Reversed and Remanded and Memorandum Opinion filed December 27, 2018.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-17-00982-CV

CHENIERE ENERGY, INC. AND CHENIERE LNG TERMINALS, LLC, 

Appellants 

V.

PARALLAX ENTERPRISES LLC, PARALLAX ENERGY LLC, 

PARALLAX ENTERPRISES (NOLA) LLC, LIVE OAK LNG LLC, LIVE 

OAK LNG PIPELINE LLC, MOSS LAKE LNG LLC AND CALCASIEU 

LNG LLC, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 61st District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 2017-49685 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

This is an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s order granting a 

temporary injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(4) (West 

Supp. 2018). The temporary injunction prevents appellants Cheniere Energy, Inc. 

and Cheniere LNG Terminals, LLC (CLNGT) (collectively “Cheniere Parties”) 
2

from non-judicially foreclosing on appellee Parallax Enterprises LLC’s equity 

interest in a subsidiary, appellee Live Oak LNG LLC (Live Oak). In five issues, 

the Cheniere Parties contend the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

injunctive relief because appellees did not establish a probable right to recovery on 

their claims or that they would suffer imminent irreparable injury absent an 

injunction, and the trial court excluded certain evidence at the hearing on the 

temporary injunction. 

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction 

because appellees did not establish that they would suffer irreparable injury absent 

an injunction. Even if CLNGT wrongfully forecloses on Parallax Enterprises’ 

equity interest in Live Oak, the damage or harm can be quantified and remedied 

through monetary damages. Because appellees did not meet their burden to 

establish an inadequate remedy at law, we reverse the trial court’s order granting a 

temporary injunction and remand for further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

The underlying dispute involves a failed attempt by the Cheniere Parties and 

several Parallax-related entities1 (collectively “Parallax Parties”) to develop jointly 

two mid-scale liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities in Louisiana: Live Oak and 

the Louisiana LNG project. The Parallax Parties allege that they reached an 

agreement with the Cheniere Parties on all material terms for an “expanded joint 

development agreement, business association, and venture” to develop the two 

facilities. The proposed venture changed over time. According to the Parallax 

Parties, the parties agreed Parallax Enterprises would take the front-line role in 

 

1 The Parallax-related entities involved in this dispute include appellees Parallax 

Enterprises LLC, Parallax Energy LLC, Parallax Enterprises (NOLA) LLC, Live Oak LNG LLC, 

Live Oak LNG Pipeline LLC, Moss Lake LNG LLC and Calcasieu LNG LLC. 
3

developing the facilities and the Cheniere Parties would provide funding of up to 

$120 million to develop the projects. The parties originally proposed to own the 

projects on a 50/50 basis, but later proposed that the Cheniere Parties would pay 

contractors directly to build the facilities and pay success fees to the Parallax 

Parties upon completion. 

The Parallax Parties allege that while the parties were working on the 

written terms of a final agreement, the Parallax Parties began incurring expenses to 

develop the project. The Parallax Parties hired Bechtel Corporation to begin 

engineering and constructing the facilities. CLNGT advanced almost $46 million 

in development funds. To obtain the funds, Parallax Enterprises signed a Secured 

Promissory Note that was later amended several times (the Note). The Note was 

guaranteed by several of the Parallax Parties, including Live Oak, a subsidiary 

wholly owned by Parallax Enterprises. The Parallax Parties contend they signed 

the Note only to satisfy the Cheniere Parties’ internal accounting department, and 

that the parties always intended the money to be considered a capital 

contribution—or equity—in the joint project rather than a loan that had to be 

repaid. The Cheniere Parties maintain the parties never reached a final agreement 

on the joint development of the projects and that the funds were advanced only as a 

short-term loan pursuant to the express terms of the Note. At the time they signed 

the Note, the Parallax Parties were not capitalized and had no assets or means to 

repay a loan. 

