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• SIMMNINIMMI

The concept of an artificial satellite orbiting around the

earth has been associated, from the outset, with the thought that

such a vehicle could be used to maintain a continuous reconnoissance

and surveillance over any desired part of the globe. The original

plan vas to install a kind of television camera in the satellite

and to transmit its images by radio techniques to a ground station

Where the signals would be reassembled into a photograph. kith

such equipment, a systematic search was to be made of the Eurasian

land mass for airfields and other military installations large

enough to be detected With the limited resolving potter of such

a system. By repeated observations it was hoped that changes

would be detected 'with sufficient reliability to provide warning

of imminent attack.

The appeal of this fundamenta14 atraightforvard approach

lies in its relative political unobtrusiveness; in the apparent

power of television techniques for making observations almost

instantly available; in the prolonged utilisation of satellites

in their orbits; and in the freedom from the logistic intricacies

of recovery techniques. At first sight, this "electronic readout"

appears to be the fully modern apprOach to reconnaissance. It

has deserved, and indeed has had the most careful study. As a

result, 'we have now arrived at a clear understanding of the
technological problem which remain to be solved. The4SANu, detitc*.tettic.

velopment project*, aimed at the A solution of these problems; we

shall shortly discuss the difficulties.

Several years ago, it was realised that orbiting satellites

might be used for the detection of ballistic missile attack in

a such simpler and more direct method than television or photographic observation. Mile the hostile missile is being launched,

its engine is a very powerful source of infrared radiation, and

this radiation can be detected, above the atmosphere, from

satellites many hundred miles away. The exploitation of this

early-warning scheme is going forward as Project MIDAS; it has

been separated from the reconnaissance project (SAMOS) and will

not be further discussed in this paper. As a consequence of this

separate development, the warning function is no longer a primary

requirement for SANDS.

Meanwhile, a much more urgent reconnaissance need has been

pointed out by the U. S. Intelligence Board. The overriding

intelligence requirement at the present time is information on

the operational status of Soviet missile launch sites. This requires photographs of very high resolution--high enough to enable

a skilled photo-interpreter to recognise and identify the objects

of interest in a missile launch site.
The exact resolution performance required for this purpose

need not be discussed here. Its technical specification is camplicated and often controversial. One must realise, for example,

that a system which will resolve 20 feet on the ground vill not

permit a photo-interpreter to describe an object 20 feet in

length.

Up to now, there has been only one source for high-resolution

photographs of Soviet missile installations, and that source has

been eliminated with the grounding of the U-2 aircraft. Can we

substitute a satellite as the observing vehicle and obtain cosy

parable results? More specifically, can we look to SAMOS to

yield results of the necessary quality vithin a short time?.

Unfortunately, as far as electronic readout is concerned,

the answer is NO.

The essence of the problem is that a photograph which contains the amount of detail that is required to know the state

of readiness and kind of activity at a missile site must be made

up of a fantastically large number of bits of information--a

number so large that there is not time enough to transmit all of

these bits of information from satellites.to earth while the

satellite is over our own or friendly territory. It is to be

expected during the next ten years that the elaboration of
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satellite technology, the ease of keeping may satellites in orbit,

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and improvements in our electronic arts, will amakeit feasible

sitiortoly to transmitkelectrically.detailed information about a

given point on the earth. But %tat ve must emphasize here today

is that it is not feasible•now, and it is not likely to be

feasible in time to give our country the kind of reconnaissance it

needs at once. Therefore, while we recommend continued research

on these electronic readout programs, and the occasional orbital

flights Which are now planned, we must both warn you that ve

cannot rely on the electronic readout approach for military purposes and urge you to give higher operational priority to other

Air Force developments which ve are about to discuss.

Physical recovery, in the air or in the sea, of a satellite

that has completed a number of revolutions in orbit has become

feasible. The improvement of recovery techniques is going forward in the DISCOVERXR project. One can therefore consider the

possibility of using advanced photographic techniques which are

capable of very high resolution, and of recovering the exposed

photographic file on or near the surface of the earth. The sub-

:he

sequent processing and evaluation of the film can t he performed

under the same favorable conditions that are used in the best

aerial photography.

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While this approach aay superficially appear clumsy and

pedestrian when compared with electronic readout, a detailed

to to

analysis will show its performance &s distinctly superior in providing; the kind of detailed information that is required for the

study of operational missile sites. In fact, ve are convinced

that this primary objective of satellite reconnaissance can be

realised most promptly and most effectively by the physical recovery of film exposed in a high-resolution convergent stereo

camera system. The principles and techniques of this kind of

photography are now yell understood. Therefore, if timely

action is taken, we can expect to have an adequate photographic

payload by the time we have mastered the techniques for recovery.

sko-a. •

Time is iot-the-oesease-ef-thi-e-probleal We should acquire information on Soviet missile launch sites while they are

under construction, in order to counter the deception and concealment that can be used in a completed site. It will take a

year and a half at best to fill the present gip incur reconnaissance ability. And we can expect useful performance early

in 1962 only if we clearly establish high resolution photography

as the first goal of the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program.

