UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

LONNIE DEAN, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 21-2082 

(D.C. No. 1:11-CR-01670-JCH-1) 

(D. N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Lonnie Dean appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 17, 2022

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I. BACKGROUND 

A. Legal Background 

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by Section 603(b) of the First 

Step Act, allows federal prisoners to move for compassionate release in the district 

court after exhausting Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) administrative remedies. See 

United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 830-31 (10th Cir. 2021). The court may 

grant the motion only when the district court finds that 

(1) extraordinary and compelling reasons justify release; 

(2) release is consistent with applicable policy statements 

issued by the Sentencing Commission; and 

(3) release is warranted after considering the applicable 

§ 3553(a) factors. 

Id. at 831; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

In general, “district courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any 

of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 

831 n.4 (quotations omitted); see also United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1043 

(10th Cir. 2021). But because the United States Sentencing Commission “has been 

unable to comply with its statutory duty of promulgating a post-First Step Act policy 

statement,” “the Sentencing Commission’s existing policy statement[s are] applicable 

only to motions for sentence reductions filed by the Director of the BOP, and not to 

motions filed directly by defendants.” Id. at 1050. Thus, current policy statements 

“cannot constrain district courts’ discretion” in deciding a prisoner’s motion for 

compassionate release. Id. (quotations omitted). 

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In other words, until the Sentencing Commission promulgates new policy 

statements, a district court may consider only the first and third prerequisites for 

compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) because currently there are no 

applicable policy statements under the second prerequisite. 

B. Procedural History 

In 2013, Mr. Dean pled guilty to (1) conspiracy to distribute at least 50 grams 

of methamphetamine; (2) possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute; 

and (3) assaulting, resisting, or impeding a federal officer. He was sentenced to 240 

months in prison.1

 

In August 2020, Mr. Dean submitted a compassionate-release request to the 

BOP under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). As justification, he cited (1) his medical 

conditions, including obesity, diabetes, and hypertension; and (2) the spread of 

COVID-19. After the BOP denied his request, Mr. Dean filed a motion for 

compassionate release in the district court. 

The district court agreed that Mr. Dean’s medical conditions constituted 

extraordinary and compelling circumstances under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).2

 It then 

1

 A state court also sentenced Mr. Dean to 10 years in prison for vehicular 

homicide after he killed an innocent bystander while attempting to escape federal 

officers. Suppl. ROA at 3, 87, 98. The federal and state sentences were set to run 

concurrently. 

2

 The court disagreed with Mr. Dean’s contention that the COVID-19 

pandemic supported a finding of extraordinary and compelling circumstances, noting 

the BOP’s adequate response to the pandemic and Mr. Dean’s vaccination status. 

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weighed the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and concluded that 

modifying Mr. Dean’s sentence was not warranted. The court acknowledged Mr. 

Dean had a clean record in prison. 

In considering the § 3553(a) factors, the district court 

(1) described Mr. Dean’s extensive criminal history, which 

“included five felony drug convictions, carrying a 

concealed weapon, possession of stolen property, an arrest 

for battery against a household member and an arrest for 

burglary”; 

(2) noted the seriousness of his offenses of conviction, during 

which “he fled from federal agents by ramming a vehicle, 

fleeing and then causing a crash that killed a person”; and 

(3) found “after review of the section []3553 factors and the 

facts set forth above, the defendant is a danger to the safety 

of another person or to the community.” 

ROA at 133. The court determined the § 3553(a) factors weighed against release and 

denied Mr. Dean’s motion. 

Mr. Dean timely appealed. 

II. DISCUSSION 

We review a district court’s ruling on a First Step Act motion for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1147-48, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 

2020). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect 

conclusion of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Piper, 839 

F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted). 

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Mr. Dean argues the district court erred because it relied on a policy statement 

in the Sentencing Guidelines, § 1B1.13(2), to deny the motion.3

 We disagree. The 

court said Mr. Dean satisfied the first prerequisite of § 3582(c)(1)(A)—extraordinary 

and compelling reasons—but denied the motion based on the third prerequisite—

evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors. It did not rely on the second prerequisite. Mr. 

Dean’s arguments to the contrary lack merit.

First, he argues the district court failed to acknowledge that no applicable 

Sentencing Commission policy statements exist. But Mr. Dean points to no authority 

providing that the district court was obligated to state that no policy statement 

applied. The Government alerted the court to our holding in McGee that the 

Sentencing Commission has not yet promulgated an applicable policy statement, 

Suppl. ROA at 7, and the court cited McGee in its order denying compassionate 

release, ROA at 129. 

3

 United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13(2) states: 

Upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a 

term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of 

supervised release with or without conditions that does not 

exceed the unserved portion of the original term of 

imprisonment) if, after considering the factors set forth 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are 

applicable, the court determines that 

 . . . 

(2) [t]he defendant is not a danger to the safety of any 

other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3142(g). 

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Second, he says the district court’s order summarized the Government’s 

argument that Mr. Dean cannot satisfy Sentencing Commission Policy Statement 

§ 1B1.13(2). But the court’s description of the Government’s argument citing to 

§ 1B1.13(2) does not show the court denied relief based on that provision. A court’s 

restatement of a party’s argument does not mean the court has adopted it. And “it 

would hardly be an abuse of discretion for a district court to look to the present 

policy statement for guidance” as long as it did not feel bound by the policy 

statement. United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 938 n.4 (10th Cir. 2021). 

Third, he contends the district court’s statement that he “is a danger to the 

safety of another person or to the community” “tracks” the language found in 

§ 1B1.13(2). Aplt. Br. at 14 (quoting United States v. Carralero-Escobar, 860 F. 

App’x 143, 146 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished)). But the court used this language 

only after it considered the § 3553(a) factors. This in no way shows it denied the 

motion based on § 1B1.13(2). The court instead tied the language from the policy 

statement to its assessment of the § 3553(a) factors. 

Even assuming the district court relied on § 1B1.13(2), any error would have 

been harmless. In its order, the court listed the § 3553(a) factors. It then determined 

that the defendant’s criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the 

offense—i.e., the facts it previously laid out—militated against sentence 

modification. Because “district courts may deny compassionate-release motions 

when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking,” Maumau, 

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993 F.3d at 831 n.4 (quotations omitted), any error by the district court in its 

treatment of § 1B1.13(2) would have been harmless. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm. 

Entered for the Court 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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