NRO APPROVED F09, 

RELEASE 1 JUL 2015 

zq 

AEROSPACE 

LIBRARY 

Document No (V..01:;-- i-VA0 

Copy No ARCHIVES 

• • et) f> 

o 

4/1/' L/1447' I

1/9J ojit 

AEROSPACE CORPORATION 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 AEROSPACE'eORPORATION a . 

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE 

CA4t130-11111.4* 

TOt CC: Ina Matsui. riles DATE: 11 lit 196h 

SUBJECT: Cri allgretr *UMW marts FROM: 111. j.. Wert. 

The ettsebed set of briding shirts is far your isfamtion wad files 

The Crew Safety briefing vas gives to Cal. W. D. BMW an It Mau* 196k. 

B. L. LaPorte 

Direetor 

assist Welts* zu mu, 

MI Sr 

Attached* 

To: I. T. bows 

A. D. *lea best 

C. 1.. Oleos 

,14.. N. SUM 

W. C. WilLlass 

• 

Aerospace Form 1861 
NRO APPROVWk 

RELEASE 1 

CREW SAFETY REVIEW 

, /// 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 

R 

2015 

o CREW SAFETY 

INTRODUCTION 

ON PAD ABORT 

IN-FLIGHT TO 35, 000 FEET 

IN-FLIGHT 35, 000 FEET TO 70, 000 FEET 

BACK-UP GUIDANCE 

EVALUATION CRITERIA 

STATUS SUMMARY 

CONCLUSION 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 Jd 

o EVALUATION OF SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM 

USED ONLY DURING STAGE 0 FLIGHT REGIME 

REMAINING BOOST PHASE NOT PERTINENT TO SEAT/TOWER 

SELECTION 

o REVIEW/STATUS/CONCLUSION TO DATE FOR STAGE 0 FLIGHT 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 

TITAN inc CREW SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 

o TITAN LU ABORT ENVIRONMENT MORE SEVERE THAN GLV 

/ HIGHER TNT EQUIVALENCE 

/ THRUST TERMINATION EXHAUST PLUMES IN STAGE 0 FLIGHT 

/ MORE SHORT WARNING TIME MALFUNCTIONS IN INITIAL BURN STAGE 

o NO REDUNDANT F/C - GUIDANCE SYSTEM 

/ STAGING OF TUNNEL FAIRING 

o RE-EVALUATION OF GEMINI A EJECTION SEAT ESCAPE MODE REQUIRED 

COMPARISON OF NEW ENVIRONMENT VERSUS SEAT/SUIT/MAN 

CAPABILITY 

o MAY REQUIRE ESCAPE TOWER 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 2916 

GLV - TUIC CREW ESCAPE REQUIREMENTS COMPARISON 

GLV THIC 

PROBABILITY OF MISSION 

FAILURE DURING INITIAL 

BURN STAGE 

1. 

