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THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 

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June 4, 1969 

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ca•rno, svsreM Jointly 

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THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 

The Nature of the Program 

The National Reconnaissance Program is a single, national program dedicated to the collection, through overflight, of intelligence to 

meet the needs and objectives of the United States Government. The 

Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the Program, managing resources of the CIA and DOD in carrying out the mission; he 

receives program recommendations from an Executive Committee made 

up of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, 

and the President's Science Advisor. The Program is managed by the 

Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, who is an official of the 

Department of Defense. The technical aspects of the program are reviewed by a special panel established by the President 1s Science Advisor. 

The Program is covert and comprises the development, management, and operation of satellites, aircraft, and drones for photographic 

or electronic overhead reconnaissance of denied areas of the world 

(peripheral reconnaissance is a separate responsibility managed by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff). The cost of the Program is 

The National Reconnaissance Program is responsive directly to 

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the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by 

the United States Intelligence Board. The National Reconnaissance 

Office sends its plans and schedules for both satellite and aircraft 

reconnaissance overflights directly to the 303 Committee of the National Security Council for operational approval. 

Program Background 

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The essential background of the National Reconnaissance Program 

begins shortly after the May 1, 1960 loss of a U-2 aircraft engaged in 

overflight reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of this 

event, faced with the loss of reconnaissance capability over the USSR, 

President Eisenhower directed the National Security Council to review 

intelligence collection alternatives, such as satellite reconnaissance. 

As a result of this review and subsequent deliberations, the reconnaissance satellite projects of the Department of Defense and the Central 

Intelligence Agency were consolidated into a single, national program 

to be managed by a special arrangement designed to enhance covert 

operation and assure successful achievement of program objectives. 

By the spring of 1962 these organizational adjustments culminated in the 

establishment of a National Reconnaissance Program which was to be 

managed by a National Reconnaissance Office -- a single, national 

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agency responsible for satellite photographic and signal intelligence 

collection operations, satellite mapping and geodesy, and aircraft/ 

drone overflight reconnaissance. 

What the Program Does 

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The National Reconnaissance Program uses aircraft, drones, and 

satellites as its collection vehicles. 

The satellite vehicles carry sensors which collect (1) broad coverage 

search photography (2} high resolution spotting and surveillance photography and (3) signal (communication and electronic) intelligence.* 

A typical broad-coverage satellite photographic mission produces 

photography of about seven million square miles of land mass at ground 

resolutions of seven to ten feet. The current system became operational 

in 1960 and will be replaced in 1971 by an improved search system that 

will provide significantly longer satellite life, broader area coverage, 

and finer resolution. 

A high resolution satellite photographic mission returns photography 

of approximately 5000 high priority targets, with ground resolutions of 

*Details or::. these projects (characteristics, weights, schedules) are 

given in the Appendix. 

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one to three feet. The current system became operational in 1963 

and has been improved repeatedly to increase its orbital life and 

resolving power. 

Some satellites are designed and operated to collect electromagnetic signal emissions which originate from Soviet or Chinese 

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Communist radars and communication devices. The collected intelligence reveals the status, locations, and characteristics of key weapon 

systems such as the Soviet anti-ballistic missile system. 

National Importance of the Program 

Most of this nation's information on USSR strategic offensive systems has been acquired by satellite reconnaissance. In the case of operational 

ICBM sites within the USSR, our dependence on satellites has been 

total. Similarly, strategic defensive systems, like the Moscow and 

Tallinn systems, have been positively detected and identified within the 

first 45 days of construction by satellite photography and observed 

closely and repetitively from that time forward. 

Information providing the basis for significant reassessment of 

Soviet and Chinese Communist ground force strength and capability to 

supply and reinforce units in conflict along the periphery of Communist 

nations is derived largely from satellite reconnaissance, either directly 

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or by implication. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that 

65% of what the U.S. knows about the strength, equipage, and disposition of Soviet ground forces -- 90% for the Chinese -- is attributable 

to s~tellite intelligence. 

In special categories like 

or locating SAM defenses ~---------------------~ 

in Southeast Asia, satellites have been practically an exclusive intelligence source. 

