ADMINISTRATION 

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ASSIST ANT SECRET ARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301 

July 11, 1969 

The Honorable John E. McLucas 

Under Secretary of the Air Force 

Dear John: 

Attached is my interim report to Mel and Dave on 

Defense intelligence, 

Hopefully, I have addressed all of the major issues 

- -and in a manner which is satisfactory to you. On the 

small chance that there is some disagreement, give me 

a call and I'll be very happy to discuss the report with 

you. 

If I don't hear from you by July 21, I'll assume 

agreement or disinterest. I'll accept either, and assume 

the former. 

Sincerely, 

Robert F, Froehlke 

Attachment 

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v<w, 11 .J-- r · -e,-VC i)· • rJf,f'. Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence 

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11 July 1969 

,j·/l ~ .· rl' Introduction 

iJ μ.1 'Afrr-1 . 1 ~ ·,r? A number of weeks ago I was appointed focal point for the defense 

jc intelligence community. In addition I was assigned to make a study of 

the community and present to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of 

Defense my recommendations to improve defense intelligence. 

It was my feeling that it would be unwise to insinuate myself into 

the defense intelligence community as a "focal point" for a short interim 

period. As a result, I have done very little in the capacity of a focal 

point. Instead all of my time on this assignment has been spent on the 

study. 

My effort has extended over approximately a 60 day period. In that 

time I have reviewed many studies and reports that have accumulated 

over the years. More importantly, I have visited all agencies and have 

talked to most of the leaders active in the intelligence community. As 

a result of my efforts I feel that I have a reasonably good understanding 

of the intelligence community as it now exists, its problems and possible 

solutions. (I was surprised to find that there was a reasonable consensus 

as to the problem areas and their solutions. ) 

Today Mel Laird and Dave Packard will receive a copy of this tentative report. I am also sending a copy to all agencies visited and to individuals with whom I talked. I am asking these people to react to my 

recommendations. If I do not hear from them within ten days, I am 

assuming general agreement. 

Those who receive a of this rei- :::.,nd lisagree in whole or 

in part, should get in t( h me. I wi1.. ,1 with those in disagreement and eithe ,y report in · £, their thinking or 

explain to them wh ,o so. In the latter case, they certainly are 

free to contact Me1 e directly. I will not discuss this report with 

Mel and Dave i:,rio c 01.- .:..t. July., 

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As a result of my investigation I have concluded that the primary 

need in the defense intelligence community is for a special assistant 

£or intelligence reporting to the Secretary/ Deputy Secretary 0£ Defense. 

He would be primarily responsible for the development and supervision 

of an all-encompassing review and decision-making process for the 

management of intelligence. This need has been recognized by many 

over the years. . --··-·-

A limited focal point was established as early as 1953, when the 

Secretary of Defense established the position of Assistant to the Secretary 

of Defense (Special Operations). This Assistant recommended policies 

and provided guidance on planning and program development to DoD 

intelligence agencies and components,. reviewed plans and programs, 

developed DoD positions on intelligence problems, and made recommendations to the Secretary on the actions necessary to provide for more 

efficient and economical operations. The position, however, was 

weakened by the lack of a charter to function as the focal point for DoD 

intelligence resource management. 

In 1960, a Presidential Task Force, chaired t>y Lyman Kirkpatrick, 

was directed to study the organizational and management aspects of the 

intelligence community. The Task Force recommended the establishment 

of a focal point to exercise broad management review authority over military intelligence programs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

and to provide overall coordination of all foreign intelligence activities 

conducted by various defense components. The solution was the Defense 

Intelligence A·gency (DIA). The DoD press release of 2 August 1961, 

announcing the establishment of DIA, stated that a "more efficient 

allocation of critical intelligence resources, more effective management 

of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of duplicating 

facilities and organizations" was expected. The position of Assistant for 

Special Operations was disestablished concurrently with the establishment 

of DIA. 

Today, under the umbrella of the Consolidate., lntelligence Program 

(CIP), the DIA "manages" only about 30% of the DoD resources devoted 

to satisfying both military ,_d "national" intell · ,- .a requirements. The 

bulk of the resources are ·_nd in a number of c,.:.1.c:~· programs such as 

the Consolidated Crypto:...,~·· Program (CCP), or are treated -.:,utside any 

formal program. 

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The Secretary of Defense is faced with the problem that there is 

no review which compares the resources in one program targeted 

against a requirement with the resources committed against _the same 

requirement in another program. Similarly, there is no arrangement 

for evaluating requirements in terms of objectives. In addition, this 

situation has been complicated by excessive classification a.nd security 

compartmentation, which tend to isolate programs and thwart comparisons. 

