### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 10-60224

BILLY ALLEN MCCAMEY,
Petitioner - Appellee

v.
CHRISTOPHER B. EPPS, COMMISSIONER, MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JIM HOOD, Attorney General of the State of Mississippi,
Respondents - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge: Following his conviction for a meth-related offense, Billy Allen McCamey

e x hausted his state remedies on claims that he did not knowingly an d
i n t e l ligently waive conflict-free counsel or an impartial jury. The federal magistrate judge, however, conducted its own evidentiary hearing and granted
the writ. Based on our review of the state court proceedings alone, we reverse. This result is a function of the high hurdle for collateral review of a “claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in state court” under t h e A n tite rro rism a n d U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Sep tem ber 2 7, 2 011
Lyle W . Cayce Clerk Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

E ffe ctiv e D e a th P e n a lty A ct (“A E D P A ”), 2 8 U .S .C

. § 2 2 5 4 (d ), a n d th e S u p re m e C o u rt’s re ce n t e m p h a sis o n th e ra rity o f d e n o v o fe d e ra l co u rt h e a rin g s. C u llen

v . P in h o lster , 1 3 1 S . C t 1 3 8 8 (2 0 1 1 ).
I.
A W a l

- M a r t employee in Columbus, Mississippi, called the police foll o w i n g

a suspiciou s s e r i es of purchases by Billy McCamey and another man. In the early morning hours of July 6, 2002, the men bought several packages of lithium batteries, several cans of starter fluid, coffee filters, numerous boxes of Sudafed,
and two pairs of wire cutters. When police apprehended the men, they
discovered the products and arrested McCamey for possession of methamphetamine p r e c ursors. McCamey’s first trial ended with a hung jury. His second trial is the subject of the current petition. During voir dire, the judge asked whether any of the jurors knew Donna
Smi t h
, the public defender assigned to represent McCamey. Martha Hinton, one of the potential jurors, remained silent despite her history with Smith. She had
sued Smith successfully for professional malpractice some years earlier and complained about her to the Alabama Bar. Smith maintains that she d i d not recognize he r f

ormer client because the latter had changed her physical

appearance in the yea r s s i n ce their first encounter. Upon hearing Hinton’s

name during the post-verdict poll of the jury, Smith realized that the jury
included a former client. She promptly advised the prosecuting attorney and the judge of her relationship to Hinton.
In re sp o n se to S m ith ’s d isclo su re , th e tria l ju d g e c o n v e n e d a h e a rin g to
d iscu ss th e situ a tio n w ith M cC a m e y

. S m it h a p p e a re d w ith M cC a m e y a t th e h e a rin g , b u t m o st o f th e d ia lo g u e p a sse d d ire ctly b e tw e e n th e ju d g e a n d
M cC a m e y

. T h e ju d g e b e g a n b y e x p la in in g th a t a fo rm e r clie n t o f S m ith ’s— o n e

w h o “h a d su e d h e r a n d o b ta in e d a ju d g m e n t a g a i n s t h e r ”

— h a d se rv e d o n th e j u r y th a t co n v icte d M cC a m e y

. T h e ju d g e a lso sta te d th a t h a d th e ju r o r

2 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

a n sw e re d tru th fu lly d u rin g v o ir d ire a s to h e r p rio r d e a lin g s w ith S m ith
, “th a t ju ro r w o u ld n o t h a v e sa t o n y o u r ju ry .” In co n clu sio n , th e ju d g e a d v ise d
M cC a m e y th a t “[i]f y o u so d e sire
, I w ill re lie v e M s. S m ith a s y o u r a tto rn e y a n d

a p p o in t y o u a n o th e r a tto rn e y ,” b u t th e ju d g e n o te d th a t M cC a m e y m ig h t a lso

e le ct to k e e p S m ith . T h e fo llo w in g e x ch a n g e th e n e n su e d : B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir. W h a t w o u ld b e th e p u rp o se o f m e g e ttin g a n e w la w y e r? I m e a n , w h y ?
B Y T H E C O U R T : H e w o u ld h a v e to -- w h o e v e r y o u r n e w la w y e r is

w o u ld h a v e to te ll y o u th a t.
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : B e ca u se I h a v e n o p ro b l e m w ith h e r
re p re se n ta tio n

. T o m e it w a s fin e

. It w a s n o th in g w ro n g w ith th a t.
B Y T H E C O U R T : S h e h a d a clie n t -- a fo rm e r clie n t w h o h a d su e d h e r o n y o u r ju ry

