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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

ME.MORANDUAM

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TALKING NOTES

FOR

NSAM 156 COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP MEETING

"IMPACT OF SALT RATIFICATION ON NRP"

HISTORY 

September 9, 1968 - Ambassador Bohlen circulated a preSALT draft statement of a State/ACDA paper, "Disarmament

Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy," to the NSAM

156 Committee. Key points: 1) SALT Delegates authorized

to use the term "information-gathering satellites" when

discussing "national means of verification." 2) Noninterference with "national means" should be conceptually

established. 3) A case for disclosure, beginning with

downgrading of "fact of" was stated.

September 16, 1968 - Meeting of NSAM 156 Committee. Key

points: 1) Proposed arms agreement would not involve

explicit reference to observation satellites. 2) Any

briefing on verification should be integrated with a

general briefing on the specific arms limitation proposal.

3) The matter should be presented to the Executive Committee

of the Committee of Principals (an interagency national

policy advisory group at that time -- Sec State; Dir, ACDA;

SecDef; Chairman, JCS; Chairman, AEC; DCI; Asst to Pres, S&T).

September 19, 1968 . - The paper was sent to the Committee of

Principals. No reaction was noted on this paper.

March, 1969 - The Verification Panel of the NSSM 28 Working

Group was formed. (Composed of DepSecDef, Under Sec State,

Dep. Dir, ACDA, DCI, NSC.)

May 1, 1969 - Ambassador Johnson, for the NSAM 156 Committee,

forwarded the 1968 paper to NSSM 28 Steering Committee

stating that the paper did not establish any basic new

policy but rather set tactical guidelines for SALT handling

of observation satellites. Ambassador Johnson also stated

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that prior to consultation with Congress or our Allies,

discussions should be held among the involved agencies

on the best means for implementing the guidelines set

forth in the paper.

May 14, 1969 - The NSSM 28 Steering Committee approved the.

paper. Key points: 1) Information-gathering satellites

provide the only feasible means of monitoring a strategic

arms limitation. 2) Tt is vital to U.S. security interests

to preserve the full integrity and unimpeded operation of

information-gathering satellites. 3) It is still sound

policy to avoid a confrontation on observation satellites.

4) Authorizes the delegation to state to the joint

delegation that "national means of verification" includes

the use of "information-gathering satellites." 5) The

delegation is enjoined not to reveal the effectiveness of

satellite intelligence systems. 6) In initial consultations

with NAC, we should define "national means of verification"

as primarily referring to "information-gathering satellites."

7) Consideration should be given at a later date to briefing

on U.S. capabilities to monitor an agreement.

July 30, 1969 - DCI intelligence guidance for the.SALT

Delegation. Key points: 1) Avoid disclosing specific

capabilities and weaknesses of U.S. collection systems.

Keep the Soviets uncertain about the precise state of

U.S. knowledge concerning Soviet strategic systems.

Avoid disclosure of the specific assumptions and judgements about Soviet systems used in developing U.S. strategic

war plans. 4) Let the Soviets take the lead in discussing

Soviet weapons systems and their characteristics. 5) Confine references to U.S. intelligence information to those

points on which we are confident the Soviets know we are

informed (e.g., parade photography, etc.) 6) Avoid any

references to specific intelligence sources and methods,

however innocuous they may appear.

April 15, 1970 - DCI reaffirmed the previous intelligence

guidance. This guidance has remained stable for the talks

since then.

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Legal requirements of Ratification of SALT dictate

that virtually all forms of agreement go to the Congress for

review. The President can initiate unilaterally an "understanding" or gentleman's agreement, but politically, this

would be seemingly unwise. Thus, a treaty or agreement, or

both, will be subject to fairly intensive Congressional

review. A Treaty must pass two-thirds of the Senate and a

formal agreement must pass a majority vote of the Congress.

It appears that one likely SALT outcome will be a Treaty on

Defensive (ABM) Systems and an Agreement on Offensive Systems,

i.e., to agree to take this issue on in seriousness.

Lastly, it is desired to know for certain the extent

and depth of discussions held between 1969 and now to the

Congress and also to the North Atlantic Council of Ministers

on "national means." Dr. Steininger has been contacted on

this question. Also of interest, is the extent and depth

of informal discussions held at the Talks on the subject.

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

The problem of SALT Ratification appears to be fairly

straight-forward from the NRO viewpoint. We desire that

the SALT ratification, when it comes, is done with the least

amount of spotlight on the NRP as possible. We do not desire

that this process be used as a means to disclose the "fact of"

either by design or default. We also do not desire that the

process be "solved" by employing a "white" satellite for

public consumption. It is recommended that the following

facts be determined:

The extent of dialog with the Congress to date.

The extent of dialog with the NAC to date.

3) An estimate of the liklihood of enjoining key

members of Congress to hold the discussions at low profile

and close discussions to the press.

A plan should then be evolved so that, in advance of

hearings, the spotlighting on the NRP .may be consciously

held to a minimum while affording the Congress a meaningful

review of the terms of a treaty and/or an agreement.

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COMMENTS 

The prior iteration of the 156 Committee and its

association with the present gives rise to several comments:

Since there was no Verification Panel at that time,

it was without question that the 156 Committee should deliberate the question of SALT and the national reconnaissance

policy. When the NSSM 28 Committee was formed, the 156

Committee transmitted its recommendations to the forerunner

of the Verification Panel. The Verification Panel adopted

these recommendations, and since then, the Verification Panel

has worked the negotiating issues for the SALT Delegation.

"National means of verification" has, from the outset, been

described in unexplicit terms by tacit agreement being called

"national technical means of verification." The policy for

discussion of this area still remains the responsibility of

the 156 group.

At the outset of the earlier iteration of the problem

in 1968, ACDA/State felt that this was an occasion to put

through the "fact of" disclosure. The original paper was

beaten down through the efforts of NRO/CIA/OSD but there may

be a ressurection of the idea on this go-around. Jack Shaw,

of State, who is a SALT de l egate now, was and will be the

Secretary of the 156 proceedings on this subject. He is

felt to be an advocate of "fact of." It is thought, however,

that there has been enough recent support of not revealing

"fact of" that the idea can be discarded for the present

subject.

3. NASA has informed that they would be desirous of

reopening the issue of a "white" bi-lateral verification

satellite, operated by NASA in the "world" interest. Although

the idea had merit some time ago, if an early agreement is

reached, there would not be enough time available to permit

"white development" of a verification satellite. Further,

since it is outside the subject area presently under consideration, it probably would be best not to discuss it at this

session.

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