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-+6+ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

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0 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

May 24, 1966 

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MEMORANDUM FOR:, STATE - Amb. Johnson 

~ DOD - M'f'.. McNaughton 

ACDA - Mr. Fisher 

CIA - Mr. Sheldon 

WIDTE HOUSE - Mr. Keeny 

- Mr. Charles Johnson 

NASC - Mr. Welsh 

NASA - Dr. Seamans 

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SUBJECT: Political Aspects of Disclosure of Space 

Reconnaissance Capabilities 

The attached NRO evaluation has been prepared in response to 

Ambassador Johnson's memorandum of May 6. 

Attachment 

NRO Evaluation 

Alexander H. Flax 

Director 

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EVALUATION OF IMPACT 

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1. BACKGROUND 

a. During the past year the NASA h:as been rapidly 

accelerating the study and planning act'ivities for its Earth 

Resources Survey Program to evaluate the feasibility and 

practicability of using satellite systems to observe, measure 

and analyze resources and changing natural and cultural condi-. 

tions on earth. Although this program involves the use of 

many different types of earth sensors, by far the most .important 

and widely applicable sensors in the proposed NASA program are 

a photographic in nature. The photographic sensor capabilities 

required by NASA, at least in the long run, generally overlap 

0 the quality of sensors used in the NRP and would provide data 

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of significant military and economic intelligence value. This 

had led to serious concern on the part of the DOD over the 

impact of the NASA program on the security and viability of 

the NRP. 

b. At the May 6 meeting of the NSAM 156 Committee 

which was convened to consider these problems i;t was agreed 

that the "NRO would undertake to evaluate the risks and costs 

of partial disclosure of surveillance capabilities (not of the 

NRP per se), with particular focus on the implied surveillance 

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capability of NASA's desired programs and the security implications of release of space photographic products of high resoiu-

·tion, and on the security of technology of space surveillat?-ce." 

2 .. ' RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROPOSED NASA PROGRAM TO THE NRP 

a. Sensor Type and Quality: 

(1) Photographic - NASA has defined as its minimal 

requirement for the initial phases of the orbital experimental 

program beginning it?- 1966 the following sensors: 

Multi-spectral synoptical cameras - 30 meter resolution ,_..-

Wide-range spectral scanner - 200 meter resolution 

These sensors, if held to the minimum resolution requirement, 

• would be of considerably lower quality than any optical systems 

in use in the NRP. The plans for 1971, however, contemplate 

meeting resolution requirements which will involve the best 

. technology of that time period. Since the best technology in 

camera optics which is likely to be available in this period 

will be that which is employed in the NRP, there is implied a 

virtually complete declassification of NRP sensors or a parallel 

development of sensors of equal quality. 

(2) Infrared and radar sensors - Such sensors are 

not currently in use from satellites in the NRP, although some 

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have been used in aircraft. This is because the available 

resolution from orbital altitude would generally provide data 

of limited value, although with respect to certain specific, 

intelligence targets (such as a large underground installation) 

IR sensors would.be useful. In general, the technologically 

available resolutions which are proposed by.NASA are considerably 

poorer than the photographic requirements discussed above. I 

(3) Radar: A synthetic aperture radar of the type 

listed in the NASA instrumentation specifications has been flown 

in a satellite experimentally by the NRO; the radar was operated, 

however, only over the United States. Although it appears that 

·' certain useful results could be obtained over denied territory, 

the requirement for active electromagnetic illumination which 

·is, at least in principle, detectable has inhibited any plans 

for operational u'se of this sensor. 

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(4) Non.,;.image forming sensors: The NASA plans 

also include sensors such as magnetometers, radiometers and 

gravity gradiometers which have no counterpart in the NRP and 

generally do not provide information which is directly of 

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intelligence value but which may in some instances have 

applications of military value. 

b. Orbits: 

All of the NASA manned space flight programs up 

to this point (Mercury and Gemini) have been flown on orbits 

' below 30 degrees inclination so that no overflight of the Soviet 

Union occurred, although China was overflown. The proposed I 

NASA natural resources survey flights which are planned to begin 

in 1969 will involve orbital flight inclinations up to 48 degrees. 

These flights will cover only the most southern part of the 

Soviet Union, but this coverage will cover some of the most 

·. significant areas from an intelligence standpoint, namely, 

Tyura Tam, Kapustin Yar and Sary Shagan. It is further planned 

that later in the program polar orbital flights will be undertakeno These wi11 completely correspond to the orbits used in 

the NRP and will provide global coverage of all d~nied territories .. 

c. NASA Program Phasing: 

(1) Phase I: As defined by NASA, Part (a) of this 

phase, which includes analytical studies, laboratory experiments .. 

and development of aircraft flight experiments to define the 

signature characteristics of the phenomena involved.and the 

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sensor characteristics required remote observations does 

not.directly relate to NRP activities as long as sensor considera• 

tions are limited to examination of desired characteristics 

than evaluation or design of spec sensor configurations to meet these requirements. .Phase I (b) which contemplates 

examination of data to determine its applicability to stated 

requirements and methodology for its use raises the question of 

what data already in the NRP should be released for this purpose 

since essentially all the available high resolution photography 

from space the product of the NRP and is subject to TALENT/ 

KEYHOLE security controls. 

