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BYEMAN-TALENT KEYHOLECORONA-GAMBIT 

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FEBRUARY 1, 1966 

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BYE 

JOP SECREr 

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 

11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

28 January 1966 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

SUBJECT: DOD Response to NASA Activities in Satellite 

Reconnaissance 

14 000756720 

Problem: To develop and sponsor the best DOD response to NASA's 

satellite reconnaissance activities. 

Background: You are well aware of the background leading up to our 

present untenable situation regarding NASA's entry into the satellite 

reconnaissance area and the impact of that activity on the National 

Reconnaissance Program. During December I advised you that the 

NRO Staff would prepare, for your consideration, a proposed DOD 

position and response to NASA's activities. In preparing this study, 

we found the alternatives available to the DOD to be substantially 

more limited than one would expect. For example, your discussions 

with us made it clear that very little or no progress could be expected 

from a simple continuation of the ad hoc, piecemeal negotiations 

conducted in the past, and that definitive resolution is essential and 

could only be achieved by explicit direction from the highest executive 

level. Secondly, Mr. McNamara's personal initiative of May 6, 1965 

set a definite policy framework against which our own considerations 

had to be measured. 

Present Status: The attached document, "DOD Response to NASA 

Activities in Satellite Reconnaissance" has been prepared in the light 

of the guidance implicit in (1) your comments and (2) Mr. McNamara's 

initiative. The audience we had in mind, during the preparation of 

this report, was the Secretary of Defense, and it was arranged 

accordingly in the format you see. The tabular reference section is 

more voluminous than I would like; however, it represents solid 

documentation for everything we say. January 1966 was the first month 

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in which we could work from lOOo/o documented facts, with no speculative interpretation on what has occurred or is actually occurring in 

NASA. 

Recommendation: I recommend that you determine the appropriateness 

of this study for presentation to the Secretary of Defense. 

l¥AHDLE: YI"~ BY 

CGNmm. SYSTEM 

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u 

2 

;f_ 

AUL E. WORTHMAN 

Colonel, USAF 

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CONTENTS 

Section 

L Problem. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . l 

II. Introduction... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . l 

III. Background .........•......... , ..... , . , . . . . • . . . . . . . . . 2 

N. The NASA Satellite Reconnaissance Program... . . . . . . . . . 7 

A. NASA Plans ..... , .................... , ..• , . . . . 7 

B. NASA Information Policy and Practice. . . . . . . . . . . . 8 

C, The Time Scale .......... , ............. , . . . . . . . . 9 

D. The Probable Results ............... , . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 

E. 'fhe Impact.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

V. Alternative DOD Actions Regarding the NASA 

Satellite Reconnaissance Program. . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 

Index and Tabular Reference, .......................•....... Appendix A 

- = 

...... ' 

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DOD RESPONSE TO NASA ACTIVITIES 

IN SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

I. PROBLEM: 

To achieve suitable arrangements between the Department of Defense 

and NASA on satellite reconnaissance activities. 

Il INTRODUCTION: 

NASA has recently outlined its plans for "remote sensing of the 

earth" by satellite reconnaissance overflight (Tab l)" This activity --

called the APOLLO Applications Program -- will justify and use those 

APOLLO spacecraft and SATURN launch capabilities which are excess to 

the needs of NASA's approved lunar program. NASA has encouraged the 

military services, civil governmental agencies, and the scientific community generally to propose active participation in this activity and has 

solicited their proposals and endorsements for this extension to the 

original APOLLO program. These solicitations have led inevitably to a 

series of proposed experimental activities involving the study, development, test, and operation of satellite-borne image forming earth sensors 

.... in a reconnaissance ~~--

mode. - = These NASA activities are more than mere formal departures 

from national policy and approved procedures, They publicly commit 

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; 

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the United States to announce its engagement in reconnaissance activities 

from orbit. They develop and disseminate a body of knowledge and 

experience covering the capability of U. S. sensors to accomplish earth 

observation, eventually revealing technology and operations derived from 

the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). These earth orbital 

activities, conducted ostensibly as a prelude to lunar exploration, will 

involve open launchings, announced overflight reconnaissance of denied 

areas, and unclassified dissemination internationally of reconnaissance 

products. The damage to the NRP will be irreparable and the resulting 

impact in the international political arena will be irreversible. 

