Functions: AFSC 3

Functions: -(eNRO

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21 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The 1962 AFSC Assault on the -"(S) NRO

The attached papers were generated by a Study Group convened

under General Schriever's sponsorship in the Spring of 1962 to "do

something about the (B) NRO problem. The AFSC grievances

against the (11) NRO are self-evident in the papers. Colon

an eaded this group.

The papers were handed (undated and unsigned) to Dr. Charyk

in June 1962. Since that date, General Martin has held them. In

August 1964, at the time of his departure, he gave them to me.

Attachment 1111/ ORTHMAN

• Colonel, USAF

Copy.4 Pose—Z_of--1--Pases•

Control No. JIN.••nn•n•11
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6- r)ee ce / c /

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SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

TO: Under Secretary of the Air Force

I am aware that you are in the process of developing

basic policies for establishing the functions and responsibilities

within the NRO on a sound basis. To assist you in this task, I am

taking this opportunity to present my views for, improving the

management relationships for the, conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). These relationships should simplify

your management problems, while at the same time enabling AFSC

to maximize its contribution to the NRP.

Up until recently the informal arrangements we have

had with the CIA, and within SSD itself have been equal to the task

at hand. However, with the growth of the NRP now that we are

approaching a large number of launches in 1962, with attendant

multiple orbital control problem. and the initiation of black projects

by the Air Force our problems have multiplied. At SSD alone more

than one-half of the personnel are working either directly or

indirectly on the NRP. Authorities and responsibilities have become

diffused and confused down to and including the contractors involved

in our space efforts.
SP

Under the present security arrangements, artificial

restraints such as exist between the NRP and non-NRP projects

make coordination of resources and support very difficult. A

security plan for all space activities as presented to you on

5 January 1962, should greatly enhance the Commander's ability

at SSD to manage more efficiently. It would appear that if the

proposed DOD security directive is published, many of your

•

problems in the NRO would be materially alleviated.

Recognition of the increasing scope and magnitude of

the NRP and a potential solution to the security problem leads

me to suggest an alternate management arrangement. The NRO

will in time assume paramount stature and become the arena for

many political arguments on program scope, content, and direction.

In the interest of program stability and national security, it is

suggested that the NRO concentrate on establishing a permanent

jointly manned office to review and approve projects in NRP;

assign approved requirements, and prepare mission satellite

operation directives.

5. The above course of action would result in assigning

approved NRP projects to. AFSC for implementation as the executive

agent of the NRO and as outlined in the 6 March 1961 DOD directive.

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Under this management arrangement, I would in turn allocate

the resources along with the assigned requirements to SSD which

would be established as a strong, central activity having operating

management responsibility for all aspects of the NRP assigned.

Our "red-line" procedures would give the same rapid response

as the present arrangement.

This approach to the problem has many inherent future

benefits. It will provide program flexibility, improved capabilities,

and counter-measures. It frees the policy makers from the burdens

of implementation and operational details as the NRP progresses.

It will safeguard other essential space efforts by optimizing the

resources made available. Finally, it protects the Air Force

capabilities from further inroads by other agencies or departments.

I trust these views will be of assistance to you in the

development of these very urgent and critical matters of national

policy and procedure. Should you desire, I will be most happy to

discuss them with you in greater detail.

B. A. SCHRIEVER

General, USAF

3
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MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

Introduction.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss appropriate management

arrangements for the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). Various

basic policy proposals for the establishment of functions and responsibilities within the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) will be covered

with particular reference to current problems and an alternative

approach aimed at a more practical solution. Although this paper

will be limited to satellite overflight projects for intelligence, geodesy,

mapping photography, and electronic signal collection, other overflight

systems could be managed in a similar fashion.

The Problem.

The immediate objective is to arrive at basic policy decisions

which will determine the relationships between the NRO and the agencies

involved and to define the functions and responsibilities within the NRO.

The solution to this problem is dependent upon devising a management

scheme which will best serve the national needs for the planning,

development, procurement, operation and exploitation of reconnaissance

systems.

Such a scheme should provide for a single individual to execute

programs established by a jointly constituted NRO of designated DOD
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-SPECIAL-HANDUNG--

and CIA personnel. This scheme should also provide for maximum

amount of cover and the minimum of interference with other national

high priority programs.

III. Background.

The present management pattern has evolved out of expedient

actions following a series of discontinuities in the management and

direction of the satellite reconnaissance program. The program

originally initiated by the Air Force and approved as a system in

July 1956, was later transferred to ARPA in May 1958. The program

was returned to the Air Force on 17 November 1959 and placed under

the direction of the Secretary of the Air Force. It was expedient at

that time to establish a Director of the Satellite and Missile Observation

System (SAMOS) Project reporting directly to the Secretary of the

Air Force. On 6 September 1961, the NRO was established based on

a DOD-CIA agreement.

