( 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'I'D. IEeRE .. 

A HISTOR Y OF SA TELL,lTE RECONNAISSANCE 

VOLUME ItA - SAMOS 

by 

Robert Perry 

Revised October 1973 

from earlier drafts 

of 1963-1965. 1972 

Volume ItA consists of 322 pages. 

C135S1tll!d bv ISYfMAN" , 

t ae.,..t-t 'rom gef'lr.' dIdass,ttC.loOn 

Sc:I1eOui• o! E .ec:uto .. Ordt. 11852 

E .,motlon category Iss 58(211 

o\uIomlllCiity CllCI .... t.1Cf on 

IM;>OSSIBLE TO QUERMlNf 

AODSY PROCESSED 

- Date - - __ •• _ _ 'n,'ti .. ". 

'l'8P SEERE .. 

s 

Copy~Of 5 COpiE 

.. _----.. 

BYE 17017 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'fOP SEeR Elf 

PREFACE TO VOLUME UA 

This volume of A History of Satellite Reconnaissance includes 

two parts. separated mostly because of bulk. It cover. the origins. 

progress. and eventual demise of the satellite reconnaissance system 

generally known as Samos over a period extending from initial program 

acceleration in 1957 (following nearly 10 years of studies and very 

modest technical development activity, the whole costing rather less 

to the cancellation of the last photographic system in 

the Samos series in October 1963. Actually, work on the last of the 

"real" Samoa systems was terminated in July of that year, but a halfbreed survivor, Lanyard, lingered on for another three months. 

Samos and its close relatives Were distinguished from other 

photographic reconnaissance satellites in several respects. Notably, 

the six numbered systems in the E-l through E-6 aeries were under 

high but ordinary security controls. Lanyard was an exception, and 

Spartan might have become a second had it survived; but Lanyard 

represented an attempt to transfer the better parts of one Samos 

system, the E-5. to the technical and operational environment of the 

highly successful Corona. It was attractive mostly in the abaence of 

any alternative system with resolution better than that of Corona--

about 17 feet at the time. Once a better syatem emergecS 6(and even 

BYE 17017-74 ii 

Ma"Q.,," • ~ 5ver"l'la,./T'3'e~' I"';e.-~',= 

::-... :; :,.... ~O. I.e •• ~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Corona shortly managed to surpass Lanyard performance, while Camblt 

made it totally inconsequential), Lanyard was an anachronism. As for 

the others, that they were given no special security protection said 

something of their reconnaissance programs. 

The Samos family of photo reconnais.ance satellites included 

three with .readout antecedents (E.l, E-2., and E-3), four with film 

recovery capabUity (E-4, E--S, E-6, and Lanyard, a stereo-configured 

E-S camera redesigned to fit a Corona payload and recovery package), 

and the spin-stabilized P-3S weather reconnai.sance system. P .. 3S 

probabl y should not be counted as a Samos program because it was 

strikingly different in both technology and management. And the P-3S 

program had another distinction: 8uccess. It is included here partly 

for convenience, but mostly because it did not fit elsewbere., 

The Samos program cannot be addressed in perspective without 

including consideration of Ciambit. the covert (more properly, -clandestine) 

photo satellite program established concurrently with the E·6 program 

but conducted in quite another enviromnent--and with very different 

results. The background and antecedents of Gambit are, therefore. 

discussed in terms of their relationship to the original Samos effort 

as that becomes appropriate. However, Gambit and Hexalon, the 

two major photo reconnaissance satellite programs to emerge succeSSfully 

iii BYE non 

"0. SEeaE!' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'l'OP 5E£IIE'I' 

from the 1960 •• are .eparately, the subjects of Volume III in this 

series. 

Matter. of variant nomenclature were of sufficient concern 

for Volume 1 to warrant a prefatory discus.ion in that volume. They 

do not represent comparably troublesome items here. Samos titles 

and designators changed from time to time. elten enough to insure 

the confusion of later researchers. but such change. are treated aa 

they occur. References to program segments have been made consistent 

by adhering to the original E·.eries deSignators throughout. 

BYE 17017-74 iv 

~:!-,:-. 3 e.e"'ar/":'~.;,-· 10<';;.-:'0:; 

: _ - . TOP l.eRE!' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'l'8P SESREt' 

CONT ENTS. VOLUME ItA 

Preface •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ii 

IV SAMOS: FROM SPUTNIK TO POWERS (1957·19&0) ••• 1 

Notes on Sources •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 47 

V SAMOS: REALIGNMENT CONTROVERSY (19&0) .,..... 5Z 

Notes on Sources . • . . . . • . . • . . • • • . . • • • • • . • • • . • • . • • • • 91 

VI NEW DIRECTIONS IN SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

(August 1960-May 19&1) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 96 

Notes on Sources .•.....••.••••••••••••• e:" •••• • • 147 

VII PHOTO· READOUT 1960·1963 (E-l. E-2. Subsystem 1. 

and Tape) ..•. ..•.....•...•••••••••••••.•.••••.••• 151 

Notes on Sources •.••.••..•.••••••••••••••••••••••. 197 

VnI THE P- 35 WEATHER SATELLITE PROGRAM •••••• 203 

Notes on Sources •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 297 

IX THE E-4 MAPPING,SATELLITE (PROGRAM lA) .00.0 305 

Notes on Sources ..........•.•..•••.•.•••.......•.. 316 

Illustrations have been separately bound in an Appendix volume. 

v BYE 17017 

.... '"~,.. ~;: . .., ..... / -. -"' .. -. t~ ... - ... wi": ,!;it • .. 

"1'0 •• EeREIf 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

BYE 17017-74 

TOP IEERE. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~BP IEC ... ., 

IV SAM05: FROM SPUTNIK TO POWERS (1957-1960) 

Note: The pre-19S8 background of the Samos program has been treated 

in considerable detail in Chapter 1. Volume 1. of this series. It is 

only casually relevant to later events in the basic Samoa program. 

which was influenced more by Sputnik and by the rapid pace of photosatellite technology than by plans laid in the 1954-1957 period. Directly 

causitive factors are noted in the first pages of this chapter; for additional detail the reader should refer to Volume I and to other and mor(> 

extensive narratives there cited. 

Characteristically, the United States reacted to Sputnik and the 

threat it appeared to represent by dumping money and manpower into a 

hodgepodge of space and satellite programs. For practical purposes, 

the initial reaction was channeled into three general areas. "First and 

foremost, there began a frantic effort to "restore the national image" 

by some sort of flamboyant feat that would demonstrate the excellence 

of American technology and prove the essential sounclne .. of pre-1958 

space program management. Predictably, the effort was a flat failure. 

The early beneficiary was Vanguard. the American "scientific satellite. " 

Vanguard launches. starting in December 1957. probably represented 

the most widely publicized set of fallure. in modern history. Although 

1 BYE 17017. 

TOP 15CII5T 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

YOP SEE liE .. 

some Vanguards eventually went into orbit--and the pro,rarn consumed 

vastly greater sums than ever contemp1ated--the effort chiefly served 

to prove that the "space program" of 1955-1958 had been distinguished 

by strikingly bad judgment at the secretarial level. The Army's 

Explorer satellite, rescued from i,nominious atorage in a warehouse 

where it had been hidden for months, finally junketed into orbit four 

months after Sputnik I. It was the petulant contention of Major General 

J. B. Medaris, chief of the Army's rocket research program, that the 

feat could have been performed many months earlier had it not been 

for the intransigent obstructionism of the Secretary of Defense. For 

the remainder of 1958, a succession of discounted failures and overpublicized successes in space probe and satellite projects chased across 

the front pages of the nation's newspapers. 

A second response to the Sputnik scare was the creation of new 

agencies, czars, committees, and study groups--each supposed to 

perform some magic that would suddenly compensate for five years of 

misjudgment and malachninistration. Most were of transitory importance. 

Only two endured: the Advanced Research Projects Agency, named 

custodian of all military-purpose space activities, and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, charged with conducting a 

peaceful-purposes scientific space program. 

BYl: 17017-'74 z 

-~-:-. ,,=.-=~1:-/-~';'-. 

TOP ISeRST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.. 8P l.eR.,&, 

The third pattern of response to Sputnik was the acceleration, 

expansion, and modification of estabUshed space developments. With 

minor exceptions, these were based on the WS 117L reconna,issance 

satellite program. a starveling which untU late 1951 had been carefully 

hidden from public view because it could not be easily accommodated 

to the "peaceful uses of space" image prized by the Eisenhower administration 

Conducted by a scant handful of imaginative scientist. and engine~rs, 

WS ll1L had been allotted sparse resources since its 1954 inception. 

Stunted thougb it was, it nonetheless represented tbe only weU-grounded 

United States space program when space suddenly became respectable, 

·in October 1957. As might have been anticipated, pressure for acceleration and for the creation of interim satellite. focused on tbe project 

offic e immediately thereafter. Roles and assignments for the booster 

and second stage prOliferated. A serendipitous compatibility of the 

WS U7L upper stage with the Thor missUe permitted creation of a 

deviant program. later named Discoverer. which had some prospect 

of early success. But Discoverer was actually a cover program cloaking 

the quiet development of the Corona reconnaissance payload. For practi-

.:al purposes. Discoverer-Corona went its own way, independent of the 

:nain ("ourse of WS 117L development and ignored by most WS 117L 

oarticipants. They concerned themselves with the continuing effort to 

3 BYE 17017-

.. OP IIiCRIi .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. OPSEeRE. 

provide photographic reconnaissance from a Iyltem embodying the 

Atlas booster and the Lockheed second stage that ultimately became 

Agena. 

Thor and Atlas became first-stage boosters for a variety of 

probe and satellite payloads. and the upper Btale of the original WS 111L 

(Agena) was called upon to support several newly conceived satellite 

programs. both military and scientific in objective. 

What remained in the 117L effort after the propalanda projects 

had been peeled away. after scientific Batellitel and communication 

satellites and navigation satellites and weather latellites had been 

shaped and separated •. was a military reconnah.ance satellite program 

that had rather surprisingly surVived the firlt year after Sputnik. 

Through most of 1958 the concept of 111L satellite reconna~s.ance 

involved an Atlas that would boost into orbit a camera-carrying Agena. 

Rather than detaching a reentry capsule to return exposed film (as 

did Corona). the orbiting Agena would rely on a scanner-transmitter 

to transform photographs lnto electronic Signals and relay them to 

ground stations for reconstruction. Two alternative techniques involving 

infrared-sensitive detellorll (subsequently the Midas program) and 

electronic signal recorders (later the individual ferret sublYltems) 

... still were embryonic at that time. 

*Midas. which was comJlletel, st=parated from the balanc; of the WS 117L 

effort during lQS9. is not conSldered part of that effort for the purpose 

of thlS account. Elet:tronlc sensor subsystems and their development 

are treated separately, 

BYE 1iOli-74 4 

_:- ... : 5 _- • 'fOP llieR.' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Originall y, WS 117 L had been conceived around a televidon 

transmission system and magnetic tape as the mode of returnlng 

reconnaissance information from orbit. By 1956, however, the 

television-magnetic tape technique had been relegated to secondary 

consideration and primary emphasis shifted to a conventional filmcamera'combination with on-bOard film pr.oce8sing and electronic 

transmission. I The future use of either magnetic or electrostatic 

tape was not excluded from consideration, but for the moment technological difficulties made them Ie .. than feasible. 

As late as March 1958, WS 117L embodied concepts refined 

in 1956. A "pioneer" system built around a six-inch (foca11ength) 

lens, and an "advanced visual" sY8tem embodying a 36-inch len8 were 

conceived as the basic data gathering devices. Both infrared and 

electronic collectors were being conddered by that time, but the 

chief emphasis remained with visual modes. i. 

Although "readout" remained tbe accepted data retrieval method, 

suggestions that physical recovery of a film capsule would be a preferable alternative had been heard at intervals since mid-1956. In June of 

that year, Rand researchers published an unassuming clasaified paper 

which suggeated the feasibility of recovering aatellite payloads, briefly 

noted reasons for considering that option, and defined the technical 

5 BYE 11017-

t-1 _ ... ,...;. ~ ... =- B.~rr.,../"'~ .. u • .;.~. _ ..,-

.. a. IEeRE .. · 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

requirements of a recovery system. Two of the "justifications" 

were basic to the Corona pro~ram, adopted early in 1958: photographic covera~e of closed area. In advance of the availability of 

a readout system, and the accumulation of knowledge concerning 

recovery techmques. A third Juatificauon was implicit in the subsequent conflict between recovery and readout: the amount of information 

a satellite could gather and return In a given periocl was considerably 

larger by way of capsule recovery methuds than by readout. The study 

affirmed the technical feasibility of recovery, categorized it as an 

"inherently simple method. " and included calculations indicating that 

a SO-pound payload could be returned in a capsule weighing only 

3 

2.28 pounds. 

Slight conSIderation was given the suggestion over the following 

year, partly because of funding difficulties that hobbled the entire 

reconnaissance satellite effort during that time but more immediately 

because there stUl was no proof that an encapsulated payload could be 

retrieved from orbit. Not until 1957, when the first ballistic missile 

nose cones were recovered. dId scientists have empirical proof that 

any object re-entering the atmosphere from orbital altitudes could 

survive. Under the circumstancel, it leemed sounder to hinge a reconnalSsance satellite program on known and demonstrated image transmission 

BYE 1701'7-74 6 

~ .... -::. .. -... .. ... - . "op IEeR.t' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.. SP IIiGII ... 

techniques than on the conaiderable uncertaintiea of atmospheric 

re-entry. Moreover, satellite reconnaissance requirements as 

then understood tended to emphasize the need for attack warninl 

rather than for targeting. search. or surveillance. The objective 

of obtaining prompt intelligence on .. pecific activities of a prospective 

enemy made readout, with a quickly avaUable product, seem much 

more attractive than recovery, with its indeterminate delay for 

retrieval and processinl of film that milht have been exposed days 

4 

earlier. 

Interest in recovery revived in October and November 1957, 

partly because of a new Rand study which ureed the substitution of 

a deboost and water recovery mode for the readout technique embodied 

in the current U7L program. Althoulh payina particular attention to 

the feasibility of early systems based on Thor boosters, Rand also 

auggested development of a family of satellites that included vehicles 

S lofted by Atlas boosters. 

Such proposals were generally submerled in the enthusiasm 

for the Discoverer-Corona prolrams that evolved during the early 

months of 1958. Nevertheleu, as early u March 1958 the prospect 

of employing recovery techniques in the Atlas-boosted WS U7L began 

to receive renewed consideration. Indeed, one of the secondary 

7 

'19P SECRE'!' 

BYE 1701':' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Justifications openly volunteered for the Discoverer at the time of 

its inception was that it might prove the value of recovery "as a data 

acquisition method. ,,0 Brief suggesbuns that such an option deserved 

investigation appeared In development piaaul that the Ballistic Missiles 

Division submitted to Air Force headquarters on IS March and on 

1 July 1958. 7 

U it had not other importance. the mention of recovery as aI' 

alternative to the accepted readout mode hinted that some question of 

readout adequacy had been raised. On the surface, there was as yet 

no indication that the question might become a controversy. 

The "pioneer" readout system. later the E-l, * was intended to 

provide in-camera definition approaching 100 lines per millimeter, 

based on an f/ 2..8 lens in combination with a very fine--grain film. 

Orbital oneration was predicnted on the assumption that the camera 

system would function for five mlnutes during each pass over the flarea 

of interest" and that on subsequent orbits three receiving stations within 

the continental United States would "read out" the intelligence thus 

acquired. (The stations were to be located at Fort Stevens, Oregon. 

* 

The letter designat.orli assi~ned individual WS ll1L subsystems had the 

£ulluwin~ basis: Subsystem A - Airframe; B - Propulsion; C - Auxiliary 

Puwer; 0 - Guidance and Contrul; E - Visual Reconnaissancei F - EleclromagnetH" Reconnaissam t! (Ferret); C - Infrared Reconnatasance (later 

Mida s), H - Commul'llcations: I - Data Processing; J - Geophysical 

EnVironment; K - PE"rsonnel; L - Biomedical Recovery. The E-deS1Jlnators 

ultllllat~" ran from E-I through E-6. the F-designators through F-4. . 

BYE: 17017·74 8 

....... ~ ~8P I.e •• ~ - ~.... , 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

NP .SC8S'I' 

Ottumwa. Iowa. and New Boston, New Hamp.hirei Oautt Air Force 

Base was to be the satellite operations control center.) It seemed 

probable that an efficient processing and dissemination complex would 

permit at least 10 percent of tbe derived intelligence to reach the 

central analysis station within one hour of its receipt and the remainder 

within eight hours. The Strategic Air Command wanted an eventual 

"near real time" system. of course. hoping to 'I.e it for attack warning 

as well as general intelligence. Each of several vehicles to be aloft 

simultaneously was to have a useful time on orbit of 10 to 30 days. 

limited principally by battery life. The initial system (E-l) was 

designed to permit identification of ground objects measuring 100 feet 

on a side. The "advanced" E-Z was to produce images that would 

pe-rmit "villual resolution" of objects lO feet on a side and was to haVe 

a potentially long orbital operating life .... a •• uming the avaUability of 

either solar or nuclear power sourCes. 

One key to a useful readout system was a data processing subsystem which would include the equipment, techniques, and procedures 

to transform recorded raw data into intelligence--and to dis.eminate 

it to using agencies. Ground receiving stations, therefore. would 

identify. record and retransm~t_ information to an If Advanced Reconnaissance System Intelligence Centerll (predictably dubbed "ARSIC") •. The 

9 BYE 17017 

~OP IEeRE .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l!OP ISC •• " 

Intelligenc~ Data Processing Subsystem ("IDPS"--later Subsystem I) 

was to be capable of performLng all func-tions needed to transform the 

raw data into useful intelli.gence: proc. asing, screening, Lnterpretation, collation, evaluation, indexing, storage and retrieval, analysis, 

8 display, dissemlnation, and presentation. 

The orbltal vehlcLe--the upper stage and payload sechons--was 

to be 19 feet long and S feet in diameter. was to carry a Z680-pound 

payload, and including S080 pounds. of propellants would weigh 9300 

pounds at launch. The somewhat loosely defined operational concept 

of March 1958 anticipated that ultimately each of several E-Z satellites 

s'imultaneou8ly on orblt would have a useful life of one year and be 

capable of providing 17-foot ground resolution. 9 

Spot survelllance of selected targets rather than general reconnaissance was the objective of the development program. Surve'il1ance 

of thlS nature was lntended to provide advance warning of an imminent 

attack, a concept emphasized by application of the name Sentry to 

WS ll7L in June 1958. Unhappily, concept had little relevance to reality. 

Although a camera and readout system ,that could actually resolve 

objects 17 feet on each side would be c- apable of locating and identifylna 

intercontinental misslie sltes, th~ total system was incapable of such 

prec ldon. Moreover. within tht: ~xl.tlng state of the art, the capacity 

BYE 1'J01'7-74 LO 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TDP IECR.7 

of the system to scan and transmit images to around staUons was 

seve rel y 1 imlted. 

Even though electronic transmission of photographs to ground 

rece1vers degraded definition. the chief objectlon to readout was that 

relatively little area coverage could be provided each day. EXpOSlOg 

the film. transportLng it. and processing 1t presented few diff1cultles 

compared to the enormously complex and time-consumin~ tasks of 

electronically scarUling each negative frame. transforming 1ts photographic content into analog signals. transmitting those signals to 

ground stations. and reforming the images in those stations. 

The readout tecnnique that had evolved by 19S8, and which was 

refined but not radically changed during the next two years. embraced 

a strip camera subsystem loaded with 4500 feet of 70-millimeter film. 

(Corona would carry about l5000 feet of three-inch film in ita payload.) 

The film moved past a slit aperture, which served as a ahutter. ·at a 

rate determined by 1mage motion compensation settings. (The "slit" 

was actually a line scribed through the alumlnum coating on a gla •• plate.) 

Once exposed, the film was pressed against a chemically impregnated web at intervals over a period of approximately 1& minutes. The 

pr~-soaked web contained all the necessary developing and fixing ingredl~nts. Ailer. ompletlDg the proc~.sing stage. the developed film went 

. to a storage section--a series of loop. which held it in readiness for 

lat~r scanning and transmisslon. 

11 8YE 1'701; 

'f8P SIiC ..... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP IEeRE. 

The readout mechanism consisted of a revolvmg drum lme 

scan tube, a scanner lens system. a light collecter lens sysh:m. a 

photo multiplier tube and a video amplifier. An electron bC!anl which 

focused on the phosphor-coated inner s~rface of the revolving drum 

was emitted through an optically flat wmdow. the light beam going 

throu~h a scanning lens that was moved vertically by a motor-orivell 

\ am. The lens moved a spot of light across the width of the processed 

film as the film moved laterally through a readout gate. The beam 

mullon had the shape of a square wave. permitting continuous top~tol>~ltt"m. bottom-to-top travel rather than returnin~ to a zero point for 

each scan operatlon. That portion of the beam which pa8s~d through 

the film was collected by another lens system capable of relaying i5 

p~rcent of the transmJtted light to a photomultiplier tube which transformed the light energy into electronil. signals. After passage thruugh 

a vldeo amplifier. those signals were relayed to the satel.l~telli ctlllununication equipment section for transmission to ground 8tations. 

Image motion compensation. exposure C'untrol. and focus iaC'tors 

were set by command from a ground station. Attitude recordin~. a key 

factor for interpretation, was provided through inscription of a binary 

code on the ed~es of the film. 

Th..- proC'css. though complicated, could be performed by 

L',\1st. 'l~ or available techmques and equipments. Limiting technical 

BYE 17017-74 IZ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .OPI.C ••• 

facton were the speed and width of the scanning beam, loverned 

by bandwidth (melacycles per second) conaiderations. Unle .. 

reliable traveling wave tubes could be incorporated in the system--

and nothing suitable was available either in 1958 or three years later--

the usable bandwidth was but six melacycles per second. Even though 

the E-l and E-Z systems were designed to limit their coding to white, 

black and one gray scale, the scanninl beam could travel across the 

width of film only once each second. The beam spanned only one-tenth 

of an inch of fUm during each transit. A compLete scanner-beam pa •• --

bottom-to-top .. to-bottom--required two seconds. The transmission, 

readout, and reconstruction process transformed the signale from 

each 8uch path into an 18-inch strip of 3S-mUlimeter film in the ground 

station. Seven such strips, halved and realigned to conform to the 

pattern of the original film, could be reauembled into a single print 

measuring nine inches along each edge. 

The basic time limitation was impo.ed by a requirement that 

the scanning beam travel slowly enough to read and translate the 

analog trace contained on the film. The analol information was traneformed into electronic: impulses which conformed to the black, white, 

and gray elements contained in that small portion of the film then being 

read. Provi8ion for better film definition (more lines per mUllmeter) 

13 BYE 17017-

-'OP I&C8&'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 -.0. SSERSIf 

or a greater variety of tonal mdlcators (multiple-scale readout 

representing three, four, or as many as IS gray-scale varietie. 

and hence providing a wider ran~e of contrasts on the processed 

"take lt) required slower scan or a wider bandwidth. The first was 

unacceptable and the second unobtainable. 

Long before flight tnals ("utd be attempted, the limitations 

of the readout technlque were well appreciated. Appreciation of the 

scan-readout time limitations was not difficult. From an altitude 

of laO nautical miles, adequate for 30-90 day orbits, res..,lution of 

l4-foot objects would involve a scale factor of 1:400,000, so that the 

70-mUlimeter film in the satellite would provide an image covermg 

270 square nautical miles on the ground for each frame of film. 

Assuming six-megacycLe-second bandwidths and a square curve path 

for thp scan beam. readout time requirements could be expressed as 

a simple equation. To read out ~ square incbes at! l.ines per millimeter using a one-gray-tone scale, the time requirement was expressed 

as: 1.580RZA __ (l.S80)·(100)2· 9 At _ ,. 38 seconds. one exposure per 

bandwidth 6.106 

::;~cund for five minutes. readout time for the product of each pass 

WOI ld be 11,400 seconds: thr~e hours! (The figure ZS80 was derived 

from a I omputation. of tht> numbc::r ui sample points or bits to be read 

BYE 170l'J-'14 14 

-_ ... ~ - ... -:- '- , TOP ... CaST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

out in each square inch uf film (lIVen the a.sumed definition and gray 

scale standards.) On the Optlffilstic assumptlon that a ground station 

could receive fully useful I "'f"rmatlon for eight minutes during each 

of five daily passes of the satelhte within its reception range. 1t was 

apparent that each station could accept no more than 6Z individual 

frames representing lb. 740 square miles of target area each day.10 

(An early Corona system could scan 1.5 million square miles eacb day.) 

. Such consideratlon~ unquestionably influenced the transformation 

of basiC requirements in the period between March and September 1958. 

By that latter date. Au Force headquarters had clearly indicated its 

desire that II onsideration . • . be given to the use of a recoverable 

satellite ln order to achieve maximum accuracy. information content. 

reliability of receipt of collected data, and reuse where economically 

11 feasible. II Nevertheless. the stated objectives of the program were 

focused on early warning of attack. the collection of general intelligence. and support of the natlon's emergency war plan. Use of satellite 

reconnaissance to assist ln detennining the war potential of tbe Soviet 

Union remained a secondary goal. Readout. even with its acknowledged 

limitations. still seemed the beat means of satisfying the requirements. 

Indeed, It was quite logical to conclude that a technique of readout 

which overcame image definition and transmission time objections would 

15 BYE 1101' 

IfSP .lilia." 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'OP .ac •• ., 

more .satisfactorily satisfy program objectives than any recovery 

t~chnlque. 

Administration of Sentry through the dodng months of 1958 

was complicated by the fact that the Advanced Researcb Projects Agency 

had custody of program funds and exel"dsed a directive authority over 

the technical content of the effort. Convinced that an alternative to the 

available readout techniques deserved careful consideration. the Air 

Force l autiously moved toward a program reorientation that would 

permlt investigation of recovery techniques. But the realignment was 

complicated by an infusion of ARPA philosophy. Although ARPA 

Director R. W. Johnson in mid-December 1958 approved a new threephase approach that included film recovery a8 well a8 ferret and readout 

payloads. the research agency continued to press for the inclusion of an 

electrostatic- tape readout system (later the E-3). Indeed, ARPA came 

to advocate cancellation of all other visual program8 in favor of reliance 

on electrostatic tape methods. 12 

Although BMD had reservations about the adequacy of the readout 

systems under development. the division was strenuously opposed to 

dl&carding all previous work in favor of a technique which stUI had not 

been laboratory-proven. Sentry project officers pointed out that an 

electrostatic tape payload could not possibly become available for use 

BYE 17017-74 1& 

.. .. . .QP .ac ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. Ops.c .... 

before November 1961. that at belt it would provide the equivalent of 

2.0 lines per millimeter resolution as aaainst the nozninallOO Imes 

per millimeter of the film system. that adoption of the electrostatic 

tape device would require complete vehicle redesign. and that the 

specific proposal supported by ARPA (the CBS "Reconotron Proposal") 

seemed itable to require more nearly 10 year. of development than the 

b . . d 13 two or three e1ng promise • 

BMDls sharp objections to the electrostatic tape scheme advanced 

by ARPA found support within the air secretariat. A •• istant Secretary 

(Reaearch and Development) R. E. Horner carried the iuue to higher 

departmental echelons. insisting that even though the proposal seemed 

theoretically feasible it would be dangerously premature to schedule 

development of such a technique. much les. to make the success of 

Sentry program totally dependent on it. Horner pointed out to -Air Force 

Undersecretary M. A. Macintyre that the ARPA-endorsed proposal 

would not satisfy established requirements, and be urged renewed 

attention to the development of a recoverable capsule for Sentry. one 

adaptable to a variety of payloads. 

Although the combined weight of objections beat down the more 

radical aspectl of Johnsonls recommendations for realigmna Sentry. 

ARPA did not .urrender. In a 17 December 1958 memorandum which 

17 BYE t'1017-7 

.,8P IEG81i'l' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 WQP •• CRIiT 

serv~d as the basis for program redirection, Johnson clearly lndicated 

that ARPA considered the proposed recoverable capsule to be no more 

than a test-bed development for pO&Sible aoplication to both ferret and 

surveillan~ e systems. It also appeared that Johnson and hlS adVlsors 

had either misunderstood the obJectlye. of Sentry or were misinterprl·ting 

the Horner viewpoint. Johnson's incorrect assumption that point survelllanct> was a reLatively new requirement probably was based on an 

erroneous intel'pl'etation of September 1958 requirements docun\ents. 

In any event, 1t tenaed to cloud both the i.sue and the objectives of 

pro~ram realignment. 

The entire question of program management from ARPA offlces 

in the Pentagon had become an irritant during the late months of 1958. 

Not only had ARPA begun to "adjust'· funding allocations, production 

schedules. and technical objectives at frequent intervals, but the 

agency had unilaterally overruled Air Force desires concerning placement of missile assembly buildings on Air Force bas •• , had cancelled 

Au Force plans for early construction of readout stations, and had 

attempted to create a high-level review committee to overhaul requirements for the system. Although some of the ruling. proved more 

acceptable. and seemed W1spr, in retrospect, it was the implication 

of th~ activlty that becam~ of must concern to Sentry program managers. 

BYE 1701'1·14 l8 

~ _. '"': .:. ... -, 'l'OP •• C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "8P IEeRE'I 

Because of the confuSlon that surrounded space matters through much 

of 1958. because of the uncertain authority of the many surviving 

boards and panels. and because of the apparent aciministratioll desire 

to keep program control concentrated in the Pentagon, it had become 

most difficult to secure timely rulings and program deciaions. More 

pertinent. many of those decision. when they did appear, seemed 

completely at variance with the stated objectives of the Sentry pr0ltram. 14 

The program reorientation of December had a direct influence 

on the immediate future of Sentry. One of lohnson's chief ineasures 

was to reduce effort on the E-l "pioneer" system. based On a 6-inch 

focal length camera, and emphasize the E-2, embodying a 36-inch 

camera. That '~uidancell was faithfuUy reflected in the revised development plan published at BMI> on 30 January 1959. Perhaps more important 

however. the new development plan significantly expanded the earlier 

stated requirement for a recoverable reconnaissance satellite. calling 

for development of recoverable ca osules concur.rent with the last half 

of the readout program flight test. 

The January proposal described a recovery capeule of 60 inches 

diameter. weighing 1200 pounds. and built around a bOO-pound payload. 

A heat shield which might be either ablative or a sublimation type was 

intended to separate from the payload package at an altitude of 55. 000 feet--

19 BYE 1'101" 

yep SECIIB'&' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !fap SECR.' 

after deceleratton from orbItal velocities durina passaae through the 

upper atmosphere. AIr recove ry over the ocean 1n the fashion of the 

DIscoverer capsule was the preferred mode of retrieval. The stated 

obJectlve of the eHort was to demonstrate a technique for rescovering) 

photugraphic payloads. Conlilderation of actual "takell dunng research 

1::' and devdopment was shjilht. 

Two weeks later, ARPA approved "in leneral" the 30 January 

development plan but reduced the funding total irom $l48. Z milllon to 

$96.6 million for fiscall9S9. After further discu .. ion of the detaile 

during March. the research project agency in April gave specific 

approval to the individual readout (E-l. E-Z. E-3) recovery (E-S) and 

ferret proposals (F-l. F-Z, F-3) but by lmplication withheld authorizatlon for a mapplng and charting photographic subsystem (E-4) which had 

earlier been grafted to the basic Sertry program. Unwittingly, the 

Ballistic Missiles DIvision had created a rival to an Army proposal 

for a covert mapping satellite program (known sequentially al Salaam, 

Vedas. and finall y Argon) and had also beiun to tread. on the toes of an 

ARPA group which favored uSing a Thor booster to orbit an Army-Navy 

geodesy satellite. Inasmuch a8 each of these options was considered 

to be as senlltive as the dosely held Curona program, relatively few 

at BMD knew of their existenc-e. N.verth.l •••• argU1'nenta 'over BMD'. 

BYE 1701'7-74 lO 

...,~ ... =.;..3=v~~a ... /iee ... · "'e.":~ 

_:-:':: :.- . ,ap IEliREY 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

MPS.ER.1f 

"right" to develop a mapping satellite with or without ARPA'. approval 

extended well into June, with the result that concern for the mappin[l 

satellite program (E-4) affected prospects for the recoverable recon· 

naissance latellite proposal (E_5}.16 

One of the basic difficulties in dealing with ARPA through the 

whole of 1959 was that agency's persistent effol't to redirect the several 

mUitary space programs toward objectives their military managers had 

not contemplated. ARPA stUI had not foresworn the goal of securing a 

manned satellite program for tm militaryeatablishment--presumably 

to be under ARPA's immediate management control·-even though 

Congress in activating the National AeronauticlI and Space Adminiatration the previous year had given a near monopoly in that field to the 

new civUian organization. In many respects. the mUltary services. 

and particularly the Air Force, were in philolophical agreement with 

ARPA on the need for a broader mUitary space program. Nevertheless. 

funds available through ARPA were scarcely adequate to support approved 

military space programs, and new efforts tended ~o divert attention from 

basic tasks. The budding E-5 recoverable satellite effort, for inltance. 

was to some degree shaped by ARPA hopeI that the capsule might be 

adaptable to housing a man. Although the Air Force at large was quite 

willing to gl0811 over peculiarities in size and environmental conditioning 

of the recovery capsule, being thoroughly in agreement with the ultimate 

Zl BYE l'lOJ~ 

IfSP l.eREIf 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

objective of such mu~dlrection, there wall Litde doubt that the lnteresU 

of satelhte reconnaissanC'e wouLd have been better served by an\lther 

17 

course. 

Funding difficulties, largely caused by the proliferation and 

mounting costs of ARPA-sponsored space efforts, were principally 

responsible for a 25 May 1959 cancellation of the mapping and charting 

satellite (E-4) and the 23 June cancellation of the Sentry E-S program. 

Such at' leaat was the official explanation. The fact that the E- 3 was 

continued, indeed that it was refined and submitted for development 

approval during the same period, tended to cast some doubt on the 

,'umplete candor of the offic1al Justification for E-S cancellation. By 

the same token, it was apparent that conflict and overlap betw~en the 

E-4 and the Army-ARPA sponsored Argon mapping and chartlng 

satellite program was a factor in E-4 cancellation. The- statement 

that funds originally scheduled for Sentry were to be diverted to "other 

ARPA programs" identified the cause of the action but did not fully 

explain it. motivation. 

Although ARPA directed only that the development of the E-5 

recovery capsule be deferred pendinl a complete program review, * 

(: 

Interestingly enough, the ARPA order to halt work on a recoverable 

E-5 capsule followed shordy after NASA responsibility fo~ initial 

man-in-space experiments had been confirmed. 

BYE 1701'7-74 

"0. ISeRS'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

the effect of tbe order and a concurrent $Z5 million reduction in the 

level of Sentry funding was to halt all development activity. Work had 

actually started only after the 3 April approval of BMOla development 

d ill plan an 8t was ' 1" d' tat 18 In a pre lmlnary eSlgn. us. 

Objections from BMD, the Air Reaearcb and Development 

Command, and the Air Staff were both prompt and vigorous. By mid· 

July, SMOla commander, Major Ceneral O. J. R itl and, had personally 

taken his objections to General T. D. White, Chief of Staff. asking 

that the Air Force fund E-S capsule development if ARPA continued to 

refuse. On 1 August. Lieutenant General B. A. Schriever (newly 

installed as ARDC com'mander) also appealed to Ceneral White to 

19 

reinstate the E-5 program. 

The issue, somewhat overSimplified, was essentially wh.ther 

readout or recovery techniques should be employed to satisfy,the five .. 

foot resolution requirement defined by the intelligence community the 

previous September. ARPA by effectively halting work On the E-S 

capsule was ruling in favor of the E .. 3 (electrostatic tape .ystem). 

Theoretically, the E-Z could, with .~bstantia1 improvements in focal 

length and aperture. provide five-foot resolution, but all the objections 

to the basic E-Z technique remained in force. Unless very ailnilicant 

advances in readout technology were introduced. an "advanced" E-Z 

would be limited to taking and tranamittina no more than 50 exposurea 

Z3 BYE 1701-
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~a.IEe.E" 

per day for each available readout atation. Each would cover, on the 

f!round. an area of about five square miles. Requirements for extreme 

precision in satellite attitud~. camera pointing. and basic targeting 

straddled the bounds of currently achievable technology. making practi ... 

cal (as opposed to theoretical) feasibility rather questionable. Against 

the only remaining alternative. reliance on the E-3. the Air Force could 

bring to bear all its contentions of unreasonable ARPA optimism. a high 

probability of program failure and the virtual assurance of very substantial program slippages, and a near certainty of inadequate image 

definition. * As for the question of whether five-foot resolution was a 

Lockheed stated the case for the E-l in a proposal dated Z9 July 1959. 

Apparently proceeding on the reasonable premise that ARPA's predeliction for readout would prevail over Air Force preferences. Lockheed 

painted the theoretical advantages of the E-3 in highly attractive colors. 

The contractor noted that E-Z technology was based on pre-19S9 concepts 

and that the "recent addition" ,;,f a requirement for five-foot visual reconnais sance had prompted attention to state-of-the-art improvements. In 

Lockheed's opinion (at least. in its 29 July 1959 opinion!). "an all-electronic 

approach would "provide the highest possible performance in the earliest 

t1me period at minimum CO&t." Noting that the "technical feasibility" of 

electronic tape systems had been proven under Aeronautical Research 

Laboratory (Wright Alr Development Center) contracts. Lockheed cited 

the availability of IOO-lines-per-millimeter definition (12. ZOO televiSion 

lines for a 61-millimeter-square format!). an equivalent sensitivity of 

ASA-l4S (standard reconnaissance film had an ASA sensitivity rating of 

l. to 5), and a -readout system substantially simpler than that of the E-Z. 

The image was to be recorded on photoelectric-sensitive electrostatic 

tape, 'read out by defiecting the modulation of an electron beam to scan 

a portion of the tape. and the video signal amplified and then applied as 

a modulating signal for transmis.ion to ground station. A bandwidth of 

12 megacycles per aecond was required (tubes had to be developed also) 

tu provide a readout time of 8.7 seconds per frame. In such terms, 

ARPA's interest was entirely understandable. 

Z4 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP lEeR.' 

valid requirement. the Air Force based itl case on a re-statement of 

intelligence needs furnished by the assistant chief of staff for intelliZO 

gence. The bones of tbe dispute were thus laid quite bare. 

As it happened. Air Force views_ atood a better chance of 

acceptance in the August-September period of 1959 than at any tlm~ 

over the previous 18 months. For a variety of reasons--stemming 

mostly from widespread dissatiaiaction with ARPA's management of 

space programs for which the indlvidual services had technical responsibUity--ARPAls influence was gradually declining. Virtually the final 

chapter in the orgy of special-agency generation that began in October 

1957 was the 1959 creation of a Directorate of Defense Relearch and 

Engineering (DDRlcE) and its placement one 'echelon above ARPA in the 

Department of Defense heirarchy. Air Force Assistant Secretary, 

J. V. Charyk, who had recently replaced Horner in the research and 

development aSSistantship. cannily chose to present the case for the 

E-5 to DDR&tE rather than to appeal again to Johnson and his associates. 

(Dr. H. F. York, who was named director of the researcb and enaineering agency, bad formerly been Johnsonl• deputy but had alao been at odds 

with the "official" ARPA position on several key i •• ue •• ) Cbaryk in a 

Z6 A,:,gust memorandum pOinted out that adding E-S development to tbe 

£isca11960 Samos * program would raise program coat by only $17 million, 

.". , 

ARPA renamed Sentry on 6 August, specifying Samos because it was a 

name without "mis.ion as.ociation." Although Samos was the name of 

BYE 1'101-
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 Tap .se •• " 

a price that seemed entirely reasonable for the product. 

Whether Johnson moved on his own initiative or was prodded 

remained uncertain. but ARPA on 4 September 1959 finally authorized 

the a ward of an E-5 Camera development contract "to prutect schedul~s. II 

(Notably. development of a recovery capsule was ~ Simultaneously 

approved. and the E-5 ca~era was in some quarters considered adi\pt. 

able to a readout system if that proved neceasary.) Concurrentl)". 

however. ARPA directed that the earlier $143 million figure for fiscal 

1960 Samos program expenditures be scaled down to a maximum of 

$135 million. Protests were again prompt. and again effective. Five 

days later. on 9 September. ARPA formally authorized reinstatement 

of E-5 subsystem development. including the capsule, and added $lZ 

million to the earlier authorization total. The approved funds, however. 

amounted to $17 million less than the BMD t'minimum requirement" and 

fell $lZ million short of Charyk's estimate of minimum needs for fiscal 

1960.

21 

Even though approval of the £-5 was a major victory for the 

supporters of capsule recovery tech~ique8. the net effect of the maneuvcring which had extended from December 1958 to September 1959 had 

a Greek island in the Adriatic Sea, it was promptly interpreted as tbl o 

acronym for satellite and missile observation system-.. an absurd 

misnomer which nonethele; .. was iiter used in-a variety of official 

directives. 0 

BYE 17017.,. Z6 

.... :!~:=., 0 a Bvemar- /Tate~' Io(,e~~~',= 

':':~o': s >. WOP I.C ••• 

. ... _-_ .. __ ... _ .. _-------
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

I'D. SECRIiI' 

begun to confuse program status 10 thuroughl y that little real 

progress in E-S development Was possible. Although General Schriever 

protested to General White that Pentagon-inltigated funding and program 

fluctuations bad been chiefly responsible for that situation, 1.2 the explanation was not that simple. In point of fact. the Air FOrce had devoted 

nearly as much attention to ~ecuring approval of the E-4 proposal as 

to furthering the E-S program. and disapproval or partial approval of 

Air Force development plans had been in large part conditioned by 

strong defense department objections to Air Force operational concepts 

which the juniol' service stubbornly supported. 

Although the Strategic Air Command had originally been highly 

skeptical of claims that satellite reconnaissance could produce operationally 

useful results. * once Sputnik I made it clear that the Soviets had a highly 

* Lieutenant Colonel ViC'tor M. Genez, who had been associated wlth 

overflight reconnaissance programs since 1953. was fond of telling 

how his first presentation of WS ll1L proposals to the Strategic Air 

Command staff had been received in 1954. Highly enthusiastic about 

the program, he had gone over its technical aspects, then based On 

television techniques, and had summed up with a fairly optimistic· 

appraisal of its prospects.. He finished. The audience turned its 

eyes on Ceneral LeMay, in the front row. LeMay clamped down on 

his cigar, glared at Cenez, and growled, "Who in the hell authorized 

you to spend good travel ·rnoney to bring thi. horse shit up here? " 

Z1 

'fap lEe •• ., 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

potent rocket and missile program SAC developed an intense interest 

both in early flights and in acquiring early operatiunal control of an 

eventual system. As in the ballistic missile program, where "initial 

operational capability at the earliest possible date" became more a 

fixation than an objective, development goals immediately became 

involved with operational readiness dates, operational sites, and plans 

for strategic command control of operational systems. The Ballistic 

Missile Division, which had responcled to similar pressures on ballistic 

missile developments by "inventing" concurrency, a concept of interlocked development-production-dt"ployment that actually was not applied 

to pre-1959 missile development effort., unprotestingly applied the 

philosophy to the reconnaissance satellite effort. The effects On program 

S1.ze and cost prOjections were enormous. Readout. the dominant technical approach. implied that each satellite would require a minimum of 

three ground stations. Handling of multiple ground station products 

would necessitate the creation of a huge processing. analysis. and 

dissemin~tion station (or several such stations), so concurrency actually 

implied the early development and construction of substantial numbers 

of elaborate and costly facilities. 

Quite apart from the COlt of such a program, concurrency and 

the prospect that the Strategic Air Command would operate Samoa roused 

BYE 17017-'l4 , Z8 

::"": .. : s ,: ... , 'IBP I.C881' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

dlsquieting emotions in several quarters. Althoulh both the developinfl, 

and the prospective operating command proceeded on the premise that 

SAC operational responsibility for Samos was inevitable, it was not 

until August 1959 that Air Force headquarters formally designated SAC 

as the command responsible for operational planning for Samos and 

for proctfssing "initial take." Shortly thereafter. all concerned. were 

carefully advised that no specific planning date for tran.fer of Sarno. 

responsibility to an operating command was to be entertained for the 

moment. Nevertheles s. concurrency remained an ingredient of BMD 

planning for Samos. Z3 

One of the chief obstacles to acceptance of the basic thesis was 

President Eisenhowerls clear directive that all United Statel satellites 

"must be advertised as being 801ely for peaceful purposes." Although 

the intent of the order had been diluted by a succession of Sentry-Samos 

publicity releases during 1958 and 1959. the Air Force nonethele .. was 

obliged to make the pattern of Samos development conform to that ideal. 

At one po~nt. Pentagon planners had proposed couplinl all Air Force 

satellite launohings to such "peaceful systems" as Discoverer and Midas. 

The plan was thoroughly unsettling to Corona manager. who had devoted 

'months to the task of disaSSOCiating Discoverer from specific or implied 

military objectives. Sarno. had been 80 clearly identifiecl with recoonaissancl 

Z9 BYE 1701" • 

. J' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'ap SECR.' 

• 

objectiv~s that relating it to Diacoverer seemed certain to compromise 

the covert Curona program. The prospect sent tremors down the 

teletype lines that connected the Central Intelligence Agency to the 

obscure Corona office in Los Angeles. 

In December 19~8. Au Force headquarters had devised a 

"cover plan" fur Samus based on "advertising ARDC as both develuper 

and operator." The sch~me of making SAC operationally responsible 

for Samus was to be handl~d as Top Secret. Planning and proMramming 

for initial operational capability were to be similarly treated. In 

theury. this would satisfy the President's directive. 

Accurately. 1f uncharitably, amused Corona managers concluded 

that the "AF cover uperation" was so leaky that it would dlvert "a good 

deal of curiusity .Ind attention" away from Discoverer-Corona and toward 

the acknowl",dged reconnaissance effort. And that was preCisely what 

happened. The attempt to hide Samos under a Top Secret labeol after 

its reconnaissance potential had been openly dis,oussed for months proved 

futile. The abundance of Top Secret clearances and normal human 

curiosity made almost every eligible staff officer 10 the Pentagon. in 

ARDC headquarters. and in SAC headquarters cognizant of the objective. '" 

s:: 

In Aprll 1959. a Pentagon presentations group took a revised draft of 

the "Sentry Cover Plan" to Undersecretary M. A. Maclnt:rye for his 

review. Before they had gotten well into their script. he interrupted 

BYE 17017-74 30 

..,:. ..... ;:. :. = ::.rra~/7a.:ll"'. Kev""_'''_ ~ .... , ... ....... --
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

"OP.BeR.Y 

Thus when Air Force headquarters formally abandoned the attempt to 

deny that Sam08 existed and announced that the Strategic Air Command 

would ultimately be made operationally responsible for satdlite reconnaissance. the problem remained quito as largo as it had been eight 

months earlier. Nor were prop08e~ solutions any more feasible. 

ARPA. in a particularly ill-timed maneuver, chole August 1'959 to 

urge that all Samos ahots be announced as Discoverers. a prospect 

that sent the Corona office lnto new tremors of despair. Like the 

earlier Air Staff suggestion of the same tenor, it was quietly deflated 

. . 2.4 WlthOUt harm to Corona security. 

Through all these petty twistings and turnings. SAC and the 

Air Staff persisted in their determination to make SAC ope.rationally 

responsible for Samos. and particularly to give SAC both the abUity 

and the authority to process and dis8enllnate initial "take. II· There 

and asked. rather impatiently. if they were familiar with the Corona 

activity. "When they said INo. I" a Corona offic;:er later reported. "he 

threw them out of the office." When one of the presentations group 

complained that the Sentry plan was "being intederred with" and was 

"butting blank walls" because of a "Corona program. II it proved necessary 

to close him down without telling him any of the real circumstance. 

Colonel W. A. Sheppard. then Corona 4irector, described the entire 

activity as a nuisance. 

>1= 

Air Force headquarters also responded to pressures from operating 

commands by, at one point. proposmg that the Air Rescue Service be 

assigned total responsibility for all retrieval operations.arisius from 

satellite reentry. 

31 BYE 1701" 

yep IEe •• 'I' 
, 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

was in AIr Staff intelligence quart~rs a peculiar reluctance to concede 

the necessity for proving out a res .. arch and development capacity in 

advance of turning over the system to all operating commanel. and 

there were some indications that lntelligence chlefs in the Pentagon 

suspected ARDC of deviously maneuvering to retain custody of the 

entire system for an indefinite future. As had happened before, the 

using command anel its Air Staff counterpart expressed resentment at 

the "refusal" of the research And development agency to be "immedlately 

respons1ve" to operating command .tatt-ments of requirements. A 

curious lack of appreclatioll of the fact that Samos was at I).at a high 

risk developmellt and that it was still far removed from operational 

l:; readilles6 was ..::omInon to much of the Air Staff through early 1959. 

On the other hand, ARDC (anel tile higher levels of Ballistic 

System Division management) ("ontinued to support application of 

concurrency concepts to Samoa development. There was no basic 

disagreement with SAC and Air Staff objectivea, merely a difference 

In approach and in estimates of an operational uti,lity date. Concurrency 

seemed the best posslble compromise between the desires of the proSPt:'."tlve operahng command for early system availability and the illC"oncf:!aled convlC"tion of 6Ume program managers that reconnaissance 

satellites were a new breed of weapons that could not be parceled out 

in the fasbion of B-Z9's and KC-97'a. 

32 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

In tbe ballistic mislile program, concurrency had meant 

conducting a broad front development and procurement prolram 

with the objective of deploying operationally usefcl missiles at tbe 

same time that launch sites and trained Air Force crews were 

available. Supporters of concurrency arlued that no other technique 

could have carried the Atlas and Thor mi18Ues 80 rapicUy through 

tbe development and initial deployment pbues. ( In fact. Thor and 

Atlas were developed sequentially and tbe concurrency thesis was 

largely an after-tbe-event invention--but tbat too was irrelevant.) 

In any cale, the applicability of concurrency concepta to programs 

other than ballistic missile development was not universally conceded. 

The question of whether concurrency was more coatly than alternate 

p:r.ocesses could not be resolved to the satisfaction of all partles 

because there was no comparable "conventional" effort against which 

to measure costs. One e.flect of concurrency. however. was to 

compress expenses into a few fiscal yeara, and in tbole years the 

costs were unquestionably greater than in other ~road-Icope programs 

which continued over longer periods. Arlurnents that concurrency 

eventually brouaht lower expenditures in years after initial deployment were handicapped by tbe fact that all prolraml were funded On 

33 BYE nc 

'fOP I. ca ... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP ISCRS9 

a year-by-year basis and that the long-term effect was of slight 

consequence to the current budget. The baUistic -missile program 

was absolutely essential to national survival. a circumstance that 

no responsible official denied. But supporting a satellite reconnaissanc'e 

program which might be quite a8 costly as a major missile development 

was another matter; many officials were quite skeptical of claims that 

such an effort was equally vital to survival • 

. Concurrency and its funding also entered the readout versus 

recovery dispute. Given the limitationa of a readout system. relatively 

large numbers of both satellites and ground stations would be required 

.to provide the reconnaissance coverage that intelligence authorities 

demanded. A successful recovery program would be much less costly. 

Fewer satellites would be required. and recovery satellite effectiveness 

was not at all dependent on the existence of expensive ground ~tation8. 

In such terms, a recovery system. such as the E-S. had fiscal attractions independent of its technical promile. 

Many program managers had reservations about the applicability 

of concurrency concepts to any reconnaissance I.tellite development. 

Those officers immediately responsible for the conduct of the effort 

at BMD felt that technology still was too uncertain to support anything 

resembling a concurrent development-procurement effort intended to 

BYE 17017-74 34 

'fOP I .. C •• 'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

result in the early availability of large numbers of satellite or ground 

stations in any given configuration. A breakthrough in traveling wave 

tubes. t'ecovery teChniques. camera optics. electrostatic tape technology, or any of several other areas might set the entire effort on a new 

course and make obsolete both the satellites and the expensive fixedfacility ground stations built to support them. Nevertheless, the 

oUicial BMD policy endorsed concurrency. 

There were additional considerations of some importance--the 

I 

reluctance of other agencies to concede to the Strategic Air Command 

anything resembling a monopoly in satellite reconnaissa.nce operations 

and a counterpart reluctance on the part of national policy makers to 

assign military space systems to a command with SAC's "militant image." 

The Ilpeaceful uses of space ll policy lurked behind almost all consideration of the subject. 

Whatever the merit. of the various argument.. there was· general 

agreement that real progress toward a us.tul reconnai •• ance satellite 

system had been disappointingly slight in the ZO months during which 

ARPA had controlled both the policy a~d the technical aspects of the 

program. The Air Force rejoiced, therefore. when Secretary of 

Defense Neil McElroy, on 18 September 19S9. authorized the reassignment of Sarno. to the Air Force. ?:he date of transfer, however. was 

35 BYE 11 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP SEeRE'I 

made conditional on the submission of acceptable development and 

Z6 

opel' ationa1 plans. 

Hopes that McElroy's decision might resolve all of the outstanding uncertainties of the Samoa program_were q,uickly dispelled. ARPA 

influence declined promptly, and there were clear indications that the 

fiscal1960_ program would be funded at or about the "minimum requirement 

level" earlier specified by 2ND, but in other areas confusion seemed to 

be compounded rather than eliminated. A revival of plans to quickly 

transform Samoa into an operational system under SAC was immediate. 

Air Force ,headquarters issued inatructioua that the procurement of 

equipment whicb would permit operatinB commands to assume.control 

of reconnaissance take was to be an early order of business. The Air 

Staff defined a role for the Air Photographic and Olarting Service. In 

October. there was a careful discussion of SAC req,uests that research 

and development equipment required for the aupport of both ferret and 

photographic reconnaissance for Samos be transferred immediately to 

Offutt Air Force Base. Z7 All in aU. it was apparent that much of the 

Air Force viewed the removal of the AR.PA yoke ... a aisnal for return 

to air staff control and vi loroua operational command participation in 

management of the development effort. 

Such expectationa proved ill-advised. DDR..E ltepped into the 

void left by ARPA's removal and damped hopei of a larie.scale 

BYE 11017-74 36 

-:-"~-: ...... ~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "op IEC.S., 

development program built around concurrency concepts. The Air 

Force was advised that "internal reprogramming" would be required 

to provide funds for Samos development. Meaningful program control 

did not return to tbe Air Staff. Neither did either the division or the 

command level regain full authority. Inetead. effective management 

authority passed upward one echelon, from Johnaon of ARPA to his 

new superior. York of DDRlcE. 

Moreover. where ARPA had discouraged E-S development and 

urged acceleration of the readout program, DDRlcE swung to the 

opposite track and endorsed complete redirection of the program 

toward recovery and away from readout. BMD, which for the.first 

ei.ght months of 1959 had contended m~ghtU y for approval of an E- S 

program, now found itself protesting aaainst an apparent desire to 

abandon all other options. By early November, DDRIrE had formally 

instructed the Air Force to emphaai .. e and accelerate recovery subsystem 

development and to devote increased attention to problems of improved 

reliability and extended on-orbit life. BMD and Air Staff protests met 

a solid wall of resistance. Bowing to the inevitable, rec08n1zin8 that 

formal trander of Samos to custody of the Air Force was contingent 

on acceptance of the DDRIcE viewpoint. the air secretariat on 6 November 

agreed to incorporate the reviled policy into its Samos plan.. Eleven 

37 BYE 1'7 

Ma~-= ~ I a Bvema" / -:"::1 "'_. "_ 

IJOP .se •• " 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .,8P SEeaE' 

days later. the Secretary of Defense officially tranafel'l'ed Sarnos 

management responsibility from ARPA to the Air Force. Z8 

Although the transfer agreement of November 1959 included 

a policy statement emphasizing that recovery Ihould be pursued more 

diligently than readout, BMD continued to balk. The division protested 

that the near abandonment o( readout mode development implied by 

Pentagon directions would deiay ayailabUity of an early operational 

satellite reconnaissance- system by 14 to ZO months--until sometime 

during the firlt half of 1963. In lieu of reduciDI the readout eUort tu 

provide funds needed for acceleration of the E-S prOlraIll. BMD urged 

continuati.on of both the ferret and photographic readout systeIlls at 

their previously eetabUshed rates and the prOvision of about 

additional in fiscall96l funds to support an accelerated E-S effort. 

The Strategic Air Command. the Air Defense Command. and the 

Auistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence attempted to reinforce the BMD 

stand by insilting on the urgency of early readout system operation. 

but both the strategic and the defense comm.ands professed inabUity 

to recommend program reductions in their own areas which would 

. release the required funds. At that point, the Air Force Ballistic 

MissUe Committee took a hanel. inatructiua BMI) to eubmit a program 

tbat emphasized pohtography ratJ:ler than ferret subsystems and which 

BYE 17017-14 38 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

clearly concentrated on recovery rather than readout data retrieval 

19 

methods. 

One immediate consequence of the redirection was to eliminate 

some effort, covered by existing contract.. Included in the termination 

package that BMD and Lockheed worked out early in December were all 

of the very advanced reado~t programs--E-3 and F-4 (a ferret package 

development comparable to the E-3 in complexity and technical uncertainty). 

Other items deleted from the basic Samos effort, though not necessarily 

from the total Air Force space technology pro,ram. included the 

development of high-energy batteries and a solar-power-source backup 

1:0 the auxiliary electrical power system, the nuclear auxiliary power 

development (SNAP). orbit adjust subsystems for Agena. an Advanced 

Photographic Readout (APR) project (the five-foot .. definition "advanced 

E-Z") and the development of auxiliary retro-rockets for the E-S capsule. 

Formal training of Air Force personnel for operational duties in SamoS 

30 "squadrons" was another cas\Ullty. 

Insofar as elimination of the E-3 anel continuation of the £-5 

resolved the long festering question of whether reconnaissance (as 

opposed to spot surveillance) should be based on a readout or a 

recovery mode, the redirection of November 1959 ,ave the total Sam.ol 

program greater stability and soliclity than it had po .. e .. ed for nearly 

39 BYE 11 

wop •• c .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lap •• ea.t' 

two years. But though the technoloaica! objectives of re.earch and 

development could now be more clearly defined. aa much could not 

be said for the end goal of the program. 

More than recovery versus readout was involved. though the 

apportionment of effort still was .ubject to change. ByOecember 1959 

there were clear signs that the SAC-dominated planning for early 

operation of Samos would meet with strona opposition from DDRlcE. 

In the view of that agency. the entire course of Sentry-Samoa develupment since April 1958 had been unreali.tically oriented toward an 

attempt to create an early operational capabUity. The Director of 

Defense Research and Engineerina. Dr. York. openly cautioned the 

ai.r secret.ariat in early December 1959 that "such efforts would 

iRevitably interfere with the re.earch and development program and. 

have the effect of delaying the overall prolram." York ·.aid frankly 

that in his opinion Samos had been "confu.ed and dowed down" by 

concentration on operatLonal requirements well before the actual 

capability.of the system had been eatabUshed in a development form. 

He" urged that.funds focheduled for operational aapecta of the Samoa 

program be withheld. that the Air Force cancel ita plana to train 

operational personnel. to acquire land and facUities. to construct 

expensive data link ... to buUd operational launch aitea. and to prOVide 

BYE 1701'7-74 40 

'rep.Ee .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

"equipment" required to proce •• the Re.earcb and Development outputl 

in an attempt to provide operational warninl. 

It was also clear that York entertained Itronl doubts about the 

technical validity and the emph.lil on the reaclout approach then supported 

by the Ballistic Mis.Ue Division and the Air Staff in leneral. He favored 

increasbg effort on the E-S becaule of it. probable edae in feasibility' 

and reUabUity over the E-2, and he ur,ed that the development of 

Subsystem 1 (the ,round proce •• inl and di •• emination .y.tem) be 

curtailecl because of its alignment with Iystems and products that did 

not then exi8t--and which milht well prove impo .. ible to develop. 31 

If the Air Research and l>t!velopment CommaDcl. the major 

operating commands. and most of the Air Staff .eemed little impressed 

with arlumenta againat either readout or the concurrency.early operation 

thesis. it waa al80 evident that A. si.tant Secretary Charylt was aympathetil.. to the DDIlIIE viewpoint. Moreover. by early December it wal 

apparent that return of Samos to Air Force manaaement channels clid 

not by any' meanl imply a reversion to "conventional" procel lea of. 

review and approval at succes.ive echelonl. incbadina the air .taff. 

before program. were Icrutinised at the secretarial level. On 

2 December. Charyk countermande4 instructions that would bave 

sent the pendina Samoa development plan directly throulh the air ataff. 

41 aYE 11' 

_:- •• ~ '3 ..... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TDP sEe .... 

and the ballistic missUe committee on its way to "final approval" by 

DDRIIE. He specified his intention of reviewinl preliminary plana 

and of ieauing specific instructions concerninl their content before 

they were submitted for final approval. 3Z 

Takina cognizance of negotiation" presentations, and polic y 

guidance statementa that continued throulh much of December 1959 

and January 1960, BND on 30 January submitted a revised development 

plan that nominally conformed to the general outline of DDR.E instructions but which somewhat surprisinl1y retained major elements of the 

earlier approach. In essence. BMD had.lrafted a 7-flight E-5 program 

to the earlier l8-flight readout anel ferret prolram. Eleven of the 18 

flight. were programmed for E-l and E-Z subsystems. Moreover, 

concurrency. early operation, anel Sub.y.tem 1 were prominent in the 

operational annex. 

Notwithstandinl the content and implication of the 30 January 

plan, Air Staff confidence in the probabUity of securinl funds to continue 

8upport of the readout 'and concurrency aspects of Samos had been shaken. 

Events of February tended to confirm doubts that the plan would. be 

approved. Although the Air Force Ballistic Mis,Ue Committee on 

1S February approved both the reaearch and development pro,ram and 

the development-operation prolram proposal, defense .ecretariat 

BYE 17017-74 41 

'l'op.se •• , 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

reviewen withheld authority to proceed with anythina more than the 

minimum research and development effort. For the moment. 8MD 

was authorized to continue along the lines of the proposed reaearch 

and development schedules. but a final and formal funds authorisation 

did not emerge from the Pentagon d~ring February. 

Marshalling arguments to support its stand. the air staff in 

mid-March concluded that unwarranted confidence in Corona was 

partly to blame for the failure of DDR.E to endorse the "early operational" 

Samos program. Some $60 million was needed in flscall9~0 to proceed 

with plans for a readout complex that presumably woulel, in conjunction 

with the E-2., fiU the gap between the U-2 program. with ita range limitations. anel the actual neeel. In the liaht of the current uncertainty 

concerning Corona pro.pech. it seemed to the air staff that a case 

might be made for substituting the Samoa readout sy.tem for an extended 

Corona effort. An analytical comparison between Corona and Samoa 

might aid Air Force objectives. although the ai" staff conceded that by 

all available indicators York and hit deputies would continue to oppose 

the authorization of "initial operational capability funels. 11 33 

Dr. Charyk. who had escorted the 30 January plan through most 

of its Pentagon review. on 18 February .sked York to approve its research 

and development elements. York's response. delayed until mid-March. 

expreased the conviction that expanding the proararn by itaeking on 

43 BYE 17' 

'I'9P .8C •• ", 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~e. IECRB" 

recovery subsystem flights was an insufficient reorientation. Not until 

ZO April did he iuue a formal ruling. and then it consisted of another 

of the familiar "in principle" approvals that had marked Samos progress 

for more than two years. 

Even more firmly than had been the case in December, Dr. York 

brought'into focus the anti-concurrency. anti-readout arguments that 

had begun to appear more than a year earlier. He insisted that answers 

to questions of technical feasibUity might well have been avaUable by 

early 1960 if program managers had not channeled their attention toward 

considerations of operational facilities and hardware procurement. He 

wanted a halt to the expenditure of funds on "operational .spect.II--and 

by tbe phrase he meant personnel training. technical operation. centers. 

multiple readout stations, operational launching facUities. and virtually 

all of Subs ystem I. The dUference between this and earUer statements 

of the same tenor was that Dr. york .... now in a position to enforce 

his de.ires; DDRIlE held the purse strings! The program was approved 

at a researcb and development ~d. level of $159.5 million for fiscal 

1960 (the fiscal year had only 10 weeks to run, but it had been operating 

since December 1959 on a "programmed II but unapproved level identical 

to that approved in April) for fiscal 1961. The 1961 

total represented a reduction the anJ,ount r eq ue. ted 

BYE 17017-74 

..,~ .. ~~. ~ 8;e""a~/T~! .... ~~ .... :,~ 

_ :~:'. :; ~. . ..e.IEe •• 'r 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'OP 'EeR • ., 

through the 30 January development plan. with the retduction to be 

concentrated in visual and ferret readout developments. Funds needed 

to support "concurrency concepts" had been detailed in the operational 

34 

annex; they were not approved. 

Less than two weeks after Dr. York had in effect denounced the 

previous conduct of the Samos program. Soviet anti-aircraft rockets 

shot down Francis Gary Powers, his U-2. and the only existent overnight program tbat was actually returning intelligence information. 

Samos was completely overhauled in the succeeding six months. By 

November of 1960 it bore virtually no resemblance to the approved 

program of April. In many respects, that reorganization was rightly 

attributed to the effects of the I May incident, the U-2 affair. But it 

was impossible to escape the conclusion that Samos would have taken 

something of its later direction as a consequence of the York directive 

of 20 April, whatever the course of international evenU. 

Certain facts and conditions were clear in April. rhe BMD 

viewpoint--continued emphasis on readout and continuation of "concurrency" 

principles in program management--had remained the most prominent 

element of each development plan presented to the Pentagon even though 

clear instructions to reorient the development toward a recovery-mode 

effort had beetn issued as early as November 1959. York and Char.yk 

BYE 17 

~QPI.C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'SP .Ee .... 

could quite hont:8tly complain that program management had not been 

T~sponsive to guidance from air secretariat-defense secretariat 

level. Whether justified or not, York was convinced that an Alr 

Rl:sear<.:h and Development Command fixation with ~oncurr~nC"y ,'oncepts 

was responsible for much of the programming difficult) uf the prt:cedin~ 

two years. 

It was also apparent by April that Charyk, who had succeeded 

to the- post of Air Force Undersecretary in February, was disillusioned 

with the "conventional II processes of program managemellt. Starting 

in December 1959, he had personaUy shepherded progrclm proposals 

. in which he had les. than full confidence through the "routine" revit'W 

and approval echelons ··onl y to discuver at the end of the long Tuad 

that his efforts had been barren. 

In lIuch an environment, both concurrency and readou~ were 

certain to be the targets of a major program reorientation. U the 

U -2 incident was immediately responsible for a significant program 

acceleration and expansion, experience of the preceding 18 months 

had to ahare responsibility for the direction of program reorientation 

and for the fact that the management structure as well as the technical 

objective was reshaped. 

BYE 11011-74 46 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. 8P •• C •• , 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. WDD Dev Plan, WS 117L Advanced Reconnaissance System, 

l Apr 56. 

Z. Prean, "New Horizon, " Summary of dev concepts and status of 

117L progm. prep by LMSD. 1 Mar 58. cy in SP Samos files. 

3. RAND Rpt RM~1811, "Physical Recovery of Satellite Payloads.-

A Preliminary lnveatigation, " 2.6 Jun 56. in Sp· Samos files. 

4. Interviews, Col W. G. King. 19 Dec 6Z, and Col R.A. Berl~ 

16 Apr 63. by R. L. Perry. 

5. RAND Rpt RM·20lZ, An Early Reconnaissance Satellite Syatern. 

12. Nov 57 and a revision. A FamUy of Recoverable Reconnaissance 

Satellites. same code and date. 

6. Memo, CoiF. C. E. Oder. Asst for WS 1171". to Col ~. H. Terhune. 

DICmdr Weap Sys. BMD, 3 Mar 58. subj~ Differences between 

ll1L Thor and Atlas Launched Proarams, in Terhune files. 

ARS 57·58, SSD Hist Div. 

7. The "suggestionl" were contained in single sentences of thick 

volumes. In the 1 Jut 58 plan. the sentence read: "To obtain 

intelligence earlier than previously sched.uled. provide an 

interim system containing a detachable capsule which may be 

commanded (or programmed) to return with stored intelligence 

to an area from where it may be physically recovered. II See 

BMD Dev Plan. ARS (WS 117L), 1 Jui 58. in SP Samoa files. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Rpt. "New Horizons. II prep by LMSD for WOO, I Mar 58, in 

Samos files. . 

10. The explanation and illustration are drawn from a composite of 

sources including discussion. involving MajOen R.E. Cireer, 

Cols J. W. Ruebel and R.A. Berg, I..tCol V.M. Genez, anei 

Capt L.G. Neuner; an ~clated. paper in Oen Oreer's fU.s titled 

47 BYE I" 

I-I!l~-:" J a BJe ..... a,. /-~ .. ~. "-. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !fOP I.S ••• 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

IS. 

16. 

11. 

BYE 11017-1. 

"Anatomy of Readoutl! (probably prepared Dec 6Z); an unclassified Rand study by A.~. Katz, Observation Satellites ••• , 

Z5 May 59; and Utility Tech Manual, "Samos A,ena B Satellite. 

and Reconnaissance" on the worth of readout as well as on the 

worth anc:l real ai,nificance of the variously noted technical 

obstacles to readout. The arithmetical factora. happily, were 

subject to fewer varieties of int.~pretation than were the philosophical advanta,es and disadvanta,es. 

OOR 80. revised Z6 Sep 58. 

Folder, ARPA Briefing, 16 Oec 58. in SP Samoa files. 

Ibid. 

Memo. W.A. Tidwell (CIA). Chm. 'lAC Ad Hoc Comm on Commun, 

to Chm. Intel Advisory Comm, Z9 Apr 58, subj: Report of Ad Hoc 

Committee on Communications. in Samos fUes, RItD-l Hist Docum; 

memo. Capt R.C. Truax, USN. MU Asst to Dir/ARPA, to R. W. 

Johnson. Dir/ARPA, 15 Sep 58, sUDj: WS 117L Requirements Review. 

in Corona files; ARPA Order 41-59. 7 Nov 58; memo. R. E. Horner. 

Aut SAF(RItD), to SAFUS. 3 Dec 58, subj: 117L Program Content 

Problems. same file; memo. R. W. Johnson, Dir/ARPA, to SAFUS. 

4 Dec 58, subj: WS-1l7L Pro,ram, Sheppard fUe.; memo, Johnson 

to SAFUS, 17 Dec 58, subj: ReorientaUon of SENTR Y Prolram. in 

Samoa file. Hist Docm 158. 

Memo. Johnson to SAFUS. 17 Dec 58; Dev Plan. Sentry Space 

System. 30 Jan 59. prep by BMD. in Samos files. 

Amend 10 to ARPA Order 9-58, 3 Apr 59; Amend 1 to ARPA Order 

48-59. Amend 8 to ARPA Order 9-59. Amend 1 to ARPA Order 38-59, 

a1116 Feb 59; msg 043Z. Col W.A. Sheppard, Dir/Corona prolm. 

to R. M. BiueIL. CIA. 30 Mal' 59, in Corona fUes; TWX WDZW -5- 31-1 

AFBMD to ARDC Z8 May 59, in SSD Hist Div fUes, Sentry, 159. 

Lockheed officials admitted to MajOen R. E. Oreer in 1961 th.t both 

the spaciousness and the pre .. urisation feature. of the E-S cap.we 

had been in1l.uenced as much by the notion of adaplin. it to • man-in-

.pace mi.sion .s by basic camera enviromnent requirements. 

Col W.Ci. Kina. prolram director at the time the E-S confiauration 

was approved, had doubts that capswe habitation :had been a major 

48 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 I'DP I.C •• ., 

{actor in tbe de.ign. Neither viewpoint is renected in contemporary documentation. but tbere il aenera! aareement that both 

ARPA and hiah Air Force officials favored a man-in-apace program 

under Air Force auspices. Pre.umably by Air Force direction, 

Lockheed submitted a 'Sentry MIS" confiauration for condderation 

late in 1958. and it bore a remarkable resemblance to the later 

(1959) E ... 5 clelign. As early as October 1958, "apec:ial" ARPA 

technical groups were reviewing and redirectina the details of 

Sentry "Hardware, " and were in some instances dealing directly 

with the contractor. Lockheed, in its turn, regularly exercised 

its precedent-endorsed privilege of making independent approaches 

to various offices in the Pentagon. On balance, therefore, motive, 

opportunity, and outcome support the conclusion that the E-S design 

was indeed influenced. if not dominated, by man-in .... pace considerations that had little relevance to satellite reconnaissance requirements. 

Interviews. MajCien R. E. Greer. 4 Mal' 63, Col W. Ci. King. 11 Mar 63. 

and LtCol John Pietl •• 11 Mar 63, by R. L. Perry. Hist Div; projection slides. Oct. Dec 1958, prep by LAC. I in SP Samos files, 

sUde box 1#1. 

18. Memo, R. W. Johnson. Db/ARPA, to SAl', 25 May 59, subj: 

ARPA Order No 9-58. SENTRY Project. in USAF Mis and Sat 

Ofe files. Sarnos 59; TWX WDZW-5-'31. BMI> to USAF. 28 May 59; 

TWX AFSAT 5Z0n, USAF to ARDC and BMO, 5 Jun 59 and WDZW 

6-6-E, BND to USAF. 8 Jun 59. same fUe; TWX DEF 96141Z. 

ARPA to ARDC. 24 Jun 59. in SSD Hiat Div filea. ARS 59; TWX 

ROOZWC-31-7-38E. ARDC to BND. 31 Jul 59. in SP Samos files. 

Hist Docum. 59; Itr. LtCien B.A. Schriever. Cmdr ARDC. to 

CIS USAF. 1 Aug 59. no subj. in USAF Mis and Sat Sys Ofe lUes. 

19. Ltr. Maj Cien O.J. Ritland. Cmdr BMD. to cis USAF. 18 Jul 59. 

subj: Transmittal of Development Plans. in USAF Mia and Sat Sy. 

Ofc file.; Itr. Schriever to CIS USAF. 1 Aua 59. 

ZOo Ltr. MajCien H.A. Watson. O/Asst CS/lntel. to Dir/Adv Tech. 

USAF. 7 Aug, 59, subj~ lnteIUaenee Requirements for Hiab Resolu ... 

tion Photography. in USAF Mis and Sat Sys Ofc fUes; presn. 

LMSD.to BMD, 2.7 Jan 60. alicl.s in SP Samos fil ••• Box '3, 

LMSD Rpt, Sentry Program E-l aecolU1ais.aDce. 29 Jul 59. 

in Samos fUes. 

49 BYE 1'7 

'fOP.lie.liT 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'OP .se •• 'I' 

11. 

loz. 

2.3. 

2.4. 

2.5. 

2.6. 

2.7. 

Z8. 

BYE l'fOl'J-'f. 

~:- ..... = :.'~ " 

Memo. J. V. Charyk., Alit SAF (R.D). to DDR.E, l6 Aug 59. 

subj: FY 1960 ARPA Pro.ram. TWX DEF 964914, ARPA to SAF, 

4 Sep 59; TWX DEF 965117, ARPA to SAF. 9 Sep 59. all in 

USAF Sarno. file •• 

Ltr. LtGen B.A. Schriever, Cmdr ARDe. to Cien T. D. White, 

CIS USAF. 15 Sep 59. no .ubj, in USAF Sarno. files. 

Ltr, Cien C.E.LeMay. VCS USAF. to CinC SAC. 5 Aug 59. 

lubj: Auignment of Operational Planning Responsibility, in 

SSD. Hi,t Div fUes; Dev Plan, Samos R.D Prolram. 11 Aug 60; 

TWX AFDAT 89855.' USAF to ARDC, 11 Nov 59. in SP Samos fUes. 

Memo, Col W.A. Sheppard. Spec Asst. to MajCien B.A. Schriever. 

Cmdr AFBMD. ZO Jan 59. subj: CoroDa Prolram Report, in 

Corona filea; TWX AFCOM TS 3665, USAF to ARDC. 5 Feb 59, 

in SP Samos fUes. Hist Docmn 59; m'l OZ67. Sheppard. Dirl 

Corona, to R. M. Bissell. CIA. 30 Dec 58, Corona files; ms. 

0394 Sheppard to CIA. II Mar 59; 0455, Sheppard to Q. Kucera, 

CIA, 3 Apr 59; 0738. Col F. C. E. Oder. BMD. to Bissell. 

6 Aug 59, all in 'Corona fUe •• 

Ltr, Col R.J. Quinn. Dir/Intel and Electronic Warfare. ARDC •. 

to Col H. L. Evan •• DirlSentry Proj Ofc. 11 Feb 59. no .ubj. 

and inch (notes on coni with AFCIN .taff); TWX RDZAA-Z6.S-Z-E. 

ARDC to BMD. Z6 May 59. both in SP Samo. files. Hlat Docmn 59. 

Memo. Neil McElroy, SoD. to Chm JCS. 18 Sep 59. subj: 

Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations, in USAF 

Samos fUes. 

TWX ASDA 85Z67. USAF to BldD. l3 Oct 59. 1tr. MajCien M.A. 

Preston. Dir/Ops. DCS/Ops. USAF to Air Photographic and 

Charting Servo Zl Oct 59. subj: ACIC Participation in SAMOS. 

in SP Samoa fUes, Rist Docmn 59. 

TWX AFC 78900, USAF to AFBMD, Z Oct 59; ltr, Col J.L. 

Martin, D/Dir Adv Tech. to DCS/D USAF, 2. Nov 59. subj: 

Samos memo for Record, Maj H.C. Howard, Ole of Dir/Adv 

Tech, 6 Nov 59. subj: SAMOS, MIDAS. and DISCOVERER. Program •• 

TWX AFC 13Z8/59, USAF to all maj emds, II Nov 59; memo, 

50 

.o.l.eae 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. UP lEG •• " 

J .H. Douglas. SAF, to SoD. 6 Nov 59. aub;: Transfer of the 

SAMOS Development Program to the Department of the Air 

Force; memo. T .5. Gatel, SoD, to SAF, 11 Nov 59, aame 

aubj; all in Hq USAF Samol flle. 

Z9. TWX WDZF-1l-6-E. BMD to USAF, 17 Nov 59: Draft Dev Plan, 

Samol, prep by BMD, 1 Dec 59; Min of 42nd AFBMC Mtg, 

14 Dec 59: TWX VC 5540, D/Cmdr SAC to VCS USAF. 16 Dec 59; 

1tr, MajGen J .H. Walsh, ACSI1, to DCS/D, USAF, 21 Dec 59, 

subj: SAMOS; TWX 982.19, VCS USAF to Cine SAC, 2.1 Dec 59; 

TWX ADLPD-D-1, .ADC to USAF, 4 Jan 60; TWX AFC 61416. 

USAF to AOC, 1 Jan 60; TWX VC 02.06, SAC to VCS USAF, 

9 Jan 60, all in USAF Samoa file I • 

30.' TWX LBZJ-1l-15-E. BMC to LAC. 19 Nov 59; 1tr, LtC01 R. W. 

Yundt. D/ Dir Sarno.. to BMC,6 Jan 60. lubj: Letter Contract 

AF AF 04(641)-341, Direction of Samoa Effort; ltr. C.A. Devine, 

LAC. to BMO ____ 3 Dec 59, aarne subj. all in 

SP Samoa fllell~ • 

. 31. Memo, H. F. York. DORicE. to SAF, 7 Dec 59, aubj: Intelligence 

System SAMOS, in SP Samoa file, Hiat Docmn 59. 

32. Memo, J. V. Charyk. SAFUS. to DCS/D, 2. Dec 59, 8ubj: 

DlSCOVERER, SAMOS. and MIDAS: TWX AFDAT 95614, 

USAF to BMD, 1 Dec 59. both in USAF Sat Pr9gm filea. 

33. Draft memo for SAF dispatch to 500. prep by DeSIO USAF, 

11 Mar 60. in Corona file I • 

34. Memo. H. F. York. DDRIcE. to SAF, 20 Apr 60, subj: SAMOS. 

MIDAS and DISCOVERER Reaearch and Development Programa 

and Development/Operational Plana for SAMOS and MIDAS 

Program.; draft memo, York to SAF. undated [approx 11 Apr 60], 

subj: InteUigence System SAMOS, both in OSAF file: Sat Progms; 

draft memo, York to SAF. undated, (approx 17 Mar 601, aubj: 

SAMOS, MIDAS and DISCOVERER Research and Development 

and Development/Operational Planl for SAMOS and MIDAS 

Programa, aame file. 

51 8YE 17' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !lap I .. CIISt' 

V SAMOS: REALIGNMENT CONTROVERSY (1960) 

The U-l that on I May 1960 failed to complete an overflight 

from Pakistan to Norway was one of many vehicle. of several kinds 

that bad pas.ed over some part of the Soviet Union. cameras and 

recorder. operating. since the beginning of the cold war. It was. 

however. the first manned aircraft ~o come down so intact and so 

far inland that cover stories became incredible. Within three days. 

after varioue spokesmen for tbe United State. bad is.ued a succession 

of. contradictory .tatements about the aircraft and it. purported 

minion, it became known that botb the U-l and its surprisingly 

communicative pilot, neither mucb damaled, had fallen into Ru •• ian 

hands. 

Althougb the President did not cancel the overflight program 

.!!! ~. he ruled tbat the U-l overflights of Soviet territory were to 

be suspended until further notice. He also assumed unqualified 

personal responsibility for the overnight decision and acknowledged 

tbat covert reconnaissance was a cornerstone of Unit.d Statel security 

policy. Tbe counterplay of motives was impouibly intricate. ranging 

from a Presidential election campaign that was rapidly becoming m~re 

intense to an impendina summit meeting and pouible rapproachement 

with the Soviet Union. 

BYE 1'lOl'l-'14 SZ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Reaction in the United States ranged from Vice President 

Richard Nixon's "hard line" statement that the flights would be 

resumed later. to the unpreceptive comments of several politicians 

and many newspapers that overflight was an inherent threat to world 

peace. Nikolai Khrushchev. the head of Soviet governm~nt. used 

the incident a& an excuse to wreck the summit meeting. The British • 

. French. and West Ciermans maintained an embarrassed official silence 

but let it be known that they thought it both naive and gauche of a head 

of state to acknowledge his role in espionage. Communist bloc nation • . made enormous propaganda capital of the episode. with telling effect 

on neutrals. The hostility of world opiJiion. the nervousneS8 of NATO 

allies (who appeared considerably 1ellS worried about the fact of overflight than by United States' handling of the consequences). the violence 

of Soviet reaction, and the domestic sensitivity of the question during 

an election campaign combined to insure against resumption of U-Z 

flights over Russia. * 

In many respects. the timing of the U-2 affair was even more 

unfortunate for the eatellite reconnaissance program than for either 

They had not been resumed 10 years later. mostly becaule the AUlust 

1960 success of Corona and the 196. success of Ciambit made resumption 

11' moot qwetttbm. 

53 BYE 1701 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

IJ'ap SECR •• 

domestic or international politics. Corona had as yet produced no 

photography. In the face of a solidifying secretariat-level jud~ment 

that the Air Force was mismanaging Samos. that service stubbornly 

persisted in attempts to seCure fundi for an extremely costly and 

technically weak program that was unwisely based on the premis(' of 

concurrent development and.deployment. Moreover. the Air For(;c 

had so completely relaxed earlier strictures on Samos publicity that 

the objectives. general time scale. and broad capabilities of the 

developmental systems were widely known. Tensions could not be 

relaxed by publici2.ing a new overflight technique to replace a discredited covert methodology. 

Even before the U-2. affair worked its effect in mid-1960. 

massive disem.:hantment with the Air Force viewpoint was common to 

the paneled offices along the Potomac face of the Pentagon. In March. 

the Air Staff had urged the Secretary of the Air Force to advise the 

Secretary of Defense that "the change of emphasis in development of 

resolution from 100 feet to loO feet to 5 feet and from recovery to 

readout then back to recovery. • . has resulted in an indefinite 

postponement of a target date for operational readiness of an electronic: 

rl!adout system. " and that the continued failure of the~!!! program 

Justified a vastly expand~d Samos effort. But again the t'mphal5is was 

BYE 1701'l-74 54 

'lap .ac .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~ap .Be8 .. '1 

on a "conventional" effort aimed at early employment of the satellite 

by the Strategic Air Command. The implication that the Air Staff 

was attempting to exploit recurrent failures of Corona missloons to 

the advantage of Samos wati unmistakable.; 1 

Even before the U·2, incident brought reconnaissance needs 

into .harper focus. DORicE and Undersecretary Charyk had explicitly 

rejected the -Air Staff viewpoint. Continued Air Force advocacy of 

a politically dangerous. technically risky. and very costly approach 

chiefly served to convince pollcy level 000 oUicia1s that the Air Staff 

was incapable of appreciating the realities of the situation. 

At the working level--in the Samos project office--there Was 

keen awareness of tbe impossible situation into which the Air Force 

was edging itself. Through the early month. of L960. the project 

office chief (CoLonel W. C. King) frequently protested that attempts 

to build concurrency into the program and to construct an elaborate 

logistiC complex in support of the satellite effort were unwise. King 

at one pOint told his chief. Colonel F. C. E. OdeI'. that he believed 

the Air Force had been deliberately obstructionist in failing to comply 

with clearly .tated secretarial guidance on-Samos. Z 

Senior member. of the Air Staff and chiefs of the major air 

commands were gravely concerned by the decision to end U·2 

55 BYE 1'1011 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lap •• c ••• 

overflighta and by the apparently .U.ht proapect of obtaining an early 

substitute. View. on Corona ranged from troubled uncertainty to 

frank hostility. In more than a year of tryina, the program had yet 

failed to return a single capsule aafely, much le .. to provide reconnaia sance information. Both those who knew of Corona and doubted. 

and thole innocent of Corona kDowledle, concluded that it waa vital 

lito expedite and to develop fully the pre-operational photographic 

potential of Project SAMOS." On 9 May 1960, a week after the U-2 

incident lurfaced, that became at least a lemi-official Air Staff 

p0aition. One week. later. foUowin, a len,thy meetina that involved 

Dr. Charyk. Ceneral Schriever, and Lieutenant Oeneral R. C. WUson 

(Deputy Chief of Staff. Deve~opment), a formal directive embodying 

3 

that phil080phy went to ARDC. 

The implications of that .tand, and its rationale, were both 

clear. All concerned unquestioningly accepted the premise that overflight waa e .. ential to U.S. security. A principal object of the U-2 

operations of 1959 and 1960 had been to determine the extent of 

deployment of Soviet intercontinental mi. •• Ues and, if po •• ible, their 

locationl. Khrushchev and other Ru.aian .poke.men had been boaatinl 

of a Soviet intercontinental mia aUe capability for many montha. The 

evidence of Rus.ian mi •• ile te.t operation. and .atellite succe.aea 

BYE 1701';-74 56 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

appeared to support thou claim.. The United State., in early 1960, 

had deployed small numbers of Atlas mi •• Ues and .omewhat larler 

numbers of Tbor and Jupiter intermediate-range miuiles (in Britain, 

Italy and Turkey). The AUaa. however highly touted in preas relea .... 

was at the time a singularly unreliable weapon of uncertain accuracy. 

AUas missUes could not be. quickly launched, the oelds were against 

their functionins correctly if launcbed. and untU launch they were 

susceptible to damage from virtuaUy any nearby nuclear explosion. 

Thor and Jupiter were not much better technically, and were in 

exposed sites within easy range of Soviet bombers. Intelligence eatimates credited the Russians with having more and better intercontinental 

ballistic missiles deployed over a broad expanse of Soviet territory. 

preciae locations unknown. Nine succeasive attempts to obtain relevant 

information by using Corona had faUed. The only other existent capability, U-Z. had been negated by the effects of the Powers affair. 

Completion of the extremely elaborate Samos plan adopted in 1959 

could not be anticipated before 1961 or 196Z at the earliest. Immediate 

• alid effective action of some sOrt therefore seemed e.sential • 

• 

It ia extremely important to View theae events in the perspective of 

the time. The existence of a real Soviet intercontinental miasUe 

capability was generally accepted •• s was Soviet willingne.s to 

resort to nuclear attack. 

57 

"8PSEC.E~ 

BYE 1'101" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

"UP SEeRE .. 

In many re'pects, the reaction of May 1960 resembled the 

furor of activity that followed the first Sputnik of October 1957. The 

emphalis lay on "maximum acceleration" of the program. with 

particular attention to "those aapects which offer a pre-operational 

intelligence return. ,,4 There waa no apparent change of heart Concerning operational concepts or concurrency, however, merely a sugge.tion 

that more money might be forthcoming. Since virtually all of the funds 

requested lor re.earch and development had been earlier approved, 

the implied goal of the program acceleration was to obtain previously 

denied fWlds for operational installations. 

Colonel King. who had been connected with the Sarno. program 

in some role virtually since its inception, had strong re.ervations 

about the wisdom of any sudden spending .p1urge. whatever ita motivation. In a thoughtful resume of program achievement. and prospect., 

he noted that alter four years of effort and the expenditure of nearly 

leemed somewhat unrealistic to conaider that e.tablishing 

new programs would insure early reconnai.sance coverage of the Soviet 

Union. He held l:hat the rapid solution of f~damelltal technical problem. 

was the real key to "obtaining intelligence at an early date. 11 Increased 

depth and flexibility in exilting programs leemed to offer the best 

prospect for program success. Havina experienced the fren~y of the 

BYE 1'1017·'14 58 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

1957 period. King was cautluus about "substituting the gross optimism 

that accompanies new programs for the cold reahsm of eXisting 

programs." He was particularly disturbed about the widening gap 

between the Air Force and DORicE viewpoints. particularly as they 

l"oncerned operational plans. concurrency. and Subsystem 1. 

King urged several ~pecific measures to improve the situation 

of the Samos program: (1) divorce the "classical operation. logistic. 

and similar considerations from the program now" (i.e •• forget concurrency. cancel S'.lbaystem 1. eliminate operational-base programs); 

(2) remove the administrative handicaps which had inhibited program 

progress (i.e., create"a clear and direct decision-action channel); 

(3) add a "back-up" recovery system and a new camera to the total 

program; (4) consider let ting a new contract with some firm other 

than Lockheed; (5) expand ground testing activity; (6) examine alternate 

techniques of data retrieval. both for readout and recovery; (7) ·expand 

the test program by addmg more launches to the schedule; (8) provide 

some means of determining Soviet weather in advance of photo mis.ions; 

(9) re-examine both the basic Thor a~d the thrust-augmented Thor in 

combination with Agena stages as avenue. to improved reliability and 

lower COltl; and (10) increase the emphaais on land recovery techniques. 5 

59 BYE 1701" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 we ••• eRE .. 

Precisely the same problema were eIi.turbin. Undersecretary 

Charyk. who wrote General White late i.n May that the entire matter 

of operational command respons~bilitie •• operational facilities. and 

the relation.hip between the operator of Samo. and the data-using 

agencies still was a subject of "considerable discus lion" in the defense 

secretariat. Charyk suggested that there was " some reason to believe 

that recovery rather than readout may .e11 turn out to be the primary 

me~ns for satisfying the bulk of the operational requirements." He 

noted that ground facility requirements would be "enormousl y Simpler 

than if complete reliance is placed on rea40ut .. " In Chal'yk's opinion, 

Subsystem 1 had been "greatly overengineered ••• ,,6 On 1.7 May he 

acted on those views. instructing ARDC to provide for parallel telting 

of recovery and readout modes and explicitly directing that AROC reevaluate the use of oU-the-shelf photographic equipment, or items in 

an advanced stage of development. as a means of acceleratlng recoverymode flight schedules. Probably mOlt lignificant, be directed that the 

E·5 recovery system get first priority in fliaht test. rather than the 

E-l and E-Z readout systems. and that the F-aubsy.tem. (ferret) be 

further de-emphasized. Finally. he ordered that no more than a 

mini~um capability for proceuing operatioDal take be provided, with 

construction or purchase of ground e~uipment and facilities to be 

reduced to the lowest possible level. 7 

BYE 17017-74 60 

~a"':o;. • ~ 5.'!''''''Ia .... / ia-e-· "'e.-:-= 

~- ... : - ~ . TOP '.CaST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Early in June it began to appear that the resolution of Samos 

program uncertainties might be taken entirely out of Au Force hands. 

On the 6th of that month. Or. H. F. York (Director of Defense Research 

and Engineering) instructed Charyk to submit Air Force recommendations 

on SanllJa program revision to DDR&E by the first week of July. York 

had been a,sked by the National Security Coucil how to accelerate the 

satellite reconnaissance program. 8 

On 10 June, President Eisenhower formally instructed Secretary 

of Defense Gates to conduct an intenaive. analysis of the "scope, bads 

and feasibility of our reeonnais sance satellite projects." The National 

Security Council. Eisenhower added. would be concerned not merely 

with the technical aspects of the program but also with the proce •• for 

establishing requirements. the requirements themselves. the "effectiveness of control over the scope and characteristics of the operational 

system, " and related topics. (Eisenhower's anxiety about the implications of as signing operational responsibility for overflight reconnaissance 

was obvious. He, and '>y implication the other members of the National 

Security Coune,il, were gravely concerned about the international 

repercussions. ) 

The Presi4ent'. lnstructions eventually involved Charyk. Dr. 

John Rubel (York's deputy), and Dr. Ceorge Kiatiakowaky (the President's 

61 BYE no' 

WOP 'EeRE'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

special .. sistant for science and techno10lY) in preparing a joint 

response to the National Security Council. But before they could 

10 much as open their inquiry, the Senate Appropriation. Committee 

to the fiscal 1961 Samos budget and publicly characterized the program as "a matter of national emergency" which 

should "move forward aa rapidly as possible." Lyndon 8. Johnson, 

Senate majority leader and a strona contender for the Democratic 

9 presidential nomination, began to urge a "cralh program" for Samos. 

Most of the proposals thus far presented implied program 

acceleration by funding expansion, even though modification of Sarnos 

technical Objectives had been suggelted. BelilUling in early June, 

increasingly frequent alternative proposal. were voiced, all stemming 

from the premise that the existent Air Force pro.ram structure was 

incapable of carrying the Samos project to a luccesdul conclusion in 

a reasonable time. Mistrust of Air Force motives and ability Was 

particularly pronounced in discussions involving the Army and the Navy. 

The most forthright statement of opposition to Air Force 

concept. was contained in a special 5tudy prepared under DDalEE 

auspices early in June. Its author, Dr. B. H. BUlin.s, * having 

* 

Various presentations of the Billin •• study continued throuah July, but 

the cOre of the recommendations was .vallable as early:as 6 June 1960 

in the Pentallon, and had reached the West Coast by 13 June • 

......... - :: '_ #0 • 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 IJ'G. 'SGREIJ' 

examined the current statuI, the palt history, and the prospects 

of the Samoa program, recommended radical changes. He flatly 

urged cancellation of the entire readout program, carrying the E-Z 

only to the stage of a technical feasibility demonstration. Billings 

maintained that the E-Z was not competitive with other conceivable 

reconnaissance systems because of its data link limitations, the 

impossibility of using it for oblique ahots, and its inherent shortcomings when used at high latitudes and in a region of heavy cloud 

cover. He alao carne down hard on the E-5 recovery system, pointing 

out that it was too complex and that a limpler technique would probably 

give a better prospect oi reliable operation. 

Billings concluded that the Air Force concept of Samoa operation 

was entirely wron~. He argued that it would be a grave error to make 

the Strategic Air Command the proprietor of the sYltem. In Billing. I 

view, Samos was essentially a pre-.trike reconnais.ance device and 

as such should be aasigned to a jOint intelligence center of 80me 80rt. 

The need, Billings pointed out, was for a national intelligence capability, not for another SAC system. The Strategic Air Command 

needed targeting information. not raw, unevaluated data. Moreover, 

Dr. Billings could see no need f01" the construction of special proce .. ing 

facilities, noting that the existent Itructure was expandable at considerably 

63 BYE 110' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~8P •• eREt' 

leu cost, and with a promise of being substantially more flexible. 

In Billings' opinion. Samos was headed down the wrong path. 

He was convinced that a recoverable surveUlance system, one that 

provided broad area coverage with ground definition of SO-foot objects, 

was needed to supplement the reconnaissance pOtential of the E-S. 

He also made the point that system operating coUs would be very 

substantially reduced. perhaps by several hundred mUlion dollars a 

year. through the substitution of a recoverable satellite for the readout 

• system of the E-2. And by implication he expressed doubt that the 

existent Air Force structure was capable of managing the neCes sary 

. . f 11i . 10 transltJ.on to a new concept 0 sate te reconnalssance. 

The phUosophy implicit in the Billings' study represented 

little that was novel or unique. Fol' weeks, York and Charyk bad 

been increasingly critical of Air Force management of Samos. The 

continued emphaSiS on concurrency and on early turnover to the 

Strategic Air Conunand was contrary 'to Department of Defense 

* 

rn the opinion of Colonel W. Q. Kina. then Samos Project Director, 

BUlin.s was more influential than any other individual in prompting 

the demise of the readout mode. It is worthy of note, however, that 

Colonel King and certain of his project officers had been dubious about 

the lona-term worth of available readout sv-tems for some time and 

had made themselves quite unpopular in some quarters by insisting 

that Corona represented the proper approach to satellite reconnaissance. 

BYE 1'01'-'74 

'&'OP I.C •• ,&, 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 '1'0. lEG ••• 

policies stated in late 19Sq and frequently reiterated thereafter. In 

six months of directed reprogramming activity, the Air Force had 

yet to produce a development plan acceptable to secretariat-level 

polic y makers. 

Even the most radical of the BUlings susgestions, that Samos 

development be assigned to some "super agency" for management, 

was in many respects no more than a logical extension of established 

trends. The development of virtually all high-ri.k .ystems of the 

previous two decades had been "manaled by exception" to .ome delree. 

The B~Zq program of lq40~1944 had set a pattern in having special 

priorities and access to the highest ded.ion levels. The Manhattan 

Engineering District of World War 11 had carried that proce.s to its 

greatest limits. "Invention" of the Usingle prime contractor concept" 

in 1951, and its quick evolution into the "weapon system conc.pt, " 

together with the creation of "weapon systent project offices" after 

1951, had been motivated by a desire to cut throulh several review 

and approval layers in the existent decision proce.s. Cien.ral Schriever's 

Western Development Division of 1954-1955 hacl been createcl with a 

single system objective as its goal and with provi.ions for abbreviating 

the decision proce •• in order to insure early .ucc.... The more recent 

example of the Polaris missUe was at hand. Ind •• d. in some ways 

. Schriever had attempted to build the "management by exception" theology 

65 BYE 17017 

.. 8 ••• CRJET 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

into the whole of the Air Research anel Development Command structure 

during a 1959 reorganization, though he channeled the communication 

and decision line. through his own ~eadquarters rather than the Pentagon. 

Strong luggestions that the methoclology of Samos development 

might undergo a change were paraUeled by a significant shift in the 

basic objective of the satellite reconnai.sance program. On 5 July 

1960. the Uiuted States Intelligence Board (USIB) issued a revised set 

of requirements baled on the premise that national intereat required 

the development of "an operational satellite reconnabsanc:e system 

with a wide range of capabUities." USIB considered the "firlt and 

moat urgent priority requirement" to be Ifa photographic reconnaissance 

system capable of locating suspect ICBM sitea." Recommending a 

system with a ZO-foot groUnd resolution potential, the board urged 

that the development program be oriented toward completion of 

11 development by the end of 196Z. 

The neW requirements statement wal ~onsiderably more 

meaningful than it seemed at first glance. It completely reversed 

1955 and 1958 policy statements on the prime loal of latellite reconnaiasance. and in so doina virtually doomed the readout program. There 

was no feaaible way of exploitina current readout systems to provide 

both the resolution and the area coverage implied in the new requirements. 

BYE 1101'l-74 66 

'O.I.eR., 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'8P IEeRE'I' 

Reconnaissance, which differed from "surveillance" in that it I.nvolved 

scanning broad land areas, could not in practice rely on a readout 

system capable of returning only 50 or 60 individual photographs 

each clay. Gros. coverage, in relatively fine detail, was an obvious 

essential, and gross coverage was quite beyond the potential of the 

E·2. For that matter. the E-5's ground-scan potential was too slight 

to satisfy the reconnaissance requirements of July 1960. What was 

needed, it appeared. was a new moderately high resolution system 

with * . panoramic-scan capability. And unless a significant breakthrough 

in readout technology came at once, the new system would of necessity 

have to embody film recovery techniques. 

Although the bald statement seems preposterous, it is nonethele.s 

true that the chief of Air Force intelligence. Major General J. H. 

Walsh. either could not see or would not admit that the new I'8quirements statement completel y changed the status of the satellite reconnaissance effort. To a query from Charyk concerning the differences 

between the 5 July USIB statement and previous requirements statements. 

Walsh replied. IIThere ia no change in the intelligence requirement. II 

General Walsh, who represented the most extreme of the SAC-oriented 

viewpoints in the 1960 Pentagon strusgle over Sarno •• also tended to 

approach the Corona versus Samos prOblem with somethins less than 

complete objectivity; he seemed to view Air Force office~s who looked 

s yrnpathetically on Corona aa guUtyof some sort of orsaniaa.tional 

treason. To single out General Walsh as a horrible example of what 

may be taken a. an outlook typical of much of the Air Staff is perhaps 

unfair--but General Walsh took special palns to insure that his prejudices 

stood out prominently. 

67 BYE non 

TOP ISCR.'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'fBP lse ••• 

Additionally, by emphasizinl c1allicall'econnai .. ance rather 

than either surveillance or early warninl, the new requirements 

degraded the importance of the concepts that had loverned Samoa 

technology virtually since proll'&m inception. If reconnaisaance akin 

to that of the U-Z was to be the program goal, neither concurrency 

nor operational control by a combat command would be needed. In 

many respects the July 1960 requirements statement seemed to have 

been more influenced by the philosophy of the COl'ona approach, with 

it. special management and technical character, than by any established 

ground rules of the existent Samos pl'ogram. 

Among factors that could not be isnored in prosram reorientation 

were considerations of contractor perfol'mance. In thil instance, the 

continued failure of the Discoverer-Corona Iystem to return photographs, a feeling that Lockheed was at least partly at fault, and the 

fact that tbe Aerospace Corporation was then comins into heinS as a 

not-for-profit succe"or to Space TechnololY Laboratories all contributed 

to what ~s, in the main, a subjective judsment. In the extant Samoa 

structure, Lockheed was the only major "system contl'actor"--as 

opposed to the "alsociate contractor" arranlement common to the 

ballistic missile program. In comparison to the relatively lucces.ful 

missile development efiorts. Samol could Icarcely be characterizecl 

BYE l'lOl'l-74 68 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 trap .sc •• ", 

as a flourishing prolram, and it was not difficult to ascribe some of 

the fault to the fact that Lockheed had both hardware and system 

engineering responsibilities. If an "independent" systems engineering 

contractor (Space Technology Laboratories) had done so well for 

missiles, might it not be worthwhile to try a similar approach for 

Samos? If, at the same time, Aerospace Corporation got a chance 

to diaplay its talents and to establish its reputation, so much the better. 

Whether justified or not, the frequency 01 suggestions that 

another contractor be brought into the Samos program seemed to 

confirm the existence of a general anti-Lockheed feeling. 

The turning-point came on Z9 June with Oeneral White's advice 

to General T. S. Powers, Strategic Air Command chief, that plans for 

-an elaborate Samoa complex at Omaba were be ina dropped and that SAC 

could expect to receive Samos data aa it did other intelligence information. Samoa, said White. would be an Air Force rather than a Stratelic 

Air Command .yatem. 1Z 

On 12 July, the Balliatic Mil8Ue Division submitted for Pentagon 

review and approval a revised development plan which incorporated 

much of the York-Charyk philosophy, the BUlings recommendations 

(modified), and the USIB requirementa atatement. ll Among the major 

innovations were a proposal for a new recovery system and carnera, a 

BYE not 

t'ap I iiI: 85'1' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

recommendation that the contractor structure be Rpaneled. plans for 

more frequent launchings (and the use of boosters olher than Atlas). 

deletion or transfer of Subsystem 1 development. curtailment of the 

ferret program, simplification of photolraphic equipment. and similar 

modifications earlier auggested by Charylt. York, Billings, and Colonel 

King. BM.D also proposeel expanding the scheduled te.t program to 

30 orbital launches (from 2.5), with 19 of the total to be film recovery 

operations. The funds requirement was estimated at for 

fiscal 1961. or the total of the administrations' budget reclueet plus the 

14 

funds added by Congress. 

First to review the BMD-propos.d plan was the Ail" Fore. 

Ballistic Missile Committee, which further increased the proportion 

of recovery-mode tests and approved the addition of a three-pad Samos 

15 launch complex at Point Arguello. Directorat. of Defense Research 

and Engineering. the next key review point, authorized the start of work 

on the new launch complex following an 18-19 July appraisal, but withheld full approval of the plan. Proces.ina and di •• emination uncertainties remained to be resolved. 16 Immediately thereafter. Undersecretary 

Charyk direct.d BMD to reviae its 12. July development plan to provide 

for eight tests of the readout-mode sateUit •• (photo and ferret combined), 

a toial of aeven E ... 5 tests (including two diagnostic ililhtl, if required), and 

BYE 170l'J-74 70 

"a~o '" , ::. 5~emar / Tale~: I":e ,r-;:'E 

::M_-,: c~ I ~ep ,.G •• 'I 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .8P I .. ca •• 

seven in the "new recoverable photo payload ••• " configuration. Additionally, 

Charyk authorized the inclusion of five unassigned Atlas-Agena vehicles in 

the total, to be used for diagnostic flights of the "new payload" satellite 

ilneeded. 

The "new program" was to incorporate a new recovery system 

(differing from both the E-S al\d the Discoverer-Corona) and a camera 

designed for gross coverage at the "best ground resolution that state-o!-

the-art will support. II Moreover. the new system was to be sufficiently 

flexible to permit payload switchina if that later seemed advisable. 

Air Force headquarters promptly palled along Charyk's directions to ARDC and authorized the immediate start of a source selections 

17 

process for the "new payload. II The Air StaU instructions that authorized BMD to act on such guidance also included specific directions to 

exclude all Subsystem I and all processing facility provisions from the 

revised development plan (due by 8 August).18 

General Schriever interpreted the Charyk dictate to mean that 

the creat~on of a reliable recovery system was the "Single most important 

development'4 for the nation, USAF, and ARDC. He concluded that the 

overhauled satellite reconnaissance program would have four discrete 

but correlated facets: Corona, Samos E-5. Samos with the ne_ payload, 

and a separate recovery system. He also believed that the elimination 

71 BYE 170' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "SP lEe •• ., 

of operational-logistic complications and the proposal for a new payloadrecovery sYltem which latidied USIB requirements had counteracted 

8uggestions that Sarnos management be reassigned outside the Air Force. 19 

But even as General Schriever waa realigning the Samos approach 

within ARDC, another DDRlr.E panel was in the proceaa of submitting a 

highly critical appraisal of Air Force management of Samoa. On 19 July 

a special advisory group headed by Dr. W. O. Baker of BeU Telepbone 

Laboratoriea, reporting to Dr. York, harsbly rebuked the earlier 

emphasis On readout over recovery, the role of the ferret effort. the 

prematurity and complexity of Subsystem I. the concurrency approach. 

and several technical facets of the prolram. The Baker Iroup's proposed 

solution was to assign all Samos prolram responsibility to an orgaDisadon attached to the Office of the Secretary of Defense while permitting 

the Air Force to continue itl technical management functions--but with 

the addition of personnel particularly well qualified in satellite recon-

. bn 1 ;;.c, nalsaance tee: 0 Ogy. 

WhUe the question of Samoa management continued under examination in the Pentagon, HMO rapidly completed a draft technical work 

statement covering the "new payload" defined by Charyk. R.equiring 

grou~d resolution of "lO feet or better, " land. recovery within five miles 

of a target point, and high system reliability, the work Itatement 

BYE 1101'7-T4 7Z 

'l'9P •• C .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .OP •• e .... 

specified a high acuity camera sublystem combined with a "new 

reliable re-entry and recovery subsYltem. " the whole to be capable 

• of providing large area coverage throughout an eight-day orbital life. 

The subsystem thus defined had by late July acquired E-6 

nomenclature. A revision of the basic development plan was in 

process. incorporating the technical guidance provided by DORicE, 

Charyk. and the Air Staff. But there continued to be uncertainty at 

all levels concerning the final management mode. USAF headquarters 

consistently described Samos .s a national program conducted by the 

Air Force, although it was readUy apparent that thil adroidy phrased 

euphemism was not being accepted at face value by the other services 

or by DORicE. Discussions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure 

and between the Air Force and DORicE never manaled to quiet fears 

that the Strategic Air Command would secure the authority to control 

both Samos operations and the diuemination of any i~telligence product. Zl 

Nor could it be denied that a vocal legment of the Air Staff continued to 

support sAC'1 sturdy claims that tbe command was rightfully entitled 

to such authority. 

* 

Although the work Itatement was in reality nothing more than an esUmate 

of intentions, its details were more than casually related to the Baker 

group report of 14 July. The new propoI.l specifically providecl a 

counter-balance to each of the major criticisms contailUld in the Baker 

73 BYE 170' 

'SP lIiGRE'I 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

While the political cauldron bubbled. BMD attempted to put 

the technical aspects of the "new approach" in pr"per perspecuve. 

On 30 July 1960. General Ritland named a SOUrl"e selectlon board fur 

the E-6. defined its task as determining the beat contraC'tors ior 

camera and recovery subsystems. and expressly stated that till' 

objective of the effort was to develop a photo-recovery version of 

Samos with broad area search capabilities and the highest attainable 

1.1. 

resolution. It was ARDC's intention to exclude Lockheed from an) 

aspect of the ("ompetition. partly to in-lure the creation of an alternate 

contractor approach. but also because of earlier criticism of both 

Lockheed and BMD management. Unlike the original WS 117L program 

and its subsequent subdivisions. the E-6 effort was to be conducted 

under the technical direction of Aerospace Corporation rather than 

with Lockheed as systems integrating contractor. The precis-.:! scope 

of the technical direction and systems engineering responsLbihty" was, 

hON ever, somewhat obscure late in July. General Schriever favored 

giving Aerospace les s responsibility than Ramo-Woolridge had ext: r< ised 

during the early days of the b"Uistic n:tis8i1e program while otheh. 

r~port. That paper had specifically characterized the E-1. ali uhsulck, 

had objected to limitations in swath width and readout that made LlIli 

orbital operation "economLca1ly and politically unacceptable. ,. and hold 

scored the E-Z on grounds of exc~s.ive complexity. too great s~nSll" ... l\ 

to precision requirements in photography, and entirely u~reali.ti(" 

expectations fur ground resolution. 

BYE 17017-'74 74 

_ :,.. ••• : '_ r- • 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "OP lEeR ... 

including Trevor Gardner, urged a full return to the operating prln<"1ph's 

of the original Atlas program. Eventually it was a~re~d that the. tn·st 

approach would be "to review the total Air Force reeonnahiSance satelhtl.· 

effort. to re-appraise Department of Defense requuements. and to 

present the results of the study to a succession of high4er authori.tie~. 

In essence. the process was to be akin to the creation of another "TI.·ap.,t 

Committee" like that which had prompted acceleration of the baUuth 

1.3 missile program in 1954. 

Part of the impulse for the creation of a "committee: of 8clenufic: 

advisors" certainly derived from the increasingly forthrillht statements 

.of a group of highly influential industry spokesmen. including som~ who 

then were serving in the Department of Defense. The "tong"--a term 

widely employed--had become convinced that the existent program strueture would never support an aggreslive. effective development effort. 

Memories of the confusion that had characterized the ARPA period of 

program control were fresh. and to many it appeared that restorin~ 

Samos management responsibility to the Air Force had brou~ht nn rt'ai 

improvement. The conviction. of this group carried weight with both 

Charyk and York. and as expressed in the Baker Committee report 

were familiar to Schriever and the Air Staff. Many members of the 

"tong. " which lncluded officials from a variety of firms but was domlnal"d 

15 BYE 17017 

..... ~ .. :-.:: 5·-:-""'~"'1-.-"· .". 

TOP IEC .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP IseRSIf 

by the photo-oriented companies, were particularly distressed by the 

failure of the Samos program to move away from the "cunventional 

channels" characteristic of less pres.ing development efforts. They 

generally favored "management by exception" as a me~ns of overcoming 

inertia in the t:xistent multi-review program office structurt!. 

General Schriever. then engaged in tran.formin~ several major 

ARDe programs into smaller replicas of the Atlas-Thor-Titan effort. 

had similar conceptions. though he naturally favored keepinll Samus 

within the ARDC management structure. He suggt!ated to the Alr Fur("t~ 

Chief of Staff. General White. that it would be advisable to name an Au 

Force general officer to head a new "management by exception" Samoa 

program. Except for the question of what agency would have direct 

control of the Sarnos effort. there was by late July a high degree of 

24 general agreement on the need for ~ new management approach. 

Such parallel tendencies came together on Wednesday. 3 August 

1960, when General White called Brigadier General R. E. Cireer into 

his office and abruptly asked how he would like to become "Mr. Samoa." 

Greer. who was then the Assistant Chief of Staff for Guided Mi.silelS. 

a post slated for early abolishment, said mildly that Samo. had always 

been One of his favorite projects and awaited developments. White told 

him to get in touch with General Schriever and to work out the 

BYE 1701'l.'l4 76 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

70P .EeR • ., 

organizational details of his new assignment. At the close of th~ 

brief conversation, th~ Chief of Staff casually asked the newl), dC~lt.:-

nated Samos chief if he had heard anything about "Eastman's bi~ n~'~ 

camera." Greer. who was familiar with the background of Samus and 

who was one of the staff officers briefed on the covert Corona pru~rarn, 

shook his head negatively and stored the information away for futurt: 

reference. 

Greer immediately contacted General Schriever, who was at 

Patrick Air Force Base participating in an ARDC Commanders' Conference, and on the following day (Thursday) flew down to the !TIL.silt-' 

base for a personal meeting. He, General Schriever, and G"'neral 

Ritland briefly discussed possible organizational arrangements that 

afternoon, and Greer continued the diScussion while flying ba~:k to 

Washin~ton with Schriever that evening. 

On the basis of the instructions Greer had received from White 

and in the context of the situation as it was then known, Greer. S,"hriever, 

and Rltland concluded that a structure resembling in general outhne 

the Western Development Divis. on of 1954-1955 should be created to 

hOUSl' the Samos project. They tentatively agreed that General Greer 

should be named Vice Commander for Reconnaissance Satellites at 

AFBMD. General Ritland and General Schriever. LD subsequent dis("usSlons, the following Friday and Saturday. concluded that" som~ direct 

77 BYE 1'1017 

""'1~r-:_ 0 :.5,--a"'/"'~··· ... 

!pap l.eRE'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

command line from the Samos office to the Pentalon was I.nevitabh.:. 

but they agreed that it would be best to have that line run throulh ttl\' 

BMD commander rather than the ARDC commander. (General Schr'ev~·r. 

when named to head the original ballistic missile program. had operaled 

as a deputy commander of ARDC but with direct access tu the ,ur 

secretariat level.) 

The nomination of General Greer as Samos chief and the subtl~-

quent propusals for alignment of the Samos office within the l'xistinJot 

command staff structure were obviously intended to create an envirunment which would insure that Samos program responsibility remained 

under an Air Force aegis. Both Schriever and Greer were fully aware 

of the still-viable proposals to install the Sarnos program in sum..: 

secretarial-level agency. either within the Department of Defens~ ur 

the Department of the Air Force. ZS The matter was scheduled for a 

decision by the time of the ZS August National Security Council m~ehnll' 

during which the Kistiakowsky-Ruble-Charyk team was to submit its 

recommendations. Inevitabl). the team recommendations would bl' 

influenced by the revised Samoa development plan. which reached 

final draft stage only On 6 August. Additionally. the E-6 source 

selection board process was then acceleratina. and complications 

might well arise from its products. Z6 

BYE 1'01'i·'4 78 

.,a.IEC •• ., 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "9P I.C •• " 

Attempting to precipltate a decision favorable to the Alr For4 .. 

vlewpoint on managing the Samos program. Schriever on b AIll!lIst 

proposed the public releas~ of a statement covenn~ Gretlr's appointment and his assignment as BMD Vice Commander for Rl·..:onnAis,.all~ • 

Satellites. The draft statement in~luded a policy :;u~mary WhlCh s:nd 

unequivocally that the Au Force was the executive agent for all conC'erned government agenci~s--including the Central Intellit!encl! All~'JlC'Y 

and the National Security Agency--in the development of reconnaissanc~ 

satellites. (One effect of ~he proclamation, upon lts approval at the 

Department of Defense level, would presumably have been to bnng th~ 

entire Corona activity under ARDC control.) The proposed relea.~ 

also emphasized the fact of Samos program acceleration and included 

an announcement that thl:: reonented effort was aimed toward the ea r1 ~ 

d 1 f d · h . li eve opment 0 recovery systems an a •• oclated camera tec nlquez;. 

The statement proposed by Schriever had enormous potential, 

4!)(t~nd1ng well past the questlon of who would l)ave organizational 

r..:;;ponsibility for Samos. If approved and published with a Pentalitcm 

impnmatur. it would havt= the eUect of formally committlng the United 

States to a policy of overfhght reconnai •• ance. and of implemel\tin~ 

that policy. It would allocate to General Schriever all effective authonty 

over all American military satellite programs, making him reapunslbh: 

79 BYE 17017 

'l'8P IECRE" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP .8e ••• 

only to the Air Force Chief of Staff. Because ope.rational au~ority 

would repose in the Samos program office, which would report 

through Schriever to the Chief of Staff, it would give Schru~ver'. Alr 

Research and Development Command ultimate control of development, 

operations, and (actually if not formally) dis.emination of thE' returns 

of all satellite overflight intelligence. 

WhUe the policy implications of Creer's appointment were 

being explored and whUe the effort to fix Samoa authority firmly 

within the exbtent Air Force command stl"ucture continued, new 

technical and financial aspects of the program moved toward approval. 

