2014 UT App 262

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### T H E 

### U TA H 

### C O U RT O F 

### A P P E A L S

D AV I D J. M UL H OL L AND, Peti tioner,

v. D E PAR TM E NT OF W OR

KF ORC E S E R

V I C E S , Respondent.

Per CuriamDeci si on No. 20140784-CA Filed N ov ember 14, 2014

Or i gin al Proceedi ng i n thi s Court

Davi d J. Mulholland, P etiti oner Pr o S e Suzan Pi xto n, Atto rney fo r Respondent
Before J UD G E S J AM E S Z. D AVI S , M I C H E L E M. C H R

I S TI AN S E N

, and K AT E A. T O OM E Y

.

PER CURIAM :
¶1 Davi d J. M ul holland pet i tions for rev i ew o f t he Wor kfor ce Appeals Board’ s (the Board) deci si on denyi ng hi m unempl oyment benefi ts. We decline to dis turb the Bo ard’s deci si on.
¶2 The Board’ s deci si on on a request for unempl oyment benefi ts i s a mi xed questi on o f fact and law that i s more fact-li ke becau se “the c ase does not lend i tself to consi stent resolution by a uni form body of appell a te precedent.” Carbon Cnty. v. Work force Appeals Bd. , 2013 UT 41, ¶ 7, 308 P.3d 477 (ci tation and i nternal quotat i on marks omi tte d). “ Becaus e of the fact-intensi ve conclu si ons inv olve d at the agency level,” the Board’ s deter minati on i s entitled to deference. Id. “When a petiti oner challen ges an agency’s findings of fact, we are required to uphold the finding s if they are supp or ted by sub stanti al evidenc e whenMulholland v. Department of Work force Ser vices

view ed i n li ght of the whole recor d before the court.” Stau ffer v. Department of Work

force Servs

. , 2014 UT App 63, ¶ 5, 325 P.3d 109 (ci tations and internal quot ation marks omi tte d).

¶3 Th e De p a r t me nt o f W o r k fo r ce Ser vic es de nie d unempl oyme nt benefi ts becau se i t found that Mulholland

vo luntaril y qui t hi s jo b wi thout goo d caus e. An admini strat i ve law judge (ALJ) affi rmed that deni al, and t he Board affi rmed the deci si on to deny benefi ts

. “ To establi sh goo d caus e, a clai mant

mus t show that continuing the employment would have caus ed an adver se effect whi ch the clai mant could not contro l or prev ent. The clai mant mus t sho w t ha t an i mmedi ate severance of the

e m p l oy m e n t re l a ti on s h i p w a s n e c e ssary.” Utah Admin. C od e R9 9 4

- 405-102

. A n adver se effect requires a showing of “actual or p ot e n ti al physi cal, mental, ec on om i c, p e rs on a l or p ro fe s s i on a l h a rm
caus ed or aggr avat ed by the employment.” Id. R994-405-102(1) (a). Good caus e i s not establi shed i f the clai mant reasonably could have

co nt inued work i ng whi le look i ng for other employment, or had reasonable alter nati ves to preserv e the job. Id. R994-405-102(1) (b)

. “The clai mant’s d e cis i on to qui t mus t be measu red again st the acti ons of an aver age i ndivi dual, not one who i s unus ually

sens i tive.” Id. R994-405-102(1) (a).

¶4 Mulholland qui t hi s jo b as a par t -t ime tech associ ate at St aples due to persi stent problems wi th a supervis or

. A l though Mu lh ollan d characterized hi s supervis or ’s behavi or as abus i ve and harassing, he di d not demonstrate an adver se effect that could not be contro lled or prev ented and that necess i tate d i mmedi ate severance, nor d i d he demonstrate that he could not have remain ed employed whi le he so ug ht other work

. Hi s problems wi th the supervis or had been going on for roughly a year , but Mulholland clai med that a preci pi tating event fo r hi s deci si on to qui t was the

su p e rv i sor alter ing hi s tim e sheet to remov e thi rt y minutes fr o m Mulholland’s tim e work ed. This ha ppened once, and i t was promptly addressed by the stor e manager, who obtained payment for Mulholland and told th e su p erv i sor not to change the tim e sheet again

. Mulholland admi tt ed that the supervis or di d not

20140784-CA 2 2014 UT App 262Mulholland v. Department of Work force Ser vices

change hi s tim e sheet again after that i nc i dent. However , Mulholland conti nued to feel that hi s paycheck was not secu re. In hi s memorandum, Mulholland repeat edly asserts that the ALJ and later the Board fabri cated facts to supp or t the deni al of benefi ts. These statements are inappropr i ate and also wi thout merit becau se the factual findings are supp or ted by subst anti al evidenc e i n the

recor d before us. Even i f Mulholland had deter mine d that he no longer wanted to work at St aples as a result of hi s ongo ing confli cts wi th the supervis or , the Board’ s det e r min ation that he fai led to demonstra t e g ood caus e to qui t rather than remain i ng employed whi le he look e d fo r another jo b i s entitled to deference. Accordi ngly, we do not di sturb the Boa r d ’ s deci si on that Mulholland di d not demonstrate goo d caus e to q uit his jo b and

was n ot e nti tled to benefi ts.

¶5 W he re a clai mant does not demonstrate goo d caus e, “ t he equi ty and goo d consc ie nc e st andard mus t be consi dered.

. . . If there are mi tigati ng ci rcums tances or a deni al of benefi ts would be

un reasonably harsh or an affront to fai rness, benefi ts ma y be allowed.” Id. R994-405-10 3 (1 ). However , a clai mant mus t have acted reasonably i n quit t ing

. Id. A clai mant’s acti ons may be reasonable “i f the deci si on to qui t wa s l ogical, sens ible, or practic al.” Id. R994-405-103(1) (a). Mulholland’s arg uments that benefi ts should be al lowed are based upon hi s asserti on that he needed benefi ts to supp or t hi s fami ly. However , Mulholland hi mself created that need by qui tting hi s jo b wi thout goo d caus e. We decline to di sturb the Board’ s deci si on that an award of benefi ts

was n ot mer i ted under the equity and goo d consc i ence standard.

¶6 We decline to di sturb the Board’ s deci si on denyi ng benefi ts.

20140784-CA 3 2014 UT App 262