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THE NRO STAFF October 1, 1969 

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llllllllijllllllillllllllllllllllllllllllll\lllllllllMlll1111111 14 00060389D 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 

SUBJECT: Quick-Response Capability for Sino-Soviet Border 

Coverage 

On September 23, we learned of a "White House {Kissinger)" 

request that CIA look at the possibility of "pushing all satellite 

launchings forward." 

On September 24, we were advised that this particular 

question was just a part of a request to CIA by Dr. Kissinger 

that he be provided a paper which described "our quick-response 

crisis capability for coverage of the Sino-Soviet border area. 11 

We contacted Mr. McMahon (Mr. Duckett' s deputy) immediately 

to learn more about the request. Mr. McMahon indicated that he 

had been asked to provide only the response to the earlier question, 

i.e., the possibility of telescoping missions over the short term to 

reduce the gap between missions. He stated further that he had 

provided such a response based upon information that he had obtained from our SOC (Colonel Sweeney). 

I asked Mr. McMahon if it would be possible (and appropriate) 

for us to have a copy of the paper which had been delivered to the 

White House, in order that you might be apprised of the query and 

the response. He indicated that it was very unlikely that he could 

obtain a copy of the complete paper, but offered to obtain a copy 

of his particular portion of the response. 

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On September 30, Mr. McMahon called and dictated the attached 

paragraphs, stating that he could not obtain a copy of the paper, since 

1. as a DCI memorandum to the President, it was being held 

exceptionally closely 

2. it was reported to contain information on CIA clandestine 

{and agent) type effort. 

The caveat on the attached page was added by Mr. McMahon, 

since he was told that no dissemination of the information could be 

made. 

It was our understanding that the paper contained a detailed 

account of new (or under consideration) NRO system developments 

including a summary of their capabilities for quick response to 

crises. This is not the case, at least, in the extract we have received. The only reference to an anticipated capability appears 

in the last sentence of Note 1. 

WILLIAM R. 

Colonel, USAF 

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Present overhead reconnaissance capabilities would be targeted 

to the maximum extent against the area of hostilities and advanced 

planning should be undertaken to be sure that this can be accomplished 

with a minimum of delays. The telescoping of missions over the short 

term to reduce the gap between missions, as currently planned, has 

limited possibilities. (See notes) 

Note 1. The two photographic satellite reconnaissance systems now 

in use do not provide a significant capability for quick reaction use in 

a crisis situation. Even if all components are readily available about 

15 days are required from the decision to the actual launch. Both 

systems can be assembled and set on the launch pad in readiness for 

launch but can only be held that way for a few days and then must be 

recycled, i.e., batteries recharged, booster purged and refueled, 

rechecking certain components and some retesting. Neither program 

provides more than one payload at a time which could be used in advance of a scheduled launch date. Even with maximum contractor 

effort and additional funds no more than four photographic reconnaissance satellites could be launched between now and January 1, 1970. 

New programs are under consideration which would provide much improved crisis capability but they are several years away from any 

possible use. 

Note 2. An additional limitation on use of reconnaissance satellites in 

crisis situations is the time between launch of the system and the 

availability of photographs. Weather conditions might prevent photographs of the desired area for at least several days. The film must 

then be received, returned to the U.S., and processed. As an example, 

the minimum time from the taking of a photograph in China to viewing 

of the film is about two to two and one-half days. 

Caveat: 

Even though this is part of an overall paper there are very strict 

restrictions in the intended use of this document. 

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