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HANOL.£ VIA TOP SECRET BYEMA~i, J AlENT-KEYHOlf 

J.St'"NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

CONTROL SVSTE:M.S JOINTLY 

THE NRO STAFF 

26 August 1971 

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INFORMAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Tasking of SIGINT Satellites -

I. Introduction 

1. This informal memorandum provides some of my thoughts on 

the subject of the tasking of SIGINT Satellites particularly as related 

to our relationship with NSA. .They are forwarded for review prior 

to our scheduled di~cussion on 27 August. My apologies for the 

rough nature of this memorandum but the whole subject surfaced 

at the Staff Director /DDNRO level while I was on leave. 

II. Background .. 

2. · Legal Basis 

a. Our Charter 

b. NRO Management Agreements with NSA I 

3. Difference between Tasking Telemetry versus ELINT versus 

COMINT. 

a,. ·Telemetry - Volume low; no search or_ location just TI; 

know in advancement where, when, what and how .. In short, it is 

easy and can be preplanned. 

b. _ELINT - Volume large, Have multifunctions su_ch as 

search, EO·B, TI. . Don't always know what or when or where or how. 

Hence, need support· from home in terms of tasking advice and tipoff 

(non-missile/ space), 

c. COMINT - Similar to ELINT but further complicated because you need more than one intercept plus much longer period of 

intercept. Again need taskir{g advice from home and non-missile/ 

space tipoff (i.e., conventional). Remember. bulk of COMINT fs 

conventional and significant amount of telemetry and ELINT conventional. Not true for photo. 

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Conclusion - More tasking support needed for COMINT 

and ELINT than telemetry. 

d •. Need skilled 24..,hour support from home for: . . \_ 

(1 1) Non-missile space tipoff. 

(2) Interpr~tation of previous days I effort whh advice 

for today. 

(3) . Working all three systems together in both missile 

and non-missile jobs. 

(4) Tactical type efforts. 

4. NRO Approach to Tasking 

a. Needed assistance from NSA (i.e., management agreements). 

b. We provide tasking :framework and NSA makes adjustments 

within that framework when needed. We monitor their adjustments. 

III. Pro bl ems 

5. Problems with this arrangement 

a .. There are no curr~nt major operational problems (i. e:, 

the collection job is getting done in reasonably good fashion. 

b •. Have had a good number of political squabbles over control, 

. message direction, etc., between SOC and NSA; NSAand CIA, NSA and 

Denver. Basically the political problem is between the SOC and NSA 

, wherein NSA wants more control and we won 1t give it although we 

recognize our need for tJ;iem to support tasking. The problem has not 

affected operations yet but will eventually if not remedied. Hence, we 

have worked out various procedural compromises with NSA, recognized 

the exist~nce of a· problem, briefed Dr. Naka last fall on it and got his. 

approval for our April-May 1971 joint manning at SSSC and are preparing 

our evaluations and recommendations. 

6. Statement of Problem - Develop a tasking mechanism which sup- · 

ports operations and is satisfactory to all parties involved (SORS, · CIA, 

NRO, SP, NSA). 

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7 .. · Factors Relating 

a. Prime dissatisfaction is by NSA and it is basically political. 

Other parties are reasonably satisfied with present procedures although they would react to any major c,hange. 

b. The NRO needs NSA to support payload development, man 

ground stations and support tasking; hence our final position on tasking 

can adversely affect the other relationships with NSA. · 

c. Some adjustment in NSA/SOC relationship eventually required or else our political squabbles will start to affect operations. 

IV. Possible Solutions 

8. Options 

a. Remove NSA completely from the tasking business· by major 

increases, in SOC manning ·and communications (i.e., develop a SOC 

run SSSC). r Comment - impractical from a resource and political/ 

legal standpoint. 

b. Get ourselves out of the tasking business by changing our 

charter, .Comment - unrealistic plus contradicts the basic purpose 

of a NRO. 

c, Maintain status quo. Comment _; Acceptable for the near-term. 

I 

d, Get SORS more closely involved in operational decisions now 

made by us and NSA. Would finesse NSA. Comment - Will .cause more 

ills than it corrects. Would result in ICRS/SOC relationship, Also a 

:bad precedent for NR T /EOI environment. 

e. Have SOC work more closely with NSA/SSSC. Comment - My 

preferred solution can improve operations, fulfill our legal responsibilities, be acceptable to other. parties, and should be acceptable tci NSA. 

Details can be worked our by the SOC but would involve· some permanent 

stationing of NRO /SOC people at the SSSC. Proper protection for our 

perogativ~s, etc~, can: be obtained. We have been developing a solution 

along these lines. 

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V. Final Comments 

9. In photography virtually all pictures come from satellites and 

. hence the SOC has a monopoly on tasking arid no competitor and nobody 

else with tasking experience /expertise. In SIGINT, majority of data 

comes froi:n conventional sources which NSA tasks. ·We cannot ignore 

their expertise nor their input to tasking from non-overhead sources • 

. Distributi_on: 

Dr .. Naka 

1 Col Bradburn 

Mr. Murphy 

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