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THE NRO STAFF February 12, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE fraiTATE DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Report of July 1966

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As you know, we are engaged in a regular coordinative exchange or information with the NASA on the subject of non-military applications of satellite earth-sensing, specifically as it relates to National

Reconnaissance Program policy issues.

In the majority at these discussions we are dealing with NASA

who are eligible to receive information controlled in the who

 In a few instances we are constrained in the disthese issues as a result of the NASA audience being eligible

only for information controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE system. •

Normally, these restrictions present no problem. However, we

have long recognized a need to discuss one particular document with

a group of NASA officials eligible to receive only that information

controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE system. This document, the

July 1966 report of•the NSAM 156 Committee, entitled "Political and

Security Aspects of Non-Mill cations of Hite EarthSensing, " is controlled in ystem 10-66A.

Through a careful review of its contents, we have determined

that with the deletion of two particular references, this document can

appropriately be downgraded TALENT-KEYHOLE level. These

on page 10 (U-2). We

have retyped the document, excluding se references, and have controlled the sanitized version in the TALENT-KEYHOLE control system.

A copy of this version is attached.

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We would appreciate your concurrence in our proposal.

'Blatant for Security

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Unless you have an objection to this procedure, we would propose to furnish NASA a ow of the sanitised version for use in our

continuing discussions.

MON P 1111810101* 101121110101111

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Political and Security Aspects of NonMilitary Applications of Satellite Earth-Sensing 

1111110)1. The NSAM 156 Committee has reviewed the issues raised

in the letter of April 4 from Mr. Charles L. Schultze and Dr. Donald .

1

1111111 1

F. Hornig to Secretary of State Dean Rusk (Appendix A), and submits

111111 the following report of its conclusions.

1111110 2. We believe that the "Report on Political. and Informational '

asis% Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy" prepared pursuant to

11111 NSAM 156 and approved on June 30, 1962, for transmittal to the NMI President remains basically valid. The objective of avoiding open 111111 challenges to satellite observation activity has been generally met,

IIIIIIS and the Soviet Union has muted -- though not retracted -- its challenge

snun to the principle of military space reconnaissance. Agreement has been

reached on fundamental legal principles which do not ban (though they NNW MN also do not explicitly sanction) space observation. Also, since 1962 the

Ma Soviets have developed a major operational satellite reconnaissance pro- c

n..

.gram of their own. Developments over the past four years have, • therefore, led to a shift of emphasis from a need for actions that will build 1111111 INN world acceptance of space observations, then a generally novel idea, to

RIM actions which will eserve the present wide tacit acceptance of such

11111 activities. Acco , there does not seem to be any imperative to

111111 launch disclosure initiatives for the purpose of furthering the general

11111 principle of space observation. On the other hand, it remains necessary

NMI to consider the possibly adverse effects of new public disclosures or

IIIIII other initiatives which could upset the present satisfactory situation.

111111 3. Our chief concern over a challenge to the legitimacy and

1111111 propriety of satellite reconnaissance has been the Soviet position. Over

MN the past several years, the Russians have withdrawn insistence on n

1111111 branding such activity as illegal in the cases of international space agreeing.' moots that they desired, and they do not press such arguments in the UN,

aim but they have not stopped referring to such activities as espionage. .

Moreover, the statements by Khrushchev and his son-in-law, Adahubei,

admitting such Soviet activities haft never been printed in the Soviet

press or acknowledged as official. In the first post-Kbrushchev stateTCS 37569-69

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11111 4€014BREV— .
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• ment referring implicitly to Soviet satellite reconnaissance, Brealinev

on July I dismissed as untrue "fables" alleging that the US has "allsee ing spy satellites", larger numbers of missiles, and invulnerable

submarines. These tables, he said, are intended for simpletons who

do not know "what missiles, what satellites, what submarines" the

USSR hes. Notwithstanding this implied admission of Soviet satellitd

reconnaissance, we see continuing pertinence of the NSAM 156 Report •

conclusion that: "It is extremely important that the US avoid public

statements about our satellite operations that would pose a direct

political challenge to the Soviet Union on the sensitive issue of reconnaissance."

It is now necessary to give more attention than heretofore to

the reactions of other countries. To date, increasing public awareness of the existence at US and Soviet military space reconnaissance

has not prompted concern in other countries for their own political or

military security interests, but such concern is likely to develop as

others become more aware at the nature and scope of satellite surveillance. Disclosure of surveillance capabilities, even indirectly in nonmilitary contexts, will awaken new interest and in some cases concern.

Accordingly, any such disclosure should be carefully considered and

planned so as to prevent or reduce adverse reactions by other states

that would be undesirable in their own right and could also be manipulated to our detriment by the Soviet Union.

Direct disclosure of satellite reconnaissance for the purpose

of gaining world acceptance of the principle of space surveillance is

both unnecessary and liable to provoke adverse reactions from the

USSR and other states. On the other hand, in the longiun the security

of our reconnaissance program can be served by encouraging the

present natural, gradual growing world recognition of the potentialities

a satellite earth-sensing in the context of scientific progress and economic betterment. Such recognition will grow whether we stimulate it

or not. We can influence and channel, and if we wish retard, such a

development -- but we cannot prevent it. We should recognize that

any apparent US efforts to suppress or hobble peaceful applications

because of presumed (and rightly presumed) sensitivity over protecting

military reconnaissance would not serve our objective of retaining or .

improving tacit acceptance at unrestricted earth observation and sensing.

A US position of favoring, leading, and sharing in non-military applies-

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tions of satellite earth-sensing will not involve the same risks of proyoking a confrontation with the Soviet Union as would direct disclosure

of reconnaissance. We should insure, insofar as possible, that these

initiatives are not construed by the Soviets as likely to result in general

disclosure of information about her military capabilities which the

USSR wishes to protect. •

As noted above, non-military uses of space which require surveillance of the earth by various sensors would as a side effect inevitably stimulate wider awareness of the capabilities of reconnaissance,

but in a more favorable context than would direct disclosure. We should

recognize that different uses of any technology will continue to evoke

different reactions. The familiar home, travel and hobby uses of ordinary cameras do not lessen objections to their use for intelligence collection. The same will be true of satellite cameras, and the Soviets

have already shifted their position several years ago to objecting to the

use of satellite intelligence collection, rather than objecting to satellite

observation (If in the future the Russians tacitly admit to having

reconnaissance satellites of their own, along the lines of Brezhnev's

statement referred to above, they would probably still claim that intelligence collection by the United States served different and nefarious

purposes. I This does not, however, seem to be a valid basis for opposing development of concurrent non-military and continued military

reconnaissance programs.

NASA's and other proposals for developing earth-sensing programs which might overlap, be derived in sanitized form from, or

stimulate public interest in, classified reconnaissance programs should

be judged on the basis of criteria such as feasibility, preference to nonspace alternatives, cost, problems in protecting classified technology,

and risks of security compromise of the classified reconnaissance program. It should usually be possible try careful planning to mitigate pos- .

Bible adverse political repercussions of the incidental disclosure of

surveillance capabilities and hence to give political and national security

clearance to such programs. The best justification•for such programs,

and the best general basis for calming any alarm over their effects will

be valid scientific or economic payoff in which other countries can ex-. •

poet to share.

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The primary area of competition in space between the United

States and the Soviet Union has been and will for the next few years

continue to be the race to the moon. This is, however, largely a

short term competition for the 1960's. In the longer run, there may

develop a competition in space applications developing the resources

of the world, particularly of the underdeveloped world. Communications satellites and meteorological satellites have already contributed •

to this end, but their benefits do not exhaust the potential value of

earth-sensing satellites for developing and using natural resources.

In the deliberations of this Committee, differences of view

arose over the relative merits of using satellites or aircraft for

natural resource surveys and other earth-sensing activities in the

"reconnaissance range" of satellite sensing (that is, roughly below

20 meters in precision of ground resolution). This Committee has

not attempted to resolve such differences; they clearly reflect an important question, but our present focus is on political and security

guidelines for use of such satellite programs in this range as may be,

determined to be economically and scientifically justified. In additioh,

there would appear to be unresolved questions with respect to the alternatives of using unmanned or manned satellites for these purposes.

10. A natural resources program of the kind in which NASA is

interested can in time provide vast data, using a variety of spaceborne -

sensors. The NASA program as now envisaged does not include opera-

, tional use of remote-sensing techniques before the 1970s, principally

because most of the sensors are presently programmed for use in

sophisticated manned spacecraft as part of the Apollo Applications Program. Homever, experimental programs might be initiated as early as

1968. There in no funding as yet of less complex, leas expensive unmanned systems.

II. One current problem which emerges is the question of use of

certain equipment and photographic materials from the classified re-

.

connaissance program to assist NASA in evaluating the utility of, and

developing techniques for, satellite photography for exploiting natural

resources. In order to develop a thorough understanding of observation

satellite technology, it would seem desirable to consider whether NASA

can be provided -- on a classified basis, but perhaps under less restrictive classifications controls -- both selected satellite. photographs for

