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THE NRO STA F F 

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADNER 

LTCOL YOST 

SUBJECT: COMSEC Surveillance Survey of 6595 ATW, 

23 July - 2 August 1 968 

PURPOSE: 

To evaluate the COMSEC report, and, i n l i ght of the 

report, to determine what acti on, if any, is required to 

insure proper security of the NRP at Vandenberg AFB. 

DEVELOPMENT OF A SECURITY CRITERIA: 

Proper evaluation requires the development of a security criteri a which must take cognizance of the following: 

a. The NRO has been d i rected to conduct the NRP 

"covertly" under the guise of R&D. 

b. The various reconnaissance systems have been 

subject to a fair amount of speculation in national news 

media. 

c. The loyalty security program is sensitive because 

of the underlying constitutional questions presented. 

d. There is an existing need for protecting technological lead time in the development and operation of 

reconnaissance systems. 

e. There is an e~isting need for the protection of 

information wh i ch .if dtvulged would cause reconnaissance 

systems to become more vulnerable to interference duringo 

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crisis, trans-conflict, or post-conflict periods. 

THE SECURITY CRITERIA: 

A realistic security criteria may be stated as 

follows: 

a. To keep within the "covert" system all tangible 

evidence of a reconnaissance effort. 

b. To keep within the "covert" system all information 

which prompts new speculation or tends to validate old 

speculation concerning the reconnaissance effort. 

c. To keep within the "covert" system all information 

which reveals the existence of a special security system, 

including personnel security investigations and clearances~ 

d. To protect all "state-of-the-art" information 

which constitutes technological lead time in the development and operation of reconnaissance systems. 

e. To protect all information which if devu~ged would 

cause the reconnaissance systems to become more vulnerable 

to interference or destruction during international crisis, 

trans-conflict, or post-conflict periods. 

COM SEC REPORT VS SECURITY CRITERIA: 

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It is stated in the COMSEC report that all information 

was developed from UNCLASSIFIED documentation. The report 

describes the mission of Program 846, describes the recovery 

operation, identifies launch dates, and reveals injection 

parameters. Obviously, the security system at Vandenberg. 

AFB has not met the security criteria established above. 

BACKGROUND TO THE COVERT SECURITY POLICY: 

To the detriment of "covert" security, early satellite 

reconnaissance history is replete with instances wherein 

Congress and the -public were given detailed information 

concerning the development, manufacture, and launching of 

the early systems. In January 1960, for example, General 

White discussed SAMOS before the National Press Club. 

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Later in that same year, General Schriever described the 

Sfu~OS mission in open testimony before the House Committee 

on Science and Astronautics. Shortly thereafter, the Air 

Force announced the establishment of the SAMOS Project, 

under General Greer at El Segundo, California. Finally, 

the Air Force openly announced the launching of SAMOS I, 

II, and III from Vandenberg AFB. In other words, prior to 

closing the "barn door" the public's interest was whetted, 

and the public was officially told who, what, where, when, 

and how the satellite reconnaissance effort was being 

accomplished. Unfortunately, these early disclosures 

educated newsmen in satellite reconnaissance technology, 

and pinpointed those areas which would later serve newsmen 

as targets for exploitation. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COVERT SECURITY POLICY: 

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Subsequent to these early disclosures, a decision was 

made at the very highest level of government to conduct the 

NRP "covertly"; unfortunately, however, as demonstrated by 

the results of the COM SEC Team survey, little effective 

action has yet been taken to implement national policy in 

a realistic manner at VAFB. The modus operandi, for 

instance, has not been changed substantially since it was 

originally announced that the SAMOS Project would be managed 

from El Segundo. Systems launched from VAFB are readily 

identifiable as being managed by SAFSP. Satellite reconnaissance system launches are being allowed to stand 

silhouetted against a background of other Air Force launches 

whose missions are for the most part well known and which 

from a security and p~blic information standpoint are being 

handled in an observably different manner. Tour groups, 

newsmen, etc, are allowed easy access to the launch base 

environment where they can expand their knowledge of missile 

technology; learn the personalities, methods, contractors, 

and agencies involved; take advantage of official faux pas, 

inadvertent disclousres, and tips from dissidents; while 

at the same time being treated as VIPs with diplomatic 

immunity to talk and write about everything and anything 

they see or hear. Consequently, unless the COM SEC Team 

members were unbelievably naive, it can be assumed that 

prior to reaching VAFB they had read numerous "spy-in-the 

sky" articles, were familiar with the missions associated 

with most of the other launches from VAFB, and were predisposed to finding evidence of satellite reconnaissance. 

They did not, of course, find tangible evidence; however, 

they were, unfortunately, confronted with an abundance 

of circumstantial evidence so overpowering in nature as to 

be almost conclusive proof that Program 846 was indeed a 

. photographic reconnaissance effort with some electronic 

reconnaissance involved. 

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THE DANGER AHEAD: 

The reason that the NRP has been able to continue without the realistic implementation of covert security policy 

at VAFB is an interesting phenomena worthy of attention for 

certainly it cannot long continue if MOL is to become a 

reality. First, it should be understood that the threat 

which gave life to covert security policy was the risk of 

a "confron ta t1.on" resulting in the "stand down" o·f launches 

and the loss of a vital intelligence collection activity. 

