### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs D ec em be r 10, 200 3 RIC KY HILL KR

AN TZv. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 94-A- 21 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2002- 02978-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2004
The Appe llant, Ricky

Hill Krantz, appea ls the dismiss al of his petition for post-conviction re lief by the Davidson Cou n t y

Criminal Court. Krantz is currently incar cer ated a s a re sult of his jury convictions for f

irst deg ree fel o n y murder a nd ag g ravated assault. On a ppeal, Kr antz raises the single issue o f wh ether

he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel at trial. Af ter re view of the issue, the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d.
D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P. J ., and D A V ID H. W EL L ES , J ., joined. Mic ha e l A. Col ave c c hio , E a ste rl y & As so c iate s, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla

nt, Ric ky Hi ll K r an tz

. P a u l G

. S u m m e r s , A t t o r

n e y G e n e r a l an d

R e p o rt e r ; M i c h a e l M o o r e , S o l i c i t o r G e n e r a l ; J e n n i f

e r L. Ble dsoe, Assi stant Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. (Torry ) Johns on I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Dan Ha mm and Katrin Miller, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for t h e Appellee, State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION
F ac tu al B ac kgr ound The Appe llant is curre ntly incar cer ated a s a re sult of his convictions for the felony murder of Da n Newla nd and the aggravated assa ult of Gary

Dea n Har ris. After an eve ning of

socializing a t th e Ne xt Do or

Ta ve rn in Na sh vil le , the Ap pe lla nt c ha lle ng e d a

no the r p a tr on , K e vin

Willi ams, to arm wr estle him with money beingwag ere d on the contest. Willi ams won t he match. In a re match, the Appellant g rabbe d Wil liams’ hand and slappe d it down on the bar be fore the match be g an. The Appellant then picke d up the money and beg an to le ave, but was grabbe d by J ack Spea

kman, a f riendA t t he t i me of t hi s of f ens e, f i r s t degr ee f

el ony mur der was def

i ned a s “ [ a] r eck l es s ki l l i ng of an ot her comm i t t ed 1 i n t he p erpe t rat i o n o f

, o r at t em p t to p erpe t rat e any f i rs t d egree m urder, a rs o n, rape, r o b b ery , burgl ary , t hef t , ki d nap p i ng or a i r cr af

t pi r ac y . ” T en n . Code An n . § 39- 13- 202( a) ( 2) ( 1991) ( as c odi f i ed i n T en n . Code An n . § 39- 13- 20 2 (a ) ( 2) (20 0 3 ), t he o f

f ense no l o nger i ncl ud es t he el em ent of “r eckl ess ”). -2- of Will iams, and thrown to the floor. Wil liams rec overe d his money from the Appellant while the Appellant wa s on the floor. Upon leavingthe taver n, the Appellant a

ng rily told Speakman, “I ’ll be back to kill y ou, y ou S.O.B.” Another w itness at the taver n overhe ard the Appellant ex claim that he wa s g oin g to ge t a

g un and , w he n h e c ame ba c k, he wo uld kil l Sp e akma

n a nd Willi ams. Approxim ately

thirty to f orty minutes later, the Appe llant returne d with a shotg un. The Appe llant enter ed the door

of the tave rn and fired two shots, one fatally striking Newland and the other striking H ar r i s , r e s u l t i n g i ns e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j ur y. On direc t appea l, this court found in a challeng e to the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e that the “evide nce establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the [Appellant] rec klessly killed Dan Ne wland during the attempted murder of Will iams. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39013- 202(a) (2) ( 1991).” Sta te 1 v . R ic k yHi ll Kran tz , No. 01C01-9406-CR-00207 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jan. 7, 1998).
Ana lys is The Appellant was charg ed with felony murder in that he re cklessly killed Danny

Newla nd duringthe attempt to perpe trate f irst deg ree murder. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(a )(2) (1991) (rep eal e d 1 99 5) . O n a

pp e a l, t he Ap pe lla

nt a rgue s th a t tr ia l c ouns e l w a s in e ff e c tiv e fo r f

a ili ng“ to make c lear

to the jury

that the only

way to find a def

endant guilty

under the felony

murder r ule was to f ind that th e [Ap pe lla

nt] k ill e d a

pe rs on wh ile a lso e ith e r c omm itt ing , or a tte mpt ingto c omm it, th e c ri m e o f f

i rs td egr ee murd er , an ac to f t erro ri s m , ar s o n , rap e, ro b b ery , b urgl ary , th ef t , k i dn ap p i n g, ag g ravated child abuse , ag g ravated child neg lect, or a ircra ft pirac y .” The Appe llant’s argument that he “wa s never found g uilty of any of the unde rlying f

elonies proscr ibed (sic) under the statute” i s cl ea rl y misplaced. The Appellant wa s convicted of the un de rl yingfe lony

of atte mpt ingto c omm it the c ri me of fi rs t degree mu rde r o f K e vin Willi ams. Ag ain, as noted by this court in the di rec t appea l, “[based upon the e vidence ] t he jury was e ntitled to conclude that the [Appellant] rec klessly killed Newland whil e ac t ing w ith premeditation and deliberation in attempting to kill W illiams, carry ing out his actions with a c ool purpose.” Ri c k yHi ll Kra ntz , No. 01C01-9406-CR-00207. Our supre me court held in Mi lle n v . S tate , 988 S.W .2d 164, 167-68 (Te nn. 1999), that whe n pr os e c uti ngan “ un int e nd e d v ic timc a se ,” a s w a s th e sit uatio n in thi s c a se , “ felon y murd e r w ou ld appea r to be the most appr opriate a pplication of the [first deg ree murder] statute.” The plain mea

ning of the fe lony

murder statute is t h at a kill ing in the c ourse of an att em p ted first degree murder is fir st deg ree felony murder. I f the prose cution e sta bli sh e s th at a de fe nd ant atte mpt s to com mit the pr e me dit a te d an d d e lib e rate fi rs t-3-

deg ree murder of

a spec ific victim b ut instead kills an unintended victim, the defe ndant may

be g uilty of first degree felony murder. T his result is plain from the statutory definition of the cr ime, without resort t o the l eg al fiction of transfer ringthe defe ndant’s intent from the intende d victim to another. Id. To succe ed on a challeng e of ineffe ctive assist ance of counsel, the Appellant be ars the bur den of establishingthe alleg ations set forth in his pe tition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2003).
Be fore we c an find inef fec tive assistance of counse l, we must fi rs t fi n d defic ient perf ormanc e. Strickland v. W ashington , 4 6 6 U

. S

. 6 6 8 , 6 8 7 , 1 0 4 S

. C t

. 2 0 5 2 , 2 0 6 4 ( 1 9 8 4 )

. In support of his ine f

fec tive assistance claim, the Appe llant argues that his conviction for f elony murder was not pr edicated upon any of the statutorily enumer ated felonies of Tenne ssee C o d e A n notated se c tio n 3 9- 13 -2 02 . A s p re vio us ly no te d, thi s court

on dir e c t a pp e a l and the re c or d in

thi s c a se establish that this alleg ation is unfounded. B eca use we conclude that trial counsel’ s repr esentation was not def

icient with reg ard to the issue pr esente d, we f ind the alleg ation of ineff ective a ssistance without merit. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct . at 2064. Acc ording ly , no relief is warr anted. CO NC LU SION
Ba sed upon the for eg o i n g, t h e Davidson County Criminal Court’s dism issal of the Appellant’s post-c onviction petition is aff irmed.

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DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE