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DEPAR"rMENT OF THE AIR FORaE 

WASHINGTON 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY 

September 30, 1965 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: Comments on NRO and NRP 

This memorandum presents a brief report'upon my retiring 

as Director, National Reconnaissance Office. The first section 

lists anumber'of events, and changes, that'have taken place 

'since February 1963 that appear to me to be significant. 'Several 

personal judgments are interpolated. Subsequent sections refer 

to the present status of the NRO and NRP. 'They concentrate on 

the problems as I see them. 

Events and changes since February 1963 

1. There has ,been a sharp increase in the pace of satellite 

reconnaissance activity. This is demonstrated by Chart I which 

lists all sa-tellite launches, successful 'or not, for reconnais- , sance purposes or in support of ~econnaissance, since February 

'1963. 

2. There has been an even sharp~r incr~ase in 'the rate of 

production of useable satellite photography. The qualifying 

word here is' Ituseabletf meaning "of useable quality." ~his 

results from an increase in satelli~e'activity, an increase in 

the amount of film carried per launch" some :imp~ovement in 

reliability, same increase in the lifet~e of our missions, and 

an improvement in our ability to forecast'weather and to avoid 

useless photography of-clouds. Chart 2 presents some statistics 

to indicate the general ,increase in productivity during the ' 

period. The modifier "useable"_ is to be distinguished from 

"useful," the latter referring to direct contributions of intelligence. Item (4) below suggests a specific reason for believing 

that there has also been an increase in the usefulness of some of 

our photography during this period. 

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'3. There has been a ,measurable improvement in the 

reliabili ty of the· CORONA sys tem, and specifically, of the 

AGENA v,ehicle. For example, the success ra'tio: CORONA film 

bucke'ts successfully returned vs. film buckets launched, was 

9/13 for March 1963 through February 1964, and 23/28 for March· 

1964 through February 1965. There appears also to have been 

a steady improvement in the quality of the CORONA pictures. 

If this, latter ~provement is real, it must be the cumulative' 

result of many smal~ factors •. 

4. 'GAMBIT became an operational ,system. Sate~lite 

photography at resol~tionsas good as three feet became a 

reality; this constituted, I believe, a real gain in the potential usefulness of satellite photography for intelligence 

purposes. The resolution of GAMBIT photography, and, the 

productivity of ~Brr missions as measured by the count of 

useable photographs of,required.targets, showed regular'improvement through May 1~65. Reliability of the spacecraft was a 

.problem in 1964. Five successive successes in 1965 Dmproved 

the record greatly, but three successive failures (one a booster 

failure) since May have been a discouragement. The failures 

have peen 4iagnosed and corrective measures instituted. The 

prospect, now is good for further reliable operation. 

. 5. The A-12' (OXCART) airplane went through its flight test 

·program and is approaching operational status. It has met the 

speed (Mach 3.2) and altitude (90,000 'feet) objectives originally 

set for it. Its range perform4Dce has so far been demonstrated ' 

at about 85% of that originally proposed. Its offspring,. the 

YF-12, has publicly established nine world's records for speed 

and altitude. 

6. The SR-71, also derivative of the A-12, reached flight 

test status on schedule, and is performing well. Both the SR-7l 

program and the 417 weather satellite program have been removed 

from under the mantle of special security. 

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7 • Management systems were introduced into the National 

Reconnaissance Program that bring the programming and budgeting 

of that Program into the five-year force ~truc~re pattern 

followed by other DoD programs. . 

8. Development of a satellite SY!ii!!IIsem G3 'ex' ected to . acquire photography at a resolution of was under- . taken. The development is going well' an ·cont ues toward a 

scheduled first launch in the summer of 1966.. G3 will make the 

first operational use of TITAN III. 

9. Studies and breadboard hardware b8ve. 'demonstrated that 

'a satellite system capable of searching the whole S~no-Sov1et 

land mass in 'one mission, at a resolution of three' to five feet, 

is feasible using a TI~ tIl booster. Full development has not 

been initiated. 

10. The' MOL pTogram was established. The 'mission plan. 

and the' specific optical concept for a SYS1JIIIiI' em to ac tiire 

photography from or~it at a resolution of or better 

were developed duritig two' years of study, un e an irected 

by. the NRO. 

