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TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA ~ 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

J.8(NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

THE NRO STA FF February 13, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR; FLAX 

1. Jim Stewart bootlegged a copy of the/attached 

this afternoon, and I in turn got this copy from him. 

of us has received it, officially at this point. 

document 

Neither 

2. I have tended in the past, to simply hold Ivan Selin 

and his people at arm's length, but now I guess I'm a little 

more concerned with what I see and believe your staff ought to 

give to you for your consideration some responsive action that 

has teeth in it. I believe that a continuation of this type 

thinking by Selin's office is becoming dangerous. 

3. I have asked Paul Worthman to take on such an action 

role, calling on such stalwarts as Lew Allen, Ralph Ford, 

Nevin Palley and others as he sees fit to assist. I have 

asked Paul to keep this as an in-house effort, reporting to 

you only. 

4. Please provide me or Paul any guidance or comment you 

may have. 

Atch 

HANDLE VlA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

Feb 69 

Russell A. Berg 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Director 

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DOD DIRECTIVE 52 D0.1 0 DOES NOT APPi. Y 

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.V,r. Palley 

Admiral Showers 

lA"iG Gen Dex-ii; 

Maj Gen Stewrt 'i, • • 

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Or ..• E Of·THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFE, 

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MEMORANDUM: FOR .DISTRIBUTION LIST 

. ' . . 

SUBJECT: OSD Management of Intelligence (u) 

14 00090448D 

·12 February 1969 

... , ... 

' 

i The enclosed paper analyzes intelligence program management in I 

OSD. It discusses what we believe a.re the major intelligence program 

management problems that exist within DoD and it recommends some 

changes within the Department to rectify some of these problems. The 

analysis was intentionally restricted as much as possible to OSD; the 

problems we believe we have, however, preclude constraining the impact of resulting recommendations to ·osD. Consequently, some of these 

recommendations affect the DoD intelligence agencies and, to a much 

lesser extent, the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, and his 

staff. 

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We would like your comments on this paper. We are interested in 

all your comments and ideas, but it would be helpful to us if you 

would first point out your' agreements and disagreements with the 

alleged facts and their presentation in the paper.. This should, of 

course, include any relevant omissions you th,ink we have made. Second, 

please discuss how the facts, as you see them, cause you to arrive at 

diff~rent assessments of the probl~ms and different recommendations 

than we do, if. such is the case. ._;. 

Our plans are to present a revised version of this paper to the. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense about Monday, February 24, 1969. For.your 

comments to be very helpful, we need them' by close of bus_iness., · 

February 20, 1969. , · 

I., or Ivan Selin, will be happy to discuss this paper with you 

if you feel that would be helpful or more·convenient. 

.. 

t"'age , of l I pages.._ 

Copy s-- of J S:::: copies 

Colonel, USAF 

Director, Intelligence Division I 

Enclosure "J 

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I:NTEILIGENCE ·MANAGEME.L"\'T IN OSD 

INTRODUCTION 

This paper discusses ,intelligence program management in DoD. It recommends procedural changes in OSD, but not reorganization, to improve 

mid ... ra.nge planning for intelligence programs and to coordinate budgets 

and programs with :plans. The paper discuss.es neither management of current intelligence operations nor intelligence estimating • .. CONCLUSIONS 

. . 

1. There is now little coordinated mid-range planning (three to five 

yea.rs a.head) for intelligence going on in DoD. That which is occurring 

is the result of ad hoc efforts. 

2. Without such planning, our intelligence decisions.are dominated_ 

by, first, short term consideratioi;],,s, and, second, by our tendencies to 

develop options, made available by/burgeoning technology, simply because 

they are available. Our major decisions on intelligence forces should be 

affected first, by our important future intelligence needs, and, second, 

·by our advancing technology which aJ.lows us.to do important things we 

_previously could not do and old things less expensively~ 

3. Conduct of mid-range planning is seriously hampered by the lack 

of mission-oriented intelligence force structures and by lack of coordination of the several OSD offices with intelligence res_ponsibilities. 

