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6LCH' r This document consists of 13 

pages. No. lal-of 60. copies 

Series A. 

-gov-444-,e-K 

ENDC MEETING 

Geneva, January 27, 1966 

6,04tA4-1 6ic) 

Contingency Paper 

Soviet Orbital Rockets and the US MOL 

I. Problem: 

The recent official exchange of assurances by the US 

and USSR as regards their intentions to abide by the GA 

"no bombs in orbit" resolution, though reducing the possibility that the Soviets might raise US plans for a MOL as 

an issue in the ENDC, may cause other delegations to question 

the applicability of the UN resolution with respect to both 

the Soviet claim to possess orbital rockets and the US MOL. 

Should the Soviets raise the MOL, they might - as they have 

done in the past - exploit it in an attempt to show that US 

policy is one of increased militarization rather than 

disarmament. 

II. Recommended US Position: 

The US should endeavor to avoid debate on the details 

of the question of the plans for a MOL and Soviet orbital 

rockets, including controversy over whether the UN "no bombs 

in orbit" resolution is being observed. Nevertheless, if 

necessary, the US should be prepared to provide complete 

assurance that the US is and will continue to abide by that 

resolution and to state that it hopes the USSR will do likewise. Equally important, the US should take the position 

that GA resolution 1884 represents a significant, though 

limited, arms control accord and, as such, we should encourage 

all states to abide by both the spirit and letter of the 

resolution. 

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The US position is that its plans for a MOL and the 

Soviets' claim to possess orbital rockets are not comparable 

in terms of the UN resolution. For our part, we have stated 

that the MOL has no relationship whatever to the resolution 

banning the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in 

space since the MOL incorporates no capability to carry or 

deliver such weapons and the purpose of the MOL involves no 

such intent. While the Soviets' display of orbital rockets, 

and official statements accompanying them, led the US to 

question Soviet intentions with respect to their adherence 

to the spirit of the resolution, we have taken the position 

that these Soviet actions and statements do not violate the 

express terms of that resolution. 

In light of these developments and to clarify Soviet 

intentions with respect to their adherence to the UN resolution, 

the US approached the Soviets privately. Mutual assurances 

have been exchanged and made public. (For additional details, 

see Section IV, E.) 

The US assessment is that Soviet claims as regards 

these weapons were made primarily for psychological reasons 

to attempt to prove the strength of the USSR to all concerned. 

Neither Soviet orbital rockets nor mobile ICBMs are credited 

by the US with being anywhere near operational status which 

the Soviets implied. (For additional details concerning our 

technical assessment of Soviet orbital rockets, see Section IV). 

A suggested contingency statement is set forth in Annex A. 

III. Anticipated Foreign Positions: 

A. USSR 

The Soviet Union will probably continue to depict the MOL 

as a further illustration of US efforts to militarize its 

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space activities. More specifically, the Soviet Union may, 

as did Ambassador Dobrynin in his statement to Ambassadorat-Large Thompson on December 8, 1965 -- and despite 

President Johnson's assurances to the contrary -- raise the 

charge that the MOL program will involve the use of orbital 

space laboratories to study or devise methods for orbital 

nuclear bombardment in support of land, sea, air, and cosmic 

armed forces. 

The Soviets may be expected to state that their possession 

of orbital rockets is wholly compatible with the October 17, 

1963 "no bombs in orbit" UN General Assembly resolution. 

They may argue, if the subject is raised, that the resolution, 

though banning the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction, 

in no way placed restrictions on the development, construction, 

production and acceptance of such equipment for its armed 

forces. They may well reaffirm their intent to abide by the 

resolution. At the same time, however, the Soviets might 

charge that the US MOL can be adapted to carry nuclear weapons; 

in fact, they may claim that the MOL is the vehicle for developing this capability. In this connection, the Soviets may 

attempt to play up or exploit any existing fears arising from 

the MOL, particularly among the less-sophisticated members 

both of the non-aligned eight and in the wider audience outside. 

B. Major US Allies 

It is expected that our principal allies will uphold our 

position that the MOL bears no relation whatever to the UN 

resolution. While initial West European reaction to the 

President's August 25, 1965 announcement on the MOL was 

favorable, it tended to show some concern over the long-range 

implications of the MOL; some viewed the MOL as either a 

warning to the Soviets or as an assertion of a U.S. right to 

do no more than the Soviets were already doing. 