Objectives 

Any organizational or personnel changes resulting from this report 

should be made to achieve the following objectives listed in priority. 

(You will notice that these objectives are primarily aimed at resource 

management and intelligence policies, and not management of intelligence 

_ , ___ ..operations-of a day t0·daf natur~~-- This does not imply that the management of the intelligence community is flawless. On the contrary, there 

is substantial dissatisfaction with certain operations of defense intelligence. However, improved management can better result through improved 

personnel and policies rather than a new organization. ) The objectives are: 

Objective l. Jo establish a review and decision-making 

.E_rocess for intelligence resource allocation. By resource 

allocation I mean determining the level and mix of resources 

to be distributed among the components of the DoD as the 

~ W-C-. ~ for the DoD budget. There are inseparable reinforcing 

wflP ~ objectives which are essential elements of this overall 

.-..+-.... ~ 1 Objective. These inherent objectives are: ' ( l} To establish 

~---' a single Consolidated Defense Intelligence Pro ram P} 

as e ramework within which D · · n-makers can 

_/ se ect the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, 

_ / processing, prodycing. and disseminating intelligence; (2) 

~- \to-improve Defense intelligence resources allocation planning 

. for the. mid-range period by establishing a Five-Year Intelligence Plan updated annually; and ( 3) to focus attention on 

decisive points in this program by developing major issue 

studies on unresolved problems of intelligence resource 

allocation and management. 

Existing DoD intelligence resource programs (GIP, 

· CCP, and others) are institutionalized and not evaluated 

in relation to r.:11 --,_ a.l ta:i;get objectives or in terms of missionoriented inforn ,)n needs. Thus, decisions made concerning 

I /_ resources in on -nctional intelligence activity - - collection, 

~ for example -- seldom take cognizance of their impact on the 

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other functional areas: processing, production and dissemination. 

The DoD intelligence community at the present time 

es not know the minimum level of information that will 

1-J isfy a stated requirement. While there is no upper 

I ..J- \':.;._ boundary on intelligence requirements, there is a limit on 

~ ~ resources applied to collection. Therefore, resource 

~l.)n,p .. - limitations make it important to ascertain requirements as 

~" -t;t,d. precisely as possible. We need to insure that all valid re-

~ 

~~ quirements are met to some minimum level, without going 

to higher levels' on some requirements while ignoring other 

ltA,J..~ valid requirements. In other words, the risks involved in 

~•iE~ acceptance of reduced or alternate levels of efforts must be 

~-, known. 

The focus of intelligence planning and programming 

activities tends to be in the near term period (one or two 

years ahead). Long lead times for moder,n technical 

collection systems, automated processing systems and 

automated analytic and production aids create the need to 

develop a long ter'm intelligence plan. Without such planning, 

intelligence decisions rely on short term considerations. ~ 

Further, there is a tendency to develop options made avail- \tc,,'\,""""""' 

able by rapidly expanding technology simply because they are ~ ~ 

available. t{.._ 

~ In the present programming process, recommendations 

. :·:f:~I reaching the Secretary and Deputy Secretary show fluctuations 

/\!'4'- ~ \ in manpower and money from previously approved levels but 

~t_V- ~ more significant issues do not tend to surface within DoD. 

Frequently, past decisions on elements or systems having 

(1/1""' (o°1--~ high dollar value or significant ramifications in a functional 

area have been reached through the mechanism of ad hoc groups 

convened by the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense to study 

each problem when it _ ."ises - - generally in a time frame which 

does not permit in-de::::,r:n analysis. 

Objective 2. To improve information flow and policy transmission on intelligence matters between the DoD and ot,h.er 

government a encies concerned with intelli ence resources 

by unctioning as DoD focal point on intelligence matters. ~ . 

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Currently, below the Secretary/ Deputy Secretary 

of Defense level, no single agency or individual has the 

authority to participate across the board in an effective 

dialogue at the highest levels with non-DoD agencies, 

resentation today is fragmented among a number of 

/ ntelligence officials none of whom possesses the 

,;..-- necessary responsibility or breadth of knowledge about 

all _DoD programs. '---....,. 

The U.S. Congress and other government agencies 

have been concerned that the military Services are performing functions specifically delegated to the DIA which, 

in turn, is performing operations which, in some instances, 

could be better undertaken by the military Services. 

