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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON/ O.C. •

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May 13, 1967

-MORANDUM ?OR DR. FLAX ' •

SUBJECT: Disclosure of "the Fact sof" Satellite Reconnaissance at the.

Secret Level

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To a • vise the Director of Central Intelligence of the desirability

ontrolling the release of • ation re rdi "the fact of" satellite

..commissance outside th Security

Systems.

•

BACKG

▪

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On April 27, the USIB agreed in principle to:

"Acknowledge the fact of a U.S. satellite photographic

reconnaissance program at the Secret level."

"Permit Ude of intelligence derived from exploitation or satellite

tography (but not the film itself) in Secret or Top Secret publications,

.. lending in the content of the intelligence, while identifying the source

satelljA photography." '

•

The JSZB minutes (at Tab A) give an account of the discussion •

leading up to the actions quoted. The roots of the first action go back •

to 1962, when the State Department urged the public acicnowle6gement

of satellite :econnaissance. „Although this initiative was muted by

President Kennedy's strong conservatism on this subject and by the •

subsequent NSAM 2454 (the "Eighteen Points"), questions regarding

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.i..•elosure have been raised at least annually-biState during the past

°I.• : years. Tab B is a paper prepared last year by a State represents- . •

:we; it is a fair example of the State argument for decontrol.

It should be noted that the so-called "State position" on decontrol

not actually a departmental position,. but rather an expression by • U..: Intelligence and Research organization within the department. We

i.r.ow, for example, that the attitude of the Deputy. Under Secretary for

Political Affairs differed sharply from that of I and R. The latter

group, while very persistent and vocal, had not made much headway .

ire COMOR or USIB until the President's "off-the-record" statement •

:sr. satellite reconnaissance. Since that date, the compulsion to tell •

...., been almost overwhelming. The USIB minutes illustrate this

g mind- swe 11 : in August 1966 a similar discussion found State standing'

alone, while in May 1967 the Board is unanimous in endOrsing a very • •

significant decontrol action.

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PRESENT SITUATION: • •

The :card's action in this case is probably irreversible. From

.ae minu:es and reported discussion, it appears that the Board's desire

-.0 make possible to attribute intelligence to a satellite source is .

..:orapelling to each of the members. The COMOR has been asked to •

develop ,;..iidelines for meeting this need. We have worked closely with

. CC...60R, urging the adoption of the procedures listed in Tab C. While

 • it is true that any disclosure whatsoever impinges on the we have

reason to hope for COMOR guidelines which will control, to some extent

at least, the disclosure of "the fact of" within the intelligence community.

• More serious problems will be triggered by disclosure outside the

community. State's I and R sthff regards the Board decisionas a coup, •

.--..., characteristically, as a first important step toward an ever- • •

L. widening liberalization of security. Unless clear guidelines are Isla

down for disclosing of "the fact of," the new license to tell will be . • •. '...4.-AU.ed artlessly (and sometimes maliciously) to the detriment of

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The ideal course of action would reverse the Board's position. . . • ..

. • Although one might be encouraged by the fact that the DCI (as well as

the DOD representative) was not at the meeting, such an effort would'

, probably be fruitless. •

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We need -- very mush •• a clear statement by the DCI on uniform procedures and practices regarding disclosure of "the fact of." We '

•• may have trouble getting such a statement. Note in the USIB minutes

(Tab A), paragraph 21, that the DDCI, in response to query, stated

that "he would rather leave the determination of how to apply the rules ,

to the individual agencies."

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• ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION:

The residual course of action is to attempt to ameliorate what the

Board has done by pressing for controlled disclosure, Such an initiative

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can be undertaken in a variety of ways:

1. A telephone call from the DNRO to the DCI. This is probably • not •enough. The problem is too complex for casual treatment. Furthermore, in the face of what is probably a widening security •issue, the NRO

needs to go on record (and this seems to be the right time to do so). A•

telephone call will not place us on record.

a. A personal conference with the DCI. Much better than a telephone call, but still off the record.

•

3. A memorandum to the ExCom. This-would antagonize Mr.

Helms, who could rightfully expect the problem to come to him first.

4. A memorandum to Mr. Helms. Probably the best strategy

and necessary for good inter-agency relations. This approach also •

gives one the option of sending a copy of the memorandum, to 'Mr. Vance

for information. • ..1. •

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1‘18COMMXNDATi0111 • •

I have prepared such a memorandum. It does not fight the Board

action; rather, it cites three typical problems, suggests broad solutions,

and urges the DCI to set up uniform controls for all disclosures of the

fact of satellite rsconnaiisance.

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The Board plans to consider this item again on May 18 or 25.

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• PAUL WORTHMAN •

• • • • :* Colonel, ;USAF

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