NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

26 July 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD 

SUBJECT: MOL Policy Paper 

Today Dr. Hall delivered to Dr. McMillan and Mr. Friedman 

the attached copy of a final version of the MOL Policy Paper. The 

red marginalia indicate changes from the Sanders/Quiggins original. 

Mr. Friedman agreed to telephone his comments to Dr. Hall. 

They center on a distaste for the new material on page 9; the misplaced Item 11 on page 12 (it should be under "Specific') and the new 

sentence in Item 2 on page 13. 

Attachment PAUS92. WORTHMAN 

Colonel, USAF 

Handle via BYEMAN 

Control System 

RAN DLE WA TALENTKEYHOLE CHANNELS DORIAN 

ONLY TOP--SEC—RET-- 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1.,JULY 2015 

TOP SECRET 2 6 JUL 195 

POLICY ON PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS 

AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE 

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY 

1. THE MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

The proposed Manned Orbiting Laboratory will have as its initial 

objective the development and demonstration at the earliest time of 

an operationally useful high resolution manned optical system. MOL 

is scheduled to make its first manned reconnaissance flight in 1968. 

Since 1962, it has been the announced policy of the United States 

Government to "avoid situations, statements, or actions which, in 

the context of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be 

exploited as evidence either of alleged U. S. aggressiveness or 

duplicity." This policy has been advanced through carefully planned 

security measures: by never openly revealing the nature or extent 

of U. S. satellite reconnaissance activities we have not forced or 

influenced other nations (particularly the USSR) to react publicly 

against our space overflights. 

Considering this background, what is the most favorable context 

for introduCing the MOL program to the American and international 

public? Will growing world-wide interest and enthusiasm for manned 

space flight minimize the possibility of international protest? Or will 

TOP SECRET 

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE-1 lULY 2015 

the fact that MOL is a military spacecraft carrying military pilots 

make it more objectionable internationally than current unmanned 

satellite reconnaissance activity? -Will the USSR allege that MOL 

contains weapons? If so, how could or should the claim be countered? 

Will the growing tacit acceptance of unmanned satellite reconnaissance 

develop to a point where by 1968 MOL is entirely acceptable internationally? The answers to these quettions may affect the success of 

MOL operations as.well as the total national security. 

In recent years satellite reconnaissance has been the major source 

of United States strategic military intelligence of the Soviet Union 

and Communist China. The United States has relied greatly on this 

information in evaluating international military capacilities and in 

determining its own force structures. The information has been 

particularly important in the United States' evaluation of Soviet 

strategic missile and other offensive weapon capabilities and of 

Soviet and Chinese strategic military research and development programs. 

Denial of satellite reconnaissance information to the United States, 

or a reduction in the program's effectiveness, would have a significant 

adverse impact on United States national security. 

■ 

2 

• TOP S[T,RFT 

- .SPECIAL 'HANDLING REQUIRED 
-NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 a r. 

•d C r"7* 

II. BACKGROUND ON THE PROBLEM OF "LEGITIMIZATION" AND DISCLOSURE 

NSC Action 2454 (Tab A), with its "Eighteen Points", forms the 

basis for the existing policy of secrecy and carefully controlled 

efforts to gain acceptance of satellite reconnaissance. In varying 

circumstances, this policy has been reviewed and re-affirmed periodically since its promulgation in July 1962. The advent of the MOL, with 

its primary reconnaissance function) has generated concern and comment 

from various U. S. government agencies concerning the security of 

existing and future satellite reconnaissance activity. 

III. TEE PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE MANNED ORBITING 

LABORATORY: CONSEQUENCES OF DISCLOSURE 

The United States' satellite reconnaissance program is a national 

program conducted in secrecy. The character of the program is 

based on five major objectives aeveloped in response to NSAM 156, 

expressing the desire to: 

1. "Maintain our freedom of action unilaterally to conduct 

reconnaissance satellite operations." 

2. "Prevent foreign political and physical interference with 

the conduct of these operations." 

3. "Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of the 

operations or end products of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance 

program." 

3 

T-1 

ath 

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE .1 JULY 2015 

rri ) 

4) 77• ;,.' 

