J-S17025-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

RAMEL M. MOSLEY

Appellant No. 1058 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered March 28, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Criminal Division at No: CP-40-CR-0001631-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JULY 08, 2020

Appellant, Ramel M. Mosley, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County on March 28, 2019 

following his conviction of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance (cocaine) (“PWID”) and other drug offenses. Appellant contends 

the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, and challenges the 

sufficiency and the weight of the evidence. Following review, we affirm.1

As a result of events that occurred on January 6, 2017, Appellant was 

arrested and charged with PWID, conspiracy, possession of a controlled 

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth filed an Application for Enlargement of Time to file its 

brief. The Application is hereby GRANTED and the Commonwealth’s brief is 

accepted as filed on June 22, 2020. 
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substance (cocaine), possession of a small amount of marijuana, and 

possession of drug paraphernalia.2 He filed a motion to suppress, contending 

the search and seizure were unlawful. 

A suppression hearing was conducted on May 11, 2018. At the hearing, 

the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Police Officers James Conmy 

and Jason Oliver of the Wilkes-Barre Police Department. At the conclusion of 

Appellant’s suppression hearing, the trial court announced its Findings of Fact 

and Conclusions of Law. 

Findings of fact, as announced by the court, indicated that Officers 

Conmy and Oliver were on duty in a marked police car on January 6, 2017 at 

approximately 7:30 p.m. As they drove on Butler Street, they passed a Ford 

SUV traveling in the opposite direction. After both officers observed an 

inoperable brake light on the rear of the SUV, Officer Conmy turned the police 

car around and followed the SUV. After the SUV made a right turn at a red 

light at an intersection marked with a “no turn on red” sign, the officers 

initiated a traffic stop. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), Suppression Hearing, 

5/11/18, at 32-33.3 

____________________________________________

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, and 35 P.S. § 780-

113(a)(31), (a)(16), and (a)(30). 

3 For purposes of context, we have included some citations to the suppression 

hearing transcript that reflect testimony offered by Officers Conmy and Oliver.
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Officer Conmy identified the driver as Jettie Johnson (“Johnson”) and 

the passenger as Appellant, Ramel Mosley. Id. 

As the officers approached the SUV, both detected the odor of marijuana 

coming from the SUV. The officers ran the occupant information through their 

computer system and learned that Johnson had a suspended driver’s license. 

Id. at 34. The officers also noticed that the SUV’s inspection was expired. 

Officer Conmy filled out a citation for the inspection violation, gave a warning 

for the brake light, and informed Johnson that his license was suspended. Id. 

at 13, 34. Because the vehicle was not legally parked, Officer Conmy offered 

the option of having the SUV towed or having Appellant, who had a valid New 

York license, drive the vehicle. Id. at 11-13. Johnson and Appellant opted 

for the latter option. Meanwhile, both Johnson and Appellant indicated they 

had earlier smoked marijuana. Id. at 13. 

Because Johnson and Appellant were going to get out of the SUV to 

switch positions, Officer Conmy informed Johnson that the officers would 

check them both for safety purposes when they got out of the vehicle. Id. at 

13-14. During the pat-down search, the officers “uncovered various items.” 

Id. at 34. As reflected in the transcript, those items included a wad of cash 

in Johnson’s pants pocket, detected by Officer Conmy, and cash in Appellant’s 

pocket, detected by Officer Oliver. Id. at 14, 29. 

When Appellant got out of the SUV, he left the passenger side door 

open. Officer Conmy could see a white bag in the door’s storage compartment 
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that was consistent with powder cocaine. He seized that bag and a black 

grocery bag next to it. Picking up the black bag, he determined, based on his 

training and experience, it was consistent with crack cocaine. At that point, 

Appellant and Johnson were taken into custody and a search of their persons 

was conducted. Johnson admitted he had a bag of marijuana in his 

underwear. Appellant had a glass vial in his pocket that was later opened to 

reveal marijuana. There was another bag of marijuana between the front 

passenger seat and the center console. Id. at 14-15. 

Another officer, Officer Holmes,4 arrived on the scene with his K-9 

partner. The dog alerted Officer Holmes to the front passenger seat area of 

the SUV. The vehicle was then towed. Johnson and Appellant were taken to 

headquarters. Id. at 15-16. 

Conclusions of law, as announced by the court, included that the officers 

“had a requisite suspicion and probable cause” to perform the traffic stop, id. 

at 33; that “[t]he pat-down search was valid and lawful under the situation 

for the officers’ safety. Any items seized, therefore, on the person of the 

individuals are admissible as evidence at trial,” id. at 34; and that “[t]he 

seizure of the cocaine and crack/cocaine was lawful in that the items were 

discovered in plain view in an area which Officer Conmy had a right to be in.” 

Id. 

