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CHRONOLOGY OF 

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1 May 1980 

10 June 1980 

25 August 1980 

25 August 1960 

· .. ·SYElAN .. -smq 

The USSR shot down a U-.2 reconnai.s8Dce aircraft, 

flown by Gary Powers, on a CIA-sponsored' mission. 

President Eisenhower directed a special review of 

the satellite reconnaissance program. 

(Tab 1) 

The Special Panel on Satellite Reconnaissance (Olfice 

. of the Special Assistant to the President for Science 

and Technology), convened pursuant to President 

Elsenho'eVer·'s 10 JUne direction, rePorted on the Air 

Force·satellite· reconnaissance prop-abl. 

The Panel concluded that, from the array of important. 

investigations already carried out by the Air Force, . 

a few of the studies could be extracted and iDtepated 

into a single Simple and powerful pr~am "to live 

us the recODJ1aisaance we· need. " 

(Tab ~) 

A special meeting of the National Security COUllCil 

waa called for the purpose of ~evie1riDl the aateWte 

reconnaissance program. 

. ", .. 

TheNSC noted and discuased the report of the Special 

Pallel on·Satellite Reconnai.sance and the Pre.ldeat'. 

approval of several recommendations made by the 

Special Panel. On September 1, 1880 the NBC directed 

the Secretary of Defense to reorieat the overt project •. 

SAMOS, and to establish a special manapment struc~ 

ture and procedurea. 

SAKOS. was removed completely from normal cbarmels' 

and assigned to a newly eatabUshed field element 

(SAFSP) under General Greer, who was .. aiped 

directly to the Secretary of the Air Force and ~pO~d . 

to the Secretary with no .intermediate supervision or 

review. 

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25 August 1960 

(Continued) 

September 1960 

Spring 1961 

7 August 1961 

A small special staff (SAFMS) under Brigadier General 

R. D. Curtin was established within the Olfice of the 

, Secretary Of the Air Force to accomplish Waahinlton 

staff, work for the Secretary and the SAMOS Project 

Director. The Secr~tary' 8 re8ponaibilities for the, 

SAMOS Project were delegated to the Under 'Secretary 

of the Air'Force (Dr. Charyk) who reported directly 

to the Secretary of Defenae concerDing the SAMOS 

Project. 

(Tabs'l and 2) 

Immediately after establishment of the new SAKOS ' 

management structure, Dr. Charyk placed manapment of the CORONA and ARGON projects wlthin tbe 

special SAMOS manaaement structure, wotar a. Air 

Force actions and authority were concerned. He also 

e8tabli8hed direct, liaison with the Deputy' Director I 

Plans, CIA (Mr.' Bi88ell) cODeemiDI the ma .... ment 

of covert' efforts. 

(Tab 2) 

During this period, initial considera:tion was given to 

further revi8iona to the special maua,ement structure. 

In a summary review' of the National RecODDaia.ance 

Office (NRO) written ju8t prior tohUI ~Parture; Dr. 

Charyk related the underlyinC rationale: "The exi8ttnc·· 

structure was effective only for . the specific' SAIIOS, , 

CORONA and ARGON projects; it had DO relation to , other projects, existing or propo •• d. Furthermore, 

the arrantement did not provide for the depte. of 

management effectiveness warranted by the national 

importance of satellite reconnai88ance ... 

(Tab 2) 

Dr. Charyk forwarded to the'Secretary of Defense. a 

Memorandum of tinderstanding, to be siped by Mr. 

McNamara and Mr. Dullea, coftrinl the ma .... ment 

aspects of tbe National Recoanais8ance Prop-am. 

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(Continued) 

5 September 1961 

.. -BYElWI .. ma 

The Memorandum:' 

1. ,'de~ined the National Reconnaissance Program 

2. established a National Reconnaissance·Office 

(NRO) on a coVert basis 

3. designa~ed the' Deputy Director'of Plans ,(CIA) . 

a8 Director of the NRO and the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force as Deputy Director of the MBO. . 

Dr. Charyk indicated his understanding that he and 

Mr. Bissell, on the baa is, of·the agreem.,nt,. were to 

develop a detailed pl~ of operation~· 

. AIs~ attached for Mr. ,McNamara's 8iplat~e was a 

memorandUm providing the delegation of authority 

insofar as the DOD was concerned. . 

The Memorandum of UnderstancH.na was Siped by 

Mr. McNamara. It was not siped by Mr. Dulles. 

(Tab 3)' 

With a memo for the Deputy Secretary of Delenae, 

Dr. Charyk forwarded a redraft of a buia of UDder-· 

standing between the CIA and the DOD relative to the 

'NRP. 

Mr. McNamara had aiPed t~e oriliDal draft (Tab 3), 

but Mr. Dulles felt that certain ch ..... were desirable 

and that he would prefer to bave the apreement ~ the 

form of a letter rather than, a formal memorandum. 

. . 

The only substantive cbanp bad to do with the deslpation of Mr. Bissell imdDr. Cbar7t. act .. joiDt1y. as 

respon8iblefor the NaP rather than the Director - . Deputy Director relationship prescribe~ in the on,tDal 

memorandum which Mr. McNamara Biped. 

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5 September 1961 

(Continued). 

6 September 1961 

6 September 1961 

September 1961 

"-.BYElIAN · ... SImI 

Mr. McNamara had requested that Mr. Gilpatric 

sign the new document. . 

(Tab' 4) 

A noD/CIA Agreement. signed by Mr .. GUpatric 

(Deputy Secretary of. Defense) and General Cabell 

(Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agenq) 

1. defined the National Reconnaissance '~ocram' 

(NRP) to consist of all satellite and overflight 

reconnaissance projects whether overt or 

covert 

~. established,. on a covert basis. a N.tional 

'Reconnaissance Office to maDaIe the NRP . 

under the direction of the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force (Dr. Charyld and the Deputy 

Director (Plans) of the CIA (Mr. Bi8se11) 

acting jointly. 

(Tab 5) 

In a meiJiorandum jointly addressed to the Secre-.· 

taries Of the Military Departments •.. the DDME, 

. the Chairman of the JCS, and the a.neral COUll8el -

Mr. McNamara designated the Under Secretar, of 

the Air Force. al!' his Asaistant for Reconnaissance 

and delepted full authority for the maaagement of 

the National Reconnaissance Program. 

(Tab 6) 

The National S.curity Councll 5412 Group rejected 

the co-director provisions of the CIA-DOD acreement on the basis that the recOnnai8S8D~~ program 

was too impe~ant nationally to be conducted 1iIlder 

divided management. 

(Tab 1) 

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October 1961 -

May 1962 

28 Noveinber 1961 

12 December 1961 

5 Ja~uary 1962 

"'.'BYElIAN 

a..smm 

During thi~. periQd, discussions of a revision to 

. assign ~equivocal1y the complete responsibility for 

management of the entire 'reconnais8anceProtram 

to a smgle person were carried' out. Bssentially 

no progress was possible toward the form~ or,anizing·. 

of" the NRO. Consequently,· the previous arrangement 

was . continued .with the Deputy'DIrector/Research 

(Mr. Bissell), due to internal CIA orir~.ational 

changes. . 

(Tab 1) 

Mr. Allen Dulles departed the CIA. Mr. John McCone 

was apPointed as Director, Centrallntelliaence. 

Mr. Ollpatric asked Mr .. McCone to 'coD8id~r two 

memoranda (prepared by Or. Chlll7k)·which set forth 

a plan of. action for the functioning. of the· no. 

A principal element in the plan wail the aS8ipment 

to Dr. Charyk'Of the tecbnicalmauapment of all 

national reconnaissance projeets (ove~and covert). 

Mr. Gnpatric suggeste'd that the CIA and DOD review 

the present functioning of the NRO before the subject 

was broUlht up qain either before the Special Group 

. (on whose agenda it was beiDI held by General Ta1'mr. 

pending fUrther word) or tbe··PreaideDt's PIAB, which. 

had postponed c0l18ideration of the 8ubject .untU ita. 

next meeting. 

(Tab 7) . 

A new draft Mem~randum of .UnderstancUna oil·the 

Management of the National RecODDa18sance Prop-am 

was prepared ·iIi SAPUS. The alNement propoaed to 

establish, on a covert baais, an .NRO to maiJage the· 

. national program. The Directo;r of tile NRO would 

be the Assistant for RecODDaiaaance to the Secretary 

of Defense. The Deputy Director of the NRO would 

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5 January 1962 

( Continued) 

March 1962 

30 March 1962 

-"·BYBtAN. _SYSRI 

be the· Deputy Director (Plana) at the CIA ~Total 

responsibility for the NaP ~ould be delegated by 

the. Secretary of Defense and the DCI to the DNRO. . 

Be would in turn delegate specific respouibilities 

to the CIA and elsewhere as required.' ~ithin·the 

D.OD, the Air Foree would be the operatiOnal·agency 

for management and.conduct of the NRP~ The 

management and conduct of individual projects and 

elements would be a88·iped·by the NRO to the CIA 

as the operational agency. A Technical.AdVisory 

Group for the NRO would be established. A Satel-

.. lite Operations Central (SOC) would be established 

as part of the NRO lo.cated within the Air Force 

STC at Sunnyvale, California •. and headedb)' the· 

Air Force member of theNRO. An Aircraft Operations Central (AOC) would be estabUshed at an 

appropriate location and headed by a CIA member 

of the. NBO. Specific responsibilities for edsting 

individual NRP projects were outlined. 

(Tab 8) 

Mr •. Bissell departed the CIA. Dr. Berbe~ 'Scoville 

was appointed Deputy. Director I Research, CIA.. . 

Dr. Charyk forwarded to Mr. Vance, General 

Counsel, DOD a copy of a 27 Karch 1882 proposed 

CIA veraion of the Agreement between:DOD'and CIA 

relative to the management of the NRP. Dr •. 'Charyk 

stated that the CIA. veraion appeared to differ in a 

fundamental' fashion from the draft forwarded by 

Mr. Gilpatric··to·Mr. McCone.on.17 January 1982. 

The' CIA version proposed the 8atabUahment, on a 

covert basis, of an NRO under the directiOll of a 

Director and Deputy Director - one beiDI appointed 

by the DOD and the other by the CIA. The· DOD 

representative would be the Under Secretary of the 

Air' Force. The Deputy· Director (Research) would . 

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(Continued) 

.. -BYfMAN 

--

act for the CIA. The prime responsibility and au- ' 

thority for the over-all aspects of each'individUal 

project would be specifically assip~d to either the 

DOD or the CIA by the Secretary of Defenae and the , , 

DCI acting"jOiDtITUpon·'the*Ni!tiiiimendatioil'-ot the'---'-"'~~ 

Director aDd Deputy Director, NRO. Decisions of ' 

the NRO would be implemented and manaiement of 

the NRP would be made effective: within DOD, by 

the exercise of the authority delegated to the SAFUS; 

within the CIA, ,by the Deputy Director (Research) 

in the performance of his assigned duties. The, 

SAFUS would be designated Special Assistant for 

Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense and 

'delegated full authority in this area. Within· DOD, 

the Air Force would operationally m..,e and conduct those projects asslped by the NBO to the DOD. ' 

, Within the CIA, the Deputy' Director (Re,search) 

would be the operational element responsible tor " 

management and conduct 01 those project •• aaiped 

by the NRO to the CIA.' A Tecbnicai Advisory Group 

for the NRO would be eatabUshed. The RROwould 

be directly responsive to, and only to, th.~photo~' 

graphic and electronic signal (SIOINT) 'coBectlon ' 

requirements and priorities established by the USS., 

NSA would be solely responsible for, the, researcb, 

development, planniJll -.nd operations for processing 

of electronic signal data' (CoMDrr and BLINT) col-' " 

lected from space vehicle sourcea. ,. .... ment 

control of the field operations of various elements ' 

of the program would be exercised ~ctly, in the 

ca8e of DOD, from the' SAJ'US to the de slpated , 

project officers, and' in the case of the CIA, trom 

the Deputy Director (Research), to the de8tcnated 

project officer8. Major ,prop-am element. and operations of the NRO would be reviewed on a repar basis 

and a8 special circumstances required by the Spe~ial 

Group under NBC Action 5412. ' 

(Tab 9) 

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2 May 1962 

2 May 1962 

Late May 1982 

14 June 1962 

.. -BYElWI·· 

-IYSIII 

A new CIA-DOD agreement estabUshed a single 

Director of the no, respODsible directly to the 

Secretary of Defense and the· Director of· Central 

Intelligence for management of the entire National 

Reconnaissance Program (NRP). 

(Tab 10) . 

Concurrent documents estabUshed the· NBO as an 

operating agency of the DOD. The Under· Secretary 

of the Air 'Force (Dr •. Charyk) was designated as 

the Director, ~(). 

(Tab .1) 

As.pecia! conference was convened by the Director, 

NRO, to discuss organization and procedures· to be 

established under the new charter. Generalagreeme.nt was reached .on the basic organization and 

modus ·operan~i.· In attendance: Deput)' Director/ 

Research (CiA).and several Ice)' members of his· 

staff; several members of the SAFUS special staff. 

(Tab 1) 

DOD Directive TS 5105.23 was publtahed. This 

directive: 

1. Established the NRO as an operating .,.DC), 

of the· DOD under the direction and supervision 

of the Secretary 01 DefelUle. 

2. Organized the. NRO separately within the DOD 

·under a·Director, NRO appointed by the Secre- . 

tar), at D~fense. . 

·3 .. Made the Director, NRO responsible forconsolidation of all DOD· satellite and air vehicle 

overflight projects for lntelltaence, podeay 

and mapping .photop-aph)' and electronic stpal 

collection into a single National Recomialasance 

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14 June 1962 

( Continued) 

14 June 1962 

27 June 1982 

"-BYEIM .. sma 

Program (NaP) and' for complete mauagement and conduct of tbis prop-am in accord-, 

&nce with ,policy guid8nce and decisions of 

the Secretary of Defense. 

(Tab a.)' 

In ,a memorandum. to: 

The Secretaries of' Military Departments 

The Director, DefeDse Reaearch • BJIIlneering 

The Chairman, 'Joint, Chief. 01 Staff, , ' 

The Assistant Secretaries of i>efeuae 

The General Counsel 

The Special Asalatant to the secretary of'Defense 

The Assistants to the Secretary ~ Defenae 

The,Director, Defense JnteUi,.nce Agency 

, The Director, National Sec~ity Agency 

Mr. allpatric designated Dr. Charyk, Director, 

National Reconnaissance 'otfice. 

'With a separate memorandum to the 8ame addressees, 

Mr. Gilpatric forwarded a copy 01 the CIA/DOD 

Agreement dated" 2 May1862 and directed that all 

'DOD activities in this 'area be bandled in accordance 

with the agreement. 

(Tab U) 

In,a memor~ to the CIA Comptroller, Dr. ' 

Scoville provided ___ rs to several BOB qUestions 

involvin, the :Deput7 Director' (Reaearch), CIA. In 

general, Dr. Scoville f,lt, that all 01 the, BOB quee-

, tiona arose from put practices (pre-NRO) aDd that 

the charter of the newly actiVated RRO clearly 

placed the responsibility for providing satlafactory 

management of all the problems raised by the BOB. 

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(Continued) 

1 July 1962 

"-BYBtAN --. 

on a question of possible dupl1c.tion in the larle 

number of different sensor platforms for satellite 

system's~' Dr .. Scoville remarked that the NRO' 

would determine the U. S. program for these various 

platforms and combinations and woUld. assip.to 

either' CIA or DOD the 'development and ()peration 

ol the. desired systems. . Seoville felt that this 

should provide a centra~ evaluation of the many 

systems under consideration and the development . 

an~ direction over a single U. S. program employing 

the most advanced state-of-the-art. . 

On a question concerniDl correlation of ground 

processing equipment with sensor payload develop· 

ment~ Dr. Scoville atated that the DNRO ·wail. clearly 

charged with the responsibility 01 keeping all processors~ i. e. NPIC and NSA~ iDformect' 01 forthcoming 

developments ina .timely fashion. . 

Concerning the number'of missions required for 

overhead reconnais8ance~ Dr. Scovi1l~.remarked 

that intelligence requirements Were determined by 

the USll3, through use of its COIlOR and'that these 

requirements were forwarded tJU.oup COMOR to 

the NRO, ~ch was charged with selectm, the . 

appropriate 'system to meet the requirements. . '. 

On the question ollimited prop-am fundiDa fieldbility 

of CIA in managin, large prop-ams as required for 

overhead reconnaissance, Dr. ScoYille stated that· 

all. programs and fund. budgeted b,. CIA for thia 

purpose were at the direction and under the approval , ,Of the DNRO. 

(Tab.12)· 

General Curtin departed the NRO.. Colonel John L. 

Martin was ,designated Director, NRO Staff.' 

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23 July 1962 

Responding to a' Scoville mem~rand~ on the pro-' 

cec:ture for initiation of overflight reconnaissance, 

Dr. Charyk'opined that, as a normal procedure, 

the COMOR" which was solely concerned with requirements, should submit its recommendatio~8 , 

for U. S. intelligence needs to the usm ~ that the " 

usm; in turn, should forward'its recommendations 

to the NRO. 

Dr. Charyk stated .turt~er that the NRC, in llIht 

of stated requirements, would forward its specific 

recommendationa to the Special Group for decision. 

In cases where sipiticaDt new factors ente~d or 

, where new systems were involved, the NRO would, 

as a normal rule, forward its as'sessment to ,the 

usm for comments and would include these in ,its 

presentation to the Special Group. In the' case of 

on-goiniprograms where no new factors entered, 

the NRC treatment would be perfunctory. Dr., 

, Charyk,tholllht it desirable that all such matters 

go to the" Special Group through the NRC Since, under 

the charter, the 'NRO bad the operatioaal respon8i~ 

bUity tor the total effort. 'Dr. Charyk included an , illustrative sketch of these procedures. 

(Tab 13) , 

A Director, 'NRO memorandum for the NRO Program 

Directors and the Director, NRO Staff estabUshed 

the bas,ic orpDization Qf tbe NRO and ~tiona of 

the individual"NBO elements. The ,general orpni-

, zational concepts,: 

1. A separately orpnized~ operatlDl "DCy 

concealed entirely within other apneie_, 

u8ing" persODDel 'and resources of these 

a,encles on full or part-time baaia, asrequired; , 

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(Continued) 

--_ -sma 

2. To consist of carefully' selected personnel 

~ highest qualifications and kept as sman 

, as possible in order to operate with the 

efficiency and' quick reaction time r,equlred. 

3. To consist of the Director, NRO, NRO Staff, 

NRO Program Directors, and their Project 

Directors and key staff officers. 

4. To establish, initially: 

a) a: Director, PrOiram A respousible for' 

NRP satellite ettort conducted by, NRC 

utilizing Air Force resources; 

b) a'Director, Program B responsible for 

, Nap effort conducted by NRO utilizing 

CIA resources; and 

c), a' Director~ , Program C responaible for " 

"NRP effort conducted by NRO utilizlDg' 

Naval Research Laboratory resources .. 

, 5. To provide organizational cover as follows: 

a) Director, NRO 'activities, by his positlon 

as Under Secretary Of the Air Force 

(SAFUS); 

b) NRO Staff by the tltle, OIfice c1 Space 

Systems, OSAP (SAFSS); 

c) Director, Prop-am A by his overt 

, primary duty as Director, Special. 

Projects, OSAF (SAFSP); 

d) Director, Progr~m B by his overt duty 

as Deputy Director/Research, CIA; and 

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(Continued) 

. 6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

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e) D~ector, Program C by a ~imilarly 

effective arraDgement. 

Personnel selected for duty with. NRO from 

Services and AgeDCies not to functionm strict 

.liaison capacity, but to be full time members 

of NRO, serving hdl tour on lilter-agency 

transfer basis, and responsible solely to an 

NRO supervisor for duration of tour. 

Stre'amlined management procedures to be 

used throughout all aspects at'NRO mana.-

mente 

Program Directors responsiblec:tirectly and 

solely to the Director, KRO. 

Director, NRO respon8ible tor ·an fundin, of 

the NaP. All cowrt tunda budgeted by Air 

Force, all covert NRP contracts let 'by CtA' 

. as Executive Agency tor the Director,· no.' 

NRO interlace with the U. ·S. Intellipnce . 

Board to be carried out within NRO, Washtncton. 

Directo~, NRO to· assign operational control 

for aircraft projeets to appropriate . Directors • 

NRO Staff to be responsible for actual mlasion 

pl~ng for satellite projects (specify t~ret., 

desired on-orbit program opti~, approval 

of .actual mission target program and options, 

on-orbit selection between options). 

(Tab 14) 

21 August 1962 in a membrandum for Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville recorded his agreement with the procedure for iDltiatiOll 

"-BYBtVl _S1S1II. 

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(Continued) 

-26 September 1962 

.. -BYEI'M 

.. smEI 

- of overnight reconnaissance outlined by Dr. Charyk . 

on 19 July ~ Dr. ScoVille stated his bellef that it 

WOlUd be impracticable in terms of·time to sub~it 

proposals for additional missions for on-gomg pro-

, -grams for Special Group approval. Accordingly, he 

proposed a revision to Dr. Charyk' 8 procedure tor 

on-going programs which would cha~ge the project 

director tor a given program to consult with the 

DNRO where ,new factors such as ~U8ual risk or 

sensitivity had arisen- as a means of expediting the 

movement ot recommended actions to the Special 

Group tor approval.-

(Tab 15) 

In a memorandum to the Secretary of DetelUle, Dr. 

Brown (DDR.E) outlined his recommendations after 

reviewing the reconnaissance satellite prop-am. 

Key recommendations: 

1. The CORONA J program, which would use 

M cameras but add an extra capsule and 

recovery, should be carried 'out. , 

2. The E"-6 program should be cancelled. 

3. The CORONA M program should carryon' 

through the whole' of FY 84. 

4. -Additional LANYARD payl.oada and launches 

beyond the five approved should be approved 

through calendar .1983 at one per m~." 

5. ,'The ARGON program and the vario. BLINT 

programs' appeared to be ade~ate and wellplanned. 

(Tab 16) 

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13 October 1962 

--BYBWI 

_mrm 

In a note for t.he DNRO, Mr. McNamara provided 

the following direction: 

"Proceed with three more E-6 shota, money' 

for which is in the proFam. Atter ·these 

three, it it appears desirable to proceed 

With more, discuss with Ros (GUpatric) or 

·tne. " . 

(Tab 17>' 

In a memorandum for the Director, Central Intelli-

. gence Agency,. Mr. McGeorge Bundy .related the 

following: 

"In view of the changing internatiOD~ situ.tion 

and .. in the light ot the recommendations· of 

the Special Group (NI2), the President baa 

directed that the responsibility, t~·include 

. command and control and operational deci-

. sion8, with regard to U-2 recoDnais8ance 

overflights of Cuba.is translerred from the 

CIA to tiie DOD, effective this date. " 

The memorandUm further directed the. CIA to.-render 

all appropriate support and assistance to the a,enc), . 

deaipated by the DOD as haVinl r.eaponsibility tor 

theae missions. 

(Tab 18) 

In a memorandum to ·Mr. BundJ, Oeneral Carter, 

Acting. Director of Central Intel1ilence stated that 

he had taken steps to ensure th.t lull cOmmand 8Dd. 

control responsibllitylo.r Cuban U-2 recOlllials.ance 

nights was traJUllerred frain the C~ to SAC. effective 12 October 1982. 

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(Continued>' 

13 October 1982 

... BYEMAN 

"smEI' 

General Cart~r also stated that he was ob.lt.ged to . 

record his essential opposition to the e~reme 

rapidity with which the chaqeover of command ' 

control was being accomplished ·at a time whttn the 

criticality of th~se missions. was so high., , ' 

General Carter stated that in his view~ the'precipitate changeover of. co~and responsibility with 

its attendant risks without adequate preparation and , 

advance planning, as well as evaluation 01 the consequences~ was not in the best interests of achieving 

out intelligence objectives. 

. General Carter included ~ memorandum, for Mr. 

Bundy's: sipature, directing the accomplishment of' 

, the transfer, which General Carter indicated "to 

date, have been comniunicated to me only'orally 

by 'the Deputy Secretary of Defense. ,. . ' 

(Tab 19) 

In a memorandum for the DePUt7 Secretary of Def.nee 

and t~e Acting Director of CentrallnteUflence. IIr. 

Bundy recorded his own' view 01 the situation with . 

respect to the responsibllit;y for "a particular recon-

. naissance operation authorized b;y hiltter authority' 

on October 9. fI 

Mr. Bundy stated that "iii lifrbt ~ the views of tho8e' 

with direct recollection of opinions of hicher authority 

who are present in Wa8hiDgtQll, 'it aeem. to me rilht 

that reaponsibility tor thi8 particular operation which 

'has been authorized shOUld now be vested in the De-

. partinent of Defense, and it is the UDderatandto, of 

all concerned that this respOuibility bOW reats with 

that department. " 

M~ .. Bundy stated further'tliat "we must all recopize 

that there is a deep and honest- difference of opiDion : 

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23 October'1962 

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not only about the wisdom of ·this particular decision 

but also in the be st way· of proceedi.ng in the future" 

that "the assignment of responsibility. • . ~hould 

not be regarded as a binding precedent" and that "the 

whole question of roles and responsibWtles in ·th~s 

area should be reviewed by the special group and 

presented to higher authority for deci.ion when further' authorizations are requested. II 

(Tab 20). . 

In'a Memorandum for the Record, Dr. Scoville related his discussions with Dr. Charyk relative to 

CIA/NRO arrangements on Cuban reCODD&~8ance. 

The memorandum outlii1ed .proposed arranp~ents 

for BLUE MOON and NIMBUS.. The memorandum . 

commented further on arranpmenta for ~ CIA 

.. interface with the mc and. the NRO Stall. 

(Tab 21) 

26 October 1962 

.... ·BYElWI 

--

Colonel Martm advised the Director, DIA that the 

security asPects of reconnaissance overflight of 

Cuba had 'been changed a8 follows: 

1. Information revealine specifiC plana for 

overflight' operations would be classified 

as SECRET or TOP SECRET, as appro-' 

priate. 

2. This information would no longer be con-

·trolled within the BYBMAN control sJ8tem, 

3. Communications pert'aining to planned 

operatiopB would be transmitted as TOP 

SECRET, to specific addressees only, 

disclosable,aa required, on a strict 

need-to-know baais. 

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(ContiDued) 

6 November'l962 

7 November 1962 

--BYEIAN, 

--

The inform.ation that CIA resources were supporting , 

some of the U-2 operations at'McCoyAir Force, 

Base remained classified under' mEALlST and was 

t~ be transmitted within the BYBMAN control system. 

(Tab 22) 

In a resume of personal observations relative to 

. intelligence data collection and exploitation aa highlighted by the Cuban experience, Dr. Charyk atated 

that: ' 

"The DOD should, be respOnsible' for the development and the operatiOnal control of aJ.1reconnaiasance activities except possibly for those, 

that, are truly covert in, nature~ Decision makin. 

and eff.ciency can be streamlined if desired 

. Ale~cy· participation in these activities, even. 

t'o the extent of real time followiDI of operational missions, is eUmtnated~ The DOD pro-

. grams, of course, must be formulated in the ' 

complete context of all requirements,' including 

the Agency requirements, and all of the appro~ , 

priate data and results s ... ould, of course, be 

: made available, to the Al8nc;y. HoWever, active 

participation ~ development and in ope~atiOD. 

leads only to unnecessary cODtu8ioo aDd complications. The existence of such criteria would 

have eliminated the -controversy relative to the 

operational 'responsibility for'the U-2 mia.ion8 

over- Cuba." - ' 

(Tab 23) 

, -

Dr. Charyk clarified the questiona ra18~d by Dr. 

Wheelon in the 23 October Memorandum for'Record 

on procedures in regard to Cuban recODDaissance. 

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20 November 1962 

23 November 1962 

_.-BYBtM 

--

Dr. Charyk stated that the JeS were responsible for 

the operational Plannina to cover specified reconnaissance objectives and for all aspects of actual 

reconnaissance operations in ac.cordance with approved ·plans. Dr. Charyk stated further that the 

JCS were delelatlng to appropriate military commanders subordinate responsibilities for the . 

planning and execution of theae operations. In' the 

JCS the focal point for operations was the mc. 

The DIA was responsible for recommendiDI reconnaissance objectives on the basis of NPIC analy_is -j 

of previous mission results, coKOa recommendations 

for additional target coverage and tactical mWtal7 requirements. 

Specific approvals on an individual a1rcrattanc:l route 

basis were the responsibility of the NBC Executive 

. Committee. . 

. With reference to Dr •. Scov1l1e's SucpatiOD concerniag 

the establishment of a CIA lla.SOO :with the DO Staff, 

Dr. Charyk state~ his belief that the a8si.pIQeDt .. of 

an individual solely for a U.iaon function w .. incom-

.' patible with tbe concept underl1in1 tbe NRO. 

(Tab 24) . 

Confirming his oral discussions with 1Ir. Gl1patr·ic, 

Dr. Charyk stated tbat in connection with the CIA 

u-a fli.htprop-am in the India-China border area, 

the NBO would provide assistance. and. suppOrt .s . . 

necessary, using Air Force resources. . 

(Tab 25) 

In an earlier letter to .Mr •. Bell (Bureau 01. the Budlet) . 

Mr .. McCone bad proposed to budget for tho •• programs which were the. responsibility of the NRO; to 

justify the amounts in the CIA bud.t submi.sion 

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--BYBtM --

to CoDgress; and tQ have full fund control over 

amounts contained in the ·CIA budget. 

. Dr. Charyk, in a.memorandum to Mr. Ollpatric, 

explained that Mr. McCone's proposal would, in 

effect, ,ive the DNRO a financial function in advance budget planning but not a responaibnity for 

financial control and administration of the NaP. 

Dr. Charyk.lndicated further that, if the NRO were 

·to function,· it must be responsible for CO~tinuou8 

mOnitoring of financial and te·cbDical status of pro- . 

grams, it must control releas.e of lunda to programs and it must be able to reallocate· lunda a. 

necessary· and desirable between programs ~omprising the total NRP. 

(Tab· 26) 

Mr·. McCone advised c1 his understandtn, with 

respect to the amount which should be Included 

in the CIA bud.et for ·FY 1884. to provide for those 

programs for which the CIA·wa8 re8po1l8ible within the:NRP. Mr.· McCone· indicated that, Within 

the NaP, the CIA was respon8ible for Ita wide 

variety ~ de"lopm.ntal and operational" actiYltiea. " 

Mr. McCone stated tbat in the aircraft field· CIA . 

was currently deveIMiCABT.. A-12, operattng·mBALIST and and had responaibUity for the developme· a new A-12 drone. ··Be 

indicated further that CIA had the payload portion 

of an operational satellite· prop-am and wascODductm, 

feasibility studiea lookiDI to the development OIl a 

truly covert satellite reconnaissance system. .Additionally. Mr.· McCone 8tatedthat CIA ... enppd 

in programs of general rese~c·h to prOvide future 

capabllities a8 well aa in activities, aucb as photo~ 

graphic process.lng, ·required for 8Upport of aU NRP 

programs. 

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(Continued) , 

14:December 1962 

8 January 1963 

24 January 1963 ' 

_. B1BWI 

--

Mr. McCone attached a' Ust1Qg of specific, projects 

and activities for which CIA was responsible alOlll 

with the estilliated cost for each ~ 

(Tab 27) 

In a'letter 'to Mr. Bell, Dr. Charyk pointed' to some' 

inconsiStency between his, concept of the relative 

~e8ponsibUities between'DOD and CIA and that·Im,-

plied by Mr. ,MeCone's,letter of 13'Dece'mber 1982. 

Dr. Charyk stated his feeling that the total NRP 

should 'be considered as a s1nll~ proaram in orde'r 

to achieve the greatest meaaure of economy;, efficiency and ,fiexibUlty. Since the proposed course ' 

at actlon was not compatible with his UDder8t&Dd1Dg 

of the maDller in which the total protram would be 

administered, ,Dr. Charyk aaked for the opportunity 

to consult, with Mr. 'McNamara before prOYidiDg 

detailed comments on the items li8ted by Mr. ' McCone. ' 

(Tab 28) , 

With respect to a discussion of 8pecial equipment 

on U -'2s as, a protection,.,alD8t CODtiDpDCy at. 

operational SAM8~ Mr., McCone advised Kr. 

McNamara that three U-28 had bee'n modified to 

, accommodate special BCM equipment and that, a 

program was underway to modify all sevea 01 the ' 

CIA U-2s and two of the Air Force U-2s -- those 

being the U-2s equipped for retuelinl. No provisiQll 

had been made to modify the ,rematntn, Air,Force 

U-2s. ' 

(Tab 29) 

In a memorandum for'Secretary Zookert and General 

LeMay, General Breitweiser (A •• iatant Chiel of Staff, 

Intelligence) outlined the key features of'DO orpD1-

zatioDal,and fUnctiooal relationahipa. ' 

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(Continued) 

25 January 1963 

25 February 1963 

1\s a result of his review .of the NRO charter documents, ·Gener~ Breitweiser adde4 several interesting 

personal observations. . 

(Tab 30) 

In a memorandum forKr. McNamara, Dr. Charyt 

confirmed his understanding of the manapment 

system for the R-12 program •.. 

Dr~ Charyk envisioned the estahliahment·of aD R-12 

program office within the NRO. Thi. office would· 

report directly to the DNRO. and would· have the 

responsibility for the development and proc~inent .. 

of a vehicl,. ~o satisfy the SAC requ1remen~ for an . interim strategic rec~i.8anCe ah-craft sJ8tem. 

The ·contracting responsibility . would be handled by 

NRO using AF black procurement procedures.· 

Security policy would be .stabUabed cOIUIiateDt 

with that in ·etfect tor the A-12 program. 

Dr. Cbaryk $uCpsted that Mr. McNamara mipt 

wish to cOnfirm the underslandingwith Mr~ McCone 

. ill order that program implementation and techniques 

the·rafo!' be understood by C~ per8ODDe~ in the: A-12 

program. 

Dr. Charyk proposed further that similar manage-

~ent and procurement arrangements be estabUshed· . 

tor the· AQ-12 drone program; 

(Tab 31) 

In a summary review of the NRO, prepared ~ 

prior to .his· departure from. the position 88 Director, 

NRO, Dr·. Charyk .tated that "the moat •• rlou. 

problem concerns the· fun&nnentall:'&ture· of the 

·NRO;.1s it to be an operatinl "'DCJ~ with actual ... 

and. effective manaarement .resj)0D8ihAity for a 

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(Continued) 

1 March 1963 

13 March 1963 

--BYDMN ."SImI 

single national prop-am or is it to be a coorctiDatiDg 

. office' responsible tor liaison 8nd .coordiDation between related . projects which are the management 

responsibility of'different Apnciea and Services?" 

