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OXCART/IDEALIS

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

OPPSC1C OP THE A0111111TANT SCCOLTARY

• January 3, 1966

•

4 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board

SITRJRCT: Reconnaissance Resources for •

Crisis Management Situations

REFELENCE: • USIB-D-41.15/72

In the referenced document, the United States

Intelligence Board requested that the National Reconnaissance

Office advise the Board as soon as practicable

of its studies toward increasingly advantageou

. capabilities and plans for speeding up processhandling. This request was pointed toward meeting the needs

of the United States Government in critical . international.

situations.

In responding to this request, the NEO is doing so

in the light of the framework in whic".1 the subject of crisis

management has been cast in previous 3oard diicussions--namely,

.periods of international tension of some duration during which

photographic reconnaissance might provide information of

critical importance for policy decisions.

Over the past six months, several informal discus .: •

sions . on this subject have taken place between the NRO Staff

and the CONOR. As a result, the NM° has evaluated all reconnaissance assets available now and in the near future which

night be employed for crisis management purposes. Attached

is a paper which briefly summarizes the characteristics

limitations, and program status of all satellite, aircraft,

and drone reconnaissance systems in this category.

With regard to satellites, except for the use of

CO2OTA (XE-4), as a means of providing coverage of those indications targets which do not req near-

.

term prospects are not good. Th. .
2 20.0045

• OXCART/IDEALIS. VA .

The KE-4 program, because of its maturity, is in

much better position to be employed in crisis situations.

Approximately six reserve systems, at 38 or less days from

launch, are always on hand and could be launched in a two/-

month period; one system is always available at R even*

on the launch day of another system. As a matter of interest

to the Board, in conjunction with a regular launch in the

next few months, I plan to test the reaction capability of

the RH-4 and the processing/production facilities in a simulated crisis situation. Unfortunately, as noted previously,

the resolution of the RH-4 is not adequate to provide a

majority of the information needed.

I am sure the Board will agree that it.and the NRO

should together ins-- laps are in effect to take maxi•

num advantage of - R3-4 c a ' es. The COMM

has provided targe de use crisis situations

and I am advised that these targets constantly under •

review in order to advise the NRO of any change. I as also

. advised that COIO is indicating which of these targets might'

ly be co Ue IH- on demanded that

..e HE-4 used o collect

atica at oint i

With regard to aircraft systems, the Board is well

aware of the uses which could be made of the U-2 and the

BLUE SPRINGS drones in crisis situations, particularly in

those areas where present air defense capabilities permit.

The OXCART aircraft will shortly be available for emergency

situations which might arise in China and Southeast Asia.

However, the use of the OXCART over the USSR when it achieves

full operational capabilities poses certain problems not so.•

much in terms of its ability to survive, but rather in terms

of its political impact. In some circumstances its use might

exacerbate unpredictably the tense situation pertaining at a.

time of international crisis.
• • •• *a ft ft

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LACART/IDEALISt1111111110Li

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OXCART/IDEALIS

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In addition, there is the SAC version of the OXCART,

namely, the SR-71, which will shortly become an available •

national asset.

. There are two other photographic assets under

development which would be of importance in'covering crisis

:situations in certain areas, particularly, China and Southeast Asia. I refer to the TAGBOARD drone which will operate

at high altitudes at Mach 3.3, with a range of 3,000 miles.

This vehicle, which is launched from a modified OXCART aircraft, should be operational by late CY 1966. The Department

of Defense is also purchasing advanced aubsonic drones known

as the 147-H which will be available by mid-1966, and is

contemplating an even more advanced subsonic drone for use

in CY 196S.

The YR tive study and feasibility

intros i tion

s a part • e NMP. Also, as a means oz educing

e tine of receipt of information after photography has

bean collected, the N20 is investigating the feasibility of •

installing an in-flight processing and exploitation capability

in a KC-135 aircraft. This would permit a saving of many

hours after the retrieval of either a manned aircraft or a

satellite photographic package..