On 8 August, AFBMD released the official work statement requir~ment 

for the E-6 source selection and two days later notified Lockheed of 

the decision to exclude that firm from the proapect list. The revised 

development plan was published on 11 .... ugust. Baaed Oil a fis"a1 19&1 

and subtlequent-year estimates 

respectively, it incorporated all of the 

, Z8 

Charyk- York guidance of June and July. 

Balli.tic Missile Committee review of the revised development 

plan was scheduled for 15 August and National Security CouncU review--

on the presumption of committee approval--for 10 days later. Until 

lZ August, the White-Schriever policy of assuming that tbe Air Force 

- would continue control of the Sarno. program seemed su'rt: of confirmation, 

BYE 1101'i-74 80 

Ke.":''; 

'l'OP I.e .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

but on that day cracks appeared. The official announcement of Greer's 

appuintment said merely that he had been named BMD Vice Cummandt:r 

for Satellite Systems in order to increase the emphasis ~ln({ act IIrded 

those satellites assigned to the Air Force by the Departnlt'nt of Ot·fen~t:. 

None of the proposed statements coverlng Air Force control of til<" 

reconnaissance satellite program were included. there was nu menbon 

of major policy decisions to emphasize recovery techniques rather than 

readout systems, and--most significant .. -reconnaissance satellites 

were not mentioned at all. At the least, the Defense Department had 

decided that a relatively minor press release was not the appropnate 

vehicle for announcing a major change in U.S. military and diplomahc 

policies. Z 9 

By 15 August, the decision to withdraw control of Samos from 

the Air Force had been made. At the conclusion of the Ballistic 

MIssiles Committee meeting of that day, follOwing the committee'. 

endorsement of the 11 Auguat Sarnos development plan, Dr. Charyk 

privately told Greer that ARDC would not retain program management 

authonty. For several days. however. Creer did not know which of 

the various defense department or air secretariat agenele. would have 

custody. Complete misconceptions of the true situation persisted at 

ARDC headquarters and in theWest Cout BMD complex. General 

81 BYE n017 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. OP .ES .... 

Schriever and the ARDe group remained .teadfast in their conviction 

that the program would somehow continue under ARDC control. In 

Los Angeles the prevalent belief was that Greer would becom~ a .ort 

of general director for what had originally been WS 117L·-Samos. Mldas. 

and Discoverer--while Colonel W. G. King. Samos program ('hief. 

exercised direct control of the main Samos program. Th~ Implication 

that Corona would enter conventional Air Force development channels 

as part of the "Greer reorganization" was not widely di8cus8ed in Los 

Angeles. but that outcome was anticipated by tho.e aware of Air Staff 

views on Corona and of the major crisis in Corona technolog y. 30 

In Washington the inevitability of Samos management by some 

special agency was being privately conceded by midsummer. Major 

General R. C. Wilson. Air Force RIED chief. who worked closely with 

Charyk and who was well attunea to Pentagon trends, refused to 

surrender his faith in an eventual Air Force triumph until late July. 

~ven though he knew of Charyk's conviction that program control would 

b~ taken away from the military. 

The three most promi~ent candidate. to replace the uniformed 

Air Force as Samos managers were DDRIlE. CIA. and the Office of 

lh~ Secretary of the Air Force--in that order of probability. By 

l'onducting the Corona pro~ram so circumspectly that no hlOt of its 

BYE 11017-14 8Z 

'1'0 ••• e .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.,0 •• seR.' 

I.!Xlstcnce had leaked out, CIA had made it.elf most eligibl~ on the 

t-trounds of political discretion. But the conduct of such a broad 

scope program as Samos would be entirely foreign to CIA habits. 

That factor probably weighed againlt the intelligence agenn' <'\:; much 

as any other. DDR&E had the requisite polition and authority, .md 

had demonstrated a consistently better grasp of program realitIes 

than the current program proprietors. Indeed. for nearly six months 

DDR&E had been the de facto program manager, even thou~h normal 

channels continued to flow with directives and responses. The Ofhc", 

of the Secretary of the Air Force had Charyk, whose personal inter~:.t 

in and knowledge of the"program were certainly more profound than 

those of any other official in Washington, while Charyk's office could 

be represented to be an element of the Air Force, thus making it in 

Some ways more acceptable to the Air Staff than any alternate agency. 

But so long as Charyk remained lolely an Air Force official, wi'Clespread objections to Air Force control of operational aspects of 

satelhte reconnaissance probably would be effective. 

Chary.k made the Samos presentation to the National Security 

Council on ZS August. He told the President quite frankly that 

satellite photographs would not for years provide the quality obtainable 

through U-Z overflights. but he outlined a reasonable approach to that 

83 BYE 17017-

.. OPIESRE .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 WOP S.CR.' 

objecuve through realignment and revitalization of the Sam". effort.. 

The presentation was perfectly llmed t.o have the prOper dfect; withIn 

the previous week the first Corona photographs had been recovered 

and the physical proof that satelhte rec~nnai.lance could actually 

be effective was at hand. 

A portion of the presenlallon waa a recommendation from 

Charyk, Kistiakowsky, and Ruble that Samos be managed by an Air 

Forc~ [leneral officer reportmg directly to the Secretary of the Au 

Force. (DDRlcE had flatly refused to accept any arrangement that 

included intervening military echelon .... -and particularly ARDe.) 

The Samoa management scheme outlined on 25 August also proposed 

that boards of technical experts be apPointed to Berve as program 

advisors while existent military organizations provided administrative. 

logistic. and technical support. 31 

The security councll resolved virtually all known program uncertainties, revieWing and generally approving the 11 August dE-velopment plan (with modifications made through direct contact betwe ... n 

Charyk and the program office during mid-August). directing that the 

new reC"o"ery-mode subsystem (E-b) be developed under a high 

national prLOrlty, and endorsing a program objective based on the 

earheat lJossible accumulation of definitive information on the lu<'ation 

BYE t'l01'l-'74 84 

.. 8. l.eRE'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lap lEe. 8'1' 

and status of Soviet ICBM sit~s. Sea r~covery wal specified for 

mitial systems. with land re("overy to be provid~d lat~l'. R,"adout 

dev~loprnent was to continUe:! onl y on a reduced scale. th~ ferret 

program was to bl:: cut back. and Subsystem I was to bt: all but 

eliminated. Additionally. the:! President approved the programm~d 

launch of the first expenmental Samo8 E-l. then scheduled for 

loO September. Specific approval of the flight had been wlthheld 

until that time. chiefly m honor of the "space for peace" theSIS, 

a nd th~ Air Force had entertained grave fears that the politlcal 

pressures of the time might induce a decision to postpone or even 

n ('an,'el actual launches. 

Although the Secul'lty Council ruling usigned program rt·sponsibihty to the Secretary of the Air Force. it was obviou8 that the 

StH're:!tary, as an mdivldual. could scarcely exerc"se direct control. 

Tht! responsible offiCial was to be Undersecretary Charyk. whu as 

. chalrman of the Ballistic Missiles Committee was the admmistration 

oi£k ial most thoroughly £amihar with the Samos program. Not for 

another month. however. were suggestions of aSSignment to DORicE 

ilnally disposed of. 

On the da~ follOWing the 25 August Security Counnl mt!\·tmg. 

Charyk and Creer met to diSCUSS the tenor and scope of required 

85 BYE 17017-

'OPSE6RE9 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

directives. That afternoon, General Greer drafted a s"quenee of 

H 

papers for the signature of tht: Secretary. They wt!!rt!! i~sut!!d as 

Secretary of the Air Force Orders on 3( August. One established 

an O££ice of Missile and Satellite Syst".ns at the Secretarial level tv 

handle administrative and liaison responsibilities with the Pentagon. 

A second named General Greer aa Di.rector of the Samos Project 

with additi ona1 duty as BMD Vice Commander for Satellite Systems. 

Greer was empowered to organize a project office by drawing manpvw"r 

and support from BMD, but his establishment was clearly identified 

as a field extension of the Office of the Secretary of the Alr Force. 

In separate actions, Air Force Secretary D. C. Sharp creatt"d 

two advisory bodies··a Sateillte Reconnaissance Advisory Group to be 

composed of technical experts and industry representatives; and a 

Satellite Reconnalssance Advisory Council to be composed of the four 

assistant secretaries of the Air Force. the Undersecretary. and Alr 

::: 

Staff representatives. Sharp additionally had the Air Staff assign 

Brigadier General R. D. Curtin (former BMD .at~'iHte program chief) 

as Director. Office of Missile and Sa~ellite Systems. and transfer lO 

specified officers. airmen. and civilians to Curtin·, staff. The 

The advisory group never met •. The adviaory councll held one mt"eling. 

formally approved several brief presentations. and. neve,r reconvelled. 

BYE l'l01'1-74 86 

,...,!-:.::-" ~ 5"err:.an/T~er"· Ke."-;''l: 

-; _ - , 'IDP '.C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !fap IEeREt' 

secretary's office, from its vwn resources, authorlzed 10 officers 

and 10 civilians for General Greer's group while BMD transferred 

39 officers and 15 clvilians to Greer's new Welt Coast or~anization. 34 

Although in some respects the events of Z5-3l Au~ust appeared 

to eliminate any confusion concerning Samos program relpon15ib1l1-

ties, a faint aura of uncertainty perSIsted. For instance, when acting 

Secretary of Defense J .H. Douglas formally approved the modified 

11 August development plan, he added a note indicating that "technical 

revisions" earher discussed and any changes to the 11 August plan 

would require the final approval of DDR&E before the Air Force could 

act on them. Nevertheless, Douglas authorized the Air Force to 

s tart work on th rogram for fiscal 1961- -a vast 

IC: 

improveme nt Over any earher funding authorization. Again. the 

operations plan earlier submitted was specifically exempted from 

35 approval. 

Through fiscal 1960, Samos development had cost between $353. Z 

. million and $360.2 milhon (both figures were cited in various 

sources in mid-1960), of which $1.5 million had been spent on 

feaslbility studiett (Rand), $8.9 million for evaluation and program 

activation, $1.41.96 million for work by Lockheed (which paid subcontractors from that sum also), $Z9.6 million to buy Atlas bousters, 

and the remainder for various lesser expenses. 

was scheduled to ~o to Lockheed and about 

(General Dynamics) during fiscal years 1 

87 

.. OP lEeR ... 

BYE 1'7011 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Further clarification of the intent of the 31 August orders and 

01 the pro,",sdures that would be followed in program management 

came on 13 September. Secretary Sharp identified the authoritydecision link between his office and Greer's with the explicit statem"nt 

that IIthere will be no review or. approval channels between the Director 

of the Samos Project and the Secretary of the Air Force. I' although 

"need to know" briefings could be scheduled at the discretion of the 

secretary. Additionally. both Generals Greer and Curtin were authorized direct contact with major command •• Air Staff alencies. and 

36 

1I0ther staffs and agencies .•• as requlred." A final and explicit 

statement of the DDRIcE role appeared two days later, when DougLas 

issued instructions that On Samos matters the Secretary of the Air 

F.!J.Tce would report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense--

Douglas himself! DDRIEE. Douglas explained. would aerve as a 

"staff agency to assist thl/.: Deputy ~t:cretaryof Defense, " and Air 

Force project managers would ke"p DDRIEE informed oi Samos events--

but there was no provlsion for DDRIlE review or approval in the basic 

dir~ctive. Creer would report directly to the Secretary of the Air 

Force (actuall y. in practice. to the Undersecretary--Dr. Charyk). 

37 and he to the deputy secretary of defense. 

On the same day. 15 September. the new Secretary of the ~ir 

Force Samos Project Office uffl. la11y came into being on:the Wt:st Coast. 3tl 

BYE 1101'1-14 

Hare'" • a 6veman/ Ta en: 

:: ..... ~ en. f 

88 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Notwithstandmg all that. General Schriever and ARDC steadfasU y rdused to cunc~de that Samoa had been entirely withdrawn 

frum the command's custody. A. late as 19 September, General 

Scbrlever proposed measures that would IIreaffirm ARDe's charter 

fur the program. II He urged On General White a modification of his 

earlier proposal for the creation_of a Samos-equivalent to the Teapot" 

Cummittee, a group to reinforce the scientific prestige of the Air 

FUrl"e viewpoint and to counteract such groups as the Baker Committee. 

S,"hrlever also renewe.1 his advocacy of a vigorous public release 

program, recalling to life a 19S6-1957 proposal conceived by Richard 

S. Leghorn which had been instrumental in the generation of Corona. 

He suggested tu General White that it might be advisable to confront 

the Soviet Union with a fait accompli by publicly sponsoring active 

satellite reconnaissance operations and proclaiming to the world that 

39 

Samos was a device for insuring world peace. 

But even though ARDC was not yet ready to acknowledge the-

(" umplete ,revoluhon in Samos management. the decisions had been 

Illade. A major consideration in the decision to exclude Sarnos management from any control by military element. of the Air Force was the 

Prt!sldent's insistence that the program be conducted mOlt cir('umspectly. The national administration could not overlook the pruspect 

. that the Suviets might react to an 1I0pen" Samos program' by making 

89 BYE 1'1017-' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'8P IEeRE'I' 

ddermined efforts to destroy reconnaissance sat.llites--or aU 

satellites--and thu8 precipitate a new lnternational crisis. A kry 

to the rationale of the new Sarno. policy was the August 1960 success 

uf Curona. which returned abundant and excellent reconnailsance 

photographs from orbit and vividly demonstrated the value of the 

product. United States' adherence to the "space for peace" theme 

was thus reinforced rather than weakened by establishment of 

Grt."t!r's organization. Nevertheless. within such limits Samol policy 

remamed relativttly fiexible. CorolUi had proved that satellite reconnai.sance was feasible. The real ta.k of the new Samos program. 

then, was to expand, improve. and domesticate that feasibility. 

BYE 17011-14 90 

_: ......... ,; -,,,, , .OP l.eRIi'l' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

1. 

? 

... 

3. 

'fOP S::CRE'f 

Draft !"!",·:!rr'.C, pre:.} for ~AF to SOD, 11 Mar 60, subj: 

DiSCOVEHES" S.~:-.-lOS I .MIDAS F rcg::-ilr.1S, in Corona Eles. 

Memo, Col W. G. Eing, Di:-, Sa:":'l.os Proj O:c, to Cd 

F.e.E. Ocler, D/Cmd:: Sat Sys, BMO, 13 MClY 60, subj: 

SAMOS & Lcgis~ies, in SP Samos files, Redirectior., 160. 

Ltr, LtGen R. C. Wilso,i., DeS/D, to Dir/Adv Tech, 9 Mi!.y oC, 

subj: SAMOS; ltr, MajGen V. R. Haugen, Asst DeslD, to 

Cmdr ARDC, 16 May 60, subj: SAMOS Development Plan; 

ltr BrigGen t..L F. McNicld~, Asst DCS/P.&E, ARDe, to 

cIS, USAF, 27 May 60, subj: SAMOS Development Plar., 

all in Air Staff files, TWX, RDRB-19-5-35-E, AP.DC to BMD, 

11) May 60, in SP S;3.rnos file!:, Hist Docrnn Jun-Jul 60; draft 

memo, SAF to SOD, 11 Mar 60. 

4. ARDC to BMD, 19 lI.-1ay 60, TWX RDRB-l9-5-35-E. 

5. Although the Kbg memo, "Thoughts on Obtaining Satell':"te 

Photo Coverage of Areas of Interest at the Ear1i~st Tlr:1.e, 1/ 

is undated, its placement in the Pl:!ntagon files (Office of 

Missile and Satellite Systems) and its genl.:!ral conter,t identify 

it as from the perioc 9 Ma y-2 5 May 60. It is a most rernary.-

able documt!nt, containing in at least some general for::: the 

germ of the SAFSP strccture and program that emergec 

five months later. Every suggestion Col King madt:! was 

ultimately adopted--thou;;h some, such as land recovery, 

were later cropped as well. There is no indication in 

Pentagon files that 6e document was widely circulatec, and 

its contents are not incorporatec in <l:1y contem?orary d.ocI.!-

ment that did recelv-,! wide circulation. Nevertheless, it 

seems hi~hly probabLe that the Kir.g rnemorar,Q'.lm went at 

least to Undersecreta!"'y Charyk, since Charyk's proposals 

of late May so nearl), ~arallel it. 

o. Memo, J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to CIS USAF, 2.5 May 60, 

subj: Exploitation of [r.itial SAMOS Data, in Oie Mis s· and 

Sat Sys files, Samos Gen, 60. 

01 

, -

TOP fiECRE'f 
( 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

I • 

'I'OP SE£RE'f 

Ltr, LtGen R. C. Wilson, besl D, to ARDe, 1 Jun 60, subj: 

Exploitation of Initial SAMOS Data, in SF Samos files, 

R&D-I, Jan-Jul 60. 

8. Memo, H. F. Yor.k, DDR&E, to SAFUS, 6 Jun 60, subj: 

SAMOS R&D Operation.al Plans, in SP £iles, R&D-I, 

Jan-Jul 60. 

.~ 

9. Ltr. D. D. Eisenhower, Pres US, to T. S. Gates, 50D,". 

10 Jun 60; no subj, in Ofc Miss and Space Sys fi1e~. 

10. TWX RDRB 62784, USAF to ARDC, 17 Jun 60, mins, Jt 

Mtg of Recon Panel and Samos Working Grp, 1 Jul 60, in 

Air Staff files; N. Y. Herald-Tribune,·13 Jun 60; N. Y. Times, 

13 Jun 60. 

11. Memo, York to SAFUS, 6 Jun 60, transmitted an advance copy 

of the Billings study; ltr, Capt H. Mitchell, ofc DCS/I, ARDC, 

to BMD, 13 Jun 60, subj: SAMOS R&D Operational Plans, in 

. SP Samos files, R&D-I Jan- Jul 60, included an updated, 

unsigned paper titled SAMOS which was actually a "bootleg" 

copy of the preliminary Billings study; the formal Billings 

rpt was presented to the WS 117L Special Study Committee on 

21 Jul 60, cy in Evans files, interview, Col W.G. King, 

Dir/Prog 206, by R. L. Perry. 19 Dec 62, Ii Jun 63. 

12. Rpt, USIB-D-33.6/8. Intelligence Requirements for Satellite 

Reconnaissance Systems of which Samos is an Example. 

S Jul 60, in SP Samos files. 

13. Ltr, Cen T .5. Power, <;;inC SAC, to Gen T .D. White, CIS 

USAF, 16 Jun 60, no subj. restated the tired ariuments for 

siting operational control at Offutt AFB and {or early transfer 

to SAC of·an operational Samos system. Power frankly said 

one 01 his objectives was to establish a precedent that would 

keep "external agencies" from interfering with any Air Force 

space program. Ltr. White to Power, 29 Jun 60, no subj, .-

was the first firm indicator that the Air Staff had abandoned 

its earlier fi."'Cation with the concept of SAC operation and had 

adopted the Billings ·outlook. Ltr, MajCen J. H. Wahh. Acs/I 

to SAFUS, (Jul 601, subj: Intelli~ence Requirements for Samos, 

in Charyk files,· cll!arly states the peculiar concepts Gen Walsh 

treasured. 

9Z 

"fOP SEe.EIf 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

14. Preen, SAMOS. by BND, 6 Jul 60, in Air Staff files; ltr 

Coi May. Chm. Sat Intell Reqmu Cmte to Secy USIB Z9 

Jun 60, subj: Transmittal of InteUi8ence Requirements for 

Satellite Reconnai88ance System of which SAMOS is an 

Example, in Ofe Miss and Sat SY. filea. Samoa, May-Jun 60; 

Dev Plan. Samoa l~ Jul 60. 

IS. Presn. SAMOS. 6 Jul 60: D~Y Plan, Samos. lZ Jul 60. 

16. Memo for Record. Maj H.C. Howard, Ok Aut/Adv Tech, 

13 Jul 60, subj: SAMOS. in Ofc Mi.s and Sat Sys, Jul-Aug 60; 

Mine of ~4th AFBMC Mtg, IS Jui 60, in Air Staff flies; TWX 

70836. USAF to ARDC. 19 Jul 60. in Ofe Miss and Sat Sys files. 

17. Merno, H.F. York, DDRIIE. to SAF, Zl Jul 60, aubj: Additional ATLAS/AOENA Launch Facility. in Ofc Miss and Sat 

Sys files. Jui-Aug 60. 

18. TWX AFDSD-AT 71953, USAF tu ARDC Z3 Jul 60, in SP 

Samoa files. RIlD-I, Hist Docmn, J an-Jul 60. 

19. TWX RDRB-Z6.7-10Z. ARDC to AFBMD, 2.6 Jul 60. in 

Ritland fUes. 

z..o. TWX RDC-2.5-7-Z7-E, ARDe (LtOen B.A. Schriever) to BMD 

(MajOen O.J. R!tland), ZS Jul 60. RUland files. . 

ll. Extract from Rpt. Review and Recommendations of USAF 

Satellite Reconnaiesanee Project SAMOS, prep by DDRIIE 

COMINT/COMSEC/ELINT Advisory Group. 14 Jui 60, in 

Ofe Miss and Sat Sys files, Samos, Jui-Au8 60. 

lZ. Memo for Record, MajOen O. J. Ritland. Cmdr BND. Z6 Jul 

60. subj: Telephone Call from Gen Cooper to Oen Ritland, 

in Ritland files. 

2.3. Ltr, MajOen O. J. R itland. Cmdr. BMD, to Col P. J. Heran. 

Chm E-6 Source Sel Bd' 30 Jui 60, subj: Letter of Instruction, 

in Ritlarid files. 

24. Memu, Col F. C.~. Oder. As.t D/Cmdr Space Progs. BMD. 

to Gen H. W. Powell, V/Cmdr, et al, Z AU8 60, Jlubj~ Meetinl - . 

93 BYE 11011 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 Y8P SEe.EY 

with Aerospace on New SAMOS Prolrami memo. 

Aerospace Corp. to MajGen 0.1. RiUand. Cmdr BND. 3 Aug 

bOo subj: Reconnaissance Satellites. both in Ritland fUes. 

ZS. Interview. MajGen R. E. Greer. Dir/SAFSP, by R. L. Perry. 

Hist Olc. b Jun b3; ltr. LtCien B.A. Schriever. Cmdr ARDC. 

to Cien T. D. White. CIS USAF. 19 Sep 60. subj: SAMOS Program. 

in Olc Miss and Sat Sys file •• Samos Gen. IbO. 

2b. Presn Sum by Lt Col Samoa Ofc. AFMBD. 

b Aug bOo subj: SAMOS. Revised Dev Plan. in Ritland files. 

Z7. TWX RDCi-b-8-l4. LtGen B.A. Schriever. Crndr ARDC. to 

Maj Gen O. J. IUtland. Cmdr AFBMD. b Aug 60i TWX WDCi-

. -6-8-20. Ritland to Schriever. 7 Aug 60. both in Ritland files. 

28, Presn Sum, Jochim. 6 Aug bOi Tech Work Stmts. 8 Aug bOo 

subj: Samos. E'-6 Payload; ltr. MajCenO.J. Ritland. Cmdr 

AFBMO, to J. H. Brown. LMSD. 10 Aug bOt subj: Soliciting 

for SAMOS £-6 System. all in Rilland files. 

Z9, M~mo. initialed by MajGen 0.1. Rilland. Cmcir BMD. 1 Aug 60, 

subj: Release dictated by Col Gilman. USAF. in Ritland files. 

30. Int.erview, Greer by Perry. lZ Dec 6Zi memo. LtColAdmin Ofc. to Spec Asst to Oir/SAFSP (Col r.-r. 

31. 

32. 

34. 

BYE 11017-74 

s 

~ram Office Personnel 

BrigGen J. L. Martin. 

file; interview. 

rry. 8 Nov 63. 

Memo. T .5. Gates. SOD, to SAF. 10 Oct bOo subj: Reconnaissance Satellite Program, in Ofc Miss and Sat Syti files: Sat 

Progs, 37-bO. Vol U. 

~. Itr. J .S. Lay, Exec Secy. NSC. to SOD. 1 Sep bOo !Subj: 

Reconnaissance Salt:!ht~ Program. in Air Staff files •. 

Interviews, Greer by Perry, 9 Oct and 12 Dec 62. 

SAF Order 11S.1. 31 Aug 60, subj: Organazation and Funt"tions 

of the Ole of Missile and Satellite Systems; SAF Order 116.1. 

31 Aug (,0. subJ: The Director of the SAMOS Proje~t; ARDC 

94 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !lap •• C •• T 

Ops Order 00-1, S~pt bO, subj: "Operational Ord~r for 

Satellite and Mis sile Observations System (SAMOS); Mt:mo, 

O. C. Sharp, SAF, to CIS USAF. 31 Aug 00, no subJ; csJl In 

SAFSP files. 

35. Memo, J .H. Douglas, Actg SOD, to SAF, 6 Sep 60, subj: 

Revised SAMOS Development Plan, dated 11 AUIt 00, in SP 

Samos files, R&D·I, Aug-Dec 00; Dev Plan, Samos 

il Au~ 60; presn slide, "Funds," approx Dec 59, i~ file. 

36. Memo and incls. D. C. Sharp. SAF, to CIS USAF, 13 Sep 60, 

no subj; in Ritland files. (A draft of the memo in Oic MISS 

and Sat Sys files indicates that it was actually prepared by 

Col J. L. Martin, Gen Curtin's deputy. presumably on Under. 

secretary Cbaryk's instructions.) 

37. Memo, J .H. Douglas. Actg SOD. to SAF, 15 Sep 60, subj: 

Recu:"lnaissance Satellite Program, in SP Samos files, 

R&D-i, Aug-Dec 60. 

3B. Ltr, BrigGen R~ E. Greer, DlrlSamos Proj. to Cmcir BMD. 

15 Sep &0, subJ: Estabhshment of Samos Project OUice, in 

Rltland files. 

·39. Ltr, S,"hriever to White, 19 Sep 60; White replied. by ltr 

19 Sep 60, that he appreCiated the suggestions, that technical 

committees had been established. and that an information 

plan keyed to R&D was being constructed. 

BYE nOl'i 

..... ~ro,,: _ _ !=.,,:,-~"/":a_-. 

TOP ISCRET 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

VI NEW DIRECTIONS IN SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

(Aullust 19bO • May 19b1) 

Technological considerations pIa yed an incidental role in the 

August decisiun to shift Samos project -responsibility from the middle 

echelons of the Air Force to the Office of the Secretary. The impli· 

cations of the U-1. affair. hillh.level disenchantment with the tortuous 

proC'esaes of conventionai Air Force program mana,ement. the reaistance of the Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) and the 

Air Staff to Samos policy decisions made at the secretariat level. and 

the shift in program obJectiv~. from surveillance to reconnaissance 

were larg~ly innocent of technical motivation. Although the s"immerlng 

readout-versus.recovery controversy of 19S9-19bd had a basi. in 

technical uncertainty. financial factors were more important than 

technical factors in the- eventual shift of emphasis to recovery modes. 

The dichotomy in V1CWP0lnts on concurrency and on who shouLd operate 

rC!connaissance satellites was unaffected by specific program achievemellts--or their absence. 

Nevertheless. technolo~y helped reshape the Samos proltram in 

the late months of 19bO even though management and organizational 

matters held the spotli~ht. The decision to develop a new surveillance 

s y.st~m wal5 the most ObViOUS facet of Samoa realignment during that 

BYE 17017-14 9b 

'I'OP .5C8ST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

pl!1"hJd. Thereafter. the fact that technical and policy decisions were 

handled as one tended to obscure the fact that technical program matters 

were receiving lnCreaSLng attention. Once indecision on ~ the program 

should be conducted had been eliminated, It became possible to concentrate on ~ should be done. Insulated from the inputs of multl-layers 

of command-level and PentaJlon officiah. Brigadier General Robert E. 

Greer and Undersecretary J. V. Charyk could devote attention to 

s~lecting the best possible course of program development and to seeing 

that It was pursued to a meaningful conclusion. In itself. that circumstance liubstantiaUy reduced the confusion and uncertainty which had 

,:haracterlzed the entlre Samos eCfort until late 1960. 

Those whose vi~ws were in£lu.ential in charting a new courle for 

Samos were relatively few in numbers. The shift in einJilasis from 

rt!adout to recovery had been urged late in 1959 by Harold Br.own and 

John Rubel of the Dll'ectorate of Defense Research and Engineering. 

As he became increasmgly familiar with the details of Samos, Charyk 

jl.radually changed his views on concurrency. operational responsibility, 

and readout (particularly on the need for elaborate ground stations) in 

the pc:nod between March and June 1960. The emergence of new re('onnalSliall('t: requltemenh, early in July 1960, and their basic shape. 

I."crtainly were lnfiuenled by the abrupt termination of the U-2. program 

. as wdl as the continUing disappointments of the Corona ·program. 

97 BYE nOli 

TOP SEERE'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .OP lEG .... 

With allowances for dltl~rence. in detaU and intensity. the 

paths laid out by ARDe and Au Staff officials generally included 

con~urr~n("y and placement of prime development emphasis on readout 

modes of satclhte reconnaissance. Strategic Air Comrnand control uf 

the reconnaissance process was generally assumed. though there was 

no Cl)mmOn a~l'E'ement on the timing of such a move. Concurrency. 

readuut. and SAC uperatlonal responsibility for Sarnos were interdependent: none made sense without both of the others. 

At the program off1("e level. concurrency. readout, and SAC 

cuntrul of operations were not hillhly regarded theses. Colonel William 

. G. Kln~. Jr. had been Samos project director since July 1959. H1S 

immed1ately previous experience had involved repairing and ministering 

to a ~rlevously mismana~ed Snark missile program. He had not been 

long with Samos before concludmg that the pre gram was badly overextended, and 11ke virtually all space-program specialist. in BMD he 

qui( kly decided that Concurren~ y was wholly inappropriate for satellite 

development. During the spring of 1960 he had consistently urged the 

adv"nta~es uf recovery uver readout •. had argued to a ho.til .. Ai,: Staff 

that the ~'.!! mana~ement approach was more appropriate for Samos 

than the then-accepted proJlram philosophy, and had persistently urg\'d 

pru).: nUll 8lmplification. His views almost certainly influenced Charyk':-; 

BYE 17017-'14 98 

: .:,~ . 'I'8P •• .: .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

l7 May 1960 instructions to employ "off the shelflt and "current 

state-of-the-art" techmques as a means of Samos program acceleration. * 

* The matter of how greatly Culonel KlnR's views mfluenced Undersecretary Charyk cannot be entlrely resolved. Surviving documents 

clearly indicate, however. that Colonel King was well ahead of hlS 

contemporaries in urgmg canu~llation of Subsystem I, termination 

(or complete reduectlon) of th~ readout program, creation of a new 

recoverable-capsule photu-satelhte, and establishment of "management 

by ~xcept1on" channels for the Samos program. His recommendations 

met with a tepid reception in BMD headquarters. a cool response in 

ARDC.headquarters, and icy blasts from moat of the Air Staff. (The 

AsslStant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, considered King's views on 

readout and Corona lndicative of dialoyalty to the Air Force, which 

suggested both the int~n8ity of the Samos controversy and the obJecllVily displayed by some partiC'ipants.). 

. The ODR&E vlewpomt, particularly as expressed in reports 

prepared under Dr. W. O. Baker and Dr. B. H. Billings, was much 

• l IO:i~r to the real world than anything that emerled from Air Staff 

dehberatlvns dUrln~ the first half of 19bO~ It is worth noting, however. 

thilt the most :iW~t:plng DDR&E recommendations for program reform 

dld not appear until after the U -2. affair; Baker and Billings took their 

final stands 1n .J une. King and Charyk had resolved their re .. pective 

doubts by May. The frequency of bnefings. presentation., discussions. 

and "think papers" during the February-June 1960 period, and the hi~h 

murtahty rate vf documents 1n that period, make it quite difficult to 

lra<~' o:!lther th~ or1gins ..,r the fates of most proposals. Nevertheless. 

thiS much is clear: by mid-May 19bO. Kina and Charyk were in general 

agreement on what shoulc1 be done to improve the status of the Sam08 

pro~rami King had arrived at such conclusions first; at least one 

careful analysis prepared by King reached Charyk without aoing 

thruu~h C"hain-of-command sanitizers; and the several echelons 

betwuen King and Charyk were not at all in sympathy with their viewpoints. 

qq BYE 1101' 

'l'OP ISCaST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. 0 •• Ee .... 

[t i. also clear that various technical developments entirel y 

independe:nt of the background Samos controversy began to influence 

the program in the spring of 1960. On Z4 March. more than a month 

before the U-l affair and two month, before Charyk's policy pronouncement, Eastman Kodak had informally submitted. to tbe Reconnaissance 

Laboratory at Wright Air Development Division (WADD) a proposal 

to develop a high-acuity 77-inch-focal-length camera 'for satel11te 

reconnaissance purposes. On 17 June, Eastman followed up the original 

submission with a relatively detailed proposal for yet another recoverable reconnaissance system, this embodying a 36-inch camera to 

provide conver~ent stereo coverage of Soviet territories. The contractor 

estimated that the system could be made available in a relatively brief 

time because the technology was well within the current state-of-the-art. 

Providing six- to eight-foot ground resolution and covering 97 per cent 

of the vital target areas. having a five-day orbital life. the proposed 

reconnaissance system generally conformed to the ground rules specified 

by Charyk. It considerably surpassed in promised performance the 

requirements subsequently detalled by US[B. Eastman called the 

system "Blanket." 

Still later, on ~O July. Eastman disclosed to WADD a second 

volume: of the te('hnl('al proposal. this covering the 77-inC'h came.a 

BYE 17017-'14 100 

:... . .. OP .EG8.-. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lap •• c .... 

mentioned original! y in March. Suggesting the "'ame technical 

approach and many of the components defined in "Blanket." Kodak 

proposed a system capable of pruvldlng two- to threeoOfoot resolution 

for s..,ot coverage of selected ground tarJlets. Alluding to the 7700inch 

focal length and a currently popular television proJlfam. Eastman 

called the })foposed system "Soln.et Stnp. " 

In a fashion that was not unique wlth Eastman Kodak. the firm 

circ-ulated the essentials of its proposal through other than the "nurmal" 

channels at WADD. In a mld-J unt" c-onversation with Charyk. Dr. E. H. 

Land described the proposed system 1n highLy favorabLe terms. It is 

probable that Eastman alao submitted tbe proposaL to the CIA; that 

agency certamly was familiar with the technical details as soon as 

was Charyk. 

Later that month. at Charyk1s request. the company forwarded 

to the: Undersecretary a copy of the technical proposal for "Blanket" 

plus a general resume of the still embryonic "Sunset Strip" idea. 

Eastman was ~xtrt=meJ y concerned about keeping detaUs of the proposals 

within a small circle of knowledlleable individuals. so much 80 that the 

subsequent correspondence with Charyk went through special CIA 

channels, emploYlOg both a pSt"udonyrn and a "letter drop" addre.s. 

Very few within Eastman 1-, .. dak l s organization knew of the proposed 

a pprua(' h. 

101 BYE 170li 

.... PSEC.E .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 '18P •• e .... 

On 5 July. after havlng digested the tlBlanket" proposal. Dr. 

Charyk met with A. B. Simmons of Eastman Kodak to discuss both 

"Blanket" and "Sunset Strip." Simmons. who was growing more 

enthusiastic about the potential of tbe later propolal al time passed. 

assured Charylc. that estimates of the worth of the 77-inch camera 

were quite conservative. At Charyk's request. Ea.tmall alao forwardt>d 

simulation photographs based on anticipated £-1 and E-Z products. The 

contrast was startling. 

Although Eastman was gravely concerned with keeping knowledge 

of lts two proposed approaches closely confined. that was particularly 

difficult in the existent environment. By late July. details were 

generally known throughout the Sarno. structure. within the Rt"connaissanee Laboratory at WADD. and In several elements of the Air Staff. 

It was ''Sunset Strip" that General Whlte mentloned to General Creer 

dUring their meeting on j August. what he apparent!y did not mention 

was that one day earlier. on l August. the Air Staff had decided to 

have WADD contract wuh Eastman Kodak for a laboratory test model 

of the 77-inch camera. Imtlally. 

I 

made available to support the program. 

in fiscal 19&1 funds were 

What followed. fur nearly a week. was a small comedy of 

errors. Pentagon instructions to WADD to act at once on the Eastman 

BYE l'lOl'l-74 102 

- - 'lOP '5e ... 'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

proposal brought an anguished response from Wrilht Field tbat the 

proposal had never been formally submltted there, having been 

orillinally prepared for a ,ompetltion that Perkin-Elmer Corporation 

had won. No ('opy was avallablt" at Wrlght Field. Reconnaissance 

Laboratory offlC'lals qUletly ,untacted the local Eastman Kodak 

representative who waS entlrt"ly Lnnocent of information about anything 

called ''Sunset Strip" and finally, in desperation. called the Pentagon 

for ai.d in identUying the proposal. He was told tbat it had originally 

been left with "a high USAF ufflcial.· Tnat advice, transmitted to 

Eastman'. home office at q p. m. on 5 August. brought a 10 p. m • 

. call from :;lmmon~. asking lf Charyk was the ''high official" meant. 

Tht: Kudak reprc:se itive 1n Dayton told Simmons that tbe Air Force 

WdS "s1ncerel~' Illttc"rested" 1n atarhng a researcb sequence leading 

tu operauonal hardware. Slmmons remarked, tartly. that Eastman 

had origlnally proposed nothlng more than a breadboard model and 

that the sudden upsurge of interest we. ratber startling. 

In the meantLme, the Pentalon instructed WADD to proceed 

as Car with "Sunset Strlp" as permit and that more 

!nune) wuuld , ~rtalnly be approved later. Further cOnversallons 

I1l:tween Wright Fl Id and Rochester caused Sinunons to retrc:at to 

the local CIA offlC":, {rom whence he could privately phone the responsible 

103 BYE 1701 

'IOPISCRE' 

--- ---------------
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 lIfap ... C.ST 

Air Staff office. Eastman. he remarked. felt that WADD's parti" ipation implied tlrather routine handling." On the contrary. he was advlsed. 

WADD was in the process of g-=thng increased authority. Somewhat 

c:ynically. Simmons said that "his bollel" were certainly interested 

1n working On a "bigger program. " but that they would prefer to work 

with the people building the vebicles--BMD. Simmons aho expressed 

concern at the widening circle of knowledge. mentioning that he had 

2. 

Charyk's agreement to limit the number of "witting" individuals. 

As it happened. Eastman Kodak's obvious reluctance to undertake the Sunset Strip program under flnormaltl Air Force operatinJ1 

procedures coincided ln time with the decision to shift Sarnos management to the Air Secretariat level. On 13 August. complying with 

instructions from Charyk. the All' Staff rescinded that portion of the 

original directive which passed * responsibility to WADD. 

* The attempt to bring Wright Air Development Division's Reconnaissanc.:t! Laboratory more immediately into the Samos program was part 

of a long-term effort to find a broader mission for the entire Wright 

Field complex. It was also. almost certainly. part of (jeneral 

Schrieve .. 's wide-front ilttempt to fix Samos responsibillty firmly 

withln the All' R~8earch .\lld J~"·.:lopment Command. While theReconnalssann: l.aboratory .. mployed many hi{lhly qualified scientiste and 

cn[lin(!~rs and wuuld :i ur~·l~· c ontinu~ to make major contributions to 

tht! advanc ~ment of the photo-reconnaissance arts. there was an 

ubVlOUS reluctance on the pa rt of many 1ft industry and in the All' 

Secretariat to entru.t "ny new major program management responsib1i111es to WADD. The "lltvrdlnated program approach" then being 

BYE l'f01'l-'14 104 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !fOP l.eR.' 

Procurement of Sunset Strip work was to be undertaken through BMD 

channels and was to be managed a8 part of the total Samos program 

rather than as a separate camera development project. 3 

The shlft of responsibihty to BMD meant, in practice, that 

the existent Samos program office became the Air Force focal point 

for Sunset Strlp activity. Eastman readUy accommodated the notion 

of operatlonal hardware development rather than an experimental 

camera program. In forwarding copies of the earlier studies to BMD 

on 13 August, Eastman proposed a 90-day Phase 1 stage (design to 

mock-up) to cost and a subsequent Phase Ii effort to include 

design, construction, test, and flight test of development models and 

prototype camera systems. Eastman noted the impossibility of 

projecting development costs until completion of the Phase I activity 

and acknowledged the uncertainty of compatibility between the camera 

system and available boost, orbit, and recovery subsystems. Nevertheless. the contractor reaffirmed the feasibility of providing two- to 

three-foot ground resolution in a high-acuity, stereo coverage 

surveillance camera system placed in a short-life satellite vehicle. 

ur~ed by ARDC promised to involve semi-autonomous elements of 

several dlvlsions in a single technical effort, thus diluting the 

eHt:Kl1veneSS of the decision process and makin, major elements 

of the S'amos project dependent on actions that could not readUy be 

cQntrulled by program managers. Distrust of WADD co"npetence 

was inherently part of the wider-based effort to make Samos a . 

spe\"ial agency assignment. 

105 

'l'8P IEe.B'I' 

BYE 170' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .,UP 'EGIIE'I' 

Within l4 hours of receiving the Eaatman atudi~. and the 

summary proposal, BMD was processing a letter contract. • 

Functional transfer of responsibility from WADD and authoriZation 

for 6"le source procurement (without competition) were part of the 

5 

process. 

At that point. yet another factor waa introduced into the 

equation. Space Technology Laboratories (STL) in August had 

responded to an earUer BMD mquiry lnto the fealibility of coverll y 

launching and operating an orbital ree-onnaissance sYltem. STL had 

attempted to specify means of aatisfying three basic criteria: 

deflnition of an orbital lift! a nd vehicle attitude adequate for the 

collection of useful photographs of SOViet ground installatlonl; an 

acceptable compromise between good photographic resolution and 

system simpliC'ity: and covert launch from within the continental 

Umted States. For purposes of study and analysis. STL projeC"ted 

a deslred first-launch deadline of. July 1961. 

The scheme that STL proposed in AUlust 1960 was based on 

lnserting an Atlas D nose cone into a polar orbit. Fired south from 

Point A r jluell 0, the reentry vehicle theoretically could make 1& passes 

bdore reenterlOg. (The orblt was arbitrarily established to provide 

QO-mlnut", \ lrcuits. so IE» passes would require ~'" hours.) The vehicle 

BYE 17011-'14 106 

-e"':~ ~~=.I1?""'ef"/--:a~-· r<-:."~'S 

: _. . '1'0 ••• G.S .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. OP IlieRIi. 

was to be spin stabilized. was to include a Z4-1nch focal lenlth 

panoramic camera. and was t.o employ five-inch film exposed 1n 

40-1nch strips during alternate axial rotations. Alignment of the 

spin axis to insure that it would be parallel to the earth during the 

c ntical period of each pass wuuld provide lood camera orientation. 

Recovery of the fUm caps ule ( comparable to the instrumentation 

capsule in a test ICBM warhead) was predicated on use of the wellpi oVl!d AVCO Shape S2 reentry vehicle and a parachute. In many, 

of it. technical details. the STL proposal of Augult 1960 was Itronl(ly 

reminiscent of the March 1958 Lockheed-Fairchild approach which 

had led ultimately to Corona. 

The "covert launch and operation" requirement was .to be 

satisfied by a public explanation that repeated passes of a warhead 

in a polar orbit were being used to measure tbe effectiveness of the 

ballistic tn1SS1le early warning system. After the ground.tations 

had taken "sufficient" instrument readings, the nose cone would be 

"directed" to assume a reentry traJectory. thus simulating the actual 

penetration of a ballistic ml.ssile warhead. 

Althuugh plausible 1n a general senae. the cover story had one 

major conceptual flaw. In order to obtain useful photographs. the 

• am~ra would have to remain in a relatively low orbit. But meaninlful 

107 BYE non 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "up •• c ..... 

tests of the early war01ng system required a good simulation of 

o 

actual warhead track: hIgh orbit and steep reentry. 

Introduction of the covert operation proposal, known as 

"Study 7," further complicated the ta.k of re.haplng the total Samos 

effort. Apart from the E-11 E-l and F-ll F-Z readout programs, 

which still existed in depreciated lorm, Sarno. project activity 

included the E-5, the E-b evaluation, and Eastman'. "Sunset Strip" 

system. Additionally. the receipt of the first Corona photographs 

on 24 August had thoroughly upset earlier notions about the feasibility 

of a "cheap and simple" approach to satellite reconnaissance. 

On lO September. less than a week after General Greer's 

office acquired a legal existence, Dr. Charyk, General Greer, Colonel 

Paul Heran (chairman of the E-b evaluation board), and Lieutenant 

Colonel James Seay (the chief procurement specialist in Greer's 

organization) met in the Unoersecretary's ofike to consider an 

Immediate course of action. Atter discussing both ''Study 7" and 

"Sunset Strip, " reViewing the status of the readout and recovery 

approaches, and conludenng other current uncertainties, they agreed 

to pursue a two-phase approach which would Include both E-6 and 

"Sunset Strip." More lIbportant, they agreed that the 77-inch system 

would be covertly developed for eventual clandestine operation. 

BYE 17017.74 lOe 

-1,!"':;..==v-?~a"'/";"'~~"'· ~-::.-:.; 

- . ~OP .aC.aT 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 IJ'SP .se.s .. 

OedSlons on what techniques to pursue and huw long to contlnue each 

had to b~ put off until the results of the Phase I "Sunset Strlp" delign 

effort had been completed, but s to be made available 

to fund the covert activity through tbe remainder of calenelar year IQ60. 

Additionally. tbe meet ing produced a formal policy of conducting the 

enure Selmo! effort under a significantly more dense securlty blanket 

than had been the case in the unrnediate past. 7 

The decision to proceed with a covert program was neither 

sudden nor startling. Cbaryk had discussed the idea with Drs. Jobn 

Rutu:l and George Kistiakowaky at least on'·e during the week before 

tht> Natlonal Security Council meeting of l5 August, and there apparently 

WdS sume discussion of the proposltion during that rneetlng, tbuugh it 

cbd lIot find its way into the minutes. 8 It was almost an obvi~ul course, 

In allY event. The Air Force had widely publicized Sarno. aa· a reconnau.sance satellite. being ~t least partly relponaible for the Soviet 

Union's ~radually hardening contention that reconnaissance from space 

was military activity which should be forbidden by international agreeIncant. It was entirely conceivable that political necesaity might someday 

rt:qu\rt: the United States to sign a "no space reconnaislance" agreement 

With the Soviets. Should the "oUicial" Sarno. program have to be 

~ a n~ ~ll\!d, for any reason, a covert effort would remain the only le.aible 

109 aYE 1701 

YO.IEeRE!' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

source for vital mtelligent e mformation on heartland activity. Corona. 

in its Clngmal configurtltlon. was madequate insurance because of 1ts 

resolution hmltations and )l,enerally shaky performance record. Havlnll 

an alternate rl:!( onnaissam_e prot£ram with greater promise of providln)t 

the required lnformahon on Soviet lnstallations thus ~came an inevitable 

element of national polley. 

There was a second aspe('t to covert development of a reco~nau.-

sanee'subsystem. Should the political climate remain relatively stable 

and the several known Samos systems survive the uncertalnties of 

development. it would be hi!(hly profitable to have a concealed technical 

'capability for very hULh resolution satellite reconnai •• anee. The general 

spel ifieations of tht' l.-b WE"rl:' "mong the most ill-kept of secret· . 

Te, IHUe. al delaLls had aCluaU~ been pubbshed in one widely circulated 

aero .space magazine. ALthough the Soviets might well be suspicious 

of such a disclosure. reasonin~ that no great power could unwittinfllv 

bl:' 5U lndiscreet. it was also possible that the tragicomic record of 

lax Air Force see. Urlty and that service's notorious fondness for 

pubhdty woul:d induce Savlet intelhgence experts to accept the specifi-

,-atlons as valid. In that case. the ability to fly a camera capable of 

!. :;-foot resolution in a satelllte ostenslbly delilned for cameras of 

.1\ ... 13tlOn Week. 

BYE 1701'1-74 UO 

TOP '.C.". 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

10- to IS-foot resolution would constitute a hiBhly useful reserve. It 

would, in effect, invoke the classical ductrine of technological surprise 

with the additional advantage that initial employment of the superior 

device need not become known to the prospective enemy. *' 

General Greer, whose responsibUity it would be to see that 

the various aspects of the newly approved Samos effol't were carried 

to fruition. found himself with two basic objectives that were not 

necessarily compatible. The first. derived from all of the studies 

and suggestions of mid-19&O. was to accelerate and improve the reconnaissance satellite effort--"a periodic phenomena since the fall of 1957. " 

as he charactterlZed it: In a note to Dl'. Charyk early in October he 

remarked of the "'mone) is no object' exercisea": "As a minor participant \n these [r~current] ..• flaps. I gradually learned the rule. of 

the game and at the same time gained some perspective which 1 believe 

is relevant to the current Situation." 

The point of ori~in of the "technological surprise" philosophy remains 

uncertaln. Unlike the nolton of developing a reconnai •• ance system 

which would remain avallable Ln case the official Samos program had 

tv be cancelled for some pvhtical reason. "technological surprise" was 

little discussed in contemporary documents. Neverthelea a. it was 

almost certainly considered in the October-December 1960 period when 

the outlines of SAFSP urganlzation and objectivea were takina sbape. 

[t c.:,-,rtamly was a factor in the more gradual prolram evolution of 

early 1961. It depended, of "ourse. on the premiae that operation of 

somt! reconnaissance satellite would be accepted--or n~ oprsed--

hy the Soviet Union, but that (apability would be concealed. 

111 BYE 1701 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. ep •• eR ... 

Realistically, Creer conc:luded that the simplest, most direct way 

to get results was to "pump more money i.nto the system, It although 

that technique invoked the inherent risk that "one may pay a high 

price for a small gain." Greer addeel. "The commodity that makes 

Sammy run at my end of the business is money. The effect of all 

the words 1 use to contractors lS dwarfed into insignificance when 

compared to the effect on them of cuttlna off money or adding money. 

This gets their attention and is the fundamental yardstick the contractor 

uses to determine how serious one is on a given i.sue. " 

His solution was to try for the least expensive program that 

could be based against approved schedules, or the best schedules 

that could be arranged in the face of a fixed and limited budget. His 

preference, he told ,Dr. Charyk, was to "loosen the purse strings by 

a significant amount [and] .•• put more emphasis on early performance 

and less on economy. ,,10 

The second major objective. apart from straightforward prugram 

acceleration. was to conduct a covert program. The Air Force w-.s 

accustomed to rapid changes of direction in programs and could cope 

with them but had little expertise in covert research and development. 

The real difference between a "covert" and a highly cla •• ified program 

was not at all well understood. largely because the Air Force had in 

BYE 17017-74 UZ 

'J!QP '.CRSI' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'8P •• e •• ., 

the past remained on the periphery of covert activity. "Black" aspects 

of Oenetrix, the U-Z, Corona and similar programs in which the Air 

Force had to some degree be~n mvolved had been entirely managed 

by the Central Intelligence Agency--although CIA drew freely on such 

Air Force technical talent, resources, equipment. and skilled personnel 

as were available. Locating and extracting information on how tu 

conduct a covert program was a delicate operation. A minor blunder, 

a slightly indiecreet query, would compromise the effort because the 

mere expre.sion of intereat luggested that the que.tioner might be 

trying to set up a covert activity in his own area. 

Some of the trappings of undercover work .eemed unnecessarily 

melodramatic. The Air Force security system tended to operate much 

like an exclusive club, rights of admission being determined by po •• ession of a top secret clearance, sufficiently high rank, and generous 

interpretation of the classic "need to knowtl rule. The original Atlas 

program was a case in point. The most that could be expected of 

security within the Air Force was to obscure detaUs of progress or 

program status; "normal" Air Force security had never succeeded in 

concealing the existence of a program or it. goals. Although the "club" 

outlook and the irrepressible habit of makin, presentations at every 

opportunity contributed to the generallaxne.s of security within the 

113 BYE 1'101' 

'I'OP Ilie.S' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'We ••• c •• ", 

Air Force, the chief offender was the system of required reporta--

chiefiy financial. Qenerations of military leaders had grown up in 

the conviction that an attempt to conceal or obscure the detaUs of 

financial transactions and contracts was immoral. It was standard 

practice to focus a harsh white ligbt on every activity that featured 

the exchange of government. money. Safeguards were sO elaborate 

that there seemed no conc~lvable way of letting contracts without 

becoming enmesbed in the intricate formalities of Air Materiel Command 

procedures--in which hundreds of people .ere neces.arUy involved. 

General Greer early concluded that the most difficult task he 

faced was keeping his financ ial dealings out of foreordained channels. 

If it became known that hi. organization had quietly sponsored multimillion-dolJar work on cameras and satellite., the implications would 

at once be obvious to every clerk and junior officer who processed 

financial recoras. But after considering the prospect, Greer concluded, 

perhaps cynlcally. that the Samoa program director could do quite a 

lot of covert purchasing and contracting without alerting the materiel 

command. simply because to "the entire purchasing and contracting 

All' Force" it would seem inconceivable that an lsolated program 

direC'tor could possess the necessary authority. An absurdly simple 

approach. General Greer reasoned, would be to get a contract warrant 

BYE 1'1017-74 114 

.. 8. '5Ca5'" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP •• ca .. , 

directly from the Secretary of the Air Force. Because auch an action 

- was unpr~cedented--not to aay unthinkable--his pOlsession of such 

authority might well go forever unsuspected. 

Many problems of operating a covert program were famUiar to 

the original Corona team but new to Samos. A complete break with 

tradition. cuatom. and established habit certainly would be needed if 

Samos was to include a covert aspect. It had been General Creerls 

observation that in the conventional military or,anization every oUicer 

exposed to a closely held piece of information immediately experienced 

an overwhelming compulsion to inform his inunediate superior. while 

. all commanders reacted by deciding that it was absolutely easential 

to brief certain "key members" of their staffs. II' The inevitable result 

was early and complete los. of security. followed by powerful pressure 

to maneuver the entire system back into "normal channel.. 'I Creer 

was particularly concerned by the reflex tendency of mUitary personnel 

to retreat into ordained procul'ement channels. noting ruefully that 

"when your contracting. finanCing. and comptrolling are 'normal' it 

'1= 

Undersecretary Charyk ultim ... tely had to forbid both General Anderson 

and General Schriever to pass knowledae 01 covert Samoa pro,rams 

downward in their headq,uarters. General Oreer bad to Ratly forbid one 

procurement officer to brief an unknoMng superior; and early in 1961 

sev~ral members of tbe ARDC staff had to be "debriefed" of information 

they had acquired rather casually. The wbole had oVertpnes of Poe's 

"lmp of th.: Perverse ... the tale of a perfect and unsuspected murder. 

Pot.' imbued the murderer With a compelling need to conlide in somebody-· 

anybody. He could not resist. Genet'al Greer hoped for a happier ending. 

115 an 1'701 

.0. ISG8S. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 90P '.C ••• 

matters little that your <:ommand and communications a .. e direct. 

Suunl!r ur later the pc)werful pull of the financial manalement process 

wilt aiLl!n the rest of the mana..,emcnt machlnery with itself. 'I 11 

Appreciating that "dev .. lopinll a capability for certain proll-rams 

is d techmque and .•. alnwlOt an tond 1n itself. " 12 Greer set out to 

ubt;un the basic mgredlents. of authority needed to perform his asslgnmente The dUfl( ulty was that nobody knew precisely what was required 

1n tl' IJrocurement realm. First step •• therefore. were in the direction 

uf Iurnplifying c"ontractintt pru("'eclures so that the basic Samos effort 

\ ould btl more expedlhously handled. In October. General Greer 

sun"eeded 1n havin~ Major Gl!neral T. P. Gerrity, the Ballistic Missile 

Center I.:omrnandcr. invested with authurity to approve reconnai •• ance 

level determinauons and findings. "Open" procurement of such items 

as boosters and launch stand modificationa received concurrent 

13 

authurizatiun. 

In the matter of louvert contracting it waa early apparent that 

the Ilnly way tu circum"ent all the requirementa for reports and 

finam idl S wnma r lee s wa s tu o!.t:'t d delegation of complete authority 

born th~ St"\ retary of th\.' Alr Fllrce. and a great quantity of entrenched 

precedent had to be pUlihed aside before .0 areat a break with established 

BYE 17017·'l4 116 

, -- " 'rOP ,.eRE' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 9UP •• e .... 

procedures could be favorably considered. initially. because of hu; 

general familiarity with C~ntral Intelli~ence Agency practices. Greer 

planned to go so far as to use pseudonyms in signmg contracts, but 

Undt::rsecretary Charyk found the idea distasteful and by early Januar~· 

::-

1901 it had been dropped. As it happened, the fi rst covert contract was 

not finally required until January, and by that time the vltal arran"ements had been made. On the fifth of that month. Air Force Secretary 

D. C. Sharp approved a f<.lrmal delegahon of contracting authority to 

General Greer, who thus acqulrtld the full authority of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Materiel, to approve deviations from armed forces 

procurement regulatlUns. Although the authorlzation was not studded 

wlth inhlbiting !.:lauses, Secretary Sharp nevertheless cautioned that 

"normal policit:::i, practices, and procedures applicable to the Department of the Au Force" were tu be employed wherever possible. 

~everthele5s, the permissive authority to depart from sacrosanct 

contracting procedures invested General Creer with almost unprecedented 

The general rlanned to use the name "Lt. Col. Roger E. Creen, USAF," 

In signing covert contracts but bt:cause of Charyk's disapproval used his 

own name. Brigadier General R. D. Curtin and Colonel J. R. Martin 

autop,raphed the signature authentlcation cards which op .. nly associated 

dollar amounts with contracts that. even though identified only by a 

5~t of numbers, would have indicated the existence of a "ubatantiaUyfunded satellite reconnaissance effort. 

117 

TOP 11i~."" 

BYE n01 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP SEeRS'! 

powers. Any questu)O as tu their scope was removed~~rly in February, 

when tht= Air Force Ci~neral Counsel confirmed that the absence of 

detall lO the ori~lOal authonzatlon bad been deliberatel y de8i~ned to 

confer the broadest possible authority. * The only significant limitation 

was a proviso that any reddegation had to be approved by the secretary.14 

Once the matter of proper authorization had been resolved, 

Covert contracts became feasible. They never became ro~tine, and 

the problems arising from security and cover difficulties generally had 

to be solved individually rather than by reference to the rate of a set 

procedure, but a satisfactory general pattern did emerge. In the case 

of the original covert .. ontr.tcts, with Eastman Kodak and General Electric, 

fuur copies of the formal agreements and the work statements were 

prepared. General Greer's establishment retained one, the "USAF 

('omptr er or covert programs 

Alr Force Asslstant Secretary for Financial Management) another, 

the cuntractor one more, a fourth was kept on 'file for a future audit 

(or a General Accounting O{flce team, should it ev-=r be needed). A 

General Greer was authonzed to appoint contractlng officers, to 

assign procurement authorit.,.. to such officers, to approve cost-plusfixed-fee contracts, to approve time and materials contracts. to 

approve contractor oVl!rtlme, to control government-owned industrlal 

property, and to appolnt and control property admini.trator •• 

BYE 17017-74 U8 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

different and "sterilized" contract, without tbe work statement, went 

to the official who wrote checks for It showed the correct 

contractor and contract number, but identified ARDC rather than 

SAFSP as the program agency. This permitted reasonably standard 

proceS"lnlJ of contracts and checks which had to go into the established 

channels for funding citation. A "sterilized" voucher preceded each 

check. The checka were mailed or personally delivered to a "neutral 

drop" somewhere in the contractor's organization and were there enter~d 

in the contractor's "black" accounting system. (Each contractor had 

two funding and accounting systems, one enfolded within the other and 

completely hidden from Vlew. In that it was necessary to hide incoming 

money and to conceal huge sales of time and material., the system bad 

the appearance of a huge t!mbezzlement in reverse!) One officer, 

strategically located withln ht=adquartera of the Air Researoh and 

Development Cummand. was briefed on the true facti and authorized 

to answer embarrassing questions tbat might arise because tbe dollar 

amounts on the "sanihzed" contracts and vouchers were considerably 

larger than was customary fur a ~ommand headquarters contract. 

