Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 CORO 

, lllllffilmmllllH-111 14 

.:f OP SECREfFACT BOOK 

FOR AD HOC COMMITTEE 

ACTIVITIES 

lfflfl1 nm 1111111 I II 1rn I (II II II 11111 II II II II 111111 II II 1111111 

i'iANOt.'E V1A' 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

CONTROi..; SYSTEMS JOINTI..V 

CORO GAMBIT 

TOP SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

May 3, 1966 

BYE" ... 52328-66 

Copy /tUU 

1 - ' 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

" I .. 

I·. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

..... Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

'' 

' ' 

••io....! " I .l ••• ' •••~ ' 'CJ"'"' ...... '" ·--·-•- ·~"''-"'~1 i ._ . \,S'~~) r' : '. . 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

-~-_~:;· 

\.~ 

.. ~ .. 

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM 

. "POP Sf!efi:~"f . 

MEMORANDUM TO; .• DOD 

ACDA 

CIA 

White House 

NASC 

NASA 

- M:.:-. ~·1 Dr. 

Mr. 

- Mr. 

- Mr. 

- Mr. 

- M;:i. 

·- Mr. 

27 April 1966 

Mo\! a ugh ton 

Flax 

Fisher 

R. J. Smith 

Keeney 

Charles Johnson 

l'lelsh 

Seamans 

SUBJECT Study of Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance 

Data, Peaceful Applications of Such Data, and Possible 

Relationship to NASA Programs 

l. AttaCJ1ed is a letter received by Secretary Rusk from Mr. Schultze 

of the Bureau of the Budget a..,d Dr. Hornig of the White House. The Secretary 

has requested that our Committee study the general issue and specific 

proposals raised in this letter. 

2. It is evident that a number of complex and sensitive questions 

are involved, and I believe we should begin promptly to consider them. ···. Accordingly. I suggest you personally pl<.n to represent your agencies if 

possible, and that the subject be handled on the basis of minimum ~ecessary 

staff participation. 

3. I suggest that· we meet in my conference room for initial consideration of our program for conducting this study on Friday, May 6 at 11:30 A.~. 

We should seek to prepare our report and recommendations by July l. 

o' 

Enclosure: 

B'!E-66004-66 Ge~)' CL • ~ - ') j - SQi'i&i B. ~ (;. · [,~ l . I ,.r . 

+oP SsG~T. 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

. . 'BYE-54065-66 

'Copy .:E.. of .12 

fv~~/ 

;. 
... 

I 

I· 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I . l~·;"_J 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

. Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 . 

-· ~~.T_:J··· ---·-----. ----~.'.··· ····J~---- · ... ·.. . !.;;,, . .;...:..; .!4'· ... ·:'i "'l '7"- "\.""I (;"tr"·;'~'"""' 

< :1 1, ; !a'.; Li ;·1'.~· ~ H:ANo::c WA BYEMAN ~ ~;;11 -..:JJ..11..J· .. ~ ... r 

CONTROL SYSTZM ONLY 

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 

BUREAU OF THE BUDG.ET 

WASHINGTON, O.C. 20503 

APR 4 1966 

Honorable Dean Rusk 

Secretary of State 

Washington, D. C. 20520 

Dear Dean: 

There is a growing interest in the possible uses of satellite 

reconnaissance-type systems for peaceful purposes. This interest 

is reflected in studies being conducted under the auspices of the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration to investigate the 

potential for earth sensing from satellites. We believe it is essen• 

tial to study the relationships between these peaceful programs 

and our classified reconnaissance programs if we are to avoid unplanned 

disclosure of our reconnaissance-type systems. 

We think such a study should review our current security restrictions 

on reconnaissance activities and our national policy established under 

NSAM 156, and then develop a plan of action based on this review. 

Accordingly, we wish to request that you convene the NSAM 156 ad hoc 

comr.iittee for this purpose. Enclosed for the committee's consideration 

is a list of issues which must be addressed if we are to develop a 

satisfactory solution to this problem and an appropriate plan of action. 

The committee will probably develop additional points for consideration 

in the course of its deliberations. 

It would be most helpful if the committee could complete its work on 

this question by July 1. 

Enclosure 

P';:CE!VE'.D 

DEPART: .~T OF STATE-INR/RCI 

2 ·.~ 

f-\PR 18 1865 

~:,(~TI f:~~{'~l.~~rt'"1'°' 

.. 1.\,lJ ~ ~~;._ ~ ~.,; 1; .• ?-;;;,, a 

Sincerely, 

Charles L. Schultze 

DirGctor, Bureau of the 

Budget 

Donald F. Hornig 

Director, Office of Science 

and Technology 

HANDLE V1:.\ B'-/EM1\N ~, ...... , ,,,:.-.,;_ ~ ... ··, ........... i ,id \,.,.,·~~\' 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

'""" ___ .. __ , ·-~. ~·.': • .. 

l~~ ... -~: 
. " 

" I

., 

I 

I .:·.s~ 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

HANDLE: vrA BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTt::M ONL.Y 

Relationship of the AAP to the NRP - Potential Issues 

1. Should there be a national plan defining the discrete steps to 

be taken in· the next four or five years in a program to gradually expose 

satellite survoilluncc capabilities to public view? If so, what major 

steps should be included in the plan and whut objectives should it aim 

to achieve? Who should be responsible for coo~dinating the formulation 

and execution of the detailed actions necessary to accomplish this plan? 

Examples of possible steps to be considered: 

(a) Declassification of the ARGON photography and the geodetic 

data derived from it. 

(b) Declassification of the Apollo-Gambit system and its 

photographs. 

(c) Sanitization and declassification of selected NRP photos 

to demonstrate value of peaceful economic or scientific 

uses. 

(d) Declassification of first generation reconnaissance systems, 

·e.g., CORONA and GAMBIT, and the non-bloc photography 

collected by these systems for use in programs found to 

be economically feasible. 

2. During the period that the satellite reconnaissance program 

remains classified, what role, if any, should NASA have in planning and 

executing missions involving high-resolution image sensors of reconnais• 

sance.quality? 

a. Should NASA be allowed to plan or conduct earth orbital 

missions involving high-resolution imagery sensors? If so, what control 

or monitoring mechanism should be established to handle problems that 

arise about the extent of the tests, classification, and press releases? 

b. Should any special control be applied to NASA's ground and 

aircraft based experimental program which involves high-resolution imagery 

sensors? 

c. Is it possible to make available to NASA, now, data already 

collected by the NRP in order to evaluate its economic and scientific 

usefulness? If so, how and at what level of classification? 

HAN CLE 

A roved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

BYE-66,004-66 

Copy _L r ef~ di!/ s~c [I_, 1 

v1A DYEMAM -r 
l

l ~-- "::--; ... 

I 

I -...... J. 

pproved for Release: 2017/01/25 C050964131., ... , ·;,..._. 

··. . . ', u .... , .. 

1~··. 

I 

1. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

3. Who should decide the classification 

or development of new high-resolution imagery 

NASA may wish to pursue from time to time? 

to be placed upon studies · 

sensor hardware that 

4. Should the development of such hardware be centralized in 

the Department of Defense? If not, how should it be coordinated? 

5. In view of the MOL capability for making high quality astronomical measurements, can MOL be used to meet NASA requirements for 

orbital astronomical experiments? If so, how and at what level of 

security classification? 

