" 
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 

AUGUST 2011 

SEeRETffM'/RELTO us,tc; AUS, ON., OBR, tel 
!Ee~El'iffttl;~EL 'fa us~, ~us, QAcN, OBR, NlL 

(U) CONTENTS 

(U) Forward ................................................................................ iii 

(U) Preface ................................................................................. v 

(U) Introduction .......................................................................... vii 

(U) Overview ............................................................................... 7' 

(U) ·Origins .................................................................................. 7 

(U) Development........................................................................ 10 

(U) Management ........................................................................ 16 

(U) Launch .................................................................................. 17 

(U) Results ................................................................................. 19 

(U) Conclusion ............................................................................. 21 

(U) NOTE: Portions marked as REL are 

REL TO USA, FVEY unless otherwise 

marked. 

SEeRETffFlEf/REL TO USA, Al:JS, 6A~., GBR, NZL 
SEGRElfFFKlfREL lU ble", AblS, c.'~., GBR, Ni!L 

(U) FOREWORD 

(S,'rr~JREL) The development of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) 

imaging for intelligence purposes began before the establishment 

of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Under the NRO's 

coordination, scientists and engineers steadily overcame the 

technological and bureaucratic barriers to achieve radar imaging's 

potential. On 21 December 1964, Quill, the world's first satellite-borne 

SAR launched from \landenberg Air Force Base, California. 

fS//TKl/REL) Quill was a successful experimental program. It is 

remarkable that it was built using technology already available, saving 

both time and money. Dr. Jeffery Charlston captures these themes in 

this concentrated account of the Quill program. For the reader, the 

Quill program offers knowledge on experimental programs, working 

with bureaucracy, using existing technology, and finding the right 

customer. 

ESlFTI(J.fREL) Dr. Charlston builds upon the work of others in 

presenting this brief history of Quill. As the reader gains insight into 

the beginning of SAR, I challenge the reader to take the lessons of the 

past and look into the future at how this experiment can be applied to 

national reconnaissance efforts. 

Robert A. McDonald, Ph.D. 

Dir~ctor, Center for the Study 

of National Reconnaissance 

SEGRETfn:KIfREL TO l:JSA, Able, SAt., GeR, ~'i!b 

iii 
aEeRE'f/1ft~}REl "fO USA, AUS, OAP4, OBR, t~L 

(U) PREFACE 

(S..'ITKlJREL) In addition to being the first orbital radar-imaging 

satellite and a remarkably cost-effective experiment conducted with 

available hardware, Quill played a significant role in pioneering 

holography, optical computing, and applied Fourier transforms. The 

program is an important missing part of unclassified aerospace history 

and the National Reconnaissance Office's (NRO's) acknowledged 

contributions to science and industry. 

(U) Quill's remarkable achievements have been previously 

discussed in two classified histories. Robert L. Perry completed 

Quill: Radar in Orbit in 1973 as part of his multivolume work for the 

National Reconnaissance Office's Program A, A History of Satellite 

Reconnaissance. Robert L. Butterworth prepared another history of 

the program, Quill: the First Imaging Radar Satellite as part of a larger 

effort for the previous NRO History Office in 2002, revising it for the 

successor, Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance (CSNR) 

in 2004. The author further revised and edited Butterworth's work while 

serving as a senior historian for CSNR from 2006 to 2008. That effort 

is the origin of this article, and large portions of it are duplicated here. 

(U) On 27 November 2009 the Director of .National Intelligence 

concurred with the Director of the NRO's decision to declassify the 

fact of Quill as a 1964 NRO experiment in radar imagery. All additional 

information about the Quill program remains classified pending 

additional guidance. 

Jeffery A. Charlston, Ph.D. 

Co-chair, Quill Declassification 

Integrated Process Team (IPT) 

SEGRCFlrFKI/REl"'FE) U&A" Al:J6, GOtH, GBR, Hi!L 

v 
SEGRETJ.qI(NAEL TO USA AUe, GA~t GSA. ~I~L 

(U) INTRODUCTION 

(6IfTK+lREL) In the early 1960's the United States successfully began 

collecting satellite Imagery from space. The cofiected imagery verified many 

Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities U.S. imagery satellites faced one 

significant limitation, however, collection through cloud cover and the darkness 

of night The story that unfolds in the following pages illustrates the United 

State's first attempt to address this limitation from space, the Quill experiment. 

(e#TKf/R~L) Quill was a small experimental satellite program used to test 

whether radar returns from space could peer through clouds and darkness. 

The experiment proved radar imagery derived from space-based sensors was 

possible, setting a foundation for building a critical reconnaissance capability 

for the nation. 

(6h'TI(1lREL) By the time Quill was under development, the Soviet Union 

had already demonstrated full strategiC nuclear capabilities and had also 

proven adept of obscuring and masking their activities in the large expanse 

of the Soviet homeland. The United States recognized that additional 

reconnaissance capabilities were required to counter the Soviet threat In 

order to help counter the Soviet threat, the National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO) was established on 6 September 1961 by an agreement between the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of the Defense (000). 

The purpose of the NRO was to enhance coordination, collaboration, and 

management of satellite reconnaissance programs under development by the 

CIA and 000 elements. Within the NRO, the Department of the Air Force 

supported a Los Angeles based element that undertook the Quill experiment. 

(3HTI~UREL) U,S. industrial partners and research laboratories had alrE!ady 

supported efforts to collect imagery derived from radar sensors on airborne 

platforms. Some the country's best minds were working issues associated 

with space-based collection including radar sensors. Quill was the beneficiary 

of an environment where government, research, and industrial engineers and 

scientIsts identified a space sensor opportunity and successfully carried out 

a proof of concept experiment. 

experiment was an important early victory in proving the potential for more 

sophisticated radar imagery systems. 

