### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 17, 200 7 S es sio n
THOM AS R. JONES , JR . v. HEA THER L. RU SC H-JON ES
Appeal f rom the F ourth Circuit Courtfor Knox County Nos. 97520 & 97555 Bill S wan n, Jud ge

No. E2006-01998-COA- R3-CV- F ILED JULY 19, 2007

Following a short marria g e of less than four y ear s, Thomas R. J ones, Jr. (“Father” ) filed a complaint fo r d i v o rc e f

ro m He at h er

L

. R u s ch -J o n es (“ M o t h er ”)

. M o t h er fi l ed a co u n t er -c l ai m al s o s ee k i n g a div or c e . B oth

pa rt ie s so ug ht t o b e the pr ima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt o f t he ir y oung da

ug hte r. Whil e thi s case was pe nding, both pa rties filed competing petitions for order s of protec tion. Father’s pe tition
was g rante d; Mothe r’s was not. Following a very leng thy trial, the Tria l Court designated Father a s the primary

residential pa

rent a nd awa rded Mother

supervised a

nd restric ted co- pare nting time. The Tr ia l Co ur

t awa rd e d M oth e r a

lim ite d amou

nt of a lim on y . M oth e r a

pp e a ls r a isi ngnume ro us iss ue s, including a

challeng e to the Trial Court’s desig nation of Father as the prim ary residential pa

rent a nd the amount of a limony

she wa s awa

rded. We a ffirm the judg ment of t he Trial Court and re mand for further proce eding s consistent with this Opini on.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he F ourth Circuit CourtAff irm ed; Case R em anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which S HAR ON G. L EE , J ., joined. C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., filed a se parate conc urringopinion.

J o h nD

. Lo c kr i d g e an d

S a m m i S

. M a i f

a i r , K n o x v i l l e , T e n n e s s e e , f

o r t h e A p p e l l a n t , H e a t h e r

L. Rus c h- Jone s.

Vi rg ini a A. Sc hw a mm a

nd Do nn a H. Smit h, Kn oxvil le, Ten ness e e , f or the Ap pe lle e , T ho ma s R. J ones, Jr.T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 4

- 1 2 9 (b) ( 2 0 0 5 ) p ro v id e s t hat t he “ co urt m ay, upo n s t i p ul at i o n t o or p roo f of any 1
gr ound f or di vor ce pur s uan t t o § 3 6- 4- 10 1, gr ant a di vor ce t o t he part y wh o was l es s at f aul t or, i f

ei t her or bo t h par t i es
a re e n tit le d to a d ivo rc e , d e c la re the p a rtie s to b e d ivo rc e d , ra the r th a n a w a rd ing a d ivo rc e to e ithe r p a rty a lo n e .”
-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

This is an appe al from a

n exceptionally

contentious divorce proce eding . The pa rties
wer e mar ried in Jul y

of 2000 and have a daug hter who was born in Marc h of 2003. F ather filed a complaint for divorce in June of 2004 alleg ing Mother was guilty of inappropr iate mar ital conduct or, in the alternative, that irrec oncilable differ ence s had ar isen betwe en the pa rties. Father soug ht to be desig nated a s the child’s primar y residential pa

rent.

Mo the r a ns we re d th e c omp la int and de nie d th a t sh e ha d e ng a g e d in any ina pp ro pr ia te marital conduc t. Mother filed a counter -complaint see king a divorce claiming Father ha d eng ag ed in inappropriate marital conduc t or, alternatively , that there wer e irre concilable differ ence s betwee n the pa rt ie s. Mo the r l ike wi se so ug ht t o b e de sig nate d a s th e c hil d’ s p ri mary re sid e nti a l pa

re nt.

There wer e numer ous court procee dings involvingtemporar y custody and tempora

ry support issues and the like befor e the trial. Ther e also we re issues surr ounding c ompeting pe titions fo r o rd e rs of pr ote c tio n fi le d by bo th p art ie s. Th e Tr ia l Co ur t e nte re d a

n o rd e r o f p ro te c tio n a g a ins t Mother and or dere d Mother to pay Father’s attorney fee s incurre d in the prosec ution of the order of protec tion. Mother’s re quest for a n order of protec tion ag ainst Father wa s denied. Mother also filed two motions t o rec use during the course of these proce eding s. Both of the se motions were denied.

Following a lengthy trial, the Trial Court issued an extensive memorandum opinion from the be nch which, w hen tra ns cr ibed, is over se venty -five pa g es in leng th. Both par ties filed post-trial motions and the final judg ment later w as ame nded. The end re sult wa s that the Trial Court decla red the parties divorc ed fr om eac h other pursua nt to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129, after f inding both parties had e stablished g rounds for divor ce. The Tr ial Court desig nated F ather as the child’s 1 pr ima ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt. B e c a

us e the Tr ia l Co ur

t f ound Mo the r t o h a ve so me ps y

c h o l o g ic a l is su e s, Mo the r w a s awa

rd e d li mit e d a

nd su pe rv ise d c o- pa

re nti ng tim e

. Th e Tr ia l Court ma de the pr op e rt

y distribution. The Trial Court ref used t o awa

rd Mother a

ny reha bilitative alimony . The Tr ial Court allowed F ather

and the c hild to remain in the marital residenc e. Mother was orde red to va cate the marital re sidence immediately and Father was re quired to pay for Mother

to stay in a hotel for one
wee k as transitional alim ony

. The Trial Court awa rded to Mother as alimony in solido an amount equal to one- half of the total pay ments Father ha d made on his student loans duringthe marr iag e. Finally , the Trial Court noted that it had previously order ed Father to pay $7,500 toward Mother ’s attorney fee s as alimony i n s olido. The Trial Court then stated that eac h party “shall her eaf

ter be responsible for

the re maining attorney

fee s that they

have inc urre d.”-3- Mother appe als claiming : (1) the Tr ial Court e rre d when it failed to g rant he r motions for r ecusa l; (2) the Tria l C ourt err ed whe n it designated Father a s the child’s primar y residential pare nt; ( 3) the Trial Court er red in re stricting he r co- pare nting time and in r equiring her c o-par enting time be supervised; (4) the Trial Court er red w hen it ref

used to awa

rd her reha bilitative alimony ; (5) the Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in the a mou

nt o f t ra ns iti on a l a lim on y

awa rd e d; ( 6) the Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d w ith reg ard to its awa

rd of attorney

fee s and discre tionary

costs; (7) the Tr ial Court erre d when it g rante d Father’s r equest for

an orde r of pr otection; (8) the T rial Court err ed whe n it made t h e order of pr ote c tion perma

ne nt; (9 ) t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d w he n it

awa rd e d F a the r atto rn e y

fe e s in c ur

re d in prosec ution of the order

of protec tion; (10) the Trial Court er red in the pr operty

distribution by failing to awar d Mother ce rtain items of proper ty she cla ims were he r sepa rate proper

ty ; and (11) the Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d w he n it

awa rd e d F a the r a jud g me nt fo r dama g e s to his sep arate pr op e rt y a lle g e dly
c a us e d b y Mo the r. Mo the r a lso c ha lle ng e s tw o e vid e nti ary ru lin g s o f t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t.

Discussion

The fa ctual finding s of the Tria l Court are a ccor ded a presumption of corr ectne ss, and we will not over t urn those fa ctual finding s unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001). Wit h respe ct to leg al issues, our review is conducte d “under a pure de novo standard of revie w, acc ording no defe renc e to the conclusions of law ma de by the lower courts.” So uth e rn Con str uc tor s, In c . v . Lo ud

on Cou nty Bd. Of Educ. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001)

.

