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istor of 

atellite econnaissance 

VolUIlle III 

PREPARED FOR 

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

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A HISTORY OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

VOLUME IlIA - GAMBIT 

by 

Robert Perry 

January 1974 

Volume IlIA consists of 338 pages. 

Classified hy BYE MAN . 1 

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PREFACE TO VOLUME lIlA 

Gambit was conceived while Dwight David Eisenhower was 

President of the United States. Thirteen years later, when this 

preface was written, the system still was the principal reliance of 

the United States government for surveillance of areas to which that 

country was denied accesso It was, of course, a vastly different 

system from that first proposed shortly after Gary Powers' U-2 ran 

afoul of a Soviet antiaircraft missile in May 1960. At the time of 

that incident, the United States had no operational reconnaissance 

satellites and of the two developmental systems with apparent neartime potential, Samos E-l was conceptually flawed and the other, 

Corona, had experienced a frustrating succes sion of operational 

failures 0 Four additional photo-satellites (Samos E-2, E-3, E-4, 

and E -5) were at some stage between invention and first launch; none 

was ever to return a single photograph of Soviet territory to American 

photo interpreters, although that preposterous outcom.e could not 

then have been foreseen by any rational participant. 

U-2 penetrations had provided some useful insights into the 

research and development status of Soviet missile and aircraft 

programs by 1960, but the United States desperately needed information 

about the characteristics, numbers, and placement of operational 

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I ballistic missiles in the Soviet inventory. Notwithstanding the urgency 

of that need, President Eisenhower chose to disapprove plans for 

I further U-2 operations over Russia rather than chance a nuclear 

I weapons confrontation. In any case, the vulnerability of the U-2 was 

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all too apparent. Lacking credible information about Soviet capabilities, the United States had in 1958 undertaken an enormous expansion 

and acceleration of its own ballistic missile program, hopeful that 

American industry could overcome what was generally assumed to 

be a substantial Soviet advantage in nuclear weapons delivery capability. 

No Corona satellite had yet functioned correctly; in mid-1960 that 

program was forced to retreat from launching operationally configured 

payloads to a resumption of engineering test flights, sans cameras, 

in the hope that malignant defects in orbital and recovery functions 

might be identified and eliminated. 

In the near panic that followed the discovery that U-2 aircraft 

could no longer safely overfly the Soviet Union, intelligence specialists devised three major new photo-reconnaissance programs: Oxcart 

(the Mach 3, 100, OOO-foot-altitude aircraft that became better known 

as the A-ll "Blackbird" and later fathered the SR-71 and F-12 programs), 

Samos E-6 (designed originally to replace the languishing Corona 

satellite), and Gambit. Political constraints finally kept Oxcart from 

fulfilling its considerable promise and Samos E-6 was technically 

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deficient, like its five Sall10s predecessors. Stubborn CIA and Air 

Force prograll1 ll1anagers working with Itek, Lockheed, and General 

Electric engineers rescued Corona and by late 1960 had collected 

the evidence needed to dell10nstrate that Soviet ll1is sile rattling was 

1l10stl y hollow bluster. But in the end it was Gall1bit that brought 

back the inforll1ation needed to proportion the Soviet-All1erican 

nuclear ll1issile balance--though that event did not becoll1e reality 

until three year s after the crisis that fostered the prograll1. And 

notwithstanding the periodic appearance of prograll1s and proposals 

for prograll1S to supplell1ent or supplant Gall1bit, that systell1 grew and 

prospered so ll1ightily that 10 years after its first flight it still was 

the principal reliance of United States surveillance effort. 

This volull1e contains the history of the Gall1bit prograll1 froll1 

conception in 1960 to tenth anniversary of first flight, in 1973. Like 

other volull1es in this series, it is designed to stand alone in being 

fully cOll1prehensible without reference to other sources, but because 

the several discrete elell1ents of the National Reconnaissance Prograll1 

are inextricably interrelated, the reader ll1ay find it advisable to 

consult one or another of those volUll1es for detailed inforll1ation 

about events that ill1pacted on Gall1bit without being integrals of the 

prog rall1. 

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This history was prepared under terms of a contract between 

the Director, Special Projects, National Reconnaissance Office 

(Director, Program A), and Technology Service Corporation, of 

Santa Monica, California. The principal author, Robert Perry, began 

research and wrote draft histories of the early years of Gambit while 

employed first by the United States Air Force and later by The Rand 

Corporation. He undertook revision and expansion of those sections 

and the addition of Gambit-3 and Gambit flight histories in 1972, in 

association with Robert A. Butler, a consultant to Technology Service 

Corporation. At various times, parts of the manuscript have been 

reviewed by members of the staff of the National Reconnaissance 

Office and of Program A. The reviewers and suppliers of both data 

and documents are so numerous that it is not practical to list them 

here. Most are mentioned in source notes following the individual 

chapters. To acknowledge their invaluable assistance in this way is 

plainl y an inadequate response, but there is no feasible alternative. 

In any case, for such errors and oversights as may have survived 

the scrutiny of contributors and reviewers, the author is entirely 

responsible. 

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CONTENTS, VOLUME IIIA 

Preface . 0 • 

XII GAMBIT ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT. • 'Ie • • • 

Notes on Sources 

Xln GAMBIT-l OPERATIONS 

Notes on Sources 

XIV THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERA TION OF 

GAMBIT-3 .•..•• 0 • • Q •••• 

Notes on Sources 

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97 

106 

183 

188 

320 

Illustrations have been separately bound in an Appendix volume. 

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GAMBIT ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 

Like rrlUch of the National Reconnaissance PrograIll, GaIllbit 

was the product of technical and political ferIllent and international 

'::: 

tensions that peaked during the Spring and SUIllIller of 1960. The 

need for new sources of high resolution reconnaissance photography 

had becoIlle critical in the afterIllath of the U-2 affair and with the 

enforced suspension of U-2 operations over the Soviet Union. Generally, policY-Illaking officials in the DepartIllent of the Air Force and 

the DepartIllent of Defense had becoIlle thoroughly disenchanted with 

what they had seen of the existing SaIllos prograIllo Continued 

eIllphasis on "concurrency" as a prograIll Illode and a stubborn Air 

Force eIllphasis on readout rather than recovery techniques severely 

prejudiced the Air Force case, since both approaches were unacceptable to IllOSt officials above the level of the Air Staff. The pressures 

of international politics had Illade it quite difficult for the Eisenhower 

adIllinistration to openly sponsor a new or accelerated satellite 

reconnaissance developIllent. Finally, attractive proposals for new 

orbital reconnaissance systeIlls had appeared during the SUIllIller of 

The reSUIlle that follows is largely an encapsulation of Chapter VI 

of VoluIlle IIA. For that reason, source citations have been used 

only when new Illaterial was eIllployed. 

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1960. Adding body to the mixture were the facts that until mid-August 

the Corona had not returned any photographs whatever, while the 

only other capsule-recovery system then under development, Samos 

E-5, was regarded with sornething less than undiluted enthusiasm by 

much of the technical community. 

In March 1960, Eastman Kodak (EK) had privately submitted to 

the CIA and separately to the Reconnaissance Laboratory at Wright 

Field a proposal to develop a 77-inch (focal length) camera for satellite 

reconnaissance. In June the company proposed a 36-inch camera 

system to provide convergent stereo coverage of Soviet territory. 

EK called the latter system "Blanket. " 

A month later, on 20 July, Eastman submitted a modified 

proposal which essentially integrated the 77-inch camera with the 

stereo features and film recovery techniques embodied in "Blanket. II 

~< 

That variant was called "Sunset Strip." Dr. E. Ho Land, one of 

the key industry authorities in the reconnaissance program, personally 

brought the Eastman proposal to the attention of Air Force Undersecretary J. V. Charyk, who was rapidly becoming the dominant 

figure in the Pentagon struggle for control of the Air Force satellite 

reconnais sance effort. Charyk opened direct contact with Eastman 

* A then-popular television series was titled "77 Sunset Strip. " 

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Kodak shortly thereafter. He was particularly interested in the 

Eastillan approach because it eillbodied two illajor eleillents toward 

which he was favorably predisposed: a fHill-only recovery scheille, 

like Corona. and a very high-acuity, long focal-length caillera. 

In the illeantiille, reconnais sance specialists of The Rand 

Corporation had renewed their efforts to induce the Ballistic Missile 

Division (BMD). iillillediate sponsor of the Saillos prograill. to 

develop a spin-stabilized reconnaissance systeill along the lines of 

a 1957 Rand proposal. In response to a request froill BMD, Rand in 

June 1960 began working with Space Technology Laboratories (STL) 

on a plan to develop a systeill which by taking illaxiilluill advantage 

of available technology could be illade operational in the near terill. 

BMD interest steillilled largely froill Charyk's earlier sponsorship 

of such an approach. 

On 7 July 1960, a group of Rand and STL specialists quietly 

as seillbled at the invitation of Colonel Paul Worthnlan of BMD. the 

sub-rosa Air Force illanager of the Corona activity, to discuss 

details of a newl y conceived variant of the original spin-stabilized 

satellite. Rand had concluded that it would be perfectly feasible to 

orbit a reconnais sance satellite in the guise of a standard ballistic 

illissile reentry body. Its real function would be hidden under the 

explanation that the orbiting body was being used in tests of a 

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ballistic missile warning system. Rand's recommendation to STL 

covered a l500-pound satellite carrying a 36-inch {focal length} 

camera system using spin stabilization to provide panoramic 

coverage at a ground resolution of about 17 feet. If the satellite 

were oriented so as to have its lens pointing directly downward 

while over latitude 55 North it would provide useful cover age of 

all of the northern hemisphere lying between 40 and 70 degrees. 1 

By early August 1960, STL had shaped the earlier scheme 

into a semi-formal proposal. It differed from the earlier scheme 

in being based on a camera with a 24-inch focal length and in certain 

other minor details. Apart from re-introduction of the spin stabilization mode after a lapse of two years, its chief attraction lay in 

the premise of operations that could be conducted most circumspectly--

even though there was a degree of unreality in the notion that a 

pretens e of warhead detection tests long could be maintained for a 

vehicle which remained in a relatively stable orbit instead of reentering steeply, as an actual warhead would do. 

With allowances for minor differences, there were only three 

combinations of basic elements which could result in a useful 

panoramic satellite reconnaissance system. A three-axis-stable 

vehicle with a panning lens and fixed-position film was one; its 

chief practictioner was Corona. Use of a stable vehicle in conjunction with a moving mirror or lens arrangement and film 

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By 25 August 1960, when the President approved the establishment of a tightly controlled secretariat-level satellite reconnaissance 

organization. there were three leading candidates for sponsorship as 

"new!! systems. The E-6 program--based on "Blanket" concepts--

had proceeded toward source selection while the question of who would 

control the total program. and at what level, was being resolved. 

"Sunset Strip" was being given very serious consideration--but most 

privately. Unlike E-6, which was rather widely known because of the 

source selection proceedings. "Sunset Strip" had unfolded very quietly. 

Nevertheless, the general structure of Eastman's proposal was treated 

as normal, highly classified information at Wright Field, at BMD, and 

in various Pentagon offices concerned with satellite reconnaissance. 

movement synchronized with lens or mirror movement was a second; 

the E-6 approach of late 1960 was representative. The third technique was spin stabilization, based on a fixed position lens that 

rotated around the longitudinal axis of the spinning satellite and 

relied on moving film for both panoramic effect and image motion 

compensation. Although spin stabilization had first been conceived 

in combination with a technique of film recovery in 1956 and had been 

the principal ingredient of The Rand Corporationis "family of 

recoverable reconnais sance satellites" proposed in August-November 

1957, no such system had ever been developed. Spin stabilization 

had briefly been the favored approach to what became Corona and 

the short-lived IIProgram IIA." A variant of spin stabilization, but 

using television techniques rather than film, was the basis of 

Program 35 (Program 417), the cloud-cover surveillance satellite 

which began development in 1961. 

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The third possibility, "Study 7, II as STL's proposal was called, had 

been handled as near-covert. 

President Eisenhower approved the concept of a clandestine 

reconnaissance satellite development in the course of the National 

Security Council meeting of 25 August. Theoretically, it would 

have been possible to select anyone of the three possible systems 

for covert development, even E-6, since by that time Cor ona 

experience had twice demonstrated that a widely known proposal 

could be officially flterminated" while actually being covertly 

continued. But because a great many people knew of the pressure 

that had been applied to bring on the development of a new reconnaissance system during the summer of 1960, it seemed unrealistic to 

assume that everybody who was witting of earlier activity would 

uncritically accept an announcement that ~ new system was being 

developed. Thus a covert E-6 program was not a real possibility. 

On 20 September 1960, very shortly after the Secretary of 

the Air Force Samos Project Office (SAFSP) had legally corne into 

being at BMD, Charyk met with Brigadier General Robert E. Greer 

(the program's new military director), Colonel Paul E. Beran 

(chairman of the E-6 source selection board), and Lieutenant 

Colonel James Seay (Greer's procurement advisor). After considering 

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all the options, they agreed that the best course was to continue 

both E-6 and "Sunset Strip, II which had been funded at a relatively 

low cost "study" level for the past several weeks. Undersecretary 

Charyk, with the specific approval of the President. decided the 

77-inch system should be developed covertly. How that should be 

done remained to be determined. * For the moment. the only major 

action was to provide $4.3 million to finance "Sunset Strip" through 

the balanc e of the year. 

"Study 7. If renamed Bolero. was briefly continued, but in 

early November Charyk had ruled against any immediate development 

of a spin-stabilized reconnaissance satellite. By that time the notion 

that a "Sunset Strip" program could be concealed under the veneer of 

E-6 activity had evolved; the covert effort had acquired the code name 

GambiL 

The general premise was that E-6 and Gambit would be made 

to resemble one another in outward details and that the same set of 

contractors would be used in both programs. The E-6 source 

s election board thus became the shell within which Gambit contractor s 

I were chosen. Since Eastman was the originator of the Gambit camera 

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conc ept and for a variety of very practical reasons had to be picked 

See Chapter V for a considerably more detailed account of the 

considerations affecting the covert program decision. 

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to carryon that effort, E-6 cam.era developm.ent was assigned to 

Eastm.an Kodak. (That would probably have been the outcom.e of 

E-6 source selection in any case.) General Electric. the m.ost 

experienced firm. in the area of reentry capsules. won the Gam.bit 

a ward and the as sigmnent to develop a capsule for E-6. One of the 

early problem.s encountered by program. m.anagers arose from. the 

need for specifying a satellite vehicle which would house both 

Gam.bit and E-6 equipm.ent. The Gam.bit cam.era was considerably 

larger, which m.eant that the E-6 had to be housed in a low-density 

structure that offended the engineering sense of E-6 vehicle designers. 

Concealm.ent of Gam.bit intentions proved less difficult than 

had initially been feared. General Greer arranged to have Eastm.an1s 

"Sunset Strip" study contract term.inated with the explanation that 

because of the E-6 decision no further developm.ent of a 77-inch 

cam.era was required. Sim.ultaneously Greer's office drew up a 

flblack" agreem.ent which authorized EK to continue the "Sunset Strip" 

work as a covert program.--the Gam.bit cam.era developm.ent. General 

Electric, which like Eastm.an had previous experience in "black II 

program.s, em.ulated the cam.era contractor in concentrating all 

Gam.bit -related activity in a secure facility. Indeed, for the first 

weeks of Gam.bit activity the m.atter of se reening Corona efforts from. 

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General Electric's GaInbit people, and GaInbit frOIn Corona, was of 

as great concern as the concealInent of GaInbit froIn Inost of the Air 

Force. 

General Electric used the story of an alternate reentry vehicle 

for E-6 as its initial cover. EastInan Kodak relied on a "proprietary 

inforInation" screen--a device of particular effectiveness because 

EastInan was notorious for ferociously guarding its new industrial 

developInents. Aerospace Corporation, which was to perforIn a 

liInited systeIns engineering-technical direction function in both 

GaInbit and E-6, concealed its GaInbit activity under rigid need-to 

know rules. Such controls were also iInposed on the two Inain centers 

of Air Force activity, the prograIn office cOInplex in Los Angeles and 

Charyk's special staff in the Pentagon. There was SOIne early difficulty in choking off the rather casual circulation of GaInbit knowledge 

within the headquarters of the Air Research and DevelopInent COInInand 

and in the Air Materiel COInInand structure, leading to a couple of 

episodes of knuckle rapping, but by early 1961 an effective "black" 

environInent had been built around the prograIn. 

Perhaps Inore iInportant to the surprising sUCCess of the Cover 

effort, a great deal of effort was then being expended in developing the 

recovery systeIns for E-5 and E-6 in secure but "white" settings. To 

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the outside world it seemed obvious that the new Samos organization 

would be intent on the E-5 and E-6 programs, so any puzzling activity 

at one of the contractor plants was attributed to thes e interests rather 

than to anything new. Inside General Greer's organization, where 

relatively few people initially knew of Gambit, normal human preoccupation with the tasks of the moment proved a highly successful 

insulator against random curiosity. Most of the Air Force shared 

the uncritical assumption that "the establishment" could not accommodate effective internal secrecy and that because procurement and 

contracting had always been open matters--and "security" a special 

sort of club to which most cleared Air Force personnel were admitted 

without qualification--no large-scale development effort could 

possibly be concealed. 

The use of E-6 as a cover for Gambit had certain disadvantages 

that were recognized early. In December 1960 General Greer began 

to worry the question of how to conceal Gambit if E-6 were cancelled. 

Termination of E-6 on the grounds of technical inadequacy or budget 

pres sure was not likely for the moment, but there seemed a real 

possibility that the politically vulnerable "overt" satellite reconnaissance 

effort might be wiped out in the aftermath of an agreement with the 

Soviets. In that event it would be impos sible to launch a Gambit 

payload under the pretense that it was an E-6. For that matter. such 

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an elementary task as construction of Gambit reentry vehicles at 

General Electric would be difficult to conceal once the excuse of an 

E- 6 alternate disappeared. 

Even while the program was first taking shape, then, General 

Greer had recognized that eventually he would have to invent cover 

other than E-6--some other ostensible payload and some other 

apparent mission--to hide Gambit. The problem continued to trouble 

him for several months. Among all the space programs being 

conducted by NASA and the Air Force, only those contained within 

the reconnais sance effort were significantly concealed. Routine 

security screened several of the "military satellites, " but experience 

had demonstrated that for a reconnaissance program "routine security" 

was not enough. The apparent susceptibility of any acknowledged 

satellite reconnaissance program to cancellation on political grounds 

was particularly acute in 1960-1961. A solution more permanently 

satisfactory than that of pretending to be an E-6 had to be found for 

2 

Gambit. 

* It may be argued that the CIA had done all those things in Corona 

without arousing suspicion, but in fact Corona was tightly concealed 

under "Discoverer" for its first four years, and in any case CIA 

expenditures were not matters of public record. as was the case 

for all Air Force Samos costs in 1960. 

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In the event, only until the early months of 1961 was it 

feasible to pretend that Gambit activity was part of the E-6 program. 

The external configurations of the two remained very much alike for 

a time, most of the subsystems planned for E-6 were more or less 

adaptable to Gambit, and the on-orbit performance requirements of 

the two were similar. But by March of 1961 it was clear that the E-6 

design was becoming fixed and that Gambit, still in gestation, was 

taking a different form. Maneuver capability greater than that of 

E-6 was added to Gambit, propulsion arrangements (for on-orbit 

operations) changed, and considerably les s of the E-6 development 

became applicable to Gambit. By June of 1961, continuing evolution 

of the Gambit satellite had caused it to lose most of its outward resemblance to E- 6. the internal arrangements were almost totall y 

different, and relatively few of the E-6 components remained applicable. 

In such circumstances the academic concern General Greer had 

voiced six months earlier became a real problem. Not only was there 

a marked technical dissimilarity between the two systems, but the 

possibility of a politically motivated cancellation of both E-5 and E-6 

seemed greater. 

The desirable solution, suggested in Greer's notes of December 

1960, was total disassociation from the original Sarnos program. 

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Since it was not at all feasible to hide Gambit under a scientific 

satellite label (the sugge stion horrified the CIA, ultra-sensitive 

to anything that might invite close scrutiny of Discoverer and thus 

threaten compromise of Corona), and none of the other in-progres s 

space programs of either the Air Force or NASA afforded proper 

camouflage, there was no easy or obvious option. 

While mulling over the contradictions between needs and 

possibilities, General Greer conceived an approach based in part 

on his earlier analysis of the problem of covert procurement. In 

November 1960 he had begun "black" contracting under the philosophy 

that since "everybody" knew it was impos sible for the Air Force to 

buy anything expensive without going through established review and 

approval channels, one might do quite a lot of unsuspected buying 

and contracting by merely obtaining a direct authorization. It 

occurred to him that the solution to the Gambit quandary might be 

found in the same thesis. He thereby invented the concept of the 

"null program, " a development with no known origin and no specified 

goal. If such a program were conducted under the aegis of a highly 

classified payload, it should be entirely possible to purchase boosters, 

upper stages, and launch services through normal channels. Because 

"everybody" knew that the entire reconnaissance satellite program 

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was in Greer's keeping, the assignment of "null program" responsibility to the regular Space Systems Division (SSD) organization would 

serve to convince most observers that it had to have some objective 

other than reconnaissance. Vague references to precise land 

recovery (a real but secondary objective of Gambit at the time) 

might serve to induce suspicion that the "null program" actually 

had a "bombs in orbit" goal. 

Putting such a cover into effect required devious scheming 

and a high degree of ingenuity, but by June 1961 the plan had been 

3 reduced to specifics and generally approved by Undersecretary Charyk. 

In July the first moves toward establishing an activity called 

"Program 307" were taken. Through the Air Staff, SSD received 

authorization to buy four "NASA type" Agena B's for launches starting 

in January 1963--the Agenas to be assigned to no particular space 

program "for the present. II In August, Charyk sent a memorandum 

to the Air Force Chief of Staff which emphasized the need to protect 

the USAF's "capability to do future space projects" and which affirmed 

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The author ran acros s the formal documentation on the "null program" I 

(then called Program 206) early in 1962, several months before being 

exposed to the real workings of SAFSP. Even though he was firmly 

convinced that parking nuclear weapons in orbit was a most irrational I 

project, he concluded that the Air Force was actually proceeding 

along that line. Any other explanation of the obvious facts was, as I 

General Greer had cannily anticipated, too illogical to deserve 

serious thought. (R.P. --July 1964) 

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the desirability of ordering six Atlas boosters (configured to accept 

Agena B's) to be used starting in February 1963. Again there 

occurred the phras e about "not as signed to a particular space projecL 114 

Apparently the matter seemed so mundane to the Air Staff that 

the authorizing teletype managed to get lost somewhere in the PentagonAFSC headquarters maze. Nearly two weeks were needed to straighten 

out the resulting confusion and even then it proved necessary to apply 

5 

considerable pressure before organizational inertia could be overcome. 

Having gotten a small batch of Atlas and Agena vehicles on 

order. SAFSP moved to the next business--formal creation of a 

"null project. II On 25 September 1961. the Air Force vice chief of 

staff directed General B. A. Schriever. AFSC commander, to establish 

"Project Exemplar. II That code phrase, which was classified confidential, was defined as covering four launches from the Pacific 

Missile Range, starting in February 1963. The authorizing message 

noted that the Secretary of the Air Force had separately ordered the 

necessary Agenas and Atlases "on an unassigned basis." "They are 

hereby assigned Exemplar. II the teletype read. 6 

In a further exchange of teletypes, all written well in advance 

in General Greer's complex, the special projects office established 

The original code word was IIQuicksilver, II changed because it 

had been used previously. 

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the fact that "Exemplar " had a goal that was clas sified top secret. 

Plans to include specific references to the procurement authorizaHons for the Atlas and Agena purchases had to be put off because 

nobody in the Pentagon could locate the relevant documents; they 

had been lost in the course of an Air Staff reorganization during 

the summer of 1961. The "white" correspondence also stated requirements for the usual sort of elaborate documentation--development 

plans, cost projections. and the like--that had become customary 

for new programs. The absence of such paraphenalia would presumably have alarmed the "normal" procurement establishment, 

though such "documentation" was completely redundant to the SAFSP 

7 procedures. 

By mid-November the basic plan had been very largel y put 

into effect. only a few of the loose ends remaining. Gambit now 

consisted of a succession of elements, some covert, some within 

the normal military classification system. All of the "white" 

elements were gathered under "Exemplar "--which for reasons of 

administrative convenience had the additional and unclassified 

nickname "Cue Ball. " 

',--'-

"Cue Ball" was chosen to add spice to conjectures about orbiting 

bombs and means of returning them to precise site s on the earth. 

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Colonel Q. A. Riepe. who had been associated with the 

satellite reconnaissance prograITl at intervals since 1953. was 

naITled the "Cue Ball" prograITl director. His assuITlption of technical responsibility for GaITlbit froITl Colonel Paul Heran (E-6 

program. director and original cus todian of the GaITlbit developITlent) 

was not cOITlplete until February 1962. however. 

A cOITlplex network of nOITlinal and actual reporting channels 

linked "Cue Ball lf to General Greer. (Greer then had an additional 

duty as signITlent as Vice COITlITlander of the Space SysteITls Division, 

although his priITlary responsibility was for the reconnaissance 

ITlission o ) All contacts between "Cue BallI! and the SAFSP structure 

were to reITlain llblack, I! as were all GaITlbit budget and prograITlITling 

ITlatters. "Cue Ball" was the cover for booster procureITlent. launch 

services, and certain other non-sensitive aspects of GaITlbit that 

could be handled through norITlal ITlilitary channels, thus providing 

a ITleans of deceiving those channels about the true purpose of "Cue 

Ball. II Nowhere was there an explicit description of the "Cue Ball" 

payload or ITlission. Persistent inquirers who had SOITle plausible 

justification for ITlore inforITlation were told that lIanother organization outside SSD is responsible for the payload. II The AtoITlic Energy 

COITlITlission was the obvious suspect since NASA, the only other 

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candidate, was notoriously antagonistic to classified work. The 

intention of the deception was to create a vague impres sion that the 

payload was either a bomb or something related to manned space flight. 

"Cue Ball" was organized along the lines of a conventional SSD 

program, although such "normal" channels and reporting lines were 

for cover purposes only; actual relations with higher authority would 

go (!lin the black") to and through Greer's SAFSP office. It was particularly important, as General Greer emphasized frequently in the 

early stages of setting up "Cue Ball, II that personnel prominently 

associated with the reconnaissance effort not be seen with "Cue Ball" 

pers onnel and that the "Cue BalPI people avoid any contaminating 

as sociation with satellite reconnaissance. Not all "Cue Ball" as signees 

were cognizant of Gambit, so internal office security was another 

>:'~~8 

problem. 

Misdirection continued successful through Charyk's approval 

of the "Cue Ball" development plan and his formal authorization of 

* It does not seem to have occurred to anyone that the CIA might have 

been nominated. 

** An odd difficulty popped up shortly after "Cue Ball" was created. 

Some of the reconnaissance program personnel who had become 

accustomed to treating all aspects of Gambit as thoroughly "black" 

insisted on so handling "Cue Ball"--a tendency which endangered the 

security of the whole elaborate scheme. 

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initial funding at a level of $16 million. Key individuals at various 

stations in the headquarters USAF and AFSC structures had been 

alerted to the scheme and were presumably prepared to see that the 

various budget, priority, and precedence authentications emerged 

promptly and satisfactorily. But in the slow weeks after Charyk1s 

directive appeared, some of the carefully laid plan began to flake 

away. Initially, all had gone well. Charyk1s directive carne out on 

24 November and within three days the Air Staff had taken the actions 

necessary for the official start of program activity. On 13 December, 

however, a message from the Pentagon to AFSC specified approval 

of a $6 million initial program, and when a non-briefed officer went 

to the budget branch to clear up the "misunderstanding" he was told 

that there were no dollars available for "System 483A "--the nomenclature assigned to "Cue Ball" for processing purposes. In the 

meantime, of course, Gambit had begun to run through what remained 

of its money. A succession of quick telephone calls patched together 

an interim solution, involving acceptance of the $6 million, while the 

larger question of how to get affairs in proper order was being worked 

. d'l 9 out In more etal 0 

The original confusion was not entirely cleared up until 

February 1962--by which time the complications of working with an 

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involved "classical" structure in the Air Staff had further diffused 

the outlines of the original "Cue Ball" plan. Though the end result 

was probably all to the good, it did not seem so at the time. 

As part of the cover plan, General Greer had decided to 

have "Cue Ball" broken up into two elements, Program A and 

Program B. "All would include the first four Atlas Agena vehicles 

and liB II the remaining six needed for the approved 10-launch effort. 

Through AFSC channels, General Greer conjured up a memorandum 

justifying a total 10-vehicle program on the as sumption of one succes s 

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in each of three tes t configurations. Such a justification went to Under- I 

secretary Charyk, in the open. Having apparently become somewhat 

foggy on the precise details of the cover scheme, Charyk questioned 

the need. A quick briefing straightened out the misunderstanding. 

Separately, Greer induced SSD to ask if SAFSP would be interested 

in supporting about $15 million worth of work on precise land recovery, 

II 

and Greer replied that $10 M [sic] is a more accurate measure of my 

interes t, " thus providing for the dollars lacking in the original 

December 1961 authorization. By 1 February, therefore, all again 

10 seemed to be well. 

Unfortunately, optimism was premature. Experience of the 

past two months had demonstrated that it was extremely difficult to 

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transfer program money from the line item called "advanced research 

and components II (where it appeared in the Air Force budget when 

actually intended for Gambit purposes) to the "support system 483A" 

line item. Then, within the Air Staff there still were some objections 

to a lO-vehicle launch program supporting something called "Cue Ball, " 

and about which little was known, when projects which seemed to have 

a much more valid requirement were "being underfunded. II Additionally, and unhappily, in a sycophantic flush of enthusiasm for a 

program which appeared to have so much secretariat support, the 

Systems and Logistics element in the Air Staff had put the "Cue Ball" 

Pentagon project office in a very conspicuous organizational spot 

where it could not avoid attracting unwanted attention. One or a 

combination of these circumstances would surely focus more light 

on "Cue Ball" than was desirable. The reports and briefings required 

of a "normal" system were troublesome enough, but if people became 

interested in "Cue Ball, " and set about "straightening out" the 

program, a lot of rather vulnerable explanations might become 

necessary. Alternatively, and equally undesirable, many more nonparticipants would have to be briefed on the real purpose of "Cue Ball, II 

thus violating the basic precept of Gambit security. 

Faced with this situation, Undersecretary Charyk directed 

that all money for SAFSP use, including the "Cue Ball" fund, be 

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carried under a 698AJ line item entry. (Vela Hotel, the nuclear-test 

detection system program, was the only non-reconnais sance program 

so funded.) The number identified "advanced system development. 11 

Programming entries for "Cue Ball, " originally listed under 483A 

("supporting system"), were changed to 698AL. The E-6 program 

was carried as 698AN, but also funded as part of 698AJ. Whatever 

else might have been achieved, the nomenclature at least had become 

incomprehens ible. 

Charyk's decision was not wholly popular, partly because the 

association of 698AL with General Greer's projects could be rather 

easily established. But since the original scheme for subduing 

Pentagon interest in "Cue Ball" had becom.e unworkable, it seemed 

as good an approach as any. 

At least one officer on Charyk' s staff felt that "the limited 

view of the SP [SAFSP] security types as to the requirements for 

cover and deception •.. II was also a factor in a security situation 

which he characterized as "just a couple of steps from disaster. 11 

But somehow disaster did not follow, even though no changes of any 

II 

cons equence were made in either views or procedures. 

In retrospect, the involved convolutions of Gambit deception 

and occasional alarms that the "cover" was disappearing seemed 

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overdone. General Greer1s original premise. that nobody would 

suspect the existence of a "null program" because the very concept 

was inconceivable to any normal staff activity. proved sound. There 

was an additional contributor to the s ucces s of the various moves 

that put "Cue Ball" in the same funds and program categories as 

other "Greer programs" without bringing on a security disaster: 

those on the inside of Gambit tended to seek complete normality as 

an avenue to inconspicuousness without appreciating that the regular 

Air Force establishment had been conditioned to accept uncritically 

any decision handed down. no matter how irrational. Rationality 

was not inherent in development decisions. nor logic a necessary 

ingredient of programming. Most of the Air Staff saw nothing 

peculiar in an arrangement that put Vela Hotel, the "Samos II program 

(as it was still called), and a supposed "bombs in orbit" development 

in a common category called "advanced systems. II Nor did the 

average staff officer wonder whether something might be hidden under 

such an arrangement. As Greer had reasoned more than 15 months 

earlier, since there was no precedent for what he had done, it would 

:{:: 

generally go unsuspected. 

The expedient of combining "Cue BallI! with other "advanced system 

developments II apparently was proposed by Major David Bradburn of 

General Greer1s staff. He wanted to include a few other miscellaneous 

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Gam.bit had by early March 1962 m.ade a partial transition 

from. a covert program. to a special-security program.. The distinction was by no m.eans clear, nor was it widely appreciated, but 

the key to the m.atter was that Gam.bit did not pretend to be anything 

else, and that such pretense represented the boundary between covert 

and highly secure developm.ents. It was true that Gam.bit inhabited 

a covert atm.osphere, and that procurem.ent techniques and m.anufacturing practices invented for covert program.s continued to be used, 

but in reality Gam.bit was a highly classified program. without a 

publicly specified payload. There were two layers of security between 

the 206 ("Cue Ball") project office and the real payload; peeling away 

the first uncovered nothing m.ore than the second. since the "tight 

security payload!' story was entirely true, What m.attered was that a 

very special security category insulated the true program. goal--high 

resolution satellite reconnais sance. 

item.s to further m.islead speculation; Agena was one he suggested. 

l the IIcom.ptroller" of the "black" program.s, also wanted 

LO aaa SOrrie ARPA and NASA program.s. The final decision apparent! y 

was a com.prom.ise to avoid calling too m.uch attention to the reprogram.-

m.ing actions involved, though to som.e on Charyk's staff the affair 

seem.ed to take place in a spotlight on an em.pty stage. 12 (Ten years 

later, before a standing-room. audience, Major Bradburn, then a 

brigadier general, becam.e the fifth m.an to occupy the post established 

for Greer.) 

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The real covert reconnaissance program, Corona, still maIntained an elaborate facade of scientific inquiry even though it was 

becoming constantly more difficult to devise excuses for not producing 

at least some scientific information from a "scientific satellite progranl" 

>'f 

now In its second year of successful recoveries. 

All the while the management and security structures of the 

Gambit progralll were evolving toward the "Cue Ball"-Program 206 

arrangement, meaningful development continued. Between November 

1960 and January 1961, the forlllal contracts with Eastman went from 

draft to signature. There were no real obstacles, although for a tillle 

Undersecretary Charyk balked at Eastlllan's demand for a seven-percent 

profit on what was essentially a time and materials contract. Greer 

felt that the fee was not excessive, basing his judglllent both on the 

precedent of U-2 experience and on Eastman's "unique capability, II 

and after he secured the concurrence of other high officials (including 

A rather significant reorientation in security thinking was in progress 

during 1962. It led, in tillle, to the practice of ubscuring all lllilitary 

space flight goals by confining released information to a terse 

announcement of the identity of the booster and upper stage. Und(:r 

such scant camouflage Corona functioned effective1 y and unnoticed 

for another 10 years. 

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the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management 

and the Air Force General Counsel}, the contract was so arranged. 

By mid-1961, the concept of Gambit development, and its 

* 

technical details, had been worked out in detail. Essentially, Gambit 

differed from E-6 (to which it still maintained a technical likeness) 

in having substantially higher ground resolution, in pos ses sing a 

capability for photographing specific targets which were off the 

immediate orbital track, and in being intended for land 

recovery_ The land recovery approach, which had been an integral 

of the original presentation to President Eisenhower in August 1960, 

was intended to overcome what were considered increasingly hazardous 

aspects of sea recovery. There was a great deal of concern in 1961 

for the possibility that a Soviet ship or submarine might reach a 

floating Corona capsule before rescue forces arrived or that a capsule 

might descend, intact, into non-friendly territory. Recovery of such 

a capsule might well precipitate a grave international crisis--while 

failure to regain pos ses sion might be the excuse for a new U-2 

incident, but an echelon or two higher on the scale of risk. ** 

Probably the two key factors in the fee decision were the original 

National Security Council directive of 25 August, which ordered that 

Samos "take" be processed by "the same agency that processed U-2 

take "--Eastman Kodak, and the complete absence of alternatives. 

Moreover, as Eastman pointed out, the firm was currently drawing 13 

a seven-percent fee elsewhere. 

':' )'~ A Corona capsule did survive an unplanned reentry, in Venezuela, 

several years later--and nobody noticed. 

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Because of its need for higher resolution, Gambit would fly 

somewhat lower than E-6. A photographic altitude of 90 miles was 

generally considered desirable. The resolution requirement imposed 

a need for accurate orbit maintenance over a period of several days. 

for more precise altitude control than in E-6, and for an ability to 

rotate the camera section about the vehicle's roll axis. Land recovery 

implied extremely precise deboost velocities and reentry programming. 

The attitude control system, then in a status of advanced design, 

was a two-axis gimballed platform on which were mounted infrared 

horizon scanners and an integrating gyroscope. The horizon sensors 

measured pitch and roll error; the gyro measured yaw error. Control 

movements were dependent on several jet-nozzle apertures, with a 

blend of nitrogen tetroxide and hydrazine fuel providing the impulse. 

The system was originally designed to permit as many as 600 roll 

reorientations during each mission. 

A set of four rocket engines. each capable of producing 50 

pounds of thrust, would provide for orbit maintenance. Six more 

such rockets were located in the aft section of the reentry vehicle. 

After reorientation of the satellite by 180 degrees and a 60-degree 

pitchdown had been completed, the reentry vehicle would be separated 

from the vehicle midsection and the engines fired. A velocity meter 

14 

signaled shutdown. 

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On 1 August 1961, at about the time the shift from an E~6 

cover to a "null program" was beginning and several months after 

the E-6 had been committed to fabrication, Eastman completed the 

basic design of the Gambit payload system--the camera, cassette, 

and ass ociated flight instruments 0 Design of the orbital vehicle 

was very nearly complete. Launch in January 1963 still seemed 

feasible 0 Two months later, after considerable thought and a 

succession of detailed studies, Undersecretary Charyk approved 

the use of the Wendover AFB area (Utah) for land recovery operations. 

He also introduced two complicating requirements: provisions for 

both north-to-south and south-to-north photography (north-to-south 

was the conventional approach), and for rapid launch--on four days 

or less notice. The quick-launch capability was not considered 

15 essential for early shots, however. 

The "Cue Balli' program office had been formally established 

on 10 October 1961 with an initial complement of 18 officers and 8 clerks. 

By that time, six Atlas boosters and four Agenas were on order and 

arrangements to obtain four more of each were pending. The various 

elements of normal development program documentation either had 

been completed or were well along toward completion. Arrangements 

for special facilities were being made: pad, launch complex, and 

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assembly buildings modifications at Vandenberg had been scheduled 

and the State Department had opened negotiations for an additional 

up-range station,lL ________ ~I needed both for controlling the 

16 

orbital vehicle and for safeguarding the proposed land recovery process. 

Nevertheless, Gambit was not in an entirely happy situation. 

In January 1962, the Samos E-5 program was finally cancelled after 

a succes sion of launch, on-orbit, and recovery system failures. 

Corona was in one of its periodic spasms of operational difficulty, 

and the proposal for a Lanyard development was receiving generally 

friendly attention, (Lanyard was a re-engineered, single-camera 

E-5 system in Corona vehicles.) The need for Gambit --or for a 

system with comparable on-orbit photographic potential--was even 

more marked than had been the case a year earlier. Various proposals 

for somehow accelerating Gambit development were being considered 

at precisely the time when the design weight of the Gambit system 

had overtaken the payload lofting potential of the Atlas -Agena. (In 

order to reduce weight, the six forward-firing rockets of the orbital 

vehicle were deleted in January 1962. This compromise had the 

effect of restricting orbit adjust maneuvers to those based on velocity 

increases--going from a lower to a higher orbit.) Perhaps more 

significant, Gambit development was now far enough along to begin 

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suffering the consequences of earlier errors and oversights. Vehicle 

stability was rapidly becoming a critical item in early 1962, the first 

major technical difficulty to cause real concern.

17 

Undersecretary Charyk, who was under constant pressure to 

get quick and effective results in the satellite reconnaissance program, 

wanted both to accelerate the pace of Gambit development and to improve 

its product. He spent 9 February 1962 in Los Angeles discussing those 

needs with Greer and Riepe. They concluded that program acceleration 

was impractical unless a considerable degradation in photography was 

also acceptable. Moreover, it was then becoming clear that problems 

of mission planning and on-orbit control would be more difficult than 

originally anticipated--and substantially more complex than anything 

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previously attempted in satellite reconnais sance. Gambit would differ al 

from all predecessors in being committed to a computer-designed 

operational procedure, since the precision requirements were deemed 

too great to be satisfied by the sort of target designation and on-orbit 

procedures employed in Corona and planned for E_6. l8 

Further, the infrared horizon sensors which General Electric 

was developing were causing particular concern. GEl s preferred 

single-scan sensor seemed incapable of providing the required 

accuracy within the time limits of the development program. Rather 

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than being able to accelerate Gambit availability, GE had to caution 

that delayed vehicle delivery was probable. A program slip of about 

four months seemed inevitable, moving the prospective first launch 

date from February 1963 to May of that year. 

General Electric's proposal for correcting the defect was to 

go to a "body bound" stabilization system, essentiallyabandoning--

at least for early flights--the concept of a stable-platform sensor 

separate from a camera that rolled into appropriate aiming positions 0 

Aerospace Corporation estimated that such an expedient would double 

the smear potential of the system, degrading its resolution quite 

markedly. Although Charyk asked for a precise evaluation of the 

resulting degradation, he privately told Greer to find an alternative 

solution, preferably one involving development of a different (back-up) 

19 

sensor. 

General Greer had suggested that option on 28 February, 

shortly after the initial disclosure of General Electric's development 

problems. He also, but somewhat reluctantly, endorsed and forwarded 

Colonel Riepe's proposal for an expanded test program, one involving 

more qualification tests, the construction of mor e spares for the 

engineering development program, the inclusion of complete hot-firing 

tests in the schedule, the provision of a back-up development for major 

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elements of the command system, funding an expansion of GE's 

industrial facilities, and the addition of three reentry vehicles to 

the basic test program, All thos e changes seemed certain to further 

delay the availability of the first Gambit. 

Similar but far les s sweeping recommendations affecting 

Eastman Kodak's program went forward simultaneously. EK, though 

having trouble, was in less difficulty than General Electric. The 

chief camera program change which Greer sponsored involved the 

development of additional manufacturing processes for lightweight 

optics. 

To the greater question of whether an attempt should be made 

to maintain schedules at the expense of system degradation, Greer 

provided a blunt answer: by going to an Agena-derived stabilization 

system it would be possible to provide for a vehicle with limited 

accuracy and system flexibility that would meet the February 1963 

launch date, But Greer opposed such an option unless the schedule 

was a sole and overriding consideration, since the development had 

no future and any resulting photographs would be degraded. Rather 

than make such a compromise. the general favored accepting a 

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four -month slip in first launch. 

With reluctance equal to Greer's. Charyk accepted the prospect 

of further schedule slippage. On 19 March 1962, he directed that a 

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limited-accuracy dual-scan infrared system being developed by 

General Electric remain the primary reference for the first three 

flights but that a more sophisticated dual-scan system be used 

thereafter o He also approved starting work on a backup single-scan 

system and cancelled GEls study of body-bound earth-reference 

techniques 0 He accepted Greer's recommendation that nothing 

immediately be done about adapting the Agena-oriented Corona 

stabilitization technique to Gambit. 21 

The options thus adopted encouraged some optimism about 

meeting schedules and performance requirements should the primary 

development systems encounter further difficulty. There was general 

agreement that the earliest possible date for initial launch would be 

22 May rather than February 1963. 

Decisions on these matters had to be made and put into effect 

by mid-March; Charyk was under orders to report to the President 

on the status and prospects of Gambit at that time. The undersecretary 

began his 19 March 1962 report by recalling that the objective of 

Gambit. "to produce satellite photography having a ground resolution 

of from two to three feet, " was being given "an overriding priority. " 

He noted that the performance requirements of the system 

pushed the state of the satellite arts in three specific areas: 

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lightweight optics, vehicle stability, and the complexity of orbital 

operations. For practical purposes, the limits of optical resolution 

were decided by the surface quality of the primary mirror and the 

scanning mirror. Gambit mirrors were larger, made to closer 

tolerances, and lighter than in any previous system. Thermal 

gradients between the reflecting surfaces and the rear supporting 

surfaces had forced consideration of metal rather than glass backing, 

further complicating the problem. 

The performance of the Gambit camera depended as much 

on vehicle stability as on any inherent photographic quality. Pointing 

had to be extremely precise, requiring extreme accuracy in the 

horizon sensors and a stable platform gyro system that would allow 

the sensors to stay locked on the horizon while the vehicle rolled to 

point toward targets on either side of the orbital track. Because the 

ground swath width of Gambit cameras was only 10 miles, more 

photogr aphs would be taken from a canted than from a vertical position. 

The complexity of orbital operations derived from the inability 

of the launch system to put the orbital vehicle on a predetermined 

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orbit with the precision required by the narrow swath width. Command I 

programming had to be changeable in flight, and further complexity 

derived from the need to set highly accurate roll positions for photography on either side of the vehicle IS track. 

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Charyk's report was relatively optimistic. although he refrained 

from any predictions of complete success in meeting either schedules 

or resolution requirements. He forecast a first flight date in May 1963 

and operational readiness by August of that year. And he concluded 

by summarizing the measures taken to insure the readiness of Gambit 

at the earliest possible date, * appending the note that something on 

the order of $10 to $15 million in additional funds would be needed to 

23 

see the "insurance program!! through. 

Certain other measures were taken during March 1962 to 

improve prospects of program success. At Greer1s insistence, 

General Electric reorganized its Gambit management to provide 

more meaningful attention from high corporate executives and to 

improve laboratory. assembly, manufacturing, and test procedures. 

Concurrently, the general put Space Technology Laboratories under 

contract to solve the orbital operations problem. STL would receive 

about $1. 5 million for computer work on orbit selection, mis sion 

profiles. and operational analysis. Charyk also approved these actions 

24 

in March. 

Separately. the West Coast group arranged with Eastman Kodak 

to begin a backup program supporting General Electric's infrared 

* These were es sentiall y the actions approved in his separate 

19 March directive to General Greer and were based on Greer's 

28 February recommendations. 

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s ens or development. Unlike most other work of such nature in support 

of Gambit, this particular EK effort became a "white'! subprogram. 

(The justification was a need for improved horizon sensors to support 

space programs generally. Equipment tests were to be conducted in 

the Discoverer program.) 

One key reason for making the scanner work at EK "white" 

was the need for close correlation of Eastman and GE developments. 

The feasibility of such contacts was enhanced by the fact that General 

Electric was moving all its Gambit work to a special facility at 

Valley Forge. Pennsylvania. (Corona and Lanyard subsystems were 

to remain at GE's Chestnut Street shops, in Philadelphia.) 

The facility problem. in conjunction with an alarming increase 

in General Electric's cost estimates. caused a minor crisis in 

Gambit program affairs in April and May 1962. In part. the reluctance 

of the Department of Defense to finance an expansion of GE facilities. 

including those needed for Gambit production. arose from an expectation that space and equipment released from the cancelled Advent 

communication satellite program could be diverted to other uses, 

including Gambit. General Greer felt that nothing of value to Gambit 

would emerge from the Advent termination in time to be useful. 

Charyk had another opinion. and a fair amount of argument was 

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necessary to change his mind. Eventually, on 31 May 1962, the 

necessary formal approval was received and the facility construction 

at Valley Forge was able to continue, but for about a month before 

approval was received the question--and the soundness of Gambit 

26 

delivery schedules--seemed very much in doubt. 

Another aspect of the apparent reluctance to commit additional 

money to General Electric was the steady increase in estimated 

program costs. Between April 1961 and April 1962, GE's estimates 

had gradually climbed from $52 million to $121. 7 million--an increase 

only partly caused by configuration changes. The contractor explained 

away Some of the puzzling increases as arising from unanticipated 

technical difficulties but also conceded to "just some bad estimating. II 

Neither Greer nor Charyk was particularly happy about a contract 

performance which the general charitably described as " ••• somewhat 

27 less than expected. II 

Equally important to the trend of Gambit development were 

technical questions which had persistently bothered General Greer 

through the early months of 1962. They stemmed. in the main, from 

Greer I S long-held conviction that the need for land recovery of film 

capsules had been considerably overemphasized. The original Gambit 

program directives had specified land recovery as one of the prime 

development objectives, for reasons which had seemed more than 

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sufficient to the high administration officials who had conceived 

and pushed the notion. In the climate of 1960, when Corona recovery 

had been infrequent, uncertaint and expensive, land recovery seemed 

a us eful option. But land recovery was more cOITlplicated than air 

catch in several ways, and the very grave risks inherent in such an 

approach had continued to trouble Greer. On several occasions during 

the first 18 months of Gambit development he had raised the issue in 

discussions with Dr. Charyk. In each instance, however, Charyk 

had acknowledged the question and reconfirmed the requirement. 

