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U<. __ ,.J (.~; c,_':~i'~i/,"~; '\~J~l ~ , 

12 September 1968 

Colonel Yost: 

The attached was written during and after several readings 

of the memo proposed by Mr. Bohlen for NSAM 156 Group 

consideration. In the cold light of another day, I think the 

following are the major points (which you and Col Worthman 

undoubtedly have already enumerated): 

1. Whatever the Russian position with regard to 

on-site inspection, I cannot see how "admission" of satellite 

reconnaissance activities on the part of the US will influence 

them to agree to strategic arms limitations. On the other 

hand, I feel that "admission" (which constitutes official 

US confirmation, no matter how discrete, secretive, etc.) 

poses a grave risk to the continuance of NRP activities. 

2. My rationale behind the belief of the risk 

involved in "admission" is as follows. In the past, the US 

has carefully avoided any statement or action that might 

literally force the Russians into an open confrontation with 

us (politically or militarily) on this issue. The stringent 

security surrounding the NRP is designed to protect the fact, 

extent, and technical capabilities. Secretive "admission" .... 

would not force the Russians into confrontation; but would 

,',OINTLY 

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give the Communists the option of forcing the US into a 

confrontation if they so desired. Public confirmation would 

give every nation in the world the option of forcing at least 

a political confrontation on this sensitive subject. 

3. It is not necessary to figuratively "bare our 

souls" to negotiate arms limitations with the Russians. 

The problem is separable into two issues: a. What are the 

limitations; and b. How any agreement will be policed. With 

regard to the "how policed", the US should first propose that 

this be done by UN on-site inspection teams; if that is not 

acceptable, the next alternative should be US-Soviet inspection 

teams; and the final offer should be self-policing - e. g. , 

a "pact of honor" (realizing full well, we are signing a 

treaty with the "devil"). At the same time, we should intend 

to supplement the "police" force (whether UN; US/USSR; or the 

self-policing honor system approach) with hard intelligence 

acquired by unilateral and covert satellite reconnaissance. 

4. If the US is reasonably close to some kind of 

strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviets, the 

US should plan on increasing the frequency of NRP coverage, 

press on with MOL, and start technology/development of a 

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satellite camera whose resolution is 

las we 11 as 0 ther ear th sensor'---s-.--W-i-t-h-r-e-g-a-r-d--t-o-v-e-r~y '--------~ 

high resolution, it would be needed as much in positive 

identification of weapons for arms control (e.g., no change) 

as it is now for technical intelligence. 

5. If high Government authorities do not share 

~ my para 2 assessment of the risk and a decision is made 

to make the "admission" (e.g., confirmation), then three 

changes are recommended in the proposed memorandum: a. it 

would seem prudent to keep at least certain allies fully 

informed of our plans/dealings with the Soviets; b. rather 

than threatening withdrawal from the agreement if the Soviets 

interfered with US recce satellites, such interference should 

be considered "an ac t of war of graves t consequence"; and 

c. official releases or statements to the press should be kept 

on the "no conrrnent" level as long as possible. 

6. Also in the paper, the verification "by external 

(national) means" portion could have serious ramifications. 

The Conrrnunist world generally uses the l2-mile limit to mean 

external as far as the sea is concerned; and they clearly 

consider airplane overflight as an intrusion on national 

i 

d 

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sovereignty. Since where space begins has never been defined, 

what assurance do we have that the Communists will not argue 

for a vertical wall upward from their borders or 12-mi1e 

limit boundaries? 

7. The authors of the paper place great reliance 

on satellite inspection capability and downgrade the 

importance of on-site inspection. I do not believe the 

National Intelligence Community or the JCS agree with them. 

8. JCS views on para 7 above and on the 

"admission" aspect of the proposed paper should be solicited 

by the NSAM 156 Group. 

i ST. STEWART ~.~ a' r Gener a1, USAF 

... ce Direc tor, MOL Program 

P.S. I think the threat to MOL's future is not as great --

or at worst, no greater -- than to the NRP in general; and 

the latter is time-wise more urgent. 

... 

