-1111111111-

ATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

4.1/. Illidatile&J.“•141

THE NRO STAFF May 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAI1ALLEN

SUBJECT: SS-5 Activity (April 27 through May 7)

I have summarized below, the more significant items

of SS-5 activity during the period of your absence. I

would appreciite an opportunity to review and discuss

with you. I have not arranged them in any order of importance.

PFIAB Report to the 40 Committee: Dr. Naka asked us to

examine our normal semi-annual report to the President's

FLAB with a view toward sending the most recent one to the

40 Committee and expanding distribution to include the

Committee on a recurring basis. We have reviewed the

report and have prepared a memo for Dr. McLucas which

would apprise the 40 Committee of its existence and solicit

their views as to whether or not they would like to see it

on a regular basis.

n .•N1 • •

----111111111111--

0001110L 00

000. 01 COM,

See 4.91101 .0. •1411 11/44. 00115"= DC

D 01C ••• 1 ft •• 001♦ ••01 •••• •

vg10.• .r.fto •

.-: -..:-.sys- • )..WWII

: • •••,.;;;Ln ., r.„

•

•

• •
•

3

411111111

4

•

Briefing for Dr. Martin: I briefed Dr. Martin on April 28.

The briefing consisted of a review of the organizational

environment, the charter, and NRO organization, followed

by a detailed briefing on national satellite reconnaissance

policy. Dr. Martin was attentive and interested; he had

many questions which I was able to answer to his satisfaction.

General Bennett Proposal on Decontrol and Downgrading: You

mentioned before leaving that Dr. McLucas was deciding

whether or not he should send a summary of the U.S./ Soviet

dialogue on the ERS resolution in the U.N. to Mr. Laird and

Mr. Packard. We received the folder back on April 28 and

were provided a memorandumfromDr. McLucas to Messrs Laird

and Packard for transmittal of the summary. We had the

McLucas memo autopenned before classifying in the TK system,

adjusted the classification of our summary accordingly and

transmitted the complete package with the McLucas note.

You also signed a memorandum to Admiral Showers, before

leaving which we had agreed to hold pending John Hughes'

return and a discussion of the subject. John returned on

Friday, May I and immediately became involved in the

Cambodia situation. I did not get to talk with him until

Friday evening. I discussed our proposed memo to Showers,

explaining to John our need for the information. John

agreed with the request and suggested I send it on. I did

SO.

On Monday, May 4 we received a copy of Dr. Foster's

response to Mr. Packard on the Bennett proposal. As I

mentioned to you on Tuesday, Foster took a very strong,

positive position and suggested for Mr. Packard's signature

to General Wheeler, a memo which expressed concern that the

Bennett proposal would represent a major departure from

present policy with possible far-reaching implications.

The Foster-suggested memo would ask . DIA, before recommending

such a departure, to look, with USIB, at all the factors of

the issue to 1) identify alternative security policies and

2) evaluate them in terms of value and risk; and to do this

by forwarding a modified proposal directly to the USIB.

sac

so• w•ccnv• IMO se sus

comnant re

cams

/Nn
•

1

f.

. •

Dr. Foster noted for Mr. Packard that he had not

coordinated his response with Dr. McLucas or Mr. Froehlke

and asked for Mr. Packard's comments. We have no further

word on Mr. Packard's reaction. We have readied the paper

for Dr. McLucas' perusal (without staffing.)

I called John Hughes again on Tuesday, to tell him of

your plans to revisit USAFE and USAREUR. He had no objections and did not consider it necessary to forewarn of

your visit. He agreed it was important that we learn as

much about the situation as possible. He mentioned he

had received our memo to Showers, and iterated that the

questions were appropriate. I asked if he had seen the

Foster response. He indicated he had. He asked my feelings--

I told him I agreed with it and considered it a much more

reasonable and healthy approach.

John asked me if Dr. Naka had done anything further

(than having the Bennett proposal discussion stricken

from the May 1 breakfast schedule) about the scheduling

of a Bennett proposal discussion with the Service ACSI

at a Froehlke breakfast session. I told him that Dr. Naka

agreed that it needed to be done in the presence of

Dr. McLucas and the Service ACSIs (who normally attend

only the first Froehlkemeeting of the month) unless as

Dr. Naka mentioned "it is settled out of court."

IDEALIST Billets: I have had an exchange of messages with

General Ross and his people on this subject. OSA's response

represents a complete abdication of its responsibilities in

this area--and as usual, leaves me holding the bag. I need

to discuss this further.