In general it is believed that our allies will follow 

closely our position on the MOL and refrain from commenting 

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friendly cooperation among all states engaged in the peaceful 

exploration of space. In his announcement the President 

reaffirmed the United States agreement not to orbit weapons 

of mass destruction and its commitment to abide by the 

terms of UN General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of 

October 17, 1963 (Text in Annex C). 

US Ambassador to the UN Adlai Stevenson on October 16, 

1963 noted that the proposed GA resolution set forth a 

policy which had already been adopted by the United'States 

as early as September 5, 1962. At that time, the then U.S. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric stated: 

"We have no program to place any weapons 

of mass destruction into orbit. An arms race in 

space will not contribute to our security. I 

can think of no greater stimulus for a Soviet 

thermonuclear arms effort in space than a United 

States commitment to such a program. This we 

will not do." 

United States policy in this regard has been reaffirmed 

on several occasions since then. President Kennedy on 

September 20, 1963 firmly stated the U.S. intention to keep 

weapons of mass destruction out of orbit. And, more recently, 

Ambassador Goldberg on September 23, 1965 at the GA stated 

that the United States fully subscribed to the principle 

that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only. 

B. Soviet Reaction to the MOL 

The Soviet Union was not instantly critical of the U.S.-

proposed MOL which was factually reported by TASS. This 

initial hesitancy possibly stemmed from the fact that Soviet 

officials themselves have since 1962 alluded to intentions 

to develop their own MOL. Soviet cosmonaut Leonov in Athens 
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and space expert Gorbanev in Tokyo on September 16, 1965 

both mentioned Soviet plans for a MOL. Instead of attacking 

the concept of a MOL per se, Soviet officials and propaganda 

media issued a series of sustained criticisms, but apparently 

within certain self-imposed limits, alleging that the 

United States intended to militarize its space efforts. 

To the Soviets, this appeared to be a more appropriate 

maneuver, particularly since they themselves have never 

drawn any distinctions as to what parts of their own space 

program were civilian or military. The bounds within which 

the Soviets could exploit the U.S. MOL were probably dictated 

by a decision to avoid any inordinate amount of emphasis on 

satellite reconnaissance and the use of the MOL for purposes 

of orbital bombardment -- fields in which the Soviets had to 

some extent already claimed a capability. Thus, the Soviets 

may have preferred not to precipitate a discussion of these 

aspects, especially the latter and its possible bearing on 

Soviet intentions with respect to the UN resolution. 

While one charge common to all of the Soviet commentaries 

to date has been that the MOL is intended for reconnaissance, 

they have stopped just short of explicitly reviving the 

USSR's often repeated arguments that space reconnaissance is 

illegal -- possibly, in deference to Soviet interests in 

protecting the USSR's own satellite reconnaissance program. 

Nonetheless, and despite President Johnson's assurances to 

the contrary, one Soviet commentary raised the charge that 

the United States might be on the threshold of developing 

an orbital bombardment system which would violate the UN 

resolution. Col. Gen. Tolubko, Deputy Chief of the Soviet 

Strategic Rocket Forces in a recent weekly publication Life 

Abroad suggested that the U.S. program was aimed at developing 

an orbital nuclear bombardment system. This allegation, 

however, was not followed up in subsequent Soviet media 

treatment of the MOL. 

Informally, two other Soviet officials have expressed 

apprehension over the possible implications of the United 

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States MOL. At the UN Outer Space Couuuittee session, 

Soviet representative Blagonravov on October 6, 1965 cited 

to NASA officials the MOL program as a factor that would 

tend to limit the scope of US-Soviet space cooperation. A 

Soviet Foreign Ministry officer, attached to the Soviet 

mission to the UN in New York, expressed apprehension not 

only over the MOL project itself, but the form in which it 

had been announced. Aside from these comments, the Soviets 

have not mentioned the MOL program in their formal statementsat recent international conferences -- the UNGA or the ENDC.. 

C. Soviet Orbital Rockets 

The Soviet Union on May 9 and November 7, 1965 displayed 

in its military parades what it claimed to be "orbital" 

rockets. According to a TASS report on the military parade 

in Red Square on November 7, 1965, Marshal Katyukov announced 

that included in the parade were "orbital missiles whose 

warheads, unexpectedly to the aggressor, can deliver their 

blow at the first or any other loop around the earth." The 

Soviets had also previously claimed possession of such , 

missiles -- CPSU Fist Secretary Brezhnev on July 3, 1965 

claimed that the Soviet Union possessed "orbital rockets", 

a different term than the "global" missiles referred to by 

Khrushchev since 1961. 

A Soviet commentary on July 4, 1965 described "orbital 

rockets" as ones which are "shot into a terrestrial orbit 

from where they are capable of hitting any target on earth 

when needed." Deputy Chief of Soviet Strategic Rocket 

Forces Col. Gen. Tolukbo on November 13, 1965 also stated 

that the USSR was developing an orbital rocket capable of 

maneuver in orbit. 

D. U.S. Assessment of Soviet Orbital Rockets 

On the basis of a preliminary technical analysis of the 

aspects of the "orbital" missiles paraded in Moscow on May 9 
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and November 7, 1965, the appearance of these rockets on 

these occasions, together with a series of increasingly 

explicit Soviet statements referring to orbital bombardment 

constituted the sole evidence of the Soviets' consideration 

of such weapons. It appeared likely that if the missiles 

paraded on November 7 were the same as those displayed 

earlier on May 9, the authenticity of Soviet claims were 

highly questionable. Neither Soviet orbital missiles nor 

mobile ICBMs were credited by the U.S. with being anywhere 

near operational status which the Soviets implied. (Izvestiya 

on November 10, 1965 did not state whether or nat the 

missile shown had been tested). 

The United States believes that flight testing would 

have been observed by U.S. intelligence prior to the 

attainment by the Soviets of an operational system particularly 

one which was accurate and reliable. Accordingly, it believes 

that Soviet orbital weapons will not compare favorably with 

ICBMs for cost, effectiveness, reaction time, target flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positive control. 

The U.S. assessment, therefore, is that Soviet claims as 

regards these weapons were made primarily for psychological 

reasons to attempt to prove the strength of the USSR to all 

concerned. UN General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) 

does not expressly prohibit the development of such systems 

and the parading of rockets and the accompanying Soviet 

statements do not appear to violate the express terms of 

that resolution. However, Soviet claims regarding the 

possession of orbital missiles raised some speculation as 

to the USSR's intentions with respect to that resolution. 

E. The Thompson-Dobrynin Talks 

In consideration of the question of action to be taken 

in light of the above developments, the United States concluded that it would be preferable to approach the Soviets 

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privately and to stress that these Soviet actions and 

statements seemed contrary to the spirit of the UN resolution 

and have caused speculation as to Soviet intentions thereto. 

Accordingly, U.S. Ambassador-at-large Thompson met with 

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on November 15, December 8, and 

December 16, 1965 to discuss the problem and to clarify 

Soviet intentions in this regard. In their first meeting, 

Ambassador Thompson presented an oral statement which took 

note of the above Soviet actions and statements and.included 

our position with respect to the UN resolution. (The full 

texts of the memoranda of conversation between Ambassador 

Thompson and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin are found in Annex D. 

A summary follows.) The United States, Ambassador Thompson 

said, did not contend that there had actually been a violation 

of the UN resolution, but in view of the importance attached 

by the United States to the UN resolution, the United States 

would welcome a public clarification by the Soviet Union of 

its intentions by a reaffirmation of continued support for 

the UN resolution. 

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he would inform his 

government of the matter but opined that he did not see how 

recent Soviet statements regarding the possession of orbital 

rockets violated the UN resolution. These Soviet statements, 

he noted, should not be construed to mean that the USSR 

intended to put such rockets in space and particularly that 

the statements did not indicate that the Soviet Union would 

equip such rockets with nuclear weapons. 

In the interim between the two Ambassadorial meetings, 

U.S. Department of State press spokesman, Mr. McCloskey, 

on November 18, 1965 acknowledged that while the parading 

of a large orbital rocket may not have violated the UN 

resolution, the uncertainties about Soviet intentions raised 

by it and by related statements seemed to place upon the 

Soviet Union an obligation to make clear its future 

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intentions with respect to that resolution. He indicated 

that the United States had been in contact with the Soviet 

Union on this matter. 

In a formal statement to Ambassador Thompson, Soviet 

Ambassador Dobrynin on December 8, 1965 stated that the 

exhibition of Soviet orbital rockets was not in contradiction to the spirit of the UN resolution, a point which, he 

noted, had been publicly reiterated by Mr. McCloskey. The 

UN resolution, he emphasized, called upon states to•-refrain 

from launching into space objects bearing nuclear weapons and 

"not a word was said therein about banning the development, 

construction, production and acceptance of such types of 

weapons as equipment of the armed forces." 

