COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

SUPER FRESH FOOD MARKETS, INC. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1276-98-4 PER CURIAM 

 OCTOBER 6, 1998 

REJINO C. STULTZ 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (S. Vernon Priddy, III; Sands, Anderson, 

Marks & Miller, on brief), for appellant. 

 (James E. Swiger; Swiger & Cay, on brief), 

for appellee. 

 Super Fresh Food Markets, Inc. ("employer") contends that 

the Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in 

finding that the Supreme Court's holding in The Steinrich Group 

v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795 (1996), did not bar 

compensation for Rejino C. Stultz's ("claimant") left shoulder 

condition. The commission found that the left shoulder condition 

was a compensable consequence of claimant's original February 14, 

1994 injury by accident. Employer also argues that the 

commission should have dismissed claimant's claim, because he 

failed to file his claim for benefits as a new injury claim, 

rather than as a change in condition. Upon reviewing the record 

and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's 

decision. See Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 I. 

 In Virginia, "[t]he doctrine of compensable consequences is 

well established and has been in existence for many years." 

Williams Indus., Inc. v. Wagoner, 24 Va. App. 181, 186, 480 

S.E.2d 788, 790 (1997). 

 This doctrine, also known as the chain of 

causation rule, provides that "'where the 

chain of causation from the original 

industrial injury to the condition for which 

compensation is sought is direct, and not 

interrupted by any intervening cause 

attributable to the [employee's] own 

intentional conduct, then the subsequent 

[condition] should be compensable.'" 

Food Distributors v. Estate of Ball, 24 Va. App. 692, 697, 485 

S.E.2d 155, 158 (1997) (quoting Leadbetter, Inc. v. Penkalski, 21 

Va. App. 427, 432, 464 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1995)) (other citation 

omitted). "'The simplest application of this principle is the 

rule that all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow 

from the primary injury are compensable.'" American Filtrona Co. 

v. Hanford, 16 Va. App. 159, 163, 428 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1993) 

(citation omitted). "[W]here a causal connection between the 

initial compensable injury and the subsequent injury is 

established . . . the subsequent injury 'is treated as if it 

occurred in the course of and arising out of the employee's 

employment.'" Bartholow Drywall Co. v. Hill, 12 Va. App. 790, 

794, 407 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1991) (quoting Leonard v. Arnold, 218 Va. 

210, 214, 237 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1977)). 

 Employer does not dispute that claimant proved a causal 
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connection between his initial February 14, 1994 compensable 

right shoulder injury and his subsequent left shoulder problems.1

 However, employer contends that the commission erred in refusing 

to apply the rule set forth in Jemmott to bar compensation in 

this case. Employer argues that Jemmott bars compensation for a 

cumulative trauma injury which is found to be a compensable 

consequence of an original injury by accident. We disagree. 

 In Jemmott, the Supreme Court held that "job-related 

impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused by repetitive 

motion, however labeled or however defined, are, as a matter of 

law, not compensable under the present provisions of the Act." 

251 Va. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802. Jemmott dealt with the 

compensability of a primary injury or condition, it did not 

address the compensability of a cumulative trauma injury caused 

by an intervening event, which was itself a result of the 

original compensable injury by accident. Nothing in Jemmott

expressly overruled or altered the well-established doctrine of 

compensable consequences. Accordingly, the commission did not 

err in refusing to apply the holding in Jemmott to the facts of 

this case. 

 II. 

 Employer argues that the commission should have dismissed 

claimant's claim because he failed to file a claim for benefits 

 

 1Claimant's testimony and the medical evidence established 

that his left shoulder symptoms were caused by overuse of his 

left extremity due to the injury to his right shoulder. 
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alleging a new injury by accident as required by Leonard v. 

Arnold, 218 Va. 210, 237 S.E.2d 97 (1977). Employer did not 

raise this specific argument before the commission. Accordingly, 

we will not consider this issue for the first time on appeal. 

See Green v. Warwick Plumbing & Heating Corp., 5 Va. App. 409, 

413, 364 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1988); Rule 5A:18. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.