(Sl(Tf("~5l) Dr. Jefferey Charlston has presented this fascinating story in 

a commendable and brief form. This history wIll benefit all practitioners of 

national reconnaissance who continue to support the defense of the nation 

through reconnaissance from space and are interested in the first steps 

leading to fully successful space reconnaissance programs. 

James D. Outzen, Ph.D. 

Chief. Historical Documentation and Research 

Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance 

vii 

{!;EQRET.''Tf4//REt.O y~o" py{!;, CP~J. CSR, ~JA 
SEeftET/FFtti/ftEL "Fe US", "US, O,Ac,., OBR, Ni!L 

(U) OVERVIEW 

(U) The U.S. Air Force began planning for space-based 

reconnaissance before the Soviet Union launched its first satellite 

on 4 October 1957. News of those Air Force plans, however, drew 

popular attention only after Sputnik's strategic implications startled the 

American public. Aviation Week magazine publicized the existence of 

an Air Force contract with Lockheed Missiles and Space Company 

(see figure 1) for the development of Weapons System 117L (WS117L) just ten days after the launch of the Soviet radio beacon satellite. 

The reconnaissance satellite, also referred to as Pied Piper, "would 

carry television, photographic cameras, [and] infra-red spotter or radar 

scanner systems."1 

(U) Figure 1-1958 

Radar Satellite (image: 

UNCLASSIFIED) 

source-(U) Aviation Week 

and Space Technology, 

69: 1 0 (8 September 1958) 

(U) The generically designated WS-117L became the ancestor of 

all American reconnaissance satellites, including systems designed 

to produce radar imagery. Analysts working for the newly renamed 

Aviation Week and Space Technology accurately included radar 

imagery systems in their September 1958 predictions for emerging 

satellite capabilities.2 That prediction came true six years later with the 

launch of a satellite called Quill. 

(U) ORIGINS 

(U) The public received an indication of the intelligence potential 

of satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar (SAR) as early as 20 April 

1960. On that date the U.S. Army released images of American cities 

taken by an aircraft-mounted AN/UPO-1 side-looking· airborne radar 

(SLAR) system. That technology, traced back to World War II radar 

, navigation systems, proved capable of generating recognizable 

images at night and through cloud cover. Washington Post reporter 

1 (U) "USAF Pushes Pied Piper Space Vehicle," Aviation Week (14 October 1957),26. U. 

2 (U) Aviation Week and Space Technology 69:10 (8 September 1958).100-101. U. 

8EORET/R=lflfREL TO UEhIc, AU8, OA •• , OBR, '.i!L 

7 
SE6RET:,q:I~fREL TO USA, AUS, OA •• , GBR, NZL 

John Norris correctly concluded that the necessary hardware could be 

mounted on a reconnaissance satellite (see figure 2).3 

tlsbbtgtonl1 <limt,18trlllA 

(U) Figure 2-1960 

Airborne Radar 

Image (image: 

UNCLASSIFIED) 

source-(U) 

Washington Post 

page 1, 20 April 

1960. 

(U) Adapting the SLAR capability for use on a satellite offered 

numerous advantages. Airborne SLAR used the real aperture of the 

radar unifs antenna, and had to measure and compensate for the 

incidental motion of the parent aircraft. Space vehicles promised 

nearly perfect stability and predictable motion. This allowed the radar 

unit to record signal returns over a considerable distance to form a 

virtual antenna-a SAR. The physically smaller antennas required 

for a satellite actually improved resolution with SAR by "painting" the 

resulting image with a smaller brush, and distance from the target 

proved effectively irrelevant. 4 

(U) Development of America's first reconnaissance· satellites was 

already well under way beneath a steadily growing cloak of secrecy. 

The core WS-117L design concepts, E-1 and E-2, sought to provide a 

near-real time imagery capability. In principle a near-real time system 

would transmit images back to Earth almost as quickly as they could 

be collected, allowing for rapid processing and evaluation. Decision 

makers and military planners could use this capability to follow critical 

events as they developed. 

8 

3 (U) John G. Norris, -New Radar-Photo 'Spy' Scans Afar,· Washington Post, 20 April 1960, 1. U. 

4 f8!,q::Kl/Rlib) projed engineer for the Quill radar, interview with Robert 

Butterworth, Litchfl8ld Park, Arizona, 10 May 2001. NRO history files. TSlITK. 
SEORET/FFltl/REL "FO USt4t, t4tU8, OAt4, OBR, NlL 

(U) No matter how desirable that capability might have been, the 

era's television camera, data storage, and bandwidth capabilities 

presented formidable barriers to obtaining near-real time imagery 

from orbit. Using photographic film for data storage in what came to 

be known as a film-readout system promised only a partial solution. 

Classified WS-117L design alternatives included a simpler film return 

option as a backup approach. 

(U) The Central Intelligence Agency's Corona program sought to 

employ that second-choice method until WS-117L produced a nearreal time system. In place of the complex mechanisms required to 

process, scan, and transmit film images in the absence of suitable 

digital technology, the alternative approach simply stored the exposed 

film in a small reentry vehicle for return to Earth. The Corona program 

successfully returned the first intelligence imagery from space on 18 

August 1960 and remained operational as the concept of space-based 

radar imagery developed. 

(SlfTl(J!RiL} During the summer of 1961 Colonel William G. King 

served as deputy director of the Air Force's Special Projects staff in 

Los Angeles. That organization was designated as Program A of the 

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) with the secret establishment 

of the new intelligence organization on 6 September 1961. King's 

office worked closely with Lockheed on satellites and launch vehicles 

under both its acknowledged and classified identities, and King soon 

headed a study group looking for new ways to use satellites for 

national reconnaissance. 

