:•1Ei:•IORANDUu FOR:

era] B adbura

Brig. General hulpa

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE IIl IUU

WASHINGTON. D.0

TF/E NUO SYA 4 ZS ilarch 1974

SUBJECT: Security Requirements of the NR0•

Attached is a draft report on the above subject fo g your

review. Essentially it deals with two rain consideratio:is:

Declassification of the names and initials

of the organization and

ieclassification of the "fact of."

The judgments of the Cor.uidttce uenbers acre uurecc+ncil:iblc

and a minority report accoripanies he basic effort. Evc:

the basic report requires that very fine lines of release

be drawn and an Implementation .^nnox has been added to iasurc

uniform interpretation.

It would be appreciated if you could review this uckagc

in anticipation of a sleeting to be scheduled early the first

keel in April. The rteetirb will be to isipart your views on

the present draft or your ideas for iodification. l;tcther we

incorporate views of the minority report in the body of the

paper or submit it as a minority report will be an itc;a or

discussion.

i.ouerc u.

CIta i r :pan

Ad hoc Security Review Comt'Iitiec:

1Ii:.I• VIA

%EHT-I'EYIO«

.. r:.: I tits ' !^:. t I

.. M$.•.;• 1

CUNT 1 ?7:

Cu,. I:O?.I

PACT! J . i - _Cli -- -.. P.•.i:I :.
K3 + .•.u. .t,

Rf r .. L.0 .-.-.1.,%..I O• .. •C..b..*••.. O.\}..•....r. .•r

^rr•+r+t`rr..^s••. •.wvlr

CAIN T RG

Co 

^^^7 5^7

rr CIII•rt :

I•r.I:t..•!` _rats:

-HANOI C VIA

ALEflT-KEYIIOEE

u y3TI• M i JAI: rL.v

the Soviets or stinulatcl then to take countcrricasu:-es.

4. after t.tirtce n years of ;a.CCSsJ? operatio:'. or ti

Program, the Review Co^nittee finds noticeable changes in the

cncironrient whicii bear on the feasibility and desirability of

modifying security Controls.

The Soviets have their own reconnaissance

satellite program. T:iere is at.least a tacit agree

ment with the Soviets abort non-interference wit;i,

if not acceptance of, the use of satellites as a

"national neans of verification" of any strategic

arms limitation treaty. Conversely, other nations

are questioning the legitimacy of uncontrolled

observation from space although the concern is

presently focused on ERTS.

A large volute of speculative information

about the G.S. and the USSR space rcconzzLissance

activities has surfaced in the p.tblic domain. Spec

ulative information in the U.S. mass !aelia has been

lent credence by nertion in a report of the Special

Coomittee to Study Questions Related to Secret and

Confidential Government Doc u euts.. The appearance

of this totality of in Eorna tion has fos tcrd a

general recognition in the world at large of the

"fact of" satellite reconnaissance fro:a space.
,.,•,... !• N..•..•.,,..•... s..•. ^. •S• :t..• •h•w9

eu:.inoel

co••v

intiu, r v,n

LEIIT-lEYiiOLE

C. There has been a recent decision to ]ocicr

security controls on sorie satellite photograj ;y by

renoving it frog conpartnontel security cot:.rt2is

and allowing photography and derived inforrwtion

to be used at the Secret level.

The Congress has recently shown a greater

interest and curiosity about the NRP than heretofore

and at least one knowledgeable cowaittee chairitan

has stated that it is increasingly difficult to

maintain the past practices of limiting knowledge

only to committee chairmen and their designated

colleagues.

U.S. civil agencies have expressed tea:

belief that the space prograra way satisfy additional

needs within their disciplines and interests beyond

those already identified. Today, assistance can

only be provided if the civil agencies arc trilling

to coaply with the safeguards accorded the product

materials.

f. Recent trends in the political and judicial

spheres of Government argue for public candor u:ticss

it can be proved that such candor da,aages the natiorai

security. The present security controls creatod by

classification of the "fact of" do nut ai]ow such

candor.
g. The NRO's cover for activities and personnel as a pseudo line clement of the Department

of ,Jefense may no longer be viable as a result of

a recent acknowledgment to the press that the \RA

is "an office through which certain intclligcnci

matters are adninistered...by a senior Air Force

civilian official."

