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-- -OR-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 111111111.11111111

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR 13 July 1974

01/ 10°

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER

SUBJECT: USIB Meeting on NRO Security Posture

(11 July 1974)

REFERENCE: USIB-b-46.2/35, 2SJun74,1IIIIII6-74

Mr. Colby opened the meeting by indicating his strong

desire to declassify the "fact of" and his intention to send

such a recommendation to the President's Advisor for National

Security Affairs. He stated that he knew there were strong

feelings on both sides of this question and then solicited

views of all at the table.

The discussion was started with a short explanation of

the activities of the ad hoc committee and the rationale behind

the recommendations which had been made. Your position was also

explained as set forth in your memorandum to Mr. Colby.

The Department of State representative initially had very

little to say on the subject, but felt that it would be preferable to leave things the way they are.

ACDA was represented by Aaron Katz who read a prepared

statement by Dr. Ikie indicating a very strong feeling that

this fact should not be declassified and that no additional

information relative to the affairs of the NRO should be made

public. Basic to his argument was the fact that nothing is

gained and there is a great potential for loss.

Admiral de Poix, representing DIA and the Services, agreed

that release could be made without damage to the country's interests. He felt that we should not make a big revelation of such

a disclosure but rather that Secretary Kissinger could drop such

a fact into one of his speeches at some time. He felt that disclosure of the fatt of photo satellite reconnaissance may be

the "lightning rod" that would draw the attention of the press,

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the Congress, and the public away from more sensitive aspects

of NRO activities. He saw advantages in the fact that we may

wish to disclose selected photos to prove a point on such

things as the Warsaw Pact, changes in Cuba, possible SALT violations, and any of the new weapon systems. He noted that

ERTS was having some problems in this area but felt that we

should join with ERTS and argue the case on "freedom of space."

General Allen of NSA gave the most eloquent argument

against release. He read from a prepared text and it was

obvious that he had chosen his words well. He stated that

existing policy has created a favorable security policy in

that we have never denied satellite programs even though we

have not acknowledged them. In fact, he noted that senior

officials, when pressed, often tacitly admit such a program.

Present policy does acknowledge a number of unclassified reconnaissance satellites such as the 647 and the weather satellites,

and to date we have never differentiated the various systems

but refer to them in toto. He cited the problem of releasing

the fact of photo satellite reconnaissance as this would be a

lead-in to inquiry relative to SIGINT satellite reconnaissance.

He felt that to focus on photo satellite reconnaissance would

force us into identification of each of the various systems.

In conclusion, General Allen asked that his comments be included

when the recommendation is forwarded to higher authority.

Mr. Morell of Treasury indicated that he was personally

favorable to the disclosure but was impressed by the arguments

that had been made for not releasing.

General Giller of the ABC was generally favorable to

release and was particularly interested in the points that

could be made relative to verifying disarmament agreements

if we could possibly acknowledge that we had systems that

could provide the necessary information.

The FBI had no strong feeling but subscribed to General

Allen's arguments.

After a short period of discussion, Mr. Colby stated that

he would have further discussions with other officials, particularly with yourself and Secretary Schlesinger, before sending

such a recommendation forward and that all views that had been

tabled would be represented.

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rni USIZ-D-46.2 WORM COrt 24 :am 1974 / 33 Waited Distribution

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS '

SUBJECT Security Requirements for the NRO

REFERENCE USIB-D-46.2/34,21 June 1974,

Memorandum for USIB Principals,

limited distribution through restricted

channels

The Director of Central Intelligence has ?squat:Red that the enclosed

memorandum from the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, and its

attachment be circulated to the USIB. The report attached to Mr. Plummer's

memorandum contains recommendations (paragraph 10) regarding certain

security aspects for the NRO.

It is planned to schedule this item on an agenda for USIB discussion

at an early date in conjunction with the DCI's proposal, subject: "Modification

of Security Classification," circulated by the reference.

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Enclosure wilimmonwoc. USI13-D-46.2/35

24 June 1974

Limited Distribution

OPPICE OF 'RIF DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF . CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

....... SUBJECT: Security Requirements for the NRO

Attached is the final report of the working group•which

has been deliberating the security needs of the NRO. Needless

to say, the transitory nature of the problem, which has been

brought about by successive disclosures, has required several

re-examinations of the original conclusions and has considerably

drawn out the completion of the final report.

