The Attorney General of Texas 

August 15, 1979 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney Geaeml 

Honorable Robert I%. Stewart 

Commissioner 

Department of Banking 

2601 North Lamar 

Austin, Texas 76705 

Opinion No. RW-44 

Re: Definition of “central building” in article 342-903, V.T.C.S. 

Dear Commissioner Stewart: 

You have asked our opinion regarding the meaning of the term vcentral 

building,” as it is used $n article 342-903, V.T.C.S., which provides in part: 

No State, national or private bank shall engage in 

business in mom than one place, maintain any branch 

office, or cash checks or receive deposits except in 

its own banking house. For purposes of this article 

‘banking house’ means the building in whose offices 

the business of the bank is conducted and which is 

functionslly .one place of business, including 63 office 

facilities whose nearest wall is located withii five 

hundred (500) feet of the nearest wall of the central 

building and is physically .connected to ‘the central 

building by tunnel, pamageway or hallway providiig 

direct access between the central building and the 

connected office facility or by closed circuit 

television or pneumatic tube or other physically 

connected delivery device, and (b) in addition, if 

authorized in the manner her&after provided, not 

more than one (D automabile drive-in facility whose 

nearest boundary is located within two. thousand 

(2,000) feet of the nearest wall of the central building 

but more than five hundred (500) feet therefrom and 

is connected to the central building by tunnel, 

passageway or hallway providii direct access 

between ‘the central buildii and the connected 

automobile drive-in facility or by closed circuit 

. . televmion,. pneumatic tube cr other physically 

connected delivery device. The entire bankii house 

shall for all purposes under the law be considered one 

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Honorable Robert K. Stewart - Page Two .(NW-44) 

integral banking house. The term 5automcbiie drive-in facility’ as 

herein used shall mean a facility offering banking services solely to 

persons who arrive at such facility in an automobile and remain 

therein during the transaction of business with the bank. 

You specifically inquire whether the term “central building” encompasses the entire 

building within which a bank’s business is conducted or whether it refers only to that part 

of the building actually used to conduct the bank’s business. The cardinal rule in 

construing the language of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Minton 

v. Frank, 545 B.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1976). In so doii, it is appropriate to look first to the 

statute itself. Jones v. Del Andersen & Associates, 539 S.W.Bd 346 (Tex. l976). Although 

the term “central building” is not specifically defined, its use in context with other terms 

in the statute is consistent throughout. Office and drivein facilities are never referred to 

as “buildings.” That word is used only in the term “central building,” which ‘refers to the 

phrase “the building in whose offices the business of the bank is conducted.” (Emphasis 

added). The latter phrase is used to define the term “banking house,” which includes 

office and drive-in facilities not located in the central buildiig. The statute consistently 

distinguishes between buildings and additional facilities. This evidences the ~legislative 

intent that the entire building in whose offices the bank% business is mainly conducted is 

the “central building.” We believe that the term “central building” is not limited to that 

portion of the building actually occupied by the bank for the conduct of its business; 

Although we have been unable to find any case directly on point; Great Plains Life 

Insurance Co. v. First National Bank of Lubbock, 316 B.W.Bd 96 (Tex. Civ. App. - 

Amarillo lSS6. writ rePd n.r.e.1, involved a drive-in facilitv ccnsistimz of leased soace in a 

building mected by pneumat& tubes to the bank building proper.’ ?‘he court in ihat case 

quoted with approval the Kentucky case of. Marvin v. Kentucky Title ‘Trust Co., 216, Ky. 

135, 291 S.W. 17, 16 (KY. Ct. App. 1927). Both the Texas court and the Kentucky court 

apparently recognized the distinctions between the main bank’building and any other 

outlying additional office facilities. See also Attorney General Opinion M-649 (1971). We 

note that it is not uncommon for ~banks to occupy only a portion of the buildii that 

constitutes their banking house, the remainder of the building being occupied by other 

~entities. In a prior Attorney General Opinion concerning the propriety of a bank’s 

acquiring a certain building for’ its banking house, this office stated: ” 

We cannot ‘close our eyes to the fact that in many instances - 

perhaps in most instances - our better bsnks .occupy their own 

buildings consisting of several, sometimes many stories, ‘and much, 

if not most of the flcor space is not actually u&d by the bank in 

conducting its banking business but is rented out. There can be no 

valid objection to this if the major good faith purpose of the 

acquisition or construction of the building be to provide a bankii 

house for the institution. 