Th e tr ia l in

thi s c a se la ste d o ve r t

we nty -f ive da y s w ith nume ro us wi tne sse s. Th e mos t
s i gn i fi ca n tt ri al t es t i m o n y wa s d i s cu s s edi ns o m e d et ai l i nt h e T ri al C o u rt ’s d et ai l ed7 5 -p age me mor and

um o pin ion . G ive n th e le ng th o f t he tr ia l and the numbe r of wi tne sse s, we wi ll d isc us s only the re levant hig hlights of the tr ial testimony and the Tr ial Court’s finding s. Although the competing petitions for order of protec tion h ad in larg e par t been
re s o lv e d b y th e ti me o f tr ia l, th e y n e v e rth e le s s h a d an im p a c t a t tr ia l. Wh e n g r an ti n g Fa ther’s petition for an or der of

protec tion, the Trial Court made specific factua l finding s. The Tria l Court found that on one oc casion Mother repe atedly hit a nd kicked Father and on another occa sion Mother hit Father on the back. Mother g ener ally denied e ng ag ing in suc h conduct, but at tria l witnesses wer e c a lle d w ho te sti fi e d th a t Mo the r h a d a dmi tte d to the m th a t sh e ha d h it Fathe r. I n a dd iti on , at le a st one witness testified that Mother stated she c ould have F ather “off ed.” I n short, the fa cts do not preponde rate against the Tr ial Court’s deter mination that Father

was the pa

rty in need of

an orde r of protec tion and that it was Mother who w as the phy sically abusive spouse.

At t ri al , Fa t h er r equeste d the orde r of pr otection be modified to a llow for socia l
c on ta c t. B e c a

us e the Tr ia l Co ur

t c on c lud e d th a t Mo the r h a d v iol a te d th e or de r of pro tec ti on in

“ many in sta nc e s, ” the Tr ia l Co ur

t r e fu se d to mod if

y the or de r o f p ro te c tio n a nd ins te a d ma de itT h e Tr i a l Co u r t f o u n d “ p e r h a p s a s m a n y a s 2 6 v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e n o
- c o n t a c t o r d e r

... [ w h i c h ] a r e ac t s of 2 cri m i nal co nt em p t

. ” T he T ri al C o urt s ub sumed al l of M o t her’ s vi o l at i o ns o f t he o rder o f p rotect i o n i nt o o ne co unt and

s en t en ce d h er t o t en da y s of i n ca r ce r at i on

. H owe v er , t h e s en t en ce w as s u s pen ded.

-4- pe rm ane nt. Th e e vid e nc e do e s no t pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t th e fi nd ing s o f t he Tr ia l Co ur

t r e le va nt t o 2 its decision to make the order of protec tion pe rmane nt. There fore , we f ind no reve rsible er

ror by the Tr ia l Co ur

t in makin g the or de r o f p ro te c tio n p e rm ane nt.

Mother also c laims the Trial Court err ed whe n it awar ded F ather hi s at t o rney

fee s inc urr ed in pro se c uti on

of the or de r o f p ro te c tio n. Mo the r f ur the r c la ims that he r atto rn e y sh ou ld have be en per

mitted to depose Father’s c ounsel reg ardingthe amount of the attorney fe e t h at was claimed.

Te nn . Co de Ann. § 3 6- 3- 61 7( a ) ( 20 05 ) p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:

P rot ec tion orders - F ilin g costs and assistan ce. – (a) Notwithstanding a

ny other provision of

law to the contr ary , the petitioner shall not be re quired to pay any filing fees, litig ation taxes
o r an y o th e r c o s ts a s s o c iate d w it h th e f il in g , is s u an c e , s e r

v ic e or enfor ceme nt of an orde r of protec tion authorized by this part upon the filing of the petition. The judg e shall asse ss court costs and litig ation taxes at the hear ing of

the petition or upon dismissal of the petition. If the court, after the he aring, issues or extends an order of protection, petitioner's court costs a nd attorney fee s shall be assessed ag ain st t he re sp on de nt. (empha sis added)

Ba sed on the unequivoca l a nd mandatory lang uag e of the statute, the Tr ial Court properly awa rded Father his attorne y

fee s and costs incurr ed in the prose cution of the orde r of pr otection.
As noted, Mother c laims the Trial Court err ed because her attorney was not allowe d to depose F ather ’s attorne y reg ardingthe amount of attorney fee s and expenses that we re c laimed. I n r e sp on se , F a the r c or

re c tly po ints o ut t

hat a t th e he ari ngon

F a the r’ s r e qu e st f

or a tto rn e y fe e s, Moth e r ’ s a tt o r

n e y w a s a ll o w e d to qu e s ti o n F a th e r ’ s a tt o r n e y a t le n g th a

b o u t th e c la im e d fee s and
e xpe ns e s. F oll ow ingtha

t he ari ng , th e Tr ia l Cour

t re du c e d th e e xpe ns e s so ug ht b y F a the r b y on e -h a lf and then a

war ded F ather

a judg ment for f

ees a nd expenses totaling $4,408.43. B eca use Mother’ s attorney was a ffor ded the oppor

tunity to question Fathe r’s a

tt o r n e y about the propr iety

of the c laimed fee s and ex penses, we find no error in the f act that Mother ’s attorne y was not per

mitted therea fter to depose F ather ’s attorne y . The amount of fee s and expenses aw arde d to Fathe r is aff irmed.

The Tr ial Court found that Moth er h ad p roblems with ang er ma nag ement and the proof at trial cer

tainly supports this c onclusion. On at least two occa sions Mother g ot a ng ry and lef t the cour troom in the middle of court proc eeding s and once even thr ew something and y elled at he r own attorne y . Mother cla imed that she suspected Father had sexually abused the child, but there w asD r. E lsb e th F re e m a n , P h . D ., i s a c linic a l p syc h o lo g ist wh o e v a lua te d b o th p a rtie s a t t h e T ria l C o u rt’s re q u e st. 3

M o the r’s fa m ily live s in N e w J e rs e y. 4

-5- absolutely

no evidenc e, medica l or otherwise, to suppor t this horrific acc usation. I n fac t, the proof
was t h at Fa t h er wa s a ver y g ood fathe r and w ould never harm the c hild. Accor ding to the T rial Court :

Dr. F ree man notes, and the Cour t finds, that the mother 3 play ed the c hild sex ual abuse car d wi t h t h e pediatrician, sug g esting that the child shou ld

be examined bec ause the mother “ha d conce rns.” Nothing w as found, a

nd the Court finds that the mere sug g estion of same is just an absolute impossibili ty ... for this fathe r. A neig hbor testified at trial that she witnessed Mother’s attempt to back into Father’s
car which was being driven by Father at the time. Mothe r later apolog ized to the neighbor for doing that in front of the ne ighbor ’s child. Mother told t h e n ei gh b o r that she had “ lost it ” and w as “over rea cting .” Mother a dmitted to thi s behavior a t trial. The neig hbor also testified that one wee k afte r Mother a

nd Father wer e marrie d, Mother told the neig hbor that she was g oing to divorc e F ather and “take him for e very

thing he had....” The Tr ial Court also set forth the f ollowing testimony

from the neig hbor:
[Mot her] told me that they foug ht a lot. She said that she boug ht a lot of thing s for the house , that she would buy things on sale a nd just buy them and store the m.... She told me once that she t hrew the ring out the window in an a

rg ument on the way

to the Biltmore, late r that she did no t do that, b ut t

hat sh e ha d n ot t old

[F a the r], that sh e ha d k e pt i t
and wa s g oin g to g o to Ne w Je rs e y and wo uld se ll i t. S he tol d me thi s at her house. She also said that if I wer e to see her in the ba ck y ard wi th a sh ov e l, [I ] wo uld

kn owwh e re [F a the r] w a s.