WLth variations to suit IipecLal Clrcumstances. that much of the covert 

.:untractin~ procedure subsequently became "standard." 

Since one of the major goals of the Samos reor&anization had 

. been to accelerate the entire process of satellite reconnailsaoce, it 

119 BYE 17017 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 WOP •• e •• ~ 

was in sum~ respects .s important to remove obstacle. to rapid 

"ope nil cuntracting as to invent techniques for covert procurements. 

Moreover, the National Security Council decision to seareaate Samos 

from the remainder of Air Force research and development. together 

with subsequent directives that cut aeros_ eltabli_hed channels of 

command and communication, pruvided an excellent means of occluding 

the whole of the Samos pruject. The October 1960 action that gave 

General Gerrity the authority to act on contracts of or 

less without command or .:lit- staff review put into practice the rules 

of "no Intermediate revlew" earlier promulgated. On l4 October, all 

maJur commands were formally notified of these new facts of life and 

o( the spel lal status to be accorded Samos thereafter. The notiflcation 

boldly stated that neither review and approval authority nor the right 

to program bnefinl{s was Implicit at any level between the program 

director (Cireer) and the secretary's office (Charyk). At the same 

tim.-, General Greer was formally assign~d to the secretary's office 

wlth additional duty as BMD vic~ (ommander. For nearly two months, 

since the time of his onglnal selection, Cireer had legally been a 

"prunary dut)" vice commander and thus subject to the orders of both 

1S 

the BMD and the ARDC cummanders. 

Basic pOliC'y quesl10ns involvinll what aspects of the program 

- ,;hould be emphasized, how the covert activitles were to be approached, 

BYE 17017-14 ll0 

..,~-:,;..~e;~"",!"./T3;"· ~~.-:-: 

-- .. -: _~ . 90P '.'85. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

and how the new techm'.ues III ~rollram security were to be activated 

were largely resolved In O("tober, November, and December 1960. A 

key indicator was Dr. Charyk's ruling that no public announcement of 

the pending E-6 source selection would be made either by the Air Force 

*' 

or by the selected contractor. 

A new public information plan being constructed for Samus was 

to be based on the thesis that "it is no longer in the national interelt 

to release detailed information on the SAMOS project. II Baaics of the 

arrangement were made known to BMD on .. November--including the 

caution that there was to be no public announcement of the new policy. 

If necessary, however. BMD was authorized to anlwer queltions about 

the E-6 competition by stating that Eastman had been given a contract 

tQ.. develop II I photographic I components" and Martin a contract to develop 

"a recovery capsule. " 16 

In point uf fact. the skeletal information that reached the 

Ballistic Missile Divlsion contained little more than instructions 

to award contracts to Eastman (photographic subsystem) and Martin 

(applied research in the area of maneuverable, lifting body reentry 

.. '0' 

Queries concerni.ng the outcome of the source selection process were 

to be directed to the secretary and answers were to be based on the 

proposltion that anythlng which could be successfully denied wouleJ be. 

Thus, since the fact that an E-6 "competition" was in proce.s had been 

widely drculated wlthin the aerospace industry. the quesiioll ''Has an 

E-6 award been made" 0' was to be answered merely, "Ye •• " 

l~l BYE 11017 

TOP IEG.IiT 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 trap •• G .... 

vehldes) and to expand existent Aerospace Corporation contracts to 

cover systems engineerlD~ and technical direction of the E-6 development. 17 

Ouring the fust week of November 1960 a second set of key 

decisions emerged from a serLes of Pentagon meetings. Undersecretary 

Charyk and General Greer discus.ed the available technical options in 

grll:ater detail and agreed to drop further consideration of the "Study 7" 

spm-stabilized camera appr,·" .. :h. They reconfirmed their determination 

to ('onduct a covert reconnausance operation, nonetheless. Charyk 

approved further study' of th~ roncept of encasing a camera in an orbiting 

mlSsile nose cone and using the "warning system test program" * as a 

. 18 

cover for rt:conna15sance nlghts. 

A n~w and highly sigmficant innovation of the early November 

meetings was th~ proposal tu us~ the E-6 program as a cover for 

devdopment of tht· "Sunset Stnp" system. Cbaryk agreed with General 

Greer's .. uggestion that Eastn an develop the 77-inch camera under the 

cod~ name Project G.tmblt--ii l~rm that Greer chose, and which was 

considerably more m~anin~f,u than most code designations--while 

Gt!neral Electric devE:luped .• !'!oultable ballistic reentry vehicle. By 

k~epinl.! tht' jJhv~ical and envlrl.lnnH:!Dtal hmilations of E-6 and Gambit 

compaHble with on~ anoth .. r. It It~t:med possible to develop and test 

~" ", 

"Study 7" had b~en named Boh~r-> and the nose-cone decoy plan was 

cal It"d DSEP. for Defense System Evaluation Project. 

BYE 11017-74 ll2 

WOP ... G ..... 

------- --------
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

~8.IEe •• 't 

Gambit without any outward indication that such a pro,ram eXisted. 

The lnstituhon of rigid security controls ove.r the whole of the Samoa 

operation would greatly enhance the possibility that the scope 01 the 

total program could be entirel)· hidden. Thus "technological surprise" 

became a goal of the new Samoa program. 

Before the plan could become effective, however. program 

managers had to dispose of the widely dispersed evidence that a 77·inch 

camera development exiated. As had been true of "Project U" in early 

1958, and of Caro . .lsel in 1959, '" the proposed "Sunset Strip" development 

program was &0 widely known that it would be neces.ary to invent and 

circulate a palatable:: rt!aaon for canceliing an e.sentially reasonable 

approach to satelhte reconnalssance. Project personnel acbieved 

that end by haVing BMD terminate the Eastman study contract for "Sunset 

Strip, " With the excuse that "review of recent proposals for E-6 camera 

reveals that future study in this area (77·inch camera) is not r.equired. " 

Simultaneously, the Samos office drew up the first of its "black" contracts, 

authorizlng Eastman to contlnue the development as a covert effort. 

Presidential reServe funds ("black" or "clalsified" fund.) in the amount 

of were tentatively identified as the fiscal 1961 program 

rc::quirement. 

See Volume I for details. 

ll3 BYE non 

.OP .E£RE~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 YeP •• CaE' 

The .physical process of shifting the Gambit camera develop. 

ment into a totally secure bUilding resembled the process of sequest-=ring Curona work at Luckheed, three years earlier. A. the "Sunset 

Strip" activity ( losed out and personnel-were nominally shifted to 

other Eastman projects, they actually moved into a new building. were 

briefed on -the fae.. t that the project was very much alive. and resumed 

their work. Much the same procedure was followed with Ceneral 

Electric, althuu~h the fact that the E-o and Cambit orbital and reentry 

systems were closely akin, at least at fust, greatly simplified the 

19 

project security problem. 

By the murning of 7 November 1960. General Greer had briefed 

key officials of At-'rospace Curporation, General Electric, and Eastman 

Kodak on the G:lmblt program. its objectives, and its relationship 

to E-o. He emphauzed that the three pnnnpal contractors plus the 

project office w .. uld constItute a task force with the objective of developmg. testing, and pruoflng the Cambit system in the shortest possible 

time compatible with attainment of the desired objectives. Lockheed. 

whIch ultunately bel"ame Involved by virtue of the decision to use Agena 

as a stage in ~he total sY:Sl.em. essentially did no more than supply a 

semi-:-standard vehicle. Ceneral Ele"tric's cover would be the develop. 

ment of an alternate reentry body for the E-6; Eastman chiefly relied 

BYE 17017-'4 

--.... :;_ ... , 

IZ4 

"OP IEeaS'!' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

on a "proprietary development" explanation like that earlier deviled 

to cover Lockheed's Corona activities; and Aerolpace Corporation 

opt:rated under the same extremely rigid "need to know" ground rules 

lO 

as the Samos office. 

The Gambit decisions of November 1960 when taken in context 

with £-S and E-6 actions of the same period generaUy eltablished a 

philosophy for SAFSP activity but fell short of constituting a policy. 

In sume respects, specifications of the program office transformed 

phllosophy into policy. * but in other regimes more formal action 

set:med required. 

Although the changed Clrcumstances of the Samos program 

should have been ObVlOUS to all of the Alr Force by October, there 

sull were l.ndications that in some quarters the passing of the old 

order either was not understood or was not accepted. Late. that month, 

Au Force ht:adquarters advised the:: Air Materiel Command that it 

would be well to plan for operanonal-ule logistic support of ··amos 

uSlJlg th~ operanonal dates hsted in the "latest" program guides. 

Some three weeks later. the Strategic Air Command inform"d ~RDC 

* The issuance of blanket travel orders to General (ireer, Brigadier 

G~neral H. L. Evans (his deputy). and Colonels Heran and J. W. 

Ruebel, permitted those key officiall to travel .s necessary without 

~lvin~ away to travel-office personnel their destinations or purpose •• 

SurreptitioUS travel thus made a gradual transition from practice to 

pulic.:y. ~l 

lZS an: 17017 

!fap IEeREIf 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

that th~ "requirement" to turn both Samoa and Midas over to oper .. -

llonal ,"ommands at th~ earhest possible! moment wa& "litlll valid 

and must b\· recop.nized."' Shortly ther~alter. ARDC issued an 

opt'rf1tlllOh order (which had been in preparation since late Seph'mbt!r) 

that at least implied. if 1t did not specifically define. a considerabh· 

rol~ fill' the research and development command in the conduct of the 

ZZ 

Samus ~rugram. 

v~neral Creer's office. followin~ a post-publicahon review of 

the operations order. decided that it was generally in concert with 

t!arill!r expre8sions of project objectives. Less charitably. SOm~' uf 

th", IJT .. J\>(,1 staff memb~rs characterized it as "ha.rmles., " even 

lhollt.:11 1t Implied an unwarranted element of ARDe project authurtt ... l3 

The AIr Staff and Strategic Air Command viewpoints were anotht."T 

lllattt'T, so on 6 December Undersecretary Charyk sent a pair of 

men,· .randa to the Air For~e Chief of Staif which restated the abJectlY,,"s 

:lnd uperatln~ prinCIples of th~ Samos effort. 

fhe first of the papers was classified secret but was "white" 

_IIl(i \t ••• ,; ub\-iously intend~d for general circulation among those whol:le 

~,., Ilrn ~ dearan("es and pos1tions made them members of the "cluu." 

It Sd forth several key thcIJrems: (1) Sarno. "should be regarded as 

an R&D program aimed at th~ exploitation of various promising recon1:~ll"'~i\nC<:" tl!chniqucs"; (.!) tht"' program would nonetheless be oriented 

BYE lj017-74 IZ6 

Tap ... C8E' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'l!GP IECRET 

toward obtainmg operationally useful intelligence; and (3) the "nature 

and character" of the eventual operational system were "completely 

conditioned upon the success of the methods which will be exploited 

in the RIrO program." "Accordingly," added Charyk. "effective 

operational planning can not be accomplished at this time." 

Dr. Charyk observed that major resources were still being 

expended in efforts having "little or no connection with the new direction of the RIrD program" la certain reference to continued attempts to 

retain Subsystem 1) and that there was a "startling lack of knowledae 

and familiarity with the reoriented program." He noted with some 

'asperity that many "unfortunate remarks" in public. repeated in the 

press, were serving to make achievement of program goals most 

difficult and procet:ded to specify policies that would reduce the incidence 

of such occurrences: 0) Samos was not to be included in the' "normal" 

program documentation published under 315-series regulations; (Z) as 

necessary. General Curtin's office (SAFMS) would provide entries for 

tht:: Chief of Staff's Policy Book for legislative matters; (3) the Weapons 

Board was not to "monitor" the Samos program and "no reviews or 

analyses should be undertaken by the various panels. boarcis, and 

committees"~ (4) operating-command reconnaissance requirements 

lZ7 

wop ISCaST 

BYE 17017-

ha--;.;..:: 5/~""8r/~~.,.~· ".,.r. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~O.'.£RI" 

would be reviewed alS received; and (5) the Samos Working Group 

(: 

should be dissolved. 

In a separate note to General White (sent the same day, but 

mark~d "Special Handling" to insure that it would reach only Gambitcleared personnel), Charyk set forth for the first time the basic 

phl10sopby behind the new Samos program. He called attention to 

the fact that "very serious pressures" would be directed toward a 

full y operational reconnalsaance system and that it was essential. 

therefore, to "maximize the reconnaissance take at the earliest 

possible date and to attempt to obtain such information in as low key 

a fashlon a& possible." Since the greatest chance of program success 

seemed to lie in conducting Samos as a long-term research and developIlTent effort and there were compelling national policy reasons for 

avoiding any iassociatlon With a military operational command "such as 

SAC, " it was desirable tv estaOlish a "combination research. development, and operational program conducted under cover of research and 

development .••• " 

Said Dr. Charyk. " It is not contemplated that there will be 

an acknowledged or normal operahonal phase within the near future. " 

Dr. Char ~k's use uf th~ t..'rm "wasted eifort" in connection with ·the 

nbolishC'd rcp .. -tl> t,a,\ .. ls. hO;Hdv, and "workinA groups:" clearly 

d~'ilncd hu upmwos ur. tht- worth of such actlvity to the protll'am. 

an 17017-74 lZ8 

TOP '.C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

NP .S' •• ' 

He added. "the policies, action., and procedures necessary 

to support this ("onfiguration of the project are completely different 

from normal policies. actions and procedures and will ct!rtainly tend 

to produce misunderstanding and criticism within nurmal organizaHunal 

channels. 'I He conceded also that the problem was further complicat~d 

by the fact that the "full story" could not be given to all who wer~ 

affected. adding, ''In fact, it must be held most closely if it is to be 

effective at all." When progress was sufficient and national poliq 

permitted a change, a transition to "a normal operational program" 

would be scheduled, the undersecretary suggested. But, "in the 

meantime, the program will include all essential elements to meet 

the reconnaissi\nce requirements and to exploit the data so obtained. ,,1.4 

Though phras~d with considerable finesse and in terms that 

probably would not cause the "in channels" Air Force to rise in revolt, 

Charyk's pollcy statement nonetheless represented a total rejectlon 

u£ all operational command claims to deployable systems and of all 

research and development command claims to management authority. 

There was no· real doubt that he intended to streamline the management 

process by eliminating ARDC influence (and procedures), to give the 

Samos program the nominal character of an extended research and 

devuloplnent etfort, and to make the Samos project an operational 

129 BYE l'l017 

TOP •• eRIiT 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'rOP SEeRE' 

organization which would essentially treat the StJ"ategi,=-Air Command 

as merely another user of acquired data. An uninhibited conversation 

b~tween Greer and Charyk later in December made those proposihons 

to5 

explicit • 

Thinking throu~h the unplications of the several policy papers 

that had emerged since the National Security Councll decislon of 

Au~ust. General Greer concluded in December that his real job was 

to "~et pictures .•• in such a manner as not to precipitate a. U-Z 

crisis in WhlCh the U.S. might be constrained to discontinue SAMUS." 

and to insure the availability of systems which could covertly obtain' 

needed photographs should even "low key" reconnais8ance operations 

become imposslble. His immediate task. then. was to create a real 

ability to ope rat .... a covert program, and his chief difficulty of the 

moment was that "the military system for contracting and for dispersing 

l6 

money are very ~ leverly deli~ned to frustrate a c,'vert program. ,. 

The elements of general policy under which SAFSP was to 

operate had been defined in February and appropriately circulated by 

the end of May 1961. On 19 May. a classified Headquarters USAF 

Office Instructlon formaUy restated, for the benefit of the Air Force 

at large. the program ratlonale that had been adopted. For practical 

purpus~s. lt was a formahzation of Undersecretary Charyk's December 

BYE 1701i·'14 

-~-:- .!=.":' .... a ... I-~! ... · 130 

~e.IEeRE" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP •• e •• ., 

1960 memorandum to General White, neither expanding nor enlargina 

the lnstructions there defined. l.7 Considerably more important was a 

3 April "Satelhte Reconnaissance Plan" which, though closely held, 

d"'£ined in conslderable detail and in formal fashion the actual" policies, 

procedures. and actions to be applired ••. in order to achleve the 

objectives of the national satellite reconnaissan.:e program. " 

Those objectives were to enhance and protect the probability 

of "adequate and timely data collection" without lIinviting pos sible 

political counteraction ... and to create a lasting ability to ~cquirt" 

reconnaissance information" in the event that circumstances should 

force limitations. reduction. or even elimination of overt flights. II 

The situation that prompted the covert effort was essentially 

that the overt obJl::ctive of creating an American satellite reconnaissance 

s ys tern had been widely publicized. that regular flights ("overt and 

acknowledged") with military objectives were scheduled to begin in 

the near future, and that any indication of prog.ram success mlght 

provoke both political counteraction and a military response ft· 1m the 

.:)unet Union. Neither was wanted. 

The plan specified that: 

As a firm basic policy, there will be no "operational" 

overt satellite reConnaissance or any association of the 

program with an operational command for a" indefinite 

hme, and the overt satellite reconnaissance praaram will 

be brought to a fully operational status under covel' of 

131 

.. SP IEIRE .. 

BYE 17011 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP ISC8E. 

research and development. and operated indefinitely 

under this cover. The policy expr ... ed in the 6 December 1960 Top Secret memorandum from the 

Undersecretary of the Air Force to the Chief of 

Staff. entitled "Basic Policy Conc.rninl Samos. " 

will continue for the indefinite future. 

Reflecting the urgency of technical efforts based on the political 

environ,ment. the policy docum~nt contained a forthright statement of 

the need for more intensive control of project security and for the 

maintenance of "a viable covert effort which has the feasible capability 

of being sustained indefinitely after canceUation of the overt effort." 

Significantly. the objective of tightened security was to eliminate 

virtuall y all public references to mUitary space programs and specifically to prohibit public disclosure of the flight tOit objectives or results 

of satellite reconnaissance. Within such an environment it seemed 

poss ible to culture a cove rt effort ". • • sustainable indefinitely in 

the wake of a forced public cancellation of the overt reconnaissance 

program. and which can meet all principal intelligence objectives of 

the overt program." To that end. it was neces.ary to conduct the 

satellite reconnaissance aspect of the total Air Force military space 

program so effectively that no indicators of the atatuB of the overt 

program would surface in public. The covert prolram. of coutse. 

would be still more obscur~--hidden even from many of those nominally 

('ognizant of the extent and progre.s of the overt eUort.~8 

BYE 1':017 • .,4 

-~->. ~ =.';--!'/~~.;-'. 

13Z 

TOP ISC ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Within six months of the decision to shut Samoa management 

to a higher level and to accelerate the pace of technical development, 

the basil program had been completely overhauled. Quite apart from 

the important new directions technology was taking, program objectives had altered so significantly that the new program bore no 

resemblance to anything that had preceded it in Air Force experience. 

The mass of detailed changes somewhat obscured but could not conceal 

the fact that what had been created was a highly specialized project 

organization with unprecedented authority. a capability to respond 

rapidly both to.new requirements and to direction from higher authority. 

and a set of goals that would have been technologically infeasible in a 

pre-l960 environment. Tht: concentration in a Single relatively small 

o.r-ganization of very sweeping engineering and procurement responaibility, exemplary technical and managerial talents, and adequate financial 

resourceS constituted a remarkable conceaaion to the urgency of the 

satellite reconnaissance effort. The assignment to such an organization of responsibility for clandestine development of reconnaissance 

systems was highly unusual; to make that organization ultimately 

responsible for the operation a8 well as the development of a major 

weapon marked a radical break with the paat. Yet in a period of 

about six months all of these innovations had been conceived, approved, 

a nd applied. 

133 BYE non 

'lOP .acaa. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

The generation of a policy did not immediately solve all pohq: 

problems, nor did the defimtlOn of program goals eliminate aU 

program uncertainties. The relationship between the cland~stin~ 

Corona effort and the part-concealed, part.clandestine activit\' b':lIl!! 

conducted by General Greer's establishment l'emain, d somewhat 

unc~rtain. even though on ZO September lQ60 Charyk had directed that 

Air Force participation in Corona should be handled within the Samos 

management structure. (Argon, the Army-originated covert rnapplOfit 

satelhte program, Wil:8 the subject of an identical order.) Colonel 

Paul E. Worthman. Air Force Corona chief. found himself in a somewhat 

awkward position. Like his predecessor, Colonel Sheppard. Worthman 

had 10 man., rtSpccts occupied a special-category management posuion, 

exercis mg virtuall y all important Air Force authority in Corona but 

having no real Alr Force chain of command either above or below him. 

Hl.s contact point in the Pentagon had been the Advanced Technology 

Office of the Air Staff. an organization absorbed by General Curtin 

in September 1960, but for pract1cal purposes he had originated program 

proposals (lncludin~ proposed schedules. payloads. and launch dates. 

for lOstance) without much concern lor coordination with or concurrence 

by other Air Force echelons. Corona requirements had dominated the 

"Discuv~rer" pro~ram and pretense to the contrary was speCious. 

BYE IjOI7-74 134 

,ap .5C ... 'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

The new arrangement brought about fewer immediate ("hanges 

than might have been anticipated. Greer and Worthman f. rst d1scussed 

the essentials of thelr relationship on 20 October. shortly after Colonel 

Worthman learned that the general was to be the West Coast "fo("al 

point" for Corona matters. Typically, Creer told Worthman he wanted 

no changes in the existent operational and organizational arrant-tements. 

that Worthman would continue a8 the Air Force Corona (and Argon ) 

director, and that ther~ was no need to depart from established communication channels. (Thus Worthman continued to deal with the CIA and 

Corona contractors by means of a special crypto teletype network 

created for that purpose. Such communication channels were not open 

to the Air Force, nor were copies of Corona correspondence normally 

1.9 furmshed to memb.:rs of Greer's staff.) 

Although an entirely comfortable working arrangement resulted 

on the W~st Coast. there was for the moment virtually no integTation 

of activity or personnel there. No open antagonism was apparent, but 

th.: dlver!l.ence of interest between Samos and Corona suggested that 

dangerous friction could have developed had the personalities of Creer 

and Worthman been different. At the policy level, particularly as it 

C"om"erned security, differences in viewpoint resulted as much from the 

cxp..:rience of the Corona people and the relative inexperience of the 

50111105 ",roup 1n covert activity as from any other factor'. With 

13S BYE 1701'; 

YUPIESRS .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .,OP I.CR.'I 

Justification. Worthman'. group took considerable prlde in Corona 

program achievements and in the fact that notwithstanding all the 

discouragements ot" t:arly years, Corona had return~d and was con· 

tinuing to return useful lntelligence. Gorona was performing precisely 

as the Sam,os program was not intended to perform. and the Corona 

people tended to resist innovations that might change their circumstances 

u nfa vorabi y. 

Members of the Samus organization, engaged in an enterprise 

tenfold larger and more costly than Corona. and convinced that the 

highly sophisticated E-o wuuld Shortly displace the theoretically less 

capable Corona system, tendl"d to be a bit superior about the older 

program. Therl! was also the fact that relatively few of the Samos 

pt!uple were co~mzant of Corona achievements, while most of the 

local Corona team members knew of Gambit and were familiar with 

E-5 and E-6 details. (Even though they were aware of Cambit and of 

the principles of Co'·ert operation. Gambit-cleared personnel who 

wl:re subsequently ~iven access to Corona program details frequently 

~xpressed astonlShment at the existence of Corona.) Most of the 

C uruna people Wel'e hearty supporters of a stereo version (Mural) 

th~n beginning development and were enthusiastic about the prospects 

u£ the £.: (pronounced cec-tflple-prime) version of Corona nearillg 

BYE 1":017-74 136 

I!GPI.~ •• " 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 yePIEeR.1' 

flight test. U the Samos people were confic1ent that E-6 would make 

Cllrona obsol~tt=. the Corona team was equally certain that impl'ovt!-

ment:; like £:::. and Mural had a <h ance of equaling or surpassing 

antic1pated Samos achhwements--and at lesSt!r cost and sooner than 

the Samos development schedule would permit. 

In the light of such circumstances. it was remarkable that the 

Corona and Samod group6 on the West Coast got along as well as they 

did. It was not that each group had uncritical confidence in the other's 

good intentions, or good fait!. In some instances a consequent lack of 

full and free communication of ideas. both technical and proc""dural, 

undoubtedl y hampered une or both vf the still separate efforts ~ But 

. * on the whole the relation6hip was effective; damage was sligbt. 

ThIS asselisment is based un a series of discussions with individuals 

who Wdre engaged 10 buth Corvna and Samos programs, at all levels. 

during. the period August 1960-December 1961. Although the hallowed 

tra<litions of hlstorio~raphy require a full statement of sources. I 

feel no compulsion to specify who said precisely what about the early 

r..:lalionsh1ps between the "Greer group" and the "Worthman group. It 

The terms themselves are misleading. since General Greer and 

Colonel Worthman had high regard for one another's talents. and the 

members of the two "~roups" were not so much divided by different 

luvalties as con'vinced of the superiority of their own programs. It 

has b~cm s ug!(ested that a notation of latent or blatant conflict between 

two groups of" Air Force people iii inappropriate to an account of this 

natur~. For my part, [think it remarkable that two groups with 

potentially catastrophlc differences worked so effectively together 

and. in time, quietly blended. The viciousness of some intra-Air Forct: 

"diff~rences of opinion" 15 le~endary. anc1 the conseque~e. of !luch 

137 BYE 17017 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'reP lEe •• , 

Contacts at the next higher level of organization were not 

always so peaceable. Or. Charykearly assumed that Corona should 

comt: under his control. as part of the total sat~lhtt: reconnaissanc:.: 

"disputes" have occasionally been d .. tlly. There is no b~tter mdicatlon 

of the dedication, intelligence. and general good sense of Samos and 

Corona program particlpants than the overall effectivenel$s of their 

rdationship during 1961. It improved later, when or!!anizational 

differences were resolved. but that was inevitable in the nature of 

things. 

One aspect of Corona-Samos program relationships that has not 

L~en treated here is the role of Central Intelligence Agency partici~ 

pants in Corona. It was not. in fact, a significant problem in 1960 

and 1961. and it remained a relatively high-level problem, with little 

impact on the West Coast program office structures. ullul 1963. 

A~a1n. that may have betm largely a matter of personahtlcs. Richard 

Bissell, CLA1s deputy director. and J. V. Charyk, head of the Department of Defense satellite reC"C.>nnaissance program as Undersecretary 

of the Alr Forc(>, had an effective working relationship that more than 

offset the or).!,.mi7.ational imperahves their subordinates usuall) 

experienced. Pt>rhaps as important, Ln 1960 and 1961 the Samos and 

the Corona wurkin~ Ji{roups were comparatively small and were 

mostly composoed of indiVIduals with long and generally happy E'xp~ri­

~nce 1.11 lnteractive Air Force-CIA alfairs. Greer, Ritland, Wurth man, 

and Sheppard w~r~ veterans of earlier coop~rative enterprises rangin~ 

irom Gc.>netrix to the U-Z; Bissell and his closest associates (Eugene 

Klefer, for instance) were similarly experienced. Finally, Bissell 

and Cha ryk looked on satellite reconnaissance as a national activity 

rather than as the unique province of one agency or another. The 

lu.H of CIA and Air Force program participants for one another's 

assigned pro~rams did not become an important consideration in the 

Jlatiunal reconnaissance effort until Charyk and Bissell had left office. 

(RP) 

BYE 1';017-74 138 

'l'OP .5e81i. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

ef{UJ'! I and began by exercis ing as much authority as he. ("ould summon. 

-- He did su With the imphed approval uf the CIA's deputy director, Blssell. 

The pecuhar ("hain of ("ummand for Dil", .IVerer -Coruna pro~ram d~ci~non:s 

uu-asloned the first frictlon. Habitually. Corona launch licheduleli--and 

thus DisLoverer schedules and payload aUocations--were determined by 

the Curona group at BMD bas\.,d on advice from CIA. Intelligence requirements were the basic justification for establishment and alteratLon of such 

schedules. During the long drought. when the first 12. Discoverer flights 

had c onslituted one continuing disappointment. decisions Lad been .limolSt 

automahc, They were originated within the Corona program, surfaced 

'as recommendations from the Discoverer program office. and forwarded 

frum BMD to ARDC headquarters for rubber-stamp approval. Theoretlcally, ARDC headquarterli was the deciding authority. with the Air Staff 

I:xerclslng a VetO. Once the Corona flights began returning "take. II 

automatic scheduhng disappeared and the question of who actually wa:s 

the deClding authority assumed some Lmportance. In October 1960, 

General Schriever decided that the long-delayed biomedical capsule for 

l)ls~overer ("the monkey capsule") should finally be nown. He instructed 

G~ncral Rltland. at BMD. to construct an appropriate schedule and 

Gl:nt.-ral Rltland. with some trepidation. complied. When the altered 

sch~du!e reached Undersecretary Charyk. he reacted strongly. He 

139 BYE 1'701'0 

'l'9P I.CA •• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

• 

Ifap IECali'l' 

bdieved that biomedical experiments leading to manned orbital fll(lht 

were the rl!sponsibility of the National Aeronautics and Space Admmistration (l"ASA), the Air Force had been told to g.et out Qf thte' "man-mspace" business. He promptly ordered that no future schedul~ or 

program modificatl0ns be introduced without his prior and expres" 

approval. 

Although Charyk"s dictum was actually prompted by a new Air 

Furce attempt to inflate its man-in-epace role. it had th~ effect of 

serving notu:e on the CIA that henceforth Charykls organization proposed to decide what Corona payloads flew. and when. By implication. 

it also su~~ested that Dr. Charyk's organization had a deciding V01ce 

1n technic-al qut'stions, a prerogative that CIA treasured. To resolve 

s-uch questions. though without a specific preliminary statement of 

lS:iUeS, a me~ting was called in Charyk's office for 3 Novembt"l' 1900. 

Richard Bissell, CIA godfather and patron saint or tho! Corona 

prugram, was actually the only CIA official competent to eetabheh his 

ag~ncy"s position. He was unable to attend the meeting. leavlng the 

dis~ussion to middle-management representatives from the West Coast 

Curona office. CIA headquarters. and Charyk's staff. 

In the discus sions that followed. Dr. Charyk made 1t clear that 

hte' \ onsidcred hu charter to include a considerable authority over 

BYE 17017-74 140 

'lap SECREIf 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Corona as well as Samus. Ht" conceded the need lor conunued dir~cl 

contacts between the CIA and the Corona office at BMD but insisted 

that henceforth all l'hang~s in schedules. dollars, payloads. and tl!ChOlcal faaturt.!s be coordinat~d with him. The discussions also madt! it 

apparent that the CtA middle management had. no intention of abdicating 

Its authority f\lr Corona activlty, in which tht' agency had inv~sted 

nearly four years and tens of millions of dollars, although Bissell's 

absl!nce prevented any direct confrontation on such issues. 

Su<.:h conversations continued through November and into Dect'mb" r wIthout producing any ground for general agreement. Charyk 

indicated, in Dt'cemb~r. that he favored an integrated cuver plan for 

Corona and Samos (partlcularly for Gambit, although that effort still 

was 10 its infanc yL He questioned whether a cover based on the ~xpressed 

mtention of eventually fir10S 2..!!! biomedical capsule into orbit was 

adequate for all of Corona. What he failed to recognize--perhaps because 

even the Corona people still had no more than an instinctive feel for the 

sltuatlon--was that after 12 less-than-successful firings the program 

was its own ""xcuae for continuance. Each program failure justified a 

whule succession of later trials for which no payload specifications need 

b\: reveal~d. 

The du~ussionli of l'-:ovember and December 19bO made it 

reasonably dear that Char'i}... and in some degree vlr'tually all of 

141 BYE 17017. 

-"';.':- .. =.';'-~-/-.-" ~. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

TOP.BeR • ., 

the Samos -oriented Ilroup, adhered to the earher unchall~nged 

aSliumptlon that Corona was a gap-fill reconnaissance svstem 

with a limited future. Confidently expecting the E-S and E-6 programs 

to produce results far surpassing the capacity of Corona. Charyk per-

_ sistently asked CIA representatives to specify a completlon date for 

the Corona effort. No zswers were forthcoming--which induced 

some members of the Samos group to conclude that the Curona people 

were erectin~ a rival effort which they intended to operate lndependent 

of the "unified" ::satellitt-> reconnaissance program. 30 

The cross flow of proposals and anti-proposals ~~tablished ;\n 

atmosphere for cuntlnut!d operation of both the Samos and Corona 

programs but did nothlllg to resolve the matter of bas1c Alr Forc~ 

authority 1n Curona. Although he received verbal advlce from time 

to tune, General Greer never was given a definition of his authorit~ 

over Corona. So long as Richard B.is.eU remained the rhief CIA 

authority on that program and Colonel Paul Worthman remained its 

pru~ram duector. that circunlstance was not important. For a time, 

<':t!rtainly through all of 1961, the basic problems of the Thor, the A~ena, 

or th~ payload independenU., remained important enough to obSI lire 

(-onl'ern for problems ar1stn~ through the interfaces of those el~ment~. 

L;tter, wh~n the basic dt!ments of the total system wer~ working 

rt'as lmabl y well. It bt'l"ame apparent that faulty interachon between the 

BYE li017-74 142 

.,8P lEe •• " 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'1'8. SEeaE'I' 

payload and thuse system portions obtained through Air Furce ('hannels 

was ::;ervlng tu inhibu the op~ r ahonal utility of the total s yatem. In 

such an environment, a centrol authority was needed to resolvt' issues 

affecting various of the! integrals of Corona--and none t",nsted. 31 

The impulse whlch had led, through devious channels, to the 

cr~ation o£.an SAFSP organization 1n August 1960, had by early 1961 

caused that organization to have a shape and content 1arllely undrc::amed 

of six months earlier. In early 1961. the reconnaissance satellite 

program consisted of Corona. with various pending improvements 

which would make it a rival of some aspects of Samos. and a basic 

Sarnos program wlnch had takc::n on unique characteristicl:f of its o~:n. 

Both readout photugraphy and readout ferret programs still survlved. 

as tht! E-l, E-2, and F-l, F-l. The E-5 of 1959 vintage continut:d 

development, an E-b more nt'arly responsive to current intelligence 

requirements had begun development. tnd Gambit was progressin~ 

tvwa rd fhght test at a someWhat slower pace. Additionally, in tht.' 

l!arly months' of 19b1, UnderS\!crclary Charyk moved the ferret programs 

irvm Atlas to Thor buosters, essentially creating one new prollram in 

the prucess, and over a span uf months he directed the revitalization 

vf ;, Illa pping satellitt! project (E-4) which. though it had ancient 

ant\:'( "'dents, was esst>nttally a rival to the existent Argon mapping 

143 BYE 11011-1 

'l'8P IEeRE .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

satellite program. * 

WOP SEGRE' 

Of these various actions and their consequences. the establishment of a covert satellite program, Cambit. clearly was more 

important than most others. With Gambit there came into being a 

tightly contained procurement and program management C'apability 

that had ~o real precedent in the Air Force. Security requirements 

originating 1n the President's desire to avoid any implication of 

military operations in space became so tight that the transition from 

"extremely seC'ure" to "clandestine" and thence to "covert" was in 

sOme sense inevitable. The political vulnerability of the widely 

publicized "E" programs made Cambit even more important than 

would normally have been true, though the very remarkable performance promise of the Cambit system was in some respects a sufficient 

Justification for emphasizing that program. 

The SAFSP organization possessed some unique advantages 

that were obvious only to those familiar with its workings. First 

and foremost. by virtue of Dr. Charyk's insistence on dlrectly 

managing program activity, it had short, quick-reaction lines of 

communication and decision. Exclusion from reporting requirements 

* These individual programs are treated separately, in following chapters. 

BYE li017-74 144 

"lap IEea •• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

TOP •• e ••• 

imposed on other Air Force projects meant relief from some of the 

most frustrating and time-consuming aspects of technical development. 

Security was sufficiently tight to permit complete exclusion of most 

"auditors" and "reviewers" who. in other programs. had the authority 

to require review, and to require revision. but who had no authority 

to approve. Additionally. because it possessed mission unity. the 

Samos project could reprogram funds to considerable advantage without 

the difficulties that att\:'nd,!d such a process in the "normal" Air Force. 

Although the ultimate span of Charykls authority had yet to be clearly 

defined--and was to be an issue of some proportions for another two 

years--for practlcal purposes the Sarno. project was able to submit 

recommendations directly to an agent with authority to act. 

Certair. problems remained. The relationship of Corona and 

its variants to Samus and to the balance of the satellite reconna.issance 

program had to be defined and, having been defined, had to be reduced 

to management essentials. In the same sense. it seemed inevitable 

that th~ abundanc~ of individual approaches within the complete satellite 

reconnaissance program wo..ald lead, in time, to a more compact total 

prug ram. (Counting Corona and Mural separately, as wa. then the 

practic~ by "arly 1961, there were two readout and five recoverablecapsule reconnaissance satellites 1n development. plus tWI mapping 

145 Bn: 17017-

I'OP SEeREIf 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .8P .scas. 

systems and two ferr~t a"Atems.' Proeress--or it5 abspnce--i" 

~nQlVlu",aJ. programs sce'ned lne mUHt U;)V:OU8 ':rlterlon ~"r (.et.t"r;· ... l· - . 

• ug which Ithoulci be abc.rlt:d and which c,lnUnueQ. }:.\"o!'l I .. t.f -J \. 1""\ 

1t was apparent tn .. t aV811abit: iun<1; w . .:uld '01. 5upuort t:v\~r·'tning t •. I' 

,lrogrammed, thouan ~h~ 1.vLal of resources available lor 'Iatellit~· 

~t:connaissance haC: increased substantially in the precedlng year. 

BYE 17017.14 146 

'l'8P 'lie.E~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART· 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

1. 

l.. 

3. 

ol. 

5. 

b. 

7. 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

Ltr. A. B. Simmons, EK, to J. V. Charyk, SAFUS. approx 

loO Jun bO, no subj; Itr, Simmons to Charyk. 1.2 lui bO, no 

subJ. both in Charyk files (in SAFSS); (both letters b~ar 

ClA ("over-.. ddress indicators); memo for record. Bl'igGt.'n 

R. D. Curtin • 10 Aug 60. subj: Eastman Proposal Cor 77" 

High Resolution Camera. in SAFSS files. Gambit; Tech01cal 

proposal for Recoverable Reconnaissance Syste~s, Vol I, 

17 Tun 60. and Preliminary Technical Proposal for R~coverablc 

Reconnaissance Syst.em. Vol n, ZO Jui bO, both prep by EK, 

both in SAFSP (SP-3J files; TWX AFDRT 74550. USAF to 

ARDe, 3 Aug 60, in SP-3 files. 

Memo {or record. Curtin, 10 Aug 60. 

TWX AFDSD 76SZ0. USAF to ARDC. 13 Aug 60. 1n 5AFSP files. 

Llr, F .G. Fostel". EKCo. to CG BMD (sic). attn Maj_ 

__ 13 Aug 60. no subj; TWX WDRSP:"l6-8-1. BMD to 

~b Aug 60, both in SAFSP.3 files. 

M~mo. LtCol_ Samos Dir, for th~ R, ,:ord, 

12 Aug bO, no~l W.G. King, Dir/Samos, to 

AMC-BMC. IS Aug 60, subj: Sole Source Justification, both 

in SAFSP-3 files. 

De", Plan, "Recoverable Photographic Reconnaissance Satellite, " 

prep by STL for BMD. Aug 60, ~n SAFSP files; interview, 

LtCol lohn Pietz. SAFSP, by R. L. Perry. Zq Oct ol. 

M~mo for record. BrigGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 20 Sep 60, 

sub): SAMOS Pro~ram Meeting with SAFUS. in SP-3 files; 

draft memo, Gre~r to BrigCien ,. D. Curtin, SAFMS, 

o 0, t 60. no subj, same file. Though the 6 Oct memo waa 

not sent to Curtin, it was used as a basi. for SAFSP policy 

dctermlnal10ns for th~ next several months (mterview. Col 

J. W. Ruebel, SP- 3, by R. L. Perry, Hist Div. 1Z Dec 6Z.) 

147 BYE 17017-' 

M~""',;" .......... =- -~,~'T""r _ .. u /-~ .... _flO. .. _ - .. 

TOP •• C."" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'fOP SEGR ... 

8. lnterview, Bri~G(>n J. W. Martin, SAFSS. by R. L. Perry, 

Hut Div, 8 Nov 63; presentation notes dtd Aug bO, m 

Charyk files, SAFSS. 

9. Interview. LtCol John Pietz, SP-3, by R. L. Perry, l3 JuI bl; 

il\tervi~w, Col J. W. Ruebel, SP-3, by Perry. 6 June 63. 

10. Ltr. BrlgGt'n R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. to SAFUS, 4 O,:t 60, sub';: 

Acceleration of Reconnaissance Program. m Ore Mills and Sat 

Sys files: Gen. 

11. Memu, Greer for Curtin (not sent), 6 Oct 60; interview, Greer 

by Perry, 12 Dec 61.. 

ll. Greer notebooks, entry for 1.0 Oct 60. 

13. Ltr, Brl~Gen R. E. Greer, Oir/SP, to Ole Mi.s and Sat Sys, 

1.4 Jan 61, subj: Contract Administration, inclosing memo for 

record, prep by Greer and witnessed by Col J. W. Ruebd, 

Spec A.st to Dir/SP, tb Jan 61, aubj: Contract Disburslng. in 

SAFSP files: TWX, SAFSP-TS-60-1. SAFSP to SAFMS, 

2 Oct 60; TWX SAFMS-Sys En8-60.6; SAFMS to SAFSP, 

17 Oct 60; Warrant of Contracting Oier. 5 Oct 60, approved 

by LtGen W. F. McKee, V ICmdr AMC. aU in SAFSP (SP-3) files. 

14. Memo, D. C. Sharp, SAF, to Dir/Samos Proj, S Jan 61, subj: 

DelegatlOn of Authurity; memo for record. prep by BrigGen 

R. E. Gr~~r, OlrlSamos Proj, 14 Feb 61, no subj (also signed 

by Col J. L. Martin, 01 Dir/Ofc M1U and Sat Sys)'; Itr, Max 

Golden, OAF G~n Coun:sel, to Greer, 15 Feb 61. no subj, all 

in SP-3 files, Pohey. 

15. OAF SO A-I ;90, 27 Sep 60, confirming verbal orders of SAF 

of 6 Sep 60; OAF SO A-183Z, 6 Oct 60; Itr, Col R. R. Rowland. 

Seeyl Air Staff, to all Maj Crnds, 14 Oet 60, subj: Mi •• ile and 

Satelhte Systems, all in SAFSP iiles. 

10. Memu fur record, prep by Col P .A. Heran, Dirl E-6 proj, 

BYE 17017-74 

..... :-.. :: :~ . 

!; Nov 60. subj: Trip Report to Hq USAF (Z.4 Nov 60), in 

SAFSP files. TWX. SAFMS-99l53. SAFU~ to BMO, 4 Nov 60, 

in Rltland files; interview, Col P .A. Heran. SA~P. by 

R. L. Perry, 20 Dec oZ. 

148 

"O.I£eR£ .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 WOP IEC81i'l' 

17. TWX, SAFMS 99153, 4 Nov 60. 

18. M~mo fur record, Heran, 8 Nov bOj notes taken by Bri~Gen 

R. E. Greer, Oir /SAMOS Proj, 3 It 4 Nuv 00, in personal 

notebook (herl!after cited as Greer Notebook); H~ran int.ervu~w, 

20 Dec 6l; Greer interview, 20 Dec 62.; TWX SAFl\lS·Sys Eng 

60-6, 17 Oct 60. 

19. Memo for record. Heran, 8 Nov 60; Greer Notebook. 2. 3, &: :, 

Nov 60; TWX SAFMS 99533. SAFMS to BMD and WADD. 

7 Nov 60; Pietz int~rvlew. 12 Dec 62.; memo for record. 

LtCol J.S. Seay. SAFSP, 7 Dec 60, subj: Visit to SAF (US) 

un 10 Nov 1960, all in SAFSP files. 

lO. Greer Notebook, b-9 Nov 60; Pietz interview, 12. Dec 62.; 

mte rview. Col J. W. Rue bel, Spec As s t to Dir /SAFSP, by 

R. L. Perry. 5 Dec 62.; Greer interview, 20 Dec 62.. 

21. DAF SO E-2356. 2.3 Nov 60; Pietz interview, 26 Dec 62.. 

2Z. TWX AFMPP-WS-2-960SS, USAF to AMC, 2.4 Oct 60, 'in 

S,\FMS files, Samos Gen '60; TWX DPL 3416, SAC to ARDC/BMD, 

Ii Nov 60. in SAFMS Telecon files, Oct-Nov 60; ARDC Ops 

Order 60-1. 23 Nov bO, and ltr. Col R. E. Soper, Asst DCS/PIIO, 

to MajGl'n O. J. Ritland. Cmdr BMD, 7 Dec 60. lIubj: SAMOS 

Operation~ Ord~r, In Ritland files. Although General Creer 

reviewed the Operatlons Order with Col Soper in advance of 

its submisSlon to ARDC headquarters, final revision apparently 

was completed in that headquarters without further reference 

l'ith~r to BMD or tu SAFSP. Col Soper who headed the 

"preparation team" was unaware of SAFSP' s real (i .e., covert) 

program objectives. 

~3. TWX SAFSP-DP-o-IZ-3. SAFSP to SAFMS. 8 Dec 60, In SAFMS 

fil~s. Samos Gen • 

.!4. Mcmos (l), J. V. Charyk. SAFUS, to CIS USAF, 6 Dec 60. 

:2ubj: Balue Policy Conc~rning SAMOS in SAFSP files. One 

mcmu is Secret, the other Top Secret· Special Handling. 

Th\! S~cret memo received relatively wlde circulation; the 

uth~ r. Vlrtu all y none. 

149 

'I'D. lEe •• " 

BYE 1'101'1-
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'I'UP IEG8E'I' 

l5. Greer Not~book. 27 Dec 60. 

Zoo M\!mo (not sent), Brlg Gen R. E. Greer. Oir!Samos Proj, 

to SAFUS, approx l8 Dec 60. lubj: Progress Report SAMOS, 

in SAFSP file, Gen. 

l. i. Hq USAF 01 l5-5. 29 May 61, subj: Management, Bauc 

Policy Concerning Samos. signed by MajCen R. M. Montgomc:ry, 

Asst VCS. Although routinely filed in SAFMS, the' 01 somehow 

escaped dispatch to SAFSP. no copy could be Located in th~ 

West Coast offices. 

28. Rpt, Satellite Reconnaissance Plan, 3 Apr 6L, prt'p in Hq USAF 

(SAFMS?). in SP-3 files, NRO. 

29. Memo, J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to Brigeen R. D. Curtin, SAFMS, 

20 Sep bO, no subj, in SAFSS fUes; (there are two near-identical 

memos, one concerning Corona and the other Ar~on); memO 

for record, Col P. E. Worthman, Z6 Oct 60, subj: CORONAARGON Focal P-oint, in Corona corresp, 158-60; interview, 

Worthman by R. L. Perry, Hist Div. Z9 Apr. 3 May 63: interview, 

LtCol R. J. Ford. SP-3. by Perry. 9 Dec 63; intervlew. MajCien 

R. E. Greer, Dir/SP. by Perry, q Dec 63. 

30. Memo for record, LtCol R. J. Ford, Corona Ofc, 30 Nov 60, 

subJ: CIlA Meetlng, 3 I\uv 60. in Dr. Charyk's Office, 1n 

Corona files: Meetings; memo for record, Ford, 13 Dec 60, 

subj: Telephone 'Conversation with Mr. John Parangosky" 

Corona files. correap '58-60: TWX SAFUS 97384, perllunal 

J. V. Charyk, SAFUS, to MajGen O.J. Ritland,Cmdr BMO, 

l8 Oct 60, and msg 1461, Col P. E. Worthman, BMD, to R.M. 

B18sell, CIA, 28 Oct 60, both in Corona files. 

31. Intervlew, MajGen R. E. Creer and LtCol R.J. Ford. SAFSP, 

by Perry, q Ot"C 63. 

BYE 17017-74 150 

TOP I.~ •• T 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !'8P SECR •• 

VII PHOTO-READOUT 1960-1963 

(E-l, E-l, Subsystem I, and_Tape) 

When the Samos project finally became the direct responsibihty 

of the Secretary of the Air Force. it included three photographic 8ubsystems and one ground-based subsystem that stemmed directly from 

the original WS 117L program. Others were pending approval, but 

only the E-l and E-l readout systems and the E-S recovery system 

were funded and in a hardware stage. Auociated with the E-l and E-l 

was the ground-site complex of receiving. processing. storage and 

dissemmation equipment that was known as Subsystem 1 (a5 J, K. 1, ••• ) • 

. Under the terms of the pre-lQ60 requirements. Subsystem 1 was also 

to be the key to the E- 5 film handling and dissemination network, as 

then foreseen. Be-cause 1t had originally been designed to complement 

E-l and E-l, however, Subs\'stem 1 was generally considerlfd to be 

associated with readout 1n the recovery-versus-readout controversy, 

and the system was also a. focal pOint of the arguments over ass1gnin(t 

IJpcrational responsibihty for satellite reconnaissance to the Strategic 

Au Command. Subsystem 1. operated by SAC, would give that command 

::\ dominant role in operating and controlling satellite reconnaissance. 

A.; it happened. th,," period of Samoa reorientation during the 

sprin~ and summer of 1960 coincided with the climax of E-1 development. 

lS1 BYE 1701'1-

"UP IEeRE .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 1J'8P ... caST 

which had begun in 1956. Eastman delivered the first camera payload 

to Lockheed on 15 April and Lockheed completed its 8yst~m test of 

the Agena-plus payload on 3 June. The payload mduded both an £-1 

and an F-I ferret subsystem. By Sept~mbel". the Agena*payload 

complex was mated with an Atlas booster at Point Arguello. and on 

11 October it was launched to a considerable fanfare that included 

elaborate press conferences and a large audience of cameramen. 

The launching went well enough to please photographers, but 

program people were less than happy. The satellite umblllcal connection failed to release at launch and the hefty push of the Atlas booster 

tore away the mtrogim fill line--complete with couplings to the Agena--

when the hoses reached their physical stretch limits. Although the 

Ktlas operated p~rfectly and the separation of the Agena from the 

first-stage booster occurred as programmed, nitrogen had been 

boiling freely into the atmosphere through the entire boost period and 

the tanks were for practical purposes empty. Attitude stabilization 

depended on gas stabilization--and there was no gas. The Agena's 

engines ignited while the vehicle was improperly aligned (or injection 

into orbit- -and the flight was over. Investigation revealed that test 

brtst: personnel had failed to install a half-inch assembly that should 

have Joined the umbilical to the quick-disconnect fittings and that ·the 

BYE li017-74 152 

!fOP .SeRE .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

" nitrogen hoses were shorter than the lanyards which were supposed 

to pull awa y the quick-disconnect fittings. It was a d~Sl).:n IJverslght 

that Dr. Charyk, for one, considered to be an incrediblt: blund.:r. 1 

He was not alone. 

Quite apart from the fact that the absence of a tiny connector 

had meant the fruitless expenditure of at least $4.85 ml1hon for th~ 

boos ter, payload. and launch services. Z the failure cost une of the 

three avallable E-il F-I vehicles and postponed, at least until Januar). 

rec~ipt of the fi~st readout data from orbit. Between January and 

August L9bO, redirecllon of the Samos program had caused elimination 

of £iv~ of tho: orij.!lnal Li scheduled readout flights; only three E-I/F-l 

and thre~ E-l payloads had been authorized. 3 Even the8'~ were eliminated in early ~uvember. leaving only five readout payloads in the 

4 launch schedule. 

Tht: rapid abstraction of readout testa was symptomatlc of a 

widespread deternunatlOJI tu get on with recovery programs that 

sl:emed much morl: promlSlng. General Greer, who had urged and 

sccur'-!d approval of the cancdlation of the "extra" E-Z'lt in a 

1. l'\ovelllbcr ("onvl:!rsatiulI With Undersecretary Charyk, considered 

the tcrlllinCitlOn to be part of hUt "overall eUorts It to bring technlcal 

~oals uito reahstic ahgnment With available financial resources. 

153 BYE 17017 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 WOP IE'RE'I' 

Lockhl!ed was entirely in sympathy with hit general goal.. One officer 

from the Pentagon who visited the contr.actor's plant in November 

characteriz~d the Lockheed attitude as IIle t's hurry and fmish E-I 

and E-Z and spend all our effort on recovery systems ... 5 Those 

. viewpoints. when added to the openly expressed conviction of the 

responsible project mana~er--Colonel W. O. King--that readout 

techniques were not truly practical. pUinted toward a brit!f existence 

for the entire readout program. 

If there were to be, at most. only five more camera-readout 

flights. any eXCUSe for continuation of Subsystem 1 had vanished. The 

declining fortune!> of that portion of the total Samos program were not 

entirely based on such factors. however. Nor was cost the chief 

motlve. thoullh the high price of development had been disturbing 

program managers for many months and the astronomical costs of 

in:slalhng operational subsystems h~d been a factor in anti-readout 

sentiment for more than a year. 

Subsystem 1 had been the core of a proposed installation called 

the Intel1i~ence Data Processin~ Center, planned for construction at 

Strale~ic Air Command headquarters virtually since the acceleration 

uf the satellite reconnaissance program in early 1958. As was apparent 

... ·ven before tht: end of that year. however. there existed a considerable 

BYE 17017-74 1,4 

'1'0. '.C •• T 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

MPIEe •• " 

difference of opinion concerning the timing of that construction, the 

phaung of the turn-over to SAC, and the quality and quantLty of the 

equipment to be installed. For the most part, p:lhcy ofilcials 10 

th~ Department of Defense were extremely sensitive to the implicaHans of entrusting a sa.tellite reconnaissance 8 ystem entlrely to a 

~-ommand with SAC's public image and private outlook. They favored, 

at most. creation of a resear(-h and development type installation that 

could. if technical and political considerations ever permltted. SOme 

day be turned over to SAC. 

On the other hand. intelli~ence elements of the Alr Staff. the 

Strategic- Air Cummand. and lnfluential members of the ALr Force 

headquarters cadre argued heatedly for accelerated development of 

Subs yst~m 1 and for early creation of an "operational capability " 

Unul 1959. there was widespread opposition to the proposal that the 

prulutype Subsystem I complex being built at Denver by ThompsonRamo-Woo1dridp,e be substltuted for the desired "standard" lnstallatlOn. But when it became apparent that the slow pace 01 Subsystem I 

d~velopment would prevent the completion of an Omaha 1Illitallation 

bdore the first Sarno. £-1 launch. SAC and the Air Force Assistant 

Chu::i uf Staff for Intt'liit(enct! (MaJor General J. H. Walsh) began 

strenuuus efforts to have the Denver equipment moved to Offutt ft.r 

155 BYE 17011. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 '8P •• eas., 

"blue suit" manninfl. In part. this insistence derived from their 

mutual mistrust of ARDC's understanding of and abllity to satisfy 

"intdligence community requirements." Efforts to explain ARDC I s 

viewpoint. that the vast difference between experimental equipment 

and operational t:quipment would inevitably prevent any "operational" 

use of the;: prototype Subsystem I. were fruitless. An Offutt insta11ahon would establish a meaningful precedent for complete Air Force 

control of military space systems. and against that ur$Ze no such 

"quIbbles" could prevail. 6 

In Dt"cember 1959. ARDC virtually surrendered. Command 

headquarters illstruc-ted BMD to provide for early installation of the 

prototype devices at Offutt as soon as a degree of reliability had been 

t!stablish~d by tests. That qualification provided a substantial obstacle. 

however. From a technical standpoint. the development was not 

proceeding at all well. a Clrcumstance which made plans for a~ 

elaborrtte Offutt complex largely academic. It was clear that tht: 

Stratt:~lc Air Command saw Samos as an attack warning deviCe that 

might make some contributions to ~eneral and technical Intelligence. 

while higher authorities 1n the Pentagon had the view that Samos wali 

a .. intdhgence system with a limlted capacity for attack warninfl. 

'56 

~ ...... -. - - .. e. ,SGRIi. -.: - . 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'lOP lIiCRIi'l 

Although such policy considerations were paramount, technical shortcomings in the system were by early 1960 becoming quite 

important to the debate. Itek Corporation and Thompson-RamoWooldridge (TRW) had jOlntly evolved the design of Subsystem 1. 

TRW had subst 'luently become the sole source subcontractor to 

Lockheed for the total subsystem. Itek, under subcontract to TRW, 

had acquired development responsibility for a key element, the center 

format processor. Both Itek and TRW were comparatively new 

companies. Itek being particularly lackinll in relevant experience. 

In the course of their relationship, TRW directed multiple engineering 

changes which Itek p~rsonne1 failed to consider properly when revising 

cost estimates. Itek also made a basic major error in calculating 

overhead costs, originally weighting them at 85 percent of engineering 

costs. The correct figure. aa proved by experience, was 165 percent. 

Finally, both ltek and TRW had sadly underrated the technical 

difficulty of the development. In consequence, Itek reported a mounting 

succe.sio~ of overrun costs on its contract during 1959; from an initial 

overrun estimate of $36,000 in February 1959 the total mounted to I 

$l.1 million over the next 10 months. Concurrently. the delivery dates 

specified in the contracts slipped by nearly a year. the performance of 

the prototype equipment failed to sati8£y specificatiotta. and both TR W 

157 BYE 17017 

.,oP S.CR.' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

yep sseREIf 

and Itek encountered new and major technical obstacles to project 

success.

7 A further difficulty was that Rome Air Development Center 

had been made responsible for technical management of that aspect 

~f the total Samoa program, so that the Samoa project office was 

several echelons distant from the acene of the developments. In 

the opinion of one experienced officer, the chief responsibility lay 

with ltek and TRW, but Rome and BMD were partly to blame because 

8 

of their ineffective management of development. 

Had the development been relatively flourishillg. the basic 

equipment would have been delivered and installed by July 1960, in 

sufficient time to meet the E-l flight schedules. A successful program 

might have overcome all criticism and lent weight to arguments for 

continuing a substantial readout program. But the fact that Subsystem I 

was in grave technical difficulty, that it was badly managed, and that 

it was running out of funds tended to lncrease the probability that the 

whole readout undertaking mlght be cancelled. 

