\ 

\ 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

ll11' ~ttilttl . CONTROL SYSTEM 

}S'fNATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WA SH IN GT ON, D, C. 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 14 000750270 

THE NRO STAFF February 13, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR! FLAX 

1. Jim Stewart bootlegge'd a copy of the:attached 

this afternoon, and I in turn got this copy from him. 

of us has received it, officially at this point. 

document 

Neither 

2. I have tended in the past, to simply hold Ivan Selin 

and his people at arm's length, but now I guess I'm a little 

more concerned with what I see and believe your staff ought to 

give to you for your consideration some responsive action that 

has teeth in it. I believe that a continuation of this type 

thinking by Selin's office is becoming dangerous. 

3. I have asked Paul Worthman to take on such an action 

role, calling on such stalwarts as Lew Allen, Ralph Ford, 

Nevin-Palley arid others as he sees fit to assist. I have 

asked Paul to keep this as an in-house effort, reporting to 

you only. 

4. Please provide me or Paul any guidance or conunent you 

may have. 

Atch 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

Feb 69 

Russell A. Berg 

Brigadier General, USAF 

Director 

r ", , I "·. ; - ,. 

/G) .~ 

- ~ 

._ TOP SECRET ' I 

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC.,REGRAOING 

DOD OIRECTl\fE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

·COPY __ _ 

'PAGE __ _ 
'-

' 

,..: ........ :. a; 

... .. .... i,J ... 

• 

:,., " ... ........ -"!"C, 

··" ., .. -, 

' • .. 'ti. ... ... .. 

4 ; 6<11 .. $( #.I M q 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

.. 

-

. ;; J£#£L . .S4 M'J QI 
·,,·_ 

,, ; ' 

'. ,'; 1' 

. ·. 

·., · 

DIA 

SAFSS 

SAJ'SL 

OASD(C) 

-~A .. -~ 

;· •. · ,•11 

.·· 

1

:f ~;qt;f \"f*'t;tf f t~\if 1£ 1;\}C1ti():'.; 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C0511 i300 , . .. .. 

. 

Y.r. Palley 

Hr. O'Gara 

Admiral Show~rs. ·: 

.B.i"ig Gen Barg 

Maj Gen Stewart 

I I . 

• • 

.',', f 

.. .. - . ... -· ·, • •• I .• ,.:· ' 

. ' . ·.~. 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

.. 

.. 

I 

. .. 

. ._, ... 

1',: < ~<, •• I / ' =••• ', ... 

·.•,, 

,·•.····• 

' . • 

,. 

,, 

I I','• 

' ... 

.. ,·•,· .. ·. :. 

:,.,.:,;:· 

··, . . ..•. 

··• . 

. , "• . : .. ,,.r 

' ,. 

. ... 
•. 

1~:".~ ... . . ·. 

. ·. 

.... . . • .. • •· .. . . .. 

. ... 

l'l'&tll.O AMAlYSll .· -.... ' ' •, ·; : . 

(Intelligence) .. . •. : .. ,. 

I,,•• 

... 

• • ~ ,t 

.,,,, 

. . :. 

. .. 

. . , 

MEMORANDUM FOR .DISTRIBUTION LIST 

SUBJECT: OSD Management of Intelligence (u) 

The enclosed paper analyzes intelligence program management in 

OOD. It discusses what we believe a.re the major intelligence program· .·, .. 

management problems that exist within DoD and it.recommends some 

changes within the Department to rectify some of these problems. The ... 

. . ana.lysis was intentionally restrict_ed as much as possible to OSD; the ·· 

problems we believe we have, however., preclude constraining the im- , .· .. 

pact of resulting recommendations to ·osn. Consequently, some of these .. ·· · 

• · recommendations affect the DoD intelligence agencies and, to a much ,·,. 

lesser extent., the Director., Central Intelligence Agency, and his 

staff. 

··· • · ·•''! We would like your comments on this paper. We are interested in 

· :\'.-'.-. · < •.·. all your comments and ideas, but it would be helpful to us if you ;.: : 

·. · ., · · · .:· would first point out your' agreements and disagreements with the 

.• 0:):.(. ::_::::_:_·_:-:.{:,\_ .. ··. · aJ.leged facts and their presentation in the paper.. This should., of . ·· :·; . course., include any relevant omissions. you tqink we have made. Second.,···: ··/>.\?; · please discuss how the facts., as you see them, cause you to arrive at • ... · 

.. ,:_ .Y:\:· ·.: ·· · diff~rent assessments of the probl~ms and different recommendations 

:., , : .. ·. : . . :·· than we do, if. such is the case. · ···: .. · ' . . ,,. 

