IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter ofthe Detention of D.S. No. 71100-8-1 DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED: January 26, 2015 Leach, J. — D.S. appeals a trial court 14-day involuntary commitment order. He challenges the trial court's admission of certain evidence and the sufficiency ofevidence to prove that he presented a likelihood ofserious harm to others due to his mental disorder. Because D.S. did not object at the hearing to the court's admission of the challenged evidence on the grounds he raises on appeal, we do not considerthis issue. And because sufficientevidence supports the trial court's finding that as a result of his mental disorder, D.S. poses a substantial riskto others, we affirm the trial court. Background On October 18, 2013, police brought D.S. to the Swedish Medical Center emergency room after an incident on a city bus. Witnesses reported that D.S. talked loudly and made threats to people around him. When the driver asked D.S. to leave the bus, D.S. threatened the driver. People moved awayfrom D.S. and left the bus when it stopped. When police arrived, D.S. reported injury, soNo. 71100-8-1/2 police transported D.S. to Swedish, and doctors evaluated him for pain. Police cited him and released him. The next day, police responded to a 911 call from the apartment D.S. shared with his wife. D.S.'s wife reported that D.S. kept her from leaving the residence, forced herto watch porn, and called her names. When police arrived, D.S. spoke nonstop, appeared belligerent and aggressive, and removed all of his clothing as the officers spoke to him. He wentwith police to Harborview Medical Center. A designated mental health professional filed a petition for initial detention after an evaluation of D.S., resulting in D.S.'s involuntary admission to Harborview. The trial court held a probable cause hearing under RCW71.05.240. The State called Dr. Brent O'Neal. As a psychologist at Harborview and the State's expert witness, Dr. O'Neal tried to meet with D.S. in person, but D.S. refused. Instead, as the basis for his testimony, Dr. O'Neal reviewed D.S.'s medical chart, talked to the treatment team, and observed his behavior at Harborview and at courton the day ofthe hearing. Dr. O'Neal testified that D.S. had mental and emotional impairment and diagnosed him with "[bjipolar disorder type 1, most recent episode manic with psychotic features, and antisocial personality disorder." He testified thatthis had
an adverse effect on D.S.'s cognitive and volitional functions and that he presented a substantial risk ofphysical harm to others.No. 71100-8-1/3 

### Dr. O'Neal relied on portions of D.S.'s Harborview medical chart to form 

### his opinions. The court admitted some of his testimony of the medical chart notes as opinion evidence and some as substantiveevidence underthe business record and ER 803(a)(4) exceptions to the hearsay rule. The court admitted as 

### opinion evidence Dr. O'Neal's testimony from the chart about the October 18 incidenton the citybus andthe October 19 incidentwithD.S.'swife. The trial court admitted as substantive evidence, over objection on 

### foundation grounds, a note prepared by advanced registered nurse practitioner Jennifer Johnson included in D.S.'s October 19 medical record. When staff 

### placed D.S. on a hospital bed in restraints, he screamed obscenities and recited song lyrics. Dr. O'Neal testifiedfrom the chart that D.S. had attempted toflip the hospital gurney he was on and bite hospital staff. The trial court admitted this as substantive evidence, finding that "the foundation for this medical record has been laid, and Ithink that's sufficient, too, for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment." Dr. O'Neal testified further from an October 23, 2013, note that D.S. 

### did not believe his psychiatric medications worked and did not plan to take them 

### when he left the hospital. He testified that Harborviewplaced D.S. in the locked unit reserved for the "most psychiatrically decompensated 

### individuals .... typically used for the patients that are of most concern." And when Dr. O'Neal attempted to contact D.S. before the trial court hearing, he witnessed D.S. demonstrate highlyagitated behavior. D.S. yelled at him directly and shouted obscenities, telling him to "stay dead." Dr. O'Neal testified thatNo. 71100-8-1/4
based on his review ofD.S.'s charts and his own interaction with D.S., ifD.S. left the hospital he would harm someone. On cross-examination, D.S. elicited testimony from Dr. O'Neal from an October 19 medical chart note, describing D.S. as cooperative and calm. D.S. testified. He apologized for his encounter with Dr. O'Neal before court and said he reacted as he did because he thought his case would be dismissed and he wanted to have his day in court. He explained his beliefthat 

### "[t]hereason why Iam being detained isbecause Ihave so much compassionfor everybody in this land ofhuman race." He also acknowledged assault charges. On cross-examination, D.S. acknowledged an incident on the bus involving 

### police but claimed that he was simply sharing with people and the bus driver wrongly tried to remove him. D.S. admitted to problems with his wife, that they both called 911 on October 19, and that in response to the 911 operator's suggestion to separate himselffrom his wife, he did so. On rebuttal, the State called Seattle Police Department Officer Bill 

### Campbell who responded to the October 18 bus incident. He testified thatwhen he contacted D.S., D.S. was sweating profusely, appeared agitated, and 