In summary, in consideration of the foregoing and

the attachment, several points seem clear. Neither the

existing satellite, aircraft, or drone systems nor those

currently in development have the desired truly quick- •

reaction capability to deal properly with rapidly changing

international situations. Aside from considerations of

quick.reaction, no single system available or contemplated

is capable of doing the total crisis management task. Collectively, there is a substantial national collection capability

on hand and/or projected for the near term which could be

employed in an emergency.

The NRO will continue to improve the capabilities'

of all systems for use in crisis situations, including the

reduction of time from retrieval of aircraft and satellite

product to delivery of findings to national authorities.

Additional/y; greater emphasis will be placed on investigations leading toward quicker reacting photographic satellite . _
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:3 :•• L.••••••• n ••• n

Director

National Reconnaissance Mies

Attachment

Assets for Crisis Management

cc: Ch/COMOR.

1•••
ASSETS FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

OXCART/IDEALISINMORONA

Ta? SECRET •
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OXCART/IDEALIST RON

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C, SECSEC"ir...7

Where ICE-4 resolution is adequate to prow Or

rnazion, the CORONA program is in on excellent position to respond

to crisis management requirenter.ts. Approximately 5-6 systems are

continually maintained at R-38, or less, days from launch. One

CORONA system is always maintained at an R-7 to R-9 status, even

on the launch date of another CORONA. In an emergency, it is estimated that CORONA systems could be maintained on orbit for approximately 60 consecutive days :barring catastrophic failures during launch

or shortly after iLlection into orbit), returning a "bucket" of film each

five days.

On :Ile de'zit side in a crisis manager:an: ro:a. the CORONA has

several characteristics whichiir.it or hinder its effectiveness. These

plus plans to i=7.Z.-C.Ve system capabilities, are:

The present 3-I CORONA provicas abou: 10 foot resolution

at nadir, varying occasionally in consistency. With the introduction

of the 3-.S model in early 1997, the IC.r1-4 is expected to be more consistent (lass random vibration-induced smear), and to have the capability to :::rovide 8 foot resolution by orbiting; at lower altitudes (perigee

at approximately 80 miles which is not possible with the present ICE-4).

2. The present. CORONA can be held at R-1 for approximately

7 days; however, by preparing two systems simultaneously and

recycling their count-downs in a complementary fashion an almost

continuous 3-1 capability can be maintained.

A completely new orbit and camera program can be placed

in the CORONA system at 3-9. There are no plans to improve on this

capability since major development efforts would be involved.

.S. At the present time, CORONA camera program options

for each revolution are preset in the vehicle prior to launch; then,

when on orbit, any one of ten alternative operations for each revolution
000-66

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may be selected by the NRO. A more flexible camera programmer

which permits addidonal alternatives will be available in 1967.

A significant limitation o the use of photographic systems is,

of conrse, cloud cover (the Sino-Soviet 3:3C averages approxi=ately

e0-35 percent cloud cover the year around.). Another limitation is

the need to return film to earth for processing prior' to interpretation.

The NRO has been investigating both radar and read-out photographic

systems for some time (experimental satellites of both have

been flown). Although no specific sysze=s are under develop-meat, or

have been. selected for development, for either category at this time,

it should be assumed such syste=s will be operational by the end of

this decade or in the early 1970 ,s. • More limited read-out capability

could be made available by late 1908.

AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS: 

•"

Depandirig on the area to be covered, the U-2 (IDEALIST) aircraft has considerable potential as a crisis management system.. It

is .2.3.S 3:4 a simple airplane system and easy to maintain. It can be

on ready alert for extended time periods; and when in this

posture, a. mission launch can take place approximately 2 . 1/2 hours

TO: F 1 ,, OXCART/EDEALIS RONA
after receipt of a directive. The flight path is completely flexible

and repeated coverage of a small area can be made on a single flight.

The normal camera system can photograph over 36

10. 4.2

er. 2,s re uses

are

=in31 3, mile range of the U-2 can be extended by in-flight

refueling. Two of the aircraft have been modified to operate from

aircraft carriers to increase mission flexibility.

