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AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE 

WASHINGTON 25. D, C. 

ATTN OF: MSF 

SUBJECT: TagboarcL.+8t 

TO: SCG (General Schriever) 

1. The attached study analyzes the Tagboard systeITl froITl the standpoint of operational effectiveness, risks involved in its use, and costs. 

The study recoITlITlends terITlination of the Tagboard prograITl. 

6;15- '- . 2::)Because AFSC and the Air Force have no accepted responsibility 

e Iii tJr$t the Tagboard prograITl, the conduct of this study ITlay be considered 

rf 11:~, ,0 by SOITle people to constitute unwarranted interference with another ff q, ~J.tt,e.organizationls prograITls. Since AFSC actions in the cove.E,!..!econnaissance 

Irll<-) area are dependent on personnel clearances and the willingness of others 

(Iyte>, to discuss probleITls with us, we should be careful in the handling of this 

study so as to not get the wrong people ITlad at us at the wrong tiITle. 

3. It is recoITlITlended that the ITlaterial in this study be discussed only 

at the Secretarial level or higher (Mr. Zuckert, Mr. Gilpatric, Dr. 

Wiesner). It has been alleged that Dr. Fubini was the original supporter 

of Tagboard and it is, therefore, possible that an approach at the Fubini 

level or below ITlight be considered a personal affront and suffer in proper 

staffing or handling. It is preferred that the study be considered an inhouse docuITlent and only be used as the b .... asis for discussions. If we can 

generate concern at the higher levels and have questions passed down to 

the staffs on reliability, costs, etc., it is quite possible that the study 

recoITlITlendation would be achieved. This approach ITlay be enhanced by 

the present shortage of funds for prope r R -12 support. If this indirect 

approach doesn It work we could, after consideration of the pos sible 

consequences, try a ITlore direct approach. 

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FORGING MILITARY SPACEPOWER 

BYE 11451-63 

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TAGBOARD STUDY 

18 October 1963 

Prepared by: 

Director of Advanced Methodology 

(MSFAL) 

Hq Air Force Systems Command 

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have an OXCART clearance 

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I. 

II. 

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PRO BLEM: Should the US Support the Tagboard (MD-2l) Program.? 

CRITERIA: ,[:: F N ;:: .r-i ,d L 

~·vdPl!.. 

A. ~ To warrant support, the Tagboard system. should pos ses s a 

reconnaissance capCl"i?iJ.ity not available through other system.s 

or its cost/effectiveness should be better than com.peting system.s. 

B. Aside from. costs and capability, this system. m.ust have 

characteristics such that its utilization should be approved by 

the President. That is, that the risks inherent in its use are 

sufficiently lov/ and are outweighed by the value of the reconnais sance data to be obtained. 

III. ASSUMP TIONS: 

A. The only i~p.~~tant application of the Tagboard system. (MD-2l) -7 

is the covert peacetim.e reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. 

IV. FACTUAL DATA 

A. Tab A provides inform.ation on the nature of the Tagboard program. 

including perform.ance, cost, and schedule s and a brief technical 

evaluation/discussion of som.e of the problem.s. 

B. Tab B provides a sum.m.ary of USAF experience on aerodynam.ic 

m.issile reliability. 

C. Tab C is an analysis of the relative survivability of the A-12 and 

Tagboard system.s in the current peacetim.e Soviet environm.ent. 

D. Tab D gives a com.parison of the reconnaissance sensor perform.ance 

for the Tagboard, A-12, and R-12 system.s. 

E. Tab E is an analysis of Air Force experience in the recovery of 

capsules ejected from. satellites. 

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V. DISCUSSION: 

2 

A. Effectiveness: 

For this study, the reliability, survivability, reconnaissance 

sensor performance and probability of data recovery will be 

reviewed as indicators of effectivene ss. Tabs B, C, D, and E 

provide information on these factors. The following summary 

can be made of that data: 

1. Reliability. USAF experience on the GAM-72, GAM-77, and 

Bomarc B indicates that the in-flight reliability of aerodynamic 

missiles of similar or less complexity compared to the D-2l 

range from 56% to 78% according to the weighting given to 

? partial succes s. Since many of the test flights had limited 

objectives, it is probable that many of the partial successes 

should be charged as failures for an ope rational type study. 

This would result in an in-flight reliability experience much 

less than 78%. It is interesting to note that none of the 

missiles examined (including the unsophisticated Q-2C) 

achieved much over 80% in-flight reliability during their test 

programs. Although there are differences between the D-2l 

and missiles reviewed, it would be considered optimistic to 

expect the D-2l to achieve an in-flight reliability of 800/0 without a much longer, more extensive and expensive development 

program than is now planned. 

2. Survivability. It is expected that the radar cross section of 

~~----~----------------------~------~------~~--~--~------

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0-1 1.-

those values. U sing cons ervative estimates of Soviet SAM 

capabilities, the following conclusions on relative survivability 

of the A-12 and D -21 can be made (See Tab C): 

a. Neither the A-12 or D-2l can expect to penetrate Without) ---,-7 

detection. 

b. Survivability of either vehicle is dependent on the need 

for near perfect performance of the SAM battery tracking 

radars. 

c. Against the Fruit Set !fBI! tracking radar with pe rfect radar 

and SAM missile performance, the D-21 would gain immunity 

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with a track offset of 15 to ZO nm while the A-lZ would 

require offsets of ZO to 30 nm. Considering differences 

in navigation capability, the D-Zl would have to be programmed for nearly as much track off-set as the A-IZ 

to achieve equal immunity from a particular SAM battery. 

There is no apparent basis for crediting the D-Zl with 

significantly better survivability than the A-IZ. 

