Filed 9/12/24 Cagle v. Armour CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TIBREA L. CAGLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

AMOR L. ARMOUR,

Defendant and Respondent.

B334400

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 

21STCV19648

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Michael E. Whitaker, Judge. Affirmed.

D’Egidio & Pedroza and Irving Pedroza; Gelb Law 

and Yisrael Gelb for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings and Michael W. Knapp

for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Plaintiff Tibrea L. Cagle appeals an order imposing 

monetary sanctions of less than $5,000 against her and her 

attorney, Irving Pedroza of D’Egidio & Pedroza, APC. (See Code 

Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (b).)1 Defendant Amor L. Armour moved 

for terminating and monetary sanctions under section 128.7 

on the ground that plaintiff and her attorney had improperly 

maintained the action without an evidentiary basis for plaintiff’s

claims. Defendant’s evidence supported the request for 

sanctions, and plaintiff offered no evidence in opposition until 

after the trial court entered an order of dismissal terminating 

the action between the parties. On this record, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Consistent with our standard of review, we state the facts 

established by the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

trial court’s ruling. (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 

428, 441 (Peake) [sanctions under section 128.7 reviewed for 

abuse of discretion and presumed correct]; Haraguchi v. Superior 

Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 [under abuse of discretion 

standard, “trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for 

substantial evidence”].)

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in May 2021. Her form 

complaint alleges defendant negligently operated a motor vehicle 

“thereby causing grievous and serious bodily injuries and 

damages” to plaintiff.2

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 

Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

2 The complaint also named as defendants Maven Drive, 

LLC (the company that rented the vehicle to defendant) and 

Maven LSG, LTD LSR (the company that owned the vehicle). 
3

In June 2022, after plaintiff and her counsel Pedroza

refused to verify plaintiff’s discovery responses and unilaterally 

cancelled her deposition with less than a day’s notice, defendant 

filed a motion to compel and request for sanctions. On 

October 18, 2022 (before the hearing on defendant’s motion), 

plaintiff amended her complaint to substitute Ki Hwan Kim 

for one of the doe defendants who was allegedly responsible 

for plaintiff’s injuries. On November 8, 2022, the trial court 

granted defendant’s motion to compel, finding plaintiff abused 

the discovery process. The court ordered plaintiff to provide 

verifications and appear for deposition within 30 days.

Plaintiff was finally deposed on December 13, 2022, after 

twice demanding $15,000 to settle the case while refusing to 

appear for her deposition within the court-ordered timeframe. 

She testified that two drivers other than defendant struck and 

injured her while she crossed the street. Plaintiff had amended 

her complaint to add one of those drivers—Kim—as a defendant 

months earlier. And she had sued the other driver—Laura 

Harrier—in a separate lawsuit sometime earlier. Plaintiff 

testified Kim’s white van struck her as she crossed the street, 

and then Harrier’s white car backed over plaintiff’s head while 

she lay in the road, causing all of plaintiff’s alleged injuries.

3 

She confirmed her injuries did not affect her memory and 

her testimony reflected her full recollection of the incident.

After these defendants successfully removed the action to federal 

court, plaintiff dismissed them from the lawsuit as part of a 

stipulation for remand. In November 2021, the federal court 

granted plaintiff’s unopposed motion for remand.

3 According to plaintiff, Harrier had been chasing plaintiff 

down the street trying to hit her before Kim’s van struck her.
4

After plaintiff’s deposition, her counsel Pedroza 

acknowledged plaintiff had identified two drivers other than 

defendant who struck her and caused her injuries. In view 

of the admissions, Pedroza asked if defendant would agree to 

a dismissal in exchange for a costs waiver. Defendant’s counsel 

agreed and prepared a confirming email, which he sent to 

Pedroza that evening. Plaintiff did not dismiss the action 

against defendant.

For the next two months, defendant’s counsel made 

repeated attempts to reach Pedroza regarding the dismissal. 

