# IN~ 1fntbeWniteb$>tates**~ourt**

# ofjfeberal**~lailns** No. 18-162C
F-.iled: July 30, 2018 

## FILED

****************** * 

## · 'JUL**~**

## 0 2018

DARLENE BENNETT,
Plaintiff,



## v.
UNITED STATES,

Defendant. 

## * 

## * * U

.S

. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS 

## * Pro Se Plaintiff; Motion to Dismiss; 

## * Subject MatterJurisdiction; In Forma 

## * Pauperis; Tort; Equitable Relief. 

## * 

## * * ****************** 

## *

Darlene Bennett, prose, Suitland, Maryland.

Steven C. Hough, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch
, Civil Division, United States Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C.
, for defendant. With him were Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director, Robert 

### E. Kirshman, Jr., Director, and Chad A

. Readier,Acting AssistantAttorney General. Ofcounsel was and Sandra Soderstrom, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

OPINION

HORN.J

FINDINGS OF FACTS

On January 31, 2018, plaintifffiled a complaint against the "United States, Dept. of Commerce," "on the grounds of Discrimination, Age, Retaliation, Harassment, Decretion/Acretion [sic] of duties, Hostile work environment, adverse

·action, and disparatetreatment."Also on January 31, 2018, plaintifffiled an Application to Proceed 

## lo. Forma Pauperis. Plaintiffstatesthatshe is "filing this complaintwith the U.S. Courtof Federal Claims for a judge to review and provide a ruling based on the accepted allegations, facts and evidence presented." According to plaintiff's January 31, 2018 complaint, plaintiff seeks "compensatory damages for emotional distress, harassment, embarrassment
, and continued reprisal in the sum of $800,000." Additionally
, plaintiff seeks a "[r]ewrite of performance reviews for FY15, FY16, & FY17 to remove negative comments that do not reflectthe employee. Promotionto nextgrade level ofpay band 3. For the Retaliation to stop and to work under new management. Remove current management."

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### 1~5~**~oq**

## _ _**~3 46**  4568 

# JOn March 5, 2018, the court received a letterfrom plaintiff, which did not comply with the court's filing procedure, and which appeared perhapsto be an attemptto amend hercomplaint. On March 12, 2018, the court issued an Orderthat referred plaintifftothe Rules ofthe United States CourtofFederal Claims (RCFC) and instructed plaintiffto refer to RCFC 10 (2018), titled "Form of Pleadings," and to respond to the court's Order on or before April 16, 2018. On March 27, 2018, the court received afiling from plaintiff, which did not include acertificate ofservice, and on March 28, 2018, the court issued an Order instructing plaintiffto refile her March27, 2018filing in accordancewith RCFC 5.3 (2018).

On April 6, 2018, before the defendant filed a response to plaintiff's original complaint, plaintiff filed an amendment to her complaint titled "FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT," in which plaintiff alleges additional claims and requests further relief. 1 (capitalization in original). In plaintiff's amendmentto hercomplaint, plaintiffasserts "new accepted allegations bythe Commerce Dept. for investigation," and indicates that since filing hercomplaint "she continuesto experience retaliation/reprisal as a result ofthefiled complaint(s)." Plaintiff's amendment to her complaint also requests an increase in monetary relief, from $800,000.00 to $2,500,000.00, "because ofthe enlargement ofthe
case with adding in the two previous cases as well as the continued distress dueto the continued retaliation the Plaintiff endures daily." Plaintiff requests that "all legal fees be paid bythe agency in the event an attorney is hired," as well as "all courtfees" and "[a]ll fees for production of documents, photocopying and all certified mail." Finally, plaintiff asks for "all leave in which Plaintiff has used for stress days, case related Dr. Appts and leave used for complaint prep be reimbursed."

Plaintiff is currently employed as a"Program Support Specialist

...with the Office of Sustainable Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA]." According to plaintiff's complaint, "due to her race (African American), color (African American), age (DOB: February 14, 1970), and in retaliation for her prior EE0[2] [Equal Employment Opportunity] activity, she has been subjected to acts of discrimination and harassment constituting a hostile work environment." Plaintiffasserts:

1 Defendant acknowledges, "Ms. Bennett appears to have intended to supplement her complaint pursuantto RCFC 15(d) ratherthan to amend hercomplaint," and that, "in light of Ms. Bennett's pro se status, we have construed her amended complaint as a supplemental complaint and will address the allegations contained in both pleadings." Plaintiff states that "[a]ll of the information that was included in the original case before the casewas amended should remain and moveforward with the new information in the amendment."

2 Throughout her complaint, plaintiff alternates between referring to her cases as either at the "EEO" or "EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission]." It is unclear, however, whether plaintifftook any of her cases to the EEOC, or ifall four of her cases remained EEO cases at the Office of Civil Rights at the United States Department of Commerce.



### 21. Jenni Wallace, her supervisor, questions her ability to do her work assignments and has accused her of not meeting deadlines and not completing herassignmentswith all ofthe information that is needed;

2. Wallace has harassed her about making errors on her assignments which are not herfault.

3. Wallace commented to herthat "it is not [Complainant's] responsibility to judge [Complainant's] colleagues" and to just do what Wallace instructs herto do and to stop questioning everything.

4. Wallace has other staff members watch her and scrutinize everything she does.

5. When Wallace has questions about Complainant's work, Wallace involves a co-worker, Maria Utterhove [sic], to review it.

6. On October26, 2016, Wallace denied her requestto telework additional days.

7. On November7, 2016, she received an unfavorable performance rating, with a score of 59, which was not an accurate reflection of her actual performance.

8. With respectto herwork assignments and assigned duties:

a. She is being forced to take on new projects and she has been informed that she be mandated to take on newtasks regardless of whether she knows the tasks or not. Further, Wallace told her that she has one (1) to two (2) weeks tofind newwork orshe will assign the newtasks.

b. When she sought outworkfrom aco-workerthatshewas interested in, itwas blocked.

c. Wallace performs all work related to Human Resources uploading ofdocuments and attends Human Resources meetings.

d. Wallace attends all meetings but she is forced to self-teach herself the necessaryskillsetsfor processing forms thatshe knows nothing about and also self-teach herselfthe Hiring freeze process.

e. Wallace communicates with the Acquisition Office on her contract dutiesthen she is notified, instead ofbeing contacted first.



### 3f. Her performance plan has been changed to add in new projects/tasks.

9. The comments made at herface-to-face midyear meeting differfrom the comments placed in Sharepoint.
(alterations in original).

Plaintiff's complaint allegesthat "[t]heAgency hasfostered aculture ofbigotry and there is no accountability." Plaintiff alleges that her current supervisor, Jenni Wallace, is retaliating against her "through performance reviews, mcromanaged [sic] tasks, increased surveillance. etc." Plaintiff's complaint also asserts that "[t]his case also involves many membersofthe General Counsel and otherswithin the Dept. ofinterfering with the process of the investigation," but plaintiff does not indicate the names of the additional individuals or how the individuals have interfered with "the process of the investigation."

Plaintiff's complaintand subsequentamendmenttothe complaint indicatethatshe has filed at leastfour claims with the EEO claims.3 In her complaint, plaintiffstates "[t]he
case I bring before you is case number 54-2016-00327. This case was pulled from the EEOC becausethe agency had not assigned ajudge to the case." Plaintiffalleges "case number54-2016-00327 was not handled rightfrom the beginning."According to plaintiff, "[t]he Agencyfailed to hire an investigatorto investigate the case and when asked about why it took so long for an investigator to be assigned, the Agency responded that for
reasons they did notfeel they needed to discuss with me."Attached to plaintiff's original complaint are emails, however, which indicate that Mr. George White was assigned as an investigatorto "case number 54-2016-00327" on Friday, February 24, 2017. Plaintiff also claims that, "[o]nce the investigator was hired, we were suppose [sic] to meet but that never happened," and that plaintiff "requested several times to be granted a new investigator but the Agency denied the request. It was as if their [sic] was a personal incentive or gain for having that investigator."4 Plaintiff's complaint further alleges that

3 Plaintiff has a long litigation history in both federal and state court. Regarding federal court litigation, as ofJuly2018, plaintiffhas been partyto at leastthree additional lawsuits in federal courts. On March 27, 2018, plaintifffiled Bennettv. United States, No. 18-454C (Fed. Cl. Mar. 27, 2018), in the United States Court of Federal Claims, which is ongoing. On May 22, 2018, plaintifffiled Bennett et al v. Hyundai Motor Co., et al., No. 8:18-CV01468 (D. Md. May 22, 2018), in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which is also ongoing. On March 3, 2009, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, granted plaintiff's motion for remand to the Circuit Court for MontgomeryCounty in Bennettv. Applied Training Resource. Inc., No. 2009-0499, 2009 WL 10687350 (D. Md. Apr. 17, 2009).

4 Plaintiff's complaint also includes a series of emails exchanged between herself and Ms. Sandra Zanelotti, Chief Investigatorofthe Office ofCivil Rights atthe Departmentof Commerce, dated Thursday, March 30, 2017 through Friday, March 31, 2017, in which plaintiff requests a new investigator.



### 4"[t]he investigatorthen put together a Report of Investigation without any input from me the Complainant. The Report of Investigation was not mailed to me and when I asked about it I was told that it was sent back to them." Moreover, plaintiff indicates that she "then had to requestforthe Report of Investigation to be sentto me via email."
Additionally, plaintiffstates, "I also have a 2 consolidated cases that is [sic] in the appeal process that is not apart [sic] of this case but should the decision not go in my favor, I would want to consolidate that case with this complaint for ajudge to rule and provide a ruling." In plaintiff's amendment to her complaint, plaintiff indicates that even though case numbers "54-2015-00095 & 54-2016-00258" are still "in the appeal stage," she requests to add them to her current complaint before this court, stating, "[t]he 180 days is the stated timeframe for when a lawsuit can be filed and the complaints can be withdrawn if no decision has been granted." Finally, plaintiff's amendment to her complaint requests that the court "pis. allow all dismissed allegations to [sic] added into case." Plaintiffattached to her amendmentto hercomplaint a dismissal document dated March 26, 2018, from the Office of Civil Rights at the United States Department of Commerce, which dismisses plaintiff's claims "in reference to Complaint Number 54- 2018-00028."

Plaintiff's amendmentto her complaint also includes an email dated April 4, 2018, between plaintiff and her supervisor, Jenni Wallace, in which Ms. Wallace explains, "[i]t has come to my attention that I am actually not able to give official time for time spent preparing EEO claims that are in federal court. If you have any questions about the regulations, please contact Sandra Soderstrom in the Office ofthe General Counsel.

..." Accordingtothe Office ofCivil Rights' March 27, 2018 dismissal, plaintiffallegedthat Ms. Soderstrom, ofthe Office ofGeneral Counsel, was "advising when Complainantcan and cannotworkon EEO matters, and advising hersupervisortothreaten herwith disciplinary action if her supervisor is not provided certain information concerning her requests for time to workon EEO matters."The dismissal also indicatesthat "[i]n a February27, 2018 amendment request," plaintiff alleged that "the Office of General Counsel has been advising her immediate supervisor in her current EEO complaint that Complainant must submitrequestsforofficialtimefor her EEO complaintthrough the supervisorforapproval
ordenial, eventhoughthe complaint is againstthis supervisor." Plaintiff's claims alleging interference by Ms. Soderstromwere dismissed bythe Office ofCivil Rights atthe United States Department ofCommerce because:

We find that Complainant has failed to show how the Agency attorney's advice, in her representational role, is an agency action affecting a term, condition, or privilege of her employment. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed forfailure to state a claim, pursuantto Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) section(§) 1614.107(a)(1).

