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WASIGNOTON

Orr= prim UNDER MICHIETANY

January 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Management of the CORONA Project

Introduction

During my tour to date as DLO, I have felt that the

CORONA project presented me with two major problems:' first,

a degree of operational unreliability which, while not

crippling, has been serious and, in my judgment, correctable;

and second, a separation of management responsibilities within

the NRO between two of the principal Program Directors. I

have tended to charge off operational faults and failures

mostly to the central contractor, Lockheed Missiles and Space

Company (UMSC), and have several times engaged in informal

technical audits of this contractor's activities. The divided

management I have tended to regard primarily as an inconvenience

to me, mostly because it has obliged me to make explicit and

careful divisions of responsibility every time even a minor

nonseroutine matter has come up. I have, as you know, been

discussing with the Director of Central Intelligence, so far

without success, a proposal to eliminate the split in management.

In pursuing solutions to these two problems, I have concluded that they are indeed the same problem. More precisely,

they are respectively operational and structural demonstrations

of the fact that the Government's management of this project

is unconscionably weak and diffuse. I am furthermore convinced

that under more effective management this project will demonstrate

significantly higher reliability and better technical performance,.

and that this can be accomplished with a real reduction in costs.

This memorandum sketches the management relations that

now prevail on the project, emphasizing the more striking features.

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In brief, seven of the major contracts that govern the project

are dispersed among four separate elements of the NRO, there

is no defined responsibility for engineering of the whole system,

and what engineering control there is is vested in a committee

most of whose members have no other significant line responsibility

in the project.

The memorandum goes on to summarize some obvious conclusions

and to offer some judgments I have formed from recent interviews

with the principals in the offices involved. A management

arrangement is proposed that I think should be our goal. With

your approval, I shall continue to seek with the DCI an arrangement that embodies the essential features of this proposal.

Since such discussions are likely to take some time, I feel that

certain interim steps must be taken, meanwhile, to get the

project under better control. These also are discussed.

Current Management

The present management structure for the CORONA system

follows closely the physical structure of the hardware, to a

greater degree than it follows the functional structure of the

operation. The major elements of the hardware are:

THOR booster, supplied by Douglas Aircraft,

AGENA-D spacecraft, supplied by Lockheed,

Project-peculiar and mission-peculiar modifications

of the AGENA-D, accomplished by Lockheed,

Payload (P/L), principally supplied by ITEK,

Re-entry vehicle (1/V), supplied by General Electric,

Structure to integrate P/L and R/V with the AGENA-D,

supplied by Lockheed.

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Many items minor in cost but critical to the system - e.g. film -

will not be covered here. Only certain functions will be

examined, mostly ones which cut across hardware or organizational

interfaces. On-orbit, recover, and post-flight functions will

not be discussed. These are also very complex.

Chart I shows in gross terms the management structure at

issue, including the formal channels for administrative direction,

technical direction, operational direction, and hardware flow.

For shock value, more detail is displayed than will be discussed.

• Attachment 2 gives details about the principal organizational

units that appear on this Chart, noting their major responsibilities. The next few paragraphs cover the features of the

organization that need emphasis.

Contracts for engineering, fabrication, and delivery to

the Government of the major payload element, the re-entry vehicle,

and their integrating substructure, are held by a CIA contracting

.officer (C/O) who resides at Langley, Virginia, and reports up.

through the NRO Program B (CIA) channels. These contracts cite

SAFSP, through the 162 Office noted on the Chart, as the source

of technical direction, "acting as the agent for all interested

agencies of the Government."

Contracts for some minor payload elements, not shown, and

for the systems engineering that Lockheed Missiles and Space

Company (LMSC) does to integrate the payload, re-entry vehicle,

substructure, and launch procedures, are held by a CIA contracting

officer who is detailed to SAFSP, El Segundo, California, and

responds to SAFSP administrative direction. The systems

engineering (SE) contract also cites SAFSP, through the 162 Office,

as the source of technical direction.

