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PROJECTS

Cuban Overflight Reconnaissance

NSA M 311 - CIIR011n10LOGY

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TOP SECRET

NSAM 311 Chronology 

CUBAN OVERFLIGHT RECONNAISSANCE

1961-1962

1962

23 October 1962

28 October 1962

11 November 1962

Prior to October 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency

was responsible for Cuban overflight reconnaissance.

Flights were conducted by the CIA using IDEALIST (U-2)

aircraft. Prior to November 62, flights by CIA were

conducted on a spasmodic basis: 5 in 1960; 24 in 1961;

and 21 up through October 1962. On 10 October 1962, due

largely to fears that the Cuban crisis would eventually

involve use of military invasion forces, and also because

of growing dissatisfaction on the part of DOD over the

lack of factual information on the military strength of

Cuba, responsibility for Cuban overflight operations was

transferred from the CIA to the DOD. DOD assigned

mission responsibility to Strategic Air Command.

Overflight reconnaissance of Cuba, under operational

supervision of JCS, began on 14 October.1962. On this

date, a SAC U-2, overflew Cuba and obtained photographs

which verified estimates of missile buildup in Cuba and

preceded a concentrated reconnaissance effort by high

flying U-2's and low flying tactical reconnaissance aircraft of the Air Force and Navy.

President Kennedy signed the Proclamation ordering

interdiction of offensive weapons moving into Cuba. The

next day, 24 October, a surface ship quarantine was

established to block further offensive weapon shipments

to Cuba.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev ordered missile sites in Cuba

dismantled and returned to Russia.

By this date, all Soviet ships (reported by the Soviets) as

those involved in withdrawal of missiles had been inspected

by the U. S. • Nine Soviet ships were involved in the withdrawal action - a total of 42 missiles were inspected and

photographed aboard these ships.

lade

Control Ram

IDEALIST
TOP SECRE

November 1962 From the latter part of November 1962 until the present

time, aerial reconnaissance of Cuba has continued to provide assurance against re-introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba.

29 June 1964 Mr. Califano of Department of Defense forwarded to State

(Mr. Crimmins - Coordinator of Cuban Affairs) a memo

prepared by the -(S)-NRO which summarized the technical

and operational considerations associated with conducting

Cuban reconnaissance. (See Tab No. 1)

10 July 1964 Mr.' McGeorge Bundy signed NSAM 311, Subject: "Review

of the Problem of Assurance Against any Missile Crisis

in Cuba. " (See Tab No. 2)

20 July 1964

23 July 1964

16 September 1964

September 1964

Mr. McNamara directed full support of Department of

Defense studies associated with NSAM 311. Mr.

McNaughton of ASD/ISA was named to head Department

of Defense contributions to problem. (Tab No. 3)

From the latter part of July, DOD staff sections, the

-(8)- NRO and other governmental agencies commenced

serious consideration of the NSAM 311 problem.

Mr. Krueger of the -(S)-NRO Staff prepared a paper which

presented the capabilities and limitations of conducting

long-range oblique photography of Cuba from aircraft

flying around the periphery of the island. (Tab No. 4)

A Special National Intelligence Estimate was published

on "Likelihood of Re -Introduction of Soviet Offensive

Missiles into Cuba, " which concluded "They fhe CubaniD

can be fairly certain of U. S. detection methods and

reactions against strategic missiles. " (See Tab No. 5)

By early September, considerable attention was being

given to evaluating alternative systems and techniques

for conducting Cuban reconnaissance.

lamb via., fad SIM
18 September 1964

24 September 1964

28 September 1964

1 October 1964

8 October 1964

lade viafari

Control SON

The AFCRL, at Colonel Worthman's request, submitted

a plan for using free flight balloons over Cuba.

