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M 0 L 

BRIEFING 

POLICY 

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MOL BRIEFING POLICY 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. PROBLEM 1 

II. BACKGROUND 1 

III. COURSES OF ACTION 3 

ALTERNATIVE I 4 

ALTERNATIVE II 7 

ALTERNATIVE III 8 

ALTERNATIVE IV 9 

ALTERNATIVE V 11 

IV. CONCLUSIONS 13 

V. RECOMMENDATION 13 

VI. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 13 

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MOL BRIEFING POLICY 

I. PROBLEM 

It is questionable as to whether we can gain and/or maintain the necessary interest in and support for the MOL program 

among concerned Congressional, military and professional 

groups and still adhere to currently exercised security policy 

and briefing procedures. 

II. BACKGROUND 

We are confronted with some critical MOL information 

request problems caused by the fact that we have a white program with a black mission. As we progress with the program, 

legitimate requirements for information at all classification 

levels will increase, as will the number of requests we cannot 

fulfill that are prompted by our publicly-stated objectives. 

Security and public affairs were considered critical problems by all agencies involved in the decision-making process 

leading to MOL program approval. Concern that domestic and/or 

foreign reaction to MOL might prevent the U. S. from using 

satellites for reconnaissance and the need to protect system 

capability resulted in current security policies. These require 

a person to have special security clearance plus a definite needto-know under a covert control procedure before a complete program briefing can be given. The present MOL security policy 

states that in areas other than those revealing the reconnaissance 

aspects of MOL, a less stringent control will be exercised. It 

implies that other mission objectives may be discussed in the 

normal security environment. The dilemma arises from the fact 

that presently there are no other legitimate program objectives to 

be discussed, and thus we are faced with a difficult, if not dangerous, situation in the white area. 

The MOL program had been discussed publicly since Secretary McNamara identified it in December 1963. Countless military, 

government, contractor and other personnel have been involved in 

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it prior to its reconnaissance mission assignment. A great 

majority of these people do not realize that drastic new security 

restrictions now prohibit even mentioning reconnaissance in connection with MOL, although previous unclassified and published 

Congressional testimony by DOD officials contains such information; and security restrictions make it impossible to apprise most 

of them of the new classification. 

In addition, in the past the Air Force had been conducting 

an extensive public information program on MOL and the requirement for it. There have been many speeches, technical papers 

and professional articles written about all potential aspects of the 

program. The problem was further aggravated by the "high key" 

Presidential announcement of program approval which stressed 

research objectives. 

It is becoming increasingly difficult to put off requests for 

MOL briefings from Congressional sources considered not eligible 

for DORIAN information. We are reluctant to give SECRET-level 

briefings to these people for fear of losing support either through 

their ignorance of the significance of the program or because of 

animosity that could arise from giving complete briefings to some 

and incomplete information to others. There are six Congressional 

committees with direct interest in MOL and other committees and 

individual Congressmen with special interests. Indications are 

that intense interest will be given space station proposals when 

Congress reconvenes. 

Another important but less critical source of requests for 

MOL information is from military commanders. Their interests 

range from the possible future support they may have to provide 

and plan for proposals to participate with operational experiments. 

While it is undesirable to get all of these individuals and their 

staffs DORIAN-cleared and briefed, it would be unwise to discourage and/or alienate them. Who in this category should be 

briefed? What kind of briefing should they be given? What office 

should dispatch negative replies so that requests are not resubmitted at a higher level of authority? 

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Individual scientists, their organizations -- government and 

civilian -- and professional societies are other sources of MOL 

information requests. We cannot continue indefinitely to put off 

these people with an excuse such as: "The program is too new 

to give a meaningful reply." Ultimately they must conclude that 

we really do not have serious intentions of conducting a laboratory program. 

III. COURSES OF ACTION 

Regardless of the course of action to be adopted, there is 

a fundamental need to refine procedures and define in detail the 

methods to be used for responding to pressure for information 

by high-powered peripheral government activities and agencies. 

Five alternative courses of action have been considered: 

1. Cancel Program -- Go Black. 

2. Broaden Black Base. 

3. Move decision point for SECRET-level briefings 

from SAFSL to OSAF. 

4. Change security classification of MOL-reconnaissance 

association to SECRET - Special Access Required. 