In addition to plaintiff's request to add case numbers 54-2018-00028, 54-2015- 00095, and 54-2016-00258 to her complaint in this court, plaintiff's amendment to her complaint introduces a series of new allegations that plaintiff asserts demonstrate her claims ofcontinued retaliation. First, plaintiff's amendmentto hercomplaint states "[a]ll of



### 5the Plaintiff[sic] work documentswere removed from hercomputerthen replaced aweek
or so later." According to plaintiff, she reported "the incident" to "theAgency CIO's dept, InspectorGeneral and Helpdesksecurity." Plaintiffclaimsthatthe "helpdeskwas notable to define what happened to Plaintiff's files or trace any kind of tampering with files." Although plaintiffclaims "[t]he Helpdesk stated that it was malware," plaintiffattaches an emailto heramendment, dated March7, 2018, in which Thomas Bolton, acontractorwith the "NMFS OCIO Help Desk"told plaintiff, "[t]here is no evidence ofmalwareormalicious tampering on your machine; howeverthere is evidence ofsoftware/hardware corruption, and their recommended nextaction isto getyourhard drive replaced." Plaintiffresponded to Mr. Bolton, stating:

The conclusion makes no sense. My computer is working fine. lt'A [sic] not moving slow, etc as well, my files were removed and then put back in the correct place. Thatis not malware. Ispokewith computersecurityaboutthis matter. This situation is very unusual and strange. I do believe that the helpdesk is aware ofwhat happened behind the scenes. This is something thattook place behind the scenes.

In plaintiff's response to Mr. Bolton, plaintiff also states "I beleve [sic] security should invest in figuring out exactly what happened and holding that entity accountable and
ensurethat itdoes not happen again." Plaintiffclaimsthat "[t]he InspectorGeneral's office opened up an investigation and assigned the investigation backto NOAA"According to plaintiff, when she learned that the NOAA Audits office would be conducting the investigation, plaintiff reached out to Mack Cato, Director of the NOAA Audits office to determinewho the investigatorwould be, but plaintiff indicatesthatshe did not receive a response from Mr. Cato. Plaintiff's amendment to her complaint asserts that "[t]he Dept. basically allowed the organization to investigate itself and to request the line office to report its own wrongdoing. In doing so, this keeps the Inspector General from having to reportthefindings to Congress."

Plaintiff's amendment to her complaint also alleges that she was tasked with purchasing supplies on a government card and shipping them to a contract employee's house. According to plaintiff, she was "mandated totake on this newtask because all of her contract duties were removed from Plaintiff as away ofpunishment." Plaintiffclaims that because she was assigned a new task, she had to undergo training, and during training it was "noted that supplies cannot be ordered for contract employees." Plaintiff claimsthatshecontacted the head officeofthe acquisition and received confirmationthat purchasing and shipping supplies to the homes of contract employees is not allowed. According to plaintiff's amendmentto her complaint:

The Plaintiff informed Immediate supervisor (Jenni Wallace) of this information and said to the supervisor that she wanted to make sure that she did not do anything to violate policy and get in trouble. Supervisor instructed Plaintiff to move forward in placing the order knowing that the process was not legitimate. Also, pis [sic] note that supervisor is an Approving officialfor all purchase card orders. The Plaintiffasked the Head



### 6ofthe AGO purchase card further aboutthe process. The Plaintiffwas told that Icould also obtain acopy ofthe contractto see ifthere is any language that would state what the government buys vs. the contract company. When the Plaintiff requested acopyofthe contract, she was denied a copy ofthe contract.

Plaintiff'samendment includesemails between plaintiffand Ms. Maria Uitterhoeve, the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR), that indicate plaintiffrequested acopy of the above-mentioned contractfrom Ms. Uitterhoeve, and that Ms. Uitterhoeve responded byaskingwhythe copywas needed. In asubsequentemail, Ms. Uitterhoevetold plaintiff, "[a]ll ofthe files are accessible to you on the S drive. However I am the COR on that contract, so Iwould liketo knowwhat's up." Plaintiff responded:

Thanks Maria. Youraction [sic] are surprising and alarming. We have never had this issue before and being a COR on a contract has never stopped you or Jenni from doing things to one of my contracts in which I was the COR. Any othertime there has never been an issuewith providing to me a copy ofany contract notsurethere is an issue now.
According to plaintiff's amendment to her complaint, on April 3, 2018, "the Plaintiff was again requested to order supplies once again by acting supervisor at the advisement of immediate supervisor (JenniWallace)." In emails attached to plaintiff's amendmentto her complaint, plaintiffexplained to "Acting supervisor, Katy Barrett," that she did notwantto go against policy and requested that she be excused from the task should the orders need to go to contractors. Plaintiff's amendmentto hercomplaint allegesthat Ms. Barrett subsequently confirmed that "some of the supplies were for a contract individual" and suggested, "[s]ince Maria is COR on MOBIS, it seems like a good idea to bring her in." Plaintiff responded stating:

With all do [sic] respect, with my downhill relationship that I have with our current management and being instructed to move forward with an order
even though I should not have was enough for me to see that my management and supervisor does [sic] not support me. My supervisor advised me to process that order. I do not have any trust for my current management. I was advised to obtain a copy of the contract and I was denied receiving that copy ofthe contractto see whatwe are allowed and not allowed to do. Ido notwant to be involved in anything that is illegal or against govt policy or regulation. Icarry a level of integritythat requires me to alwayswalkand perform right. Ido notmind placingthe orderbut Icannot do so if I am going against govt. policy. Itwould be good for Maria to order those suppliesforany contractorwithin this office since she is the COR and knows whatthe contract states. I ask that you not look atthis as my going againstyou butthatyou look at it as having a level of respect, integrity and being agood employee forwanting to dothe rightthing which is missing in today's society.