. B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : S h e d id n o t te ll th e C o u rt o r a n y o n e e lse a b o u t th a t, n o r d id th e clie n t re sp o n d to th a t q u e sti o n w h e n a sk e d
sp e cifica lly a b o u t th a t b y m e -- B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : -- w h e n w e w e re se le ctin g a ju ry

. B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : I a ssu m e y o u re ca ll th e q u e stio n s I a sk e d

. B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : “D o a n y o f y o u k n o w M s. S m ith o r a n y im m e d ia te

m e m b e rs o f h e r fa m ily ?” T h e re w a s n o r e sp o n se fro m th a t p a r ticu la r ju ro r. If y o u a re sa tisfie d w ith M s. S m i t h ’ s
re p re se n ta tio n , it m a y b e th a t y o u w a iv e o r g iv e u p c e r t a in

a rg u m e n ts o r le g a l a r g u m e n ts th a t y o u m ig h t h a v e e ith e r o n a
m o tio n f o r a n e w tria l o r o n a p p e a l. It is a d e cisio n y o u h a v e to

m a k e

. S h e is still y o u r a tto rn e y

. If y o u w a n t to a sk h e r a b o u t th e m , y o u c a n

. I f y o u w a n t a n o th e r a tto rn e y , I w ill a p p o in t y o u
a n o th e r a tto rn e y . T h e d e cisio n w ill h a v e to b e y o u rs. B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : I u n d e rsta n d

.

3 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

F o llo w in g th i s e x ch a n g e , th e ju d g e o rd e re d a re ce ss, d u rin g w h ich M cC a m e y

co u ld co n sid e r th e fa cts ju st re v e a le d to h im

. S m ith a rra n g e d fo r M cC a m e y to

m e e t w ith tw o a d d itio n a l d e fe n se la w y e rs d u r i n g t h e re ce ss. O n e o f th o se la w y e rs file d a n a ffid a v it in sta te co u rt sta tin g th a t h e “ta lk e d to M cC a m e y fo r

se v e ra l m in u te s a b o u t h is situ a tio n ” a n d “to ld M cC a m e y th a t h e d id n o t h a v e
to a cce p t a n o th e r a tto rn e y a n d co u ld w a iv e h is rig h t to a n e w tria l.” A cco rd in g
to th e la w y e r, “M cC a m e y to ld m e th a t h e w a n te d to w a iv e h is rig h ts.” T h e

se co n d a tto rn e y , w h o m e t se p a ra te ly w ith M c C a m e y , d id n o t d o cu m e n t th e

co n te n t o f th e ir m e e tin g

. W h e n th e h e a rin g re su m e d
, th e ju d g e e n g a g e d M cC a m e y in a n o t h e r d ia lo g u e a b o u t h is in te n tio n s: B Y T H E C O U R T : 2 0 0 2 -0 7 0 8 -C R 1 , I h a d sp o k e to M r. M c C a m e y
a b o u t th e p o s s i b ility o f o b ta in in g n e w co u n se l, a n d h e w a n te d a p e rio d o f tim e to t h i n k a b o u t it a n d d iscu ss th e m a tte r w ith h is

cu rre n t co u rt-a p p o in te d co u n se l. H a v e y o u d o n e th a t, M r. M cC a m e y ?
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : D o y o u w ish th e C o u rt to a p p o in t n e w co u n se l fo r y o u ?
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : N o , sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : D o y o u u n d e rsta n d th a t m e a n s th a t y o u w ill b e g iv in g u p m a y b e a g r o u n d t h a t y o u h a v e o n a m o tio n fo r a n e w tria l?
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : A n d d o y o u a lso u n d e rsta n d th a t y o u m a y a lso b e g iv in g u p a g ro u n d th a t y o u h a v e o n a p p e a l; d o y o u u n d e rsta n d th a t?
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : T h a t’s b e e n e x p la in e d to y o u ?
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.

