Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

AT THE CROSSROADS 

Part I• Management Evolution 

· The National Reconnaissance Program is a most unusual program-•unlike any other. Formally recognized by the President~ 

it operates under an informal charter that is in many respects 

outdated. Attack,ed from without and within since iss inception, 

.it has nevertheless grown to be the single most important intel• 

ligence collection program of the United· States GovernmentG· Its 

dual agency composition has been·both a source of problems and 

provided a sanction from outside intrusion. Today the autonomous. 

structure of the organization is threatened more than ever before. 

Can the NRO survive? Under what arrangements? What must happen 

to guide· the events· that will 0shape or reshape the NRO? This 

paper.addresses the major points of importance ~o the management 

of t~e NRO. 

At the direction of the President on August 25. 1960, the 

National Security Council forwarded to the Secretary of Defense 

directions to apply streamlined manag~ment techniques to the 

satellite reconnaissance program. Within DOD, the Secretary 

Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 
Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

. . . 

direct responsibility fo~ ~~tellite reciormaissanee, repc~tiing 

directly to the Deputy s~~retaey of Deferm:;e fol' re;riew atmd 

approv:ala _'!"he S@~retaey slgijo dasignated the ODDR&E ~s the 

prin~~pal staff agency t~ assist the Deputy Sec~etary~ 

· In Septemb~r 1 ··• ll';rae Secretary of Defense desig;irmted the 

Under Secr~tacy- of the Air Fotce as his Assistant fcr.c Re<eoMaie"" 

$1'.Utce~ acting a~ the Seelt"®taeyas db:ect·.rep~esentative lbOJth 

withi~ and ootsicle the Depair~nt of Defense,, It was· f\J.1uether 

_di.reacted that the Assi@tant foiE' Reconna!jsance bG givemi a.1r&y 

support he irequir®d fll:'om rtol'm&1 staff elemerit·s 1, although t~se · . . . # 

. . . . . . 

staff elements wal.?;'e not tie> pa~ti@il..ps.te in prog~at!l ma.ttel.r:'~. TlhdLi!a'! 

designation ~c<eomp.istimied dist.it'ibution cf the first m.emoiraimdwn of 

· agreement felt'· the ~, d3ilted Septe11llb_er 6£) 1961. 

, . · . ·~?t~~r 

The second. NU>· .ag~eem.ent ,~~us issued ffjy 2ll 1962n While . ··--~it . . 

the 1961 Agreement prescirib~d e p~ogram jointly managed lb>y eo= 

. equal OOD and CIA Directc:ee" the new doc1!.Wient ca,lled o\!lt only 

one D:lte~tor 9 . from OOD.. In June of that year DOO Directive 

2 

Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

,· 

,. 

I'. 

I 

I' 

,, 

I 

I' 

II 

I 

I 

1· 

I' 

1· 

I' ' 
Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

'.~t;et,ir:t~~ru1te.d _in ,the: .l~~s ~ta.and~-~ 9~-~~e~~t~..-the. ,PF):AB:: 

tio_te<f t;hllt:' tbt? :~$e . of: ~~:lt~ri- by -. tlu3 . ~s~c:retary. ·<>~ Defense: ~nd ·• -

the; nire¢tot of Centr~l:, ·Iriteitisend.a to· review 'the • NlW tnt:er•··. • ,. ' _, • ~, ' • ' •'' • _. r • .- , • ' , ': •• ' • • • ' 

-~ered wttll -the ctir.ec:# 41¥-i~t( o~_:;~qm1,iand: be.~een -the ·nNRO. 4n.4: · · 

thfl se~#etary <>l'l>efenscef~.' . :~. ·\9~S ·•Agreen.ept is, wr:ftt.e,n.· :ir{ . . ,, ., ' -. . ' . ':, ' 

. . -t~~-,•w~i~l) _s~.f:~ --cl~af. ~i~~. ~~ c~11t~atf.~~-- be~een ~he ---

,b~o -. ~ti' ;ther,-,s-,c~~;.afy:~n.d_ D_fl~ty- Sec~;t~.tJ -q'f _.1).e;~~se··13.n,4~_the 

'team.: ,' No:ticabte. -b:f .i~~t $bs~n.*•·- Jrf r~te~f!ng~ -: t.~- -~~V'i.e~f -~y-_ arii:' ·_.' ', ··. 

oth~r.~ttitoring offic~. 

