(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. STATIC 

CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC.
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 12–873. Argued December 3, 2013—Decided March 25, 2014 

Petitioner Lexmark sells the only style of toner cartridges that work 

with the company’s laser printers, but “remanufacturers” acquire and

refurbish used Lexmark cartridges to sell in competition with

Lexmark’s own new and refurbished ones. Lexmark’s “Prebate” program gives customers a discount on new cartridges if they agree to

return empty cartridges to the company. Each Prebate cartridge has 

a microchip that disables the empty cartridge unless Lexmark replaces the chip. Respondent Static Control, a maker and seller of

components for the remanufacture of Lexmark cartridges, developed 

a microchip that mimicked Lexmark’s. Lexmark sued for copyright 

infringement, but Static Control counterclaimed, alleging that 

Lexmark engaged in false or misleading advertising in violation of 

§43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. §1125(a), and that its misrepresentations had caused Static Control lost sales and damage to its

business reputation. The District Court held that Static Control 

lacked “prudential standing” to bring the Lanham Act claim, applying a multifactor balancing test the court attributed to Associated 

Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Second Circuit’s “reasonable interest” test. 

Held: Static Control has adequately pleaded the elements of a Lanham 

Act cause of action for false advertising. Pp. 6–22.

(a) The question here is whether Static Control falls within the 

class of plaintiffs that Congress authorized to sue under §1125(a). To 

decide that question, this Court must determine the provision’s 

meaning, using traditional principles of statutory interpretation. It 

is misleading to label this a “prudential standing” question. Lexmark 
 

 

 

 

2 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Syllabus
 

bases its “prudential standing” arguments on Associated General 

Contractors, but that case rested on statutory considerations: The 

Court sought to “ascertain,” as a statutory-interpretation matter, the 

“scope of the private remedy created by” Congress in §4 of the Clayton Act, and the “class of persons who [could] maintain a private

damages action under” that legislatively conferred cause of action, 

459 U. S., at 529, 532. And while this Court may have placed the 

“zone of interests” test that Static Control relies on under the “prudential” rubric in the past, see, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. 

Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 12, it does not belong there any more than Associated General Contractors does. Rather, whether a plaintiff comes 

within the zone of interests requires the Court to determine, using

traditional statutory-interpretation tools, whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff ’s claim. 

See, e. g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 

97, and n. 2. Pp. 6–9. 

(b) The §1125(a) cause of action extends to plaintiffs who fall within the zone of interests protected by that statute and whose injury

was proximately caused by a violation of that statute. Pp. 10–18.

(1) A statutory cause of action is presumed to extend only to

plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the zone of interests protected

by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751. “[T]he

breadth of [that] zone . . . varies according to the provisions of law at

issue.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 163. The Lanham Act includes a detailed statement of its purposes, including, as relevant 

here, “protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the control

of Congress] against unfair competition,” 15 U. S. C. §1127; and “unfair competition” was understood at common law to be concerned

with injuries to business reputation and present and future sales.

Thus, to come within the zone of interests in a §1125(a) falseadvertising suit, a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales. Pp. 10–13.

(2) A statutory cause of action is also presumed to be limited to

plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the 

statute. See, e.g., Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 268–270. This requirement generally bars suits

for alleged harm that is “too remote” from the defendant’s unlawful

conduct, such as when the harm is purely derivative of “misfortunes 

visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts.” Id., at 268–269. 

In a sense, all commercial injuries from false advertising are derivative of those suffered by consumers deceived by the advertising. But 

since the Lanham Act authorizes suit only for commercial injuries, 

the intervening consumer-deception step is not fatal to the proximate-cause showing the statute requires. Cf. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Syllabus 

& Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. 639, 656. Thus, a plaintiff suing under 

§1125(a) ordinarily must show that its economic or reputational injury flows directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that occurs when deception of consumers causes them 

to withhold trade from the plaintiff. Pp. 13–15. 

(3) Direct application of the zone-of-interests test and the proximate-cause requirement supplies the relevant limits on who may sue 

under §1125(a). These principles provide better guidance than the

multifactor balancing test urged by Lexmark, the direct-competitor

test, or the reasonable-interest test applied by the Sixth Circuit.

Pp. 15–18. 

(c) Under these principles, Static Control comes within the class of

plaintiffs authorized to sue under §1125(a). Its alleged injuries—lost

sales and damage to its business reputation—fall within the zone of

interests protected by the Act, and Static Control sufficiently alleged

that its injuries were proximately caused by Lexmark’s misrepresentations. Pp. 18–22. 

697 F. 3d 387, affirmed. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–873 

LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC., PETITIONER v.
 

STATIC CONTROL COMPONENTS, INC.
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[March 25, 2014]

 JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case requires us to decide whether respondent, 

Static Control Components, Inc., may sue petitioner, Lexmark International, Inc., for false advertising under the

Lanham Act, 15 U. S. C. §1125(a). 

I. Background 

Lexmark manufactures and sells laser printers. It also 

sells toner cartridges for those printers (toner being the

powdery ink that laser printers use to create images on

paper). Lexmark designs its printers to work only with its

own style of cartridges, and it therefore dominates the 

market for cartridges compatible with its printers. That 

market, however, is not devoid of competitors. Other 

businesses, called “remanufacturers,” acquire used Lexmark toner cartridges, refurbish them, and sell them in 

competition with new and refurbished cartridges sold by 

Lexmark. 

Lexmark would prefer that its customers return their 

empty cartridges to it for refurbishment and resale, rather

than sell those cartridges to a remanufacturer. So 

Lexmark introduced what it called a “Prebate” program, 
2 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

which enabled customers to purchase new toner cartridges

at a 20-percent discount if they would agree to return the 

cartridge to Lexmark once it was empty. Those terms 

were communicated to consumers through notices printed 

on the toner-cartridge boxes, which advised the consumer

that opening the box would indicate assent to the terms—

a practice commonly known as “shrinkwrap licensing,” 

see, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447, 1449 

(CA7 1996). To enforce the Prebate terms, Lexmark included a microchip in each Prebate cartridge that would 

disable the cartridge after it ran out of toner; for the cartridge to be used again, the microchip would have to be 

replaced by Lexmark.

Static Control is not itself a manufacturer or remanufacturer of toner cartridges. It is, rather, “the market 

leader [in] making and selling the components necessary

to remanufacture Lexmark cartridges.” 697 F. 3d 387, 396 

(CA6 2012) (case below). In addition to supplying remanufacturers with toner and various replacement parts, Static

Control developed a microchip that could mimic the microchip in Lexmark’s Prebate cartridges. By purchasing

Static Control’s microchips and using them to replace the 

Lexmark microchip, remanufacturers were able to refurbish and resell used Prebate cartridges. 

Lexmark did not take kindly to that development. In 

2002, it sued Static Control, alleging that Static Control’s 

microchips violated both the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 

U. S. C. §101 et seq., and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. §1201 et seq. Static Control counterclaimed, alleging, among other things, violations of §43(a) 

of the Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 441, codified at 15 U. S. C. 

§1125(a). Section 1125(a) provides: 

“(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any 

goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in 

commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

any combination thereof, or any false designation of

origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false 

or misleading representation of fact, which— 

“(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, 

or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to

the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her

goods, services, or commercial activities by another 

person, or 

“(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, 

services, or commercial activities, 

“shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 

such act.” 

Section 1125(a) thus creates two distinct bases of liability:

false association, §1125(a)(1)(A), and false advertising,

§1125(a)(1)(B). See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F. 2d 

1093, 1108 (CA9 1992). Static Control alleged only false 

advertising.

As relevant to its Lanham Act claim, Static Control 

alleged two types of false or misleading conduct by

Lexmark. First, it alleged that through its Prebate program Lexmark “purposefully misleads end-users” to believe that they are legally bound by the Prebate terms and 

are thus required to return the Prebate-labeled cartridge 

to Lexmark after a single use. App. 31, ¶39. Second, it 

alleged that upon introducing the Prebate program, 

Lexmark “sent letters to most of the companies in the 

toner cartridge remanufacturing business” falsely advising 

those companies that it was illegal to sell refurbished 

Prebate cartridges and, in particular, that it was illegal to 

use Static Control’s products to refurbish those cartridges. 

Id., at 29, ¶35. Static Control asserted that by those 
 

4 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

statements, Lexmark had materially misrepresented “the 

nature, characteristics, and qualities” of both its own 

products and Static Control’s products. Id., at 43–44, ¶85.

It further maintained that Lexmark’s misrepresentations 

had “proximately caused and [we]re likely to cause injury

to [Static Control] by diverting sales from [Static Control] 

to Lexmark,” and had “substantially injured [its] business 

reputation” by “leading consumers and others in the trade 

to believe that [Static Control] is engaged in illegal conduct.” Id., at 44, ¶88. Static Control sought treble damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and injunctive relief.1 

The District Court granted Lexmark’s motion to dismiss

Static Control’s Lanham Act claim. It held that Static 

Control lacked “prudential standing” to bring that claim,

App. to Pet. for Cert. 83, relying on a multifactor balancing test it attributed to Associated Gen. Contractors of 

Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U. S. 519 (1983). The court 

emphasized that there were “more direct plaintiffs in the

form of remanufacturers of Lexmark’s cartridges”; that 

Static Control’s injury was “remot[e]” because it was a

mere “byproduct of the supposed manipulation of consumers’ relationships with remanufacturers”; and that 

Lexmark’s “alleged intent [was] to dry up spent cartridge

supplies at the remanufacturing level, rather than at

[Static Control]’s supply level, making remanufacturers

Lexmark’s alleged intended target.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 

83. 

