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• 26 Feb 1976

.COMMENTS ON THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

GENERAL COMMENTS 

The National Reconnaissance Office is included in the

Executive Order of 18 February 1976 under the heading of "special

offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of

specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs."

Unlike many intelligence organizations, the NRO has not been

chartered by a National Security' Council Intelligence Directive,

but is covered by a joint DOD-CIA Agreement. It appears most

appropriate to update the NRO organizational framework by

publication of a classified charter, signed by the Committee

on Foreign Intelligence. The NRO will prepare a draft of this

document. As a corollary action, the NRO will draft a revision

to DOD Directive 5105.23 which identifies the NRO within the

DOD and levies requirements to support the NRP.

Given the NRO will be covered by a charter type document,

it seems desirable that the implementing provisions of the

charter be covered by a Committee on Foreign Intelligence

Directive (p.m. This mechanism could provide some of the

details of implementation not appropriate for a charter document

and could more easily be changed to reflect changes in the

intelligence community management structure. As the NRO

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proceeds with the draft of a charter a.suitable CFID will

also be proposed.-:..—

One of the key documents which implements the policy

that satellite reconnaissance activities will be conducted

only by the National Reconnaissance Office is the memorandum •

signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Rush, titled "Department

of Defense Satellite-Borne Earth Sensing and Space Shuttle

Planning Activities," dated 17 October 1972. This memorandum

will be updated in consonance with the revision of other

documents noted above.

The term "special activities" is used in the Executive

Order to mean covert actions which are not related to satellite

reconnaissance. There may be a tendency to confuse this with

"special offices," which does refer to the NRO. It may be

worthwhile to provide a clearer distinction in preparing

implementing documents.

5. Section 5 of the Executive Order covers domestic surveillance. There are implications in this regard for engineering

operations; system testing and system exercising used by both

photographic and SIGINT NRO satellite collectors. It appears

that these activities must be clearly defined and discussed

with the Attorney General for the purpose of obtaining

authorization to continue our testing operations. The NRO

is preparing the necessary position papers.

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6. The Executive Order calls for amendment of existing

NSCIDs. An action flitiiiior the NRO is to work closely with

participating organizations to assure that changes to the

NSCIDs do not impact adversely on the National Reconnaissance

Office.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS 

Page 4, Sec 3, para (a)(3). It is presumed that the CFI

provides the data to the NSC for the semi-annual review called

for in this paragraph. If not, procedures should be specified

in the various organizations to use in furnishing the information

themselves.

Page 5, Sec 3, para b(2)(A). Recognizing that the CFI

will replace the NRP ExCom, this paragraph would make it

appropriate for OMB to no longer participate in an "ExCom

advisory" role. In the past, OMB has participated in detailed

programmatic reviews of the NFIP. It would appear appropriate,

in light of the responsibilities specified for the au, that

OMB now assume strictly a budget allocation function adjudicating

between the major elements of the President's Budget. Procedures for operating relations with OMB are needed.

3. Page 5, Sec 3, para b(2)(B). The rules established for

reprogrammihg should be in consonance with the desires of

the Congressional Appropriation Oversight Committees; however,

above threshold reprogramming action in R&D or

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In Procurement funds) within' specific program

elements of the .budget or new starts in excess of

total cost should be handled on an informal notif ation basis.'

with the Congressional staffs following CPI approval.

4. Page 6, Sec 3, para b12)(B)(IV). While the Executive

Order establishes that the CFI will not be responsible for

tactical intelligence, there is much overlap with national

intelligence. Briefly, the relationships between the two

should be expressed in the following way:

National - The support of U.S. national security policy

(foreign policy plus military policy) in such areas as indications and warning/crisismonitoring, monitoring international

agreements and compliance with their provisions, development

of economic assessments, monitor changing military posture,

force strength, and introduction of new weapons systems.

Tactical - The support of U.S. military operations

requiring timely indications and warning of attack, the size,

disposition, and capabilities of opposing strategic and tactical

forces and their support facilities, and the production of maps

for military purposes.

There exists little difference between the tactical or

national intelligence data, the differences are only in the

application. Clearly many organic resources of the-services

support tactical force elements. However, the overlap of

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common data is so all encompassing in the case of the NRP,

that to the degreert4ate. Satellite systems can support tactical

intelligence it should be funded and developed within the NRP,

with management oversight by the CPI. In meeting the national

needs, the NRP can meet many of the tactical needs especially'

with improvements in timeliness and frequency of coverage.

Within the context of the defined national role, timeliness

is not as critical a parameter in comparison to data quality.

The basic issue yet to be squarely addressed by the

Community is--What degree should the NRP modify its current

and projected efforts in support of tactical requirements,

and what would be the resultant implications?

S. Page 8, Sec 3, para (d)(iv). If the DCI truly is to fulfill this task, procedures must be established to provide

full access to military intelligence. Without substantive,

output from DOD, he will be insulated by the Community from

an essential need. This appears to be an historic and continuing

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-problem area.

6. Page 10, Sec 3, para (d)(1)(xi). This paragraph provides

that the DCI acts as the principal spokesman to the Congress

for the foreign intelligence community. It would seem appropriate that'each head of an intelligence organization be the

principal witness for the defense of his program. It is suggested that this matter be further expanded upon in implementing

documents.

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Page 10, Sec 3, para (d)(1)(xiv). Assuming this will

replace this existthrbtIi . mechanism procedures should be

established to provide the Services with a more substantive

opportunity for input.

Page 11, Sec 4. This section provides for detailed imple-

• mentation of the Executive Order to include classified documents.

The NRO will prepare a BYEMAN document to implement the provisions of the Executive Order and to recognize the position

of the NRP in the new intelligence community arena.

Page 12, Sec 4, para (a). There needs to be a definition

of "senior officials" in the various departments and agencies.

Within the Department of Defense, for example, who are the

"senior officials"--it is assumed that the Director of the

NRO is considered in this category.

Page 12, Sec 4, para (a)(1). Recognizing that the DCI

does not have a responsibility for tactical intelligence

programs, there is still a need to disseminate tactical data

to many members of the intelligence community. This paragraph,

which refers to maximum efficiency, may provide the framework

for integrating tactical data flow with national level intelligence

when appropriate.

11. Page 14, Sec 4, para (b)(1). The CIA is given a responsibility to produce and disseminate foreign military' intelligence.

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This is an obvious overlap with DIA and.the military services

intelligence functivrwe:r Although this is not necessarily

all bad, there needs to be a further clarification of the role

or limitations of CIA military intelligence collection.

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