ARTMfNT IitH', ~r§1( 1· J~\.-1:: 

OFFICE OF S!ECR/ET A/RV 

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 20330 

Nov~mber 14, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PLANS & OPERATIONS 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 

>)»>~))}--)'DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, ,SYSTEMS . & LOGISTICS 

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL. 

COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE 

SUBJECT: Limitations on Release of Information Concerning 

Weapon Systems 

The attached study was recently forwarded to General 

Hogan by a major command information officer for consideration 

and any action deemed appropriate. I think the study makes 

some cogent points. Its conclusions and recommendations 

\ appear to be both feasible and sound from a functional information standpoint. 

Coincidentally, the subject of possible realignment of 

Air Force secur_ity and policy review procedures has come up 

in relation to other apsects of the public information function. 

Both the Directorate of Security Review, OASD(PA), and the 

Sec~etary of the Air Force h~ve indicated active interest in 

this area. We have informed the Secretary that our study of 

this subject is expected co produce so · :::..c: recommendations ~ _... 

by the end of this 

However, since .s~ .. , ::eco,:'.l.11e::: 

will impact in your functioLlal 

have the benefit of your thi~ki. 

upon which '::::, base our recommenc.. 

.ons w~ ~:~imately make 

~ it is ~.?erative we 

_n:ior to ..:-,-:: . . ~::.ng any judgment 

-~ons to ~~2 Secretary. 

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Therefore, request you review the attached study and 

forward your comments by December 3, 1969. Please comment 

as extensively as you wish, w1T'hl;Jartic'uiar attention to the 

study's conclusions and recommendations. Our project officer 

is Mr. James R. Newton, SAFOIPD, Extension 79835 or 74065. 

1 Attachment 

Study 

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THOMAS P. COLEMAN 

Brigadier General~ USAF 

Deputy .Director of Infonnation 

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sumer, Limitations on Release of Information Concerning Weapons Systems 

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PROBLEM 

1. Severe limitations on release of information about new weapons systems 

prevent their importance being fully appreciated by the public and Congress. 

This reduces survivability in economic and/ or politica_l exigencies. 

FACTORS 

2. Some really promising U.S. Air Force weapons systems have died in 

anonymity -- their need, capabilities and potential practically unknown by 

the public, Congress, and\in some instances, the people i:!'l the Air Force. 

This has been in part due to high classification including the incre~sing 

use of the special access category on new weapons systems. There seems 

to be overkill in thjs area yet there is no apparent security problem. On 

the other hand, it is agreed throughout the Air Force, there is a very grave 

problem of urgently needed weapons systems beind slipped or canceled. The 

reason for this is certainly in part lack of understanding of their need and 

importance. The extent of understanding is proportionate to- the amount of 

information that is made available about s·ystems. '~ 

Skybolt, Dynasoa:t;:;_ and some others have gone down the tube. Most ....:---

rec,ently ~OL, on which Air For,ce placed major hope,s for an expanded space 

mission was lost. Administration or DOD policy and budget considerations 

are'often responsible. But, there is some reason to believe the Air Staff, 

the Air Force system of security, some ,:,£ the· R&D agencies and the SPOs 

on occasion have a role in t:f-::, :oss of w.--:.1,pons systems as well as in their 

creation. As aptly sta'.:ec · ., ,_ contemp .. ::·ary paper, democracy simply doesn't 

wvrk if the people do no:. -· . .::...,.::; ~he esser: .. -i.al facts. The essential facts need 

not include details that ,, -~lct constitute legitimately classified information. 

It would appear some ;:;E..:c·~cus si:uciy of lthe matter by USAF and action if and 

as indicated is in order. 

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DOD REGULATION S5200.13 

In the early 1 60s Dr. Charyk was given responsibility by Mr. 

McNamara for drawing up a security policy for military space programs. 

The drafts of the policy indicated a complete blackout of all classified 

information would result as well as a blackout 0£ me:ani.ngiul unclasoHied 

information. 

With the Ai.r Force seeking space mission capability :recognition, 

under this regulation it was simply not possible. The regulation effectively 

prevented recognition of space accomplishment by any sex:vice and credit 

for weapons systems developed. It destroyed the identity of the latter. 

