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1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 Ill llll 14 000037870 NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

Washington, D. C. 

September 12, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NRP EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

SUBJECT: Revision of ExCom-M-17 

(Dtd August 7, 1969) 

Please substitute the attached revised pages 2 

and 3 in ExCom-M-17. The revisions are indicated by 

broken underlining. With this revision, I consider the 

minutes to be formally approved as agreed at the August 15 

ExCom. 

Attachments 

F. Robert Naka 

Executive Secretary 

Revised pages 2 and 3 

for ExCom-M-17 

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I. 

ExCom-M-17 

Issue: Should the ExCom encourage an NSAM 156 

Committee consideration of the security 

and policy implications of SALT with 

respect to the NRP? 

Dr. McLucas introduced the subject of the impact 

of the SALT negotiations on the NRP. Background material 

had been previously distributed (see BYE-13062-69, 6 Aug 69). 

Mr. Nitze stated that Mr. Gerard Smith, head of 

the SALT delegation, had asked the CIA to provide guidelines 

on the various levels of sensitivity associated with our 

collection capabilities. He said he had read the paper 

yesterday and it was very good. The NRP was well covered in 

the paper. As for the SALT negotiations, his impression is 

that during our talks with the Russians we ~re _!o_dis_£uss 

verification last and that in_connection with_its_initial 

.QO.§.ij;_ion the delegation has been instructed to state the 

willingness of the United States to rely on "national means" 

to the maximum extent Qossible. If the discussion proceeds 

beyond that, then the delegation must return for instructions. 

As a consequence, the NRO and other interested parties should -

have plenty of time to consider this matter further. 

Mr. Helms confirmed the content of the CIA report. 

He further said that the inspection satellite question 

should not be brought up because such negotiation would start 

us down the "slippery slope" and we must not reveal our resolution capability. Dr. DuBridge concurred, saying that NASA 

was going to have an earth resources satellite so why do we 

need another program. Mr. Packard said that there are two 

reasons why it may be desirable to have a verification satellite program: 

1. It would indicate how we would verify 

that the terms of the Treaty are being met, and 

2. It would symbolize a joint effort 

between NASA and the DOD. 

Dr. McLucas pointed out that NASA has already sent 

a proposal on a~ inspection satellite tc The NSSM 28 Committee and to the 3~J Committee. Dr. Steiningor pointed out 

that the current JASA time schedule for an ::arth resources 

satellite might 02 too late for SALT. Th~ 2arth resources 

satellite plan calls for 300-foot resolut~0n in 1971 or 1972. 

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ExCom-M-17 

Dr. DuBridg_e suggested that the restriction of 

20 meters'_resolution which was Qlaced on NASA three years 

ag-0 could be relaxed considerably._ Mr. Helms concurred. 

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Mr. Packard summarized the feeling of the ExCom 

that discussion of this subject with the NSAM 156 Committee 

would be premature and no action should be taken now. 

II. Relationship between SALT, High-Resolution 

Activities, I I 

Dr. McLucas raised the question of whether in 

the period of a budget squeeze we should cut back on our 

high-resolution activity which is a follow-on to MOL in 

favor of~---------~ He asked if we did that, how 

SALT would be affected. 

The consensus of the Committee was that the 

existence of SALT negotiations should not now affect the 

NRP and that it was too early to tell which is more important for SALT, high resolution or~----------

Dr. DuBridge asked whether the SALT negotiations would act 

to shift money from weapons to intelligence. Mr. Packard 

replied that mon~y is so tight that it probably would not 

work that way. 

III. DOD Intelligence Programs Reorganization 

Under Mr. Robert F. Froehlke 

Dr. DuBridge raised the question of the Laird 

memorandum on reorganizing the DOD intelligence resources. 

Dr. DuBridge said that he had understood from Mr. Laird 

that he intended that the NRO not be affected. Mr. Packard 

replied that the idea was to organize the activities of 

NSA and DIA better but not affect activities which were 

working well, like the NRP. He said that he thought the 

proposed Executive Council would be made up of members of 

the NRP Executive Committee and a few others for the purpose of coordinating the DOD intelligence activities. 

However, the ExCom should continue to function as it has 

and so should the NRO. 

J-: 

F. Robert Naka 

Secretary 

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