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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

Early in the 1950s it became apparent that the U.S. would experience increasing difficulty in

mounting classical intelligence collection operations against the Soviet Union. The development'

of • Soviet nuclear capability significantly increased the urgency of the requirement for information

concerning Soviet strategic forces. It was decided that overhead reconnaissance represented a

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feasible means of olAaining the essential strategic intelligence information.

Therefore, on August 4, 1935, after months of negotiations, the CIA and the USAF agreed to

Jointly sponsor and conduct the U-2 developmental and operational program. It was recognised that

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although the U-2 was initially highly survivable, the Soviets would eventually be capable'of interdicting

U-2 and othe •airborne overflight missions, thereby denying to the piimary source of strategic

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intelligence.

Faced with the eventuality of losing our airborne reconnaissance capabilities, the USAF began

the overt development of a reconnaissance satellite system in September 1955. This development

became the SAIAOS program.

AO development activity on satellite reconnaissance systems progressed, it became apparent

that openly operating a satellite espionage system would be inconsistent with the stated U. S. "space
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for peace" policy. In recognition of the potential international sensitivity to reconnaissance operations,

satel/itit vehicles notwithstanding, the USAF and the CIA were made joint sponsors of a covert satellite

reconnaissance program. Thus began the CORONA (EII-4) program under the cover at the

DISCOVERER research project.

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The incentive for development of an alternative reconnaissance capability heightened when on

May 1, 1980 Gary Powers' U-2 was shot down on a mission targeted against Plesetsk.

The President's decision to terminate overflights of the Soviet Union following the Powers

incident essentially shrouded the Soviet Union until August 19, 1960 when the first intelligence

photography was returned from space. Although the mission lasted only one day and returned

comparatively poor quality imagery (about 35 feet ground resolution versus the 2-3 feet .for the U-2),

a capability was demonstrated.

Pertintalp, NSC meeting had been scheduled for August 26, 1980 to review the management

of the SAMOS program. The photography from the first successful CORONA satellite mission lent

substantial evidence to the potential of satellite reconnaissance systems. The President directed '- A"'

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Abet the SAMOS project be-reeriented along Thies similar to the CORONA project, and llot special

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SAMOS management proceduresobe-eetabliabed. •

A week later the Secretary of the Air Force delegated the management authority for satellite

reconnaissance to the Under Secretary at the Air Force. It became increasingly apparent, however,

that the importance of satellite reconnaissance products dictated that the collection program be

conducted at.a national

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is September 1961, the Secretary at Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence signed

an agreement establishing the National Reconnaissance Program. The agreement established

the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans), CIA, as co-directors of the

Vilitht this agreement laid the groundwork for succeeding NRP agreements, the NSC 5412/2

Group (now the 40 Committee) recommended against the co-directorship concepten essence the

agreement .never operated.

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On May 2, 1962 a second agreement was signed which established a single Director of the

Se.A.• NRO and developed the following responsibilities and relationshipewhili have carried through

to the present:

The NRP will be solely and directly responsive to the requirements and priorities of

the UM&

The NRP will consist of all overt and covert satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects.

Specifically licensed here are those overt and covert satellite

This provision. in May 1962, formalised in a national charter the responsibilities outlined on October

20, 1961 by the Secretary of Defense in his directive "Space Vehicle Electronics Intelligence Program"

in which he:

defined the utilisation of space vehicles as a means for collection of electronic signal

(COMINT and RUNT) information as • special augmentation to other signal intelligence resources of

the U. S. Government and,

assigned to the NRO the sole responsibility for the research, development planning

and operations for electronic 'signal collection by space vehicles.

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The resources of the DOD and the CIA will be used to conduct the NRP. •

The DNRO will be responsible for funding the NRP.

The DCI will establish security policy for the protection of the NRP.

The DNIIO will be responsible for the scheduling of all NRP projects.