Ironically, most of the "requirements" solicited by NASA can be 

satisfied easily and promptly by presently-available data acquired by 

- the NRP. (Tab 2) This fact, although advanced to NASA in a proposal 

by the DOD, has been ignored by top NASA officials. Additionally, these 

officials have declined to respond to an initiative by the Secretary of 

Defense on this subject. 

III. BACKGROUND: 

NASA has a valid need for image forming sensors - - optical and 

radar - - to map and explore the surfaces of the moon and planets. The - development and testing of these required sensors must, of necessity, 

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draw from the same industrial group which supports the National Reconnaissance Program. In connection with the NASA lunar program, these 

needs were recognized in an agreement of August 28, 1963, signed by 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of NASA. 

(Tabs 3 and 4) This agreement (still in effect today) has established 

a suitable working relationship under which NRP-derived technology, 

experience, and other support are now being provided to the NASA lunar 

program. 

As early as 1963, a number of contractors to NASA who were working on Manned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) studies examined, 

at NASA direction, optical reconnaissance systems. One such study by 

Boeing addressed explicitly the earth reconnaissance mission and possible 

military applications. In spite of the DNRO's expressions of concern the 

follow-on MORL work statement to Douglas Aircraft Company for FY 65 

listed such objectives as research and development in surveillance and 

reconnaissance (as well as in other purely military domains such as 

command and control, anti-ballistic missile technology, and anti-satellite 

work). In January 1965, Douglas reported that "two categories of experiments have been tentatively selected for inclusion on board the MORL 

.... which support the reconnaissance and surveillance required for the - national defense effort. " In addition to industry, NASA was also engaged 

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actively in advertising its potential satellite reconnaissance capability 

to the scientific community and was soliciting testimonial support and 

requirements from the military services and from federal agencies 

such as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States 

Coast & Geodetic Survey, the United States Department of Commerce, 

the United States Geological Survey, and the United States Department 

of Agriculture. (Tab 5) By 1964, NASA's satellite reconnaissance 

planning - - expanded far beyond lunar exploration - - openly included 

specific applications for "earth sensing" -- a NASA pseudonym for 

photographic and electromagnetic reconnaissance" By 1965, NASA's 

"earth sensing" objectives included "visual, photographic, and 

electronic surveillance of ocean areas and detection, observation, 

tracking and various other uses of large telescopes and antennas. 11 

Today, NASA is considering 20 to 30 SATURN launchings for the initial 

four-year period beyond the initial APOLLO flights" (Tab 1) The 

majority of these are to be earth-orbital missions devoted primarily 

to 11 earth sensing'' using optical, infra-red, and radar sensors, 

During this entire period, meetings were convened, committees 

formed, and correspondence exchanged between the DOD/NRG/CIA and 

NASA in attempts to agree on suitable arrangements for NASA-sponsored 

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satellite reconnaissance activity. These DOD/NRO/ CIA efforts were 

entirely constructive with their major theme being that of protecting 

the integrity and security of the NRP. 

On May 6, 1965, the Secretary of Defense proposed to Mr. Webb 

an arrangement by which the Associate Administrator of NASA and the 

DNRO would jointly review the NASA requirements for study, development, test or use in earth orbit, of devices or methods for forming or 

recording high resolution images to determine whether or not the 

requirements could be construed to be of reconnaissance quality. 