In the field of electronic signal intelligence, satellites have contributed uniquely to our knowledge of the disposition of Soviet air defense 

radars; this knowledge aids the Strategic Air Command in selecting 

bomber penetration routes. Satellites have also determined deployment 

status and operational characteristics of the Soviet ABM system. These 

are two examples only of a broadly productive program. 

Today the United States depends on the National Reconnaissance 

Program for most of its strategic and tactical information on the world rs 

closed societies. 

Policies Supporting the Program 

When the first U-2 photography of the USSR was produced (in 1956}, 

President Eisenhower directed that it be protected -- as an ultraEARPOP IDEALIST HANDLE V>A. 

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sensitive espionage product -- in a special security system. In 1960, 

when the first satellite reconnaissance photographs were produced, 

President Eisenhower directed that they be similarly protected and 

placed them in a compartment of the same special security system. 

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During 1961 and early 1962, the Soviets made a number of private 

overtures to the U.S. protesting the use of satellites for reconnaissance. In 1962, the question of the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance began to appear as an important pre-condition to international 

negotiations on disarmament and on the peaceful uses of outer space. 

In response to increasing pressure, the President asked a Committee 

of Principals, acting under the leadership of Ambassador U. Alexis 

Johnson, to formulate a national policy which would (1) maintain United 

States freedom of action to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations 

unilaterally, (2) prevent foreign political and physical interference with 

those operations, (3) prevent accidental or forced disclosure of the 

details of the operations or end-products of the United States reconnaissance program, and, at the same time (4) permit the United States 

to continue to work toward disarmament and international cooperation 

in space. 

A national policy supporting these goals was recommended by this 

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Committee, approved by the President on July 10, 1962, and issued 

in NSC Action 2454. Essentially, the policy enjoins the United States 

to ( 1) operate its reconnaissance satellites with great discretion, (2) 

work toward developing tacit acceptance of these operations, and 

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(3) avoid embarrassment to our allies or confrontation with our enemies. 

As a result of careful satellite reconnaissance policy planning, the 

United States is enjoying, at this time, an international political situation 

which provides all the advantages of tacit acceptance without the hazards 

inherent in open discussion or confrontation. It is critically important 

to nourish the conditions which contribute to such an atmosphere, for 

reconnaissance satellites require a permissive environment -- political 

and physical -- for successful operation. Lacking such an environment, 

their operation can be challenged on the floor of the United Na~ ons or 

in the skies of any nation which desired to demonstrate against space 

espionage. 

Long Term Goals of the NRO 

The NRO plans to continue w: 

1. Conduct a covert program to collect intelligence through the 

overflight of denied territory. 

2. Seek methods to reduce the cost of such collection. 

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3. Improve the responsiveness of collection systems to intelligence needs. 

4. Advance satellite reconnaissance techniques in order to improve collection capabilities and respond to new collection needs. 

Ten Year Projections 

1. Extension of Current Programs 

Based on the present understanding of future needs, the following 

schedule of launchings is anticipated: 

Program* FY 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 

PHOTO 

Broad coverage 

High resolution 

SIGINT 

Primary 

Secondary 

6 

7 

7 

5 

4 

5 

4 

4 

4 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

2. Possible New Programs. Although satellite reconnaissance is 

conducted as a covert program, its hardware and techniques are developed, 

procured, and used in "the open, 11 whenever possible. For example, the 

program uses Air Force launching facilities at Vandenberg Air Force Base, 

it shares the Satellite Test Facility at Sunnyvale, and uses satellite recovery capabilities in Hawaii. The bulk of the program's hardware 

*Additional detail on scheduled launchings is found in the Appendix. 

3 

4 

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boosters and spacecraft -- is readily available to any organization. 

As a general rule, only the payload is handled under special security. 

The NRP budget for new technology reflects this arrangement, being 

oriented essentially toward improved payloads. 

At present, photographic satellites return data by ejecting capsules 

which are aerially recovered. It has long been desired to return imagery 

electronically, thus permitting nearly immediate intelligence analysis. 