The Committee adopted the procedure of selecting a number

of options of increasing declassification, then examined each

option in detail. Discussion of these options, with pros and

cons is well done. The report indicates that it was not possible

either within the Committee or the reviewing senior group to

arrive at a unanimous opinion on the recommended declassification

option. Therefore, they offer no unanimous solution. On the

other hand, they have simply stated, and offer advice to the

proper authorities, on a general course of action.

It is ray opinion, as DNRO, that it is entirely appropriate

to acknowledge the National Reconnaissance Office and initials

"NRO" based in large part on the fact that this has appeared

many times in the press and has been released officially this

year. Also, I feel it appropriate that we maintain an active

interface with appropriate members of Congress to keep them

advised on the key programs. I do not • believe, however:that

we should release officially the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance even though many have surmised that it is the basis

for "national technical means for verification." I see little

to be gained by admitting our process and much to be lost by

third country official complaints or by the confusion which

would result by our security inhibitions preventing proper answers

to. the series of questions which would be bound to follow.

19 June 1974

Attachment

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UST16-111.46.2/35

REPORT ON THE 243=411974

REVIEW OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM .

Welow

•••

INTRODUCTION 

1. This report responds to tasking by the Director of

Central Intelligence and the Director, National Reconnaissance

Office for a review of the need for continuing covert security

for the National Reconnaissance Program in today's environment.

•

The review was conducted by a committee chaired by

Mr. Robert Singel, Deputy Director, National Reconnaissance

Office, with representation from the NRO Staff, NRO Program

Managers, the CIA Office of Security's Special Security Center,

and the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff. The report was

then reviewed by a senior level review group with representatives from the NRO Staff, the NRO programs, the IC Staff, and

COMIREX. This senior group recommended additional considerations and a change of format to include arguments on both

sides of each consideration. This report reflects the recommended changes. Conclusions begin on page 16 and Recommenda

tions, on page 17.

The concerns which fostered tight security controls

at the inception of the Program in 1962 were primarily associated with uncertainties of Soviet and international reaction

to our space reconnaissance program and the fear of disclosures

which could have provided gratuitous technical advantages to

the Soviets or stimulated them to take countermeasures.

4. After thirteen years of successful operation of the

Program, the Review Committee finds noticeable changes in the

environment which bear on the feasibility and desirability of

modifying security controls.•

a. The Soviets have their own reconnaissance

satellite program. There is at least a tacit agreement with the Soviets about non-interference with,

if not acceptance of, the use of satellites as a

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"national means of verification" of any strategic 46.2/35

arms limitation treaty.. Conversely, other nations'

are questioning the legitimacy of uncontrolled

observation from space although the concern is

presently focused on ERTS.

A large volume of speculative information

about the U.S. antral, USSR space reconnaissance

activities has surfaced in the public domain. Speculative information in the U.S. mass media has been

lent credence by mention in a report of the Special

Committee to Study Questions Related to Secret and

Confidential Government Documents. The appearance

of this totality of information has fostered a

general recognition in the world at large of the

"fact of" satellite reconnaissance from space.

There has been a recent decision to lower

security controls on some satellite photography by

removing it from compartmented security controls

and allowing photography and derived information to

be used at the Secret•NOFORN level.

The Congress has recently shown a greater

interest and curiosity about the NRP than heretofore

and at•least one knowledgeable committee chairman

has stated that it is increasingly difficult to

maintain the past practices of limiting knowledge

only to committee chairmen and their designated

colleagues. However, there is evidence that the

committee chairmen are still retaining tight control.

U.S. civil agencies have expressed the

belief that the space program may satisfy additional

needs within their disciplines and interests beyond

those already identified. Today, assistance can

only be provided if the civil agencies are willing

to comply with the safeguards accorded the product

materials.

•

f. Recent trends in the political and judicial

spheres of Government argue for public candor unless

it can be proved that such candor damages the national

security. The present security controls which prohibit

official public discussion of satellite reconnaissance

or even official admission of the '.'fact of" do not

allow such candor.

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sonnet as a pseudo line element of the Department

of Defense may have been jeopardized as a result of

a recent acknowledgment to the press that the NRO

is "an office through which certain intelligence

matters are administered...by a senior Air Force

civilian official."

THE PROBLEM 

S. Recognizing the arguments for tight security but considering the changes that have occurred, the Committee examined

the appropriateness, advantages, and disadvantages of continuing the uniquely tight security system imposed over the NRP

and the NRO at the inception of the Program. While many specific current problems were discussed, it was generally agreed

that recent changes in the environment have not altered the

need for tight security of the NRP and its activities; however,

the recent publicity about the NRO and the official acknowledgment of its existence require that a new public disclosure cutoff point be established. To establish this cut-off, arbitrary

levels of disclosure were selected and the pros and cons of

each level reviewed. The considerations reviewed are as follows:

Retain pre-publicity security policy.