Mr. McNamara proposed further that, in the event the requirements 

were considered to be of reconnaissance quality, the DOD would serve 

as agent to the NASA in carrying out specific studies, development, 

test in earth orbit, and procurement for NASA lunar and planetary 

exploration purposes. (Tab 6) 

On June 23, 1965, Mr. Webb replied stating that he considered 

non-military terrestrial surveys utilizing satellite technology to be a 

proper function of NASA, citing the policy expressed in NSC Action 2454~ 

Mr. Webb indicated that the arrangement proposed by Mr. McNamara 

"would not meet NASA 1s responsibilities" and suggested that in lieu 

1 

Mr. Webb's reference to NSAM 2454 was an out-of-context cite of 

Point 5 which states: "The NASA should study possibilities of accelerating bilateral international cooperation concerning non-military space 

activities involving space observation, 'perhaps including photography" 111 

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of executing a further (to the August 1963) agreement2 "at our level, 11 

the Associate Administrator, NASA and the DNRO be delegated the 

responsibility for executing a memorandum of understanding "in any 

future case in which NASA desires to proceed beyond the exploratory 

study phase. " (Tab 7) 

On July 31, 1965, the Secretary of Defense stated his personal concern to the Administrator of NASA saying "in view of the grave possibility of endangering the national security, I believe that study contracts 

you have underway in this regard should not be carried any further with 

the industrial and academic community. These study groups should be 

disbanded until determination by the management procedures we have 

agreed to can be brought to bear. 11 (Tab 8) Mr. Webb never responded 

3 

to this proposal. 

2 

The August 1963 Agreement is confined explicitly to the NASA lunar 

program and cannot, in any sense be construed as encompassing NASA 

earth orbital activity. 

3 

A detailed chronology covering DOD/NASA relationships during this 

period is attached as Tab 9" 

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IV. THE NASA SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 

A. NASA Plans 

NASA has purchased 24 APOLLO spacecraft, 12 SATURN IB's, 

and 15 SA TURN V 1 s. Both the SA TURN IB and SA TURN V vehicles are 

capable of injecting sizeable APOLLO spacecraft payloads into low 

inclination, polar, or synchronous orbits. 

For months, NASA has been engaged in a meticulous study of 

potential earth orbital space reconnaissance missions which would use 

the APOLLO spacecraft and the SATURN IB and SATURN V launch 

capabilities in activities extending far beyond requirements for the initial 

APOLLO effort. Some 20 to 30 SATURN launchings are being considered 

for the four-year period beyond the initial APOLLO flights. The NASA 

reconnaissance program (referred to as the APOLLO Applications 

Program) will use any of these vehicles which are excess to APOLLO 

lunar program requirements. NASA has, in fact, tentatively scheduled 

APOLLO spacecraft 507, 513, 517 and 521 for a first series of earth 

orbital flights. (Tab 1) Assuming a degree of success similar to that 

of its current programs, NASA plans to begin its earth orbital reconnaissance flights by July 1968. 

.... NASA has conducted a number of studies and instrument develop-

= ments for its planned use of these vehicles in earth sensing reconnaissance 

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and mapping roles. Specifically, NASA has already defined a program 

for the development of: 

a. A metric mapping camera system which will provide ground 

resolutions of less than 12 meters (roughly four times better than the 

ARGON map.eiqg_camera used in the NRP today). 

b. A panoramic,_ high res.olution search camera system which 

c. An ultra_-high resolution camera system wl}ich wiJLJ2royj_tj_~ 

ground resolutions of less than two meters (quality approaching that of 

the GAMBIT system currently being flown in the NRP). (Tab 10) 

NASA is now engaged in detailed experiment definition and hardware 

specification for these reconnaissance sensors, 

B. NASA Information Policy and Practice 

NASA information release policy is very simply stated as 11 if 

we fly it - - we release it. 11 NASA intends to continue this policy and 

is determined that security classifications will not be imposed on the 

reconnaissance sensors it plans to use or on the operations it intends 

to conduct. - = 

CORONA/ GAMBIT 

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NASA has stated that: (1) all reconnaissance sensors flown on 

NASA spacecraft missions will be unclassified; (2) all data acquired 

on NASA space reconnaissance missions over foreign areas will be 

unclassified; (3) all data acquired by NASA reconnaissance missions 

will be generally available to the international scientific community. 