T. The NRO v/11 be responsible for first-phase processing of NRP projects.

B. Public release of information will be the responsibility of the DNItO.

ahis above roles and responsibilities have remained essentially unchanged to date despite the

ensuing agreementD

On July 6, 1962 the NBC 5412/2 Group and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

non-concurred in the May 1982 agreement and directed the development of a more definitive

"permanent documentary basis for the National Reconnaissance Office. "

On March 13, 1963 a third agreement was signed by the Deputy 'Secretary of Defense and the

DCL While this agreement was more specific than the two previous attempts and was concurred

in by the PFIAB, the agreement was considered unworkable by the CIA. This agreement very

clearly established the authority and responsibilities of the DNRO; however, acceptance of the

agreement by the CIA was less than enthusiastic. During this period and until 1965, CIA and
DOD relationships were at a very low ebb. Finally, in May 1964, following an intensive study,

the PFIAB sent a memorandum to the President recommending that lie approve a directive

establishing a framework for the National Reconnaissance Office. In response to the President's

direction in 1964, the current "DOD/CIA Agreement for Reorganisation of the NRP" was signed

on August 11, 1965. Tbis agreement, which currently charters the NRP, is directly responsive

to the concerns expressed by the PFIAB in Mt •

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During the two-year period following the first successful CORONA mission, the President

was subject to many national and international forces with respect to satellite reconnaissance

systems. In response to the increasing pressure for a• national position on satellite reconnaissance activities, on May 26, 1962 the President (via NSAM 156) directed the State Department to

chair an Ad Roc committee to formulate a U.S. position on satellite reconnaissance which would:

maintain United States freedom or action to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations

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prevent foreign political and physical interference with those operations

prevent accidental or forced disclosure of the details of the operations or end-products

of the United States reconnaissance program ind, at the same time,

permit the United States to continue to work toward disarmament and international

cooperation in space.

The committee was (as it is today) chaired by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and had highlevel representation from DOD, NASA, the White House staff, CIA and ACDk.

4014-SEenT- CORONA

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119F-SEatitOn July 10, 1N2 (via NSC action 2454) the President approved as national policy the

NUM 156 Committee report on the political and informational aspects of satellite reconnaissancn. The key elements of this policy:

Satellite reconnaissance activities are considered to be legitimate and peaceful.'

Avoid public reference to "reconnaissance"

Resist Soviet pressure to outlaw space reconnaissance.

Control public statements.

Do not disclose the status, extent, effectiveness or operational characteristics of

NRP.

The U.S. cannot agree to:

Declaring the purpose of all satellites

Advance launching notification

c. Pre-launching inspection.

This policy has undergirded the NRP since 1962 and has been reaffirmed by the NSAM 156

Committee on several occasions. For example, in 1966, the NSAM 156 Committee addressed

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10P-SECRETthe impact on the NRP of NASA's earth resources survey activities and provided 'guidelines for

its development while reaffirming the basic satellite reconnaissance policy established in i062.

In summary, the current national policy enjoins the United States to operate its reconnaissance satellites with great discretion while working toward developing tacit acceptance of the

operation and avoiding embarrassment to our allies or confrontation with our enemies. The

continued acceptance of this policy was recommended to the President in the NRP Annex to the

Space Task Group Report and approved by the President on September 30, 1969.

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The National Reconnaissance Program is conducted in accord with national policy and is

executed in accordance with the August 11, 1965 DOD/CIA Agreement. This agreement, asr

proviseslreinnttoned, was developed in response to the concerns of the PFIAB and in essence

represents Presidential desires concerning the conduct and management of the most sighificant

strategic intelligence program.

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Tho Agreement recogniseg the used for a single, national program to meet the intelligence

needs of the U.S. Government (as opposed to DOD needs only). The Agreement establishei) the

NRO as a separate agency of the DOD. The Secretary of Defense iirdesignated as the executive

agent for the NRP and will:

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Be ultimately responsible for the management and operation of the NRP and the NBA.

Choose the DNRO.