In the course of the August 1960 program reviews, an "Ad Hoc 

Group on Samos Ground Handling Data" recommended continuing Subsystem I development throuJZh a fuU system test and moving the 

completed equipment to Waahln~ton for eventual use there. A certain 

va~ueness concernlng the technlcal capability of the system and 

BYE 1701'l-'l4 '58 

'l'8P SSC.'" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'fOP •• C ••• 

uhsupported optimism concerning project cosU doomt;td the re' omm~l\da ~ 

tions. however. 9 Almost concurrently, ARDC proposed transferrln~ 

responsibility for Subsystem I from :EM.D to the Air Forc-e Command 

and Control Development Division, at Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

The suggestion, which originated with General Schnever. assum~d 

the elimination of all requirements for processing operatlOnal intelhgence information during the remainder of the research and development 

period. (Two years were sug8ened as appropriah: 

resourCeS. The project had coat some 

10 

August 1900.) 

to that time--

One of tht;t major products of the lS August 1960 Nahonal ~e("urit)" 

Council meeting was a deciuon to reduce emphasis on the ground data 

processing equipment. Immediately after securing confirmation of hi. 

authority. Dr .. Charyk assigned a special study group to the task of 

making recommendations on disposition of what remained. By that 

timu. it was appart:nt that the computer chosen as the heart of Subsystem 1 

was unsuited to its assignment. having been outdated by later models. that 

the abihty of the equipment to handle ~asic inputs was somewhat dubious, 

and that film procesSlhg ltself presented problems that had not been 

II will be recalled that ARDC headctuarters was concurrently involved 

111 ;m effort to cn1ar~~ the: R~conllaissance Laboratory's role in camera 

(h."n:lopment for Samos, 

l59 

'lap IscaET 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

solved. TRW was then 14 months behind schedule and in the throes 

of an overrun tbat promised to at least double. if not triple. project 

costs. 

Charyk himself apparently had deep misgivings concerning the 

prospects of Subsystem I. but at the same time he remained uncertain 

of its possible importance to the sort of program that might develop. 

On 13 September he told Greer to examine the dtuation and to submit 

detailed recommendations on tbe future of the ground data subsystem. 

General Cireer. although having no special animus toward the 

subsystem. was by that time convinced that recovery techniques 

offered much better prospects than readout and that SUbsystem 1 

development had been generally mismanaged. Whether it could be 

saved was not so much the question as whether it should be. 

In mid-OctOber, after several weeks devoted to careful analysis 

of the readout situation, Cireer urged Undersecretary Charyk to 

terminate the Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge contract and to begin 

considering something new. a system more completely responsive 

to real Air Force needs. Cireer had been particularly upset by some 

of the peculi~r compromises made in Subsystem 1 design in order to 

permit it to accept several varieties of input. "1 object. " he said at 

one point, "to a system that accepts five-tnch by 25-inch exposed film 

BYE 1'7017-74 160 

.ap lEe •• ., 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'I8P l.aR.'I 

(E-5), reduces it, and chops it up .•. to fit an automatic scheme 

along with U-Z photography, World War II photography, E-I/E-2 

take. etc." Adding that his VlewS were his own, that most of hl:; 

staf! was not in agreement, he urJiCed a work cancellauon. The subsystem was not essential to Samoa operations, Greer told Dr. Charyk. 

For the purpol5es of early photo and ferret readout flights, he said, 

the Satellite Tracking Center at Sunnyvale, California, could handle 

processing requirements. 

In this stand, Greer was almost alone. Charyk's Pentagon 

staff (SAFMS) urged that Subsystem I be continued. withal at a less 

expensivt: rate and wuh revlsed objectives, while most of the West 

Coast group held the subsystem es.ential to a technically valid 

11 

program. In ench ... ase, a cautious reluctance to discard readout 

approaches WhlCh had been pursued for five years probably motivated 

the two staf!s more than any innate confidence in Sub.yst~m 1'8 

technical promise. Neither Charyk nor Greer was disturbed by such 

qualms, however; t:ach was personally and philosophlcally committed 

to a sharp break with the past--if such a break promised to make 

~caneral program ~oals mure attainable. 

On 4 November 1960, Charyk directed immediate term~nation 

oi aU work on Subsystem I except that required to enable ARDC to 

1&1 BYE 170'-

'I'OP SEe •• 'I 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

~\"aluate the feasibility of employing the equipment elsewhere. 

Processing equlpment fur the several remaining readout satellite 

flights would be provided from other resources. he told the Air 

Force chief of staff. II Within the week, termination notic-es had 

bt·tm issued to TRW, Rome Air Development Center had received 

in~lructions on funding. and ARDC headquarters had been advised of 

its responsibility for determining the usefulness and £lOa1 dispollition 

of the developed equipments. 13 

Shortly before Christmas of 1960. Undersecretary Charyk 

approved a total expenditure in fisc aJ 1961 (unds to 

close out the project. (Total program cost approximated 

Including the 1961 funds.) Roughly 

expended before the November cancellation. s needed 

to ("over work stiU on ~he contract, and _ was provided to 

finance contract termination actions. The decision met a final 

anuuished protest (rom the Strategic Air Command, which pleaded 

f\Jr l:ontinued development and test of Subsystem 1 as an integral umt. 

but Charyk was adamant. He had concluded that the entire concept 

of Subsystem I was obsolescent. He ~u1 an end to speculation that 

~ Jl(:,W and .. nore elaborate system mi.eht eventuate by asking AROC 

tu )Jr .. po~",· a "~ood solid research and development program" to 

BYE 170li-74 

-_ ... : : .: .... 

162 

TOP '.'85'1' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.8P ISCRS. 

result in equipment capable of processinK all Samos film; Charyk 

emphasized that he wanted not a syst.em proposal, but a program to 

devdop "simple and practical equipment." Wh~n nothing promlsing 

appeared by February, he ordered all Subsystem 1 act.ivity tv be 

14 clo$~d out by Zl July 1961. 

Large among the reaSOns for ending the development was cost. 

Fvr an input of nearly the Air Force had obtained a semiobsolescent lot of partially developed equipment tied to an abandoned 

concept. In the final analysis, Subsystem I had been ddiJlnt·d to 

satisfy the pre-1960 requirement for early attack warning; the shift 

. of emphasis from surveillance to reconnaissance in July 19&0 had 

doomed the development, although full appreciation of that circumstance 

was not widespread. 

The factor of technical failure in the development program 

ltseU was certainly an element In tbe termination decisum. But though 

engineering difficulties were substantial, greater obatael,·s had been 

overcome elsewhere in the Samos program, and the re~punsibility 

{or the ulumate collaps~ of the development pro((ram had therefore 

to be credited as much to improper management as to an ything else. 

Suparated from the conduct of development work by an intervemng 

ARDe center and two layers of contractors, the Samos project office 

163 

'!'op .sells'!' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

was never able to maintain sufficiently close control of the e naineering 

effort. The unfortunate fact that both of the principal contractors were 

relatively inexperienct'ld in such work was certainly a contriblllor, but 

probably not a determinant. Experience in satellite reconnaisliance 

was not an abundant commodity, after all. 

One other significant aspect of the t~rmination delierved nouce. 

Between the time that Charyk received Creer's recommendationll and 

the time of an absolute. final cancellation, only two weeks passed. 

The recommendation itseLC was based on an analysis that took les8 

than a month. Both the assurance and the speed with which the new 

Samos managemt!nt Il.roup acted showed that more had changed in the 

program than thl..' technical character of aome of the sub.yatems. A 

new impatiencE' with failure lay close to the surface. 

E-l and E-2. 

Doubts about the worth of continuing the still-scheduled readout 

t~sts were apparent in the wake of the Subsyatem [ caneeUahon but 

wt're generall y subdued by the absence of an y flight data that could 

cunfirm Ju.jgments on system feasibility and ullefulnes.. Both Charyk 

and Greer were ctlrtain that the readout system would return photo-

~raphs. but whether such photographs would be of a useful quality 

164 

~O. 'Ee.E~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

remained to be seen. 

YOP •• ea ... 

They a~reed to await result. of flight tests 

before deciding th~ program's future. By the end of 1960 there was 

no longer any question of Corona feasibility, and in terms of utility 

for reconnaissance purposes the worst of the Corona returns was 

. 15 

certain to be better than the best of the E-l photographs. 

Nevertheless. empirical evidence remained the best basis for 

judgment on program validity, and in the absence of flight data on 

which to base a findmg the cancellation of the E-I program might 

prove difficult to defend. It was also pertinent that by late 1960 the 

5~cond flight vehicl~ was ready for launch; cancellabon thereaft~r 

would have saved the cost of launching one Atlas-Agena. but payload 

expenses could not have been recovered and in any case, as yet the 

booster combinatiun had not recorded a success in orbiting a 

reconnaissance payload, so termination would have been costly in 

prestige. as well. All in all. the arguments for attempting the 

s~cond E-l launch were more compelling than those against. 

By early January the vehicle was on the stand and had been 

checked out •. At that point a new complication arose. Negotiations 

with the Soviet. for release of two imprisoned members of an 

unprudent RB-47 crew were approaching a climax; the newly installed 

Kt!nnt!dy administration was extremely anxious to establish an early 

165 BYE 170'-

.OP IliCll1i9 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'I'8P •• e85'1' 

r~cord of diplomatic achievement by getting agreement--1o the crew's 

return. In mid-January, WIth the E-l on stand and ready, General 

Gre~r received urgent encrypted instructions to delay the sCheduled 

launch by some plausible subterfuge until the freed creW ('auld actually 

be returned to American custody. He explained the situation to 

Colond H. L. Evans, hIs deputy, and they concocted the schemt! of 

havin~ the colonel appear before the general in the company of two 

"unwitting" program office ~peciali.t. with a suggestion that the E-l 

launch be delayed by a week or 90 to per'nit a final recheck of launch 

readiness provisions. Deliberately unspecific but convincin~ references 

to difficulties and un("ertainti~s involving the telemetry stations, range 

pro('~dures, and checkout processes made up the bulk of Colonel E\ans' 

remarks. WIth (Ollllterfeit reluctance, General Creer agreed to a 

postponement. Once the released Air Force crewmen had been returned, 

th~ oc('asion for delay vanished--and 80 did the technical obstacles . 16 

E\.an,; had mat~rialized (or his appeal to the general. 

There followed the 31 January 1961 launch or the second Samos 

vehide (number 2102). Like the first. in October. it carried a composite 

E-l I amera. Unlike the October vehicle. however, the second Samoa 

went into a stable orbit and relayed information to the readout atation 

at Sunnyvale. (The orbital vehicle had a period of 95.2 minutes, a 

166 

TOP •• C •• 'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'lOP •• C •• ., 

perigee of Z60 miles. an apogee of 311.6 mile •• and a nominal life 

expectancy of U30 days. ) 

On 3 February. Colonel King took the first analysis of flight 

results to Dr. Charyk. An assembled photo(lraph was available 

which indicated that the ground resolution of the system was roughly 

wh<lt had been anticipated. about 100 feet. Although the hand-proceased 

pictures were relatively good in terms of original system requirements. 

the system itself did not promise much in the way of eventual utility. 

There seemed little justification for altering the premise vi the 

previous eight months--that the £-1 would be tested only to prove out 

the feasibility of the in-flight processing. transmitting. and readout 

equipment. 

General Greer was closeted with Undersecretary Charyk lor 

most of three days starting on 13 February. Among the many Samos 

program matters discussed and decided durin~ that period. one of 

th~ chief was the future of the E-1 and E-Z launches. As had been 

~\!nerally anticlpated. Charyk agreed that the relative Success of 

the Z102 vehicle was a sufficient proof of E-l system feasibility; he 

approved General Greer's recommendation that the third of the 

pro~rammed E-1 fiiElhts be cancelled and the equipment stored for 

some possible future application. They also agreed to let the 

167 BYE 1'10' 

"ep ,liC .... 
t:JRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP , .. CRE., 

scheduled £-2. llight.s remain in the program for the moment, a1t.ho'1~h 

again it was apparent that once a set of returns had buen received 

th~re would be no real justification for further continuance of the E-2. 

17 

program. 

In effect, the February decision halted all work on the remamin~ 

E -1 system (vehicle 2.103) and caused it to be returned to Lockheed's 

Sunnyvale plant for bonded storage. All of the necessary directives 

were in drcu1ation by 15 February, one day after Charyk's verbal 

. . G 18 lnstructlons to reer. 

There was one additional, almost afterthought aspect to the E-l 

program. [n April 1961, representatives of the National Aeronautics· 

and Spac~ Admmistration (NASA) contacted Dr. Charyk's office to ask 

permiSSlon to '!Xamlne and use E-l technology in then own programs. 

It seemed possible for a time that the physical product. of the £-1 

d~velopment might actually find their way into a moon vehicle. One 

stImulant was the obvious parallel between £-1 equipment and techniques 

and the de vie es used by the Soviets to photograph the back surface of 

the moon in October 1959. 

The Soviet feat had excited admiration from a number of American 

sp~clalists in reconnai •• ance and from astronomers in general. (The 

lunar pictures, incidentally, represented the first public disclosure of 

BYE 1jOI7-'14 168 

'l!OP '.GR ... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON:.7 MAY 2012 

"'DP .5C.5T 

satellite photography and stimulated considerable conjecture about the 

existellce and capabilit}: uf a Soviet reconnaissance satellitt! system.) 

Wlthout gwing any indication that he knew of the E-l and E-l specifications. Amrom H. Katz, Rand'. furemost optical physicist, calculated 

the relative ground resolution of the Soviet camera and data link system 

at about 2.50 feet from an altitude of 300 miles. That was a shade less 

dfective than the E·l. though in practice the considerable difficulties 

of transmitting photographic data over distances ranging from ~O, 000 

to 1.00, 000 mlles tended to invalidate any general conclu81ons on that 

seo"re. (The Soviet system had employed an eight-inch F/S. 6 lens 

and a lO-inch F/9. 5 ltln=> to produce simultaneous photographs. each 

on one-half of a single irame of 35 millimeter film. Katz and others 

e~ti.mated that transmissiun of a complete negative required about 

lO minutes. The satellite never approached closer than 40, 000 to 

50, 000 miles to the moon but nevertheless returned . photographs which 

showed a ground resulution on the order of 5-10 miles.) In tbe realm 

uf the theoretical, it seemed that the slightly Inore IIOphlsllcated--on 

paper. at least--E-l or its E-2 successor might permit the United 

Slates to obtam better pictures. At least NASA seemed (. "nvinced--so 

much 50 that Undersecretaq' Charyk authorized that agency to d ... al 

wlth the E-l contractors through CieneraJ. Greer's office. Charyk 

169 BYE 1701'7 

,., ,-: ~ . ;. =. .--a- / - " --" ~ 

",up lIiGRE .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'8. SEe •• ., 

lnstruch:d Creer to permit access to technical data on the came ra 

and on-board processmg equipment. data transmission elements, 

and the ground processing system. However. he forbade the release 

lQ of speclfic satt:llite photography or detailed test results .. 

There was considerable doubt in informed quarters that the 

C-l devices had any useful application to the problem of lunar photography: both Rand and Colonel King freely expressed reservations on 

that }.ioint. Indeed. as analysis of E-l results continued and as the 

fund of preclSe information on system capability increased. confidence 

1n the :;ystc:m t~nded to decrease proportionately. Concurrently • 

. there was a growing awareness that it would be most difficult to 

fund all of the assorted Samos systems in the next fiscal year. a 

circumstance that caused program managers to give new thought to 

early cancellation of the entire E-Z program. Early in March 1961. 

when tho= fiscal 1962. budget for Samos was undergoing final review. 

the question of what could be done with funds that. though substantial. 

w~r\! definitely limited, focused in part on how many E-Z nights should 

be carried on the schedule. The issue was complicated by Dr. Charyk's 

desire to develop and test a mapping and charting satellite (essentially 

iI rt!viv~d E-4 system) as well as to continue or even expand a basic 

prugram that now included ferret satellites, the E.S. E-6. Gambit. 

BYE l'l017-'l4 170 

.. 8.IEE81i. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

~ep I.CR.' 

and several variants of Corona. Dr. Charyk was willing to consider 

cancellation of the E·Z program in favor of a new readout.technology 

lO 

appruach with more promise, should that seem thtl bc!st course. 

Although in mOlt ellential features the E-Z system was technieally identical to the E-l, differing chiefly in th~ degree of lens 

magnification, there was evidence that all of the ('ompiexities of 

r~adout had not been resolved by the relatively successful E-I Ui[lht. 

In May 1961, for instance, the program ofiice reported that the 

processing unit in the payload vehicle had repeatedly jammed in the 

course of check-out tests, that the film record was subject to distortion under certain conditions, and that the ground equipment still 

Zl 

experienced frequent random failures. Even before the program 

review that brought such circumstances to the attention of the undersecretary, he had decided to limit th~ total of E-l £lights to two. On 

19 April, the third E-2 vehicle-payload (vehide 212l) was canceUed. 

Another significant change came early in July when a succession of 

payload, tracking net, and booster difficulties forced postponement 

of the scheduled launch of the first E-l. Even after the original 

sequence of such difficulties was resolved, a new onset of electronic 

trouble in the Atlas booster allain caused postponement of the launch 

Zl 

date into September. 

171 

~9P I .. C8 ... 

BYE 11011-
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 yep IEIRE, 

On 9 September 1961 the initial attempt to orbit an E-Z payload 

ended in an aweSome launch pad explosion. Loss of electrical power 

.-:aused the Atlas to drop back on the pad less than two seconds aftl'r 

liftoff. The E-Z payload was destroyed-ln the reaultin~ blast and fire. 

(The Atlas failure was caused by a delay of • Z seconds in disconnectin~ 

the umbilical that carried the signal to switch from external to internal 

, l3 

electrlc power.) 

The remaining E-Z flight test vehicle (Zlll) faced a problem oi 

crowded launch pad schedules. After weighing the prospect of a major 

malfunction and the clear evidence that basic subsystem performance 

had been adequately demonstrated in the single successful E-l'flight, 

Charyk and Greer decided not to launch the second E-Z vehicle. On 

30 September the contractor was instructed to remove it from flight 

readiness processin~ and put it in bonded storage. For all practical 

purpos~s. such action concluded the original readout-oriented Samos 

Z4 

program. 

Colonel W. C. King, responsible for those aspect. of Samos 

which predated the August 1960 reorganization, saw clearly that the 

decision to st,ore rather than launch the remaining E-Z payloads meant 

that readout, lias presently conceiveci, " was no longer "an acceptable 

alternative solution to tht> earth recce problems facin~ us. II On 

BYE 11017-74 17l 

TOpaEe •• '!' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lap IBe •• " 

6 October h~ issued instructions that all work un readout should halt 

immt!diately. cautioning the procurement office to look carefully to 

be sure u1 ilnding "a lot of the efforts which are hidden In the 

bushes ••• II He wrote. a brief epitaph with the phrase. "It is 

presumed tht! present readout program is defunct. " 

Colunel King's expe~ience with the E-l and E-l had not 

convinc-=d hIm that any of the equipment was applicable to NASA's 

moon r~connaissance program. He remarked mUdly that "the gentlemen" with whom he had discussed the NASA proposal "did (not] seem 

to understand much about the problems uf taking pictures from a space 

vehicle. " but then he had earlier concluded (as had The Rand C,orporation. independently) that little of the basic eqUipment could be adapted 

to a lunar recuOll.lissance program. Hi, own draconian preference 

£01' disposing of ::Iurviving payloads was to offer one of the E-l 'IS to a 

museum and to give the remaining £-Z vehicle to anybody who could 

afiord to fly It. 

The residue of the readout program was initiaU y concentrated 

at Vandenberg Air Force base. although bits and pieces finally settled 

at other sites over the country. The two remaining £-1 flight models 

remained at Vandenberg. together with spare parts sufficient to make 

a third payload. Three aasembled or partly assembled but untested 

173 BYE 17017. 

,8P •• C8ET 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP •• ,aE. 

E-l's wt:re stor~d at Sunnyvale. One E-Z flight model and parts {or 

another were also in Vandenberg storage. Two other non-flyable t~st 

mudds remained, one at Eastman Kodak's Rochester plant and the 

~5 other at Sunnyvale. After September 1961. there were no serious 

proposals for Au Force utilization of the equipment. even thoullh lunar 

rt:C"onnalssance kept bobbinS! up. The flyable payloads 'went into storage 

at Milpitas. California. and the Agena vehicles not adaptable to other 

programs with them. Contractors converted to other uses most test 

items. Readout in lts original form was. as Colonel King had observed. 

·'defunct. " 

That being the case, King felt himself free to state several Vlewpoints that would have been considered inappropriate in the manager of a 

major readout development. Although he agreed that many people thought 

readout might be the "ultimate" system. King could see no reason at all 

for developing sUI.:h a device. A good system, he told Culonel J'. R. 

Ruebel. requU'ed a reliable long orbital life. an invulnerable long unattended life. boosters capable of lofting large power supplies. and a 

readout network capable of doing a fi~.t-rate job. The combination. he 

observed. would be "tough to provide--and costly." " •.• Why spend 

your time creating a problem so you can work on it?" he wrote 

Colonel Ruebel. 

BYE liOl'l-74 174 

IJ'BP .SCaST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

It was also apparent, Ki.ng noted, that no readout system then 

conceivable could provide the clarity or definition oC recovered film. 

What could the readout system sense that a small-ume dlfferential 

would degrade, he asked? Would a readout system be more ~("onomical 

thana recovery system if estimates properly welghed the cost of 

amortizing development? King thought not. He was convinced that 

with the possible exception of better response to low levt.·h of illumination, . everything a readout system could do a recovery sY15tem could do 

better. The need for long on-orbit life pushed a readoul 'l5ystem 80 far 

out into space, for example, that a 10-foot recovery system would always 

become a ZO-foot readout system. 

As for the future. King felt that development of traveling wave 

tubes would indeed allow much more information to be transmitted, 

quickly and al'curately, than current six-megacycle systems. but he 

noted acidly that a great deal more would be required to make readout 

compatible with any of the recovery systems then in development. So. 

he asked •. "Why develop something that will take weeks to cover the 

same ground· that you can cover in S days? 11 As for technology, not 

only was a stabilizahon and ai.ming system capable of supporting a 

very high resolution readout system rather remote, but it promised 

to be very expensive. Perhaps more important. an electronic data 

175 BYE non 

'lap .&e8." 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~ePIE£." 

link was much more vulnerable. both physically and politically. than 

any recovery system. 

Not even when the proposition was a continui~ research program 

pointed toward possible needs five years hence did it satisfy Colonel 

King's standards. He was convinced. he told Colonel Ruebel. that 

rehable recovery. even reHable recovery of several packages from toe 

same orbitinll vehicle. would always prove simpler than providing a 

combination of reliable long life on orbit with a good data link. Five 

years in the future. satellites might pl'ovide the only source of reconnaissance information. but by then both readout and recovery would be 

difficult and the earlier advantages of recovery would have persisted. * 

SQme of the .rJlulllents against readout, though not Colonel King's, 

w~re based on advantage. of the E-5 and E-6 over the E-l and E-Z 

which were the product of general advances in the state of the reconnaissance arts. The E-I was a fixed camera covering a IOO-mile 

swath on the ground while the E-2 had a stabilized rotatable mount 

to provide 17-mile-widestrlp coverage within a 300-mil~-wide strip 

along th~ ground track. Maximum resolution of the E-Z, under ideal 

conditions. was on the order of ZO feet. In practice. a r~solution on 

tht> high s~de of 35 feet could be normally anticipated. BE-tter optics. 

10lprovt=d techniques of film transport. improved vehicle stabilization 

on ·orbit, and·modes of panoramic' photography. made both the E-S and 

£-6 considerably more attractive in terms of ground resolution, 

gruund coverage. and general picture quality. But with allowances 

ior the fact that stabilization requirements would be more critical 

:11 the case of a camera on 300-mile orbit than for one 0l'bitin8 below 

150 miles, the lens. film transport. and panning advances incorporated 

in lhe £-6 might well have been built into a readout system, thus. 

176 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

"In Itummary. " wrote Colonel Kina. "l donlt favur diluting any 

of our efforts [in order] to build a readout gadget. Despite the pres.ure 

to get lnto readout and electrostatic tapes. etc •• lid say 1t was a 

wasteful effort. Started now it would chug along and we would cancel 

Z6 

it later anyhow." 

r-.!ducmg the performance gap. The E-3 design was a case in point. 

Though it had inherent faults it was in many respects a t~chnical 

contemporary of the E-S. The basic defects of readout. from a 

technological standpoint. were those C01!lnel King constantly emphasiaecl: 

Inability to provide reliable long life on orbit. and the absence of a sound 

wlde-band data link. When thos~ objections had succumbecl to some 

It!l"hnological advance that could not be accurately"foreseen in 19&1. 

evolutions of the potentlal of readout could take a different direction. 

A s it happened, 10 years were to pass before the objectives King 

postulated could be overcome--even in theory. 

171 

WOP IEe.EY 

BYE nOli 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ",up IEGREY 

READOUT REVISITED 

The abandonment of the original E-l and E-l readout appro~ch~s 

by late 1961 did not start a pogrom of readout advocates. nor did it nlark 

the extermination of all readout research. There was nutably little 

- enthusiasm for the readout approach within the ruling circles in SAFSP, 

but with considerably morc substance than most ghosts. readout kept 

materialiZing, being exorcised. and then materializing again. 

The chief 1961 alternative to the teChnique embodied, in the E-l 

and E-Z (automatic processing of standard photographic fUm and transmusion of analog data to a ground station) was some form of electronic 

or electrostatic tape recording. The Air Force had first funded such 

t~chnology 10 1950 , durin~ the period when the Advanced Retearcb 

PrOjects Agency (ARPA) had controlled the Sentry-Samos effort. 

Obviously inspired by advice that bigh ARPA offlcials were wildly 

enthusiastic about electrostatic tape techniques, Lockheed had proposed 

and secur~d approval of a program to develop the E-3, a h1.gh-resolution 

tape- readout system. By July 1959, when it brieny seemed that ARPA 

rather than the Air Force might acquire'permanent custody of Samos, 

Lockheed was assuring the Pentagon super-agency that an "all-electronic 

approach" (electrostatic- tape) would "provide the highest possible 

p-:rCormance in the earliest time period at minimum cos~." 

BY!: l'l017-74 

178 

TGII ISCIIET 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'lap Isea.'I' 

Such enthusiasm was not limited t. electrostatic tape applications but as the occasion required could be extended to encompasa a 

variety u£ interesting technical gadgetry then under conslderation. 

Lockheed--and the Wright Air Development Center's ReC'onnaissance 

Laburatory--contended that the fea~ibility of an electrostatic tape 

development had been demonstrated under a tesearch contract. that 

ther~ was good reason for optimism cone-erning an ima((e orthicon 

tube development. and that at least three alternative projects (the 

CBS Laboratories' Reconotron. Ceneral Electric's Thermoplastic 

Tape, and the Westinghouse EBICON device) promised greater BensitlVlty and less complexity than any conceivable film approach. /.7 

In electrostatic tape, however, both Lockheed and the Wright Fl.eld 

laboratory saw real promille. They pointed out that in theory a tape 

system could provlde the equivalent of 100 lines per millimeter resoIlltion (12, ZOO televislon hnes for each fll-miLlimeter-square frame!) 

usmg an F 14.5 lens and a slit shutter set for t!:lree-millisecond 

ICc 

~xposures. Assuming the availability of a lZ-megacycle-per-second 

bandwidth. experimenter. calculated that readout time would be but 

8. 7 s~conds per frame-ea. opposed to the .everal-tninut~s-per-frame 

l8 

of the E-1 system • 

. '. -, 

Th~· readout technique used a sandwl.C'h-type electrostatic tape 

cunlr\lhing a very sensitive photo conductor and an accompanying 

179 BYE 17017 

'lap IEeRIi .. :. .. ' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Although the earefull y organized demise of the £- 3 program 

lal~ in lQS9. one of the first of Air ForC'e actions o. regaininf! full 

{"ontrol of Samos, eliminated the possibility that a major portion of 

the sateilite reconnais aanee effort would be diverted to ~adgets that 

could not realistically be readied for initial tests in le8s than three 

y;.:ars, the investigation of "E-) type technolugy" was continued--at 

a relatively low level of financing. In the fall of 1960. when impatience 

with the lack uf progress in Samos development caused the establish· 

m~nt of General Greerts Directorate of Special Projects (SAFSP). * 

at least olle member of the DDRIEE (Directorate of Defense Research 

and Engineering) staff queried the Ballhtic Systems Division concerning 

the "ad~quacy" of support for electrostatic tape development. Colonel 

H. L. Evans. the Ballistic Missile Divisionis vice commander for 

satellite systems and a veteran of the E-3 episode of 1959. hastily 

<1,;;sured the Inquiring authority that "present support" was quite adequate. 

lnlSuLator, the tape receiving and storing a hitzh quality image picked 

up through the lens. Readout itself involved the process of deflecting 

the modulation of an electron beam whieh was magnetically guided to 

scan thl! area of the tape on which an image was recorded. The re.ulting video signal was amplified in transistorized amplifiers and then 

<1pplied as a modulating signal to a transmitter tuned to a ground station. 

Onginally, Director of the Samos Project. 

BYE 17011-14 

har-c Ii! • 3 Bveman/Tslen! Ke~"~le 

::~:.: ;; ~" . 

180 

'1'8. '.C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

He addl!d that there was no immediate prospect of transition from an 

advanc~d research program to a system d.evelopment, th~ t~chnology 

, 'd Z9 belllg as yet lna equate. 

After SAFSP's establishment, funds were obtained to c"ntinue 

research lnto the electrostatic tape approach. The Aernnautical 

Systems Division. WhlCh had. inherited the Reconnaissan"" Laboratory 

through a 1961 reorgamzation, retamed custody of the prugram on a 

"monitored activity" basis. The Wright Fif'ld people were honestly 

convlnced that they were working toward an early operational camera 

sys'tem based on RCA's electrostatic tape process. West Coast specialists 

bdter contained their enthusiasm and their expectations. Nevertheless. 

by Sl!ptember 1901 the proponents of the RCA system were able to prompt 

a formal eva1uahun of their proposal. Unhappily (from their viewpoint). 

lh~ SAFSP englneers who evaluated the proposed system had t-o report 

t11at obtainlllg the requisite four-foot resolution "would mean developing 

it vl!ry complex system" even though "many technical and operational 

pfublem.s r are1 yet unsolved." Power supply bmitations promised to 

kt:ElP any tape system from remaining active for more than two months 

lin urbit, with one-month life being a real possibility. The only approach 

then feasible could be to mate the tape system to one of the eXisting 

rcaduut-mode reconnaissance systems, thus providinll at relatlve~y 

181 BYE nOt'i 

TDP .BCRB .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

slight cost the essenllal optica, vehicle, stabilisation, cornm.and and 

30 

control. and 8lX-megacycle data link. 

Largely on the basls of that appraisal. SAFSP in November 1901 

advised the Aeronautical Systems Division of its readiness to listen 

to proposals for developing a camera--le .. opticl--suitable for 

environmental and functional testing of the electrostatic tape equlpment. 

Wright Field. in response, estimated a lS-month effort that would C'ost 

General Greer's organization from 

Perhaps the cost. perhaps the awarene •• of technical uncertainty 

proved sufficiently impressive, but in any event it became clear that no 

'such major program would be carried throulh on sAFSP money. What 

did result was a proposal that SAFSP (through the Air Force Space Systems 

Division) provide 80me in fiscal 1963 money. with the Aeronautical Systems Division investing a like amount. (In the prOeceding 

three fiscal years. the Samoa project had furnished about and 

the Reconnaissance Laboratory support the 

electronic readout work.) Since the E-Z syatem had been cancelled 

before these proposals could be refined, the E-6 became a leading 

candidate to provide optics and stabilisation elements. Advocates of 

the E-2 approach still were heard. however. chiefly because th- difficulty 

of adapting E-6 optics and film transport to the tape devices seemed 

BYE 17011·'4 18Z .0, •• C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

yep I.' ••• 

,'onsid~rably greater than the dil!iculty oC adopting E-Z Hubsysterns. 

The reahstic objective for the immediate future, however, wa~ to 

obtain a "breadboard" version which could be usefully telited aboard 

an aircraft. No orbital experiments were seriously considered in 

31 

the . lrcumstances of the moment. 

There was little doubt of SAFSP interest, but in the mlddlt. 

months nf 1961 there arose a substantial question about the technical 

I 

adequacy of the proposed RCA approach. The first test results reported 

to SAFSP proved quite disappointing; in Aprill96Z Captain Frank Gorman 

(U.S.N.). the chief of advanced planning for Ceneral Or'!er's t:lItablilihment, urg~d the Reconnaissance Laboratory to retest for sensuivity 

(t!qUlvalcnt of film speed). resolution. and dynamic ran~~ (equivalent 

of gray scale 1n photographs). Subsequently. when few data wel't! forthcoming. At!rospace Corporation personnel contacted RCA directly--a 

development that brought a pained protest from Wright Fleld. f~arful 

that RCA would become too fond of dealing directly with thl:! customer 

for satellite systems. Gorman reassured the Dayton laboratory that 

he had no intention of letting Aerospace Corporation pirate the develop32 

ment program. 

A meaningful revival of interest in readout came 1n October 1961. 

almost entirely prompted by the Cuban missile cnsis of that fall. A 

183 

'lOP •• caa .. 

BYE 1781' 

H!J"'d~ I.e B~m.r/TH·~· I"~. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 T8P •• C •• '1 

major Air Force achievement had been the successful relocatiun dnd 

operation of a cloud-cover satellite system. the "Program 35" satellite and ~round complex developed under cover of SAFSP activity. 

." 

" 

Enorlnoulily impressed both by the .flexibility of the satellite system 

and by its application to a crisis situation. Undersecrptary Charyk. 

after brief consideration. asked Ceneral Creer to propose a rEOadout 

system ~ apable of providing surveillance capacity over spedfk hmited 

ar(:as of the Soviet heartland. It was in some important respects a 

regression to the requirements of the pre-1960 period. when warning 

rather than reconnaissance was the program objective. (One side 

effect of the episode was a quick inventory of available E-l and E-2 

payloads; three fl yable systems were located. ) 

General Greer responded by instructing Captain Gorman to 

"develop a plan for a mobife surveillance satellite system" based on 

t:iectrostallc tape or some other electro-optical recordinli( method. 

(The p- 35 satellite had us ed a derivation of the Tiro. television recordIn!l, syst\!m.) Gorman's goals were to be a system concept and a 

development plan. Greer did not really care which of several basic 

,",chlcie concepts was employed. although he suggested paying parth-ulal' 

att\!ntlon . hId' h' I 33 to W l'e -type an spin-pan-type ve lC es • 

." 

'" 

Dl::;l.Ussed l~ Chapter VlIl. 

BYE 17017·74 184 

'lOP •• eaSy 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 we. lac •• " 

In point of fact, General Creer found it difflcult tu become 

particularly enthuslastic at the thought of any new readout development 

prugram. Thoughtfully, he retrieved Colonel King's unlnnd epilot!lc 

remarks on readout from the file where they had been rf'!ltlng ior 

nearly a year and after reading them again he openttd an extenslve 

personal lnquiry into the pO,lential and limitations of readout in general. 

The result was an essay, "Anatomy of Readout, II buUt around a series 

of mathematical calculahons of readout'. theoretical and probable 

utility. He concluded that the best obtainable readout sY$tem would 

require about 700 seconds to transmit the information it could a\.ljuire 

in one second. Any readout satellite would need 40 day. of r,eliable 

operation to equal the gross product of avaUable recovery sysh'rot> 

that could photograph 100 targets a day for three days in orbit and 

which could make all of its photographs available for examination 

within three days of recovery. (With 10 ground stations to read out 

satellite mlormation. Greer calculated, the readout system might In 

!lve days equal the recovery system'. three"day output.) Apa.rt from 

ObV10US disparity in resolutIon 'lotential which made recovery .0 

attractive, an operationally useful readout •• tellite would also have 

to overcome Culonel KIng's basic objections that current technology 

could not provide for lon'-l-tc.'rm untended reliability on orbit, for 

l8S BYE 1'701 

!JIGP •• CRE" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

IfSP 15G85'1' . 

in~xpensive ground stations, a'.,ld for considerable lmprovernents in 

. . 34 data transmlSSlon. 

Anything that promised to satisfy such requirements would 

have to corne from work supported by the Reconnaissance Laboratory 

at Wright Field. When interest suddenly spurted, in October 196Z, 

the project could look back. on four independent efforts to develop an 

electronic camera having significant advantages over a conventional 

silver halide image device. RCA had devoted considerable effort to 

developing a photo-conductive tape system and Westmghuu8e ,to photoemissive tape. General Electric touted the virtues of a thermoplastic 

tape system. Chance-Vought had explored the potential of a moclification of the Xerox process. The Navy, which had pro.rided virtually 

all funds for the Chance-Vought investigation, dropped the project in 

1961. Even earlier, the Reconnais.ance Laboratory had /itlven up on 

the General Electric system and was then in the pro:ess of clo.ing 

out the Westinghouse activity. RCA remained. "on its merits. " to 

quote the project officer. AU of the othe-r artful techmqucs had displayed 

apparently unsurmountable defects i~ resolution, sensitivity, and handling 

, 35 requlrements. 

The advanta~es of electronic tape, apart from those ritllally 

urg~d whenuver devotees of readout gathered, lay essentially tn a 

BYE 1'l01'7-74 186 

Na-c'.;, ,'3 9veman/Tale"~ Key"oIe 

'lOP •• ea., 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

greater sensitivity than film (by a multiple of at least SO) ami in the 

promise tbat a shutter mechanism might be electronic rather than 

mechanical. (Both vibration effects and reliabihty wer~ markedly 

influenced by shutter design.) As compared to film, tapt: had another" 

advantage for a period of "hot war"j although exposure tu nuclear 

radiation migbt wipe away any sorted imagea. it would not so affect 

the reuse potential of the tape. Other advantages, aa 80;cn by project 

advoc~te.. tended to binge on the availability of techniques not yet 

generally proven--sucb as ZO-rnegacycle-per-second data links haVLng 

a 30-decibel signal-to:noiae ratio, or an 80-megacycle link "developed 

and demonstrated by tbe Communications Laboratory at ASD." Such 

equipment was purported to be "available" in a form that would qualify 

36 

it for satellite installation. 

The option of reactivating tbe E-Z, and improving its technology 

by half a decade, was not readily available. CaptaLn Corman investlgated tbat situation and concluded that a test of E-Z payloads could not 

s~nsibly b~ fundedi it would b. prohibitively expenaive, Lf only because 

a yatem operation depended on the availability of impregnated developing 

37 webs which bad not been manufactured for two years. 

In ellenee. the non-availabUity of an E-l system. the canceUation ·of three proposed tape systems because of major defects, and the 

187 BYE 1701'1 

.,OP IEeRE~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

continuation of the requirement posed by Dr. Charyk left Captain 

Gorman with but one option: investigation of the RCA tape system 

for possible application to the problem. He therefore asked the 

Aeronautical Systems Division to provide definitive performance 

data on the RCA tape system which, he cotnment~d, "may have 

progressed in development to the point where it can be s~rlously 

considered for .•• system applications." Late 4n November, 

General Greer assigned a relatively high priority to the necessary 

tests. The investigation had earlier been formalized as "Project 7 3, " 

a speCial study entrusted to a select group of SAFSP officers headed 

38 by Captain Corman •. 

Early in December, Gorman and several spedah.t engineers 

fr-ultl SAFSP and Aerospace Corporation visited the RCA laboratory 

to \"lew the electrostahc tape deVice and to deflne test reqUlretnents, 

I.tcncral system requirements, and a method of data analysis that 

would be used. Funding was being provided in part by the Rae-unnaissance Laboratory, but the bulk of the money required to finance the 

special performance tests had to come from SAFSP. The first incremen gone out in October; an equal amount went 

iorward in late January. The tota was intend~d to finance 

RCA's efforts through the end of the fiscal year. 

BYE 17017-74 188 

.ep •• c .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

TOP •• G •• 'I' 

Apparently, however, RCA concluded that a very substantial 

5 ystem development contract, On the order of lay at 

tht! pnd of the data demonstration process. The contrac-tor thereupon 

proceeded to concentrate on producing ~ impressive pu·tllre with 

the breadboard equipment, without much concern lor maklng funds 

last until June or, as later became obvious, without too much worry 

about eliminating major shortcoming' of the equipment. 

The first series of testa, conducted on 10 Januar\", secuII'd 

Inadequate in all respects. The Reconnaissance Laboratury'&; e\'aluahun showed "performance levels appreciably les8 than had been hoped 

for .... " Howev~r the Aerospace Corporation estimated that the 

performance was adequate to the needs of a surveillance reconnaissance 

program. Product improvement requirements were ch~raC'terlZed as 

39 

"modest. " 

Captain Gorman, much les. impressed than AerospaCe Curporahun reviewers, descrlhed RCA's system performance as "worse" than 

Inlually thought, but still capable of improvement "with a hed~e for 

unknown techmcal factors and a big hedge for RCA management." On 

the day that Gorman set that judgment on paper, RCA suhmitted a 

formal proposal for Immediately accelerating work to per 

munth level and for or~amzlDR the effort on a system ba:ois. ThlS 

189 BYE 1'1017-

.,ep SECRIi'l' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

TG ••• e .... 

althouMh the Reconnaissance Laboratory project engineel had duwngrad~d the contractor (or deficiencies in "feeling of urat'ncy, It 'on~-

term planning, anticipation of prospective problems, and llpnera t 

management. 

Gorman bluntly told the Reconnaissance Laboratory that no 

additional SAFSP dollars would be made available for the RCA work 

that fiscal year, that the contractor should be advised tu program his 

effort to keep funds available until mid-June, and that the flical 1964 

fundin~ level would be largely dependent on the results (.f the current 

40 pro~ram. Within three days, RCA had been so notlfied. 

Undeterred, ~aily optimistic and lacking es.ential experien ... t= 

tn reconnaissance and optics, RCA plunged ahead at a_per 

munth spendin~ rate. gambling on the successful demonstration o( 

system performance and the award of a substantial contract by 1 Apnl. 

Apparently neither SAFSP nor the direC't project managers at Wright 

Fleld were aware of the RCA decision, although visitors to the RCA 

facility must on occaS1on have come away shaking theu heads 1n 

wonderment. As late as 1 March, for example, the contractor had 

nut selected a full-time program chief. 41 

Notwithstanding the sometime Disneyland aspe, ts of some RCA 

actiVities, results of system testa conducted late in March seemed to 

have Cully justilied the Reconnaissance Laboratory 10 1t8 cunsistent 

BYE 17017·74 190 

1J'8P .Ee.Ii'll 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

optimism. The project officer reported that RCA had produced a 

good picture: 40 line pairs per millimeter. Z:l contrast ratio. 

equivalent film speed of 1. 0, and an acceptable slgnal-to-nolse ratLo. 

He wrote his SAFSP contact that RCA had satisfied Its promis~ to 

prove feasibility of the system by 1 April; further "finandal assistance" 

4Z 

was warranted. he concluded. 

Although the "good picture" (which RCA said it could not repeat. 

the only available electron gun having failed!) had not corne to th~ West 

Coast with the project offIcer's report, a high degree of optimum 

seemed warranted. 

SIX days later, it seemed almost as though another plcture was 

being dlScussed. 

In the interlm, the Wright Field project engineer had taken a 

closer look at the "good picture" and had asked several I ollea~ues to 

appraise it. Resolution. they agreed, was nearer 18 than 40 line pairs 

per milhmeter. Tht"' other parameters were proporhonateLy downJ!raded. The laboratory enRlOeer apologIzed for taking RCA'. word 

for picture quality and conclucted, somewhat plaintively, that RCA was 

"still incapable of performing measurements on Photo-Tape which are 

43 

mt!a ningful. " 

Concurrently it became obvious that RCA had spent money at 

~. rate 0 

. per month and had DeMlected other elementary pro. ram 

L9l an: 11811-

HaNJ"! I a B~fman/Tale~' Ke;~' 

C:~''') s c,. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'l'UP SEeR.t' 

precautions. SAFSP's rejection of the spurious analysis and demand 

for a more meamngful test fell into a fmancial vacuum. No money 

remained. On 6 May, RCA stopped work entirely. All that remained 

of the allocated for the year was a reSf'rve to pay 

for the final report--and RCA could not readily use that sum because 

of disag'reements over fees due. The activity simply sputtered into 

silence, due for a relatively low level of funding in the approachmg 

44 

fiscal year. 

Although there seemed little enough reason. some of those who 

had become Involved with RCA maintained their earlier optimism. One 

Aerospace Corporation SCientist said cautiously that RCA was makmg 

progress, but added that the contractor had given no real consideration 

to environmental problems and that the laboratory models were far 

removed from fli~ht hardware. Concentrating on the electronics of 

the proposed systefTl, RCA had Ignored the machamcal aspects of tape 

transport, had no real understandin~ of reconnaissance needs. was out 

of tun .. - with system deSign trends, and would need close monitoring in 

-&5 

any C"ontinuat'ion of the pro~ram. 

As it happened, RCA was relatively honest \D the affair of the 

picture. but the explanah1m laid open an appaUinll error LD basic 

understandmg. As e'Cpl;l.Ined by the contractor's markehnll mana~er, 

BYE 17017-74 

... -'": ;. _ .... 

19Z 

'1'0. I.e •• ., 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. 8P 15'85'1 

who had experience in putting the best face on unfortunate clevelopmenta, 

RCA had through a "regretable mlsunderstandlng" not known until afte r 

submltting both the pictures and the appraisal that the AIr Force standard 

for determimng photographic resolution differed from thl' televlSion 

standard--by a factor of 100 percent. Photographic :'line palrs per 

millimeter" standards counted each line and space combination as a 

unit. television standards c,.ounted a -line and space as two lines! In a 

thorou~hly subdued evaluation of its own performance. the contractor 

conceded to unwarranted optimism ancl the failure to recognize that the 

40 

system involved photographl~ as well as electronic problema. An 

interesting unanswered question was whether RCA had for 16 months 

been diligently trying to build a system capable of reproducing 35 hne 

pa1.rs per millimeter whlle AIr Force project officers continued to 

believe that 75 line-pairs was the object of the program. 

After the furor dl~d dOwn, RCA was moc.ielstly financed for 

another year of devt:lopment. (There was clear understanding, this 

hme, that the technical objectlve was a demonstration of 75 cycles per 

s~cond resolution--a "l-y..:le" meaning line ~ space to both the 

lcl~Vlsion industry and the Air Force.) The goal of the revised program 

\\ja~ demonstration of the de~ured functional utility by March 1964. a 

possibility that the project engineer thought somewhat uncertam Qecause 

193 BYE 1'101'7 

Tap ... CIIST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'fIBP '&CIIS" 

of continued poor management at RCA. The contractor was considerably more conservative in his goalli--and claims; hili immediate 

objective now was a flyable system that cuuld resolve 50 cycles at 

1. 0 (ASA) film speed by mld-1965. The goal seemed not unreahstic. 

-17 

On the other hand, it had no particular technical appeal. 

In a sense, Project 73 died at birth. NotwithstandlllR a cunsiderable degree ot uptimism--always most pronounced amon~ those who 

knew' the least about photographic and electronic problems of readout--

there was nothin!! to ~ecommend for near-term development. The E .. l 

still was the only readout system to have demonstrated any reconnaissance 

capacity 1n operation. and the E-Z stiU was the most advanced of those 

with any near-lerm availablhty. None uf the various ele("trostatlc or 

electronic devices approached operational feasibihty. The CBS 

Reconotron, in d~'velopment qUlte as long as RCA's ele-clrostatlc tapt' 

C<llllera. had developed 100 hnes per millimeter resolutlCln In s~'stem 

dements closest to the optics, but would lose from 50 tu 75 percent 10 

fucus and readout processin~. The Westinghouse tape seemed to have 

4M 

no promise at all. 

In a special staff study completed in May 1963. C~ptaln Gorman's 

plans office determined that the theoretical maximum rate uf readout 

..... as 4. oS square inche~ of film per me)tacycie per minute at 100 lines 

BYE 17017·"4 194 

'I'OP •• C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !'ep IIiCaa'l 

millimeter. This, Gorman reported. "can not be exceeded with any 

kind of system." In practice. degradation of the signal-to-noise 

ratio. extension of gray scale requirements, and the need for hne 

scan techniques to avoid degraciation of resolution would make the 

actual tra,namission range between 0.98 and 2.93 square inches per 

magacycle per minute. Digital techniques would permit better transminion than analog readout, althoulh under optimum conditions an 

analog system had resobltion advantages over a comparable digital 

system.

49 Other formulae devised by other experts differed in 

specifics. but the general conclusion--that readout limitations were 

very considerable and that substantial advances in teChnology would 

be necessary before any significant advances could result--seemed 

common to all. 

There was obviously a continuing demand of variable intensity 

for a system that could be put in orbit and turned on and of! as Clrcumstances required--one capable of detecting actions indicative of a 

hostile intent on the part of an observed enemy. In lts essentials, 

th~ recurrence of demand for a readout system was a sytnptom. an 

mdication that the formal abolishment of the "surveillance and warning" 

satellite requirements of 1957-1960 had not eliminated the sentlment 

195 BYE non 

WOP .5C.5. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !fOps.eR." 

that uriginally prompted them. Technical attractions WE're less 

<.-ompelhng. Ell:ctrostatic tape, despite Its dem\..nst:-ated failinlts, 

uffer~d relative insensitivity to radlatlon 10 the Van Allen belts 

wht..'re a long-life satellite would nave \0 take stahon. somewhat 

better spectral sensitivity, and a degree of selective tar~et quicK 

rl:!sponsiveness that "sudden-launch" satellites would nevc:r be able 

to match. In other respects it remained inferior tu r~cuvered film. 

Data transmission time was the greatest difficulty, even thou!Ilh n~w 

rnultlplexing techniques offered some promise for wide-band 

. . SO transmiSSion. 

BYE 17017·.,4 

- _ ........ _ r_ 

... :...... . 

196 

cap .5ca .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'Igpl.caST 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. Ltr. Col W.C. Kln~. Du/Samos ProJ •• to BMD Excc. 23 Sep 60. 

subj: ..• Chronology .• '. in SSD Hlst D1V files; Sentry/Samos 

Chronology Mar 59-Dec 60, in Samos files; ,·pt. LMSD Prehrnlnary Test Report. 11 Oct 60: rnem_o for r. cord. LtCu1 E. F. Blum. 

Ch Agena Div. BMD. 24 Oct 60, subj: SAMOS GSE ASsoclated 

Problems During SAMOS I Launch. 11 Oct 60. both In Samos files. 

l.. TWX SAFSP-DP-ZS-IO~23, SAFSP to SAFMS. 

SAFMS ic costa we 

E-l payload 

aunch and management ser 

3. Program Summary, 6 Aug 60. with SAMOS Revuled Dev Plan, 

11 Aug 60, in SAFMS filea. Samos Hist • 

4. TWX SAFSP-3-11-23. BrigGen R. E. Greer. SAFSP. to SAFMS. 

3 Nov 60, citmg te1con with J. V. Charyk. SAFUS. 3 Nov 60. in 

SAFMS files. Telcon. Nov 60. 

5. Ml!mo for record. Maj H. Howard. SAFMS. 30 Nov 60. subj: 

Trtp R~port. 10 SAFMS files; TWX SAFSP-3-11-23. 3 Nov 60. 

o. Ur, Col W. L. Walker, OCc ACS/I, USAF, to Cmdr BMD, 

11 Aug 58, s ubj: WS 117L, in SP-Samos files, RlcO-L. 58; 

memo R. W. Juhnson, Dlr/ARPA, to SAF. 4 Dec 58, subj: 

WS-1l7L Program, 1n SSD Hist Oiv files. ARS 58; 

hr. MajGen J. H. WalSh, ACS/I, to Cmdr ARDC. LO Nov 58, 

subj: Intelligence Requirements for SENTRY, in SP-Samos 

hIes. Hist Doem; see also a varlety of letters and memos in 

SP-Samos files. R&D-I. Hi.st Docm 1959, which clearLy 

ddine the trends of ACS/I and SAC thinking on Sub:iyatem I. 

readout, concurrency. and earLy operational assignment of 

5<tlllus to SAC. 

I. TWX RCW 10-S-1-E. RADCto Col W.O. King, DirlSamos, 

11 May 60. in SP-Samos files. Hist Docm 160; memo, LtCol 

R. E. Zelenka. Exec. DICmdr Space Progs, to Col R. D. CUTtino 

D/Cmdr Space Progs. BMD, (9 Jan 601 subj: Trip Report - Visit 

197 BYE 17017-

TOP IECRET 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 !lap l.eRS .. 

to Itek Corporation 3-6 January 1960, in Corona correa 

files; interview, Col Kmg by R. L. Perry, 19 Dec 62; intervi\!w, Capt L. G. Neuner, SAFSP. by Perry, 18 Apr 63. 

8. Memo, Zelenka to Curtin, 9 Jan 60 • 

9. Rpt, IIProvisiona1 Draft Report of the Ad Huc Croup On 

Samos Ground Handling Data ... 8 Aug 60, in SAFMS files, 

Samos Gen 'bO. and handwritten memo, attached to rpt, 

unsigned, prob by Col R. D. Curtin, 22 Aug 60 •. 

10. Ltr. MajGen K. P. Berquist, Cmdr AFCCDO. to ARDC, 

15 Sep 60, sUbj: Transfer of Executive Management Responsibility (EMR) of S~bsystem I, in SP-Samos files, RlrD-5 60-61; 

TWX RDRB 2-8-10, ARDC to BMO and CCDD, 2 Aug 60, same 

file. 

11. Mins of 117M Spec Studies Committee. Zl-Z2 Jul and 27 Sep 60, 

in SP-Sarnos files; mins of SAFUS-SAFSP-SAFMS mtg, 

18 Oct 60, quuted m TWX SAFMS-EXEC-13, SAFMS to BrigGen 

R. E. Greer. SAFSP, 20 Oct 60, in SA.FMS files, Telcon 

Oct-Nov bO; ltr. Greer to SAFUS, 17 Oct 60. subj: Sub-System 1. 

in Greer '5 hies. 

12. Memo. J. V. Charyk. Actg SAF, to DirlSamos files, RlrD-l 

Hist Docm Aug -Dec 60. 

13. TWX SAFSP-VT-q-ll-lO. SAFSP to RADC and AFCCDD, 

9 Nov 60; TWX AFDSD-CS-61150. USAF to ARDC. 14 Nov 60: 

TWX RCKW-17-11-36-E, ARDC to TRW. Ii Nov bO, all in 

SP-Samos files. R&::D-5 60-61. 

14. TWX SAFSP-23-12-38, SAFSP to ARDC. 23 Dec bO, 

BYE l'J017-14 

flIes; TWX SAFM5-DEP-60-69, J. V. Charyk. SAFUS. to 

BrigCen R. E. Greer, DirlSamoB Prog. 2,3 Dec 60. in SAFMS 

file, Mags Dec 60: TWX Dic 4171. SAC to SAFMS. 13 Jun 61. 

m SAFMS files; Mlsc; TWX SAFMS 62.617, SAFMS to BMD. 

18 Nov 60. Ritland files: memo, Charyk to CIS, USAF. 3 Feb 61, 

subj: SUbsystem I Test Plan. in Martin files. 

198 

wa.lse •• 'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

IS. TWX (no code line) SAFMS to SAFSP, 8 De~ 60, in SP-3 files; 

TWX SAFMS-Sys-Eng-61-0S, to SAFSP, 19 Jan 61, in SAFMS 

files. Samos-Cen. 61. 

16. Interview. MajGen R. E. Greer. SAFSP. 1 Nov 63. by R. L. 

Perry. Hist Div. 

17. Samos Hist Chron. J an-Jun 61i rpt, LMSD Preilminary Test 

Report. SAMOS n. 31 Jan 61. in SP-Samos file. memo for 

record, BrigGen R. E. Greer, DirlSamos Proj. 16 Fl"b 61, 

subJ: Trip Report. in SP files. Gen Prog. Feb 61. 

18. TWX SAFSP-VT-lS-2-13. SAFSP to SAFMS. 15 ~Iar 61. in 

SP-Samoa files: Hist Docm 61. 

19. TWX SAFMS-INS-60-4S, to SAFSP. Z4 Apr 61. 1 

files; A.H. Katz. "Analysis of Lunik. til Photographs. " publ 

by RAND. from Proceedings of Lunar and Planetary Exploration. 

Collogium. Mar 60, Vol II, No. Z. pp 27-44; intt!rview. MajGen 

R. E. Greer by R. L. Perry. IS Nov 63. 

lO. TWX SAFMS DEP 61-12, SAFMS to SAFSP, 24 Jan 61. 

files; TWX SAFMS SEN-61-Z9. SAFMS to SAFSP. 9 Mar 

21. Sum of Program Review 10 May 61, in SP-Samoa files, IOLAI 

101B 60-61. 

lZ. SAMOS Hlst Chrun. Jan-Jun 61; TWXs to SAFSP from LMSD: 

LMSD 396861, 5 Jun 61, LMSC A09704S, 14 Aug 61, and 

LMSC 8000613, 6 Sep 61, all in SP-Samos files, RIED 38-5, 61. 

~3. TWX VWZS-U-9-134-5, 6S6Sth Tng Wg to SAFSP, Ll Sep 61i 

Samos H1St Chron, Jul-Dec 61; Samoa Pr~ject Progre •• Rpt, 

Sep 61, all ln SP -Samoa files. 

24. Sarnos Progm Chron. Jul-Dec 61. 

l5. Ltr, Col W.G. Kin~, D/Dir Proim I, to Col H.L. Evans, 

D/ Dir SAFSP. 6 Oct 61. 8ubj: Readout-Disposition of Program 

Elements, and Itr, Evans to BrigGen R. E. Greer, DirISAFSP. 

9 Oct 61, same subj, both LD SP-Samoa files: Readout. 

199 BYE 11011 

'lap IEI •• Y 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ~e •• EeRE" 

l6. 

l. 7. 

l8. 

l. 9. 

30. 

31. 

Memo, Col w.e. Kmg. Progmt, toCoIJ.W. Ruebel. SP-3. 

21 Nov 61, no subj, 1n Cien Greer' .. file ... 

Rpt. Sentry Program E-3 Reconnaissance, prep by LAC. 

29 Jul 59. in SP-Samos files. 

Ibid. 

Ltr, Col H. L. Evans, O/Vic.e Cmdr Sat Sys, BMO. to SAFMS, 

19 ~j: Development of Electrostatic Storage Tape. 

in __ files. 

Rpt, samoJlillA lied Research Program. prep by WADD. 

9 Nov 60, fUu; ltr, R. E. McCormick, Actg ch, 

Surveil Br, econ a. ASD, to SAFSP, Sep 61; ltr, 

_ Dir, Sat Sys, Aerospace Corp. L 

SAFSP, 2 Oct 61, subj: Requirement for Eval 

Electrostatic. Imaging and Recording System; rpt, 

Corporation Evaluation of the RCA Electros 

Capt L.G. Neuner, SAFSP. 18 Oct 61. aU 

Memo. Aerospace Corp. 

SAFSP. Nov, 8ubj: Comparison of Rec: 

E-6; TWX SAFSP-X-2-11-65, SAFSP to ASO, 3 Nov 61; itr. 

Maj D.W. Denby, Sys Br, D/Techn, ASO. toSAFSP. 13 Dec 61. 