The disadvantage of the t-2 lies generally in the aircraft's

vu:r.erability to the increased air defense capability. 7.te IDEALIST

aircraft flies sufficiently high n above C:./.5 feet) to minimize the

interceptor aircraft threat, but is vulnerable to SA-2 missile systems.

Mlactronic cour..termes.sures equipments for protection against both

the aircraft and missile threats are inS i.2.1:03:: While these equipments

er.:hance U-2 survivability, they are not completely affective. Thus,

ScQ= constraints must be imposed in selecting flight paths in heavily

defended target areas.

present time, there are twenty U-2 -Liz-ars!: which could

be used in crisis management situations. Nina of these are assigned

to Cry, eleven to SAC. The SAC aircraft have slightly less capability in operational altitude and in electronic equipment; however, a

mod.':ication program is under way to up-grade these aircraft so that

a2.1:......enty U-2 aircraft will have Elite configuration for world-wide

employment..

The A-12 (OXCART) aircraft offers a high potential for crisis

management. This aircraft is in the final stage of test and development,

operational utilization scheduled for early 1966. The reaction time

for the A-12 aircraft is not as fast as that of the U-2. As with the U-2,

the OXCART flight paths which can be selected are highly flexible

although less adaptable to last minute and/or in-flight changes. Flight

will no molly be pre-selected and y..,roparexced in the aircraft

g-.1idance computer. The high speed of the aircraft does not permit a

wide .rance of al-night pilot options in target selection, and changes

will be -..w.de more on the basis of external advice rather than on pilot

ol.%servan'ons.

OXCART/IDEALIS

DM/000-66

ORONA _
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OXCART/IDEAL'S . TEMORONA

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been obtained with two

, still in development,

he aircraft will fly

of slightly less than

3, 000 nautical miles. In-flight refueling provides flexible mission

planning and range extension for increased target coverage.

The A-I2 is equipped with modern electronic countermeasures

equipments and techniques. The aircraft design concept included

minimizing the aircraft radar return cross-section. The combination.

of minimum radar return, high altitude high speed pertormar.ca and

sophisticated ECM equipment makes the aircraft relatively ilwalnerable

to the presently 'mown Sino -Soviet anti-aircraft defenses.

There are eight A-I2 aircraft 4.= the G a:LW!. configuration.

addition, two aircraft are being use :or contiuued testir_g and one

two-sea: version is being used for These ls.ther three are

no: readily adaptable to operational missions. There are no plans to

buy adc:itional OXCART ait-cz..z.f:.

The SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft. is an outgrow-a of the OXCART

development prog,rant. Althou7h somewhat larger, its performance is

vary similar to :ha: of :he A-12, and the advantages and disadvantages

to ::.a applied to operational utilization in crisis management situations

are the sane. The SR-71 payloads, however, are quite different. The

has three ea:T.:era syste=.s all carried st-h--taneously. Large

area coverage, high resolution photography, and cartographic information can be obtained on a single mission. 11.• addition, the SR-71 has

a side-looking radar p.homgraphic system for use during all-weather

conditions. This aircraft has a broadband ELINT collection capability

for Electronics Order of Battle reconnaissance.

• SAC will receive twenty-five operational SR-71 aircraft. 54.x.

additional aircraft have been manufactured for the test program.

Delivery of the first operational aircraft to Beale Air Force Base,

California, is scheduled for January 1988. A limited operational

capability will be available by May 1988 and a. full capability by October

1988. "No additional buys of SR-71 aircraft are anticipated at this. time.

C-round target resolution

of the camera systems. A third

will produce resolutions of less th

above 80, 000 feet at Mach 3.1 and
r1-7... SYSTEMS: 

addition to the aircraft programs, there are two drone programs which could be used for crisis rcanage — ent. The :47 series

drones have been ern2loyed in operational missior-s sinoe August 1964.

