SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3771-13T2

A-3772-13T2

IN THE MATTER OF KATHLEEN 

CARR, TRENTON PSYCHIATRIC

HOSPITAL, DEPARTMENT OF 

HUMAN SERVICES.

______________________________

Argued September 12, 2016 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Haas.

On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service 

Commission, Docket Nos. 2012-1708 and 2012-

2828.

Dominick Bratti argued the cause for appellant 

(Budd Larner, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Bratti, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

Christopher J. Hamner, Deputy Attorney 

General, argued the cause for respondent

Trenton Psychiatric Hospital (Christopher S. 

Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa 

H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Christopher M. Kurek, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent Civil Service 

Commission (Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is only binding on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

August 7, 2017
2 A-3771-13T2

Appellant Kathleen Carr appeals from two

Civil Service Commission (CSC) final administrative decisions, 

both issued March 13, 2014. The first decision upheld her 

suspension and demotion; the second decision upheld her removal 

from office. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.1

During the time she committed the infractions that resulted 

in her suspension and demotion, and removal, appellant was employed 

at Trenton Psychiatric Hospital (TPH) in the position of Personnel 

Assistant 1. On May 24, 2011, TPH served appellant with a

Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (PNDA) proposing a 

twenty-day suspension and a demotion from her position as Personnel 

Assistant 1 to Personnel Assistant 2 (the suspension action). 

The PNDA specified the following charges: incompetency, 

inefficiency or failure to perform duties, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

2.3(a)(1); insubordination, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(2); conduct 

unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); neglect of 

duty, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7); other sufficient cause, N.J.A.C.

4A:2-2.3(a)(11); falsification, Administrative Order 4:08-C8; 

insubordination, Administrative Order 4:08-C9; violation of a 

rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order or administrative 

action, Administrative Order 4:08-E1; and intentional abuse or 

 

1 Appellant filed separate appeals. We have consolidated the 

appeals for purposes of this opinion. 
3 A-3771-13T2

misuse of authority or position, Administrative Order 4:08-E2. 

The PNDA summarized appellant's infractions:

You began your employment at Trenton 

Psychiatric Hospital after being transferred 

from Ancora Psychiatric Hospital on November 

20, 2010. Since your transfer to Trenton 

Psychiatric Hospital, you have violated 

policies and procedures, misused your 

authority to perform actions where there is a 

direct conflict of interest, failed to carry 

out an order, failed to complete assignments 

in a timely manner, acted in an insubordinate 

manner, and falsified information. 

Following an October 19, 2011 departmental hearing, TPH 

prepared a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA) on November 

9, 2011, which imposed a twenty-day suspension and a demotion to 

the position of Personnel Assistant 2. The FNDA did not include 

the effective dates of the sanctions. 

Appellant filed an administrative appeal, which the CSC 

transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) as a 

contested matter. The OAL received the matter on January 17, 

2012. A month later, on February 23, 2012, TPH filed an amended 

FNDA, which included the dates appellant was to serve her 

suspension – July 8, 2011 to August 4, 2011 – as well as the 

effective date of her demotion, July 8, 2011. 

Meanwhile, within two months of serving appellant with the 

PNDA, TPH served appellant with a second PNDA seeking her removal 

from office (the removal action). The PNDA enumerated the 
4 A-3771-13T2

following charges: failure or excessive delay in carrying out an 

order which would not result in danger to persons, Administrative 

Order B4-1; insubordination, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(2); conduct 

unbecoming a public employee N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6); other 

sufficient cause N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(11); insubordination -

intentional disobedience or refusal to accept a reasonable order, 

disrespect or use of insulting or abusive language, Administrative 

Order C9-3; and, divulging confidential information without proper 

authority, Administrative Order C10-1. 

The PNDA specified instances of appellant's failure to update 

management or Employee Relations concerning an employee's job 

performance; making unprofessional comments about a member of TPH 

management; breaching confidentiality; and discussing the 

disciplinary history of another TPH employee. 

The PNDA concluded: "You have been served with two (2) 

separate [d]isciplinary [a]ctions for [i]nsubordination and 

[c]onduct [u]nbecoming. Your continual refusal to conduct 

yourself in a proper and professional manner has led to this third 

[d]isciplinary [a]ction." 