Lockheed Request to Colonel Buzard re Dr. Stampfl: As you

know Lockheed was pressing Colonel Buzard for permission to

apprise Dr. Stampfl, Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) of

their activities on the Colonel Buzard did

not want to permit this nvo vement and asked our help.

I talked with General Smart's office to ascertain whether

INK COIMMINIO

corns

satmoti #1106 adros a 4C 71f05MM 5501%

DOS PAIR 1•11( SIN IS GUS 501 Si OP •

•
Bennington Request on Mr. Disney: at reived a DDR&E 411 request to fill out Disney with Cjilluld McGough

suggested we shelve it as unjustified and t essential.

I learned from Dr. Naka and Colonel Sweeney that Bennington

was involving Disney in a Foster exercise that related the

restriction of cloud cover to the perennially stated need

I approved Disney's access immediately. Wally

g was very upset. I related the facts. None of this

bothers me as much as the justification for the access. I

would like to discuss with you.

Berger Involvement in Historical Coverage: You left with

me a proposed letter which General King had suggested

Dr. McLucas sign to General Grussendorf. I have prepared

an LHSM and have rewritten the request to Grussendorf for

Berger's services.

Air Force General Counsel Access: You asked me before

leaving on April 27 to talk with Colonel Ratkovich about

the access request on Mr. Stempler. I visited Colonel

Ratkovich prior to our visit with General Carpenter but

forgot to mention the results. Colonel Ratkovich was not

upset; he understood the tight controls that we are trying

to effect but indicated that Stempler, none the less, was

being involved by the Secretary in almost every meeting

the Secretary had with the ACSI people. It appeared to

me that Stempler was being used by Seamans in a manner

similar to that in which the President uses Mr. Mitchell.

In this light, I told Colonel Ratkovich that we had no

problem with the request and that I would proceed to

authorize the access. I have done so.

or not Stampfl had a need for these discussions and

learned that not only was there no need but NASA did not

intend for Stampfl to be involved in these activities. I

also mentioned this matter to Dr. Naka at Staff Meeting

..•010% this morning. He agreed that the Lockheed marketing people

should not be allowed to brief Stampfl. I called Buzard

and passed this guidance on to him.

**)

AMU MIMICS ISOM sylOMIMS 5SoSsOmo8

SO• OMINCI•sl SIN MI SOBS

mmlft 

::--4--:

alms

..114 s

• ;.•

• •;.„ •'% PIM
Outstanding Unit Award for Detachment 11 (Our Comm Group):

As a result of our discussions with General Carpenter, I

forwarded the request to Dr. Seamans with your cover note

along with the descriptive LHSM we prepared for Dr. McLucas.

Apparently Colonel Simokaitis in Dr. Seamans' office did

not notice our statement that "we had discussed with

General Carpenter." So he sent it to the Chief for a

review prior to Dr. Seamans' approval. Unfortunately,

neither Colonel Otis Moore, in the Chief's office, or

the Chief noted our coordination with General Carpenter--

because I received, late Friday, May 1, the word that the

Chief needed more information. Lt Colonel Bacon hadn't

noticed our pre-coordination either. On Monday, May 4, I

stopped by to see Colonel Moore and asked if I could help.

He mentioned that Seamans' office had sent it over for the

Chief to see before signature. He suggested that you (or

you and I) talk with the Chief. I said fine--but indicated

you were away until Friday. He said the Chief's schedule

was also jammed up and asked me the urgency. I replied there

was no real urgency--and added that we had already discussed

with General Carpenter to effect the pre-coordination. He

was surprised, and indicated that that would probably solve

the problem. He will check with the Chief. I asked

Lt Colonel Bacon to follow up. I asked Lt Colonel Hausenfleck

to check also.

On May 5, Lt Colonel Bacon called to say he was

returning the award folder to me. Evidently Colonel Moore,

on the basis of my discussion with him had checked it out

with General Carpenter, who confirmed that we had discussed

it with him, that he agreed--but that since the Chief has

been out this week, and he planned to be out next week, he

would not have an opportunity to review it for the Chief.

He (General Carpenter) has suggested that you discuss with

General Ryan just as we had done with him. I have not set

an appointment for you. Should I do so?

Call from Mr. Kriegsman: Mr. Kriegsman called to express

his thanks for a very complete, well informed briefing on

the SOC presented by Colonel Sweeney and his people on

C••• la0

wow &Riche( W• 1111 SOU •••1,v

ri
Monday, April 27. Mr. Kriegsman asked that I pass the

information on. I have mentioned Kriegsman's call to

Colonel Sweeney.