• 

HANDLE: VIA BYE~rnl\I 

CONTROL ~fS7~M ON~Y 

...... _____ , 1 

~~' 

\. .... ~- ~ 

I 

\ 

l 

I I 

{ 

I 

_....,......,.,,..,,.,..........,....,..._ ...... ....,.,....,._.. ...... ._....,._..,...,...,.,.,.._~,ll.pp_i:.12\/i:;SLfoE R_~le.51s~..:..,?Q1]1Q!f2!J .. CQ?9§§'.;!1}_..,....,,_.,..,. .. , ----......... ,,..,_......,,,,.,.,..... , ...,._,, __ _...... 
• , .. ,.. ,-. j"·~ .t: .. · • -- ·~ i. '~.:~r.. . 

l

, I . .. ; .· . ;::~· . . l . ,. . . l. ·. ... . . . . '· 

:· ·, .. ' '• ' ".' 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

"1' 

11 I ... ·. 

I.I '· .. · · ..I. BaCkground 

.. 

.. . 

. ·.,.DOD Areas of Concern Relative to NASA Satellite Sensor Programs 

~ ... ' 

q .. 

j 1 · ',>· > .. A. ·::~e:::::: from Secretary McNamara to Mr. Webb dated 

i ' ·" ·July 31. 1965. 

11 ··:' ... ·. ·~ . ·, -' · (2) : DOD/CIA~NASA Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance 

· '· · , · Pr9grams dated Augus~ 28, 1963. 11 ··::·'_~i:. ··.~ " ·· (3) Letter from Dr. McMillan to Dr. Seamans dated 

jl · · .'f.'... August 5, 1965. 

ii··::~.:.}" :· " (4) Let .er frOm Dr. Seamans to Dr. McMillan dated 

1

1 .. ··~·.· August 24, 1965. 

li 1 \:;" ,/ . the T~=c~~f ~~t~~~ t v~!b ~~~~~s~f i~h~e~~~~~!~ ~e a!~~n~~~!=~~~g Pror · · · :· .. ~ : gram (NRP). NASA activities involving reconnaissance-like 

!I · .,., .':. · .. .:~''. sensors pose a serious problem to both the security and viability 

!j I. · · ·· .·of the NRP. The Secretary of Defense has called to :the attention 

1\ ·. · ;:~. of the Administrator of NASA (Reference 1) that the considera-

\ ,. : .· .. tions of national security which formed the basis for the 

!j 1· .: .. ·\ :< DOD/CIA-NASA Agreement of August 28, 1963 (Reference 2) must ~ ~. apply to current NASA activities involving reconnaissance . 

~ · ~ .. ·sensors and that all such activities including studies are of 

q ' .. " ; .. ~·. 

:

1 I :._~:"}. : concern. · :1 .... •:· ·,. 

!I ,_; ··- · ·. The definition of a reconnaissance sensor and of an activity ii : <)· .. · . ':·:'-·. of interest were provided by the Director of the National · 111 ··· :;." · · Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in Reference 3. The Associate 

II ;,-::::_:·:.· · .. ·> . · .. Administrator of NASA in' Reference 4 accepted the criteria 

'J ·· ·· · · · ·· and definitions established in Reference 3 as a basis for fur-· 

i,i 1·:.:<'_.\·/: ther NASA-DOD consideration of NASA reconnaissance activities. 

, .. As agreed to with the Director NRO, the ~,,ssociate Adminis- 11· · · .. · trator, NASA designated a committee of three NASA members to 

1 : •• '·. be given BYEMAN clearances and briefed on NRO activities. i -··'. ·.· · This committee was to keep the Associate Administrator of NASA 

:111 .->:· ... :. . informed of reconnaissance-related activities within NASA 

1 ·:. . . • which fell within the scope of the criteria and definitions. 

Any such activities were to be discussed with tne Director NRO 

· · · and resolved in accordance with _the principles of agreements 

I .. ··,_:_.· . already in force. However, the actions of this committee have 

· · · not effectively met the concerns of. the .DOD. 

I .. 

I 

. ,'. 

1-rr,r·:t:~Lc~ \.:i._.~ ;J"/EL1/\~-I~ 

•. ·• .. T:;'.i;l ONf..,Y 

' . ,•'. 

: ,:.·, 

l.,· .. ' 

. . . 

., . . ' 

-' ·-:···'· 

,·' ;COPY--2-~ot ~-2.. __ dop.io:J . . 7 C./ Page--~--of_..:.; ... _:..Pages. 

... •, 

:. ,. . ~ -

. . . . ' 

Approved for ~elease:_2g17 /01 /25 C050964 ~ 3. 
l ... I . ~:::: : ...~· '. .. 

''··. ~rr,,.....,,· --- . Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 . •· .! - • _, .•• -...rj: ... : .. T. . . : 

. "· ... ·.\:·, • •• !,.·· 

I

.·':·: 

.... ' 

. ·, ·.:. 

.' . ·. 

· ··. 2.-. Criteria 

' ;' 

.... : 1· '. ~- The criteria agreed to, as defined in Reference 3, are: 

~ ·, .; ' 

. ',•' 

A. Activities'of Interest 

An activity is defined as the expenditure of NASA research. 

and development money with a university or industry, or the 

transfer of money to another activity to be used in this way. 

\ ; .-.: The activities to be brought to the attention of the NRO are 

.those involving the study, design, development, ~abricat1on 

.. ·or test of l'.'econnaissance-like sensors, or significant com po-

: ·· .· · · nents thereof, for use in orbital systems or studies of the 1 · i .. .: : ::· "> use of such sensors in orbital systems. 

B. Reconnajssance-Like Sensor 

I ~; .·~ A reconnaissance-like sensor is defined to be an image 

· · .. ·<; . . forming sensor having' an angular resolution of .1 milliradian · :. ( · ·. · or finer or an optical or infrared image forming system with 

I

.'" -::: ,. "· ··'· .. a physical aperture greater than 30 cm and an optical figure 

; .. :<· .:: .. · .,. ::>:controlled to better than 1/4 wave length • . ,.. ..... 

. . . .:··,.· .· .· '•" 

I .. ::,.<··· ... .· ... ' ·' 

~ .. ;; ,• <- ~ .. 

. ": 

I

·. ··-· ... ,.,. ,. ... ·. . : ·. 

• ·' 1·. •" 

: ' .•. • e'' ' .... 

C. Other Activities of Interest 

Other possible activities of interest include development 

or test of pointing, tracking and stabilizing techniques or 

systems to be used with satellites bearing high resolution 

1:·.: ... · 

. sensors in which the pointing accuracy is better than 20 microradians or the unstabilized rate is less than 20 microradians 

per second. Development or test of new recording media for · "· use with reconnaissance-like sensors are also activities of 

I

-·.,,:· .:_.''"" " ..... ·. 

·_,< .;c interest. 

.. -... ~ D. Additional Activities Df Concern 

..;, . ; ~· i ' .. 

I .,, The evolution of NASA program planning activities since ··~ ·'' :. :·-.·.·the exchange of References 3 and 4 has brought to light the 

, .· '· ·· ·· ~following additional activities of concern: .. , '' 

I';'.'/,~: .. ,;, , , . . tions , et~:) RFP' s , Symposia , Requests for Program Recommen da-

. :;. 