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[; [0/ C~~ ':jiL~JJ:., ~ . 

letF p /VJ. ,-

II September 1968 

Colonel Yost: 

·i::::~'HOLE: 

·';0'<',:;1"; J,OINTLY 

This paper literally terrifies me. I would be inalterably 

and violently opposed to any such "admission" by the US 

(which would constitute "official" confirmation no matter 

how secretive, discrete, or informal). The risk to future 

NRP operations seems terribly high (more on the risk aspect 

later); the gain to the US seems questionable (e.g., "official" 

Sovi et acceptance of reconnaissance acti vities vs thei r tacit 

acceptance now); and why such an admission should induce the 

Soviets to enter an arms limitation agreement is incomprehensible to me. 

On page 1, the paper properly identifies and agrees 

with US objectives of freedom from political or physical 

interference to unilaterally conduct satellite reconnaissance. 

On Page 4, the paper notes we have always been guided by the 

overriding desire to avoi d an open confrontation and, on the 

same page, that i t is still sound policy to avoid a 

confrontation. The US has generally implemented this policy 

by carefully avoiding any actions or statements (formal or 

informal) which mi ght force the Soviets -- for political or 

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u __ ".;" - -... . _,_).~~ 

other reasons -- into a reaction of almost any kind. There 

is another and subtle facet to this US policy; we must also 

be extremely careful to not provide gratis the wherewithal 

to the Soviets for a confrontation should they desire to do 

so at some future date. I think this aspect is very 

important and should be explored fully by the NSAM 156 Group; 

the paper completely overlooks such a possibility. 

Any risk of an open confrontation on satellite 

reconnaissance, and a possible limiting or banning of such 

activities, is a grave risk to US national security but would 

not be terribly serious to the Communist World. They can 

learn more about the US from Congress, press, journals, travel, 

etc., than we can ever hope to learn about them from satellites 

and satellites provide almost all of the "hard" intelligence 

information on Russia (for example, each and every known or -

suspect ICBM launches in the USSR was discovered by satellites; 

each year, the DIA summary to the FlAB states that the 

information acquired came almost exclusively from satellites, 

etc. ) . 

Some miscellaneous thoughts follow: 

- 1. If such a step is taken by the US, we had 

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better accelerate MOL and start work on even better 

resolutions -- arms limitation agreement enforcement solely 

by satellite invitation is risky, even if we have super 

resolution, and would be comparatively easy to evade. A 

combination of on-site inspection and satellite reconnaissance 

is needed. 

2. I certainly agree with the o1l»jective of arms 

limitation but not the approach. There are two steps which 

can be taken sequentially: a. what weapons will be limited 

by mutual agreement; b. and how to enforce such agreement. 

Item b should not be discussed until item a is settled; then, 

"admission" should never be a part of b. We should first 

propose UN enforcement with on-site inspection by neutral 

nations (intending to unilaterally supplement their inspections 

with covert satellite reconnaissance). If this were - unacceptable, we should next propose a bilateral US-Soviet 

agreement for on-site inspections of each other (still 

intending to unilaterally do covert satellite reconnaissance). 

As a last resort, we should propose a "pact of honor" (still 

intending to covertly observe their activities from space) . ..... 

that is as far as we should go. 

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:, . . .... ~ :~ 

3. On page 2, too much capability is credited to 

satellites and too little to on-site inspections. Both would 

be needed for a high assurance of compliance. 

4. On page 3, it is not at all "evident" to me 

that the US must alter past space-security policies to pursue 

an agreement on arms limit. There is no reason why we have 

to discuss "national means of verification" with the Soviets. 

Our only source is satellites and/or on-site inspection; they 

need neither. 

5. The "scenario" on page 5 is rather one-sided. 

If the Soviets interfere with our one source, we are "blinded" 

and merely withdraw from the agreement. How could the US 

interfere with their open sources -- create a closed Cornmunistlike society? ~ 

6. On pages 6 and 7, how can we expect to keep the - trust of our Allies if we unilaterally trade secrets with 

the Soviets. 

7. Re second para on page 7, the "precise timing 

and scope" would be a matter for the Pre'sident, in consultation 

with the NSC -- not the Sec State. 

-

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8. Re the press, past experience should have 

taught us by now that Hno comment" would be the best approach 

until an agreement was reached. 

9. Have the JCS been invited to comment on this 

specific paper? They should be consulted immediately. 

~ .. ,./" 

S T;; '- S TEWAR T 

M1jor General, USAF 

Vice Director, MOL Program 

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