In rejecting speculation as to the USSR's conscientious 

fulfillment of the terms of the UN resolution, Ambassador 

Dobrynin alleged that the U.S. plan for a "military" manned 

orbital laboratory (MOL) "to study methods of firing rockets 

from orbits as well as bombing for purposes of aiding land, 

sea, air, and cosmic armed forces" could, on the basis of the 

US view of Soviet orbital rockets, also be considered as a 

violation of the UN resolution. 

Ambassador Dobrynin concluded by stating that the Soviet 

Union regarded the recommendations in the UN resolution as 

"very important, strictly observes them, and will in the 

future undeviatingly comply with this resolution, on the 

understanding, of course, that other states will adhere to 

the same position." 

As to the previous U.S. suggestion that it would be 

helpful if the Soviets would make a public statement to 

the same effect, Ambassador Thompson inquired whether the 

United States could make use of the Soviet statement 

presented by Mr. Dobrynin. The latter replied that he had 

no specific instructions in this regard, but he assumed that 

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the United States could say that the Soviet Union had 

informed the United States of its intention to uphold the 

UN resolution. The Department of State on December 10, 

1965 publicly announced that it had received assurances 

that the Soviet Union would continue to abide by the UN 

resolution. 

Pravda, on December 9, 1965, reiterated the arguments 

adduced by a November 10, 1965 article in Izvestiya regarding 

the non-applicability of the UN resolution to Soviet orbital 

rockets. Also, in what appeared to be a possible public 

response to the U.S. suggestion above, Pravda reiterated 

Ambassador Dobrynin's remarks that the USSR regarded the 

recommendations contained in the UN resolution as "very 

important" and that it "abides and will continue to abide 

by them." 

Ambassador Thompson on December 16, 1965 welcomed the 

stated intention of the USSR to abide by the UN resolution, 

but at the same time termed "entirely incorrect" Soviet 

Ambassador Dobrynin's earlier conception of the US plan 

for a MOL. Ambassador Thompson stated that there was no 

relationship whatever between the MOL and the deployment 

of weapons of mass destruction in space. (See Annex D.) 

Attachments: 

1. Annex A - Contingency Statement 

2. Annex B - Statement by the President, 

August 25, 1965. 

3. Annex C - UN General Assembly Resolution, 

October 17, 1963. 

4. Annex D - Memorandum of Conversation, 

November 15, 1965, 

Memorandum of Conversation, 

December 8, 1965, and 

Memorandum of Conversation, 

December 16, 1965. 

ACDA/IR:JSBodnar:gcc 

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ANNEX A 

Contingency Statement 

SOVIET ORBITAL ROCKETS AND THE US MOL 

Recently, various questions have been raised as to the 

nature and aims of the United States plan to construct a 

manned orbiting laboratory (MOL) as announced by 

President Johnson on August 25, 1965. While many nations 

have recognized the significant potential offered by this 

project in the further peaceful exploration of space, we 

regret that the Soviet Union has taken a view to the contrary, 

alleging that it is just another manifestation of a US 

intention to use outer space for other than peaceful purposes. 

Our position as regards the MOL is clear. As stated by 

President Johnson, the MOL project will be non-aggressive in 

nature and will be designed to contribute to the further 

development of technology and equipment essential to manned 

and unmanned space flights and friendly cooperation among all 

states in the peaceful exploration of space. The plan to construct a MOL in no way marks a new US policy with respect to 

military activity in space. It is a logical step in the 

continuation of the US space program to help develop space for 

peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind and at the 

same time utilize space efforts in the defense of the United 

States and the Free World. As such, the MOL project will be 

entirely peaceful in character. To remove any misconception 

as regards the MOL, I would like to assure all concerned 

that there is no relationship whatever between the MOL and 

weapons of mass destruction in space. The design of the MOL 

incorporates no capability to deliver such weapons and the 

purpose of the MOL involves no such intent. 

Mr. Chairman, the United States remains firmly committed 

to the principle that outer space should be used for peaceful 

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affirmed its adherence to this principle. In announcing plans 

for a MOL on August 25, 1965, President Johnson strongly 

reaffirmed the US commitment to support UN General Assembly 

resolution 1884 (XVIII). (President Johnson's statement is 

contained in Annex B.) Ambassador Goldberg on September 23, 

1965 at the General Assembly stated that the US fully subscribed to the principle embodied in that resolution. 

Vice-President Humphrey, at the White House Conference on 

International Cooperation on November 29, 1965 reiterated 

that the US sought to use outer space as a laboratory for 

man's progress. And, more recently, President Johnson on 

December 5, 1965, expressed the hope that the Gemini 7, which 

was then in flight, would be "a continuous reminder that the 

peaceful conquest of space is the only form of conquest in 

which modern man can proudly and profitably engage." 

Mr. Chairman, this is the position of the United States. 

I should like to point out that our space program from its 

inception has been notable for its predominantly civilian 

tone, but military components and personnel - as in the case 

of the USSRb space program - have made indispensable contributions. (FYI: The Soviets have only one space program 

which relies heavily on military inputs including boosting 

facilities and personnel). 

U.S. plans for a MOL were not conceived as`a reaction 

to any space project undertaken by another nation and the 

decision to embark on the project was motivated entirely 

by the reasons I have already set forth. 

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3.c.11 C:C;713-71 

ANNEX B 

EXCERPT OF THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S 

WHITE HOUSE NEWS CONFERENCE, AUGUST 25, 1965. 

"After discussion with Vice President Humphrey and 

members of the Space Council, as well as the Defense Secretary McNamara, I am today instructing the Department of 

Defense to immediately proceed with the development of a 

manned orbiting laboratory. 

This program will bring us new knowledge about what man 

is able to do in space. It will enable us to relate that 

ability to the defense of America. It will develop technology, 

and equipment which will help advance manned and unmanned 

space flight. It will make it possible to perform very new 

and rewarding experiments with that,technology and equipment. 

The cost of developing the manned orbiting laboratory 

will be $1 billion 500 million. Unmanned flights to test 

launchings, recovery and other basic parts of the system 

will begin late next year or early 1967. 

The initial unmanned launch of a fully equipped laboratory 

is scheduled for 1968. This will be followed later that year 

by the first of five flights, with two-man crews. The Air 

Force has selected the Douglas Aircraft Co. to design and to 

build the spacecraft in which the crew of the laboratory will 

live and operate. General Electric Co. will plan and develop 

the space experiments. The Titan III-C booster will launch 

the laboratory into space, and a modified version of the NASA 

Gemini capsule will be the vehicle in which the astronauts 

return to earth. 

Even as we meet, Gemini 5, piloted by two very gallant 

men, backed by hundreds of dedicated space scientists and 

engineers and great administrators, now orbits the earth as 

a dramatic reminder that our American dream for outer space is 

a dream of peace and a dream of friendly cooperation among 

all of the nations of the earth. 
F.mmi A 

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We believe the heavens belong to the people of every 

country. We are working and we will continue to work through 

the UnitedNations--our distinguished Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, 

is present with us this morning--to extend the rule of law 

into outer space. 

We intend to live up to our agreement not to orbit 

weapons of mass destruction and we will continue to hold out 

to all nations, including the Soviet Union, the hand of 

cooperation in the exciting years of space exploration which 

lie ahead for all of us. Therefore, I have today, in fact, 

directed Mr. James Webb,. the Administrator of our civilian 

space program, after conferring with Secretary of State and 

our Ambassador to the United Nations and others, to invite 

the Soviet Academy of Science to send a very high-level 

representative next month here to observe the launching of 

Gemini 6. 

I hope that he will find it convenient to come. 

We will certainly give him a warm welcome in America." 
iieftnIttR5D NATIONS 

GENERAL 

ASSEMBLY 

ANNEX C 

Distr. 

LIMITED 

AYRES/1884 (XVIII) 

17 October 1963 

Eighteenth cession 

Agenda item 26 

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

fan the report of the First Committee (A/557117- 

1884 (XVIII). question of general and complete disarmament 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 1721 A (XVI) of 20 December 1961, in which it 

• expressed the belief that the exploration and use of outer space should be only 

for the betterment of mankind, 

• Determined to take steps to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer, 

space,. 

1. Welcomes the expressions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 

the United States of America of their intention not to station in outer space any 

objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction; 

2. Solemnly calls upon all States: 

(a) To refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying 

nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing 

such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in " 

any other manner; 

• (b) To refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in 

the conduct of the foregoing activities. 

