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1St• NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE NRO STAFF

March 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: Letter to Ambassador Johnson on "Fact Of"

Indications are that there is agreement between the U.S.

and the Soviets to finalize a SALT ABM Treaty prior to

President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May. There is also

likely to be an executive agreement of some sort with respect

to offensive weapons. Both will require Congressional review

and approval shortly following the Moscow visit.

The Verification Panel still has not addressed a ratification strategy. The NSAM 156 Committee paper has been at •

a standstill since Ambassador Johnson entered the hospital.

In view of the "second thoughts" on "fact of" voiced

by Mr. Helms recently and the fact that the NRO position on

the table supports the release of "fact of," we feel that a

letter with a restated IMO position should be sent without

delay to Ambassador Johnson.

There is likely to be a very rapid effort to set a

ratification strategy for SALT. We are fearful that the

"fact of" issue will become lost in the desire to obtain

unhampered ratification; the NRO position should be on the

record.

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-1St NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Dear Alex,

I understand that the 156 Working Group is divided in

its thinking on how far to proceed in recommending revelation

of "fact of" satellite reconnaissance by government spokesmen

in response to public questioning about "national means of

verification" for a SALT. When favorable reaction to this

proposition was obtained from CIA, I instructed my representative to support the acknowledgement of "fact of," subject

to certain constraints, should it become necessary.

Following recent conversations I have had with Dick Helms

and others, I desire to restate my position on the "fact of"

matter. I am apprehensive that many, not directly involved

with the operation of the National Reconnaissance Program,

tend to view the subject of "fact of" in too simplified a

manner. There are two major points which should be made clear

to all those deliberating this apparent dilemma. First,

although one can read about "spy satellites" in the news,

the largely speculative articles do not constitute official

U.S. admission of the activity. Over the recent years, the

official policy of protecting the "fact of" has been viewed

often as fatuous in its original context. This is accurate,

in a simplistic sense. However, what is ignored or not

perceived is that the "fact of" policy today literally serves

to severely constrain a propensity for less carefully or

guardedly discussing the scope and the nature of our reconnaissance activities. Thus., the original purpose of not

revealing the "fact of" in order to minimize provocation

or the scope of the program is indeed still effective, but

in a more indirect fashion.

Second, and less subtle than the above, the admission

of the "fact of" as a practical response to public questioning

about "national technical means" may not serve a useful purpose in the long run. Other forms of "national technical

means" might also come under scrutiny. Further, those who

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would be initially skeptical or disbelieving about utility

of a SALT or about our abilities to verify a SALT likely

would not be satisfied with a limited statement of admission

of "fact of." The alternative--going beyond a limited statement with details--seemingly would be counterproductive since,

if capabilities become public knowledge, intricate countermeasures might be devised to hinder the actual monitoring of

a SALT.

Thus, even for such an important concern, as assuring

unified support and successful ratification of a SALT, it

seems impractical, in my view, to admit to "fact of" without

considering the depth of implication. At this time, at least,

the risks still appear too great and official silence, in the

face of questioning--difficult as it is to maintain--appears

to be a sound policy.

Sincerely,

John L. McLucas

The Honorable. U.

Under Secretary

Department of St

Washington, D.C.

Alexis Johnson

for Political Affairs

ate

20520

cc: Hr. Helms

Dr. David

Dr. Tucker

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