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April 8, 1974 CONTROL SYSTEM 

THE NRO AND AIRCRAFT AND DRONE RECONNAISSANCE 

INTRODUCTION 

This paper is divided into two main parts--the first 

dealing with the operational aspects of air-breathing platforms deployed over denied territories, and the second part 

with the RDT&E aspects of these systems. 

Air-breathing overflight vehicles available today include 

the U-2 and SR-71 aircraft and 147/154 series drones. New 

systems under consideration or development represent primarily 

an extension of present regimes of operation, rather than 

revolutionary concepts, and are not treated separately here. 

The NRO presently "owns" only four aircraft--the U-2Rs 

assigned to the CIA Office of Special Activities (OSA) and 

these aircraft will transfer to the Air Force in 1974. Thus 

the NRO will soon own no air-breathing assets. 

AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS 

The upper part of the chart at TAB A is intended to show 

the aircraft and drone overflight process as it is specified 

in the NRO 1965 Agreement. The blocks in yellow will drop out 

when the OSA U-2R aircraft are turned over to the Air Force. 

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The blocks in red represent activities in which the DNRO has 

a direct interest or responsibility and require a conscious 

approval or decision. This baseline case does represent the 

present situation for the OSA managed IDEALIST TACKLE Chinese 

peripheral flights and the JRC managed OLYMPIC FIRE Cuban 

flights. These flights are conducted on a routinely scheduled 

basis and are relatively noncontroversial. The point can be 

made for these flights that maintenance of political presence 

on Taiwan and over Cuba is as important as the intelligence 

collected. For example, there is no plan for peripheral 

photography of China following withdrawal of the U-2Rs. 

The process for generating, approving and executing overflights in time of crisis or intense national interest is considerably different from the norm. There appears to be no one 

focal point for all overflight requirements, short of 

Dr. Kissinger. Specifically, the DNRO has not been included 

before-the-fact in the approval cycle for any Mid-East overflight in the period from 1969 to the present. The lower part 

of the chart at TAB A shows several different paths by which 

overflight requests have been submitted and approvals granted. 

These are examples of what has occurred; since there is very 

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little formal documentation in some of these cases the actual 

process may have been different than shown. 

This situation presents a potentially serious problem. 

The mechanism leading to 40 Committee approval dates to the 

unfortunate incident of May 1, 1960, and the subsequent confusion within the U.S. Government on a consistent story for 

the conduct and control of overflights. Certainly Dr. Kissinger 

in either his role as Advisor to the President (and therefore 

Chairman of the 40 Committee) or as Secretary of State can 

and does establish the requirement for overflights. The 

operating agencies of the DOD or CIA respond, but when requirements are generated this way the DNRO has historically never 

been consulted nor asked to give any advice, guidance or 

direction. And yet the DNRO is charged also with contingency 

planning. 

The NRO is in the aircraft operational business for several 

reasons: 

because it all started that way--specifically the 

U-2s searching for Soviet ICBMs. 

requirement. 

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because the 1965 charter says so--a "legal" 

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it permits one agent to present all overflight 

requests to the 40 Committee. 

functionally concentrates overflights in one 

organization. 

protects the covert nature of overflights. 

to issue a coordinated U.S. Government contingency 

plan. 

historically the NRO has developed the platforms, 

the sensors, the defensive subsystems and the life support 

systems. 

The intelligence collection problem has changed considerably 

over the years. The vast capabilities of satellites have 

severely reduced the need for aircraft and drone overflights, 

and the foreign air defense environment has critically limited 

our flexibility to fly aircraft or drones when and where 

desired. In considering whether or not the NRO should retain 

an aircraft capability, the following points are pertinent: 

For: 

satisfies the 1965 charter 

provides a convenient mechanism for aircraft 

versus satellite collection system trade-offs. 

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provides a convenient place for planning aircraft and satellite coordinated collection activities. 

provides for aircraft and satellite contingency 

planning by one interdepartmental group. 

the NRO could react quickly to meet overflight 

needs (recently applied only to U-2 operations). 

Against: 

the DNRO has been bypassed in practice for any 

recent, critically important operation. 

the NRO (SOC) is not properly manned to support 

aircraft operations. 

NRO does not control or task DOD support 

resources, which are by far the greatest part of overflight 

operations. 

chances of conducting a truly covert mission 

over any territory we are vitally interested in is minimal: 

only the U.S. owns U-2s, SR-7ls, and 147 

drones, and the world knows it. 

detection is virtually certain. 

there will be little NRO interest when all assets 

are turned over to the DOD. 

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without owning aircraft assets, there is no 

apparent contribution which the NRO makes to overflight operations which the DOD cannot do at least as well. 

Some of the factors which are presently unfavorable could 

be corrected. For example: 

the provisions of the 1965 charter could be reapplied, but it would require reaffirmation at the highest 

levels--and it is presently these same levels from which the 

recent requests have originated and are approved outside of NRO 

cognizance (see lower part of TAB A). 

the SOC could be strengthened to include an aircraft mission planning function. But it would still appear 

logical to task DOD elements through the long-established JRC 

channels. 