All of those discussions were informal. Only once did the question 

of an alternative to the original land recovery scheme receive consideration at the level of the program office. In January 1962 a member 

of the A erospace Corporation's Program 206 contingent advised 

Colonel Riepe that air retrieval was "being considered, " but that it 

28 

was quite impractical. The very considerable weight of the 206 

recovery capsule as it then existed exceeded the air-catch capacity 

of recovery aircraft. 

By July of 1962, General Greer's concern had put down roots 

more substantial than an academic distrust of land recovery as a 

technique. The Gambit system was then essentially 500 pounds over 

design weight, and most of the overweight derived from complications 

introduced by the land recovery requirement. Moreover, the reasons 

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for distrusting au-sea recovery modes had become much less valid 

since 1960. Succes sful Corona recoveries were proving to be les s 

difficult as time pas sed. The anticipated danger of losing a capsule 

to a Soviet trawler or submarine had largely dissipated; over-water 

recovery plans contained provisions for dealing with virtually every 

imaginable contingency, while the possibility that a slightly misdirected 

land-recovery capsule might descend in either Canada or Mexico--or 

might drive into some populated area of the western United States--had 

not diminished. 

Equally important, the disabilities arising from land recovery 

had not been appreciably les sened in the intervening years. Indeed, 

in many respects they had Corne into sharper focus. Over-water 

recovery, as developed in the Corona program. seemed a very 

simple process when compared to the planned land recovery scheme. 

In its descent toward the sea, a Corona reentry vehicle could safely 

shed all sorts of accessories--hatch covers and the ablative cone 

being the most obvious. Such jetsam fell into the ocean without danger 

to anything below, and then sank into the secure obscurity of a 

cluttered sea bottom. A land recovery vehicle could shed nothing 

that might corne to earth as a lethal proj ectile or which, if discovered, 

might breach the security of the satellite reconnaissance effort. 

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Everything that re-entered with a land-recovery vehicle had to remain 

with it. Finally, experience with the E-5 and E-6 reentry vehicles, 

and particularly the latter, did encourage great optimism about the 

feasibility of recovering bulky, weighty capsules 0 

Toward the end of July 1962, General Greer again raised the 

question of the desirability of land recovery with Undersecretary 

Charyko Although still dubious, Charyk agreed that Greer should look 

into alternatives 0 In point of fact, the most desirable alternative had 

occurred to Greer some days earlier. Thoroughly familiar with 

Corona, he had concluded that it might be entirely feasible to modify 

the Gambit vehicle to accept a Corona-type recovery capsule. After 

mulling over the idea, he decided that was the sensible and logical way 

out of the current dilemma. Having broached the thought to Charyk and 

gotten agreement that the idea had merit, he went directly from Washington to the General Electric facility in Philadelphia. Hilliard Paige, 

GEls senior satellite program official, was absent when Greer arrived9 

so the general settled down at Paige's desk and wrote a longhand memo 

authorizing GE to do a quick study of the feasibility of "gluing the 

Discoverer capsule on the front end of GambiL ,,29 

Encouraged by preliminary findings, General Greer induced 

Charyk to formalize the inquiry. On 28 July the undersecretary 

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agreed that a major policy decision was necessary on tithe question 

of land recovery in the entire satellite reconnais sance program. " 

He acknowledged doubts about the wisdom of relying too fully on 

" • the more complex and larger vehicles being developed toward 

land recovery" and asked for a "white paper" on the merits and shortcomings of land recovery. He also suggested a study of the feasibility 

of designing a capsule which could be retrieved in any of several 

different modes as individual mission circumstances dictated. Later 

that day Charyk added a requirement for a broader study of simplifying 

Gambit to provide "possible alternative modes of operation" including 

30 

sea recovery. 

Apart from Greer himself, at least one other senior officer in 

the West Coast establishment had given serious thought to the land 

recovery problem during the early summer of 1962. Colonel Paul 

H eran, director of the E-6 program (which was then entering its 

flight test phase and had begun to encounter problems in recovery 

techniques), had looked into land recovery options for his satellite 

and had concluded that while the technique was feasible for E-6 it 

was not particularly attractive. Charyk was familiar with this conclusion as well as with Greer's severally expressed reservations. 

On 30 July 1962, General Greer discussed the Corona-capsule idea 

with Colonel J. L. Martin, Charyk's principal staff officer for the 

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satellite program, in Washington. By the start of the following week 

he had received an advance report from GE, in Philadelphia. He 

promptly advised Martin and Charyk that a relatively minor modification to the Discoverer capsule would provide 1'a vastly simpler scheme 

for recovering record data on certain special projects. 11 He asked 

for authority to start GE on a full investigation and, if there were no 

technical obstacles, to buy and modify sufficient capsules for the 

31 

Gambit launches 0 

In the meantime, Greer had assigned to Colonel Riepe the task 

of responding to Dr. Charyk's formal query of 28 July. Riepe was 

cognizant of Corona, but the Gambit people who worked for him were 

not. Moreover, they were, like all good project people, convinced 

that their current approach was best. Thinking chiefly in terms of 

modifying the current Gambit capsule for air-catch recovery, as had 

been suggested--and dismissed as "impractical"--six months earlier, 

they displayed neither optimism nor enthusiasm. They pointed out 

that the current deceleration parachute was totally unsuited to an 

air-catch operation and that the capsule had been designed to sink if 

it carne down at sea. The heat shield was specifically designed for 

land impact, as was the basic structure of the recovery capsule itself. 

Moreover, the command and control system intended for Gambit was 

integrated with a capsule design built around the philosophy of small 

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dispersion errors; it would be unsuitable for a capsule susceptible 

to relatively wide dispersion. Then there were considerations 

involving facilities: negotiations for th9 I command and ~------' 

control station had been pressed (though with no particular success), 

and a start had been made toward the construction of buildings on the 

Wendover range, in Utah. 

On the other hand, more than 600 pounds of orbital weight 

could be chopped by going to an overwater recovery mode. The elimination of the land recovery requirement would also permit earlier 

testing with less risk, would reduce requirements for orbit adjust, 

and would (at least in theory) enhance the probability of recovering 

film, since over-water recovery techniques were by then well proven. 

Such reasoning was based on the little that Gambit people knew about 

the details of the Discoverer recovery vehicle. 32 

Some among General Greer's people believed that land recovery 

should be continued at almost any cost, considering its eventual 

adoption inevitable. In his summary study, forwarded to Charyk on 

4 August 1962, the general took the opposite view, noting that many of 

the original motives for developing a land recovery capsule had been 

invalidated by the passage of time. The enormous expense of maintaining a sea recovery force to back up air catch operations had been a 

point in favor of land recovery in 1960, when the first Discoverer 

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recoveries were successful, but with the refinement of air catch techniques the need for such elaborate surface forces had disappeared; air 

catch with limited ship and frogman backup had been well proven in the 

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previous several months. The danger of capsule capture, the probability I 

of loss, and the logistics of an air-catch technique had become less 

significant and techniques improved, while development of a land-recovery I 

capsule had underscored new problems: weight, complexity, reliability, I 

and performance penalties 0 In retrospect, the disabilities of land 

recovery seemed to have overtaken any earlier advantages. So, said 

General Greer, it was his conviction that the mobile air-sea recovery 

mode was "far simpler and has overwhelming operational advantages 

over fixed base recovery. ,,* He predicted that the continued evolution 

of guidance systems would further reduce logistic requirements and 

increas e accuracy, making multiple recovery feasible in the proce s s. 

(The general was also thinking in terms of a capsule suitable for use 

Such opinions were supported by extensive comparison tables which 

showed the air-sea techniques to be best on the basis of all possible 

cons ide rations 0 Land recovery showed up as the least promising 

technique, with island recovery next lowest. Among the factors 

considered in the study were all-night and all-weather operations, 

the dangers of dropping a capsule into a neutral country, requirements for precision, the status of several recovery techniques. the 

use of multiple capsules, the ability to conceal a recovery operation, 

and hazards to population. 

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in any of several recovery lTIodes--land. island. sea, and air-catch--

with fewer specialized requirelTIents than the contelTIporary landd . )33 recovery eSlgns. 

On 6 August, Captain Frank B. GorlTIan (USN). General Greer's 

plans chief, sUlTIlTIarized the status of various recovery techniques in 

a special presentation to Undersecretary Charyk. AllTIost silTIultaneously, General Greer was lTIulling over a problelTI of funding which 

bore directly on the newly pregnant question of continuing land recovery 

plans; he recolTIlTIended on 14 August that requests for $6.65 lTIillion 

in facilities funds for the Wendover range be withdrawn frolTI the fiscal 

1963 budget totals. concluding that they would be extrelTIely difficult 

to defend in the existent clilTIate. Ten days later. Colonel Riepe 

lTIade a separate presentation to Charyk on recovery lTIatters and at 

its conclusion received instructions to plan for initial systelTIs tests 

over the Pacific rather than over the Wendover range. The undersecretary also decided that developlTIent activities related to the 

original land-recovery capsule should be reduced to a lTIinilTIUlTI 

expenditure rate, accepting the probability of progralTI slippage if it 

34 

were later reinstated. Separately, Charyk authorized Greer to 

begin ilTIlTIediate developlTIent of a Corona-type recovery s ystelTI for 

35 

GalTIbit. planning on a June 1963 first flight date. 

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For two weeks following Charyk's 24 August decision, both 

the new and the old approaches to recovery were kept in being. In 

that interval, the undersecretary consulted with CIA members of 

the National Reconnaissance Organization. The situation was complicated by the fact that all matters involving use of the Corona capsule 

were in CIA custody; the agency maintained a jealous control of 

Corona security. opposing as a matter of policy all proposals for 

broadening the dissemination of information on the Corona recovery 

system. Although to many observers CIA I S caution seemed to verge 

on the psychotic, there was no denying that the use of the 1!Discoverer" 

capsule system in a non-CIA reconnaissance system would increase 

the chance of compromising Corona. Memories of the U-2 incident 

were too fresh to encourage any laxity. In 1962, the consequences 

of a disclosure that the "science oriented" Discoverer program had 

always been a CIA-sponsored reconnaissance scheme were too 

frightening to contemplate. The agency therefore insisted from the 

start that any provisions for using the Corona capsule configuration 

in Gambit had to begin with thorough protection of all aspects of Corona 

security. General Electric, which made the "bucket" for the CIA, 

agreed that use of the Corona equipment in connection with Gambit 

could easily jeopardize the four-year-old cover story unless some means 

could be concocted for concealing the origin of the capsule. 

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On 18 September, General Greer and Undersecretary Charyk 

met in Los Angeles to settle the main question. Charyk had by that 

time corne to the viewpoint that land recovery was a sophistication 

of reconnaissance techniques which, though highly desirable, might 

take another decade to perfect. He still felt that operational costs. 

system efficiency, and security would benefit from land recovery, 

but he agreed that it was not immediately essential or feasible. 

General Greer commented mildly that land recovery was a useful 

emergency capability, but one not necessary in the current situation. 

He added, as an aside, that he had never firmly believed that the land 

recovery mode would be used for the first Gambit. The need to 

recover was too compelling to risk the additional complications of 

an entirely new technique when a proven recovery system was readily 

available. 

Charyk capitulated, approving us e of the H- 30 (Corona) capsule 

on the first ten Gambit shots and withholding a decision on later 

launche s Q He authorized cancellation of current studies on precis e 

land recovery but added the proviso that Greer should undertake a 

study of modifying the H-30 for land recovery as an option to be 

cons idered after the first ten firings of Gambit. The approved plan, 

Negotiations for al Itrackin~ station site had to be terminated 

once the need for land recovery had dlsappeared. An amicable breakoff 

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then, involved adapting the original H-30 to the first ten Gambits 

and developing a mildly modified H-30, with a capacity for emergency 

36 

land recovery, for later use. 

General Electric suggested several possible ways to hide the 

fact that Corona equipment was being used in Gambit and on 18 September, the day of the actual decision to proceed along the Corona 

capsule route, CIA recommended adoption of one of these. To the 

Greer people on the West Coast, the GE-CIA recommendation seemed 

unduly complex; they proposed a compromise. On 28 September, 

CIA agreed. The final procedures (which were complex because they 

were designed to keep knowledge of Corona from the Gambit people 

who would be using the device) provided for design of the H-30 for 

Gambit within GElS Chestnut Street establishment and the performance 

of qualification tests at Valley Forge. All of the "white" components 

of discussions was complicated, unhappily. by one of those periodic 

lapses in communication that troubledce govrnment. The project 

office believed that conversations with through the State 

Department, had been discontinued in ugust. It later developed 

that several agencies involved in the affair had not been advised 

that the need for ~ Istation no longer existed. As a result, 

a formal agreement was very nearly signed before the kinetic energy 

of the original conversations could be harmlessl.y drained away. 

Final orders cancelling th~ I station proposal were 

issued on 20 September 192. A further refinement of Gambit station 

requirements, in February 1963, led to the abandonment of earlier 

plans for using the Annette Island site (in Alaskan waters) as a 

doppler radar tracking site. 

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would be made and tested at Chestnut Street and all "black" work 

conducted at Valley Forge. The purpose of the arrangement was 

to keep non-Corona people from learning that for more than three 

years the CIA-purchased Discoverer series of satellites had actually 

37 

been carrying reconnaissance devices. 

The effect of the transition from a land-recovery system. to 

the Corona recovery system included a slippage of at least one month 

in launch schedules. At that cost, the very troublesom.e weight 

difficulty that had earlier afflicted Gambit was eliminated, the complexity of the early design was materially reduced, and the requirement 

for a separate recovery force within the continental United States 

could be cancelled. 38 On the whole, it seemed a worthwhile exchange. 

Dr. Charyk was not entirely happy with the outcome. however. 

His reluctance to abandon land recovery as a Gambit objective almost 

certainl y stem.med from his original commitments to that mode during 

the Samos realignment period of 1960 and from the fact that the 

P resident and the National Security Council had been encouraged to 

expect a land-recovery system to become operational during 1963. 

Although he accepted the inevitability of the change. he never displayed 

any special fondnes s for the thought that the original Gambit concept 

had been modified. Greer, more pragmatic, was well pleased with 

the course events were taking. Not merely had the uncertainties of 

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Gambit film recovery been reduced by the change in recovery techniques, but it appeared that the whole of the Gambit system had been 

markedly simplified. 39 In the wake of E-5 and E-6 experience. 

simplicity was a virtue for which he had a marked respect. 

Prompted in part by hard questioning during a meeting with 

the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the "special group" of 

the National Security Council, Dr 0 Charyk in early October 1962 

q'.lestioned the adequacy of project-office-level management. Charyk 

characterized Gambit as "imperative" and urged that it be pressed 

with a "maximum sense of urgency, II noting that the "extreme political 

<_ sensitivity of any other method of obtaining such photography" made 

it es sential that "no reasonable steps should be omitted to guarantee 

its success at the earliest possible time. II Discouraged about the 

rate of Gambit progress Charyk specifically suggested to Greer the 

appointment of an extremely able project manager and the start of an 

exhaustive technical review to locate any problems remaining in the 

Gambit program. Resolution better than the two-foot requirement of 

1960 was desirable, he emphasized. He also cautioned that money was 

not unlimited and that greater management talent rather than more funds 

40 should be applied to the program. 

In all probability, the prevalence of over-runs, particularly 

at General Electric, the threat of new schedule slippages, and the 

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I increasing cost of the Gambit program prompted Charyk's sudden 

I outburst of concern for the validity and future of the development. 

Such factors certainly were at the heart of his indirect suggestion 

I that Colonel Riepe be relieved--a suggestion that he separately disI cussed with General Greer by telephone. Charyk. who had made 

efficient management his fetish at the time he acquired custody of 

I the satellite reconnais sance function, tended to ascribe most of 

I Gambit's contemporary difficulties to deficiencie s in management at 

the program office leveL He was particularly concerned at the 

I possibility of further schedule slippages since Gambit offered the 

I most promising approach to the task of discovering, at any given 

time, whether the Soviets were actively preparing their military 

I forces for use o 

I The coincidence of Charyk's anxiety with the start of the Cuban 

missile crisis of 1962 could scarcely be ignored; even though the 

I United " States did not have clear evidence that Soviet nuclear-warhead 

I missiles were being emplaced in Cuba until the second week of 

October, concern for that possibility had been mounting since the 

I previous Augusto Obviously, it would have been much easier to 

I deal effectively with a Soviet missile threat in Cuba if the administrahon had detailed information on the degree of Soviet preparation 

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for quick use of strategic striking forces. This, then, was a central I 

consideration in Charyk's desire to accelerate Gambit progress and 

to improve the quality of Gambit products 0 The prospect of program I 

dela y rather than acceleration, and of photogr aphic degradation rather I 

than improvement, certainly influenced him to suggest the assignment 

of a new program office chief. 41 I 

General Greer, who had to decide the fate of both the program I 

and its immediate manager, was scarcely indifferent to the circurnI stances that had moved Charyk to such a position. The E-6 program 

was in grave technical trouble in October 1962, having experienced I 

four failur es ln as many flight attempts. Nor was ther e available 

any convincing evidence on which to base a rebuttal of Charyk's stand. I 

Through a succession of misfortunes mostly originating in the pre-196l I 

Samos program, it had been necessary to cancel each of the major 

photo-oriented reconnaissance programs originally assigned to 

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SAFSP except E-6 and Gambit. And E-6 had taken on a distinctly I 

unhealthy cast. True, the most obvious defect in Gambit design had 

been eliminated with the decision to adopt air-catch recovery techniques I 

and the Corona recovery vehicle. But the prospect of program slippage I 

because of faulty attitude control development could not be banished 

and there was no ready means of insuring that the rather complex Gambit 

camera system would function with complete propriety during its early 

flight trials. 

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On 5 October, Greer told Charyk "with some reluctance" 

that the most certain way to strengthen Gambit management along 

the line s Charyk had indicated would be to transfer official custody 

of the program from SSD to SAFSP. * He reaffirmed his desire to 

keep Colonel Riepe in charge of Gambit development. Moving the 

program into SAFSP, he told Charyk, would give the development the 

benefit of prestige that adhered to any effort identified with the 

secretary's office, although it seemed possible that identification of 

Gambit with reconnais sance objectives might follow. In Greer's 

eyes, that was not a disqualifying handicap. He reminded the undersecretary that the United States had constantly maintained the basic 

legality of satellite reconnaissance under international law and that 

the nation had never denied either the existence or the employment 

of orbiting camera systems. The chief purpose of concealment now, 

he suggested, was to cloak the scope and operational success of such 

operations 0 That much could be done within SAFSP. The remote 

possibility that national policy might shift, in which case it would be 

difficult to continue any effort even indirectly associated with reconnaissance objectives, was the chief argument against moving Gambit. 

The desirability of shifting 206 into the SA FSP structure had been 

examined in some detail as early as July 1962. By October, Colonel 

J 0 Wo Ruebel, General Greer's special assistant, had worked out 

the basic details of the transfer plan later adopted and had composed 

a "rationale" for public consumption. 

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The general was not optimistic about the prospect of improving 

the quality of Gambit photography, at least in the first several flights. 

He told Charyk that the original definition requirement, two to three 

feet in resolution, would very probably be satisfied--though he observed 

that not all experts agreed with him on that score. The mirror was 

the critical item, being chiefly responsible for both distortion and 

light loss which reduced resolution. Greer cautioned that results 

from the first few flights might not bear out his conviction that Gambit 

would prove itself; past experience with "new" space vehicles (into 

which category the General Electric orbital control vehicle certainly 

fell) was not such as to encourage undiluted optimism, 

As for priorities and emphasis, General Greer noted separately 

that " ••• it is difficult to convince either contractors or military 

pers onnel involved in administration of this program that it enjoys 

any special priority or importance. The one infallible indicator of 

status--timely and adequate funding--is and had been consistently 

42 absent since the turn of the fiscal year. II 

Although General Greer had essentially reacted to Charykfs 

message of 3 October by defending the status quo, he thereafter 

set afoot major changes which. within 60 days, markedly altered 

both the configuration and the character of Gam bit. On 30 October 

he announced to members of the 206 program office that Colonel 

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William G. King was assuming management responsibility for their 

project and that Colonel Riepe had been detailed to a new and demand43 

ing SSD program. Four weeks later, Colonel Riepe was officially 

named director of Program 437. identified by Air Force headquarters 

as an extremely high priority project aimed at the early development 

of a useful satellite interceptor. 44 General Greer had earlier 

discussed SSD's need for an experienced space program manager with 

SSD's commander, Major General B. 1. Funk, and with Colonel Riepe's 

45 

knowledge had worked out a transfer arrangement. 

King, who had been intermittently associated with satellite 

reconnaissance for nearly 10 years, had special qualifications for 

the Gambit assignment. As Samos program director during 1959 and 

1960, he had been a participant in the bloody infighting that accompanied 

the Samos reorganizations. He had been one of the first to recognize 

the superiority of film recovery over readout techniques for Samos 

and had been notably outspoken in his support of recovery as a 

technique. Since cancellation of the E-5 program the previous winter, 

he had served mostly as a special plans officer for General Greer, 

conducting detailed studies and comparative analyses of the various 

systems proposed and in development, although he had also retained 

responsibility for the slow-paced Valley program, an early effort to 

develop a search system with 1. 5-foot resolution potential. 

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Admittedly, the Gambit program was a bit out of hand when 

King took it overo Riepe had reacted to Charyk's continued pressure 

for insuring a first flight success by creating an elaborate test 

regime which had substantially increased the cost and complexity 

of the development. There were indications that Charyk did not have 

a high regard for Riepe's ability; General Greer, who thought well 

of him. nevertheles s conceded that in his dedication to the as signment 

Riepe had tended to overelaborate the program and the program office. 

In the circumstances of October 1962, simplification of both seemed 

necessaryo King's job. then, was to devise and put into effect 

measures for re storing full confidence in program succes s .. -a 

commodity not always abundant that fall. 

Immediately after taking over the program, Colonel King 

discovered that the adaptation of the Corona capsule to Gambit uses 

had gone thoroughly off course. The situation had its origin in a 

series of basic misunderstandings complicated by a lack of knowledge 

in the program office and among GE and EK engineers 0 

Greer's original intent. confirmed by Charyk, was to "glue onll 

the Corona recovery vehicle. Elaborate or extensive modification of 

either the capsule or the orbital midstructure was neither intended nor 

desired o Because of the rigid compartmentation of programs. however, 

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only Colonel Riepe among the Gambit program office people had a 

reasonably full knowledge of the Corona program. Corona provided 

two years of carefully concealed experience with unpressurized 

operation. Reasonably enough. lacking any indication that unpressurized operation was possible, Gambit people concluded that pressurization of the film cass ette, a basic feature of Gambit, would have to 

be continued in the new recovery capsule. The chief difference between 

the two cassettes, once pressurization requirements had been sorted 

out, lay in the greater film width of Gambit, a factor that General 

Electric's engineers must certainly have taken into account in 

responding to Greer's July inquiry on the feasibility of converting 

Gambit to a Corona recovery vehicle. 

In the cours e of changing over from land recovery to air catch, 

the Gambit office had eventually authorized General Electric to 

develop a recovery vehicle essentially capable of accepting the 

original--pressurized--Gambit take-up cassette and film chute. 

Because the unit was substantially larger than the Corona cassettefilm chute package, General Electric had scaled up the Corona 

capsule, making it deeper and increasing its base diameter. Such 

changes presented the program office with what was neither a 

Corona nor a Gambit capsule, but something resembling the former 

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in external coniiguration while being nearer the latter in overall size 

and internal arrangeITlents. It was, for practical purposes, so significantly different froITl the original Discoverer capsule as to require 

proof testing. Colonel Riepe's inquiry about the procedures to follow 

in scheduling a drop test prograITl first brought the ITlatter of capsule 

configuration forcefull y to the attention of General Greer's iITlITlediate 

staff. Obviously there was no justification for drop-testing Corona 

capsules. There was a good case for the arguITlent that no need for 

such a ITlajor ITlodification of the Corona recovery capsule could be 

deITlonstrated, that pressurization--which was the cited justification 

for the ITlodification--was entirely unneces sary. 

As it happened, one of Kodak's senior people in the GaITlbit 

prograITl was aware of the fact that the requireITlent for pressurizing 

any part of an orbital CaITlera s ysteITl had long since been invalidated. 

F. C. E. Oder, deeply involved in the early Corona effort, had 

retired froITl the Air Force and joined EK. IITlbued with the security 

cons ciousness of the Corona activity and no longer active in that 

prograITl, he did not consider hiITlself entitled to pass his iniorITlation 

to fellow workers at Rochester. Major John Pietz (of Greer's staff) 

solved that difficulty by flying to the New York plant and briefing a 

select few EK people on Corona. Thereafter, EK could work on an 

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unpressurized cassette design with some confidence that it would not 

fail because of the lack of a pressurization feature. But by this time 

(mid-October 1962), GE was well along in the final design of a bigger 

Corona -style reentry vehicle. A full-scale mock-up had been built. 

substantial sums added to the contract totals, and an extensive test 

program planned. 

One of Colonel King's first moves after moving into Gambit 

management was to advise General Greer that he thought the design 

of the adapted capsule represented much more of a change than Greer 

had intended. Greer, who had ordered that changes to the Corona 

capsule should be minimal, was disconcerted. He forcefully endorsed 

Colonel King's suggestion that the original intent of the modification 

be reinstated and that the rapidly burgeoning General Electric 

development effort be stopped in its tracks. King met with key GE 

officials two days later and defined the objective of the capsule change 

in terms of General Greer's appreciation of the need. Cross-briefing 

of Gambit people on Corona, a continuation of the process earlier 

begun at Eastman Kodak, eliminated any excuse based on technical 

uncertainty. 

The episode apparently was partly the consequence of a semantic 

gap. Colonel Riepe and the 206 program office people considered that 

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the modifications General Electric proposed to make were "minor!! 

in the tenus of General Greer's original instructions. The problem 

was compounded by a general lack of Corona information among 

Gambit people, both in the program office and on contractor staffs 0 

If pressurization was either essential or highly desirable, a "big ' ! 

capsule was inevitable, and in the absence of knowledge to the contrary 

it was not illogical of Gambit program people to continue to believe 

in a need for pressurization. In Colonel King's view, the new GE 

version of the Corona capsule represented a sharp departure, a morethan-minor change. General Greer, it developed, agreed with King. 46 

The main is sue was finally disposed of early in December 1962. 

Stating his preferences plainly, General Greer told Colonel King: 

"The name of the game is to adopt it [the Corona capsule] for 206 

without introducing a change external or internal which will result 

in failure on the first try or otherwise prejudice its reliability. II 

King responded with the advice that he had imposed an "absolute minimum" 

change policy and that earlier changes in the external configuration had 

aris en from too strict interpretation of instructions that adoption of the 

Corona recovery system was to have a minimum effect on the payload. 47 

As it happened, the payload was the least risky element of the system, 

command and control representing the most difficult. 

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By that time, Colonel King had made it entirely clear to both 

GE and EK that system changes were to be minimal. Deviations from 

the original external configuration of the Corona capsule had to be 

cleared personally by King before approval. By all indications, the 

external changes would be slight. The general policy, King added, 

was to use flight-proven components wherever possible, keeping all 

change at a minimum but altering the details of payload configuration 

48 

as essential to the requirement for limiting external change. Early 

in November, while Colonel King was in the early stages of sorting 

out the technical complications of Gambit and subjecting them to a 

detailed analysis, General Greer reactivated the suggestion of transferring the entire 206 program to SAFSP. Answering earlier objections., 

he explained to Charyk that such a move did not imply "surfacing" the 

development and acknowledging its reconnaissance objectives, that the 

pa yload would remain covert and procurement "black." Moreover, 

the cover plan devised in SAFSP promised to perpetuate the legend 

that 206 ("Cue Ball") was in some way related to a bombs-in-orbit 

program. The explanation for transfer from SSD to SAFSP need not 

be either complex or particularly sophisticated; a straightforward 

statement that because of program priority it was being put under the 

direct control of the Secretary of the Air Force would satisfy those 

unknowing that covert programs were conducted within the Air Force. 

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Greer expected that others aware of the existence of clandestine 

activities would deelU it unthinkable to lUove a concealed reconnaissance progralU into a reconnaissance organization and would be lUore 

firlUly convinced than ever that 206 had SOlUe lUission other than 

satellite reconnaissance, 

"Children or half-wits, if they care, will lUost likely reason 

directly to the correct deduction, i. e., if it's assigned to SAFSP, it's 

reconnaissance. InaslUuch as we will do nothing to confirlU this, " 

cOlUlUented Greer, "and we will insure that SOlUe actions are apparently 

inconsistent with this hypothesis, I think there is a good chance of 

fooling--or at least confusing--the professional espionage agent, who 

is presulUabl y neither a child nor a half-wit. " 

There was another consideration, which General Greer did 

not specifically identify in his correspondence with Undersecretary 

Charyk but which certainly influenced his judglUent on transferring 

GalUbit to SAFSP. A DepartlUent of Defens e Directive--DOD Dir 

5200.13--originally published in March 1962 and revised later that 

year, had placed all lUilitary space progralUs in a "no publicity on 

payloads" and "special access, lUust-know" category. Individual 

access lists were to be lUaintained for each progralU and inforlUation 

on each progralU was to be confined to those having been granted a 

II specific need to know" recognition. RandolU nUlUbers were substituted 

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for the previously used popular names and launch announcements 

were restricted to a bare statement of the type of booster and the 

date of the operation. In those circumstances, it was no longer 

possible to identify a "Samos" payload solely from the fact of 

launch security; all military space launches were to be conducted 

under tight security provisions. Thus it was increasingly difficult 

to come by information about most Air Force space programs 

(though in point of fact, 5200.13 was rather casually administered 

within the fraternity of those having general access to classified 

information), and to a degree all cover stories had become somewhat 

49 redundant. 

The arguments were effective. By 20 November Charyk had 

concurred in the "desirability" of transferring 2,06 to SAFSP. \I1ajor 

General O. J. Ritland, who was then part of the Air Force Systems 

Command headquarters staff, * was called in to brief General Funk 

f . 50 on the realities 0 the situahon. 

That much out of the way, Greer and King set about changing 

the technical character of Gambit. Since the questionable stability 

of General Electric's orbital control vehicle currently was the most 

* In 1962, the Air Force Systems Command embarked on a determined 

campaign to return control of satellite reconnais sance to "normal" 

Air Force channels. "Loss" of Gambit repres ented a defeat in that 

campaign. Charyk later quashed the whole activity, but it experienced 

a brief revival after his departure in early 1963. 

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dubious aspect of the development, they conceived the idea of leaving 

the orbital vehicle attached to the Agena second stage through the 

whole of the first mission. The Agena, which had a generally reliable 

stabilization and control system but one consider ed insufficiently 

precise for Gambit operations, could stabilize the Gambit camera 

long enough to secure operating experience and proof of system feasibility. Gr eer and King, with memories of E- 5 and E-6 cancellations 

caused by on-orbit failures, were determined that the first Gambit 

flight should return at least ~ good picture. That achievement in 

the E-2, G-5, and E-6 projects might well have insured their continuance, at least temporarily. Greer was adamant that nothing of the 

sort would be said of Gambit. Charyk was not convinced that the !lone 

picutre above all" outlook was the correct one, but it seemed possible 

that he could be brought around. 

There was more to "hitchup, " as the notion of keeping the 

orbital control vehicle attached to the Agena was called, than met 

the unwitting eye. An elaboration of the scheme involved use of the 

roll-joint coupling invented for Lanyard. Should the orbital control 

vehicle prove generally unreliable, it might be possible to introduce 

the Lanyard roll joint between the Agena and the payload end of Gambit, 

eliminating r elianc e on the stability and control elements of General 

Electric I S orbital control vehicle. 

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On 29 Novem.ber. General Greer took the results of a prelim.inary analysis of the I'hitchup" and Ilroll joint" ideas to a m.eeting with 

Undersecretary Charyk. The undersecretary showed interest. On his 

return to Los Angeles, Greer drafted an authorization for continued 

study of these options and sent it to Washington for endorsem.ent. 

Later that day (30 Novem.ber) the second m.ajor change to Gam.bit in 

two m.onths was tentatively approved. 

The chief difficulty in the latest idea was devising a non-com.prom.ising m.eans of bringing the roll joint part of the technique into the 

Gam.bit program.. As was the case with the Corona reentry capsule, 

the roll joint was quite unknown to m.ost Gam.bit people and because of 

the security com.partm.entalization that existed within the reconnaissance program. structure it seem.ed highly unwise to disclos e the 

existence of Lanyard to large num.bers of Gam.bit workers. So IICharyk1sli 

m.essage of 30 Novem.ber. actually written by General Greer, contained 

the Iisugge sHon" that Greer contact Lockheed about the roll joint as 

II ••• he [Charyk] believes a sim.ilar idea was once proposed and 

possibly designed in connection with another space program.. " 

The kernel of the cover story here outlined was that Lockheed 

would be em.powered to "develop" the earlier "idea, II delivering 

finished roll joints to Gam.bit as though they were new Hem.s with no 

relationship to any other reconnaissance program.. The schem.e was 

51 

so sim.ple it seem.ed foolproof. 

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In his conversation with Dr. Charyk on 29 November, General 

Greer had promised that additional measures for insuring the success 

of the first Gambit flight would be proposed in the course of a fullscale program review on 14 December. On that date, he, Colonel King, 

several program people, and a team from Aerospace Corporation not 

only reviewed the program but proposed still another technical innovation. 

(Charyk had earlier approved a contract technique change which eased 

the financial pressure on the first six flight vehicles, agreeing that 

they could be purchased on a cost-plus -fixed-fee basis with the seventh 

and later Gambits being funded on an incentive fee basis 0) The latest 

change provided for incorporating "Life boat!1 provis ions in Gambit. 

"Lifeboat" was another technique originated in the Corona program; 

it involved the provision of independent reentry command circuitry 

(including a receiver), a separate magnetrometer, and its own stabilization-gas supply. All were independent of the main systems. If the 

primary reentry systems became inoperative for any reason, "Lifeboat" 

could be separately actuated. The magnetrometer used lines of 

magnetic force around the earth as a longitudinal stabilization 

reference, permitting the device to place the Agena (or any other 

suitably equipped orbital vehicle) in a proper attitude for the start of 

de-boost, relying entirely on its own gas supply for attitude control 

and a taped command sequence for the recovery process. In several 

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experiences with Corona vehicles, "Lifeboat" had proved highly reliable. 

On 19 December, the undersecretary formally authorized the 

"LifebGlat, " "hitchup, " and "roll joint" expedients for Gambit. "Lifeboat" 

was to be a permanent part of the total system, "hitchup" was to be 

incorporated in the first four vehicles (but a determination on use would 

be made on a flight- by-flight basis), while "roll joint" was to be 

developed "as a bona fide operational substitute for the OCV [orbital 

control vehicle] roll system." "Black" costs, all for the roll-joint, 

carne to $690, 000; "white" costs, covering Lifeboat, hitchup, and 

remaining roll-joint expenses, totaled $250, 000. 52 

At the time that these additions were made, General Greer 

approved a proposal by Colonel King to delete rather substantial 

portions of the elaborate test program earlier scheduled. There was 

no real alternative if the launch schedule, now specifying first flight 

in July, was to retain any validity. Both King and Greer were uncomfortably aware that reducing the number and scope of development 

tests was risky. They were also aware, however, that another contract 

overrun or a new schedule slippage represented an equally grave danger 

to long-term program stability. Experience--not always the best 

criterion, but in this instance the only one available--seemed to 

indicate that the simplest and most direct technical approaches worked 

best for reconnaissance satellites. Although it was possible that 

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pruning away tests might lead to the failure of some major component, 

the program innovations of September-December 1962 provided considerable insurance against a major catastrophe. Air-catch and use of 

the H-30 capsule overcame objections to the faults of the original 

Gambit recovery technique, and Lifeboat provided greater assurance 

of recovery success. Hitchup represented a feasible means of increasI 

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ing the probability that the camera system would have a chance to display I 

its abilities without succumbing to the frailties of an unproven stability 

and control system. Roll joint was a safeguard against the long-term 

unsuitability of the GE orbital control vehicle. On these counts, Gambit 

was a much more realistic program in late December 1962 than had 

53 

been the case four months earlier. 

Finally conceding that the most vital initial objective of Gambit 

was to return one good picture (Greer's frequently stated goal), Dr. 

Charyk nevertheles s insisted that all flights subs equent to the first 

had to be programmed to return useful pictures of pre-selected intelligence targets 0 He specifically rejected the concept of a step- by-step 

approach to an operational configuration through research and development improvements. His philosophy was the key to the reason for 

incorporating the roll joint development: * if it were necessary to rely 

Roll joint development, from a technical standpoint, presented no 

special difficulty. It existed, and worked, as part of Lanyard. But 

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on roll joint becaus e of the failure of the GE orbital control vehicle, 

the GE effort could be discontinued. Degradation of picture quality 

was a probable consequence, but the degree of degradation could not 

be accurately estimated in advance. Theory had it that the greater 

delicacy and precision of roll obtainable through the GE vehicle was 

essential to Gambit operation. The roll joint system could provide 

only 100 stereo pairs of pictures of selected targets during a single 

mission, about one-third to one-fourth of the current expectation for 

the GE vehicle, and one-sixth of the original requirement. Roll joint 

was designed to permit shooting at angles as great as 30-degrees from 

the vertical, with intermediate settings every five degrees. In late 

1962, Gambit experts were not optimistic about the prospect of 

compensating for smear and image-motion-compensation errors when 

roll joint was in use; in the event, more than a year later, experience 

getting it from the Lockheed Corona works to the Gambit assembly 

building was something of a problem. Contract authority originated 

in a change order to the existing Lanyard contract. The basic pattern 

devised to get the H-30 capsule from Corona to Gambit channels was 

adapted thereafter. Fabrication was !lin the white"; assembly, test, 

and qualification were "black" proces se s. Aerospace people were told 

only that Lockheed had proposed the roll joint to Greer somewhat 

earlier and that the firm was so well advanced in a hardware sense, 

because of such earlier work. Thus there would be no need to brief 

any new Aerospace people on Corona. Some Lockheed people would 

need Gambit briefings, but that was inescapable. Documents and 

correspondence relating to roll-joint origins would remain in Corona 

channels until delivered to SAFSP, at which point all reference s to the 

Lockheed organization and to Corona associations would be deleted from 

the documents, Thus "sanitized, " the paper could go into Gambit 

channels. Risk of compromising Corona was negligible. 

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was to show that they had been far too pessimistic about the stability 

capabilities of the Agena and too exacting in their requirements for 

54 

camera stability in Gambit. ) 

The first 19 Gambits would cost on the order of $300 million, 

of which roughly $183 million had been expended by December 1962. 

(Some $134 million more was budgeted against flight and operation 

55 

costs through June 1965.) In such a context, measures which would 

hold down costs were in order. There was no ignoring the need for 

program insurance applicable to several aspects of the total program. 

General Greer I s instructions to King in October had emphasized 

three critical goals: staying within the budget, staying on the schedule, 

and obtaining one good picture. The prospect that Lanyard could fill 

the role earlier reserved for Gambit was but one reason for discernible 

concern at the pos sibility that Gambit might be terminated if it 

encountered major difficulties. In the reconnaissance program, none 

of the ordinary reasons for avoiding program cancellation situations 

had much weight. No embarras sment could result becaus e news of a 

cancellation would be confined to a small circle of familiars. Neither 

the public nor Congres s would have occasion to carp at a program 

cancelled, a factor of some importance to the normal program management structure and one of the more important influences in continuing 

programs which in a totally rational world would probably have been 

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terminated. Either budget overruns or significant schedule slippages 

could degrade Gambit's prospects. 

By early January 1963, Colonel King had pared off $6.3 million 

in fiscal 1963 and $9.2 million in fiscal 1964 program fund requirements. 

(The total largely represented cuts in engineering work not essential to 

program success, the purchase of fewer spares, a reduction in the 

requirement for post-flight data reduction, tightened q~ality control, 

elimination of much documentation earlier called for, simplification 

of reentry vehicle tests, and a reduction, in qualification tests.) King 

proposed that program funding be further reduced by eliminating some 

of the work earlier scheduled, and suggested to General Greer several 

areas which seemed ripe for attention. Some $8.5 million additional 

might be gained by cancelling parallel efforts and alternative subsystem 

developments. 

Although Greer was attracted by the possibility of reducing 

program costs, he was reluctant to adopt all of the measures suggested 

by his new Gambit manager. Although agreeing that it was feasible to 

cut a rather extensive vendor reliability program ~Ito the minimum 

essential" and to employ an earlier scheduled ground test system in 

the flight program, he was extremely dubious about the wisdom of 

halting work on an alternate horizon sensor since there still was 

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some uncertainty about the utility of those then programmed. He 

expressed similar reservations about King's proposal to halt work 

on an alternate velocity meter. But in both instances, he told the 

colonel, if it appeared that funding the work into an indefinite future 

would cause invalidation of established budget ceilings, he would be 

. "II" "d h" d ." 57 qU1te W1 1ng to reconS1 er 1S eC1S10ns. 

The horizon sensor problem, then more than a year old, was being 

attacked from three directions. The EK infrared system which had 

earlier been funded because it seemed to offer an attractive alternative 

to GElS dual-scan sensor had not proceeded as well as hoped. By 

December 1962 it was clearly a high risk development which promised 

rather les s improvement over the GE system than earlier hoped. It 

was also, at that time, at a stage where major redesign seemed 

necessary if it was to satisfy original goals. Nevertheless, it still 

seemed to promise greater inherent accuracy than anything else available--if it could be perfected. The GE scan system was making 

satisfactory progress but in King's opinion would encounter both 

schedule slippages and overruns before 1963 ended. The third alternative, 

the Barnes system, promised to be lowest in cost and at least as good in 

performance as either of the others. King had urged Greer to approve 

cancellation of the EK progr am, continuation of the Barnes development 

and use of the Barnes scanner on the fourth and subsequent Gambit 

flights, and proposed to delay a decision on the GE program until the 

outcome could be more precisely estimated. General Greer agreed 

with the suggestion that the Barnes scanner be programmed for the 

fourth and subsequent Gambits but did not favor cancelling the EK effort 

for at leas t another month (after February) and felt that the GE system 

should continue to receive support. The uncertainty was not finally 

eliminated until September 1964, when Colonel King again urged adoption 

of the Barnes sensor. By that date both the GE and EK versions had 

proved their utility, but each was more costly and neither was better 

than the Barnes sensor. The Barnes model had other advantages; it was 

lighter, simpler, had the lowest power requirements, and operated over 

the widest temperature range of the three. After discussing the situation 

with Colonel King in some detail, General Greer agreed to such an 

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Unexpected funds probleITls rose to plague GaITlbit shortly 

after the question of what to cut and how deeply had apparently been 

resolved. In reviewing his budget, Colonel King discovered that 

the Agena cost estiITlates given to Dr. Charyk in DeceITlber "were 

grossly low. If * The total of costs for the ITlodified prograITl would 

be about $1. 49 ITlillion higher than planned. chiefly because of 

configuration differences which had not been adequately weighed in 

costing the adoption of Agena vehicles based on the Discoverer 

prograITl. Because of the earlier budget overhaul, however, the 

deficiency was substantially less of a probleITl than it ITlight otherwise 

58 have been. 

assessITlent. On 17 SepteITlber 1964. then. King notified GE that 

Barnes sensors would be furnished by the governITlent for installation in the GaITlbit vehicle. A key factor in the decision was the 

ability of the Barnes sensor to function effectively in a winter 

environITlent. a feature which neither the EK nor GE ITlodels could 

satisfactorily deITlonstrate. 56 

* Italics in original correspondence. 

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Funding difficulties were scarcely unique in satellite reconnaissance. There were times, however, when Gambit seemed to 

have its own special affinity for such difficulty. Colonel-King 

remarked at one point, early in 1963, that the program had been 

stigmatized as a high cost development and GE as a high cost 

producer--and that both characterizations might be justified. He 

told General Greer, lilt is my feeling that we may have outlined a 

program to the contractor that is inherently expensive; our scheme 

of managing, reviewing, and presumably safeguarding a high degree 

of success is a big order to be swallowed. Certainly it isn't the 

cheapest way of doing all things. We may have built such a super 

59 

foundation that we cannot afford the remainder of the structure. " 

Yet despite such obstacles, which were both very real and 

very important, Gambit continued pretty much on schedule. In late 

1962 the main uncertainties which affected expectations of operational 

success concerned the vehicle stability and film recovery aspects of 

the program. Those areas received greatest attention, through conversion to the Corona capsule. adoption of hitchup, roll joint. and 

lifeboat options, and the concentration of effort on horizon scanner 

development. In other respects, the program was doing quite well. 

The camera, in particular, seemed to be corning along nicely. Even 

before the stability expedients were adopted, camera operating tests 

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had demonstrated an equivalent 2.. 7-foot ground resolution at better 

than 115 lines per millimeter. The only problem that appeared to 

offer any particular difficulty was the motor speed drive, and it was 

far from insurmountable. A mirror mounting problem, that had 

earlier given trouble (and which was similar to a problem then 

60 

holding up Lanyard). had been essentially solved by November 1962.. 

One additional change in the basic configuration of Gambit was 

recommended in January 1963 and approved for adoption on 2.8 February. 

This was a stellar-index camera, earlier treated as "purely an 

auxiliary package" but now considered quite important. The National 

Photographic Interpretation Center made the original recommendation. 

CIA IS Herbert Scoville endorsed it, and Charyk approved its inclusion. 

The camera itself was to be that developed for the Corona-Mural. 

Because of procurement and installation delays arising from the 

advanced stage of completion of the first lot of Gambit payloads, the 

fourth Gambit was the first which could be scheduled to incorporate 

a stellar-index system. Each installation would cost about $12.5.000. 61 

By virtue of circumstances, the fourth Gambit vehicle became 

the first in what was essentially a re-modified configuration. Hitchup 

capability was provided in all of the first six, but Lifeboat was an 

Agena installation in the first three, being shifted to the GE vehicle 

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thereafter, and roll-joint capability was scheduled to be incorporated 

starting with the fourth system--as was the stellar-index camera. 

Earl y in March, funds for a total of 10 Gambits were provided (on! y 

six were then financed) and that month the earlier requirement for 

19 was reconfirmed (but not completely financed) and an additional 

six Gambits were authorized to provide a quick-reaction and standby 

b OlO 62 capa 1 lty. 

The standby requirement had appeared rather suddenly, in 

mid-March 1963, although its origin could readily be traced to the 

Cuban Crisis of the previous October. The Gambit schedule in effect 

since early program approval had envisaged one launch every 40 days Q 

By March 1963, the several high level agencies that maneuvered 

national polic y in accordance with intelligence inputs had concluded 

that provisions should be made for launching a second Gambit in the 

event any primary mission was not successful. Second, the intelligence 

community saw a need for an emergency crisis reaction capability for 

the rapid launch of reconnais sance satellites. Once the basic need 

had been defined, what remained was a series of unanswered questions 

concerning potential: how much notice was required, what additional 

facilities would have to be built, would additional vehicles be needed, 

were there options on launch systems? 

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Colonel King's office responded to the original query of 

12 March 1963 with the inforITlation that a backup capability could 

be provided by May 1964, that at least three and preferably four 

additional launch pads at Vandenberg would have to be ITlodified to 

accept the GaITlbit-configured Agena, and that additional orbital 

vehicles were the critical iteITls froITl a tiITle standpoint. The answer 

was sufficiently cOITlprehensive to perITlit the issuance of the 27 March 

order for six additional GaITlbits. (Authorizations for pad ITlodification, 

which were included with the procureITlent approval, involved changing 

at least two launch pads to a dual configuration capable of accepting 

either thrust-augITlented Thor-Agenas or Atlas-Agenas in a GaITlbit 

configuration.) The end objective of this prograITl expansion was to 

satisfy plans for "a ITliniITluITl intelligence cycle capability for coverage 

of the very highest priority special tasks, including only sufficient 

orbital duration to achieve the specific coverage ••. " Resolution 

at the level of the GaITlbit systeITl, and in stereo, was desired. The 

probleITl, General Greer learned. " ••• is not to locate targets. but 

to inspect in detail activities at selected known targets. (I 

Further cOITlplications of the already cOITlplex probleITl thus 

outlined lay in a subsequent directive to study the us e of tandeITl 

recovery capsules in GaITlbit to perITlit early recovery of a portion 

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of the film while continuing the remainder in orbit until it was specifically needed. Corona was on the way to that configuration in 1963. 

By early May, study of the problems of supplementary launch, 

standby, and quick reaction had been sufficient to show that a high 

launch rate could be maintained by keeping at least three pads in a 

Gambit configuration and by building up a modest stockpile of boosters 

and Gambit systems. The chief difficulties lay in procurement, since 

the only way to accumulate spares was to accelerate production rates 

or to reduce the frequency of launches. Either promised to be costly. 

There was some indication that fundamental changes in the Gambit 

program might ultimately be needed, including provision for both 

multiple recoveries and for an Atlantic Ocean recovery force. 

Although the basic actions needed to provide a standby capability had been approved early in March, it was not until May that a 

pers~stent uncertainty over funding arrangements was eliminated. 