4. The beginnings of_a mission structure.and some of the analytical 

· •.:'.-: tools to do useful planning and analysis of intelligence forces are 

• .. :_· .. ·available. •:: ··. •. 

5. The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and the National 

Reconnaissance Program (NRP) present unique but different problems in 

doing coordinated mid-range planning. In the case of the CCP, we lack · .. 

basic understanding of the purposes, costs, and effectiveness of the effort involved. Projects of the NRP a.re now excluded from normaJ. DoD review procedures. This practically denies the OSD .staff timely access to 

cost, technical, and performance data required for such planning and for 

adequate support of OSD'participants in the NRP Executive Committee 

(EXCOM). 

l 6. Some of the problems in intelligence planning are similar to 

problems we have met and partially solved in planning our military forces. 

Similar solutions can be applied within OSD to our intelligence planning . 

problems without reorganizing OSD intelligence management or doing away 

now with existing mechanisms such as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program 

and Consolidated Intelligence Program reviews. Changes in the CCP and 

CIP, and in the review of these, might ·be cons~dered after a tria,.l __peri.0.9- _ 

of revised intelligence administration in OSD. '.] Y Jt..:-7 ~ 8 7 f: O g} 

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

.CONTRQI.. SYSTt:MS JOl~T~ 

2 

l. Portions of the Target Oriented Display (TOD) (discussed below) 

should be used as a DoD Five Year Intelligence Plan (FYIP). The FYIP 

would be a mission-oriented display of the DoD intelligence forces and 

finnnc::'iul programs in Program III of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). 

The FYIP would supplement, not replace, the FYDP for intelligence. 

2. An annual cycle of coordinated mid-range planning for intelligence should be started in OSD for CY 69. OSD activities should be supported by studies performed by the major DoD intelligence agencies. 

This planning should be mission-oriented like the FYIP and should serve 

to maintain the FYIP current .. This planning cycle would result in an 

· intelligence planning memorandum in late spring. The purpose of this 

memorandum would be to inform all interested parties of the tentative 

results of the planning exercises. It would also focus issues and 

stimulate discussion of these issues, the techniques for their analysis, 

the mission structure, program costs, effecti~eness criteria, and other 

aspects of intelligence planning. After review and discussion by all 

agencies concerned, this planning would provide the basis for programming and budgeting during the late summer and fall . 

... 3. The major intelligence agencies and OSD should be canvassed for 

major issues for this year's mid-range planning cycle. 

4. Such standard practicesas use of Program Change Requests (PCRs), 

Program Change Decisions (PCDs), and Development Concept Papers (DCPs) 

should be applied to the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). These 

are already used for the CIP and CCP. Such changes would have to be 

. worked out with CIA. These changes' would provide to the OSD staff information needed for mid-range planning and to support the OSD participants 

in the NRP Executive Committee. 

5. Additional BYEMAN billets should be authorized for OSD cost 

analysts~ programming and procurement people ( in OASD(SA), OASD(C) and 

OASD(I&LJ) in sufficient numbers to permit adequate review and analyses 

of the NRP. No more than 10-20 billets would be needed in addition to 

those we already have. Similar access is already available to the_CIP 

and CCP. 

The net result of implementing these recommendations would be to 

make intelligence program management in OSD similar to our management of 

the military forces program. 

BACKGROUNDDepartment of Defense intelligence efforts can be divided into two 

broad classes: national and "tactical" intelligence programs. There is 

no clear dividing line between these· two classes of intelligence efforts, 

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but in general the national programs; are those which support the needs 

of the highest echelons of."the government, and many of the needs of the 

Strategic Air Command. The tactical programs are those which support 

the needs of other military commands. In addition, the national efforts 

are generally tasked by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB); the 

tactical efforts, by military com.~anders in the field. This paper ad• 

dresses the way we plan for the national'programs within DoD. 

