1 The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-1779

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Vincent Sharnee Johnson, * * [PUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 10, 2008 Filed: May 13, 2008

___________ Before BENTON, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges

___________ PER CURIAM.
The Appellant, Vincent Sharnee Johns on, appeals the district court’s 1 denial of his motion that his appointed counsel berelieved and that substitute counsel be appointed. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Johnson was indicted on charges of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d) and using, carryi ng, and brandishing a handgun during and in-2- relation to a crime of violence in violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and is awaiting trial. Johnson was found to be indigent, and the Federal Public Defe nder was originally appointed to represent him. Subsequently , the Federal Public Defender was permitted to withdraw, and a private attorney was substituted. On January 30, 2007, Johnson filed a motion asking that his appointed couns el be relieved and th at substitute counsel be appointed. The motion was denied. Johnson filed a second motion seeking substitution of counsel. The district court also denied this motion, and Johnson now appeals that dismissal.
Our jurisdiction is restricted to appeal s from “final decisions of the district courts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In order to be immediately appealable, a collateral order “must conclusively determine the dis puted question; . . . resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; . . . [and] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final j udgment.” Flanagan v. United States , 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay , 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)); Will v. Hallock , 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (“[T]he collateral order doctrine accommodates a small class of rulings, not concluding the litigation, but conclusively resolving claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,” and which are “too important to be denied review and t oo independent of the cause itself to require that appellate cons ideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). As the order denying substitution of appointed counsel is subject to reconsideration by the district court as the prosecution proceeds, and is effectively reviewable on appeal after final judgment, at least two of the three requirements for appealability are not satisfied. SeeUnited States v. Celani , 748 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1984) (“An order denying the appointment of counsel fails both the first and third prongs of the Coopers test.”); but cf. Slaughter v. City of Maplewood , 731 F.2d 587, 588-89 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that an order denying appointment of counsel in a Civil Rights Act case is immediately appealable). Accordingl y, an order denying the appointment or substitution of counsel in the criminal context is not immediately appealable.
In view of the foregoing, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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