In early February 2023, Pedroza responded. He advised that 

his firm had “no intention of pursuing this any further” and 

that plaintiff was “aware” of counsel’s position. He said either 

plaintiff would sign a substitution of attorney to represent herself 

or he would withdraw from the case. He asked defendant’s 

counsel to prepare a “waiver of costs release” to present to 

plaintiff. Pedroza explained, “I have to do what I believe my 

obligations to the client is [sic] without my office pursuing 

this claim any further.” He reiterated, “we are no longer 

going to pursue this claim against your client.” Later that day, 

defendant’s counsel prepared a “stipulation for dismissal with 

wavier of costs” and emailed it to Pedroza. Plaintiff did not 

file the stipulation, and Pedroza did not move to be relieved 

as counsel.

On March 20, 2023, defendant served plaintiff and Pedroza

with a motion for terminating and monetary sanctions under 

section 128.7. Relying on plaintiff’s deposition testimony and 

the communications with Pedroza, defendant argued plaintiff 

and Pedroza knew plaintiff lacked evidentiary support for her 

claims yet unreasonably continued to pursue them in violation 
5

of section 128.7, subdivision (b)(3). Defendant maintained this 

continuing conduct was part of a pattern of delay and deception 

that plaintiff and Pedroza had employed to extract a nuisance 

settlement from defendant. On April 17, 2023, after the 21-day 

safe harbor period passed without plaintiff dismissing her 

complaint or Pedroza moving to withdraw from the case, 

defendant filed the motion for sanctions with the court.

Plaintiff opposed the motion but offered no supporting 

declaration or other evidence. Her opposition brief argued 

plaintiff’s claims could not have been frivolous because 

defendant had offered a “policy limits” settlement that was 

“later withdrawn prior to the Plaintiff’s deposition.” The brief 

also denied that Pedroza had engaged in bad faith tactics, 

acknowledging that plaintiff, “at her deposition[,] provided 

testimony that no longer allows for Plaintiff’s counsel to continue 

representing the Plaintiff,” while emphasizing that “Plaintiff’s

counsel has not engaged in any further discovery, or [settlement] 

offers to the Defendant” since plaintiff’s deposition.4

On June 8, 2023, the trial court granted the motion, 

finding terminating and monetary sanctions were warranted 

against plaintiff and Pedroza for “advancing objectively factually 

frivolous claims against Defendant, in violation of Section 128.7, 

subdivision (b)(3).” The court explained: “Based on Plaintiff’s 

admissions in her deposition that the subject car accident 

involved two separate individuals other than Defendant, 

Plaintiff’s factually devoid written discovery responses, and 

Plaintiff’s failure to advance any meritorious argument in 

4 Plaintiff’s attorney moved to be relieved as counsel the 

same day plaintiff filed her opposition.
6

opposition to the motion defending the validity of her claims 

against Defendant, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s ‘allegations 

and other factual contentions’ advanced in her complaint do 

not have evidentiary support.” The court ordered plaintiff and 

Pedroza, jointly and severally, to pay sanctions in the amount 

of $2,430, representing the attorney fees and costs defendant 

incurred to bring the sanctions motion.

On June 9, 2023, the trial court entered an order of 

dismissal with prejudice as to defendant.

The same day, Pedroza filed a declaration explaining 

his and plaintiff’s reasons for filing and maintaining the action 

against defendant. On July 10, 2023, plaintiff filed an ex parte 

application for reconsideration, asking the court to revisit its

ruling in light of Pedroza’s declaration. The court rejected 

the application, ruling plaintiff failed to satisfy the procedural 

and substantive requirements for ex parte relief.

On August 10, 2023, plaintiff filed a request for voluntary 

dismissal of the entire action. The next day, the trial court 

entered an order of dismissal purporting to dismiss “MAVEN

LSG, LTD LSR, et al.” under section 581, subdivision (b)(3).5

On November 29, 2023, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 

from the order imposing monetary sanctions. (See § 904.1, 

subd. (b).)

5 As noted, plaintiff dismissed Maven LSG, LTD LSR from 

the action in late 2021 as part of a stipulation for remand from 

the federal court. (See fn. 2, ante.) Section 581, subdivision (b)(3)

authorizes the trial court to dismiss an action “without prejudice, 

when no party appears for trial following 30 days’ notice of time 

and place of trial.”
7

DISCUSSION

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and for Additional 

Sanctions

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal and requests 

that we impose additional sanctions against plaintiff and her 

counsel. He argues this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the 

appeal, both because plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action 

and because the appeal is untimely. He also maintains the 

appeal is frivolous, warranting an award of additional sanctions. 