Formally declassify the names and initials of the NRO and NRP but not acknowledge

satellite reconnaissance as the mission of the NRO.

The NRO's ' cover for activities and per-L8-D-46'2/35

C. Declassify the

reconnaissance.

"fact of" satellite

Declassify the

and the Deputy Director.

Declassify the identity of the Staff

organization and release information on partici:-

pating organizations, budgets, and. personnel.

Declassify the identity

• 

of the pr

▪

 ogram

offices, budgets, and associated contractors but

not program details.

Decompartment but not declassify all

aspects of the Program and organization, including

programs and program objectives.

identity of the Director

3

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6. In its considerations, the Committee was continually

mindful of the need to maintain secrecy around • essential elements of the Program while giving balanced recognition to the

fact that time and events may have overtaken some elements of

concern for which the security features were originally imposed.

A basic thread which ran through all of the considerations was

the need to retain a credible security posture by not retaining

a classification on information which is no longer sensitive

and which is already in the public domain. This concern dominated the considerations of these seven levels of disclosure.

Discussion of each level of disclosure addresses those considerations important•in determining a position on each point.

Some of the considerations could be considered arguments, but,

depending on the particular viewpoint, could be variously

interpreted. Every effort has been made to identify pros and

cons which are generally agreed. These apply directly to the

consideration under discussion and, except for the option to

retain the pre-publicity security policy, are generally cumulative as additional security constraints are relaxed.

a. Retain Pre-Publicity Security Policy ;• • sitti ••

(1) Strong reasons still exist for

maintaining the tigh ty that has been

the hallmark of th stem. Compartmentation has made s ble to maintain

virtually leakproof security which precludes

the need for judgments as to who has access.

The effectiveness of a security program is

.dependent u on a strong personal sense of

ob all participants. The rigidity

curity policies regarding publicity

an ses has generated that sense of per- •

sonal obligation and should be perpetuated.

U.S. companies, particularly those with foreign

business, prefer the anonymity of compartmented

systems as it eliminates public resentment

against participation in reconnaissance ( spy)

activities and possible disruption of business.

Public hostility could dissuade companies possessing unique and "only available" capabilities

from participating in the NRP. The objective

of-the System is to protect technical capabilities of U.S. reconnaissance systems from adversaries, particularly those technical secrets

which would be of use to the Soviet space

MB

reconnaissance systems and would provide g

for their countermeasures capability. The

System has been extremely successful.

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(2)' The NRP is a crucial, irreplaceable national asset. It is vul-.

nerable to international political

pressures from countries being observed.

Public discussion by U.S. officials will

practically insure public complaint and

political countermeasures by offended

nations in the same way that public acknowledgment of spying by human agents

always necessitates public response and

political countermeasures. In spite of

the general acknowledgment that the U.S.

has "technical means of verification,"

no nation is now accosted by the "fact

of" and, therefore, is not required to

protest the invasion of its national

sovereignty.

(3) Following are the pros and

cons of this consideration.

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UM -D-46. 2135

Pro

(a) Non-affirmation policy

discourages additional inquiry.

(b) Definite, easily recognizable security bounds facilitate

tight security.

tc) Cover is simple, logical,

and--to date--completely successful.

(d) Because of the above,

the Program shows a low profile

as an intelligence target, does

not compromise critical technical information, and develops

high security consciousness

among all participants.

Con

(a) Does not recognize

-information demands of an "open

society" as represented by the

media • and a small group of

Congressmen.

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(b) Precludes spokesmen viSI8-D-46.2/3!.

from discussing "non-secrets"

and thereby detracts from the

importance of valid secrets.

b. The Names and Initials

Between the first exposure in 1971

and mid-1973, there have been about seven

references in the public domain to the.

National Reconnaissance Program or Office.

These were considered specu]ative reporting

since no official source was credited. The

revelations were ignored and the lack of

' follow-up inquiry or subsequent revelations

may be indicative of the appropriateness of

this course of action. On 12 October 1973,

the National Reconnaissance Office was

pointedly mentioned in a report of the

Special [Congressional] Committee to Study

Questions Related to Secret and Confidential].

Government Documents. Although the committee

was unaware that it had used a classified

title, this action represents an official

acknowledgment of the Office and has been

determined to be'sufficient grounds to consider the name of the Office unclassified.