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----311-1Tevaluation, and selected satellite hardware, including cameras. The

groundwork would thus be prepared for possible future operational use

in natural resource survey missions. The equipment to be used need

not -- and in our view should not -- represent the latest, highest resolution cameras. But considerable useful work could, for "example, be

accomplished with resolutions on the order of 10-15 feet. Some of the

many applications that might be usefully served with resolutions of this

level include mapping, surveys of water resources, agricultural and •

forestry surveys, and studies of land use over broad areas. Suitable

cameras for these purposes already exist in the KR programs, and the

release to NASA of both selected equipment and photography taken in

the past might be useful and presumably could be done without raising

unmanageable security problems. The cameras and photography from •

the KR systems could remain classified; only the products of actual

NASA missions would probably need to be unclassified. In cases where

• decision had been made for NASA to proceed with a given program for

which unclassified cameras or other equipment could be used, NASA

could let contracts to the NRO industrial contractors, who could then in

fact adapt on an unclassified basis equipment originally designed for the

classified program. In the case of classified equipment, the NRO could

provide such assistance, as it is doing in the Apollo lunar-orbiter program, or classified contracts could be arranged for necessary adaptation of existing classified equipment. NASA would prefer to the greatest

extent possible to use unclassified equipment. On the other hand, permissible NASA programs would necessarily be more severely limited if

only unclassified equipment could be used, and for a range of cases

valuable photographic data could be released while the equipment would

need to remain classified.

Public awareness of the quality of some of the lower resolution

materials released in non-military contexts need not have damaging

effect on the viability of 'inflaters' reconnaissance programs, provided

care is exercised in the type of materials released and the manner of

release. Security of the classified national reconnaissance program

would also be enhanced by having NASA conduct the actual launch and

retrieval operations of tlie•non-reconnaissance programs.

The United States, will, in any case, find it increasingly • •

difficult to control public disclosure of satellite surveillance capabilities.

To date the US and the USSR have maintained tacitly acknowledged but

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unpublicized mutual reconnaissance surveillance. Lately, the USSR

has shown what may be indications of a alight loosening up of their

own reticence to discuss satellite sensing capabilities by releasing

TV photographs of the earth taken by the Molniya satellite, and by

publishing in their own press earlier US-released Gemini photographs

(without attribution of the source). These steps suggest a possible '

Soviet willingness to accustom the world to the idea that non-recon- •

naissance photography from space is a normal activity, and could

foreshadow an openly acknowledged future Soviet satellite program for

earth-sensing and natural resources development. (The USSR may

also use this knowledge later to attempt to undercut the American

position on disarmament verification, and as noted earlier this would -

not necesarily imply any softening of Soviet objection to open acknowledgement of reconnaissance.) Other countries, too, may be contemplating similar programs. Recent French studies of the use of

aerial photography for geographic uses have indicated an interest in

the use of space platforms as well. as aircraft. This interest is not

surprising; France is only the first of several countries with developing space programs which will be investigating useful economic or

scientific satellite programs in an area that has not already been preempted by the USA or the USSR. In the likelihood that other countries

will soon be operating or at least openly discussing the use of observation satellites, it might be to the US- advantage to be prepared to take

the lead in such discussions and activities. Indeed, at some point wa

may wish to consider cooperative and collaborative programs not only

with other countries in Western Europe and Japan, but even with the

USSR, if the political climate were appropriate.

14. The United States should consider steps to apply its highly •

developed and developing photographic capabilities for the benefit of

the underdeveloped countries. In this way the United States can be

in a position to provide tangible evidence of out interest in helping

developing countries, while forestalling or overmatching possible

Soviet propaganda initiative in that field. This will require considera-

• tion of a whole range of political, as well as scientific-technical and

security, factors. For example, merely advising developing countries

of new resources and opportunities will not always win us plaudits if we

are not prepared to assist these countries in resits these•potentialities.

Nonetheless, in the longer run there would appear to real political

opportunities to us in taking a more active role than the Soviet Union in

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applying satellite earth observation to non-military economic uses.

This long-run political Interest reinforces other reasons for developing the potentialities or non-military uses of earth-sensing by satellites.

Prom the atzuzdpolot of protecting security of thi classified

national reconnaissance program, NASA programs should proceed

gradually through current aerial experimentation, to unmanned and

manned satellites, and in general moving from less to more precise

ground resolution. The technical limits placed on security grounds

could probably change as the general state of the art of classified

technological capabilities improves and as public awareness and appreciation of them advances. This process of reducing the security margin •

could not go on indefinitely, but the line of sensitivity probably could recede along the lines indicated above as both technological and political

security limitations become less acute. At present, it is generally

agreed that the limiting optical ground resolution should be about 20

meters from low earth orbit; public discussion of potential future

economic applications should, however, be less restricted.

At some point, probably after there had been further initial

exploratory study and if the program proved practicable, it would

appear that the United States -- perhaps the President himself might

launch a major public program. At that time, experimental NASA aerial

and space photographs could be released, and NASA program plans and

expectations described -- all without mention of the classified program.

Such an initiative would maximise political gains for the United States.

It could, of course, also prompt prominent speculation about classified

reconnaissance activities, but such speculation could probably be fended

off, and possible hostile Soviet reactions would probably be foreclosed or

undercut by the wide interest that the program should generate. However,

the question of whether and how any such initiative should be made should

probably be deferred at t)di time, and in any case will require further

careful consideration.

17. It should be noted that public recognition, even on an incomplete basis, of satellite observation capabilities would also have reverberations in other fields. For example, public awareness of such caps-

. bilities should assist in building a consensus in support of disarmament •

proposals which rely on satellite surveillance. The existence or, an

openly acknowledged photographic satellite system, .even with poorer

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quality products, would under some circumstances give the US government an additional option: to make public use of satellite photography •

to prove a violation of an agreement to a world forum, without dis- • .

closure of the classified reconnaissance program. In the absence of

such a publicly known system, it might be more difficult to make a

convincing case that a violation had indeed occurred. At the same time,

it may also be used by others to argue against requirements for other

verification measures in cases where such requirements remain. By

and large, however, disclosure of surveillance capabilities within the ••

limits we are suggesting would probably facilitate distinguishing between

what satellite observation can and cannot verify for the purposes of dis- •

armament negotiations..

18. Recommendations:

The classified national reconnaissance program should be

protected by continuing to consider carefully the political and security

effects of proposed unclassified earth-sensing activitiel prior to their ..

authorization. Similarly, consideration should continue to be given to

the political and security effects of public discussion of such activities. • Any party at interest can request the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee to

review possible politicat.or security issues which might arise from

particular NASA or other non-military plans, programs, or other

related activities concerned with spaceborne earth-sensing.

There is potential great political capital in a US program

of natural resource surveys and other scientific and economic exploitation of satellite earth observation and sensing, provided the basis has

been properly laid, and the announcement of such a program is able to

draw upon and project viable economic promise. Further consideration should therefore be given to a major political initiative advancing

the concept of economic betterment through space activities. If such

an initiative is decided upon, it should come at a time when sufficient

work has been done to demonstrate the potentialities and offer reasonable promise of some early payoff.

(3) At present, and for the next several years, from the standpoint of political and security considerations there is no objection to

NASA proceeding with its tentatively planned experimental program, .

complying with the limitation previously established between NASA and

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In discussion of the use of observation satellites for

natural resources purposes, NASA should, for the next five years --

subject to future review and possible revision of guidelines -- restrict

its discussion of future systems to those involving ground resolution xi

10-15 feet. The same restriction should apply to all other interested

Government agencies. In order to facilitate proper classified control

to apply the above general guidelines, and additional detailed implementing guidelines developed by NASA with the concurrence of NRO, a

NSAM should be issued directing all other civilian agencies with an

interest in satellite earth-sensing for these purposes to make known

their interests in that field to, and coordinate fully with, NASA. Apart

from other advantages to be expected from such an articulation of responsibilities, it should enable NASA to apply the agreed classified

guidelines limitations to other civilian agencies.

NASA and other appropriate agencies should consider carefully the relative merits and costs of aerial and other possible alternatives to various space-borne earth-sensing programs in terms of practical political interests as well as cost effectiveness. Similarly, the

respective merits of manned and unmanned satellites will of course require consideration. To assist in deciding these questions. NASA and

other appropriate Government personnel should be permitted to use •

selected aircraft and ICII-4 photography, most of which is now codeword

c/assified, to advance its studies of non-military earth-sensing applications.

*The Committee accepts as a satisfactory present definition of

the limitation on the study, design, development, fabrication, or test

of earth sensors by NASA (as proposed in Dr. McMillan's letter to

Dr. Seamans of August 5, 1965, and accepted by Dr. Seamans in his

reply to Dr. McMillan of A 1965) as those sensors not exCOO

. This limiting optical resolution is

to rs from low earth orbit.
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(6) With a view to facilitating the above studies noted in

pars (6), USID should be asked to review:

The question of removing reference to the fact

that the US has an operational satellite reconnaissance

program from codeword control, retaining either a

SECRET or TOP SECRET classification. This would

permit explanation of the reason for limitations, on a

classified basis, to Government personnel concerned

with non-military satellite earth-sensing programs but

without a need-to-know the performance capabilities or

product of the classified program. One of the-considerations involved is that at present, uncleared Government

personnel often voice their speculations about reconnaissance programs and even capabilities on an unclassified and uncontrolled basis.

•/

Selective removal of appropriate photography_

from codeword control for classified use by selected

NASA and other cleared personnel studying the potentialities of non-military earth-sensing activities, or,

alternatively but less desirably, clearance of an inZ

creased number of NASA personnel for such use of

those materials under present codeword control.

(7) The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with

the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, should review and

establish appropriate security restrictions on cameras and other

sensing apparatus and equipment which can be made available for

NASA's program at non-military applications of satellite earth-sensing.

It is recognised that substantial compartmentalisation will probably have

to remain, but the non-military programs should be enabled to profit

from relevant achievements ot the military program to the extent feasible.

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