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mime-ger THE UNDER SECIISTANY

March 26, 1964

/41240RANDOK FOR DEM/ 8SCRIYARY OF DEMME

Attached for your information are taro different histories

relative to our discussion this amain. 'Saone history,

which totals 90 pages, provides a very detailed description

of the development of satellite reconnaissance programs beginning in 1946 and continuing to date. While this history is

very lengthy, it does contain a complete story that should

be skimmed to provide you with the necessary background. It

does not identify specifically the problem areas that now ...

exist but rather alludes to than in explaining the historical

events.

The second history is primarily oriented to the explanation of the development and continuation of the Configuration

Control Board activity associated with the 00MONAIMORAL •

prowl's. When I explained to Mr. &Namara that a Configuration

Control Board actually controlled the changes to the CORONA/

MORAL system, he very emphatically stated that a program with

.the national priority afforded to COMMA would not be reneged

by committee. While I have not dissolved the Coofiguration'

Control Board of the COMM grommet the present tine, I .

have required that all proposed changes be brought tow attention for approval prior to the initiation of any corrective

effort.

The 90 page history has been provided to Dr. Baker and

his panel, and the CCB history has been thoroughly explained

to them during the numerous discussions that have taken place

since 29 February.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

Handle Yin

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DOD DUI 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY T 

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After you have had a chance to review these, if you

feel that a furthei- diecusalan period would be appropriate,

Colonel Strand, wy Executive Assistant, will be available

to discuss any aspects of the merest problem you nay be

interested in pursuing. le addition, General Jolm Martin,

who is Director of the NED staff, will also be available.

slimed

Brockway McMillan

Attachment

2 Histories

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13 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McMILLAN

SUBJECT: Summary History of the Configuration Control

Board Management Arrangement

In response to your request to me during my visit on 5 December

in regard to some background on the CCB, I have assembled the

following facts for your information.

1. Background.

The early CORONA management arrangement (1958-1960)

can be described in the following fashion. The contract structure

was composed of Lockheed as prime weapon system contractor on

the overt side to the Air Force. Lockheed was also under contract

to the agency as a system integrator for payload integration with ITEK

and FCIC as black subcontractors to Lockheed. FCIC was responsible

for camera construction, while ITEK conducted the camera subsystem

and calibration tests. At that time, both the Air Force and the agency

had respectively overt and covert contracts with GE for various portions

of the re-entry body work. The Air Force portion at this time was

concerned with bio-medical experiments and was principally employed

as a cover.

On the government side, Colonel F. C. E. Oder was the Air

Force manager at the working level under General Ritland, while Mr.

Bissell retained the responsibility for major technical and policy

decisions associated with system development. Program progress

was generally reviewed and reported to a group composed of Purcell,

Land and Baker of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, and

Bissell and Kucera of the CIA, and Dr. Herbert York of ARPA. General

Ritland and General Schriever occasionally participated.

c. When the program was transferred to ARPA as part of the

original cover scheme, Captain Truax, USN, was transferred from

Colonel Oder's shop at BMD to act as the payload coordinator for the

CIA on the ARPA staff. Due to Colonel Oder's involvement in the

SENTRY/SAMOS activity, he elected to visibly get out of the program,

and Colonel Red Sheppard was appointed CORONA Director at ESMD.

Subsequently, Colonel Sheppard was replaced by Colonel Paul Worth/man.

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The record indicates that the•CIA (Bissell) objected to the

FCIC/ITEK arrangement and in May of 1960 proposed that both

these contractors become associate contractors to LMSD. During

the period May 1960 to September 1960, the contract and management

structure was the subject of considerable discussion and various

proposals.

In September 1960, shortly after the first CORONA success,

ITEK induced Land to propose an improved CORONA camera directly

to the President. This proposal was the outgrowth of various recommendations on the part of both ITEK and FCIC for product improvement

and camera re-design. The first...of these re-designs was the C I camera

which had been a general product improvement of the basic C instrument.

The proposal which Dr. Land took to the President was substantially a

new design which had grown out of the work done by ITEK and FCIC

independently to improve the basic C instrument.

f. The competitive attitude which evolved between FCIC and ITEK

was basically the result of the agency's dis the contract

structure noted above. In fact, the agency d asked

for separate proposals on an improved ins contractor.

For this reason, the ITEK C HI proposal, which Dr. Land sponsored,

eliminated FCIC from the contract structure. ITEK got "verbal

approval" on the CM from Land, who cited Eisenhower as the authority,

and Mr. Bissell did not challenge this arrangement.

2. Creation of the CCB.

The creation of the CCB was an outgrowth of the negotiations

which took place with the initiation of the MURAL system. The decision to undertake the MURAL camera configuration was basically made

by Mr. Bissell.

Historically, the undertaking of a new development task was

accompanied by a re-appraisal of management arrangements and

working relationships. The actual agreement for the establishment

of a CCB occurred at a meeting of 4 April 1961, in which the principal

negotiators were Dr. Charyk and Mr. Bissell, with Colonel Worthman

and Colonel Battle present. This meeting was tie culmination of a

number of proposals and counter-tproposals, which included a variety

of contractual and management arrangements. Dr. Charyk had taken

the position, which ultimately proved to be the case, that Lockheed

should be given a system engineering function with ITEK as an

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associate contractor. Further, Dr. Cbaryk had expressed a desire

u.;::. AV: to keep the system engineering/technical direction responsibility in „..P.-• . :4. 2 _ the Air Force. As a result of his desire, the 814D volunteered to

...., assume the over-all •S,ETD function, and on 29 April 1961, the CIA

...ri K. agreed to this arrangement.

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El c. Apparently there was some hope at that time that at the con-

., elusion of the C 11 1 effort, then consisting of approximately two payloads, the M effort might be established as a separate program. If

, (ita! this condition had occurred, and in view of the Air Force SETD . .. responsibility-for M, it appeared to some that a clear definition of

7. • program responsibility would be relatively easy. However, when the

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a M system was subsequently incorporated into the original program,

the M arrangements were, by osmosis, diffused through CORONA.

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I would like to point out that it was during the same time

period that negotiations were in progress for the establishment of

the first version of the NRO charter. During this period, a rather

tenuous relationship existed between the CIA and SAFMS. The NRO

was pressing for a clear definition of responsibilities and authorities

in the reconnaissance area, but due to the sensitive relationships

between the principal parties, the hope that the MURAL Program

might evolve into a separate system, the acceptance by the CIA of

AF SETD responsibility, and the many other problems existing

at the time, it was decided not to drive the CORONA issue to a clear

conclusion.

In June of 1961, the AF SETD contract was issued to Lockheed

in the black, which established the Air Force, specifically the AF

!• Space Systems Division, as the responsible agency for systems

engineer' and to hnical direction of the MURAL effort. This contrac 08, was written under my contracting authority.

The mance covered by this contract was April 1961 to

October 1962. These arrangements were subsequently modified during

March and April of 1962 to more clearly define functions and responsibilities of the SETD activities.

f. Clauses were inserted into the associate contractors' contracts which, by inclusion, obligated the associate contractors to

perform contractually under the terms of the SETD agreement

in the basic Lockheed contract.

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The CCB's relationship to the SETD contract evolved as a

matter of inter-government working expediency. Contractually, the

contractors were responsible to me and to the Contracting Officer

whose contract was affected by SETD decisions. The only place

that the CCB appears in the contractual documents is on the form or

cover sheet for a technical directive, wherein a space is provided

for AFSSD/ LMSD coordination.

As the result of the 4 April meeting mentioned above and

various understandings growing out of negotiations, the CORONA/

MURAL CCB, by mutual agreement, consisted of a CIA representative from Headquarters (technical), a CIA representative from the

field for operational considerations (Colonel Murphy), and the then

BMD people from the Discoverer Program Office, initially only one

person, Captain A. Johnson. Subsequent participation in an observer

status by a representative from SAFMS (Major Howard) was changed

when, again by mutual agreement of all parties, Major Howard was

made a voting member.

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i. At this point it might be well to define SETD as it was interpreted for the purposes of these arrangements. System engineering

and technical direction for the program (the word program was "Ad

interpret2d.to mean black payload F..a.tte , .rs) was the responsibility of

the AF Space Systems Division. Lockheed was contracted with to

provide specified system engineering and technical direction over

associate contractors which included the following functions:

Determination of system requirements and establishment

of performance specifications.

Recommend to the government required research,

development and experimentation to achieve established objectives.

(3) With approval, establish design specifications, test

specifications, engineering analysis, reports, procedures and

specifications, system evaluation, subsystem and component

development, preparation and coordination of technical directives,

establishment of program milestones, master schedule, status

reporting, system integration, establishment of interfaces, reliability, associate contractors' weft statements, qualification and

acceptance tests of associate contractors deliverable items, etc.

