UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMAPLAT MAURITIUS LTD. et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ZIMBABWE MINING DEVELOPMENT 

CORPORATION, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 22-cv-58 (CRC)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Mining companies Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. and Amari Nickel Holdings Zimbabwe Ltd. 

(“Plaintiffs”) filed suit under the D.C. Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition 

Act. The suit seeks recognition of a foreign court judgment enforcing an arbitral award against 

the Republic of Zimbabwe, the Chief Commissioner of the Zimbabwean Ministry of Mines, and 

the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (“ZMDC”). The Court has already ruled on 

one round of motions to dismiss. Teed up now are the Republic and ZMDC’s (“Defendants”) 

motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal 

jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. All three grounds for dismissal turn on whether the 

Republic and ZMDC can be considered alter egos under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 

(“FSIA”). Finding that Plaintiffs have established an alter-ego relationship between the Republic 

and ZMDC, the Court denies the motion to dismiss. 

I. Background 

The Court’s previous opinion detailed the facts and procedural history of this case so the 

Court will pick up the thread where that opinion left off. See Amaplat Mauritius Ltd. v. 

Zimbabwe Mining Dev. Corp., 663 F. Supp. 3d 11, 16–18 (D.D.C. 2023). After the Court 
2 

dismissed the original complaint without prejudice, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and

included new allegations detailing the Republic and ZMDC’s purported alter-ego relationship. 

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41–80. In turn, the Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, 

contending that the Court lacks both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over them and that 

the complaint fails to state a claim. Plaintiffs also filed a conditional cross-motion for 

jurisdictional discovery, requesting an opportunity to explore the Republic and ZMDC’s 

relationship should the Court find Plaintiffs’ alter-ego allegations inadequate. Both motions are 

fully briefed. 

II. Legal Standards 

On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or lack of personal 

jurisdiction, “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that the court has jurisdiction.” Cause of Action Inst. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 390 F. Supp. 3d 

84, 91 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Whiteru v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 258 F. Supp. 3d 

175, 182 (D.D.C. 2017)). Because this suit involves claims against a foreign nation, the FSIA

provides the framework for determining subject matter jurisdiction. Creighton Ltd. v. Gov’t of 

State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Under the FSIA, a federal district court has 

original jurisdiction over a civil suit against a foreign state only if the foreign state is not entitled 

to immunity under the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). “[T]he FSIA begins with a presumption of 

immunity, which the plaintiff bears the initial burden to overcome by producing evidence that an 

exception applies.” Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 

1183 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Once the plaintiff has made that threshold showing, however, “the 

sovereign bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the exception does not apply.” 

Id.; accord Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
3 

(“‘In accordance with the restrictive view of sovereign immunity reflected in the FSIA,’ the 

defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff’s allegations do not bring its case within 

a statutory exception to immunity.” (quoting Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic 

Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1985))). 

If, on the one hand, “the defendant challenges only the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 

jurisdictional allegations, then the district court should take the plaintiff’s factual allegations as 

true and determine whether they bring the case within any of the exceptions to immunity invoked 

by the plaintiff.” Phoenix Consulting, 216 F.3d at 40. On the other hand, if the motion to 

dismiss presents “a dispute over the factual basis of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 

the FSIA” by contesting a jurisdictional fact or raising a “mixed question of law and fact,” such 

as whether the “person alleged to have harmed [the] plaintiff was [an] agent of [the] sovereign,” 

then “the court may not deny the motion to dismiss merely by assuming the truth of the facts 

alleged” but instead “must go beyond the pleadings and resolve any disputed issues of fact the 

resolution of which is necessary to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss.” Id. (citing ForemostMcKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 448–49 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 

Defendants also move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In 

reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “accept all the well-pleaded factual allegations 

of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in the 

plaintiff’s favor.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

“[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice,” however, nor does the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions.” 

Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Accordingly, “[t]o survive a motion to 
4 

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).1

III. Analysis 

Defendants’ twin jurisdictional arguments—that the Court lacks subject matter and 

personal jurisdiction over them—overlap and both hinge on whether ZMDC is the Republic’s 

alter ego. The two involve other considerations as well, but the Court will begin by conducting 

its alter-ego analysis in the context of the Republic’s claim that the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over it. 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Unless one of the FSIA’s exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, the FSIA bars suit 

against foreign sovereigns. Plaintiffs rely on two such exceptions: § 1605(a)(1)’s waiver 

exception and § 1605(a)(6)’s arbitration exception. The Court has already rejected the 

application of the arbitration exception in this case, leaving just the waiver exception at issue. 

