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foATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

HA~OLE VIA 

BVEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

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THE NRO STAFF 

HANDLE VIA 

February 1, 1968 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

VIA: General Berg and Mr. Reber 

., 

SUBJECT: Recommendation G, of a Report forwarded by DCI to 

the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee, 19 September 1967 

I have been addressing the matter of Dr. Seamans' '" 

request for clarification related to Recommendation G of the 

special study panel's report prepared as DCI security policy 

in response to the NSAM 156 Committee's Recommendation #7. 

I find myself at grips with a very difficult problem. 

My initial approach was to prepare a draft study (see 

attached, which I forward to you at this time for exampling 

purposes only). The study att~mpts to define sensitive 

technology in terms of DAD-Voyager activities, and then 

proceeds to outline the elements of a NASA instituted and 

managed security system (distinct from, yet complimentary to 

BYEMAN) designed to provide the appropriate level of security 

protection. I am now convinced that this is not the answer, 

that any system of strict security for this purpose within 

NASA would be as an oasis in the desert. Particularly so, 

unless we can devise a good reason for the speCial security, 

appropriate for unclassified consumption. 

Upon re-examination, I have concluded, that the inconSistencies which presently exist between NASA and DOD 

methods of security operation, cannot be adequately dealt 

with on the baSis of DCI security policy gut-dance alone 

(competent only as it relates to protection of intelligence 

sources and methods). Although I presently have no detailed 

evidence to support such a conclusion, I am convinced that 

these inconsistencies exist across the board and are by no 

means limited to matter of satellite, reconnaissance-like 

sensor activity. It is just a caSe where attempt is being 

made to apply the grease to the nOisiest wheel. 

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It is unfortunate that DOD and NASA have placed so much 

singular emphasis upon the subject of the security of reconnaissance-like sensors, because anything we do to attempt to 

correct the situation, is doomed to self-defeat. The reason 

for our corrective devices becomes immediately apparent; in 

some circles they are viewed as being DOD interest serving. 

The result is controversy and controversy is a deadly enemy, 

of security. Furthermore, it is far easier to define what 

technology should be behind the special security fence in 

DOD, where the alternative is special access required or at 

least normal security classification, than in NASA, where 

the alternative is no security at all. In the case of satellite reconnaissance, all elements of technology, whether 

spacecraft, hardware or---sGftware, contribute in some measure 

to our degree of success. 

I now feel that the matter of the security of overall 

NASA-DOD space technology should be addressed first. This 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

is long overdue. With the U.S. Government spending crose to 

six billion dollars per annum on space activities, and with' 

the ratio favoring NASA between 4 or 5 to 1, it is not in the 

national interest to permit NASA and DOD to continue with 

such a stark difference in basic security philosophies. 

Certainly with the U.S. Government providing such substantial funding for the advancement of space and related 

technology, it is within its rights to insure that a process 

exists for a review of the resulting technology to ascertain 

if it itself does not have some other application for the 

technology, i.e. some defense or intelligence application. 

If some defense or intelligence application exists, then an 

appropriate level of security classification and/or control 

should follow - regardless of what government organization 

was responsible for the initial effort. 

Yes, I am talking about a form of 5200.13 to cover both 

DOD and NASA space activities. But that would be the policy, 

first we would need to define the objective and then the 

mechanism. The objective, I think, would be clear: to insure adequate consideration of potential military applications 

for U.S. Government sponsored space research and development, 

with appropriate security controls to follow. The mechanism, 

I feel, would of necessity have to involve something revolutionary - possibly the establishment of a JSTCO (Joint Space 

Technology Coordinating Office) however, it may be that the 

matter could be explored initially within the framework of 

existing organization such as the MSFPC, the Space Council 

or PSAC. 

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RECOMMENDATION: 

That you authorize this subject to be pursued from the 

standpoint of overall DOD-NASA security inconsistencies, 

rather than attempting to solve the problem based solely 

upon the requirements for intelligence sources and methods 

protection. Once we have dealt with the former, the latter 

will surely come into sharper focus. 

Atch 

HA NDLE VIA 

BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM 

HAND LE VIA CONTROL "OINTERN AL 

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A STUDY 

Recommendation G, Section XIV 

of a Report forwarded by DCI 

to the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee, 

19 September 1967, Examined. 

I . BACKGROUND: 

Included in a report of a special study panel convened to 

consider the matter of Recommendation #7 of the NSAM 156 Ad 

Hoc Committee's report of 11 July 1966 "Political and Security 

',' 

Aspects of Non-military Applications of Satellite Earth 

Sensing''; was the following recommendation: 

"G. NASA systems intended to produce better than the 

prescribed .1MR limiting criterion, such as might be 

required for purposes of lunar or extra-planetary exploration or astronomical observation from earth orbit, 

should be developed utilizing security procedures 

presently prescribed under project UPWARD." 

