N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
TIM OTHY LEON FOY, Jr., Pe titione r - Appe lla nt, v. C ONNIE GIPSON, W arde n, R

e sponde n t - Appe lle e . No. 12-15947

D.C . No. 2:10-c v-02322-KJM -TJB M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of C a lifornia Kim be rly J. M ue lle r, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d and Subm i tte d Nove m

be r 18, 2014 San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : THOM AS, C hie f Judge , REINHAR D T and C HR ISTEN, C i rc uit Judge s. In C a lifornia

sta te c ourt, a jury c onvic t e d Tim othy

Foy of se ve ra l forc ible se xua l offe nse s a

n d kidna pping. Foy

a ppe a ls the distric t c ourt’ s de nia l of his



# F IL ED APR 06 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. 1pe tition for a writ of ha

be a s c orpus. W e have jurisdic t ion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291, and we a ffirm

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt. 1 Unde r the Antite rrorism and Effe c tive De ath Pe n a l ty Ac t of 1996 (AEDPA),

“ [this c ourt] m

ust de fe r to the sta

te c ourt’ s re solution of fe de ra l c la i m s unle ss its de te rm i nation ‘ re sulte d in a de c ision tha

t wa s c ontra

ry to, or involve d a

n unre a s ona

ble a p plic ation of, c le arly

e sta blishe d Fe de ra l la

w, a s de te rm ine d by

the Supre m e C ourt of the Unite d State s .’ ” De lgadillo v. W oodford , 527 F.3d 919, 924–25 (9th C ir. 2008) (c i ting 28 U.S.C . § 2254(d)(1)). “ ‘ [C ] le arly e sta blishe d Fe de ra l la w’ unde r § 2254(d)(1) is the gove rning le ga l princ iple or princ iple s se t forth by the Supre m e C ourt a

t the tim e the sta

te c ourt re nde rs its de c ision.” Loc k y e r v . Andrade , 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003) (quoting W illiams v
. Tay lor , 529 U.S. 362, 405, 413 (2000)). “ [A] fe de ra l ha be a s c ourt m ay

ove rturn a

sta te c ourt’ s a pplic ation of fe d e ra l la

w only if it is so errone ous tha t ‘ the re is no possibility fa irm inde d jurists c ould disagre e tha t the sta te c ourt’ s de c ision c onflic ts with [the Supre m e ] C ourt’ s pre c e de nts.’ ” N e v ada v . J ac k son , 133 S. C t. 1990, 1992 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Ric hte r , 131 S. C t. 770, 786 (2011)). I. E vide nc e of the vic tim ’s c onduc t

1 The pa

rtie s a re fam ilia r with thefa c t s, so we will not re c ount the m he re . 2The tria l c ourt c ite d C a lifornia Evide nc e C ode § 1103 in deny ing Foy ’ s m otion to a dm it e vide nc e of se ve ra l spe c ific insta n c e s whe re the vic tim

(O.) e nga ge d in a c ts of prostitution, inc luding dire c ting unde rc ove r polic e offic e rs to drive he r to se c lude d loc ations. TheC a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l a ffirm e d this ruling. Foy

argue s tha

t the tria l c ourt’ s e xc lusion of e vide nc e c onc e rning the m anne r in whic h O. e nga ge d in prostitution viola te d his c onstitutiona

l rights to c onfront witne sse s a

nd pre se n t a

c om ple te de fe nse . The e vide nc e at issueis pa rtic u la rly im porta nt to Foy ’ s de fe nse to the kidna p ping c ha rge — if O. a gre e d to go with Foy

to the pa rk, the jury

c ould ha ve de c ide d tha

t he did not kidna

p he r, e ve n if he se xua lly

a ssa u lte d he r a fte r the y arrive d the re . B ut unde r the c irc um s ta nc e s of this c a se , we c annot c onc l ude tha t the C a lifornia

C ourt of Appe a l’ s de c ision a ffirm ing the tria l c ourt’ s e xc lusion of this e vide n c e wa s c ontra ry to, or a n unre a sona

ble a pplic ation of, c le arly

e s ta blishe d fe de ra l la

w . A. Right to c r oss-e xam ination The Supre m e C ourt ha s long re c ogniz e d the right to c onfront a nd c rosse xam ine witne s se s a s a

n e sse n tia l c om

pone n t of due proc e ss. Se e C hambe rs v . Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 294–95 (1973). B ut “ the right to c onfront a nd to c rosse xam ine is not a

b solute and m ay , in a

ppropria t e c a se s, bow to a c c om

m odate othe r le gitim ate inte re sts in the

c rim ina l tria l proc e ss.” Id. at 295. “ [T] ria l judge s re ta in

3wide latitude . . . to im pose re a sona

ble lim its on suc h c ross-e xam ination ba se d on c onc e rns a

bout, a m ong othe r things, ha

ra s sm e nt, pre

judic e , c onfusion of the

issue s , the w itne ss’ sa fe ty , or inte rrogation tha t is re p e t itive or only

m argina lly re le va

nt.” De law arev . Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The c a se s whe re the Supre m e C ourt ha s found a viola tion of theright to c ross-e xam ination e sta

blish tha t the right prim arily

prote c ts the de fe nda

nt’ s a bility to a tta c k a witne ss’ s c re dibility . Se e Olde n v . K e ntuc k y , 488 U.S. 227, 231(1988) (re ve rsing sta

te c o urt de c ision e xc l uding e v ide nc e tha t a lle ge d ra

pe vic tim and c orroborating witne ss live d toge the r and we re involve d in rom a ntic re lationship be c a use it wa s c ritic a l to showing witne s s’ s pote ntia l bia s); Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. at 679 (whe re sta

te dism isse d pe nding c h arge s, prohibition of all inquiry into possible witne ss bia s viola te d de fe nda

nt’ s right to c ross-e xam inat ion); Dav is v . Alask a , 415 U.S. 308, 317–21 (1974) (e xc lusion of e vide nc e te nding to show witne s s’ s bia s viola

te d de fe nda

nt’ s right to c ross-e xam ination). The c onstitutiona

l right to c ross e xam inat ion a s inte rpre te d by the Supre m e C ourt wa s not viola

te d by the tria l c ourt’ s re fusa l to a dm it e vide nc e tha t O. pre v iously

dire c te d unde rc ove r polic e offic e rs to drive to se c l ude d loc at ions be c a use this e vide n c e would ha ve ha d littlea dditional im pa c t on thejury ’ s pe rc e ption of O.’ s ge ne ra l c re dibility . The jury he a rd e vide nc e tha

t O. ha d 4c onvic tions for prostitution, tha t O. use d drugs, a

nd, de spite he r te stim ony

she wa s not working a s a

prostituteon the e ve ning shewa s a ssa ulte d, tha t O. ha d the DNA of som e one othe r tha

n he rse lf or Foy

in he r unde rwe ar. The s e fa c ts ge ne ra lly c a ll O.’ s c re d ibility

into que stion, a

nd de fe nse c ounse l use d this e vide nc e to stre nuously

atta c k O.’ s c re dibility . B . Right to pr e se nt a c om ple te de fe nse Foy argue s on a

ppe a l tha t he wa s de nie d the right to pre se nt a c om ple te de fe nse . “ [T] he c onstitution gua rante e s c rim ina l de fe nda

nts a m e aningful opportunity

to pre se nt a c o m

ple te de fe nse .” J

ac k son , 133 S. C t. at 1992 (quoting C ranev . K e ntuc k y , 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). B ut “ sta te and fe de ra l rule m ake rs have broa d la

titude unde r the C onstitution to e sta blish rule s e xc luding e vide nc e from c rim ina l tria l s.” Id. (quoting Holme s v . South C

arolina , 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006)). “ Suc h rule s do not a bridge an a c c use d’ s right to pre se nt a de fe nse so long a s the y are not ‘ arbitra

ry ’ or ‘ disproportiona

te to the purpose s the y

are de signe d to se rve .’ ” U

nite d State

s v . Sc he ffe r , 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Roc k v . Ark ansas , 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987)). A rule is “ arbitra