S. Review and approve the NRP budget.

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The Agreement also recognizei the varied roles of the Director of Central Intelligence as

senior U.S. intelligence advisor, co-sponsor d the NRP and the Chairman at the WEB. Under

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the terms of theAgreement the DCI will:

Establish collection prioritise and requirements.

Review the product of NRP operations.

Be a member of the NRP Executive Committee.

Review the NRP budget.

5. Provide NRP security gads:ice.

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The Agreement also delineates the responsibilities and commensurate authority of the

DNRO, who will:

Manage the NRO and execute the NAP subject to the direction and control of the

Secretary at Defense and the guidance of the ExCom.

billets, approve, modify, redirect or terminate any or all research and development

projects in the NAP.

Report to the ExConk on the status of all NAP projects or activities.

Prepare the NRP budget.

5. Establish fiscal control and accounting procedures for the NAP.

S. Sit with the USW on matters affecting the NRP. •
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Ot particular significance in this Agreement was the establishment of an NRP Executive

Committee very similar in composition to that recommended by the PFIAB in 1964. In

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essence the ExCom acts as a board of directors for the 14RP. It composed of the Deputy

Secretary of Defense and the DCI as co-sponsors at the Program, while the President's

Science Advisor represent the White Rouse. The Exec= is tasked to:

Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP.

Approve or modify the NRP and its budget.

Approve the allocation of research, develop: eat, and operational responsibilities •

between the DOD and CIA program element.

Review the essential features of the major program elements of the. NRP.. '

In practice, the BxCom acts for the Secretary of Defense to review the NRP and provide

guidance to the DNRO on the conduct and execution of the NRP. The existence of the ExCom

and its composition were directed by the President in 1964 to replace the system of DOD and

CIA NRP monitors which was chartered in the 1962 and 1963 agreements. The individual

agency monitor concept interfered with the direct chain of command envisioned for the NRP.

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In addition to the ExCom functions, the NAP is presently reviewed quite substantially. The

USM, as the requirements generation agency, evaluates the degree to which NRP activities

satisfy stated requirements. The "Land Panel" under Dr. DuBridge monitors the development

of sensors pertinent tq reconnaissance systems and identifies promising areas for study and

exploitation. The WINS also takes an active role in assessing the effectiveness of the

organisation, management, and operation of the Program in response to national needs and

priorities.

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The August 1965 charter has proven to be a good one. It establishes a program and an

organisation which are responsive to changing intelligence needs and a Program whose

effectiveness is readily and frequently measured by the requirements community. •

Several constructive changes within the tenets of our charter have been made from time to

time. In April 1969 the DNRO established an analysis capability on the NRO Staff to provide •

basis for selecting among alternative approaches to meeting stated user requirements. The

current Deputy DNRO has a much stronger and more effective role than in the past. Be has a

strong technical capability and increased responsibility for program management has been

delegated to him. He is, as per the charter, a CIA employee and is providing a stronget interface between CIA and DOD management on NRO matters.

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A'• A significant characteristic of the NRO is the marked difference :Me trs„xnajor

program offices of the NAP -- CIA Reconnaissance ams under and the Air

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Force Special Projects Office under . The CIA Program Office is very

close to the intelligewe community and has an excellent understanding of intelligence priorities

and requirements. The C*, while it recognises the ultimate authority of the DNRO with regard

and Ws res•vela ezer.".4 41%4 to managetsent of the NAP; operates its programs in a nearly autonomous fashion. StrrOnelteft

and the DCI are continually involved in intelligence matters at every level of government and

with many agencies. As is perfectly natural, they tend to favor the collection projects for which

the CIA is responsible in many discussions outside the NRO and beyond ExCom. This influence

tends to restrict the options for program decisions open to the DNRO.

Conversely, the Air Force Program Office is solely responsive to DNRO direction, since it

reports in a direct line to the DNRO. This office is by geographical location (Los Angeles) and

composition, however, removed from the intelligence community and looks to the NRO Staff to

interface with the appropriate USIB committees.