3 

DoD's national intelligence efforts are in four major programs: the 

National Reconnaissance Program, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program 

(CCP), the Consolid~ted Intelligence Program (CIP), and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program (MOL). There are some other· projects, e.g., the 

SR-71s, which probably should be considered with these four programs. ' 

The table. below shows the expected costs of these programs in FY 69 and 

FY 70 and the executive agency for each. The fifth major program, the 

Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIA?), lliuounts to about $550 and 

$600 million in FY 69 and FY 70, respectively. Therefore, DoD has 

executive responsibility for about 85% of our national int~lligence efforts. 

Program 

NRP 

CCP 

MOL 

Budget~$ in Billions◊ 

FY 2 FY 70 

-515 ,576 

Executive Agenci 

National Reconnaissance Office 

National Security Agency 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

MOL Program Office, USAF 

·, :'< i _Total , ' ~· . 

DoD oversees these programs in different ways with different results. · 

OSD MANAGEMENT OF THE FOUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRCGRAMS 

The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). The NRP is managed by 

the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development 

in his covert capacity as Director; National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO). 

The NRP was established to integrate and coordinate Air Force and CIA 

overhead reconnaissance projects. The Executive Committee of the .NRP, 

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with the Director, CIA, and 

the President's Scientific Advisor as members, was set up to control the 

NRP and to institutionalize CI.A's participation in this control. The 

Director, Bureau of the Budget; Director, Defense Research and Engineering; 

Assistant Secretary of Defense ( Comptr.oller); and DNRO also participate in· 

EXCOM meetings. 

The EXCOM meets during the year to consider specific matters usually 

placed on the agenda by DNnO. At one of these meetings in the late fall 

the NRP budget is presented. 

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The NRP budget document is published about two weeks prior to this 

meeting. This document p~esents the:budget, broken down by projects and 

activities; the document also includes discussions of issues in the NRP 

·~hich the EXCOM then addresses. Various options for each issue are pre• .,.- sented and the pros and cons of these are discussed. The document pre• 

· sents very little detail 1'."hiQh l)ermits·anal;ysis of how the budget figures 

were arrived at. Also, the budget is not placed in the broader context 

of a five-year plan for the Nill', nor is the Nill' part of a community-wide 

Five Year Intelligence Plan (FYIP). 

NRP projects are excluded fJ:o;::i "normal :;:)epartment of Defense staff 

review" by DoD Directive TS-5105,23, "Xatio:1al Recor,no..issance Office (1"RO)". 

As a result of this exclusion, such documents as Development Concept 

Papers (DCPs) and Program Cnange Requests (?CRs) are not prepared for NRP 

projects. Also, NRP projects are in the Bfilw~ control system. Very few 

OSD procurement, cost, and programming specialists have Bm.-lAl~ access. 

In sum, OSD support of DoD EXCOi.~ members is seriously hampered by 

the following factors: 

1. The NRP is not analyzed as Pal:t of a Five Year Intelligence Plan. 

2. The NRP budget is submitted late. This, coupled with the lack 

of detail and the inaccessibility of the budget to OSD cost, procurement 

and program analysts, prevents adequate review of the budget and the 

· issues presented in it. 

3. The exclusion of the NRP from routine procedures in DoD denies 

some parts of the OSD staff; essential to planning and support of OSD 

EXCOM participants, an opportunity to see the .initiatives being taken 

and the data needed to address NRP issues. 

4. There are no routine periodic planning activities outside the 

· NRO which create an effective dialogue between the OSD staff and the· 

NRO. As a consequence, this avenue for understanding and overseeing the 

NRP is also practically cut off. 

The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CC?). The CCP is documented 

in great detail and submitted to OSD for review in late spring. The CCP 

receives two reviews in OSD. The first occurs soon after its submission 

and is done by a review group chaired by the Assistant Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering (Special Intelligence). This review group consists, in addition, of representatives of the DCI, DIA BoB, NSA, ASD(c), 

and ASD(SA). The CCP review group concentrates on a large number of 

relatively small issues such as addition of individual positions at 

various stations, manpower levels, :rfSA's computer capabilities, and-simi-. 

lar matters. Larger operational problems such as station consolidations 

are also considered. The CCP is p£epared by NSA and the Service Cryptologic Agencies from about January to June. No doubt much of this time is ' .. 

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given up, too, to detailed reviews by the Services and NSA. Finally, 

in the fall, a budget ·review. is held. by ASD( C) and BoB, with partici_pa• 

tion as needed by people from ODDR&E, OASD(A), NSA, and OASD(SA). 

5 

The CCP presents some fundamental problems. First, we do not 

really know how the efforts in the CCP coqtribute to our broader intel-' 

ligence goals, Second, we do not have measures of effectiveness for 

the collection and processing systems in the CCP; in fact, we have not 

yet succeeded in defining the collection systems and their associated 

processing activities in such a way that very much of the money in the 

CCP can be associated directly with the "production process" of collecting and processing foreign signal intelligence. In effect, we know 

neither the marginal costs nor the marginal productivities of various 

physical assets in the CCP, and the CCP appears to be mostly overhead. 

In sum, OSD is largely ineffective in mid-range planning for the 

CCP for at least the following reasons: 

1. We do not understand how CCP projects contribute to broader 

national intelligence goals. 

2. We have neither measures of effectiveness nor effectiveness 

• models which relate NSA's output to financial inputs. 

3. We do not know the direct costs of discrete collection and processing efforts at NSA. 

4. Even if the problems above did not 

CCP tend to be very short range, Also, the 

are never reviewed together. 

exist, our reviews of the 

CCP, the NRP, and the CIP 

,. . The Consolidated Intelligence Program ( CIP). The CIP is handled 

•.· :. ·." much like the CCP except that the review group is chaired by DIA. In 

.· other respects, the nature of the review is much like the CCP review. 

·we know more about the CIP, more about how it contributes to our intelligence efforts and its costs. In other respects, however, the criticisms 

of our handling of the CCP apply to the CIP. 

Manned Orbiting Laboratorl (MOL). The MOL should, by nature, be 

part of the NRP; however, it has been kept separate. MOL has been subjected to superficially routine handling in OSD with theAssistant 

Director (Space Technology), ODDR&.E, being the main .action office. For 

example, DCPs were written for MOL in early 1968 and again in late 1968, 

but neither of these were reviewed by all the OSD staff offices concerned. The MOL program is in fact receiving very little review in OSD. 

SG1E ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS 

There are informative parallels in DoD 

military planning and _programming. 

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·l. In intelligence we have fo~ major programs, three of 

which (CCP, NRP, .~QL) are bui~t around.specific collection technologies. The CIP is, in effect, "all 

other". This parallels the di vision of our military 

forces by sea, air and land warfare. 

2. The'major innovation in _planninG and programming our 

military forces was the adoption of a mission-oriented 

structure for these forces rather than a serviceoriented structure. We have not yet taken thi_s step 

in intelligence, even though we know enough about 

most of'our intelligence forces and missions to stQrl 

moving in this direction. It is clear, however, that 

packaging and planning for intelligence forces by their 

outputs is more difficult and complex than doing the 

same for military forces. 

3. Technology is tending to determine what we do in :i,ntelligence rather than our future·needs for intelli-

_gence. As in other fields, available options exceed 

our needs. We therefore find ourselves developing 

systems for intelligence which are either marginal improvements to existing systems or s,ystems i.Qr w~ 

there is, at best, a questionable~d. This results 

in large part from the mid-range planning deficiencies 

cited earlier. This problem parallels what was occurring in the late 195Os and early 196Os with such pro-. 

grams as SKY.BOLT, the B-7O, NAVAHO, and DYNASOAR. · 

.4. There is now no coordinated relatively disinterested 

statement of future intelligence needs. This is much 

like the situation that existed in strategic forces 

prior to the development of the National Intelligence 

Projections for Planning about 1963. The lack of such 

projections of the future inhibit our ability to plan 

ahead. 

