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NASA/NRO/DOD STAFF ANALYSIS

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REMOTE EARTH SENSING ACTIVITY

INTRODUCTION .

• •-

•

This report reviews some of the technical and

considerations involving the relationships between

and civil *earth sensing programs and technologies.

was accomplished by an ad hoc committee from NASA,

and NRO.

PROBLEM

•

political

military

The review

DOD, CIA

There is a Defense Department concern that civil spaceborne earth sensing is perceived by many to resemble classical

satellite reconnaissance activity. Even without regard to the

quality or information content of data being returned from

apace, the overt civil programs of routine overflight and data

acquisition (especially from denied areas) is considered by

DOD to be a reconnaissance-like activity that could lead to

international political confrontations that in turn could.

impact the current free exercise of the space environment by

the NRO for intelligence collection or by NASA for scientific

activity. Defense also believes that there is a risk that

civil programs may adversely impact the interests of the NRO

and DOD through premature release of reconnaissance-related

technology and/or release of data of.military or intelligence

value to other nations. DOD recognizes that NASA, working

with other civil agencies has the responsibility for scientific

research in space and for developing space applications to meet

the economic, social, and policy objectives of the United States.

•

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BACKGROUND

The current national policy is contained in the report of

the NSA!! 156 Committee on the "Political and Security Aspects TCSoda7•32-7Z1
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of Non-Military Applications of Satellite Earth Sensing,".

July 11, 1966. The report recommended:

a. Continued protection of the NRP by continuing

consideration of the political and security effects of unclassified earth sensing activities.

b. Continued development of civil earth-sensing

programs looking toward operational systems of economic value.

c. Restriction of civil space-acquired imagery to

20-meter resolution and restriction of future capabilities

discussion to 10-15 feet.

Consideration of the relative merits and costs

of manned space systems, unmanned satellites, aircraft, and

other alternatives for civil earth resources surveys.

Establishment of security procedures covering

civil use of NRP-developed sensors.

• •

NASA ACTIVITIES 

NASA has undertaken a broad range of experimental' earth

r

▪

 esources survey activities using both aircraft and spacecraft.

LANDSAT-1 (ERTS-AX the first dedicated earth resources satellite,

was launched in 1972. The primary sensing instrument is a fourchannel multispectral scanner. The earth imagery from this

instrument is built up from individual pixels each covering a

ground area of some 80 meters by 80 meters; the resultant imagery

therefore has a ground resolution of about 150 meters in the

classical photographic sense. LANDSAT-2, a duplicate of

LANDSAT-1, was launched in January of 1975 to replace the first

satellite and to provide continuing experimental earth coverage..

LANDSAT data are returned by direct telemetry, to ground stations

within line of sight of the satellite or stored on-board for

later read out. In addition to the several U.S. ground stations,

there are LANDSAT ground receiving and data processing stations

in operation or under procurement by the governments of Canada,

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Brazil, Italy, Iran and Zaire; several other foreign governments

are expected to invest in similar stations in the near future.

All LANDSAT data, whether received in the U.S. or abroad, are

— in the public domain and any individual is free to purchase

copies thereof. In the U.S., the Interior Department, NOAA,

and the Agriculture Department sell LANDSAT data through

established data centers. Release of all NASA-ac quired earth

survey data,to the public domain has been a hallmark of the

civil space program of the United States; this policy was

established to blunt concerns about potential unfair U.S.

exploitation of the data and to encourage wide utilization

of this new resource management tool.

Many investigators, foreign and domestic, are involved in

the continuing analysis of LANDSAT data for scientific and

operational purposes. Foreign and domestic commercial interests

are also using these data for their own investigations. A

number of U.S. agencies are using the data for resource investigations. In addition, the United States Government is experimenting with the LANDSAT data to help improve estimates of U.S.

and overseas crop production. For this experiment, LANDSAT-2

is routinely acquiring data from all major wheat-producing areas

of the world, including the Sino-Soviet region. The Secretary

of State, at the World Food Conference in November, 1974,

described this experiment as potentially contributing to solution of the world's food problem. NASA expects LANDSAT-C to

be launched in 1977 and to operate through early 1980. LANDSAT-C

will have some added capabilities over those of the first two

LANDSAT vehicles. Recent cost-benefit studies, although not

conclusive, indicate that an operational earth resources survey

system could yield positive economic benefits. NASA is continuing its broadly based R&D program in sensor development, data

handling and processing techniques, and information delivery

to establish the feasibility of such an operational civil system.

•

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES•

The satellite reconnaissance program has evolved since

1961 into a sophisticated program stressing advanced technology

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and long-lived imagery and electronic collection systems. The

U.S. has no other dependable means of acquiring stratetic

intelligence data from within the heartland of the Soviet Union

and China. Since 1972, the classified satellites have become

the principal means of verifying the SALT agreements. In addition, the military services have become increasingly dependent

upon the classified satellites for strategic warning and for

providing intelligence information to tactical commanders. In

1973, the President authorized the DCI to release much of the

satellite photography to the intelligence community at the SECRET

level. Because of the critical importance of maintaining this

unique and vital intelligence asset, extraordinary security

measures are employed to protect the U.S. reconnaissance program

against international imposed political constraints and from

revelation of its technical capabilities and limitations.

ISSUES

International Political Considerations 

The United States policy is to employ space for legal and

peaceful purposes in accordance with its interpretation of the

doctrine of the United Nations Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space. Russia and the United States accept the fact that the

other is conducting satellite reconnaissance activities but

neither nation publicly acknowledges that it conducts such programs. The basis of acceptance of the classified reconnaissance

program has, therefore, been tacit. The U.S. has for many years

kept certain heads of friendly governments aware of the classified

program and, for example, shares intelligence data with the U.K.

Because of minimum program visibility, no third party has had a

diplomatic or legalistic basis for challenging this activity

and the classified program has not been seriously threatened

to date with international constraint. The United Nations

Outer Space Committee has proved to be a benign forum for

nations to debate space matters. From 1963 until very recently,

there had been little serious debate concerning the use of

space for information gathering purposes. Remote sensing is

currently a subject of discussion from two standpoints--the issue

of unconstrained distribution by the acquiring nation of potential

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valuable national resources data, and the issue of unilateral

acquisition of such data without prior consent of the governments involved. Brazil, (which has a dedicated LANDSAT ground

receiving station), and Argentina have tabled a draft treaty

which would require prior approval for both acquisition and

release of data taken over other countries; other Latin nations

have supported this political posture. The Legal Subcommittee

of the UN Outer Space Committee discussed these in February

with no action being proposed this year. The present United

States policies of unconstrained data acquisition and dissemination are being called into serious question. The U.S. would

prefer no distribution constraints, but is willing to abide by

a consensus on this matter; the U.S. will not accept constraints

on acquisition. Because of the nature of the current discussions,

however, Defense feels that there is a prospect that unconstrained

military space activities will be challenged by inference and

that if this challenge becomes codified the U.S. would unilaterally accept some order of accommodation. NASA, on the other

hand, believes that the growing foreign investment in ground

stations for earth resources data, the inherent value of the

civil program to all participants, and the growing sophistication of nations about space capabilities will mandate for

global acceptance of unconstrained remote sensing, and that

military activities will therefore not be endangered.

Protection of Technology 

Technical guidelines used by NASA and the NRO, as described

earlier, have been in being since 1965. The limitations on

releasable photography were waived by the NSAN 156 Committee

when NASA received approval to employ a 10-meter resolution

camera system on its SK LAB vehicle and then to release this

imagery to the public. The DOD, NRO and NASA have close

relationships in terms of information being exchanged about

the nature of earth observing satellite technology and tech- .

niques of data acquisition. The formal mechanisms for overseeing this joint technology exchange have, however, fallen

into disuse and technology discussions have been handled on

an ad hoc basis over the past several years. Since 1966,. the

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technology relationship between DOD, NRO, and NASA has become

more complex. The Defense Department feels that there has

been a growing convergence of NRO and NASA technology and that

the proposed use of advanced earth sensing technologies by NASA

could lead to compromise of NRO capabilities. First, NASA has

undertaken a variety of non-photographic sensor developments

which could appear to parallel reconnaissan -

wants. An example is a NASA

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assoc ations with the NRO is becoming more aggressive in pursuing corporate interests by trying to market reconnaissance- !

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ested in a standard earth observation package for routine use

on the Space Transportation System; original proposals from

NRO experienced • actors included a 1- to 5-meter •ualit

camera

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The Defense Department views the present national policy

of open release of all civil program space-ac quired data as

having a potentially adverse impact upon DOD (this policy is

at present limited to meteorological satellite and R&D program

data only). 'NASA believes that any significant change in this

policy would create world-wide suspicions of U.S. motives and

would result in a serious international confrontation on all

space programs that then could result in curtailment of

classified activities.

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Public Release of Space Data and Information 

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A preliminary DOD contractor survey indicates that,.in

the absence of alternative data sources, data from current

and proposed NASA programs could potentially be of military

value to adversary nations. At the same time, there is a

growing recognition of the value of civil space information

by U.S. civil agencies and by the private sector. The classified programs acquire mainly foreign military intelligence

data, most of which is not of use to the civil sector and all

of which is classified and not releasable to the public.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

A fundamental concern identified by the DOD appears to be

one of a growing convergence in technology and in data quality .

between the NRP and the civil space programs. It is recognized

that there are national and international benefits to be gained

from continuing a civil earth observation program which is

acceptable to the other nations. The DOD believes that extreme

care should be exercised so that NASA's programs, either from

technical or political standpoints, do not lead to constraints

on the NRP, or in fact, become a reconnaissance activity of

serendipitous benefit to other governments. The issues to be

considered, therefore, appear to be:

a. How .should civil and military programs be coordinated and managed to avoid disclosure of classified capabilities

or of military valuable data and information?

. b. TO what extent do classified programs risk con- .

straint in the event of international opposition to civil •

remote sensing from space?

avid Williamson, Jr.

Assistant Administrator

for Special Projects

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

24 April 1975

.•

Harold S. Coyle, Jr.,e1X7Ciir .

Deputy Director for

Plans and Policy

National Reconnaissance

Office

24 April 1975

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