HANDLE VI-' 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN' 

WHITE PAPER ON CRISIS RECONNAISSANCE 

INTRODUCTION. 

Within recent months high level concern has been expressed about 

the capability of the NRO satellite reconnaissance program to provide the 

responsiveness and flexibility required for crisis management. This 

concern is certainly justified when one considers the inherent limitations 

in the flexibility and capability of the projected pt'ogram to meet potential 

( special or crisis needs. A frequently recurring question which has surfaced as a result of this concern is 11How can the NRO respond to crisis 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

situations 1nore effectively? n The purpose of this paper is to answer that 

r.: 

question by outlining an approach which will provide a responsive, economical, and timely crisis reconnaissance capability. This approach is oriented 

towards providing an interim capability to fill the gap until a near-real-time 

system is ready. 

BACKGROUND. 

For many years there has been a community-wide interest in 

obtaining quick-return imagery, particularly from areas in crisis. Prior 

HAl'fDlf VIA 

BYEMAN 

co--.rnoL SVS1(M 

TOP SECRET [)CCLUDEO FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

000 DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C05134222>, .,. ·· · 

CONTROL NO ______ _ 

COPY ___ OF ___ COPIES 

PAGE __ l __ Of ___ PAGES 
TOP SEeRET HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

to July 1969, the NRO investigated. a variety of a;pproaches to this problem. 

The primary solutions resulted in providing two recovery vehicles for the 

photographic satellites and maintaining tbe CORONA on a one-day alert 

status. Neitl ~r the option of early recovery nor the quick reaction of ll, 

CORONA were exercised, regardl':lss of the crisis climate. 

In July 1969, USIE approved intelligence requirements for a near- 11 

real-tilne (NRT) imagery satellite system which would have a multi-purpose 

mission to include crisis reporting. The long lead time solid state array 

system was t;:,_ilored to this requirement, with the GAlvlBIT approaches under 

study as possible inexpensive alternatives. 

In the summer of 1970, the Middle East crisis brought the is sue of 

crisis response imagery into very critical focus. Dr. Kissinger requested 

Mr. Helms to determine how we could increase our ph0tographic satellite 

coverage for special situations in other parts of the world. Mr. Cline of 

State (in a letter to Mr. Helms) expressed concern ove1.· the increasing lack 

of flexibility of the NRO satellite reconnaissance program and the 5-6 years 

lead time prior to availability of crisis imagery. This letter tr.iggered a 

COMIREX study, "Outlook for Photographic Satellite Reconnaissance, 

FY-1971 and Beyond, 11 and a DIA/SAC study, ''Analysis of Potential Contributions to Intelligence Problems by Near-Real-Time Satellite Imagery 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD OIRECTlVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C05134222 

coNTRo, •o Internal COPY ___ OF ___ COPIES 

PAGE 2 or ___ PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C05134222 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN 

(OHTROL SYSTEM 

Systems. 11 Most recently, the COMIREX Ad Hoc Crisis Analysis Task 

Group has been formed to do an in-depth study of the needs for near-realtime imagery (to update and amplify the July 1969 NRT requirement), and 

to examine the needs fer an interim crisis response satellite system. 

Tb.is group presented its interim report to COMfREX on 21 January 1971. 

At this time, both State and DIA have formally recommender!. 

consideration of an interim NR T imagery system, and both the DIA/ SAC 

and COMIREX work have combined to form the basis for modification to 

the July 1969 USIB NRT requirement which will soon be distributed. 

Following is a summary of the portions of the projected requirement which 

pertain to a crisis response capability. 

a. Image Quality: Two to three-foot ground resolution 

distance (GRD).1 fwelve-inch GRD may be required for tactical ~--~ 

utility. In some cases GRD up to 15 feet may be useful.) 

b. Field of View: Ground coverage of 15,000 to 20,000 feet 

on a side (adequate for most installations). Area coverage of 85 x 50 

nautical miles (sufficient for most key areas\. Additionally, lines of 

communication having widths of approximately 5 nautical miles and varying 

lengths up to hundreds of nautical miles. 

c. Continuity and Target Access: Capability to provide continuous daily access to crisis areas for periods of at least one month 

H/\NDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

+OP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRAO!NG 

D00 DIRECTIVE 5200,10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C05134222' 

co•r•o• •o __ In_te_r_n_a"""l __ 

COPY ___ OF ___ COPl£S 

PAGE _ __,__ OF ___ flAGES 
TSP SEeRIT HI.HOU; V1A 

BYEMAN 

(critical periods examined thus far range from sever2,l days tu two months). 

Desirable to hav 

d. Imagery Return Times: (Imaging to viewing) Lesi; than 

12 hours desired. (In some cases times of one to several days would be 

acceptable.) 

e. Crisis Frequency: From an analysis of critical situations 

occurring during the last several years, it appears that an average of 

approximatdy eight incidents per year might arise which would require 

crisis area imagery coverage. 

DISCUSSION. 

We have examined the crisis response problem at frequent intervals 

during the past several years. One fact that has been consistently evident 

is that quantity, responsiveness, timeliness, quality, and continuity are all 

essential ingredients in formulating and rating satisfaction of crisis intelligence needs. Our studies have indicated that no one single system can 

adequately emphasize all these ingredients because of ·sechnical trade-offs. 

We believe your action should be as follows to satisfy the current 

crises needs. Initiate immediately, with ExCom1 s approval on 29 January, 

a two-pronged and parallel approach. First, optimize cur existing resources 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SECRET EXCWOEO f'ROM AtJTOMATtC REGRADING 

000 OHlECTIY E 52 00 t O DOES NOT A-P.PLV 

CONTROL nu ______ _ 

COPlf ___ ,,. ___ coPIE'SPAG,, 4 
1 Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C05134222 

HANDLE VIA 

TOP SE6RET BYEMAN 

for crisis use without interfering with the satisfaction of USIB standing 

requirements. Secondly, introduce an interim dedicated system which 

is optimized for the satisfaction of crisis requirements. These two 

parallel efforts are described below. 

a. Existing Resources. 

