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OgIIIIIIIMM" PICTIONINNIOULSOP CLAIN•100 MON

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TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 111

-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE NRO STAFF 13 January 1975

•

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Review of Civil Remote

Sensing of the Earth from Space

Attached is a package for Secretary Schlesinger's

consideration. It recommends that he sign a memorandum

to the Secretary of State requesting a review of civil

earth sensing activities by the NSAM 156 Committee. I

have personally discussed this with Dr. Wade of ISA who

would do the staffing within the OSD and with Mr. Walsh

of DDR&E. Both agree fully with the need for such a

review. Because of the reluctance of the State Department

to undertake such a review in the recent past, we believe

that it is necessary to have the Secretary of Defense

initiate the request. We propose that you and he discuss

the matter personally rather than staffing this correspondence through the normal OSD staffing mechanism.

Lt Colonel, USAF

•

•

CONTROL NO Internal.

COPT OF COPIES

PAOEJ,..0F...1._, PAGES
• TOP SECRET

•

-St NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

•

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Review of Civil Remote

Sensing of the Earth from Space

As we have discussed, NASA is beginning to present

both political and technical p;oblems to us in terms of

the continuance of a well protected and unchallenged

satellite program. The interagency group, which has

addressed national policy in the context of the National

Reconnaissance Program, has been an ad hoc group called

the NSAM 156 Committee. This group has met from time

to time since 1962, most recently in 1972, to address

various issues relating to military and civilian earth

observation.

I believe it is appropriate at this time to reassess

the national policy regarding NASA's future role in earth

observation and its application of reconnaissance type

technology. We have discussed the propriety of such a

review with Mal Currie and Jim Wade as well as with Amrom

Katz of the Arms Control Agency. They all encourage and

support such a review. Bob Ellsworth and I nominally are

members of the 156 Committee which is chaired by the

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. I request

that you sign the memo at the right to Secretary Kissinger

requesting the review. I have attached a copy of the 1966

report for your reference.

J. W. Plummer

r

1 Attachment

R t of NSAM 156 Committee

•

TOP SECRET

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CONTROL NO

caw OF COPIES

..rge f`F ••nr•
OFFICE Of THE SKRETARY Of DEMME

WASHINGTON, D.C. WWI

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Review of Civil Remote

Sensing of the Earth from Space

In 1966, the NSAM 156 Committee reviewed the political

and military aspects of non-military applications of satellite

earth-sensing. The report recommended that the classified

National Reconnaissance Program continue to be protected

from undesireable political and security effects of the then

proposed unclassified earth-sensing activities. The potential

international benefits accruing from unclassified earthsensing were recognized in the report and since then the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration, assisted by

the Department of State and others, has vigorously worked

toward this end.

Recently, I have noted a growing convergence of NASA's

activities with those of the classified reconnaissance

program. Because of this, I believe it would be appropriate at this time to schedule another review of unclassified earth-sensing activities. I am particularly interested

in assuring that the government has a well defined strategy

for its unclassified programs. We should preclude a diminution of our SALT verification and intelligence collection

capabilities because of international political debates over

remote earth-sensing or the premature exposure of our

reconnaissance technology.

I propose that you reconmene the NSAM 156 Committee for

- fhfi review and that a report be completed by 1 April.

Ambassador Ellsworth and Under Secretary Plummer will

represent me on the review. • •
•

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

HANDLE V14111111FNTROL SYS'1E.4

11 July 1966

TOP SECRET

NERORANDWA TO : DOD - Mr. Rortughton

Dr. Plaz

ACDA - Mr. Pichor •

CIA ShelCon

White Reuse - Mr. Many

Mr. Charles Johnson

NASC - Mr. Walsh

NASA - Mr. Soacans

RUM= Report of tho USD14 155 Committoe on

"Political and Security Aspects of

Non-Rilitary Applications of Satollito

Earth-Sonsing"

Attached ic the final report on 'Political and

Security Appeots of non-Nilitary Applications of

Satellite Earth-Sensing", as transmitted to tho White4E.--

Rouse. . •

-

S

•

•••

Zaclosure s

•

Report on 'Political and Security Acpects of non-Rilitary

. Applications of Satellite E:...rth-.