3. Reconnaissance Sensor Performance. The photographic 

sensors of the D-Zl and A-IZ vehicles are expected to give 

equivalent performance. It is interesting to note that the 

R-IZ, a derivation of the A-IZ, provides improved photographic 

resolution and accommodates a large assortment of active and 

passive sensors which could probably be adapted to the A-IZ if 

future requirements dictate. 

4. Data Recovery. The recovery of the data from the D-Zl 

involves air pick-up or surface recovery of a capsule similar 

to but much b:~~ than that used on the Discoverer program. 

The last two years I experience on the Discoverer capsule .if 

recovery program (involving 31 attempts) indicates at most p1 () ~;uA 

an 84% probability of recovery of the D-Zl data unless great/' oL. l ! 

improvement is made in recovery techniques and design ./ J-. 

reliability. The A-IZ £lys horne with its data or, in an emergency, would recover at a foreign base. The probability of 

recovering the A-IZ reconnaissance data after an otherwise 

succes sful mis sion is very high. 

5. Effectiveness Summary. The much higher in-flight reliability 

of the A-IZ together with its better method of data recovery 

will make it much more effective than the Tagboard (MD-Zl) 

system. Both systems are believed to have substantially 

equivalent ability to survive probable enemy action and they 

have equivalent reconnaissance sensor capabilities. 

B. Presidential approval to conduct covert overflight reconnaissance. 

1. General. Peripheral and ove r£light reconnais sance must be 

specifically approved by the President. It is presumed that 

the President will approve such operations when, at the time in 

question, the need for specific reconnaissance warrants the 

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risks involved (in his opinion). Everyone will agree with 

, the general need for intelligence data but the urgency that 

f ~)! will be attached to it varies from time to time and with the " S .-,- /' V 'j \.I personal views of the President. On the other hand, except 

i~ (; ~ i (;J{ rf as political/diplomatic events (i. e., imminent Summit 

\ ,,'cr-l \.. ,(ill ,~\ e, Conferences, etc.) affect risks for a short period, the risks 

"I-t\ V,,-V pll r' ..-.seem amenable to fairly long term analysis. With either the 

C". it 1~9. tit .rcYA-IZ or the Tagboard (D-ZI) system, the risks primarily 

4V fl . .« ff· involve whether the vehicles go down in Soviet territory and 

o ,'I t what, if anything, the Soviets can do with the resulting evidence 

4 

CiJ"J to embarrass us. The A-IZ and D-ZI will be compared on that 

basis. 

Z. The occurrences which could res ult in either of the vehicles 

going down in enemy territory are in-flight failures, which 

may be measured by reliability, or by hostile enemy action 

which may be measured in terms of survivability. We have 

examined the reliability of drones/missiles in Tab Band 

find that experience indicates a ::::robable in-flight reliability 

of less than 80% for the D-Zl (it could. be much less). This 

compares unfavorably with the in-flight reliability of manned 

aircraft. From the survivability analysis (Tab C), it was 

concluded that the survivability of the D -21 would not be I 

significantly different from that of the A-IZ. It appears then 

that the use of the D-Zl would be much more risky than use 

of the A-IZ from the standpoint of lea'li ng incriminating 

evidence within the Soviet Union. 

3. If either the A-IZ or Tagboard (D -Zl) go down in the Soviet 

Union for any reason, it is difficult to estimate the final 

condition of the wreckage. Both systems will eIllploy destruct 

packages to destroy the data, cameras, and vehicles. There 

is no reason to expect different results if destruction is 

initiated. The fact that the A-IZ has a pilot probably insures j 

a higher reliability of destruction being initiated because he I 

has a manual destruct capability. It seems that with the A -IZj 

there is less chance that the enemy could prove the sensor I 

capability. Of course, the pilot of the A-IZ is a problem. 

If the pilot lives, he can be tried in court before the world 

for what its worth. However, except for pure propaganda i 

aimed at the naive, it is doubted that a living pilot is any 

better evidence than sophisticated hardware obviously made 

in America. 

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4. In summary, it appears that for an equivalent number of 

missions, more D-2l 1 s than A-12 l s would go down in the ,j!. 

Soviet Union. This probably makes the true risks of employ-;/ 

ing the D-2l greater than using the A-l2. . 

C. Costs: 

The present MD-21 program calls for fabrication and test 

of 19 D-2l drones and modification of two A-12 1 s to the 

M-2l configuration at a cost of $65 million. From Tab B, 

we would expect the cost of development - and test to achieve 

80% in-flight reliability for the D -21 to be more nearly 

$150+ million and involve 50 to 60 test flights. 

2. For operations, it is expected that $150 million would be 

required to acquire an operational fleet of 5 carriers and 

30 drones. Costs of recovery operations and M&O costs 

have not been estimated. 

3. It appears then to have an operational capability of any signi-

~cance, the Tagboard system would require expenditure of 

o (iJ~£'over $300 million exclusive of ~&O ~nC!._:-~co'yery s;..osts. For "I /)pfl the A-12 program, acquisition costs will be about $500 million 

p i~t,.// but much of this has been already invested. Various comparisons sP of the relative costs per sortie indicate the MD-21 system to 

be 4 to 30 times as costly as the A-12. In any case, it is 

estima~to be more costly than the A-12 on a sortie basis.~ ,.. :> 

s /1% CLIl';Y;.....j" 

VI. CONCLUSIONS: 

5 

A. The A-12 program is estimated to have a much greater operational 

effectivenes s in securing desired specific reconnais sance data than 

can be achieved by the Tagboard (MD-21) system. 

B. There are equal or greater risks involved in conducting overflights 

with the D-21 drone as compared with the A-12. 

C. Costs of acquisition and operations of the MD-2l system will be 

several times that of the A-12 on a sortie basis. Costs will also 

be much greater than now planned. 

D. T .. le Tagboard program is aimed at achievement of a capability 

inherent and available earlier in the A-12. 