5. Develop white objectives for a white program. 

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ALTERNATIVE I 

CANCEL PROGRAM -- GO BLACK 

APPROACH: 

This approach entails having an official at the highest 

executive level, i.e., President, Vice President, or Secretary 

of Defense announcing the cancellation or suspension of the MOL 

program. In order to lend credence to such a statement, existing MOL resources, personnel, facilities, equipment and contracts (white) must disappear. As a result, replies to inquiries 

concerning MOL activities can be answered: "Program cancelled/ 

suspended." 

REQUIREMENTS: 

1. Formal announcement and white memorandum from the 

Executive Office of the President to the Secretary of Defense, 

instructing him to cancel or suspend MOL activities; or announcement by Secretary of Defense. 

2. A black memorandum authorizing the continuation of the 

program under expanded covert management procedures, with 

permission to reallign management and resources to be under 

NRO control. 

3. In the white, direct the SAF to abolish MOL management 

activities in USAF-AFSC -- except as necessary to administer the 

orderly termination of MOL activities, such as: cancellation of 

contracts, the retirement of records, and reassignment of MOL 

resources. 

4. In the black, prepare for the relocation and redesignation of the SSD-MOL SPO, and facilities of contractors. 

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5. In the black, invent a new space program for SSD to 

work on; assign Program Number 782 (SAFSP). 

6. In a white memorandum from the SAF, direct AFSC 

to reassign resources from the MOL to SAFSP Program 782. 

7. In the white, SAFSP write new contracts for 782 

requirements. 

8. Relocate, rearrange, redesignate, and do all those 

things at SSD to give the appearance that the MOL program is 

phasing out. 

9. Relocate, rearrange, redesignate activities at contractor 

facilities to give appearance of close-out. 

10. Reassign all resources to Program 782. Program 782 

writes new contracts to cover industrial operations. 

11. Give DORIAN briefings where necessary to maintain 

the continuity and credibility of the scheme. This may entail 

certain security risks as some people will have to be briefed 

before the usual investigation is completed. 

12. All currently DORIAN-indoctrinated individuals be 

notified of above action through black channels. 

PRO: 

This action will take the constant pressure placed on MOL 

to brief various staff and command elements on MOL activities 

and avoid logistic, funding, purchasing, and technical reviews, 

studies, investigations, inspections, and other committee activities 

normally accomplished by the DOD and Air Staff in management 

control. These activities, if they were to continue at the present 

and anticipated scope and depth, would eventually engulf MOL and 

surface the very secret we must keep submerged. 

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CON: 

Assuming the program goes to fruition with a manned launch, 

it will be impossible to deny the existence of men in space to our 

nation, friends and enemies. By 1968 or later or earlier, stateof-art in space will be such that the nature of the MOL in its space 

environment, its contents and mission, will be easily gleaned by 

at least the Russians. The Russians could choose to tell the 

American public and world that the high official who announced 

cancellation had, in fact, lied. Black Gemini production could be 

tried but not at the present location. Many hundreds, possibly 

thousands, of clearances would be a basic step. Launch, aborts, 

recovery -- voice transmissions from lab to earth, astronaut 

training, astronaut selection, astronaut physicals -- all add 

imponderables to this alternative. To effect a good 782 program 

cover, many additional people will have to be DORIAN briefed. 

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ALTERNATIVE II 

BROADEN BLACK BASE 

APPROACH: 

The approach in this case is to brief DORIAN discreetly 

selected individuals of peripheral agencies and activities having 

a functional interest in MOL. The intention is two-fold: To get 

support from other Air Force staff agencies and commands for 

the MOL program as needed; and to turn off unnecessary pressures 

by well-meaning people trying to do their job. 

A substantial segment of this problem involves the release 

of information to Congress. This matter can be resolved by 

briefing selected Congressmen. There are six Congressional 

committees that have a legitimate need. The chairmen and other 

key members of these committees can be briefed. Allowances for 

off-the-record and on-the-record Congressional testimony can be 

established. 

Other problems concerning individual Congressmen demanding information could be coordinated with General Corbin, Legislative Liaison, and resolved on an individual basis. 

PRO: 

It becomes evident that more clearances are needed when 

comparing the clearance base of DORIAN with other NRO programs. 

There are less than 600 government people cleared for DORIAN. 