1··:·:·· .. :/.:-.:.0. ·~ (,.: .... ·~ ~ , 

I

·· ... ·:_'·-.''- ,. •. ' . . .. ' .,,.,f-: ... 

1· 

I 

Prior to actually initiating funded programs, NASA 

has issued RFP's, Requests for Program Recommendations or 

Endorsements and held or encouraged widely attended symposia 

."which have led inevitably to a series of proposed studies, · : design and ~xperi~ental activities involving the use of recon- · .naissance sensors in earth_-orbiting satE'.llites.. This has 

' .... 

... -:..' 

'"·'., '.•': 

,·,· ,, 

· .... ,·.·. ' . ', ~· 

'. ,'" , 

·. \. ... ·' 

;·-. 

•. .~ ' ' 2 ' ... ·. 

. ·.·' 

· •.. · Copy __ :.-;_ __ of __ 

. : . Ppge.;.• __ -:f-.:...of _.,. _Copio::x 

_;rages. 

.CON_Thci;~ ~~ y,-; J~;:;-~~ ~~ ., ' . .. · '·· c~ntrol No.LZ:~4:.~~S:.J;..?;-_';{J -t; t 

___ ------~~__p~~~__for Relea~~_:__~-~I/01/2~~05~5>:i13 __ _ 
. ·.. . :·; ''; ; ' ' .: ~ ':: . 

I 

.... ,.,,.. . 

·.'.' . : . .. •.'. :' "' . . -.... ~ .• . . . ' . . . pproved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

I " 11··>: .~ .. f . . ; ~ : 

I · ,... :resulted in widespread discussion an4 publication of satellite 

·: >: :· ., . reconnaissance (earth sei:-sings) po~entials as "."e~l. as state11 :. , .... ', ·~ : .. men ts of needed and attainable equipment capabilities. NRO .. :.:._ , .. ·.contractors have been involved in some of these activities, 

· \.· · ... ". :·: since they are the obvious sources for equipment of the kind 

··::,..,.:·~/ : ·;:.'desired. . . . ·. . ·. . · 

~ . : ... : · ... _ .. _ ·. . ' ... 

': _-'. · ., .. ,: Therefore, issuance of RFP' s 1 and Requests for - ·.,· .. ,.,. :~ Program Recommendations or planning activities for symposia I and conferences where the subject matter is or could evolve 

' · into an activity of interest as defined above, is a matter of , .. ·' \, • I 

..... :· ·. ·DOD concern •. · . I· : > ·: ( . (2) Polar Orbits 

, "" ,._ ~. 

" 

I

,._,· -: ... , 

........ ' The particular sensitivity of satellite reconnais- .. · sance of the Soviet Union is introduced as an additional 

factor when reconnaiss~nce quality sensors are flown ·in high ... · ... inclination (polar) orbit. Such flights potentially· i:nvolve ·I-' ... ;~,, ' · . '... : . ·acquisition of data from tr denied" areas and are presently-

·. ·, ·~r.· · . governed by rigid national level surveillance and control 

.,>:,,.· ·(e.g. 1 President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the 

I .. . ... .. 303 Cammi ttee and the USIB). Planning for such polar flights · · · ·• ··. ·· • with reconnaissance quality sensors could excite unwanted 

· · reactions from the Soviet Union or other affected nations. :~:< •' ,. ·, 

I 3. Specific DOD concerns 

1··.::;· .. : ...• In reviewing activities of interest, the following factors 

will be considered. 

' . :~. . . ·,;;::,_, .... A. Security 

1-~·'.··;,. ·.. It is essential to protect the security of the NRP in 

· "· ·: .. ;:·.. .. accordance with established "national policies. The security 

· ~ . policies of the NRP have been formulated to meet the requirements I- ~::' .. · ·r · of NSC Action 2454 and are responsive to the general policy .. .. , ·guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence. These 

.. ·i:· • >:. · policies have met and are meeting the purpose for which they 

I .'!"··.· .. : . , were intended, namely the protection of probably the most 

. . . important single U. S. intelligence source and the maintenance 

., : .· · of an international environment conducive to continuation of 

this covert program. Under this system of security, information 

. . which might reveal the extent and success of the NRP is tightly 

controlled. ·Such controlled information includes the identity 

and scope of specific operational and development. programs, the 

. :U. S. state-of-the-art in .reconnaissance sensors and related 

equipment ·and the· quality and quantity .of photography being . . ·:· obtained~. :/.. .. · · 

' . 

.. ·~ 

·. . .. ~ .. 

l' . 3 

.: ..... 

Copy __ J __ _-of'~--2--Col)iea 

. . Page __ .:..'.i-::or ---?--Page!j. 

Control No~r~,:-):2::;j{ ;{-(. t 

Approved for Release: 2017/01 /25 C05096413·-----------------t 
... ' .• . ;I'. 

.... 

: ·, .... 

,. 

I

:: .. · .. 1:-: •. · ..... 

. . ·. . ·:·~, . ' ' 

• ... 

I. " 

•·.·· 

I ..... · .. _· ..... ... .' 

:~ ... ' 

··· ... : '. 

·:· 

B. Policy 

., ~- -.. ~"")····· 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 • < • -- ~·. "· j. \ ' 

'' '. 

In accordance with NSC Action 2454, it is necessary 

., 

that open disclosure of U. s. capabilities and intentions to 

orbit reconnaissance sensors be controlled to avoid unfavorable 

international reactions. The stimulation of ill-timed discussion of this issue in the international arena could produce 

unfavorable reactions from neutral or unfriendly nations; or 

might confront the Soviet Union with a situation in which it 

would be forced to take a hard posit:i,on. on the issue of satellite reconnaissance. The attainment of international acceptance 

of satellite reconnaissance is a U. S. goal, but it is of the 

utmost importance to national security to protect the viability 

of the NRP as a covert operation until there· is a high degree · 

of assurance that overt activity is acceptable. 

It is extremely difficult to envision circumstances I ... :. · ..under which 'the U. S. would be able to continue indefinitely 

.... , ··•the present degree of ~ontrol of technology associated with 

· · · sensing of earth.' s surface from satellites, particularly when ~~ • •v~·. I I

.; · · · .. · such devices represent the best potential for lunar and plane-

.~ J ·• tary exploration and study. On the other hand, the uncontrolled 

- .- ·· .. .' ··disclosure of such technology at a time when the U. s. can 

I

. • '·. · · reasonably be presumed to be engaged in a major program of 

:".\:;··,, · ·· satellite reconnaissance, might prove provocative and might 

well contribute to causing an unfavorable reaction in the inter- ... \':' .. 

, ::·:, national sphere. 

C. Utilization of the Industrial Base ... 

I

.·.: :':· · -;'.: · The U. s. industrial organizations experienced and · 

).::'.~:~-';_ ~- ·.:_.·capable in the development of satellite reconnaissance sensors 

: • 1 , .:· .. : ·· .• ·are relatively few in number and subject to severe security · 

· · ;. ·· · · restriction. In order to avoid compromise of security or 

1

1 '.r :· . -' " interference with NRO acti vi:ties in dealing with these con-

;:.?.~ _f.·,,:> ·~. ·. • tractors, all government-sponsored activities in relation to 

I

.; ,<: .. · reconnaissance sensors must be managed through the NRO as ·. - provided for in Reference 2 • . : ..• ·4- .:~.· ... : •. :-~ • ·7 ..... · ... _ 

" . D. Duplication 

I

. ; ...~: ~.< · ... .. ·· .. · , <- :' .. 

.. ~: :. . - ' 1 ·- .. 

... ). I ... 

I. 

The initiation of new NASA programs which essentially 

~duplicate equipment capabilities or operations of the DOD or 

vice versa should not be allowed to occur, unless after a 

· thorough consideration of each specific program by the DOD and 

'NASA, it is. determined that some overriding consideration in 

the national interest warrants such_ duplication. Certainly no ..' ... 1':· 

... :. 

. .- .... ...... : .. · 

; · Cop:r-'-/---of ___ z_,..Cop:l.00 

' .. Page_.:._~-~or ---(--Poeor; ~ ' .. ' '' ·~ .. 

.=re I"~G [Gr~ :.J. ·· .. · Control No -~-4.-: .. .':J-:.2.~-~ J -!,, & .'. ,.·:'. 

4 

--------------..._-_r_6PE!9\fecj f?~-~~~9~~3Q!.Z:(01/25 C05096413 -~- ----·-. ====-=--=·-~· =~-·=· ==~ 
. ,·'' 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 ,ct..,;; ~.;.~,.f~ . \.1 • / \ 

...... 

)~ ....... 

... ~ such duplication should be allowed to occur because of lack 

I

. ·· of accurate knowledge of its existence, extent and cost by . : .··;· :: ·~,: ··:. '.. responsible officials of both agencies. Proposed NASA re con-.· 

· .. · .. . naissance programs should be reviewed t'o determine whether: , ...... . . ' '• .• .. i: 

I ·· . . (1) They involve development of systems 1 sensors; .. '. ·' :."~ · · .· ':·.techniques or related equipment closely duplicating those 

' ., ···: «already .developed or being developed by the NRO. 

·I: .. \,· . r_"<·, :· 

I-' ... ,· ·. -

-· ·. 

1 ... 

I·· 

.'· 

I ,. '.•, . . .. ~:. 

.. :. ·' 

(2) .They involve development of systems 1 sensors, . techniques, and other related equipment·to collect data which 

can be collected by NRO systems already operational or in 

·development. · 

(3) T~ey involve development .0£ systems, sensors, . ·techniques and related equipment to collect data (such as 

•.mapping and, charting data) which have already. been collected, 

.in whole or/part; .. bY the .NRO. · . . ' ·' '. ..... . ' 

,-,, "/' 

.. 

,' .. : 

. ,.,., .'. 

.... :•' .·' .. 

. · .. ~. . "" 

,.'.' ',··. r . . :..-: . .. ,, -: .. ·,: .. ,. ' 

.... ,. .·,, 

,•,.• '. ':' . .. " ~. . ··~. '" ":.· .. 

~ : .', 

' ' 

. " 

,. ,. - .,.": ... .. ~ . 

,·', ... < 

... . ' .f, :· .. :~: y .. ·.~:::·.:, ": . . ... ·. ·;. :.{: ·"·· 

','.· 

.... 

\'';' 

. :: .'· ' ~· .. ', 

"•' 

' ... '\.• 

·. ,·." 

.. ;.,. . ~-. 

-,.,.;.· __ ... ".: . ., .. ; ·~ . ' ... ·" 

I''

' .·.· .... ;~· •.:. 

· ... 

"."' ';·«.'." I .... 

1

.: .. -.-.: ' . ' 

.... " 

.. -. 

.···'· . ~: . .. · . . : 

. :···: ... 

..; : ._; . .... '\.. 

.. · ... 

'•, 

.. ' ' " . ,. 

'f,: 

J·: · • .... .., 

· .... 

.. .... 

·•.' ''' 

... ,)·_·'~qp::f_:..~?--cj·~-... · .,.,;:~;,,.;·_,, ,,· :· 'i") . ·'" 1 VJ .(> ~J.:.'t.t~·;t.:~\~'-J " ·.· ,J-J.f!.<i.l..:.-j:---OJ. -- - -

' ' . . , '!.< ~ j-' )- )... I../ .3 - (. (, Contr~..- J.i0o~~7i -~--.-... -L. 

• '. ;: ~< 

/ 1 

'i::::· ' ' ' 

__ Approved for Releas~: 2_017/01/25 C050964~ 3 . - - --- .1 
I 

I 

I 

I 1963 

I 

I 28 Au;;;ust 1833 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

Uo..rch 1964 

I 

I 23 :v:c..1"c:J. l83L.:: 

I 

I 

I 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

.li n1.::rr1~e1~ of NAS.l'.. contractors who were v.ror1dng on l\CORL 

studies exawin.ed - at NASA direction - optical reconnais-

::<::.nce systems. Objectives of the studies included R&D in 

.r:-veillance a~:d ::-·ecorii:aissance as well as in ottier pure 1y 

i~J.ilitc..ry dom8.in.s. 

A ~,-,.~;rp·A "TAC'' A 'f l" 1 t I1 LJvLJ \....,,.1.1-~-1\Jl-'J.urt .c~g·reer.D.er1-c ·o:"":r-~1aJ.1zea arraJ1ger.nen s 

iJetween NASA a:J.d the NRO 0:1 N·P .. SA Heconnaissance pro-

;... -,A".:::. , - • ·,. -,,... ':':.. ·.- -- ...._ \._.. '--................. ....._._..__v ... ..,,_. 

... --. ,,-.: .. ,...,.,.. -- -- .-, C:O...o..i.\....-4. .1. ...... ~---- _,. ...... 

TJ.i.e 2)~~s·C2:ic2 c: cove::."'t 8.1:d ~;.ig:~.:.ly s""~ ,~tive NRO 

tecl1~o~O[~y, cc~.-~::·~c-:c:...,,, ~esourcesJ ~~:... ·:_3.ger11ent 

s:ciLs c:.::-.C.. sec-.:::..<-~y :r.:-~ethod.s for on-~;:.:. . ~c, reconnais -

·~-,~·:2 liJ:~22:::.~c..~"--~ 2s-ts..Ol:s:-... 2C. s·:-;2c:i::ic: v10Tlzing· ~:: .... -~cedure s 

y1:::2reby x::.:::c C:e::r·iv2C: ·~2c::::~-.o:ogy could oe app::.icd to 

~,~ASA 's s--~c;.-~eci :.,-.2c:_~i:i.---2:-~ ... 2:-.i.-~s i:: lur1ar reconnaissance. 

=:.iscussions b2t\?'l2e~ ::=J:cs. McMillan and Mueller failed 

to resolve p:cot,:e::-ns crec..ted by u:1controlled activity 

~""212.·ted to reconr1aisss.:1ce .. 

l-it --~:-ie ti:-x:e of t~.le 28 l~ug-llst 1803 DOD-CIJ:'.>./l\ASA AgreeI"' ... -:er.;.t tb.e r'J.1.appi:'1g ar:C. survey rn.issio:i c: P~?G~~O was 

er~v~sio:J.ed as b2ir1g d2sign.2~ to provide NAS_~ ... \V1tl1 lunar 

surf8..ce :-... 1.appin~· in aC.diticn to higlJ. resolutio::~ photog:..,...~·?~J.Y 

cf specific luna:;:- areas, :;.ecessary to effect ~:2 APOI....::::....0 

lw.nar landing. 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

23 March 1964 

(Continued) 

31 March 1965 

12 ApTil 1965 

' ' -~ ... , 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 o:,:.r; •. ,, • .._ , 

\,.'"•'A•'' 

'0.Tnile it was anticipated that an advance earth orbital 

mission for system checkout purposes might also be 

required, no specific security procedures had been formulated. 

