--TOP-SECRETNATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

Washington, D. C.

September 28, 1971

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NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

AGENDA

Office of Deputy Secretary of Defense

Room 3E 928, The Pentagon

Thursday. September 30, 1971

(1, 1. Status and Plans for EOI 

; • .. 2. Launch Schedule and Days in Orbit 

For Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites 

( r . i7 -3. Releasing the Fact of Satellite Reconnaissance 

'.••` 4. NASA Space Transportation System 

5. NAS6 Earth Rtscurces Mission 

0 or • I I . 11• • — — •

F. Robert Naka

Secretary

FRP Executive Committee

Dikribution

1 Mr. Packard

2 Mr. Helms

3 Dr. David

4 Dr. Hall

5 Gen. Bennett

6 Mr. Dam

7 Adm. Gayler

8 Mr. Duckett

9 Dr. Mar

20 Mr

11

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--TOPLSECRET--

DISCUSSION PAPER FOR SEPTEMBER 30 EXCOM

SUBJECT: "Fact of" Satellite Reconnaissance

BACKGROUND:

Over the years there has been considerable pressure

to declassify or downgrade the "fact of" satellite

reconnaissance. The main reasons for initiating the

present stringent security practices were twofold:

first, to protect the technological and operational

aspects of our reconnaissance systems; and second, to

prevent the possibility of a diplomatic confrontation

with our enemies or causing embarrassment to our allies.

As a result, the U. S. Government has never formally

and publicly acknowledged the "fact of".

The main reasons offered in support of downgrading

or declassifying have been twofold: first, exploitation

is cumbersome, difficult and expensive because of relatively limited access to the product; and second, the "fact

of" is public knowledge even though the government has

not officially and publicly acknowledged it.

More recently, COMIREX has been studying the question

of possible downgrading or declassifying. In June, the

DNRO sent letters to various interested individuals

soliciting their views on the question from the standpoint

of impact of disclosure on unique aspects of their organizations.

Responses to the June letters were relatively nonuniform, varying from a suggested notion of negative

impact on NASA's programs, if "fact of" were admitted,

to an overhaul of compartmentation removing SIGINT from

TALENT/KEYHOLE control. State Department expressed no

objection to "fact of" admission but emphasized that

operational information and resolution require stringent

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protection. Concern was expressed by the NRO on the

continued ability to operate within a streamlined

management philosophy under "normalization". It was

also stated that a unilateral U. S. disclosure might

have adverse impact on the ability to continue

operation of the NRP.

Mainly because of an overall security problem of

policy leakage and concern from the White House, Mr.

Helms requested COMIREX to hold its "fact of" study

in Obeyance for the present.

CURRENT SITUATION:

The question of "fact of" admission remains perplexing

and largely unanswered. There is speculation on the one

hand that public admission of "fact of" would undermine

the conduct of the NRP. On the other polar extreme there

is speculation that there would be few, if any, repercussions if "fact of" was revealed. The main problem is that

if "fact of" is officially admitted, and there are repercussions, the admission is irreversible.

Several on-going actions bear on the "fact of" problem:

first, the SALT ratification process may, by default,

cause an official admission of the "fact of" in its discussion of means of verification. Second, the Soviets in

the UN have given evidence of desiring discussions on the

defining of space in terms of national sovereignty and on

the establishment of the ethicality and legality of satellite earth resources survey. This is somewhat contradictory to their uncharacteristic cooperation on sharing data

from future earth resources missions. This contradiction

developed during the NASA-State-Soviet talks recently completed.

Finally, the NSAM 156 Committee recommended to the

President that international reaction to ERTS A and B

should be assessed in terms of political impact of acknowledged satellite overflights.

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It is contended that there would be user benefit

gained from a general relaxation of security controls

and public admission of satellite reconnaissance. On

the other hand, ehe political instabilities presently

evident seem to warrant the exercise of great care and

judgement before such an irreversible action is taken.

-TOP-SECRETCOM' NS

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DISCUSSION PAPER FOR SEPTEMBER 30 EXCOM

SUBJECT: US/Soviet Space Cooperation

BACKGROUND:

Last summer the US and the Soviets began exploration of

ways to cooperate in space. Original US overtures were made

based upon precepts contained in NSSM 72, which concerned

international space cooperation. In January 1971, working

meetings were held in Moscow. Principal US representatives

included Dr. Low and Mr. Frutkin from NASA, and Mr. Packard

of State.

These meetings culminated in the establishment of three

major working groups which formulated cooperation position

papers. In August 1971 the working groups again met to make

final their joint recommendations.

The subject areas of agreement include three broad themes:

exploitation of near earth space, the moon and the planets;

the natural earth environment; and space meteorology.

CURRENT SITUATION:

•

The principals were requested to approve the recommendations by October 6, 1971. Dr. Fletcher transmitted a letter

of approval to Academician Keldysh on September 3. Subsequent

to that action DDR&E formally posed strong objection to the

geographic areas agreed upon for investigation of the natural

earth environment, saying that they were strategically critical

areas.

A meeting was held on September 28 between high level NASA

officials including Dr. Low and Mr. Frutkin, and Dr. Rechtin,

DDR&E. As a result of this meeting DDR&E is rethinking its

objectiors and attempting to work through the problem with NASA.

It does not appear as if the Fletcher letter of Sep 3 will have

to be retracted.

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SUMMARY:

Based upon a Presidential directive the US sought and has

achieved a relatively high degree of initial cooperation in

space with the Soviets. There appears to be sufficient US

awareness of potential impact on satellite reconnaissance

activities, thus any exchange of data is to be carefully studied

by interagency panels. It is interesting to note that at the

outset of the talks a year ago the US was not prepared to

discuss exchange of earth resources survey data. This portion

of the talks has been based upon Soviet initiative. It is not

clear whether the Soviets will continue this philosophy as

time approaches for actual earth resources data collection

and exchange.

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