The contract with LMSC for adaptation of the AGENA-D to

the CORONA mission is held by the 162 Office. This office reports

directly but covertly to SAFSP. This particular contract will

be called the LMSC 162 contract.

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Two other LMSC contracts are held by the Booster Support

Office in Space Systems Division. These cover respectively

(1) procureMent of the standard AGENA-D and (2) all LMSC launch

services at Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAPB). Therefore, LMSC

has five separate contracts critical to this program, held by .

at least four different contracting officers in four different

parts of the NRO. Responsibility for all five unites only in

my office. The actual confusion at LMSC is not as great as this

organizational confuSion could create; this will be explained

below.

As noted, technical direction for the P/L, R/V, and substructure, and related systems engineering, comes from the

162 Office. A document incorporated into all applicable contracts

by reference establishes procedures for approving technical

direction which seriously dilute the personal responsibility of

SAFSP or his 162 Program Director in•this regard. By these

procedures, technical direction is binding on the affected contractors and contracting officers only if it is unanimously

approved by a committee called the Configuration Control Board (CCB).

Furthermore, the contracting officer is allowed discretion to

reject technical directives from the CCB that induce contract

changes which exceed the funds approved to him. This latter has

not so far created a problem, although in principle it could

since, in some cases, funds are approved through administrative

channels that are completely separate. The CCB is chaired by

an officer from the 162 Office, and manned by representatives

of SAFSP, NRO Staff, and NRO Program B; not more than two members

of the CCB have any other direct line responsibilities in the

project.

Internally to LMSC, the five critical contracts are treated

with some unity. The 162 contract, the payload substructures

contract, and the SE contract are all handled by an LMSC

162 Office which is supported by functional elements of LMSC.

Part of this LMSC 162 organization operates in a covert facility,

A/P. There is in this organization some systems engineering

effort that reflects back on the AGENAAL 

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Conclusions 

From this outline of the organization, I conclude:

The only place in the present organization where the

authority of a true project director can be exercised is in

my office.

The channels now defined through which I must operate

as project director are confused and unnecessarily tortuous.

There is no contractually defined responsibility for

systems engineering of the whole system from booster through

reentry vehicle and of its operation from mission-definition

to recovery.

In reviewing the practices and the attitudes of the people

involved I conclude also:

I have not up to this time exercised the functions of

a project director in the continuous detail required of that

office.

The project operates amiably on a "business as usual"

basis but standards of efficiency and technical performance are

low.

LMSC is better motivated and more unified than might

be expected under the confused and permissive controls that are

in effect, but both the quality and efficiency of their efforts

need improving, and can be improved.

7. Everybody is busy, but they are principally engaged

in engineering for and accommodating, to changes and "improvements."

There is in fact no conscious control over the configuration of

the system. Despite the preoccupation with change, major

correctable technical deficiencies remain in the system, and

others are not even under study to determine their correctability.

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Recommended Organization

I take it as clearly established at this point that the

management of the CORONA project must be simplified. Chart II

shows fairly specifically the organization that I recommend.

It puts the key elements of the project into a single office

under SAFSP. This will be a covert office, under a strong

director, replacing the present 162 Office. The latter

was established at a time when ovided cover for CORONA

by engaging in overt space expa gris. Nohas been used

since DoD Directive 5200.13 took effect, an been dropped

ime is approMore basically, in proposing, this structure, I considered

the following features as being essential:

A focus for the management where one individual has

sufficient authority that he can be held personally responsible

for success of each operation, for technical performance, and

for economical management.

Channels of communication and responsibility clearly

defined and direct enough that operational, technical, and fiscal

direction can be consistent with each other and unequivocal.

A clear point of contact with the Government for each

contractor on the project so that (1) and (2) can apply also to

each contractor's organization.

A contract structure that covers all elements of the

system and its operation in a sufficiently comprehensive way.

Specific contractual provisions that enable the

Government to control the amount and direction of engineering

effort that goes into system changes.

