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October 23, 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HAROLD BROWN 

SUBJECT: MOL inspection Proposal 

Attached for your coordination or comment is a response to itMbessatior 

Thompson's memorawkasof 6 October on the above subject which you 

addressed in your memorandum of 15 October to John McMaughton. 

you Will note that our proposed response casts doubt on the urgency, 

and even the need, for considering a pre-launch Inspection proposal as 

a contingency to counter a possible Soviet prepagamla attack in the UN, 

or elsewhere, on the MOL program. It also ashes the generally held point 

within DoD that the national security implications must be more adequately 

treated in the paper before a determinetion can be mode on the advisability 

of making an offer to the Soviets. 

I would like to get John *Naughton's signature on a Letter to Thompson 

today. 

Alvin Friedman 

Deputy 

Attachment 

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

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The Honorable Llewellyn E. Thompson 

Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State 

The State Department 

Washington, D. C. 

Dear Tommy: 

We have been reviewing the State Department staff paper 

describing a possible mutual U. S. - Soviet pre-launch inspection 

program involving the MOL and perhaps other space vehicles that 

you forwarded with your memorandum of October 6, 1965. 

In our judgment, the proposal may perhaps have merit 

principle, but the State paper appears only to scratch the surface 

of the many issues and considerations that would have to be taken 

into account before any pre -launch inspection program could be 

proffered by the United States that goes beyond what we have already 

proposed to the ENDC. Moreover, and equally important, we 

question whether there exists at this time a pressing need to move 

urgently toward formulating a more specific pre-launch inspection 

proposal relating to the MOL. The risk appears small that the 

Soviets will use the MOL program to raise seriously the bombsin-orbit issue in the United Nations -- the real contingency toward 

which the State paper is directed. 

Taking this latter point first, because it bears directly on how 

high a priorit30 w'e should attach to the launch inspection proposal, it 

would p.ppear that recent events suggest that there is little likelihood , 

of conro vertx4;,-with the Soviets. As you know, the United Nations 

Outer Space Committee meeting completed its sessions in New York 

on October 8 without public airing of the MOL program by the 

Soviets. Nor has the program been raised in any significant way 

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at other United Nations sessions. Finally, I understand that outer 

space is the last item on the General Assembly agenda, and that 

it will be well into December and perhaps even January before 

the subject is discussed. 

We doubt that the Soviets will make a public issue of MOL 

apart from the UN forum. The fact is that Soviet public attacks 

on our space activities have been practically non-existent since 

1963. Some of us suspect that these attacks stopped when U. S. 

and Soviet space programs began largely to parallel each other. 

Passing to the merits of the proposal the State paper advances, 

it appears to us that the paper is deficient in its treatment of the 

possible types of pre-launch inspection of both manned and unmanned 

satellites, and the impact that various levels of inspection might 

have on U. S. national security interests. The paper treats quite 

fully the case for the proposal as a me ans of gaining a psychological 

or propaganda advantage for the U. S., particularly if the Soviets 

rejected an offer after they had challenged the MOL program in the 

UN forum. However, since our entire satellite observation program 

might become involved if the Soviets were to accept the offer, we 

should be more fully aware of the security ramifications of the prelaunch inspection proposal. As an example only - by no means 

conclusive - of the type of analysis which should be made, there 

is attached a very preliminary statement' on the possible technical 

implications, and resulting intelligence and security implications, of 

implementing the proposal as stated in the State paper; i. e., . . "to 

permit inspection adequate to demonstrate that there were no nuclear 

weapons aboard any manned (or, perhaps, 'any large! or even 'any') 

space launchings. " 

On balance, the inspection proposal would seem to be too high 

a card to play in any propaganda game the Soviets might initiate 

over the MOL without our first giving the matter further study. 

I accordingly recommend that the proposal be spelled out in 

greater detail and that it'be more fully analyzed in order to determine 

the advisability of making an offer to the Soviets in the UN context.' 

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I also recommend that we consider other, and less potentially 

sensitive, ways to cope with any Soviet propaganda attack on MOL. 

For example, if it develops that the Soviets are indeed worried about 

our space programs being pointed in the direction of a bomb-carrying 

capability (notwithstanding repeated assurances by the President and 

other high U. S. officials) it would seem appropriate to have frank 

discussions with them, on a technical level, concerning the inadvisability 

and relative high cost of doing bombing from space. 

I should note here that Harold Brown has responded to the State 

paper with the view that "our primary concern in all these,discussions 

is the preservation of our national security; and, in this case, I rate 

the value to national security of preserving our reconnaissance capability above that of public and official opinion in other countries. " The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed similar concern that "the impact 

on our national security program is not adequately treated " in the 

proposal. 

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proposal before the ENDC states: 

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PRELIMINARY TECHNICAL COMMENT ON STATE DEPARTMENT 

PAPER ENTITLED "AN OFFER OF INSPECTION OF MOL" 

The State Department paper rests in large measure on the 

following proposition: 

"The U. S. could meet Soviet allegations that we,: 

, 

are pursuing a weapons-in-space program by publicly 

offering, on a basis of reciprocity, to permit inspection 

adequate to demonstrate that there were no nuclear 

weapons aboard any manned (or perhaps, 'any large: 

or even 'any') space launchings. " 

Two portions of this proposition that bear upon one another are 

of particular concern. The first is "inspection adequate to demonstrate 

that there were no nuclear weapons aboard. " The second is the suggestion that "any large" or "any" (meaning all) space launchings could 

be involved in the proposal. 

1. The United States has on record with the ENDC a proposal 

for pre-launch inspection of space vehicles as part of our general proposal on the freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles. Sliecifically, the 
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"Observers would witness announced missile 

and space firings to ensure that the proper types and 

numbers of vehicles were being launched. It is our 

view that pre -launch inspection should consist of 

visual observation of the gross characteristics of 

the vehicles being launched. " 

This proposal appears to assume that observers-could detect 

the presence or absence of a nuclear weapon merely by visual observation 

of the gross characteristics of the vehicle - an observation that could 

be made some hundreds of feet away from the vehicle. UnfOrtunately, 

this is not the case. Currently available or planned devicei fOr the 

on-ground detection of nuclear weapons are useful only within a few 

feet or even inches of the suspected component itself. Accordingly, 

internal access to the components of a particular system might well be 

required. Even within these seemingly appropriate bounds, however, 

the presence or absence of a nuclear weapon could not be determined 

with a high degree of certainty. For example, a recorded emission 

from uranium or plutonium would not establish conclusively that a 

weapon (or peaceful power-supplying reactor) is present, although it 

would, of course, raise enough suspicion to require further inquiry. 

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It is possible - and perhaps likely - that unrestricted physical 

access to individual components of the launching vehicle would become - 

an element of any realistic program of pre-launch inspection. Only 

in this way could there be reasonable assurance that the cover or 

shielding of any component is not being used to evade the weapons -inspace ban. In this situation, again, the suspected components must 

be pulsed in such a manner that emissions from individual components 

may be recorded and measured. While the radiation that might accompany 

such activity is not particularly harmful to the human body, its level 

is sufficient to render the ancillary solid-state componentry in any 

system of this type completely inoperable. Consequently, it is highly 

unlikely that any such scheme would be accepted by either party to an 

inspection agreement. 

2. The requirement, then, for unrestricted, internal access 

to a vehicle, makes the inspection scenario considerably more difficult 

and raises the second concern -- that associated with the portion of 

State's proposition which would provide an inspection "aboard any 

manned (or, perhaps, 'any large'; or even 'any') space launches." 

In the manned category there is, of course, MOL. Uninhibited 

access to a MOL vehicle would reveal the detailed configuration of any 

military subsystem which might be on board, permitting a trained 

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observer to deduce characteristics and capabilities in a comprehensive 

manner. 

In the "large" unmanned category, unrestricted internal 

access would reveal completely the details of the system, subsystems, 

and components. In an Attack Alarm Satellite, for example, the IR 

sensing devices; in a Nuclear Detection Satellite -- the radiation 

sensing devices; in an Inspector Satellite -- the terminal sensing 

koptical or non-cooperative radar) devices; in an observation system -- 

the details of the optics. 

In the "any" category -- internal access would again reveal 

highly significant payload details and would lead inevitably to a compromise of our space reconnaissance capability. Such revelations 

would enable the Soviets to develop countless devices for "spoofing" 

or taking counteraction against our systems, for camouflaging 

objectives, and for detecting U. S. activity in the space environment. 

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