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VII. RECOMMENDATION: 

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That the Tagboard program be terminated {and that planned funds 

be allocated to the R -12 program}. 

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General 

EVALUATION OF THE MD-Zl 

DRONE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM 

Description 

The system under consideration is a composite of the A-lZ airframe 

plus a small, ramjet powered reconnais sance drone. Design of both airframe features a high finenes s ratio fus elage chine combination, thin, low 

aspect ratio wings and vertical tail surfaces, and high strength titanium 

and plastic structure. 

Carrier 

The carrier aircraft is basically the same as the A-lZ. Modifications 

to this basic design to enable it to function as a launching platform include 

the following: 

1. A launching subsystem will be attached to the upper surface of 

the aft fuselage. As originally conceived, the launcher consisted of a 

pair of one inch rails attached by a release mechanism to two fuselage 

stations on the missile. These rails are supported by a four-bar linkage 

hinged to a pair of rails attached to two fuselage stations on the carrier 

airframe. Unequal lengths of the actuating armS of the four -bar linkage 

allow the drone to be positioned for minimum drag during captive flight, 

and to be positioned for desired angle of attack when erected and ready 

for launch. Subsequent studies indicated that the drone could be succes sfully launched from the cruise position, and the elevating mechanism 

discarded. Wing tunnel tests to confirm the calculations are now in 

progres s. 

2. The fuel system will be modified to interconnect the mis sile and 

carrier fuel systems. This will permit the use of the mis sile fuel in the 

carrier during return to base in the event of an aborted launch, and will 

also permit replacement of hot fuel in the missile with cooler fuel after 

any in-flight refueling. Provisions will also be made for pres surizing 

the mis sile fuel tanks from the carrier nitrogen pres surization system. 

3. An air line will be provided to supply air to the secondary power 

drive turbine while the drone is in captive flight. 

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4. The equipment bay area of the A-12 will be converted to a 

second cockpit for the drone launch control officer. 

Drone 

The reconnaissance drone is a composite titanium-plastic structure 

which repeats the distinctive fuselage-chine combination of the A-IZ. 

Length is approximately 42 feet, span of the delta wing is approximately 

20 feet, and loaded weight is approximately 11, 000 pounds, of which 

about half is fuel weight. Structural material is titanium except for wing 

edges, inlet spike, and the vertical fin~ which are made of a structural 

plastic. The modified RJ -43 engine is installed in the aft fuselage and 

the duct runs the full length of the fuselage from a fixed geometry spike 

in the nose. Design load factor has been increased from 2.5 in the 

original design to 5. a to permit a high speed terminal dive. Space for 

installation of payload, navigation system, secondary power system, 

cooling system, and other ancillary equipment is provided in the fuselage 

chines and in the fuselage beneath the engine inlet duct. 

Technical Evaluation 

Air Vehicle 

Modifications required to convert the A-12 to a missile carrier are 

not trivial, but they require detail engineering rather than innovat:con. 

Redesign of structure in the aft fuselaget(; distribute captive and launch 

loads will be required, and complete redesign of wiring harnesses and 

fluid and gas line routings will be required. Modification to provide a 

second cockpit will make use of AF-12 design experience. 

Drone Airframe 

The significant problem in the n"lissile airframe design lies in realizing 

a relatively inexpensive structure with the desired low radar cross section 

and adequate strength. I l 

I The contractor states that solutions to the ~--~~------~~--~,-~--~ problem are in hand, based principally on proper shaping of joints, providing no major airframe design changes are required. Weight estimate 

has increased about 150 pounds since the design was started but offsetting 

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gains in the propulsion system have preserved performance capability. 

The design contemplates use of insulating material to reduce transfer 

of heat to the fuel. The present plan is to spray coat the external surfaces over fuel tank areas with approximately 0.4 inches of insulation. 

The insulating material is a rubber -like compound and test applications 

to test panels are proving succes sful. 

Propulsion 

The basic concept of using a ramjet for the missile propulsion 

system is excellent. Indeed, an application that requires operation 

over a limited range of high airspeeds is ideal for a ramjet. The 

particular engine proposed is a well-developed unit, of demonstrated 

reliability, and has been flown experimentally at speeds in excess of 

M 4.0 in the X-7. The installation proposed by the contractor includes 

a simple external compression, fixed geometry inlet spike, and a tail 

pipe shortened by approximately 30 inches from current RJ -43 design. 

A few preliminary tests have shown no significant change in engine 

performance with the shortened tail pipe. A recent experiment, increasing the divergent portion of the exhaust nozzle by 7 inches, has shown a 

4% increase of thrust and will be included in the design. Since the basic 

RJ -43 engine and installation have been significantly changed, current 

testing will need to be continued and expanded to include comprehensive 

tests of the whole propulsion system including inlet, burner, and nozzle. 

This testing should be comprehensive enough to establish performance 

and repeatability in the operating envelope. Some "tailoring!' will almost 

surely be necessary to solve thrust, fuel consumption, drag, combustion 

stability, and ignition problems. 

Wind tunnel testing of the inlet has already shown peak ram recovery 

of 83% versus the 74% assumed in performance estimates. Wind tunnel 

drag measurements, approximately 7% higher than the design estimate in 

June, are now reduced essentially to the design estimate level. 

The other significant problem is the development of an ignition method 

which is in effect 100% reliable. Flow conditions for ignition are critical, 

and considerable effort on an ignition system is expected before an operational system is established. The ignition system must also provide blowout protection during and immediately following launch when flow conditions 

are other than normal. The contractor has concluded that the best solution 

to this problem lies in the application of a pyrophoric ignition system using 

the same starting agent (Triethyl Borane) employed in the J -58 engines of 

the launch aircraft. Present design allows sufficient quantity of the 

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starting agent to accomplish eight starts. Because of the critical 

conditions encountered at launch and the potential for a catastrophic 

failure, the earlier evaluation group recommended consideration of 

continuous flow of the triethyl borane during the launch sequence. 