Our plans are to present a revised version of this paper to the.-... :.·.,·/. 

Deputy Secretary of Defense about· Monday, ·February 24, 1969. For. ·your· · 

comments to be very helpful., :we need .them' 'by close of bus_iness, . ·· · 

February 20., 1969. · 

. I., or Ivan Selin, will be happy to discuss this paper with: you if you feel that would be helpful or more·convenient. · 

·--iu~ 

.Page 1 ... of l I pages.._ 

Copy s;-:. of 1 s:::: copies 

Enclosure CuRG!!A . . EXCL!JD.~D FROM AUTO!l-i TIC ~ REC.RADIN~; DOO DIR 5200,lO 

DO~S:NO? APPLt .. 

.. 

Intelligence Di vision . . , . I 

""r."'l'.'l'j ! .. . ! 

l~~i~ .·-· ···--··-·-----i-··---1 

!J,Ul1. ~t7"·~°9--· ; ------+-.. --.. !. 

"M'Al'l::i"'::'~ "4 ,.:: ,; I 

:O~M.AN:r A!.:::~.7-KE"i'H::)!:.E 

'.C::ON'tfi:l~ SYSTE:MS '.J~1NT1_,r 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 
. .

. . Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 :--• • -~ nva.. bTIHA:i:MG_ JOINTL:,f ' , . . . 

·. . 

, I 

; - ,; . . . . 

.. ' ' •. 

IN'.rELLIGENCE ·YJ.ANAGE.tv.Ei"'i"T IN OSD 

INTRODUCTION 

This paper discusses ,intelligence program. management in DoD. It re• 

commends procedural changes in OSD, but not reorganization, to improve 

midarange planning for intelligence programs and to coordinate budgets 

and programs with plans. The paper· discus~es neither management of cur• 

rent intelligence operations nor in~elligence estimating. .. . CONCLUSIONS 

~- : . ~ ' . 

1. There is now little coordinated mid-r~e planning (thre~ to five'., 

. yea.rs ahead) for intelligence going on in DoD. That which is occurring 

is the result of ad hoc efforts • 

•, '.t' 

; ... :.'..' ''. 

•,•:·. 

·: . 

2. Without such planning, our intelligence decisions-are dominated·_ 

by, first, short term consideratioi;_i,s., and; second, by our tendencies to . develop options, made available bV-ourgeon~ng technology, simply because· 

they are available. Our major decisions on intelligence forces should be 

affected first, by our important future intelligence needs, and, second, . . ' :..:·:~:::.·· 

.. 

· .. ,··: 

· • 'by our advancing technology which allows us. to do important things we 

·· previously could not do and old things less· expensively-;-

. . . :··· .' 3. Conduct of mid-range planning is seriously hampered by the lack · :., . 

of mission-oriented intelligence force structures and by lack of coordina.• · · 

tion of the several OSD offi~es with intelligence responsibilities. .. ',. . .. . :-.,r: . ·:: :'.- .. 4. The beginnings of a mission structure. and some of the analytical .. 

·~-:::::.·tools to do useful planning and analysis of intelligence forces are · .· :,;i:·_.- ·available. . . ·• ~: :·: ! 

· · · · ., 5. The Consolidated Cryptologic Program ( CCP) and the National 

·Reconnaissance Program (NRP) present unique but different problems in . : · ., : 

doing coordinated mid-range planning. In the case of the CCP, we lack · .. :· 

basic understanding of the purposes, costs, and effectiveness of the effort involved. Projects of the NRP are now excluded from normal DoD review procedures. This practically denies the OSD .staff timely access to 

cost, technical, and performance data required for such planning and for 

adequate support of OSD'participants in the NRP Executive Committee 

(EXCOM). 

6. Some of the pr~blems in intelligence planning are similar to 

problems we have met and partially solved in planning our military forces. 

Similar solutions can be applied within OSD to our intelligen~e planning , 

problems without reorganizing OSD intelligence management or doing away 

now with existing mechanisms such as the Consolidated Cryptologic Progrrun 

and Consolidated Intelligence Program reviews. Changes in the CCP and 

CIP, and in the review of these, lnight ·be cqns~dered after a tria.l,_Peri.09- _ ' 

of revised intelligence administration in OSD. Jj Y Jf--7 7 8 7 f.: Of) J 

ur · \ 

:_ ; ' \ pe,• 

\ .:,.:. ' 

.. ,' i,,··. 

'· .. .. ·• ., 

,;, 

,.,, 

.. ,··· . .-· 

nru·. A n.~Q1y 11t RANOC~ vrn . CORri}rn U . ~Jul.J~ . BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYKOLE I U.J.H ' ··,pages TO~.~ ·sr:f"luliT . 1 ',..,a "v 01 11 . "fOi"' -~Cjii{il,.;, i C::ONIROL.. SYSTEMS JOIN11.J' 

f--. -·. Copy __ o:_-_·_c~~'-~~-- ·-·--.. . ---·· ..... ·-:-·· ; .... ~--· ·•.•·· .. :.'.. ... -.. ,----· .. __;_, .. --.. -~·:·.~-~M==:~::J.::-.::_ 1'_.....,. ________ ..:...:.. _____ """"" ______ .....,....,.. .................. _~~ .... :;;;::,:,-:.:.-z..;.;;..~--~ ....... ---.;;;,,::;;;;.;;;,:.;;.:; __ 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 
.:: . 

... 

I 1•, • 

I •. 

.. seee •••••= 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

2 

·, RECOMHENDATIONS 

l. Portions of the Target Oriented Display (TOD) (discussed below) 

should be used as aDoD Five Year Intelligence Plan (FYIP). The FYIP 

would be a mission-oriented display of the DoD. intelligence forces and 

· fino.nc·ial programs in Program III of the Five Year Defense Plan (F-:WP). 

The FYIP would supplement, not rep~ace, the FYDP for intelligence. 

2. An annual cycle of coordinated mid-range planning for intelligence should be started in OSD for CT 69. OSD activities should be sup•· 

ported by studies performed by the major DoD intelliccnce agencies. , ,,,, This planning should be mission-oriented like the FYI? and should serve 

, to maintain the FYIP current .. This planning cycle would result in an 

·. intelligence planning memorandum in late spring. The purpose of this 

memorandum would be to inform all interested parties of the tentative 

results of the planning exercises. ·rt would also focus issues and 

stimulate discussion of these issues, the techniques for their analysis,~ 

the mission structure, program costs, effectiv.eness criteria, and other 

aspects of intelligence planning. After review and discussion by all 

agencies concerned, this planning would provide the basis for programming and budgeting during the late summer and fall • 

... 3. The major intelligence ag~ncies and OSD should be canvassed for 

major issues for this year's mid-range planning cycle. 

4. Such standard practices as use of Proeram Change Requests (PCRs), . 

·Program Change Decisions (PCDs), and Development Concept Papers (DCPs) 

should be applied to the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). These 

are already used for the CIP and CCP. Such changes would have to be 

, worked out with CIA. These changes' would provide to the OSD staff' inf,or• 

'mation needed for mid-range planning and to support the OSD participants 

in the NRP Executive Committee. 

5. Additional BYEMAN.billets should be' authorized for OSD cost 

analysts~ programming and procurement people ( in OASD(SA), OASD(C) and 

·. OASD(I&L;) in sufficient numbers to permit adequate renew and analyses 

of the NRP. No more than 10-20 billets would be needed in addition to·· 

those we already have. Similar access is already available to the CIP 

and CCP. 

The net result of implementing these recommendations would be to 

make intelligence program management in OSD similar to our management of 

the military forces program. 

BACKGROUND. 

Department of Defense intelligence efforts can be divided into two 

'broad classes: national and "tactical" intelligence programs. There is 

no clear dividing line between these· two classes of intelligence efforts, 

. \ ..... 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

.. 

.· ·, 

': 

t·' 

.. ,,.· ·. 
/'. 

I 

I ) ) 

I 

I ' I 

l 

i 

J 

I 

l 

.J 

I 

I 

. . ' 

. '

' ' ., 

.. Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 . . . '. 

but in general the national programs:are those which support the needs 

of the highest echelons of.••the government., and many of the needs of the 

Strategic Air Command. The tactical programs are those which support 

, the needs of other military commands. In addition., the national efforts 

are generally tasked by the United States Intelligence Board (USIB); the 

tactical efforts, by military commanders in the field. This paper ad• 

dresses the way we plan for the national'programs within DoD. 