### 7Plaintiff's amendmentto her complaint also asserts that because her supervisors would notgrant herofficialtime offtowork on her EEO complaints, plaintiffwas setupfor failure. According to plaintiff, her "[i]mmediate supervisor (Jenni Wallace) responded to all emails butwould not respond totheemailfrom Plaintiffrequestingofficialtime." Plaintiff claims shewas told that such leave could be requestedjust like "sick leave, annual leave etc.," and alleges that even though Ms. Wallace approved another one of plaintiff's requests for leave that same day, she "ignored" plaintiff's request for time to work on plaintiff's complaints. According to plaintiff's amendment to her complaint, "Acting Supervisor (Tracey Thompson)," who served as plaintiff's supervisor while Ms. Wallace
was on leave, "stated that she would leave the official time request for my immediate supervisor (Jenni Wallace) to review and approve but approve the other leave request that Plaintiff had pending." Plaintiff asserts that her "supervisor" never responded to plaintiff's leave request and that plaintiffwas "denied official timetowork on complaints." According to plaintiff's amendment to her complaint, plaintiff's "[i]mmediate supervisor stated that she was informed by the Office ofCivil Rights that the Plaintiff must request official time from immediate supervisor and then the immediate supervisor would work with the office of Civil Rights in [sic] how much time should be granted." Plaintiff claims that she subsequently reached outto the Office ofCivil Rights Director, Kenneth Bailey, who told plaintiff that she should submit all requests to her "supervisor." Plaintiff's amendment to her complaint attaches an email exchange between Mr. Bailey and plaintiff, dated March 22, 2018, inwhich plaintiffstated "I don'tunderstandwhy Iam being required to obtain permission from the supervisor that I have the complaints against for permission to work on a case against her. Pis. reply." Mr. Bailey responded to plaintiff stating:

Ifyou are working on your EEO case you should requestthetimeyou need (specific hours)to spend on the case to your supervisor. She should inform you of how many of those hours she is approving you to work on your complaint. It could be all that you request or less. She can make a better determination of how much time to approve ifyou share what you're doing i.e. meeting with your attorney, being interviewed by the investigator, and
or reviewing your Report of Investigation.

As indicated in the amendment to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff continued to question the procedure, and asked Mr. Bailey, via email dated March 22, 2018, "[i]s itfair to saythat there is something greatly wrong with the fact thatthe person who I have the complaint against is the one who reviews and approve [sic] the time?" According to plaintiff, "Mr. Bailey did not reply."

Also according to the amendmentto plaintiff's complaint, "Plaintiff is told that she cannot have official time because the cases are with Federal Court." Plaintiff further claims "Plaintiffwas informed by immediate supervisor that she must report to work on days that was originally approved or use annual leave." Additionally, plaintiff indicates that "[i]mmediate supervisor informed Plaintiff that she must change her previously certified timesheet to reflect that official time was now not granted." Plaintiff claims that because she was not granted approval to take official time off, plaintiff must now "try to



### 8prepare case information while at the same time continue with the normal daily duties duringwork hours." Plaintiffasserts "[t]his is egregious, retaliatory and asetupfor Plaintiff to fail with regards to ensuring that Plaintiff meet requirements ofthe court as well as the demands ofherduties on thejob."

On June 19, 2018, defendant, the United States, filed a "MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINTS,"for lackofsubject matterjurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1) (2018) (capitalization in original). The government argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims because the District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction
overclaims ofdiscrimination and retaliation "underTitle VII ofthe Civil RightsActof 1964 (TitleVII) and the Age Discrimination in EmploymentAct (ADEA)."

Defendantassertsthat plaintiffis seeking equitable and injunctive relief, as well as tort damages, and that such relief is not available in the United States Court of Federal Claims. Additionally, defendant argues:

Federal employees must exhausttheiradministrative remedies beforefiling
a discrimination complaint in district court. See 42 U.S.C. 

### § 2000e-5(f); 29 C.F.R. 

### § 1614.407. To assist the Court in determining whether transfer of this action to a United States district court would be "in the interest of justice," 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1631, we note that while Ms. Bennet may have exhausted her administrative remedies with regard to case number 54- 2016-00327, it appears that she may not have done so with respect to her otherEEOC cases. Specifically, Ms. Bennetappears notto havewaited 180 daysafterfiling hercomplaintto sue on case numbers 54-2015-00028, see 29 C.F.R. 

### § 1614.07(b), and appears notto havewaited 180days afterfiling her appeals to sue on case numbers 54-2015-00095 and 54-2015-00258,
see C.F.R. 

### § 1614.07(d).

On June 26, 2018, plaintifffiled a motion titled "PLAINTIFF MOTION OPPOSING DEFENDANTS [sic] MOTION TO DISMISS." (capitalization in original). In her June 26, 2018 filing, plaintiffstates that "for record thatthis case is againstthe United States" and also argues:
[B]oth the U.S. District courts as well as the U.S. Court of Federal Claims both in concurrence havejurisdiction overthis case because the case that is set forth is against the United States and therefore the Plaintiff is requesting thatthis case be allowed to moveforward in this court.

Plaintifffurther indicates, "that she is seeking the review of

... all four cases along with the new filed case if the complaint is still awaiting a ruling."5 In response to the government'sjurisdictional arguments, plaintiffcontendsthat "[t]his Court is authorized to

5 Plaintiffappears to reference afifth case, but plaintiffdoes not provide a case number
or any additional information.



### 9handle all money claims. Underthe TuckerAct and statute understatute [sic] 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983, thejurisdiction over claims Plaintiffspecified." Furthermore, plaintiffalleges:

Under concurrent jurisdiction, both state and federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over section 1983 claims. Within section 1983, Damages

- A plaintiff successfully pressing a section 1983 claim may recover a broad range of both compensatory and punitive damages. Compensatory damages may include costs ofmedical care and supplies, lostwages (i.e., back pay and lost future earnings), physical pain and suffering, emotional pain and suffering.

