-101.1—StrUr a.

THE SECRETARY OF OFFENSE.

WAWIINGIOr► ?I C 10191 anZERVIMIN

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: National Space Policy

In 1966 the NSAM 156 Committee established a policy for

the conduct of civil remote earth sensing and affirmed guidelines for the quality of earth-looking sensors which should

be employed for the civil space programs.

Recently NASA, DOD and NRO, with the advice of CIA, have

held detailed discussions regarding the evolving international

political considerations of remote sensing, protection of

sensitive space technology and public release of space data

and information. Attached is a staff analysis paper which

resulted fro© the discussions.

To facilitate acquiring Presidential guidance in those

areas of space policy, I request that yell convene an interagency group similar to the old NSAM 156 Committee, augmented

as appropriate by Agriculture, Interior and Commerce, to

assess the relevant national political and.information policies

and update them as necessary and to assist in the interpret:mien

of the policies. I have asked Assistant Secretary Ellsworth

and DNRO Plummer to act as principals from the DOD. Also

attached are suggested Terms of Reference for the review which

are agreeable to MAU.

2 Attachmants

Staff Analysis Paper

Tema of Reference

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NASA/NRO/DOD STAFF ANALYSIS

OF

REMOTE EARTH SENSING ACTIVITY

INTRODUCTION 

This report reviews some of the technical and

considerations involving the relationships between

and civil earth sensing programs and technologies.

was accomplished by an ad hoc committee from NASA,

and NRO.

political

military

The review

DOD, CIA

PROBLEM

There is a Defense Department concern that civil spaceborne earth sensing is perceived by many to resemble classical

satellite reconnaissance activity. Even without regard to the

quality or information content of data being returned from

spacer the—overt—civil programs of routine overflight and data

acquisition (especially from denied areas) is considered by

DOD to be a reconnaissance-like activity that could lead to

international political confrontations that in turn could

impact the current free exercise of the space environment by

the NRO for intelligence collection or by NASA for scientific

activity. Defense also believes that there is a risk that

civil programs may adversely impact the interests of the NRO

and DOD through premature release of reconnaissance-related

technology and/or release of data of military or intelligence

value to other nations. DOD recognizes that NASA, working

with other civil agencies has the responsibility for scientific

research in space and for developing space applications to meet

the economic, social, and policy objectives of the United States.

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BACKGROUND 

The current national policy is contained in the report of

the NSAM 156 Committee on the "Political and Securityy4Aspects

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of Non-Military Applications of Satellite Earth Sensing,'

July 11, 1966. The report recommended:

Continued protection of the NRP by continuing

consideration of the political and security effects of unclassified earth sensing activities.

Continued development of civil earth-sensing

programs looking toward operational systems of economic value.

Restriction of civil space-acquired imagery to

20-meter resolution. and restriction of future capabilities

discussion to 10-15 feet.

Consideration of the relative merits and costs

of manned space systems, unmanned satellites, aircraft, and

other alternatives for civil earth resources surveys.

e. Establishment of security procedures covering

civil use of NRP-developed sensors.

NASA ACTIVITIES

NASA has undertaken a broad range of experimental earth

resources survey activities using both aircraft and spacecraft.

LANDSAT-1 (ERTS-A) the first dedicated earth resources satellite,

was launched in 1972. The primary sensing instrument is a fourchannel multispectral scanner. The earth imagery from this

instrument is built up from individual pixels each covering a

ground area of some 80 meters by 80 meters; the resultant imagery

therefore has a ground resolution of about 150 meters in the

classical photographic sense. LANDSAT-2, a duplicate of

LANDSAT-1, was launched in January of 1975 to replace the first

satellite and to provide continuing experimental earth coverage.

LANDSAT data are returned by direct telemetry, to ground stations

within line of sight of the satellite or stored on-board for

later read out. In addition to the several U.S. ground stations,

there are LANDSAT ground receiving and data processing stations

in operation or under procurement by the governments of Canada,

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Brazil, Italy, Iran and Zaire; several other foreign governments

are expected to invest in similar stations in the near future.