This position was officially adopted by the

CIA in February 1974 when it withdrew legal

objection to mention of the National Reconnaissance Office as classified material in

Narchetti's proposed manuscript, CIA and

the Cult of Intelligence.

It should be noted that the

present 1965 charter of the NRO represents

the joint interests of the CIA and the DOD.

It incorporates many of the precepts of

the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board (reaffirmed'in 1974) and was

developed to assure rapid response to the

requirements of the intelligence community.

For some thirteen years, the system has

fulfilled its purpose well. All managers

have had unique authorities but have also

been monitored closely in both the technical and financial areas. The system permits

concentration of authority in highly capable

program offices and dispenses with long lines

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of approval and control. It was agreed USEB-D-46.

that a relaxing of security should not be

the basis for "regularizing."

(3) The significant impacts of declassifying the names and initials:

Formally acknowledges

current situation and thereby

establishes security guidelines.

Eliminates chiding of

security policy which attempts

to protect non-secrets.

(c) Permits normalization

of budget procedures.

Con

Tacitly admits overhead reconnaissance.

Creates confusion as

to limits of disclosure, e.g.:

Being an unclassified organization, can employees admit

affiliation?

Provides data for

media and foreign intelligence

speculation and investigation,

at least requiring some identification of organization.

Alerts the total

Congress to activities now

closely held by committee

chairmen.

(e) Normalization of

budget procedures will tend

toward normalization of organization at significant cost to

programs in time and money.

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USIB-D-46.

security, as it is normal for

personnel to admit employment if

working for an unclassified organization. Without acknowledgment

of the organizational structure,

this is impossible.

(4) It has been generally recognized

in the Committee that any declassifying or

outing of information now in the 411111PCtea breeds additional pressures

re information and additional release,

particularly under the "open society" posture required of the DOD. It was therefore

agreed that the DCI as the ultimate agent

for the security of the NW should continue

in this role as this acts as a counterforce

for those DOD organizations prone to press

for publicity and inclined to easily yield

to pressures from the media. •

c. Declassify the "Fact Of" 

(1) Discussions relating to declassifying the "fact of" showed particular concern in three areas. First, it was noted

that declassification of the "fact of"

satellite reconnaissance can be applied to

'.both photographic and SIGINT satellites.

Second, it was agreed that implementation

of any new policy would have to emphasize

that the admission of the "fact of" at .

either the Secret or unclassified level still

excludes any "facts about." And, finally,

there was great concern that official acknowledgment of our use of intelligence satellites might trigger the Soviets or third

countries to raise political objections in

an international forum and thereby hinder

our unilateral operations. There is also

considerable feeling that the "fact of"

should be acknowledged prior to considering

subsequent declassification actions.

(2) The concern with credibility was

the primary argument favoring declassification. The large volume ofinformation,

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particularly in trade journals, has estab- 133113-D-46.21:

lished a general recognition of photographic

reconnaissance from space and it is doubtful

that the difference between "official" and

"speculative" material is often recognized.

It was felt that continued insistence on

tight security for "open" secrets reduces

overall credibility and erodes the integrity

of security around the technology and the

operations which still need to be protected.

' (3) Foreign reaction to an open admission of satellite reconnaissance appears to

be the most serious potential probled but

it is recognized as one that falls primarily

in the political field rather than one to be

decided by the security needs of the intelliis system. The most significant threat

is the possibility of a U.N. treaty banning

surveillance or reconnaissance from space

without the concurrence of the country being

surveilled. Vafious non-aligned countries

have expressed significant sensitivities

about space surveillance and, in fact, Brazil

has tabled a treaty in the U.N. to regulate

observations from space. Recognition of the

"fact of" space reconnaissance would likely

not.derogate the collection mission of the

NRO, as long as restraints of international

treaties do not preclude mission activity,

and would enhance credibility in our claims

on other security matters.

(4) The arguments related to this

consideration are aligned as follows:

Pro

(a) Provides credibility

for the need to retain other

secrets if no effort is made to

retain the classification of

non-secrets.

•

(b) Permits easier access

tb NRP product for both military

and civilian use, including mapping and earth resources surveys.

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overhead reconnaissance by

the U.N. as a result of

complaints that the national

sovereignty of other nations

is being violated.

Under pressure of

international disapproval,

friendly countries may withdraw

base rights.