In some degree, the difficulty arose because Pentagon officials did 

not fully appreciate the intricacies of contract negotiations, particularly when they involved a manufacturer (General Electric) who 

apparently felt that the need for continued production was sufficiently 

great to elicit particularly generous terms. In order to keep the 

contractor responsive, General Greer had broken Gambit into blocks; 

General Electric was not aware of the total programmed and Greer 

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did not propose to give the firm such information until the unit price 

became reasonable. Nevertheless. in order to maintain the required 

rate of production, Greer had to have in his funding reserve sufficient 

money to finance the complete approved production order. To 

accountants who looked at the General Electric situation without 

knowing these facts, it appeared that Greer's organization had a 

comfortable reserve of uncommitted money. In actuality, what seemed 

to be a "reserve" was required for technical contingencies and for 

satisfying vehicle requirements not yet formally on contract. Once 

thes e facts were made sufficiently plain, the funding difficulty began 

to d ' .. h 64 

lmlnlS • 

Another pending uncertainty, involving the possibility of tandem 

recovery vehicles for Gambit, remained unsettled. The notion seemed 

feasible if certain rather substantial changes were made in the Gambit 

system and if a degree of photograph degradation were acceptable in 

the case of systems "stored in orbit" for considerable periods. But 

the cost was a bit high, reaching $9.1 million for development and 

$3 0 65 million for each vehicle. In general configuration, the proposed 

Gambit tandem system rather closely resembled a similar design 

evolved for SPAS-63 ("Spartan"), a Lanyard-category variant of the 

recently cancelled E-6. * None of its elements were technically 

See Chapter IX. 

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unrealistic. though reliability might be low. In any event, General 

Greer's judgment was that nothing serious should be attempted in the 

matter of tandem-configuration Gambits until the original system had 

65 been well proven. 

By the time such matters had been resolved, attention was 

turning toward the impending first launch of Gambit. Booster-payload 

assembly had begun in February. after some delay because of the 

late arrival of prime components and the need to incorporate hitchup 

provisions. In order to protect schedules. Colonel King had agreed 

that it would be permissible to put the missing components into the 

total system during functional testing. 

The command decoder had to be modified late in January 1963 

to eliminate a conflict between command reception and execution. 

Subsequently. system tests disclosed the existence of some electromagnetic interference problems not previousl y suspected. but fixes 

proved possible without delaying the test program appreciably. The 

Agena for flight number one passed final acceptance tests at Sunnyvale 

on 21 March, slightly later than desired but still within the boundaries 

of the desired launch timing schedule. Early in April. Eastman Kodak 

located and corrected three sources of focus error in the camera system 

and later that month static tests of the assembled system showed 

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resolution superior to that required of the Gambit system. (The focus 

problem was not critical for the first flight since it was used only 

during a roll maneuver, and hitchup was to be employed throughout 

the period of camera operation on the maiden flight.) All seemed to 

66 

be going rather well. 

Then, during the late afternoon of II May, a faulty valve in 

combination with a deficient fuel loading sequence caused a loss of 

internal pressure in Atlas 190D, that being used in checking out 

procedures for the first Gambit flight. The booster collapsed on 

its stand, dumping both the GE orbital vehicle and the Agena on the 

concrete hardstand. The GE vehicle was severely damaged, the 

Agena to a lesser degree. Surprisingly, there was neither explosion 

nor fire, although 13, 000 gallons of liquid oxygen and a full load of 

fuel sloshed over the stand and the nearby terrain. Equally fortunate, 

the payload did not split open, so there was no compromise of Gambit 

security. But the camera system was rendered permanently useless, 

a large part of the optics being demolished, and the recovery vehicle 

was so battered that further use seemed imprudent. Neither the 

camera nor the orbital vehicle was that scheduled for the first Gambit 

test; the Agena, however, was supposed to be used in that launch. 

Through a quick scavenging operation the program office 

secured an Agena to replace that damaged in the accident, using 

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considerable overtiITle work to adapt the space booster to hitchup. " 

But hope for ITleeting the 27 June launch date lessened as the degree 

67 

of launch stand and vehicle daITlage was as ses sed. There was a 

possibility of further delay in a requireITlent froITl the undersecretary's 

office that the Agena and Atlas for the first GaITlbit shot be subjected 

to the saITle sort of "tiger teaITl" pre-flight check that had resulted 

in a perfect booster operation record during E-6 launches the previous 

year. Both through SSD channels and in his own right, General Greer 

set up special review procedures to insure the basic reliability of the 

booster eleITlents, assuring McMillan in ITlid-June that every conceivable ITleans of assuring reliable operation had been eITlployed. No 

68 

prograITl delay resulted. 

While boosters were attracting attention, final checks of the 

orbital control vehicle on a vibration stand uncovered subsysteITl 

faults which incapacitated the cOITlITland prograITlITler. Fixes and a 

* Agena daITlage proved to be less than originally estiITlated. Underseer etary Brockway McMillan, who had replaced Charyk in that post 

in March 1963, initially directed that the repaired vehicle not be used 

in the early GaITlbit prograITl but General Greer subsequently urged 

its reinstateITlent. He reported that exhaustive tests had disclosed 

alITlost no harITl to the vehicle and that having been subjected to even 

ITlore thorough checks than ITlost Agenas it was qualified for its 

intended use. McMillan accepted the recoITlITlendation. The Agena 

in question was nUlllbered 47010 

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re-test required two weeks, setting the launch date back to 10 July. 

As it happened, some delay was by then inevitable, the Agena modification to a hitchup mode having taken sever al days longe r than 

predicted and pad repairs having continued until 22 May--which left 

too little time for a complete pre-flight checkout before the original 

27 June launch deadline. 69 

One other set of developments had been continuing parallel 

to the technical aspects of launch preparation. These involved 

security and deception. For several months the process of closing 

off all avenues to information on the true mission of Gambit had 

been accelerating, not because the dense blanket of security and 

misdirection surrounding the project had ever been thinned in any 

degree, but because the extension of project activity to the launch 

complex at Vandenberg and the prospect of a recovery operation 

required a number of out-in-the-open arrangements and some measure 

of physical exposure. The CIA. for instance, was expressing uncommon 

concern about the pos sibility that the Gambit employment of Coronaoriginated devices had "caused greater deterioration to Corona 

security than was anticipated. II CIA had always been extremely 

sensitive to any threat of Corona exposure, however slight it seemed; 

the Gambit episode appeared to attract even more attention on that 

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score than usual. It was the CIA's position that all possible alternatives should be attempted before resorting to the practice of briefing 

70 

more people on Corona. To a lesser extent. Greer's organization 

operated on the same premise. acting in January 1963--for instance--

to change payload analysis procedures so that no test controllers at 

Sunnyvale would have to be made cognizant of Gambit's actual 

71 

functions 0 But a great deal of observation and a fair amount of 

quiet inquiry had confirmed General Greer's assumption that most 

minor participants in launch and orbit control operations merely 

performed their assigned duties without even wondering why. The 

flight controllers. for instance. were largely content to monitor 

their mete rs and take their required readings without asking whether 

the incoming telemetry originated in a camera subsystem or a betaray sensor. 

Special provisions had been made at Vandenberg to cordon 

off the Gambit areas in the missile assembly building from other 

projects that shared the facility. Then the E-6 people. for instance. 

were told that "your program is extremely sensitive, " and that they 

were not to let the 206 people get a glimpse of their payload. The 

gambit worked marvelously, convincing the E-6 workers that 206 

was much les3 sensitive than their own effort. 

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Other people at Vandenberg who had enough experience with 

either overt or covert reconnaissance programs to be suspicious 

of Gambit apparently concluded that 206 couldn't involve reconnaissance because other efforts. such as Corona and Lanyard. were 

fully satisfying all needs. There was also a general impression among 

the photographic fraternity aware of Corona and the E-5, E-6 programs 

that it was not technically feasible to stuff a big camera-film package 

72 into a vehicle dependent on a Discoverer-size recovery capsule. 

There were significant indications that the original misdirection 

of 206 program documents had been spectacularly effective. High-level 

officers who were briefed on Gambit during the early months of 1963 

generally confessed complete ignorance about the character of the 

payload (concurrently disclosing a most interesting lack of curiosity) 

or admitted to a belief that it involved precise de-orbiting of some 

73 

sort of nuclear weapon. There was no pertinent press speculation 

whatever. 

One of the problems peculiar to pretending that Gambit was a 

non-camera project was that a certain number of Eastman Kodak 

people had to be at the launch stand during final checkout. The 

problem decreased appreciably when Lieutenant Colonel John Pietz 

and Colonel J. W. Ruebel ran a careful study of needs and discovered 

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that no more than four or five camera specialists were actually needed. 

In dress rehearsals for the first launch, they were literally smuggled 

into the launch area in the back of an unmarked van. The practice 

was dropped, however, when the driver wrecked the empty truck 

while returning from one delivery run. Thereafter the needed specialists entered the launch zone as inconspicuously as possible, but using 

74 

more conventional means of transport. 

There was some concern for the mode of getting recovered 

film from the mid-Pacific drop zone to the Eastman processing 

facility at Rochester, chiefly because it seemed possible that a clever 

agent could trace back along the capsule's route and identify both the 

facility and the fact that film was the payload. But a succession of 

package transfers, arrangements for which were made immediately 

before the first launch, eliminated most worry. 75 

Apart from such precautions, which were not at all unusual 

in other satellite reconnaissance programs and which were routine 

in the case of Corona, the Gambit operation involved one deception 

that was unique. Colonels Ruebel and Pietz, Major David Bradburn, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Ralph J. Ford were responsible for an elaborate 

scheme of misdirection that would have qualified for a good spy noveL 

It revolved around a wooden box of irregular shape which measured 

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about 12 by 3 by 3 feet. The box--which actually contained three 

50-gallon druIns filled with water and a set of storage batteries--

included several hatches and inspection plates, each secured by 

heavy hasps and cOInbination padlocks. Under one of the plates was 

an iInpres sive instruInent panel, cOInplete with blinking lights and 

flickering voltage gauges. It was a very iInposing Quaker gun. 

The container, painted white and proIninently Inarked with 

the well-known corporate sYInbol of Space Technology Laboratories, 

was for official purposes designated an "EnvironInental Shipping 

Containerff--ESC for the purpose of what had to seeIn routine governInent correspondence. * 

The ESC was the basic subject of an elaborate set of pre-written 

Inessages to be exchanged between SSD, the launch base at Vandenberg, 

and several contractor establishInents. Designed to provide "tangible 

evidence" that SOIne governInent agency other than the Air Force was 

participating in the "206 PrograIn, " the Inessages were also intended 

to proInote confusion and uncertainty aInong "those unwitting and 

peripheral people" who were aware of or involved in the 206 activity. 

A reasonably astute reader with access to a few of the Inessages 

* To Iny Inind, the "ESC" nOInenclature was the stroke of brilliance 

that Inade this preposterously funny bluff so effective. No selfrespecting adIninistrator in all of the Air Force could avoid believing 

in sOInething so classically bureaucratic in title. R.P. 

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could not but conclude that the 206 payload was sOITlething delivered 

to and ITlaintained by STL iITlITlediately before a scheduled launch. 

By all appearances. each such payload was delivered to the launch 

site by truck and there installed in the flight vehicle for launch into 

orbit. 

Because of the severe restrictions iITlposed on the pre-launch 

handling of the payload (ran the legend). no payload checkout was 

perITlitted at the launch site other than norITlal countdown checks during 

pre-launch. Too perfect security would negate the des ired iITlpres sion, 

so a policy of "calculated ineptitude" was adopted which, it was hoped p 

would expose knowledge of the !lESC" payload to as large an audience 

as possible while still retaining credibility. 

Sixteen ITles sages were involved in the general deception package. 

One called for a ITleeting between launch base people and the "payload 

responsible organization" at SSD to discuss payload probleITls. Another 

cancelled the ITleeting and called for destruction of the first ITlessage. 

A third, froITl Vandenberg, protested against the lack of a pre-launch 

checkout and asked for a definition of lIESC o " The reply confirITled 

that no pre-launch payload check would be permitted and called for 

the assignITlent of a representative of the test wing who would be 

instructed in the "operation of the ESC. II Others raised questions 

concerning the ITliniITluITl pre-launch delivery tiITle needs of the 

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contractor, the test wing, and the "other government agency. II The 

general tenor was that something enclosed in the "environmental 

shipping container" had to be closely monitored, carefully watched, 

and handled very, very gently. 

On 3 July (eight days before the scheduled launch) an unmarked 

truck entered Vandenberg. The driver, who exhibited considerable 

uncertainty about his final destination, eventually was routed to the 

Lockheed receiving area where a "puzzled" Air Force officer opened 

one of the shackled hatches of the white-painted crate, briefly disclosed to several nearby personnel an array of blinking lights and 

pulsing dials, and hastily directed the driver to the General Electric 

receiving area. There were subsequent meetings between 206 people 

and the local security officers over the "lapse" in security, all 

designed to encourage speculation about the peculiar nature of the 

ESC's contents. At one point the deception proved so successful that 

it evoked an unplanned inquiry from the Strategic Air Command--which 

wanted assurances that the "payload" did not contain any nuclear 

devices to be placed in orbit without due regard for various national 

76 

laws and international agreements. 

In the aftermath of the July 1963 Gambit 1aunch--and those 

which followed it that year--it became clear that the extremely tight 

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security which had corne to surround all military space launches 

tended to limit the effect of a very ingenious deception scheme. 

theory at least, the purpose of such a deception was to convince 

In 

Soviet intelligence that the 206 payload was not a camera. The ESC 

maneuver could have that effect only if one of the witnesses to the 

transaction happened to be an agent or if some of the witnesses 

mentioned the event and its implications to an agent. By extention, 

an American agent serving as part of a Soviet espionage net could 

use the event or certain of the classified messages exchanged during 

preliminaries as evidence that something presumably radioactive 

had been orbited in the 206 vehicle. It was conceivable that a 

Russian agent could be let into the periphery of the security process 

and fed just enough selected information to mislead him. But nothing 

of the sort seems to have happened. Instead, a handful of people who 

had been forcefull y indoctrinated with security consciousness were 

exposed to the ESC deception and were so impressed with the sensiti vity of the information they had "accidentall y" acquired that they 

would discuss it only with similarly cleared fellow witnesses. As 

for the outside world, the only information generally available would 

indicate that another Atlas-Agena had been launched. The presumption 

that an Atlas-Agena launched from the vicinity of Vandenberg carried 

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a "Samos" payload was common to journalists and to interested 

members of the aerospace disciplines. Whether the ESC prank 

succeeded and was useful was something only the CIA could judge, 

and the CIA did not say. 

Los Angeles was experiencing one of its recurring sieges 

of "unusual" warm weather during the early afternoon of 12 July 1963. 

From General Greer's office on the fourth floor of the six-story 

building that housed the Air Force space program organization, the 

mountains around the basin seemed no more than slightly solid 

chunks of the prevailing smog. It was an uncommonly quiet Friday 

afternoon. Most of the fourth floor offices were empty of officers 

and senior civilians. General Greer's secretary, and Colonel King's, 

turned away visitors and telephone inquiries with politely vague 

phrases: "the general is on TDY, " or lithe colonel is out of the 

complex this afternoon." The double doors at the east end of the main 

hallway on the fourth floor were closed and latched, which was somewhat unusual, if not unprecedented. Behind them, in a small conference 

room equipped with a speaker system, project people who could not get 

to Vandenberg listened intently to the piped-in verbal traffic of launch 

controllers on the site. 

Shortly after two o'clock the gathering broke up. Lieutenant 

Colonel Ralph Ford, responsible for much of the "ECS" deception 

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that shrouded the purpose of the first GaITlbit launch froITl observers, 

opened the electrically secured door to his office to reSUITle his 

afternoon routine and found an occasional visitor punching vigorously 

at his secretary's typewriter. The visitor, a sOITletiITle historian, 

asked in a carefully casual voice, tfHow'd it go? tf 

He got a quick grin and the answer, "It's ofL It looks good. 

Real good. " 

At that ITloITlent, 22 ITlonths and 17 days after the National 

Security Council decision to proceed with developITlent of a "covert" 

alternative to SaITlos. a new phase in satellite reconnaissance was 

beginning. The first GaITlbit had lifted into orbit at 1344 hours, 

Pacific Daylight TiITle, on 12 July 1963. 

Many of the GaITlbit prograITl office people had ITlanaged to 

get to Vandenberg to watch the launch. General Greer and Colonel 

King were at the Satellite Control Facility, at Sunnyvale, watching 

the launch on reITlote television and listening to the countdown. Earlier 

in the day the launch crew had notified Greer that during the final 

checkout they had uncovered a fault in the Atlas booster that would 

either force delay or cause reliance on a cOITlponent not tested to the 

extent required by specifications. Shouldering aside the oppres sive 

ITleITlory of unbroken failures and "partial successes" in the E-5 and 

E-6 programs, Greer ordered continuation of the countdown. It was 

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a personal decision, taken without consultation with others, based 

as rrluch on instinct as on the confidence of a prograrrl director who 

had done all that could be done to insure success. For an instant 

during the launch itself. rrlost observers experienced the horrified 

conviction that the decision had been wrong. that disaster had COrrle 

again to the Air Force satellite reconnaissance prograrrlo The splashing rocket exhaust of the Atlas knocked out all electrical connections 

to telerrletry and carrleras, giving the irrlpression of a rrlajor launch 

stand explosion to observers at Sunnyvale and El Segundo. But 

seconds later the signals began to COrrle through again, and they 

said that the Atlas was clirrlbing stolidly toward its selected launch 

window. 

Clirrlbout. separation, and orbital injection occurred as planned. 

Then for 90 rrlinutes the tense group in the control center had to wait 

until the satellite cOrrlpleted its first orbital pass and the cOrrlputers 

could report precise epherrleris and attitude data. Only then could 

there be cOrrlplete assurance that the first Garrlbit was actually in its 

intended orbit and that the delicate and cOrrlplex stabilization equiprrlent 

was perforrrling its assignrrlent. And after that, another five orbits 

before the Garrlbit payload. that cOrrlplex of optics, electronics, and 

rrlechanical devices conceived rrlore than three years earlier, carrle 

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to life. And then another nine passes before a recovery attempt 

could be made. and still another wait for information that the 

capsule had re-entered, had survived its passage through the upper 

atmosphere, had been arrested in its descent by parachutes, and 

had been recovered. Even if all possible combinations of failure 

during orbit. re-entry, and recovery stages were avoided, there 

remained the ultimate uncertainty: what about pictures? 

Both the Atlas and the Agena operated normally, apogee 

being 116 nautical miles and perigee 1070 When excess propellants 

were dumped from the Agena the reactive force caused an unprogrammed 

series of vehicle motions that used up considerable portions of the 

Agena's control gas supply, but enough remained for Agena stabilization during nine orbits 0 

On the fifth orbital revolution. command controllers turned on 

the camera for eight strip exposures of 20 seconds each, commanding 

an identical maneuver on each of the next two orbits. On orbits 

eight and nine. two stereo pairs and five 20-s econd strips were 

exposed--after which the premature exhaustion of Agena stabilization 

gas forced discontinuance of camera operations. 

With the depletion of Agena control gas. the Life boat became 

the only means of recovering the film capsule. The Gambit-Agena 

coasted through eight uncontrolled orbits after stabilization gas 

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finally was exhausted during orbit nine, ground control activated 

the "Lifeboat" circuitry during the 17th pass, and on orbit 18 an 

"execute" signal frolTI the ground station went to "Lifeboat. II Routine 

separation and recovery followed. There was no dralTIa. And 

nobody lTIinded. 

After the reentry capsule had been safely retrieved by C-1l9 

aircraft circling near Hawaii, the Orbital Control Vehicle was 

separated frolTI the Agena for IIs0101l tests of various operations. 

It lTIaintained stability through orbit 25 and was successfully restarted 

again on orbit 34, after a period of inactivation. Thereafter spurious 

cOlTIlTIands caus ed instability. Greer's expectation of the unpredictable had proved reasonable: not only had the orbital control vehicle IS 

lTIistrusted stabilization systelTI been affected by spurious cOlTIlTIands, 

but the perforlTIance of the IIreliable" Agena had been unexpectedly 

degraded when engine propellants were routinely dUlTIped. In the 

end, the successful operations of "Lifeboat" and "BUSS" (the backup 

stabilization systelTI) had been essential to the success of the initial 

lTIission. 

Evaluation of the recovered fillTI indicated an out of focus 

condition apparently caused by uncolTIpensated telTIperature changes 

that affected the face of the prilTIary lTIirror and by faulty ilTIage lTIotion 

cOlTIpensation settings. Nevertheless, best resolution on the 74 exposed 

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frames (and nine stereo pairs) was on the order of 3.5 feet; 5-foot 

ground resolution occurred on several stretches of the 198 feet of 

exposed film, and average res olution was about 10 feet. With all, 

it was the best photographic return ever obtained from a reconnaissance 

satellite, "best!! resolution being better than anything previously 

77 

obtained by a factor of four to five. 

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NOTES ON SOURCES 

Notes by A. H. Katz, Rand Corp, 7 Ju1 60, on meeting with 

STL representatives. in Rand (Katz) files. 

TWX TEC 648/002, K. G. MacLish, EK, to BMD, 20 Dec 60; 

notes by BGen R. E. Greer, DirlSAFSP, attached, in SP-3 

"G" file s • 

Rpt, "Presentation on G, II June 61, prep by SAFSP for SAFUS, 

in SAFSS files, Gambit; interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, 

DirlSP, by R. L. Perry, 23 Jan 64. 

TWX AFDSD-MS-83304, Dcs/D USAF to Hq AFSC, 5 Ju1 61, 

in SP-3 files, "G"; memo, J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to cis 

USAF, 8 Aug 61, subj: Atlas Boosters for Support of Space 

Projects, in SAFSS files, Gambit; Charyk also sent a 

23 Jun 61 memo to the cis ordering the Agena procurement 

but it did not appear to have found its way to the Gambit files. 

TWX SAFMS-M-1163, SAF-MS to SAFSP (Maj John Pietz), 

11 Aug 61; memo, MajH.H. Howard, SAF-MS, toMaj J. Sides, 

10 Aug 61, no subj; TWX SAFMS-M-1162, SAFMS to Pietz, 

11 Aug 61; TWX SSZA 11-8-349, SSD to AFSC, 12 Aug 61; Ur, 

MajGen J. R. Ho1zapp1e, Asst DCS/S&L, to SAF-RD, 21 Aug 61, 

subj: Boosters for Support of Space Projects. 

TWX AFCVC 64852, Gen F.A. Smith, vc/s USAF, to Gen 

B. A. Schriever, Cmdr, AFSC, 25 Sep 61, in SAFSS files, 

Gambit. 

TWX SCGN 26-9-50, Col R. Nudenberg, Dir ISpace Progms, 

AFSC, to SSD, 26 Sep 61; TWXs SAFSP-F-19-9-l114, SAFSP 

to SAF-MS, 19 Sep 61, SAFMS-M-1l72 SAFMS to SAFSP, 

11 Sep 61, all in SP-3 "G" files. 

Memo, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir Isp, and MajGen O. J. 

Ritland, Cmdr SSD, to all Gambit-cleared personnel, 

14 Nov 61, subj: GAMBIT Project, in SP- 3 files; memo, 

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Greer to Gambit-cleared personnel. 16 Nov 61. subj: Cue 

Ball Security Precautions, same file; TSXs SAFMS-M-1l98. 

SAFMS to SAFSP, SAFSP-F-15-ll-143, SAFSP to SAFMS, 

and SAFMS-M-1l97, SAFMS to SAFSP, all 15 Nov 61, all 

in SAFSS files. Gambit. 

Memo, J. Vo Charyk, SAFUS. to DCS/S&L. 24 Nov 61. no 

subj; ltr, BGen M.C. Smith, Dir/Sys Services, DCS/S&L, 

to AF Compt, 27 Nov 61, subj: Project Cue Ball; TWX 

AFSSV-82581, DCS/S&L, USAF, to AFSC. 27 Nov 61; ltr, 

Dir /Proc, DCS/S&L, to Hq AFSC, 13 Dec 61. subj: Program 

Adjustment AF-62-62-600, with MFR on SAFSS copy, 

initialed by Col R. J. Halgreen, no date but apparently written 

on 14 Dec, detailing contacts with the budget people; TWX 

SCGN-22-1-46, AFSC to DCS/S&L. 31 Jan 62 (requesting 

release of the additional $10 million); all inSP-3 files, "Gil. 

Memo, Maj J. Sides, SAFMS, to BGen R. D. Curtin, 

19 Jan 62, subj: Cue Ball; TWX SAFSP-F-1-2-190, MajGen 

R. E. Greer to Curtin. 1 Feb 62, both in SP- 3 files; memo, 

LtGen James Ferguson, DCS/S&L, to SAFUS, 22 Jan 62, 

subj: Cue Ball, in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

TWX SAFMS-INS-M-2017, BGen R. D. Curtin to MajGen 

R. E. Greer, 16 Feb 62, in SP-3 files, Funding; Itr, Col 

P.J. Maher, Ch, R&D Programs Div, DCS/S&L, to AFSC, 

13 Feb 62, SAFSS files, Gambit; MFR. Maj J. Sides, SAFMS, 

7 Mar 62, subj; Trip Report, SP, 28 Feb 62, Gambit, in 

SAFSS file s • 

MFR, Col J. L. Martin, SAFMS, 13 Feb 62, subj: SAFUS 

SAFSP West Coast Conference 9 Feb 62, in Martin' s files, 

SAFSS; MFR, Sides. 7 Mar 62. 

MFRs, BGen R. E. Greer: 6 Jan 61, subj: Trip 4-5 Jan 61, 

and 16 Jan 61, Time and Materials Contract EKC, both in 

SP-3 Gambit files. 

Memo. MajGen R. E. Greer. Dir /SP, to J. V. Charyk, 

SAFUS, 10 Jul 61, no subj, in SAFSS files, "Gil. 

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TWX SAFSP-F-1B-9-1O, SAFSP to SAFMS (Maj H. Howard), 

18 Sep 61; TWX SAFMS-M-1-187, BGen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS 

to MajGen R. E. Greer, SAFSP, 20 Oct 61, both in SAFSS 

files, "Gil; TWX SAFSP-F-12-B-99, SAFSP to EK, 23 Aug 61, 

in SP-3 files, Gambit. 

Briefing charts, 9 Nov 61, "Project Cue Ball, 11 in SP-3 files. 

MFR, Maj J. Sides, SAFMS, 30 Jan 62, subj; Trip Report 

- G (22-26 January 1962), in SAFSS Gambit files; Hr, MajGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to SAFUS, 28 Feb 62, subj: Action 

Pursuant to 9 February 1962. In SP-3 files. 

MFR, Sides, 30 Jan 62; TWX SAFMS-DIR-62-25, BGen R. D. 

Curtin, SAFMS, to MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 1 Feb 62, 

in SP files, General. 

MFR, Col J. L. Martin, D/Dir SAFSS, B Mar 62, subj= 

SAFUS-SAFSP EK-GE Visit on 5-6 Mar 62, in SAFSS files, 

Gambit. 

Ltr, Greer to SAFUS, 2B Feb 62. 

TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2024, SAFSS to SAFSP. 19 Mar 62, in 

SAFSS files, Gambit. 

Memo, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, 

14 Mar 62, subj: 69BAL Program Enhancement, in SAFSS 

files, Gambit corres. 

TWX SAFSS-DEP-M-2023, SAFSS to MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir/SP, 19 Mar 62, in SP-3 files, IIG". 

Memo, MajGen R.E. Greer, Dir/SP, to J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, 

about 15 Mar 62, subj: Contractor fiX" in SAFSS files, Gambit; 

TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2024, 19 Mar 62; memo, Greer to Charyk, 

14 Mar 62. 

TWXs: SAFSP-F-1O-4-299, SAFSP to SAFSS, 10 Apr 62; 

SAFMS-INS-M-2035, SAFSS to SAFSP, 20 Apr 62; 

SAFSS-PRO-M-203B, SAFSS to SAFSP, 20 Apr 62; 

SAFSP-F-2B-4-239, SAFSP to SAFSS, 30 Apr 62, all in 

SP-3 Funding files; MFR, Martin 8 Mar 62. 

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TWXs: SAFSP-F-4-5-243, SAFSP to SAFSS, 4 May 62; 

SAFSP -F-lO-24 7, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, to J. V. 

Charyk, SAFUS, 10 May 62; SAFSP-F-lO-5-248, Greer to 

BGen R. D. Curtin, Ofc Space Sys, 10 May 62; SAFSS-DIRM-2041, SAFSS to SAFSP, 14 May 62; SAFSP-F-15-5-255, 

Col Q.A. Riepe to Greer (in SAFSS), 15 May 62; SAFSPF-17-5-257, SAFSP to SAFUS, 17 May 62, a1l in SP-3 files, 

"G"; memo, T. D. Morris, Asst SOD/Instal and Log, to 

SAFUS, 31 May 62, subj: Industrial Facilitie s Expansion, 

Project 698AL, in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

Memo, L.C. Meyer, Ch, Mis and Space Sys Div, Dir/Budget, 

As stSAF (Fin), to J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, 17 Apr 62, no subj, 

in SP-3 files, Funding; TWX SAFSP-F-17-4-232, MajGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to BGen R. D. Curtin, Ofc Space Sys, 

SAF, 17 Apr 62, in SP-3 files, "G". 

Memo, W. F. Sampson, Aerospace Corp, to Col Q.A. Riepe, 

Dir/206 Progm, 19 Jan 62, subj: Air Retrieval for Program 

483A, in King files; Interview, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, 

by R. L. Perry, 11 Sep 64. 

Greer interview, 11 Sep 64; msg,l 12280, MajGen R. E. 

Greer to J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, and Col J. L. Martin, 

Dir/NRO Staff, approx 3 Aug 62, in SAFSS files, l62-Disc. 

TWX, SAFSS-DIR-M-2072 and 2073, both J. V. Charyk, 

SAFUS, to MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, 28 Jul 62, in 

SP-3 files. 

Msg,,---I ___ 12280, approx 3 Aug 62. 

Memo, LtCol W. W. Botzong to Col Q. A. Riepe, Dir /Prog 

698AL, 1 Aug 62, Subj: Pro-Con-Overwater vs Land Recovery, 

in SP- 3 files, Land Recov; the affair of thel 1 station is 

covered in MFR, Maj J. Sides, SAFSS, 7 Mar 62, subj: Trip 

Report, SP, 28 Feb 62, Gambit, in SAFSS files, Gambit. in 

TWX, Dean Rusk, Secy/State, to American Emb~ 

~ 2 Jul 62, cy in SAFSS Gambit '-cfl:-::·l-e-s-,-~ 

'-----a-n~d~in-v-a-r~i-o-u-s---=T"'W=X=-s----.-Jin thos e files. 

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33. Study, "Pros and Cons of Satellite Recovery Methods, " 

MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 4 Aug 62, in SP-3 files, 

Land Recov. 

34. Memo, prep by Capt F. B. Gorman (USN), SAFSP Plans Ofc. 

17 Aug 62, subj: Program Recovery Information Desired by 

Dr. Charyk; TWX SAFSP-F-14-8-321, MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir/SP, to Col J.L. Martin, Dir/NRO Staff, 14 Aug 62, 

both in SP-3 files, Land Recov; TWX AFSSA-AS-1-7768S. 

DCS/S&L, USAF, to Cmdr AFSC, 24 Aug 62, in SAFSS 

files, Gambit. 

35. TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2082, SAFSS to Dir/SP, 24 Aug 62, in 

SAFSS files, Gambit. 

36. TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2082, SAFSS to Dir/SP, 24 Aug 62; msg, 

ADIC 6708, CIA to SAFSP, 18 Sep 62, inl ~Leach) files; 

TWX SAFSP-F-7-9-333, Col R. A. Berg, Asst Dir/SP, to 

Col J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, 7 Sep 62, in SP-3 files, 

"G", summarized the course of the earlierl ~station 

negotiations and the uncertainty as to their status. rWX 

SAFSP-F-21-9-343. MajGen R. E. Greer. Dir/SP, to 

Martin, 20 Sep 62, confirms agreements of the 18 Sep 62 

meeting, details of which are contained in memo for the 

record, prep by LtCol J. E. Coleman, 19 Sep 62, in Col 

King's files; TWX SAFSP-F-20-2-530, SAFSP to SAFSS, 

20 Feb 63, concerns the Annette Island station and the 

doppler radar requirements. 

37. Msg, ADIC 6708, CIA to SAFSP, 18 Sep 62; TWX SAFSPF-21-9-343. MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, to Col J. L. 

I 

::~:i:l SAFSS, 20 Sep 62, in SP-3 files, Finance; msg, 

2423, SAFSP to CIA, 24 Sep 62, and msg, ADIC 

, CIA to SAFSP, 28 Sep 62, both in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

38. Rpt, Gambit Report for FlAB, 28 Sep 62, in SAFSS files, 

Gambit. 

39. Greer interview, 11 Sep 64. 

40. TWX SAFSS-DIR-M-2095, J. V. Charyk, SAFUS. to MajGen 

R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. 3 Oct 62, in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

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Interview, BGen J. L. Martin, D/Dir/SP, by R. L. Perry, 

18 Sep 64; interview MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, by Perry, 

22 Nov 63. 

TWX SAFSP-F-5-l0-364, MajGen R. E. Greer to ITleITlbers of 

the 206 ProgITl Ofc, 30 Oct 62, subj: New Assignments, in 

SP-3 files, ProgITls. 

44. SSD Spec Order, 28 Nov 62, in SSD Mil Pers Div files. 

45. 

47. 

48. 

Greer interview, 22 Nov 62. 

Interviews: LtColJ. Pietz, l4Sep and 70ct 64; ColW.G. 

King, 7 Oct 64; MajGen R. E. Greer, 15 Sep 64, all by 

R. L. Perry. 

MeITlo, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, to Col W. G. King, 

D/ Dir / 206 ProgITl, 7 Dec 62, subj: H- 30 Capsule, and 1st 

Ind, King to Greer, 10 Dec 62, in King IS files. 

MeITlo (1st Ind), King to Greer, 10 Dec 62; King interview, 

7 Oct 64. 

TWX SAFSP-F-8-ll-409, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, 

to J. Vo Charyk, SAFUS, 8 Nov 62, in SP-3 files, PrograITls; 

rpt, Security of Satellite Reconnaissance Activities, 25 Jun 62, 

in SAFSS files, Basic Policy; interview, Greer by R. L. Perry, 

23 Jan 64. 

50. TWX SAFSS-l-M-2119, SAFSS to SAFSP, 20 Nov 62, in SAFSS 

files, GaITlbit. 

51. 

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TWX SAFSP-F-30-11-432, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to 

Col J. L. Martin, SAFSS, 30 Nov 62; TWX SAFSS-I-M-2l29, 

Martin to Greer, 30 Nov 62, both in SAFSS files, GaITlbit; 

interview, LtCol John Pietz, SP-3, 6 Jun 63, by R. L. Perry; 

Greer interview, 22 Nov 62. 

TWX SAFSS-1-62-l78, SAFSS to SAFSP, 11 Dec 62; interview, 

LtCol J. Pietz, SP-3, by R. L. Perry, 22 Jul 64; TWX SAFSSl-M-2138, SAFSS to SAFSP, 19 Dec 62 (confirITling the hitchup, 

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roll-joint, lifeboat, and H-30 changes}, both in SAFSS files, 

Gambit; TWX, SAFSP-F-24-1-491, MajGen R. E. Greer, 

DirISP, t1 I NRO Compt. 24 Jan 63. (summarizing 

~ 

"white" costS), ln sp- 3 files, Funding; msg.1 12660, 

~ 

tol I 9 Jan 63 (concerning "black" costs). in 

(Leach) file s. 

53. Greer interview, 22 Nov 64, 11 Sep 64; Pietz interview, 

6 Jun 63. 

54. Pietz interview. 6 Jun 63; Greer interview, 22 Nov 63; 

TWX SAFSS-I-M-2138, 19 Dec 62, msg,1 12602, 

MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir Isp, to J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, 

6 Dec 62. in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

55. Rpt. Program 206 Detail Schedule, Oct 62, in SP-3 files, 

Progms; rpt, Program 206 Bi-weekly Activities, Rpt, 

2 Dec-22 Dec 62, in SP-3 files, Gambit. 

56. Memo, Col W.G. King, DIDir 206 Progm to MajGen R.E. 

Greer, Dir Isp. 21 Dec 62, subj: Horizon Sensors; memo, 

Greer to King, 8 Jan 63; memo, King to Greer, 11 Aug 64, 

subj: Improved Barnes Horizon Sensors; Itr. King to GEl 

ASPD, 17 Sep 64, same subj; all in King's files. 

57. Memo, ColW.G. King, DIDir/206Progm, toMajGenR.E. 

Greer, DirISP. 7 Jan 63. subj: 206 Program Funding; memo, 

King to Greer, 15 Jan 63. subj: Review of Changes to Program; 

memo, Greer to King, subj: 206 Program Funding, all in 

King's files. 

58. Memo, Col W. G. King, DIDir/206 Progm, to Col G. Smith, 

1 I 22 Jan 63, subj= Estimate of Funding Required to 

Provide Program Changes Directed by SAFUS, 19 Dec 62, 

in King's fil e s • 

59. Memo, Col W.G. King, DIDir/206 Progm, to MajGen R.E. 

Greer, DirISP, 27 Feb 63, subj: 206 Costs and Current 

Contract Negotiations, in King's files. 

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Memo, LtCol J. Sides, SAFSS, to Col J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO 

Staff, 31 Oct 62, subj; I'G" Camera, in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

Memo, A.C. Lundahl, Dir/NPIC, to Dir/NRO, 24Jan63 

(with undated longhand note by H. Scoville, Dir /Res CIA), 

subj: Specific Technical Requirements Satellite Photographic 

Systems; TWX SAFSS-6-M-00Sl, SAFSS to SAFSP, 28 Feb 63; 

memo, Col J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, to Dir /NPIC, 

2 May 63, subj: Stellar/Index Camera for GAMBIT, all in 

SAFSS files, Gambit; TWX SAFSP-F-18-2-S26, SAFSP to 

SAFSS, 18 Feb 63, in SP .. 3 files, "G". 

TWX SAFSP-F-S-3-S48. SAFSP to SAFSS, S Mar 63; TWX 

SAFSS-l .. M .. 0070. SAFSS to SAFSP, 28 Mar 63; TWX SAFSPF-16-4-641, SAFSP to SAFSS, 16 Apr 63, all in SAFSS files, 

Gambit. 

TWX SAFSS-6-M-00S9, SAFSS to SAFSP, 12 Mar 63; TWX 

SAFSP .. F .. 14-3-S79, SAFSP to SAFSS, IS Mar 63; TWX 

SAFSS-l-M-0070, 27 Mar 63; TWX SAFSS-I-M-0071, Col 

J.L. Martin, Dir/NROStaff, to MajGenR.E. Greer, Dir/SP, 

28 Mar 63, TWX SAFSS-6-M-0074, Martin to Greer, 2 Apr 63, 

all in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

TWX SAFSS-I-M-OIOS, SAFSS to MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 

10 May 63; memo, B. McMillan, D/NRO. to Greer, 10 May 63, 

no subj; memo, Greer to SAFUS, IS May 63, subj: Budgeting 

and Procurement, all in SP-3 files, Funding. 

Memo, Col W.G. King to MajGen R.E. Greer, Dir/SP, 

10 May 63, subj: Preliminary Feasibility Report - Dual 

Recovery Capability for GAMBIT; indorsement, Greer to 

Col J. L. Martin, SAFSS, 13 Jun 63, same subj, both in 

SAFSS files, Gambit. 

TWX SAFSP-F-1l-2-Sl7, SAFSP to SAFSS, 11 Feb 63; 

TWX SAFSP-F-13-3-S7S, SAFSP to SAFSS, 13 Mar 63; 

TWX SAFSP-F-27-3-608, SAFSP to SAFSS, 27 Mar 63; 

TWX SAFSP-F-2-4-619, SAFSP to SAFSS, 2 Apr 63; 

TWX SAFSP-F-16-4-642, SAFSP to SAFSS, 16 Apr 63, all 

in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

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TWX SAFSP-F-16-5-706, Col W.G. King to LtCol J. Sides. 

SAFSS, 17 May 63; TWX SAFSP-DIR-15-5-1, SAFSP to SAFSS, 

15 May 63; TWX SAFSS-I-M-01l9. SAFSS to SAFSP, 23 May 63; 

TWX SAFSP-F-6-737. King to Col J. L. Martin, SAFSS, 

5 Jun 63, TWX SAFSS-I-M-0134, 6 Jun 63, all in SAFSS files, 

Gambit. 

TWX SAFSS-I-M-0l09, SAFSS to SAFSP, 15 May 63; memo. 

MajGenR.E. Greer, Dir/SP. to MajGenB.I. Funk, Cmdr, 

SSD, 15 May 63, subj: 206 Program; memo, Funk to Greer, 

31 May 63. same subj; TWX. SAFSP-F-17-6-758, Greer to 

B. McMillan. SAFUS. 17 Jun 63. all in SP-3 files. "Gil. 

TWX SAFSP-F-22-5-718. Col W.G. King, SAFSP, to LtCol 

J. Sides. SAFSS, 22 May 63, in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

Msgs, ADIC 1279, CIA to D/NRO. 4 Jan 63; and ADIC 1940, 

CIA to SAFSP, 18 Jan 63, both i~ I(LeaCh) files. 

TWX SAFSP-F-19-1-498. SAFSP to 6594th ATW, 29 Jan 63, 

in SP-3 files, IIG". 

Interview, Col J. W. Ruebel, SP-3, by R. L. Perry, 29 May 63. 

Interview, Col R. J. Ford, SP-3, by R. L. Perry, 17 Sep 64. 

Interview, LtCol J. Pietz, SP- 3, by R. L. Perry, 29 May 63. 

Msgs, BAIL 6550 EK to CIA, 11 Jul 63; and 1 10521, 

D/NRO to SAFSP. 1 Jul 63, both in Leach files, TWX SAFSP8-21-588, SAFSP to SAFSS, 21 Mar 63, in SAFSS files, Gambit. 

"Book. II Gambit Payload Deception Operation. May 63. prep 

by LtCols R. J. Ford and J. Pietz, SP-3, in I I files; ltr, 

J. D. Hansford. GE, to Col R. J. Ford, SAFSP, 21 Oct 63, 

subj: Memo Report on STL Payloads, 951, 952 a.nd 953 in 

SP-3 files; Ford interview, 14 Sep 64. 

Author's notes, 12 Ju1 63; rpt. Gambit Program Summary Report 

1960-1967. prep by R. Perry, Sep 67 (hereafter cited as G 

Summary); rpt, Summary Analysis of Program 206 (GAMBIT), 

prep by Col G T Smith. 29 Aug 67 (hereafter cited as 

206 Summary). 

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XIII GAMBIT-I OPERATIONS 

The flight portion of the Gambit>:' Project offered interesting 

departures from the "normal" cycle of research, developrn:; nt and 

operations observed by most DoD developrn:; nt agencies. It owed 

much in that respect to the precedent of the Corona program, the 

only earlier satellite reconnaissance activity that could even casually 

be called succes sful. Although nominall y divided between development 

and operational phases, the dividing line corning after the fifth flight, 

the de facto value of each flight was measured in various ways. 

On nomenclature: Gambit operated under a considerable variety 

of htles and numerical designators. Two principal designators 

are used hereafter in this manuscript. The name Gambi..! ordinarily 

is used to identify the vehicles, and the program, that included any 

version of the original 77 -inch (focal length) camera and the original 

single-recovery-vehicle film retrieval system. Gambit-3 (for "GambitCubed") is the comparable designator for the systems and program 

that involved the l60-inch lens and the "double bucket" recovery system. 

Where both the original Gambit and Gcmbit-3 are being discussed, the 

term Gambit-l has been used to lessen confusion. It will be recalled 

that Gambit carried the "white" titles "Exemplar" and "Cue Ball" in 

1961 and 1962, the latter name being associated with the unclassified 

program number 483A, mostly for accounting purposes. In mid-1962 

the terminology "Program 698-AL" was applied as an unclassified 

identifier for Gambit; it subsequently was changed to "Program 206, I' 

the terminology ordinarily used until the original Gambit gave way to 

Gambit- 3. That follow- on program, which officially became "Gambit" 

in 1969 (the "G3" or "Gambit-Cubed" description was formally dropped 

at that time), carried the numerical designator "Program 110. II 

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TOp 5J!:GREtr 

Criteria ranged from the performance of the Gambit vehicle and 

camera system through the success of piggyback experiments and 

equipment modifications which were of development significance to a 

variety of projects, including Gambit-3. As for operational value, 

data of appreciable intelligence worth were collected as early as the 

fifth flight, and the quantity of such data continued to increas e at a steady 

rate throughout the life of the original Gambit program. 

While technical developments including the refinement of 

hardware and the introduction of new manufacturing techniques were 

of obvious significance, other and perhaps les s tangible aspects of 

the Gambit project had greater potential long-term value. They 

were mostly of a program management sort. They included such 

areas as security devices necessary to "black" programs and management techniques for ushering a program through flight test into operations. General Greer I s stubborn insistence that " one good picture" 

was the only valid goal of the first flight lost much of its dramatic 

impact once success became the norm rather than the exception for 

new programs. But it was almost certainly one of the pivotal reasons 

for the early success of the Gambit project. 1 Other projects in the 

space r econnais sance program had fallen almost entirely from the 

weight of overly ambitious early flight objectives. The result, with 

uncommon regularity, had been catastrophic failure and consequent 

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abandonment of the program. Whatever had been invested was 10sL 

Greer's forte had been that of a midwife to the new project- -overseeing 

and guaranteeing a successful birth and infancy. His successor, 

Brigadier General John L. Martin, Jr. >:<, proved to be particularly 

adept at raising the child to rna turity, Martin I s handling of a midstream crisis (three successive catastrophic failures midway through 

the flight program) by re-orienting contractual incentives served as 

a model for future contracting practices as well as solving the problem 

of the moment. The elements of the incentive program were probably 

of less importance than its conceptual basis. It represented an 

acknowledgement that the goals of a project changed as it outgrew 

its developmental constraints, and that incentives suitable for one 

phase were not necessarily appropriate to another. 

Less than two weeks after the first Gambit flight aimed at 

" one good picture, 11 General Greer advised the project director, 

Colonel W. G. King, >:<>:.: that he very much wanted "two in a row. ,,2 

That was to become the watchword for the second 9_ambit flight. 

While Greer was gratified by the success of the first flight, he 

appreciated that unwisely ambitious second-flight objectives could 

Both Greer and Martin retired as Major Generals. 

Later a Brigadier General, and Martin's successor. 

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damage the program just as much as an unsuccessful first flight. 

Paradoxically, the very success of the first flight raised expectations 

for subsequent flights and could be expected to make later failures 

even more unsettling to those who ultimately controlled project 

funding. If enough succes s could be tucked away in the flight history 

of the basic hardware, then downstream failures could be treated as 

local problems rather than indications of a flawed conception. While 

no one knew how many successful flights or how much good output 

was required to create this aura, King and Greer were both quite 

positive that at least the second flight would have to be a pronounceable 

success. 

The operational plan for the second flight called for three days 

of flight in a hitch-up mode. During the first flight control over the 

orbital control vehicle (OCV) had been lost after seven orbits, which 

did not represent enough of a test to justify making the success of the 

second flight dependent on its proper functioning. King decided that 

the Agena should be relied on once again for orbital control during 

that portion of the flight when primary mission objectives were to be 

satisfied. Those objectives were the demonstration of best resolution 

from the camera and succes sful recovery of the film. The secondary 

mission goal was to demonstrate controlled independent flight by the 

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OCV, but not until after three days had been logged on orbit in the 

3 

hi tch-up mode. A cautionary note was inj ected by anxiety over the 

operation of the Agena, which had malfunctioned during the first 

flight. Greer and King decided that ground controllers should be prepared, beginning with the second revolution, to separate the OCV -R V 

4 

combination from .A gena at the fir st sign of trouble. 

Although master schedules called for one Gambit launch 

every 40 days, making 6 September nominally six days late. 5 early 

Gambit flights were acknowledged to be development flights, so 

neither the schedule nor the slippage was considered critical. What 

was important was to precede each flight with a full analysis of the 

failures of the previous flight- -and to incorporate corr ective feature s. 

The first two years of Gambit flights were to ~e marked by steady 

increases in pre-flight testing and by the installation of telemetering 

devices to monitor in-flight failure modes. That trend developed 

from a gradual understanding that although the proper dictum was to 

correct each flight's failures before the next, the extent of effort 

needed to successfully perform that task had initially been underestimated. 

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Underestimating may have been the least important of several 

influences. In the early stages of the program, its managers were 

justifiably worried that it might be cancelled. The record of earlier 

failure in other satellite reconnaissance efforts, and financial overruns in the Gambit program provided reason enough for that worry. 

In any case, Greer perceived the urgency of extensive pre-flight 

tests to enhance the probability of program success even at the cost 

of schedule slippages. He had gone a long way toward hedging his bet 

by massive simplification of the Gambit hardware and early flight operations. While lack of adequate test data continued to trouble the program 

for some months, it was clear in retrospect that Greer made the 

right tradeoffs. They were clearly responsible for the regular succesS 

and smooth progress which marked the program for all but the middle 

portion of its life. 

Another factor of some considerable importance in the perceived 

vulnerability of the early Gambit program was a fundamental difference 

of viewpoint between the CIA and the photo-intelligence community, on 

the one hand, and Greer's organization plus the NRO staff, on the other. 

Admittedly, the Gambit group saw their mission as one of correctly 

exposing and efficiently recovering film. They were less concerned 

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with the intelligence content of the product, as such. The intelligence 

cOITlITlUnity was preoccupied with the inforITlation content of the filITl; 

its ITleITlbers were willing to accept the risks of ITlission failure if 

the quality and quantity of intelligence returns ITlight be enhanced 

thereby. Greer's people were not, arguing reasonably enough that 

6 

failed missions returned nothing of value to anybody. 

The GaITlbit countdown on 6 SepteITlber was uneventful; launch 

occurred at 12:30 local tiITle. All went well. Perigee was 102 

nautical ITliles. During fifty-one hours on orbit, the hitched vehicle 

cOITlpleted 34 orbits and exposed SOITle 1930 feet of filITl7 SOITle in 

stereo pairs but the ITlost in single fraITles. The ITlission covered 

ten different intelligence targets. On the 34th revolution, the reentry 

. 7 vehicle was detached and successfully recovered by aIr catch. 

During separation of the Agena froITl the orbital control vehicle, 

a ITlalfunction of the pneuITlatic systeITl caused a rapid loss of stabilization gas. As a result, the ITlajor objective of the solo flight of the 

OCV --operation of the stabilization subsysteITl--could not be dem_onstrated. The OCV was deboosted before cOITlpleting any of its planned 

49 revolutions. 

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Gas leak problems were not confined to the stabilization system. 

On revolution 31 of the hitched flight, the primary camera door failed 

to close (during the 20th opening-closing cycle). That too was due to 

a gas leak, but in the door actuator. That event pressaged a problem 

which was to recur in One form or another until the pneumatic systems 

were eventually replaced, in both primary and secondary modes, by 

electro-mechanical actuators. But that modification was not effective 

until the 26th Gambit. 

Initially, the pneumatic door actuator failure did not appear 

to be a major problem. In terms of product, the flight was hugely 

successful. During hitch-up, the cameras provided ground resolution of 2.5 feet. The contractual specifications called for two to 

three feet, so one of the three major objectives of the project had 

been satisfied on the second flight. (The other objectives were an 

operational life of five days and the ability to point the camera at 

wilL A completely successful five-day flight was almost two years 

and 17 flights away; pointing accuracy was to be demonstrated by 

the seventh flight.) 

The Gambit flight program developed three major classes of 

problems. The first and least frequent but most persistent appeared 

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as failures of various pneumatic subsystems. Another class of problems I 

included one-time failures, which once corrected did not reappear. 

The third class of problem was intellectually the most interesting I 

and operationally the most frustrating. Throughout the program instances I 

of seemingly random failure occurred in components which had functioned correctly for many flights. The problem would per sist through 

three or four flights, notwithstanding strenuous correction efforts, 

before succumbing. While there was nothing mysterious about the 

recurrence of a given failure, the sudden appearance of one where 

none had existed earlier was unusual for space vehicles, used only 

once and normally immune to wearout as such. No fully satisfactory 

explanation of the phenomenon ever appeared, although transient 

quality control and test program faults were generally blamed. 

The aftermath of the second flight brought a renewal of controversy about the paramount objectives of early Gambit flights. An 

analysis of the photographs recovered from the second Gambit showed 

consistently high quality until the 31st orbit. The failure of the m?in 

camera doors to close thereafter with consequent optical problems 

caused by temperature transients, had caused a softening of image 

quality and some loss of resolution. But the resolution achieved during 

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the initial portion of the flight was sufficient to distinguish details 

like aircraft engine nacelles, small vehicles and even maintenance 

. 8 equlpment. Thus, for the first time an orbiting camera had returned 

detail at levels previously obtained only from aircraft. In effect, 

only three years after aircraft overflights of the Soviet Union had 

been discontinued, satellite reconnaissance had more than filled the 

gap. First, Corona had returned coverage of areas most U -2' s 

could not reach or could not safely overfly, and now Gambit had 

returned detail not greatly inferior to that produced by U-2 cameras. 

But the Gambit returns had been limited; 1950 feet of film was not 

a large return, only ten targets having been covered, but more 

important, the OCV on which eventual routine coverage would depend 

had not yet functioned properly. Pointing accuracy demonstrations 

were lacking. Although the Gambit achievement represented remarkable progress and excellent research and development results, it did 

not yet constitute a basis for good recurring coverage of the Soviet 

Union. And information of that sort, at resolutions much better than 

Corona could provide, was an urgent n2tional goal. 

Given that the high resolution potential of Gambit had been 

demonstra ted and pointing accuracy using the orbital control vehicle 

had not, Greer decided that for the third flight the primary obj ective 

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should be demonstration of the operation of the vehicle. High 

resolution photography of intelligence targets would be relegated to 

a secondary obj ective. 

McMillan approved Greer's decision on 17 September, 

after which King forwarded the formal statement of objectives and 

9 

priorities to Washington. The target launch date was set for 

22 October. Operations were to be maintained for two days in the 

hitch-up mode and two additional days in solo flight. 

That operational plan prevailed until 24 October. While 

technical problems that had caused a three-day launch postponement 

were being resolved, McMillan reversed his earlier position, 

telling Greer he wanted to "clarify" the objectives of the Gambit 

program. He explained that the effectiveness of the program could 

not be judged by the ground area covered or the amount of film 

exposed successfully. Rather, effectiveness would be judged in 

terms of the number of high priority targets for which high resolution 

stereo pairs could be obtained. Primary efforts for following 

Gambit missions were to concentrate on obtaining the best possible 

ground resolution over larger number s of "denied area II targets. 

Orbital control, as such, was to be a secondary consideration. Further, 

10 

development-oriented flights were to end as soon as possible. 

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operational missions were wanted at the earliest achievable 

date. ':' 

In historical summaries, the primary objective of the third 

flight is duly recorded as obtaining maximum information from high 

re solution photography, and the secondary obj ectives as demonstrating 

capabilitie s of the orbital control vehicle and proving the feasibility 

12 

of a five-day flight. 

But post-fact notations do not necessarily reflect the course 

of real events. The 34 revolutions of the third Gambit vehicle in 

the hitch-up mode we.re what had been specified in Greer's message 

of 13 September, in any case. The only other relevant evidence concerning real objectives of the flight is the amount of film used and 

In September and October 1963, McMillan had the first of several 

major brushes with Dr. Albert D. Wheelon, who had become the 

CIA's Deputy Director, Science and Technology, in July. Even 

earlier, McMillan had been exposed to several pointed suggestions 

that Gr eer' s organization be instructed to subordinate its R&D 

orientation to an intelligence-return orientation. Althollgh no 

directly relevant documents from that period have survived that 

detail the Gambit flight goals disagreement of July-October, indirect 

evidence of the pressures on McMillan and of his reluctance to reorient Gambit flight objectives is found in his own memoranda. The 

instructions to Greer on 24 October reflect an effort to compromise 

existing differences, requiring--or formally stating--an unwritten 

agreement between McMillan and Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, to place greater emphasis on quickly ending the R&D 

phas e of the Gambit program. 11 

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the nUITlber of targets photographed. One hundred feet less film 

was recovered from the third Gambit mission than from the second, 

and the amount actually exposed on orbit (rather than in pre-launch 

tests) was less than half that of the second flight. Four targets were 

photographed compared to ten of the second flight. 

Greer's principal concern was to demonstrate, systematically, 

that each essential element of Gambit hardware was functional. He 

was satisfied that sufficiently high re solution photography could be 

obtained. If he had doubts, they were resolved by the results of the 

second and third missions. His next concern was for the orbital 

control vehicle. Dr. McMillan had to cope with different constraints. 

One of his problems was that only the first three Gambit flights had 

been represented to "high authority" as developmental. While he and 

Greer were completely agreed on the need for more developmental 

flights, McMillan also wanted to be able to display intelligence returns 

that could substantiate claims of operational utility for Gambit. He was 

not prepared to reverse Greer, in any case. On 12 February 1964, 

he authorized developmental flights to continue beyond the fifth Gambit. 

Indeed, he ruled that flights would only be designated operational after 

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"several" four- or five-day flights had been successfuL. Sinc e the 

first such rnissio:il was not scheduled until August 1964, Greer I s 

arguments clearly had prevailed. 

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By February 1964, however, it had become almost certain 

that Gambit would return large quantities of highly valuable photographic intelligence, and in the reasonably near future. McMillan 

therefore broadened his position in dealing with "users, 11 and supported Greer I s well-based convictions both priva tel y and publicl y. 

Some additional cause for anxiety about the success potential 

of the third Gambit resulted from the history of the orbital control 

vehicle. It had originally been used in thermal-vacuum testing 

of the satellite vehicle. It was subsequently refurbished and 

assigned the third Gambit flight. By 25 October 1963, all systems 

had been checked out and, for the fir st time, propellants were 

loaded that would support orbital adjust maneuvers. A t one minute 

before noon, local time, the booster was ignited and the third 

Gambit space vehicle was put into orbit. 

Whatever the preliminary uncertainties about mission 

objectives and equipment, the result was a mission that conformed 

to flight goals from first to last. Not only was the photography as 

good as that of the second flight, but the recovery was routine and 

the orbital vehicle, in solo flight, successfully demonstrated 

14 

orbital adjust and de-orbit capabilities. During the solo flight 

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the stabilization subsystem was exercised extensively and found to 

operate as specified. Of the 38 Gambit flights ultimr'ltel y undertaken 

(not including Gambit- 3) this was one of only three which was perfect 

in the sense that it was unmarred by any failure. major or minor. 

The other two such missions came at the very end of the Gambit-l 

program. 

The general quality of the photography was judged to be 

" ... better and more consistent •.. " than that of either of the fir st 

two missions. Photographs from that mission were the first to 

show identifiable figures of people on the ground- -from a distance of 

some 90 mile s. (The scene wa s a football field in Great Falls, 

Montana.) In one picture a place kicker could be seen putting the 

football in place while other player s moved into position. In a 

15 

second photograph the players had lined up. ready for the kickoff. 

Its first three flights having been successful, Gambit secured 

the virtual guarantee of continued funding Greer had sought. Lanyard, 

the "insurance" surveillance system that backed up Gambit, was 

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cancelled. The Gambit space vehicle and payload having been 

proven, the only backup necessary in the future was an operational 

one, satisfied by the production of Gambit vehicles for continued use. 

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Although photography obtained from the first three flights of 

Gambit had little intelligence value, it had superb resolution. 

Orbital adjustment maneuvers had been carried out successfully, as 

had solo flight of the orbital control vehicle, after separation of the 

payload capsule for reentry_ The entire system had an evident capability of performing five-day operational missions. The problems thus 

far encountered appeared to be manageable. 

The next step was a mission which fully explored operational 

capability. The stated primary mission of the fourth Gambit was to 

obtain high-quality reconnaissance photography, as 'I'\;Ould be the case 

with every flight thereafter, to the end of the program. The secondary 

17 

mission goal was demonstration of five-day longevity. 

The fourth flight vehicle differed substantially from the first. 

The stellar index cameras (being procured through a black CIA 

contract with Itek) still were not available, but most of the other 

major features of Gambit, as originally planned, were present. 

The hitch-up option was dropped, giving the orbital control vehicle 

its first opportunity to display its capabilities in a "live" test. Such 

changes had once been planned for the sixth mission, but success in 

the solo operation of the OCV had been so encouraging that program 

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rated by further dry runs. A "lifeboat!! systelu was installed for 

the first tillle in the fourth Galllbit. (Also known as the back-up 

stabilization systelll (BUSS), !!lifeboat!! utilized the earthfs lines of 

lllagnetic force as a reference to stabilize the vehicle in flight. It 

had its own control gas supplies and cOlllllland circuitry, separate 

frOlll the prilllary stabilization systelll. Originally conceived as 

telllporary insurance against the fai lure of the prilllary systelll in 

early lllissions, BUSS survived to the last in the original series of 

Galllbit flights and was last used to bring back the reentry vehicle 

of Galllbit nUlllber 36.) 

Launch occurred in the early afternoon of 18 Decelllber 1963. 

Separation of the Agena and the OCV and orbital injection were nOlllinalo 

Launch controllers were slightly uneasy because of an uncorrected 

test failure which had occurred during countdown. They had been 

unable to change the crab position of the prilllary lllirror. The 

failure was considered randolll; probably due to a short circuit 

between the crab servo and the cOlllluand decoder relay box. In 

any case, no corrective action was considered necessary, In any 

event, the short circuit persisted, but the anticipation of "no problelll" 

proved accurate, 

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The first four orbits were normal. During the fifth revolution, 

however, the satellite vehicle began to tumble and all orbital control 

gas was expended in efforts to stabilize it. The precipitating fa ilure 

was in a small heat controlling device .responsible for maintaining 

acceptable temperatures around the rate gyro. The heater operated 

at full output the first four orbits. The result was a heat-induced 

malfunction of the rate gyro, causing massive instability of the space 

vehicle. Mission controllers decided to deboost and recover the RV 

during the 18th revolution. 

Because the primary stabilization gas supply had been fully 

exhausted at the end of the fifth revolution, controllers had to call on 

the Lifeboat system. Tumbling was so extreme that BUSS could not 

fully suppress it during the next 13 revolutions. By the time the 

recovery was attempted, BUSS gas was all but depleted. The result 

was that deorbit of the RV was inaccurate and reentry occurred 72.0 

miles downrange from the planned location. Nevertheless, because 

they had been warned in advance of that likelihood, the recovery 

team was still able to recover the capsule by air catch. 

Of the missions assigned to the fourth flight, only one was 

demonstrated, and that only in part: the BUSS, newly installed on 

this flight, performed very well in an unexpected emergency. It 

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had allowed the recovery of the capsule when all else would have 

been unavailing. 

Although the fourth Gambit had experienced catastrophic 

mission failure and had performed none of its primary assignments, 

the fault was so localized that it caused no significant change in the 

system. The only alteration suggested by the failure was to wire 

a back-up heater switch in the rate gyro assembly to turn off the 

18 

heater when a critical temperature was reached. 

Even though the early Gambit flights were developmental and 

telemetry of error mode information was essential, much instrumentation essential to detailed system operation monitoring was not 

incorporated in the fir st four Gambit vehicles. Limited mis sion 

objectives in combination with budget problems partly explained the 

omission. After the first three flights, that rationale evaporated, 

to be replaced by another: program success. Hinds ight suggested 

that instrumenta tion was inadequate to the needs of development. 

For various reasons, the launch schedule for the fifth Gambit 

was allowed to slip to the extent of about a month. During the interval 

between missions four and five, McMillan accepted the premise that 

ten development flights should be programmed before operational 

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status could be claimed. Gambit was not to be considered operational, McMillan concluded, until, " ..• several completely successful 

four- or five-day missions have been accomplished and all significant operational limitations and capabilities identified. II The 

maximum effort was to be aimed at development and use of full 

Gambit potential. The NRO director told Greer, " .•. the name of 

the game is specific coverage of specific, known targets with 

stereo photography of the be st pos sible quality. II Mission criteria, 

he added, would be the number of priority targets photographed in 

19 

stereo and the resolution of the photographs. 

Greer's confidence in the capability of Gambit was increasing, 

but he remained cautious. It was reasonable to assume that the 

camera was capable of being pointed accurately at ground targets, 

that orbit injection and orbit change maneuvers could allow coverage 

of differ ent area s on the same flight, and that the re sulting high 

resolution photography would be routinely recovered. The criteria 

settled on by the director of the NRO assumed these accomplishments 

and asked, if somewhat imprecisely, for considerably more: many 

photographs of many priority targets. To that time (1964), the 

selection of Gambit targets had been done manually; analysts decided 

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which targets were to be photographed, how many frames were to 

be exposed over each, and the time sequence of the operation. The 

amount of film ordinarily available to be exposed was on the order of 

two thousand feet. 

Two later developments in Gambit! s operational capability 

were directly responsive to the requirement for the large numbers 

of aimed photographs. The first, which had long been planned for 

mission operations once R&D goals had been satisfied, was initially 

used on Gambit's fifth flight. It involved the use of computer techniques for target selection. The second was to increase the quantity 

of film carried, with a corresponding increase in the potential 

longevity of a given flight. Thirteen hundred feet of film had been 

loaded in the first Gambit mission. By the end of the program, 

2.0 

almost 3400 feet were carried regularly. 

The first target selection technique used in the Gambit program, 

called TMPGP, was developed by Space Technology Laboratories 

(which later became the core of the A erospace Corporation). It used 

da ta on prioritie s, re solution, and total number of areas of interest 

as inputs and then performed an exhaustive search of possible targets 

from target folder data in order to determine the optimal set of targets 

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for a given mission. Because of the necessarily broad scope of 

the search technique, the program was balky and expensive to 

operate, as well as being very time consuming. Program directors 

therefore sponsored a second generation program using dynamic programming techniques, which eventually replaced TMPGP. It was 

characterized by far more rapid and less costly operations but 

perhaps more important provided better satisfaction of optimal 

II 

target selection criteria. 

Once the set of targets had been chosen, relevant data on 

them were entered into an event generation program which computed 

major orbital parameters as well as all commands necessary to 

carry out the selected photographic operations. Commands included 

such details as door openings and closings, crab angle, and film 

transport speed. Once the vehicle was on orbit it could be assumed 

that command changes would be required, either to correct for 

flight anomalies of various kinds or to incorporate late changes in 

mission objectives- -as during a sudden crisis in the Middle East or 

Southeast Asia, for instance. These eventualities were taken care 

of by a set of command and control programs which allowed technicians 

at the satellite test center at Vandenberg to alter the sequence and 

nature of events on orbit. New target data were fed into the control 

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cOITlputers; the output was in the forITl of COITlITlands to the space 

vehicle. In generating those cOITlITlands, the prograITl would also 

deterITline whether carrying out the new tasks would in any way 

degrade vehicle capability, either by requiring it to perforITl highrisk operations or by overloading SOITle subsysteITl to the point of 

incipient failure. 

Such technique s were fir st eITlployed on the flight of 25 

February. The space vehicle separated £rOITl the Agena and entered 

the planned orbit, with an initial perigee of 96 ITliles. On the second 

revolution, teleITletry indicated that roll and pitch gyros had not 

uncaged. It was faulty diagnosis, but not until sOITlewhat later did 

it becoITle apparent that only the signals were wrong, that in fact 

the flight control systeITl was functioning correctly. In the ITleantiITle, flight controllers responded by sending a new "uncage gyrosll 

cOITlITland to the vehicle. Its effect was to cause loss of yaw 

reference and a steadily increasing yaw angle. (The yaw angle 

grew at the relatively large rate of 2.5 degrees per hour. Because 

the vehicle and the caITleras were no longer at right angles to the 

orbital path, iITlage ITlotion cOITlpensation becaITle steadily less 

effective. Resolution degraded froITl an initial 12 feet to an eventual 

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100 feet before the command and control system succeeded in 

negating and correcting the yaw angle anomaly, on revolution 18. 

Unfortunately, either communications between personnel at the 

Satellite Control Center Facility or the computer-controlled command 

system could not cope with the situation; in any case, a command to 

cut the film and load it into the take up spools had been transmitted 

and obeyed during the 16th revolution. Thereafter, Gambit number five 

performed some research operations which had been included as part 

22 

of the primary mission, but photographic functions ceased. 

During early Gambit operations, interest in the feasibility 

of low level flights had become pronounced. Better resolution was 

the goal. But relatively little was known about the density of the 

atmosphere at altitudes of 70 miles. Gambit number five was 

photographically "dead, " but something might be salvaged by having 

the vehicle descend to a lower altitude. Flight controllers quickly 

prepared and sent commands for three orbit adjustments. They 

demonstrated that the OCV could be successfully controlled and 

that operation at 70-mile altitudes was feasible. So notwithstanding 

the succession of command errors that led to a failure of mission 

photography, the mission was judged a success, 

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On the 34th revolution, the recovery vehicle was separated 

from the OCV and recovered. That event had originally been 

scheduled for the 51st revolution, but the extra time on orbit was 

to have been used for photography which had been precluded by the 

premature command to cut the film. In partial compensation, 

mission control extended the flight of the solo OCV from its original 

program of 32 revolutions to 49. During that period, a malfunction 

occurred in the BUSS (caused by the failure of a relay) which would 

have caused catastrophic failure in the event BUSS had been relied 

on for recovery of the RV. Other minor functional failures marred 

the flight, but for the fir st time instrumentation was sufficiently 

comprehensive to provide relatively detailed information on each of 

the anomalies. Detailed corrective modifications of the sixth Gambit 

followed anal ysis of the failure modes experienced during flight 

23 

number five. 

The fifth flight had another distinction. It was the fir st for 

which an incentive fee arrangement had been in effect between the 

project office and General Electric, the contractor for the orbital 

control vehicle, which related fee to vehicle performance on orbit. 

Basically, GE would recover the costs of production plus an additional 

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fee which had a potential range of $1, 000, 000. around a missionsuccess midpoint. Penalties and rewards were on a pro rata 

basis between the two extremes. Because of various OCV failures 

in flight number five, GE had a full fee penalty assessed: $1, 000, 000. 

was deducted from the normal contract fee. 

Incentives of that sort became increasingly important to Gambit 

as the program progressed. Although cost, performance, and schedule 

were all covered by the contract incentive clauses" cost was the 

principal early target. Gambit costs had substantially exceeded 

early program estimates, although later developments in satellite 

reconnaissance were to make that program seem quite inexpensive. 

In any case, the arrangeme nt that took effect with the fifth Gambit 

mission provided that GE would retain as profit a large part of 

whatever underrun occurred, but would pay an equivalently large 

share of overruns out of fee. The fee variation associated with performance was only about half the size of the cost function variation. 

That difference was partly accounted for by the expectation that the 

orbital control vehicle would be extremely reliable, a notion 

strengthened by the first four flights. The schedule incentive was 

small, consisting of penalties amounting to $2, 000 a day up to a 

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maximum of a quarter of a million dollars (112 days). As might have 

been expected--indeed, as was intended, after the first couple of 

flights, GE concentrated effort on reducing costs, paying less heed 

to performance. Under the terms of the agreement, for instance, 

if GE delivered a minimum-cost OCV on schedule (collecting $33.6 

million, more or less) and the vehicle was an utter failure on orbit, 

the contractor still would earn the full scheduled fee plus an incentive 

bonus amounting to more than three percent of actual costs. Of course 

that sort of arrangement wmld not be continued if failure became a 

major problem, but it was an interesting condition of the program and 

24 

one that GE exploited- - briefl y. 

The failures of the fifth flight determined the operational 

as signment of the sixth. The mission would be the same: a threeday flight to demonstrate full operational control and orbit adjustment 

capabilities, and continued investigation of low orbit operations. The 

primary mission would continue to be high-grade photography, but this 

was now a sufficiently hoary tradition to be accepted without notice 

25 

in the fonnal statement of mission objectives. The long awaited 

stellar index camera was originally scheduled for its maiden flight 

on the sixth vehicle, but qualification delays made it necessary to 

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wait one more flight before that final important piece of equipment 

could be added to the Gambit package to make the vehicle fully con26 

sistent with original specifications. 

Even though the fifth Gambit had been less than successful 

from the standpoint of program personnel and the intelligence community alike, the system was making steady and remarkable progress 

toward full operational status. That circumstance was acknowledged 

by Greer's near -term plan for flights six through ten. The length 

of the flights was to gradually extend from three to five days. low 

altitude experimentation was to be ended, and optimal tar geting 

procedures were to be developed so that the greatest possible number 

of high-priority tar gets would be photographed. Greer maintained 

that the plan was flexible, providing a " ... deliberate approach to 

completing the development program. It can and will be adjusted 

to either unusual success or catastrophic failure." McMillan's 

concurrence in that general plan reached Greer, without additional 

27 

comment, on 17 March 1964. 

The subtle incr ease of emphasis on obtaining opera tionally 

useful photography starting with flight six was in some respects a 

further acknowledgement of the pressure McMillan was experiencing 

from users of the satellite photography. The failure of Gambit five 

to return useful take was reflected without much subtlety, in measures 

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that put Gambit six on its launch pad well ahead of normal delivery 

and checkout schedules. Only 15 days elapsed between the launch of 

the fifth Gambit and the readiness of the sixth. That striking 

accomplishment was made possible by energetic refurbishment 

of the launch station and by making detailed adjustments in delivery 

schedules for later Gambits and their subsystems. It was possible 

partly because the production, test, and delivery of satellite vehicle 

equipment had earlier been acc elerated in order to provide a standby 

or backup vehicle as early as possible in the Gambit flight program. 

One effect of moving Gambit six forward in the schedule was to 

force a delay in the planned delivery of the reserve system; it had 

been slated for availability by May 1964, but the actions of March 

(in conjunction with an independent delay in the availability of the 

booster, the first SLY -3 "Standard Atlas" intended for use with 

Gambit) made June the earliest possible month for delivery. 

Gambit six was launched shortly after nOOn on 11 March 1964. 

Orbit and separation wer e nominal. There were two major system 

failures during the flight, neither catastrophic. The BUSS failed 

for a second time due to overheating of a solenoid during the test 

cycle. (Test procedures were immedia tel y changed.) The primary 

stabilization system operated nominally throughout the flight so that 

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failure of the BUSS was of no mission significance. 

The second major problem was malfunctioning of the roll 

jets, which caused orbital predictions to be inaccurate and led to 

in-track errors that made it impossible to acquire 25 percent of 

the planned targets. (The errors were apparently cumulative; the 

majori ty of targets not acquired were programmed for revolutions 

38 to 41.) An additional problem was that some targets had been 

specified "by hand" rather than through the use of computerized event 

selection programs. While on orbit, it became clear that many of 

these were incompatible with the technical capability of Gambit hardl8 

ware. (That event brought on a short, sharp controversy over 

operational direction of intelligence gathering.) 

Despite such problems, some 150 successful camera 

operations were cornman ded and took place of a programmed total 

of 229. After 51 revolutions, the film capsule was recovered and 

several orbital adjustments were made with the oev in solo flight. 

With the first burn, the perigee was raised from 120 to 202 nautical 

mile s, then returned to 95. In the next experiment it was reduced 

to 70 miles,. then finally returned to 90. The vehicle had stayed on 

low orbit with a 70-mile perigee for a total of ten continuous revolutions. No temperature anomalies or other difficulties were registered, 

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further denlOnstrating the feasibility of such a low orbit. The next 

step would be to operate the camera from such an altitude to determine if special problems would arise either from camera operation 

or In the quality of photography from low orbit. 

Such events were of paramount importance to the Gambit 

program office, but the intelligence community they ranked considerably below the fact that Gambit six had returned substantial 

quantities of highly useful intelligence data. Earlier photography 

had generally been scant and, even when of good photographic 

quali ty, had provided information of slight operational intere st. 

The photographs returned by the sixth Gambit permitted interpretation of additional details in already identified targets and confirmed the existenc e of targets in areas which had been clas sified 

as "probables" earlier. Good quality photographs were obtained 

on all but four of the assigned targets covered on the mission. Some 

of the photography was degraded as a result of snow or haze cover. 

29 

but most was excellent. 

That achievement received far le s s recognition than it 

deserved, then or later, owing to continued concern for impending 

mlsslOns. But in fact, Gambit was only the second thoroughly 

satisfactory satellite reconnaissance system to reach operational 

status in a development effort that had been intense--a matter of 

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extreme national urgency--for six of its ten year s. Corona, the only 

predece ssor system to provide much in the way of useful operational 

intelligence, had not recorded its first success until 15 launches 

had been attempted, only three of which could be accounted technically successful. All five of the E-series Samos payloads that 

had progressed as far as completed hardware had been cancelled, 

as had Lanyard, the repackaged E-5 camera system. The whole 

concept of readout that originally underlay the program had been 

dropped, and in the entire series of Samos-derived mission attempts 

that started in January 1961, only the E-l and the Lanyard had returned 

photography in which photo interpreters could honestly express the 

slightest interest. As compared to Corona, E-l had been thoroughly 

inferior, while Lanyard displayed various defects of system and 

product that made its cancellation inevitable once Gambit had demonstrated even minimal capability. In coverage, quality, and detail, 

Gambit photography obtained from the sixth mission represented 

a data acquisition success that could only have been matched, In 

earlier years, by aircraft operations so uncertain of success and 

so risky in a political sense that even in the worst stages of the 

several international crises of the early 1960' s they were never 

serIously considered. And the only comparable successes of the 

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next eight years were to be Gambit-3 and Hexagon. In that sense, 

the success of the sixth Gambit mission constituted one of six real 

achievement milestones in the first fifteen years of serious satellite 

reconnaissance development by the United States. The others were 

the original Corona, the Corona-Mural stereo system, the dual-capsule 

Corona-J, Gambit- 3, and Hexagon. And two of those were improvements on existing systems. In that context, the first real operational 

success of Gambit in March 1964 could stand as one of the most 

remarkable achievements of U. S. technology in the first decade 

and a half of the space era, 

With the succe ss of the sixth flight, operational pr oving had 

been extended ln several areas, helping to determine the character 

of the seventh flight. Two events were of particular significance, 

First, the stellar index camera was finally mounted on the satellite. 

Second, the low altitude tests seemed very promising for the future. 

Greer, King, and McMillan were agreed that they should take the 

final step of flying the recovery vehicle with camera operating at 

low altitude during the seventh flight. The operational plan called 

for one day of flight at a 90-mile perigee followed by two days at 

70 miles. During the low flight, technicians at Vandenberg were 

to be prepared to adjust the orbit upward if any sign of unacceptable 

30 

temperature rise appeared. 

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The circulation of Ga:mbit- six photography through the intelligence co:m:munity had one effect on Ga:mbit-seven plans that neither 

Greer nor McMillan appeared to have foreseen, and which they and 

the :me:mbers of the Ga:mbit project group justifiably regarded as both 

unwelco:me and unwarranted. On 26 March 1964, two weeks before 

the scheduled launch of the seventh Ga:mbit McMillan received fro:m 

the Co:m:mittee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) a request that 

data on the ephe:meris and track of each Ga:mbit :mission be supplied 

to COMOR ten days in advance of launch so that, upon study, COMOR 

could add to the operational plan a set of photographic requests of 

31 

its own. 

The request had its origin ln two related circu:mstances, fir st 

that the Co~ operations with which COMOR was fa:miliar were 

target progra:m:med "by hand, It so to say. and second that COMOR 

was largely unfa:miliar with the highly co:mplex co:mputerized techniques used to construct a Ga:mbit :mission profile. Underlying the:m, 

of course, was a COMOR charter that i:mplied rights of target 

selection and recent history of disagree:ment about :mis sion and 

target priorities--disagree:ment that ste:m:med in part fro:m CIA 

beliefs that the Ga:mbit progra:m was insufficiently attentive to 

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intelligence needs. In this instance COMOR was largely reflecting 

the CIA viewpoint.:\< 

McMillan and Greer were in agreement about the importance 

of maximizing the amount of photography of priority targets on each 

mission. To that end, Greer had set in motion the technical effort 

required to plan each mission systematically, exploiting new computer 

methodology, so that the greatest number of highest priority targets 

would be photographed on each mission. That activity had only 

begun to bear fruit on the sixth Gambit flight. The idea of inserting 

even one r andoml y determined tar get in a mis sion so planned had 

nightma rish qualitie s. Such an insertion would almost certainly 

ensure that the mission was suboptimal--that some priority targets 

that might have been photographed would not be, and that those 

missed might, in sum, be more important than the single insertion 

that displaced them. Mission tinkering might not have that effect, 

of course, but it could. 

Dr 0 McMillan turned over the problem of reply to General 

John Martin, head of the NRO Staff. Martinis response was swift 

and deft. He provided a primer on the technical capacity of Gambit 

J. Q. Reber, who later became Deputy Director, National 

Reconnaissance Office, was the chairman of COMOR and its 

acknowledged spokesman; he was also a CIA employee. 

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and the means of utilizing it, explaining that orbital parameters 

were planned so as to be consistent with a target list which was a 

primary input for such computaticn s and pointing out that the 

optimality of such a mission plan would be destroyed by inse rtion 

of last minute targets. He felt tha t COMOR should ha.ve learned 

about the technical aspects of Gambit operations from experience 

with earlier requests for special targets. He concluded that, "It 

is simply not pos sible to proceed on the basis of manual target determination as the mission progresses without substantial loss of potential 

3a 

intelligence take. II 

The problem went away. The later success of Gambit operations precluded its resurrection. 

One point Martin did not make was that mission event planning 

was already having to cope with an excess of targeting requirements. 

The computer program then in use co uld absorb data on only 900 

targets although some 2700 had been earlier specified as "eligible. II 

This meant that some hand massaging would have to be done even 

33 

before the optimization routine could begin. And for Gambit 

number seven, there were other pre-launch problems. The launch 

date had already been slipped by about a week, but checkout was not 

going smoothly. On 16 April the mission was scrubbed because 

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the checkout crew could not satisfactorily explain (and fix) command 

34 

sequences anomalies which kept recurring in the test sequence. 

The seventh Gambit with stellar index camera aboard, was 

finally launched on 23 April. All mission assignments were successfully completed by the third day, after which the vehicle flew for 

an extra day~ making Gambit seven the first four-day system. In 

particular, the two days spent in low orbit were uneventful, preparations for emergency reorbit maneuvers being unnecessary. The 

only major malfunction of the flight was registered in the failure of 

a component in the horizon sensor, although that relati vel y minor 

anomaly caused track errors of as much as four miles late in the 

flight. Some camera pointing problems resulted, with a consequent 

degradation of photographic quality after orbit number 42. Inspection 

of the photographs showed that the low altitude at which most had 

been taken enhanced their quality substantially. Stereo pairs 

were particularly good, registering a "best!! resolution of two and 

a half feet. The stellar index camera had taken 663 frames, although 

many were of impaired value because of light fla re in the stellar 

exposures and overexposure in the terrestrial. Initial estimates 

of the cost of fixing those deficiencies were too high, so as an interim 

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measure, black felt material was affixed to the interior of the lens 

35 

cone to suppress reflection. 

Growing recognition of inherent Gambit capabilities contributed to the next attempted perturbation of the planned program. The 

CIA expressed interest in operating the system over Cuba, although 

the continuing success of U-2 flights in that area would seem to have 

provided sufficient assurance that the missile crisis of 1962 could 

not recur. Attempts--and success--at shooting down U-2's would 

presumabl y signal the start of a new crisis. But Gambit (and 

Corona too, for that matter) was in its usual mission mode not 

well adapted to reconnaissance over Cuba, mostly because its 

flight plan was optimized for operations at higher latitudes, at 

different sun angles, and in another hemisphere. Night launches 

from Vandenberg could put the satellite over Cuba during daylight 

hour s, as could launch from Cape Kennedy. Both options had 

severe drawbacks. A night launch from Vandenberg would create 

a mission capability limited to daylight operations over the Carribean 

and some other areas where the U. S. had little or no intellig ence 

interest. Daylight recovery near Hawaii would depend on successful 

orbit adjust and could not follow closely on photographic passes over 

Cuba. Facilities at Cape Kennedy were inadequate, and provision 

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of minirrlUm checkout capability would cost about $10 million and take 

about nine months. 

Basically, however, the Gambit camera-vehicle system was 

far les s than optimal for the sort of Cuban coverage being considered. 

Gambit could, of course, take both mono and stero strip photography. But a mono strip photograph over Cuba would cover a swath 

ten miles wide and 600 miles long. Several such passes would be 

needed to cover the entire island and resolution could be expected 

to degrade because of small, cumulative in-track errors which 

would normally be corrected between tar gets. U sing stereo pairs 

was not a better alternative: difficulties with slow settling times 

had still not been erradicated and computations showed that ten 

percent of time over target would be consumed by a single roll 

maneuver of 25 degrees. Finally, and ironically, the seventh 

Gambit flight had been a four-day mission, raising hopes of a fiveday mission shortly. Cuban coverage would need no more than a 

two-day mission, and that represented a costly disregard of the 

maximum technological capabilities of the satellite. Gambit obviously 

could do crisis reconnais sance if the need were su£iicientl y great, 

36 

but it did not appear that Cuban reconnaissance qualified. 

Preparations for the eighth flight proceeded, unruffled by the 

distant flap over Cuba. Mission plans were as for the seventh flight 

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except that the duration was to be four days. Low altitude flight would 

continue to be tried. 

Launch occurred on 19 Ma y just after noon. to be followed 

immediately by problems. After separation from the Agena, the 

satellite vehicle was injected into an orbit which was more than 30 

miles below the planned 90-mile perigee. Initial perigee was 57 

nautical miles--an altitude at which the satellite experienced 17 times 

the atmospheric density for which it had been designed. In addition 

the vehicle was rolling very rapidly. As tracking equipment lost 

contact with the vehicle, most flight controllers felt the vehicle had 

no chance of surviving the disastrously low orbit, much less the rapid 

spin. But the time Gambit had passed over the first downrange tracking 

station, however, the spin had stabilized automatically. On the second 

revolution. normal procedures for orbit adjust maneuvers were successfully carried out, lifting the vehicle into its planned 90-mile 

orbit. For the next 13 revolutions the vehicle operated nominally, 

producing what would later be labeled " ••. high quality stereo photography considered by some to be the best imagery yet obtained from 

satellite photography. II On the 15th revolution, however, the 

vehicle inexplicably lost all attitude reference. Just as mysteriously, 

it reappeared on tre 25th revolution. Photography resumed, but in 

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vlew of the various travails to which the satellite had been exposed, 

the mission was terminated on the second day instead of the fourth. 

37 

Capsule recovery was uneventfully successful. 

Attempts to explain the attitude control failure of the eighth 

flight were dominated by concern about the initial low orbit. Fears 

that the high atmospheric density would destroy ablative materials 

and cause rnal£unctioning of various subsystems seemed to have been 

borne out when attitude reference disappeared. That failure was 

initially charged to the effects of atmospheric heatingo But a similar 

failure occurred during the next flight, and later analysis of the flight 

track showed that it happened only when the satellite was over Antartica. 

It became apparent that the horizon sensor (which maintained attitude 

reference by determining the position of the horizon beneath the vehicle 

and appropriately issuing roll command) could not distinguish between 

the temperature of Antartic and the temperature of outer space--at 

least during winter in the southern hemisphere. Sensor redesign 

followed o Once the attitude sensor failure had been correctly credited 

to geography rather than atmospheric s, there wa s little remaining 

doubt that the vehicle could withstand the rigor s of extremely low 

altitude flight with no major deleterious effects. A bonus gained by 

the unscheduled experiment was a significant refinement of the standa rd 

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model of the atmosphere, which it developed, was wrong for the 50-

to 70-mile altitudes Gambit had penetrated. * 

The ninth Gambit flight was little distinguished from the 

eighth except that it spent no time at 50-mile altitudes--planned or 

otherwise. It expEl" ienced the same problems of attitude control, 

however, and the effects were considerably worse. The best resolution obtained was on the order of fifty feet, making photography of 

little worth. Inadvertent exhaustion of orbital control gas owing to 

the attitude control problem was so acute that the BUSS had to be 

used for capsule recovery. The best product of the flight was information about what had not caused the attitude reference problem of 

the eighth flight and where the correct solution should be sought. 

Three weeks after the mission ended, the project director, Colonel 

W. G. King was able to provide a definitive explanation for the entire 

38 

episode. 

And, unhappily, starting with Gambit number nIne there began 

a series of five missions which were generally poor in one or several ways. 

* Explaining where the correct data had originated was more of a problem 

than collecting and analyzing it; scientific satellites simply did not operate 

at 50-mile altitudes, aircraft could not go so high, and balloon data had 

been misleading. In the end, the "corrected" figures on atmospheric 

density were "surfaced" thr ough NASA, with no real explanation of source, 

and apparently nobody noticed. 

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The best resolution obtained during the entire period from earl y July 

to the end of October 1964 was seven feet. Only 345 targets were 

photographed during a total period when five separate launches produced 

but five da ys on orbit. The tenth flight was to be, according to the 

schedule agreed upon between Greer and McMillan, the last of the 

Gambit development flights. The generally good records of the sixth, 

seventh and eighth Gambit missions had roused sanguine expectations 

of returns thereafter, yet the three men most responsible for Gambit, 

McMillan, Greer and King, were too canny about research and development to count overmuch on a run of good luck. 

The hardware for the tenth Gambit flight had been modified 

in response to earlier problems. In particular, a new backup electromechanical device had been installed to operate the primary camera 

door in case the pneumatic system failed. Gambit number ten was 

also the first to use the new Atlas Standard Launch Vehicle (SLV-3). 

But early in the flight, an electrical failure, on 14 August, followed by 

a blown fuse, induced failure of the stellar index camera, making 

exact location of primary photographs difficult. From the 19th 

revolution the command programmer co uld not be loaded, the result 

of either a parts failure or poor contact in a coaxial connector for 

the harness between decoder and programmer. After recovery and 

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photoanalysis, poor resolution suggested a misalignment of the photo 

slit. It was only later that engineers discovered that the camera was 

out of focus because of a malfunctioning temperature sensor which 

forwarded incorrect temperature compensation data to focusing devices. 

(The problem was not identified until it recurred on the eleventh flight.) 

That eleventh flight, launched on 23 September, was marred by 

a host of problems. The focus error, incorrectly diagnosed from the 

previous flight recurred. In addition, two separate instances of valve 

contamination were identified: one valve was inhibited from opening, 

and the other remained open, allowing a slow leak. A new problem 

occurred with the stellar index camera. Camera access doors would 

open only partly because of weak springs (improper heat treating) and 

incorrect door clearances. The saving grace of the eleventh flight 

was that pointing accuracy of the camera proved to be superior to all 

39 

previous experience with Gambit. 

While the ninth, tenth and eleventh flights returned only poor 

and small amounts of photography, the next two missions returned 

none at all. The twelfth flight, an 8 October 1964 launch, expe denced 

an Agena failure and was the only Gambit flight in the original series 

that failed even to orbit. 

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Two weeks later, the thirteenth Gambit had been hurried to 

readiness. The intelligence community had gone almost four months 

without adequate cover2ge of important targets and expressed understandable uneasiness. Program managers were reasonably confident 

that there was sufficient information about hardware shortcomings to support 

adequate corrective measures, however. On 23 October the thirteenth 

bird was launched and successfully injected into orbit. The four-day 

flight went well, all subsystems working perfectly as far as the ground 

crews could ascertain. On the 67th r evolution, the command to retrofire was sent to the recovery vehicle. The reentry vehicle separated 

from the orbital control vehicle but thereafter --nothing. The backup systems available on the OCV could not be used. Natural orbital 

deca y finally brought the capsule down on its 93rd revolution, but 

40 

reentry point could not be accurately calculated and it was lost. 

Several consequences arose directly in that sequence of failures. 

Dr 0 McMillan reite rated, in their aftermath, that the principal program 

objective was to achieve one successful mission every 40 days. In line 

with this objective, the Secretary of Defense approved the procurement 

of an additional four Gambits during fiscal year 1966 (raising the total 

on order to 16) and an additional three for the next year, raising that 

total to fifteen. In addition, McMillan ordered the curtailment of all 

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piggyback experiments and supplementary development of Gambit in 

41 

an effort to improve the chances of success for the next few flights. 

A problem which was to recur the following year was the low 

quality of workmanship on the orbital control vehicle. The project office 

concluded that " .•. poor discipline in factory and field ... by the SV 

contractor ... " caused black-box failures at an unacceptably high rate. 

General Electric responded to such prodding by agreeing to a series 

of remedial actions: a reduction in overtime worked, slippage of 

delivery schedule to allow system modificCltions to be completed at 

the factory rather than in the field, a moratorium on piggyback 

payloads, and a general tightening up of personnel control and training. 

The terms on which agreement was reached indicate that GE 

was very concerned about the incentive scoring system. The contractor 

felt, for instance, that the introduction of extra payloads decreased 

his control over the chances for success--and a high incentive score. 

After a string of almost perfect scores, the ninth and tenth flights cost 

GE almost $70, 000 each in penalities. Oddly enough, despite several 

findings of faulty workmanship, the eleventh flight brought nearly the 

maximum fee to the contractor. There were clear indications that the 

contract incentive structure required overhaul. 

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General Electric ITlade serious efforts to iITlprove production, 

control and testing. Flight results suggested, for instance, that therITlal 

vacuuITl testing had been inadequate; both its intensity and its duration 

were enlarged. Vibration testing was also changed. Instead of "before 

and after" tests, "operation during vibration testing" was required. 

42 

Faults that earlier had gone undetected were thereby identified. 

During the early ITlonths of 1965 the horizon sensor probleITl was 

finally solved. The cause of loss of attitude reference had already 

been identified as the inability of the sensor to distinguish between 

earth and space during winter ITlonths over the south pole. The first 

response to this difficulty was to atteITlpt the developITlent of a ITlore 

sensitive device, but initial estiITlates of the cost and tiITle required proved 

low and the real probable cost unduly high. Spurred on by this, by 

study on the terrestrial ITlechanics of GaITlbit flights, and by the approach 

of warITler weather at the south pole, prograITl ITlanagers found a cheap 

solution. No targets of any value existed over the south polar regions, 

so the easiest answer was to let the vehicle coast over the area unstabilized. Once it returned to warITler latitudes, the horizon sensor 

could be reactivated and attitude control regained. The solution saved 

ITlore than the ITloney required to develop a bettor senso r; it also 

43 

perITlitted a significant saving of orbital control gas, 

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The fourteenth flight of Gambit began a pe riod of succes sful 

operation which was to continue through the summer of 1965. During 

the period, there was a significant increase in the amount of photography produced and the number of targets photographed, as well as 

a steady improvement in resolution. The fourteenth flight was the 

least successful of the lot, being aborted after only one day on orbit, 

and cloud interfered with photography during much of that day, but the 

recovered film registered a best resolution of 2. 1 feet. The BUSS 

control system was altered: Gambit number 14 incorporated several 

new features. BUSS commands were changed from single to double 

tone, and an address command was inserted in the BUSS programs. 

The first change resulted from the fact that fishing vessels frequently 

used the BUSS frequency for communications and occasionally transmitted the critical tones, triggering spurious commands of the BUSS. 

The second change was introduced in anticipation of having more than 

one vehicle on orbit simultaneously. 

Gambit number 14, launched on 4 December 1964, operated 

successfully through the first eight revolutions. During the ninth, however, battery overheating was followed by a loss of stability. The 

vehicle was recovered via BUSS during the 18th revolution, providing 

44 

a successful test of the new command coding. 

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A month and a half later, the fifteenth Gambit was launched. 

It was the first vehicle to incorporate the subsystems generated by GEls 

changed quality control process. Launched on 2.3 January 1965, Gambit 

15 went through separation and injection and the first few revolutions 

without untoward incident. But thereafter, three main heaters malfunctioned and temperatures in critic al sections of the space vehicle 

degraded throughout the flight. The result was that although photographs taken early in the flight had resolution of as good as two feet, 

they gradually diminished to ten feet by the fourth day. The vehicle 

was recovered during the fourth day, completing its planned mission 

succ es sfull y. 

The previous three flights had each been sched~led for five days 

of operations and none had lasted longer than one da yon orbit. By 

the time the fifteenth flight was launched, the seriousness of the problem 

45 

was such that the longevity aim was actually reduced to four days. 

Despite heater difficulties and a serious failure of the stereo 

mirror, Gambit 15 could be considered successful. The photographic 

take, of variable resolution, covered 688 targets - -more than any 

previous flight and more than the five preceeding flights together. 

The sixteenth flight began on 12 March under the s arne operational 

plan as the fifteenth. Again, a high volume of intelligence material 

was produced, but as there was no heater problem the photographs 

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were of uniformly high resolution. The major drawback was that on 

revolution 16 the stereo mirror stuck again, allowing only mono 

photography. 

The stereo mirror problem was finally pinned down by Eastman 

Kodak engineers as a result of data retrieved from Gambit 16. The 

fault was improper relay sequencing to the stereo servo which could 

cause arcing, the consequent welding of relay contacts, and freezing 

of the mirror in whatever happened to be its position when the weld 

occurred. Correction was relatively simple once the cause had been 

identified: the comlnand sequence was changed. Although other relatively minor problems of command transmission and decoding affected 

some of the photography, the flight returned a high volume of useable 

intelligence and was accounted successful. 

The seventeenth flight of Galnbit was something of a watershed for the program. It incorporated the products of all the hardware 

and procedural changes of the past year, a set that extended from 

improved testing and production control technique s to the reduction 

of piggyback experilnents flown on the vehicle. Two successive fourday mission successes had increased confidence that the five-day 

mission objective was now achievable, and correction of the sticking 

stereo mirror probleln eliminated the last known major technical 

defect of the system. 

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The mission began on 28 April. Except for one malfunction, 

it was superb. Photographic coverage increased to 992 targets, best 

resolution reached two feet (equaling the earlier "best"), and operation 

of the stereo mirror was uneventful, allowing 180 stereo pairs to be 

produced in addition to a high volume of mono photography. The single 

malfunction was in the primary camera door actuator, apparently a 

result of binding between the door and the opening or some nearby 

harnessing. The backup system overcame the difficulty, however, 

46 

and the outcome of the mission wa s not affected. 

The 17th Gambit was distincitive in another way, apart from 

its superlative flight performance and record intelligence return. It 

incorporated extensive new failure mode detection and diagnostic 

devices and associated telemetry. In some respects it was odd that 

such comprehensive instrumentation first appeared on the 17th 

Gambit vehicle. The greater need would appear to have passed, 

particularly if account were taken of the exceptionally good performance 

of the 17th vehicle and its two immediate predecessors. But as h?d been 

the cas e with Corona, the only earlier satellite reconnais sance system 

to provide useful intelligence returns, Gambit had no sooner demonstrated that it could satisfy (and in some respects, exceed) tre original 

program requirements than proposals for modifying it to produce still 

better intelligence began to surface. The feasibility of six- to eightBYE 17017-74 

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day missions was being seriously evaluated--and Gambit-3 was midway 

between first contract and first flight. * Those specific developments 

and several subsidiary aspects of Gambit evolution lent both respectability and urgency to the effort to obtain more definitive information 

on potential reliability enhancement, and that in the end was the object 

of the instrumentation effort. But it was not merely capability 

enlargement that encouraged attention to flight instrumentation; 

project officers were painfully aware of the possibility that the 

Gambit system could experience another plague of minor and major 

malfunctions that would inhibit its immediate usefulness, and experience 

of the recent past had clearly demonstrated that incorrectly diagnosed 

malfunctions tended to recur. (The attitude stabilization problem and 

the camera door difficulties were two painful reminder s of the need 

for adequate instrumentation and diagnostic capability.) As it hClppened, 

the incorporation of that additional instrumentation was providential; 

* A s earlier explained, in order to distinguish between the two 

programs the de signator "Gambit- 3" will hereafter be used in this 

manuscript to identify the two-capsule, long-lens system that, after 

June 1967, was formally known only as Gambit. A similar distinction 

has been made elsewhere: the terms Corona-Mural (or Corona-M) 

and Corona-J have been used here even though contemporary documents 

did not distinguish among the several variants of that system. It is 

perhaps worth noting that even after the original system disappeared, 

discussions among satellite program participants generally included 

references to IIG-cube" rather than "Gambit, If or "G. " 

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Gambit was indeed about to experience another set of flight difficulties 

not unlike those of flights nine through thirteen and for reasons very 

47 

much like those behind the earlier difficulties. 

The 18th Gambit was launched on 27 May 1965 with the 

assignment of performing a five-day operational mission. Apart 

from two non-significant functional problems (one being a recurrence 

of the earlier door-actuator failure), it experienced no on-orbit 

difficulties. The quantity of returned film was again larger than 

on any earlier flight, and resolution again reached a "best recorded" 

level of two feet. Two successive operations so superlative made it 

appear that Gambit had indeed matured, that it was a fully reliable 

operational vehicle subject only to the random minor disabilities 

inevitable in so corn plex a system. 

As though reas serting its rights to perversity, Gambit number 19 

was the complete anti thesis of its immediat e predec essors. Launched 

on 25 June 1965, it experienced a massive short circuit during ascent. 

The electrical failure completely disabled the stabilization system and 

the flight programmer. Either event was catastrophic. Notwithstanding 

the strenuous efforts of flight controllers to regain command, the 

vehicle remained unstable and uncontrollable during the 18 revolutions 

it logged. It was recovered via the Back-Up Stabilization System on 

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the 18th revolution. Usable output from the flight was nil. 

The initial diagnosis of the fai lure was that it had been induced 

by the extremely high vibration associated with the boost phase of 

the mis sion. The short circuit, which occurr ed on the ground side of 

the direct current power supply, opened the power supply input filter, 

48 

disabling the stabilization subsystem. More disturbing, the ultimate 

cause of the failure had to be either contamination or a faulty part--

which immediately suggested that quality control and testing procedures 

at General Electric had been gros sl y inadequate. 

On that unhappy note, Major General Robert E. Greer left the 

program, and the Air Force, on 30 June 1965. He, more than any 

other individual in or out of government, had been responsible for 

instigating the Gambit program and for carrying it to its mid-1965 

level of proficiency. With Colonel W. G. King, he had been personally 

responsible for all of the major, and quite difficult, technical and 

management decisions that marked the program's first five years. 

(Gambit had been invented, in a sense, in the summer of 1960, although 

it had not taken form as a system program until December of that year. ) 

By the only valid standard of comparison then available, the early 

Corona program, Gambit represented the most comprehensive and 

striking success yet achieved by the American reconnaissance satellite 

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program. It had recorded its successes earlier and with greater 

regularity than the early Corona, and the returned photography was 

in its own special way of equivalent or greater value. And by the 

summer of 1965, there was abundant evidence that Gambit could be 

improved at least as markedly as Corona had earlier been improved, 

with a consequent equivalent benefit to the overall satellite reconnaissance program. On balance, the achievement was qu.ite remarkable. 

Brigadier General John L. Martin, Jr., who had earlier 

headed the NRO staff in Washington but who had most recently been 

Greer I S deputy, succeeded to Greer I s post in Lo s Angele s. Virtually 

from the day of his acces sion, he was confronted with tre question of 

whether to proceed with the next scheduled Gambit launch on 9 July 

or to delay the mis sion in order to revalidate the pr obability of mis sion 

success. Given that the failure of Gambit number 19 could well have 

been caused by a random breakdown of the quality control, inspection, 

or testing procedures, Martin decided to proceed in accordance with 

existing plans. In any case, he was immediately confronted by a 

massive problem in contracting and procurement. 

Nearly two months earlier, program officers had advised 

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company of their increasing distaste 

for the high pric es reflected in Lockheed bids on new Agena vehicles. 

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Costs were much higher than for earlier deliveries of approximately 

the same equipment. Procurement officers concluded that Lockheed 

was negotiating to protect a position rather than "in good faith. II 

They were also concerned that Lockheed rnight be maintaining a 

large reserve pool of engineers who did not work on Gambit but 

were funded by that contract. Even more than was usually the case 

for a sole-source supplier to the government. Lockheed was in a 

very favorable situation for negoitating follow-on procurement. 

Agena production had continued at a regular rate for years and bid 

fair to continue for several more. NRO people had long since explored 

and discarded as unfeasible the possibility of establishing an alternative 

production source. It promised to be an extrernel y costly course, and 

one involving considerable technical risk. Nor, in general, could 

Lockheed be faulted for inferior Agena performance. Although some 

quality control problems had occasionally appeared, the Agena was 

widely regarded, at the time, as a reliable vehicle--something of a 

contrast to the more troublesome GE orbital vehicle, which was the 

49 

object of considerably more immediate concern On that score. 

The twentieth flight of Gambit slipped three days, to 12 July. 

The launch was a prompt and total catastrophe. The Atlas flight programrner shut down the sustainer engine prematurely and the Agena 

and its payload followed a ballistic trajectory to impact in the Pacific 

some 680 miles south of Vandenberg. 

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Although the Ga:mbit-20 :mission had been a co:mplete failure, 

the fault was al:most unique. Atlas boosters rarely :malfunctioned 

so thoroughly. The OCV and the Agena, :more characteristic sources 

of progra:m difficulty, had not been given a chance to de:monstrate their 

capability. Nevertheles s, the entire Ga:mbit syste:m was subjected to 

new and :more stringent test and inspection procedures starting with 

:mis s ion twenty-one. In particular, OCV co:mponents were subjected 

to x-ray inspection, and second, the intensity of vibration testing was 

increased by 30 percent. Both of these :measures led to the discovery 

of faulty OCV co:mponents, and in six other instances they were attributable to insufficient quality control and inspection during :manufacture 

and asse:mbly by GE. Power supply subasse:mblies. which had caused 

the June failure, were re-exa:mined in detail, with the result that 

several instances of the incorrect application of ther:mal grease were 

detected. 

The correction of such defects and the redefinition of :mission 

objectives caused a schedule slippage of one week. On 3 August 1965, 

the 21st Ga:mbit was launched. It achieved orbit without difficulty but 

the AC/DC power converter in the OCV pro:mptly failed~ resulting in 

an i:m:mediate and per:manent loss of stability. No acceptable photographs 

were recovered. Ga:mbit nu:mber 21 thus beca:me the third in succession 

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Understandably, the intelligence community was becoming 

increasingly concerned about the gap in detailed coverage of the Soviet 

missile program that three successive Gambit mission failures had 

caused. The last good high-resolution photography of what was known 

to be an intensive Soviet ICBM buildup had been recovered in May; 

owing to the rapid depletion of Gambit hardware, launch schedules 

could not be accelerated and not until at least late August would it 

be feasible to attempt another mission. (In the event, a September 

launch date proved to be the earliest that was achievable.) The minimum program goal of one successfulGambit flight each 40 days had 

gone by default. Nor was Gambit the sole--or even the paramount--

concern of the NRO during the summer of 1965. The Washington 

staff had been involved in institutional bickering between the Pentagon 

and the CIA which in September 1965 led to the departure of Brockway 

McMillan, for more than two years the Director of the NRO. Although 

the possibility that the NRO might be entirely abandoned as an instrument of national reconnaissance policy was dispelled by the appointment 

of a successor to McMillan (Dr. Alexander Flax) and by the issuance 

of a new NRO charter, the whole of the reconnaissance program was 

in some disorder. Corona operations had been reasonably successful 

during that summer, only one major mission failure having occurred 

in three flights, but Corona did not return the detail that intelligence 

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analysts had begun to expect and interpreta tion of Soviet force status 

had become heavily dependent on information elicited from Gambit 

photography. Some part of the institutional infighting of 1965 was 

occasioned by disagreement over the management of the Corona 

program and some of the Corona project people on the West Coast 

were convinced that a serious failure of Corona operations could 

result if the authority for technical and operational control of that 

bifurcated activity was not promptly sorted out. Although in retrospect that appeared to be no more than a minor possibility, it contributed to uneasines s on both coasts 0 And finally, an extended controversy 

about the nature and timing of a replacement system for Corona, 

and perhaps also for Gambit, was complicating plans for the continuation and improvement of both systems. 

Flax had to turn his attention to several of thes e is sues almost 

simultaneously; his immediate reaction to the Gambit problem was to 

suggest study of the possibility that "twenty to thirty" Gambit launches 

might be conducted each year. (At that time, increasing the schedule 

from 13 to 15 annual launches was occupying the project office; a 20-

launch-per-year program would require about an 80 percent expansion 

of production capacity--a considerable undertaking.) He was also very 

attentive to measures initiated by General Martin that were intended 

to improve markedly the general quality and reliability of delivered 

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GaITlbit subsysteITls, particularly the Agena and the orbital control 

vehicle (which had, on balance, provided ITlost of the prograITl difficulties, the Atlas and the caITlera systeITl being infrequent offenders.) 

General Martin's response to his probleITl of the ITlOITlent--

GaITlbit - -was to obtain approval of his proposal that the next scheduled 

GaITlbit launch be delayed by a ITlonth to perITlit ITlore cOITlprehensive 

testing and the incorporation of whatever correctives ITlight be needed 

to insure ITlission success. He, too, was keenly aware of widespread 

uneasiness about GaITlbit's potential. The decision to delay launch 

was not lightly taken; it guaranteed, at the least, that the next delivery 

of GaITlbit photography would occur at least a ITlonth later than had 

51 

earlier been expected. 

The ITlore extensive therITlal vaCUUITl and vibration tests being 

conducted by GE were uncovering large nUITlbers of faulty parts and 

asseITlblies, frec:p ent contaITlination, and other defects of workITlanship. 

But to Martin's relief, nothing seeITled to be inherently wrong with 

the design of the OCV or its interfaces with the Agena and the caITlera. 

Consistent with these findings, therITlal vaCUUITl testing was extended 

to 48 hours and expanded to include the entire OCV. SiITlilar tests 

were also applied to 24 critical cOITlponents. Vibration testing was 

also expanded to include cOITlplete systeITls with equipITlent operating 

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during the period of vibration. Inspection teams began tear-down of 

25 mission critical components on each vehicle, searching for contamination and bad workmanship--and finding more than enough to 

justify the time they spent. The vibr ation tests wer e enhanced by 

improved monitoring devices so that part failures or malfunctions 

could be more easily identified. Components which had earlier been 

extensively modified were subjected to complete requalification. 

(Many components little res embled their original, qualified format.) 

All inspection procedures were sharpened. Finally, because some 

modules reworked following identification of a failure became even 

more prone to failure, GE began an effort to decrease frequency of 

reworking. 

While some of these changes were routine enough and cheap 

enough to be continued thereafter, others were extraordinary measures 

adopted temporarily in response to what was widely regarded as a 

transitory crisis. The Air Force lacked the resources to su pport 

such a complex process of test and checkout through the life of an 

operational program. Recognizing that circumstance, General Martin 

began to plan for the adoption of a novel contract incentive scheme he 

had originated earlier, while serving as Greer's deputy. It was 

pointed more at GE than Lockheed, at first, because the failure of the 

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21st Gambit had resulted from the third catastrophic OCV failure in 

five flights. Martin's point of attack was the incentive fee contract 

with GE. His study of the existent contract incentive provisions led 

him to conclude that they were most appropriate for the development 

stages of the program and decidedly inadequate for the operational 

phase (which had presumably begin with the tenth flight). 

The incentive structure earlier installed emphasized the 

importance of cost over operational performance. It had been, at 

least in part, prompted by lost control problems characteristic of 

the early Gambit program. But it also reflected the experiences of 

Greer and King with previous satellite reconnaissance programs in 

the older Samos series. With few exceptions, they had incurred 

major cost growth. King's reputation for bringing high-cost, highrisk programs under control was highly regarded, and in assuming 

control of Gambit, he had done precisely that. 

But Gambit was no longer a development-focused activity. 

despite the continuation of engineering improvement activities. To 

the extent that the nature of satellite reconnaissance vehicles would 

permit, Gambit was a production item--witha1 one that little resembled 

the usual military article. 

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A second point seems to have been the expectation that as the 

Gambit program continued, the contractors, as a matter of course, 

would strive to earn the bulk of the performance incentive fee. The 

original contract incentive program perfectly reflected such considerations and beliefs. 

The incentive structure had three major parts: schedule incentives, cost incentives and performance incentives. The schedule 

cons ide ration was in fact a disincentive for late delivery of the vehicle. 

The maximum penalty for late delivery was $2000 a day, with a ceiling 

of $250.000. On the other hand, a cost overrun of 23 percent carried 

fee penalties of more than $2 million. GE would be penalized at a 

20-percent-of-fee rate for overruns until the fee was wiped out completely, and would profit at a 20-percent rate for underruns. Since the 

return to capital is computed by dividing fee by gros s cost, that 

arrangement meant that the rate of return on gross costs was a variable 

function of vehicle cost, dropping sharply for overruns and rising 

sharpl y for underruns. 

The performance incentive, unlike the cost incentive, was 

linear, being unrelated to the gross outlay for a given vehicle. A 

scoring system was devised on a scale from zero to 100. The critical 

region initially fell between 65 and 95, but these numbers increased as 

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the system became more fully operational. A score of 80 was the 

breakeven point where no incentive fees were either gained or lost. 

For scores above or below 80, the fee changed in proportion to the 

change in the score. The maximum gain or loss in fee that was 

pos sible under such a system was on the order of half the amount that 

could be gained or lost via the cost incentive. To any rational contractor, 

that arrangement was an imperative to worry about cost far more than 

about performance. 

One result of the bias was that GE was motivated to delete 

as many control and test procedures as possible in order to save 

money in the production of the vehicle. If, for instance. the deletion 

of a given test procedure had the same effect on reducing cost as on 

decreasing the probability of a failure, it would rationally be deleted, 

since half of the savings would be returned as an incentive fee on cost--

over and above any penalty for inferior performance. Because that 

accommodation also reduced the captial outlay of the contractor, the 

resulting fee increase would be proportionately larger than the fee 

differences arising from flight performance bonuses or penalties. 

Taken to its logical extreme, the formula could result in the 

delivery of a minimum-cost vehicle (23 percent less than negotiated 

price) which failed catastrophically, but nevertheless earned a premium 

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of $1, 000, 000 over and above the standard fee. The rate of return 

on invested capital in that case would be greater than 33 percent--

about twice the normally acceptable return on fairly risky investments 

by private firms. 

General Martin I s arrangement left the schedule incentive 

essentially unchanged, but radically altered the relationship between 

cost and performance incentives. The new system paid no bonus for 

a cost underrun, a reflection of the belief that the cost of a vehicle 

built at that relatively late stage in the program could be estimated 

rather precisely. The maximum penalty that could be incurred for 

cost overruns was about what it had been--$2 million. The major 

change was in the performance incentive. From a maximum or minimum of $1 million under the old system, it became a maximum or 

minimum $3.64 million. It no longer made sense to sacrifice per .... 

formance for cost savings because costs below negotiated price br ought 

no incentive fee, while performance shortfalls would reduce the fee at 

a much more rapid rate than before. Furthermore, even with an 

overrun of more than 25 percent, perfect performance meant a fee 

bonus of $1.5 million dollars. Most military procurements of the 

period were suffering from overruns at least as lar ge as 25 percent, 

so no rational contractor would quarrel with the conjunction of a 

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large price increas e coupled with an incentive fee. 

In retrospect, General Martin's incentive system represented 

probably the most significant non-technical accomplishment of the 

Garnbit program. It recognized the fact that contractor performance 

could, in some instances, be "fine tuned" to the objectives of the 

contracting agency. In this case, shifting the focus of the incentive 

system from development to operations had precisel y its intended 

ef£ect--to judge Gambit missions to which it applied (number 24 and 

after). 

Hindsight illuminates what General Martin saw: the contract 

performance of GE during 1965 steadily deteriorated, while fees did 

not. It seems clear that GE was reacting to an inappropriate incentive 

structure. Perhaps the change could have been made earlier. But 

the signs that seemed to stand out clearly after the fact--workmanship 

deterioration, faulty inspection, inadequate testing, and catastrophic 

failures resulting from such causes rather than from basic engineering 

design problems--were not readily detectable in the normal events of 

the early Gambit program. The succes s of early Gambit flights did 

nothing to make the identification of these problems any easier; when 

52 

all goes reasonably well, prophets of doom have small voices. 

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The introduction of expanded checkout procedures affected the 

program immediately, influencing the flights of Gambit 22 and 23. 

But those two vehicles were not subject to the provisions of the new 

incentive system. Nevertheless, changes in vehicle testing and quality 

control were rewarded by a successful flight for Gambit 22. That 

satellite was launched on 30 September 1965 after a lacuna of almost 

two months. The flight plan specified five days on orbit, but the excessive use of stabilization gas by the fourth day lessened vehicle stability 

so much that the capsule was called down on the 67th revolution. Some 

heating problems associated with the direct current power supply 

caus ed flight planners to reduce the battery charge below normal, 

but overall, the flight was a striking succes s. Some 963 targets were 

photographed and for the first time the two- to three-foot resolution 

required by the specifications for the vehicle was exceeded, 1.8 feet 

having been attained. This photography was the first intelligence 

53 

material produced by Gambit since the end of May 1965. 

The Gambit vehicle for flight number 23 differed in some 

important respects from earlier versions. Most important were the 

changes that made it the first six-day vehicle. They included the 

installation of a sixth battery and a 12 percent increase in Freon--

control gas--loading. The six-day capability had basically been made 

possible by the research on and development of thin-base film, 

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permitting a 20 percent greater quantity of film (by area) to be carried 

without any increas e in the size of loading or take-up casettes. 

Providing stabilization control for six rather than five days required 

several minor changes (computer programming for instance) but 

increasing control gas capacity was the most substantial. 

Owing to several circumstances (the new test and inspection 

regimen, the modifications needed to support a six-day miss ion, and 

delays in GE delivery schedules caused by correction of defects uncovered during checkout), the oev for Gambit mission 23 reached 

Vandenberg seven weeks later than planned. arriving on 14 October. 

Nonetheless, it was launched on schedule, on 8 November. The launch 

was called "a good job!' and injection went as well. But the excessive 

use of stabilization gas which had been experienced on the previous 

flight recurred; all gas was exhausted by the tenth revolution. The 

cause was leakage from the high-pressure regulator. The failure 

mode was peculiar in that it also caused thrust control valving to lose 

effectiveness, so that stabilization control vanished earlier than 

would have been the case had the leak occurred elsewhere. Only 76 

photographs were taken of 19 targets during the 18 revolutions of 

the flight. of which ten were stabilized. Resolution was so poor that 

it could not be measured. 

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The gas pressure failure on Gambit 23 led to a detailed design 

change which became effective immediately before Gambit-3 replaced 

the original version, but it also lent further impetus to the continuing 

shift from pneumatic to electro-mechanical devices for Gambit-l. 

Owing to the excellent instrumentation carried on the 23rd vehicle, 

considerable data applicable to engineering improvements for appli54 

cation to later Gambits were obtained. 

Gambit number 23 was a turning point of another- -and welcome--

sort; it was the last of the lot of generally imperfect vehicles flown in 

1965. The next ten flights were to be almost unqualified succes ses. 

The combination of quality control enhancement and the new contract 

incentive system became operative for the 24th and later Gambits. 

Each of the next ten flights experienced malfunctions of one sort or 

another, but none could be called a failure in consequence of those 

malfunctions. Those missions extended from January to October 

1966, Gambits being launched about once a month during that period. 

They routinely returned photographic intelligence of high quality, 

covering more than a thousand targets on each flight. One flight 

returned photographs of 2000 targets. "Best resolution" ranged 

from 2.5 feet to 1.9 feet for the entire series of missions and averaged 

about 2.0 feet. 

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Major system anomalies in that set of missions included two 

malfunctions of the stereo mirror, two stellar index camera breakdowns, 

and four instances of orbital control difficulties. None was grave 

enough to imperil mission success, although each had the effect of 

degrading total mission success in some degree. The OCV experienced 

no malfunctions of any sort during the first five of the ten flights, 

but four of the last five were so marred. The new testing procedures 

were extremely effective, locating and identifying several potentially 

catastrophic failure modes well in advance of launch. If only half of 

the major problems so identified by the new procedure had gone 

undetected by launch time, the majority of the missions would have 

failed or returned much degraded photography. 

Beyond these matters, Gambit registered several notable 

achievements during the period. Although the first two missions had 

six-day capability, they were limited to five days because of minor 

system malfunctions. The third flight with six-day capability, however, flew for something more than six days, registering 99 revolutions 

and the remainder of the planned six-day flights performed as scheduled. 

On the third anniversary of the flight program, 12 July 1966, 

the first vehicle with eight-day capability was launched. It was recovered 

on the 20th, having precisely satisfied the extended mission requiremente A comparison of the two flights, three years apart, had some 

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very interesting elements. The first Gambit had been quite successful, 

in its own way, even though limited to what was predominately a 

research and development function. But in the interim, Gambit 

had extended its longevity (one to eight days on orbit), had increased 

the number of targets (from three to 1636), and had improved resolution (from 3.5 feet to 2.5 feet). And except for longevity, the initial 

eight-day Gambit was not particularly distinguished; it had the poorest 

resolution of the ten-mission set in 1966 and returned 20 percent 

fewer target photography than the best of the lot. 

The first eight-day mission was the 30th Gambit. The 31st 

had originally been scheduled for launch eighteen days later, on 30 

July 1966, but the first wildly succes sful Gambit- 3 flight intervened. 

Gambit-3 had more than twice the film capacity of its predecessor, 

two recovery capsules, and a lens with a focal length of 160 rather 

than 77 inches. Gambit-3 was so extraordinarily successful in its 

initial operation that the need for launching the 30th in the original 

Gambit series on its original schedule completely vanished. Indeed, 

the returns from the first Gambit-3 mission so overloaded the film 

processing and interpretation capabilities of the National Reconnais sance Program that had the 31 st Gambit operated with its usual 

effectiveness there would have been no timely way to exploit the intelligence return. Whatever else Gambit might have achieved in its 

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first three years, it had completely suffocated--in film--early complaints from the intelligence community that not enough data were 

being returned. Now the problem was an excess of photography, a 

surfeit that would continue for a considerable period. 

The string of successes that had begun with Gambit-l number 

24 was broken at ten. The cause was almost as infuriating as the flight 

was disappointing. The manufacturer of the explosive charges that 

removed the camera doors had changed pyrotechnic specifications 

without properly advising those responsible for altering the remainder 

of the camera door actuation sequence. In consequence, the door 

itself was not altered to accommodate the new changes and could 

not be removed once the vehicle was on orbit. Only stellar index 

photographs could be made. A new manufacturer was found, the door 

was altered appropriately, and provisions were made for door removal 

even if only one of the charges operated correctly. No further problems 

55 

of that sort arose. 

Gambit number 34 was the last instanc e of catastrophic failure 

in the original Gambit-l flight program~ although less serious malfunctions continued to occur. Gambit number 35 suffered from an 

excessive roll time at low rate, causing degradation both in the number 

of targets that could be photographed and in the resolution (2.5 feet). 

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A programming error caused selection of the wrong shutter slit during 

revolutions 7 to 25 of the 36th Gambit mission, with approximately 

the same effect. The last two flights, Gambits number 37 and 38, 

registered no problems of any consequence, an outcome that had 

marked only one other operation in the entire program (number 31). 

Those flights were also distinguished for photographing the greatest 

number of targets (2015 targets on mission 38) and for the best reso56 

lution obtained in the original Gambit-1 program (1. 6 feet). 

The last three flights extended from February to June 1967. 

By the time the last capsule was recovered on 12 June 1967, most 

of the remaining resources of the Gambit program had been dispersed. 

The distributed res idual included four orbital vehicles and four Atlas 

57 

launch vehicles, plus several cameras and Agenas. 

The original Gambit-l program had been completely phased 

out by the end of June 1967. not quite three years after the first of 

its 38 missions. The name survived: "Gambit-cubed" dropped its 

suffix and thereafter was known as "Gambit. II The newer system had 

by that time completed eight operations, mostly successful, and was 

returning film images with resolutions consistently better than the 

1.6 feet that was the best ever obtained from the 77-inch cameras used 

in the older reconnaissance satellite. Had that not been the case, had 

Gambit-3 been troubled by major problems of operation or resolution, 

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four additional missions using the older system could have been 

mounted. They proved unnecessary. In a special sense, the older 

Gambit was the victim of its own success. The best of the original 

system had been carried over to the new, and progress in technology 

combined with simple economics to make continuation of the older 

system an exercise in inefficiency. Gambit-3 cost somewhat more, 

but one Gambit-3 mission returned more than twice as much film. 

at better resolutions, and of more targets than the original could 

ever manage. 

Even after Gambit-l became one of the several casualties of 

technological obsolescence in the American satellite reconnaissance 

program, the system added another "first" to its considerable record 

of accomplishment. It became the first of the satellite reconnaissance 

systems--the first of all clandestine reconnaissance systems--to 

leave behind both a careful historical record* and a full set of system 

"hardware II deliber ately stored against the day when it could be openly 

displayed. 

* Somewhat sketchy historical accounts of the early Samos program 

appeared in the Air Force histories prepared at Wright Air Development 

Center (later the Aeronautical Systems Division of the Air Force 

Systems Command) in the mid-1950s but even then access to program 

details was difficult to acquire. Still sketchier records appeared in 

early chronological summaries of activity at the Ballistic Missiles 

Division (later the Space and Missiles Systems Organization of the 

Air Force Systems Command) from about 1956 until early 1960. The 

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>:«continued) first serious attempt to write a history of any such program 

was sponsored by Major General (then Brigadier General) Robert Eo 

Greer in 19620 He arranged to have Robert Perry, at that time the Air 

Force historian for the Air Force Space Systems Division, assigned to 

his organization, the Special Projects Office, on an informal, part-time 

basis. Greer's expressed purpose was to insure that accounts of the 

increasingly complex Air Force reconnaissance satellite program were 

prepared before the vital records disappeared. His support was continued and enlarged by his successors (Generals J. L. Martin, W. G. 

King, Lew Allen, and D. D. Bradburn). The activity to be covered by 

the history also expanded substantially, largely at the urging of Colonel 

Paul E. Worthman, an early Corona program manager and subsequently 

the long-term chief of plans for successive heads of the National Reconnaissance Office staff in the Pentagon. Perry continued to work toward 

a comprehensive satellite reconnaissance program history after leaving 

his Air Force position to join the research staff of the Rand Corporation 

in 1964, and became a contract historian after transferring from Rand 

to Technology Service Corporation in 1972. He was briefly assisted 

by W. D. Putnam, another former Air Force historian employed by 

Rand, in 1969-70. Bureaucratic considerations (the "blue suit" Air 

Force would not agree to the expenditure of Project Rand contract funds 

on such work) interrupted the preparation of the history between 1969 

and 1973, and relatively little was done in the years 1967-69 because of 

Perry's primary commitment to the Rand Corporation assignments. The 

work was taken up again late in 1972 under CD ntract between the Special 

Projects Office and Technology Service Corporation, at which time 

Robert A. Butler, a consultant with that firm, became a collaborator. 

The product of that spasmodic work over a period of ten year s (to the 

time of this note) is this manuscript- -which includes coverage of the 

background of Samos, the several E-series Samos programs, Corona 

and its descendants, Gambit, the evolution of the National Reconnaissance Office and its early activities, and related issues and programs. 

To the best knowledge of the present authors and present and past 

members of the NRO staff, there is no formal history of any other 

reconnaissance program ever conducted by the United States. A CIAsponsored hostory of Corona was nominally in preparation late in 1972, 

and apparentl y some effort within CIA has been devoted to pr eserving 

records of the Idealist (U -2) and Oxcart (A-12) aircraft programs, but 

that represents the sum of such history. The ancestor of all such programs, 

the balloon-carried reconnaissance camera system of the mid-1950s, appears 

to have disappeared from the records. Given the volume of documentation 

of reconnaiss ance prograill activity by 1970, that is unlikely to happen again--

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Early in August 1967, Martin suggested to Dr. Flax that 

Gambit systems left over from the program and brief summary records 

of the achievements of the Gambit program be encapsulated "for eventual 

release to the Air Force Museum and the Smithsonian Institute. " 

Flax promptly agreed and issued appropriate instructions to the Air 

Force Chief of Staff and the Commander, Strategic Air Command (in 

whose facilities the artifacts would be stored). Flax gave the enterprise 

58 

the name, "Project Van Winkle. II 

In due time (and rather more time than originally planned), 

two large sealed canisters went to Building 1538 at Vandenberg Air 

Force Base with instructions for long-term storage under continuing 

guard. Each contained both hardware and documents, and each carried 

a plaque explaining that the contents were neither explosive nor toxic 

but that they could be opened on! y by approval of the Secretary of the 

Air Force--at some future time. Flax also'insured that "each succeeding 

commander of Strategic Air Command and the Commander of Vandenberg 

59 

Air Force Base "be briefed on what had been done. II 

* (continued) but detailed source material of the kind available in 

the early years of Gambit and Corona had become a casualty of the 

records destruction process by 1970, so there is no as surance that 

all of the important events can ever be captured for historians. 

(RP, March 1973) 

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The accompanying summary report, enclosed with the two 

sets of Gambit hardware, covered the main events of the Gambit-l 

program. (The summary had to be completely rewritten early in 

1968; as first presented to Martin by General Electric, which had 

a contract for the whole of the preservation work, it was classic 

engineering and was nearly unintelligible. Martin had the thenunofficial program historian, Robert Perry of Rand, prepare an 

English version.) 

The hardware included everything that went into orbit with 

Gambit above the interface with the Atlas booster. It was a fitting 

interment. * 

Comparable Corona hardware was subsequently treated in 

similar fashion, under CIA auspices, but was on display in a closed 

area of the National Photographic Interpretation Center in Washington. 

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NOTES ON SOURCES 

SAFSP, Gambit Program Summary Report 1960-1967. 

prep by R. Perry, Sep 67, p -124 (hereafter cited as 

Gambit Summary). 

Memo, MGen R. E. Greer to Col. W. G. King, 24 Jul 63, 

subj: Instructions on Second 206 Bird, SP files. 

GE, 206 Program Report, Rough Draft, Document No. 

DIN 500200-34-1. (undated, prep Jul 67), p 11-6, (hereafter referred to as GE Report). 

Memo, Greer to King, 24 Jul 63. 

Gambit Summary, p 1-25. 

For details, see Vol V this history, p 112, et seq. 

For Mission details, see GE Report, p 11-7. 

Msg 7028, EK to SAFSS, 10 Sep 63. 

Msg, SAFSP-F-13-9-936, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 

to B. McMillan, DNRO; 13 Sep 63. Msg, SAFSS-I-M0196, McMillan to Greer, 17 Sep 63; msg, 1 13462, 

Greer to McMillan, 18 Sep 63. 

Msg, 0698, B. McMillan, DNRO, to MGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir /SP, 24 Oct 63. 

See Vol V, pp 120-135; see also: MFR, MGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir/SP, 15 Aug 63, subj: Plans for Ultra-High Resolution 

Reconnaissance, in SP-3 files; memo, R. Gilpatric, Dep 

Sec Def, 5 Sep 63, subj: Discussion with Mr. McCone 

regarding NRO, in NRO Staff files; itr, A. D. Wheelon, 

D/Dir (Sat), CIA, to Dr. B. McMillan, DNRO, 5 Nov 63, 

no subj, NRO Staff files. 

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GE Report, p 11-8. 

Msg, 110918, B. McMillan, DNRO, to MGen R. E. 

Greer~P, 12 Feb 64. 

Rpt, National Reconnaissance PrograITl Status, 29 Jan 64, 

SP-3 files; GaITlbit SUITlITlary, pp 4-22 and 4-25. 

15. NRP Status, 29 Jan 64, p 3. 

16. 

17. 

19. 

2 O. 

21. 

22. 

2. 3. 

24. 

2. 5. 

26. 

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See Vol IIB, Lanyard, nOITlinally and occasionally called 

a "GaITlb~t backup, II did not pretend to GaITlbit-clas s resolutions. 

GE Report!,. pp 11-4, 11-9. 

Ibid; NRP Status, 29 Jan 64. 

Msg, ~1 __ ~10918, McMillan to Greer, 12 Feb 64. 

GE Report, p 11-4. 

Ibid, pp 5-18 to 5-21. 

Msgs,1 11139 and 1141, STC to SAFSP, 26 Feb 64; 

GE Report. 

Msg 1 11161, STC to NPIC, 27 Feb 64; ITlsg, ~I _____ ~-

1165, STC to SAFSS, 28 Feb 64; ITlsg,1 12528, SAFSS 

to NPIC, 28 Feb 64. 

See Quarterly PrograITl Review, DeceITlber 31, 1965 

(hereafter cited as QPR) for details of GE Incentive PrograITls. 

The scoring systeITl had changed slightly up to that tiITle 

and was overhauled cOITlpletel y in DeceITlber. 

Msg,1 142.67, SAFSP to SAFSS, 18 Feb 64. 

"------_~14357, SAFSP to SAFSS, 3 Mar 64. 

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Msg, 1 14362 , BGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. to B. McMillan, 

DNRO, 4 Mar 64; msg, Whig 1030, BGen J. L. Martin, 

Dir/NRO Staff, to Greer, 17 Mar 64. 

Msg, 1 14562, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to BGen 

J. L. Martin, DNRO Staff, 25 Mar 64. 

Ibid; msg. Spectre 2061, NPIC to AF Proces sing Lab 

(AFSPPL), 27 Mar 64. 

Msg, 1"--_~~562, 25 Mar 64. 

Memo, J. Q. Reber, Chm, COMOR, to DNRO, 26 Mar 64, 

subj: Request for Epheimeris Data for Next KH-7 Mission, 

in SS files. 

Memo, BGen J. L. Martin. Jr, Dir/NRO Staff. to Chm 

COMOR, 27 Mar 64, subj: Target Priorities, in SAFSS files. 

Msg. '------~I 1458, STC to SAFSS, 27 Mar 64. 

Msg, "----_~11601. STC to SAFSS, 16 April 64. 

Msg, Spectre 2247, NPIC to AFSPPL, 6 May 64; GE Report, 

pp 11-12; QPR, 31 May 64. 

Staff memo for Col J. Lowe, SAFSS-6, (undated. but 

prepared 3 May 64); msg, 1 13233, SAFSS to SAFSP. 

7 May 64; msg. ADIC 6222, CIA (Col'. J. Ledford) to BGen 

J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, 1 May 64; msg, Whig 1214. 

DNRO to CIA. 4 May 64. 

Msg, Spectre 2407, NPIC to SAFSP, 10 Jun 64; GE Report, 

p 11-13; msg, 1 11760, STC to SAFSS, 30 Apr 64. 

Interview, Col W. G. King, Dir/Program 206, by R. Perry, 

27 Jul 64. 

QPR, 30 Sep 64. Many of these details there specified are 

in conflict with those provided by the GE Report, cited for 

previous flights. For various reasons, the program review 

document seems more reliable. 

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GE Report, p 11-17; The time lag between the 12th and 

13th flights was 15 days, which represented a speed-up 

of only five days from the originally scheduled 28 October 

launch. Considering the problems created by launch 

schedule acceleration, however, that represented a considerable achievement. 

SAFSP, Quarterly Program Review, 31 Dec 64. 

GE Report, pp 5- 6 and 5-70 Such tests began with vehicle 

966, used for the 16th flight. A final form of test procedure 

was introduced with the vehicle for the 26th flight. This 

combined the operation-during-vibration idea with an 

accurate mission profile to simulate on-orbit events. 

Interview, MGen R. E. Greer by R. Perry, 20 Nov 64. 

GE Report, p 11-18. 

Ibid. 

GE Report, pp 11-4 and 11-19; Gambit Summary, p 3, 

Attachment 1. 

QPR, 30 June 65. 

GE Report, p 11-20. 

QPR, 30 Jun 65, Procurement Section. 

QPR, 30 Sep 65; 31 Dec 65; see also Ch V of Vol V, this 

ms s, and particularly pp 211 et seq. 

QPR, 31 Dec 65. 

Memo, BGen J. L. Martin, Dir/SP, to DNRO, 29 Aug 67, 

subj: Summary Anal ysis of Program 206 (Gambit), atch 4; 

Interview, Martin by R. Perry, 8 Aug 67. 

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GaITlbit Sw:nITlary, AttachITlent 1. 

QPR, Sep 65. 

QPR, 31 Dec 66. 

GE Report, p 11-4, and GaITlbit SUITlITlary. AttachITlent 1. 

QPR of 31 Mar 67; 30 Jun 67. 

MeITlo, BGen J. L. Martin, Jr, to SAF{R&D) (Dr A. Flax), 

4 Aug 67; subj: Long-TerITl Storage of GaITlbit Hardware at 

Vandenberg AFB (Project Von Winkle); ITleITlo. Flax to 

CITldr, SAC, 25 Aug 67, saITle subj, all reproduced in 

PrograITl SUITlITlary Report, Vol I, 6 Mar 68. 

MeITlo, BGenJ. L. Martin, Jr, Dir/SP, toDrA. Flax, 

DNRO, 6 Mar 67, subj: Long-TerITl Storage of GaITlbit 

Hardware at Vandenberg AFB (Project Van Winkle), in 

SAFSP files; ITl eITl 0, Flax to CITldr, SAC, 25 Aug 67. 

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XIV THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERA TION OF GAMBIT - 3 

Background and NOITlenclature 

GaITlbit was the first operational AITlerican satellite systeITl to 

return high resolution photography. ~< Originally designed around a 

lens of 77-inch focal length to produce photographs with ground resolutions of two to three feet, the GaITlbit was boosted to orbit by an 

Atlas-Agena cOITlbination. The caITlera systeITl was housed in an orbital 

control vehicle built by General Electric, an innovation in photosatellite design intended to overCOITle the assuITled stability shortcOITlings of the Agenao The caITlera systeITl was a product of EastITlan 

Kodak design; the recovery capsule was adapted froITl one first developed 

by General Electric for the Corona satellite. Operational use of the 

original GaITlbit systeITl began on 12 July 1963 and continued until 4 

June 1967. During that tiITle 38 vehicles were launched. The successor 

surveillance satellite in the National Reconnaissance PrograITl was 

GaITlbit- 3. 

During its developITlent and operational life, GaITlbit was identified by several designators other than its code naITle. "Cue Balllf and 

PrograITl 206 were respectively a classified non-ByeITlan cover naITle 

As noted elsewhere, the abortive SaITlOS E- 3, E- 5, E- 6, and Lanyard 

systeITls were intended to perforITl surveillance functions of one sort or 

another, but none ever becaITle operational and only Lanyard produced 

satellite photography. 

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and the "white" prograITl designator. Neither was publicly identified 

with satellite surveillance. GaITlbit-3 was often called "GaITlbit-Cubed" 

although the "-3" designator was actually a suffix differentiating that 

particular design froITl three others: GaITlbit-l, the original, GaITlbit-2 

a proposed ITlode st iITlproveITlent, and GaITlbit-4, a proposed very-highresolution systeITl considered as an alternative to GaITlbit- 3 for 

developITlent as a second-generation surveillance satellite. 

GaITlbit-3 was influenced by but was not directly related to the 

Valley systeITl, a very-Iong-lens developITlent project conducted by 

EastITlan Kodak in the early 1960s. The lens s ysteITl derived froITl 

Valley work was ITluch ITlore closely akin to the proposed GaITlbit-4 

than to GaITlbit-3. When first considered, GaITlbit-3 was also inforITlally 

referred to as PrograITl 207, iITlplying that it was the follow-on to 

3 

IIPrograITl 206. " as Advanced GaITlbit, and G --or "G-Cubed." G-3 

eventually becaITle the accepted shorthand de'signator for the succes sor 

s ysteITl, although upon the cOITlpletion of the original GaITlbit prograITl and 

the start of GaITlbit- 3 operations that suffix was dropped. Old hands 

continued to use "G-3" as a convenient way of distinguishing the 

successor systeITl froITl its predecessor. For reasons of clarity, that 

distinction has been retained here. In the following sections, the terITl 

GaITlbit- 3 is ordinarily used to identify the "advanced" s ysteITl, and 

GaITlbit-l the original. Unless otherwis e indicated when the terITl GaITlbit 

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without a suffix appears in quotations, it can be interpreted as referring 

to Gambit- 3, that being the official post-1967 nomenclature. 

In the Talent-Keyhole designation system us ed to identify 

the products of photographic reconnaissance operations, Gambit-l 

products were labeled KH-7, and Gambit-3 products KH-8. 

The Origins of Gambit- 3 

Even before the first of the original Gambit reconnaissance 

satellites had been launched in July 1963, planners acknowledged the 

need for a more capable surveillance system. By implication, they 

suggested that such a system could be successfully developed. 

The underlying rationale for satellite surveillance stemmed 

from as sumptions that significant operational and technical details of 

Soviet weaponry could be discovered through satellite photography. 

Something could be learned from photography with resolutions of two 

to three feet--which was from three to five times better than anything 

Corona, the only other available system. might then produce. But 

much more could be deduced if photographs capable of resolving 

ground details one foot or less on a side were returned for analysis, 

and the intelligence cOrn.rrlunity wanted "much more. " 

The dominant ingredients of higher resolution tended to be focal 

length (which by implication included optical aperture), and pointing 

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accuracy (which included stability). Smear, a product of imprecise 

camera stabilization and imperfect image motion compensation, was 

not always treated as a major constraint in the effort to obtain high 

resolution. Nor, for that matter, was focal length alone. In the 

early 1960s the objection to using very-long-lens systems was more a 

matter of system weight, and principally weight of optics, than 

magnification potential. 

Long lens systems created enlarged images of relatively 

small areas. In that circumstance, pointing accuracy was es sential; 

surveillance targets had to be caught within the optical field of the lens 

system if the total system was to be functional. It was customary to 

design lens or mirror motion into camera systems to cover a wide 

swath of the earth. But panoramic coverage at high magnifications 

required huge film quantities, and given the relatively limited film 

capacity of the boosters and orbital vehicles available in the early 

1960s, using panoramic coverage techniques as a substitute for 

pointing accuracy was not an attractive option. 

Lacking a better solution, camera designers of the early 1960s 

had to adopt a "brute-force" gross coverage approach--essentially a 

"broad swath" technique. That was the essence of the early Valley 

program, a proposal to carry large quantities of high-acuity film to 

compensate for what was assumed to be an inherent deficiency in 

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camera pointing accuracy. Pointing with the precision required to 

operate a narrow-swath camera system was until 1963 generally assumed 

to be beyond the capability of satellite-carried cameras. 

Recovery of the first Gambit-l film in July 1963 disclosed 

that several system capabilities about which there had been significant 

doubt were feasible. Although few photographs were recovered from 

the first Gambit mission (because Major General Robert E. Greer 

was determined to obtain "one good picture" and not to endanger that 

goal by attempting complete system operation on the trial mission), 

the consequences were enormous. Getting the pictures was one substantial achievement;* the obtained resolution of about 3.5 feet was 

Apart from Corona, which had been operational for three years, 

one Lanyard flight of May 1963 which produced a few photographs 

of no great intelligence worth and the returns from one Samos E-1 

mission (with resolution limited to about 100 feet), represented the 

only previous successes of a satellite reconnaissance effort that had 

been in existence for nine years and had been heavily funded for five. 

C orona, sponsored by the CIA, was not considered an element of 

the "Air Force" satellite reconnaissance program, being classified 

as an "interim" capability system even though developed, managed, 

and operated mostly by Air Force people. Both the Samos E-5 

and Samos E-6 programs had failed and had been cancelled by the end 

of 1962-- after eight consecutive mission failures (nine, if the first 

Lanyard were counted), An effort that very probably cost more than 

a billion dollars had yet to produce useful photography. Greer's 

concern for "one good picture" was all too understandable in those 

circumstance s. 

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another; and exceptional pointing accuracy was a third. Although 

the first two were of greater immediate importance, the demonstrated 

ability of Gambit-l to point its optical system with great precision 

caus ed a complete revision of long-term plans for a next- generation 

surveillance system. Valley was promptly redirected toward "narrow 

swath" concepts; the "wide swath" and "brute force" approaches 

were abandoned as unnecessary. By August 1963. Valley research 

and Gambit-l experience had convinced the National Reconnaissance 

Office that long focal lengths were feasible for satellite operations 

and that (because pointing accuracy could be guaranteed) a system 

built around large optics could be appreciably lighter than had 

earlier been thought necessary. One consequence was that plans 

for the "big optics" system were adjusted to provide for use of an 

Atlas rather than the much larger Titan III-C booster (although other 

1 

considerations later caused a reversion to the Titan booster). 

Disagreements and uncertainties marked subsequent developments. A major contributor was a bureaucratic competition for 

control of the satellite reconnaissance program. But for the most 

part such skirmishing concerned matters other than the "very high 

resolution" system, which in July 1963 received the endorsement of 

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Dr. E. M. Purcell and a special panel he headed>';: and in September 

2 

became the subject of preliminary plans for contractual actions. 

One of the problems was technical: the Purcell Panel had recommended 

development of specific lens systems defined in terms of focal length 

and aperture (and very large aperture at that- -i/ 2.0 and f/l. 5 lenses 

of 60- and 40-inch diameter were proposed!). General Greer was 

convinced that the proper course was to require a specific ground 

resolution and let the system design emerge from the tradeoffs necessary 

3 

to obtain that resolution. Ultimately that became the approved course 

of Gambit- 3 development, but in 1963 it was not popular. 

Although several contractors had been involved in the "big 

optics!! program of 1961-63, Eastman Kodak had two notable advantages 

when proposal time arrived, having been the principal contractor for 

Valley and having designed the original Gambit system. It would 

have been feasible, of course, to have some contractor not involved 

in either Valley or Gambit develop a Gambit successor, but cost, 

time, and technical capability factors all agreed against such a course. 

The Purcell Panel simultaneously urged discontinuance of efforts 

to develop new optics for Corona and in so doing provided the initial 

impetus for the S-2 and Fulcrum programs. By 1966, the Hexagon 

program had emerged, laboriously, from Fulcrum and S-2 activities. 

See Chapter XIII. 

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Early in December 1963, Eastman Kodak presented ideas and 

concepts for an advanced Gambit system to Dr. Bro ckway McMillan* 

and (subsequently) to General Greer. As a result of the presentation, 

Greer formally proposed the development of a higher resolution, 

longer lens Gambit system. 

The crux of Eastman's proposal was to develop a system that 

Will ld exploit the pointing accuracy of Gambit-l to drive a camera 

with a 160-inch focal length lens. Eastman urged that resolutions 

of better than one foot could be obtained from such a system, assuming 

photography from an orbital altitude of 90 miles. Eastman also proposed that the new system incorporate a ilfactory to pad il co ncept 

providing greater modularity than Gambit-I. Specifically, instead 

of an orbital control vehicle which enveloped the camera system, 

East man propos ed using two modules, physically distinct, one co ntaining 

the camera and the other providing orbital control. That arrangement 

would make it unnecessary to do major assembly work at the launch 

4 

complex, a troublesome aspect of Gambit-l operations. 

Although the proposed Advanced Gambit would include a variety 

of detailed refinements of the basic Gambit system, Eastman Kodak 

Director of the National Reconnais sance Office from February 

1963 to October 1965. 

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felt that the major system performance improvements would derive 

from three factors: focal length, the use of International Harvester's 

Invar {a brazed, low coefficient of expansion material} as the mirror 

substrate, and introduction of a new thin-base, high-resolution film 

with a substantially higher exposure index than that available for Gambit-l. >:< 

Three candidate systems had received attention during the 

1962. -1963 period when a higher-resolution succes sor to Gambit-l 

was under consideration. Categorized in terms of resolution potential, 

the "Gambit-2" system would have been capable of resolving 18 inches 

(at 2: 1 contrast ratios from an altitude of 90 nautical miles), "Gambit-3" 

of resolving I and "Gambit-4!1 ,--I _____ -----" 

~----~ 

(In each 

instance the requirement postulated 95 percent returns at the desired 

resolution. ) 

Gambit-2 did not appear to afford a sufficient advantage over 

Gambit-l (which had a potential for 19-inch resolution for rather less 

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than 60 percent of its photography). Development of Gambit-4 promised I 

Film with an exposure index (El) of six might not seem "fast" to 

commercial users, who in 1963 were able to buy EI 1200 film frOlu 

Kodak, but EI six film was roughly three times as fast as the film 

used in Gambit-l. Its availability made the lens-mirror system of 

Gambit-3 an equivalent two f-stops "faster" than the predecessor 

system. 

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to be attended by " .•. serious technological and manufacturing uncertainties, formidable costs, and a long development time. II In the 

view of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Gambit-3 would 

provide " ••• significant improvement in resolution at acceptable 

estimated costs and lead times, II and should be the preferred system. 

Eastman Kodak heartily concurred, although disagreeing with the 

additional estimate of NRO program officials that the Gambit-3 

program might incur major problems if the new mirror substrate 

material and Eastman's higher speed film did not become simultaneously 

available. To hedge against any major program difficulty that might 

arise from that circumstance, the NRO decided to sponsor the concurrent development of the primary substrate material endorsed by 

Eastman and of two alternatives: a Corning product known as Pyroceram, and another Corning substrate made of fused silica. 

By 13 December 1963, Colonel W. G. King, Project Director 

for Gambit, had constructed an initial development proposal based on 

technical content of Eastman's "Gambit-3" briefing. He incorporated 

Greer's instructions that general cleanup of the Gambit-l system would 

5 

continue until Gambit- 3 became operational. 

King's plan provided that the entire Advanced Gambit program 

would operate under the purview of the existing Gambit office. The 

initial flight of the new system was scheduled for the second quarter 

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of 1966, with the operational transition from old to new system taking 

place later the same year, Contractors for the new system would 

begin "controlled entry" into development toward the end of fiscal 

1964. 

King saw only two feasible options for orbital control. He 

conceded that an orbital control vehicle could be developed with a 

capability similar to that of Gambit-l. but for various reasons 

he favored using an Agena with a roll joint coupling to the photographic payload. The roll joint used in the first few Gambit-l flights 

had operated perfectly, while General Electric IS orbital control 

VEll icle. a new and complex system, had experienced a great many 

difficulties. * To rely on the Agena for orbital control afforded 

advantages of lesser technological and financial risk. >'.<* 

The roll-joint had been invented for Lanyard and later adapted 

to Gambit-I. 

** Although experience with the GE orbital control vehicle was 

limited in early 1964, to Colonel King it was evident that the subsystem was potentially the most troubles ome of all Gambit elements. 

The accuracy of that assessment was evident two years later: General 

Electric proved difficult to work with, had the poorest cost record of 

any Gambit contractor, had the poorest schedule record, and delivered 

systems with the poorer reliability than that of any major Gambit subsystem. 

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King's tentative schedule called for receipt of proposals in 

6 

mid-April of 1964 and contract award by June. As 1963 ended. 

McMillan informally authorized Greer to proceed with the Gambit-3 

program outlined in King's development plan. Formal approval 

appeared on 3 January 1964. 

King and Greer had been predisposed toward the combination 

of Atlas and Agena, but McMillan felt that as long as scheduling 

difficulties would not result, the option of using a Titan III should 

be retained. That change represented the only significant initial 

7 

alteration of King's Gambit-3 plan. 

King and Greer worked out the remaining major elements 

of the Advanced Gambit concept early in January 1964, The major 

subsystems of the satellite were to include a photographic payload 

section (PPS), a satellite control section (SCS), and the booster 

vehicle. The payload section would contain a camera module and a 

recovery vehicle (SRV). The control section was to include the orbit 

adjust module, an attitude control subsystem, a back-up stabilization 

system (BUSS), and the power supply. *' 

Although the option of using a Gambit-I-style orbital control 

vehicle had not yet been formally discarded, the Greer-King concept 

was heavily biased toward Eastman's proposed approach as early 

as January 1964. 8 

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A preliminary development plan for what was to become 

Gambit- 3 appeared early in February. It made clear the contributions 

of Gambit-l to the early concept of what was already being called 

"Gambit Cubed. If:]< Operational use of Gambit-l was then demonstrating 

that testing and maintenance were greatly hampered by the highly 

integrated nature of the subsystems. Thus, s aid program managers, 

" .•• a great deal of connecting and disconnecting of wiring harnesses 

3 

was necessary .•• In the..9 system, the emphasis on modular construction will increase the ease of maintainability ..•• The command 

control subsystem. o. of the ..9-program has been shown to be a 

superior system and it is anticipated that it and associated software 

may be included in the ..9 3 system." Thus, not only would the direction 

of Gambit- 3 development be guided by Gambit-l experience, but some 

of the hardware and software of the earlier system would be used 

9 

"off the shelf" for the new system. 

Colonel King expected to have program evaluations and 

recommendations complete by 13 May 1964, to have all contracts 

in effect by 30 June 1964, and to meet a scheduled first flight date 

10 

of 1 July 1966. In the event he was optimistic only by four weeks. 

* 3 

Why "G "("Gambit Cubed" or "G-Cube") became the informal 

designator for the program, rather than "G-3" ("Q-Three"), is a 

minor mystery. 

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Only one major change to the preliminary specifications 

occurred in the early stages of development. After consideration 

of the risks, General Greer decided it would be imprudent to anticipate 

full development of a dual platen camera configuration in time to 

meet flight schedules. McMillan agreed. With that change, negotiations with Eastman Kodak for the development of the camera system 

could be concluded. Contract price, including fee, was just under 

11 

$63 million. 

By May, Eastman had completed preliminary research that 

seemed to reaffirm the feasibility of using a honeycomb substrate 

for the primary mirror and had concluded tha t use of the new thinbase, fast film would allow three times as many photographs to be 

taken on each Gambit- 3 mission as on Gambit-l missions ••• if 

problems of storage, on- orbit life, and recovery of larger film loads 

12 

could be solved. 

Neither a booster nor an orbital control system had yet been 

chosen. Cost and schedule implication were large. Moving from 

A tlas to Titan III would impl y either building a new pad at Point 

Arguello, or transforming an existing Atlas pad. Building an orbital 

control vehicle that could initially be used on an Atlas and later on 

Titan was a complex operation. If Titan were chosen, with its much 

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greater lift capability, useful compromises in camera system weight 

13 

and performance might be feasible. 

Predictably, Lockheed favored use of the Agena and GE the 

use of an orbital control vehicle (OCV) like that of Gambit-l. Both 

contractors had to consider the adaptability of their vehicles to the 

Titan III booster. 

Influenced by orbital control system problems which were 

already beginning to affect the Gambit-l flight program, Greer and 

King had early endorsed the use of Agena, suitably modified, as the 

orbital control vehicle, although conceding the need for backup 

14 

work by GE to help keep all options open. (During the first few 

Gambit-l missions, the orbital control vehicle was only used in 

"solo" flight, after the film had been recovered. Primary missions 

had been flown in what was known as the "hitch-up" mode, which 

meant reliance on the Agena for orbital control by way of a roll 

joint. Results had been greatly better than expectations.) 

The Agena was a proven space vehicle. Its shortcomings 

were well known and generally were not critical. The orbital control 

vehicle developed by GE both duplicated Agena capabilities and provided desirable properties the Agena did not possess. Lockheed 

proposed extending proven Agena capabilities to meet the requir ements 

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of the GaITlbit-3 systeITl. GE proposed ITlodifying the existing GaITlbit-l 

orbital control vehicle. Greer, concluding that the OCV approach 

was too cOITlplex and too risky recoITlITlended that Lockheed do the 

15 

priITlary vehicle study and GE a backup study. McMillan agreed. 

Work on the parallel satellite control section studies began 

in early July. Lockheed's task was to study the cOITlpatibility of the 

Agena with the Titan III-X, the version of Titan best suited to the 

GaITlbit-3 ITlission. GE was encouraged to look at both the siITlplification of the GE proposal for a siITlplified OCV and the possibility 

of using a separate ascent stage (rather than Agena) with the orbital 

control vehicle. 

The photographic payload section included three ITlajor COITlponents, the satellite recovery vehicle (SRV), the external structure 

and the caITlera itself. EastITlan had originally agreed to build the 

recovery vehicle thus concentrating the design, developITlent and 

ITlanufacture of the entire payload section in the hands of one contractor. It rapidly becaITle clear, however, that EastITlan would have 

difficulty in staying on schedule with just the caITlera subsysteITl to 

worry about. In consequence, EastITlan subcontracted the capsule 

work to the Recovery SysteITls Division of GE, which had built ITlost 

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earlier recovery capsules. SiITlilarl y, EastITlan subcontr acted external 

structural work to Lockheed and concentrated on the developITlent of 

the advanced optical systeITl for the new GaITlbit-3. However, the 

arrangeITlent that ITlade Lockheed and GE subcontractors to EK insured 

that both the external structure and the reentry vehicle would be 

designed in cOITlpliance with caITlera systeITl needs and that design 

comproITlises, should they prove necessary, would be cOITlpliant to 

the priITlary needs of the camera systeITl. 

By the Fall of 1964, EastITlan and its subcontractor shad 

advanced to the point where engineering specifications of the cOITlposite 

design had been released, design reviews held, SOITle engineering 

drawings had been released and some of the critical long lead-tiITle 

iteITls had been ordered. Nevertheles s, payload developITlent was 

16 

sOITlewhat behind schedule. 

The hedge represented by concurrent developITlent of two 

orbital control concepts was duplicated, by force of circuITlstances, 

in camera systeITl developITlent. Neither King nor Greer was willing 

to hinge program succ es s on the probability that both the new filITl 

and the new substrate ITlaterial would appear, operationally ready, 

on schedule. The two-fold task of casting such large blanks as were 

required (58-inch diaITleter for the stereo ITlirror and 44-inch diaITleter 

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for the primary mirror) and then polishing them to the required 

smoothnes s provided numberless opportunities for delay. Eastman 

had originally estimated that each of the two mirrors would require 

almost 800 hours of grinding, polishing, in-process testing, electroplating, and coating. The actual manufacturing time proved to be 

about 3000 hours for each mirror blank, thus the precautionary development of the two alternative substrate materials by Corning Glass. 

As substrate development proceeded, initial pessimism proved to 

be warranted. Invar, in the sizes needed for Gambit-3 optics, lacked 

stability, a fault arising from characteristic small internal strains 

in the material. Pyroceram had a low coefficient of expansion which 

promised to offset the effects of on-orbit temperature differentials. 

and could be fabricated more quickly (and with less uncertainty) 

than fus ed silica. 

The program experienced several failures; collapsed and 

fracturing substr,ates, and polishing proces ses which proceeded far 

more slowly and less accurately than expected. The results were 

so variable that no final selection of a substrate material could be 

made in 1964. 

During the last quarter of 1964, Eastman fell farther behind 

schedule while all other phases of the Gambit-3 project were either 

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on or ahead of schedule. Less than a year old, and therefore going 

through a period normally associated with legions of bad surprises, 

the Gambit-3 program had encountered and overcome most of its 

major technical problems. Only the camera optics still presented 

significant difficulties. 

Despite such rapid progres s, by the end of the calendar year 

the Special Projects Directorate was able to return $1.245 million 

of unexpected Gambit- 3 funds to the NRO budget, a precedent that 

was continued, by and large, for another eight years. * 

Although schedules continued to slip, by late 1964 Eastman 

had apparently solved the problem of manufacturing the optics for 

G -3. The solution lay in foregoing unconventional manufacturing 

and polishing techniques for conventional ones. The reason for going 

to unconventional techniques in the first place had been the difficulty of precision finishing mirror surfaces. Two developments of 

1964 made it possible to overcome the natural shortcomings of the 

conventional techniques: mapping the surface irregularities of the 

mirrors by interferometery, and filling the mapped depressions by 

selectro-plating. It had taken Eastman more than a month to prove 

the applicability of these processes however, and that represented a 

17 

month of schedule slippage. 

* Through 1972. 

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Other equipment to be incl uded in the photographic payload was 

subject to changes. The Astro-Position Terrain Camera, completed 

earl y. was redesigned by the end of the year to enhance its performance. GE completed design of the satellite recovery vehicle by 

November 1964. Profiting from earlier exper ience. King and Greer 

had insured that the G- 3 recovery vehicle was much like that of G-l. 

The only significant change from the original was the imposition of 

extremel y stringent quality control proces ses from the start. The 

widening schedule gap in optics development thus was the principal 

subject of management attention. New controls, technical reviews 

by Aerospace Corporation personnel, and the institution of bi-monthly 

progres s reports were all aimed at getting Eastman back on schedule. 

or failing that, to prevent further slippage. 

In October 1964 on the basis of the Titan III X-Agena studies 

carried out by Lockheed and General Electric. Greer I s staff prepared cost 

estimates pertaining to a switch from Atlas-Agena. * Just before the 

* A consideration of some importance was the probability that a 

new search system to replace Corona would have to rely on Titan III 

boosters. Although considerable technical and institutional controversy 

preceded the latter (Apr 66) decision to develop what became Hexagon. 

the pattern was plain enough for Greer to see in 1964. 

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18 

end of the year, McMillan approved the change to Titan. 

That decision had a number of effects on the program. The 

first was a significant growth in the budget. Another was a slippage 

in the scheduled initial launch data. But from the long view, neither 

of these perturbations was important. The choic e of a Titan booster 

made future system improvement far simpler than it would have 

been if the lift capacity of the Atlas had been an operative constraint. 

The collective experience of McMillan, Greer, and King, 

in particular their recent Gambit experience, induced a sequence 

and timing of Gambit-3 decisions which, in retrospect, may have 

assured the ultimate success of the Gambit-3program. Ironically, 

the keynote of that decision pr aces s was indecision- -or delayed decision. 

They refused to allow the program to be tied irrevokably to the 

"obvious" booster (Atlas), the "available" orbital control vehicle, 

or the "most promising!! mirror substrate material. In each area, 

they delayed design freezes long enough to allow all the relevant 

dat a to come to light. The price of such decision delays was a 

growth in program cost and a modest slippage in the initial launch 

date. The product seemed well worth that slight cost. 

The second year of Gambit-3 development saw the disappearance 

of residual ambiguities and uncertainties affecting the final configuration. In particular, optical materials and manufacturing processes 

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I were selected and adaptation to a Titan III booster mode was completed. 

I By the end of the year, engineer ing models of all systems had been 

built and were in test or fabrication stages. The transformation of 

I Point Arguello Launch Complex II (PALC II), Pad 3, fromAtlas-Agena 

I capability to Titan III-Agena capability was well underway. (An additional capability of handling small, strap-on solid rocket motors had 

I been added. ) 

I The distinguishing marks of the Gambit-3 program were that 

the problem-solution cycle was more compressed than in earlier 

I programs of similar nature and the program experienced continuing 

I economies rather than overruns. Once the schedule adjustment required 

by the shift to the Titan III booster had been accommodated, the schedule 

I remained valid. The projected capabilities of Gambit- 3 equipme nt were 

I enhanced rather than reduced as the program proceeded. It is interesting to recall that such events took place during a time in the midI 1960s when virtually all military procurements were experiencing major 

I cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls. 

By the beginning of 1965, major camera system problems had 

I been reduced to four. One was the selection of a substrate material 

I (and a structural form) for the primary and secondary mirrors. The 

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requirements for the material included low weight, dimensional 

stability. and handling properties appropriate to the method of surface 

preparation. A second problem, partly solved, was the development 

of a method for preparing the precise optical surfaces. The requirements here were that the method yield the desired precision, but that 

it do so both economically and at a rate of production consistent with 

the operational plans for the completed satellite. The third problem 

was to devise a method of mounting the optical surfaces in the spacecraft so as to maintain focus and avoid the introduction of me chanical 

distortion. Finally, some technique had to be developed by which 

thermal distortions could be controlled during operations. 

Program reviews during the last half of 1964 had dealt chiefly 

with the first two problems. One result of the concern evidenced 

by those responsible for reviews was to amend the Eastman Kodak 

contracts to include reporting on critical experiments and tests which 

had a bearing on the issues of concern. This activity came to be 

called the "Early Demonstration' ! program. After reviewing it during 

September of 1964, McMillan directed that the program be extended 

to include all aspects of the optics development program. He anticipated final selection of substrate materials by May, final decisions 

on engineering by June, completion of the engineering by August 

19 

and completion of tests during September. 

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Concentration of attention and effort on one com.ponent of one 

subsystem. of the project had som.e interesting im.plications. Beyond 

the critical nature of that com.ponent. and the fact that it represented 

the largest single technological advance captured in the Gam.bit 

developm.ent, the attention paid it suggests that there was little els e 

of critical m.om.ent in Gam.bit-3 developm.ent that required m.uch 

m.anagem.ent attention. In any case, m.anagem.ent spent its tim.e rather 

lavishly on the one m.ajor problem. that did exist. 

Early in January 1965, notification of the switch to Titan IUAgena configuration went to the principal contractors. It was the 

20 

last program. change of any consequence in Gam.bit-3 developm.ent. 

Unhappily for routine operations, the Titan III announcem.ent 

very nearly coincided with a m.ajor program. review~ having the effect 

of invalidating m.ost of the schedules on which that review was predicated. As it happened, however, except for the m.irror developm.ent 

activity the entire program. was essentially on schedule--and within 

predicted cost ceilings--and the readjustm.ent necessitated by shifting 

to a Titan III launch capability provided a cushion for the m.irror 

21 

developm.ent schedule. Form.al direction for the incorporation of 

the new booster in the Gam.bit- 3 program. included instructions that 

the budget was to be austere, pad m.odification was to begin at once 

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at PALC II, production rate of the boosters was to be approximately 

one per month, and the first should be available in time for the projected first launch date of 1 July 1966. The project staff were also 

directed to include a capability of using small strap-on solids (such 

as the Minuteman first stage) in both the pad modifications and the 

ZZ 

booster production contract. 

The optics situation was still sufficiently worrisome in March 

Z3 

1965 to warrant a four-hour briefing for Dr. McMillan. Many substrate materials still were being considered. They included fused 

silica with egg-crate construction for the plano-stereo surface, a 

Pyroceram asphere substrate, Invar for the stereo mirror, and a 

completely new material being developed by Owens-Illinois, called 

Cer-Vit. Of all the materials used and investigated, the only one which 

had been definitely rejected was, ironically, aspheric substrate 

Z4 

made from Invar blanks, the material originally preferred. 

By early March, Martin-Marietta (the builder of the Titan) 

had concluded that the earliest possible delivery date for the first 

booster could not support a launch date before Z8 July 1966. almost 

a month later than the date by which the payload and satellite control 

sections could be ready. There seemed to be no way to protect the 

original first flight date of 1 July 1966, so General Greer recommended 

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that the late July date be accepted. Dr. McMillan concurred immediately. 

Both were aware that Eastman's payload schedule slippage made the 

goal of I July more theoretical than real in any case. 

March 1965 marked the appearance of a new problem. The 

satellite control section began to fall behind schedule when GE started 

work on a new command system. That development paced the progress 

of the checkout for the development test vehicle. which by the end 

of March had fallen six weeks behind schedule. In the end, therefore, 

26 

the new booster schedule caused no real problems. 

The progress of Gambit-l and its flight experience were also 

important for Gambit-3. During the Spring of 1965. the project 

office had decided that Gambit-3 should incorporate both a redundant 

view port actuator and a backup film cutter. The camera-door actuator 

certainly owed its provinance to a series of failures experienced on 

Gambit-l flights. The Gambit-l systems, primarily pneumatic, 

continued to fail throughout the history of that vehicle until, near the 

end, they were completely replaced by electro-mechanical devices. 

While the lesson might have been that pneumatic devices could not be 

relied upon for space operations, it was not accepted in toto at the 

time. But more of the primary actuators used on Gambit- 3 were 

electro-mechanical than had been the case for Gambit-I. 

25 

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By the end of JlUle 1965, GE was two m.onths behind schedule 

in com.m.and system. engineering, and Eastm.an was a full three m.onths 

behind in m.irror developm.ent and fabrication. Happily, neither delay 

im.pacted on the initial launch date schedule, for which the m.odification and structural checkout of the new Titan III was the pacing 

item.. In addition, test schedules for virtually all subsystem.s of the 

Gam.bit-3 were very liberal, so slippages in developm.ent sim.ply 

27 

m.eant som.e low risk com.pression of the test program.s. 

The central problem. at Eastm.an involved m.ore than sim.ple 

inability to solve the m.anufacturing and finishing problem.s for optical 

surfaces. As the project office phrased it in June 1965, "It is evident 

at this tim.e, that EKe has underestim.ated the engineering m.anpower 

required to produce the electrom.echanical portion of the PPS (photographic payload section). Their late design releases are evidence 

of this. We have started down too m.any paths in som.e areas and have 

28 

been late in form.alizing the route to be taken. II 

Extrem.e concern for preserving options had earlier in 1965 

been expressed in the wide variety of substrate m.aterials which continued under investigation. By June, indecision had ended. Pyroceram. 

was selected as the prim.ary substrate m.aterial for the m.irrors, 

with fused silica as the backup. Eastm.an still followed a course of 

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caution, however, keeping the new alternative material, Cer-Vit, as 

an open option. In the event, the first attempt to produce a second 

generation aspheric replication with Pyroceram failed, and the backup 

material, fus ed silica, was elevated to primary status. 

Perhaps a more significant change occurred even before the 

shift to fused silica. The original stereo mirror had a tapered 

design, which caused trouble in the polishing process, and its beveled 

edge s were troublesome to grind. Both these special features wer e 

eliminated with a new design which called for an elliptical shape, 

30 

uniformly nine-inches thick and lacking bevels. Although the simplification cost a slight loss of theoretical resolution, that was never 

to prove a serious drawback. 

The fiscal 1965 cost of Gambit-3 development was $76.2 

million. * The project office estimate, ten months earlier, had been 

$77.672 million. The initial NRO authorization had been $49.4 

31 

million. During the subsequent nine months, new authorizations, 

cutbacks, and transfer of funds to the fiscal 1966 budget raised the 

actual figure to only $1.5 million less than the original estimate. 

The ability to predict costs so accurately--for a high-risk development 

The number quoted in the Quarterly Program Review of 30 June 

1965 was $75.857. The discrepancy probably arose from late contract 

charges. 

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program--was perhaps unique to the Special Projects Directorate 

among all major government contracting bodies of that era. 

During the summer of 1965, the NRO experienced administrative changes which, while of considerable internal significance, had 

only minor influences on the Gambit-3 program. After some two 

years of struggling with the CIA over control and direction of the 

National Reconnaissance Program, Dr. McMillan left his post as 

Director of the NRO in September. He was replaced by Dr. A. H. 

Flax. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (R&D). i.' General Greer, 

with the successful development and early operations of the original 

Gambit to his credit, retired from the Air Force, to be replaced 

as Director of Special Projects by Brigadier General J. L. Martin, 

Jr 0 Martin, in turn, was suceeded as head of the NRO staff by 

Brigadier General J. T. Stewart. Colonel King remained as project 

director for both Gambit-l and Gambit-3, thus insuring management 

continuity. 

Schedule problems continued to trouble Eastman, General 

Electric, and Lockheed. Photographic payload section schedules 

* 

Flax served as Acting Director at various times between July 

and September 1965, during McMillanls temporary absences. McMillan's 

plans were known to the NRO staff in July. 

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were so tight that for the first time the project office began to 

question whether the initial launch schedule could be protected: 

"Continued compres sion of the EK test schedule is beginning to 

make the 28 July 66 initial launch date appear somewhat optimistic, " 

King's group noted in September. Similar doubts persisted through 

the end of the year. Eastman was six months behind by September 

1965, and the reliability model test sequence, originally scheduled 

32 

to begin on 15 October 1965, had to be rescheduled for April 1966. 

Although pad modification at Vandenberg Air Force Base was 

70 percent complete by the end of September. labor jurisdiction 

problems briefly caused worry about a work stoppage. Apprehensions 

had two facets. Not only would the launch schedule be invalidated 

by a stoppage, but there was no desire in the project office to call 

attention to Gambit-3 activities at Point Arguello. 

Minor difficulties also arose in Lockheed's effort to incorporate 

new redundancies into the control electronics for the roll joint 

while Martin encountered combustion instability symptoms in 

Titan III-X tests. 

Eastman's difficulties had several sources, not the least being 

an apparent overcommitment of resources. The company was 

working simultaneously on Gambit-I, Gambit- 3, a lunar camera 

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for NASA, the covert camera (Dorian) for the Manned Orbital 

Laboratory, and a proposed new search system (for what later 

became the Hexagon competition). Late in 1965, Eastman also 

began to do work on mission profiles for Gambit-3. (Such profiles 

would simulate the flight of the camera around the globe an d yield 

the data neces sary to study on- orbit camera operations. The 

data would then be used to derive operational parameters for the 

camera during a variety of flights. The parameters to be estimated included the number of roll maneuvers, distribution of roll 

angles and the distr ibution of slit positions. Because of the problems encountered on Gambit flights with the horizon sensors, 

separate pr ofiles had to be developed for winter and summer 

operations. )* 

* See chapter on Gambit Flight Operations. During deep winter, 

the heat sensitive horizon sensor aboard Gambit was incapable of 

distinguishing between space and earth over the South Pole. After 

a brief flirtation with the developrne nt of more sensitive devices. a 

solution rather typical of the Special Projects group was found; since 

photographs of the polar ice cap were not of interest, neither was 

orbital stability in that region. The vehicle was therefore allowed to 

coast over the cold region, regaining attitude reference and control 

as it reached the areas of intelligence interest. A supplementary 

benefit arising from that solution was that orbital control gas was 

expended les s rapidly since it was only used on part of each orbit. 

The expedient was one of several that allowed the eventual stretchout 

of Gambit on-orbit life from an originally specified five days to 

eight days by the end of th e program. 33 

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Even beyond the administrative changes and schedule slippages 

encountered with Gambit-3, the summer of 1965 was rather traumatic 

at the West Coast facility. Gambit-l problems had come to a head 

during July and August: three succes sive catastrophic failures 

caused a complete stoppage in the receipt of high resolution photography. The immediate result, felt during the fall of 1964, was 

an intensification of virtually all quality control measures imposed 

on National Reconnaissance Program contractors. The first Gambit-3 

item affected by such stringency was the Lockheed command system; 

after some difficulty, the project office brought Lockheed to agree 

to the inspection of all command system components, beginning 

with the second batch of equipment (to be used on flights after number 

five). More stringent and earlier tests were also required for the 

first group of flight items as well. Finally, Lockheed was encouraged, 

in some instances, to find better qualified personnel to work on 

34 

Gambit-3. 

Contracts in virtually all areas had been let for development 

and procurement of hardware for the first six (developmental) 

35 

flights. After exposure to the flurry of Gambit-l problems, 

General Martin concluded that requirements for more intensive 

inspection would not. of themselves, instill a sufficient degree of 

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systelTI reliability in either GalTIbit. He concluded that the procurelTIent 

policies hitherto used for the progralTI were best suited to a 

developlTIental progralTI relatively low in technical and high in 

financial risk. The environlTIent in which GalTIbit had been developed 

explained adequately the kind of incentive structure which could be 

thus described. The GalTIbit progralTI was no longer in a developlTIent 

phase. however, and sOlTIething new was needed. 

Enough experience had been gained with GalTIbit production to 

give the project office considerable confidence in its ability to 

estilTIate the cost of a satellite. But the GalTIbit-l failures of the 

sUlTIlTIer of 1965 indicated that perforlTIance was far less predictable. 

In particular. existing contractual incentives for saving money in 

production were greater by a factor of about two than those for performance. Appreciating such considerations, General Martin 

developed a new incentive systelTI which not only reversed the order 

of priority, elTIphasizing perforlTIance over cost. but deleted all 

reward for cost saving. That policy was consistent with MartinIs 

belief that the cost of the hardware was the least of existing uncertainties; he perceived on-orbit perforlTIance to be the crux of the 

problelTI. That GalTIbit contractors accepted the new incentive 

structure strongly suggested that the new systelTI made more sense 

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than the old. In fact, the new incentive structure subdued several 

contract disputes that had been continuing for several months. * 

* The "Martinized" incentive structure was described in his 1969 

paper, "A Specialized Incentive Structure for Satellite Projects." 

It discussed, clearly and in detail, the thesis and its application, 

although (of course) Gambit was not identified as the program to which 

the policy was first applied. General Martin's approach was intended 

for application to mature programs, those past the stage of schedule 

and cost uncertainties but still subject to performance improvement. 

Its attractiveness, and the obvious success of its application to 

Gambit, had the unfortunate effect of inducing other s to attempt to 

apply it to programs that lacked the fundamental character General 

Martin specified. In particular, it was occasionally applied, in part 

or in whole, to the development phases of new programs--where the 

structure devised by Generals Greer and King for the initial stages 

of Gambit was almost certainly more suitable. Misapplication of 

the Martin strategy to immature programs was particularly unfortunate 

because what may have been General Martin's major contribution was 

the demonstration that the incentive structure could be "fine tuned!! to 

the needs of almost any procurement problem. He did not intend, and 

certainly did not recommend, that it be applied to development enterprises characterized by cost, schedule, and technical uncertainties 

of real consequence. The success of the Martin approach resulted 

from his recognition that Gambit had changed as it matured, and that 

a mature Gambit required contract incentives differ ent from those of 

developmental Gambit. He did not suggest, and did not believe, that 

the incentives of the original Gambit contracts were in any sense 

incorrect- -merely that they were no longer appropriate to the 

circumstances he had to contend with. The incentives he devised 

could, or may have been, of indifferent quality. in an absolute 

sense. But they were better suited to the circumstances than those 

they replaced. There lay the explanation of the success of General 

Martinis approach. And there lay the seed of failure when his 

techniques were applied, in inappropriate circumstances, to other 

programs. 

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:I,OP SEfRETThe Martin reforms could scarcely have been timed better 

for Gambit- 3. Program manager s planned six development flights 

of the new system, after vvhich it was to be considered operationaL 

Contracts covering the initial flight systems were converted to the 

new incentive structure shortly before the first flight of Gambit-3. 

That development, like the accelerated inspection, checkout and 

test program for Gambit-3, was a direct product of Gambit-l 

experience. ,:~ 

By the end of 1965 it was apparent that the occurrence of any 

major problem in the test cycle for the payload section would cause 

a slippage of the initial launch date for Gambit-3. Eastman was by 

then 30 weeks behind schedule; it was the low point for the company 

and the program. Indications of improvement, later shown to be 

accurate, were present even then, however. Several components 

of the photographic payload section had completed their initial 

tests with slight difficulty, an event that brought a symbolic sigh 

of relief from apprehensive program manager s. 

* 

Since Gambit-3 Was still in the IIdevelopment!! stage, one 

might wonder if this did not constitute the first misapplication 

of MartinIs new incentive system. The answer is no for two reasons. 

First, cost uncertainties were not substantial, nor were technical 

risks. Second, Gambit- 3, as the name implies, was a new 

mark of a proven system. 

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The selection of fused silica with egg-crate construction for 

the primary aspheric mirror substrate ended uncertainty about 

initial optics design. Fused silica would be used in the first 22 

vehicles (the developmental flights and the first 16 operational systems). >',< 

And by the end of the year construction work on the modified launch 

complex at Point Arguello had been completed, as had the first 

battery of tests of the Development Test Vehicle (the satellite control 

section) at Lockheed's Systems Test Complex. On 6 December, 

the test article was returned to Eastman for mandatory re-manufacturing to correct faults discovered in testing. At the end of 1965, 

36 

optimism was in order. 

One product of photographic payload section difficulties was 

an early 1966 reorganization of the entire test schedules for both 

Eastman Kodak and Lockheed. If schedules could be maintained, 

and no major test failures occurred thereafter, the new system 

would make its planned first launch date. But all was not completely 

serene. By January 1966 there existed considerable doubt that the 

high-speed (E.!. 6), high-resolution film on which Gambit-3 excellence 

* In fact, although hope continued for the later introduction of 

the new material, Cer-Vit, only one mirror made from that substance 

would ultimately be flown. 

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so heavily depended would be ready for use in initial flights. 1£ 

it were not ready, Gambit-3 photography would not satisfy expectations. The fall-back film, with proper resolution and a lower 

exposure index, ~, would cause a certain amount of smear in the 

photography; control parameters had all been designed to accommodate 

37 

the faster film. 

Other elements of the development program were going well. 

Pad modifications still were on schedule. The development test 

vehicle, having been through mandatory re-manufacturing, successfull y completed its thermal-vacuum tests in late March. The integrated satellite control section and photographic payload sections 

were expected to enter joint te sting at Lockheed in early April, 

as planned. 

Engineer s identified and solved a venting problem with the 

Titan booster and by March had completed structural tests on its 

skirt and the Agena adapter. The troublesome command system 

hardware for the development test vehicle was back on schedule. 

Lockheed had understood the message implied by incentive and 

test procedure changes, and was responsive to program needs. 

Most hardware schedules looked sound. The only significant 

problem, other than film, was with substrates for the mirrors, 

The alternative was a film with index of 3.6 with a resolution 

capability of 110 lines per millimeter, as against the nominal 

130 lines ASA 6 0 0 film under Gambit-3 flight conditions. 

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and it was now a manufacturing problem rather than a design 

problem. Casting difficulties persisted; other problems seemed 

38 

to be under control. 

Gambit-3 introduced one other significant change derived 

immediately from experience of the early phases of Gambit-I. 

In lieu of the extensive testing at the launch site that characterized 

Gambit-I, testing that frequently was accompanied by substantial 

amounts of repair work in the Missile Assembly Building, Gambit-3 

incorporated a command system with features permitting automated 

checkout of virtually all vehicle functions, telemetry readout of 

the functional check being fed directly to a computerized evaluation 

and ass essment subsystem that indicated directly whether or not 

various subsystems and components were operating within acceptable 

limits. The automated checkout normally was performed during 

final as sembI y of the payload at the principal manufacturing points 

(EK and Lockheed-Sunnyvale); vehicles, therefore, went directly 

from factory to launching pad, bypassing one of the most fertile 

sources of subsequent trouble. The independent subsystem checkout routines were combined into a single simulated flight operation 

during final check of the vehicle while on the launch pad immediately 

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before launch. The effect of the new capability, and the procedure s 

that accompanied it, was to increase confidence in the validity of the 

testing process, to abbreviate the launch and countdown procedure, 

and to eliminate the field handling and te sting that had sometimes 

39 

contributed to later operational problems. 

Development Flights 

At the end of June 1966, the proj ect officer reported " •.• 

reasonably good (indications) that the initial Gambit-3 launch 

date of 28 July 1966 can be met." The Titan booster had arrived 

at Vandenberg on 7 May and was mated with the satellite control 

section of the development test vehicle three days later. Inspectors 

accepted the control section and command system by 30 June, but 

refused to sign off on the Titan because of residual thrust instability. 

(Two alternative fixes were put in train, both of which would protect 

the launch date.) Final acceptance te sting of the photographic 

payload section went slowly, but there were no failures. The optic s 

demonstrated a theoretical resolution capability of 12.2 inches 

against an anticipated LI _____ ---JOI, >:< but that was no surprise, 

and in any case the optics for the second system were then testing 

40 

out at near theoretical optimums. 

In the event, the estimate proved optimistic by almost 40 percent. 

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By 28 July the vehicle was ready to go. General Martin decided 

to ignore several minor defects in order to bring off the first 

flight on schedule. The most important, discovered during the pad 

checkout of the primary camera, was that co mmands to change 

the slit size were only intermittently obeyed. The project office 

decided to fix the aperture in the best Ilaverage" position to insure 

that res earch objectives could be satisfied. Operation of the 

roll joint was constrained to limits of plus or minus 35 degrees, 

a precaution reminiscent of the initial flight of Gambit-l. 

At the last moment, an anomaly developed in ground station 

equipment which forced a one-day delay in launching, but at noon 

on 29 July 1966, the teletype at the Special Projects office in EI 

Segundo began to rattle off its message: 1129 Jul, 1830:22Z Preliminary TLM data indicates normal launch. II Precisely two hours later 

Sunnyvale rep orted, "All systems appear normal. II Target count 

41 

data began to flow in four days later. 

The ephemeris achieved was very close to that sought: inclination 

of 94.15 degrees, apogee of 150.33 nautical miles and perigee of 

84.43 nautical mile s. The primary (i. e •• photographic) mis sion 

lasted for five days, during which the system was programmed 

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for a maximum of 717 targets. Of these, a total of 463 were 

successfully "read out. 1I~< The best resolution actually obtained in 

the recovered photography was 17 inches (as against 13 inches predieted), measured at a contrast ratio of 2.: 1 on CORN targets. The 

42. 

film was also underexposed to the extent of 1/2.. to 1 stop. 

To be read out, a photograph must represent the confluence of 

several aspects of success. The camera must h?ve operated correctly, 

causing no perturbations which would make the negative unreadable. 

Such perturbations could incl ude uncompensated smear, incorrect 

focus, faulty compensation for thermal effects, solar or terrestrial 

flare and ( occasionally) degraded optics. The film had to be unmarred either by faulty manufacturing or by scratches caused by 

film transport or take up. All of these factors were nominally controllable in manufacture and checkout. The major cause for unreadable film, however, was natural and uncontrollable--weather. 

The dominant cause for difference s between targets programmed and 

targets readout in the entire Gambit- 3 program was cloud cover. 

In later years, the output of weather satellites lessened that effect, 

but it would persist as long as cloud cover data were other than 

instantane ous. 

There is almost no stable relationship among frames exposed, 

film used, and targets cover ed. Most targets occur in clusters 

of random size. Thus, several are scheduled to be covered in one 

photograph. In addition, a Ilphotograph" may be a single frame, 

a stereo pair, or a strip of variable length, so there could be no 

predictable relationship between film length and the number of 

exposures, or between the number of exp03ures and the number 

of targets photographed- -or between the number photographed 

and the number Ilread out. II 

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Aside from the constraints imposed on vehicle operations 

before the flight, the only operational failure was intermittent 

operation of the Astro-Position Terrain Camera. The reentry 

vehicle was successfully recovered on the 83rd revolution, after 

which three days of solo flight were conducted with the satellite 

control section. Shortly after separation of the recovery vehicle, 

the roll joint malfunctioned (on orbit 90), but it later recovered. 

The solo flight was used to gain experience with the vehicle in 

orbital maneuvers and to carry out some nineteen experiments 

related to the demonstration of specified capabilities of the vehicle. 

Three succes sful 0 rbital adjustments on orbits 89, 97, and 122 

satisfied the first of those objectives, and all of the subsequent 

43 

experiments were successful. 

Post flight analysis of recovered film was revealing. The 

overall quality of the imagery from the first Gambit-3 mission 

proved to be about 25 percent better than that obtained from any 

Gambit-l mission. (A 17 -inch best resolution against a Gambit-l 

"best" of 21. 6 inches. The best that Gambit-l would ever achieve 

would be 19.2 inches. )* 

Resolution of 1.6 feet was not obtained with the Gambit-l 

system until its last two flights, numbers 37 and 38, in May 

and June 1967. 

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TOP SEeRE'I' - Eastman analysis noted, "Although .•• primary optics fell short 

of the design goal, the intelligence provided by this mission was 

reported to be the highest of any r econnais sance satellite to date. " 

And, Ilevaluation of the flight record indicates that the ground resolution achieved on this mission was comparable to or exceeded 

44 

tha~ achieved on the best Gambit missions to date. II 

There could be little doubt that, at least in one area, the new 

ver sion of Gambit was superior to its predece ssor. While the 463 

targets read out did not compare favorably with best Gambit-l 

results to that time (2010 targets had been photographed on the 

2. 7th flight of Gambit-I), the improvement which could ultimately 

be expected was indicated by progress recorded since Gambit-lIs 

45 

fir st flight 0 

Gambit- 3 program plans dated from December 1963 and January 

1964. The initial launch of the system had then been scheduled for 

1 July 1966. Almost a full year later, booster changes caused a 

schedule revision to reflect a new fir st-launch date of 2.8 July 1966. 

In the event, launch was postponed by 24 hours. In sum, a schedule 

established 134 weeks beforehand proved to be only four weeks in 

error. In retrospect, that did not seem an enormously significant 

achievement--and was not. But if considered together with the 

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I budgetary record of Gambit-3, it represented a unique 

I 

achievement in those years of major program slippage, budget 

overruns, and performance shortfalls throughout the Department 

I of Defense. No DoD program of the 1960 l s that approached Gambit-3 

I 

in terms of technical advance, gross cost, or scheduling stringency 

achieved such a record. The caution that Gambit-3 was really 

I no more than an advanced version of a system already in operation 

I 

had no real relevance. Even though its mission was the same as 

that of Gambit-I, Gambit-3 provided substantial advances in resoI lution and orbital life. It required development of a new camera 

I 

with more than twice the focal length of the original, new film, 

batteries, fuel plumbing- -and ultimately a new booster. The perI formance objectives ofLI ____ ---"1 resolution and ten-day orbital 

I life constituted goals beyond reasonable expectations of earlier 

year s- -and when Gambit- 3 itself matured, even those goals were 

I surpassed. to< 

I The fate of the Gambit-l system was, of course, markedly 

influenced by the success of early Gambit-3 flights. By June 1966, 

I shortly before the first Gambit-3 flight, there were clear indications 

I The 22nd flight achieved resolution ofLI ____ ~I and an 

orbital life of 27 days was later recorded. 

I 

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that the first lot of Gambit-3 systems probably would not produce 

much better resolution than the (now) well regarded Gambit-I. 

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) approval of Hexagon 

development some two months earlier (April 1966) further complicated 

the problem; early expectations of Hexagon availability, though 

unreasonably optimistic, made it seem advisable to begin nearterm conversion of the Gambit-l launch pad for use by the Hexagon. 

The certainty that Gambit-l would be entirely replaced by Gambit- 3 

made it difficult to keep the Gambit-l development-manufacturing 

t...::am adequately motivated--and, indeed, made it unlikely that a 

Gambit-] capability could be maintained at all, given the increasing 

needs of the Gambit-3 program. If Gambit-3 were even moderately 

succes sful, the need for completing the planned purcha se of 16 

additional Gambit-l systems would vanish; if, on the other hand, 

Gambit-3 encountered early operational problems, keeping a 

reserve Gambit-l capability in being would be es sential to continuance of the surveillance mission. Dr. Flax was extremely 

reluctant to cancel any planned Gambit-l launchings until Gambit-3 

46 

had actually demJnstrated a "reasonable" level of capability_ 

Despite Dr. Flax's reluctance, the Director of Central Intelligence, 

Richard Helms, felt that the combined total of 20 Gambit (counting 

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both Gambit-l and Gambit-3) in fiscal year 1967 was too much. 

He pointed out that the schedule developed for fiscal 1967 dated 

from January 1966. At that time, Gambit's had experienced a succession 

of catastrophic failures- - but there had been no Gambit-l failures 

during 1966. Further, Gambit-l had recorded remarkable advances 

in orbital life and coverage during that year. Finally. the first 

Gambit-3 had flown successfully and the considerations which 

underlay the January decision were quite obsolete. On 17 August, 

therefore, the Executive Committee for the National Reconnaissance 

47 

Program decided to delete four of the scheduled Gambit-l flights. 

USIB's Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance in September 

1966 proposed that nine Gambit-l and eight Gambit-3 missions be 

conducted during fiscal year 1967. USIB. as a whole, somewhat 

reluctantl y accepted the recommendation of its subcommittee, 

several members expressing concern that success in all of the 

scheduled missions would cause the exploitation elements of the 

intelligence community to be swamped in high resolution photographs. 

Many of those USIB members also favored contined use of Gambit-l 

rather than Gambit-3 because of the apparently greater cost of 

the newer system. 

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For the m.Olnent, the ded sion to proceed with a ~TIix of Gam.bit-l 

and Gam.bit- 3 system.s during the 12 m.onths starting in July 1966 

was perm.itted to stand unchanged. The convincing argum.ent, 

advanced by the staff of the National Reconnaissance Office, was 

that the better roll m.aneuverability and longer orbital lifetim.e of 

the Gam.bit-3 system. in com.bination with a resolution that, at 

worst, would be at least as good as that of Gam.bit-l, were sufficient 

justifications for proceeding rapidly to total reliance on Gam.bit-3. 

One of the growing national concerns during the period of 

Gam.bit-3 developm.ent was quick reaction to crises. As early as 

January 1965, Dr. McMillan had inform.ed Secretary McNam.ara 

48 

of im.pending studies of a quick reaction capability for Gam.bit-3. 

While funds had been allocated in the fiscal 1966 budget for this 

purpose, little work had been done; --the m.oney was held back 

until actual results of Gam.bit-3 operations could be weighed. 

The tangible proof which had been lacking during fiscal year 

1966 becam.e available shortly after the first Gam.bit-3 flight, at 

the beginning of fiscal year 1967. On 17 August 1966, the NRP 

Executive Com.m.ittee approved in principle the m.odification of 

Gam.bit-3 by inclusion of m.ultiple recovery vehicles and extended 

orbital life. The costs involved were two years in the future and 

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the technology involved was, by that time, low risk. Long life 

49 

and multiple reentry capsules would satisfy the need. 

The premise of long-life, multiple capsule systems was that 

urgentl y required photographs would be taken and returned for 

analysis while more routine surveillance duties were still performed, 

exposed film being fed into a second recovery vehicle. But another 

requirement for quick reaction was that either a satellite be on-orbit 

when the need arose or that one could be launched quickly. One 

was lar gel y a matter of luck and the other was, during 1966, 

ultimately constrained by the rate of production of reconnaissance 

satellite s. 

While the first G-3 flight had been largely meant to prove the 

capability of the camera and gain some experience with orbital 

maneuvers, the second flight was intended to demonstrate some 

extension of the satellite I s orbital life and to test, as exhaustively 

as possible, the roll joint and the backup systems. * 

In September 1966, Colonel King left the Gambit office for a 

new assignment. In some respects, the timing was unfortunate; 

King had been the prime mover in Gambit development for several 

years, and the second Gambit-3 mission still was pending. General 

Martin, therefore, arranged for King's continued availability to 

oversee the second and third Gambit- 3 mis sions- -a task that had 

precedence over any he incurred in his new assignment. 

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The camera system was still the pacing item in scheduling, 

and on-pad testing had to be compres sed s lightly when the acceptance 

testing slipped a week. The slippage affected the Astro-Position 

Terrain Camera, which was not a critical item for initial flights 

of Gambit-3. When that subsystem failed its acceptance tests (a 

looper malfunction due to a broken roller bracket), it was disabled 

and the second Gambit- 3 system was launched without its services 

50 

on 28 September 1966. 

The vehicle achieved a correct orbit and began its planned sevenday primary mis sion, programmed to photograph almost 1200 targets --

51 

half again as many as the first flight. A tape recorder malfunction 

was the only disturbance of the primary mission. It failed during 

orbit 82, but recovered thereafter. The capsule was recovered, 

52 

uneventfully, on orbit 115. 

The roll joint was exercised extensively during the primary 

mission (943 cycles), and in solo flight (546 cycles). Only one 

malfunction occurred (during solo) and it was corrected via backup 

53 

systems. 

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The importance of the backup systems being well understood 

by the project office after Gambit-l experience, a total of 1552 

backup system operations were completed during the solo portion 

of the mission. 

The results of the second Gambit-3 flight were mixed. While 

the mechanical operation of the satellite was impecable, the camera 

system did not score as well. Photography for the second flight 

was poorer than that of the firs t, a variance in the quality of the 

54 

optic s being blamed. The outcome was puzzling, however, because 

preflight tests had indicated that the optics for the second Gambit-3 

were slightly superior to those of the first. Best ground resolution 

was about 36 inches. Nevertheless, the second Gambit-3 success 

reinforced the growing conviction of NRP managers that too many 

Gambit's were in the flight schedule. * 

* Two issues underlay the overlapping flight schedule; cost and 

continuity of coverage. The success of both Gambit flight programs 

during 1966 created pressures to reduce the total number of flights. 

Contemporary schedules called for one Gambit -1 per month in 

the period October 1966 to June 1967 plus Gambit-3' s in November 

1966, January 1967, and one per month thereafter. Three of the 

planned Gambit- 1 flights were eliminated. Because of the optic s 

problem, the Gambit- 3 flight planned for November waS slipped to 

December, and the January, March and May 1967 flights of Gambit- 3 

e limina te d. 

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Shortl y after recovery of the film from the second Gambit- 3 

flight, the photograp hic payload for the third flight began acc eptance 

tests toward a 27 October delivery in anticipation of a 1 November 

launch date. But the payload experience of the second flight induced 

an extension of testing for the third, causing the flight to be slipped 

until mid-December. The extended test procedure was adopted as 

55 

the norm for all future payloads. 

The vehicle was readied during the second week in December 

and launched on the 14th. The orbit achieved was similar to the 

56 

two previous flights, although somewhat more eccentric. Two 

pre-planned orbit adjustments during the primary flight lowered 

57 

the perigee from 82.6 nautical miles to approximately 76 miles. 

During the flight, spurious commands generated thr ough one channe 1 

of the extended Command System troubled flight controllers, but 

actually affected operations only during three orbits (28 to 31), 

during which most of the operational photographic take was lost. 

Thereafter, changed operational procedures overcame the difficulty. 

The Astro-Position Terrain Camera which had malfunctioned on flight 

one and been deliberately disabled on the second flight, again 

malfunctioned, experiencing intermittent operation of the shutter 

mechanism. 

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The mission returned "best resolution" of 21 inches On a new 

ultra-thin- base film (still not the high-speed film earlier promised) 

that extended the available film load from roughly 3000 feet to 

about 5000 feet. That increased film capacity largely accounted 

for an improvement in the numbers of targets programmed and 

read out, these values being 1584 and 794 respectively. Another 

58 

contributing factor was mission length: eight days. Gambit-l 

had yet to achieve that goal. But Gambit- 3 had still not been extended 

to its full capabilities. The project directors were carefully adhering 

59 

to the "proceed slowly" rule for development flights. 

