--TIP-SECIET23 August 1977

COMMENTS ON DR. MARK'S DRAFT LETTER TO TRE PROGRAM MANAGERS

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Although Dr. Mark may not wish.to list it as a major topic, I

believe that inevitably the IRO management will need to get into a

discussion of the evolving management environment. We are badly

organised to work with some of the conceivable outcomes of PRM-11.

With respect to new technologies, I believe we should look

beyond the narrow interpretation of the SRO mission as one of

collection. An argument can be made that we are already collecting

mare information than the processors, analysts, and producers can

consume in an optimum way. Someone needs to look at new concepts of

information processing, including aids to analysis. Why us/ Because

we have money, programs, and initiatives. I think this is one case

where the technological imperative is justified.

NMI

Brigadier General, USAF

Director

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.MEMORANDUM FOR DR. CHARLES W. COOK, 4C1000

B/GENERAL WILLIAM L. SHIELDS, JR., 4C1000

MR. JIMMIE D. HILL, 4C1000

!/GENERAL JOHN E. KULPA, JR., PROGRAM A, SAMSO

MR. LESLIE C. DIRKS, PROGRAM B, CIA

REAR ADMIRAL GROVER YOWELL, PROGRAM C. USN

Gentlemen:

Now that I have had some preliminary orientations and

discussiins of the National Reconnaissance Program I would like

to call a meeting of the Program Managers and the senior NRO

Headquarters staff members for a general discussion of the

major issues that will be facing the National Reconnaissance

mission

Program in the coming years. Fortunately, the Cheater of our

organization is very simple so that we have a good common starting

Our mission is: "Tbe NIP is responsible for the research, developpoint. The-Charter-eeye: "

sent, acquisition, and operation of all United States Government reconnaissance

satellites."

mission

The major point is, of course, that the Charter emphasizes

reconnaissance from space platforms and that is all that need

recognizing that other

concern us at the moment,. 0.-the-.their-i►eed, there are sees' quite

Important and complicated questions that arise even from a simple

mission

Chaat.es of this kind. These questions deal both with the technolog

of space-based reconnaissance and with the use of space-based

systems that is compatible with the evolution of our national,

There will likely be strongly dive ent views within the elements of the NSO;

foreign and military policie . ibe questions and issues need

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definition and for this reason I would like to have a in depth open

discussion with'you in the mar future.

As I see it, there are four main issues that seem to be

uppermost in people's minds today that bear on Zhe'National

Reconnaissance Program:

1. The vulnerability of apace-based srstems.• There

are three separate aspects of vulnerability. One is the vulnerability that we have in case of overt Soviet action against one

of our systems. This action may either be an ASAT attack or

it could be denial by ground-based means. The second vulnerabilit,

is a technical failure, either ai'launch or on orbit, of one of

our systems. The third vulnerability is the compromise of one

of our systems through espionage or leaks. All of these vulnerabilities are inportantI and I would like to have your judgments

sm.! priorities

on what we should do to make our systems less susceptible to the

specific dangers that I have outlined. There may, of course, be

vulnerablilities that I have not included in this list.

2.. Declassification or "open skies:"' During my short

tenure in this office so far, I have seen a number of pressures

in this direction both from civilian and military people. I

think it is important that we develop a specific philosophy

toward the declassification of any of our space-based reconnaissanc

systems so that we can join the debate over the declassification

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HAmT)LE YSTEM

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. CHARLES W. COOL 4C1000

B/GENERAL WILLIAM L. SHIELDS, JR., 401000

MR. mom D. HILL, 4C1000

if/GENERAL JOHN E. KULPA, JR., PROGRAM A. SAMSO

MR. LESLIE C. DIRKS, PROGRAM B, CIA

REAR ADMIRAL GROVER YOWELL, PROGRAM C. USN

Gentlemen:

