This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A23-0688

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Nancy Marie Banks,

Appellant.

Filed March 4, 2024

Affirmed

Smith, John, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-20-4342

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Gregory P. Holly, Richfield City Attorney, Holly Law, LLC, Richfield, Minnesota (for 

respondent)

Paul P. Sarratori, Mesenbourg & Sarratori Law Offices, P.A., Coon Rapids, Minnesota (for 

appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Smith, 

John, Judge. 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, JOHN, Judge

We affirm the district court’s order denying appellant’s motion to suppress because 

the district court did not err in determining that, based on the arresting officer’s

observations of various traffic violations, there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to 

support an investigatory stop of appellant. 

FACTS

On February 15, 2020, appellant Nancy Marie Banks was driving northbound along 

Interstate 35-West (I-35W). An on-duty police officer began following Banks northbound 

on I-35W after merging from Highway 62. The officer followed Banks around two-tothree lengths back, first in a different lane and then in the same lane, for about one mile. 

After observing Banks “cross[] into my lane, nearly causing a traffic accident,” “cross[] 

into the lane—into my lane of traffic in front of me without signaling,” “speed up and then 

brake erratically,” and her vehicle “swerving within its lane as it continued northbound,” 

the officer stopped Banks. During the stop, the officer detected “an overwhelming 

[alcohol] odor” and observed that Banks’s eyes were “very bloodshot,” her speech “slightly 

slurred,” and her reactions “very clumsy.” As a result, the officer conducted field sobriety 

tests, which Banks failed. Banks admitted she “maybe had one drink” before driving. 

The officer arrested Banks for driving while impaired (DWI), conducted routine 

booking after transport to the police station, and impounded her vehicle. As part of the 

booking, Banks was read a breath-test advisory, but refused to take the test, stating, “I’m 

not doing it.” During the inventory search of the vehicle, several containers of alcohol 
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were located on the passenger side floorboard. Respondent State of Minnesota 

subsequently charged Banks with one count of gross-misdemeanor second-degree DWI, as 

Banks had two qualified prior impaired driving incidents, and one count of second-degree 

refusal to submit to chemical testing pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subds. 1(1), 2(1) 

(2020). 

Before trial, Banks moved to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of her 

vehicle, arguing the stop was without justification because there was no “reasonable, 

articulable basis of unlawful conduct or unsafe driving conduct.” The state opposed her 

motion. The district court denied Banks’s motion to suppress on September 21, 2021, after 

a Rasmussen hearing. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.02; State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 141 

N.W.2d 3, 14 (Minn. 1965) (adopting a pretrial proceeding, or Rasmussen hearing, to 

determine the admissibility of evidence allegedly obtained by infringement of a 

defendant’s constitutional rights). 

Banks stipulated to the prosecution’s case pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, 

subd. 4. The district court found Banks guilty of the DWI- and breath-test-refusal charges

on February 14, 2023. Banks was convicted and sentenced for the DWI.

Banks now appeals the district court’s denial of her pretrial suppression motion. 

DECISION

Banks challenges the district court’s denial of her pretrial suppression motion, 

asking this court to reverse and dismiss her case because the officer did not have reasonable 

suspicion to stop her vehicle. This court reviews a district court’s factual findings in a 

pretrial suppression order under a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Gauster, 752 
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N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). But “we review questions of reasonable suspicion de 

novo.” State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). 

Although evidence obtained from an unconstitutional stop or seizure must be 

suppressed, State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 2011), a police officer may 

constitutionally conduct a limited traffic stop without a warrant if the officer has 

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 

136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). “The reasonable-suspicion 

standard is not high.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843 (quotation omitted). Reasonable 

suspicion simply requires “something more than a mere hunch,” or particularized and 

objective facts supporting the suspected criminal activity. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 

575, 578 (Minn. 1997); see also State v. Engholm, 290 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Minn.1980) (“To 

lawfully stop a person. . . . The intrusion cannot be based on an inarticulate hunch and 

must be reasonable in light of the particular circumstances.”). In evaluating whether 

reasonable suspicion exists, we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

stop. Knapp v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 610 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 2000).