Navigation and Guidance 

The navigation and guidance problems for the drone reconnaissance 

system are essentially the same as those presented by an air to surface 

missile. Major elements of the problem are establishment of initial 

conditions for the drone at launch, and accuracy of drone guidance during 

its independent flight. The range of coverage provided by the camera, 

however, leads to a reduction of accuracy required, as compared to an 

air to surface mis sile application. 

The present design has a stellar-monitored inertial navigator in the 

carrier, and an unaided inertial system in the drone. The operational 

concept envisages ground alignment of both systems prior to take off, 

and independent navigation by both systems to the launch point. Prior to 

launch, the Launch Control Officer will reset the position indication of 

the drone guidance system to coincide with position indicated by the stellar 

inertial system of the carrier. The presumption is, of course, that the 

carrier system is more likely to be correct, and since it has the stellar 

adjunct, this presumption is reasonable. Accuracy specification for the 

stellar-monitored system in the carrier is a bounded error of not greater 

than Z. 8 nautical miles. Navigational accuracy of the unaided inertial 

system of the drone will degrade with time but should be no worse than 

Z to 3 nautical miles per hour for launch within two or three hours after 

take of£. At the end of a 3000 mile reconnais sance flight, therefore, 

navigation CEP of 5 nautical miles appears to be a reasonable estimate. 

The equipment proposed for the navigation and guidance functions 

is a further growth of the MH-330 equipment now being supplied for the 

A-IZ. Only the basic gimbal structure is preserved without change. 

For the carrier, a Kollsman star tracker is mounted in conjunction with 

the gimbal system, and the two elements are coupled by optical links. 

The drone platform is essentially identical to the MH-330. Computers 

in the drone and in the carrier will be identical and will be based on the 

PICO computer developed by Honeywell as a company project. Each 

computer has more capacity than is required solely for navigation or 

guidance computation. Exces s capacity in the carrier will be used for 

the sychronizing functions between the two as well as for other required 

vehicle computation functions. The exces s capacity of the drone computer 

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will be used for pre-launch go-no-go checks. By programming the 

computer to direct the checkout, the number of umbilical connections 

to the parent aircraft can be significantly reduced. 

Accuracy numbers quoted appear well within current state of the 

art, and while this accuracy level is unattractive in weapon delivery, 

it is adequate for the reconnaissance mission. 

Camera 

The drone payload is a single camera of 28 inch focal length. The 

film magazine capacity is 4500 feet of 9 1/2 inch thin bas e film which is 

sufficient to provide continuous coverage for 3020 nautical miles of drone 

flight. Lateral coverage is 14 nautical miles either side of flight path. 

Five fixed depression angles are provided, one vertical and 19 0 and 360 

above the vertical on either side. Frame overlap is 60% up to + 300 from 

vertical and 40% to + 45 0 from vertical. Camera is stabilized in pitch 

and roll. Camera specification calls for weight of 385 pounds versus an 

allowance of 500 pounds used in original performance estimates, so that 

an adequate margin for weight growth is available. 

Launch and Recovery 

The launch operation presents some severe analysis and design 

problems. Complexities arise from the following: 

1. The drone and carrier configurations provide only 14 inch clearance 

between the D -21 wing tips and the M-21 vertical stabilizers. Yaw and roll 

control of the drone at launch must, therefore, be very precisely controlled. 

2. The flow field through which the drone must fly is very complex 

and includes a pattern of shock waves generated by the carrier nose, 

engines, and wings. 

3. Upon release of the drone, air loads, as well as weight loads on 

the carrier may change abruptly, posing control problems for the carrier 

vehicle. 

4. The inlet for the drone engine is a single point design which makes 

it possible to provide good performance at design point, but also causes 

very rapid degradation if conditions vary from the nominal. Effects of 

penetrating the nose and engine shock waves on engine performance are 

unknown at present. 

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As presently planned, prelaunch operation wi11 include comprehensive 

checks of the drone guidance system, flight control system, secondary 

power system, and fuel system. Streamlining cones on the drone duct 

wi11 be removed, the aft closure by firing explosive bolts and the forward 

enclosure by a retractor. The engine wi11 be started and its performance 

monitored by comparison of combustor pressure against a pre-set standard. 

Since safe separation is critically dependent upon the drone autopilot 

performance, about 50 distinct go -no-go functions will be tested through 

the guidance computer. When a11 performance checks are complete, a 

panel indicator will show ready to launch, and the drone wi11 be released. 

Present tunnel data indicate that, upon release, air loads will cause 

drone and carrier to separate and will also cause a nose up pitching 

moments a short time later, perhaps a tenth of a second, the pitching 

lTIOlTIent wi11 reverse, and another tenth later, as the drone penetrates 

the nose shock, it will reverse again. It is now planned that the flight 

control system will operate on a constant normal acceleration signal for 

15 seconds after launch and will then switch to Mach hold. 

There is nothing to indicate that safe separation of the composite 

aircraft cannot be accomplished. On the other band, it is apparent that 

a considerable effort in analysis, wind tunnel, and flight test will be 

necessary to assure safe and effective drone launch. rJettison, in the 

event of a drone failure has not yet been analyze<!d -

Recovery of reconnaissance data wi11 be accomplished by ejecting a 

package containing the _cClg:t~ra, the n~'yigCL~~<:>E:...~ystem, elect]-'onic C~lTIponents of the fl~ght<::?1J.trQ I s.y~tem, beac on a~~c0Tr?::rp.andrE)c~i ve r. The 

total package weight is currently estimated at §.a-Q pounds. Recovery operations will start with engine shut down at a programmed position. The 

drone will descend at constant ram pressure to approximately 40,000 feet, 

and will have a velocity of M 1. 0 to M 1. 4 at that altitude. The recovery 

package wi11 be ejected at that point, and will be further slowed by deployment of a parachute. Primary recovery lTIethod will be the air pick up 

." technique used for recovery of Discoverer payloads. In the event the pick 

~r,l ~ up is not successful, surface recovery is possible, since the package is 

(i {O if,} designed to float. Although some detail design has not been completed, 

\( € / / ,'~~ l e. g., ejection method, parachute size, the concept has been demonstrated, 

E

' t \'vi.rj~l and payload recovery appears to be a completely feasible operation. 

