NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAUL CASTANEDA-AMEZQUITA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 15-73507 

16-73969 

Agency No. A201-148-875 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 4, 2019**

Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Raul Castaneda-Amezquita petitions for review of the decision of the Board 

of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of an immigration judge 

(“IJ”) denying his applications for adjustment of status, waiver of inadmissibility, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 6 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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(“CAT”), as well as the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction 

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and deny the petition for review.

1. The BIA did not err in finding that Castaneda-Amezquita had been 

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). The BIA correctly 

identified the elements of aggravated domestic assault under Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 13-1203(A)(2), 13-1204(A)(4), and 13-3601. The BIA 

acknowledged that “simple” domestic assault, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A) 

and 13-3601, is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. See FernandezRuiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1165–67 (9th Cir. 2006). But, it determined that 

the aggravating factor required under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(4)—that the victim be 

bound, physically restrained, or otherwise substantially impaired in capacity to 

resist—rendered the offense a CIMT. See Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 782–83

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Given the BIA’s thoughtful examination of controlling 

precedent and the offense at issue, we defer to its determination that this particular 

form of aggravated domestic assault is a CIMT. See Rohit v. Holder, 670 F.3d 1085, 

1088 (9th Cir. 2012). 

2. Nor did the agency err in its application of the heightened hardship 

standard when evaluating Castaneda-Amezquita’s application for a waiver of 

inadmissibility. The BIA considered the hardship to both Castaneda-Amezquita and 

his wife in the event of removal and relied solely on the IJ’s factual findings to do 
3 15-73507 

so. See Rivera-Peraza v. Holder, 684 F.3d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, even if 

the IJ erroneously failed to consider the hardship that would befall CastanedaAmezquita, the BIA’s application of the correct standard renders that error harmless. 

See Singh v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010). 

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that CastanedaAmezquita failed to demonstrate a likelihood of future persecution on account of his 

membership in a particular social group. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1015 

(9th Cir. 2010). Castaneda-Amezquita has not suffered past persecution. The 

evidence he submitted either failed to discuss persecution of his alleged social group 

or involved limited examples of random acts of violence, which are insufficient to 

establish a likelihood of future persecution. See id. at 1015–16.

4. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s determination that 

Castaneda-Amezquita failed to demonstrate eligibility for CAT protection. See 

Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013). The record does not compel 

the conclusion that he will more likely than not be tortured by or with the 

acquiescence of public officials if returned to Mexico. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 

600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Petitioners’ generalized evidence of violence 

and crime in Mexico is not particular to Petitioners and is insufficient to meet this 

standard [for CAT protection].”). 
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5. Finally, although he challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen 

on timeliness grounds, Castaneda-Amezquita has not challenged the BIA’s 

alternative determination on the merits that reopening was not warranted. Thus, we 

need not consider whether Castaneda-Amezquita was entitled to equitable tolling.

PETITION DENIED.