11. There has been a great increase in effort directed 

toward study and' analysis, largely in the domain of satellite 

photographic reconnaissance •. Operational analyses o·f cost and 

effectiveness, using realistic models of the target system and 

of the'effects'of weather, defined the general system parameters 

for the. new general search system mentioned in-(9) above. S~i1ar 

analys'es have identified improvements to GAMBIT and CORONA, and 

have assisted in defining the parameters for G3. Extensive 

mission analyses went into the study of the MOL. 

12. The NRO supported, throughout this period, a p~ogram' 

of technical studies and d.esign studies by optical contractors. 

Excluding purs~it of s ecific d.eSigns for new g.eneral 'search 

systems, over was spent during the period on work 

of this kind. Resu ts 0 this effort are visible in t~ optical 

designs for G3, for the new general search system, and.for the MOL. 

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• 

A review in detail of these studies as they evolved will, 

I believe, ~upport the judgment that the technology of large 

optics and, specifically, of very high resolution photography 

has progressed ·ina striking manner in the last two years. 

The NRO Agreement 

My tenure as DNRObegan with the Gilpatric-McCone agreement 

of 13 March 1963, defining the structure, authorities, and 

responsibilities of the NRO •. Within a few weeks., the Director 

of Central Intelligence had challenged the terms of this agreement; by July of 1963 he had openly r~pudiated portions of it. 

At no .t~e after that was there a' satisfactory agreement as to . 

the authorities orresponsibilit1~s of the DNRO, or as to·the 

structure of the NRO; there were many disagreements on substance 

and no satisfactory or agreed upon.Il\eans to settle them. I· 

cannot record, in a manner that would appear objective, the 

history of the' many difficulties that developed out of 'this 

situation,and will not try. The record is an interesting one, 

and is fairly cOmplete. 

The "Agreement f9r the Reorganization of the National . Reconnaissance· Program~U signed on 11 August 1965 by M:r. Vanc'e 

and Adm. Raborn replaces the document of 13 ~arch 1963.·· It 

goes less far in defining the structure of the NRO than did· the 

earlier agreement. It is also less definitive'about the. authori .. ties of the DNRO, and circumscribes those Which it does define •. 

rt:is evidently intended to palliate some of the frictions which 

were charged to the .prior agreement. In the process, it has 

weakened considerably the structure provided by that prior 

agreement, and has, I believe, introduced a number of potential 

further sources of friction. 

Three specific weaknesses of the present agreement strike 

me. First, it is .quite ambiguous, in fact, about 'the authorities 

of the Executive Committee. While the opening paragraphs charge 

the Secretary of Defense with the rrultimate responsibility for 

the management and operation of. the NRO and the NRP,1t the 

paragraphs defining the duties of the Executive Committee do not 

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consistently reflect this. Of the six functions ·assigned to I 

the Executive Conmittee J only, one, ("Recommend to the Secretary I 

of Defense an appropriate level of effort for the NRP ••• ") I 

refer,s to the fiilal authority of the Secretary of Defense. The I o~her five functions are defined ~y the unqualified verbs I 

"approve or modify"r rrapprove,rr rrapprove," "assign,rr and "review.", 

Second, the document almost completely omits reference to 

respons'ibilities of the DNRO in connection with reconnaissance 

operations. These'responsibilities will have to be defined 

somehow, either defacto'by extension of present practices, or 

by fiat of the DNRO, ,of the Executive', Committee, or of the 

'Secretary of Defense. 

Third, the document imposes no obligation upon the CIA', or 

upon anyone other than' the Secretary of Defense for that matter, , to provide any focus' of re,sponsibilities for actions undertaken 

under the ~. 

In general, the document has a trucial character. It 

scarcely touches on the substance of the NRP, bu,t rather sets 

up procedures 'for negotiating the kinds of dispute that have 

marked the recent past. Its emphasis on the procedural and on 

the dichotomy between CIA' and DoD, its inordinate emphasis ' 

specifically on procedures ,for allocating responsibilities for 

research and development, and'its failure to provide any basis 

for an operating organization leave the way fully open for 

extensive further negotiations on all of,t~e important substantive 

,problems now facing the ~RO. 

Indeed, the agreement can easily have the effect of putting 

even the,day to day management of the ,NRP directly into the 

hands of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of-Defense. 