On 23 March 1964, a Supplemental Agreement and Security 

Audundu~n, ;::;peci.L.cally dc;:::;igncd for this set of circurustances was negotiated and signed. Work then proceeded 

tov.rard system definitions with the ultimate selection of 

the GAMBIT and improved stellar index camera combination as the photographic equiprnent to be used for the 

APOLLO M&S mission. 

The Security Addendum to foe Agreement was designed to 

afford continued security protectic::_ to '~:-~e NRP, while 

rendering complete assistance to 'c::-.2 ~\-'"Si~. 

Basically, it :;,~ec_ui:ces cls.ssification of NASi':.. APOLLO 

products as foilows: 

Lunar photog::.~aphy as initially 

processea 

Sanitized lu:-:2r photography (i.e. , 

remove ~·ic:-..:ciaries and en.large) 

any 

SECRET 

UNCLASSIFIED 

':'O? SECRET/ 

r.f _-~:.:_,~NT-KEYHOLE 

::.:~:.. a letter to the Asst Secretary of Navy (R&D), the Deputy 

Associate Adn1inistrator, NASA, listed 28 technical items 

ia the NASA program as being of current or prospective 

interest to the Navy. The first eight were categorized as 1

'visual, photographic and electronic surveillance of ocean 

areas and included such efforts as detection, observation, 

tracking and various uses of large telescopes a:.J.d ante:Gr:as. 11 

Dr. McMillan, Dr. I-Iall, and Mr. Shapley attended a NASA 

briefing at which a NASA representative outlined a proposed 

program of 15 ea.::.~th-orbital APOLLO missions - extra to the 

?. 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

12 April 1965 

(Continued) 

21April1965 

28 April 1965 

6 May 1965 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

lunar mission - being considered by NASA. On five of 

the missions, earth mapping and other remote sensing 

of the earth's surface by image forming devices were 

listed as primary experiments. The devices included 

radar, optical cameras, and IR cameras. 

Dr. Seamans stated that NASA had, or was planning to 

have, a number of contracts for the study and development 

of satellite-borne high resolution radar mapping systems. 

Dr. McMillan, in a resume of NASA activities related to 

earth reconnaissance, recommended to Mr. McNamara 

that: 

1. The resources of the NRO be made available to 

NASA in a manner similar to that agreed upon for 

NASA 1s lunar program, with the NRO supporting 

all of the necessary reconnaissance-like activities 

of NASA, as well as any reconnaissance-like 

activities undertaken by NASA in res ;-onse to actual 

or assumed military requirements. 

2. A general agreernent be struck with NASA setting 

up a procedure which would identify NASA require -

ments for reconnaissance sensors or reconnaissance -like activities and provide in each case for 

specific agreements at the level of the Associate 

Administrairor, NASA, and the DNRO. 

In a letter to Mr. Webb, Mr. McNamara proposed that the 

Air Force serve as NASA's agent in procuring, developing 

and testing in earth orbit, sensor equipment for NASA 

reconnaissance related activities. 

Mr. McNamara offered a formal agreement for Mr. Webb's 

signature. The agreem.ent stipulated that all NASA require -

ments for reconnaissance-like sensors and activities would 

be reviewed and if rec:.3onably construed to be of reconnaissance quality, the DC:J would serve as the agent to NASA 

in carrying out the specific effort required. 

£!::::n ~-. ··~·, - ' ._, -. --,.,,. ·";"'11 

~~ \~· .. ~ \..~~ .. :~~;•;_. ~: '~ ;~-,~ t 

0 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

19 May 1965 

23 June 1965 

27 July 1965 

31 July 1965 

5 August 1965 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

-::·\_,_ .:~ '..~; L~C .. :{ [I~ 

Mr. Webb indicated he would like to take a little more 

time to review the closely related activities under the 

McMillan-Seamans Agreement of 20 April 1964, and 

correlate a response to Mr. McNamara 1s letter with 

negotiations which NASA had undertaken with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior. 

Mr. Webb's final reply to Mr. McNamara 1s letter cited 

elements of national policy (NSC Action 2454 and NSAM 

156) as supporting NASA 1 s efforts in the study of the 

possibilities of non-military terrestrial surveys utilizing 

satellite technology. · 

Mr. Webb considered that NASA's current activity in the 

satellite technology area was fully covered by the 

DOD/CIA-NASA Agreement on NASA Reconnaissance 

Program (28 August 1963) and suggested in lieu of a 

further agreement at the Administrator I SecDef level, 

that future cases be covered by memoranda of understanding between the Associate Admin:inistrator, NASA and the 

DNRO. 

Dr. McMillan met with Dr. Seamans to discuss a general 

procedure for identifying and reviewing reconnaissancerelated activities in NASA. 

Mr. McNamara replied to Mr. Webb's letter, stating that, 

in view of the grave possibility of endangering the national 

security, certain NASA study contracts should not be 

carried any further with the industrial and academic 

groups and that those study groups should be disbanded 

until determination by agreed upon management procedures 

could be brought to bear. (Mr. Webb never replied to this 

letter. ) 

Dr. McMillan, in a letter to Dr. Seamans, defined the 

scope of reconnaissance-related activities and outlined 

criteria by which activities would automatically be selected 

for review. The criteria: 

,,,.,.;..., :10~ ' ., :."'' -, ..... ''l '"',__ :~k~ :,'"' 

~ ~·,,. ~ \_:~.~-~t.J~ \.~ ~ 

4 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

5 August 1965 

(Continued) 

24 August 1965 

30 August 1965 

l September 1965 

F~.i~ ;r-~_.::. ·i .~l ~~; 

tLl d ~~~.~h!r~ 

SYSTEM 

l. 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

Those activities involving the study, design, development, fabrication or test of reconnaissancelike sensors or significant components thereof, 

for use in orbital systems, or studies of the use 

of such sensors in orbital systems. 

2. A reconnaissance-like sensor is defined to be an 

image forming sensor having an angular resolution 

of 0. 1 milliradian or finer, or an optical or IR 

image forming system with a physical aperture 

greater than 30 cm and an optical figure controlled 

to better than 1/ 4 wave length. 

3. An activity is defined as the expenditure of NASA 

research and development money with a university 

or industry, or the transfer of NASA money to 

another government agency for spending in this way. 

Dr. Seamans concurred in the arrangements and criteria 

set forth in Dr. McMillan's 5 August letter and designated 

three individuals (Gray, Garbarini, and Sullivan) to serve 

as a committee to keep him informed of reconnaissancerelated activities within NASA which fell within the scope 

of the agreed-upon definition. 

Mr. Vance directed all agencies to deal exclusively with 

the NRO on all DOD needs for the study, development, test 

or use of satellite-borne image forming earth sensors. 

