Filed 3/11/24 In re Jeremy R. CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re JEREMY R. et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B329305

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP06458 A-C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHRISTOPHER R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Conditionally affirmed and remanded with instructions.
2

Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________________

INTRODUCTION

Christopher R. appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights over Jeremy R. (born 2016), and 

twins Angel R. and Jordan R. (born 2021) under Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Christopher’s sole contention 

on appeal is that the Los Angeles County Department of Children 

and Family Services (the Department) and the juvenile court 

failed to comply with the initial inquiry requirements of the 

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)

(ICWA) and related California law. 

Christopher argues the Department failed to interview the 

children’s maternal grandfather, paternal aunt and great-aunt, 

and maternal aunt and uncle as to the children’s possible Indian 

ancestry, and the court prejudicially erred in finding without a 

further inquiry that ICWA did not apply. The Department

argues it thoroughly inquired about Indian ancestry from the 

paternal great-grandmother, the paternal great-grandfather, the 

paternal grandfather, the paternal grandmother, the maternal 

grandmother and the maternal great-grandmother, and 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 
3

contacted several relevant tribes and agencies which indicated 

the children were not Indian children. Thus, the Department

contends substantial evidence supports a finding that ICWA does 

not apply to the children and any error in failing to interview 

additional extended family members was harmless.

We agree with Christopher the juvenile court and the 

Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of 

ICWA and related California law. We consider such error 

prejudicial and reversible because the relatives he identifies were 

readily available and information they had was likely to be 

meaningful in determining whether Jeremy, Angel, and Jordan 

are Indian children. In particular, information from the 

maternal grandfather was likely to be meaningful and not 

duplicative of information available from the other relatives 

interviewed. Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the court’s 

order terminating Christopher’s parental rights and remand the 

matter to allow the Department and the juvenile court to comply 

with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and California 

law.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Proceedings

On October 10, 2018 the Department filed its underlying

juvenile dependency petition regarding Jeremy. The Department

alleged pursuant to former section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b),

that the parents had a history of engaging in domestic violence in 

Jeremy’s presence and histories of substance abuse, and that 

they were current abusers of amphetamine, methamphetamine, 
4

and marijuana.

2 At the detention hearing on October 11, 2018 

the juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining Jeremy 

and ordered him detained in foster care. Jeremy was placed with 

his paternal great-grandmother, Audrey. The court found 

Christopher to be Jeremy’s presumed father.

On March 4, 2019 at the jurisdiction and disposition 

hearing, Christopher and S.G., Jeremy’s mother, executed 

waivers of rights and agreed to plead no contest to the petition. 

The juvenile court sustained the petition after amending it by 

interlineation to strike the a-1 domestic violence count, to alter

and remove certain language regarding the b-1 domestic violence 

count, and to edit the b-2 and b-3 counts relating to substance 

abuse to state that the parents were recent, rather than current, 

substance abusers. The court declared Jeremy a dependent of 

the juvenile court, removed him from parental custody, and 

ordered reunification services for both parents.

At the six-month review hearing on October 15, 2019 the 

juvenile court found the Department had provided the parents 

with reasonable reunification services and ordered services 

continued. At the 12-month review hearing on September 17, 

2020 the juvenile court found the Department had provided the 

parents with reasonable reunification services, and the parents’

compliance with their case plans had not been substantial. The 

court terminated reunification services for both parents and set 

2 Section 300 was amended effective January 1, 2023, after 

the juvenile court issued its jurisdiction findings in this case. 

(Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1.) The amendments do not impact our 

analysis.
5

the case for a selection and implementation hearing under 

section 366.26.

On March 18, 2021 the juvenile court identified adoption as 

a specific goal for Jeremy.

On June 2, 2021, shortly after Angel and Jordan were born, 

the Department filed its underlying juvenile dependency petition

regarding the newborn twins pursuant to former section 300, 

subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j). The Department alleged the 

parents had a history of engaging in verbal and physical 

altercations in the presence of their older sibling Jeremy, 

resulting in Jeremy becoming a dependent of the juvenile court; 

Angel and Jordan were born with positive toxicology screenings 

for amphetamine; and the parents had a history of substance 

abuse, with current use by S.G. and recent use by Christopher.

On June 4, 2021 the juvenile court found a prima facie finding for 

detaining Angel and Jordan and ordered them detained in

hospital care.

On September 2, 2021 the juvenile court again identified

adoption as a specific goal for Jeremy.

On September 27, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the 

petition regarding Angel and Jordan as to the b-3 and b-4 counts 

relating to the parents’ substance abuse and the j-3 count 

regarding parental altercations in Jeremy’s presence, dismissed

the remaining counts, and ordered the matter continued for 

disposition.

