IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 23, 2019 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DIONTAE SMARTT

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

No. 294713 Don W. Poole, Judge

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No. E2018-02013-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

A Hamilton County jury found Defendant, Diontae Smartt, guilty of aggravated sexual 

battery, for which he received a sentence of eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, 

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to admit the video 

recording of his statement to police in its entirety, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of 

Evidence 106, after the State questioned Defendant about inconsistencies between the

statement and Defendant’s trial testimony. Defendant further contends that the trial court 

erred by denying his request to instruct the jury on self-defense as the defense was fairly 

raised by the proof at trial. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JJ., joined.

Steve E. Smith, District Public Defender; and Erinn Rene O’Leary and Christian Coder, 

Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Diontae Smartt.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Courtney N. Orr, Assistant 

Attorney General; Neal Pinkston, District Attorney General; and Jason Demastus and 

AnCharlene Davis, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

10/03/2019
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OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In March 2015, the Hamilton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for

aggravated rape.

1

The indictment alleged that Defendant:

on September 29, 2014, in the County aforesaid, did unlawfully and 

intentionally or knowingly engage in sexual penetration of [the victim] and 

. . . [D]efendant caused bodily injury to the victim, in violation of 

Tennessee Code Annotated [section] 39-13-502[.] 

Trial Testimony

Defendant’s case was first tried in August 2017; however, the trial court declared a 

mistrial after the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the charged offense. The 

case proceeded to trial for a second time in April 2018. The victim’s daughter testified 

that on the morning of September 29, 2014, the victim called her around 7:00 a.m. The 

victim sounded “[s]haken and upset” and said that he needed to go to the emergency 

room because he had been raped. The victim’s daughter drove to the victim’s residence, 

which was about two or three minutes from her home. When she arrived, she saw that 

the victim had been “beaten up.” She testified that she tried to hug the victim, but he was 

“very standoffish” and did not want to be touched. She took the victim to the emergency 

room at Parkridge Medical Center (“Parkridge”). She testified that they arrived around 

7:30 a.m. and did not leave until 12:30 or 1:00 p.m. The victim’s daughter stated that the 

victim’s injuries required immediate medical attention but agreed that neither she nor the 

victim called 911. She stated that she later learned that Defendant’s residence was “four 

doors down” from the victim’s home. 

The victim’s son testified that he received a call from his sister on the morning of 

September 29, 2014, informing him that the victim had been raped. The victim’s son

explained that he worked as a dispatch operator for Hamilton County 911 and that, after 

learning about the offense, he called dispatch and spoke to his supervisor. He told his 

supervisor that the victim had been raped and was being taken to Parkridge. The victim’s 

son then went to the hospital where he saw the victim. The victim’s demeanor was 

unusual as he seemed “glum” and “sad.” 

 

1 Defendant’s case originated in Hamilton County Juvenile Court but was transferred to Hamilton 

County Criminal Court. 
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Delight Chandler testified that she was working as a nurse in the emergency room 

at Parkridge on the morning of September 29, 2014. Ms. Chandler recalled that the 

victim came in and stated that he had been sexually assaulted. Ms. Chandler took the 

victim back to a private room, noting that he had an abrasion on his head. The victim 

described “some pain to the ribs.” Ms. Chandler testified that she notified the police 

department and the Partnership Rape Crisis Center (“Rape Crisis Center”), as per hospital 

policy. Ms. Chandler testified that the victim’s son had already reported the offense to 

the Chattanooga Police Department. 

Rebecca Ammons testified that she was a nurse practitioner employed at the Rape 

Crisis Center as a sexual assault nurse examiner. On September 29, 2014, she 

interviewed and examined the victim at Parkridge. The victim reported that the sexual 

assault occurred between 6:30 a.m. and 6:45 a.m. He stated that he did not know the 

perpetrator. He stated that he was “held down by the suspect and that he was injured and 

beaten[.]” The victim denied having sexual relations with anyone in the seventy-two 

hours preceding the sexual assault and stated that he had no injuries prior to the sexual 

assault. Ms. Ammons testified that she noted both non-genital and anal-genital injuries to 

the victim. The victim stated that he was “penetrated by the [perpetrator’s] penis[.]” Ms. 

