### N UMBER 13
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## COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

– EDINBURG

JOHN LAZO, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 148th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Longoria Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
Appellant, John Lazo, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault
, see T EX

. P ENAL C ODE

A NN . § 22.02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) and pursuant to a plea agreement

with the State
, received deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of ten
years. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to revoke
, alleging that Lazo vi olated the2

terms of community supervision. At the hearing on the motion to revoke, appellant
pleaded “true” to the allegations, and after hearing evidence, the trial court revoked Lazo’s
community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to twenty years’
confinement. By two issues, Lazo contends that he was denied due process under the
United States and Texas Constitutions, and that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel. We affirm.

I. D UE P ROCESS At the revocation hearing, after Lazo pleaded “true” to the State’s allegations that
he violated the conditions of community supervision, evidence was presented to the trial
court. The State called Officer Joseph Garza stating that his testimony was offered

“ strictly for punishment evide nce .” After other witnesses testified, the prosecutor and
defense counsel stated that each was resting. The trial court asked, “All right. Rest as
to punishment phase?” And, each attorney responded, “Yes.” After hearing closing
argument from each atto rney, the trial court revoked community supervision, adjudicated
Lazo guilty, and sentenced him to twenty years’ confinement. Lazo made no objection.
Appellant argues that the trial court denied him an opportunity to be heard on the
issue of punishment an d thus, denied him due process of law

. See Issa v. State , 826
S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam). However, Lazo made no objection
comporting with his argument on appeal despite having the opportunity to do so. See

T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 33.1(a )(1); Euler v. State , 218 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“If
appellant wanted an opportunity to present evidence and argument on the question of
punishment, it was incumbent upon him to ask for that opportunity and to be ready to3

present such eviden ce and argument as soon as the trial court announced its finding that
he had violated the conditions of his probation.”).
Moreover, t he law provides no “absolute right to a separate punishment hearing”
after the adjudication of guilt at a revocation hearin g. Hardeman v. State , 1 S.W.3d 689,
690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). And, in this case, the trial court specifically asked if both
attorneys were resting regarding punishment and each attorney rested . Thus, Lazo was provided an opportunity to be heard regard ing punishment. Lazo was given “the
opportunity to present evidence during the proceedings, and that is all that [was]
required.” See id. at 691. We overrule Lazo’s first issue.

II. I NEFFECTIVE A SSISTANCE OF C OUNSEL By his second issue, Lazo contends th at his trial counsel was ineffective because
he failed to object immediately at the end of the adjudication hearing on the basis that the
trial court did not conduct a separate hearing on punishment. However, as stated above,
there is no absolute right to a s eparate punishment hearing after the adjudication of guilt
at a revocation hearing. Id. Thus, Lazo has not shown that his trial counsel’s omission
rendered his performance deficient. See Goodspeed v. State , 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.

Crim

. App. 2005) (providing that we apply a two

- part test in determining whether trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by first requiring that the appellant

show that counsel’ s performance was deficient, or in other words, that counsel's

assistance fell below an objec tive standard of reasonableness) (citing Strickland v.
Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)); Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999). Moreover, Lazo does not argue that there is a reasonable pr obability
that, but for counsel’ s alleged error , the result would have been different. See Thompson
,4

9 S.W.3d at 812; see also Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, we overrule Lazo’s

second issue.

III. C ONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/ s/ Rogelio Valdez Rogelio Va ldez Chief Justice
Do not publish. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b)

. Delivered and filed the 30th day of October, 2014

.