Father testified that Mother told him that he would neve r see his daug hter a g ain and to g et re ady

“for the custody

case of y our life.” Mother told Dr. F ree man that Father did not spend any time at t h e hospital when the child was born, a n asser tion that was flatly

contra dicted by

the medical r ecor ds from the hospital.

During one of the parties’ many arguments, Mother supposedly threw a ring at Father which later

co u ld n o t b e f

o u n d

. F a th e r h a d g iv e n M o th e r a v a lu a b le r in g an d it w a s th is r in g that Mother alleg edly

threw at Father. When the ring could not be found, the par ties made a

n insurance
c la im and re c e ive d $9 ,0 00

. F a the r t e sti fi e d at tr ia l th a t he la te r l e arn e d th a t Mo the r h a d in te nti on a lly thrown anothe r ringat him, and t h en t ook the valuable ring to New Jersey and paw ned it. When 4 M o t h e r w a s a s k e d

a b o u tt h i s r i n g i n c i d e n ta tt r i a l , s h e r e f u s e d t o t e s t i f y an d i n v o k e d h e r F if th Amendment privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination.M o t her had t hese bi l l s sent t o t he ho use of her f ri end , A l l i son M i l l er, who was cal l ed as a wi t ness at t ri al and 5 who conf

i r med t hat ce r t ai n bi l l s wer e s ent t o her hous e. -6- Mother would buy things and hide t hem from Father . Acc ording to Fathe r, Mother would make sure she g ot the mail from the mailbox, and he later le arned that she did this so she could hide ce rtain bills. I n fac t, Mother went so far as to have some of the c redit ca rd bills mailed direc tly to a fr iend’s house so F ather would not find out how much cre dit card de bt she had incurre d. Mother admitted on cross-e x amination that Father did not want her to obtain a ny more 5
cre dit cards, but she did a

ny way and cha rg ed over $20,000 on these additional credit ca rds. Mother adm i t t ed to having a proble m manag ing mone y . Mother wa s fired f rom two jobs during the marria g e, and f

ired fr om other jobs befor e the mar riag e.
After t h e parties se parated and F ather initially moved out of the mar ital residenc e, Father re quested his clothes, a s well as som e furniture, sheets, and photog raphs of the child. When he fina lly rec eived this furniture , some of it had been ruined. For example, one piece of fur niture, which orig inally

had belonge d to Father’s gr andmother, ha d deep g ashes in it. A desk wa s broken. F a the r’ s c lot

he s w e re ri pp e d a

nd tor n. An op e n bo ttl e of Go ld B on d po wd e r ha d b e e n thro wn int o a bagcontaining Father’s c lothes, ruining those clothes. I nside the furniture , Father found se vera l photogr aphs. Ther e wa s an Easter family photogr aph and a

weddingphotogr aph, but the photos had been c ut up and ever

y one except Father ha d been c ut out of the pictures. Mother denied damag ing the fu rn i t ure a

nd clothes, but she did admit to cutting up the photog raphs. Ac cordingto Fathe r, Mother g ave him s o m e s h ee t s, but they wer e shee ts that had bee n used as dr op-cloths when the pa rt ie s ha d pa int e d the mari ta l re sid e nc e

. Th e Tr ia l Co ur t f ound that Mo the r w a s r e sp on sib le fo r t his damag e to Father’s pr operty . The Tr ial Court valued the items that we re da mag ed or not re turned to Fathe r at $2,150, a

nd enter ed a judg ment for Fat h er i n t h at amount. The f acts c erta inly

do not preponde rate ag ainst the Trial C ourt’s finding t hat M other was responsible for damag ing F ather ’s proper t y and the amount of that damag e wa s $2,150. We affirm the judg ment to Fathe r in the amount of $2,150.

We next will address whe ther the Trial C ourt err ed whe n it denied Mother’ s motions to rec use. The f

i rs t m o t ion to recuse was filed in Septembe r of 2004. One of Mother’ s primary
co mp l ai n t s wa s t h at t h e T ri al C o u rt co n t i n u edwi t h a “ fi ft y -f i ft y co -p ar en t i n g s ch edu l e” ev en t h o u gh the Tr ia l Cour

t at tha t time kn e w “v e ry lit tle a bo ut the ph y sic a l hi sto ry

of the c hil d. ” Mo the r a lso was dissatisfied with the Tr ial Court beca use the Tr ial Court had g rante d Father’s mot i o n for a protec tive order

and re quest for attorney fee s, but de nied a similar motion filed by Mother. The Trial Court de nie d th e fi rs t mo tio n to re c us e , s ta tin g the “ Court ha s n o b ia s fo r or a g a ins t e ith e r p art y , a ll ruling s having been r ooted in the evidenc e pre sented at trial ....”

Mother’s se cond motion to recuse was filed in N ovember of 2005, afte r the trial wa s over a nd the Trial Court had issued its memora ndum opinion. Ag ain, Mother c laimed that the Tria l Court was pre

judiced ag ainst her. Mother claimed the Trial Court ma de comments whic h Mother perc eived to be de meaning to he r and pr aisewor thy toward F ather . Mother fur ther c laimed that the fac t that the Trial Court orde red he r visitation to be s u p er v i s ed was fur ther e vidence of the Tr ial-7-

Court’s lack of

objectivity . Mother also points to the foll owing comments made by the Trial Court to her attorney

when de ny ing the second motion to rec use:

You attac k the ver

y essenc e of a judge ’s job de scription and you’ve done this be fore

. I reme mber when I was a y oung judge on the benc h y ou had a c ase g o ag ainst y ou strong ly and, y ou know, i t must be be c a us e Iha d s ome so rt

of bia s...
S o w h e ny o ug e tana d v e r s e r e s u l t , d o n ’ ta t t a c k t h e f a c tf i n d e r

. If any thing, look at y our own job performanc e. I f y ou need to be at up on somebody , beat up on yourself. Say Icould have done this trial better. Somebody ’s g ot to be g uilty , make yourself guilty , don’t make the judg e g uilty

.... When the Trial Court denied Mothe r’s sec ond motion to re cuse, the Trial Court made
sever al other observations i n addition to those selec tively emphasized by Mother. For example, the Trial Court also stated:

W el l , M r. L o ck ri d ge, y o ueq u at e a d v er s e f i n d i n gs b y

a t ri al j u d ge with bias, with prejudice

.... Now I think that y ou’re old enoug h and long e noug h in the tooth to realize that there ar e clients that don’t pr e se nt a s w e ll a s o th er clie nts a nd that w he n y ou

re pr e se nt c lie nts that don’t prese nt as well as other clients, y ou’re likely

to ge t an
a dv e rs e re su lt... I have be nt ov e r ba c kw ard s in bo th d ir e c tio ns in t his
c a se and tha t me mor and

um o pin io n in [this ] ca se is a bs olute ly straig htforwa

rd.
“[W ]hether re cusal is war rante d is left to the discretion of the trial judg e, and suc h decision will not be reve rsed a bsent a c lear ab u s e of discr etion on the fa ce of the re cord.” Bd. of Pr of'l Re sp on sib ili ty

of theSu pr e meCou rt v . S

lav in , 145 S.W .3d 538, 546 (Tenn. 2004) . Our Supreme Court in Sla v in also stated:

Tenne ssee ha s also rec og nized that “the pre servation of the pu b li c ’ s c o n f

id e n c e in ju d ic ia l n e u tr a li ty r e qu ir e s n o t o n ly that the judge be impartial in fac t, but also that the judge be per ceive d to be impartial.” Kin ar

d v . Ki na rd , 986 S.W .2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Thus, re cusal is also appropriate “ when a person of ordinary pr ud e nc e in t

he jud g e ’s po sit io n, kn ow inga ll o f t he fa c ts k no wn to the judg e, would find a rea sonable basis for questioning the judge ’s impartiality .” Davis v. Liberty M ut. Ins. Co. , 38 S.W .3d at 564-65 (q u o t i n g Al le

yv . S tat e , 882 S.W .2d 810, 82 0 (T enn. C rim. App. 1 9 9 4 )) . “He nce, the test is ulti mately an objec tive one since the appea ranc e of bias is as injurious to t he integ rity of the judicial-8- sy stem as ac tual bias.” Id

. We note, howeve r, that the mer e fa ct that a judg e has r

uled adve rsely to a party or wit ness i n a prior pr ocee ding is not grounds f

or re cusal. Id

. Sla v in , 145 S.W .3d at 548.

Father arg ues t hat M other’s moti ons to rec use were nothing m ore than “cla ims that
ever y ruling made by

the Trial Court that wa s not in her favor demonstrated t h e T ri al Court’s prejudice ... ag ainst her.” To be sure, Father was the m ore suc cessf ul liti g ant. Howe ver, dur ing the
course of this litigation, Mother filed some motions that wer e g rante d and Father filed some motions that w e r e d e n ie d

. M o th e r ’ s la c k o f s u c c e s s p r im ar il y c an b e a tt r ib u te d to th e T r ia l Court’s deter mination that Mother was abusive and that she was not being truthful. The Trial Court went so far as to state that “this is a ca se, unfor tunately , of widely disparate cre dibilit y ... , and it does not favor [Mot her].” The Trial C ourt provided specific e x amples of c ontradictory testimony

g iven by Mother and w hy

the Trial Court believe d that testimony was untruthful.

I n W e lls v . Te nn esse e Bd

. o f R e ge nts , our Supreme Court obse rved:

Unl ik e a p p e ll a te c o u rts , tr ia l c o u rts ar e a b le to o b s e r

ve wi tne sse s a s th e y

te sti fy and to a sse ss t

he ir dem ean or , w hic h b e st situates trial judg es to eva luate witnes s cr ed i bility

. See State v

. Pr ue tt , 7 88 S.W. 2d

55 9, 56 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) ; Bowman v. Bowman , 836 S.W .2d 563, 566 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). Thus, trial cour ts are in the most favora

ble positi o n t o resolve f actua l disputes hinging on cre dibilit y

deter minations. Se e Te nn -T

e xPr op erti es v . B ro wne llElectro, Inc

. , 7 78 S.W. 2d 42 3, 42 5- 26 (T e nn . 1 98 9) ; Mitchell v. Ar c hib ald , 9 7 1 S

. W

. 2 d

2 5 , 2 9 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. 1 9 9 8 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, appellate courts will not re-e valuate a trial judg e’s a s s essm ent of witness cre dibilit y

absent c lear an d convincingevidenc e to the contra ry

. S e e H u m p h r e yv

. D a v id

W it h e r s p o o n , Inc. , 734 S.W .2d 31 5, 31 5- 16 (T e nn . 1 98 7) ; Bingham v. Dy ersburg Fabrics Co., Inc ., 567 S.W .2d 169, 170 (Tenn. 1978)

.
W e lls v . Te nn esse e Bd

. o f R e ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999). Se e als o Lockmiller v. L o ck mi ller , No. E2002-02586- COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094418, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2003), no appl. perm. appeal filed (“ T h e cases are leg ion that hold a trial court’ s determinations
re g ard ingwi tne ss c re dib ili ty are e nti tle d to g re a t w e ight on a pp e a l.” ); Se e als o McBray er v. Smitherman-M

cBraye r , No. E2006-00040- COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL187938, at * 5 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 25, 2007), no appl. perm. appeal filed (e mph a sizi ngthe imp or tanc e of ass essi ngwi tne ss cre dibilit y

when a trial court is making a d ecr ee of primary residential status and e stablishing visitation).-9- Given the vastly contra dictory testimony offe red by the parties on various issues, the Trial Court was r equire d to make a c redibility deter mination, a

nd it did just that. There is no clear and convinc ing e vidence that the Trial Court’s cre dibilit y deter mination was in err or. Ke eping the Trial Court’s cr edibility

deter mination in mi nd, we be lieve the a dverse ruling s as to Mother we re based not on a

ny prejudice ag ainst Mother or her attorney , but rathe r on a dis belief of her te stimony and a c onclusion that she was a busive. Whil e the Trial C ourt’s comment made to Mother’s attorney
conce rning an incident b et we en t h em when the judge “wa s a y oung judge on the benc h...” wa s inappropri at e, i t d oes not rise to the leve l of demonstrating any prejudice toward Mother or her attorney . After

thoroug hly

consideringall of Mother’ s various ar g uments on this is sue, we c onclude that the Trial Court did not abuse its discre tion when it denied Mother’ s motions t o rec use.

The ne x t issue is Mother’s cla im that the Trial Court err ed whe n it designated Father as the c hild’s p rimary

residential pa

rent. In Bu rn e tt v . B ur

ne tt , No. E2002-01614- COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21782290 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 23, 2003), no appl. perm. appeal fil ed , this Court di scussed the re levant standa

rd of r eview in c hild custody case s. We stated:

Th e sta nd ard of re vie w on ap pe a l f or iss ue s a dd

re ssi ngc hil d custody and visitation was set forth by our Supreme Court in Suttles v. Suttles , 7 48 S.W. 2d

42 7 ( Te nn

. 19 88 ), and re c e ntl y re a ff ir me d in Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82 (Tenn. 2 0 0 1). In Suttles , the Court a c kn ow le dg e d th e g e ne ra l r ule that:

Al th ou g h ... “ the de ta ils of c us tod y and vis itatio n w ith children a re peculiarly within the broad discr etion of the trial judge,” Edwards v. Edwards , 501 S.W .2d 283, 291 (Tenn. App. 1973), a

nd that the trial cour

t's de cision w i l l not ordinarily be re verse d absent some a buse of that discretion,

“ in r e vie wi ngc hil d c usto dy and vis itatio n c a se s, we mus t
reme mber that the w elfa

re of the child has a lway s been the para mount consideration” f

or the c ourts. Luke v. Luke , 651 S.W .2d 219, 221 (Tenn. 1983)

.... Suttles , 748 S.W .2d at 429. The Supre me C ourt further explained the abuse of discretion standa

rd in Eldridge , s t at i n g:
Under the abuse of discre tion s t an d ard, a trial cour t's r uling “will be uphe ld so long a s rea sonable minds can disa g ree as to propriety

of the de cision made.” Sta te v . S c ott , 33 S.W .3d 74 6, 75 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; State v. Gilliland , 22 S.W .3d 266, 273 (T e nn . 2 00 0)

. A tri a l court a bu se s its disc re tio n only

wh e n it “applie[s] an incorre ct leg al standar d, or re ache [s] a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or reasoning that cause [s] an injustice to the party co m p l aining .” State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243,-10- 247 (Tenn. 1999)

. The a

buse of discr etion standard doe s not permit the appe llate court to substitute its j udg ment for that of the trial cour

t. Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 9 7 0 S.W.2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998)

. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d at 85.

