SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4946-18

ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THETA HOLDING 

COMPANY, L.P.,

EUROPEAN METAL

GROUP, and ARMANDO

PEÑA, individually and 

t/a EUROPEAN METAL

GROUP,

Defendants,

and

THETA HOLDING

COMPANY, L.P.,

Third-Party PlaintiffRespondent,

v.

LUIS PEÑA,

Third-Party Defendant.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-4946-18

_____________________________

SCARINCI & HOLLENBECK, 

LLC,

Respondent.

_____________________________

Argued September 27, 2021 – Decided October 19, 2021

Before Judges Vernoia and Firko.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-9027-17.

Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Robert E. Levy argued the cause for respondent 

(Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC, attorneys; Peter R. 

Yarem, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Robert J. Triffin, an attorney, appeals from a March 1, 2019 order 

granting defendant Theta Holding Company, LP (Theta) summary judgment on 

his claim that Theta, as drawer of a $15,000 check made payable to defendant 

European Metal Group (EMG), is obligated to honor the check under N.J.S.A. 

12A:3-414. The check was first presented to 144 Enterprises, LLC, trading as 

City Check Cashing, and dishonored because Theta stopped payment on the 

check. Plaintiff also appeals from a May 25, 2019 order directing him to pay 

$5,262.50 in Rule 1:4-8 sanctions for the counsel fees Theta incurred with its
3

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counsel Scarinci & Hollenbeck, LLC (the law firm) opposing plaintiff's motion 

for reconsideration of the February 5 and 21, 2018 orders denying his motions 

to quash deposition subpoenas and a subpoena duces tecum. We affirm both 

orders.1

I.

The facts are derived from evidence submitted by the parties in support 

of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motion, viewed in the light most 

favorable to plaintiff. H.C. Equities, LP v. Cnty. of Union, 247 N.J. 366, 380

(2021). In 2015, Theta hired EMG to "perform construction services." On June

17, 2016, Theta issued a $15,000 check to EMG, which was ostensibly left in a 

stolen truck. On June 21, 2016, defendant Luis Peña,

2

a driver for EMG, 

1

 At oral argument before us, plaintiff raised the issue of standing to challenge 

a statute, relying on Crusco v. Oakland Care Ctr., Inc., 305 N.J. Super. 605 (App. 

Div. 1997). In Crusco, we considered the issue of "whether plaintiff may [have] 

base[d] a wrongful discharge claim upon the provision in the Ombudsman Act 

prohibiting retaliatory acts, N.J.S.A. 52:27G-14(a)." Id. at 614. We held it was 

"abundantly clear" there was "no private cause of action for wrongful discharge 

under the Ombudsman Act" because the plaintiff was not part of the class that 

the statute was intended to benefit, and there was no evidence the Legislature 

intended to create a private cause of action under the statute. Id. at 614-15 

(citing In re State Comm'n of Investigation, 108 N.J. 35 (1987)). After careful 

consideration, we conclude the Crusco holding is not germane to our analysis in 

the matter under review.

2

 Parties who share a last name with other parties are referred to by their first 

names for the ease of reference. By doing so, we intend no disrespect.
4

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informed Theta that his truck and the check, which was inside, were stolen. That 

same day, Luis cashed the check with 144 Enterprises, LLC, trading as City 

Check Cashing (Enterprise), on EMG's behalf. Simultaneously, Luis requested 

a replacement check from Theta and asked Theta to stop payment on the first 

check, which it did. Luis picked up a second $15,000 check from Theta on June 

21, 2016.

When Luis cashed the first Theta check with Enterprise, it "had a certified 

copy of a corporate resolution [prepared by] EMG" requiring "all members be 

present when cashing a check." On June 21, 2016, the president, secretary, 

shareholder and director of EMG was defendant Armando Peña, Luis' father. 

The record shows Luis was not a member of EMG; he was not mentioned in the 

EMG resolution; and Enterprise did not have a separate corporate resolution 

authorizing him to present a check on EMG's behalf. Enterprise claimed it was 

unaware Theta had stopped payment on its first check and had Enterprise 

contacted Theta prior to cashing it, Enterprise would not have completed the 

transaction. The record shows Enterprise failed to contact Theta or its bank 

before cashing the first Theta check.

On March 3, 2017, plaintiff purchased Enterprise's rights to the first Theta 

check, as well as fourteen other checks, for the sum of $4750 by way of an 
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A-4946-18

assignment agreement. On April 20, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint against 

defendants in the Essex County Special Civil Part seeking to enforce Theta's 

dishonored check. On October 13, 2017, the matter was removed to the Law 

Division.

