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IS} NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON. D.C. D.C.

29 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Classification of 'Fact Of"

REFERENCE: Letter to the DCI, Mr. Colby, From Secretary of Defense,

Mr. Schlesinger, Dated 22 August 1974 (SecDef Contr No. X-2565)

With reference to the subject of the classification of the "fact

of" satellite reconnaissance, currently being brought forward for USIB

consideration, I would like to call your attention to the referenced

letter. In essence, we still continue to believe that there would be

little gain, and the possibility of great loss by declassifying at this

time the fact that the United States conducts satellite reconnaissance.

In addition, we do not see the need for pressure to make a change at

this time. We recognize the present proposal is to reduce the classi -

ver, we question whether this

ire of the minimal personnel

IAL clearance.

As Mr. Schlesinger pointed e degradation of.the classification of the "fact of", d lead to considerations of national

sovereignty and U.N. discussiods t t could be harmful to our interests".

Thus, as indicated before, Oe believe it is unwise to subject ourselves

to such added risks and public discussion.

fication from SECRET to CONFIDENTIAL;

.caveat provides sufficient protec

security standards required for C

J. W. Plummer

CLAIM IIINS1141111111111111111"101: —p __SEC NU

EXEC"TWO TEc 000Y ESE DEOLAINNY ON OUT ear

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PAGE OF PAGES
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

30 April 1976

NOTE FOR MR. PLUMMER

I

I have talked to Dr. Proctor on

this subject. He tells me that

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Mr. Bush is now going to push for

"Unclassified." Apparently Mr. Bush

is trying hard to downgrade areas to

gain credibility with Congress and

be able to keep classified areas

about which he feels more strongly.

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--TOP-SECET--

(5) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

30 April 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUM ER

SUBJECT: Classification of "Fact Of"

Forwarded for your signature is a proposed memorandum

to Mr. Bush in response to Dr. Proctor's proposal to downgrade the "fact of to the CONFIDENTIAL level.

Also enclosed are the Proctor draft memorandum (Tab A)

and the letter from Dr. Schlesinger to Mr. Colby (Tab B) which

is cited in the reply.

. 2 Attachments

Draft Memo

SIM

SecDef Memo, dtd 22 Aug 74
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President r .. '•

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FROM : George Bush • -

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SUBJECT : Modification of the Classification and .

Dissemination Controls for the Products

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of Reconnaissance Satellites

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1. This memorandum requests that you authorize the Director

of Central Intelligence to make certain modificatiins in the existing

restrictions concerning access to the products of the US reconnaissance

program. These changes are in response to one of the duties assigned

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to me by Executive Order 11905. Specifically, Section 3 (d)(1)(viii)

states that the Director of Central Intelligence shall "establish a

vigorous program to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence

information as appropriate and consistent with Executive Order

No. 11652". •

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In 1960 soon after the US satellite reconnaissance program

. • began, President Eisenhower ordered that all aspects of the program.

even the fact of its existence, be classified TOP SECRET axid be given

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VIORKING COPY r)

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additional access.limitations. In 1973 President Nixon authorized

the Director of Central Intelligerice to make modifications in

classification and access limitations regarding the products of

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the program; however, the President did require that the fact of

the existence of the photographic reconnaissance pro gram he'

classified at the SECRET level

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S.. It is common knowledge, both at home and abroad, that

the United States Government conducts such program. In these

circumstances It has been argued that the fact of the program st.ould

not be classified at all. A primary reason for continuing some degree

of classification is the concern that official public aclmowledgment

of the program will risk some degree of diplomatic and political

reaction by some foreign governments, especially the USSR in

connection with SALT. Because it is not the knowledge of the fact •

of the prokram but the official acknowledgment by the United States

Government that would be disturbing, it would be appropriate to

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classify the fact of the program at the CONFIDENTIAL level in

accordance with Executive Order•11652.

WORITILCOPY
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controls for the photographic and signals intelligence products of

4. Idodifications should also bo.made in the dissemination

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reconnaissance satellites. These changes would faCilitate the

use of the less. sensitive prooucts, especially for tactical military

purposes, and would ease the present restrictions on dissemination

to certain allied governments. Deputy Secretary Ellsworth and the

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Joint Chiefs of Staff have advocated modifications along these lines.

I can assure you that any changes.

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that are made will be with due

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regard for my responsibility--as stated in Executive Order 11905,

Section 3 (d)(1)(vii)--to "ensure that appropriate programs are

developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods

and analytical procedures". It should be noted that while I am

requesting authority to modify the restrictions on access to the

products of reconnaissance satellites, I do not intend to change

the classification or the system of controls presently applicable

to the operational aspects of the satellite reconnaissance program.

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5.. O

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 n this basis, I recomniend

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that you authorize the

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Director of Central Intelligence to

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Classify as CONFIDENTIAL the fact that the

United States

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 Government conducfs. a plYot3graphic

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satellite reconnaissance program, and

Implement a policy of reducing the dissemination

restrictions on the photographic and signals

intelligence products of our satellite reconnaissance

program in a way that will not jeopardize this

essential source of intelligence. •

George Bush

The recommendations in Paragraph 5 are approved

Date:

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CS. COPY • •
• SECRET SENS7.11E •

- THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE to. e

P • .04

t t AUG 1974

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The Honorable William E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bill:

With reference to the question of declassification of the

"fact of" satellite reconnaissance, I believe your memorandum

lays out the pro and con arguments reasonably well. However,

we continue to believe that ther • would be little gain, and

the possibility of great loss by declassifying at this time

the fact that the United States conducts satellite reconnaissance over the Soviet Union. In addition, we see no pressure

for making a change at this time.

While there is obviously considerable public knowledge of the

program, in our view the declassification and ultimate admission of the "fact of" would inevitably lead to erosion of the

security of the program. Further, once the program is pub,

licly admitted, the Soviet leadership could be subjected to

different, largely unforeseeable, and possibly unfavorable

pressures from our viewpoint. Finally, it is likely that declassification would lead to considerations of national sovereignty and U.N. discussions that could be harmful to our

Interests.

In

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view of the importance of this program to our Defense posture, we believe it unwise to subject ourselves to such added

risks and public discussion. Maintaining the classification

of the program provides the continuing option of a Presidential release. and statement if future events make this advisable.

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Sincerely,

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Classified ASELLU

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