We deny the motion.

This is the relevant procedural background: Pratik Shah 

of Shah D’Egidio, APC filed the complaint on plaintiff’s behalf. 

On October 18, 2022, plaintiff’s counsel filed a notice of firm 

name change and notice of change of handling attorney. The 

notice advised the firm’s name had been changed to D’Egidio 

& Pedroza, APC and the attorney of record handling the case 

would be Irving Pedroza.6 The filing confirmed the firm’s 

mailing address and phone number had not changed, but 

requested that all future communications be addressed 

to Pedroza at the new firm name.

On June 9, 2023, the trial court signed and entered an 

order of dismissal with prejudice as to defendant. The same day, 

the clerk of the court served the order of dismissal on Pratik 

Shah at Shah D’Egidio, APC.

On June 15, 2023, defendant filed a memorandum of costs 

as the prevailing party.

6 Pedroza had represented plaintiff and signed discovery 

responses on her behalf since March 2022.
8

On August 10, 2023, plaintiff filed a request for voluntary 

dismissal of the entire action. The superior court clerk entered 

the dismissal the next day.

On August 23, 2023, the court entered judgment in favor 

of defendant and against plaintiff, awarding defendant $7,719.13 

in costs as requested in his unopposed costs memorandum.

On November 29, 2023, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal 

from the award of monetary sanctions.

Defendant argues plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of the 

action divests this court of jurisdiction to review the underlying 

proceeding. The rule he relies upon is not applicable in this case. 

“When an action is wilfully dismissed by the plaintiff 

against one or more of several defendants the effect is the 

same as if the action had been originally brought against the 

remaining defendants.” (Cook v. Stewart McKee & Co. (1945) 

68 Cal.App.2d 758, 761 (Cook), citing Page v. W. W. Chase Co.

(1904) 145 Cal. 578, 584.) “A wilful dismissal terminates the 

action for all time and affords the appellate court no jurisdiction 

to review rulings on demurrers or motions made prior to the 

dismissal.” (Cook, at pp. 760–761.) “After such dismissal 

the defendant is a stranger to the action.” (Id. at pp. 761–762

[defendant who was voluntarily dismissed from action had 

no standing to appeal prior order overruling demurrer].)

The foregoing rule applies to a defendant who has been 

voluntarily dismissed—it does not apply to the “remaining 

defendants” or to a defendant who had already been dismissed 

from the action. (Cook, supra, 68 Cal.App.2d at p. 761; see, e.g., 

Courtney v. Waring (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1434, 1439 [plaintiff’s 

voluntary dismissal of “all other defendants” did not divest 

appellate court of jurisdiction to review demurrer ruling in 
9

favor of respondent-defendants].) As we have discussed, two

months before plaintiff filed her request for voluntary dismissal, 

the trial court entered the sanctions ruling and a signed order 

of dismissal with prejudice as to defendant. A written order of 

dismissal, signed by the trial court, constitutes a final judgment 

and, as a general matter, divests the superior court of jurisdiction 

to alter the judgment with respect to those defendants affected 

by the dismissal. (See APRI Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 

Cal.App.4th 176, 181 (APRI) [“ ‘Once judgment has been entered, 

. . . the court may not reconsider it and loses its unrestricted 

power to change the judgment.’ ”]; cf. Wells Fargo & Co. v. 

City and County of San Francisco (1944) 25 Cal.2d 37, 44 [“The 

awarding of costs is but an incident to the judgment [citations], 

and is therefore within the court’s jurisdiction to enter the 

judgment.”].) Because the court entered a signed order 

dismissing defendant from the action before plaintiff voluntarily 

dismissed what remained of the action, plaintiff has standing 

to challenge the sanctions ruling and we have jurisdiction to 

consider her appeal. (Cf. Yancey v. Fink (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 

1334, 1342–1343 [“While a compulsory dismissal by order 

of a court is a judicial act from which a plaintiff may appeal, 

a voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff is accomplished by a 

ministerial act of the clerk, filing from which no appeal lies.”].) 

Alternatively, defendant argues plaintiff’s appeal is 

untimely because she filed her notice of appeal more than 60 days 

after purported service of the June 9, 2023 order of dismissal and 

the August 23, 2023 judgment awarding costs. Plaintiff contends 

neither document was properly served, and therefore her notice 

of appeal—filed within 180 days of entry of the dismissal order—

was timely. We agree with plaintiff.
10

Under rule 8.104, a notice of appeal must be filed on or 

before the earlier of either (a) 60 days after the superior court 

clerk or a party serves the appealing party with “a document 

entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of 

the judgment, accompanied by proof of service,” or (b) 180 days 

after entry of judgment. (Rule 8.104(a)(1).) Under section 581d, 

“[a]ll dismissals ordered by the court shall be in the form of 

a written order signed by the court and filed in the action and 

those orders when so filed shall constitute judgments and be 

effective for all purposes.” 

Defendant argues the superior court clerk’s service of the 

June 9, 2023 order of dismissal triggered the 60-day deadline 

for plaintiff to file her notice of appeal.7 Plaintiff acknowledges 

the signed order of dismissal under section 581d constitutes a 

“file-endorsed copy of the judgment” as specified in rule 8.104, 

but she argues the 60-day deadline was not triggered because 

the clerk addressed service of the document to Pratik Shah 

at Shah D’Egidio, APC after plaintiff had filed a notice of firm 

name change and change of handling attorney specifying that 

all future filings should be addressed to Irving Pedroza at 

D’Egidio & Pedroza, APC.

7 Defendant seems to suggest the court’s June 8, 2023 

minute order granting his motion for terminating and monetary 

sanctions “constitutes entry of judgment” as well; however, 

defendant also acknowledges the order may “not satisfy” the 

requirements of section 581d. Defendant is correct on the latter 

point. Because the trial court did not sign the minute order, 

it does not constitute a judgment under section 581d. (Cf. Muller 

v. Tanner (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 438, 440 [signed minute order 

dismissing action is “treated as a judgment of dismissal and 

as appealable” under section 581d].)
11

Section 1013 provides that “service by mail” is complete 

when it is posted in an envelope “addressed to the person on 

whom it is to be served, at the office address as last given by 

that person on any document filed in the cause and served on 

the party making service by mail.” (§ 1013, subd. (a), italics 

added.) “This subdivision is applicable to the mailing by a court 

clerk of notice announcing the entry of an appealable judgment 

or order.” (Triumph Precision Products, Inc. v. Insurance Co. 

of North America (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 362, 365 (Triumph); 

see Valley Vista Land Co. v. Nipomo Water & Sewer Co. (1967) 

255 Cal.App.2d 172, 174 (Valley Vista) [“A successful service by 

mail requires strict compliance with the statute.”]; see also Alan 

v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 902

(Alan) [“documents mailed by the clerk do not trigger the 60-day 

period for filing a notice of appeal unless the documents strictly 

comply with [rule 8.104]”].)

“Where the envelope containing the notice is improperly 

addressed, it is as though notice [was] never mailed by the clerk.” 

(Triumph, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 365, citing Valley Vista, 

supra, 255 Cal.App.2d at pp. 173–174.) Here, because the 

clerk of the court did not address the order of dismissal to Irving 

Pedroza at D’Egidio & Pedroza, APC, the mailing of the order 

was not effective to trigger the 60-day deadline under rule 8.104.8 

8 As noted, on August 11, 2023—the same day the clerk 

entered plaintiff’s request for voluntary dismissal—the trial court 

signed and entered an order of dismissal, listing the defendants 

as “MAVEN LSG, LTD LSR, et al.” (See fns. 2 & 5, ante.) 