4 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

B Y T H E C O U R T : P le a se p re p a re m e a n a ffid a v it to th a t e ffe ct. T h a t h e ’s b e e n e x p la in e d a ll th a t a n d p u t i t i n t h e re co rd in th is

ca se . I w o u ld a lso th in k th a t it o u g h t to b e in clu d e d in th e m o tio n fo r a n e w tria l.
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y o u r H o n o r?
B Y T H E C O U R T : Y e s?
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : S h e d id te ll m e e a rlie r th a t th is -- sh e h a d

a lre a d y to ld m e b e fo re I e v e r ca m e in h e re th e first tim e w h a t h a d h a p p e n e d . J u st to le t y o u k n o w sh e h a d a lre a d y to ld m e

. B Y T H E C O U R T : I a ssu m e th a t sh e d id
, b u t th e re co rd m u st k n o w [ sic ] itse lf th a t I to ld y o u

. B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : O h
, y e s, sir. O k a y

. I u n d e rsta n d

. I w a s ju st le ttin g y o u k n o w th a t sh e h a d -- sh e w a sn ’t try in g to , y o u k n o w , lik e , k e e p it fro m m e o r n o th in g . S h e d id te ll m e

. B Y T H E C O U R T : T h e m o tio n fo r a n e w tria l co u ld co n ta in th a t a s
e rro r in y o u r tria l. A n d if it d id
, M s. S m ith w o u ld b e a w itn e ss. A n d sh e ca n n o t b e y o u r la w y e r a n d a w itn e ss a t th e sa m e tim e

. B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : S o , if sh e re m a in s y o u r co u n se l a s y o u re q u e st, th a t m e a n s th a t y o u g iv e u p th e rig h t to ra ise th a t in a m o tio n fo r
a n e w tria l.
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : I u n d e rsta n d

. B Y T H E C O U R T : It a lso is g o in g to m e a n th a t y o u -- a n d th is w ill b e in clu d e d in th e a ffid a v i t

. I f th e m o tio n fo r a n e w tria l is

o v e rru le d a n d y o u a p p e a l to th e M i s s i s s i p p i S u p re m e C o u rt, M s. S m ith w ill b e y o u r co u n se l fo r a p p e lla te p u rp o se s. B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : S h e ca n n o t, h e rse lf, r a i s e [th e ] in e ffe ctiv e
a ssista n ce o f co u n se l a rg u m e n t. S h e c a n n o t cla im th a t sh e -- th a t y o u w e re d e n ie d e ffe ctiv e a ssista n ce o f c o u n se l b e ca u se o f th is b e ca u se it w o u ld b e h e r th a t sh e ’d b e ta lk in g a b o u t.
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : R ig h t.
B Y T H E C O U R T : A n o th e r a tto rn e y co u ld o n d ire ct a p p e a l, b u t sh e
ca n ’ t

. W h i c h a lso is g o in g to m e a n th a t o n -- if th e su p re m e co u rt

5 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

a ffirm s y o u r co n v ictio n , a n y p o st-co n v ictio n co lla te ra l re lie f a ctio n th a t y o u m ig h t file a s a n in m a te w ith th is C o u rt, y o u ca n n o t ra ise in e ffe ctiv e a ssista n ce o f co u n se l b e ca u se o f th a t issu e e ith e r. W h a t

a ll th is m e a n s is th a t y o u a re w a iv in g o r g iv in g u p th e rig h t to ra ise th a t o r q u e stio n th a t issu e e v e r a g a in . Y o u u n d e rsta n d th a t?
B Y T H E D E F E N D A N T : Y e s, sir.
B Y T H E C O U R T : O k a y

. T h a t’s w h a t I w a n te d th e a tto r n e y s t o
e x p la in to y o u

. T h e sa m e d a y , M cC a m e y file d h is w ritte n a ffid a v it, w h ich sta te s:

I a m B illy A lle n M cC a m e y , th e D e fe n d a n t in t h a t c e rta in

a c t io n sty le d S ta te o f M ississip p i v

. B illy A llen M

cC a m ey , C a u se N o .2 0 0 2 -0 7 0 8 -C R 1

. B o th m y a t t o rn e y , D o n n a S

. S m ith
, a n d th e C o u rt h a v e in fo rm e d m e th a t a ju ro r w a s se a te d o n m y ca se w h o d id n o t re sp o n d to th e C o u rt's q u e stio n re g a rd in g w h e th e r sh e k n e w M s. S m ith o r a n y o n e in M s. S m ith ’s fa m ily . I k n o w th a t th e ju ro r, M a rth a D