The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Static Control’s Lanham Act claim. 697 F. 3d, at 423. Taking the 

lay of the land, it identified three competing approaches to 

—————— 

1Lexmark contends that Static Control’s allegations failed to describe

“commercial advertising or promotion” within the meaning of 15

U. S. C. §1125(a)(1)(B). That question is not before us, and we express 

no view on it. We assume without deciding that the communications alleged by Static Control qualify as commercial advertising or

promotion. 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

determining whether a plaintiff has standing to sue under 

the Lanham Act. It observed that the Third, Fifth, 

Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all refer to “antitrust standing or the [Associated General Contractors] factors in

deciding Lanham Act standing,” as the District Court had 

done. Id., at 410 (citing Conte Bros. Automotive, Inc. v. 

Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F. 3d 221, 233–234 (CA3 

1998); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F. 3d 

539, 562–563 (CA5 2001); Gilbert/Robinson, Inc. v. Carrie 

Beverage-Missouri, Inc., 989 F. 2d 985, 990–991 (CA8 

1993); Phoenix of Broward, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 489 

F. 3d 1156, 1162–1164 (CA11 2007)). By contrast, “[t]he 

Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth [Circuits] use a categorical

test, permitting Lanham Act suits only by an actual competitor.” 697 F. 3d, at 410 (citing L. S. Heath & Son, Inc. 

v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc., 9 F. 3d 561, 575 (CA7 

1993); Waits, supra, at 1108–1109; Stanfield v. Osborne 

Industries, Inc., 52 F. 3d 867, 873 (CA10 1995)). And the 

Second Circuit applies a “‘reasonable interest’ approach,”

under which a Lanham Act plaintiff “has standing if the

claimant can demonstrate ‘(1) a reasonable interest to be 

protected against the alleged false advertising and (2) a

reasonable basis for believing that the interest is likely to

be damaged by the alleged false advertising.’” 697 F. 3d, 

at 410 (quoting Famous Horse, Inc. v. 5th Avenue Photo 

Inc., 624 F. 3d 106, 113 (CA2 2010)). The Sixth Circuit 

applied the Second Circuit’s reasonable-interest test and 

concluded that Static Control had standing because it 

“alleged a cognizable interest in its business reputation

and sales to remanufacturers and sufficiently alleged that

th[o]se interests were harmed by Lexmark’s statements to

the remanufacturers that Static Control was engaging in 

illegal conduct.” 697 F. 3d, at 411. 

We granted certiorari to decide “the appropriate analytical framework for determining a party’s standing to

maintain an action for false advertising under the Lanham 
6 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

Act.” Pet. for Cert. i; 569 U. S. ____ (2013).2 

II. “Prudential Standing” 

The parties’ briefs treat the question on which we 

granted certiorari as one of “prudential standing.” Because we think that label misleading, we begin by clarifying the nature of the question at issue in this case. 

From Article III’s limitation of the judicial power to

resolving “Cases” and “Controversies,” and the separationof-powers principles underlying that limitation, we have

deduced a set of requirements that together make up the

“irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.” Lujan 

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992). The 

plaintiff must have suffered or be imminently threatened 

with a concrete and particularized “injury in fact” that is

fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant

and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. 

Ibid. Lexmark does not deny that Static Control’s allegations of lost sales and damage to its business reputation give it standing under Article III to press its falseadvertising claim, and we are satisfied that they do. 

Although Static Control’s claim thus presents a case or

controversy that is properly within federal courts’ Article 

III jurisdiction, Lexmark urges that we should decline to 

adjudicate Static Control’s claim on grounds that are 

“prudential,” rather than constitutional. That request is

in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the principle that “a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide” 

cases within its jurisdiction “is ‘virtually unflagging.’” 

Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2013) (slip op., at 6) (quoting Colorado River Water Con-

—————— 

2Other aspects of the parties’ sprawling litigation, including

Lexmark’s claims under federal copyright and patent law and Static

Control’s claims under federal antitrust and North Carolina unfaircompetition law, are not before us. Our review pertains only to Static 

Control’s Lanham Act claim. 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

servation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976)). 

In recent decades, however, we have adverted to a “prudential” branch of standing, a doctrine not derived from

Article III and “not exhaustively defined” but encompassing (we have said) at least three broad principles: “‘the 

general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s

legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized

grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff ’s 

complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the 

law invoked.’” Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 

542 U. S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 

737, 751 (1984)).

Lexmark bases its “prudential standing” arguments

chiefly on Associated General Contractors, but we did not 

describe our analysis in that case in those terms. Rather, 

we sought to “ascertain,” as a matter of statutory interpretation, the “scope of the private remedy created by” Congress in §4 of the Clayton Act, and the “class of persons 

who [could] maintain a private damages action under” 

that legislatively conferred cause of action. 459 U. S., at 

529, 532. We held that the statute limited the class to 

plaintiffs whose injuries were proximately caused by a 

defendant’s antitrust violations. Id., at 532–533. Later 

decisions confirm that Associated General Contractors 

rested on statutory, not “prudential,” considerations. See, 

e.g., Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 

503 U. S. 258, 265–268 (1992) (relying on Associated General Contractors in finding a proximate-cause requirement

in the cause of action created by the Racketeer Influenced 

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. 