On October 26, 2017, Theta filed an answer to the complaint, crossclaims, and a third-party complaint against Luis. Theta alleged plaintiff lacked 

the requisite legal status of a holder in due course to enforce its dishonored 

$15,000 check to EMG against itself.

On December 20, 2017, plaintiff moved to quash Theta's subpoena to 

depose Lovy Santos, an Enterprise teller working on the day Enterprise cashed 

Theta's dishonored check. On February 5, 2018, Judge Annette Scoca denied 

plaintiff's motion to quash, and on February 21, 2018, the judge issued an 

amended order compelling the deposition of Santos to proceed on March 13, 

2018.

On February 26, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

February 5, and 26 orders, which was denied by Judge Scoca on March 16, 2018. 

In the interim, the judge denied Theta's initial motion seeking sanctions 

premised upon plaintiff's alleged frivolous motion for reconsideration. On April 

20, 2018, Theta renewed its motion for sanctions. Relying on its attorney's 
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certification, Theta argued it had "strictly complied with all the procedural 

requirements of Rule 1:4-8(b)(1)" and plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was 

"completely frivolous" because he "did nothing more than attempt to reargue his 

[m]otion."

On May 11, 2018, Judge Scoca granted Theta's renewed motion for 

sanctions. Before a memorializing order was entered, plaintiff filed opposition, 

with the judge's permission, on May 21, 2018, maintaining Theta lacked 

standing to pursue discovery. Nonetheless, on May 25, 2018, the judge ordered 

plaintiff to pay $5,262.50 in frivolous litigation sanctions in the form of counsel 

fees to the law firm.

Following the close of discovery, on November 20, 2018, Theta moved 

for summary judgment and to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Theta argued that 

section thirteen, N.J.S.A. 17:15A-47, of the Check Cashers Regulatory Act of 

1993 (CCRA), N.J.S.A. 17:15A-30 to -52, barred plaintiff from collecting 

payment from Theta on its first issued check because the Uniform Commercial 

Code (UCC) limits plaintiff's recovery to Luis under N.J.S.A. 12:3-403(a). On 

December 7, 2018, plaintiff filed opposition to Theta's motion and challenged 

the court's subject matter jurisdiction over his claim.
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A-4946-18

On March 1, 2019, the parties appeared before Judge Thomas M. Moore 

for oral argument. In his comprehensive oral decision, after recognizing the 

standards for summary judgment, Judge Moore explained the CCRA applies and 

provides:

that no licensee or any person acting on behalf of a 

licensee shall cash a check which is made payable to a 

payee which is other than a natural person unless the 

licensee has on file a corporate resolution or other 

appropriate documentation indicating that the 

corporation, partnership or other entity has authorized 

the presentment of a check on its behalf and the federal 

taxpayer identification number of the corporation, 

partnership or other entity.

The judge continued his explanation:

[Plaintiff], of course, was involved in the Triffin v. 

Liccardi case, 417 N.J. Super. 450 [453] [(App. Div. 

2011)]. In that case, in my view, the [c]ourt decided 

whether [plaintiff] was a holder in due course after 

acquiring a check that was in violation of the CCRA of 

1993. In that case, Liccardi Ford issued a check to an 

employee, Mr. Stallone, but withheld the check on 

suspicion that he was actually embezzling funds from 

the company. At [], Mr. Stallone purloined the check 

and cashed it at J.C.N.B. Check Cashing, Inc. but upon 

discovery that Stallone purloined the check Liccardi 

immediately issued a stop payment on the check. 

[Plaintiff] acquired the dishonored check from 

J.C.N.B., sued Stallone and Liccardi for the amount of 

the check. The trial court determined that the check 

was post-dated which put J.C.N.B. on notice that there 

was a claim against collection and found that J.C.N.B. 
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A-4946-18

was not a holder in due course. The trial court then 

granted summary judgment.

The [c]ourt analyzed the matter and began by laying out 

relevant law and explaining that:

"Under the [UCC] Act N.J.S.A. 12A:3-

302A, to be a holder in due course one must 

take an instrument for value in good faith 

and without notice of dishonor or any 

defense against or claim to it on the part of 

the person."

Quoting the Triffin v. Quality Urb. House case, 352 

N.J. Super. 538 at 541 [(App. Div. 2002),] the [c]ourt 

explained:

"[Plaintiff] did not take the Liccardi check 

as a holder in due course because he 

purchased the instrument with notice that 

[it] had been dishonored."

