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MEMORANDUM TO: 

SUBJECT 

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DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYS"~M . ~ 

19 May 1966 

OOD - Mr. McNaughton 

- Dr. Flax 

ACDA - Mr. Fisher 

CIA - Mr. Sheldon 

White House - Mr. Keeny 

- Mr. Charles Johnson 

NASC - Mr. Welsh 

NASA - Mr. Seamans 

Political Aspects of Disclosure of Space 

Reconnaissance Capabi.lities 

l. Attached is the preliminary Department of State draft 

paper on this subject, prepared in accordance with the decision 

reached at our last meeting. summarized in paragraph 3 of the 

Minutes. 

2. As indicated in my memorandum of May 6, we will meet on 

Wednesday, May 25, at 4:00 PM to discuss this paper, the NASA 

paper dated May 13 and distributed separately, and the forthcoming 

paper which NRO has undertaken to prepare. 

'Enclosure: 

Preliminary Department of 

State Draft Paper. 

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Political Aspects of Disclosure of Space 

Reconnaissance Capabilities 

1. On June 30, 1962, a "Report on Political and Informational Aspects 

of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy" prepared pursuant -to NSAM 156 was approved 

for transmittal to the President. Its conclusions were affirmed (with one 

exception not pertinent·to our present purpose) in NSC Action 2454 on July 10, 

1962. That Report remains basically valid. The objective of avoiding open 

challenges to satellite observation activity has been generally met, and the 

Soviet Union has muted -- though not retracted -- its challenge to the I 

principle of military sp~ee reconnaissance. Agreement has been reached on 

fundamental legal principles which do not ban (though they also do not 

explicitly sanction).space observation. 

2. The general course of action of the NSAM 156 Report continues to be 

implemented. Developments over the past four yea.rs have, however, led to a. 

shift of emphasis from a. need for actions that will ~ world acceptance of 

space observations, then a. generally novel idea, to actions which will p~eserve 

the present wide ta.cit acceptance of such activities. Accordingly, there does 

not seem to be any imperative to launch disclosure initiatives for the purpose 

of furthering the principle·of space observation. On the other hand, it r~mains 

. necessary to consider the possibly adverse effects of new public disclosures 

or other initiatives which could upset the present satisfactory situation. 

3. Our chief concern over a challenge to the legitimacy and propriety of 

satellite reconnaissance has been the Soviet position. Over the past several 

yea.rs» the Russians have withdrawn insistence on branding such activity as / 

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from international space agreements that they desired, and they do 

not press such arguments in the UN, but they have not stopped referring to 

such activities as espionage and as illegal. Moreover, the statements by 

Khrushchev and his son-in-law, Adzhubei, acknowledging such Soviet activitie~ 

and acquiescing in American activities have never been printed the Soviet 

press or acknowledged as official, and they have not been even informally 

repeated by the present Soviet leaders. During the three years the e 

Russians have developed a major operational satellite reconnaissance program 

of their own, but they have not ceased to attack our program. Accordingly, we 

see continuing pertinence of the NSAM 156 Report conclusion that: "It is 

extremely important that the US avoid public statements about our 

operations that would pose a direct political challenge to the Soviet Union 

on the sensitive issue of reconnaissance". 

4. It is now necessary to give more attention than heretofore to the. 

reactions of other countries.·, To date, increasing awareness of the existence 

of US and Soviet military space reconnaissance has not prompted concern in 

other countries for their own political or military security interests, but 

such concern is likely to develop as others become more aware of the nature 

and scope of satellite surveillance. Disclosure of surveillance capabilities 

even in non-military contexts will awaken riew direct interest and concern. 

Accordingly, any such disclosure should be carefully considered and planned so 

as to prevent or reduce adverse :reactions by other states that would be 

undesirable in their own :right and could also be manipulated by the Soviet Union. 

s_ The recommendation of the NSAM 156 Report that further studies be 

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made 11to determine whether there are releasable data ••• which would help 

create wider public acceptance of space observation and photography" led 

to consideration of specific disclosure possibilities, and it was decided 

that such disclosures should not be made. Negative decisions were also ; 

reached on unclassified discussions of the potential role of space surveillance 

for arms control verification, although other unofficial discussions have since 

occurred. The parallel NSAM 156 ·Report recommendation that NASA should study 

' 

"the possibilities of accelerating bilateral international cooperation to 

develop non-military space activities involving space observation, perhaps 

including photography" has not led to concrete proposals for our consideration. 

Both of these recommendations would appear in general no longer to be necessary 

in view of the now widespread tacit acceptance of space reconnaissance. The 

' 

current NASA proposals for consideration of broader earth-sensing programs 

would appear to super~ede both these earlier more narrow and limited study 

recommendations. 

6. In short, systematic disclosure for the purpose of gaining world 

acceptance of the principle of space surveillance is both unnecessary and 

subject to provoking adverse consequences from the USSR and other states. At 

the same time, non-military uses of space which may require surveillance of 

the earth by various sensors would stimulate wider and deeper awareness of 

the capabilities of reconnaissance. Generally, such effects should be 

manageable, but it would be prudent to consider whether particular non-military 

indirect disclosures would entail overriding risks to our reconnaissance program, 

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and to work out ways to mitigate possible adverse effects of programs 

which were approved. 

7. NASA's and other proposals for developing earth-sensing programs 

which might overlap, be derived in sanitized form from, or stimulate public 

interest in, classified reconnaissance programs should be judged on the basis 

of anticipated political impact, as well as on the basis of otner criteria 

such as feasibility, preference to non-space alternatives, cost, problems in 

protecdng classified technology, and risks of security compromise of the 

classified reconnaissance program. As a general rule, such non-military.· 

programs would not be justified on the basis of contribution to legitimizing 

space observation. On the other hand, it should usually be possible by careful 

planning to mitigate possible adverse political repercussions of the incidental 

disclosure of surveillance capabilities and hence to give political and national 

security clearance to such programs. The best justification for such programs, ' 

and the best general basis for calming alarm over their effects, will be valid 

scientific or economic payoff in which other countries can share. 

BYE-54082-66 

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