Fortunately, the gaps in the agreement, and ,many of its 

weaknesses, can :t>e remedied if the Secretary of D'efense exercises 

his authority and issues a set of firm ~plementing instructions. 

It is ~y recommendation that this be done. Drafts of possible 

instructions have been provided to Dr. Flax. ' 

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The job of the DNRO 

During the period of my tenure, the job of the DNRO has 

been a full-t~eendeavor. Indeed, I did not give to two parts 

of the NRP, the OXCART development and the satellite SIGINT' 

program; the full attention they needed for good management. 

Time was consumed'because much of it was spent negotiating or 

defending; rather than managing. Whenever a CIA interest was 

involved, even the mos·t straight forward manageinent decisions 

i~curred delays and required endless discussion. On such matters, 

no delegation of the DNRO's authority was possible, and even 

the required basic information was difficult to get· and validate. 

Unless a basis for management by the DNRO is provided and accepted 

that is firmer than suggested by the. words of the current agreement, this situation appears likely to continue. If it does, 

Dr •. Flax .will· find it very difficult· to be an e.ffective 'DNRO and 

accomplish his other duties as well. In a less troubled ~omosphere, the DNRO could operate,. and have adequate t~e to' 

devote to the important· elements of his job, without expending 

all of his available t~e. . 

More· than just the time of the DNROis at issue here. It 

is my conviction that ·the NRP needs vigo~ous and ~aginative 

technical leadership, and that this must came from the DNRO and 

his immediate staff. Some rea$ons for this conclusion will be 

cited later. If the kind of people who can provide technical 

leadership are to be recruited and retained, working conditions 

are required within which their leadership' is ·possible. Defined. 

authorities,reasonable procedllres for review and approval,' and·' 

'clear evidence of support from higher authority are all required 

if these working conditions are to .be created • 

. II'Reguirementsrr 

In the spring of 1965, for the first time, the usm provided 

the NRO with a comprehensive statement of current photographic 

collection requirements. This document specified surveillance 

targets-, areas for search, and the required fre.quency of coverage 

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for each. This has been a valuable document. Not only has it I· 

provided a basis for'an orderly scheduling and programming of ! 

future launches, but it bas provided a validated. target model I 

against which ·tQ analyse operational plans and potential new ~ 

systems. With its help, we were able to determine an.opt~um 

film load' and booster select:l.on for· the ·pr.oposed new general. 

search system, and ~o identify operational improvements to 

GAMB IT and CQRONA •. 

Requirements in .the other areas of' the NRP are in a ~ar less 

satisfactory state. Even in the photographic field, it is not 

clear to me that a good ;analysis has been made of all of the 

value that can be derived from the intelligence eources that are 

now open to us. There seems to be no interest in the economic 

and agricultural activity that could be·deter.mined fram satellite 

photography. Although a great deal of interest is professed .within 

the. Defense Deparement in geophysical and oceanographic data that 

can b~ collected by satellite photography, ,requirements for such 

photography have not reached the NRC. Meanwhile, .these same 

interests have mo·tivated NASA to consider expensive manned APOLLO . missions to collect .s~ilar· data. . 

In the field of signals intelligence, a ~omprehetisi';i" statement of collection requirements exists. It is, 'however, very 

broad and undiscr.:imina.ting, and provides little guidance except 

for the grossest planning decisions. 'This is a field in which 

there appears to be very little analysis relating the specifi.c 

intelligence to be collected to specific" military needs, actitins, 

or decisions. The NRO', at leatlt, .sees little distinction made. . between radar order of battle (ROB) -,which may affect targeting 

8:ld flight planning in a direct and immediate way -" and the general 

search for new'and unkno~ signals.' Even within the~d 

of ROB, no distinction'of' priority is evident betwee 

radars - which are so common and of such general func on t t 

little specific military action is taken to counter them ~ and 

weapon.system radars Whic9 represent specific 'local threats and 

call for specific counter'actions. No rational basis is available 

for selecting technical approaches to·SIGINT problems because no priorit~es are stated for the determination of 8ignal.~rameters. 

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In effect, most requirements are given the NRO in the form of 

a request to fly a specific payload on a requested schedule. 

The requir~ent is often stated by the desigD~r of' the payload 

in question. 

No good.basis exists, in the form of statements"of 

collection requirements, for long range planning of new payload" 

developuents, beyond the canprehensive statement of current , photographic requirements' already· cited. ,Such long range guidance 

as .the ~O has been given is in the form of hardware requirements. 