The juvenile court ordered a bonding study regarding 

Christopher and Jeremy on November 8, 2021, and continued

Jeremy’s section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.

On January 31, 2022 the juvenile court declared Angel and 

Jordan dependents of the court and removed them from parental 
6

custody, bypassed the parents for reunification services pursuant

to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), and ordered the matter set 

for hearing under section 366.26.

On March 14, 2022 the juvenile court identified adoption or 

guardianship as a specific goal for Jeremy. The juvenile court 

modified that goal on August 1, 2022 to placement in foster care 

with a permanent plan of adoption and selected the same plan as 

a specific goal for Angel and Jordan.

At the selection and implementation hearing on April 24, 

2023 the court found all three children adoptable and that no 

exception to the statutory preference for adoption applied, 

terminated the parental rights of S.G. and Christopher, and 

ordered the children placed for adoption with maternal 

grandmother Angela.

Christopher timely appealed on April 24, 2023.

B. The Department and Juvenile Court’s ICWA-related Actions

At the time it filed the petition on behalf of Jeremy, the 

Department attached the required ICWA-010(A) form, dated 

October 9, 2018, indicating inquiry had been made and Jeremy 

had no known Indian ancestry. ICWA-020 forms signed by both 

parents and filed on October 11, 2018 indicated Christopher and 

S.G. each had no Indian ancestry as far as they knew. On 

October 11, 2018 the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply to 

the case.

On November 16, 2018, Christopher told a social worker he 

had Native American ancestry through his father, paternal 

grandfather Desmon. Paternal great-grandmother Audrey told a 

social worker on November 18, 2018 that she had Choctaw 

ancestry.
7

On November 29, 2018 S.G. told a social worker her father, 

maternal grandfather Stephen, had Blackfeet and Cherokee 

ancestry.

On January 14, February 6, and March 4, 2019 the 

Department submitted return receipts and responses received 

from several tribes stating Jeremy was not a member or eligible 

for membership, including from the Eastern Band of Cherokee 

Indians; the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma; the Blackfeet Tribe of 

Montana; the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians; the Jena 

Band of Choctaw Indians; the Cherokee Nation; and United 

Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians.

On March 4, 2019 the juvenile court again found ICWA did 

not apply.

At the time it filed the petition on behalf of Angel and 

Jordan, the Department attached the required ICWA-010(A) 

form, dated June 1, 2021, indicating a social worker interviewed

the parents and had no reason to believe the twins were Indian

children. ICWA-020 notices signed by both parents and filed 

June 3, 2021 indicated the twins had no Indian ancestry. On 

June 4, 2021 the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply as to 

Angel or Jordan.

On August 1, 2022 the juvenile court ordered the 

Department to conduct and document a full ICWA inquiry.

The Department interviewed maternal great-grandmother 

Beverly (mother of Stephen), who reported she may have 

Cherokee and Blackfeet heritage through her own paternal greatgrandmother. Beverly was not able to provide a name of that 

ancestor or other vital information. Stephen was not 

interviewed, and the record reflects no attempt to contact him or 

explanation why he was not interviewed. Stephen’s father, 
8

Norman, was not interviewed; the ICWA-030 form indicates it 

was unknown whether he was alive or deceased.

The Department interviewed paternal great-grandmother 

Audrey, who indicated she had Choctaw ancestry through her 

grandmother, but did not have her grandmother’s birthdate or 

know of other people with knowledge regarding that ancestry. 

Paternal great-grandfather Joe told a social worker he had heard 

his grandmother was Native American, but that he did not know

what tribe. He reported his son, paternal grandfather Desmon, 

was Choctaw and receiving services through Rio Hondo. On 

August 11, 2022 paternal grandfather Desmon was interviewed 

and stated he was not registered with the Choctaw tribe.

The Department also interviewed maternal grandmother

Angela and paternal grandmother Rose, who denied Indian

ancestry.

On November 28, 2022 the juvenile court ordered the 

section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing for all three 

children continued for further ICWA updates from the 

Department, and ordered the Department to verify and correct 

paternal grandfather Desmon’s birth date and full name in its 

notice to the Choctaw Nation.

On January 30, 2023 the juvenile court ordered the matter 

continued for further receipt of ICWA responses.

On March 9, 2023 the Department reported it had inquired 

further from Christopher and was told he had no additional 

information. S.G.’s whereabouts were unknown. Paternal greatgrandmother Audrey and maternal great-grandmother Beverly 

also reported they had no additional information.