ry ” whe re it “ e xc l ude [s] im porta nt de fe nse e vide nc e but . . . [doe s] not se rve any le gitim ate inte re sts.” Holme s , 547 U.S. a

t 325. “ [A] fe de ra l ha

be a s c ourt m ay

ove rturn a

sta te c ourt’ s a pplic ation of fe d e ra l la

w only if it is so errone ous tha t ‘ the re is no possibility 5fa irm inde d jurists c ould disagre e tha t the sta te c ourt’ s de c ision c onflic ts with [the Supre m e ] C ourt’ s pre c e de nts.’ ” J ac k son , 133 S. C t. at 1992 (quoting H arrington , 131 S. C t. at 786). He re , the tria l c ourt’ s de c ision unque stiona bly e x c l ude d re le va

nt de fe nse e vide nc e , but theruling did not pre ve nt Foy from

pre se nting a

de fe n se to the kidna p ing a lle gation. Thejury wa s instruc te d tha

t the kidna

ping c ha rge re quire d a showing tha

t Foy m ove d O. without her c onse nt. The jury he ard e vide n c e sugge s ting tha

t O. ha d be e n “ strolling”a s a prostitutethe night shewa s a ssa ulte d, c ontra ry to he r te stim ony , a

nd O. a dm itte d

she got into Foy ’ s c ar willingly . Foy re lie d on this e vide nc e to a rgue tha t the prose c ution fa ile d to m e e t its burde n of proof. He spe c ific a lly c o unte re d the kidna ping c ha rge by arguing: “

p rostitution in and of itse lf is ba sic a l ly

a ve ry ha z ardous oc c upation by willingly going into c ars with stra nge rs a nd going off some whe re to ha ve c onse nsua l se xfor m o n e y .” The jury he ard e vide n c e c ritic a l to Foy ’ s de fe nse to the kidna pping c ha rge and he argue d his de fe nse the ory

to the jury . Give n the e v ide n c e tha

t wa s a dm i tte d, a

fa irm inde d jurist c ould c onc l ude the tria l c ourt’ s ruling struc k the right ba la n c e be twe e n Foy ’ s right to pre s e nt a de fe nse and the sta

te ’ s “ l e gitim ate inte re st in prote c ting ra pe vic tim s a ga inst unwa

rrante d inva sions of priva c y

and ha ra ssm e n t re ga

rding the ir se xua l c onduc t.” Se e W ood v
. 6Alask

a , 957 F.2d 1544, 1549 (9th C ir. 1992) (c iting Mic higan v . Luc as , 500 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1991)). The e vide nc e of O.’ s inte ra c tion with unde rc ove r offic e rs is c le arly pre j udic ia l— a s Foy argue d

to the C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l , the e xc lude d e vide nc e would ha

ve shown tha

t O. “ e nga ge d in ora l c opula t ion . . . [, a

nd] willingly got into c ars a

nd drove to publicloc ations in order to providese xua l se rvic e s in thosec ars.” The fa c t tha t the jury wa s a ware O. wa s a

prostituteand use d drugs doe s not ne gate the c um ulative e ffe c t

of the a dditional de ta ils de fe nse c ounse l sought to introduc e . Apply ing AEDPA de fe re nc e , a s we are oblige d to do, wec onc lude tha t it wa s not unre a sona

ble for the C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l to find no c onstitutiona l viola tion he re . R e a sona

ble jurists c ould diffe r c onc e rning whe the r e xc luding e vide nc e of the m anne r in whic h O. e nga ge d in prostitution was “ arbitra ry ” or

“ disproportiona

te to the purpose s [C a lifornia ’ s ra pe shie ld la

w s we re ] de s igne d to se rve .” Se e Sc he

ffe r , 523 U.S. a

t 308. II. Adm ission of pr ope nsity e vide nc e Foy argue s tha

t introduc t ion of e vide n c e he a ssa ulte d anothe r wom an a fte r he a l le g e d ly

a s sa ulte d O. runs a foul of the ge ne ra l princ iple artic ulate d in Albe rni v . Mc D anie l tha t “ de nia l of due proc e ss is de m onstra te d if the a c tion c om

pla ine d of . . . viola

te s those funda

m e n ta l c o nc e ptions of justic e whic h lie at the ba se of our

7c ivil a

nd politic a l institutions.”

