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16 MICROFICT 

;ATE P-tli irl 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING 

SUBJECT: Comparison of MOL to an Unmanned System of 

Resolution 

:f3 

Reference is made to your letter of April 6 requesting a 

comparison of performing the MOL reconnaissance/intelligence 

mission unmanned versus manned. The results are summarized herein 

and the attachments have supporting data. We are, of course, prepared 

to provide such briefings as you may require. 

In order to respond to your requests, it was necessary to define the 

design of a wholly unmanned system. The description, performance, and 

costs of the unmanned system are contained in TAB A, as derived from 

two contractor studies and a separate in-house study, employing an 

optics module essentially identical to that of the MOL. The booster was 

 a five-segment solid rocket motor version of the Titan III, without 

 transtage, modified to provide radio guidance. Within the performance 

 of that booster, a wholly unmanned spacecraft was configured for a 

 nominal thirty-day orbital lifetime to provide approximately 

 ground resolution with data return weekly by recoverable capsules. 

An appraisal of the complexity of making orbital development tests of 

 the system without a man concludes that ten development test flights 

 would be needed for the unmanned system to achieve an acceptable system 

 maturity, although even at "maturity", the unmanned 'system would be 

mat40/4eIly inferior to MOL in probability of success. as imate 

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development cost of the unmanned system, including the ten development 

flights, to be approximately $1.12 billion. This estimate is a value 

judgment based on a range of submitted estimates between 95 percent 

and 110 percent of this figure. The basic-reason for the variance 

rela to differing appraisals of the development difficulty involved. 

TAB A provides an explanation of the above costs and presents recurring 

costs in the amount of approximately $45 million per launch. 

The MOL orbital development testing can be completed one year 

sooner than the ten-shot unmanned series. Besides shortening the time, 

the participation of the MOL crew gives an added confidence that major 

obstacles can be overcome. The new developments needed to automate! the 

:>(1\ system present an added risk during the orbital testing phase. Some 

functions involving important new components are: 

Image motion compensation across the format. 

Image tracking 

Focus sensing 

Remote optical alignment 

Precision automatic navigation 

A discussion of the new features appears in TAB C. Out-of-specification 

performance in any of these functions can defeat the objective of providing 

resolution. The presence of a man during the orbital development 

period is a significant insurance factor. 

As you have been apprised, the development cost for the seven-shot 

MOL Program amounts to $1.822 billion. (see TAB B). This program provides 

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both a manned and an unmanned capability. The cost difference over 

the wholly unmanned program is approximately $700 million. This 

differential, however, is more than offset by outstanding advantages 

in the MOL. These advantages appear directly in terms of cost effectiveness on a recurring flight-by-flight basis because of MOL's superior 

ability to produce intelligence information. 

Before summarizing the comparisons, however, it is pertinent to 

discuss briefly the effect of the field of view of the DORIAN optical 

system. Optical systems have a field of view that diminishes with 

resolution, a very significant factor in mission planning against various 

target models. The following table presents a comparison: 

Width, N.M., of Area Covered per 

System Field of View Photo, Sq. Mi. 

GAMBIT 9 180 

GAMBIT-3 4.5 90 

DORIAN 1.5 2.0 

The small field of view puts a pretium on pointing accuracy, requiring 

accurate target location and very precise navigation and attitude control. 

On actual target models now in existence, it has been shown that some 

means of target selection is mandatory in order to insure maximum 

intelligence collection. 

Assuming that pointing accuracies, equipment alignment and adjustment, 

image motion compensation and tracking can be done unmanned, the resolution 
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results of all targets covered during a thirty-day mission are 

expected to average approximately z inch better manned than unmanned 

because of man's ability to center images of obliquely located targets 

and to correct for offset errors introduced by navigation uncertainties. 

Inherent is the assumption that all equipment is maintained at peak 

performance for both systems. The man in the system will be able to 

maintain peak resolution performance, while the unmanned system may 

very well degrade. The manned system will use electronic readout and 

will return daily practically all of the information collected having 

high intelligence value. (The primary photographs will of course be, 

recovered later.) In-transmission the resolution will probably be degraded 

by about15 percent. The response time of the manned system by this method 

4‘94er is very much i,e-az than that of the unmanned system:- Since thebprovemnts \ 

in resolution by the man are offset by his use of readout, the difference 

between a manned system using readout and an unmanned system not using 

readout is small-- 

Of the many factors which cause the manned system to have a superiority, 

the following have characteristics which permit numerical comparison: 

a. An increase in photographs returned per launch because of 

a higher probability of success. 

b. An increase in photographs per mission resulting from operator 

selection of cloud-free targets. 

c. A greater number of individual target photographs using 

operator target verification to eliminate redundancy. 

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d. A. higher intelligence content per photograph by employing 

the man in a search for active target indicators. 

e. An increase in intelligence value by the short response 

time provided by the readout system. 

The effect of the above factors was evaluated by applying them 

against a representative DORIAN 30-day mission. By employing a realistic 

target deck and simulating DORIAN system characteristics, it was found 

that a total of 3988 camera operations resulted, for either the manned 

or the unmanned system. The improvements of using a man in such a mission 

are discussed in the paragraphs below. 

Selection of Cloud-Free Targets 

In a typical unmanned mission, the photographic loss is 50% from 

cloud cover alone. An effectiveness comparison assessed the number of 

targets which would be photographed by a manned system and an unmanned 

system on identical simulated missions. The concept of operations envisaged 

both systems being targeted automatically against the same primary targets, 

with the MOL astronauts assigned the task of observing the weather ahead 

and switching to one of several pre-programmed alternate targets (where 

available) when the primary target was obscured by clouds. 

An extensive study of unmanned and manned system potential target 

coverage was conducted by members of the NRO Staff and the MOL Project 

Office. An MOL target deck was derived from current and projected intelligence requirements. A range of weather models were derived from actual 

KH-7 mission results and KH-4 photography of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. KH-7 

computer programs (modified, as necessary, to properly reflect MOL 

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system characteristics) were used to select the optimum combination of 

primary targets for the two systems;then up to three alternate targets 

{where available) for each primary target were selected for the manned 

system so as not to interfere with any other designated primary target. 

In the simulated 30-day missions analyzed against average climatology, 

the manned system photographed from 16-20 percent more targets than did the 

unmanned system. When the simulated missions were analyzed against worse - 

than -average weather, the manned system photographed as many as 30 percent 

more targets than the unmanned system. Against target complexes like the 

Moscow area, whose weather is considerably worse than the overall SinoSoviet Bloc average, the manned system might return 40 percent more target 

photos than an unmanned system. Conversely, operating against an area 

like Lop Nor, whose weather is consistently good, the manned syetem 

probably would return only 5-10 percent more target photos than an 

unmanned system. 

The average improvement factor is 18 percent. In the unmanned case, 

an estimated 1990 good target pictures would be returned, while the ICS 

would produce 2360. 

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available replacement targets 

improvement fallen below 20 A 

individual target photograph 

assumed.- In no case considered has the 

The unmanned s would return 1190 

The -- MOL ,imp rovaMe 

has been . based upon the low 207, figure. 

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t 

Verification of Photography Accomplished 

A loss factor even in an automatic system with capsules occurs 

because there is a delay in verifying that a programmed target has 

been photographed clearly. A target may be photographed several times 

before removal from the deck, reducing the operations on other targets. 

An operator can make the desired positive verifications. Once a clear 

photograph has been obtained, that target can be eliminated from the 

succeeding program. 

A comparison was made using the mission described above and 

assuming that the unmanned system would return a capsule every 7 days, 

the results of which could be applied to target verification. In the 

MOL, verification would be made soon after the target is photographed. 