~S{FFI~}REL) In the late fall of 1961 this study group took up 

the possibility of launching a proof-of-concept SAR satellite.5 An 

operational SAR satellite would greatly improve the Air Force's 

capability to conduct post-strike analysiS in the event of a nuclear war, 

, a possibility weighing heavily on strategists' minds at that time.6 After 

several months of continued effort, this project had matured enough 

for King to offiCially propose the experiment to NRO Director Joseph 

V. Charyk, who approved it in mid-November 1962.7 

tS/fTKlJREL) King had already assigned Major Davi~ D. Bradburn, 

an electrical engineer with long experience in the Air Force's Air 

5 (U) Ibid. 

6 (U) Robert l. Perry, Quill: Radar in Orbit (NRO, 1973), 1-2. lSI/BYE. 

7 (U) NRO headquarters (DNRO Charyk) to Maj. Gen. Greer, head ofthe Air Force Special Projects 

(SAFSP) activities on the West Coast, 21 November 1962. ARC Job 199880073, box 1, folder 

100. S. Captain Gorman, USN, "SAFSP Historical Chronology CY 62,· ARC Job 199800072, box 

3, ,folder 11. S. Charyk to McCone, 14 December 1962, -Memorandum for Mr. McCone,· ARC Job 

199700046, Box 4, Folder 14. lSI/BYE. 

9 

8EORCFffFIEf/REL TO l!J8A, Al!J8, OAt4, OBR, t4lL 
SEeRETfffttilREL 1'6 US", "US, e"N, 8BR, N2L 

Research and Development Command, to direct the effort. Bradburn 

summoned a group of industrial and scientific experts, including 

representatives of Lockheed and Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, 

to a meeting in Los Angeles without telling them the subject. It turned 

out to be the official start of the SAR satellite demonstration, now 

known by the classified name "P-40." The satellite itself received the 

code name "Quill." 

(S.frrKJJREL) Although overshadowed by the Corona program and 

other efforts of the young NRO, Quill remains an example of sound 

project management and the successful use of available technologies 

for a new purpose. Robert Perry summarizes its accomplishments: 

(S/FTKl/REL) In the first 20 years of reconnaissance 

satellite program activity in the United States, Quill was the 

only program that substantially conformed to initial cost, 

schedule, and performance estimates, and the only satellite 

program of any nature to proceed from start to finish with 

a perfect record in launch, orbital operations, readout, and 

recovery. 8 

(U) DEVELOPMENT 

(S/ITI<J/REL) The group quickly requested proposals from industry, 

and contracts formalizing Lockheed and Goodyear's preexisting 

cooperation in the project were awarded in November 1962. The 

Lockheed team in Sunnyvale, California already providing theAgena 

vehicle for the Corona satellite assumed responsibility for overall 

systems engineering and technical direction, together with providing 

the upper stage/satellite body and associated subsystems for Quill. 

Goodyear would manufacture the radar payload and cooperate in the 

design, testing, and operation of the experimental satellite program. 

The contract called for two identical vehicles, designated as missions 

2355 and 2356, with first launch in April 1964. A third vehicle's payload 

would also be prepared, but no booster was identified for it. 9 

(&lfTKlJREL) Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara's senior 

technical advisor, Dr. Eugene Fubini, raised an immediate objection 

to the cost of the program. He noted that the budget for acquisition 

8 (U) Perry, 1. Of course the fact that Quill proved to be a single-flight program must be taken into 

account in weighing Perry's assessment 

9 (i!I+"'JRib~ Infonnation about the contradual arrangements for Quill is drawn from the 

Bradburn interview with Robert Butterworth, NRO history files, S1rrK, and from lockheed Aircraft 

Corporation, Vehicle 2355 System Report: Volume 1: Summary (Sunnyvale, California: Lockheed 

Missile and Space Co., ~1 March 1965), pp. 8ff., SIIBYE. 

10 
SEORCF/fFltl/REL Te tJ8JIc, )l(tJ~, CAN, ~I!R, NZL 

of the project's five radar units amounted to five times the cost for 

the existing APS-73 radar upon which it was based. 10 The radar was 

designated KP-II (Knowles Project Number Two, after Goodyear 

Aircraft Company president T. A. Knowles) in its secretly modified form, 

and actually represented a form of the AN/UPQ-102 pulsed-Doppler 

system that Goodyear was then developing for the Air Force RF-4C 

reconnaissance aircraft (see figure 3) from the earlier APS-73.11 To 

meet P-40's requirements, Goodyearwould remove unnecessary aerial 

subsystems and prepare this cutting-edge technology for operation in 

space. The preliminary budget covered all of the associated costs, 

including launch services. Bradburn's explanation satisfied Fubini and 

the Pentagon released funds to initiate the experiment. 12 

(U) Figure 3-

RF-4C Aircraft 

(. Image. SfA=I~" SF I , 

~ 

f&'ITKlJReb) Bradburn focused the P-40 experiment on 

demonstrating orbital functionality. Lockheed emphasized this proof of 

concept mission, establishing a goal of SO-foot resolution in both azimuth 

(across track) and slant range (along track}.13 Secondary mission 

objectives assessed the radar system's performance, determined the 

limits imposed by the Agena platform, gathered technical information 

on radar operation and ground recording equipment, and sought 

information to improve subsequent radar system designs. 

(S1FFKlJREb) The project did not seek to develop new technology 

or become the basis for an operational reconnaissance system.14 In 

Bradburn's view, the orbital experiment sought to answer only two 

10 (U) Perry, 21-22. 

11 (U) The first production RF-4C aircraft were delivered to the Air Force in September 1964. 

12 (U) Perry, 21-23. 

13 fS1FFI6'/REL) Lockheed, Vehicle 2355 System Report 1, 15. 

14 (U) Joseph V. Charyk, Director, National Reconnaissance Office, to Mr. McCone, memorandum, 

14 December 1962, p. 4. ARC Job 199700046, box 4, folder 14, TSI/BYE. "Status of Satellite 

Reconnaissance Programs," 13 November 1963, p. 7. ARC Job 199700046, box 4, folder 14, TSI/ 

BYE. _. "Satellite Reconnaissance," July 1963, p. 20. ARC Job 199700046, box 46, 

folder 14, TSI/BYE. 