See Amaplat, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 31–33. Section 1605(a)(1) divests a sovereign of immunity 

when “the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, 

notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect 

except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). Plaintiffs maintain, 

and ZMDC does not dispute, that ZMDC waived its sovereign immunity under § 1605(a)(1) by 

agreeing to arbitrate disputes in the 2007 and 2008 Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) 

between Plaintiffs and ZMDC and by participating in the arbitration in Zambia. Am. Compl. ¶ 

1

 As Plaintiffs’ conditional cross-motion for jurisdictional discovery is moot in light of 

the Court’s opinion, the Court need not address the standard for jurisdictional discovery. 
5 

10. Plaintiffs allege that ZMDC’s waiver is attributable to the Republic because the two are alter 

egos. 

1. Alter-Ego Relationship 

“A government instrumentality ‘established as [a] juridical entit[y] distinct and 

independent from [its] sovereign should normally be treated as such,’” and therefore such entities 

are “presumed to have legal status separate from that of the sovereign.” Transamerica Leasing, 

Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (alterations in original) 

(quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S. 

611, 627 (1983)). “That presumption can be overcome,” however, if the plaintiff demonstrates 

that the sovereign and instrumentality are alter egos. Id. at 847–48. The two are deemed alter 

egos in either of two circumstances: (1) the “corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its 

owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created” or (2) “recognition of the 

instrumentality as an entity apart from the state ‘would work fraud or injustice.’” Id. at 848 

(quoting Bancec, 462 U.S. at 629). 

To assess the presence of both circumstances, courts have “coalesced around [] five 

factors,” dubbed the Bancec factors: (1) whether the government exercises economic control 

over the entity, (2) whether government officials manage the entity or its daily affairs, (3) 

whether the entity’s profits go to the government, (4) whether the government is the sole 

beneficiary of the entity’s conduct, and (5) whether adherence to separate identities would entitle 

the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations. Rubin v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U.S. 202, 210 (2018) (cleaned up).2 

2

 The parties’ briefing reflects understandable confusion about how the five Bancec

factors fit into the two alter-ego inquiries, namely the principal-agent and fraud-or-injustice
6 

The first step in the alter-ego analysis is to define the relevant time period, which the 

parties dispute. See Mot. Dismiss at 16–17; Pls.’ Opp’n at 29; Defs.’ Reply at 4–5. Defendants 

urge the Court to consider only events that occurred between ZMDC’s signing of the MOUs with 

Plaintiffs (2007 and 2008) and ZMDC’s participation in the arbitration (2011). Mot. Dismiss at 

16. Plaintiffs counter that the Court should also consider facts that post-date the commencement 

of the arbitration, including, for example, information in a 2017 Zimbabwe Parliamentary report. 

Pls.’ Opp’n at 29–31, Third Declaration of Steven K. Davidson (“Third Davidson Decl.”) Ex. F. 

The Court’s approach falls somewhere between the parties’ positions. 

For the principal-agent analysis (roughly mapping onto Bancec factors one through four), 

the Court will consider only facts that bear on whether ZMDC was Zimbabwe’s alter ego from 

2007 to 2011. Of course, events that occurred soon before or after this period may be relevant to

whether ZMDC acted as Zimbabwe’s agent within this timeframe. But the pertinent question is 

whether ZMDC was Zimbabwe’s agent between 2007 and 2011. This approach accords with the 

D.C. Circuit’s guidance that jurisdiction over a sovereign cannot “necessarily” be maintained just 

because “a state and a state-owned corporation may in some circumstances be, respectively, 

principal and agent.” Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 850. “[T]he agent’s actions [must be] related to 

inquiries. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 28–29; Defs.’ Reply at 21–22. In Rubin, the Supreme Court 

suggested that the Bancec factors apply to both. 538 U.S. at 210. But the fit isn’t perfect. 

Factors one through four bear more on the principal-agent inquiry. The fifth Bancec factor—

whether adherence to separate identities would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United 

States courts while avoiding its obligations—does capture notions of fraud and injustice. But it 

is narrower than what courts have found relevant to the fraud-or-injustice prong. For example, 

the Supreme Court in Bancec, as well as the D.C. Circuit in subsequent cases, considered as part 

of the fraud-or-injustice analysis whether the state had undercapitalized the instrumentality or 

transferred money to avoid debtors. See Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633; Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 

854. The Court will therefore use the framework of the five Bancec factors but incorporate other 

considerations into the equity factor. This flexible approach hews to the Supreme Court’s 

guidance that the Bancec factors do not supply a “mechanical formula” for determining judicial 

separateness. Rubin, 583 U.S. at 210 (quoting Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633). 
7 

the substance of plaintiff’s cause of action.” Id. (cleaned up); see also TIG Ins. Co. v. Republic 

of Argentina, No. 18-mc-00129 (DLF), 2022 WL 1154749, at *9 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022), order 

corrected and superseded, No. 18-mc-00129 (DLF), 2022 WL 3594601 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2022) 

(defining the “relevant time” for the principal-agent analysis as “when the contracts ‘were 

made.’”). 