TAB C describes the method of calculation. The calculations show a 

39% improvement for MOL. The value is quite sensitive to the number of 
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Target Selection 

A factor having the same order of importance as those discussed 

above is the ability of an operator to select, by real-time inspection, 

targets of high value.e DORIAN optics field of view will cover approximately one-half of a 12,000-foot runway system. In order to insure that 

photographs are obtained of military aircraft parked on the perimeters 

of such a runway, one must have either a prior knowledge of their 

location at the start of a mission or must in some manner select in real 

time the portion of the airfield to be photographed. To illustrate, a 

single GAMBIT or GAMBIT CUBED target separates into two or more targetS 

for DORIAN'because of its snaller field of view. Not only does the 

number of targets proliferate, but to 411aure maximum intelligence 

content, target selection becomes mandatory. A complex such as Tyuratat, 

with overall dimensions of 50x100 miles and containing twelve launch 

complexes, could break into more than sixty indiVidual targets. These 

targets are sufficiently close thatlphotographs of all cannot be taken 

on a single pass; .hence the need for some means of selection of those 

which contain items of high intelligence interest. Our studies show 

that man can make a major contribution in this role of target selection 

to increase intelligence content. 

To estimate the usefulness of this function, analytical runs were 

mai of the DORIAN system against a realistic target deck. Results 

showed that crew participation in target selection yielded. almost 

three times as many photographs of targets with active indicators as 

could be taken by an unmanned system on the same mission with such cases 
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occurring about 6% of the time. Details are in TAB C. Representative 

of the operations performed are: 

a. Location of significant military vehicles 

b. Inspection of special radar equipment 

c. Detection of a silo with an open door 

d. Detection of a missile being transported 

e. Technically valuable view angle of new radar 

An advantage incident to the process of searching for active 

indicators is the fact that the operators can inspect more targets 

than can be photographed. In many cases, their determination that 

nothing new can be seen will be equivalent to an additional photograph 

returned. 

TAB C calculates that the unmanned system would return 4% special 

intelligence photos, while MOL will return 12%. If these are rated as 

three,times as valuable in intelligence content,. the MOL improvement 

is 15%,in what will be termed "equivalent intelligence photos,", the 

MOLrWill return 2100 equivalent intelligence7photes to 1290 for the, 

unmanned system. d 

Quick Response Intelligence from Readout 

The value of most intelligence photOgraphs. 4ecreases with time. 

In some instances the quality can be teried'Periehable. In thoSe 

cases where quick response to the intelligence*i important a satelliteborne readout system is most useftL, The MOL readout system will be eMployed 

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oa 

to provide the needed timely information by scheduling photography 

to be performed by the operators using a special camera on 

pre-designated targets. The film will be processed on board and 

the intelligence-bearing portion of it will be transmitted quickly 

over the data link. It would be possible to have an alternate unmanned 

configuration designed to perform readout, but an entire mission would 

be consumed each time the readout configuration was flown. The loss 

of a regular mission could be tolerated therefore only in very unusual 

cases. Based upon an estimate that timeliness of information will be 

important about 10% of the time, the cumulative number of "equivalent 

intelligence-photos" becomes 2310 for MOL compared to 1290 unmanned. 

Relative Probability of Success 

TAB C compares the individual reliability factors in the two systems, 

including the benefits of manned attendance of the equipment. As shown 

there, the "mature" unmanned system can be expected to complete an 

average of 24 mission-days for each one launched. The MOL, on the same 

basis, will complete 28 mission-days per launch. Applying these factors 

to the two systems, the final numerical comparison shows that the ratio 

of the quantitative intelligence product per mission of the MOL to that 

of the unmanned system is 2150 to 1030 or about .2 to 1. 
Unit of 

Factor Comparison 

Operational Camera 

Constraints Operations 

Weather Good Target 

Loss Pictures 

MANNED SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS 

Manned 

Improvement 

-. Ratio 

3988 

2360 

Target Individual 

Verification- Y. Targets. 

Target Equivalent. - 

Selection: - Intelligence.. 

Photos 

Response Equivalent 

Time IntelligencePhotos 

-1700 

2100 

2310 •:,. 

Mean Mission.. 

Life 

Equivalent 

IntelligencePhotos 2150. 

The foregoing is our current best appraisal of the usefulness 

of man in performing certain well-defined functions. There are many 

more, however, and it will be remembered that in the Memorandum of 

August 24, 1965, for the President, a stated important objective of 

MOL was "to give us --- knowledge of the nature and value of critical 

contributions of man to photographic reconnaissance and to other militaryThese added contributions are of three 

general kinds 

I 

which are discussed in 

I IT T; 4 

$ 

0 .c 

The table below s tap_ ize results: 

Cumulative 

Manned 

related space missions`: 

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Additional Manned Actions Which Can Improve Intelligence Information 

In addition to maintaining the system, assessing weather, validating 

cloud-free targets photographed, and selecting targets of high intelligence 

interest, man can, without interrupting the photography sequence, perform 

visual reconnaissance such as simple counting, color discrimination, 

classification of activity, and detection of movement. One feature, 

referred to above, is his ability to determine the best viewing angle from 

which a target should, be photographed. For instance, if he is approaching 

a parked aircraft from the rear and the needed intelligence will come 

from examining the fore end, he can wait until he has pa d •ver and 

take a backward-looking picture. He can, on call, place, • olor 

film, infra-red film or other special films in the secondary camera so 

that their special discrimination characteristics can be realized. Min 

can process photographs in orbit, edit them and transmit the images to 

the ground. In conjunction with this capability, he can make judgements 

and render specific decisions as to the relative importance of information 

to be processed on orbit and transmitted to the ground. He can also, 

over limited areas, search for mobile targets whose exact locations are 

not known or whose presence is only suspected. 

Additional Reconnaissance Capabilities 

The MOL system can, during times of crisis, be transferred from 

its nominal 80-mile orbit to an orbit of approximately 200 to 250 miles. 

In this higher orbit the system will have access to all targets in the 

Soviet Bloc approximately once every three days, taking photographs at 

resolutions of about The crew can also employ the acquisition 
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and tracking scopes, with a resolution of about nine feet, for 

intelligence by direct viewing. The absence or presence of aircraft, 

ships in port, cargo accumulations, parked vehicle build-up and railroad 

activity are examples of such intelligence. The vehicle can enter 

orbits of about 200 miles after one to twenty-one days, and still 

remain in orbit thirty days, permitting daily reports of activity of 

• 

significant value in determining the posture and state of readiness of 

Soviet forces. 

The foregoing additional reconnaissance capabilities can be 

accomplished with essentially no change to the baseline MOL system. 

Additional Military Missions and Growth 

The MOL laboratory module has been designed with sufficient 

flexibility to support missions other than high resolution reconnaissance. 

Although not of military significance the MOL, without change, can 

produce a photographic map of Mars at approximately fifty miles resolution, 

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military missions, such as communications intelligence or ocean 

surveillance, can be added to the MOL Program by the fabrication 

of new mission modules and some minor modifications to the laboratory 

module. Other elements of the system can be used without change. 

In addition to these military uses, the MOL has the potential 

of providing a unique laboratory environment for the execution of 

scientific experiments. The MOL has 1,000 cubic feet of pressurized 

volume and can provide up to 3,000 cdhic feet (8,000 pounds) of 

unpressurized experiment space. It is currently under consideration 

by NASA for use in their earth-orbital experiment program. 

Finally, the MOL Program, as currently configured, is well 

suited to grow beyond the applications outlined in the foregoing 

paragraphs. Our studies have indicated that growth to sixty days on 

orbit is feasible, as is rendezvous and resupply. Ekploiting either 

of these two growth areas provides increased cost effectiveness and 

would permit, by incorporating larger sensors, the provision of ground 

resolutions on the order of approximately All of our studies 

involving applications validate the.necessity for man and yerify that 

longer lifetimes on orbit and the use of larger higher resolution optical 

devices require the kind of manned space flight experience that will 

accrue from the present MOL Program. 