All LANDSAT data, whether received in the U.S. or abroad, are

in the public domain and any individual is free to purchase

copies thereof. In the U.S., the Interior Department, NOAA,

and the Agriculture Department sell LANDSAT data through

established data centers. Release of all NASA-acauired earth

survey data to the public domain has been a hallmark of the

civil space program of the United States; this policy was

established to blunt concerns about potential unfair U.S.

exploitation of the data and to encourage wide utilization

of this new resource management tool.

Many investigators, foreign and domestic, are involved in

the continuing analysis of LANDSAT data for scientific and

operational purposes. Foreign and domestic commercial interests

are also using these data for their own investigations. A

number of U.S. agencies are using the data for resource investigations. In addition, the United States Government is experimenting with the LANDSAT data to help improve estimates of U.S.

and overseas crop production. For this experiment, LANDSAT-2

is routinely acquiring data from all major wheat-producing areas

of the world, including the Sino-Soviet region. The Secretary

of State, at the World Food Conference in November, 1974,

described this experiment as potentially contributing to solution of the world's food problem. NASA expects LANDSAT-C to

be launched in 1977 and to operate through early 1980. LANDSAT-C

will have some added capabilities over those of the first two

LANDSAT vehicles. Recent cost-benefit studies, although not

conclusive, indicate that an operational earth resources survey

system could yield positive economic benefits. NASA is continuing its broadly based R6D program in sensor development, data

handling and processing techniques, and information delivery

to establish the feasibility of such an operational civil system.

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES 

The satellite reconnaissance program has evolved since

1961 into a sophisticated program stressing advanced technology

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and long-lived imagery and electronic collection systems. The

U.S. has no other dependable means of acquiring stratetic

intelligence data from within the heartland of the Soviet Union

and China. Since 1972, the classified satellites have become

the principal means of verifying the SALT agreements. In addition, the military services have become increasingly dependent

upon the classified satellites for strategic warning and for

providing intelligence information to tactical commanders. In

1973, the President authorized the DCI to release such of the

satellite photography to the intelligence community at the SECRET

level. Because of the critical importance of maintaining this

unique and vital intelligence asset, extraordinary security

measures are employed to protect the U.S. reconnaissance program

against international imposed political constraints and from

revelation of its technical capabilities and limitations.

ISSUES

International Political Considerations 

The United States policy is to employ space for legal and

peaceful purposes in accordance with its interpretation of the

doctrine of the United Nations Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space. Russia and the United States accept the fact that the

other is conducting satellite reconnaissance activities but

neither nation publicly acknowledges that it conducts such programa. The basis of acceptance of the classified reconnaissance

program has, therefore, been tacit. The U.S. has for many years

kept certain heads of friendly governments aware of the classified

program and, for example, shares intelligence data with the U.K.

Because of minimum program visibility, no third party has had a

diplomatic or legalistic basis for challenging this activity

and the classified program has not been seriously threatened

to date with internatioaal constraint. The United Nations

Outer Space Committee has proved to be a benign forum for

nations to debate space matters. From 1963 until very recently,

there had been little serious debate concerning the use of

space for information gathering purposes. Remote sensing is

currently a subject of discussion from two standpoints--the issue

of unconstrained distribution by the acquiring nation of potential].)