Ammons stated that the victim suffered a “long laceration” on his head, and his abdomen 

had an “abrasion and some tenderness upon palpitation.” The victim reported that the

entire right side of his abdomen was tender and sore when he moved. The victim had 

lacerations on his arms and abrasions “from the hips down.” The victim also had a large 

contusion on his left upper arm and a large abrasion on the buttocks. Ms. Ammons 

testified that she performed a rape kit on the victim, during which she collected anal 

swabs and buccal swabs from the victim. She explained that the victim had “a large[,]

bigger-than-two-centimeter[s], contusion on the anal tissue of the rectum.” Ms. Ammons 

testified that the victim’s injuries were consistent with forcible penetration. She 

photographed the victim’s injuries and gave the victim’s clothing to police. 

Sergeant Joe Montijo with the Chattanooga Police Department testified that on 

September 29, 2014, he received a call from lead investigator Lucas Fuller. Investigator 

Fuller advised that he was at Parkridge with an elderly male who had been raped and 

assaulted. He requested that Sergeant Montijo come to the hospital to document the 

victim and collect evidence. 

Sergeant Montijo testified that he took photographs of the victim, documenting 

any visible injuries. He recalled that the victim had on a soiled white t-shirt and had 

injuries to the back of his head. He had a large laceration on the back of his head, a 

scrape mark on his neck, and both of his elbows were “skinned up.” The victim also had 

abrasions on his back and a “scraped up” abdomen. Sergeant Montijo collected the 

victim’s shirt, jogging shorts, and underwear, as well as the completed rape kit. He also 
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took swabs of the victim’s hands, underneath his fingernails, and a buccal swab. After 

leaving the hospital, Sergeant Montijo located the crime scene on Mississippi Avenue. 

He found a red stain on the sidewalk that was consistent with a blood. He stated, “There 

was quite a bit of blood and skin and debris[.]” 

Two days later, when Investigator Fuller brought Defendant to the police 

department for an interview, Sergeant Montijo photographed Defendant, took 

fingerprints, and collected a DNA sample. Sergeant Montijo explained that Defendant 

had visible injuries. He had “very pronounced bruises” on his shoulders; a laceration on 

his arm; abrasions, bruises, and scrape marks on his knees; an abrasion on his elbow; and 

a raised abrasion on the bridge of his nose. 

Investigator Lucas Fuller testified that he worked as a criminal investigator at the 

Chattanooga Police Department in September 2014. On September 29th, he responded to 

Parkridge to interview the victim. After speaking to the victim, Investigator Fuller 

conducted a neighborhood canvas as Sergeant Montijo collected evidence. Investigator 

Fuller explained that he received a tip that identified Defendant as a suspect. Investigator 

Fuller learned that Defendant was a student at Red Bank High School. After locating 

photographs of Defendant on Facebook, Investigator Fuller noted that Defendant’s age, 

build, and hairstyle matched the victim’s description of the perpetrator. Investigator 

Fuller went to Red Bank High School and obtained video footage from the morning of 

September 29, 2014, that showed Defendant arrived late to school. Investigator Fuller 

explained that Defendant’s residence was on Federal Street, “less than a half mile” from 

the crime scene. Investigator Fuller testified that he interviewed Defendant and collected 

a DNA sample, which Defendant willingly provided. Investigator Fuller recalled that 

Defendant had scrapes on his knees and scrapes to his back. He stated that Defendant 

had a “stutter or speech impediment” and that he was crying uncontrollably at times 

during the police interview. 

Special Agent Chad Johnson, a forensic biologist in the DNA unit of the 

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, testified that he tested several items of evidence in 

connection with Defendant’s case. He first tested anal swabs taken from the victim’s 

rape kit and found that the victim’s “DNA [was] there on the anal swab as part of the 

sperm fraction, but there [was] a second individual that [was] inconclusive as to 

[Defendant][.]” Agent Johnson explained that he also found the presence of spermatozoa 

on the “inside back area” of the victim’s underwear. He obtained a partial DNA profile 

from the sperm fraction, and the partial profile matched Defendant’s DNA profile in a 

percentage “greater than the world population[.]” Agent Johnson further testified that he 

found a bloodstain on the back side of the victim’s underwear; he obtained a DNA profile 

from the stain and found that it matched Defendant’s DNA profile. Agent Johnson stated 
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that he also obtained a DNA profile from a bloodstain collected at the crime scene on 

Mississippi Avenue, which matched the victim’s DNA profile.

