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AS!'iSi ANT SECRET ARY Of DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 14 00060577 D 

INTIRNATIONAL SICURtTY Al'1AIR$ 21 JUN 1966 

Eoztc,1; i:1~'1\c;2c::.:1 'le:.-- Dir.~c2c~l~:. ... ..;; of S;J/wll;ite 

:t1ccoi1r,/~) iz:.;~i:ce ~pc::i~::. .. ~ic·~ 

l174::..lt noo°"oo"';~;t ha.o p:t'OJ)O::;cJ 80:::.Q .rn.~';Jlic dicclO:J~"..:rO of1 c::.,t::-Jii..ic,o 

roco:J.:r.:D.ios.::::..;.~cc capo.bility, DO~sibly in c z~~oc~. ~~o Cbieta 

hr1 '\"C l"cvlc;;cd ·t,his p1~ojic·::o..l u1:d c.1·\! o:_J:_;o:.od. I C-.C:'\:: c 1:,.:l. th 

tl1c C:nici'o "~hc.t the Eosto:J pl·c::;?o;::;nl. in its pi·cscn:'c fo1-::i t:lhould 

z:o·;;. be O.J?};)TOVCd. 

Il":itinting a policy of publi~ ~~cclocUT~ ic undesirable 

·( s~e ;l:::::J.ynic, Ta.b B). ~::0 Sovie"'.; U:.:2.c:.'.l io t.lle only ni:i:Cio::l 

c:..:.'):i..blc o-Z iutc:;.-te1'1.n3 \·r!th \.:bo co.~;;;:::.ll:-:*to :;.~co2~isz.:mce pl~Cl~• 

Our d:!.sclo::n;r.r-3 policy; ·;;.borcfci·c, Gll.c;.:J..d bo evclv.2:tcd ;pri.:w.i"ily 

in to:::."'Jls of its inr.J?act en the USfil?. 

The U.3. ~::01.U.d enc;cc;c in p:r1.'V~te discit:ia:'..c:~s .:(Jl J~'1ee Eo~rlet 

Un!~ ocr~'.'"i:1s e.grce~ant -'eio a J?olicy O"f mu:.;it~G2:. i;.::,:..: ... i:~/~o?i'ercnce 

in f.:_')o.ce reconmissn..nce acti vl tic~ 1 and a mu·;;:.:.:::lly c.,s::."'cod polior 

not ~~ raveal. puol.ic1y info~~tic~ ec~c~rn:Lns c~cn o'i.:.he~·~ 

milit:.il"'J ca!X1bilities. 

2. c-2:.:>o:::c public dtsc:!.osu:re tl.ithoti.t ;prior p:rlv<:i.to 

c~sul ta-'~ion v.1. tll the Soviet. Unicn 

3. ap:p:-..""O'Vc careful. ;pre1;a:.re. t5.o::i ~d ru'li.llyois o:? e. 

Walking l?~pe:i· for such disc.u:::;::;ion:::> (see Dr..lf"''' 'Xo.b A). 

imr1nm1 1111 1111 r1 II 1(11 II II II II II II 111111111111111111 Ul\VVI A 

Excluded from automatic 

downgrading and declassification 

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MOSCOW GUIDELINES 

1. You ~re to inform tha Soviet Government that we ~re both 

aware that both countries are conducting photographic oPservutions 

from sp~ce. lt is the view of our Govornn1cnt .thZlt it is in tho mut®l 

interosts of the United St~tos 1;::11d tho Soviet Governments not to 

interfere with each otl1or•s obso•v~tions. Ccrt~inly, wa will not 

interfere in Soviet sp.:::ice operations as lc.ng .;::s ti10 Soviet Union doe$ 

not interfere with our operations. 

2. We think there may bo advent~gos to a freer private exch~nse 

of views with the Soviot Union on this matter. \fo .:ire therefore 

interested in soliciting the views of the Soviet Government on the 

fol lowing matters. 