(v' I\!./ I 

n~' . Other 

Secondary power fOT the missile will be provided by a ram air powered 

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turbine driving an alternator and hydraulic pump. During the descent, 

prior to payload ejection, power will be provided by a battery-inverter 

system. 

A command receiver will be included to permit command control 

of fuel cut off, beacon operation, package ejection, and drone destruction. 

A self-contained destruct system will also be included. The logic for 

arming and tripping the destructors are under study. Development 

problems in these areas remain to be solved, but there appear to be 

none which influence feasibility of the concept. 

Performance 

Drone 

The D-2l has been designed for a nominal range of 3000 nautical 

miles. Variations from original design estimates to the present have 

been both favorable and unfavorable, so that the nominal 3000 mile range 

remains a good estimate. Launch altitude is 75, 000 feet, and since 

cruise operation is at constant Mach number, the drone will climb 

continuously, and will reach 95, 000 feet at the end of a 3000 mile leg. 

T-wu mission profiles are shown in the charts rQllowing, ope forqperationfro:rri a staging base,without in-flight refueling""and one with two 

refuelihgs. The map chart"indicates potential flight'paths withthis'range 

capability. 

Camera 

The camera specification calls out system resolution of 120 lines 

per millimeter or ground resolution of about 1. 25 feet from nominal 

85, 000 foot operational altitude. The opinion of a consultant from the 

Reconnaissance Division, Air Force Avionics Laboratory, based on 

evaluation of the details of can'lera design, is that 70 lines per millimeter, 

or about 2 foot ground resolution against medium contrast targets is a 

very reasonable estimate of the camera potential. 

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Costs and Schedule 

Both cost and schedule data are very inexact at present. Information presented below is best available at present, but may change 

radically. 

Schedule 

The present program calls for fabrication and test of 19 drones, and 

modification of two A-12 airplanes to the M-21 configuration. The first 

drone is now scheduled for completion in April 1964, and the first carrier 

will be delivered in June 1964. The final drone will be delivered approximately one year after the initial delivery. Without the benefit of a detailed 

flight test plan, the project engineer estimated that 12 to 18 months of 

flight test would be required prior to any operational commitment. These 

estimates argue an operational capability early in 1966. This is an 

extremely optimistic estimate, and probably represents a possibility if 

no unanticipated development problems arise. For comparison, the 

original GAM-77 schedule allowed four years from initiation to operational 

capability, and was considered so optimistic as to approach the ridiculous. 

In--th-c-'evButIZiirection was given to accelerate the program, but the 

development flight testing was nevertheles s completed approximately a 

year later than planned on the original schedule. The parallel is not 

exact, but is an indication that the schedule is optimistic. An estimate 

of operational capability in mid-1966 is reasonable providing no major 

development problems arise. 

Cost '11V'4"' ( 

.r,)..' 

i., , 

Original estimates for the present drone development program have 

grown to present estimate of $65 million'v- A planning estim3.te of $52 

million for an additional 30 operational drones has been made. Given 

an operational program, additional mother airplanes will probably be 

required, at an acquisition cost of $20 million per aircraft. 

Cost of acquisition or modification of recovery aircraft ....... iu.the event 

C'l!1'J:·'!"entinventfH;;y-,-i6,,·:tngU'ff:h:~ient, has not been estimated nor has maintenance 

and operations costs. 

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Summary 

Progress in development of the DM-21 system is on schedule, and 

the performance estimates still appear feasible. 1£ no major development 

problems arise, a drone reconnaissance system could be in operation by 

the middle of 1966 which can provide photographs of about 2 foot resolution 

over the full length of a 3000 mile flight. Camera field and expected 

guidance accuracy are compatible, so that a high probability of actually 

covering desired targets can be expected. 

Development cost estimate is $65 million. An additional $150 million 

would be required to acquire an operational fleet of five carriers and 30 

drones. Costs of recovery aircraft and M&O costs have not been estimated. 

, '. 

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MISSILE RELIABILITY 

1. Data from earlier missile development programs do not establish 

limits for cost, reliability, or development time, but they do provide a 

background of experience which can be used as a basis for evaluating 

perfections of current developments. 

2. The GAM-72 is a small missile designed for carriage by B-52's. 

The payload is electronic equipment which causes the GAM-72 to present 

a radar target similar to that of the B-52, and hence, to act as a decoy 

for enemy defenses. Propulsion is provided by a small turbojet engine. 

a. The GAM-72 development program was started in 1957 with first 

launch in 1958. Category III testing was completed in 1961, and a followon test program of 8 flights was accomplished in 1962. Development 

program cost was $116.4 million. 

b. During Category I, II, and III testing, the pre -launch and launch 

reliability of the mis sile was 63%. Figures to demonstrate a trend are 

not available. Flight reliability is shown in the table below: 

Vi 

?/" 

("-- :; (V .. (;/ 

/> flf f" 

Category I 

Category II 

Category III 

Follow-on 

Total 

Success 

18 

12 

2 

7 

39 

Flight Expe rience 

GAM-72 

Partial Succes s Failure Total 

4 7 29 

2 4 18 T, 

2 2 6 p 

0 1 8 ? ~, 

8 14 61 

c. Definition of a "partial success II varies with the stage of testing 

but giving credit for partial successes, the flight reliability is 77% for 

the entire program. Probably a more realistic estimate of operational 

expectation can be derived from the Category III and follow-on test 

results. Again crediting partial success as adequate, the flight reliability 

is 78%. 

