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Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144005 

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Minority Report on the 

BYE-5315 ... 74 

Copy _!_of S2.0 Ma:rch 1974 

Review of Security Requirements of the 

National Reconnaissance Program 

·tNTRODUCTION 

Thtl representative of the Olfice of Security, CIA agree• 

with the basic findings of the majority but does: not believe the 

modifications of ecurity policy and prooedures proposed by the 

majority go far enough to satisfy thl"! pf'ess\lrcs of tho timoa. 

The following, then, represent ■ the propoaala he ofter• baaed 

upon the change ■ noted in today's environment over those 

existing when tight security was adopted around the National 

R:econna-isaance Proaram in 1962 .. 

I. Time and. event■ have overtaken and moderated 

the fears a.nd concerns of 1962 which led to tbe impo Uion of 

compartmented mecurity controls over the entire National 

Reconnaissance Protrarn.. Modifications to the BYEMAN 

Control System which prescr-ibee aecul'ity procedures around 

the NB.P can be introduced which will e•se the pressut(!S of 

today's environment !or greater candor, complement the 

·. approved modification■ of ecurity controls over satellite 

Cl,4.ISff'!O IY .· !ff;.•.•Qt t 

arnn Ho· .. \ <:m:,·i .. t c·_:'A·:,;:Fic~ . sc·mu:!: i::1. c ··.:uti\'.' •:: ·· ·· n:. ·• i:: .. n,or, c,1.trcc.1;, ,, t, i:1 

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pho~apby, andfaeilitate a more reasonable admim.strationol the 

DYEMAN Control System witbou~ sacrUlee of essential security 

ewer . operations. and technoloff · of the .. Natit·mal Recormaissance Program. . . 

a. The froposecl modifications are: 

(a) DecJase:tfy the 19'65 agreement between 

the Db!'ector of Central Intelligence and the< Seeretl.1"f 

of Defenae which established·· the ·National .Rec:on .. •i••aace Pro1ram.. and ·.the · National D.econnais &ance · 

OUiee and impl~unentin1 directives. 

(bl· Perinlt•iclentification.·ofthe composition 

and bu4lot of the Nl\O at the: SECRET level. 

(cl Cllange··tbe· BYE.MAN •Control System 

policy so a• to: 

fl); lla,ahHah ·at. tne gover·mnent 

le,vel • .. only t\vo. eompart:rnenle ·.rather· titan 

the· present etght--~one ··. compa,.-tment tor 

iwoeec:iion · of SIGINT satellite• a.Ad one 

eompartmentJor protection of photo- .. 

· 1:taptdc satellites~ · ·•· • t><,·•. not eha.n,e. the 

compar11Mn1aaofi .p1iactice1 1.1;··.tlWi··.·. · mdusuial level. . . . .. ... . 

. . .. . Cll :rte•i--•• the l•erm~ of. BYl:MAM 

plP'oceduee .to .• comply .1.\Fiilr Ill., !req11il"'1• .. menta o.f ~uftve Order J li!il~ In. this: 

0011nec:tim dec:ot'rlparttarne•t llml ~eclitsslly .· .. 'c-.1..,oicl.,, diia.tti~ tl\JQil:,.,rs· ~. ~ililtd.6:n 

. ·-~•IUl'I··:· . ... .... .. . ........ . 

••·••· : Jollciw i > . 
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•· ltlr. ,c,a·•:r' . • . · .• , w"-Ju.: ... , 

BYE-5315-74 

to the declassification of' the NRO which occurred 

on 12 October ·1973 ·in consequence ol its appearance in the Congres siona.l Record. Further, it 

would permit and serve as a. frame o{ refere.nce 

for release of information on the NR.P without 

lorma.l acknowledgement of a U.S. reconnaissance 

satellite · pr og:ra.m. 

fbl Ellrn:lnatlon of the present difficult cover 

arrangements used to conceal the l\1RO and its 

personnel. 

(c) .Permit· opporb.utit:y to re-evalua.te the 

deebrabU:ity of formalizing the NRO management 

atructur!I •• a· legitimate organ of ·the National 

I.m:elligence ··eommanity • 

. ·(4).•··The ••Nllo budge·t could be consolidated 

as 1.1.n official p..rt of the National Jntelligence 

. Budget and defended before the Con@i"OS<I as 

.. such.· . 

· ca,· Reducing the. number of compart ... .. rnentaB.ona within. the ··aY£14AN Control· System 

Wtrm.~ pe~rnit s{lllpUfication of the administration 

•••·o~ ,.. •r•ten1 at· •• tlte· 1ove:rnme1nt level where· the 8'•~in is.· criflciaed for• •requiting. e:t:ee• aive 

compm-trnenla:iion and tooripd control ot . ·1•...::.,... ... .,. •. liilo· • · ••v• ••-~ .. "* . . . . ... 

... ·•··•• . . (fJ .. A .reatahm~nt 0£ BYEMAN controls 

. >iE3⁄4§~;§FQi;M . . . Order l165t. Declae- . 

· •• • rniaa11⁄46n·tm~ltirs,. -:·./·:=·.-;:•:::· ;:.·:.i·)il:,:=·.'.., :·.,·.' ,L ·\ ::.: .:_.·.·.,:;:··,.'. 
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BYJ:-5315-74 

(I) Adoption of the e moclific&tiona would 

make it ea ier in 1eneral to satiafy the desire ■ 

of Con1res ■ for information about the NRP and 

tbe NR.O. 

(h) The needs of the civil a1enciea, recognized 

as a le1iti.mate requirement could be ati fied as 

deaired without imposing expensive and complex 

••curity stipulations on them. 

(i) The elective use of security control■ 

where nece sary to protect es ential operation■ 

and technology would increase the credibility of 

the need.a of ecurity and gain a greater meaaure 

of ae:t:eptance £or euch ecurity. 

4. The followin1 diaadvantages are seen: 

(a) An increased Congressional crut:lny 

of the NRP and DCI involvement in the NRO. - (b) Poasiblo difficulty in continuin1 uae of 

treamlined management procedure■ now employed 

by the NRO. 

(c, A po■■ ible desire by department■ and 

as encte ■ which now contribute to the NRO to 

decentralize and regularize program mana1ement 

along line• of other DoD program■• 

(d) There will be increaaed prcsaui-e to 

ollicially admit the ttfact of'' a U. s. ••tellite 

reconnaissance program with aub1equent 

tncreaae ol interest at international forum• 

on the ■■ue ■ ol le1ality and aovereignty. 

(e) There would be an increase in the ri k 

of unauthorized disclosures about the operation 

of the NRO which may •timulate countermea ur••• 

-4-

TOP ~ttiREr 

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H 
' (I) Modification of the BYEMAN Syst~m 

... to eatabli h .only two apecial clo&Yance• wov14 

:tiave a.negative impact o:a:the•earre11;t see.ity 

practice ■ at the industrial level. 

Balanced considerations of the advantage• and disadvantages 

· ot eaa,ing the spec:ial security caveats placed a:round the NR.P indicate>•• 

·that they can be moderated to eatis!y the trend■ of the time without · · 

aerious th:reat to the continued viability of the NRO and unilateral 

conduct of the U. S,. National Reconnaissance Program. · 

. a.obert A. Taylor 
CIA 

to DCI for Info Handling Sys.