3 

DoD's national intelligence efforts are in four major programs: the 

1fotional Reconnaissance Program, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program 

(CCP), the Consolidntcd Intelligence Progrnm (CIP), and the Manned Orbit• 

ing Laboratory Program (MOL). There are some other projects, e.g:, the 

SR-71s, which probably should be considered with these four programs. ' 

The table, below shows the expected costs of these programs in FY 69 and 

FY O and the executive a enc for each. The fifth ma·or ro~ram the 

• NRP 

CCP, 

,,•, CIP 

MOL 

Executive Agency 

National Reconnaissance Officee 

National Security Agency 

Defense Intelligence Agency 

MOL Program Office, USAF 

., 

•··•, ... DoD oversees these programs in different ways with different results. : 

, OSD Mfu"l'AGEMENT OF THE FOUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROORAMS ' ,','·' . ~ . . ' ,. 

,. 

·,. ' . 

•,·. \.-·,;· ',:: 

The National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). The NRP is managed by 

the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development 

in his covert capacity as Director; National Reconnaissance Office (DNRO)., 

The NRP was established to integrate and coordinate Air Force and CIA 

overhead reconnaissance projects. The Executive Committee of the NRP, 

chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with the Director, CIA, and 

the President's Scientific Advisor as members, was set up to control the 

NRP and to institutionalize CIA's participation in this control. The 

Director, Bureau of the Budget; Director, Defense Research and Engineering;· 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and DNRO also participate in· 

EXCOM meetings. , 

The EXCOM meets during the yea:r: to consider specific matters usuallyplaced on the agenda by DrmO. At one of these meetings in the late fall I the NRP budget is presented. I 

Page f , of , 1 pag~s Copy ___ of ___ copies r.B YE--- 71 811 ~ 6 9 .. -! \ 

DOR! }AJ13ll 

•' 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

~ Viti I 

BYEMAN• T ALENT-KE:YH:>l'E 

,.;;:ONTROL. SYSTEMS .JOIN'fl.¥ 
., 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 ... I 4 

' The NRP budget document is published about two weeks prior to this 

meeting, This document presents the:budget, broken down by projects nnd 

activities; ·the document also includes discussions of issues in the NR? 

·~hich the EXCOM then addresses, Various options for each issue are pre• .. -~- ' sented and the pros and cons of these are discussed. The document pre• 

· sent.a very little detail "Which ,riermits·anaJ.ysis of how the budget figures . "We.re arrived at. Also, the budget is not placed in the broader context 

.of a five-year plan for the riRP nor is the NR.? part of a community-wide 

Five Year Intelligence Plan (F ) , 

.NRP projects are excluded i'J:o;;i. "norm.:..l :;:)epartment of Defense staff 

review" by DoD Directive TS-5105,23, "Xational Reconnaissance Office (.NRO)JI. 

As a result of this exclusion, such documents as Development Concept 

. .Papers (DCPs) and Program C'nange Requests (?CRs) are not prepared for tffiP 

·. projects. Al.so, NRP projects are in the BYZM.A.1.~ control system. Very few 

OSD procurement, cost, and programming specialists have BYDl.AJ.~ access. · 

In sum, OSD support of DoD EXCO.~ members is seriously hampered by 

the following factors: 

1. The NRP is not analyzed as Pa.1:t of a Five Year Intelligence Plan. 

2. The NRP budget ·is submitted late •. Thfs, coupled with the lack 

of detail and the inaccessibility of the budget to OSD cost, procurement 

and program analysts, prevents adequate review of the budget and the 

.. · issues presented in it. 

3. The exclusion of the NRP from routine procedures in DoD denies 

some parts of the OSD staff; essential to planning and support of OSD 

EXCOM participants, an opportunity to see the ,initiatives being taken 

· and the data needed to address NRP issues. 

4. There are no routine periodic planning activities outside the · NRO which create an effective dialogue between the OSD staff and the 

. NRO. As a consequence, this avenue for understanding and overseeing the 

NRP is also practically cut off. ~ 

The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CC?). The CCP is documented 

in great detail and submitte~ to OSD for review in late spring. The CCP 

receives two reviews in OSD. The first occurs soon after its submission 

', j. 

· and is done by a review group chaired by the Assistant Director, Defense 

Research and Engineering (Special Intelligence). This review group consists, in addition, of representatives of the DCI, DIA BoB, NSA, ASD(C), 

and ASD(SA). The CCP review group concentrates on a large number of 

relatively small issues such as addition of individual positions at 

various stations, manpower levels., l'J'SA '· s computer capabilities, and -simi- . lar matters. Larger operational problems such as station consolidations 

are also considered. The CCP is P!,epared by NSA and the Service Cxiyptologic ..Agencies fi'om about January to}·une. No doubt much of this time is 

Page '5 of " pages Copy __ of __ copies 

TO? SECRET. -

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

.. 

I· 

' .J 

I 

f 

1 ,, 

,, 

;! 

" , 

if 

!( 

.i 

'I 

II 

!i 

ii 

·I 

., 

;t 

I' 

' ' 

I 

t 

j 

,! 

i 

t 

J ., 

l 

·1 

j 

l 

l 

f 

f 

I 
. Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

given up, too, to det~iled reviews by the Services and NSA. Finally, 

in the fall, a budget rev~ew.is held.by ASD(C) and BoB, with participa• 

tion as needed by people from ODDR&E, OASD(A), NSA, and OASD(SA). 

The CCP presents some fundamental problems. First, we do not 

s 

· really know how the efforts in the CCP contribute to our broader intel• • 

ligence goals. Second, we do not have me~sures of effectiveness for 

. I 

the ~ollection and processing systems in the CCP; in fact, we have not 

yet succeeded in defining the collection systems and their associated 

processing activities in such a way that vei-.J much of the money in th~ 

CCP can be associated directly with the "production process" of col• 

lecting and processing foreign signal intelligence. Xn effect, we know· 

I• I • '~ 

. -

.. 

· neither the marginal costs nor the marginal productivities of various . ' 

. _physical assets in the CCP, and the CCP appears to be mostly overhead •. · 

In •sum, OSDTs largely ineffective in mid-range _planning for the 

CCP for at least the following reasons: 

l. We do not understand how CCP _projects contribute to broader . national intelligence goals. · ·,. 

'2. We have neither measures of effectiveness nor effectiveness 

models which relate NSA's output to financi~•inputs. 

. 3. We do not know the direct costs of discrete collection and processing efforts at NSA. 

4. Even if the problems above did not exist, our reviews of the 

CCP tend to be very short range, Also, the CCP, the NRP, and the CIP 

. ,,, ,· ,'• .. : .. are never reviewed together. ,,_. 

,,' I 

. , t ..... 

·' ••' '. 

···'.::,·'..· The Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP). The CIP is handled 

· ": ·. :_ much like the CCP except that the review group is chaired by DIA. In 

: other respects, the nature of the review is much like the CCP review. 

·we know more about.the CIP, more about how it contributes to our intelligence efforts and its costs. In other respects, however, the criticisms 

of our handling of the CCP apply to the CIP. 

Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL), The MOL should, by nature, be 

part of the NRP; however, it has been kept separate. MOL has been subjected to superficially routine handling in OSD with theAssistant 

Director (Space Technology), ODDR&E, peing the main .action office. For 

example, DCPs were written for MOL in early 1968 and again in late 1968, 

but neither of these were reviewed by all the OSD staff offices concerned. The MOL program is in fact receiving very little review in OSD. 

SCME ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS 

There are informative parallels in DoD 

military planning and programming. 

Page <.,. of U pages 

c_opy __ of __ copies IT HE GON 

tDRD 00 -···r,SAMBi D,Q0P s-r.:in,... ..... · 

.wi .. · ~tLrd: i 

. ; 

. :• ..... - ' ....... -

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

1 

I 

.I 
. . . .. • • • .. t.,. ii-

.. 

. . y_: 

.·.··· • .... ,, .. ,.:· .. _:: .. : ... ' . ,, .. . 

Approved for Release: 20201q2107 C05112300 

·l. In intelligence we have four major program. , three of 

which ( CCP, NRP, .l1QL) are bui~t around .specific col- . · · 

lection technologies. The C'IP is, in effect, "all . . 

other". This parallels the division of our military 

. forces by sea, air and land warfare. 

I t . l 

2. The'-mo..jor innovation in planning and programming our ·'- .... 

military forces was the adoption of a mission~oriented 

structure for these forces rather than a serviceoriented structure. We have not yet taken this step 

in inte:μie;ence, even tli.ough we know enough about 

most 0£ our intelligence forces nnd missionc to start 

moving in this direction. It is clear, however, that 

packaging and planning for intelligence forces by their 

outputs is more difficult and complex than doing the 

same for military forces. 