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The CCB function under this concept was to control payload configuration, act as the internal government coordinating organization, be approval authority over all technical directives issued by

the contractor which affected payload, and serve as coordinating

and review group for items not within the scope of the contract.

j. The LMSD established within the covert area (Advanced

Projects) a SETD group which, under the direction of the CCB,

had authority to issue orders to the associate contractors; however,

the associate contractors had to have approval of the CIA Contracting

Officer in matters which involved changes in scope of work, costs,

or delivery schedule changes.

3. CCB Operation.

Management of the ARGON Program fell into the same general

pattern as CORONA/MURAL, with the establishment of the CCB concept. Initially the ARGON arrangements had been defined in July of 1959.

At that time it was agreed that the BMD/LMSD arrangements for CORONA

be essentially the same as those for ARGON. The principal difference

existed in the fact that over-all technical guidance on the ARGON payload

was provided by DDR&E. At the time the CCB for ARGON was established, a DDR&E representative GON Board. The

first such representative was Mr

With the establishment of 14rograrn in April of

1962, Dr. Charyk proposed and the CIA (Scoville) agreed that I would

be responsible for all technical management aspects of LANYARD,

including payloads; that the CCB system of MURAL would be continued; that the CIA would continue to have responsibility for mission

planning and camera on-orbit operations. Further, the CIA would be

responsible for program security, covert contracting and extending

the CORONA teletype net to include all LANYARD participants. In my

development plan for the conduct of the LANYARD Program I established, to the best of my knowledge, the first formal description of the

CCB in a government document. This description is attached. Contractually, this was implemented in substantially the same fashion as the

MURAL SETD contract, with the exception that Lockheed was given a

systems engineering responsibility, rather than a systems engineering

and technical direction responsibility.
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c. In October of 1962, as a matter of convenience and working

expediency from a contractual viewpoint, I transferred the administration of the SE contract for URAL to the CIA Contracts

Officer stationed here iM t that time the CORONA/MURAL

contract was modified as i of LANYARD to give Lockh

systems engineering role only. This contract was identified 42,

with a period of performance from October to June of 1963.

tract was renewed by Letter Contract on 1 July 1963 to run to 30 June

1964, and is due. for *tization in the immediate future. This document is identified 28. chment 2 is the Statement of Work,

Exhibit A, which w rt 42 and has been carried on under

the Letter Contra 28. , in a similar fashion, Attachment

3 has been include carry over from the old contract to the Letter

Contract. This. is the operating procedure for system engineering and

technical direction dated 10 June 1963. This document is a somewhat

detailed description of the operation of the TD function by the contractor,

and responsibilities of the CCB. References to the CCB in the contractual document are again quite minimal. These are CCB approval of

TDs in paragraph III. 3; initiation of TDs in paragraph V.2; and the

provision for AF CCB signatures on the TD authorization sheet.

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Major General, USAF

Director, Program A

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TEE mum= IS EXTRACTED PRQM PROGRAM CONCEPT DOCUMENT ATTACEED

TO SAFSP MORAN= TO D. CRAM:

C. Internal Government Arranrements 

1. Technical Program Management (SE/TD): Technical

responsibilitiea for the accomplishment of the LANYARD Program rests

1%4 ' • •

vith the Director, Special Projects, OSAF. In this capacity the

Director, Special Projects will discharge all major technical decisions

affecting the development, modification and delivery rates of all

ccmponents of this system. Specific detailed technical responsibilities

vill be delegated to the Director, LANYARD Program for the day-to-day

operation of the technical aspects of the program. A Configuration

Control Board viii be constituted from representatives of the participating organizations to support, advise, and counsel the Director,

Special Protects and the Director, LANYARD Program. The CCB will review and

assess all proposed changes and modifications to the payload, items

affecting the on-orbit operation o: the tayload, and the content of the

final product. The Configuraticn Control Board actions which do not

involve a change in contract scope, alter payload characteristics or

performance, do not affect delivery or launch, schedules, and which have

no appreciable effect on cost a 11.11/3 

11 be s;-omitted to the

Director, LANYARD Program for final approval. The Configuration Control

Board actions involving a change in contractual scope, costs is excess

11111111Fisions to launch 'schedules or payload performance, will

be submitted through the Director, LANI'ARD Program to the Directom,

Special Projects for final approval. For CCB procedures,. see Annex A.