In summary, the total NASA effort in this area will be unclassified. 

(Tab ll) 

NASA has never closed any of its launchings to the public. NASA 

policy enjoins extensive pre-launch, in-flight and post-flight public 

exposure. NASA encourages its scientists and engineers to write and 

speak freely in all matters concerning the technical content and operational aspects of NASA programs. 

NASA conducts itself as if uninhibited by stated national policy on 

satellite reconnaissance, by the PFIAB, the 303 Committee, the USIB, 

or by any definition of mission or requirement for security. 

C. The Time Scale 

To meet a first reconnaissance satellite launching in July 1968, 

NASA must accomplish a series of actions by approximately the dates 

indicated: 4 

4 These actions are drawn from typical planning factors used by NASA 

and the DOD in the accomplishment of any program of this nature. The 

time phasing of these events is based upon past NASA and DOD experience in related programs and developmental activities. 

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Specify functional requirements 

Define mission payload specifications 

Issue an RFP to the optical industry 

for the development of 

a mapping reconnaissance camera 

a search reconnaissance camera 

a spotting reconnaissance camera 

Evaluate proposals from industry 

Award hardware development contracts 

and publicly announce the award 

Obtain Manned Space Flight Evaluation 

Board approval 

Conduct validation tests for reconnaissance 

camera performance 

Make spatial mockup available to news 

media 

Commence final mission planning and 

choose orbital inclinations 

Complete plans for data collection, 

reduction and processing 

Publicly announce flight objectives 

Release mission profile to news media 

Distribute public information (press) plan 

Commence astronaut training 

10 

January 1966 

February 1966 

March 1966 

May 1966 

June 1966 

August 1966 

November 1966 

April 1967 

June 1967 

July 1967 

August 1967 

September 1967 

December 1967 

January 1968 

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Deliver hardware to spacecraft 

contractor for integration 

Integrate payload 

Checkout spacecraft (payload) systems 

Conduct simulated flight test 

Furnish complete detailed system 

performance characteristics 

(animated) and seqience of mission 

events (for national TV network 

coverage) 

Conduct open launching for 14-day 

manned earth orbital reconnaissance 

mission 

Release (to wire services and national 

TV networks) the in-flight mission 

control/ astronaut dialogue (on experiment activity, sightings, targets 

photographed, estimated degree of 

success, etc.) 

Recover, process and make available 

to the news media and the international 

scientific community: 

..:2.Q.9_0 f e~t 9f. .;>(}lective high 

resolution photography 

March 1968 

March-June 1968 

June 1968 

June 1968 

June 1968 

July 1968 

July 1968 

July-August 1968 

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D. The Probable Results 

Assuming normal global weather conditions and nominal subsystem performance, examples of the photography which would be 

included in that obtained from the NASA reconnaissance missions are 

the following: 

an array of Soviet ICBM deployments 

Chepelevka airfield (and an identifiable count of 

some 100 aircraft of various configurations) 

the Soviet nuclear submarine bases at Petropavlovsk 

and Vladivostok 

Soviet tactical missile deployments at North Brest 

Leningrad and Moscow with associated ring of 

AICBM installations 

the Israeli nuclear production plant 

the Aswan High Dam 

the Chinese nuclear test site at lop Nor 

the French atomic test site on Tuamotu Atoll 

the 19, 000 foot runway of the NRO's covert reconnaissance 

base - - Area 51 

various key strategic bases and ICBM deployments 

within the Continental United States 

key deployments of U-2 reconnaissance vehicles at 

Peshawar and Ban Takhli 

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E. 1',h_~Impact 

The impact of the major events in this time scale is over -

whelming. 

