"Approved for Release: 2018/11 h 6C05115203 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

OFFiCE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

MEMORANDUM 

November 1, 1966 

Mr c Vance 

This is the paper I propose to 

send to the ExCom. I would appreciate 

your comments on same. 

A1 

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~~~,Approved for Release: 2018/11/16 C05115203 

OXCART!TAGBOARD 

i

ViEI10i<ANDUM FOR TI-IE NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

SUBJECT: Reorientation of the TAGBOARD Program 

The contractor and Government investigations into the 

TAGBOARD launch accident which occurred on July 30 have now 

been completed. Unfortunately, the results are not entirely 

conclusive. However, as a result the contractor has reaffirmed 

his previous recommendation for a major change in the method 

of launching the drone. 

The July 30 launch was the fourth in the TAGBOARD Program. 

".<:: zhree previous launches from the modified A-12 aircraft 

(at Mach 3.2 speeds and approximately 75,000 foot altitudes) 

had taken place without incident. After launch, each drone 

':l:;"ght had been more successful than its predecessor. And 

al~nough a payload module had not yet been recovered, there 

was confidence that the cause of electrical power failures just 

prior to payload ejection from the drones on flights two and 

chree had been identified and corrected. 

the July 30 launch, the drone separated normally from 

the A-12) rose to a height of approximately seven feet above 

tne launch aircraft, yawed slightly to the left, and then began 

to roll to the left at a rate higher than the drone's elevons 

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CONTOOCNO BYE 52769-66 /) 

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OXGART!TAGBOARD 

could stabilize. A few seconds later, the drone collided with 

the launch aircraft near the left vertical stabilizer and both 

aircraft subsequently disintegrated. The pilot ejected successfully with only minor injuries; the Launch Control Officer also 

ejected successfully but drowned before rescue from the sea. 

Telemetry and chase-aircraft photography have permitted 

a reasonably complete reconstruction of the sequence of events 

which took place; however, the single factor or combination of 

factors which caused the accident have not been precisely 

ic :2nt ified 0 

'T" 

..... ue fourth TAGBOARD drone carried more fuel than those 

launched previously and was approximately 25 percent heavie~~ 

Although elevator control travel had been increased to compensate for the additional weight, the drone nevertheless separated 

from the launch aircraft at a slower rate than anticipated, 

and the two remained relatively close for a longer period than 

on previous launches. It should be noted that the aerodynamic 

flow patterns when the drone and carrier aircraft are in close 

proxL~ity are not well understood, and this void has not been 

filled either in extensive wind tunnel testing or from flight 

test instrumentation. The accident therefore could have been 

HA~OLE VIA CONTROl HO ______ _ 

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OXCART /TAGBOARD 

tb.e result of unusual and/or unique airflow interactions between 

drone and launch aircraft at the time of separation. 

Other factors which might have caused or contributed to 

the accident could have been an out-of-limits center of gravity, 

the loss of a small fairing somewhere on the drone or carrier 

aircraft, excessive yawing of the carrier aircraft at launch, 

abno~mal operation of the release mechanism, etc. However, there 

is r.o evidence to indicate that any of these conditions did 

C:Xlst. On the contrary, telemetry from the highly instrUt'1leLted 

L:::ur,ch aircraft and drone showed that all equipment operated 

norr.1ully and the flight conditions at launch were within the 

specified envelope. 

The contractor, as a result of his analyses, has reluctantly 

COille to the conclusion that the TAGBOARD launch from an A-12 

aircraft at Mach 3.2 is a marginal operation, in that launch 

accidents can occur as a 'result of only slight deviations from 

the norm in nume::ous areas. The Project Office and I share that 

belief on the basis of the limited evidence in hand. 

A rather detailed study on the feasibility of alternative 

launch methods for the TAGBOARD drone was completed just prior 

to the accident (the study had been initiated because of problems 

associated with acquiring the third launch aircraft considered 

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8 'I E~~il A ~~l CONTROL SYST[W 

OXCART/TAGBOARD 

necessary for the operational program and the prospects of 

o~taining additional launch aircraft in the future in the face 

of possible attrition). The results of this study indicate that 

ti~e program can be reoriented to a safer and probably more reliable 

;-;letr,OG of launch, with minimal program slippage, and for modest 

cost. 7he most promising alternative technique is to launch the 

c; rone from a 3-52 wing-pylon in the same manner tha t the X-l5 and 

EOL-:\:JDOG air-to-surface missiles are launched. I propose to 

reorient the TAGBOARD Program to this launch technique. 