29 X 10-3 33 X 10-3 

OVERPRESSURE ASSOCIATED 

WITH VEHICLE BREAK-UP 

APPROXIMATELY 50% 

HIGHER THAN GLV 

FIREBALL ASSOCIATED 

WITH VEHICLE BREAK-UP 

6101DIAMETER 7351DIAMETER 

THERMAL ENVIRONMENT 

AFTER THRUST 

TERMINATION BUT PRIOR TO 

BREAK-UP 

NONE T. T. EXHAUST PLUMES 

PRESENT 

MALFUNCTION WARNING 

TIME 

COMPLETE SYSTEM 

DESIGNED TO 

ELIMINATE 

MALFUNCTIONS WITH 

SHORT WARNING TIME 

COMPLETE SYSTEM DESIGNED 

ASSUMING AUTOMATIC 

ESCAPE SYSTEM FOR SHORT 

WARNING TIME 

MALFUNCTIONS 

PROBABILITY OF 

MALFUNCTION WITH LESS 

THAN 2 SECONDS BETWEEN 

DETECTION AND BREAK-UP 

j 

9 X 10-4 25 X 10-4 
NRO APPRO.OR 

RELEASE 1 Y 24318 • 

TITAN IIIC 

FAILURE MODE VERSUS FLIGHT PHASE 

FAILURES PER MILLION LAUNCHES 

FAILURE MODE 

FLIGHT PHASE 

0 I II in - COAST - TOTAL 

1 LOW ENGINE THRUST, NO 4, 500 4,700 15.000 . 27.000 25 52, 000 

THRUST OR PREMATURE SID 

?.2 VEHICLE UNSTABLE 10,000 17,000 5.000 16,000 2,700 51,000 

3 THRUST VECTOR REMAINS ON 850 6, 500 1, 300 1, 300 15,000 25, 000 

NULL 

4 HARD-OVER OR FAST 3, 400 4, 000 1. 600 6, 000 6, 000 21, 000 

ATTITUDE DIVERGENCE 

5 SLOW ATTITUDE DIVERGENCE 5, 800 180 700 1, 800 2, 000 11, 000 

6 COLLAPSE OR PUNCTURE OF 7, 300 860 940 1, 100 - - - - 10, 000 

PROPELLANT TANK 

7 STRUCTURAL BREAK-UP OR 260 2, 000 1, 600 95 6 4.000 

EXPLOSION 

FAILURE TO SEPARATE --- ■••••..111. 

... ... .. .. 

w■ 10 40,.1. 3, 400 3,400 

PAYLOAD 

COLLISION WITH PAYLOAD ---- ON MD 111. . . OW O. OP OM =I . . 

. 

1, 700 1.700 

;1.8 TIP-OVER ON PAD 210 •/.. OW ow MP MP ••• ••• .0 fa* •■• ..0 •■• •Is AM. O. M. 210 

ENGINE FAILS TO SHUT -DOWN .1. •■• ao As 46 64 20 11 140 

9 PREMATURE STAGING 23 2 3 42 24 94 

10 LOSS OF BEACONS OR RADIO 9 " 2 3 15 11 40 

COMMAND LINK 

FALSE ABORT 1 1 22 - - - - 1 25 

PREMATURE STAGE III -- -- ---- - - - - -- -- 19 19 

ENGINE START 

TOTAL .33, 000 36,000 27, 000 54,000 31, 000 180, 000 
NRO APPRO OR 

RELEASE 1 

VEHICLE SYSTEMS 

o TITAN IIIC MDS BLOCK DIAGRAM 

COMMAND CONTROL 

RECEIVERS 

ENGINE 

SHUT DOWN 

& ABORT 

TANK 

UNDER PRESSURE 

PRESSURE 

SENSORS 

ABORT 

COMMAND 

PITCH, YAW & 

ROLL RATES 

RATE 

SENSORS 

ENGrNE_ ENGINE 

SHUTDOWN CONTROL 

HOT WIRE 

t SENSORS 

PROGRAMMED I 

EVENTS 

GUIDANCE 

DISCRETES 

MDS 

LOGIC 

STAGE III 

APS & 

IPS 

MDS LOGIC 

1 POWER 
NRO APPRO OR 

RELEASE 1 2015 

EJECTION SEAT CHARACTERISTICS 

o MANUAL ABORT INITIATION BASED ON PARAMETRIC AND GO-NO-GO DISPLAYS 

o REQUIRED WARNING TIME 

/ MAN DECISION TIME +. 45 SECONDS 

o ASTRONAUT /SEAT SEPARATION TIME 

/ MAN DECISION TIME +1. 55 SECONDS 

o NON-STABILIZED SEAT WITH POOR NATURAL STABILITY 

o SEATS ARE USED ON PAD AND UP TO 35,000 FEET (MAY BE LOWERED) 
NRO APPROVER 

RELEASE 1 LY-2015 

ESCAPE TOWER 

o CHARACTERISTICS 

/ LAUNCH WEIGHT 2,000 POUNDS 

/ THRUST 65,000 POUNDS 

/ TOTAL IMPULSE 75,000 LB-SEC 

/: LENGTH 15 FEET 

o REQUIRES DEVELOPMENT AND TEST PROGRAM 

o REQUIRES MAJOR STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO GEMINI B 

o POSSIBLE TOOLING CHANGES 

o STRUCTURAL TEST 
NRO APPROV OR 

RELEASE 

a EFFECT OF MANUAL SEAT ABORT ON PIBOL 

/ PIBOL CANNOT BE UTILIZED DURING STAGE 0 FLIGHT 
NIRO APPROV R 

RELEASE 2015 

o ON PAD ABORT 

FAILURE MODES 

/ ABORT ENVIRONMENT 

/ EFFECT UPON SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM 

/ DATA NEEDED 

/ SUMMARY 

/ CONCLUSIONS 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE YJULY 2015 

o ON-PAD FAILURE MODES 

/ TIP-OVER 

o PROBABILITY - 200/MILLION LAUNCHES 

o WARNING TIME 

MINIMUM - 1. 2 SECONDS (IMPACT WITH STAND) 