Plaintiff also addresses the government's exhaustion argument asserting, "there
are 2 exceptions with the EEOC forwhich you may skip the process and file your case with federal court." Additionally, plaintiff claims "[t]he EEOC was notified in proper time and the casewaswithdrawn. The Plaintiffcontinuesto check in with the Office of Federal Operations for a decision regarding the appeal." Plaintiff indicates that "[!]here has not been adecision made on the appeal since last checked of6/25/2018. The 180dayclock expires July 12, 2018." Finally, in asection ofplaintiff's June26, 2018 filing titled "NOTE," plaintiff indicates that she "has filed another complaint against the Agency for continued retaliation," and that she "will be requesting to amend the case for a second time to add in those new accepted allegations making the case larger." (capitalization and emphasis in original).

On July 10, 2018, the government filed a motion titled "REPLY BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS," in which defendant again asserted that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's claims and to grant plaintiff's requested relief. (capitalization in original). On July 17, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion titled "REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DISMISSING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS." (capitalization in original). Plaintiff'sJuly 17, 2018filing repeated many of the arguments alleged in plaintiff's June 26, 2018 filing and added, "[t]he Defendantstatesthatthe District Court has exclusive rights overthe accepted allegations of race, age discrimination, and retaliatory claims. Just this statement alone states that the Court of Federal Claims have [sic] jurisdiction to hear and rule on this case." Additionally, plaintiff's July 17, 2018 filing alleges that "[d]efendants are simply trying to prolong or drag the case outwith statementsthatsimply hold no substance."

DISCUSSION

The court recognizesthatplaintiffis proceeding prose.When determiningwhether
a complaint filed by pro se plaintiffs is sufficient to invoke review by a court, pro se plaintiffs are entitled to a more liberal construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to "less stringentstandardsthan formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); Matthews v. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322

10(Fed. Cir. 2014); Diamond v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 516, 524 (2014), aff'd, 603 F. App'x 947 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1909 (2015). However, "there is no 'duty [on the part] ofthe trial court

...to create a claim which [plaintiff] has not spelled out in his [or her] pleading

...."' Lengen v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 317, 328 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 293 (1995) (quoting Clarkv. Nat'!Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); see also Bussie v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 89, 94, aff'd, 443 F. App'x 542 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007). "While a prose plaintiff is held to
a less stringent standard than that of a plaintiff represented by an attorney, the pro se plaintiff, nevertheless, bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction by a preponderanceoftheevidence." Rilesv. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. at 9; and Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.) ("Plaintiff bears the burden of showing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see also Shelkofsky v. United States, 119 Fed. Cl. 133, 139 (2014) ("[W]hile the court may excuse ambiguities in a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court 'does not excuse [a complaint's] failures."' (quoting Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); Harris v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 290, 292 (2013) ("Although plaintiff's pleadings are held to a less stringent standard, such leniency 'with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meetjurisdictional requirements."' (quoting Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. at 253)).

In the above-captioned case, plaintiff, Ms. Bennett, filed an Application to Proceed 

### !n Forma Pauperis. In orderto provide access to this court forthosewho cannot paythe filing fees mandated by Rule 77.1(c) (2018) ofthe Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012) permits a court to allow a plaintiff to file a complaint without payment of fees or security, under specific circumstances. Section 1915(a)(1) statesthat:
Subjectto subsection (b), any court ofthe United States may authorizethe commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes astatement of all assets such prisoner[6] possesses [and]thatthe person is unable to pay

6A number of courts have reviewed the words of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), regarding in forma pauperis applications by non-prisoner litigants in federal courts, and have concluded that Congress did not intend for non-prisonersto be barred from being ableto proceed in forma pauperis in federal court. See, 

### g,g_,_, Manning v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 679, 682-83 (2015) ("The Federal Circuit has in effect endorsed this construction of Section 1915 in a non-precedential decision." (citing Jackson v. United States, 612 F. App'x 997, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("affirming a Court ofFederal Claims dismissal ofa nonprisoner's complaint for frivolousness under Subparagraph 1915(e)(2)(B)")).; Lister v. Dep't ofTreasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Section 1915(a) applies to all persons applying for 

### Orr forma pauperis] status, and not just to prisoners."); Haynes v. Scott, 116 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that"[t]here is no indication in the statute
orthe legislative historyof[§ 1915]that Congress meantto curb 

### Orrforma pauperis] suits

11such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's beliefthat the person is entitled to redress.

28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, thestatuteat28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) requiresaperson to submit an affidavitwith a statement of all the applicant's assets, and thatthe affidavit state the nature ofthe action, defense or appeal and affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress. See

### i<i

When enacting the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915, Congress recognized that "'a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits."' Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzkev. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)); see also McCulloughv. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 1, 3 (2006), appeal dismissed, 236 F. App'x 615 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1050 (2007). Accordingly, Congress included subsection (e) in the in forma pauperis statute, which allows courtstodismiss lawsuits determinedto be "frivolousormalicious."28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(e).The United States SupremeCourt hasfound that "a court may dismiss a claim asfactuallyfrivolous only ifthefacts alleged are 'clearly baseless'

... a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful'

... 'fantastic'

... and 'delusional

... .'" Dentonv. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at32-33 (internal citationsomitted);
see also Floyd v. United States, 125 Fed. Cl. 183, 191 (2016); Jones v. United States, 122 Fed. Cl. 543, 545 (2015), appeal dismissed (Fed. Cir. 2016); McCullough v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. At3 ;Schagenev. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. at663. Courts, however, should exercise caution in dismissing a case undersection 1915(e) because a claimthat the court perceives as unlikelyto be successful is not necessarilyfrivolous. See Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 33. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradictthem."