The pr erne... drone (14.7-G) cruises at .50 Imoj's az approximately

t.5, COO :cot ar:.-11-_as a •ranga cr-pz.,:z:::::ty of 1000 railes. The camera

sys:a.= produeas resoluzion.s of approximately three feet; ground

covarace is S20 linaar =files VI:7.7.h a• 20 mile swath width. Likenvar.tional aircraft,heone has the of mission route

selection and the capability for rapid reaction to launch. Only a few

hours are re..zuirad to program the guidance co=.putar.

"he r-ain &sac:vantages of :he drone Llab....ity to altar

nt.th, re► ,noto7raphic

coverage, and drone vulner....-bilit.y. 1:a

ec.ntrole zy :he DC-IS: tachnicue

the a-reas operation. The

- .

%.* an area zuch LE. a where :ha aircou:d. "ztar..r: of" v.thila contrz......ing the. or :ass control to

3C-:3: on the cf

• 17 ...-nerabilizy of :ha drone heavily defar...ded -r a:... is a prohlem

:o both .1-17.G's surface-to-air

Eov.-aver, arns.:: siza of the drone rr..E.1:e.e. it a radar target

and positior....:-.g of the int.e.:r.cpto:- airorg...ft for a zoom

J.*. • :-

or. .60.4.1...n• wr. al..A.OZ Goo fto

a :2.W:a Cf..% :.Z.Va occurred as a result of vis..:11 due to 7.:.--a

-ts.le trail. A contrail session sys:a=. will be

installed fr. :.rones beginning ezr:y in 1033.

To incradea oz:.erational capability, a new =ode: ∎:;7-3.") is under

develop nail.. new version will fly approxi=ately 3, 0:3 feet

higher her. 1::.-esent G model szld wr...1 have double the photograp'aic.

coverage. ca:ability (20 miles by 730 miles). To increase =ission

flexibiaty, Y. ha:it:op:az air retrieval syste= will be used with the

drone. Tor higher resolution pho:ogra7.1-..ic. coverage of critical

targets-and for coverage below cloud decks, e leven drones are being

won:ilied for both high- and low- level operations.

AM!

OXCART/MEAL RONA

000-55
Twenty-six 147-G drones . were purchased. Four have been lost

on operational missions. Twelve low-level drones were ordered;

one has hear. lost on a test mission. Thin:y-eight 147-E drones have

been ordered. Attrition of these is expected by the second qi.tarter of

1S37. A s-...-zdy is progress to determin.e the size of the increased

147-F.. ?rod..tat:Da requirement.

ln addition to the :cresently available and planned droner:, a new

subsor'c drone will be deve l o-sed. ^his "PAGLE)

avails.b_e' for operatior.c2. use in Marc:11E3^. t will •be able to

±:y az 75, :;33 feet (beyond the reach. of present Y..IG aircraft), have a

range of and a new csmers. sys:em designed to lirovide one

foot grou:n..: target. resolution. r.. addition, :ha drone will be designed

and sha;ad to mir_mg iza the rs.dar return decrease its vulr-aro.:=ty SA-.2 missiles.

..L 'so under devalolx=e-n;

(T1-.030..F..:..) aircraft. This vz:hicle %%ILI or-.:.ise :.::::.rox:.:nately.

35-S3, VLV feet, at z. zr. a Z. of ..z on 3. and ra.t7e. of 3,

The c:ars. systa= will be co.::ohle of along the

route, sws.-1.-. 22.• noutic.s.1 and s. T..-ound

resolu:io:. of feet. T:.e, drohe • till Launcha:: ':5, VVV fee: and

Mac:: 3.2 fro= A-l2. This offers :h.a flexf:oility of

••• n•••• • ••• •nn••n••••• •••••1%. •n••

...y range

of the Hol-rier" eror'z.

The radius of 7.1;.rn ;dic..azed by the hish speed of the dr.one),

the o: ca:tabi7.i.ty to alter 'the enroute, ezid a slov.•e=

cre the pri=axy disodvantage.s of this drone. There is

no :mown an..f.-aircrafr. defensive system ca;able of intercepting the

drone. anti-missile system may have the caps.bility at some future

date to react in time to accomplish an intercept.