Now that I have had some preliminary orientations and

discussions of the National Reconnaissance Program I would like

to call a meeting of the Program Managers and the senior NRO

Headquarters staff members for a general discussion of the

major issues that will be facing the National Reconnaissance

Program in the coming years. Fortunately, the Charter of our

organization is very simple so that we have a good common starting

point. The Charter says: "

The major point is, of course, that the Charter emphasizes

reconnaissance from space platforms and that is all that need

concern us at the moment. On the other hand, there are some quite

important and complicated questions that arise even from a simple

Charter of this kind. These questions deal both with the technolog,

of space-based reconnaissance and with the use of space-based

systems that is compatible with the evolution of our national.

foreign and military policies. These questions and issues need

JOILSEGPVLI Ohm
..

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definition and for this reason I would like to have a in depth

discussion with you in the near future.

As I see it, there are four main issues that seem to be

uppermost in people's minds today that bear on the National

Reconnaissance Program:

The vulnerability of space-based systems. There

are three separate aspects of vulnerability. One is the vulnerability that we have in case of overt Soviet action against one

of our systems. This action may either be an ASAT attack or

it could be denial by ground-based means. The second vulnerability

is a technical failure, either arlaunch or on orbit, of one of

our systems. The third vulnerability is the compromise of one

of our systems through espionage or leaks. All of these vulnerabilities are importantl and I would like to have your judgments

on what we should do to make our systems less susceptible to the

specific dangers that I have outlined. There may, of course, be

vulnerablilities that I have not included in this list.

Declassification or "open skies:"' During my short

tenure in this office so faro I have seen a number of pressures

in this direction both from civilian and military people. I

think it is important that we develop a specific philosophy

toward the declassification of any of our space-based reconnaissanc

systems so that we can join the debate over the declassification
. 1 ur or..t,nc. 1 tith; VIAMYSTEM

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issue in an aggressive way. I want to emphasize here that

believe it is not simply enough to take. a negative position

and to say nothing should be declassified. I believe that the

pressures to do something in a declassified way will be too strong

to resist. Personally, I believe it would be a mistake to declassify.any of our systems but I think we should look at contingenc

plans that we would follow when, in our judgment, it becomes

necessary to take such a step.

The "national" versus "tactical" use of space Inseam 

reconnaissance system. There is a spectrum of opinion on this

particular subject which I believe we should define and then

understand. To some extent the discussions I have heard about

this problem are governed by semantics since people tend to mean

different things when they use the word "tactical." On the other

hand, it is extremely important for us to understand both the

opportunities and the possible pitfalls in the widespread

"tactical" use of the space-based reconnaissance systems.

The !sentence of new technolo ies. There are a

number of new technical developments on the horizon which I am

sure will bear very strongly on our activities. There is, for

example, the development of the space shuttle vehicle and the

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opportunities and problems which it presents. If a shuttle

transportation system is actually developed to its full potential,

then the erection of large structures in space, and the operation

of man-tended systems,becomes a very real possibility. I would

like to understand what such developments mean in terms of the

future programs that we would want-to develop. There are also

technologies that are independent of the launch vehicles. For

example, there are developments in cryogenics that have clear

applications to space-based systems, specifically, the sensors

that can be used. There have also been interesting new developments in infrared and microwave sensors that we should consider.

Finally, the development of high energy space-based laser systems

is something that should be studied and perhaps taken into account.

These are simply a few suggestions that come to mind and I am

sure there are many others. What I would like to.know is whether

our research and development programs cover the fields that seem

to us to be most promising.

This list is obviously not complete and please feel free

to add to it. As you can see, I am not interested in discussing

specific project plans. Rather, I would like to see individual

projects evolve from some general principles that we develop in

discussing the issues that I have outlined here.

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I mould like to suggest that we meet in office iv

Washington on Saturday, September 10, for a day long discussion

of the issues that I have outlined. There will be no formal

agenda but please let as know if you would like to add any other

major topics that should be considered.

With best personal regards.

Hans Mark

cc: Col Harry Goodall

Maj Dick Tiplady