2021 IL App (1st) 192203-U

No. 1-19-2203 

Order filed July 21, 2021 

Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

KENYATTA MCLAURIN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County. 

No. 18 CR 03684 

Honorable 

Stanley J. Sacks,

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.

 Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for armed habitual criminal is affirmed over his contention

the evidence was insufficient to establish his constructive possession of a firearm. 

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Kenyatta McLaurin was found guilty of armed habitual 

criminal and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he contends his conviction should 

be reversed where the evidence was insufficient to establish his constructive possession of a 

firearm. We affirm. 
No. 1-19-2203 

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¶ 3 Defendant was charged with one count of armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) 

(West 2018)), which alleged he knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm after having been 

convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and aggravated battery with a firearm. Three 

counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)), 

alleged he possessed a firearm and ammunition in his own abode after having been convicted of 

possession of a controlled substance. One count of violation of the Firearm Owner’s Identification 

Card Act (FOID) (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1), 14(c)(3) (West 2018)), alleged defendant possessed a 

firearm without a valid FOID card.1 

¶ 4 Chicago police Detective Vaci testified he and a team of officers executed a search warrant 

at an apartment on the 1200 block of North Taylor Avenue in Oak Park at approximately 7:00 a.m. 

on February 12, 2018. Vaci and his team went to the second-floor apartment, knocked, and 

announced their presence. No one answered, so the officers forced the apartment door open. Upon 

entry, Vaci saw a kitchen to the right, a “sitting area and a bathroom” to the left and, directly ahead, 

“a couch in like a little living room and then a bedroom to the direct right of that.” The apartment 

had one bedroom.

¶ 5 Darius Hammond was inside the apartment when Vaci entered; he was not the target of the 

warrant. The officers detained him. 

¶ 6 The bedroom door was locked with an electronic keypad, which Vaci identified in a 

photograph of the bedroom.

2 The officers knocked on the bedroom door; no one responded, so the 

officers forced entry to the bedroom and searched it. In the bedroom, Vaci found an “[electric]

1 The State nol-prossed one count of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver.

2 None of the exhibits the parties entered into evidence are part of the record on appeal.
No. 1-19-2203 

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utility bill, a birth certificate with [defendant’s] name as well as a family picture with [defendant] 

in it.” Vaci initially testified he found “proof of residency” in a drawer of a dresser in the bedroom, 

then testified he found “proof of residency” “on or in the dresser.” He also found a loaded Taurus 

9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun in the top left dresser drawer, ammunition in the top right 

dresser drawer, and a box of ammunition in the closet. Vaci found one bundle of cash in a safe in 

the closet and a second bundle of cash in a dresser drawer. He also found cannabis in a vacuumsealed bag next to the dresser. Vaci inventoried the items he found in the bedroom. 

¶ 7 In court, Vaci identified the following items he recovered from the bedroom and 

inventoried: (1) two electric bills with defendant’s name and the address of the Taylor apartment, 

(2) defendant’s birth certificate, (3) “a picture on the mirror that was attached to the dresser of 

[defendant] and his family,” and (4) a social security card with Hammond’s name.

3 Vaci identified 

defendant in the family photograph and in court. Vaci also identified photographs of the firearm

“that was in the drawer,” ammunition “in a plastic bag as well as loose rounds in the drawer,” “the 

box of ammunition recovered from the closet,” the safe, and the cash. The State moved these items 

and photographs into evidence. 

¶ 8 On cross-examination, Vaci testified defendant was not present during the execution of the 

search warrant and “was not taken into custody at any time during or near the execution of the 

search warrant.”

¶ 9 Vaci did not see who put the firearm or ammunition in the bedroom and did not know how 

long the firearm and ammunition had been there. He did not submit the firearm or ammunition for 

3 The record is unclear as to whether Vaci found and inventoried one electric bill or two. Vaci 

referred to two electric bills when reviewing the items he inventoried but, otherwise, the record and the 

parties’ briefs refer to one electric bill.
No. 1-19-2203 

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fingerprint or DNA testing. The electric bill was issued on August 2, 2017, approximately six 

months before the execution of the search warrant. The photograph of defendant and his family 

was not dated. Vaci did not know who placed the photograph in the bedroom and did not know 

how long it had been there. He did not know who placed defendant’s birth certificate in the 

bedroom. 