. H i n to n , h a d p re v io u sly su e d m y a tto rn e y a n d

o b ta in e d a n in fo rm a l a d m o n i t i o n d ire cte d to M s. S m ith b y th e A la b a m a S ta te B a r. S in ce b e in g m a d e a w a re o f th e se d e v e lo p m e n ts, I h a v e b e e n in d e p e n d e n tly a d v ise d b y A tto rn e y M i c h a e l R

. F a rro w a n d A tto rn e y C a rrie A

. J o u rd a n , a s w e ll a s b y M s. S m ith a n d th e C o u rt, th a t th is co u ld re su lt in a n e w tria l b e in g g ra n te d a n d
, fu rth e r, th a t h e r se le ctio n a s a ju ro r co u ld b e ra ise d a s a n issu e o n a p p e a l o f m y
co n v ictio n a n d fo r P o st-C o n v ictio n R e lie f. I u n d e rsta n d th a t I h a v e th e rig h t to ra ise th is issu e , a s w e ll a s th e issu e o f in e ffe ctiv e
a ssista n ce o f co u n se l, o n a p p e a l a n d in a n y p e titio n I m a y ch o o se to file fo r P o st-C o n v ictio n R e lie f. H a v in g b e e n a d v ise d o f a ll o f th is I h e re b y w a iv e th e issu e o f

a ju ro r h a v in g b e e n s e le cte d to sit o n m y tria l ju ry w h o fa ile d to

re sp o n d to v o ir d ire b y th e C o u rt a n d w h o h a d b e e n i n v o lv e d in
p re v io u s litig a tio n in v o lv in g m y tria l a tto rn e y , D o n n a S

. S m ith

. I fu rth e r w a iv e th e issu e o f in e ffe ctiv e a ssista n ce o f co u n se l a risin g fro m th e se le ctio n o f ju ro r M a rth a D . H in to n

.
B a se d o n M cC a m e y ’s a ffid a v it a n d th e v e rb a l e x ch a n g e s b e tw e e n M cC a m e y a n d th e tria l ju d g e , th e M ississip p i a p p e lla te co u rt d e te rm in e d th a t
M cC a m e y h a d w a iv e d th e rig h t to ch a lle n g e h is co n v ictio n o n th e b a sis o f ju ro r

6 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

b ia s a n d in e ffe ctiv e a ssista n ce o f co u n se l. M cC a m ey v

. S ta te , 9 2 3 S o .2 d 2 2 3 , 2 3 0 (M iss. C t. A p p

. 2 0 0 5 ). In so h o ld in g , th e co u rt sta te d th a t “M cC a m e y w a s w e ll

a w a re o f th e rig h ts h e w a s w a iv in g .” Id

. T h e M ississip p i S u p re m e C o u rt
d e n ie d M cC a m e y ’s p e titio n fo r certio ra ri in th e d ire ct a p p e a l, M cC a m ey v

. S ta te , 9 2 7 S o .2 d 7 5 0 (2 0 0 6 ), a n d lik e w ise d e n ie d h is p e titio n fo r p o st-co n v ictio n re lie f.
In th e la tte r a ctio n , M c C a m e y ra ise d th e sa m e issu e s th a t h e d id o n d ire ct

a p p e a l, a n d th e sta te S u p re m e C o u r t w r o t e th a t h e “fa ile d to m a k e a

su b sta n tia l sh o w in g o f th e d e n ia l o f a sta te o r fe d e ra l rig h t . . . .” Following his unsuccessful efforts in stat e court, McCamey sought
collateral review in f

e d eral court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the
convictio n v i o l ated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Integral to this
claim is that he did not knowingl y a n d intelligently waive his rights to an impartial jury or conflict-free counsel. To that end, McCamey requested, and the magistrate judge granted, an evidentiary hear i ng. After weighing the newly
enhanced record, the magistrate j u d ge issued a 71-page report and
recommendation concluding that McCamey was entitled to habeas relief. In a
two-page opinion and over the State’s objections, the district court adopted the report and recommendation. The State appeals.
II.
“In a h a b e a s co rp u s a p p e a l, w e re v ie w th e d istrict co u rt’s fin d in g s o f fa ct
fo r cle a r e rro r a n d re v ie w its co n clu sio n s o f la w d e n o v o , a p p l y in g th e sa m e
sta n d a rd o f re v ie w to th e sta te co u rt’s d e cisio n a s th e d istrict co u rt.” G a rcia v

. Q u a rterm a n , 4 5 4 F .3 d 4 4 1 , 4 4 4 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ) (in te rn a l q u o ta tio n o m itte d )

. F e d e ra l co u rts’ sta n d a rd o f re v ie w in h a b e a s ca se s is sta tu to rily d e fin e d in
A E D P A

. A E D P A e sta b lish e s a h ig h th re sh o ld fo r h a b e a s p e titio n e rs w h o ra ise a “cla im th a t w a s a d

ju d ica te d o n th e m e rits in S ta te co u rt.” 2 8 U .S .C

. § 2 2 5 4 (d ).
A p e titio n p re se n tin g su ch a cla im ca n p re v a il o n ly if th e sta te -co u rt d e cisio n :

7 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

(1 ) “w a s co n t r a r y to , o r in v o lv e d a n u n re a so n a b le a p p lica tio n o f, cle a rly

e sta b lish e d F e d e ra l la w , a s d e te rm in e d b y th e S u p re m e C o u rt o f t h e U n i t e d
S ta te s; o r (2 ) r e s u l t e d in a d e cisio n th a t w a s b a se d o n a n u n re a so n a b le
d e te rm in a tio n o f th e fa cts in lig h t o f th e e v id e n ce p re se n te d in th e S ta te co u rt

p ro ce e d in g .” Id

. N e ith e r p a rty a rg u e s th a t th e issu e in th is a p p e a l— w h e th e r B illy A lle n M cC a m e y w a iv e d h is r i g h t s to a n im p a rtia l ju ry a n d co n flict-fre e

co u n se l— w a s n o t “a d

ju d ica te d o n th e m e rits” in M ississip p i co u rts.

III. A. Evidentiary Hearing
The federal magistrate judge g r a n ted McCamey’s motion for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The S u p r e me Court has

r e c e n t l y c l arified the narrow applicability of the hearing provision, rend e r i n g t h e hearing inappropriate in this case. As a result, the district court’s review should
have been—and our review is—confined to the record in the state court.
Federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) asks whether a statec o urt decision “w a s co n tra ry to , o r in v o lv e d a n u n re a so n a b le a p p lica tio n o f
, cle a rly e s t a b l i s h e d F e d e ra l la w , a s d e te rm in e d b y th e S u p re m e C o u rt o f th e U n i t e d S ta te s.” The Supreme Court has recently interpreted this “back w a r d

looking language” to confine habeas review to the record before the state court.
Cullen v. Pinholster
, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). The issue in Pinholster was whether the petitioner’s counsel was ineffecti v e for failing to introduce
additional mitigation evidence. Although the California Supreme Court
dismissed the petition as meritless, a federal district court cond u cted an evidentiary hearing, received expert testimony regarding the petitioner’s psychological con d i t i o n , and granted the writ. The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, discussing the limited availability of
federal evidentiary hearings in habeas cases: “We now hold that review under

8 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

§ 2 2 5 4 (d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state cour t t h a t adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Id

. Confining collateral review to the record before the state c o u r t follows
AEDPA. The statute states that “a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Consistent
with this presumption, § 22 5 4 a l l o w s an evidentiary hearing in federal court only
under narrow circumstances:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shal l n ot hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-- (A) the claim relies on-- (I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that could not have b e e n p reviously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitu t i o n a l error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). As the Court explained in Pinholster
, “[t]he focus of that
section is

. . . on limiting the discretion of federal district cou r t s i n holding
h e arings.” 131 S. Ct. at 1401 n.8 (emphasis added). Section 2254(e)(2) is no t , however, meaningless. It remains an important tool in cases where habeas petitioners r a i s e a claim that was not “adjudicated on the merits in State
court”— i.e.
, a claim to which § 2254(d) does not apply. Pinholster
, 131 S. Ct. at
1401. The high bar for introducing evidence in a § 2254(d) case accords with “the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction,” which acknowledges that “state

9 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state
convictions.” Harrington v. Richter , 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011 ). 1
The Supreme Court had not decided Pinholster at the time of the district
court’s decision in the present case. That timing is unfortunate, as writs were granted in both cases following federal court evidentiary hearings. McCamey’s petition alleges that the Mississippi courts ruled “contrary to clearly established
federal law” when concluding that he waived his rights to an impartial jury and

to conflict-free counsel. Although the pet i t i o n does not cite § 2254(d)(1), its language tracks that provision. For its part, the federal court cited § 2254(e)(2)
when ordering an evidentiary hearing. The interaction of these two provisions is exactly the subject of Pinholster

