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IHI' ~tGKtl 

--tSi-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, O.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

September 4, 1969 

Dr. M.cLucas, 

The attached report of the HEXAGON 

Review Committee was used as the basis for the 

briefing given to the NRP Executive Committee 

on June 20, 1969. The report has been prepared 

for file to be available for later review. 

Attachment 

Report of the 

d. 

F. Robert Naka 

HEXAGON Review Committee 

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GENERAL 

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REPORT OF THE HEXAGON REVIEW COMMITTEE 

June 20, 1969 

BYEMAN 

C:(HfTROI. SVSUM: 

TALENTKEYHOLE 

This survey of the HEXAGON Project responds to a DNRO 

request of June 4, 1969 to report to the NRP Executive Committee on June 20. The short but intensive review had the 

objectives of 

Assessing the probability that an 

initial HEXAGON launch date of 

December 1970 can be met 

Determining the confidence of mission 

success for initial HEXAGON launches 

Recommending to the ExCom a plan to 

optimize existing collection capabilities while minimizing cost. 

The Committee c=n~s~i~s~t'-"'-'d,._~___,,.""------'.______,._,__,,_,""-h'--'"'--"'-----"---•,aka, DDNRO 

designee, Chairman; -the HEXAGON 

Sensor Subsystem Project Office 

Col. Lewis S. Norman, Jr., Vice 

(SSSPO); and 

Director of SAFSP. 

It was clear that in the time available the Committee 

should not attempt an exhaustive technical review of either 

the HEXAGON Project or of other projects which could provide 

a capability for a time-phased collection overlap. The 

Committee concerned itself with comprehensive evaluation of 

those aspects of the HEXAGON and other projects which were 

directly relevant to the review objectives. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Upon completion of its study, the HEXAGON Review Committee reached the following conclusions: 

HEXAGON CORONA GAMBIT 

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The probability that the date of the 

initial HEXAGON launch will not be 

delayed in excess of one month is 

50 percent, that the delay will not 

exceed three months is 75 percent, 

and that the delay will not exceed 

six months is 95 percent. 

The confidence of mission success for 

individual initial HEXAGON launches 

is 75 percent. 

In view of these circumstances, 

adequate collection overlap could be 

provided if CORONA launches were 

rescheduled from the currently planned 

to 

6 in FY 1970 

6 in FY 1971 

5 in FY 1970 

5 in FY 1971 

2 in FY 1972. 

No new CORONAs need be bought at this 

time. 

BYEMAN 

CftNTIIIIIOl $Y'!iT£M 

TALENTKEYHOLE 

Supported by these conclusions, the Committee recommends that: 

The HEXAGON ProJect be funded to the 

minimum level necessary to meet the 

December 1970 initial launch date, 

The CORONA launch schedule be revised 

to .. ilide for 

5 launches in FY 1970 

5 launches in FY 1971 

2 launches in FY 1972, 

The need for a buy of additional CORONA 

vehicles be reviewed in December 1969. 

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SATISFACTION OF COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS 

The Committee first directed its attention to the 

United States Intelligence Board (USIB) collection requirements, specifically those for HEXAGON. In discussions with 

the NRO/SOC, it was noted that complete satisfaction of 

current USIB search requirements is not achieved by CORONA 

alone. Increased satisfaction could be provided by using 

a combination of CORONAs and GAMBITs; HEXAGON will provide 

near 100 percent satisfaction. It was not obvious, however, 

that the user community considered CORONA collection inadequate. 

Most of the remaining CORONA vehicles in the inventory 

would have a mission lifetime approaching 20 days each compared with 15 now generally flown, therefore the mission 

lifetime of five of the remaining CORONAs is comparable to 

six or eight of the older CORONAs (approximately 100 mission 

days per fiscal year). The Committee was convinced that 

their recommended change in the CORONA launch schedule (see 

page 2) would maintain the current level of search collection 

satisfaction and would extend the period of overlap with 

HEXAGON. The current HEXAGON and recommended revised CORONA 

schedules would then appear thus. 

CY 1970 CY 1971 

J A s 0 N D J F M A M J J A s 0 N D J 

Current 

HEXAGON ti /J /J /J 

Revised 

CORONA ~ fl t ti 6 6 /J 

The recommended overlap satisfies several contingent situations involving schedule slips and/or unsuccessful flights. 

As long as the first successful HEXAGON flight occurs by 

September 19 7 (a 9-month delay from December 1970), the 

overlap with CORONA will maintain the current level of search 

collection satisfaction. Extending the CORONA schedule by 

six months into FY 1972 will require $14 million of FY 1972 

funding. However, these funds would not be required should 

successful HEXAGON flights occur before all CORONAs have been 

launched, 

F 

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The Committee also considered other steps to insure 

continuance of both search and surveillance collection: 

A contingent buy of new CORONAs 

Refurbishing and flying the remaining 

GAMBIT (KH-7) payloads 

Buying one or two additional of the 

current GAMBIT (KH-8) series, flying 

them at high altitudes against the 

HEXAGON surveillance targets (with 

worst resolution equivalent to the 

best achievable with HEXAGON), and 

concentrating the remaining CORONAs 

against the most difficult to satisfy 

requirement--that of semiannual inbloc search. 

TALENTKEYHOLE 

The latter alternative virtually fully satisfies collection 

requirements. It would cost an estimated $27 million in 

FY 1971 for additional vehicles. The seven vehicles in the 

current program for FY 1970 are in part to provide a backup 

capability for the GAMBIT Vehicle 23 configuration. If 

Vehicle 23 is a success, one or more of the FY 1970 GAMBIT 

vehicles can be flown at high altitude. (No change in the 

GAMBIT camera is required if photos are taken at altitudes 

of 110 nautical miles or below. Flights above 110 nm would 

require a modest one-time change to the camera to extend the 

operating range of the slant range compensator and of the 

film drive speed. This cost is estimated at $3.3 million.) 

However, as GAMBIT was designed as a surveillance and technical intelligence collector, its camera is not suited to 

search as are the CORONA and HEXAGON pan cameras. To satisfy 

both search and surveillance requirements would require 

continuing CORONA. This option best satisfies a situation 

where HEXAGON is not used. 

The second option, flying the older GAMBIT series payloads, would involve major costs and require at least 

19 months' lead time. The Satellite Control Network would 

have to b€: reoutfitted to track and command such a vehicle. 

New Agena:'l and much out-of-production hardware would be 

needed. This option was considered clea.rly uneconomical 

and would oot satisfy search requirementso 

The first option is closely allied with the Committee's 

recommendation to revise the CORONA schedule to insure overlap. 

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TALENTKEYHOLE 

If the revised schedule is adopted, reorder lead time for 

new CORONAs does not occur until December 1969. In the 

intervening time HEXAGON will have progressed through several major system level assemblies and tests, and we shall 

be in a much better position to determine whether a slip 

in HEXAGON will occur. Having had more testing time on the 

HEXAGON cameras, a better assessment of reliability could 

be made. The Committee urges that a decision to procure 

additional CORONAs be deferred until December 1969. Should 

a reorder be necessary, three units are estimated to cost a 

total of $43 million; six units, $84 million. $20 million 

of FY 1970 funds would probably suffice to cover initial 

costs of either a three- or six-unit buy. 

PROBABILITY OF MEETING A DECEMBER 1970 LAUNCH DATE 

Sensor Subsystem (Perkin-Elmer) 

The most critical, and indeed the pacing, HEXAGON component is the sensor subsystem. This Committee received 

detailed briefings at Perkin-Elmer, the sensor subsystem 

contractor, on progress in design, fabrication, and test. 

Of particular concern was the film transport system, the 

servo system, the thermal analysis of both the optical bars 

and the two-camera assembly, and the structural analysis. 

Perkin-Elmer has expended considerable effort in these critical areas. In particular, a thorough servo analysis, 

including the effects of structural and thermally induced 

disturbances, lends credence to Perkin-Elmer's conviction 

that successful operation of the sensor is highly probable. 

Thermal analyses were also exhaustive, resulting in a very 

good understanding of optical system performance. Work on 

the film transport system led to considerable refinement 

and simplification with consequent improved performance. 

The Committee also noted that in the six months since 

Dr. A. F. Donovan of Aerospace Corporation had conducted a 

systems engineering level audit of HEXAGON (at General Martin's 

request) informal assessment of HEXAGON sensor subsystem 

progress has been described as "remarkable." In general, 

the Committee was satisfied that the technical status of 

the sensor was indeed good. 

The Committee a.lso noted that, after considerable effort 

on the part of the SSSPO, Perkin-Elmer management had streamlined their internal functions to provide tighter and more 

effective technical management and cost control. The possible exception is in cost management of subcontractors. 

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The Committee found no major known problems with the 

sensor subsystem, Reliability causes continued concern, 

largely because of the number of electro-mechanical 

components of which the sensor is composed--ma.ny of which 

cannot be made redundant, Since near perfection through 

exhaustive testing is the only real approach to high reliability, the Committee believes continued priority emphasis 

here, as well as with electronic components, is essential. 

Important, but of lesser concern 1 is the question of 

film properties. Film base thickness variations and film 

relative humidity pose difficult but, in the Committee's 

view, solvable problems. 

Satellite Basic Assembly (LMSC) 

The next most critical HEXAGON system element, the 

satellite basic assembly (SBA), was then examined. The SBA 

contractor, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC), has 

had much experience in spacecraft design, manufacture, and 

test; and few unknown problems are expected. In the case 

of the SBA, problems are largely engineering in nature and 

several solutions are available. 

The Committee did not consider reliability a major 

problem, for the SBA is composed of many components that 

can be made functionally or otherwise redundant. Certain 

components, such as the orbit adjust engine and the propellant tankage, are not redundant; but they represent current 

state-of-the-art and can be made demonstrably quite reliable. 

Not so obvious are the incipient problems of operating 

the spacecraft as an entity, Past experience points to the 

probability that system problems will arise. Time is necessary for their resolution. LMSC, as satellite integrating 

contractor, is aware of this situation. LMSC and Perkin-Elmer 

must exhibit close cooperation if major system problems are 

to be avoided. System level engineering a.nalysis and audit 

are lagging; should this continue, some system problems may 

be discovered in terms of damaged hardware from sneak circuits and unsuspected transients rather than from errors on 

engineering drawings, These circumstances are the greatest 

cause of uncertainty about meeting the established December 

1970 initial launch date, 

After considering all factors, the Committee is confident that with adequate funding HEXAGON can meet the initial 

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TALENTKEYHOLE 

December 1970 launch date. As stated in the conclusions on 

page 2, the Committee agreed with the SSSPO evaluation of 

possible schedule delays. A lesser funding level would 

immediately produce a launch slip but no greater confidence 

in a firm initial launch date (for, though emerging problems 

might be solved during a schedule slip, there is no guarantee 

that the problems would reveal themselves in a timely fashion). 

However, only those aspects of the system associated with 

successful launch and operation of the basic sensor subsystem 

need be funded at levels necessary to achieve the December 1970 

initial launch date. Other elements of the system (such as 

the terrain camera, associated integration costs, and its 

operational software costs) can be deferred without any effect 

on the basic HEXAGON vehicle. 

CONFIDENCE OF MISSION SUCCESS 

Factors assuring success of the first HEXAGON missions 

a.re wedded to those factors assuring achievement of a specified initial launch date. However, before a useful estimate 

of all-system success can be determined, it is necessary 

To examine each major system element for 

its impact on probable mission success 

To assess the critical technology 

To evaluate expected launch and flight 

conditions. 

Sensor Subsystem 

The sensor subsystem represeni:s the greatest advance 

in new technology. It is a complex redundant mechanism whose 

successful operation depends on excellence of functional 

design and thoroughness of testing. Its most critical components--those associated with the film transport and its 

allied servo system--are of new, untried designs. We believe 

the intensive attention given to these system aspects imparts 

a high confidence of successful operation. The Committee 

assesses the single shot probability as 88 percent that the 

sensor will survive the launch environment and operate for 

30 days with acceptable optical performance--if not perfectly 

within specification. 

Satellite Bas ,.c. Assembly 

The satellite basic assembly represents current stateof-the-art. However, it is an entirely new structure, 

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containing some heretofore untried hardware--i,e., the propellant tankage with its galleried fuel lines. The basic structure is very long and quite flexible, both in torsion and 

bending modes. The film supply mounting is statically 

indeterminate, which defeats rigid structural analysis. 

Hence, a thorough testing program of flight-quality hardware 

is essential to structural integrity and to determination of 

modes of structure movement which might be coupled into the 

sensor. Fortunately, guidance and control, telemetry, command, power (including solar arrays), and orbit adjust engine 

have had (or will have) considerable prior flight experience. 

These systems also are more amenable to functional redundancy, 

Based on these factors, the Committee assessed the single shot 

probability that the satellite basic assembly will survive the 

launch environment and operate acceptably for 30 days in orbit 

as 90 percent (probably conservative). 

Launch Vehicle 

The launch vehicle, Titan IIID, is a different configuration of the Titan booster family; its major difference 

is that the Titan transtage is not used, Other components 

of the Titan IIID have been thoroughly flight tested and 

proved. Because of past experience with the launch vehicle, 

the Committee assesses the single shot probability of 

successful Titan IIID operation throughout the launch phase 

as 95 percent (probably conservative). 

Recovery Vehicle 

The final essential element is the successful functioning and recovery of each recovery vehicle (RV). The HEXAGON 

RVs are new, but are a scaled up "DISCOVERER" shape. The 

parachute design has been flown on the PRIME Project and will 

be scaled for the HEXAGON recovery vehicles. An extensive 

test program is under way, including high altitude drop tests 

to simulate all recovery sequences occurring after initial 

re-entry. Again using experience a.s a basis, the Committee 

assesses as 98 percent the single shot probability that each 

individual reclvery vehicle survives the launch environment, 

operates successfully in orbit for its particular specified 

lifetime (the last RV must operate 30 days in orbit), and is 

successfully recovered. 