Action: NASAs RFP to the optical industry will represent the first 

publicly announced active solicitation of effort for the development of 

satellite-borne photographic image-forming earth sensors since the 

adoption of a no-public-notice Presidential policy in 1961. 

Impact: Dangerous, irreversible relaxation of carefully 

structured national security standards 

Substantive and explicit deterioration of NRP security 

Increasingly strained DOD/NASA relations as two 

organizations work on the same general task using 

different rule books 

Public confirmation of United States intention to engage 

in satellite reconnaissance activities 

NASA rrpeacefulrr image irretrievably tarnished or 

destroyed 

Loss of national control over public statements and 

backgrounding concerning satellite reconnaissance 

.Action: NASA 1s award of reconnaissance sensor hardware development contracts will represent the first serious breach of NRP contractor 

discipline. 

Impact: Dilution of the Nation's already scarce optical contractor resources 

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Disturbance of contractor morale as DOD contractors 

work in the "black" and NASA's work in the "white" 

Unreconcilable demands on the optical industry from 

two competing Federal agencies 

Inevitable duplication of technical effort. Most of 

what NASA will insist on developing already exists 

Open invitation to the Bureau of the Budget and the 

Congress to adjudicate the DOD/NASA reconnaissance 

budgets 

International proliferation of sensitive NRP-derived 

technology 

Security compromise over the full spectrum of the NRP 

Action: NASA's public announcement of flight objectives and its 

release of complete mission profile data to the news media will represent 

the first disclosure of the United States' wide-ranging activity in satellite 

reconnaissance overflight of denied areas: 

Impact: Unilateral abrogation of national security policy 

Unilateral redefinition of 303 Committee authorities 

Action: NASA rs launching of a satellite for earth reconnaissance 

purposes will represent the first publicly disclosed, open launching of 

a vehicle with such a mission since the 1961 Presidential decision that 

such releases were contrary to the national interest. 

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Impact: 

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Explicit public confirmation of U.S. engagement in 

satellite reconnaissance activity (contrary to existing national policy). 

Action: NASA's public dissemination of satellite photography will 

represent the first uncontrolled release of unsanitized satellite reconnaissance products. 

Impact: Explicit disclosure of United States interest and 

technical capability 

Unilateral dissolution of the Presidentially-directed 

TKH security control system 

Unilateral abrogation of DCI statutory authority 

regarding intelligence collection activities 

Afforded the uninhibited pursuit of its objectives, NASA can accomplish these actions on its planned time scale. NASA is convinced that 

such a program can be conducted without straining international relations 

unduly. Indeed, NASA is confident that such activity will elicit kudos 

from all nations of the world. 

Previous experience - - the U-2 for example - - has demonstrated 

that national and international reaction to such a series of events and the 

11fait accompli 11 could range from the unlikely -- but possible -- situation 

~~!i~.Ji!~!-E '>/ f /:;,,, 

BYEMAN·-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

t;ONT'RO:; SYSTEMS JOiNT'J._ Y 

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of no unfavcrable comment to one of threats or actual efforts to destroy 

or interfere with the offending satellite. Assuming that NASA's convictions are valid -- that this series of events elicits no unfavorable 

comment -- then the following actions are incumbent upon the U0 S.: 

redefine national security policy 

reassign all U.S. reconnaissance activity to a no-longer 

"peaceful" NASA 

arrange with NASA a suitable priority for the collection 

of intelligence information 

devise an orderly plan for dissolving the NRP 

cancel the DOD Manned Orbiting Laboratory program 

arrange the transfer of programmed DOD reconnaissance 

funds (roughly $1. 5 billion annually) to NASA 

arrange the orderly declassification of all presently-available 

TALENT-KEYHOLE controlled intelligence products 

redefine (statutorily) the authority of the DCI in this area 

dissolve the 303 Committee 

develop new contingencies to cover U.S. military response 

to crises on a fast reaction basis, in the absence of a DOD 

satellite reconnaissance program 

If, on the other hand, NASA's judgments are not valid and previously 

demonstrated adverse reactions to reconnaissance overflight activity 

occur, the following events are imminent: 