(Tab 1) 

Dr'. Charyk departed .the NRO. Dr. Brockway 

McMDlan was·appointed Director, NRO. 

A revised DOD-CIA agreement on "Kaaapment 01'· 

the National Reconnaissance Pro .. am" was sllned 

by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (AIr. Gilpatric) 

and.the Director of Central JnteWcence (Mr. McCone). 

It: 

1. Established the Secretary of Defense as .xec-

. utive Agent for,the NaP.' 

2. Established the NRO as a separate operatm, 

aleney of the DOD under the direction. authority and control of the Secretary 01 De-' 

fense. . . 

3. Authorized the Secretary of Defense and the 

Director of Central .lntelligence· to designate 

appropriate officials of the OSD aDd CIA to 

examine and 'monitor on their behalf the 

activities of the NRO. 

This agreeme~· outlined in detail: 

I. The organization aDd command of the NRO. 

2. The functions and res~sibWties of the 

Director, NRO and the Deputy Director, NRO. . 

3. The functions and responaibilitiea CJf the NRO. 

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13 March 1963 4. The authorities. of the Director, NRO. 

(Continued) 

i . 5. The re 1ationahip between the Director, no 

13 March 1963 

·26 March 1963 

2 April 1963 

--BYEI'I 

--

ud~e . 

a. Secre.tary of Defense 

b. Director of CentrallnteUigence 

c. USIB 

d. JCS 

e. DIA 

t. NSA 

g •. DOD 

h. CIA 

(Tab 32) 

Dr . Herbert Scoville, Deputy Director I Research 

(CIA) was designated Deputy Director, NBO. 

Dr. ·Fubini waa deaipated monitor of· Nl\O aetlvitie·s 

on behalf of the Secretary of Defense (per·the 13· March 

63 DOD-CIA Agreement). . 

The DNRO directed .SAFSP ~o conduct a wrap-up 

evaluation of the studies to date of cowrt launching 

schemea ·for reconnaissuce satellite vehicles to 

include: 

a) a.comparison of submarine launchinl as 

proposed by the Na~ and·air launchiDI as 

covered in Conft~ B-58 ·stUdy 

b) a discussion of the feasibility and ciesira- .. 

. bUity of c9vert 1allDChlng operationa 

c). a reco~mendation a8 to a future course 

of action. 

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(Continued) 

10 May 1963 

IEIII·BYDIN -smg' 

This evalution was considered essential. to a 

decision. on' the extension or termination of the 

submarine launching study. 

(Tab 33) 

Colonel Martin issued a memorandum, Subject: 

"Duties of the Deputy Director, NBO. tt Reterencing· 

the 13 March 63 DOD-CIA Agreement, the memorandum outlined the following as duties of the 

Deputy.Director, NRO, ~der the direction of the' 

Director, NRO: 

1. Keeping tully and currently informed a8 to 

aU activities.of the NaP. 

2. SuperviSing relations between the· NRO and 

. the usm and ita aubcommittees, and ·the 

intelligence exploitation community. 

3 •. Supervising all NR.P tasks a88iped by the' 

Director, NRO to the CIA. 

4. Acting tor and exerci8in, the powers of the 

Director, NRO during his'abaence or' 

disability. 

The Deputy Director. NRO retained h18 CIA ()tlice 

location and 8Upportmg statt .aa Deputy Dlr8ctor I 

Research, CIA, never moviDg to the Pent.,on. 

Internal NRO administrative procedures ~re estab-· 

Ushed in order to permit the Deputy Director, NRO 

to be kept tully intormed on all actlYltlea 01 the 

NaP. . . 

With-regard to CIA support of·the NRP, ~e Deputy. 

Director, NRO waa reapOnslble, lnter aUa, tor: --.---

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( c'ontinued) 

24 May 1963 ' 

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1. Insurulg CIA responsiveness to NRO direction 

and guidance. 

2. Inaurmg that the Director, NRO was informed 

on prolreaa of NRO projects assigned CIA. 

3. Submitting to the Director, NRO, the ,CIA 

portion of NRP budget. 

,4. Initiating, proposals for operational employment of NRO projecta aSBiped to the CIA. 

(Tab 34) 

The Director, NRO in a memorandum to the Deputy' 

Director, NRO, Subject: "NRO U8e of CIA 'ContractlDl 

,Authority" outlined the rationale sU,pOrtm, NRO U8e 

of CIA contracting, authority' for "projects and/or . 

tasks other tl1an those, for wblcb technical manapment re&jiOJUJibWt)' was assigned 'to Director, NRO' 

Pro.ram B." The 'uses: 

1. To provide e.sential security. to NRO m~tters, 

not available otherwise.' 

2. To provide speed of response not obtaiDable 

through DOD contractual chumel8 by utiU.tng , 

existin. CIA contracts in cases· of overriding 

urgency. 

3. To obtain significant aaviDp to the IOftrlime nt, or significant improvement in manap- ' 

me nt, by utllizm, sucb contract autborit7 In 

joint.DOD-CIA procurement actions .in 8Upport 

of the NRO .. 

(Tab 35) 

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31 May 1963 

1 June 1963 

7 June 1963 

--BYDIAN 

CIII8lsmm 

In a conversation with Dr.' FubiDi, Dr. Scoville . 

commented to the .effect that it was his and the 

CIA's belief and under~tandiDg that· the 5412 Group 

had assigned to the CIA the responsibility for the 

dev~lopm~nt of. a "truly" covert satellite • . (Tab 36) . 

In a Memor~dum for Record, ·Dr. Fubini pointed 

out that; on the basis Of further discussiOllS, it 

appeared that Dr. Scovllie' s statement of a 5412 . 

Group assignment of co~rt satellite 'development 

may have· been overstated .. 

(Tab 37) 

In a memorand~ to Dr •. ScovWe (DDNRO) Mr. 

GUpatric advised tbat "it baa come to my attention 

that according to your underStanctiDI the 5413' Group 

has assigned to CIA the re.ponaibillty for develop~ 

ment' of' a covert satellite. " . 

Mr. GUpatric stated that he did not recall bein, 

party to any such understandiDg and that ~e had 

found no record of it in the 5412 minutes or ·any 

other papers. 

Mr. Gilpatric indicated that be "certainly did. not 

intend in any agreements reached durin, the 

. FY 64. NRO bud,et review to commit DOD to any 

such mission aasipment, tt and attlrlned·that.!t 

. was 'not his purpose in thi. memorandum'to deal 

'with the merits of a proposal that CIA have the . 

, responsibility ,for a covert sate.1lite development 

but rather to make clear that the .issue was one tIlat 

remained to be resolved. 

(Tab 38) 

Mr. McGeorge Bundy forwarded to~. McNamara' 

the text of recommendations on the, National 

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(Continued) 

.. -aYEI' • . _smq 

Reco~issance Program made by the Preside·nt's 

. Foreign. Intelligence Advisory Board. (FlAB) together with comments thereon submitted by the 

Director of Central Intelligence on 15 April 1963. 

The FlAB eXpressed its judgment that the draft 

"Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and 

. the Director ot Central Intelligence on the Management of the NRP" was the best conceived. and most 

soundly detailed plan for the management, the 

mission and the· operation of ·the NRO tbat had come 

to its attention and ur,ently recommended· its. immediate adoption. Additional recommendations . included: . 

1. Establishing a clear cb~l of guidance and 

authorization from policy decisions of the. 

President to th~ Secretary Ql Deteue, and 

. as provided to the Director of Central Intel-

··ltge·nce. 

2. Establishing a clear· and ettective cODDection. 

between. pIarmfDI ·ot the Up· and plans for 

reconnaissance capabWties at the DOD and 

. miUtary services ~ 

3.· . Planning to improve the continUity of management of ·the no. 

4. Bnsurlng consistency between DOD directive 

. w~lch guides the NaP and pertinent directives 

trom higher authority, e .1., National Secqrity 

Councll Intelligence Directives (NSCID's). 

5. Clarifying present &nd plaaned relationships 

. ~ithfn the DOD between NRO, DIA and NBA. 

Mr. McCone had commented.that: 

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(Continued) 

14 June 1963 

--.IYDIAN· 

Cllllasma 

1. The new (13 March 83) agreement a!read,. 

provided for close relationship. ~tween the 

NRO and the USI8. 

2. Arrangements for handling s.pecific FlAB 

recommendations were outlined in the NRO 

·agreement -- noting a "natural interlace 

betwee.n CIA and DOD in overhead reconnaissance. " . 

3. The new agreement was re·ached atter due 

consideration of PossibUities' that either 

DOD or CIA take full·responaibUIt·,.. for the 

program. 

·Mr. ~cconeconcurred in the judgrQent of the Board .. 

that the plan was well conceived and soundly detalled~ 

Mr. Bund,. requested from Mr. McNamara a report 

refiect'1n, the status of the NRP a8. 0115' Septembe·r 

63 and the' progress toward meeting the,.object!"s 

. of the FlAB recommendations. 

(Tab 39) 

Dr. Scoville, in a reply to Mr. GilpatriC'8 I June 

memorandum. indicated that he was sUre he·had at. 

no time stated that the 5412 Group had u.ilDed to 

CIA the responsibility tor the development of a 

covert satellite and that Mr. GUpatric's source of 

information must bave been misinformed. 

Dr •. Scovill8 atated further that he bew' .perfectl,. 

. well that the 5412 Group was not the responsible 

orpnization to'make 8uch an·usipment. and therefore. was certain he had been misquoted. . 

Dr. Scoville. indicated that IIr •. McCone had fDformed 

him: that Mr. Gilpau-ic' had reached a decision to 

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(Continued) 

15 June 1963 

18 'June 1963 

19 June 1963 

2 July 1963 

IIIIIE'III B1DMIt ' 

_mnl 

place the item in the CIA budget during the F,Y ,64 

NRO budget discussions. ' 

In light of c~rs ,prellminarystudies, Dr. ScoYwe 

,suggested that it would be very t:bnely for a joint 

meeting between DOD, CIA and NRO to make a 

decision on the assignment 01 responsibility in 

this area. 

(Tab 40) 

Dr.' Herbert Scoville departed the CIA. Or. Albert 

D. Wheelon was appointed Deputy Dlrector/Science .' 

Technology. CIA'. 

In a note for Mr. Gilpatric, Dr. Fubini stated that, 

as a result of the Purcell Committee study, the 

'general interest in a covert satellite capabilit7 

among those concerned bad greatly decreased. 

Additionall;y. Dr. Fubini remarked that the amount 

of money originally budgeted' for that ptU'po8e mi,ht 

have to be adjusted in light of an over-all deticit , 

of $100 million in 1964. Dr. Fubini expres8ed his 

view that a meeting to decide on assignment. of 

responsibilities not be called until such time as he 

and Mr. Gllpatric were. convinced that the project 

should be pUrsued. " 

(Tab 41) 

Mr. Gllpatric noted his ,agreement with, Dr •. Fublni's 

views ondelaytng the meetiDa on a88ignment of 

responsibilities and as.d that he be advised when 

such a meeting would be timely. 

(Tab 41) 

Mr. Eugene Klefer was appointed Deputy D""ector, 

NRO and, moved to an ottice in the Pentagon. ' 

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23 July 1963 

Dr. McMillan and Mr. '.Kieler met with Mr. McCone 

to discuss the Purcell Report. Mr. McCone mentioned the last paragraph of the Purcell Report 

(which comments on management organization) and 

expressed his confid·ence that the organization as 

constituted, was satisfactory. 

(Tab 42) 

In· a Memorandum for the Record, General Carter 

related his discussions with Dr. 'McMillan of the . 

TAGBOARD program. 

Key relevant points: 

1. Dr. McMillan stated that he was not prepared 

to draw back from his TAGBOARD memo- . 

randum, unless so directed by Mr. KcNamara, 

presumably generated by a protest Irom Mr • 

. McCone. 

2. Dr. McMillan stated he wished to a.sip a 

project officer to the CIA to push forward 

on the program and that at the end 01 three 

months the entire program would be switched 

over to NRC Program D (Colonel Geary) for 

management. General Carter reported that 

CIA was agreeable to having the Air·Porce 

supply a Project Director ~ .. 

3. General Cart·er proposed that aD)' decision 

on transition be deferred tor· about six months 

when a much better idea of where OXCART 

stood would be available. General Carter 

suggested that there might even be a Deed for 

sOme policy decisiona in this cODnection. 

4. .General Carter proposed to hold the existing 

line, 1. e., budget for and technicallJ ~aaap 

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(Continued) 

15 August 1963 

--BYBWt -~ 

TAGBOARD in Program B (under Colonel 

Ledford in, CIA). 

On other subjects: 

1. General Carter strongly recommended both 

Colonels GWer and Ledford for promotion 

to Brigadier, General. 

, 2. General Carter proposed that more CIA people 

be assigned to the NRO Staff and that CIA 

people be proliferated intQ the various other 

programs. 

3. General Carter proposed that Dr. McMillan 

call in an NRO Pro,ram Directors and their 

deputies' for a one-or two-day 8)'Dlpoalium 

slanted toward emphasiz1Dg their primary 

function of intelligence collection. 

4. General Carter mentioned a rumor that General 

Greer had decided to take over cOlltractm, of ' 

all his projects and expressed his teellDl that 

"any moves which tended to downgrade these' 

(CIA) capabilities were not in the best interests 

of NRO and, certainly not in the best national 

interests' ot an exotic' intelligence collect·i()ll'· 

program. II 

(Tab 43) 

In a Memorandum tor the Record, General Greer 

related the items discussed and a,reed upon by 

the Director., of Program A anei B reprcUng plans 

lor developing .,. ultra high resolution satellite 

reconnaissance system. 

These items included: 

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22 August 1963 

--BYBWI 

--

a., Performance Specificationa which were dtre'cted' 

·elements. 

b. Work.Statement which would be prepared by a 

joint team of members from Program A and 

Program B with assistance as re~d by 

Aerospace. The \york 8tatement was to provide for d~~lopment· through protot)1)8 of 

each of two cameras meeting the performance 

characteristics. 

c. RFP which- would be handled covertly and be 

sent 't~ EKC, Bet, Fairchild, ;P-E and Bycon. 

d. ,Source E'valuati~n which would be accomplished . 

by a board composed of representatiVes of. both 

Programs A, and B with techllical panel assistance 

by. Aerospace. 

e. Management which was, to be provided over-all 

by the Director d Program A with replar 

participation by designated repre .. ntatlves 

trom Prop-am B. Security and coDtrac~iDc 

would be a CIA responsibility with execution 

delegated to CIA representatives on.the Pro-

. gram Astatt. 

f. Go-Ahead Date which would be immediately upon 

receipt of DNRO direction. 

(Tab 44) 

Mr. McCone, at a luncheon meetm" expres8ed'cOD-, 

cern over the functioning' of the NRO,. specJficaliy. 

,that: ' . 

1. NRO was functioning as a line organisation 

_ rather than as man.,er (coordiDator) ~ a 

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23 August 1963 

_lIBYDWt 

_SYSIII 

combined enterprise which, in his estimation, 

, was the iritent of basic CIA-DOD agre·ement. 

2,. CIA experience in contracting for both aircraft and sate lUte recoanaiss8Dce projects 

should be used for results not' achievable 

under the more elaborate and,time-consuming 

Air Force, procedures .. 

3. NRO was misplacing emphasis onR.D advances 

rather than on intelligence collection. 

In attendance. at this meeting were: 

Mr. McCone· 

Mr. Gilpatrlc 

General Carter 

(Tab 45) 

Dr. 'Fub1ni 

Dr. Wheelon 

In a message to Dr. McMillan, the Director of 

Program B referenced General Greer'. memorandUD;l of 15 Aucuat· and· cited an apparent mis-

, understanding over areas of agreement, between' , 

he and ·General Greer in the discussion of plans 

for developing an ultra-high resolution satellite 

reconnaissance system·. 

Comments by the Director, PrOgram B: 

I. Concu~ with the camera performance specificationa as directed by the ,DNRO. 

2. Agree with .. preparation of work atatement 

by joint team of members from ~~8 

A, and B. Recommend the Director of 

Program A. appoint a chairman for this 

ettort. 

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4, September 1963 

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3. Agree ,that EKC, Itek, Fairchild, peE and 

H,con constitute available lndustr7 capability 

and should be asked to submit proposals. ' 

4. Agree to joint proposal evaluation board and , 

propose Colonel Charles' Murphy as chairman. 

5. Do not agree with'Director, Prop-am A on 

plan tor over-all management. 'The entire 

problem of assignment of functions and 

responsib~lities within, the NRP is being 

debated at higheJ" levels and any al"~ment 

on program management must neces8ari17 

await a major policy decision. 

6. Recommend proceeding with the work .statement and evaluation on. a joint basis until 

over-all NRP management responsibilities 

are defined at higher levels. 

(Tab 48) . 

At a meeting with Mr. McNamara and 1Ir. Gllpatrlc, 

Mr. McCone ac~owledged 'that his previous statements regarding NRO not.functiODlnl as a line 

organization was not in accordance with· Article 

V(B) 01 the basic agreement and stated that whUe 

, be was not askin, at the time lor a chaJlle in the 

agreement.he was concerned 'that- <;:IA's recoDnaisSHce resources be fully utUized. 

6 September 1963 

.. -8YE1A11 

_SYS1II 

(Tab 47) 

Mr. GUpatrtc coDtirmed the ••• ipment of responses to FlAB recommendations to Dr. McMillan 

and Dr. Fubini. 

(Tab 48,) 

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With reference to the White House memorandum of . 

7 June 1963, Mr. McCone forwarded to Mr •. Bundy' 

a memorandum Indicating that: 

1. The implementation of the CIA-DOD agreement had brought forth certain amblgultles 

and areas of possible conflict that needed 

clarification. -

2. These areas had been identified and were 

. the subject of several weeks' diacu8SiC)Ds 

between and among Dr. ~eelon, General' 

Carter and Mr. McCone for·CIA. and Dr. 

McMillan, Dr. Fubini and Mr. Gnpatric 

for DOD. 

3.' It was perhaps premature to state whether . 

the discussions W9Uld brm, about need tor 

a revision of the agreement. . 

4. In light of the significance of the program, 

Mr. McCone would inaure that Mr. Bundy 

. was kept advi8ed of any signfficant chanps. 

(Tab 49) 

Dr .. M~Mi11an'met with Mr.· McCone to deliver the 

report of NRO actiODs related to the Purcell.Board. 

Mr. McCone discussed his views OIl relations between the .CIA and the NRO •. Mr.- McCone made the 

following' points: 

1. He reiterated that he lelt the central lasue 

was to ensure that all resources, b~ mnltary and CIA, be brought effectively to bear 

on NaO matters. -

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(Continued) 

13 September'1963 , 

.. ·B1DUN 

_SYSTEI 

2 .. He ·said that· he' had been surprised to learn' 

the extent to which the NRO had actually 

been set up as a line or operatlDg orpDization and' was surprised also to learn of 

special organizational arrangement under 

which General Greer operates. He expressed 

a desire to be informed .of background history. 

. 3.. He said that he was still not fully clear. in 

his mind, . reprdln, exactly how the Director, 

NRO should work with CIA - whether with 

Colonel Ledford or with an individual farther 

up in CIA' '- or perhaps with two individuals, 

depending on the matters at is8ue. 

(Tab 5'0) 

In a Memorandum for tbe PFIAB, Mr •. Gnpatric 

submitted, on behalf'of the Secretary of Delense, . 

comments on the 7 June 1963 PFIAB recommendations on the NRP. 

General comments: 

1. In his supervision and guidance to the· NRC, 

the Secretary of Defense bas a~ered to the 

provisions of the 13 ,March 1983 NBC agree';' 

ment. : In this process certain problems . 

and dlvergenci,es of viewPoint have occurred 

and are in fact not completely resolved. 

Where 8uch differences have occurred the . 

issues bave been frankly discu8sed aDd worked 

out to the benefit 01 NRO operationa. 

2. ,It is the conviction of the Secretary ~ Defense 

that the 'over-all operatiQn of the NRC is 

8atlstactor)'i that NRO prop-am8' are producinl, . 

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_. BYElUI 

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and wiU'contiDue to produce, important intel-

, ligence information; and that a smooth, steady 

state and highly efficient operation of the ~o 

is beginning to be apparent. 

Specific Comments: 

1. ,In the opinion of the Secretary ot Defense, there 

, already exists the clear channel of guidance and 

authorization recommended by the FlAB. 

2. ,Seve:ral steps have ,been taken tc! establi8h a 

clear and effective connection between the ad-' 

vanced technology and plaDDiDg of the NRP and 

the development plans lor reconnaissance capabilities of,the DOD and the milltal'7 services. 

a) The'Secretary of Defense has a.siped 

exclusive re8pon.lblli~7' to the NRO tor 

the Tesearch, development aDd ,operation 

, of all reconnaissance mapping and 

geodesy systems, bQth photo .... phic 

and electronic signal, wbich are developed 

tor and are operated in overfUght of denied 

areas. 

b) Provision has been made within the organizational structure ot the' NRO to monitor 

potentially overlapping areas of' NRO and 

other DOD research and development,. 

c) The Assistant Secretary of Detenee (Deputy 

DDR.E) has been ,liven the responsibility 

to monitor all aspects of the 'NRO on' behalf 

ot the Secretary. 

d) Re8pon.ibb~ ,persoDllelwithln key development areas have been briefed on ~e 

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(Continued) . 

.. ·BYBWI 

_smu 

entire NRO development and operational 

program. 

e) The Army and Navy have provided highly 

qualified technical officers for full t~e 

duty in key development bUlets within the 

Air Force element of the NRO~ 

f) The NRO Staff. includes full time blliets 

fUled by personnel from the Army, Navy, 

Air Force, CIA, NPIC and MBA. 

3. Continuity of managenlent has' been provided for 

by establishing direct monitoring of key .,.rson-. 

nel moves by the Director, NRC. 

4. Department of Defense directives, which the 

Secretaz:oy of Defense promulgates as executive 

. agent for the NRP, are conaiatent with recommendations and policies emanating: from higher 

authority. . 

5. The. Director, DIA is kept completely knowl-. 

edgeable of all asPects of the NRP a8 requested. 

In addition, his membership on"USm permits 

hiDi to participate in the formulation of requirements to which the NRP i8 reiponsive. 

6. The primary interest ot NSA in. the NRP lies 

in the non-image formm, collection capability 

developed for· the NRO. The participation of 

NSAin this' aspect of the NRO activity is now . 

. beginning to. be fairly complete. The' Director, 

NBA, in prepar·iIig the National BLDn' Plan, 

has considered certain aspects of no responsibilities in the EUNT area. Th8. Director ~. HSA 

participates· In usm and is, the~efore, in the 

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(Continued) 

18' September 1963 

. position of helping to formulate ·requirements 

to which.the NRO is responsive·. 

Summary Comments: 

1. The Secretary of Defense is doing, and will 

continue to do, in coorcUnation.with th~. DCI, 

his utmost to make certaln that the resources· 

of both the DOD and CIA are fully utilized and 

efficiently managed by ·the DRRO UDder the 

joint guidances of the D.CI and the Secretary 

of Defense. 

2. It is reasonable to anticipate that the NaP, as 

managed by the DNRO in his capacity as head 

of an operating a,ency, wili meet the lull 

expectations of the FlAB and th. other indi-

. viduals who have been largely resPonsible for 

its creation ancl for the statement of ba.lc 

guidance for the program. 

(Tab 51) 

In the executive se8sion of the usm meetlDg, M~. 

McCone expressed concern over gaps in the relationship between usm and theNRO. He adVi8ed the . Board membe~s. tbat be had discussed the problem 

. w.ith Mr.· McNamara who had concurred in' his 

conclusion that it would be useful to lave Dr. McMillan 

. meet with the Board .whenever 'matters of . mutual 

conce~n were on the usm agenda .. 

Mr. McCone stated further that a similar relationship should be developed. to. ensure·· NRO participation 

in appropriate C~MOR deliberations. 

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18 September 1963 

(Continued) 

22 October 1963 

28 October 1963 

31 October 1983 

5 November 1963 

--BYBWI .. sma 

·The usm concurred in the arrangements described 

.by Mr., McCone. 

(Tab 52) . 

.Jh a memorandum tor General ROdelihau8er (Al"TAC), 

decision to provi~ a 

packap tor the OXCART 

Vell1CJLe in an ort to exploit the operatioaa1 neldbllity of the vehicle •. The memorandum .to 

the under CIA of. a 

(Tab 53)' 

Dr .. McMillan forwarded to Mr. McCone for hi8' 

concurrence, a.proposed memorandum to the Directors of'NRO Programs A and B concemini responai-

. bUit)' for operating management of the CORONA 

(Tab 54) 

In·a Memorandum of Record, 

(NPIC) reported on a meeting 

Aerospace to discuss the need for 

cameras with the CORONA program .. 

. expressed his feelinl that the program 

was becoming schedule domiDated aDd tbat "some 

of the operations people are I08ing' ··sight of the prime 

objective of the program.; the user. " 

(Tab 55) 

. In a letter to Dr •. McMillan, Dr. Wheelon diacU88ed 

the problem of quality spread in CORONA photo.-

rapby and advised· that etA would convene a' Satel11te 

Photography Working Group to addre8s both an . 

immediate que8tion of present system improvement 

and the. longer term problema which were fUDdamental to the design of future. 8ystems. : Dr. Wheelo~ 

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(Continued) 

7- November 1963 

8 November 1963 

--

---

. discussed objectives, .arrangements, staffing, 

organization and funding for this Working Group 

and outlined three types of support which· he 

anticipated would be required from the NRO: . 

1. D,esiptlon ot a liaison officer on the 

'NRO Staff who could support the group 

. by. arranging visits and bri~fing8. 

2. Nomination of one or more techDical 

individuals from the NRO Staff who 

could serve under the chairman as 

working members of the ·group. 

3 •. Agreement to reimburse the CIA· tor 

the costs of the group up ·.to 

FY 64 NRC funds. 

(Tab 58) . 

Dr .. McMillan, Mr • Kiefer, General Carter, Dr. '. 

Wheelon-and Mr. Bross met to review ~e orpni~ 

zatioDs, responsibilities. and technical capabilities 

of the: . -

1. NROStalf 

2. NRO Program. A 

3. NRO Program.B 

4. ~lce of·the Deputy. Director/. 

Science and TecbnoloQ, CIA 

(Tab 57) 

Mr. McCone, in a letter to Mr. Gilpatric, 1nd1cated 

that: 

1 .. In light of agreement that NRC would be 

strengthened by active partic.ipation of 

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(Coiltinued) 

8 November '1963 

18 November 1963 

"-BYEIAII -SftfIII . 

additionalotficers with CIA experience, 

General Carter and Dr. Wheelon were 

working'with Dr. Fubini and Dr. McMillan 

to determine. appropriate assignments. 

2. Dr. Wheelon had been designated to examine and monitor on his (·McCone's) behalf 

the activitles of the NR9, in acco~ance 

with the provisions of the C'IA-DOD apeeemente 

3. . Regularly. scheduled meetings of ,senior 

DOD, CIA and NRO otfic1als to review and 

discUss policy aspect~ of all NRO programs 

and ··act~vities would greatly. improve the . 

policy guidance afforded the NRO by the 

Secretary of Detense and the DCI. ' 

(Tab 58) 

In a·Memorandum for Record, General Kartin 

~ 

commented.'on the 31 October MFR by •. 

NPIC. General Martin had dlacuaaed ' 

~orandum with Mr. Lundahl, who agreed ' 

,with the expressed concern and JIPOlopzed tor 

the memorandum and with Dr. 'McMlllan, who· 

called General Carter and Dr. Wheeloo and aaked 

that the_memorandum be withdrawn. 

(Tab 59r--

In a response·to Dr. Wheelon's letter of 5 Novem-

'ber, Dr. McMillan related his general agreement 

with 'the estabUshment of a, Sat.e11ite Photography 

Working. Group and the proposed over-all approach 

to the problem of variations in quality and resolution 

of tbe CORONA sys_m. 

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(Continued) 

27 November 1963 

~.BYDIM ... mlll 

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Dr .. McMillan considered the proposed world.ng 

arrangements amenable·, He felt the Group should· 

be limited to several particular objeCtives, kept 

as small as possible, .and confined to the very 

best qualified people, 

Dr. McMillan named Lt, Colonel Howard (NRO 

Staff) and Lt.· Colonel Williams <lmO PrOll'am A) 

to serve as members of the Worldn, Group. 

(Tab 60) 

Dr. McMillan met with Mr .. McCone to discuss 

"Unified CORONA Ma.gement, tI 

Dr. McMillan's objectives: 

l. Assign to one Program Director the silllle· 

management .responsibillty for developin,# 

testing and employing CORONA/MURAL 

satellite systems to include the responsibility for: 

a) Developm~nt, launching, tracking, 

recovery, and product delivery ot . CORONA/MURAL satellite systems 

in accordance with appr.oved schedules. 

b) System engineerina/tecbnlcal direction authority and control oYer aU 

system and associate contractors. 

c) Technical. direction authoritY and 

control of eng1Deerlng cunpa 

recommended by the ·Configuration 

Control Board (CCB) within limits 

expressed by the Director, MOO, 

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2'1 November 1963 

( Continued) 

4' December 1963 

--BYBII ,..mrm 

d) Contract adDlinistration of all contracts pertaining to ',CORONA/MURAL ' 

satellite systems. 

e) Directive control over all NRO representatives at contractors,',planta. 

t) Programming and budgeting responsibility to the Director, NRO for approved 

programs. 

g)' Accountability to the Director, NRO for 

reporting program and ff.Dancial,progre8s 

on all applicable contracts. 

h) UtiU'zation of DOD and CIA special sldlls, 

c~pabilities, and resources to achieve 

maximum program accompUshment. . 

Dr. McMillan expresse~ his concern that ~e the 

Director, Program A had over-all responalbnity, 

he'did,not control all elements essential to managing 

the CORONA/MURAL programs effectively, ,i.e., " 

he ~id not administer all pertinent contracts, he 

did not have dire'ctive control over all cODtractors 

involved, he did not have control over all BRO representatives at contractor8' plants, he 'did not h.ve , 

complete programm~1 and buqeting re,sponaibUity ~ 

(Tab 61) , 

Mr. Gilpatric signed a joint (Oilpatrlc/McCone) , 

memorandum estabUshing the NaP Review Commitee. ' 

The Committee: 

Dr. McMillan 

Dr. Fubini' 

Dr. Wheelon 

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Chairman 

Member 

Member 

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4 December 1963 

(Continued) 

4 December 1983 

""" BYEllW .. mu 

was responsible for: 

1. Regular review of the responsiveness of 

the NRP to the intelligence collection' 

, requirements and priorities established 

by the usm. 

2. Review of the 5-year program planning. 

3. Review of the annual prop-am and b.udget planning. . . 

4. Review of major advanced development 

projects. 

5. Review of such .other aspects of the N.RP 

as may' be deemed appropriate by the 

Chairman. ' 

(Tab 62) 

In a memorandum to Dr. Wheelon, ClA, Dr •. 

McMillan sU'18sted the procedures that should 

be followed by D.r. Wheelon in performing his 

function to exaniine and' monitor on beJtalf of 

the DCI the activities ot the NRO. 

. Key points: 

I. . WorldJig relationships between Dr. Wheelon 

and'Dr. McMillan should tollow th~ same . 

pattern as those followed by Dr. PubiDi, 

performing the same function on behalf of 

the Secretary. ot Detense. , 

2. Dr. Wheelon f s contacts with the NRO should 

be made through Dr. McMillan whenever 

possible. . 

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,4 December 1963 ' 

(Continued) 

7 December 1963 

--SYElAlt 

-SISJ£I 

3. ,Necessary arrangements tor information, 

briefings', or attendance at meetings by' 

' NRO personnel would be directed by Dr. 

,McMillan . 

4. 1'here would be no direct tasking of any 

personnel Bssigned to the NRO on an 

individual basis. 

(Tab 63) 

The NRP Review Committee met. 

Items discussed: 

1. Failure of CORONA missioD;. Dr. McMillan 

agreed to appoint a .com~Ittee to inftstlgate. 

2. ' Telephone Security. Dr. McMillan ra.ed 

issue expressing' concern at 'a number of 

codewords improperly, used. 

3~ Management of' CORONA/MURAL. Dr. 

McMillan sugrested a directive on mauagement of the program'., He considered it 

most important that the DKRO approve 

major changes.' He'felt:that a CIA contracting offic,er wa, needed on General 

Greer,' s staff and propoaed that the DCI' 

nominate such an individual. General 

Carter objected to previous management 

proposal "because too much was t1lrnecJ 

over to Greer." General Carter stated 

, the new draft might not'meet objections -

CIA bad 'been erOded. Ge~ral Carter 

proposed to: 

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. (Continued) . 

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a) separate "search" and "target track"· 

into two payload programs acquiring 

vehicles from same source but with . 

separate integration. , 

b) .establish General Greer as a joint 

CIA/DOD staffing at appropriate level 

with a CIA Deputy for General Greer. 

c) advise oper~ting level of fact that, 

intelligence, was purpose of this program and infuse all levels of NRO 

with this purpose. 

Several other manacement·, schemes were discuSsed 

(and are summarized in this Tab). 

10 December 1983 

10 December 1983 

.1IIIl£. BYBWI 

".SISJ(I 

(Tab 64) 

In a letter to Mr. Ollpatric, ,Mr. McCone acknowledged receipt ot the proposed joint inemor~dum 

on the establishme~t of an NRP Review Committee 

signed by, Mr. allpatric on 4 December. ' 

Mr. McCone noted his understandlDg that Dr. 'FubiJii 

had proposed that the review group meet biweeldy,· 

alternating meetin, places and chairmen aDd that 

such a worldng arrangement bad been .,reed by all. 

Mr. McCone suaested proceeding in accordance 

with the Fubini proposal and expressed hi. hope that 

he and Mr. Gilpatric could meet. periodically, perhaps 

monthly, to receive status rePorts and recommendations from the monitorin, group. . 

(Tab 65) 

Dr. McMWan discussed with Dr. Wheelan the iliformation required by Wheelon in· his personal capacity 

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(Continued) 

10 December 1963 

11 December 1983 

IIIIlE 1M BYEIAII 

_mnl 

as the desipated staff monitor of the NRO for the 

DCI. 