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3. The IM-99B Bomarc is a ground launched, unmanned interceptor 

comparable in size to the D-21. Propulsion is provided by two Marquardt 

ram-jet engines. A rocket engine provides initial boost to drive the 

missile to ramjet operating velocity. The Bomarc B development program 

was started in 1957 and Category III testing Was essentially completed in 

1963. Total RDT&E cost was $322.4 million. 

a. Although a total of about 75 flights were accomplished, readily 

available data are concentrated in 45 Category I, II, and III flights conducted in a two year period starting March 1961. Failures during this 

period were as follows: 

Target Seeker 8 

Electrical System 3 

Flight Control 5 

Miscellaneous 3 

Total 19 

These figures indicate a rather low 58% reliability. However, target 

seeker failures were not determined unless the missile actually reached 

the intercept area, so the probability that the missile will reach the target 

area is 780/0. It is significant also that the ramjet engines have given •.. -------

completely failure-free operation. Since this engine is the same unit 

proposed for the D-21, demonstrated propulsion reliability is heartening. 

b. The Bomarc project office has als 0 gathe red statistical data concerning pre -flight reliability of the mis sile and its support equipment. 

For the missile, pre-flight reliability is defined as the probability that a 

missile selected for firing will successfully pass through countdown and 

launch sequence. Category I, II, and III experience has shown this reliability to be 90%. The support reliability is defined as the probability that 

a weapon selected from ready storage can be prepared, counted down, and 

launched in a 60 minute period, and so far as supporting equipment is 

conce rned, the demonstrated reliability is 100%. 

4. The GAM-77, Hound Dog, is a cruise missile, designed for external 

carriage by B-52!s. Of all the missiles previously developed by the Air 

Force, it is most similar to the D -21 in guidance and control equipment. 

Guidance is provided by an inertial system which is given pre-launch 

conditions from the parent airplane navigation system and a pylon mounted 

star tracker. Development of the missile started in 1957, and the R&D 

program was completed in 1962 at a cost of $194.4 million. 

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a. Reliability objective of the program was a 750/0 probability that 

an installed missile will survive an 8 hour captive flight, pass pre-launch 

and alignment checks, launch and fly 1/2 hour to the target area with less 

than 2 nm error. Available test results are as follows: 

GAM-77 

Cat I, II 

GAM-77 

Cat III 

GAM-77A 

Cat I, II 

Total 

Success 

15 

4 

8 

27 

Hound Dog 

Flight Reliability 

Partial Succes s 

11 

7 

2 

20 

Failure Total 

6 32 

5 16 (. 

1 11 

12 59 

Again giving credit for partial success, the in-flight reliability for the 

total test prograrn is approximately 800/0. For missiles most nearly 

representative of operational configuration, the Category III GAM-77 and 

the GAM-77A, the reliability figure is 780/0. Data to determine the probability 

of succes sful checkout at the end of some period of captive flight are not 

available. 

5. At the other end of the complexity spectrum among Air Force unmanned 

aerodynamic vehicles is the Q-2C target drone. Development of this target 

was started in 1957 and the drone became operational in 1961. Development 

cost was approximat ely $15 million. Category III testing included 25 flights. 

Two drones were lost, and an additional four malfunctioned but were successfully recovered. Reliability requirements are stated in two ways. First, 

the probability of locating a drone in position and altitude for a hot run must 

be 900/0, based on having two drones prepared for launch so that the second 

can immediately be launched should the first abort. Second, an average 

life of five flights per drone is required before operational loss occurs due 

to material or component failure. Both reliability requirements are being 

met. The first requires single target reliability of about 680/0. The second 

requires reliability per flight of about 870/0 but allows for repair between 

flights. 

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6. Despite the dissimilarity of mission, performance, and characteristics of the systems, there is a surprising consistency of flight reliability 

demonstrated of about 80%,. This is perhaps the level at which current 

state -of-the -art reaches ~t "knee" of a cost versus reliability curve. 

That is, higher reliability is certainly possible, but only by the expenditure 

of much larger amounts devoted solely to reliability. Development costs 

in themselves show no such pattern with RDT&E varying from $116 to $322 

million (neglecting Q-2C). Difference between the GAM-72 and the GAM-77 

can easily be explained by the greater complexity and higher performance 

requirements of the latter. Higher cost of the Bomarc may lie in the more 

elaborate ground launch equipment requirements. It appears, however, 

that expenditure of the order of $150 to $200 million is a minimum to bring 

a sophisticated unmanned system to operational status. 

7. Investigation of anyone missile program is likely to be mis leading, 

because of limited sample size, particular mission, or particular design 

problems. Combining results may provide a more meaningful standard. 

4 

GAM-72 

GAM-77 

BOMARC B 

Success 

39 

27 

26 

Missile Test Experience i/'5 

Partial Succes s 

8 

20 

8 

,-_.' 

Failure 

14 

12 

11 

Total 

61 

59 

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DETECTION AND SUR VIVAL 

1. Effectiveness of any system designed for covert aerial reconnaissance 

is dependent upon the ability of the reconnais sance vehicle to operate over 

its targets with immunity from the most effective defensive measures 

available to the adversary. The potential for national embarras sment 

inherent in the concept of covert reconnais sance demands that major effort 

be devoted to design for survival. 