Here, the police officer stopped Banks based on his observations that she violated 

two traffic laws: illegally changing lanes in an unsafe manner and failing to signal a lane 

change. The officer also observed Banks driving erratically. These three observations by 

the officer support a determination of reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the 

circumstances. 

The officer first observed Banks illegally changing lanes, or drifting into 

neighboring lanes, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1) (2020), which states:
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When any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly 

marked lanes for traffic . . . a vehicle shall be driven as nearly 

as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be 

moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that 

the movement can be made with safety.

The district court determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Banks’s

vehicle because Banks “crossed slightly into the neighboring lane of traffic on at least one 

occasion.” Banks conceded that she did “briefly cross[] the dotted center line” at least 

once. Banks’s vehicle’s movements created reasonable suspicion because “the statutory 

violation of moving a vehicle from the lane occurs when even a fraction of the vehicle 

extends outside its lane.” Soucie v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 957 N.W.2d 461, 464 (Minn. 

App. 2021), rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2021).

The officer also observed that Banks’s driving was dangerous, testifying that, when 

Banks “crossed into [his] lane,” she “nearly caus[ed] a traffic accident.” Because crossing 

into neighboring traffic lanes without first ensuring that the movement can be made safely 

violates Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1), the officer’s observation of Banks’s unsafe lane 

drift created an objective basis for a lawful vehicle stop. See George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. 

But Banks argues that inconsistencies with the officer’s testimony and the squad 

video evidence refute the finding that her driving was dangerous. To the extent there are 

any inconsistencies, we defer to the district court’s determination—that the officer was a 

credible witness. See State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App. 2012) (citing 

State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989)). And although a single swerve within 

a lane is not sufficient to sustain the stop of a vehicle, a police officer’s observation that a 

car is weaving repeatedly within its lane is. Compare State v. Brechler, 412 N.W.2d 367, 
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368 (Minn. App. 1987) (determining that a stop is improper if an officer only observes a 

driver swerve once within their lane of travel), with State v. Dalos, 635 N.W.2d 94, 96 

(Minn. App. 2001) (distinguishing Brechler and holding that weaving continuously within 

one’s lane is sufficient on its own to create reasonable suspicion). Here, the officer 

observed Banks’s vehicle “swerving within its lane as it continued northbound,” and the 

district court noted Banks “did not simply swerve once within her lane.” An officer can 

even stop a vehicle if they observe weaving within a lane but do not believe that the driving 

violates any traffic laws. State v. Morse, 878 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. 2016) (citing State 

v. Ellanson, 198 N.W.2d 136, 137 (Minn. 1972)). The officer had reasonable suspicion to 

justify stopping Banks’s vehicle because Banks was weaving within her lane. 

The officer next observed Banks fail to signal a lane change, nearly colliding with 

the officer’s vehicle. See Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 4 (2020) (“No person shall . . . move 

right or left upon a highway unless and until the movement can be made with reasonable 

safety after an appropriate signal. . . .”). A traffic violation—even a seemingly 

“insignificant” petty misdemeanor traffic violation—counts as reasonable suspicion of 

illegality and thus a proper basis for an investigatory stop. State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 

818, 823 (Minn. 2004). Because changing lanes without signaling violates Minn. Stat. 

§ 169.19, subd. 4, the officer’s observation is an objective basis for a lawful vehicle stop. 

See State v. Jones, 649 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. App. 2002). 

Finally, Banks asserts that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion justifying 

an investigatory stop because she exhibited “appropriate driving conduct” through the 

maintenance of a constant speed, navigation, and proper braking. This contradicts the 
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district court’s findings that Banks’s driving was erratic, and we do not reweigh the 

evidence. Additionally, a lawful vehicle stop does not require an observation of egregious 

driving; mere erratic driving provides reasonable, articulable suspicion of intoxication or 

wrongdoing sufficient to support an investigative traffic stop. Otto v. Comm’r of Pub. 

Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App. 2019) (determining that failing to signal a turn, 

among other grounds, provided reasonable suspicion). 

The district court did not err in denying Banks’s pretrial suppression motion because 

the totality of the circumstances as shown by the record—that Banks illegally and unsafely

crossed into neighboring traffic lanes, illegally failed to signal a lane change, and drove 

erratically—supports a legal determination that the police officer had reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of a traffic violation. 

Affirmed.