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Jfi'f NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C, 

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THE NRO STAFF June 9, 1971 

HAMOLE VLA 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 

SUBJECT: Study on Utilization of Satellite Photography 

PROBLEM 

The Special Task Group of COMIREX appointed to study 

the problems inhibiting the effective use of satellite 

reconnaissance photography has been directed to pursue 

further development of an option that would classify 

SECRET the "fact of satellite reconnaissance 11 and permit 

release of KH-4, KH-8, and KH-9 photography at the SECRET 

level. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 11, 1970, Mr. Helms directed the Chairman 

of COMIREX to conduct a study concerning the utilization 

of satellite photography. As you know, this was prompted 

by General Bennett's letter requesting that KH-4 photography be selectively downgraded to the SECRET level. 

Mr. Helms specified three areas to be included in the 

study. 

a. Review the problems that inhibit the effective 

utilization of the materials derived from satellite photography within the Department of Defense and other USIB 

agencies. 

b. Develop various alternatives for increasing 

the utilization of such materials. 

c. Outline the significant advantages and disadvantages of each of the alternatives with special attention 

to security, costs, and timeliness. 

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This study was originally scheduled for USIB consideration in October 1970. Because of the overriding considerations 

of crisis response studies and presumably the letter from 

President Nixon in December concerning disclosures of sensitive 

information, the study lost momentum and was continuing on a 

pace to oblivion when DIA requested that action on the study 

be accelerated in April. The first draft was distributed on 

12 May 1971. This draft offered four possible alternatives: 

a. Broaden utilization within the existing 

security control system. This would be accomplished.by 

modifying standards for physical security and/or personnel 

access and increasing the sanitization and decontrol 

authorizations. 

b. Downgrade to SECRET the fact of the U.S. 

photographic satellite reconnaissance program and adopt 

as an 11 initial test" downgrad:i.ng and decontrol of KH-4 

satellite photography and derived substantive information 

(DIA proposal). 

c. Downgrade to SECRET the fact of the U.S. 

photographic satellite reconnaissance program and release 

from TALENT-KEYHOLE control both information and photography derived from KH-4, KH-8, and KH-9 systems except for 

specified sensitive information, not to reveal a resolution 

factor of three feet (tentative figure) or less. 

d. Blanket downgrading to SECRET and decontrol 

of essentially all film and derived information from the 

KH-4, KH-7, and KH-9 systems and selective downgrading to 

SECRET of KH-8 film and derived information which do not 

reveal a resolution capability better than three feet. 

9~tg_inal negatives would be automatically classified 

SECRET except for the Kll-8. 

The draft of the study as released supported the first 

alternative to maintain the TALENT Control System with only 

minor internal modifications. These modifications would have 

included revision of the physical security standards (allowing 

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greater latitude in physical protection requirements), 

improved sanitization and decontrol procedures, and updating 

of the TALENT security manual, published in 1956. The study 

also discredited the second alternative primarily on the 

grounds that the KH-4 is going out of the inventory and the 

requirement is for a current product. 

On May 20, 1971, a Task Group meeting was held to review 

the initial draft. At this time it was remarked by the 

Chairman,'--------- that Mr. Roland Inlow, Chairman 

of COMIREX, had requested that the third alternative be 

expanded and fully explored by the Task Group. 

CURRENT SITUATION 

On May 21, 1971, I met (at his specific request) with I I Executive Secretary of COMIREX and Chairman 

of the Task Group. He advised that the third alternative 

was not included in the original text of the Task Group but 

was added after the paper went to typing. It was personally 

prepared and recommended by Mr. Inlow for inclusion. cl _____ _ 

stated that the alternative did not, at this time, have the 

support of CIA since it had not been reviewed by their senior 

officials. 

He agreed that the study (now 83 double spaced pages) 

did not deal with the new alternative and as written supported 

the first alternative. This will require a complete study 

rewrite to incorporate sufficient data from which to base an 

analysis of the third alternative in parallel with the other 

three alternatives of the study. Also of concern is the fact 

that the other two alternatives do not appear to cope with 

the problems cited by the USIB agencies. The problems cited 

are general in nature and further definition of the problems 

appears to be essential for insuring validity of the study. 

The real issue of the study is classification of the 11 fact of" photographic satellite reconnaissance. This is 

also the issue that is of paramount concern to the NRO. 

