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121 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 1400003487D 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

8 April 1971 

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PACKARD 

SUBJECT: Future of Drones and Aircraft in Overhead 

Reconnaissance 

For some time I have been considering making a recommendation 

to you that we eliminate NRO Program Office D which handles drones 

and aircraft for overhead reconnaissance purposes. Such an organization would also have an impact on the CIA/OSA covert U-2 capa-

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appropriate. I have become increasingly convinced that we should 

be expending our efforts on upgrading our satellite activities, 

rather than trying to continue with air-breathing vehicles. We 

have not flown a U-2 over unfriendly territory since March 1968. 

The only overhead reconnaissance capability which we have at the 

moment with air-breathing vehicles and which stands a good chance 

of survival over defended areas is our SR-7ls. 

We have had essentially no successful drone coverage in our 

flights over China. To achieve this capability with drones, we 

will have to spend some more money. The Ryan 147 drones are 

considered obsolete for the purpose in mind. TAGBOARD is not 

obsolete, but has not yet reached an operational stage. During 

the past two years "ve have not spent any money on new TAGBOARD 

development activities, but have concentrated on trouble-shooting 

and fixing the current design. The program has operated at.a 

very austere budget level during this period. Simultaneously, 

we have been considering terminating TAGBOARD. At each ExCom 

meeting there has been a question of whether to put it in storage 

or make one or two more flights. To date we have not faced up 

to the decision to either kill the program or to put it on a paying 

basis. 

The advantage of manned systems and drones is supposed to be 

that they have a quicker reaction than satellites. In the case of 

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our U-2s and SR-71s, I think this is a real advantage. 

Nonetheless, the political atmosphere is such that there are 

no areas of the world of strategic significance where we are 

willing to have manned overflight of denied territory. I am 

sure the State Department would be overjoyed to hear that we 

had decided to spend future development money in upgrading our 

satellites rather than trying to improve our drones. The fact 

that we have the SR-7ls for real emergencies allows us to make 

decisions about drones which we might not otherwise be willing 

to do. So far, we have not demonstrated that the TAGBOARD has 

the quick response capability which is needed. Neither do we 

have this capability in the satellites, so we will have to spend 

money to get such a quick response on one or both systems. I 

definitely believe such a capability is needed. 

A substitute for quick response on the part of satellites 

is to have one in orbit all the time. We have discussed this 

over the past few months and have made the statement to Kissinger, 

Rogers, etc., that for about $100 million a year extra we would 

have a satellite on orbit all the time. Although the requirement which they had in mind was a little different, having one 

on orbit all the time would take care of situations such as the 

South China weather problem. There we have the situation of the 

weather opening up for a period of a few days, but this usually 

happens when we don't have a satellite on orbit. We are moving 

already toward more days on orbit. For example, here are the 

actual and planned number of days on orbit from 1968 through 1974 

for approved programs. 

CORONA 

GAMBIT 

HEXAGON 

TOTAL 

Total No. of Days in Orbit 

(Calendar Year) 

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 

116 79 

67 68 

183 147 

76 

63 

139 

15 

76 

90 

181 

(1) 

108 

120 

228 

(1) CORONA Missions 1115/6/7 are not included 

1973 1974 

108 

180(3) 165 

288 279 

(2) GAMBIT assumed to have 30 day life as of mid CY 74. 

(3) HEXAGON assumed 45 day life starting CY 73 - 7th vehicle. 

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A decision to have a vehicle on orbit continuously can 

be put into effect within a year. This is roughly the amount 

of time for the TAGBOARD to certify that it has indeed achieved 

a satisfactory degree of reliability so that we can trust it 

in flights over denied territory. I wonder if we would not be 

smart to spend our money on satellites rather than on drones. 

The other capability which people seem to want is a daily 

return of data and we of course are getting ready for an April 

ExCom decision on whether we should develop this capability in 

the form of the near real-time EOI system or the FRO system or 

both. In order to acquire such a capability, which is some 

three or more years away, constraints have caused us to terminate 

all activities leading to a Very High Resolution system capable 

of some 1" to 5" resolution. In addition we are trying to achieve 

An interim step towards satisfying the daily return of data 

is to fly our existing systems more often during the ensuing 

years so we have a current generation satellite on orbit every 

day until we have the new systems. Once the new systems are 

available, such a capability follows automatically (subject to 

our launch strategy). I am not in a position to state today what 

the financial implications of this proposal are, but I am already 

convinced that we should not spend very much money on fixing 

TAGBOARD when there are other less provocative things that we could 

do with satellites. 

By saying that I believe we should get out of the use of 

drones and aircraft for overhead reconnaissance, I do not mean 

to imply that they do not have a continuing general reconnaissance 

role. Specifically, I think that we should use our U-2s and 

drones for more COMINT than we are now doing. We will shortly 

have good evidence on the capability of the U-2 in this role as 

they will soon start to fly in Southeast Asia. We already have 

Combat Dawn drone experience. This experience leads us to 

believe that there is indeed a future for this type of vehicle. 

Similarly, I believe that there is a weapons carrying role for 

drones which ought to be exploited. The Air Force HAVE LEMON 

(defense suppression) program will be the first step in demonstrating such a capability. 

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If I decided to recommend closing down our office which 

handles airplanes and drones, the principal problem we would 

be faced with is what to do with the U-2s. I propose in that 

case that all U-2s go to the regular Air Force and that we 

have a contingency plan whereby these U-2s could (under NRO 

direction) be called back for use for overhead activities any 

time t:hey are needed. This capability could be kept available 

through either overt or covert channels. Such a move of course 

has implications in both the supporting Air Force elements 

(Program D) and CIA/OSA. I am examining these areas before 

making a recommendation to you. I will be in touch with you 

as my thoughts on this matter become more concrete. 

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