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I believe the asymmetrical nature of the IMO. while not wholly desirable, can perhaps be

exploited by the judicious assignment of responsibilities for various exploratory, development

sad operational projects. For example, in the field of near real time readout, it is to our

advantage to have both the CIA Program Office and the Air Force Program Office continue the

technology effort leading to systems definition some time in the future. Once these systems

are defined, however, in our decision as to which office should have development responsibility,

we should take into account not only the technical capability of the two cayanisations but also

their management experience, as demonstrated on other NRO programs.
A recent management action which affects the NRP is the Secretary of Defense memorandum,

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"Responsibilities for for Intelligence in the DOD" dated August 6, 1969. This memorandum outlined

the intelligence responsibilities 01 the ASD (A). The purpose of these new responsibilities is to

assure the Secretary at Defense that all intelligence programs of the DOD are viewed competently

and in mutual context to permit optimum allocation at resources. The need for such an overall

view is doubtless valid and, to date, it appears that the clean organisation and functional arrangement of the NRO offers a visibility sufficient for such a review without placing much additional

burden on the NRO. However, the implementation of the authority delegated to the ASD (A) 43i.';

resource allocation, requirements validation and line management, if applied to the NRP, can

be in conflict with the present charter establishing the NRP. For example, the ASD (A) has expressed

concern about over classification and an intent to reduce compartmentalisation of intelligence data.

But the special security policies of the NRP are based on a national policy which has been reaffirlied

a number of times and which designates the DCI as the responsible official for security policy.

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Proposals to change this policy must be carefully handled to account for. the views of the several

groups external to the DOD who have responsibility.

Similarly. the expressed intent of PFIAB in recommending to the President the organisation

of the NRO included the relief from internal review within DOD or CIA. The Board's study revealed

"that the use of monitors by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to review the conduct of the

National Reconnaissance Program has interfered with the direct chain of command between the

Secretary of Defense and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, and from the NRO

Director to the CIA elements engaged in the Program." Consequently the Board recommended to

the President that "in lieu of the monitor and review functions provided for in the present (March

1863) NRP Agreement, periodic reporting by the Executive Agent for the Program to the

President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the President's FLAB, concerning

all aspects of the Program, including organisation, management, funding, programming, security,

advance planning, research and development, production and operations." (From PFIAB _Memorandum for the President, dated May 2, 1964, approved by the President on May 22, 1964,

IIIIII62/64). Management procedures which tend to add another layer of review and approval

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can cause concern within these groups and could easily undermine the good featikes of a national 

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organisation. At present. we have outstanding requests from both ASD ESA) and DDR&E for

additional clearances for people whowould conduct even more reviews of our programs.

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The present organisation and management arrangement has been effective although it is a

fairly delicately balanced arrangement between two agencies and influenced by several others.

The NRO, like any organisation, can be improved. But improved management arrangements

should be considered cjerefully in view of the relationships with the CIA and others and executed

in a straightforivard, coordinated manner. A current fear is that a gradual process of

normalisation will occur which degrades the truly national characier of the NRP. Such a

degradation may well not be in the best interests of national security and may be viewed with

considerable concern by various groups as soon as its effect becomes apparent.

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Whether or not organizational changes of a fundamental nature are implemented. it is

essential that the DNRO have a clearly established line of authority. Unless and until interagency changes are made, it is strongly recommended that there be no ambiguity in the authority

and responsibility of the DepSecDef as Chairman, ExCom over the DNRO. With regard to the

NRP, it appears that the ASD(A) can provide all necessary advice to the Secretary of Defense and

DepSecDef on resource allocation without interfering with the normal operation of the NAO.

Budgets and other information normally supplied by the DNRO to the ExCom will be made

available to ASD(A). The DNRO will. of course, cooperate with the ASD(A) in all activities

essential to an overall review of DCO intelligence programs.

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