Program 647 MGS: Colonel Porter, 647 SPO and Major Brendel,

General Hedrick's representative on 647 net with us to discuss the West Coast submission of a Form 1391 for the 647

construction activities. We resolved the issue to our

mutual satisfaction and dispatched a wire to the 647 SPO/

SAFSP-3 with our instructions.

Palley Departure:" I had the opportunity, since I was not

going to be able to attend the Wednesday evening, April 29

going-away session for Palley to have lunch with him and

to express your regrets for not being able to attend either

and to express both our thanks for his fine cooperation and

excellent support of our activities. As a matter of interest,

Mr. Palley has announced that he will become President of

Martin Metals, a wholly owned subsidiary of Martin-Marietta

located in Wheeling, Illinois (just outside Chicago). This

company manufactures metals for aircraft and rocket engine

casings. It has, as I mentioned before, been losing about

$1 million per year for the last five years; its gross

sales are estimated to be about $10 million annually.

Palley's job is to show a profitable balance sheet over

the next two years at which time Martin will decide whether

to continue and expand its activities or dispose of it.

On a subject related to Palley's departure--Howard

Barfield will pick up the Palley effort in an acting AD

capacity. We have already begun to bring Howard up to

speed on SACC/MSFPC generally and open items (such as the

guidelines and the possible NSAM 156/40 Committee review)

specifically. We have had two sessions with Howard with

another planned for May 7.

Possible NSAM 156 Review of NASA Activities: I have had

two calls on this subject, one from Mr. Krueger and one

from Mr. David Williamson. I am satisfied with their

tentative approach on the issue. It is essentially the

COMM% il•

UV,/ CONS

I mnersfic wawa Pate%

MOO 11141101.11 WOO is WS •Di &moo
one we suggested to them. I have attached an M/Rwbich

describes the issue and background (TAB A).

Cost Savings in NRO Communications: As a result of our

cleaning up loose ends of circuitry, rerouting traffic,

and solidifying our plans for the SOCOKM switch, we have

, been able to reduce our overall circuitry costs by

AOW040annually. We will probably have to apply this

savings to our efforts at th since requirements have increased over those initia ly planned. We do

not feel our overall communications budget will decrease

over the next two to three years; however, we do plan to

absorb additional customer requirements into our socamm

FASTRAN capability in a manner similar to our arrangements

for the SOC. This latter activity will certainly enable

a savings in our NRO contractual costs presently being

carried by the program directors. We intend to insure that

each time we take on one of these customer requirements a

corresponding reduction is realized in the cost of the

contracts with that customer.

Mr. Risley and the General Advisory Committee for Arms 

Control and Disarmament: On Thursday, April 30, Dr. Naka,

Colonel Sweeney and I met with Mr. Risley, who was visiting

to arrange first for a dry-run of our intended briefing to

the General Advisory Committee and the follow-on formal

briefing to what Risley estimated to be about ten members

of that Committee. This guy Risley continues to disturb

me. As you know Mr. Ladner was not successful in following

your direction that Risley be dealt with rather harshly,

but instead, acquiesced to continuing Risley's access on

the basis Risley said be was sorry and that Mr. Marvel

(the State allowed as to how he had forgotten to

apprise Mr. isley of the security surrounding the identification of this organization. I can't really believe this

since Risley has, for some time, been briefed TKH. I was

able to apprise Dr. Naka of this complete story prior to

our meeting with Mr. Risley. Mr. Risley's approach in the

meeting was one of attempting to put the NRO in a position

amnia ro

::-7---:

moms

f.C. MIMS pasts

NO W11111 ••1•11 SRN I S Nts MO

• -....•••••••^1

. •
•

ewlla

PAGIVS

—11111111111FI.C.►OIO f Soo dio1010•Of

SOO IfalC O 41 Will I 110,111.0, ary l

COON101. NO

CO., Of

PaIlL.11_._ Of

of expounding on SALT, its verification, and the complete

technical details of the NRO ability to support such

verification. I remarked that we should not be asked to

provide such a briefing, since we should not be upstaging

the activities of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lynn (and their

respective panels) in this area. I suggested that any

briefing we provide to this group be limited to a factual

description of our organization, charter, and operational

activities in an intelligence collection role. Dr. Naka

agreed. He scheduled the dry-run of such a briefing for

Mr. Thomas Fine and Mr. Risley to be given on Wednesday,

May 6 by Capt Geiger and myself. Dr. Naka plans to attend.

We can, at that time, decide on the appropriateness or

the worthwhileness of such a briefing to the group

represented by Fina and Risley. I get the impression that

this Committee does not serve a very meaningful role.

Interesting to note, they hang somewhere between State

and ACDA, with neither really sponsoring their activities.

