IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00237-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.G. AND A.P., CHILDREN

From the 74th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017-3473-3

O P I N I O N

In four issues, appellant, Augustine Perez, challenges the trial court’s order, 

entered after a bench trial, terminating his parental rights to J.G. and A.P.1 Specifically, 

Perez contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the 

 

1

In his notice of appeal, Perez indicates that the style of this case is In the Interest of J.G., A.P., and 

L.G., children. However, the record reflects that Perez is not the father of L.G. and that his parental rights 

were therefore terminated as to J.G. and A.P. only. Neither the mother of all three of the children nor the 

father of L.G. have filed notices of appeal in this matter. Accordingly, we cannot construe Perez’s notice of 

appeal to encompass L.G. Without a proper notice of appeal, there is nothing preserved for appellate 

review pertaining to L.G. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c) (“A party who seeks to alter the trial court’s judgment 

or other appealable order must file a notice of appeal.”); see also Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 

171 (Tex. 2004) (“Northglen did not file a notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment, did not notice a 

cross-appeal, and did not petition this court for review on the point. Accordingly, Northglen did not 

preserve this issue for our review.”). Because there is not a proper notice of appeal corresponding with 

L.G. in this proceeding, we modify the style of this case to delete L.G. 
In the Interest of J.G. and A.P., Children Page 2

predicate grounds for termination under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family 

Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D)-(E) (West Supp. 2018). We affirm as 

modified.

I. ANALYSIS

In its termination order, the trial court stated that the predicate grounds for 

termination of Perez’s parental rights as sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) of the 

Family Code and that termination of Perez’s parental rights is in the best interest of the 

children.2 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O). On appeal, Perez only challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the predicate grounds for termination under 

sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code.

Appellee, the Department, represented by the Criminal District Attorney for 

McLennan County, Texas, filed a letter brief conceding that the findings under section 

161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code “should be removed from the final order 

terminating Appellant[] Augustine Perez’s parental rights.” Because appellee agrees that 

Perez is entitled to the relief requested, and because appellee has waived any complaint 

 

2 Perez does not challenge the trial court’s best-interest findings, nor does he challenge the trial 

court’s findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (O) of the Family Code. Therefore, the trial court’s 

best-interest findings, as well as the trial court’s findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (O), are 

binding on this Court, and we need not address them in this opinion. See IKB Indus. (Nigeria) Ltd. v. ProLine Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1997); McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); see also 

In re K.L.G., No. 14-09-00403-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 8011, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 

15, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Appellant did not raise a challenge to the predicate ground in subsection Q 

or to the best-interest finding. Second, because they were unchallenged, findings supporting termination 

of appellant’s parental rights to K.L.G. are binding, and no review of the other predicate grounds or the 

best-interest finding is necessary.” (citing In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003))).
In the Interest of J.G. and A.P., Children Page 3

pertaining to sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code, we sustain Perez’s 

issues on appeal to the extent that the parties agree that sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) 

of the Family Code should be removed from the trial court’s order as predicate grounds 

for termination. In sustaining Perez’s issues on appeal, we are simply accepting 

appellee’s waiver and specifically not reviewing the evidence for sufficiency to support 

these predicate grounds. See, e.g., Menon v. Water Splash, Inc., No. 14-14-00012-CV, 2018 

Tex. App. LEXIS 194, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 9, 2018, no pet.) (“On 

the other hand, a litigant also can concede or waive issues and arguments on appeal . . . 

.”).

II. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we modify the trial court’s termination order to delete the 

findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Family Code. Given that Perez 

does not challenge the remaining two predicate grounds for termination of his parental 

rights under section 161.001 of the Family Code or the best-interest grounds, we 

otherwise affirm the trial court’s termination order in all other respects. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (stating that in an involuntary termination proceeding, the Texas 

Department of Family and Protective Services must establish: (1) at least one ground

under subsection (b)(1) of section 161.001; and (2) that termination is in the best interest 

of the child); see also In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (“Only one predicate 
In the Interest of J.G. and A.P., Children Page 4

finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination 

when there is also a finding that termination is in the child’s best interest.”).

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Neill

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed November 20, 2019

[CV06]