MAXIMUM - 2. 6 SECONDS (EXCEED ATTITUDE LIMITS FOR HATCH UP) 

SINGLE THRUST VECTOR HARDOVER 

o PROBABILITY - 200/MILLION LAUNCHES 

/ MINIMUM - 1. 0 SECONDS (EXCEED ATTITUDE LIMITS FOR HATCH DOWN) 

/ MAXIMUM - 3.2 SECONDS (EXCEED ATTITUDE LIMITS FOR HATCH UP) 
1_4 

Hatches up, tip IIII 

over angle 

Hatches down, 

tip over angle 

o ATTITUDE ANGLE CONSTRAINTS 

/ ANGLE LIMIT, HATCHES DOWN 

o 5° MAXIMUM SAFE 

/ ANGLE LIMITS, HATCHES UP 

o 11° FOR 560 FT. RANGE 

o 25° FOR 400 FT. RANGE 

/ ASSUMES NO WIND 

ASSUMES SEAT LEAVES RAIL AT INSTANT 

BOOSTER ATTAINS LIMITING ANGLE 

NRO APPROV 

RELEASE YJtJLY 2015 

o MDS SIGNAL 

• / 

o VEHICLE ATTITUDE AT MDS TRIP 

/ ON PAD - 1° 

/ IN FLIGHT - 5° 

o CONCLUSION 

/ ATTITUDE CONSTRAINT NOT GOVERNING 

FOR ON PAD TIP OVER 

/ ANGLE CONSTRAINT CRITICAL FOR IN 

FLIGHT THRUST VECTOR HARD OVER 

WITH HATCHES DOWN 

P/Y RATE SENSOR AT 3.5°/SEC 

ON PAD TIP OVER TRIPS MDS SIGNAL - 0.6 SEC 

IN FLIGHT (LIFT OFF) TRIPS MDS SIGNAL - 1.0 SEC 

Seat Ejection 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 

o OVERPRESSURE VS RANGE AND TIME ON PAD EXPLOSION OF TITAN IIIC 

30 

20 = O. 046 sec 

= O. 086 sec 10 

9 -- 

8 — 

7 — 

6 

= O. 132 sec 

= 0. 169 sec 

= 0. 263 sec 

4 

3 

2 

1 

t = 0.450 sec 

t = 0. 64 se 

0 -Tto 200 300 40.0 50'0 80 

RANGE FROM EXPLOSION - FEET 
RELEASE 1 

NRO APPROV 

015 • 

TO PARABTU/FT2 

BTU /FT2 

TOTAL HEAT 

CHUTE - - 

CASE 0 - 82 

CASE 0 - 130 

ASTRONAUT AID FIREBALL RANGE VERSUS TIME 

104 

TIME, SECONDS AFTER DETONATION 

ASTRONAUT ABORT AT 

2 SECONDS BEFORE 

DETONATION 

ASTRONAUT ABORT AT 

DETONATION 

735 FEET DIAMETER 

FIREBALL 

AVERAGE FIREBALL 

SURFACE TEMP - 3000°F 

TOTAL HEAT TO ASTROT•A 

NAUT --

CASE 0 - 119 BTU /FT 2 

CASE 0 - 250 BTU /FTz 

(ALLOWABLE WITH SUIT - 

UNKNOWN) 

(ALLOWABLE BLARE SKIN 

15 BTU/FT 

2ND DEGREE 

FLASH BURNS) 

BTU/ 

FT2

) 

• 

• 

(ALLOWABLE 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE L' 2015 

o HEAT FLUX 

• 

\Y_ 

4 r -12 watt o 4 r 

2 Btu . r 2 * 

 11870 K) x R- 61 R 

cm

Z oK

4 

- ft -SFc 

T 

where: Cr = T

a 

B

y 

Fireball Surface Temp. , (0K) 

