MORI DocID: 1366036

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11 March 1959

PROJECT CORONA

The original outline of the CORONA Project (Document No.

COR-0013) was submitted for approval on 15 April 1958. As then planned

it called for twelve flights of the CORONA vehicle during the calendar year

1959. The total separately accountable cost was estimated as slightly over

30 Million Dollars, made up of 24 Million Dollars to be provided by ARPA

for second stage vehicles and 7 Million Dollars to be funded by the Central

Intelligence Agency for the classified payload.

. Under date of 8 August 1958 a report on this Project was submitted which pointed out that the original cost estimate was incomplete on

two grounds. First, it contained no allowance for the Thor boosters (first

stage vehicles) on the assumption that these would be furnished by the Air

Force. Second, it inclnded none of the costs that would be incurred with

either four engineering flights to be carried out before the first CORONA

launch as part of the development of the CORONA vehicle or of three biomedical flights planned in part for cover purposes. This report gave a

revised figure of 49 Million Dollars as the cost of the CORONA flights

including Thors but still excluding the associated flights referred to above.

3, Rather extensive discussions took place in the early autumn

of 1958 concerning the cost of the whole program, since christened the

DISCOVERY program, in the context of the ARPA budget for FY-1959. In

the course of these discussions it appeared that certain cost estimates had

to be revised upward. Moreover, it appeared that if an appropriate share

of development and facilities costs were allocated to CORONA the total cost

would come to something in excess of 60 Million Dollars, although it was

recognized that the allocation of these overhead items between related

programs is essentially arbitrary. When this cost study was completed in

October, it still appeared that the entire DISCOVERY program of nineteen

flights (twelve CORONA plus four engineering plus three biomedical) could

be funded within existing budgets.

4. During late autumn of 1958, a further study was made of both

the DISCOVERY and SENTRY (WS-117L) programs by ARPA and the Air

Force. In November, decisions were made concerning the ARPA FY-1960

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COR-0372

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budget. As a result of these revisions, and in the light of the program

review just concluded, the decision was made by ARPA to cancel four of

the twelve CORONA flights and two of the three biomedical flights and thus

to reduce the DISCOVERY program from nineteen to thirteen flights. This

decision was influenced by the expectation that the Air Force would be prepared to fund additional flights using CORONA vehicles and payloads which

would be scheduled late in CY-1959 and in CY-1960, so that the ARPA cut

would be more than made good.

5. Under these circumstances, production schedules were left

unchanged and development continued at full speed peniing further studies

of (a) intelligence requirements during 1959 and 1960, (b) the effects of

modifications in the SENTRY program, which contemplates the use of an

Atlas-boosted vehicle, larger payload, and more sophisticated equipment,

and (c) the availability of funds. These investigations led to the following

conclusions:

There is a high priority requirement for photographic

reconnaissance of the USSR both in 1959 and in 1960 by numbers

of flights sufficient enough to give complete coverage twice in

each year. Because of the prevalence of cloud cover, twice over

coverage will be required to give even moderately complete

photography of the more important areas, The most important

single objective is to require further evidence on the status of

the ICBM program during the phase when construction of launch

sites may be expected to be in progress.

The SENTRY program could not be accelerated to provide

the required coverage in 1960.

c. The extended CORONA program can be financed within

approved Air Force and Department of Defense budgets.

6. Accordingly it is proposed that the presently reduced CORONA 

program of eight flights in 1959 be augmented by twelve additional flights,

four to be restored in 1959, and eight to be conducted in 1960. On this basis

there will be a total of twenty CORONA flights. The requirement for twelve

in 1959 as against eight in 1960 reflects an anticipated improvement in.

systems reliability and performance. The whole DISCOVERY series will

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include in addition to the twenty CORONA flights, four engineering flights

as originally planned (one of which has aborted and a second carried out

with nearly full success) and one biomedical flight which is largely for cover

purposes.