____________________________________________

4

In the trial transcript, the officer is identified as Officer Homza. N.T., Trial, 

1/22/19, at 13, 67, 78.
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The court concluded:

[B]ased upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, all of the 

items that were seized and taken into evidence by the WilkesBarre Police Department at said time were seized lawfully and 

were done not in violation of any Constitution[al] Rights or due 

process violations of the rights of [Appellant] under either the 

United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions, and, therefore, said 

items were lawfully seized and would be admissible at trial in this 

matter. 

Based upon that, the motion to suppress physical evidence filed 

by [Appellant] is hereby denied. 

Id. at 35. 

Appellant was charged with PWID and related crimes, as set forth above. 

Following denial of his motion to suppress, Appellant’s case proceeded to trial 

on January 22, 2019. The Commonwealth again presented the testimony of 

Officers Conmy and Oliver. The officers’ testimony at trial was broader than, 

but consistent with, the testimony offered at the suppression hearing. The 

Commonwealth presented an additional witness at trial, Officer Duffy, who 

testified as an expert and rendered an opinion that the cocaine recovered from 

the SUV was consistent with PWID rather than personal use. N.T., Trial, 

1/22/19, at 85-122.

Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of PWID, possession of a 

controlled substance (cocaine), and possession of drug paraphernalia. The 

jury acquitted Appellant on the conspiracy charge. The trial court found 

Appellant guilty of possession of a small amount of marijuana. The court 

ordered a pre-sentence investigation report and scheduled sentencing for 
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March 28, 2019. At the sentencing hearing, Appellant presented a motion to 

set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. The court denied 

the motion and sentenced Appellant to a term of 90 to 180 months’ 

incarceration for PWID. In addition, the court imposed a sentence of thirty 

days’ probation for possession of a small amount of marijuana, concurrent 

with the PWID sentence, and twelve months’ probation for possession of drug 

paraphernalia, also concurrent with the PWID sentence. Appellant’s 

possession of a controlled substance conviction merged with PWID. 

After the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions, he filed 

a notice of appeal to this Court. Both Appellant and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents three issues for our consideration:

A. Did the lower court err in denying [A]ppellant’s motion to 

suppress physical evidence as the stop, search, and seizure 

was not based on probable [cause] in violation of Article I 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the 4th and 14th

Amendments of the United States Constitution?

B. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient as a matter of 

law to find [Appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

C. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence presented at trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 4. 

In his first issue, Appellant claims the court erred by denying his motion 

to suppress. As this Court has explained:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of 

a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record 
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and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as 

a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may 

reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, 

as here, the appeal of the determination of the suppression court 

turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal 

conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it 

is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are 

subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Mbewe, 203 A.3d 983, 986 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(quotations and citations omitted). 

Having reviewed the transcript of the suppression hearing, we find the 

court’s findings of fact announced at the conclusion of the hearing are 

supported by the record. N.T., Suppression Hearing, 5/11/18, at 32-35. 

Therefore, we are bound by those findings. We further find the suppression 

court properly applied the law to those facts. 

With respect to the initial traffic stop, both officers observed that a rear 

brake light was inoperable. Further, the vehicle made a right hand turn on a 

red light at an intersection where a right turn on red was not permitted. 

As this Court held in Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009 (Pa 

Super. 2019):

“Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal 

activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the 
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authority of Section 6308(b)[5] must serve a stated investigatory 

purpose.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). For a stop based on 

the observed violation of the Vehicle Code or otherwise noninvestigable offense, an officer must have probable cause to make 

a constitutional vehicle stop. Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291 (“Mere 

reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the 

driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant 

to the suspected violation.”). Pennsylvania law makes clear that 

a police officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle 

if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is a 

minor offense. Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80, 960 

A.2d 108 (2008).

Id. at 1019 (emphasis added). 

The court properly concluded that the officers had probable cause to 

stop the SUV. It was not necessary for the officers to investigate further 

whether the brake light was out. Having observed the traffic code violation, 

they had probable cause to make the stop. Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 

____________________________________________

5 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (Authority of police officer) provides:

Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of 

checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a 

violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a 

vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the 

vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle 

identification number or engine number or the driver’s license, or 

to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably 

believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

Id. 
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A.3d 987, 994 (Pa. Super. 2015). There is no basis to disturb the court’s 

conclusion of law with respect to the initial stop. 

With regard to the search of Appellant’s person and the SUV, the 

testimony revealed that Appellant was sitting in the front passenger seat of 

the SUV. When Appellant got out of the vehicle, Officer Conmy observed a 

white bag, consistent with powder cocaine, in plain sight in the storage 

compartment of the passenger’s side door. Next to that bag was a black bag 

that Officer Conmy determined, based on his training and experience, was 

consistent with crack cocaine. 