The NRO was designated the DOD point of contact with the 

NASA as well as with other governmental agencies with 

regard to activities involving study, development, test or 

use of satellite-borne image forming earth sensors. 

Dr. Seamans forwarded to Dr. McMillan copies of letters 

by which NASA had informed the USGS, USDA, and the US 

Navy of its willingness to initiate interagency fund transfers 

for the planning and definition of APOLLO Extension System 

programs, excluding spacecraft hardware development, in 

the fields of geo-science, agriculture, and oceanography. 

5 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1 September 1965 

(Continued) 

2 September 1965 

15 September 1965 

~~ \lf,:;~,.J i~J\~ ;;..;I Iii ........ ~~11 

.;G;HITDL SYSTEM 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

Dr. Seamans advised that NASA was not forwarding a work 

statement to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in accordance with Dr. McMillan's request. 

Dr. McMillan furnished to Dr. Hornig an outline of NASA 

activities in the area of earth reconnaissance. Dr. McMillan 

indicated his feeling that the NASA activities ran counter 

to national policy as expressed in NSC Action 2 454 and 

jeopardized security discipline within the NRP. 

Mr. Peter C. Badgley produced a proposed NASA position 

paper on remote sensing. The paper stated that NASA was 

c 1 .Tently using remote sensing devices in many of its 

StJaceflight programs and that these devices were being · 

improved continuously for very extensive use on the 

upcoming APOLLO, VOYAGER, and APOLLO Applications 

Programs. 

Badgley related that specific expressions of desire for 

cooperation and participation in the NASA remote sensing 

program had been received from appropriate officials in 

the NAS, U.S. Dept of Interior, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, 

U.S. Air Force, U.S. Dept of Commerce, U.S. Dept of 

Agriculture, and many leading universities. 

The paper cited the Space Act of 1958 as the derivation of 

"NASA's vital responsibilityn in the remote sensing of 

planetary (earth) surfaces and reaffirmed NASA's belief 

that the observation of the earth from outer space was a 

legitimate and permissible activity vis-a-vis NASA's 

concurrence in the UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI). 

The paper identified four general fields of application of 

earth sensing: geography I cartography, geology /hydrology, 

oceanography, and agriculture /forestry. 

With regard to international relationships, the paper stated 

that to the maximum extent possible, NASA sponsored 

remote sensing equipment would be unclassified and that 

all data acquired by NASA sponsored (non-DOD) remote 

sensing investigators over foreign areas would be unclassified. 

6 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1· 

15 September 1965 

(Continued) 

2 0 - 21 September 

1965 

11A~IllE VIA BYEf 

cmnROl SYSTEM 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

....... ,. .\ ... 

. •' 

The paper recognized the need for NASA to cooperate with 

the DOD to: 

1. Minimize instrument duplication. 

2. Insure that latest NASA developments in remote 

sensing would be available to DOD. 

3. Insure that latest DOD developments in remote 

sensing were available to NASA. 

The paper recommended: 

1. NASA use of the best possible instruments with resolutions recommended by the scientific community. 

2. NASA documentation of a list of unclassified remote 

sensing instruments to be flown over foreign test 

sites. 

3. Continued coordination with DOD on equipment 

availability and state -of-the -art. 

4. Necessity for complete access to all phases of 

DOD development of remote sensing instruments 

for selected NASA program scientists and engineers. 

NASA center program management, and NASA principal investigators. 

NASA held a conference on the "Post-APOLLO Lunar 

Photographic Program 11 at Dayton, Ohio 

NASA was proposing a group of cameras to be flown in an 

APOLLO continuation program. This group included: 

2 metric mapping 

2 panoramic 

1 ultra-high resolution 

4 wide angle multiband cameras 

NASA proposed a hold on the ultra-high resolution system 

· until the UPWARD system could be evalu.ated for the task. 

7 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1· 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

"ii"'.'i\[~\ C»r"er·· ....... "'.! ,L;;; ~" --1-. ~- i .JJi..u.·~,.. ~lL· 1~~i 

30 September 1965 Dr. McMillan recommended that Dr. Morse work with 

Dr. Flax to see whether missions directed to Navy 

requirements could be included in current data gathering 

requirements. Dr. McMillan felt that many Navy requirements for oceanographic data could be met by use of 

systems currently in operation, sooner, and at a much 

lower total cost to the Government, than would be experienced by proceeding as NASA had proposed. 

16 October 1965 Admiral Raborn expressed his concern that the increasing 

use of photographic equipment in NASA programs would 

necessitate consideration of the security of intelligence 

programs in terms of both equipment and product if such 

use should result in photography approaching intelligence 

quality. 

22 November 1965 Dr. Flax issued policy guidance for participation by DOD 

representatives in conferences, symposia, etc., on the 

NASA APOLLO Applications Program for earth orbital 

satellites. Attendance was authorized; however, re pre -

sentatives were directed not to express either orally or 

in writing any endorsement of proposed NASA programs, 

nor comment favorably or adversely on proposed APOLLO 

systems or components, nor submit any proposals direct 

to NASA to participate in this APOLLO effort. 

22 November 1965 NASA set $250 million as the most acceptable amount for 

FY 67 for the APQLLO Applications Program. This 

amount would enable achievement of the first APOLLO 

Applications flight in March 1968, and a follow-on series 

of manned, highly-instrumented missions to 1972. 

27 December 1965 In a letter to Dr. Seamans, Dr. Flax expressed serious 

concern about the rapidly accelerating NASA program 

planning activity directed toward earth sensing (reconnaissance) from satellites. 

HAlmLE VIA B 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

Dr. Flax indicated that he had anticipated that actions in 

response to the August 1965 agreement between Dr. McMillan 

and Dr. Seamans would identify for a joint consideration 

~~re;~, rt(·~ pr, E ~ 

~h ~~ ~tu!\ 1 

8 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1· 

27 December 1965 

(Continued) 

9 January 1966 

14 January 1966 

HANDLE VIA B 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

those items falling within the agreed-upon definition of 

reconnaissance-like activities; however, there appeared 

to have been no effect in restraining NASA public and 

contractor activities in areas affecting the National 

Reconnaissance Program. 

Dr. Foster and Dr. Seamans, having agreed that it was 

necessary to provide an expeditious means to coordinate, 

at the policy level the manned space flight programs of 

the DOD and NASA, submitted for Secretary of Defense/ 

Administrator, NASA consideration a proposed memo of 

understanding which would establish and delineate the 

functions of a "Manned Space Flight Policy Committee" 

to be co-chaired by the DDR&E and the Deputy Adminis -

trator, NASA. Nominated as additional members of the 

proposed Committee were: 

Mr. Daniel T. Fink, Deputy DDR&E 

Dr. Alexander H. Flax, SAFRD 

Dr. George E. Mueller, Associate Administrator 

NASA(MSF) 

Dr. Homer E. Newell, Associate Administrator, 

NASA(SSA) 

Mr. McNamara and Mr. Webb signed a memorandum of 

understanding to establish an expeditious means of coordinating the manned space flight programs of the NASA and 

the DOD. It provided for the establishment of a NASA-DOD 

Manned Space Flight Policy Committee which would: 

1. Resolve those matters concerning the mutual 

participation in and support of the manned space 

flight programs of the two agencies which cannot 

be resolved at a lower level. 