The objectives of development flights included proof of hardware 

capability as well as learning how to extract the maximum return 

from the hardware. The fourth flight of Gambit- 3 principally 

served the latter end. The flight was scheduled for 21 February 

1967. No major problems were encountered during acceptance 

testing, but preflight checkout disclosed an out-of-specification 

condition in the inertial reference package of the guidance section 

60 

that ultimatel y caused a three-day slip in the launch. 

By shortly after noon of 24 February 1967, the satellite control 

facility at Vandenberg sent the cryptic IINominal ascentll mes sage 

to the dozen or so stations waiting for word. 

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The fourth mission of Gambit-3 thereafter proceeded with few 

on-orbit problems. Flight controllers confidently predicted that 

the photographic take would be as good as that of the first Gambit- 3 

61 

flight, thus far not duplicated. 

Some anomalies did occur, of course. Erratic behavior of 

the focus sensor, incorrect timing of the backup roll joint drives 

during the solo flight, and erratic spacing between photographic 

frames were the most notable. 

Double images and run-through of unexposed film resulting 

from frame spacing faults absorbed the greatest amount of administrative and technical energy durirg the days following recovery of 

62 

the film. 

Unhappil y, best resolution was on the order of 27 inches, a 

development that--in light of good preflight test results and promising 

on-orbit performances--demanded explanation. The only obvious 

difficulty experienced in the camera section acceptance test had 

involved determination of the best point of focus. "Best focus!! was 

established by adjusting the platen with reference to a tri- bar target 

similar to those photographed from orbit. Skilled technicians 

focused the optics repetitively until a large body of data on the 

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"best electrical focus" distance had been built up. The data were 

then plotted. All previous experience, both with Gambit-l and 

Gambit-3 had been that the resulting plot formed a unimodal 

distribution. The mode, or peak. was chosen as the point of best 

focus. 

Because of an abberation in the optics for the fourth Gambit-3, 

the distribution of points of best focus had two peaks. The better 

of the two also displayed double imagery. In an attempt to use the 

higher resolution focal distance designers inserted a nine-inch 

mask in the lens, eliminating the secondary image. The optics 

were flown in this configuration despite a supplementary test using 

a point target which indicated that the lower resolution peak was 

unambiguousl y correct. On-orbit. defocus experiments, unhappily. 

agreed with the results of the point-target procedure. 

But the wrong "best point of focus" had been selected before 

launch. As a result of that experience, all future optical assemblies 

in which an abberation had been detected were focused by use of 

a point target rather than the more common tri-bar target. A 

cause for chagrin was a set of calculations which showed that 

resolution of the mission photography would have been as good as 

that obtained on the first mission had the correct focal plane been 

63 

chosen. 

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In other respects the mission had been successful. Despite 

the double imagery and comparatively low resolution, the intelligence 

value of the photography was considered to be high. Exposure 

was excellent for more than 90 percent of the exposed frames. 

Free for the first time of malfunctions, the terrain camera registered 

ground resolutions between 100 and 120 feet, more than adequate 

for mapping purposes. The stellar camera element again expe rienced 

film fogging, although not as badly as had been the case On the first 

64 

three missions. 

By the time hardware acceptance had begun for the fifth flight 

of Gambit-3 there was reason to anticipate a very successful mission. 

Acceptance testing of the cameras ran more smoothly than ever 

65 

before. Procedures for determining the best plane of focus 

seemed quite adequate and tests showed the camera to have a welldefined stable point of best focus with a resolution potential of 60 

66 

line s pe r millimete r. While nominal lens resolution was inferior 

to that of the fourth flight article, it seemed more than adequate. 

The optics tested better than those of the first Gambit-3 camera, 

that which had achieved the best resolution of the se ries. General 

Martin reported to his Washington counterpart, General Berg that, 

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67 

"The recoITllnendation is a very strong 'Let's go! If! No significant 

problems had appeared in acceptance testing. delivery, or mating 

of the components on the launch pad. A slip of one day from the planned 

25 April 1967 launch date apparently was caused by weather conditions 

in the launch area. ~~ 

Lift-off occurred at exactly 10: 00 a. m. Pacific Standard Time 

on 26 April 1967. Before the message could be sent to that effect, 

however, the second stage booster, Agena. and camera section had 

impacted in the Pacific Ocean southeast of Hawaii. The first notice 

of failure mentioned a possible second stage Titan failure adding, 

"Injection into orbit is questionable at this time. f! The final message 

from Point Arguello that day spoke for itself: "Water impact due 

to low thrust of second stage of Titan booster. Negative acquisition 

at downrange ship on ascent. Further report will be issued only if 

additional information becomes available." That day, at least, none did. 

* 

The principal documents which cover launches are Quarterly 

Program Reviews of Special Projects and the routine memo from the 

Director, SAFSP, to Director, NRO (Mission Summary). Both of 

these documents were concerned with the most important feature of 

the mis sion- -its failure- -to the exclusion of all other details. 

However, high winds in the launch area were Common during March 

and April, accounting for similar one-day slips on other launches. 

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Such information as eventually became available indicated that 

thrust chamber pressure had dropped by 40 percent shortly after 

second-stage ignition. Maximum velocity was 8000 feet-per- second, 

too slow for injection. Suspecting that the failure was due to a 

fuel line blockage, Martin instituted more stringent inspection 

68 

procedures on all tanks, lines and pumps. No more could be done. 

The sixth and final Gam bit- 3 development flight had 0 riginall y 

been planned for 6 June 1967. Following the failure of mission 

five, it was rescheduled for 20 June. Acceptance testing and prelaunch checkout proceeded smoothly, no major anomalies being 

encountered. 

Early in June the NRO staff in Washington recommended COnsideration of a new flight pattern for Gambit-3 with the object of 

exploiting the higher sun angles characteristic of summer months. 

It was accepted and made effect ive for the sixth Gambit- 3 mission. 

In the past, Gambit cameras had normally been operated only 

on north-to-south orbital passes. By launching in the early morning, 

instead of early afternoon, photographic opera tions could take place 

on the ascending portion of the orbit as well. In consequence, some 

targets, those which fell in the ascending track, could be photographed 

twice a day instead of only once. Making such an adjustment also 

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required that the latitude of perigee be shifted northward so that 

the satellite would be closer to the earth during the ascending portion 

of its orbit. Although resolution would be acceptable on both sides 

of the orbit trace, targets in southern latitudes would register 

poorer resolution than usual because of the camera's higher altitude 

when it flew over them. The tradeoff was acceptable because of 

better coverage of "more interesting" Soviet and Chinese target 

69 

sites during the ascending portion of the orbit. 

Detecting a slight anomaly in the optics, technicians set the 

"best electrical focusl! one mil away from the calculated best plane 

of focus. Modal distribution seemed slightly abnormal, and because 

the platen position was subject to slight shocks during ascent, a 

one-mil, out-of-focus condition of the platen seemed the best 

compromise between expected resolution and a potential out-of-

'!< focus condition.' 

* 

The conservatism of the choice was warranted by flight 

experience. Analysis revealed that the electrical focus had shifted 

a half mil from its intended position. 

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A change in checkout procedures for the sixth Gambit-3 provided yet another increase in total film capacity. Final checks of the 

system before a flight normally consumed from 200 to 300 feet of 

film. To offset that loss, Eastman overloaded the spool; the first 

300 feet of film extended above the spool flange. The flange kept 

film from slipping loose during launch and injection, but it was not 

nece ssary in the controlled gr ound experiments used during checkout. 

(The first two Gambit-3 flights had carried only 2600 feet of film, 

as did most of the later Gambit-l vehicles. The introduction of 

ultra-thin base film had allowed an increase to 4700 feet. With the 

adoption of the new checkout pr ocedure, Gambit- 3 could be launched 

with almo st 5000 feet of unexpended film. ) 

The mission began on schedule, early in the morning of 20 June 

1967. All ascent events proceeded normally until 60 seconds before 

Titan second stage engine cutoff. At that moment, part of the 

ablative skirt of the engine blew off. The resulting aerodynamic 

asymmetry slowed the vehicle I s acceleration, and injection velocity 

was 88 feet per second lower than programmed. Apogee was more 

than 46 nautical miles lower than planned, and perigee was about 

two miles low. Mission controllers called on the Agena propulsion 

system to correct the orbit, but during that maneuver (on orbit 32) 

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the Agena rocket engine suffered a chamber pressure loss. For70 

tunatel y, it did not affect the ultimate success of the miss ion. 

Indeed, notwithstanding such mishaps, the flight proc eeded so 

well that controllers decided to extend orbital life from the planned 

eight days to ten. An Agena reburn during orbit 98 provided the 

essential repositioning impulse. 

A malfunctioning relay brought on roll join~ operating peculiarities 

during and after the 64th orbit. Flight controllers spent some 14 

hours in identifying the source of the problem before attempting a 

correction. The first fix attempted was to use the crab servo to 

work around incorrect roll-joint movements. After three orbits 

during which smear was inevitable. new programming instructions 

71 

went aloft. Not until orbit 112 was the problem wholly overcome. 

The photographic products of the sixth Gambit-3 mission were 

well worth the effort required to make the flight successful. The 

best CORN target resolution registered was slightly more than 19 

inches, not as good as the first miss ion, but a big improvement 

over the intervening flights. Two extra days of flight and the extra 

film contributed to a doubling of the number of targets photographed 

and read out (3416 photographed and 2279 read out). Resolution 

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showed less variability than in earlier Gambit-3 operations, as did 

exposure. Photography was considered generally to be the best 

72 

achieved by Gambit-3 to that time. 

Analysis of the film results by the National Photographic 

Interpretation Center indicated that the decision to adopt a new 

orbit had been wise. NRO headquarters reported: !fAll evaluations received to date regarding the intelligence effectiveness and 

overall scale and exposure quality of NSN 4306 have been highly 

complementary .•• it is requested that the capability for high 

northern latitude perigee placement and early morning launch be 

retained and requirements be examined for each Msn during the 

high solar northern declination months for applic ation of this type 

or bit. We wish to commend your development of the 4306 type 

orbit and its contribution to increased intelligence return in terms 

73 

of operational flexibility and cost effectiveness. " 

Dr. Flax was somewhat less euphoric. Reporting to the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense. Flax noted that, "In general, system performance 

was excellent (after six flights) except for the optical sensor which 

is, of course, the most critical element of the system.." Resolution 

of 19 inches fell well short of the planned resolution. But in all 

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other respects, Gambit-3 had to be considered a striking success. 

As compared to Gambit-I, the newer system had achieved its 

development goals--excepting resolution--in about one-third as 

74 

much mission time. 

Results obtained during the first year of Gambit-3 operations 

fully justified the dec ision to rely on that system. Although the 

newer high-resolution film was not yet available, Gambit-3 produced 

a "best resolution" of 16 inches (as compared to the 19 inches 

"best resolution" of Gambit-l), an average resolution that was 

slightly better, and a substantially greater rate of film exposure. 

(Owing to various limitations on maneuvering during the first three 

Gambit-3 missions, in deference to research and development test 

objectives, Gambit- 3 averaged coverage of only slightly mor e 

targets than Gambit-I, but on a "best missions" basis the Gambit- 3 

system covered half again as many critical targets.) 

After the second Gambit-3 flight had appropriately demonstrated the general technical capability of that system, Dr. Flax 

cancelled the final five Gambit-l mission s and diverted the boosters 

75 

to other assignments. There was abundant evidence that the 

interpretation facilities would be overloaded were the full complement 

of Gambit-l and Gambit- 3 vehicles to be flown in what remained 

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of the year. After the sixth Gambit- 3 mission it was clear to all 

concerned that the system "WOuld produce better returns than 

Gambit-1 could ever hope for and that it was wasteful of resources 

to continue production of Gambit-I. On 30 June 1967, Flax cancelled 

the Gambit-1 program. At the time, seven additional Gambit-l 

systems were on contract, but only two were approaching completion 

(work on the other five having been earlier curtailed). Even though 

the improved film on which Gambit-3 expectations were partly 

based still had not been perfected~ Gambit-3 recorded a "best 

resolution" of 13.5 inches during its ninth flight (mission 4534), 

in October 1967. 

Results of the adoption of Gambit-3 were evident in more 

generally acclaimed ways than !lbest resolution" alone. The Defense 

Intelligence Agency reported that Gambit-3 returns made it possible, 

for the first time,l 

The U. S. knew, for instance, almost precisely at what rate the new 

Soviet T-62 tank was being delivered to Soviet tank regiments 

stationed along the Chinese border, and similar findings were 

reported for a surprisingly wide variety of aircraft, missiles, 

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and ships. That the newer Gambit returned pictures that made 

it possible for U. S. interpreters to assess th~ __________ ~ 

Iwas a sufficient comment on ~--------------------------~. 76 

the improvement that had resulted from its introduction. That 

~----------------------------------I 

Policy, Administration and Further Development 

The sixth flight marked the end of the development flight 

program for Gambit-3. In terms of mission operations, however, 

that milestone was mostly distinguishable by a slight decrease in 

experimentation during flight. The first four flights of Gambit- 3 

had been clearly developmental in that they had limited objectives. 

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Malfunctions in some non-critical components were tolerated, for 

instance, as had also been true of Gambit-l in a comparable phase. 

A significant difference in the experience of the two programs was 

the amount of attention devoted to the transition from developmental 

status to full operational readiness. For Gambit-l the pace of that 

transition was an issue of considerable concern generated partly 

by political considerations (the mounting CIA-NRO differences of 

the time) but also by the complete lack of any alternative means 

of obtaining high resolution overflight photography. The NRO 

probabl y could not have survived another program failure, so 

Greer and McMillan were exquisitely circumspect in their deliberate 

progress toward full operational readiness. But precisely because 

all previous programs had been failures, the intelligence community 

was enormously impatient to get early operational returns from 

Gambit. Largely because of Greer's stubborn insistence on stepby-step progress, Gambit-l had an unprecedented run of early 

success es. Major problems when they occurred, carne toward 

the mid-point of Gambit-l IS operational life, at a time when intelligence specialists had become accustomed to a steady output of 

high-quality photography and had corne to assume, almost placidly, 

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that any Gambit problems would be solved quickly and without 

disrupting the flow of information to photo interpreters. Gambit-l 

experienced mid-term problems because of manufacturing and test 

process faults; Greer and King had successfully insured against 

the survival of any disabling design defects. In Gambit-3 the design 

verification process proved out in the earlier program was supplemented by the manufacturing process emphasis that General Martin 

had applied to Gambit-i. Defects in Gambit-3 tended to be random, 

the product of oversight or a<t:cident rather than any failures of 

process. 

Developme nt of the camera systems of both Gambits was a 

never ending process. Development-during-production expenditures 

for Gambit-l camera systems (identified as such by their being 

entered in the books as non- recurring costs) far exceeded initial 

development expenditures. That also became true, for Gambit-3. 

That a potential for continual improvement existed testified to the 

excellence of the basic design of the two camera systems. (The 

same had been true of Corona, though in a somewhat different 

fashion. ) 

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During the period covered by the development flights of 

Gambit-3, the NRO was working its way toward an optimal mix of 

reconnaissance vehicles. During the early days of Gambit-l, the 

entire photo-satellite reconnaissance effort was dependent on two 

systems, Gambit and Corona, each based on technology of the late 1950s. 

Gambit-3 represented a vehicle at least as reliable as the secondgeneration Corona, and like that system promptly became an apt 

subject for modification and performance improvement. 

Among the developments which concerned Gambit- 3 were 

readout technology, extended operational life, and multiple filmreturn capability. Readout and multiple reentry implied longer 

system orbital life and expanded coverage of ground targets. 

Imagery readout had been a goal of satellite reconnaissanc e for 

two decades--originally because no obvious alternative ways of 

retrieving orbital photography were available. The introduction 

of recoverable film capsules, with Corona, and the indifferent 

quality of returns from early readout systems (Samos E-l and E-2) 

had relegated readout to a res earch enterprise by 1962, however. 

During 1966, the concept of readout was again raised to system 

design status, and in one proposed application Gambit- 3 became 

the vehicle. Various technical considerations made it only marginally 

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attractive at the time, however, and in November 1967 the NRP 

Executive Committee decided against any near-term application 

to Gambit-3. It recurred more and mo;re frequently to consideration 

77 

of new system possibilities thereafter, however. 

Although readout was rejected for the time, long life and multiple 

reentry capability had become approved Gambit-3 goals earlier in 

the year. Neither involved the technological and financial risk of 

imagery readout. Fortunately, owing mostly to McMillan, the 

Titan booster of Gambit-3 had life capability the early Gambit-3 

systems did not need. The addition of a second reentry vehicle, 

more film capacity, and the attendant modifications to film transport, cutting and other mechanisms would considerably increase 

Gambit-3's weight. Except for "crisis reconnaissance" operations, 

a capability never required though often proposed, a second recovery 

vehicle would be redundant if the total time on orbit for the camera 

were no greater than with one capsule. Extended orbit of life would 

require more batteries and greater quantities of control gas and 

rocket fuel. Additional lift capability through the addition of small 

strap-on solid rocket engines to the Titan III was an option which 

had been foreseen early in the Gambit-3 program (and provided 

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for in construction of the launching pad at Point Arguello). Formal 

approval for the development of long-life, multiple- reentry vehicle 

78 

capability for Gambit- 3 was obtained in August 1966. The change 

79 

would add almost $23 million to Gambit- 3 costs in fiscal 1968. 

By November 1967, the question of schedule overlap between 

Gambit-l and Gambit- 3 was conditioned by the continuing succes s 

of Gambit- 3 operations. For a time late in the year, the CIA 

suggested that Gambit-3 rather than Gambit-l schedules should 

be curtailed. Absolute cost comparisons were all in favor of 

80 

Gambit-1- -if resolution were disregarded. 

The success of the first two Gambit-3's made it apparent to 

the United States Intelligence Board that with three satellite systems 

routinely returning large quanitites of photographic intelligence, 

the interpretation task was becoming, for the fir st time, a constraint 

on oper ations • 

Photo interpreter s were not alone in finding it difficult to deal 

with three successful satellites at the same time. The Satellite 

Operation Center (SOC) in the Pentagon (Washington's principal 

interface with STC, Vandenberg) was also feeling the pinch. Major 

General James T. Stewart, Director of the NRO staff, complained 

that, liThe SOC is barely able to cope with Gambit and/ or Gambit 

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Cubed today in a manual operation." Addition.of Hexagon 

or the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) to their burden would 

swamp them, as would any appreciable improvement in Corona 

81 

capability. 

By early December 1967, USIB was considering a reduction 

in coverage requirements as a way out of the difficulty. In combination with extended life for Gambit-3, that implied steadily 

decreasing launch rates for the future. At the launch rate then 

prevailing, the 16 Gambit-3 systems then on order would last 

through April 1970. At the usage rate suggested by USIB, only 

12 would be required. After allowing for backup vehicles to 

replace possible failures, the NRP Executive Committee decided 

82 

to buy 14 rather than 16 new Gambit-3's. (In the event, 16 

were actually used by June 1969, after which the dual-reentry 

vehicle (double bucket) version of Gambit-3 became standard. 

The recurrent Gambit-3 launch-rate question was nominally 

resolved in January 1967;* six launches were scheduled for fiscal 

1967, ten for fiscal 1968, nine for fiscal 1969, and seven each 

year thereafter .. That decision reflected a cutback in scheduled 

launches of seven vehicles through fiscal 1969 and two per year 

* It was reopened annually, however. 

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thereafter. Uncertainty concerning the provision of standby and 

backup vehicles was countered by a decision to consider reserve 

vehicles as hedges against expanded intelligence requirements 

rather than as insurance against the catastrophic failure of a mis sion. 

Thus readiness within two months became the standard for reserve 

vehicles. rather than readiness within two to three weeks (as would 

have been the case if protection against mission failure consequences 

83 

were intended). 

In a separate effort to conserve funds, the NRO altered its 

earlier disaster recovery policy for Point Arguello. Against the 

possibility of a disabling launch pad disaster, the NRO had planned 

to modify a second pad to back up the primary Gambit- 3 launch 

pad (PALe II, Pad 3). That commitment was revoked in February 

1967 in favor of a policy of quick rebuilding and repair in the event 

of launch stand damage. The newer approach had the undeniable 

advantage of being less costly, particularly if no severe damage 

occurred. It invoked a degree of greater risk, of course, but in 

that no occasion for either major repair or the use of an alternate 

launch stand arose through the end of 1972, the policy subsequently 

84 

justified itself. 

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The only major shortcoming that inhibited Gambit-3 by late 

1967 was the inadequacy of the camera system. Despite the fact 

that it was better than that of Gambit-l it was not yet sufficiently 

better to justify Gambit-3 development--and could not be so rated 

until the original requirement forl~ ____ lresolution was actually 

satisfied. That achievement depended on real progress in developing high-resolution, high-speed film, improved substrate materials, 

better manufacturing process, and improvements in the final 

preparation of the optical surfaces. 

All df the cameras flown in the first six flights carried optics 

whose substrate material was fused silica. All available alternative 

materials except Cer-Vit had been rejected by the beginning of 

1967. Cer-Vit was characterized by a low coefficient of thermal 

expansion, and was less expensive and easier to manufacture 

than fused silica substrates. Those were important considerations; 

the 1967 rate of production was so low that it prevented the accumulation of enough spares to pe rmit diversion of mirrors to the 

development of faster polishing techniques- -a circularity which 

would require considerable effort to break. 

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Happily, Cer-Vit was showing greater proITlise. During the 

first quarter of 1967, Owens-Illinois had cast six proITlising but 

undersized blanks and sent theITl to Perkin EIITler and EastITlan 

for finishing. Unfortunately, the castings were ITlarred by opacity 

and structural defects. Owens -Illinois eliminated those faults 

in the next batch of blanks, but the castings still were overweight, 

85 

and polishing techniques were not adequate to the need. Still, 

the casting process seeITled to have progressed past the period 

of experiITlentation. Late in July, Colonel Lew Allen left a note on 

General Berg's desk~< which provided a good indication of progress: 

"After ITlany disappointITlents it appears that we have a good 72" CerVit blank. The press operated flawlessly .•• We still need to hold 

a reservation until full clean-up and interior inspection is done, 

86 

but our experience leads us to feel success is here. Hooray!" 

Notwithstanding such progress, the resolution specified for 

GaITlbit-3 still had not been realized. The urgency of achieving 

better than one foot resolution in GaITlbit-3 operations had its own 

* 

Allen, later head of the NRO staff, and still later head of the 

Special Projects Directorate, was then in charge of technical developITlent in the NRO staff; Brigadier General R. A. Berg headed the 

NRO staff at the tiITle. 

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rationale in system requirements, but it was reinforced by activity 

elsewhere, particularly in Hexagon and Dorian* programs. In 

sOme respects. Dorian seemed to be a prospective replacement 

for Gambit-3. 

The elusive goal of photo-satellite reconnaissance was resolution of objects as small asl ~ _____ lacross. It was a threshold -J 

number for photo interpreters, who foresaw in it marvelous 

possibilities for obtaining hitherto unobtainable information. By 

1967, some seasoned veterans of the National Reconnaissance 

Program had begun to suggest that Gambit-3 might never achieve 

even the I I resolution for which it had been designed. but ~--------'" 

that Dorian would actually return imagery of ~I ____ ---"Ior better 

resolution. Commenting on a draft study by Colonel Lee Battle, 

former Corona program manager, General Berg conceded that, 

II OLI ___ -JI ma y be just too tough a development problem. But compar e 

that to the theoretical statement that LI _______ --"Iat the outset' 

(from Dorian). I want to seel I so badly, I become completely 

~---

vexed with anyone talking it down. But I also realize that getting 

Qdepends a heckuva lot on the G 3 learning curve and experience 

Dorian was the covert reconnaissance aspect of the otherwise 

"white" Manned Orbiting Laboratory program. 

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••• II and not just on Dorian. 

Uneasiness about Gambit-3' s prospects also surfaced during 

an August 1967 meeting of the Reconnaissance Panel of the President's 

Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC). Although the nominal 

topic was Dorian, the PSAC had also scheduled a one-hour briefing 

on the status of Gambit-3 optics. In the event, it lasted three 

hours, counting the extended discussion it generated. Dr. Richard 

L. Garwin sharply criticized several aspects of the Gambit-3 program: 

program management, lack of technical expertise at Eastman 

Kodak, and the faltering progress in improving the l7-inch resolution 

provided by the first Gambit-3 mission to the 1<-____ ---"1 resolution 

resolution specified. General Berg cautioned Dr. Flax that the 

PSAC might well pursue the topic at greater length in another 

sess ion, but the threat never materialized. While members of 

the PSAC were fully aware of Gambit-3's difficulties, and concerned about them, most did not accept Garwin's pessimistic views. 

The NRO staff concluded that Garwin's criticisms were in part based 

88 

on incomplete information. 

Notwithstanding the failure of Gambit-3 to satisfy early expectations for resolution, its demonstrated operational capability was 

sufficiently satisfying by the sixth flight to warrant final cancellation 

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of Gambit-l. In consequence, several camera systems and attendant 

flight equipments were freed for distribution to other programs. 

Most went to NASA to support the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter 

photography programs, although two were crated and stored for 

display at "some future time ll when security permitted. 

Making Gambit-l cameras available to NASA created its 

security problems. In order to conceal the potential of the nowoutmoded Gambit-l. enormously better than anything in NASA I s 

inventory. the NRO specified that the equipment be called the II Lunar 

Mapping and Survey System" (LMSS) and be used only for lunar 

photography--and that products be presented to the public in a 

way that would make it impossible to determine resolution. That 

could be accomplished--in theory--by failing to disclose the altitude 

from which photographs were taken, thus concealing both scale and 

definition. In that fashion, the need for invoking Talent-Keyhole 

89 

security proc edures would be obviated. 

As it turned out, the LMSS camera was never used for lunar 

photography. But the ownership of equipment so advanced presented 

new opportunities. and new temptations, to NASA. Some NASA 

people began to argue for the use of the Gambit-l camera in the 

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Earth Resources Survey and Earth Sensing programs. The product 

would be photography with at least two-foot resolution in a program 

that was closely monitored by a large community of scientists 

who were unwitting of the achievements of covert reconnaissance. 

The National Security Council had earlier ruled that NASA could not 

release photography with better than 60-foot resolution. There 

seemed no feasible way of concealing Gambit-l capability if the 

system were used at any scientifically reasonable orbital altitude--

although NASA was not willing to concede that point. With the 

vigorous support of Dr. Donald Hornig, the President's Science 

Advisor, the NRO responded to NASA's enthusiasm by stony refusal; 

90 

the issue was allowed to die of its own weight. 

While such events were proceeding, and while development 

flights of Gambit-3 still were continuing. designers had begun 

to work seriously on the development of a dual-recovery-vehicle 

version of the system. Film capacity Was the limiting factor in 

Gambit-3's orbital life, the ten-day film supply generally being 

used up long before the system was otherwise exhausted. On the 

seventh mission, for instance, even after completion of a solomode operation and deboost of the Agena control section, remaining 

battery life WaS sufficient for five additional days of life, and enough 

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control gas remained for another 28 days on orbit. 

The small quantity of film available, relative to other expendables. evoked considerably ingenuity among flight planners intent 

on securing maximum returns from the single-bucket version of 

Gambit-3. That ingenuity was rewarded by significant and steady 

increases in target coverage from the first to the last (22nd) 

single-bucket Gambit- 3. 

The development period allowed for the double- bucket Gambit 

was fundamentally determined by the rate at which the original 

Gambit-3 systems were used up. Following the purchase of six 

development systems, the NRO bought 16 additional single-bucket 

Gambit-3's for a total of 22. The last was expected to be launched 

before April 1969. which thus became the scheduled initial launch 

date for the first double-bucket Gambit-3. But small schedule 

slippages in development of the double-bucket Gambit could be, 

and were, offset by stretchouts in single-bucket launch schedules. 

In late October 1967, less than a year after work had begun, it 

became evident that July 1969 rather than April 1969 was the 

probable first flight date for the initial double-bucket Gambit. 

Launches of the remaining si ngle- bucket satellites were stretched 

92 

out to cover the gap. (The relatively late finding that a double265 

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bucket Gambit would require a more comprehensive data handling 

and command subsystem had an appreciable influence on the 

93 

schedule slip} 

While the events peripheral to the development and operational 

quality of Gambit-3 continued to intrude on the program, and in 

many instances tended to distract attention from the central purpose of that program, the technical features, intelligence potential, 

and on-orbit performance of the system were themselves in a 

constant state of change. Such change was neither random in 

nature nor wholly responsive to problems encountered in operation; 

both technological progress and mission performance were somewhat 

unpredictable influences on program status. 

Several improvements in the Gambit-3 system became feasible 

almost concurrently with the shift to a dual-recovery subsystem. 

The major innovation was a new optical system (R-5) which used 

five lens elements rather than the four of the original (R-36l) 

94 

system. The new system provided greater foc allength (177 

rather than 160 inches) a flatter field, and improved color correction. 

Both resolution quality and the variability of resolution would improve 

95 

thereby. (The R-5 lens system was finally introduced on the 

32nd Gambit-3, the eleventh in the series of dual-recovery vehicles.) 

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The introduction of irnproved film was also a constant of the 

Gambit-3 program. A medium-speed (E. I 3.6), thin-base film 

had been used during the first two flights. The same emulsion, 

on a thinner base, was carried on flights three through thirteen. 

By the time of the 14th flight, the faster emulsion (E. I 6.0) 

originally scheduled for the first Gambit-3 flight was deemed ready 

for use. Because it was somewhat less satisfactory than had been 

anticipated, the slower emulsion was reintroduced, temporarily. 

for flights 20 through 27, after which an improved version of the 

higher-speed emulsion on ultra-thin base was adopted. It exceeded 

original expectations. 

Two other major advances in Gambit-3 technology originated 

in research performed for the Dorian program. The first was a 

solution to the stubbornly intractable problem of obtaining a fully 

satisfactory optical substrate material. Half a dozen materials 

had been tried and rejected for one reason or another during the 

course of Gambit-3 development. The only materials that still 

seemed to offer promise by the time the R-5 lens approached 

readiness were fused silica, used on virtually all flights of the 

single-bucket series, and Cer-Vit, the Owens -Illinois material 

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meant to replace it. Dorian required a 72-inch mirror. Both 

Cer-Vit and a newer material, ULE, were candidates for the 

substrate, and ULE proved better. Because fused silica had always 

been an interim solution to the Gambit-3 mirror substrate problem, 

and Cer-Vit was proving extremely difficult to form and shape, 

Gambit lens designers seized eagerly on the new material. In 

a sense, it was the last real hope for mirror improvement; none 

of the feasible alternatives had the desirable qualities of ULE. 

(Cer - Vit was finally discarded after determined effort produced 

only one flight-qualified mirror from the total of 70 blanks that 

Owens-Illinois fabricated.) Not until flight 42 of Gambit-3 was 

the ULE substrate used, however. 

The second innovation which Gambit-3 owed to Dorian was 

the Titan III Iliong tank'i modification, originally developed for use 

with MOL. The cancellation of MOL-Dorian in June 1969 made the 

larger Titans available for use in Gambit- 3 operations - -and by 

then Gambit- 3 had grown so much heavier that additional thrust 

was essential. The 32nd flight of Gambit-3, marking the introduction 

of the R-5 optical system, was also the point of adoption of "longtank" Titan III boosters. (The excess lift capacity of the Titan 

III-X had been sufficient to permit an uncomplicated conversion 

from single- to double-bucket ver sions. ) 

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In early 1968, USIB again suggested changes in coverage requirements and Gambit-3 launch frequencies, explicitly proposing 

96 

a reduction to seven flights during fiscal year 1969. The NRO had 

earlier concluded that eight vehicles would have to be procurred 

to insure seven successes (and nine to insure eight successes). 

Eastman's optics production capacity was still limited, and eight 

systems was a more realistic prospect than nine. Secondly, by that 

time only eight more single-bucket vehicles remained on contract 

and the availability date for the first double-bucket Gambit-3 

was somewhat uncertain. Stretching out the single-bucket Gambit-3 

launch schedule was the least painful way of protecting against 

97 

a gap in coverage. 

In the event. the first flight of the double-bucket Gambit-3 

did not occur until 23 August 1969, almost five months after it 

was originally scheduled and two months after the last singlebucket Gambit flew. Thus a short hiatus in intelligence return 

98 

did occur. 

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FLIGHT PROGRAM - VEHICLES 7 to 22 

Acceptance testing for the flight equipment to be used on the 

seventh Gambit-3 mission went smoothly. The payload was accepted 

with a total of nine performance waivers, of which only one, a shortfall in resolution, was important. It was also recurrent and persis99 

tent, continuing to be lithe major performance waiver. II 

During preflight testing on the launch pad a faulty command in 

the test command tape caused a failure in the roll joint primary 

motor electronics. The entire component had to be replaced, 

causing a slip of one day in the launch. The vehicle finally lifted 

off shortly after nine in the morning of 16 August 1967. The early 

launch time was, as in the case of the sixth flight, used in order to 

take advantage of high sun angles still available during August. 

Despite the II ••• nominal launch II message from Vandenberg, 

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the injection was not nominal. The initial perigee was six 

nautical miles high (80.3 miles) due to an injection velocity 25 feet 

per second higher than planned. The satellite was allowed to remain 

in high orbit until its 31st revolution, when it had decayed to a 

perigee of 79.8 nautical miles. At that point an orbit adjustment 

brought it some five miles closer to earth. 

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Even before the non-nominal orbit had been detected, ascent 

telemetry indicated that the roll joint separator had not functioned. 

causing it to be Illocked Upll and unable to traverse from side to 

side along the flight path. Backup systems successfully freed the 

roll joint almost four hours after launch. Minor problems also 

occurred with the battery thermostat in the recovery vehicle 

making it necessary for flight controllers to turn off the battery 

heater power for most of the mission. Some channels of the 

Extended Command System also became troublesome, but neither 

failure degraded the mission. Two further orbital adjusts were 

101 

carried out on or bits 81 and 162. 

The number of targets programmed and read out were both 

extremely high: 3430 and 2091, respectively. That so many targets 

actually were photographed was partly due to favorable cloud 

conditions over areas of interest. Ground resolution as measured 

from photographs taken of CORN tri-bar targets* measured 18 

102 

inches, nearly as good as the first Gambit-3 flight. 

* CORN target tri-bars are large panels with multiple lots of 

three parallel bars laid out in successively smaller groups both 

parallel and perpendicular to the flight path of the satellite and 

photographed for the single purpose of making controlled measurements of the resolution obtained on a given flight. Resolution 

numbers represent the best combination of on-track, cross -track 

results obtained on a given flight. 

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.!fiB. ~ECR£irThere were no delays in acceptance or checkout of flight 

equipment for the eighth flight of Gambit-3, and that pattern persisted 

through the mission. Mission eight was one of three in the first 

group of l2 for which no major on-orbit anomalies were recorded. 

Of several minor anomalies, however, two were significant. As 

with mission 4307, the "nominal launch" signal sent immediately 

after launch on 19 September 1967 was a premature indicator of 

mission normality, injection error causing the perigee to be almost 

four miles lower than predicted. Because it was within acceptable 

tolerances, however, no orbital adjustment was performed until 

perigee had decayed to less than 71 nautical miles p on the third 

day of the mission. Another orbit adjustment proved necessary 

three days later. An eccentric film wrap prevented primary camera 

operation for several minutes during the first pass over the Soviet 

Union, but was quickly corrected. (It was one of a very few camera 

103 

malfunctions in the early operation of Gambit-3.) 

Because of the season, mission 4308 was launched later in 

the day than its two predecessors, there being no possibility of 

taking advantage of high sun angles. Instead, the satellite trace was 

altered for better coverage of targets at lower latitudes (descending) 

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than had been obtained in recent missions. Target coverage suffered 

from the change, but an offset was the achievement of 17-inch resolution, equal to the best yet obtained. The average quality of the 

104 

photography was superior to that of any earlier Gambit mission. 

During acceptance testing of the photographic payload section 

for the ninth Gambit-3 mission, tests indicated that resolution 

would be on the order of ~I __ ~Ipercent better than with earlier 

optics. However, intermittent operation of the platen drive motor 

caused a two-week slip in delivery to allow for retrofit. The eventual 

105 

effect was a two-week slippage of the launch itself. 

An additional one-day delay in launch occurred with the detection of a propellant leak in the Titan second stage. Launch finally 

106 

occurred on 25 October 1967. 

Launch trajectory and orbital injection were near perfect. 

The Astro-Position Terrain Camera experienced a minor malfunction and the last half day of photography was lost due to the 

failure of the film take-up system. (Some 200 feet of film remained 

in the camera when the recovery vehicle separated for reentry.) 

Otherwise, troubles were few. 

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Upon analysis, the photography proved to be the best ever 

recovered from. orbit. Measured resolution was 15.1 inches and 

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less than eight percent of the fram.es were incorrectly exposed. 

CIA Director, Richard Helm.s, was m.oved to com.plim.ent Gam.bit's 

recent photography, characterizing it as a rich source of "extrem.e1y 

108 

im.portant intelligence. " 

Pressures for target selection changes reached the Gam.bit 

Proj ect Staff from. various groups within the intelligence com.m.unity, 

109 ~-----~ 

One of the m.ore interesting concerned coverage of I I 

Flax's reaction was to schedule a com.pilation of coverage 

experience over ~I _____ ~I(as well as other difficult targets) 

to "enable us to relate planned aircraft and drone coverage and, 

if necessary, to plan special or additional..9, m.issions, assum.ing 

the requirem.ents were 'hard', II The resulting study indicated that 

satisfaction of nom.inal USIB requirem.ents for LI ______ ~lalone 

would require no fewer than 20 Gam.bit m.is sions a year. Since, at 

the tim.e, USIB was in the process of trying to decide whether 

Gam.bit m.issions should total six or seven annually. Flax's interest 

in distinguishing between " requirem.ents" and "hard requirem.ents II 

110 

was warranted. 

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Actually. com.m.unications between the NRO and the CIA in 

that m.atter dealt, not wi th coverage of LI ______ ~I but with m.apping 

and charting applications of Gam.bit. Apparently not all in the 

intelligence com.m.unity appreciated that although Gam.bit-l often 

had unexpended film. at m.ission's end (m.ission event selection 

procedures for that system. were relatively unsophisticated in term.s 

of later procedures). Gam.bit-3 relied on far better program.m.ing 

routines and "wasted" only a very sm.all am.ount of prim.ary film.. 

111 

and abs olutely no indexing film. whatever. 

The tenth Gam.bit flight was little distinguished from. the 

ninth. Resolution achieved was the sam.e, although overall film. 

quality was som.ewhat lower. The Extended Com.m.and System. failed 

during its test cycle at Vandenberg, but was quickly replaced by 

the unit intended for the next flight. Launch occurred on 5 Decem.ber 

1967. Ascent and injection appeared to be nom.inal; although the 

orbit was actually slightly high. As a result, an orbit adjust 

program.m.ed for the 80th orbit was rescheduled for orbit 33 and 

was supplem.ented by another adjust on orbit 96. The prim.ary 

reason for orbital adjustm.ents was target optin"lization, however. 

and not recovery from. an anom.alous orbit. Sm.all. non-critical 

m.alfunctions occurred during the m.ission in the Extended Com.m.and 

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System. and the terrain cam.era part of the APTC. 

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Early in 1968, one of the few hardware changes during the 

single-bucket flight program took effect--completion of the development of a redundant attitude control system (RACS) as a backup 

for the primary system used in the satellite control section. While 

no failure of the primary system had occurred in Gambit, thus far. 

the project officers were wary of such an occurrence. Experience 

with the Gambit-l vehicle had been considerably different. and since 

the weight of a redundant system could be easily accommodated in 

113 

Gambit-3, it seemed wise to make the change. 

Gam.bit-3's eleventh mission was not a happy one. The vehicle 

seemed plagued with problems from its beginnings. Acceptance 

testing for the photograp hic payload section began on 8 December 1967 

but was halted six days later when a telemetry unit malfunctioned 

and had to be replaced. The replacement unit failed on 2 January 

1968. A third unit was installed and the payload was accepted. 

with waivers, on 4 January. (The major waiver was again for the 

optics, which were still considerably below specification. Initial 

resolution tests were so bad for the unit that the optical axes of 

the Ross Corrector and the primary mirrors were realigned 

using interferometry. The realignment yielded a significant 

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improveme nt in resolution (18 inches per millimeter), so the 

system was accepted at a double-pass resolution of 85 lines per 

millimeter. 

The satellite control section had comparable problems. 

During on-pad checkout at Vandenberg. a line surge through one 

of the breakout boxes resulted in burned wires in the separation 

controller. It took two days--passed on as a launch slippage--

to remove and replace the unit and recheck the remainder of the 

114 

vehicle. 

Finally, on 18 January 1968, mission number 11 was begun. 

Launch and injection were almost nominal again. But the orbit 

was again low and had to be corrected during the 32nd or bit. 

Another orbit adjust was performed on orbit 96. Much earlier, 

the primary viewport doors had refused to open. Fortunately, 

the backup system worked properly. 

On the tenth day of flight, recovery procedures were put in 

115 

train, but although telemetry signals were mostly positive. planes 

in the recovery area never made contact. Nor did tracking stations. 

The recovery system had functioned correctly up to and including 

dispatch of the coded message indicat ing that the parachute cover 

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had been ejected. but two minutes later all telemetry ended. 

It could only be assumed that the capsule had reentered the 

atmosphere without benefit of parachute. A search was begun 

without much hope of finding the capsule. It ended some thirty 

hours later with the assumption that reentry velocity had been 

sufficiently high to destroy the capsule on impact with the water. 

Despite such mishaps. the mission was not a complete loss. 

After separation of the capsule. the Agena satellite control section 

continued in orbit for an additional seven days, logging thereby 

the longest time on orbit yet experienced for the system. The 

purpose of the extended solo mission was to demonstrate the 

capability of the control system to operate over the total time 

required in support of the double-bucket Gambit. The control 

section was deboosted after a total of 17 operational days on 

116 

orbit. 

Another matter conditioned by the expectation of longer life 

beginning with vehicle number 23 was the capacity of the roll joint, 

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the link between the power supply stored in the Agena and the payload section. The Agena. stabilized by its own attitude control 

system, received commands from tracking and guidance stations 

and translated these into roll maneuvers that would allow the camera 

to point at targets to the side of its trace. Because "interesting" 

targets fell on the satellite's trace only by accident (i. e •• rarely), 

virtuall y every target to be photographed was the cause of a roll 

manuever. 

The ultimate reason for increasing Gambit-3's time on orbit 

was to obtain an increased number of good photographs of important 

targets. A fully successful mission could require as many as 

7000 separate roll maneuvers. The roll joint used in the first 

eleven flights had been capable of performing only 1250 rolls .. 

and these at a rate of 3.5 degrees per second. A new drive system 

installed for the 12th vehicle had a capacity of 2250 rolls and a roll 

rate of 4.5 degrees per second. It represented the first step in 

117 

moving toward the capability for the double-bucket Gambit. 

The only other major equipment change on Gambit-3 number 12 

was a newly designed parachute. Its installation caused a launch 

date slippage of seven days. Otherwise. optics were predominant 

matters of concern, although the electronics for the Astro-Position 

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Terrain Camera had to be removed and reworked before the payload section was acceptable. Primary optics were again the subject 

of a performance waiver, a procedure almost ritual for Gambit-3 

by that time. Although continuing progress in polishing techniques 

and improvements in the use of interferometry had steadily improved 

system resolution, the Gambit-3 system as a whole was not yet 

capable of satisfying original specifications. Tacit acknowledgement of that reality was signaled by the decision to disable the shortrange compensation mechanism after it operated erratically during 

tests. The trouble was traced to a drive motor. A failure during 

flight could cause platen adjustment loss and mission failure, so 

the compensator was disabled. The penalties were inconsequential; 

the optics were still so imperfect that correctly making the fine 

adjustments for Viihich the slant range compensation device was 

intended would have no detectable effect on the quality of mis sion 

photography~ 

All was ready by 12 March 1968 but, as had happened before, 

high winds at Point Arguello forced a further slip of one day. On 

13 March, fifteen minutes after the launch window opened. the mis sion 

began. 

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Launch and inj ection were again nominal. The only significant flight problem was failure of the terrain-camera element of 

the Astro-Position Terrain Camera on orbit number four. But 

because the stellar camera operated throughout the mission, 

indexing for the primary camera was adequate. 

Analysis of mission telemetry provided the lead to solution 

of a major problem of camera operations. The difference between 

predicted and actual resolution for previous missions had been 

much greater than expected.:I,< The point of best focus determined 

in preflight tests seemed always to be off by an unacceptable margin. 

By the 12th flight, a considerable amount of experience had been 

built up through secondary flight objective experiments with the 

focus adjustment. On the 12th flight it was noticed that the focus 

wandered during the course of each revolution between +.001 

inches at the start of the orbit and -.001 inches at the end. >',<>',< 

Analysis established that heating of the front surface of the stereo 

mirror by the earth albedo was responsible. Flight controllers 

attempted to stabilize the mirror by cooling it for ten minutes 

* Sometimes by as much as LI_~ ___ ---"I See Analysis of Gambit 

(110) Project. 

):<* That is, the distance between lens and platen shifted in this 

fashion, causing the focus to change. 

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during the dark-side portion of each orbit. The experiment was 

only partly successful, but it led to a far better understanding 

119 

of thermal influences on focus adjustments. Ultimately, it 

would become possible to minimize heat-induced focus shift by 

regulating the time and degree of camera door and viewport 

opening during various phas e s of the mis sion. 

After ten days of flight, the capsule was separated--and the 

new parachute worked. The recovery vehicle was air recovered 

on 23 March 1968. Best CORN target resolution was 13.5 inches, 

and the general level of photography was better than on any previous 

120 

mis s ion. 

A more serious special coverage requirement than the 1L __ ---" 

~ __ ~Iinquiry was dealt with on mission number 13. In response 

to a request made by the Director, Joint Reconnaissance Center, 

the program office prepared a des cription of coverage to date of 

~ ______ -----"~rom April 1967 to March 1968, corresponding to 

Gambit-3 mis sions five to twelve. During that period, 371 targets 

had been programmed in I I, 146 had been fully covered, 

28 partially covered, and 48 had poor coverage. Some 312 targets 

were programmed for coverage during fiscal 1969. Designing a 

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mission for enhanced coverage o1L _______ ~lcould increase 

the programmed coverage of targets there to 537 while still 

satisfying 60 to 70 percent of USIB requirements for the rest of 

III 

the world on that mission. 

In the end, that pattern was imposed on the forthcoming 13th 

Gambit-3 mission. {"Requirement is max access to LI _______ --" 

plus unique access to at least 60 percent of the remaining targets 

122 

in the Communist block ••• "} The change caused no major delay 

in the acceptance proces s, although it was neces sary to inhibit 

the activity of the platen adjust motor in order to avoid possible 

catastrophic failure resulting from malfunction of this component. 

The vehicle was ready on 16 April 1968 but high winds in the launch 

area again caused a delay of one day, to 17 April. 

The mission was "nominal" from start to finish; there were 

no significant malfunctions on orbit. Because of the stringent 

coverage requirements, and the conS equent need to fly a near 

cyclic orbit, two orbital adjusts were carried out (orbits 64 and 

113). Two more took place during the subsequent two-day solo 

mis sion (to study the thermal effects of low altitude flight, an 

experiment aimed at demonstrating capabilities of the control 

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section in anticipation of more demanding requirements for the 

123 

operation of the double-bucket Gambit). 

The results of the mis sion were encour aging. Resolution 

again improved- -to a "best" of 12 inches. In addition, more 

targets were both programmed and read out than ever before, 

4073 and 2658, respectively. The coverage was the subject of 

a congratulatory message from Washington: "Please accept the 

congratulations of Dr. Flax and the NRO staff for achieving the 

highest readout of intelligence targets in the Gambit Program to 

124 

date. " 

If an ything, the 14th mission of Gambit-3 was more smoothly 

run than the 13th. Acceptance testing and checkout cycles were 

uneventful. Launch occurred on time on 5 June 1968, early in 

the morning (as had the previous flight). The mission flew for its 

planned ten days and recovery was also nominal. The oni y failure 

on orbit involved a tape recorder intended to record data on malfunctions elsewhere in the vehicle--but there were none to record. 

Of greatest interest were the results of the mis sion. The 

resolution achieved was again 12 inches, photographic quality 

being slightly poorer than had been registered on mission 13. 

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The number of intelligence targets read out was greater. however. 

even though fewer had been prograrnm.ed. (More targets were 

126 

cloud free. ) 

Experiments conducted during the 14th flight of Gambit-3 

had the additional benefit of demonstrating that target coverage 

could be enlarged without altering flight parameters. Reducing 

the length of each "burst" of photography would reduce the quantity 

of film used in photographing areas surrounding the real target. 

As a product of improvements in target location data (generated 

largely by the Corona program) and corollary improvements in 

Gambit position data, the need for "insurance" footage had gradually 

diminished. By the time of the 14th flight of Gambit .. 3, enough was 

known about true position on orbit to achieve a far greater degree 

of control over the camera than had been possible at the beginning 

of the program. That knowledge was applied dun ng the flight in 

experimental reduction of burst times. The results of the experi .. 

ment were good: " ••• this is a succes sful test and could be applied 

in future mis sions with the exclusion of the highest priority targets •.• II 

Mission 15 of Gambit-3 used short burst times as standard. 

The result was another dramatic increase in the number at: targets 

programmed and read out: 5500 and 3058 respectively, despite 

slightly heavier cloud cover. 