Although the superior court clerk correctly addressed mail 

service of the order to Pedroza at D’Egidio & Pedroza, we 

conclude this order was insufficient to trigger the 60-day filing 

deadline. As we have noted, “documents mailed by the clerk 
12

(See Triumph, at pp. 364–365 [where “envelope containing 

the notice [of entry of order granting new trial] had been 

addressed to [appellant’s] attorney at the correct street address, 

but had omitted the name of his law firm,” clerk’s mail service 

did not trigger deadline to appeal].)

Defendant’s purported service of the August 23, 2023 

judgment was likewise ineffective to trigger the 60-day deadline. 

In a declaration offered in support of the motion to dismiss, 

defendant’s attorney states he “served Plaintiff’s counsel with 

the [judgment] via email on September 12, 2023.” However, 

the copy of the email offered with counsel’s declaration does 

not include the judgment, much less a proof of service stating 

the date a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment was served. 

(See rule 8.104(a)(1)(B) [requiring “filed-endorsed copy of the 

judgment, accompanied by proof of service” to trigger 60-day 

deadline]; see also § 1013b [stating methods by which proof 

do not trigger the 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal 

unless the documents strictly comply with [rule 8.104(a)(1)].” 

(Alan, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 902.) This order of dismissal did 

not clearly apply to defendant, who had already been dismissed 

from the case. Moreover, the order referred to dismissal under 

section 581, subdivision (b)(3)—the statute authorizing dismissal 

“when no party appears for trial following 30 days’ notice of 

time and place of trial.” (§ 581, subd. (b)(3).) In view of these 

anomalies, this order was insufficient to trigger the 60-day 

period. (See Alan, at p. 903 [“To interpret rule 8.104(a)(1) 

as commencing the 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal 

only when the clerk has sent a single, self-sufficient document 

satisfying all of the rule’s conditions does not do violence to 

the rule’s language.”].)
13

of electronic service may be made].) Counsel’s email was 

insufficient to trigger the 60-day deadline.

Finally, defendant argues the appeal is frivolous and 

requests we impose sanctions against plaintiff and her counsel.9 

He bases the request on the same grounds he asserted for 

dismissing the appeal, arguing plaintiff’s “Request for Dismissal 

divest[ed] this Court of jurisdiction” and plaintiff “missed the 

deadline to timely file her notice of appeal.” Having rejected 

both arguments, we also deny defendant’s request for sanctions.

2. Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated the Trial Court 

Erred in Imposing Monetary Sanctions

Section 128.7 “authorizes trial courts to impose sanctions 

to check abuses in the filing of pleadings, petitions, written 

notices of motions or similar papers.” (Musaelian v. Adams

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 514 (Musaelian).) Under this authority, 

trial courts may issue sanctions, including monetary and 

terminating sanctions, against a party or her attorney for filing 

a complaint that is factually frivolous. (§ 128.7, subds. (b)–(d); 

Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 253, 263–264.) 

A complaint is factually frivolous if a reasonable attorney would 

agree it is not well grounded in fact because it lacks “evidentiary 

9 Section 907 authorizes the imposition of appellate 

sanctions “[w]hen it appears to the reviewing court that the 

appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay.” (See also rule 

8.276(a)(1).) An appeal may be found frivolous and sanctions 

imposed when the appeal “is prosecuted for an improper motive

—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse 

judgment,” or “indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable 

attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely 

without merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637,

646, 650.)
14

support” and is “[un]likely to have evidentiary support after 

a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”

(§ 128.7, subd. (b)(3); Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 

156, 167; Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 189 [“[T]o 

obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party’s conduct 

in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. [Citation.] 

A claim is objectively unreasonable if ‘any reasonable attorney 

would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit.’ ”].) 

“A court has broad discretion to impose sanctions if the moving 

party satisfies the elements of the sanctions statute.” (Peake, 

supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 441.)