§1964(c)); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451, 

456 (2006) (affirming that Holmes “relied on a careful 

interpretation of §1964(c)”). Lexmark’s arguments thus do 

not deserve the “prudential” label. 

Static Control, on the other hand, argues that we should 
 

8 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

measure its “prudential standing” by using the zone-ofinterests test. Although we admittedly have placed that

test under the “prudential” rubric in the past, see, e.g., Elk 

Grove, supra, at 12, it does not belong there any more than 

Associated General Contractors does. Whether a plaintiff comes within “the ‘zone of interests’” is an issue 

that requires us to determine, using traditional tools of 

statutory interpretation, whether a legislatively conferred 

cause of action encompasses a particular plaintiff ’s claim. 

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 

83, 97, and n. 2 (1998); Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 

479 U. S. 388, 394–395 (1987); Holmes, supra, at 288 

(SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). As Judge Silberman

of the D. C. Circuit recently observed, “‘prudential standing’ is a misnomer” as applied to the zone-of-interests 

analysis, which asks whether “this particular class of 

persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive statute.” Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 

F. 3d 667, 675–676 (2013) (concurring opinion).3 

—————— 

3The zone-of-interests test is not the only concept that we have previously classified as an aspect of “prudential standing” but for which, 

upon closer inspection, we have found that label inapt. Take, for 

example, our reluctance to entertain generalized grievances—i.e., suits 

“claiming only harm to [the plaintiff ’s] and every citizen’s interest in 

proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that 

no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at

large.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573–574 (1992). 

While we have at times grounded our reluctance to entertain such suits

in the “counsels of prudence” (albeit counsels “close[ly] relat[ed] to the 

policies reflected in” Article III), Valley Forge Christian College v. 

Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 

464, 475 (1982), we have since held that such suits do not present

constitutional “cases” or “controversies.” See, e.g., Lance v. Coffman, 

549 U. S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 

547 U. S. 332, 344–346 (2006); Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 573–574. 

They are barred for constitutional reasons, not “prudential” ones. The 

limitations on third-party standing are harder to classify; we have 

observed that third-party standing is “ ‘closely related to the question 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

In sum, the question this case presents is whether Static

Control falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress 

has authorized to sue under §1125(a). In other words, we 

ask whether Static Control has a cause of action under the 

statute.4 That question requires us to determine the

meaning of the congressionally enacted provision creating 

a cause of action. In doing so, we apply traditional principles of statutory interpretation. We do not ask whether in 

our judgment Congress should have authorized Static 

Control’s suit, but whether Congress in fact did so. Just 

as a court cannot apply its independent policy judgment to

recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied, see 

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286–287 (2001), it

cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created 

merely because “prudence” dictates. 

—————— 

whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of action on 

the claim,’ ” Department of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U. S. 715, 721, n. ** 

(1990) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500, n. 12 (1975)), but

most of our cases have not framed the inquiry in that way. See, e.g., 

Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 128–129 (2004) (suggesting it is an

element of “prudential standing”). This case does not present any issue

of third-party standing, and consideration of that doctrine’s proper 

place in the standing firmament can await another day. 4We have on occasion referred to this inquiry as “statutory standing”

and treated it as effectively jurisdictional. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens 

for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 97, and n. 2 (1998); cases cited 

id., at 114–117 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). That label is an 

improvement over the language of “prudential standing,” since it 

correctly places the focus on the statute. But it, too, is misleading, 

since “the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action

does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory 

or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’ ” Verizon Md. Inc. v. 

Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U. S. 635, 642–643 (2002) (quoting 

Steel Co., supra, at 89); see also Grocery Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA, 693 F. 3d 

169, 183–185 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), and cases cited therein; 

Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 Okla. 

L. Rev. 89, 106 (2009). 
10 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

III. Static Control’s Right To Sue Under §1125(a) 

Thus, this case presents a straightforward question of

statutory interpretation: Does the cause of action in

§1125(a) extend to plaintiffs like Static Control? The 

statute authorizes suit by “any person who believes that

he or she is likely to be damaged” by a defendant’s false 

advertising. §1125(a)(1). Read literally, that broad language might suggest that an action is available to anyone 

who can satisfy the minimum requirements of Article III.

No party makes that argument, however, and the “unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually injured 

plaintiffs to recover persuades us that [§1125(a)] should 

not get such an expansive reading.” Holmes, 503 U. S., at 

266 (footnote omitted). We reach that conclusion in light

of two relevant background principles already mentioned: 

zone of interests and proximate causality. 

