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181441ATIONAL. RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASKINOTON• S.C. •

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°PPM OP TIN OVIWIT somcwni . • • August 6, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PACKARD

MR, HELMS •

SUBJECT: Background Material for ExCom Meeting of August 7

Attached, for your information, is a copy of a talking paper

which describes the issue for discussion by ExCom at its meeting

on August 7.

Also attached is a paper which discusses the related subject •

of an arms control satellite and an alternatiim "no elaboration"

approach to verification of a strategic arms limitation agreement.

F. Robert Nalm

Copy to Mr. Nits*

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45.NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

• WASHINGTON, D.C.

0,1111:11 OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR August 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. STEININGER

SUBJECT: Background Material for August 7 ExCom

I have attached a copy of a re talking paper to replace

the one I sent you on August 4 , 69). Our reason for

revising the paper was to insure that there was no misunderstanding

that the issue was one of security and policy implications of SALT

rather than the arms control satellite initiative as several people

have been led to believe.

We have removed the arms control satellite initiative text

from the issue and have appended it as an information paper relating

to the verification of any arms limitation agreemiTt that may be

reached sometime downstream. We are not proposing that it be

addressed as an issue by the ExCom •at this time.

I have also attached a copy of this discussion for your use.

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F. Robert Naka

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August 6, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Consideration of SALT on

Thursday, August 7

Apparently there is some misunderstanding amont those participating in the staffing of the subject to be discussed by you with

the Executive Committee on August 7. It seems that our previous

discussions and papers on this particular subject have led those

participants to believe that the key issue for ExCom consideration

is the "white" arms control satellite initiative. This is, of course,

not the case. The only issue, as far as we, the NRO, are con

of the SALT -cerned, is that of the security and policy implications activity with respect to the NRP.

I have just had along discussion with Dr. Colin Blaydon, who

has been charged by Mr. Benington with the staffing of a paper for

Mr. Packard's and Mr. Nitze's use at this meeting. I find, unfortunately, that Dr. Blaydon has devoted frirtually his entire effort

to establishing a position for Mr. Packard and Mr. Nitze on the

arms control satellite initiative and has only tacitly treated the key

issue of the security and policy implications as it related to the arms

control satellite initiative. I was able, in my discussion with Dr.

Blaydon (who, incidentally, will now represent Mr. Benington to

Dr. Foster and Dr. Tucker since Mr. Benington had departed on

leave), to assure him that the urgency and concern on the part of the

NRO in this matter was one of informing the ExCom, as completely

Objectively as we can, that the current and anticipated activities of

SALT are very likely to impinge on those of the tTRP unless the
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validity of U.S. policy on satellite reconnaissance is reaffirmed

and some explicit guidance is provided those individuals involved

in SALT, both during this period of preparing for negotiations of

an agreement and during the negotiations themselves. Dr. Blaydon

agreed that our concern was certainly a relevant and important one

and felt somewhat embarrassed that he had centered his activity in

support of Mr. Bemington around the lesser important (as far as we

are concerned) and separable issue of an arms control satellite

initiative.

Dr. Blaydon's conclusions on the arms control satellite proposal

are quite similar to ours, i.e., that it displays some advantages as

a credible means of verification, that there are political dangers

associated with its proposal, and most important, that a substantive

discussion of the implications of its acceptance by the NSAM 156

Committee is a bit premature at this time.

It is unfortunate that there has been this misunderstanding of the

real issue. I feel we can correct this misunderstanding in the ExCom

with a very informative discussion by you of NRO concern over the

security and policy implications of SALT and perhaps a clarification

in these discussions that the arms control satellite was simply proposed as one means of providing, much further downstream in the

arms /imitation talks, a credible cover for whatever actions the U.S.

decided it must take with respect to the verification of any agreement.

Dr. Blaydon intends now to adjust his thinking and revise whatever he

prepares for Drs. Foster and Tucker to likewise address the key

issue for discussion at the ExCom meeting.