(Tab 66) 

In a memorandum to Mr. McCone, Dr. McMillan 

asked that his proposed memo' to Directors of 

Programs A and B of 28 October 83 be returned. 

Dr. McMillan forwarded with this memo a revised 

proposed directive, that more 'clea'rly defined the 

assignment ot responsibilities for the conduct of 

the CORONA program, for Mr. McCone's concurrence. 

The proposed memorandum assigned to the Director, 

Program A 'the. responsibilIty for: 

I. Projecting vehicle and payload requirement's 

and launch schedules, 

2. Directive control for launching, orbital and 

recovery operations, 

3. Technical direction to contractors for day .. 

to-day engineering, 

4. Contractual direction of CORONA contracts 

through a CIA contracting officer to be assigned the Program A staff, and 

5. Programming, budgeting, and progress reporting on all assigned projects. . 

(Tab 67) 

Dr. McMillan recorded his conversation with Mr. 

McCone on 10 December ~ 

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( Continued) 

12 December 1963 

"·BYElIAN ,,'smEI 

After reading Dr. MC.Millan's proposed dralt directiVe on consolidation of CORONA management, Mr. 

. McCone said liThia is the same paper you' presented 

before. You want to take the whole project over." 

Mr. McCone added that he had. loo~d into the hl8tQry 

of the CORONA project and that he was convinced 

. that had .it not been for CIA influence the U. S. would 

. stDl today be without picture~ of the Soviet Union •.. 

He stated that he would not stand for submersion of 

the CORONA project into ·the ''bureaucracy of the Air. 

Force" and that he would "liquldatetbe NRO" if necessary to prevent this. Mr. McCone spOke of the 

necessity to keep the "imagination, . inventiveness. 

enthusiasm and flexibility. of th~ . CIA organization'.' 

at work on the CORONA project in order to insure 

its success. 

Mr. McCone' promised Dr. McMillan a decision on 

the CORONA .matter '''within a few days. " 

(Tab 68) 

In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense .d 

the Director of Centrallntelligence, Dr. McMillan 

related the results of' the 7 November 63 review of 

organizations, responaibWties and technical ca~­

bilities of 'NRP 'participants and indicated a desire 

to· consider immedi8.telynomlnations from CIA lor 

candidates for the following position8: 

1. Staff Aircraft Operations Officer, NRO Staff 

2 ~ Statf Engineer, NRO Staff 

3. Statf Development Engineer, . Program A 

Staff 

(Tab 69) 

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.. - BYEMAII 

CllaSYSTEI 

Dr. McMillan ·outlined for Mr. McNamara some 

possible. NRO/CIA issues. 

. Dr. McMillan surmised that Mr. McCone would make 

several assertions: 

1. The NRO is dominated by t~e Air Force. 

2. The' historic role of the CIA in satellite 

reconnaissance has been eroded away, and 

is threatened with extinction. 

3. The resources of the CIA, the imaginativeness and flexibility that created our present . 

satellite capabllity, . are. not being elf.ectively 

e.mployed • 

4. He· will "liquidate the NRO" rather than haft 

the C~' s capability frustrated or destroyed. 

5. It is essential that the CIA be given responsibility to develop a new broad-coverage satel- ' 

lite system. 

With respect to these assertions, Dr. McMJUan outlined the lacts as he saw them: uThe CIA did .control 

the early development Qf the pres,nt CORONA camera 

. and, reconnaissance system.· They buUt on, and depended on, Air Foree contributions, but it was by 

their leadership that the U.S.' achieved IUcc.sstul 

satellite reco~issance as early as it did,.. The Air 

Force SAMOSprogram was U1 considered, undisciplined, and 'poorly managed. It would &ave, at best, . 

fiolindered into success at a much later date. " . , ' 

Dr. McMillan added that CIA's contributioD to. COBONA was not primarUy ,technical, nor to maaap,ment. 

in the broad sense. They set and enforced a, disciplined 

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(Continued) 

"-BYEMAN --. 

set of requirements which focussed' the Air Force r s 

efforts, and provided a simplified management 

structure which kept the military bureaucracy out 

of the critical parts of the .. program. 

Dr. McMillan stated that the CORONA system had 

long been an "operating" system in which reliability, . 

efficiency, and responsiveness to intelligence needs 

were primary considerations. He added that management was not faced with major deciSions. Contracting for the program was . split between Air 'Force 

and CIA, with CIA responsible for payloads and their' . ! 

integration into the spacecraft. Technical.control of 

the payload integration contracts was vested in a 

committee, the Configuration Control Board (CCB), 

on which CIA had two members. 

Dr. McMillan stated that at the present time, as far 

as .he knew, no one in the CIA who played a sign1ficant role in the. creation of CORONA now had any 

responsibility associated with ita routine' operation. 

He did not feel that Mr. McCone ·r·eallzed this point.. I 

• Dr. McMlllan added that since he bad became DN~O, 

the CIA had made no unique contribution~ to satellite 

reconnaissance. He considered that part of the CIA 

which reported into the NRO structure to haft no 

. speci.l capability in the satellite' field, and .to be so 

busy with necessary activities elsewhere a~ to have 

little interest~ Dr. McMillan felt that such \Ulique 

capabilities as CIA had, resided in'the large and' 

expanding organization. of Dr. Whee~on (Db/aT) and 

'were outside the NRO program organization. 

Dr • McMlllan outlined several·other specific issues 

which he felt Mr. McCone might raise: 

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... - BYElIAN -SISIEI 

1. Th~ DNRO is trying to eliminate the last element of th(! CIA 'contr'ibution to the CORONA 

project. 

2. He (Mr. McCone) has been trying to get a 

unified staff in the NRO, but the, difficulties 

are, insurmountable. 

With regard to these two issues, Dr. McMillan 

stated that he had proposed a clarification Of responsibilities and a simplification of the CORONA man- , 

ageinent which would put the NRO Weat Coast project 

director, General Greer in control of the CIA contracts for such technical matters as in his judgment 

were minor and were necessary for the health of the 

system. Dr. McMillan had also confirmed, in 

writing, 'four proposed, specific additions to the NRO 

management organization which could profitably be 

manned by qualified and experienced CIA pers9Dnel. 

In summary comment, Dr. McMillan considered 

, the final price of peace with the CIA, "considering 

the temperament of its leaders, " was at, least to 

give the CIA carte blanche for development of a new, 

general search system. He opined that untn this 

was done, or the leadership changed, there would 

be continued obstruction of the NRC) and, contests' of 

its actions, on many subsidiary issues. He saw no 

reason, however, to compromise Judgments or 

voluntarily liquidate the NRO. He' did not consider 

that he' had exhausted 'his means to, resolve the specific issues belng contested. 

Dr. McMillan recommended temporizing b;y negotiating all anc,Wary i.sues on their merits while 

awaiting the main issue on which he felt the" should 

be no compromise in any manner that denied to the ' 

U. S.' the benefits of that development Whlch ... 

judged most needed. 

(Tab 70)' 

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14 Dece~ber 1963 

Mr. McCone in a reply to Dr. McMillan's lette~ 

, of 10 December, indicated ,that: 

I. The McMillan proposal raised several 

questions, 

2. He would not be able to present his views 

until he returned from Saigon, 

3. He considered it essential that no action 

be' taken within the NRO or its contractor 

structure which might, prejudice "our" 

ability to implement other management 

approaches. 

4. He desired that status quo be maintained 

until he had further considered the matter. 

'I 

Mr. McCone ite,rated his concern,over the ,"re80ur~es" 

problem and asked Dr. McMillan to take corrective, 

action on, a contrac,tor problem wbich had been broupt 

to his attention. 

(Tab 71) 

Dr. McMillan outlined for Dr. Wheelon the methods. 

to be used in. supplying the information required b,. 

Wheelon in his capacity as designated CIA staff ' 

monitor of the NRO. These included: 

1. lDformation copies of wires. 

2. Dally wire report on launching schedule status. 

3. Information copies of NRO.documents. 

4. Mission wrap.:.up information reports. 

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(Continued) 

20 December 1963 

10 January 1964 

13 January 1984 

.. ·BYBWI 

CIIIIIl S1Slll 

Dr. McMillan indic.ated his willingness to consider 

a trial period ()f weekly personal briefings to .Dr. 

Wheelon by an NRO Staff-member, but rejec·ted 

Wheelo~' s suggestion that the information be pro~ 

vided his weeldy Dil/Slr.T (CIA) staff meeting (as 

contrary to Paragraph V(B) of the CIA-DOD agreement). 

(Tab 72) 

Dr. McMillan asked Dr. Wheelon's perso~ hand 

in guiding, on· hiS behalf, the NRO Program B 

studies of a possible mobne-Iaunched satellite. 

Dr. McMillan suggested several general ruidelinea 

and mentioned' several past .studies which he considered to have a direct bea~ing on the furthere~­

~ri. . 

(Tab 73) 

In a- letter to Dr. McMillan, Dr. Wheelon objected 

to a statement of Dr. McMillan's .intent to assign 

to the Direc~or, Program A the responsibility for 

any new system' developmentlD the covert or synchronous satellite field. 

Dr. Wheelon stated that developmental work on 

covert sateWtes was a respotlaibUity of the Director, Program B and that it was his position that 

such responsibility should remain unchanged. Dr. 

Wheelon indicated that this poSition would "be 

sustained at such times a8 further discussions 

take place on programming NRO activities for 

FY 1965. I •. 

(Tab 74) 

·In a Memorandum for the Record, Dr. Fubini summarized. his discussioDS with Mr. McCone cODcerDinl' 

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(Continued) 

the resolution problems which interfered with the 

proper relationship of elements that composed the 

NRO. 

Dr. Fubini had suggested: 

1. assignment to CIA of the responsibility for 

the research, development, engineering 

and the early flights of a new payload aimed 

at achieving the maximum resolution permissible with current state-Of-the-art without 

compromising the breadth of coverage accomplished with LANYARD and GAMBIT and 

planned for the follow-on to GAMBrr. 

2. that such a program come about as a natural consequence of the basic studies beiDg 

carrif,td on by the Drell Committee. 

3. that after the first 4 or 5 succe,stul fillhts, 

a smooth transition- take place between CIA 

management of the payload and P&1.10ad 

integration into a "routine" operational arrangement ;under th~ detailed control Of the 

Air Force but stUI subordinate to plans 

.and policy direction from both the DCI aDd 

Secretary of ~fen.e (through the NRO)~ _ 

4. t~at the same rule be applied -to CORONA, 

i. e., that "keep weU" steps necessary to 

maintain efficiency and effectiveness of 

CORONA be made unmistakably a part of 

the Air Force's responsibilities. 

As a- part of the over-all reassipDient of resp0D8ibilities in NRO manaaement, Dr. Fublni expected 

that the Air Force would apply itself to the research, 

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13 January 1964 

. 15 January 1964 

_. BYElWI 

"smEI 

development, engineering and early test fiigbt of 

follow-on GAMBIT with exactly the procedure 

. toward the NRO that the CIA would .practice in the 

broad coverage program.' 

(Tab 75) 

In a memorandum for Dr. McMillan, General Gree.-

discussed several management aspects of the CORONA Program. The memorandum 0~1ned in detall: 

1. Organization of SAFSP, . SSD~ SCF ~d the 

flow of operational information between 

these orgaDizations 

2. Disposition of Agena vehicles. 

3. Implementation of program changes 

4. Systems d()cumentation and CCB m~l8-

ment arrangements 

5. Contractual work statements 

Additionally, the memorandum addressed the relationship between the. CORONA program and the 

Agena D ·SPO, and the relationship between the 

LMSC AP 'Facility, the resident CIA represent.-

tlv~ and the CORONA program. 

(Tab 78) 

In a letter to Dr. Wheelon, Dr. KcMlllan stated bis 

concern over CIA's identification, in the FY 85 . 

budget,' of fta possible source. of funds for use abouid 

a covert or synchronous satellite development be 

undertaken. " . 

Dr. McMillan stated that the Director, Prop-am ~ 

had not been aS8illled responaibillt)' for devel~pm.nt 

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(Continued) 

28 January 1964 

28 January 1964 

1AIIU_·BYElMN _sma· . 

of a covert satellite and ~at a previous claim.to 

the contrary had been dealt with on 1 June 1983. 

. Dr. McMillan advised. Dr. Wheelon that no decisions 

.. or actions s1n~e that date bad cbauged the situation·. 

Dr. McMillan indi~ated his bellef that "studies 

specifically directed toward a covert syst.m must 

be paralleled by studies ot· other requirements and 

of other possible systems before a decision to 

develop a covert system· can rationally be made. tr 

(Tab 77) . 

Dr. McMillan reminded Mr. McCone ·that whUe 

three positions ·within the no bad been identified· 

as ones which might usefully be staffed by qualified 

CIA personnel, he had received no nominatioDa. 

from the CIA. 

Of the. three identified, Dr. McMillan felt that the 

position of Aircraft OperatioDs Staff .Officer should 

be lilled within the very near future because ot the . 

lack of necessary coverage and capabUity within 

the NBO Staff in this area. Dr. McMillan felt it 

to be of mutual interest to consider individuals from 

CIA for this post and urged Mr. McCone to submit 

CtA nominations by 14 February 1984. . 

(Tab 78) 

Dr. McMillan provided for Mr. McNamara a very 

detailed resume on the management of the CORONA 

project. 

Dr~ McMillan considered as the :two major problems 

in the CORONA project: . 

1. a degree of operational unreliability which. 

while not crippling. had been serious and. in 

his. judgment, correctable. 

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(Continued) 

-·BYEMAN .. mnl 

2. a separation of management. responsibilities. 

within the NRO between two of the principal 

program directors. 

Dr. McMillan indIcated that he. had tended to "charge 

off operational faults and failures It mostly to the 

central contractor, Lockheed, and had several times 

engaged in informal technical audita of Lockheed' a 

activities. He had tended to regard the divided management primarily as an inconvenience, mostlybecause it had obliged him to make explicit and careful 

division of responsibility each time· a minor non-. 

routine matter arose. He had discussed with the 

DCI, without success, a proposal to eliminate the 

split in management. 

In pursuing the solutions to the two problems, Dr. 

McMillan had concluded that they were indeed the 

same proble·m. More precisely •. he felt they we" 

respectively operational 8.1'id structural demol18trations of the fact that the Government's management 

of CORONA was "unconscionably weak aDd c:Ulfuse ... 

He was further convinced that under a more effective management CORONA would demonstrate' 

significantly higher r~l1abllity and better techDical 

performance, and that such could be accompUabed 

with a real reduction in costs. 

Dr. McMillan discussed, in detan, the current 

management and concluded th.t: 

1. The· only place in the present organization 

where the authoriv of a true project director could be exercised was in . the olfice of 

the DRRO. 

2 •. The defined channels through which the DnO 

must operate a8 project director were confused and unnecessarily tortuous. 

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, (Continued) . 

3 February 1964 

4 February 1964 

_. BYEIAN 

"·smtI 

3. There was not contractuaUy defined responsibility for systems e.ngtneertng of 

the whole system. from booster throU8h 

reentry vehicle and of its operation from 

mission definition to' recoyery. 

Dr. 'McMillan' discussed further a recommended 

organization, the. recommended contractlnl and 

pollcy, the initiation, of improvements and imm.ediate actions. ' . 

(Tab 79) 

Dr. McMWan'advised Mr~' McNamara that he had 

briefed the FlAB on 30 January ,on the status of a 

proposal to haVe a group of consultants examine 

the conduct by the Government and its' contractors 

of the CORONA project • 

. Upon being asked by the FlAB for his recommenda- . 

tions as to pos,sible changes, Dr. McMillan presented 

. essentially the structure, pollcies and action. outlined iD his rePort of 28 January to Mr. McNamara. 

'·Dr. ,McMillan explained to the FlAB that his recommendations did not have ·the approval of, Mr. 'McNamara 

or the DCI. Dr. McMlllan proposed to' brief the DCI 

at the earliest'.possible time. 

Toward enforcing better .control of the CORONA project, Dr. McMillan advised Mr. McNamara that he 

had issued a directive (aee Tab 82) that aet' out 

pollcy and objectives, and introduced 'procedures 

for keeping the DNRO more cloae1y iDform~d of 

proposed engineering chaagea. 

(Tab 80) 

In a letter to Mr. McCone, Dr. McMillan reported 

the results of his personal survey of the manaceIllent, technical and contractual arrancelll~Dta,' and 

practice a followed'in the .CORONA program. 

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(Continued) 

4 February 1964 

"'-BYEMAN --S1SJEI 

Dr. McMillan had concluded that "the Government's 

management of this project is a sipificant factor. 

contributing to the unsatisfactory record· of recent 

performance. " 

As a result of his survey, Dr. McMillan issued a 

. policy directive defining the over-all objectives for 

the conduct of the CORONA program~ . The directive 

outlined admiDistrative procedures which Dr. 

McMillan consi~ered interim.in nature, but effective until. ~uch time as he felt the pro,ram was 

under satisfactory control. 

Dr. McMillan informed Mr. McCone that he had 

been asked, in late J~uar1, to report to the FlAB . 

. on the status of the NRO and its programs. In Mr. 

McCone's absence, Dr. McMUlan had discussed . 

with Mr. McNamara the material he intended to 

present. Durmc the FlAB meeting, Dr. McMillan 

was asked specifically to outliDe the steps he considered necessary to bring into being a satialactory 

management structure. Dr. McMillan offered to . 

review this material and· present a detalled account 

of his survey and plans for aligning the management 

and contractual structure. 

(Tab 81) 

/ 

In a memorandum for the Directors of Program A 

and Program B, Dr. McMillan stated the policy 

for the CORONA program .pinat which engiDeeru. 

objectives could be set and eugineering. dec18lons 

made. The m~morandum also establlahed procedures 

by which the· DNRO would be kept iDformed of the 

degree to w.hich the policy was etlective and made 

aware of any problems creating a Deed for further 

guidance. 

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1lIIIE. 'BYOWI 

".SYmI 

Policy: 

1. The primary objective of the CORONA pro-. 

gram - to achieve consistent reliable returns 

of intelligence photography of a quality com:-

parable to that of the best experienced during 

1963, on a schedule closely approximating 

that laid down in advance by the DNRO, and 

in a manner responsive to the targeting 

guidance supplied by usm •. 

. 2. The secondary objective of the CORONA 

program - to improve the performance at 

the CORONA system in quaUty, in respoD- -

siveness to intelligence needs, aDdiD, 

reliability and economy. 

3. The amount of engineering ettort expended 

4. 

'5. 

fort is always and economically directed 

toward approved objectives of high priority. 

Changes would not be introduced ·into·~e 

system or its operation except as judged -essential to meet the pr1ri1ary' objective or 

judged to contribute s1gD1ficantly toward 

specific, important, identifiable improvements in quaUty, responsiveness, reliability 

or economy. 

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(Continued) 

12 February 1964 

-IABYBWf -sma 

6. System improvement etforts would be initi~ted 

only when the effort was' specific in Da~ure; 

when directed toward a specific identifle,d 

improvement in quality, responsiveness, reliability or economy; when judged to be significant 

and desirable in the light of the cost to attain; 

and when judged to be possible with()ut aignifi-' 

cant risk to the primary objective. 

(Tab 82) 

Dr. McMillan asked General Martin to prepare a 

document summarizing the basic pollcies which 

had been set forth in written references to' CORONA' ' 

project management. The purpose of the document 

was to provide a convenient, unified statement of 

the material, for ret~rence. 

Dr. McMillan outlined, 'lor inclUSion, .everal, items 

of policy which we~e not comple,tely defined in' the, 

references: 

1. Planning, design, engine.ering. and incorporation of specific system changes 'Would be authorized, and assigned lor accomplishment; 

by decision of the DNRO. 

2. Authorized planning. design, and engineeriD, 

01 changes would be conducted under contracts 

separate trom those under which normal oPerations were conducted. ' 

3. DNRO app~oval would be required lor-"807 

change in the system which altered the tormat 

or content Qf anY part Of the product, tor 8D7 

change that altered the format or fiexibWty 

ot plalming or control of missioDS, for any 

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3 March 1984 

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change that required prior night testing, or. 

~hange that required more than 

_of engineering effort. 

4. Any change that required extensive flight 

testing or one that alte~ed such thinls as 

the· size or nature of the product material, 

the controlling dimensions of the prime 

sensor, the amount of recovered materi81, 

the mode of recovery, or the basic philosophy 

of design of the prime sensor was to be consideredso sweeping in character a8 to be 

classed as a "new development. It Any such 

change would have to be judged tor desirabUity against other potential new developments. 

(Tab 83) 

his notes' covering their 11 February discussional . 

the information given to the cut ford Board. 

Mr. McCone indicated th.t it was important that 

agreement be reached in memorandum torm concerning the future of CORO~A before there wa. 

further disturbance of exiatiDI outstandiD. COD- . 

tracts and management responsibilities of the CIA. 

(Tab 84) . 

In the absen~e of CIA nominations for a qualified 

OoerliLtlc;na UfI'lce~r, . Dr. McMillan selected 

. tm the position on the BRO 

.• Dr. advised Mr. McCone of this 

selection and urged his consideration 01. nom1De.es 

. for the other posta identified in the 12 December 83 

memorandum. 

(Tab 85) 

84 --BYElWf.: 

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12 March 1964 

23 March 1964 

24 March 1964 

. 26 March 1984 

"-SYEIAN 

--

In a letter to Dr .. McMillan, Dr. Wheelon complaiDed about the NRO desigtultlng' individuals in 

CIA to serve on study groups. Dr. Wheelon cited 

two examples - the first related ·to photographic. 

fUm processing resources, and the second to . 

follow-on for the Drell-Chapman Committee. ·Dr·. 

Wheelon considered it n quite inappropriate for the 

, NRO Staff to be designating individuals in CIA for 

such purposes" and asked that Dr. McMillan make 

his needs knoWn to CIA, who would "select the 

best qualified people in view of their other time 

. commitments to both CIA and 'NRO programs. If 

(Tab 86) 

Dr. Whe e lon, in reply to Dr. McMillan' 8 request 

for nominations, proposed that "incrementalsolutions to part!al staffing problema" be poatponed 

until broader guidelines are supplied by the DCI 

and the Secretary of Defense. 

(Tab 87) 

Dr. McMillan advised Dr.. Wheelon tat he was 

completmg an inventory of all advanced plaDlliDl. 

of all projects within the NRP in preparation for 

the programming tor' FY 1965. Dr. McMillan 

asked tor a resume of any CIA in-house studies 

and investigations, and contractual work, pertaining to or applicable to the NRP or, ita objectives. 

(Tab 88) 

CORONA-J (Mission I003)' faUed ·to orbi~. 

Dr. McMWan torwarded to Mr. Vance ·two, histories: 

1. a very detailed description of the development of satellite reCODll&i.8ance programs 

beginning in 1948 and continuing to date. 

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27 March 1964 

27 March 1964 

--BYEMAN 

-SYSTEI 

2. an explanation of the development and continuation of the Configuration Control Board 

. activi~y associated with the·C~RONA/MURAL 

program. 

(Tab 89) 

DOD Directive TS 5105. 23 was revised in ~esponse 

to a strong appeal trom DIA for more definitive 

. guidance regarding the appliance of appropriate . 

security controls to knowledge that the RRO and 

NRP existed. The change required that the ex-· 

pressions "NRO" and "NRP"· be handled with~ 

BYEMAN or TALENT/KEYHOLE systems only. 

·There were· no changes in the "functional teat." 

(Tab 90) 

Dr. McMillan forwarded to Mr. Vance copies of 

the following documents: 

1. the 13 March 1983 DOD/CIA Agreement on 

. Mauagement of the NRP 

2. a proposed Presidential Directive to amend 

the .13 March Agreement 

3. a set of footnotes explaining the· rationale 

behind the proposed· changes 

4. an explanation .of some of the more pertinent 

problem areas. . 

The proposed Presidential Directive expressed the 

sense of Dr. McMillan's recommendatioll8. not· 

necessarily in the 18J11U81e appropriate ·tor such a 

directive. 

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16 April 1964 

18 April 1964 

· .. -BYEIAII 

.. smn 

TOP SECRET 

Dr. McMlllan cautioned that the tact that such a 

proposal ·had been presented to the FlAB was known: 

only ,to a few people and· suggested that the 'propo8a~ '. 

be held in confidence. 

(Tab 91) 

In a message for the DNRO, the Director, Program 

B stated: 

"Recent events and communications force 

me to request ·formal clarification and 

definition of my responsibiUties an~ functions concerning the (LMSC) AP Facility 

and CORONA payload management. " 

(Tab 92) 

., 

In· Dr. Wheelon's absence, General carter respondf!!d 

to Dr. McMillan's letter ot 23 March 1984. General 

Carter asked that diScU8sions of the "various advanced projects under way in support of the NRP" 

be held unW Dr. Wheelon's return from abroad . 

. General . Carter took this opportunity to mention 

"certain advanced projects" undertaken with CIA 

money which had a direct. beariDe on 'CIA'a capability to carry out its intelligence miasion and which 

were concurrently in direct support of the NaP. 

These were primarily in the BLINT area. 

General Carter su"eated further that the discussions 

cover the dollar and anticipated contract leve18 of 

the var·iOU8 NRO program elemeDta.whereiD CIA'. 

tI spe.cial authoritie8, security and contract cbannel. II 

would be employed. ' 

(Tab 93) 

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20 May 1964 

22 May 1964 

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CORONA-J (Mission 1005 - next in succession. to 

Mission 1003) experienced a series of ditficultles: 

1. The camera doors did Dot eject due to a 

pyro power failure. 

2. The fUm broke in camera '1. 

3. The first capsule impacted in Venezuela 

on revolution 451. . . 

, 4. The second capsule was'not recovered. 

" Dr .. McMillan reminded Dr. Wheelon of his 23 March 

1964' request for a resume of any CIA 1D~house studies and investigations, and contractual work pertatntn, 

to or applicable to ·the NRP or its objectives. . 

In view of the impending FY 1985 budget decisiona, 

Dr. McMillan asked that the review of these efforts 

be set for an exact date during the week of 25 May. 

(Tab 94) 

In a restricted se8sion of the usm meetlDg; Mr. 

McCone stated that "unless the NRO organization 

can come" closer to meeting· usm requirements for. 

the inte11J.g~nce inventory, somethiDg would have to 

be done about the NRO itself. n Mr. McC~ne iDdicated 

that he would have to respond to Secretar7 McNamara 

that, if NRO failed to obtain the necessary satellite 

. photographic cove.rale in time, usm would be· unable 

to meet the requested National IilteUigence Bstimate 

(NlE) schedules. . 

(Tab 95) 

Mr. McGeorge Bundy forwarded to the Secreta17 of 

Defense and the Director of Central. Jnte11ipnce a 

report and recommendations on the Natl __ al 

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--BYEMAN 

. "SYSIEI 

Reconnaissance Program submitted by the Presi-. 

dent's FlAB under date of 2 May 1964.· Mr. Bundy 

reques~ed preliminary comments and recommendations on the report not later than-I. June 1984. 

Based on its review. theFIAB submitted the following 

conclusions and recommendations: 

Conclusions: 

1. The NRP must be conducted as a natiow 

effort. 

2. The DCI (as Chairman. USm) has a large -and 

important role in the establishment of intelligence requirements and priorities to be met 

through the NRP~ -

3. Both.the Department of Defense and the CIA 

have made important contributions toward 

the achievement of aD effective.' _tiona! 

reconnaissance capability.-

4. It is essential that the NRP include the fullest 

use of science and technolol1 in the conduct 

01 lOlli-range. forward-thinking x-e'8earch and 

development leading to the ·advancement of oUr 

reconnaissance intelligence collection techniqUes and' to more efficient means tor· proc- . 

essing and analyzm,' the Intelligence obtained. 

5. Fuller use sho~ld be made of the potential of 

the CIA in meetm, the vital need for advance 

planning and resea:rch. 

6 ~ Eifectlve development and conduct of the NaP 

require that it be a streamlined operation 

under stroD,. centralized manapment and 

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(Continued) 

IIIIIf _smm III BYDMIf, 

control within the Department of Defense, 

with ready access to personnel and resources' 

ot the DOD and of the C~. 

\ 

, 7. With proposed FlAB modifications, a sound 

organizational concept for the NRP is set 

forth in certain parts of the, March 13, 1963 

Agreement between the Secretary of Defense 

and the DCI. 

Recommendations: 

The FlAB recommended the issuance ()l a Presidential directive which would provide guidelines for 

the centralized direction, management and conduct 

afthe NRP, and clarification of the departmental 

, and agency responsibilities involved, as follows: 

1. Definition of the' NRP as a sinale program, 

national in ,character, f-or the developD1ent, 

management, control and operation of aU' 

projects, both current and long-range, tor , 

the collection of intelligence, mapping· and 

geodetic information through overflight (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operati0D8)~ 

2. Designation of the Secretar), of Defense as 

Executive Agent tor the NaP having primary 

responsibility and authority for (a) the management and conduct of reconnai8sance activi-, 

ties involved ,iii the NRP and (b) the tasJdna of 

personnel, facilities an~ other reao~e8 01. 

the DOD, CIA and other agericies 88 req~red. 

·3., Establishment within the DOD of a National 

~coDnaisSalice Office to function as a aepa-

~ate operating agenc1 of the DOD, and to be 

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5. 

6. 

7. 

;8. 

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' .. 

headed by a Director responsible ~olely to 

the Secretary of Defense l~r discharging' 

the Secretary's responsibility as Executive' 

Agent of the NRP. 

Assf.gnDient to the DCI, as, C~irman of the 

USIB, Of the function Of sharpening and, ex-

, pediting the efforts of the usm. 

Direction that there be a coordinated, ' comprehensive budget for all elements of the NaP 

and that .there be estabUshed fiscal control 

and accounting procedures to assure appro-, 

priate utilization of funds by ,the atencias 

concerned in support of the Program. 

Direction to the heads of the DOD, the CIA 

and other agencies concerned that full utilization be made ot"the resources of each of those 

agencies as required for ,the 'conduct of research projects looldng to the development of 

new and improved aircraft and satellite reconnaissance vehicles, photographic and other 

sensors, and advanced methods for improved 

processing and exploitation of the intelligence 

obtained therefrom. 

As'sigiunent to the CIA of the re8ponsibWty 

, for providing the Executive Agent with securlt1 

and policy guidance required tor the malnteDaDCe of a uniform system of security p~ocedtJrea for the NRP. 

ID lieu of p,rese,nt monitor and ren.w functions 

periodic reporting' by the· Executive Agent lor 

the Program to the President's Special ASSistant 

for National Security Affairs aDd the President's 

FlAB, concernin, all aspects ~ the ,Program. 

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(Continued) 

IIIIU III BYOtAN . --mTDI 

. 9. Authorization to the. Director of the NRO to 

establish a Scientific Advisory Board. 

The FlAB recommended further the implementation' 

of several actions within the framework of the NRO. 

These included: .. 

1. Close and continuing collaboration on the· 

part of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. 

. 2 ~ Continued deSignation d the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force as Director of the NRO • 

. 3. Contributions of personnel by the DOD and the 

.. CIA to provide'stalf suppOrt to the' Director.· 

NRO -. such personnel to serve sole~y under 

the direction and supervision of the. Director. 

NRO while so assiped. 

4. Delegation by the Secretary at Defense to the 

Director. NRO of the authority for the' issuance of directives t.o elements of tlie DOD. 

and foI" levying of requests upon the CIA and 

other apncie's involved in the conduct of the 

NRP. 

5. Assignment to the DOD (Air Force) of respOnsibility for the management of over-all systems 

engineering, . procurement and operation of all 

satellite reconnaissance systems. 

6. Elimination of the inter-apncy Confipration 

Control Board as a decision-making entity . 

. within the' satellite reconnaissance program • 

., . Continued assignment to the CIA of the OXCART 

program (responsibility for operational. use. 

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28 May 1964 

~ III BYf.IIJ 

-sma 

following development, to be determined by 

. the 303 Committee.) 

8. Continuation for time being of present management arrangements with respect to the A-ll, 

the R-12 and TAGBOARD Projects. 

(Tab 96) 

Dr. McMillan met with Mr. McCone. 

Dr. McMillan reported on the two (recent) fanures 

of the· CORONA system and the actioDs that he bad 

directed General Greer to uDdertake to insure an 

adequate investigation.·· 

Dr. McMillan stated his desire to introduce Aerospace Corporation as the ,eneral systems eDlineering and ·technical direction contractor. While 

·Mr. ·McCone a,:reed that this was probably the 

right. thing to do, he reminded"Dr •. McMillan that 

it had been at Dr. Charyk's. insistence that Lockheed had been given the systems engineering 

res·ponsibUity. 

Dr. McMillati pointed out that his proposal to 

introduce Aerospace in . such a role would require . 

contractual changes since the existing arr&DIem!!nt. 

called tor systems engineering by Lockheed and _ 

technical cHrection by a Configuration Control Board 

(CCB). Mr •. McCone agreed-that the CCB was undesirable. Dr~ McMillan atated that he wanted 

General Greer to be· fully in charge of the CORONA 

contracts. The discussion immediately tUrned to 

mucb the same ground that "previous discusslona"on 

tbis subject had covered. Kr. ;McCone questioned 

General Greer's quaUficationa. He recalled the 

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(Continued) 

2 June 1964 

_. BYOWt ... sma 

historic role of CIA. He accused Dr. McMillan~. 

wanting only to cut CIA entirely out of the satellite 

business. Dr. McMillan att.mpted to justify his. 

proposed changes .. Mr. McCone c9uotered with a 

number of sharp criticisms of the NRO and of Dr. 

McMUlan r s administration thereof. Dr. M;cMill.an 

urpd Mr ~ McCone to put these criticisms in a letter. 

to him. Mr. McCone then stated that he thought it 

was tI absolutely criminal" for Dr. KcYWan to make 

a visit to the West Coast and conduct an inve~ilation 

of the conduct' of the CORONA project· Without inviting 

anyone from the CIA to be present. 

The working relations between Dr. McMillan and 

Dr. Wheelon were discussed extensiveiY. Dr. 

McMillan stated that jf there were to' be a CIA role 

in the satellite field under the NRO, then' these 

relations would have to change, since he could not 

be responsible for activities over which he had no 

control and about which he had no knowledge. Mr. 

McCQIle . did not challenge' this statement. . 