3. ls the Soviet Union interested in discussions or exchange of 

information on third countries? L-fVI: \~e wish to sec if tho Soviets 

are internstod in exch.;ln9in9 information en China. but do not wtsh to 

ma:,o an ex?l icit pro;?osnl on this point._7 

4. \/..:;; \'>/Ot.dd like the views of your" 9overnment on the possibilities 

( 7 

of observation s.:::itel l ite.$\\/hlch could be used for m;;.ipplng economic growth 

and ultimately sorne reports on military rorcos in third country areas. 

We s.ook your cooperati,on in this motter ~r.d would not p,ropose to reveal 

any information on US or Soviet military ~ctivitios. 

You should· inclicato that we wouic! l ~ke to consider scm3 initi(Jltfve 

~olicit their support for a ros;::,h•tior. 01.:thorizlng tho t;~; :;,::;~;.;rity Council 

subject to the control of the Security Ccw~cil. BYE-5356 ... 66 

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P~ iVi'\TE CU I Dl1tlCE 

No discussion of US technology is authorized. 

No discussion of US porform.:mce is authorized excopt to indicate 

by inference that we are not plar:oi'ng the pu~l ic:: release of ''hlgh 

perfonnanco 11 equipment or materla 1. 

If the Soviets indicate surpris'3 eand s~neral hlck of preparation 

for such discussions, indicate you are will!r.g to continue tho 

discuss ions at a later date, if they wis!1 to do so. 

· HANt>I:E: ViA 

}3YEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE '. CONTROi.. SYSTX::MS JOINTLY 

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1·ho suggostlon raised by \<J<;)lt Rostow raises cert<:iin fundamental lssue:i; 

which ~re not clearly indicated in th~ subjoct memorandum. I believe 

there are four or possibly five 1icy altornotivas the Uni 

• 

l. ''°S<'.1'£ nottiJng and 1-'-£.:?:2 .t ic;~t controls over any maJcrial 

is is 1 for many reasons. 

Tho aviation journals th::) intere~ts of sclentists, 

and Informally in the sr:;.-::ca pro~rcm and in ti·.~ univers.Etios. makes it 

ib10 to maintain for 1l complete pf pu~l ic discussion 

of ion f'rcm 

Cond u:!l.Qn.: lmpr.::c ti ca 1 • who tho r or not des i r "bl e. 

to an occurate description of our publtc policy. lt is upon the 

premise that evolutionary disclosure and Soviet public aecc?tance of this 

operation wt11 create al and public irs ition that this 

.Sov Union is the only nation capable t~k1ng action against our 

program. 

they bol ieve we aro 9oin9 to publ icly~di!:iclo~e Soviet ml 1 itary posture, 

they might take ion. 

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CONTROl. SYST:0:1':5 JOINTLY . 
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prc;;,.:.bi l ity m;:y be s:.1~11, this course of action. ,c;:;p::!c:irs most i ikcl~ to 

• 

create • a ' .-~--.;;;---.,;::;..;...;...;;;,,.,.;;....;;...;;..;;;.;..;;;...;:;.;..,;;..o.;;. host11a Soviet rc~ctlon. 

4.. Private discussio:-:s vdth t:·;::;; Soviet Ll:1ion. T~10. obje:-::tive 

here would be to seek Soviet. agrc2;.10nt to~ po1 icy of mutuQ1 non .. 

i~terfercnce, and a mutual pol 1cy not to 1~ icly'l!cvozd informotion 

on the other's military capobi l ities. (This docs not rr;oan that such 

cu~abilities could not be effective for inspection•• by inference from 

our capabilities in other areas, our capabilities could be inferred and 

if a significant violation did occur, we could, of courso, utilize the 

Conctus.!2.u: Continued public disclosure without prior 

discussion with the Soviet Union, eithor on a present evolutionory ba$iS, " 

or suddenly, may create m~jor risks to our present program. As th3 

Soviet Union is the key, private discussions indicating our pol icy, 

while disclosing littlo or nothing concerning tho substance of our progr.:i.11, 

could at least provi\!0 a useful test of Soviet policy and might provide 

SOIT'.e very signlf icant private ~greemonts with the Soviet Union not to 

interfere in exchange for comparable caTh~itmcnts from tho Untted States. 