3. Technology is tending to determine what we do in :i,ntelligence rather than our future·needs for intelli-

_gence. As.in other fields, available options exceed 

our needs. We therefore find ourselves developing 

systems for intelligence which are either marginal improvements to existing systems or systems for which 

there is, at best, a questionable need. This results ' 

in large part from the mid-range planning deficiencies ·· 

cited earlier. This problem parallels what was occur-: 

ring in the late 1950s and early 1960s with such pro• /. · 

grams as SKYBOLT, the B-70, NAVAHO, and DYNASOAR. · 

·. · .. :,: )'. :.;'•:- '. 

. 4. There is now no coordinate~ relatively disinterested 

statement of future intelligence needs. This is much· . 

like the situation.that existed in strategic forces 

prior to the development of the National Intelligence . ; 

.... Projections for Planning about 1963. The lack of such 

projections of the future inhibit our ability to plan 

ahead. 

SCME CORaEC'I'IVE ACTIONS 

l. Establish a.n output' oriented Five Year Intelligence Plan. 

2. Start annual coordinated mid-range planning activities in OSD. 

3. Normalize OSD administration of the NRP. 

A Five-Year Intelligence Plan. The Target Oriented Display, Phase 

II, to be completed in late May, 1969,'will result in a display of intelligence forces and financial programs by a set of intelligence missions. The forces will be for eight ;/cr.t's, the finances for five,' just 

as in the FYDP. The missions into;,,:;:, ,..:-:a:rly all DoD intelligence 

forces will fall a.re: 

.. 

I 

i 

Page 1 of \I pages Copy Jf __ co~es 

]3YE~1'1871·.69 -

............ -... ~ \ ~"'I.•-... . .,.. l CDRDtl11 

· TOP SECRET.: 

B'\.,..,..., ... ,, • '. -A, .--. ,.,. .. -... '., ,... , r.111i-\, ,. , _.:.r, 1 •r.:. 1 :·,...,. ,. 

CONTROL; S'.:STS:!WJ :JQ!NT• ;.• 

' 

. . ' 

'.,• •' 

. ~ '•' . ·, 

----·---·-··-··-·· - ......... -·-- ..... ~. - "'"""----..-------------""""'----...... -~ ..... ~------...... --"""'"-........ ____ .:.,• ........... 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 
. ' • I 

I , 'I 

I 

. ' 

. ' 

. .. 

,.. 

t' 'I "' . I \ ,.. M - l _f . :I 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 . 

Search Search of earth's surface for things of intelligence 

interest-generar:ry··this will 'include overhead systems such 

as CORONA (KH-4). and HEXAGON (KH-9). 

Forces Intelligence - Surveillance to determine order of battle--

Signal Intelligence (SIGI.l\'T), KH-4, KH-9, and GAM.BIT (KH-8) 

typify the systems that will be found in this mission package. 

Weapon Systems Characteristics - Scientific and technical intelligence on foreign weapons--here will be the GANi3IT-3 (KH-8)' 

o..nd the• Manned OrbitiniLnborntory (Kii-10);~--~~ a 

future electronic intelligenc~ satellite; the Atomic Energy t · 

Detection System, etc. It is likely that this package will 

.. break down into several smaller ones. 

Tactical Warning - Warning of imminent military actions--systems 

are the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System-, System 949, 

a warning satellite, SIGINT., over-the-hori_zon radars, etc • 

Contingency Intelligence - Quick reaction manned and unmanned 

reconnaissance--mainly SR-7ls, drones, U-2s., etc. 

Counter Intelligence - Mainly investigative activities and some 

counter espionage. 

~~P£ing, Charting and Geodesy Self-explanatory. 

Processing Support - Pr.ocessing program elements which contribute 

to more than one of the missions above. 

Production - Production program elements generally cannot be mission• 

oriented. This package would include these elemen\s• 

General Support - Overhead. 

Much of the ct::P effort will not fit into this mission structure. We 

, are currently trying, as part of the TOD exercise, to develop a better 

•· understanding of the role of CCP activities. It is likely that a 

"strategic warning" or "indications" mission for these forces will be 

identified. These packages may change, and no doubt we will find prob-

. lems with some of them (we are uneasy about the Forces Intelligence and v 

. ·weapon Systems Characteristics Packages, especially), but we believe 

these missions are reasonable for starting a mission-oriented approach 

to program management of inte~ligence. 