¶ 10 Vaci searched Hammond after he was taken into custody and recovered a set of keys to the 

Taylor apartment from Hammond’s pants pocket, which he inventoried. Vaci was unable to 

determine who the lessee of the apartment was. 

¶ 11 Upon questioning by the court, Vaci testified the keys in Hammond’s pocket were not to 

the locked bedroom and Hammond “did not have access to the bedroom that was locked.” The 

digital keypad that locked the bedroom door could be opened with “a 4, 6 digit code.” There was 

no need to use a key to unlock the bedroom door. 

¶ 12 The State moved into evidence certified copies of defendant’s prior convictions for 

aggravated battery and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. 

¶ 13 Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the State failed to prove his actual 

or constructive possession of the firearm. The court denied defendant’s motion.

¶ 14 Tiffany McLaurin testified defendant, whom she identified in court, is her brother. 

Defendant had lived with her on the 1300 block of North Central Avenue in Chicago continuously 

for 15 years and received mail at that address. 

¶ 15 McLaurin identified a letter from the State’s Attorney’s office addressed to defendant at 

their home on the 1300 block of North Central. The letter was a “notification for [defendant] to 

appear in court for this case.” McLaurin also identified a gas bill addressed to defendant at their 
No. 1-19-2203 

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home on the 1300 block of North Central, which was dated October 26, 2018. Defendant moved 

these documents into evidence; however, the court only admitted the letter from the State’s 

Attorney’s office to “show that [the State’s Attorney] sent a letter to that address because maybe 

she thought [defendant] lived there on a certain date.” 

¶ 16 In closing, defendant argued the evidence established he lived on North Central in Chicago 

with his sister, not at the Taylor apartment in Oak Park, and Hammond’s social security card 

supported an inference he had access to the bedroom of the Taylor apartment. Defendant noted the 

State introduced no evidence he knew the combination to the keypad securing the bedroom. The 

State contended the evidence established defendant and Hammond’s “joint constructive 

possession” of the items in the bedroom. The State theorized defendant stored his firearm at the 

Taylor apartment because he wanted to keep it in a safe place away from his family.

¶ 17 The court found defendant guilty of the armed habitual criminal count and acquitted him 

of all the other counts. In announcing its ruling, the court reasoned defendant storing “things that 

are important to him in that bedroom, like the birth certificate, like the picture of him and arguably 

his family as well,” implied he possessed the firearm in the bedroom because people tend to keep 

such important belongings at their homes. The court concluded the evidence showed “at least that 

[defendant] had two places, one with his sister and the other on Taylor Street in Oak Park.” 

¶ 18 Defendant filed a posttrial “motion to set aside the finding of guilt.” Defendant’s written 

motion is not in the record on appeal. However, at the hearing on this motion, the court described 

it as “comprised of the following numbered paragraphs, 15.” Defendant orally argued “the 

evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] possessed this weapon.” The court 

denied defendant’s motion. 
No. 1-19-2203 

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¶ 19 The court sentenced defendant to 12 years’ imprisonment. 

¶ 20 On appeal, defendant challenges his conviction for armed habitual criminal. Specifically, 

he contends the State failed to prove he constructively possessed the firearm Detective Vaci found 

in the bedroom dresser. 

¶ 21 In assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 

322 (2005). We do not retry the defendant. People v. Joiner, 2018 IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 58. In a 

bench trial, the court is responsible for evaluating the credibility of the witnesses, resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, and determining the weight to be given to and the inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). We cannot substitute our 

judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 242 (2006). We will 

only reverse a defendant’s conviction if the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it 

creates a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 12.

¶ 22 To prove defendant guilty of armed habitual criminal as charged, the State had to establish 

he knowingly possessed a firearm when he had previously been convicted two or more times of 

certain enumerated felonies. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2018). Defendant does not dispute 

the State established his qualifying convictions. He only contests the evidence supporting his 

possession of a firearm.

¶ 23 A defendant’s possession of contraband is a factual issue, and we will not disturb the 

findings of the trial court unless the evidence is so unbelievable that it creates a reasonable doubt 

as to the defendant’s guilt. People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 27. Possession of a firearm 
No. 1-19-2203 

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can be actual or constructive. Id. Here, there is no dispute defendant did not actually possess the 

firearm on his person. Thus, the State had to prove defendant constructively possessed it. See 

People v. Hannah, 2013 IL App (1st) 111660, ¶ 28. 