 Events that pre- or post-date 2007 to 2011 are relevant, however, to the fraud-or-injustice

prong. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Bancec by considering the Cuban 

government’s conduct after the plaintiff filed suit. 462 U.S. at 615–16. Namely, the Court found 

that because the government dissolved Bancec and transferred its assets to other entities, in order 

to insulate those assets from possible counterclaims, “adher[ing] blindly to the corporate form” 

“would cause [] an injustice.” Id. at 632. The Court will therefore follow suit and assess the 

Republic’s conduct beyond 2011 as part of the fraud-or-injustice inquiry. 

 With these guideposts in place, the Court now turns to the Bancec factors.

a. Economic Control and Day-to-Day Management

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the Republic exercised significant economic control 

over ZMDC. ZMDC’s organic statute, the ZMDC Act, vests the Republic with control over the 

instrumentality. Under the act, the government’s Minister of Mines appoints ZMDC’s board 

members. Third Davidson Decl., Ex. B (“ZMDC Act”) § 5(1).3

 The act also mandates that the 

3

 Defendants submit a declaration from Dominic Muzawazi, a Zimbabwean lawyer, 

explaining that subsequent legislation has superseded some of the ZMDC Act’s provisions. 

Defs.’ Reply, Declaration of Dominic Muzawazi (“Muzawazi Decl.”) ¶ 3.2. Of relevance to the 

section cited above, Mr. Muzawazi notes that the Corporate Governance Act now requires the 

Minister of Mines to consult with the president before appointing or terminating ZMDC’s board 

members. Id. ¶ 4.1 (“[T]he President now has a close control on [Board] appointments.”). The 

Corporate Governance Act went into effect only in 2018, however, and therefore would not have 

impacted the Republic’s authority over ZMDC during the relevant period. See Date of 
8 

Republic hold at least fifty-one percent of ZMDC’s shares and conditions the sale of other shares 

on government ministers’ approval. Id. §§ 27(2), (5). And from ZMDC’s founding until at least 

September 2023, the Republic has owned 100 percent of ZMDC’s shares. Am. Compl ¶ 45; 

Muzawazi Decl. ¶ 4. These factors alone do not establish an alter-ego relationship. See

Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 448 (“Majority shareholding and majority control of a board of 

directors, without more, are not sufficient to establish a relationship of principal to agent under 

FSIA.”). But the ZMDC Act also grants the Minister of Mines authority to give ZMDC 

“directions of a general character relating to the exercise . . . of its functions, duties and powers,” 

and ZMDC is required, “with all due expedition, [to] comply with [these] direction[s].” ZMDC 

Act § 25. Moreover, under Zimbabwe’s Public Finance Management Act, ZMDC must notify 

and seek approval from the government before “the acquisition or disposal of a significant 

asset,” “the commencement or cessation of a significant business activity,” or “participation to a 

significant extent . . . in a partnership, trust, unincorporated joint venture or similar 

arrangement.” Defs.’ Reply, Declaration of Quinn Smith (“Smith Decl.”), Ex. Z (“PFM Act”) § 

48(3).4

The Republic’s control is also “not merely aspirational.” See OI Eur. Grp. B.V. v. 

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 73 F.4th 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2023) (finding Venezuela 

exercised economic control over a national oil company because “statements of authority [we]re 

not merely aspirational.”) A 2010 news article documented that the Minister of Mines “brought 

in” a new chairperson for ZMDC’s Board, and then “at the instigation of [the] Mines Minister” 

Commencement: Public Entities Corporate Governance Act (Jun. 8, 2018), 

https://perma.cc/9AV8-PLSJ. 

4

 The Public Finance Management Act went into effect April 2, 2010. See PFM Act at 

1. 
9 

ZMDC’s senior executives were placed on forced leave. Third Davidson Decl., Ex. J at 1.5 But 

see Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 851 (finding no alter-ego relationship even when the Venezuelan 

government appointed members of an instrumentality’s Board and “exercis[ed] its influence, 

through the Board of Directors, to put its own chosen manager in charge of a corporation.”). 

Plaintiffs have also submitted evidence that the Republic was involved in the “day-to-day 

operations” of ZMDC and its subsidiaries. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 52 F.3d 

346, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset 

Controls (“OFAC”) imposed sanctions against ZMDC and numerous other companies that 

supported the regime of former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. Third Davidson Decl., 

Ex. BB (OFAC press release) at 2. In so doing, OFAC described ZMDC as “planning, 

coordinating and implementing mining projects on behalf of the Government of Zimbabwe.” Id.

at 1. And a 2013 Zimbabwe Parliamentary report noted that the Minister of Mines, not ZMDC’s 

Board, controlled appointments to the boards of ZMDC’s subsidiaries. See Third Davidson 

Decl., Ex. U at 15 (“The ZMDC Board was rendered powerless when it came to the selection and 

appointment of members who sit on its subsidiary companies. It[]s only function is to 

regulari[z]e [] appointments made by the Minister.”). Though a government’s appointment of 

members to an instrumentality’s board does not alone create an alter-ego relationship, see

5

 The Court hesitates to rely on unsubstantiated newspaper articles, but Defendants 

themselves cite to this 2010 article as evidence that ZMDC had a board. See Defs.’ Reply at 19. 