Additionally, the relationship of the National Security 

Agency (NSA), to counterpart agencies in the military 

Services has been questioned. The institutional structure 

of the Defense intelligence community is the result of an 

evolution,ary process which seldom addressed the interrelationships of the elements in the community as a whole. 

Objective 4. I,o improve intelligence flow by a u·.listic 

reappraisal of security policies and procedures with a.. 

toward relaxing standards which lead to unneces sar 

e 

i 

Dialogue between the participants in DoD intelligence 

programs is restricted to such a degree that at times those 

officials charged with reviewing existing programs are 

denied information essential to the formulation of recommendations for their particular programs. 

Organ°· ;-ion and Staffing 

The primary organizatH..n,al change I recommend is to name one 

individual to act as the. Special Assistant to the Secretary/ Deputy 

·-·---"Secrefaryof .. Defense for defense intelligence and to provide him with 

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a minimum staff. The solution to our current problems in intelligence/ 

management will not be found in the panacea of mass reorganization/~ 

Directors of all DoD intelligence agencies would report directly 

to this Special Assistant, except that the Director, DIA, would report 

through the JCS. The Special Assistant would be responsible for all 

DoD intelligence management. It should be stressed, however, that 

resource management has the top priority. It is not intended that the 

Special Assistant will become involved in the day to day operations 

of the various DoD intelligence agencies. 

\ 

I recommend that the individual selected as the Special Assistant, \~~ as a management technique, informally create a DoDintelligence Board. I \)OV 

This Board should be made up of the Directors of the various DoD 

intelligence agencies, chaired by the Special Assistant. In a sense, 

therefore, the Special Assistant will primarily serve as the coordinator ~ 

of the Board. Ideally that is all he would need to be. 

Inasmuch as this is an imperfect world, there will be times when th 

Board will not reach a consensus. For that reason the Special Assistant 

must have the authoritY. ,,_ot on! ~ but l.so direct. ) -\; (1,\f,. 

he~:;. 

4

,;,\nagement pos si biliti es s}~ia Assistant ~,.J.. 

ranges from a monitoring role to complete and close supervision of all . ~ 

DoD intelligence activities. There are, of course, intermediate possi- ;/' J..t. 

bilities between these two extremes. A series of alternatives are herein j\l't,t~' 

described which provide varying levels of capability to achieve the objectives outlined. Under any of these arrangements, however, the function 

of the Special Assistant would interface with operational aspects of intelligence conducted by the various DoD components. Existing channels 

of command and control would be used for direction of operational r:qatters. 

d;,-~ 1taffin;!:r::: 

Three alternatives to 1)r-ovide staff support to the Special Assistant 

have been considered: 

Alternative 1. Provide a nucleus of intelE •·• e expertise 

for the Special Assistant, leaving currently :,igned responsibilities of OSD elements essentially as fr:c d.re now. It 

is estimated that it wourd require five profo:;sionals and two 

clerical spaces for this staff. 

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Alternative 2. Transfer professional positions and the 

necessary clerical support currently dealing with intelligence resource management from OSD offices to 

the office of the Special Assistant. The objective would 

be to consolidate a number of existing OSD intelligence 

management activities in one office. The transfer of 

positions might be accomplished as follows. · (This does 

not necessarily mean incumbents would .transfer with 

the position): 

ASD (A) 

DIA 

DDR&E 1 s Office of Special 

3 

5 

Intelligence 4 

ASD (SA) 2 

14 

Alternative 3. Enlarge the proposed intelligence staff 

to a level at which it would be capable of performing, on 

a totally centralized basis, the full range of intelligence 

resource management functions: development and ranking 

of requiful.ents, mid-range planning, program and budget 

development, and review of intelligence issues. While a 

detailed analysis of personnel requirements has not been 

made, it is estimated that it would take about 150-200 

professionals to accomplish these functions. 

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In determining which staffing Alternative to recommend, I considered 

each in light of the objectives listed earlier: 

Objective 1. (Establish a review and decision-making 

process for intelligen:c:1t~~agement. ) 

The Special Assistant and his staff would have to establish and conduct an objective·-oriented Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program 

.(CDIP) which would encompasE_all DoD managed intelligence resources 

(probably excluding tactical); establish a Five-Year Intelligence Plan to 

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improve intelligence resource allocation planning for the mid-range 

period; and formulate major is sues of intelligence resources allocation 

and management. 

Initially it will take a considerable number of man years to achieve 

this objective. I do not think the staff should be set up for the initial 

surge of personnel needs. This initial surge could be met on an ad hoc 

bas:i.s from within OSD. 

