Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981 

M/R 

On July 16, Dr. McLucas returned the attached LHSM with the 

urgent direction that we immediately redo as a memo for his 

signature to Mr. Packard. The memo was prepared, with 

necessary changes, and one added paragraph (see copy, also 

attached). 

Dr. McLucas discussed the memo with Mr. Packard and returned 

it to us for formal controlled transmittal -- accomplished early 

PM, July 16. 

WRY 

July 17, 1969 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981 
Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981 

TOP SECRET CONTROL SYSTEM 

~ATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE llll\lll\l\\lllllllll\ll\1111\1111\llll\lllllllllll\lll\llll\lll\ 14 000037600 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

THE NRO STA FF July 14, 1969 

HANDLE VlA 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 

SUBJECT: ExCom and the Arms Control Satellite 

Problem: 

To encourage Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's NSAM 156 

Ad Hoc Committee to review a proposal for an Arms Control 

Satellite. 

Background: 

In May 1969, your NRO Staff recommended that the NSSM 28 

Committee (responsible for SALT negotiation policy) consider the 

desirability of an Arms Control Satellite initiative to the USSR. 

Such an initiative would, we believe, give ACDA the advantage of 

being able to openly discuss satellite observation without adverse 

effects on the security protection surrounding (and so vital to) the 

NRP. In this approach, the United States would negotiate with the 

Soviets on the basis of an Arms Control Satellite to be developed 

and operated {1) jointly by the two nations, or (2) bilaterally, like the 

US-USSR meteorological satellites, or (3) nationally, with each 

nation agreeing to build and operate its own. In each case, the U.S. 

development agency would be NASA. 

The satellite would be defined in terms of whatever emerged 

from the negotiations. Resolution -- always a critical question 

previously -- would be no problem here, and it is estimated that 

the USSR would propose some value between 2 and 10 meters. By 

working in this manner, outside the NRP, ACDA could avoid conCONTROL NO ______ _ 

BYEMAN TOP SECRET COPY ___ OF ___ COPIES 

CONTROL SYSTEM EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981 

PAGE. ___ OF ___ PAGES 
HANDLE VIA 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981 

TOP SECRET 

fronting the Soviets (and the rest of the world) either publicly or 

privately with the reality of a major U.S. intelligence collection 

program. Perhaps even more important -- if that is possible --

ACDA would also avoid domestic confrontation with Congress and 

the American public. Finally, if the initiative is successful, the 

U.S. would have achieved a measurable step toward legitimatizing 

HAND( EVIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

satellite observation at some to-be-negotiated level; the discussions 

failed, they would do so without jeopardizing the NRP. 

Prior to the May 14 meeting of the NSSM 28 Committee, NRO 

Staff members met with Mr. Gerard Smith (ACDA), Dr. Seaborg 

(AEC}, Mr. Bruce Clarke (CIA), Mr. Jack Shaw {State), and 

Major General Allison (JCS) to discuss the Arms Control Satellite. 

At its meeting, the NSSM 28 Committee decided to ask Ambassador 

Johnson's NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee to examine the suggestion 

in the light of satellite reconnaissance policy. 

Pre sent Status: 

The State Department is showing no sense of urgency in calling 

the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee into session. As a matter of fact, 

last Thursday (July 10) in conversations with Mr. Jack Shaw 

(Executive Secretary of the committee), I was surprised to learn of 

his open hostility to the proposal. Mr. Shaw says that an Arms 

Control Satellite would present "more problems thah disclosure." 

In reply to the question, "What would you do to establish verification 

credibility with the American public? 11, Shaw replied, "We'll tell 

them we have national means of verification. If they ask what it is, 

we'll say we can't tell them. 11 With regard to satellite vulnerability, 

Shaw said, "I'm told 'they' can't do anything to keep us from flying. 11 

In the meanwhile, Dr. DuBridge has recommended that "the 

ExCom consider the proposal and decide whether to encourage a 156 

review. 11 

Recommendation: 

It seems very timely to have an ExCom meeting -- perhaps a 

luncheon -- to conduct the review recommended by Dr. DuBridge. 

CONTROL NO ______ _ 

BYEMAN TOP SECRET COPY ___ OF ___ COPtES 

CONTROL SYSTEM EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981 

PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES 
HANDLE VIA 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981 HANOI EVIA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN 

I suggest that Mr. Packard consider inviting Dr. Tom Paine and 

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to be guests. This meeting would 

produce the following results: 

1. Acquaint Mr. Helms and Dr. DuBridge directly and for 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

the first time, with the details of the Arms Control Satellite initiative. 

2. Give Dr. Paine (who has supported this idea strongly in 

letters to Mr. Packard and Mr. Helms) an opportunity to express 

NASA's thoughts on the initiative. 

3. Give Ambassador Johnson some facts he is not getting from 

Jack Shaw plus a sense of urgency in considering the initiative within 

his committee. 

4. Establish important coordinated ground work in DOD, CIA, 

State,. OST, and NASA prior to the NSAM 156 Ad Hoc Committee 

meeting. 

'~-a..~l. . AN ~ 

Colonel, USAF 

~-

CONTROL NO, ______ _ 

BYEMAN TOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

COPY ___ OF ___ COPIES 

PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111981