(c) Represent

•

 s an'irreversible action if problems

develop as a result of United

Nations consideration.

d. Declassify the Identitv of the Director and 

the DODUtV Director 

(1) Although the National Reconnaissance Office has been acknowledged as "an

office through which certain intelligence

matters are administered...by a senior

Air Force civilian official," no specific

identifications have been made. While

there is little likelihood of a specific

effort being made to obtain this additional

bit of information, the question which

elicited the above response was directed

at identifying the director of the satellite

reconnaissance program.

(2) The fact that identifying the

Director would show that he is both the

Under Secretary of the Air Force and the

director of the satellite reconnaissance

program should have little effect as the

Director has already been identified as

a "senior Air Force civilian official"

without there being any subsequent

perturbations. However, the questions

already raised about his former employment with Lockheed would indicate that

Lockheed's involvement in NRO programs

is well known to the media.

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(3) Identification of the Deputy

nclosure

101,11B-D-46.2/3! D rector would raise questions related i

to the CIA involvement. The degree of •

this concern is difficult to assess but.

could run the gamut from support for the

DCI's involvement in all major•intelligence efforts to consternation" that the •

Program is not merely a reconnaissance

effort but is a bona fide "spy" operation.

While this is recognized by those in the

'"trade" as being a matter of semantics,

great emotions are. often aroused when the

CIA is involved. However, there are arguments on both sides: 1

Pro

It provides a focal

point for an identified organi

zation and simplifies contacts

with the media and the nonclassified Or non-compartmented

sectors of Government.

It eliminates a cover

problem for both the DNRO and

the DDNRO.

Con

The media would have

two separate focal points to

exploit for different avenues

of inquiry: One relative to

activities of the NRO and the

other to the role of the CIA.

It would subject both •

officials to normal marketing

pressures and could complicate .

the utilization of streamlined

management procedures.

(c) It could open the

Director to the usual Congres-

'sional inquiries and pressures

related to possible procdrement

from "home state" business

interests.
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(d) It would identify the usrg.D.46.2/35

key individuals and by a review

of their . associations would

focus intelligence penetrations

on NRP operating elements, including contractors. -.

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(1) A logical fall-out of identifying

the "names and initials" and the principal

officers would be further inquiry related

to the composition of the organization, its

budgets, and its personnel. No other organization except nefarious groups such as the

Mafia are known by name and top leaders,

but without information on the organization.

Pressures from the media would be aimed at

simply ferretting out that which is secret.

Pressures from industry would be to develop

a knowledge of possible forums in which

there is a marketing potential. And,

finally, pressures would come from inside

the • Government to determine the extent to

which they, too, could use streamlined

management procedures or, conversely, the.

reasons why the NRO should not be normalized. The effect of this change would be

as follows:

Pro

Would eliminate burden

of organizational cover and.ease

personnel-related actions.

Would not require

cover for Staff personnel and .

could thus allow recognition to

a greater degree than is now

possible.

(c) Would permit Congress

and the public to know how this

portion of the Defense budget

is being spent.

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MIS-D-46. 2/ 35 - Con

Would focus intelligence penetration efforts.

Would permit the.

opposition to know how a pdrtion of the Defense budget

is being spent.

(c) Would make definite

boundaries of security now ..

enjoyed by these programs

unclear and require security.

judgments or precise knowledge

by all cleared persons, thereby

: eroding security control of

.. ' the program.

" td) Acknowledgment of

CIA involvement may lead to

criticism of past covered

operations.

(e) . Would expose "fact

of" space reconnaissance through

association of NRO and SAFUS and

the Office of Space Systems;

(f) If such disclosure

induced efforts to normalize

management, increased personnel

would be. required.

(g) Marketing efforts

would have a broader range for

contacts and contractor rolationships would be more

difficult.

(h) The potential for

additional audits, investigations, and facilities inspections would be increased.

(2) The probable pressures to normalize NRO activities as a result of declassifying to•this extent can be viewed

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(1) With the disclosure of the headquarters components, it will be obvious

that additional management appendages exist

to manage the funds that are budgeted.

Lines of inquiry that lead to CIA may be

of political interest but specific program

.interest would probably be dropped because

of previous blank walls that have been

encountered. Other programs would most .

likely receive considerable press attention

as any program that has been so well hidden

for so long must have a good story. There

are few virtues to the declassification and

significant drawbacks.

•

Pro

Because of more visibility, it may bring forth additional

competition from contractors whose

capability was not previously .

appreciated.

Would significantly

reduce the need for security in

that only a small body of information would remain classified.

Con

.

