1947 -

1956 -

1960 -

1962 -

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RECONNAISANCE SATELLITE INFORMATION POLICY 

National Security Act of 1947 - DCI responsible for 

protection of intelligence sources and methods. TAB 1 

June 20 - First U-2 overflight of Soviet Union. 

President directed special security compartment -

TALEN1'. system. 

July 11 - First Soviet protest to State Department. 

January 11 - Gen White - "SAMOS is a reconnaissance 

satellite ... 11 

February 5 - Gen Schriever testifies before Congress 

on SAMOS. 

May 1 - U-2 shot down. Publicly acknowledged and 

suspended. 

August 19 - First satellite photography recovered. 

August 26 - President directed TALENT-KEYHOLE system 

- covered product and fact of 

- reiterated DCI responsibility. TAB 2 

Soviets openly protested satellite reconnaissance was 

illegal espionage; violated sovereign rights. 

March - Blagonravov to Dryden: " ... each side declare 

it would not use reconnaissance satellites for military 

purposes over territory of other." 

March - DOD Directive S5200.13, Security Policy for 

Space Programs published. TAB 3 

April - Soviets launch first reconnaissance satellite, 

PHOTO/ELINT, from TTMTC. 

May 26 - NSAM 156 issued to fornrulate position on 

satellite reconnaissance. TAB 4 

July 10 - President approved NSCA 2454. TAB 5 

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January 18 - NSAM 156 Cormnittee met pursuant to 

NSAM 216 

- disclosure to Soviets at high level, or 

-- material in hands of U.S. Ambassador. TAB 6 

February 26 - Reconnnendation against disclosure. 

September - AF Regulation 205-23 published, Special 

Security Procedures for Military Space Programs. TAB 7 

December 20 - NSAM 156 Committee met to consider disclosure in relationship to disarmament. TAB 8 

January 21 - NSAM 156 Cormnittee recorrnnended against 

additional dissemination. 

June 6 - NSAM 156 Cormnittee met to discuss question 

of approaching Khrushchev following visits of Drew 

Pearson and William Benton 

- several meetings followed 

- Soviet question dropped 

- briefings to other heads os state proposed. 

October - November - Heads of NATO and others briefed 

- "fact of" and value of U.S. program 

- Soviet capabilities. TAB 9 

May 27 - Walt Rostow urged President to approach Mos--

cow for joint release to U.N. on space reconnaissance. 

TAB 10 

June 24 - State response: not desirable to disclose 

publicly or to the Soviets. 

July 20 - Secretary of Defense voted against disclosure. 

TAB 11 

September 16 - NSAM 156 Committee met to discuss State/ 

ACDA paper, Disarmament Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy 

-- SALT delegates use "information-gathering satellites" 

- establish non-interference principle 

- discussed case for disclosure. 

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1971 -

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1973 -

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May 14 - NSSM 28 Steering Cormnittee 

- acted on the State/ACDA 1968 paper 

- enjoined Delegation from discussing effectiveness. 

September - NSAM 156 Committee asked to look at acknowledgement of "national technical means of verification" 

before Congress 

- referred to Verification Panel. TAB 12 

June 16 - DCI reiterated responsibilities for BYEMAN 

and TALENT-KEYHOLE controls. TAB 13 

June 17 - White House declared the "fact of" the type 

of verification system would not be disclosed. TAB 14 

The situation today --

- We are heavily dependent upon satellite reconnaissance; 

no viable alternative exists. 

Satellites are fragile and vulnerable and require a 

permissive environment to operate. 

- The decision to disclose is irreversible. 

"Everybody knows", so there is little point in disclosing the "fact of". 

- public reaction is not adverse 

- public knowledge is neither complete nor accurate 

- "Facts about" are very sensitive --

- how good we are 

how dependent we are on satellite reconnaissance 

- what we are not collecting 

- some missions are more sensitive than others. TAB 15 

- CIA involvement in the NRP is very sensitive. 

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- Sanitization provides data to analysts while 

protecting sensitive sources 

- USIB approval to provide certain satellite SIGINT 

data as SECRET NOFORN 

- Over 370,000 frames of satellite photography 

sanitized in last five years 

- Next generation system, KENNEN, needs to be protected 

because of significantly greater capabilities 

Reaction to NASA Earth Resources Survey Program is 

not all favorable 

- Mendelevich comments at U.N. in 1969. TAB 16 

- Comments by other countries at U.N. TAB 17 

- Acceptance is tacit; decision to disclose should 

- consider effect on our Allies 

- consider acknowledgement of Soviet capabilities 

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