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AM-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 5 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ELLSWORTH

SUBJECT: Compartmentation of Satellite Reconnaissance Products

In response to your request for my comments on the JCS recommenda- .

tions to decompartment all satellite collected imagery and ELINT, I

am providing the following views:

The NRO enthusiastically supports the timely dissemination

of NRP satellite collected data. We are eager to see the data

in the hands of those who need it. We, therefore, are in total

agreement with the JCS objectives in this regard.

We do not feel, however, that wholesale decompartmentation

is the prudent step at this time. We believe a more careful

delineation of relaxation of security constraints is warranted.

As you are well aware, the situation is clearly a one-way street --

once secrecy has been relaxed there is no way to recover the

situation.

Our main differences with the JCS paper include the following:

Whereas we wish imagery to be available to users

at useful classifications, we do not recommend decompartmenta -

tion of our best resolution imagery which would indicate the

Ultimate capabilities of our satellites. This could lead

our adversaries to utilize successful concealment and deception

methods that would deny us the ability to obtain high quality

imagery.applicable to tactical and national users alike.

We do not feel that the collateral security system,

because of its lesser investigative and adjudicative personnel

security standards, is sufficient to protect the most sensitive

aspects of our concerns.

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.3. We believe that the 'fact of" for imagery, as well .

as ELINT satellites should not be classified below the

SECRET level. The CONFIDENTIAL classification is not adequate

in our opinion. We are worried, of course, that national

sovereignty issues and widely publicized UN debates would

result if the "fact of" becomes widely discussed.

4. We believe that the "fact of" satellite COMINT

should be retained in compartmented systems because of the

extreme sensitivity to easy countermeasures.

S. We believe that information about our sensors

should be retained wholly in compartmented systems. The case

for decompartmenting this data has not been c made.

In this regard, the near-real-time aspects o hould

remain compartmented at least until actual experience implies

this is not necessary.

Inherent in all of the above concerns is the realization that as

NRP satellites move from national intelligence collection systems to

supporting tactical needs that the systems may more readily become targets

for information denial through techniques such as camouflage, deception,

concealment, jamming, EKON, etc.

I have taken the liberty of preparing a proposed memorandum to the

DCI which would replace the one forwarded by the JCS. It requests that

JCS military and tactical needs be given higher priority for use of the

current and continually improving NRP capabilities. (Attached)

Attachment .

As noted above

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