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valuable national resources data, and the issue of unilateral

acquisition of such data without prior consent of the governments involved. Brazil, (which has a dedicated LANDSAT ground

receiving station), and Argentina have tabled a draft treaty

which would require prior approval for both acquisition and

release of data taken over other countries; other Latin nations

have supported this political posture. The Legal Subcotinittea

of the UN Outer Space Committee discussed these in February

with no action being proposed this year. The present United

States policies of unconstrained data acnuisition and dissemination are being called into serious question. The•U.S. would

prefer no distribution constraints, but is willing to abide by

a consensus on this matter; the U.S. will not accept constraints

on acquisition. Because of the nature of the current discussions,

however, Defense feels that there is a prospect that unconstrained

military space activities will be challenged by inference and

that if this challenge becomes codified the U.S. would unilaterally accept some order of accommodation. NASA, on the other

hand, believes that the growing foreign investment in ground

stations for earth resources data, the inherent value of the

civil program to all participants, and the growing sophistication of nations about space capabilities will mandate for

global acceptance of unconstrained remote sensing, and that

military activities will therefore not be endangered.

Protection of Technology 

Technical guidelines used by NASA and the NRO, as described

earlier, have been in being since 1965. The limitations on

releasable photography were waived by the NSA"! 156 Committee

when NASA received approval to employ a 10-meter resolution

camera system on its SNYLAB vehicle and then to release this

imagery to the public. The DOD, NRO and NtSA have close

relationships in terms of information being exchanged about

the nature of earth observing satellite technology and techniques of data acquisition. The formal mechanisms for overseeing this joint technology exchange have, however, fallen

into disuse and technology discussions have been handled on

an ad hoc basis over the past several years. Since 1966, the

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technology relationship between DOD, KRO, and NASA has become

more complex. The Defense Department feels that there has

been a growing convergence of NRO and NASA technology and that

the proposed use of advanced earth sensing technologies by NASA

could lead to compromise of NRO capabilities.

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associations with the Isbecoming more aggress ve In pursuing corporate interests by trying to market reconnaissance

developed technology for civil use. For example, NASA is interested in a standard earth observation package for routine use

on the Space Transportation System.

Public Release of Space Data and Information 

The Defense Department views the present national policy

of open release of all civil program space-ac quired data as

having a potentially adverse impact upon DOD (this policy is

at present limited to meteorological satellite and R&D program

data only). NASA believes that any significant change in this

policy would create world-wide suspicions of U.S. motives and

would result in a serious international confrontation on all

space programs that then could result in curtailment of

classified activities.

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David WLIMIson, Jr.

Assistant Administrator

for Special Projects

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

24 April 1975

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A preliminary DOD contractor survey indicates that, in

the absence of alternative data sources, data from current

and proposed NASA programs could potentially be of military

value to adversary nations. At the same time, there is a

growing recognition of the value of civil space information

by U.S. civil agencies and by the private sector. The classified programs acquire mainly foreign military intelligence

data, most of which is not of use to the civil sector and all

of which is classified and not releasable to the public.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 

A fundamental concern identified by the DOD appears to be

one of a growing convergence in technology and in data quality

between the NRP and the civil space programs. It is recognized

that there are national and international benefits to be gained

from continuing a civil earth observation program which is

acceptable to the other nations. The DOD believes that extreme

care should be exercised so that NASA's programs, either from

technical or political standpoints, do not lead to constraints

on the NRP, or in fact, become a reconnaissance activity of

serendipitous benefit to other governments. The issues to be

considered, therefore, appear to be:

How .should civil and military programs be coordinated and managed to avoid disclosure of classified capabilities

or of military valuable data and information?

To what extent do classified programs risk constraint in the event of international opposition to civil

remote sensing from space? •

airs4A/9614: 1,‘

Harold S. Coyle, Jr., •41=

Deputy Director for

Plans and Policy

National Reconnaissance

Office

24 April 1975

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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-SRE'RET/NOFORN Attachment 

November 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPACE POLICY COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: Status Report

Attached is a copy of a status report that I have

sent to Mr. Sisco as Chairman of the Space Policy Committee. It identifies certain issues regarding the

nature and timing of the current study which I would hope

will form the agenda for next Tuesday's meeting. I am

providing this report to all members of the Working Group,

and suggest that you utilize it in briefing your principals so that the meeting can focus on a common agenda.

