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THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM )/tj'ii_. 

What the Program Is 

The National Reconnaissance Program is a single .. national program dedicated to the collection. through overflight .. of intellige nce to 

meet the needs and objectives of the United States Government. The 

Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent for the Program .. managing resources of the CIA and DOD in carrying out the mission. The 

entire Program is covert and comprises the development, management, 

and operation of satellites. aircraft. and drones for visual, photographic .. 

or electronic reconnaissance of denied areas of the world (peripheral 

reconnaissance is a separate responsibility managed by the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff). The cost of the Program is close to~I _____ ---.Jlper year. 

The National Reconnaissance Program is responsive directly and 

solely to the intelligence collection requirements and priorities established by the United States Intelligence Board. The National Reconnaissance Office sends its plans and schedules for both satellite and aircraft 

reconnaissance overflights directly to the 303 Committee of the National 

Security Council for operational approval. 

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Program Background 

The essential background of the National Reconnaissance Program 

begins shortly after the May 1, 1960 loss of a U-2. aircraft engaged in 

overflight reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of this 

event, faced with the loss of reconnaissance capability over the USSR, 

President Eisenhower called a special meeting of the National Security 

Council to review possible alternatives, such as satellite reconnaissance systems. As a result of this review, the Department of Defense 

was directed to accelerate and re-orient its overt satellite reconnaissance project -- known as SAMOS -- and to establish a streamlined 

management structure and special procedures for enhancing its successful development and operation. Within a few weeks, a CIA-managed, 

DOD-funded covert reconnaissance satellite was also placed within the 

special management structure. Further procedural adjustments, extending through the spring of 1962, culminated in the establishment of a 

National Reconnaissance Program which was to be managed by a National 

Reconnaissance Office - - a single, national agency with a charter covering satellite photographic and signal intelligence collection operations, 

satellite mapping and geodesy, and aircraft/ drone overflight reconnaissance. 

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What the Program Does 

During the years from 1962 to the present, the National Reconnaissance Program I s capabilities have developed to a point where satellites 

photograph 145 million sq1-J.are miles of the Sino-Soviet land mass al1t1u(;l.lly. 

A typical broad-coverage satellite photographic mission produces, on the 

average, 800/0 cloud-free photography of about 7 million square miles of 

land mass at ground resolutions of seven to ten feet. A high resolution 

photographic mission returns, on the average, 550/0 cloud-free photography of 3500 high priority targets, with ground resolutions of one to 

three feet. National Reconnaissance Program electronic signal intelligence collection vehicles routinely provide detailed information on Soviet 

and Chinese electronic order-of-battle locations, surface-to-air missilerelated radars, and Soviet ABM radars in a virtually continuous electronic 

surveillance of the entire Sino-Soviet land mass. 

Today, the United States depends on the National Reconnaissance 

Program for most of its tactical and strategic information on closed 

societies. 

Policies Supporting the Program 

When the first U-2 photography of the USSR was produced (in 1956), 

President Eisenhower directed that it be protected -- as an ultra-sensitive 

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espionage product -- in a special security system. In 1960, when the 

first satellite reconnaissance photographs were produced, President 

Eisenhower directed that they be similarly protected and placed them 

in a compartment of the same special security system. 

During 1961 and early 1962, the Soviets made a number of private 

overtures to the U. S. protesting the use of satellites for reconnaissance. In 1962, the question of the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance began to appear as an important pre-condition to international 

negotiations on disarmament and qn the peaceful uses of outer space. 

In response to increasing pressure, the President asked a Committee 

of Principals to formulate a national policy which would {l} maintain 

United States freedom of action to conduct reconnaissance satellite 

operations unilaterally, (2) prevent foreign political and physical interference with those operations, (3) prevent accidental or forced disclosure 

of the details of the operations or end-products of the United States reconnaissance program, and, at the same time (4) permit the United States to 

continue to work toward disarmament and international cooperation in 

space. 

