J-A28030-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF C.R. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF C.R.

No. 249 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Dispositional Order entered December 18, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Juvenile Division at No.: CP-51-JV-0001824-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 20, 2020

Appellant, C.R., appeals from a dispositional order following an 

adjudication that he committed the offenses of receiving stolen property and 

unauthorized use of a vehicle. The court ordered Appellant to pay restitution 

in the amount of $250.00 and remain on in-home detention under the 

supervision of a juvenile probation officer. Appellant argues that the evidence 

was insufficient to sustain the determination of delinquency for receiving 

stolen property. We affirm. 

On November 4, 2018, at approximately 7:53 p.m., Appellant sped 

through a stop sign on the 6200 block of Media Street in West Philadelphia, 

and then through a steady red traffic signal, as Officer Ryan Wong and his 

partner watched from their patrol car. The officers activated the dome lights 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and siren and pursued Appellant, who led them on a high-speed automobile 

chase for one-third of a mile. Appellant came to an abrupt stop at the corner 

of 62nd and Jefferson Streets, opened the driver’s-side door and fled on foot. 

Officer Wong followed on foot, chasing Appellant for five minutes in a zig-zag 

pattern. Appellant eventually hid in an alley, where Officer Wong apprehended 

him. 

Police ran the vehicle identification number through the NCIC database 

and discovered that the car had been reported stolen by its owner, Lisa Small, 

five days earlier. Neither Small nor her husband knew Appellant or gave him 

permission to use their car, which had sustained damage to the exterior since 

she last saw it, including indicia of being “sideswiped” in the rear and damage 

to both doors. The interior reeked of marijuana.

At a delinquency hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony 

of Officer Wong and Small. The parties stipulated “that the car was taken out 

of county” from Collingdale, Pennsylvania, and that, if called to the stand, 

Detective James Brady would testify that he recorded an interview with Small 

confirming her ownership of the vehicle and lack of permission to Appellant to 

use it.

On December 18, 2018, Appellant was adjudicated delinquent and 

placed on probation. Appellant filed this timely appeal, and both Appellant 

and the juvenile court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises a single issue in this appeal: “Was not the evidence 

insufficient for Appellant to be found guilty of, and adjudicated delinquent for, 
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receiving stolen property where there was no evidence that he knew, believed, 

or should have known that the automobile at issue was stolen?” Appellant’s 

Brief at 3.

When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting an adjudication of delinquency, this Court employs a well-settled 

standard of review:

When a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a 

crime if committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must establish 

the elements of the crime by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review the 

entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth. In determining whether the Commonwealth 

presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test 

to be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all reasonable 

inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to find every 

element of the crime charged. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence.

The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not be absolutely incompatible with a defendant’s innocence. 

Questions of doubt are for the hearing judge, unless the evidence 

is so weak that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be 

drawn from the combined circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth. The finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or 

none of the evidence presented.

Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 650 (Pa. Super. 2017).

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of 

unauthorized use of a vehicle. He challenges only the sufficiency of the 
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evidence for receiving stolen property on the ground that the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that he knew the car was stolen. 

A person is guilty of receiving stolen property “if he intentionally 

receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it 

has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the 

property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the 

owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). A defendant “receives” property where he 

“acquir[es] possession [or] control” of it. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3925(b). The factfinder may infer guilty knowledge that a car was stolen based upon multiple 

factors, including, but not limited to: (1) alterations to the property indicative 

of theft; (2) the recency of the theft; (3) the location of the theft in comparison 

to where the defendant possessed the car; (4) the place or manner of 

possession; and (5) the defendant’s conduct, including attempts to flee 

apprehension. Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d at 651. 

Viewed under this standard, the evidence supported Appellant’s 

adjudication for receiving stolen property. The arresting officer testified that 

he chased the car for one-third of a mile after seeing it pass through two stop 

signals and then saw Appellant exit the driver’s door and flee on foot. The 

officer also testified that the license plate of the car had been altered and did 

not match the plate assigned to the vehicle identification number of the car, 

and that the registration card with the true owner’s name was inside the 

vehicle. Small, the owner of the car, testified that (1) neither she nor her 
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husband knew Appellant, much less gave him permission to use the car; (2) 

it had been stolen five days before Appellant’s arrest; and (3) when it was 

returned, it had been altered by damage to the rear, as if it had been 

“sideswiped,” and damage to both doors. Further, the interior had been 

altered because it now reeked of marijuana. The parties stipulated that the 

car had been taken out-of-county from the victim, who lived in Collingdale, 

Pennsylvania. Viewing the totality of the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

as verdict winner, this evidence demonstrates Appellant’s knowledge that the 

car was stolen. 

