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THE NRO STAFF 3 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUNMER

SUBJECT: Omnibus NSCID

General Graham's memos constitute a regrouping of the IC

Staff with respect to the preparation of an omnibus NSCID for

the NSCIC approval, and asks for our participation. At last

weeks NSCIC meeting, Dr. Kissinger apparently directed that the

appropriate agencies review the draft NSCID prepared unilaterally by the IC Staff. General Graham's memoranda energizes the

USIB mechanism to develop a coordinated document. We understand

that Mr. Clements suggested that an NSCID should reflect the

current roles and missions of the various intelligence entities

and that this suggestion was approved by Dr. Kissinger.

I suggest the following approach for NRO inputs to the

task group:

It appears that we are in a relative position of

strength with respect to our participation. The thrust of the

omnibus NSCID is the President's intelligence reorganization

directive. That document also directed the retention of the

existing management structure of the NRO. Also, as a reflection

of current basic roles and missions, our 1965 charter remains

valid as a constitution of a nationally oriented NRP which is

implemented by an NRO.

We have reconsidered the advantages of an NSCID

over some other form of charter and we have concluded that,

since the NRO is not a full fledged intelligence entity but a

management structure, perhaps an NSCID as an NRO charter is not

entirely appropriate.

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-TOPIECRETWe believe that our input to the omnibus NSCID

should be relatively short in length. It would specify an

NRP, an ExCom, an NRO and a. streamlined management philosophy.

The NRO would be chartered by appropriate other national directives and agreements. We think that this approach would serve

to preclude a pre-emption of the PFIAB study with the promulgation of a very specific NSCID on the overall functioning of the

NRO. It would also clearly recognize that the NRO is not an

intelligence entity per se but a streamlined management entity

providing a service to the intelligence community under the

overall aegis of the Secrettruf,pefense.

Finally, we think that basic security of the NRP

and NRO should not be compromised under the guise of a

requirement for a SECRET omnibus paper.

The following input to a properly classified omnibus

NSCID satisfies the above approach and does reflect current

roles and missions of the community vis-a-vis the NRP. Since

the role of the Secretary of Defense is defined in the 1965

Agreement the references above and below (underlined in yellow)

could be deleted to make it more acceptable and to allow more

flexibility in adjusting to PFIAB suggestions.

"National Reconnaissance Activities 

(1) Satellite Reconnaissance. A single satellite

reconnaissance program, the National Reconnaissance Program,

will develop, manage, control and operate all space platforms

used for the collection of intelligence. The Secretary of

Defense will be the executive agent for the conduct of thi.NRP

through a National Reconnaissance Office. An Executive Committee,

Chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, with membership

including a representative of the Secretary of Defense, will

formulate and guide the NRP. The National Reconnaissance Office

will implement the NRP.

(a) The Director, National Reconnaissance Office

will be responsible for the streamlined management and the

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execution of the NRP in fulfillment of the requirements and

tasking authorities established by the USIB.

(b) The National Reconnaissance Program and

National Reconnaissance Office will be organized and managed

in accordance with other national directives and agreements."

JOHN E. KULPA, JR.

Brigadier General, USAB

Director

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8 October 1964 (2) the Deputy Secretary of Defense also directed the

(Continued) 410-DNRO to evaluate establis I a at

Eastern Test Range from whic

orbits could be flown to traver

than the width - of Cuba. (Tab No. 8)

8 October 1964 AFXOP-R provided a paper showing existing capabilities

for conducting peripheral oblique photographs of Cuba.

(Tab No. 9)

9 October 1964 The -(9} NRO produced a draft booklet entitled "Planning

Facts NSAM 311. " (Tab No. 10)

13 October 1964 The 4% NRO requested the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to define the specific informational content required by a P. I. to detect and identify -

with assurance - IRBM or MRBM associated targets.

Definition to include photographs from satellites, aircraft,

drones and balloons. (Tab No. U)

15 October 1964 A revised draft of "Planning Facts - NSAM 311" was

completed by the46)- NRO Staff for Mr. Friedman.

15 October 1964

19 October 1964

21 October 1964

A NSAM 311 "briefing kit" was provided Dr. McMillan

in anticipation of his meeting with Mr. Friedman to

discuss this subject. (Tab No. 12)

General Greer was requested to study the feasibility of

flying an "8 -day equally spaced" orbitagainst Cuba and

to provide a plan for establishing a KH- uach

capability at AMR. (Tab No. 13)

Copies of the final edition of "Planning Facts - NSAM 311"

were forwarded to Mr. Friedman together with a cover

memorandum signed by Dr. McMillan. Copies were subsequently furnished State, CIA, JCS, and the Deputy

Secretary of Defense.