11 

8EORE"F/fFI~:REL "FO USA, AUS, OA •• , GBR, •• i!L 
SESRET/FFKlJREL TO ~SA, )C~S, OA •• , OaR, Nll 

questions: could the system achieve the desired resolution in the 

azimuth plane, and did atmospheric phenomena degrade system 

performance. He sought to use proven technology and techniques 

wherever possible to maintain this focus, minimizing P-40's pursuit of 

technological advances. 

(&,FFKlfREL) In accordance with the experiment's proof of concept 

objective, Goodyear simplified the radar design and did not include 

the capabilities needed for an operational intelligence system. For 

example, the KP-II retained no ability to select the terrain swath 

being imaged. Resulting hardware underwent extensive modification 

to ensure reliability in the harsh environment of space. This offered 

sufficient engineering challenges without involving the additional 

components needed for an operational system. 15 See figure 4 for 

more information about P-40's imaging operations. 

ts/Ff~IftI!!L) 

Figure 4--P-40 Imaging 

Operations 

(image:. S/fFfElIREt) 

(S.fITKlfREL) The P-40 effort was concerned only with resolution 

in the azimuth ("map") plane, at right angles to the satellite's ground 

15 t8fFfUIIREL) Infonnation about the payload is drawn from Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, 

Engineering Analysis Report No.1, KP-1/ Radar System (utchfield Part, Arizona: Goodyear 

Aerospace Corporation, 25 July 1964). SECRET -SPECIAL HANDLING. 

12 

SEORETt'fFlElIREL"FO USA, AUS, OAt., SBR, t.ZL 
SEeREflffltllftEl'f6 US'A, AUS, eAN, 68R, Nfl 

track. Bradburn remained unconcerned about range resolution 

along the satellite's direction of travel because shortening the radar 

pulses or other simple modifications could readily change it. His goal 

remained constant: processing space-based SAR data to achieve 

useful azimuth resolution, thus proving the concept of reconnaissance 

via space-based radar imagery. 

tSJITKJJREL) Quill's experimental mission would last only 96 hours. 

During that time the KP-II radar would operate no more than five 

minutes per orbit, and for no more than three orbits in succession. 

Three silver-zinc batteries powered the unit, providing a maximum 

of 80 minutes of SAR collection. These parameters would allow the 

vehicle to achieve its mission goals. 

(SJfTKl/REl) The Corona program's proven flight package of a 

thrust-augmented Thor·booster and an Agena D upper stage would 

carry the KP-II radar into space. Lockheed engineers expected the 

Agena to provide sufficient stability for its integrated KP-II payload to 

function effectively. This allowed them to opt for the simple solution of 

flush-mounting the radar antenna onto the Agena's outer surface. The 

15 foot antenna occupied nearly the entire right side of the Agena (see 

figure 5), protruding about 2.5 inches from its surface once covered by 

a protective fairing. 16 

(8ffFI~IREL) 

Figure 5-Quill 

Agena vehicle 

with KP-II 

antenna 

(image: &lFFlflt 

~sourceLockheed 

System Report 

2, p 144. 

(SfITI"JREL) The antenna fairing reduced the strain on the Agena's 

small engine by detaching after the Thor booster engine cut off. Three 

of the antenna's four mountings slid along fixed tracks as the vehicle 

reacted to thermal loads, thereby preventing antenna deformation. 17 

16 (U) Bradburn, interview. 

17 ~SNTIEi:REl) Lockheed, System Report 2, p. 1-139. S-SPECIAL HANDLING. 

13 

8EORETffFI6','REL TO Us,Ic, AUS, 0A.4, oeR, NiOL 
Once in orbit the Agena would follow a typical early Corona mission 

profile, flying tail first to facilitate film recovery and terrestrial coverage. 

(SfFTltNREl) Quill reflected the same technological challenges 

that had led WS-117L engineers to the film-readout and film-return 

solutions for photographic imagery. Return signals from each pulse 

of the KP-II radar produced a line on a cathode ray tube on board the 

Quill satellite. Photographic film moved across the display to' record 

successive radar returns, preserving the data for later analysis. 

(S/FTI<J/REL) The satellite would send that data to the ground in 

two ways. While the Corona system's film return technology provided 

a proven method, the desire' for a near-real time satellite imagery 

capability remained alive and well in the Air Force. Strategic Air 

Command supported Quill, particularly in conjunction with a nearreal time capability, as a potential tool for post-strike bomb damage 

assessments. 18 The experiment accordingly employed an ultra high 

frequency (UHF) wideband data link to test this potential. 

tS/ITI<I}REL) The experimental SAR problem was not as challenging 

as using analog systems to transmit an operational optical image, 

as contemplated in WS-117L's E-1 and E-2 efforts. Quill" transmitted 

data directly from the KP-II receiver to specialized recorders at 

the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and New Boston, 

New Hampshire, tracking stations used for the Corona program, 

and gathered data only when in view of one of those stations. 

The recorders duplicated the satellite's machinery, translating the 

raw KP-II data into a cathode ray tube image and recording it on 

film. Preflight engineering analysis considered this task simple and 

. straightforward. 19 

(SIFTKI}REL) Whether in space or on the ground, this approach 

preserved the Doppler-coded return signal from the KP-II radar unit 

as a film transparency. Technicians could convert the seemingly' 

meaningless result into visual imagery using a purpose-built device 

known as a Precision Optical Processor (see figure 6). The University 

of Michigan's Lou Cutrona had developed this technique for processing 

SAR Doppler data in the 1950's, using optics to perform a task beyond 

the limited capabilities of that era's electronic computers. 

18 (U) Robert L. Perry. Quill: Radar in Orbit (NRO, 1973). 1-2. 

19 (SfR"I"fREL) Goodyear. Engineering Analysis, p.9-1. 

