, 

.1.1.1.1■01.1■14.110M■ 

LL 

"-IMMEIMM 

"Sincerely, 

Robert 9. mayo 

Director 

Enclosures 

ro 

NRQ.APPRONiiD FOR i

RELEASE. 1 JULY 2015 

or I;IrAi1 HANDLE VIA BYEMAN-COMINT 

CONTROL,SYSTEMS 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE. PRESIDENT 

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 

• r WASHINGTON. D.C. 20503 

FEB 13 1969 

Honorable David Packard 

Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Dave: 

I have made a preliminary review of the major programs 

in the Defense intelligence program area based on the 

earlier FY 1970 Budget decisions. I recommend.that 

you give the items enclosed your special attention 

in our effort to reduce the FY 1970 Budget. 

There are three large programs which have high potential savings. Papers are enclosed discussing the 

Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL); the HEXAGON system; 

and reconnaissance drone procurement. In addition, 

there are five other items which I believe you should 

include in your review. They are being provided to 

.your staff separately. 

I would be happy to talk to you about these programs 

after you have finished your own review. My staff is 

available to work with your people in developing additional information on these items. 

0) 

(.:7 >_.,-...-,--- -7- 

- 

CRET. 

BYE-11654-69 

oE OEM copy 

, :: • HANDLE VIA BYEMAN-COMINT. 

CONTROL SYSTEMS 4 
-rianaie 

INEp

via BYEMAN-COMINT 

NRO APA ekT R

• 

5 ystems Only "RELEA--1-..rarc i #-01 

THE RELATIVE VALUE OF THE MOL FOR 

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURF,*DECISIONS 

Background 

\

\ Since 1W;5-1966 when the decjsionwas made to pursue. the 

i 

MOL for its iL,(4elligence.value, -ite relative benefit and the 

. 

cost of the MOL have changed...very significantly. The other 

operating photographic satellite which is competitive with 

the MOL, the GAM3IT-3, has improved significarrt1y both in 

terms of resolution and in terms of days on orbit per mission. 

Further •improvements in the high resolution GAMBIT- are planned 

and 1 would be possible at far less cost than the MOL. In addition to the improved alternative photographic capability to 

the MOL, there has been a very large expansion of development 

of SIGINT satellite effort to provide information about major 

Soviet and Chinese weapons systems, against which the MOL 

will also be primarily targeted and justifie 

In 1965, the estimated total cost of initial program of 

7 launches (4 unmanned) was $1.5 billion. It is presently 

$3.2 billion .The benefit or value of the MOL _.p, otography, 

compared to that oftheit photograp y of the 

was seriously questioned by the DCI in May 1968 (BYE-1419/68a 

In DeCember 1968,1 Department.OfDefense evaluation group 

under DDR&E argued that MOL would enable some increased force 

effectiveness and-permit U.S. to plan less conservative and 

BYE 11700-69 e°' 

I 1 1 I fA 
Tr N7CP)771' 

iitat. 2- 

"NioAFFii4)1(g@Rvia BYEMAN—COMINT 

REJ_EASE iViabtitol Systems Only 

therefore less expensive forces (BYE-78445-68A). 

The issue: 

Would the MOL's design resolution, if eventually 

achieved, provide sufficiently important additional intellience on Soviet and Chinese weapons systems that the beriefit 

to U.S. force structure decision would -justify the very high 

cost of the MOL? If the marginal value does not justify the 

increasing cost, the MOL program should be terminated, with 

FY 69 and FY 70 savings of about $800 M and a total saving 

(:) iabout $2 billion. A decision o;. the issue should address 

at least the following considerations: 

(1) The marginal value of the MOL photography 

over the high resolutionhotography produced by 

the competitive GAMBIT-3 

(2) The highly important SIGINT information on 

Soviet and Chinese missile syitems 

(3) Whether theet arginal improvement in information 

against a few targets, produced by the MOL, would lead 

to higher confidence in our knowledge of enemy forces 

BYE 11700-69 
yriTi) 77..n71F. 

tVk 

Ilandle via BYEMAN-CQMINT 

NRO APPROMfe01 Systems .Only 

RELEASE t1 JULY 2015. 

system is deployed. 

-3 

and therefore less conservative (and therefore less 

expensive) U.S. force structure decisions, or whether 

_ 

\

. .the U.S. may well continue to rely heavily not only 

. . --. ... 

..'upon limited intelligence available but also upon .• 

ontimat*m of whet Soviet technology is reesonably 

capable of posing as a threat by the time the U.S. 