This is the highest priority Objective. Presently it is not being met. 

Decision makers need a framework for selecting alternative options and 

corresponding levels of effort. Establishing a CDIP to provide this framework, and conducting an annual review has primary claim on manpower 

assigned to the Special Assistant. (The Directors of the DoD intelligence 

agencies will be directly responsible for the development of their respective 

programs.) If the Special Assistant is undermanned for the CDIP, work 

will have to be processed by cooperating agencies and departments with 

attendant loss of control. 

The Five-Year Intelligence Plan will strive: (1) to permit resource 

allocation decisions to be made as early as possible, especially for long 

lead-time items; (2) to explore the adequacy of resources to meet future 

needs; (3) to present the costs and benefits of satisfying various levels. 

of intelligence needs, and (4) to understand better the resource impltcations of satisfying various future requirements. · 

A major factor in the development of the Plan is the requirement to 

establish a continuing system for review of intelligence collection requirements against collection resources~ taking into account costs and 

risks. No means exist at present for accomplishing this, since there is 

no measure of value for levels of information. No one knows how much 

information is essential and we have only sketchy estimates of what it 

costs to obtain the information. (This problem has been recognized for 

some time. DIA has an analysis underw,.J ·which, hopefully, will 

structure a solution to this problem. Oth-c·:.:· efforts are under way to help 

solve this problem. ) 

The formulation of major issues is closely tied to the preceding 

objectives, and much of it can be accomplished in the process of gaining 

those objectives. Formulating, major issues has never been attempted 

successfully in the DoD intelligence community. It is, however, 

necessary in order to determine the proper courses to follow. 

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This Objective could be accomplished by either of the three staffing 

Alternatives. However, if Alternative I (the minimum staff) were 

selected, the Special Assistant would operate principally as a monitor, 

with the major effort fragmented among DoD agencies. 

Objective 2. (Improve intelligence communications 

between DoD and other agencies. ) ~~ It is envisioned that the Special Assistant would act as the DoD ~.1.r 

intelligence management contact with DCI, BOB, PFIAB and other non- {'J!"y_ .,. 11 

DoD members of the intelligence community. One of the less obvious ,.;,\[V""' 

responsibilities would be to keep communication channels open at all ~ times, unimpeded by a lack of rapport and understanding. 

Any one of the three staffing Alternatives could satisfy this 

Objective. 

Objective 3. (Evaluate the intelligence organizational 

relationship, roles and missions. ) 

It appears that this could best be accomplished by an Ad Hoc study 

group. (The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel appears to be a likely candidate). 

,As a result, this could be accomplished under any of the Alternatives. 

Objective 4. (Re-appraise security policies and eliminate 

unnecessary classification and over compartmentation in 

the intelligence field.) 

This Objective would necessitate a review of current security policies 

and procedures. It is a continuing effort because of the ever-present 

tendency to overclassify and overdo compartmentation. 

There is a distinct feeling in the community that over-classification 

and over-compartmentaLon .exists. It is a natu:ral tendency and I observed 

evidence of it. If it is : · -esent in any signific:c_i:·~ .iegree, it certainly is 

bad because over-c: cs ~ification impedes ·c.-,, flow of information and overcompartmentation c::xcludes agencies and individuals who may ,have a 

legitimate need for the information . 

.. Both-Alternatives 2 and 3-(the middle and maximum staffing Alternatives) 

could accomplish this Objective. Alternative I (the minimum staffing Alternative) could not accomplish it unless the function was farmed out to other 

OSD elements. 

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Recommendation-Staff 

The· primary advantage of Alternative 1 (minimum staff) is that it 

requires a minimum number of people under the Special Assistant. 

Cosmetically, this is advantageous. 

The primary disadvantage of Alternative 1 is that it would be impossible for the Special Assistant to achieve the stated Objectives without relying almost entirely on a number of other elements in DoD. This 

raises the distinct possibility of the Special Assistant having the image 

of responsibility but not the ability to carry it out. 

Alternative 2 (the middle staff) has the advantage of providing sufficient staff to meet all of the objectives and establishing the Special 

Assistant as the intelligence manager for the Secretary and Deputy \ 

Secretary of Defense. All the staffing would be under the supervision o 

the Special Assistant and could be obtained from existing OSD billets. 

It also clearly reduces fragmentation of OSD responsibilities for intelligence. 