SCME CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 

1. Establish an output oriented Five Year Intelligence Plan. 

l 

2. Start annual coordinated mid-range planning activities in OSD. 

3. Normalize OSD administration of the NR.P. 

A Five-Year Intelligence Plan. The Target Oriented Display, Phase 

II, to be completed in late May, 1969, will result in a display of intelligence forces and financial programs by a set of intelligence missions. The forces will be for eight .;-,,rs, the finances for five, just 

as in the FYDP. The missions into ~: · ~•xly all DoD intelligence 

forces will fall are: 

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Search Search of earth's surface for things of intelligence 

interest-generaily··this will 'include overhead systems such 

as CORONA (KH-4) ·and HEXAGON (KH-9). 

Forces Intelligence - Surveillance to determine order of battle-• 

Signal Intelligence (SIGI.Tu'T), KH-4, KH-9, and G.A.i.''1.BIT (KH-8) 

typify the systems that will be found in this mission package. 

Weapon Systems Characteristics - Scientific and technical intelligence on foreign weapons--here will be the GANBIT-3 ~KH-8)' I: ·::· M:ed Orbitio,i ;•h:rot. :dlrn-7 D) fh. Atomic Eile;gy 

e ec ion ystem, etc. t is li;tely that_ this package will 

.break down into several smaller ones. 

Tactical warning - Warning of imminent military ac~ions--systems 

are the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, System 949, 

a warning satellite, SIGINT, over-the-horizon radars, etc. 

Contingency Intelligence - Quick reaction manned and unmanned 

reconnaissa.nce--mainly SR-71s, drones, U-2s, etc. 

Counter Intelligence - Mainly investigative activities and some 

counter espionage. 

M,apping 2 Charting and Geodesy - Self-explanatory. 

Processing Support - Pr.ocessing program elements which contribute 

to more than one of the missions above. 

' 

7 

Production - Production program elements generally cannot be missionoriented. This package would include these elements. 

2i 

General Support - Overhead. 

Much of the CCP effort will not fit into this mission structure. We 

are currently trying, as part of the TOD exercise, to develop a better 

understanding of the :role of CCP activities. It is likely that a 

"strategic warning" or "indications" mission for these forces will be 

identified. These packages may change, and no doubt we will find problems with some of them (we are uneasy about the Forces Intelligence and 

·weapon Systems Characteristics Packages, especially), but we believe 

these missions are reasonable for starting a mission-oriented approach 

to program management of intelligence. 

Mid-Range Planning Activities •. Many of our collection systems have ' 

lead times of several years. Because of this, we need to plan ahead to 

be sure we have what we need in the future. We do this for our military 

forces with the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and the DPMs. 

The JSOP is prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DPMs by Systems 

alysis. There is no military staff for intelligence corresponding to 

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the Joint Staff for military programs. Consequently, there is no JSOP 

for intelligence. (The Jo·~nt Staff prepares an intelligence annex to 

the JSOP, but it is only a very general statement of intelligence needs.) 

Similarly, there is no DPM for intelligence. Such a DPM was proposed 

in April, 1968, but the Deputy Secretary of Defense chose not to initiate such a document then, with its supporting planning activities, beM 

cause of other pending decisions. We understand these decisions had to 

do with reorganizing the OSD staff for intelligence. 

We believe that rectifying mid-ran6e planning need·s in intelligence 

management are independent of the organizationaJ. structure. For example, 

if an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD(I)) were to be 

established (one of the more radical reorganization proposals), he would 

need to do mid-range planning and therefore would need a document like a 

DPM to report the outcomes of this planning; to write such a document, 

he would need to work with a mission-oriented Five Year Intelligence Plan. 

Such a plan is even more important without the centralized staffing an 

.ASD(I) would provide . 

. Intelligence planning should address major issues by mission pack-

. ages so that decisions on these can be made early enough to affect the 

FY 71 budget. The basic approach to such planning should be to explore 

the adequacy of the mission packages to meet future intelligence needs. 

· The planning process should also present to the decision makers the costs 

and benefits of satisfying various levels of intelligence needs so that 

the resource implications of future intelligence requirements as well as 

the benefits of fulfilling these can,be treated explicitly. 