At the close of the meeting, Mr. McCone agreed 

again that Aerospace could be iDataUed as systems' 

engineering contractor and stated that he would 

"speak to his. boys" about changing the contracta~ 

(Tab 97) 

In a memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. 

Vance concurred with the recommendations contained in the 2 May 1964 report of the President's 

FlAB. 

Mr. Vance stated that, upon issuance Of the Prealdentia~ direcUve recommended by the FlAB,' he 

would request the DNRO to make the necessary 

detailed arrangements regardilig the Implementation 

of the further.recommendatioBa of the·Board. 

(Tab 98) 

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12 June 1964 

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In a Memorandum for Record, Dr. McMillan stated 

that he and Dr. Fubini had received a briefing by. 

PhUco which outlined "its . studies of: 

. 1 .. Capabilities of Titan m as a booster tor 

reconnaissance payloads 

2. Subsystems and techniques for on-board 

power, attitude co~trol and navigation 

. 3. Side looking radar as a reconnaissance sensor 

. 4. Sensors forELINT 

5. CommunicatioDs techniques and. systems 

for transmission of imqery 

6. Conceptual satellite systems for intelligence 

data collection 

7. Cost-effectiveness of various conceptual 

systems. 

Dr._ McMillan judged the materi~l to be of direct 

interest and importance to the no and duplicative!! 

in part, of current and past studies by.the no. 

(Tab 99) . 

Dr. McMUlan asked Mr. McCone for a listing of 

all a~tive CIA contracts for the s~d7 or development of systems, subs,stems, equipment or 

techniques that related to theu.e of satellites tor 

the collection' of intelligence • 

. (Tab 100) 

Dr. McMillan advised Mr. Vance of his conversation with General Carter regarding an unanswered 

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(Continued) 

13 June 1964 

25 June 1984 

_. BYDIJI 

CIDlSYSRI 

request to CIA f~r a resume of all studies having 

to do with· the NRP. 

General Carter had responded with "Why worry 

about it -- the·FIAB is going to straighten everything out. If 

Dr. McMillan also'stated that he had had separate 

indications that Dr. Wheelon was contracting for 

satell1tes1stem and subsystem studies with probable explicit instructions to the contractors rtn~t' to 

give the DNRO or DDR&E any iDtormation regarding 

thes~urce of the request tor s.tud;y. If . 

(Tab iOl) 

Mr. McCone asked for the results of·Dr.".McMW8I1's 

. analysis of the. possibility of uSing" the Atlas-Agena 

and the GAMBIT type" platform as a launchinl vehicle 

for the CORONA pa;yload. 

Mr. McCone felt that the additional costs and the 

availabiJity ot the Atlas-Agena combinations mlaht 

weigh heavily in the decision, particularl;y if there 

were developing increasing demands tor GAMBIT 

shots along the lines "as some have advocated 

during the past few. months ... 

Mr. McCone appreciated the tact. that this sl1l.8tio~" 

was made during the "darkest hours at CORONA 

troubles" and OPined that-the ~ecent 8ucce88 ""ould 

also influence the final decision. 

(Tab 102) 

In a Memorandum tor' Record (pa8sed to Qeneral 

Carter) Dr. McMlllan related his discussions with 

General Carter on the conduct of further studies 

o(FULCRUM. 

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25 June 1964 Dr. McMillan had -agreed that: 

( Continued) 

--aYEMAN_- .. SYSTEI -

1. CIA tunds to the extent of about $8001 000 

could be obligated in FY 1984 to conduct 

tests at ITEK _~f an engineering model of 

the -critical fUin -transport -mechanism. 

2. The test program would be conducted under 

the aegis of the NRO. 

3. An individual in CIA would be identified as 

responsible for the testsland responsible 

to the DNRO for them. 

4. -The DNRO would be kept full)' informed 

about the conduct and progress of the tests. 

5. In order to obligate the mone), during -FY 

19641 the contract could be initiated by a 

letter of intent. The DNRO woUld review 

the work statement of the -definitive contract 

betore it was signed. 

6. The management arrangement did not commit the DNRO or the CIA-in connection with 

-any final development program that milbt be 

initiated for a new pneral search system •. 

_ 7. In the event the FULCRUM concept wail approved-tor development·other than--wider CIA 

auspicesl the CIA funds expended on the tests 

would be reimbursed b)' the NRO. 

The assignment to Aerospace Corporation- of respol181-

bility tor syatetns engineering on CORON. was a180 -

-discu88ed. Dr. McMillan noted that during FY 1883 ~ _-

the equivalent ot the CIA contract SB-1928 had ·been 

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(Continued) 

26 June 1964 

--BYEMAII ,CIITIIt nml 

held by SAFSP as an Air Force' contract. Dr. 

McMillan stated that the Prop-am'B contract'inI 

office should not negotiate an extension of SB- ' 

1928, but'that the necessary contractual covera. 

would be provided by SAFSP either under' an 'Air 

Force black contract or under a black annex to 

an existing Air Force contract. ' 

Dr. McMillan informed 'Qeneral Carter that a 

new Director of the NRO S~aff' would soon be named. , (Tab ,103) 

Dr. McMillan met with Mr. McCone, General 

Carter, Dr. Fubini and Dr. Wheelon to discuss 

1. FULCRUM 

2. the need for thorough photographic coVer.,e 

of the Soviet Union in search of nel' siDIlesilo launch sites 

3. the status of GAMBIT-3 

The FuLCRUM discussion touched on technical 

considerations but centered on the question of 

establishing a budgetary line item.' ' 

On the :Search of USSR item, Dr. McMillan recommended that a . CORONA miasion during Jtt17 1964 

be programmed for area search, .'ainl mono.coplc 

photography for maximum coVerage. The matter 

was referred to Dr. Wheelonfor cODsideration. 

, p~opo.ed'for 

GAMBIT-3 durin, F . Mr. McCone questioned' 

the requirement, in: comparison to the need for a 

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(Continued) 

26 June 1964 

29 June 1964 

IllItE 11 BYEIMII .. SYIJII 

new general search system, and stated that he 

had not be~D informed that such a decision was 

being considered or made. Dr. Mc~i1lan 

identified the ·decision as his own. 

(Tab 104) 

The Director, NRO in a messap to the CIA and 

SAFSP, ·related the decision (coordinated with the 

Secretary of Defense and the DCI) directing SAIPSP 

to contract with the ~erospace Corporation to per- - . 

form a general system engineering function on . 

the CORONA program. . 

The message authorized: 

. ~ .. , .. 

1. The Director, Program B ·to aUow Contr~ct . 

SE-1928 (tor systems engineering and iDte~ . 

gration) with Lockheed to expire. 

2. The .Director, Program A to accomplish, 

by 1 July 84, contractual.arrangements 

establishing Lockheed as systems iDtearat!' 

contractor with a work statement, compatlb e 

with the general systems encineeriDg elIort 

to be accomplished by the Aerospace Corporation. 

(Tab 105) 

Referring to Dr; McMillan's 25 JUne MFR, General 

Carter related hi" understanding· that, ir.a upt of 

subsequent conversationa between Dr. McMillan 

and·Mr. McCone, the.memorandum was of·purely 

academic interest. 

General Carter remarked further that the memorandum did not .conform with his underatandm, . 

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(Continued) . 

30 June 1964 

IIE··BYEMAN 

-ma, 

. and that he had made no agreement of any kind, 

nor did he com~it CIA or the DCI to· any course 

Of action on FULCRUM. -

(Tab 106) 

General Carter referred to Dr. McMillan's outline, 

of two actions which he (Dr. McMillan) stated he 

must take on 1 July 1984: 

1. Establish a contract with Aerospace Corporation for comprehensive. systems engineering 

and t~chnic&l direction of the '~ORONA project. 

2. Continue the work at Lockheed, conducted 

under CIA 'contract SE-1928, under an Air 

. Force "black" contract with a work statement 

modified to reflect the SE lTD responsibllities 

ot Aerospace and to define Lockheed's role 

as ·an integrating contra~tor. 

General Carter reminded Dr. McM1l1an that the 

DCI had st~ted that he desired.o chanps in COD"'!' 

tracts, management concepts, or cU,rrentNRO 

operating procedures for the CORONA prop-am 

until the matter.presently before the'F'lAB had been 

settled, or except with his own pel"sonal approval 

in each case,; 

General Carter considered bis memorandum to confirm his telephone conversations with Mr. Vance 

and Dr. McMiU~ indicating that he did not concur 

in the action proposed by Dr. McMillan.' General 

Carter' recommended, iDatead, that the etA COD-

. tract with Lockheed be extended on an indefinite 

basis by letter of intent, pendinl settlement of the . 

matter~ 

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(Continued) 

30 June 1964 

.--BYElWI CIIJIIl·mro 

In a· covering note to Mr. Vance and Dr. McltfUlan. 

General Carter stated that Mr. McC.one had in- . 

dependently arrived at the conclusion that the· 

actions proposed by Dr. McMillan should not be 

taken "at this time. " 

(Tab 107) 

Dr. F.ubini in a memorandum to Dr. McMillan. 

referred to a Project FULCRUM briefing and recalled for Dr. McMillan r s attention, a series of 

technical events: 

1. The Purcell Committee advised apinat a 

new broad coverage .system. 

2. The Air Force made a series of rec·om-· 

mendations for the lmp~ovem_t of the 

CORONA camera, in accordance with the 

Purcell Committee recommendations • 

. 3. Dr. Wh.elon disagreed with. the Air Force 

recommendation and initiated the study of 

the Drell Committee. 

4. The Drell Committee found little correlation between the product resuits and the 

. mechanical or. optical characteristic8 of 

the sY8te~, ·an~ made a number of sUlgestiona for further quantitative measurements of the product. 

5. ·Recent CORONA missioDS seemed to con';' 

firm the Purcell recommendation that 

substantial improvement over the CORONA 

camera' result could be obtained, .and appe~u·ed 

.also to confirm the Drell· Committee fiDdlDp 

since there did not seem to be an)' basic 

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(Continued) 

.. -BYEMAN _nml 

change in the camera set-up between 

recent missions 'and the old ODeS. 

6. CIA made a proposal called FULCRUM 

which did not correct the unIm()WD defects 

. . of the CORONA camera nor take into account the questions, recommendations or 

conclusions 01 the Drell Committee' related 

to hardware imP.rovement - but inatead, 

proposed to initiate a completely different 

camera design •. 

7. Recent· results in CORONA take seemed to 

indicate a possible resolution .of 5 to 7 feet, 

in rough accordance with expectatlona. If 

this resolution were mafntafnable,would 

·there be sufficient motivation lor a new 

broad covera,e system in the 3. 5 to 5 ft . 

re-solution rauge? (CIA' studi.s ae.m.d.to 

indicate that resolutions substantially Under' 

this were desirable for high target detection' 

confidence in many target classea). 

Dr. Fubini stated that he felt it absolutely necessary 

that before a new system design were aceepted, a 

comparison should be made . between the old CORONA 

results, new 'CORONA results, the Drell CODunittee 

results, KH-7 results a.-l fiDally'the technical recommendations ai,med at the new broad cover.... camera 

to insure that the stUI. UDknoWn causes of poor performance in CORONA (except the most recent) had 

been eliminated. 

Dr. Fubini expressed his· 'bellet that a substantlal . 

amount of effort -could aDd should' be' devoted to these 

pr'oblems at the earliest possible time. 

(Tab 108). . ' , 

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1 July 1964 Dr. McMillan drafted • reply to General Carter's 

memorandum of 30 J~e 196-4. .. 

-Dr. McMillan stated that he had authorized the 

extension of the· CIA contract with Lockheed, under 

its present terms, for ·thirty days. He added that 

. his proposals for centralizing the management· of 

the CORONA project had been before the DCI, in 

writing, . for more than eight months arid had been 

discussed with the DCI in extenso on four separate 

occasioDs ~ Dr.· McMillan con8idered the only _ 

substantial difference between h~s present recom ~ 

mendatioDs and th08e he had made on 28 October 

1963 to be the determination that Aerospace should 

carry the re8pon8ibiUty for over-all .Y8tems 

engineering and technical direction. 

Dr. McMlllan inferred, from General Carterf 8 

memorandum, that one iJlIredient nece8sary for 

a determination by the DCI of a final Position on 

the matter was a ·recommendation from General 

Carter and Dr. Wheelon •. Dr. McMillan urged an 

early resolution of the matter. 

In a cover Dote to Mr. VaDce~ Dr. McllWan asked: 

Should I .8ign this? 

Brockll 

The memorandum was never signed. 

(Tab 109) . 

. ". 

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7 July 1964 

-IIBYEMAN 

"miD, 

Dr. Wheelon presented and .discussed a· plan for . 

. initiating the FULCRUM project. The CIA plan 

called for: 

- '..' t!. . 

with, seven contractors fQr covering. 

a new camera system,· a D W .. '1 vehicle,' 

and a new spacecraft to be launched on a 

TITAN U from a PMRpad with STL acting as 

,the integration assembly and 'checkout contractor. 

2. The establishment of a new project officer ~der 

theClA DD/S&T of 8-10 technical people (5-8 

new requirements) to perform SBTD with STL 

staff support. 

3. The provision, by present NRO elements in 

the CIA, of procurement/contracting and 

security. 

4.' ,The enIarpment of the project office to appzoxImatel,. 3.5 people, by means Of further recruitment, upon a.,proval of the FULCRUM s1stem. 

5. A request to the DOD to. provide launch services , 

and recover1 operations for launches be,inning 

in FY67. ' 

(Tab 110) 

Dr. McMillan prepared a paper on "CIA'Management of Satellite Projects U in which he. discussed 

CIA studies of" and plans for, a DeW generals.arch 

satellite system (FULCRUM). . 

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(Continued) 

On 28 June, the DCI stated his-desire that the MRO 

be directed to establish FULCRUM a,. anNRO 

development project, and to aasfln to the CIA 

responsibility for research, development and 

operation. 

On 2 July, Dr. Wheelon presented and discuSsed a 

plan for initiating the project with a six months' 

period of design stu3Mdi8 and. relimiDary design .. 

effort, requiring ab and involving 

seven contractor or za ons. IA would establish a ,Project office with a director reporting to 

Dr. Whee Ion. The project office would bave full 

technical responsibility, cODsist initially of ten 

JlE'ople, and be expanded to 35· people should a tun 

scale development follow. 

Dr. McMillan considered the central issue to be: 

should the CIA establish an independent capability 

for full scale- deveiopment 01 space systems' He 

raised a related and more fundamental iS8ue: how 

are new developments to be authQrized' 

Dr. McMillan recommended that: 

1. The .Secretary Of Defense will be the execu"" 

tive agent for .the NRP. . 

2. As executive gent, the Secretary 01· Defense 

will have authority to initiate such Dew de-

. velopment projects as be determiD88 are 

feasible and necessary in support 01 the NRP. 

3. Such development8 aa are initiated in response to specific collectiGn requirement .. 

enunciated by the DCI 8hall be concurred 

in by the DCI. 

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7 July 1964 

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4. , As executive agent, the Secretary of Defense 

w~ll determine the assignment to elements 

or agencies within the DOD 'and the ClJ.\of 

responsibility for tasks or' projects in support of the NRP. 

Dr. McMillan consid~red only recommen~tion 3 

as not already explicit in the NRO ,agreement and 

the PFIAB recommendations. 

Dr. McMillan concluded the paper with a' detaned 

discussion of possible reasons for considering the 

assignment of major development responsibiliti~s 

to the' CIA, rather than to elements of the mUitary 

establishment. 

(Tab lll) 

In a note to Mr. McNamara, Dr. Mc~an outUned 

the CIA plan for 'FULCRUM: 

1. anaJ.ysis with 

seven contractors, f coverinl" 

-entry 

vehicle, a new spacecraft, to be launched" 

on a 'TITAN D,from a PMR pad with STL 

acting as the integration, assembly and 

checkout contractor. 

2. Establish a new project office under Dr. 

Wheelon of 8-10 technical 'people (5-8 new 

recruitments) to perform SETD with, STL 

staff support~ 

3. Procu~ement/contractinl and security 

provided by present NRO elements iri the 

CIA. 

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(Continued) 

8 July ~984 

.. _mTfI -BYBWI 

4.' Upon approval of th~ FULCRUM system. 

enlarge the project o(tice to approximately 

. 35 people, by means of further' recruit- , ment.' 

5'. Request'OOD to provide launch services 

and rec'overy operatioDs for launches 

'beginning, in li'Y 1987 • 

Dr.' McMillan indicated he had ,discussed the CIA 

plan with Mr. Vance, who recommended that Mr. 

McNamara'sign a proposed memorandum to Mr. 

McCone. 

(Note: Mr~ Vance signed the proposed memorandum to Mr. McCone on 8 July 1984. Tab 113) 

, (Tab 112) 

In a letter to'Mr. McCone. Mr. V.-nce.ret~rred 

to the CIA plan for FULCRUM aDd suggested that 

"in ,order to insure that all possible alternatives ' 

have been. explored,. • '. we should ask the Dire~tor, 

NRO to direct the completion of comparatift studies •. 

meanwhile authorizing CIA to pursue only tho8e 

designs and tests that ,are necessary· to estabU,.h 

the feasib.ility of the pr~po8ed F.ULCRUM ,camera' 

concept." Mr. Vance indicated that th,· r~8~t8 

of the studies should become available in January 

1965 and would provide the iDformation neces8ary: 

,1. To 'determine whether a development should 

be undertaken. 

2. To select a system. 

3. Todiacuss the 8s8ipunent Of responsibilltie8 

for development and operational employment. 

(Tab 113) 

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10 July 1964 

-~BYElWt .. S1IRI . 

In a memorand~m tor -the Director, NRO, D·r. 

Wbe.elon.outlined various FULCRUM tasks for· 

which the CIA required immediate NIlO funding. 

The tasks included: 

1. Film drive and control 

2. Camera design, engineering, mock-up 

and dynamics . 

3. Weight budget and dynamic balance· 

4. Assembly, integration, and checkout;; 

and 

amounted to ~re·quirenient _ 

_ les8 .~V$i1able Apnc11ear~ end funds). 

had· been placed on areas which the Land Panel 

had identified as meriting immediate attention. 

Dr. "Wheelon further advised that upon conclusion 

of the effort, scheduled for stXmontha,CIA 

"should have amassed a substantial appreciation 

of the· technical .,pects of each. task which will 

permit an over;'all evaluation of the program.W1th 

a high confidence factor. " 

. (Tab 114) 

In a memorandum to the Director, MBO, the Director, .I'l-0gram B, submitted an addendum to his FY 

85 the immediate requiresought In . 

FY 65 be set aside for Prop-am use pending the 

. outcome of the initial tasks scheduled for a period 

of six months •. The Director, .~ogram ~, .. added 

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20 July 1964 

21 July 1964 

.. -BYBWI 

CIITIIl SJs1El 

that "until their (the tasks) com~tion .. it is difficult to judge. whether the entir can 

be judiciously committed in the ·curr.ent y. 85) 

fiscal year; however, at this point in time, we 

prefer that this amount be earm~rked lor FULCRUM, 

to prevent any delay in the program 'should· our 

initial efto"s:.. p. sfq1. n Also noted, was 

booster mods an a onal for coninformation tha hadll'led for . 

struction and launch facUity e PPiDI - ough 

normally incorporated in the Air Force budget -

carried in FULCRUM for progra;m Integrity and 

to ensure the availability of funds. 

(Tab 115) . 

The Director, Program B urgently recommended 

to the Deputy Director/Science. Technolol1 (CIA) 

~hat immediate action be taken to tm the position 

to be vacated by. Colonel Murphy (CORONA Operationa (i)lticer at· the covert Palo Alto Facility) at 

the end of July "to preclude the poasibillty ol .. Getle.ral·· 

Greer's . staff to usurp this function aDd respouibility. II . 

(Tab 116) 

Colonel Ledford, Director Program B offered 

"congratulations and warmest appreciation tor 

most excellent performance" ·to Colonel Murphy 

as his CIA tour approac.hed completion. For Lt. 

Colonel Webb, Colonel Ledford directed that "In 

view imminent· departure Colonel Murphy, effective immediately you are desilD&ted a8 Chief 

Operations Officer, LKSC (AlP). vice Colonel 

Murphy reassigned. " 

(Tab 117) 

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23 July 1964 ' 

--BYDJAN 

"'SISlEI 

'In a letter to Mr. Vance" Mr. McCone offered 

several recommendations which he ,belie,ved should' 

be implemented promptly' by the DNRO: 

1. GAMBIT - all practical steps should be 

taken to obtain the maximum resolution 

from this system , 

2'. GAMBIT-3 - an advisory panel should be 

convened to review this system and to 

advise concerning its feasibUity 

3. FULCRUM - proceed wlth the research 

and developmental work recommended 

by the Land Pailel. Decision to proceed 

must necessarily await successful con- ' 

elusion of the developmental' work. 

4. Alternative high, resolution spotting and" 

search' syst~ms - a brieflDg by Dr. 

Fubini or Dr. McMillan on conceptual 

designs by the five principals),stems 

manufactUrers should~be arranged since 

, the ideas advanced mitbt weigh' he.v1ly 

on decisions with respect to the GAMBIT- ' 

3 and FULCRUM systems. 

(Tab 118) 

Mr., McCone commented on, the FY 1985 NaP plan,. 

Be expressed c:oncern that the Program A and'D 

funding unde,r the President' 8 tsua.ntt 

in fact increased ' P'r.'l~.1n 

Program B funding 

remained to be justified. 

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29 July 1964 

.. ·BYDMN 

_SYirEl' 

Mr. McCone expected a COMOR study to "throw 

. further light on the desirabUity of new photographic reconnaiaa.ance systems to improve our 

reconnaissance inventory" and presumed that 

'usm's desires would serve as guidance to NRO 

tor its FY 1985.and subsequent programs. 

Mr. McCone summarized his specific comments 

by stating that he needed much more iDtormation 

in considerable depth on the questions 'he ralaed 

and suggested that the budget discussions be 

. continued atthe'earUest opportunity. Mr. McCone 

suggested that major commitmentS of FY 1985 

funds "in ~ose controversial" areas he had noted 

be held in abeyance·untU he and Mr. Vance could 

agree on an FY 1965 NRP. 

(Tab 119) 

Dr .. McMillan commented in detail to Mr. Vance 

on Mr. McCone'S me~orandum of 23 July. 

Dr. McMillan felt that the McCone memorandum 

took a much more Imperative. tone than any 

previous correspondence from· the DCI. save 

perhaps brief notes or parap-aphs cODCe~ninI 

very specific items. e. g •• a change of contract 

or reassigninent of program responsibility. 

Dr. McMillan considered the document. coming 

from the DCI. to represent a complete rejection 

of the 'w.ord and spirit of the 13 March 1983 NRO ' 

Agreement. He felt· that. inas.~uch as the DNRO 

was responsible directly to the Secretary·oI Defense as Executive' Agent tor the ~p. the DCI 

should not assume the authority to direct spec:iflc 

actions 'or require separate program justttic.aUona 

in a manner that implied exclusion of Mr., Vance' 8 

olfice. 

(Tab 120) 

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In a letter to Mr. McCone,. Mr. Vance iterated 

the agreed upon objective of FULCRUM - to establish, in an expeditious manner, definitive data on 

the technical issues that are critical to the performance or success of the camera. Mr. Vance 

stated his belief that the FULCRUM effort "should 

be directed toward and limiteci to: 

'1. Initial design, fabrication of an engineering 

model, and definitive test of the complete 

film transport mechanism. 

"-BYElIM 

--

2. Preliminary optical and mechanical design 

of the rotating camera, limited to the 

amount necessary to estabUsh a model 

suitably simulating the camera IS mass 

inertia, , balance, and flexural stiffness; 

this model must be d)'Damically tested., 

with prototype bearin,s. 'f 

Mr. Vance further suggested that activities be 

,conducted under the following general conditions: 

1. Under the aegis of the NRO, full information on activities and progr,ess to be made 

available to the Director, NRO at all· times. 

2. Separate contracts for items 1 and ,2 above. 

3. Consideration of competitive biddlDg on 

1 above. 

4. Application of funds only to sPecific coo" 

tracts, each defined by a neiotlated statement of work approved by the Director, 

NRO and accompanied by a definitive contractor cost, estimate .. 

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2.9 July 1964 

(Continued) 

29 July 19-64 

1 August 1984 

3 August 1984 

5 August 1984 

... '-

--

5.'- No contracts for items not covered in 

1 and 2 above (e. g., systems integration, 

. spacecraft design, r/., design, etc.) 

. 6. An individual in CIA identified a8 ~sponsible for the contract. 

Mr. Vance provided se~ral addltioDal suggestions 

relative to the accomplishment Of the ettort, and_ 

solicited Mr. McCone'. over.-all views. -

.. (Tab 121) 

In a message to Colonel Ledford'and General Greer, 

. General Martin stated: 

"Dr •. McMillan requests that Contract SB192-8 be extended until 10 Auaust 84 at the 

current level of ettort and under -the cur--

rent work statement." - . 

(Tab 122) 

The first-evidence- of a breakdown in LMSC/AP 

(CIA covert facUity tor CORONA operatiou) day· 

to-day communicatioDs with -SAFSP (CORONA 

Program Office) began to develop~ . 

Brigadier General J~ L. MarUn departed NRO 

to become the Vice Directo~ of Special Projects, 

OSAF (SAFSP). Brigadier General James T. 

Stewart was designated Directo .. , NRO ·Staff. 

A CIA message to Lt. ColOnel W~bb outlined his 

supplementary duties. These were:'. 

1. Duly authorized representative of the 'contracting officer on contracts DM-2818, 

TE-1901 and 9J-1939 • 

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(Continued>. 

7 August 1964 

11 August ,1964 

_III BYBMII' ... SISJ£I 

3. Final inspection and acceptance at all 

items under contracts cited above - to 

be redelegated only in exceptional circumstances. 

The message further stated that· "in keeJdnl with 

the spirit of accompllshment under'. progra~s . 

covered by the above' contracts, no' detaUed procedures for your operation wlll be attempted . other than to request that the Contracttnc Officer 

be kept appropriately advised .•• of actions 

taken by you as his 'duly authorized representative·;.'" . 

(Tab 123) 

Durinl a presentation to the FlAB, Dr. McMillan 

stated that, as a result of close mauapment and 

hard bargaining in connectlon with the GAMBrl' 

system, the cost of GAMBIT-3 had been reduced 

almost 2()1Jf. below the early forecaat for FY 1985. 

He waS' asked by the FlAB whether similar saviDgs 

might not be expected in the CORONA system. He 

repHed that it was his considered opinion that 

close management aDd hard barpiniDI would not 

be possible oD the CORONA -system as long as the 

contract structUre under which the system operated remained in its present unaatlafactor1 and 

diffuse state. Dr .• McMillan noted that he bad· 

been unable to secure permisaim to c~ thia . 

structure. 

(Tab 124) 

Dr. McMillan recorded the agreementa 'made and .-

the actions agreed upon at a meetlDl on 11 AUlWlt 

1984 amonl Mr. Vance, Mr. McCone, Dr .. Publid 

and Dr. McMillan. . 

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--BYEMAN 

.amra 

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On GA¥BIT-3: . The program was ·approved in 

principle by Mr .. Vance and Mr. McCone •. It 

was agreed that Dr. McMillan would review pro- . 

gram phasing and return by 15 September a 

recommended· program ·for consideraUon·by Mr •. 

McNamara and the parties to the meeting. 

On FULCRUM: Mr. McCone stated that ~~ was not 

his iJitention to estabUsh within the CIA a unilateral capabUity for development and .operation 

of space systems. Be stated that reaponalblllty 

for launch ·and on-orbit operation of developed 

systems would remain an Air Force r~spoD8i-

·bUity. . 

It was agreed that the CIA would Dot unclertalat, 

in-house, to do systems engineerm, for FUL-

. CRUM, but would rely on a sy~tem8 eagineerin, 

contractor for this function should· a d,veloPment 

. be undertaken. 

It was agreed that a systems design study would 

be undertaken on FULCRUM, in addition to work 

on the camera described by Mr. Vance OD 29 July • 

. Terms agreed upon: 

1. the study would be .conducted by a contractor, or contractors, limited to about 

a six months' period 

2. no commitment to a subsequant development would be made 

3. should a development be undertaken, contractors would again be selected b,. competition and the stud)' contractor(s) would 

have the opportunity.to bid 

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.. IIBYEMII 

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4. it feasible, study contractor(s} would be 

selected competitively 

5. the study would be under the ae,is of the 

NROand' NRO funds 'would be authorized 

against firm ne'gotiated proposals. 

On TITAN m: All parties, agreed on the desirability 

of a polar launch capability for ,TITAN class vehicles on the West Coast. The DNRO would ,under- ' 

take to expedite consideration of: 

1. modifications to, existini facilities to adapt 

, to TITAN U, TITAN DIA, TITAN mx~ with 

or without AGENA. 

2. a full TITAN mc facility. 

On CORONA: Mr. McCone stated his view that to 

introduce Aerospace as general systems eJlllneer 

and source of technical direction on CORONA would 

be most undesirable II at this critical time." He 

felt that it could be a serious disturbance to a situation which, at the moment, appeared to be in ,a 

satisfactory state. 'Mr. Vance voiced bis' view, that 

the services of Aeros~ce would be val~ble to, the 

program. Dr. McMillan stated that if Aerospace 

were introduced, full continuity of all activities 

would be maintained, and that be would continue to 

review and approve personally any teclmical chanpa 

proposed for introduction into the system. 

It was a,reed that Dr. 'McMma could,make the 

necessary contractual cbaDgea and install 'Aero- ' 

space Corporation aa proposed. 

At this particular meetlDg, it was agreed to hold, 

'periodic meetm,s, attended by these four lndlviduala, 

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(Continued) 

12 August 1964 

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to discuss any major policy problems confrontinl . 

~he NRO. "This agreement cOll8tl~ted the informal 

establishment of the NRO Executive Committee. 

(Tab 125) 

The Director, NRO in a ~essage jointly' addressed. 

to Directors, Program A and Program B, cited the 

agreement between "Mr. McCone and Mr. Vance 

effective 17 August 84 and assigned to the Director, 

Program A the responsibility tor contractiDg tor 

the system" engineering functions on the CORONA 

project. 

The message authorized" the Director, Program A to 

introduce Aerospace Corporation in a general 8Y.-

tems engineering and technical direction capacity 

and appUed the follow!ni criteria: 

1. Contract with LMSC to insure continuity of 

project effort until total SETD relationships. 

firmly established. 

2. Director," Program A to establish suitable 

contract with LMSC to insure continuity of 

systems integration function. 

3. Director, Program B to .allow SE-1928 to . 

expire. 

4". Director, Program B to incorporate ·enabllDg 

clause in existing contracts with LltfSC (Alp), 

FSDS, rrEK, and GB. 

5. Director, Program A to present work statements and description oi SBTD contractual 

structure for I;lirector, NRO approval prior 

to final contract •. 

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(Continued) 

14 August 1964 

6. Director, Program B to complete by' 14 August 64, the processing of clearances-far ' 

, A~rospace and SAFSP 'persoDDeI. 

(Tab 126) 

In a memorandum to Dr. Wheelon, Mr. McCone 

sought to "make two points abundantly clear" with 

, regard to the handling of FULCRUM contracts to 

the extent authorized: 

"l. -There shall be no commitment, contractual or implied that we are to 

proceed past the authorized, R&D work 

on the film handling mechanism and th" 

camera, which includes deveI()pmental 

mock-ups built iii sufficient detan to 

answer or to disprove all 'questiona or 

doubts concerDingfeasibWty and, with 

re,spect to the spacecraft and re-entr1 

vehicle, conceptual desips and suttici~Dt 

detaUed engineering to present accurate 

determinations as to weight 01 the total 

. aS8embly and compatibility with the 

launcher. " 

"2. You will employ engineers and contractors to the fullest po8~ible extent, 

reserving as _ 'in-house activities' -

responslbllities for supervi8ion and 

guidance of the eDiUleer8 and CODtractors. I wish you to avoid as' _far 

a8 possible' unnecessarUy bulldlnl, an ' 

-in-bouse, capabWty, restrietm, the 

expansion of your staff,if any is required, to such addition. as are' necessary to adequately supervise the work 

of the ~nlineers and ,the contractors. " 

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(Continued) 

14 August 1964 

.. -BYDMN 

--

Mr. McCone specifically. indicated his feeling that· 

the above guidance involved: 

. 1. The employment of an architect-enpneeror . 

systems enpneering contractor to be 

r~sponsible for developing plans, specifications,. etc. I for all phases of the project·. 

2. Competitive contracts with two or more c'ontractors for film transport mechanism. 

3. A contract for the camera; recognizing'that 

it probably could not be competitive becauRof tbe.ITEK input to the FULCRUM 

concept. 

4. Competitive contracts for the design of ' the 

. spacecraft, assuming that competitors 

plans and from these the ~iDning contractor 

would be chosen and authorized to proceed 

with detaned engineering to the extent 

necessary. 

(Tab 127) 

In a memorandum tor Dr. Wheelon~ Dr. McMtlJan 

V.uIIo"VU his understanding of guideliDea for the 

iCOJ1lCelDt study . 

1. CIA would conduct an iDformal .. competitive 

selection of the c~n~ractor to do the· study •. 

2. . The recommended selec;tton topther .with the 

p~opoaed work atatementa and the anticipated 

period of effort would be discussed with 

Dr. FubiDi and Dr. McMillan. 

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(Continued) 

, 3. The proposed. study eftort would cODsider 

17 August 1964 

18 August 1964 

.. -BYBMtI 

--

inclusion of a ~~~~~ 

4. After reaching agreement on the contractor 

'to be selected and ~e contents of the work 

statements, the DNRO .would establish 

mechanisms for the selected contractor to 

acquire necessary information. 

5 ... un 'tor th~8tud1es would be , as previou'sly released to Program, . ' 

Dr. McMillan referred to a CIA proposed AKINDLE 

study and indicated th.t, the views expressed by the 

303 Committee were sufficiently discouragiDg that 

the expenditUre, of funds on AKINDLE was not war- , 

ranted. 

(Tab 128) 

A CIA message to ITEK, LMSC (AlP) and OE, advised that specified euablinl clauses would be in- : 

corporated in each of their contract, "for purposes 

of establishing appropnlata recognition of Aero.,pace 

,Corporation. " ' 

(Tab 129) 

Mr. Kiefer summarized the discus.ioDS at a meeting 

attended by Mr. Vance, Mr. McCone, Dr~ Fubini ' 

and Mr. Kieler. 