Dr. Blaydon agreed that our talking paper did represent an

reasonable and adequate discussion of the "key" issue. I suspect

the format in which it was presented led to the confusion- of issues.

We continue to feel very strongly that there is a used for NSAM •

156 Committee review and consideration of the security and policy

implications of SALT and would hope that such a review would result

in a reaffirmation of the validity of established U.S. policy on sates-'

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lite reconnaissance and definitive guidance to the participants in

SALT as to just exactly how that preparatory activity and further

negotiations should proceed in the light of this policy.

We have revised the text of the talking paper previously

furnished for your use at the ExCom meeting in an attempt to

more clearly relate the issue and correct the misunderstanding.

Essentially, we have addressed only the issue in the main paper

and have appended a separate "talker" on the arms control satellite and the "no elaboration" proposal as alternatives in verification.

These papers are attached. We suggest that a.copy of the

revised papers be provided to Dr. DuBridge to replace the previous

paper which Dr. Naka has already sent Dr. Steiningger.

• We could also, if you desire, • deliver this afternoon a copy of

the revised papers to Mr. Packard, Mr. Helms and Mr. Nitse.

WILLIAM R. YOST

Lt Colonel. USAF
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The Issue 

Shoild the ExCom encourage an NSAM 156 Committee consideration of the security and policy implications of SALT with respect

to the NAP.

Background

In early September 1968, the U.S. began preparations to enter

negotiations, with the USSR, aimed toward reaching an agreement

to limit strategic arms. The State Department proposed to enforce

such an agreement by "maximum, or if necessary, excluhive

reliance on national means of verification, meaning all types of

observation satellites, as well as other surveillance activities

carried out by one side -- either unilaterally or in conjunction with

its allies -- outside the territory or territorial waters of the other

side."

The problem, as presented by State, was to permit the negotiations to proceed on this basis and at the same time develop a policy

which would maintain U.S. freedom of action unilaterally to conduct

reconnaissance satellite operations and prevent foreign political

and physical interference with the conduct of these operations.

The essentials of the State proposal wire these:

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Reclassification of the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite

reconnaissance from Top Secretglaor TALENT-KEYHOLE) to

SECRET.

Continuation of the present TALENT-KEYHOLE

• security systems with regard to acquired intelligence, capabilities,

and operations of reconnaissance satellites.

Revelation to the Soviets that "national means of verification"

includes the use of reconnaissance satellites.

Establishment of a negotiating position based on the assumption

that "one side will not impede the operation of the other's reconnaissance

satellites."

Providing NATO general information on the U.S. negotiating

position on verification.

Briefing Congress on the U. S. position on verification and

capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement through national means.

7. Maintaining• a discreet position in response to press 'inquiries

and in official public statements, with preparation to eventually acknowledge "maximum reliance on national means of verification" and the

inclusion of the use of satellite photography in such means.

On September 9, State submitted the proposal for NSAM 156

Committee consideratioN

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with the statement for release limited to "the U.S. is prepared to

place maximum reliance on national means of verification. "

Although some of the rationale expressed in the paper was objectionable, the NRO agreed that there had been a general improvement in

concept.

In late October 1968, the urgency of the negotiations dissipated,

and SALT entered a waiting phase.

On Merck 6, 1969, the Presideit, in NSSM 28, directed the

preparation of a U.S. position for possible strategic arms limitstion talks with the Soviet Union. Alternative options were to be

developed by a steering committee under ACDA chairmanship for

consideration in preparing the U.S. position. The options were to

be accompanied by an evaluation of the strategic balance that would

result, as well as by a discussion of possible Soviet reactions to

each and likely U. S. response. A statement of principles and

objectives was also to be developed for each option, togethei with

proposed tactics for its use in relation to the proposal.

