[Cite as State v. Schroeder, 2016-Ohio-849.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 LUCAS COUNTY 

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-14-1228 

 

 Appellee Trial Court No. CR0200701938 

v. 

James E. Schroeder DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: March 4, 2016 

* * * * * 

 Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

 David F. Cooper, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

 Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 

 Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 

* * * * * 

OSOWIK, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a September 30, 2014 judgment of the Lucas County 

Court of Common Pleas, denying appellant’s motion to vacate postrelease control in 

connection to appellant’s 2007 felony conviction of two counts of unlawful sexual 

conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), felonies of the third degree. For 

the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court. 
2.

{¶ 2} Appellant, James E. Schroeder, sets forth the following assignment of error: 

 The trial court erred by failing to vacate Mr. Schroeder’s post release 

control. 

{¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. In 2007, the 

Lucas County Sheriff’s Department was contacted by concerned parents of various 

teenage boys regarding a pattern of conduct by appellant. It came to the attention of 

these parents that appellant was furnishing their sons drugs and alcohol and ultimately 

initiating and engaging in oral and anal sex with the boys. 

{¶ 4} The investigation revealed that the minors pursued by appellant would be 

approximately 13 years of age when initially approached by appellant. The subsequent 

investigation included a search of appellant’s residence and extensive interviews with the 

victims. The investigation uncovered a wealth of irrefutable evidence that established 

repeated unlawful sexual conduct between appellant and minor males over a period of 

many years. In addition, appellant possesses an extensive criminal history, including 

multiple past felony sexual offenses, and multiple drug and alcohol offenses. 

{¶ 5} On May 3, 2007, appellant was indicted on four counts of unlawful sexual 

conduct with a minor, in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A), felonies of the third degree. On 

August 21, 2007, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to 

two of the four counts pending against him. In exchange, the remaining charges were 

dismissed. 
3.

{¶ 6} On September 26, 2007, appellant, appellant’s counsel, and the trial judge all 

reviewed and executed a detailed written document entitled, “Notice Pursuant to R.C. 

2929.19(B)(3).” Notably, the first sentence of this document unambiguously states, “A 

term of post-release control after prison will be imposed following prison release for an 

F1 or F2, a felony sex offense as defined in RC 2967.28 or for an F3.” 

{¶ 7} As applicable to this matter, appellant pled no contest to two F3 sexual 

offenses, thereby clearly triggering the imposition of postrelease control. In conjunction 

with this, the record further reflects that in the written plea agreement itself, executed by 

appellant and affirmed by him during the colloquy process, states, “If I am sentenced to 

prison for a felony one or a felony sex offense, after my prison release I will have 5 years 

of post-release control under conditions determined by the parole board.” Lastly, the 

2007 sentencing entry clearly reflects that appellant was furnished, “post release control 

notice under R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) and R.C. 2967.28.” 

{¶ 8} On September 26, 2007, at the request of counsel for appellant, the R.C. 

2929.19(B)(3) notice documentation was executed by appellant, counsel for appellant, 

and the trial court. The completion of appellant’s sentencing was continued until 

October 1, 2007. On October 1, 2007, appellant was sentenced to a total term of 

incarceration of seven years. The sentencing entry reflects in pertinent part, “Defendant 

given * * * post release control notice under R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) and R.C. 2967.28.” 
4.

{¶ 9} On May 16, 2014, as the conclusion of appellant’s term of incarceration 

approached, appellant filed a motion to vacate postrelease control alleging trial court 

error in the imposition of postrelease control such that it is void. 

{¶ 10} On September 30, 2014, the trial court denied appellant’s motion, holding 

in pertinent part, 

 The Sixth District has released numerous cases holding a simple 

reference to the applicable statutes [R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) and 2967.28] is 

sufficient to give the offender notice that the court authorized a post-release 

control sanction. In view of the above, the court finds that the court 

properly notified defendant of his post-release control sanction at the time 

of sentencing and properly incorporated the notice into its sentencing entry. 