The contracting arr8Jll8ments for' 'FULCRUM were 

discussed. ¥r. McCone expres~ed hls'views b7 

quoting from his l' Augu8t 198' memorandum to Dr~ 

Wheelon'. His views.: 

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(CQnt!nued) . 

_II BYEMAN 

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1. Contract with ITEK for preliminary design 

study. of camera 

2 •. Competitive· contractors tor preUm~ry 

d~sign study ot· tUm transport 

3. Same for preliminary desill1study of 

. spacecraft to verity weight estimates 

4. Selection of contractor· to perform systems 

engineering and technical directioil 

5. Minimum increase in government personnel lor supervision of .these activities . 

Dr. Fubini explaiJied the system engiDeeriDg and 

technical direction contracting struct~e,· .emphasizing that tbe Air Force contracte~ directly with 

hardware auppUers and not via a prime-subcoDtract 

relationship involviDg the system eDlineering con-

. tractor. Mr.· Kieter stated that the only apparent 

issue of importance was whether· 8)'Stem engiDeerlna' 

and technical direction would be dODe within IOvern-· 

ment or by contract. Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone 

agreed that CIA would initiate contracts within the . 

framework of Mr. McCone's mem.orandum ~ 14 Au.-

ust 1984 to Dr. Wheelon,. and within budptArJ approvals. and would exert system eupDeerlDg and 

technical. direction through an appropriate coiltractor. 

Dr. Fubini raised the question of uaiDg the SAMOS . 

E-2 equipments being eX&JniDed lor lunar reCOD-

-"roject. He stated that the B-2 

iiir,IitiiOr be obtainable. it a decision on 

application were delayed. Mr. McCone .... ,...41· 

review the question. 

(Tab 130) 

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"·8YDM1 -sma 

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-. 

Mr. Kieler summarized the discussioDS at a meeting 

attended by, Mr. Vance, Dr. Fubini, Gener81 Carter 

and Mr. Kiefer.' 

General Carter brought up the s~bject at CORONA 

procurement, stating that funds beyond the current 

contract extensions to September and Ocfober had 

not been released to CIA.' Mr. Kiefer stated his 

understanding that this was being done through General Greer, ,in accord with agreement at the 11 August meeting. Mr. Vance read Dr. McMillan's' 

memorandUm, on the meeting, in, order to clarify 

the understanding. 

General Carter stated that 'such an arrangement 

obviated an)' input by CIA into the CORONA program 

in the future. On this po,int, Mr. Vance stated that 

there was agreelD:ent on the SETD function via contractor" and that CIA technical participation was 

'desirable, thus leading to the question at whether 

separate Air' Force and cIA suppliers' contracts 

could be 'continued with, the agreed SBTD arr8DIemente Dr'. Fubini stated this was posaible in a 

theoretical sense. Mr. Kiefer voiced objection 

on practical grounds., Dr. Fubini' .,reed'. 

Mr. Vance asked how a, CIA. input could be retained' 

in the program. Mr. 'Kiefer aUlaested that a few' 

qualified CIA ,personnel be aaaiped to the project 

office under General Greer. Dr. Fub1D1 cODCurred 

but obaerved that, in addition, it would be neceaaary 

to. create an environment to foster good worJdna ' 

relations. General Carter aJid Dr. FublD1 ~uI .. ated 

that 'a practice 01 holding suppliers me~tiDI. a8' often, 

as ever), two weeks would be beneficial. Mr. Vance 

stated that it would be desirable, but not m~tory, 

to assign CIA people to General Greer's CORONA 

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project office. ·Mr. Vance favored such an approach. The point was left open for .further 

. study. 

Dr. Fubini reminded General Carter of the quea~ 

tion rais~revious meetiDg on E-2 equipmentfo~ . (Tab 131) .. ... 

In a memorandum to the Deputy Director./Science 

& Technolol1(CIA), General Carter provided ad-· 

ditional (to 14 August·DCI memo) DCI-approved.· 

guidelines for the over-all organization and direction 

of the FULCRUM program.· Thea.e were: . 

1. The FULCRUM Program ia a CIA prograD;l 

under NRO aegis. Command, control, . 

8upervisionand direction of the entire 

FULCRUM Phase·1 Progr.am Is·as81gDed to ·DD/S&T. .. 

2. Coordination, liaison, project .integration . 

and engineering support will. be provided 

to DD /S&T by the systems engitleeriDg 

contractor, who wID have direct access· 

to all other contractors. 

3. DD/S&T will keep NRO fully and completely 

informed at Its progress thrOUlh repIar 

monthly progre8s reports and/or briefings, 

and will provide iDformatlon copies of contractor work statements. to NRO. 

4. DD/s&T will act as the sole point of CODtact and direction in the government for 

the· FULCRUM co.ntractora. 

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31 August 1964 

I11III11 BYEIWI 

_smll 

5~ Additional funds up t~ma1 be committed again8t~ plan, 

as approved by the Deputy Director of . 

Central Intelligence. The NRO wm reimburse the CIA for funds expended in the ' 

FULCRUM program in accordance with 

previous aireements . between Mr.· Vance 

and the DCI. ' 

6.· A specific unit will be established in DD/ . 

S&T reporting directly to the DD/S .. T .to 

manage the FULCRUM and other aateWte 

programs. In consonance with the Del's 

discussions with the PFIAB and Secretary 

McNamara, it should be no larger than 20 

or 30 technical people dependlng on the 

impact of other programs, but may utilize 

covert support capabilities elsewhere in 

. DD/S .. T to accomplish its aS8iped mission. 

General Carter also directed the development of 

(I) an organizational concept, (2) a 8chedule ot 

contracts and contractual structure, and '(3) a 

concept for system engineering tor FULCRUM 

for his approval.' 

(Tab 132) 

. Dr. Wheelon responded to the Deputy DCI direction 

. with a memorandum' for the'DCI, Subject: ','Conduct 

of the FULCRUM Program." The memorandum 

confirmed the DCI-established terms 01' reference 

and ~dvanced a specific ,management plan for Phase 

I FULCRuM development. 

The paper related the creation of a Special Projects 

Group within· DD/S&T (CIA) to handle all Ottw CIA 

satellite reconnaissance programs - cODaiiStm, 01' 

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I September 1964 

1 September 1964 

--BYElUI 

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eleven CIA staff technical professiona.!s and s,ix 

support people being brought together in ,one unit. 

Additionally reported were four technical pro-, 

tessionals in the CIA "recruiting pipeline" to be 

assigned the group, and a probable 'eventual irowth' 

to fill the 20-30 authorization mentioned by the 

DCI to the President's FlAB. 

(Tab 133) 

Mr. McCone advised ,Mr. Vance that he had appro~ed l)r. Wheelon's 31 August 84 proposed 

proCedures for the conduct of the FULCRUM 

program, as consistent with agreements reached 

at a meet1Dg on 18 August. 

Mr. McCone further advised that he 'had "instructed 

Dr. Wheelon, to keep Dr., McMWan as Director, 

NRO and the' NRO EXCom tully and currentI)' in-

,formed on the progress of FULCRUM work. 

(Tab 134) 

Mr. Vance and Dr. McMillan met with Mr. McCone. 

It was agreed that an earlier (ll August) cO,Dversation 

referred only to the use cA Aerospace as SETD CODtracto~ on CORONA, and only to the' contractual 

changes related thereto. 

Mr. ,McCone made a long statement of his positioD 

that theNRO was not properly or,anised and cited 

his memoranda ontbls subject to Mr.' BUDdy and to 

'Mr. 'McNamara. He ma~ed that it was wron, 

to permit one agenc), to 1Dnuence the interul manage~ent of another aDd that therefore'the no 

should simpl)' tast the CIA, nbt run its internal 

alfairs. He asked that no further clUmaJe be 'introduced into the CORONA contract structure untn 

this major issue was ,settled. 

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I September 1964 

4 September 1964 

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Mr. Vance remarked "All right, John, we think 

it is wrong, but' if you want it that way we can run 

it that way." ,Dr. McMillan supported this 8tate~ 

me nt, however, re~oui1ted all the good mauagemerit reasons why it was wrong to operate in 8ueh 

a way. Dr. McMi1l~, urged that at least the CIA 

contracts be administered by a contracting otffcer 

on General Greer's statf. Mr. McCone agreed. 

Dr. McMillan viewed the contracts under discussion 

to be those with, ITEK" Eastman Kodak, Fairchild 

,and Qeneral Electric as well as the Lockheed contract for fabrication of 'the payload compartment. ' 

'(Tab 135) 

An SAFSP message to the CIA related the contents 

of a proposed security annex to the LYSC contract 

for systems integration of the CORONA S7stem and 

requested that CIA authorize its covert facllit)' 

security representative to have LYSC comply with 

,SAFSP security procedures. 

(Tab 136) 

In a memorandum for 'Mr. Vance, Dr. McMWan 

identified the more serious misuncierstaadlDa8, 

differing views and dilteriDg interpretatioDs relatiDg 

to FULCRUM. 

Key points: 

1. Initial discussions centered about the use 

by CIA of a systems engineering contractor 

to avo.id a need to ezpimd the CIA staff to ' 

pde FULCRUM. Dr. McMlllan cQuidered 

this to apply to the 'manapmelit teclmique 

that CIA would use should a full scaledevelopment be undertaken. Dr ~ WheeIon, on the 

other hand" proposed to use a separate 878-

tem:s engineering contractor alao during any 

Phase I studies. 

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2. CIA explained in -great detan the term "s)'8-

tems engir1eering" as a f~ction identical 

with that described by Dr. Wheelon as a, 

function' to be performed by a proposed 

"integration and 'check~out" contractor. 

Subsequently, Dr. Wheelon stated explicitly 

that the integration and check-out contractor 

wouid not do system elJllneeriDg. Specifically, the prime systems engme e ring f~ctions were reserved for the CIA. 

3. Initially ,Dr., Fubini suggested that in addition 

to ~ork on the camera and 'fUm traD8po~ sya-

,tem, already agreed to, a ·contractor be' engaged to do a comprehensive systems design 

study. ,This was offered as' an alternative to 

Dr~ Wheelon's plan to enpp separate study 

contractors for s,-:cecralt .and r,entry vehicle 

integratm, all of the study efforts· by U8e of , his own staff. . 

Dr. McMillan conclUded with a recommended posi";' 

tion: 

1. Preliminary optical/mechanical desip, 

prototype fabrication, ' and 'dynamical teat 

of the camera, 801e source to ITB~~ 

2. Possibly competitive effort. 01 aimilar 

kind on the film tran8port mechanism. 

3. A system8 deaign study of the' whole a1'8-

. tem, conducted by a 8tudy contractor who 

would not be reatraiDed· from bidcHDe on a 

'subsequent development; consider parallel 

competitive atudiea. 

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4 September 1964 

... BYEIAII, 

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4.' The DNRO to review work statements of all 

contracts before final negotiation. 

5. NRO funds to be released against firm 

negotiated prices. ' 

6. The whole an NRO project ,with DNRO acces's to all informatloll~ 

(Tab 131) 

In a letter to Mr. McCone, M~," Vance' called attention to the'fact that the FULCRUM prop-am' 

direction issued by General Carter on 21 August 

did not reflect ttte Vance /McCone agreement in one 

very important detall. 

Mr. Vance restated the agreement that a SBm , (sy8tema-en,1neer1ng~technical-d1rectlon) contractor would be hired and that the work of'integration and tec~nical direction would be conducted 

by the cOntractor, and not by CIA personnel. 

,General Carter had interpreted the -.reement to 

state: Coordination, llaisODl". project lnte,ration 

and engineering support will be provided to the 

DD/SI&T (CIA) by the syatems enginee .. iD' con- " 

tractor, who would have direct acceas to aU other 

" contractors. 

M'r. Vance stated that this was clearl)' iDcoaa1ateDt 

with the agreement. He further reported that hi. 

difficulties were increased by the interpretati~n 

iiven to this "already weakened and DOt acceptable 

condltion'~ by Dr. Wheelon'. memorandum 0131 

August, in which the ayatems engineeriDe cODtrac~or 

was made responsible ,only for developiDI plana,' 

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4 September 1984 

(Continued) 

8 Septe~ber 1964 

8 September 1964 

1IIIlE. BYElWI 

-Clllammt 

- specifications, etc. :for all phases of the project on 

an integrated basis. This interpretation,. Mr. Vance 

felt, rendered the plan contradictory to the agreement. 

(Tab 138) 

In a letter to Dr. McMillan, Dr. Wheelon co~e~ed 

that the FULCRUM feasibility stud7 was proFesslDg -

_ and that the CIA planned_ to release that week the 

funded design competition -contracts for- the re-entr7 

vehicle. 

Dr. Wheelon indicated that· FULCRUM might be ~e 

only reason for a new re-entr7' vehicle If his Understand~g of the NRO intent to use the standard CORONA- (Mark V) capsule for G-3 was correct, aDd aaked 

to be- advised ot any other NRO s7stem which required 

a new re-entry vehicle "so that we do not design twocapsules where one might be justified-." _ 

Dr. Wheelon expressed his desire'to become'thoroughly familiar with the GE Mark VIU:desip (though 

never developed) or any other r/v design studies 

conducted by the Air. Force or NRO. Dr. Wheelon 

asked Dr. McMillan if this acdess could be arraDged 

by the NRO in the near -future. 

(Tab 139) 

In a letter to Dr. McMillan, Dr. Wheelon atated that 

"we are now charged with explor1D& the technical and 

system feasibWty for 8e~ral photop-aphic aDd 

electronic satellite recoDDalssance s;yatema, II indicating that Mr." McCone had urpd him to ,exa~ 

how the present FULCRUM high reaolution'pql8ad 

system based on TITAN D could be enhanced' or insured by utUizm,g the ere~ter pa)'load capabWt7 of 

TITAN m. 

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9 September 1964 

10 September 1984 

-,- BYElIAII .. nsa 

Dr. Wheelon asked for authoritative design and performanc.e data on TITAN m in its various coDfiiurations, together with firm planning schedules.for ~ta 

operational availability at both A~R and PMR. 

Dr. Wheelon further sugles~d that he be added to 

the routine' distribution list for all TITAN m dOcuments and that he be afforded ready and continuing 

access -to the responsible Air· Force SPO. . 

(Tab 140) 

In a measage to CIA, Lt. Colonel Webb stated that . 

plans for the incorporation of the GB prop-ammer 

into CORONA systems -were proceeding at' a rapid 

rate and aa yet there bad been no- CORONA CODffluration Control Board (CCB) deUberation8 on the . 

subject. 

He remarked further that in. the 'past, sy8tem cbau •• 

of far les8 malDitude had'been subject to approVal 

only by the CCB and the, Contracting Officer. 

Lt. Colonel Webb recommended that, 8Uice contract 

nelotiationa for the GE programmer and software 

were at that.point in proce8s, lQulti-lateral. di8C~­

sions throUgh the auspices of the' CCB 'be"'held at the . 

earUest PoSSible date. 

(Tab 141) 

Dr. Wheelon forwarded.to the Director. ·!fRO ~op188 

. of the CIA Request8 for Proposals (UP) OIl the spacecraft and recovery. ·s,stems tor Project FULCRUM. 

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10 September 1964 

10 September 1964 

"_.BYBMI ... SfSIfI· 

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The Project Program and Schedule attachment r,-· ~c~d:' .' 

1. A Phase I, lasting trom 1 September 64 

to 31 January 65 devoted to demonstrating 

the technical and mechanical teasibllity 

of the over-all program, and' . 

2. A Phase D covering the development, 

production and operation of the e~t1re 

system to commence on·l March 65 

should the over-all Phase I stud,. effort 

'''prove the merit ot embarking on a tullscale development program. " 

(Tab 142) 

Mr. Vance and Dr. McMillan met with Mr. McCone 

and Qeneral .Carter. 

Mr. McCone stated that he had decided to a88ip a 

new CIA man, Mr. Crowley, to General Oreer'8 

statt to be responsible for all CIA activities on 

CORONA: contracting, .ecurity, and technical. 

Crowley would have CIA contractini aDd' 8ecurity, 

people with him. . 

Mr. 'McCone, in the presence of Mr. Vance 'and Dr. 

McMillan, directed General carter to unci a memo 

to this effect to Dr. McMillan. It was _,reed that a 

technical advisory committee (to Greer) would be 

tormed, with CIA representation, to r~p1ac.~ the' 

(Tab 143) 

•• t f' o Dr. McMillan's 14 AQlU8t memo on 

Dr. Wheelon stated that primary 

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emphasis .had been, laid on establi8~ clearly the 

program responsibility within' CIA aDd ,in begiDntng· 

a preliminary screening of suitable study contractors. 

A Special Projects Staff within the DD S.T 

had been established to carry the primary responsihUity for "all satellite programs. If 

Project responsibility "ad been assigned to that Staff and Dr. had been 

named Program Director. 

qu~a111~lc~atl.)ns for nl1 .. -al1tnd 

had 'been invited to describe 

experience for conducting such studies. 

Dr. Wbeelon promised the first of monthl~ ,exchange sessions during tl)e week, of 13 &t~ 

(Tab 14~) 

17· September 1964 

17 September 1984 

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-"Bmtl~ -smu ' 

General Stewart alerted Ge'neral Greer to Dr. 

Wheelon's request for results of r/v deaip s~dies 

by Air Force or NRO and indicated that the Director. 

NRO had advised Dr. Wheelon to contact ,General 

Greer directly for the information desired. 

(Tab 145) 

In a reply to Dr. Wheelon's 8 September letters. 

Dr. 'McMillan indicated that arraagements bad been 

completed to Provide the desired information to CIA 

on the various TITAN m configuratioas. Dr. 

McMUlan designated Captain Frank B. Gorman. tJSN 

(Deputy Director for Advanced Plana. SAFSP) as'. 

direct point ot contact for Trr AN', m mattera •. With 

regard to Mark vm r/v desigb iDfor'mation. Dr. 

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17 September 1984 

17 September 1964 

-·BYElWI _sma 

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McMillan apprised General Greer of· Or. Wheelon'. 

desires and suggested to Dr. Wheelon that he contact 

General Greer wi~h the specifics. . 

(Tab 146) 

In a message to the ClA., Lt. Colonel Webb requested 

that an early CCB meeting be convened at the. LMSC 

AI P FacUity to discuss the followina CORONA· oPerational requirements: 

1. Increased accuracy of film footap pot readings from take-up ·cas8ettes. 

2. Modifications to allow cut-and-wrap opera.-

. tion to be independent of recovery operation. 

Webb iterated his·belief that an)' chuge to the CORo-. 

NA system, howeve!" small or large. should have· the. 

benefit of CCB discussions before presematlon to the 

Contracting Officer. 

·(Tab 147) 

. . 

lit a meSSale to the CORONA Program. artice, Lt. 

Colonel Webb complained that he had received unofficial wo.-d that the CORONA vehicie contractor 

had already been directed to 1Dcorporate the GE 

digital programmer in the AGBNA to be used to carry· 

CORONA payloads. in the near future.. . 

Lt. Colonel Webb considered that this cbuge Pre-

. sented a different interface to the payload system 

and requested full particulars in order that the 

L~C AlP could plan &nd accomplish aD)' nec.~.&r)' 

adjustments to operational support procedures and 

equipment. 

(Tab 148) 

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18 September 1964 

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Replying to a 1 September request by SAFSP, a 

. CIA mess·age advised that "NRO ile.curity policy is 

based upon the premise that securit)' responsibility 

follows contracting authority, 1. e., it Director, 

Program A .executes contract with LMSC he would 

have security r.esponsibUlty for activities under 

contract. " . 

Caveat noted "understanding that subject proposed 

. contract is under discussion between agencies • • . 

and- that. • . message addresses. only security 

responsibility ••• not contract authority·or management matters. " 

(Tab 149) 

Dr. McMillan summarized·the activit)' of 15, 16 .. 

and 17 September 1964 regarding· the s),stems 

in~egration contract for CORONA ~t was being . 

negotiated with Lockheed by General Greer. 

On 17 September. Dr. McMillan· had learned that 

CIA contracting officers bad instructed Lockheed 

not to sign the contract with General Greer for 8ystems. integration work. Security problems had been 

cited, without specifics. ne question of whether 

the AlP facUlty, under CIA juriadlcUon. could be 

used by contractors of apncies other than CIA· 

was also raised. 

Dr. McMillan advised Mr. Vance of the situation. 

Mr. Vance instructed Dr. McMillan to contact . 

Lockheed and ask for a written cODfirmation of the 

systems integration contract with General Greer. 

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Buzard, representiDI· 

repreaentiDI Colonel . 

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18' September 1964 

23 September 1964 

--BYEIAN -sma 

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'Ledford to meet Colonel Ford, representing General 

Greer and Visit the' Lockhe~d Alp facility t~ examine the security problem. 

(Tab 150) 

Dr. McMillan recorded his conversation with Mr. ' 

B'ross regarding the "security problem tI at the 

LMSC AlP facility. 

Mr. Bro,s believed that CIA prOcedures on CORONA 

were less formal than those customary on, Government classified contracts~ in the interests. of max- ' 

imum covertness. He 'stated ·that Mr. McCone~ just 

before leaving on 17 September, had made aome ' 

statements to General Carter about the aecurit)' 

issue 'at the LMSC' facility which had not been 'ea87 

to interpret. 

r. ross e a c one a &Dee 

had reached some agreement on CORONA on 

17 September. Dr .. McMillan indicated that his 

conversations 'with Mr. Vance had lett him with a ' 

firm impression that CORONA had not been diacussed between Vance and McCone on 17 September. 

(Tab 151) 

Colonels Buzard and Ford and 

ported their fmeting_ on IIAl'!ur'ftv Dr()Celaw~e. 

Lockheed AlP facUlty •. 

The ~oup found a\marked similarity In' practices I between the LMSClfacllity and 'NRO Program A. 

The group unanim~u8ly concluded that, to ettecU .. l, 

operate security controls over covert contracts and 

to alleviate contractor., confusion, there should be 

only one security control system within a facWt,.. 

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23 September 1964. 

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The group felt that there .were only two prole.--

sionally sound alternatives \to the probl~m: . 

. . 

1. continue with the present security control 

system under whi.ch cla~sflieations were 

not stamped on documents and intrafacility loggings were not required 

2. adopt a system which would require classification stampln,s together with the 

"special handling" notation on each document and intra-facility loggings by each 

. contractor of·the CORONA project 

The group recommended, in light of the 'increased 

size of the CORONA project,the latter alternative. 

(Tab 152) 

In a messap to the NRO on the status 01 FULCRuM. 

CIA cited the followm, prop-ains as underway: .. 

1. ITE~ had begun work in late June to demonstrate the feasibility of tilm handliDl. 

camera dynamics, optical de.lin, facility 

analySiS, and general engineeriDe of the' . 

60-inch F-3 Maksutov desfln. The etfo~, 

on letter contract to date, was bein. -10": 

tiated iil final form. 

2. Back-up ettort at STL to demonstrate tea8i-

. bility.oI faat fllm band ling had belUD on 

8 SeptemfJer 1984. Final contracts were 

being Degotiated. 

3. Back-up optical destin eValuation etlort . 

had been. estabUshed at ~rldn-Elmer on . 

23 June 1984, with CIA funds rlIIlDiDI to 

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28 September 64 at a low level. CIA was 

exploring possibility 'of continuing and 

enlarging this eftort substantially to exlore alternate desi 

CIA advised (for planning purposes). that it ~ . 

M

all n NRO for release Of approximate1y_ 

of the Program B advanced study fund to 

. cover ese efforts. . 

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--BYElWI, 

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(Tab 153) 

In a memorandum for General Stewart, Colonel . 

Worthman outlined the key points of a2l September 

SAC briefing on Satellite War RecoDDais~ance to 

the JCS and commented th.t" "it i8 clear that the 

Strategic Air Command baa become aware of the 

sQ-called 'FULCRUM Development •. ' I c~l1 it a 

development becau8e everyone who heara about this· 

work'., whether in. SAC, JCS~ or Dlf\ - believes .. 

that we are actually produc::t. the system and 

keeping it on super huah-hus • When one attempts 

to explain that the system under description is at 

most a study and at least a hope, .the listener invariably says, 'if this·were only a.studyyou would 

'not have assigned a codeword .to it. r We made a 

fundamental error in permitting a codeword to be 

assigned to the study. Our own security policy -

well-known' to the lntellilencecommunlty - states 

that we will never do thls. We can expect a FOWm, 

clamor for FULCRUM clearances from people who . 

hear hints of it and want on the 'inside. ,n . 

Colonel Worthman recommended cancel1aUOIl at the 

codeword and use ot a standard. routine study 

desl,Bator, such as "P;..43. It 

(Tab 154) 

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29 September 1984 

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Dr. McM,lllan noted the discussions at a meeting 

with Mr. Vance, Dr. Fubini and General Carter. 

1. General Carter would reply to Dr. 

McMillan on the security ,issue at the 

Lockheed A I P facility 

2. General Carter would reply whether 

or not CIA accepted the General Greer 

contract with Lockheed fo~ systems 

integration on CORONA 

3. General Carter would reply on 'whether 

CIA had objections in substance to the 

new SII- installation. 

Mr. Vance r s version of these agreements with 

General Carter'was cc;»nsistent with ,Dr. M~MWan's. 

(Tab 155') 

In a memorandum for the CIA DD/S&T, Dr. McMillan 

referenced: 

1. An 11 August agreement between the Deputy, 

Secretary of Defense and the DCI that "in addition 

to preliminary design on the FULCRUM camera, 

and design and test ot the film transport system, 

a contractor should be elllagad'to conduct a 

comprehensive' system8 design study centered 

on the FULCRUM concept. It 

2. A 23 September 84 CIA mes8age reporting 

that funded competitlon8 were underway to 

select contractors to study new spacecraft 

and re-entry vehicles for FULCRUM. 

3. A 10 September 64 CIA tr8n8Jnittal de8cribing 

the manner'in which thecompetltion was 

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being ~onducted and indicating CIA intention to contract, thereafter for separate 

design studies oli spacecraft and re-entry 

vehicle. 

Dr. McMillan expressed his beliet that the CIA 'funded 

competition and its proposed manner of continuing 

. separate studies' were both premature and not in 

conformanc~ with ~e 11 August 'agreements. 

Dr. McMillan' indicated 'his non-concurrence in the 

CIA action and requested, that, upon receiPt of 

initial contractor responses, further effort!l be 

suspended pending discussion by the NRO Bxecutive 

Committee. 

(Tab 156) 

In a message to SAFSP, CIA requested the to~owfnl 

types of information for use in "conducting a series 

ot studies on a new 8ystem." 

1. ' Operatio~l and desip parameters for 

Mark V and Mark VlU. 

2. Any studies for, new re-entry vehicles .. ' 

3. Detaned rundown on the operational upeets of· the recovery, including limitationa imposed',by snatch gear, etc., 

CIA propOs.ed to visit SAFSP tor a discu88ion and 

suggested 15 or 16 October a8 be8t dates. 

(Tab 157) 

Contract admlnlatration services copizanc'e of the' 

Hiller' Aircraft Company Plant, Palo Alto (''black'' 

facility for CORONA contracts) was a •• iped "t,o 

the Army. 

(Tab 158) 

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IlEIiBYElWf .. SYSTBI 

Representatives of Perkin-Elmer visited Dr. 

M~Mnlan. 

During the summer of 1984, P-E bad been under .. 

contract to CIA :studylng a number of alternative 

camera designs. The work was about to be com- . pleted and they had been approached by CIA to extend the contract, to pursue in more' depth. a 

design study or preliminary de8ign of .one particular preferred configuration. At almflat the same 

time· as the later approach by CIA; General Greer 

had approached P-E for a proposal on certain 

stu~ies which· were sufficiently1ike the work requested by CIA, that P-E feared the)' could not 

undertake both without danger of criticism. In 

conveying this feeling, 'P-E ,.ensed that General 

Greer's people felt that P-E bad ulet them down" . 

in favor of a CIA contract. 

Dr. McMillan explained the general rationale for 

conducting studies ot· the kind. in question. He 

noted that there was intenae enthusiasm in the CIA 

for a particular approach to the general search 

problem. Dr. McMlllan stated as his desire that 

a basis of study be established broad enough to 

insure that any decision by the Goveriunent· on a 

new general search/surveillance system be taken 

"rationally rather than emotionally." 

Dr. McMillan 'and P-E agreed that P-E 'Would consider what they might accompliah iil tbi8 8tudy area 

but would not. be dupUcatiDg work that the CIA contract covered.' 

(Tab 159) 

Dr. McMillan provided to General Carter' and Mr. 

. Vance information concerning the Lyse Alp 

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2 October 1964 

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facility and its fabrication, test ~ s,.stem. engineering effort for the CORONA program •. 

Specifically, Dr. McMillan detailed the tasks 

ac proIna memorandum for Dr. Wheelon, Dr. McMillan . 

requested that DO discussioDS flnplytna a contract 

award on_be .engaged·in untn the agreements ca~r. Mc~illan on 14 August 

had been arrived at. 

Dr. McMUlan's memorandum was instigated by 

a letter of 24 September in which Dr. Wheelon 

stated that he was finalizing study contracts with 

each of three selected firms. 

No discussion of the selections had taken place 

no~ had agreement been reached on either the 

selectiQns or the content of the work atateme.nts. 

(Tab 181) 

In a re.ply to Dr ~ McMillan's 29 September memorandum, Dr. Wheelon indicated that CIA was- proceediDgon FULCRUM according to the plan of 

31 August 64 (forwarded to Mr. Vance on 1 September by Mr. McCone with an indication that be ~d 

approved the procedure and considered· it cOD8istent 

with "the agreement reached OD 18 August 1984. tI) 

Dr. Whee10n suggested that Dr. McMWan's reterence to.a meetini ot 11 Auaust mipt eXplain the 

difference and stated ''In any case, our actlona 

taken thus far and planned are completel,. conaistent with the basic document. II 

(Tab 162) 

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6 October 1964 

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In a memorandum for Mr., Vance, Dr .• McMillan· 

recorded the discussions at meet1nis on 1 and 10 

September on CORONA contracting and added a 

plea: . 

"let us not agree to foul up this impos-

. sible mess any further by having SETD 

under Greer and Lockheed systems 

integration under CIA." 

(Tab 183) . 

Dr. McMillan asked Dr. Wheelon tor a status report on~dies.- what contract. were in 

force and for what amounts - with a brief description 

of the scope of each. . (Tab 184) . 

In a. reply to the 29 September CIA request~ SAFSP 

indicated that Lt. Colonel Sweene, would .provide . 

the information on rlv operational and design . 

parameters and on the operational aspects of recovery. SAFSP confirmed the date 15' October . 

for the proposed CIA visit to SAFSP. 

(Tab 185) 

Mr. McCone, in a memorandum to Mr. Vance, proposed the consol1dation under General Greer of CIA 

responslbllities for securitj, coDtractm, and technical'asslstanee in the CORONA prop-am.' Mr. 

McCone suggested: 

1. Designation' of a single authoritative program director. 

2. Establishment of a CORONA AdVisory Committee. 

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3. Referral of .aU proposed CORONA system changes to CORONA Advisory. Committee for evaluation and appropriate 

recom~endation8 . 

4. Establishment of Aerospace Corporation 

in a general systems engineering function. 

(Tab 166) 

Dr. Wheelon advised Dr. McMillan that an ea.rlier 

response to a query for information on the NRO 

vulnerability program did not provide the iDtormation required by.the DCI..· . 

Dr. Wheelon asked for a briefing on the exact 

nature of the vulnerability program sponsored by 

Director~. Program A~ in FY 1965. 

Responding to Dr. McMillan's letter of 5 October, 

Dr. Wheelon provided a brief status report .on 

-

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9 October 1984 

Dr. Wheelon stated that at the t1me CIA e&tabli,hed 

tile Special Projects Staff in DD/s.T to serve 'ali a 

focus for CIA participation in the sate111te portion 

of the NRP, the· decision was· made to transfer the 

_program to that Staff. .This tranafer was . 

~and Mr. Maxey had just begun to remw . the entire program in detail. Dr. Wheelon sur~ed 

that a' regroupin. or shift in emphasis amODl the 

contractual efforts might proy.· desirable once the 

examination had been cOplpleted. 

'(Tab 188) 

Dr. McMillan submitted to Mr. McNamara the NRO 

Budg~t (Table.33 - Costs FY 1984 throUlh 19~O). 

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9 October 1964 

--BYElMI .--

Dr. McMillan stated.that the p~o.ram co. 

_ ished at a cost -.through FY 1969 of 

above the approved Force Structure 

Financial Plan . 

. The increase provided for the development and 

introduction of an improved general search system; of a new high resolution system - GAMBrr •. 

. 3; five launches ot a new advanced cartographic 

system; and an additional buy of 20 AQ-12 drones. 

Dr. McMillan ·remarked that the program could 

cover the CIA-recominended·FULCRUM system, . 

it the decision were made that FULCRUM would be· 

the new general search system. Be pointed out 

that the FY 65/66 budget figures for this develop-

_ ment were ·low·er than CIA had recommended for 

FULCRUM. The program did not lriclude·CIAre.commended programs fo~ a major DeW -aircraft 

system, two new balloon projects, nor financing 

as CIA had recommended tor two additional satellite systems. 

(Tab 169) 

General Ca·rter forwarded to Mr. Vance, a draft 

of proposed working arrampm,ents for systems 

engiileering of the FULCRUM program, . comment,d 

on by Mr. McCone at a 6 October uieettna of the 

NRO Executive Committee • 

Dr. Fublni's comment: 

"Excellent definition of SB but no TD. " 

Mr. Vance aaked for Dr. McMillan's commentS. 

(Tab 170) 

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--,BYEJMN 

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At a meeting with Mr. Vance, Mr. McCone, General 

Carter and Dr. Fubini" Dr. McMillan reported on 

the latest CORONA and GAMBIT faUurea. 

,'Dr. McMillan also reported on SE/TD as practiced 

by Aerospace for' the Air Force. Mr. McCone and. 

General Carter both stated that the e~cerpt from 

the contractual language read by Dr. McMillan well 

expressed their intent with regard to BE/TD on 

FULCRUM. Mr. Vance stated his feeling that ClA 

was not tasking i~ contractor for technical direction. 

Dr. Fubini' recalled his experience that the TD contractor, when assigned explicit responsibility for 

that task, assumed full technical direction. It, was 

agreed that Dr. McMillan would furnish an e~ple 

of a contract on which Aerospace had s./TD responsibility, and a copy 'of the corresponding taakiDg 

language in the A~rospace ~ontract.' 