N. B.: This document, while useful as an educational

aid on types and capabilities of various reconnaissance

systems which could be applied against Cuba, was subTOP SECRET

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21 October 1964

(Continued)

sequently refined by the introduction of more accurate

and precise climatological data than was available for

this edition of the Planning Facts book. Particularly,

it was discovered that the climatology first used (while

applicable to balloons) was not adequate for other types

of sensors. (Tab No. 14)

21 October 1964 Mr. Friedman sent to Ambassador Thompson a copy of

the "Planning Facts - NSAM 311" and, drawing upon

information contained in the study, proposed a revision

to a draft State Department position paper (dated 12 Oct

64) on NSAM. 311. (Tab 15)

21 October 1964 NPIC provided an evaluation of ca • bility of satellite

reconnaissance systems (KR-4 • satisfy Cuban

reconnaissance requirements. This was the first such

paper published which was applied to the use of satellites

over Cuba. (Tab No. 16)

22 October 1964 COMOR addressed the problem of Cuban reco

from satellites. Summary: notmuch he

1V‘a .

22 October 1964

22 October 1964

26 October 1964

Mr. Friedman requested DIA to analyze whether a

reconnaissance "package" composed of a "mix" of aircraft, drones, balloons and satellites could satisfy Cuban

reconnaissance requirements. (Tab No. 18)

The first satellite photographs of Cuba, taken specifically as a result of NSAM 311 (resulting from an arrangement made by Colonel Worthman through DIA and thence

to USIB), were received by-48)- NRO. Photographs

(mission 1011-1) were 90% degraded by clouds.

(Tab No. 19)

A draft memorandum for record, prepared by Mr. Friedmanof ISA, indicated he had been informed by Mr. McCone

that he (McCone) was very exercised over inclusion of

OXCART data in the NSAM 311 Planning Facts study.

(Tab No. 20)

aids

tostni

OXCART

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26 October 1964

26 October 1964

26 October 1964

28 October 1964

At request of Mr. Friedman, Mr. Augenstein of DDR&E

prepared a paper on "Additional Reconnaissance Capabilities of Interest in Future Surveillance Missions. "

(Tab No. 21)

A draft Department of Defense paper, Subject: "NSAM 311

Possible Courses of Action" was prepared by ISA, working in conjunction with the (S} NRO Staff. This paper

analyzed existing Cuban reconnaissance requirements

and evaluated the capabilities of various individual sensors,

or combinations of reconnaissance sensors, to reconnoiter

Cuba. (Tab No. 22)

A first attempt was made at estimating the amounts

(percentages) of Cuban real estate which would be cloud

covered during each month of the year. (Tab No. 23)

A paper was prepared by the 4S)- NRO for ISA which

analyzed costs and other relevant factors of an "Integrated Reconnaissance Package. " This was a theoretical approach to the practical matter of conducting Cuban '

reconnaissance with a "mixture" of alternative reconnaissance sensors. (Tab No. 24)

3 November 1964 COMOR defined its estimate of what satellite reconnaissance could contribute to Cuban reconnaissance requirement. This was an extremely pessimistic paper; dealt

mainly with the problems involved in satellite reconnaissance and studiously avoided a direct consideration of

the problem: i. e. "If we could not use U-2's, what else

do we have in the reconnaissance inventory which could

be used to contribute to a solution to the problem?"

(Tab No. 25)

3 November 1964

4 November 1964

Primarily as a result of the foregoing reference, the

-(6)-NRO published a more objective and realistic estimate

of the capabilities of satellite systems (KH-4) to cover

Cuba. (Tab No. 26)

United States Intelligence Board considered the COMOR

and 4S)-NRO papers (Tabs 25 and 26). The Board was

briefed by the -fa DNRO that he considered the COMOR

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4 November 1964

(Continued)

12 November 1964

appraisal to be inconsistent with actual experience. The

Board then remanded the offending document (Tab 25) to

COMOR for rewrite. (Tab No. 27)

Lt Colonel Quiggins provided ISA (Mr. Friedman) with a

resume of Department of Defense actions which had been

initiated to date in response to NSAM 311. (Tab No. 28)

12 November 1964 IS)• DNRO asked for an analysis of best MIG/Fighter

capability known to be available to Cubans. AOB estimate showed 40 MIG-21's. (Tab No. 29)

18 November 1964 In preparation for a meeting of the "Thompson Committee"

Messrs McNaughton and Friedman of ISA, working with

Colonel Worthman, prepared two briefing papers - one

considering the reasons Ely Cuban reconnaissance is

necessary - the other directed at what we must see and

how well various reconnaissance systems, are adapted to

the problem. (Tab No. 30)

18 November 1964

18 November 1964

19 November 1964

The Thompson Committee met to consider NSAM 311.

Three primary areas discussed: (1) capabilities of

satellite reconnaissance to assist in solution; (2) what

can the "advanced aircraft" contribute; and (3) a "scenario"

to use in dispelling concern (mostly Cuban concern) over

continuation of II. S. overflight operations. (Tab No. 31)

A final draft of the Thompson Committee response to

NSAM 311 was received by Department of Defense. It

was reviewed and annotated by the-(S) NRO and subsequently by Secretary of Defense. (Tab No. 32)

A CIA input to the final draft of the NSAM 311 paper was

(belatedly) received which dealt in cursory fashion with

what OXCART could contribute to the Cuban reconnaissance problem. Summary: "It is possible to use, " but

"Vie are unable to make a firm estimate of its capability. "

This latter reference applied primarily to vulnerability

of the SR-71 to Cuban air defense. (Tab No. 33)

OXCART

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19 November 1964 The -fa NRO produced a paper showing the percentage of

Cuban coverage (useful photo) versus number of flights -

for various reconnaissance systems. These data were

subsequently found to be erroneous in several regards,

but particularly as applied to satellites, since we had

considered only a one bucket, rather than dual bucket,

KH-4 capability. Embarrassing - but discovered prior

to distribution and corrected in a later edition.