T

a 

Ambient Temperature, (°K) 

watt 

By Unit Black Body Radiation, 

cm 

o

K

4 

c 

r = Fireball Radius, (ft) 

R Radial Distance, Center of Fireball to Astronaut, (ft) 

2 

* Meas. Data Aerojet @ 2:1 - 10 ft = 60 ft 

HEAT FLUX ON ASTRONAUT = o T R= 5. 67 x 10 
VECTOR DISTANCE 

OM DETONATI 

385 FT E- 300 

250 F 

200 0 

ALTIT

U

DE, 

T = 3. 5 CL 

PARACHU 

DE PLOYME 

100 

ASSUMED POINT OF DETONA ION k 

1 640 775' • i 

500 

540 

650 

NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 

GEMINI ON-PAD ABORT TRAJECTORY ENVELOPE 

500 1 

NOTE: THE SPREAD OF THE TWO CURVES 

IS DUE TO THE POSSIBLE VARIATIONS 

IN ALL PARAMETERS INFLUENCIN 

THE ABORT TRAJECTORY 

400 

500 FT.550 FT. 

200 400 600 800 

HORIZONTAL DISTANCE, FT. 
NRO APPR 

RELEAS 

8' SECURITY FENCE 

8' SECURITY FEN 

TRAFFIC CONTROL HOUSE 

3a-EDA FOOTPRINT 

NO WIND-TYP. 

30- 

LANDING FOOTPRINT ' 

AVERAGE WIND VELOCITY (13 MPH) 

\ 

7 
OVERPRESSURE (PSF) 

■-• 0 0 0 0 0 0 11311430 ZH

O/13 

O 

a 

ti

tTJ

th 
Direction of Travel 

Shock Front 

4-587 Feet to Pad 

Direction of Travel.. 

NRO APPROV :OW 

RELEASE YJflEV 2015 

EFFECT OF BLAST OVER PRESSURE ON PARACHUTE 

o PARACHUTE PRIOR TO BLAST OVERPRESSURE (C-9 CANOPY) 

o PARACHUTE 0. 023 SECONDS AFTER SHOCK WAVE STRIKES CANOPY 

o RESULTS OF CANOPY DISTORTION 

/ POSSIBLE PARACHUTE COLLAPSE DUE TO RAPID, NON-UNIFORM CANOPY 

DISTORTION 

/ POSSIBLE PARACHUTE TANGLING DUE TO RAPID SUSPENSION LINE LOAD 

RELAXATION 

/ POSSIBLE FABRIC TEARING DUE TO IMPACT. LOADING 
NRO APPROVR 

RELEASE Y 2015 

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 

o PARACHUTE DESIGN 

/ ADD PRESSURIZED MEMBERS TO PRESENT CANOPY 

o STIFFEN CANOPY TO AVOID COLLAPSE 

/ PROVIDE GEOMETRIC POROSITY ON CANOPY TO PERMIT RAPID 

EQUALIZATION OF BLAST PRESSURE EFFECTS 

o USE RING SLOT- CHUTE 

/ RECUIRES DROP TEST PROGRAM 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 

R 

LY 2015 

ABORT LEAD TIME 

ABORT TIME - SEC ASTRONAUT DISTANCE RESULTING POSSIBLE 

(FROM DETONATION) AT DETONATION ENVIRONMENT EFFECT 

> .15 600 - 800 FT. O'PRESS 91.1 - 1. 5 PSI) NONE 

(ON GROUND) FIREBALL (370 FT. RADIUS) NONE 

-15 SEC > T > -3.5 550 - 800 FT. O'PRESS (1. 1 - 1. 9 PSI) PARACHUTE COLLAPSE 

(PARACHUTE OPEN) FIREBALL (370 FT. RADIUS) PARACHUTE BURN? 

-3.5 SEC > T > -2 380 - 550 FT. O'PRESS (1. 9 - 3.4 PSI) EARDRUM RUPTURE? 

-2 SEC > T> 0 60 - 380 FT. O'PRESS (3.4 - 200 PSI) 50% LETHAL 

SAFE ABORT LEAD TIME FROM DETONATION IS: 

2 - 3. 5 SEC. 

