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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

OPPICE OP MC ONO= OICOMINV

March 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. McMillan has requested that I send you the

attached current 13 March 1963 Agreement, a proposed

Presidential Directive to amend the agreement, and a

series of footnotes that explain the reasoning behind

the propcised changes. The proposed directive expresses

the sense of his recommendations not necessarily in the

Language appropriate for a directive of this type. As

discussed on 26 March, the fact that such a proposal

has been presented to the FLAB panel is only known to

a few people and Dr. McMillan respectfully suggests

that it be held in confidence at this time.

Also attached is a very brief explanation of some

of the more pertinent problem areas that Dr. McMillan

wanted to bring to your attention.

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G' *. Colonel, USAF

Executive Assistant

Attachments
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PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE

TO

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

ON •

MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMffl

I. Management of the National Reconnaissance Program

The Secretary of Defense is hereby appointed as the 0

Executive Agent of the United States Government for the management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program. In

the establishment and management of the National Reconnaissance

Program the Secretary of Defense will determine necessary broad

policies and guidance to insure that the talents, experience

and capabilities within the Department of Defense, the Central

Intelligence Agency and other appropriate Government agencies

are applied as necessary to insure the most efficient conduct

of the NRP. The Secretary of Defense will consult with the a)

Director of Central Intelligence prior to the issue. of such

policies and guidance to insure that the requisite needs of

the Intelligence community are adequately recognized in appropriate

policy directives.

To carry out his responsibilities as Executive Agent

for the NRP, the Secretary of Defense will establish a National

Reconnaissance Office as a separate operating agency within

the Department of Defense solely under the direction, authoritylg)

and control of the Secretary of Defense. This office will be

national in character with its foremost objective being the

efficient management of the NRP to insure maximum contributions

to the reconnaissance activities of the United States Government.

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II. Organization and Command of the National Reconnaissance .

com ! Office

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! A. The National Reconnaissance Office shall consist of: 0.

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1. A director appointed from among the officers and

:a employees of the Department of Defense by the Secretary of

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Defense with the concurrence of the Chairman of the Foreign

a Intelligence Board, the Chairman of the Special Group, and the

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Director of Central Intelligence. The Director shall devote a

4 major portion of his time to the management of the National

Reconnaissance Program. The chain of command shall run directly

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from the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent to the Director,

NRO. Guidance to'the Director, NRO, shall be furnished by he

Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent hereunder. 

2. Suchlpersonnel of the Army, Navy, Air Force, other

components of the Department of Defense and the Central

IntIlligence Agency, and other appropriate Government agencieS1

asgill be assigned on a full-time basis to appropriate

positions within the National Reconnaissance Offic4

B. The National Reconnaissance Office will be formally

established by DNRO directives ass fining responsibilities for

NRP projects to Program Directors. f.A.Drganizational changes

deemed necessary by the Secretary of Defense and the DNRO after

coordination with the affected agency may be inRoffrated without requiring a rewrite of this basic agreement 'Ill personnelV

assigned to the NRO will serve on a full-time, inter-agency

transfer basis for the duration of their NRO tour of duty. To

protect the security of the NRO, unclassified titles and office

assignments will be used, and such personnel will continue to

occupy manpower authorizations in and be paid by their parent

Service or Agency. However, such personnel will be under the

complete control of the appropriate supervisory level of the

NRO element to which assigned and NRO supervisors will be

responsible for normal administrative actions including the

annual rendering of effectiveness reports2

III. Functions and Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance

Office

Subject to the direction, authority and control of the

Secretary of Defense, the National Reconnaissance Office, under

the operational direction and control of its Director, is

responsible for the management of all aspects of the NRP,

including but not limited to:

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Development of current and long-range projections of tri

a single National Reconnaissance Program for approval of the

Secretary of Defense. Such projictions on a continuing basis

will include collection of intelligence, mapping, and geodetic

information through aircraft and satellite overflights over

denied territories by collection systems exclusive of peripheral

operations. Effective use will be made of technical and

operational capabilities an resources of the Department of

Defense, National Security Wr and the Central Intelligence

Agency to support appropriate collection and processing projects.

Responding directly to the intelligence collection (1E)

requirements and priorities established by the United States

Intelligence Board, in accordance with approved Secretary of

Defense procedures.

Planning, selection of appropriate resources, assignment of responsibilities, and execution of all missions for

overflight of denied territories, involving both aircraft and

satellite systems in the NRP. Prior clearance from higher

authority will be obtained in accordance with approved procedures

as directed by the Secretary of.Defense.

Determination and assignment of responsibilities for

accomplishing initial imagery processing, titling, production, a

and delivery of the collected product to the users, based on

USIB statements of requirements and priorities.

Decommutation, ,eonversion, technical correction and

reconstruction of the collected electronic signal data to yield g

a usable collection product, and delivery of such collection

product in proper format together with associated data necessary

for exploitation to appropriate DoD components, National Security

Agency, Central Intelligence Agency or other user as specified

by the Secretary of Defense, based .on stated USIB requirements.

Determination and assignment of responsibilities to

appropriate NRO agenices for accomplishment of engineering

analysis of all collection systems to correct the problems that

exist on the operating systems as well avto provide information

for new systems.

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Determinition of requirements and assignment of

responsibilities to appropriate NRO agencies for planning and

conduct of research and development of future NRP projects.

Presentation, as required, of all aspects of the

NRP to the Special Group and the President's Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board.

Maintenance of a uniform system of security procedures

and control in accordance with security policy established for

the NRP by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Preparation of budget requests for all NRO programs,

and presentation and substantiation of such budget requests

to the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget and

Congressional Committees. Budget requests for all NRO elements

other than the DoD will be coordinated with the appropriate

agencies prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense.

Direction:management, and control of the application

and administration of all funds made available for the NRP.

Accountability for NRP funds expended or obligated under the

authority of the Director of Central Intelligence under Public•

Law 110, administered and accounted for by the CIA, will be

reported to Director, NRO, in accordance with agreed upon

Comptroller procedures.

Release of public information subject to the security

guidance of CIA.

IV. Authorities

The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, in connection

with his assigned responsibilities for the National Reconnaissance

Program, shall be authorized to:

Organize, staff and supervise the National Reconnaissance

Office.

Establish, manage and conduct the National Reconnaissance

Program.

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Determination and assignment of all NRP projects

to appropriate Program Directori for overall project management

to include current and long-range planning, budgeting, financial,

technical, and contract management. DNRO is authorized to

change such assignments and take any such steps as may be deemed

necessary to the efficient management of the NRP.

Issue appropriate instructions and procedures implementing

this agreement.

V. Relationships

A. In carrying out his responsibilities for the National

Reconnaissance Program, the Director, National Reconnaissance

Office shall:

Report directly to the Secretary of Defense and

shall keep him currently informed on the NRO and the NRP.

Establish appropriate procedures to keep the

Director of Central Intelligence currently informed on the NRO

and the NRP.

Establish appropriate liaison between the National

Reconnaissance Offici and the United States Intelligence Board,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and

the National Security Agency.

Where appropriate, make use of qualified personnel

of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency

as full-time members of the National Reconnaissance Office.

B. Officials of all elements of the Department of Defense

and the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide support

within their respective authorities to the Director, National

Reconnaissance Office, as may be necessary for the Director to

carry out his assigned responsibilities and functions. (Streamlined management procedures shall be utilized whereby individual

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project directors will report directly to the Director, National

Reconnaissance Offic0 The Director, National Reconnaissance

Office, shall be given support as required from normal staff

elements of the military departments and agencies of the

Department of Defense and of the Central Intelligence Agency

concerned. These staff elements will not participate in those

project matters except as he specifically requests, and these

projects will not be subject to normal Department of Defense

or Central Intelligence Agency staff review.

VI. Effective Data

This directive is effective upon signature and supersedes

•the DoD-CIA NRO Agreement dated 13 March 1963.

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FOOTNOTES TO PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL

DIRECTIVE

A Presidential Directive is probably the only mechanism

that can successfully bring about changes of the character

recommended. A directive to coordinate on a rewrite of the

agreement will prolong the present situation.

The basic purpose of the directive is to establish the

Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent for the NRP and not

"to insure that the talents, experience, and capabilities

are most effectively utilized etc." The composition of

capabilities of DoD, CIA, other Government agencies, and

contractors are extensive and we need to "insure that such

capabilities are applied as necessary."

Inasmuch as the Secretary of Defense is the Executive Agent,

the policies and guidance do not have to be "jointly" agreed

to by Secretary of Defense and DCI. Rather, "The Secretary

of Defense will consult with the DCI prior to the issue of

such policies and guidance etc."

The DNRO must be"solely under the direction, authority,

and control of the Secretary of Defense" in order to avoid

the quasi committee management that now exists. The Secretary

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of Defense and DCI designated officials to monitor and

examine are eliminated to avoid diffusion of the DNRO

management authorities in the conduct of the NRP. The DNRO

must be accountable solely to the Secretary of Defense.

Further, the NRO must be national in character to emphasize

the national aspects of the NRP.

Because of the relationships of the DNRO to the Secretary

of Defense and to the FLAB, the Special Group, and the DCI

as Chairman of USIB, a minor point included is that after the

Secretary of Defense selects a DNRO, these three other agencies

should be given the opportunity of concurring with the

selection.

The provision for a Deputy Director of the NRO has been

eliminated. In actual practice the DDNRO has not been able to

accomplish the responsibilities outlined in the 13 March 1963

agreement; specifically, the CIA will not allow him to "supervise

all NRP tasks assigned by the DNRO to the CIA" because this

implies supervision over the many elements of DDS&T.

7. Once the authority of DNRO is recognized, we need to issue

formal assignment directives to establish specific responsibilitie

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and eliminate confusion that now exists between Programs A & B

and B & D.

This detail is included to require that all personnel,

regardless of parent organization, who are formally included

in the NRO are under the management control of the appropriate

supervisor. To date, the CIA has not agreed to NRO supervisors

rendering annual effectiveness reports on CIA personnel assigned

to NRO organizational elements. However, we have not forced

this issue because of the present relationship problem.

The current and long range NRP must be reviewed and

tentatively approved by Secretary of Defense as Executive

Agent and then coordinated with the DCI to avoid dual direction

to the DNRO.

Effective and not maximum use must be made of capabilities

and resources. See note (2) above.

DNRO must respond not solely to USIB but to all appropriate

intelligence elements as may be directed by Secretary of Defense.

12. DNRO must be able to task appropriate agencies and resources

for both aircraft and satellite overflight with higher authority

clearance as directed by Secretary of Defense.

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DNRO Must be able to task appropriate agencies as in

(12) above.

DNRO must be able to deliver product for exploitation

to all appropriate agencies as specified by Secretary of Defense.

DNRO must have authority to assign engineering analysis

responsibilities to appropriate NRO elements.

Same as (15) above. One of the present deficiencies in

the relationships between DNRO and the DDS&T is that we have no

practical visibility or control over their advanced planning

activities. DNRO needs to have authority to assign responsibilities

to appropriate NRO elements.

DNRO must consolidate Budget requests for the NRP and be

responsible for justification. This includes those funds to

be expended by the CIA. The NRP Budget must be justified as

a whole program and not in two separate pieces.

All elements of the NRO expending NRP funds must be

accountable to the DNRO.

19. DNRO must determine and assign all NRP projects to

appropriate NRO elements. At the present time this authority

is not accepted by the CIA.

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20. DNRO responsibility is first to the Secretary of Defense

and secondly he should keep the DCI informed. He should also

keep other DoD or CIA officials informed but not for the

purpose of allowing such officials to examine and monitor DNRO

management of the NRP.

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Problems 

There is a fundamental split in the management of CORONA

as between Air Force and CIA elements of the NRO. This results

in a complicated contract structure, and technical management

by a committee specified in the contracts. There is no center

of authority short of DNRO. Presently DNRO is under injunction

not to change this.

More generally, the way in which the CIA fits into

the NRO is not in fact well defined. Contrary to the agreement

of 13 March 1963, the Deputy DNRO has no authority in the CIA

over any activity in support of the NRO. De facto, the situation

is this: The Office of Special Activities, CIA, is headed by

Colonel Jack Ledford. He is identified in the NRO as Director,

NRO Program B. "Program B" then consists of exactly those

activities managed by Ledford. These activities are summarized

on an attachment. A number of other tasks for the NRO are

conducted by the CIA outside of Colonel Ledford's area of

responsibility. All of these tasks are under the Deputy Director,

CIA, for Science and Technology, Dr. Wheelon, to whom Colonel

Ledford also reports in the CIA organization. Dr. Wheelon

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is also the official' monitor of NRO for the CIA, a post

established by the 13 March agreement.

In this arrangement Dr. Wheelon acts as the point of

contact for DNRO for all NRO matters in the CIA except

(a) matters directly under Program B and (b) certain more or

less routine matters relating to security and security policy

which need not be considered here. This creates a situation

in which Dr. Wheelon acts both as agent for DNRO and as monitor

of DNRO. This leads to ambiguity of authority over and

responsibility for NRO activities.

There appear to be further ambiguities, as between Program B

and other elements of the CIA, within the CIA itself which

complicate relationships but are not intrinsic to the problem

of inter-agency relations.

Within this rather fuzzy structure there is little personal

contact between the DNRO and those who function in support of

the NRO. To my memory, the only personal contacts between me

and CIA personnel, other than Ledford, Wheelon, and the Director

and Deputy Director have been at my invitation or request.

Ledford's unsolicited contacts with me have been few; I sense

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but cannot prove tftit he as well as all of his people are

constrained in the extent, and content, of their dealings with

me.

Almost all of my knowledge of CIA activities related to

or in support of the NRO results from explicit inquiry by me.

In recent months, for example, two important and valuable

studies bearing significantly on NRO programs were conducted

by the CIA, without my knowledge until the results were presented.

While this cannot objectively be cited as wrong, it creates an

unwholesome atmosphere.

There exists no clear statement of NRO policy with

respect to the role or responsibilities of the CIA. In the

clouded atmosphere described above, I have been unwilling to

issue one. I feared that if I even opened a discussion of these

matters, the CIA would *demand" a much broader assignment of

responsibilities than I have any evidence to believe they can

discharge. Even the necessary effort to clarify the CORONA

management has in fact led to this situation.

The existence of the DoD and CIA monitors seriously

clouds the authority of the DNRO. In actual practice the DNRO

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