(2) In this phase, Part (b) which 

contemplates analytical studies and planning of s.pace instrumentation systems to obtain and,process the required data 

definitely involves close interaction~ with the NRP and raises 

questions concerning the release of highly classified equipment 

for unclassified NASA programs. 

(3) This phase involves principally 

flight tests of instrumentation systems over calibrated target 

· areas. If such instrumentation systems are limited to those 

required to obtain the desired resolution from airplane altitudes, 

1 ' NRP satellite equipment will not be involved and the required ....... 

0 instrumentation will, at most, .be affected by classification 

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at the military "Secret" level. 

. (4) Phase IV: This is the orbital flight phase 

and its initiation will involve, in increasing: degree.as it 

progresses, overlap with NRP activities. 

3. RISKS: 

a. The assessment of risk is necessarily a subjective · 

matter and the impact of the NASA program will depend on many I 

factors which are not presently well defined. Probably the 

most important of these is the international environment from 

1969 onward& For purposes of this assessment, however~ it is 

assumed that the present environment will continue with no 

significant change. In this environment it appears that disclosure of U. s. capabilities and intentions for orbiting 

reconnaissance quality sensors could seriously jeopardize the 

security and reliability of the NRP. It is difficult to define 

a precise resolution at which point this problem becomes serious • 

. However, it appears possible to define a threshold· of ·resolution 

at which orbital data collection would provide information of 

military intelligence value over a broad·spectrum of targets. 

(For certain specific targets of isolated nature such as a very 

large radar ant~nna or an airfield location even resolutions 

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poorer than this threshold value could provide some military 

information). For the broad spectrum of military intelligence 

targets, the threshold appears to be· at .a value of resolution 

between. twenty and thirty meters. not clear 

this threshold for military target information relates closely 

to a threshold for political sensitivity. 

b. It. the· risks involved, particularly 

those affected by international political factors, must be faced 

whether the U. S. reconnaissance activities are identified .as 

a NASA "peaceful'.' program or not. 

c. The risks may be divided into three major categories 

·as follows: 

(1) International Eolitical: The stimulation of 

ill-timed discussion of space .reconnaissance activities in the 

international arena could produce unfavorable reactions from 

neutral, hostile or even friendly nations and could confront 

the Soviet Union with a condition which it would be forced 

to a hard ion on observation .. Among the 

actions which might be triggered are increased political pressure 

to hinder observation satellite activity by discrediting it, 

agitarion for imposition of international controls on satellite 

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': observation activities, or proposals to consolidate national 

.satellite reconnaissance.activities into a·single internationally 

·sponsored and controlled program.· It is conceivable that the 

latter proposal would be coupled to a stipulation that photog-

. raphy in the international program would be limited to specific .· 

areas approved by the nation being overflown. In any event, 

.: .-.,the· legality of the existing U. S. program could be called into n ·.: u.;" _,.-.. -- .. question at the outset of any international discussion.· . ' . . : 

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(2) Passive control measures: Public disclosure 

of the scope or quality of current U. S. satellite reconnaissance 

· activities could lead to cover and camouflage :responses from 

o.·:·.:·.·.·~:·.·. nations being overflown. While such activities would probably 

D .. ·.·: ·.··it might be very successful\ in denying .us the kind of. information 

not be feasible or adequate to cover the larger installations, 

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I With the present' KH-7 much effort is expended in 'analysis : ~~~-

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of photography in an attempt to derive information of the 

· type exemplified above. The KH-8 with its 50X1 improve-. 

. ment in resolution will make possible the derivation of even 

more information of this kind. However, as the resolution be~ 

comes finer and finer, it becomes easier and easier, particularly 

for technical intelligence targets, to camouflage or cover the 

fine detail, hard though. it may. be to cover the gross outlines.· 

.... ~of large objects • 

". (3) Active countermeasures: The Soviet Union has · .· · ·' 

:.been developing a network of large surveillance radars (Dog ···.··· .. . '; 

House and Hen House) which will provide orbital search and ,_ , 

O .:_·· '·, .: . track .capabilities.· adequate for an anti-satellite system. · This 

.. D , . system is expected to become. operational initially during 1966 •.. :·> 

' · ·Although· there is no solid evidence of the· existence of a Soviet .... " ' 

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.anti-satellite interceptor system, it must be recognized that 

such an interceptor, based on a nuclear kill capability, can 

readily be developed by the Soviets through adaptation of :MMRBM 

or IRBM vehicles. Such a development would parallel our own 

development of the 437 satellite interceptor and could be 

accomplished in a relatively short time. In the longer range, 

but certainly by 1970-75, a· non-nuclear kill. capability could 

be achieved utilizing. a. terminal homing interceptor. Based on 

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U. S. studies, it appears that development of such a terminal 

homing interceptor poses no particularly difficult technological 

problems and that.such an interceptor system could be operated 

at a cost per interceptor considerably less than the cost of the 

reconnaissance satellite being destroyed. 

· d. The present security policies: .. of the NRP, which 

have been formulated to meet the requirements of national 

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_.•' ··· ... policy (as expressed in NSC action 2454), essentially are . ; 

intended to minimize these risks by tightly controlling all .· ·'. ,, ... 

information as to the existence, the extent and the.successes ... 

··.of the NRP. These controls cover, among other elements, the 

identity and scope of specific observational and develo?mental . •, •, D .. :.· -' .. ·~ . . 

programs, the U. S •. state-of-the-art in observation sensors and·. 

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being obtained. . The proposed NASA program would certainly .: .. 

···. disclose at least the state-of-the-art in observation sensors 

·and would probably result in some further leakage of information 

:concerning the existence and activities of the NRP. Such disclosure would be occurring well in advance of any projected 

flight dates through the media of NASA-sponsored symposia'. on 

earth-sensing, requests for proposals, and requests for program. 

·recommendations and endorsement which are widely. distributed 

throughout.the scientific community.· These.activities, which 

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are in most cases conducted prior to actual initiation 

funded programs, have led to a series of proposed.studies, 

designs and experimental activities involving the use of recon• 

naissance sensors in orbiting s • This 

resulted in wide-spread discussion and publication of earthsensing satellite potentials, as well as statements of needed 

and obtainable equipment capab 

' • NRP contractors have ;, 

been ~o~g those solicited, since they are the obvious sources 

· Dr equipments of the kind desired. 

e. Thus the risks to the security and viability of the 

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·NRP which are engendered by the NASA program actually begin in 

the planning and intensify through the process unc 

· hardware development on through to the flight phase, at which 

point the political sensitivity. is probably. at a maxi.mum. It 

must be that the conduct of photographic activities from satellites implies, . in at least some degree, an interest.·· 

in denied territories, since it is apparent to those of even a 

·modicum of technical ion that, where .is not 

denied, many of the high resolution photographic objectives of 

'..· the NASA program could be achieved earlier and probably. at 

lower cost through the use aircraf'I;: •.. , .. 

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4. COSTS: 

a. Since satellite reconnaissance is.probably the most J ,. 

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important single U. S. intelligence sou'rce, it. is difficult to : 

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·assess an national cost which would result from an 

international situation in which the U. s. no longer found it 

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,. ., :. / possible to continue the program in its present form .. At the 

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very best, there could result from international deliberations:.; 

an "Open Skies" situation. At worst there could result a 

· situation in which all satellite reconnaissance was subject to 

specific approval of photography by the nat overflown.· 

··.Between these limits. lies a wide spectrum of possibilities. 

In , however, for establishment of.an uopen 

Skies" doctrine, a~l possible consequences.involve either greater. 

difficulties on the international scene for the U. S. or greater 

d costs in cover.·. continuing viability 

for satellite reconnaissance activities •. 

b. The possibility that other nations·will make increasing use of pass control measures such as cover and camouflage 

could significantly decrease the intelligence value of information 

obtained from satellite collection activit , especially for 

resolutions expected to be obtained with the KH-8 this summer. 

This in effect would negate in part the effort and resources 

·whi.ch have been expended in t~e development the KH-8 system.: 

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A similar but lesser effect would occur even for the products· 

of the KH-7 system. should be noted that, even we assume· 

that the Soviet Union is well aware of the quality of our 

present reconnaissance photography, Communist China and, many 

smaller nations are less likely to have such information in 

spite of the speculation on such matters which appears from time 

in s. In any event, the pub dissemination o.,:. 

high resolution reconnaissance products contemplated in the NASA 

·program would dispell all doubt. 

c.. effect of active countermeasures which, for the 

near future, would probably be restricted to those undertaken ... 

by the Soviet Union, could be substantial. In order to apply 

. vulnerability-reducing measures which have under development 

by the NRO, a substantial reduction in other satellite payload 

must accommodated. These vulnerability-reducing measures 

include! 

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payload degradation would dep'end on the of 

the threat, but in general, the reduction normal on-orbit 

payload equates to a reduction in number of days in orbit with 

a consequent total intelligence collected. :In 

event that the Soviets developed and employed a terminal homing 

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satellite interceptor with conventional warhead in the 1970-75 

period, the U. S. could be involved in an expensive game of 

measure and countermeasure which could easily double or tripl:e 

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the cost of the present satellite reconnaissance program. 

d. · Specific cost levels cannot be related directly to 

levels of disclosure since even a partial disclosure might have 

the same effect in the i,nternational political arena as a full 

disclosure. Disclosure inevitably faces the overflown nations 

• with pressures to react which can move them to take unfavorable 

positions to the U.S. Nevertheless, it appears that the conduct.· 

of NASA satellite reconnaissance activities at resolutions no 

better than thirty meters and in orbits below thirty degrees 

would pose a minimum risk, and would in any event involve 

minimum cost to the NRP with respect to possible active countermeasures since the Soviet Union would not be directly involved. 

Extension of NASA activities to include higher resolutions and 

orbits of higher inclinations would increase the risks and 

. potential cost to the U. S. In the extreme case, the U. S .. 

might be faced with the alternatives of eith~r continuing 

the NRP and facing the disapprobation of world opinion ·:or discontinuing the NRPs 

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