Mr. McCone asked for Mr. Vance's reaction to hi. 

letter proposiDg a centraiized CIA responsibility 

on, COR()NA, under' Crowley. reportm, to Greer. 

Mr. Vance indicated that he had a letter :In preparation. 

Dr. McMillan stated his desire to 'meet Mr.' Crowley. ' 

Mr. McCone asked General Carter to meet with Dr., 

McMWan, Mr. Crowley and General Greer and 

'tentatively set a date of 2'1 or 28 October. 

(Tab l~l) 

Mr. Vance, in a reply to Mr. McCone'. 8 October 

memorandum" lauded the DCI proposal, uidicating 

complete OSD agreement on all pointS. ' 

ldr. Vance concurred in, the proposed deatanaUon 

of General Greer as the "single authoritative 

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20 October 1964 

20 October 1964 

--BYEMAN .. SISJDI 

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'representative of the Government tor technical 

direction on the entire CORONA system (r/v, 

camera, substructure, AGENA, booster, STe, 

and recovery forces). " 

Mr. Vance proposed Colonei Beran as the Ch8irman of CORONA Advisory Committee and suggested 

that Mr. Crowley serve as the senior CIA representative. 

(Tab 172) . 

Dr. McMillan forwarded to Mr. McCone several" 

pertinent contractual documents which defined the 

general system engineering and technical direction 

respoDsibiUties of Aero.pace in the GAMBrr program and the contractual enabling' clauses that 

r~cognized the Aerospace relationships' with associate contractors. 

Included were: 

1. Statement of· Work; Con1ract AF :04(895)-

489 with Aerospace' 

2. Technical Operating Plan cove~lDg specific 

Aerospace responsibilities 

3. GSE/TD Clause of Contract AF 18(800)-

2108 'with GE 

(Tab 173) 

Re'erriDg to General Stewart's proposed memorandum to NRO Pro,ram Directors A and B on 

security clearance prQCeaaiDg procedures, Dr. 

Wheelon advised that he was the responsible· olticer 

within the CIA to monitor the poliCies which "plde 

the arriving at s~ch must-know determlDatiolUl." 

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(Continued) 

20 October 1984 

21 October 1964. 

.. -BYElM. 

--

Dr. Wheelon reminded General Stew~rt that the DCI 

had made clear to the NRO Bxecutive Committee 

that he desired that no changes be made in the over:" 

all assignment for contract responsibility in the 

CORONA program. In this Itpt.Dr. Wheelon felt· 

the time was not appropriate to institute the proposals 

recommended by General Stewart IUld 8llIIP8ted that 

consideration be suspended to a later date. Dr. 

Wheelon felt it would be appropriate to recODsider 

the matter at such time as the NRC Executive Com- . 

mittee had completed its current deliberations and . 

had. arrived at a conclusion on. the over-all contract 

management of the CORONA program. 

(Tab 174) . 

Dr. McMillan discussed the NRO budcet with Mr. 

McNamara and Dr. Fubini. 

Dr. Fubini proposed a. a policy that enoup launchillls 

be programmed in both CORONAiuld GAMBIT.to insure a high probabllity of successfully laUDCbfn , 

twelveeacb year. Sixteen or seventeen launchm,8 

of CORONA and fifteen or 8ixteen launchiDgs of GA"~ 

BIT were suggested. 

Mr. McNamara cUrectedtbat· two CORONA 8fatams 

be added in FY 1985 to the previOUSly proposed schedule of fifteen. and that planninl for GAMBIT be done 

on the basis of twelve successes rather than ten 

launcbiDga. . 

(Tab 175) 

Dr. McMillan called Dr. Wheelan to aat ~hether the 

DCI had made any determiaation about iDcorporatma 

technical direction laaguage into the FULCRUM 81stems eJllineeriDg contract. 

Dr'. Whe.elon stated that If the NRO had the impression the DCI was cOllaiderm, such a move_ it w~ 

mistaken. . Dr. Wheelon indicated that CIA had 

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22 October 1964 

24 October 1964 

--BYEIAN --

.bsolutely no intention of inco,rporating technical 

direction in the way he and Dr. McMillan understood the term. 

Dr. Wheelon questioned whether General Greer used 

Aerospace for technical direction in the way belag 

discussed for FULCRUM. Dr. McMillan pointed out 

that the Aerospace contract called for subsystem 

analyses and the analysis of trade-offs between subsystems to optimize performance, ,and imposed upon 

Aerospace a contractual responsibWt)' to develop a 

consistent over-all' system descr,iption and apecilication~. 

Dr,. McMillan stated his desire that the BE lTD contractor for FULCRUM studies ha".a'similar re-' ' 

sponsibility to propose a coherent system concept. 

(Tab 176) , 

The Director, NRO, in a ,memorandum t~' requested:, . . 

1. Authorization for extended 'use of the classified section' of the Biller Plant. 

2. Exemption from normal administration by. 

Army ,representatives .. 

(Tab 177) 

Mr. Vance forwarded a cOP7 of his notes on the 

. 23 October NRO Executive Committee meeting to 

Mr. McCone. 

Actions agreed to:, 

1. DNRO would submit a written report on 

the last three missions. 

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(Continued), 

26 October 1964 

--BYDMN-

--SlID 

2. Sixteen CORONA launchings would be 

budgeted for in each of :VY 85 and FY 88, 

with purchasing to keep six or more re3. Thirteen GAMBrr ~unch1ngs would be -

-budgeted for in FY 65- and fJtteen in FY 68. 

Seventeen system8 -would be purcha8ed for 

delivery during FY 88. 

f. Engineering- and fabrication would be iDitiated 

for four modification kits to permit l1ym, the 

CORONA camera in the GE orbital vehicle. 

5. would be held in FY 85 for 

GAMBrr-3 planning purpo8es. 

6. DNRO wQuId consider with Dr. Fubiin the 

po8sibWty of movinl Prop-am 4i7 out of 

the classified budget. -

(Tab 178) 

In a response to Mr. Vance's letter of 15 October, 

Mr. McCone stated that he was not sutticieidly 

familiar with the internal worldDle of General 

Greer's -organi~t1on to comment on the detail8 of 

the organizational-structure and its function. - -

Mr. McCone coDaidered it proper to haft a 8m,le 

authoritative progralb director (General_ Oreer) 

and that this director should exercise comp1et-e 

technical direction and ~t corporatiOll8 such as 

-Aerospace and others should be aseiped r •• ponaibilities -such as the general s,steme eJll1Deerma 

-function. 

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(Continued) 

27 October 1964 

Addressing the assignment of Mr.' Crowley to and 

in support of General Greer. Mr. McCone. stated 

that Mr. Crowley would "pull together and be responsible for all of the activities carried on by. 

CIA personnel. rr Mr .. McCone telt this would provide a tocal point for contact on all matters and 

"would overcome the problem mentioned to the 

Executive Committee by Dr. McMillan." 

(Tab 179) 

Dr. McMillan recorded. in considerable detan. the 

NRO FY 1985 financial plan discussions at a meeting 

among Mr. Vance, .Mr. McCone, Dr. I'ub1ni and 

. Dr. McMillan on 27 October. lie forwarded to. Mr. 

Vance an UDsigned memor~um - in shorter form -

that he considered more appropriate for signature 

. and trlUlsmittal to Mr. McCone. 

Key relevant it~ms: 

1. .Dr. McMWan would report in more detail 

on the Westo~r' (APSPPL) budpt, relatiDI 

it to the capability of that facility to supplement the BX facility. . 0 

2. 

~ 

_for vulnerability might be low. 

would review the pr()~m . 

with Dr.o McMiJ1an. • 0 

3. _would be applied to_ 

~ve10pmelit funds, ifn::a:r.-

would be 80upt at a later time. 

4. _woUld be beld for FULCRUM 

~. McCone would review the 

contractuallaDguap definiilc the SB/TD 

role of Aerospace on GAMBrr. 

(Tab 180) 

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28 October 1964 

... BYBtAI 

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In a message to CIA, Lt. Colonel Webb protested 

the method for transporting recovered CORONA_ 

capsules directly to the East Coast and requested 

that "an early meeting- be convened ~t Project Headquarters with each intereste~ organization represented to discuss the many operationai, technical, -

economic and security advantages and disadvantages 

introduced by that method. " -

Webb further requested th~t, on a trial basis 

starting with the -next scheduled CORONA-J mi8-

sion, the airplane dellYering capsules stop at 

-Moffett NAS long enough for the capsule to be defilmed at the LMSC Ai P covert facility in Palo 

Alto. 

He suggested that the net 10S8 in time would be 

about one hour over the direct delivery method. (T~b_181) 

In a me88age to the CIA, Lt. Colonel Webb reported 

that the CORONA contractor had submitted, at the 

request ot .the CORONA ProF~m Office, a work 

authorization for the installation of a Jaw programmer in CORONA system J-18. 

The CORONA Program OIlice cODsidered it -advisable 

to review the results of yaw steeriDe in the J-18 .7.-

tem prior to authorizing the incorporation of theprogramme-r-in subsequent flights. -

_ Webb co~sidered that the value of pbotop-apby to be 

derived from yaw steerm, could not be coi:acluatvely 

established by a comparative aual)'aia of results 

with and without the -capabWty; and recomm.eDded -

that further experimentation with the -yaw p~Fammer 

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28 October 1984 

2 November 1964 

2 November· 1964 

TOP SECRET 

be terminated and. ~at the yaw programmer be 

unmedJately introduced into-the systems J-19 

through J-39 a8 an "operational requirement. II 

(Tab 182) 

The CORONA Program Olfice had asted -the CORONA contractor to install Plranl ,aups and ampUllers on ~yatem8 J-4, J-14, J-19 and J-20 to 

measure pressures a8 a check on the pressure 

make-up system ~st iilstalled.· . 

In a messap to the CIA, Lt. Colonel Webb advised 

that he was withholding approval· of this work untU 

the results of previously fiown ,aups were fully 

assessed and the benefit of further installations 

was clearly delineated. Webb lndicated ~t the 

probable operational importance that could be 

gained from additional fiilbts was not readily.appareD. 

Webb remarked further that thla same subject had 

been discussed many times in the past and that he 

''believed it time we sat doWn and figured out'what 

it is we are t~ying to prove with these pressure 

gauges before we 'A further. II 

(Tab 183) 

authorized the Director, NRO the ex- . . . . . 'HiUer Plant and exempted the specified 

a~ea from normal.dministratiYeprocedures practiced by plant representatives. 

(Tab 184) 

·In a messa,e to the NRO Satellite Operations Center, Lt. Colonel Webb stated that he bad iD8tituted 

a program for sampling all orbits deyeloped for 

vehicle ascent guidance purposes and Bent to him. 

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(Continued) . 

2 November 1964 

3 November 1964 

.. -BYDIAN· _ SIIIEI 

Joe SEGREl 

(LMSC A I P) for mis·sion planniDg to "prevent 

another episode such as developed around attempts 

to apply the 9th day synchronous, 800 orbit to a 

Cuba-emphasized. CORONA mission. 

Webb indicated that it· appeared to him that the· NRO 

Satellite Operations Center had been left out of 

planning for- the referenced mission and asked that 

he be advised if there had been a change in the planning procedure which would shift responsibility from 

the NRO Satellite Operations Center to some other 

authority. 

(Tab 185) 

With reference to Lt Colonel Webb'. 2 November 

query, Dr. McMillan ·advised General Greer that 

"the Director, NRO holds the Program Office and· 

Program Director at SAFSP responsible for· the accuracy of orbital planning information submitted. to 

the NRO Satellite Operations Center on the CORONA 

Program. " 

Dr. McMillan suggested that General Greer should 

make the necessary arrangements to' insure that the 

responsibility was adequately fulfilled. 

(Tab 186) 

In a memorandum for Dr. McMiUan, General Stewart 

summarized the events which necessitated. the re~7cliDg 

of the countdown for CORONA Mission 1014 and the consequent inability to meet the launchiDI date lor this mission proposed by Mr. Vance to the USlB on 22 October. 

Although he did not consider it necessary for Mr. Vance 

to explain the tecPical details to the USIB, General 

Stewart suggested that Mr. Vance be advi_d of "our· 

problems. tI . 

Mr. Vance's response to the adYice: 

"Brock --

We must be more careful in the future. This 

is slopp)' and puts us in the poaitionot loOJdDa 

like we dOn't know wbat we are dou.. Row 

did it hapPeD. . Cy'" . 

(Tab 18BA) 

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4 November 1964 , In a memorandum for .the Director of Prop-am B, 

Dr. McMillan expressed his concern over the increase. of "inadequate responses. to requests for 

submission of' important data. 

5 November 1964 

· .. ·8mPI 

-SYSmf 

To rever'se the undesirable trend, Dr. McMillan ' 

directed that: 

1. existing and requests ,for data be ' 

complied with on a timely baSiS, 

2. material overdue be furnished as rapidly 

as possible, and 

3., a positive cooperative relationship be 

developed. 

(Tab 187) 

Dr. McMUlan felt that for a relati~lJ 

Dr. McMillan concluded that the develop-mellll 

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(Continlled) 

6 November 1964 

6 November 1964 

--BYBMN '''SYmI 

McMillan recommended tb:&t CIA keep fully in~ 

Dr. Wheelon com !aiDed to SAFSS-about'a Iltor.ent 

, ,of directives" and 'guidance flooding Lt Colonel 

Webb and announced- his direction to Lt Colonel 

Webb that he accept only Mr. Crowley's word for 

authentication of technical matters. Dr. Wheelon 

stated tha_could, 61 course, continue 

to provide ~ guidance. ' ' 

(Tab 189) 

General Stewart, in a message to, the Director, 

Program B cited the followiDe incidents (see Tabs 

177 arid 181): 

1.' The transport of recovered CORONA cap8ule8~ 

2. The yaw programmer. 

3. The Firani gauges. 

as examples of actions, taken by Lt Colonel Webb, 

at cross purposes with the CORONA Program 

Director (SAFSP). 

General Stewart explaiDed that "non~cont.actua1 opo poSition, while it requires effort needed on other 

problems and may be irritating, is not neceaaarUy' 

bad - - but it is intolerable to have contractual action 

init~ated which ,is directly counter ,to the expressed, 

wishes of the Program Director." 

General, Stewart stated that, on the apecific items 

in question, th~ Director, NBO had decided: 

1. Tbat the yaw programmer was Dot deairable 

on CORONA System J-18 and up •. 

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7 November 1964 

TOP SEGRET 

2 ~ To approve, the installation of Pirant la~s 

and ampl1tiers on CORONA Systems J-4~' , 

J-14, J-19 and J-20. 

General Stewart requested that the CIA eontractinc 

Officer (CORONA) take appropriate contractual ,action. 

(Tab 190) 

Referring to General Stewart's 6 November messa." 

, Lt. Colonel Webb expressed to the CIA rep-et that 

-1 

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IlEIlBYDWI 

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"a mature and conscientious ettort on 'my part to ' ' 

carry out responsibllities to, Project Headquarters 

and to the CORONA, Program haa been misinterpreted 

as malicious fnte,rterence with the wishes' Of the 

CORONA Program Director. " 

lit a somewhat lengthy comment, Webb atteJDpted to 

rationalize his actions, on the specff~c proble,ma. 

Webb stated his belief that "the major fault is that I 

persistently' recommended a returD to the' practice 

where emotionally mature people discuss the Deeds 

o~ the program in an atmosphere of mutual professional respe'ct. " 

(Tab 191) 

Dr. McMillan directed that Program ,8 (CIA) CODtractor security practices be revised to provide for: 

1. A formal internal document accountingsys-

_tem at all contractor'installaUoDS for 'all 

documents. 

2. Marldng of all docume~s with the appropriate standard security classification 

indicator in addiUo~ to other, indicators. 

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9 November 1964 

(Continued) 

10 November 1964 

10 November 1964 

11 November 1964 

--BYDIAN 

--

A copy of this directive was forwarded to General 

Ca~er with a note from Dr. McMillan Wllich ref~renced a 23 September 1964 report 01. security pra~­

tices at the LMSC AlP Facility on which he bad 

expected General Carter' a com~enta. 

Dr. McMillan advised Geueral Carter that, in the 

absence 01. any comments,· he bad issued the directive. 

(Tab 192) 

. In a memorandum for the Director, . NRO, Dr.· . 

Wlutelon offered a progress report on the FULCRUM 

program during'the week· of 18 November 84. 

(Tab 193) 

Referring to Dr. McMillan's concern over estimates 

of satellite vulnerability, Dr. Wbeelon ·offered the 

servicee of the Office of Scientific IDteWgence, CIA 

to resolve any difteren~es of substantial mapltUde 

in the estiinates. . 

(Tab 194)-

.. 

Referrinl to Dr. McMillan'. mess .. e of 3 November, 

General Greer commented on the current situation 

regarding operational responaibWty for the COR~ 

NA project, and sUlgeated explicit direction by the 

Director, NRO to corl"ect the aituation • 

SummariziDg his comments, General Greer advised . Dr. McMillan tbat the prime ·factor in the series 

incidents surroUllCiiDl the CORONA prop-am was-that· 

" .- •• Webb's operatiOns are·now almoat completely . 

removed from the Satellite Tracking Center in ·practically every resPect.. Other than to check microwave, we seldom see any ot his people &Del the Feat . 

majority of all busiDess i8 now bl Phone.'~ 

(Tab 190) 

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.-BYEMM 

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Dr. Wheelon complained bitterly that Dr. McMillan's 

direction to apply FY 84 advance aircraft studies· 

carry-over money against "other a.,proved" items 

in FY 85 was contrary to the agree.ment Dr. McMWan 

had reached "in the presence of a dozen CIA aad NRO 

personnel" at a· meeting at Langley. 

Dr. Wheelon claimed that CIA had presented a ·per.-

suasive case that a Mach 5-8 aircraft would make 

little improvement oVer OXCART and had requa·.ted 

that the money be carried over into FY 85 a8 a . 

"working account tor promising new approaches." 

Wheelon.~lleged that Dr. McMWan had a,reed to 

this course of action as a "prudent and constructive 

step. It 

Dr. Wheelon asserted that if those tunds were ·not 

avallable. CIA must insist on comparable interim 

fUnding trom FY. 65 pending clarification of the matter. 

Dr. Wheelon had directed ColOllel Ledford to suspend 

action on that portion ot Dr. McMillan's directive 

which dealt with th~ subject. 

(Tab 198) . 

Dr. McMWan called General Carter to arraace a 

meeting with General Carter. General Greer and 

Mr. Crowley for· the followfDa week. 

General Carter ·indicated he woul~ be awa)' for several 

days the following week. General Carter advlaed that. 

he. was trying to have an a~y8i8 made of the VanCe' 

McCone corresponden~e because. althoulh he could 

see vast areas of agreement, he al80 saw· places 

which could become "hookers." and believed it would 

be best to have Carter/McMillan nelOUatioDB on 

these areas prior to settiDg up 8uch a meetm,. 

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(Continued) 

16 November 1964 

18 November 1964 

--BYEIAN 

. --

General Carter felt that, after the aua1ysls had 

. been evaluated, and proper ne,otlatloDS between 

McMillan and Carter took place, a: meeting could . 

be arranged with Greer and Crowley. 

Dr. McMillan agreed with that approach and advised General Carter that he would await further . word. 

(Tab 197) 

In a letter to Dr. McM:il.lan, General Carter concurred in the "recommended security revisioDs" 

in Program B contractor security practices .. 

Generar'Carter explained that he had chosen not 

to comment "as there seemed to be agreement as 

to the relatively mino:r changes required" and ~ . added the caveat: ". • . it is explic~t1y' under- . 

stood that this modification does not set a 'precedent 

for other 'CIA programs nor does it affect the current discussion of CIA participation in various 

portions of th~ CORONA program. II 

(Tab 198) 

Because of a severe short.,e of ·clearances, it was . 

not until the first part of this month ·that the Aero-

. space Corporation agreed that it would participate 

in a CORONA mission. This was cODSidered by 

Aerospace to be the most rapid and efficient" method 

of acquiring a detaUed un~erstandiDI of the cOlllp18te 

CORONA system.. Accordln,ly SAFSP contacted the 

CIA representative at the LMSC Alp and requested 

schematics, ca1ibrati~D boob, block diagrams. . 

telemetry schedules, payload operation seqaellce,data 

and other pertinent data and documents. The CIA 

representative reluctantly agreed to ~pp17 this data 

to Aerospace durinl the operation. . 

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(Continued) 

--'BYElWI 

--

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To cause as ·little commotion as, possible. Aero~ 

space agreed to take the documents and data to .a 

separate area at the Satellite Control Facility 

(SCF). Sunnyvale and perform an independent 

analysis. 

Upon arrival at the SCF. on the day of the CORONA Mission 1014 operation. Aerospace requested. 

the documents and were told by the C~ represent_-

tive that in his opinion he did not 'have the authority . 

to release them to Aerospace. 

Aerospace explained that, in order to discharge 

its responsibilities as the general SETD contractor, it required a detailed firsthand knowle.e of 

the complete system and that' 8Uch knowledge, it 

felt. could be gained most efficiently from actual 

experience. 

The CIA representative was most concerned by the 

Aerospace request for the actual payload, ,operation 

sequence. In an effort to proceed. Aerospace 

waived that reqUest ~d agreed to proCeed to the· 

LMSC AlP FaCility and pic't up the documents. 

At the appointed t1me~ the Aerospace personnel 

arrived at the LMSC AI P FacUilJ and were confronted by the CIA representative, who fiat17 refused 

to supply Aerofipace with any documentaUon or data, 

giviDgas his reason his feeliDl that he did not h.~ 

the· proper authority • 

At this point, Aerospace abandoned' an hope of obtaining the' documentation or data or of monitoring , 

the miasion - and, departed. 

(Tab 199)' 

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19 November 1964 

20 November 1984 

"'-SYDIMI ,--

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Mr. Vance apprised' Mr.' McCone of his suggestion 

that Dr. McMillan convene a sman steering ,roup 

of appropriate persoDS. under Dr.' ¥cM1llan's. 

chairmanship. to assure that the approach or approaches selected for future development of a new 

searchand/ or surveWance system fulfilled· all 

national requirements and were. . in fact. the --best 

optIons avanable. 

Mr. Vance indicated that' he had as~d that the group 

examine information needs •. determiDe techDical and 

operational criteria. and present an e~aluatioD of . 

the most promising alternative search.and/or surveWance. satellite systems-which milht beiDcluded 

in the NRP. He anticipated further that the steering 

group be assisted by a full-time task f()rce in the . 

Washington area. 

Mr. Vance indicated his agreement on Dr~ McMi~an's 

suggestion that the steeriDg poup and the. ta8k force 

each have a CIA representative and as~d Mr. McCone 

for the names of his representatives. 

An "Operating Plan for study of Search/Surveillance 

Satellite Recormaissance" .as- attached. 

(Tab 200) . 

Responding .to Dr •. Wheelon's memorandum of 12 November, Dr. McMWan stated that hladirective of 14 AlII-. 

ust relative to fundi .. -~as .tW ·in force. 

Dr. McMUlan agreed to consider authorizfDg .FY 85· 

funds for studies relating to advanced aircraft it a 

specific ... d clear requirement were identified. 

(Tab 201) 

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20 November 1964 

20 November 1964 

21 November 1964 

--BYDtAN --' 

Referring to Dr. WheelOn's memorandum'of 10 November, Dr. ,McMillan stated "we seem to be .o8iD1sflht' 

of'my original request to the Agency tor assistance.", 

Dr. McMf:l1an indicated that his orilfDal request to 

the DCI,was for estimates of the pOssible and probable 

Soviet anti-satellite technical/operational capabilities 

in mid-196S and by mid-1968. He explained that he ' 

had been briefed on possible near term Soviet' detec'-

tion and tracking capabilities, but bad asked tor 

further analyses. 

Subsequently, Dr. M~MWan had pointed out that his 

need was, for anti-sateWte weaponry' as well as detection and trackinl systems. Be had not received any 

information on thls subject •. 

Dr. McMillan reiterated his orfllnal request. 

(Tab 202) 

Gener8J. Greer advised General Stewart that Lt. Colonel 

Webb .(CIA representative at LMSC A/P) had refused 

to give 'the repre,sentatives of Aeroapace Corporation 

the documentation and data essentlai. to carryiDI out 

itsleneral enpneerm, responsibilities in the CORONA program. ' 

(Tab 203) 

In a messa,e for Colonel Ledford, Dr. McMillan indicated that Lt. ColonelWebb'e refusal to re~e .. e 

CORONA payload iDtormation to'duly authorized A.erospace representatives had been broupt to h1a atteJition. 

Dr. McMillan directed that· Colonel Ledford lasue 

instructions to the CIA representative at the LIISC 

A/P FacUity to release the requeeted iDfo~atiOD to . 

Aerospace personnel aaauthorized byGe~ral Greer. 

(Tab 204) , 

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23 November 1964 

25 November 1964 

28 November 1964 

30 November 1964 

30 November 1964 

.. - BYElCAN 

-SfSIDI 

. CIA cancelled the FULCRUM briefing scheduled for 

24 November 64. 

(Tab 205) 

Dr. McMillan asud Dr. Wheelon for a briefing on 

FULCRUM: activities on 3 or 4 December. 

He also .asked Dr. Wheelon ·to· arranie for the CIA 

group to brief the Steerm, Group for the new NRO 

Search/SurveWance Satellite. System on 9 December. 

(Tab 208) 

A CIA message . authorized the CIA representatlve . 

at the LMSC AlP Facility to 'provide Aer9sp8Ce 

personnel in their capacity .a ._ral systems 

engineers the CORONA pa71oad.iDformatlon previously requested. The message rioted further that 

this Hinteriin" action was taken JMladm, further 

'negotiations on the ~ver-aU CORONA program. 

(Tab 207). 

Referring to .Dr. McMillan'.s request of 25 November, Dr. Wheelon 'stated that he would haVe to await 

instructions from ''his boas" before ap-eeui, to 

brief. the Steeriilg Group, aa requested.' . 

Dr. Wheelon stated that his orpnization was not 

persuaded that the Steerin, .Gr.oup was a proper or 

a good idea~ He characterized the brietiDg to 

Fubini and McMillan' aa "routine and proper. " 

(Tab 208) 

Dr. McMillan in an attempt to clarity West Coast 

responsibilities and to preclude inadvertent actioDs 

. in the operational CORONA program, directed the 

following: 

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30 November 1964 

(Continued) 

30 November 1964 

--BYElWt · .. smEI 

1. All CORONA traffic to be handled between' 

the NRO and SAFSP/STC.·terminals on the 

BYECOM net.· 

2. General Greer to be responsible for the ac" 

. curacy and content of all traffic. 

3. 

under command 

General Greer (or· his designated representative) and to be responsible for: 

4~ Durm, CORONA mission.,re8p0D8ib1e repre8entation frO~the P FacWty to be 

present at th to provide advice 

or talm require ac on8. . . 

·(Tab 209) 

Referring to Dr •. McMWan'.· inemorandum of 5 NcweQiber to Dr. Wheelon G«tneral Carter atated that while 

the potential 

bad been ree •• • ~I Ie - ~ 

factors of the, system from the outset, he did not 

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(Continued) 

1 December 1964 

-. BY£lIAN 

_SllTD·· 

TOP SECRET 

consider itte or render prem~ture 

judgment of untU ·CIA had had an 

opportunity to re of the technical 

studies being prepared in depth by the "three. bighly 

y s u g m. 

As an administrative nlJll't'b!IP 

on the possible .,., ... ,,, ..... 

General Carter remarked tbatthe polley decision 

that Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone. h$d made regarding 

vigorous and secure exploration of "this importaat 

intelligence opportunity~· by CIA was be'iDl followed. 

dililently by CIA. .' 

(Tab 210). 

Dr. McMillan forwarded to Ge~eral Car:ter a propo8ed 

redraft of a memorandum d agreement on the CORONA 

prograin. .. 

The redraft: 

1. named General Greer as prOiram manager 

2. al.gned responsibUities of the Secret&r)' of . 

Defense and the DCI with- the 13 March·S3 

Agreement 

3. adjusted organizational terminolol1 to that 

of NRO elements 

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(Continued) 

2 December 1984 

2 December 1984 

--BYElWI 

-sma 

4. recognized the contractual'amenebnent of' 

Aerospace respo~8ibnities 

5. removed Mr. Crowley,from a propOsed 

cha~rmanship of the CORONA Advisory 

Committee 

6.' specified the technical decision responsibUities of General Greer. as CORONA 

program, manager 

7. deleted a proposed' parallel PI:"oject manager arrangement. 

(Tab 211) 

SAFSP requested the CIA to place eilht SAFSP and ' 

six Aerospace . personnel on the permanent acceaa 

list at the LMSC Alp FacUity in o~der that SETD 

responsibilities in the CORONA Pr~gram could,be 

carried. 'out. 

(Tab 212) , 

In a message to Dr. McMillan. General Carter stated 

that "in view of recent traffic concerniDg the ,(operational CORONA) problem and, our conversations about' 

your op~on of ,Lt. Colonel Webb" he had, examiDed 

all incidents that miaht fall.within the "obUque'refer- , ' 

ences" of Dr. McMillan's 30 November measap. 

General Carter indicated that whatever problema 

had occurred. they were not traceable to deficiencies 

, in the standar~ operating procedures heiDI used ,nor ' 

to any lapse on the part of Program B peraODDel at . 

the LMSC Alp Faclliti~ 

General Carter concluded that the problem ... If any. ;, 

would not be solved by modificat'lon 01. the procedures. 

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2 December 1964 

( Contiliued) 

3 December 1964 

... BYElIAN -sma 

especially since there was still in force the" Deputy 

Secretary of Defense /DCI agreement not to· nlake 

changes pending 801ution of CORONA program 

organizational resp<;)nsibilities. 

General Carter stated fUfth,i-· that he could not 

agree to Dr." McMillan's 30 November direction 

. nor to any changes to existing. standard operating 

procedures or manuals which would refiect such 

proposals_ 

(Tab 213) 

In a reply to Mr. Vance's 19 November letter. Mr. 

McCone stilted that he had. no objection to Dr. 

McMlllaD's suggestion that a steering group and 

supporting task force be ~atab1i8hed to as sur, that 

the approach or approaches selected for future 

development of a new search and/or surveillance 

. system fulfllied all national requirements. He 

indicated that he Was agreeable to CIA participation 

and that he would arrange ·for the nece8sary personnel to be .assigned to both organizations. . 

Mr. McCone qualified his agreement by 8tat~that 

he "assumed that the terms of refe~ence for the task 

force would be modified to the extent Decesaar,- to 

. avoid overlaps or duplications wi~ the charters of 

the existing USmcommittees or the USlB itself •. 

and that the research and development work underway on FULCRUM and GAMBrr-S\would" be carried 

forward to the point -.reed by the NRO Bxecutive 

Committee without interruption or further delay_ 

Mr. McCone indicated his desire to reserve com-. 

ment on the detans of the "Operating Plan for "Study 

of SearchlSurveDlance satellite Reconnaissance" 

which. h.·.f.lt. served a8 terms of reference tor the 

steerini group aDd might requIre modffication. 

(Tab 214) . 

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4 December 1964 

4 December 1984 

8 December 1964 

"·8&. 

-SIBIl 

In a reply to the 2 December request by SAFSP lor' 

permanent access to' the LMSC Alp' Facility, CIA' 

indicated that the LMSC Alp had.been directed to 

place only Colonels. Murphy and Heran oil the perma;' 

nent acces's Ust and that the CIA had non-concurred 

in the request for permanent access for the remaining 

personnel cin the basis of inadequate justification lor 

need-to-k:now and CIA's view that the subjects did ~ot 

need unlimitedaccese in the performance of their' 

duties. . 

SAFSP was 'told that all SAFSP visits to the LMSC 

A I P would require individual written clearance from 

Washington, based upon detaned individualilubjects 

to be discussed and processed·at least 48 hours in 

advance. 

(Tab 215) 

.. Dr. McMillan ·was briefed privately on FULCRUM bl 

Mr. Maxey.. Mr. MaXey Indicated that all was ,olD, 

well.' The design remained about the same as shown 

on pr~vious charts -- 60 lDches, F/3, ~o c·ameras. 

The coverage remained at 11,000, OOO.square miles 

in stereo. 

(Tab 216) 

Confirming hi-s telephone conversatlon with. Dr. 

McMillan, General Carter· desipated Mr. Huntm,ton . 

Sheldon as the initial CIA representative to the 

McMillan steering group. Also confirmed was the 

designat~on of Mr. Arthur Lundahl to the steeriDI 

group in his capacity. as Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center. 

General Carter cautioned that 'later developments 

might well1ndlcate the desirability of addm, additional CIA· personnel to both the steerm, p-oup and 

task force or. changing the desipated r,pre.sentative. 

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(Continued) 

9 December 1964 

"-BYDWI 

-sma 

, General Carter indicated his underst-.nd1ng that Dr. 

McMillan had requested 'a briefinl on, FULCRUM . 

for the steering group on 9 December,' and advised 

that Mr. McCone's letter to Se,cretary Vance bad 

excluded FULCRUM from the consideration of the, 

steering group. He remarked furthe~ that he would 

discuss the matter with Mr. ,McCone as the first ' 

order of business after his return. 

(Tab 217) 

In a message to Dr. McMillan, General Carter confirmed his ap-eement with Mr. Vance on ,8 Dece~ber , 

that the CORONA procedures in existence prior, to 

Dr. McMillan's directive of 30 November would be ',' 

utilized for the CORONA mission scheduled for 

14 December 64, and further that. the' provisions of 

the 30 November, directive' would be held in abeyance 

until ,such time as, the entire matter of command,' 

control, jurisdiction of payload and operatioD&l 

aspects of CORONA had been agreed to by the DCI 

and the Secretary of Defense. 

,General Carter requested that Dr. McMillan: 

, 1. Advise appropriate CORONA addressees 

that the ,30 November procedures were nOt 

applicable. . 

2. Advise appropriate CORONA addressees 

that the LMSC Alp would participate in the 

mission under fo~mer prOcedures eDstm, 

prior to the issuance ~ the 30 November 

directive. , 

3. Detail Lt. Colonel Vern Webb to 'the CIA so 

that he could assume bla,prior duties and 

responslbWties at the LMSC AlP FaeWtJ~ 

(Tab 218) 

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10 December 1984 

1l.December 1984 

14 D.ecember 1984 

14 December 1984 

_II. BYElIAN 

--

'rheDirector, Program B adVised the CIA representative at the LMSC AlP FacUlty that "should you 

encounte.r any circumstance which wW not p!trmit 

the efficient discharge 9f your responsibilities, . or 

c rcums ance w c your ew opar zes m ssion success, I am to be notified immediately." 

