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28 AUG 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FUBDU

Further to our discumion an 27 August concerning the

question of the basic nature at the NRO as an organbation, I have

extracted the attached comments from a memorandum for record

and forward them for whatever help they may be in your present

discussions. These comments were prepared by Dr. Charyk just

prior to his departure, 'and reflect the orgmbational philosophy

under which all NRO actions have been taken op to the time of his

departure. In addition, they show his reconuneedations for farther

revision of the 2 May 1962 DCO-CIA Agreenwmt to clarify the basic

NEC charter in this regard.

• You will note that the 13 March 1963 Agreement, while falling

somewhat short of his recommendations, nevertheless did go a long

way toward clarifying the NRO as a line, operating orpnination,

although, as he points out, all NRO orgimising and bnictioning under

the previous agreement 01.2 May 1962 was carried out an this name

basis.

If there is to be a further revision to the 13 March 1963 . •

Agreement, I suggest that the following sentence from Dr. Charykla

recommendations be taken as a guide:

"It would seem, therefore that in the process of .:.

revision of the Agreement, clarity should be preferred to • ,.:

diplomacy, and the major, questions which have arisen in

the course of operating under the present Agreemont :.:41.: ... • should be dealt with clearly and unequivocally in enough AV.

'..1r! detail to insure understanding by all concerned." 421 .....4

-aloud • s.

1 Atch Join L. Martin, Jr.

comments Brigadier General, USAF

Director, NRO Staff

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liaLuM FROM AV:O.:171C : Coati! DOD Da. 3200.20 DOSS NOT A—i PPY Liop4E6 Dontrol ye e '63
Excerpt' from views and recosintendatioos of Dr. Joseph V. Charyk swiktimewlognsmirata is

(Prom an , 12 Mar 80 .

"PROBLEMS

"A review at the experience to date indicates that there are

several outstanding problems which sequin resolution. It Is believed

essential to insure that they are resolved in the establishment of the

new charter for the orgemiation which is now to preparation. The

critical problem areas can be summarised as follows:

"a. There appears to haw been misunderstanding or minister.

pretation in some quarters as to the fundamental nature of the NRO.

Specilicelly, the question is Whether the office is an operating agency

with direct management resposeibility for a single national program or

whether itis: function is as a coordinating office responsible far liaison

and coordination between related Prolects which are the managemeol .s.

responsibility of various agencies and departments.

"I have operated on the basis that the former arrowsmeat is the correct one. In order for this function to be properly

exercised, it is essential tint the DNRO have available to him all of

the management tools necessary for the accomplishment of the respond- .. Wily. A critical missing element has been the direct control or • . •

funds for the entire program. Without control over the allocation and

redistribution of funds as dictated by program and requirement con- .• • '

alder:Mons, it is my judgment that the responsibility cannot be • •

effective/7 discharged.

..

"fl appears clear that the office has always been envisaged • as an operating agency. I is clearly reflected in the various DOD •• charter documents supporting the basic CIA-DOD Agreement of 3 Mq'

1982. It was outlined in detail by the DNRO in the NRO orgiudsationtd

conference in late May 1962 and included in the organisation policy • '

statement of 23 July 1962 issued to the NRO program directors and the

Director of the NRO Staff. The position may be stated as follows: • ;:

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"Within the limits Of applicable public law, within

the proms at the CIA-DOD Agreement c12 My 1962,

and subject to the geldsone he receives from the Director

of Central Intelligence at the Secretary of Defense, the

Director of the NRO is responsible for the actual managemeat of all projects at the National Recospaissame Program

and has the authority to carry out this task without the necessity at reachieg agreement as each sad every aspect of the

management @dims lambed. /a the CIA, ender the terms

of the 2 May Agreement, the respeosibility of the Deputy

Director (Research) in mein that the terms of the Agreement are carried at within the CIA simian* includes the

responsibility to see that the instructions and directions of

the Director of the NRO are carried out. Within the DOD,

the authority of the Director is ca ptained in DOD Directive

TS 5105.23, dated 14 me 1962.

"The agreement reached in the organisational conference in

late May 1912 and confirmed in the 23 Jul 1962 memorandum, cleart,

spells out that the DNRO has direct management responsibility for all

elements of the program. The specific program respansibilities are

divided between several program directors. In the absence ci the

DNRO, each of these directors is responsible for. decisions In his

pram area. In every sense therefore, the program directors are

deputy directors of the NRO for their own program areas.

