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", . :', , ' . MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUT,y SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

SUBJECT: Target-Oriented Display (TOO) , 

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This is in response to your memorandum of May 27, 1968 on 

the ab'ove subject. In accordance with your direction, we will 

attempt to provide the data required, by OSD-'?A for continuation of 

the TOD within the DOD. HOWever, I feel constrained to point out 

that there are nutpe rous possible pitfalls involved in casting the, 

NRP, and partic\iladythe satellite programs, in this format if 

meaningful concl~;sions are to be drawn from the aggregated data. 

There is, of course , a basic weakness in the TOD approach in 

, I , ,', that it measures resource input but not intelligence output. There .. 

.: fore, it does not permit evaluation of the relative merits of the programs it includes; it deals only with the distribution of intelligence 

collection and exploitation resources by geographic area. While this 

basis for categorizing intelligence programs may have a certain value 

I.,for programs in which fixed ground installationsessenHally determine 

the intelligence targets, it has limited applicability to the overhead 

reconnaissance programs comprising the NRP. 

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Up to this time no recurrent requirements outside the Soviet Bloc 

and China have been established which have any significant effect on 

the annual number-of satellite launches programmed in the NRP. 

The reasons for this seemingly paradoxical state of affairs with 

respect 'to GAMBIT are that the laws of orbital mechanics and the 

facts of geography give this satellite system reasonably good access 

to other areas of interest over the surface of the earth when it is proto"'~Ol 'YU'I! 

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grammed for near-optimum coverage of the Soviet Bloc and China; and 

second, that the capability of the GAMBIT system to cover targets in Q 

given area along its track is limited by access time and the response' 

time for roll angle change and not by the amount of film carried, thuB, 

for example, making it possible to cover targets in the Middle East 

'without any appreciable effect on coverage of China and the Soviet Bloc. 

Search systems, such as CORONA, are somewhat more depend~nt 

on total film carried, but different weather factors as between, say 

South China and the Middle East, are such that, often, coverage of a 

high priority requirement in the Middle East will not substantially reduce cove rage of high priority targets in South China, but may take 

away instead from the film available for lower priority targets in Africa 

which would otherwise be covered When South China and other Soviet Bloc 

area cloud cover make unprofitable the use of film in those higher priority 

areas. Photographic satellites are thus much more f1e~ible in the choice 

of geographical areas for coverage than any other intelligence collection 

system of comparable applicability. Changes in ,targets and area coverage "', 

can be and are made even while the satellites are in orbit; these changes 

are in response to current intelligence situations as defined by the USIBCOMIREX. Allocf}tion of photographic satellite resources to areas outside the Soviet Bloc and China, as reflected in the TOO, is based on the 

targeting requirements given to the NRO, but does not really indicate 

changes in emphasis between these areas and the Soviet Bloc and! or 

.' China. 

,-----_----""T'-"h~e"__--'i0bservations regar'cling targetable resources made by Dr. 

I lin his memorandum to you of May 16, 1968 on the,TOD, iUustrate the lack of applicability of this fbrmat to making detailed resource 

allocation judgments regarding the NHP. These observations (paraphrased) and the re levant factors conce rning the NRPare as follows: 

1. Since there is an inc reased intc lligence effort on South China 

which is in support of the war in Vietnam,thcre is actually a decrease 

'in programmed resources for China's other activities. As indicated 

above, for satellites which constitute the largest faction of NRP r,esource s, no such relationship between South China, and other areas of 

China exists. In fact, if South China requirements became demanding 

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as to call for additional satellite launches, the coverage of the rest of 

China would be improved, not diminished. 

2. FY-G8 Near East Hesources are almost twice those of FY-67 

and this increase is entirely in satellite photography. This statement 

is true, but for the reasons given above, has little, if any, resource 

implications. Basic satellite launch schedules are determined by 

Soviet Bloc and Chinese coverage r:equirements. 

3. TOO findings accurately reflect our current emphasis on the 

strategic defensive forces of the USSJ{ but they also show a growth in 

our ave raIl inte lligence effort on the USSR. Our Soviet Inte lligence 

Program is large enough that it appears that shifts in emphasis should 

be accompanied by re -evaluation of the entire program, rather than 

add-ons to existing levels. Because offensive and defensive systems 

in the USSR are for the most part found in diffe rent geographical areas, 

satellite photography of the Soviet defensive forces does not substantially 

detract from our capability to cover Soviet (and Chinese) offensive forces. 