The victim testified that in September 2014, he lived on Federal Street and that he 

was sixty-nine years old. The victim explained that he ran three miles every morning 

between 5:00 and 7:00 a.m. He said that his practice at the end of every run was to “walk 

a little bit to cool down.” The victim testified that on the morning of September 29, 

2014, he finished his run around 6:30 or 6:45 a.m. and began walking in an area near his 

home. He stated that, when he turned onto West Mississippi, he saw Defendant walking 

from Forest Avenue towards East Mississippi. The victim explained that, the next thing 

he knew, Defendant was “right behind” him. Defendant tried to put his arm around the 

victim, and the victim pushed it away. The victim testified, “He asked me if I wanted to 

engage in a homosexual act with him and I told him no.” Defendant “kept walking 

beside [the victim] and asking [him] why not, why don’t you want to.” The victim 

responded, “I don’t do things like that” and repeatedly told Defendant “no.” The victim 

did not want Defendant to follow him home, so he stopped and confronted Defendant. 

Defendant then “charged him,” knocked the victim to the ground, and began pulling the 

victim’s shorts and underwear down. The victim fell onto his back, and the back of his 

head landed against the bottom of a set of steps. The victim recalled:

The first thing I did, I kicked him in the chest, I guess one of my 

feet, and it knocked him back off of me. And at that time, I tried to pull my 

shorts back up because they’re down around my knees and I can’t do much. 

He was immediately back on me, just like he’s energized. And, you know, 

I’m exhausted, he’s energized. So he pulls the pants back down again.

The victim explained that Defendant held him in a position where his shoulders 

and part of his back were still on the ground but his legs were “lifted up.” The victim 

recalled that his head was pushed up against the step in a position where he could not 

move much. The victim testified that Defendant “took his penis and pushed it into [the 

victim’s] rectal area.” The victim recalled:

I tried to scream a couple of times, maybe it was three or four, you 

know. There was nobody around. He kind of looked around to see what 

was going on. And then the pain from the force was more, I couldn’t 

hardly scream anymore. So, you know, finally, he finished up, he pulled 

out, and then he said “one more time.” So then he forced his penis into my

rectal area again the second time. The pain became even more intense and I 

just, all I could do was beg him to quit and leave. So, finally, he finishes up 

and he steps back out in the street and, I guess, getting himself together 

again, and he walks off and says “have a sweet day.”
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The victim testified that, after the assault, he returned home but began to feel pain 

in his chest. The victim called his daughter and asked her to take him to the emergency 

room at Parkridge. The victim recalled that he spoke to Investigator Fuller the next day. 

The victim testified that he had never seen Defendant before that morning but agreed that 

he could see Defendant’s front door from the deck of his home. 

Defendant testified that he was hit by a car three weeks prior to September 29, 

2014, and that he had a sprained ankle that necessitated the use of crutches for several 

weeks. He stated that he stopped using the crutches a day or two before the offense. 

Defendant testified that he lived on Federal Street and that he was walking to his bus stop 

at the corner of Liberty and Mississippi Avenue on the morning of September 29. He 

stated that he left his residence around 6:10 a.m. because his bus arrived at 6:20 a.m. 

Defendant said that he saw the victim run past him, and he said “hi” to the victim but 

kept walking towards the bus stop. Defendant claimed that the victim “circled back 

around[,]” put his arms around Defendant, and asked Defendant to have sex with him for 

$100. Defendant testified that he told the victim “no” and that he “wasn’t into that.” 

Defendant stated that he was walking down the road “side-by-side” with the 

victim when the victim pulled him into a “dark little area[.]” He stated that the victim 

pulled his own pants down and that Defendant was on his knees during the encounter. 

Defendant testified, “[The victim] undid my pants when his was down already, and that’s 

when . . . he had me to penetrate him[.]” Defendant also stated that he did not use any 

lubricant before he penetrated the victim. 