On May 1, State submitted for NSSM 28 Steering Committee consideration a new paper which set forth the general guidelines for

handling the question of observatioi satellites in connection with

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SALT. The new paper was practically a word-for-word copy of the

guidelines paper issued by ACDA on September 26, 1968.

Ori May 14, NASA formally urged NSSM 28 Committee consideration of a possible new Administration initiative in strategic arms

limitation: bilateral negotiations on verification means to include

the development and utilization of. an open satellite system' designed

for the single purpoie of verifying U.S. and USSIVadherence to

treaty conditions. "NASA was emphasizing the potential of this

initiative in:

1; avoiding discfosure of the existence, scope; utility or

sophistication of the present overhead reconnaissance program,

minimizing concern over international confrontation on

this issue,

providing an important bulwark to the unimpeded continuation of covert intelligence gathering activities,

4. providing a reasonable overt basis for the possible challenges

that might become necessary in the event treaty violations were discerned through any covert means.

Current Status 

At its meeting on May 14, the NSSM 28 Committee approved the

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State Proposal as a basis for drawing up instructions to the SALT

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delegation and for planning consultations with Congress and our

allies.

The alternative proposal for an Arms Control Satellite initiative

was remanded to the NSAM 156 Committee for examination at a later

date.

Discussion 

It is apparent from our discussion with participants in NSSM 28

activity that the Committee's concern with the basic requirements

of the various U.S. options for SALT has completely overshadowed

its recognition of the profoundly adverse effects that any disclosure

of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program could have on the

security of this nation.

Once taken, the disclosure action is irreversible. No matter

how much the nation might regret its action, its options would be

foreclosed.

Disclosure does" not enhance our negotiating position; in fact,

it is counterproductive since our persistence in discussing satellite

reconnaissance surfaces our heavy. dependence on it and, by in-

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ference, indicates the limitations of our more conventional capabilities.

Disclosure excites curiosity and in negotiations would elicit

a pressure for more and more credibility. The path from a dia11 ..77 • •

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Closure of "the fact of" to total revelation then becomes very short

and swift.

A disclosure of satellite reconnaissance could well prejudice

and even tacitly outlaw other space intelligence techniques as well as

ground collection methods.

Disclosure affords the Soviets the high ground in the challenge

to "continue negotiations or tolerate U.S. espionage" since we are

almost uniquely dependent on satellite reconnaissance for our

intelligence information and they are not.

Disclosure would inevitably excite Soviet interest in protecting

its sensitive targets. Disclosure would renew their interest in

developing methods -- operational or standby -- of hampering or

incapacitating our operations in a necessarily permissive environment.

Most nations accept satellite overflight tacitly; they know it is •

being done and will not react unless confronted publicly with the

fact. Disclosure is, in effect, a confrontation. It force& each nation

to reassess its attitude toward U.S. satellite reconnaissance in terms

of prestige, sovereignty and popular reaction. It is likely.that many

neutrals would be forced by that public reaction to join the hostiles

and to announce that henceforth their nations would not be overflown.

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The Soviets could easily negotiate on one hand and sponsor a clamor

of protist (in some neutral or non-allied nation) on the other.

Friendly nations would be shocked by the disclosure and would feel

that they had been sold short in negotiations with a common adversary.

While disclosure could result in a possible gain in Congressional

support for arms limitation negogations because of the specific

assurance regarding a reasonable basic U: S. capability to verify,

it could also become a major political issue, irrespective of timing

or degree of disclosure. It would undoubtedly trigger a clamor

for information on related covert and clandestine operations and an

apprehension and uneasiness over undisclosed aspects of the arms

limitations negotiations.

' With the American public, disclosure could develop a knowledgeable support for U.S. intelligence collection activities or perhaps

create widespread dismay over official confirmation of an espionage

activity, especially with the well informed, vocal sector which will

understand the violation of the international intelligence code. DUclosure would certsiinly have • tremendously disruptive effect on the

existing security control systems.