Following a January 31, 2012 departmental hearing, TPH 

personnel prepared a February 24, 2012 FNDA, which imposed the 

removal effective August 5, 2011. 
5 A-3771-13T2

Appellant filed an administrative appeal, which the CSC 

transmitted to the OAL. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to 

whom the suspension and removal actions were assigned conducted 

hearings over seven non-consecutive days commencing September 25, 

2012, and concluding February 14, 2013. The ALJ held the hearing 

records open until May 29, 2013, when he received final posthearing briefs. On August 16, 2013, the ALJ issued comprehensive 

written opinions in both actions. 

In the suspension action, after comprehensively recounting

the evidence, including the examination and cross-examination of 

the witnesses, the ALJ upheld appellant's suspension and demotion. 

Significantly, the ALJ determined the witnesses presented on 

behalf of TPH were credible:

I FIND that, although appellant attempted to 

discredit the testimony of all of those TPH 

witnesses through cross-examination, the 

absence of any direct testimony by either 

appellant (who, it is noted, did not testify) 

or any witnesses on her behalf as it applied 

to the plethora of charges and specifications 

which were generated in the 

suspension/demotion discipline caused the 

bulk of the testimony of the TPH witnesses to 

remain intact, viable and credible at the 

conclusion of the matter. Thus, appellant's 

efforts to attempt to discredit the 

testimonies of the TPH witnesses on crossexamination failed even though she attempted 

to bootstrap a global defense, and 

particularly a Winters[2] type defense, based 

 

2 Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire and Rescue, 212 N.J. 67 

(2012).
6 A-3771-13T2

upon those witnesses' testimonies. And I so 

FIND. Each of those witnesses presented 

cogent, relevant testimony regarding the 

respective roles they played in this matter. 

The ALJ determined, among other findings, that upon 

appellant's permanent transfer to TPH from Ancora Psychiatric 

Hospital, she was tasked with preparing a step-by-step manual to 

a new electronic payroll system, New Jersey Electronic Cost 

Accounting and Timesheet System (eCATS). Despite inquiries from 

supervisors, the TPH Deputy Chief Executive Officer, and personnel 

in the main office of the Department of Human Services, appellant 

never completed the manual. Rather, she challenged the "ASAP" 

nature of completing the project, questioned its urgency, and 

eventually produced some type of manual that had been used at

Ancora but was unsuitable for the payroll transition occurring at 

TPH. When preparation of the manual was ultimately tasked to 

another employee, the employee completed a draft within five days. 

The ALJ further determined appellant had committed numerous 

other offenses, which included failing to produce information 

regarding three employees who had been overpaid certain benefits,

and deleting a personal identifier. These were examples of 

appellant's recurrent failure to respond to periodic directives 

from supervisors. 

In addition to the foregoing findings, the ALJ determined 

from the evidence appellant had "violated numerous policies and 
7 A-3771-13T2

procedures regarding her handling of her own personal matters." 

These included scheduling her own fingerprinting at TPH while she 

was still employed at Ancora, "inappropriately provid[ing] a code 

which authorized TPH to pay for her fingerprinting and, in the 

process, [failing] to obtain the proper authorizations to 

appropriately obligate TPH to pay for [the] fingerprinting." 

These were not all of the violations of policy, procedure, 

or ethics the ALJ found appellant committed. Others included 

completing and reviewing her own FMLA leave application; 

submitting an employment application with glaring deficiencies, 

including the omission of two previous periods of employment with 

the State; exhibiting a loud, aggressive and abusive attitude 

toward another TPH employee; and processing another employee's 

leave request after being told by a supervisor not to do so without 

first consulting the supervisor. 

The ALJ concluded TPH had proved the charges of incompetency, 

inefficiency or failure to perform duties; insubordination; 

conduct unbecoming a public employee; and other sufficient cause, 

including falsification; insubordination; and intentional abuse 

or misuse of authority or position. The ALJ upheld the penalty 

of suspension and demotion. 