Sensing'

. •

. • .. • . • • •

••

,—TOP--SEGRET--

., . • .•
NUMB VIA NTROL SYS2 4

Political and Security As000to of Non-

- Militarxikonlications of Satellite. Earth-Sensin%

• •

. • •

► •„ •

••

..*

1. Tho NSAM 156 Committee, hoc rovieved the looms

7rained in the lottor of April 4 from •. Charles L. Schultze

4nd Dr. Donald V. EorniG to Socrotary of State Doan Rusk

(Appendix A), and submits the following report of its

mum ' conclusions.

111111111111•111

2. We boliovo that tho "Deport on Politicil and

11111 Informational Ampocts of Satollito Roconnalocance Policy"

propared purouant to MAN 155 and approved on June 30, 1952,

NN"W for transmittal to tho Prooidont romains basically valid. Ems The objoctive of avoiding open challonzpo to satellite

obgervation activity has boortsonorally mot, and the Soviet

Union has =tad though not rotractod ito challonse to IMO the principlo of military spaces roconnaiocanco. At:room-Int

111111 has boon roached on fundarantal local principloo which do

am not ban (though they also do not orqgicitly sanction) apace

mom oboorvation. Also, since 1952 the Soviots have dovolopod a

4"1"=•• major operational oatollito roconnalcoance procram of thoir

own. Dovolopmonts over the pant tour yawn havo, therefore,

all mmmmall led to a shift of emphasis from a nood for actions that

v111 build world acceptance of apace oboorvations, than a

OMNI gonoinlrhovol idea, to action° which tall pr000rvo the -1IIIII pr000nt vide tacit acceptance of ouch activitioo.

Accordingly, thore doos not soon to be any imperative to

Simi launch diaclooure initiatives for the purpose of furthering -III= the General principle of apace oboorvation. On the other

mum hand, it remains nocesoary to coesidor the possibly advorao •

effocts of now public discloouros or other initiatives

11111111 which could upset the prosont oatiafactory situation.

3. Our chief concern over a challenge to the legitimacy and propriety of oatellite reconnaissance ram boon the

1MM Soviet position. Over the past sovoral years, the Russians min have withdrawn insictence on branding such activity=

'11111111MME illegal in the caws of international space aGroomonts that

;11111 they desired, and they do not proso ouch argenzoto in the

Timm US, but thoy have not stopped refOrrinG to ouch activitioa

11111

 as espionago. Z1oroovor, the atatomonto by Khruohohov and

his son-in-law, Adzhuboi, admitting such Soviot activities

have never been printod in the Soviot press or acknowlodGed

as official. In the first moot-7.1.zushchev statement Warring; imolicirtly to Apviet cataliite recormaisoanco, :

.-Tor-sieRnor-
•

• • • ... T. • • . . .

. .

1 •

▪

$.

•

--1201L-SSCRET--- BAND= VLF CONTROL

•

about our oatollito oporatione that would poet a diroot

•

I •

political challocco to the Soviet Union on the consitive

loom of roconnalocanco.n

4. It is no noccoaary to Vivo more attântion than •

heretofore to the reaction of other countries. To date,

Increanins public awaromeno of the oxiotonce of US and

Soviot military apace roconnaloaanco has not promptod

concern in other countrioe for their own political or

' military oocurity interest°, but ouch concern is likely

to develop as ethos become CO20 amaro of the naturo end

poop* of =tonna ourvolllanco. Diocloouro of surveil-

` • lance capabilition, ovon indirectly in non-alitary

. contoxto, will owakon now intoroet and in comp camp con.

corn. Accordincly, any ouch diaoloaure ohould to carefully

conniderod and planned co ac to prevent or roGuco advoroo

ronotiono by other °taco that would be undoolrable in

• their dun right and could alp° be manipulated to our

. detriment by the Soviet Union.

5. Direct diooloouro of oatellito r000nnalooence for •

. . . the purp000 of minims world acceptance of the principle

of space our/mina= la both unn00000cry and liable to

. . provoke adverco reastiono from the USSR and other otatoo.