_____________ ~elopment of a Photo Tape Sensor; memo, _I---.:t~o~----­

__ 20 Dec 61. subj: Evaluation of Modifications to E-2: 

32. 

33. 

BYE 17017.14 

rpt. Photoconductive Photo-Tape. prep by SAFSP (SP-6l. 

18 Jan 62; TWX SAFSP-OA-16-1- 5. SAFSP to AAD. 16 Jan 62 

FSP- -5 8 Jan 62; memo for record. 

6Z. subj: Testin~ of Electrofiles. 

TWX SAFSP-6-l3-4-1, SAFSP (Capt Frank Gorman, USN) to 

ASO, 23 Apr 62; memo of telephone conversation, 15 Ol't 62. 

by Gorman, s~ectrostatic Tape, ASD!!. Aerospace 

Efforts, all in __ files. 

Ltr, MajGen R. E. Greer, Oir/SP, to Capt F. B. Gorrnan. 

19 Nov 62, .ubj: Establishment of Special Study Group; ltr, 

Greer to Gorman, 19 Nov 62, subj: Letter of Instructions' 

zoo 

::-:": s Cr.,. 'l'OPIB£RE'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

ft ••• e .... 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

-It. 

42. 

for Speclal Study Group; Memo, LtCol_ Aut 

O/Oir,~o s~.and E-2 ~oadout Equlpment, all i~files. 

Essay, "Anatomy of Readout, " prep by MajGen R. E. Greer, 

Dir/SP. Nov 62, in Greer files (copy sent to SAFMS, Dec 62. 

to Col J. L. Martin). 

Tech Note, AOC Recon Lab, p~~, Taak 62.6302.. by 

J. T. Fulton, ASO, Nov 62., in~i1u. 

Ltr and atch, R. E. McCormick, Actg Ch, Optronics Br, 

Rocon Lab, ASO, 3 Dec 62., • . .. t·· . ~ . nnual Report, 

in SP-6 files; interview, Capt SP-6, by 

R. L. Perry, 5 Dec 63. 

Memo, Capt F. B. Gorman (USN), O/Oir/SP-6, to MajCen 

R. E. Greer, Oir~~Z, .ubj: Proof tests on E-l or 

E-2 Payloads, in~iles. 

Ltr, Greer to Gorman, 19 Nov 62,; ltr, Gorman to ASD, 2.0 No"- 62" 

subj: Evaluation of RCA Electr~tatic Tape; TWX SAFSP-6-Z3-11-2. 

to ASO Recon Lab, 23 Nov 62, aU in SP-6 filos. 

Memo, W. F. Leverton, Aerospace Corp, to Col 

SSD. 25 Jan (,3, subj: Electrostatic Tape; rpt. 

Electrost~gram, no date, aprox May 63, 

SP-6 file~ interview. 5 Dec 63. 

EST Chronology, May 63: rpt, "Photo Tape Reconnaissance 

System, " prep by J. T. Fulton, ASO Recon Lab, I Feb 63; 

TWX SAFSP-6-8-2.l, Capt F. B. Gorman (USN), D/Dir/SP-6. 

to ASO, 8 Feb 63, all in SP-6 files. 

EST Chronology, May 63; rpt. Photo Tape Reconnaissance 

sys_em. re b J. T. Fulton, ASD, 1 Mar 63; memo for record. 

Ma' SP-6, apr'ox 15 Feb 63, .ubj: Evaluation of 

Decem er A EST Tests. in SP-6 files. ' 

,Rpt, Photo-Tape Reconnaissance System, prep by J. T. Fulton. 

ASD Recon Lab, 9 Apr 63, in SP·6 files. 

ZOI BYE 11017 

~ap •• C •• I" .... -: : 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'lu.IEe .... 

43. Amended Mo Rpt, Photo-Tape Reconna' •• ance System. 

15 Apr 03. 

44. 

45. 

EST Chronology, May 6 

Memo~erospace Corp, 

space Corp. 24 Apr 03. subj: Trip R 

in SP-o files. 

interview. 5 Dec 63. 

Aeroch 1963. 

-46. Ltr, _ Mgr. Marketing. RCA. to LtCol T. O. Haig. 

Ch 41~ Jun 63, subj: AFASD DielectriC Tape 

Camera Program, in Prog 417 Ofc files. 

47. Rpt, Photo-Tape Reco~aissance System. prep by J. T. Fulton, 

ASD Recon Lab, 1 Aug 63, in SP-6 files. 

48. Rpt. Photo-Tape R(Oronnalssance System. Fulton, 1 Aug 63. 

49. Staff Study, "Limits of Readout ... prep by SP-6. l May 63. 

in SP-o files. 

so. Intervlew by Perry. 6 Dec 63. 

BYE 17017-74 202 

--........ - ,....- ... ::. \". , 'I'DI' •• cae 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.... ,.e .... 

VtlI THE P-3S WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITE PROGRAM 

Prefatory notes: 

At various times the Air Force-DoD weather satellite program 

was known as Program 35. Prograrp 698BH. and Program 417. After 

1964. it also operated under other names of no concern to this account. 

Program 35. the weather satellite program that functioned under 

l"ational Reconnaissance Program authority. was successfully represented to be a closely held space program with no covert ot' clandestine 

associations. Few of the people who operated the program office and 

developed the satellite were briefed on the existence of such programs 

as Gambit and Corona. even though Corona was untill964 the only 

satelhte op~ration that contelvably could benefit from knowledge of 

weather over the Soviet Union. The account that follows is baaed almost 

entirely on program office sources; that is. the narrative reflects the 

fact that program managers were largely innoc~nt of knowledge about 

the way their system would ultimately be used. It must be recalled. 

however. that until 1963 the original Samos program maintained an 

official existence, and most Air Force people unaware of the Gambit 

and Corona programs assumed that Samos. in one of its several 

lncarnations. was the intended beneficiary of satellite-based weather 

1.03 BYE 17017 

H~~:~ I:: B"~"'II~/T~ .;.' ... .,. 

:: --. : : ,. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.8P .liea.'I' 

reconnaissance. The pretense that such was the case lasted until 

development of the P-35 system had effectively been completed. 

P-35 was operated under ordmary but rigldly enforced seC'urlty 

controls and was not m(.orporated in the BYEMAN control system 

although access to mfurmation about the program was closely 

controlred. 

In light of the foregoing. this account has been constructed 

without much reference to other aspects of the National Reconnaissance 

Program. A shghtly different version, denuded of all allusions to 

covert or dandestine satelhte reconnaissance operations, was prepared 

(by this author) and filed with other program office records in 1965. 

Apart from occasional references that relate P~3S events to important 

motivating aspects of satellite reconnaissance program activities, 

this verSlon conforms to the pattern of the original. 

Finally, this account extends only to late 1963, by which time 

the original program !loals had been wholly a.tidied. 

BYE 17017-'74 

M3-:::" • a 5.e~a~ /Ta'e'" 

::-:-: s ~r . 

l04 

"UP .liea." 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

NP •• C .... 

Like communication eatellites. the development and operation 

of mlhtary wt!ather reconnausance sateliltes was until late 1960 more 

a matter of politics than technology. Existing weather satellite proposais and embryonlc programs generally were absorbed by the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the space 

program upheaval of late 1958. Weather observation from satellites 

was plainly the responsibility of civilian agencies under the terms of 

the National Space Act of 1958, but that did not el~minate concern for 

military weather reconnaissance requirements that could not be 

entirely satisfied by NASA programs. Nevertheles •• that a weather 

reconnaissance satelhte dedicated to the military would certainly be 

viewed as redundant and duplicative by Congress was a major factor 

in.. the failure of the defense department to approve any of the early 

A lr Force proposals. 

The reconnaissance program realignment of late 1960 had 

lmplications that did not escape the eyes of major defense contractors. 

If, as seemed probable, the original Samos effort was to be expanded. 

the-re might also be room to insert developments earlier turned down. 

On 17 November 1960. while Sarno. program reor.anization was 

In progress. but before the unique structure of Ceneral Greer's organi-

~atLOn had been clearly estabUshed. the Radio Corporation of Am.,rica 

2.0S BYE 11011 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

wap •• ea.'I' 

(RCA) propoled to the Air Force the clevelopment of a c:loucl cover 

reconnaissance satellite system. 

The submission, which went to Colonel H. L. Evans, Assistant Deputy Director for Space Programl in the Air Force Ballistic 

Missile Division (BMD), * envisioned a 300-pound payload of television 

components, two readout stations, a satellite control center, and 

contractor prOvision of cloud cover analysis services. RCA urged 

that the system would fill a functional gap in the array of military 

satellites by exploiting techniques and equipment., many of which had 

been flight-proven in the course of NASA's Tiros weather satellite 

program. The use of proven or "off·the-shelfll system elements was 

a particular attraction to both the Directorate of Defense Research 

and Engineering (DDR&E) and the Undersecretary of the Air Force, 

J. V. Charyk, who had recently acquired cognizance over the total 

reconnaissance satellite program. Even a. early as November 1960, 

it was clear that both of those authorities would have to approve before 

a system c.ould be funded for development. 

Appreciating that more was involved than merely evaluating a 

contractor proposal for a new satellite .ystem, Colonel Evans and 

.', 

'" 

Colonel Evans was General Greer'l deputy. 

BYE 11017 ·'14 Z06 

'lap •• ea ... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'lap SEeRE'I' 

hu lmmedlate staff devoted some two months to lts exammation and 

to l unS1derin~ how th~y mlght uvercome some obvlous obstacles to 

s~curmg s ystern approval. Th~ chlef technical difficulty was selectmg 

a launch \'ehide. the propos~d payload was too heavy for any of the 

avallable probe rockets and too hght to warrant use of the Thor-Agena. 

Pick -a-back modes were considered 10 detail and then dlscarded because 

of thdr possible degrading effect on the basic Thor-boosted satellites--

which were mostly carrylOg Corona payloads. 

The Air Weather Service (A WS), asked to review and comment 

on the RCA proposal. carped at details of the system as then concelved. 

A WS favored a sateillte that could provide information on night clouds 

as wdl as daytime weather, one capable of operating in poor light. and 

one that would embody a variety of automated functions. What the 

weathe ~ SerV1Cf' actually wanted was a mature, highly-sophisticated 

system built arO<1nd a complex lntercommunication net. There was, 

perhaps. a degr~e of bitterness in the A WS reaction to BMD's request 

for cammepts; A WS had been rebuffed in a September 1960 attempt to 

secure acceptance of a system only slightly more elaborate than that 

proposed by RCA. 

Acceptance of the RCA proposal would involve the Air Force 1n 

a development that in some respects was directly competitive witb tbe 

National Operational Meteorological Satellite System (NOMsS)--a 

l01 aYE 17017 

IJIOP IEGRE' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "epSEGaH 

car, um5tanc~ of which Colonel Evans was poignantly aware. A NASA 

pru),!.ram, NOMSS was intended to serve all using agencies, whether 

llVil or m1litary, The NOMSS program required development of an 

lntTlcately detailed orb1ting device and thus invoked a conSlderable 

cl~l1lent of rIsk, For th .. t reason, it was being brought along in two 

}Jhascs, the hut betn~ a satellite called Nimbus which was, 1n its own 

1 

rl~ht. exce~dlngly complex. 

HavIng weighed all the available evidence, Colonel Evans in 

F~bruary 1961 suggested to the chief of BMDIa Scout booster office, 

LI('ut~nant Culonel D. A. Stine, that it might be feasible to develop 

a \8riant of RCA's proposed cloud cover satellite for l .. unch via tbe 

S, Ollt. A suct:essful combination would be relatively inexpensive, both 

in payload and booster el~ments, and it would serve a highly useful 

funC"tlon 1n supporting a variety of Air. Force mi.sions--including Samos. 

By early MaTch, CUlonel Sant' had gone over the idea with RCA in 

cons iderable detall. He sent an enthusiastic report to Colonel Evans, 

At Evans' direction, Stine and hls program office people. with the 

l:ontinued aSSlstance, of RCA consultanu, put together and formally 

submltted a p~elimlDary development plan. In endorsing It. Colonel 

Evans directed that 1t be expanded to Indudt" provisions for testing 

dirl,ct readout techmque~ dU1"\n~ system oper'ltion. 

BYE 17017-'14 

l08 

yep alie •• " 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

t'SP I.calit' 

While such details were being worked over. and In the midst 

of dlScussLons concerning means of transmitting satellite-obtained 

weather data frum one coast to another. the entire proposal took a 

new turn. The Kennedy Admmistration _had come into office in January 

pledged to an overhaul of the. space and missile program. Although the 

"mLssile gap" which had served as a convenient campaign issue subsequently proved to be much less significant than had been feared. 

Defense Secretary R. S. McNamara resolved to carry through a major 

clarification of the military space missions of the services. In March. 

he proposed to gtve the Air Force virtually all responsibility for military 

space systems. One of the condillons he specified was that the Air Force 

immediately reorganize to put proper emphasis on space. Early in 

April. therefore. the Air Research and Development Command was 

massively overhauled to accommodate procurement responsibilities--

and funds .. -previoudy entrusted to the Air Materiel Command. The 

reor~anization brought the Air Force Systems Command into being and 

on the west coast Saw BMD segmented into a Ballistic Systems DiviSion 

and a Space Systems Division (SSD). The latter organization immediately 

began working on the Au Force portion of a national space program 

proposal which was intended to integrate NASA and service inler.sts. 

SSD's initial contribution was to be a "Five Year Space Plan" which. if 

l09 BYE 1'1011 

!fOP ISC8S'I' --....... ,. J _ ..J 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'IaPlscan 

approved, would give the Air Force the basic authority to eatablish 

an interlocked, rnulh-prolZram mlhtary space effort. The cloud 

cover satellite, attractive becaus~ of it. apparent technical feasibility 

and because of its low cost, was promptly swallowed up in the larger 

scheme. 

A not-uncommon metamorphosus occurred at that pOlnt. As 

laid out 10 February and March, the Scout-boosted satellite would have 

been a relatively modest program, both in total coat and in the number 

of vehicles needed for imtial testa. In general, it conformed to the 

real world outlook of Under:oecretary Charyk and DDRIIE. For the 

purposes of the "Five Year Space Plan, "however, it was markedly 

elaborated. By late May, it involved 13 launches and a minimum cost 

through fiscal 1963. Packaled with seven other development plans (including a lunar expedition, a military communications 

satellite, the Saint interceptor satellite, and an inhabited space station), 

it began a presentation and review proces8 at the diviaion, sub-command, 

command, and Air Staff lev pIs before finally rea~hing secretariat 

echelons. By that time neithe r the we~ther satellite nor any other 

element of what had become a multi-billion-dollar proposal had any 

real chance of acceptance •. The President had decided that putting a 

man on the moon during the 1960's should be the chief national space 

8YE. 11011-14 

He"'c~.:! 5ve~a-/':"ae"· 

:: ... : .. : s 0" -. 

llO 

.. e. lEe .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

goal, and he assigned the task to NASA. Additional funds, in the 

amount of many billions, went into an expanded ballistic missile 

program, and the budget ballooned accordlhgly. Lesser developments, 

whatever their abstract merits. could not be funded at the levels the 

Air Force proposed. Moreover, the Air Force still had not been able 

to demonstrate that a viable space mission existed for anything other 

than reconnaissance satellites. Although hope remained high. and 

reas surances frequent. no action was ever taken On the ItFive·Year 

Space Plan" after it reached the upper echelons in the Pentagon. 2 

Nevertheless, the cloud cover satellite did not die of indiffer-

'ence, as did most other of the May 1961 proposab·-nor was it assigned 

to NASA, as was the fate of the lunar landing project. Instead, it 

attracted the particular attention of Undersecretary Charyk. On 21 June 

in the aftermath of a presentation involving several of the "Five· Year 

Plan" systems, he quietly abstracted the main elements and told General 

Greer's group to put together a "minimum" proposal involving a fourvehicle program. Five days later, Greer approved the "minimum plan" 

drawn up by his people and sent it forward to Charyk. On 11 July. Charyk 

submitted it to the DORicE with a request for approval and fundin,. 3 

Although the method of securing revision of the original IIMeteorologlcal Information Satellite System" had been somewhat unorthodox, 1t 

III BYE l'lOn-

!fOP IIiCR •• 

----------------,------
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

"aPIECRE" 

was characterbtic of Charyk" method of operation. It apparently 

signified nothing more than impatience with the painfully long processes 

of review and revision that typified normal handhng of system proposals. 

In his initial exchange with DDRacE, Charyk propo.ed a relatively 

mundane and entirely conventional development J rocess, differing from 

others of the time only in that it specified the use of fixed-price contracts 

and a guaranteed delivery schedule. Cbaryk saw in the proposal a means 

for providing global weather inlormation during the 196Z-1963 period 

when the Nimbus would be in pre-flight development. He was attracted 

chiefly by the low cost and ready availability of major components. * 

* The approach Charyk favored resembled that adopted, with eventual 

success, for the development of Corona three years earher and also 

re-nected philosophies that Charyk and Greer subsequent! y incorporated 

in the Gambit and Lanyard programs. The justification for development 

of a military weather reconnaissance satellite lay not solely in the 

poss ible delay in Nimbus operations, but in two other factors not 

generally recognized outside the National Reconnaissanct' Program. 

Flrst, Corona was in 1961 starting to return regular packages of 

photographs of the Soviet Union, and the quality of the retrieved 

reconnaissance seemed likely to improve if timely weather information 

could be fed into the Corona operations program. There was an excellent possibility that political objections to Nimbus operatlons might 

hmit the quantity and quality of information made available to the U.S. 

military services. Therefore Corona (and other military reconnaissance satellitel prolrammed for later operation) could well be handiC"apped if they had to depend on data abstracted from a weather satellite 

program controlled by individuals who honored the "space for peaceful 

uses" theme NASA continued to proclaim. Second, the timing and . 

quality of weather reconnaissance could not be guaranteed_ if Nimbus 

BYE 17017-74 lIZ 

.. OP IlieRS. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 _PI.C.E~ 

On l~ July 1961, after the pI ."lposal had gone to DDRItE. the 

unde rsecretary instructed Ceneral Creer to change the security of 

the propolal from conventional "secret" to "Mandatory Knowled!i!e" 

and to transmit all program information by a sealed envelope system. 

He further duected that the proposal be withdrawn from "normal Alr 

Force documentation [processes]. and .•• consideratiol. be Jllven 

to chang in" [the] narne of [the] project." 

By 15 July Dr. Harold Brown, DDRLE chief, had adv1.sed Charyk 

that he would support the "minimum program" if 1t could be clearly 

demonstrated that the system had advantages over an expanded Tiros 

development. The undersecretary convinced Brown dUrlng a conver.ation on 19 July and later that day telephoned General Greer that DDRltE 

had approved the proposal--subject to a set of special conditions. Those 

conditions, though unusual, were nonetheless implied by elements of 

the development plan and by the 12 July instructions on program security. 

Essentially, the program was to be based on fixed-price contracts, was 

qr some successor civil system were the provider; the operators of 

... anous reconnaissance satellite programs were unlikely to have much 

In£luence on the operational control of the satellite or on the dispos1.tion 

of its products. If reconnais.ance authorities did intrude, there wa. 

the danger of public prot .. ts that would 111 effeCt"'advise the Soviets 

that the United States needed weather information (chiefiy cloud cover 

data), a·nd hence presumably was operating reconnai .. ance satellite •• 

In the early 1960., those operations had gone underground and there 

was no immediate prospect of their surfaclng in the near~ future. 

Z13 Bft non 

,OP IEGIlIi, 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

OECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'!'BPIECR.'!' 

to be continued only so long as flight sCbedules remainecl-valid. had 

to be entrusted to contractors aware of and willing to accept th~ 

schedule requirements. and was to be given a new name and l"ondu~ted 

under special security proVlSlons. The purpose and eUec t of lh~ 

qualifications were clear: in no manner was the "normal o

, Air FllrCt:! 

to become aware of the program1s objectives. schedules. or tt>chmques. 

Use of the widely known term "MISS" (Meteorological Information 

.... 

Satellite System) was to cease. 

A speclal security policy statement that achieved the desired 

ends was prepared on the day the instructions arrived in Los Antleles. 

Like the basic Samos under which it now sheltered, the program was 

exempted from customary reView and approval channels, from routine 

reporting requirements. and from the halo of publicity routinely erected 

over any military space program that received significant fundmg 

4 

support. 

Although the cloud-cover satellite seemed" relatively innocuous 

in its main aspects and differed little in function or purpose from the 

widely publicized Tiros. it quite probably could not have begun development in normal military channels Without causing SIgnificant controversy. 

"MISS" was earlier used as the acronym for the abortive "Man in 

Space Soonesttl proposals of 1'-f;8-1959. -

BYE 17017-'14 Z14 

.. aPI.c •• , 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Hav1ng a military objective, employing techni.ques common to reconnaissance and surveillance satellites in general (though wlth such ~ro.s 

ground definition that 1t obviously could supply no signifkant intelhgence 

on the Sino .. Soviet heartland), and obviously of value to the basic Samos 

systems then in development, the new program was patently unsulled 

to open management by SSD. Soviet protests against "military reconnais.ance" from space were becoming more pronounced In mid-19bl, 

and no purpose could be served by adding fuel in the shape of an 

acknowledged military weather satellite program. The fact that the 

"MISS" plan had been submitted and presumably was awalhng approval 

was well known in the Air Force at larle. In all probability, it would 

have required no more than an approval signal to 1008e the publicity 

crews; the Air Force was findmg it difficult to outgrow habits acquired 

when press releases had to substitute for launches and orbits. 

In any event, the deed was done. In the next two weeks the 

program acquired a director, Lieutenant Colonel T. O. Haig: a name. 

Program 35: a cost structure derived from payload (RCA) and vehicle 

(Chance-Vought) contractor data; and a set of accepted procedures. 

In point of fact. full and final approval from DORIIE still had not been 

received, but there seemed little doubt that it would come. 

llS an: 1101 

"up •• C •• " 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. tiP l.ea.1f 

Colonel Haig had been associated with ground station aspects 

of the Discoverer program and was admittedly bored with what had 

become a mundane assignment. * Early 10 1961 he had become known 

to Colonel Evans as an officer of energy and ability. Glvt"n th,,' task 

of finding a program director for the cloud cover satelhte offu ~. 

Evans called Haig and asked if he would be interested in tak10g un a 

small program with rigidl} rationed resources and limitt"d objectives. 

Haig instantly accepted, without knowing any program.details. IOltlally, 

he found himself with four other people to "manage"; they became the 

Program 35 Office. 

Program ground rules had been defined, in consldt'rable detail. 

by early August. In order to secure DORicE approval, Dr. Charyk 

promised to complete the four-vehicle program for no more than 

-and under the fixed-price contracts earher propo·sed. 

C oniorming to practices that had grown into away of life in the Samus 

pru),!ram, he ruled that very rigid 'Imust know" security practices were 

t·. tJ~ established and maintained. No public announcement of any nature 

was to be made concerning the program; Lts existence was not to be 

pubhl..-ly acknowledged. Maximum use would be made of available 

Lll~t: many other Dlscoverer participants, he did not know oC its 

Cur'Jna aspects. 

BYE 17017-74 Z16 

.,ep I.GR.' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.. 8P l.e •• 'I' 

hardware (mostly from the Tiro. and Scout actlvihes). ~ventual launch 

and operation being entrusted to Au Force uniformed personnel. with 

a bare minimum of contractor support where essential. Charykls 

established distaste for the spate of "program documentahon" that 

a("companied any new program or project caused a flat prohibition on 

such paperwork activity--which was even more pOlntles8 than usual in 

any event, since in this instance there was no place for the do("umentation to go except to Greer--who had no need for it. 

Reassured by such measures, Dr. Brown on 5 Au~u"t approved 

the program Charyk had proposed. Later that day the Alr Force underst:cretary telephoned "General Greer the authorization to proceed with 

contractual commitments as appropriate. An official document to that 

eJ1Q arrived three days later. By that time the Department 01 Defense 

had obtained a reluctant but binding agreement from NASA IS chlef 

whlch permitted the Air Force to negotiate directly with booster producers rather than buy through NASA. The principle. which ran 

l ompletely counter t~ NASA's instincts and prejudices, was anathema 

5 

tu NASA field officials. (Abo to the Air Force. One of the most 

cl!lebrated interservice squabbles of the 1950s had originated in 

C\!ne-ral Schriever's refusal to let General Medaris contract independ. 

~nth for North American Aircraft Corporation rocket enJ,!lnes, ana 

th\.· Air Force had carefully sesresated initial NASA contracts for 

l17 

.. 8P •• C .... 

BYE 170" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "8P .se •• , 

Atlas missiles so as to keep NASAl. Mercury booster purchasers 

outsld~ the production plant.) 

The first program difficulty came from the reluctance of NASA 

ufficials to permit the Air Force to deal directly with Chance-Vought 

on matters concerning the basic airframe system. The issue finally 

had tu be resolved in Washington. By IZ August. ne~otiations were 

complete and the firm had agreed to a I March 196Z delivery schedule 

a nd to a. total cost figure The price was appreciably 

better than NASAl. IIfh:m price" offer--a circumstance that did little 

to {'ndear Program 35 to NASA officials. 6 Preliminary arrangements 

fur dlr~ct contracts covering procurement of the first and second atalite 

motors of the four-stage Scout vehicle were completed by 14 August. It 

became apparent shortly thereafter. however. that the two upper 

sta~es would probably have to be purchased through NASA channels. 

The production plants involved were working at full capanty and the 

motors had not yet been flight qualified. A meeting at Vandenberg Air 

Force Base on 15 ~ ugusl discl",~ed the need for additional launch and 

track facilities at the PaCific Missile Range site. Then the tentative 

a~reement with Thiokol coverlOg procurement of the second-stage 

motors was endangered by the Army's refusal to let Thlokol accept 

a fixed-price contract because the same motors were bei~g sold to 

BYE 1'017-74 Zl8 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

tht- Army on a cost-plus basis. (The objectiun seemed well founded. 

if somewhat Parkinsonian in logic. since Thiokol apparently had no 

intention of renegotiating its pleasantly profitable arrangement with 

the Army agency that owned the manufacturing facilities Thiokol used. ) 

Most of the resulting parleys with the Army were carried on 

from Washington. principally by Brigadier General R. D. Curtin. 

chief of the Miuiles and Space Systems Office (SAFMS) (which ostensibly was the staff element of Undersecretary Charyk's Samos ur~anization. but actually was the National Reconnaissance Office staff.) In 

a succession of patient but persistent calls to various Army underse('re-

. taries and finally to Redstone Arsenal itself, CurtlD induced the Army 

to accept a "firm price" military interdepartmental purchase request 

covering the ... n~cessary Thiokol motors. Since Greer had ordered that 

no action on contracts with Chance-Vought and RCA be taken until 

there was absolute assurance that the lower stage motors could be 

acquired precisely as Charyk had directed. the resolutlon of the Thl0kol 

controversy on 18 August also served as a signal for startmg work on 

the airframe and payload portlons of th~ whole program. 

At the moment. one major unresolved item was becomlna 

cfltical. As originally planned, the Program 35 effort was to have 

been conducted within the bounds of a rather conventional Iystems 

.l19 BYE 1181' 

.8 ••• S8.t-
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 1If8P IEeRE'I' 

engineering-technical direction agreement with Aerospace Corporation. 

The modus vivendi had been established several months earlier. in 

December 1960. a8 part of the compact that put the E-6 phase of Samos 

into effect. But by August 1961. negotiations between Program 35 and 

Aerospace Corporation had done little more than highhght sharp differences over the scope of the contractor's responsibihties and details of 

funds management. Under the terms of the Program 35 charter. 

Colonel Haig had a limited amount of mpney to invest in systems engineering. Moreover. one of the pre-conditions of Program l~ approval had 

been wIdespread use of available hardware, and that included the payload. 

The quantity and scope of systems engineerin8-technical dlrection 

activity was. therefore. certain to be unlike that of other programs. 

In such circumstances. the Aerospace Corporation was quite besitant 

a bout undertaking to support Program 35. 

Unable to obtain the concessions that he felt were essential, 

Colonel Haig decided it would be feasible to conduct the program without 

any assistance from Aerospace. With General Greer's approval. he 

\,:OJlverted the program office into a de facto systems en(llDeering-technical 

dlrection agency authorized to call on SSD offices and the wing organizations 

fur any necessary assistance. Both the booster and the spacecraft 

l ontractors would operate under the immediate control of.the program 

. 7 office. Aerospace Corporatlon had no role. 

BYE 1701'1-74 z.zo 

lIfep IEeRE'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'1'8 ••• e .... 

By 31 August. Colonel Haig's embryonic program office had 

prt-vared a highly detailed development plan--in three copies clrculated 

• 

onh to those with a "must know" status. The document defined the 

purpose and approach of Program 35. a8_ then understood. and ldentlfied the chief technical and operational characteristics of the satellite 

development. 

The goal of Program 35 was a weather observation satellite 

system that would enhance the effectiveness of Samos operations and 

lmprove the accuracy of cloud cover predictions for other militar~ 

satellites. The development was necessary! in large part, because 

the extant NASA program had deficiencies in development timp scales 

and orbital placement, as well as inappropriate timing of readout 

signals. politico-security ingredients, and program management 

controls. 

The 100.pound satellite. a lO-sided polyhedron Z3. 5 inches 

across and Zl inches high. was to be spin stabihzed on an axis perpendlcular tu the plane of the orbit. The camera. fixed at 90 degrees 

from the spin axis. would point directly toward the earth once each 

time the satellite rotated. At programmed intervals the television 

camera would take pictures of an 800-mlle._quare area un the earth. 

ZZI 

'8. I.ca •• 

BYE 1101' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART . 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'1'0 •• EeRE' 

the exposures being made when horizon sensors inchcated that the lens 

was vertical to the earth. The images could elther be rt:cordt:d on 

tape or read out by any suitably equipped ground station withm range. 

Spin axis orientation was to be controlled by a magnetic turque system 

developed by RCA and in the course of work for NASA's Tiros I. NASA 

had rejected the technique as unfeasible. 

With the satellite in a sun-synchronous 400-mile polar orblt, 

the system would provide 100 percent daUy coverage at latitudes tbove 

60 degrees and S5 percent coverage at the equator. When readout was 

undertaken during the western hemisphere portion of a pass that included 

photography, video data on eastern hemisphere cloud cover could be 

transmitted to the Global Weather Center at Offutt Alr Force Base within 

one hour of its being observed. In a less favorable pass sequence. 

readout would always be possible within three orbits of sensor activity. 

Should it prove desirable. either for test purposes or for an actual 

operation, a direct real-time readout mode could be employed to feed 

cloud pict~re. to any ground stallon withm range. 

None of those who designed th~ program expected to encounter 

any serious technical problems during development. Thf' Tiros-type 

clO..1d cover senSOr system had been night proven. The Scout vehicle 

had been little tested but seemed potentially reliable enough (five 

BYE n017-'14 

_:- ... ,- .:: -,"" .. 

T,_. 01 .. ~~," __ 

,up IEeRli'l 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART .0. I.CR •• 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

successes in seven flights). The satelhte would rely on proven sate1-

lite control and readout systems and statlons, with standard airborne 

command, control. and readout components from such programs as 

Advent and Midas completing tht= technical equipment. Althou~h much 

of the equipment was experimental in character. 1t did exist and 1t was 

available from contractors who had experience 1n 1ts fabrication. 

Funds were to come from SAFSP resourCes through an SSD 

channel, with program management entirely concentrated 1n the program 

office. The contractor structure included RCA (spacecraft). Chance 

Vought (prime booster contractor), Minneapolis Honeywtc'll (gUidance 

fond contrul), and (as solid-fuel rocket fabricators) AeroJet Cieneral. 

Thll~kol. and Allegheny Ballistic Laborator1es of Hercules Powder 

Company. Assembly, checkout, and launch were responsibilities of 

the 6565th Test Wing (later the 6595th Aerospace Test Wing). under 

SSD control. Satellite control functions were to be exercised by the 

Satellite Test Center (later the 6S94th Aerospace Test Wmg) at Sunnyvale. 

~he Au Weather Service would do weather analysis in the Cilobal Weather 

Center located in the SAC underground headquarters at Offutt Air Force 

Base, Nebraska. 

The actual payload, weighing 100 pounds, would consist of a 

videc'on-camera recorder system similar to the wide angle sensor 

223 BYE 170 

,gp I.CR.~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

used in Tiros I and lI. plus stabilization and control devl< ea. RCA 

estimated the sensor system would have an orbital hfe of 90 days. 

The ingenious attitude control system depended on torqueing 

the axis perpendicular to the orbital plane throuRh an electric-current 

loop around the perimeter of the satellite. The torque was generated 

by a ground command that caused current to flow around the loop in 

the desired direction. 

Spin-up during injection of the fourth stage and payload into 

final orbit was followed by a decreaae to 1Z revolutions per minute 

under the impulse provided by a system of "yo-yo" weights. After 

rotation speed decreased to nine per minute. spin-up ruckets could be 

used to re-energize the satellite. 

Pulses generated by the borulon sensor drove a specialized 

cornputer which triggered the camera. The recorder component was 

capable of storing 32. frames of miormation. Seven frames were 

required to cover the area of interest for each pass. but the probability 

of exposing the first frame was only SO percent. therefore fixed 

sequences of eight frames were planned. 

Changes from tbe TirOl transmitter were mostly I n the direction 

of transistorizing. Performanct' was little affected. although both 

weight and power requirement. decreaaed. The transmitter broad1:ast 

BYE l'l0t1-'l4 Z24 

-

_ : ...... s -, -.. ,/"'1 " 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'l'OP •• C ••• 

a ol. 5 kilocycle bandwidth 81llna1 at ZSO megacycles per second. 

Frequency modulation Wh Ild permit a total output bandwidth of 

190 kilocycles with two watts of output power. The video data were 

to be collected by existing nO-foot antennas at Vandenber,.: and New 

Boston. 

nitlally programmed for PrlJllram 35. 

the booster procurement, an~ 

to satellite control support. The total would buy one prototype satellite, four flight models, four Scout boosters, separation systems, 

aerospace ground equipment, control and support equipment, techmcal 

8 

assistance, and support services. 

Program schedules projected at the time the development 

proposals first went forward to Undersecretary Charyk had to be 

revised almost immediately, chiefly because General Gr~er had 

delayed a program go-ahead order until he had absolute assurance 

that all contractors had been committed to the types of C"ontracts 

specified. The delay, prinCipally occasioned by NASA and Army 

objections to direct Air Force contracts with Chance-Vought and 

Thiokol, coat the program a month of worlung time, but the eventual 

.. agreements had the effect of stabilizing Virtually all predlctable 

ZZ5 

'1'8 ••• C •• T 

BYE no' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP .se ..... 

program cosu. By early October. it was possible to reimburse those 

Sarnos activities from which money had been "borrowed" 10 ord~r to 

activate Program 35. Provisions for program funding had been 

essentially completed b~ Zl October. 9 

For practical purposes. the program office had n"t come 1nto 

existence until August 1961 although the first flight was firmly scheduled 

for May 196Z. In those 10 months, the program managert- had to complete all of the steps leading to availability of a flight-ready launch 

system. an orbital payload, readout stations, and the several participating and supporting ground systems. It was inevltable that the pace 

of program actiVity should be extremely rapid and that prlJgram 

deCisions, when required. should be unusually prompt. Nor. was there 

any squeamishness about bringing pre.surf' to bear where needed. As 

a case in point. it proved necessary to have Undersecretary Charyk 

intervene before arrangements could be Inade for earl y tt:8ts of the 

third and fourth stage motors in the tunnels at Arnold Enlllneering 

Development Center. A briefing to Cieneral T. S. Power. Strategic 

Air Command chief. got space for P-3S facilitLes in the SAC underground 

headquarters complex when "through channels" attempts had failed. 

Issues of thie nature were habitually forced to a deCision pOint for 

action rather than being obUsed to strusgle through the slower and 

BYE 17011-14 Z26 

"'!l~C <; • !l 9.e""ar./ Ta ~~: i'<i! , .. ~.,= 

-~ ... ! ~,~ , 'WOP •• C.ST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

"0.1.1i ••• 

less certain "normal channels" of Air Force proced\lre. 10 By ·late 

1961, it was apparent that the approach to sate111te reconnaissance 

had been rid of most of its earlier organizational constramts. 

An excellent illustration could be found In the handling of 

fO\lrth-stage motor problems that cr'lpped up in October. After 

several earlier danger signs, the first certain mdlcatlOn that the 

development of the ABL-Z58 fourth-stage motor was not Drocepdln~ 

lJat1sfactorily reached the program office on 25 October. One day 

later, Colonel Haig met with NASA representatives to prl''!s for the 

early development of an alternate motor. Six failures in SiX tests, 

he told the "lASA people, had convinced him that somethlnc( more 

reliable was needed. Disconcertlngly, Haig discovered that NASA had 

made no special plans to meet the tight Program 35 schedule and seemed 

rather casual about the prospect that the ABL-Z58 might not be ready 

when promised. Haig. who considered tht" matter anythlng but ca.ual, 

immediately began to a.semble cost estimates on a back-up motor 

deve lopme nt. 

Within 10 days, the program office had obtained from the rocket 

test establishment at Edwards Air Force Base (an SSD subsidiary) a 

proposal to accelerate development of a device called the "M" motor 

as an alternate Scout fourth-stage. The propwsion people said they 

l.27 BYE 170· 

YOP'Be.BY 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'rap IEeRE'I' 

could complete their development and te~t program and furnisb four 

flight articles within five months--at a total cost NASA. 

apprised of the option. figuratively yawned. provlnll qUit .. uninterested 

and. on the whole. dis beheving. 

Haig postponed action pending another trial of the ABL-l58. 

When that ended in a seventh failure. Haig Immediately told General 

Greer that it would be essential to fund development of the "M" motor 

to insure the validity of Program 35 schedules. Concurrently. the 

prototype "M" motor completed its third successful firlnll. 

On 16 November. the day definitive cost proposab reached the 

program office from the 6593rd Test Group at Edwards. (,olonel Haig 

requested and received fro~ General Greer permission to proceed 

with development of the "M" motor. A purchase request {or 

was written that afternoon. Major design decisions had been taken by 

8 December. fabrication and initlal tests were completed 10 January, 

and on 16 February the first flight weight motor was test fired at 

Edwards. The motor. a Lockheed development now deSignated the 

MG-18, experi~nced an insulation failure and operated fOr only 7.9 of 

the programmed 12..7 seconds. but the faults were promptly identified 

and fixed. On 2 April 1962. five months after the purchase request 

had been signed. an MG-18 mounted in the vacuum chamber at Arnold 

BYE 1701'1-74 .!Z8 

-,.. ... - : _ ... ._ I.ca., 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART TOP •• C •• 'I 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Center operated successfully. Precisely three weeks later a fhllht 

motor was mated to vehlcle 3501. the second fhttht craft, for spLn 

II 

test and balance checks. 

Only five month.s and one week after Colonel Haig had first 

acquired sure knowledge that the upper stage development was m 

Heriou5 trouble, a different rocket motor was being prepared for 

mitial use. The implications were in .omt! respects more important 

for management than for technology. The unsettling effect of learning 

that NASA had no concept of schedule importance--at least for an Air 

Forct: program--was to have long-term consequences. Buried within 

NASAls genial indifference to program urgency was the conviction 

that smce no publicity had accompanied Program 35 and no bugles were 

sounding important assignments for the Scout booster. the program 

could not be particularly critical. It was a yardstick both the Alr Force 

and NASA often used. 

The ti t-for-tat attitude of 80me NASA field people was particularly exasperating. Perhaps because the Au Force had resisted 

NASAls efforts to deal dIrectly with the contractors for Atlas and Thor. 

or perhaps because of youthful exhilaration natural to a new organizatlon, 

NASA people openly displayed resentment that Program 35 had lomehow 

suC'ceeded in getting authority to negotiate directly with the engine and 

airframe subcontractors. 

BYE 170 

'lOP .EC .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'1ep Iseas .. 

Within the kernel of achlevement that represented the first 

MG-l8 success was a germ of particular surnificance. For Drachcal 

purposes, the entire development had been planned and conducted by 

Air Force personnel, most of them in unlform. Quite understandably, 

they had begun to take a considerable prlde ln their accomplishm~nt. 

The Program 3S office, small, blEht-knit, mostlv composed of young 

officers who were completely ("ertaln that they either had the answers 

or could get them given half a chance. was developln~ an intense 

esprit de corps. Even if read two yearl aiter the fact. program correspondence reflected an assurance not common to youn~. tranSlent. 

and notably small program offices. Enthusiasm was becomin~ the 

most prominent characteristtc of Program 35. even this early, and 

it tendeCl to set the program apart from others. And if the public 

relations creatures were ritlht. it motivation was lessened bv an 

officerls being assigned a task that was :'lever fp.atured on televlSior., 

there was a counterpart compensation m the sense of dOing something 

that was so important it had to be hidden from the herd. The phrase 

"sense of urgency. II even if admittedly trite and overworked, described 

a state of mind that really existed 1D Program 3S. Whether 1t could be 

cultured, kept flourishin~. remalned to be leen. 

Many other aspects of system development had made progress 

~ag the mo~ths when the l\.iG ~ .. {, bumc;tlmt:~ s'.!em.:-d to monopohze 

BYE nOl'l~74 llf! 

.. ap llie .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 "sP .8eR.1f 

attention. It was particularly encouraging that additional lnstances 

of administrative obstructionism could generally be squashed a. 

they appeared. At about the time the NASA-ABL fourth-stage motor 

experienceci its seventh (ailure, the Pacific Miuile Ran~~ began 

making official noise. about priorities. Requests that mllital"Y personnel be assigned to training slots for Program 35 produced counter 

demands for development plans, normal "through chann~ls" program 

authorization documentation, and priority authentication Crom Air 

Force headquarters --none of which the prog~am office l uuld furnlsh 

under the existing security and management ground rules. An elaborate. 

Program Requirements hocument (PRO) had been C'omplt'ted and 

delivered to the range On 3 November. That seemed, to the program 

office, quite enough. But range officers were not satisfied. After two 

weeks of formal conversations proved fruitles S, Haig again stormed 

the Pentagon. On 16 November 1961 the Department of Defense formally 

instructed the Pacific Missile Ranle to support Program 3"--development 

plan l r not. 

Another Gordian knot parted wi~h General Greer's decision to 

operate the readout station. under a contract With RCA. That highlighted another difference between Program 35 and most other Air 

Force satellite developments. Early in December, Colonel Haig 

briefed the commander of the Alr Weather Service on the pro.ram'. 

231 BYlnO 

.9P •• C .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/tART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

ob.iectives and schedules. A. Hai~ rememoored the event, the Weather 

Service seemed about as interellted 1.1 tOt: prulJpec.t u1 a. In->re ~!aoor.te 

lo11ow-on development, sometlnng lnUre (.QUlp"cX an" eJC.lJ~II.LV\': lnan 

Weather Service would not agree to 1urmsh (('.Lut.n f perl>~nnei tu 

,,, ')perate tbe equipment •••. 

The period trom Decemuer lC,o! \brOUSlO March 1~0. was largel~' 

taken up with detailed englDeer .. nfil \Vorl( ana IIl1rveillance of corltraCtuT 

progress, particularly Ln computers, motor_, anei payloaQ--the thre~ 

moat critical areas, But there Were runl~llngs of new duiicultlea 

w~th NASA early in February, anei tn.sy IIrow omlnous as the month 

wore on. Although the first Scout booster scheQu .. eCl. ior Prolilram 35 

was not accepted until l Marcn l'1bl. a montn earlier the program of;lce 

had bee 'lme desperately concernec WHh U,e lo'c"SSlblhtv that suf{lclent 

"pare parts might not be avaua:lie t,J IJUD1)Ort \",e te~t projll,r.nt. Aga_ 

NASA's attitude seemed infurlatindv cas\..a... 1 ne local NA5A representative was ~n Air Force oftlcer wno In tilE: U?lnlon 'Jl sorllt! Progranl :: 

people ".ad 'ost bis perspective on the real world, t1e tolQ rialg '. 

!>rincipal assistant, Fritz Runl[le. an en~lneer Who naG Ileen involved 

,,'lth development for 10 yea:::-. and """h s.tei.lnelr fur :;. tna~ the best 

,,·~v to handle the spares proDlem was to allocate_in procurement 

BYE 11011-14 :32 

""1~",~ ... 3 B,,~""a ... /Te::e"',· K.e.":I~ 

:: .... : :::,.. . "8 ••• e •• , 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

funds to NASA and atop worrying. Runge'. report of tbe meeting was 

composed of equal parts of irritation and bewilderment. 1.3 

A partial explanation certainly lay in the fact that within NASA 

only the three senior administrator. we.re aware of the real objectives 

of Program 35. That situation, wbich was controlled less by All' Force 

desires than by the wishes of NASA's top managers, was a real source 

of difficulties in communication. Virtually nobody in NASA understood 

why Program 3S was important, and in the hoary tradition of all those 

Intellectuals who for centuries had looked down on the centurion from 

the vantage of scholasticism, most of NASA decided not to be impressed 

by the parochial pretensions of a few relati-yely junior Air Force officers 

who were showing inexplicable signs of premature apoplexy. 14 

The problem was in two parts. Outside the reconnaissance field, 

from which all casuals were excluded. there was no real Air Force 

space program·-a fact that NASA appreciated well in advance of the 

Air Force. victimized by its own propaganda. Most NASA scientists 

honored the tradition of Wernher Von Braun, who admitted to only one 

goal in life·-manned space flight. Since it was obvious that no program 

based on use of the Scout vebicle could have eitber immediate utility 

or lasting significance •• it certainly was not a reconnaissance project, 

Z33 BYE nOI 

Hatld,<: Ifa Bveman/T;u·· .... .; 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

and the Air Force bad nothing elle wortb mentiomnll--anci since it 

would mterfere with other NASA actlVltleS that were It"adlnsr toward 

manned space flight, it could be of no Ilreat consequenc~. Hence 

NASA t S pedestrian, almost condellcena.ing attltudt:" 

NotWlthstanding such difficwtles. tne proszram cuntlnued Its 

pace toward a May launch. 0 Everytlllnll itr\!w IranuC"" Tht= lapse 

between rejection of the ground equipment for the New Hi'lmpshue 

readout station on tbe grounds of poor workmanship and the acceptance 

of rebuilt equipment was eight days; the baSIC vehicle, th .. payload, 

and the individual motors arrived at Vandenbertz within tJlX days of 

one another, with the ch~ckout van arrivinp but six weeks before the 

actual first launch. 

On ZS April the first West Coa.t Scout launchine was attempted. 

It seemed a bad omen. UnhapPIlV" tne third stasze functloned most improperly, to the end that the two upper stalles tt)2etner drove lnto thtP Of" 0 IS aCl lC cean. 

Di~appointed but not d18couraszed. the orOllram oeople turned 

back to their work on the first vehicle"l'-the second West Coast Scout. 

By 1 May the initial Program ~~ Scout had been mated with the first 

"operational" payload on the paQ at Vandenber!l. There was a dress 

rehearsal on 1 May and a launch attempt on 13 Mav, scrubbed because 

BYE 17017-74 

Mandie °loa Bvemaf".j Tale'" Ke.,"ote 

:: .. :.~ ~ C·., ~ 

~34 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

of various technical problt.'ms. Ten days later, after minur holds, 

the first Program 35 vehicle lifted off the launch pad. A catastrophu: 

failure during second-stagp burn ended the test. 16 

The post-launch inveshgating committee decided that unproper 

assembly of the basic vehlcle was the most probable source of fallure, 

although that was never finally established. The launch officer at 

Vandenberg suggested that transporting the assembled Scout to the 

pad over a needlessly rough road might have caused enough misalignment 

of the stages to cause the trouble. General Greer was sufficiently 

concerned at the possi-bility to ask the Pacific Missile Range commander 

to fix the road, but he dld not completely accept the thesls. 

The first and second stages of the Scout vehicle were coupled 

by a shallow, thr,-,aded inner sleeve, six threads deep. After being 

rotated into pla(-t.', it was held there by a three-quarter-inch pin 

driven through most of the vehicle skin and into the threaded sleeve. 

Pad workmen drilled the hole for the pin as part of the assembly 

process. and installed the pm once the vehicle was properly assembled. 

It all seemed simple and rather straightforward. 

Unfortunatel y, NASA had no prime contractor for the Scout. 

At the time, the Scout was delivered to Vandenberg in 17 boxes from 

mne sources. Procedures were NASA's responsibility; neither the 

235 

BYE non .. 

'I'9P SECaE .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Air Force nor the airframe contractor had authority to make chanaes--

or responsibihty for seeing that they were made when ntA. ded. Along 

the line. NASA engineers decided it was advlsable to thlcken the skm 

of the Stage I vehicle at the point where the threaded sleeve was to bt!' 

inserted. Owing to the absence of a central configuration control 

authority. nobody examined the effect of the change on the assc-rnbl ~ 

proce.s. In putting the vehicle together. therefore. pad personnel 

rotated the sleeve as usual, drilled the required hole, and inserted 

the. customary three-quarter-inch pin. 

But this time the pin extended into an inch of skin, never touching 

the threads. No positive means of preventing sleeve rotation eXisted. 

Indeed, in some respects. it seemed almost as though Chance-Vought 

a_~d NASA had combined forces to insure that the stages could not remain 

properly interconnected. Instead of the clean and dry thrt:ads required 

by specifIcations. the Scout used at Vandenberg had a fairl y heavy coat 

of grease on the critical threads. The lubricant was perhaps needed to 

get a proper fit in the first place. but it contributed littlt" to contmued 

tightness. Then the metal gl'1t left behind by the drill would also settle 

in the threads and under vibration might well serve as a lOl1rt of free 

rachet. permitting the sleeve to unscrew but acting like an irreversible 

cog to prevent tightening. 

BYE n011-'" 

Harole Via Byem.n/Ta.en~ Kev"'~e 

c:-:-: s ;:;"''1 

2.36 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Subsequent efforts by the prolram office to let either ChanceVought or NASA to test vibration effect. in a I'ealistic enVlronment 

had no Bucces., 80 program officers were never to be !OI,re that th~y 

had located the chief source of difficulty. Except for the program 

office. nobocly seemed to be particularly concerned. E\ t'n the fact 

of NASA IS unilateral action in cbanaing specifications dld nothlnll Lo 

alter the situation. 

There were other indications that the relationship between NASA 

and the Air Force was growing strained. One of the chLef factors was 

the spare parts problem. For more than five months NASA had been 

ineffectually negotiating a spare. contract with Chance-Vuught, uniformly rejecting the contractor's proposab on the grounds of unwarranted 

cost or insufficient detail. Air Force people on the scene, though unable 

to take a hand., were convinced. that NASA was almost entirel y wrong on 

both counts. In any event. with nO spare parts. and with no prospect 

of their early availability, the Air Force reverted to the eventual device 

of all supply sergeants, whether for chariots, muskets, B-Z4's. or 

solid-fuel missiles. Cannibalization began--and continued. And irritation 

with NASA increased. 

Friction arose from other causes too. Launch crews were 

convinced that NASA IS quite legal exerCise of the right to override 

Z37 

BYE 1101 

"SP IEC •• ", 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

"hold" commands during Scout launches frum the Pacific MissIle Range 

had actually caused the first Scout failure there. in AprIl. The "no go" 

item that NASA overruled seemed. by some evidence. the point of 

failure. That circur:rtstance did little to endear NASA people to th~ 

Air Force. The launch officer at V~ndenberg. however. was more 

than willing to take help where he could get it and was ('onvlnced that 

NASA had made highly useful contributions to the program. He. and 

a fair number at both SSD and SAFSP headquarters. felt that weaknesses 

in the Scout (Blue Scout) Program Office were more directly tu blame 

both for the immediate launch problems and for the long-term difficulties. 17 

Needless to say. that was not the outlook of the Scout program 

director. who had much earlier concluded that "NASA Indians" resented 

the special priority of the Program 3S vehicles and supported that 

18 

program only because such support was mandatory. 

Whatever the validity of the several positions. the lIuue of 

Scout responsibility was settled on il June 196Z by means of formal 

agreements between NASA and the Air Force. They conceded control 

of VIrtually all Scout matters to NASA, including general configuration. 

modification. launch stand procedure' •• and most related topics .19 

There was no prior coordination with the Program 35 people-·who 

were concurrently acquiring a 698BH program designator. For the 

moment, neither the agreements nor the nomenclature clange had 

BYE 17017.74 l38 

Ha"ci,! 'MI Bveman/Ta'en ~eV'lcle 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.GP I.e •• ., 

any detectable effect. Attention was generally concentrated on the 

- lO effort to get the next scheduled launch vehicle on its stand and ready. 

Through June and July 196Z, a succession of modlfications, 

revisions, and overhaul operations were performed with the next 

launch vehicle as the subject. (Vehicle 117 was to be used In heu of 

- 113, which had been mishandled in transport.) August 7th had been 

the original launch goal; optimism caused a shift to l8 Jut y, which 

then slipped successively to 19 July. 30 July. 3 August. and 10 August 

(to permit payload modifications directed by Charyk). Mo~ifications 

complete. the vehicle was rescheduled for a 13 August launch. At the 

critical instant, a Union Pacific passenger train crawled out on the 

track that crossed Vandenberg and for the first time in history a 

launching was scrubbed be~au.e of train interference. 

On the following day, 14 August, monitors caught signs of 

excessive gyro drift during countdown and rescheduled for the 16th. 

Technical difficulties (problems with the C-section and the hydrogen 

peroxide subsyetem) slipped that date to 18 August. and then Zl August 

when the Pacific Missile Range was unable to provide tracking services 

on the 18th. It seemed to many that the vehicle, and perhaps the entire 

program. was jinxed. One last slip carried launch over until l3 August, 

the eleventh official deadline date to be set that month. But on 

239 

BYE 1'01' 

'I'8P 15CR5T 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP IEGR ... 

Z3 August the Scout finally climbed away from its pad, all stage. 

burned more or less as programmed, and the payload went into a 

near-optimum orbit. Direct readout was successfully attempted 

over the New Hampshire station on l6 August and on the following 

day the first remote readout data on cloud Cover over the Soviet 

ak f h - - b- II Union was t en rom t e same po1nt 1n or it. 

Nowhere in the official reports was there_ the indication that 

a great deal of luck had settled on the Scout a few seconds before 

launch, as if in restitution for the six weeks of misadventure that 

had gone before. Nor was that fact entirely clear following pre-launch. 

Often a period of several days passed before detailed information on 

booster performance became available, and when a bird went into a 

near-optimum orbit there seemed little enougb rea.on to quibble over 

oddities in the launch process. In Colonel Haigls view, if Scout 

boosted tbe payload into any sort of orbit it was a near miracle; to 

get it into a near-optimum orbit was incredible. 

Haig was quite right. There had been several peculiarities 

or errors of 9ne sort or another during the launch. but none had 

individually done enough damage to cause complete failure. Had 

two combined. catastrophe would have resulted. Instead, in an 

unbelievable chain of coincidence. one fault cancelled out another. 

BYE 1'l01'l·'I4 Z40 

.... 

-: ..... : So ..... -, ... , 70P •• S .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.. 8P •• C .... 

At first-stage ignition the lanyards pulled out late. so all 

timers experienced a delayed start. The first-Itage motors should, 

therefore, have burned out before the timers could signal lecond-atage 

ignition to begin. Instead, the first-stage motor inexplicably burned 

longer than it should have and first-stage thrust was near perfect for 

the mis sion. 

Third-stage ignition was alsQ late, by O. S4 seconds. Fourthstage burning began, therefore, when the upper Itage waS further along 

its rough orbital trajectory than had been planned. But an earlier 

attitude error had caused a pitch down. and the effect of delayed 

fourth-stage ignition was to ·postpone the insertion procell until the 

vehicle had drifted far enough along its orbital path to be in perfect 

position for fourth-stage burn. 

The fourth stage was pOinted some 0.4 degrees left of its 

predicted course at the time of spin-up. Spin-up invariably threw 

the vehicle a bit off course in an unpredictable direction, a phenomenon 

called tip-off error. In this instance. spin-up provided precisely the 

az.imuth correction needed to insure a proper course. The final errOr 

was les8 than 0.1 degrees. which meant that the vehicle had lone into 

orbit close enough to true sun synchronization so that total dritt over 

the next six. months would total only 15-20 minutes (in sun time). (The 

241 

BYE 11017 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. DP SIiC •• " 

next succe .. ful Program 35 birel drifted three sun-time hours in six 

22 months as a result of a 0.6 degree error.) 

Colonel Haig called Colonel R. A. Berg, Greer',. deputy, from 

Vandenberg the afternoon the details of the launch were hrst put 

together. He askeel Berg to stay a few minutes past usual closing 

time to hear something Haig had to tell him. The C-47 t.huttle from 

Vandenberg landed about two hours later, and at dusk Colonel Halg was 

• 

verbally piecing together the tale of COincidence and happenstance which 

had resulted in so fine an orbit. Berg was fascinated. General Creerls 

reaction was similar. In a busineS8 where the unique was commonplace, 

. Haig's tale kept a place of honor. In any comparisons of satellite program 

oddities, citation of the event was almost certain. 

Even though the outcome had been happy, there was little to 

cheer in total booster performance once the truth was known. Nor, in 

the circumstances, did relations with NASA improve over the period of 

the first two launches. NASA contended, apparently quite serious, 

that the launch attempt of Z3 May had faned because of the Me-lS upper 

stage (although it was a tortuous trail between the real culprit, the 

second stage, and the MG-18. which had never been aiven time to begin 

separation from the third .tage). NASA pointed out, correctly, that 

the'Me-IS had never been night tested, and that it was not"qualified" 

BYE 11011-14 

wep •• C .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 '1'8 ••• C ••• 

in the sense of having completed a demandinl flilht trial prOlram·· 

but even at that the Me-l8 had certanl obviou8 attractions as compared 

to advantales of NASA '. proposed upper stage and its reC"ord of (Oomplete 

failure. There was a certain rude humor to the news that NASA had 

urged the commander of the Pacific Missile Range to close his ianilties to the Me-18 because that etage was "not qualifie~." And the 

final scene, the Z3 August launch, became almost ludicrous when NASA 

officials refused to let their people go near the final stage --in effect 

the entire launch site--claiminl that the launch was a dan~erou8 operation. 

In the light of such events. HaiS and hil people could sene rate 

little enthusiasm for a: proposed joint opel"ation, a project office structure 

which would put NASA into a sort of Siamese tWln relationship with Haig's 

people by means of a NASA link to the Scout prolram office. The prospect of such an arrangement had belun to alarm Colonel Evan. in May; 

his initial inquiry into Colonel Haia's reaction to a proposed NASA-USAF 

agreement on Scout prompted aeveral critical commenta. As Hail later 

explained, he felt that a joint project office. in the unhappy tradition of 

paat Air Materiel Command-Air Research and Development Command 

joint offices, would be respondble either to no master or to two, that 

each half would have a veto power but no approval authority. Candidly, 

Haig estimated that Program 35 would never have prolresaed to first 

~43 

BYE no 

70. IEERIi'l' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ",op ISCR.' 

launch attempt by that time if a joint oBice had existed. NASA, h~ 

reminded one listener. had strenuously opposed a great many Program 

35 decisions which later proved perfectly valid and which m any event 

oIlered the only chance of staying on schedule and setting critical 

equipment. He did not say MG-18. or "upper stage. " but his meaning 

was clear. It was Colonel Haigte conviction that the inability of the 

Air Force Scout program office to prOVide entirely satisfactory service 

was the product of faulty second-echelon management. And in 80 many 

wordS, Haig .aid the Air Force Scout office was providing msufficient 

support to his project largely becaus. its chief, Colonel Stme, was 

Z3 forced to do mo.t of the work himself. 

