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ltJt' !Stl:iKt I 

~NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL }~YSTE0M , 

1\lll\1\l\\~l\\!1\\11\\\ 111\\1\11\\1\ 14 

THE NRO STAFF July,31, 1969 

HANDLE ,VIA 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 

SUBJECT: SALT Talking Paper 

As Colonel AllE:n has indicated to you> , Mr. Packard has 

concurred in calling an ExCom meeting to initially examine 

from an NRP ExCom perspective exclusively the security implications of SALT with respect to the NRP and the related 

subject of an arms control satellite initiative. 

Attached is a talking paper which we have prepared for your 

use in this meeting on Thursday, August 7, at 1000. 

fh~1l 

WILLIAM R. YOST 

Lt Colonel, USAF 

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SALT TALKING PAPER 

The Issue 

Should the ExCom encourage an NSAM 156 Committee consideration 

of the security and policy implications of (1) SALT with respect to the 

NRP, (2) an Arms Control Satellite initiative. 

Background 

In early September 1968, the U.S. began preparations to enter 

negotiations, with the. USSR, aimed toward reaching an agreement to 

limit strategic arms. The State Department proposed to enforce such 

an agreement by "maximum, or if necessary, ~xclusive reliance on 

national means of verification, meaning all types of observation satellites, as well as other surveillance activities carried out by one side --

either unilaterally or in conjunction with its allies -- outside the territory or territorial waters of the other side.'·' 

The problem, as presented by State, was to permit the negotiations 

to proceed on this basis and at the same time develop a policy which 

would maintain U.S. freedom of action unilaterally to conduct recon ... 

naissance satellite operations and prevent foreign political and physical 

interference w:...:h the conduct of these operations. . . .. . 

The essentials of the State proposal were these: 

, July 31, 1969 

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1. Reclassification of the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite 

reconnaissance from Top Secret BYEMAN (or TALENT-KEYHOLE) to 

SECRET. 

2. Continuation of the present TALENT-KEYHOLE and BYEMAN 

security systems with regard to acquired intelligence, c_apabilities, 

and operations of reconnaissance satellites. 

3. Revelation to the Soviets that "national m.eans of verification" 

includes the use of reconnaissance satellites. 

4. Establishment o{a negotiating position based on the assumption 

that "one side will not impede the operation of the other's reconnaissance 

satellites." 

5. Providing NATO general information on the U.S. negotiating 

position on verification. 

6. Briefing Congress on the U.S. position on verification an,d 

capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement through national means. 

7. Maintaining a discreet position in response to press inquiries 

and in official public statements, with preparation to eventually acknowledge "maximum reliance on national means of verification" and the 

inclusion of the use of satellite photography in such means. 

On September 9, State submitted the proposal for NSAM 156 

Committee consideration. 

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The NRO reacted quickly to this proposal, meeting with representatives of the CIA, JCS, and NASA to develop opposition to the basic proposal and to suggest an alternative. 

On September 13, 1968, the USIB considered the security aspects 

of the State proposal and decided that "there should be no change in 

the classification of reconnaissance satellite operations or the information derived from them at this time. 11 

Ori September 16, 1968 the NSAM 156 Committee met, discussed 

the matter at some length, and arrived at no specific conclusion. 

Those in attendance reported that all parties were to pre.pare recommended guidelines and furnish them to State. 

On September 26, 1968 ACDA issued a proposed guidelines paper 

for comment by NSAM 156 Committee members. This paper was 

a decided improvement over the earlier (September 9) proposal. It 

did not ask for a downgrading of the security surrounding "the fact of" 

satellite reconnaissance. It restricted the proposed discussions to 

"information-gathering" satellites, with no further definition authorized. 

Consultation "with Congress" was changed to 11 selected members of 

Congress" and was to be done on a classified basis.· Constraints were 

placed on what might eventually be said to the press, with the statement 

for release limited to "the U.S. is prepared to place maximum reliance 

on national means of verification." Although some of the rationale 

expressed in the paper was objectionable, the NRO agreed that there 

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had been a general improvement in concept. 

In late October 1968, the urgency of the negotiations dissipated, 

and SALT entered a waiting phase .. · 

On March 6, 1969 the President, in NSSM 28, directed the 

preparation of a U.S. position for possible strategic arms.limitation 

talks with the Soviet Union. Alternative options were to be developed 

by a steering committee under ACDA chairmanship for consideration 

in preparing the U: S. position. The options were to.be accompanied 

by an evaluation of the strategic balance that would result, as well as 

by a discussion of possible Soviet reactions to each and likely U.S. 

response. A statement of principles and objectives was also to be 

developed for each option, together with proposed tactics for its use 

in relation to the proposal. 