The recommendations of this Committee were approved by the 

President on July 10, 1962 and issued as national policy in NSC Action 

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2454. This policy statement* provides that the U. S. will: 

1. Maintain the legal position that the principles of international 

law and the U. N. Charter apply to activities in outer space. 

2. Continue to avoid any position implying that reconnaissance 

activities in outer space are not legitimate. 

3. Avoid public use of the term "reconnaissance satellites. II 

4. Seek to create wider public acceptance of space observation 

and photography. 

5. Seek to gain acceptance of the principle of the legitimacy of 

space reconnaissance. 

6. When confronted, continue to take a public stand for the 

legitimacy of the principle of reconnaissance from outer space, the 

precise form and extent of the stand depending upon the circumstances 

of the confrontation. 

7. Continue the present practice of not identifying individual 

military space launchings by mission or purpose. 

,8. Refrain from publicly disclosing the status, extent, effectivenes s, or operational characteristics of our satellite reconnaissance 

program. 

* The statements which follow are abstracted from the very comprehensive basic policy paper. 

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9. Exercise strict control over public statements and backgrounding 

concerning reconnaissance satellites. 

10. Direct no public attention toward development of anti-satellite 

capabilities. 

11. Discreetly disclose to certain allies and neutrals selected 

information with regard to the U. S. space reconnaissance program. 

12. In private international disclosures emphasize the fact of our 

determination and ability to pursue such programs, as well as their 

great contribution to the common security. 

13. Not agree to (a) declarations of the precise purpose of all 

satellites, (b) declarations of the equipment of all satellites, (c) requirements for advance notification of all satellite launchings and the 

tracks of satellites, (d) pre -launching inspection of satellites, or 

(e) a specific definition of peaceful uses of space which would not embrace unlimited observation. 

These policy statements have undergirded the National Reconnaissance Program from 1962 to the present, have been a primary element 

in the success of the Program, and have been a remarkably effective 

influence in protecting a major espionage activity from the public spotlight. For while it is true that there is a general public awareness of 

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sance program, the awareness is latent, rather than active. A modest 

level of awareness also extends internationally; because of the carefully 

subdued manner in which this awareness has been allowed to generate, 

it has been accompanied by a gradual tacit acceptance of satellite ovel'-

flight as a reasonable national venture. By continuing to surround 

satellite reconnaissance with a unique security system, the U. S. has 

been able to avoid embarrassment to other nations (particularly important in the case of its allies), and has muted the threat of international confrontation on the "legitimacy" of space espionage. 

Vulnerability of the Program 

As a result of careful satellite reconnaissance policy planning, 

the United States is enjoying, at this time, an international political 

atmosphere which contains all the advantages of tacit acceptance without any of the hazards inherent in open discussion or confrontation. It 

is critically important to nourish the conditions which contribute to 

this atmosphere, for reconnaissance satellites require a completely 

permissive environment - - political and physical - - for their successful 

operation. Lacking such an environment,. they could be interdicted on 

the floor of the United Nations or in the skies of any nation which desired 

to demonstrate against space espionage. Modern laser technology has 

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placed a powerful anti-overflight weapon within easy reach of all 

nations. In the face of such technology, the reconnaissance satellite 

stands as a fragile vehicle which cannot be protected against any 

determined assailant. 

The Influence of Other Governmental Activities 

Two United States agencies -- the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency -- have 

recently shown an increasing interest in 'Jearth-sensing" satellites, and, 

by their interest, have stimulated a re-examination of the reconnaissance 

policies developed in 1962. NASA has been exploring the use of photographs to locate and study natural earth resources. Early experiments, 

involving hand-held cameras operated by GEMINI and APOLLO astronauts, have not been controversial, largely because the photographs 

are at a fairly gross resolution, t(W "targets" are carefully selected, 

the film is reviewed by an inter-agency security panel before it is 

released to the public, and hostile states such as the USSR and Red 

China are either not overflown or not photographed. Future NASA applications involving oceanography, forestry, geology, and agriculture 

must be controlled carefully, for the line between economic research - photography and economic intelligence photography is very thin and 

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careless experimentation could trigger an international confrontation 

on the legitimacy of overflight observation/ reconnaissance. Recognizing this potential problem early in 1966, the President's Science 

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Adviser has been sponsoring policy studies ~nd roq1.Jlrement conferences 

in an effort to develop a civil earth-sensing program which will meet 

the needs of science without hazarding the security of the National 

Reconnaissance Program or offending the sovereignty of other nations. 

