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AS)-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON C.C. AMOMINFRIMM

January 4, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Review

At the right at Tab A is a copy of a recent letter sent

by Dr. Ikle, Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to

Ambassador Porter, Under Secretary of State for Political

Affairs. The letter requests him as Chairman of the NSAM 156

Committee to undertake a review of the present national space

policy, NSCA 2454. A parallel letter making essentially the

same request was forwarded by Dr. &Lucas to Ambassador Porter

on November 29 (Tab B).

You, as DNRO, are a member of the NSW 156 Committee along

with Secretary Clements, W. Colby, Dr. Ikle Dr. Fletcher and

Dr. Kissinger, wearing his NSC hat. The 156 Committee has been

continually active, and has reviewed several problems connected

with NRO, NASA, and SALT.

We plan to brief you in detail on the philosophy and function

of the 156 Committee at the time of our next policy briefing

session with you. This memorandum is for information only.

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL. AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WAIBRINOTON

December 21, 1973

01,FICE OF

TN! DIRECTOR

MEMRANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Subject: The 156 Committee and National Earth

Observation Policy

As you know, the present national political and

informational policy governing United States space activities

in earth observation was drawn up by the NSAM 156 Committee

in 1962. The last major review of this policy was in 1966 in

the context of the non-military applications of earth sensing.

The review concluded that the 1962 policy was valid in terms

of protecting the National Reconnaissance Program. It also

concluded that NASA should proceed with its planned experimental programs.

Singe 1966, the nation has witnessed major advances in

thb use of space, specifically in the areas of national

security, domestic application and international cooperation.

I believe that it is now time, especially because the civil

application programs have sufficiently matured, to update

the present national policy. I am particularly interested

in assuring that the continuing ability of the United States

to use space freely for arms control verification is not

jeopardized by decisions or actions which are focused on

single segments of the national space effort.

Implications of the recent decisions with respect to

partial decompartmentalization of satellite-obtained photoreconnaissance, and the downgrading of "the fact of satellite

photo reconnaissance" to Secret must be kept in mind in

connection with the proposed review.

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The MBFR negotiations demonstrate continuing concern

and pressure, on the part of our NATO allies, in obtaining

information about and from "national technical means." A

review of our policy in respect to such pressures, its modification, or reaffirmation is very much in order, both to

deal with our allies and to work out a preferred approach on

verification issues in the Vienna talks.

Accordingly, I propose that the NSAM 156 Committee

undertake a review and make recommendations with respect to

the following:

An update assessment of the arms control and

intelligence implications of earth observation activities in

light of disclosure problems and possible political risks.

A policy sorting out our priorities between arms

control, intelligence, and other objectives of earth observation.

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Fred C. Ikle

Attachment: Draft Terms of Reference

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

FOR

STUDY OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS OF EARTH OBSERVATION

I. Using NSCA 2454, July 1962, as a point of departure,

develop a policy with respect to the United States earth

observation programs which will:

Permit the U.S. to sustain the conduct of our national

reconnaissance activity for national intelligence and arms

control.

Prevent forced disclosure of details of the U.S.

verification and reconnaissance program.

Permit the U.S. to avoid confrontations in which U.S.

space activity might be condemned as illegal or provocative.

Permit the U.S. to derive maximum benefit from nonreconnaissance earth observations as well as from national

reconnaissance end products. •

'Avoid disruption of space-oriented programs of cooperative Scientific investigation.

Facilitate the resolution of any conflicts which

might arise between the technical and security requirements of

the U.S. reconnaissance activity, domestic requirements, and

the international commitments and foreign policy objectives of

the United States in a fashion which is in the overall best

interests of the national security of the United States.

II. The policy should incorporate the following:

A. A comprehensive statement of United States' goals,

actions and criteria with respect to political protection and

successful continuation of:

1. National reconnaissance and arms''control

verification.

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National earth observation for U.S. Government

needs.

.3. National earth observation for domestic and

foreign scientific investigations.

B. Considerations of the activities of the NSSM 72

Committee in respect to sharing the products derived from

international civil satellite programs and the relationship

of such programs to continuation of U.S. national reconnaissance

programs.

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Distribution:

81 - Addressee

- OSD

3 - NASA

4 - NRO'

- -6 - White House

6 - D/I Chron

7 & 8 D/I File

9 - RCI

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la-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

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6 4

OFFICE OF TFIE DIRECTOR November 29, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Impact of Photoreconnaissande Satellite

Decompartmentation

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In view of the recent approval which authorizes the DCI

to plan for partial decompartmentation of satellite photoreconnaissance, I believe that it would be appropriate to

consider the impact of this action in. the overall context

of current national reconnaissance policy.

Accordingly, I propose that the NSAM 156 Committee review

the present policy, NSCA.2454, in order to formulate updated

political and.informational guidelines which are reflective

of the current environment. An assessment of the current

environment should include growing domestic desires to exploit

space derived data freely, international reactions to civil

space programs, Sino-Soviet space philosophies, and estimates

of U.S. toleration to political risk should international

confrontation develop.

cc: SEC DEF

DCI

NASA

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