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SUBJECT: Organizational Considerations for the National Reconnaissance

Program

To most effectively manage this Nation's Overhead Reconnaissance Program

an organizational apparatus must exist (or be created) Cgat achieves three

fundamental objectives:

It must provide unambiguous guidance and direction to the

builders and operators of the overhead collection systems:

It must be able to augment the dedicated builder/operators

with existing space-related resources (e.g. SANS°, AFSCF, VATS, etc)

that are both essential and economically impossible to duplicate: and

(c) It must act as a buffer between the dedicated builder/operators

on the one hand, and the desperate groups - be they the intelligence

customers requirements generators, advanced system planners, or procurement/budget experts - on the other, whose views and contributions, while

important, would tend to bias the system building/operating environment

and thereby detract from optimum mission accomplishment.

The implications of attempting to achieve these objectives dictate an

organizational mechanism that consists of four elements, three of which

are currently in place. The Nati saace Organization's

Program A (SAFSP), B (CIA), and C rise the dedicated

system builders and operators. Ea program directors has

total responsibility for the research, design, procurement, development, and

operation of the NRP projects under his cognizance.. The program directors

do not however establish or justify the system requirements. Their single

unambiguous mission is to build and operate spy satellites. This singleness

of purpose coupled with select manning procedures and unique contractor

relationships has produced an excellent fleet of intelligence gathering

satellites. No change is required to this portion of the NRO management

scheme.

The NRO as an entity is currently established as a covert separate agency

within DOD. This status :must be maintained in order to derive legal

procurement authority. The Director of the NRO (DNRO) needs to be a

statutory appointee in an overt (cover) position. Within the covert

aegis of the NRP he has strong and direct line authority over the three

NRO program directors. It is useful for him to have direct line

management authority over those activities which support the NRP as well.

As these support activities are largely provided by Air Force organizations,

the DNRO has traditionally been the Under Secretary of tae Air Force.

Historically that nes been both a workable and a useful arrangement.

However, as DNRO the Director is the senior official within DOD responsible

to the Secretary of Defense for all satellite reconnaissance programs,

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studies, and activities. He must be able to call Own and receive support ,

assistance from DOD agencies external to the Air Force. Correspondingly

he has the obligation of keeping other senior officials with a clear

interest in NRP activities (e.g. DDR&E, DTACCS, JCS) apprised of the

overhead programs, the direction of their future actions and the like.

This element of the management structure is also in place, however, this

should be reaffirmed by updating and reissuing DOD Directive TS 5105.23

dated March 27, 1964 (Atch 11).

The third management element, also currently in place, the Under Secretary

• in his covert role must have a dedicated Deputy, Comptroller and Staff.

Current cover arrangements, whereby Army, Air Force, Navy, NSA, and CIA

personnel appear. to be members of the Under Secretary's staff, are adequate

and the high level (i.e. HAF) is in many cases expedient.

The fourth critical element needed for effective management of the NRP

is absent in today's environment. In 1976 the NRP Executive Committee

(EXCOK),the "Board of Directors" that provided overall resource and program

guidance to the DNRO, was absorbed into the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI). Unlike the EXCON the CFI did not focus exclusively on the

NRP as separate reviews. Rather it was concerned with allocating resources

across the entire National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The CFI

in turn was subsumed into the Policy Review Committee (PIC) in 1977. That

Committee has even a broader charter than the CFI before it. The

aggregation of the NRP with all other elements of the NFIP has a worthwhile

purpose from the National budgetary standpoint and probably should continue.

However, it had a deleterious effect on the management of the NRP itself.

Because of the expanded scope of the PRC's arena in consolidated reviews

of the NFIP, specific NIP issues are largely decided by the PRC(I) Staffs.

Although the closeness of contact which the EXCOM had enjoyed was lost

in the new mechanism, the level of trade-off concerns was lowered to the

point . that the integrity of the DNRO's direct line management responsibility

was disrupted.

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To most effectively manage the NRP I recommend that you reconstitute the

NIP EXCOM as a body that would have meetings scheduled periodically to

deal solely with the National Reconnaissance Program. The members of the

EXCOM might be the same as on the PRC(I) and would convene separately to

review and establish the NEP. Regardless of how the EXCOM is constituted,

its members must be senior enough to render decisions,not recommendations.

The EXCOM would receive staff support from the NRO Staff. The DNRO would

present his Director's Report to the EXCOM with all its options and

variations. The EXCOM would marry the Intelligence Community requirements

with potential NRO-developed options. The PRC(I) members would look to

their respective intelligence organisations for the intelligence value

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of the various NRP program alternatives. The DNRO would present and defend

the NRP program before the PRC during its deliberations on the total NFIP.

Any trade-offs between elements of the NFIP would be made at the program

level and if the NIP were levied a dollar-cut, the EXO3M and the DNRO

would determine how that cut was applied across specific NIP systems.

The DNRO would then implement the program approved by the EXCOM.

This final, critical element of the organizational apparatus will be a

key factor in ensuring the overall success of the Overhead Reconnaissance

Program.

A final note should be made concerning requirements for overhead systems.

As the foregoing describes, the SRO steadfastly avoids becoming embroiled

in intelligence requirements issues. By charter, we receive target

tasking from the DCI through the National Foreign Intelligence Board

(NFIB). If it is determined that overhead systems should play a greater

role in operational or tactical areas, no organizational changes are

required within the NRO. Rather a change to the requirement establishment mechanism would be in order. For instance, tactical (DOD) requirements could be consolidated within DOD to ensure a stronger position at

the NIB table. Alternatively, the charter could be changed to provide

for the NRO's acceptance of tasking requirements from both the NFIB and

whatever DOD group emerges to consolidate the tactical requirements. We

would prefer the former, but could respond to either option. If a greater

tactical role for overhead systems is chosen, however, it would make sense

to give the CJCS some role on the EXCOM in order to ensure system design

responsiveness to tactical considerations.

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