'There,is no basis, for comparing disparate alternatives against a 

common statement of need, since no statements of need are made. 

Three examples will 'illustrate the problem. ' ' 

The only statement by USIB that exi$ts which address~s the 

need for ,developing a new general search sys~em, beyond CORONA, 

dates from July, 1964. It asserts that there is .a need for a 

satellite system having the resolution of ~IT and the swath 

width of CORONA. This is not a statement 0'£ collection requirements. It is a system specification, albeit a crude one. It 

leaves little roam for, and provides no basis for, trade off 

analyses among swath,width, resolution, orbit altitude, orbit 

life time, and o.ther important mission parameters,' and offers 

no cr~ter~a for opt~izing performance Within ,constraints' of 

cost or physical feasibility. Fortunately, in this· case, later 

definitive statements from USIB of current cQllection 'requirements have provided a target model against which eo make'performance analyses. The applicability ,of this model'to the period 

'beyond 196~, when a new search syste.n could be available, is 

probably not seriously to be questioned, but has not been 

validated by USIB. ' 

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Similarly, a rrrequirement" has been stated for a high. 

altitude hypersonic'manned boost-glide vehicle, ISINGLASS, to 

carry a reconnaissance camera. In a separate memo~andum for, 

record I have commented 'in ,detail on thMll!' I note here 

only that it is expected to result in a program" and, , 

that no statement 0'£ intelligence c:ollect on requ rements has ' 

been provided which ISINGLASS specifically satisfies. Again, 

therefore, there is no clear basis for comparing the performance 

of this' system with possible alternative means ,of collection_. 

The technology of 'intelligence collection from overhead 

vehicles is rich in opportunities. The most basic, tll'sk ,of the 

, NRO is to exploit thi,s technology in " way that most effectively 

meets the country's further important needs. It is for, this 

reason that I, believe that the DNRO must be, as anindiv1dual, 

capable of making the critical technical judgments involved, and 

must have the 'authority, and the support, to make these judgments 

effective. It is' the lack 9f in,t,ellectual.,rigor evident 'in ,the 

three examples of long-range "requirements" just lis~ed, and 

evident also in inany other instances, not cited here, that 

convinces me that the DNRO himself must exercise intellectual. 

leadership for the NRP. Neither valid nor responsible leadership ': 

is available elsewhere. 

Current problems 

1. The OXCART program has been, and continues to be, complex 

technically and managerially. As DNBO, I controlled by gross,' 

and often somewhat arbitrary, control' of funds~ ,Detailed control 

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was exercised through CIA channels and 'was never really , delegated by the CIA to their elements 0,£ the NRO. Therefore, I' \ 

even to get information about the program was a slow and 

difficult process. I see no ~ediate prospect of a.change '! 

in this situation. ' 

'-1 consider this a continuing problem. I cannot be 

sharply critical of CIA management; indeed I am sure that it 

'has :tmprovedli!il!!'reatl inhe past two years. Neverth.eless, 

OXCART ,costs annually, is not yet a productive 

system, and rema s erefore a troub~esame item in the NRO, 

budget. I.£eel'that if it were subje~ted to the same'rigorous 

posed upon the satellite programs, 

same annually could be saved. This is, 

however, s t. It could not be put to test without, 

a determined effort by the DNRO to establish effective control. 

2. It is one year and eleven months since I first Proposed 

to the DCI improvements to the management of the CORONA system 

whi-ch I then considered, and still do, to be ,necessary. The 

management of CORONA is now in somewhat worse condition than 

it was at the time of that proposal. Specifically: 

There is still no recogn~zed prosram director sbort 

of the DNRO,htmself. 

There is no contract or authority for over-all systems 

engineering and technical direction that is recognized by all 

contracts on the program. 

'The contractual structure is' still essentially the 

complex one described in my 'memorandum to the Secretary of 

Defense, of January 28" 1964. 

',There exists no valid contract for systems integration 

of the camera and re-entry vehicle into the spacecraft. This 

,work is being done by a contractor wi thou e ,a signed contract, 

because the CIA has directed him not to' sign the instrument. 

Th,e present DCI reiterated this. deman,~ on June 17 I 1.96:5. 

