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" IN-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCEOFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE MO STAFF

17 August 1977

NOTE FOR DR. MARK

While I realise that you did not ask for arguments against

an overt treaty verification satellite, I believe this paper contains enough food for thought possibly to be of use to you. .In

the interest of time I an forwardingi4t, so there will be a few

hours to respond to further information you say want for your

Friday discussions.

Brigadier General, USAF

Director

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16S)-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

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THE NRO STAFF • 17 August 1977

4

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MARX

SUBJECT: Unclassified Arms Control Satellite (UACS)

The NRO Staff, with input from Programs A, B, and C, has

reviewed the concept of "Open Skies" and a potential

unclassified Arms Control Satellite" and finds them not

in the best interest of the United States. While technologically feasible at some substantial cost, the development

of a UACS, either Unilaterally or jointly with the Soviets,

could threaten the ability of this government to continue

collecting useful intelligence from space.

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The technical parameters for a yaw can generally be

gleaned from a recent DCI Memorandum .' entitled "Imaging System

Matrices" which outlines requirements for SAL and MBFR treaty

monitoring as•follows:

AGREE- QUALITY TIMELINESS FREQUENCY VOLUME TYPE OF

RENT AVG NIIRS - OF VISIT OF IMAG COVERAGE'

(BEST)

4-6 (7) 2Weeks-MOnthsPeriodic Large Area +

Targets

MBFR 4-6 (7) Days-Months Daily to Limited Area +

Periodic Targets.

A further inhibition is the inhibition desire to minimize

the amount of chnology/capability that might be

compromised . of a UACS.

Operating under these constraints, several NRP systems

or derivatives present themselves as candidate UACSs:

Memorandum for PRe(I 0-77, 4 Aug 1977

2 Memo states that SAL squires precise mensuration

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d. CORONA Revival: "Resurrecting portions of the

CORONA program, while expensive, would provide'five to seven

feet resolution from an 82 mile orbit. The PINTO concept,

a CORONA system with six or eight recovery buckets, has

been studied in the past. Similarly parts and pieces of

the old SAMOS technology is available at NRP contractors.

An alternate approach would be to develop the DACS

or the NRP. This would insulate

from NASA activities, decouplingrely from the NRO Miltechnology and

experience somewhat; people woul c ear y have to appreciate that the VACS was not aireconnaissaece system but

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rather a remote sensing observation satellite. NASA could

develop and launch the UACS for ADCA using its work on meteorological satellites for NOAH as a model. Candidate options

for a NASA-developed CACS include:

a. LANDSAT D: The multispectral scanner (MS) is

projected to RainVisual images in five bands at 80 meters

spatial resolution. A thematic mapper (Tr.) is planned to

provide six bands of 30 meter spatial resolution. !Mile these

capabilities appear unacceptable for treaty verification

purposes, a decision to pursue UACS could lead to greater

performance.

b. SEASAT B: In cooperation with the Tracking and

Data Relay SatiniEW-( YDRS), SEASAT B could provide radar

images with 25 meter spatial resolution. The 25 meter limit

is a procedural constraint; ten meters is the technical limit.

Although currently designed for ocean use, SEASAT could and

will be used equally well over land.

Space Telescope Program (STP): NASA's newly

awarded STP could be modified to point toward earth. The SVP's

94 inch diameter mirror is theoretically capable of three to

five inch ground resolution if flown in a 145 mile orbit.

Using the TDRS, the STP as a VACS could provide near real-time

verification.

Shuttle Imaging *rider (SIR): Using STS as a

platform, joint US-USSR crews could provide verification •

services in a manned-UACS concept. The currently planned SIR

could be coupled with the 15 meter camera used on SKYLAB to

provide a multispectral approach to the problem.

A final approach to the treaty verification problem would

be to specifically delimit the mission and function of a given

UACS. Consider, for example, a potential arms limitation

agreement for the Indian Ocean. The key provisions in such an

agreement would be concerned with limiting the presence of CS

and Soviet surface combatants in the treaty area.