## !sL

by nonprisoners.''); Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275-76 (6th Cir.), reh'g denied (6th Cir. 1997); Schagene v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 661, 663 (1997), appeal dismissed, 152 F.3d 947 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing howto administer in forma pauperis rightsto a non-prisoner, thereby acknowledging the rights ofnon-prisonersto applyfor in forma pauperis status); Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 183 (2d Cir. 1996) (using "sic" following the word "prisoner" in 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) seeminglyto indicate thatthe use ofthatwordwastoo narrow); Smithv. United States, 113 Fed. Cl. 241, 243 (2013); Powell

v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 564, 566 (M.D. Pa. 1997) (holdingthata"fairreading ofthe entire section [28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1)] is that it is not limited to prisoner suits."). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) refers to both "person" and "prisoner." The word "person" is used three times in the subsection, while the word "prisoner" is used only once. This court, therefore, finds thatthe single use ofthe word "prisoner" in the language of28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1)was not intended to eliminate a non-prisonerfrom proceeding in federal court in forma pauperis, provided thatthe civil litigant can demonstrate appropriate need. Any other interpretation is inconsistentwith the statutoryscheme of28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915.

12The standard in 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1) for in forma pauperis eligibility is "unable to pay such fees or give security therefor." Determination ofwhat constitutes "unable to pay" or unable to "give security therefor," and therefore, whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis is left to the discretion of the presiding judge, based on the information submitted by the plaintiff or plaintiffs. See,**~.** Rowland v. Cal. Men's Colony, Unit II Men'sAdvisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 217-18 (1993); Robersonv. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 234, 239, appeal dismissed, 556 F. App'x 966 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Fuentes v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 85, 92 (2011). This court and its predecessors
were established to make available a user friendly forum in which plaintiffs can submit their legitimate claims against the sovereign, limited only by the legislative decision to waive sovereign immunity as to the types ofclaims allowed. In fact, prominently posted at the entrance to this courthouse are the words ofAbraham Lincoln: "It is as much the duty of governmentto render promptjustice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administerthe same, between private individuals."
Interpreting an earlierversion of the in forma pauperis statute, the United States Supreme Court offered the following guidance:

Wecannotagreewith the court belowthat one must be absolutely destitute to enjoy the benefit of the statute. We think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his poverty "pay or give security for the costs

... and still be able to provide" himself and dependents "with the necessities of life." To say that no persons are entitled to the statute's benefits until they have sworn to contribute to payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves and their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in awaythat would throw its beneficiaries into the category ofpublic charges. The public would notbe profited if relieved ofpaying costs ofa particular litigation only to have imposed on it the expense ofsupporting the person thereby made
an object of public support. Nordoes the result seem more desirable ifthe effect ofthis statutory interpretation is to force a litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in orderto spare himself complete destitution. We think a construction ofthe statute achieving such consequences is an inadmissible one.

Adkins 

### v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948) (omissions in original). In Fiebelkorn v. United States, forexample, a Judge ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims indicated that:
[T]he threshold for a motion to proceed in forma pauperis is not high: The statute requires that the applicant be 'unable to pay such fees.' 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1915(a)(1). To be 'unable to pay such fees' means that paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship on the plaintiff, notthat such payment would render plaintiffdestitute.

13Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also McDermott v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 412, 414 (2017) (quoting Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. at 62), aff'd, No. 2017-1790, 2017WL4082033 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2017); Fuentesv. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. at 92; Brown v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 762, 763 (2007); Hayesv. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 366, 369 (2006).

In herApplication to Proceed

## lD. Forma Pauperis, plaintiff indicates that she earns $75,651.00 as an employee of the "U.S. Department of Commerce." Although plaintiff checked the "Yes" column indicating that she has received money from sources other than those listed in herApplication to Proceed

## lD. Forma Pauperis, plaintiffstates, "I have my payroll but no money coming from other resources." The court also notesthat plaintiff has not completed the sections in the court's Application to Proceed

## lD. Forma Pauperis regarding whether plaintiff has received money in the form of"[r]ent payments, interest,
or dividends," "[p]ensions, annuities, or life insurance payments," and "[g]ifts or inheritances." Plaintiff estimates that her monthly expenses include $1,504.34 for her mortgage, $600.00 for utilities, and a monthly car payment in an unspecified amountfor
avehicle she does "not own it directly." Plaintiffalso fails to indicatewhethershe has any debts or expenses. Because plaintiff has left portions of her Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis incomplete, and appears to receive a steady income of more than $75,000.00 per year, it is difficult from plaintiff's submission, forthe court conclude that the paymentofcourtfees would impose asubstantial hardship on plaintiff. As discussed in detail below, however, plaintiff's Application to Proceed 

## lD. Forma Pauperis is moot because hercomplaint is being dismissed for lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction.
"Subject-matterjurisdiction may be challenged at anytime bythe parties or bythe court sua sponte." Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Fanning, Phillips & Molnarv. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). TheTuckerAct, 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491, grantsjurisdiction to this court as follows:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall havejurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim againstthe United Statesfounded either uponthe Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon anyexpressorimplied contractwith the United States,
orfor liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491(a)(1). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Tucker Actwaives sovereign immunityto allowjurisdiction overclaims againstthe United States (1) founded on an expressorimplied contractwith the United States, (2) seeking a refund from a prior payment made to the government, or (3) based on federal constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law mandating compensation by the federal government for damages sustained. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289-90 (2009); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); see also Alvarado Hosp., LLC v. Price, 868 F.3d 983, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en bane denied (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1142 (2008); Palmerv. United States, 168 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1999). "Not every claim invoking the Constitution, afederal statute, or a regulation is cognizable

14under the Tucker Act. The claim must be one for money damages against the United States

...." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216; see also United States v. White MountainApacheTribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003); Smithv. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 945 (2013); RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Rick's Mushroom Serv. Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[P]laintiffmust

... identify asubstantive source oflaw thatcreatesthe right to recovery ofmoney damagesagainstthe United States."); Golden

v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 764, 768 (2014). In Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit identified three types of monetary claims for which jurisdiction is lodged in the United States Court of Federal Claims. The court wrote:

The underlying monetary claims are ofthreetypes

.... First, claims alleging the existence of a contract between the plaintiff and the government fall within the Tucker Act's waiver.