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Funding information on CIA CORONA contracts is· denied 

'the NRO West Coast office where CORONA programming is done. All 

informa tion -·on CIA contracts used by tha t office ws t . be forwarded, 

by the -NRO Comptroller. ' . 

Release by'CIA of information on the payload to operating elements of ·the NRO during orbital operations' is sharply . 

curtailed in comparison to the free exchange that Was in practice . I 

prior to August·1964. 

I am concerned about. these depar·tures from good management 'practice, not only as a matter of principle, but also, 

because they subtly threaten ,the health of the CORONA system. 

For rea.Bons noted below, CORONA is likely to remain the backbone of our- search operations for at least two more years. 

er the expenditure, during the past year, o,f some 

on specific design efforts 'toward a·new general. 

searc sys em, to replace CORONA, we are still over two years 

from a launch thereof. Last February, .it would have been , 

. possible to initiate a,.completely· safe and fully viable program 

oriented toward a launch in March or April of 1967. That option 

was in fact retained until quite recently. The earliest possible 

launch date is now· late in 1967, and is advan~ing one day per 

day, until an effective decision is made to proceed. 

Loss of time, and ex.penditure of effot't, while 4 .. decision 

is arrived at are two of my concerns. A third is the impact of .. 

the, current NRO agreement on the conduct of the· prograni. It will 

certainly be very difficult to establish a management structure 

that can di"scipline the conduct of the payload developnten~· by 

the CIA, as ·the agreement provides. Yet I am convinced that 

firm control and discipline by the DNRO will be necessary •. So . far in this program, the management by the ·CIA of their efforts 

to establish a competing design bas been lacking in ·judsment and 

intellectual rigor. The '-camera concept originally selected was 

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rej ected by one contractor .!. priori, :;~nd was 'rej ected by ~ a 

second contractor after he had worked;on it for nine months •. 

An outside panel of experts were critical of. it on two· 

occasions, and' a third con~ractor later rej ected it, in effe~.t, 

by changing it drastically before' ele¢ting to undertake further 

design effort. Despite this evidencej~that the camera concept 

was open to. serious .question,_ the' CIA,t'spent about three time:s 

as much money on ancillary items such:'~as 'spacecraft and reentry vehicles as on direc.t pursuit of' the 'fundamental' technical 

problems of the camera. 

Many details of the system concept adopted by the CIA 

are also, in my judgment', open to question. The fundamental 

fact, .however, that they were unable'to recognize.or accept 

the basic problems of their camera design is what causes me 

most concern.' It seems to me that there is. therefore little 

assurance that they are capable of correct or courageous action 

with respect to the technical problems that will inevitably arise 

"during any camera development they undertake, whatever the 

source· of the design.. I ··believe it ,will be necessary for the 

DNRO to review their technical efforts in detail and on aC9ntinuing basis to p.rotect the integrity of any camera development" 

by them. Whether such monitoring or review will be possible is 

doubtful in my mind. I, ~t least, was aggressively prev.nted 

from getting any det~iled.information.abou~k on 

general search systems, despite that aboutlllllllllllllof NBC 

funds were spent on this. work. " :'. . 

Final thoughts . 

While this memorandum places considerable weight on' the 

problems currently afflicting the ·NRO,. I 'want .to close witb the 

acknowledgment that the program· has been enormously productive 

in spite of these problems. Our interagency difficulties' with . the CIA have been concentrated at the top management levels;. 

at the working level there have been many examples of a 

cooperative attitude. The NRP will be even 'more productive 

once it is given the opportunity and ·the mandate to deve~op an 

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orderly, disciplined management en~ironmen~. As my predecessor 

indicated in his final report to you,- the concept of· an NRO is 

sound but it must be designed as an· operating agency, nota 

coordinating body. Achieving this most desirable goal will call 

. for your personal intervention in asserting the position and' 

authority of the DNRO on' all 'matters associated wi:th the manage- . 

'ment and accomplishment of the program. . 

.At·tachments 

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~ORONA.~S 

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~4-27 'APR 64' 209 

~O MAY.54 52 t 1964/746 TARGETS ON 

15-16 AUG 64, 66 . 6 MISSIONS WITH 

24-27 SEP 64 120 15 PHOTO DATES 

5 DEC 64 37 

24-27 JAN 65 359 

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21· APR-3MAY 65 55'4 

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