1244th plenary meeting; 

17 October 1963. 

63-22574 

rt, 
fi 

4. Annex D (1) 

• CROUP I 

Excluded from automatiO 

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or, iS#10.1 I 

I 

VAL, LEThompson:mac LUIIHULII I 1HL 

• NRi) APPRUvtnimigg Wire and Officer) 1‘..[UtT• DEPARTMErqT OF STATE 

°-'ApproVed in S/AL 11/15/65 

Memo= crurii or Conversation. • 

DATE: 196.5 

SUBJECT: 

PARTICIPANTS: 

Soviet Possession.of Orbital Rockets 

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR 

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large 

Department of State 

COPIES TO: S/S CIA S/AH 

S AI EUR ACDA 

G ' G/PM DOD 

INR/OD I0 SCI 

White House IL USUN 

• S/AL (3) 1L Arnemb. MOSCOW 

• U . S Mission. 

GENEVA 

I made the attached oral statement. to Dobrynin on the Soviet 

statements concerning their possession of orbital rockets. 

Dobrynin said that he would, of course, inform his Government but that he did not see how these statements violated the 

United Nations Resolution. He pointed out that we were orbiting satellites frequently for observation or other purposes and 

that any of these could be used to carry nuclear weapons. He. 

said that the fact that his Government had a capability of putting 

such rockets into space did not mean that they intended to do So, 

and particularly that this did not indicate that they had any intention of putting weapons of mass destruction on them. 

I said I understood it was not our contention that there had 

actually been a violation of the United Nations Resolution but 

that the making of such satellites and stating that they were 

capable of carrying nuclear weapons raised questions as to 

the intentions of the Soviet Government and that it was for this 

reason that we would welcome a reaffirmation of the Soviet '-

Government's continuing support of the Assembly Resolution. 
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• The United ante::: Govern: lent notes with concern 

comtinuing.reereneer... by soarces to the pecses 

&len el orbital reelzets. 13.eviewing the military parade. in -Red, 

on November seventh, .77 !.SS roportc.,d that Marshal, 

ltatyukov aznotraced•that included in the Parade were .orbital 

rf.issilos whose =heads, rmexpe,ctodly to the aggressort- can 

deliver their blow at the first .or nny other loop around' the 

earth. " This rizsertion is evzn mom explicit than one Made., 

earlier this year. On third,:, L. 1. Breshnev told Soviet • 

military graduates that the USSR had "orbital" rockets. 

1,:oscow several days cicaned such rockets as ones ". . 

shot into aterrestrial froya. where they are capable of .. 

hitting any on earth wbenmeded. Distinct from other..

types of rocl:cts, they have p.,2acticcOly no flight limit and 

capable of carrying superpowerf.ul nuclear charges. " 

The Soviet Cover..=ent i.s aware that the Genera.l 

Assembly, in unanimous:1y adopting Resolution 183d of Octo. 

ben 17, 1003, wc.,1conled the intention of both our cjovernments 

not to Etat ion nuclear or other weaDons of mass destruction - 

in outer space. The Geacral Assembly solemnly called on 

all Gtates not only to re:rain from orbiting such WC;, ponsbut 

also to refrain "frora eauzinej, cneoux-aging or in any way 

participating in the -conduct of the foregoing activities. " 
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F.;ovict. c...4-ttc-nIcaTts as .are noted above 

cont;nry to the of Arzembly Resolution • 

1CC4. They have ca zed ::;eculation az to the latentlens of 

the .Savict. C-:overnznerit with -roar:eat' to the Reo,olution. Ike 

aro cOnfing und03.4corie.:5.-able pressUro toe:Vain 

the meaning of soviet and Irtzntdon..3, alld may have to 

do co at my ti-inc. X12 vb i of the foregoing', and the Import :moo 

the world att.:ix:hoz to the Cend:cal Accenzbly'a Resolution 1334, which 

vrt= co-zponcoraci by the MIS, my Govomnient believes that a 

public ci..L.:ciacc,..tica of Sov.it. intentions by reaffirra4ti

, on of the 

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Approved in S/AL 12/9/65 

Mcmortmciu.-.7 a Conversation 

DEP;.RTMEN7 OF STATE 

DATES Dec. 8, 1965 

SUBJZC7: 

PARTICIPANTS: 

Soviet Orbital Rockets 

Ambassador Anatoliy F.. Dobrynin, USSR 

Llewellyn E. Thorn2son, -Ambassador-at-Large 

. Department of State. 

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The Ambassador said he had been instructed to make the follow 

• ing remarks in reply to my statement to him on November 16,. 