A jointly developed and operated "radar Indian Ocean

surveillance satellite system"! could be an acceptable

monitoring tool. Such a jointly developed spare system

could be launched by either the US, probably on the shuttle,

or the Soviet Union, or by both if a multiple spacecraft

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operation is envisioned. Readout might be to US and Soviet

ground stations. If the littoral states are involved in an

Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement (at least as

interested third parties), one or more ground stations for

readout only (not for spacecraft control) might be deployed

in key littoral countries. The ocean surveillance radar

could be based'on state-of-the-art technology of low

security sensitivity: Performance could be gated to be sufficient to reliably detect only destroyer escort-sized and

larger surface combatants. Applicable technology is already

incorporated in the Soviet RORSAT. • Features which might be

added to such a scheme encompass ship unique transponders

which all US and Soviet combatants in the Indian Ocean would

have to carry. Such transponders would, upon being illuminated by the orbiting radar, identify the radar return

uniquely. This information could be encoded if desirable,

so that this ship unique identifier would be only available

to the US and USSR (not the PRC, for example). An obvious

weakness, however, would be the ease with which a ship could

turn off its transponder and change positions, later claiming innocently that it was SOFM (e.g., Beacon Off For

Maintenance).

In summary, there seem to be several technically feasible methods of achieving ly usable UACS without

having to reveal the late chnology in the process.

more important than mere technical issues, however, are

the substantial non-quantifiable risks that can be foreseen

with an Open Skies or UACS proposal.

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The verification of arms coQtrol agreements may be said

to have three distinct purposes :a

First, verification serves to detect violations of

an agreement (or to provide evidence that violations may

have occurred), and hence to furnish, as far as is possible,-

timely warning of any threat to the nation's security arising under a treaty regime.

Second, by increasing the risk of detection complicating any scheme of evasion, verification helps to deter

violations of an agreement. The deterrent value of verification depends to a considerable extent on a potential violator being ignorant of the exact capability of the

Arms Control Report', US Arms Control and Disarmament

. Agency, Pub 89, July 1976, p 55.

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intelligence techniques used to monitor his compliance with an

agreement--a fact which helps to explain the importance of

secrecy regarding many of these techniques.

Third, verification serves to build domestic and international confidence in the viability of an arms control agreement. By providing evidence that the parties to an agreement

are in fact fulfilling the obligations they have assumed,

verification contributes to mutual trust among the parties and

helps to create a political environment necessary for further

progress in arms control. At the same time, it provides an

important safeguard against wishful illusions and against possible

manipulations of an atmosphere of trust in the pursuit of

unilateral advantage.

An unclassified arms control satellite (UACS) would not.

serve the first purpose because its capabilities would be

known to the Soviets, might marginally contribute to the second,

and could'serve to a limited extent. the purpose of general confidence building implicit in the third purpose.

These potential benefits, howevei,

serious costs surrounding a UAC

have been estimated at between

and deploy. Continued operatic a roc

be large.

However substantial, "financial costs" represent only a

small part of the picture. A UACS might significantly impact

the current foundation of verification by national technical

means MM. There are two major areas of concern: first, the

process of defining and negotiating a "verification satellite"

could lead rapidly to the Soviet position that identifiable and

limited performance criteria can and must be associated with

specific treaty provisions, and that better performance is not

required for verification and, hence, is spying. For example,

the assertion might be made that the detection and counting of

ICBM silos can be satisfied with 5 foot GRD and any resolution

better than that is clearly for the purpose of intelligence

gathering, not for treaty verification. Second, the existence

of UACS would appear to undercut the protection afforded to

NTMS by noninterference treaty language. Any noninterference

assurance would likely be narrowed to apply, only to assets for

verification (i.e., UACS). Thus, the consequences of ACDA's

having its own verification satellite may be that the United

States has no other.

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CORTf1OL SYSTEM

Regardless of which UACS concept was there

would continue to be a requirement for o atellite

systems to resolve ambiguities, verify viola and insure

treaty compliance. US experience with compliance issues

demonstrates that they frequently involve ambiguous practices

that cannot be clarified by photography alone. Nigher resolution photographs and possibly SIGINT and CONINT will be needed

by both sides. Neither the Soviets nor the US will believe

that the UACS is sufficient in and of itself. Without the

implied protection of an ambiguous MTN definition these satellites night be even more vulnerable to interference than is

currently the case.

Touting an unclassified verification satellite could leid

to a public misconception that UACS is the US means of verification, particularly if we continue to protect the existence and

status of the other systems being used for verification. In '

effect the UACS, as a symbolic satellite, could eventually be

construed as a mass deception to the US public and the world by

the Government of the United States.

