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l«>NTHL Y REPORT - DECEMBER '71 

Recovery of RV-3 (SV #1) 

Headquarters SSC (L. MOlaskey) representatives joined the recovery 

No'vellobe:r as the White Sands approached the recovery dte. Preparations for the first dive got underway almost inmediately. 

The refrigerator for cooling the payload was in final stages of completion. As 

originally constructed, the unit consisted of a 3/4 inch plywood box built around 

a 2 x 4 frame. The outside dimensions approximately 8 x 8 x 8 feet. The insulation consists of 1-1/2 inch glass wool blankets fabricated with the aluminum side 

facing th~ interior of the box. The cooling unit was mounted to the outside of 

the box blowing air from the outside into the box through an opening behind the 

cooling coil. After reviewing the requirements, it was agreed that the set up 

could not adequately refrigerate 8,000 pounds of sea water to below 400p in the 

outside ambient of about 900 p in bright sunlight. Therefore, the following 

modifications were recommended: 

I _ Paint the outside all over with white paint. 

2. Construct a recirculating duct to take the cooled interior air and 

pass it over the cooling coils in a closed system. 

3. Insulate the cooling unit as much as possible. 

4. Tape all seams to shut off air leakage. 

After these modifications were accomplished (Figure 1) the shipping container 

was loaded into the box, (Figure 2) flushed, and filled with clean sea water. 

The original water temperature was recorded to be 70°F. The unit was then 

sealed and the cooling process started. 

While this was going on the Trieste was being prepared for launching_ At about 

2030 the dock well was flooded and by 2230 the Trieste was trailing in tow off 

the stern of the White Sands. The gassing operation started as soon as the dock 

well was p\.DDped out. By 2200 on 3 November 67,000 gallons of aviation gasoUne 

and 32 tons of steel shot had been loaded into Trieste and predive checkout had 

started. 

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Meanwhile the temperature of the interior of the refrigerator appeared to have 

stabilized at about 56°F. the coolant coil could not increase the differential. 

It was therefore decided to request an air drop of dry ice to lower the temperature. In addition, plastic bags and· buckets of fresh water were loaded into 

the deck top refrigerator to make ice. The plan being to open the box, install 

the dry ice and regular ice, seal it up and hopefully lower the temperature 

below 40°F. The following afterno.on as the predive checks were being completed 

the Air Force parachuted (Figure ) 600 pounds of dry ice which was then loaded 

into the unit. 

While the air drop was in process, the White Sands was heading for the "zero 

dot" (Deep Ocean Transponder). This is the transponder laid on the bottom by 

the search team to mark the location of the package. It is a transmitter that 

when interrogated by a signal of the proper frequency returns a signal of its 

own·. The search team has planted two such dots. The zero dot being 160 - 165 

yards north of the payload and the other dot, designated dot 3, was reported 

to be about 110 yards N E of the zero dot. These dots were located from the 

surface using satellite navigation and then interrogating them from the sea 

going tug boat Apache. Apache" meanwhile was preparing to plant two additional 

dots in the area. 

The new dots were planted and their position, or at least the position of the 

Apache as the dots were released from the surface, was recorded. These additional dots were to act as position markers to help remove ambiguity in the 

range readings from the other dots and to provide a fixed pattern on the ocean 

floor from which to navigate on the bottom. the preliminary data, before the 

first dive, was: 

Channel No. 02erat1ng Fre~uencl Estimated Location 

0 12.5 KHz 160 yards N of P.L. 

2 13.5 KHz Oil Trieste 

3 14.0 KHz 110 yards N.E. of 0 

5 15.0 KHz 5,330 yards s.w. of 0 

8 16.5 KHz 5,670 yards S.E. of 0 

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The position of the "zero dot" was reported to be 24° 47.5' NOJ."th latitude by 

162° 01.7' West longitude. A 37 KHz pinger was also reported to have been 

planted on the bottom 30 yards from the zero dot by the search team. 

Final preparations for the dive commenced as the White Sands approached the 

location of the 0 dot. The tle.covery hook was attached to the Trieste by divers, 

(Figure ), the anti-chamber filled with sea water and the Trieste descended 

toward the bottom. 

At about 2000, one hour and forty-five minutes after leaving the surface, the 

Trieste reported their position 300 feet above the bottom which was at 16,400 

feet. Relaying their range to each of the dots in the pattern, the Trieste 

attempted ~o close in on the zero dot. At the same time, their position was 

plotted both on Apache and White Sands. As the Trieste approached the zero 

dot they observed a sonar contact on their CTFM. They changed course to investigate the contact and found nothing. The same type of search mane~. 

were conducted with several other sonar contacts. Each time no visual ~''1.,,­

tact was made. DUring the dive, there seemed to be a discrepancy in the range 

data indicating that the dots were not located where they were reported to be. 

At about 0200 the dive was terminated unsuccessfully. The scaph reached the 

surface at about 0345. 

Meanwhile the temperature of the refrigerator box had stabilized at just below 

50°F. 

Immediately following the dive the weather conditions deteriorated to the extent that it became impossible to safely operate the small boats.required to 

service Trieste. After waiting several days for the weather to improve the 

recovery team returned to Pearl Harbor to repair,damage to Trieste caused by 

the rough seas. (A pan and tilt camera assembly had been broken ,off and 108t 

as well as the dot launcher containing an operational dot). 