(a) Significantly broadens

the target base for intelligence

penetration. •

(b) Identification of contractors often permits easy

deduction of type of program,

e.g., Eastman Kodak indicates

photography.

Im

.....

2. .

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(c) Could eliminate contractor participation because

of impact of reconnaissance

program affiliation on commercial market.

(d) Broadens sabotage

base, particularly as related

to high reliability parts, by

exposing program participation

to unwitting subcontractors. '

Additional physical security

programs at additional cost

would be required.

Le) The proliferating of

conditions of security make

personnel security virtually

impossible. It also provides

such a broad base of inquiry

that-program details are likely

to be made public.

(f) The disappearance of

the tight constraints of security

and the associated aura of importance on contractors will have a

derogatory effect on morale and .

a subsequent effect on security.

g. Pecomoirtment But Not Declassify All Aspects 

ofthe Program and Organization. Including Programs and Provo Objectives 

(1) By definition, compartments are

utilized to restrict the availability of

information to a definite audience-without

increasing the classification. Considering

the number of high priority programs involving many new technologies handled by. the

NRO, the compartmentation system was the

obvious answer. In essence, each program

has a bigot list and the total program

411111115

receives a seep rity wrap provided

by the overall ystem. Only a

similar system provide such definite

security bounds without restricting the

programs. 'Obviously, there are some arguments on both sides.

15

• 11.086.74•
sysTams JOINTLY

Attachment to

Enclosure

USIB-D-46. 2/35

(a) To some observers,

the elimination of compartments

repree.ents a simplification of

the security system.

Con 

Decreases security of '

programs and increases the poten-

`- tJal for compromise.

Complicates security

procedures, particularly related

to contractor work areas.

lc) Obfuscates security

bounds.

CONCLUSIONS 

The deliberations of the Committee and the Senior

Review Group showed 3 considerable disparity of views. In

general, there was a strong desire to contin y practices that have been normal procedure in the ystem

since its inception. They felt that the prese tem provides security boundaries that are easy to define and this

in turn protects technical capabilities, permits management .

efficiencies, and shortens program schedules. The problems

of protecting non-secrets was of concern but the practice of

declassifying the leaked information which is true becomes a

convenient checklist approach for investigative reporting or

in ligence penetrations. It was their conclusion that the

System as now utilized should be retained to the extent

possible but that serious consideration be given to each problem and security be relaxed when appropriate.

A second viewpoint was strongly held by CIA representatives., excluding representatives of the Pro 'ram Office.

This position leaned toward relaxing.the System by declassifying the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance, the existence

and purpose of the NRO, and the size of the NRP but continuing compartmented -ontrol over all else. In their judgment,

this would simplify security procedures, would comply with

Executive Order 11652 on classification policy, and would

obviate the . problem of maintaining security of non-secrets.

9. With th erations in mind, it was generally

agreed that tigh urity should continue to protect

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1111NSIVa targets, operational information, and technology of •

the itatisttiou systems. However, it was recognized that some

assdlfications to the System should be made in light of the 012201t state of public knowledge.

Security procedures should be modified

ta be consistent with official statements acknowl-

=

ma the National Reconnaissance-Office. This

require•formal declassificatidn of the title,

"Vitinnal Reconnaissance Office," and of the

imitials, "NRO."

The %)CI should recommend to the Assistant

%ft the President for National Security Affairs that

the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance be declassified tOnsistent with national policy: The Committee

agreed that the programs had little to gain from

this itclassification but there was little doubt

that this was in the class of non-secrets. Assuming

sw ptai.Zical repercussions from foreign countries,

It was apparent that admission of the "fact of" would

sat be detrimental to the intelligence community.

hatter, is "political repercussions" fall within

the scope of foreign policy, final decision would

. have to be made by the Assistant to the President.

• The NRO shoulUmaintain an active information program to enable members of Congress and

Federal department heads to better fulfill their

respassibilities.

The NRO should continue its policy of

; Tembeadiat to public and media queries rather than

. mpg* to any kind of public release policy.

•

02CCONEONTIONS 

10. As a result of these discussions, it is recommended:

4

a. That Conclusions 9a through 9d above be

U. That the chairmen of appropriate Congresbiesal committees be briefed on any security changes

Valor to accomplishment.

c. That, with the above recommended

ties*, the strict security controls of the

System be continued.

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e. That information provided in response to

queries be in accord with the endations

and that all holders of eithe AUNTXIYHOLE clearances be briefed licy and

the continuing need for strict security.

4

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