In conclusion, I wish to single out a point which impresses me 

greatly; although a direct comparison of two systems has been attempted, 

such an appraisal is almost invalidated by the fUndamental divergences 

in system characteristics. A few significant inequalities are. 
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a. Some quantitative correspondence between the two can be 

identified, but there exists a positive superiority under all condi-

, 

tions in the intelligence content of the product of the manned system. 

b. As a reconnaissance system the unmanned development leads 

to a specific end imposed by a rather well-defined limit in system 

resolution and utility. The MOL, on the other hand, has a substantial 

growth potential. 

c. The development schedule for the unmanned program lacks the 

confidence contributed by the- attendance of an operator. There are 

individual inventions and extensions in technologies which threaten 

to become the cause of impasses during the orbital test phase. 

d. The MOL program encompasses the growth of a system having the 

prospect of great versatility for missions of a wide range. The unmanned 

system will be narrowly limited in comparison. 

In any plan actually to impose a program reorientation, serious 

attention must be given the fact that we are now proceeding in a direction 

which will produce both a manned and an unmanned high-resolution 

reconnaissance system. Even disregarding the certainty of piogram 

disruption and termination expense 'that would be caused by such redirection, 

a crucial question must be faced: can we Afford to apply lens than:Ourc 

best efforts to achieving the benefits of a :high ,resolution satellite - 

photographic system at the 

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• i• 

TAB B 

MOL PROGRAM COST SUMMARY 

The planned total RDT&E cost of,MOL Phase II development is 

$1,821.5 million. This figure is based - upon the program schedule 

shown in Figure B-1 and the annual distribution of funds shown, 

by system segment, in Figure B-2. 

The cost figures shown werederived through a deliberate, 

methodical, and systematic piocedure which was formally instituted 

in January 1966, and which will continue through negotiation of 

Phase. II contracts with all major associates. The cost estimating 

methodology employed has involved the generation of independent 

estimates concurrently with preliminary contractor estimates; 

reiterations of these procedures; detailed evaluation of final contractor. proposals where such proposals were available; and detailed 

reviews of cost estimates by independent groups of highly-qualified 

individuals. The result is an estimate of MOL system costs which 

is believed to be entirely realistic.: 

It should be noted that the Cost estimates shown in Figure B-2 

provide only for an austere program. There is no ailowance for 

system improvements beyond the primary optical reconnaissance mission. 

While the desirability and potential of other posSible military appli 

cations of MOL, such as SIGINT and Ocean Surveillance, have been, 

recognized, the costs for such secondary objectives are not included 

in the estimates shown. -Neither are costs included for general 

scientific and technological orbital experimentation effort for 

which MOL may be particularly well'suited.. 

To provide a basis for cost comparisons, the follOwing,estiMates 

of recurring costs are shown; These costs assume a 5-year operational program with,current baseline configuration at six flights 

a year. 

MOL Recurring Costs 

($ Millions) 

Lab Vehicle $ 28.0 

Mission Module 23.0 

Gemini B. 14.0 

Titan TIMM 16.5 

Crew & Equipment .5 

Test/Operations 1.0 

GSE/TD 2.0 

TOTAL $ 85.o 

DORIAN 

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DORIAN 

Figure B-2 

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MOL PHASE II COST SUMMARY. 

SYSTEM PRIOR FY 67 FY 68 FY 69 FY 70 FY 71 TOTAL 

Laboratory Vehicle 0 132.4 213.0 176.0 140.0 59.0 720.4 

Mission Module 2.0 37.8 64.5 50.5 30.7 16.0 201.5 

Payload 11.3 54,2 60.8 59.5 33.0 6.5 225.3 

Gemini B 0 39.0 72.8 66.7 33.0 5.0 216.5 

Titan IIIM 9.4 35.0 124.3 87.2 35.5 20.6 312.0 

Other System Segments 0 2.6 11.0 7.5 7.0 2.9 31.0 

GSE/TD 0 10.8 10.4 10.4 10.4 6.1 48.1 

HSQ 17.5 5.0 0 0 0 0 22.5 

Sub-Total (RDT&E) 40.2 316.8 556.8 457.8 289.6 116.1 1777.3 

Facilities Nil Con) 22.0 8.7 13.5 0 0 0 44.2 

TOTAL 62.2 325.5 570.3 457.8 289.6 116.1 1821.5 
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PAB C 

BASELINE MOL EFFECTIVENESS FACTORS 

Extensive analysis has been made of the functional and 

operational modes of the current baseline MOL, with particular 

attention directed to the contributions of man in the development 

of full mission potential. The findings of the analysis have 

shown that man's participation as an integral element of MOL 

results in 

1. Reducing the initial development risk for both the 

manned and unmanned versions of MOL. 

2. High probability of achi ving mission success at 

program outset. 

3. Attainment of mature systems reliability early in the 

flight program. 

4. Significant increases in the quantity, and quality, 

timeliness, and uniqueness of the intelligence return over that 

expected of unmanned DORIAN configurations. 

5. Alternate mission potentials of high intelligence value, 

such as with no 

alteration in the vehicle configuration. 

I. RELIABILITY, DEVELOPMENT RISK AND MISSION SUCCESS 

The MOL Laboratory Module is based on current state-of-the-art 

subsystems, which in large measure have been adapted from the Gemini 

and Apollo programs. On the other hand, the Mission Module, which 

contains the DORIAN high resolution optical sensor, represents a 

major advance in the state-of-the-art, with an attendant high development risk. Additionally, MOL is designed to function both in manned 

and unmanned modes, hence its configuration is more complex than would 

be the case of a single mode. Many new components and subsystems must 

be developed, or adapted from existing designs to provide for this 

dual capability, such as 

A. New Developments 

1. Image Motion Compensation (IMC) across the Film Format 

2. Image Tracking (V/h) Sensor 

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3. Wideband Photo Image Readout Subsystem 

4. Tracking Mirror Drive Servo Subsystem 

5. Acquisition and Tracking Scopes 

6. Thermal Control Door and Louvre Assembly 

7. Focus Sensor 

8. Automatic Optical Alignment System 

9. Low Drag Accelerometer 

10. DORIAN Optical Assembly 

11. Re-Entry Vehicle Launcher 

B. Adaptation of Existing Designs 

1. On-Board Computers 

2. Star Trackers 

3. Re-entry Vehicle 

4. Consoles, Displays and Associated Instrumentation 

5. Thermal Control System 

Because of these new engineering requirements system reliability 

is a major factor in system design. In order to provide a basis for 

reasonable projection of reliability values, a failure analysis of, 

the current GAMBIT program was conducted. The types of failures 

encountered fell into four general categories: 

1. Design Deficiencies. Failures which can be corrected 

by change in basic design. An example is -- infrared horizon sensor 

locked on cloud rather than horizon. 

2. Procedural Errors. Failures which can be corrected by 

procedural changes. An example is -- wrong command sent to satellite. 

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3. Quality Control. Failures can be corrected by better 

training, improved inspection, better acceptance testing. An example: 

stuck secondary propulsion system valve. 

4. Random or Unknown. Failures which are not susceptible to 

specific corrective action, but result either in no change, or in added 

redundancy, more complete parts selection, or similar approaches. An 

example: malfunction of command decoder and programmer after period 

of successful operation. 

Of GAMBIT failures, 21% were due to Design Deficiency, 5% to 

Procedural Error, 47% to Quality Control, and 26% were Random or Unknown. 

It is significant to note that while 74% of the failures were attributable 

to what might be considered "non-random" causes, only 26% were 

attributable to random or unknown processes, and thus of the type usually 

referred to as "reliability failures". The largest single category is 

that of Quality Control, i.e., failures where neither the design nor 

the procedure is deficient,.but where fabrication and assembly techniques 

were faulty. It is also of interest to note that all non-random failures 

occurred in the first day on orbit, whereas the random or unknown failures 

were distributed throughout mission duration. 

GAMBIT failure rates have been reduced in recent flight history 

through a sophisticated and thorough ground testing program in which 

incipient failures were detected and corrected before actual flight. 

This testing is analogous in approach, though neither as extensive nor 

similar in motivation, to the "manrating" process which NASA has employed 

to a high degree of success, and to which MOL will be subjected. 

With an intensive approach to ground testing, both random and 

non-random failures can be reduced, but it is clear that failures of 

either type cannot be completely eliminated. The Mission Module, 

representing advanced state-of-the-art, can be expected to experience 

malfunctions at a higher rate than the Laboratory Module, for which 

phenomenology and technology are well in hand. 