Therefore, this obse rva tion has little meaning for allocation of NRP photo .. 

graphic satellite resources. It could he interpreted to mean that photographic satellite launches should be reduced in order to offset the costs 

of SIGINT sate llite s em plnye d to intercept defensive system radar signals. 

However, photographic coverage of defensive systems is at least equally 

important as SIGINT coverage. In fact, of course, the photographic 

coverage is important for a Wide range of inte lligence targets not only in 

the Soviet Union hut elsewhere. Therefore, there is no reasonable way 

within the NH.P to offset incTcased satellite coverage of Soviet defensive 

forces by decreased coverage of other major Soviet intelligence objectives. 

4. The decrease in resources on Soviet Ground Forces is surprising, 

since our continuing studies ()f NATO policies and force needs have placed 

heavy emphasis on Soviet Gcnc t'al Purpose Forces Clnd a recent study indicated the poor state of our knowleclge of these forces. As far as the 

NHP is concerned, there has been a substantial increase in photographic 

satellite capability to obtain intelligence data on Soviet and Chinese ground 

forces, although this is not discernible in the TOO format. The advent of 

GAMBIT-3 with its steadily improving photographi<;: resolution has, for· 

the first time, made it possible to acquire specifiC data on some deployed 

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ground [OI'C'C equipments such as vehicles, artillery, missiles, etc. 

These capabilities have made it possible in, the last year to substantially advance our knowledge concerning Soviet ground forces. The 

frequency and degree of coverage of Soviet ground force units by high 

resolution satellite photography is dependent on the priority relative 

to Soviet strategic intelligence targets since there is considerable 

geographical overlap of these forces and targets. However, fewer 

photographs of sufficient resolutiQn to identify the type and levels of. 

major items of equipment of deployed ground forces may provide 

much more useful intelligence than more photographs of grosser 

resolution. 

In summary, the TaD format does not provide a very meaningful 

or useful basis for making resource allocation judgments in the NRP, 

particularly with regard to satellite systems. Further, when the NRP 

is aggregated with the CIP and CCP in TaD summaries, the meaningful conclusions which might otherwise be drawn with respect to geographical allocations of resources in the CIP and CCP, may be obscured because the relatively large resources included in the NRP will 

tend to weight the tot.Olls heavily. To get any useful evaluations of the 

CCP and CIP from the TaD analyses, the best approach would seem to 

be to collect total resources in programs other than the NRP by geographical area to the extcnt appropriate (although NRP aircraft programs can also he allocated by geographical area to some degree) and 

to use NHP satellite geographical area attributions only for comparison. Ir 

The NRP data should be kept compartmented from a security standpoint. II" 

It should also he observed that the NR P resources included in the 

TaD do not correspond to the program {budget figures usually identified 

with the NRP or the program subject to review by the Executive Committee of the NRP. The TOD figures include the MOL program funds 

and some part of the SH-71 program funds. This could cause some 

confusion. It is suggested that these items be identified differently in 

the TOD by some title such as "Other Covert Overhead Heconnaissance. " 

Finaily, I note that it is now intended to extend the TaD to include 

tactical inte lligence systems, an area far removed from most of the 

NRP. I strongly recommend that papers dealing with this area not inGAMBIT 

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, clude any information on or reference to the NRP. Otherwise a considerable expansion of B YEMAN access clearances will be required 

to accommodate large numbers of DOD personnel concerned with 

tactical reconnaissance and)ntelligence who do not have and do not 

need BYEMAN clearances. 

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I again reiterate the recommendation in my memorandum to you 

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of 'June 5. 1868, subject: "Secretary of Defense Guidance Memorandum 

(OGM) on Communications and Inte'lligence" that the NRP not be in": " . 

eluded in any standard wide ly-distributed DOD documentation formats V, 

such as DPM's or DGM's. Such handling of the NRP is inconsistent I:' 

. with the security requirements of the NRP, contradicts established 

DOD policies for the NRO, and is incompatible with the interagency 

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character of the program and the agreed management arrangements ',' ' 

as reflected in the DOD/CIA Agreement on the NRP of August ,II, 1965. 

If some real benefits in the evaluation of the NRP or its management 

could be shown to result from a DPM!DGM-type treatment, there might 

be some reason to accommodate to a degree of relaxation of security 

and some additional management complications. However, no such 

benefits are apparent. In fact, as indicated in the present memorandum, 

the aggregated treatment of things which are unlike and incommensurable, 

as in the TOO, is not a useful or meaningful contribution to evaluation or 

management. 

Lk$ 

Alexander H. Flax 

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