There are in excess of 3100 government people cleared for another 

program. 

CON: 

It is necessary in a program such as MOL-DORIAN to restrict 

clearances as much as possible. Each time an additional person is 

briefed, security risk increases. 

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ALTERNATIVE III 

MOVE DECISION POINT FOR SECRET-LEVEL BRIEFINGS 

FROM SAFSL TO OSAF 

APPROACH: 

This approach sets up an escape valve for giving MOL program briefings, when it is decided that the best interest of the 

program dictates giving no briefing rather than insufficient or 

too much (DORIAN) information. 

Since at this time we have no SECRET-level experiments 

or military mission other than reconnaissance to discuss, the 

SECRET-level briefing must by necessity be limited to support, 

booster, space vehicle, and other support. MOL program briefings by SAFSL to responsible staff elements looking for mission 

or mission-related information is pointless. Some requests come 

from sources which cannot be discreetly denied. To effect this 

solution, a memorandum must be signed by the SAF or USAF, 

instructing SAFSL to refer all requests for MOL program briefings to OSAF. 

PRO: 

Relieve pressure on SAFSL from superior and equal agencies 

that cannot be effectively denied a MOL program briefing by SAFSL. 

CON: 

Referring inquiries may hurt support of the programs, i.e., 

we can lose friends we may need -- whether we or SAF turn them 

down. 

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ALTERNATIVE IV 

CHANGE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF MOL-RECONNAISSANCE 

ASSOCIATION TO SECRET - SPECIAL ACCESS REQUIRED 

APPROACH: 

The security policy could be changed to allow identification 

of the reconnaissance mission in briefings protected by only normal special access security classification (5200. 13), not DORIAN. 

The change would permit mention of the mission but would not 

allow disclosure of degree of capability planned or other operational details. 

REQUIREMENTS: 

1. Authority to partially exempt the program from the 

provisions of AFR 190-23. 

2. Revision of the program Security Classification Guide. 

3. Careful preparation of a briefing that would emphasize 

the importance of the program and the vital need for security, 

while supplying enough information to make a plausible reason 

for current plans and operations. 

PRO: 

The new classification would alleviate considerably the 

pressure for information from influential sources not considered 

eligible for a complete DORIAN briefing. It would also eliminate 

the dangerous and embarrassing position we are in when nonDORIAN cleared people ask directly about reconnaissance during 

discussions. At present, our complete avoidance of the subject 

appears to be more startling than our admitting the mission would 

be. Another advantage accrues from being able to answer directly 

and convincingly the question of NASA/DOD duplication. Finally, 

there would still be security classification protection for the 

information. 

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CON: 

Lowering the clearance requirements for this list of information could lead to further security erosion. It could lead to pressure 

for similar downgrading on other space programs. It would also 

increase the danger of inadvertent official confirmation of the program mission in public. 

Security of information pertaining to reconnaissance from 

satellites is controlled by the DNRO and DCI. It is not very likely 

that they will change policy. Even if they wanted to change policy, 

approval from the President's office may be required. There is 

considerable evidence that the Executive level wants to keep very 

secure the association between MOL and reconnaissance. 

It is difficult to envision a briefing or discussion stopping at 

the revelation of MOL having a reconnaissance mission. Once 

that door is opened, inevitably deeper probes must be made which 

could threaten the various structures and programs depending upon 

special security for reconnaissance programs. 

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ALTERNATIVE V 

DEVELOP WHITE OBJECTIVES FOR A WHITE PROGRAM 

APPROACH: 

This approach is based on the premise that as long as the 

MOL program is discussed openly and it is white, it needs white 

objectives. It is necessary that a bona fide experiments program 

be developed so that the white program objectives are indeed 

meaningful and not merely a cover which can be easily penetrated. 

REQUIREMENTS: 

1. Develop a versatile white experiments program which 

can both serve usefully in the R&D of military space programs 

and be used for official white discussion of MOL objectives. 

2. This implies the broadening of the scope of the MOL 

program from its present status, but not beyond the originally 

approved three levels of program objectives. 

3. As a consequence of admitting to and fostering tertiary 

objectives, there is a need to provide either piggyback space and 

crew time on primary mission flights or set aside separate 

vehicles for white missions, or both. 

