10P-SECREF

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

What the Projram Is 

The National Reconnaissance Program is a single, national pro-

.

gram dedicated to the collection, through overflight, of intelligence to

meet the needs and objectives of the United States Government. The

Secretary of Defense i.e the Executive Agent for the Program, managing resources of the CIA and DOD in carrying out the mission. The

entire Program is covert and comprises the development, management,

and operation of satellites, aircraft,. and drones for visual, photographic,

or electronic reconnaissance of denied areas of the world (peripheral

reconnaissance is a separate responsibility managed by the Joint Chiefs

of Staff). The cost of the Program is close tolitarMer year.

The National Reconnaissance Program is responsive directly and

solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. The National Reconnaissance Office sends its plans and schedules for both satellite and aircraft

He reconnaissance overflights directly to the JOS Committee of the National

Security Council for operational approval. •

r.

/INNS ve.

4111/1/1P eseumilf MID Nommue

11111b eistillve 61011.119 INKS Mir .Mr
v?'

Program Background 

The essential background of the National Reconnaissance Program

begins shortly after the May 1, 1960 loss of a U-2 aircraft engaged in

overflight reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of this

event, faced with the loss of reconnaissance capability over the USSR,

President Eisenhower called a special meeting of the National Security

Council to review possible alternatives, such as satellite reconnaissance systems. As a result of this review, the Department of Defense

was directed to accelerate and re-orient its overt satellite reconnaissance project -- known as SAMOS -- and to establish a streamlined

management structure and special procedures for enhancing its successful development and operation. Within a few weeks, a CIA-managed,

DOD-funded covert reconnaissance satellite was also placed within the

special management structure. Further procedural adjistments, extending through the spring of 1962, culminated in the establishment of a

National Reconnaissance Program which was to be managed by a National

Reconnaissance Office -- a single, national agency with a charter covering satellite photographic and signal intelligence collection operations,

satellite mapping and geodesy, and aircraft/drone overflight reconnaissance.

40P-SECREF---

',CONOCO VON ,OODINNIC OCOMIONNI

110, 1101/41,18 NOD CO OM WO 4•Oar

ONMIS

MKS .
-TOP-SECRET----

What the Program Does

During the years from 1962 to the present, the National Reconnaissance Program's capabilities have developed to a point where satellites

photograpiellirsquare miles of the"Sino •Soviet land mass annually.

A typical broad-coverage satellite photographic mission produces, on the

average,cloud-free photography of aboutliMsquare miles of

land mass at ground resolutions of seven to ten feet. A high resolution

photographic mission returns, on the average,111Icloud-free photography of 3500 high priority targets, with ground resolutionsilIMOI

11111111 National Reconnaissance Program electronic signal intelligence collection vehicles routinely provide detailed information on Soviet

and Chinese electronic order-of-battle locations, surface-to-air missilerelated radars, and Soviet ABM radars in a virtually continuous electronic.

surveillance of the entire Sino-Soviet land mass.

Today, the United States depends on the National Reconnaissance

Program for most of its tactical and strategic information on closed

societies.

Policies Supporting the Program

When the first U-2 photography of the USSR was produced (in 1956),

President Eisenhower directed that it be protected -- as an ultra-sensitive

-TOP-SECRETNom

con Sr awn

arm swags. 11•0011410 601141aTIC

IIMICIIIPII NM le MIS NW IMO

S.
•... -TOP-SECRET- ,

•

espionage product -- in a special security system. In 1980, when the

first satellite reconnaissance photographs were produced, President

Eisenhower directed that they be similarly protected and placed them

in a compartment of the same special security system.

During 1961 and early 1962, the Soviets made a number of private

overtures to the U.S. protesting the use of satellites for reconnaissauce. In 1962, the question of the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance began to appear as an important pre-condition to international

negotiations on disarmament and on the peaceful uses of outer space.

In response to increasing pressure, the President asked a Committee

of Principals to formulate a national policy which would (1) maintain

United States freedom of action to conduct reconnaissance satellite

operations unilaterally, (2) prevent foreign political and physical interference with those operations, (3) prevent accidental or. forced disclosure

of the details of the operations or end-products of the United States reconnaissance program, and, at the same time (4) permit the United States to

continue to work toward disarmament and international cooperation in

space.