< 15 SEC. 
NRO APPROV. R 

RELEASE 1 L 2015 

o DATA NEEDED 

I SUIT CAPABILITY 

/ FRAGMENTATION 

/ TOXICITY 
NRO APPROV OR 

RELEASE I Y 2015 

• `, 

SUMMARY 

o ON-PAD FAILURE PROBABILITIES ARE LOW 

/ 400/MILLION LAUNCHES 

o ADDITIONAL DATA NEEDED 

/ ABORT ENVIRONMENT 

/ SUIT CAPABILITY 

/ FUNCTIONAL RELIABILITY OF SEATS 

o LANDING FOOTPRINT SENSITIVE TO WIND VELOCITY AND DIRECTION 

o ABORT INITIATION TIME WINDOW NARROW 

/ 2 - 3. 5 SECONDS PRIOR TO DETONATION 

o RELIABILITY OF SEAT SYSTEM HAS TO BE FACTORED IN TO DETERMINE 

CREW FATALITY RATE 
NRO APPROV JR 

RELEASE 1 2O15 

o CONCLUSIONS 

/ SEAT EJECTION ABORT FOR ON-PAD FAILURE APPEARS EXTREMELY 

HAZARDOUS 

/ SEAT EJECTION SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE DISCARDED ON BASIS OF ON-PAD ABORT 

o LOW FAILURE RATE - 400 FAILURES/MILLION LAUNCHES EXCLUDING 

SEAT RELIABILITY 
NRO APPROV R 

RELEASE 1tr2U15 

ABORT FOR IN-FLIGHT TO 35,000 FEET 
NRO APPROVER 

RELEASE LY 2015 

o CONSIDERATIONS 

/ CRITICAL FAILURE MODES 

/ WARNING TIMES . 

/ FAILURE ENVIRONMENT 

/ . SEAT EJECTION MODE 
NIRO APPROVE.R 

RELEASE 2015 

o CRITICAL FAILURE MODES AND PROBABILITIES 

/ VEHICLE UNSTABLE 

o PROBABILITY ,---5300 PER MILLION 

/ THRUST VECTOR REMAINS ON NULL 

o PROBABILITY-450 PER MILLION 

/ HARD OVER OR FAST DIVERGENCE 

o PROBABILITY---1800 PER MILLION 

/ COLLAPSE OR RUPTURE OF PROPELLANT TANKS 

o PROBABILITY---3800 PER MILLION 

/ SLOW ATTITUDE DIVERGENCE 

o PROBABILITY-3100 PER MILLION 

o TOTAL FAILURE PROBABILITY IN THIS FLIGHT REGIME 

/ APPROXIMATELY 14,000 PER MILLION 
NROAPPROV= •R 

RELEASE 20 5 

o WARNING TIMES 

/ NO FIRM DATA TO DATE 

/ MMC WILL HAVE BY 14 AUGUST 

/ MDS 

o PITCH/YAW RATE SENSOR TRIPS AT 3. 5°/SEC 

/ VEHICLE BREAKS UP AT APPROXIMATELY 20° 

ANGLE OF ATTACK (MAX q) 

/ ONE THRUST VECTOR HARD OVER 

o ATTITUDE ACCELERATION-APPROXIMATELY 10°/SEC2 

o WARNING TIME-4, 7 SEC FROM MDS SIGNAL TO BREAK UP 

/ TWO THRUST VECTOR HARD OVER 

o ATTITUDE ACCELERATION-APPROXIMATELY 20°/SEC2 

o WARNING TIME-. 7 SEC FROM MDS SIGNAL TO BREAK UP 

} 
NRO APPROVE 

RELEAS JULY 2015 

o VEHICLE MOTIONS DUE TO FAILURES 

/ MMC HAS CALCULATED 

o IN FLIGHT OVER PRESSURES 

/ EXPLOSION DUE TO STRUCTURAL BREAK UP 

/ EXPLOSION DUE TO COMMAND DESTRUCT 

o IN FLIGHT FIREBALL 

/ MMC WILL HAVE DATA BY 14 AUGUST 

o FRAGMENTATION 

/ VERY LITTLE DATA AVAILABLE 

/ MMC WILL HAVE "BEST GUESS" BY 14 AUGUST 

o THRUST TERMINATION PLUME 

/ UTC DATA AVAILABLE 
10 

8 

OVERPRESSURE 

PSI 

1st EXPLOSION (STAGE 2 & 3) 