Moreover, though courts must rely only on “evidence satisfactory to the court” in deciding 

motions for default judgment under the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e), and courts in this district 

have therefore rejected inadmissible hearsay when ruling on those motions, see, e.g., Strange v. 

Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 14-cv-435 (CKK), 2017 WL 11670394, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 

2017), the same standard does not apply to evidence used to establish subject matter jurisdiction. 

In TJGEM LLC v. Republic of Ghana, for example, the D.C. Circuit considered information in 

“an internet news story” when analyzing the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. No. 14-

7036, 2015 WL 3653187, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 9, 2015) (ultimately concluding the allegations in 

the news story did not establish subject matter jurisdiction).
10 

Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 851, the report found the Republic used board appointments to 

exercise control over ZMDC’s subsidiaries. As a result, the ZMDC Board “ha[d] little control 

and information over its subsidiary companies.” Id. at 15–16.6

 

b. Profits and Beneficiaries

Plaintiffs have also shown that the Republic took ZMDC’s profits and was the 

beneficiary of its conduct during the relevant time period. The Republic owns ZMDC shares

(indeed, all of its shares) and therefore receives profits in the form of dividends. Again, stock 

ownership does not alone create an alter-ego relationship. See Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 849 

(“A sovereign does not create an agency relationship merely by owning a majority of a 

corporation’s stock. . . .”). But Plaintiffs have also offered evidence that, as early as 2008, 

government officials illegally diverted ZMDC’s revenue to their own coffers. OFAC placed 

ZMDC on its sanctions list that year because “Robert Mugabe, his senior officials, and regime 

cronies ha[d] used [ZMDC and other] entities to illegally siphon revenue and foreign exchange 

from the Zimbabwean people.” Third Davidson Decl., Ex. BB at 1. And, in 2013, the State 

Department’s Acting Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs testified before 

Congress about similar misuse of mining funds. Third Davidson Decl., Ex. MM (June 18, 2013 

testimony). He stated that the State Department was “concerned about ongoing reports that 

6

 Plaintiffs also cite a 2017 Zimbabwe Parliamentary report about Zimbabwe’s diamond 

industry. Pls.’ Opp’n at 25. The Court will not rely on the report because, as it describes, the 

Republic’s level of control over the diamond industry shifted in 2015. Previously, the Republic 

had “issue[d] multiple licenses to various investors.” Third Davidson Decl., Ex. F at 5. In 2015, 

however, the government “centrali[zed] all diamond mines” in the Zimbabwe Consolidated 

Diamond Company, a subsidiary of ZMDC. Id. at 5–6. Analysis in the 2017 report therefore 

has limited relevance to the 2007 to 2011 time period. Likewise, the Court will not rely on the 

2017 to 2023 State Department Investment Climate Impact Reports cited by Plaintiffs. See

Third Davidson Decl. Exs. FF–LL. The 2017 to 2022 reports all noted that “recent[ly]” the 

“government allow[ed] [ZMDC] to function without [a] board[].” See, e.g., Third Davidson 

Decl. Ex. LL at 13. Recently is likely not 2011. 
11 

diamond mining entities in Zimbabwe [we]re being exploited by people in senior government 

and military positions for personal gain, that revenues from those enterprises [we]re being 

diverted for partisan activities that undermine democracy, and that proceeds from diamond sales 

[we]re enriching a few individuals and not the Treasury and people of Zimbabwe.” Id. at 2. 

As other courts have found, officials’ use of an instrumentality’s funds for personal gain 

or policy goals contributes to the creation of an alter-ego relationship. In Transamerica, the D.C. 

Circuit held that an alter-ego relationship exists when the “affairs of the [instrumentality] [are] so 

intermingled that no distinct corporate lines are maintained” and cited as an example a 

company’s use of its subsidiary’s “profits for its own purposes.” 200 F.3d at 849 (cleaned up). 