2. Arrive at agreements involving top policy determination. 

3. Facilitate the exchange, at top management level, 

of viewpoints and information of importance in the 

coordinated planning of the manned space flight 

programs of the NASA and the DOD. 

A 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

1· 

21 January 1966 

l March 1966 

ll April 1966 

HANDLE VIA B 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

The first meeting of the newly constituted MSFPC was held 

at NASA Hq, with Dr. Seamans presiding. 

c..-Considerable time was devoted to a discussion of the remote 

sensing possibilities considered for the APOLLO Applications Program - - specifically the possible political and 

security sensitivity of earth sensing. 

The Committee noted that while individuals had been pre -

viously selected by NASA and DOD to review this problem, 

sufficient guidance had not beenprovided. Dr. Flax was 

asked to prepare a document setting down these areas of 

concern and to develop guidelines for a joint review by 

selected individuals. 

In a letter to Admiral Boone, Dr. Flax indicated that the 

proposed geography I cartography program by USGS for 

NASA appeared detrimental to the security of the National 

Reconnaissance Program and that it was directed in large 

measure toward the development and later operation of 

satellite techniques and systems to collect mapping data 

which had been or was be·i ng collected in the operational 

programs of the NRP. 

Dr. Flax stated that he could not concur that the major 

part of the proposed work was either necessary or desirable. 

Dr. Flax submitted to the Manned Space Flight Policy 

. Committee the two papers requested at the first meeting: 

1. DOD Areas of Concern Relative to NASA Satellite 

Sensor Programs 

2. Guidelines for DOD/NASA Committee on Reconnaissance Sensors 

The two papers presented criteria and an organizational 

mechanism for identifying NASA activities of concern to 

the DOD because of their potential impact on the National 

Reconnaissance Program .. 

10 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C050964.13 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

12 April 1966 

14 April 1966 

15 April 1966 

HANDLE WlA BY 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

In a memorandum for Admiral Boone, Dr. Flax accepted, 

from the standpoint of NRP security only, the revised 

USGS/NASA work statement. 

Dr. Flax iterated the concerns expressed in his letter of 

March l, 1966 as still applicable. 

Dr. Flax pointed out that unless the actions taken in 

phases l and 2 of the proposed program resulted in directing the program away from reconnaissance quality sensors 

and mapping and charting they would raise the issues including security addressed in his letter of March 1. 

Dr. Flax stipulated several conditions under which the 

program could proceed. 

The second meeting of the Manned Space Flight Policy 

Committee was held at the Pentagon, with Dr. Foster 

presiding. 

As directed in the first meeting, Dr. Flax had prepared 

and distributed a memorandum on "DOD Concern with 

NASA Remote Sensing Activities. " Mr. Shapley of NASA 

had prepared a similar memo which was to be transmitted 

to Committee members. 

It was agreed that the NASA three-ma~ group (Gray, 

Sullivan and Jaffe) would review the NASA program in the 

light of Dr. Flax's memo and recommend procedures for 

adopting the suggested ground rules as well as flagging 

potential difficulties. 

Dr. Seamans forwarded for Dr. Foster's consideration a 

paper by Mr. Shapley on earth observation from space --

the paper referred to in the Manned Space Flight Policy 

Committee meeting of 14 April 1966. 

The paper summarized: 

1. The principal reasons of current direct concern 

to NASA for moving ahead with consideration of 

11 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

15 April 1965 

(Continued) 

18 April 1966 

HANDLE VIA B 

CONTROl SYSTEM 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

the policy question related to earth observations 

from space for olher than intelligence and other 

military purposes. 

2. The principal policy and program evaluation 

question that must be addressed in considering 

whether these should be programs for nonmilitary earth observations from space. 

Mr. Schultze and Dr. Hornig co-authored a letter to Secretary of State Rusk which related a growing interest in the 

possible uses of satellite reconnaissance-type systems for 

peaceful purposes reflected in studies being conducted 

under the auspices of the NASA. 

Mr. Schultze and Dr. Hornig considered it essential to 

study the relationships between these peaceful programs 

and our classified reconnaissance programs "if we are 

to avoid unplanned disclosure of our reconnaissance -type 

systems. 11 

The letter: 

1. Proposed a review of current security restrictions 

on reconnaissance activities and national policy 

established under NSAM 156 and then the development of a plan of action based on the review. 

2. Requested that the NSAM 156 ad hoc committee be 

reconvened for this purpose. 

Inclosed for the committee's consideration was a list of 

issues: 

1. Should there be a national plan defining the discrete 

. steps to be taken in the next four or five years in a 

program to gradually expose satellite surveillance 

capabilities to public view? 

2. During the period that the NRP remains classified, 

what role, .if any, should NASA have in planning 

and executing missions involving high-resolution 

image sensors of reconnaissance quality? 

JOP SECRET 

12 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

18 April 1966 

(Continued) 

27 April 1966 

I ' HANDLE VIA BY 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

,J 

3. Who should decide the classification to be placed 

upon studies or development of new high-resolution 

imagery sensor hardware that NASA may wish to 

pursue from time to time ? 

4. Should the development of such hardware be centralized in the DOD? If not, how should it be coordinated? 

5. In view of the MOL capability for making high quality 

astronomical measurements, can MOL be used to 

meet NASA requirements for orbital astronomical 

experiments? If so, how and at what level of security 

classification? 

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson alerted the NSAM 156 l'ld I:bc Committee 

princ.i pals: 

DOD Mr. McNaughton 

Dr. Flax 

ACDA Mr. Fisher 

CIA Mr. R. J. Smith 

WH Mr. Keeney 

Mr. Charles Johnson 

NASC Mr. Welsh 

NASA Dr. Seamans 

to a meeting on May 6, 1966 for initial consideration of a 

program for conducting the study requested by Mr. Schultze 

and Dr. Hornig. 

Mr. Johnson suggested that the principals personally plan 

to represent their agencies and that the subject be handled 

on the basis of minimum necessary staff participation. 

The letter established a goal of July 1, 1966 for preparation 

of a report and recommendations. 

13 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

,. 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

TOP SEGRCT 

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NSAM 156 AD HOC COMMITTEE 

AND ITS ACTIONS 

26 May 1962 

29May1962 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

CONTROL SYSTEMS .JOINTI..Y 

President Kennedy sent NSAM 156 to the State Department, 

directing State to assume leadership in developing a U. s. 

policy on satellite reconnaissance. The President's 

directive: 

1. Cited the fact that the U.S. is engaged in negotiations on disarmament and peaceful uses of outer 

space. 

2. Noted that these discussions raised a problem of 

"what constitutes legitimate use of outer space, 

and in. particular, the question of satellite reconnaissance. 11 

3. Directed State to formulate a position which: 

a. Avoids the dangers of restriding ourselves, 

b. Compromising highly classified programs, 

or 

c. Providing assistance of significant military 

value to the USSR, and 

d. Permits us to continue to work for disarmament and international cooperation in space. 

(See Tab No. 1) 

State (Mr. U. Alexis Johnson) passed NSAM 156 to several 

agencies and convened a meeting on 1 June 1962. 

