J-S41031-17

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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JERMAINE SANDERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 19 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 29, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002003-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 06, 2017

Appellant, Jermaine Sanders, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial 

conviction of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer.1 We affirm and 

grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

York County police observed Appellant driving at a high rate of speed on 

March 15, 2015. As a result, police activated their lights and sirens and 

attempted to pull over and stop Appellant. Police pursued Appellant for 

several miles and for ten to fifteen minutes until Appellant finally stopped. 

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a). 
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Police arrested Appellant, and the Commonwealth charged Appellant with 

fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, possession of a small amount 

of marijuana, and driving without a driver’s license. 

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on November 16, 2015. At trial, 

police officer Christopher Roosen testified that he was on routine patrol in 

York County on March 15, 2015, at or around 4:00 a.m. when he received a 

report that Appellant was driving erratically in a silver Honda. While officer 

Roosen was traveling toward Appellant’s reported location, Appellant drove 

past officer Roosen at a rate of speed fast enough to shake his patrol car 

side to side. Officer Roosen followed Appellant down a narrow alley and 

activated his lights and sirens. Appellant responded to the lights and sirens 

by accelerating down the alley, kicking up dirt and debris at officer Roosen’s 

patrol car. Appellant then drove off-road, forcing officer Roosen to re-route 

to the nearest street. Officer Roosen caught up with Appellant and 

continued the pursuit. Officer Roosen said he pursued Appellant throughout 

the urban district of York for several miles and for approximately ten to 

fifteen minutes. Appellant slowed down when he blew out two tires while 

making a sharp turn, but he did not stop. Appellant eventually pulled over 

several minutes later in front of his house. Officer Roosen arrested 

Appellant and advised him of his Miranda rights.2 Officer Roosen testified 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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that he asked Appellant why he did not stop, and Appellant responded, “his 

life wasn’t going right and that he had hoped that he had died.” (N.T. Trial, 

11/16/15, at 113). A camera inside the patrol car recorded this 

conversation, which was played for the jury. Additionally, the 

Commonwealth presented video footage from officer Roosen’s dashboard 

camera, which captured the pursuit. Officer Roosen narrated the video and 

gave a detailed account of the pursuit. 

Next, police officer Alex Sable testified that on March 15, 2015, he 

received a radio call about an erratic driver and initially observed Appellant 

driving at approximately 60 miles per hour. Officer Sable lost visual contact 

of Appellant for several minutes but eventually caught up with officer Roosen 

and Appellant. Officer Sable observed Appellant driving erratically with two 

flat tires while police were in pursuit. 

On November 17, 2015, a jury convicted Appellant of fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer. The Commonwealth withdrew the 

marijuana charge, and the court found Appellant not guilty of driving without 

a license. With the benefit of a pre-sentence investigative report, the court 

sentenced Appellant on December 29, 2015, to a term of nine (9) to twenty 

three (23) months’ incarceration, plus costs and fines. Appellant timely filed 

post-sentence motions on January 7, 2016, in which he asked the court to 

reconsider his sentence and challenged the weight of the evidence. The 

court granted Appellant’s motion in part on April 21, 2016, and re-sentenced 
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Appellant to a term of six (6) to twenty three (23) months’ imprisonment, 

plus costs and fines, but denied Appellant’s request for a new trial. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on May 18, 2016. This Court 

dismissed Appellant’s appeal on December 7, 2016, for failure to file a brief. 

On December 12, 2016, Appellant filed a petition to reinstate his direct 

appeal rights nunc pro tunc, which the court granted on December 13, 2016. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc on December 30, 

2016. On January 5, 2017, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellate counsel filed a Rule 1925(c)(4) statement of intent to file an 

Anders3 brief on January 26, 2017. On March 21, 2017, appellate counsel 

filed an Anders brief and petition to withdraw representation. Appellant 

responded pro se to counsel’s request to withdraw in a letter dated April 24, 

2017, and on May 5, 2017. 

As a preliminary matter, counsel seeks to withdraw representation 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 

493 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349 

(2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: 1) petition the Court for 

leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the record, 

counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; 2) file a 

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3 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 

(1967). 
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brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the 

appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of 

his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional 

points the appellant deems worthy of review. Santiago, supra at 173-79, 

978 A.2d at 358-61. Substantial compliance with these requirements is 

sufficient. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa.Super. 

2007). After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements 

to withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to 

confirm that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 

A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing 

requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw 

representation:

Neither Anders nor McClendon[4]requires that counsel’s 

brief provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of 

argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To 

repeat, what the brief must provide under Anders are 

references to anything in the record that might arguably 

support the appeal. 