On May 1, State submitted for NSSM 28 Steering Committee consideration a new paper which set forth the general guidelines for handling 

the question of observation satellites in connection with SALT. The 

new paper was practically a word-for-word copy of the guidelines paper 

issued by ACDA on September 26, 1968. 

In light of the renewed activity in SALT and its security implications with respect to the NRP, the NRO suggested, for NSSM 28 

Committee consideration, an Arms Control Satellite initiative as an 

alternative to the new State proposal. This .initiative would, we 

believe, give ACDA the advantage of being able to openly discuss 

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satellite observation without adverse effects on the security protection 

surrounding (arid so vital to) the NRP. In this approach, the United 

States would negotiate with the Soviets on the basis of an Arms 

Control Satellite to be overtly developed and operated (1) jointly 

by the two nations, or (2) bilaterally, like the US-USSR meteorological 

satellites, or (3) nationally, with each nation agreeing to build and 

operate its own. In each case, t.he U.S. development agency would be 

NASA. 

The satellite would be defined in terms of whatever emerged 

from the negotiations. Resolution -- always a critical question 

previously -- would be no problem here,·· and it is estimated that the 

USSR would propose some value between 2 and 10 meters. By 

working in this manner, outside the NRP, ACDA could avoid. confronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or 

privately with the reality of a major U.S. intelligence collection 

program. Perhaps even more important -- if that is possible --

ACDA would also avoid domestic confrontation with Congress and 

the American public. Finally, if the initiative is successful, the 

U.S. would have achieved a measurable step toward legitimatizing 

satellite observation at some to-be-negotiated level; if the discussions 

failed; they would do so without jeopardizing the NRP. 

On May 14, NASA urged NSSM 28 Committee consideration of 

a similar proposal, emphasizing its potential in 

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1. avoiding disclosure of the existence., scope, utility, or 

sophistication of the present overhead reconnaissance program, 

2. minimizing concern over international confrontation on 

this issue, 

3. providing an important bulwark to the unimpeded continuation 

of covert intelligence gathering activities, 

4. providing a reasonable overt basis for the possible challenges 

that might become necessary in the event treaty violation were discerned 

through any covert means. 

Current Status 

At its meeting on May 14, the NSSM 28 Committee approved the 

State proposal as a basis for drawing up instructions to the SALT 

delegation and for planning consultations with Congress and our allies. 

The alternative proposal for an Arms Control Satellite initiative 

was remanded to the NSAM 156 Committee for examination at a later 

date. Unfortunately, the State Department is showing no sense of 

urgency in calling the NSAM 156 Committee into session. 

Discussion 

It is apparent from our discussion with participants in NSSM 28 

activity that the Committee's concern with the basie fequirements 

of the various U.S. options for SALT has completely overshadowed 

its recognition of the profoundly adverse effects· that any disc1osure 

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of the U.S. satellite reconnaissance program could have on the 

security of this nation. 

Once taken, the disclosure action is irreversible. No matter 

how much the nation might regret its action. its options would be 

· foreclosed. 

Disclosure does not enhance our negotiating position; in fact, 

it is counterproductive since our persistence in· discussing satellite 

reconnaissance surfaces our heavy dependence on it and, by inference, 

indicates the limitations of our more conventional capabilities. 

Disclosure excites curiosity and in negotiations would elicit 

a pressure for more and more credibility. The path from a disclosure of_ "the fact of" to total revelation then becomes very short 

and swift. 

A disclosure of sateHite reconnaissance could well prejudice 

and even tacitly outlaw other space intelligence techniques as well 

as ground collection methods. 

Disclosure affords the Soviets the high ground in the challenge 

to "continue negotiations or tolerate U.S. espionage" since we 

are almost uniquely dependent on satellite reconnaissan.ce. for our 

intelligence information and they are not. 

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Disclosure would inevitably excite Soviet interest in protecting 

its sensitive targets. Disclosure would renew their interest in 

developing methods -- operational or standby-- of hampering or 

incapacitating our operations in a necessarily permissive environment. 

Most nations accept satellite overflight tacitly; they_ know it is 

being done and will not react unless confronted publicly with the 

fact. Disclosure is, in.effect, a confrontation. It forces each nation 

to reassess its attitude toward U.S. satellite reconnaissance in 

terms of prestige, sovereignty and popular reaction. It is Hkely 

that many neutrals would be forced by that public reaction to join 

the hostiles and to announce that henceforth their nations would not 

be overflown. The Soviets could easily negotiate on one hand and 

sponsor a clamor of protest (in some neutral or non-allied nation) 

on the other. Friendly nations would be shocked by the disclos_ure 

and would feel that they had been sold short in negotiations with a 

.common adversary. 