This appeal ensued. 

{¶ 11} In the assignment of error, appellant maintains that the 2007 imposition of 

postrelease control as a component of appellant’s sentence was defective and, therefore, 

void. We do not concur. In support of this appeal, appellant alleges, “Here, the trial 

court did not impose any period of post-release control at any time.” The record of 

evidence in this matter does not comport with appellant’s position. 

{¶ 12} We have carefully reviewed and considered this matter. We find that the 

record of evidence demonstrates that appellant was explicitly and properly notified on 

multiple occasions that postrelease control could and would be imposed as a result of the 

proceedings against him. 
5.

{¶ 13} On August 21, 2007, appellant executed a written plea agreement explicitly 

attesting to his knowledge that he was entering pleas of no contest to several third-degree 

felony sexual offenses and that a felony sex offense sentencing will result in, “5 years of 

post-release control under conditions determined by the parole board.” The plea 

agreement goes on to further attest to appellant’s understanding that, “[I]f I violate any of 

the conditions imposed, I could be given a longer period under court control, greater 

restrictions, or a prison term from the basic range.” 

{¶ 14} On September 26, 2007, appellant, appellant’s counsel, and the trial court 

all reviewed, executed, and certified a written notice to appellant performed pursuant to 

R.C. 2929.19(B)(3). This document consistently states, “A term of post-release control 

after prison will be imposed following prison release for an F1 or F2, a felony sex offense 

as defined in R.C. 2967.28 or for an F3.” Appellant subsequently entered pleas to thirddegree felony offenses. This same document further delineated, “For violating postrelease control conditions, the adult parole authority or parole board may impose a more 

restrictive or longer control sanction, including a nine-month prison term for each 

violation.” The acknowledgment provision at the conclusion of the document and 

executed by all involved unambiguously stated, “Defendant understands all components 

and consequences of sentencing at this time. Defendant acknowledges receiving a copy 

of this form, completely reading it and understanding all components of any sentence the 

Court imposes.” 
6.

{¶ 15} On October 1, 2007, appellant’s bifurcated sentencing hearing was 

completed. The corresponding sentencing judgment entry clearly reflects, “Defendant 

given * * * post release control notice under R.C. 2929.19(B)(3) and R.C. 2967.28.” 

{¶ 16} In conjunction with all of the foregoing, we note that the underlying dispute 

in this matter is governed by this court’s ruling set forth in State v. Murray, 2012-Ohio4996, 979 N.E.2d 831 (6th Dist.). In Murray, it was similarly alleged that the imposition 

of the postrelease control sanction was defective. In addition, the cases are further 

analogous in that both involve appellants who failed to furnish full sentencing transcripts 

in support of appeals alleging trial court error at those sentencings. 

{¶ 17} In Murray, this court clearly stated, “Our court has released numerous 

cases holding a simple reference to the applicable statutes is sufficient to give the 

offender the required notice that the court authorized a post-release control sanction.” Id.

at ¶ 24. Significantly, this court further held that because appellants failed to incorporate 

into the record a full transcript of the sentencing hearing, “[W]e must presume the 

propriety of that hearing and find that appellant was properly notified of post-release 

control at the sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 25. 

{¶ 18} Based upon the foregoing, we find that appellant’s failure to incorporate a 

full transcript of the sentencing hearing in the record on appeal culminates in a 

presumption of the regularity of the proceedings at the sentencing hearing. However, we 

further find that even assuming arguendo that the presumption of regularity of the 
7.

sentencing hearing was not applicable, the record nevertheless contains ample evidence 

of proper postrelease control notification to appellant. 

{¶ 19} Wherefore, we find appellant’s assignment of error to be not well-taken. 

The judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. 

Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. 

Judgment affirmed. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4. 

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ 

JUDGE 

Thomas J. Osowik, J. 

_______________________________ 

Stephen A. Yarbrough, J. JUDGE 

CONCUR. 

_______________________________ 

JUDGE 

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of 

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported 

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: 

http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.