• The rf._.C..:SC.A.?.D Systemf.r. development. We

z.nticipete he first test and development launch :a occur in January

_e:35. Six TAC..1.7.., 0A?..D is have been p•.-a-chased for to test program.

o..: tan :r.z.ve bean ordered for operational -.Ise. additional

il be contingent Upon the develo?.marz sucoass and operational utilization-.

OXCART/DXSALAIIIMPRCZA

D.C30-66

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OXCART/M.EALIS

9

••• n•• ••••• • 11.8

7.-71^^7'Q4- XQ•/?RODUC77...;N: 

X".? .° processing facilities azue located at Roches:er, West- •

ovar ;-..3'3, Yokota A33, Taiwan and Saigon. Occasionally, c:?.er DOD

are tz:Lizad, and in an az:largo:Icy, =.a.ny az..a avale for

Thus, ty.foccssinqproduction ca,nbility is av

ilab

ailablo for

saLanita, aircraft, and dz.one prodacts.

liznitatior. a:pilityto react traic's.ly is a ct-isis

is ti-..ne involved in carrying -.1:e film to a processing

anf. thence to Washing:on for ir..ta • pratz.tion aztri evalvation.

sate2.1its capsules ara recovered-

tha Eiwaii area.

7.::.4ar fa-Lycra:11a conditions, alo. ;...-oxiznataly hours zra 7:aq:tired to

fil•n to 20r:has:az (viz. davalo-3, produce

;12 goo. n my. NV,. ..•

nn•n • wort V ....ma .. a

n• • ••. • . ••• the -zhoto '--2.rareters

r..%1 ravia-...-1.7.4 soon c.e. L: was clave loped.

2::•Lanza apr:roxin..z.:a.ly 1.1 hours rz.covery,.

nrocessingt

. •••• 0. • • • • • •

%.0/00 •n •••n•• a••• CO. maawaolvj moo= ft •n•n•• msg.. • ••n•n %/•n _..r- •-" •"' •

_:La pcss.i:ola :-.1car_s. of .1.22712...• '"

Delete Thle;Za0N.-. ":2

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ma.•

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L^ e= Wiz..-_-.-. L... .a analyses :a

::-lowava•, :ant e.esi=a :o view

:.La -

nr-s. 20---sf.zia::ed :codifications :o this

.3 process ar.d.

rac,-.Lize zpiz

▪

 oxiraz.:ely hoLLrs altar copr.-.1a

ezova, z.nd :ha tz:te to Was:-.incon in a

spacis.: C-141, wi.41 ex:J.:a:Lotion equip:nen: a.-.3

z. tea.r.1 of photo in:er,raters. the 8-9 hotrs night to

Was".....:.g:on, the 1....hoto interpre:ars cou:d acco .n^:olish a reasonahly

•• • - - 23=7:7:12;717.3:Are E.:12.1•VIS O. 11.c :az ge.:s covered.

=ost proznising approach (for tha relatively near tez-=)

s.py.as.z.s a co=b' nation of in-flight processing, lintited duplication, and initial interpretation fr. a sir.gle s.ircraft. Research and

De 00-66
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Cow

%VT.. " .• •••• •••••

%nor ma... «as 4...7

;:rocassor yr acce;table I :base inveztizations prove out

fac.sibi:ity of a.n. 21.2.-viscous airborne rz.seassor, it is antici,s.:ed

e.z.va.:::::=er.: of to airborne ::....rocesa-7.. " nrnodifiadha undertaken near and of CY 6€. 's

er.vsazes cialivery :7z-cc:asset: sr.:elate 1,—. ;Long with in:ar;re:ation, to Washir..gtor. :lima hours after

razovary 17:aurait area. ':.7.7.ar. =sad for aircraf: or one

7.roduct, wOr..14 :o o'a.2. 'srar processad fian,

Vtra.salington fro=. may pain: on :ha

z7.?rozir..tata".!y 23 2-..ours or '_as...

De.000-66