... Second, the Tucker Act's waiver encompasses claims where "the plaintiff has paid money over to the Government, directlyorin effect, and seeks return ofall orpartofthatsum." Eastport S.S. [Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 605-06,] 372 F.2d [1002,] 1007-08 [(1967)] (describing illegal exaction claims as claims "in which 'the Government has the citizen's money in its pocket"' (quoting Clapp v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 117 F. Supp. 576, 580 (1954))

.... Third, the Court of Federal Claims hasjurisdiction overthose claims where "money has not been paid but the plaintiff asserts that he is nevertheless entitled to a payment from the treasury." Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1007. Claims in this third category, where no payment has been made to the government, eitherdirectly or in effect, require thatthe "particular provision oflaw relied upon grantsthe claimant, expressly or by implication, a rightto be paid a certain sum." !Q_,_; see also [United States v. ]Testan, 424 U.S. [392,] 401-02 [1976] ("Where the United States is the defendant and the plaintiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or retained, the basis of the federal claim-whether it be the Constitution, a statute, or a regulationdoes notcreate acause ofaction for moneydamages unless, as the Court of Claims has stated, that basis 'in itself

... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained."' (quoting Eastport S.S., 372 F.2d at 1009)). This category is commonly referred to as claims brought under a "money-mandating" statute.

Ont. Power Generation, Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Twp. ofSaddle Brook v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 101, 106 (2012).

To prove that a statute or regulation is money-mandating, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an independent source of substantive law relied upon "'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government."' United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)); see also United Statesv. White Mountain ApacheTribe, 537 U.S. at472; United

15States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 217; Blueport Co., LLC v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1153 (2009). The source of law granting monetary relief must be distinct from the TuckerAct itself. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. at 290 (TheTuckerAct does not create "substantive rights; [it is simply a] jurisdictional provision[] that operate[s] to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law (e.g., statutes or contracts)."). '"If the statute is not money-mandating, the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction, and the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'" Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Greenlee Cnty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d at 876); Fisherv. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The absenceofa money-mandating source is "fataltothecourt'sjurisdiction under theTuckerAct."); Price v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 128, 130 (2017); Peoplesv. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 553, 565-66 (2009).

When deciding a case based on a lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction orforfailure to state a claim, this court must assumethatall undisputed facts alleged in the complaint

aretrue and mustdrawall reasonable inferences inthe non-movant'sfavor. See Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 ("[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all ofthe factual allegations contained in the complaint." (citing Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citing Swierkiewiczv. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002)))); Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United States, 805 F.3d 1082, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

"Determination ofjurisdiction startswith the complaint,which mustbewell-pleaded in that it must state the necessary elements ofthe plaintiff's claim, independent of any defensethat maybe interposed." Holleyv. United States, 124 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983)), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Klamath Tribe Claims Comm. v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 203, 208 (2011); Gonzalez-Mccaulley Inv. Grp., Inc. v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 710, 713 (2010). A plaintiffneed only state in the complaint "a shortand plain statementofthe groundsforthe court'sjurisdiction," and "a shortand plain statementofthe claim showing thatthe pleader is entitled to relief." RCFC 8(a)(1), (2) (2018); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2) (2018); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (citing Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57, 570. To properly state a claim for relief, "[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences offact do not suffice to support a claim." Bradleyv. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Mczealv. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting C. WRIGHTANDA. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE 

### § 1286 (3d ed. 2004)); Briscoev. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir.1981) ("[C]onclusory allegations unsupported byanyfactual assertionswill notwithstand a motiontodismiss."), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). "A plaintiff's factual allegations must 'raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and cross 'the line from conceivable to plausible."' Three S Consulting v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 510, 523 (2012) (quoting Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), aff'd, 562 F. App'x 964 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 2014). As stated in Ashcroft v. Igbal, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or

16'a formulaic recitation ofthe elements of a cause of action will not do.' 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Plaintiff's complaint alleges various violations of her civil rights due to her race, age, and in retaliation for previous EEO cases filed by plaintiff. Plaintiff claims, among otherallegations, that heremployertook assignments awayfrom heras punishment, and forced herto take on newtasks despite alackoftraining, plaintiffclaimsthat herrequests to telework were denied, plaintiff claims she was supervised by staff other than her supervisor, and that "[t]heAgency hasfostered aculture ofbigotry." Plaintiff'samendment to hercomplaint also makes additional allegations of retaliation, including a denial of her requests fortime offtowork on hercomplaints against heremployer, and allegationsthat her employer set her up to fail. Plaintiff's complaint in this court requests that the court consider herfour EEO cases, case numbers 54-2015-00095, 54-2015-00258, 54-2016- 00327, and 54-2018-00028, all alleging discrimination and retaliation. In her June 26, 2018 filing, plaintiff urges this court thatjurisdiction is proper because she has brought herclaims pursuantto 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983 (2012). Plaintiffargues that both District Courts and the United States Court of Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction over such claims.