¶ 24 To establish constructive possession, the State must prove the defendant had knowledge of 

the presence of the firearm and exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where the 

firearm was found.4 People v. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. Constructive possession 

is typically proved entirely through circumstantial evidence. People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st) 

132176, ¶ 26. Control is established by showing the defendant’s intent and capability to exercise 

dominion over the area where contraband was found. People v. Jackson, 2019 IL App (1st) 

161745, ¶ 27. Proof the defendant inhabits the premises is sufficient to establish control for 

purposes of constructive possession. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. The fact that others 

also have access to the location does not diminish the defendant’s constructive possession. 

Jackson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161745, ¶ 27.

¶ 25 A defendant’s knowledge of contraband may be inferred where it is found in an area under 

his control. People v. Bogan, 2017 IL App (3d) 150156, ¶ 29. Because knowledge may be inferred

from control, but control may not be inferred from knowledge (Id.), we analyze the State’s proof 

of control first.

¶ 26 Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for the trial 

court to conclude defendant controlled the bedroom in which Vaci found the firearm. Three pieces 

of evidence connected defendant to the bedroom: the electric bill in his name at the Taylor Avenue 

4 The term “exclusive” tends to be misleading in this context, as it is well-settled that more than 

one person may share control over an object or area. People v. Bogan, 2017 IL App (3d) 150156, ¶ 31 n. 

3. 
No. 1-19-2203 

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address, his birth certificate, and his family photograph. The electric bill supported an inference

defendant lived at the Taylor apartment or stayed there some of the time. See People v. Lawton, 

253 Ill. App. 3d 144, 147 (1993) (utility bills show the defendant lived on the premises and, 

therefore, controlled them). If defendant lived in or stayed at the Taylor apartment, it would be 

reasonable to infer he controlled and used its only bedroom and the furniture therein.

¶ 27 The other items Vaci found in the bedroom further supported a conclusion defendant had 

access to and used the bedroom. Defendant’s birth certificate and family photograph were personal 

items, and his birth certificate was unique to him. Vaci found those items on or in the dresser in 

which he found the firearm. This evidence supported a conclusion defendant used the dresser to 

store his personal belongings. 

¶ 28 Moreover, the bedroom in which defendant stored his personal belongings was secured 

with not just an ordinary lock, but a digital keypad lock. Vaci testified Hammond did not have 

access to the bedroom. Thus, the evidence supported a conclusion defendant stored his personal 

belongings in a room with specially restricted access. Altogether, the evidence supported a rational 

inference defendant had access to the bedroom of the Taylor apartment and, at a minimum, used 

it to store his belongings. Thus, the court reasonably concluded defendant controlled that bedroom.

¶ 29 Because the State established defendant controlled the bedroom, the trial court could 

properly infer defendant knew the firearm was in that bedroom and, specifically, in the dresser 

where his other personal items were found. See Bogan, 2017 IL App (3d) 150156, ¶ 29. Thus, the 

State established defendant constructively possessed the firearm in the dresser.

¶ 30 Defendant argues there was “uncontroverted evidence [he] lived elsewhere,” citing his 

sister’s testimony and the letter the State’s Attorney’s office sent to the North Central address. 
No. 1-19-2203 

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Even accepting that defendant’s primary address was on North Central in Chicago, that does not 

negate his control over the bedroom of the Taylor apartment in Oak Park. One person can have 

control over multiple properties. See, e.g., People v. Bond, 205 Ill. App. 3d 515, 517 (1990) 

(defendant had control over apartment that was no one’s residence and that was used to package 

and sell cocaine). 

¶ 31 Defendant also contends there was no evidence he knew the firearm was in the dresser. As 

explained above, the trial court properly inferred defendant’s knowledge of the firearm from his 

control over the dresser where it was found. See Bogan, 2017 IL App (3d) 150156, ¶ 29. With 

respect to this argument, both parties overstate Vaci’s testimony regarding where he found 

defendant’s personal items. The State insists Vaci found the birth certificate and electric bill 

“inside the same dresser drawer” as the firearm (Emphasis in original.). Defendant claims Vaci 

found those items “in the open.” In fact, Vaci testified he found defendant’s personal items in or

on the dresser. Regardless, defendant’s personal items were in the same locked bedroom, in or on 

the same dresser as the firearm. To the extent their location in versus on the dresser is material, the 

trial court was responsible for resolving this somewhat unclear testimony and we will not disturb 

its conclusion. See Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228.

