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Comptroller Comments on "Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence" 

The following comments are primarily addressed to the NRP involvement: 

1. Page 3, Objective 1, opening paragraph. The NRP has what we believe 

to be an adequate review and decision-making process, we have five year programs, and we certainly focus attention on decisive points in the program, 

with the needed guidance and direction from the Ex Com. However, we have a 

number of meaningful innovations and dynamic conditions which should be 

considered before a decision is made to fit us into a common framework with 

other Intelligence interests. For example: 

a. The field submissions for the financial programs are submitted 

in May annually, which is one to two months behind all others, but allow 

us to get the latest and best data from the field, and we are geared to 

respond quickly with detailed examinations, to then issue detailed initial 

approvals. These are "zero base" reviews (i.e., just because any item 

appeared in the President's Budgett it is not considered as an automatic 

approval for the financial program). 

b. The field submissions for the budget estimates are submitted 

in May ordinarily, and are factors in considering the financial program, but 

the DNRO detailed budget review is not initiated until the initial financial 

program is established, and program options are selected (we consider many 

trade-off options in the process). There is then a continuing review until 

mid-September, including fieldexchanges up until one week before finalization. 

At this point, we are up to four months later with detailed estimates than 

many of the normal processes, but consider such estimates to be up to four 

months better. The DNRO budget review process does not stop at this point, 

but continues on until the November Ex Com meeting, and we are subject to 

detailed OSD and BOB reviews. 

c. We ordinarily do not issue a call to the field for estimates for 

four years after the budget year until end-September (after the DNRO budget 

is established), and have these completed in time for the November Ex Com 

review. On these four year estimates, we are up to six months later than 

the 11 normal" programs, but with six months better data. These are then 

reflected in the January FYDP update. 

d. We identify to the Ex Com, for both the August financial program 

review and the November budget review, and at various times during the year, 

specific issues on optional costs and efforts for decision. In the process,· 

we not only identify major issues but also a number of others as means of improving the program, reducing the funding requirements, etc. 

e. "Normalization" has a tendency to inhibit the recognition of 

dynamic conditions. For example, if we had submitted a PCR with back-up 

in May or June, as would be "normal," we would not have been able to recognize 

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the impacts of MOL termination, would have been undecided as to what to do 

about additional Corona buys and the Hexagon program, have had to make 

Follow-on choices which have been overtaken by events, 

~n_o_t~h~a_v_e-----cb_e_e_n_r_e_a~d~y~for a Readout System definition and subsequent effort 

program recommendation, not have been ready for "Unmanned" system options," 

have had a different Tagboard drone budget recommendation than is now the 

case, have had a different Satellite Control Facility program than now 

expected, etc. These have all been influenced by May, June and July considerations. 

f. We are geared to rapid and reasoned choices on program and 

funding throughout the year, adapting to changes in requirements, which 

would be hamstrung by "normalization." 

g. The proposed paragraph refers to "components of the DOD" and 

"DOD decision-makers," which applies to the GIP and CCP, but in our case 

CIA is a "full partner" in most of our decisions. In PY 1969, for instance, 

CIA is involved in 52% of our program accounts, and received 31% of our 

total funding. 

The main points of the preceding are that (a) "normalization" with 

the GIP and CCP timing would eliminate our improvements in concurrency 

and produce worse program and cost estimates for consideration, (b) reduce 

our adaptability to dynamic conditions, and (c) could create many problems 

in relation to CIA involvement. 

2. Page 4, second para. This starts "The focus of inte!lligence planning 

and programming activities tends to be in the near term period (one or two 

years ahead)." This is seldom the case in the NRP, particularly in planning 

and contracting for satellite systems. At any particular time, we must face 

initial or reorder lead times of up to four years, with deliveries until 

launch of up to six years. Accordingly, we must be prepared with meaningful 

guidance and decisions for programs six years in the future. 

3. Page 4, Objective 2. This would need considerable clarification. 

For example, we have daily interchanges with CIA on information flow and 

policy, and frequent exchanges with White House personnel, Congress, BOB, 

NASA, etc. 

4. Page 5, Objective 4. This could present a real problem for the NRP 

if standards were relaxed merely to improve intelligence flow. (Assume 

SAFSS will address this in more detail.) 

5. Page 6, top para. This says that the Special Assistant would be 

responsible for all DOD intelligence management, with emphasis on resources. 

It is by no means clear as to how this could work in the case of the NRP, 

with the USIB, 303 Committee, PFIAB, PS.AC and other involvements in the 

requirements formulation and technical advisory efforts, nor how it would 

relate to CIA heavy involvement. The Special Assistant's staff would quickly 

grow towards the alternative 3 manning to be able to handle the NRP interfaces 

alone. 

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6. Page 8, bottom para. The statement is made "Formulating major 

issues has never been attempted successfully in the DOD intelligence 

community." In the case of the NRP, major issues have been formulated 

on the Oxcart, U-2 and SR-71 aircraft, and all new or significantly changed 

satellite systems. There are major issues on at least 5 satellite systems 

at the moment. 

7. Page 13, second para. The Executive Council, in supposedly an 

advisory role, would supersede the Ex Com, which has operated in a decision 

role for the NRP, which appears to be a step backward. The inclusion of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would create complications, as 

many Joint Staff personnel would probably be assigned to keep up with the 

programs to advise the Chairman. The inclusion of the DDR&E raises questions 

on his normal responsibilities vis a vis the Special Assistant's. 

General: 

1. In the case of the NRP, the replacement of a "National" decisionmaking structure, which has been working, with an "advisory" structure, 

with many questions as to whether it could effectively work, needs much 

more consideration before implementation. 

2. As I see it, the Special Assistant is the best choice, with a staff 

of about 14, and these should be fairly knowledgeable on NRP programs, 

technology, and requirements coverage, to help insure that there are not 

unnecessary duplications in the GIP and CCP; that certain intelligence 

programs might be given to or taken away from us, because we or others can 

do it best; and to conduct over-all intelligence assessments. However, 

we should continue with a decision-making Ex Com, and proceed as we have 

been. 

3. If this "Tentative Report" were implemented, one of the first areas 

open to re-examination would be the DOD-CIA agreements on the NRP. There 

would be many other problems to be examined. 

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