Incentive contracts wherever possible with accent on

performance.

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The organization outlined in Chart II permits these

features to be realized. In defining it, I considered that

SAYUS/DNRO should not be the day-today project director for

L CORONA, so that all the authority needed for day-to-day operation

must come to a focus at a lower echelon. Although in principle

a new organization could be set up, in the CIA or the Air Force,

to assume this authority, to my mind the only practicable

alternatives involve regrouping under SAFSP the necessary elements

of the SAFSP and SSD organizations. I cite four reasons:

(1) Most of the authority already resides in this structure,

albeit in a dispersed way. (2) All but four of the experienced

people who presently have direct day-to-day responsibilities

for managing or supervising parts of the project for the Government operate within this structure. (3) Some of the resources

important to the CORONA project must be under the control of

SAFSP for use on other projects. (4) SAFSP was set up for this

purpose and there is no need to establish a parallel organization.

There remains some choice as to how closely the following

elements are to be integrated into the SAFSP organization:

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AGENA•D procurement and launch services,

THOR procurement and launch services,

The 6595th Aerospace Test Wing which conducts the

detailed launch operations, and

The 6594th ATW which operates the Sunnyvale Satellite

Test Center and its outlying tracking and command

stations, and operates the recovery forces.

All of these elements are important to activities other than

those under SAFSP, so there is a general argument in favor of

retaining them in SSD, relieving SAFSP of an administrative

burden and treating him as any other customer. In this case

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of the THOR and the services of the 6595th, there appears to

be no strong counter-argument; service to SAFSP has been good,

and the interfaces have not been troublesome.

Interfaces with the AGENA-D an the 6594th are more complex,

and have not been without their problems. Furthermore, SAFSP

represents 757. of the world market for AGENA-D's, although only

30% go to CORONA, and buys over 90% of the services now provided

by the 6594th. My present recommendation is to examine further

the possible transfer of AGENA-D to SAFSP, although the Chart

shows it as GFE to him, and to leave the 6594th in state sm.

One reason for the latter is that you have directed the Air Force

to incorporate the services and facilities of the 6594th more

closely into the national ranges.

Recommended Contracting and Policy

To realize the objectives toward which this proposal is

directed, the new CORONA program office must have administrative

control over contracts that cover all of the functions now under

contract to the project from LMSC, ITEK, GE, and other associates.

Other functions must be added. In addition, the contractual

arrangements with IMSC can certainly be simplified.

I consider it above question that MSC should continue to

be the integrating contractor. I propose that the contract or

contracts with EMSC include but not be limited to the following

terms and general items of work:

Comprehensive systems engineering of the whole CORONA

system and its operation, including the establishment of

performance and reliability standards for all elements, and of

test and launch procedures.

SAFSP will be the point of contact for the Government.

Technical direction, including that arising from the systems

engineering, will be approved and promulgated by SAFSP or by

his designated representative. DIAXX-3A CONTROLLED

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Detailed engineering of the AGENA-D and of its

program-peculiar modifications.

Detailed engineering of the substructure integrating

AGENA, payload, and re-entry vehicle.

Fabrication and test of the modified AGENA-D and of

the- integrating substructure, and the integration thereof into

the system.

It will be specified contractually that engineering

efforts judged by the GOvernment to be directed toward major

changes in the system will not be permitted except by separate

contract or contract change that is specific to the change in

question.

In setting up these contracts, I will review . all work

statements before final negotiation. I believe that it will

be. possible to write contracts with MSC in such a way that

the bulk of the money will be put on incentive contracts in

Which fee will be determined by performance on orbit. This

will certainly not be possible under the present diffuse structure.

I believe further that the tight controls implied by items (b)

and (f) will save more engineering effort than will be required

to support the enlarged scope implied by (a), resulting in a

net saving to the Government. There is no question in my mind

that better technical performance will result.