The proposed restoration of four flights in 1959 and an addition 

of eight flights in 1960 will require additional funding in the amount of 67.1

Million Dollars, of which 30.4 Million Dollars will be in 1959 funds, 34,6

Million Dollars in FY-1960 funds, and 2.1 in FY-1961 funds. The breakdown

of additional cost by purpose and funding agency is shown on the attached

table. In accordance with the decision made at the inception of CORONA, all

of these additional funds, with the possible exception of the cost of additional 

payloads, will be transferred to ARPA which will authorize procurement by

the Ballistic Missile Division, ARDC. Procurement of additional payloads

may be undertaken by CIA (as with the initial CORONA program) or by BMD 

depending on the requirement for security, BMD will act as executive agent

for the DOD and the CIA in the operational phase including launching, tracking,

and recovery operations.

The maintenance of security, that is effective concealment of

the true purpose of these missile flights, will be exceedingly difficult at

best and will give rise to serious problems. The DISCOVERY series has

been described as a developmental activity. Specific ostensible missions

are being defined for each flight and data will be accumulated ostensibly

resulting from the DISCOVERY flights to be furnished on an unclassified

basis or with low classification to interested persons. No matter how , carefully cover explanations are developed and supported, however, it is

impossible to prevent speculation in the technical press and by Communist

governments to the effect that the DISCOVERY flights involve reconaissance

of some kind. Accordingly, even if security is successfully preserved, that

is any unauthorized disclosure by persons witting of the true purpose of

DISCOVERY is avoided, the cover for this operation may be eroded. If it

is desired to preserve the cover and deny the true purpose of the 1960 flights

as well as of those scheduled for 1959, a decision to this effect should be

made immediately so that administrative and security procedures may be

designed with this end in view.

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COR-0372

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Attachment to

COR-0371

DISCOVERER EXTENSION

SCHEDULE CY-1959 CY.1960

8 Original May 1

June 1

July • • 2

August 2

September 2

12 Extension October . 2 May 2

November 2 June . • . • 2

July • • • • 2

August . 2

COST ESTIMATES

(In Millions)

FY-1959 FY-1960 FY-1961

OSD Emergency AF

Funds Funds

AF

Funds

AF

Funds

LOCKHEED SECOND STAGE VEHICLES

8 Vehicles for 1960 6.2 15.3

4 Vehicles for 1959 11.4 3.1

8 Launchings in 1960 3.0 1.0

4 Launchings in 1959 2.0

8 Payloads for 1960 flights 2.4

4 Payloads for 1959 flights To he furnished

THOR BOOSTERS

12 Launchings 6.8

1?. Vehicles 5.6 4.0

RADC .9 2.8 .9

Support .7 .2

TOTA L 20.0 10.4 34.6 2.1
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

The Advanced Research Projects Agency, in conjunction with the

Department of the Navy, proposes an interim electronic intelligence

collection capability which can be accommodated in the Department

of Defense's navigation satellite development program. This

proposal, which employs existing electronics components and requires

minimum additional research, has the capability to obtain critical

intelligence on Soviet defenses and technological development in an

inexpensive and reliable manner.

The system, tentatively designated as Project CANES, has

been coordinated with the Director of Central Intelligence, who has

expressed his approval. It provides for a collection capability at an

earlier date than that provided in SENTRY (recently redesignated as

Project SAMOS). The planning envisions a completely covert program,

thus avoiding political repercussions and undue publicity. Further,

the system has several operational safeguards to reduce interference

and to provide considerable flexibility for decision as to its use.

The Department of Defense and the intelligence community

believe that this proposal is a complement to, and not a substitute

for the SAMOS satellite system, and that it offers an early

opportunity to check assumptions relating to the latter system at

very low cost. It also will provide a significant intelligence input.

The estimated cost of the proposal is $700, 000, of which the

Navy Department already has allocated $375, 000. The Department

of Defense is prepared to fund the remaining $325,000 from money

available to ARPA.

Your approval to proceed with the technical development and

planning is respectfully requested. It is, of course, understood

that your approval will be required before the actual launching

occurs.

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