Any member of the Committee is free of course, to raise

any other topics that he feels should be addressed.

In order to facilitate a full discussion at the

meeting next week, I hope that each member of the Committee will bring with him no more than one adviser,

and that observers on the Committee will not feel it

necessary to bring staff support.

Leon Sloss

Chairman of the

Working Group

Attachment

Distribution 

NSC - Dr. David Elliott

NASA - Mr. Neil Hosenball

DOD/ISA - Dr. James Wade

OMB - Mr. Emory Donelson

JCS - Capt R. Curran, USN

CIA - Dr. Sayre Stevens

Air Force - LtCol Harold Coyle

White House Staff - Mr. Gus Weiss

NOM - Dr. John Townsend

USGS - Mr. Ma. Radlinsky

ACDA - Dr. Amos Katz

-SEeRET/NOFORN 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S's

SISCRLPT/NOPORN November 13, 1975

TO: Mr. Sisco, Chairman

Standing Committee on Space Policy

NSC Under Secretaries Committee

FROM: Leon Sloss irman of the Working Group

Space Policy Committee - Status Report and Agenda for Discussion 

Introduction - The Standing Committee on Space Policy (SPC), is

to meet on November 18. This report will advise you and other

members of the Committee of the status of the Working Group's

activities and identify subjects for discussion at the meeting.

This status report has been prepared by me after discussion

with other members of the Working Group, but it is not a consensus report. As you will see from the discussion below there

are differing views with. respect to the way the Committee should

proceed in its future work. Thus, I believe the main objective

at this first meeting should be for the Committee to provide

the Working Group further guidance for the study it.i p t' nnnetuct.

Status - The directive which established the Standing Committee

as an arm of the Under Secretaries Committee charges it with

"review(ing) the relationship between civil and intelligence

space programs, and any relevant international considerations."

The Committee is to propose to the President him his consideration "appropriate new policies or changes to existing policies,

and be a forum for the interpretation and implementation of

such policies." This means that the Standing Committee has both

an initial task, i.e. the review of current policies, and a continuing responsibility, i.e. to monitor and interpret policies

in this area. To accomplish these two objectives we have initiated

a study of military and civil space-based earth-sensing programs

which will review major issues and consider policy options. This

will be the first of what will probably be a series of studies

of aspects of space policy covered by the Committee's terms of

reference. At the same time, I have established liaison with

the principal agencies involved in space activities to assure

that the Committee is made aware promptly of emerging policy

issues that it should address.

-SECRET/NOPORN 

GDS
-SECRIPP/NOPORN 

2

We have received draft contributions to the initial study

from the various participating agencies. We are now in the

process of reorganizing this material into two main papers. A

background paper will describe current policies and programs

on both the civil and intelligence side, and will discuss the

present domestic and international environment as it bears upon

space policy. An issues paper will describe the major policy

issues that are emerging from the study and discuss the Ems

and cons of current policy and several alternatives. I expect

to circulate a first draft of these two papers later this month.

We will then need to discuss these papers in the Working Group.

I cannot now foresee how long this will take, but 1 would hope

to have these papers ready for consideration by the SPC by the

end of the year. There are differences within the Committee

regarding the pace of this schedule. More important these

differences relate to the scope and nature of the initial report which is discussed further below.

The Objectives of the Initial Study - There are some members of

the Working Group who believe that the Committee should discuss and establish the goals of the Committee. I believe that

these are adequately set forth in the directive establishing

the Committee. It may be more to the point to discuss the

objectives of the initial study and there may be proposals from

the DOD representatives to do so. A brief discussion of objectives could be helpful in providing guidance to the Working

Group, although detailed drafting of language should, in my

view, be left to the Working Group. Even if the objectives of

the study are considered by the Committee, in my view more detailed guidance is needed on the scope and nature of the initial

study.