These studies and conferences have been a strong positive influence in 

coordinating the needs of the civil community and assisting it to plan a 

reasonable program. In addition, the Department of Defense and the 

CIA coordinate on NASA I s plans for " earth-sensing II activities, working 

in consonance with special National Security Council policy guidelines 

adopted in July 1966. 

The US-USSR discussions of 1968 regarding a Strategic Arms 

Limitation Treaty brought the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

directly into satellite reconnaissance policy considerations. Convinc;ed that the USSR would never agree to on-site inspection, ACDA 

proposed to negotiate with the USSR on the assumption that the United 

States was prepared to accept " e nforcement by maximum, or if necessary, exclusive reliance on national means of verification .... II For 

the United States, this expression means Iisatellite reconnaissance. II 

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In addition, in order to support its proposal, ACDA recommended 

declassifying the fact that the U. S. is conducting satellite reconnaissance, disclosing to the Soviets that reconnaissance satellites are our 

capabilities, and informing the press and public, gradually but officially, 

along the same lines. After discussion within the United States Intelligence Board and key affected government agencies, it was decided that 

disarmament discussions with the USSR could proceed effectively, and 

possibly more effectively, by restricting the U. S. delegation to use of 

the expression "national means of verification" with no reference to our 

satellite reconnaissance program. It was pointed out that disclosure is 

an irreversible step which would have profoundly adverse effects on 

national security. Furthermore, to single out one or some intelligence 

collection methods now and to pass only that or those to the Soviets, 

Congress, and the American public would be dangerous and misleading 

and could evolve a genuine "credibility gap. II 

,The Department of Defense and NASA proposed an alternative 

approach which, they felt, gave ACDA all the advantages of satelliteborne inspection with no impingement on the security protection required 

by the National Reconnaissance Program. Both agencies recal1ed a proposal made by ACDA, in January 1963~ which envisioned creation of an 

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internationally supervised or operated arms control satellite system. 

It had been suggested that the United States would provide technical and 

other support for the system, as would the Soviets and other interested 

nations. The photography would be retained and used by an international 

disarmament body. 

This proposal, whether conducted internationally, bilaterally 

(NASA and the Soviet Academy), or nationally (NASA alone) is very 

attractive. By working outside the National Reconnaissance Program, 

the ACDA would avoid confronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world) 

either publicly or privately, with the reality of the U. S. program, avoiding an unsettling episode with other nations, with Congress, and with the 

American public. This approach would also enable the United States 

to continue its own covert disarmament reconnaissance program until 

it unilaterally decided, if at all, to rely upon the international program. 

Finally, a separate program would protect existing intelligence security 

and would very likely achieve a measurable step toward "normalizingJl 

satellite observation at little or no risk to U. S. national activities. 

In Summary 

The United States government is deeply dependent on overflight 

reconnaissance, and particularly satellite reconnaissance, for inforlnation on closed societies. Satellite s are fragile, vulnerable vehicles 

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which must have a totally permissive environment for successful 

operation. National satellite reconnaissance policy, begun at the 

instance of President Eisenhower and continuing to the present, recognizes the need to (1) operate reconnaissance satellites with great 

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discretion, (2) develop tacit acceptance of these operations as a reasonable national activity, and (3) avoid embarrassment to our allies or 

confrontation with our enemies in carrying out our operations. These 

policies, and the special security arrangements resulting from them, 

have been primary forces in protecting United States reconnaissance 

operations from the threat of international confrontation. NASA IS 

and ACDA IS interests in Ifearth-sensing'l satellites pose special 

problems which can be, and are being, solved through close coordination and cooperation. 

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