COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RANDALL LEE NORTON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1897-95-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

 JUNE 25, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 

Charles L. McCormick, III, Judge 

 Robert H. Morrison (William W. Bennett, Jr. & 

Associates, on brief), for appellant. 

 Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 On appeal from his conviction of possession of cocaine, 

Randall Lee Norton contends that the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction. We agree and reverse. 

 On August 18, 1994, Officer Pulliam of the South Boston 

Police Department stopped a car that had come into radar at 

thirty-eight miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone. 

 When the vehicle stopped, the driver exited and ran. The three 

people remaining in the vehicle identified Norton as the driver. 

 Morgan Brown, a passenger in the front seat and the owner of the 

car, told Officer Pulliam that they were headed back to their 

hotel room, "Crestview, Room 121." Brown told Pulliam that he 

had given Norton money to pay for the room. Brown consented to 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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let Officer Pulliam search the room and opened the door with his 

key. Officer Pulliam found two aluminum beer cans that had been 

converted into smoking devices, one in a folding bed and the 

other between the mattress and box springs. The beer cans 

contained cocaine residue. 

 The following day, Norton told Officer Pulliam that he had 

run because he was afraid of getting another DUI charge. He 

admitted that he had checked into the Crestview and had paid for 

the room with money from Brown. Officer Pulliam asked Norton 

whether his fingerprints were on the beer cans. Norton replied, 

"Possibly, I guess they are." Officer Pulliam asked, "Why are 

your fingerprints on the cans?" Norton said, "Because I drank 

the beer." Officer Pulliam then asked, "Is it possible you 

smoked crack out of those cans? Norton said, "I'm sure it is." 

 "On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences 

fairly deducible therefrom." Maynard v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. 

App. 437, 439, 399 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1990) (en banc). The 

judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury will not be set 

aside unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 

(1987). 

 Plainly, Norton was not found in actual possession of 

cocaine. He contends that the evidence fails to prove 

constructive possession. We agree. 
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 To establish constructive possession, "the Commonwealth must 

point to evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the accused 

or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the 

defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the 

substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control." 

Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 

(1984). 

 The Commonwealth proved only that Norton was registered in 

the Crestview Motel, that cocaine residue was on two beer cans 

found in the room registered to him, and that he had smoked 

cocaine within several days prior to his arrest. "[P]roof that 

contraband was found in premises . . . occupied by the defendant 

is insufficient, standing alone, to prove constructive 

possession." Behrens v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 131, 135, 348 

S.E.2d 430, 432 (1986). There was no evidence that Norton was 

seen inside the motel room, that his fingerprints were on the 

beer cans, or that he had smoked cocaine from those beer cans. 

Thus, the evidence did not prove that Norton had knowledge of the 

cocaine on the beer cans or that he asserted dominion and control 

over that cocaine. 

 The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the 

indictment is ordered dismissed. 

 Reversed and dismissed.