As this Court recently reiterated:

Generally, a warrant stating probable cause is required before a 

police officer may search for or seize evidence. Commonwealth 

v. Anderson, 40 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2012). However:

the plain view doctrine provides that evidence in plain view 

of the police can be seized without a warrant, Coolidge v. 

New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 

564 (1971), as modified by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 

128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), and it was 

adopted by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. 

McCullum, 529 Pa. 117, 602 A.2d 313 (1992). The plain 

view doctrine applies if 1) police did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment during the course of their arrival at the location 

where they viewed the item in question; 2) the item was not 

obscured and could be seen plainly from that location; 3) 

the incriminating nature of the item was readily apparent; 

and 4) police had the lawful right to access the item.

Id.

“Courts have alternatively described the plain view doctrine in 

terms of a three-prong test”: The plain-view doctrine permits “the 

warrantless seizure of an object when: (1) an officer views the 

object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent 
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to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a 

lawful right of access to the object.” Commonwealth v. Luczki, 

212 A.3d 530, 547 (Pa. Super. 2019). “There can be no 

reasonable expectation of privacy in an object that is in plain view. 

To judge whether the incriminating nature of an object was 

immediately apparent to the police officer, reviewing courts must 

consider the totality of the circumstances.” Id. “In viewing the 

totality of the circumstances, the officer’s training and experience 

should be considered.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, --- A.3d ---, 2020 PA Super 65, *7 (filed 

March 16, 2020). 

Here, Appellant exited the SUV to exchange positions with Johnson and 

left the SUV’s passenger side door open. Officer Conmy saw the cocaine in 

plain sight in the storage compartment of the passenger side door. Officer 

Conmy did not have to move any items to see the powder cocaine in plain 

view. Based on his training and experience, Officer Conmy recognized the 

contents of the bag as cocaine. As the court observed, “Probable cause exists 

where the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient 

to warrant a prudent individual in believing that an offense was committed 

and that the defendant has committed it.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/19, at 7 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Dennis, 612 A.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Pa. Super. 

1992)). 

Moreover, both Officer Conmy and Officer Oliver detected the odor of 

marijuana as they approached the SUV. “[T]he odor of marijuana alone, 

particularly in a moving vehicle, is sufficient to support at least reasonable 

suspicion, if not the more stringent requirement of probable cause.” In 
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Interest of A.A., 195 A.3d 896, 904 (Pa. 2018) (citing, inter alia, United 

States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (odor may be sufficient to 

establish probable cause)). 

The suppression court’s finding of probable cause to search Appellant 

and the vehicle is supported by the record.6 We find no error in the court’s 

denial of Appellant’s suppression motion. Appellant’s first issue fails. 

In his second issue, Appellant contends the evidence at trial was 

insufficient to support his conviction of PWID (cocaine). 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

____________________________________________

6 Appellant notes that our Supreme Court has granted a petition for allowance 

of appeal in Commonwealth v. Alexander, No. 151 EAL 2019 (Pa. filed 

September 24, 2019), to consider whether its decision in Commonwealth v. 

Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014), should be overruled or limited with respect to 

warrantless vehicle searches. Appellant’s Brief at 22-24. Appellant suggests 

that overruling or limiting Gary would entitle Appellant to relief in light of the 

absence of a warrant to search the SUV. Alexander is inapposite. In 

Alexander, an officer took a key from Alexander’s key ring and used it to 

open and search a locked metal box found in the car. Alexander is seeking to 

reinstate the general warrant requirement of Article I, Section 8. However, as 

outlined in Gary, exceptions to the warrant requirement have been recognized 

under Article I, Section 8, based on individual factual situations, including plain 

view observations. Here, the cocaine was detected by a plain view 

observation. Regardless of the outcome in Alexander, disposition of the issue 

as presented in that case does not offer a path to relief for Appellant. 
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drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be 

considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, 

is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852, 856-57 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(additional citations omitted)). 

As this Court recognized in Roberts:

To sustain a conviction for PWID, “the Commonwealth must prove 

both the possession of the controlled substance and the intent to 

deliver the controlled substance.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 

A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted). It is well 

settled that “[i]n narcotics possession cases, the Commonwealth 

may meet its burden by showing actual, constructive, or joint 

constructive possession of the contraband.” Commonwealth v. 

Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) 

(quotation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the police did not 

discover the controlled substances on Appellant’s person, and 

thus, we must determine whether the Commonwealth sufficiently

established that Appellant had constructive possession of the 

controlled substances.

Id. 

Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to prove he constructively 

possessed the cocaine discovered in the SUV. This Court has defined 

constructive possession as 

a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to deal with the realities of 

criminal law enforcement. Constructive possession is an inference 

arising from a set of facts that possession of the contraband was 

more likely than not. We have defined constructive possession as 

“conscious dominion.” We subsequently defined “conscious 
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dominion” as “the power to control the contraband and the intent 

to exercise that control.” To aid application, we have held that 

constructive possession may be established by the totality of the 

circumstances.