-, :Tt1e -mto pterogat:t~s, were :~estC!d· :in March,• '1966, -wh~n-: :·--_ .•.. . l .· . , . . '.. .. .. -·,. ,. '. --- . -· - '. \>'.:,,:'. .·._ . . 

the_ Dtr•cto~, DDR&E "deferreq'~- $18 udllio~. in ~o ~nds :be~ause.: .. ,, _-

. ?le' wijrit~'1- s•veial. que:jciqr,.s -Bn~~,e~ b~lc:,r_e:·r~feasfiig·_~h~•:: -_-_' 

-Fo~~gwtng- a: ~visit by tl\e. b~ci~ -J;J~f3V,e~,: the.:of'i!ndt.~-•~~~-'~.-~:· . : . . - . 

tiiemotandum was ·withdrawn-~. _: ... ' - .. -·-,-~ , . - ' . , ~ . . - - - ' - . - ' . 

'rjlij osn ~.Systems Aana.lys;ts Qf1l¢ei ~<Je · t~te at.t;~pt_,.-: t.f: 

:,_., , ·.,' ,' ;_:.. . ,• ·.' ' . . . ' ' . ' , . . .. , i ·: ' .. ·, ' ·,,· . ' _-. •, . .. . ,· -'. • . ·.. . 

_jpply'jJlbrma.t~zed DOD--ma.nagen,ent techll'.i4~-~:·eo the NR?•--in!::1966·,._. -, .. . . -. . . : ,,._- -... : -, - ; . - ; ,_. -, "> - -- .- . -, ' -- -·: - ' .. -.. _ -. , ~- .. . , ·- :· - - --- . >. • • • • • • ,,_ -· -. ·;· .-

. Td4$y we ilre per~p:s f~c~~i-<with . greatef pre~stttes 1:0 chang~. _ .· -

than, ever before. Tpe' o~~r~lt::~i-i~~::_::,t1jcif . is :-~~~ need t~: ::1m~- -- -, . ,. .. ·. 

prqv$. the foret.sn. 11:1tel\Jgenc_e}'.~o.11.ec:tion. ,e-ffort'.: -. -ThE!- 'fQ~ces .· . , • .s •• • ' ·: - .,.- •• • - ··- • • --

3 

... · ·., Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 . . , "-•~· -·· 

ll 

I 

t; 
Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

at work are several and intermingled. Tlte Blue Ribbon Defense 

Panel addressed DOD intelligence prqblems; the President's 

letter of November 5, 1971 and the creation of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) have all had an effect. 

On April 29. 1969 Secretary Laird signed a memorandum 

assigning Assistant Secretary of .Defense.(Adminiatration) 

Mr. Froehlke the-additional duty of Special Assistant for Intel• 

ltgence to the ~ecretary and Deputy Secretary. . Any . thoughts 

that the staff entertained that Mr. Froehlke was not to be 

concerned with the NRO were dispelled on May S II when a second 

memo from Mr. Laird announced that Mr. Ftoehlke's responsibilities , l 

"encompass the NRP ... 11 While :Mr. Froehlke. attacked _his assignment 

with ~igor, his relationship with the NR.O worsened until the 

issue came to a head in December,. 1969. In a memorandum to 

·Mr. Packard, Dr. McLucas said '6i1b.at Mr. Laird tells me and what 

he apparently tells Bob Froeblke puts μsin an untenable position•~ 

not knowing whether to respond to. ExCom guidance, which our agree• 

ment clearly establishesi or whether to respond to Bob Froehlke 1 e· 

guidance, which is bas~d on the assumption that our office is 

just another component of.DOD .. " 

Internal 

4 

Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

I' 

I' 
Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

Dr. McLucas' concerns led to a briefing for Secre~aey 

Laird, Mr. Packard and Mr. Fooehlke on'March 19. 1970. At 

that time Mr. Laird clarified that Dr. McLucaa worked for 

, , 

Mr. Packard and 'the ExCom; that Mr. Froehlke did not need 

to ~eview the NRP internally; and that the NRO should provide 

data of the sort provided excellently to t~e Ex.Com which w~uld' 

p°'ermit Mr •. Froehlke to examine DOD intelligence issues in proper 

· perspective. This served ·to ease t~e tense relationship, at 

least temporarily. 

close on the heels of this confrontation came the report 

of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, with an allegation that the 

NRO was somehow.derelict·tn its failure: to ~eport. to,Mr. Froehlke. 

