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WASHINGTON, D.C. 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 14000605290 

n U TH.E NRO STAFF December 18, 1967 

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Messrs Warnke and Halperin 

PROBLEM: 

To prepare for your meeting with Messrs Warnke and Halperin. 

BACKGROUND: 

On November 29, you received a memorandum from Ambassador 

Kohler (see Attachment 1), calling for a DOD-initiated meeting of the 

NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee. Since the memorandum caught us by 

surprise, our immediate concern was to find out who in the DOD had 

called the meeting and what was on his mind. 

Our investigation showed that Dr. Morton Halperin, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary (Plans and Arms Contro!), ISA, had called the 

meeting. We are also told that the business of the meeting was to 

have been consideration of a proposed U. S. initiative for the U. S. to 

negotiate privately with the Soviets for a joint public disclosure of 

both nations' satellite reconnaissance capabilities. It was also likely 

that the episode of the Lindsay paper would figure in these discussions, 

since Mr. Raymond Garthoff (State) told us that Dr. Halperin was very 

unhappy over the NRO's "Gestapo tacticslt in commandeering and classifying all copies of that paper. 

On November 29, you discussed the proposed NSAM 156 Ad Hoc 

Committee meeting with Mr. Warnke and he told you he had never 

heard of it. You asked me to investigate the possibility of postponing 

the meeting until the DOD members had a chance to get together on 

the DOD initiative. Mr. Garthoff was pleased to cancel the meeting. 

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PRESENT SITUATION: 

Messrs Warnke and Halperin are to meet with you on December 19 

at 1400 hours to discuss this entire matter. We see several possible 

avenues of discussion: 

1. The initiative may turn out to be a rH~ol?b$al to the Soviets, 

pretty much as disclosed to us by an ISA staff member. 

2. It may involve using the Lindsay paper, as written or in some 

new form, to create an image of U. S. "openness. II 

3. It may be a disarmament proposal, requiring an exposure of our 

policing capability (satellite reconnaissance) to strengthen its credibility. 

4," It may be a complete surprise. 

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION: 

There are several courses of action open to us in response to ISA' s 

proposal. 

1. We can hear the proposal and agree to calling an NSAM 156 

Ad Hoc Committee meeting. Unless the proposal is fairly innocuous we 

should avoid this response. The NRO is an organization representing 

the DOD and the CIA; as such it has an obligation to insure that proposals 

affecting it are staffed in both organizations, The fact that the initiative 

is DOD-inspired puts our relationship to the Ad Hoc Committee in a completely different light from previous meetings, where proposals originated 

with the White House, the State Department, and with the BOB / PSAC 

(jointly). Even if we were assured that Mr. McNamara agrees with the 

proposal (and we will probably be told something like that by Dr. Halperin), 

we owe it to the other half of the NRO to coordinate. 

2. We can hear the proposal and insist that we must coordinate it 

with the DOD and CIA. Under Mr, Nitze's and Mr. McNaughton's regimes$ 

proposals of Ad Hoc Committee variety were almost always coordinated 

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (which also includes the DIAl. This was a 

surprisingly rewarding coordination; many good ideas were developed in 

the process. Other reasons for folloWing this course of action are indicated in 1, above. 

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3. We can hear the proposal and recommend it be considered, 

but not in the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee. Considering the very 

considerable statutory authorities of the Secretary of Defense and the 

Director of Central Intelligence, we may want to move toward more 

classical staffing of a proposal, rather than trusting it to an Ad Hoc 

,Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee may have served its purpose we'll 

in the past; as of now, the principals are having more difficulty in 

holding to a detached view than they did in 1962. They are, more and 

more, representing vested interests. For example: 

DOD/ISA 

ACDA 

CIA 

White House 

NASC 

NASA 

This membership has been controlled increasingly by arms control people, starting 

with Yarmolinsky-Barber and moving to 

Halperin. 

This is the agency which had convinced Mr. 

Rostow that we will "probably" have to disclose U. S. satellite reconnaissance capabilities to our fellow citizens and Congress 

to prove that we can police a not-yetannounced disarmament proposal. 

After last summer's disclosure fiasco, hardly 

to be relied on for solid support. Probably 

still smarting under Mr. McNamara I s fiat. 

These representatives are under so much 

pressure from earth-sensing enthusiasts in 

Commerce, Interior, and Agriculture that 

they have flinched from drafting a NSAM 

which would give one department coordinating 

authority. 

The member is unfriendly to the NRO; believes 

all space activity should be open and peacefuL 

The detached view of NASA in 1962 has certainly changed to one of partisan interest 

since 1965. 

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Additionally, this group, except for yourself and Dr. Seamans, is 

essentially uninformed on the real issues: the basis of NRP security; 

the true threat of NASA's earth-sensing program; the fallacy of "legitimization"; and present inter-nation attitudes regarding satellite reconnaissance. To most of these people, satellite reconnaissance is a 

space stunt which we will disclose some day; they do not understand it 

as pure espionage, which can never be disclosed unless one is willing 

to forfeit a capability. 

4. We can hear the proposal and temporize. A strong case can 

be made for deferring any initiative at this time. We are replacing 

a Secretary of Defense, an Under Secretary of State (Political Affairs), 

an Associate Administrator of NASA, and the CIA representative. Why 

not wait until the dust settles? Disarmament has no suspense date. 

RECOMMENDATION: 

I recommend that we examine critically the future role of the 

NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee in the life of the NRO. We should be able 

to find our security policy answers in consultations with the JCS, the 

DIA, the DCI, the ExCom and the 303 Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee, although superb in 1962, looks somewhat tarnished in 1967. 

If. we are forced to the Ad Hoc Committee, we should invoke our obligation to coordinate thoroughly with the DOD and CIA. We should brief 

all Ad Hoc Committee members ~ ... ~~" .... ;,,"t;:-:::7 prior to any meeting and 

should insist that the Committee's findings go to its principals {Secretaries of Defense and State and DCI} prior to going to the White House. 

WORTHMAN 

Colonel, USAF 

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