Id. at 767-78 (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown. 48 A.3d 426, 420 (Pa. 

Super. 2012)). 

An “intent to maintain a conscious dominion may be inferred from 

the totality of the circumstances.” [Commonwealth v. 

Macolino, 469 A.2d 132, 134 (Pa. 1983)]. . . . Additionally, our 

Court has recognized that “[c]onstructive possession may be 

found in one or more actors where the item in issue is in an area 

of joint control and equal access.” [Commonwealth v. Valette, 

613 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. 1992)]. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26 A.3d 1078, 1094 (Pa. 2011) (footnote 

omitted). “The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence, and we must evaluate the entire trial record and 

consider all evidence received against the defendant.” Roberts, 133 A.3d at 

767 (citation omitted).

As noted, Officers Conmy and Oliver testified at trial and offered 

testimony consistent with the testimony from the suppression hearing that 

was summarized above.7 That testimony was sufficient to establish that 

Appellant had conscious dominion over the drugs located in the passenger 

door storage compartment of the SUV. See Roberts, 133 A.3d at 767. In 

addition, Officer Daniel Duffy offered expert testimony, including his opinion 

____________________________________________

7 See N.T., Trial, 1/22/19, at 3-35 (Oliver) and 35-80 (Conmy).
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that the drugs were consistent with possession with intent to deliver rather 

than personal use. N.T., Trial, 1/22/19, at 110-11. 

The trial court concluded:

Having presided over this trial, we do not hesitate to conclude that 

the evidence was sufficient to convict the Appellant of possession 

with intent to deliver cocaine. The trial testimony included 

evidence that the Appellant had more than $2,500.00 on his 

person at the time of the arrest, and that a canine officer trained 

to detect the presence of narcotics indicated the presence of same 

in the area where Appellant was seated within the vehicle. A 

quantity of what was later proven to be cocaine was observed by 

law enforcement in plain view in the passenger door pocket within 

the Appellant’s reach. An additional quantity of crack cocaine was 

located next to the bag of powder cocaine. The officers did not 

locate any drug paraphernalia inside the vehicle which may have 

suggested the occupants possessed the drug for their own use.

Officer Daniel Duffy of the Wilkes-Barre City police department 

testified as an expert in narcotics identification and drug 

trafficking. Officer Duffy’s expert report entered in to evidence [] 

concluded that the circumstances of the Appellant’s arrest were 

more consistent with possession with intent to deliver cocaine. 

Having conducted our own independent review of the totality of 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, for 

all the aforementioned reasons, we find that there is ample 

evidence that the Appellant both possessed cocaine, but also that 

he intended to deliver it. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/3/19, at 9-10 (references to notes of testimony 

omitted). 

Viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we find there was sufficient evidence to 

enable the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant 

possessed cocaine and did so with the intent to deliver. Therefore, Appellant’s 

sufficiency challenge fails. 
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In his third issue, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the 

weight of the evidence. In Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 

2013), our Supreme Court instructed:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319, 744 

A.2d 745, 751–52 (2000); Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 

410, 435, 648 A.2d 1177, 1189 (1994). A new trial should not be 

granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because 

the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different 

conclusion. Widmer, 560 Pa. at 319–20, 744 A.2d at 752. 

Rather, “the role of the trial judge is to determine that 

‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater 

weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all 

the facts is to deny justice.’” Id. at 320, 744 A.2d at 752 (citation 

omitted). It has often been stated that “a new trial should be 

awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as 

to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is 

imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to 

prevail.” Brown, 538 Pa. at 435, 648 A.2d at 1189.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a 

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review 

applied by the trial court:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise 

of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Brown, 648 

A.2d at 1189. Because the trial judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an 

appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the 

findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is 

against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. 

Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1976). One 

of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new 

trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or 

was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new 

trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

Widmer, 560 Pa. at 321–22, 744 A.2d at 753 (emphasis added).
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This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the trial court 

in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a 

challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered.

Id. at 1054-55.

As the trial court determined, Appellant’s challenge rests upon his 

assertion that there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence connecting Appellant 

to the cocaine, or evidence that he was observed holding or secreting the 

cocaine. Essentially, Appellant claimed Johnson was the guilty party. 

“Appellant’s counsel made these arguments at trial. The jurors, exercising 

their prerogative as finder of fact, apparently chose not to credit them.” Trial 

Court Opinion, 10/3/19, at 11. The trial court’s sense of justice was not 

shocked by the verdict, nor is ours. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for a new trial based on weight of the 

evidence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/08/2020