P.I.'s to idemtify and report objectives of

immediate intelligence interest. In addition, ideal= assessment

is soda and the photography is examined in detail to determine

characteristics of the system performsace.

8. Ism DATA MAIMS

Electronic intelligence data telemeters& tram ferret vehicles

i.e received by the SINOB Center from the TAA stations (the same

stations that collect the photographic-vehicle data), in the farm

of binary-coded end analog mire messages. Ibis data, which includes

communication intercepts as well as radar intercepts, are immediately

transferred to mimetic tape is preparation for processing. Part of

the ferret data processing is automatic; the rest is and

le done by the computer vith the assistance of an anAyst. Reports are

prepared an electronic activity mad copies of both digital and analog

tapes are mole for using agencies.

, •
DATA PROCESSING AND INPORNATION STORAGE

Most of the data processing and storage and retrieval of

infiraiption is done by the "Central Data Processor." This is a flexible

electronic computing system to which most of the other **pigment in the

center is directly connected. Operators in the center can communicate

directly with the Central Data Processor to enter data into the cow

pasting system and to obtain inftrmation from it in the farm of

displays and print-outs.

DISPLAYS

To assist various operators and to give Center Control informatics

it needs for its decision-making functions pertaining to system control

and operation. A number of visual &tipplers can be generated and kept

up-to-date with information stores in the Central Data Processor.

PROCESSING CONTROL

The basic functions are workload programming, evaluation of

the processing operations and results, and general msnagement of the

Center operations.

CENTRAL PHOTO STORE

A semi-automatic store of SANDS photo take plus required selected

photo reference material is stored in the form of center format fibs

chips. These chips have unique maching readable numbers which are cross

referenced inside the Central Data. Processor and can be recalled as

requested by analysts by input to the Central Data Processor.