We are not unmindfUl of other objectives associated with

SAMOS. Photographic surveys of broad areas, in which extensive
coverage is obtained at the expense of reduced resolving power,

have important uses. The detection and recording of electrommgnetic transmissions by means of the proposed "F" payloads will

provide valuable information, especially in areas of technical

intelligence, of new aspects in communication links, in missile

defense systems, in navigational aids.

But we do not consider these objectives comparable in importance to the task of getting, at the earliest possible date,

high-resolution photographs that will provide information about

the operational status of missile sites, with detail nearly as

good as that from the U-2. We therefore recommend a carefully

planned program, with simplified management, and with primary

emphasis on:

Sigh-resolution stereo photography

Recovery techniques

Mindful of the urgency of this need for detailed photography

the Air Force has greatly modified the,RAMOS development plan. A

number of well conceived photographic recovery systems are now

under study and evaluation. These designs fall into two distinct

categories:

1. A system to achieve maxim= coverage with

ground resolution adequate to identify

missile sites under construction, and

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2. A system capable of photographing a large

number of selected installations with the

higher resolution required for evaluation

of the operational status of a missile site.

We are convinced that with straightforward good management in the

utilization of components and technology now potentially available, both of these systems could be placed in operation within

eighteen months. We therefore urge a resolute concentration of

effort on these two systems and a clear decision to assign to this

task a higher priority thanosll other aspects together of the

8A1406 program.

Since we must now rely upon the physical retrieval of

satellite photography, it is necessary that increased efforts be

made to improve the reliability of recovery techniques. Recent

achievements in the DISCOVERER program are most encouraging.

An alternative procedure, unproven operationally, but most

appealing in concept, involves the use of a drag brake mechanism

to effect reentry. The applicability of this technique to the

SAMOS recovery operation should receive serious consideration.

Until recently, the operational aspects of recovery have

been greatly complicated by the obvious requirement for safety

to restrict these activities to the ocean areas. As a result

of our increased confidence in the precision of the recovery

operation, the Air Force is now studying the feasibility of
effecting recovery over land. Since this would significantly increase the probability of success of the recovery operation, we

heartily recommend the support of Air Force efforts in this area.

PROCESSING AND EVALUATION 

The reconnaissance "take" of the proposed systems is recovered as a set of latent images an photographic film. The

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intelligence yield, that will be extracted from theseo images is

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critically dependent on Quality factors in thei, processing of

the film and in the subsequent analysis and interpretation of

the finished photographs. We cannot emphasise too- strongly that

such of the detailed information captured in the latent image

can be irretrievably lost unless first-rate work is done in theprocessing laboratory and in the interpretation center.

In the purely technical domain, we must point out that the

achievement of optimum image-quality calls for the closest possible interaction between individuals concerned with emulsion

design amd manufacture and individuals concerned with processing

techniques. If these two activities were to be organised as

separate and independent enterprises, with only formal channels

of communication from one to the other, it is most unlikely, in

our view, that the results would be the best obtainable.

A full awareness of these factors has led to the special
organization of processing and evaluation that was used in the

handling of the we films. The superior results obtained under

that arrangement suggest strongly that the same pattern be

followed in handling the output of the proposed satellite reconnaissance systems.

WEATHER

In aerial photo-reconnaissance operations, the state of

the weather over the target has long been a primary considerstion. For satellite reconnaissance operations, the sensitivity

to weather is in some respects even worse. If the target is

obscured by clouds on the first pass, the satellite may have

later opportunities to observe the target. But the times of

subsequent passes over the target are fixed by the orbit

parameters, and the situation is less flexible than the scheduling

of aircraft. Moreover, the weather over the great majority of

Soviet targets is very bad indeed, and the opportunities for

good photography ere scarce.

The program outlined in this discussion can succeed only

if it is closely integrated with the weather services that will

be associated with the TIROS project, with Air Force's 433-L

system and with other sources of weather data that may come

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into existence. Because of the abort reaction intervals that

are necessary here, these arrangements vill be difficult to

establish, and ve recommend early attention to planning.
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RIC010410IDATION

Our analysis of the investigations alresdy carried out by

the Air Force, lead:us to the conclusion that fro g the array of

important studies a few can now be extracted and integrated into

a single simple and powerful program: to give us the reconnaissance

we need, almost within the time in which we need it. Therefore

our recommendation is that the following selected components of

the Air Force satellite reconnaissance program be none assembled

into a program of very high priority:

A recoverable satellite-payload.

To be recovered for the time being at sea.

To be recovered as soon as feasible on

land.

To carry in some of the satellites camera

and film competent to identify with certainty missile sites both in construction

and after completion.

5. To carry in other satellites camera and

film competent to study the state of

readiness, type of activity, and type of

missile.

We further recommend that this program be managed with the

directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great

success, far projects of overriding priority. We suggest that

this can best be accomplished by a direct line of command from

the Secretary to the general officer in operational charge of the
vhole program, with appropriate boards of scientific advisers to

both the secretarial level and to the operational level. The

general officer in command would look to associated military

boards for advice in the execution of his plans. We recommend

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this extraordinary type of organization to start the program

because vie are convinced that the situation presents an unusual

combination of urgency and inherent amenability to a direct

approach.