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Finally, a detailed knowledge of the capabilities and

limitations of the VACS would allow the Soviets to develop an

optimized camouflage, concealment and deception program. A

unilateral US VACS would bound the Soviet cheating threshold

allowing them to better expend their CCD resources. It would

also reveal to them our perception of politically important

targets in their country and allow them to tighten up the.

facilities or disporse'their functions.

For these reasons a unilateral UACS seems ill-fated. A

recent interagency intelligence memorandum declared: It is

our judgment that unless the US worked with the Soviet Union

to jointly create an open-skies type of photoreconnaissance

system, the Soviets would consider such a move to be both

strategically threatening and politically embarrassing. Under

such circumstances, there is a high likelihood that they would

take aggressive actions to aggressively disrupt the system

operation. The Soviet Union could claim its actions were taken

on behalf of the many, or it could simply assert that it must

protect itself from illegal intrusions. The exact form of the

Soviets' reactions could vary from politica/ harassment to overt

interference depending on how they read world opinion."

17—TER: Possible Soviet Reactions to US Space Systems and

Policies in Peacetime (draft), TCS-889100-77/3, page's 76-78
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An alternative to the unilateral VACS would be a joint •

US-USSR UACS program. While the Soviets wili still learn our

targeting priorities and may, from close association, comproin film, optical system,

as a "team player" they

dome way harm the VACS

concept. If a skillful program or blatancy avoidance was

followed it might be possible to achieve a joint UACS without

offending the sensibilities of conservative Americans, the

Soviet citizenry and third party nations.

More likely, the establishment of a publicly-acknowledged

superpower photo satellite cartel could be politically

unacceptable as countries and their political leaders sought

to protect their sovereign rights and proprietary interests.

This could increase the scope and fervor of the international

. debate about unauthorized data gathering already in process in

the UN with respect to earth resources imaging satellites, as

much negotiation is based on one country not being totally

aware failur tional disasters

o reac to o * overflights by US and USSR espionage satellites.

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If, for example, the UACS imaged areas other than the

US-USSR and released photography or radar images of one

country committing an aggressive act against another nation it

is conceivable that such photography would be far superior to

that which both aggressive and defending nations might be able

to collect with their own resources. Therefore, the possession

of such photography by the aggressive nation would constitute

an excellent BOA tool and could result in even more accurate

and effective aggressive acts. We,.therefore, could become an

unwitting collaborator to the aggressive act and might have to

share the burden of guilt for the damage inflicted on the

defending nation.

Satellite photography (and radar imagery more so) is both

ambiguous and controversial. "Interpretation" of such photographyjimages could emerge as a source of controversy so large

as to overshadow any real or imagined benefit from VACS. It is

not clear that public disclosure of UACS products would substatially change the overall public confidence in the US

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intelligence collection process. 'Both the public and our allies

appreciate that NTNisaeuphesaism for sophisticated satellite

reconnaissance vehicles. The Soviets, however, have never had'

to formally acknowledge that their prime rival is overflying

their homeland. (Neither have we had to explain to our

populace why we can do nothing about espionage satellites which

spend their time ferreting information from high above the

atmosphere over Davenport, Iowa.) Non-judicious, unclassified

release of OACS data could lead to spurious amateur assessments

by the public and maybe even panic should an overzealous press' •

conclude an attack was imminent. The Soviets have never

accepted on-site inspection either, yet a jointly manned VACS

station or perhaps a OACS ground site in the Soviet Union would

amount to the same thing.

The likelihood of the Soviets agreeing to a joint OACS

program appears remote. The IIM° draft states: 'We seriously

doubt that the Soviets would agree to the idea of a joint openskies program. Their very serious activities in the UN regarding

both the grouqd resolution problem on earth resources systems

and the requirement for prior consent before distributing

remotely sensed data both indicate a strong national desire to

protect themselves from worldwidet observation. Official and

public discussions of this topic could lead to UN activities,

perhaps coupled to the Landsat issues, raising the prospect of

an international restrictions on sensing from space of another

nation's territory or limiting dissemination of the derived data.

Both the US and the Soviet Union would suffer from such activity."

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In our judgment, therefore, the concept of a OACS should not

be pursued. The identified substantial costs--both quantifiable

and unquantifiable--far outweigh the potential benefits.

WILLIAM L. WIELDS, JR.

Brigadier General, USAF

Director

371 a. p.78

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