My general operating policy will be to delegate responsibility

to SAFSP for day-to-day CORONA operations in response to USIB

requirements as transmitted to him from DNRO, holding him

personally responsible for the success of each mission, and

for the performance of all contractors. He would be authorized

to make only such changes in the system as were in his judgment

minor in scope and necessary under his responsibilities. In

the exercise of this judgment he would be accountable to DNRO.

Major changes in the system would not be undertaken without

specific authorization from DNRO. He would be expected to

recommend to DNRO any actions he felt were required for the

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success of the system that were not within the scope of his

assigned authority. He would be expected to set up, as Chart II

suggests, such controls and inspections at contractor's plants

as he felt necessary to the discharge of his responsibilities.

Initiating the Improvements

All the authority I need to bring about the situation just

described is explicitly assigned to me by the NRO Agreement of

13 March 1963 (See attachment 1). As a first simple step in

the direction of Chart II, I have. already. proposed transferring

the CORONA contracts now held at Langley, Virginia, to a CIA

contracting officer attached to RAFSP, so that .they could be.

administered in the same way as the systems engineering contract

now is. This proposal has not yet been approved by the DCI,

and I am presently under injunction from him to maintain the

status quo.

I am of course continuing to plan the details of a

centralized management along the lines of Chart II. Most of

the relevant contracts lapse with the fiscal year; if they are

to be followed by well-negotiated but different ones, planning

must soon be replaced by action. I propose to continue working

in this direction.

Immediate Actions

Meanwhile, unfortunately, the program continues to flounder.

I feel that I must personally assume close enough day-to-day

control to stabilize the configuration in a sensible way and

to establish clear-cut and meaningful priorities and engineering

objectives. There is no question that I have the authority to

do this; I bring the specific proposed actions to your attention

for three reasons:

First, evidence from other actions I have recently taken

suggests that the staff of the DCI may consider that any new

actions are in violation of his request not to disturb the

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status quo. I therefore expect to be discussing these proposals

with the DCI as the time comes to put them into effect.

Second, should the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board at their January 30 meeting quiz me, as they sometimes do,

on my efforts to improve the record of CORONA performance, I

would like to cite some specific actions.

Third, I would like to emphasize that I do not consider

these steps as substitutes for the kind of basic clean-up of the

CORONA management that I have proposed. They are a natural

sequel to my recent review of the project, in my judgment

urgently needed at the present time if I am properly to discharge

my responsibilities.

The actions in question are

Instruct the 162 Program Office via the covert channel

through SAFSP that henceforth all technical directives, after

approved by the CCB, will be reviewed by me before - they are

signed by the 162 Program Director and transmitted to the contracting officers and the contractors. This -is an administrative

step which can be taken without change to the procedures as they

are defined by contract.

Direct the NRO Staff that I be kept informed, on a

timely basis, by the NRO staff representative on the CCB, of

all matters that come before the CCB. This action is entirely

internal to my staff.

3. Establish monthly technical project reviews under my

chairmanship. Responsibility for arranging the agenda will be

retained within the NRO Staff.

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4. Hold performance reviews under my chairmanship after

each mission, to be attended by responsible representatives of

all responsible offices and contractors, with agenda to be set

up by the NRO Staff.

•

Brockway

Director -3A CONTROLLED

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EXCERPT PROM MARCH 13, 1963 AGREEMENT

IV. Authorities

The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection

with his assigned responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance

Program, shall be authorized to:

Organize, staff and supervise the National Reconnaissance

Office.

Establish, manage and conduct the National Reconnaissance

Program.

Assign all project tasks such as technical management,

contracting, etc., to appropriate elements of the DoD and the CIA,

changing such assignments, and taking any such steps he may

determine necessary to the efficient management of the NRP.

Issue appropriate instructions and procedures implementing this agreement.

