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MICROFICHE 

DATE (s,- F 7 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

SUBJECT: Contingency Pidnning for MOL Flights 5, 

NOV 5 

6 and 7 

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Because of our many scub-downs and cost reduction efforts, 

we find that the current MOL flight schedule and hardware procurement plan is based on a complete success philosophy. In case 

of any single failure in the early stages of the flight program, 

there is little chance to achieve all fundamental program 

objectives without very long delays and high expenditures caused 

by delayed hardware replenishment. This situation can be 

alleviated by a considerable measure by some timely contingency 

planning and limited procurement action. 

There are at least three scenarios which, if they occur, could 

have a major adverse impact on the MOL Program. The first is the 

failure of the initial unmanned Gemini B Qualification (GBQ) flight. 

In case of failure, it is planned to repeat the test on Flight 2 

by advancing the use of the next Gemini B spacecraft. Since we 

currently have under procurement only four Gemini B's, this type 

of failure would leave Flight 5 without a manned capability unless 

an additional spacecraft is procured in advance. The second 

eventuality would result as a consequence of any malfunction on 

manned flights 3, 4 and 5 which would cause us not to complete at 

least one 30-day manned mission profile.. Under these conditions, 

we would not have completed the objective of a 30-day manned 

mission by Flight 6 and would either have to forego that objective 

or delay the unmanned flights. Conversely, something could occur 

to the automatic devices which would render us unwilling to fly 

Flight 6 on an unmanned basis. The final possibility is that the 

manned flights may provide sufficient enhancement of intelligence 

content that the decision to go unmanned on Flights 6 and 7 might 

be inappropriate from the standpoint of intelligence collection. 

In any of these three eventualities, under our current Gemini B 

procurement plan, long delays would be encountered until either 

additional Gemini B spacecrafts were procured or refurbished. 

The preceding discussion suggests the merit of providing the 

options for flying MOL Flights 6 and 7 manned as well as backing 

up Flight 5 in the event its assigned Gemini B spacecraft has to 

be used to repeat the qualification because of flight failure. It 

is in this context that we have examined the lead times and funds 

required to provide these options. 

DORIAN Page 1 of 2 pages 

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General Berg 

DORIAN 

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The lead time for a Gemini B spacecraft is presently two years . 

from order to launch. The cost of the spacecraft is approximately 

$19.2 million and the other associated costs to convert from an 

automatic to a manned/automatic capability adds another $9.3 million. 

The cost of a refurbished Gemini B spacecraft would be $14.2 million 

and would require 16 months from decision to launch. 

Another interesting aspect for contingency planning is that 

the spacecraft used on the first flight (GBQ), if successful, is 

available for refurbishment in time to be available for Flight 7. 

This option is a rather cost effective way of further protecting 

mission accomplishment in spite of possible automatic system difficulties. The decision to exercise the manned option of Flight 7 

depends to some measure on the composition of the operational 

follow-on program. 

The option to have a back-up for Flight 5, in case of GBQ 

failure, and fly Flight 6 manned can be protected without any formal 

direction to the MOL Systems Office until June 1968. The decision 

to refurbish a vehicle for Flight 7 would not require a decision 

until September 1969 with funding starting in FY 1970. Exercising 

both options would entail a total additional cost to the program of 

$52,0 million. 

The attached chart shows the options discussed and the dates 

on which decisions are required. It is possible to protect these 

options without expenditure of FY 1967 or FY 1968 funds, although 

early purchases of spare parts and long lead time items in FY 1967 

would effect some net cost savings. 

I recommend that we provide for these two options, i.e., 

ordering an additional spacecraft for back-up of Flight 5 and refurbishing of the GBQ spacecraft for Flight 7, by including the 

following additional fanding requirement in our baseline program: 

FY 19(9 

$17.2 

FY 1970 FY 1971 TOTAL 

$28.1 $ 6.7 $52.0 

With your concurrence, I will dispatch the enclosed message 

to General Berg. 

PEMAN SYSTEM OW 

SIGNED 

HARRY L. EVANS 

Major General, USAF 

Vice Director, MOL Program 

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