(Tab No. 34)

19 November 1964 -(6) DNRO sent to Secretary of Defense the corrected

coverage tables referred to above. (Tab No. 35)

19 November 1964 The DCI, before the USIB, stated that the draft COMOR

rewrite of the "satellite contribution paper" (Tab 27)

did not deal sufficiently with the operational delays which

might be encountered with satellites in a crisis management situation. (Tab No. 36)

19 November 1964 Handwritten notes by Mr. McNamara on coverage tables

shown as Tab 35. (Tab No. 37)

20 November 1964 Request for Cuban climatology study. (Tab No. 38)

20 November 1964 Cuban Climatology Study prepared by Captain Forsythe

of the -(5) NRO Staff. (Tab No. 39)

20 November 1964

24 November 1964

COMOR passed a message (TWX) request to members

asking for review of a new statement of requirements for

Cuban reconnaissance. (Tab No. 40)

NPIC responded to request of 13 October for an Assessment of Photo Interpretation Capabilities to Detect any

Re-Introduction of Offensive Missiles into Cuba.

(Tab No. 41)

27 November 1964 The USIB approved, with amendments, Cuban requirement paper prepared by COMOR. (Tab No. 42)

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30 November 1964

4 December 1964

5 December 1964

A near final draft of the Thompson Committee's report

on NSAM 311 was reviewed by Colonels Worthman of

IS) NRO Staff and Sanders of ISA. Marginalia show

recommended changes to draft. A covering memorandum

indicates that Presidential approval of the final product

of the committee is not required - that a description of

the problem and a recommended (alternative) course of

action is sufficient. (Tab No. 43)

The COMOR examined results of Mission 1014-J - the first

ten-day synchronous/nine-day equally spaced orbit flown

by a satellite reconnaissance vehicle. This orbit (in lieu

of the fifth day synchronous usually flown) was used

because it was expected to provide full cover of Cuba in

a four-day period - with little or no degradation of Soviet

coverage. Mission 1014-J photo was also compared with

U-2 photo of Cuba flown on same day. COMOR concluded

that: (a) the "equally spaced" orbit had no significant

adverse effect on Sino-Soviet coverage and (b) that there

were certain advantages for carefully selected use of this

orbit in the future. (Tab No. 44)

The 4S) DNRO, Mr. Friedman and Colonel Worthman conferred on DOD comments to the NSAM 311 draft dated

27 November. Agreement was reached on a response to

State. (Tab No. 45)

7 December 1964 Department of Defense comments on State Department

NSAM 311 Draft of 27 November 1964. (Tab No. 46)

7 December 1964

9 December 1964

The Photo Working Group of COMOR compiled a tabulation

showing coverage of buckets 1 and 2 of 1014-J over the

Sino-Soviet bloc. (Tab No. 47)

Another Cuban climatology study, directed toward the

USIB's requirement for "interpretable" photo (i.e., defined as 25% cloud cover or less) was completed by the

IS)-NRO Staff. (Tab No. 48)

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10 December 1964 A DOD footnote to NSAM 311 final response was prepared

to express the ease with which orbital mechanics could

be converted for optimization of Cuban reconnaissance.

(Tab No. 49)

10 December 1964 The CIA challenged the DOD statement that reconnaissance

drones could be flown effectively against Cuba. The DOD

position, based on factual experience with drones in South

East Asia and over China, was verified by a detailed

examination of past experience. (Tab No. 50)

10 December 1964 A study indicated numbers of HPL targets in Sino-Soviet

11 December 1964 Last minute changes to Department of Defense comments

sent to State Department involved primarily use of

balloons and drones as an alternative Cuban reconnaissance resource. CIA not enthusiastic about this proposal.

(Tab No. 52)

11 December 1964 The State Department published a recommended response

to the Principals concerned with NSAM 311. (Tab No. 53)

14 December 1964 The -(6)- NRO Satellite Operations Center published a post

mortem report on Mission 1014-J showing intended versus

actual orbital characteristics and results. This report

also confirmed that there was no degradation of SinoSoviet coverage on this mission. (Tab No. 54)

4.. ai• • AB •

15 December 1964

16 December 1964

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Mr. Friedman sent to the Secretary of Defense a brochure

containing (a) the final draft of the Thompson Committee

report on NSAM 311; (b) a commentary on inadequacies of

the paper; (c) a draft transmittal in the event Secretary of

Defense should decide to have the JCS review the final

NSAM 311 draft and (d) a memorandum containing minutes

of the 18 November committee meeting. (Tab No. 55)

To preclude out-of-context use of the NSAM 311 Planning

Facts book, all copies (except Copy No. 1 held by

Mr. Friedman of ISA) were withdrawn. (Tab No. 56)

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