. 02 - 1...OSEC. AFTER 

STRUCTURAL BREAKUP) 

2nd EXPLOSION (STAGE 1) 

1. 0 - 1. 1 SEC. AFTER 

STRUCTURAL BREAKUP) 

3rd EXPLOSION (SR1v1) 

5. 0 - 5. 1 SEC. AFTER 

STRUCTURAL BREAKUP) 

NRO APPROV 

RELEASE L 2015 

OVERPRESSURE FROM IN-FLIGHT EXPLOSION 

(TYPICAL CURVE"-.30, 000 FEET ALTITUDE SHOWN) 

o THESE CURVES PERMIT 

EVALUATION OF SEAT - 

SUIT-MAN FOR IN-FLIGHT 

ABORTS 

o DATA REQUIRED 

/ SEAT TRAJECTORIES 

/ WARNING TIMES 

/ SEAT -SUIT -MAN 

CAPABILITY 

50 100 150 200 250 

DISTANCE FROM EXPLOSION FEET 
NRO APPROV R 

RELEASE 2015 

o• SEAT EJECTION MODE 

/ SEAT EJECTION SEQUENCE AND WARNING TIMES CRITICAL 

/ MAC WILL HAVE SEAT TRAJECTORIES BY 14 AUGUST 

/ SEAT-SUIT-MAN CAPABILITY IN ENVIRONMENT UNKNOWN 

/ PARACHUTE CAPABILITY 

o CURRENT INDICATIONS - NO PROBLEM 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 2015 

o SEAT EJECTION SEQUENCE 

/ TIME 0 - PULL "D" RING 

/ .24 SECS HATCH OPEN 

/ . 39 SECS SEAT AT END OF RAIL 

/ .72 SECS SUSTAINER ROCKET BURNOUT 

/ 1.46 SECS INITIATION OF SEAT-MAN SEPARATOR 

/ 1.. 50 SECS MAN FREE OF SEAT 

/ VARIABLE MAN FREE FALLS TO 5700 FEET 

/ AT 5700 FT. INITIATION OF PARACHUTE SYSTEM 

o ADDITION OF INFLATABLE CREW TRANSFER TUNNEL ADDS, 

. 05 SECS TO TIME 
GEMINI RE-ENTRL.Gemini BORATORY VEHICLE 

MODULE Adapter 

STOWED TUNNEL 

NRO APPROV OR 

RELEASE YJQLT2015 

INFLATABLE TUNNEL ABORT PROVISIONS 

- -, NFLATED TUNNEL 

o SEAT EJECTION MODE 

SHAPED CHARGE CUTS TUNNEL AT ® 

SHAPED CHARGE CUTS FAIRING TIE STRAPS 

WITH TIME DELAY AND TOLERANCES, t FOR TUNNEL RELEASE 05 SECONDS 

HATCH IS FREE TO OPEN AFTER TUNNEL AND TIE STRAP ARE CUT 

o CAPSULE ABORT MODE USING RETRO MOTORS 

/ SHAPED CHARGE CUTS TUNNEL AT 0 

/ SHAPED CHARGE CUTS FAIRING TIE STRAPS 

/ GEMINI ADAPTER/LAB VEHICLE SEPARATION BY SHAPED CHARGE 

/ TIME DELAY INSIGNIFICANT 

/ IF SEAT EJECTION IS SUBSEQUENTLY USED, ABOVE SEQUENCE FOLLOWS 
NRO APPROV R 

RELEASE 1 ' 2015 

o SUMMARY 

/ FAILURE ENVIRONMENT DATA AVAILABLE ON 14 AUGUST 

/ SEAT TRAJECTORIES AVAILABLE ON 14 AUGUST 

/ WILL PERMIT COMPARING TRAJECTORY TIME HISTORIES 

WITH ENVIRONMENT TIME HISTORIES AT THAT TIME 

/ . LACK OF SEAT-SUIT-MAN CAPABILITY DATA WILL NOT 

PERMIT CLEAR DECISION 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE L 2015 

o TENTATIVE CONCLUSION 

WARNING TIMES VERY CRITICAL 

/ CAN NOT HANDLE TWO THRUST VECTOR HARD OVER 

FAILURES 

o LOW PROBABILITY 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 

R 

2015 

ABORT FOR IN-FLIGHT 

35, 000 FEET - 70,000 FEET 
NRO APPROV R 

RELEASE tXrT2Ol5 

• CRITICAL ABORT ALTITUDE (35, 000 - 70, 000 FEET) 

