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-ierNATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. C

THE NHO Si Ar F 4 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER

SUBJECT: Security Breach

The Summer issue of Studies in Intelligence was distributed

yesterday. It contains a SECRET level article referencing the

NRO and SIGINT satellites. The PFIAB alerted us to the article

and asked us whether or not the NRO and SIGINT satellites were

now SECRET information. We obtained a copy of the publication

and the paragraph of interest is attached.

We informally made inquiry to the Special Security Center

at the CIA to determine what action would be taken with respect

to amending the security breach. No action apparently is intended. We believe that the article constitutes a revolutionary

departure from existing security policy because the decompartmentation was expressly limited by the President to photo

satellites although the door was left open for the DCI to

formally request additional decompartmentation. The memo at

the right requests that formal guidance be issued to the

community so that the new action may be clearly understood.

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Looking at the work content of the SICINT Committee is not the wholestory, .

because one needs to understand the environment in which these affairs are cons. ducted. The National Security Agency (NSA) is a huge organization, and it is i• •• .•

singularly preoccupied with the collection and processing of SICINT. The NSA. •

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member represents a production organization, while the other members represent

user organizations. NSA, for the most part, tries to avoid explicit direction of its *-?•:4;

work. It prefers to get tasking in the most general -terms possible. The users—

State, CIA, DIA. and the Senices—would like to be as restrictive . as possible, • •

and tend to write tasking documents in great detail. There results a tug-of-war he- • hmen NSA and the other members over many of the issues discussed in the

committee. Usually the committee resolves the issue by doing that which con- • A.R.%

mitten do best—finding a compromise solution acceptable to both sides. jl 2:

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r. There is a similar relationship between the representative of NRO and the'"'' f

committee members. NRO is a huge organization, too—not in numbers of people,

-• 

but in the fact that it exercises great control over a large share of the intelligence I

budget. Overhead sensors used to collect SICINT are procured with money . •

doled out by NRO to the agencies managing the particular sensor programs. There

results a different sort of tug-of-war, in which NRO tries to get the committee to x

•

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specify requirements far SICINT data in general terms. But the user organizetimes would like to know how NRO proposes to satisfy their requirements, and in .

so doing inevitably get involved in the details of the design and capabilities of

the satellite collectors. Some of the committenlmembers represent both user

groups and satellite project management teaird, and this causes additional

•

trauma.

One of the most difficult documents for the committee to get out is its annual

statement to the L'SIB of the 5-year guidance for the SICINT portion of the

national reconnaissance program. There is no requirement that the 5-year quidTance take into account the availability of funds to satisfy the requirement, and

if the committee chose to be completely irresponsible. it would merely put out

a "wish list" of all the things it would be nice to get. Fortunately, the committee

has tried to inject some realism into the process, by doing such things as putting

requirements in priority order, identifying those requirements whose satisfaction

would result in changes in the national reconnaissance program, and estimating

their cost impact. Even so. the process is not without defects. It has not been 1. .4

possible so tar to interleave COMINT. EUNT and telemetry needs into a 

single priority list. This makes for great difficulty for those who have to make

choices between costly overhead collection senses which specialize in one or

enother form of SICINT.

•

.

An even more fundamental problem is the one alluded to earlier, the lack•:;13-

of a system for matching the value of intelligence to the cost of its collection. The it •

SICINT Committer. in doing the 5- •ear guidance. has problems in making fait

authoritative choices of the most cost-effective programs. It must screen proposed

requirements collected from analytic organizations. and it has no guarantee .."

that they have been submitted with a consciousness of their cost impact. The

degree to which the final document is useful to the policy level therefor is

very dependent on the maturity and good judgment of the committee members.

1

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.-1SeNATIONALRECONNAISSANCEOFFICE

WASHINGTON. D C. e

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

October 30, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: BYEMAN Security Compromises

Since its inception, the National Reconnaissance Program

hnd all of its activities have been considered covert and not

acknowledged by the U.S. Government. In recent months I have

been concerned by numerous references to the National

Reconnaissance Program and its activities outside covert channels.

I recognize that there are problems in trying to maintain an

organization as large and as mature as the NRO completely covert.

I am aware that there are increasing pressures for easing or

even abolishing the special caveats placed around the NRO.

The most recent case in point is the unclassified statementwhich appeared in the Congressional Record of October 12,

1973 in which the National Reconnaissance Office was acknowledged (Atch). I would appreciate your assessment of the impact

of this breach of BYEMAN security and how we should react to it.

I believe, however, that this is another manifestation of a

growing problem and suggest that the overall subject of covert

security for the NRP be looked at. I would be pleased to have

my Staff work-with yours to make recommendations in this area.

1 Attachment

Extract of Congressional Record

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-1St NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. 0 C

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR,. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SIGINT Satellite Decompartmentation

I have reviewed the recently published issue of

Studies in Intelligence which contains an article entitled ,

"Confessions of a former USIB Committee Chairman" by David

S. Brandwein. On page 48 there is a SECRET level discussion

on the NRO and SIGINT collectors. Since this represents a

significant decompartmentation action on its face, I believe

that formal guidance to the community should be issued as

rapidly as possible so that there is a clear understanding

of the limits of the further decompartmentation.

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JOHN E. KQLPA , JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Director

-01 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, 0 C

•

THE NRO STAFF September 5, 1974

NOTE FOR MR. PLUMMER

We have attempted to work this at a security staff

level, however, as Bud indicates in paragraph 2 of his memo

(TAB A) to you, it appears that no one is planning to take

any action. In addition to the phone call from the PFIAB

Staff we have had a contact from AF Intelligence on the subject.

It does not appear that the CIA Staff desires to approach

Mr. Colby. Since he personally is still charged with maintaining sources and methods security, he should be made aware

of the problem. In the past the DBRO has requested of the DCI

clarification of the security policy, so that a precedent does

exist. I have attached a most recent example of this (TAB B).

If you have reservations on sending the memo on the right,

I suggest that you discuss the subject with Mr. Colby on the

telephone.

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