Further, an electronic imaging satellite might have a longer useful life 

on orbit and thus be more economical than present systems. Recent 

developments show promise that such a satellite may soon be technologically feasible. If development continues favorably, consideration will 

be given to a program start leading to a system of very long-lived satellites which could be operating after 1975. 

The MOL program (which is not a part of the NRP) has the objective 

of developing a very high resolution photographic system which can be 

operated manned or unmanned. At some point in the future, consideration 

will be given to establishing an unmanned program within the NRP which 

utilizes the MOL camera. 

A second generation of electronic intelligence collection satellites 

is being developed now and will be operational during the early 1970 1 s. 

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There are several possible ways to decrease the cost of photographic 

satellite operations: (1) to recover the camera and re-use it, (2) to 

resupply the payload in orbit, and (3) to utilize a photographic system 

which returns imagery electronically and thus could have a useful life 

measured in years. The development emphasis and the apparent trend 

is toward an electro-optical imaging system for surveillance. Recoverable payload and resupply may permit economies for continued 

operation of current systems but the trend toward reduced launching 

rates, as shown in the future schedule, appears to provide a small 

margin to amortize major system changes. 

Studies and limited developments are underway in areas such as 

Such techniques can augment current reconnaissance capabilities and 

will be evaluated during the 1970' s. 

3. Trends. The increasing success of satellite intelligence col-

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lection and the increasing sensitivity of the U.S. to international confrontation have caused a decreasing emphasis on covert aircraft programs. The NRP budget is now 93% devoted to satellite systems. As 

satellites have become more effective, it has been possible to reduce 

the launching rate substantially while increasing intelligence collection. 

This trend is forecast to continue as indicated in the future year schedule. 

If there were no new programs, the completion of development now underway and the reducing launch rates would permit a budget decrease as 

shown in the Appendix. It seems quite clear that there is a steady trend 

toward long-lived satellites. This trend will continue and will permit 

economies. 

Whether or not there will be manned reconnaissance satellite systems 

in the 197 0' s will depend largely upon the demonstration of benefits 

associated with manned flight resulting from the MOL program. 

Possibilities of Satellite Interdiction 

Since the legality of satellite espionage is an unsettled matter, the 

possibility of some nation attempting to destroy U.S. reconnaissance 

satellites has long been a matter of concern. The Soviets have a clear 

existing capability to destroy U.S. satellites on orbit; this capability is 

derived from their ABM radar and interceptor systems and, indeed, the 

) 

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location and characteristics of some of these radars identify them as 

providing specifically and only an anti-satellite capability. On the other 

hand, current intelligence estimates state .that it is extremely unlikely 

that the Soviets would intercept U.S. satellites in any circumstance other 

than as a prelude to general war. Further, the estimates point out that 

other nations are unlikely to have any significant anti-satellite capability 

at this time. On the basis of these estimates, there has been little 

attempt to provide protection for current satellite operations, although 

a certain amount of research has been accomplished. 

If the Soviets were to harrass our satellite reconnaissance operations, 

it would be difficult and expensive to provide means for assurance of continued photographic intelligence. Upon such an occasion, it might be a 

useful tactic to respond in kind, intercepting a Soviet reconnaissance 

satellite in the hope that such action would deter further interference. 

The U.S. has no capability at present to carry out such an interception 

with non-nuclear weapons. It would appear prudent to consider acquiring 

such a capability as an aid to insuring the availability of continued satellite reconnaissance to this nation. 

NRP Relationships with NASA: Post-APOLLO Goals 

For some time, NASA has been e5ploring the use of satellite-borne 

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sensors to locate and study earth resources. Experiments involving 

hand-held cameras operated by GEMINI and APOLLO astronauts have 

not been politically offensive to other nations, largely because the 

photographs are at a fairly gross resolution, the 11targets 11 are carefully selected, the film is reviewed by an inter-agency security panel 

before it is released to the public, and hostile states such as the USSR 

and Red China are either not overflown or not now photographed. Future 

possible NASA applications, involving oceanography, forestry, geology, 

geography, and agriculture, must be planned and controlled very carefully, for the line between economic research photography and economic 

intelligence photography is very thin and casual experimentation could 

trigger challenges to the legitimacy of not only the NASA earth-sensing 

program but of the National Reconnaissance Program. In 1966, U. 