/ EJECTION SEAT MODE CANNOT BE USED ABOVE 35, 000 FEET 

/ PRESENT SPACECRAFT ESCAPE MODE CANNOT BE USED 

BELOW 70, 000 FEET 

/ TITAN IIIC FAILURE RATE 

o 8 FAILURES/1, 000 LAUNCHES 

• CONCLUSION 

/ NO SAFE ESCAPE METHOD IN THIS CRITICAL ALTITUDE RANGE 

/ INVESTIGATE ALTERNATE ESCAPE MODES 

o LOWER SPACECRAFT ALTITUDE ABORT CAPABILITY TO 

REDUCE RISK 

• 
TWO PORT 

THRUST 

TERMINATION 

0 0 0 

tri 

70, 000 F

E

ET 

NEGATIVE SIGN DENOTES NO SEPARATION 

AEROSPACE CALCULATIONS 

RELEASE 1 

NRO APPROV OR • 

SEPARATION DISTANCE BETWEEN GE1VNI/ TITAN IIIC AT RETROGRADE MOTOR BURNOUT '..--- 

800- 

400 

(+) 

E-4 

(-) 

E-■ 

LI) 

z

0 

400 

800 

1200 

1600 - 

0 20 40 60 80 100 

TIME FOR SEPARATION INITIATION (SECONDS) 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 

PRESENT AEROSPACE ABORT STUDIES 

o ADDITIONAL THRUST REQUIRED TO ABORT SPACECRAFT SAFELY 

(WITHOUT ESCAPE TOWER) 

o CASES CONSIDERED 

/ ABORT FROM ON-PAD UP TO 70,000 FEET USING SPACECRAFT ONLY (CASE I) 

/ ABORT WITH SPACECRAFT FROM 35,000 FEET AND HIGHER (CASE II) 

/ SAME AS ABOVE AND COMPLEMENTING WITH SEAT EJECTION (CASE III) 

/ WHEN MC DATA IS AVAILABLE, THE STUDY WILL INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF 

BOOSTER FAILURE ENVIRONMENT 

/ DETERMINE RETROGRADE AND RE-ENTRY ABORT REQUIREMENTS FOR 

ORBITAL ALTITUDE = 250 N. M. 

o COMPLETION 

/ 15 SEPTEMBER 1964 
NRO APPRO OR 

RELEASE 1 J 

SPACECRAFT (S/C) ESCAPE MODE 

o CASE I (ON-PAD THROUGH 70,000 FEET) 

/ STUDY OUTPUT 

o SEPARATION DISTANCE BETWEEN GEMINI B AND TITAN IIIC 

o ABORT PROPULSION REQUIRED 

o SPACECRAFT DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS AFTER ABORT 

o DETERMINE WHETHER S/C MAIN PARACHUTE WILL COLLAPSE 

o MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO S/C 

o CASE II (35. 000 FEET AND HIGHER) 

/ STUDY OUTPUT 

o SIMILAR TO CASE I ABOVE 

o CASE III (S/C + SEAT EJECTION) 

STUDY OUTPUT 

o SIMILAR TO CASE I AND CASE II ABOVE WITH ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION 

OF USING EJECTION SEATS AFTER S/C FREE FALLS 
NRO APPROVOOR 

RELEASE 1 zU lb 

o BACK UP GUIDANCE 

I IMPROVES G/FC RELIABILITY FROM . 938 TO . 952 

/ AEROSPACE STUDY TO EVALUATE ROLE OF BACK UP GUIDANCE 

o COMPLETION - 15 OCTOBER 1964 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 