Bu rn e tt , 2003 WL 21782290, at **5, 6.

A lis t o f n o n -exclusive fac tors to be consider ed by the trial cour

t in child custody matters ar e set for

th in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 106(a) (2005) which provides, in releva nt part, as fo llo ws : (a) I n a suit for annulment, divorce , separ ate maintena nce, or in any ot h er p roce eding requiringthe cour t to make a c ustody deter mination reg ardinga minor chil d , such dete rmination shall be
ma de up on the ba sis of

the be st i nte re st o f t

he c hil d. Th e c ourt

sh a ll consider a ll relev an tfa ct o rs i n cl u d i n g t h e f o l l o wi n g wh er e ap p l i cable: (1) The lo v e , a f

f e c tion a nd emotional ties exi sting be tween the pare nts and child; (2 ) T he dis po sit ion

of the pa re nts to p ro vid e the chi ld w ith food, clothing, medical car e, educ ation and other nece ssary

car e and the deg ree to which a pa

rent ha s been the primary car eg iver; (3) The importance of continuity in the chil d ’s life a

nd the leng th of time the child has lived in a s t ab l e, satisfac tory environment; ... (4 ) T he sta

bil ity of the fa mil y un it o f t he pa re nts ; (5 ) T he me nta l and

ph y sic a l he a lth

of the pa re nts ; (6) The home, school and c ommunity rec ord of the c hild;

* * * (8 ) E vid e nc e of

ph y si cal or

e mot ion a l a

bu se to t he c hil d, to the other pa

rent or to a

ny other pe rson; ...-11- (9) The char acte r and be havior of a ny other pe rson who resides in or f

reque nts the home of a pa rent a nd such per son’s interac tions with t he child; and (10) Eac h pare nt’s past and potential for f uture pe rfor

mance of par enting responsibilities, including the willing ness and a bility of
eac h of t he parents t o fac ilitate and enc ourag e a c lose and c ontinuing pa re nt- c hil d re la tio ns hip be tw e e n the c hil d and the oth er pare nt, consistent with the best interest of the child.

I n making its custody

deter mination, the Trial Court discussed the va rious fac tors as fo llo ws : [L ]et

me no te th at bo th o f t

he se pa re nts de mon str a te c ha

ra c te ri sti c one, “love , aff

ection and e mo tional ties” betwe en themselve s and [the child]. As t o criteria two, both have the dispositi on to provide her with food, clothing , medical c ar e and other nece ssary

car e. Mother was the pr imary

car eg iver whe n the child was ve ry y oung . The father has bee n very

active in he r life throug hout, and when this ca se beg an, a 50/50 ca retaker of the child. He did well during that period of time, as did mother.... F actor

three i s n o t re l evant. F actor four is the stability and re spective f

amily u n i t o f [the] two pare nts. This is of limit ed re l ev ance . The mother a ppear s to have a

n excellent ste pf a the r; the fa

the r h a s an e xce lle nt m oth e r. F a c tor fi ve is
e xtre me ly re le va nt: me nta l and ph y sic a l he a lth of re sp e c tiv e pa re nts

. Fa ctor e ight, the e vidence of phy sical or emotional abuse to the other pare nt, is ex tremely

rel ev ant ... and it re flec ts very badly on the mot he r, a s d oe s te n, the wi lli ng ne ss a nd abi lity of e a c h to fa c ili ta te
and e nc oura g e a

c los e and

c on tin uin g pa re nt/ c hil d r e latio ns hip betwee n the child and the othe r par ent.

The Tr ial Court properly considere d the per

tinent statu t o ry fa ctors. Given the
e vid e nc e c on ta ine d in

the e xten siv e re c or d b e fo re us , w e c on c lud e that th e Tr ia l Co ur t did n ot a bu se its dis c re tio n w he n it

de te rm ine d that, ov e ra ll, the re le va nt fa c tor s fa

vo re d F a the r and that it w a s in the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st f

or F a the r t o b e the pr ima

ry re sid e nti a l pa

re nt.

The nex t is s u e inv o lv e s th e a mo u n t o f M o th e r ’ s c o
- p ar e n ti n g ti me an d the require ment that h er v i s i t at i o n be super vised. When the Trial Court initially decla red the parties divorce d and desig nated F ather as the primar

y residential pare nt, Mothe r was awa rded standa

rd copa re nti ngtim e wh ic h d id n ot h a ve to b e su perv is ed. Fa the r f ile d a po st- tr ia l mo tio n s e e kin g to restric t Mother ’ s c o
- p a

r e nti n g time be cause , acc ording to Fathe r, his daug hter told him “You’ve been mean to Mommy

and stole her

house and she has t o move far, fa r aw ay back to Ne w J erse y ....” The child appar ently

made similar comments to her car e-g iver. F ather

also claimed:-12- Since the close of proof

in this matter, the Mother has made statements to the Father that c ause him continuing conce rn about the Mother’s psy cholog ical s tability . Specifica lly , on October 4, 2005, the e ve be fo re the Me mor and um O pin ion wa s del ive re d to th e pa rt ie s, the Mother c alled the F ather and told him that she knew whe re the Father’s attorney

lived, and knew

what color

and make o f car the Father’s attorney ’s childre n drove. Following a hea

ring on the allegations made by Father in the above motion, the Trial Court credited F a the r’ s te sti mony

and re du c e d Moth e r’ s c o- pa

re nti ngtim e and

dir e c te d th a t he r c o- pa

re nti ngtim e be super vised.

Gi ve n M oth e r’s beh a vio r t hr ou g ho ut t

he marr ia g e and

the c ours e of

the se pr oc e e din g s, it c e rt a inl y

is und e rs tand a

ble wh y the Tr ia l Co ur

t ru le d the wa

y it did

. Ne ve rt

he le ss, we be lieve it is in the best interest of the child for Mother to have more co-pa

renting time with the
c hil d a nd that he r c o- pa

re nti ngtim e sh ou ld b e un su pe rv ise d. W e, h ow e ve r, are re luc tant t o definitively

instit ute such a

require ment at t his time beca use t his Court does not have before it any p r o o f c o n c e r n i n g M o t h e r ’ s p o s t

- t r i a l b e h a v i o r , i n c l u d i n g a d d i t i o n a l i n a p p r o p r i a t e b e h a v i o r , i f

a n y. There fore , on rema

nd, the Trial Court is instructed to conduct a hear ing on this issue. I f Mother ha s not eng ag ed in furthe r inappropr iate beha vior post-trial which would rise to the level of ne cessitating that h e r v is it a ti o n c o n ti n u e to b e s u p e r v is e d , th e n th e T r ia l Co u rt is in s tr u c te d to e n te r

an orde r providing Mother with standar d, unsupervised c o-par enting time.