(See Tab No. 6)

The COMOR published a paper which estimated the number of OXCART flights required to meet Cuban reconnaissance requirements. This paper also provided a

comparative analysis of (expected) OXCART versus

(actual) U-2 results. (Tab No. 7)

Mr. Alvin Friedman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,

International Security Affairs, was designated by Mr.

McNaughton as the Dept of Defense action officer for

NSAM 311 matters. A series of discussions, conferences

and briefings were held to acquaint Mr. Friedman with the

capabilities and limitations of the various reconnaissance

systems available for use against Cuba. Various DOD elements participated in these early discussions, including:

the JCS (JRC), Defense Intelligence Agency, various offices

of the Air Staff and the iS)-NRO.

Mr. Friedman requested the -(S)- NRO to consider the various

reconnaissance assets available to the U.S. which could be

used as an alternative means of conducting reconnaissance

of Cuba.

Dr. Fubini requested, early on the morning of 8 October,

that the Of NRO provide (by 1200 hours) a brief summary

of the considerations affecting reconnaissance of Cuba with

satellites. Fortunately, much of this information had

already been collected for inclusion in the work being done

for Mr. Friedman on this subject. As a result of this paper

the-{S) NRO was directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense

(see marginalia on original memo) to: (1) prepare to fly an

8-day evenly spaced orbit - this orbit would provide optimum flight path cover of Cuba and not degrade Sino-Soviet

coverage - it was not to be optimized as regards time over

Cuba since the normal launch time (to cover Sino-Soviet

targets) would place the vehicle over Cuba at about 1500 bra

local - too late in the day to avoid cumulus build-up;

OXCART

--TOP-SECRET---

3
t3p SECREr

8 October 1964 (2) the Deputy Secretary of Defense also directed the

(Continued) -(3)-DNRO to evaluate establishing a launch facility_ at

Eastern Test Range from which

orbits could be flown to traverse the length - rather

than the width - of Cuba. (Tab No. 8)

8 October 1964

9 October 1964

13 October 1964

15 October 1964

15 October 1964

19 October 1964

21 October 1964

AFXOP-R provided a paper showing existing capabilities

for conducting peripheral oblique photographs of Cuba.

(Tab No. 9)

The -(-S)- NRO produced a draft booklet entitled "Planning

Facts - NSAM 311. " (Tab No. 10)

The 48)- NRO requested the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) to define the specific informational content required by a P. 1. to detect and identify -

with assurance - IRBM or MRBM associated targets.

Definition to include 'photographs from satellites, aircraft,

drones and balloons. (Tab No. 11)

A revised draft of "Planning Facts - NSAM 311" was

completed by the-(8)- NRO Staff for Mr. Friedman.

A NSAM 311 "briefing kit" was provided Dr. McMillan

in anticipation of his meeting with Mr. Friedman to

discuss this subject. (Tab No. 12)

General Greer was requested to study the feasibility of

flying an "8 -day equally spaced" orbit against Cuba and

to provide a plan for establishing a ICH-4111111111aunch

capability at AMR. (Tab No. 13)

Copies of the final edition of "Planning Facts - NSAM 311"

were forwarded to Mr. Friedman together with a cover

memorandum signed by Dr. McMillan. Copies were subsequently furnished State, CIA, JCS, and the Deputy

Secretary of Defense.

N. B.: This document, while useful as an educational

aid on types and capabilities of various reconnaissance

systems which could be applied against Cuba, was subHide 41111111,

Wei SOF-

-40E-SE-CREL

4
•••.uP SERE

21 October 1964 sequently refined by the introduction of more accurate

(Continued) and precise climatological data than was available for

this edition of the Planning Facts book. Particularly,

it was discovered that the climatology first used (while

applicable to balloons) was not adequate for other types

of sensors. (Tab No. 14)

21 October 1964 Mr. Friedman sent to Ambassador Thompson a copy of

the "Planning Facts - NSAM 311" and, drawing upon

information contained in the study, proposed a revision

to a draft State Department position paper (dated 12 Oct

64) on NSAM. 311. (Tab 15)

21 October 1964 NPIC provided an evaluation of the ca bility of satellite

reconnaissance systems (KR- satisfy Cuban

reconnaissance requirements. This was the first such

paper published which was applied to the use of satellites

over Cuba. (Tab No. 16)

22 October 1964 COMOR, addressed the problem of Cuban reco

from satellites. Summarv: KR-4 not h halg

22 October 1964 Mr. Friedman requested DIA to analyze whether a

reconnaissance "package" composed of a "mix" of aircraft, drones, balloons and satellites could satisfy Cuban

reconnaissance requirements. (Tab No. 18)

22 October 1964

26 October 1964

The first satellite photographs of Cuba, taken specifically as a result of NSAM 311 (resulting from an arrangement made by Colonel Worthman through DIA and thence

to USIB), were received by-(S)- NRO. Photographs

(mission 1011-1) were 90% degraded by clouds.

(Tab No. 19)

A draft memorandum for record, prepared by Mr. Friedman of ISA, indicated he had been informed by Mr. McCone

that he (McCone) was very exercised over inclusion of "wry An n. Ala 2 at- a...a a --
inquest/7 refined by the introduction of more accurate

and precise climattlingical date thao was available for

this edition of the Planning Peale book. Particularly.

It was discovered that the climatology first used (addle

applicable to balloons) was not adequate for other types

of sensors. (Tab No. 14)

31 October 1964

(Continued)

21 October 1944 Mr. Friedman sect to Ambessedor Thompson a copy of

the °Planning Pacts - NUM 3110 and. drawing upon

information contained in the study. proposed a revision

to a draft State Department position paper (dated 12 Oct

04) on IMAM 311. (Tab 15)

21 October 1904 NPIC provided an evaluation of the capability of satellite

reCOM11111111Ult* systems 001

.4k1.9.350 ta Satiety Cuban

reconnaissance requirements. This was the first such

paper published which was applied to the one of satellites

over Cuba. (Tab No. IS)

22 October 1004 Mr. Friedman requested DRA to analyse 'needier a

reconnaissance °package° composed of a "mix" of

croft, drams, bailment and satellites could satisfy Cuban

reconnaissance requirements. (Tab No. /IQ

22 October 1904 The first satellite photographs of Cobs. Saban specifically as a result of /MAW 311 (resulting from an arrangement made by Colonel Worthless through DIA and thence

to um), were received by4M-NRO. Photographs

(mission 1011-1) were 90% degraded by clouds.

(Tab No. 10)

A draft memorandem for record, prepared by Mr. Priedman of MA, indicated be had been informed by Mr. McCone

that he (McCaw) was very exercised over Inclusion of

OXCART data in the NUM in Plan tap Facts study.

(Tab No. 20)

39 October 1904 • •• • **t •• ; ••
1 • 4. •

.. • •

M Oda. MS A test, Mparlomot at BMWs Mosr. SOMotts "MOM MI

Pesanio Wanes et MMus" waw IMMMI 7 MIS Ronan. la mstassatm grin tboMMIK, flak. TM mar

millan Mann Cam ramosimasso ',mainmasts

mad orMain Ur omottlftim at mime ladlonall Irma%

or sembatattaas at ramosammo moms, to wrzearallitr

Cn0111. tiYlb Pa at

0040,.. 44 A OM atamM .11111.144111110 Itgliall11114 tm 11$11611•0*

41.~11110110 Of Clams nal MOM Mtn MOM% Mood

morn Man oath mon of tbe roar. an No. 13)

lea Ogootor 1011 A mom my Monnsf iq 4•41040414

mama ems Not Sault wart baton of og

snood Itoommiamm nefina." Tim om s theer•Ai.

iso 11141.11MA a tlr onstfasi •Mor of ambelano Cam

tommimmea Mia • AMMO It *Merman /UMealsonlats. (TA, So. Ill

I sowooior lad COMOR Mind W estima, a was itatollit• omMoilasem aotari ametnisma at Calm rammlooms moanmot. 'OM ma at mamma' onnalatia mon iaW

maist, atm Mt mann= Mann 6sMllia ramaitissumo ma mien • Mom manderstion of

Mit IMAM 1. is It soon not am 117 4d% nok

Os a Imo Or Ihr nomMussa, Mrsotery width cant

uelso temslbow se • *alma* loth* irobloat.