The recommendations of this Committee were approved by the

President on July 10, 1962 and issued as national policy in NSC Action

TOP-SECRET--

MUMS NOSISMIC 11111111111111114

MO INSICIIIIS NIN1111 m, arfo►

Or OWNS

Oft
--TOPSECREF2454. This policy statement* provides that the U.S. will:

Maintain the legal position that the principles of international

law and the U.N. Charter apply to activities in outer space.

Continue to avoid any position implying that reconnaissance

activities in outer space are not legitimate.

Avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance satellites."

Seek to create wider public acceptance of space observation

and photography.

5. Seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the legitimacy of

space reconnaissance.

G. When confronted, continue to take a public stand for the

legitimacy of the principle of reconnaissance from outer space, the

precise form and extent of the stand depending upon the circumstances

of the confrontation.

Continue the present practice of not identifying individual

military space launchings by mission or purpose.

Refrain from publicly disclosing the status, extent, effectiveness, or operational characteristics of our satellite reconnaissance

program.

Ir Miriatements which follow are abstracted from the very comprehensive basic policy paper.

COMP et

eseirou osesatic

SOP 11111184110111 MN Is Mill WWI IMMO
Exercise strict control over public statements and backgroinding

concerning reconnaissance satellites.

Direct no public attention toward development of anti-satellite

capabilities.

Discreetly disclose to certain allies and neutrals selected

information with regard to the U.S. space reconnaissance program.

In private international disclosures emphasize the fact of our

determination and ability to pursue such programs, as well as their

great contribution to the common security .

13. Not agree to (a) declarations of the precise purpose of all

satellites, (b) declarations -of the equipment of all satellites, (c) requirements for advance notification of all satellite launchings and the

tracks of satellites, (d) pre-launching inspection of satellites, or

(e) a specific definition of peaceful uses of space which would not embrace unlimited observation.

These policy statements have undergirded the National Reconriaissance Program from 1962 to the present, have been a primary element

in the success of the Program, and have been a remarkably effective

influence in protecting a major espionage activity from the public spotlight. For while it is true that there is a general public awareness of

the likely existence of a United StatesIsponsored satellite reconnals-

-TOP-SECRET- fie cam

sattesse VMS afsesenc assaaami raGill Off

seggelwa well se MIS Mr Moo
gar -TOP-SECRETsance program, the awareness is latent, rather than active. A modest

level of awareness also extends internationally; because of the carefully

subdued manner in which this awareness has been allowed to generate,

it has been accompanied by a gradual tacit acceptance of satellite overflight as a reasonable national venture. By continuing to surround

satellite reconnaissance with a unique security system, the U.S. has

been able to avoid embarrassment to other nations (particularly important in the case of its allies), and has muted the threat of international confrontation on the "legitimacy" of space espionage.

Vulnerability of the Program 

As a result of careful satellite reconnaissance policy planning,

the United States is enjoying, at this time, an international political

atmosphere which contains all the advantages of tacit acceptance without any of the hazards inherent in open discussion or confrontation. It

is critically important to nourish the conditions which contribute to

•

this atmosphere, for reconnaissance satellites require a completely

permissive environment -- political and physical -- for their successful

operation. Lacking such an environment, they could be interdicted on

the floor of the United Nations or in the skies of any nation which desired

to demonstrate against space espionage. Modern laser technology has

-TOP-SECRET--

1140141411 MOIMMINC alleM4alle

0144.011 111100.10 MIS MIN NOM

011011001,

tory et taus
--TOP-SEC-RETplaced a powerful anti-overflight weapon within easy reach of all

nations. In the face of such technology, the reconnaissance satellite

stands as a fragile vehicle which cannot be protected against any

determined assailant. •

The Influence of Other Governmental Activities

Two United States agencies -- the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- have

recently shown an increasing interest in "earth-sensing" satellites, and,

by their interest, have stimulated a re-examination of the reconnaissance

policies developed in 1962. NASA has been exploring the use of photographs to locate and study natural earth resources. Early experiments,

involving hand-held cameras operated by GEMINI and APOLLO astronauts, have not been controversial, largely because the photographs

are at a fairly gross resolution, the "targets" are carefully selected,

the film is reviewed by an inter-agency security panel before it is

released to the public, and hostile states such as the USSR and Red

China are either not overflown or not photographed. Future NASA applications involving oceanography, forestry, geology, and agriculture

must be controlled carefully, for the line between economic research

photography and economic intelligence photography is very thin and

S

•

•

annea.

Cern -TOP-SEOREF I/ SWAY stsammus

no 111080WIt MO SO OM OM I'M
•

-BF-SECRET--

a.m.

careless experimentation could trigger an international confrontation

on the legitimacy of overflight observation/reconnaissance. Recognizing this potential problem early in 1966, the President's Science

Adviser has been sponsoring policy studies and requirement conferences

in an effort to develop a civil earth-sensing program which will meet

the needs of science without hazarding the security of the National

Reconnaissance Program or offending the sovereignty of other nations.

These studies and conferences have been a strong positive influence in

coordinating the needs of the civil community and assisting it to plan a

reasonable program. In addition, the Department of Defense and the

CIA coordinate on NASA's plans for "earth-sensing" activities, working

in consonance with special National Security Council policy guidelines

adopted in July 1966.

The US-USSR discussions of 1968 regarding a Strategic Arms

Limitation Treaty brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

directly into satellite reconnaissance policy considerations. Convinced that the USSR would never agree to on-site inspection, ACDA

proposed to negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that the United

States was prepared to accept "enforcement by maximum, or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national means of verification.... " For

the United States, this expression means "satellite reconnaissance. "

MOWS

taunt, .ON TON wiewatic OILUSIDNIO ISM

INIO IISUCTIVII 4N IO IOU SOT MOO

.4.11.r.n.11/1"
-TOP-SECRET--

•

In addition, in order to support its proposal, ACDA recommended

declassifying the fact that the U.S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance, disclosing to the Soviets that reconnaissance satellites are our

main reuggio• for versmation, briefing Congress on our 111001U104111111111011

capabilities, and informing the press and public, gradually but officially,

along the same lines. After discussion within the United States Intelligence Board and key affected government agencies, it was decided that

disarmament discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and

possibly more effectively, by restricting the U.S. delegation to use of

the expression "national means of verification" with no reference to our

satellite reconnaissance program. It was pointed out that disclosure is

an irreversible step which would have profoundly adverse effects on

national security. Furthermore, to single out one or some intelligence

collection methods now and to pass only that or those to .the Soviets,

Congress, and the American public would be dangerous and misleading

and could evolve a genuine "credibility gap."

The Department of Defense and NASA proposed an alternative

approach which, they felt, gave ACDA all the advantages of satelliteborne inspection with no impingement on the security protection required

by the National Reconnaissance Program. Both agencies recalled a proposal made by ACDA, in January 1963, which envisioned creation of an

-TOP-SECRETtatmona ftommunic aseasemo

— smacews INN MIS OM /Way

arwn 11111

or PPM

"1.6.1n MOO

ti
40P-SEGRET

internationally supervised or operated arms control satellite system.

It had been suggested that the United States would provide technical and

other support for the system, as would the Soviets and other interested

nations. The photography would be retained and used by an international

disarmament body.

This proposal, whether conducted internationally, bilaterally

(NASA and the Soviet Academy), or nationally (NASA alone) is very

attractive. By working outside the National Reconnaissance Program,

the ACDA would avoid confronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world)

either publicly or privately, with the reality of the U. S. program, avoidfag an unsettling episode with other nations, with Congress, and with the

American public. This approach would also enable the United States

to continue its own covert disarmament reconnaissance program until

it unilaterally decided, if at all, to rely upon the international program.

Finally, a separate program would protect existing intelligence security

and would very likely achieve a measurable step toward "normalizing"

satellite observation at little or no risk to U. S. national activities.

In Summary 

The United States government is deeply dependent on overflight

reconnaissance, and particularly satellite reconnaissance, for informs-.

tion on closed societies. Satellites are fragile, vulnerable vehicles

-TOP-SECRET- Isimollits teem adtersist HUMP*

11014111v1 UN t5 OM sr &OM

COMM

IbI eons

10044 sr Nen
which mustust have a totally permissive environment for successful

operation. National satellite reconnaissance policy, begun at the

instance of President Eisenhower and continuing to the present, recognizes the need to (1) operate reconnaissance satellites with great

discretion, (2) develop tacit acceptance of these operations as a reasonable national activity, and (3) avoid embarrassment to our allies or

confrontation with our enemies in carrying out our operations. These

policies, and the special security arrangements resulting from them,

have been primary forces in protecting United States reconnaissance

operations from the threat of international confrontation. NASA's

and ACDA's interests in "earth-sensing" satellites pose special

problems which can be, and are being, solved through close coordination and cooperation.

0111111111%

aft OF 40P -SECRETVICI1149 P.S. woman agsa....4

ON IMIRCIIII4 SIM IS MIS MT &NO

Pis