The influence of the Blue Ribbon report on subsequent change$ 

:ln the int·elligence community :ls not very clear, but it was 

eertainiy detrimental to the concept of an autonomous NRO. 

During this time••starting in early 1969-""Dr. McLucas, 

as DNRO. established a pattern of frequent discussions with 

Mt'~ ·Packard on NRO matte:s:-s. Mr. Packatd has an obvious under• 

atanding!of the J?rogr~ and.had a strong interest in it. It 

is als9/notewortby that Mr. Packard'$ tenure pre•dat;ed the 

/ 

esta~fishment of the position of Special Assistant for Intel,.,; 

.ri ,/. 

ligeq~e .to the Secretary. Mr. Packard left in December :t 1971. 

I . : 

Internal 

Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

,· 

1' 

,, 

{' 

ii 

,, 

,. 

{' 

,. 

" 

{' 

f' 

'{ 

\I 
Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

·and Mr~ KenrAetli Rush became the Deputy. Secretary in.February, 

1972~ ... ~- Rush neve!:" had the ~~derst&1<ling of ·the details ·of . . 

the. Pit"t'gram ·. that Mt'~ Packard had-~and · perhpas . more importantly, · 

he entered ·ooD to find an already e$tablished ASD(I). We. found · · . : . . •. " ' . - : . ~ 

. that• Dr. Hall ha~i. a cona,iderably gtlat,r influence . on Mr. Rush . . . 6 . 

- ... ·:-i~j(~:.: . . .. . ,, ,, ' . , . . . . ; . . 

than ~- bee,n ~he case with Mr~ ·packs.rd, .~nd on ·~occasion· found . 

cc,~fli~~irig 8u~.dance ·on NRO matters coming_ from the: Deputy . 

secretary's off$.ce .. . . 

. The President;'s letter o:f November Sa 1971.'containe.d the · 

·. . encouraging words that the management s'b:ucture ·o~ the NRO wa~ ' • 

to remain un~hangec:l. This appears to have bad little effect, . - . . : 

how~ve_r, as .. subsequent events .have shown •. The letter was also. · 

spe~'t~i«:' · $.n assigning _tlie DCI. thia. responsibility . for· chairing 

all intelli~ence cormnunity- advist.tty .· boards and committee.s; . 

Dr. Schlesinger clarified with the· President that. this :l:;icluded ... 

· t;he NRP .ExCom •. :While Mr. Helms bad t'emaine.d as the UCI the ... 

. ExCom: pperated as ~t had . for the previous se.veral ;years • : ~ut . . / . ' - . 

when Dr. Schlesinger arrived at CIA: in eariy i913. ·thet.e ·was . . ' . : - . , -

Deputy Secretary· of: Deiense~""by now i!ih-.' Clements.;.'.9the ExCom ~ . •. . - . . . ' . - '. , . . -:_ ., . . . . ,; " : . . .·, 

Chairmait-11 and he backed -.~ay fr·Qm active il)VOlvement in the· ,. . . - . - - ·.·, 

Internal .· 

. Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 . ,: 
Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

NRP. Dr. Hall filled the void, attending' Excom meetings as 

the DOD member••a role recognized in writing by the present 

The position of the ASD(I) has become ever stronger in 

terms of his influence on the NRP both through Excom partici• 

pation and ·in day@to•day influence. And his staff, also, i_s . ~:' 

becoming more involved with NRP matters. It is fictitious to 

believe that the.ASD(I) can operate independently as an ExCom 

member from his tole as the director of a staff which ov-ersees 

all Department of Defense intelligence. The management concept 

directed by the President, and reaffirmed by the President, 

is being eroded. two other factors which affect us today are 

·NSCID No, 6, and the decision to decompartment satellite photography. 'The former because_it gives NSA a role in tasking SIGINT 

satellites; the latter because many consider the decision to 

decompartment tantamount to normalization of the Program •. 

The problems we are experiencing today are symptoms.tic: 

the task that needs to be done is to take a comprehensive look 

at the national environment ~oday, the role of a National 

Reconnaissance Prog~am and Office in that environment, and 

Internal 

7 

Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 
Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014 

· evolve a. strategy to cause the chQnges whieh need to be made. 

· • ?he NRP bl too vital to the natiottsl interekl'!t tc permit ita , . ' ,, . . , . : 

·'• 

. ' 

Approved for Release: 2024/01/12 C05144014