(Tab No. ill
I I

.

Ir..'

4 November 1004 epfuldeal to be leccemistent with Aetna/ experience. The

(Continued) Beard time remanded the offending document (Tab 25) to

(=NOR far rewrite. (Tab No. 21)

12 November 1254 in Calomel Wiggins provided ISA (Mr. Fristkosel with a

resume Oi Department of Wane. actions which had ham

initiated to date to response to *JAM 311. (Tab No. 21)

12 November 11114 prom aided for as mays* of best U16/Fighter

Capability *mon to be extilleble to Cabe*. A08 estimate showed 40 211G-21%. (Tab No. 211)

111 November 106t preperstion for a meeting of the "Thompson Committee"

Wears NicNangbthe and Friedman of IA& working with

Colonel Narthexes, prepared two briefing papers - one

considering the mamma Ay Cuban reeonnaissance is

bow wall various reconnaissance syntax* are to

erceasary - the other directed at vihni Earl and

the problem. (Tab No. $0)

18 November 1964 The Thompson Committee Met to coeleider INSAN 311.

Three primary arose discussed: lit capabilities of

satellite T*000411.111MIMIS to assist is ealuttem (2) what

can the "advanced aircraft" contribute: and (3) a "eceearie"

to uee to dispelling concern (mostly Caber, concern) over

ocetbunition of 1J S. overflight operations. (Tab No. 31)

A final draft of the Thompson Committer restuntiat

NUM 311 was received by Departneent at Defense, It

was reviewed and annotated by thertithX110 Sod stabilegoogly by Secretary of Deana.. (Tab No. sal

lb November 11164 A CIA input to the final draft of the NSAM $11 paper was

thelatedly1 received which dealt in cursory hoiden with

what OXCART could contribute to the Cuban MOOPOSISsame problem. Summary: "It fa possible to use." but

"We are unable to make a firm estimate of its capability. *

This latter reference applied primarily to vulnerability

of the 811-71 io Cuban air defense. Mob No. SS)

•

OXCART

18 November 1904
19 November 1964 The 411).17110 produced a paper abysm; the percentage of

Cuban coverage bumf a/ photo) versus number of flights -

for 'melees reconnaissance systems. These data were

subsequently found to be erroneous in several regards.

but partimearly as applied to satellites. since we had

considered only a one bucket, rather than deal bucket.

KR-4 capebilUy. Nmberreessing - but discovered prior

to diiitribution and corrected in • loner edition.

(Tab No. 34)

19 Novenete r 1964 .46) DNRO sent to Secretary of Defensellet corrected

coverage tables referred to above. (Tab No. 35)

19 November 1964 The DCI, before the 8/3101, stated that the draft COMM

rewrite of the "satellite contribution paper" (Tab 27)

did not deal sufficiently with the operational delay* which

might be encountered with satellites in a crisis management situation. (Tab No. 86) •

19 November 1964 Handwritten notes by Mr. McNamar* on coverage tables

shown an Tab 35. (Tab No. 37)

20 November 1064 Request for Cuban climatology study. (Tab No. 36)

20 November 1964 Cuban Climatology Study prepared by Ca ptain Forsythe

of the.le 16140 Stile (Tab No. 39)

20 November 1964 COMM passed a message (TWX) request to members

asking for review of a new statement of requirements for

Cuban reconnaissance. (Tab No. 40)

94 November 1964 PIM responded to request of 13 October for an Assessment of Photo Interpretation Capabilities to Detect any

Re-introduction of Offensive Missiles into Cuba.