Alexis Johnsonr s satellite reconnaissance policy committee met again 

and developed policy to cover this potential danger area. As a result, 

NASA and the DOD are now proceeding on a cooperative basis in planning 

a NASA earth-sensing program which will meet our nation's scientific 

needs without jeopardizing its ability to gather intelligence from space. 

In addition, the Presidentr s Science Advisor has sponsored policy 

studies and requirement conferences in an yffort to determine how 

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available space intelligence photography can be applied to the needs of 

the civil government without hazarding the security of the National 

Reconnaissance Program. These studies and conferences have been 

a strong positive influence in coordinating the needs of the civil community and assisting to plan a reasonable earth-sensing program. In 

order to encourage further progress, consideration should be given to 

allotting a small but regular percentage of film from each search 

satellite to these purposes. 

There are two new areas in which NASA could benefit frort1 -:::loser 

technical ties with the Department of Defense. First, the DOD maintains a reconnaissance wing of SR-71 aircraft whose main purpose, in· 

the event of war, is nuclear strike assessment. At present, some of 

these aircraft fly training missions and some are stored in flyable condition. Some SR-71 1 s and possibly U-2' s could be made available for 

NASA earth-sensing surveys. Photography from SR-71 1 s should be 

very useful to NASA and its user community in developing baseline 

mosaics and in evaluating the possible return to be expected eventually 

from satellite phowgraphy. In addition, aircraft like SR-71s off er 

many advantages over satellites as sensor carriers: their operating 

cost is much less than that of satellites, a wide choice of sensors is 

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possible, the survey of a nation can be carried out faster by aircraft 

than by satellites, aircraft can be selectively employed, and they need 

offer no political risks. An intensive program of earth-sensing from 

aircraft over selected cooperating countries could provide a useful 

assessment of the utility of earth resources surveys prior to embarking on a very expensive satellite program. 

Second, NASA has concluded that its initial earth resources satellite 

will be more cost-effective if it uses an electronic imaging system, 

rather than film-recovery cameras. It is quite possible that highly 

refined electronic imaging sensors will permit economy and improvement 

in NRP operations in the future. It may be appropriate and mutually 

advantageous for NASA to make a significant commitment to advancing 

the technology of high resolution electronic sensors to replace filmcamera systems. 

NRP Relationships with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

The US-USSR discussions of 1968 regarding a Strategic Arms 

Limitation Treaty brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

directly into satellite reconnaissance policy considerations. Concerned 

that the USSR would not agree to on-site inspection, ACDA proposed to 

negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that the United States was 

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- prepared to accept "enforcement by maximum, or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national means of verification ... 11 (for the United 

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States, this expression means "satellite reconnaissance"). In addition, 

in order to support its proposal, ACDA recommended declassifying the 

fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance, disclosing to 

the Soviets that reconnaissance satellites are our main reliance for 

verification, briefing Congress on our reconnaissance capabilities, 

and informing the press and public -- gradually but officially -- along the 

same lines. After discussion within the United States Intelligence Board 

and key affected government agencies, it was decided that disarmament 

discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and possibly more 

effectively, by restricting the U.S. delegation to use of the expression 

"national means of verification'' with no reference to our satellite reconnaissance program. It was pointed out that disclosure is an irreversible 

step which could have profoundly adverse effects on national security. 

Furthermore, to single out one or some intelligence collection methods 

now and to pass only that or those to the Soviets, Congress, and the 

American public would be dangerous and misleading and could evolve "'" 

genuine "credibility gap. 11 

An alternative approach exists which could give ACDA the advantages 

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of satellite reconnaissance without adverse effects on the security 

[')VfC,""n;'.'.\I 

~ ti L~•itit~:1JJ COI-.TROl SYSICM 

protection required by the National Reconnaissance Program. In this 

approach, the United States would be prepared to negotiate with the 

Soviets on the basis of an Arms Control Satellite which would be 

developed by NASA for the ACDA. This satellite could be defined, on 

the basis of developments of the past decade, such that its performance 

would be highly credible to the Congress, the press, and the public. 