A. Zone of Interests 

First, we presume that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests “fall within the 

zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen, 468 

U. S., at 751. The modern “zone of interests” formulation 

originated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970), as a limitation on the cause of action for judicial review conferred

by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). We have 

since made clear, however, that it applies to all statutorily 

created causes of action; that it is a “requirement of general application”; and that Congress is presumed to “legislat[e] against the background of ” the zone-of-interests

limitation, “which applies unless it is expressly negated.” 

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 163 (1997); see also 

Holmes, supra, at 287–288 (SCALIA, J., concurring in 

judgment). It is “perhaps more accurat[e],” though not

very different as a practical matter, to say that the limitation always applies and is never negated, but that our 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

analysis of certain statutes will show that they protect a

more-than-usually “expan[sive]” range of interests. Bennett, supra, at 164. The zone-of-interests test is therefore 

an appropriate tool for determining who may invoke the

cause of action in §1125(a).5 

We have said, in the APA context, that the test is 

not “‘especially demanding,’” Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish 

Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U. S. ___, 

___ (2012) (slip op., at 15). In that context we have often 

“conspicuously included the word ‘arguably’ in the test to 

indicate that the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff,” 

and have said that the test “forecloses suit only when a 

plaintiff ’s ‘interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it 

cannot reasonably be assumed that’” Congress authorized

that plaintiff to sue. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 15–16). That 

lenient approach is an appropriate means of preserving

the flexibility of the APA’s omnibus judicial-review provision, which permits suit for violations of numerous statutes of varying character that do not themselves include

causes of action for judicial review. “We have made clear, 

however, that the breadth of the zone of interests varies 

according to the provisions of law at issue, so that what 

comes within the zone of interests of a statute for purposes 

of obtaining judicial review of administrative action under 

—————— 

5Although we announced the modern zone-of-interests test in 1971, 

its roots lie in the common-law rule that a plaintiff may not recover

under the law of negligence for injuries caused by violation of a statute

unless the statute “is interpreted as designed to protect the class of

persons in which the plaintiff is included, against the risk of the type of 

harm which has in fact occurred as a result of its violation.” W. Keeton, 

D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 

§36, pp. 229–230 (5th ed. 1984); see cases cited id., at 222–227; Gorris 

v. Scott, [1874] 9 L. R. Exch. 125 (Eng.). Statutory causes of action are 

regularly interpreted to incorporate standard common-law limitations 

on civil liability—the zone-of-interests test no less than the requirement of proximate causation, see Part III–B, infra. 
12 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

the ‘“generous review provisions”’ of the APA may not 

do so for other purposes.” Bennett, supra, at 163 (quoting Clarke, 479 U. S., at 400, n. 16, in turn quoting Data 

Processing, supra, at 156). 

Identifying the interests protected by the Lanham Act,

however, requires no guesswork, since the Act includes an 

“unusual, and extraordinarily helpful,” detailed statement

of the statute’s purposes. H. B. Halicki Productions v. 

United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F. 2d 1213, 1214 

(CA9 1987). Section 45 of the Act, codified at 15 U. S. C. 

§1127, provides: 

“The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce 

within the control of Congress by making actionable 

the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such 

commerce; to protect registered marks used in such 

commerce from interference by State, or territorial 

legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud 

and deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations 

of registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition

entered into between the United States and foreign

nations.” 

Most of the enumerated purposes are relevant to falseassociation cases; a typical false-advertising case will 

implicate only the Act’s goal of “protect[ing] persons engaged in [commerce within the control of Congress]

against unfair competition.” Although “unfair competition” was a “plastic” concept at common law, Ely-Norris 

Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F. 2d 603, 604 (CA2 1925) 

(L. Hand, J.), it was understood to be concerned with

injuries to business reputation and present and future 

sales. See Rogers, Book Review, 39 Yale L. J. 297, 299 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

(1929); see generally 3 Restatement of Torts, ch. 35, Introductory Note, pp. 536–537 (1938).

We thus hold that to come within the zone of interests in 

a suit for false advertising under §1125(a), a plaintiff must

allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or

sales. A consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a

disappointing product may well have an injury-in-fact 

cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke the 

protection of the Lanham Act—a conclusion reached by 

every Circuit to consider the question. See Colligan v. 

Activities Club of N. Y., Ltd., 442 F. 2d 686, 691–692 (CA2 

1971); Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F. 3d 1163, 1177 

(CA3 1993); Made in the USA Foundation v. Phillips 

Foods, Inc., 365 F. 3d 278, 281 (CA4 2004); Procter & 

Gamble Co., 242 F. 3d, at 563–564; Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 

F. 3d 468, 470 (CA9 1995); Phoenix of Broward, 489 F. 3d, 

at 1170. Even a business misled by a supplier into purchasing an inferior product is, like consumers generally,

not under the Act’s aegis. 

B. Proximate Cause 

Second, we generally presume that a statutory cause of

action is limited to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute. For centuries, it 

has been “a well established principle of [the common] law,

that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.” Waters v. 