458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th C ir. 2006). AEDPA

“ re c ogniz e s . . . tha

t e ve n a ge ne ra l sta

nda rd m ay be a p plie d in a

n unre a sona

ble m anne r.” P ane tti v . Quarte rman , 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007). B ut in this c a se , pre c e de nt fore c lose s the c onc lusion tha t the sta te c ourt’ s de c ision wa s c ontra ry to, or an unre a sona

ble a pplic ation of, c le arly

e s ta blishe d fe de ra l la

w . Este llev . Mc G uire , 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (expre ssly re s e rving the que stion “whe the r a sta te la w would viola

te the Due Proc e s s C la

use if it pe rm itte d the use of ‘ prior c rim e s’ e vide nc e to show propensity to c om m i t a c ha rge d c rim e ” ); Albe rni , 458 a t 866, 875 (“ The sc ant supply of Supre m e C o urt pre c e de nt a pplic a b le to the prope n sity

e vide nc e issue doe s not . . . provide suffic ie n t ‘ c le arly

e sta blishe d Fe de ra l la w, a s de te rm i ne d by

the Supre m e C o urt of the Unite d State s’ ” (M c Ke own, J., c onc urring)). The tria l c ourt’ s de c ision did not unre a sona bly a pply a “ gove rning le ga l princ iple or princ iple s se t forth by the Supre m e C ourt a

t the tim e the sta

te c ourt re nde r[e d] its de c ision,’ ” Loc k y e r , 538 U.S. a

t 71–72 (2003), be c a use the Supre m e C ourt ha d not se t forth a ny a pplic a ble le ga l princ iple s c onc e rning whe the r the introduc tion of prope nsity e vide n c e viola

te s due proc e ss. AFFIRM E D.

8Foy

, J r. v . Gipson, N o . 12-15947 REINHAR

DT, C irc uit Judge , c onc urring in pa rt a n d disse nting in pa

rt. I disse nt from

the m a jority ’ s c onc lusion in Pa

rt I.B that the e xc lusion of Foy ’ s e vide nc e re g arding the kidna pping c ha rge did not justify

issuing the

writ unde r AEDPA with re spe c t to tha t c ha rge . The re le va

nt que stion is whethe r e xc luding e vide nc e tha t O. “ willingly e nte r[e d] into stra

nge r’ s c ars” and “ dire c t[e d] the m to a loc at ion of he r c h oosing,” whic h Foy

argue d would provide

“ c irc um sta

ntia l e vide nc e to e sta

blish tha t no

‘ k idna p’ ha d oc c urre d,” viola

te d Foy ’ s due proc e ss right to pre se n t a c om ple te de fe nse to the kidna

pping c ha rge . The only

re a sona ble answe r is y e s. It is c le a rly e sta b lishe d tha

t a de fe nda

nt’ s right to “ a

m e aningful opportunity to pre se nt a

c om ple t e de fe nse ,” Holme

s v . South C

arolina , 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting C

ranev . K e ntuc k y , 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)) (inte rna l quota

tion m arks om itte d), “ is a

bridge d by

e vide nc e rule s tha

t ‘ infringe upon a

we ighty inte re s t of the a c c use d’ and a re ‘ arbitra ry ’ or ‘ d isproportiona

te to the purpose s the y are d e signe d to se rve .’ ” Id . (quoting Unite d State s v . Sc he ffe r , 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). Unde r AEDPA, “ [a ] fe de ra l ha be a s c ourt m ay issue the writ unde r the



# F IL ED APR 06 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1‘ c ontra

ry to’ c la use if the sta

te c ourt a p plie s a rule diffe re nt from

the gove rning la

w se t forth in our c a se s.” Be l l v . C one , 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). Inste a d of a pply ing Holme s , the C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l in this c a s e sim ply c onc l ude d tha

t Foy ’ s rights we re not viola

te d be c a use , ha d the e vide nc e be e n a dm itte d, the jury would not ha ve re c e ive d a

signific a ntly diffe re n t im

pre ssion of the w itne

ss’s c re dibility . This m ay be an a c c urate de s c ription of the sta nda rd for a sse s sing C onfronta tion C la use viola tions, but it is not the H

olme s sta nda rd tha t gove rns the right to pre se nt a c om ple te de fe nse . The C a lifornia C ourt of Appe a l’ s de c ision wa s thus “ c ontra ry to” c le a rly e sta blishe d Supre m e C ourt pre c e de nt. Se e Lafle r v . C oope r , 132 S. C t. 1376, 1390 (2012) (holding tha t a sta te c ourt de c ision wa s “ c ontra ry to” fe de ra l la w be c a u se the sta

te c o urt “ ide ntifie d re sponde nt’ s ine ffe c t ive -a ssista nc e -ofc ounse l c la im

but fa ile d to a

pply Stric k

land to a sse s s it. R athe r tha n a pply ing Stric k land, the sta

te c ourt sim

ply found tha

t re sponde nt’ s re

je c tion of theple a

wa s knowing a

nd volunta

ry .” ). Eve n a ssum ing tha

t the C a lifornia

C o urt of Appe a l im

p lic i tly ide ntifie d Holme s a s the c orre c t sta

nda rd, its de c ision would be

an unre a sona

ble a pplic ation of tha t pre c e d e nt. Unde r Holme s , sta te e xc l usiona

ry rule s c a nnot be a pplie d to e xc lude re le va

nt e v ide n c e if doing so would be “ disproportiona te to the purpose s [those rule s] are de signe d to se rve .” Holme s , 547 U.S. a

t 324–25 (quoting Sc he

ffe r , 2523 U.S. a

t 308). The que stion is thus whe the r the sta

t e ’ s inte re st in prote c t ing a lle ge d “ ra

p e vic tim s a ga inst unwa

rrante d inva sions of priva c y and ha ra ssm e nt re ga rding the ir se xua l c onduc t” outwe ighe d Foy ’ s due proc e ss right to introduc e e vide nc e im

porta nt to his de fe nse to the kidna pping c ha rge . The m a jority first note s tha

t the jury wa s prope rly

instruc te d a s to the e le m e nts of thekidna

pping c ha rge . M any

things we re done prope rly in Foy ’ s tria l, but I se e no logic a l c onne c tion be twe e n a c orre c t jury instruc tion a

nd whe the r it wa s e rror to e xc lude the c ruc ia l e vide nc e at issue . The m a jority a lso note s tha

t the jury he ard e vide n c e sugge sting tha t O. ha d be e n “ strolling”a s a prostitutetha

t night, a nd she a dm itte d tha

t she got into Foy ’ s c ar willingly . Of c ourse , the sta te c ourt did not e xc lude all re le va nt e vide nc e favora

ble to Foy , but e ve n AEDPA re quire s m ore tha

n tha t. Tha t O. wa s “ strolling”a s a

prostituteand tha

t she willingly got into Foy ’ s c ar in no wa y shows wha

t the e xc lude d e vide nc e would have shown: tha

t she would “ d ire c t” c lie nts whe re to go onc e she got into a c lie nt’ s c ar. 1

1 Eve n m ore off the m ark is the m a jority ’ s re lia

nc e on the fa c t tha

t in his c losing state me nt Foy ’ s c ounse l a rgue d tha t “p rostitution in a

n d of itse lf is ba sic a lly a ve ry ha z ardous oc c upation by willingly going into c ars with stra

nge rs and going off some whe re to ha ve c onse nsua l se x for m one y .” As jurie s a re a lwa y s re m inde d, sta

te m e nts by

de fe nse c ounse l a

re not e v ide nc e , a

nd in a ny e ve nt Foy ’ s c ounse l sim

ply re s tate d wha

t the admitte d e vide nc e showe d . This in no wa y sugge s te d tha

t O. ha d he rse l f dire c te d Foy (or any one e lse ) whe re to go, ra the r tha n 3I strongly doubt tha t the sta te ’ s inte re s t in pre ve nting unwa rran te d intrusions into a n a lle ge d vic tim ’ s se