On March 27, 2023 the juvenile court ordered the matter 

continued for receipt of one outstanding ICWA response.
9

In all, the Department received responses that the children 

were not members or eligible members for ICWA purposes from 

the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, the Cherokee Nation, the 

Blackfeet Nation, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee 

Indians, and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.

On April 24, 2023 the juvenile court found, without 

objection from any party, that ICWA did not apply to this case.

DISCUSSION

A. ICWA and the Duties of Inquiry and Notice

ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R. 

§ 23.101 et seq. (2023)) set minimum federal standards a state 

court must follow before removing Indian children from family 

and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes. (In re Y.W.

(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 551; accord, In re T.G. (2020) 

58 Cal.App.5th 275, 287; see 25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The statute 

“authorizes states to provide ‘a higher standard of protection to 

the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child 

than the rights provided under’ ICWA.” (In re T.G., at pp. 287-

288; see 25 U.S.C. § 1921.) In addition to significantly limiting 

state court actions concerning out-of-family placements for Indian 

children (see In re T.G., at pp. 287-288), ICWA permits tribes to 

intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a 

child custody proceeding (see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); In re Isaiah W.

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 8).

To ensure Indian tribes have the opportunity to exercise 

their rights in dependency proceedings, an investigation of a 

family member’s belief a child may have Indian ancestry must be 

undertaken and notice provided, where appropriate, to the 
10

relevant tribes. (See § 224.2, subdivision (a) [imposing on the 

court and child protective services agencies “an affirmative and 

continuing duty to inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an 

Indian child.”].) “The continuing duty to inquire whether a child 

is or may be an Indian child ‘can be divided into three phases:

the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the 

duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’” (In re Y.W., supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 552; accord, In re Antonio R. (2022) 

76 Cal.App.5th 421, 429.)

The duty to inquire “‘begins with initial contact (§ 224.2, 

subd. (a)) and obligates the juvenile court and child protective 

agencies to ask all relevant involved individuals whether the 

child may be an Indian child.’” (In re Rylei S. (2022) 

81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316; § 224.2, subds. (a)-(c).) The duty of 

inquiry also extends to the juvenile court, which is required to 

“ask each participant present in the hearing whether the 

participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an 

Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c); see also 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) 

[“[s]tate courts must ask each participant in an emergency or 

voluntary or involuntary child-custody proceeding whether the 

participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an 

Indian child”]; In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 

742.) 

The Department’s initial duty of “[i]nquiry includes, but is 

not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian 

custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest 

in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, 

whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, 

subd. (b); see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1) [the 

Department “must ask the child, if the child is old enough, and 
11

the parents, Indian custodian, or legal guardians, extended 

family members, others who have an interest in the child, and 

where applicable the party reporting child abuse or neglect, 

whether the child is or may be an Indian child”]; In re Y.W., 

supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 551-552.) ICWA and state law 

define “extended family member,” if not separately defined by the 

law or custom of the Indian child’s tribe, as “a person who has 

reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s 

grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or 

sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or 

stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, 

subd. (c) [providing “extended family member” follows definition 

stated in ICWA].)

The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the juvenile court 

or the Department “has reason to believe that an Indian child is 

involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information 

to determine that there is reason to know that the child is an 

Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e); Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.481(a)(4); In re Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 552.) 

That further inquiry requires interviewing, “as soon as 

practicable,” extended family members, contacting the Bureau of 

Indian Affairs and contacting “the tribe or tribes and any other 

person that may reasonably be expected to have information 

regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or 

eligibility.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e) & (e)(2)(C)); see also 

rule 5.481(a)(4).) 

If the further inquiry “results in a reason to know the child 

is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of 

section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 

1052; see 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3, 
12

subd. (a) [notice under ICWA “shall be provided” if the court, 

social worker, or probation officer “knows or has reason to 

know . . . that an Indian child is involved”].)

“‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a 

child is an Indian child rests with the court and the Department, 

not the parents or members of the parents’ families.’” (In re 

Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; accord, In re 

Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742 [“the agency has a 

duty to gather information by conducting an initial inquiry, 

where the other party—here a parent . . . has no similar 

obligation”].)

“[I]n determining whether the failure to make an adequate 

initial inquiry is prejudicial, we ask whether the information in 

the hands of the extended family members is likely to be 

meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child, 

not whether the information is likely to show the child is in fact 

an Indian child. In most circumstances, the information in the 

possession of extended relatives is likely to be meaningful in 

determining whether the child is an Indian child—regardless of 

whether the information ultimately shows the child is or is not an 

Indian child.” (In re Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435, 

see In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 325 [“the failure to 

fully comply with a mandatory duty may be harmless error, so 

long as the record affirmatively reflects that the protections 

intended to be afforded through the exercise of that duty have 

been provided”]; see also In re Benjamin M., supra,

70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [“in ICWA cases, a court must reverse 

where the record demonstrates that the agency has not only 

failed in its duty of initial inquiry, but where the record indicates 
13

that there was readily obtainable information that was likely to 

bear meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child”].)