However, the MOL is being designed to take the maximum advantage 

of the presence of man in the event of equipment failure. Equipment 

is being designed and installed wherever practicable to permit astronaut 

access for trouble shooting, adjustment, maintenance, repair, and 

replacement. The system is being designed to permit manual switching 

and override so that man can work around problems, choose alternate 

modes, or himself perform_the funCtion for which the faulty equipment 

was intended. 
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KEYHOLE. 

His capability for in-flight trouble shooting is expected to 

be one of the major contributions to the early success and maturity 

of MOL. He can detect malfunctions, both incipient and actual, 

diagnose, and institute corrective measures. He can also work in 

coordination with ground based technical support. This team approach, 

as shown by aircraft experience, is a powerful technique for overcoming 

in-flight probleMs. The recent XB-70 experience in which a nose gear 

failed to lower is an excellent case in point. Repeated consultations 

between flight crew and ground supported by trouble shooting in flight, 

permitted the diagnosis of the trouble, and a corrective action to be 

devised to lower the nose gear with the aid of a paper clip and save 

the aircraft. It is significant to note that no amount of pre-analysis 

would have predicted this particular failure nor its solution. 

As a result of these design principles which have been factored 

into the MOL, it is possible to continue a manned mission despite 

cumulative equipment failures beyond man's capacity to repair. To 

examine this point in more detail, consider the two basic manned 

operational modes for MOL. The first, the usual mode, involves automatic 

programming both of the acquisition and tracking scopes, as well as the 

primary optics to pre-planned, and usually different targets, taking 

photographs automatically, and tasking the crewmen with altering this a 

automatic sequence to increase the quality and quantity of intelligence 

collected through weather avoidance, target selection,and target 

validation. In this way man exploits automaticity to produce data 

of considerably greater value than would result from automatic 

operation alone. The second mode is the manual mode in which the crew 

manually acquires the target, centers it in the field of view, nulls 

image motion, then activates the photography sequence through the main 

optics. Assuming MOL operating in the usual man-augmented automatic 

mode, the following equipment can fail cumulatively with little or no 

degradation in mission performance beyond the basic capability of the 

manual mode 

:1. Image Tracking (V/h) Sensor 

2. Image MOtion Compensation (Imp Across the Film Format 

' 3. Star ,Trackers 

4. Data Recovery Vehicle Launcher 

5. Wideband Photo Image Readout 

6. One SGIS Command and TraCking Data 

7. Two.FueI Cells 

DORIAN/G.AMBIT 

via BYEIIIAN / TALENT-KEYHOLE 

CETia21 System S JOINTLY. 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE 1 JULY 2015 

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NRO APPROVED FOR 

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8. One Cryogenic Tank 

9. Three Pairs of Attitude Control and Translation 

System Fuel Tanks 

10. 25% of Attitude Stabilization System Thrusters 

11. Automatic Mode for Orbit Adjust 

12. One On-Board Computer 

13. One Acquisition and Tracking Scope 

14. Laboratory Attitude Reference System 

15. Auxiliary Computer Memory Storage 

The resulting performance in the manual mode after failure of 

the above equipment is approximately equivalent to an unmanned 

configuration with all of its automatic equipment functioning, 

except that overall mission photographic resolution still remains 

somewhat better in the manned mode due to man's target centering 

capability. In essence, the presence of man results in a MOL 

system less complex than a comparable unmanned system. A most 

important outcome of the flexibility of man is that trouble shooting, 

adjustment, maintenance, repair and replacement, or actual manual 

performance of machine automated functions will be done on much of 

the equipment in the high development risk category. 

A numerical reliability analysis of the Mission Module alone 

in the unmanned mode results in a mature reliability figure for random 

failures of .892, although it is somewhat less (.8 to :85) early in 

the flight program. This analysis is based on a random failure rate 

of one failure per ten million hours per Active Element Group (AEG), 

and estimating that the Mission Module contains the equivalent of 

10,000 AEG's in serial, and 19,000 in redundancy. For reference 

purposes, GAMBIT has an equivalent AEG count of 6500, and GAMBIT CUBED 

is estimated at about 10,000. Clearly the Mission Module is a very 

complex system element. 

Reliability estimates were then computed for the MOL as a system, 

as presently configured to function in both manned and unmanned modes, 

and for a comparable wholly unmanned system, both using the same 

Mission Module. A comparison of the two approaches was then undertaken 

to determine the number of unmanned launches which would be required 

for equivalence with the MOL flown in the manned mode. Then, with 

each of the systems operating in a similar orbit against the same 

target list, the following assumptions were established: 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

JOINTLY 

IT 1 
A. MOL in Manned Mode 

1. Design Life = 30 Days 

2. 5 Manned Launch Development Program 

3. 6 Operational Launches per Year for 5 Years 

After Development Program 

4. Man-Rated Booster Reliability (Random Failures) =.97 

5. Manned Orbiting Vehicle Reliability, Including Mission 

(Random Failures)=.95 

6. All Non-Random Failures Repaired or Alternate Modes 

Used by Crew 

7. Combined Booster and Orbiting Vehicle Probability of 

Success for 35 Launches (Random Failures) =.92 

8.. Mean Mission Duration(Adjusted for Booster Reliability) 

= 28 Days 

B. Equivalent Wholly Unmanned System, 

I. Design Life = 30 Days 

2. 6 Launch Development Program 

3. Operational Launches as Required over 5 Year Period 

After Development Program 

4. Non-Man-Rated Booster Reliability (Random Failures) =.93 

. Orbiting Vehicle Non-Random Failure Assessmenti 

Modul 

First Ten 

(Incl. Dev. 

Launches) 

Orbital 

Control 

Vehicle 

Mission 

Module 

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vtaailu . . 3 

J OINTLY 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

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Second Ten'' Third Ten 

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ON ORBIT 

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UNMANNED. 

LAUNCHES 

40 

46 

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/TALENT-KEYHOLE 

S JOINTLY 

- DORIAN/GAMBIT PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS (RANDOM FAILURESY 

• 

1 FT 

6° T 

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YEMAN/ '1-KEYHOLE 

O • ' TATC1 •ev 1' iSielliS JOINTLY 

6. Orbital Control Vehicle Reliability (Random Failures) =.91 

7. Mission Module Reliability (Random Failures) =.81 

8. Combined Launch and Orbiting Vehicle Probability of 

Success (Random Failures) =.71 

9. Mean Mission Duration (Adjusted for Booster Reliability) 

= 24 days 

In the case of the Wholly Unmanned System, both random and 

non-random failures are taken into consideration. Four of the first 

ten vehicles are projected to fail in their first day or orbital life, 

on this basis. Of the second ten, only one failure of this nature is 

projected, and no others are assumed to occur after the twentieth 

launch, which reflects the improvement in the learning curve, assuming 

that experience in GAMBIT can in fact be applied to this system with 

success. 

Due both to its "man-rating" and the presence of a crew, the 

MOL in the manned mode is not projected to experience any non-random 

failures and few random failures which cannot be repaired or otherwise 

overcome by crew selection of alternate modes. 

The following curve shows the trend of the number of unmanned 

launches, including those which fail on the first day due to . non-random 

failure processes, required to equal the number, of days on orbit 

achieved by the 35 manned launches: 
1 1 IT 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

TALENT-KEYHOLE 

S JOINTLY 

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Via LI I Effitifi / IALENT-KEYHoLE 

C6.71J61 System S JOINTLY , 

II. QUANTITY, QUALITY AND TIMELINESS OF INTELLIGENCE RETURN 

The DORIAN high resolution optical system represents a major 

advance, not only in photographic art, but also in optical science. 

The size of this sensor, which requires a mission module 35 feet long 

and 10 feet in diameter to contain it, is difficult to visualize. 

The prime optical elements themselves stand taller than most men 

(they are six feet in diameter). Few astronomical telescopes approaCh 

this size, and even fewer, including the 200 inch Hale telescope on 

Nt. Palomar, can match DORIAN optical quality. 