14 

SEeRET/fFl~/REL TO l:JS,o" Al:J6, &'~., SiR, N~b 
COLLIMATOR 

SIGNAl FILM (TILTED) 

~~-- '\ LC i· .... j, FILTfR.I'LAN£ RECOIOING , ~:-.. ....... I t I'lANI! (TILTED) 

~\ .,- IY?~ I ~I . ~~~ ~I ~ ~~ 't .. ,,_ SIGNAl. '. • r:::1 ..... ~, ". 

---

~~ 

I . . '-:"'- / 'x.) CYLlNOItICAl ,"\/X 21 TEUSCOPE / 

SPHERICAl _. ---I TEUSCOPE 1 ~ 

(U) Figure 6-

University of 

Michigan Precision 

Optical Processor 

(image: 81fFl~1 

~ 

(SJrrKlJREL) The unprocessed SAR data, although captured on 

optical film, presented nothing comprehensible to the human eye. 

Cutrona's technique recognized that optical lenses, when linked to 

lasers, could perform fast Fourier transforms beyond the capabilities 

of the era's digital computers. His Precision Optical Processor concept 

was a holographic computer designed to translate optical film data 

from a s stem into fully focused, fine-resolution optical 

imagery 

ESJFFKI!REL) When complete, Quill filled the Agena's three payload 

sections: barrel, conical, and nose. The KP-II radar system, weighing 

370 pounds, went in the barrel section. The recorder system, including 

the cathode ray tube recorder and the film-supply cassette, weighed 

approximately 99 pounds and went in the conical section. The reentry 

capsule, located in the vehicle's nose cone, protected exposed film 

containing the raw data until it arrived safely back on Earth.20 

20 (SJR'I"JREl) Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, pp.4-1-4-12. 

15 

SEeREflffl~fREt 'fa tJS", "tJS, e"N, 8BR, '4ft 
9ECRETHTt(NREt TO U&<, J!tU9, eAf4. SBft '4ft 

(U) MANAGEMENT 

(~(IT"'lIRE'=) With this architecture, P-40's experimental Quill vehicle 

took full advantage of the equipment and procedures developed for 

the Corona film-return program. The program itself benefited from 

experience with WS-117L contractors. When P-40 was first approved. 

Bradburn had observed that his experience with the earlier effort led 

him to believe that preliminary budgets underestimated actual costs! 

and that proposed schedules would slip as contract negotiations 

unfolded. Bradburn's planning therefore assumed a program cost of 

double Lockheed's 1962 proposal. When negotiations 

were complete in January 1963. Bradburn's original forecast roved 

prescient. The program's actual estirnated cost stood 

just under his assumption and well below the approved 

in November 1962. These costs did not include boosters, launches. or 

space operations. 21 

(S/fft(HREL) Quill contracts originally called for first launch in April 

1964. but even Bradburn's tight focus and insistence on minimal 

technology development could not prevent delays. Bureaucracy 

was not the problem. Bradburn had few reporting requirements and 

good relations with Program B, the CIA element of the NRO running 

the Corona program. The difficult technical and engineering issues 

surrounding the P-40 program simply required time to resolve. Like 

many program directors to follow him, Bradburn believed it was 

better to launch late with a successful satellite than on schedule with 

a failure, and so he emphasized thorough testing and a successful 

first flight. 22 

(S/ITKIIRFiL) Steady progress continued through the summer of 

1964 as the launch date moved to 5 August, and then fell back to 

29 August. 23 Payload tests were completed without any indication of 

problems. The radar and the antenna proved compatible, promising 

slant range resolution better than 25 feet for best case targets. 

Technicians had completed installation and testing of equipment at 

the tracking stations; they also used the completed optical correlator 

to verify proper adjustment of the recorders. A performance evaluation 

plan for the mission had also been completed. 

21 (U) Perry. 28~31 

22 (U) SAFSP DIrector, QUfJI1erly Report 31 May 1964 TS/BYE. 

23 (U) IbId 

16 

GEORETh'TIENREL TO UGA, AUG, O,Act~. OSA. '~2L 
s!e~!TIfTt<77~I!L TO tl8'J!c, AtlS, e)l(r~, 68R, Nfl 

(SrfTltJ/REL) The Agena D upper stage had passed acceptance 

testing and awaited its payload at Vandenburg Air Force Base, 

California. However, problems continued to surface ,in system-level 

tests at altitude, and the launch date slipped to 2 November.24 This date 

also passed as engineers redesigned a troublesome radar transmitter. 

That final component arrived at Vandenberg under careful security 

measures, and by mid-December Quill stood ready for launch. While 

eight months later than originally planned, this was only 25 months 

after initial contract award. 

(U) LAUNCH 

f&lITKJ.fREL) With Bradburn in command as launch control officer, 

on 21 December 1964 the world's first satellite-borne synthetic 

aperture radar (SAR) awaited liftoff. Controllers brought all systems to 

readiness 10 minutes before the launch window opened. Quill could 

then fly within 30 seconds of Bradburn's command. 

(S"'TI~}REL) Regulations permitted only official, and protected, 

personnel within a defined area of Vandenberg during launches. 

Range safety officers reported a civilian train approaching the safety 

exclusion area moments before the launch window opened. The 

launch could not proceed while the train was inside the exclusion area, 

a delay that might exceed the launch window. Bradburn thus found 

himself assailed by demands that he launch before the train crossed 

into the safety zone. He refused, waiting for the planned time rather 

than implementing an alternative that his personnel were improvising 

on the spot. The train stopped before it entered the exclusion area 

and the launch proceeded as planned at 11 :08 a.m. Pacific Standard 

Time.25 

(SJITKl/REL) With Quill safely off the launch pad Bradburn headed 

to the Satellite Control Facility in Sunnyvale and soon learned that 

the Agena, international satellite designation 1964 87 A, had reached 

a useful orbit and appeared to be functioning properly. Determining if 

the radar actual,ly worked required several more hours. The ground 

station at Vandenberg included a video display that would show the 

characteristic shapes of radar pulses being received and decoded if 

the Quill system was operating and transmitting. Goodyear, referred 

24 (U) SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 September 1964. TSIIBYE. 