What would be necessary if the NRO were to divorce itself 

totally from aircraft overflight operations? 

recognize the change to the 1965 Agreement. This 

would require the concurrence of the ExCom, the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense (as the office of signature on the 1965 Agreement) 

and notice to the PFIAB (they obtained the President's direction 

for the 1965 charter). 

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formally transfer the operational responsibility 

to the JCS. 

transfer the aircraft contingency planning function 

from the NRO to the JCS for aircraft overflights. The NRO 

would retain the satellite contingency planning function only, 

and would not need to be represented on the aircraft committee. 

provide a mechanism, such as an NRO-JCS agreement, 

for coordinating satellite and aircraft coverage. 

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RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION 

The NRO has evolved and used streamlined management 

techniques for air breathing system development which date 

to the early days of the U-2 program, and which have been 

used for the U-2R, OXCART (and SR-71), and TAGBOARD programs, 

as well as for system studies. 

Some of the major features of this management method are: 

Very direct lines of decision making and resource 

allocation, from the ExCom through the DNRO to the Program 

Director. The normal DOD planning, programming and budgeting 

process is completely bypassed. 

Covert contracting techniques. While the basic 

provisions of law are adhered to, the Air Force implementing 

management documents are waived and normal audits and inspections are precluded. Instead, the NRP is audited and 

inspected internally. 

Compartmented security controls. These keep all 

except people with a need-to-know from becoming involved in 

the program or its management. 

The NRO normally has developed not only collection platforms, but also the associated optical and electronic sensors, 

defensive subsystems, and life support systems. The 1965 

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Agreement implies that the NRO has this development responsibility, it is not specific as it is in the case of spacecraft. The Program D Charter, at TABB, is more explicit. 

The TAGBOARD drone was the last NRO airframe acquisition 

program, and recently only sensors, defensive subsystems, and 

some life support developments have been pursued. For example, 

Program Dis developing the 70 inch optical bar camera. 

Defensive subsystem work for all U-2 aircraft, both NRO and 

USAF, is being performed for OSA by the CIA Office of ELINT, 

although starting in FY 75 all funds for this work will come 

from the Air Force budget. The SR-71 SPO at Wright-Patterson 

AFB has been establishing requirements and funding SR-71 

development work for some time, although contracting functions 

are being carried out through Program D resources. 

Recently Program D has acted as a contracting agent for 

conducting Air Force drone studies, using Air Force provided 

funds but covert contracting techniques. While this has 

probably resulted in more useful work being performed for the 

money, it does not support an NRO need, and if the Air Force 

concludes that a new drone is required the actual system 

development test and acquisition would need to be performed 

by the Air Force through non-covert means. 

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The absence of an NRO air-breathing system development 

can perhaps be attributed to one of two main factors -- either 

fiscal pressures to keep the NRP budget down, or perhaps that 

there is no compelling reason for these vehicles to collect 

intelligence through overflight. The latter factor could in 

turn be attributed to several reasons: 

satellites perform the intelligence collection 

requirement well enough. 

political reasons for overflights are more 

important than their intelligence value. 

since overflights can rarely be considered really 

covert, it matters little what agency carries them out. 

finally, there are both aircraft and drone assets 

available in the Air Force inventory which can be called upon 

to fly missions when needed. 

Reasons for the NRO to be involved in air-breathing system 

developments appear to be largely based on historical precedence: 

the U-2, OXCART and TAGBOARD were all developed 

in the covert world, using streamlined management methods. 

the 1965 Agreement implied an NRO responsibility. 

functionally concentrated all overflight systems 

development in one agency. 

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permitted covert development of platforms for 

covert flights. 

Today there does not appear to be any compelling reasons 

for the NRO to maintain an aircraft or drone development 

capability. There are, however, several factors to be considered in this decision: 

For retaining a capability: 

it represents a well-established, effective 

streamlined management development capability. 

keeping an in-being resource is perhaps more 

efficient than terminating and re-establishing it if needed 

in the future. 

it can continue to serve to support the U-2 and 

SR-71 fleets. 

can serve as a streamlined management vehicle for 

non-BYEMAN studies for the Air Force. 

Factors against retaining a capability: 

there is no pressing need today to develop a new 

overflight system. 

development of air-breathing overflight vehicles 

and subsystems by covert methods is a dubious requirement. 

aircraft development, operations, and support 

funding has been deleted from the NRP. 

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maintenance of a cepability for unidentified 

future contingencies is wasteful; it will tend to be used 

for marginally justifiable reasons. 

What would be required to terminate NRO aircraft and 

drone activities? Major items include: 

since there are no platform developments under 

way, no action is required here. 

defensive subsystem developments will all be 

funded by the Air Force effective July 1, 1974. Future 

contract actions could be accomplished through non-covert 

channels. Provisions would need to be made for the Air 

Force to assume all U-2 and SR-71 management functions. 

the ExCom should be informed of the action. 

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