(Tab No. 41)

97 November 1964 The 1/3135 approved, with amendments, Cuban requirement paper prepared by COMDR. (Tab No. 42)

..-3331.1r2,4
41if ol 1.!

4111

' . 4

A near final draft of the Thotopsoo Committee's report

on IMAM 311 was reviewed by Colonels Northman at 1* MO Mall and Sanders of MA. Marginalia show

recommended cheeps to draft. A covering memorandum

indloates than Presidential approval of the finel product

of the committee in not repaired - that a description of

the problem and a re commended (slternative) course of

action is sufficient. (Tab No. 43)

The COMOR examined results of Mission 10144 - the first

ten-day ayochronousinine-Mty sqoally awed orbit flown

by a satellite reconnaissance militate. This orbit (in lien

of the fifth day synchronom usually flown) was used

beciuse it was expected to provide full cover of Cob^ in

a tour-day period - with little or no degradation of Soviet

coverage. Mission 10144 photo was also compared with

17-2 photo of Cuba Down on name day. COMM catmluded

that: (a) the "equally spaced" orbit had no significant

adverse effect on Sian-Soviet coverage and (b) that there

were certain advaatages for carefully selected use of this

orbit in the future. Matt No. 44)

Rho* DNAG, Mr. Friedman mad Colonel Northman conferred on DOD comments to the ENIAM 311 draft dated

27 November. Agreement was reached on a response to

State. (Tab No. 45)

Depart:owe of Defense comments on State Department

MAW 311 Draft of 27 November 1964. (Tab No. 48)

The Photo Working Group of COMDR compiled a tabulation

showing coverage of buckets 1 end 2 of 10144 over the

Sire-flovist bloc. (Tub No. 47)

Another Cuban climatology study, directed toward the

BMWs requirement for "interpretable" photo (La., defined as 2511. cloud *over or lose) wee completed by the

tetqato Staff. (Tab No. 48)

30 November 1984

4 December 1964
December 1964 A DOD footnote to IISAM 311 final response win prepared

to express the cane with which orbital etethanics could

be COliverted for optimisation of Cuban recommisaance.

(Tab No. 49)

10 December 1964 The CIA challenged the DOD statement that reconnaissance

drools could be flown ettectivelY egainst Cuba. The DOD

position. based on tactual *aperient* with drones in South

Seat Asia and over China. was verified by a detailed

examination of put exparboote. (Tab No. SO)

10 December 1964 A mudy indietted embers of SDI, taraais to Sine-Soviet

U December 1964 Lout minute changes to Department of Defense contruente

sent to Mats Department involved primarily use af

hallows and drones as an alternative Cuban reconnaissance resource. CIA not enthusiastic about thin proposal.

(Tab No. 53)

11 December 1964 The State Department published a recommended response

to the Principals concerned with NUM 311. (Tab No. thi)

14 Decomber 1984 The419.31110 Satellite Operations Center published • post

zoortem report on Mission 1014-.1 showing intended venue

actual orbital characteristics end results. This report

also confirmed that these was no degradation of StaoSoviet coverage on this mission. (Tab No. 54)

lb December 1964 Mr. Friedman Bent to the Secretary of Defense a brochure

emendating (a) the final draft of the 'Thompson Committee

report on MIMI 311; (b) • commentary on inadequacies of

the infers (e) a draft transmittal in the event Secretary of

Defense should decide to have the JCS review the final

NUM 311 draft and (d) a memorandum containing minutes

of the 19 November committee meeting. (Tab No. 53)

16 December 1984 To preclude out-of -context um of the NUM 311 Pleaming

Teets book. 40:opts& (except Copy No. 1 held by

M:. Friedman of 111/0 were withdrawn. (Tab No. 56)

4p-mkimic.4