### incoherently responded to questions. Campbell testified that he observed several bus passengers waiting to speakwith lawenforcementaboutthe incident who "appeared upset." The trial court found that D.S. suffered from a mental disorder that had a 

### negative effect on his cognitive and volitional control, which affected D.S.'s

.4-No. 71100-8-1/5 

### perception of events and impulse control. Thetrial courtfound that the impactof D.S.'s disorderon his perception was clearbased on D.S.'s testimony of the bus incident, which the court did not find credible and found that people were 

### frightened by what he said. It found that D.S.'s loud reaction before court that day evidenced how his misperceptions affected his ability to maintain impulse control. The court stated that though D.S. pulled himself back together for his 

### court appearance, it worried about his "ability to hold ittogether for extended periods of time." Itfound that D.S. had an argumentwith his wife on October 19 and that his wife and police believedthat "hewas the onethatpresentedthe risk" and needed treatment. The trial court also cited D.S.'s reaction at the hospital 

### and attempttoflip hisgurneyand bite staff. It found that D.S.'s own testimony demonstrated that he presented a risk 

### and required treatment. It found that while at the hospital, D.S. behaved 

### aggressivelytoward staff and threatened them. Itfound thatD.S. admittedinthe hospital to past aggressive behavior. Also, it found that D.S. was verbally 

### aggressive toward Dr. O'Neal at the day of the hearing. And because D.S. experienced an unpredictable inability to hold himself together at times, the trial court found thatD.S. presented athreatto community safety. The trial court concluded that D.S. presented a likelihood ofserious harm 

### to others and ordered his 14-daydetention.1 1 Mootness is not at issue because involuntary commitment orders have 

### consequencesfor future commitment determinations. In rePet, ofM.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 625, 279 P.3d 897 (2012).
-5-No. 71100-8-1/6
D.S. appeals. Analysis We review a trial court's determination of involuntary commitment for 

### psychological treatment to see if substantial evidence supports the court's 

### findings and whether its findings support its legal conclusions.2 "Substantial evidence is 'evidence in sufficientquantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth ofthedeclared premise.'"3 

### Wereview atrial court's interpretation ofevidentiaryrules de novo.4 Ifthe trial court correctly interprets the rule, we review the decision to admitevidence for an abuse of discretion, looking to see if the decision is manifestly 

### unreasonable or rests on untenable grounds.5 Ifthe court rests its decision on 

### facts unsupported in the record or applies the wrong legalstandard, its decision rests on untenable grounds.6 Ifa courtdoes notadhere to a rule's requirements, 

### we may consider this an abuse ofdiscretion.7 D.S. claims that the trial court violated the best evidence rule and the 

### hearsay rule when it admitted Dr. O'Neal's testimony. Because substantive evidence of D.S.'s recent history of physical aggression included Dr. O'Neal's recitation ofD.S.'s actions at the hospital, including his attemptto flip his gurney 2Inre Pet. ofA.S., 91 Wn. App. 146, 162-63, 955 P.2d 836 (1998). 

### 3AJL 91 Wn. App. at 162 (quotingHolland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)). 4State v. Griffin, 173 Wn.2d 467, 473, 268 P.3d 924 (2012). 5State v. Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d 168, 174, 163 P.3d 786 (2007). 6 Griffin, 173 Wn.2d at473. 7 Foxhoven. 161 Wn.2d at 174.
-6-No. 71100-8-1/7 

### and bite the staff, he argues that the court's admission of that statement is prejudicial. D.S. concedes thatthe Harborview records metthe hearsay exception for medical records. But he contends that Dr. O'Neal's testimony aboutthe content 

### ofthe October 19 note describing D.S.'s attemptto flip the gurney and bite staff violated ER 1002's "bestevidence rule" because the note had not been admitted. 

### The State responds that D.S. did not object at the hearing on best evidence 

### grounds and may notraise this objection for the first time on appeal. D.S. admits that he did not object at the trial court hearing on this basis but claims testimony about the record admitted as substantive evidence was error nevertheless. 

### When a party fails to object on particulargrounds to testimony inthe trial 

### court, it may not raise those grounds for objection later on appeal.8 At the hearing, D.S.'s counsel objected to Dr. O'Neal's challenged testimony about 

### D.S.'s attempt to flip his gurney and bite Harborview hospital staff. He said, "[Jjustto objectaboutthe allegation that [D.S.] attemptedto bite staff, Iwould ask forthewitness to lay some—lackoffoundation, objecting as to lack offoundation about that." The trial court admitted this as substantive evidence, finding that "the foundation for this medical record has been laid, and Ithink that's sufficient, too, for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment." D.S. never objected to the admission of Dr. O'Neal's testimony about D.S.'s attempts to flip his gurney or bite staffon the basis ofthe bestevidence rule or hearsay. 8State v. Gulov, 104Wn.2d412, 421, 705 P.2d 1182(1985).No. 71100-8-1/8 

### D.S. claims State v. Fricks9 supports his evidentiary challenge despite his failure to make the asserted objection to the trial court. In Fricks. the Statefailed 

### to produce a document, and the court heldthata managercould not testify to the contents of a missing documentwhen the bestevidence rule required an "original 

### writing be produced unless it can be shown to be unavailable."10 The court continues thateven ifthe writing inthatcasewere available, itmustotherwise be shown to be admissible through the business records exception to the hearsay 

### requirement.11 Butthat case does not address the issue ofwhether a party who fails to object on the basis ofthe best evidence rule may proceed and does not control. 