L. "Avoid situations, statements or actions which, in the 

context of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be 

exploited as evidence either of alleged U. S. aggressiveness or 

duplicity." 

5. "Facilitate the resolution of any conflicts whbh might arise 

between the essential technical and security requirements of the U.S. 

satellite reconnaissance program and the international commitments 

and foreign policy objectives of the United States in a manner which 

is in the over-all best interests of the national security of the 

United States." 

The primary objective, abstracting those listed above, is to 

forestall foreign or domestic actions that would prevent the United 

States from using satellites for reconnaissance. This objective is 

not changed by the advent of MOL. 

Woulu we enhance the acceptability. of MOL by private disclosure 

to hostile nations? There is great danger in disclosing MOL's 

essential secret -- the high resolution of its photography -- to 

hostile nations. Such a disclosure would arouse apprehensiveness 

over our intelligence capability and might stimulate those nations --

especially the Soviets.-- to renew their historic oppodtion. Further, 

since Soviet military astronauts overfly the United States routinely, 

SPECIAL PAr' 1" t"T"PFD 

D qc(IL -T7-r a kil..AAL 
• NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 , Tro, Q Fri r-r 

c.P...,LOILI 

a reconnaissance disclosure by the United States would be a confusing 

defensive action. The Soviets might presume that the true character 

of the MOL must be quite different from that offered in disclosure. 

Therefore, any announcement of high. resolution photograFhic capability 

could have an unsettling influence upon the Soviets with protest, 

camouflage, and even physical counteraction as possible responses. 

No definable "good" would accrue to the United States from a private 

disclosure of the MOL mission. 

Do we enhance acceptability by public disclosure? The existence 

of a U.S. requirement for effective intelligence of the Sino-Soviet 

area is generally clear to the governments of the free world. In spite 

of this acceptance it is unlikely that the U.S. could gain widespread 

support in any international forum for a positive affirmation to conduct 

satellite reconnaissance, especially with the introduction of a manned 

vehicle. The newly emerging small nations are strongly nationalistic. 

Their representatives could view a Soviet/U.S. debate over manned or 

unmanned reconnaissancel,ith quiet detachment, but. if faced squarely 

with a vote on the "space rights" of their own nations they would very 

probably choose to affirm total sovereignty. Friendly large nations 

are no exception to this rule; they simply enter the debate at an 

earlier point. Even arguments for "common defense" would normally 

- SPECIAL I-IHANDLING REQUIRED 
, 

RELEASE t JULY 2015 U " 1

.NROAPPROVEDFOR 

yield in the face of arguments for sovereignty. The United States 

could, if necessary, debate the issue of the free use of space in any 

forum without apprehension. But it.should carefully avoid any situation 

which forces a nation-by-nation roll call on photograthic overflight. 

As in the case of private aisclosure, public aisclosure would have 

the additional effect of forcing hostile nations to react, since the 

announcement would be construed as a deliberate'flaunting of a 

provocative capability. The Soviet reaction to U-2 overflight is well 

• known; public aisclosure could provoke Soviet leadership into placing 

the'U-2 and MOL in the same category. 

Does continued secrecy create a bad image of the United States? 

Secrecy does not mean illegality. The practice of conducting legal, 

secret operations in international waters and air space is well established. There is no reason for the United :States to assume the lack 

of disclosure of details, timing, and results of satellite reconnaissance 

to be taken as a concession to illegality. The fact that these details 

are not disclosed becomes relevant only as the United States allows it 

to become relevant (for example, by reacting defensively to criticism 

in this regard). 

6 

SPECIAL HANDLNIG REQUIRED 

TOP SECRET 
"NIRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

IV. THE FEASIBILITY OF CONDUCTING MOL FLIGHT OPtRATIONS WITHIN 

THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL POLICY 

From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that disclosure of the 

MOL reconnaissance capability is an irreversible step which would 

have profound adverse effects on enemies, allies, and neutrals. 

Ftrthermore„ no gain would appear to flow from disclosure. 