25 (U) Bradburn, interview, and SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 December 1964, TSIIBYE. 

Bradburn's unclassified account may be found in -The Evolution of Military Space Systems,· R. 

Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld, eds. The U.S. Air Force in Space (Andrews Air Force Base, MD: 

Air Force Historical Foundation, 1995), 61-65, U. 

17 

SECRETJR=KIJREL 1'0 US,,, AUS, SAN, GBR, t4i!L 
6E8RETffFIElJREL TO t:J6JIc, At:J6, SAt., oeR, t.i!L 

to as the "Program Associate Contractor" (PAC) for security purposes, 

operated this equipment. Later that day Bradb~rn received the 

message "PAC Room reports Code One"-radar returns from Quill 

were showing up on the Vandenberg monitor. 

ES:ITI~NREL) Quill's non-rechargeable batteries ran out of power on 

schedule during orbits 72-73, 26 December 1964.26 The radar operated 

fourteen times, imaging large swaths of the northeastern and western 

United States.27 Data collected from those fourteen radar passes went 

to the ground station in view, either Vandenburg or New Boston, over 

a wideband (UHF) data link in real time. In addition, the onboard film 

recording system captured data from the first seven radar passes. 

Technicians developed the film after its 23 December recovery and ran 

it through the specially made Precision Optical Processor to produce 

useful images. The only delay in the process came when the courier's 

flight was cancelled, but the key question had already been answered. 

The film had achieved azimuth resolution of 7.5 feet-the theoretical 

maximum from the 15,,;,foot antenna. Reconnaissance by SAR imagery 

was practical. 

(S/fTK/JREL) Quill re-entered the atmosphere during its 333rd orbit. 

Bradburn and his Program A superiors declared the mission a success 

well before its 11 January 1965 conclusion. In his 30 December 1964 

Quarterly Report, the Program A director said that "vehicle and payload 

performance were within acceptable limits on all parameters. . . . The 

radar maps ... cover about 80,000 square miles. The resolution is 

better than 15 feet in azimuth and approximately 80 feet in ground 

range .... The volume of data is greater than had been anticipated. 

Technical evaluation has begun and will be completed in 90 to 

120 days." The second payload and its booster stood complete at 

Lockheed, their launch postponed until the first Quill mission could be 

analyzed in detail. A third system, without an assigned booster, also 

neared completion. The program director promised recommendations 

for the disposition of the remaining Quill hardware in 30 to 45 days.28 

26 (6"R""J(R'~ Ibid, see also Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, KP-1/ Final Report: Experimental 

Laboratory Investigations BKP-I/-16 (Litchfield Park, Arizona: Goodyear Aerospace Corporation, 

31 March 1966), pp.~. SECRET-5PECIAL HANDLING. 

27 (S/RlEfIREL) The original mission plan called for 16 radar passes. Available documents do not 

account for the reduction. Goodyear, Engineering Analysis, 1-4. 

28 (U) SAFSP ,Director, Quarterly Report, 30 December 1964. 

18 

!!e~!'fi"ttJlfieL T6 t:JSA, At:JS, eAr~, OBR. r~2L 
SEORE"f/ffl~:REL TO USA, ABS, OAt., GBR, t.~L 

(U) RESULTS 

E&lfT~!REL) The P-40 team had sought answers to several 

questions. Determining whether satellite-based SAR would work at all 

remained the primary concern. Figuring out how to make it work best 

drove other experiments. 29 

(9J'ITI~}REL) Quill's evaluation compared the satellite's data film 

with observation of its ground targets. Original output transparencies 

from the Precision Optical Processor were magnified 2.6 times and 

reproduced as paper prints or positive transparencies. The evaluation 

found neither of those two derivative products suitable for detailed 

intelligence analysis despite Quill's native resolution: 

(S/FFI<lIREL) The paper prints . . . have a resolution 

capability of perhaps 6 lines per mm; at the scale factors 

corresponding to the 2.6: 1 enlargements, this poor 

resolution completely dominates the quality of the imagery. 

The resulting ground-range resolution is of the order of 90 

to 100 feet. The degradations in the positive transparencies 

... are not as severe. In either case, imagery to the scale 

of the 2.6:1 enlargements is useful primarily for orientation 

and descriptive purposes only, and not for detailed study 

of the target complexes. Detailed examinations require the 

use of enlargements of greater magnification, the use of the 

original output transparencies, or in special instances the 

observation of the optical output of the processor prior to 

recording. 30 

(St'FFKl/REL) The proof of concept experiment succeeded despite 

this shortcoming. The KP-II radar met P-40's goal of 10-foot azimuth 

resolution. 31 It illuminated more than 100,000 square miles of U.S. 

territory, producing useful images of nearly 80 percent of that area. As 

expected, the satellite's smooth trajectory allowed it to provide clear 

SAR imagery without the complex motion compensation systems 

needed on aircraft.32 Quill's slant-range resolution, not a mission goal 

and limited by bandwidth, was 45 feet. At the Agena's depression 

angle this provided approximately 75 feet of ground-range resolution. 

29 (SlR"KI!RrL) Lockheed, System Report 1, pp. 37-38. 

30 (U) Lockheed, System Report 2, pp.4-14-4-15. 

31 (U) Lockheed, System Report 1, pp.34-35 . 

. 32 (U) Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 146. 