Before the parties finalized the written terms of their agreement, the deal fell 

through. CLNGT demanded repayment of the $46 million under the Note. The 

Parallax Parties refused repayment, contending that the $46 million advanced 

under the Note was not debt but a capital contribution and that additional funds 

were due from the Cheniere Parties. According to the Parallax Parties, although 
4

the parties had not finalized a written agreement, the Parallax Parties proceeded to 

develop the project and incurred expenses—including the execution of the Note—

based on the Cheniere Parties’ assurances that the advanced funds would be 

considered equity and not debt. Live Oak alleged that it incurred substantial 

liabilities to third parties, though it does not have any assets to pay the debts. The 

Parallax Parties ceased development of the two projects and were left owing $10 

million in debt to third parties. 

The Parallax Parties—including Live Oak—sued the Cheniere Parties, 

alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, promissory 

estoppel, quantum meruit, and fraudulent inducement of the Note. The Parallax 

Parties also sought declaratory relief that the Note constitutes equity rather than 

debt, and that the Note lacks an enforceable security interest. The Cheniere Parties 

counterclaimed, asserting the right to repayment of the $46 million under the Note 

and bringing third-party claims against four individual defendants and four entities 

affiliated with those defendants. In addition, CLNGT served notice that it intended 

to non-judicially foreclose on all of Parallax Enterprises’ equity interest in Live 

Oak. The Cheniere Parties contend that Parallax Enterprises’ interest in Live Oak 

was included as collateral to secure the Note. 

The Parallax Parties sought injunctive relief to prevent Cheniere from: 

(1) foreclosing on Parallax Enterprises’ interest in Live Oak; (2) interfering with or 

attempting to control the management, governance and/or operation of any of the 

Parallax Parties; and (3) otherwise disrupting the normal course of business of any 

of the Parallax Parties. The Parallax Parties also asserted that their rights under the 

Note are the subject of the lawsuit and that allowing CLNGT to foreclose would 

undermine the trial court’s jurisdiction because it would allow the Cheniere Parties 

a “self-help remedy” without proving any of their claims. The Parallax Parties 
5

maintained that the debt was not valid or enforceable, and that CLNGT did not 

have an enforceable security interest in Parallax Enterprises’ equity interest in Live 

Oak. The Parallax Parties also argued imminent irreparable injury would result 

absent injunctive relief because monetary relief would not adequately remedy the 

interruption of Live Oak’s operations, loss of Parallax Enterprises’ management 

and control of Live Oak, and loss of the court’s jurisdiction to determine the claims 

brought. 

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the requested injunctive 

relief. The trial court’s order states in pertinent part as follows: 

. . . the Court finds and holds that [the Parallax Parties] have 

demonstrated claims against [the Cheniere Parties]; have shown a 

likelihood of success on the merits of their claims; and, absent 

injunctive relief, will suffer imminent irreparable injury by, including 

but not limited to, losing ownership and control over assets, including 

the limited liability company interest of Live Oak LNG LLC, the 

rights to which are the subject of the parties’ claims in this action, and 

through which claims are made by [the Parallax Parties] against [the 

Cheniere Parties]. Absent injunctive relief, [the Parallax Parties] also 

will be forced to defend their right to control claims made against [the 

Cheniere Parties], including defending against attempted dismissal of 

legal claims that [the Parallax Parties] make against [the Cheniere 

Parties] and with regard to claims that [the Cheniere Parties] state they 

intend to assert through ownership of the limited liability company 

interest in Live Oak LNG, LLC. The Court finds that an injunction is 

necessary to avoid a party performing an act relating to the subject of 

the pending litigation, in violation of the rights of the applicant, and 

that the act would tend to render the judgment in the litigation 

ineffectual. As such, [the Parallax Parties] have established a right to 

injunctive relief pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 683 and Tex. Civ. Prac. & 

Rem. Code §§ 65.011(1) and (2), and their application should be 

GRANTED. 

Pursuant to the terms of the injunction order, the Parallax Parties posted a 

cash deposit in lieu of bond. This appeal followed. 
6

ANALYSIS

The Cheniere Parties raise the following issues in this appeal: (1) whether 

the trial court abused its discretion in entering a temporary injunction preventing 

them from exercising an express contractual right under the Note to foreclose on 

Parallax Enterprises’ equity interest in Live Oak; (2) whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in concluding that the Parallax Parties carried their burden to prove 

an imminent, irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in concluding the Parallax Parties carried their 

burden of proving a probable right to relief; (4) whether the trial court erred in 

concluding that the Parallax Parties were entitled to an injunction under section 