Initiating such activity in OSD need not replace for now any of the 

reviews conducted of the four programs. The pr.oposed activities would 

not replace the EXCOM or anything of that sort. Rather, an intelligence 

planning cycle should result in a clearer presentation of issues and an 

· improved environment within which to conduct these reviews; hence, 

initiating mid-range planning now offers potential gains without risking 

the existing system of review. After such a planning and programming 

cycle, some changes in the existing activities might be desirable, but 

that can and should be left until results of a normalized cycle are in. 

Normalization of OSD Administration of the NRP. The OSD staff should 

have two obligations relating to the NRP .. The first is to include ~tin 

mid-range planning. The second is to do that staff work needed to support 

OSD participants in the EXCOM. Both of these obligations require early 

routine access to virtually aJ.l facets of the NRP. The best way to 

· achieve such access is to get OSD and the NRO working together coopera-

. tively on such docwnents as.Development Concept Papers for developmental 

NRP projects, Program Change Requests and.Program C'nange Decisions.· 

These documents, if properly used, would also give access to the CIA 

staff in support of the Director, Cent~al Intelligence Agency. Through 

these mechanisms, both CIA and OSD representatives to the EXCO.~ could be 

much better supported. 

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Obviously, because of the CIA's role in the ~'RP, the details of 

such changes would have to be worked out with CIA. ' .. 11 . . "' ~: 

It should be emphasi~ed, also, that a change in the role of EXCQ~ 

,is not being proposed, but only that OSD participants in EXCCM be supported better. 

ANALYTIC CAPABfiITIES TO Su?PORT MID-RA}JGZ rn1'ELLIGENCE PLAi""T.NING 

9 

Quantitative analysis of intelligence can be broken down into three 

main problems. First, we need to be able to determine the value of given 

pieces or classes of intelliaence information, Second, we n~ed to be 

able to estimate the intelligence forces needed and the costs to acquire 

such information. Third, we need to be able to· determine optimum forces 

. ( that is, minimum cost forces) to acquire such information:: · 

We are able to solve the problem of intelliGence value only in some 

very limited cases. If the intelligence involved is useful mainly for 

our strategic forces, our ability to .analyze the value of information 

tends to be betta.one Designing intelligence· forces to meet -specified requirements_ can beLin a number of cases, notably in the search package 

and the contingency intelligence package. In these cases, too, we can 

usually find the minimum cost forces to satisfy given requirements. In 

other mission packages we have not yet demonstrated a comparable quantitative ability. 

Useful work can be done on the other mission packages and it is 

likely that some of this can be quantitative; however, the nature of the 

uses of intelligence and the nature of intelligence systems will preclude 

quantitative analyses of the elegan,ce of those done for strategic forces. 

These quantitative analytical difficulties ar~, however, insufficient 

reasons not to go ahead with a mission-oriented approach to intelligence 

· planning. Displays of mission-related forces, the discussions of mission objectives and performance criteria, the structuring of future intelligence requirements by mission, and the refocussing of our attention 

from the near future to the more distant future will all help to sharpen 

. issues. Even qualitative analyses are improved if they are properly 

structured. 

A POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE PL.AllNING CYCLE 

If we instituted an annual planning cycle as being proposed here, 

it might proceed as follows: 

l~ December and January - Define major issues and initiate studies 

. of these. 

2. February through May Study the major issues. 

HANDLE Vlf\ 

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4. July and Augu~t. - All agencies review the intelligence planning 

memorandum and comment on ·-i-ii·.·: Revised memorandum _published in late July. 

PCRs submitted to make programs conform to revised planning. Reclama. 

Pals also submitted as required. PCDs completed by late August. 

5. September - Final version of intelligence planning memorandum 

published. 

6. October through November - Receive and review the budget 

submissions. 

The intelligence planning memorandum would result in resolution of 

major issues; the PCRs, PCDs, and EXCQ."1 actions would implement these 

resolutions in our programs, and the budget review would provide a last 

detailed examination of these programs in the current and budget years 

just before commitment to the budget. This is the approach now used for 

military forces planning., programming and budgeting. 

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