SEOREF/fFltlfREL"fO UEbIc, AUS, OAt., OBR, N2L 

19 
SEeRE'flfTtflIftEL'f6 USA, AUS, 6ltN, SBR, Nfl 

tSlITKlJREL) The resulting imagery held promise for strategic 

reconnaissance, revealing natural terrain features and human 

construction. Weather conditions did not seem to have affected the 

. quality of the system's images except for a small area experiencing 

intense rainstorms. Even then, the imagery successfully revealed 

the target's underlying structure. When the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration launched Seasat in 1978, that "first spaceborne 

synthetic aperture radar" failed to surpass Quill's azimuth resolution 

and showed little qualitative difference in its imagery.33 

(S/FTI(/,<REL) Quill answered dozens of technical and engineering 

questions. It showed that analytic models based on aircraft operations 

worked well for satellites, that imagery processed from transmitted 

data suffered only slight degradation in comparison with pictures 

made from recovered film, and that images obtained from orbit 

could approximate those from aircraft radars using similar technical 

parameters. It proved that ambiguous target indications could be 

minimized and that the slight inaccuracy and instability in the satellite 

platform could be compensated for electronically. It also sampled the 

average radar reflectivities of several different types of terrain. 

tSfITKlJREL) The orbital experiment met all of its objectives. 

Lockheed's assessment noted that the system proved its expected 

ability to produce radar imagery of a consistently high quality by day, 

by night, and through a variety of weather conditions. It also observed 

that prevailing conditions in most of the target areas would have 

prevented successful photographic or infrared imaging. Significantly, 

the experiment did not reveal anything that would prevent future 

systems from realizing azimuth and ground-range resolutions on 

the order of 10 feet. 34 Goodyear engineers continued their research, 

including suggestions for improving Quill's radar resolution and the 

quality of its film-based recording system.35 

(S/ITI<lJREl) Evaluation reports all exuded optimism and expectancy. 

The project's first flight had been highly successful and the path to 

further experiments, or even an operational system, seemed clear. 

One report recommended continued use of both Quill's analytical 

model and experimental aircraft systems in further development of 

satellite-based SAR. The Lockheed report agreed and recommended 

(U) Lockheed, System Report 1, p. 146. 

35 (S/R"IElJREl) Goodyear, KP-/I Final Report, pp. 151-154. 

20 

OEORCF/R=I~/REL 1=0 USA, Al:IS, GA •• , OBR, ·.i!L 
that additional experimental SAR satellites include long-duration 

power supplies capable of supporting operational missions. 36 

(U) CONCLUSION 

(6/fTK,LJJ4EL) However, the first Quill satellite's clear success did not 

necessarily bode well for continuation of the experimental program. 

Referring to the mission's success. Bradburn asked a fellow officer 

"What do you do when you come up to bat and, the first time, you 

knock a ball out of the ballpark, what do you do then?" The officer 

replied, "Well, Dave, I think you go down and sit on the bench. "37 On 

5 January 1965, Bradburn gave NRO Director Brockway McMillan a 

preliminary briefing on the mission's results. McMillan agreed with 

Bradburn's recommendation to remove the second Quill vehicle from 

the launch schedule pending further results expected the following 

month. 

(Sh'TI(IfREL) On 11 February. several weeks before contractors 

completed their evaluations of the mission's product and performance, 

McMillan received a cable from Major General Robert Greer. The Quill 

contractors recommended a second launch in fall 1965, but the director 

of Program A did not agree. In his opinion the first mission had proven 

the feasibility of satellite-based SAR reconnaissance. Greer felt that 

further development did not require additional launches, and that an 

operational use should be defined before space-based experiments 

resumed. McMillan agreed, and the remaining Quill hardware went 

into storage untiJ an evaluation committee commissioned by NRO 

headquarters could complete its report 38 Program P\s financial 

summary showed a total of remaining in Quill's 

budget. 3£; 

(eYTK/tReL) In his quarterly report for June 1965-his last as 

director of Program A-Greer reported that a further _ had 

been provided to finish a contractor study, but that otherwise the Quill 

program had been completed. 40 Apparently none of the work went 

any further. Three years later, in 1969, the NRO reported that .INPIC 

[National Photographic Interpretation Center] evaluated the [Quill] 

36 (Gf/Tl~;,;,nEL) Lockheed, Svstem Report 1 p 146-148 

37 (U)_lnter,iiew. 

38 ('i"TKIIRF! ) Maj. Gen Robert Greer to Maj David Bradburn, Cabl€_7061. 'Disposition 

of Quill Hardware,· 11 Feb 1965 .t\RC Job 199800073 box 1. folder 106. SI/BYE. 

39 (U) SAFSP Director. QU8I1erly Report. 30.June 1965 TS!tBYE 

40 (U) Ibid 

21 

SEORET/IfIWREL TO US;II, AUO. OAt( aBR. '~iL 
6EGRE"f/fFI~,fREL 1'O l!JeA, Al!J6, OAt., GBR, t.i!L 

imagery, stated it was capable of providing useful intelligence, and 

recommended further research and development. "41 In 1972, an NRO 

Position Paper explained that after Quill's flight: 

(SIITKlJREL) It was concluded that no further satellite 

experiments as such should be conducted; instead efforts· 

should be made to define precisely the system application 

desired, and then the development of the actual system 

should proceed. The system application studies, intended to 

be conducted in parallel with the engineering demonstration, 

were not decisively concluded. Thus by 1965 the NRO had 

completed an orbital demonstration, but no agreement had 

been reached that the proposed application, bomb damage 

assessment, or any other application, was sufficiently 

attractive to proceed. 42 

(S!rrKlJREL) Using available technology the NRO had 

demonstrated the feasibility of an all-weather, day-night, nearreal time imaging system that could meet an important Strategic 

Air Command (SAC) need. Procuring an operational system was 

a different matter. NRO Director Charyk had been emphatic in 

authorizing Quill: "The effort is to be strictly experimental in nature 

and is not to be considered in any sense as an operational prototype 

or the initial step of an operational system development. ... The 

request for proposals should make clear the experimental, rather than 

the operational prototype or system nature of this effort. "43 

(S/ITKlJREL) Quill's first experimental mission achieved a resolution 

almost three times better than the early Corona cameras. Some of 

SAC's intelligence officers favored procuring an operational system, 

but SAC did not pursue further development. 44 Some of Program /J\s 

own officers thought there were good reasons to discount the value of 

an imaging radar satellite regardless of Quill's success. 