Prior to the establishment of the NRO, CIA had jointly participated

in the NRP with the Air Force providing support to the various black

projects under CIA's control. Since the establishment of the NRO,

there has been little change in the actual conduct of the program. In

the meantime, the program has grown to such size that it is dominating

the entire defense space effort. The shifting of various projects from

QPCPIAI AANMING
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--SPECIAL-HANDUtewhite to black with various shades of gray has resulted in

considerable confusion and diffusion of effort.

Now that policies are being considered for the establishment

of functions and responsibilities within the NRO, it is time to take

a fresh look at the total problem. A management scheme is needed

which will not only take care of the situation today, but one which

will also provide for continuity and plan for the Nation's future needs.

IV. Present Situation.

The scope of the NRP and its interactions with other space

programs is frequently not recognized. Figure I illustrates the

programs and activities of the Space Systems Division (SSD) of the

Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) in three categories: those

which are a part of the NRP; those which are not a part of the NRP;

and those which are common to both. Also shown are the management

channels used. In the aggregate, the organizations inv lved comprise

close terilitary spaces augmented by man

contractor personnel. They reside at sites and stations arou the

globe.

An examination of Figure I reveals that the fully funded, highest

priority programs are under the direct control of SAFLTS, while the

other space programs, including those in support of other agencies,

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are under the Commander SSD. The SAMOS Program Director

(SAFSP) and a token numblipf his staff are assigned to SAFUS.

Actually the manning of the OS office incl paces, most

of which are supplied by SSD. Since SAFSP has the additional duty

as Vice Commander SSD and his deputy has the additional duty as

the Deputy SSD for Satellite Systems, they enjoy double-hat control

over many other elements of SSD.

This diffusion of responsibility gives rise to many problems.

It does not provide for adequate planning, coordination of effort and

resources for a growing national space program. Under the present

arrangement divided responsibilities and security complications make

it very difficult to have effective management. Although it is impossible

to sort out individuals in detail, it is safe to estimate that one-fourth

of SSD is under the direct control of SAFSP, with an additional one-fourth

to one-third under his nominal control.

4 In like fashion, the contractors are confused by unclear channels

of authority and responsibility. Since the same hardware is often

used in NRP and non-NRP projects, security, priority and Secretarial

prestige tend to cloud normal management channels. Similar confusion

is extending to the satellite launch, command and control, and recovery

organizations which are confronted with multiple orbit control and

increasing launch rates for all space programs. In addition to the

organic elements of SSD, many organizations of AFSC and other

COMA' mANININg
l UP 5El litl

government agencies support and interact with the NRP and SSD

programs. The national ranges, military installations and units

of DOD contribute to and participate in the launch, operation and

recovery of satellites. The various technical centers, laboratories

and test facilities in AFSC contribute to the programs on a continuing

basis. The CIA is providing technical and operational direction to

the NRO on those programs which are identified as black projects.

Elements of OSD and the National Security Agency are repeatedly

attempting to exercise control over the NRO.

In short, there are many pressures at play and while Secretarial

prestige can cope with many of the problems on a day-to-day basis,

the present arrangement depends too much upon the strength and

integrity of a single person. As a result, continuity, consistency,

and sustained effort are subject to severe erosion.

V. Security..

Another item of concern under the present scheme as the NRP

is currently scheduled, is the question of security. By January 1965,

according to the plans being made there will only be one white project

left in the NRP (Project 35) unless Project 102 (Ferret) is extended.

The cover is already thin on DISCOVERER and will probably not hold

up through the summer. The proposed security plan for all space

5

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efforts, recently presented by AFSC, would alleviate the tendency

to go black on the entire NRP. The CIA may desire to retain

management control on all black contracts which greatly complicates

management. Further, the shifting of white projects to black creates

confusion and division of assigned responsibilities. Headquarters

AFSC and SSD are organized and have the machinery to contract

for black programs and should be given the entire task.

Another potential problem in the present management

arrangement is the dependence on an individual as a person to head

up the NRO. Could the head of the NRO be replaced by an individual

from the CIA? Or, since the Navy and Army have been given spaces

in the NRO, it could be a member from one of the other military

departments. If Dr. Charyk is replaced by someone who will only

wear the DOD/AR hat, what will happen to the direct and indirect

controls SAFUS has over most of the elements of SSD in connection

with the NRP? Certainly a management scheme with more permanence

is desirable.