Likewise, in OI Eur. Grp. B.V., the Third Circuit held that Venezuela and a state instrumentality 

were alter egos because, among other things, Venezuela “committed [the instrumentality] to sell 

oil to [] allies at steep discounts” and senior officials used the instrumentality’s “aircraft[s] for 

state purposes.” 73 F.4th at 173. See also McKesson, 52 F.3d at 352 (finding an alter-ego 

relationship because the instrumentality’s “policy was not commercial” and instead was guided 

by “government representatives”). Plaintiffs’ evidence here is of a similar vein.

c. Fraud and Injustice

Under a narrow application of the fifth Bancec factor—whether adherence to separate 

identities would entitle the foreign state to benefits in U.S. courts while avoiding its 

obligations—Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Republic seeks any benefits from the U.S. 

legal system. But, more broadly, “recognition of [ZMDC] as an entity apart from the state 

‘would work fraud or injustice.’” Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 848 (quoting Bancec, 462 U.S. at 

629). When a government shields its instrumentality from creditors—for example, by “thinly 
12 

capitaliz[ing]” the instrumentality or transferring its “assets to separate juridical entities”—this 

conduct supports an alter-ego finding. See id. at 854; Bancec, 462 U.S. at 633. 

And there is evidence that the Republic did exactly that. According to a 2022 

Zimbabwean news article, as legal judgments against ZMDC began to pile up, the Republic 

started “selling off parts” of the company. Third Davidson Decl., Ex. NN at 3. In 2018, the 

Republic issued a tender offer for six mines held by ZMDC. Id. In early 2022, the Minister of 

Mines then ordered that two of ZMDC’s few remaining assets—the Kamativi and Todal mining 

projects—“be spirited away into a new government company, Defold,” even though ZMDC’s 

board expressed concern that the asset transfer was “illegal and against [ZMDC’s] interest.” Id.

at 2–3. According to the article, the government made the transfer to “stave off US$467 million 

in claims from [ZMDC’s] creditors.” Id. at 1.7 In April of that year, the Secretary for Finance 

and Economic Development approved the transfer of ZMDC’s shares to Defold. Third Davidson 

Decl., Ex. OO (April 14, 2022 approval letter). The fraud-or-injustice inquiry therefore supports 

a finding that the Republic and ZMDC are alter egos.

 In light of Plaintiffs’ evidence, the Court finds that the Republic was ZMDC’s alter ego

and can therefore be subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. Moreover, because Plaintiffs seek to 

take jurisdictional discovery only “to prove that the Amended Complaint’s alter ego allegations 

are true,” the Court denies that motion as moot. Pls.’ Opp’n at 31. 

7

 Again, the Court is cautious not to put too much stock in news articles. But Plaintiffs’ 

other evidence—namely, the record indicating that the government authorized ZMDC to sell its

shares in the Kamativi and Todal mining projects to Defold—substantiates the 2022 article. 

Third Davidson Decl., Ex. OO. And, though Defendants take issue with Plaintiffs’ citations to 

news articles and the government record, they do not deny that ZMDC’s assets were diverted to 

Defold or offer countervailing evidence. See Defs.’ Reply at 22. 
13 

2. Remaining Subject Matter Jurisdiction Arguments 

The subject matter jurisdiction analysis does not end with the alter-ego determination. 

Defendants suggest that, even if ZMDC is the Republic’s alter ego, § 1605(a)(1)’s impliedwaiver exception is still not satisfied. See Mot. Dismiss at 24–27; Defs.’ Reply at 22–23. 

Defendants offer two supporting theories, but neither is availing. First, Defendants contend that 

a foreign state that “was not a party to the arbitration agreement” could not have impliedly 

waived its immunity to suit. Mot. Dismiss at 25; Defs.’ Reply at 23. But the D.C. Circuit has 

rejected this argument; indeed, that is the whole point of the alter-ego exception. See

Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 848 (the principal-agent and fraud-or-injustice alter-ego theories are 

“exceptions to the rule that a foreign sovereign is not amenable to suit based upon the acts of 

such an instrumentality”). 

Second, Defendants renew their argument that the waiver exception does not apply 

because the New York Convention governs enforcement of arbitration awards, not enforcement 

of foreign judgments confirming arbitral awards. Mot. Dismiss at 26–27. This theory would 

deprive the Court of jurisdiction over both the Republic and ZMDC, but the Court has already 

rejected it. See Amaplat, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 35–36. When a sovereign (or its instrumentality) 

waives immunity by signing on to the New York Convention and agreeing to arbitrate in another 

signatory’s jurisdiction, “the cause of action to enforce [a] foreign judgment is within the scope 

of [that] implicit waiver of sovereign immunity.” Seetransport Wiking Trader 

Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 989 

F.2d 572, 582 (2d Cir. 1993).8 “The cause of action is within the scope of the waiver because 

8

 Although the Court adopted Seetransport’s implicit-waiver rule in its ruling on 

Defendants’ prior motion to dismiss, it cautioned that a panel of the D.C. Circuit recently 
14 

the cause of action is so closely related to the claim for enforcement of the arbitral award.” Id. at 

583.9 

The Court finds, accordingly, that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the Republic and 

ZMDC.

