UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1200

SABRINA RENEE BROWN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson, 

District Judge. (4:11-cv-00044-RAJ-FBS)

Submitted: June 22, 2012 Decided: July 19, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sabrina Renee Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Scott William Kezman, 

Anna Richardson Smith, KAUFMAN & CANOLES, PC, Norfolk, Virginia, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Sabrina Renee Brown appeals the district court’s order 

granting summary judgment to the defendant, Huntington Ingalls,

Inc., on her claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (“ADA”) and 

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 

U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). Brown also 

challenges the magistrate judge’s denial of several discovery 

motions, seeks to supplement the record on appeal, and moves

this court to compel the production of discovery materials. For 

the following reasons, we decline to supplement the record or 

compel discovery, and we affirm the judgment below.

I. Discovery motions*

We review the denial of discovery prior to the grant

of summary judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Harrods 

Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 

 * Huntington contends that Brown has waived review of the 

magistrate judge’s denial of her various discovery motions 

because she did not challenge their disposition in the district 

court. Because Brown, proceeding pro se, did not receive notice 

of the consequences of failing to file timely objections to the 

magistrate judge’s orders, however, her failure to object to 

them below does not waive appellate review. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(a); Wells v. Shriners Hosp., 109 F.3d 198, 200-01 (4th Cir. 

1997); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 

1984). 
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2002). A trial court necessarily has broad discretion in 

managing pretrial discovery and an appellate court should not 

disturb its orders absent a clear abuse of discretion. Ardrey 

v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986).

Having carefully reviewed the record, we find no abuse 

of discretion in the magistrate judge’s denial of Brown’s 

various discovery motions. Further, to the extent that Brown 

seeks to supplement the record with additional materials and 

information that were not considered by the district court, she 

has failed to show that such supplementation would be 

appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(2)(C). Nor is her 

present appeal the proper venue for her to seek the production 

of additional discovery materials. 

II. Summary judgment

We review de novo a district court’s order granting 

summary judgment. See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607 

(4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment shall be granted when “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). A district court should grant summary judgment unless a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party 

on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might 
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affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, i.e., 

material facts, will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. at 

248-49. “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice

[to generate a genuine dispute of material fact], nor does a 

mere scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party’s 

case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 

(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the ADA, an employer may not discriminate 

against a “qualified individual” based on her disability. 42 

U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West Supp. 2012). A “qualified individual” 

is one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 

perform the essential functions of the employment position that 

such individual holds or desires.” Id. It was Brown’s burden 

at the summary judgment stage to project evidence that she could

perform the essential functions of the position in question 

here, with or without reasonable accommodations. Tyndall v. 

Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th 

Cir. 1994). As the district court noted, Brown has failed to 

produce competent or admissible evidence tending to contradict 

Huntington’s well-documented determination that she was not a 

“qualified individual.” Accordingly, summary judgment in favor 

of Huntington on Brown's ADA claim was appropriate. For the 

same reasons, any claim Brown sought to raise under the 
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Rehabilitation Act also fails. See Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. 

Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264-65 (4th Cir. 1995).

Therefore, we affirm the judgment below and deny 

Brown’s pending motion to compel discovery. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED