-SEW Coe System

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FRCO E

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

January 21, 1971

NOTE FOR DR. NAKA

. • 71.

. •••!

. SUBJECT: SALT Debriefing

• As you are aware, you, Dr. Seamans

and Dr. Mamas are scheduled to be

briefed by General Allison on February 1.

Attached for your information is a

record memorandum reflecting the

thoughts passed to Colonel Sweeney and

the staff on January 19, by Col Paul

Vonlns and Capt Bill McLean of Gen Allison's

staff.

Col Sweeney raised an interesting point

during the January 19 debriefing about

USIB involvement. I share the notion

that USIB should begin generating some

interest in the requirements as opposed

to the capability for verification. Our

systems are capable but no real assessment

has been made on the required intensity.

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of verification and the effect of

this on our total mix of resources

during a year-by-year verification

process. This may be a point worthy

of mention in your future discussions

on SALT.

-SECRETHAROLD S. COYLE, JR.

Major, USAF
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1St- NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF January 21, 1971

ME)VRANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Debriefing on the SALT Negotiations

Colonel VonIns and Capt McLean debriefed the staff on

January 20, on the current status of the SALT talks.

Colonel VonIns led off the debriefing by explaining the

proceedings of SALT I at Helsinki, and SALT II at Vienna.

SALT I consisted of the U. S. tabling two kinds of

"illustrative" proposals to show what types of an

agreement could be made. SALT II ended with the U. S.

tabling a definitive proposal, sometimes referred to as

'Option E". The proposal, directed by NSDM 74 remains

the U. S. position. It is less comprehensive than the

proposals prepared earlier under NSSM 28 but did include

mention of specific verification of the agreement by

"national means."

Capt McLean then explained what had occurred during

SALT III at Helsinki, which ended December 18. The U. S.

stand during this round was one of "standing fast" on the

tabled proposal and to let the Soviets do the talking.

Several topics of interest arose during both formal and

informal discussions.

1. The Soviets began "piecemealing out" counters

to the U. S. proposal but never wrapped this up. Then

toward the end of the round the Soviets tabled an "ABM only"

proposal which was tabled with blanks for radius permitted

.1 and numbers of systems to be positioned around Moscow and

Washington. The Soviets apparently are treating their
TOP-SECRET

proposal as their beginning position and not their final

one. This has implications for the decision on the U. S.

FY 72 budget for the SAFEGUARD system.

2. There were informal discussions relating

to verification by "national means." The formal proposal

set forth some points which appear to confirm that the

Soviets desire to protect their own satellite capability.

OSD legal people feel that there were no traps in the

Soviet proposal with regards to a potential dispute over

what constitutes national sovereignty. The Soviets have

privately discussed their desire to keep the overhead

reconnaissance effort viable and it is indicated that

they have a sincere desire to retain their capability.

There is an implied "understanding" of non-interference

with national means as well as an "understanding" of no

deliberate concealment which deviates from established

practices of construction and building.

Colonel VonIns then went on to discuss the matter

of Inter-Agency papers in support of policy decisions

affecting the SALT negotiations. He stated that there

had been 42 Inter-Agency papers generated by the National

Security Council between SALT II and SALT III. Only two

or three of these papers ever reached the top decision

group. After explaining the mechanism for working these

papers Colonel VonIns speculated that the preparation for

SALT IV to begin in Vienna on March 15 will be more

rational and there will be fewer study requests generated.

There are presently four papers under review at this time

which are considered meaningful for the negotiations.

These are verification of mobile ICBM's, fixed ICBM's,

SAM upgraded to ABM capability, and strategic forces

survivability. There is still apparently a desire to

review and reassess the October 1969 Verification Panel

Study. Mr. Kissinger's present feelings are that the four

papers mentioned above, especially the strategic forces

survivability paper, serve as the reassessment to the

original Verification Panel Study. We share the view of

JCS that a consolidated review of our verification capabilities

directly associated with the tabled proposal should be

accomplished.

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TOVSECREFIn summary there seems to be optimism as to the

potential of reaching a fairly extensive Arms Limitation

Treaty with the Soviets but the question remains—when

will an agreement be reached. No one is willing to

speculate on this. Contrary to the reports in the

press, the Soviet Party Congress which convenes in

March apparently is not expected to have significant

impact on the talks. The NRO will continue to support

the efforts of General Allison's office as required. It

is evident that the NRP is going to be the major element

in the process of evaluating adherence to an Arms

Limitation agreement.

HAROLD S. COYLE, JR.

Major, USAF

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