The ne x t issue is whether the T rial Court err ed whe n it denied Mother’ s p o s t -t ri al mot ion to h a ve c e rt a in p ro pe rt

y de e me d h e r s e pa

ra te pr op e rt y . L oc a l Ru le 10 of the Kn ox County F ourt h Ci rc uit Court pr ov ide s, in r e le va

nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
10. P re- Trial Stipu lations as to Separate and Marital P ropert y. At least forty -eig ht (48) hours be fore the day of trial, the parties sha ll file with the Clerk three (3 ) J OI NTL Y EXECUTED AGREED STI PUL ATI ONS as t o rea l and per sonal proper ty , setting forth, pursua

nt to the c riteria of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121: (1) the
rea l and personal s epar ate property and debt of each of the parties; (2) the re al and pe rsonal mar ital property and debt of

the par ties; (3) the
r e ma in in g r e a l an d p e r s o n a l p r o p e rty an d d e b t o f th e p arti es, the
c ha ra c te r o f w hic h is dis pu te d a nd to b e de c ide d by

the Court . T his last item consists of all real a nd persona l property

and debt of

the pa rt ie s not c ov e re d und e r t

he fi rs t tw o s tip ulatio ns

.... (e mph a sis in the or ig ina l) The pa rties complied with this loca l rule and submitted to the Trial Court a listingof items the parties de emed se parate or marital property , along with a listing of disputed items. When the joint sti pulation was pre sented to the Trial Court pr ior to tr ial, Father wa s not livi ng in the maritalT he amo un t of M ot her ’ s s har e of

t he equi t y was t o be r educe d by t he $4 , 40 8. 43 i n a t t orn ey f ees an d expen s es 6
M o t he r o w ed F athe r, an y un p aid co urt co st s asso ciated wit h the o rd er o f p ro t ec t i o n, and t he $ 2 ,15 0 jud gm en t ag ainst M o the r fo r th e d e stru c tio n o f F a the r’s p ro p e rty d isc u sse d p re v io u sly.

T he T r i al C our t ent er ed a p ost

- t r i al o r der al t er i ng t he pay ment s che dul e. Accordi ng t o t he new order , Fat her 7

wa s t o pa y M ot h er $30, 000 by J u n e 11, 2006, a n d t h en n o l es s t h an $20, 000 pe r y ea r t h er ea f t er u n t i l t h e en t i r e $120, 000 was paid. Simp l e i nt erest was t o accrue be gi nni ng June 1 1 , 20 0 6 , at t he rat e o f 71⁄2 % pe r y ear. -13- residenc e, and Mothe r wa s. Following the trial, the Tria l Court awar ded the mar ital residenc e and responsibility

for the c orre sponding three mortga g es t o Father. There w as appr ox imately $27,000 to $28,000 in e quity

. The Trial Court or dere d that the mediator’ s fee s, Dr. F ree man’s fe es, and the court c osts be paid from the equity

. The remaining equity was to be divi ded 50/50 betwee n Mother and F ather

. Father had two individual retirement a ccounts with a c ombined approximate value of

6 $7,370, which the Tr ial Court divided 50/50. The Trial Court valued Father ’s intere st in a company he oper ated at $240,000. The Trial Court divided this asset 50/50 and ordered F ather to pay Mother $60,000 within 45 day s and the re maining $60,000 ove r t he nex t twelve months at the rate of $5,000 per month. The Trial Court or dere d Father to pay additional debt totaling $42,000, w hich consisted 7 of a B an k o f Am er i ca Vi sa debt of $21,000, a Chase Visa de bt of $12,000, and a debt to a loca l
c re dit un ion of $9 ,0 00 . M oth e r w a s o rd e re d to pa y a pp ro xima te ly $2 2, 90 0 in va ri ou s oth e r c re dit
car d debt. Mother wa s awa rded a s her se parate prope rty a ringvalued at $15,000.

After the Trial Court cla ssified and divi d ed t h e mos t significa nt items of marital proper ty , divided the marital de bt, and classifie d cer tain proper

ty as sepa rate proper

ty of F ather or Mother, all of the rema ining proper ty was deeme d “line item property .” The Trial Court instructed th e p arti e s to d iv id e th is p r o p e rty w it h M o th e r ma

k in g th e f ir s t se le c ti o n , th e n F a th e r ma k in g th e n e xt
se le c tio n, and

so on and so fo rt h u nti l a ll o f t

he pr op e rt

y wa s se le c te d. Th e pa

rt ie s d id j us t th a t.

Mo the r f ile d a po st- tr ia l mo tio n c la imi ngthat sh e had negle c te d to inc lud e c e rt a in items of her personal property on the L ocal Rule 10 list of proper ty . As a re sult, thi s proper ty was not c lassified as her separ ate proper ty beca use the Trial Court w as not a war e it e x iste d

. M other
c la ime d th e se ite ms we re g if ts fr om he r pare nts and sh ou ld have be e n aw ard e d to her a s h e r s e pa

rate proper ty . Father c laimed some of these items were marital prope rty . The T ri al Court denied the motion, st ating , int e r a lia , th a t:

[a] ny separ ate pr operty or any marital proper ty could have been a

nd should h a v e b e e ns ti p u late d o r d is c lo s e d

. A n d

th e nw e ’ v e g one throug h, disclosed as disputed status prope rty . And we’ ve had a classification arg ument. W e did. These thing s are simply omitted. And in a case of this leng th, in particula r, that is inexpl icable.... A t
so me po int , th e tr ia l pr e pa ratio n p ha se e nd s, and

the c a se g oe s to tr ia l. Mother’s motion is nothing less than her request to reope n the proof to a llow further testimony reg arding the items she ne g lected to include in the Rule 10 list and to reopen the pr oof reg arding how t hese items should be classified, i.e., as marital or se parate prope rty . We will treat-14-

Mother’s motion as a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend the judgme nt. We r eview a trial court’ s determination of w hether to gr ant a Rule 59.04 motion t o al t er or amend a judgme nt under a n abuse of

discretion standa

rd. See Stov all v. Clarke , 113 S.W .3d 715, 721 (Tenn. 2003). We c on c lud e tha

t th e Tr ia l Co ur

t di d not a

bu se its dis c re tio n w he n it de nie d M oth e r’ s mo tio n to
re op e n th e pr oo f fo llo wi ng a ve ry le ng thy tr ia l sim ply be c a us e Mo the r ne g le c te d to inc lud e c e rt a in items of proper

ty on the list as require d by

L ocal Rul e 10 or bec ause Mother neg lected to update that list prior to trial or even a ny time during this lengthy

trial. W e note that Mother wa s living in the house both when the Rule 10 lis t was submitted to the Trial Court and dur ing the trial. Mother
a c kn ow le dg e s in

he r b ri e f t

hat ma ny of the se ite ms we re purc ha se d by he r pare nts wh e n h e r p a re nts
we re liv ing wi th he r in the mari ta l re sid e nc e ov e r the su mme r. Mo the r h a s se t f or th n o ju sti fi a

ble
rea son expl aining why

she did not include these items on the L ocal Rule 10 list or why she neg lected to up d a te th a t l is t b e f

o r e th e p arti e s d iv id e d

th e li n e it e ms

. T h e T r ia l C o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f Mother’s motion is , there fore , aff

irmed.