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Recommendation

We heed a clear statement of policy which will permit the U. S.

to continue, without foreign political or physical interference, to

conduct a unilateral satellite reconnaissance operation and at the

same time, enable it to proceed in negotiations with the USSR

toward reaching an agreement to .limit strategic arms.

We are recommending, therefore, a review and consideration

by the NSAM 156 Committee of the security •and policy implications

of SALT with respect to the NRP. We would expect such a review

and consideration to provide for U.S. participants, both in preparatory SALT activity and negotiations with the USSR, a clear statement

of U. S. policy on satellite reconnaissance and explicit guidance as

to how U.S. SALT activity and negotiations must proceed in the

light Cl this policy.

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CONTROL .4

Verification and the Arms Control Satellite Initiative

A major problem in preparing a basis for SALT is that of a

credible means for verification of any agreement to limit strategic

arms. There is little' question that the U.S. must rely, to some

degree, on the covert satellite reconnaissance program to provide

this means. The concern then centers about any acknowledgement

to the Soviets, either publicly or privately, of our reliance on this

means for verification and the attendant requirement to disclose the

existence, status, extent or effectiveness of the covert satellite

reconnaissance program.

An option to develop and employ an overt arms control satellite

for the single purpose of verifying adherence to the conditions of any

agreement would, if accepted, appear to offer several advantages.

It would not require the revelation of the existence, scope or utility

of our covert program. It could provide a reasonable overt basis

for any necessary challenges on violations discerned through covert

means, and thus provide a strong support to the unimpeded continuation of the covert program. If accepted as a reasonable venture in

the SALT arena, it would minimixe . our concern-bver international

confrontation on the issue of satellite reconnaissance. Its acceptance •

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and application would provide a step forward in increasing the tacit

acceptance of satellite observation as a reasonable governmental

operation. It would underline the U.S. commitment to the peaceful

uses of outer space.

The approach could essentially be one in which the U. S. would

negotiate with the Soviets an Arms Control Satellite to be developed

and operated (1) jointly by the two nations, or (2) bilaterally, like .

the US-USSR meteorological satellites, or (3) nationally, with each

nation agreeing to build and operate its own. In each case, the U.S.

development agency would be NASA.

The satellite could be defined in terms of whatever emerged

from the negotiations. Resolution -- always a critical question

previously -- would be no problem here, and it is estimated that

the USSR would propose soihe value between 2 and 10 meters. By

working in this manner, outside the NRP, ACDA could avoid confronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or

privately with the reality of a major U.S. intelligence collection

program. Perhaps even more important -- if that is possible --

ACDA could also avoid domestic confrontation with Congress and

the American public. Finally, if .the initiative .were successful,

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The most significant advantage of this option is that if a limitation agreement could not be reached with the Soviet Union, national

intelligence capabilities would not be disclosed, nor would operations

be impaired. A revelation of the scope, utility or existence of

covert/clandestine elements of the national intelligence programs

would not be reqiired. This option would not force us to provide a

basis for Soviet or third country challenges of U.S. collection

activities. Such an option should be acceptable to the Soviet Union

for generally the same reasons it is acceptable to the United States;

sensitive and valuable intelligence collection activities remain undisclosed and -unimpaired.

Initial SALT consultations with the NATO allies and Japan have

been conducted. This option would permit further briefings to our

allies on general verification capabilities until specific limitations

have been negotiated with the Soviet Union. Similarly, specific

verification capabilities probably need not be discussed with the

Senate prior to negotiating a tentative agreement with the Soviet

Union. This would correspond to previouk approaches to Senate

consultation (e. g. Outer Space Treaty).

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It must be understood, however, that while this option affords

an excellent position for the initiation of negotiations, it has, the

disadvantage of forcing the revelation of some degree of verification

details once an agreement has been reached and is ready for further

NATO consultation and Senate ratification. This advantage is

inherent in any option which does not contain a means of verification

which may be discussed openly.