An optical system the size of the DORIAN sensor is essential to 

the achievement of ground resolution from an orbit altitude 

of 80 nautical miles. But with this size, and with high resolution, 

the optical field of view, hence the area on the ground observed by 

the sensor, becomes very limited. This is apparent when the fields 

of view of current systems are compared with the DORIAN camera: 

Camera Field 

of View 

Nadir Frame 

Width 

Frame Width at 

Maximum Oblique 

GAMBIT 6.4° 8.95 n.m. 17.94 n.m. 

GAMBIT CUBED 3.2° 4.45 n.m. 8.95 n.m. 

DORIAN 1.10 1.54 n.m. 2.38 n.m. 

GAMBIT and GAMBIT CUBED utilize strip cameras, in which film is 

pulled past a slit in the focal plane in synchronism with the satellite's 

apparent motion over the terrain. Strips of film are typically exposed 

for about 5 seconds, which represents about 21 miles along the satellite 

path over the earth. the DORIAN camera, on the other hand, is a frame 

camera, that is the film remains motionless while the scene is tracked 

and entire frame of film is exposed at the same time. At nadir, the 

camera frames have included areas of: 

GAMBIT 188 sq miles (Rectangular format) 

GAMBIT CUBED 93.5 sq miles (Rectangular format) 

DORIAN 1.88 sq miles (Round format) 

It is immediately obvious that a great premium is placed on the 

accuracy of target location, and the precision to which the DORIAN 

optics can be pointed sq that the target will fall in the camera 

field of view. At nadir, a 120000 foot airfield runway cannot be 
NRO APPROVED FOR 

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contained in the DORIAN field of view, hence we must now specify 

which end of the runway we wish to photograph. Two major effects 

arise from these circumstances; one, locations which represent one 

GAMBIT or GAMBIT CUBED target area.(which in itself could contain 

several specific targets) will now represent several DORIAN sized 

targets; and two, careful target selection becomes of paramount 

importance because photographs of all targets which are closely 

clustered cannot be taken on a single active pass. Every effort 

must be made under these conditions to insure that each photograph 

is of the highest intelligence value. 

It is here that man offers immediate capabilities to increase 

significantly the value of intelligence returned, principally due to 

- Verification of Targets Photographed 

Avoidance of Weather 

- Selection of Active Targets 

1. Avoidance of Weather 

By exploiting the automatic mode of the MOL baseline system, 

the crewmen need not routinely acquire and track targets for target 

centering and image motion compensation as long as all systems are 

functioning (of course, this remains a vital function when key subsystems 

have failed). Thus, they are free to perform other functions while over 

the target area. Operating in the automatic mode, they are freed to look 

ahead in the vehicle's path to perform a weather avoidance function. 

A striking assessment of man's capability to perform 

avoidance role has been developed in quantitative form in 

accomplished by the NRO Staff. This study evaluated the 

improvement in the total amount of cloud-free photography 

man is used in the weather avoidance function. 

a weather 

a study 

numerical 

obtained when. 

A minimum of theory and a maximum amount of experience and realism 

was employed throughout the study. Every effort was made to use existing 

photographic reconnaissance requirements, actual target decks and 

existing weather. The MOL vehicle was programmed and operated in an 

almost identical manner to the present GAMBIT (KH-7) and contemplated 

for the GAMBIT-CUBED (KR-8). 

The possible improvemont due to man in the weather avoidance role 

was determined by measuring the relative amount of cloud-free photography. 

1 TT 
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of the MOL vehicle in the manned versus the unmanned mode of operation. 

Identical physical capabilities were used for each mode; the use of the 

man was the only variable. To assure that all identifiable effects of 

the voluminous number of variables were eliminated, identical operating 

environments were provided for each, i.e., the same targets, launch 

time, weather, target selection method, photographic requirements, etc. 

The selection of each of the above was carefully chosen so as not to 

provide an advantage for either mode. 

The target deck consisted of 3428 targets containing 361 DIA 

selected targets and 205 targets external to the Sino -Soviet Bloc. The 

remainder of the targets were selected from the existing GAMBIT/GAMBIT - 

CUBED target deck provided by the USIB. 

The orbit was selected by the best coverage of the highest priority 

targets within the actual MOL vehicle operational and functional constraints. 

The orbit selected provided 4 complete accesses to the Sino -Soviet Bloc 

in a 30-day period. 

Individual targets to be photographed were selected by the GAMBIT/ 

GAMBIT-CUBED computer software. This target selection provided an optimum 

sequential series of photographic operations based upon target availability, 

the orbit, target priorities, target photographic mode requirements andvehicle capabilities. This sequential list of target photographic 

operations represents the absolute maximum capability of the MOL vehicle 

and numbered 3988 operations for the 30-day mission evaluated. 

Suitable alternate targets for the manned system were selected 

manually for each of the above designated primary targets. Alternate 

targets were limited to three for each primary target. Their average 

distance from the primary targets was approximately 30 miles. Approximately 

one-half of the 3988 targets photographed. had at least one alternate, 

one-third had at least two alternates and one-fourth had three alternate 

targets assigned. 

The unmanned MOL vehicle was required to photograph each of the 

3988 primary targets regardless of weather. The manned MOL vehicle 

utilizing man in the woather avoidance function was permitted to select 

the best of the alternate targets where clouds covered the primary. 

Thus, both the manned and unmanned vehicle had to take a picture for each 

of the 3988 target operations. If man did not select an alternatethe 

primary target was photographed. If 100% clear skies had prevailed 

during the entire 30-day mission. both the manned and unmanned vehicle 

would have returned precisely the same photographic product. Stated 

another way, the worst the manned vehicle should &it - under these conditions, 

is the very best the unmanned vehicle could possibly do. 

'I I 
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Recognizing the sensitivity of the comparison to the assumed 

weather (because the probability for each camera operation by the 

manned system is the mathematical sum of the primary plus alternate 

target probabilities), several different approaches were taken 

toward defining the "average" weather model: 

a. A weather-distribution model was made based on the 

analysis of approximately 1200 individual frames of KH-7 photography 

(taken during three separate missions). 

b. The results of more than 3,000 KH-7 camera operations 

(seven different missions) were analyzed and a second weather model 

WAS created based upon the actual results achieved vs the weather 

"observed" (weather observation broadcasts plus weather satellite 

inputs) at the time photography was attempted. 

c. A third weather distribution model was created based upon 

the analysis of 152,000 frames of KH-4 photography. Additionally, a 

complementary weather distribution model was made for the alternate 

targets which averaged 30 miles distance from the primary targets. 

d. The observed weather in the Sino-Soviet Bloc for each 

target area during the month of March 1960 was obtained and the probable 

results of 30-day missions by both manned and unmanned systems were 

computed. In this case, the number of targets photographed by the 

manned system were approximately 30 percent greater than the unmanned 

system; however, later analysis indicated that this particular 30 day 

period represented worse-than-average climatology and this condition 

favors the manned system optional use of alternate targets.\ 

e. Additionally, several mission days (by both systems) were 

analyzed against observed weather in 1966. 

The weather model based upon the analysis of 152,000 frames of KH-4 

photography was judged to be the most generally representative of average 

Sino-Soviet Bloc weather (it correlated almost precisely with KH-7 

results achieved over the life of that program). Using only the primary 

target operations for the unmanned system, the total number of targets 

photographed was determined. This is the total unmanned product. The 

total number of target photographs, the manned MOL vehicle would acquire 

was determined by summing the probabilities for each primary target 

and its alternate targets (where available and appropriate). 

Ti i• 
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Considering the conservative approach of this study, the 

results which were obtained are significant. Approximately an 

18 percent improvement can be expected using man in the weather 

avoidance role. When the weather is worse than average climatology, 

the manned system demonstrates more than an 18 percent increase in 

the number of targets photographed. When the weather is considerably 

better than average, the manned improvement can be as low as 10 percent. 

The weather studies indicated that approximately 25 percent of the 

time, the weather conditions encountered are 90-100% cloud cover; here, 

the manned system contributes little increase over the unmanned system 

in total targets covered in a weather avoidance role. In the remaining 

40% of the time, the weather conditions encountered vary from 10-90 

perceht cloud-cover; here, the value of the weather avoidance function 

would vary in proportion to the amount of cloud-cover. Thus, it appears 

that the astronauts could be involved profitably in weather avoidance 

about 50 percent of the time during photographic operations. 

The study resulted in 2191 clear plus partial targets for the 

unmanned system and 2594 clear plus partial targets for MOL. GAMBIT 

experiences 77% clear targets and 23% partials. Of the partials, 

40% are evaluated as good photographs and 60% as poor to practically 

useless. For MOL, only good photographs can be considered, since 

high resolution is the objective. About 10% of all GAMBIT targets 

are larger than DORIAN targets. One would expect, therefore, that the 

percentage of partial DORIAN targets would be less. A reasonable 

estimate would be 15%. The weather-improvement factor is not sensitive 

to this estimate. Using the 15% figure: and the 40% quality factor 

against the total clear photographs yields 1994 good target photographs 

for the unmanned system and 2361 for'MOL. 

2. Target Verification 

This TAB discusses in a quantitative manner the improvement to be 

expected in the MOL mission by crew confirmation of successful photography. 

Applicable data for the analysis were obtained from the weather avoidance 

study conducted by the NRO staff. (See elsewhere in this TAB) The 

intent, however, was to divorce completely the target verification 

function from that of weather avoidance. 

The measure of improvement most appropriate in comparing the manned 

and unmanned cases was considered to be the number of good photographs 

obtained of different or unique targets. Although multiple photographs 

of important intelligence objectives probably would-be required in an 

actual 30-day mission, coverage of these objectives can be considered 

1 I A 
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coverage of different targets. In this analysis the intelligence 

need was assumed satisfied if one photographic operation against a 

target was successful. 

The NRO Study data applicable to this analysis are as follows: 

a. The target deck consisted of 3428 targets-- 3223 within 

the Sino -Soviet Bloc and 205 external. 

b. The total number of operations in the simulated 30-day 

mission was 3988. (An operation is equivalent to a primary target 

access). 

c. 1990 good target photographs resulted from the unmanned 

simulation (including multiple photographs of a single target). This 

corresponds to an approximate 50% overall weather probability of 

obtaining good photography. 

d. The number of different targets operated against was 

1539 with the multiple-operation distribution as follows: 

Number of Operations 

On Same Target 

Number of *Cases With Alternate 

Cases Targets Available 

805 

249 

130 

104 

70 43 

73 40 

29 14 

32 19 

14 6 

33 14 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 (or more) 

Total Different Targets 1539 

Operated Against 

* Note: Cases of 1, 2, 3 and 4 operations were considered to have 

sufficient alternates. Cases of 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (or more) without 

alternates were classified as remote. 

r 
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In the manned case it is assumed the crew member is completely 

accurate in his assessment of target cloud coverage. He will cause 

a target to be deleted from further mission consideration immediately 

after its photography has been determined successful. A replacement 

target will then be operated upon except in those remote areas where 

a replacement is unavailable. It is assumed that for those targets 

operated upon four times or less, during the NRO Study simulation, 

there is always a replacement target. The remote targets are those 

observed five or more times where no alternates were recorded in the 

NRO Study. 

The following table tabulates the computation for the manned 

verification case. The good photographs of unique targets are derived 

by applying the 50% weather factor to the number of operations in each 

case of multiplicity. Although the remote targets are operated upon_ 

926 times, only one good photograph of each can be included in the total. 

The resulting total good photographs of unique targets with manned 

verification is 1647. 

Multiple 

Operations 

Number of 

Unique Target6 

Operated On 

Number 

of 

Operations 

Good Photographs 

of Unique 

Targets 

1 805 805 403 

2 249 498 249 

3 130. 390 195 

4 104 416 208 

5 43 215 108 

6 40 240 120 

7 14 98 49 

8 19 152 76 

9 6 54 27 

10 (or more) 14 194 97 

Remote 115 926 115 

Total 1539 3988 1647 
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In the unmanned case verification of target successful coverage 

is possible by examining the results of photography returned by capsule 

while the vehicle is still operational. For this computation, it is 

assumed that capsules, each containing one-fourth of the total missionphotography will be recovered on the 7th, 15th, 22nd and 30th days of 

the mission. It is further assumed that four days will elapse from 

de-orbit until a feedback to the vehicle can be effected (this includes: 

capsule transport, film processing, film interpretation and reporting, 

command generation, and command loading). Therefore, 11 mission days 

will have passed before analysis of the first capsule take will change 

the target programming. Similarly, 19 days will be required for input 

from the second capsule, and 25 days for the third. The new replacement 

targets will be operated on for only two-thirds (approximately) of the 

mission in the case of the first capsule, one-third for the second 

capsule, and one-sixth for the third. In addition, successful coverage of 

the new targets resulting from each capsule return is subject to the 

same weather probability (or less) than that with no verification as 

determined by the multiplicity of observations. The remote targets were 

handled in the same manner as in the manned case. 

The following table lists the computations. No verification 

whatever results in 1050 good photographs of different targets. The 

first capsule adds 77 to this number, the second 39, and the third 

20, resulting in a total of 1186 good photographs of different targets 

unmanned with capsule verification. 

(See Following Page for Table) 

Based upon the NRO Staff simulation target deck and the assumptions 

contained herein, manned target verification results in obtaining good 

photography of 461 more unique targets than unmanned with capsule 

verification. This represents a manned improvement over the unmanned 

of 39 percent. 

3. Selection of Active and Mobile Targets 

Freeing MOL crewman from routine target acquisition and tracking 

tasks by operating the manned MOL vehicle in the automatic mode also 

permits employment of another operational technique, that of inspecting 

targets for indications or activities of a transient nature that would 

yield photography of especially high intelligence value. 

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NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASEI JULY 2015 

To assess the value of this technique an analysis was conducted 

which 

a. evaluated the effect of the limited DORIAN field of view 

when superimposed on actual GAMBIT photography on the size, number, and 

character of MOL targets; 

b. determined whether certain activities or conditions might 

exist for periods of hours or a few days during which the value of tephnical 

intelligence would be particularly high, and 

c. determined whether indicators, would be present which the 

crewmen could detect by examination through the acquisition and tracking 

scope. 

The extremely high resolution of the DORIAN sensor and its 

limited field of view are of overriding importance in the assessment of 

its coverage. This becomes evident from a sample of 140 frames of GAMBIT 

photography in which 700 DORIAN sized targets were found. Some of these 

were larger than the available field of view and hence would actually be 

considered two or more targets. This proliferation of targets renders 

target selection for DORIAN of particular importance. As a first step, 

indicators of transitory conditions of special intelligence value that 

crewmen might easily detect were defined. Utilizing the 140 frames of 

GAMBIT photography with its 700 DORIAN sized targets, 

a. The fraction of the targets which had potential for active , 

indicators of conditions of special intelligence value was estimated and 

b. Of those, the fraction that would have active indicators 

present at any given time was determined; 

Transient Activity Indicator Probabilities 

Possibility of Likelihood 

Target Categories Occuvrence Occurrence 

Missile Development & Test 

Ground Forces 

Airfields 

Radar/Communications Deployment 

Industry 

Missile Production & Logistics 

Nuclear Weapons 

BW/CW 

Nuclear Materials 

Aircraft Production 

Naval Activity 

Radar/Communications 

Major & R&D 

11 ,i 

i!tIENT-KEYHOLE S- ;JOINTLY 

ONDOkAN/GAMBIT 

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The fraction of targets for which active indicators can be 

defined is relatively large while the incidence of indicators is low. 

Because of its importance in yielding early technical 

intelligence data on the USSR missile and space programs, Tyuratam 

has been studied in some detail. In addition to its specific importance, 

Tyuratam is also a typical example of other high target density complexes 

such as Sary-Shagan and Kapustin Yar which contain large numbers of high 

priority, active targets. More than 60 targets can be identified 

currently at Tyuratam and the number is increasing steadily. Five GAMBIT 

frames laid down with care will cover the entire Tyuratam complex. Forty 

DORIAN fields of view have been defined, with specific locations, which 

would generally return the same "target take" as the five GAMBIT frames. 