Merchants’ Louisville Ins. Co., 11 Pet. 213, 223 (1837); see 

Holmes, 503 U. S., at 287 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). That venerable principle reflects the reality that

“the judicial remedy cannot encompass every conceivable 

harm that can be traced to alleged wrongdoing.” Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U. S., at 536. Congress, we

assume, is familiar with the common-law rule and does 

not mean to displace it sub silentio. We have thus construed federal causes of action in a variety of contexts to 
14 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

incorporate a requirement of proximate causation. See, 

e.g., Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 

346 (2005) (securities fraud); Holmes, supra, at 268–270 

(RICO); Associated Gen. Contractors, supra, at 529–535 

(Clayton Act). No party disputes that it is proper to read

§1125(a) as containing such a requirement, its broad 

language notwithstanding.

The proximate-cause inquiry is not easy to define, and 

over the years it has taken various forms; but courts have

a great deal of experience applying it, and there is a 

wealth of precedent for them to draw upon in doing so.

See Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 838– 

839 (1996); Pacific Operators Offshore, LLP v. Valladolid, 

565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part

and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3). Proximatecause analysis is controlled by the nature of the statutory

cause of action. The question it presents is whether the 

harm alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the 

conduct the statute prohibits. 

Put differently, the proximate-cause requirement generally bars suits for alleged harm that is “too remote” from 

the defendant’s unlawful conduct. That is ordinarily the 

case if the harm is purely derivative of “misfortunes visited 

upon a third person by the defendant’s acts.” Holmes, 

supra, at 268–269; see, e.g., Hemi Group, LLC v. City of 

New York, 559 U. S. 1, 10–11 (2010). In a sense, of course, 

all commercial injuries from false advertising are derivative of those suffered by consumers who are deceived by 

the advertising; but since the Lanham Act authorizes suit 

only for commercial injuries, the intervening step of consumer deception is not fatal to the showing of proximate 

causation required by the statute. See Harold H. Huggins 

Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F. 3d 787, 800–801 (CA5 

2011). That is consistent with our recognition that under 

common-law principles, a plaintiff can be directly injured

by a misrepresentation even where “a third party, and not 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

the plaintiff, . . . relied on” it. Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & 

Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. 639, 656 (2008).

We thus hold that a plaintiff suing under §1125(a) 

ordinarily must show economic or reputational injury 

flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising; and that that occurs when deception

of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the 

plaintiff. That showing is generally not made when the 

deception produces injuries to a fellow commercial actor 

that in turn affect the plaintiff. For example, while a

competitor who is forced out of business by a defendant’s 

false advertising generally will be able to sue for its losses, 

the same is not true of the competitor’s landlord, its electric company, and other commercial parties who suffer 

merely as a result of the competitor’s “inability to meet 

[its] financial obligations.” Anza, 547 U. S., at 458.6 

C. Proposed Tests 

At oral argument, Lexmark agreed that the zone of interests and proximate causation supply the relevant background limitations on suit under §1125(a). See Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 4–5, 11–12, 17–18. But it urges us to adopt, as

the optimal formulation of those principles, a multifactor 

balancing test derived from Associated General Contrac-

—————— 

6Proximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing, 

which requires only that the plaintiff ’s injury be fairly traceable to the 

defendant’s conduct. Like the zone-of-interests test, see supra, at 8–9, 

and nn. 3–4, it is an element of the cause of action under the statute, 

and so is subject to the rule that “the absence of a valid (as opposed to

arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 89. But like any other element of a cause

of action, it must be adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order

for the case to proceed. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679 

(2009). If a plaintiff ’s allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to

establish proximate causation, then the complaint must be dismissed; if

they are sufficient, then the plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to

prove them. 
 

16 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

tors. In the alternative, it asks that we adopt a categorical 

test permitting only direct competitors to sue for false 

advertising. And although neither party urges adoption of 

the “reasonable interest” test applied below, several amici 

do so. While none of those tests is wholly without merit, 

we decline to adopt any of them. We hold instead that a 

direct application of the zone-of-interests test and the 

proximate-cause requirement supplies the relevant limits

on who may sue.

The balancing test Lexmark advocates was first articulated by the Third Circuit in Conte Bros. and later adopted 

by several other Circuits. Conte Bros. identified five relevant considerations: 

“(1) The nature of the plaintiff ’s alleged injury: Is

the injury of a type that Congress sought to redress in

providing a private remedy for violations of the [Lanham Act]?

“(2) The directness or indirectness of the asserted

injury.

“(3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the 

alleged injurious conduct.

“(4) The speculativeness of the damages claim.

“(5) The risk of duplicative damages or complexity 

in apportioning damages.” 165 F. 3d, at 233 (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

This approach reflects a commendable effort to give content to an otherwise nebulous inquiry, but we think it 

slightly off the mark. The first factor can be read as requiring that the plaintiff ’s injury be within the relevant

zone of interests and the second and third as requiring 

(somewhat redundantly) proximate causation; but it is not 

correct to treat those requirements, which must be met in

every case, as mere factors to be weighed in a balance. 

