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COMIREX 

S T U DY 

uUTILlZATION OF SATELLTTE PHOTOGRAPH.:x_ 11 

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COMIREX-Sp~•ci<ll Task Group Study 

SUBJECT: Utilization Of Satellite;. Photography 

In response to tasking established in USIB-D-46.2/14, dated 

12 June l:J71, TCS #Oi~0-70, the following study has been prepared by 

a Special Task Group for COMIREX. 

I. Statement of tlw ProbJ.em. 

1. (Reforence USIB-D-46.2/14) 

8. Review the problems which inhibit the effective utilization 

of the materials derived from satellite photography within the Department 

of Defense and other USIE agencies; 

b. Develop various alternatives for increasing the utilization 

of such materials; 8nd 

c, Outline the significant advantages and disadvantages of 

each of the alternatives with special attention to security, cost, and 

timeliness. 

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Problem Backr,rc~.".-!_!1-<l and Pn,vious Action. 

2. The TALENT Control System w.,s first e:,tablishecl by the Director 

of Central Intelligenui in 1956 to provide maximum security protection 

and optimu;_, controlled exploitation of the pcoduct of the very sensitive 

United States U-2 aircraft reconnaissance flights over denied areas. 

3. On 26 August 1960, President Eisenhower, by White House Memorandum, 

approved the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System to provide JH·otection 

for the products of satelli.te reconnaissance and t.he fact of such reconnaissance. ln the memorandum, the Director of Central Intelligence, in 

consultation with the USIB, was charged with responsibility for determining 

all questions involved in the continued protection and control of satellite 

reconnaissance material and i.nformati.on (Presidential Memorandum is attached 

at Annex A). 

4. Since the inception of the TALEID'-KEYHOLE compartment of the 

TALENT Control Systew in August 1960, the USIB and its committees have 

conducted an almost continuous review of 'I'ALENT and TALENT-KEYHOLE security 

and utilization policies and procedures. Although some of the actions 

taken since August 1960 have resulted in proposals to decontrol and downgrade 

certain TALHfl' and/or TALENT-KEYHOLE controlled m2terial and information, 

the only really significant liberalizing action was the development and 

approval of the 1965 COHOR ''Hanual for Sanitization, Decontrol, ~nd 

Downgrading." This manual, i.ncluding changes made to cl.ate, provides 

for limited use of TALENT and TALP.NT-KEYr\OLE derived information at the 

SECRET classification level in approved intelligence products without 

consideration of cover sources, and for limited use of satellite photography 

at the SECRET classification level to satisfy .specific at~P.~·q'-i'91(?1:..~f~tiP:t1.~\.i Fr' , , "-" l •, • , , , ,.: I J , 1 ,_; . 

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or planning requirements. 

A listing of the different proposals considered, and the 

subsequent actions taken by USIB and its committees, is contained at 

/1nnex B. 

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III. Volu1ne and Ranf_~~-of Intcllit·cuce Materials Derived from 

6. At the time the TALENT-KF:YlIOLE Control Systcrc1 was established, 

the true potential .:md impact of satellite reconnaissance on the 

national security and the intelligence and mapping and charting 

communitic-s uerc Ln !_'.Cly unknown. 

7. In 1960, two successful missions proved the feasibility of 

reconnaissance by satellites. These two KHsquare miles of photographic coverage with 

missions provided 

foot resolution. 

8. In 1970, ___ successful missions provid-ed ____ square 

miles of KH-liB (search) photographic coverage with _foot resolution, 

and _______ square miles of KH-8 (spotting} photographic coverage 

with----· foot resolution. 

9. As a direct -result of improved search and spotting system 

resolution, increased ground coverage, and improved image timeliness, 

the role of satellite photography as a primary and unique source of 

timely and comprehensive vital strategic intellig_ence has dramatically 

increased .. The uniqueness and importance of recmnnaissance by photographic 

satellite will be further ex.pandcd as the result of the Hdditional 

improvements in resolution, coverage and timeline.:r,;s that ~:hould accrue 

when the new KH-9 (search/surveillance) system be-comes opcration<;l 

in Fi-72. D12veloprnent of other follow-on systems, such as a possible 

near-real-time system, would re.present fqrther possible technological 

advances which would even more identify this source of data as vital 

to the national security. 

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10. Additional details regiJrding the volume and range of 

intelligence mater:Lnls derived from satellite imagery mciy be found 

at Annex C. 

11. Concurrent with NRO i,.;pruving the collecrion systems 

capabi.lities, the intelligence c:omrnuni.ty also improved its ir:u1gery 

exploitation and int:ellir,enci::. production and utilization capa\Jil.ities. 