Briefly, the drone will be modified to permit attachment 

':"0 ~ special pylon on a B-S2H and to carry an external eolid-

?ro;)sllant rocket booster which will provide approximately 

SO,COO pounds of thrust for about 70 seconds. The drone/ 

booster co~bination will be dropped from the B-52 at Mach .8 

&~ 40,000 feet. After a safe separation distance is achieved, 

the rocket booster will be ignited and will accelerate the 

or01',e to a speed in excess of Mach 3 at approximately 80, 000 reet. 

v~r~ng the rocket boost phase, the drone will be guided by the 

?rcsent flight control system (obviating the need for any 

gimballing of the rocket nozzle). The booster and its attaching 

hardware vJill be jettisoned after ramj et ignition. From that 

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point on, the drone would proceed on its flight in a manner 

identical to the present flight profile (Mach 3.3 cruising speed 

at 95,000 feet altitude, air catch of the payload, etc). 

The B-S2H is capable of carrying two drones. Modification 

of the B-52H consists of attaching a ne,\,l pylon under each wing, 

to existing attacmaent points and the installation of a dual 

launch control station in the present Fire Control and ECM Operator 

posi;:;ions. It should require approximately six months to 

fa-Dricate the pylons and modify the first B-52H launch aircraft, 

using existing control consoles and instrumentation, and eight 

:r.:w-.i.chs to procure additional control equipment and to modify a 

second B-S2H. Two launch aircraft would provide a reasonable 

operational capability. The B-52H's can be made available frau 

the SAC inventory. 

A typical TAG BOARD mission against targets in South China 

and/or Viet Nam would begin at Area 51, launch the drone in the 

vicinity of O~inawa about 13 hours later, and return non-stop 

to Area 51 in a total elapsed tiffie of about 24 hours. Two 

aerial refuelings would be required for the B-52. Recovery of 

the drone payload would occur approximately one and one-half 

hours after launch and take place in a "safel! area dictated by 

the mission profile (for example, in the Bay of Bengal or the 

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OXCART/TAGBOARD 

SOll~h China Sea). 

Assuming an early program go-ahead, it appears feasible to 

begin flight testing of the B-52H/D-21B combination early next 

S;,:;:uller. It is estimated that at least three D-21B R&D launches will 

be required to prove ont the launch/rocket boost concept, and 

that D-21B's with cameras installed could be launched there6fter 

at a one-per-month rate. Therefore, a limited operational 

c&?&bility is possible one year from go-ahead. All B-52 testing 

&1Q operations would be conducted from Area 51. Should Area 51 not be 

available in the future, operations could be conducted fram 

Beale AlB. 

The original TAG BOARD Program included the two modified 

1\-12 launch aircraft and 20 drones and cameras, of which 15 

remain in the inventory (five drones have been expended thus far--

one in ground test, and four in flight test). A follow-on 

procurement of fifteen additional drones and cameras was approved 

in FY 66; however, the contractors were not authorized to begin 

production on this second increment until after the first drone 

launch had been accomplished. After the accident, this second 

increment was reduced from fifteen to seven drones. For the 

fucure, program planning had anticipated the modification of a 

j, . 

third A-12 into a launch aircraft in 1961, and the procurement 

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OXCART /TAGB01\RD 

of a third increment o~ 24 drones and twelve cameras in FY 68. 

The proposed new TAGBOARD Program includes the following 

major elements: 

1. Two B-52H aircraft (already tentatively identified 

L1 the SAC inventory) will be mod ified into launch aircraft. 

'T~-le first B-52 can be modified in approximately six months, with 

the second following about three months later. 

2. The 15 D-21 drones remaining frOID the original 

procurement increment will be modified into a D-21B configuration which is compatible with B-52 launch andirocket boost. 

'::'i-:e first of these can be ready in six months) and the fifteenth 

nine months later (December 1967). 

3. The second procurement increment of seven drones 

(ffianufacturing has just begun) will be produced as D-2IB models 

rather than the original D-21 version. The first of these would 

be delivered in January 1968, and the seventh in June 1968. 

4. field operations, if required, will begin in the 

Fall of 1967. For planning purposes, a one-per-month launch 

5. A third increment of sixteen drones will be procured 

for delivery between July 1968 and June 1969. 

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CONHIOl SYSTEM 

OXCART/TAGBOARD 

A schedule for the proposed new TAGBOARD Program is included 

f 

as AttacllIl1ent 1. 

Specifically, the following portions of the new TAGBOARD 

Program would require FY 67 funds; 

1. Modification of the two B-52H launch aircraft. 

2. Retrofit of the 15 D-2l ' s remaining from the original 

?:Loc:urement to the D-2lB configuration. 

3. Production of the seven additional drones and cameras 

frou1 the second procurement increment into D-2lB models. 

/ 4. Minor taxiway construction at Area 51 to accommodate 

5. Long-lead time procurement against the delivery 

O£ sixteen drones and eight cameras in FY 69. 