Mid-Range Planning Activities •. Many of our collection systems nave • 

lead times of several years. Because of this, we need to plan ahead to 

be sure we have what we need in the future. We do this for our military 

forces with the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) and the DPMs. 

The JSOP is prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DPMs by Systems 

· fne.lysis. Ther: is no military staf~ f~r intelligence corresponding to 

PclgeJ_of II pag~:::, Ut"'! fl n<:~~ HAN01..e: v1A 

',I' 

CODY , _of _ __,,~op1es 11'U.A.ht1LJJ BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYKOLE 

CDRilSJ~ . Dom;~':] .?AMBft TOP srnnn --li'"'TR"'- s•>:":'! JOIN!,"' ,_B_A __ E.-..7_T8 71 .. 6t 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

'., '. 
.. 

. .. ~ ':11 {' ~ .fJ ~i ·.- -:,-

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 CONTROL. sv.i:.n.::.:3 J01Ni'W . 8 

the Joint Staff for military programs. ·Consequently, there is no JSOP 

for intelligence. (The Jo·i.'nt Staff prepares an intelligence nnne:x: to 

the JSOP, but it is only.a very general statement of intelligence needs.) 

Similarly, there is no DPM for intelligence. Such a DPM was proposed 

in Aprili 1968, but the Deputy Secretary of Defense chose not to initi• 

ate such a document then, with its supporting planning activities, be• I 

cause of other pending decisions. We understand these decisions had to 

do with reorganizing the OSD ztaff for intelligence. 

We believe that rectifying mid-ranGe planning need·s in intelligence 

management are independent of the organizational structure. For example, 

if an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD(I)) were to be · ··~ 

established (one of the more radical reorganization proposals), he would 

need to do mid-range planning and therefore would need a document like a 

DPM to report the outcomes of this planning; to write such a document, 

he would need to work with a mission-oriented Five Yea:r Intelligence Plan. 

Such a plan is even more important without the centr_alized staffing an 

.ASD(I) would provide • 

. Intelligence planning should address major issues by mission pack-

. ages so that decisions on these can be made early enough to affect the 

FY 71 budget. The basic_ approach to such planning should be to explore 

the adequacy of the mission packages to meet future intelligence needs. 

· · The planning process should also present to the decision makers the costs • 

· and benefits of satisfying various levels of, intelligence needs so that 

the resource implications of future intelligence requirements as well as 

the benefits of fulfilling these can,be treated explicitly. 

Initiating such activity in OSD need not replaGe for now any of the 

· reviews conducted of the four programs. The pr.oposed activities would 

not replace the EXCOM or anything of that sort. Rather, an intelligence 

• planning cycle should result in a clearer presentation of issues and an 

improved environment within which to conduct these reviews; hence, 

initiating mid-range planning now offers potential gains without risking 

the existing system of review. After such a planning and programming 

cycle, some changes in the existing activities might be desirable, but 

that can and should be left until results of a normalized cycle are in. 

Normalization of OSD Administration of the NRP. The OSD staff should 

have two obligations relating to the NRP •. The first is to include ~tin 

mid-range planning. The second is to do that staff work needed to support 

OSD participants in the EXCOM. Both of these obligations require early 

routine access to virtually aJ.J. facets of the NRP. The best way to 

· achieve such access is to get OSD and the NRO working together coopera- . tively on such documents as.Development Concept Papers for developmental., 

NRP projects, Program Change Requests and _Program Cnange Decisions.· 

These documents, if properly used, would also give access to the CIA 

staff in support of the Director, Cent~al Intelligence Agency. Through 

these mechanisms, both CIA and OSD representatives to the EXCQ~ could be 

much better supported.· •.. 

Pa3e_1.___of II pages Copy of __ cop1e;; rBYE-7787I=69'-

-·------ -0- ' . , .. ?-1"~:.' .... ._....·•• ... ;"} 'i, ·.· .. ·. 71."ip, ~.: 

• .tjUH~ -~ 

... 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

I 

I ,. 

' i 
'j 

' 

,. 

r, 

.. Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 - .. 