On 17 November, the day following arrival at .Pearl Harbor, a briefing was held 

with Admiral Lacey at the Submarine Base. All the officers of the Trieste 

and White Sands, and Cdr. Mooney participated. Foll owing that mee 

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met with Adm. Lacey for further discussion of the operation~ The outcome of 

these briefings and discussions was a decision to return to the site and again 

try to recover the payload. This time, however, more support from the Navy 

will be available. It seems that much more attention from the higher ups in 

the Submarine fleet will be directed toward successful completion of the operation. As a result, Lt. Cdr. Bartels, Officer in Charge of White Sands and 

Trieste, was directed to outline his needs and requirements for continuation 

of the operation. A list of requirements was started immediately. The objective was to be ready to go back to sea by Saturday, 20 November. 

Activity on the ship became intense as plans were being made to repair Trieste, 

order replacement parts, provision the ship for the operation, etc. Among the 

items required were: two new outboard motors, a new Boston Whaler, a large 

refrigerator to replace the one built aboard ship. on the way out, gas hose for 

refueling Apache and loading Trieste, more shot, lithium hydroxide for Trieste t s 

life support system, fuel oil, lubrication oil, food, fire pump parts, etc. 

The task element got underway at 1300 on Sunday, 21 November. Another tow 

ship, the "CoucaU" joined,'White Sands in the channel of Pearl Harbor and the 

tow line trans.ferred. As they reached the mouth of the harbor, Coucall reported that berLtOlring!:' engine (a device that maintains proper tension in 

the tow line) had failed and that she could no longer tow White Sands safely. 

The tow line was separated, White Sands headed out under her own power, and 

a rush call put in for Apache. Fortunately, the crew of Apache were 'all 

aboard and she was dispatched immediately to pick up the tow. They again were 

underway by nightfall. 

The following day, while in transit to the recovery site a battery problem 

on Trieste was surfaced. One of the primary battery cells was grounding out 

and it could not be determined if it was cracked due to the pressure from the 

16,400 foot dive or if it were some other problem resulting from the rough 

weather after the dive. In any event, the problem had to be resolved prior 

to the next dive. Around-the-clock attention was directed towards a solution 

which finally turned out to be not one big problem as suspected but two small 

'failures in series. These were corrected and the Trieste was ready to dive again. 

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Continued bad weather and high seas prevented further operations until 29 

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November when Trieste was launched and the evil~tion in preparation for the 

next dive commenced. The predive checks were completed, all of the electrical 

problems resolved, the recovery hook lowered into the water on floats and 

Trieste towed to the dive site. The hook was fastened into place (It is 

attached just prior to the dive so that it and Tri~ste are not subjected to 

long periods of exposure to surface action which could cause damage.) 

The dive got underway at 1745. On the way down, the scaph developed a list 

to port of about· 25°. The pilots tried to correct the attitude by dropping 

shot from the opposite side. It was stated that the pilot didn't feel he 

had control until after they reached a depth of'7,000 feet. 

They continued down to about 15,000 feet, stopped; and started interrogating 

PDIIO .... S 

the trans~ Id~8. They first pinpointed their location about 5,000 feet from 

the #3 dot. After driving to the target and lowering to the. bottom they 

searched the base line between dots #3 and zero crossing the base line about 

four times. In the process they encountered several equ~pment problems. The 

computer power supply failed and dumped part of its memory. Riding with the 

trail bailout to about 35 feet they couldn't see the bottom so they winched 

it in to 10 feet. That was a little too much because when ~hey started to 

move forward, the cable assumes a slight angle to the rear pulling the 8caph 

down slightly. With the residual list because of improper metering of the 

shot ballast on the way down, the port skeg started d~aging the bottom. They 

then tried to lower the trail ball slightly and it wouldn't payout. The end 

result was that they either had to slow down or slide the skeg on the bottom. 

In this configuration it was extremely difficult to steer a steady course. 

The doppler sonar system also failed on the bottom. This device provides 

both height off the bottom information as well as horizontal velocity. The 

loss of this information is not critical to the mission since they have 

redundant depth indicators and a means of determining their position other 

than through velocity time relationships. After searching the. 3 - 0 base 

line and investigating several CTFM sonar signals with no success and having 

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been down for almost eight hours the battery voltage was reaching its mintMum 

safe level, they picked up a CTFM signal in a direction West of dot #3. They 

drove in that direction until they suddenly lost the contact. They immediately 

slowed down and peering out the viewing scope they spotted the payload passing 

about two fee~ to the right of the starboard skeg. (The reason for losing the 

target is that the CTFM has a minimum range of 30 yards but the visual range 

through the viewer is about 30 feet. There is a dead zone between the two). 

They came to an immediate stop but their momentum carried them beyond the 

package. They then started to maneuver the scaph around to bring the payload 

into view ~en the low voltage battery alarm came on. They tried to operate 

the mechanical arm in order to plant another transponder next to the payload 

and the shoulder movement would not operate to the right. It was suspected 

that the combination of low voltage and the list of the vehicle was too great 

a load for the arm shoulder motor. In any event they were not able to deploy 

the dot. With very little power remaining and little hope of even tripping 

the recovery hook they decided to head for the surface. The last check of 

the battery on the bottom indicated 4 of the 65 or so cells had been depleted 

to the extent that they had reversed polarity. The decision to surface was 

confirmed. They reached the surface at 0415 Wednesday morning. 

Again after several days of waiting for the weather to abate to the level 

where operations could be resumed it was decided to head for the shelter of 

the islands where Trieste could be reloaded into White Sands and any damage 

repaired before attempting another dive. 

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