This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellee, 8

v. NO. 29,821 9 JAMES BOUNDS, 10 Defendant-Appellant. 11

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY 12 Jane Shuler Gray, District Judge 13 Gary K. King, Attorney General 14 Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellee 17 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 18 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellant 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 WECHSLER, Judge. 232 Defendant appeals his c onvictions for driving wh ile license suspended or 1 revoked, possession of drug paraphernalia, and false eviden ce of title and registration. 2 The notice proposed to affirm, as well as to remand for the limited purpose of 3 correction of the sentence. Defendant filed a timely memorandum in opposition, and 4 the State filed a timely response in agreement with a limited remand. We remain 5 unpersuaded by Defe ndant’s arguments. For this reason, we affirm and remand for 6 correction of sentence. 7 Defendant continues to argue that ther e was insufficient evidence to support his 8 convictions for false evidence of title and registration and for possession of drug 9 paraphernalia. [MIO 3] We review the evidence to de termine “whether substantial 10 evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt 11 beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to ev ery element essential to a conviction.” 12 State v. Sutphin , 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988). Under this 13 standard, “[w]e view the evid ence in the light most favorable to supporting the verdict 14 and resolve all conflicts and indulge all inferences in favor of upholding the verdict.” 15 State v. Hernandez , 115 N.M. 6, 26, 846 P.2d 312, 332 (1993). We do not re-weigh 16 the evidence nor substitute our judgment for th at of the factfinder, so long as there is 17 sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Sutphin , 107 N.M. at 131, 753 P.2d at 18 1319. 193 We address first Defendant’s conviction for false evidence of title and 1 registration. [RP 51, 102] This conviction requires that Defendant, on October 30, 2 2008, held or used a registration plate or validation sticker that had been altered, 3 forged, or falsified with fraudulent inten t; and that Defendant knew the registration 4 plate or validation sticker had been so altered, forged, or falsified. [RP 61; MIO 4] 5 See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-3(D) (1978); see also State v. Ortiz , 106 N.M. 695, 697, 749 6 P.2d 80, 82 (1988) (holding that a convicti on for using an altered plate requires 7 findings that the plate was altered with fraudulent intent and that the defendant used 8 the plate knowing that it was altered with fraudulent intent). 9 The facts provide that, on October 30, 2008, officers stopped Defendant after 10 the vehicle driven by Defendantchanged lanes and almost struck an officer’s vehicle. 11 [MIO 1; RP 7] During the course of the stop, an officer noticed that, although 12 Defendant’s vehicle had a validation sticker, the sticker was partially covered by a 13 portion of a different sticker glued over the original license plate. [ MIO 2, 4; RP 7] 14 When questioned about the sticker, Defendant stated that he was aware of the 15 alteration. [MIO 2; RP 7] 16 We hold that the foregoing facts support Defendant’s conviction for using an 17 altered license plate, registration sticker, or validating sticker with knowledge of the 18 alteration. See State v. Sparks , 102 N.M. 317, 320, 694 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Ct. App. 194 1985) (defining substantial evidence as thatevidence that a reasonable person would 1 consider adequate to support a defendant’s conviction). Given that a portion of a 2 different registration sticker had been glued over the underl ying sticker, a jury could 3 reasonably conclude that the sticker had been altered with the intent to deceive 4 authorities regarding the true registration num ber or registration date, such that the 5 registration would appear to be valid when in fact it was not. [RP 7] And even if 6 Defendant may not have hi mself altered the sticker [MIO 2; RP 7] , the jury could 7 have reasonably inferred from the manner in which the stic ker was altered, along with 8 Defendant’s admission that he knew the stic ker was altered, that Defendant knew the 9 sticker was altered withfraudulent intent. See State v. Ortiz , 106 N.M. at 698, 749 10 P.2d at 83 (indicating that a jury could find against a defendant on the facts, even 11 when the defendant disavowed that he ha d knowledge of the plate’s appearance until 12 it was pointed out to him by the arresting officer). 