1985, , .concerning the Soviet orbital rockets: 

"The statement that the exhibition of Soviet orbital 

rockets allegedly contradicts the spirit of the- General!: -- 

Assembly resolution of October 17, 1983, calling . 

upon nations not to launah into orbit around the earth 

. objects carrying nuclear weapons was received in 

Moscow with surpfise.. The same thing,• in essence, 

was publicly reiterated by State Department representative McCloskey at a press conference Novembereighteenth. It is well known that.this General Assembly.. 

resolution, of which the USSR was one of the sponsors, 

called upon states to refrain from launching into space: 

objects bearing nuclear weapons, and not a word was 

said therein about banning the development, construe., 

tion, production and acceptance of such types of • 

weapons' as equipment of armed forces. .• 

"Moscow rejects the attempts to cast a shadow over 

the Soviet- Union's consCientious fulfillment of the 

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General Assembly resolution of October 17, _1963. 

The thought inc.,.viably arises t hat the fuss raised 

in the American press about this question is clearly• 

designed to distract th," attent on of world public. 

. opinion from the USA';:; military preparations in space,. 

particularly from the prograrr announced by. the U. S.. 

for the creation of a military, manned, orbital laladitoi.y (VIOL) which is designed to study methods of 

firing rockets from orbits as well as bombing for the. 

purposes of aiding land, sea, air and cosmic armed. 

forces. From the point of view you have set forth, 

the availability to the U. S. of the above-mentioriek 

laboratory can be considered as a violation of the 

resolution. 

"The Soviet Union regards the recommendations 

contained in the UN General Assembly resolution of 

October 17, 1933, as very important, strictly ob- • 

serves them,* and will in the future undeviatingly 

comply with this resolution, on the understanding, 

of course, that other states will adhere to the same 

-position. " 

I pointed out that what we had in fact suggested was that it would 

be. helpful if the Soviets would Make a public statement to the 

effect that they adhered to the re.solution of the General Assembly's 

on this subject. I inquired whether we could make use of.the state= 

ment he was making to me today. The Ambassador replied that 

he had no instructions but he assunied that we could say that the 

Soviets had told us that they were upholding the Assembly resolu= 

tion. 

In this connection, the Ambassa.dor remarked that he had been 

very careful in reporting our conversation and had said that we 

had no present intention of making a public statement, but that 

such might become necessary. He said that in fact Mr.- 

McCloskey had Made a public statement the next day, which had 

reached Moscow about the same time as his cable. He thought 

in cases of this kind that it would be better if we told them frankly 

what our intentions were. 

I explained that the purpose of my .remarks had been to warn him 

that we might .be subjected to pressure to say something_ and that 
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fz-et occurred the net clay, l lthough at the time I 

to him, we had hope .i we could avoid saying anything - 

until they had had an opportunity to reply. 

The Ambassador merely obser.red that he thought we were to 

sensitive to pressure from the press on questions of. this kind. • 
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Approved in S/AL 12/16/65 

.Memorandum o I Conversation 

DATE: Dec. 16, 1965 

SUBJECT: Soviet Orbital Rockets 

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR 

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large 

Department of State 

COPIES To: SiS CIA 

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Amemb as s ies MOSCOW 

E I made the following statement in reply to the Ambassador's 

remarks to me on December eighth concerning Soviet orbital 

rockets: 

"We welcome the stated intention of the Soviet 

Government to abide by.the UN General Assembly 

Resolution 1884 of October 17, 1963, and have so 

stated publicly. 

• 

"In your comments on December eighth, you implied that the United States Government had stirred 

up the question in the American press in order to 

distract the attention of world public opinion from 

American military space activities. This is not 

correct. I do not need to repeat the actual reasons: 

for concern about the intention of the Soviet Govern 

ment, which I noted on November fifteenth. I do, 

however, wish to state on direct authorization that 

your statement that the planned U. S. military 

manned orbiting laboratory (MOL) is designed to 

study methods of firing rockets and bombing from 

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orbit is entirely incorrect. There is no relationship whatever between the MOL and weapons of 

mass destruction in space; the design of the MOL 

incorporates no capability to deliver such weapons 

and the purpose of the laboratory involves no such 

intent. 

"I trust this statement will remove any misconception on the part of the Soviet Government with respect 

to the MOL, as reflected in your statement of December eighth. " 

I said that as he could realize, the statement was prompted by 

some remarks which he had made. He laughed and said that 

they had explained their statement and now we were explaining 

ours.