The ne x t issues surround alimony . The fa c to r s to c o n s id er w hen dete rmining w hether to aw ard a lim on y are se t for th in Te nn . Code Ann. § 3 6- 5- 12 1( i) (2 00 5) , w hic h p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: (i ) I n deter

mining whe ther the g ranting of an or der f or pa y me nt o f s up po rt

and ma int e na

nc e to a pa

rt y is a pp ro pr ia te , a

nd in deter mining the nature, amount, length of term, and m an n er of p ay m en t , t h e c o u rt s h al l co n s i d er al l re l ev an tfa ct o rs , i n cl u d i n g: (1) Th e relative ear

ning c apac ity , obligations, needs, and financ ial resour ces of

eac h party , including inc ome from pen sion, pr of it s ha ri ngor re tir e me nt p lans and

a ll o the r s ourc e s; (2) The relat i v e education and training of ea ch par ty , the abilit y an d o p p o rtu n it y o f e a c h p arty

to s e c u r e s u c h e d

u c a ti o nand training , and the ne cessity of a pa rty to se cure further

education and tr a ini ngto i mpr ov e su c h p art y ’s e arning s c a

pa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (3) The duration of the ma rriag e; ( 4 ) T h e a g e an d

m e n t a l c o n d i t i o no f

e a c h p art y; (5) The phy sical conditi on of ea ch par ty , including, but not lim ite d to , p hy sic a l di sa bil ity or inc a pa c ity du e to a

c hr on ic debilitating disea se; (6 ) T he e xten t to wh ic h it

wo uld be un de sir a

ble fo r a pa rt y to seek e mploy

men t outside the home, bec ause suc h party will be custodian of a

minor child of the mar

riag e;T h e T r i al C ou r t not ed t h at M ot h er ’ s m os t re ce n t empl oy men t was as a c at er i n g s al es ma n ag er ma k i n g $36, 000 8

a n n u a lly. W h e n c h ild su p p o rt w a s se t fo llo w ing the tria l, M o the r at tha t tim e w a s e a rn ing $ 4 8 ,0 0 0 p e r ye a r, w h ic h d id

n o t i n c lud e a n un id e n tif ia b le a m o u n t o f i n c o m e a s g ra tuity.
-15- (7 ) Th e se pa

rate a sse ts of

e a c h p art y , b oth re a l and pe rs on a l, tang ible and intang ible; ( 8 ) T h e p r o v i s i o n s m a d e w i t h r e g ar d t o t h e m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y, as def ined in § 36-4-121; (9) The standard of living of the parties e stablished during the marria g e; (1 0) Th e e xten t to wh ic h e a c h p art y has made su c h ta

ng ibl e and intang ible co ntributions to t he mar riag e as mone tary

and homemaker contributions, a nd tang ible and intang ible contributions by a par ty to the education, training or i ncre ased earning power of the
o t h e r p art y; (1 1) Th e re la tiv e fa

ult of the pa rt ie s, in c a se s w he re the c ourt , in its di scre tion, deems it appropriate to do so; and (1 2 ) S u c h o t h e r f

a c t o r s , i n c l u d i n g t h e t a x c o n s e qu e n c e s to
eac h party , as ar e nec essar y to consider the e quities betwee n the pa rt ie s. When making its ruling on alimony , the Trial Court discussed the above statute and state d a s f oll ow s:
There are 12 fac tors fo r s p o u sal support. Many of them have been dealt with und er equitable distribution [ of the mar ital property .] Some of t he m h a v e n o t b e e ns p o k e nto

. Iw o u ld n o te , a g a in , f

a c tor three is rele vant; this is a brief m arr iag e. I would note, ag ain, wife ’s
se pa rate a sse ts of $1 5, 00 0. Iwo uld no te , a g a in, that th e re la tiv e fa ult of the pa rt i es applicable to the spousal support statute favor s the husband....

Th is is n ot a

c a se fo r a

ny sig nif ic ant s po us a l su

pp or t. It is a brief ma rriag e. In no way

has the mother impair ed her car eer or ab i l i t y t o m ak e a t l ea s t$ 3 6 , 0 0 0 a y ea r. S h e h as l et h er co l l ege 8 education languish, but that wa s h er own choice . She prese nts no cog ent plan for

furthe r education and no proof w hatsoeve r of enhanc ed ear

ning pow er throug h such educ ation. Whether sheT h i s a mou n t of Fa t h er ’ s s t u den t l oan pay men t s m ade du r i n g t h e mar r i ag e wa s l at er de t er mi n ed t o be $10, 395, 9 the re b y re su lti n g in a ju d g m e n t t o M o the r in the a m o u n t o f $ 5 ,1 9 7 .5 0

. -16- pursues it or not is her c hoice. The Court acc ording ly cannot f ind that the same w ould enhanc e her ear ning pow er, but who know s what the future holds? She sug g ests that she should have r eha b i l i tative alimony of $3,000 per

month for 48 months to finish her
un de rg ra du a te e du c a tion, to s tart a ft e r h e r d a

ug hte r b e g ins sc ho ol. Wel l, the Court c ann ot fi nd that re ha bil itatio n is f

e a sib le , a pp ro pr ia te or prope r, but we do note that there wer e som e pay ments made upon th e h u s b a n d ’ s student loans during the marr iag e, educ ation completed befor e the mar

riag e. Some pay

ments were made upon the husband’s stu de nt loa

ns duri ng the marr ia g e . I

e ith e r d id n ot n ote the a mou nts , or they did not fall in the testimony , but w hateve r that amou n t m ay be, a judgme nt f

or the wife of 50 perc ent of that number to assist her, if she choose s, in her own education. That num ber is pronounced a s 9 alimony in solido. Given the ext reme fi n an cial load placed upon [Father] otherwise in this opi nion, the pay ment of that number can be at a sc hedule f

ar more rela x ed than the sc hedule a nnounced a

bove.

The Cour t d o e s n o t f

in d th e w if e in n e e d o f r e h a b il it a tion. I ndeed, she does not need further education. She earne d $36,000 at her last job a

nd was rising in he r field of hotel and cate ri n g s ales when she left her

last employ

ment....
Our le g is latu

r e te ll s u s th at tr an s it io n a l a li mo n y is f or a deter minative period of time, and it is awa rded when t he C ourt finds that r e ha

bil itatio n is no t necessar y , b ut t

he e c on omi c a lly di s a d v an t a g e d

s p o u s e n e e d s a s s i s t an c e t o a d j u s tt o t h e e c on omi c conseque n ce s o f a d i v o rc e, l ega l s ep ar at i o no r o t h er p ro ce ed i n g wher e spousal sup p o rt m ay

be aw arde d. There shall be some tra nsitional alimony addre ssed below. I t is non-modifiable.

Th e L e g isl a tur e g ive s us ano the r opt ion fo r s po us a l su pp or t, which is ca lled lump sum alim ony or alimony

in solido; I ’ve spoke n to that a bove. I t is the only alimony in solido that will be pronounce d in this cause. I

touched upon attorney

fee s. The Court notes that the hu sb and a lr e a dy pa id $7 ,5 00 a s a lim on y

tow ard wi fe ’s a tto rn e y

fe e s. Noting that , each par

ty shall here afte r be r esponsible for the
rema ining attorney

fee s that they

have inc urre d.