Further, the [c]ourt explained that:

"If J.C.N.B. was a holder in due course 

when it obtained the check from Stallone it 

could have signed its interest in the check

to [plaintiff] and he could, in turn, enforce 

J.C.N.B. rights as it[s] assignee."

The [c]ourt acknowledged that in Triffin v. Pomerantz 

Staffing, 370 N.J. Super. 301[] [(App. Div. 20[0]4)]:

"We denied holder in due course status to 

an assignor who failed to comply with 

instructions on the face of the check to test 

whether the ink on the check was heat 

sensitive."
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A-4946-18

In that case, the [c]ourt determined that it is reasonable 

that the holder be expected to fully examine the front 

and back of the instrument and where the instrument 

purports to contain a method by which its authenticity 

may be tested, that the holder actually utilized the 

method for Liccardi at 460-461.

Here, I don't think it's disputed, it's not disputed or I 

find no dispute that the first Theta check was made 

payable to EMG. EMG has a corporate resolution in 

place that requires "all members be present when 

cashing a check." Very clear on the document, 

Armando . . . was the only member listed on the 

corporate resolution and the only member authorized to 

cash checks. Armando . . . in fact, no dispute of fact, 

did not cash this check and Enterprise, therefore,

violated the CCRA by cashing this check for L[uis] 

. . . .

I think there's no doubt in my mind and I think the 

[c]ourt has the ability to come to that determination. I 

don't think it usurps anyone's banking commission's 

authority to make a determination that [Enterprise] was 

not a holder in due course. Even by assignment 

[plaintiff] cannot assert the rights of a holder in due 

course.

In granting Theta's motion for summary judgment, the judge found it was 

not liable to plaintiff for payment of the first check. Under the CCRA, the judge 

concluded "an unauthorized signature is ineffective except as the signature of 

the unauthorized signer in favor of a person who in good faith pays the 

instrument or takes it for value . . . ." Since Enterprise was never a holder in 
10 A-4946-18

due course because it violated the CCRA, likewise the judge determined that 

plaintiff could not be a holder in due course either. A memorializing order was 

entered. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, plaintiff argues:

(1) Judge Moore erred in granting summary judgment 

to Theta and ignored the distribution of powers 

provision in Article III of the New Jersey Constitution 

and case law, which preempts prior precedent 

addressing the CCRA; and

(2) Judge Scoca abused her discretion in awarding 

sanctions and denying plaintiff's motion for 

reconsideration.

II.

We review an order granting summary judgment under the same standard 

that trial courts apply when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. RSI 

Bank v. Providence Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 234 N.J. 459, 472 (2018) (citing Bhagat 

v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)); ADP, LLC v. Kusins, 460 N.J. Super. 368, 

399 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 

395, 405 (2014)). Courts ruling on summary judgment are required to view the 

evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party to 

determine whether the materials presented "are sufficient to permit a rational 
11 A-4946-18

factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving 

party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

If "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and . . . the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment . . . as a matter of law," then summary 

judgment is appropriate. R. 4:46-2(c). In other words, summary judgment is 

properly granted "[w]hen the evidence 'is so one-sided that one party must 

prevail as a matter of law.'" Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 

406 (2014) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540).

The non-moving party bears the affirmative burden "to make a complete 

and comprehensive showing why summary judgment should not be entered." 

Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 556 (2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting). To 

satisfy this burden, the non-moving party "must 'demonstrate by competent 

evidential material that a genuine issue of fact exists.'" Globe Motor Co. v. 

Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 479-80 (2016) (quoting Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 

229, 241 (1957)). The court must then determine "whether a rational factfinder 

could resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party," id.

at 481 (quoting Perez v. Prof'ly Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 405-06 (2013)), 

bearing in mind "neither the motion court nor an appellate court can ignore the 
12 A-4946-18

elements of the cause of action or the evidential standard governing the cause of 

action." Bhagat, 217 N.J. at 38.

Plaintiff argues that the distribution of powers clause contained in Article 

III of the New Jersey constitution and the holding in Klumb v. Bd. of Educ. of

Manalapan-Englishtown Reg'l High Sch. Dist., Monmouth Cnty., 199 N.J. 14 

(2009), invalidate the holding in Triffin v. Liccardi Ford, Inc., which Judge 

Moore relied on in granting summary judgment to Theta. However, Theta 

contends that plaintiff's "reliance on Klumb is misguided" and the wellestablished principles in Liccardi Ford give it standing to raise a violation of the 

CCRA defense and preclude plaintiff from asserting holder in due course status.