13 We further recognize that Defendant to ld Deputy Hutchinson that he himself 14 did not alter the plate [MIO 2; RP 7] , that the car had been loaned to Defendant 15 [MIO 2] , and that witness Robyn Coleman testifie d at trial that she had altered the 16 license plate sticker without Defendant’s knowledge. [MIO 2] However, 17 Defendant’s conviction for us ing an altered plate does not require that he himself 18 altered it, but only that he used a registration sticker that he knew had been altered 195 with a fraudulent intent. See § 66-8-3(D) (conviction base d on use of a plate altered 1 with fraudulent intent). We note further thatthe jury may have also considered the 2 circumstance that Defendant was drivi ng with a suspended or revoked license [MIO 3 2] and concluded that this provided a motive for Defendant to use a fraudulently 4 altered sticker for purposes of avoiding detection. See State v. Allen , 5 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 65, 128 N.M. 482, 994 P.2d 728 (filed 1999) (stating that 6 circumstantial evidence may be used to prove intent). 7 We next address Defendant ’s conviction for possessi on of drug paraphernalia. 8 This conviction requires that, on October 30, 2008, Defendant ha d drug paraphernalia, 9 a glass pipe, in his possession; and th at Defendant intende d to use the drug 10 paraphernalia to plant, pr opagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, 11 convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, re-pack, ingest, inhale or 12 otherwise introduce into the humanbody, a controlled substance. See NMSA 1978, 13 § 30-31-25.1(A) (2001). [RP 51, 60; MIO 4] 14 While officers were talking to Defendant, Deputy Hutchinson heard an item fall 15 and hit the ground. [RP 7; MIO 2] Deputy Hutchinson heard Captain Newman ask 16 Defendant about the gl ass pipe he broke [RP 7] , and both Deputy Hutchinson and 17 Captain Newman observed Defendant stepping on a broken glass pipe. [RP 7; MIO 18 2, 4] Witness Robyn Coleman also testified that she had seen the glass pipe in the 196 vehicle. [MIO 2] 1 We hold that the foregoing facts support Defendant’s conviction for possession 2 of drug paraphernalia. See State v. Sparks , 102 N.M. at 320, 694 P.2d at 1385 3 (defining substantial evidence as that evidence that a reasonable person would 4 consider adequate to support a defendant’s c onviction). In this regard, the jury could 5 have reasonably relied on Defe ndant’s proximity to the paraphernalia, together with 6 his action of stepping on th e broken pipe, to concludethat Defendant was in 7 possession of the pipe and exercised control over it by discarding it from the vehicle 8 and then stepping on its broken glass in anapparent effort to conceal it from the 9 authorities. See State v. Phillips , 2000-NMCA-028, ¶ 8, 128 N.M. 777, 999 P.2d 421 10 (recognizing that “[c]onstructive possessi on exists when the accused has knowledge 11 of drugs or paraphernalia and exercises c ontrol over them” and th at “[t]he accused’s 12 own conduct may afford sufficient additional circumstances for constructive 13 possession”). 14 We similarly conclude that the jury could infer, from Defendant’s act of 15 stepping on the pipe, a culpability such that he intended to use the pipe to ingest a 16 controlled substance. See State v. Higgins , 107 N.M. 617, 621, 762 P.2d 904, 908 (Ct. 17 App. 1988) (holding that “a material fact necessary to support a verdict may be proved 18 by inferences”). In addition, the jury could have reasonably considered witness 197 Robyn Coleman’s testimony that the pipe “looked like it was dirty” [DS 5; MIO 2] 1 as circumstantial evidence that the pipe wa s used to ingest a controlled substance. 2 While Coleman may have additionally opine d that it looked like the pipe “had not 3 been used for a while,” [DS 5; MIO 2] the jury could have inferred that the dirty pipe, 4 used in the past, was intended by Defendant to again be us ed in the future. See id. 5 And while Defendant deniedthat the pipe was his [MIO 2, 5] , it was within the jury’s 6 prerogative to reject his version of the events. See Sutphin , 107 N.M. at 131, 753 P.2d 7 at 1319 (the factfinder may reject the defendant’s version of an incident). Lastly, 8 Defendant’s conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia is not dependent on 9 whether Defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs [DS 6] , as the jury 10 could have surmised that Defendant had the pipe for the purpose of ingesting a 11 controlled substance even though at the time of the stop he was not doing so. 12 Finally, the judgment and order partially suspending sentence[RP 102] states 13 that Defendant was convicted for a violation of Section 66-8-3(A), even though the 14 amended criminalinformation [RP 51] and submitted jury instruction [RP 61] relate 15 to Section 66-8-3(D). We therefore affirm for the reasons stated above and remand 16 for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment and order partially suspending 17 sentence to reflect that Defendant was convi cted for a violation of Section 66-8-3(D). 18 Conclusion. Based on the foregoing discussi on, we affirm Defendant’s 198 convictions and remand for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment and order 1 partially suspending sentence. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3

_______________________________ 4 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 5 WE CONCUR: 6

_______________________________ 7 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 8

_______________________________ 9 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 10