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NEMO'RANDUM FOR MR. LAIRD

--TOP-SECRET

SUBJECT: Revelation of "Fact Of" Satellite Reconnaissance

The United States is critically dependent upon reconnaissance satellites for verifying Soviet compliance with the

Strategic Arms Limitation agreements. The Verification Panel

will shortly consider whether.we should make some formal public

statements about these satellite capabilities as an element of

our "national technical means of verification." We believe it

is in the best interest of the United States not to change our

policy with respect to satellites--that is, we should not begin

discussing the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance. In taking

this position, we realize that the subject may need to be

addressed again later if new circumstances arise. The paper

at the right explains the background of the issue and the

rationale for our position in more detail.

The main reasons for our conclusions are:

We recognize and support the need for full disclosure, with proper precautions, of all relevant capabilities

to persons responsible for SALT ratification. This is the

current policy and should be continued.

The simple admission of the "fact of" satellite

reconnaissance therefore does not represent any new information

and cannot be an inducement to ratification because everyone

concerned either 1) knows, or 2) assumes it.

c. What is new is the official nature of a disclosure.

An official disclosure has two distinct disadvantages 1) it may

force Soviets or third countries to react adverSely, 2) it does

weaken real security rules because there is no practical enforceable rule between the "fact of" and "facts about" satellite

reconnaissance.

RECOMMENDATION: We do not favor any disclosure at this time, and

believe that positive steps, are required to preclude inadvertent

disclosure. We recommend that you bring these points to the

attention of the President at the earliest possible time.

Gardiner L. Tucker John L. MbLucas •John S. Foster

G. Warren Nutter Albert C. Ball

-TOP-SECRET--

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This paper discusses alternative policies for releasing information to the

public on satellite reconnaissance in conjunction with the current SALT

agreement and follow-on discussions. The current policy, established a

decade ago by the President and periodically reaffirmed since then, prohibits

disclosuriAthe ,"fact of" U. S. satellite reconnaissance outside of TalentKeyhol let ontrol system channels; i.e., neither the public nor the

vast majority of normally cleared personnel are even told that the U.S.

has reconnaissance satellites.

The SAL agreement provides that each side shall use "national technical

means of verification", consistent with "international law" and will not

"use deliberate concealment" or "interfere with national technical means."

All these phrases will probably cause considerable public interest. Questions

will be raised as to:

what are the U.S. national means and how effective are they?

what have we told the Soviets about these means and what

implicit or tacit agreements have resulted from the negotiations

with respect to concealment or interference?

does the U.S. conduct satellite reconnaissance?

what is the international law?

There are many options for response by officials:

we can hold to current practices and sidestep questions.

we can provide much more compartmented information

to all members of Congress interested in SALT or allow the

"fact of" to be downgraded to Secret (i. e. uncornpartmented).

we can limit the acicnowledgernent of the "fact of" to certain

highest officials only as necessary to respond to Congressional

hearings on SAL agreements. Policy for all other people would

be as before.

we can publicly acknowledge the "fact of" U.S. satellite

reconnaissance but provide no other information whatsoever

at an unclassified level.

we can acknowledge the "fact of" and also provide broad

background information on the scope and nature of photographic

reconnaissance. ••

we can decide to hold to current policy in the initial phases

of Congressional and press relations but release more data

if the pressures develop and after consultation with the Soviets.

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The current major issue within the Government is whether to acknowledge

the "fact of". All parties seem to agree that we will need to play by ear

the extent of classified discussions with Congress. The key underlying issues

are:

Would disclosing "the fact of" eventually lead to more detailed

disclosure of capabilities which could lead to Soviet understanding

of verification shortcomings and consequent temptations to cheat

in these areas.

Is disclosure necessary or helpful in getting SALT agreements

ratified.

Would disclosure at this time assist in "legalizing" satellite

reconnaissance, or alternatively, could disclosure lead to

declaring it contrary to "generally accepted principles of

international law", thus compromising U.S. capability to

verify the SALT agreement.

Would disclosure permit or provoke some third parties to object

to satellite reconnaissance as an invasion of their military and

economic privacy.

Would disclosure now assist us in establishing within the government

or challenging with the Soviets a possible Soviet violation of the

agreements.

We conclude as follows:

The U.S. security policy during the past decade has very successfully

achieved its objectives (this is discussed in a following section).

A SAL treaty and the growing recognition and acceptance of satellite

reconnaissance are factors that argue under certain circumstances

for more candor on the part of the Government.

3. It has not been shown that acknowledging the "fact of" will help to

sell a SAL agreement to the Congress or the public.

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There would probably be no damage to security if only the top

leaders were to acknowledge the "fact of (without any details)

in appropriate circumstances. However in view of #3 this

only serves to relieve the awkwardness in a minor way. However

if the Government as a whole acknowledges the "fact of" it is

certain that much more information will become available,

possibly starting an irreversible process that damages both

critical U.S. intelligence and even the current or potential SAL

agreements.

Disclosure could place the Soviets into an untenable position,

forcing them to react unfavorably.

Acknowledgement of the "fact of" may invite or provoke some

third countries to object and possibly to lead a movement to

declare it illegal. Some believe this to be a major risk.

The verification issue should not be upgraded within the

Administration so that it is forced into the spotlight in order to

sell the agreements. •

& These issues should be discussed with the President but the DoD

position at this time should not be changed.

Extent of Disclosure

During Congressional hearings on SAL agreements top leaders will likely

be questioned closely on means for verification; they will probably be asked if the

U.S. has reconnaissance satellites. It will be very awkward for them to

decline to comment in these circumstances. There is support for a policy

which would allow top leaders to acknowledge only the "fact of under this

pressure with no other changes to the national disclosure policy to the

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The key question remains whether acknowledgement of the "fact of can be

limited to this simple disclosure or whether acknowledgement will be the

beginning of an erosion of security such that in months there will be widespread

public knowledge of the extent, success and limits of U.S. satellite

reconnaissance. If disclosure and discussion could with very high confidence

be limited to the simple "fact of", then there is no strong opposition. However,

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there is a strong view on the part of some that "the wound will not heal", that

erosion is inevitable and that the long-term consequences may be Soviet,

Chinese and third country actions that will significantly damage U.S. intelligence.

According to this view the "fact of" is common knowledge whether, or not the

Government officially acknowledges it. Public debate and public interest will

demand more details and "crossing the line" to acknowledge the "fact of" will

signal to the Congress, press, public, and bureaucrats that we are prepared

to disclose more.

The. Current U.S. Position

The rationale for the current U.S. position is as follows. Reaction by the

Soviets or others to U.S satellite reconnaissance seems to be heavily

determined by the extent to which the subject is discussed and becomes an

issue. The simple acknowledgement by the U.S. that it photographs the Soviet

Union may be embarrassing to the leaders, not directly, but by putting them

in a position to be pressured by the military, security and intelligence units,

and their allies. Equally, acknowledgement will increase awareness.

There is some evidence that a decade of photographic reconnaissance may

have significantly changed the attitude of Soviet leaders toward more widespread

acknowledgement within the Soviet Union that nations photograph each other:

NINA

- The SALT discussions and language imply acceptance of the legality

of ov head reconnaissance.

ovze s • all e sa e ite act viti s are ea m

and being increasingly used against China.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union has many of the characteristics of a very

large bureaucracy that is difficult to control and prone to compromise. To

the extent that the military and security elements of the bureaucracy become

aware, concerned and knowledgeable of U.S. reconnaissance, we can as a

' minimum, expect reactions in the form of concealment and deception. We

may also see development of anti-satellite capabilities not otherwise needed

but maintained in case the SAL agreement is terminated.

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Issues Raised by SALT 

In the context of SALT, a number of factors argue for wider dissemination

of information on U.S. reconnaissance:

Acknowledgement and dissemination may help gain approval of

SAL agreement by providing assurance that the U.S. knows what

strategic forces the Soviets have, and will be able to verify development and detect violations if they occur.

Discussion: If intelligence and verification become public issues,

this is so. However, these are not the issues that are being raised

by those who think we have given away too much, and are not the'

concerns of the SAL supporters.

If the United States plans to disclose in the foreseeable future

the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance, making such an announcement

a part of the SAL package would result in the greatest likelihood of

gaining international acceptance.

Discussion: However, disclosure could, in spite of international

sentiment favoring SAL, cause other nations to renew their stated

objections to satellite reconnaissance and press for action to

declare such operations illegal. Such an eventuality would create

serious problems since we have accepted the Soviet stipulation that

verification of the agreement must be "in accord with generally

recognized principles of international law."

Disclosure could inform the public of uncertainties and risks

caused by the SAL.agreement and so help to gain their acceptance

of developments or deployments that will be needed within the

agreement to provide U.S. safeguards.

Discussion: On the other hand, disclosure of previously unheard

of U.S. capabilities may cause public overconfidence (something

seems much better than nothing). At the same time, the Soviets

would better understand the U.S shortcomings and might be

tempted to cheat or at least "test" these weak areas.

Acknowledgement of the "fact of" would make it less awkward

for officials to face questions on what is meant by "national technical

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means"; acknowledgement would recognize the people's right-to-know

and increase the credibility of the Government.

Discussion: These are true to the extent that details are presented.

It is hard to see how more acknowledgement (without additional

details) would be significantly less awkward than a reply: "The

U.S. has a number of means of verification and it is our policy not

to discuss them even in broad qualitative terms. To the extent

that we say anything, we either assist other countries to recognize

the priorities we attach to different means or we mislead the

public. These matters are discussed on a classified basis with

members of the Congress."

5. Acknowledgement of the "fact of" will be helpful in preparing U.S.

and international public acceptance of future U.S. claims of Soviet

violations if these occur.

Discussion: Public acknowledgement is not necessary prior to

confronting Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission.

If public ac knowledgement becomes necessary to gain acceptance

of a violation charge there would be no penalty in delaying until

that time, arguing that early disclosure could have revealed

weaknesses allowing even more cheating.

There is a dilemma in establishing a public information policy on disclosure.

An informed public and credibility demand honest details but these details

may cause Soviet reaction and concealment and open the way for cheating.

Making details of U.S. verification available to the Soviets may in fact lead

to haggling over conformance since they can more safely "test the edges"

of the agreement with respect to concealment.

Conclusion 

A decade of satellite reconnaissance has helped establish de facto acceptance.

A SAL treaty has significantly assisted this by:

adding formal recognition of national technical means (but

not specifying satellites). • providing an informal forum for discussion between us and the

Soviets.

ensuring non-interference and minimizing some concealment as

long as the treaty is in force.

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Although there are probably some short-term advantages to more open discussion of satellite reconnaissance, there are also some long-term risks.

Discussions would likely lead to an overall revelation of the capabilities and

limits of our reconnaissance, and there is the danger that disclosure will

stimulate an unofficial Soviet reaction of significant concealment and deception,

even if these do not clearly violate the treaty.

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