Defendant testified that he hit the victim when the victim grabbed his testicles. He 

recalled that he and the victim engaged in a “[s]cuffle.” Defendant claimed that he was 

attempting to “pull away” from the victim but that the victim was holding Defendant’s 

testicles. Defendant explained that he dragged the victim down the stairs until the victim 

let go. Defendant then put his clothes back on and asked the victim for money, but the 

victim told Defendant that he was not giving him money. 

Defendant testified that he went to a neighbor’s house and asked her to take him to 

school because he had missed the bus. Defendant said that he waited about thirty or forty 

minutes before his neighbor could take him to school and that, consequently, he was late 

to school that morning. Defendant testified that he was at school the next day when the 

school resource officer pulled him out of class. Defendant was taken to the police 

station, and he was interviewed by police after his parents arrived. Defendant explained 

that he felt hurt and ashamed and was crying during the entire interview. He testified that 

he was “really emotional, sad, [and] hurt.” Defendant said that he was unable to tell the 

“whole story” because he was emotional and officers “kept walking in and out and asking

[him] questions . . . interrupting [Defendant] the whole time.” 
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On cross-examination, Defendant admitted that he first lied to the officers about 

the incident, denying that he had any contact with the victim. He said that he changed his 

story after learning that the victim accused him of rape because he was “not fixing to go 

down for something [he] didn’t do.” Defendant told Investigator Fuller that he had 

consensual sex with the victim. Defendant also told Investigator Fuller that he punched 

the victim before he penetrated him. 

Introduction of Defendant’s Recorded Statement

During cross-examination, the State questioned Defendant regarding 

inconsistencies in his statement to Investigator Fuller, as follows:

[THE STATE:] You were asked if you knew who this 

individual was, weren’t you?

[DEFENDANT:] Yes.

[THE STATE:] You told them you didn’t know?

[DEFENDANT:] Yes.

[THE STATE:] You told them you knew there was a rape in the 

area, but you didn’t have anything to do with it . . . ?

At this point, defense counsel objected and argued, “At this point, I think under . . 

. Rule 106, the defense, because the district attorney is entering elements of his prior 

statement, the defense has the absolute right to request that the entire statement be played 

for the jury.” Initially, the trial court ruled that the State could cross-examine Defendant 

on his prior statements and then it would allow defense counsel to introduce the recording 

of “the complete statement[.]” The State continued its cross-examination of Defendant, 

questioning him about inconsistencies between his testimony on direct examination and 

his statement to Investigator Fuller, using a transcript of the recorded statement to assist 

in cross-examination. During a jury-out hearing, the State argued that Rule 106 did not 

require that Defendant’s entire statement to be played but only what was necessary to 

provide context. Defense counsel responded that, under the rule, “if any portion of 

[Defendant’s statement] comes in, the entire thing comes in.” 

The trial court then took an hour recess to review Defendant’s statement to 

Investigator Fuller and case law presented by defense counsel. Following the recess, the 

trial court ruled, as follows:
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And here’s what the Court’s ruling. And the whole rule is based 

upon being fair and to put the statement in context. I think to put the 

statement in context, most of the questions concern themselves with him 

not telling the truth. I think [Defendant] gives an adequate explanation on 

the stand, and starting in this statement, of why he didn’t tell the truth; one, 

his mom was in the room, he was embarrassed, he didn’t want to tell what 

happened.

It seems to me, in looking at the statement, that the first [twentyfive] pages of that statement, to put it in context, [Defendant’s] in the police 

department, he’s being talked to by the police detective, he’s being advised 

of his rights, he initially says it didn’t happen. When his -- and then when 

his mom leaves, he cries, I think his emotions are important, I think that 

puts it in context. His mom leaves and then he completely tells what 

happened. And that’s basically what he’s testified to today.

The Court rules that to put this in context, to be fair, the first 

[twenty-five] pages will be played. I want the jury to see him crying, his 

emotions, I think that’s important, to be fair. And I think it’s important, to 

be fair, to say that when his mom left the room, he gave the statement that 

he basically has given today.

. . . [The State] is going to play down to the first [twenty-five] pages 

of that statement, that explains the clothing, that explains the cooperation,

then that explains later when his mom says he wouldn’t do something like 

this. She leaves the room, he then says I haven’t been telling you the truth, 

it was consensual. He’s testified to that today. I don’t think we have to 

play the whole statement to get in context and to be fair what really 

happened.