B. Personal Jurisdiction 

1. The Republic 

Under the FSIA, personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign state if the district court has 

subject matter jurisdiction and service has been effected. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). In other words, a 

simple equation governs: “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal 

jurisdiction.” GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805, 811 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 

The Republic does not dispute that it was properly served. Thus, because the Court may 

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the Republic, it also has personal jurisdiction. 

2. ZMDC

The personal jurisdiction analysis is a bit more complicated for ZMDC. “Whenever a 

foreign sovereign controls an instrumentality to such a degree that a principal-agent relationship 

signaled concerns about the rule’s application. Amaplat, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 33–35; see also

Process & Indus. Devs. Ltd. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 27 F.4th 771 (D.C. Cir. 2022). 

9

 Defendants’ Reply also seems to suggest that ZMDC could not have waived its 

immunity to suit because it was improperly served in the Zambian award enforcement 

proceeding. Defs.’ Reply at 23. Putting aside whether Zambian service issues are properly 

considered at this stage of proceedings, see Amaplat, 663 F. Supp. 3d at 39–40, as the Second 

Circuit explained in Seetransport, it was ZMDC’s agreement to arbitrate and its participation in

the arbitration proceeding—not its participation in the Zambian award proceeding—that waived

its immunity in this suit, see Seetransport, 989 F.2d at 582 (“Navimpex, a Romanian agency or 

instrumentality, had implicitly waived its sovereign immunity because it was a signatory to the 

Convention and had proceeded to arbitration in the I.C.C.”).
15 

arises between them, the instrumentality receives the same due process protection as the 

sovereign: none.” GSS, 680 F.3d at 815. In that situation, the simple equation for personal 

jurisdiction over a state—“subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal 

jurisdiction”—also applies to the instrumentality. But, when an instrumentality is not the 

sovereign’s alter ego, “the instrumentality [] enjoy[s] all the due process protections available to 

private corporations,” including the requirement of “minimum contacts” with the relevant forum. 

Id. at 815, 817. Plaintiffs have opted for the alter-ego route, contending that ZMDC is not 

entitled to due process protections due to the Republic’s substantial control over it. The Court 

agrees. Since ZMDC and the Republic are alter egos, personal jurisdiction over ZMDC is 

satisfied by subject matter jurisdiction and service.10 As the Court has already concluded it may 

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over ZMDC, all that is left to consider is service.11 And the 

Court finds service was proper: Plaintiffs served ZMDC pursuant to the “special arrangement”

in the 2007 and 2008 MOUs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(1). 

The FSIA creates a “hierarchical regime for the appropriate methods of service” on 

agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state. Est. of Hartwick v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 

18-cv-1612, 2021 WL 6805391, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2021). The first-choice method in the 

10 Defendants claim Plaintiffs “cannot rely on contradictory arguments” to establish 

jurisdiction and therefore cannot contend ZMDC is an “instrumentalit[y] [or] agenc[y]” after 

arguing it is Zimbabwe’s “alter ego.” Defs.’ Reply at 24. The two theories offered by Plaintiffs 

are not contradictory: ZMDC can be both an instrumentality and an alter ego of the Republic. In 

fact, the D.C. Circuit defined the alter-ego doctrine as applying to a “sovereign” that dominates 

its “instrumentality.” See Transamerica, 200 F.3d at 848 (“A sovereign is amenable to suit based 

upon the actions of an instrumentality it dominates because the sovereign and the instrumentality 

are in those circumstances not meaningfully distinct entities; they act as one.”).

11 As noted above, Defendants made, and the Court rejected, the contention that subject 

matter jurisdiction over ZMDC does not lie because service in the Zambian award proceedings 

was allegedly improper and because ZMDC’s waiver does not extend to this suit. 
16 

hierarchy, and the one Plaintiffs used, allows a party to effect service by “deliver[ing] [] a copy 

of the summons and complaint in accordance with [a] special arrangement for service between 

the plaintiff and the agency or instrumentality.” 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(1). The MOUs contain the 

following “special arrangement”:

The Parties choose the following physical addresses at which documents in legal 

proceedings or any written notices in connection with this MOU may be served. . 

. . Any notice given in terms of this MOU shall be in writing and shall if 

delivered by hand to a responsible person during ordinary business hours at the 

physical address chosen as its domicilium citandi et executandi be deemed to have 

been duly received by the addressee. 

Am. Compl. Ex. B §§ 12.8.1–2 (emphasis added); Am. Compl. Ex. D §§ 10.9.1–2 (emphasis 

added). The MOUs further provide that “a written notice or communication actually received by 

one of the Parties from the other Party shall be adequate written notice or communication to such 

Party.” Am. Compl. Ex. B § 12.8; Am. Compl. Ex. D § 10.9. 

