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111P-SECIET- II I

--ESFNATIONALRECONNAISSANCEOFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE NRO STAFF July 9, 1974

•

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SINGEL

SUBJECT: NRO Staff Opinion on the USIB Declassification

Motion

Utmost care should be taken by our Government to protect

the freedom to conduct satellite reconnaissance. Although it

is generally agreed that Russia is comfortable with the stabilizing balance of satellite reconnaissance, the lesser developed

countries and China pose a political threat similar to that

posed by Russia in the early 1960s. The solution created for

the earlier threat was to maintain an official national silence

about the program.

This policy today seems ludicrous on its surface because

of the widespread knowledge of the "fact of the program.

HOwever, the policy has actually served to preclude others from

voicing political opinion about the program. The U.S. has been

in a position of defending the value of earth observation in

the international arena because of the openly conducted and

sometimes criticized ERTS and SKYLAB activity. The official

U.S. position is that it will continue to conduct earth observations because it helps all countries.so observed. However,

this position could not be made convincingly vis-a-vis satellite

reconnaissance.

In addition, satellites still are as fragile and vulnerable

as they were at the outset of space reconnaissance even under

optimum freedom to operate. Should an irritated nation decide

to interfere with one of our satellites, or Russia's, it could

do so with modern technology. Furthermore, since our satellites

e the only means available to collect much of the required

telligence data, an ultra-conservative security policy should •

be maintained to protect the continued viability of the program.

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In amplification of the international political situation,

the matters of national sovereignty and lawfulness of space

observation have not been fully defined in international law.

The UN working group on earth resources surveys recently was

inconclusive in its position on the legality of data acquisition. Brazil has tabled a treaty which would constrain all

forms of data acquisition from space pending permission of the

nation observed. Although not much support has been obtained

by Brazil for its treaty, other nations may be inclined to

take similar constraining actions should the United States

begin open discussions of its space reconnaissance program.

The position of the United States with respect to ERTS is

that all data are made available immediately to all countries.

Unless the United States is willing to do the same with reconnaissance satellite data, then there is not a parallel situation

with ERTS.

An estimate provided me by the United Nations Legal Counsel

of those nations which would likely raise objection to unconstrained U.S. reconnaissance activities is as follows: Brazil,

Mexico, Argentina, Iran, India, France, at least some South

African nations and China and Russia. With respect to the

latter two, China might likely condemn space reconnaissance on

its principle if it would cause discomfort to the United States.

Russia has voiced a concern that certain United States activities,

if discussed in the public domain, might jeopardize U.S.-Russia

parallel space interests.

We believe that there is nothing at all to be gained by

authorizing acknowledgement and discussion of the "fact of"

photographic satellite reconnaissance. The real decision which

is being addressed at this time is how many facts about the

program would be revealed through the declassification. More

pressures than exist today would be created to become more

credible about the program. Following historic patterns, once

open discussion is enabled, the nature of the photographic and

SIGINT reconnaissance programs would be subject to inadvertent

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disclosure without means to protect the valid secrets. Therefore, from both a political and technical sense, there is

nothing to be gained and much risk to the nation from pursuing

the declassification motion. •

S. C

Lt Colonel, USAF

Deputy Director for

Plans and Policy

CON 11401 6-74 copy iMIF.;

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