On May 6, Captain Geiger and I gave our standard

briefing to these gentlemen as we had agreed. Dr. Naka

was present for my part (the front end). When I finished,

Dr. Naka asked Fina if he felt this portion was appropriate

for the Committee. Fina replied--no.

Bob proceeded then to present the systems portion.

Very few questions, but quite a bit of "unspoken communication" between Fina and Risley. Bob had not planned to talk

AR/AT, or specifically EOI. When he finished, Fina asked

"now that you've reviewed operational and developmental

systems, what about future planning--are you doing anything

in real time readout, for example?" Bob then discussed EOI.

At the close of the session then, I asked Mr. Fina the same

question Dr. Naka had asked on my portion--is this portion

of the briefing appropriate? Fina stated that rather than

do this type briefing, he felt it best for he and Risley

to think more about what the Committee needs for their

review of SALT verification capabilities, and come up with

a list of questions which they would then address to the

"appropriate" agency (CIA, NPIC, NSA, NRO) for response

with briefings tentatively set by Fina for May 28. He
mentioned that he had received briefings on "hardware

and hardware capabilities" from the other agencies (CIA

and NPIC) and he would have to decide just who should

respond to which questions. The alarm rang here--and I

considered it necessary to caution him on the question

of the appropriateness of a discussion of the capabilities

and potential of our operational and planned systems and

hardware by agencies other than us.

He appeared to accept the cautionary word. He indicated

that he would be in touch with us (with Dr. Naka I presume)

as soon as possible on the questions and briefing plans.

I feel very uneasy about this one--I suppose because

I really don't understand all I should about the exercise.

We certainly were unsuccessful in our attempts with Risley

(and Fins) to learn more.

CIRIS and Your Reputation: I am somewhat concerned over.

the continued infamous references by Admiral Bowen to

your judgments about CIRIS. You will recall in our briefing

of Admiral Bowen on February 19 you took the opportunity

to express our concerns about the TOD/CIRIS. On March 2,

1970 you expressed officially these concerns about the

usefulness of this data previously provided for the TOD

and asked Admiral Bowen's help in understanding the reasons

for the non-usefulness of our previous submissions. About

a week later, Vance and Morrison prepared a paper for

Admiral Bowen/Mr. Froehlke on the projected role of the

DASD(I) in NRO affairs. Mr. Froehlke, in his discussions

of the paper with Dr. McLucas, specifically on "CIRIS and

fiscal guidance", mentioned the problems the NRO had with

providing this data and the ability (or willingness) to

provide it. During this particular meeting Mr. Froehlke

marked in the marginalia that "General Allen was concerned

over non use of this data." Dr. Naka has just received from

Admiral Bowen a memorandum dated April 27, 1970 in which

Admiral Bowen does it again--and I quote "Lew Allen has

questioned the usefulness of data previously provided to

the TOD as a forerunner of CIRIS." This statement is

------111111111111111Vww ge W006 ataiwowwit itisCaus see Dafires•vit saes .1 Dors 1101 •wwww

moms.

coy.

P&0 9 Ow

COMB

14111111
11111114 111 Abe 41•111014 0-

BOO Welle • orlt IMMO le DIM WI •PPt•

• canna as

awes

PIM

•

totally unnecessary. Moreover, it has obviously been

seen by Mr. Packard with whom Froehlke reviewed the Bowen

memo before dispatch. Admiral Bowen has never responded

constructively or otherwise. He simply continues to set

you up as a "potential cause" for the failure of Seidel's

inadequate reporting system. I think it is now time for

us to call a halt to the continued references to your

concern. I suggest that since Dr. Naka has established

a "communications channel" with Admiral Bowen on CIRIS

and the CDIP resources review, that we should ask him to

kindly request Admiral Bowen to cease making such

references.

DOD Directive 5160.32: You will recall this as the directive

which gives the Air Force the lead crew responsibility in

space--the one which the Navy has continually protested.

We have seen the latest proposal, by DDR&E, with about 4

options: 1) cancel; 2) let it stand as written; 3) let

Air Force be responsible for surveillance and warning

systems plus all launch vehicles, launch and support operations; or 4) let Air Force be executive agent for all military

space systems plus the launch and support operations.

We tend to favor Option 4 and have so advised Colonel

Nelsen. In any event, we will still need to exercise

through Mr. Packard an exception to the provisions of any

directive for our continuing effort. We'll watch it closely.

