IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-10567

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CECIL HOUSE, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CR-222-13

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Cecil House, Jr., pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to conspiracy 

to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, and he was sentenced to the statutory maximum, 240 months of 

imprisonment, and three years of supervised release. He appeals his sentence.

House argues that the district court miscalculated the drug quantity. He 

contends that the statements of his coconspirators regarding the amount of 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 6, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 14-10567

drugs he sold to them are unreliable and did not provide a plausible basis for 

the drug quantity calculation in the Presentence report (PSR).

At the sentencing hearing House presented rebuttal evidence in the form 

of his own testimony to challenge the facts provided by his coconspirators to 

investigators concerning the amount of methamphetamine he distributed. The 

Government presented the testimony of DEA Agent Brian Finney, who 

testified about his interviews of House’s coconspirators and explained why he 

believed their statements were credible, consistent, and corroborative of one 

another.

The district court found Agent Finney’s testimony to be credible and 

found that corroboration of the information related by the coconspirators 

provided sufficient reliability to their statements. The district court found that 

House was not credible and that the drug amounts set forth in the PSR were 

reliable. The district court’s factual finding on the quantity of drugs was not 

clearly erroneous. See United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir.

2005) (applying clear error standard of review); see also United States v. 

Rogers, 1 F.3d 341, 344 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding the district court’s reliance 

on quantity-of-drug information provided by confidential informants where 

there was no corroboration of the amounts attributed to the defendant, but the 

government’s investigation corroborated many other details of the drug 

scheme).

House argues that the district court incorrectly attributed use of a 

firearm to him under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Cindy Flores told agents that 

House carried a pistol during drug deals and that he carried it visibly for 

deterrence and intimidation. The PSR credited this information as sufficiently 

reliable. Based on its finding that House’s denial that he possessed a weapon

was not credible, the district court overruled his objection to the weapon 

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enhancement. The statement by Flores was sufficient to establish the basis 

for the enhancement, and the district court’s findings regarding the 

statement’s reliability and House’s lack of credibility were not clearly 

erroneous. See United States v. King, 773 F.3d 48, 52-55 (5th Cir. 2014).

The PSR listed three pieces of information to support a role enhancement 

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c): (1) Flores’s statement to investigators that she 

distributed methamphetamine at House’s direction, (2) Flores’s report that 

House once directed his sister to threaten Flores in order to collect a drug debt, 

and (3) reports that House was often accompanied by other men at drug deals. 

The district court found that Flores’s statements bore sufficient reliability to 

support a finding that House acted in a managerial or supervisory capacity 

over her. House argues that the district court erred in this finding. The “record 

does not give rise to a definite and firm conviction that the district court made 

a mistake in applying the § 3B1.1(c) enhancement.” United States v. Zuniga,

720 F.3d 587, 592 (5th Cir. 2013).

House argues that the district court erred in denying him a reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 and in finding that he 

obstructed justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Contrary to House’s assertions, the 

district court’s finding that House testified falsely was not predicated solely on 

the fact that his testimony was contradicted by cooperating codefendants, but 

because his denials were also contradicted by other information from the 

investigation, in particular, regarding House’s testimony that “Frisco” was his 

only methamphetamine supplier. The district court did not clearly err when it 

found that House intentionally testified falsely about his relevant conduct in 

an effort to minimize his sentence, and its decision to apply the obstruction 

enhancement and to deny acceptance of responsibility was proper. See United 

States v. Marmolejo, 106 F.3d 1213, 1217 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that 

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obstruction enhancement based on defendant’s false statements warranted 

denial of acceptance of responsibility).

Arguing that his sentence is procedurally and substantively 

unreasonable, House challenges the district court’s reasons for imposing the 

sentence because they did not include a detailed explanation of how the factors 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) were considered and balanced. Contrary to House’s 

suggestion, the district court was not required to discuss each sentencing factor 

on the record. The record shows that the district court’s reasons for imposing

a within-guidelines sentence are sufficient. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 

338, 356-59 (2007).

As for the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, House suggests 

that the district court imposed the statutory maximum solely on the basis that 

the guidelines would have allowed a higher sentence had the statutory 

maximum been higher, and he questions whether the sentencing judge 

realized he had the discretion to impose a sentence less than the statutory 

maximum. There is nothing in the district court’s stated reasons indicating 

that the district court perceived the guideline range to be mandatory. The 

court explicitly recognized that the guidelines were advisory and noted that it 

had considered all of the “matters required to be considered by 3553.” The 

within-guidelines sentence imposed by the district court is entitled to a 

rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347. House’s 

substantive-reasonableness argument does not show a clear error of judgment 

on the district court’s part in balancing the § 3553(a) factors but is merely an 

invitation for us to reweigh the sentencing factors, which we cannot do. See

United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

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