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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

41 THE NRO STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MCLUCAS

August 24, 1970

„__. .1444 by the

...ger secretary

tta Jur son.

SUBJECT: A Few Parting Thoughts

1. Organization: Although I have thrashed mightily at

the question of organization within the NRO and have written

you several, probably ill considered, notes on the subject,

I leave somewhat mellowed and am convinced that our present

,organizational arrangement can work about as well as any.

There are still significant problems but they can be worked

within the organizational structure. Similarly, although

there is more concern about changes in the structure outside

the NRO, I believe it somewhat a matter of choice and personality as to whether there is an ASD/A or a DDI and whether

there is staff assistance from DDR&E, ASD/SA, DIA or whatever.

Clearly the ExCom is a very good set-up and nearly essential

to our joint type of operation. It is best if the Chairman of

ExCom can look to the DNRO for objective appraisal of all program issues including those requiring inputs from DIA, NSA,

DDR&E, ASD/A, CIA, etc. Something like the current ASD/A

function of addressing cross-program issues separately from

the DNRO may be useful but insertion of any autonomous level

between the DNRO and ExCom needlessly complicates the decision

process.

There is one issue, outside the NRO, which is most

disturbing to me. It is extremely important that the President

receive definitive intelligence advice from a single, highly

competent and completely objeCtive source. The DCI was created

to provide him that and it was a very wise action. It is so

important that the DCI maintain a position of objectivity,

integrity and unexcelled competence that it is most disturbing

to observe even small examples which tend to erode that position. Such examples have occurred from time to time in matters

relating to the NRO when the DCI has been placed in the position

of providing judgments and recommendations which appear influenced by collection system aspirations of his CIA staff. There

is a simple solution which avoids this occasional difficulty

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I. and that is to separate the DCI with his estimating and evaluation staff, USIB, etc., from the CIA organization devoted to I

collection programs. Such a separation seems to have been

intended originally but has become very blurred in practice.

One man really can't wear conflicting hats. The.DCI at ExCom

I should represent the intelligence community and its needs of

intelligence. His advisor there should also be a representative of intelligence needs and priorities. The DNRO should

II

represent NRO-CIA programs. Obviously that is not the case.

The danger is not, as I once thought, unbalanced representation

of CIA program views, but is rather that it demeans the position

1

of the DCI and must, in some small way, damage his credibility

for complete impartiality on intelligence matters and any damage

of that sort is a small tragedy. The DCI must, in all situaI all should defer on intelligence estimates and basic intellitions, be the unquestioned senior intelligence officer to whom

gence needs. It is very bad that we contribute to small nicks

i

in that image.

2. Security: I am not at all confident that the U. S.

I

can engage in public, official discussion of its satellite

reconnaissance activities without encountering major objections

to its continuation.

spy a • era agreemen were reac'

. .

88

it would still be very complicated to open the subject because

it is hard to imagine assuring other countries that our satellites were operated only against Russia. As'long as we must

avoid official acknowledgment we must operate covertly and I

believe compartmented security is essential with the sort of

control we have now. Nevertheless, our security system is

unpopular with many. The complaints raised about it can in

most cases, and in all essential cases, be answered by changes

within the framework of the system. For example, it might be

possible to give much broader distribution of KEYHOLE photos-

"

raphy if "Sanitized" sensibly and not "attributed" to satellites.

It doesn't matter so very much if recipients speculate about

its source as long as the government position of "no comment"

I! can be maintained.

I

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To alleviate some of the annoyances felt -within DOD,.

I have initiated certain actions which have been described in

a separate paper. I hope that by taking a constructive.attitude and taking the initiative.in working for improvements

while firmly maintaining the truly essential elements of our

security program we can avoid the ill-advised proposals which

seam to keep coming up.

3. Fitzhugh: It is a great disappointment to me personally that my tour ends with the receipt of a very damning

comment by the Blue Ribbon Panel. It is particularly frustrat,

ing that I have not been able to find out what "fiction" I have

allowed to pervade the staff nor where I misunderstand my

responsibilities or "deliberately tried to mislead the panel."

I have never been so accused before and I suppose I can take

some "pride" in having the first accusation made at such a

level and distributed to so many senior persons and probably

being the only individual so vilified by the Panel. I have

been unable to see Fred Buzhardt but I am writing to him to

seek some clarification. If you.are able to obtain some understanding of the basis of Mr. Fitzhugh's comments I would very

much appreciate being informed. Obviously we must take whatever corrective action is indicat

Lew Allen, Jr.

Brigadier General,, USAF

Director

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