Representatives: DOD 

NASA 

Mr Nitze 

Dr Charyk 

Dr Seamans 

WH 

CIA 

ACDA 

Dr Wiesner 

Mr Kaysen 

Dr Scoville 

Mr Fisher 

This was the beginnipg of an Ad Hoc Interagency Committee 

which was never given a name. 

ror SECRET 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

l-

·1 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

30 June 1962 

17 January 196'.3 

18 January 1963 

26 February 1963 

HANDLE VIA 

;;; ·;EMAN-TALENT -KEYHOLE 

CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

The Ad Hoc Committee submitted its final report to the 

President, who approved it on 10 July, establishing 

Eighteen Points of National Space Reconnaissance policy. 

This policy has furnished a firm basis for all U. S. informational activities and international negotiations. 

(See Tab No. 2) 

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson sent a memorandum to members 

of the Ad Hoc Committee requesting them to prepare 

material for a contingency paper to be available in conjunction with an approach to the Soviets on a possible 

separate arms control measure on outer space. The DOD 

was asked to prepare a study on: 

l. The possible usefulness of inspector satellites 

against bombs-in-orbit, and 

2. The feasibility of neutralizing bombs-in-orbit by 

means of a non-nuelear satellite. 

(See Tab No. 3) 

Mr McGeorge Bundy sent NSAM 216 to Messrs Rusk, 

McNamara, and McCone, stating that the President desired 

a study covering: 

1. Should there be a high-level disclosure of our 

satellite reconnaissance to the Soviets? 

2. Should our U.S.· Embassy in Mos cow keep suitable 

disclosure materials on a contingency basis? 

(See Tab No. 4) 

The NSAM 216 response was undertaken by the Ad Hoc 

Committee and completed on this date. The final report 

stated: 

1. Concur in the consensus that the disadvantages of 

disclosure under conditions both of calm and crisis 

appear to outweigh the potential advantages. 

TOP SECRET 

2 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

26 February 1963 

(Continued) 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

""~"'.J"'-l""' ., '·r• .. : ....... ~~ 

[ \j'~ci' ~j~~~~(~ 1 

2. Question the feasibility of exploiting mapping 

information as a means of convincing the Soviet 

Union of their declining secrecy. 

3. Non-concur in the desirability of establishing a 

standby disclosure capability in Moscow on the 

ground that potential utility does not appear to 

justify the effort an<j security risks involved. 

You might suggest instead that such a capability 

be held in readiness in Washington for rapid 

movement to Moscow, should circumstances 

ever require. 

4. Agree that the basic paper, with an expanded 

treatment of the Cost of Disclosure to reflect 

the implications involved in an official acknowledgment and with changes consistent with recommendation 3., above, provides an appropriate 

framework for the required report to the White 

House. (See Tab No. 5} 

13 March 1963 The Ad Hoc Committee completed its response to 

NSAM 192 (

1

i

1

bombs-in-orbit 11 ). 

20 December 1963 Mr. U. Alexis Johnson circulated a mem"orandum to 

Ad Hoc Committee members, Subject: "Consideration 

of Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance Information. 11 It stated that at a recent White House review 

of the disarmament situation the question had been raised 

of exploiting our satellite reconnaissance capability for 

progress in the disarmament field. (1) Could we share 

more actual information with our Allies, revealing the 

source? (2) Should we press the Soviet leaders to realize 

the obsolescence of their closed society? 

(See Tab No. 6) 

21 January 1964 The Ad Hoc Committee made its final report on "possible 

disclosure, 11 stating "we find no present necessity for 

additional disclosures to our Allies ... 11 ; "we have concluded that no additional action to disseminate more knowledge of our satellite reconnaissance capability is re quired 

at this time in support of our disarmament or other policies. " 

(See Tab No. 7) 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE TOP SECRET 

CONTROL.: SYSTEMS .JOINTl..Y 

~ 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

2 June 1964 

June - September 

1964 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson sent a memorandum, Subject: 

"Recent Commentaries on Satellite Reconnaissance 11 to 

members of the Ad Hoc Committee. He remarked on 

the Benton/ Pearson/Khrushchev conversations. He 

raised a question as to what "measures we might take 

to effect or use these Soviet views to serve our own 

objectives. 11 Specifically, should we "privately surface 

our program to Khrushchev, or publicly, or both? (The 

idea being to reduce adamant Soviet opposition to inspection). He called for a meeting on 5 June. 

(See Tab No. 8) 

From June through September 1964, the Committee met 

seven times in attempting to resolve the disclosure 

que.stions. Discussions of possible alternatives included: 

1. TOP SECRET briefings to key U. S. Senators 

and/ or SECRET level dissemination to the North 

Atlantic Council by the CIA. 

2. A proposal by the DCI that he brief Heads of State 

instead of the NAC. 

As of September 15, it was agreed that we would not 

privately or publicly surface the satellite reconnaissance 

program to Khrushchev, the Congress, or the North 

Atlantic Allicance. Mr. McCone was authorized to give 

a carefully-revie;..ved presentation to selected European 

Heads of State. 

22 September 1965 The Ad Hoc Committee met to consider some of the 

cpestions which had arisen in connection with the Manned 

Orbiting Laboratory. Ambassador Thompson suggested 

that the recent MOL announcement might have aggravated 

the difficulty of achieving international legitimization of 

satellite reconnaissance. State suggested further that 

the U.S. should be prepared to offer to the Soviets a mutual 

pre-launching inspection of space vehicles and indicated 

that it would prepare a paper outlining such a proposal with 

the pros and cons. 

HANDLE VIA ~t:JP SECRET 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE 

CONTROx.;; SYSTEMS. ;JOINTLY 4 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

., 

I 

I 

6 October 1965 

23 October 1965 

•t.:;' 

27 April 1966 

HANOLE VIA 

BYEMAN-TALENT-KEYHOLE. 

CONiROL SYSTEMS . .JOINTLY 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096413 

Mr. Lewellyn Thompson forwarded to Ad Hoc Committee 

members a paper, "An Offer of Inspection of the MOL." 

The paper proposed that the U. S. meet Soviet allegations 

that we were pursuing a weapons-in-space program by 

publicly offering, on the basis of reciprocity, to permit 

inspection adequate to demonstrate that there were no 

nuclear weapons aboard any manned space vehicle. 

The DOD completed its review of the State Department 

proposal for possible mutual pre-launching inspection 

of MOL. Highlight: of the paper: 

"The inspection proposal would seem to be too high 

a card to play in any propaganda game the Soviets 

might initiate over MOL •.. Recommend the proposal 

be spelled out in greater detail. .. Recommend we 

consider other, and less potentially sensitive, ways 

to cope with any Soviet propaganda attack on MOL .•. 

Our primary concern in all these discussions is the 

preservation of our national security; and, in this 

case, I rate the value to national security of preserving our reconnaissance capability above that of public 

and official opinion in other countries ... Impact on 

our national security is not adequately treated in the 

State proposal. 11 

To date, the Ad Hoc Committee has not reconvened to 

resolve the issue.outlined above. Thus, its last formal 

meeting was on 22 September 1965. 

Mr. U. Alexis Johnson advised members of the Ad Hoc 

Committee to prepare for a meeting to study possible 

disclosure of satellite reconnaissance data, peaceful 

applications of such data, and possible relationship to 

NASA programs. 

(See Tab No. 9) 

TOP SCCRff 

5 

Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C050964) 3