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DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING 

WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 

Mr. James E. Webb 

Administrator 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

Washington, D. C. - 20546 

Dear Jim: 

Attached are copies of the documents, as transmitted 

to the President, which were the subject of our recent discussions on the MOL program. The final Memorandum to 

the President has been altered somewhat to present Dr. 

Hornigts position more accurately. The recommendations 

are almost identical and the discussion is essentially the same 

as in the document you now have. 

Sincerely yours, 

Harold Brown 

4 attachments: 

I. Memo to President/ 

2. Policy on Public Information ./ 

3. Answers to Questions 

4. News Release, 25 Aug. 65 — 

cc: Dr. Robert C. Seamans, Jr. 
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASH I NGTON 

24 August 1965 

VXMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

SUBJECT: Manned Orbiting Laboratory 

Your FY 1966 budget request to pongress included, and the Congress 

is in the process of appropriating, $150 million for the Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory (MOL), which was initiated in December of 1963 when the DYNASOAR 

Program was terminated. When these funds were budgeted in December of 1964, 

I indicated that I would defer their release until such time as the studies 

of the nature and value of the program, then underway, were satisfactorily 

completed. 

These studies have nov been completed. Based upon a thorough review 

of the conclusions I recommend the following: 

1. Approval of the MOL for full-scale development to begin during 

FY 1966. The release of the $150,M in the FY 66 budget and the initiation 

of contract definition will begin the full-scale development. I plan to 

request $330 million for the support of the program in Fiscal Year 1967, 

plus about $70 million for the related manned and unmanned optical development. 

2. That the MOL program proceed toward the following objectives: 

a. Semi-operational use beginning in late 1968 to secure photographs of resolutions of significant targets. This 

is approximately better than the best satellite photography 

we are now obtaining, and approximately better than the 

best expected U-2 photographs or the G3 satellite 'system, now under 

development, from which we expect photographs in about 15 months. 

b. Development of high-resolution optical technology and systems 

for either manned or unmanned use. This technology will provide the 

resolution and be aimed at ultimately even better 

resolution 

c. Provision of a facility for the development, test and use of 

other potential military applications such as SIGINT collection, 

radar observation and ocean surveillance, as the utility and feasibility of such applications become established. 

d. Provision of an experimental program for determination of 

man's utility in assembling large structures, and in adjusting, 

maintaining and processing the output from complex Ha gsitprymequipment in space. BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

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3. That the MOL program be operated within the guidelines of our 

existing national policy and within the carefully-ordered security 

environment which already exists for military space programs. This 

environment helps to avoid provocation in the international arena, and 

to forestall initiation of international action that might prevent the 

United States from using satellites for reconnaissance. 

4. To support this objective, that we maintain a firm position to 

ensure that the public information programs associated with MOL are kept 

modest and low key and that the publicly announced mission of the MOL 

continues to be expressed solely as "the investigation and development 

of orbital capabilities, manned and unmanned, associated with national 

defense." A press release is attached. 

I have the concurrence of Secretary Rusk, Mr. Webb, Admiral Raborn, 

and Dr. Hornig on the above recommendations. Mr. Schultze concurs subject 

to his comments on page 3 of this memorandum. The program has been discussed in the Space Council and the Vice President believes we should 

proceed with it. I have not sought or received concurrence on the parts 

of the paper other than the recommendations. 

I am proposing a development program of six launchings, one unmanned 

and five manned. The first manned launching would take place late in 

Calendar Year 1968, and the last early in 1970. The total cost for this 

program is now estimated at $1.5 billion, including the optical sensor 

programs, for both a manned and a parallel unmanned capability. 

The payload vehicle for these launchings consists of the basic twoman MOL module and the GEMINI B recovery capsule which has figured in 

previous Department of Defense studies. It is proposed to launch into 

polar orbits from the Western Test Range, using the TITAN IIIC booster. 

Some Eastern Test Range launches may also be included. Orbital operations of 30 days' duration are planned. 

The primary emphasis in the six-flight program will be placed on the 

development, demonstration and use of optical reconnaissance systems of 

very high resolution, including a system producing resolutions of 

on the ground. 

The Director of Central Intelligence indicates "It is in the interest 

of the United States to obtain the highest resolution of photographic 

coverage feasible over those areas of intelligence interest designated , 

by the United States Intelligence Board, provided that such highest resolution will of course have to be weighed against the relative factors of 

cost, time, and relative importance of intelligence which could be obtained 

in an optimum balance of these considerations." 

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I believe that there is a vital national need for reconnaissance 

photography at a resolution of The first and 

obvious need is for technical intelligence. There is also a clear need, 

particularly during times of crisis, for high resolution photography of 

tactical objectives. Closely related to these applications is the 

potential use of high resolution photography to assist in the policing 

of arms control agreements. 

You will remember that in the crisis of 1962 we exerted our 

reconnaissance capabilities to the utmost to acquire pictures having the 

detail and the credibility that were necessary to eerie; and to convince 

others of the nature of the military activity in Cuba. In other situations, 

it may be important to accomplish these same ends without the provocation 

of visible overflights. 

If we had resolution capability today, it would be of great 

value in assessing such problems as the hardness of Soviet missile silos 

and the nature of various possible Soviet anti-missile deployments. 

Examples of its use in the future are: 

1. Estimation of the operating depth for which Soviet and Chinese 

submarines are designed. 

2. Estimation of the use and capability of plants that may be 

employed for nuclear weapons prcduction. 

3. Assessment of Chinese or other nth-country development of 

weapons-delivery capability by detailed examination of missile and 

airekaftpaants and rocket engine test activity. 

I expect the six-flight program to give us: 

1. Onerational.intelligence collection at resolution 

2. Knowledge of the nature and value of critical contributions 

of man to photographic reconnaissance and to other military-related 

space missions; and of the specific differences, in an engineering 

sense, between manned and unmanned systems of large size and very 

high resolution. 

3. The optical technology and designs for systems which, if 

manned, can give resolution 

Original estimates for the MOL indicated the cost of the manned 

system would exceed that of an unmanned system by $800 1,000 million. 

The Director of the Bureau: the Budget questioned whether the value of 

the additional resolution manned vs. unmanned) 

was worth this additional cost and on the basis of these estimates was 

prepared to recommend proceeding with the development of an unmanned 

system only. Further Defense Department studies now indicate that the 

difference in cost between the two systems would be more nearly $300 -

400 million. On the basis of these revised estimates the Director has 

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withdrawn his objection to proceeding with the program as proposed. 

However, he recommends that, if the studies over the next six months 

indicate a cost difference substantially greater than $300 - 400 million 

(to date only limited studies have been made of the nnmanned system), the 

MOL program be subject to a reappraisal and a new decision made as to 

whether the additional benefits of the manned system are worth the additional costs. I concur in this recommendation. 

Dr. Hornig has recommended that one of the MOL objectives should be 

the development of a camera system having automatic or ground-control 

features which will permit it to equal when employed in an unmanned system 

the ground resolution expected from it when operated 

in the manned mode. He believes that the two modes of operation may well 

be possible with essentially the same camera. It is his opinion that 

efforts should be made as part of the MOL program to employ more precise 

navigation, an appropriate on-board computer, automatic introduction of 

image motion compensation over the format and methods of remotelycontrolled alignment and adjustment. The existence of a camera suitable 

for both modes of operation would provide high-resolution photography 

even if international objections or foreign threats should prevent panned 

operations or if man proves physically unable to perform as expected in 

MOL for extended, periods in orbit. He also believes it possible that, 

from an operational standpoint, an unmanned system will eventually be 

desired to complement the manned system by performing the more routine 

reconnaissance missions, or missions undertaken during times of particular 

political stress. 

Dr. Hornig's recommendations have been incorporated in the program I 

propose to initiate. During the contract definition period, a clearer 

identification can be made of the designs for the new devices which will 

need to be developed for the unmanned operational mode. At that time, it 

will be clearer whether a common camera system can be employed which 

optimizes both modes. It is my intention that the system will be designed 

so that it can operate without a man. It will operate somewhat differently, 

however, (and with improved overall effectiveness) with a man. Whether 

the system will produce peorer average resolution without the man depends 

on how well some of the ideas for such functions as automatic focusing 

and adjustment, automatic navigation and image motion compensation work 

out. But in any event, it is agreed that the man's ability to select 

targets, to override the automatic controls when they function less well 

than expected, to choose date for prompt transmission, will improve the 

overall utility of the data. Furthermore, the presence of man in the 

developmental phase can be expected to shorten the development and improve 

the capability of the unmanned version of the system. 

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Beyond the initial objective of producing ground resolution 

photography, successful automation will be increasingly difficult. 

Conducting the development program with a manned spacecraft will improve 

the prospect of achieving resolutions in the class. 

The plan for MOL as proposed by the Department of Defense has been 

prepared specifically to meet defense needs. Provision has been made, 

however, for including experiments and technology of special relevance 

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to certain military needs other than reconnaissance. As the program 

proceeds, they may increase in importance. Preliminary study has been 

made as well to determine what general scientific needs could be included. 

On the basis of further DoD-NASA cooperative studies, VASA will determine 

which of its scientific or general technological experiments should be 

carried out using the MOL capability on the basis of non-interference with 

defense priority objectives. 

Ky judgment is that we should now proceed to acquire the benefits of 

an experimental high-resolution reconnaissance system. I conclude that 

the combination of the specific manned and unmanned reconnaissance development. which I believe will fill a national need for photography at 

resolution, and the other more general purposes discussed above 

is worth the cost of the development and semi-operational launches. I 

request your approval of this program. 

Robert S. McNamara 

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AND INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO THE 

MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY 

1. THE MANNED ORBITING LABORATORY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY 

The proposed Manned Orbiting Laboratory will have as its initial 

objective the development and demonstration at the earliest time of 

an operationally useful high resolution manned optical system. MOL 

is scheduled to make its first manned reconnaissance flight in 1968. 

Since 1962, it has been the announced policy of the United States 

Government to "avoid situations, statements, or actions which, in 

the context of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be 

exploited as evidence either of alleged U. S. aggressiveness or 

duplicity." This policy has been advanced through carefully planned 

security measures: by never openly revealing the nature or extent 

of U.S. satellite reconnaissance activities we have not forced or 

influenced other nations (particularly the USSR) to react publicly 

against our space overflights. 

Considering this background, what is the most favorable context 

for introducing the MOL program to the American and international 

public? Will. growing world-wide interest and enthusiasm for manned 

space flight minimize the possibility of international protest? Or 

will the fact that MOL is a military spacecraft carrying military 

pilots make it more objectionable internationally than current unmanned 

satellite reconnaissance activity? Will the USSR allege that MOL 

contains weapons? If so, how could or should the claim be countered? 

Will the growing tacit acceptance of unmanned satellite reconnaissance 

develop to a point where by 1968 MOL is entirely acceptable internationally? The answers to these questions may affect the success of 

MDL operations as well as the total national security. 

In recent years satellite reconnaissance has been the major source 

of United States strategic military intelligence of the Soviet Union 

and Communist China. The United States has relied greatly on this 

information in evaluating international military capabilities and in ' 

determining its own force structures. The information has been particularly important in the United States' evaluation of Soviet strategic 

missile and other offensive weapon capabilities and of Soviet and 

Chinese strategic military research and development programs. 

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Denial of satellite reconnaissance information to the United 

States, or a reduction in the program's effectiveness, would have a 

significant adverse impact on United States national security. 

II. BACKGROUND ON THE PROBLEM OF "LEGITIMIZATION" AND DISCLOSURE 

NSC Action 2454 (Tab A), with its "Eighteen Points", forms the 

basis for the existing policy of secrecy and carefully controlled 

efforts to gain acceptance of satellite reconnaissance. In varying 

circumstances, this policy has been reviewed and re-affirmed 

periodically since its promulgation in July 1962. The advent of the 

MOL, with its primary reconnaissance function, has generated concern 

and comment from various U.S. government agencies concerning the 

security of existing and future satellite reconnaissance activity.. 

III. THE PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE MANNED ORBITING 

LABORATORY: CONSEQUENCES OF DISCLOSURE 

The United States' satellite reconnaissance program is a national 

program conducted in secrecy. The character of the program is 

based on five major objectives developed in response to NSAM 156, 

expressing the desire to: 

1. "Maintain our freedom of action unilaterally to conduct 

reconnaissance satellite operations." 

2. "Prevent foreign political and physical interference 

with the conduct of these operations." 

3. "Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details of 

the operations or end products of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance 

program." 

4. "Avoid situations, statements or actions which, in the 

context of our satellite reconnaissance program, could later be 

exploited as evidence either of alleged U.S. aggressiveness or 

duplicity." 

5. "Facilitate the resolution of any conflicts which might 

arise between the essential technical and security requirements of 

the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program and the international 

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commitments and foreign policy objectives of the United States in 

a manner which is in the over-all best interests of the national 

security of the United States." 

The primary objective, abstracting those listed above, is to 

forestall foreign or domestic actions that would prevent the United 

States from using satellites for reconnaissance. This objective is 

not changed by the advent of MOL. 

Would we enhance the acceptability of MOL by private disclosure 

to hostile nations? There is great danger in disclosing MOL's 

essential secret -- the high resolution of its photography -- to 

hostile nations. Such a disclosure would arouse apprehensiveness 

over our intelligence capability and might stimulate those nations --

especially the Soviets -- to renew their historic opposition. Further, 

since Soviet military astronauts overfly the United States routinely, 

a reconnaissance disclosure by the United States would be a confusing 

defensive action. The Soviets might presume that the true character 

of the MOL must be quite different from that offered in disclosure. 

Therefore, any announcement of high resolution photographic capability 

could have an unsettling influence upon the Soviets with protest, 

camouflage, and even physical counteraction as possible responses. 

No definable "good" would accrue to the United States from a private 

disclosure of the MOL mission. 

Do we enhance acceptability by public disclosure? The existence 

of a U.S. requirement for effective intelligence of the Sino-Soviet 

area is generally clear to the governments of the free world. In 

spite of this acceptance it is unlikely that the U.S. could gain widespread support in any international forum for a positive affirmation 

to conduct satellite reconnaissance, especially with the introduction 

of a manned vehicle. The newly emerging small nations are strongly 

nationalistic. Their representatives could view a Soviet/U.S. debate 

over manned or unmanned reconnaissance with quiet detachment, but if 

faced squarely with a vote on the "space rights" of their own nations 

they would very probably choose to affirm total sovereignty. Friendly 

large nations are no exception to this rule; they simply enter the 

debate at an earlier point. Even arguments for "common defense" would 

normally yield in the face of arguments for sovereignty. The United 

States could, if necessary, debate the issue of the free use of spacd 

in any forum without apprehension. But it should carefully avoid air 

situation which forces a nation-by-nation roll call on photographic 

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As in the case of private disclosure, public disclosure would 

have the additional effect of forcing hostile nations to react, 

since the announcement would be construed as a deliberate flaunting 

of a provocative capability. The Soviet reaction to U-2 overflight 

is well known; public disclosure could provoke Soviet leadership 

into placing the U-2 and MOL in the same category. 

Does continued secrecy create a bad image of the United States? 

Secrecy does not mean illegality. The practice of conducting legal, 

secret operations in international waters and air space is well 

established. There is no reason for the United States to assume the 

lack of disclosure of details, timing, and results of satellite 

reconnaissance to be taken as a concession to illegality. The fact 

that these details are not disclosed becomes relevant only as the 

United States allows it to become relevant (for example, by reacting 

defensively to criticism in this regard). 

IV. THE FEASIBILITY OF CONDUCTING MOL FLIGHT OPERATIONS WITHIN 

THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL POLICY 

From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that disclosure 

of the MOL reconnaissance capability is an irreversible step which 

would have profound adverse effects on enemies, allies, and neutrals. 

Furthermore, no gain would appear to flow from disclosure. 

MOL should therefore be operated within the guidelines of 

existing national policy and within the carefUlly-ordered security 

environment which already exists for military space programs. Such an 

environment enhances the achievement of the primary national objective 

indicated above, "...to forestall international or unilateral actions 

that would prevent the United States from using satellites for reconnaissance," avoiding unnecessary provocation in the international arena. 

Achievement of this objective will require a firm position on 

several points. 

First, there must be determined governmental resistance to any 

suggestion that MOL requires elaborate justification. MOL requires 

no more public justification than any other military space projects. ' 

The United States has announced that it will have a.military space 

program and it has one. The United States has never made a secret 

of the fact that a number of its space projects are under military 

control and have military objectives. MOL must be treated as part of 

the mainstream of a continuing U.S. military space program. 

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Second, and.corollary to the above, the public information 

program associated with MOL must be kept modest, low-key, and carefully planned. Particularly at the time of program approval, it will 

be in the best interest of the program -- internationally -- to avoid 

fanfare. Contractor publicity must be controlled. All public 

information releases must flow through a single DoD point-of-view --

the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs. Public information 

stories will deal exclusively with the non-sensitive technological 

aspects of MOL, such as the booster system, the life support system, 

engineering for long life on orbit, launching technology, communication plans, biomedical experiments, etc. Operational goals will 

not be discussed in news releases. Public releases and response to 

questions should be designed to cover the flurry of interest which 

will be associated with a decision to go ahead with the program. It 

should be recognized that at the time the first MOL is launched the 

NASA Apollo program will be at a peak of manned earth orbital activity. 

Public interest in the MOL may be very little. 

It is possible, however, that public interest or the international 

situation at the time of manned launches of MOL may require the release 

of information on orbital activity to ensure that these launches cannot 

be reasonably interpreted as some type of covert aggression. The Air 

Force will have military experiments on board the spacecraft which, 

while they may be classified, lie outside of reconnaissance-associated 

activity and- therefore may be discussed at least in general terms and 

often in specific detail. The nature (content and timing) of the 

release of information on MOL may be considered when the period of 

manned launches approaches and a decision on the release of information 

may, at that time, be reached in light of the then existing inter- . 

national and public circumstances. 

Third, the publicly announced mission of MOL must continue to be 

expressed solely as "the investigation and development of manned 

orbital capabilities associated with national defense." It should not 

be stated or implied that the mission or justification of the MOL is 

to provide a general-purpose manned orbital laboratory. More specifically, the concept that the mission of MOL is general scientific and 

technological experimentation should not be used as a "cover" positiop, 

as this might lead to domestic and international demands for information 

on the nature of the experiment, which could serve to focus more public 

and international attention on the program. It could also lead to 

questions in Congress, the press and the scientific community on the 

relative roles of NASA and Defense in the national space program which 

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could not be answered fully without jeopardizing the security of 

the MOL program. In presenting the MOL as a military program, it 

can be noted that MOL is not a break with the past military space 

program. Dynasoar, which was a manned military space program since 

the 1950's, was cancelled because it was. aimed only toward the development of advanced reentry techniques and it was replaced by MOL 

specifically to study man's military capability in space. MOL should 

therefore produce no new objection. The MOL program was announced in 

December 1963 and $1557Rillion was included in the FY 66 budget. 

Fourth, the United States should be prepared to re-affirm its 

abhorrence of orbiting weapons and advise that no U.S. satellite --

operational or developmental -- carries weapons of any kind. Statements should be made to apply to both manned and unmanned satellites 

and not in direct context with MOL. In view of its present agreement 

to ban weapons of destruction from orbit, this re-affirmation is somewhat trivial in impact; the believers will believe and the accusers 

will remain unconvinced. 

Fifth, the tight security surrounding MOL's mission capability 

must persist regardless of comments and speculation (however accurate 

or inaccurate) by U.S. trade journals and the public press. Public 

information experience with unmanned satellite reconnaissance operations 

has shown that the most "devastating" publicity carries very little 

impact if completely ignored. 

VI. POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY FOR THE MOL PROGRAM 

A. GENERAL 

1. The United States should maintain the legal position that 

the principles of international law and the U.N. charter apply to 

activities in outer space and, specifically, that outer space is free, 

as are the high seas. (NSC Action 2454) 

2. The United States should continue to avoid any question 

implying that reconnaissance activities in outer space are not legitimate. Similarly, we should avoid any position declaring or implying 

that such activities are not "peaceful uses." (NSC Action 2454) 

3. It is recognized that the United States cannot entirely' 

avoid or disclaim interest in reconnaissance, so that where feasible 

the U.S. should also seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the 

legitimacy of space reconnaissance. (NSC Action 2454) 

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4. When confronted by specific international pressure to 

outlaw reconnaissance activities in space, the United States should 

continue to take a public stand for the legitimacy of the principle 

of reconnaissance from outer space, the precise form and extent of 

which would depend upon the circumstances of the confrontation. 

(NSC Action 245) ) 

5. The United States should, to the extent feasible, seek 

to avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance" satellites, and 

where appropriate use instead such broader and neutral terms as 

"observation" or "photographic" satellites. (NSC Action 2454) 

6. The United States should not, at this time, publicly 

disclose the status, extent, effectiveness, or operational characteristics of its reconnaissance program. (NSC Action 2L5!) 

7. Strict control over public statements and backgrounding 

concerning reconnaissance satellites should be exercised to ensure 

consistency with the policy guide-lines suggested in these recommendations. (NSC Action 2454) 

8. The United States should continue to disclose discreetly 

to certain allies and neutrals selected information with regard to 

the U.S. space reconnaissance program, making each disclosure orally 

while impressing upon them its importance for the security of the Free 

World. However, no information should be provided on the MOL at this 

time. If the program is questioned, the response should emphasize 

the non-aggressive nature of the program. Disclosures should be made 

in a manner that will preclude acquisition by the Communist Bloc of 

useable evidence of an official U.S. acknowledgment that we are conducting a satellite reconnaissance program. Proposals for such 

disclosures should include clearance by the National Reconnaissance 

Office. (NSC Action 2454) 

9. The United States should in private disclosures emphasize 

the fact of our determination and ability to pursue such programs 

because of their great importance to our common security, despite any 

efforts to dissuade us. (NSC Action 2454) 

10. The United States should note in connection with private, 

disclosures that, except in some cases for specifically defined 

disarmament agreements, the U.S. cannot agree to (a) declarations of 

the precise purpose of all satellites, (b) declarations of the equipment of all satellites, (c) general requirements for advance notification 

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of all satellite launchings and the tracks of satellites, (d) prelaunch inspection of the satellites, or (e) a specific definition of 

peaceful uses of space which does not embrace unlimited observation. 

(NSC Action 2454) 

11. The United States should continue to describe the MOL 

program as a Department of Defense program. Provision in the design 

has been made to support general technological experiments and NASA 

will consider the capability available in conjunction with its needs. 

However, the classified military objectives will continue to have top 

priority and no steps should be taken to use any possible NASA 

interests as a cover. 

B. SPECIFIC 

1. The United States should continue to preserve the security 

of the National Reconnaissance Program by conducting Manned Orbiting 

Laboratory development and operations within a carefully conceived and 

disciplined security environment consonant with the spirit of NSC 

Action 2454. 

2. The mission of MOL will be described solely as the 

investigation and development of manned orbital capabilities associated 

with national defense and not as a general-purpose manned orbital 

laboratory. It should be described as an improved substitute for 

Dynasoar and no break from the earlier program of manned military 

activities. 

3. The MOL program will not be justified publicly. MOL is 

a logical element of a continuing U.S. military space program; as 

such, it requires no more public justification than any other space 

program. 

4. Public information on MDL will be carefully planned at 

a modest, low-key level. This will be especially important at the 

time permissible information on the operational phase will be released 

at or near launch times. All public information releases or statements 

on MOL made by representatives of any Executive Department or Agency 

including contractors involved in the program will process for approval 

through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Public Affairs. 

Such news stories as are required will deal exclusively with nonsensitive technological aspects of MOL; operational goals will not be 

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5. All MOL launchings will be included on the U.S. portion 

of the United Nations registry of satellite launchings. 

6. MOL reconnaissance products will be controlled in the 

TALENT-KEYHOLE security system after exposure, during processing and 

throughout exploitation. The intelligence product will be exploited 

through established facilities of the intelligence community. 

7. The United States will promote, within the bounds of 

security, the free exchange of bona fide non-sensitive data accruing 

from MOL experiments. 

8. It may become desirable for the United States to re-affirm 

its abhorrence of orbiting weapons and advise that no U.S. satellite --

operational or developmental -- manned or unmanned -- carries weapons 

of any kind. 

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PROPOSED ANSWERS TO POTENTIAL QUERIES ON THE MOL PROGRAM 

1. Reference Dr. Brown's statement before the Senate Committee on 

Armed Services, March 2, he listed characteristics for the orbiting 

vehicle as: (a) at least two men (b) 30 days duration; (3) 300 to 700 cubic 

feet of pressurized volume per man; (d) capability for extra-vehicular 

activity; (e) precise attitude control; (f) safe crew ascent and descent. 

Are all of these part of the program now? If not, which are? What about 

capability of assembling large objects in orbit and rendezvous? 

Answer: All of these are still program considerations. 

2. How many launches are planned? Manned? Unmanned? 

Answer: There are six launches planned in the MOL development 

program, five of which are manned. We will have one 

or possibly two "pre-MOL" unmanned launches to qualify 

subsystems and component development, and to obtain 

early information on structures and environment. 

3. When is the first launch scheduled? Manned? Unmanned? 

Answer: A "pre-MOL" launch to qualify subsystems and to obtain 

early information on structures and environments is 

planned for late 1966 or early 1967. The first manned 

launch in the MOL program is planned for late 1968. 

4. When will the research and development program be completed? 

Answer: The contract definition phase should be completed in 

about six months. Then we plan to go into full. scale 

development which should be completed in early 1970. 

5. How much money have you spent on the MOL program to date? 

How much do you estimate for the cost of the entire R&D program? 

Answer: About 30 million dollars relating to MOL have been spent 

thus far. (Part of this has been used to protect long lead 

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time procurement and for pre-MOL activities such 

as refurbishing the Gemini-Titan II spacecraft for 

a pre-MOL launch). Entire program will cost about 

$1, 5 billion. 

6. How far do you think you will get into the program with the $150 

million authorized in the FY 1966 budget? 

Answer: This would take us into full scale development. 

?„ How will the work be contracted? Will there be a prime contractor ? 

Who? 

Answer: There will be an associate contractor structure. 

8. Will you use the NASA lvlis n Control Center at Houston? If not, 

where will the control be? 

Answer: The MOL program flights will involve the Air Force Satellite 

Control Facility, Sunnyvale, California. Relation to the 

NASA network has yet to be completely worked out. 

9. What additional facilities such as tracking stations, etc., will be 

required? 

Answer: No major facilities not now available in the National Ranges 

or the Satellite Control Facility are expected to be needed. 

10. Is there an unmanned portion of the program other than the launches 

that may be made primarily to test hardware and systems for manned flight? 

If so, what will it consist of? 

Answer: We will be developing technology relating to unmanned 

capabilities as part of the program. 

11. Will all of the launches be made from Cape Kennedy? Which? 

Answer: We anticipate launching from both coasts. 

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12. Will launches be into polar orbits with the MOL travelling over Russia? 

Answer: Any launches over the Western Test Range will be into 

polar orbits. When you are in a polar orbit, it you stay 

up long enough, you will pass over the entire surface of 

the earth. This has been true of the Soviet orbiting vehicles. 

13. Will experiments be conducted while traveling over Russia? 

Answer: Precise flight profiles are not firm at this time. Experiments 

will be conducted wherever in orbit seems most appropriate. 

14. How will crew move from Gemini B into the laboratory? 

Answer: Through a hatch in the Gemini Heat Shield. 

15. What is NASA's part in the program? 

Answer: NASA provided a base of technology and operational experience 

upon which DOD drew. For example, certain .systems and 

subsystems from Gemini and Apollo will be incorporated. The 

Gemini vehicle itself is a NASA development. NASA may 

participate in the MOL by carrying out certain technological 

experiments of scientific interest on a non-interference basis. 

16. What is the Navy's part in the program? 

Answer: The Navy will participate in the MOL program with experiments peculiar to their interests. There is a Navy 

Field Office located at the Air Force Systems Division 

Headquarters in California for liaison. 

17. Is the Army participating? How? 

Answer: The Army has been invited to participate by identifying 

experiments peculiar to their interests. So far, they 

have not come in with any. 

18. Have the scientific experiments been s(•leczed? What are they? 

Answer: The selection process has boon going on for some time 

and will continue. The DOD expects to support those 

experiments with potential relevance to military needs. 

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Have contracts been let to W3Lt is dollar value? 

Answer: Not yet. 

LO. Has contract been let McDonnell for the Gemini B? What is 

dollar value? 

Answer: Not yet. 

21. Will additional facilities be required on the West Coast for manned 

MOL launches? 

Answer: We have included in the FY 1 65 budget request funds for 

additional Titan III launch and support facilities at the 

WTR for both manned and unmanned purposes. 

22. Why do you want to launch into a Polar orbit? 

Answer: Polar orbits enable us to collect flight data from all the 

space regions -- north and south as well as east and west. 

(Some types of data are: radiation measurements, communication phenomena, meteoroloqical data, micrometeorite density measurements, and geophysical data.) 

23. Will the MOL be used as a development vehicle leading to an orbital 

bombardment system? 

Answer: No. There would be no military advantage to developing 

such a capability. 

24. Will it be capable of carrying a nuclear bomb? 

Answer: We have no plans for incorporating such a capability. 

The U. S. fully supports and is committed to complying 

with the UN Resolution which bans the orbiting or stationing 

of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. "Carrying" 

a bomb. is useless. Delivering it from space is difficult. 

We will make no pi-rivision for such delivery. 

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25. Is it intended to use the MOL for detecting nuclear explosions which 

may be in violation of the Test Ban Treaty? 

Answer: We have a program of nuclear detection satellites specifically 

designed to accomplish this purpose. 

26. Would we permit foreign inspection of the 1VIOL vehicle before it is 

launched? 

Answer: The U.S. will permit pre-launch inspection of its space 

vehicles or missiles in the context of an agreed to 

verifiable arms control measure, involving such inspection 

for all parties. 

27. What will be the policy on the release of data on MOL experiments? 

Answer: All unclassified information will be released as soon as 

practical. 

28. What military information will be released? 

Answer: MOL policy on sus : release will be identical with the 

practices relating to other types of military information. 

29. Why not use the Saturn-Apollo system? 

Answer: The Saturn-Apollo system designed for lunar exploration 

has capabilities beyond those required for the MOL. These 

capabilities make an Apollo-based system more expensive 

than a Gemini-based system for the MOL. 

29(a) Will NASA make any use of the Gemini B/MOL/ Titan IIIC system? 

Answer: NASA has indicated that possible use of the Gemini B/MOL/ 

Titan IIIC system in conjunction with the Apollo-Saturn system 

for future NASA programs will be considered. 

30. What will happen to the Titan IIIC pads at the Cape? 

Answer: They will be employed for future space launches. 

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31. Will the Air Force or NASA procure Gemini B? 

Answer: The procurement arrangements will be worked out between 

the Air Force and NASA. 

32. Is there any plan to increase Titan MC performance for MOL, for 

instance, to provide 7-segment solid motors? 

Answer: A 7-segment configuration has been studied and may be 

introduced. 

33. On December 10, 1963, Mr. McNamara stated the first MOL launch 

was expected late in 1967 or early in 1968. Why do you now say late 1968? 

Answer: The additional time was required for the Air Force to work 

out a suitable plan for this expensive program. 

34. Will MOL employ any advanced reentry vehicle like the START? 

Answer: No. The Gemini .5 will be used, with the guidelines of 

changing the NASA Gemini as little as possible. 

3c. Will the MOL perform ren,: :vows and docking? 

Answer: Rendezvous and (1 requirements of the 

currently approved program. However, this ca.pabilit- ; 

which is being developed by NASA for its lunar prograln, 

will be employed in the MOL at a later date if required. 

36. What will you do if Gemini proves men cannot last 14 days in orbit? 

Answer: Studies made by the Air Force have indicated that a-vigorous 

exercise program should assist substantially man's ability 

to withstand the space enviromnent, and space, facilities, and 

time would be allowed for such prophylactic activity. The 

MOL is planned for the devel.oren.:nt of both manned and. 

unmanned technology. The flighi• durations may be ad,n.st„ c. 

to take account of what is learned of man's capabiLtie:3 1.:' 

the Gemini and Apollo programs. 

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37. What kind of "large structure" are you thinking of building? 

Answer: We may investigate means of deploying, extending or 

erecting such items as a large antenna, a shelter for 

external repair or a solar energy collector. 

Deleted. 

Will MOL launches be open to the public:? 

Answer: It is planned that the public information policy on the MOL 

launch operations will be identical to the current DOD 

practice. This is in conformity with the December 20, 1961, 

U. N. Resolution, sponsored by the United States, which 

requires that nations launching objects into orbit or beyond 

are to furnish information promptly to the United Nations 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space through the 

Secretary General. However, this policy will be reviewed 

as the time approaches for rna med. launches. 

40. Since the MOL is a. military program, can it be expected thai sat 

considerations may be to a degree less controlling than in the NASA ma::::::H 

space program? 

Answer: Crew safety is always a primary consideration in 

programs. MOL is no exception. In this case, the adapta.r.ion 

• of the Gemini as a crew-transportation spacecraft, the incorporation of redundant features in the laboratory and the 

advantage of previous NASA experience will yield high 

assurance of safe operation. 

41. Will not MOL meet many of the objectives being planned for the NASA 

Extended Apollo Program? 

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41 (Cont 7 d) 

Answer: The MOL is a DOD program to meet specific defense 

needs. If it can conizibute to any important non-defense 

scientific objectives, this will be jointly worked out by 

NASA and the DOD. Priority will be given to the DOD 

needs. This is anal: ,,,7,us to the NASA Gemini program 

which carries Air experiments,with priority given, of 

course, to the NASA objectives. 

42. How will MOL crews be trained and selected? 

Answer: The Air Force will be responsible for the training. 

Current training techniques will be applicable to a 

significant extent. Considerable specialized knowledge 

and skills will be needed, however, and the training 

program will be augmented to include them. 

43. Who will be in charge of the 3.\.10L program? 

Answer: The Air Force will manage the MOL through a program 

office similar to the arrangement for other large programs. 

Details will be furnished later. 

44. What technical experiments will be performed? 

Alternate Answer: The following ex:in- „re omtative: Space structures 

technology, cornm—, c . 3115 e,iuipment, guidance and navigation and extra-vc.]i.cular equipment. 

Proposed Answer: The details are classified. 

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45. To what extent will the A.poilo tracking and control facilities be 

used in the MOL Program? 

Answer: MOL will use t:• i.;itieswherever possiblG 

and acceptable I fc,:r direct support or 

stand-by needs. tails a.L•e not yet worked out. 

To what extent will existing DOD satellite control facilities be 

used? Will additions or modifications be made? 

Answer: All of the existing Satellite Control Facility, with its 

center at Sunnyvale„ California, will support MOL. 

In some cases, augmentation which is already planned 

will apply to the MO. E.,. A naodest amount of further 

addition and alteration will be needed. 

47. Will any new stations be needed? 

• Answer: We do not foresee at this time the need for any. 