Obviously, because of the CIA's role in the Nh.t- 1 the details.of 

such changes would have to be worked out with CIA. ,,.11 • •• w• ~:, • 

It should be emphasi~ed, also, that a change in the role of EXCC\~ 

~is not being proposed, but only that OSD participants in EXCCM be supported better. 

Al"'IJ'.ALYTIC CAPABILITIES TO Su7POR'i' MID-RANGE Ir."'rELLIGENCE PLAf'fNING 

9 

Quantitative analysis of intelligence can be brok~n down into three 

main problems. First, we need to be able to determine the value of given· 

,Pieces or classes of intelli(lence:: information. Second, we need to be , able to estimate the intelligence forces needed and the costs to acquire· 

such information. Third, we need to be able to· determine op~imum forces 

. (that is, minimum cost forces) to acquire such information:·:·· 

• We are able to solve the problem of intelliGence value only in some· 

very limited cases. If the intelligence involved is useful mainly for 

our strategic forces, our ability to _analyze the value of information . 

tends to be bettt1'6ne Designing intelligence· forces to meet ._specified requirements, can beLin a number of cases, notably in the search package. 

and the contingency intelligence package. In these cases, too, we can 

usuaJ.+y find the minimu~ cost forces to satisfy given requirements. In 

other mission packages we have not Y,et demonstrated a comparable quantitative ability. 

Useful work can be done on the other mission packages and it is 

likely that some of this can be quantitative; however, the nature of the 

uses of intelligence and the nature of intelligence systems will preclude 

quantitative analyses of the elegan,ce of those done for strategic forces. 

These quantitative analytical difficulties ar~·, however, insufficient , 

reasons not to go ahead with a mission-oriented approach to intelligence 

• planning. Displays of mission-related forces, the discussions of mission objectives and performance criteria, the structuring of future intelligence requirements by mission, and the refo~ussing of our attention 

from the near future to the more distant future will all help to sharpen 

· issues. Even qualitative analyses are improved if they are properly. 

structured. 

A POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE PLA.l'"\JNING CYCLE 

If we instituted an annual planning cycle as being proposed here, 

it might proceed as follows: 

l~ December and January - Define major issues and initiate studies 

of these. 

2. · February through May study the major issues. 

HANDLE VII\ 

. ,. 

· BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

CONTROi.. -SYSTEMS .ro1NTL./. 

·]¥ i.~-1J .. 871.· 6 9 - · ··- ........ ·-·- ... .. 

r 

' ! 

I 

l 

' r 

' . ·:.: l 

.. 

·,. 

'·, ' 

I 

' I . ) 

f 

i 

f 

I 

• . :· ... I 

,• [ 

> ' i 

( 

f 

I 

f 

l 

I 

r 

I 

\ 

1 

. ' I 

I 

I 

I 

.. ... ....... ... . . .. . . ' .. ~ ............ ~-- ..... ..., .. ·------·- •.••· .................... _. ____ ,' ·- ...... ··~ -~·· ................ ,.....,._ -

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 
r 

i.\O 

•!· 

r•.• '·, ,: 

; · .. · .. <' .-,, , ... 

.. Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 - .. 10 

4., July and Aug, .. u~t. - AJ..l agencies review the intelligence planning 

memorandum and comment on ·-i,t,•;: Revised memorandum published in late July. 

PCRa submitted to make programs conform to revised planning. Reclama. 

PCRs aJ.so submitted as required. PCDs completed by la.te August. 

5. September 

published. 

' Final. version of intelligence planning memorandum 

6. October through·November - Receive and review the budget 

submissions. ... 

. 'l'he intelligence planning memorandum would result.in resolution of 

major issues; the PCRs, PCDs, and EXCQ.'1 actions would implement these ~ ",: 

resolutio~s in our programs, and the budget review would provide a last 

detailed examination of these programs in the current and budget years 

just before commitment to the budget. This is the approach now used for 

military forces planning., pr.ogramming and budgeting. · ,...- . . · . .: . 

• ''' 

' :•. ,: .. 

' .. ~•it ... ·;•-~. !fo 

' .. 

. •,:, 

I 

TOP SECR[T . ' 

...... -..... ' . ..., ........ ·--·•· ··-. ~· ... __ ...... __ ... _ .. ·-----.. -·•·· .......... . 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05112300 

i ,, i 

l 

' \ 

I 

I . · ... ! 

't , :, 1· .,· 

. ·, i 

I . ' ... 

',''. 

i 

'i