NRO/DIA/USAF Management reement: As you know, I had given

my version of this, the reement, to Mr. Brubaker and

Cdr Ralph in DIA and to Lt Col Jackson in AF, for their

review and comments in early April. After some two or

three weeks delay in their hands, I finally got the agreement back with a couple of very insignificant (certainly

not worth three weeks) comments, which I agreed to accommodate

in a final version. I had the final prepared on April 30

and sent it to Jerry Moskowitz for his review and concurrence/

comments. NSA has now decided it would prefer to coordinate

in a separate memo rather than on an added line in the agreement. I have no hangup here. Just have a little difficulty
C1.? 00

legume ••00 ...Mahe •raummos

Nf 0.010.14 MN 10 0011 am am.

I I

COM N C00101

PIM

keeping abreast of NSA desires. I plan to have the

principals (McLucas/Bennett/Ryan) sign as soon as I have

NSA's concurrence. We will keep you apprised.

Financial Data on Lockheed Contracts: We are still plagued

with this task--and have submitted to OASD/Comptroller some

additional info on fund status of Lockheed's eight (white)

open contracts. For the time being, they (OASD/C) are

satisfied.

Replacement for Capt Meceda: Gordon Bass is busily pursuing

_ this item. He has about 5 good to excellent candidates. He

: • ',;:ii

is shooting for a May 15 identification of the one or two

-r4

• ..... candidates he wants to interview. Looks like late August for

:•-i....fi a replacement date.

-,•:...

....,.:!?

CIRIS/NRP Issues: I was visited by Cdr Martin (Froehlke's

office) on May 4. Jim Marshall, Gordon Bass and I discussed

with him, generally, our concerns about the NRO data inputs

to CIRIS. I do believe, after one hour, we convinced him

that he too should be concerned. His real purpose in his

visit was to ascertain 1) if and 2) when he might have

information on the issues we will bring before ExCom on

July 15. Again, we are going to be terribly out of synch

with them, since they will, at that very same time begin

the (estimated two week) CDIP review for FY 1972--we will

be wrestling with FY 1971 issues. I don't really see how

he can fit any of this info into his review. I did not commit to anything--but rather suggested to Martin that I discuss the possibilities with you. He is awaiting our word.

U-2C's and NASA: General Smart responded to Dr. MtLucas'

office with "definite interest" and asked for an interface.

We prepared . a response • for Dr. Naka's signature naming

Colonel Hartley in both an overt and covert role.

CIRIS Manpower Data: I have provided you a copy of the manpower data I submitted to Jim Marshall for his use in the

CIRIS.
Room

COMO& we

cot.

emu a

—1111111111111,---- LLLLL Re Roo ou•Oroot oftReovoc

Noe "sec h.g ROO y 11/011s not moot.

S.

kkkkkkkk‘\‘‘‘‘\\\\\

NUW VW NklQk VWWWNRk \\‘'W‘N‘W‘N. '‘‘‘‘‘‘‘‘‘

XWWWW.Qqk

Amrom Katz Consultanc y

: This matter has taken a slight (but

serious) turn in course. I am not expounding the details

here. Major Rose is p

p

reparing a summary brief on this articular matter for you. We have effectively stopped any further action until you have had an 

review Ray's brief. opportunity to

Comma Computer Transfer: As you know, we experienced a

1

bit of difficulty recentl in 11001(closing ,attempting to move a 9300 from down) to (for use in the SOK bit circuit or radburn). Problem: Our briefed point of contact in

the Directorate of Data Automation suddenly became 

latio a regu- n-conscious manager and refused to recognize a reasonable, appropriate, cost-effective, high utility move of the 9300.

We were forced, by him, to resort to a decision by Mr. 

(as Schedler senior ADPE official for AF) waiving the 

provisions of a recent Packard directive controlling such moves; which
11111111111V----

created another--Problem: Maj Can Morris, Dir of Data

Automation was caught unaware of the action and embarrassed

when asked to explain by Lt Gen Crow--the briefed contact

has never apprised Gen Morris (his boss) of the action. I

met with Gen Crow, about three weeks ago--explained the

situation to his satisfaction, in the presence of the briefed

contact, a Mr. Burke. I asked Gen Crow for permission to

brief Gen Morris since Mr. Burke was really not providing

the support we required, also in Mr. Burke's presence.

Gen Crow appreciated the importance, agreed to the briefing

and asked me to proceed. I briefed General Morris on May 1.

He was extremely attentive and receptive--summarized his

recognition of the importance of our activity--guaranteed

his complete support and asked that we feel free to call

him at any time on any issue. Most important--he means it.

I anticipate no further problems in this area.

CMIMO% NO

C...

list4WHO MOM &WOO & at•

see *nowt SIMI N 1110IS *Ph.