The issue-is discussed below. 

Discussion 

There are serious questions about the value of MOL 

photography to U.S. decisions about size and'design of U.S, 

forces for at least three reasons: 

(1) 

Yet perhaps the basic intelligence justification of MOL is that it will provide 

better information on such Soviet and Chinese strategic' 

weapons. Some of those weapons' most important characteristics (such as accuracy) are more-precisely and 

BYE 11700-69 
rkanu.Le via BlEMAN-COMINT 

.NRoAppRoxgofietProl Systems Only 

RgLEASE 1 JULY 2015 4 

often exclusively determined through SIGINT. Other 

important information (such as numbers of missiles 

and deployment pattern), accessible through photography, is either quite, adequately or more easily 

11 

; 

11 collectable with high resolution GAMBIT-3 ■rryklesign 

resolution presently, to be improved to in 1971) 

and with the search capability of the CORONA system. 

(2) GAMBIT-Cubed (G-3), the presently operating 

high resolution photographic satellite will provide 

a resolution capabil t very close to that of the much 

more expensive MOL;eginning with G-3 vehicle #34 in 

1971, a new lens (R-5) will be introduced that will have 

a design resolution improved from the present 

The improvements in the resolution and orbital life 

of the proficient G-3, not easily foreseen at the outset of the MOL development, make it highly questionable 

that the MOL's marginal improvement beyond an eady 

impressive capability is worth the huge cos 

The MOL is planned to have a 30-day and later a 

45-day life. The G-3, beginning with vehicle #23 in 

July 1969, will have a capability to go to 18-20. daais, 

. , 

BYE 11700-69 
• 

. : 

FIEIAAW0t D,70\74. a BYEMAN-COMINT 

Control Systems Only 

f 7.2 5441;1 r? 

cia.Eli 

Even if the G-3's orbital life were not extended . 

beyond 20 days with fuel cells or other changes, over 

a year it w d be much cheaper to fly more G-3's 

$126-150 M/launc However, the G-3's orbital life 

than MOL' (G-4) 'launch versus MOL at 

might be extended beyond 20 clays by a modification 

program which, although presumably not cheap, would 

still leave the G-3 much less costly than the MOL. 

Presuming the design resolution of the G-3 

is adequate, the G-3 would, primarily because of its 

larger area coverage (20 sq. mi. vs. 1.3 sq. mi.), 

photograph any and probably more targets'per orbit 

as the m0 

A larger number of G-3 launches per year would have 

the advantage of shorter gaps between collection missions 

during a year. 

Finally, if there is a significant risk that the -- 

permissive environment for satellite reconnaissance, 

observed by the U.S. and U.S.S.R., might be jeopardized 

by manned satellite reconnaissance over the U.S.S.R. or 

. other countries, the G-3's unmanned nature would be 

an advantage over the mOL, 

BYE 11700-69 

, r 
NRO EAAlirmare i a BYEMA _ 

pEL yN-COMINT ' 

Control Systems Only 6 

The competing capability of the high resolution G-3 

can be seen through the following table: 

.Design Orbital Targets Swath width 

Cost/Launch resolution life . pen day on ground • 

(aPlorPX.):. 

G-3 20+ days 330 -400. 

MOL $120-150 M 30-45 days 

(3) U.S. strategic forces (Minuteman, Poseidon, 

B-52's) are designed and sized upon conservative, high 

confidence assumptions that would probably not be sick 

nificantly affected by MOLbography. This is because 

of (a) the conservative nature of U.S. calculations for 

providing U.S. an assured destruction, second strike 

capability (e.g., consideration of worst case Soviet first 

strike on U.S.) and/or (b) because of the limited value of 

photography, better than G-3, compared to SIGINT in measuring important parameters of 'et and Chinese missile 

threats to U.S. capabilitie 

Assured destruction is the principal criterion or minimum objective upon which U.S. strategic forces are designed 

and sized. This criterion required that, under very pessi- . 

mistio assumptions about Soviet weapons and tactics; the ' 

U.S. can with high.confidence kill 20% to 25% of the Russian 

population after a surprise first strike on our strategic. 

• 

BYE 11700-69 

Ti Jd la 
Hanole via BYEMAN-COMINT 

NRO APPR edEtfti Systems Only t...14;. u:111A1.:!. 

RELEAS. 1 JULY 2015 - 7 

offensive forces by the Soviets. Of'course, the assured 

destruction calculations take into account Soviet ABM 

capabilities, presently observed and prospectively 

possible. 

The U.S. has already--by its commitment to Poseidon 

and Minuteman III--built substantial hedges into U.S, • 

forces against greater than expected Soviet ABM. A 

recent study by Systems Analysis in OSD concludes that 

"very large increases can be. Lolerated in projected 

Soviet forces, especially their ABM's, before major new 

Outlays on U.S, gic forces would be required" 

(p.3, B-77827-69). 

Because of the unavoidable leadtime (e.g., 5 years- ) 

from design'to deployment of.U.S. strategic weapons., 

even with somewhat improved intelligence on presently 

observable R&D or deployed targets in the U.S.S.R,1 

the U.S. must take into account what the Soviets could do, 

for example to improve their ABM or introduce MIRV's on 

a wide scale, within the expected state-of-the-art and 

resource limitations. 

These educated quesses-about future Soviet capability 

will continue to be an important input to U.S. force 

structure decisions and, if high confidence in assured 

' destruction is to be maintained, then only marginally im 

proved photography on present Soviet or Chinese weapons 

111 t

• ri IL • 
. :a:2.41u pinpim 

NROAPPaeb tal Systems: Only , . 3. 

RELEASE '1 JULY 2015 or equipment will not lead the U. to neglect worst 

case possibilities in the future 

The Soviet forces which influence the U.S, calculations 

about weapons needed to provide assured destruction are. 

(1) ballistic missiles (land and sea based) 

(2) ABM defenses 

(3) Air defenses 

(4). Antisubmarine warfare capability 

An examination of the major threat related characteristics or parameters of.the above Soviet forces indicates 

that either: 

(1) present. and improved photography (G-3 and CORONA/ 

I- X) is adequate to determine or measure the 

parameter, or 

(2) photography of even will not 

measure the parameter because, not being an 

Xray, photography by its nature only records ex-. 

ternal.leatures. (e.g., 

.,or 

( ) MOL photography would make a significant but not - 

., essential or major contribution to the determination or measurement of a threat-related parameter,or: 

(4) SIGINT (FLINT, COMINT), RADINT, or HUMINT can 

provide the only or by far the most precise measurement of the threat parameter in question 

(e.g., radar signal characteristics). 1 

Using these . 4 conclusions, the following table illustrates 

how the 4 conclusions relate to specific major threat-felated 

L4..1.c.acharaeteristics of. Soviet ballistic missiles and ABM system: 

CONTROL; s`. 31' -BYE 11700-69 

I 11 1 
Handle via BYEMAN-COMINT 

NRO A°P aO)TbnEUtol Systems Only 

RELEASE'. '1 JULY 2015 

• 1 k•-:, 1.4 y• 

47.;V 

1V2 

• 9 

SIGINT,RADIN 

Weapon 

System 

Ballistic 

Missiles 

and 

ABM Missiles 

ABM System 

Radars 

Threat G-3/HEX 

Parameter adequate 

Number of 

launchers/silos 

of MRVs or 

MIRVs 

Accuracy 

(CEP) • 

Reliability 

Warhead and 

yield 

Vulnerability 

of 

RV 

Silo 

Not amenable or HUMINT 

to even MOL contra only or 

Whotoq. significant best source 

X 

- 

X 

X 

X 

Air Defense 

Radars: 

Ground and 

downward 

looking Air/ 

Borne warning 

and fire control radars 

Intercept 

Missile 

(e.g., SA-5) 

Numbers X 

Discrimination 

& traffic handling capacity, 

range, etc.'' 

Numbers 

Missile 

Characteristics 

(e.g., fire 

'power, reaction time, 

max. alt.) 

The analysis,above indicates that, given the availability' 

of G-3 and CORONA/HEXAGON, the MOL would not have significant 

BYE 11700-69 
i~1R0 AP ig&via BYEMAN-COMINT 

'Elglipp2tts.b1 Systems Only 

additional value for U.S. force structure decisions in 

part because of the low likelihood that some components 

would be exposed (e.g., chaff, RV) as a target of- opportunity for MOL. It is noteworthy, for example, that 

the U.S. has never seen with high confidence a GALOS 

(presumably ABM) missile outside of its cannister. 

MIRVs, decoys, chaff, etc., are almost always under windshields when boosters are on test pads. MOL would not 

make a major contribution to, strategic threat analysis 

for another reason: important information (e.g. precise 

radar characteristics, weapons yield, accuracy,refire 

rates, operational doctrine) is collectable only through 

SIGINT, RADINT, or HUMINT. 

BYE 11700-69