THE PROBLE:1 

S. In consideration of these changes, the Corusittce examined tie appropriateness, advantages, and disadvantages of

continuing the uniquely tight security system hposed over the

;JRP and the N20 at the inception of he Prograri.1 ;iile many

specific current problems were discussed, it was generally

agreed that recent changes in the environment have not altered

the need for tight security of the i::' and its activities;

however, the recent publicity about the i4f0 and the official

acknowledgment of its existence require that a neti: public

disclosure cut-off point be established. In this regard, it

was determined that five issues required resolution. )ecisions on the points which follow would dictate the current

security posture for the ::R0.

A. whether there is a need to formally

declassify the terms, "national lteconnaissance

Office" and "atioral Reconnaissance Program,"

and their initials.

IJI E: VIA

1UIT•KEYHOLE

^Y^1Fi►1aJJ^?:^l Y

C.

. n...•• .. . .. ...w. j.:••i

CU.. M/ P.N.1R I • M..r 0..

CON'1I:C7 r.. 77c9_

copY_ Old

-C(fl JfS

PAC C^ ._to,-..-__ PA(:!'S
E. Ihether or not to retain the "fact of"

space reconnaissance at the Secret level or to

declassify it.

Tlhether Congressiot:al counittec chair men

need additional information and guidance to sa;isiy

the inquiries of their fellow Congressiien.

tlhat is the appropriate reaction to Inublic

disclosures.

E. To what extent can the executive level

continue to support strict security control of the

developnental and operational phases of the NRO.

DISCUSSION 

6. In its considerations, the Cott-tittee was continually

mindful of the need to maintain secrecy around essential aleiaents of the I'rogran while Riving balanced recognition to the

fact that tine and events may have overtaken some elements pf

concern for which the security features were originally iiaposed.

A basic thread which ran through all of the considerations 'ras

the need to retain a credible security posture by not retaiuirtg

a classification on information which is no loiter sensitive

from a national security standpoint anwicü is already in he

public dotaa in. This :.oncern doi :i mated the co^isi der^t i ott of

these rive points.

.:IOLE VIA

iLE -liEYiiDLL

Y5' i `.1^^ .;) r L Y

c(•r 7 ^S)

CAr Y Co.`t r

PAt.! • J;_.._oi

- I•.tGFti

fl• .. a

Ca►. ►.. V •7^.*14

CI.^•1.19 ..1. • .Iw NN :.•
A. The ::aLtes and Initials

(1) Since the fi rst exposure i :: 197 1

there have been about sc.-e : refere nces iz:

the public do:aain to the ::ctioal Rece;ui : s -

sance Program or Office. These 3:cr a coitsic:: r ed

speculative reporting since no official

source was credited. he revelations were

ignored and the lack of follow-up inquiry

or subsequent revelations nay be indicative

of the appropriateness of this course of

action. On 12 October 1973, the :catioral

Reconnaissance Office was pointodly r.:entiored

in a report of the Special (Congressional)

Corfu i ttec to Study Questions i:elated to

Secret and Confidential Gaticrzaac::t Oocurtaa:ts.

Although the cormittee i:as unat:are that i

had used a classified title, this action

represents an o fficia ackaoiil edgnent o

the C-fr"ice and has been dcter-:ined to be

sufficient grounds to consider the nano of

ta:: Office unclassified. This posir :on s

officially adort^l by the CI.: i.^ Feb: :tar,

1974 when it ti: itiu rcz 1e^a1 objection to

fentioii of the ::atiort^1 ftccornaisaa:.cc: ;)fften

as ::lass i is ied rta t er i.:t1 in '!': rc; c: tti's pro s ed

• ? )Lf vi:.

• r

LE 1-i:EYHOLE !) .Y:... •.!' Y

r:..: i iLnel i5_9

c.

{^ c.;

...... .... .. ....
t

manuscript, CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.

The Coruiiittce is of to opinion that official

action should be taken to dec? assi fy the t;a:^e

and initials and make this action known to

personnel now responsible for sec •.:ri ty ccrol .

(2) The Coamittee con3 dcred the potential results of such identification. Ii

addition to the anticipated rcq*rests for

more information fro;a the press and Congress

it is expected that there would also be

pressure to fit the \2O into a fora]

organizational structure and dispense with

the "cover" that has been used to date. In that evtrrt

the NRO structure itself would require

reorganization since the iirector of the

`RO is currently "covered" by his dual

title of.Under Secretary of he Air Force

and his headquarters organization is

"covered" wider the organizational title

of "Office of Space Sy,:eL:s, Of ice of

the Secretary of the Air Force." with

fornal dccia:sificatiar:, both the Director

and his StaFf could be nc row_cdgcd as

entities of t'm National tecc;nnaiss:ncc•

Office and all c;:iplcyces could zJ:ait

::ULE V:1

t.,.I ._...

....

:• .v. ...

• ....

C^ r. Off ► +=:::'

r•:..:^ • '---of----- P" •
(.$V

i^ M.K : •^.^.- . ..tip'..••+t.. I. S •t.••..•t_•t

their affiliation if such disclosure is

desirable. It should be noted hat, on

the surface, no impact on security has

been perceived as a result of disclosuro

to date.

The discussion of declassification of codewords, mission numbers, etc.,

evoked a recognition of the technicalities

of retaining classification but the

Coaaliittee decided in favor of . the practicality of retaining such classification.

The Coiami ttee was concerned that

declassification of the NR? and the i:RO

could load to an effort to regularize he

NRO in conformity with nor;aal orgarizational

structure and procedures of the DOD. Such

a move is viewed as detrimental to the

efficient and streamlined management procedures now e:aployed by the NRO, and

accordingly, dctriiaental to the rc^ponsiveness of the ::RO to the national ir.tolligenze

requirements.

^! F VIA

EEfT-KEYHOLE

CV.•J7 Deli .1(^ -7

cfb•Y CCN•^i S

1•l..:F — ^j_ Q. _..... 1•.S •:: ^:
(5) The present 1965 charter of the

IRO represents the joint interests of the

CIA and the i)OD. It incorporates ;^:t. of

the precepts of the Presic:cnt's Foreign

Intelligence advisory Board (rcaffirr..cd

in 1974) and was developed to assure rapid

response to the requirements of the intelligence community. For some thirteen years,

the system has fulfilled its purpose well.

All managers have had unique authorities

but have also been rionitored closely in

both the technical and financial areas.

The system pernits concentration of authority in highly capable program offices

and dispenses with long lines of approval

and control. It was agreed that a relaxing of security should not be the basis

for "regularizing."

B. The "Fact Of" 

(1) Discussions relating to deci.assifying the "fact of" showed particular concern in three areas. First, it was agreed

sat oil i to reconnaissance

that any declass.ific4tion of the "fact: of" /

must be applied only to photographic

satellites as they arc not as vulnerable

A::r.L; VIA

MLtlT-i► fYI,01f :;i: iv:: i t .. J:) • .... v

T

C4,.. W.r.fl, . *....I P.

I.I...I.•t A.J... - :e.• -... . . Cut. V • .. !I.r •.\•V._

cnurlee^^?^ '^^-

Co1^V__ ^_CC1NIFS
:-:7^ L• vIn

a..,

Ct••M:ef..N...;♦ W

co. —:.^i.

cc: .

to countermeasures as t: SIG IN'i sy sto: ^s.

Second, it was agreed that thplc; tenta t i on

of any now polity woulc: :i:.ve to c-pasicc

that the ad,:t .ss ion of to "1a:t af" at

either the Secret or urclassi: icy: level

still excludes any "facts abaut."

finally; there was great concern that

official acknowledgment of our use of

intelligence satellites night trigger

the Soviets or third countries to raise

political objections in an international

forun and thereby hinder our uil:tersi

operations.

(2) The concern with credibility

was the pririary args:lent favorin declassification. The large volume of ir.::ora-

.tion, particularly in trade iournals, has

established a general recoo:.iticn of

photographic rcconnaissnnce ion snaca

and it is doubtful that he : verape perso

concerns liirlselC t:ith he difference bct:;^cn

"offic ial" and "spec'ulzti:'e` I .^.ate,► ;•i. It

was felt that continud ins:st^rc6 or: 4igh

security for "open" 3c;crets roc:uccs overall

crcdibility and crodcs the iat gri ty or

1
security around tic technology and the

operations which still reed to be p rotected.

(3) Foreign react io;t to a.i opeit

admission of satellite recornaissarco

appears to be the most serious potential

problem but it is recognized as one that

falls primarily in the political field

rather than one to be decided by the

security needs of the intelligence systosa.

The most significant threat is the possibility for a U.N. treaty banning surveillance or reconnaissance frort space without

the concurrence of the country being sur

voilled or reconnoitered. Various nonaligned countries have expressed significant

sensitivities about space surveillance and

in fact Brazil has tabled a treaty to

regulate observations from space. Recognition of the "fact of" space reconnaissance would likely not derogate the

collection mission of the i0 as long as

restraints of internatioc:al treaties do

not preclude mission activit y and would

enhance credibi]ity in our claims ou other

IArlc111 VIA

! LEfT-KEYHOLE

eo:ITRIDe _-7•

copy ^ _..^C.1: 1^ -

ta.a r..:r

r:. SY::Ti:: S JC11t:C:.Y
security matters. for those reasons, it

appears appropriate to recommend decIassifieation of the "fact of" on security

grounds but defer to Dr. Kissinger for

the political decision.

(4) It should be noted that he

fact that the Government has chosen not

to publicly acknowledge the "fact of"

has helped to preclude international

challenges to the conduct of space reconnaissance. As much can be gained by the

i method of exposing this decision, specific

procedures should be agreed.

C. Brief of Congressional Coniaittees 

(1) Congressional committee chairzen

have long helped to maintain the security

of NRO programs and decided on the need-;oknow of the entire Legislative Branch. It

is recognized that there has been some difficulty in retaining this security and once

recently

chairman has/remarked at the difficulty oC

.'ire. r v=:.

i!L£i T4i£YHDL £ J

° i...^

• .....^t.•.^.. ••.•5.•.w•.t^:./l

CO?.T r

P►11i: ^ • l? .n.. ....._ . r^iNci. S

r
continuing such a posture. However, on

query from the press, each chairman has

continued his firm support. It is obvious that these men can be relied on to

not make their own decisions on classification.

(2) However, the entire Congress has

some responsibility for the proper functioning of all aspects of the Government,

and the prospect that a heavily budgeted

NRO exists is certainly of legitimate

interest.. To meet this need, it is proposed that a briefing be provided to the

chairmen of the appropriate committees

i which would assure that methods of doing

business arc essentially the same as

those of the rest of the Government, that

our track record on overruns and management costs arc good, and that audit and

oversight provisions arc at least as

restrictive as those found elsewhere.

This would enable the chairmen to pass

this information to other representatives

at the classified level, according to

their desires.

NAh3ll VIA

P,EEUT-I^EY:iOLE

:Y_ r_ •. • J^1f.: t Y

CONTIP!1 91 2 y^! 7

co^• Y - _. ct)pf: S

C_

u..r

___________________.w• ..Lr

.•

..• u •.a u._...wjI...»u•a•. PACK ^l 3 V' ,_ rAC.: 3

qv+. .av"......( •
1

[: UJ: T i::l^'

i

c,y

^ _.1 4o, -

Reaction to Public Disclosres 

(1) The need to react to public disclosures re:tairs much the sa c, D:sCio5ures c r

classified inforiatior1 arc cncrally iaore^

but as some information is to available at

the unclassified level, inquiries will be

answered to the extent now possible. iaowet•er,

as the recommendations of this Comzittce

create a gray area in security where blac:;

and white formerly existed; more public

disclosures can be expected unless clear

cut-off lines arc briefed to all holders

of ALEXT-KEYHOLE clearances.

Executive level Support 

(1) It was recognized that the execu

tive level is often under heavy pressure to

respond to queries relating to inforation

in the public domain. If the names and

initials relating to the NO are formally

declassified, this coals also relate to

"facts about" the NRC, its organization,

program, person:tcl , aid activities. In

spite of this recognition,

bed i eves that a] 1 "facts about" the Ni'.O

must renain clessi ficd.

the r`..oz.:^i t • e. c

NDLI Vli.

T,niit

^
CVN1H

corn_

R^vi scd rAc.^_1

•

ECOi•L•IENDr\TIONS .

7. As a result of hose discussions, the Coi:i:iittc^^

recommends:

That the terms, "national reconnaissance

Office" and "National ieconnaissance Program," as

well as the initials, "fO" and "NRP, " be forila l ly

declassified but that no infors,iation be revealed

about the identity of personnel, the organization,

or the prograns.

That the JCI reconoend the declassification of the "fact of" space reconnaissance on

security grounds alone but that he point out

the potential political problens and defer to

Jr. Kissinger for the final decision)

The NRO Staff Security representative believes otacr nations

will distinguish between the -existing "cor,uaon knowledge" of

satellite reconnaissance and an "official" acknowle ;gaeitt by

the Government, even if that acknowledgncnt occurs only by

confirmation of that fact by official records. Such acknowledgment night inpel foreign govcrnnents to protest officially

a natter which had been tolerated when it was widely known

but not officially adnittod.

NULL vi,.

LEllT-KE?flO1 E

it V

c... war....,..