"Despite the basic CIA-DOD Agreement, the agreement at the

organisational conference and the basic organissatiansl documents, •

this arrangement has never been accepted by the Deputy Director

(Research), CIA. Rather than seeking a resolution of his cancers

through proper channels and arriving at a new agreement with accompanying revised organisational documents, the apparent procedure has

been one of resisting the "motioning of the orpaisation slang the lines

established in the basic Agreement and in the organisational documents.

This is a fundamental point which requires clarification.

"Effective iroplementation of decisions affecting Agency

activities has ban difficult, if not impassible, if the Deputy Director .• .

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... (Research) was not completely sympathetic to the action proposed.

.... The direct management responsibility of the DNRO over CIA activities .-.. needs to be re-examined.

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"It is significantto note that although the DOD elements of the

NRO have undergone rather drastic chanps, no substantial change

from pre-NRO procedures has been effected in the CIA except possibly •

in the writing of security policy and the =tension at a few communications links. Completely harmonious and effective tutor-actions

between the NBA, DIA, Army, Nam and Air Force exist. Efforts to

mold the CIA activities into a unified program have been resisted

vigorously. The apparent concept has been one of comddering the DNRO

as a coordinating official but not as one having direct operational

authority over CIA programs.

* * •

"RECOMMENDATIONS 

"It should be noted that although the problems currently facing

the NRO originated some time ago, they have not prevented substantial

accomplishment. However, it should be noted also that these problems

have become acute only recently, with the impasse reached in late

December 1962 and early January 1963. That these difficulties most

be resolved promptly in order to prevent serious degradation is evident.

"Experience to date would suggest that two steps are required.

The basic CIA-DOD Agreement and related NRO charter documents

should be revised to clarify the desired nature of the NRO and the

responsibility and authority of the Director of the NRO. In additico, • •

measures should be taken to establish and support the internal organisetional discipline essential to the repair of the present difficulties and

the continuance of a high degree of effectiveness. Each of these steps

should include certain specific provisions which are outlined separately

below.

year. The numerous drafts of proposed agreements which preceded the

2 May 1962 Agreement, the many discussions required to reach this • . 1

Agreement, the repeated refinement of phraseology which vas necessary/ •

and the extended time period required for completion of this process

would suggest the presence of semantic masks in the final document;

"a. In regard to the revision, it should be noted that •

the present Agreement, while indicative of apparent harmony in May

1962, has proven inadequate as a charter in little more than half a

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subsequent experience has verified the presence of two types. The

first is phraseology sufficient/g Ibudble to cover different points of

view, representing agreement not reached in actuality and requiring

only a matter of time to produce problems. The additional we of

vague and generalised language to deserbe the sesponsibilitles and

infer the authority of the Director also gives the Ash= of apparent

agreement to matters shown by subsequent experience to be unsettled.

It would seem, therefore, that in the process of revision of the

Agreement, clarity should be preferred to diplomacy, and the major

questions which have arisen in the came of operation under the

present Agreement should be dealt with clear* and unequivocally in

enough detail to insure understanding by all concerns& la particular,

the following points should be included:

V) The revised Agreement should reaffirm and

clarify that the NRO is intended to be an operating agency, with actual

management responsibility for all projects of the National Recannids• , •

Bence Program, rather than a mechanism of coordination between

agencies separately responsible for parts of tide Program.

. .

. • "b. Recognition must be given to the fact that revision of the -•

CIA-DOD Agreement is a necessary but insufficient condition to resolve .

the problems facing the NRO. In addition to a clear charter, effective

management of such a joint office requires the continued support of the . • Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense in order • •.

that the Director of the NRO may establish and maintain essential , . •

internal office discipline. Since the Director is from the Department . • •• of Defense, the main burden for this support falls upon the Director . • • of Central Intelligence.

"In particular, each of these officials should deal directly

with the Director of the NRO for all NRO matters rather than through :

intermediate NRO personnel of their respective agencies. This is ". .

fimclamental to the maintenance of internal NRO organisational discipline. • .

"The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of

Defense also should take appropriate action from time to time to

support the thesis that the projects of the National Reconnaissance

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Program are *either CIA or DOD projects, they sr* NRO projects,

pert of a single aatiosal program, elements at which are supported by

the resources of the CIA sad the several Services of the DOD."

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