PRO: 

1. Since the President has made a MOL program announcement and stated some of its objectives, it is relatively easy to 

follow up on that and continue with a limited set of white objectives. 

2. The GE contract, which presently is mostly black and, 

therefore, raises a lot of questions, could be better protected by 

expanding its scope to include additional white experiments. 

3. Open discussion of white MOL objectives promotes better 

relations with Congress and thus stimulates support. 

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4. The existence of white objectives allows meaningful 

briefings to be given to military and other government personnel 

of high rank, satisfying their repeated requests for briefings and 

possibly leading to new experiment or objective definitions. 

5. The existence of white objectives provides a suitable 

cover against enemy penetration of mission capability as well as 

political and international speculation and embarrassment. 

CON: 

1. The serious consideration of experimental objectives 

in addition to the primary reconnaissance objective will require 

significant funding increases which may be as high as $200 million 

if several flights are to be added to carry experiments. 

2. Additional objectives will not only burden financial 

resources but also government and contractor manpower, and 

will always be cause for dispute on priorities, design optimizations and distractions from a single-minded pursuit of primary 

goals. 

3. The existence of white objectives encourages the spread 

of publicity and public discussions of MOL, which is contrary to 

the policy and generally accepted desire of minimizing public 

release on MOL. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 

1. Alternatives I and IV seem too difficult to accomplish. 

2. Alternative V is an excellent solution, but cannot be 

accomplished immediately. 

3. Regardless of the approach chosen, procedures must 

be written for: 

a. Authorizing DORIAN clearances. 

b. Replying to MOL program briefing requests from 

individual Congressmen. 

c. Giving MOL program information in Congressional 

hea rings . 

d. Briefing Congressional committees. 

e. Giving negative responses to requests for MOL 

program briefings received from various staff, command and other 

military and government elements. 

V. RECOMMENDATION 

It is recommended that a combination of Alternatives II and III 

be adopted. The necessary detailed procedures need to be written 

and approved. It is further recommended that we should exert 

every effort to develop a white experiment program so that we can 

eventually adopt Alternative V, modified by II and III. The basic 

mechanism for. Alternative V is already inherent in the present 

MOL security policy. 

VI. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY 

A. ALTERNATIVE I -- "Cancel Program -- Go Black": 

This alternative has too many imponderables, such as 

how to explain Gemini production, launch base activity with astronauts, possible aborts, recovery, astronaut medical care, selection and training. Additionally, the cost of relocating, camouflage, 

cover and additional clearances makes this alternative clearly 

unacceptable. 

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B. ALTERNATIVE II -- "Broaden Black Base": 

This alternative is in essence not a liberalization of 

DORIAN briefing policy but is a consequence of the realization of 

the fact that a complete manned system like MOL needs a large 

number of people to be involved in the process of continuously 

supporting the program. Specifically, this alternative would 

solve some of the briefing problem, but still would not be effective 

in turning off people who should not be briefed DORIAN. 

C. ALTERNATIVE III -- "Move Decision Point for SECRETLevel Briefings from SAFSL to OSAF": 

The immediate effect of this solution will be, it appears, 

a reduction of requests for briefings. However, the major weak 

point of this solution is that the requestor is alienated in his support 

of the MOL program if he is denied his request, whether it be from 

SAFSL or OSAF. This alternative has an escape valve and, used 

with discretion coupled with the solution suggested in Alternative II, 

should prove helpful. 

D. ALTERNATIVE IV -- "Change Security Classification of 

MOL-Reconnaissance Association to SECRET - SAR": 

Although it is true that briefings should be more factual, 

the major political problems in dealing with other agencies involved 

in reconnaissance activity appear overwhelming. The time that it 

would take to change policy, pressing of this alternative as a solution to the problem is not practical. 

E. ALTERNATIVE V -- "Development of White Objectives 

for a White Program": 

The original security policy was developed under the 

assumption that there would be white objectives in a white program. 

The adoption of this solution would solve the problem of relieving 

pressures of the MOL program briefings for most sources of concern. However, Alternative II, which suggests expanding the 

briefing base to include members of Congress, would be an essential 

adjunct. 

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The main problem in implementing this alternative would 

be trying to identify white objectives (experiments), select contractors, and initiate contracts. Also, additional time and effort would 

be required to justify the funding for these objectives. 

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