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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D C 11111111111,111118

• OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 21 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HALL, ASD (I)

SUBJECT: NRO Reorganization

The DCI's proposal for the reorganization of the intelligence community of 13 October 1975 identified the National

Reconnaissance Program (NRP) among other specific problem

areas. The report referred to the NRO as being ". . . an

anomalous patchwork originally constituted in a period of

bureaucratic strife." These words were also used in Annex C

which dealt with the history, present capability, and options

for reorganization. I believe that the descriptions tend to

over-dramatize the somewhat strained relationships between

DoD and CIA which existed at the time when the NRO was organized to meet the specific need of developi4 reconnaissance

satellites.

Based on my experience working for the NRO as a contractor,

and in these two years as the DNRO, I agree that the organization suffers from the degrees of compromise that were necessary

in its founding. However, this problem notwitstanding, I believe

the NRO is one of the best run development organizations in our

government. This happy circumstance results from two basic fac

tors provided for in the original incorporation, namely: streamline management and a dedicated group of individuals with provisior

for longevity in assignments.

The CIA study identified an alternative organization for

the NRO (page 78). Here, they propose an integrated operational

organization jointly staffed by elements of the DoD and CIA and

headed by a DNRO with line responsibility (essentially the same

responsibilities as at present). This organization would be

analogous to NSA and, armed with an appropriate NSCID, could

provide for streamline management and tight program direction.

This organization would be effective in dealing with Congress

on the matter of programs and resources, and with the many military and non-military customers for its output data. They pose

a problem, however, relative to where the organization . would

report.

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On the basis of some consideration within the NRO. I

have concluded that the reorganization of the NRO could be

patterned after NSA and that internal program simplifications

could be effected in the interest of efficiency.' In view of

the increasing interest by the military services in the output

data of its acquisition programs, I believe the organization

could report effectively to the SecDef. The difficult part in

such considerations is maintaining the critical provision of

streamline management and proper personnel policies. Attachment A provides our first thoughts on guidelines for the

reorganization...
ATTACHMENT A

A RECAST OF THE NRO

In order for an NRO mechanism to be useful, several

essential elements must be embodied in the structure.

SINGLE RESPONSIBILITY

An NRO should have single governmental responsibility

for reconnaissance satellite development, acquisition and onorbit operation. It should be located in the Washington, D.C.

area for the maintenance of close contact with the intelligence

community, resource managers and the Congress.

UNAMBIGUOUS REQUIREMENTS 

An NRO should be divorced from the requirements

mechanism and the tasking authority insofar as influencing

the process. On the other hand, there should be a single

manager (individual or properly constituted board) to provide

requirements for the organization to satisfy.

FENCED BUDGET

An NRP should be established at the Executive level

based on desired objectives. An NRO should maintain direct

relationships with the Congress and maintain internal flexibility for reprogramming monies within the authorized budget.

STREAMLINED DECISION MAKING 

An NRO should be responsive to a single high level

chain of command for its programs and budget. The Director

of the reconnaissance satellite program should be the authority

to make day-to-day resource decisions and call upon the chain

of command as necessary. The Director should have total control over the operation of the field organizations and the

contracting mechanism.

LIMITED REVIEW

To assure streamlined management, the normal review

process should be replaced by a special review cycle so that

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the normal bureaucracy does not interfere with the program

activities. On the other hand, sufficient review should be

provided at the higher levels to assure that the prograd is

responsive to the requirements.

END-TO-END CONTRACTING 

• An NRO should contract for the total reconnaissance

satellite system from concept development through on-orbit

operation and ultimate failure. Special reporting procedures

should be incorporated in the contract mechanism. Favorable

contractor relationships should be maintained.

MINIMUM MANNING 

An NRO should be kept small and low profile in its

activities. Manning should be stabilized below the Director

level to afford continuity. The organization should be nonservice/CIA oriented and provide balance between the services

and the intelligence agencies. Emphasis should be focused on

maintaining a streamlined SPO concept. Field organizations

should be non-service/CIA oriented and should provide strong

R&D, system engineering and contracting capabilities. Manning

for collection operation incorporated in the intelligence

agencies as opposed to the NRO.

SELF POLICING 

An NRO should be responsive for internal controls

over its operations and should call upon conventional audit

or inspection agencies as required under the discretion of the

program Director. Special controls for audit and inspection

should be maintained.

SECURITY

A strong security system should be maintained in

order to afford minimum program visibility to those outside

the resource and user areas. A strict need-to-know association

with the program should be emphasized to protect sensitive

technology for extended periods of time and to afford management efficiencies.

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