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...... / /··., 

breaching of the current "detente 11 between the U.S. and 

the USSR 

destruction of the NASA "peaceful" image 

forced disclosure of satellite reconnaissance operations 

forced disclosure of satellite reconnaissance products 

loss of a virtual sole source of photographic intelligence 

informa tiof1: (or at best acceptance of a totally clandestine 

modus operandi) 

charges of duplicity or aggressiveness in the U. N. forum 

exposure to a confrontation by the USSR or a third party 

extreme international pressure - - particularly from our 

allies and from friendly neutrals -- to "cease and desist" 

all photographic overflight (or acceptance to fly in a known 

hostile environment with constant risk of interception and 

resulting high level international crisis) 

V. ALTERNATIVE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACTIONS REGARDING 

THE NASA SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 

As indicated in Section IV, NASA's reconnaissance program will 

have a wide -ranging impact on federal policies and activities. The 

Department of Defense has needed a clear policy to guide all of its 

elements in dealing with the impact as it affects them. Such a proposal 

is contained in the Secretary of Defense's letter of May 6, 1965 to 

Mr. Webb. (Tab 6) 

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The Department of Defense has also taken a first step toward 

setting up intra-agency practices to carry out this proposal. In a 

memorandum dated August 30, 1965 for the Service Secretaries, 

Mr. Vance designated the NRO and the DOD point of contact with NASA, 

as well as with other governmental agencies regarding activities involving study, development, test, or use of satellite-borne image forming 

earth sensors. Mr. Vance further directed all DOD agencies to deal 

exclusively with the NRO on all intra-DOD needs of this nature. 

(Tab 12) 

While these actions have had a positive influence in coordinating 

and disciplining DOD activities, they have had little or no parallel effect 

on NASA. Indeed, the only response from NASA has been a studied 

reluctance to accept anything less than total NASA autonomy in satellite 

reconnaissanceo Since the DOD and NASA are the only U. So agencies 

conducting space operations, it is unreasonable to expect a governmental "third party" to referee or arbitrate the reconnaissance issue. 

With matters now at a stand-off, it is essential that the DOD take the 

initiative to resolve this issue. 

The Secretary of Defense's memorandum of May 6, 1965, refer- .... ""' 

enced above, has already established the general outline of a desirable 

solution. In the light of that proposal, several alternative follow-on 

actions are available. 

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ALTERNATIVE ONE: 

l. Continue to negotiate a,9 _hoc £9.:.r~ial solutions to th~gblem, 5 

With this approach, the DOD could attempt to strengthen the existing (or create a new) DOD-NASA coordinating group to examine NASA 

satellite reconnaissance proposals on a one-at-a-time basis, evaluating 

the necessity and propriety of the proposals in the light of federal needs 

and federal policy. 

The following points outline the elements of such an approach: 

a. Authority: All NASA activities, current or proposed, will 

be reviewed by a joint DOD(NRO)/NASA committee at regular intervals, 

Proposed new NASA activity will be reviewed prior to, during (if 

approved), and after the study phase, whether in-house or contractual. 

(The success of this review will depend entirely on the ability of the 

committee to achieve agreement. ) 

b. Requirements: The DOD will request NASA to make its 

"requirementsn available to the DIA. In any case, the DIA will collect 

the 11 requirements 11 of the DOD, which, in this context, are essentially 

those of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (for mapping photography) 

5 

In carrying out negotiations on Alternative One, the DOD would actually 

be working toward a timely adoption of a stronger Alternative - - which is 

discussed in Alternative Two below, and which calls for "permitting 

NASA to conduct carefully defined satellite observation activities. 11 

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and the U. S. Navy Oceanographic Office (for oceanographic photography). 