(Tab 219) 

. A Director, Program B Instruction to 

_at the LM8C Alp Facility stated: 

"l. Coritracting Olficer. herein transfers 

the redelegation 01 his authority . • • 

to you. This authority covers all of 

the work under contracts DM-2818, 

TE-1901, 8J-1939, and.·AM-2817.· 

"2. This authority originally granted Lt.· 

(Tab 220) 

Lt. Colonel Webb -was returned to the Air Force from 

duty with the CIA and assflned to the SCF, Sunnyvale. 

General Carter 

to the McMlllan tast 

stee:ring group. 

GeneraiCarier indicated his understandin. that the 

original "Operating Plan for Study of Searcb/Survalllance Satellite Reconnaissance" was beu. fully 

t a 

by Mr. McCone for his approYa! would not be forthcoming. 

General. Carter~clflcall J.nted out that the 

. participation of Mr. Lundahl in . . 

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(Continued) 

14 December 1964 

IIIIlE III BYElIAN 

· ... smu. 

the work of the steering group and task force did . 

not commit in any way the DCI or the' CIA to the 

findings of these groups - stating that they were 

participating as individuals who had a technical 

competence needed in Dr. McMWan's studies. 

Substantive actions developed a8 the result of 

studie8, General Carter stated, would be subject 

to the approval of the DCI and, as appropriate, 

the usm. 

(Tab 221) 

Mr. McCone requested that Dr. McMillan brief 

the NRO Executive Committee' and members of the 

. CIA staff on plans and proposals for utilization of 

the two fUm processing facilities, EX, Rocheate'r 

and the AFSPPL at Westover AFB. 

Mr. McCone stated that. the 11 Aupat 8a memorandum of understanding regardiDa processine and 

. reproduction of photography d~signated 

1. the covert EK processing facility under 

. CIA to be utilized for processing all 

original nelative materials, some film 

duplication and R&D of new proee.siDe 

techniques for both facilities. 

2. the AFSPPL to be utllized to produce 

duplicates for distribution to users. 

Mr. McCone considered it necessar,. that this pOUc:y: 

be reaffirmed or mOdified b:y joint .. reement in onter 

that CIA might comment properq OD the FY 85 NRO 

budeetary proPosals. 

(Tab 222) 

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18 December 1964 General Carter'informed_(n8wly'deslgn&ted 

CIA repre8entat~ve at the ~FacUlty): that no 

policy decisions had been reached between Secretary 

Vance and the DCI nor had discussions, been held. ' 

19 December 1964 

21 December 1964 

21 December 198,4 

_a_ '--

General Carter directed that normal procedures in 

effect on 3,0 November 198~W0u1d continue to be followed, i. e. , had personal 

control and responsibility or_as well as 

on-orbit camera 'operations. was advised 

to maintain strict control of con ra or support &lid to 

insure their, specific responsiveness to ,him as the 

CIA representative. 

(Tab 223) 

Referring to Mr. McCone's request of 14 December. ' 

'Dr.' McMillan agreed to brief the RBO Bxecutive 

Committee on NRO film processing plans. 

priate members of the CIA Statf. 

(Tab 22.) 

Referring to General Carter" s memorl!!!-

14 December, Dr., McMillan welcome 

participati~n as a member of the Steering Group 

Task Force. 

Dr. McMillan c 

participation of 

." fl.', . 

not commit in any y 

'findinls of the Group_ 

(Tab 225) 

• 

understal1ding that the 

and Mr. Lundahl would 

CI or the CIA to IUlJ 

In a messale to Captain Gorman" the CIA requested 

payload and 'configuration data (He Tab 148,. on the 

TITAN nrx/AGBNA launch vebicle in support of 

"study programs now underwa, at CIA. II 

(Tab 22'6) 

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22 December 1964 

24 December 1964 

] --8YElPJI --. 

In a me'morandum to-Mr. Clark 

. (CIA Director of Bu~Al1&lyais and. 

Manpower) finalized the funding arrangement for 

Project requested funds in the . 

. FY 65. 

(Tab 227) 

In a note to Mr. Vance, Dr" McMillan requested 

guidance in the handlmg of the 22 December CIA 

request for FULCRUM fundin,. . 

Specifically, Dr. M:wI[ended rrtha~ . 

we do not release tb 'and that notification 'be given to· the C via Comptroller channels 

in a memorandum containiDg the following central 

paragraph: 

"The DNRO has instructed me that 

NRO funds are to be'released at this 

tim:e only tor those parts of the' PULeR UM s'tUdies that cover prelimiDary 

optical and mechanical'deailD of the 

camera and tUm handling system, 

and tabrication and detinitive dynamical test of suitable prototypes or 

simulations thereof. Other studies 

. relating to FULCRUM are not bem, 

conducted in a manner approved b;y 

the DNRO or by the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, and.no agreement baa 

been reached that they be funded from 

the NRO budget. ". 

Dr. McMillan stated his beUef that "the CIA's complete rejection of NRO control in this case should not. 

he c~ndoned in any way. ". . 

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(Continued) 

24 December 1964 

30 December 1964 

"-.BYEfUI 

--

Mr. Vance noted the recommendation but did not 

concur. He -indicated' that the matter. s~ou1d be 

handled in the same manne.r as GAMBrr-3, i. e., 

with review and release points. 

(Tab 228) . 

Dr. McMillan asked Mr. Vance's guidance on a request by CIA. to the NRO Compt~oller. that a copy 

Of the NRO budget tor FY 1988 be forwarded to Mr. 

McCone, since·tlte budget. had not been discussed 

at NRO Executive Committee level. 

Mr. Vance' replied "Give it to Mr. McCone." 

(Tab 229) . 

Referring to Dr. McMillan's memorandum of 

20 Novembe.r, Dr. Wheelon alle"d that the eor-

. respondence had sh:lfted the subject somewhat away 

McCone's concern • 

. Dr. Wheelon re18.ted his understanctm, that Dr. 

McMillan had challenged the .correctness of the . . 01· 

of the 

:ra,Ckllmr cOltnblDl~UCl.n. . Dr. 

the validity of this est!- . 

mate would be easily discussed and settled in a 

technical forum. Dr. Wheelon stated that Ii Dr. 

McMillan did not disagree with the CIA estimates 

''by an order of magnitude .or more" then the matter could be promptly closed •. 

Dr. Wheelon added that Dr. McMWan'a memorandum raised the broader and more tuDdamental . 

question of probable Soviet capabWties and intent,' 

which be lelt w •• certainly the t~.t concern 01 the 

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. 30 December 1964 \ 

(Continued) 

NRO. This judgment,he claimed, properly be-

. longed to the Board of National Estimates. 

4-15 January 1985 

6 January 1965 

t . 

(Tab 230) 

request funding simply requested 

that CIA furnish the data which 'would 'essentially 

update the chart attached' to Dr. Wheelon's memo- . 

randum of 31 August 64. 

(Tab 231) 

Parametric study results and preliminary designs 

on the search/surveillance satellite .ystem· (5-2) 

were presented to Dr. McMillan by EKC, FeIC 

and ITEK. 

General Stewart and Mr. Maxey had undertaken a 

series of low-key, exploratory nelotiatioD~ in atNA impasse. 

General Stewart and Mr. Maxey agreed that: 

1. A~ would be established 

b~STC (General Greer) .. 

and the LMSC Alp (CIA rel)reaentatlve). 

ircuit would be established 

hlilln."en STC and the LMSC AlP. 

3. BISON (CIA representative, STC) would 

be·closed. 

General Stewart· ,instructed 

Communicatlons Office.r) to .LI&D'~~ 

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12 January 1965 

--BYBWI -- . 

Ina note to Dr. Fubini. Dr. McMillan included a 

summary of the characteristics of the· camera s,stem being studied by Perkin-Elmer as a backup to 

rrEK on ·FtrLCRUM. 

peE had been told'by Dr. Wheelon to devise a relatively simple system with low risk factors. Dr. 

McMillan felt that his reasoning ·was that he wanted 

something he knew would work as compared.to the 

risks involved in the. rrEK concept •. 

Dr. McMillan opined that the peE de.fIn 'was marginal. Be likened the concept of two 7-foot barre.ls 

mOving horizontally and laterally to "two G'·s 

moving in the breeze I" WhUe Dr. McMillan could 

not understand Dr. Wheelon's reasoning in this· . 

matter. he felt that Dr. Wheelon had perhaps accepted the peE design "as a wedge to insure that 

the 'ITEK concept was the moat reaso_bl,. acceptable. " . 

(Tab 232) 

Referring to the CORONA agreement which he had 

been discussing with GeneraiStewart, Mr. Maxey 

expre.ssed CIA concern that the desilDation of the 

Director. SAFSP as responsible for the direction 

of field operations could be interpreted to include 

those activities being performed at the LYSC AlP 

Facility. specifically the on-orbit camera operations • 

. Mr. Maxey indicated his re~ollection that General 

Stewart had a,reed not to alter present procedures 

concerning the functions of the LMSCA/P Facility 

and that, by field operations, General Stew.rt was . 

particularly concerned ·about launch, space-tracking, 

recovery, etc. 

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(Continued) 

13 January 1965 

14 January 1965 . 

.. -BYEIM , .--

Mr. Maxey requested a confirmation of this understanding .. 

'(Tab 233) 

General Carter forwarded to Dr. McMillan a copy . 

of a proposed Memorandum of Agreement on CORONA, indicating that it had been·worked over ver1 

carefully by General Stewart with the CIA people. 

General Carter signed the origiJial. and carbon and 

indicated that he would consider the ap-eemerit in 

full force and effect upOn receipt of'a copy signed . . 

by Dr. McMUlan. 

Key points: 

I. The Director, SAFSP as the _iDele authoritative program.manager for CORONA, 

reportiDg directly to th~ Director,NRO. 

2. All CIA technical and contractual activities 

in CORONA consolidated un4er a' senior 

CIA representative, reporting to and 

located in the offices of the Director, 

SAFSP. 

3. Aerospace Corporation to provide s1stems enP.n.eerlng services for CORONA. 

4. Palo Alto AlP Facility to continue'to provide software. support to the' CORONA 

program. 

(Tab 234) 

Dr. Wheelon called Dr. McMillan to discuss the allegation that the GE and Lockheed contracta had not· 

been amended to permit Aerospace to get the' neeeasary information. '. 

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.(Contin~ed) 

15 January 1965 

18 January 1965 

"·BYElWf 

. --smu 

Dr. McMillan told Dr·. Wheelon that the information 

requested by Aerospace was not beinl made available 

and that he (Dr. McMillan) was not s~e it w.s the 

fault of the contractors involved. Dr. Wheelon asked 

Dr. McMlllan a. specific question, "Who do you think 

it was?" Dr •. McMillan replied, "You." 

(Tab 235) 

In a reply to Mr. Maxey's query of 12 Janual7 on the . 

CORONA understandiDg, General Stewart stated that 

his interpretation of the intent ot the ap-eement was 

that there would be· no change either in current tunctions and responsibilitIes of the LMSC A I P Facility 

or in their rtlationships with the NBO Satellite 

Operations Center. General Stewart indicated that 

he felt sorne change in the relationship of the Lyse 

. AlP FaciUty with the Director, SAFSPwas implicit .. 

through the responsibillties, ·functions, etc., of the 

proposed senior CIA representative. 

(Tab 238) 

. in a message.for Dr. McMillan, Dr. Wheelon reiterated CIA r .. unders:tandlnl that the baSic ground 

rules·for CORONA operations were predicated upon 

the agreement. reached between General'Carter and 

Mr. Vance that CORONA procedurea effective OD 

30 November 84 would apply for CORONA miasioDs 

until such time as the entire matter of command;,' 

control, jurisdiction of payload and operational 

aspects of CORONA had been a,reed by the DCI an4 

the· Secretary of Defense. 

Dr. Wheelon requested that Dr. McMillan ensure 

that only those CORONA procedures in ettect on 

30 Novemb~r' be applied to current CORONA operations. 

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16 January 1965 

(Continued) 

22 ,January 1965 

IIIIU .. BYBWI -sma 

Regarding communications discussions between Mr. 

Maxey and'Geileral St~wart, Dr. WheeloD indicated 

,that -it was Mr. Maxey's that ap-eement was reached to communications 

install 

On a new subject, Dr. Wheelon stated that the CIA 

was convinced that nothing but confusion could stem 

from contractors receiving directioD8; requests~ 

and information from more than one source. Dr. 

Wheelon indicated his belief that, in'view of the Dew17 

proposed CORONA agreement and the tact that Dr. 

McMillan was not. ,taking sPecifiC, exception to the 

principle, it would be, proper fo~ the directioD to th. 

CORONA payload contractors and, other CIA-let COD~ , 

tracts t • .... c·, I d through the' CIA cODtrac~iiII 

officer in the, case at the LYSC Al P 

. , (Tab 23'1) 

A CIA message to LYsC, ITEK and' GE reiterated' 

the following CIA contractm, officer's policies and 

procedures covering the CORONA program: 

1. Contractors, shall not implement work outside'the contract scope and/or specificatioDa 

without the expressed approval of the contracting officer or his ' ' 

'sentative (desipated 

the LMSC A/P). 

by written dtrection from the contractin, 

, officer or in the form of technical directives ilibY the contracting officer or. . 

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(Continued) , 

22 January 1965 

, .. - BYEMAN 

--

3. Contr,actmg officers will be kept informed 

of proposed incre.s.s in contract scope 

from the very beginning. ' 

The CIA indicated that this action waa essential in 

light of "several inStancea 'where 'CORONA contractors had re~eived cables, letters and/or phone, 

calls from various sources in the government which 

ha4 requested and/or directed that certain work be 

,accomplished. If , ' 

(Tab 238) 

Iil a letter to Mr. MC,CQfte, Dr. McMlllari outlined the 

study efforts undertaken by different NRO contractors .. 

exclusive of those OD FULCRUM, that applied or were 

related to ,gene~al aearch and aurveUlance 8Y8tems •. 

These included: 

1. The EKe VALLEY contract directed 8peclfically to general search systeins based 

. on TITAN me boosters. 

2. The ·ITEK contract which inCluded such ' 

items as atmospheriC investigations U8li1a 

balloon photography and 'some work on' ' 

large aperture optics •. 

3. The Fairchild contract for studies leading 

toward, the definition of 9ne or more . 

. general aearch systems. 

4. The 'LMSC studies on: 

a. ,j\daptatlon of the AGENA to .a larpr 

diameter payload. 

b. Updating of the "six-pack" r/v concept. · 
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(Continued) 

25 January 1965 

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c. Integration of various protective· 

measures. 

d. Increased orbit adjust capability for 

the AGENA. 

5. The GE study of the adaptation of the backup 

G-3 spacecraft to the general aearch mis8ion~ 

Dr. McMillan intended that this iDformatioD serve as 

background 'prior to detailed brieflnp to· Mr. McCone 

and Mr. Vapce scheduled for 2 February 1985. 

(Tab 239) 

EKC and lTEK 'were directed ·to produce advanced 

preliminary design OD S-2 and to build mock-ups. 

One tull-scale and one approximately 1/10 scale 

mock-up were required. 

. GE were directed to approximately 

25 January 1965 

.. - BaM 

-mitt 

1/10 scale mock-ups to Ulustrate. systems iDtegratioD 

with the' EKC and ITEK S-2 payload designs. 

In a memorandum to Mr. Vance, Dr •. McMWan provided the CIA data (communicated by Dr. Wheelon) 

on ~e proposed turther tuncHng for FULCRUM and 

a copy ot his 22 January' 65' letter to Mr. McCone on 

NRO studies 01 general search and' surveillance 8YStems. Key point8 by Dr. McMillan: 

1. The question as to whether'all of the work. 

done on FULCRUM was' necesaar,. aa part 

of a feasib~lty . 

frankly as deailn phase., 

required to protect a· development 8cbedule 

and to preserve the development team .. 

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(Continued) 

29 January 1965 

"-BYEMAN" ... smnt 

2. The important questions appeared to be: 

a. Whether development effort seems, 

warranted, ad interim or otherwise. 

b. If development is undertaken, what 

are to, be the roles 8D(i responsibilitie's 

of the NRO and the DOD?, 

c. How is our judement on any of these 

matters to be made effective? 

Dr. McMillan recommended that: 

1. As of 26 January, we ,0 no furtbMlPr 

intermediate funding alternate, ' 

deferring determinations relative to the er 

efforts at least until alter the preUmiDary 

2 February_ 

2 ~ If Mr _ Vance felt that the' decision about a 

new general search system ~ust be made ' 

, in _onment, no fUDc:ls above 

'the be agreed to untll alter " 

a spec ic p is established for arrlvu. ' 

at the neces8ary decisioDs and inaurm, 

their acceptance. 

(Tab 240) 

Mr. Clark furnished the FULeR 

4 January 85. 

(Tab 241) 

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4 February 1965 

5 February 1965 

10 February 1965 

11 February 1965 

--BYElWl 

" --'SYSIII 

In a memorandum"for Mr. McNamara, Dr. McMillan 

provided a detaUed summary of the NBO pOsition in 

the selection of a new: satellite reconnaissance "system tor general search and surveillance purposes. 

(Tab 242) 

Dr. McMillan furnished Mr. Vance a recapitu1ati~n 

" of and comment on a 2 February discussion 01 candidate" systems for quick reaction or crisis manage- " 

t;nent. 

(Tab 243) 

Mr. McCone in a letter to Mr. Vance suggested a 

possible modification of procedures "for presentation 

and substantiation Of the NRO budget to Coup-ess 

(which would curtail the budgetary authority of the 

Director, NR6)~ 

(Tab 244) 

General Stewart advised Mr. Maxey that a commercial. 

service authorization had been given_tele one " 

company to install a telet_ betwe.,n 

the LMSC AlP" FacUity and or an oper.-

tional date of 1 February. e a IJ"~) General 

Stewart reported further that the telephone compan;y 

representatives were denied access to the LMSC 

A I P Facility and had returned the service authorization to the DCA, after being told that a high-level 

CIA approval would be required before proceediDI 

with the installation. 

" (Tab 245) 

Dr. Wheelon forwarded to the Director, NRO work 

statements on the tollowing FULCRUM contracts: 

1. Camera: ITBI{ 

Perkin-Elmer 

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11 February 196.5 

12 February 1965 

15 February 1965 

15 February 1965 

--,8YEMAN -SISJDI 

2. Alternate Fast Film Transport 

Studies: STL 

RCA 

3 •. SEAC: STL 

4. Spacecraft: GE. 

. 5. Recovery 'vehicle: A VCO 

(Tab .246) 

In a message to all CORONA contractors, CIA indl-

,cated that it remained responsible tor providing 

CORONA payload llight hardware and that all direction 

to CIA contractors would continue to 'be channeled 

through or lrom the CIA. 

In a memorandum to Mr.' vanciJNEer c 'illan related the CIA proposal to spend uriDI 

February on the PULCRUM pro c, m 

design and other eltorts wit~ all of the contractors 

involved. 

In view of his concem about the' atrinpnt weight 

budget to which the FULCRUM system had to be' held, 

Dr. McMillan reconlmerided, a continuation 01 the eflorts duriJig February at the level reque8te~ by CIA. ' ' 

Mr. Vance approved. 

(Tab 248) 

'In a message to General Stewart, the C~ expre8.ed ' 

concern that decisions by 'the CORONA Program alice on payload items were threateniDI the CORONA 

launch schedule aDd therefore the .vai1abWt7 of 

timely, data to the, iDteIu,ence comm1Ulity. 

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(Continued) 

--BYElIAN -SYSmI 

TOP SECRET 

The CIA cited a series of events centered on a 

recovery vehicle. fore body problem on CORONA . 

Mission 1017, indicating' that the CORONA Prop-am 

Office ~- with no prior consultation with CIA headquarters, the payload system integration contractor, .. 

or the cIA resident maJ:l8Pr at the LMSC.A/p . 

'FacUity -- had ordered the recovery'vehiQle forebodies replaced on the CORONA Mission. 1017 s1stem. The message stated that ·the CORONA Program 

Olfice had also directed that no missioD8 woul" be 

flown in which forebodies would be schedUled where~ 

in the .18 at. recovery would exceed twelve, months. 

The CIA further-stated that the SAFSP directive, 

issued without retard for program implications, 

would have caused CORONA operational standdown . 

of thr~e to four months. . 

On being informed that SAFSP did not cons.icier the 

forebodies on Mission 1017 to be tUPtworthy~ the" 

CIA took the follOWing actio~: 

1. Directed the LMSC AI P. to ~eplace the items 

with younger forebodies. 

2. Directed that the replaced items be sent 

back·to the General Blectric Compan;y 

(Philadelphia) tor testa similar to those 

used to indicate over age in the GAMBIT 

program. 

3. Directed' the .LMSC Alp to evaluate the 

shelf life of .all items necessary to support the spares requirement indicated 

by SAFSP •. 

4. D1rec~ed the assesament of prop-am .plicatioris anct" remedi8l.measures to preserve 

program integrity. 

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(Continued), 

16 February 1965 

--BYBIN _sma 

5. Initiated action to determine specifically , 

the va.ldity of the information on Shelf " 

life limitations in the CORONA program. 

The CIA indicated that an anal)'sis of the data had 

established flight acceptability and reliability for 

forebodies of at'least 17 months. 

In view of considerable prop-am perturbation, the 

CIA advised that it had informed all CORONA COD-, 

tractors that the' responsibUity for assumina n taht 

qualified hardware on a schedule responsive to 

total program requirements rested with the CIA, 

and that the contractors were to respond, onl7 to 

direction received from the CIA "in order that 

further embarrassment to the Government and program difficulties (could) be obviated. " 

(Tab 249) 

In, a letter to Mr., Vance" General Carter indicated 

that, befor~ embarking on the FULCRUM search ' 

satel11te program in July 1984, Mr. McCoDe had, 

asked Dr. Land to convene a technical pule!' t9 ,adviae him whether or not It ,was a ,promising venture. 

, General Carter stated further that the Land Panel, , 

after careful examtBatlon, h~ ~commended a six 

month techDlcal feasibUitl'program and that thi8 

program had been completed. 

Confirming'a conversation between Mr. McCone aDd 

Dr. McMillan, General Carter indicated that Dr., 

,Land had agreed to reconvene his paael to evduate 

the results of ~ feasibUily program, 'but that CiA 

did ,not feel that it should include GoverDDient People. 

Dr. Land had alao agreed to prov1diDl CIA with l18 ' 

technical counsel on FULCRUM but felt that his pauel 

should also be exposed to other search, sat.UIte pro- , 

Posals in order to make a balanced evaluaUon. 

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(Continued) 

17 February,1965 

17 February 1965' 

--BYaIAN .. sma 

General Carter recalled for Mr. Vance a subsequ~nt 

discussion in which they had agreed tlUlt·Dr. McMillan 

would arrange to present the two Air I'o~ce sea~ch 

satellite p~oposals ,(Eastman K04ak and ITBX) to the 

Land group. General Carter indicated that Dr. 

Wheelon and his ~tatf would present the FULCRUM 

system and advised that a thorough-going two-day 

session in Boston bad been ,tentatively set tor 23 and 

24 February 1965 .. 

Dr. Land had asked that his terms ot reterence be 

clearly established. Mr. McCone had indicated' that 

Dr. Land and his panel would be acting a8 technical 

advisors to' Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone, to whom he 

, would provide his technical finding8. 

Mr. McCone had agreed to go toB08ton on the tirst 

day to clarity the terms of reference 'and to summarize the usm requirements for a new search s7stem. General 'Carter inVited Mr. Vance to join Mr. 

McCone. 

(Tab 250) 

Dr. McMWan forwarded his revised draft of the 

Memorandum of Agreement on CORONA (See Tab . 

234) to General Carter. ' 

Dr. McMillan'. revised draft expres8ed in much 

greater detail the responsibilities of both .the Director, SAFSP, and the seldor CIA repre8entative. . 

(Tab 251) . 

In a message to the Director, Program B, Dr. 

.' McMillan stated that it was e8senti •• that be be 

provided a complete reView 01 the circumstance8 

and practices which led to the inclusion of out-of-. 

spec components in the SRV's assigned to CORONA 

Mission 1017. . 

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(Continued) 

He asked to be hnmediately· advised as· to what 

specific steps had been taken to avoid a recurrence 

of the problem and to determine: 

1. Who was responsible for the inclusion of 

the out-of-spec components. 

2. Who approved their inclusion .• 

3. Whether disciplinary actions had been 

.taken or were contemplated. 

Dr . McMillan stated that he was scheduling tor 

1 March, a detailed technical review ot the UfetiD).es of all the critical compOnents in the SRV's 

utilized in both Program A and Pr.ogram B, to 

include: 

1. The ide~t~ication of all recovery system 

components which had or should have 

definitely specified If,fe limits. 

2. What these limits were or should be. 

3. The technical validation/test basi a that 

had been or should be used to determine 

the·Umits •. 

It was Dr. McMillan's intent that a set of standard 

specifications for both Prop-am A ~ Program B 

SRV's be developed from the review. 

Dr. McMillan iddicated his desire that. there be 

participation by the. contractors involftd in both 

. Program A and Pro,ram S, includm,the·Aeroapace Corporation. 

(Tab 252) 

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"-BYEMAN 

"SYST£I 

With reference to Dr. McMillan'smessa,e of 17 FebruarYI the Director, Program B outlined the following 

information: . 

1. No out-of-spec companents were assigned 

. to 'CORONA Mission 1017 • 

2. _ A shelf life survey of MK5A components 

was authorized by the CIA representative 

at the LMSC AlP FacUity on 20 JuIy1981. 

The survey results, presented on 20 March 

1962, indicated that·a 38-month shelf life 

for the foreb04ies was considered con8ervative. 

3. 'rile payload-for CORONA Miasion 1017 was 

. bought off by an SAFSP repreaentatlve at 

the LMSC Alp Facility. 

4. No disciplinary action taken or contemplated 

or appropriate. 

'. The message eutUned the following actions: 

1. A detaUed shelf life limitation determmation was presently under review. 

2. A forebody age teat program was in progress. 

3. A GE technical representative would be assigned to the LMSC AlP FacUlty as '&D' 

advisor to the CIA resident officer. 

4. The buy-off at Vandenberg AFB would be 

accomplished by the' CIA resident ·officer 

at the LMSC AlP FacUity. 

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(Continued) 

18 February 1965 

23 February 1965 

24 February 1965 

".BYEMAI 

-mlDl 

The CIA indicated that "shelf life" had not been 

defined in the development document and that no . 

. qualification program' had been authorized. ' 

The message indicated that the CIA would continue . " 

tc;> comply with the broad programming directives 

of the Director" NRO in providing acceptable flight 

qualified payload hardware in a timely fashion and 

wouid be prepared to present on i. March a status 

report on all SRV components which had shelf life 

limitations.' . 

(Tab 253) 

Mr., ,Eugene Kiefer ~eparted the NRO. 

In his reply to Mr" McCone's 5 February letter, 

'Mr. Vance acknowledged that modificatiOn to 'the 

previous year's procedUres (wherein Mr. Hitch 

and.Dr. Brown presented the budget) waa poasible 

and indicated that the inclusion of meznbers of CIA 

in the discussions to emphasize the joint character 

of,theNRP was a "health)'r~ suggestion. Mr. Vance 

asked Mr. McCone for the names 01. those who would 

represent CIA when Mr. Hitch and Dr. Brown met 

the Appropriations Committees. Mr. ,Vance,8uggested th~t perhapS Dr. McMillan should also be 

present. 

(Tab 254) 

Colonel Worthman received a call from Mr. Walt 

Levison of ITEK Corporation, who 'made the. tollowina 

remarkable announcement: "For a multitude, of 

'reasons, ITEK has come, to a co"porate decision 

that it cannot 'accept the follow-on to FULCRUM. 

even if it is offered.'" Mr. Levison ,~mph&8ized that"· 

this was a co,rporate decision and' 8tated that there 

. were .!2. conditions which would cbanp this attitude. 

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(Continued) . 

... _SYmI ·BYEIMR 

Mr. Levison .asked Colonel Worthman's advice as 

to the· proper scenario for h.ndliD, the aituation. 

Colonel Worthman stated ~at the 'firat thing ITEX 

had to.do was to advise its FULCRuM sponsor -

Mr. McCone - of the decision. Colonel.Worthman 

urged Mr. Levison (and Mr. Lindaay, President'of 

ITEX) to move very quickly pointin, out the danger 

of waiting several hours or perhaps a day uiltU. they 

could locate or gain access to Mr. McCone. Colonel 

Worthman suggested that·rrEX should conYeylts . 

message to General Carter or to whoever was in 

charge of the CIA at the moment. Colonel Worthman 

further pointed out.that the Land Committee was in 

executive session and that it would be moat embarrassing to all participants if the Committee were to 

make a decision and then receive the ITEX decision. 

About twenty minutes later. Mr. 'Levison called 

again to say that Mr. Lindaay was unable to reach 

Mr. 'McCone, but had passed the corporate decision 

to Mr. Bross. Mr. Levison asked Colonel Worthman 

to arrange for a meeting with Dr. Land~ Dr. 

_ ~~~~~~~ _.~~l~~.~ 'W~~man contacted Dr. McMillan 

and urged him to call Mr. Levison. 

L&te in the afternoon. Mr. Levison 'met with Dr. 

McMillan and Dr. Land at the Po~aroid' factory to 

announce the ITBX corporate decision reprdiJII 

FULCRUM. Mr. Levison atated categorically that 

under no condition would the Corporation accept a 

follow-on FULCRUM contract~ 

Mr. Levison informed Dr. McMWan that the.ITBX 

dec-ision was made with, the full lmowledp that it 

would cut the Corporation Out 01 additional satelUte 

camera development within the Dear:-term future 

but stated that rrEX felt it could not aurvive under' 

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25 February 1965 

... BYEMAN, 

",SYSTEI 

the "domi~tion of the CIA. II Mr.' Levison 81so 

referred to the CIA as fostering an "immoral 

environment" which was becoming increasingly 

unacceptable to ITEK. 

(Tab 255) 

Dr. McMillan prepared for Mr. Vance a cOn1plete. 

record of his 24 February meeting with Dr. Land 

and representatives of ITEK. 

At Mr. Levison's request. Dr •. McMillan and Dr. 

Land met with Mr. Levison and Mr. John Wolt 

at 5 :00 PM on 24 February. Mr. Levison reported 

tbat be, Mr. Lindsay, Mr. Philbrick and o~ra 

of rrEK management had decided Ulat they would ' 

not accept from the CIA any follow-on development 

contract to their present contract on FULCRUM. 

Mr. Levison made .it clear that ~e deci8ion ITEK 

bad made was a considere.d Corporate decision, . 

" that it' was not 'poUtically motivated, that ITBK 

had no intention of seeking favor or 8pecial treatment of any kind as a· result of the decision. 

, Mr. Levison stated that the .ITEK ~e,c18ion bad b,en, 

arrived at at approxim~tely 4:00 PM on 24 February, 

that Mr. Lindsay had immediately tried to telePhone 

Mr,. McCone. 'Although'unable'to reach Mr. McCone; 

Mr. Lindsay had communicated the substance of the 

ITEK decision ,to Mr. Bross at the time of bis call -

4:00 PM. , He added ~at Mr. 'Lindsay and Mr. 

Philbrick were already OD their way ·to WUhiDlton 

with the hope of seeing Mr. McCone 'per8onally 

during the evening., 

Subsequent discus8ion brought out a number of the 

circumstances aurroundiDg the IT.EK dec'ision: 

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.. -BYElIAN 

--

1. ITEK felt that they could not maintain their 

"technical integrity" if they undertook a 

development project for FULCRUM with 

as little technical control over the project 

as they had been allowed durini the. work 

up to this' time. '. 

2. ITEK felt that the. rotating optical bar 

technique to be used in FULCRUM coUld 

not be justified. unless there was a firm 

requirement for scan .&DIles of 1200 or . more . 

. 3.' In response to previous ITEK queries on 

the validity of the 1200 scan requirement, 

the CIA staff (Dr. Whee lon, Mr •. ·Maxey, 

Mr. Dirks) had replied that no s~ch re'-

quirement had been stated.' (A fourth . . 

member' of the· CIA staff painted out that 

the requirement tor the 1200 scan was 

stated in the ITEK contract. ) 

4. On 23 February, Mr. Dirks had specifically 

stated th~t the CIA was considering both 

1200 and 900 scan angles~ . 

5. lA June 1964, Mr. Philbrick had aaked 

Dr. Wheelon tor permission to brief Dr. 

McMillan on the FULCRUM project •. 

This permission was denied pro tem . 

and several other requests dur·iDC the 

summer ot 1984 were Weewiae denied. 

In August 1964, Dr. Wheelan adYi8ed 

ITEK that he would be the point· of con-' 

tact between ITBK and the DNRO OIl the 

FULCRUM project. 

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(Continued) 

25 February 1965 

26 February· 1965 

--BYElIAN 

-mra 

6 .. ITEK had never been given any information 

from the associate contractors worldDg on 

alternate film drives or alternate camera 

concepts . 

. '(Tab 256) 

In a memorandum for Mr. Vance. Dr. McMillan 

discussed an earlier meeting with Mr. Levison 

of ITEK. 

Dr. McMillan had expected at the time of his 

earlier me~ting with Mr. Levison to recommend 

to Mr. Vance and Mr •. McNamara the development ot a general search system other' than those 

that were being studied by ITEK. Be felt that 

ITEK should be warned of thls recommendation 

and that they should have full opportunity to 

prepare their own technical case in the best 

possible fashion. Dr. McMillan discussed the· 

reasons for his technical judgments and heard 

a brief rebuttal by Mr. Levison. 

Dr. McMillan felt that both the fact and content 

of Mr .. Le.vison' 8 rebuttal made clear the need, 

in the national interest, to continue ITBK on an 

alternate approach to that which he tended to 

favor, untU all substantIal technical' uncertainties could be resolved. 

(Tab 257) 

Dr. McMillan recorded the eventa whIch occurred 

at the opening of the meeting of Dr. Land'. panel 

on the morning of 24 February. 

Mer explaining the program for the day, Dr. 

McMillan introduced Colonel.Boward, who briefed 

the group on the baclqrround of correspondence and 

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(Continued) 

--BYElIAN --

actions in regard tQ collection requirements. . 

that bad taken place aince July 1980. 'Hia brief-

, ing further covered actions taken wi~hiD the NRO 

in relation to studies of new geDeral search systems. 

During the disQussion of requirements, Dr. 

Wheelon made a number of comments --' in particular on ,the existence and content of COMOR 

paper D13/29 which was addressed by Colonel 

Howard. 

Dr. Wheelon appeared to object, to the paraphrase 

of the content of the COMOR document as well as 

to·the inciusion of reference to the document in 

the briefing of requirements. He stated that he 

felt that the discUIIsion ot the COMOR document 

might lead to contusion in the minds of the' panel. 

Upon Dr ~ McMillan'8 reiteration of the status of 

the COMOR paper (i.e. that usm had discussed the 

paper, declin.ed to accept it, 'and returned it to the 

several agencies represented onUBm :tor examiDation and comment), Dr. Wheelon ceased his comments .• 

After Colonel Howard's ~rieting, Dr. Wheelonpassed 

to Colonel Howard a handwritten note which said: 

"Hank --

I am sorry to have had to tackle your. pitch. 

However,it was pretty damned selt-aerviDg 

for AF and NRO and in direct confltct with, 

McCone's charge to the pan.,l. f'WHI- McCone 

and I will, take this upstaging up with McNamara 

. and Vance. 

Bud" 

(Tab 258) 

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3 March 1965 

--BYElIAN 

--

tain the program at ITEK to "cover ae'MJA:lDment~ design, and/or systems engineering effort 

at Perkin-Elmer, GE, AVCO, BTL and RCA. 

(Tab 259) " 

" " 

In a letter to General Carter, Dr. McMillan expressed serious concern over the lack of progress 

in implementing the 12 August agreement between 

Mr". Vance and M.-. McCone"to employ the Aerospace Corporation ina general systems engineering role on" CORONA. 

Dr. McMillan noted his instructions of 14 A1lIUst 

1964, and the poor results achieved to date in the 

implementation of the necessary actions. 

Dr. McMillan requested General Carter's support 

in issuing the necessary directive to correct the 

situations 1n order to comply with the Vance I 

" McCone agreements. 

(Tab 260) 

In a letter to General Carter, Dr. McMillan indicated that, to date, NRO had received no teclml-" 

cal data on FULCRUM other than copies of briefing charts us~d in August 1984. 

Dr. "McMillan reque.-ted: 

1. Copies of all charts used to brief Dr. LantHs 

panel on 23 l'ebJlUary 1985. " 

2~ Copies of" all co~tractor reports available. 

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(Continued) 

5 March 1965 

.6 March 1965 

.1 -IIBYDWI 

---

3. An indication as to when remaminl reports 

would be. avall.ble. 

(.Tab 261) 

Dr. McMlllan summarized for Mr. Vance the . 

status of four matters in cODDection with the· 

management and operation of CORONA. These 

were: 

(Tab 282) 

Systems Engirieer1ng 

Security 

Orbital Operations 

Camera Commands 

Dr. McMUian recorded his concerns about the 

ISINGLASS rOPQsal. 

1.· It was not clear that a manned vehicle waa 

required, or even desirable, tor the mission 

in question. 

2. The vehicle described. though somewhat 

dlfterent in structural concept, was in ·siM 

and performance very similar to the X-JO 

(DYNASOAR) toward the development Lwhich the Government had spent abo~ 

_ Any·undertakiDg. to study vehlcle~ 

ot the ISINGLASS type must permit briuIiDI 

. to bear knowledge gained and technology 

developed on the X-20.· 

3. It was not clear that a tullj 1nteeral, completely 

recovered, single stage boost was the beat tor 

the mission ~- in particular. a 8maller vebicle.· 

properly 8taged at ·boost miaht not require 

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(Continued) 

9 ° March 1965 

_o.BYDWI 

.. -

development of a new propulsion system. 

4. A program of theo size and oscope of that . 

visualized by CIA cannot ° practicably be 

carried out in a clandestine maDDer. 

5. A boost glide system is in potential competition with satellite and ballistic systems. 

While he agreed that proper consideratio~ must 

be givenoto a boost glide system, Dr. McMill8n 

did not feel he could recommend even initial 

steps to the Secretary of Defense Olr the DCI 

until he was satisfied that two conditions could 

be met: 

1. that a program could °be laid out that provided 

the DNRO, and the Secretary of Defense and 

DCI, ° with °a full and objective comparative 

analysis of all competing omeaD. that might 

reasonably satisfyOthe stated °requirement, 

and 

2. that financial commitments and obligations 

to contracotors during the pro,ram could at 

°all times be limited too those which in the 

judlDlent of the DNRO were justified b70 their 

expected contribution to~rd the achievement 

of approved goals. 

Dr. McoMillan provided the detailed guidelines and 

asked the Director, Program B, to.layoout Ii program for his consideration. 

(Tab 283) 

Dr. ° McMillan forewarned Mr. Vance of possible 

CIA complaints about the somewhat !nore temperate approach to ISllfOLASS which he °had 

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(Continued) 

9 March 1965 

10 March 1965 

1.1 March 1965 

--BYElIAN _smne, 

requested in his memorandum to CIA. 

Dr. McMill~n outlined the issues involVed and, 

stated his conviction that Ifwe cannot afford 

another breathless endeavor, begun with shoddy 

analyses and conducted without rec;o,mtion of 

technical realities. " ' 

(Tab 264) 

Dr. McMillan noted that the CIA proposed boost 

gUde device was not in the BYEMAN system; 

but rather iil a new security category:called,--

ISINGLASS. 

Procedures tor handling ISINGLASS documents 

were listed. The names of cleared individuals 

in Air Force were recorded.' 

(Tab 265) 

General Stewart passed to Dr. Fubini a draft of 

, a '''possible letter to Mr. ,McCone from Mr. Vance 

regarding the continuing NROiCIA management 

problems. ,t ' The letter 'sullested early resolution of'the CORONA ,and related manaaement ' 

problems and a focus of'NRC Bxecutive Committee 

, attention to the' significant policy'aspects of the 

NRP. 

(Tab 266) 

Dr. Fubini reviewed a draft letter to 1Ir. McCone 

regarding ,the continuing NRO/CIA management 

pro~lems prepared by General Stewart. ' 

Dr. FubiDi's response: 

"General Stewart': 

This is typical of the grab for power ~ 

which the AF has been guilty for,ears 

and is in line 'With JOur desire to pt the 

CIA out of the rec,onnalssance busiDess --

I will oppose this with aU the resources 

at my commaDd, 

E. Fubini 

'1'19 tor Bud Whee Ion I" 

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(Continued) 

15 March 1965 

--BYEIAN .. sma 

The draft letter viewed as the only logical 

solution to the CORONA maDa,ement problem 

the assignment of total responsibUlty for. 

eORONA to General Greer. 

In the space reconnaissance area, the draft 

letter suggested that the CIA staff "probably 

should direct their attention ()n1y to studies 

and science /technology efforts as a part of the 

total NRP. ". Dr. Fubini commented on this 

point as the CIA advocate: 

"Yes, but you (-:---..• ) trom the Air Force 

. don't want to use these. efforts. You are 

trylDg. to get rid of us I" 

The ·draft letter also addressed an adjustment 

of aircraft programs and the complete realignmentof responsibiUties. 

(Tab 267) 

Dr. McMillan forwarded to General Carter a 

draft of a directive which he consider •• necessary to insure the proper .conduct of·tuture· 

CORONA misllions. 

It would direct that on CORONA Mission 1018, 

and on all subsequent ~issioD8, an authoritative 

representative of Program B be present at the 

STe at such time during the orbital operation as 

may be requested by the. Director, Program A. 

It would further direct that at all time. duriDg. 

the Qrbital operation, all c'alibratioD8 and other 

data necessary to interpret telemetry and to Y&lidate 'commands be physically present at the STe 

and available to such CORONA cleared individuals 

a8. the Director, Prop-am A, milbt desipate. 

(Tab 268) . 

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18 March 1965 

In his reply to Dr. Mc.iUan's letter of 2 March 

1965. General Carter indicated that: 

1. The Aerospace problem would have to await 

the more comprehensive agreement. 

2. Mr. Crowley bad been instructed to reestablish coverage by retroactift contract 

with LMSC on system integration. 

3. The 15, March 1965 draft directive fby Dr. 

McMUlan) was merely an attempt at piecemeal solution to the CORONA problem. and, 

should be considered only in an agreem.ent, 

on' its over-all management. 

(Tab 269) 

Dr. McMillan prepared for Mr. Vance ,a chronol-

, 011 of the dialog between SAFSP and rrEK concerning estimates of costs and schedules tor a program 

to develop and fly their version of a general se.rcb 

system. 

Two approaches were made by S4FSP to ITBK soon 

after 24 February. SAFSP had interpreted 'Dr. 

McMlllan's, cautions abou~ approaches to ITEX to 

be: don't initiate or discuss new prop-am~, or new 

increases in current efforts. Dr. McMillan assumed 

full responsibility for such ~ interpretation--which 

he felt sure was implicit in his instructionS to SAFSP. 

These instructions were followed meticulously'. The 

total rate of effort at ITBK throughout the JanuaryMarch period had remained almost coutant. Major 

components of the effort were: 

1. Support of balloon-borne photography to probe 

the characteristics of th, ~tmos~ere. 

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(Continued) 

18 March 1965 

19 March 1965 

20 March 1985 

--BYElWI. .. sma 

2. Preparation of an 80" lightwei,ht experimental 

mirror. 

3. Preliminary deSign, and breadboard teating •. 

. related to a new general sea~ch a)"stem. (This 

effort, the newest, was at i8sue. ) ' .. 

(Tab &10) 

In a letter to Mr. Bross (CIA), Dr. Fublni 

addres8ed th~ subject ot CORONA 878tem improvements and called to Bross ' attention "the tact that. 

in addition. to the management consider'ationa re.-

lated to a device whose operational date i8 late in 

1987, we should belln to ,ive attention to some- .. 

thing which could become operational in the middie 

of 1988, " addm, that "it" i8 cl~ar that· such action 

can only be taken throqh. the 1ntermecliary of the 

. present contracting agene)", i. e.. CIA." . 

(Tab 271) 

In a memorandum to Mr. Vance, Dr. Fubini passed 

on a "little detail.about commercial blackmailing" 

and quoted a source as indicating that a CIA em- . 

pl9)"ee had told member. ot a leadm, electroDic8 

firm that the)" should not .team up with IT.K since 

"ITEK is in disrepute with CIA. If 

(Tab 272) 

In a reply to Dr. McMillan's 3 March letter. 

General Carter forwarded a compilation of the 

charts employed in the!. Laad· Panel Br·iefiBI on· 

. 23 February. 

With regard to definitive reports from contractors. 

~n~ral Carter indicated they had not been completed but offered to have Mr. Maxe)" and bia atiatf. 

brief' Dr.. McMillan on an)" points. 

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(Continued) 

, 24 March 1965 

... -BYEMAN· 

_SYsmI 

General Carter suggested that Dr. McMillan look 

, upon Mr. Maxey and his s~ as "that teclu;lical 

arm of the NRO 'responsible for the FULCRUM 

program. " ' 

7 

In a note to Mr. Vance (written at 10:30 a. m. ),' 

Dr. McMillan furnished a ~opy of a CIA message 

which he interpreted as sayiDg that there would' 

be no change in orbital ~perations for·CORONA 

'Miss~on 1018 from ~e conditions prevailm, on 

the two previous missions. l)r. McMillan considered these peeval1ing conditions WlBatiatactory. 

, Dr. McMillan had verified his 'interpretatiOn ' 

thllillsation between Colonel Heran 

an (senior CIA representative at 

the Loc ee P facUity). " 

Dr. 'McMillan felt he could get nowhere by,t~ 

to argue with' General Carter by telephone from 

the West Coast; hence directed that the miasion 

be postponed one day. 

Dr. McMillan state" that he was unwWinl to 

conduct a mission unless full information on the' 

c,ondition of the payload and payload aection was 

freely available to the SAPSP personnel rllDnJ"1 

the operation. 

Dr. McMillan concluded th,.t he had two choices: 

1. issue a directi" having'the force of a proposed draft (which he attac~ed tor Mr. Vance'. 

review) 

2. take ch~rge him.self and isa~ a comparable. 

directive naming himSelf aa Director', Prop-am 

A. 

(Tab 274) 

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25 March 1965 

.. -BYEIAN 

--

Dr ~ McMillan .prepared and handcarried .to Mr. 

Vance a record of a telephone conversation with 

. General Carter at 8:15 p. m. on 24 March. 

General Carter reported that he had sent Mr •. 

Crowley to Sunnyvale to assume responsibUity 

tor CIA operations on the next CORONA mission. 

Dr. McMillan had asked if Mr. Crowley would 

be prepared to release to General Greer (or ,his 

designated representative) any and all technical 

information on the health and condition of the 

payload. Gene~al Carter ~eplied, tlNo. Be will 

release any information that bears on the success 

of the operation or the decision to de-orbit. ", 

Dr. McMillan asked General Carter whose judg- , 

ment would determine whether a particular item 

of information is 'or is not relevant to the success 

,of the operation or the deciSion to de.-Drbit. 

General Carter' replied, "CDOwley's." 

General Carter stated further tbat be was not 

. willing to release the calibration data on'the 

payload commands or the payload telemetry to 

General Greer or to' his representatives. 

A copy ot Dr. McMillan's memorandum for the 

record was torwarded to General Carter. 

(Tab 275) 

General Carter prepared his record.of the telephone conversation with Dr. McMillan on 24 

March. ' 

General Carter told Dr. McMillan tliat the 

instructions to Crowley were to ensure cODt1n~­

tion'of the procedures whicb bad been followed in 

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(Continued) 

. 25 March 1965 

1IIIIf.l. BYBIM 

-sma 

the past, and to make sure that there waa no 

slip-up in the' passage of 1utormation about the 

payload necessary to determine· the health of 

the bird or to make. a decision on de-orbit. 

General Carter reported that he had implored 

Dr. McMillan to consider the propose~ agreement on West Coast organization that he (General Carter) had forwarded in January and 

which had been worked out with the NRO statf. 

General Carter stated that it was' his intention 

to keep the Agency in the satellite business and 

that he had no intention of proliferating away 

the ·Agency's responsibilities, authorities, and 

equity in the program on. piecemeal matters. 

He urged·Dr. McMillan to co~e to s.ome agree-" 

. ment on the West Coast organization along the 

lines of his rior ro sals 80 that "we coulcl 

get away from this sort of basic .organizational 

problem. " . 

General Carter denied that he waa in the babit. 

of refuting memoranda for record and stated he 

would fur~sh Dr. McMWan a copy at'his memordandum tor record. This he did. . 

. (Tab 276) 

In a inessage to Mr •. CDDWley and_ 

the 

Qeneral 

CIA message 

Carter atated 

of 23 

that 

March 

the 

(888 

i~ 

Tab 274) . 

remained in effect. 

Visited STe during Miasion 1018, . Crowle)' and 

_should be prepared to brief him ful17 on 

appropriate procedures and actiylties relative to 

CIA's participation and re8Ponsibilltles in CORONA 

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(Continued) 

29 March 1965, 

missions. ,The message reminded the CIA 

representatives that the)' should not chan,e any 

current procedures, but "coliform tuUy and with 

highest cooperation with current SOPs." 

(Tab 277) 

, Dr. McMillan expressed to Mr. Vance his 

appreciation for Mr. Vance's personal support 

in "restoring a state of normalcy to the current 

CORONA operations." 

Dr. McMillan confirmed that there had been a 

resumption of data provision, and information 

that had been withheld during the last several 

operations was now available 'at the STC to Col 

Heran. Dr. McMillan stated that it was quite 

clear that the ClArepresentatives did not want 

Aerospace to look at their data., Accordingly, 

Dr. McMUlan had instructed SAFSP not to raise 

or test this issue. 

Dr. McMillan regretted the tact that _til a 

realignment of responsibilities was accompUahed, 

he, as DNRO, was powerless to briDg &bout 8I1y 

significant improvements in NRO management 

where CIA was concerned. For the near future, 

, Dr. McMillan promised to try personally to 

minimize any further perturbations in NRO 

activities, pending'a succes8M conclusion to Mr. 

Vance's negotiations or organization. 

Dr. McMillan attached a copy of his note to General Carter expressing his sincere appreclatl~ , 

tor Qeneral Carter's personal efforts In restorinl' 

a successful ,working relaUonabip in the CORONA 

on-orbit operations.' 

(Tab 278) 

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12 April 1965 

20 April 1965 

20 April 1965 

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--

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In a response to Dr. McMillan's note ot 29 ¥arch. 

General Carter pointed o~t that the detailed data 

exchange that had taken place in the recut CORONA I 

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mission was really a continuation ot procedures that . ~ 

had long been in effect be~~eeD the AI p tacWty and 

Colonel Heran's p~ogram ottice. rather than a new 

departure' or resumption. 

General Carter stated that CIA was always anxious· 

to lend whatever help they could in estabUahiDI and 

maintaining proper relationships between "our two· 

organizations" to the end that the best interest of 

the Government as a whole was served. 

(Tab 279) . 

Dr. McMillan prepared lor Mr. Vance a detailed 

paper on the. argument that 'respol18ibWty tor the 

Satellite Operations Center (SOC) was an essentW 

element 01 any properly cOl18tituted manaaement 

structure for theNRP. 

He noted in passing that the CIA clearly recopized 

the essentiality of the SOC .... that they had made an 

issue of it in 1963 and were doing so again. 

Dr. McMWan noted turther that his paper was 

cb-afted "before today's news about Raborn" but 

"may however be relevant. " 

(Tab 280) 

, Dr. McMillan asked General Schriever for the 

reports resulting from an AFSC analysis of a 

possible new boost ,lide vehicle. Dr. MeliWan 

cautioned that any circulation, of the reports out- . 

side the Air Force would require' the approval of 

the Secretary and the Chief of Staff. 

(Tab 281) 

Dr. Wheelon advised Dr. McMillan tIult the terms of 

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r the completion of the Phase I 

rogram'had now been estabUshed. 

'by Mr. Vance and ·Mr. :,.fcCone and were pro-

, . . I . • 

• 

ceedillJ along those lines • 

. Dr. Wheelon stated further that durm, this 

phase Of the program, CIA woUld bave it. contractors explore the feasibility of incorporating 

other into the '. of the basic 

Dr. Wheelon stated that it was indicated that·the 

DNBO would provide the requirements data for 

these additional functions to the CIA; and asked 

if Dr. McMillan could provide this data within 

the next two weeks so that CIA could definltize 

the wor~ statements along appropriate lines. 

(Tab 282) 

Dr. M·cMillan informed Mr. Vance that "rumors· 

indicate that CIA .is makinl full preparations for 

an early move of the Satellite Operations Center 

to Langley. " 

Dr. McMillan explained that this remained a 

relatively harmles8 and Internal pme at the .' 

moment, but that iS8ue·. would come into the 

. open on or about 1 May since financial' ·plaDs were 

due on that date • 

. Dr. McMUlan indicated that the CIA plan woUld 

call for full funding of CORONA throup the CIA, 

as well as, the development of a new general . search system. 

(Tab 283) 

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Dr. Fubini outlined for Mr. McNamar. a proposed 

Presidential directive on the NRP. 

Key points: 

1. The NRP is a single program national in 

character. 

2. The Secretary of Defense' is designated as the 

sole executive agent for. all aspects of the NRP~ , 

including the management of all programs and 

the' tasking of other agencies to cooperate in 

such programs. 

3. There shall be established within the DOl)~ a 

National Reconnaissance Office to function as 

a separate operating agency of the DOD, to be . 

headed by a Dire'ctor ~ responsible 801ely to the 

Secretary of netense for discharli:Dl the Secretary',s responsibWty a. executive •• m tor the 

NRP. . , 

4. The DCI is assigned the followinC responsibilities: 

a. As Chairman, USIB~ to establish requ1rem~nts 

and priorities tor intelligence collection. 

b. To review Intelligence collected by the NRP 

to insure that it is responsive to the requirements established by. the usm 

·c. To recommend steps tor improvement 01 such 

collection. . , 

d. To establish a research aDd development.or-

,anizatlon within the CIA, solely re.-ponalve 

to the tasking Instructions 01 the Director, MRO~' 

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e. To review the budget of the NRP each year 

before its presentation to the Bureau of the 

Budget. 

5. The DCI should further be responsible for the 

prompt analysis, and reporting for appropriate· 

uses, ·of the photographic and signals intelUpnce 

obtained from the NRP proVided the procea8D1g 

and analysis of ELINT iDformation is carried on 

through the NBA·. 

6. The Central·Intelligence Agency will be responsible for providiDg the Secr.,tary ~ Defense the 

security policy guidance for the maintenance Of 

a uniform system of s·ecurity procedures in the 

whole area 01 the National Reconnaissance Prop-am . 

7. The Director of the me shall be deailJlated as 

the Director ot Operationa' at the NRO, . reportiDl. 

to the Direc.tor, NRO. There shall be established . 

within the DOD a Satellite and Aircraft OperatioDS 

Oftice under the dtrec,tion of the Director, NRO,. 

and under the management 01 the Director of 

Operations of the NRO. 

8 •. Subject only to review by the· Secretary of Defeue, 

the Director, NRO, will have complete authority 

to initiate, modify,· redirect, or terminate all 

research and development programs in the NRP, 

including those carried on within all .,encles in 

the tJ. S. To fulfill thea.e 'functiona, the Director, 

. NRO, will eatabUsh·a Director 01 Research ~ 

Develop.mant, at the aame orpnizatioual1evel as 

the Director 01 Operations. 

9. The Director, NRO, shall prepare a coordiDated 

comprehensive budpt for all aspects of the NRP 

alid shall eatabUsh a fiscal' control and acc01lli~ 

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procedure to insure that all funds expended in 

support of the. NRP are fully accounted for and . 

properly utUized. 

The budget shall show separately those funds to 

be applied to research and explorator;y develop· 

ment, advanced development. engineering develop~ 

ment, and operational development. CIA portion 

of funds for research and exploratol7 development shall normally approximate one-half of the 

total budget tor research and exploratofy development. The Director, NRO, shall report to the 

·Secretary of Defense if he cannot make full ~e of 

the resources of the CIA or if the funda allotted to 

the CIA cannot be full;y utilized • 

10. The :Secretary of Defenae shall endeavor to maintain a close and continuing cooperat~on with the 

DCI. 

11. . The Secretary of Defense shall insure that personnel of the CIA are giveD aDopportuntt;y to 

participate in the work of the NRP b,.·direet 

assignment to offices w.orldDg under the direction' 

01 the Director. NRO •. In this case, these personDel will serve solely under the~irecti~ and supervision of the Director, NRO, .wbUe 80 ~88iped. 

12. As an 'interim meaaure, the CIA ahall contiime 

the management of the OXCART.program under 

the direction of the Director, lIRO. 

13. Following development, tbtt reaponaibWt;y for the 

operational use of the OXCART and related laellti'a shall be controlled by the· Director~' MBO. 

(Tab 284) 

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A DOD t~ldng·paper on the NRO organization outlined two important issues:· . 

1. Direct responsibility tor the Satellite Operations 

Center was an essential element ot a stron, centralized management of the NRP •. Thia issue 

was not addressed directly by the l'.FIAB report; 

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26 April 1965 

.. -BYnIAN 

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·2. Assignment to the DOD of responsibility for satellite systems -- their "mana,ement, over-an 

systems engineering, procurement and operatioDs" 

-- as recommended by the Pl'IAB, .. _ also e·_-

sential for a strong and efte~tlve NRO. . 

The recommendations included: 

1. That the Pubini draft directive (22 Apri11985) 

be used ·as a basiS fo~ redefiniDg the charter of 

the NRO. 

2. That the assignments of responsibility recommended by the PFIAB be implemented •. 

(Tab 285) 

The· Land Panel isstied ita repOrt on the 23-24 February study ot FULCRUM ~d t.wo other simi1&r proposals. The Panel addressed itself chiefly to the 

following questions: 

1. How coDfldent can one be that the deVice shall 

meet the performance ,oa18? 

2. Are there critical t~cbnical problema in any 

one of the pl'oposed systems the 80lutioD of 

which is not in hand? 

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3. Is there a likelihood that unforeseen technical 

problems will be encountered in carrym, a parti~ular design to completion and operation? . 

4. In the light of one's judg~ment on the preceding 

questions, how great is the risk of serious delays in reaching operational status and assured 

operational reliability? 

Key points: 

1. An earlier study of FULCRUM had singled out 

certain key technic~l problems whose. 80lution 

was necessary for the ·succeS8 of the de~ce-­

among them: 

- - High speed film transport 

- - Multiple passages of the same film strip 

- - Rotational 8~bility connected with loading 

and unloading ~ very larae spools 

-- ReliabUity of the cut and splice operation 

The Panel felt that very sigDiticant. prop-ess had 

b~en made in answering some of the questions, i.e.: 

- - Mechanical aspects ~ rapid film transport 

appeared to be under control 

-- A less tortuous and trickt film path had 

been worked out 

-~ The dynamical problems inherent in:the earlier 

configuration were circumvented in the new 

design 

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... _SYSTII - BYElWI 

2 •. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

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Many questions of earlier concern remained 

open i . ! 

-- Effects of the real' space e~vironment on 

film transport 

-- Reliable control of the dpamic balAnce in 

the spools throughout a mission 

-- Reliability of the cut and splice operation 

II there were no acceptable alternative to the 

FULCRUM camera Bystem~ a continued viIorou8 

development of the concept would be thoroughly 

justified. 

On the assumption that a 1200 s~an is !2!.. an . 

overriding requirement, this unique property 

of.FULCRUM does not outweflh the risk, namel;y 

that the' novel and difficult problema which still 

remaiil cannot be all solved on schedule, and 

probably at this stage cannot all be foreseen. 

·The ~.two systems are more conventioDal. in 

con.cept and r~present a relatively short evolutionary step from present p.-actice. 

Unless the 1200 angle is an absolute require-· 

ment, it appears to the majority of the Panel 

that. in this program a revolutionar;y. development is not necessary8.lld that an evolutioDa17 

approach, with its much smaller risks is the 

wiser choice for the next addition .to the natioJial 

reconnaissance capability. 

A minority (of one) position: "Altho. this 

.system (FULCRUM) may not be optimum, the 

good progress to date. and. the more tbC)roqh 

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26 April 1965 

"-BYElWI _mID 

system analysis which has been done on this 

system co~pared with the others, justify at 

least tentative authorization tor full-scale 

development. It should be remembered that 

any of these systems, at anywhere near the 

claimed cost, will actually save "money over 

the present operations, in addition to con-

, tributiitg greatly to the ~tional security. II 

His view was that a contractor' judgment that 

this system 1"s less than optimum i. less'rel-, 

evant th8n the same contractor's judgment that 

the system is feasible. 

8. Two members stressed the potentia~ value of 

new techniques for film transport,'· th~rmal . 

control, and optical scan, and would regard 

any recommendation to abandon the whole 

FULCRUM approach as, at best, premature. 

Panel ConclusiGa: "The ~vestiptioD undertaken in FULCRuM: was valuable, iDtormatlve, 

and stimulating. even though it .does not .eem 

Jmudent to sn.h FULCRUM a8 a wh01~ to ·conelusion. Far 'from regarding FULCRUM as 

something that should not· have been lindertateD, 

we feel it is, exactly the kind of investigation 

that. will be repeatedly needed a~d that its scope 

is probably' the necessary one tor evaluation of 

any worthwhile fresh approach." 

(Tab 288) . 

The CIA proposed an "Agreement tor Reollanizatio~ 

of the National Reconnaissance Program. " 

In a .preamble were set torth some basic assumptions 

which would determine the, appr~priate orpniutlon. 

These included: 

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I ... -BYElWt 

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1. The national character of this intelligence 

enterprise must be mailita1ned :tbrouah a . 

joint endeavor on the part of DOD and C~. 

2. The potentialities of U. S. technology must 

be aggressively and imaginatively exploited 

to develop systems for the collection of inteillgence which are ·tully respOnsiVe to intelligence needs and objectives. 

3.· Scheduling and targeting of sate lUte and 

manned aircraft reconnaissance miasions 

over denied areas shall be the fiDal reaponsi-

~nity ot the DCI and the USIB. 

4. A new organizational framework is required 

which will a) provide a clearlyeatabli8h,d . 

delineation of the roles and re.po~ibllities 

of components of the Government engaged in 

satellite reconnaissance operaUon8 and 8YStems development· and b) ensure effective 

co.ordination of these activities under centralized policy guidance and· control. 

A8 an organizational framework, the CIA pro- . 

. posed version of an agreement called for an 

Executive Committee, consistina of the ~put:y 

Secretary of Defense and the ·DCI, to formulate, 

guide and regulate the NRP. SpecJfically, . the 

Executive Committee would: 

1. Est~blish an appropriate level of ettort tor 

the NRP. 

2. Approve or modify the cODsolidated NR program and ita budget. 

3. Acting throUlhthe DINK, auocate reaponsl-. 

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bility and the corresponding funds to CIA 

and/or DOD for research and preliminary· 

design studies for n~w systems. 

4. Allocate development responsibilities and 

the corresponding funds for specific reconnaissance programs to DOD or CIA, and 

establish· guidelines tor mutual support where 

appropriate. It would be free to use technical 

advisory voups as necessary. 

5. Assign operatio~ responsibllities to either 

DOD or CIA for various types of manned 

overflight missions, subject to the Qoncurrenc~ of the 303 Committ,e .• 

6. Review periodically the essential features of 

major program elements of the NRP. 

A Director of National Reconnaissance. (D/NJl) 

would be appoint~d by the Secretary of Defense 

with the concurrence of the DCI. The DINK would 

serve a four-year term and would be selected by 

the Secretary of Defense and concurred in by the 

DCI from CIA. DOD, or from other sources. He 

would be responsible to and carry out the directives 

of the Executive Committee. He would devote his 

activities exclusively to the NRP aDd would baft no 

other offici&! duties. Specifically, h~ WOUld:· 

1. Provide ·a. sinlle point of integration for the 

planning and bud,etm, of the NaP and would 

be respOnsible to the Executive. Committee for 

the execution of the proFam. 

2. ~. kept fUUy and completely" iDformed of all . 

reconnaissance activities in CIA and DOD. 

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.. -a •• -smu 

3. Schedule', the use of the space launchin& 

tracking and recovery facilities. 

, 4. Review budget proposals submitted by 

appropriate elements of CIA and DOD and 

prepare' and subniit a consolidated budget 

for examination and approval by 'the, Executive Committee. 

5. Ensure the flow of funds from the NRP 

appropriations to CIA and appropriate DOD 

elements in lumpHiUDl transfers each fiscal 

year~ 

6. Deal with the operating head of the CIA or 

his designated alternate on all matters of 

policy, coordination, or guidance. He would 

not exercise command control over subordinate elements of CIA o:r its personnel; however, the DCI would insure that the fullest 

measure of cooperation was atlorded the D /NR. 

7 • Slt with usm for the matters affecting the, NRP. 

8. Appear before the 303 Committee to the extent 

desired by the DCI or the' Deputy Secretar;y of 

Defense to ~ecure approval for overhead reconnaissance missions. ' 

T.o insure that the NRP was truly a Dationa! entity, 

CIA proposed that it be mauned In. a ba1an~ed way 

by personnel from DOD and CIA. An appropriate 

plan to rotate DOD and CIA personnel into, key 

, positions of the NRP would be developed and approved by the Executive Cqmmitte.e. 

'Other aspects of the NRP were d-18cus8ed in detaU in the proposed 'agreement. Key releftilt 

items: 

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1. Research and preliminary desilD--would 

be encouraged and supported in both CIA· 

. and DOD. by lump sum allocation at a 

level recommended by the D/NR and approved by the Executive Committee. 

2. Systems development--would. when approved by the Executive ~ommittee, be 

assigned as· a apec.ffic program in whole 

or in part to either the CIA or DOD. 

3. Satellite reconnaissance operatioDa--would 

be the responsibUity of the D/NR who wQuld 

estabUsh ·the launching schedule. DOD 

. would create ·a single satellite recoDDai8sance 

operational organization which would .be responsible for the launch. command. tracldDg and 

recovery phases of aU sate lUte operations. A 

Satellite Requirements Prop-am Center, tormerly known as ~'Satel1ite OperatiolUl Cent.rl.f 

would function as the responsibility ~ the CIA. 

4. M.nned overflight operation--covert maDDed 

overflights· of denied areas would be the responsibility of the CIA. DOD would continue to support suchoperatiQns with airlifts.. tankers. and . 

base equipment in accordance with basic u-a 

and OXCART agreements. Overt manned over~ 

flights of denied terr-ltory or overt missioDS 

covering friendly territory would .nerally be 

e.xecut*d by the DOD. 

5. Security--over-aU security policy would be the 

responsibility of the Det in ac~ordance with 

his statutory responsibilities. 

6. Budgeting--would be the subject of a aepara*e 

NRP funding agreement to be made part of the 

basic agreement. 

(Tab 287) 

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Colonel Worthman and Major Yost prepared a 

comparatlve ana9'sis of 

1. The FlAB Memorandum for the President, 

2 May 1964. 

2.' The Fubini Memorandum tor the Secretary 

of Defense, 22 AprU 1965 

3. The CIA Proposed Ap-eement, 28 April 1985 

The analysis compared managem.ent concepts, 

executive management roles, organi~ational c'on-' 

cepts,' functional concepts, budgetary and program 

review provisions and security pollcy among the 

three proposals. . 

(T~b 288) 

Mr. McCone departed the CIA. Vice Admiral 

William F. Raborn USN-Retired was appointed 

Director of Central Inte1J.igence. '. Lt General 

Marshall S. Carter departed the CIA and was 

appointed Director, NationaJ, Security AI~ncy. 

Mr. Richard MeG. Helms was appointed Deputy 

Director of Central lnteUigence. 

28 April 1985 . Addressing a Buggested reevaluation of an 

AKlNDLE proposal, Dr. Wheelon related a 303 

Committee disapproval of the U8e of the AKDmLB 

".·BYBWI .. smm 

concept and atated he cOD8idered the capabWties of 

Dr. Wheelon indicated that, should the DNRO feel 

that aD AKlNDLBtype stand-by capability and mor. 

experience In the hip altitude balloon recoanai8aaoce 

art was a" de8irabl~ RRO Prolr~, the CIA .. a prepared to consider a vehicle developmental prop-am 

lor such operations oYer the ZI. 

(Tab.281) . 

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