In the removal action, the ALJ also found TPH's witnesses 

credible. The ALJ found:
8 A-3771-13T2

although appellant repeatedly attempted to 

discredit the testimony of all of the TPH 

witnesses through cross-examination or by 

curiously calling them even as her own 

witnesses, the absence of any direct testimony 

by appellant herself caused the bulk of the 

testimony of the TPH witnesses to remain 

intact, viable and credible at the conclusion 

of the matter. 

The ALJ also found "the only real witness on behalf of [appellant]" 

turned out to be "as much of a corroborating witness on behalf of 

TPH as were the other witnesses." 

Based on the testimony presented by TPH's witnesses, the ALJ 

determined appellant breached confidentiality and privacy 

principles by ranting to a "subordinate employee" about another 

employee's discipline, and in the process, referring to yet a 

third employee by a derogatory name and a vulgar epithet. The ALJ 

characterized appellant's conduct as "reprehensible and a direct 

example of unbecoming conduct by a public employee." 

In addition to this incident, the ALJ determined appellant 

disregarded completely verbal and written orders to assess the 

time and attendance of her staff as well as their performance. 

The ALJ found appellant's conduct insubordinate, unbecoming, and 

particularly egregious since appellant was a management 

supervisor. 

Although rejecting certain charges, the ALJ concluded:

failure or excessive delay in carrying out an 

order which would not result in danger to 
9 A-3771-13T2

persons under Administrative Order 4:08 B4; 

Insubordination under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)2; 

Conduct unbecoming a public employee under 

N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)6; and Other sufficient 

cause under 4A:2-2.3(a) (then and previously) 

(11) to wit, and specifically, (1) 

insubordination under Administrative Order 

4:08 C9, and (2) divulging of confidential 

information without proper authority under 

Administrative Order 4:08 C10 have been 

established by TPH and that those charges are

AFFIRMED.

The ALJ upheld the removal of appellant from office.

The CSC adopted the ALJ's findings and upheld the discipline 

imposed in both the suspension and removal actions. These appeals 

followed.

In the eleven points appellant raises on her appeal of the 

suspension action, she challenges as arbitrary and capricious, or 

as unsupported by the evidence, virtually every material factual 

finding the ALJ made. She asserts the ALJ erred by failing to 

make specific credibility findings and by relying on testimony 

implicitly or explicitly found to be suspect. She claims the ALJ 

failed to properly address her argument that the accumulation of 

a series of alleged infractions was fundamentally unfair and 

pretextual, as well as her objection to TPH's allegedly illegal 

conduct. Appellant also argues the CSC erred in failing to find 

or even address her contention the ALJ was biased against her.

In the removal action, appellant makes similar arguments on

appeal. She contends the ALJ's determinations that she disregarded 
10 A-3771-13T2

directions from a supervisor and was insubordinate are not 

supported by credible evidence. She also contends the ALJ erred 

in determining she disclosed confidential information. She 

asserts the ALJ failed to properly address her argument that the 

accumulation of a series of alleged infractions was fundamentally 

unfair and pretextual. Lastly, she argues the ALJ made no findings 

concerning either her prima facie case of retaliation or her claim 

concerning TPH's allegedly pretextual conduct.

Our review of the CSC's decision is limited. Karins v. City 

of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 540 (1998) (citation omitted). We 

will not disturb the CSC's final determination unless it is 

arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or lacks fair support in the 

record. Ibid. (citation omitted). A "strong presumption of 

reasonableness attaches" to the CSC's final administrative 

decisions. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.), 

certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001). That is so because agencies 

generally have "expertise and superior knowledge of a particular 

field." Outland v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teachers' Pension & Annuity 

Fund, 326 N.J. Super. 395, 400 (App. Div. 1999). "If the original 

findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the 

record as a whole, we must accept them." Ibid. (citation omitted).

Having considered appellant's arguments in light of the 

record on appeal and our limited standard of review, we affirm the 
11 A-3771-13T2

CSC's final agency decisions, substantially for the reasons 

expressed by the ALJ and by the Commissioner. The final agency 

decisions are supported by sufficient credible evidence on the 

record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Appellant's arguments 

are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.