Additionally, the DIA will approach NASA's other federal customers 

-- which are now mainly the Department of Agriculture (crop photography), 

the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey (mapping photography), and the U.S. 

Geological Survey (geological photography and large scale mapping 

photography) - - to assemble their requirements and determine to what 

extent they may be fulfilled from the already-available data bank. (The 

DIA is already working along these lines with civil agencies in connection 

with a mapping and charting study requested by the BOB.) (Tab 13) 

c. Operations: A survey of NASA customer "requirements, " 

as outlined in b. , above, indicates that 50% of the need could be met 

(without additional expense) from presently-available DOD material. 

The remainder could be met within the capabilities of already-programmed 

DOD flights without detracting appreciably from primary missions. 

d. Exploitation: The DOD will attempt to acquire NASA concurrence to permit NPIC to conduct all processing, production, and 

necessary interpretation of photographic reconnaissance of the earth. 

Similarly, NASA would be requested to permit NSA to process electronic 

observation products. 

- e. Security: The DCI will be asked to issue an intelligence - directive stating that earth reconnaissance products will be automatically 

~· _:. 

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:· " •: ~- ~ =-> ,· 

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controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system, pending a DCI 

review for releasability. (Arrangements are now in existence for making controlled releases to the civil agencies referenced in b. and c. , 

above. ) (Tab 2) 

Strength of Alternative One: 

L Avoids a direct interagency confrontation. 

Weaknesses: 

L Assumes an over-optimistic view of the situation. To date, 

NASA's actions indicate a total disinterest in negotiating the subject. 

2. Assumes that all negotiations can be concluded in a short 

time. Actually, it is likely that NASA will release a comprehensive, 

earth-reconnaissance sensor RFP in March 1966. 

3. Contains no provision for automatic higher-level enforcement 

of committee decisions. 

4. In practice, invites the Congress and the Bureau of the Budget 

to adjudicate DOD/NASA reconnaissance budgets. 

5. Deals with symptoms only; never settles the basic issues of 

adherence to well-established federal satellite reconnaissance policy. 

- - If Alternative Two is the goal of Alternative One, why not move 

directly to: 

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ALTERNATIVE TWO: 

the permissible range of NASA satellite reconnaissance activities. 

Under this Alternative, a Presidential directive will be issued 

permitting NASA to conduct satellite reconnaissance activities within 

a range of sensor resolutions which would not endanger the security 

of the NRP, nor embarrass the United States publicly or politically. 

In August 1965, such a range was defined by the DNRO and agreed to 

by the Associate Administrator, NASA. (Tabs 14 and 15) In this 

agreement, a reconnaissance-like sensor was defined as 

"an image-forming sensor having a resolution of 

0.1 milliradian or finer, or an optical or infra-red 

image-forming system with a physical aperture 

greater than 30 cm and an optical figure controlled 

to better than l/ 4 wave length. 11 

This definition will serve as a basis for the Presidential directive. 

NASA activity will be permitted at resolutions more gross than those 

defined for reconnaissance-like sensors; moreover, NASA is not 

exclusively franchised in this range of resolutions, since the DOD will 

necessarily continue to conduct satellite reconnaissance at any 

resolutions required -- gross or fine -- to obtain national intelligence . 

The following points outline the essential elements of such a 

directive - - essential in the sense that they must be non-negotiable 

if Alternative Two is to be employed effectively. 

;'-.: : .. : .. ~-~ • .. :. ;,, 

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s·rsTEMS .J01NTL y 22 

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. 