To the extent plaintiff is generallytrying to allege aviolation of her civil rights, the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging a deprivation of civil rights undercolor of law. See Elkins v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 607, 608 (1981) ("[W]e do not have jurisdiction over claims based upon alleged violations of the civil rights laws." (citation omitted)); see also Johnson v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 565, 575 (2017) ("Section 1343 ofTitle 28 provides the federal District Courts original jurisdiction over any relief requested under an 'Act of Congress providing for the protection ofcivil rights."' (citations omitted)); Vincentv. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 561, 563 (2017) ("[A]ctions for civil rights violations brought under 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983 (2012) cannotbe heard bythiscourt." (citing Marlinv. Untied States, 63 Fed. Cl. 475, 476 (2005), appeal dismissed, 146 F. App'x491 (Fed. Cir. 2005)), aff'd, No. 2018-1739, slip op. (Fed. Cir. May 4, 2018); Wagstaffv. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 99, 109 (2012); Mayv. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 278, 284 (2012), aff'd, 534 F. App'x 930 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Hanes v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 441, 449 (1999), aff'd, 243 F.3d 562 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied (2000); Sanders v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 75, 80 (1995) (concluding thatthe general civil rights claims alleged are not based on any money-mandating provisions, and do not give rise to liabilityforthe United States), aff'd, 104 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g denied, en bane suggestion declined (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 831, reh'g denied, 522 U.S. 1036 (1997); Blassingame v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 504, 505, aff'd, 73 F.3d 379 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1237 (1996); Anderson

v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 178, 179 n.2 (1990) ("Jurisdiction over such cases resides in the district courts relative to violations ofany provision ofthe Civil Rights Act") aff'd, 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Furthermore, in Blassingame v. United States, aJudge ofthis court determined that jurisdiction is lacking over claims brought pursuant to civil rights

17laws, including 42 U.S.C. 

### § 1983, asjurisdiction for such claims remains exclusivelywith the District Courts. The Blassingame court stated:

Section 1983 is not ajurisdiction-granting statute. District courts are given jurisdiction to hear claims for damages for violation of that provision by virtue of28 U.S.C. 

### § 1343(a)(4) (1988). Such an action cannotbe sustained here, however, because this court has not been given an equivalent jurisdiction. See Sanders v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 573, 576 (1995); Anderson v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.178, 179 n. 2 (1990), aff'd, 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Blassingame v. United States, 33 Fed Cl. at 505. Accordingly, this court dismisses plaintiff's claims alleging civil rights violations for lack ofjurisdiction.

Plaintiff also seeks compensatory damages "for emotional distress, harassment, embarrassment, and continued reprisal." Plaintiff's complaint claims that her employers took actions against her which created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff alleges various instances of harassment, including micromanagement and extra supervision, criticism of her work and undeservedly negative performance evaluations. Defendant, however, argues that this court does not have jurisdiction to award damages for claims based in tort and moves for dismissal pursuantto RCFC 12(b)(1).
Although plaintiff alleges to state that "[t]he Court of Federal Claims possesses exclusivejurisdiction for all cases, not sounding in tort," plaintiff continues to assert that this court hasjurisdiction to hear her claims under the TuckerAct. This court, however, lacksjurisdictionto heartortclaims againstthe United States. See 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491(a)(1) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction

... in cases not sounding in tori."); see also Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993) ("[T]ort cases are outside thejurisdiction ofthe Court of Federal Claims today."); Brown

v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ('The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. It lacks jurisdiction over tort actions against the United States."); Kant v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 614, 616 (2015); Cottrell v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 144, 149 (1998) ("[The court] does not have jurisdiction over harassment claims." (citing Pinkston v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 263, 267 (1984)); Gates v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 9, 12 (1995) (concluding that the court does not have jurisdiction to entertain claimsalleging emotional distress (citations omitted)). In contrast, "districtcourts have exclusivejurisdiction to considertort claims againstthe United Statesthatfall within the purviewofthe FTCA [Federal Tort ClaimsAct]." Bobkav. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 405, 412 (2017); Because this court does not havejurisdiction to review tort claims, and because plaintiff's allegations of harassment, hostile work environment, and emotional distress all sound in tort, this court does not havejurisdiction over plaintiff's claims, and plaintiff's tort claims are dismissed.

Plaintiff also asks, and asserts this court to order, (1) a rewrite of plaintiff's performance reviews from 2015through 2017 removing negativefeedback ofplaintiff, (2)
a promotion to the next grade level, (3) the removal of hercurrent management, and (4)

18for the retaliation to stop. Defendant argues that even if this court had jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's claims, it lacks jurisdiction to grant plaintiff's requests for such equitableand injunctive relief.

This court's ability to grant equitable relief is limited, and does not extend to the sort of injunctive relief requested by plaintiff. See United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723, 1729 (2011) (The United States Court ofFederal Claims "has no general powerto provide equitable reliefagainstthe Governmentor its officers."); Massie

v. United States, 226 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Except in strictly limited circumstances, see 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1491(b)(2), there is no provision in the Tucker Act authorizing the Court of Federal Claims to order equitable relief." (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) ("cases seeking relief other than money damages from the court of claims have never been 'within its jurisdiction"') and Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1990))); Jamesv. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998), reh'g denied (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Court of Federal Claims has no power'tograntaffirmative non-monetary reliefunless it istied and subordinateto amoney judgment."' (quoting Austin v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 719, 723, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 911 (1975))); WestlandsWater Dist. v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 177, 192 (2013); Haka

v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. at 113; Halim v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 677, 684-85 (2012); Smalls v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 300, 307 (2009); Voisin v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 164, 178 (2008) ("It is well-establishedthatthe Court ofFederal Claims generally does not have the authority to entertain declaratoryjudgment requests."). Because this court lacks the authorityto grant plaintiff's claims for equitable and injunctive relief, those claims mustalso be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. Plaintiff's Application to Proceed 

### lo. Forma Pauperis is MOOT. The Clerk of Court shall enter JUDGMENTconsistentwith this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19

# ~tL£,~~~ 'MARIAN BLANK HORN Judge