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Division of Responsibility widds NRO

The NRO is composed of certain offices within the Department of

the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. it is headed by co-directors

each of whom acts wing the authority of his overt position within his own

organisation. The NRO has inherited responsibility for several reconsaissance

programs which are in Afforest stages of development and operation and

which have been managed both technically, operationally. and with respect to

security, in somewhat different fashions.

There exists today a workable and well tadersteed division of

responsibility between the two offices for the several programs with which the

NRO is concerned. It is contemplated that there will be no inunsdiate change

in the established division of responsibility but consideration will be given to

a redefinition of reeponsibilities for these programs that are today in their

earlier stases in such a way as to snake the best use of the capabilities of the

two participating orgauisatims.

3. The present allocation of responsibilities with respect to the

major programs is as follows:

a. CORONA/MURAL/ARGON: The Air roses has primary

responsibility for: (1) launch scheduling and launching; (2) orbit and recovery

operations; (3) development and procurement of boosters. orbiting vehirlea.

andel= CIA has primary responsibility tow (1) targeting; (2) °petal
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planning and control of payload operations (3) development sad Procurement of

.- photographic payloads and nose cones; (4) security.

b. SAMOS: The Air Force has primary :responsibility for

SAMOS with CIA in a supporting role. The latter is important particuarly

in target planning and in security planning.

e. OXCART: This is the primary responsibility of the CIA

with the Air Force in a supporting role.

4. With respect especially to the later configurations of SAMOS and

to other advanced systems, consideration will be given to gradual modification

of this distribution of responsibilities. In general, it is clear that Air Force

elements will retain primary responsibility for operations and for vehicle

development and procurement. For the most part these activities not only can

but must bo "white", that is conducted in a reasonable public fashion. CIA•.

main contribution will be in target planning. serving as the communication

channel for operational control, security. and that development and procurement

which should be "black". More specifically, the following gradual changes

will be considered:

It may soon be possible for all procurement of nose cones

(recovery systems) to be white in which case this should be assumed by the

Air. Force.

It would appear that there will be an increasing pressure to

conduct the development/procurement of at least certain cameras covertly; the

CIA may assume a larger responsibility with respect to all such systems.

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5. Consideration will also be given in due time to the desirability of

gradually converting the NRO into a more unified single office with a single

directing head. This development presumably will require a delegation of

authority front both the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central

Intelligence to the Director of the NRO so a,s to permit him to exercise an

appropriate degree of control over elements of both agencies. it miiht also

render appropriate some redistribution of responsibilities as between the

two components of the NRO and a change in budgetary procedures.