o STAGE 0 FLIGHT CONTROL/GUIDANCE REDUNDANCY DATA 

FLIGHT CONTROL/GUIDANCE FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY 

o TOTAL - 20/1000 LAUNCHES 

ON-PAD - .2/1000 LAUNCHES 

IN-FLIGHT TO 35,000 FT. - 11/1000 LAUNCHES 

IN-FLIGHT - 35,000 TO 70,000 FT. - 5/1000 LAUNCHES 

REDUNDANT FLIGHT CONTROL/GUIDANCE FAILURE MODE PROBABILITY 

o TOTAL -4/ 1000 LAUNCHES 

/ ON-PAD - NEGLIGIBLE 

/ IN-FLIGHT TO 35,000 FT. - 1/1000 LAUNCHES 

/ IN-FLIGHT - 35,000 TO 70,000 FT. - 025/ 1000 LAUNCHES 

CONCLUSIONS 

• REDUNDANT FLIGHT CONTROL/GUIDANCE SYSTEM FOR TITAN MC 

(STAGE 0 ONLY) CAN REDUCE CREW RISK SIGNIFICANTLY 

o AEROSPACE TO EVALUATE 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 

o ABORT MODES TO BE EVALUATED (STAGE 0 FLIGHT) 

/ PRESENT SEAT /S. C. SYSTEM 

/ PRESENT SEAT /MODIFIED S/C SYSTEM 

o IMPROVED ABORT CAPABILITY OF S/C SYSTEM 

/ TOWER 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 1 ztri 

o EVALUATION CRITERIA 

/ STAGE 0 ABORT RISK 

o ON-PAD 

o IN-FLIGHT TO 35,000 FEET 

o IN-FLIGHT 35,000 FEET TO 70,000 FEET 

/ PERFORMANCE 

o RELIABILITY 

o GREATER NUMBER OF FLIGHTS 

/ TECHNICAL RISK 

/ DEVELOPMENT AND TEST TIME 

/ ADDITIONAL COST 
NRO APPROV 

RELEAS JULY 2015 

o STATUS SUMMARY 

COMPLETED AEROSPACE STUDIES 

o "GEMINI/TITAN IIIC ON-PAD ABORT SAFETY ANALYSIS" 

TOR-269(4107-15)-1 

o "EFFECT OF HARDOVER MALFUNCTIONS IN TITAN III ON MOL" 

TOR-469(5107-15)-1 

• PARACHUTE COLLAPSE ANALYSIS 

AEROSPACE STUDIES UNDERWAY 

o UTILIZE S/C ABORT AT 35,000 FEET AND ABOVE 

/ COMPLETE - 15 SEPTEMBER 1964 

o BACK-UP GUIDANCE 

/ COMPLETE - 15 OCTOBER 1964 - 

AEROSPACE/ MC/MAC MEETING ON 14 AUGUST 1964 IN DENVER 

MARTIN TO PROVIDE INTERIM REPORT ON ABORT ENVIRONMENT 

14 AUGUST 1964 

o SHOULD PROVIDE REQUIRED ENVIRONMENT DATA •TO EVALUATE 

SEAT SYSTEM 

/ VEHICLE RATES/OVERPRESSURE CURVES ARE AVAILABLE 

MAC TO PROVIDE IN-FLIGHT SEAT TRAJECTORIES AT 14 AUGUST 1964 

MEETING 

o COMBINED WITH MARTIN DATA TO EVALUATE SEATS FOR 

IN-FLIGHT USE 

SSD OBTAINING SEAT/SUIT/MAN CAPABILITY DATA FROM NASA 

SSD/AEROSPACE EVALUATION CRITERIA AND WEIGHTING FACTORS 

o UNDER REVIEW 
NRO APPROV 

RELEASE 14 tCY2015 

o CONCLUSIONS 

/ ON-PAD ABORT EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS, BUT HAS LOW PROBABILITY 

OF OCCURRENCE 

/ FATALITY RATE IS AT LEAST 8 CREWS/1, 000 LAUNCHES EXCLUDING 

S. C. /SEAT RELIABILITY 

o DETERMINED BY TIME GAP BETWEEN SEAT ABORT CEILING AND 

S/C ABORT CAPABILITY - Z5 SECONDS 

/ BOTH SRM THRUST VECTOR HARDOVERS DO NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE LEAD 

TIME FOR SEATS FOR IN-FLIGHT ABORT 

o LOW PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE 

CONCENTRATE ON FOLLOWING. FAILURE MODES 

o SINGLE THRUST VECTOR•HARDOVER 

o THRUST VECTOR NULL 

/ NEED MORE IN-FLIGHT ABORT DATA TO EVALUATE FULLY THE SEAT SYSTEM 

/ SELECTION OF SEAT VERSUS TOWER DECISION CAN BE MADE 

15 SEPTEMBER 1964