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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

April 23, 1973

NOTE FOR MR. KATZ (ACDA)

You expressed some interest in the

current exercise of considering the decompartmenting of satellite photography. Attached

for your information is Dr. McLucas' response

to USIB, which was signed out on April 12.

Admiral DePoix' response is presently being

coordinated by the SecDef. DIA is advocating

decompartmenting, but says that there will be

"significant internal adjustment."

Assistant Deputy Director

for Plans and Policy

NRO Staff

1 Atch

Response to USIB

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Joint

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR •

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

SUBJECT: Modification of TALENT-KEYHOLE Controls

ference your March 29 memorandum USIB-D-46.2/22

11111111/16-73).

The issue raised here is a significant one for the nation.

The fundamental logic behind the recommendation stems from

high confidence that a partial decompartmenting is possible

without adversely affecting the national security and, more

basically, that normal classification rules will adequately

control information flow.

I believe, if this logic proves to be sound, that the

NRO could withstand the added pressures without jeopardizing

the integrity of the conduct of the NRP.

Since such a decision would be irreversible once it is

made, I believe that further examination of risks and potential

problems is warranted. I have attached a paper which identifies

some risks and problems which have A strong likelihood of

materializing should the decision to decompartment be made

and if normal security does not adequately hold the line.

The attached paper also lists questions which were raised from

an examination of Dr. Proctor's paper.

I recommend that a systematic analysii of the implications

be undertaken by a group representing the CONIREX, SIGINT

Committee, NRO, NASA and the NSC prior to approaching the

President for his decision.

John Id: McLucas

1 Attachment

Discussion Paper co CLOSSnitAt ing80111IXEMPT FROM

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DISCUSSION PAPER

I. Risks if non-compartmented security is inadequate.

A. A rapid declassification of satellite photography

and public acknowledgeme4. of "the fact of." This

possibility could be influenced by several factors:

1. Decreased control over the quality of people

having access resulting from less stringent

and less thorough security clearance criteria.

Decreased control on access to the product at

the SECRET level resulting in less psychological

responsibility of those having access.

3. Increased pressures from domestic Agencies in

the Executive Branch to declassify for various

Agency-oriented purposes.

Increased numbers of Legislators pressing for

more complete information on programs.

5. Increased pressures from the media at a variety

of levels for informition which would lead to

inadvertent disclosures.

A rapid erosion of SIG/NT program . security. This

possibility could be influenced by several factors:

1. Increased pressures for relaxation of SIGINT

data controls since the rationale for decompartventing photography also applies to SIGINT, i.e.,

vide-spread accesses and ineffectiveness of the

present TALENT-KEYHOLE System, problems in

credibility, difficulty in sanitization, etc.

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2. Present degree of fusion of SIGINT and PHOTINT

for intelligence use.

Increased personal freedom to discuss satellite

related aspects.

•

4. Increased difficulty in rationalizing to

Legislators and others the difference between

"sensitive" and "non-sensitive" satellite

reconnaissance activities.

ecurity. This possibility

could be influence eril factors:

Increased numbers bf individuals able to discuss

reconnaissance satellites resulting in discussion

of "facts about," which can be more sensitive

than "the fact of."

Increased pressures from domestic Agencies in

the Executive Branch to declassify for various

Agency-oriented purposes.

Increased pressures from the Legislative Branch

for complete information in order to justify

the programs.

Increased pressures from the media at a variety

of levels for information which would lead to

inadvertent disclosures.

5. Decreased control of "black to white" interface,

by which covert work is accomplished, resulting

. in erosion of protection for the covert procurement activity.

. •

II. Problems if non-compartmented security is inadequate:

A. International political sensitivity toward an acknowledged U.S. space reconnaissance program. Several

factors which bear are:

C. A rapid erosion o
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The compartmentation of "the fact of" actually

. serves to prevent official acknowledgements at

any level of classificition which could serve as

a basis for protests of U.S. spy activity over

the territory of others.

Many countries are urging that national sovereignt:

be instituted in space'.

There is no defense of overt information gathering

from space other than the fact that it is legal

and peaceful and there is no national policy at

this time which governs aan acknowledged high

quality information gathering space program.

4. The U.S. cannot afford to alter its space reconnaissance philosophy and thus may be forced into

a compromising position at the U.N.

-Notwithstanding the tacit agreement and SALT

national means understandings, the Soviets, if

publicly confronted with the fact of a U.S.

reconnaissance program, could revert to historic

behavior patterns by publicly condemning space •

reconnaissance, even at the expense of Soviet

operations. •

B. NRO Management. Several factors which bear are:

1. "Normalization" of the product may imply a

normalization of NRP activities, potentially

causing increased costs of development and

. procurement.

If the Soviets acquire substantive information

about U.S. capability, which affirms a relative

U.S. advantage, an expensive competition may

ensue, thus potentially increasing NRP costs.
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3. Should it become known that a central office

is devoted to the development and procurement

of satellite reconnaissance systems extensive

marketing efforts on the part of outside contractors may develop, thus eroding the solidarity of present covert contractor relationships.

Security implementatton may be extremely

difficult because of lower security investigative and adjudicating criteria utilized in

processing a person for access to SECRET information and also since immigrant aliens can be

processed for SECRET and individuals having

foreign relatives can have access to TOP SECRET

information, thus increasing the potential for

disclosures.

If there are not indeed high numbers of beneficiaries,

would an alternative to decompartmentation be of use

in lowering risk potential?

•

What would be the resource impact of increased knowledge of capabilities of photoreconnaissance on the

identification of collection requirements?

D. What would be the resource impact on the physical

requirements for product handling and dissemination

at a decompartmented level of classification?

1

the data?

III. Questions raised by 's paper. Dr. Proctor

1 A. Who precisely would benefit from decompartmenting

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What degree of acceptability is expected from

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presently "cleared" members of Congress?

What would be the resource impact on EIS programs of

NASA and other agency programs?
-TOM-CRET- ALEUT

G. In the SALT vein, what impact is expected as to

the President's options for raising challenges

on SAL compliance, if the data are also available

to Congress on demand?

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R. Also in the SALT context, what is the legal implication of an inadvertent public disclosure•vis-a-vis

Soviet national reaction?'

1.:

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