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y161 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

September 29, 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CARL DUCKETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CIA

(SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)

min nes SUBJECT: International Participation in . the Post-APOLLO

Space Program

I have recently reviewed a set . of "Guidelines for

Technical Exchange Under An Agreement for Post-APOLLO

Cooperation (Period 2)," being proposed for consideration

by the NSDM 72 Ad Hoc Interagency Group (TAB A).

The workings of this group clearly have implications

for the NRP. Beyond that, the proposed international

technical exchange (as set forth in the Guidelines) has

more broad, long-term implications. If not properly

controlled, such a program could lead to a slow, imperceptible erosion of the overall technological superiority of

the US.

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potential, long,term implications of. the proposed program.

WASHINGTON. O.C. aglanfirral

Although the NRO has not been called upon to contribute

its views, I have taken the liberty of comdenting on the

Guidelines to Grant Hansen, Assistant Secretary of the

Air Force (Research and Development). I have expressed my

concerns to him and asked that he keep me informed of continuing developments. As DOD Co-Chairman of the NASA-USAF

Joint Committee on the Space Transportation System, Grant

has been tasked to undertake the screening of technical data

that NASA wants to release to foreign participants.

utE I thought that you especially should be aware of the
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I an attaching for your review a package of materials (TAB B)

which will provide background in the matter, with the thought

in mind that you may want to interject CIA views in the

proposal.

1111111111111111111

F. Robert Rake

Deputy Director

2 Attachments

Guidelines

Folder of Materials
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September 11, 197

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0=1= FOR TRCIMICAL RICORANCX UDDER M AONSIgear

FOR POST.APOLIO COOPERATI011 (PZRZOD 2)

The objective of these guidelines is to provide for timely ant effective

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exchange of technical. information neceaaary to support development of

elements of the Peat-Apollo Prosrans by foreign govarmeenta and inter..

national organimationa participating in that Program under cooperative

arrangements vith the adta Staten, vhila at the camo time onauxina

protection of the US national interest.

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It is intended that (1) them guidelines chaff be reflected in any

*. agreements betimen.ZASh and counterpart foreign apace agendas,

(2) the apectfic terms of the aveemente viii be coordinated with the

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:appropriate agencies of the Us Ginrenamert and shall be subject to

confirmation by executive ascedment at the government-to-covernment

level, (3) stash agreement° viii be muted bath by agency.to-egency

arrangements and by subcontracts between MA contractors. and foreign

aerospace firms, and (I) ouch subcontracts abaft be reviewed under

minitions control regulations and procedures std approved than they

conform to the substantive parameters of the government-levo3. agreements.

The manage of technical information shal). be ed by the foLlovinI

prInciplea:

!: PURPOSE

3.. The central. purpose of the effect is to develop foreign particiz..;,ica

In the Poet-Apollo Program end to generate foreign contributions to
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that program, rather than to dispense US teeboolozy abroad.. Poroign

participation and contributions could include: Inanition and coographic altos; scientific and applications oxpcmiceato; design, daveleP•

sant and production of *opponent systeos or subayntilms (o.g., for the

space Shuttle and/Cr the spec' atetion).

2. Recognizing that advanced torlaolo= associated vith the open*

progran is a national ascot, much or it imortaut to our national

security, the rococo of US technology In tho couroo of ouch an international. proven should ha carcrully considered ao'..that the ararall. •

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1. benefits varrant the natal, pzrtioulorly to our military ooeurity.

. 3. Unclassified US technical. data (other then cloaca, develoxont or

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production information nufficiently detailcd to convey co=dorels3.

knoehoe) on all or aay part of the Poat-Apollo Provaa, w. ly be re3.eaced to foreign goveri=ents, ngenciea iu their contractors cartritubing to the prwao in any of the ways outlined in parr-vaph 1 above.

h. All US classified inforn4ion, cr4 that unclassified I.nfor=tiOn

Which convoys ca=orcial know-har in deciga, devel.a....=t or production,

viii be released onlyto the =beet necessary on.techniial

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:and under appropriate sareguardn. •

5. All ouch roleanes viii be pursuant to torts of gm:nu:cot-togovora--ent ageencnt(i) requiring ar.au•aoce co to tronsrera.to

cona;41.0.1 not participating in thec,7a....-ftzezrt or D,70e...-anto.