### A party's foundation objection in the trial court does not preserve for 

### appeal a challenge based on best evidence orhearsay grounds. Because D.S. objected only on foundational grounds and does not appeal on thatbasis, we do not review the merits ofthis issue.12 

### P.S. challenges the sufficiency ofthe evidence to support the trialcourt's commitment order. D.S. also claims that the court used opinion evidence as 

### substantive evidence in its findings, exceeding the scopefor which the courtmay use opinion evidence.

991 Wn.2d 391, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979). 10Fricks. 91 Wn.2d at 397. 11 Fricks. 91 Wn.2d at 397-98. 12 Gulov. 104Wn.2dat422.
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### The State may not subjecta personto involuntary commitmentforthe 

### treatmentof a mental disorderwithout the due process oflaw.13 To do so, the trial courtmustfind thata person, as a resultof a mental disorder, must "(1) pose a substantial risk ofharm to themselves, others, or the property ofothers, or (2) 

### [be] gravely disabled."14 Under RCW71.05.240(3), the State mustprove by a preponderanceoftheevidencethat D.S. presented a likelihood ofserious harm to others. RCW 71.05.020(25)(a) defines "likelihood ofserious harm" as (a) A substantial risk that. . . (ii) physical harm will be inflicted by a person upon another, as evidenced by behaviorwhich has caused such harm or which places another person or persons in reasonable fear ofsustaining such harm; ... or (b) The person has threatened the physical safety ofanother and has a history ofone or more violentacts. 

### A court can base its findings, even entirely, on circumstantial evidence.15 We review the trial court record to see if a rational trier offact could have 

### found, by a preponderance ofthe evidence, that D.S. posed a substantial risk of harm to others as a result of his mental disorder. The trial court found that D.S. suffered from bipolar disorder type 1 and possibly an antisocial personality disorder that affect his perception of events and his impulse control. The trial court based this on the opinion and diagnosis of Dr. O'Neal, who briefly interacted with D.S. and reviewed hospital charts to determine that D.S. suffered from bipolardisorder and posed a risk to others. The courtfound from direct and circumstantial evidence that the October 18 incident on a city bus demonstrated 13 In re Pet, ofLaBelle, 107Wn.2d 196, 201, 728 P.2d 138(1986). 14 LaBelle. 107Wn.2d at201-02 (citing RCW 71.05.020(1)(3)). 15 Statev. Evans. 32 Wn.2d 278, 280, 201 P.2d 513 (1949).
-9-No. 71100-8-1/10 D.S.'s inability to perceive events and control his impulses, as did the incident between D.S. and his wife, requiring him to be hospitalized. As evidence ofthe risk D.S. posed to others, the court cites that he was aggressive at the hospital, tried to flip his gurney and bite staff, and yelled obscenities at Dr. O'Neal before the court hearing. D.S. claims thatthe court improperly relied on evidence admitted solelyfor opinion evidence purposes to form its findings. Courts may not rely on evidence 

### admitted solelyas opinionevidence but not admitted as substantive.16 D.S. cites the trial court's finding that D.S. and his wife argued, when the court admitted this as opinion and not substantive evidence. But the record shows that D.S. separated himself from his wife on October 19 and required 

### hospitalization, which provided evidence for the court's conclusion that D.S. presented a risk to his wife. Omitting the evidence D.S. challenges, other 

### unchallenged evidence sufficiently supportsthe court'sfinding. D.S. also cites to the court's finding that D.S. self-reported a history of past aggressive behaviorwhile atthe hospital, when D.S. did not admitto this in 

### his testimony, and the court admitted this evidence solely for the purpose of Dr. O'Neal's opinion. But D.S. did admit to an assault charge in his own testimony. Again, omitting the evidence from hospital records of past aggression, other unchallenged evidence sufficiently supports the court's finding.

16Allen v. Asbestos Corp.. 138Wn. App. 564, 579, 157 P.3d406 (2007).
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that it contains sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to find that D.S. suffers from a 

### mental disorder causing him to pose a substantial risk of harm to others. This is truewithout Dr.O'Neal's testimony about D.S. flippingthe gurney or biting staff. Conclusion 

### Because D.S. did not object in the trial court to Dr. O'Neal's challenged 

### testimony onthe grounds on which he appeals, we holdthathe may not raise the issue on appeal. And because the record contains sufficientevidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that D.S. presented a serious risk of harm to others as a result ofhis mental disorder, we affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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