. The state anticipated the holding in Pinholster when it op p osed McCamey’s motion for an evidentiary hearing because neither of the exceptional
circumstances in § 2254(e)(2) were present. In response, the magistrate judge
focused on t h e p r o v ision’s introductory clause: “If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of the claim

. . . .” R e l y i n g on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Williams v. Taylor
, 529 U.S. 420, 432, 120 S. Ct. 1470, 1488 (2000),
the court reasoned that “[t]he necessity for mee t i n g t h e exceptions of this statutory provision only apply when the failure to develop the factual basis for
the claim is attributable to some decision or omission of the petitioner.” 2 McCamey v. Epps
, 696 F.Supp. 2d 667, 681 (N.D.Miss. 2010). But Williams is inapposite. The holding in Williams addressed claims that were not adjudicated

on the merits in the state court. 529 U.S. at 429, 120 S. Ct. at 1486 (“Petitioner
did not develop, or raise, his claim s of juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct, or

Pinho ls ter abro gates this cour t’s pr ior, cont rar y dec isi on in Gu idr y v. Dr etke
, 397 F.2d 1 306 (5t h Cir

. 2005)
, reh ’g e n ba nc deni ed
, 429 F.3d 154 ( 5th Cir. 200 5).

Mc Came y did not argue and t h e d i s t r i ct cour t did not hold that eit her of the 2 cir cum st ance s in § 2 254( e)( 2) exis ted in t he pr es ent cas e.
10 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

the prosecution’s alleged Brady violation

. . . until he filed his federal habeas petition.”). The one exception was a c l a i m o n w h i ch the district court denied
relief on th e m e r i t s, making it “unnecessary to reach the question whether § 2254(e)(2) would permit a hearing o n the claim.” Id. at 444. In short, the grounds for relief in Williams were either not adjudicated in state c ourt or did

not require the Sup r eme Court to reach them. Pinholster held that “ Williams
did not concern whether evidence introduced in such a hearing could be

c onsidered under § 2254(d)(1).” 131 S. Ct. at 1400. Because the present case, like Pinholster
, concerns only claims under § 2254(d)(1), we must rej e ct the
district court’s application of Williams and decline to consider the evidence developed in the federal court hearing. This court’s review of McCamey’s waiver therefore considers only the state-court record.
B. Waiver
B e ca u se th e M ississip p i co u rts h e ld th a t th e ch a lle n g e d j u r o r, M a rth a H in to n , “sh o u ld n o t h a v e b e e n a llo w e d to p a rticip a te a s a ju ro r,” M cC a m ey v

. M ississip p i
, 9 2 3 S o .2 d 2 2 3 , 2 2 8 (M iss. C t. A p p

. 2 0 0 5 ), th e o n ly q u e stio n in th is

a p p e a l is w h e th e r M cC a m e y w a iv e d h is rig h ts to a n im p a rtia l ju ry a n d co n flictfre e co u n se l. F ro m th e sta n d p o in t o f A E D P A
, th is co u rt’s in q u iry is lim ite d to

w h e th e r th e M ississip p i co u rts, in fin d in g a n e n fo rce a b le w a iv e r, u n re a so n a b ly

a p p lie d g o v e rn in g S u p re m e C o u rt p re ce d e n t.
T h e S u p re m e C o u rt h a s lo n g v ie w e d w ith su sp icio n d e fe n d a n ts’ w a iv e rs

o f th e ir co n stitu tio n a l ri g h t s

. F a r fro m h o n o rin g a n y sta te m e n t th a t m ig h t

e f f e ct a w a iv e r, “co u rts in d u lg e e v e ry re a so n a b le p re su m p tio n a g a in st w a iv e r

. . . .” J o h n so n v

. Z

erb st , 3 0 4 U .S

. 4 5 8 , 4 6 4 , 5 8 S

. C t. 1 0 1 9 , 1 0 2 3 (1 9 3 8 ). T o

re b u t th e p re su m p tio n , a w a iv e r m u st b e in fo rm e d a n d v o l u n t a r y

. U n ited
S ta tes v

. B ra d

y , 3 9 7 U .S

. 7 4 2 , 7 4 8 , 9 0 S

. C t. 1 4 6 3 , 1 4 6 9 (1 9 7 0 ) (“W a iv e rs o f

c o n stitu tio n a l rig h ts n o t o n ly m u st b e v o lu n ta ry b u t m u st b e k n o w i n g , in te llig e n t a cts d o n e w ith su fficie n t a w a re n e ss o f th e re le v a n t c ircu m sta n ce s