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.6. The /ISDN-72 Ad Hoc Interagency Group shell. identify, with the

assistance of the NASA.-VSA7 Joint Gannittoe on the Space Tranoportation

System, those specific areas of technical information which are sensitive

In. terms Cr VS national security.

7. Technical Information (classified co o unclassified) vhich has boon •

determined to be of a sensitive nature in terns of notional security

shall be exchanged under the conditions set forth in paragraphs k and

5 above, and ividitionally, tindor the pirovisions •of such safeguard° as

the United I:Uteri considers fully adequate to protect its national

interest and to which the foams gavot or agency concerned agrcen„.

Such safegmudis ahnllncxxs11,yinclude proyislaathat:

Ito intonation regarding such teanologr or its existence

Vi]l be tranaferrol to any nation:As ' of nceoporticipating ccuntries

without the prior approval of the US GoverFont.

Access to such technical information rs,y be limited to

those individuals er teem cle;:rly identified air requiring it r.v3. its

avallaility nay be restrictc.d to the location :Mora_ the vet: for which

it is accessary is being carried out.

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(o) Amon to any such sensitive tochnical infccvation rich

any boar a US security classification trill be limited to those peraonnol

actuaLlq requiring knowledge thereof for vs* in thePost•Apallo Proam

and to covartrica son tin= .050 ZIICALIIt2r ClOOMICOG Gad protective

custody proccdurec aro acceptable to the US.

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PROPRIETARY RI(* 8

9• "Proprietary Rights (Issnevationa, Invention, Data and Ccr_rjriglita)

of all concerned chall ba protected as follova:

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*Each party shall obtain sufficient rienta, eatabliched

acc=dance with its der-es:tic lair and practice, to . any invention,

innovation, tedmical data or copy right, pre acted or• generated by

mid party or its contractors in the cows* of lurk under the pestrApona

participation poograa, sad 'hall grant, upon rot= an irrevocable,

non-c:clusive, royalty tree licence to aay other party to thic c.ca-sant

on said invention, innovation, technical data, or copyright fcw the

Impale only of permitting its r-anufacture, use, or rsprecluctien•fcc

furthering tho porgy.-Apollo participation laven.*

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8. Should a altuatiou arise vhcro actuate safeguards cannot be agreed

wan far ammo to technical information neceasary for develop= of

an 01M113lt in the program vhich has bar s weed, a hardvare col-rxeduct

may be substituted for the technology itirolf, on a 'bleat bra haala

is appropriate.
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Arrangements for utilization of such."Propriotary Rights" for purposes

outside of the post-Apollo participation program would be made following

normal commercial practice.

10. Although there should be no areas of technology from which foreign

participation is a 21=1 excluded, contributions which will require '

access to US design, development or production information in certain

critical areas of sensitive data listed below (to be identified as precisely

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as possible) will not be sought or agreed to unless it can be clearly

demonstrated that (1) better technology and know-how exists in the

prospective contributing country or, (2) in the case of only equivalent

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technology and know-how, there are overriding reasons to seek foreign •

. participation in these areas , and (3) neither the US technology nor end

products resulting from it will be transferred to any third country, :nor

applied to,rxr in any other way drawn upori by the recipient for use in

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the development of strategic weapcins delivery systems.

This provision is based on the following considerations:

In the critical areas to be identified, the technology is

closely aligned with, or directly applicable and critical to current '

US strategic delivery or military space systems.

To serve the basic goal of foreign participation there are

adequate non-critical areas of technology to which foreign participation

can be directed.

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11. (a) The US shall require all information, classified and unclassified, including design developaient.and dati, necessary to fulfill;

its role as systems integrator. •

The US shcqld accept no foreign restriction upon its use of

the Sliace Trarilfortation System and Space Station.

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It is not considered necessary to provide for a clause banning

strategic delivery applications of any data exchanged inasmuch as guideline No. 10 has the effect of excluding the transfer of such data by the

. • United States. Furthermore, it is undesiiable that the US place itself

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II ' in the position of accepting restrictions upon its use of data received, as

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I: i might be the case if reciprocal prohibitions upon strategic applications

ii/ 1 • were framed in the a

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 greement. P

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.S.ONFIDENTIAL--

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