On the other band, in the long ran the oocurity of our

.%

Brezbnov on :el 1 dicalcoodezuntruolfebloollalloydn'•

u ^o a.i...-ecoizsavcatollitoo",ler-or -

91, 'Woe

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•

4410.A.,..• num:ore or moollee, cm , remlmwaalo c1=2.7Imaz' Thood

tor "-

ift.i14.4. lino, 4,ehat nScarPP.775A3,11.t—t, T-'-.- 11 r,-"--ft.r.r.,77afbeloo l no—rarrar

'

a, xc:: .1147.-uctc..= =zoLC5%ottho ussn hem. Ebtuithet=d1rI ttlo lmligd_Onicalon as idhe •

Soviot catollito merr",===r„...:-tou, v—i,

J .1

morttmenca of the IXIA:: 15 Ror.o rt comoltrzion that: "It to

oxtremoly important that tho US avoid public otatementa . ' •

• ' , ' .

. 

reconnalonanoo procram can.bo oorvod by encourasins the •

,. • pr000nt natural, gradual crazies world rocosnition of the

potontialitioo of oatolllte oarth-oenzins in the context

] of ociontific procrono and °apnea° bottom cut. ;ugh

r000cnition will crou whether wo oticalato it or not.

Uo can influence and obannol, and if uo rich retard, such

71 ' a dovolopmeat -- but uo cannot provont it. Uo should

LI. , rococnice that any amaront US ofrorto to aupproec or

.---- bobble peaceful applications boom= of pram:mod (and

. rightly prom:mod) nonnitivity over protecting military

J

reconnaissance would not corve our objective of rotairsinz

El. •

-immrimunirr1 MOM
•

•

• 1, • • • • . • • . .•

•

. HAN LB NTAOL SYSTE2

or irnprovins tacit acceptance of unroatrioted earth oboervation and conoins. A US position of favorinz, loading, and

1 : •

sharins in non-military application., of antollito earth-

. conoins will not involvo tho c: ao rich= of provoking a con- •

fronton= pith to Eov2.ot Mica as cooia direct also/ammo

•

.that thaw initiativoo aro cot tonsured by tho Sovioto ac

of roconnalccanco. Ue chould 1=708 inoofar ao pocciblo,

• likely to rocult in soceral dicolosuro of information about

- . her military capabilities which tho =Swishes to protoct.

6. An notod abovo, non-military ncoo of apace which

. • roquiro aurvoillanco of tho earth by uarCouo conoorc would

. ac a aide effect inovitabiy atimulato widor awaron000 of the

• capabilitico of roconnalccaoco, but in a mom favorablo con-

• %.. taut than would diroct disolocuro. We should rocoznizo that

different =to of any tocanl oloay will continuo to ovolo

different remotion-1. Tho familiar home, travol and hobby

. moo of ordinary camorao do not bacon objections to their

. use for intolliConco collection. he 08:3 will be true of •

) e 4 aatollito =corm, and the Soviota havo already ohiftod thoir

. • pocition covo'cl yearn aso to objecting to tho two of Dotal-

- • Tito intolliconco collootion, rathor than objoctins to

oatollito °boo:irrational:co. (If in the tutu= the nuociana

; tacitly admit to having roconnalccance =Wilton of their

pooLow, oun, olonq tho Atop of nrorhnwr i o ntnto:;pot rorogggsLIg

abovo, they would probably still claim that intolllconco

LI . 65115ction by tho 1.1tod Statoa carved different and nofar-

/5"00: Sous p• rpocoa.) Rio does not, bowovor, coon to bo a valid

wilt :lob ir,e bat= for oppooins dovolopaont of concurrent non-military

1.61fr • and continuod military recannaicoanco prosramo.

tea'. 7. Mat o and other proposal° for devolopIns earthsensing programs which might ovarian be derived in aanitizod

•

' form from, or atinulate•publio interest in, claaniflod roma-

, • nalsoance provomo should bo judcod on the basic of critoria

. such as foocibility, preferopco to non-space altornativoa, •

'coot, problem in protootins claccifiod*tochnolosy, and

rialto of cocurity compromico of the claccifiod roconnalcoance

pro-on. It chould czually bo pooalblo by carofulplennins

. to olticoto poaoiblo adverao political roporcusoloub of the

• incidental dicolcauro of curvoillanco capabilitioa and hence • to give political and national cocurit7 oloaranco to ouch

. prosrano. Tho boot justification for ouch programs and

.--the boot (moral boots for cal=2123 any alarm over their

.'1* effects will be valid se:tontine or economic payoff in which

1.1

other countries can expect to'chare.
.