While disclosure could result in a possible gain in qongressional 

support for arms limitatior... negotiations because of the specific 

assurance regarding a reasonable basic U.S. capability to verify, 

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it could also become a major political issue, irrespective of timing 

or degree of disclosure. It would.undoubtedly trigger a clamor 

for information on related covert and clandestine operations and 

an apprehension and uneasiness over undisclosed aspects of the 

arms limitations negotiations. 

With the American public, disclosure could develop a knowledgeable 

support for U.S. intelligence collection activities or perhaps create 

widespread dismay over official confirmation of an espionage activity, 

especially with the well informed, vocal sector which will understand 

the violation of the international intelligence code. Disclosure would 

certainly have a tremendously disruptive effect on the existing security 

control systems. 

A major problem in preparing a basis for SALT is that of a 

credible means for verification of any agreement to limit strategic 

arms. There is little question that the U.S. must rely, to some 

degree, on the covert satellite reconnaissance program to provide 

this means. The concern then centers about any acknowledgement 

to the Soviets, eL:,t:::r. publicly or privately, of our :;,~eliance on this 

means for verification and the attendant requirem1:.1t to disclose the 

existence, status, extent or effectiveness of the covert satellite 

reconnaissance program. 

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An option to develop and employ an overt arms control satellite 

for the single purpose of verifying adherence to the conditions of any 

agreement would, 'if accepted, appear to offer several advantages. 

It would not require the revelation of the existence, scope or utility 

of our covert program. It could provide a reasonable overt basis 

for any necessary challenges on violations discerned through covert 

means, and thus provide a strong support to .the unimpeded continuation of the covert program. If accepted as a reasonable venture in 

the SALT arena, it would minimize our concern over international 

confrontation on the issue of satellite reconnaissance. Its acceptance 

and application would provide a step forward in increasing the tacit 

acceptance of satellite observation as a reasonable governmental 

operation. It would underline the U.S. commitment to the peaceful 

uses of outer space. 

Discussions concerning the U.S. capability to verify a SALT 

agreement have generally led to equating the term "national means 

of verification" with the cove.rt satellite reconnaissance program. 

It is very likely, however, that the verification of any agreement 

would require the use of collection capabilities of the other programs supporting national intelligence needs, i.e.,. the CIP, the 

CCP and the CIAP .. A disclosure of.the details, or in some cases, 

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the existence, of any of these activities is of equally significant 

concern. 

Another option would appear appropriate in light of this concern --

that is, a proposal which permits negotiations to_ proceed without a 

definition of "nationa.l means of verification. 11 The U.S. delegation 

would simply state that the U.S. _is prepared to rely on unilateral 

verification capabilities to an extent practicable for any specific 

strategic arms limitation agreement. The delegation would not be 

authorized to elaborate upon the verification capabilities. 

The most significant advantage of this option is that if a limitation agreement could not be reached with the Soviet Union, national 

intelligence capabilities would not be disclosed, nor would operations 

be impaired. A revelation of the scope, utility or existence of covert/ 

clandestine elements of the national intelligence programs would not 

be required. This option would not force us to provide a basis for 

Soviet or third country challenges of U.S. collection activities. Such 

an option should be acceptable to the Soviet Union for generally the 

same reasons it is acceptable to the United States; sensitive and 

valuable intelliger:ice collection activities remain undisclosed and 

unimpaired. 

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Initial SALT consultations with the NATO allies and Japan have 

been conducted. This option would permit further briefings to our 

allies on general verification capabilities until specific limitations 

have been negotiated with the Soviet Union. Similarly, specific. 

verification capabilities probably need not be discussed with the 

~enate prior to negotiating a tentative agreement with the Soviet 

Union. This would correspond to previous approaches to Senate 

consultation (e.g. Outer Space Treaty). 

It must be understood, however, that while this option affords 

an excellent position for the initiation of negotiations, it has the 

disadvantage of forcing the revelation of some degree of verification 

details. once an agreement has been reached and is ready for furth~r 

NA TO consultation and Senate ratification. This disadvantage is 

inherent in any option which does not contain a means of verification 

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which may be discussed openly. 

If an alternative means of verification, which may be discussed 

openly, is not developed, the disclosure of some details of the 

national intelligence program is inevitable. 

Recommendation: 

We need a clear statem~nt of policy which will permit the U.S. 

to continue, without fore.;ign political or physical interference, to 

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CONTRO~ SY!JTE,,,:s JOl~HL.Y 

conduct a unilateral satellite reconnaissance operation and at the 

same time enable it to proceed with negotiations with the USSR 

toward reaching an agreement to limit strategic .arms. 

We are recommending, therefore, a review and consideration 

by the NSAM 156 Committee of the security and policy implications 

of ·(1) SALT with respect to the NRP and (2) an arms control satellite 

initiative as a means of avoiding the disclosure of the existence, 

status, extent, effectiveness or operational characteristics of the 

U.S. satellite reconnaissance program, 

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