MOL should therefore be operated within the guidelines of existing. 

national policy and within the carefully-ordered security environment 

which already exists for military space programs. Such an environment 

enhances the achievement of the primary national objective indicated 

above, "...to forestall international or unilateral actions that would 

prevent the United States from using satellites for reconnaissance," 

avoiding unnecessary provocation in the international arena. 

Achievement of this objective will require a firm position on 

several points. 

First, there must be determined governmental resistance to any 

suggestion that MOT, requires elaborate justification. MOL requires 

no more public justification than any other military space projects. 

The United States has announced that it will have a military space 

program and it has one. The United States has never made a secret 

of the fact that a number of its space projects are under military 

n rt 71-7 

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED 
' NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE *1 JULY 2015 I.. 

control and have military objectives.. MOL must be treated as part 

of the mainstream of a continuing U. S. military space program. 

Second, and corollary to the above, the public information program associated with MOL must be kept modest, low-key, and 

Carefully planned. Particularly at the time of program approval, it 

will be in the best interest of the program -- internationally -- to 

avoid fanfare. Contractor publicity must be controlled. All public 

information releases must flow through a single DOD point-of-review 

-- the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs. Public information stories will aeal exclusively with the non-sensitive technological aspects of MOL, such as the booster system, the life support 

system, engineering for long life on orbit, launching technology, 

communication plans, biomedical experiments, etc. Operational 

goals will not be discussed in news releases. Public releases ana 

response to questions should be designed to cover the flurry of interest 

which will be associated with a decision to go ahead with the program. 

This will permit aeferment of releases and discussion of the launching 

phase until we get closer to those events, at which time the then 

existing circumstances can be taken into account. 

Third, the publicly-announced mission of MOL must continue to 

be expressed solely as "the investigation and development of manned 

(t r% 

S 

1/4 t _ 

8 

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED 
•NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE l• JULY 2015 

orbital capabilitiesfrIt should be noted that MOL is not a break 

with the past military space program. Dynasoar, which was a manned 

military space program since the 19501 s, was cancelled because it 

was aimed toward the development of advanced reentry techniques 

and replaced by MOL to study man's capability in space. MO$ should .10.24. 

therefore proauce no new objection. The MOL program was announced 

in December 1963 and $150 Million was included in the FY 66 budget.1 

Fourth, the United States should be prepared to re-affirm its 

abhorrence of orbiting weapons and advise that no U.S. satellite --

operational or developmental -- carries weapons of any kind. In view 

of its present agreement to ban weapons of destruction from orbit, 

this re-affirmation is somewhat trivial in impact; the believerS will 

believe and the accusers will remain unconvinced. 

Fifth, the tight security surrounding TM's mission capability 

must persist regardless of comments and speculation (however accurate 

or inaccurate) by U.S. trade journals and the public press. Public 

information experience with unmanned satellite reconnaissance operations has shown that the most "devastating" publicity carries very little 

impact if completely ignored. 

VI. POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY FOR THE MOL PROGRAM 

A. GENERAL 

1. The United States should maintain the legal position that 

the principles of international law and the U. N. charter apply to 

ra 

(7 1—*(1T-11' ul—tintL9, 

•SPECIALNANDLING REQUIRED 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 IT— 

old e ire 

activities in outer space and, specifically, that outer space is fr,:e, 

as are the high seas. (NSC Action 2454) 

2. The United States should continue to avoid any question 

implying that reconnaissance activities in outer space are not 

legitimate. Similarly, we should avoid any position declaring or 

implying that such activities are not "peaceful uses." (NSC Action 2454) 

3. It is recognized that the United States cannot entirely 

avoid or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, so that where feasible 

the U.S. should also seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the 

legitimacy of space reconnaissance. (NSC Action 2454) 

L. When confronted by specific international pressure to 

outlaw reconnaissance activities in space, the United States should 

continue to take a public stand for the legitimacy of the principle of 

reconnaissance from outer space, the precise form and extent of 

which would aepend upon the circumstances of the confrontation. 

