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Notes on Draft Memorandum, "MOL Experiments" 

The draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject 

"MOL Experiments," dated 3 February 1964 provides the Depart 

ment of Defense's first firm planfer a Military Orbiting. 

Laboratory. Like all plans, it also provides insights into 

the current level of development (maturity) of the MOL concept. 

These insights are not reassuring; indeed, they supply convincing evidence that the MOL, as presently conciAved will never 

get off the ground. The comments which follow outline the 

reasons for this conclusion. 

1. The Plan is Mission-Ridden. "Operational mission" 

and "military laboratory" are incompatible terms: the opera-' 

tional always drives out the research and development. Is the 

MOL a laboratory? Or is it an Operational reconnaissance spacecraft? 

(Or a bomber?) If it is a laboratory, it must be planned as a 

laboratory and act as one It cannot have operational assignments 

in "primary mission areas of ..reconnaissance and surveillance." 

(See page 1) It cannot be categorized as capable of "many experiments which are not described yet which could ...be accomplished 

when it is feasible to do so without degrading prime experiments" 

(see page 2). A laboratorY cannot be founded on a document which 

devotes 17 pages to the'design of an operational reconnaissance 

system and 4 pages to "General Experiments." A laboratory is 

col-Icerned with the acquisition of technical data; its experiments 

do not require 

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operational "scenarios." 

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2. The Plan Degrades the Role of the Astronaut/ 

Scientist. Gross emphasis is placed on man's manipulative 

skill. Man becomes a pointer, not a thinker. lie aligns 

and focuse8; he handles yaw problems; he aims; he adjusts 

for image motion; he processes film. All of these tasks can 

be done better by machines and most of them can be automated, 

I see nothing about man as a judge, an integrator-, a selector, 

or a scientist/engineer.- 

3. The Plan Proposes a Competition Which MOL Cannot 

Win. It is clear that machines will do everything that this 

plan proposes lor MOL long before - and better than - MOL can 

do it. Is the competition resolution? MOL will lose. Is it 

selectivity? Again, MOL loses. It iss cost? Is it coverage? 

Response time? Repetition rate? No contest. MOL, as a Manned 

Reconnaissance Satellite, will be cancelled - either now, or 

as soon as any "outside" group revieleit. 

4. The Plan Asperses the Very Experiments Which 

Could Sustain It. Why does the plan say "the MOL should not be 

justified on the basis of bioastronautic experiments?" (see page 19). 

Why the negative approach to a most promising military - technical 

field,,,onne that becomes particularly attractive when the 

possibility of a polar-orbiting MOL is considered. Way say 

is a plausible application?" All of the 

basic technology of rendezvous docking, and sensor testing can 

be built into a sound laboratory program. Why nine 

to "Engineering Technology and Subsystem Experiments?" Th:L_ part 

of the study should have had the bulk of availa'ple attention and 

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5. The Plan Invites and Assures the Hostility of 

the USIB, the FIAB, and the Special Group. No scenario is 

required to illustrate this point. The reaction will be swift 

and incisive. 

6. The Plan Violates DOD Organizational and Security 

Directives. DOD DirectiVe TS 5105.23, subject ""eSt National 

Reconnaissance Office", dated 14 June 1962, makes the -(-St DNRO 

responsible for the -(-TO-} National Reconnaissance Program. "The 

-DNRO. will be given support as required from normal staff 

elements of the military departMents and agencies concerned, 

although these staff elements will not participate in these 

project matters except as he specifically requests." In addi—

tion, he will "review all DOD budget requests and expenditures 

for any items falling within the definition of the (-tiler.)-NRP, 

including studies and preliminary research and development of 

components and techniques to support such existing or future 

projects." Finally, he will "establish the security prOcedures 

to be followed for all matters of the 4910+-National Reconnais 

sance Program." Clearly, the 4€4-NRO and the-tS*DNRO have 

been placed in an impossible position by a garden-variety SECRET 

plan, which is already appearing in part in the national press 

and will assuredly appear in detail within the very near future. 

zle 

44r These points summarize my reaction to the plan. I am well 

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:23.19 aware of the apprehension that the DOD cannot "sell" a bona fide Cd2 

ftt co* 

m laboratory. I believe a bona fide military laboratory can be 3 3 4= Fi "sold: A wide variety of sensors- and.experiments belong in sdch 

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a laboratory, along with a wide range of other things. No one 

is working on those "other things." 

We'd better start soon. The MOL can be salvaged, but it 

will take hard work. The hard work must start now, based on a 

totally new concept. Otherwise we just finished planning 

DYNASOAR II. 

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