Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed February 25, 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

No. 05-13-01442-CR ANTWAN DEVELL DOUGLAS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Crimin al District Court No. 4 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F12-63774-K 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Whitehill Opinion by Justice Francis Antwan Devell Douglas waived a jury trial and pleaded not guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. After the trial court fo und him guilty, appellant stipulated he had two prior felony convictions. The trial court found the enhancement paragraphs true and assessed punishment at twenty five years in prison. In th ree issues, appellant cont ends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and the trial court’s judgment should be modified to show appellant pleaded not guilty with no plea bargai n. We modify the tria l court’s judgment and affirm as modified. The trial court heard tes timony from Dallas police officers Chad Murphy, Nicholas Morris, Gustavo Rodriguez (G. Rodriguez), Ma rtin Rodriguez (M. Rodriguez), and Albert‐ 2 ‐ Sanchez. Murphy, who was off duty, was walk ing his brother’s dog when he saw appellant “leaning” into a Jeep through an open door. Murphy knew appellant was not the Jeep’s owner. When appellant saw Murphy, appellant looked surp rised and walked away from the vehicle, leaving the door open. Murphy followed a ppellant at a distance and called 911. Officers Sanchez and M. Rodriguez were wo rking off-duty bicycle patrol when they heard the dispatcher report a possible burglary of a motor vehicle witnessed by another off-duty officer. Sanchez spotted appellant on the Katy Trail and ordered him to the ground. While M. Rodriguez handcuffed appellant, Sanchez searched the bag appellant wa s carrying and found marijuana inside. M. Rodriguez patted down appellant’s clothing for weapons, found none and handcuffed appellant. Officers Morris and G. Rodriguez were dispatch ed to the scene. They arrived after the two bicycle officers had handcuffe d appellant, who told the offi cers his name was Roy Stone, a name they determined was fictitious. Morris said appellant had “4 or 5 shirts on” and “probably 3 or 4 pairs of pants.” When Morris searched appellant, he found “nothing of value, just trash and coins.” Morris put appellant in the back seat of his patrol car and drove to the location of the alleged burglary. Officers locate d the owner of the Jeep, who ve rified that nothing was taken from the vehicle. During the ride to the jail, a ppellant was “acting weird” and kept “fidgeting . . . moving back and forth.” G. Rodriguez was sitti ng in the front passenger seat, and appellant was in the rear passenger seat behind him. Both officers told appella nt several times to stop moving. During the book-in process at the jail, appellant began to remove his layers of clothing. G. Rodriguez said that when appellant removed the second pair of pants, officers found what looked like a “pantyhose and it’s tied at the end with a ball of change . . . made it look as if it is a weapon.” After appellant removed two more pairs of pants, G. Rodriguez looked at the clothing‐ 3 ‐ and saw an empty gun holster with a string attached to it. Iden tification with appellant’s true name on it was found in the clothing. G. Rodriguez went back to the patrol car to run appellant’s name through the computer and learned appellant ha d an active warrant for a parole violation. Before he returned to the book-in area, G. Rodriguez decided to look in the back seat of the patrol car because of the empty holster in appell ant’s clothing. When he opened the car door, he saw a nine-millimeter gun on the backseat floorboard on the passenger side in plain view. The gun appeared to be in good working order and was loaded. All officers are required to go through a check list when they start a shift, making sure nothing is inside the vehicle and there is no dama ge to the outside of the vehicle. Morris checked the patrol car before he began his shift at 4:00 p.m. that day, he arrested and transported appellant to the jail at 5:30 p.m., and no one othe r than appellant and G. Rodriguez had been in the vehicle. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdic t and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Wise v. State , 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim . App. 2010) (plurality op.). We are required to defer to the jury’s credib ility and weight determinations becaus e the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the wei ght to be given their testimony. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 326. To obtain a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was pr eviously convicted of a felony offense and possessed a firearm after the conv iction and before the fifth anni versary of his release from confinement or from supervision under comm unity supervision, parole, or mandatory‐ 4 ‐ supervision, whichever date is later. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 46.04(a) (West 2011). Appellant does not dispute that he had a pr ior felony conviction. Instead, he challenges only the evidence that he possessed a firearm. “Possession means actual care, custody, control, or management.” T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 1.07(a)(39) (West Supp. 2014). If the firearm is not found on a defendant’s person or is not seen in a defendant’s exclusive care, custod y, control, or management, the State must offer additional, independent facts and circumstances that link a defendant to the firearm. See Bates v.
State , 155 S.W.3d 212, 216–17 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to show he exercised actual care, custody, control, or management of the gun. Appellant asserts that because (1) he was searched by two officers who did not find any weapons on his person, (2) his hands were handcuffed behind his back while in the patrol ca r, and (3) someone else could have placed the gun in the patrol car during the time appellant wa s being booked into the jail, the evidence is insufficient. The evidence links appellant and the gun. The patrol car was cleared prior to the start of the shift. The gun was found on the back seat fl oorboard of the patrol car that transported appellant to the jail. Appellant had been sitting in the back seat, conti nually moved around while being transported to the jail, and was the only person who had access to th e backseat floorboard before the gun was found. When appellant removed his layers of clothing at the jail, an empty gun holster was found in one of the pairs of pants he had been wear ing. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knowingly or intenti onally possessed the firearm. See Evans v. State , 202 S.W.3d 158,‐ 5 ‐ 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The evidence is suffi cient to support the conviction. We overrule appellant’s first issue. In his second and third issues, appellant c ontends the trial court’ s judgment should be modified to show he entered a not guilty plea w ith no plea bargain. The State agrees that the judgment should be modified as appellant requ ests. The trial court’s judgment erroneously shows appellant pleaded guilty to the offense and plea bargain terms of “25 Years Penitentiary Fine $-0-.” We sustain appellant ’s second and third issues. We also note the judgment states “N/A” in the sections regarding the pleas and findings on the enhancement paragraphs. The record, however, shows appellant pleaded true to having two pr ior felony convictions, and the trial court found those paragraphs true. We modify the trial court’s judgment to show th e: (1) plea to the offe nse is not guilty, (2) terms of plea bargain are none, (3) plea to first e nhancement paragraph is true, (4) plea to second enhancement paragraph is true, (5) finding on first paragraph is true, and (6) finding on second paragraph is true. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). As modified, we affirm the tr ial court’s judgment. We orde r the trial court to enter an amended judgment that reflects these changes.

Do Not Publish T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47 131442F.U05 /Molly Francis/ MOLLY FRANCIS JUSTICE‐ 6 ‐ 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
JUDGMENT

ANTWAN DEVELL DOUGLAS, Appellant No. 05-13-01442-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4 of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. F12-63774-K). Opinion delivered by Justice Francis, Justices Lang-Miers and Whitehill participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is MODIFIED as follows: The section entitled “Plea to Offense” is modified to show “Not Guilty.” The section entitled “Terms of Plea Barg ain” is modified to show “None.” The section entitled “Plea to 1st Enhancement Paragraph” is modified to show “True.” The section entitled “Plea to 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragra ph” is modified to show “True.” The section entitled “Findings on 1st Enhanc ement Paragraph” is modified to show “True.” The section entitled “Findings on 2nd Enhancem ent/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to show “True.” As modified, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment. We order the trial court to issue an amended judgment that reflects these changes.

Judgment entered February 25, 2015