41 (U) Memorandum for the Record, "List of Topics for Discussion with ExCom,"13 June 1969. 

ARC Job 199700046, box 4, folder 8. TSI/BYE. 

42 (S/fFlfl/REL) ·NRO Position Paper on the NRO Satellite Radar Program,· attachment to John 

l. McLucas to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and Director, Defense Research and 

Engineering, memorandum, ·Synthetic Aperture Radar Surveillance Satellite System," 1 0 October 

1972, ARC Job 199900005, box 2, folder 19. TSI/BYE. 

43 (U) Charyk to Greer, 21 November 1962. 

44 (U) USAF (ret.), interview with Robert Butterworth, January 2000, Waterton, 

Colorado. NRO history files, TSI/BYE. SAFSP Director, Quarterly Report, 30 June 1966. 

22 

6EORE"F/fFI~/REL 1'O l!JSA, Al!J8, GAt., GBR, Ni!L 
SEOREl'/fFlfl/REL TO USA, Aue, eAN, 68R, r~:lL 

ES/ITKI,tREL) Pointing to QuiWs "small area coverage, narrow 

bandwidth, and low resolution," they argued that SAR could 

serve neither search nor surveillance purposes. According to this 

interpretation radar imagery's only useful application lay in providing 

bomb damage assessment to support SAC's war fighting capability. 

These critics questioned SAR's ability to execute even that mission in 

a timely, reliable, and cost-effective manner.45 

fS/ITKlJREL) Reflecting on the effort later, Flax commented that the 

real difficulty was opposition from the Intelligence Community.46 Military 

leaders offered strong support for proceeding with an operational radar 

satellite program. SAC was favorably impressed by Quill, and the 

new Director of Defense Research and Engineering, John S. Foster, 

Jr., urged Flax and his successor, John McLucas, to build another 

satellite.47 Flax agreed that it would be a good idea, but some in the 

CIA resisted. Quill had proven that satellite-borne SAR imagery was 

feasible, but the Intelligence Community thought and worked in terms 

of optical imagery. In those terms a radar satellite would not be useful 

until it attained much finer resolution. 

(S/FFKlJREL) Flax did not believe that he should press the matter 

in the absence of agreement from the Intelligence Community. 

He confronted the institutional wreckage left by his predecessor, 

Brockway McMillan, and worked under a new NRO charter intended 

to repair that damage and prevent its recurrence. As a result, Flax paid 

careful attention to bureaucratic diplomacy and based his decisions 

and recommendations on solid technological grounds. 

fSIITKI}REL) TheSARsatelliteproposal, however, was nota question of 

howto do something, butwhethersomething was worth doing .Atechnical 

major advance was needed before an operational radar satellite could 

receive broad support. Evolutionary improvements in film emulsions, 

platform stability, signal timing, and the like would not be enough to 

make satellite SAR imagery comparable to that obtained by optical 

cameras. 

45 (U) Draft manuscript, ·Satellite Reconnaissance,· marked Study, Not 

Released,· July 1963, pp. 20-21. ARC Job 199700046, box 4, folder 14. TSI/BYE. 

46 (U) Dr. Alexander Flax, interview with Robert Butterworth, 21 November 2002, Potomac, 

Maryland. NRO history files. SlIBYE. 

47 (U) John S. Foster, Jr., interview with Robert Butterworth, 4 December 2002, Washington, D.C., 

Foster to Flax, memorandum, 22 November 1966, "Special Support Activities RDT&E FY 1968 

Budget,· ARC JOB 199800073, box 1, folder 118. TSI/BYE. 

23 

eEORCF/fFI~{REL TO USA, AUB, SAN, GBR, Ni!L 
GE6RETHT'~/REL TO UGA, ;JA,U6. CAt( GOA. P42L 

(S/ITKHREL) No physical artifacts, and few documents, from the 

Quill experiment survived. The Thor/Agena launch vehicles were 

recycled into the Corona program, and the remaining radar e ipment 

was broken up and destroyed. "It was heartbreaking," said: 

(Sfffl(h'REL) "Someone came [to Litchfield Park] and had 

the right kind of credentials, and wanted to know if any 

hardware existed fronl the KP-II program. I said no, all had 

been destroyed. What did you want to do with it? He said 

they wanted to put it into the Smithsonian museum. Sorry, 

all gone. Unfortunate that the program has remained so 

highly classified. But that's the way it is. I'd like to be able to 

tell my son what I had accomplished and what I was a part 

of. but I can't and I won't."48 

(6/ffl(IIREL) Quill represents a technological triumph, the 

demonstration of a space-based reconnaissance capability 

bordering on science fiction just three years after the NRO's birth. 

The off-the-shelf technologies that it harnessed, however, held 

limited intelligence value in the short term. Considerable advances 

were required before the wider intelligence community would see 

any need to translate the proof of concept into an operational system. 

The search for advances ultimatel. drove development 

(SlfFl(,'fREL) As a harbinger of things to come, Quill's existence 

had to remain classified until space-based im.aging radar, the U.S. 

Intelligence Communitis use of it, and the existence of the organization 

that brought its parent P-40 program to fruition were aJl known to 

the public. Those events have all come to pass, leading to the 2009 

declassified acknowledgement of Quill as a 1964 NRO experiment in 

radar imaging. In due course, the full story of the NRO's remarkable 

achievements with Quill will be released to the public. 

24 

GEGRETh'TI(:'lREL TO USA, ,ocue, G"\~4. GSR. N2:L 
6EORE"F:fflfl/REL TO UB,tc, ,tcUB, etcN, eBR, NiL 

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