An estL~ated $28.4 million of FI 67 obligating authority 

,JoG be: required for the B-52H/D-21B progr&i1, compared with the 

~vious estimate of $34.5 m~llion for the A-12/TAGBOARD drone 

COi~ibination. A comparison of FY 67 fund requirements is attached 

as :nclosure 2. It should be noted that the reduction is primarily the support area and reflects the fact that the A-12 

rr r aircraf-E flight test program was terminated in September, 

:::11a: the B-52H will beruaintained by Air Force rather than 

cont~actor personnel. 

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CON.TROl SY5H toC 

OXCART/TAGBOARD 

FY 68 fund requirements have been estimated on the basis 

of supporting B-52H launches of previously procured drones and 

cameras at a one-per-month basis, and completing financing of 

eight drones and four cameras in the third procurement increment, 

for which long-lead time procurement had been initiated in FY 67. 

The remaining eight drones and four cameras of the third increment 

buy of sixteen drones and eight cameras would be financed in FY 69 .. 

It is estimated that $31.6 million of FY 68 funds will be 

re~uired for this proposed program. This total compares with 

~~-.e earlier esti.."Ilate of $71. 7 million for new drone procurement 

a~d the support of A-12!TAGBOARD launches at a one-per-month rate. 

A more detailed cost comparison is set forth in Inclosu~e 3. 

In surnmary, the analysis of the July 30 launch accident 

indicates that the TAGBOARD launch from an A-12 type aircraft 

is a marginally-safe operation; however, the program can be 

~eoriented to utilize a B-S2 launch platform/solid rocket booster 

la;':'cich techniql1e with minimum program slippage and for less 

:n 67/68 funds than previously estimated. Although it is not 

li~(ely t;"hat the TAGBOARD drone will be employed in large quantities 

o~-;. a routine basis in the near future, I believe there is a need 

i:C:.::" this uTh"Ilanned capability in crisis reconnaissance situations 

a: .. c to augment satellite coverage when needed in special areas 

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s~ch as South China, and that such a drone is likely to be used 

increasingly in the future--particularly as ground and air 

defenses ituprove in certain areas. 

It is recon~ended that the Executive Committee approve the 

reorientation and continuation of the TAGBOARD Program as 

described in this memorandum. 

3 a ttacrunents Alexander R. Flax 

Director 

National Reconnaissance Office 

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CN.(ROl SYSTEM 

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Inclosure 1 

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OXCART/TAGBOARD 

FY 67 TAGBOARD FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 

1. PRSVIOUSLY APPROVED PROGRAM 

a. Operational Support: 

(1) A-12 Launch Aircraft 

(2) Drone Aircraft/Engine 

(3) Drone Camera 

b. ~nv~stment; (1) 

(1) Drone Aircraft/Engine 

(2) Drone Camera 

TOTAL: 

NET FY 67 NOA: 

2. PROPOSED PROG~4M 

Operational Support 

Modify two B-52H's 

Modify original 15 drones 

Procure 7 additional drones 

Procure 7 additional cameras 

Minor construction at Area 51 

Long lead procurement for 16 drones and 

8 cameras CFY 69 delivery) 

TOTAL: 

NET ]:1 67 NOA: 

$15.22 

5.10 

.87 

$21.19 

34.56 

3.76 

38.32 

$59.51 

$34.51(2) 

$7.37 

4.40 

13.23 

20.53 

2.17 

.38 

5.30 

$53.38(2) 

$28.38 

(1) This covers the second procurement increment of 15 drones 

and 15 cameras, as originally planned. After the July 30 accident, 

the procurement increment was reduced to seven drones and seven 

cameras. Not included was a requirement for $3.1 illillion to 

modify a third A-12 into a launch aircraft. 

(2) Net total of FY 67 New Obligating Authority reflects carryover of FY 66 funds. 

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Inclosure 2 

CONTROl. NO 

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OXCART/TAGBOARD 

-'-. 

FY 68 TAG BOARD FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 

?REVIOUSS-,Y APPROVED PROGRAM 

a. 922ratio:1a1 Support: 

(1) A-12 Launch Aircraft 

(2) Drone Airframe/Engine 

(3) Drone Cameras 

b. Investment (24 Drones/12 cameras) 

(1) Drone :Airframe/Engine 

(2) Drone Cameras 

TOTAL: 

2. PROPOSED PROGRAH: 

a. ODerational Support: 

(1) Drone 

b. 

(2) Camera 

-- (1) i.nvestment 

(1) Drones/Cameras 

TOTAL: 

$16.3 

3.7 

• 7 

48.14 

2.86 

$51.0 

$71. 7 

8.90 

• 7 

9.60 

22.0 

$31.6 

(l) LOJ:1g lead for the third procurement increment of 16 drones 

and 8 cameras began in FY 67. This $22.0 million. will complete 

funding of the first 8 drones and 4 cameras and begin funding 

the remaining.8 drones and 4 cameras. Remainder of funds will 

be applied in FY 69. 

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Inclosure 3 

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-(:OJirfTROl NO. 

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