Material preapred by Mr. Friedman

for meeting with Mr. McNaughton

13 January 65

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MEMORANDUM 

Proposed Insertions for NSAM 311 Paper Whether or Not KII-6 Matter 

is Raised

(These changes are in addition to those transmitted by Tab 11 of MA memo

to Mr. Vance, dated 15 December 1964.)

Add to paragraph f. of summary memo: 

"... , although it is probable that even this requirement can be reduced

somewhat (say, to 80-85% monthly or 90% every 45 days) without significantly increasing the risk to U. S. security interests. "

(Change paragraph 2 of the 311 paper to accord. )

Change paragraph (1) of the summary memo as follows:

"i. Cloud-free KH-4 photography of about 75 per cent of Cuba could

be obtained monthly at an additional expense eia and about

50 per cent coverage could be obtained monthly per cent bi-monthly)

at no increase in cost. In each case, a modification of existing KH-4

practices would be required. KH-4 options are:

KH-4 COVERAGE FROM WESTERN TEST RANGE VS ADDED COST PER YEAR 

90% Coverage 90% Coverage 90% Coverage 75% Coverage 75% Coverage.

Eve 3 Da Eve 30 Da s Eve 60 Da
Iii-4 photography probably would not permit detection of single MRM

MRBM field sites of the unpatierned type. It probably would (along with

other intelligence) raise sufficient suspicions of the deployment of a

number of such weapons as to justify the use of U-2 or drone capability

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2/ For flights westbound from Western Test Range, double the costs

in each case.

(Change paragraphs (ii) and (iv) on pages 7 and 8 of the 311 paper to.accord.)

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3. On page 9 of the 311 paper, change "19" in the second line to "21. "

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(ii) Cloud-free KR-4 photography of about 75 per cent of Cuba could

be obtained monthly at an additional expense

or about 50 per cent coverage could be obtained monthly at no increase

in cost. In either case, a modification of existing KR-4 practices would

be required.

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MEMORANDUM 

Proposed Additional Insertions for NSAM 311 Paper Relating to ICH-6 Matter 

Add following to paragraph g. of summary memorandum:

"Alternatively, the U. S. might consider stopping the U-2 flights if

it became U. S. policy to take such action as one means of reducing EastWest tensions:

(I) While at the same time protecting U. S. security interests by

using an equivalent substitute reconnaissance capability;

(2) By being willing to slightly reduce the requirement for Cuba

reconnaissance coverage by an extent that would not significantly increase

the risk to U. S. security interests.

Change second sentence of paragraph 6. a. to read:

"Accordingly, the U. S. should not consider a change in current surveillance arrangements* until: (1) there is significantly increased danger

of a U-2 shoot-down or (2) it is decided to eliminate the U-2 flights as a

major policy decision, either to reduce East-West tensions or for other

reasons, and U. S. security interests could be protected by use of an

equivalent adequate substitute reconnaissance capability (see par. 7 below).

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3. Add following to revised paragraph (i) of summary memo: 

"KH-6 photography can provide photography adequate (5-foot resolution) to detect unpatterned site MRBM deployments and could satisfy the

exis requirement for Cuba coverage (90% monthly) at an added cost of

ally. (Coverage of the world areas noted above would be

provided. ) 10:1-8 options are:

KH-6 COVERAGE FROM WESTERN TEST RANGE 

Added Cost Per 90% Coverage 90% Coverage 90% Coverage 75% Coverage

Year Every 30 Days Every 45 Days Every 60 Days Every 60 Days

At least 70%

cloud-free

photography*

* Since one flight furnishes more than 90% coverage of 100% cloud-free

photography, the 70% column is redundant.

(Substitute the above for par (v) on Page 8 of 311 paper and renumber

present par (v) as par (vi)).

4. Add following as new paragraph 7 in 311 papger (at Page 14) and renumber 

paragraph 7 and paragraph 8:

7. Use of Satellite Coverage Under Changed Circumstances.

a. Change in II. S. Policy to Reduce Tensions. It is conceivable

that under certain circumstances, the United States might wish to take

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positive steps leading to a reduction in the probability of a confrontation

with Cuba over the overflight issue. Such circumstances might include:

(1) A new round of efforts to reduce East-West tensions in

which both sides take concrete steps to eliminate areas of friction.

A fundamental change in U. S. policy toward Cuba designed

to bring Cuba back into the inter-American community.

A positive U. S. response to Cuban overtures to reduce

friction with her American neighbors such as a marked curtailment of

subversive activities in Latin America.

(4) •An attempt by the U. S. to dampen-down certain potential

crisis areas because of increased tension in other areas (such as

Vietnam or the Congo).

b. Alternative Programs. If any of the above circumstances apply,

the U. S. could consider several actions to achieve the desired results:

(1) Reducing the stated requirement for interpretable photography from 90% every four weeks to a lower figure, or extending the

time period of coverage. This would increase the risk of offensive missiles escaping detection, but the actual increase in risk may be difficult

to measure and it may be relatively small. Moreover, we do not have

100% assurance of detection now. Such a reduction in the requirement

w ould open up alternative areas of collection, such as mein reliance on

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KR-4 photography supplemented w quired, with U-2 or drones

held on a standby basis only, and including peripheral photography. The

charts at pages above indicate the options available utilizing

currently operational systems.

(2) Providing essentially the same coverage as at present

but re-activating the KH-6 system, whose resolution (5 feet) is adequate

to identify mobile missile deployments. The capabilities are shown on

this chart:

KH-6 COVERAGE (CLOUD-FREE) AND COSTS

90% Coverage 90% Coverage 90% Coverage 75% Coverage

Every 30 Days Every 45 Days Every 60 Days Every 60 Days

Flight units to be procured annually to achieve required number of

successful launches (80% reliability factor).

c. Discussion of Alternatives. Because of the inadequate resolution of the

frequency of flight des only marginal gains in

utilizable coverage for the costs involved.

The KH-6 system, on the other hand, offers the prospect of

providing the required coverage (94% of Cuba, cloud-free, monthly)

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with utilisable photography at a cost which is reasonable if other benefits

are considered. An orbit can be selected which will cover from 24°

north latitude to 24° south latitude. In addition to providing full coverage

of Cuba, such crisis areas as the Congo, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam,

Laos, and Southern China (in the area of Chinese air-buildups on the

South Vietnamese Border) can be covered with 5 foot resolution photography. This additional coverage alone would go a long way toward

justifying th liars involved. (If 84% Cuban coverage

monthly (clou e were acceptable, the ICH-6 system could provide

even greater coverage of other world areas -- from 34° north latitude •

to 34° south latitude. )

If present KH-4 tography is reduced to the extent permissible by using the -6, costs attributable to the KR-6 will

be reduced commensurately. Interesting trade-offs can be contemplated

if Cuban coverage is varied to provide greater China coverage. Similarly,

costs for increased coverage of China which may be necessary in the

future can be absorbed by the new system.

d. Political Scenario. The manner in which the U. S. would go

about terminating U-2 flights over Cuba would depend in large measure

on the circumstances pertaining at the time the action Was contemplated.

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In those circumstances in which the U. S. took the initiative

in reducing tensions such as those in paragraphs 7. a. (1). (2). and (4),

above, it •would be necessary to satiety two somewhat conflicting objec-

' dyes. On the one hand, the U. S. would hope to establish that in ceasing

the U-2 overflights, we were in fact making a meaningful gesture toward

reducing tensions. At the same time the American people and the

Congress would have to be assured that the U. S. was not taking undue

security tisks vis-a-vis Cuba. This could be managed by briefing the

Congressional leadership on the adequacy of the substitute measures.

Selected Allies could also be briefed, perhaps as a follow-up to the

earlier McCone briefings. At the same time, we would take the public

posture that the U. S. has adequate new techniques to assure itself

against the re-introduction of missiles, that cessation of the U-2 flights

will assist in reducing tensions and that a quid-pro-quo involving

Communist concessions is a part of the proposal. It would be essential,

of course, to avoid any impression that the U. S. was retreating under

duress.

e. Recommendations. The following recommendations are made

in light of the above considerations:

(I) Ready the KH-6 system for utilisation in the satellite program. (Approximately 6 months required).

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Procure additional KH-6 sets to enable the system to

run on a 15 launch sets per year basis. Present on-shelf capability

would be exhausted about the time new production comes in. •

Begin as soon as possible KH-6 launches on a random

basis to gain operational experience with the system.

(4) Prepare to phase out 11-2 operations on a gradual basis

as the KH-6 is phased in if any of the circumstances in 7. a. above

dictates such action.

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