¶ 32 We note that Vaci identified several photographs he took of the bedroom and items 

recovered therein. These photographs are not included in the record on appeal, nor are the physical 

exhibits Vaci identified. As the appellant, defendant bears the burden of providing a sufficiently 

complete record to support his claim of error. People v. Smith, 406 Ill. App. 3d 879, 886 (2010). 

We construe any doubt arising from the incompleteness of the record against defendant. Id. The 

photographs of the bedroom and recovered items might, for example, clarify whether defendant’s 
No. 1-19-2203 

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birth certificate and electric bill were in or on the dresser, and how close to the firearm they were. 

But we are unable to review this photographic evidence, so we can only resolve the lack of clarity 

as to these items’ locations against defendant. See Id. Moreover, the trial court saw the photographs 

and recovered items, and we presume the trial court’s ruling had a sufficient factual basis. See 

People v. Carrion, 2020 IL App (1st) 171001, ¶ 34 (not yet released for publication and subject to 

revision or withdrawal) (“absent a complete record, it is presumed the trial court’s judgment 

conforms to the law and has a sufficient factual basis”). 

¶ 33 Defendant next argues the evidence supported a conclusion Hammond had access to the 

bedroom and possessed the firearm and cannabis inside it. There was conflicting evidence as to

whether Hammond had access to the bedroom; Vaci testified he did not, but also testified 

Hammond’s social security card was in the bedroom. This conflicting evidence was for the trial 

court to resolve. See Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d at 228. In any event, even if Hammond had access 

to the bedroom, that would not exonerate defendant; it would make defendant and Hammond’s 

possession of the firearm joint. See People v. Ingram, 389 Ill. App. 3d 897, 901 (2009) (the “

‘dominion and control required to establish constructive possession is not diminished by evidence 

of others’ access to the contraband’ ”; “ ‘the result is not vindication of the defendant, but rather a 

situation of joint possession.’ ”) (quoting People v. Hill, 226 Ill. App. 3d 670, 673 (1992)).

¶ 34 The cases defendant cites are distinguishable and do not require reversal of his conviction. 

See, e.g., People v. Wise, 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 1 (no constructive possession where firearm was 

found near passengers in the third row of a minivan the defendant was driving); People v. Terrell

2017 IL App (1st) 142726, ¶¶ 19-25 (no constructive possession where no utility bills connected 

defendant to the apartment where contraband was found, a different individual was the lessee, and 
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none of defendant’s property was in the same room as the contraband). People v. Maldonado, 2015 

IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 28 (no constructive possession where a retail delivery receipt and two 

unopened mass mail solicitations were the only evidence connecting the defendant to the apartment 

where contraband was found); People v. Alicea, 2013 IL App (1st) 112602, ¶¶ 13-15 (no 

constructive possession where multiple witnesses testified defendant did not live in the apartment 

where contraband was found and that he had moved out permanently). Accordingly, the evidence 

sufficiently supported defendant’s conviction for armed habitual criminal. 

¶ 35 Finally, footnotes in defendant’s brief challenge the trial court’s exclusion of testimony 

there were dogs in the Taylor apartment and of the letter the State’s Attorney’s office sent to 

defendant at the North Central address.5 To preserve these evidentiary issues for appellate review, 

defendant was required to make contemporaneous objections and raise the issues in a posttrial 

motion. See People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005). Defendant’s posttrial motion is not in 

the record on appeal. The transcript of the hearing on that motion reflects defendant did not raise, 

and the court did not address, any issues other than the State’s proof of constructive possession. 

Thus, the record before us does not establish defendant properly preserved these issues, and 

defendant does not seek plain error review. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited any challenge to 

these evidentiary issues. See People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 544-45 (2010). 

¶ 36 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction.

¶ 37 Affirmed. 

5 The court did not exclude this letter. As noted above, it admitted the letter for the limited 

purpose of establishing where the State’s Attorney’s office believed defendant lived at the time that letter 

was mailed.