UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-5127

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DARYL SAVAGE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-04-96)

Submitted: November 30, 2005 Decided: January 3, 2006

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Arthur Robbins, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:

Daryl Savage was convicted by a jury of one count of

felon in possession of a firearm and one count of felon in

possession of ammunition, both in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) (2000). Savage was sentenced to imprisonment for 180

months. We find no error and affirm Savage’s convictions and

sentence.

Savage first contends the district court erred when it

denied the defense’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained

during law enforcement’s search of Savage’s residence. Savage

asserts the defense witnesses were more credible than those

presented by the Government. Therefore, Savage concludes the

search was performed prior to the issuance of a search warrant.

We review the factual findings underlying the denial of

a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de

novo. United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134 (2005). The evidence is construed in

the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. United

States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998). As weighing

the evidence and reviewing the credibility of witnesses are

functions reserved for the trier of fact, we conclude the district

court did not clearly err in its determination that a signed, valid

search warrant was issued prior to the search of the Savage
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residence. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234

(4th Cir. 1997).

Next, Savage contends the district court erred in its

conclusion that the statements made by him during the search of his

residence were voluntary. To determine whether a statement was

voluntarily made, we consider the “‘totality of the circumstances,’

including the characteristics of the defendant, the setting of the

interview, and the details of the interrogation.” United States v.

Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1071 (4th Cir. 1987). Though “[a]n

appellate court must make an independent determination on the issue

of voluntariness[,] . . . the district court’s findings of fact on

the circumstances surrounding the confession are to be accepted

unless clearly erroneous.” Id. at 1072 (citations omitted).

Savage was twenty-four years old. He committed the first

of five offenses at the age of fifteen. Upon entry, both the

premises and the eight individuals present were secured by police.

Officers provided appropriate warnings under Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966), before questioning Savage, and Savage verbally

acknowledged he understood his rights. Though Detective Moran

stated while questioning Savage that everyone in the house could be

arrested if any guns or illegal narcotics were found, this is not

sufficient to render Savage’s statement involuntary as “[t]he mere

existence of threats, violence, implied promises, improper

influence, or other police activity . . . does not automatically
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render a confession involuntary.” United States v. Braxton, 112

F.3d 777, 780 (4th Cir. 1997). Therefore, under these

circumstances, we conclude Savage’s statements were voluntary.

Finally, Savage contends the district erred when it

classified him as an Armed Career Criminal. Savage maintains his

two 1999 offenses should be counted as a single conviction as they

were consolidated for sentencing purposes.

When reviewing a district court’s application of the

sentencing guidelines, we review legal determinations de novo.

United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 503 (4th Cir. 1996). A

district court may enhance a sentence based on the “fact of a prior

conviction” regardless of whether or not it was admitted to by the

defendant or found by a jury. United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d

278, 282 (4th Cir. 2005). Therefore, a district court may

determine if a defendant has been convicted of the predicate

offenses required by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) so long

as the facts necessary to support the enhancement “inhere in the

fact of conviction” rather than being “extraneous to it.” Id. at

283. 

Since Savage’s offenses occurred on different dates, at

different locations, involved different individuals, and were

charged separately, we conclude the district court appropriately

characterized them as separate offenses for ACCA purposes. See

United States v. Williams, 187 F.3d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 1999).
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Furthermore, Savage’s argument is in direct contradiction to this

Court’s conclusion that “[t]he federal interest of providing for

substantial sentences for repeat offenders stands independent of

state sentencing practices.” United States v. Allen, 50 F.3d 294,

299 (4th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, we affirm Savage’s convictions and sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED