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May 7. 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: State Department Proposal for Handling the Subject of

Satellite Reconnaissance in Future Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks

Problem:

To show an alternative to a State Department proposal, "Strategic

Missile Talks: Related Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Disclosure

Policy. "

Background: 

We have briefed you on a State Department proposal of September 9,

1968 (see Tab A) to reveal to the Soviets our willingness to (1) forego

on-site inspection and (2) depend upon satellite reconnaissance as an

arms control observation and monitoring system. The essentials of the

State proposal were these:

Reck.ssification of the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite

reconnaissance from Top Secret BIERMAI`Hor-el'A-bENT•trentOtr). to

SECRET.

Continuation of the present TKH and-EYE-sysitems with regard

to acquired intelligence, capabilities, and operations of reconnaissance

satellites.

3. Revelation to the Soviets that "national means of vartfication"

includes the use of reconnaissance satellites.
Establishment of a negotiating position based on the assumption

that "one side will not impede the operation of the other's reconnaissance

satellites. "

Providing NATO general information on the U.S. negotiating

position on verification.

Briefing Congress on the U.S. position on verification and

capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement through national means.

Maintaining a discreet position in response to press inquiries

and in official public statements, with preparation to eventually acknowledge "maximum reliance on national means of verification" and the inclusion of the use of satellite photography in such means.

The NRO reacted quickly to this proposal, meeting with representatives of the CIA, JCS, and NASA to develop opposition to the basic proposal

and to suggest an alternative. The NRO position, abstracted in our briefing

to you, is expressed in detail in Tab B.

On September 13, 1968, the USIB considered the security aspects of

the State proposal and decided that "there should be no change in the

classification of reconnaissance satellite operations or the information

derived from them at this time" (see Tab C, and particularly paragraph

14 for Mr. Helms' further comments).

On September 16, 1968 the NSAM 156 Committee met, discussed the

matter at some length, and arrived at no specific conclusion, as far as

the minutes are concerned (see Tab D). Those in attendance reported

that all parties were to prepare recommended guidelines and furnish them

to State.

On September 26, 1968, ACDA issued a proposed guidelines paper

for comment by NSAM 156 Committee members (see Tab E). This

paper was a decided improvement over the earlier (September 9) pro-

,

posal. It did not ask for a downgrading of the security surrounding tithe

fact of" satellite reconnaissance. It restricted the delegation's discussions to "information-gathering" satellites, with no further definition
•

•

authorized. Consultation "with Congress" was changed to "selected

members of Congress" and was to be done on a classified basis. Constraints were placed on what might eventually be said to the press, with

the ::tatemeld for releatic limited to "the U.S. is prepared to place maximum reliance on national means of verification. " While the :IRO objected

to some of the woolly thinking in the paper -- and said -- we agreed

that there had been general improvement in concept.

About this time, President Johnson released the pressure he had

placed on the SALT negotiators, and with the November election at hand,

SALT entered a waiting phase.

Present Situation:

We have received a copy of a memorandum from State, dated

May 1, 1969, which asks the NSSM 28 Committee to consider guidelines

for negotiations at future SALT meetings (see Tab F). The NSSM 23

Committee membership is shown on the address list. It is a new committee, organized by Dr. Kissinger, to develop policy for SALT talks.

The new paper is practically a word-for-word copy of the guidelines

paper issued on September 26, 1968 (shown above at Tab E).

Possible Courses of Action: 

We could spend a good deal of time in editing and improving the

proposed paper. We dornot believe, however, that an "acceptable"

version of this document will do very much for SALT talks or for arms

control in general. As you will recall from our briefing, we believe

there is a "Fourth Alternative, " calling for the bilateral development

and operation of an Arms Control Satellite which should become the

basis for a strong United States initiative. (By the way, Dr. Paine

supports this thought enthusiastically.)

Recommended Course of Action: 

We would like to show you a new, short briefing, revised in the

light of the new State paper, in which we suggest consideration of an

Arms Control Satellite, as an alternative. We will further propose to
show this briefing to Dr. Homer Newell (NASA), General Allison (JCS),

Dr. Clarke (CIA). and Mr. Spurgeon Keeney MD. to provide a "Fourth

Alternative" for consideration in NSSM 28 discussions. We should move

rapidly (within the next few days) to make this concept available to the

SALT planners.

PAUL E. WORTEIMAN

Colonel, USAF

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