* * *

Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by 

counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and 

counsel’s references to anything in the record that 

arguably supports the appeal. 

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4 Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981). 
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Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 359-60. Thus, the Court 

held:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed 

counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a 

summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations 

to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set 

forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and 

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal 

is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of 

record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that 

have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous. 

Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361. 

Instantly, appellate counsel filed a petition to withdraw. The petition 

states counsel conducted a conscientious review of the record and 

determined the appeal is wholly frivolous. Counsel also supplied Appellant 

with a copy of the brief and a letter explaining Appellant’s right to retain new 

counsel or to proceed pro se to raise any additional issues Appellant deems 

worthy of this Court’s attention. (See Letter to Appellant, dated March 21, 

2017, attached to Petition to Withdraw as Counsel). In the Anders brief, 

counsel provides a summary of the facts and procedural history of the case. 

Counsel’s argument refers to relevant law that might arguably support 

Appellant’s issues. Counsel further states the reasons for his conclusion that 

the appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore, counsel has substantially complied 

with the requirements of Anders and Santiago. 

Counsel raises the following issue on Appellant’s behalf:

WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 

CONVICT APPELLANT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OF 
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FLEEING OR ATTEMPTING TO ELUDE A POLICE OFFICER?

(Anders Brief at 4).5 

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence 

and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter 

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

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5

In Appellant’s pro se responses to counsel’s petition to withdraw, Appellant 

claims his constitutional rights were violated because he received a surprise 

trial date and was unable to call witnesses to testify on his behalf. The 

record belies Appellant’s contentions. As jury selection was about to begin, 

trial counsel stated that Appellant would like to ask for a continuance. 

Appellant then asked the court for a continuance in order to subpoena his 

therapist and other people to testify at trial on his behalf. Counsel stated

she had several pre-trial conversations with Appellant and asked him if he 

had any witnesses he wanted to subpoena for trial, but Appellant did not 

provide counsel with any names and/or information. The court asked 

Appellant directly to explain how his newly identified witnesses could offer 

relevant evidence in his case. Appellant said the witnesses could testify that 

he was trying to get the cops to kill him. Because the witnesses were not 

present during the event, Appellant failed to explain how the proffered 

witnesses’ testimony was relevant to his state of mind at the time of the 

offense. Appellant also raises two other claims unrelated to his judgment of 

sentence. Therefore, we give Appellant’s pro se claims no further attention. 
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received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal 

denied, 613 Pa. 642, 32 A.3d 1275 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

The Motor Vehicle Code defines the offense of fleeing or attempting to 

elude police as follows:

§ 3733. Fleeing or attempting to elude police officer

(a) Offense defined.―Any driver of a motor vehicle 

who willfully fails or refuses to bring his vehicle to a stop, 

or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing 

police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to 

bring the vehicle to a stop, commits an offense as graded 

in subsection (a.2).

* * *

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a). “The statute is clear and unambiguous on its face 

as to the elements necessary to trigger its violation: an operator’s ‘willful’ 

failure to bring his...vehicle to a stop in the face of an audibly or visually 

identifiable police officer’s signal to do so.” Commonwealth v. Scattone, 

672 A.2d 345, 347 (Pa.Super. 1996). 

Instantly, officer Roosen testified that he followed Appellant into a 

narrow alley and activated his lights and sirens. Instead of pulling over, 

Appellant accelerated down the alley and began driving off-road. Officer 

Roosen pursued Appellant throughout the urban district of York for several 
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miles and for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. Appellant eventually 

slowed down, because he blew out two tires, but continued driving for 

several minutes until finally stopping. Officer Roosen said he asked 

Appellant why he did not stop and Appellant explained, “his life wasn’t going 

right and that he had hoped that he had died.” (See N.T. Trial at 113.) The 

Commonwealth presented a recording of Appellant’s statement to the jury. 

Additionally, the Commonwealth presented video footage of the pursuit, 

captured by officer Roosen’s dashboard video camera. Officer Roosen 

narrated the video and gave a detailed account of the pursuit. Next, officer 

Sable testified that he witnessed Appellant drive erratically with two flat tires 

while officer Roosen was in pursuit. Under these circumstances, the 

evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction of fleeing or 

attempting to elude a police officer. Following our independent review of the 

record, we conclude the appeal is frivolous. See Palm, supra. Accordingly, 

we affirm and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed; counsel’s petition to withdraw is 

granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2017