“[E]ven though an action may not be frivolous when it 

is filed, it may become so if later-acquired evidence refutes the 

findings of a prefiling investigation and the attorney continues 

to file papers supporting the client’s claims. [Citation.] Thus, 

a plaintiff’s attorney cannot ‘just cling tenaciously to the 

investigation he had done at the outset of the litigation and 

bury his head in the sand.’ [Citation.] Instead, ‘to satisfy [the] 

obligation under [section 128.7] to conduct a reasonable inquiry 

to determine if his [or her] client’s claim was well-grounded in 

fact,’ the attorney must ‘take into account [the adverse party’s] 

evidence.’ ” (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 441, quoting 

Childs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (5th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 

1018, 1025.)10

10 “The Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 

128.7 based on rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

(28 U.S.C.), as amended in 1993 (Rule 11).” (Peake, supra, 227 

Cal.App.4th at p. 440, citing Musaelian, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 

p. 518, fn. 2.) “Therefore, federal case law construing Rule 11 
15

“[S]ection 128.7 provides for a 21-day period during which 

the opposing party may avoid sanctions by withdrawing the 

offending pleading or other document.” (Peake, supra, 227 

Cal.App.4th at p. 441; § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) “By providing 

this safe harbor period, the Legislature designed the statute 

to be ‘remedial, not punitive.’ [Citation.] When a party does not 

take advantage of the safe harbor period, the ‘statute enables 

courts to deter or punish frivolous filings which disrupt matters, 

waste time, and burden courts’ and parties’ resources.’ ” (Peake,

at p. 441.)

“We review a [section] 128.7 sanctions award under 

the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] We presume the 

trial court’s order is correct and do not substitute our judgment 

for that of the trial court. [Citation.] To be entitled to relief 

on appeal, the court’s action must be sufficiently grave to 

amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Peake, supra,

227 Cal.App.4th at p. 441.) The appellant bears the burden 

to overcome our presumption of correctness by affirmatively 

demonstrating error on the record presented. (Ketchum v. Moses

(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140–1141.)

Plaintiff contends the imposition of monetary sanctions was 

an abuse of discretion for two principal reasons. First, she argues 

a police report placing defendant at the incident scene establishes 

she and her attorney had an objectively reasonable basis to 

believe defendant could have been at least partially responsible 

for her injuries when they filed the action. Second, with respect 

to her attorney, plaintiff argues Pedroza cannot be sanctioned for 

(28 U.S.C.) is persuasive authority on the meaning of section 

128.7.” (Peake, at p. 440.)
16

failing to dismiss the action, even after plaintiff’s “self-sabotaging 

deposition testimony,” because plaintiff “would not agree to the 

stipulation to dismiss.”11

11 Plaintiff also argues Pedroza cannot be sanctioned 

for failing to dismiss defendant from the action during the 

safe harbor period because some federal courts have held Rule 11 

sanctions cannot be imposed on attorneys who do not sign 

offending papers or who fail to file papers, including a dismissal. 

(See, e.g., Samuels v. Wilder (7th Cir. 1990) 906 F.2d 272, 275.) 

However, other federal courts disagree with this interpretation 

of Rule 11. (See, e.g., Mann v. G & G Mfg., Inc. (6th Cir. 1990) 

900 F.2d 953, 959 [“After the complaint is filed, plaintiffs’ counsel 

retain a continuing responsibility to review their pleadings and, 

if necessary, to modify them to conform with Rule 11.”]; accord 

Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership (4th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2d 

207, 211, fn. 1 [“The crux of the district court’s order imposing 

sanctions was that plaintiff’s counsel continued to pursue their 

claims for some time after it would have been reasonable and 

responsible to dismiss the claims. Under these circumstances 

it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose 

sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.”].)

No California court appears to have adopted this unsettled

aspect of federal Rule 11 jurisprudence, and we need not wade 

into the debate here. The record shows that, consistent with 

plaintiff’s deposition testimony, she and her counsel Pedroza 

amended the complaint to substitute Ki Hwan Kim for one of 

the doe defendants who was allegedly responsible for plaintiff’s 

injuries. This evidence, especially when coupled with counsel’s 

ongoing refusals to respond to defendant’s discovery requests 

at the time, supports a reasonable inference that counsel knew 

defendant was not responsible for plaintiff’s injuries when he 

filed the amended pleading. Plaintiff’s and her counsel’s filing 

of the amended pleading while continuing to maintain the action 

against defendant plainly comes within the purview of our state 

statute. (See, e.g., Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 439–440 
17