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: 

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a. Authority: Under the Presidential directive, all NASA 

activities current or proposed, will be reviewed by a joint 

DOD(NRO)/NASA committee at regular intervals. Proposed new 

NASA activity will be reviewed prior to, during (if approved), and 

after the study phase, whether in-house or contractual. Committee 

disagreements will be taken directly to the President for adjudication. 6 

b. Requirements: Will be collected by the joint DOD(NRO)/NASA 

committee and processed through the USIE. 

c. Operations: After review and validation, the joint 

DOD(NRO)/NASA committee will assign reconnaissance operations in 

strict compliance with the definition contained in the Presidential directive. The DOD will continue to conduct, through its NRO, reconnaissance operations across the resolution spectrum in fuJfillment of national 

requirements. 

d. Exploitation: Processing, production, and necessary 

interpretation of all photographic earth reconnaissance products will 

be accomplished by the NPIC. Similarly, all electronic observation 

products will be exploited by the National Security Agency. 

6 One might consider that the Vice President as Chairman of the NASC 

would adjudicate committee disagreements; however, the National 

Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, places the NASC in an 

"advise and assist" role and calls for decision by the President on 

matters of this nature in which the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, NASA are unable to reach an agreement. 

{,iAr-..?DLE 'V~A 

~"\f:f\L'1J!-T/l_LENT-KEYHOLE 

:~)~).4 .. PTROL $)'STEMS JOiNTL '{ 23 

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eQ Security: All products of earth reconnaissance will be 

automatically controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system, 

pending review for releasability by the DCI in accordance with existing directives. (Tab 16) 

Strength of Alternative Two: 

l. Forces a timely agreement on satellite reconnaissance 

activities. 

Weaknesses: 

L Places the total National Reconnaissance Program under two 

dissimilar managements. 

2, Requires substantial redefinition of national satellite reconnaissance policy to license NASA 1s "no-secrets" public information 

practices. 

3. Invites Congressional and BOB adjudication of DOD/NASA 

reconnaissance budgets. 

4. Requires Presidential adjudication of committee disagreement. 

To overcome the weaknesses of either Alternative One or Two, 

consideration should be given to: 

H/:,NDLE'. V!A 

BYEJYlAN· TALENT-KEYHOLE:: 

~~ONTROL; SYSTEMS :JO!NTl..Y 

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~·' 

ALTERNATIVE THREE: 

reconnaissanc~ of_ th~ earth,_!£_~ Department of Defense. 

This Presidential directive will appoint the Secretary of Defense 

as the single federal manager for satellite reconnaissance of the earth. 

whether civil or military in application. The Secretary of Defense will 

have the authority to task NASA for validated civil agency needs, as 

required or appropriate. All funding will be controlled by the Secretary 

of Defense, with reimbursement from those civil agencies whose needs 

are served. 

The following points are the essential elements of such a directive, 

and, as in Alternative Two, are considered non-negotiable: 

a. Requirements: All federal requirements will be collected 

by the DOD and processed through the USIB. 

b. Operations: After validation of the requirements by the 

USIB, the Secretary of Defense will assign all federal earth reconnaissance operations, as appropriate, directing that these operations be 

conducted in strict accordance with existing national satellite reconnaissance policy. 

c. Exploitation: Processing, production, and necessary 

interpretation of all photographic earth reconnaissance products will 

H/.\NOLE VIA 

BYEMAN··TALENT-KEYHOLE 

f;;(INTk!0L SYSTEN15 JOlNTLY 

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be accomplished by the NPIC, Similarly, electronic observation 

products will be exploited by the NSA, 

d. Security: All products of earth reconnaissance will be 

automatically controlled in the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system, 

pending review for releasability by the DCI in accordance with 

existing directives. (Tab 16) 

.§!?;~.Eg,lli? of Alternative Three: 

l. Requires no adjudication of budgets by the Congress or BOB. 

2. Requires no Presidential review and adjudication. 

3. Settles basic issues of adherence to established national 

satellite reconnaissance policy. 

4, Preserves existing authorities of the 303 Committee, the 

PFii\B, the USIB, and the DCl~ 

5. Provides single, responsible, national program management. 

6. Assures effective utilization of national resources. 

Weaknesses: 

None 

..... " 

= """" 

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