With four over-flights per mission and two stereo pairs per over-flight, 

on the average, one unmanned DORIAN system flight will be about equivalent 

to one GAMBIT system flight in terms of the "target take" at Tyuratam. 

Therefore, with probable fewer flights of an Immanned DORIAN system, the 

"target take" at Tyuratam could be expected to be about half that which 

will currently be obtained with the GAMBIT system. 

An analysis was made of Tyuratam photographs of pads and silos: 

159 pad photographs yielded 9% with missiles on the pad. 

77 silo photographs yielded 21% with doors open. 

These are much higher incidences than would be expected from operatiorAl 

systems, which further emphasizes the importance of obtaining data in 

the early development phases. 

The unmanned DORIAN system would require times from months to 

years to develop a high probability of catching a particular missile 

on a pad depending upon the priority structure given to the forty fields 

of view required to cover the complex. 

However, mai crewmen can examine targets for active indicators 

through their acquisition and tracking scopes, and can begin to yield 

a gain in the return of photographs of high intelligence value. An 

estimate of typical resolutions needed by the crewmen to detect active 

indicators was carried out with the followiag result: 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

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RELEASE'' JULY 2015 

Decision 

Photo Target Indicators Resolution 

Missile Sites Missiles Exposed 10 Ft. 

(Completed) Erection/Loading Equipment Exposed 10 

Vehicular Activity 10 

GSE Exposed 5 

Silo Door Open 5 

Special Vehicles 3 

Snow Removal 10 

Airfields New Aircraft 15 

Unusually Configured Aircraft 5 

Aircraft in Unusual Locations 15 

Disassembled Aircraft 5 

Aircraft/Ground Equipment in 

Weapons Loading Areas 

Aircraft Subsystems Exposed 3 

Aircraft in Maintenance Docks 10 

Vehicle/Truck Activity Around 5 

Aircraft 

Ground Forces, Vehicles Present 5 

Major Installa- Vehicle Types 3 

tions 

Motor Pool ' Maintenance Activity 5 

The question of the practicality of this mode of operation 

hinges upon two points; 

a. with what resolution can the crewman examine the 

target, and 

b. how long can he examine the target before a decision 

is required. 

It appears that a reasonable design for the tracking scope will 

permit the following range of operation: 

Ground Resolution Field of View 

3 - 4 feet 1° 

30 - 4o feet 10° 

With the particular time constants of the MOL/DORIAN system, 

the crewman will have 10 seconds to examine and judge fOr the presence 

of indicators (starting the examination with the target at 36° ahead of 

the vehicle and'ending at 11° ahead). If the judgement is affirmative, 

a 15° stereo pair can be obtained looking aft at -5° and -20°. If a larger 

aft angle is acceptable the examination time can be correspondingly longer. 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

/ 

KEYHOLE 

S JOINTLY 
Number of Attempts in The 

Automatic Mode 

Number of Targets 

Examined by Crewmen 

Day 1 93 111 

Day 2 114 1.71 

Averaging these two days, the resulting "take" with and. without •Crew, 

participation, is, as follows: 

Analysis of Collection of 

Photographs of Special Intelligence Value 

Assumptions 

50% Cloud Cover 

Photographs are Stereo Pairs 

70% of Programmed Photographs are Potentially:Special 

6% of Potentially Special Are4n_Fact 

1.5 Programmed Photograph Reduction-Pactor'feach 

Interdiction - 

Crew Does'Not Use We4ther Avoidande TeChnique* 

DORIAN/GAMBIT 

dh); Via BYEAN / TALENT-KEYHOLE m-r, 

,31 SYStein S JOINTLY 

N.„.1 . 

t= i u 

0 1. 401 7 .v4 ,1,;;; ■.-; ;.1.1

41

4-1 

NRO APPROVED FOR 

RELEASE '1 JULY 2015 _,ade S JOINTLY 

The specific concept of the "examination for active 

indicators mode", is to program the primary optics as though the 

MOD vehicle were unmanned. In addition, the two acquisition and 

tracking scopes will be programmed automatically to acquire and 

track two targets in the immediate vicinity of the target programmed 

for the primary optics (specifically, the three targets Will be 

chosen to establish to the most efficient roll angle between them, 

thus optimizing -the time to slew the primary mirror from one to the 

other). At any instant that a crewman makes a judgement that active 

indicators are present (and the weather is good), he interdicts the 

automatic program, the primary mirror slews to the position of the 

acquisition scope mirror, and a stereo pair is obtained. At the 

end of the sequence, the primary optics returns to the next 

pre-programmed target. 

The acquisition of a stereo pair requires 10 to 12 seconds. 

Depending upon when the automatic cycle is interdicted, 1 to 2 of 

the pre-programmed targets will be lost each time a crewman interdicts. 

To determine the enhancement of the return of especially 

valuable intelligence photographs due to crew target examination, 

two days of runs against atypical target deck were made with and 

without crew participation. The results are shown below: 
DORIAN/GAMBIT 

/ TALENT-KFY. HOM \ 

IS JOINTLY 

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Automatic Mode Only 

104 Programmed Photographs per Day 

104 x 0.50 = 52 Cloud Free Programmed Photos per Day 

52 x 0.70 . 36.4 Potentially Special Cloud Free Programmed 

Photographs per Day 

36.4 x 0.06 = 2.2 Cloud Free Special Programmed Photographs 

per Day 

Manned Target Selection Mode 

141' Potentially Special Photographs per Day 

141 x 0.50 = 70 Potentially Special Cloud Free Photographs per Day 

70 x 0.06 = 4.2 Cloud Free Special Photographs per Day 

• 4.2 x 1.5 = 6.3 Normally Programmed Photographs Lost Due to 

Interdiction 

104 -6 = 98 Normally Programmed Photographs Retained per Day 

- 98 l x 2.2 -.2.1 Clear, Special Photographs from Retained 04 Programmed Photographs per Day 

Manned Improvement Factor 

Cloud Free Photographs per Day with Crew Participation 

104 + 4.2 -6.3 = 53 2 

• Special Photograph Occurrences 

4.2 Handled By Crew 

2.1 Retained Program 

6.3 Total Manned 

Manned Improvement Factor for Cloud Free, Special Photographs 

6.3 = 2.9 

2.2 

Several key points emerge from the analysis: 

1. Because of the low incidence of active indicators, the 

acquisition of pre-programmed targets is effected only slightly -- 

reduced from 104 to 98 per day. 

2. The reduction in clear photographs returned in the automatia 

mode because of crew interdictions is offset by, the added clear, special 

photographs, even if the enhance value of the special photographs is not -

taken into account. 
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11 . 

3. The ratio of clear, special photographs returned with and 

without crew participation is large -- 2.9. This number is believed 

to be conservative since it does not account for: (1) examining more 

than one target in the 10 second period in high target density areas 

and with possible slow panning by the crew to cover large targets like 

airfields and harbors, and (2) possible increases due to crewman 

examination and judgement of weather factors. 

A digital data readout system in the MOL baseline system is capable 

of reading out 15 stereo pairs (1" x 1") to the ground per (9" x 9") and 

transmit to the ground all clear, special photographs (4 per day) which 

they have acquired. The remaining capability can be used to transmit 

photographs of high priority targets taken in the pre-programmed, 

automatic mode. 

It is instructive to compare the "take" in a typical operational 

mission for the automatic mode (flown completely unmanned) and the 

manned mode: 

Photograph Take Per FlightAutomatic Mode Manned/Automatic Mode 

(Mean Mission - (Mean Mission 

Duration = 24 days) Duration = 28 days) 

Clear Programmed 

Photographs Per Flight -1,248 1,484 

Clear, Special Photographs Per Flight 53 176 

Note: Photographs are Stereo Pairs 

The return of clear photographs is moderately increased with the 

manned system due to greater reliability. But the dramatic gain is in 

the number of clear, special photographs returned with especially valuable 

intelligence. 

Turning again to the previous example of Tyuratam, the number of 

special photographs collected based on the. findings of the above analysis 

would be expected to be increased by a factor of 4 to .10 over an unmanned 

automatic mode. There are several reasons why the increase should be 

realized: 

1. The targets tend to be clustered so that several may be 

examined in a single field of view or with a slight amount of panning.- 

2. Examining launch pads for the presence of missiles might well 

be done at 10 to 20 foot resolution, thus tripling or quadrupling the field 

of view examined by the crewmen as compared to the main optics. 

, .11 YE IAN TA1 ENT-KEYHOLE 

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3. The targets at Tyuratam have very little background clutter 

and the crewmen will become extremely familiar with them through repeated 

training and examination. Thus, it is expected that the time to examine 

a target will be. much less than the allotted 10 seconds. 

In general, the MOL system with crew participation can be expected 

to return 2 to 4 times more special photographs from Tyuratam than the 

current return with the GAMBIT system (with the MOL system flying half 

as many flights). 

A special category of active targets deserveS particular attention. 

These targets are not only transitory, but they are also mobile. Examples 

are (a) an experimental aircraft which may operate from a known airfield, 

but its location on the airfield is not known (b) a. missile or space 

booster being transported on an access road in the vicinity of a target 

launch pad (c) tanks, mobile missile launches or similar materiel in a 

field or a general research and development area (d) trains on sidings. 

The specific location of these targets cannot be predicted with surety, 

but a search in the vicinity of the main optics field of view can surface 

these targets. The man can then make a vernier centering adjustment to 

bring the special target into the primary field of view. It is also 

quite posSible for the crewmen to actively track moving targets to obtain 

high resolution photography. This function cannot successfully be done 

by the V/h or image tracking sensors. Man is :indispensable in locating 

and tracking targett of this general category. 

III. ALTERNATE MISSION POTENTIALS OF HIGH INTELLIGENCE VALUE 

1. 

2. Crisis Surveillance and Tactical Targets 

Man's particular capabilities both with respect to improving 

the basic performance of the DORIAN sensor, and in overcoming equipment 

shortcomings and failures, are largely a result of his capacity to reason, 

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to make judgements, and to render specific decisions. These factors 

can be put to work under the circumstances of international crisis, 

particularly when a capability to observe and photograph critical 

events is better done without the provocation of visible overflight. 

Even should the presence of MOL in orbit be known, the fact that it 

is routinely so would obviate the element of provocation which might 

otherwise arise should other overt activities have to be mounted in 

response to the critical situation. 

The MOL can, in times of crisis, be boosted from its 80-mile 

orbit to orbits of 200 to 250 miles. Although changes in orbit 

altitude and period can be readily detected by careful ground tracking, 

such changes might not be considered unusual, as MOL routinely (and 

detectably) adjusts its orbit to make up for losses due to drag. 

The advantage of the higher orbits is that they permit access to 

all targets in the Sino-Soviet land mass once every two to three days 

or so depending upon the actual altitudes and orbital ellipticity 

selected. Altitude changes are accomplished by using fuel normally 

utilized to sustain the MOL in its usual orbit.- When the orbit perigee 

is raised, fuel expenditure for orbit sustenance is sharply decreased, 

and duration on orbit can remain unchanged at the normal 30 days. The 

maximum circular orbit altitude which can be attained with available 

fuel is about 260 nautical miles, although the Gemini B sets a practical 

limit of about 240 miles. Above this altitude, insufficient thrust is 

available from the retro-rockets (on the presumption that only 5 of the 

6 rockets provided function properly) to de-boost the Gemini or re -Ontry. 

Eliptical orbits can also be selected, rotating the line of apsides, for 

example, so that apogee occurs over the area of interest. Orbital limits 

in this case are set by permissible Gemini re-entry angles, and, at the 

higher average altitudes, the Gemini de-boost capability. The following 

shows the circular orbit altitudes to which MOL can be boosted. according-. 

to when the change is initiated fram a typical normal orbit (80 n.m. perigee, 

180 n.m. apogee, inclination 800). In all cases, re-entry is initiated 

after 30 days in the higher orbit. 

*New Circular Orbit Change Initiated On: 

Orbit Altitude (n.m.) 1st Day :- 7th Dav '''14th Day 21st Day 

150 30 :-.30 30 3o. 

180 ,. 3o , :30 - 30-. 3o 

200 30 ':. 30 '30- 3o at 

190 n.M. 

RANDLE VIA BYE 

CONTROL SYSTar 

250 30

** 

30 at 30 at 30 at 

210 n.m. 200 n.m. 190 n.m. 

"* 

Note: 213.6 n.m. repeats every 2 days, 240.5 n.m. every 3 days. 

** 

Marginal. Exceeds Gemini De-boost limit. 

The field of view of the DORIAN sensor in terms of area of terrain 

observed is increased, and its resolution decreased at higher altitudes, 

though these factors should not affect crisis surveillance needs. 

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DORIAN/GAMBIT 

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Orbit Altitude Nominal Area Observed 

Resolution at Nadir 

80 1.88 sq miles 

150 . 6.56 sq miles 

200 11.65 sq miles 

250 18.25 sq miles 

300 26.20 sq miles 

In addition to the prime optical sensor, which can be utilized 

simultaneously in both photographic and visual modes, both of the 

acquisition and tracking scopes can be programmed to different 

suspect areas on the ground, multiplying the opportunity for the 

observation of activities of interest. Although acquisition and 

tracking scope resolution will fall off to about 9.feet at 250 n.m., 

the field of view is large compared with the DORIAN sensor, and some 

categories of activity can be readily distinguished visually, such as: 

a. Gross count of large objects, such as aircraft, ships 

in port, tanks in park. 

b. Verification of the absence or presence of aircraft on 

airfields, ships in port, cargo in port, army vehicles in camp. 

c. Estimate of whether railroad yards are empty or full, and 

if full, general class of rolling stock present. 

Hence, operated in this mode, advantage of man's.flexibility and 

adaptability is turned to the return of urgently needed intelligence 

data on a daily basis. 

Inherent in either normal or crisis surveillance modes, is the 

capability to program the MOL for the collection of both photographic 

and visual reconnaissance of tactical and battlefield areas. Although 

coverage would differ from that which.aircraft, reconnaissance provides, 

it may prove extremely valuable where certain sanctuaries exist 

(such as particular cities, buffer zones, and. national boundaries) and 

aircraft overflight is denied. 

3. Visual Reconnaissance 

Apart from the support which visual observation affords the 

primary photographic mission in terms of target verification, weather 

Over Area of Interest 

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avoidance and active and mobile target selection, and to the crisis 

surveillance mode in terms of verifying order of battle, and confirming 

presence or absence of major activity, visual reconnaissance remains a 

latent potential. It is highly likely that a critical examination of 

highly important targets, during the high resolution photography sequence, 

can provide supplementary information of major value. Events maybe 

detected that may not be caught or identified on the photographic 

image. Targets can be inspected by the crewmen from a continuously 

changing aspect. They can do simple counting by class of object, 

discriminate detail by color, classify activity, and detect and 

classify movement. The value of visual reconnaissance from space 

is difficult to assess at this point in time, but the capability is 

present in the manned MOL system. 

4. Observation and Mapping of Mars 

It is expected that interest in the planet Mars will be 

heightened in the 1970 time period as the national space program 

looks beyond Apollo. In support of this interest, the DORIAN sensor 

with no change in its configuration, offers a capability to examine 

and map the entire surface of Mars at about 50 n.m. resolution. This 

is considerably better then present ground based systems (300 n.m.) 

which are handicapped by the turbidity of the earth's atmosphere. 

At present, the DORIAN sensor appears to be the largest instrument 

capable of astronomical observation which will be in orbit during 

the time of interest. 

Astronomical and planetary observations in addition to Mars 

can also be conducted. However, the current DORIAN pointing and 

tracking system is not configured to support the long exposure times 

needed for photography of distant objects. This aspect is treated in 

more detail in Tab D. 

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