Scope of the Initial Study - The principal issue on which the

working group now requires guidance is the scope and nature of,

the initial study. I believe that there is general agreement

in the Working Group that it is not possible to encompass all

issues related to the relationship between civil and military

space programs in a single study, and thus that the initial

study should focus on earth-sensing programs. However, there

are differences as to the issues that should be addressed in

the initial study.

In order to provide a focus for the Committee's discussion

I have identified five major policy issues that have emerged in

my discussions to date with the Working Group members (Tab 1).

-SEGRIFIVNOPORN 
-SEeRET/NOPORN 

3

I believe that these should be the framework for the initial

study, and that they need to be considered together as they are

inter-related. Other members of the Working Group believe we

should focus initially on one or two of these issues which

they consider to be most urgent. Still others believe that

in view of the complexity of the subject the Committee should

defer a decision on which issues to address until the Background Paper can be prepared and considered by the Committee.

The Committee needs to decide whether:

The issues described in Tab 1 ought to be the

focus for the initial study;

If not, whether one or several of these issues

should be the focus for the initial study, or

(c) Whether to defer a decision on what issues to

address until the Background Paper has been completed and

reviewed by the Committee.

Liaison with Other Groups - To carry out the continuing functions

of the SPC effectively, .t will b: =ccaosary to establish

liaison with other groups involved in space activities. In addition to the members of the SPC, who should be urged to bring

emerging policy issues before the Committee at an early date,

there are two groups whose activities have an important bearing

on the responsibilities of the SPC. One is a recently established

User Committee, chaired by Interior which is responsible for consolidating user requirements of US Government agencies for classified imagery of the US. I have asked the Chairman of this Committee, Mr. Radlinsky of the USGS, to attend the SPC meeting as

an observer, and he has agreed that policy issues emerging in

his Committee will be referred to the SPC. As an initial step,

this Committee is to prepare guidelines for its activities and

submit them to the SPC for its review.

DOD and NASA have arrangements to identify technical issues

that arise between their programs. A joint paper on earth-sensing

issues has already been prepared, and is a useful input to our

study. A similar review of ocean-sensing issues is now being

undertaken. These agencies have agreed that policy issues will

be referred to the SPC. However, there is a need to assure that

there will be an opportunity for the SPC, to be involved in

judgments as to what is a policy issue. I have asked DOD and

NASA to keep me closely informed during their identification of

SEASAT issues, and later studies of a similar nature that they

-6BeRET/NOFORN 
—5BeRET/NOPORN 

4

may undertake. I believe it would be useful for,you to

review these arrangements at the meeting so that the SPC

members are aware of them.

Proposed Agenda - At the SPC meeting on November 18 I propose the following agenda based on the above status report:

A brief discussion of the objectives) of the initial

study,

- A general discussion of the policy issues identified

in Tab 1 with the objective of the Committee providing further guidance on the scope and timing of

the initial report.

A review of the liaison arrangements discussed above,

emphasizing the responsibility of each agency on the

Committee to bring to the attention of the group

policy issues that should be addressed in the

Committee.

•

•

Attachment:

PM:LSloss/res 11/12/75 x22478

-S1ERET/'NOPORN 
Tab 1 .

-SSCRETINOPORN 

Major Policy Issues 

What is the appropriate level of technology to be 

employed in civil remote earth-sensing programs, and what 

would- be the consequences of selective classification of the 

data acquired from these programs? 

To address this issue we will need to consider the type

and quality of data required by civil users, the value of

activities to which the data will be applied, alternative

means of collecting similar data and any risks . to U.S. national

security involved in improving the quality of the product collected and released by civil programs. It will also be necessary to assess the potential military value both to the U.S.

and other nations of the data that will be acquired by proposed civil programs. Risks that need to be assessed in connection with this and the following issue include: (a) any risk

of compromising sensitive capabilities, (b) any risk of

compromising intelligence objectives and operations, (c) any

potential intelligence value of data to other countries, and

(d) any risks to tacit political acceptance of remote earthsensing. We will also need to consider international implications of classifying or limiting the technical capabilities

of civil programs in light of the fact that a number of countries

are benefitting from our open, civilian earth-sensing program.