• -74

Attachment No. 1

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CONTROLLED
MAJOR OFFICES INVOLVED IN CORONA

1. SAFSP (Secretary Air Force Special Projects). This is

an office situated in the AF Space Systems Division (SSD) complex

at El Segundo, California. It is headed by Major General

Robert E. Greer, who reports directly to DNRO. Within the NRO,

SAFSP is Director, Program A. He has a small staff who report

directly to him, augmented by people detailed to him from SSD.

He is Deputy Commander, SSD, for Satellite Systems, and exercises

overt authority in this capacity over elements of SSD.

There is a CIA contracting officer detailed to SAFSP

for handling certain CIA contracts in such a way that SAFSP

effectively has administrative control over them. The particular

contract of interest here is one with IMSC which provides for

systems engineering integrating R/V, P/L, and structure with

the modified AGENA-D. This is a rather central contract known

as SE1928.

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I162 Program Office. This is an office within SSD, first

set up as a cover for the CORONA program. By written covert

r-• agreement with the Commander, SSD, SAFSP has direct control of

this office; the relationship is covert. This office has

responsibility for the modifications of the AGENA-D into its

s.. CORONA and mission-peculiar configuration. This modification

n. is accomplished by LMSC under a contract that provides for

engineering, fabrication, and test, and provides also for

systems engineering to integrate the modified AGENA into the

whole system, including integration of the launch pad and

check-out procedures. This contract resides in a 162 project

r. office in LMSC which is supported by many functional elements

of U(SC.

AGENA-D Program Office. This is an office in SSD over

which SAFSP has only the control implied by his Deputy Commander

position in SSD. This office is responsible for procurement r

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of AGENA D's for all users. More specifically the office

assembles requirement forecasts from all users, including SAFSP,

and forwards these and recommended procurement schedules through

AFSC channels to Headquarters, USAF. Approved production rates

and procurement policies are returned through channels, for

implementation by the Office.

This Office administers, in the standard Air Force format, .

two major contracts with LMSC, one for fabrication, test, and

delivery to the Government of AGENA D's, and the other for launch

services to all users of these AGENAs, as well as launch services

from IMSC which are peculiar to the CORONA system. The firstmentioned contract includes the engineering needed for quality

assurance, for minor product improvements, and major system changes.

No distinction is made contractually among these engineering

elements, but the Office does exercise control over changes in

the AGENA, and coordinates these with all users.

THOR Booster Office. This office is responsible for

supplying THOR boosters, in a manner exactly analogous to that

just described in connection with the AGENA D. The THOR booster

is a key element of the CORONA system, but it is sufficiently

mature and isolated from the rest that technical interfaces have

not been a problem.

Director, NRO Program B. This is Colonel Jack Ledford

of the CIA, who appears in that organization as head of the Office

of Special Activities. This office is responsible for virtually

all NRO activities in the CIA; it reports to the Director of Central

Intelligence through the Deputy Director for Science and Technology,

Dr. Wheelon, who is also the official monitor of the NRO for the

DCI.

Under Colonel Ledford, and resident in Langley, Virginia,

is a CIA contracting officer who handles several CORONA contracts.

Two major ones are of interest here. One is with ITEIC for

engineering, fabrication, test, and launch services on the primary

payload. The other relates to activities at a covert IMSC facility,

the so-called Advanced Projects (AUP) facility near Sunnyvale.

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Colonel Ledford has two representatives, a Camel Murphy

and his assistant, resident at A/P. Their defined duties

are in connection with operational matters, but they do

informally monitor the activities'of the contractors at A/P.

MSC is the principal contractor at A/P. Two

contracts cover their efforts here; the one just mentioned,

that is held in Program B, covers engineering, fabrication,

and test of the substructure that carries the payload and

reentry vehicle and'unites them with the modified AGENA D,

plus engineering and fabrication of the recovery system and

of certain elements of the reentry system, 'plus check-out of

the payload/recovery system exclusive of certain critical

tests conducted by associate contractors.

The other LMSC activity at A/P is covered by the

systems engineering contract SE1928, mentioned earlier. The

principal payload contractor, ITEK, has a small contingent

at A/P, as do other associates.

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