improving the national defense. 

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I teliigence Information for Dr. Foster's appearance before the 

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Senate Subcommittee, on Military Preparedness. 

1 

The 'following members and staff members have 

previously on intelligence programs: 

been briefed 

Senator Stennis 

Senator Symington 

Senator Anderson 

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Senator Margaret Chase Smith 

Staff member - Mr. Kendall 

Mr. Chairman 

I would like to discuss briefly some of the significance and usage 

of intelligence information within the Department of Defense. 

The Department of Defense must take actions in force deployments 

and in the selection and initiation of research and development programs 

which counter identified and potential threats, by foreign powers, to 

the safety of the United States. 

Today these vital decisions are made after deliberate and concentrated analysis of all sources of intelligence data which might 

influence our day to day decisions as well as our long term plans for 

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Satellite photography, SIGINT and ELINT have made major contributions to the quality and confidence in the intelligence data we 

collect. 

Four principal functional categories of intelligence activities are 

exploited to get the maximum information on our potential and actual enemies. 

First; Search -- 

Second; Baseline -- 

Third; Surveillance -- 

Fourth; Science and Technology -- 

I would like to give some current examples of each of these categories. 

To conduct our photographic search missions we use the KH4 camera 

system in a low altitude orbiting satellite. In FY 68 the KH-4 system is 

producing photographs with 10 foot ground resolution. This past year the 

KH-4 system identified: 

59 new Soviet ICBM silos 

10 new Tallinn defensive missile sites 

Significant Soviet missile build-up along the Chinese border 

New airfields in Mongolia 

5 extremely significant but unidentified advanced weapons related 

facilities in China. These are hardened facilities, apparently related to 

a Chinese advance weapons system. 

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.Using the higher resolution of the KH-8 camera, 

satellites are used to, provide engineering details which allow us to 

"Baseline" equipment and probable usage of thousands of specific 

national targets within the Soviet Union and China. For example: 

specific missile usage can be identified 

--the specific weapons equipage of Soviet forces can be determined 

--new classes of aircraft are identified 

--new classes of ships and submarines are identified 

--modifications to existing ships are identified 

--a new unidentified aircraft or surface effects vehicle was detected 

in the Caspian sea 

The time-phased continuity of coverage provided by the KH-4 and 

KH-8 has been used successfully for the "Surveillance" function. After 

a Tallinn site is suspected, for example, we have been able to confirm 

the identification within 45 days of the start of site construction. We 

have been able to positively confirm the disposition of the Soviet MR/IRBM 

force of 709 launch positions. This force remains about 90% deployed 

against the NATO area and has been relatively static for almost four 

years. This continuity of coverage allows us to update our Order of Battle 

for the USSR and China so we can plan our own deployments to counter 

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their strengths or exploit any weaknesses we discover. 

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Other typical areas of surveillance are: 

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ilo starts and types 

--ruclear storage sites and facility changes 

--inuc/ear manufacturing plans changes 

--Chinese nuclear test build-up 

--underground nuclear test craters in USSR 

--located USS Pueblo in North Korea about 19 miles south of 

Vladivostok. KH-8 photography showed 

These have been a few samples which indicate the breadth and 

value of the coverage by satellites. In the case of China, satellite 

photography has been our most important source for intelligence data 

and in most cases the only source. 

The in-depth analysis of the photographs plus electronic intercept on 

communications, radar activity and telemetry signals gives us information 

on which wasp-arm are operational and what technology is either more advanced 

or less advanced than ours. For example, the following illustrate th 

"Science and Technology" usage of the intelligence information. 

Installations. SIGINT satellites intercepted a signal 

which has been identified with high probability as emanating from the 

radar. The signa3 has 

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the frequency, modulation and mode of operation to make changes in 

some of our other intercept systems to improve our chances of 

positively specifying the purposes of the 

Engine test facilities have been identified in the USSR which could 

be used for the development of high energy upper stages 

Several new aircraft have•been identified by satellite photography 

early enough to allow us to get the best coverage 

when that aircraft has been shown. 

In the future better resolution and better detection capability for 

the ELINT and SIGINT satellites will bring us close to an intelligence 

data collection capability 

There will always be much we could only learn through 

physical access to the equipment and/or defectors and agents. The 

quality of our data is improving steadily and this provides us with more 

confidence that our deployment and R&D decisions are the optimum balance 

for effectiveness and cost of national defense. 

COFINA HEXAGON 

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