General Mission Success 

The Committee calculates as 75 percent the single shot 

probability that each individual HEXAGON vehicle will survive 

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launch, operate acceptably for 30 days on orbit, and have 

successful first RV recovery, The assessment for all four 

recovery vehicles places the probability of success closer 

to 70 percent. (This latter figure is not directly equa table to mission success in terms of product returned 

because the first recovery vehicles generally bring back 

the majority of critical targets as a consequence of target 

priorities.) The Committee finds that the 75 percent probability figure is for all intents identical with the HEXAGON 

Project specified probability requirement. 

Initial HEXAGON Mission Success 

For the initial HEXAGON launch, what is the probability 

of successfully recovering good photographs in the first RV? 

The first HEXAGON vehicle will be operated under conditions 

tending to improve probability of mission success and to 

provide for recovery of the most significant information; 

thus, a comprehensive grasp of vehicle performance can be 

gained. Specifically, the first vehicle will be placed in 

a "benign" orbit--one which will not task the thermal control 

system and which has a sufficiently high perigee so that no 

orbit-sustaining maneuver will be required prior to recovery 

of the first RV. The first RV itself will be fully instrumented so that its performance can be carefully measured. 

Under serious consideration is programming the cameras so 

that film is transported in the forward direction only (and 

not reversed as is normal between each photo operation). 

Although some film would not be exposed under these circumstances, there is less chance of a film transport malfunction. 

This technique would be added insurance that some exposed 

film would be returned so that actual camera performance on 

orbit can be measured. Once the firbt re-entry vehicle is 

recovered, the film transport system could be operated in 

the normal forward and reverse cycle and other operations, 

such as orbit adjust, could be begun. The first few flights 

will not carry the terrain camera, and the additional weightcarrying capacity will be utilized by the installation of 

extra batteries. This will help guard against solar array 

malfunctions and provide sufficient power to insure return 

of the first re-entry vehicle with its load of fil~. 

The Committee a.ssigned no percentage probability to 

these techniques, but it is quite clear that they enhance 

the likelihood of successful return of exposed film in the 

first recovery vehicle. 

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EFFECT OF FUND LIMITATION 

BYEMAN 

TALENTKEYHOLE 

The Committee examined the situation which would arise 

should HEXAGON be funded in FY 1970 at a level less than 

that recommended. The sensitive element of the system is 

the sensor. If reduced $10 million below the requested 

amount of $96 million, a six-month program slip would be 

expected. A $25 million reduction would result in a twelvemonth slip. Other elements of the system which are not 

pacing at this time appear to be as sensitive to reductions 

as does the sensor, but definitive figures were difficult 

to develop. However, the Committee agrees that a combined 

$10 million reduction in satellite basic assembly and 

satellite integrating contractor funding (both LMSC) would 

result in a six-month slip. The amount of reduction leading 

to a twelve-month slip was not clearly identified, and considerable work on the part of the contractor would be necessary to develop credible figures. However, in the Committee's 

view, the launch date sensitivity to funding limitations had 

been tested enough to expose the problem adequately so no 

further exploration was conducted. It was evident that fund 

limitations would have an immediate, unfavorable effect on 

scheduling. 

SUMMARY 

Funding at the level required to achieve a December 1970 

initial launch date is the preferable option. The probability 

of a successful HEXAGON flight by the third launch, ,June 1971, 

is close to 95 percent under these conditions. The pressure 

on the collection overlap can be relieved by stretching 

CORONA launches six months into FY 1972. This would entail 

expenditures of $14 million in CORONA launch and operating 

costs in FY 1972, which may not actually be needed if HEXAGON 

flies successfully prior to our committing the last two 

CORONAs to flight. Immediate pressure on FY 1970 funds for 

a new CORONA buy can be relieved by deferring a decision until 

December 1969 at which time a more accurate assessment of the 

HEXAGON program can be made. 

The Committee feels strongly that its recommendations 

are proper at this time. However, the Committee urges that 

the status of both CORONA and HEXAGON be carefully tracked 

in the next few months so that any departure from expected 

conditions can be quickly identified and a new course of 

action formulated. Such departures might take the form of 

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a ma.jar technical problem in HEXAGON which would force a 

major slippage or any situation which would cause CORONA 

to be flown at more frequent intervals tha.n. those recommended. In any case, a clear determination should be made 

in December 1969 on whether to initiate a further CORONA 

buy, 

F. Robert Naka 

Chairman 

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BYE-13146-69. September 4, 1969 

Report of the HEXAGON Review Committee - Jun 20. 

Copy 1 Col Norman, AFSCF (Los Angeles) 

2 I I 

3 SS-7 STAR 

Working Copies 

:McLucas 

Allen 

SS-4 

Naka - 2 

Working copy of memo for Mel 

RF 

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