Although Colonel Haig'. appraisal of ' the problem apparently 

was blunt enough to quash notions of a joint project office. it could not 

prevent a moduication of the original arrangement for booster procuremente The Air Staff was afraid that NASA might succesdully invoke 

the Scout example to justify independent procurement of boosters 

developed by the Air Force: Thor and Atlas. [t pained the Air Force 

to see a Thor given a new coat of paint, prominent NASA mitials three 

feet high. and a name--Delta--whicb was supposed to indicate NASA 

origins. And unfortunately, that pouibility had been overlooked until 

after the Air Force had designated it. NASA-developed 5C'out boosters 

"Blue Scout. " 

BYE 1'1011·'14 

Her-die 'I'a eveman/Talent KeytlOle 

'::-:-:;, s 0n,~ 

244 

.. aPI.' .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

MP •• G .... 

In mid-October 1962. Dr. Charyk alreed that NASA would act 

as SAFSP's agent in contracting for additional Scout boosters. He 

specified that price and delivery dates had to be guaranteed and that 

product quality and program administration had to satisfy the requirements of ProgralTl 3S. U these conditions were not acceptable. he 

told NASA. General Greer would contract for follow-on vehicles 

precisely as he had for the first four. Z4 

In retrospect. that concession was to be recognized as a tactical 

errOr. Even though Charyk could not have known what NASA's future 

course would be. the small group which had placed the first Project 35 

satellite in orbit had some pronounced--and readily available--opinions 

on the subject. They proved rather sound. on the whole. 

For the moment. however t the matter seemed les s vital than 

the burgeoning crisis in Cuban affairs and the possibility that persiltent 

rumors of Soviet missiles in Cuba might have a foundation of truth. 

Reconnaissance of Cuba. chiefly by means of U-2 aircraft, began in 

September 196Z. On the lZth of that month Charyk authorized the 

satellite controllers to activate tlHaig's bird" over the Caribbean. 

The data thus obtained was read out during the next following pa .. over 

a friendly station. About 80 percent effectiveness was recorded in the 

remote readout operation. 

245 BYE nor 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'lOP 11i'81i. 

Late in October, the United State. thoruughly verified th.,. 

presence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cl4ba. Whll,," 

diplomatic tempers frayed, the United States intensified r ... unn;U~·'I" 

flights over Cuba and then tnltltuted a blockade of that lsland. W .. "'th~r 

information of the sort returned by the Program 3S salelll1e wa,. 

demanded early in the period of preliminary reconnals·sa"'e allC~ th .. 

requests multiphed as the crisis deepened. 

Because of payload peculiarities, it was neces.arv to fnrt:~(. 

exposures Ove I' the Soviet heartland on orbits which had or wuuld 

include exposures over the Caribbean. Power drain was too great 

and ("ommand cirCUitry" was inappropriate for such operations. Direct 

readout took less power, and i.f adroitly conducted during the satellite's 

northward pass would leave time for controllers at New Boston to 

program the bird for an over-Russia aeries of exposures un the uther 

leg of the orbit. During early October. therefore, the satellite· frequently 

was turned On while passtng over Cuba for direct readout from New Boston. 

Early trials worked reasonably well. But as the Cuban affair 

became more tense and pubhc awareness more general. long dormant 

military installations up -and down the Atlantic Coast began to operate 

their radar devices virtually around the clock. As Haig later phrased 

it. "everything up and down the coaat from. DEW line to the Univereity 

BYE 17011-'74 l46 

ft.,IiC .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'I'D.I.eRS .. 

of Florida se~med to be on the au,' Because of the c::urvature of the 

earth. the radar dish at New Bost"n had to be angled but SiX deare~s 

from the horizontal to read out tht:> satellite dUring ltspassage uver 

Cuban waters. That low angle made the transmission particularly 

susceptible to interferenc~--and the babel of radiation from reglor,1S 

south of Boston continued to grow louder, 

A return to the remote readout proce,ss .. ~emed \nevltable, 

But there were new compiLcations, qU1te apart (rum the fact that 

information on both Soviet and Caribbean cloud l.over was mcreaslngly 

n eded as the tension 'mounted. It WB .. :he pr~)vlDce of a military 

commander to decide whlch had the more urgent prl"rity. 1f a choice 

had to be made. In case both were vitally needed, it would ha.ve been 

a military prerogahve--and requlrement--to bleed away all the power 

of the satellite. that being In the supreme national interest. But by 

the time somethtng of the sort .eelned mescapable, there were tentative indications that it might no longer be possible. 

World geograpby being what 1t was, the satellite had to be 

.commanded .to take Caribbean pictures wbile moving northward In 

the vicinity of New Boston. The next pass, as it moved over the 

Caribbean on its way north again, was the final Leg 1n one ('omplete 

BYE 17017· 

!fOP IECaST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 yep •• e •• , 

circuit of the earth. But in some instances exposures commanded from 

New Boston had not been made when the bil-d again ov .. rn .. w the 

Caribbean. Investigation indicated that as the satellite passed over 

the pole and began itl southward r~, down and across th~ Kamc:-hatka 

Peninsula. signals fr~m an alien source were causing tl ttl rest command 

controls. The question of whether the interference was uJ a random 

nature ur represented a successful Soviet ploy in counter·ltatdhte 

teChnology remained unanswered for the moment. The rrqulrement 

of a reliable means of direct readout became presSln~. rt"~ardl"!ls of 

the reason. 

In that envlro.nment. Colonel Hail called Culone 

a member of Undersecretary Charyk IS Washington staff. It) aek fur a 

c!tancc: to propose a new approach. Haig told only that he thuught 

he might have answers to both Kamchatka and AtlantiC Coast Interference 

problems. who had been bedeviled for solutions for the previous 

two days, scheduled Haig for a meeting with ("haryle.. The next afternoon, l3 October, Halg appeared in Charykls office with a hastily 

prepared presentation previously exposed only to General Creer. What 

he pruposed was to set up a direct readout station at Eglin Au Force 

Base. Florida. In 'one stroke. such a statlon would elimtnate relLance 

on remote readout commands that might be countermanded and WQuid 

an: l'101'1·'I4 

Hal'ldle v;a Bveman/Talent· Keynote 

COMrOIS Cm,), 

l48 

_PI.C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

!'e.l.e •• ~ . 

overstep obstacles to direct readout from !'lew Boston. Th~ equipment 

wa- available. Haig explamed. Th~ launch , h~,-kout van on the West 

Coast. which could be airhfted ttl Eghn. would pro" ide all the needed 

command and readout capacity. while there happened to be on s1te at 

Eghn'. Awnliary Field Number S a TLM-IR antpnna whH:h would 

beautifully serve the direct readout needzl uf the Program JS aatelhte. 

(Halg's certitude on the matter of the TLM-18 was well fuunded; a 

year earher. while It tht> bunness of settlng Up (r,pnmand and, ontrol 

stalions for another program. he had OCl:aSl0n to purlOin ~ 61nnlar 

umt for emergency placemt'nt In an African site. He walt qUltt" famillar 

With the- lnstrwnent1s charaC'terlstics.) As it happened. Colonel Halg 

had earlier taken informal steps to insure tbat the TLM-18 would be 

ready if needed; ht' had phuned Eglin and Without saying anything to 

idenhfy objectives had told officers overseeing tnais of the TLM-l8 

that It might be best tn speed up acceptance tests. wh,,:h were 

scheduled to take another three weeks. since the antenna mi~ht be 

requisitioped and Eghn might neVer have a chance to complete the 

tests later. The Eghn people toole. Haig'. word and accelerated theIr 

actiVity. Haig had also assured himself that the equipment at Vandenberg could be airlifted. 

Charyk approved Haig's proposal on the spot. On his way 

~ 

through Charyk's anteroom, Haig telephoned Eglin and VandenberJl. 

249 BYE 11011 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. 8.I.G .... 

He then climbed aboard the first airplane headi.na south. He wal on 

Eglin's AuxUiary Field Number !; the next morning. A quick confer- ." 

enCe with the senior officer on the spot (Briaadier Ceneral A. T. 

Culbertson), and a phone call to the program office confirmed actual 

departure. He spent the balance of the day writing station security 

and operating procedures. 

The Vandenberg equipment arrived in Florida on Z5 October; 

two days later, on Saturday, Z7 October 196Z, it was put in operation 

for the first time. (The new station was called Site IV--L~da Site.) 

The first attempt at direct readout was only moderately successful, certainly not of the quality the Program 35 people had anticipated. 

They quickly located the trouble: electrical noise originating in the 

brushes of the auxiliary generator that provided power. A switch to 

commercial power drawn through Eglin wal completed the following 

morning, and that afternoon, Sunday (Z8 October), the readout operators 

got extremely good results. 

On the next day, attempts to read out through the birdie 

television eyes were completely unsuccessful. Power fluctuation and 

massive radiation interference frustrated every effort. The operators 

located the source of the radiation almost at once; in order to interrogate the satellite, the dish had to be aimed almost directly acroll the 

BYE 1'101'-'1" 

Handle Via Bveman/Talent Kevhole 

CentrOIS Only 

ZSO 

~e.lse ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'I'OP .BC ••• 

main houling area of Ef(lin Air Force Bale. and lowerinll the scan 

angle shghtly showed that huge quantlh~s of radlatl"n Wt"rt' streaming 

upward from that area Into the path of thE' readout SLllnals. The 

preVlouz; day's results had been so lmpres81ve bt'\ aus~ ~u'lda\ had 

been a lovely day and many of the lnhabltanu of Iht" hOUSlflW- ar.'a had 

been absent. Monday was washday, which meant thE' ,"onhnued \lSt" of 

electrical Iladgets ranglnll. from walhers and dryers to t~lt'vlIiLUn sets 

and vacuum cleaners. The «..omblnation reathly t'xplalnt'd why power 

fluctuated, and where thE' radiation originated. 

Colonel Halg wa~ In C"ontact with General Culberts()n's .• {flCt' 

scarcely mlnutes after tht' trouble had been identified. c...ulbert,;un. 

a genial, blunt IItflcer whu had recentl y left Wright FiE'ld afte r twu 

frustrating years of exposure to the slow and C"ontorted dE""l81un 

proceSses thert:. had come to favor a dr ... conlan appro ... ch to problems. 

Time being rathE'r short, he lnformed al many Eglin retlldents as 

possible of his intentions and of his need for complete uSt" of all lucal 

power--a~d then threw the maln switch to the hOUSing area. In that 

one stroke he solved the problem of current fluctuatLon and E'linlinated 

random electrical noist>. LatE'r that week, when mdtters had become 

less hectiC, he inserted appropriate notice. in the Eghn bulletin, 

advi.ing readers that there would be periodic: power outages. When he 

ZSI BYE 1701 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

heard that automobiles dr ,Vlntt under the ,un~ II! Tl.M-Ir. radlatlun 

mLJlht produce Interference thrCltuzh their Ignition systems. he ,ailed 

out the local Air Pollee. set up road blucks, and stupped ,very car 

withIn range of the dish. 

Signal clarity was eXl"eptional. So was ht·' "lIudt rabh.· dt'llrt-e 

. ''; of respe~t that Culbertson and H~ig ac-qulred for "lit" ~n.)ll',,·r.-

As usual, luose t->nds rema·ned. Fur one, lilt" val. tlo\\n to 

Eglin represented une -third of the apphcable readuut Io'ott" nUai LIl the 

world and. at the moment, all uf the launch cheC'k -out, apac ltV avallable to Program 35. Th"'r~ was no criels comparable ttl the Cuban 

imbrogho, but It was a danghng end and Halg's people s ... , lIut to tl'lm 

It off. With help from RCA's engLneers. they canmbahz..-d tht- fa, tury 

check-out equipment, assembled a new readout complex. Installed it 

at Slte IV, and switched operatlon to the new equlpment. On II November 

the original van was flown back to Vandenberg. One day latc= r, the 

manufacture of new equipment for factory ( heck-out sets be~an. 

Virtually nobody outside the orlgmal C'lrcie of cognizant PruRram 

35 peuple knew of the EglIn operation. (General Culbertson was never 

fully briefed, for Instance.) In terms of the hundreds of thuusand. of 

uniformed personnel who wert: alerted or shifted abo It late in October 

1961. the Program 35 operation seemed inSignificant. Ypt Ceneral Power 

BYE 110l'J-74 

Har-::1'~ • a Bveman/Ts'e"! Ke~~ole 

::,. ... -:,.: V"'9 

zsz 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

TOP S.C •• ., 

later said it had been worth a. much .. three wings of 8-5Z' •• and 

from a bomber man that was a significant compliment. even if there 

was a possibility that it also reflected satisfaction over a parallel 

decision to give operational respon8ibility for the Program 35 satellites to the Strategic Air Command. In any event. the establishment 

and activation of a direct readout station in the Caribbean had taken 

an unbelievably brief time. had been successfully conducted in an 

atmosphere of extraordinary security. and had required relatively 

few people. Moreover. those people--from Charyk through the least 

senior of the antenna operators--had conaiatently functioned with a 

directness that seemed quaintly archaic in its vigor and enthusiasm. 

The episode was a thoroughly refreshing interlude in an otherwise 

stodgy fright contest between nuclear behemoths. 

In retrospect it was clear that the separation of Program 35 

from the ponderous main trunk of research and development hacl much 

to do with the success of the Eglin operation. Colonel Haig. who had 

a Parkinsonian distaste for officiousness. arranged for transportation 

a~d installat~on of the equipment by placidly ignoring ordained channels. 

General Culbertson obviously relished his opportunity to take direct, 

effective action. So did most of the junior officers and the RCA technicians who were indispensable to the operation. It was clear that 

253 

BYE 1701'1 

handle "/I Bverr.an/T~H~· .... ,' 

'lap I.CR.1f ......... - :: -
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

TOP IIiC8.' 

ptersonal enterprise had as much to do with the sue. cess uf the I,ndt:r· 

takln~ as dId technical skil1. l t. 

In parallel with the decision to set up an E".hn h'ddout statilln, 

Ch,sryk had confirmed a set of rulings WhiCh put Program 35 " •• a ne'w 

('ourl5e. On the dity followinll. Colonel Halg's proposal of the Eglin 

solutlOn. Charyk notlfLed General Greer of his approval, r.ot onJv of 

the E".lin proposal, but also ~f suggestions that th ... Stratefllc Air 

Command be ohered the job of operating the Program lr;satdhtt':. 

under the dire<"tlon of the program office, and tbat prOVISions bE> made 

for standby launC'hes to provide additional cloud COVer satl"lhtes as 

l7 ne~ded. In one stroke, the program office had become responsible 

for ( reatln~ and mann\.n~ (wLth SAC people) two semi-permanent readout 

statIOns and for ,tn t'xtended program. That expansion of the millS Ion 

had Its own mIgraine potential, while there remained the eternally 'Hurt" 

dlfiH'ult problem uf deahng successfully witb NASA in matters com ernlng the hooster. The satelhte Itself had proved almost truubJ .. free. 

unhappily, ther..: could he few demonstrations of Its potenhal whlle Its 

booster remaUled unrehable to a degree that tbe Air Force could not 

There were lome special problems in operatlng a mihtary 

satelhte uver a long period of hme. Oddly enough, tbey had not been 

aCl'urately foreseen in some five year. of planning for the day when 

BYE 1'1017.'14 

Hal'dle ila Bveman/Talen!, Kevrole 

:c~:·:; 5 On., 

l54 

.. SPSliC •• " 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

the Air Fune would bave long-tlme-on-orbh satellites 1u uperiltr. 

Th~ p- J'; vehicle was. of course. the flrst mlhtar\' satelllte 1., be 

k~pt func'tional on a daily bas'l for so long a perlod. and 1t had. t!rtaln 

pt.>C'lIharll1es that set it apart from other orb1lLn~ devlces. 'h .. dld the 

pnl)!(ram off1ce. For one, tile strictures ofoperahng w1th it tlJ~ht 

bud~et and with military personnel had prevented t reatt.,n .. f a S()Phl~tlc.:<ltt"d l"t)ll1munication system mterlocking Los Angeles Wltt. V .. udt'nberg. 

as was the case with other SSD apace systems. AU the data acquired 

from urbit had to flow through the 6594th Aerospace Test, WLn~ bdore 

reachmg th~ engineers who designed and built the spacecraft and ground 

equipment. There was' no dlrect feedbaCk of operational data from the 

tracking stations and the Satellite Tracking Center (Sunnyvale) to the 

program office. Both sltuations resulted from operatlng withuut a 

systems engineering/technlcal direction contractor. That novel arrangement also meant a shortage of qualified techmcal people to assist and 

advlse the test wing during operations. The test wing. therefore. had 

to a8sum~ more initiatiVe 1n the operation. analVlHs and evaluation of 

the program.- In the eyes of the P-35 office. the only real difficulty in 

thiS unique system had been the failure of the test wmg'. people to 

report on the operation of the ground equipment. The ground eqUipment 

contractor operators were emplov"d by RCA and were responsible to 

~5S BYE not 

'lap •• e .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'I'O.IEsa ... 

the win~ rather than to the program office, but lhe" were under «antraet 

to tht' program office, and the prCltHam .tfhc e had an obvIOUS need for 

deta\l~d data on t-quipment operation. 

Early tn the operation of the bird (which b~" Onuber was known 

by Its fourth new designatur' Program 417). an old mlhtary p".,hlem 

nosed into the space: program for the first hme. Malntalnlng hl~h 

murale and hLllh operating effiCiency had alwaYIl bet"n dlffu"ult In 

rouhne mihtary operations, particularly those wh" h "fOem~d Lo "ave 

little of a crisIS nature In their character. One of tht" r.-a1 rt"a:-.uns 

for a pubhc mformabon office was to make troups dOlnl'! " ",ndane duty 

think of thetnselves as Important and theLT task • • s gla,,' .. ruus. Until 

the 417 bird went into orbIt, however, therte" had be' .. n utlthing rout\nt> 

or repetitive abollt space operattons - -e,u"ept perhaps r • .,~tltioll uf Co nalS. 

T rue, many satellit~s had been orbited, and the ree urrence of launch 

and rfOcovery operations set"med a similar problem. But E'ven If they 

had outward hkenesses, one laullc hand re-("overy differfOd from anuther, 

and the phySical differenc.es shmulated participants. As much euuld nut 

be said for a satellite operatIon routine that w1thln 30 days of Its start 

had become about as excitinll as taklng a dally barometer readl.n~. h 

was scarcf'ly a new problem, even .r new to space aperatwns. Th .. 

remedy was classical: 

BYE 1101"-74 

"'a~::,'" , ~ Bvemar./Tate.,!" Key"o'e 

::-":.5 c.., y 

lnape'llon. inC'entlves, re-tralnlnK. and aU 

256 

'10.,.S .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

!lap llie •• ., 

the.- time-tested means of "maintalmng an alert., competent upt>ratmg 

l8 

force •••• I, If such problem=> troubl~d a research and devt'lopm~nt 

operation, how much more- wuuld the,; prove a source oi dlffu-ulty to 

an operational unit which would be ,-harl(ed With tht-1lI not tor a f~w 

weeks, but for many months, perhaps years. The sp~(\rC" uf ui,,{ormed 

boredom that earlier seers had dubbed' the 5110 Sitter 11£ tht' Slxtlt'S 

was sidlintt lnto Program 411. 

Whethcar foreseen or not, many of the diffH:ultlt."b thitt Invanably 

beset any develupmental system making a transltlUI1 tu " ..... relll,mal us~ 

were "bout to desct!nd for the first tune on a spact: "Ylih'm. I (~~ 

was an operational eystem, of ('ourse, so the real dlstinCholl was 

uperahon of a space system by an operating command. ) 

Underst". rt:tary Charyk's onginal instructions tu General Greer 

had specified that a separ .• te readout system manned by uniformed Air 

Force personnel was to be in operation by about 1 July 1963, operated 

by SAC and the Thud Weather WLn~ of the Air Weather Se r"lce, but he 

exphcltly ordered that there were to be no elaborate requlreme-nt& for 

complete standardization, comprehenSive training manuals, and all 

the paraphernalia so beloved by the LogleuC's Command. In thiS respect 

he was in a pOSltion to be more Immediately effective than a predec ... 80r 

who had faced, recognIzed, and finally won over the same general 

prublem. Years earlier, Colonel W. G. King, now heitdLng one of 

Z57 BYE 110' 

.aPIEcaa" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 y~p IEGaEI' 

Ceneral Creer's major program offices, had been in charge of the 

Snark missile program. When Kmg took it over, the Snark was 

admittedly in its declining days; roughly six years behind sch ... dule. 

and widely conceded to hav~ httle more lhan nUISance valin'. ~l1drk 

had nonetheless been pushed dt'terminedly through the d~velupment 

process, complying With all the multitudinous requlrements of the' era. 

King's job, It developed, was to get th, one wing of Snark:. rt"ady fur 

placement on their sole ,U ':le, In Maine. That task he pt"rforrned rn.)st 

skillfully and With as htUe damage to the national exchequt·r as the 

Umes would permit. In hu efforts to reduce extraneous ~nark effort 

he came across a requrrement that operating manuals fur new,.. .;It.'ms 

be prepared and fUTOlshed to all major air bales in the Umted Stat~s. 

For months King pomted uut that Snark, a one-way miss ale With a 

somewhat irresponsible guidance system, was not an ainraft and not 

subject to established rules, was unlikely to settle down at Tmker AFB 

for emergency repairs. and that in any event it would be rather uneconomical to train repair crews across the country when only 10 SnaTks 

were ever to be available. Kmg ~ oncluded, reasonably, that launch 

crews might well need manuals, but that these could be mexpenslvely 

prepared in about 50 copies; mas. printing and distributton, he coneluded, was not entirely warranted. Convincing nece.sary elements 

BYE 1'1017-'14 lS8 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

of the Air Force and sec.urlng a waiver "'l that particular phase of 

- lQ Snark development too~ Colonel KlOg many. many months. 

The distinCtion between the 417 prugram and conventional 

aircraft systems was obvious; dIffereD( t'S from established mlslSlle 

programs were less obvious but could b~ tdentified by 1ntelbgent 

oblJervation. On the oth-=r hand. the 417 program also differed 

radically in its objectIves and tcchniqueli frum th.· "pure St 1en('e" 

pruject~ of NASA. ProgrAm 417 personnel rei' 0lllllzed the useful 

distinctions; because ul tht: tlght security brack~t around prograll 

activities. it often was dtfflcult to communicatE' tht· full nwamn)l of 

thE' situation to outslderli. The 417 program had been sPt'c lite-allv 

exempted from vlrtually all routine reporting requl"emenls. and 10 

Dr. Charylc's latest ruling had been empowered to I reate hlJlhly 

unot'thodox operattonal enVlronments for an operahng command to man. 

but which would never b-= "turned over" in the traClltlonal sense. The 

existence of firm requirements for meeting schedules. and for staytng 

within c~st boundanes. set the 417 program well apart frum most NASA 

enterprises at the other end of the spectrum. In order to mamtaln lts 

established high level of program success. the 417 program office 

would have to perform more skillfully than mOllt others 1n comparable 

situations. Charyk's injunction that the program office could purchase 

. boosters through NASA but would maintain Alr Force qUality control 

l59 

_PI.C ••• 

BYE 1701' 

Handle "a Bveman/ Ta'~·· .... e 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 '1'8. IEeRE~ 

standards, fixed price agreements, and set delivery dates, for lnstant"e, 

added new difficulties to the existing NASA perplex. 

By late November 196Z. RCA was at work on the Sf' ond bat("h 

of satellites (the follow-on vehiclea), a contract covennl( liieven dddiuonal 

MCi-18 motors had been let to Lockheed (the motor cas~ had hnal1~ 

failed--at 3S0 percent of deSlgn load!). and the first flYe !StrategIc Air 

Command officers elated to work with the onginal 417 program offic. ~ 

crew had arrived. Additionally. program officers had betcun an attempt 

to obtam Algol IIA motors for Scout first stage use In heu of the AlllOl 

to'motors originally provided. (The ItA promised to be better in 

thrust and generally,more reliable.) Unhappily. few UA's were a'\aLlable. 

and most orgamzations with on-hand or on-the-way nA's werf" quite 

a.ware of their vlrtues--as well as of Alaol ID disabilities. The 417 

offlC."e had notably little luck in horae trading--but kept trymg. In 

Dt.'C"embel' 1962. Lieutenant Colonel E. J, Istvan. in the Pentagon 

uffu"e, brieny thought he had talked the Office of Aeronautical Research 

J n10 a swap. but that organization reneged when the thrust advantages 

uf,the Algol IIA were defined. Navy'. Bureau of Weapons would not 

l'v,.-n consider a trade. Proaram 417, it aeemed. was to continue 

wlth the Algol ID regardless of desir ••• 30 For the 417 payload. the 

thrust differential would be measured in orbital altitude.: about ~OO 

nautical miles for the Algol lIA aaainst 375 mile. for the 7A1lol ID. 31 

BYE l'l01'.'I4 

Ha"die 'Jla Bveman/Ta1e"t Ke~"..,le 

::':~:';J,S unly 

Z60 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

With the potential of the 417 satellite thoroughly proven, Lt was 

b~corning increasingly clear that the greatest danl(er to l'ontLnued 

program success lay in the tntdfectiveness of the S. U..1t booster. On 

6 December 1962.. the program office began a study of altt:rnatlves. 

The field was initially limited to the Thor·Delta (Thor with a Vanlluard 

upper s,tage) but later expanded to include Thor-AbleStar (Thor With 

an Aerobee upper stage) and Thor-Agena (the combination u!led In 

Program 16Z. still known as Discoverer). General Greer had no 

doubts about the importance of the program. then and for the future. 

With the Cuban operation 10 mind, he wrote ont' of the test winJl 

cory'Unanders that. "The output from Program 41; has ("onlrlbuted 

sigmflcantly tu the success of recent operations of the greatest nabonal 

Importance. Ea,"h succesdul readout results 111 strengthenIng our 

military capabibty. ,,3Z 

The Eglin operatum actually stopped a w~p.k after General Greer 

made that analysis--the Cuban crisis having simmered down- -and a 

dispassionate evaluation of results began. (The readout statioJ1 remamed 

In storage. r.eady for reactlVatlon on Z,4-hour notice.) There was the 

confusing if interesting revelaLlon, for instance, that readout had 

somehow been better at low than maxunum elevations. Stmllarly, It 

was becoming obvious that the problem of operator error aril1nll from 

simple boredom ,-, 19ht be ~reah:r than anyone had fores~en--a c .. ndusion 

lbl BYE 1101 

Haf'dl~ Ita Bvem.r/T~'en! t'.e 

TopsscaST 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP .se ••• 

drawn from the first five months of experit"nce With operators at New 

Boston. The famiharlty- breeds.contempt S) ndr .. m~ had taken new 

H 

turn. 

Mo re C ommonplac e problems. 80me in new \ olots. also 

l'eappeared. NASA. 1t developed, ,was not prepar~d to quote a precise 

dollar figure for Scouts. and SAC had no sooner acquuecl an Lnterest 

In the satelhte than lhat command began insisting on acceptam t' of 

its uwn notions concernms control centers and the like. But in the 

circumstances. these still were irritants more than obstacles. 

Colonel Haig, who had been with the program almost preC'lsely sixteen 

months, choAe early January 1963 to propose an expanded program and 

to review for Dr. Charyk the past and. future of the 417 program. 

The 8reat talking point still was the first satellite. vehicle 3502. 

which after 137 days and 1968 orbits (as of 7 January 1963) was returning better cloud cover information than immediately after 1ts launch. 

That pecuharity Colonel Haig 'ascribed to improvement ln operator 

techniques which exploited the full potential of horizon senSor efficlency 

and readout effectiveness. 

The selection of a contractor to construct and activate two readout stations for SAC had by then been made. The 417 office had let the 

contract at a fixed price a completion deadline of 

BYE I'lOl'r·'f4 Z6Z 

- - , .... : ... : ... :.,~ "-Ir' ,. TOP •• C .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED. ON: 7 MAY 2012 

!'ep •• S ••• 

six months. Experienced researcb and development oUlcen 1n SSD 

had sternly cautloned Ha1~ and General Greer that the work wuuld 

cost at least three times that much and take three limes as lon~. 

Colonel Haig, who had made the original estimates and stood by them. 

had convinced Greer he could get t~e work done in the tLmco and at the 

34 

cost quoted. Radiahon Incorporated had won the contract and was, . 

hard at work preparing two statlons, two 40-foot radar d.shes, radomes 

(the dishes were too fragde for strong wind.), and equipment vans. 

Haig had located two abandoned Nike missile sites. onE' in ,the Northeast 

and the other 1n the Northwest sections of the Umted States, had 

acquired thealn at nO cost to the program, had seen to 1t that full advantage was taken of existing roads and buildings, and was fully c oruidenl 

that the contractor would do as he had promised, and In the time allowed. 

In Colonel Halgls judgment, the demand for the 417 ay"em was 

more pres81nK in early 1963 than at any time in the past. Continual 

slippage in Nimbus schedules and major techni!=al d1fficulties lD 1ts 

develop~ent tended to make 417 increasingly attractive. The pointing 

acc\4racy of N1inbus prortl1sed to be in a six-degree cone, at best, the 

prototype was senously overwei,ht, the power source--solar panels--

was in serious trouble, the launch schedule had shpped by nearly a 

year in an elapsed six months, and there was no real pos.ibility of 

Z63 BYE non 

.. ePI.S8 ... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .. UP •• e .... 

constructing something to do the same tallk a5 Nlmbus. SUI.. h as an 

"ope rational" T Iros. 

SAC's interest m the 417 satelhte had mcreaged <:onslderably 

after exposure to early results. The 417 represented a n~ar perfE-ct 

training device for space operations. being stable. depenaable. and 

relatively uncomplicated. Operation by a field command was not 

particularly dangerous for the vehicle on orblt. (Haig. alied th .. 417 

~atE'llite "idiot proof. ") Perhaps most Important. the system ""as 

lnexpenSlve to operate. and mamtaln. F mall y, there was .m. reaSlnll 

pressure from the Navy and the Strike Command for a tacheal readout 

system; the Au Force had a small but Slgniflcant invelo\ment In litround 

stations --and one that would not become rap1dly obsolete. e1ther--

which underlined the importance of continuing an active spal.. f' program; 

and there was a substantial opportunity for inexpensive experimentation. Taken together, these represented solid arguments for nmtlnuing. 

indeed for expanding. 417. So long a. it retainf'd 1ts baSIC- characlerishCI of Simplicity. reliab1hty, and economy uf uperatlon, lt remained 

attractive. 

Colonel Haig seemed convinced, even this early. that the 

eventual salvation for 417 lay in adoption of a new booster. The 

studies begun the previous month had identified the BLock 11 Thur 

(with Bell Telephone Laboratories guidance) and the ARe~na 0 as the 

BYE 1'701'7-74 

Ha"CJI~ \I.a Bveman/Ta1ent Kei":lIe 

~.:r·r~.s C~I~ RPI •••• ' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'l!GP •• C •• 'I' 

most economical booster combination. The two prOvided the greatest 

injection accuracy. highest theoretical reliability. and heaviest payload potential of all the systems examined. Haig contended that a 

Thor-boosted 417 could be a heavier satellite. one capable of covering 

the entire northern hemisphere and having an average orbital life 

expectancy of eight months. Such a vehicle could easily incorporate 

a tactical readout capability. could grow to 700 pounds payload. could 

include three remote cameras .nd three backup cameras (one for each 

primary). and could operate on a 60-kilocycle bandwidth with one-halfmile resolution. The program office estimated would 

buy and launch six such satellites. 

In support of an "advanced 417. " Colonel Hail'S office proposed 

two specific developments: a stabillte--a miniature .t~ble platform 

and associated circuitry. _and a new ion detector attitude sensor He 

asked Charyk to authorize expenditure of for the stabilite and 

r the detector. 

Charyk approved the additional funds but withheld any ruling 

on the need for a new booster. 35 For the rest. Hail and his group 

had to prepare mOre detailed proposals. The stabilite--which had 

actually been conceived in the course of a technical discussion between 

~65 au 11011-' 

Hindle ~11 Bveman/Tlllnt· Ke/~:' 

Ccrtrc 5 :n, 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

personnel of the 417 office and RCA representative.-·embodied the 

notion of torqueing the maln body of a spacecraft about a flywhet!1 

that was spun up by rockets. The concept promlsed a useful ( ompromise between the stable platform that was so desirable frum the 

standpoint of photography and the spin.stabilized body whac h uffen·d 

so much in simplicity of stabilization technique. 36 

In mid-February there was an interesting meetinlll In Washmgton 

with implications for the far future of the entire 417 effo,"t The ~athering included Charyk and 01'. John Ruebel of Directoratt" .,1 Defense 

Research and EngineerlOg. Dr. S. Fred Singer of the Wt"atht"r Bureau 

. (he was the ongmatoruf the MOUSE satellite proposal of 1953 whlch 

so profoundly influenced the ICY program). plus two representatives 

(named Hoffman and Eaton\ from the Department of Commerce. Nobody 

from NASA was on hand; Haig was there. The crux of the meeting was 

Ruebel'. blunt -statement that he wanted to get Nimbus responsibihty 

transferred from NASA to the All' Force. after which tht' All' Force 

would support Weather Bureau satellite Objectives. The Department 

of Commerce was ln favor. SlOgerls reaction was not noted. but could 

be guessed: the Weather Bureau wanted an operating system. Ruebel. 

whose fiscal and engineerlng (onservaU.m had given him the general 

reputation of automatically opponng all new proposals for space systems, 

BYE 17017-'14 2.66 

M~"CIE ... Ia Bveman/ia'e.,t· Key"ole 

ft ••• e8.' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .ep 'Ee •• , 

»aid frankly he favored expanclina Proaram 417, wanted the 417 team 

held together. and expected to lssue instr"ctlons authorlZln~ a 10\\-

37 

claSSlf1cation 417 program in support of Weather Bur~a\l ubJeclLves. 

Such an attitude had far reaching lmphcatLons. That SAC would 

havt effective control of satellites m orblt was assurea. ana that a 

more elaborate satellite system would be developed for mlhtary use 

seemed probable. That Nimbus shortcomings were beu)mlllg "ver 

more apparent and that technical faults promised to dela, Its availabtlity further compileated the situation. Nlmbus seemed dt'stLnt'd to 

becornt: an "international" weather satelbte 1n con,,'erl wllh thl' stillhonored space.for-peace theme. It could never complt.'lt'ly 8atHlf)' 

Alr Force needs. even 1f a resounding success, aince a .. desl~n~d ll. 

would provide insufficient north latitude coverage. 

Haig's people had reservationd an a"nt=r accaunts. loo. .rteasonably familiar with the tecnnical delad. al Nlmous, tiley were convinced 

that it had inherent technical failings, partLcularly 1n ti,e pow~r liupply 

system. ~inally. Nimbus was dependent un a nt=w concept uf IiLablhzation that had never been test flown. AU in all, &'IIlmDuB set=rned qutte 

unhkely to serve Alr Force objectlves. ,fhe fact that Lt would t'ely 

on an electrostatic tape system of uncletermmed rehabllity did little 

to endear Nimbus to Air Force people who had recent sad experience 

1.67 BYE 110n 

'Iep ISERS .. I*' ,.~... _ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 yep •• eRE!' 

In tests of similar systems for a proposed Samos E.} apphc:ation. 38 

For the moment, however. there were other problema. of more 

immediate concern. On 19 February the second 41; salelhte went mto 

orbit. It was not placed as accurately as the first. bemlt ;;0 "1\lles low 

in apogee and 140 in perigee, a8 well a. haVing a two-degree lnC'iLnatLon 

error.

19 Initially 1t appeared that the fault lay In .t fourth .taJl~ separation which occurred at too great an altitude and too low a speed. 

Further analysis indicated that each of the first three stalles had 

performed badly.·although the ABL X-lS9 third-stage el1t(1Ile wa. the 

chief offender. In any event, the satellite was in a "lesli than optlmum" 

orbit. 40 Its functlomng was generally acceptable, even .nder. :iuch 

handicaps. untll late April. when the- primary tape control ~ircult 

went bad, ehmmatmg the birdls ability to store primary data. The 

direC't readout mode remained operational and 80 percent effectlve. 

By September 1963, however, the satellite would have Ilotte-n 80 thoroughly out of phase With the sun that a l80-degree reorlentatLon would 

be necessary. 41 

The February 1963 launch (Operation Ol40) proved lhe feasibil~ 

ity .,f still anothe!' innovation in cloud-cover reconnalssance. Nearly 

a year earlier, the program office had undertaken a study of radiation 

measuring subsystems, devices which by registering b.clt~round radiatlon 

BYE 1.,01.,-., .. 

handle I'a B~eman/Taler.t Key"'01~ 

C: .. ··c.s O .... y 

Z68 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

from the earth's surface could identify nilbt cloud cover. The s:nall 

investigataun had been stimulated by General Oreer's oblu~rvatlon, 

in March 1961. that it was unfortunate that a cheap Infrared system, 

was not fea8ible. 

In the cour8e of their inquiry. prolram office peopl~ dis. overed 

that Or. V. E. Suomi of the Univer8ity oI Wlsconsm had prado, ~d a . 

prototype and one flight-model infrared ae,neor for the E.xplorer pro~ram. 

Because of changes in that NASA activity, the s,m80r had never been 

orbited. It had every indication of meeting the requirements lor a 

secondary payload for the 417 spacecraft. 

On 3 September 1961, the prolram office let a low-co .. t ,,'ontract 

covering rehabilitatior of Suomi's prototype and tentahvely scheduled 

it to be flown on the fourth 417 satellite (0240). By December l'ibl., 

test results were 10 promlling that contract. ""ere let cu""rmg the 

deSign, development, and test of live aociltional suosyslt>ma (une prototype and four flilht versions) for ule Wlth tne second aroup ot lour 

417 spac~craftl then on order. 

All went well and the flrst Suoml radlallon measunng subsYltem 

was aboard 0240 for its February lC,ol iauDen. The deVlce functioned 

perfectly; by May 1963 lnfrared <lau were Delnl routinely extracted 

and the system still was 9S percent operational. 

function until Ji&nuary li64. 

l69 

It conunued to 

an: l'lOIP 

HINtIe VII BvemIII,,/Tllllent Ke. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .,ap •• e .... 

From the data obtained throUlh the Suomi sYltem. the Thtrd 

Weather Wing. uSlng computer programs wrltten entire)) by Alr 

Weather Service personnel. produced daily operataonal maps of nighttime cloud cover throughout the entire period from October 1963 

through January 1964--the span of the Cuban crisis and the lQlmfOdlate 

aftermath. The techniqut" was ~o succelsful that exte'nS10l1 of the 

infrared measurement program was subsequently approved and it 

acquired the role of a semi-permanent dement in the tOlal 417 system. 

Reaffirmation of the reliability and operatlonal pott'ntlal of the 

417 satellite was provided b., the second lnsertlon mto orbIt. The 

dubious reliability of the booster was agaln underscored. E,sfOnttally. 

of course. both such facts had been ,enerally appreciated earlier. 

The results of the February 1963 "succesl, "therefore. tencled to 

accelerate consideration of an enlarged program, one embodying a 

rnore sophisticated set of seniors and based on a considerably mOre 

trustworthy booster. The general notion, by early March 1963, was 

that use of Thor-Agena as a booster would provlde enough additional 

lifting capaclty to permat launching a neW satellite based generall} 

on 417 technololY but also incorporating the best proven features of 

Tlros, Nimbus, Relay, and other satellites mto a system With mlnimum 

BYE 170l'1-74 l10 

H&no'~ v a Bveman/Ta1ent - KevF'o'e 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

requirements for a long and costly development process. The Retneral 

proposal. known as 417·1. had all the oper.ttlural putt'ntlrl' of Nimbus 

oil plus circuit redundancy whit'h promused ,,'nhanl toll rehabdll). 

The proposal to develop 417-1 also had aUral huns "ther than 

technical. Gt'neral B. A. Schriever. Air FOTce Systems Command 

chief. heard the 417-1 presentation on 15 Marl h. mdll Ilt~d that he wa~' 

"mtenst=ly interested. " and asked that ht' b~ pruvld ... d with a formal 

dev.-topment plan at on("e. Ht" a~reed that the prugram shuuld rema in 

in the SAFSP manallemenl ulrn.ly. but he sURMested that the existlnM 

secrecy restrichons would have to be relaxed to "resolve the' manage-

. ment problem with ~ASA and the Weather Bureau." Culonet Haag 

mildly observed that a program operated through two parallel manage· 

ment channels was "probably impo •• il?le and certainly und .... irable. II 

an opinion in which Genel"al Greel" concurred. 

The appearance of two viewpoints on how 417-1 should be conducted 

reopened all the past arguments about the need for a Secur", syatem for 

mlhtary "!eather reconnais.ance. Nevertheless. there were sound 

indications that Ruebel of DORicE seriously planned to substatute 417-[ 

43 

for Nimbus. The problem was ~ 

In the meantime. While involved questions of national polLcy 

toward weather reconnai.sance were thra.bed out in Washington. the 

Z71 aD: 1101' 

Handle VIa 6¥erNn/Tllent Key~ 

CCt'!r::;:. C 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ,.OP I.CR.~ 

417 office had the more immediate prublem ot I ury&nl out 1tS orLILnal 

assignment. Initially. the prolram had I untemplated a Jlrututype and 

four flight satellites. plus ground equLpment and spares. In November 

19&1. after the passage of the Cuban cnSLS, a new CO;ltract had been 

written with RCA to cover modUica11on (upgradlnll) of tht" prutotype. 

four additional night satellites. and the usual ground equipment and 

spares. In May 1963. while a decision on a weather reconnaLSSanC'e 

system to follow the original 417 still was pendinll. Colonel Ha&g 

secured Dr. Charyk's endorsement of a program extens10n lnvolvmg 

six more satellites in the original configuration plus the Scout boosters. 

spares. and ground equipment needed to continue the program from 

December 1963 through September 1964. (The contract With RCA was 

sianed in June. The total of dollar investment with RCA reached 

prototype and two night model ItabUites.) 

Charyk was thinking les. in terms of a substitute for Nimbu. 

than of a basic 417. improved. modernized. and mated to an improved 

Scout booster. The details of 417-1 were far from certain. Charyk 

having expressed marked reservations about the cost of using ThorAgena. the redundancy of a stabilized Alena. and the prospectively 

hilh command and control cost. if Alena were employed. 44 

BYE 11011.'4 

HII'dl" VIa Bveman/ Talent Ke.,.,oIe 

C::r.:rOJS Only 

Z71. 

_PI.C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'l'8P •• e •• ~ 

Permeating all .uch propolall and discu.8i\lns after ",arly 1963 

was a general conviction that something radicaUy effectl\'''' wuuld have 

to be done to improve the Scout vebicle and to enhance NA~A'1i apprenation of 417 18 real importance. The diuenslon which had bt en apparent 

virtually from the time the program began. certatnly from lht4 date 

at whic~ Colonel Haig proposed 8ub8Ututing the MCi-18 for NA5A's 

upper stage. lessened not at all in the early months of 1963. NASA 

persisted in efforts to extend its Virtually complete control of the boost 

vehicle program effort. even inailting at one point on belOt( reimbursed 

for "travel in support of 417 vehiclea procured partly through !\IASA. " 

The Au Force Scout office--which lometlmes had the bedralilled 

appearance of a bewildered canary that unwittingly flew mto a badmtnton 

court--asked the 417 program office to pay the bill. Indlilllantly. 

Lieutenant Colonel J. R. Smith. Haig's deputy. responded that "at no 

tillle has this office requested any support from NASA." Furthermore. 

said Smith. 'Iall 417 vehicles procured until this time have been contracted for directly. and contrary to the desirel of several personl 

in the NASA •. we have endeavored to ••• remain independent of any 

NASA support." (NASA. apparently not at all embarrassed.. IUMequently 

explained that there had seemed no need to document requests for 

assistance ol'iginating in the Scout office and the 6S9Stb teat wlng--

1.73 

_PI.C ...... 

aD 1'1011 

Hal'ld:e ~Ia Bveman/TII'ent - Kev· 

C:·:~:..~ l 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 wep IEe •• y 

and then in the best tradition of one-upmanshLp added. "In the event 

SSD is unable to pay for the suvport prevlousl Y !llven. NASA will not 

preas this point to any extreme." The sum lnvolved wa 

The real source of difficulty lay cluser. On 19 Apr ... U1 

response to a 417 'lffice query. the Scout office con<.-eded that the 

X-Z59 thlrd sta,e, wtuC'h had performed so inadequately .r. tht" F,·bruary 

launch. had a dubiOUS performanl.e potential. But the ~. &JIlt pt"uplt" 

were quick with assurances that the motor gOlnlC into the n .. xt scheduled 

launch vehicle was flight-worthy. Precisely une weeJc lat .. r, on 

Z6 April, the fourth attempt to orbit a 417 satellite ended In loss of 

third-stoge thrust eight seconds before scheduled burnout, followed 

by violent tumbling and total destruction of the upper stage and payload. 

The failure was bad'enough iu its own right. But subsequently 

the program office discovered that the third-stage motor whlch had 

caused the failure wa. one which had been earlier rejected because 

it had been dropped during shipment. NASA hact inspected the rocket 

stage on its return to the factory, had declared 1t flight-ready. and 

had approved its use on another 417 booster. But nobody had told the 

417 office of the motor IS earlier history. 46 

The matter of determining what part mishanclling had played 

1n the failure of the fourth 417 vehicle became less urgent when 

BYE 1701'1-'4 

Ha"dlfO I'a Bveman/Tafent· Kevnole 

C:r:~:'IS C,...; 

274 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'0 ••• eR.' 

detailed analysis indicated that inadvertent actuation of the thlrdstage destruct mechanism was the prime culprit. Through the 

Space Systems Division. the 417 uffice asked for a s pt:nfll e:ffurt 

to insure that destruct mechanism would not be actlvatt'd ace Ldenlally 

in future launches. NASA brushe~ a.ide the query, 18S IUnJl a nt'w 

47 

proclamation of confidence in the eXisting Scout. 

The 417 group was leas than satisfied. Late lQ May Colonel 

Haig induced the Scout directorate to ask the commander uf the Paclflc 

Missile Range to have the command destruct transmitter" continue to 

illuminate the vehicle with "the strongest possible carner signal" 

until fourth-stage operation had been confirmed. That precaution 

would guard against the POSSibility that the destruct mechanism might 

respond to some random "signal once the illumination was cant fOlled. 

Additional requests for Improvement of the destrud mechanisms 

went to NASA, but with an admitted expfOctatlon that the space agency 

would refuse to take effective action. NASA 'pokesmen in early June 

took the position that if the Air Force lnSlsted on modifying the destruct 

plugs on Scout vehicles the change would be arbitrarily rejected for 

NASA -launched Scouts. 

Captain R. L. Geer, an outapoken member of Colonel Hal~'s 

417 group. discovered at about the same time that the command destruct 

Z7S BU 1'01 

Handle Via Bveman/Ta1en' Ko! 

C:~'r: = 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

receiver in the Scout third stale was extremely sUlceptible to random 

\ 

noise activation--Geer told Colonel Hail that recent test.s had proved 

not only that the receiver would react to random noise. but that "It 

was part1('warly susceptible to Rock and. Roll statIons. £9})£'<"la11y 

when male 'slDger.' sounded the letter 'Pl. II A poss ible Bequt"llce of 

t"vents, ,thtm, would have the ground stallon transmitters shut down 

their destruct circuitry illumination once the Scout was safely uut 

of the laun("h base danaer zone. at which point an opportunely bm,:d 

rock and roll recording broadcalt from Santa Monica cuuld touch uff 

48 

the destruct charge. 

By early May 1963, the generally unsatisfactory ("hara("teris. 

tics of the Scout booster had received widespread recognitlon. Oulte 

apart from the Impulse to go to a more powerful booster as a means 

of putting a heavier and more sophisticated payload in orbIt, there 

was a [Eeneral d.etermination that either Scout would be sIgnificantly 

improved or the Air Force would go to a more reliable vehicle. 49 

And so slight had been NASA's respons. to pressure for lmprovement 

of critical S('~ut features that SOme members of the program offire 

had be("ome quite o'ltspoken In their cntici.m, not only of NASA. but 

abo of the Pacific MissUe Range. The obvious course of havinl the 

Air Force sponsor its own unprovement program was pohllcally 

inexpedient, so the 417 office was rpduced to the expedlent of proposing 

BYE 1101?74 

t1a~:!'" 1'3 Bveman/Ta1en! Key"ol6 

::r.,:,!; ';j~, v 

1.76 

.8 ••• C .... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

.8P IECa., 

actions which seemed es.ential but of b,,",njil unable to seCure th .. u 

adoptlon. Even when logic and common "'t"I,,," w,,"re translaled lnto 

directlves carrying the Signature of tht' Alr Force und~rst"\:rdary, 

50 they had no apparent effect. 

In part. the cOncern for Scout unreliability was an t"xpr .. !'sLOn 

of program office resentment at having been unable to put a new 417 

satellite into orbit at a time when the two earlier vehicles were runninll 

down. On 11 June, after nearly 10 months df Clrcling the earth, the 

origiruil 417 satellite (vehicle 3502) responded to ground commdnds 

lor the last time. Attempts to recapture control by reorienting the 

bird were unsuccessful later that month. forCing the ground controllers 

to postpone further efforts until the satellite assumed a more receptive 

attitude as a result of its gradual change uf position in orbit. Concurrently, the program office suspended operations involvmg' the 

second satellite (vehicle 0240) for intervals of two or three days at 

a time- -and by that timt" 0240 was functiomng onl y in the dl rect readout 

51 

mode. 

Apprehension that unprogrammed actions by the 417 satellites 

might be the consequence of skillful Soviet interference had generally 

subsided by June 1963. After the orilinal flurry of suspicion had 

stilled the previous fall, there had been a recurrence an February and 

1.77 

'l'8P •• e •• 'I' 

an: 1'101 

Handle VIa 8vemen/Taltw 1'<,. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 WOP .se •• , 

March 1963. Examination of tapes of command and response slgnals 

cauf!d the program office to al~rt Vandenberg ear1y in March and. 

80mewhat later. to examine the possibihty of incorporatlllg c:-omrrumcation safeguards--receiver clocks or multi~tone signals, for lnstaIK\". 

Later analysis indicated that the two satellites had bet'l. subjec:t 

to t'unintentLonal or at most unintelligent jamming. ,,52 In some relipe("t., 

that fact continued to surprise plolram office people. Cummand 

chann~la. and most signals for that matter, were near idt"ntll a.l to 

those used for Tiros. They were not classified and Soviet liour("es 

certainly hitd full knOWledge of their characteristics • By the same 

,token, the orbits of the 417 satellites were readily determmable • 

. Random sampling by One or more. of the abundant antenna-enc rusted 

Soviet "fishing trawlers" could have confirmed the general features 

of the signals. and elther jammlng or transmitting spurluus ("ornmands 

53 

would thereafter have been a SImple matter. 

Almost unnoticed in the mounting clamor against NASA's handling of the Scout problem. the StrategIc Air Command on II July 1963 

began operatin~ the first two mllitary readout station8, one at 

Fairchild AFB. Washington, one at Loring AFB, Maine. RCA manning 

of the now~discontinued New Hampshire station and around suppurt for 

satellites in orbit halted slmultaneously. Initially. the two operational 

BYE 1101'1-74 

"a"'::~ ~'!I Bye",al'/Ta,e"~ Kevr~e 

:: ... • .. -.5 (J""lf 

l78 

.. OP •• e •• 'I' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

stations would handle only satellite Ol40, although thel'~ sHU r~mamced 

hope that 350Z might be made to respond to ('ommands at .. later date:. 

SlnCt" ndther satellite was fully capable of normal uperat , .. n. !=;AC . 

<-uuid not exerClse all systems, but it was a start. Oat.,. analYSIS 

be~an itt Offutt AFB (Omaha) Slmultaneousl y. 

The SAC personnel who had worked 80 wholt'h~artt"dlv \n the 

417 uffice for the ·previous six months we re mus tl y Kuneo. (A side 

effeC't of station activation was a minor manpower <. 1"81" 10 thf' pruRram 

ufflc.:e. where Colonel Haig had used "trainees" hI keep 'he program 

moving, even though most were C'ompletely unsophlstiC'atf'ri about space 

when they arrived.) Much remained to be done. m antu ipatlon of SAC 

op.·rator requirements, the program office had set Ullt to prepare 

detailed written procedures for dealing with every posslble C',mtingency 

in satellite operation--and they were ready in time for the l.July site 

activation date. Neve'rtheless. the transition from contractor,to SAC 

operatton of the readout stations marked a major turning point in the 

evolution of an Air Force space capability. Unfortunately for the 

legend that a public relations staff had to tout all aspects of the IShift, 

but to the considerable advantage of program security. the entire 

transition was handled with a discretion and unCOmrntmlCatlvene-s. 

that had come to characterize all 417 activities. The maJur mile.tone, 

Z79 8D 1'M1 

Handle '118 Bveman/ Taief\t K ... 

C:,,:·:.~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

the fint operational Air Force space IYltem. went UDheralded. 54 

Subsequent to transfer of the readout Itationl. there wal some 

consideration of allocatmg a Scout launch facility and total launch 

responsibility for 417 to SAC. The Itrategie command waa definitely 

intereated. but only on condition that the launch vehicle be standardized 

and that routine logistic support be provided through Air Force channell. 

There lay the difficulty, for NASA was if anything more reluctant than 

before to give the Air Force any lignificant control over Scout development and fabrication, and was equally insistent on keeping control of 

resupply. There was one other objection: SAC, lacking trained and 

experienced launch personnel. could scarcely be expected to b~tter 

the launch record of the expert technicianl who, 10 far, had manaled 

only SO percent succes.el. In that reapect, prolpectl for early transfer 

of total 417 launch responsibility to SAC aeemed dim. 55 

Through the lona summer of 1963 the controveray with NASA--

it could not honestly be called by another name--arew more heated. 

In part it wal fanned by persistent difficulties in attempts to aet 

another satellitE. into orbit. The booater waa to be Scout ilZ. A twomonth delay extending from Z9 July 1963 through Z7 September had 

developed because of faulty trajectory computationa, revilion of the 

upper stage deltruct system, diacrepancie. in the electrical cozmectionl 

Z80 

BYE 110l'r-'l4 

.aPI.c ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

to and with1n the launch vehicle. major problems Wlth tht> new fuststage.' booster (AlROI llA), and a host of millSC'ellaneou9 tteln:S. 

The original request to NASA asking a chanlle In tht" phYSical 

featureli of the destruct system's electrical ~unnectlUns had provoked 

a prompt and strong "No." SSD formally asked "please" a week later 

and got a ''Hell no" reply by telephone. (NASA Insisted that modifications would delay delivery and force a launch postponement.) Not for 

another six weeks was there a change, and then It came because of 

56 

pressure frum the Secretary of the Air Force. 

Scout 13Z. scheduled to boost the fifth 417 satelhte, had 

orilllnally been delayed in launch because of concern arlsmg from 

the failure of a NASA Scout (110) lat~ m July. Engineers had determined 

almost immediately that the nozzles of the Algol ItA first-stage rocket 

had caused the difficulty. Test stand trials disclosed both design and 

fabueation defects, forCing suspension of all Scout operations. Use 

of the oTlginal Algol 10 first stage had been scheduled to end 1n June. 

Culonpl Haig personally wrote the chairman of the board uf Aerojet 

General. the Al,ol 1lA fabricator. to ask for emergency speed in 

correcting defects. An Aerojet respondent retreated to phraate. like 

"unparalleled reliability" in describing the staRe and ascrtbed the 

fallure of 110 to a change of techniques at a liubcontractor's establishment. 

l8l 

.... e .... 

BYE 1'101' 

Hafldre VI' 6veman/ •• ent ;t e 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

That bland and misleading generalisation caused even Cien~ral Crf'~r. 

normally quite restrained. to make impolite remark. on th~ hn~8 Itl 

" .•• we found we were skating on the thm edge uf dlsaster ~ver., 

time we lighted one of tho. e things. ,,57 

Whatever Aerojet Cieneral l• opinion. SAFSP preferred to r~ly 

on test results. and once theae were avallable went immediately back 

tu the Algol ID motor. The lelser thrust of the Algol ID as a~ain.t 

the Algol IIA forced adoption of a more powerful X-lS8 fourth stage. 

The only one avallable was at Arnold Engineering Development Center 

for burn tests; the 417 office had it sent immedlately to Allegheny 

Ballistic Laboratories (the fabricator) for fhMht readiness tests. 

Resort to the X-l58 in turn forced a chanse in the spln-up rocket •• 

an unorthodox arrangement of one long-burn and three short-burn 

devices which Chance-Vouaht initiall) rejected out 'If hand and ultimateiy had to be coaxed into adopting. 

The Air Force. which for months had been lJeeklDg means of 

improving the Scoutls reliability. discovered in AUKust that NASA had 

not Hcheduled either ultrasonic or X-ray tests of Algol IIA nozzles. 

NASA had refused to apply quality control standards tv them. Captain 

Geer. who looked into the situation, reported hSplritedly that NASA 

was quite content to have the Air Force .oy "development" SC'out 

BYE 1101'7-74 

Ma~d,,. I'a B~eman/Ta'e..,t Kev"O'e 

:.:~": ~ 0'" " 

lo8l 

ft ••• C ••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

boosters since " ••• we are doing a8 much to 8upply them with 

development d.ata on their vehicle as . . • putt1ng our payluad anto 

58 orbit. ,. 

By July 1963, NASA had experienced its first two "uperational" 

Scout failures; until that time one of the standal"d NASA gambits had 

been to explain the 417 launch problems 1n tel"ms of gent'r;·l All' Fur,-e 

incompetence. (NASA never entirely gave up that approa"h, Its own 

problems notwithstanding.) The Air Force viewpoint was that lnadeliuate quality ("ontrol and slippy configuration contrul wer ... baslcall ~ 

at fault. In the case of Scout l3l. the Air Force seemed to have the 

better uf the argument. Before it finally reached the launch stand. 

Chance· Vought was obliged to rework more than 13l individual sulder cunne 

tions--a clear indication of qualitative inadequacies. In the same 

period the Air Force had vast difficulty in getting correct trajectory 

computationa from Chance-Vought. Component weighta were not 

always entered in the totah. th«:re were error8 in complling subsystem 

weights. and the contractor seemecl immune to suggeltions that the 

program was rather urgent. 

In the matter of configuration changes. NASA continued it. 

bland course of altering components without much concern for the 

effect of the change on Air Force launch procedures. The beacon in 

Z8l 

..... e.E~ 

BU ItO· 

Hafldle Via Bveman/Talent Ki 

c:~~·c. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

132 was modified. for mstance. 10 that it wal incompatible both with 

the Pacific MlssUe Range frequency a.signment and with the Scout 

antenna system. Antenna changes which thus became mandatory 

contributed to tht: launch date shppage. 