HANDCE:' VlA 

SYq~AN-TALENT~KEYHOLE' 

C!ONTROL. SYST:::'.MS JOlNTl-Y 
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CONTROL. SYSTEMS JOINTI.. Y \I ~UN 

11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 14 000605780 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador u. Alexis Johnson 

reference to re 

to • Rostow's· proposal, the encl memorandum, en ting 

views of the Department of Defense, is submitted £or your· 

consideration •. 

Enclosure 

"Disclosure of US 

Satellite Reconnaissance" 

TOP SECRff 

HANDLE VIA 

. BYEMAN· TALENT -KEYHOLE 

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: U1 \'.h .. GHt I CONTR 

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Disclosure of US Satellite Reconnaissance f:PBBjl. (~3~) The draft memorandum represents an excellent. 

assessment of the political implications of the proposal. 

It is ou~ view that the implementation of the disclosure 

proposal, even on a auid Dro c~ basis, would seriously 

jeopardize or completely preclude continuation of this 

nation's single most valuable intelliGence collection 

capability - the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). 

In addition, a great deal of technology associated with 

the 1\TRP wou16. significantly assist others in developing 

a lilrn capability. Together•,, the potential intelligence 

loss to tl1is nation and the technological advantages 

which would be gained by other nations as a result of 

disclosure would have an adverse impact upon our National 

Security and seriously affect our National Defense posture. 

' 

2. (~BD) With respect to the question of technological loss~the 1~1-7 and I~~-8 cameras could not be disclosed 

'Nd.t:1out the most serious e:'fect on the comparative positions 

of the US and all other nations in the area of satellite reco~naissance technology. On the other hand the KR-~ 

came:ea could be modified so that it could be disclosed t'o 

the USS:~ without a significant impact upon other NRP tec~nolosy o~ the comparative technical position of the 

US and ·c[;e USSR. Stated in terms of resolution; presently . o:;>era ti or:.al NR? c«ilneras producing photographs with resolutions 

of 10 feet or greater could be disclosed without adverse 

technological impact vis-a-vis the USSR. Cameras producing 

resolutions of 3 to 5 feet are at the forefront of the state-o~-the-art and could not be disclosed without significant 

benefits to all nations. 

3. t!~!:CJ From an intelligence view point satellite 

reconnaissance provides the intelligence community with 

annual usable coverage of 95 percent of the Communist Bloc_. 

It also provides usable coverage of a large portion of tbe 

earth's surface for intelligence, mapping, charting, and 

target materials purposese · 

HANDCE 'VI'A'. 0 BYEMAN~ TALENT-KEYHOLE 

'r,,,,r.r·rn(;1_ 1;;v-::-:-iit 1f:l Je11::-rr,.,y 

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SYSTF.MS> JOINTl..Y 

Tbe knowledge of Communist capabilities in the strategic 

offensive, defensive, nuclear enerzy ficld9 is largely 

o0 or c ed by satell and could 

ac on-site 

sou:rce 

t:ie US and to 

military threat agains~ 

n&ture, character, and strengths 

of 

cour.ter 

struc the defense posture to 

a 

b 

l:. t°l1.!:.:!37 Al'.lpendices A B h set in greater detail the effect of the proposal upon NRP technology and intelligence collection capability. 

ets 

to or 

serious tion US asses 

capabil:...-Cies. While increased high resolution stereo coverage could reduce the effectiveness of such a program, such US 

reac would time, vastly e collection cos 

6. (1?85'.':C) D.;Lscontinuance of both US and Soviet satellite reco~naissance activities, due to political action, would 

res the sustaining a more ss' than the 

such circums co 

c collec 

in e en 11 soc ty, . c 

intelligence collection in the 11 closed 11 Soviet society 

remain largely ineffective and nonproductive of 

e ne t.o that formerly derived from 

s sance. 

7. ~ S:S''.GC) osure e 11 sance 

nro'J°ram could an overestimation of this - 0 ' capability by friendly nations which now authorize US 

manned reconnaissance activities from their territory. 

Su.ch overestimation could cause the withdrawal of these 

; c 

.more conventi manned which 

are more flexible, timely, and less costly, than satellites, 

in responding to and s,atisfying national .and military intelligence 

rec.;.uirements .. , . 

HANO(E V!A 

. lrAQ ,···q;;cr-,:-~; Bi'EMAN-TALE:NT .. l(ITYHObE ___ _........................... --Approved for Release: 2017/02/06 C05096223 .. -~-· ·., · ·-·~"'"'''~"- · ··· ···· ~-,,-~ 
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ONTROL SYSTEMS JO!NTl...'I 

8. t'±1S'±'IC) In summary, the DOD firmly believes that the 

National Reconnaissance.Program is a productive and 

irreplaceable intelligence collection asset. D:tnclosure of thi~ capability would result in the loss or degradation of 

this source of information with the attendent affect on 

the Nation~l Defense posture. Any disclosure initiative 

should carefully consider the serious loss to this nation 1 s 

intelligence collection effort and t&chpological advantage . in the satellite reconnaissance i'i0ld. 

HANDLE VIA' 

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yr.p C'ICRr- BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE .~ uij. -u:.....vl:... I . r:r:·:-:TROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY. 

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pproved for Release: 2017/02/06 C05096223 HANOLC VIA 

BYEMAN-Tf,LE:H-KEYt-:OLE 

CONTROi.. SYSTEMS JOINT!..'/ 

:rzc l~~\~·Ic -~IJ S:2:C u·2 =·I·~: c O~·~,s ID:S:~:~ - 01\TS 0:51 TIIE 

DISCLOS'JT·:E· 07 :\JATIO?:f:~L :::2C01'.J2'{:0.::SSAJ\:CE PROGRAM 

SE:\TSCR TZC:~?~OLCGY 

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State DdpartDent 1 s d~a:t rs9ly pu~~osely di~ not address the QUestio~ of the technolosical advantaces whic~ mizht be 

sained by ot~er nations, if such a ~roposal were implemented. 

Tl1e follov1in3 disct:.ssion considers tbe c:uestion: What degree 

o:.-. disclosure \~ould so reveal tecnnolo2,"]' that it would seriously co::~.:::ibu'ce to Soviet capability in t}:iis the satellite 

reco~naissance field? 

~r-- 7 l\.t.i.- ) 

Threa satell:'i.. te recon:::ai.ssar:cc ca:ner·as (the KH-1.J :1 the 

a:-:.C. tbe KI-I-8) 111ere exc.1I:ined in light of this question. 

I - ) ~ ...L 

Sorne for~-:: of t:C:e KH-1.J c2.:1;era has been available 

for about ten years. The 112B version of the 

Tq..:;-_)_1 lo 'oc1 nr.- f'l QW'" ~,"- -A"f""'•"' ""D'G l"' C'1-..,..'=''Gc:.r;oiC ,.\. ... J. 1 _u ..._,.......,_ .. C> - ...... "lJ.l.J. C.. U !_..!-Ci;)~ -J.J. U v..i.. '-'v '.-;;; 0 

Air Cornmand U-2 1 s over· Soutbeast. Asia. T::Jis 

car;ie::."'a no:ernall=.1 ope:c·e:.tes i:--i a virtually prep:.....,ogra:-nr.ced ::::.ode) '".Jitb i'lexible cornmand and 

C ~""\<-~.:.,01 ·'.-o ·.~;o.~,,·,c-i '- OVe·.~,-.,.,.; r;-=> h'o·r-· ·r0 aDD-I Y'g' v_ ... v_ v :...JV- ... 1 ......... u ......... ..L..'-"'C IJ "" J... UJ ~ .... ......... J, ' • 

cl1arting,.? ar:d geodesy 2.~')plicatior.ls _, the c8.rnera 

uses a coo1"'dina:ced panora::Jic caiuera/stellar 

.index camera feature. · 

The KH-~ characteristics which are potentially sensitive ~ 

ele;:ients of' technology ar·e t:-iese: 

So::'.'t:.•iare; 

Tech::-~:i.ques: 

~esolution: 

"'0""'J' ·'=' ,_ 8" ·n-~ "'· -··')·.-,or,·-,->Qrr,1':"1 J... Y\ rP ( ex·o O" "re \J uJ..:, ..-V l,., J..J.i.. .._. .;._ ..I.. Q- ;.......U.hlJ .i..:.0 .i.: ,;;;;, U. 

of th~s feat~re would facilitate a 

hostile an2lysis of system vulnerability) 

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r:Ja)pin,S; c~a::::ti1:.g;1 and geodesy applic&- ~1 t.,,_ o~s J..;. f~~v-alc \"""C t;:;!,__......,o..) c~DQ~~11~y c,.1..~._j.J_L -.V J.. ~o-..L acc·u~ri·n~ ,!. ...._ o 

rnappi::::g information from panoramic 

ma te:r•ic.ls) 

10 feet (ground) 

Appendix ~ti. 

:-:ANDL.E: VIA 

T''"' '"" f.T'"'":"l'T BYEMA>-!-TALENT-KEYHOLZ I vi vLCi~L l CONTROL. SYSTZMS JOINTLY . :. 

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would certainly represent 

for other nations 

'engaged 

have o a 

in 

e 

Resolution: 2 feet (ground). 

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·~c:1c _ _]__ c~.?~8I'J.. _~:~q~·e_-.:;0~1-'~-~- t:~e bes~-; opej~Gi-'c:Lo:r1al ~ 1c2ehnolog;y c.:~ ~:1~8 ~\=1~? ::.::.<5 sl--1ou.1c: :c:.o·~ ·02 cl:ir:..:cJ.0;32c~. J:i1

or tl'}e tJ~SSR; ;:;ucb a ?]·_.::;,"._~ """:1',_--.,~. ,,,,..,.~,--;:-, "'l"•o"':~,-.~::;-1"".j"~.:-::::--::::--;-r-::::;-:-.;-:::.u,·l '·ol·,.-,, QY'"'-~"e'·1e~·,,,ro"'-:i.•' on - ...,., ~- v..__ ...... ~i1v~1..J..'.....t. .J:'..l. ;...1"-"'.....i-..; ... J-v .... U 0 .J.....__l,,, _1.,.. ,,, .. ~ .... i...... 0 .i. ""<..J.,\..I 

a~v~nce in op~ic~l sensor to0h~olosy. For other nations~ such 

.s.s F:::"'2.:.;cc" Cl1:2.i:.~; or Japo..r.~ the ;;:. vailabili "'cy of this inf orma ti on 

would pl~ce t~em in the position of bein~ able to move 

e:.:'fo:L.,tlcssly f::."'or:1 tbe US posi'cion circa 1956 to the US 

positio~ ~n 195G. 

r;'1~s c~1:12~.2'" .. """" i:.\1hich v1ill p1"0C.L1co photographs at; 

resolut::_m:s o::.:LJ2 incJ:·Jes is still u.r:der development .. It 

incoi'"'por2.tes C.rar,1atic state-o:C-th2-art adv2nces over the KH-7 

cama~a. The imnact of disclosin? this camera would be even r~:o::.-'2 adve:,.,se J~o~ tlJe US tl1an tl~e ~ c2~se cited fc;r;-}{17!. 

In summary, the ~1-~ camera could be modified rather 

easily so that it could be Cisclosed to the USSR ~ithout a s~;~ificant. impact upon other NRP technology or upon the t,..; "o·-.-,-~--~Y'l...._.·--:,r"'· ..... .;_,.Jc:...-a.v ...... \i~ '-ec"''"l·c U .>.J.i. ... (,,...j.....t.. 01 l Do~i·'··:on UV ........... o""' ..l.. '-'1° l.tJ.Jv ·u·s anr:· .. '-A USQP u.1.1.. .l Other 

nations ~o~ld benefit greatly from such a disclosure. 

·r::'"l8 I·c:Ii-7 and KH-8 cameras coulC. r..ot be disclosed \·;itl~out the :·.'lost serious effects on tl-;e comparative positions 

.of the US and all other nations in the area of ~atellite 

reconn~~ssance technologyG 

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50X1 

If it WG~a decided to make any form of technological disclosure 

o:" ?-3P-C.2::·ived tecl"Jnology,, ca::.."eful plarmi::\g would be esser,tial. ~o~ v~~~ ~ 1~ L~e c~ce o~ ~~e ~V-b c~~ ~~ ~~ ~ou~..LQ' "o· Q to .L. ... v ...... c...! ... ~.;--..:• _ .. .._ V.1...1 dh.> - v.:.; .:.. .... _J. a 0...1..1.JV.l.CI...) ...LV v... \...-

t~S nation2l advantage to su~face it as an aircraft reconnaissa::-o&ce c&r:;e:-')a r,a;cl-Jer than to e~{:Jose i;c·s origins 2.?""ld .. ·.usage in the 

sc..·:_:slli .Ice ~rosrar.1. ~l1is. con"'c::.~ollecl e.:K1)osu:.~e rnight ~111ell be · 

i~;~oved further by arranging for a contractor to propose the 

cc.::.:2ra design 2.i1d then to develop :'..t rapidly under governmentally co~trolled conditions. In any event, the security o~ past 

op.:;::·atio::.al employment of the KR-1.i system would have to be 

protecteG and preserved. 

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Il\'.CELLIGErWE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DISCLOSURE 

OF NATION.!\L RSCONNAISSANCE PROGRAM: 

To discuss and assess the estimated security effects 

of the declassification and surfacing of the intelligence 

products of the National Reconnaissance Program~ it. is 

necessary to first determine the importance of satellite 

reconnaissance material to the nationa.l security and the 

intelligence conuuunity. 

From two successful missions in 1960, ·which proved 

the feasibility of reconnaissance by satellite,. the progra1::1 has expanded to where today it provides the intelligence coiilffiunity with annual usable coverage of 95 percent 

0£ the Com.uunist Bloc. It also provides usable coverage 

0£ a la~ge portion of the earth's surface for intelligence, mapping and charting and target materials purposes. 

Since 1960, the dramatic improvement in the quality 

of the i;nagery has been pa:calleled by a more than doubling 

of the quantity of materials obtained. As a result, its 

value has also dra.rJatically increased to the po;int vhere 

it is of major importance to: 

(1) T~e intelligence conuuunity, since U.S. knowledge of Communist cap~bilities in the strategic 

offensive, defensive .and nuclear energy fields 

is largely obtained or confirmed by this source 

alone and could not be acquired by any other 

means except possibly on-site inspections or 

low altitude overflights for photographic purposes. 

(2) The'national decision makers,. since information 

on the Communist capabilities ·is used to determine the nature, character and strengths of the 

national force structure and national defense 

posture required to counter these capabilities. 

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The contributions of satellite reconnaissance to the 

mapping, charting, geodesy and target materials program 

ha.ve been equally significant. It is the ·only source of 

reliable information on vast areas of the Coffil.uunist Bloc, 

and in addition provides the most effective source of 

information from the standpoint of timely and economical 

,p"l:'oduction of maps and charts. With regard to target 

materials, satellite reconnaissance not only identifies 

new targets but also provides the details required by 

planning and operations staffs to establish target prior-· 

ities, select appropriate weapons and delivery systems, 

and provide combat crews with materials for target study. 

In relation to geodesy, satellite recon!:laissance has 

enabled the location of specific targets and installations 

to be improved, significantly enhancing the precision and 

effects of weapons systems to be employed against them. 

The dY"i:lamic and complex nature of the Conuuunist Bloc 

military posture creates an ever increasing demand for 

detailed factual information. The sophistication to be 

provided by follow-on satellite reconnaissance, systems--

not duplicated by any other source--will satisfy presently 

stated requirements for detailed factual information and 

will allow for an even more accurate assessment of the 

Communist Bloc military threat. 

With the c:.bove discussion of the importance of satel·-

lite reconnaissance material to the intelligence cornrr..unity 

and the national security, the following provides a basis 

for assessing the security effec~s of declassification and 

disclosure. 

The possibility of loss of the satellite reconnaissance 

source through active counterrri.easures is greater now than 

in 1960. Recent studies conclude that there is no major 

deficiency precluding the Soviets from having an operational anti-satel}~te system at the present time. 

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Approved for Release: 2017/02/06 C0509622 

National Intelligence Estimate 11-3-65, 18 November 

1965, discussed the subject with the following com.uents: 

11.An antisatellite system employing these radars 

(HEN HOUSE) could use an existing missile with a 

nuclear warhead. No~-nuclc2r kill, on the other 

hand, would require a homing missile capable of 

exoatmospheric maneuver which would be developed 

in about two years after a decision to do.so. 

Although we have no evidence of ·such development, 

it could well be under way without our knowledge. 

We believe, therefore, that at about the time the 

HEN HOUSES become operatio-nal the Soviets could 

have an antisatellite capability with either 

nuclear or n'on-nuclear kill. We consider the 

latter more likely because the capability of the 

HEN HOUSE radars appear to exceed that required 

for a nuclear kill. 11 

The decision to use this capability in peacetime would 

confront the Soviet leaders with very serious problems. 

However, the Soviet fetish for secrecy, coupled with other 

reasons to greatly disrupt East-West relations, could provide the inducement to such a course of action. In this 

cor:nection it should be recalled that the Soviets 1 seA.1.sitivity to possible adverse reactioA.1.s has not precluded the 

shoot-down of UQS. aircraft over their territory or over· 

waters which they effectively control, even though these 

waters are 11 international 11 within the normal meaning of 1

'i:-.ternational law11 • Further, the difficulty that the 

UQS. would experience in trying to prove direct Soviet 

connection with acts resulting in satellite destruction/ 

incapacitation might encourage'theill to take this type of 

action. 

It is interesting to note that since the enactment of 

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1721 on 20 December 1961, which commended to the member states the propositions that international law applied to the peaceful use of 

outer space, and that it was free for exploration and use. 

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by 1 states 

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that they did not 

use. Analysis of 

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Approved for Release: 2017/02/06 C0509622 

e 

consider reconnaissance to be peaceful 

public pronouncements indicates 

to just the eyes 

Soviet act to s 

t 

The degradation of satellite reconnaissance photography 

through pass a course of action open not only 

S to 

s 

evaluations Soviet cemouflage and deception 

to conclusion the S ts 

e 

s concurrent 

s ly 

ste~eo coverage would be 

tuni to 

U 0 S. es 

not approach accuracy 

failure to detect all new 

t s 

todayvs estimates because of 

with present satelto 

tio·n of practical, t.s.ctical or op2r2tional considerations. 

I:.: the Soviets were t:o combine thes2 considerations with a 

reduce they 

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e areas 

creased high resolution stereo coverage could reduce 

so;,12what the e tiveness 

would 

action designed to force discontinuance of 

by any 

to ion of 

:Eacti.lal .. knowledge which revec:.ls quality and scope of 

te :ceco:nnaissance program. The discont~nua~ce UQSO satel 

U.S. SUS 

Under circumstances_, 

reasonably effective conventional intelligence 

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int: el. 

satelli~e reconnaissance. 

a:.-..d. satis::ying natfpn.s:.1 

werLts. 

from their territory. 

·withdrawal of these 

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Ii.1. a rec~:it revi2w of the current security handling of 

satellite reconnaissance materials, the Defense Intelliger:.ce Agency and Military Dep&rtment Intelligence Officers 

concluded: 

(1) Thut the presently opc~~ting satellite reconnaissance sys-::er~· . .s are c:. productive and irreplaceaole sourc2 of information vital to the 

:,:·atior~al S2c11r~·":..y., 

T:-<at although c:c·2:ion ::o decontrol ar.d downgrade 

to a· SECRET classification the products of 

presently operating satellite reconnaissance 

systems would improve production capability, 

widen dissemLJ.ation~ .s.nd permit direct use of 

photo L .. :::.gery ·::he:ceby improving user confidence 

in the finished intelligence and map and chart 

product, such action would also increase the 

hazard associated with compromise, and could 

result in loss or degradation of this productive and extremely vital source of, information •. · 

(Public disclosure would have an even greater 

impact upo~ the Nation.s.l Security than the 

circumstances u..-.der which this conclusion was 

derived.) 

6