Another important consideration in assessing the importance of

further technical improvements is whether and to what extent

data from classified programs can meet the needs of civil users.

This leads to the second issue.

Can broader use be made of classified data collected by 

,

•

earth-sensing intelligence satellites for civil purposes? 

To address this issue it will be necessary to make judgments

about the risks to national security of removing data from its

present special compartments either to make it more widely available at a lower classification or possibly to declassify

selected data entirely. It also will be necessary to assess

the value to civil users of intelligence satellite data at

the secret level and the unclassified level as compared to data

from other sources.

3. Should the U.S. continue the current policy of classifying the "fact of", satellite earth-sensing intelligence operations?

This question arises because certain agencies feel that use

of classified data for civilian purposes would be facilitated

-SECREFIVNOFORN 
-SEGBEW/NOFORN 

2

if the ultimate source of the data could be acknowledged at ,

least in general terms. The question would also, of course,

arise if consideration were given to declassifying certain

data. We will need to take into account the possibility and consequences of Congressional pressures to acknowledge "fact of"

and to evaluate in some detail what security risks could flow

from acknowledging "fact of" and facts about intelligence

satellites.

Should the U.S. alter current policies of open distribution of imagery acquired from unclassified earth-sensing 

satellites? 

This issue involves judgments about the extent and significance of foreign opposition to remote earth-sensing and

open distribution of data, and the long-range effect on foreign

attitudes of an open dissemination or controlled dissemination

policy. Of particular importance is an assessment of any risk*

to intelligence operations if international opposition to remote

earth-sensing should be come significant, and the impact on U.S.

foreign policy objectives of any change in the policy of open

dissemination.

Should chances be made in the current organization and

management of remote earth-sensing programs? 

This will involve judgments about the impact on the objectives of the two types of programs of combining certain functions and about the savings and management efficiencies that

could be achieved through a variety of possible changes.

We have also identified several issues of a legal nature.

One has to do with whether or not it is appropriate to use

satellite data for law enforcement purposes, and just what constitutes law enforcement use. A second type of legal issue

could arise if classified data becomes involved in litigation

or if the Freedom of Information Act is employed to force the

revelation of classified sources. I have asked L to prepare

a memorandum for us on these issues which will then have to be

discussed with experts in other agencies. Until we can determine more clearly the nature of these legal issues, I am

reserving judgment about their inclusion in the initial report.
-TOVSECRET- Tfilli_A -at I rr ifEVITI C

COhlrA0.. Vet.?

TERMS OF REFERENCE 

DOD, NASA and CIA have established a Program Review Board

to coordinate on issues relevant to space programs of NASA and

DOD. To assist the Review Board, the following areas should

be addressed.

1. To what extent have the political and technical environments

evolved since the 1966 NSA ► 156 Committee policy recommendations

as a result of the initiation of civil earth resources and earth

science programs?

What international benefits have accrued to the U.S.

since the advent of the Earth Resources Program? How can

potential benefits be optimized?

Should the U.S. Government enhance unilateral benefits

from the civil programs? Should the civil data release policies

be made more stringent?

Should the civil sector receive greater technological

and/or data benefits from military programs than is presently

the case? If so, when should it be done?

Is the DOD/NASA analysis an accurate assessment of the

interagency group views? What amendments should be made to the

analysis? •

2. To what extent has the political environment become less

benign to the conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program

Has this been as a result of the openly conducted earth resources

And earth science program?

a. What is the assessment of the current dialogs at the

United Nations or in other international forums? Is the U.S.

position likely to lead to a change in the modus operandi of

the National Reconnaissance Program?

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b.' To what extent and under what conditiOns should the

civil earth resource and earth science programs continue to

openly survey other countries?

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