While the NRP was still a relatively small effort, it was 

sufficient to concentrate on the protection of tangible 

evidence which might be devulged by disloyal employees, 

uncontrolled documentation, or open hardware. Consequently, 

in the past, stress was placed on the investigation, clearance, 

and security indoctrination of personnel, the physical protection of documents and hardware, the protection of revealing associations between contractors and government 

agencies, and the "sanitization" of program documents required 

to be used outside the "black" community. Other than a 

deve l oping avalanche of newspaper and magazine articl es, 

outside criticism and pressure was at a sufficiently low 

leve l as to be handled by the ad hoc "briefing" and "indoctrination" of persons holding strategic positions within 

government. Although certain news releases were cause for 

concern, since they were neither confirmed or denied, they 

died quickly due to lack of public interest in the rather 

sterile, undynamic character of unmanned systems. It is 

highly dangerous, however, to assume that this same condition 

will continue to exist. Particularly, when it is likely that 

the interest and imagination of every man in the street will 

be sparked by the spectacular human life and death situation 

presented by the first launch of a manned system from VAFB. 

Certainly the NRO should not take unnecessary security risks 

if they can be avoided. 

COURSE OF ACTION: 

A. No simple or easy solution to the problem is 

immediately available; however, there is no question but 

what security at VAFB should be tightened immediately. As 

a first step, all program documentation should be reviewed 

for proper clap~it.~~a~i9n. This review should cover UN- CLASSIFIED;i~¥o/mtt·ltri~ and should include but not be limited 

to the following: 

Planning Estimate (PE) 

Program Requirements Document 

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Program Support Plan (PSP) 

Operations Requirements (OR) 

Operational Directives (OD) 

Systems Test Plan (STP) 

Systems Test Objectives (STO) 

Range Safety Report 

Flight Terminat i on Report -"'~ 

Pad Safety Report --- Launch Test Directive (LTD) _c Payload Recovery Plan 

Test Procedures 

Countdown Manual 

Presto ReportsCommander's Summary Report -- Launch Evaluation Report (Final Launch _,~ 

Report) 

Discrepancy Reports --

Scheduling Requests 

APEX BEELINE ReportsCONTROL SYS TE M 

B. I believe the next important and necessary step is 

to completely submerge reconnaissance satel lite launches 

deeply with i n all other launches from VAFB. It will no 

doubt be necessary to accompli sh this over the objections 

of NASA, AFWTR, SAC,and possibly HQ USAF, a most painful 

exercise to say the least. To be effective all VAFB 

launches must be classified and handled exactly the same 

from a security and publ ic i nformation standpoint. The 

base must be complete l y closed to tour groups, newsmen, 

etc. No press rele~ses can be authorized except those 

regarding the most mundane housekeeping chores. The industrial faci l ities and launch compl exes must be separated 

from the main housing area, and all ingress must require 

a SECRET security c l earance and'heed-to-know." The 

closing of VAFB should be accomplished by the Base Commander 

at an early date so that the act is not obviously connected 

wi th MOL. With discretion, the closi ng shoul d be accomplished 

in easy stages so as not to generate undue heat from the 

press or local community. The "whitett rational e can be very 

direct and simple, in that, the previous security posture 

was too loose to adequately protect the vital R&D and EWO 

missions associated with VAFB. 

C. In addition, I believe that there are possible 

weaknesses in the NRO approach to security which may be 

deserving of further study. The following will serve as 

illustrative examples: 

(1) LATE SECURITY IMPLEMENTING PLANS - When I was 

assi gned to the launch base, I often l amented the fact that 

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security planning was not accomplished at the same time 

and as an integral part of the technical planning. For 

instance, .in the caSe of GAMBIT3 no security plan was available until after the launch facilities had been completely 

built and the technical operation completely decided upon. 

This situation not only hurt security, but resulted in 

extra costs to the program. Does this same condition exist 

in relationship to HEXAGON and DORIAN? 

(2) LACK OF CENTRAL CONTROL - There is no one 

individual responsible for implementing DCI security policy; 

consequently, there is a strong possibility that in security 

matters the left hand does not know what the right hand is 

doing, and that a certain amount of redundancy exists resulting in unnecessary security cost to the NRO or the 

government as a whole. For instance, within Lockheed there 

exists "black" SAFSP contracts and "black" CIA contracts, 

and each type of contract is being administered separately 

by their" separate sponsors. 

(3) PROTECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEAD TIME - Since 

the NRO has taken the security of satellite reconnaissance 

out from under the normal security controls, one might 

well question whether or not the new security system provides protection to anything other than the "covert" 

aspects of the program. As an illustration, one might 

wonder how technological lead time is protected under the 

Patent Secrecy Act of 1952 (35 USC 181-188). Has someone 

been briefed in this area so that they can look out for 

NRP interests? Or has NRO "reinvention of the security 

wheel" caused many of the common security protective 

measures to fall by the wayside? 

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