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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McMILLAN

SUBJECT: NSAM 311 - KH-4, KH-6 rage of Cuba

Concerning our recent conversation on the above subject, I wish to

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reiterate ,(largely as a means of confirmingAthe re-establishment of a

K11-6 launch capability) my understanding of the variousgactoriP involved.

I believe this re-statement will also assist in maintaining the consistency

of further discussions which you or I may have with the Deputy Secretary

of Defense on this matter.

Regarding the status and capability of the KH-6 satellite reconnaissance system:

Operations. We can launch a westbound KH-6 from the Western

Test Range in 6 months from "go. " The KH-6 can be launched at the ideal

coverage inclination angle of 24°. It will make two reconnaissance passes

over Cuba every day at (optimal cloud-free) 0930 and 1100 hours local.

Logistics and Costs: The KH-6 system is not in the scheduled

inventory today. Five payloads are available and can be prepared for

flight (ATLAS-AGENA boosted) f ad-time for additional

KH-6 payloads is 12 months. A -6's are priced at ipipch (produced, launched, tracked). With forecast reliao , 5 K11-6's would be required per year at a cost

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liar argument" over relative

priorities which would face us each time launch of either the KH

capability will "preclude

OP SEC

Cuban Coverage: One KH-6 mission will cover Cuba completely

four times, producing a monthly average of 94% cloud-free coverage at a

nominal resolution of 5 feet.

Bonus Coverage: Dependent upon launch angle selected, the

KII-6 could be programmed to cover targets in South China between 24°-34°

North and 240 -34° South latitude. Approximately 130 of the 468 priority

targets in China could be covered (as a bonus to Cuban coverage) by the

KH-6 system launched at an inclination angle of 340.

Based on the information above, I must confess that re-vitalization

of the KH-6 appears to me to offer a readily available satellite system, at

a reasonable cost, which could be resurrected and maintained for use in

contingency situations (assuming inability to continue use of the U-2 overflights) such as we might face again in Cuba. I believe that the KH-6

solution is more acceptable than the thought of placing a number of

KH- n standby for such contingencies, primarily because launching o 6 would not directly conflict with priority commitments of

the KH- stems for coverage of Sino/Soviet bloc targets. As I

summer during our conversation: establishing a KH-6 launch

Dania villp

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was considered against what could be an equally serious problem, but one

which had not yet previously been validated as a national priority requirement.

From our discussions, I appreciate that the KH-6 could not be

re -estabrished as an instant solution to this problem; that further effort,

lead time and funding would be involved. However, I believe this system

has definite merit for use as outlined above and I solicit your assistance

in bringing to the attention of the Deputy Secretary of Defense the contributions which the ICH-6 could make if we are forced to employ alternative

means for conducting reconnaissance of such targets as Cuba.

As I indicated during our discussion on this subject, as the opportunity presents itself, I will also attempt to convince Mr. Vance that

revitalization of the /CH-6 program is very definitely in the national

interest.

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