Perhaps the most unfortunate overall effect was to make it practically 

impossible for the American people to learn anything of Consequence 

from official sources about the military potential in space and the· 

hardware required for space defense. 

Strenuous objections by SAFOI-X and P to the rigid blanket provisions 

of this regulation were ignored and it was subsequently published. It is 

secret so its provisions are not subject to open examination. Its classification prevents most people from knowing of its existence. 

Today much, if not most, of the information the regulation sought 

to protect has been put in the public realm by unofficial sources since 

its publication seven years ago. Detailed stories about secret, limited 

access space projects have appeared in numerous news and space publication, Many technologies requiring some protection initially have 

become obsolete or it is known the Soviets have cognizance. 

Orie undesirable purpose served by ;;:;~,; _ ,:'?'-:',.::ion I s blanket blackout 

.effect today is to prevent official i.nfor1. ... :Gac1.;.::1 o::: vital military space 

activity from reaching the public. It limits their knowledge to unofficial 

often distorted or inaccurate information and effectively prevents · 

authorities in military space systems from explaining the p::obable role 

of space weapons in futur~ wars to the public. 

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SECURITY CLASSI.FICA TION GUIDE SYSTEM 

Even without the DOD Policy S5200, the Security Classification 

Guide System of the Air Force as it presently functions, can in many 

instances effectively prevent the democratic process of public opinion 

ahd congressional reaction thJreto. It can even keep a vast majority 

of responsible Air Force people from knowledge of systems on which 

.the'future of the Air Force and nation may depend. 

It is understood the Security Classification Guide is prepared 

primarily by the SPO of each new weapon system. This is clone ea:rly I 

in the development process and has the effect of enumerat'ing in detail 

every aspect of the system to be classified and the degree of classification. 

The SPO has more or less autonomous authority over what goes into the 

Security Classification Guide. He can arbit;rarily establish a classification 

of secret without other agencies or requireme:pts having a voice in the· 

tnatter. He can also be the prime factor in spe1cial access category 

being established. 

Whatever he decides, the Air Force normally abides by. ,IC1sa:'"{a.cl 

tha.t. the· higherthe· .. classification '.and•·fewer· the_:a.ct:::~-~ ~ ·.!.h.~,:_saf..~r ~~-h.e,_pr,Qgta:ru 

d.s .irom outside ·obse·rvatfon:·:·meddli:ng~:and ·criticism7 Also, of course, 

the mo·rct·securejt;i.s·;.~.the .. 1e:s.s~~th~~-,P.:~8:i:iS-t-;.congres·s·::aria:the~;re·st.oLtheAix.;:£bi c e:. kno·w- a tiou:c:uJ · 

A sufficiently tight security classification guide such as on MOL in 

concert with DOD Regulation S5200. 13, effectively prevents any normal 

democratic public opinion effect or public information support. With no 

public knowledge of a system or the need for it, cancellation can happen 

, suddeniy_, without public or congressional objection or regrets. 

(Som eth f ng-tha 1: ·:c10-es n ! 'f'cxr s t'it.Cthe:pu b lfC.::mtn.a-~ will -:never:r::.bEr~m is s e d r 

If security is so tight, only a few in the Air Force know about it, then 

those few can't support it and the rest the Air Force knows nothing 

about it anyway. It becomes a matter lC'~ serious deliberation in the case 

of MOL, for example, if _it would be b1:.:.:. ~o have a little less security 

and more chance of the system becc reality. 

Because MOL was cancelled ab::uptly withou~ corr.,pt...::.::ti.on, one is led 

to questior .. i{ its real importance to the 1~~ation jtisti.fied t::c almost unprecedented blackout 0£ news on\it which to .an important degree probably contributed t,:, its demise. At least it's clear the civilian authorities did not 

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share the Air Force's opinion of its importance, The carefully planned 

publicity program surrounding NASA ts manned space station project i.s 

the direct anti.thesis of that of the Air Force 1 s MOL project. In time 

son1e interesting conclusions may be drawn £ rom relative comparisons 

of these similar projects. 

It is not intended to suggest the end of the Security Class_ification 

Guide system. But, rather to point out there are other considerations 

besides the SP01 s opinion that should be weighed in framing ·the guides, 

considerations for which some overcautious mission dedicated SPOs 

have demonstrated little aptitude to judge and which they have been often 

pro·ne to overlook. It would appeai: unless the Security Classification 

Guides are changed so the need and purpose of selected space systems 

can be explained that they will never be competitive with non-military 

systems. • 

It is recognized there are occasional systems where .compelling . 

sensitivity will require a virtual blackout. But, these are probably the 

exception rather than the rule. 

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AIR FORCE CLEARANCE PROCEDURES 

Finally, the opini.on and judgmental factors applied at lower levels 

in clearance procedhres currently in effect within t'hc Secretary's office 

and Air Staff should be reexamined. In addition to thi.s, specchwritcrs 

0£ 'high 1•at'i.ldng Alr Fo·rco of'f'i.dalo some times take spoechon directly 

to DOD. DOD is understandably reluctant to edit these unles3 absolutely 

necessary. Therefore new informat5on is cleared some times that the 

Air Staff, especially at working and project officer level, is not aware o!. 

It follows in such circumstances when a speech from.a senior officer in 

the field is subm~tted to the Air Staff important new information previously 

cleared by DOD can be and has been cut out before the speech is even 

submitted to DOD. Presumably if the Air Staff cuts it out DOD won't 

put it back in. 

, A case in point may be seen i.n 0TH radar. Even mention of this 

by'name was deleted in the Air Staff for security poli~y from an ADC 

General officer's speech at a time when it was being publicly discussed 

by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force. A more 

recent case - - in an ADC General's speech a quote of Secretary of Defense 

Laird that the Soviets' military budget exceeded ours by 4 to l was approved 

but the number of Soviet satellites passing over Texas was deleted, In 

another General1 s speech, the budget ratio quote of 4 to l was deleted but 

the number of Soviet satellites passing over the U.S. was approved. 

It would appear in the former example, some one "hadn1t got the word" 

and in the latter there was a difference in judgment and opinion between 

individuals • 

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CONCLUSION 

3, The information restrictions on military weapons systems, 

especially space systems, must be eased. In event they _are not, it 

appears these systems may never be competitive with civilian projects 

of a similar nature. 

In a democracy, expenditures of vast sums of public money, have 

to be explained and justified, Civilian projects on which the processes 

of public information can operate ~ot only without restriction but aggressively 

and system'3⁄4ti.cally in their behalf are Hkcly to be succoas{u1. 

Military projects which are shrouded with secrecy to an extent their 

real need cannot be explained are not likely·to be successfully carried out. 

This is especially true in the present climate.of public opinion and the 

foreseeable rigid economies in the years ahead, 

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

4. The Secretary of the Air Force ask the Secretary of Defense to request \ 

a review of the seven year old DOD Regulation S52_00. 13 to determine its 

.validity in t~e light of different U.S. space policies and current information 

available on the Soviet Military Space Program. Also with a view to its 

consistency with his stated policies on informing the public about military 

matters. 

That Security Classification Guides on all priority Air Force weapons 

systems be reviewed by a joint panel of R&D, Information, Security and/ 

L&JJ authorities with the object of downgrading to unclassified all infor- 1-

·mation that cannot be justified as classified. 

The instructions on preparation of Security Classification Guides be 

amended to require a maximum amount of information be unclassified 

consistent with legitimate security and the individual responsible for 

preparation cf: :. guide to 11 show cause" when a security classification is 

assigned or special access category requested. The Security Classification 

Guide should state information sent fo:.: ~·2:v:.2!:w within AFSC may be submitted sir:, '·aneously to SAFOI. I 

..__The Office of Air Force Security Rrqview be g~ven an active rather than 

passive role. It should be established as _the top Air Force authority on 

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DOD cleared information and should maintain and update daily a file of 

cleared n1atcri.al on all important items of Air Force information interest. 

SAFOIS should make final review for Air Force prior to submission of 

material to DOD and should normally be empowered to overrule Secretarial 

and Air Staff agenci.hs seeking changes more restrictive than current 

DOD Security Review policieo require~ 

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