48. Will the new systems of NASA and DOD, which combir.,•: 

tracking, data and communication functions, both be suitable for 

Answer: The two systems are basically compatible. 

49. What special training for MOL astronauts is planned? 

Answer: The MOL astrci-,:lu'cs will receive a basic training 

program. This will be followed by detailed training 

with the specific ecuipments planned for launch, 

orbital support; mission. experiments and recovery. 

50. What type of power sources are under consideration for the MOL? 

Answer: Fuel cells, nuclear reactor and isotope power supplies 

have been studied. The planned mission duration of 

MOL for 30 days favors the fuel cell type of system. 

Specific conclusions on this matter will be reached during 

Phase I. 

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51. Will public information arrangements for the personal stories 

of MOL astronauts permit the type of private contractual arrangements 

which have been entered into by NASA astronauts? 

Answer: It is general policy within the Department of Defense 

and the Air Force to encourage its personnel to write 

for publication, and in fact, many Air Force officer 

and civilian personnel do write for profit. The restrictions that apply are ess three in number: 

First, private literary effor:; :Teas t be accomplished 

during off-duty hours. Secoi..d; all material on military 

subjects must be sabniittec: review for accuracy, 

propriety, and security, and for clearance by the 

Department of Defense. Finally, the author may not 

use information from a privileged source or on an exclusive basis. In t.-:;0 case of MOL, any proposed arrangement would ,,ubject to prior approval of theDepartment of Defen,Je. 

52. Since the peaceful nature of the manned space program has been 

continually emphasized, would you not expect that the initiation of a 

manned military program would be regarded as a change in national 

policy with regard to space? 

Answer: The introduction of a man into an established and well 

known Department of Defense space program does not 

indicate, as such, a significant change in the nature of 

the nation's over-all space program. The purpose of 

MOL is the investigation and development of manned 

orbital capabilities essential to the national defense. 

It should be noted that MOL is a laboratory: It"investigates" and "develops." The same has been true of a 

number of DOD space projects; whether they are manned 

or unmanned is cot as imporLant as the fact that they are 

all in the mainstream of a coatircaing U. S. military 

space program. 

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52. If the purpose of MOL is for experiments, why cannot the orbits 

available from launches at Cape Kennedy be employed for these experiments? 

Answer: We anticipate launching from both Cape Kennedy and 

WTR. Orbits of high inclination enable us to collect 

flight data from all space regions -- north and south 

as well as east and west. Representative of the types 

of data to be collected are: radiation measurements, 

comnitulicatien .:0er.Lena, meteorological data and 

micron-ieteorite e, -ements. 

In view of the military secs.;:i.ty covering the MOL program, ,,:ve.a.t 

if any, do you plan to take to assure the international communiey 

'nat.-there is not a hidden aggressive intent in the initiation and development of this program? 

Answer: On October 17, 1963, the United States government joined 

the United Nations General Assembly in adopting by acclamation a resolution calling upon all States "to refrain 

from placing in orbit areueci the earth any objects carrying 

nuclear weapons c r any cifte r kinds of weapons of mas: 

destruction, installing e..apons on celestial borel.e,:e. 

or stationing such we:ape:IL- :later space in 

The international cornmeuvAy ehould continuo in its 

assurance that the United States has no plan to de\ee. 

from this position which it su,-iported strongly :[or 

years before its U. N. adoption and which 

be a milestone in progress toward peace. No 

assurance should be necessary. 

54. Does this mean that the ?VIOL is not a "weapon system" in the usual 

connotation? 

Answer: MOL is not a weapon :system. 

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55. Is MOL a reconnaissance program? 

Answer: As pointed out before, MOL is an experimental program in 

which the activities are identified best as investigating, 

testing and developing. 

56. Is the basic purpose of MOL to investigate and develop a space 

intelligence system, reputed to be a major element in the DOD space program? 

Answer: The identification of MOL as a development program is 

correct. As stated before, it will include experiments 

to determine man's utility in a military role. 

57. What is the reason for the DOD policy against discussing intelligence 

or reconnaissance? 

Answer: The reason should be obvious. 

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58. You have announced that Douglas and the GE Company are teamed 

as associate contractors. Why was this don.e;what are their responsibilities? 

Answer: As more detailed investigation t i MOL capabilities has 

evolved, it became increasin ;:parent that because of 

the importance and complexity of the MOL program, it was 

in the government's interest to divide the MOL laboratory 

vehicle tasks into two parts. One would deal primarily with 

the overall orbital vehicle,' integration and test and the 

design, development and fabrication of the laboratory vehicle, 

which together with Ll-,e Gemini B and T-III transtage form the 

orbital vehicle. Ths:,.:::ond major task is the design and 

development of various experiments and the incorporation 

of these equipments into the experiments module of the 

laboratory vehicle. Due to the differences in the two types 

of tasks, DAC and GE have been teamed as associates to 

perform these two tasks. 

59. What are the orbiting components of the MOL? 

Answer: The orbital vehicle 170r the Manned Orbiting Laboratory is 

composed of the reentry capsule, a modified Gemini, provided by the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation; the laboratory 

vehicle to be provided by the associate team of DAC and GE 

and the T-III transtage, provided by the T-III Martin 

team. 

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