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The planned launch date had been 23 July 1968. but problems 

in checkout of the payload caused a slip to 6 August. The mission 

was near nominal with no major malfunctions. A quick-look 

estimate of LI ____ ---"1 resolution was later revised upward to 12 

12.8 

inches, equivalent to experience in the previous mission. 

Seven more Gambit-3 vehicles remained before the first of 

double-bucket vehicles appeared. They were flown between 

September 1968 and June 1969. System changes and experiments 

carried out during that time were mostly aimed at proving capabilities needed in the double-bucket version of Gambit-3. 

The first new item of equipment, and possibly the most significant addition to Gambit-3 during the period, was a redundant 

attitude control system (RACS). The first was installed in the 

16th vehicle and was the subject of tests during the solo portion 

of that flight. Timing was exquisite: a failure of the primary 

stabilization system on flight 17 forced reliance on the still .. 

experimental redundant system, after which the mission proceeded 

to a succes sful conclusion. "As a matter of fact, " General Ber g 

told Dr. Flax, "John (General Martin) tells me the vehicle stability 

129 

is better. In this case we can chalk one up for the horne team~ " 

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Flight number 16 also included some experimentation with 

color photography as well as the introduction of a third version of 

the roll joint, a redundant system to be used in the double-bucket 

Gambit-3. The color photography was quite successful, achieving 

130 

both good color correction and two-foot resolution. Such an 

achievement was noteworthy; the earlier Gambit-l system had been 

designed to produce resolution of two to three feet using the best 

available monochromatic film, and had not bettered 18 inches. Here 

was more evidence of the influence of changing technology on Gambit. 

Flights 18 and 19 were marked by extremely high energy orbits 

which caused a short mission in the first instance and degraded 

photography in the second. One unique event of mission 19 caused 

considerable concern among policy makers in Washington. Toward 

the end of the mission (which had begun on 22 January 1969), a 

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I 

During the last three flights of the original GaITlbit-3, resolution iITlproved to '-----_____ I(ITlission 20). to LI ____ ---"I (ITlission 

21), and thenLI _____ r (ITlission 22). The resolution specified 

for GaITlbit-3 had finally been surpassed by the last caITlera to be 

flown in that series. The final two flights of the single-bucket 

GaITlbit also set records in target coverage: 7832 prograITlITled 

targets, and 4032 readout during the 22nd flight. 

Photographic quality benefited froITl several innovations introduced during the flight prograITl of the GaITlbit- 3 vehicle. They 

included the introduction of ultra-thin-base filITl over "over-flange 

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wrap" (for preflight tests), ascending and descending photography 

during sununer lllonths, and reduction in burst tillles lllade possible 

by lllore accurate position data on the vehicle and its targets. 

Resolution was also illlproved through the continual developlllen t 

of better optical surfaces, lllore accurate polishing techniques 

and closer tolerance testing. Other contributing factors included 

illlproved understanding of the influence of therlllal variation on the 

optical surfaces during flight (and the ability to control these thro ugh 

operation of the viewport doors), and better control of call1era dwell 

tillles and stereo lllirror flip tillle. One area where illlprovelllent 

was lacking, where SOllle real deterioration was noticeable, was 

the effect of cloud cover. The Galllbit project staff did not see it 

as their responsibility to alter the weather, but they were charged 

with avoiding poor weather to the extent that other factors perlllitted. 

Perhaps the 417 weather satellite had pr ovided all the assistance 

in its capability; perhaps Galllbit-3 was unlucky in that respect. 

But in any case, target obscuration by clouds continued as a lllajor 

inhibitor of cOlllplete lllission success. 

The Galllbit-3 flight of 3 June 1969. lllission nUlllber 22. had 

been skipped to cOlllpensate for delayed availability of the first 

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double-bucket vehicle. In the event, the mission schedule adjustment was not sufficient, and last-minute problems caused a gap 

in coverage of almost two months between the 22.nd and 23rd flights 

of Gambit-3. In general, the results of the l3rd mission and following 

flights of the improved Gambit-3 system proved to be well worth 

133 

the extra wait. 

Flight History of Gambit-3 Block II (Double-Bucket) 

The first group of double-bucket Gambit-3's (referred to here 

as the Block II vehicles) experienced three kinds of capability 

improvement. Resolution increased from a previous best ofLI __ _ 

rnd the hnprove=ent in average resolution 

"------------------------~ 

was even more dramatic. Operational longevity increased from 

ten days to 27 days. In the entire period there were only three 

catastrophic failures: the second recovery vehicle was lost on 

flights 25 and 27, and mission 35 was a total loss. It was not that 

technology took a sudden spurt. Rather, a succession of modifications conceived and tested over several years coincided in their 

effect. The Gambit- 3 system matured appreciably between August 

134 

1969 and September 1972. 

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The first group of Block II flights included lTIissions nUlTIbered 

4323 thr ough 4327. Each was planned as a 14-day lTIis sion, a week 

of photographic operations being allocated to each of the two recovery 

vehicles (SRV's). Of the five flights, the third and the fifth were 

lTIarked by catastrophic failures; a parachute failed to open for the 

second recovery vehicle of lTIission 4325, and an Extended COlTIlTIand 

SystelTI failure on lTIission 4327 prevented recovery of the second 

SR V frolTI that satellite. Although these vehicles bro ught back 

50 to 100 percent lTIore phot ography than the last of the singlebucket GalTIbit-3's, their best resolution was not better. Average 

resolution ilTIproved slightly. 

Other than the introduction of the second SRV, only two lTIajor 

hardware changes distinguished the first lot of Block II GalTIbit-3 

vehicles: a battery was added to extend the orbital life of the vehicle, 

and an ilTIproved reserve attitude control systelTI was introduced. 

No lTIajor lTIalfunctions lTIarked the first Block II flight. 

An excessively high orbit (408 nautical lTIiles instead of 220) 

lTIarred the second (4324). Because of a relay lTIalfunction, the 

vehicle control asselTIbly failed to shut down the lTIain engine 

during ascent. Happily, the failure did not degrade lTIission 

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success, orbital correction being possible through use of the 

secondary propulsion system rather than the primary gas supply. 

Remote tracking stations had some difficulty in picking up the 

vEh icle I s transponder frequency, which caused SOme delay in 

loading commands and a loss of some photography. But the effect 

was minor. The post-flight discovery of a dome nut tucked into 

the folds of the recovered film prompted redesign of those nuts 

for future flights, but again there was no mission effect. 

The recovery parachute on the second capsule of mission 4325 

failed and the capsule sank before recovery personnel could reach 

it. Flight 4326 encountered no major problems, but registered the 

worst resolution seen for a year and a half (13.5 inches). 

Mission 4327 was routine through recovery of the first capsule, 

although the air-catch crew was somewhat startled to discover 

that the ablative shield had failed to separate upon parachute 

deployment. Still both the parachute and the air-catch harness 

were able to sustain the extra weight, so no harm resulted. But 

shortly after film began to pan to the second capsule, the heater 

for the clock in the extended command system began malfunctioning. 

In the absence of that component, the propulsion systems of the 

vehicle could no longer be precisely controlled and little could 

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I be done to govern the impact point of the second capsule when it 

I 

deboosted. Program controllers decided to attempt an emer gency 

recovery, but it was unsuccessful and the second capsule, carrying 

I one-day's film was lost. 

I 

The first 18-day flight of Gambit-3 was scheduled for 18 

August 1970, one year after the first double-bucket Gambit-3 

I mission. No major hardware changes had been necessary to extend 

I 

the 14-day life of the earlier vehicles to 18 days. Mission 4328 

remained operational only for 16 days, however, being called down 

I early with theiL ________________________________________________ ~ 

I Loose thermal tape interferred with operation of the horizon 

I sensor and detracted from photographic operations in a minor 

I way, but the total take was significantly greater than on any previous 

mission. 

I In the next three flights, between 23 October 1970 and 11 May 

I 1971, there were no hardware changes and no malfunctions of 

any consequence. Mis sian 4330, begun on 21 January 1971, achieved, 

I for only the second time among the Block II vehicles, a resolution 

I 

as good as the best of the earlier Gambit-3 Is. It was also the first 

of the Block II vehicles to undergo an atmospheric survivability 

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test (VAST). Despite close tracking, no debris could be located 

on this or any of the subsequent three tests, conducted at the conelusion of missions 4331, 4332, and 4334, reassuring intelligence 

specialists that no revealing bits and pieces of Gambit hardware 

could survive reentry and thus provide clues to the system's compo135 

sition or capability. Later events were to show that confidence 

to be wholly unwarranted, but that was for the future. 

The last of the second lot of Block II Gambit- 3 operations, 

began on 22 April 1971 and continued for 19 days. Vehicle 4331 

achieved a best resolution ofe-,-I _____ ---,1 and exposed more film 

than any earlier Gambit. Its take included more than 3000 stereo 

pairs, more than 5600 mono strips and 118 lateral pairs. 

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Mission 4332, begun on 12 August 1971, two years after the 

first Block II launch, marked a new watershed in the maturation 

of the Gambit program. The orbital life of 4332 was extended from 

18 to 22 days by the introduction of a tenth one-kilovolt battery 

and other minor system modifications. Far more significant, 

however, was the first operational use of the R-5 lens, under 

development for several years. The new lens system improved 

best resolution from its earlier peak of LI ______________ ~ 

equivalent to ac=::bercent performance improvement. 

Several hardware changes in the four flights which followed 

led to still longer orbital life, improved stability, increased maneuver 

capacity, and still better photography. The mission 4333 Gambit-3 

used, for the first time, a new type of battery that enabled it to 

stay on orbit for an extra two days, bringing total mission life 

to 24 days. The booster and second stage had reached their lift 

capacity with the introduction of the newer--and heavier--batteries. 

however. In order to carry still more batteries, therefore, it 

was necessary to increase the thrust of the Agena upper stage 

by the use of High Density Acid (HDA) in place of the standard 

oxidizer. That modification allowed either an increase in orbital 

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payload of 125 to 150 pounds,. or an increase in the vehicle's inclination 

capability. On vehicle 4334, which included this modification, a 

fifth I'magnum!! battery was used. The satellite was launched on 

17 March 1972. 

Mission 4335 incl uded more major hardware changes than any 

other Block II vehicle. A Gemini Uniform Mixture Ratio (GUMR) 

engine was installed in the secondary propulsion system which 

further enhanced lift capacity by an additional 200 pounds, or alternativel y, allowed spacecraft inclination to approach eight degrees. 

The introduction of a latching solenoid valve in the Backup Stabilization 

System (BUSS), allowed the use of surplus BUSS gas in the primary 

control system, which effectively increased the number of rolls 

that could be performed. Finally, some of the extra lift capacity 

was utilized to completely replace all of the original batteries 

with the newer, heavier, "magnum" models, bringing the total of 

the more powerful batteries to ten and increasing orbital capability 

life to 30 days. Unfortunately, a defective pneumatic regulator 

prevented the delivery of control gas during the ascent stage of the 

launch of mission 4335. In consequence, the satellite failed to 

orbit and the entire mission was a failure. 

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While mission 4335 did not include a VAST experiment, an 

attempt was made, as on all flights, to identify the impact point 

for whatever debris might remain after reentry. The predicted 

impact point for 4335 was somewhere over South Africa. Ground 

tracking stations lost contact with the disabled spacecraft during 

its descent, however, so no search was attempted. Considering 

the few instances in which debris had survived reentry, that seemed 

safe enough. * 

Almost five months after mission 4335 had been launched, 

Dr. Walter F. Leverton, Gambit-cleared employee of the Aerospace 

Corporation visiting his firm I s London bffices, heard from a coworker, Irving Rzepnick, some "interesting space material" had 

been recovered by the British earlier that year. Leverton was 

interested, so Rzepnick arranged to revisit the Royal Aircraft 

Establishment at Farnborough, where he had first seen the debris 

on a laboratory bench. 

Leverton found three objects on open view, a spherical titanium 

pressure vessel about a foot in diameter, some circuit boards 

* 

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of U.S. manufacture, and several chunks of glass which, together, 

fonned a pie-shaped wedge with a ten-inch edge. The glass was 

backed by the egg-crate structure characteristic of Gambit optics. 

All the pieces had been found on farmland within a five-mile 

radius some 75 miles north of London. Eyewitness accounts 

indicated that they had corne down about 20 May 1972. 

Convinced that he had viewed debris from a Gambit vehicle, 

Leverton privately alerted the project office in California. The 

resulting flurry of telephone calls and memoranda led to informal 

arrangements for recovery of the residue, the transfer being 

arranged through Rzepnick and friendly RAF contacts. Subsequent 

anal ysis confirmed that the debris had indeed survived the breakup 

136 

and reentry of Gambit 4335 - -which cast some doubt on the 

findings of Project VAST and further lessened confidence in 

impact-point predictions. ~< 

The offending pneumatic regulator was replaced for mission 

4336 and later Gambit-3 flights, but no other hardware changes 

137 -

were made. Gambit 4336, the last Block II system, was 

Five years earlier, an entire Corona capsule had survived 

random reentry and landed, largely intact, in Venezuela. See 

Volume I for detail s. 

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launched on I September 1972 and remained in orbit for 27 days of 

photography, after which the satellite control section was exercised 

for an additional day. Best resolution was '---1 _____ ---"1 all of 

the new hardware introduced in the previous mission functioned 

correctly, and none of the several minor malfunctions had any 

substantial impact on mission performance. 

Three distinct advantages arose from the addition of a second 

satellite recovery vehicle to Gambit-3. The increase in photographic coverage was the most obvious- -although. in fact, photographic days on orbit did not dramatically increase merely by the 

addition. Perhaps more important, the second capsule enhanced 

the quick reaction capability of the Gambit; if need be, the first 

film batch could be recovered as soon as vital photographs had 

been obtained without forcing an end to the entire mission. Final! y. 

a IIQuick Look" team assembled to perform rapid analysis of the 

output of the first lot of recovered film could direct focus or 

ephemeris corrections that enhanced the quality of the second lot 

of film. 

Gambit-3 vehicles 23 through 36, comprising the "Block IIIf buy, 

incorporated continuing changes in hardware through their period 

of use. Refinement of operational procedures had been the most 

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important source of improvement for "Block I" vehicles, although 

modifications, subsystem changes, and optical system development 

also occurred. But hardware change s during "Block II" flights 

were chiefly res ponsible for orbital life extension from an original 

14 days to an eventual 27 days. For Block II, procedures changed 

mostly as hardware changed. Major design changes included the 

introduction of a long tank Titan booster, introduction of a modified 

fuel system for the Agena, detail changes which allowed improved 

utilization of orbital control gas, and the introduction of larger and 

more numerous batteries. In order to take advantage of the 

extended life thus provided, flight controllers had to place greater 

reliance on short-burst times and on early morning launches. 

The reduction of burst times, film pads, and frame sizes required 

a number of improvemerl: s in hardware and software. Data collected 

throughout the Gambit- 3 program were used to improve target 

location and orbital parameter accuracies. Reduced burst times 

thus became possible. The introduction of the MOD IV Command 

Subsystem permitted more precise calculation and control of 

138 

ephemeris changes. The reduction in burst times was so effective 

that over the initial period of Gambit- 3 operations, the average 

frame length decreased from 2.68 feet in 1966 to 1.29 feet in 1969, 

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the first year of Block II operations. By the end of 1972, average 

139 

iraITle length had dropped to slightly ITlore than six inches. 

Such accoITlITlodations initially extracted a price in degraded 

resolution. Ascending photography required higher average altitudes. and the brevity of burst tiITles was liITlited by requireITlents 

for stabilization after a roll ITlaneuver (settling tiITle), and flip 

tiITle for the stereo ITlirror. SITleared photographs resulted if 

140 

burs ts were too brief and too frequent. To some degree. these 

disparities were increasingly offset by co ntinued iITlproveITlents 

in filITl. Indeed, filITl quality so outpaced the ITlechanical capabilities of the vehicle, principally the roll joint, that by the tiITle 

Block III changes were planned (vehicles after 36). a principal 

addition was a new roll joint capable of supporting 18. 000 roll 

141 

ITlanuevers during the ITlission. 

The quality of GaITlbit-3 photography was also degraded in 

earl y fligh ts by high frequency banding and focus shifts, both 

which were. at first, poorly understood. Banding, troublesoITle for 

the first lot of GaITlbit-3 satellites, was eventually attributed to 

a lack of sITloothness in the filITl drive. The probleITl was corrected 

by stiffening the drive shaft between the ITlotor and the caITlera 

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platen. Focus shift, had also been identified earlier, but not until 

mission 4332 was it demonstrated conclusively that focus shifts 

occurred because of temperature changes brought on by camera 

door settings. Setting primary camera doors at appropriate 

angles to provide shade helped to regulate the temperature gradients 

142 

across the lens. 

Efforts to apply Owens-Illinois's Cer-Vit, the optical glass 

material early intended for Gambit- 3, were finally discontinued 

during the Block II program. After a large number of casting and 

finishing failures had slowed progress, Cer-Vit was dropped in 

favor of ULE (Ultra-Low Expansion), a material that had been 

initially developed for the Dorian system. When Dorian was abandoned 

in the late Spring of 1970, large quantities of ULE became available 

to the Gambit-3 program. 

Perhaps the most important Gambit-3 improvement during the 

Block II program was the introduction of the R-5 lens. The design 

of the lens benefited from long experience with focusing difficulties 

encountered with the original optical system of Gambit- 3. The 

first nine double-bucket vehicles had resolution slightly better 

than the last few single-bucket Gambits, and resolution actually 

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degraded on occasion. Early Block II Gambit-3 vehicles used 

the same cameras as Block I systems, but various problems 

associated with Block II design changes caused resolution to worsen 

for several flights. Average resolution had only returned to the 

level achieved late in the Gambit- 3 Block I flights at the time 

the lens was introduced, on mission 32. With a focal length of 

175 inches as compared to the 160 inches of the earlier Gambit-3 

camera, the R-5 lens permitted resolution to surpass the previous 

best ofl I(achieved only three times in the entire ~----~ 

Gambit 

143 

program), reaching, first, ,----~ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ -_ ------,~I 

With the launch of the first double-bucket Gambit- 3 on 23 August 

1969, the mission life of that system doubled and the cost per target 

covered dropped significantly, though not proportionately. By 

December 1972, fourteen of the double-bucket Gambit systems had 

been launched; of the 28 potential film recovery opportunities 

thus created, 24 reached fruition. On one occasion the recovery 

parachute failed to deploy (a mishap that also marked the first 

flight of Hexagon in mid-1971, when two of four recovery parachutes 

deployed improperly and one payload was lost). Later in 1970 a 

command system failure sent a recovery vehicle back into the 

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atmosphere still attached to the orbital vehicle. and in May 1972 

an Agena malfunction ended in failure to achieve orbit. Following 

somewhat after the introduction of the twin-capsule version of 

Gambit, the R-5 optical system was incorporated and "best resolution" 

immediately went from a normal range ofL-1 ______ 1 inches to 

an achievable I 

'---------------------~ 

Target coverage increased 

from the 4000 "best achieved" record of Gambit- 3 to a normal 

6000 to 10,000 for the R-5 version of the double-bucket Gambit-3. 

None of the high-re solution films routinely used by 1972 had existed 

in 1969; film improvement was a major factor in Gambit-3 l s 

144 

extended scope of coverage and vastly improved resolution. 

The first Block III Gambit- 3, 4337, was launched on 21 December 

1972. Recovery of the second SRV on 22 January made 4337 the 

longest Gambit mission yet flown (3l days). Best resolution was 

not quite matching the achievement of mission 34, 

but average resolution was as good as any ear lie r recorded. 

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The next :mission of Ga:mbit-3, operation nu:mber 4338, was 

plagued by :malfunctions which inhibited operations to so:me extent, 

although they did not cause substantial failure. Prob1e:ms began 

before launch with the discovery of an unreliable power supply 

for the ca:mera' s electronic foc using apparatus. The launch date 

slipped by two days in consequence, to 16 May 1973. 

Launch itself was uneventful, but prob1e:ms with the AstroPosition Terrain Ca:mera (APT C) developed a1:most i:m:mediate1y. 

The terrain ca:mera portion produced no usable fra:mes before the 

232nd revolution. Owing to extre:me underexposure, inter:mittent 

failure of the entire APTC occurred after the 300th revolution. 

Finally, not all the photography which had been planned could be 

acco:mplished; only 129 feet of fil:m could be recovered because the take146 

up reel in the second recovery vehicle had overfilled. 

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Nevertheless, mission 4338 had to be accounted an outstanding 

success. Had none of the photographs of Soviet-installations 

proved useful, which was far from the case, a separate Gambit-3 

operation would have been enough to warrant the mission. Ga~'TIbit 

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21 May, the take-up spools of the first capsule were nearly full. 

Bradburn ordered a recovery sequence programmed for that 

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afternoon (nine days earlier than originally scheduled), advising 

Dr. McLucas that he co uld cancel the order if so directed, but 

that a cancellation would have to be transmitted to the satellite 

no later than noon (Eastern time) of that day. 

McLucas telephoned Dr. J. R. Schlessinger, then Director of 

Central Intelligence (and thus chairman of the Executive Committee 

for the National Reconnaissance Program), at 9:20 that morning. 

Unable to contact Schlessinger directly, McLucas left a message: 

unles s advised to the contrary by 11: 00, McLucas propos ed to allow 

the recovery of the first capsule to proceed as Bradburn had directed--

that afternoon. The cost, he advised, would be about 15 percent of 

pro grammed coverage of relativel y low priority targets and inability 

to use some 1500 feet of film. 

No objections appeared. At 4:01 (Eastern time) on the afternoon of 21 May, a C-130 circling east of Hawaii caught the capsule 

in its descent and headed for its base. Twelve hours later, after 

a nonstop flight from Hawaii, the spooled film reached Eastman's 

Rochester, New York, laboratories. Despooling, developing, and 

locating and inspecting the critical frames required seven hours, 

during which the atmosphere shifted from hope to gloom to elation. 

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Although the first phase of mission 4338 lost nine days an orbit, 

the second was flown for seven days longer than had been planned. 

It might have been flown for an additional two days except for the 

expenditure of control gas in adjusting Gambit-3' s orbit to bring 

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Ultimately, all but a small portion 

of the film flown on 4338 was exposed and all but 25 feet loaded 

into recovery vehicles. No high-priority targets and few lowpriority targets programmed for coverage before launch were 

missed. Advancing the launch date for the next Gambit-3 on 

schedule would offset any coverage gap. 

The last mission of fiscal year 1973, mission 4339, was begun 

on 26 June 1973. It proved to be a disappointing anticlimax to the 

high achievement of 4338. Some 12 seconds after the early morning 

launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, the main fuel tank of the 

Titan ruptured. The debris fell into the Pacific Ocean south of 

Vandenberg. 

With the launch of the fir s t double - bucket Gambit- 3 on 23 

August 1969, the useful single-mis sion intelligence return virtually 

doubled. The single-bucket version had carried 5000 feet of film, 

the double-bucket Gambit-3 carried almost 10,000 feet. The 

number of roll maneuvers the system could perform increased to 

7000 from an initial 1250. Time on orbit increased from ten to 

fourteen days. Principally due to two operational changes brought 

about during the first 22 flights of Gambit-3, the number of targets 

acquired was enormously increased. Those changes included 

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early morning launch during summer months (to enable both ascending 

and descending photography), and the use of shorter burst times 

149 

(i. e •• less film per target). 

By 1973, the Gambit program had moved into its fourth 

generation--Gambit-l, Gambit-3, the double- bucket Gambit-3, 

and the "Block III" Gambit-3 (the 37th Gambit-3). That newest 

satellite was initially capable of Some 12,000 camera operations, 

each one accompanied by a roll maneuver. It could resolve images 

on a side from 90 nautical miles and from heights of 65 nautical 

miles--a feasible operational altitude--it was expected to resolve 

targets less than ~I _____ ---"Ion a side. 

The achievements of the Gambit program from its inception 

in 1963 to 1973 were varied, significant, and in many cases. 

dramatic. One that was often overlooked was cost. Although 

Gambit photography improved in resolution from three feet to less 

than LI _____ ~I over those years, the photographs themselves 

became less expensive by several orders of magnitude. From an 

initial cost of more than $3 million per target (average during 1963), 

the program reached a cost of just over $3000 per target in 1971 

and $5000 in 1972. 

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The gross cost of the Gambit-3 program through mission 22 

was $587 million, of which $408 million represented recurring 

costs (the cost of production and operation). Development and subsequent improvement of Gambit-3 to April 1970 cost some $173 

million. In that total, $70 million represented costs incidental 

to the development of the Titan III launch vehicle and $103 million 

the costs of camera, orbital system, and control system development. 

Funds thereafter invested in the engineering improvement of Gambit-3 

were relatively small; rather less than $1.5 million were so expended 

in fiscal 1971, for example. >:' In fiscal years 1970 and 1971, 

Gambit-3 expenditures totalled $36.6 million and $53.2 million, 

respectively, less than budgeted, owing to the cancellation of planned 

improvement efforts and a cutback in the num ber of launches and for 

150 

quality improvements diminishing as the system matured. 

Such figures were close approximations, given minor uncertainties about final contract costs and SOme variances in bookkeeping 

practices as between the NRO staff and the Gambit program office. 

The NRO comptroller listed non-recurring Gambit-3 costs for 

the program through mission 22 as $146.4 million, a figure 

that reflected the program office's allocation of some non-recurring 

program costs to vehicles delivered after April 1970. 

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Table A,compiled from the program analyses periodically 

generated during the course of the Gambit program, provides 

summary data on quality. quantity and cost of the program during 

the period. Table B shows the per-target cost in 1963 constant 

dollars. The per-target cost of Gambit operation at the end of 

the period was about one-tenth of one percent of the initial cost. 

Even though photography was artificially constrained during early 

Gambit flight in order to provide for adequacy of R&D testing, that 

represented one of the m.ost notable achievem.ents of the National 

Reconnaissance Program. to that tim.e. 

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TABLE A - GAMBIT PROGRAM: RESOLUTION, TARGETS AND COST 

Cost: $ thousands 

Year Recurring Total 

Sat lCY) 

Best 

Resolution~' 

(inche s) 

Targets~o',< 

Per Day Per Day Per Tgt. Per Day Per Tgt. 

G 

G 

G 

G 

G 

G 3 

G 3 

G 3 

G 3 

G 3

11 

G 3n 

G 3n 

G 3n 

1963 

1964 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1966 

1967 

1968 

1969 

1969 

1970 

1971 

1972 

30.0 

l4.0 

21, 6 

22.8 

19.1 

17.0 

15. 1 

n---O 

3 

29 

156 

203 

223 

93 

164 

210 

269 

251 

374 

381 

280 

8080 

4570 

3470 

1650 

1380 

3360 

2280 

2050 

1730 

1710 

1710 

1180 

1440 

3080.0 

160.0 

22.0 

8.0 

6.0 

36.1 

13.92 

9.74 

6.44 

6.82 

4.60 

3.08 

5. 15 

3830 

3160 

2000 

* Be st CORN res olution mea surement during year of operations. 

3 3 ** For G: Number of photography taken, for G and G II: Number of high priority 

(lA - 9A) COMIREX targets read out. This number is therefore overstated 

for G compared to the later programs. The degree of overstatement can be 

judged by the fact that 30 - 40 percent of photographs could not be read out 

due to cloud cover. Also, a large number of non-priority and non-COMREX 

tar gets are read out, but not counted. 

+ Sources: G: SAFSP, "Analysis of Gambit Project, " 24 August 1967. 

G 3 and G 3II: SAFSP, "Analysis of Gambit, Block II, "(Draft), 1973. 

24.0 

16. 1 

5.86 

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TABLE B 

Wholesale 

Industrial Cost Cost Per 

Commodity Per Day 

Price Target On Orbit 

Year Index ( $1000) ($1000) 

1963 100.00 3080 8080 

1964 100.53 159.2 4546 

1965 101.80 21.6 3409 

1966 104.01 7.7 1586 

1967 105.60 5. 7 1307 

1968 108.24 9.0 1894 

1969 111. 93 5.8 1546 

1970 116.16 4.0 1472 

1971 120.38 2.6 980 

1972 124.50 4.1 1157 

(Annual costs are not adjusted to reflect modifications and introductions 

of such new configurations as Gambit-3.) 

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NOTES ON SOURCES 

Rpt, SAFSP Quarterly Program Review, 10 July 1964; 

(hereafter cited as QPR, with date). 

Memo, E. M. Purcell, Chm, Reconnaissance Panel, to 

DCI, Jul 63, subj: Panel for Future Satellite Reconnais sance 

Operations; memo, B. McMillan, DNRO, to Dir CIA, 11 Sep 

63, subj: Implementation of Purcell Panel Recommendations, 

both in SAFSS file s. 

MFR, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 15 Aug 63, subj: Plans 

for Ultra-High Resolution Satellite Reconnaissance. 

Rpt, "Preliminary ljevelopment Plan for Advanced Gambit 

System (Program G ), " prep by SAFSP, Vol I, 4 Feb 64. 

Memo, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP to Col W. G. King, Dir/ 

Gambit Ofc, 13 Dec 63; subj: g3. 

Msg, I 1 3952 , MGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP to BGen J. L. 

Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, 27 Dec 63. 

Memo, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP to Col W. G. King, Dir/ 

Gambit Ofc, 2 Jan 64, subj: G 3; msg, 1 1 0822, BGen J. L. 

Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, to c"i="eer, 3 Jan 64. 

Ltr, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to Col W. G. King, Dir/ 

Gambit Ofc, 7 Jan 64, subj: Letter of Instructions; msg, 

1 1083 7, B. McMillan, DNRO, to Greer. 8 Jan 64; ltr, 

Greer to King, 8 Jan 64, subj; Appointment of a Special 

Evaluation Board G 3, in SP files. 

Prelim Dev Plan for Advanced Gambit Sys (Program G 3), Vol I, 

4 Feb 64. 

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11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

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Ibid, pp 14-1, 14-2. 

Msg, 1 10910, BGen J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO staff, to 

MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 10 Feb 64; msg, 1 14282, 

Greer to Dr. B. McMillan, DNRO, 24 Feb 64; ltr, R. D. 

Lorbach, EKC to Greer, 28 Feb 64, subj: Proposal for 

Recoverable Satellite Reconnaissance System ~3. 

QPR, 10 Jun 64. 

Memo, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to Col W. G. King, 

Dir / Gambit Ofc, 28 May 64, subj: 9 3 . 

Msg, Whig 1311, BGen J. L. Martin, Dir /NRO Staff, to 

MGen R. E. Greer, Dir SP, 2 Jan 64; msg, I I 5002, 

Greer to Dr. B. McMillan, DNRO, 3 Jan 64; msg, Whig 

1319, Martin to Greer, 4 Jan 64, in SP files. 

Ltr, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to P. Kearton, LMSC, 

5 Jun 64; ltr, Greer to B. Cowles, GE, 5 Jun 64; memo 

Greer to Col W. G. King, et aI, 9 Jun 68, subj: 9 3 SCS 

Parallel Program; msg, Whig 1434, BGen J. L. Martin to 

MGen R. E. Greer, 1 Jul 64. 

QPR, 30 Sep 64. 

QPR, 31 Dec 64; memo BGen W. G. King, Dir /SP, to Dr 

J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 28 Apr 70, subj: Analysis of Gambit 

(110) Project. 

Msg, 1 16158, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, to Dr. B. 

McMillan, DNRO, 22 Oct 64; msg, Whig 2209, McMillan to 

Greer, 30 Dec 64. 

Memo, B. McMillan, DNRO, to DepSecDef, 4 Jan 65, subj: 

Milestones for Gambit-3, in DNRO files. 

Msg, Whig 2242, BGen J. T. Stewart, Dir /NRO Staff, to 

MGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 8 Jan 65; msg, SAFSP to EKC, 

21 Jan 65. 

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21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

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QPR, 31 Mar 65. 

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Msg, Whig 2215, BGen J. T. Stewart, Dir/NRO Staff, to 

AFSC, 4 Feb 65. 

Msg, ,--I __ ---"17214, SAFSS to EKC, 4 Mar 65. 

QPR, 31 Mar 65. 

Msg, 17260, MGen R. E. Greer, Dir /SP, to Dr. B. 

McMillan, DNRO, 8 Mar 65; msg. Whig 2621, BGen J. T. 

Stewart. Dir/NRO Staff to Greer, 9 Mar 65. 

QPR, 31 Mar 65. 

QPR, 30 Jun 65. There is some ambiguity in this source, 

however. In the overview section, compression of test 

schedules is cited as the reason the EKC slippage did not 

impact on the initial launch: in the technical status section, 

EKC is described as pacing the entire ..9-3 Program. 

QPR, 30 Jun 65. 

QPR, 30 Sep 65. 

QPR, 30 Jun 65. 

Ibid. 

QPR, 30 Sep 65; 31 Dec 65. 

QPR. 30 Sep 65. 

QPR, 31 Dec 65. 

See procurement resume in memo, King to McLucas, 28 

Apr 70, attachment 4. The exception was the camera; 

22 flight articles were purchased at one time. 

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37. 

38. 

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QPR, 31 Dec 65. 

Rpt. !fA Review of the Gambit-3 Program. " Feb 68. in NRO 

staff files. 

QPR, 31 Mar 66. 

39. Rpt. "A Review of the Gambit-3 Program. 11 Feb 68. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

QPR, 30 Jun 66. Such optimism, a consistent problem 

for several years. was sometimes as much as 60 percent 

off from results actually achieved. See memo. King to 

McLucas, 28 Apr 70. 

Msgs, I 10397. 29 Jul 66. 10398. 29 Jul 66. 

I 10 518. 2 Aug 66, all Sat Ops Center to Dir, SP. 

Note that IIZII time is Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). When 

daylight savings time is in effect. there are seven hours 

difference between GMT and Pacific Time; when not, the 

difference is eight hours. 

EKC, "Addendum I to the Final Flight Evaluation Report 

for Flight No.1, If Operation No. 3014, on 29 Ju1y-6 August 

1966, II 3 Oct 66. These reports referred to hereafter as 

"EKC Evaluation Flight No. If 

QPR, 30 Sep 66; memo, King to McLucas, 28 Apr 70. 

44. EKC Evaluation Flight No.1, p 5. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

Memo, Col C. T. Smith. Gambit Ofc, to BGen J. L. Martin, 

Dir/SP, 24 Aug 67, subj: Analysis of Gambit Project. 

Msg, Whig 5591, Dr. A. H. Flax, DNRO to BGen J. L. 

Martin, Dir/SP, 10 Aug 66. 

Min, NRO ExCom Mtg, 17 Aug 66. 

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48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

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Memo, Dr. B. McMillan, DNRO to R. McNamara, SecDef, 

11 Jan65. subj: Quick Reaction Surveillance System. 

Min on NRP ExCom Mtg, 17 Aug 66. 

Msg, 1~_~11656, 28 Sep 66; QPR, 30 Sep 66. 

Msg, "---I _------"11661, 28 Sep 66. 

Memo, King to McLucas, 28 Apr 70, Atch 1, Tb1 1, and 

Atch 3. 

Msg, Tower 1434. 31 Aug 66. 

54. QPR, 31 Dec 66. 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

59. 

60. 

61. 

62. 

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QPR, 30Sep 66,31 Dec 66; memo, BGenJ. L. Martin. 

Dir/SP, to Dr. A. H. Flax, DNRO, 2 Feb 67, subj: GAMBIT 

Cubed Mission Summary. Hereafter, these memoranda 

will be cited as "Mission Summary, Flight No. " 

Msg. ~~~ b375, 14 Dec 66. 

Msg. "-----_~I 3733, 23 Dec 66. 

Memo, King to McLucas, 28 Apr 70, Atch 1, Tb1 1, and 

main report. 

See Ch XIII. 

Mission Summary No.4, 25 Apr 67. 

Msg, ~--~ 

16881, 24 Feb 67; msg.1 ~--~ 17286, 5 Mar 67. 

Msg, 17451, 23 Mar 67; Mission Summary No.4, 

2.5 Apr 67; msg, Charge 6365,23 Mar 67. 

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64. 

65. 

66. 

67. 

68. 

69. 

70. 

71. 

72. 

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Msg, Charge 6365, 23 Mar 67; Mission Summary No.4, 

25 Apr 67; QPR, 31 Mar 67; Addendum I to EKC Evaluation, 

Flight No.4, 11 May 67. See also MFR, BGen R. A. Berg, 

Dir/NRO Staff, 23 Mar 67, subj: Telephone conversation with 

Gen Martin. 

EKC Evaluation, Flight No.4, 11 May 67, p 3-1. 

QPR, 30 Jun 67. liThe contractor appears to have s ignificantly improved his component and manufacturing quality 

control. II was the project office evaluation. 

QPR, 31 Mar 67. 

MFR, Berg, 23 Mar 67. 

Msg, 1 17736, 26 Afr 67; iission Summary, No.5; 

QPR, 30 Jun 67; msgs, 6058, 11 Apr 67 (Mission 

parameters), 1 <0> 17733, 26 Apr 67 (count), 1 17734, 

26 Apr 67 (launch and first failure indication), 1 17736, 

26 Apr 67. 

Mission Summary No.6, 27 Jul 67; msg, 1 17082. 

SAFSS to STC, 1 Jun 67; interview, Capt L. Mills by R. 

Butler, 16 Apr 73. 

QPR. 30 Jun 67; Mission Summary No.6, 22 Jul 67. 

Msg, 1 19644, 3 Jul 67. '-----_------l 

These data were provided by I lof Special 

Projects,l I In addition, the Mir;:;on S J1 rrno a]ieS cited 

here are all from files maintained by the only 

ones extant in the case of early G-3 missions. In addition 

to the targets mentioned above, an additional 110 were photographed outside the programmed areas. Of these, 53 had 

been camera identified. See msg. I 18495, 31 Jul 67. 

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74. 

75. 

76. 

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Msg, "---I __ 18375,25 Jul 67. 

Memo, Dr. A. H. Flax, DNRO, to DepSecDef, 6 Jul 67, 

sub';: National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Is sues and 

Pending Decisions. 

Ltr, Dr. A. H. Flax, ASAF / R&D, to cis. USAF, 13 Oct 

66, subj: SLV -3A Launch Vehicle Requirements, SAFSS 

files; m sg. Whig 5849. Dir I NRO staff to Dir SP, 24 Oct 

66; rnsg. Charge 3461, SP to SS, 16 Nov 66. 

Rpt. "A Review of the Gambit-3 Program, 11 Feb 68, ln 

S AFSS Proj Ofc file s. 

77. Min NRO ExCom Mtg, 23 Nov 66. 

78. 

79. 

80. 

8L 

82. 

84. 

85. 

Min NRO ExCom Mtg, 17 Aug 66. 

Memo, A. H. Flax. DNRO, to DepSecDef, 20 Sep 66, 

subj: The DNRO Recommended FY68 Budget for the National 

Rl:'connaissance Program. 

Min, NRO ExCom Mtg, 23 Nov 66. 

Memo, MGen J. T. Stewart, Dir /NRO staff. to DNRO. 

30 Jun 67, no subj. NRO files. 

Memo, James Reber, Sec NRP ExCom. to DNRO, 9 Dec 

66, subj: Agenda; Min, NRP ExCom Mtg. 16 Dec 66. 

Msgs, Whig 6102, 2.0 Jan 67; Charge 4889. 14 Feb 67. 

Memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir INRO staff, to MGen J. T. 

Stewart, MOL Ok, 23 Feb 67, subj: Rapid Recovery Capability 

from a Disaster for SLC-4W and SLC-4E. 

QPR, 31 Mar. 30 Jun. 30 Sep 67. 

86. BGen R. A. Berg, Dir/NRO Staff, to DNRO. 25 Jul 67. 

no subj. 

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Draft paper, Col. C. L. Battle, SAFSS, no date (1967), 

subj: High Resolution Photography; memo, BGen R. A. 

Berg, Dir/NRO staff, to Battle, 22 Aug 67, no subj. 

Memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir / NRO Staff, to A. H. Flax. 

DNRO, 1 Sep 67, no subj. 

QPR, 30 Sep 67. 

Memo, A. H. Flax, DNRO, to C. Vance, DepSecDef, 

6 Jul 67, no subj. 

Mission Summary No.7, 15 Sep 67. 

Msg, "-----_~11923, 2.6 Oct 67. 

QPR, 31 Mar 67, and 31 Dec 67. 

Rpt, "Design Study Report for the R-5 Lens Configuration, II 

Eastman Kodak Co, 30 Dec 69. 

Memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir/NRO staff, to C. A. Sorrels, 

BoB, 30 Dec 68, subj: Resolution Related Improvements, 

GAMBIT; Rpt. Program 110 Status Book, Section 6, "Hardware Description and Capabilities, " in Gambit office files. 

Ltr. Chm. USIB, to SecDef, 4 Apr 68, with atch, New 

Coverage Requirements, 27 Mar 68. 

Memo, A. H. Flax, DNRO, to Chmn, USIB, 10 Apr 68 

(draft), subj: Gambit Mission Schedule. 

"Program 110 Launch Summary, Ii in Gambit office files. 

Mission Summary No.7, 15 Sep 67; QPR, 30 Sep 67. 

Msg, 1"---__ pI99, 16 Aug 67. 

Mission Summary No.7, 15 Sep 67. 

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"Summary of Series 4300 Operational Missions, II (referred 

to hereafter as "4300 Summary), pr ep by SAFSP; Gambit 

Office "Program 110 Status Book" (referred to hereafter 

as "110 Status Book"). There is an unresolved ambiguity 

affecting resolution data in the records of that mission. 

The Gambit Office number is 18 inches, used in the text, 

while Operations shows the result to be 19.2 inches. Because 

there were so many ways of measuring resolution, and so 

many points at which provisional measurements were made, 

that confusion is not surprising. 

Msgs, I 11088, 19 Sep 67; msg, 

Mission Summary No.8, 25 Oct 67; 

Oct 67. 

1 1718, 2 Oct 67; ~-~ 

msg, Bail 8202, 2 

Msg, 1 ~ 9265, 2.8 Aug 67; Mission Summary No.8, 

25 Oct 67; Analysis of Gambit (110) Project, Atch 3. 

Mission Summary No.9, 27 Nov 67; the original launch 

date had been 10 Oct. ,In---t:u-I;n it became 17 Oct, 20 Oct, 

and 24 oct:]sgs ~ 9484, 11 Sep 67; 1 19595, 

14Sep67; 9768,20Sep67;1 10146,40ct67. 

Msgs, Charge 9431, 23 Oct 67; "---I _------l11897, 25 Oct 67. 

Msg, 1'-___ 13227, 6 Nov 67; memo, King to McLucas, 

28 Apr 70, Atch 3; Addendum to EKC Evaluation~ Flight 

No.9, 2 J an 68. 

108. Min, of NRP ExCom Mtg, 17 Nov 67. 

109. Memo, MGen J. M. Reynolds, USAF (Ret), Office of the 

Dir, CIA, to BGen R. A. Berg, Dir, NRO staff, 15 Sep 

67; subj: Utilization of the KH-7 and KH-8 Reconnaissance 

Systems for Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Requirements, 

in DNRO files. 

110. Memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir/NRO Staff, to A. H. Flax, 

DNRO, 26 Sep 67, no subj. (Flax's marginal note in reply 

is quoted here); memo, J. J. Schadegg, Ch Photo Br NRO, 

to Flax, 2,6 Sep 67, subj: Satellite Coverage ofl I 

26 Sep 670 

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Memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir/NRO staff, to ,---I ____ ~-~ 

CIA, 14 Dec 67, subj: GAMBIT and GAMBIT-Cubed Film 

Expenditure Against MappIng and ChartIng Requirements. 

Mission Summary No. 10, 22 Jan 68. 

QPR, 31 Dec 67. 

Mission Summary No. 11, 6 Mar 68; msg, 1 

~-~ 

14186, 

16 Jan 68. 

Msg, ~-~ 

1 4229, 18 Jan 68. 

Msg, 14834, 29 Jan 68; msg. 1 14858, 30 Jan 68; -'-----------" 

Mission Summary No. 11, 6 Mar 68. 

Memo, King to McLucas, 28 Apr 70. 

Msg, "---I ~~15298, 13 Mar 68. 

Mission Summary No. 12, 1 May 68. 

Program 110 Launch Summary. I 

~--

Memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir/NRO staff, to Dir, Join 

Reconnaissance Center, 8 Apr 68. subj: 1 1 Satellite 

Reconnais sance Data. 

Msg, 11800, 9 Apr 68. 

Msg, 16082. 17 Apr 68; Mission Summary No. 13, 

11 Jun 68. 

Msg, Whig 7756. 6 Jun 68. 

Msg, 16931, 5 Jun 68; Mission Summary No. 14, 

17 Jul 68. 

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Msg, Whig 7896, 12. Jul 68. This mes sage is also co ngratu1atory, pointing out that the mission had exceeded in intelligence 

take, number thirteen which had been a record to that date. 

Of particular note, however, was the exceptional ratio of 

read-out to programmed tar gets. 

Msg, Spectre 42.22, 17 Jul 68. 

Msg, Spectre 4802., 14 Oct 68; Mission Summary No. l5~ 

7 Oct 68. 

Ltr, BGen R. A 0 Berg, Dir /NRO Staff, to Dr. A. H. Flax, 

DNRO, 14 Nov 68, no subj. 

Ltr, Dr. A. H. Flax, DNRO, to H. Waggershauser, VP 

and GenMgr, EKC, Apparatus Div, 31 Oct 68, no subj. 

4300 Mission Summary, I I memo, BGen R. A. Berg, 

Dir, NRO Staff, to Dir, CIA Reconnaissance Programs 

(draft), 12. Feb 69, subj: Special Report on Current Soviet 

Anti-Earth Satellite Capabilities. 

Memo, BGen R. A. Berg, Dir/NRO staff, to LtCol L. Neuner, 

Analysis Branch (SAFSS), 3 Feb 69, subj: Mission 4319 I' -------------'----~-----,I memo, Neune r to Be r g, 

same subject, 4 Feb 69; memo, Berg to Dr. A. H. Flax, 

DNRO, 7 Jan 69, subj:LI ___ ---~_~----~~1 

I I 

Mission Summary Numbers 16 to 22; Program 110 Launch 

Summaryl ~ 4300 Summary, I IAnalysis of Gambit 

(110) Project; Quarterly Program Reviews during the period 

Sep 68, Sep 69. 

The discussion of the flight program which follows is taken 

principally from a tab'.llar history of the program which is 

maintained in the Program 110 Status Book, a working document of the Gambit Office, SAFSP. Additional sources are 

cited individually where used, 

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SAFSP, "Analysis of Gambit Project Missions 23 through 36, " 

p 6, Gambit office file s (her eafter cited as "Analysis of 

Gambit Block II"); MFR, LCol R. J. Kiefer, NRO staff, 

subj: Vehicle Atmospheric Survivability Te st (VAST -Phase II), 

dtd 17 Sep 71, NRO staff files. SAFSS. 

Memo, LCo1 F. L. Hofmann, NRO Staff to Dr. J. L. 

McLucas, DNRO, 25 Oct 72, subj: Recovery of Space Objects; 

msg, H. Cohen, SAFSP (SP-3) to McLucas, 25 Oct 72; 

interview, H. CohenbyR. Perry, 2lDec72. 

QPR. 30 Jun 72. 

Anal ysis of Gambit, Block II, pp 3, 11. 

Msg, BGen L. Allen, Dir, SAFSP, to Dr. J. McLucas, 

DNRO, 7 Oct 70. 

Analysis of Gambit (110) Program. 

QPR, 30 Jun 70. 

Anal ysis of Gambit, Block II. p 7. 

Program 110 Launch Summary. 

Memo, J. L. McLucas, DNRO, to SecDef, 18 Dec 72, 

subj: Taking Stock of the National Reconnaissance Program; 

memo, McLucas to SecDef, 21 Dec 72, subj: Taking Stock. 

both in SAFSS files. 

Memo, BGen D. D. Bradburn, Dir Isp, to Dr. J. McLucas, 

DNRO. 20 Mar 73, subj: Gambit Mission Summary (4337). 

Memo, BGen D. D. Bradburn. Dir Isp, to Dr. J. McLucas. 

DNRO, 23 Jul 73, subj: Gambit Mission Summary (4338). 

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MFR, 1 1 Actg Chief, Photo Sci Studies Br, 

NPIC, 28 J1lll 73, s ubj: NPIC Support to Project Skylab, 

in SAFSS files. 

MFR, LtCol F. L. Hofmann NRO staff, 15 Jun 73, subj: 

Gambi notes by M. Krueger, NASA, 

17 May 73, in NRO files; msg 8626, SOC to Dir /SP 

(BGen D. D. Bradburn), 17 May 73; msg,l 14397, 

Bradburn to J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 21 May 73; msg, 

Charge 2864, SAFSP to L. C. Dirks, CIA, 18 May 73; 

MFR, Shafer, 28 Jun 73; interviews, Hofmann by R. Perryp 

20 Jun 73, H. C. Cohen, SAFSP, by Perry, 6 Jun 73. 

Program 110 Status Book, LI __ _ 

Rpt, Analysis of G(110), 28 Apr 70, prep by Gambit Program 

Office; memo, Col. E. Sweeney, Dir/NRO staff, to Dr. 

J. L. McLucas, DNRO, 15 May 70, no subj, with unsigned 

memo byl I NRO Compt, 14 May 70; memo, 

McLucas to DepSecDef, 1 Jul 70, subj: NRP Funds Available 

for Withdrawal; rpt, DNRO Report to NRP ExCom on Fiscal 

Year 1970 Status and Fiscal Year 1971 Program, 15 Jul 70. 

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