x ual c onduc t is a

t a ll im p lic ate d he re . Te lling a

c ustom e r whe re to drive ha

rdly c onstitute s se

x ual c onduc t. 2 M ore im

p orta nt, the C a lifornia R a pe Shie ld La

w invoke d to e xc lude the e v ide nc e in this c a se a pplie s only

whe n the e vide n c e is sought to be introduc e d in orde r to show tha t the a l le ge d ra

pe wa s in fa c t c o nse n sua l se x. Se e C a l. Evid. C o de § 1103(c )(1). Foy , howe ve r, sought to introduc e e vide nc e of O’ s non-se x ual c onduc t a fte r she volunta rily e nte re d the c a

r in orde r to re but the k

idnapping c ha

rge . The a sse rte d

inte re sts unde rly ing the R a pe Shie ld La w a re thus not pre se nt in this c a se at a ll, a nd the y c e rta inly c annot outwe igh Foy ’ s due proc e ss right to pre s e nt a c om ple te de fe nse to the kidna pping c ha rge . In short, I ha

ve no que stion tha

t it wa s not only

“ arbitra ry ” but

“ unre a sona

ble ” for the C a l ifornia

C ourt of Appe a l to hold tha t the e xc l usion of the e vide nc e tha

t O. dire c te d he r c ustom e rs to the loc ations shese le c t e d did not de prive Foy

of his dueproc e ss right to pre se nt a c om ple te de fe nse to the

be ing the vic tim

of a kidna pping. 2 The m a jority sta te s tha t “ the e xc l ude d e v ide nc e would ha ve shown tha

t O. ‘ e nga ge d in ora l c opula

tion,’ ” but it wa s of c ourse possible for the tria l c ourt to a dm it te stim ony

a bout O. dire c t ing c l ie nts to loc ations of he r c hoosing and at the sametime

e x c ludee v i de n c e about he r e ngaging in oral copulation . 4kidna

p ping c h a rge . The e vide nc e from

the unde rc o ve r polic e offic e rs tha t dire c ting he r c ustom e rs to se c l ude d loc ations wa s O’ s m e thod of ope ra tion wa s the only e vide nc e offe re d by

Foy tha t she , not Foy , wa s re sponsiblefor the pa ir’ s going to the s e c lude d loc ation a

t whic h the se xua l offe nse tra nspire d. It wa s in fa c t the only e vide nc e , a

nd the only de fe nse , Foy

offe re d re ga

rding the kidna

pping c ha rge . Exc luding tha

t e v ide n c e de prive d him

of tha t de fe nse . Foy wa s prope rly

c onvic te d of be ing a

ra pist but he

wa s unc onstitutiona

lly c onvic te d of be ing a

kidna ppe r, unde r any

sta nda rd tha t a re a sona ble jurist c ould e m ploy , spe c i fic a lly

inc luding tha

t of whe the r the e xc lusion of the only de fe nse e vide nc e on the kidna

pping c ha rge wa s a n unre a sona

ble a p plic ation of c le arly e sta blishe d Supre m e C ourt la w . I c an a dd only

tha t the e xc lusion of tha

t e vide nc e wa s “ disproportiona

te ” to a ny purpose the C a l ifornia

R a pe Shie ld La

wwa s de signe d to se rve , give n tha t the jury ha d be e n inform e d tha

t O. wa s strolling a s a prostituteat the tim e she e n te re d Foy ’ s c ar, and ha d be e n c onvic te d of prostitution, or, a s the m a

jority puts it, “the jury

wa s a ware tha t O. wa s a prostitute .” Evide nc e a s to he r m e thod of se le c ting theloc ation of he r busine ss a c tivitie s be ars dire c tly on the kidna

pping c ha rge but a dds little

if a nything to wha

t the jury kne w a bout he r pa st se xua l c onduc t. I would re v e rse without the slighte st he sita

tion or sha d ow of a doubt. 5