DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR Fa

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Apri122, 1966

MORAN= FOR THE NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: CORONA Management

A prOblem of long standing in the NRO has been CORONA

rznagement. Although there appear to have been several

attempts to resolve the problem of defining a set of manage-

=ant responsibilities acceptable to all parties in 1964 and

1965, none of • these ware successful in arriving at an agreedupon solution.

The August 11, 1965 Agreement for the Reorganization of

the National Reconnaissance Program (1965 MP Agreement) provides general and specific guidelines for the management of

XR? systems which constitute an authoritative basis for dealing

with the CORONA problems. However, the need to avoid unnecessarily perturbing certain established practices and responsibilities now being exercised in the on-going CORONA program

must also be recognized. Having taken both these factors into

account, I now wish to recommend specific assignments of management responsibility and related program actions as described in

this memorandum.

THE PROBL.M.

I have reviewed the available background on the CORONA

management situation. There are several particular problems,

all of 'which stem from the lack of clearly established and/or

agreed-to management responsibilities and relationships. Prom

my point of view the most serious problems are as follows:

1. Other than myself, there is no single person or NRP

participant accepted by all concerned as clearly responsible for

overall system engineering, definition and specifications, integration, a master project plan, overall system,facilities, integrated funding requirements, and on-orbit operations.

2. Since mid-1954, LMSC has worked without benefit of

signed contracts in two areas : (a) overall systems integration;

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and (b) the qualification, test, and integration of an Improved

Stellar-Index Camera (ISM. (The latter task is essentially

complete; the fozzer is continuing).

3. The final phase of the CORONA Improvement Program has

been extended somewhat because authorization has not yet been

given to contract for all elements (specifically: integration

of a modified ISIC--called the DISIC; internal modifications to.

the RV; and fabrication of larger diameter camera payload shells).

DISCUSSION:

The next several paragraphs provide a brief discussion of

the problems cited above.

There were, inthe past, and are, at present, widely divergent

opinions on the necessity for a single CORONA Project Director in

the field (on the premise that the program has been operating

quite successfully for some time without anyone who was generally .

accepted as such). In my opinion, there is a need for a project

director in any case and this need will be increased by planned

actions in the CORONA program.

. • Up until this Summer, when the first THORAD booster/longerlife AGFA% combination is launched, the NRO will have been

operating, for more than two years, a mature system in which only .

relative minor changes have taken place. When the CORONA Improve-.

meat Program is completed in mid-1967, however, the system will

feature a modified booster, modified AGENA, modified command

system, new stellar-index camera, modified main cameras, and a

new payload assembly structure. Implicit in these changes is the

need for assigning responsibility to a single person for overall

system engineering and integration as well as for definition of . interface specifications.

In view of the above, I believe it is essential to have a

single Project Director in the field (with proper definition,

of course, of his responsibilities and authority in view of the

joint-agency nature of the CORONA Project).

With regard to the two unsigned 1.1:SC contracts, this situation apparently evolved because of the lack of well-defined

technical and management responsibilities. For the same reason

there has been an unresolved question as to whether SAFSP or CIACSP should hold the contract for the qualification testing and
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integration of the DISIC in the new, larger diameter payload

assembly structure (this work has not yet started).

I understa peaded Corporate funds in the amount •

of approximately ince July 1964 on overall system

integration matte ificatioa testing/integration engineering on the ISIC :at about the time this latter task was essentially

complete, a dec •,..sion was made to use the DISIC in lieu of the :3IC)

aSC is awaiting uniform guidance from the government as to the

approved contracting agency for the several tasks involved and as

to the scope of the contracts. The solution to this problem will

be straight-forward under the management assignments which I propose--namely, SAFSP or CIA-OSP will sign the pending contracts

for the period from 1964 to the present date, and will, in

accordance with assigned responsibilities, negotiate new contracts

(or amend existing ones) for the work from this date forward.

Last, with regard to the deferral of authority to proceed on

the remaining elements of the CORONA Improvement Program. These

were not released when CORONA Improvement Program was originally

approved. The deferred items were not pacing at that time and it

was apparently expected the than imminent new NRP Agreement would

provide more specific guidance on the . assignment of CORONA responsibilities. Recently, to preclude further delay, I authorized

CIA-OSP to contract with DISC to initiate design engineering on

the larger-diameter payload assembly structure.

MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS:

In developing these proposed arrangements, a guiding principle

has been that no serious consideration would be given to any

management plan and/or rearrangement of responsibilities which

would unduly disrupt the on-going program. Further, to the extent

possible, the solutions were to be in accord with the specifics,

as well as the spirit and tatent, of the 1965 NRP Agreement. I

believe that my proposed assignments of responsibility and related

management actions are fully responsive to these criteria.

At present, CIA is clearly responsible to the DNRO for procur

=eat of the XR-4 and SI cameras (the latter to be replaced by the

DISIC), the RV's, the payload assembly structure, and the engineering integration of these elements into a Payload Sub-AsseMbly and

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their test, operation and activities of the LMSC-AP facility,

software support of the Satellite Operations Center before,

during, and after missions, operation of the payload sub-assembly

on-orbit, and diagnostic services. I recommend that these responsi

bilities continue essentially unchanged, with CIA assuming

responsibility for integration of the DISIC, and the engineering,

fabrication, qualification and production of the larger-diameter

payload assembly structure.

SAFSP, on the other hand, is responsible for the boosters,

the AGENA spacecraft, procurement of the DISIC, overall system

integration in preparation for launch, launch services, on-orbit

command and control, and recovery of the film capsules. I recommend that these responsibilities remain essentially unchanged.

However, if a new RV or major modification to the present RV is

ever undertaken (this excludes minor internal modifications to

the present RV, peculiar to the CORONA cameras), I propose to

assign this responsibility to SUS? in line with the 1965 NRP

Agreement and to insure maxim Standardization among all RV's

utilized in the NRP. •

Additionally, I propose to designate the Director, SAFSP, as

the overall CORONA System Project Director (SPD). The rationale

for this assignment is that SAPS? is the NR.O element best suited

in terms of personnel, facilities, operatibnal resources, experienc.

and technical competence necessary to undertake this task. For '

example, under existing DOD arrangements wherein the Air•Force

assigns space elements either wholly to NRO (as in the case of .

fie Space Systems Division's launch, on-orbit commend and control

facilities and capsule recovery forces), the Director, SAFSP is

the only individual in the field who has the authority to direct

all elements involved in the operation from launch through capsule

recovery. As SPD, the Director, SAPS!, will be responsible to me

for overall system engineering and integration (including master

system specifications); overall system %master planning, programming, and budgeting; preparation of the system for launch; launch

activities; mission operations; and capsule recoveries.

In this arrangement, the CORONA System Project Director (SPD)

responsibilities will not include sub-system engineering, technical

direction, or contract supervision for the Payload Sub-Assembly;

the CIA will be responsible to the DN30 for these functions with •

respect to the Payload Sub-Assembly. The following discussion of

the =amazement relationships is intended to clarify the division

of responsibilities:
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l. The SPD as the Project Director will serve as overall

system engineer having the responsibilities stated above. As such

he will be responsible for all sub-system interfaces. In such

matters, the Payload Sub-Assembly Project Office is expected to

be responsive to appropriate direction from the SPD. However,

the SPD, in the exercise cf his interface responsibility, will

give special consideration to the basic environmental requirements

of the payload sub-assembly as established in consultation with

the CIA.

On the other hand, the SPD is not expected to accomplish engineering (• nless assistance is solicited) on technical

natters pertaining solely to the payload sub-assembly. SPD

actions elsewhere in the system affecting interfaces with the

Payload Sub-Assembly do require the concurrence of that Project

Office. Similarly, any Payload Sub-Assembly Project Office actions

which affect interfaces with other elements of the system do

require the concurrence of the SPD.

The SPD is resnonsible for =aster planning, master

programming, and overall budgeting; however, he is not authorized

ro alter program or budget estinates of the Payload Sub-Assembly

Project Office. Conversely, the latter is expected to program

and budget in accordance with the waster schedules issued by the

SPD. (Mote: CIA-OSP will subnit budget estimates in the normal

manner direct to the DNRO; however, the SPD will also include

payload sub-assembly schedules and budget estimates in the System

Project Plan for information purposes).

The most significant area of SAFSP/CIA-OSP relationship is

that pertaining to interface between the sensor sub-system and

other system elements. I cannot emphasize too strongly the need

for close daily rapport between the respective offices. Representatives of both offices are expected to attend all meetings

on subjects having a possible interface impact. The SPD and

Payload Sub Assembly Project Office are erected to have free and

full access to all infornazion and data pertaining to the system.

This includes, as appropriate, access to contractor plants,

engineering staffs and test facilities. However, supervision and

technical direction of the contractor's activities will be solely

CIA-OSP for all elements of the Payload Sub-Assembly and by

SAM for o:".r.ar system elements. If either SAFSP or CIA-OSP infers

a possible interface action pertaining'to any action of the other,

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he is expected to so advise the other without delay. When a

possible problem of this nature is raised, it is to be resolved

without delay (if resolution in the field is not possible, the

matter will be brought to the attention of the DNRO for decision).

The SPD will operate a CORONA Operations Command Post at the

Satellite Test Center, Sunnyvale, continuously during a mission.

The Payload Sub-Assembly Project Office will station appropriate

Project Office and contractor representatives there as well as at

the LMSC-AP facility during missions. The Satellite Operations

Center in the Pentagon will deal principally and directly with

the CORONA Command Post and the ASC-AP facility, as appropriate,

during a mission.

The SPD is the final field authority during a mission operation from launch through recovery. The SPD is expected, in normal.

situations, to assign responsibility to the senior Payload Sub

Assembly Project Office representative on matters of payload subassembly readiness, on-orbit operation, analysis of technical

difficulties, etc. The senior Payload Sub-Assembly Project Office

representative, in tura, will provide Payload Sub-Assembly status

reporting on an agreed-on regular basis or upon request of the •

SPD. However, when there are differences of opinion in the case

of technical difficulties, and when in the judgment of the SPD

that mission failure may be imminent, the operational decisions of

the SPD shall always be overriding and final.

Both the SPD and Payload Sub-Assembly Project Office will be

authorized to grant CORONA clearances to properly clearablAsazons

under their jurisdiction, in accordance with established Wm.‘ 00

security policies. The SPD and PS-APO shall honor, without

question, a need-to-know determination on the part of the other. .

Each shall keep the other advised on a continuing basis of current

project access lists.

The SPD will utilize the services of Aerospace Corporation •

in a general systems engineering role. Aerospace Corporation

employees supporting the SPO shall have free access to information'

and data at the payload sub-assembly contractor(s), but shall

exercise no technical influence or judgments over matters internal : .

to the Payload Sub Assembly, and shall not be charged by the SPD •

with advising him on such matters.

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HANZLIE

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Alexander E. Flax

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Despite good iatezzions on the part of both SAFSP azd CIA-OS?,

7 mn sure there will be honest differences of opinion in interpretetion me=gement responsibilities, whether or not a problem

really has interface implicEticns, etc. When such instances arise

and cannot be settled in the field, the matter will be called to

my attention and promptly resolved.

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With your concurrence, I will take the following actions:

.a.UG suitable management directives to c;4*? End

CLA in accord with the 7:recedng sections o. this menorandum.

D4 -e-t to sin. zhe IS7C integration contract with

fra- : -.cw:t 4 on through ccmplation so that LMSC mey bill the

Gevernmenr for services alreaey accc=14shed.

cont=t (or amend an

existing cne, with LKSC for :ualification tasting and integration

o= the =SIC .ae Pey --oecf .Sub-Assembly.

4. Direct C. to , --end the ?ayload Sc --' --;:epriete ;arseale: o2 Sz..?S? mad

ry heve ;:ree access :o data and in rL •

tiract S.2:3P to eizy. the systan iztegratl om contract

with 7.:::SC fr.= thrcuth tha currant date so that LCSC

=ay bill the Gavernment for services elreedy acc=plished.

:irect cZn. 7..:. to negotiate a new contract- wa g.h LXSC

for system in:ail:a:tic:. re2lacting the assignments of responsibility

dezer; bed herein (the ,ro,csed wo="4 statement will be coordinated

tith ., -nroved by -, tr: or to Ce=t=aCt execut'on).

^-. 7. Aut..‘,.._z:1 new contracts (or amend

exist"- , --ar ' =- -o- -ame-,4-0. e - l_ements of the CORONA

National Reconnaissance Office