2. Air defense capability today, and for the foreseeable future, is based 

upon radar detection of potential targets and destruction of targets by 

guided mis siles. Although infrared terminal guidance is certainly a 

feasible technique for a surface to air missile, some mechanization of 

radar guidance would still be required for mid-cours e, for target position 

prediction, or target designation. In practice, Soviet air to surface 

missiles use a radar command guidance mechanization for the whole 

course of mis sile flight. Survival of the reconnais sance vehicle, therefore, 

can be as sured by reducing Soviet radar capability against it, or by providing vehicle performance beyond the intercept capability of the air defense 

missiles. 

3. Much can be done in aircraft desi n and construction to minimize radar 

reflectivity. 

on both the A-12 and the D -21. Very little information concerning succes s 

of the designs is available but indications are that the A-12 will approach 

its design goals in radar reflectivity. Even fewer data are available for I 

the D -21 design, but based on size, we may expect that the D -21 will 

present from 1/4 to 1/2 the target presented by the A-12. A given radar 

will, therefore, achieve from 70 to 85 percent of its A-12 range against 

the D-21. Despite the anticipation of success in reaching design goals of 

radar reflectivity, recent studies show that early warning radars will have 

about 200/0 probability of detecting the A-12 when it rises above the radar 

horizon. Taking the most optimistic prediction of D -21 radar cross section, 

probability that Tall King early warning radar will detect the drone is 50% 

at approximately 200 nm and 85% at approximately 85 miles. It is safe to 

assume that, if the Soviet early warning net is operating at anything near 

its potential, neither the A-12 nor the D-Z1 will be able to penetrate without 

detection. 

4. Assuming that detection is not, in it-self, a deterrent, we must consider 

Soviet capabilities for succes sfully attacking the reconnais sance aircraft. 

In A-1Z studies of this problem, the following assumptions r~ 

concerning Soviet S~I\1":aa~~bi~t~?;~:~"t( ,,' Han e Via 

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a. There IS no radar tracking error and no ITlissile guidance error. 

b. There is no angular liITlit on the tracking radar; i. e., the target 

tracking radar covers a heITlispheric voluITle wi thout liITlitations. 

c. There are no fire control or guidance cOITlputer errors. 

d. Missile launch can be accoITlplished as quickly as six seconds 

after the target COITles within range of the target tracking radar. 

e. The ITlissile can reach the A-12 or D-2l operating altitude in 30 

seconds and can ITlaintain an average horizontal velocity of 2,.500 feet per 

second. 

It is apparent that the assuITlptions are extreITlely generous to the defense, 

and represent a worse case so far as survival of the reconnaissance 

vehicle is concerned. 

5. The capability studies have considered two target tracking radars, 

Fruit Set !tAli and Fruit Set liB, II and have exercised their capabilities 

against the A-12 with the assuITlption that design goals for radar reflectivity 

are ITlet, and that these goals are exceeded by a factor of three. The 

results of the study and extrapolation to the D -21 are as follows: 

a. Fruit Set "A" tracking range is not sufficient to perITlit an attack 

if the A-12 ITleets its reflectivity design goal. 

AN/Ii EO b. If the A-12 exceeds its goal by a factor of three, Fruit Set "A" 

r4 . /' (vi tracking range is adequate to attack, providing the A-12 course is offset 

f\,oji- '}1f:~less than 15 nITl frOITl the SAM battery. 

l~o D tv}1 /' 

c. Against Fruit Set liB, !t the A-12 track ITlust be offset 21 ITliles to 

escape attack if reflectivity goals are ITlet, and it ITlust be offset 30 ITliles, 

if reflectivity goals are exceeded by a factor of three. 

d. Even if the D -21 pres ents as ITluch as half as large a target as the 

A-12, Fruit Set "A" will not have sufficient tracking range to perITlit an 

intercept. 

e. Against Fruit Set "B" the D-21 will require track offset of 15 to 

20 ITliles to avoid attack. 

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f. The perITlissible ITlissile launch "window!! IS extreITlely sITlall. 

For a track directly over the ITlissile battery, for exaITlple, the tiITle 

interval during which launch ITlust occur, is of the order of 30 to 40 

seconds. As the track is displaced, the launch window becOITles 

p ropo rtionate 1 y sITlaller. 

6. SUITlITla r y 

n 1- a. Neither the A-12 nor the D-2l can expect to penetrate Soviet 

territory without detection. fft127 i IM £? 

b. Survivability of either vehicle is dependent ITlainly on perforITlance 

of ITlis sile battery target tracking radars. 

c. Against Fruit Set itA, It the drone cannot be intercepted, and 

although the A-12 can theoretically be attacked, the ITlis sile defense 

capability is ITlarginal at best. 

d. Against Fruit Set ItB, It the drone gains iITlITlunity with track offset 

of 15 to 20 ITliles, while the A-12 requires 20 to 30 ITliles offset. 

'. ~ e. All of the conclusions above are based on as sUITlptions extreITlely 

favorable to the defense. 

7. The operational survivability of a drone or a ITlanned reconnaissance 

systeITl is not solely a function of its vulnerability to attack, but also 

depends upon the precision with which it can be guided to avoid known 

I defenses. In a ITlanned aircraft, the pilot will be able to ITlonitor his 

f) actual position and correct any errors developed by the autoITlatic navigation 

I;' equipITlent. The A-12 should be able to fly very clos e to a planned track 

which would give it greater iITlITlunity to interception. 

The drone, on the other hand, will be guided by an inertial systeITl 

which is not subject to correction after launch. The initial conditions at 

launch will also be subject to error. Present specification for the M-2l 

navigation systeITl requires an error boundary of 2.8 nITl which becoITles 

the initial error for the D-21. As sUITling that the D -21 inertial navigator 

will ITleet accuracy specified for the MH-330 systeITl, further error 

accuITlulation will be at a rate of 1. 5 nITl per hour, standard deviation. 