Whether operated internationally, bilaterally (NASA and the Soviet 

Academy), or nationally (NASA alone) the approach offers significant 

advantages. By working outside the National Reconnaissance Program, 

ACDA would not need to confront the Soviets (and the rest of the world) 

either publicly or privately, with the reality of the U.S. intelligence 

program and would avoid an irreversible confrontation with other nations, 

Congress and the American public. This approach would also allow the 

United States to continue its covert reconnaissance program (the NRP) 

as a unilateral and essentic.~. c1rce of basic intelligence. A separate 

ACDA /NASA program would - ,-.,ed existing intellige · · ;:;ecurity and 

could achieve a measurable St-:':.:: toward :egalizing satellite observation 

at little -:, ,_o risk to U.S. national interests. 

In Sumrn"'. 

The United States government is deeply dependem on overflight 

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reconnaissance, and particularly satellite reconnaissance, for inforrriation on closed societies. Satellites are vulnerable vehicles which must 

have a permissive environment for successful operation. Satellite 

reconnaissance is a quasi-legal espionage activity conducted covertly 

by the National Reconnaissance Office. 

A national.satellite reconnaissance policy, begun at the instance 

of President Eisenhower and continuing to the present, recognizes the 

need to operate reconnaissance satellites with great discretion, develop 

tacit acceptance of these operations as a reasonable national activity, 

and avoid embarrassment to our allies or confrontation with our enemies 

in carrying out our operations. These policies, and the special security 

arrangements resulting from them, have been primary forces in protecting United States reconnaissance operations from the threat of international confrontation. If this protection should fail, and our satellites 

encountered harrassment, it would appear wise to have a non-nuclear 

interceptor capability available as a psychological and real countermeasure. 

NASArs and ACD_"_'2 inten.s::s in ear·~:---. ,·:oing satellites requires 

special consideration wh:..~:h can be, and is ;)c:ing, provided through close 

:oordination and cooperation between those agencies and the DOD. It 

appears that significant benefits would accrue through:'.'>-..: ~JOD (1) making 

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an SR-71 or U-2 capability available to NASA for civil earth-sensing 

activities, and (2) 1;ncouraging NASA to sponsor a major program in 

readout technology. It appears possible that ACDA, with extensive ., 

NASA commitments, could take the initiative for development of a USUSSR Arms Control Satellite. 

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DATA APPENDIX 

INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE NRP 

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DATA APPENDIX 

INFORMATION ON ACTIVITIES OF THE NRP 

1. Photographic Satellites 

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a. CORONA. A medium resolution, broad-coverage search 

system which began operating in 1960 is scheduled for phase-out in 

1971. Typically, seven or eight 10-14 day CORONA missions are flown 

per year and, on the average, each provides about 7. 0 million square 

miles of photography at resolutions of seven to twelve feet. 

b. HEXAGON. A second generation search system which will 

cover 20 million square miles per 45-day mission at resolutions of two 

and one-half to five feet. HEXAGON will cover a swath of 280 miles 

from a normal operating altitude of 82 miles -- about double ttc swath 

of CORONA. With its improved resolution, HEXAGON will also satisfy 

many surveillance requirements. First flight is scheduled for Decemoer 

1970, and three or four successful launchings per year are planned for 

the program's lifetime, which is estimated to be ten years or more. 

c. GAMBIT. A high resolution surveillance/ technical intelligence system which began operating in 1963. Typically, six GAMBIT 

missions 2.r:: flown per year and an average mission returns photography 

of 5, 000 h:,,gh priority targets, at ground resolutions of one to three feet. 

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7'CJI' SECRET BYEMAN 

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Plans call for increasing GAMBIT's time-on-orbit to 20 days and improving its resolution 

2. Signal Intelligence Satellites 

a. POPPY. A long-life, broad-band SIGINT search system 

for locating new and unusual signals and determining their position. 