VI. An Alternative Solution.

In order to develop a sound counter-proposal, it is necessary

to examine the total problem in broad perspective and select the

basic factors for further consideration. Figure II illustrates the

functional process in the formulation of reconnaissance requirements

--TOP-SEeRET--

6
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---SPEC-IAL-tIANDLING--

and a projected Air Force concept for providing the hardware and

the operation of it to satisfy the requirements received.

The problem breaks down into four functional areas as depicted

on Figure II. The National Policy area deals with National Objectives

and decides the level of effort and manner in which these objectives

may be satisfied. The Satellite Reconnaissance Requirements area

must validate and determine the priority of meeting all U.S. approved

reconnaissance requirements. The Program Review and Operational

Control area limits itself to the final determination of the programs

needed to satisfy authorized requirements and the overall control of

satellite operations to meet the priorities for intelligence as established

by the USIB. The actual performance and accomplishment of the NRP

is delegated to the Air Force and, in turn, is redelegated to AFSC as

the executive agent to the NRO. This is in consonance with the

6 March 1961, DOD Directive and provides a single point and individual

who can be given the authority and resources to do the total job. It

further eliminates the divided responsibilities and complications which

result when the two latter functions are combined.

An organizational chart has been prepared, Figure III, to

depict the relationships which would exist based on the functional

management concept portrayed in Figure II. The Commander AFSC

would be directly responsible to the NRO for carrying out all aspects

of the National Aerospace Reconnaissance Pro m (NARP). The

7 --41aff+A-1--MTIMMTV"
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Commander AFSC with the assistance of a small staff would keep

informed on the status of satellite reconnaissance and would allocate

resources along with the assigned requirements to SSD.

The Commander SSD would consolidate all of his requirements.

both NRP and non-NRP and implement them in accordance with the

priority and availability of resources. He would be responsible for

all activities from receipt of the requirement to the delivery of the

"take". This management scheme would permit the Commander SSD

to give attention to the impact that future technological advances

would have on the program and alternate courses of action which must

be devised to counter Soviet capabilities or changes in National Policy.

He will also have the flexibility of adjusting his organization or

shifting his resources to meet expediencies or changes in the NRP

on a more practical basis.

Procedures are in existence at the present time to give the

NARP the special emphasis and attention it would require. The

"red-line" (AFR 375-6) procedures with only slight modification

permit the same rapid response that exists under the NRO organization

today. A good example of how these procedures would work can be

illustrated with the AGENA D program which supports the NRP as

well as non-NRP projects. The AGENA D Program Director reports

directly to the Commander SSD. The "red-line" system is used to

8
4DL1NG

keep higher management levels informed. A SYSTO has been

appointed in the Air Staff and the program is reviewed and

approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. The "red-line"

channels are direct from the Program Director to the Secretary

of the Air Force for status and decisions when the urgency requires

such action.

The NRO would be a jointly staffed office with members from

the three military departments and CIA. and headed by the DOD/AR.

The DOD/AR should be a representative of OSAF since the Air Force

will be the executive agent for almost all of the NRP. The NRO will

be constituted to review and approve programs, receive and assign

authorized requirements and prepare mission directives.

VII. Conclusions.

The current and projected NRP is of a size which will not

only destroy cover, but will seriously tax the resources of AFSC;

particularly in the space area.

Previouily employed management arrangements are

becoming overtaxed and are leading to confusion, and diffusion of

responsibility and authority.

3. A sound solution is to establish an NRO, jointly manned

by CIA and DOD as a program review and approval activity with

the additional function of assigning approved requirements and

9 SPECIAL HANDLING
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Mk t,../7!

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preparing mission directives. The Air Force and, in turn. AFSC

would be designated as the executive agent to prepare plans to

satisfy assigned requirements and implement the approved plans,

conducting such satellite operations as covered in mission directives.

SSD would be established as a strong, central activity having operating

management responsibility for all aspects of the program including

integration of the non-NRP projects to optimize the total effort

expended on space activities.

4. A comprehensive security and information plan for all

space efforts would alleviate many of the present artificial management

restraints which is severely complicating the efficient conduct of both

NRP and non-NRP space projects.

10
OSAF

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1 USAF

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AFSC

- - - -• v/cmdi

SSD I

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COMMON Non-NRP1

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NRP

Project 35

Project 102

SAMOS

DISCOVERER

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CORONA

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Black

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CIA

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SSD Staff

6595 Test Wing

6594 Aerospace Test Wing

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Geopolitical Advise

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United States

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Program R iew & Approval

Operati Directives

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Figure II. ---SPECIAL-HANDLINGNational Policy Technical Advise

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