11 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

a n d lik e ly co n se q u e n ce s.”). T h e re sp o n sib ility fo r e n su rin g th a t w a iv e rs sa tisfy
th e S u p re m e C o u rt’s re q u ire m e n ts b e lo n g s to th e tria l ju d g e

. S ch n eck lo th v

. B u sta m o n te , 4 1 2 U .S

. 2 1 8 , 2 4 4 , 9 3 S

. C t. 2 0 4 1 , 2 0 5 6 (1 9 7 3 ). But federal courts

must presume the correctness of the state courts’ factfinding underl y i n g a waiver determination according to A E D PA’s exacting test. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In th e p re se n t ca se , th e tria l ju d g e h a d tw o v e rb a l e x ch a n g e s w i t h
M cC a m e y a n d a lso in siste d o n a w r i t t e n w a iv e r p re p a re d w ith th e a ssista n ce

o f co u n se l. B a se d o n th e se m e a su re s a n d M cC a m e y ’s o p p o rtu n ity to d iscu ss h is
situ a tio n w ith tw o in d e p e n d e n t la w y e rs, the state courts did not unreasonably conclude that McCamey’s waiver was in accordance with federal law.
As required in Brady
, the trial court alerted McC a m e y t o the “relevant

c i r c u m stances and likely consequences” surrounding his waiver. This
information included both the factual and legal bac k g r ound against which McCamey would make his decision: first, that one of McCamey’s jurors had a prior relationship with Smith; second, if the court had known of the relationship,
“th a t ju ro r w o u ld n o t h a v e s a t o n y o u r ju ry ”; a n d th ird
, th a t M cC a m e y co u ld
h a v e n e w co u n se l, p o ssib ly fo r th e p u rp o se o f a n a p p e a l o r m o tio n fo r n e w tria l.
T h e co u rt a lso so licite d q u e stio n s fro m M cC a m e y , w h o a sk e d
, “W h a t w o u ld b e th e p u rp o s e o f m e g e ttin g a n e w la w y e r?” McCamey went on to state that “I
have no problem with her representation.” The court r esponded “She had a client -- a former client who had sued her on your jury.” To an ordinary person, the judge’s response conveyed the relevant circumstances. In fact, his succinct

answer likely served McCamey better than a jargonized allusion to “conflicts of
interest.”
F o l l o w i n g M c C a m e y ’ s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t w o i n d e p e n d e n t p u b l i c d e f e n d e r s , whom Smith had brought in to help, the court asked whether McCamey desired

new counsel. When he declined the offer, the court ask e d s e parately whether

12 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

McCamey realized that he was (1 ) “g iv in g u p m a y b e a g ro u n d th a t y o u h a v e o n

a m o tio n fo r a n e w tria l” a n d (2 ) “g iv in g u p a g ro u n d th a t y o u h a v e o n a p p e a l.”
To both questions, McCamey responded “Yes, sir.” Later in the colloquy, the

court again reminded McCamey that if Smith “re m a in s y o u r co u n se l a s y o u

re q u e s t , t h a t m e a n s th a t y o u g iv e u p th e rig h t to ra ise th a t in a m o tio n fo r a

n e w t r i a l.

. . . S h e ca n n o t cla im th a t sh e -- th a t y o u w e re d e n ie d e ffe c t i v e

a ssista n ce o f co u n se l b e c a u s e o f t h is

. . . .” McCamey’s affidavit finishes the work begun by the trial judge. It states in part:
I h a v e b e e n in d e p e n d e n tly a d v ise d

. . . th a t t h i s co u ld re su lt in a
n e w tria l b e in g g ra n te d a n d
, fu rth e r, th a t h e r se le ctio n a s a ju ro r
co u ld b e ra ise d a s a n issu e o n a p p e a l o f m y c o n v ictio n a n d fo r P o st-C o n v ictio n R e lie f. I u n d e rsta n d th a t I h a v e th e rig h t to ra ise th is is s u e , a s w e ll a s th e issu e o f in e ffe ctiv e a ssista n ce o f co u n se l,

o n a p p e a l a n d i n a n y p e titio n I m a y ch o o se to file fo r P o st-C o n v ictio n R e lie f.
McCamey’s affidavit proceeds to waive his rights regarding both juror bias and
ineffective assistance. The repeated, direct statements of the circumstances and

consequences of McCamey’s waiver support the state courts’ conclusion that his
waiver was knowing and voluntary. In any eve n t , s u c h conclusion is not contrary to federal law as established by the Supreme Court.
The district co u r t re p e a te d ly sta te s th a t n o o n e “n a m e d ” th e rig h ts
M cC a m e y w o u ld b e w a iv in g

. See, e.g., McCamey
, 696 F.Supp. 2d at 700 (“Nothing in the written record corroborates tha t S mith expressly named the rights implicated in her discussions with McCamey.”); id. at 701 (“He [the judge]

names none of the rights McCamey will be waiving.”). A s fa r a s t h e c o u rt is

co n ce rn e d
, “th e fa ilu re to n a m e th e rig h ts is in fa ct a cru cia l fa ilu re .” Id

. a t 7 0 5

. T h e co u rt co n tin u e s: “a fu n d a m e n ta l co n stitu tio n a l rig h t m u st b e n a m e d to b e ‘k n o w n .’” Id

. T h is co n clu sio n p ro p o se s, if a n y th in g , a n e w ru le o f co n stitu tio n a l
la w

. T h e te st a n n o u n ce d b y th e S u p re m e C o u rt a n d th e F ifth C ircu it re q u ire s

13 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/27/2011No. 10-60224

th a t a n y w a iv e r b e “k n o w in g a n d v o lu n ta ry .” B ra d y , 3 9 7 U .S

. a t 7 4 8 , 9 0 S

. C t.

a t 1 4 6 9 ; U

n ited S ta tes v

. B u r n s , 4 3 3 F .3 d 4 4 2 , 4 4 9 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 5 ) (q u o tin g B ra d y ). T h e C o u rt h a s n e v e r e q u a te d a “k n o w in g a n d v o lu n ta ry ” w a iv e r w ith

a fo rm a l n a m in g o f rig h ts. In so m e ca se s, a d e fe n d a n t’s lim ite d e d u ca tio n w ill

re n d e r a fo rm a l n a m in g u se le s s , b e c a u se th e “n a m in g ” a lo n e fa ils to m a k e k n o w n th e sco p e o f th e rig h t o r its co n se q u e n ce s fo r th e d e fe n d a n t. H e re , in
fa ct, th e la ck o f te ch n ica l la n g u a g e m ig h t h a v e in cre a se d th e lik e lih o o d th a t
M c C a m e y , w h o h a s a n 1 1 th -g ra d e e d u ca tio n , w o u ld m a k e a k n o w in g a n d

v o lu n ta ry d e cisio n

. C o n tra ry to th e m a g istra te ju d g e ’s su g g e stio n , th e te st fo r a v a lid w a iv e r is a ca se -sp e cific in q u iry in to “a ll o f th e re le v a n t circu m sta n ce s su rro u n d in g it.”
B ra d y , 3 9 7 U .S

. a t 7 4 9 , 9 0 S

. C t. a t 1 4 6 9

. T h e circu m sta n ce s s u r r o u n d i n g M cC a m e y ’s w a iv e r d o n o t su g g e st th a t th e M ississip p i co u rts u n re a so n a b ly

co n clu d e d th a t th e w a iv e r sa tisfie d th e co n stitu tio n a l sta n d a rd

. B o th th e tria l ju d g e a n d th e a ffid a v it in fo rm e d M cC a m e y th a t h e w a s fo re g o in g a p p e lla te a n d

p o st-co n v ictio n re lie f a n d w h y h e h a d “rig h ts” to p ro te ct. N o S u p re m e C o u rt

p re ce d e n t e m b ro id e rs th e “a ll re le v a n t circu m sta n ce s ” t e s t b y re q u irin g , in

a d d itio n , a p a rticu la r le g a l e x p o s itio n o f th e rig h t to b e w a iv e d

. A cco rd in g ly
, th e M ississip p i co u rts tra n sg re sse d n o p re ce d e n t so cle a rly a s to w a rra n t

re v e rsa l o n co lla te ra l re v ie w

. Conclusion
In light of Pinholster
, the district court erred in allo w i n g an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). With the evidence properly confined to the record before the state courts, we REVERSE the grant of habeas relief.
REVERSED.

14 Case: 10-60224 Document: 00511614469 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/27/2011