2. The Department Failed To Comply Fully with Its Duty of 

Inquiry Under Section 224.2, Subdivision (b)

As discussed, the Department had a duty pursuant to 

section 224.2, subdivision (b), to ask not only the parents, but 

also extended family members whether the children had possible 

Indian ancestry.

Christopher identifies the following available relatives 

likely to have information bearing on the children’s ancestry, but 

who were not asked: maternal grandfather Stephen; paternal 

aunt Nvelyn and paternal great-aunt Merel, who were each 

interviewed by a social worker on October 1, 2018 but were not 

asked about any possible Indian ancestry; and maternal uncle 

Aaron and maternal aunt Omega (S.G.’s half-siblings and

children of the maternal grandmother).3

3 Christopher also mentions his minor half-sister Abigail

(i.e., the paternal aunt) “who is now [at the time of appellate 

briefing] approximately thirteen or fourteen years old.” To the 

extent Christopher suggests the Department should have 

interviewed his minor half-sister, she does not fall within the 

statutory definition of extended family because she has not 

reached age 18 and Christopher makes no argument that tribal 

law or custom dictates otherwise. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2)

[extended family member for ICWA inquiry purposes must be “a 

person who has reached the age of eighteen” unless otherwise 

defined by tribal law or custom]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, 

subd. (c) [providing “extended family member” follows definition 

stated in ICWA].)
14

As detailed above, the Department’s reports confirm its 

social workers or investigators contacted and inquired about 

Indian ancestry from the paternal grandfather, the paternal 

grandmother, the paternal great-grandmother, the paternal 

great-grandfather, the maternal grandmother (mother of S.G., 

Aaron, and Omega) and the maternal great-grandmother (mother 

of Stephen).

Section 224.2, subdivision (b), does not establish an 

absolute (and often impossible) standard mandating that every 

living extended family member be interviewed. What is required, 

however, is that the Department interview all known and 

available maternal and paternal extended family members and 

make reasonable efforts to identify and thereafter to interview 

any other extended family members, as well as other individuals 

who have an interest in the child, regarding the child’s possible 

Indian ancestry. Here, although we do not suggest the 

Department did not make a dedicated effort to determine Indian 

ancestry, its efforts did not fulfill its statutory obligation.

Specifically, the Department did not interview, or make 

any showing of reasonable efforts to contact and interview, the 

maternal grandfather, Stephen, despite the fact that S.G. told a 

social worker she had Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry through 

Stephen, her father, and that she had a good relationship with 

him.

In addition, although the Department interviewed paternal 

aunt Nvelyn and paternal great-aunt Merel on October 1, 2018, it 

made no inquiry of either of them regarding Indian ancestry. 

And, there is no indication that maternal uncle Aaron and

maternal aunt Omega were ever interviewed about Indian 

ancestry, although S.G. reported she was very close with them 
15

and a social worker reported “Jeremy has a maternal Aunt and 

Uncle who love to buy him things and spoil him.”

While it made a concerted attempt to determine the 

children’s possible Indian ancestry and notify relevant tribes, the 

Department did not satisfy its duty of inquiry under 

section 224.2, subdivision (b). (See, e.g., In re M.B. (2022) 

80 Cal.App.5th 617, 629-630 [Department did not conduct 

adequate inquiry into child’s possible Indian ancestry prior to 

terminating parental rights because it failed to contact the child’s 

maternal grandmother, did not determine whether the maternal 

grandfather was available for an interview, and did not ask 

ICWA-related questions of a maternal great-aunt who had been 

identified as the child’s prospective adoptive parent]; see also 

In re Jayden G. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 301, 311 [Department

failed to ask maternal and paternal extended family members 

about their Indian ancestry despite having contact with maternal 

grandmother and maternal cousin and information about 

paternal grandfather’s residence].)

This error is not harmless. As we have consistently held, 

because we do not know what information these relatives might 

have, prejudice is established when the record reflects that 

information from extended family members who were not 

contacted is “likely to be meaningful in determining whether the 

children involved were Indian children—whether the information 

ultimately showed they were or established they were not.” (In re 

Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 324; accord, In re Antonio R., 

supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435 [“Where the Department fails to 

discharge its initial duty of inquiry under ICWA and related 

California law, and the juvenile court finds ICWA does not apply 

notwithstanding the lack of an adequate inquiry, the error is in 
16

most circumstances, as here, prejudicial and reversible. 

Speculation as to whether extended family members might have 

information likely to bear meaningfully on whether the child is 

an Indian child has no place in the analysis of prejudicial error 

where there is an inadequate initial inquiry.”].) 

That standard of prejudice is satisfied here. Although S.G. 

indicated her father Stephen had Blackfeet and Cherokee 

ancestry, the record contains no indication the Department ever 

interviewed him or made any attempts to contact him. Nor did 

the juvenile court direct the Department to attempt to contact 

Stephen. Responses from Stephen, the children’s maternal 

grandfather, would have provided meaningful information with 

which to assess S.G.’s assertion of possible tribal ancestry.

That the Department inquired of Stephen’s mother 

Beverly, the children’s maternal great-grandmother, does not 

change this conclusion. Beverly would not necessarily possess 

the same information as Stephen regarding his ancestry,

particularly with regard to Stephen’s paternal lineage. No one in 

Stephen’s paternal line provided any information: Stephen’s 

father Norman, the maternal great-grandfather, was not 

interviewed and the record contains no indication the 

Department made any attempts to contact him. (The ICWA-030 

form provided no date of birth or other vital information about 

Norman beyond his name, and stated it was unknown whether 

he was deceased.)

Nor does the fact that notice was provided to Blackfeet and 

Cherokee tribes affect our conclusion. S.G.’s belief that Stephen 

had Blackfeet and Cherokee ancestry does not mean that her 

information was accurate in the absence of interviewing him 

directly; without interviewing Stephen it is impossible to know 
17

whether he would confirm S.G.’s information, deny it, or claim 

ancestry from another tribe or tribes altogether. As discussed, 

the Department’s obligation to interview extended family 

members is not dependent on a parent’s statement of Indian 

ancestry. (See In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317 

[“‘The duty to develop information concerning whether a child is 

an Indian child rests with the court and the Department, not the

parents or members of the parents’ families.’”]; accord, In re 

Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742 [parent “has no 

similar obligation” as agency to gather information about 

ancestry].)

Moreover, Stephen’s full and correct information was 

apparently not provided to the identified tribes and agencies in 

any event: his birth year was missing from the ICWA-030 notice. 

Although the juvenile court ordered the Department to verify and 

correct a similar omission (incorrect birthday and incomplete 

name) as to the paternal grandfather in its notice to the Choctaw 

Nation and continued the section 366.26 hearing on this basis, 

the record reflects no similar effort by the court with regard to 

verifying or correcting Stephen’s vital information. This notice 

error must be corrected on remand as well.

Because we conclude the failure to interview Stephen was 

not harmless, we need not additionally determine whether the 

Department’s failure to interview the additional available 

relatives identified by Christopher was also harmless given its 

inquiry of other extended family members.4 

4 Although initial inquiry error “is in most circumstances, as 

here, prejudicial and reversible” (In re Antonio R., supra,

76 Cal.App.5th at p. 435), we do not suggest that harmless error 
18

On remand the Department must make an initial inquiry of 

the identified relatives meeting the statutory definition of an 

“extended family member,” including the children’s maternal 

grandfather Stephen, paternal aunt Nvelyn, paternal great-aunt 

Merel, maternal uncle Aaron, and maternal aunt Omega. (See 

25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (c).) 

Christopher does not contend there are other extended family 

members over the age of 18 whom the Department needs to 

contact.

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally 

affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to ensure 

the Department complies fully with the inquiry and notice 

provisions of ICWA and related California law. If the court finds 

Jeremy, Angel, and Jordan are Indian children, it shall conduct a 

new section 366.26 hearing, as well as all further proceedings, in 

may never be found. In In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 

page 325, responding to the Department’s mischaracterization of 

our prior decisions as holding that any ICWA-related inquiry 

error, no matter how trivial, required an automatic reversal, we 

described a hypothetical situation in which the agency’s failure to 

contact all of a child’s close relatives would not require a remand. 

We provided the following hypothetical: “The child protective 

agency interviews the maternal grandfather; several, but not all 

of his four siblings; and the maternal grandfather’s surviving 

parent, none of whom indicates the family has any Indian 

ancestry.” (Id. at p. 325.) The failure to interview the 

grandfather’s remaining siblings, we said, “would certainly be 

harmless absent some additional unusual circumstance.” (Ibid.)
19

compliance with ICWA and related California law. If not, the 

court’s original section 366.26 orders will remain in effect.

MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.