An even more Slgmficant fault in ilZ became apparent when 

the interstage between the first and second stagea--the B section--

could not be mated to the castor nozzle of the lecond Itage. C'.lfSory 

examination disdosed that the> shear pins in the B section were longer 

than and misahgned with the reception holes in the castor nozzle. A 

total of five different B sections were tried with five castor motors in 

aU possible combmations and none would fit. The jigs were incompatible. 

Such a basic errOr was lD('omprehenlible to program office people. By 

all indications, each hole had been drilled by reference to lome other 

hole rather than from a standard reference point. 59 

Even before vehicle 13Z became lomethlna of a cause celebre. 

General Greer had induced Air Force Undersecretary Brockway 

McMillan to write NASA's Associate AdminIstrator. R. C. Seamana, 

C"oncerning Scout defects 'lnd Au Force judgments on their cause. 

M\.Mlllan. still hopeful that the Scout might be uPlraeled and maele an 

acceptable launch vehicle. told Seamans that a decision on the continued 

Alr Force use of S,'out was pendlnl. that itlcurrent reliability wa,' too 

BYE 170l'f-74 

>-1a"dll! .'a Bveman/Talen! Ke~"ole 

::-:'- s e" . 

2.84 

~aPI.C.E' 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

low to make ita use attractive, but that on the whole there were 

obvious benefita to improvlDg Scout rehability mBtead of going to 

another booster. To prove his point, he attached a list of 'Iselected 

management problems. t· Several amon~ those cited had earher been 

called to NASA's attention. Others were relatively new. 

* Included in McMillan's summary were these entnes; 

In late 196Z NASA made major modifications of the je-t "ane dengn 

Without notifying the Air Force. That service learned upon unpacking' 

vehicle l16. The modifications had never been fl111ht tested before 

being incorporated in that booster (a 417 vehicle). Said Me Millan: 

"417 was faced with accepting the honor of flying first" or lndefinite 

delay. 

NASA had completely ignored three requests for clarlflcahon of 

invalid spin-up data. 

No Scout body bending modelDvesiiaation had ever bt-en conducted: 

NASA treated Scout as a rigid body insofar a. control sys\ ... m dynamics 

were concerned--though that seemed a aomewhat shortlllhted outlook 

in light of the Scout's four-unit configuration. 

NASA insisted on subjecting 417 vehicles to spedal "le-C"tronic 

circuitry tests that both the contractor and the local plant repreaentative 

(Navy) considered entirely unnecessary. even harmful. 

NASA had refused to change pin assillnments to reroute current 

away from the destruct mechanism so as to insure agalnst short circuits. 

NASA had originally quoted fourth-stage motors at_each. 

In August 196Z the agency had indicated a January availabillty at_ 

A fter encountering major technical difficulties and ind~ ::=:rcontract overruns, NASA was then (June 1963) quoting_aad 

still had not delivered. 

l8S BYE .18. 

Handle "" Byemen/ratent ~e 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 TOP •• a .... 

Seamans replied on 15 July (after the certainty of a slip 1n 

the scheduled launch of 13Z had become common knowledle) that 

the Scout had "satidactory reliabibty" and an "acceptable record." 

He cited an 80-percent success rate in Wallops Island launches by 

NASA crews. (To get the 80-percent figure Seamans had ignored 

three failures in the first eight "development" launches and had considered only the four successes in five "operational" launches.) 

Seamans also drew an unflattering comparison between the Wallops 

[sland record and that at Point Arguello, on the Pacific coast. He 

observed kindly that the Pacific MisaUe Range launch crew had been 

formed "late, " thus contributing to tbe fallure of four launches in 

eight tries. He also suggested that the modifications of Scout to 

NASA had rejected flight-ready motors on their arrival at :he 

Pacific Missile Rangt: because of the absence of NASA criteria, 

though they fully satisfied Air Fot'ce needs. 

Although the Air Force had Singled out the need, NASA had never 

conducted torsion or bending tests on the Scout transporter. 

NASA plans for changing the POLDt Arauello launch facility had 

been drawn in December 1962, but the Air Force had not been notified untU 12 February 1963. with the result that the line of siaht 

from the on-pad payload to the payload van had been interrupted. 

No correction had been made by June. 

286 

BYE 11011-14 

'1'8 ••• e •• , 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'I'OP •• C .... 

conform to 417 l'equirements and related departures from NASA "sp4:Ici. 

fieahons and procedures" were the true culprits. He concluded by 

opposinJl any change to the eXlstent management structure, the 

NA~AI 000 Scout Coordinating Commlttee arrangement WhlCh. he 

argued, was functiomns effectively. 

Colonel Hailll, commentary on the Seamans I letter" unfined 

itself to detailed refutabon, but it bristled with unspoken indi.gnation. &0 

By that time. however, he was more gravely concerned With the immediate problem of shaping S,"out 132 into a vehicle which could actually be 

used to launch the fifth 417 satellite. He summed up a situation which 

had grown steadily more difficult in the months since 132 had first 

encountered problems ln meeting schedules and performance requirements: 

"The 5 LV·1 launch team, 'ha VLng intimate knowledle of all the new and' . different features incorporated into the booster for operation 1610. have 

begun to call it the IX-l3Z.' Their point 11 well made ••.• ,,&1 

Slnce the Alr Furc.-e stl11 hoped to conv~rt the Scout into a standard 

launch vehicle suitable for asuBnment to operational squadrons. the 

continuation of such a situation wai Intolerable. In JUDe 1963, Colonel 

H aig had outlined a set of conditions which he felt would tend to Improve 

the reliability of the Scoul. In Augu8t. the SSD Scout directorate 

proposed them formally to NASA. They were given 80me apparent 

au 1'10' 

Hartdle VII 6veman/Tal6t't K. 

r-f" •• ~ 

'-'- -
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 1'8P .Ee ••• 

force by being coupled to the pen<lin. procurement of dx mure Scout 

boosters, but in fact no conditionl could be iftlpoled becaule of the 

earlier (June 196Z) agreement which lave final authority to NASA 10 

virtually all Scout matters. The apace a.eney r,esponded to a threat 

not to 'Ise the XZS8 fourth stage by saYlng that it had been proven 

flight ~orthy. NASA alsu rdused to agree that the Air Force should 

have a veto on proposed vehicle modifications. 

The Scout "f£ice was wearily inclined to accept NASA'I pOlition 

on modifications. hoping that the AU' Force would be conaulted on any 

action which would "drastically affect" tho Scout'. abUity to perform 

the 417 asslgnment. Culonel Haig waa markedly less conclliatory. 

appreciating from sad experience that he had to have .ome control over 

modifications which would change vehicle performance or reliability 

6Z 

and not at all certain that NASA would concede 10 elementary a courteay. 

His misgivings were confirmed lela than two weeki later, when 

he learned that tht" X-l"i8 fourth-stage rocket waa due for an additional 

change which would redul:e its payload potential to the point of being 

but four pounds greater than the MG·18. It developed almost immediately 

that Haig's infOrmation was only partly correct. In actuality, NASA had 

totally changed the baslc ('onfiguration of the x-z-;a to make it compatible 

with the NASA verSLull uf Thor. By virtue of an lllcreased alt diameter, 

BYE 1'01'-'" 

Handle '1'a Bvemar./Ta1er! Kev"ole 

Ccr.:ro:s O.,ly 

laa 
l 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ""PI.C •• ~ 

the X -Z58 would no longer be adaptable to the 411 configuration. The 

structural integrity of the X-ZS8Is case was weakened 10 the process. 

Th~ Air Force Scout office promised Haig that aU Au Force purchases 

would be in the former configuration. that if NASA refused to cooperate 

the Au- Furl e would buy directly from Allegheny Ballistlt S Laboratory. 63 

In light of the comptete lack of SUCCesS in obtaininJ( like concessiona from NASA in the past. Haig seemed justified in any reservations 

he might entertain_ As it happened. the issue rapidly bf'("dme inconsequentlal. On 2.1 September 1963 the fifth 411 launch was attempted; it 

ended in the third booster failure. The precise cause was somewhat 

obscure; failure oc.curred because of a malfunction of the third-stage 

control system ariSing from a premature los. of hydrogen peroxide. 

_ The immediate c.-onsequence was an explosive failure near the pitch-down 

. 64 jets of the third stage_ 

On .3 October. four days after the launch disaster. Colonel Haig 

briefed Undersecretary MCMillan on the launch and on program status. 

McMillan seemed to favor a booster other than Scout. 

Going to Andrews Air Force Base from his Pentagon 

stop. Colonel Haig found himself in conve~sation with Colonel Rodney 

Nudenberg, a key member of General SC"hrieverls Air Force Systems 

Command Staff. Nudenberg passed alollg instructions from Ce~eral 

1.89 

., •••• e •• , 

au 1101'1 

Handle VI. 8ytman/Talef\~ - Key 

Ccr~r::)ls ( 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

,a ••• e •• , 

Schriever to Haig: the 417 director was to be,in an immechate study 

of Minuteman and Thor as alternates to Scout. Haig told Colonel 

Nudenberg he had received earlier instructiona along thoae hnes from 

Undersecretary MI.:Millan and had completed considerable work 

before coming to Washmgton. (The study had begun almolit precist'1y 

10 monthas earlier and preliminary results had been in the undersecretary's 

hands for at Least eight months! )65 

. Haig apparently did not paIs to Nudenberg the remainder of 

McMillan's mstructions--that he was to continue with plans for at least 

one more Scout-buosted program launch. to complete study and planmna 

for a slngle trial laun~:h using the Thor-Agena combination. and to 

complete the study of Mmuteman potential. McMillan had been rath~r 

specific in anoth"r dlrectlon; Haig had ordera to work out an eltimate 

of the money that c .. uld be recovered by a complete cancellation of S("out 

66 

procurement. 

And the prutlpE't't of continuina with Scouts in their current 

configuration apparently was closed. On 7 October. actina on in.tructions from Colonel Hal~. the Scout directorate at SSD formally cancE'Ued 

the Last two vehicles on the original delivery order and all six of tbe 

follow-on order. A stop work order was is.ued to cover all vehicles 

67 

subsequent to number 1 ~4--later extended to include U4. 

BYE 17017-'l4 Z90 

MaMIe vIa 6veman/Talen! Keynole 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

...... c •• , 

McMillan had authorized Hail to participate in a scheduled 

Scout reliability improvement meeting. set for 14 October, in a last 

desperate attempt to convInce NASA that the alternative to mt"'anlngful 

actlon was cancellation. Nothing useful resulted. On II Of tobt' I, 

Haig again reported on program status to the undersecretary. Three 

days later, on l3 October 1963, McMillan ordered immediate cancelIation of all activities connected with the Scout booster, lmmediate 

effort to recover every,possible dollar from NASA, and assignment 

of a Thor-Agena from "available resources" to support a December 

or January 417 launch. The launch was to be in a dual payload contiguraHon origmally desc"l'ibed by Haig during his 3 October presentation. 

Development of the "optimumll payload capability was also authorized 

68 

in the undersecretary's 23 October instructions. 

"Complete and immediate" termination orders went to NASA 

early on 2S October 1963. The instructions were impossible of.misconstruction: everything connecting 417 to Scout was to stop except 

the final report on the disastrous 132 launch. 69 

Thus ended the Scout phale of Program 417. In five attempts, 

the program office had one unqualified luccess, ODe partial succes., 

and three catastrophic launch failures. After -the-fact invesU_.tion 

had clearly identified major booster faults in each of the "successful" 

291 BYE 11Ol'JHandle VII Byeman/Ta1ent· Kev M 

CC"~~(i.s ::, 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 .OPI8C ••• 

launches: with a fractional difference in luck, the booster mL~ht well 

have contributed to five succesdve faLlures. The satelhtes had 

operated marvelously well, consLderln. their dLfficultLes 111 limnC'h 

phases. 

Tu its c-redit In the Scout phase, the program had dlsu th~ 

record of the flrst successful USe of a space vehicle in actual cumbat 

troop operations (the Cuban crisis of October 196Z), the first ttround 

,'ontrol Ittations tu be built for an operationai command's use In span" 

Up, rations, and the first transfer of total space Vt '.lcle op. rational 

responsibllity to an operational command. The program "ffice had a 

remarkable record of cost effectiveness, had functioned with.a C'ombination of fewer inhabltants and larger responsibilities than any other 

space vehicle development in AIr Force history, and had progressed 

from concept to satelhte in orbit more rapidly than any earlier organization. A host of techmc-al aChU"Vements, 80me with implications of 

tremendous value for the future, had to be added to the acorf'card. 

BYE 1701'-'" 

Hllf'ldl~ Via Bveman/ Talent Keynole 

::-:-:; s On.y 

19Z 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Epilolue 

The termanation of Scout usale did not in any respect cause a 

break in the frantic pace of program office activity. On S October, 

the Saturday following his presentation to McMillan, Haig asked the 

SSD Deputy for Boosters. Colonel R. W. Hoffman, to aid 1n a special 

study of Minuteman as a 417 booster. He told Hoffman he needed to 

put 150 pounds in a SOO-mile orbit at 96 delrees of inclination and 

asked for any additional payload lift capac:ity that could be Identified. 

On the following Tuesday the program office belan working on the 411 

Mod l program--tht! Thor-Agena du=--.l.payload launch proposal Undersecretary McMillan had initially approved. Still very much In ('ontention was the stabilite development begun much earlier. a program which, 

If successful, would provide a constant rotation rate and vastly improve 

attitude stabilization for later 417 (and other) satellites. 70 . 

At the time of the Scout canceUation. the 417 office had completed 

or had in being payload and related cOntracts • .,., ... ,,,,aa 

exclusive of boosters. The primary mis.ion of the prolram was as 

before: to maintain a satellite system in operation 4t all times to 

provide accurate cluud cover information over various areas. A 

coroUary responsibility wa. to introduce .ystem improvements where 

'lap •• c .... 

8U 1111'1 

Hafldle ".a ~men/ Tale'lt -Key" 

C~r:rol~ C 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

warranted un a cost-effectiveness basis. Bomb damage a.se.sment 

had become a probable assignment as early as June lq63--at least 

from the viewpoint of the Strategic Air Command chief, Gf'neral 

11 

T. S. Power. 

Apart frorn its general advantages, the 417 had als(I succeeded 

In establishing a support relationship between space operahons and 

existing logistic agencies. the responsible field urganizatlon, proved both cooperative and dflclent in 

obtaining lngredlt>nts needed to keep the ground stations oper~tlng and, 

perhaps more important in some crisis situations, proved (Oapable of 

workinR out pape rwurk tangles that otherwise might well have stalled 

the program. (After tht! order to shift to Thor-Agena. Colonel Haig 

was unable to work out a neat and legal rneans of getting his hands on 

a bt!'a ring to inte rconnect the 417 payload to Thor. He lSolved the diffiC"ulty by picking up a bearing--literally--while visitin8 Chance-Vought, 

telling the people there he would get thern paid somehow. He brought 

1t back to Los Angeles as personal baggage, got it to the booster people, 

and having eliminated a technical roadblock gave the paperwork me •• to 

his prucurement people. They solved it. Haig was never certain 

how, but he was grateful.) 

Finally, the 417 operation developed, or displayed, a rare competence in the uniformed Air Force. Not commonly did 7a program 

BYE 1'011-'4 Z94 

HIll'dle VIII Bveman/Talent Keynole _P ..... , 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'1'8 ••• ca.1f 

ollice composed almost entirely of officer. have the opportunity and 

occaSlon to exercise buth managerial and technical talents to the 

degree of the 417 office. The lack of a systems engineering-technic."al 

direction (ontractor often challenged program officers. but ultimately 

the lack served to prove that under controlled conditions none was 

needed. The pro~ram operated under security wraps that precluded 

widespread knowledge of proRram accomplishment., even within the 

Air )fort \,!. and there was none of the publicity that rharacterized other 

pru~ ramli of tht' time. III effects were nonexistent. 

PruRram 417, as it was known 1n 1963. wal in many respecte 

the antithesis of the "ideal" Air Force development program. It was 

rurl on a tlght budget--about one-third al large as would have been 

required 1n "normal" clrcumstances. [t functioned without reliance 

on the elaborate cumplex of contraC"tor technical support common to 

space and miSSile programs of the time, and seemed to prosper thereby. 

It was managed by peopll" who were constantly at odds with other government agencies nominally supporting them, anel who took great plea.ure 

in ignorin~ established review and approval channels. It was marked 

by a reporting and monitoring syatem notable chiefly for incon •• quence--

and for effectivenesa. It met budget and schedule loab. and satisfied 

established program objectlves. That it was able to do a. much seems 

195 BUtTOn 

Handle Via Bvemen/Tale.,t . Ke'lr 

:C"~"~'5 ( 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

to have been very largely the consequence of its havinl been mauled 

by three extremely capable. strong-mincled individual •• Colonel Halg 

in the program office. Ceneral Creer at the directorate level. and 

Dr. Charyk at the National Reconnaissance Office. In the first decade 

of the space age. only th~ early Corona program and the post-l962. 

Cambit program. could claim 8lmilar records--and both were characterized by the same emphases on program austerity. minimum reporting. 

avoidance of public ity. direct linea of authority. and program management 

that verged on the iconoclastic. That wal the decade of the B-10. the 

F .. ll1. the C-S. and the Skybolt--all marked by enormoul technological 

ingenuity. great publk acclaim. ma •• ive program mannina. atrllung 

cost overruns. and lengthy program delay. (or cancellations). It was 

surpriSing that more had not been made of the contralt by the end of 

the decade. 

BYE 1'1011-'14 

Haf\ote via Bveman/Talent· Keynote 

C::r~rOls Only 

2.96 

'1'8. I •••• 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'I'OP.s, •• , 

NOTES ON SOURCES 

1. Memo, no 81gnaturf'. by LtCol T. O. Haig, O/Dir/Pro(l. JS, 

17 Nov 60, subj: b98BH Chronological Program H,stury. 

wlth supplements to cover the period 17 Nov 60 through 

JWle 1962, in Prog 417 fLles. 

l. Ur. MajGen O.J. Rltland. Cmdl'SSO, to LtGen B.A. 

Schriever. Cmdr AFSC. 31 May 61, 8ubj: Development Plans 

in Support "f Five-Year Space Plan, in SSD Hist Div filea; 

P-35 Hi8t Rpt, Aug 61, in Prog 417 files; History of the Deputy 

Commander for Aerospace Systems, 1961, prep by DCAS Hist 

Ofe. Jun 6Z, in SSD Hist Div files. 

3. P- 35 Hlst Rpt. Aug 61. 

4. MFR. Col H. L. Evana, V/Dir. Samos Prol. 19 Jul 61. aubj: 

Mptc!orolo~ll al Satelhte Program. in Hail files; P-3C; Hlst Rpl. 

Aug 61. 

5. Memo. J. V. Charyk, SAFt·C;, to DDRIcE. 4 Aug 61, 8ubJ: 

Meteorolugical Information Satellite, in Hail files; memo. 

Charyk tv OOR LE, 7 AUJl 61, same subj, same file; memo. 

MajCien R. E. Cirf'er. Dlr/Samoi Prol, to Db·/P-1S. 7 Aug 61. 

subj: Project 35. lh Prog 417 files; TWX SAFMS 61-96, Ofe 

Miss and Spacf" Sys, SAFUS, to SAFSP, 8 Aug bl, in Hall files; 

P-35 Hist Rpt, Aug b1. 

6. TWX NBE 74, NASA (Wash) to SAFSP, 11 Aug 61, in Prog 417 

files; P- 35 Hist Rpt. Aug 61. 

7. Ur. LtCol T. O. Haig. Dir/P-35. to LtCol E. J. Istvan, SAFMS, 

9 Nov 61, .ubj: Program Chronology. with incl_, in Prol 417 

files; ~-15 Hlat Rpt, Aug 61; TWX, SAFMS-DIR-61-107. SAFMS 

to SAFSP. 18 Aug 61, in Prog 417 files. 

8. Program)5 Satelhte System Development Plan. prep by P-35 

Ofc .. 31 Aug 61. 

1.97 

.. D ••• e .... 

au 1111'.' 

HaIldI6 lila 8veman/Ts'e"! Ke'ol~~ 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 ... aca. 

9. TWX SAFSP-25-9-19. SAFSP to SAFUS, 25 Sep 61, in SP-3 

files, Fundi; TWX SAFMS-INS-61-136, Bri.CielLR..J. Curtin, 

SAFMS. to Majeen R. E. Cireer, SAFSP, 21 Oct 61, in Pro. 

417 files. 

10. Ltr. l-faig to Istvan, 9 Nov b1. 

11. Ibid; P-35 Chronology. l5 Oct 61-5 Jan 62, in Prog 411 files; 

P-3s Cllronology. 2S Feb-2~ May bZ. same files. 

lZ. Ltr. Haig to Istvan. 9 Nov 61. P-15 Chron. 25 Oct 61-5 Jan b2; 

memo for record. LtCol T .0. Haig, Dir/P-35, 14 Dec bl. 

subj: Report of Trip to Hq AWS and SAFUS from t"' .. 6 thru 9 

Dt- bl, in Prog 417 Trip Rpt file. 

13. Memu for record. F.C. Runge, Dep Dir/P-3S, 21 Ff'b 62. 

subj: Scout Spare Parts; P-35 Chron. 25 Oct 61-5 Jan 62 (which 

actually continues mto Feb 620. 

14. See memo for record. LtCol T .0. Haig, Dir/P-35. 23 Mar 62. 

subj: T rlp Report from 16 Mar 62 through 22 Mar 62. in Prog 

411 Trip Rpt file. Judgment. on the mental state and uutlook 

of NASA people below the top level are those of the author, not 

of program officer personnel--wbo either stiffled their frustrahons or ignored them. 

15. This was Scout vehicle Ill, prototype spacecraft F-I; see P-35 

Chron. lS Feb-Z4 May 62. 

16. p- 35 ehrun, l r; Feb-24 Ma y 62. 

17. Ltr. CoIB.H. Kucheman, SSD. tOCoIH.L. Evans. O/Oir 

Sat Sy., 28.May 62. subj: Prolram 35, in Hail files; P-35 

Chron. 25 Feb-Z4 May 62 and 25 May-30Jun 62; ltr. Evans 

to Kucheman. 23 May 62. subj: Program 35. in Haig files. 

18. Ltr. Kucheman to Evans. 28 May 62. 

19. NASA/DOD Scout System Organiaational A.reement. signed 

by Dr. H.E. Newell. Du/Ofc Space Sy., NASA Hq. and Col 

R. Nudenberg fur MajGen O.J. Rltland, Dep to Cmdr AFSC 

BYE n011-'" 

Handle VIa Bveman/ Talent· Key"oIe 

::~:ro.s Only 

198 

"0 ...... .. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

'IN IIiE .... 

for Manned Space FIt, 21 Jun 62; Joint OperatUlI Alreemeat 

NASA/DoD Scout Launch Operations at PMR ..... me date. 

same signators plus concurrent sllnature of BrilGen Joseph 

Cody. Cmdr 6595th ATW, both docs in 417 ole files. 

20. Memo for Record, MajGen R. E. Greer, Dir/SAFSP, l2 Jun 62. 

no 8ubj, in 417 Ofe- files. 

21. Ltr, LtCol T.O. Hug, Dir!417, to LtCol E.J. Istvan, SAFSS. 

2.0 Nov 6l. subJ: Program. Chronology, in Haig file Ii • 

ll. Interview, LtCol T .0. Haig. Dir/Prog 417, by Perry. 19 Feb 

64, 15 Nov 63; variOUS launch rpts dtd Sep 62, in Prug 417 fUes. 

2.3. Ltr, Kucheman to Evans, 28 May 62, citing Haig; interview, 

LtCol T. O. Hai~ by R. L. Perry, Hist OCc. 10 DeC' 62, 15 Nov 63. 

24. TWX SAFSS-I-62-1C;6, to S."FSP. 16 Oct 62. in Hal)t files; ltr, 

MajGen R. E. Crt>p.r. Dir/SP. to 01 Launch Veh •• SSD (Col 

Elchel). 25 Oct al. subj; Project 417 Follow-on B"'''8ter Procurement. ln Greer flIes. 

l5. Authorization for the Eglin move was contained in TWX SAFSS6-62-159, to MajG~n R. E. Greer, Dir/SP, 24 Oct 6l, in Haig's 

files; mtervlews with Gen Greer (24 Oct 62, 30 Jan 64), Col 

R.A. Bert( (l J Jan 64) and Col Hail (IS Nov 63. 19 Feb 64) 

provided most of the details of the Eglin episode. althoulh a 

copy of the presentation to Undersecretary Charyk still is 

preservt!d in Haig's files. 

26. Interviews, Hai~ (11 Dec 62, 15 Nov 63. 19 Feb 64) and Greer 

(l4 Oct 62, 30 Jan 64) by Perry. hI', Haig to Istvan, 24 Jan 63. 

1.7. TWX SAFSS-6-6l-159. to Creer. Z4 Oct 62. 

lB. Ur, Lteo! T.O. Haig, Dlr/ProI417. to 6594th ATW (Col 

Villars), 6 Oct 6Z. subj: Prolram 417 Analysis and E"aluation. 

in Prog 417 files. 

Z99 

TOP I.C ••• 

8ft 110l'7 

Hlnole Via Bveman/Ta1ent Ker 

C';"~")I~ ( 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

, .... e.n 

29. Interview •. Col W.G. Kina. Jr. Dirlllll by R.L. Perry. 

lO Nov 62. lO Feb 64. TWX SAFSS-6-62-159, 24 Oct 6l. 

30. TSX SSZH-3-12-259, MajCien R. E. Greer. OirlSP, to Col 

W. K. Kincaid. Cmdr 6S94th ATW, 4 Dec 62: Itr, l.tCol G. W. 

Adams, O/Dir SLY-I. to 011'/417, 17 Dec 62. a "bJ: SLV-ID 

'126. in 417 Prog Ofc files: FTV Ol40; Itr, Haia to latvan, 

l4 Jan 63. 

31. Ltr, Adams to Oir/417, 17 Dec 62., with handwritten notes 

o appa rentl y by a 417 program officer. 

32. Ltr, Gre~r to Kincaid. 4 Dec 62. 

33. Ltr, H.ng to Istvan, 24 Jan 63; Itr. Col W.K. Kincaid, Cmdr 

b5~4th ATW, to Oir/417, 21 Dec 6l, aubj: 350l Special Evaluation ... Z-8 November 1961; Itr, LtCol T.O. Halg, Dir/417. 

tu MajGt"n R. E. Cireer, DirISP, 14 Jan 63, subj: 6594th ATW 

Special Evaluation of FTV 350l, in 417 files. 

34. lntervlt"w. Halg. 15 Nov &3; Cireer, l3 Jan 64; 417 Briefing. 

pre", by Haig for J. V. Charyk, SAFUS. 7 Jan 63. in 417 files: 

BrleflnJi/s. 

35. 417 Brlt"1l11ll, 7 Jan 63; TWX SAFSS.6-63-04, to SAFSP. 

17 Jan & 3. an BalK files. 

36. Rpt; 417-1 Propusal, prep by RCA. 30 Jan 63, in 417 files: 417-1. 

37. Memo for record. LtCol T.O. Haig. Dir/417, 21 Feb 63. subj: 

Report of Trip to RCA-AED and Pentagon 14 ... 15 Feb 6 \, in 

417 ofe Trip Rpt file. 

I 

38. Proposal for Continued Operation of P-3S, aprox Feb 63. in 

Haig files. 

39. Ltr. LtCol J.R. Smith, 417 Oil', to !.tCol E.J. Istvan. SAFMS. 

1 Apr 63. subj; Prc.gram Chronology. in Prog 417 fUes. 

40. Ltr. W.M. Mento, Subv, L.A.OfcCVC, toLtCoIT.O.Haig. 

et al, Prog 417. ltS F~b 63. subj: Program 417. Scout S-ll6 

BYE 17011·'14 

Handle Via Bveman/Talent· Keynole 

Cor.:rO,$ Only 

lOO 

.......... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Flight Results •. Real Time Evaluation of. in Prog 417 files: 

Ol40; ltr. Haig to LtCol E.J. Istvan. SAFMS. 12 Jul 63, 

subj: Program 417 Chronology; TWX SSZH KNEEDEEP 01·ZI-Z. 

Proj Ofc(at VAFB) to MajGen R. E. Greer. Dir/SAFSP. 

II Feb 63. in Prog 417 files: OZ40. 

41. TWX TWOB 01.Z6. 6S94th ATW to 417 Prog Ofc. l6 Apr 63. 

in Proll 417 files: OZ40. 

42. Memo. Col J. R. Martin. Dir/Ofc Space Sys, SAF, to DDRLE. 

lZ Mar 63, subj: Comparison Between NIMBUS and Proposeel 

417 .1, in Prog 417 files: 417-l. 

43. Memo for recorel. LtCol T .0. Haig, Dir/Prog 417. 16 Mar 63, 

sub): Trip to RCAI AED anel Pentagon, 11 thru 15 Mar 63, in 

Prog 417 trtp rpt files. 

44. TWX SAFSS-6-63-47. DNRO to SAFSP, 28 May 63, in Haig 

files; rpt, Prog 417 Program Direction Plan, 21 Oct 63, in 

Haig files. 

4S. Ltr. LtCol M. F. Gregg. DirISLV-I, to 417 Dir, 19 Mar 63. 

subj: NASA support of 417; ltr, LtCol J.R. Smith, 417 Dir, 

toSLV-IDir.llMar63. samesubj:ltr. R.B. Morrison, 

Dir Launc-h Vehs anel Propul Prog, NASA (Washington), to 

SLV-I Dir, 24 May 63. subj: Scout Procurement. all in 417 files. 

46. Ltr. Haig to Istvan, 12 Jul 63; Itr. K. W. Greaves. eve. to 

LtCol T.O. Haig. 417 Dir. 19Apr63, lubj: Program 417, 

Scout S-lZI Flight Results, Real Time Evaluation of; TWX 

KNEEDEEP 26.4-04. 417 Dirto SAFSS. 26 Apr 63. in 

Prog 417 files: 1298. 

47. TWX SSVB-17-S-S5, SLV·l Dir to NASA Washington. 17 May 63, 

anel 5MBOOI, NASA Santa Monica to SSD. 21 May 63. in 

Prog 417 files. 

48. Ltr. LtCol M. F. Gregg. SLY -1 Dir, to Cmdr PMR, Z3 May 63, 

subj: Range Support for SLV-lD Program; TWX SSVBD-U-S-63, 

SLV-l Dir to NASA WaShington, Z4 May 63; memo for record. 

Capt R. L. Cieer. Prog 417. 6 Jun 63, no subj. all in Pro. 417 

files: Booster. 

101 BYE 1101,. 

Hllndle ~Ia Bvemen/Talel"lt - Ke~~ 

Ccr-~r:,_s 0. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

49. 

so. 

51 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

BYE 17011-'14 

Resume of Prolram 411 BriefinB for Undersecretary 8. 

McMillan, 20 May 63, In ProB 417 fUe., indicate. that 

McMillan agreed with that viewpoint. 

Memo for record, prep by Capt R. L. Geer, 417 Prog Ofc. 

7 Jun 63 , .ubj: SSVB Support of 119-121 Inve.til!atlon Board 

Recommendations. in Prog 417 files; memo for recurd. prep 

by Col R.A. Berg. VIDlr SAFSP, 10 JUIl 63 •• ubj: VISit of 

Dr. McMillan. 10 June 1963. in SP-3 files: FundintL. 

TWX TWOP-J/14-6-l. 6594th ATW to SSD, 15 Jun 63, TWX 

SSZH-19-6-l63. 411 Ofc to 6594th ATW. 9 Jun 03; TWX TWOP3-25-6-6, l6 Jun 63, all In Prog 417 files: 0243. 

Rpt. Preliminary Study of Two Tone Command System versus a 

Receiver Clock, 13 Jun 63. in Pro. 417 files; TWX SS7H-5-J-96. 

417 Ofc to SAFMS. 5 Mar 63, and TWX TWRDA-8- 3-5, 6r;q4th 

ATW to SAFSP, 8 Mar 63. in 417 Ofe fUes: 0240. 

Halg interview. 10 Dre 6l. 

Ltr, LtCo! T. O. Haig. Oir/Prog 417, to all 417 Pers, 24 Jui 63, 

subj: Letter from Director. 417, in Haig files. Itr, Halg to 

SAFSS, 18 Sep 63. subj: Program History, in Hail file.; 

notes in 417 ofc files re notable events aiter 1 JuI 63. 

Ltr, Col L.A. Perry. o/Spt Sys. 6594th ATW. to SLV-l Dir, 

SSD. 18 Aug 63, subj; Proposed Scout Facility. in Prog 417 files. 

Ltr, LtCol T. O. Haig. Dir 417 Prog, to SAFSS, 23 Sep 63. 

subj: Processing History of Scout 132, in 417 files. 

Ltr. Haig to SAFSS. 23 Sep 63; interview, MajGen R. E. Greer. 

Dir SAFSP. by R. L. Perry. 14 Nov 63; Itr. LtCol T. O. Hail 

to Dan Kimball, Chm Bd Aerojet Gen Crop, 31 Jul 63, no subj, 

in 417 files. 

Memo for record. prep by Capt R. L. Geer. 417 Dir. 6 AUI 63. 

subj: Trip Report to Ae rojet Solid Rocket Plant, Sacramento, 

Calif, 5 AUluBt 63, in 417 ofe trip rpt files; 1tr, Haig to SAFSS, 

23 Sep 63. 

30Z 

Haf\OIf! Via Bveman/Talent Keynole 

':c!": ";j,S Onl) .... P •• G •• , 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

59. Ltr. Haig to SAFSS, Z3 Sep 63; TWX VWZC-7-329(3lZ4" 

6595th ATW to SLV-l Dir, ZZ Jul 63, in 417 ofe fUes. 

60. Ltr, B. MC"MiUan, SAFUS. to R. C. S~aman8. A.soC' .Admin, 

NASA. 2.& Jun 63. no subj; 1tr, Seamani to McMIllan. IS Jul 63. 

no subj; 1tr. LtCol T .0. Hal~ to SAFUS. 15 Aug 63, subj: 

Comments on Letter dated IS July 63 from Or. Seamans to Under-

_cretary McMillan, all in 417 ofe fUes. 

61. Ur. Hai),: to SAFSS. 2.3 Sep 63. 

61.. Ur. LtCol T .0. Haig, Oir/Prog 417. to SLV-l Oil'. 13 JUIl &3, 

subj: Program 417 Additional Booster Procurement; ltr. 

UCo1 M. F. Gregg, SLV-l Oil', to NASA Washington, attn 

W. A. Guild. Z. AUIl 63. subj: Amendment to Delivery Order 

63-32.; itr, R.O. GInther. Ch, Small Vehs. NASA. to SLV-l 

Dir, 14 Aug 63, subj: Amendment to Delivery Order 63-n; 

Itr. GregR to Haig, lO Aug 63. subj: Follow-On oiLV -LA procurement; Itr, Halg to SLV-l Oil'. 23 Aug 63. same subj. aU in 

417 Ofc files. 

63. Ur. LtCol T.O. Haig, Dir/Prog 417, to SLV-1 Oil'. 11 Sep &3 • 

• ubj: Performance of X-2S& Motor; 1tr. LtCo1 Ci. W. Adams. 

01 Oil' SLY -I, to Halg, 13 Sep 63. same .ubj. in 417 ofe files. 

64. Rpt. Program 417 Program Direction Plan. 21 Oct 63. in Ha18 

files: undated excerpt from "Minutes of Meeting of 5-132 Flight 

Evaluahon Bua I'd, It in 417 Ofe fUes. 

65. Memo for Record, LtCoi T .0. Hail, Dir/Prog 417, 7 O("t &3. 

subj: Trip Report to Wash D. C. 3 &r: 4 October 63. in Prog 417 

trIp rpt files. 

66. TWX SAFSS-6-63-73, SAFSS to SAFSP, 8 Oct 63, in HailC files. 

67. TWX SSVBl<-7-l0-17, SLV-l Oil' to NASA. 7 Oct &3: TWX 

SSVBK-IO-3&. SLY -1 011' to NASA, 10 Oct &3, both in 417 ofc files. 

68. TWX SAFSS·&·63-78. SAFSS to SAFSP, 23 Oct &3, and TWX 

SAFSP-DIR-21-10-1, 5AFSP to SAFSS, II Oct 63. in 417 ole files. 

303 au tT." 

Handle Vl8 8yemen/Talent. Key 

ContrOls. ( 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

69. TWX SSVBK .. lS-I0·44, SLV-l Dir to NASA, ZS Oct 63, in 

70. 

71. 

an: l'lOn-14 

417 ofe files. 

Ur, LtCol T .0. Haig. Dir/417, to Col R. W. Hoffman. 

D/Space Launch Vehs, SSO. 8 Oct 63. subj: Study of Booster 

Support for Prugram 417; TWX SAF5S-6-63-78. l3 O('t 63. 

Proj 417 Program Direction Plan. Z10ct 63. in Haig filea: 

memo for record. LtCol T.O. Hail. Dir Prog 417, 17 Jun 63, 

subj: Trlp Report 13-14 June 63 to Hqs SAC and to RCAI AED, 

in 417 ofe trip rpt files. 

304 

Ha"dle "18 Bveman/Talent· Keyllole 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

IX THE E-4 MAPPINC SATELLITE (PROORAM LA) 

Development of a mappmg and charting satellite had be.en a 

cherished Au Furce drt>atn for at least two years before ~AFSP 

mherited the mantle of satelhte reconnaia sance responsll)llit y- -but 

progress had remained in the dream category. The requirement had 

been defined In September 1958 (although considered abstraC'tly even 

earlier). By the following January the notion had been translated into 

a proposal for a reC'overable capsule system capable t" takmg pictures 

with hi~h f(eometru:· fldelity and correlating them with the products of 

a stellar-image recurdlng C'amera. Called E-4, the proposed system 

was consldered a companion to the £-5 surveillance system then belng 

defined. Although the Ballistic MiuUes Division and the Air Re •• arch 

and Development Command heartUy favored starting development, 

even seeming to prefer the £-4 to the E-5, the Air Staff was never 

more than lukewarm. In part because highly influential Lntelligence 

officers withheld firm support. the E-4 took shape .s a somewhat 

tenuous development which was in direct competition with a proposed 

ARPA-sponsored interim mapping system and with the Argon system, 

being covertly developed under Army auspices. In May 19~9, ARPA 

directed the Air Force to cancel work on the E-4 mapping camera 

305 .Ut.,..'1 

Halldle VIa 8yerN1n/ Tale,.! Ke I 

Centrols t 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

program. Must contracts were dropped the followin, month, althoulh 

the photographic laboratory at Wrilht Field continued to fund related 

camera developments without calling much attention to the effort. The 

cancellation came, somewhat diaconcertinlly, on the day that L«kheed 

I 

finished the initial version of the development plan. 

_ Samoa program managera were never enthusiastic about Argon. 

The system had serious performance limitations that chiefly arose in 

a policy of making technical compromises to insure early delivery. 

Plans in October 1960, when the question of mappiul satelhte8 belan 

, attractinll Unders4:"crt"tar.y Charyk's attention, called fat' a total of 

four Argon launch~'s b,·tw~~n December 1960 and AUlust 1961. 

On 18 October 19bO, Major C. E. James of the newly organized 

Samos Washinllton .. (fiee met with Dr. Charyk to eliscuss geodetic and 

mapping satelht4:"s. He brought the under.ecretary up to date on the 

status and prospt"("u vf Argon and then explained that the All' Force 

had a camera known as th~ "41l" (actually the "applied research" 

development undertak~n upon formal cancellation of the E:-4 camera) 

which represented th~ lOllle"at follow-on to Argon. Two were scheduled 

for compleuon by early 19&1 and long-lead-time provisions had been 

made to purchase seven more. In James' opinion, the system repre-

!lented the best the eXlIi1.ent state of the art could provide. He adv18ed 

BYE nOn-'4 306 

MPIK ... 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

NPISC ••• 

Dr. Charyk that the camera system could be readied for flillht in an 

E.C; ,oapsule by August lCJbl. (By using the considerabh IIreater thrust 

of an Atlas booster. the £-4 avoided deslgn compromises inherent in 

the Th"r-boosted Argon.) 

The E-4 had other attractions. It promised new av~nues for 

the futurf", seeming to be adaptable to evolutLon toward a long-term 

0(: 

objectLve defined in September 1960 by the Natioltdl Security Councll. 

Moreover, an E-4 program under SAFSP auspices would ehminate any 

. need for continuing the cumbersome Arion management complex. 

which then included the Army Mapping Service, the National Photographic 

Interpretation Cent~r. the Central Intelligence Agency, and the West 

Coast Argon office. Finally, and malt important. £-4 promised better 

results than Argon. 

Convinced, Charyk authorized the BMD-WADD (Wright Air 

Development DiviSion) organization to plan for early inclusion of the 

412 camera in the Samos program. For the moment, he withheld any 

authorization to schedule use of the 412.. 

Although Or. Charyk and hi. staff were relatively enthusiastic 

about the prolpects of the E-4, neither General Greer nor Colonel Kinl 

* Although the eviden("~ is not entirely clear. it would appear that a 

discussion of mappintl IJatellites durin, the September meeting of the 

National Security CUUft( tl touched off Charyk IS interest~. 

)01 

'1'0 ••• G •• Y 

au l"rOn 

Handle va Byenwn/Talent Key 

ContrOlS ( 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

R ••• C .... 

looked on it so favorably. Conceclina the fea.tbi.llty and Renera1 

-:: 

desirabihty of an E-4 system. they nevertheless queshoned the 

wisdom uf substituting a mapping satellite for any of the E-5 payloads 

then on s('hedule. Charyk, who thought less highly of the E-5, 

directed in December that the mapping camera be intelrated in the 

total Samoa effort as soon as po •• ible and tbat tbe existing contracts 

be expanded to provide for three fligbt cameras. two teat artid .. ,. 

and f~ur follow-on models. (That total matched the filure of nine 

that Major Jamea had d~,crlbed as "available" two months earlier. ) 

'" The objective of the E-4 development was a system capable of giving 

. position dccuracies of 500 feet or less. Based on the usual AtlasAgena B comblnation, th~ recovery capsule was nearly identical to 

that of tbe E-5, havinJ!, a 7l-inch diameter and being 84 inches long. 

The mappin~ t,"amera had a ux-inch focaiiength; the stellar-indexing 

camera a focal l~"gth of threl inches. The customary las-real"tion jets 

were to control attitude during a five-day mi.sion with an apogee of 

178 naullcal miles. Ground rt"soiution would be. under good conditlons. 

on the order of 150 feet. aSlSuming a 90-mile perigee over the target 

a rea. The usual near -polar orbit was planned. The f/5.6 lens ot 

the mapping camera was considered by recoonaiesance camera experts 

to lh· the "best.. available today for photogrammetic purposes. " 

It had an axial reBol uliun of 60 lines per millimeter with a distortion 

of 10 microns-.. which reduced to two microns upon calibration. Some 

4000 feet of OLne by ntn~-iDl'h film would be carried and retrieved. Shutter 

speeds could be varied ovt'r " range from l/SO to 1/800 seconds. 

Fudlcial and reseau edge marie ings on the fUm were to be provided. 

based in part on a timer with an accuracy of .001 seconds. The f/2. 5 

stellar image camera used 4. S by 4. 5-inch film frame •• expo.in. 

each frame for four secunds to provlde an elongated tral'~r of star images 

On a tutal of lOOO teet .of film. Each mis.ion could theorebcally provide 

high quality photographs of about 50 million square mileS of SinoooSoviet 

territory. 

BYE 1701'1-"" 

HaMle Via Bveman/ Talent KevllOie 

:::::-:-: 5 O",~ 

308 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

\ DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

Flight hardware (Agenas and equipment) for three fii.htl was to be 

purchased or transferred from other sub-programs. The booster 

problem was to be solved by using Atlas boosters made available by 

the decision to £1y F-Z (ferTet) subsy.tems atop Thors. and the 

matter of inserting E-4's lnto the tiiJht schedule of E-5 and E-6 

flights by al1ppmg th~ entire sequence of shots. l 

Instructions and guidance along such lines came into General 

Greer's complex gradually, over a period of several weeks. Late in 

December 1960. Greer concluded that the net elfect of redirection 

involvinjl! the £-4 and the F-2 had been to create two additional Samo. 

technical programs. He cautioned Charyk that "nothing comes free 

In this business." Manpower and dollar increases were !Devitable if 

the directions wen~ carried'out. The £-4 program promised to be 

particularly costly, he warned. since the implication of earlier 

directives was to ~ive the £-4 precedence over both the E-S and E-6. 

Greer was certain Charyk had not intended that ~e.ult, and he was 

also sure that Charyk had not fully analyzed the cost impact of modify ina 

3 A~enas from an F-l. to an E-4 configuration. 

After weighing the various considerations. Undersecretary 

Charyk in February 1961 decided that he wanted an E-4 but that it would 

have to be developed and tested within the limit. of e:xbting fund.. He 

309 

~8 • •• ' •• '1' 

8D 1"1'·' 

Handle via Bvemen/Talent, Kev",: 

Ccr:rOls U" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

continued to insist, however, that reschedulin, boosters and launches 

would permit th~ £-4 to progress withfolut gro .. ly affectina any of the 

search or surveillance payload programs. But partly In deference to 

the existence of Argon and the certainty of Army ubjechuns should it 

become known that reVival of the £-4 program was beln~ planned. he 

decided to ('onceal the program's existence. The term "Program lA" 

was generally substituted for "E-4" as a means of obscurmg project 

intentions. That subterfuge was also an element in the more widespread 

effort to remove.!!!... reconnaissance satelhte effort from gen~ral view. 

By early April 1961. the E-4 had acquired relatively firm COnfiguration characteristics and had made the transition from p~oposed 

effort to funded procurement. '" An effective working reiabonship between 

the Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) and SAFSP had been created. 

and progress seemed to be qulte good. Both the technical and the 

financial detaUs had received Charyk's specific approval following a 

general presentation of 7-8 March. although the West Coast group 

4 

remained rather "bearish" on the whole i.sue. 

Lockheed was the system lntegrating contractor. under letter contract 

AF04(647)-K41. ilJSued on 6 April 1961. The original work statement 

covered systems engmeering and vehicles for three fliahts plus long 

lead time items for flYe mor.'. Fairchild Camera and Instrument 

Corporation had payload develupment responsibility under letter COntract AF33(600)-4Z9Z6. lssued by the Aeronautical System Division's 

(ASD) Reconnaissance L.aburatory on ZS March. (Fairchild actually 

BYE 1'7017-'74 310 

'lOP •• ealilJl 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

The ambitiou. E-4 program conceived during the Samos reorganization of August-September 1960 began to lose stature tht> 

folloWlng spring. On Z8 March 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Roswell Ciilpatric confirmed Air Force responsibility for development 

and operation of all defense department reconnaissance satellites. but 

also made the Army responsible for establishing and manatling "a lingle 

5 

geodetic and mapping program" to meet defense department rpquirements. 

Within two weeks, the Army's chief of staff had contacted his Air Force 

cOWlterpart, General T. D. White. to request numinations to an 

"tntegrated three--8Pl'vice" group to plan for mapping satellites--under 

Armye-ognizanct-. The first meeting was held early in May, and it was 

immediately apparent that the Army saw the Gilpatric directive a8 a 

mdndatt" for elltablilihing a new major rea.arch and development effort 

in satellite m.tpptnJl and geodesy. The All' Force inevitably disagreed. 

The only product of tbe meetinl w.s a decision to collect requirements 

statements from all three services. 

The next meeting, on 11 May, was called on short notice but 

found the Air Fore-a more determined than ever that reconnaia.ance 

acc-epted six days lat~re initially released to ASD on 

10 March. A total n_wa. aet a.ide for "Prolram lAo " 

the coverage extt-ndlnR through four fiscal year. until fi.cal 1964. 

but the bulk of that amount faUing due in fi.cal year 1963. SchedW:e. 

called for initial launchea in March, June, and September 196Z with 

the first of the flVt> aupplemental payload. ,oin. into orbit in April 196'. 

311 

.OP '.G •• ~ 

aD 17017-

Handle vea 8yeman/Tatent Kev'" 

COIn rOI$ 0. 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

satellite researC'h and development should not be parceled out accord. 

ina to C"amera foC'al len~th·-whi('"h seemed in some reepects to be the 

Army's goal. On instructions from Charyk. the Air FurC'e rt:=preeentative refused to discu .. researcb and development in satellite geodesy, 

characterizing it a matter for secretarial resolution. Typically, the 

tri-service committee was unable to agree on anything slgniflcant. 

adjourning on the note that what was immediately needed was a commonly 

accepted definition of geodesy. some agreement on targeUng require6 

ments. and a standard viewpoint on data proces8ing requirements. 

Nevertheless. the lines had been drawn and under the rules 

outhned by Gllpatric the E-4 program had become quite vulnerable. 

Yet had the matter remalned one for resolution by a tri-service committee. 

Charyk and Gr~er might well have flown the E-4 before any ded.ion could 

be taken. However. In late May 1961, the mapping satellites issue had 

been pas8ed to the Dire-ctorate of Defense Research and EngineeriDg 

(DDRIlE) for resoluhon. and the E-4 became but one of three proposed 

systems. Early in June. Gilpatric authorized continuation of the procurement of four cameras in the E-4 (Program lA) configuration but 

lnstruC'ted Charyk to suspend plana for buying aDd launching booeters 

and space vehicles. There still was hope, of cour8e, that a decision 

BYE nOn-7. 

Har-c e • a 9veman/ Talent Kev"oie 

C:,.~·: s Or"y 

3lZ 

.. a ••• e •• , 
l 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

tu ('onfirm proposed flight schedules would follow complehon of an 

ev .. luatlOn- -but the hope was rather fa1nt. Charyk thert'fore directed 

that all E-4 activity not essentlal to compiehon of four batol\ payloads 

(includinJl aCt t'S8ories) should be halted. He subsequently modified 

the "t'omplete st.op" order to permit Lockheed to wf'rk on ('apaule 

englneering pSlit:ntial to creation of an "appropriate" interface between 

capsule and payload and to insure compatibUity of the pllyload W1th th~ 

"apaule ellvlronrnent, but even then tbe Lockheed work was carefully 

limlted. 

For another six months, payload development continued at a 

slow pace and un a luw.key. It appeared to be proaressmll remarkably 

well. on the whole, a situation that most obaervers credited to thl' 

abillty and lndulltry of the immediate program officers (Mr. Leonard 

Cruuch at ASD and Major Cienerai Cireer's establishment). No firm decision on the future of the program had y~t 

emerged from ODR&E, and Charyk seemed content not to push the i.sue. 

In October, he discussed mappina satellites with Dr. E. A. Fubini of 

DDR&E and got appruval of a plan to bring the E~4 payloads to a .tate 

of flight readiness and hold them there, the objective beuig to provide 

the least possible delay between a launch decision and an actual launch. 

He tuld SAFSP to begin putting tolether enlineerinl and Cost detail. 

313 

'0. 'EHS" 

8U 1101'-

Handle Via 8yeman/Talent· Key,.. 

CcnrOIS 0 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

for a "hold II program. General Greerls people, thOUlh reasonably 

optimistic about the prumise of the E-4 cam .. ra and the functional 

"ffectiveness uf the: system, were not particularly encouraging--

estimating that it would c to orbit all four payload •• 

7 

and one-- not cuuntinR launch and recovery charges. 

Charyk, who ~ad preserved the E-4 prolram through a succession 

of adnunistrative mishaps and _0 had Bomehow managed to keep it 

alive in tht- face of a formal Ciilpatric directive that denied hi. authority 

to do so. reacted anarily to the cost and tilbe figures. "It appears that 

SAFSP does nut want to do this job, II he told Cieneral Curtin. "The 

syst~m is obviously $Cold plated and fat. It ie necessary that the program 

8 be St rubbed down to the hard core and re-estirnated." 

Though unpalatable. the figures neverthele .. proved to be well 

founded. By the l"nd of the year, Charyk was apparently resigned to 

the fact that there was no prospect of early flight for the £-4 payloads 

then approaching completion. Early in January 196Z, he advised 

Gllpatrl<.· that as they were completed the £-4 payloads were being 

5t.ored 10 a readiness-in-nine-months flight condition. and that a 

decision to fly would require the provi8ion of substantial furads for 

9 

launch, booster, and apace vehicle COlts. And there the E-4's remained •. 

The dec ie iun was nClt wholly one of institutional pre rogatives. 

howe:ver much that seemed to be the case in 1961. In fa(!t. the E-S launch. 

BYE 17017-.,,, 314 

Ha"Cl.~ lila Byeman/Talent Kev"'oIe 

.. PI.C ••• 

J 
l 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 'I'ep •• c .... 

orbital. and recovery system on which E-4 relied had been progressing 

with notable lack of dlstinction throuJlh 1961. Whether the E-5 (Oamera 

system would work properly remained uncertain (and was not to be 

established until a modified camera waa aucce .. fully flown in the 

Lanyard pruJlram, in July 1963: results were rather disappointing). 

But that the Atlas, Agena, and recovery subaystem were marginally 

capable, at best, was apparent early. In consequence of those unhappy 

developments, E-5 was cancelled in December 1961. With it went much 

of the potential of E-4. 

Also significant was the development of a mapping and charting 

capabUity in Corona. Although the superb capability that wo~d appear 

with the eventual introduction of a dual intearated stellar-indexing 

("amera (DISIe) as part of the Corona payload was not evident in 

October 1961, when it was decided to add an indexinl cameraoto Corona, 

Lockheed and the Corona program office could by then confidently 

anticipate that outcome. The Argon program did not completely run 

down untU 1964, but even earlier Argon's spotty record of success. 

lndex-camera development, and the chanlina concept of leodesy pro,ram 

requirements had obViated any real need for specialised mappin, camera 

lSystema. 

315 

wa.l.a. 

au 1111' 

Handle VI8 e,.lNn/Talen~ Key· 

CcrtrOIS C 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

_p •• e •• ~ 

NOTES ON SOURr.ES 

I. USAF GOR SO. 26 Sep CjSi Sentry S"an' System Dt-vealopment 

Plan. 30 Jan 59; ltr. MajCien J.H. Walsh. ACSI. to Olr ARPA. 

l3 Mar ';9. subj: Inte1lillence Requirements for SENTRY. In 

SP Samail files: RlcD-l. TWX. RDZCiW-Z6-C;-43E, ARDC to 

BMD. 26 May 59, in SP Samoa fUes. Hiat OoC'm 'sq· TWX. 

AFDA T 52072. USAF to ARDC. 5 Jun 59, same file: 1.MSD 

Rpt. Pruposed Dt'v Plan for Sentry Photogrammetry PI·oRram • 

.; Jun 59. Samoa files. 

l. Memo for record, Maj C. E. James, SAFMS. lK Oct 60, !tubJ! 

Meeting with Dr. Charyk, in SAFMS file, Pullc. y. 'bl. rwx. 

SAFSP-ZO-IO-13, BrigCien R. E. Cireer to BrigGen R. D. Curtin, 

lO Oct 60; TWX SAFMS-OIR-60-14. Curtin to Cireer. 21 Oct 60, 

buth in SAFMS files: Telcon. '60; 1tr. Col W.Ci. Kmg. V/Olr. 

Samos Proj Ole, to SAFSM (siC). 2.1 Nov 60, 8ubj: Lt·tter uf 

Transmittal, In SAFMS files, Samos Cien: TWX, SAFMS-Phuto60-6S. SAFMS to SAFSP. 2.3 Dec 60, in SP Samoa files. 

3. TWX SAFSP-P-Z9-1Z-9. BrigCien R. E. Cireer. SAFSP. to 

OSAF, 29 Dec 60, in SAFMS fUe, messagea, Dec 60. 

4. TWX SAFMS-Photo-Itl-23, SAFMS to SAFSP, 20 Feb 61. in 

SAFMS flle, Samos Gen, '61; Itr, BrigCien R. E. Greer, Dirl 

Samoa, to Col W.C. King. V/Dir. et a1, 24 Feb 61. subj: 

Security PolH:Y, in SP-3 files; draft dev pin: Samua PhotuFSP to SAFMS. 6 Apr 61. ~llbJ: Ltr 

file a , Samoa Cien. 161; TWX SAFSPVT-6-4-20. Col W.G. King. V/Dir. SAFSp to SAFMS (Maj 

H. C. Howard). 6 Apr 61, in SAFMS files Samos Gen, '61i 

ltr contr AF 33(600)-4Z9Z6 between ASD and FCIC. Lssued 

Z5 Mar 61. accepted by FCIC 30 Mar 61; ltr l untr AF 04(647)-

841 between SAF SSD and LMSD. 6 Apr 61. C'overlllJ,t II y .. tems 

engineering dond vehicles for three E-4 pay1uads. hnal C'untracts 

Were to be. respectively. AF 33(600)-39469 (FCIC) lind AF 04 

(647)-563 and -595. cuvering delavpry of E-C; develulJ'·d Items. 

5. DoDDir 5160.34. Reconnaissance. Napping and ul" df'ti(' 

Programs. lS Mar 61. in E-6 files. Mgt-4. 

BYE 11017-'74 316 

Har>dle Via Bvemen/Te1ent Key"ole 
"'. 

f. 

NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 - 6. Ltr. Genu.H. Decker. CIS. USA. toGen T.D. White, CIS 

USAF. II Apr 61. no subJ; hr, White to Decker, l1 Apr 61; 

memo for record, Col G.H. Chase, Ofc ACS/ •• USAF. 8 May 61. 

subj: Department of the Army Mapping and Geodesy Conference; 

memo for record. Chase. 11 May 61, subj: Mappmg and Geodesy 

Ad HoC" Committee Conference, all in SAFMS files: M18t . 

7. TWX SAFMS-SEN-61-60. SAFMS to SAFSP. 6 JWl 61. In SAFMS 

files. Samos Gen, '61; Itr. Col H. L. Evans. O/Olr, SAFSP to 

V/Dir SAFSP (Tech). (, Jun 61. subj: Stopwork on Contract. Ln 

f.vans files; TWX SAFSP-L-7-6-S4. SAFSP to SAFMS. 7 Jun 61; 

TWX SAFMS-SEN-61-61. SAFMS to SAFSP, 8 Jun 61. both in 

SAFMS Samos Gen. '61 files; TWX SAFMS-M·1189. GrigGen 

R. D. Curtin. SAFMS. to MajGen R. E. Greer. SAFSP. ZO Oct 61 • 

. In SP- 3 files. 

8. TWX SAFMS-DIR-61-141, BrigGen R. D. Curtin to MajGen R. E. 

Greer. SAFSP •. in SP-3 files. 

9. Mt·mo. J. V. Charyk. SAFUS. to R. L. Gilpatrick. D/50D, 

3 Jan 6ol, subj; Mapping and Geodetic Programs. In Argon fUes. 

317 

I'a.IE8 .... 

8U 17017." 

~rtdIe Via Bve",.n/Tat.nt Kev"" 
NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE 

. DECLASSIFIED BY: CIIART 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 7 MAY 2012 

BYE 170l'J-'l4 

Ma"'dl~ ,/la Bveme"/ Telent· Kevnote 

'1'8 •• se ....