Plaintiffs complied with the special arrangement in the MOUs: They hand delivered 

copies of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit to Theresa Kanengoni, “a secretary for 

Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation,” who “stated that she was authorized to accept 

service” for ZMDC. Return of Service [ECF No. 24] ¶¶ 2–4.12

12 As Plaintiffs acknowledge, they hand delivered the papers to a different address than 

the one listed for ZMDC in the MOUs. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 37; Return of Service ¶ 3. ZMDC 

does not suggest that this change rendered service improper, and, in any event, service was still 

proper for several reasons. First, prior to the date of service, ZMDC notified Plaintiffs that its 

address had changed. See Second Declaration of Steven K. Davidson, Ex. 1 [ECF No. 32–2]. 

And, as other courts have noted, it would be “senseless” to attempt service at a location plaintiffs 

know the defendant does not occupy. Int’l Rd. Fed’n v. Embassy of the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, 131 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251 (D.D.C. 2001). Second, the MOUs allow some wiggle 

room; they provide that “a written notice or communication actually received by one of the 

Parties from the other Party shall be adequate written notice or communication to such Party.” 

Am. Compl. Ex. B § 12.8 (emphasis added); Am. Compl. Ex. D § 10.9 (emphasis added). 

Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) also permits some flexibility: “[S]ection 1608(b) may be satisfied 

by technically faulty service that gives adequate notice to the foreign state.” Transaero, Inc. v. 
17 

ZMDC contends that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the MOUs’ special service provision for 

two reasons: (1) the MOUs were terminated as a result of the arbitration proceedings and (2) 

even if the MOUs’ service provisions survived contract termination, they do not apply in a 

proceeding to enforce an arbitration award. Defs.’ Reply at 24–25. 

As to the first contention, other district courts, including at least one in this district, have 

held that service under the FSIA can be effected pursuant to a special service provision in a 

terminated contract. In G.E. Transp. S.P.A. v. Republic of Albania, for example, petitioners 

sought confirmation of an arbitral award against the Republic of Albania. 693 F. Supp. 2d 132, 

133 (D.D.C. 2010). Even though the arbitral tribunal determined the underlying contract was no 

longer in effect (in fact, the tribunal determined the contract never “enter[ed] into force” because 

Albania “prevented [its] reali[z]ation”), the district court still held the petitioners could rely on 

the contract’s special service provision. Id. at 136–37; Petition, Ex. A at 60, G.E. Transp. S.P.A. 

v. Republic of Albania, 693 F. Supp. 2d 132, 133 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 08-cv-2042), ECF No. 1–

1. Likewise in Arbitration Between Space Systems/Loral, Inc. v. Yuzhnoye Design Office, the 

court found “[t]he fact that [the plaintiff] purported to terminate the contract at some point before 

serving its petition [did] not prohibit it from using the special arrangement established” in the 

contract. 164 F. Supp. 2d 397, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 

 This view—that special service provisions can survive contract termination—accords 

with the Supreme Court’s holding in Nolde Brothers, Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery and 

Confectionary Workers Union. 430 U.S. 243 (1977). There, the Supreme Court considered 

whether a mandatory arbitration clause (and not a special service provision) survived contract 

La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Agudas Chasidei Chabad 

of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 798 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying a “substantial 

compliance” standard to service of agencies or instrumentalities under § 1608(b)). 
18 

termination and therefore governed the parties’ dispute over severance pay. Id. at 244. The 

arbitration clause at issue provided that “‘any grievance’ arising between the parties was subject 

to binding arbitration.” Id. at 245. The Supreme Court found the arbitration clause governed: A 

contract provision “survive[s] contract termination when the dispute [i]s over an obligation 

arguably created by the expired agreement.” 430 U.S. 243, 252 (1977) (citing John Wiley & 

Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 552 (1964)); see also Livingston, 376 U.S. at 553 (a 

provision requiring arbitration for any disputes “arising out of or relating to [the] agreement, or 

its interpretation or application, or enforcement” survived termination). 

The same is true here for MOUs’ special service provisions. Though the arbitral panel 

considered a number of arguments, the core of the dispute was whether ZMDC illegally 

cancelled the MOUs. See Am. Compl. Ex. A ¶¶ 7–8, 92, 179. A dispute about whether a 

contract can be cancelled—or, put differently, whether a contract remains binding—is a dispute 

“over an obligation [] created” by the contract. The special service provision therefore survived 

contract termination.

 Second, ZMDC contends that the service provisions do not cover actions to enforce 

arbitral judgments. This comes down to contract interpretation. As noted above, the MOUs’ 

service provisions provide (1) that “documents in legal proceedings or any written notices in 

connection with this MOU may be served” at listed addresses and (2) that “[a]ny notice given in 

terms of this MOU . . . shall[,] if delivered by hand to a responsible person . . . at the physical 

address chosen as its domicilium citandi et executandi[,] be deemed to have been duly received.” 

