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-MI- NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE 1010 STAFF 14 September 1971

MEMO FOR LT COLONES..

SUBJECT: Reorganizational Thoughts

In considering the future of the NRO, and possible.

effects of the ASDI reorganization, there are several

factors that have significant bearing on the NROls

future effectiveness. I would like to informally present

some of my thoughts for whatever value or use you may

have.

One of my chief concerns is the ability of the NRO to

function in the overt world. We may have a strong charter,

but I am convinced that it is worthless unless we are

able to effectively control and influence the overt world

without having to rely upon our charter. That is -- the

Air Force in my opinion only 'puts up' with the NRO because they can't really do anything about us. While we

have a piece of paper that says the DNRO literally owns

the resources of DOD as required to do his job, the

practical fact of life is the DNRO is the Undersecretary

and does have control of AF resources. The point is --

most of our cooperation within the Air Force is due to

the fact that our boss is their's -- and they have to

directly respond to him. In many instances I have felt

that our requirements have hurt the Air Force - and as

an AF officer I have regrets -- however, my loyalty lies

with my employer -- the NRO. To a degree, I am certain

that Dr. McLucas is in the same position -- that is, he

is the DNRO first and Undersecretary second. Therefore

his primary obligation is to the NRO, however regrettable

it may be. Should the future DNRO be a non-USAF key

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position, I would have serious doubts as to the ability

and, I guess the word is "loyalty" of any 'dummy'

'front', or 'cover' man that might be tasked. The problem that I see is this individual would not be charged

with full responsibility -- he would only be a 'tool'

or method to control the Air Force. Whether we like it

or not, we are primarily an Air Force organization -

totally dependent upon the Air Force for support and a

major consumer of their ever diminishing funds. Since

our program is beyond their control, cuts assumed by the

Air Force are proportionately greater than they would

normally be. I am sure that this presents a major sore

point with General Ryan, and one he would like to get

around.

What then are the elements that must be preserved 

for the NRO to function smoothly?

. = .1 • I

We must preserve our a

A4menymoUl operation. Any

burying of the NRO under additional levels of management

or review cycles will only inhibit our operation. From

what I have observed, additional management results in

more staffing, people, paper time and COST. In many

cases I also believe that it leads to mediocrity since

solutions are by compromise, and leadership is easily

abandoned.

We must preserve our routine methods of operation

and control. This is the Air Force Issue mentioned above.

Unless we are able to override the basic issues and concerns of the Air Force, and unless this is recognized

without question by the Air Force at all levels we are

helpless - or at least severely restricted in our future

operations. The very best we could hope for would be a

series of tussles that would result in our re-establishment as a controlling force.

III. We must retain our policy function. This is

not only to our benefit but government as a whole. By

the nature of our organization, we are one of the few

places where National Policy and implementing authority

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exist at both the senior and working level of government.

While our management is the SECDEF - DCI - WHITE HOUSE

level, our day-to-day operation involves the little cogs

or "Where it gets done" level. We are recognized as a

place where "the word" is available, and you can get

advice on keeping out of trouble. More times than I

wish to recall, I have seen routine correspondence or

replies changed that could have 'fouled' a situation

simply because the Capt or Lt Col on the NRO Staff was

aware of a National Policy paper that would have been

violated. Normal government functions with their bureaucratic functions cannot effectively serve this purpose - they don't have the accessibility to information,

people, and the desire to 'bite the bullet'.

IV. We must preserve the National character of the

NRO. There is a basic distrust within bureacracy as to

the 'hidden meaning' of actions between agencies and

departments. The TIRO by being constituted of representatives of the various intelligence and service functions

has been able to be fairly impartial and open in our

dealings. In many cases we are the "sounding board"

that is available. We also have access to internal

opinions of the various agencies and provide an arena

where they may be heard without having had "something

slipped over on them". All may not be utopia in relationships - but we are a major, established, recognized

source of communications between agencies at both top

and bottom levels of management.

What are the possible alternatives for the future?

The NRO could remain unchanged. I don't think

this is possible - or really desirable. If the ASDI is

to really function it must include all the National

Programs.

The NRO remains basically unchanged, however

the DNRO now reports to the ASDI. This could become a

nightmare solution. It would interject a major decision

making body or organization in our chain of command. It

would also mean that many of our decisions and interagency

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It could require extensive staffing and defacto

weakening of the DNRO's charter. This would also

place the CIA in an unacceptable position by increasing

DOD control of the program.

The NRO could be abolished with the Services,

CIA and even NSA picking up the former NRO missions.

This solution is so bad I won't waste words on it.

The ASDI could become the operational DNRO

and DXXX of all National Programs (with a CIA deputy?).

Under this scheme all the National Programs would be

incorporated under the ASDI and the now existing National

Programs would becooe more of a program office or

operational element.

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Under this concept, select elements of the NRO Staff

and similar staffs could become a part of the ASDI's for

policy, security, operational tradeoffs and evaluation.

The program directors would have a restricted charter for

their elements, would have service/agency control, but the

multiple National Programs would disappear in favor of

a single National Program. This would require a significcant expansion of the ASDI staff which could and should be

drawn from the National Program staffs -- if for no other

reason their experience and knowledge.

If this solution is attempted without enlarging the .

ASDI's staff to include key functions (they would remain with

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the program director) there would be no significant

advantage gained and we *Dad probably be faced with the situation in II above.

These are some of the thoughts that have come to

mind - as I think of more I'll pass them to you. I hope

you may find them of some benefit..

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