(NSC Action 2454) 

5. The United States should, to the extent feasible, seek to 

avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance" satellites, and where 

appropriate use instead such broader and neutral terms as "observation" 

or "photographic" satellites. (NSC Action 2454) 

10 

7(y) (.'770-17—r 

k.,LAJw 

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRD 
. NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 nn 

t ‘../1 Q;LA11., 

6. The United States should not, at this time, publicly disclose the status, extent, effectiveness, or operational characteristics 

of its reconnaissance program. (NSC Action 2454) 

7. Strict control over public statements and backgrounding 

concerning reconnaissance satellites should be exercised to ensure 

consistency with the policy guide-lines suggested in these recommendations. (NSC Action 2454) 

8. The United States should continue to discreetly disclose 

to certain allies and neutrals selected information with regard tcP 

the U. S. space reconnaissance program, making each disclosure orally 

and at a time while impressing upon them its importance for the 

security of the Free World. However, no information should be provided 

on the MOL at this time. If the program is questioned, the response 

should emphasize the non-aggressive nature of the program. Disclosures 

should be made in a manner that will preclude acquisition by the 

Communist Bloc of usable evidence of an official U.S. acknowledgment 

that we are conducting a satellite reconnaissance program. Proposals 

for such disclosures should include clearance by the National Reconnaissance Office. (NSC Action 2454) 

9. The United States should in private disclosures emphasize 

the fact of our determination and ability to pursue such programs 

because of their great importance to our common security, despite 

any efforts to dissuade us. (NSC Action 2454) 

.0.11 

11 

SPECiAL EANDL1NG REQUME3 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

10. The United States should note in connection with private 

disclosures that, except in some cases for specifically defined 

disarmament agreements, the U. S. cannot agree to (a) declarations 

of the precise purpose of all satellites, (b) declarations of the equipment of all satellites, (c) general requirements for adVance notification 

of all satellite launchings and the tracks of satellites, (d) pre-launch 

inspection of the satellites, or (e) a specific definition of peaceful 

uses of space which does not embrace unlimited observation. 

(NSC Action 2454) 

r 11. The United States should continue to describe the MOL 

program as a Department of Defense program. Provision in the design has 

been made to support general technological experiments and NASA will 

consider the capability available in conjunction with its needs. 

Separate ETR launches for general scientific purposes could be made and 

Nre.A.k.r NASA could include experiments in the WTR launches. However, the 

classified military objectives will continue to have top priority and 

no steps should be taken to use any possible NASA interests as a cover. 

B. SPECIFIC 

1. The United States should continue to preserve the security 

of the National Reconnaissance Program by conducting Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory development and operations within a carefully conceived 

and disciplined security environment consonant with the spirit of 

NSC action 2454. 

12 

SPECIE' HANDLING REQUIRED 
.7-7)0 1 77

2. The mission of MOL will be described solely as the 

investigation and development of manned orbital capabilities essential 

to national defense. rIt should be described as improved substitute 

for Dynasoar and no break from the earlier program of manned military mi.24 

activities.) 

3. The MOL program will not be justified publicly. MOL 

is a logical element of a continuing U. S. military space program; 

as such, it requires no more public justification than any other space 

program. 

It. Public information on MOL will be carefully planned at a 

modest, low-key level. This will be especially important at the time 

permissible information on the operational phase will be released at 

or near launch times. All public information releases or statements 

on MOL made by representatives of any Executive Department or. 

Agency will process for approval through the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs. Such news stories as are 

required will deal exclusively with non-sensitive technological aspects 

of MOL; operational goals will not be discussed. 

5. All MDL launchings will be included on the U.S. portion 

of the United Nations registry of satellite launchings. 

6. MOL redonnaissance products will be controlled in the 

TALENT-KEYHOLE security system, after exposure, during processing, 

r , :9 s ri 

g 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

-RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE.1 JULY 2015 S r I t 

and throughout exploitation. The National Photographic Interpretation 

Center will exploit this product jointly with the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. 

7. The United States will promote, within the bounds of 

security, the free exchange of bona fide non-sensitive data accruing 

from MOL experiments. 

8. It may become desirable for the United States to re-affirm 

its abhorrence of orbiting weapons and advise that no U.S. satellite 

-- operational or developmental -- manned or unmanned -- carries 

weapons of any kind. 

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED 

n 7-) 

os