Both arguments are insufficient to overcome our 

presumption of correctness because plaintiff bases them 

on evidence she offered after the trial court entered its order 

dismissing the action against defendant. As noted, plaintiff 

opposed defendant’s motion for sanctions but offered no 

supporting declaration or other evidence. Her opposition brief 

made no mention of a police report, arguing instead that her 

claims could not have been frivolous because defendant earlier

offered a “policy limits” settlement. Further, while plaintiff 

(or her counsel) acknowledged she had “provided testimony that 

no longer allows for Plaintiff’s counsel to continue representing 

the Plaintiff,” she said nothing about refusing to allow her 

attorney to dismiss the action against defendant. Rather, her 

opposition brief observed only that “a waiver of costs still has 

to be approved and signed by the Plaintiff,” while emphasizing 

that “no further discovery or demands from the defendant ha[d]

occurred” since the deposition. To the extent plaintiff offered any 

evidence to support the arguments she now advances on appeal, 

all the purported evidence was submitted with the Pedroza 

declaration, which she filed after the trial court ruled on the 

sanctions motion and entered the signed order of dismissal 

as to defendant.12

[affirming sanctions against plaintiff and attorney where trial 

court found plaintiff’s “claims were ‘utterly lacking in legal merit’ 

and [plaintiff’s and counsel’s] continued maintenance of the 

claims warranted sanctions under [section] 128.7”].) 

12 Plaintiff contends the trial court had these documents 

on June 9, 2023 when the court entered the order of dismissal. 

However, the reverse chronological register of actions shows 
18

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to

consider evidence that plaintiff submitted after the court signed 

the dismissal order. As we explained with respect to defendant’s 

motion to dismiss, a written order of dismissal, signed by the 

trial court, constitutes a final judgment under section 581d and 

divests the court of jurisdiction to reconsider its ruling once the 

judgment has been entered. (See APRI, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 181.) In APRI, the trial court signed an order dismissing 

the defendant from the action before granting the plaintiff’s 

motion for reconsideration of the dismissal. (APRI, at pp. 179–

181.) The APRI court issued a writ directing the trial court 

to vacate the latter order, reasoning the lower court lacked 

jurisdiction to grant reconsideration because its signed 

dismissal order constituted a final judgment under section 581d. 

(APRI, at pp. 180–181, 186.) The fact that the plaintiff had 

filed her motion for reconsideration before the trial court entered 

the dismissal order did not change this necessary conclusion: 

“The issue is jurisdictional. Once the trial court has entered 

judgment, it is without power to grant reconsideration. The 

fact that a motion for reconsideration may have been pending 

when judgment was entered does not restore this power to 

the trial court.” (Id. at pp. 179–180, 182.) 

The same rule applies here. Once the trial court entered 

the signed order dismissing defendant from the action, it had no 

jurisdiction to reconsider its sanctions ruling in light of Pedroza’s 

late-filed declaration. If plaintiff and her counsel had evidence 

relevant to the motion for sanctions, it was incumbent upon them

to file it with their opposition brief. 

the court entered the dismissal order before plaintiff filed the 

Pedroza declaration later that day.
19

The record properly before us establishes plaintiff and 

her attorney knew they lacked evidentiary support to pursue the 

action against defendant at least as early as plaintiff’s deposition. 

Indeed, the trial court could have reasonably inferred they 

knew the claim was objectively unreasonable earlier than that. 

(See fn. 11, ante.) In her deposition testimony, plaintiff affirmed 

that her injuries had not affected her memory and that she had 

been able to give a full account of how the incident unfolded. 

After plaintiff’s deposition, her counsel repeatedly acknowledged 

plaintiff’s action against defendant lacked evidentiary support. 

Nevertheless, despite twice receiving defendant’s agreement 

to a waiver of costs, plaintiff did not dismiss the action. Even 

after defendant served his motion for sanctions, plaintiff did 

not withdraw her pleading, and her counsel did not move to 

withdraw from the case during the 21-day safe harbor period. 

On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion 

by imposing monetary sanctions equal to the attorney fees 

and costs defendant incurred to bring the sanctions motion. 

(See Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at pp. 439–441.)
20

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Defendant Amor L. Armour is 

entitled to costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.