POPPY is also used to locate selected radars for updating the Electronic 

Order of Battle (EOB). This satellite is flown in a 500 n. m. orbit and 

has an operating life of over one year. 

b. STRAWMAN. A multi-purpose, broad-band, high-sensitivity, 

near-earth-orbit (27 5 n. m. ) SIG INT system whose primary function is to 

determine the technical characteristics of known radars. It also has a 

good capability for locating new signals and providing locations for EOB 

updating. 

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EARPOP HANDLE V!A 

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f. P-11. This name refers to a special purpose secondary 

satellites responsive to a wide vareity of SIGINT needs. Most frequently 

they are used for directed coverage of a specific nature, such as antiballistic missile search, technical intelligence collection on certain 

radars, and low capacity multi-channel COMINT. P-1 ls are launched 

as secondary payloads on other satellites (e.g. CORONA), separated 

at altitude, and then spin-stabilized in orbit. 

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I or :Stt;Kt I 

3. Launching Schedules 

Programs FY69 70 71 72 

CORONA 7 6 4 0** 

HEXAGON 0 0 3 4 

GAMBIT 8 7 5 5 

POPPY 0 1 1 (1) 

STRAWMAN 2 2 1 

P-11 4 3 4 4 

*No major configuration change from current program 

**Two systems in reserve 

BYEMAN 

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73 74 

0 0 

4 4 

4 4 

( 1) 

4 4 

NOTE: Parenthesis indicates not yet approved by NRP Executive Committee. 

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4. Ten Year Projections 

Programs FY70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 

CORONA 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

HEXAGON 0 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 

GAMBIT 7 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

POPPY 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 

STRAWMAN 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 

P-11 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 2 1 

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5. System Characteristics 

Payload 

CORONA 

HEXAGON 

GAMBIT 

POPPY 

STRAWMAN 

P-11 

Payload 

Booster Weight 

Thorad/ Agena 4,280 

Titan III D 22,500 

Titan III B / Agena 8,550 

Thorad/ Agena 1, 200 (4 balls) 

Thorad/ Agena 3, 900 

Passenger on CORONA/ 405 

HEXAGON 

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Lifetime 

14-20 days 

30-45 days 

14-18 days 

/ 1 year 

/ 6 months 

> 9 months 

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6; .. NRP Financial Program (Satellites) 

Programs 

CORONA 

Launches 

Costs 

HEXAGON 

Launches 

Costs 

GAMBIT 

Launches 

Costs 

POPPY, p...:11 and 

STRAWMAN 

Launches 

Costs 

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FY69 

7 

$ 47 

$ 218 

8 

$ 137 

1 

$ 79 

(Million $) 

FY70 FY71 

6 4 

$ 27 $ 17 

3 

$182 $ 193 

7 5 

$ 167 $ 137 

3 2 

$ 58 $ 52 

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FY72 

$ 2 

4 

$ 203 

5 

$ 122 

1 

$ 41 

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CONfR()L c;'!'STEM 

FY73 FY74 

4 4 

$ 181 $ 178 

4 4 

$112 $ 112 

0 1 

$ 39 $ 36 

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H.lt' ~tliHL I 

Programs FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72 FY73 - Mission Support 

(SCF, AFSPPF, etc.) 

Costs $ 99 $104 $115 $ 102 $ 99 

Support R&D (AR/ AT, 

Photo, Vulnerability, etc.) 

Costs $ 26 $ 29 $ 43 $ 38 $ 32 

Totals $ 843 $ 788 $ 810 $ 743 $ 679 

NOTES: 

1. Data is consistent with cost estimates in the Five Year Defense 

Program (FYDP). 

BYEMAN 

CONfROL (,'fSHM 

FY74 

$ 96 

$ 30 

$ 635 

2. These costs make no provision for new systems (such as readout) for 

launch, but do include technology efforts. 

4. Two additional CORONA systems will be available for launch in 

FY 1971 or 197 2 if needed. 

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