Whereas recommendation G of the special study panel~ 

report deals with a subject not considered by the NSAM 156 

ad hoc Committee, the, panel, after developing rationale 

supporting the need for special security controls for image 

forming, satellite borne equipment producing better than the 

.1MR limiting criterion, opined, :'that optical and spacecraft 

technology and technical requirements for telescopes for 

stellar and solar observations, are of a degree of significant 

( ~'1 51:'tfth NRP high resolution optical systems, as to warrant the 

development of a security guide for such activities similar to 

that prescribed under project UPWARD." 

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On 19 September 1967, the DCI approved the findings and 

recommendations of the special study panel and forwarded its 

report'to the NSAM 156 ad hoc Committee. 

At the Manned Space Flight Policy Committee meeting of 

28 November 1967, the Deputy Administrator, NASA asked: 

"What are the relationships between these potentially re ... 

strictive considerations and what is likely to happen to the 

technology?" He exampled OAO, NASA's planned efforts for an 

astronomical telescope and the VOYAGER program as areas 

of possible conflict resulting from recommendation G. The 

Director, National Reconnaissance Office agreed to prepare a 

position paper and to consult with the DCI regarding the 

matter . 

. I I. PURPO SE : 

The purpose of this study is threefold: 

(1) To attempt to differentiate, in the sense of 

the degree of security protection required, between 

NASA systems designed for purposes of astronomical observation from earth orbit or space exploration and 

those designed to observe the earth's surface. 

(2) To attempt to identify sensitive technology 

related to such activities, as would require special 

security controls in order to insure continued protection to the NRP as a vital U.S. intelligence 

source. -

(3) To recommend an appropriate system of security 

for such activities. 

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III. INTRODUCTORY RATIONALE: 

Prepared as DCI security policy guidance, this study is 

competent to speak only to the subject of the degree of security protection required to protect a vital intelligence 

source. This requires an estimate as to the impact of various 

public or international exposures in terms of bringing about 

various levels of counteraction, which would prejudice the 

end effectiveness of the NRP, the intelligence source - in 

short, an estimate of the provocation. 

There is a very fundamental difference between security 

requirements related to NRO and NASA activities involving the 

use of spacecraft borne optical sensors. This is the requirement under NRP to conceal the on-board presence of the optical 

sensor, a requirement which does not exist in regard to NASA 

activities. In considering the present subject, this fundamental difference effects the conclusions related to what 

technology should be provided special security protection 

as well as the character and composition of the system of 

security controls to be imposed, as will be shown later. 

IY', SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NASA, OAO/VOYAGER TYPE AND EARTH .- .•.. ~ .. , '. 

SURVEY ACTIVITIES DISTINGUISHED: 

The provocation value of imagery resulting from NASA 

astronomical observations from earth orbit or resulting from 

survey of other planets, in terms of causing prejudice to 

the NRP, would in all probability be minimal regardless of 

the resolution produced. This is because the imagery will be 

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of unfamiliar surfaces and will include none of the usual 

landmarks which are characteristic of reconnaissance photography. 

The provocation value of research, development and fabrication activities related to such activities however, will 

in all probability be significant, inasmuch as the equipments 

those 

produced will be comparable in most respects to/high performance 

equipments used for satellite reconnaissance purposes. If 

conducted without benefi't of strict' securi ty controls, this 

would provide to those who are interested, a convenient 

corollary to U.S. satellite reconnaissance systems, which 

would serve as excellent data base to those adversaries 

considering counteraction, particularly if they lean toward 

more sophisticated techniques to inhibit the program, least 

apt to involve themselves in international confrontation as 

a result of their acts. 

This leads to the conclusion that, whereas research, 

development, and fabrication activities related to such 

programs should be subj ect to strict security controls -in 

deference to the vital intelligence source, some allowance 

can and in all probability should be made with respect to 

data reduction, compilation-and analysis activities 

associated with the resulting imagery, even to the extent 

of providing the basic geometry related to_ the optical 

sensor (eg: focal length, swath width etc) necessary to 

those engaged in such activities. This would allow for the 

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full and open exploitation of the resulting imagery, uninhibited by special security controls. 

V. SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY IDENTIFIED: 

An important point to be considered in identifying that 

technology associated with NASA OAO/VOYAGER type activities 

requiring special security controls, is that not all of the 

items to be listed, currently require BYEMAN security controIs within the NRP. This seeming enigma stems from the 

previously referred to fundamental difference between security requirements related to NRO and NASA activities involving 

use of spacecraft borne optical equipments. It is not the 

first time that it has had to be considered with respect to 

NRO V/A/V NASA activities, for whereas a NASA image forming 

sensor for earth application, designed to produce no better 

than .. 1MR, would not require special security controls, NRO 

systems of similar capability do. 

Because covert or semi-covert activities, if they are to 

remain such, must compartment the sensitive portions of the 

activity into the smallest possible nuclei, much fringe 

technology (not directly involving the optical sensor, but 

critical nevertheless to the complete spacecraft/sensor 

reconnaissance system) are within NRP, handled under normal 

security classi fication and controls, however, the application to a satellite reconnaissance system is "fuzzed" through 

the use of cover explanations and/or "cut .... outs," appropriate 

to the particular situation. If the same degree of security 

protection were to be afforded this fringe techno l ogy within 

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NASA activities, where the concealment of the on-board 

presence of the optical device is not a security requirement, an easy corollary could be drawn. 

The following technological items are therefore recommended for special security controls in association with 

NASA OAO/VOYAGER type activities where they are intended to 

include image forming sensors designed to operate at better 

than the prescribed criterion: 

(1) All data related to the internal composition 

of the image forming sensor, not essential to data 

reduction, compilation and analysis of the resulting 

imagery. 

(2) All processes related to image forming sensor 

fabrication, related lens grinding and polishing, 

mirror construction and film manufacture to be either 

researched or developed under NASA contract. 

(3) Those command and control processes which 

reveal data described in item #1 above to include indications of cycle time limitations, image motion compensation techniques, focus, filter, and exposure controls. 

(4) That data related to the spacecraft, external 

to the image forming sensor, but which have a direct 

bearing upon sensor targeting, timing, and attitude 

controls, temperature and other environmental requirements critical to sensor functioning. 

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VI. RECOMMENDED SYSTEM OF SECURITY: 

The system of security recommended is one which would 

be instituted and managed by NASA, subject to review by the 

Offices of the DCI to insure compliance with DCI security 

policy guidance. The system would not involve semi-covert 

security procedures such as those used under the NRP, because 

it is only the technology which is being protected and 

not 

because semi-covert procedures do/lend themselves well to 

NASA activities and organization. It is intended to be 

distinct from, yet complimentary to the NRP system of security 

(BYEMAN). The system recommended is one which is adaptable 

to implementation within the framework of the existing NASA 

organization and those agreements into which NASA has entered 

with other U.S. Government organizations related to the 

subject of security. 

The basic elements of the recommended system of security 

are as follows: 

(1) Implementation and management by NASA. 

(2) Review by the Offices of the DCI to insure 

compliance with DCI security policy guidance. 

(3)· Prerequisite TOP SECRET security clearance 

for all individuals provided access to controlled information (Recommended in preference to DCID 1/14 personnel 

security requirements, because access to actual intelligence activities is not being authorized and 

because TOP SECRET security clearance standards are 

more compatable with NASA's organization and existing 

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agreements with other U.S. Government organizations 

related to the subject of security). 

(4) Physical security protection consistent with 

BYEMAN standards. 

(5) Strict, formal review of need-to-know for all 

individuals provided access to controlled information, 

consistent with the requirements of the activity. 

(6) Special~ontrol of documents, equipments, and 

associated data designed to insure that access to controlled information is limited to only authorized 

individuals. 

(7) Prior coordination with the NRO through the 

SACC before entering into negotiations with contractors 

involving activities req~iring access to controlled 

information, in order to insure compatability with any 

NRP instituted security procedures which may be 

applicable to the particular contractor's facility. 

VII. SUMMARY RECOMMENDATION: 

That NASA, in consideration of a vital U.S. intelligence 

source, institute a system of special security controls, the 

basic elements of which are described in Section VI of this 

study, to be applied to technology related to the use of image 

forming sensors for purposes of space exploration or astronomical observation from spacecraft. The technological data 

recommended for special security control ~e. listed in Section 

V. 

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

MEMORANDUM 

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