• • . • •n••n••• ••• •• • 4... •••n••• • • • • rm... • ....•••n••

•

••••••••••• • • ." :•••••'7.7. ••• ••• ••• ••

• •

.• •

,•n•

VXMICIalita SYSTIN

-4-

8. The pricary are* of conpotition is cpace boturcam : • tho United Statoo and the Covtlot Umcn hap been and rill I *- • • for the neat foz goo= continuo to bp the raco to the coon. .2hia to, hor.ovor, largoly a cot to coupotition for the

 • •• 1.950 1 c. Fa t longor run, thoro cny dovoloD a cm:73=1am

1 •

in opaco ap?licationo Covolopicg tho r000C2000 of tho world,

particulmay of to undordovoloped coil d. COC=n1C0t1000

. oatellitoo aad cotoorological oatollitoo have a? rowdy contributed to this end, but their bonofito Co cot ochaurt

• lUg Ond =cc: rat of 2000=00.

the potcatia3. vat= of earth-cowing catollitoo for dovolop-

. .

. •

le • • • •

9. In the dolrborationz of this Con:attoo, difforoncoo

• of vier crow over the rolatSvo ccrlto of using catollitoo

• • 02 aircraft Dor natural rocourco curvoyo and other earth- oonsing activitloo in tho "room:nal:canoe range of catollito .

. conning (that io, roughly bolo, 20 cot= in preciolon of ,

ermcd r000lution). tihio Cocnittoo has not attomptod to •

'%; • • r000lvo ouch difforoncee; thoy clearly reflect an inportent quoation but our pr000nt foam to on political and oocurity Gaidolirlo for urn of ouch catollito 1370C222.3 in thin ronge. co coy be dote: mead to bo ocononically and ociontifically . In addition, bore could appoar to be unr000lvod

..quoationts with roopoat to the altornativoo of uoing,u=annod • or caned oatollitoo for them purp0000.

. .. • • 10, A natural recourcoo program of the kind in which

_ to intorootod can in tiro provldo vent data, using a

•• varioty of opaceborae cocsora. the prom= as now "f" enviaccod Cow not include operational CZO of =note- conning tochniquco before the 19703, principally bocci= •

...- cost of the aonooro are prommtlyprocracaod for um in fi • .• aophioticatod resod cpacocraft ea part of the Apollo

►

Applicationo Program. •Zor.evor, czpericontal prom= might -t*! • be initiated as early ao 1958. ..ere lo no funding Co yet

n • of Una ea:plaza loco omgroolve 1=onnod oyotemo. U .

n

op-eamter-1

, . . 11. Ono current problock which =moo is tho quootion of C20 of cortain oquipnont end photographic catoriaZo from the olamitiod r000nnalcoanco wog= to amolot ILA in ovaluatiag the utility of, and dovdloping tochniquoo for, .

..

catollito photograp-ly for enploitiag notural ro i powcoo. In

0 • -ardor to dovolop a tho..-,ouda w.doratendiug of oboorvation aatellito tochnology, it uould peon deoirahlo to conoldor whether UASA can bo provided -- on a claaciflod basis, but
.• •

• 91

• •

•

••• •

••••••••• •••••• a•••n ••••••••n•n •.••n ways., .•••• •• ••• • • ••• •••n••••• •n••••n•••••• •••• oar.. ••n ••••• •

•

•

.•• .

-110P-811ORBP 41111011TROL -_sue

_-5-

- •

nndor loco rootrictivo clazoirications controls

both colootod oatollito photographa for evaluation =di ..., • -celoctoacatollito hardyaro, includng i cacoras. TL ground- .

....-. work would thuo to- proporod to: posaiblo tuturo oporationol.

woo in natural recourse curvoy miosiona. Cao equip:42ot to

be 'aced rood not -- and in cur vices ohould not roprozont •

tho latort, highoot r000lution canoras. Eat considerable

=fa worts could, for era.-plO to accooplishod with

r000lutiono cn tho ordor of 10-13 :cot. 6=2 of tho =n,*

• • applicat4ons thot might to =fully corved with rocolutions

:. of this lovol tooludo copping, curvoya of rater rocourceo,

. . agricultural cod forootry ourvoya, and otudica of land uoo

—.. • • ovor brood areas. Ealtablo car.orao for th000 purpozoo

•

• •• • 

• alread7 eoiot in tho mo:,--.•.=3, and the Doloaco to VASA

• of both coloctod equipoont and photo why tat on in tho prat night to uceful and procunably could bo dcuo without . rattling =amble oocurity proSloas. The camorao and-

.. 'Thotqgra:Ohy :ten tho Moyatoms could reu3iU classified;

only . the products of actual IitSA nizolons-tmuld probably

1 .-.. . need to bo unciecolficd. In =co eft-or* a docicion hod-

. • boon nada for IL' to proccod with a ell= procroo for

att caolcooltiod camor,

rasa could lot contracts . . •

1 ....

/

. 1= 4 would profor to the greatoot

.0 ? I 7. J . r., •

• • • • • • noo nnalascifiod oquipment. On tho

. ' ..othor hand, peroimible URSA programs would noceocorily be ..

j= ..% .. core severely linitod If only unolecoifiod equip:lout could - •

• . .

.,,,.... . be used, and for a range of cows valLablo p-otogralehic

r:. ....:, data could be reloacod while the oquipoont would nood to

ronain clacolfiod. . • ..... • .•

12. Public =arm= of two quality of oono of the ...

.

71,...,.....lcaer rocolution notarial° rolcacod in non-militorY . Li . , :..: content° mod not have danngicg offoct on the viability •

.:-.- • of unilatoral roconaoicoance pro a, providod care to •

; .: ..i. • •

El -:. =voiced in the typo of coterlaIc rolcaood and the cnoner

.., '. of ',Gleam. Socurity of the clazzitiod national con- m

: •.- =imam) programwould also be enhanced by having CASA

1 .r. conduct the actual launch and retrieval operatioho of the (1' .

• non-recionnaissance programa. .

.

. •
. •••••• • • •n •• • a.. •• • • • • •• • n•• •• • ••••n••••nn •••n •

•

-,ToP-szem VOW SYS2EI . .6"

. •

-6-

natural rocouroco (evolopnont. (Thu USS2 nay alsoum°

tiilla knoulodoo la tar to ottoupt to undorout tho Amorican

poaltion on dioarmanont vorification, end ao notod ocrlior

[I-

( t

**obZootion to opon aoLoulodconont of roconnalccanco.)

. hlo nould not nocovarily ieply any softoninc of Soviot

. Othor countrioc, too, Eny to contomplotim3 melon procreum.

: Escent Drench otadica of tho to o2 eoriol photocrephy for

• "..; • cnocraphio noon ham indicatod an into:not in tho uoo*of

. • °pact) platforno co roll ea aircraft. Zi p intoroot lo not ourpricinc; France lo only the firot of occoral coun- [1 - . nith dovolopinc cpace procremo uhich bill b3

"In7ooticatin3 ucoful cooncnio 07 colontitic satollite

procrarm in en arca that hap not clroody boon pro ocptod

. by the USA or the U223. In the likelihood that ot%or

comatrus ,rill coon ho oporatinc or at bast openly

,.: dimooins the too of oboorvation catellitoo, it night be

.: to the US advontoce to be proparod to take the load in "." pooh dicousoiono and cotivitioc. Indood, at non point us nay viola to ponoidor cooporativo and collaborativo prom= cot only nith othor ocuntrico in troctern Etropo and Zapan, but *von with the USSR, if the political clicato

=re approprioto.

••

f 14. ho United States chould conoldor ctopo to apply

its hilly dovolopod end Covolopinc photocrophic tioo for tea bonofit of tiro undordovolopod countrios. In

- • •..*;:::.this nay tto Unitod States can b3 in a pooltion to provide

[I• H. ; ,tanciblo ovidonoo of cur tnteroot in holpipc dovoloping

,

. 1 countrieo, uhilo forestalling or ovormatohin3 posaible .**4 Soviet propacanda initiative in that field. This still require oonoideration of a whole ramp of political, ao

-TOP-fneRrt

•

- .* 23. Tto Zhitod Stotocmill, in any =zoo find it -'. inoreapincly difficult to control public dicolosuro or

--- . _ pato:Luta curvoillonco capobilitioc. To (:to the US and

. tho USZ2 b2VO caintalnod tacitly ectnorledzod bv.,:t nnpubli..**

. olzod cut• roconnnicoonce curvoilZcnoo. Latoly, tho

1 • riaLl ban oho= chat nny he indications oC a olicht locconit: np of thoir oun roticoroo to disc= catollite conoin3 capabilitioo by roloasinc TV photopaphs of the

] • in thoir cun prow = lar US-roloccod Co i pia photocrephs

earth taken by tho Nelniyo catollito, end oy publichinc

(oithout attribution of the courco). Zoco otepo cu of a posOlblo Soviet nillimcnooc to =not= tho rorld to the idea that non-roconnalccanco photocrophy from °pow is a

nor:al activity, and cculd forooLadou an oponly echnoulodcod

.. L' It Ooviot catollito procrem for carth-oonoinc and
1 .. ..*• v

-TOP-SECRE? HANDLEVIINDONTROL SYSTEX

-7-

veil-as scientific-technical and security, factors. For

example; merely advising developing countries of new

resources and opportunities will not always win us pleudits

if we are not prepared to asciat theca countries in

.realizing theca potontialitioa. Nonetheless, in the longer

run there would appear to be real political opportunitlea

to us in taking a more active role than the soviet union

in applying satellite earth observation to non-military

economic 11303. This long-run political interest reinforces •

other reason* for developing the potentialities or nonmilitary usec of earth- tensing by satellites.

a

a

a

From the standpoint of protecting security of

the classified national reconnaisaanco program, NASA

programs should proceed gradually through current aerial

experimentation, to unmanned and manned satellites, and

in general moving from leas to more procice ground recolutioni The technical limits placed on security ground.,

could probably change as the general state of the art of

clawified technological capabilities improves and as

public =renew and appreciation of them advances. This

promos of reducing the security margin could. not go on

indefinitely, but the line of conaltivity probably could

recede along the lines indicated above as both technological and political aecurity limitations become lea p acute.

At present, it to generally agreed that the limiting

optical ground resolution should be about 20 cetera from

low earth orbit; public discussion of potential future

economic applications should, however, be less restricted.

At some point, probably after- therd had been

further initial exploratory study and if the program

proved practicable, it would appear that the United States

-- perhaps the President himself -- might launch a major

public program. At that time, experimental NASA aerial

and space photographs could be released, and NASA program

plans and expectations described -- all without mention

of the classified program. Such an initiative would

maximize political gains for the United States. It could,

of course, also prompt prominent speculation about clonalfled reconnaissance activitioa, .but such speculation

could probably be fended off, and possible hostile Samlot

reaction° would probably be foreclosed or undercut by the

wide interact that the program should generate. rewever,

the question of whether and how any ouch inialtive should

be made should probably be deferred at this time, and in

any case will _require further careful consideration.

-TOP-WORE*

•
•

•

. -TOP-3NCRET- 11110 CONTROL SYSTEM

-8.

17. It should be noted that public recognition, even

i • on an incomplete basin, of catellite obeervation capabili- •

ties would also have reverberations in other fields. For

I

• example, public awaronoce of such capabilities should assist

in building a consonsue in support of disarcacant proposals

* which rely on satellite curveillanco. The cmistence or an

I

- with poorer quality product°, would under coca circucetancos

openly acknowlodsod photographic satellite pyitcm, even

' give the US government an additional option: to cake public

use of satellite photography to prove-a violation of an

]

agreement to a world forum, without disclosure of the

classified reconnaissance program. In the absence of such

'a publicly known system, it might be more difficult to make

] ' the came tic°, it may also be used by others to argue

a convincing caco that a violation had indeed oocurred. At

against requirements for other verification meaouroe in

0

disclosure of surveillance capabilities within the limits

cacao where such requirement° rocain. By and large, howover,

we are sussosting would probably facilitate distinguishing

between what satellite observation can and cannot verify

[1

for the purposes of disarmament negotiations.

[I

18. Recommendations: e-•. . .

The classified national reconnaissance program

should be protected by continuing to consider cnrefullv the,

a ,t politicalt

political and cocuritv effects of nronoced uncl=iflod

mKammtiu earth-seneinm activit es nrior to IFFZirCntn 

Similarly consideratton 642uld continue to ba Aron to the

;',101 oLsk §BIII176Brano socurirrinatza oi7aiglic discuss o4 o such

act vibes. hpy party at interoet Can request the nun 155• 10‘

as noclUbittee to review possible political or security '4.„,e.A.

issues which might arise from particular NASA or other non- -141,e

military plans, programs, or other related activities S...., ,,,,,

concerned with spaceborne earth-sensing. S I

w,.

p.c..........Le-4k.;

466.1f-- Thore is potential great political capital cdVw.40,1

in a US program of natural resource surveys and other t4

scientific and economic exploitation of satellite earth

observation and coming, prov:.60 the basis has boon proporly

laids'and the announcement of ouch a program is ale to draw

upon and project viable economic promise. Further consideration should thorofore be given to a major political

initiative advancing the concept of economic betterment

through space activities. If such an initiative is decided

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upon, it should cone at a tice when sufficient work has been .

done to deconatrate the potentialities and offer reasonable

promise of some early payoff.

At presort, and for the next several years,

from the otandpoint of political and aocurity considerations

there is no objection to NASA proceeding with its tentatively

. planned experimental program, complying with the limitation

previously established between NASA and ZERO.*

In dise •soion of the use of observation Betel-

. lites for natural =sources pm•ps.sos, ,::.SA saoulo, for two

OL.404kaik novo rivo yours cub:looto future roviem and possible

revision of guidelines -- restrict its discussion of future

onto= to thoso involving ground resolution of 10-15 foot.

The pace restriction should apply to all otbor interostod

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Covornment *sonatas, In order to facilitate proper classified

 to apply the above general guidelines, and additional

s detoilod imploconting guidelines doveloped by NASA with the

concurrence of URO, a NSAM should bo icauod directing all

7.1 . other civilian agonies with en interest in catollito earthconning for those purposes to race known their interests in

that field to, and coordinate fully with, NASA. Apart from rl .

LA

. other advantages to bo expoctod from ouch an articulation

- ; of responsibilities, it should enable NASA to apply the

agreed classified guidelines limitations to other civilian tla....impick

agencies.

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cuv&A ,.i.c::

aTho Committoo accepts as a satisfactory present dofini- ei6n

•• tion of the limitation on the study, design, dovolopcent,

fabrication, or test of earth senors by NASA (as proposed

in Dr. McMillan's loiter to Dr. Swears of August 5, 1955,

and accepted 'by Dr in his ro Dr. McMillan of

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(5) NASA and other appropriate agencies should

consider carefully the relative merits and costs of aerial

and other possible alternatives to various space-borne

earth-sensing programs in terms of practical political

interests as well as cost offectivonesa. Similarly, the

respective =rite of manned and untanned satellites will

of course roquiro consideration. To assist in deciding

theao questions, NLSA and other appropriate Govornment

personnel ahould be permitted to use selected U-2 and KE-4

photography, cost of which is now codeword classified, to

advance its studios of non-military earth-sensing applications.

(6) Mith a view to facilitating the above studios

noted in para (5), USD. should be asked to review:

:I

(a) The question of remelting reference

to the fact that the US has an operational •

satellite reconnaissance program from codeword

0

. control, retaining either a SECRET or TOP

SECRET classification. This would permit 'ust not

explanation of the reason for limitations, ort:.i•l A

.a...

a 

. a classified basis, to Government personnel .a..A0A.Astruo .,

concerned with non-military satellite earth-I,D442.6"..`:,,t

sensing programs but without a,need-to-know Ge...44...,,,,,,4

the performance capabilitips'Or product of „.,..w.:44.'

rl • the classified program.00-1 re thq conaider-1- Li * . . ..c... - ationz involved is that, at present, uncleared

tp...,A uovernmonv personnel oaten voice their

LI rl ethaut adLALLA speculations about reconnaissance programs

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. •

uncontrolled basis.

and oven capabilities on an unclassified and

10.1r0.61.....1m.,-.fto a .4., „,,.b.3....„.... (b) Selective removal of appropriate

photography, from codeword control for classified

use • by selected NASA and other cleared personnel

0

studying the potentialities of non-military

earth-sensing activities, or, alternatively but

less desirably, clearance of an incroaped

number of NASA personnel for such use of those

materials under proadnt codoword control:

(7) The Director of Central intelligence, i•.

[Imate,:- minanimumalathe Director of the National Reconnais-

- sauce Office, should.review and establish appropriate

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security rostrictionz on cameras and other sensing apparatus

and equipment which can be made available for NASA's program

of non-military applications of satollite carth-zoning.

It is rocognizod that aubstantial compartmentalisation will

probably have to remain, but tbo non-military programs

[1 obould be enabled to profit from rolovant nonievomonte of

the military program to the oxtont feasible.

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