And the fourth and fifth factors are themselves problematic. “[T]he difficulty that can arise when a court attempts 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

to ascertain the damages caused by some remote action” is

a “motivating principle” behind the proximate-cause requirement, Anza, supra, at 457–458; but potential difficulty in ascertaining and apportioning damages is not, as 

Conte Bros. might suggest, an independent basis for denying standing where it is adequately alleged that a defendant’s conduct has proximately injured an interest of the 

plaintiff ’s that the statute protects. Even when a plaintiff 

cannot quantify its losses with sufficient certainty to recover damages, it may still be entitled to injunctive relief under §1116(a) (assuming it can prove a likelihood of 

future injury) or disgorgement of the defendant’s ill-gotten 

profits under §1117(a). See TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. 

Edriver Inc., 653 F. 3d 820, 831 (CA9 2011); Johnson & 

Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F. 2d 186, 190 (CA2 

1980). Finally, experience has shown that the Conte Bros. 

approach, like other open-ended balancing tests, can yield

unpredictable and at times arbitrary results. See, e.g.,

Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal

Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1305, 1376–1379 (2011). 

In contrast to the multifactor balancing approach, the

direct-competitor test provides a bright-line rule; but it 

does so at the expense of distorting the statutory language. To be sure, a plaintiff who does not compete with

the defendant will often have a harder time establishing

proximate causation. But a rule categorically prohibiting

all suits by noncompetitors would read too much into the 

Act’s reference to “unfair competition” in §1127. By the 

time the Lanham Act was adopted, the common-law tort of

unfair competition was understood not to be limited to

actions between competitors. One leading authority in the

field wrote that “there need be no competition in unfair 

competition,” just as “[t]here is no soda in soda water, no

grapes in grape fruit, no bread in bread fruit, and a clothes 

horse is not a horse but is good enough to hang things 
 

18 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

on.” Rogers, 39 Yale L. J., at 299; accord, Vogue Co. v. 

Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (CA6 1924); 1 H.

Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, 

p. vi (4th ed. 1947); 2 id., at 1194–1205. It is thus a mistake to infer that because the Lanham Act treats false 

advertising as a form of unfair competition, it can protect 

only the false-advertiser’s direct competitors. 

Finally, there is the “reasonable interest” test applied by 

the Sixth Circuit in this case. As typically formulated, 

it requires a commercial plaintiff to “demonstrate ‘(1) a 

reasonable interest to be protected against the alleged 

false advertising and (2) a reasonable basis for believing 

that the interest is likely to be damaged by the alleged

false advertising.’” 697 F. 3d, at 410 (quoting Famous 

Horse, 624 F. 3d, at 113). A purely practical objection to 

the test is that it lends itself to widely divergent application. Indeed, its vague language can be understood as 

requiring only the bare minimum of Article III standing.

The popularity of the multifactor balancing test reflects its 

appeal to courts tired of “grappl[ing] with defining” the

“‘reasonable interest’” test “with greater precision.” Conte 

Bros., 165 F. 3d, at 231. The theoretical difficulties with 

the test are even more substantial: The relevant question

is not whether the plaintiff ’s interest is “reasonable,” but 

whether it is one the Lanham Act protects; and not 

whether there is a “reasonable basis” for the plaintiff ’s 

claim of harm, but whether the harm alleged is proximately 

tied to the defendant’s conduct. In short, we think the 

principles set forth above will provide clearer and more

accurate guidance than the “reasonable interest” test. 

IV. Application 

Applying those principles to Static Control’s falseadvertising claim, we conclude that Static Control comes

within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress authorized to

sue under §1125(a). 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 19 

Opinion of the Court 

To begin, Static Control’s alleged injuries—lost sales 

and damage to its business reputation—are injuries to 

precisely the sorts of commercial interests the Act protects. Static Control is suing not as a deceived consumer,

but as a “perso[n] engaged in” “commerce within the control of Congress” whose position in the marketplace has 

been damaged by Lexmark’s false advertising. §1127.

There is no doubt that it is within the zone of interests 

protected by the statute.

Static Control also sufficiently alleged that its injuries 

were proximately caused by Lexmark’s misrepresentations. This case, it is true, does not present the “classic 

Lanham Act false-advertising claim” in which “‘one competito[r] directly injur[es] another by making false statements about his own goods [or the competitor’s goods] and 

thus inducing customers to switch.’” Harold H. Huggins 

Realty, 634 F. 3d, at 799, n. 24. But although diversion of 

sales to a direct competitor may be the paradigmatic direct

injury from false advertising, it is not the only type of

injury cognizable under §1125(a). For at least two reasons, Static Control’s allegations satisfy the requirement

of proximate causation.