65.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; and (5) whether the trial 

court erred in precluding the Cheniere Parties from offering evidence relevant to 

unclean hands. Regarding the Cheniere Parties’ second issue, we agree that the 

Parallax Parties did not meet their burden of establishing imminent, irreparable 

harm and conclude the trial court thus abused its discretion in issuing injunctive 

relief under general principles of equity and under section 65.011 of the Texas 

Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Given this disposition, we need not reach the 

Cheniere Parties’ remaining issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 

I. Temporary injunction requirements and review 

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the 

subject matter of the litigation pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford 

Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). A temporary injunction is an 

extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right. Id. To obtain a 

temporary injunction under equitable principles, the applicant must plead and 

prove (1) a claim against the defendant, (2) a probable right to the relief sought, 

and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Id.; Hsin-Chi-
7

Su v. Vantage Drilling Co., 474 S.W.3d 284, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). These equitable elements of injunctive relief likewise 

apply to a request for injunctive relief under section 65.011 of the Texas Civil 

Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 65.001 (“The 

principles governing courts of equity govern injunction proceedings if not in 

conflict with this chapter or other law.”); Town of Palm Valley v. Johnson, 87 

S.W.3d 110, 111 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (applying irreparable harm element to 

application under Section 65.011(1)); City of El Paso v. Caples Land Co., LLC, 

408 S.W.3d 26, 37 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, pet. denied) (stating applicant must 

establish both probable right to relief and irreparable injury in addition to showing 

required by Section 65.011(2)).

To show a probable right to relief on a claim, the applicant is not required to 

establish that it will prevail at trial on the merits. Hsin-Chi-Su, 474 S.W.3d at 295. 

With regard to imminent and irreparable injury in the interim, an injury is 

considered irreparable if the party cannot be adequately compensated in damages 

or if those damages are incapable of calculation. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; 

N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. St. Laurent, 296 S.W.3d 171, 175 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). An adequate remedy at law is 

one that is “as complete, practical, and efficient to the prompt administration of 

justice as is equitable relief.” Tex. Black Iron, Inc. v. Arawak Energy Int’l Ltd., 

527 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). 

Money damages are generally adequate to compensate an injured party 

unless the loss at issue is considered “legally ‘unique’ or irreplaceable.” See St. 

Laurent, 296 S.W.3d at 175. Thus, trial courts grant injunctive relief in foreclosure 

actions involving real property because real estate is generally considered unique. 

See Butanaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 (noting a trial court may grant equitable relief 
8

when dispute involves real property); Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc. v. Breton, 447 

S.W.3d 558 565 n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting real 

estate is generally considered unique). Courts typically do not enforce contract 

rights by way of injunction, however, because an applicant who may recover 

breach-of-contract damages can rarely establish an irreparable injury or inadequate 

legal remedy. St. Laurent, 296 S.W.3d at 175. “In a temporary-injunction hearing, 

the burden is on the applicant to prove that his damages cannot be calculated, not 

on the non-movant to disprove that notion.” Id. at 177 (emphasis in original). 

We review a trial court’s order granting temporary injunctive relief for a 

clear abuse of discretion. Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017). In 

reviewing the order, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 

court’s ruling, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor. LasikPlus of Tex., 

P.C. v. Mattioli, 418 S.W.3d 210, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no 

pet.). We do not review or decide the underlying merits of the case, but instead 

limit our review to the validity of the order. Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 33-34. The trial 

court does not abuse its discretion if some evidence reasonably supports its ruling. 

Id. at 34. A trial court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law to the 

established facts of the case. Tex. Black Iron, Inc., 527 S.W.3d at 584. 

II. The Parallax Parties did not establish an irreparable injury.

The trial court found in its order that the Parallax Parties demonstrated an 

imminent irreparable injury from the planned foreclosure because: (1) Parallax 

Enterprises would lose ownership and control over assets, including Live Oak, the 

rights to which are the subject of the parties’ claims in the case; and (2) the 

Parallax Parties would be forced to defend against dismissal of claims that Live 

Oak has asserted against the Cheniere Parties and against claims that the Cheniere 

Parties state they intend to assert through Live Oak. The trial court concluded that 
9

injunctive relief is necessary to avoid the Cheniere Parties’ performing an act 

relating to the subject of the pending litigation that would violate the Parallax 

Parties’ rights and tend to render any judgment ineffectual under section 65.011(2). 