In Klumb, the Court addressed the interpretation of a teacher's pension 

statute relative to reinstatement of a teacher previously on disability leave. The 

Court held that its goal is to promote the Legislature's intent when interpreting 

a statute, and when the plain language produces a "clear and unambiguous 

result," the process is concluded. Id. at 23-4 (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 

Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 195 (2007)) (citing Bd. of Educ. of 

Sea Isle City v. Kennedy, 196 N.J. 1, 12 (2008)). If an ambiguous result should 

arise, then a court should look to extrinsic evidence like legislative history to 

discern the Legislature's intent. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
13 A-4946-18

Relying on Klumb, plaintiff argues that "this court's holding in [Liccardi 

Ford] . . . unconstitutionally modified, or otherwise rewrote by judicial fiat the 

plain language of N.J.S.A 12A:3-414 to make a licensed check casher's 

compliance [with] the [CCRA] a requirement for a plaintiff to enforce the 

dishonored check warranties in N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414." We disagree.

In Liccardi Ford, we did not discuss N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414. See 417 N.J. 

Super. 453 (App. Div. 2011). Instead, like the matter under review, we were 

faced with determining whether a licensee under the CCRA, who cashes a 

dishonored check in violation of the statute gains, and transfers by assignment 

of rights to the dishonored check, holder in due course status. Id. at 455. 

The first statute relevant to our analysis is N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414, which

deals with the obligation of the drawer3 when the drawee4is a holder in due 

course. Whether Enterprise was a holder in due course is purely a legal 

determination. Under the UCC, a holder in due course takes the negotiable 

instrument free of the obligor's claims and defenses that do not arise from his 

3

 "Drawer" is defined as "a person who signs or is identified in a draft as a 

person ordering payment." N.J.S.A. 12A:3-103(a)(3).

4

 "Drawee" is defined as "a person ordered in a draft to make payment." 

N.J.S.A. 12A:3-103(a)(2).
14 A-4946-18

own behavior. A holder is a person in possession of a negotiable instrument 

payable to him or to a bearer. Under the UCC, to qualify as a holder in due 

course, the holder of an instrument must have taken "the instrument for value, 

in good faith, without notice that the instrument is overdue or has been 

dishonored,"

5 or "contains an unauthorized signature." N.J.S.A. 12A:3-

302(a)(2). "Good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact and the observance of 

reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." N.J.S.A. 12A:3-103(a)(4). It 

is the "without notice that the instrument . . . contains an unauthorized signature" 

language that governs our decision. N.J.S.A. 12A:3-302(a)(4).

The second statute relevant to our analysis is the CCRA, N.J.S.A. 17:15A30 to -52, which prescribes the responsibilities of check cashers when presented 

with a negotiable instrument. Enterprise is licensed by the New Jersey 

Department of Banking to cash checks. As such, it is subject to the CCRA. 

Under the CCRA, no licensee or person acting on behalf of a licensee is 

permitted to,

[c]ash a check which is made payable to a payee which 

is other than a natural person unless the licensee has on 

5

 Whether plaintiff had notice that the first Theta check was dishonored is not 

at issue on appeal. Furthermore, the assignment agreement between plaintiff 

and Enterprise states, "Seller warrants that at the time it cashed the referenced 

checks; it had no notice that the referenced checks had been dishonored."
15 A-4946-18

file a corporate resolution or other appropriate 

documentation indicating that the corporation, 

partnership or other entity has authorized the 

presentment of a check on its behalf and the federal 

taxpayer identification number of the corporation, 

partnership or other entity.

[N.J.S.A. 17:15A-47(a).]

There is no dispute Enterprise did not have on file a corporate resolution 

or other appropriate documentation authorizing Luis to cash checks on behalf of 

the payee identified on the Theta check. There is equally no dispute Enterprise 

was aware of this deficiency and also aware of its obligation under the law to 

cash checks made payable to Armando only.

Clearly, a licensee's6cashing of a check in violation of the CCRA does 

not satisfy the licensee's obligation of "good faith" under the UCC as a matter 

of law. In Valley Nat'l Bank v. P.A.Y. Check Cashing, 378 N.J. Super. 234,

234-35, we affirmed the trial court's finding in Valley Nat'l Bank v. P.A.Y. 

Check Cashing, 378 N.J. Super. 406, 425 (Law Div. 2004) (citing N.J.S.A. 

17:15A-47(a)) that the licensee "cashed a check payable to a corporation without 

having a corporate resolution or other appropriate documentation indicating that 

6

 "Licensee" is defined as "a person who holds, or who should hold, a license 

pursuant to" the CCRA. N.J.S.A. 17:15A-31. A license under the CCRA 

"authorizes the licensee to cash checks for a fee." Ibid.
16 A-4946-18

the presentment was authorized." As a consequence of this failure to comply 

with the CCRA and its own internal guidelines, we also concluded the licensee 

"did not . . . satisfy [its] obligation of 'good faith' under the UCC." Valley Nat'l 

Bank, 378 N.J. Super. at 234-35.

Here, Enterprise similarly violated the CCRA, precluding it from 

obtaining holder in due course status. A "natural person" does not include a 

"partnership, professional association, company, corporation, or other business 

entity" identified as a payee on a check. N.J.S.A. 17:15A-31. Moreover, our 

administrative code defines "[a]ppropriate documentation" as "a corporate

resolution filed with the Secretary of State, Federal taxpayer identification

number, filed New Jersey Certificate of Authority, filed trade-name certificate

or other readily verifiable official document." N.J.A.C. 3:24-1.3.

Saliently, if a licensee is not a holder in due course, then it cannot transfer

holder in due course status in a check to an assignee. Liccardi Ford, 417 N.J. 

Super. at 457. In Liccardi Ford, we held that examining the face of a check to 

discern whether it was postdated was a required, reasonable commercial 

standard under the CCRA. Id. at 458. Thus, the licensee violated the "express 

terms" of the CCRA when it failed to "examine the face of a [post-dated] check 

and refrain from cashing it," precluding holder in due course status. Ibid. Since 
17 A-4946-18

the licensee was not a holder in due course, the assignee was not either and could 

not enforce the dishonored check against the drawer. Id. at 461.

Analogous to the licensees in Liccardi Ford and Valley Nat'l Bank, 

Enterprise "failed to observe reasonable commercial standards, because it 

'violated the [CCRA], which establishes reasonable commercial standards for 

check cashing licensees.'" Liccardi Ford, 417 N.J. Super. at 459 (quoting Valley 

Nat'l Bank, 378 N.J. Super. at 425). Moreover, Enterprise cashed Theta's check 

made payable to a corporation, EMG, without appropriate documentation. 7 

There is no genuine issue of material fact that Enterprise did have the EMG 

Resolution on file when Luis cashed the first Theta check, and Luis was not 

authorized to cash the check on EMG's behalf. As Judge Moore highlighted, 

"Armando . . . was the only member listed on the corporate resolution and the 

only member authorized to cash checks" and "Armando . . . did not cash this 

check." And, Enterprise did not possess a separate corporate resolution 

authorizing Luis to cash the check either. As did the licensee in Valley Nat'l

Bank, "Enterprise . . . violated the CCRA by cashing this check for [Luis]." See

N.J.S.A. 17:15A-47(a).

7

 As noted above, Luis "also subsequently cashed the second Theta check[,] 

which had not been stopped." However, the second Theta check is not in dispute 

on appeal.
18 A-4946-18

Here, Enterprise failed to meet reasonable commercial standards by 

violating the CCRA, thus precluding holder in due course status based on lack 

of good faith under the UCC. N.J.S.A. 12A:3-302(a)(2). Consequently, 

plaintiff's argument that Liccardi Ford "unconstitutionally modified . . . the plain 

language of N.J.S.A. 12A:3-414" is rejected. Based upon our de novo review, 

Judge Moore properly granted Theta's motion for summary judgment.

III.

An abuse of discretion arises when a decision is "made without a rational 

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) 

(quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs., 779 F.2d 1260, 

1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). Our review of a trial court's imposition of sanctions is 

similarly reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 

181, 193 (App. Div. 2005) (citing R. 1:4-8). We likewise review a judge's 

decision to impose discovery sanctions and award attorney's fees as a discovery 

sanction under an abuse of discretion standard. Shore Orthopaedic Grp., LLC

v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 397 N.J. Super. 614, 629-30 (App. 