Attorney General Opinion O-2691 (1940). 

You inform us that you would construe the entire building to be the central building, 

although the bank might occupy only the ground floor. You applied a similar construction 

P- 131. 
Honorable Robert E. Stewart - Page Three (RI+44) 

in approving an office facility of the Greenway Bank d( Trust ‘to be located Within five 

hundred feet of the nearest w.all of the large building complex wherein were located the 

bank’s main banking offices, To the extent necessary to resolve ambiguities in the 

meaning of the statute, the construction placed upon. it by the agency charged with its 

administration is entitled to weight in the courts. Ex parte Roloff, 510 B.W.%d 913 (Tex.. 

1974); Cslvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W.%d 605 (Tex. 1966). 

You ask whether a psrticular complex known as Allen Center constitutes a central 

building as that term is used in article 342-903, V.T.C.B. The answer to your question 

requires the resolution of fact questions, which cannot be done in the opinion process. Bee 

Attorney General Opinions H-llO6 (1977)i M-649 (lS7B. 

- 

You also inquire whether the subterranean walls of a central building may be used as 

measuring points between the central building and the proposed office facility. We 

believe that the subterranean wslls of the central building may be used as the measuring 

point. This recognizes the common practice in modern architecture. of incorporating 

greenbelt landscaping and building setbacks for aesthetic purposes The result is that 

subterranean walls of such buildings extend farther th@n do the building walls located 

above the surface of the ground. We see no prohibition in the statute egainst the use of 

the subterranean walls in the central building as the measuring point in the application of 

the distance restrictions imposed by law. 

On the contrary, the statute provides that the connection between the central 

building and the office facilities may be by passageway, hallw+y,.cr tunneL V.T.C.B. art. 

342-903. Thelatter term implies subterranean structure, ,and.sugges&!%! the~legislature 

did not intend to limit’& relationshmbetween the central buildins and the office facilitv 

to aboveground structures. Indeed, many bsnks use’ undergro&d floor space in the& 

banking houses. Bee Houston National Bank v. Adair, 207 S.W.Bd ‘374 .(Tex. 1946) (bank 

located its safe-&&sit boxes in the basement of its building). We’ do not believe, 

however, that the statute should be construed to &low~ two or in&buildings to constitute 

one central. building’ mealy ‘because thdy are connected by tunhel, passageway, or 

underground driveway. such a broad construction could run.afoul qf the statutory and 

constitutional proscriptions that no bank shall enage in business in .more thanone place. 

Tex. Const. hart. XVI, S 16; V.T.C.S. art. 342-903. It is well settled that, to’ the extent 

that a statute may be ambiguous.. it should be given that construction which will render it 

constitutional. Key Westein Life Insurance &J. v. State Board of Insurance, 350 S.W%d 

639 ~(Tex. 1961). We also emohasixe that anv liven bank consistinn of the cenirai buildina. 

and any additional office .& drive& fachi&s must be used & a .unit, devoted to in’ 

common purpose, and that they must together constitute but one integral banking house. 

V.T.C.S. art. 342-903; Attorney General Opinion V-1046 (1950);~ Letter Advisory No. 96 

(1975). 

S~,MM.ARY 

The term “central building,” as it .is used in article”342-903, 

V.T.C.S., encompa&es the entire ,building in whose offices the 

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Honorable Robert R. Stewart - Page Four (Mw-44) 

business of the bank is conducted, and it is not limited only to that 

Portion of the building that is actually being used to conduct the 

bank’s business. The term also permits the subterranean walls of 

the central building to be used as.8 measuring point for purposes of 

determining whether additional office facilities are within the 

distance limitations imposed by the statute. 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

TED L. HARTLEY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Pqsred by Tom Rutledge 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVRD: ‘. 

OPINION COMMITTEE. 

C. Robert Heath, Chairman 

David B. Brooks 

Susan Garrison 

Rick Gilpm 

Tom Pollan 

Wiiam G Reid 

Tom Rutledge 

Bruce Youngblood 

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