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May 7. 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 

SUBJECT: State Department Proposal for Handling the Subject of 

Satellite Reconnaissance in Future Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks 

Problem: 

To show an alternative to a State Department proposal, "Strategic 

Missile Talks: Related Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Disclosure 

Policy. II 

Background: 

We have briefed you on a State Department proposal of September 9, 

1968 (see Tab A) to reveal to the Soviets our willingness to (1) forego 

on-site inspection and {2) depend upon satellite reconnaissance as an 

arms control observation and monitoring system, The e.ssentials of the 

State proposal were these: 

1. Reclassification of the fact that the U. S, is conducting satellite 

reconnaissance from Top Secret BYEMAN (or TALENT-KEYHOLE) to 

SECRET. 

2. Continuation of the present TKH and BYE sy'?tems with regard 

to acquired intelligence, aapabilities, and operations of reconnaissance 

satellites. 

3. Revelation to the Soviets that "national means of verification" 

includes the use ot reconna~esance satellites, 

BM!.DLE VlA , , , ·.:·. 

/TALENT-KEYHOLE 

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4. Establishment of a negotiating position based on the assumption 

that "one side will not impede the operation of the other's reconnaissance 

satellites. 11 

5. Providing NATO general information on the U.S. negotiating 

position on verification. 

6. Briefing Congress on the U.S. position on verification and 

capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement through national means. 

7. Maintaining a discreet position in response to press inquiries 

and in official public statements, with preparation to eventually acknowledge "maximum reliance on national means of verification'' and the inclusion of the use of satellite photography in such means. 

The NRO reacted quickly to this proposal, meeting with representatives of the CIA, JCS# and NASA to develop opposition to the basic proposal 

and to suggest an alternative, The NRO position, abstracted in our briefing 

to you1 is expressed in detail in Tab B. 

On September 13, 1968, the USIB considered the security aspects of 

the State proposal and decided that "there should be no change in the 

classification of reconnaissance satellite operations or the information 

derived from them at this time" (see Tab C, and particularly paragraph 

14 for Mr. Helms' further comments). 

On September 16, 1968 the NSAM 156 Committee met, discussed the 

matter at some length, and arrived at no specific conclusion. as far as 

the minutes are concerned (see Tab D). Those in attendance reported 

that all parties were to prepare recommended guidelines and furnish them 

to State . 

..On September 26, 1968, ACDA issued a proposed guidelines paper 

for coxn,m~nt by NSAM 156 Committee members (st:1e Tab E). This 

paper- was a decided improvement over the earlier (September 9) proposal. It did not ask for a downgrading of the security surrounding t'the 

fact of" satellite reconnaissance. ~t restricted the delegation's discussions to "information•gathering" satellites. with no further definition 

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authorized. Consultation "with Congress" was changed to "selected 

me'mbers of Congress 0 and was to be done on a classified basis. Constraints were placed on what might eventually be said to the press, with 

the statement for release limited to ''the U.S. is prepared to place maximum reliance on national means of verification." While the NRO objected 

to some of the woolly thinking in the paper -- and said so -- we agreed 

that there had been general improvement in concept. 

About this time, President Johnson released the pressure he had 

placed on the SALT negotiators. and, with the November election at hand, 

SALT entered a waiting phase. 

Present Situation: 

We have received a copy of a memorandum from State, dated 

May 1, 1969, which asks the NSSM 28 Committee to consider guidelines 

for negotiations at future SALT meetings (see Tab F). The NSSM 28 

Committee membership is shown on the address list. It is a new committee, organized by Dr. Kissinger, to develop policy for SALT talks, 

The new paper is practically a word-tor-word copy of the guidelines 

paper issued on September 26, 1968 (shown above at Tab E). 

Possible Courses of Action: 

Vi'e could spend a good deal of time in edi'ti.i{g and improving the 

proposed paper. We domot believe, however, that an "acceptable" 

version of this document will do very much for SALT talks or for arms 

control in general. As you will recall from our briefing, we believe 

there is a "Fourth Alternative, 11 calling for the bilateral development 

and operation of an Arms Control Satellite which should become the 

basis for a strong United States initiative. (By the way, Dr. Paine 

supports this thought enthusiastically.) 

Recommended Course o! Action: 

We would like to show you a new, short briefing, revised in the 

light of the new State paper. in which we suggest consideration of an 

Arms Control Satellite. as an alternative. We will further propose to 

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show this ,...,,..,,..,,..., General Allison 

Dr. Clarke and Mr. to a 

Alternative" for consideration in NSSM 28 discussions. We should move 

the next few to make this available to the 

PAUL E. WORTHMAN 

USAF 

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· 1s an irrcversil>le action· 

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BUT-:- failure to discuss our e;ovc-rt rrogi·am:. 

Lim.ifs. effettivenesR in convincfog pμblic, press, and 

Congress Oil ~rcclib:ility of "national means" . . . . 

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TIIJS PIWPC)SAL is ATTRACTIVE 

Because: 

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1. It give" t!1e Ut:itcd States the initiative in a:n imnginative p~ace-kceping venfurc. 

. . 

2~. It avoids hilrtlc>:·;,J or international confrontation on satellite reconnaiss,mcc. . ' r·• •.. ····\·w "''" 

3 •. It avoids a rlifficnH C!pisoclo \!:it:, l)!lr intcrnntional friends, allies, om~ Coi1[;r;css 

and our pu:,,lic. 

4. It p0rndts the U.S. to contiritw its own satclHte espionage program unilatct·ally. 

5 •. H sttcce~sfol, it ,,chievr:s a great step toward "normaliz.ing" satellite obscrva!fon. 

6, If it f(tilS, tile C'OV./'.!l't p:·ogr:in, (';o:;'.inucs u_nimpaired. 

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to empl6y an Arms·control sa:teHite as. p:irt ()fits nati'onafmeans 

a. P1·~vious 1:hililary and civil i·es.carch. and development · 

. ·in space provides coinpletc conridence in the employn~ent of sucli 

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b .. The s,!!e nitc will be clevcloped f6r nic \J. S. by NASA; ... 

c, The USSR js urgcd .to join _in this projccl. 

TAU-:XT-!<l·: flfOLE 

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