Div. 2008); Innes v. Carrascosa, 391 N.J. Super. 453, 496 (App. Div. 2007).
19 A-4946-18

A judge, in his or her discretion, has the inherent authority to sanction a 

party for behavior that is vexatious, burdensome, and harassing. See Brundage 

v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 610 (2008) (recognizing the inherent power 

of courts to sanction parties as means of enforcing ordinary rules of practice); 

Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 139 N.J. 499, 513 (1995) (recognizing 

the inherent power to punish for discovery violations); Dziubek v. Schumann, 

275 N.J. Super. 428, 440 (App. Div. 1994) (reasoning a court's inherent power 

may include awarding attorney's fees in the form of a sanction). Although the 

power to sanction should be invoked sparingly, the circumstances presented in 

the matter under review support Judge Scoca's award of attorney's fees as the 

proper sanction for vexatious and harassing motion practice relative to the 

discovery permitted by her February 5 and 21, 2018 orders.

We conclude there is sufficient, credible evidence in the record to support 

Judge Scoca's award of attorney's fees as a sanction against plaintiff in 

accordance with Rule 1:4-8. Plaintiff's reconsideration motion was founded on 

a wholly unsupportable legal argument based on two cases, Valley Nat'l, 378

N.J. Super. 234 (App. Div. 2004), and First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 

N.J. Super. 419 (App. Div. 2007). These cases provide that the holder of a 

dishonored check cannot seek damages against a check casher who violates the 
20 A-4946-18

CCRA. And, these cases do not stand for the proposition that a party to an action 

to collect on a dishonored check under the CCRA is barred from taking 

appropriate discovery. Moreover, Theta did not seek relief against plaintiff 

under the CCRA but sought the sanctions under Rule 1:4-8(b)(1).

The frivolous litigation statute permits a court to award reasonable 

counsel fees and litigation costs to a prevailing party in a civil action if the court 

determines that the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or defense is 

frivolous. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. A claim is considered frivolous when: "no 

rational argument can be advanced in its support"; "it is not supported by any 

credible evidence"; "a reasonable person could not have expected its success"; 

or "it is completely untenable." Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 

(App. Div. 1999). "[F]alse allegations of fact [will] not justify [an] award . . . 

unless they are made in bad faith, 'for the purpose of harassment, delay or 

malicious injury.'" McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 

546, 561 (1993) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)(1)). An honest attempt to 

pursue a perceived, though ill-founded, claim is not considered to be frivolous. 

Id. at 563. The burden of proving bad faith is on the party who seeks fees and 

costs. Id. at 559.
21 A-4946-18

Rule 1:4-8 supplements N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1. A Rule 1:4-8 sanction is 

"specifically designed to deter the filing or pursuit of frivolous litigation." 

LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 98 (2009). "For purposes of imposing 

sanctions under Rule 1:4-8, an assertion is deemed 'frivolous' when 'no rational 

argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not supported by any credible 

evidence, or it is completely untenable.'" United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 

407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Perez, 391 N.J. Super. at

432). "Where a party has [a] reasonable and good faith belief in the merit of the 

cause, attorney's fees will not be awarded." Ibid. (alteration in original).

Theta sought counsel fees, asserting plaintiff moving for reconsideration 

did "nothing more than recycle and attempt to reargue his underlying denied 

motion." In his motion to quash, motion for reconsideration, and again on 

appeal, plaintiff continues to argue that a drawer of a dishonored check cannot 

assert a violation of the CCRA as a defense to a check enforcement action and 

lacks standing to pursue discovery in support of that defense.

In deciding Theta's motion for sanctions against plaintiff, Judge Scoca

aptly stated:

[t]o the extent that [p]laintiff yet again repeats 

previously-rejected arguments regarding Theta's 

alleged lack of standing to pursue discovery, the [c]ourt 

disregards such arguments in their entirety. Should 
22 A-4946-18

plaintiff continue to ignore this [c]ourt's prior rulings 

and burden the [c]ourt with frivolous, previouslyrejected, procedurally improper arguments-rather than 

availing himself of the proper procedural remedies (i.e.

a non-frivolous motion for reconsideration or appeal)-

then plaintiff will continue to expose himself to the 

possibility that sanctions will be imposed.8

We discern no abuse of discretion in Judge Scoca's decision to sanction 

plaintiff by imposing attorney's fees in favor of Theta. The law firm complied 

with Rule 1:4-8(b)(1) and timely notified plaintiff that his motion for 

reconsideration was frivolous. Nonetheless, he did not withdraw or modify his 

motion. 

To the extent we have not specifically address any remaining arguments 

raised by plaintiff, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

8

 However, the judge agreed with plaintiff that not all of Theta's requested fees 

were "reasonable" under RPC 1.5(a)(1) and therefore, reduced the requested fee 

by fifty percent from $9750 to $5,212.50. A $50 filing fee was added to the 

counsel fee award resulting in the $5,262.50 total amount.