Am. Compl. Ex. B §§ 12.8.1–2 (emphasis added); Am. Compl. Ex. D §§ 10.9.1–2 (emphasis 

added). 
19 

 The MOUs’ service provisions extend to the current case. Domicilium citandi et 

executandi is a term in Zimbabwean and South African law that refers to the address for service 

of process. See Pls.’ Opp’n at 36; Christian Schulze, Practical Problems Regarding the 

Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments, 17 S. Afr. Mercantile L. J. 125, 131 (2005) (“[A] 

domicilium citandi et executandi” refers to a “domicile for the purpose of facilitating service of 

process and levying execution.”). Because the MOUs used this term of art, it is clear the parties 

intended for hand-delivery to the chosen location to satisfy service of process in legal 

proceedings. 

Defendants nevertheless contend that the service provisions’ phrase “in connection with 

this MOU” renders the provisions inapplicable to actions to enforce arbitral judgments. See

Defs.’ First Reply [ECF No. 34] at 9–10 (“Under section 12.8 and section 10 of MOUs, ZMDC 

only agreed to accept service of ‘documents in legal proceedings or any written notices in 

connection with the’ MOUs . . . . Plaintiffs are not seeking relief under the MOUs, such as a 

finding of a breach of the MOUs. Rather, the Complaint is connected to the Zambian High 

Court’s order.”). Yet the D.C. Circuit has held that the phrase “in connection with” is “quite 

broad.” Azima v. RAK Inv. Auth., 926 F.3d 870, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2019). It is equivalent to the 

phrase “in relation to,” and a dispute arises “in relation to” an agreement so long as “the origin of 

the dispute is related to that agreement, meaning it has some logical or causal connection to the 

agreement.” Id. (cleaned up). Applying these definitions, the D.C. Circuit rejected the notion 

that a claim “is ‘in connection with’ a contract only when ‘the dispute occurs as a fairly direct 

result of the performance of contractual duties.’” Id. at 878. Though the current suit is now 

several steps removed from the original arbitration, it still has a direct “logical or causal 

connection” to the MOUs. Plaintiffs won an arbitration award finding Defendants illegally 
20 

terminated the MOUs, a Zambian court confirmed that award, and now Plaintiffs seek to have it 

enforced. 

Moreover, the MOUs specifically contemplated that the parties might dispute the 

confirmation or enforcement of awards. See Am. Compl. Ex. B § 11 (“[A]ny Party may submit 

[a] dispute to ICC International Court of Arbitration in Paris for arbitration . . . , the award of 

which shall be final and binding upon all Parties.”); Am. Compl. Ex. D § 9 (same). See also

Yuzhnoye Design Off., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (finding a special service provision applied to 

arbitration enforcement actions because the parties’ contract “specifically contemplate[d] that 

‘disputes between the [p]arties arising out of [the contract]’ [would] be submitted to arbitration 

and that the parties [could] apply for judicial confirmation of an arbitration award”). “If 

[ZMDC] had wished to mark a narrower boundary for th[e] [service] clause[s], [it] could have 

easily done so.” Azima, 926 F.3d at 878.. It did not, so it cannot now claim that service 

pursuant to the special arrangements was improper. 

The personal jurisdiction equation is therefore solved: The Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over ZMDC and Plaintiffs properly served ZMDC, ergo the Court has personal 

jurisdiction over ZMDC. 

C. Failure to State a Claim

Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to 

establish an alter-ego relationship. As Defendants acknowledge, however, the standard under 

Rule 12(b)(6) is “more forgiving than that applicable to allegations for establishing personal and 

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Mot. Dismiss at 31. See also Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in 

Washington v. Pruitt, 319 F. Supp. 3d 252, 256 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The standard to survive a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is less forgiving” than Rule 12(b)(6)’s standard.) Thus, 
21 

for the reasons explained above, the Court finds Plaintiffs have pled facts sufficient to establish 

that the Republic and ZMDC are alter egos. 

The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss. To avoid juggling two 

complaints and because the Amended Complaint reincorporates the original complaint’s 

allegations against the Chief Mining Commissioner, the Amended Complaint shall be the 

operative complaint for all three defendants. 

IV. Conclusion 

For these reasons, it is hereby 

ORDERED that [ECF No. 42] Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that [ECF No. 46] Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery is 

DENIED as moot. It is further

ORDERED that the Amended Complaint shall be the operative complaint in this case. It 

is further

ORDERED that the Republic, ZMDC, and the Chief Mining Commissioner are directed 

to file an answer to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint by March 11, 2024. 

SO ORDERED. 

 

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER

United States District Judge

Date: February 9, 2024