In their second issue, the Cheniere Parties argue that the Parallax Parties 

failed to establish an imminent, irreparable injury, and the trial court abused its 

discretion in making these findings, because any harm resulting from foreclosure 

on the equity interest in Live Oak can be quantified through monetary damages. 

We agree. 

As evidence of an imminent, irreparable injury, the Parallax Parties point to 

the following: (1) Live Oak has significant debt to vendors, which it alleges it 

incurred in reliance on the Cheniere Parties’ promise to fund the project; (2) a 

portion of the $46 million advanced by the Cheniere Parties via the Note was used 

to repay vendors for costs associated with development of the project; (3) Live 

Oak’s only assets are its claims against the Cheniere Parties in this litigation; (4) 

the attempt to foreclose is intended to provide the Cheniere Parties an avenue to 

sue Live Oak’s principals and others for breach of fiduciary duty and other claims; 

(5) foreclosure on the interest in Live Oak would allow the Cheniere Parties to 

cause Live Oak to nonsuit its claims against them; and (6) at the time of the 

injunction hearing, CLNGT had posted the interest in Live Oak for foreclosure. 

These facts do not establish irreparable injury to the Parallax Parties. 

A. Loss of the claims asserted by Live Oak against the Cheniere 

Parties 

The parties agree, and the evidence at the injunction hearing showed, that 

Live Oak has no assets other than its claims in this litigation. Those claims are for 

damages in the amount of the debt Live Oak incurred to vendors based on the 

Cheniere Parties’ alleged promises, rescission or damages for alleged fraudulent 
10

inducement of the Note, and a declaratory judgment that the Note is properly 

characterized as equity or does not create an enforceable security interest. 

The evidence showed that Live Oak’s debt to vendors, which Live Oak 

alleges it incurred in reliance on the Cheniere Parties’ promise to fund the project, 

is for a sum certain. Live Oak’s Accounts Payable Aging Detail report shows 

outstanding debt to vendors in the amount of almost $4.3 million. Whether 

CLNGT or Parallax Enterprises owns Live Oak and thus controls the claim 

regarding its debt to vendors does not change the quantifiable value of the claim 

that would be lost if the Cheniere Parties caused Live Oak to file a nonsuit. The 

Parallax Parties argue that foreclosure of Parallax Enterprises’ interest in Live Oak 

would deprive it “of the damages awardable on those claims,” which Parallax 

Enterprises would have to spend money to relitigate on Live Oak’s behalf after 

proving that the foreclosure was unlawful. But the value of the claims lost could 

be quantified and awarded as damages in this case if it is shown that CLNGT 

wrongfully foreclosed upon the interest,2

 and some courts have held that attorneys’ 

fees are available for obtaining a declaration of wrongful foreclosure.3

 The 

Parallax Parties produced no evidence that the Cheniere Parties could not pay any 

such damages and fees. Cf. Tex. Black Iron, 527 S.W.3d at 587 (“Texas cases hold 

that a plaintiff does not have an adequate remedy at law if the defendant faces 

 

2

See St. Laurent, 296 S.W.3d at 177 (reversing injunctive relief because applicant failed 

to establish his damages could not be calculated, noting expert witnesses frequently offer 

opinions regarding the value of a partnership interest); Durkay v. Madco Oil Co., Inc., 862 

S.W.2d 14, 21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, pet. denied) (stating measure of damages for 

wrongful foreclosure is difference between value of property at time of foreclosure and any 

indebtedness owed). In their reply brief, the Cheniere Parties describe the damages for the 

wrongful foreclosure as “the amount of vendor charges Live Oak supposedly incurred in reliance 

on Cheniere’s alleged representations for which Parallax Enterprises became liable as a result of 

the foreclosure.” 

3

See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. Ortiz, 227 S.W.3d 831, 837–38 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 

2007, pet. denied).
11

insolvency or becoming judgment proof before trial.”). 

Regarding the Note, the Parallax Parties are correct that if CLNGT 

forecloses, the Cheniere Parties could cause Live Oak to nonsuit the fraudulent 

inducement and declaratory judgment claims that Live Oak currently asserts. The 

Parallax Parties’ representative testified that foreclosure may complicate the 

litigation. But the other Parallax Parties are also either signatories to or guarantors 

of the Note, and they maintain all of the same right and ability to rescind, 

recharacterize, or obtain damages relating to the Note through their own claims 

against the Cheniere Parties. The Parallax Parties’ right to relief under the Note 

claims is thus unaffected by whether Live Oak also maintains those claims. To the 

extent Live Oak suffers a separate negative impact from not pursuing these Note 

claims, Parallax Enterprises can obtain damages for Live Oak if it proves wrongful 

foreclosure as discussed above. 

B. Potential for the Cheniere Parties to cause Live Oak to assert 

claims 

The Parallax Parties’ argument that foreclosure may allow the Cheniere 

Parties to cause Live Oak to pursue claims against Live Oak’s principals—some of 

whom are also principals of other Parallax Parties—also does not support the 

injunction. Live Oak’s principals are not parties to the injunction, and the Parallax 

Parties have no standing to assert a potential threat of litigation against others as 

injury to themselves. See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 155 (Tex. 

2012) (standing requires showing that plaintiff—rather than a third party or the 

public at large—was personally injured). 

The Parallax Parties maintain that the Cheniere Parties could cause Live Oak 

to assert claims against them and that they have no legal remedy available to 

recoup the costs of defending against frivolous claims. Such apprehensions of 
12

what the Cheniere Parties could do in the future do not constitute an imminent 

irreparable injury necessary for injunctive relief.4

 See Camp Mystic, Inc. v. 

Eastland, 399 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (“fear or 

apprehension of the possibility of injury is not sufficient; injunctive relief requires 

the plaintiff to prove the defendant has attempted or intends to harm the plaintiff in 

the future” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Morris v. Collins, 881 S.W.2d 138, 

140 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). There is no evidence that 

the Cheniere Parties intend to cause Live Oak to assert claims against the Parallax 

Parties, and apprehensions that they will do so cannot support injunctive relief. 

Morris, 881 S.W.2d at 140. 

C. Loss of control and ownership of Live Oak 

The Parallax Parties also point to the loss of continued control and 

ownership by Parallax Enterprises over its interest in Live Oak as evidence of 

irreparable injury. Courts have recognized the existence of an irreparable injury 

where an applicant will suffer the loss of unique management rights in a company. 

For example, in Sonwalkar v. St. Luke’s Sugar Land Partnership, L.L.P., the court 

concluded that unique management rights related to interests in a limited liability 

partnership supported injunctive relief. 394 S.W.3d 186, 201 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The management rights included the right to 

participate in the selection of governing members of the partnership that could 

block major actions, such as capital calls. Id. 

Unlike the applicant in Sonwalkar, the management rights cited by the 

Parallax Parties in this case can be measured by a certain pecuniary standard. The 

only evidence of management rights in Live Oak that would be lost concerned 

 

4 We note that rules and statutes authorize sanctions against parties for filing frivolous 

claims. Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 365 (Tex. 2014).
13

management of claims in litigation. The value of claims in litigation can be 

measured by a certain pecuniary standard regardless of who manages the claims, 

and thus loss of management does not establish an irreparable injury. See St. 

Laurent, 296 S.W.3d at 176 (finding no irreparable injury because loss of 

partnership shares could be measured in money damages); see also Doerwald v. 

MBank Fort Worth, N.A., 740 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no 

writ) (finding no irreparable injury because party to joint venture agreement with 

5% interest in profits could be compensated for lost profits measured by pecuniary 

loss standard).

5

 

D. Section 65.011 

The Parallax Parties also argue that section 65.011(2) of the Texas Civil 

Practice and Remedies Code authorizes the temporary injunction. Section 

65.011(2) permits a trial court to issue an injunction when a party is about to 

perform an act relating to the subject matter of pending litigation, in violation of 

the rights of the applicant, and the act would tend to render the judgment in the 

case ineffectual. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 65.011(2); Topletz v. City of 

Dallas, No. 05-16-00741-CV, 2017 WL 1281393, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 

6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming injunction in part where trial court found 

conduct of defendants affected core functions of the court). 

We conclude that section 65.011(2) does not support the trial court’s 

injunction here for two reasons. First, the Parallax Parties must also establish the 

existence of an irreparable injury under section 65.011(2). See Town of Palm 

 

5 Courts do recognize the propriety of injunctive relief where the enjoined conduct 

threatens to disrupt an ongoing business. See Sonwalkar, 394 S.W.3d at 199-200; Liberty Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Mustang Tractor & Equip. Co., 812 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1991, no writ). But the Parallax Parties presented no evidence at the hearing and make no 

argument on appeal that foreclosing on the equity interest in Live Oak would disrupt any 

ongoing business.
14

Valley, 87 S.W.3d at 111 (holding that applicant seeking a temporary injunction 

under subsection 65.001(1) of the general injunction statute was not exempt from 

traditional requirement of irreparable harm); City of El Paso, 408 S.W.3d at 37. 

As discussed above, the Parallax Parties did not meet their burden of establishing 

this element for injunctive relief. 

Second, the statute requires the Parallax Parties to establish that the act 

complained of would render any judgment by the trial court ineffectual. The 

Parallax Parties argue that allowing CLNGT to foreclose on the equity interest in 

Live Oak under the Note would render a judgment in this case at least partially 

ineffectual because the trial court could ultimately find that the Cheniere Parties 

have no rights under the Note, thus allowing the Cheniere Parties to exercise 

disputed rights before they can be adjudicated. But the Parallax Parties’ 

representative testified that even if CLNGT forecloses on Live Oak, Parallax 

Enterprises would not dismiss its claims against the Cheniere Parties.6 Parallax 

Enterprises does not contend it will be entitled to more money under its claims if it 

owns Live Oak than if it does not. In other words, Parallax Enterprises’ ownership 

of Live Oak does not affect its ability to pursue its claims regarding the validity of 

the Note in this lawsuit. Because the Parallax Parties have not shown that the 

relief they seek in this lawsuit would be affected even if the injunction were not 

issued, there is no showing that the judgment would be rendered ineffectual. See 

Guillermo Benavides Garza Inv. Co. v. Benavides, No. 04-13-00453-CV, 2014 WL 

3339555, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

As to any injury that Live Oak might suffer from foreclosure, nothing in the 

record or in the Parallax Parties’ argument suggests that monetary damages could 

not be awarded to compensate for wrongful foreclosure or that any judgment 

 

6 The representative testified only that the lawsuit may get more complicated. 
15

awarding those damages would be ineffectual. See Hotze v. Hotze, No. 01-18-

00039-CV, 2018 WL 3431587, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 17, 

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applicant presented no evidence that judgment rendered 

against brothers for wrongfully receiving advance payments would be rendered 

ineffectual). The cases the Parallax Parties cite involved materially different facts 

and do not support a temporary injunction here. See Brazos River Conserv. & 

Reclamation Dist. v. Allen, 171 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Tex. 1943) (permitting 

injunction because allowing separate suit involving same subject matter to go 

forward would “not afford a remedy as practical and efficient to the ends of justice 

and its prompt administration as that of injunction”); Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 

Practice Place, Inc., 897 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no writ) 

(involving foreclosure on real property); Trinity Water Reserve, Inc. v. Evans, 829 

S.W.2d 851, 866 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992, no writ) (restraining action that 

could put applicants into bankruptcy because applicants would have no realistic or 

fully adequate remedy at law). 

We conclude that any damages to the Parallax Parties from the loss of 

Parallax Enterprises’ equity interest in Live Oak can be measured by a certain 

pecuniary standard. The trial court abused its discretion in finding the Parallax 

Parties would suffer an irreparable injury where the evidence established any 

losses could be compensated through monetary damages. We sustain the Cheniere 

Parties’ second issue. 

CONCLUSION

Having sustained the Cheniere Parties’ second issue asserting that the trial 

court abused its discretion because the Parallax Parties have not established an 

irreparable injury, we need not address the Cheniere Parties’ remaining issues. We 

reverse the trial court’s order granting temporary injunctive relief and remand for 
16

further proceedings. 

 

 /s/ J. Brett Busby

 Justice 

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Boyce and Busby.