Appellant argues that the evidence does not establish his guilty 

knowledge:

[With regard to] 1). alterations to the property indicative of theft 

—here, there was no damage to the car, which was being operated 

with its keys; 2). an attempt to flee apprehension—because 

Appellant had no license, a totally unrelated and independent 

motivation for his action, only by purest speculation can an 

inference of guilty knowledge be drawn from his flight; 3). 

recentness of the theft to suggest guilty knowledge—the car had 

been parked by the owner on October 29, 2018, and was found in 

Appellant’s possession only on November 4, 2018, too far 

removed in time to satisfy this requirement; 4). geographic 

proximity between the location of the theft and where the property 

is discovered—no information was offered by the Commonwealth 

on this point; 5). indicia of ownership—the registration card for 

the vehicle was present; the absence of any such identification 

might notify an operator that a vehicle had been stolen, but here 

the card was in the glove box; 6). a mismatched license plate—

this circumstance offers no evidence as to guilty knowledge on the 

part of the driver given the fact that the theft had occurred five 

days earlier. The presence of a plate not belonging to the vehicle 

is but one consideration in the evaluation of the circumstances 
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surrounding possession. This factor alone will not sustain a 

conviction if the circumstances treated as a whole do not establish 

sufficient evidence . . .

Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.

Appellant’s arguments turn the proper standard of review on its head by 

isolating and then viewing various evidentiary factors in the light most 

favorable to him. First, he states incorrectly that “there was no damage to 

the car” indicative of theft. Id. Small unequivocally testified that the car was 

not in the same condition as when she last saw it, since it looked like it was 

sideswiped in the back, and there was some damage to both doors. She also 

testified that the interior of the car was different from when she last saw the 

car because there was a pervasive stench of marijuana. Both Small and the 

arresting officer testified that the car no longer bore the original license plate

but rather a different one that did not match the vehicle identification number, 

which was typewritten on the Pennsylvania vehicle registration card inside the 

vehicle. Commonwealth v. Cross, 335 A.2d 756, 757 (Pa. Super. 1975) 

(evidence that defendant had been observed operating stolen automobile, 

original license plate had been replaced, owner did not know defendant and 

had not given him permission to operate the vehicle was sufficient to sustain 

conviction for operating vehicle without owner’s consent). 

Next, Appellant maintains that five days between the theft of the car 

and its possession by Appellant “was too far removed in time” to demonstrate 

guilty knowledge. Appellant’s Brief at 11. The law demonstrates, however, 
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that even longer periods between events are consistent with a finding of guilty 

knowledge. Commonwealth v. Williams, 362 A.2d 244, 250 (Pa. 1976)

(twelve days);1 Commonwealth v. Hogan, 468 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 

1983) (en banc) (four weeks is not so long as to preclude inference of guilty 

knowledge); Commonwealth v. Walters, 378 A.2d 1232, 1236–37 (Pa. 

Super. 1977) (guilty knowledge properly inferred by unexplained possession 

of stolen furniture six days after theft, where defendant fled to avoid police).

With regard to the location of the theft in comparison to where Appellant 

possessed the car, Appellant claims incorrectly that the Commonwealth 

offered no evidence on this point. The Commonwealth stipulated to 

testimony, and Appellant conceded on the record, that the car was taken from 

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1

It appears that Williams is binding precedent. As we recently observed, 

subsequent to Williams, 

In . . . Commonwealth v. Doman, [] 416 A.2d 507 ([Pa.] 1980), 

the Supreme Court referred to Williams as a plurality decision. 

Id. at 509. A review of the Williams opinion, however, suggests 

that it was in fact a 6–1 majority decision, with four justices 

joining in the majority decision and two concurring in the result. 

Justice Eagan authored the majority decision with two justices 

(Jones, C.J. and O’Brien, J.) joining. Justice Pomeroy filed a 

concurring opinion in which he amplified on the constitutional 

history of the evidentiary presumption/inference at issue. In his 

concurring opinion, Justice Pomeroy agreed with both the 

majority’s decision to reinstate the judgment of the trial court and 

Justice Eagan’s reasons for doing so. Williams, 362 A.2d at 250–

51 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 267 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc).
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Collingdale, Pennsylvania, in Delaware County, approximately six miles from 

where Philadelphia officers saw him speeding. This evidence contributed to 

the totality of the evidence against Appellant. Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 

A.3d 147, 155-157 (Pa. Super. 2011) (six-mile distance between crimes was 

close enough to create “logical connection between” multiple indictments 

charging receipt of stolen property). 

Lastly, Appellant argues that he fled from police, first in a high-speed 

car chase for one-third of a mile and then in a foot chase of about equal length, 

because he “had no license,” not because he knew the car was stolen. 

Appellant’s Brief at 12. Appellant construes the evidence in the light most 

favorable to himself, but this Court must construe the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth. Viewed in this light, the evidence raises 

a strong inference that Appellant fled because he knew the car was stolen. 

Not only did the foregoing evidence demonstrate knowledge that the car 

was stolen, but it also demonstrated consciousness of guilt, particularly the 

fact that he fled from police and hid in an alley. Commonwealth v. Laird, 

988 A.2d 618, 627 (Pa. 2010) (evidence of defendant’s concealment following 

crime establishes an inference of consciousness of guilt).

For these reasons, Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence of receiving stolen property is devoid of merit.

Dispositional order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/20/2020