* * *-17- I t is most painful for this judge to inject y et another neg ative note in this already sad case, but the C ourt has already found that the wi fe ha s w ith he ld from th e hu sb and a t se pa ra tio n h is c lot

hin g , h is famil y fu rniture, a ll the contents of the home, sa ve the she ets that
we re us e d f

or pa int ingdr op c lot

hs , an d mal ic iou sly

dama g e d h is
c lot hing and fu rn iture be fo re it w a s f

ina lly de liv e re d. She sim

ply cannot be left in t h e home to ser ve as a trustee f or these items for these two pa

rties. There is substantial furniture a nd furnishing s. She cannot se rve a s trustee. I t w ould be neg lige nt of this Court to allow that to ha pp e n. Th is C ourt wi ll not e nd ur e any mor e lit ig a tio n a s to what items wer e dama g ed by the wife over the next s ev en d ay s or what disappe are d or what’s not there.

Ac c or din g ly , s he is n ot t o re tur n to the ho me tod ay

.... Th is is highly irregular, but thi s ca s e has been hig hly irregular in eve ry aspec t. Her age n t o r ag ents shall g o to the home today , in the prese nce of

the husband and his counsel, and remove her c lothing and uniquel y p er s o n al effec ts, as well as 50 pe rce nt of all linens and towels. The entire transac tion sha ll be videotaped.... I t is t o be anticipated that the wife w ill lodge in a hote l fo r the next seven nights. The Court directs that t h e h usband shall today book and g ua ra nte e pa y me nt f or se ve n n ig hts ’ l od g inga t th e Knox vi lle M ar r i o t t

. ... T h i s i s a

n o n
- m o d i f

i a b l e i n c i d e n to f

t r an s i t i o n a l a l i m o n y.
Tenne ssee c ourts hav e s t at ed on numerous occ asions that a trial c ourt has broa d dis c re tio n in

de te rm ini ng the ty

pe , a mou nt and dura

tio n of a lim on y , de pe nd ing on the pa rt ic ula r f a c ts of eac h case

. See, e .g. , W ood v. W ood , No. M 2003-00193-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 3008875 at *4, (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 28, 2004), app. denied J une 27, 2005 (citing, int e r a lia , Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W .3d 46 5 , 470 (Tenn. 2001) and Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 511 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). Appe llate cour

ts are disinclined to sec ond g uess a tria l court’s de cision reg ardingalimony
un le ss i t is no t su

pp or te d b y the e vid e nc e or

is c on tr ary

to p ub lic po lic ie s r e fl e c te d in the a pp lic a ble statutes. Nelson v. Nel

s on , 106 S.W .3d 20, 23 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). “ The two most rele vant fac tors in deter

mining the amount of alim ony awa rded a re the economica lly

disadvantag ed spouse’ s need and t he obli g or spous e’s a bility to pay .” Broadbent v. Broadbe nt , 211 S.W .3d 216, 222 (Tenn. 2006). The primar y problem with Mother’s a rg ument on appea l reg ardingalimony is that she does not set for

th what her

specific monthly

financ ial obligations are a nd how much money

she needs to mee t those obligations. L ikewise, she does not set forth what Fathe r’s monthly financ ial ob lig a tio ns are and ho w muc h mon e y he ha s le ft ov e r e a c h mo nth

a ft e r m e e tin g tho se ob lig a tio ns

. Becau s e t h i s cr i t i ca l i n fo rm at i o ni s n o td i s cu s s ed , M o t h er ’s b ri ef co n t ai n s n o co rr es p o n d i n g ci t at ions to the re c or d ind ic a tin g wh e re thi s inf or ma tio n c an be fo un d in the vo lum ino us re c or d o n ap pe a l. See Bean v . Bean , 40 S.W .3d 52, 55-56 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000)(“Courts have routinely held that the-18-

failure t o make a

ppropriate ref

ere nces to the r ecor d and to cite r eleva nt authority

in the argument section of the br ief a s require d by Rule 27(a) (7) c onstitut es a w aiver of the issue.”) (citations omitted). Mother simply states that s h e n ow has monthly g ross income of $4,000, plus a n unidentifiable amount of “additional income a s g ratuity .” W e know that Father’s g ross income wa s substantially

more at $12,371.50 per month. Howeve r, F ather also was he ld responsible for much more than ha lf of the mar ital debt. Mother does not discuss how m uch money , if any , Father is left
w i t h a f t e r p a y i n g t h e m u l t i p l e m o rt g a g e s o nt h e h o u s e an d t h e o t h e r d e b t h e w a s o r d e r e d

t o p a y, including a subst antial amount of c redit ca rd debt incur

red by Mother duringthis short duration marria g e. In addition, Mother does not explain how her financ ial need and Father’s ability to pay is affe cted by

Father’s r equire ment that he pay her $30,000 by

J une 11, 2006, and $20,000 pe r y ear there afte r until a total of $120,000 is paid, plus interest. I n short, we a re una ble to asce rtain whe ther Mother ac tually

has a ne ed for

additional alimony

or whether Father has the ability to make such a pay ment.

Mother also c laims the Trial Court err ed when it f ailed to a war d her a

ny attorney fee s over a nd above the $7,500 that Father was order ed to pay

. An award of attorney fee s in a divorce
case constitutes alimony

in solido. See He rre ra v . H e rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 379, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). B ecau s e Mot her ha s not set forth the information necessa ry for us to asc erta in whether additional alimony

should ha

ve been order ed, we likewise will not dis turb the Tria l Court’s finding on this particular point.

The fina l two issues are evidentiar y

. Take n verbatim fr om Mothe r’s brief, the se issue
are :
A. Whether it was err or for the Court to admit into evidenc e the

repor t of Dr. F ree man, the Court’s own e x pert witness, a s well as he r entire office file, whe n Dr. F re em an wa s prese nt to testify and did in fac t testify

at the trial of this matter.

B

. Whethe r

it w a s e r r o r f o r th e Co u rt t o a d mi t c e rta in h e arsay state me nts of

the min or

c hil d in to evide nc e and us e tho se statements as g rounds for f ur th e r r e s tr iction of the Appe llant’s co-pa renting time.

I n McD aniel v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 955 S.W .2d 257, 263 -6 4 (T enn. 1997), our Supreme Court obser

ved that “que stions re g arding the admissibili ty , qualifications, relevanc y and competenc y of expert testimony are left to the discre tion of the trial cour t.” Id . at 263-64 (c itations omi tte d) . T hu s, a

tr ia l c ourt ’s e vid e nti ary

ru lin g may

be re ve rs e d o nly

“ if the dis c re tio n is arb itr a ri ly exercised or

abused.”

Mo the r a rgue s tha t th e a

bo ve e vid e nc e sh ou ld n ot h a ve be e n a dmi tte d a nd its impr o p e r a d mi s s io n r e s u lt e d , in p art, in h e r h a v in g r e d u c e d c o
- p ar e n ti n g ti me w h ic h h a d to be supervised. Since we have re manded this case for further proce eding s as to Mothe r’s c o-par enting-19-

time and wh et h er that co-pa renting time should be unsupervised, these evidentiar y issues are rende red moot. We ag ain emphasize that on re mand Mother should be g iven standard c o-par enting time that is not supervised, un l es s she has e ng ag ed in conduc t post-trial that rises to the level of
nece ssitating that her

co-pa renting time remain re stricted and supe rvised.

Conclusion The judg ment of the Tr ial Court is aff irmed and this c ause is r emande d to the Trial Court fo r fu rther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s Opinion and for c ollection of the c osts below. Costs on appeal ar e taxed to the Appellant, He ather L . Rusch-Jones, and her sure ty

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE