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11 June 1969 

Director of Space Systems 

Office, Secretary of the Air Force 

Headquarters United States Air Force 

Washington, D.C. 20330 

Attention: Colonel Paul Werthman 

Dear Paul: 

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l-l l l 71 

Enclosed is a copy of a paper I am working on currently. Any comments 

or suggestions would be most welcome. 

MED:ws 

Enclosure: paper 

Sincerely, 

Merton E. Davies 

Engineering Sciences Department 

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INSPECTION BY SATELLITE FOR A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY 

by 

Merton E. Davies 

The use of observation satel 11 tes to monitor arms control treaties· 

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has been suggested many times In the past both In open publications and 

In government studies. Perhaps the first time .It was discussed during· 

negotiations was at the Surprise Attack Conference held In Geneva In 

1958. , ('..,.,n "{~. ...• ...,~--

At this tl"!E!, It has been proposed that an observation satellite 

~ 

system be developed to monitor.~ Strategic Arms limitation Treaty. 

The proposal has two forms: the first and best thought-out Idea visualizes entering- Into direct negotiations wlth the Soviet Union for the 

simultaneous development of one Inspection satellite system In the U.S • 

• (by NASA) and another i11 the_ SU. These systems would be operated relatively openly by the nations· Involved. The second thought was to propoH!I 

establishment of an Inspection satellite system within the structure of 

the UN, to be operated by the UN and for the data· to be freefy avaf 1ab1e 

to all. As this second proposal Implies greater openness than the first, 

it would probably be.more difficult to obtain Soviet cooperation for Its 

establishment. On the other hand, It might emerge In a few years as a UN 

response to a bilateral U.S./SU Inspection agreement. The remaining dis• 

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cusslon will pertain only to bilateral U.S./SU relationships (first pro· 

posal) and should not be confused with possible mu1 lateral relationships 

(second proposal) In regard to object Ives II f ntent t r purpose. 

1. What would be the technical characterhtl. 

satellite system? 

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Performance and operational characteristics of the Inspection systems would be determined by direct negotiations between the U.S. and the 

SU scientists. As a point of reference, the ground resolution of an ob•, 

servatlon satellite at 200 km altitude based on thef U.S. Lunar.Orbiter 

camera system would be 4.5 meters and based on the fovlet Zond 6 camera 

system would be 10 meters. 

2. Who would normally see the plc~ures7 

NASA would furnish the pictures to the U,S. a-=w~vernmentt as de• 

o.,...J~~'t;; 

sired, =-i Flililtiiiif.'6 exchange them for SU pictures. Only minimum public dis· 

closure would be required, however, samples would be needed to demonstrate 

performance to the public and. congress. In event of crisis or grave con• 

cern they would be available to the UN or other designated body. 

J. Why should the Soviets agree to such a system? 

They understand the way our government and press operate and realize 

that something will have to be said about inspection before a treaty will 

be ratified by the Senate~ This system would be less objectionable than 

previous proposals (on-site Inspection, ground stations, aerial inspection, 

etc.). 

4. Why not tell the Senate that no Inspection is necessary? 

Recalling how the Soviets broke the nuclear weapon test moratorium, 

" 

lied during the Cuban missile crisis, and more recently Invaded Czechoslovakia 

would lead to little support for such confidence In the Soviet Union within 

the -Sen,te or by the Amer I can pub 11 c. 

5. Why not tell the Senate that Inspection wll1 be;c::11rthsd out by uni-.· 

lateral collectlon techniques? 

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This would lead to questions regarding the details and re11abl1ity' •·, 

of the collection effor•t and perhaps lead to the compromise of some c1asi 

-.t), o.-.:-l 

slfled programs. On the ot 

,; 

the Soviets might be embarrassed by 

the efficiency of 11esplonage 11 and choose to react vlo1ent1y to brazen 

claims or Impressive unilateral demonstrations. 

6. It will take two years to develop an Inspection satellite system; 

what should be used ·1n the meantime? • 

The long lead time would suggest that discussions with the 

concerning the system should take place soon so as to_ minimize the 

spection period. Knowing Inspection was coming would gain support 

treaty as the publ le would have confidence It was to be monitored·. 

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7 .. Will the solution of the Inspection system be_sufflcfent /1 

Identify a11 treaty violations? 

Oft~n It will not be nor does It need to be~ When uncertainties of 

interpretation exist, this system will be adequate to Illustrate the nature of the questions and to give precise geographical locations. The ob• 

f\ 

Jective of this Inspection system Is not to supply fnambiguous evidence of 

treaty violations for legal proceedings but rather s Intended to Identify. 

localities whose function Is possibly suspicious. Other means will be re• 

quired to establish whether treaty violations are In fact taking place. 

Armed wl th these data It should be poss Ible to dl.scuss the concerns directly wl th the Soviets. The Inspection of miss Iles leaving Cuba was by 

aerial photography of·the ships H the crews uncovered the.mlssJ,1esll thus 

avoiding any need for boarding., 

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