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As a result of the Task Force meeting and the private 

session with the following status is available: ~----~ 

a. The Task Group is primarily limited to providing information that would update the 1967 study when 

Mr. McNamara stated it was not the appropriate time to 

downgrade "fact of. 11 

b. There is a consensus within the Task Force 

that 11 operational matters and capabilities 11 require continued 

compartmented protection (i.e., no move to change the BYEMAN 

system); however, the NRO could emerge as a 11SECRET11 fact. 

c. According to~~-~~~ the Task Group and 

COMIREX are responsible for developing the study, possible 

alternatives, and significant advantages and disadvantages 

of the alternatives. They will not make any recommendation 

and the final decision will rest no lower than USIB and 

Mr. Helms. Since the DCI is charged with the security 

protection of intelligence, he may override a USIB decision, 

if warranted, in his opinion. 

d. The Utilization Study, as written, is deficient in explicitly stating what is sensitive and what 

must be protected and the degree of dependency by the 

United States on satellite photography. 

e. During my private session with.~---~~ he 

requested that the NRO, to the extent possible, provide 

authoritative information on the following points for 

inclusion in the study. 

1. Problems experienced by NASA in regard 

to international reaction to ERTS and other programs 

involving space photography. 

e. Any legal statements or opinions on 

legality and reaction to overflight by reconnaissance 

satellites. 

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3. Vulnerability of satellite programs to 

interference by foreign powers. 

4. Effect on SIGINT programs if photo programs 

are downgraded. 

5. Cost impact if the program is declassified to any extent. 

6. Counterintelligence value if photographs 

or original negatives are compromised. 

7. Explanation of the security problems 

unique to satellite collection versus other intelligence 

collection operations. 

OBSERVATIONS 

Criticism of the security restrictions placed on satellite 

collected intelligence datesback almost to program inception, 

-and- has been a continuing biannual subject on the USIB agenda 

since November 1964. Traditionally, the military departments 

have pushed for lessening of restrictions and the NRO has 

attempted to forestall any such action. Unfortunately there is 

no pat answer -- no one can predict Soviet or third party 

reaction, or what the U.S. would do if "they" insisted we cease 

these collection efforts. Indeed, the problem is much more 

complex than the reaction of the present governments, but the 

reaction of future governments confronted with growing evidence 

of U.S. collection against their sovereign territory. The 

Soviets, despite so-called tacit agreement, have not officially 

agreed and we might force them into disagreement. This coupled 

with increased dependency upon satellite collection as the 

primary, and in many cases sole source of collection by the 

u_s. places us in a most vulnerable position. 

Another observation is the fact that the Special Task 

Force members are lower echelon personnel who would nonnally 

not have direct and immediate access to the principals considering the matter at the USIB level. The aspects of the 

international considerations are subtle, and there is the 

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"f6P SE6RET TALENT-KEYHOLE/ BYEMAN 

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possibility that they could be overlooked in the course of 

the deliberations unless specifically and authoritatively made 

known. While the NRO has always assumed this responsibility, 

we are collection operators and while we may state our estimate 

of the impact on our portion of the program -- we are not international experts or users, and in that regard we must limit our 

judgments. However, as in the past, we have been called upon 

to serve as the bridge soliciting and reporting on these factors. 

This is a legitimate activity on our part, since the DNRO is 

responsible for operating the NRP which requires that a fine 

balance be sustained in terms of maximizing the intelligence 

collection and utilization in the face of minimizing the danger 

which would impair our continued ability to collect. 

RECOMMENDATION 

Since the last USIB review, there has been a significant change in the operating environment of the NRP (antisatellite), a shift in our collection capability (more complex 

systems but fewer in number) and increased dependence on overhead means for collection. These factors and their impact on 

the collection capability must be taken into consideration at 

the time a decision is made whether or not to downgrade 11 fact 

of. 11 At the present time there is little or no current authoritative documentation applicable to the subject. It is therefore 

recommended that you sign the attached letters to principals 

concerned in this area to insure that prior to the USIB decision 

all the relevant factors including impact on SIGINT, peaceful 

uses potential, as well as photographic are made known and 

considered. 

• 

~ ROSE 

Major, USAF 

Dep Asst for Security 

I ternal CO"Tf<Oc MO'-----======-

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