Details regarding the improvements in image exploitation capabilities 

may be found at Annex D. Details regarding the imprcvemi:mts in intel~ 

ligencc production and utilization cD.pabilities may be found at 

Annex E. 

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B11.sis and Scope of Present Sccurit-v Control.s and Comr,artmentcttion. 

12. (To be developed by NRO and TSO/BSO-CIA) 

NOTE: Section IV must identify the specific material and information 

that is to be secured, and stnte why such action is required. 

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v. Currc~nt F'rohlt0ms in Effective Use of Materials Derived from 

Satellite Irna?~.SL~. 

It is against the impressive prospects for improved satellite 

imagery co11ection that COMIREX has conducted its comprehensive review 

of the utilization problems. 

The problems identified to us in the course of this study, 

presented in detail at Annex F, derive from both the general and special 

needs of all ap.;enci.es. As such, they vary widely in scope and as to 

the immediate utilization end sought. In general, they suggest that 

in all departments and agencies, the production, dissemination, and 

utilization of timely and responsive intelligence products are limited 

by unnecessary TALENT Control System policy and procedural constraints, 

The Study Group has developed the following summarized statement of the various specific problems identified: 

a. The ll,S, Government has not developed an authoritative 

nati.onal security policy directive which identifies t.he specHic NRP 

related information and material that is to be given. compartmented 

security protection. Similarly, the specific reason for such protection 

hds not been identifi.ed. 

h. The policy and procedures governing TALENT Control S.ystem 

operations are overly restrictivEi, As a substitute for a DCID, the 

1956 TALENT Control. System Manual does not establish acceptable, current, 

coordinated, and consolidated national security policy, Additionally, 

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the procedural guidance provided no longer insures administrative 

efficiency or the desirecl level of product utilization, 

c, The policy and procedures governing the sanitization, 

decontrol, and downgrading of TALENT controlled information and material 

are overly restrictive. The 1965 USIE approved rixanual for Sanitization, 

Decontrol, and Downgrading" of TALENT information and material is no 

longer accept.able as a current, coorclinatecl, and consoli<lated statement 

of national policy, Without extensive background i.nformation and 

guidance, the procedures prescribed are not easily understood or implemented. It does not insure the desired level of security or product 

utilization, 

d. The national authorities, who approve TALENT-KEYHOLE 

need-to-know, have not as yet acted to fulfill the urgent need to educate 

a broad spectrum of personnel concerning the capabilities of the 

National Reconnaissance Program, and the appli.cation and utilization 

of Jts products, 

e. Access to BYEMAN controlled i.nformation is overly restrictive. 

The policies and procedures governing its sanitization and dissemination 

under other security controls has not been formalized I coordinated, 

~nd\implernented at the national or operating level. 

,' 

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H.A.NDl.E VI.A 

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VI. Rnn,-.e of Potential AlteJ"natives for Increasin'J Use of 

Satellite Imagery :Materials. 

After much consi.der.ati.on, the study group has concludt'd: 

a. There cll"C~ three bnsic 21 ternative courses of action. 

b. The cl,oice of a particular alternative course of action 

will largely determine bow much satellite photography utilization 

can be increased. 

c. The choice of: a particular alternati_ve. w:i.11 he determined 

by considerotiorr of various factors such as security, cost, and timeliness. 

However, current validated national security requirements should be the 

driving factor in the final decision. 

The three ba•sic alternative. courses of action are: 

a, ALTERNATIVE 1 -- Based on re.vHlidat.ion of national policy, 

first stated in the 26 August 1960 Presidential Memorandum, continue to 

provide TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System protection for the 11 products 

of Satellite reconnaissance, and information of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the productn. 

b,. ALTERNATIVE 2 -- Based on revision of national policy, 

f\i1:,-:t stated in the. 26 August 1960 Presidential Memorandum, decontrol 

. ' 

an(\ 5luwngrade all or part of the "products of satellite reconnaissance, 

and information of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the 

product 11 • 

c. ALTERNATIVE 3 -- Based on reyision of national policy, 

first stated in the 26 August 1960 Presidential Memorandum, decontrol 

and declassify all or part of the 11 products of satellite reconrn1i..ssance., 

and information of the fact of such reconnaissance reve?,l:<;'q:·qr/fhff'i 

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VII. Assessment of Advanto.ges/Disc1Llvrrnti~ges of J,lternatives. 

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NOTE: Cannot be prepared until at least a draft <,£ Section IV is 

avail.nble. 

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