In the near term, a more favorable capability for crisis 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

response can be achieved from available photo-satellite systems. The 

basis for this capability would be a somewhat accelerated launch schedule 

which would enhancE. crisis response by p1·oviding a collection capability 

well in excess of USIB standing requirements. With requirements satisfaction near 100 percent, early return of a film capsule fo-r crisis imagery 

should be acceptable to the intelligence commu:..1.ity. 

Based on the estimated development time for an inte.rim crisis 

response sy.;1tem of 20 to 24 months, the increased frequency of launches 

would extend from Feb:n.:..a:-cy 1971 thro1,1gh the end of June 1973. _Based on 

present and currently p.:i:.qjected procurement, five CORQN:Ats, twelve . . . . 

GAMBIT' s and eleven HEXAGON' s. sho1,;i.ld be available for faun.ch in this '. ,' .. ,.' ·:, ", :,'" - ::.. '· :-:>·: .,' .' ·. . '-, ,. ', ,' - :, . . .._ , 

timeframe. · These.·figui~s r~flect th~ CO~C;N'Ars.~tl h?:nd; tli; GAM.BIT's ~ .. ,:. ,.. . .. ·, -: :> /.. ,., .··> '.. .-. ' . . ' 

veh:idle, -_ and the a.ntrdpated_B'.EXAGON 

:;_,:1,unch rat'3 plus 
.Approved for Release: 2022/02/.10 C05134222: 

HA.NOLE I/IA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM 

launch from December 1970 to March/April 1971. Taking into account 

the planned increases in GAMBIT mission life, the above resources would 

yield 719 days on orbit, amounting to 81" 5 percent of the calendar p,; riod. 

The average gap between missions would be six days. If HEXAGON can 

achieve its 45-day design life by the seventh launch (second block of 

procurement), the corresponding figures would be 779 days on orbit, 

88. 4 percent of the calendar period, and an average of less than four days 

between missions. An optimum launch schedule would require some 

aC:ditional analysis and would require continual update to reflect standing 

require:.nents satisfaction and contingencies. 

b. Interim Crisis System. 

Introduce a relatively inexpensive system which is designed 

to provide data return via an RF link. Such a system avoids the penalties 

associated with early return of the recovery vehicle while at the same time 

providing improved continuity and more rapid (daily) return of imagery. 

A number of crisis reconnaissance designs have been 

proposed with a range of performance and cost figures. All proposals have 

in common the use o:fa panoramic>camera system because of the need for 

a11 area ,overage ca:rability a.s typified by the Suez Cease Fire Zone situation • 

. CONTROL·~ . Inte rrta.1 

pproved for Release: 2022/02/10 C0513422 
N 

EM 

OO!l CllRFC:TIVF "ii?OO tn f"lfH."c;; 1.1r,"1' .11.00,v 

Approved for Release: 2022/02/1 o cos 1. 3422_2 

tt.i.NOlE VIA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN 

This class of system h;:i,s been studied sufficiently to 

allow the NRO to proceed directly into system definition. A period of 

60-90 days would be required to select the optimum configuration with 

consideration being given to various launch modes, such as HEXAGON 

surplus MINUTEMAN, or aircraft. The resolution versus 

system complexity trade would also be examined during this period to 

arrive at a best resolution without unduly complicating the design. 

Following the 60 to 90 day period we would be prepared to start system 

acquisition. The PV',, 'm could be operational in 20 to 24 months from a 

go-ahead decision" 

EVALUATION. 

The Table at the attachment provides background data on the 

proposed actions. One can say with confidence that a system approach 

should approximate the optimum desired, but not necessarily achieve it 

because of the diminishing marginal returns associated with pressing for 

given increments of effectiveness. This leads to the conclusion that it is 

CONTROL SYST04 

not possil.JJ.e to build a "low cost11 crisis reconnaissance system that provides 

HEXAGON and better quality and substantial area. coverage along with daily 

return of data. However, it is possible to trade-9££ some resolution and 

HANDLE V\A CONTROL No. __ I ... n.,..t=e_r,._..,na=--1.___ 

BYEMAN 

'•coNTROL ·svSTE!-1 

/ 
Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C05134222 

TOP SECRET 

acquire a dedicated responsive system which allows prompt data return. 

Interaction of this data with that from other sources of intelligence 

(SIG INT, HUMlNT, or open source materials} should provide the inf ormation base necessary for a confident assessment of the crisis situation. 

The SIGINT contribution should be significantly increased ,:vith the introBYEMAN ( JN1ROL S VS Tf.lloll 

duction of By observing the table, it 

is evident that a considerable capability can be achieved by maximizing 

the days on-orbit with CORONA's, GAMBIT's, and HEXAGON1 s during the 

interim time it takes to acquire a crisis dedicated system. 

One advantage of the dedicated system approach is the distinct 

possibility that the product derived could be disseminated as declassified 

data which appears to be much in demand during a crisis situation. Additionally, introduction of this system into the environment willes.ercise the 

decision making process prior to arrival of the near-real-time system. 

HA.NOLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

' ' ' 

TOP ·sEGREl . .· • ticd11~io • ril~,l ~~fa~:..:ric .#~~~~"IN~ ; .. · •··• . . . , !IQO iiincl1Vfl2;,~;\o DOE$ ~QlmLY •. • •. 

,;Approved for Release: 2022/02/10 C05134222i 

Internal 

,,:_(;-OH.TROl HO._-'-------