For reconnaissance track planning, it seeITlS reasonable to offset by at 

least two tiITles standard deviation in order to insure a high probability of 

survival. Using root SUITl square cOITlbination of errors, and two standard 

deviations of navigation error, it would be necessary to offset the drone 

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track by approximately 4 to 5 miles for probable guidance errors in 

addition to the offset required for theoretical immunity from SAM attack. 

With this consideration, there appears to be little to choose between the 

20 to 30 miles standoff of the A-12 and the 20 to 25 miles standoff of the 

D-21. 

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RECONNAISSANCE SENSORS 

1. The A-12, and D-21 are designed as photographic reconnaissance 

vehicles, while the R -12 is a multiple reconnaissance sensor vehicle. 

Direct comparison is possible only in the camera complement of the 

three vehicles and is presented in Table 1. 

2. In addition to the cameras, the R -12 will carry the following reconnaissance equipment: 

a. High Resolution Radar 

Lateral Coverage 

Linear Coverage 

Resolution 

b. Infrared 

Lateral Coverage 

Resolution 

Thermal Resolution 

Linear Coverage 

10 or 20 mile swath at 20-80 nm right 

or left of track 

- 4000 nm 

- 20 mile swath 501 

10 mile swath 30 1 

- 28 nm 

1 milliradian (85 ft at nadir) 

- 0.50 

6 hours (12, 000 nm) 

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TAB D 

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""0 

c. 

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Characteristic 

Focal Length 

Type 

Coverage Lateral (nm) 

Linear Coverage 

(1 ) 

Ground Resolution (ft) 

A-12 D-21 

21 in 28 in 

Panoramic Step Frame 

41.3 36 

3743 3020 

1.3 1.3 

R -12 

Terrain Operational 

6 in 12 in 

Frame Panoramic 

21 34.4 

8500 4000 

16. 5 1.8 

Technical 

48 in 

Step Frame 

34 

10 

5.3 

100 targets 

19 frames ea 

or 

2240 nm 

0.6 

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c. 

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(1) All figures for ground Z'1e,,~olution are design goals and are dependent upon achieving fil~-lens 

resolution of 120-160~mil1imeter, and IMC of the order of .5 to 1. 0 percent. ASD camera 

specialists predict ope rational values of 2 feet for A-12 and D -21 designs, 1+ for R -12 technical 

objective camera on medium contrast targets near nadir. 

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CAPSULE RECOVER Y 

1. It is intended that recovery of the D -21 reconnaissance data be 

accomplished by ejecting a package containing the camera, navigational 

system, electronic components of the flight control system, a beacon 

and command receiver. The total package weight is estimated at 880 

pounds. Primary recovery will be by the air pick-up technique used 

for recovery of Discoverer payloads. In the event air pick-up is not 

successful, surface recovery is pos sible since the package is designed 

to float~"~~5" r /) [? !"t' 0c.::=rt y J1 F IG d ,5 F c v~-t5 0 ? () r.5 P t! ,; 6. 

2. The following information defines the Discoverer capsule recovery 

program and experience as it may apply to the D-21 capsule recovery 

effort: 

a. The capsule weighs approximately 180 pounds, the 30.7 foot main 

chute deploys at 50,000 feet, the time-to-water from main chute deployment is 26. 5 minutes. 

b. For detection, a radio beacon is actuated at capsule separation, 

the chute has alternate orange and white gores and at chute deployment, 

a flashing light is turned on. 

c. Based on a three-sigma dispersion, the primary recovery area 

is 20 x 140 nm. 

d. Recovery forces consist of the following: 

(1) Aircraft Required Standby 

JC-130B 5 2 

SC-54 1 1 

(2) PMR Ships Required 

Victory Ships 2 

Destroyers 1 

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Remarks 

Capsule detection, air 

recovery and search 

Air rescue and surface 

retrieval by pararescue 

team 

Detection, search, and 

surface recovery 

Back-up surface recovery 

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e. The JC -130B aircraft range for support of aerial recovery is 

1100 nITl with 3 hours on station. The aerial recovery range depends 

on the tiITle froITl parachute deploYITlent to pickup but is considered to 

be 70 nITl for planning purposes. 

£. The following chart depicts Air Force experience with capsule 

recovery: 

Capsules 

R e -entering 

Calendar Capsules Recovery Recovery 

Year Separated Area Air Sea Lost 

r 1959 4 0 0 0 0 

l- " '-'I 1960 6 5 3 1 1 '1'([( (i O' 

~I v

y 1961 8 7 4 3 0 (/ (.- 1962 20 20 16 0 4'" '.' 

1963 (thru 11 11 8 2 1 ,.,,', 

.. 1 .... 1 .. 

15 Oct) 

,:~ One chute did not deploy, three atteITlpts at air recovery 

daITlaged chute, capsules iITlpacted in sea and sank. 

,:~,:, Power failure prevented chute deploYITlent. 

3. It is believed that the following conclusions can be based on applying 

the Discoverer experience to the D-21 recovery probleITl: 

a. The larger weight of the D-21 recovery package (880 vs 180lbs) 

ITlay ITlake aerial pick-up ITlore difficult. 

b. A significantly large fleet (aircraft and ships) will be needed for 

-.1'')'-' recovery operations and the beacon on the D-21 ITlust radiate for a 

. \-'f' r (-;2- {relativel y long period to perITlit re -deploYITlent of the recovery aircraft 

yt v ,,,i ~ . (to within sufficient range of the capsule separation point if air pick-up (lv , .... 

u'; ~ " /1 L- ;?J., b h' d .' i' /J.O to e ac leve • ,- l'P/,/ 

I_ U // 

c. Most Discoverer capsule losses in the last two years were of a 

type directly applicable to the D-21 probleITl. This iITlplies no better 

than an 840/0 probability of data recovery unless iITlproveITlents in recovery 

technique and design reliability are achieved. 

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