First, Static Control alleged that Lexmark disparaged

its business and products by asserting that Static Control’s business was illegal. See 697 F. 3d, at 411, n. 10 

(noting allegation that Lexmark “directly target[ed] Static

Control” when it “falsely advertised that Static Control 

infringed Lexmark’s patents”). When a defendant harms 

a plaintiff ’s reputation by casting aspersions on its business, the plaintiff ’s injury flows directly from the audience’s belief in the disparaging statements. Courts have 

therefore afforded relief under §1125(a) not only where a 

defendant denigrates a plaintiff ’s product by name, see, 

e.g., McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 848 

F. 2d 34, 38 (CA2 1988), but also where the defendant 

damages the product’s reputation by, for example, equat­
 

20 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

ing it with an inferior product, see, e.g., Camel Hair and 

Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 

799 F. 2d 6, 7–8, 11–12 (CA1 1986); PPX Enterprises, Inc. 

v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F. 2d 120, 122, 125 (CA2 1984).

Traditional proximate-causation principles support those 

results: As we have observed, a defendant who “‘seeks to 

promote his own interests by telling a known falsehood to 

or about the plaintiff or his product’” may be said to have 

proximately caused the plaintiff ’s harm. Bridge, 553 

U. S., at 657 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §870, 

Comment h (1977); emphasis added in Bridge).

The District Court emphasized that Lexmark and Static

Control are not direct competitors. But when a party

claims reputational injury from disparagement, competition is not required for proximate cause; and that is true 

even if the defendant’s aim was to harm its immediate 

competitors, and the plaintiff merely suffered collateral

damage. Consider two rival carmakers who purchase

airbags for their cars from different third-party manufacturers. If the first carmaker, hoping to divert sales from 

the second, falsely proclaims that the airbags used by the

second carmaker are defective, both the second carmaker 

and its airbag supplier may suffer reputational injury, and

their sales may decline as a result. In those circumstances, 

there is no reason to regard either party’s injury as derivative of the other’s; each is directly and independently

harmed by the attack on its merchandise.

In addition, Static Control adequately alleged proximate

causation by alleging that it designed, manufactured, and 

sold microchips that both (1) were necessary for, and

(2) had no other use than, refurbishing Lexmark toner

cartridges. See App. 13, ¶31; id., at 37, ¶54.7 It follows 

—————— 

7We understand this to be the thrust of both sides’ allegations concerning Static Control’s design and sale of specialized microchips for 

the specific purpose of enabling the remanufacture of Lexmark’s 
 

 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 21 

Opinion of the Court 

from that allegation that any false advertising that reduced the remanufacturers’ business necessarily injured 

Static Control as well. Taking Static Control’s assertions 

at face value, there is likely to be something very close to a

1:1 relationship between the number of refurbished Prebate cartridges sold (or not sold) by the remanufacturers 

and the number of Prebate microchips sold (or not sold) by 

Static Control. “Where the injury alleged is so integral an 

aspect of the [violation] alleged, there can be no question”

that proximate cause is satisfied. Blue Shield of Va. v. 

McCready, 457 U. S. 465, 479 (1982).

To be sure, on this view, the causal chain linking Static 

Control’s injuries to consumer confusion is not direct, but

includes the intervening link of injury to the remanufacturers. Static Control’s allegations therefore might not

support standing under a strict application of the “‘“general tendency”’” not to stretch proximate causation “‘“beyond the first step.”’” Holmes, 503 U. S., at 271. But the 

reason for that general tendency is that there ordinarily is 

a “discontinuity” between the injury to the direct victim 

and the injury to the indirect victim, so that the latter

is not surely attributable to the former (and thus also to

the defendant’s conduct), but might instead have resulted

from “any number of [other] reasons.” Anza, 547 U. S., at 

458–459. That is not the case here. Static Control’s allegations suggest that if the remanufacturers sold 10,000 

fewer refurbished cartridges because of Lexmark’s false 

advertising, then it would follow more or less automatically 

that Static Control sold 10,000 fewer microchips for the 

same reason, without the need for any “speculative . . . 

proceedings” or “intricate, uncertain inquiries.” Id., at 

459–460. In these relatively unique circumstances, the

remanufacturers are not “more immediate victim[s]” than

Static Control. Bridge, supra, at 658. 

—————— 

Prebate cartridges. 
 

22 LEXMARK INT’L, INC. v. STATIC CONTROL 

 COMPONENTS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

Although we conclude that Static Control has alleged an 

adequate basis to proceed under §1125(a), it cannot obtain

relief without evidence of injury proximately caused by 

Lexmark’s alleged misrepresentations. We hold only that 

Static Control is entitled to a chance to prove its case. 

* * * 

To invoke the Lanham Act’s cause of action for false 

advertising, a plaintiff must plead (and ultimately prove) 

an injury to a commercial interest in sales or business

reputation proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentations. Static Control has adequately pleaded 

both elements. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 

affirmed. 

It is so ordered.