United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-3732

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Tracy Parker

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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Submitted: April 19, 2019

Filed: July 9, 2019

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Before SHEPHERD, MELLOY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

In 2017, Defendant Tracy Parker pled guilty to being a felon in possession of

a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See also 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)

(setting forth the penalty for violating § 922(g)). At sentencing, the district court

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The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri.
concluded that two of Parker’s prior convictions—one in 2006 for second-degree

robbery and another in 2010 for attempted second-degree assault—were crimes of

violence under section 4B1.2(a) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”). 

Based partly on these convictions, the district court concluded that Parker’s offense

level was 25 and that he had a category-IV criminal history. The district court

sentenced Parker to a within-range term of 84 months’ imprisonment. Parker timely

appealed. We affirm.

Parker argues that the district court erred in concluding that Missouri seconddegree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines. We disagree. At the time

Parker was convicted, “a person commit[ted] the crime of robbery in the second

degree” in Missouri by “forcibly steal[ing] property.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 569.030.1

(2006) (current version at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 570.025). Last year, we held that Missouri

second-degree robbery is a “violent felony” for purposes of applying the Armed

Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) because it “requires the use or threatened use of

violent force.” United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668, 670–672 (8th Cir. 2018) (en

banc); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (defining the term “violent felony” to

include an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use

of physical force against the person of another”). The definition of the term “crime

of violence” in the Guidelines is “nearly identical” to that of “violent felony.” United

States v. Mata, 869 F.3d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); see also U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state

law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that—(1) has as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person

of another . . . .”). We therefore “construe ‘violent felony’ under [the ACCA] and

‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines as interchangeable.” Mata, 869 F.3d at 644

(citation omitted). Indeed, we did so just months after Swopes, holding that Missouri

first-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines. See United States

v. Shine, 910 F.3d 1061, 1063 (8thCir. 2018) (explaining that Missouri’s first-degree

robbery statute, like the statute at issue here, involves “physical force that is capable

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of causing physical pain or injury to another person” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). We likewise hold, for the reasons articulated in Swopes and Shine,

that Missouri second-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines and

reject Parker’s first argument.

Parker also argues that the district court erred in concluding that his 2010

conviction for attempted second-degree assault under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.060.1(2)

(2010) (current version at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.052) is a crime of violence. Parker

concedes that we have previously held to the contrary, see United States v. Welch,

879 F.3d 324, 326–27 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam), but raises the issue to preserve it

for further review. We must follow our decision in Welch. See Mader v. United

States, 654 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit

that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.” (citation omitted)). We

therefore reject Parker’s second argument and affirm the judgment of the district

court.

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