C;.• r.,

C. ri. •.4 • .7 • r.... .. r•.....:..
Cu:.: RG-1

Cc! •r

.:. r . 1

!759- i

C. That the chairr.icr. of Conrssioaal coriCaittees be briefed on any c:ia:tges prier to area-:-

plishaient and that additiori^1 ifor ►atn for

release to fello Congressen at the classific!

level be provided on the NO orgari_ation and

methods of doing business.

i). That information provided in response

to queries resulting from public disclosure be

in accord with the above recommendations and

that all holders o ALEST-KEYHGLz

clearances be briefed on this policy and the

continuing need for strict security.

E. That, with the above recommended

exceptions, the strict sec:irity controls of the

C Conti :iucd . )

8. In order that there be no confusion on he interpretation of these recommendations, there is appended a section

on thplemencation which s pecifies th^ interpretation intended

by the Committer.

1Tiic. representative of te CIA O:ficc ot Security :'.ocs not

concur in this rcco,:mendat ion. Uc a clie? that :e's^'ioas

can be made to allot: dccl:tssificwtio : of a].]. code ;vrda.

prog ra,.r niracs, mission names, á:d mission nr:JET: s s i:: it as

organization, subordination, i^gcncy narticipatinn, c:tl, personncl of the XR0. Uc has sub-:? tted a ninority repr)rt itiaich

is attached.

• I.s vin

;' E ; [-^(EVlfltE
I .IPLE.`1FUTATION OF RECO`•E•IE;;DAT IONS

A. Declassification of names and initials 

Would be a low-key acknoi^ledgment by DCI or Ssc;;cf.

Could be acknowledged by PIOs.

Would evoke "no comment" beyond acknowlcdg:tcnt of

organizational existence.

Would not authenticate acknowledgment of place or

organization of employment.

Would not identify the organizational location,

composition, or personnel.

Would not change the organizational subordination

or mode of operation of the ?IRO.

7. Appropriate Congressional committee chaff r,uen would

be briefed prior to°formal declassification.

B. Proposal to declassify the "fact of" 

Would recon:iend to Jr. Kissinger the deciassiiication of the "fact or" as a means of enhancir&g

official credibility of the intelligence community.

Mould point out the possible depreciation cf intelligence if such open acknowlcdgr.ient precipitated

international treaties or agrcei:ients w;rich woi:id

limit satellite reconnaissance.

NOt E VIA

ALEIIT- KEYHOLE

OL SY.';TF .+3 Jo,P.T.Y

eoa`i Leo.. _7 59

cor m CC)P1 = .

PAC J _l_? OF Pf^Ci
Once declassified, there would be no annou:tccnent

but would be revealed as a natter of course by the

DC1, the SecDef or, as appropriate, P th1ic Information Officers, an query.

Appropriate Congressional co^auittee c^lairrici& would

be briefed prior to declassification.

C.. Brief of Congressional Cocamit tees 

1. The chairmen of the appropriate Senate and house

committees and their designated associates be

briefed on the management of the fRO, to include

Procedures for soliciting RFQs.

Procedures for source selection.

e. Degree of adherence to ASPRs.

Costs, management costs, overruns, and

comparisons.

Provisions for audit.

f. Provisions for oversight.

2. The briefings should stress ad;tercncc to redu?ations

and procurement guidance but shot; the ::canner in c:izich

the NRO is able to operate pore ef^icieutly than by

using normal Government management methods.

L). Reaction to Public Disclosures

1. All holders o .M.1T-I EYEIOLE clearances,

including PIOs should be briefed to cst ai l i sh the

D:.r VIA

^T-KE I1OLE

Fr.:.. J}INTLV

cON :I. .ri^Jco°vim _..

.CP' UL.

PAC.r'1V of _.

C..... • 1 ..r..

N ••r.. . ?..11:. /.l1 a..., C .,...1..? tern.-, ..t.tl

C... .DM.•A.... t....... 1.
CI SL I.....wr

4•^• w •. •d 9nl ..

. ►1: Ye.I OgI1. .w..I H..^••+a.q

con HIDe

co .V

PAI:E 19 -

?.Z9

cc qrf'

PALi^!'

new disclosure cut-off lines and reinforce the

"no coiyrcnt" response beyond these lines.

E. Executive Level Support

Inplementation would be effected in consonance with

is . above.

Attachment

Minority Repo 15-74

Ia1SIJLE VIA

iALEfT-^iEYf01E . sys rFM; Jn/I,rL V