The disadvantage, if it really is one, is that this level of staffing will 

not allow the Special Assistant to become involved in the day-to-day 

operations of the intelligence agencies. Another disadvantage, if it is 

one, is that the Special Assistant will spend a good deal of his personal 

time coordinating with DoD agencies and the rest of the intelligence 

community because staff will not be available. 

Alternative 3 (maximum staff) has the advantage of being able to 

accomplish all objectives -- and then some. It not only allows the Special 

Assistant to be primarily responsible for intelligence management but involves him deeply in the day-to-day intelligence operations. The primary 

disadvantages of Alternative 3 are the cosmetic ones of added manpower 

and major reorganization. Both Congress and the existing intelligence 

agencies would react adversely to this. 

Alternative 3, because of the considerable additional manpower, 

doesn't make sense at this time., Alternative 1 would be an improvement 

over the present but the lack of sufficient staff supporting the Special 

Assistant would probably leave responsibility diffc.sed. 

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I recommend Alternative 2. It is a happy compromise. It would 

accomplish the four stated objectives with a minimum of reorganization 

and without adding any personnel to the OSD staff. 

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Location of the Special Assistant 

The n.umber of options available for the location of a Special Assistant 

for Intelligence narrows down to five: 

Option 1. "Normalize" present intelligence resource 

management and allocation with a Five-Year Intelligence 

Plan, Development Concept Papers (DCP 1 s) from the 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and Major 

Program Memoranda (MPM' s) from the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Systems Analysis), with a minimum role being 

played by the Special Assistant. 

Option 2. Assign to an existing Assistant Secretary of \ 

Defense the additional duty of Special Assistant for 

Intelligence. 

Option 3. Establish the Spedal Assistant under the 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Option 4. Establish a Special Assistant to the Secretary 

of Defense (Intelligence) as a separate office directly subordinate to the Secretary. 

Option 5. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Intelligence). 

Analysis of the Options 

Option l does not truly integrate the DoD intelligence effort, and it 

puts sizing and development of intelligence forces under officials who 

have an interest in intelligence products for use in developing weapons 

or in setting force levels. It has the effect of placing the intelligence 

management responsibilities in the hands of officials who are customers 

for various parts of the intelligence product. {This Option actually lends 

its elf only to staffing Alternative 1 ). 

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Option 2 furnishes the Special Assistant with the prestige and 

authority, both inside DoD and with other government agencies, 

possessed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Further, the intelligence management function envisioned should not require the full time 

attention of an ASD. However, when required, the authority of his 

office as an ASD is available. 

Option 3 - - The JCS is oriented primarily toward strategic planning 

and direction and to those activities of the military Services which support 

these functions. To charge them with the intelligence management role 

as envisioned herein would assign them a type of responsibility heretofore 

not possess ed. Such an assignment would short-circuit those responsibilities for resource allocation and management charged to the Secretary 

of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. The JCS 

responsibility in intelligence management is more properly one of providing views based on the intelligence needs of the JCS and the combat 

forces. 

Option 4 would probably accomplish the objectives but is handicapped 

by the lack of position and authority normally associated with an ASD, 

particularly in interagency activities and relationships. The Special 

Assistant in this Option is solely dependent on his relationship to the 

Secretary to accomplish the objectives. As a result, there is an aura 

of the 11 ad hoc 11 about a separate Special Assistant. 

Option 5 would require redesignation of an existing ASD or Congressional action to add an ASD because of the statutory numerical limit 

of seven Assistant Secretaries. The magnitude of the intelligence function 

suggested in staff Alternatives l and 2, in terms of manning levels and 

percentage of the total DoD budget managed, is relatively small and there-· 

for militates against Option 5. 

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Recommendations 

I eliminate location Options 1 (normalize present practice) and 3 

(JCS) because it appears to me that either COclJ.:.'. result in the Special 

Assistant being unable to achieve the stated ot ::ctives. 

I recommend Option 2 (as;ign to an existing ASD). 

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If there is some reason that Option 2 is not selected, I would 

recommend that Option 4 (Special Assistant) and finally Option 5 

(New ASD). 

I further recommend the establishment of an Executive Council 

for Defense Intelligence, to supersede a similar committee. This 

Council would properly consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

as Chairman, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director 

of Defense Research and Engineering, and, because of their obvious 

interest, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the President's 

Scientific Advisor. The Special Assistant for Intelligence would sit 

ex officio. 

The Council will advise the Secretary of Defense on intelligence 

matters, and it will provide broad technical and organizational advice 

to the various DoD components. It would also provide a helpful 

communications channel to other interested agencies in the government. 

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