When the State resumed its cross-examination of Defendant, it played the first 

thirty-six minutes and twenty-five seconds of Defendant’s recorded statement for the 

jury, which covered the first twenty-five pages of the transcript of Defendant’s statement. 

The State then questioned Defendant regarding prior inconsistent statements he made on 

the next three pages of the transcript. Specifically, Defendant had testified that he struck

the victim with his elbow when the victim propositioned him for sex, but he told police 

that he had punched the victim in the face. Defendant explained that he understood 

punching and elbowing to mean the same thing. Defendant testified that the victim did 

not threaten to accuse him of rape; however, he told Investigator Fuller that the victim 

threatened to lie to police and accuse him of rape. Additionally, Defendant stated that 

both he and the victim were on the steps during the offense, but the State confronted 
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Defendant with his statement from the interview where he said they were on the ground. 

Defendant explained that his prior statement referred to what happened “after the fact.”

Finally, Defendant testified that he did not use any lubrication when he penetrated the 

victim, but he told Investigator Fuller that he used saliva as a lubricant.

Defense counsel again requested that the entire recording of Defendant’s statement 

be admitted, but the trial court stated:

I tried to put it into context. I did, quite frankly, think that [the 

State] was through with his questioning, but I really thought the context . . .

and the import of what I allowed the jury to hear, was this: [Defendant] 

subjected himself to police interrogation, advised him of his rights, he gave

a statement, initially denying any contact. I think the context that I wanted 

the jury to hear, and which they did hear, was he said, Look, my mom was 

here, I haven’t told anybody, I’m too embarrassed, I’m too ashamed to tell 

anybody anything.

That’s the context that I thought, quite frankly, was important. To 

allow another hour of the thing, I don’t think has anything to do with the 

completeness, don’t know that that helps anything, quite frankly. I don’t 

know that that adds anything. 

[Defendant] has testified for a lengthy period of time as to what he 

says happened. He told the police initially that all that was not true, but 

then, based upon shame, embarrassment, his mother present, he then said, 

Look, officers, I didn’t tell you the truth. I think that was the import of 

allowing the transcript that I allowed. But simply because other questions 

are asked later about that, I don’t know that the Rule of Completeness 

would require [us] to play the whole thing simply because two or three 

more questions were asked. Now, I may be wrong. But it seems like to 

me, in fairness, the jury has heard [the State] ask [Defendant] about prior 

lying[.] I think the jury, the trier of fact, saw in context why he said what 

he said to the police. . . . Certainly, we’ve tried it before, I watched the 

whole thing, [Defendant] basically says at that time what he’s testified to 

today. And certainly it was emotional, you know.

And I’m trying to explain my ruling, and I’m trying, once again, to 

put it in context and to be fair. But I think, in context, the jury heard why 

he said what he said initially. The trier of fact heard that. And then to go

into the complete statement, I don’t know that the Rule of Completeness 

requires that.
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Request for Self-Defense Instruction

At the close of proof, defense counsel requested that the trial court provide the 

jury with a self-defense instruction. Defense counsel explained:

I understand that there are two competing theories of the case here, 

and if the defense’s theory is to be believed that at some point this 

encounter became nonconsensual and it was an assault on [Defendant], on 

his person, squeezing his testicles, and to the extent that he fought back to 

end that and get away, that is a self-defense claim. 

The trial court denied the request for an instruction on self-defense, stating:

I have reviewed the request for self-defense, and it appears to me 

that the instructions, as prepared now, cover all the theories of the case 

concerning alleged rape or the consensual part of that. I don’t think -- I 

think it basically muddies the waters to put in that. I don’t think it’s really 

an issue, I think it’s pretty clear the theory of the State this is what 

happened, the theory of the defense is this is what happened, so I think it’s 

covered by the charge that’s there.

Now, if the defense wants to argue that he was fought off or 

something like that, I would have no objections to you doing that, but I 

don’t think it’s necessary in the charge itself.

Following deliberations, the jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser-included 

offense of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve 

eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant filed a timely motion 

for new trial, which the trial court denied in a written order. This timely appeal follows. 

II. Analysis

A. Rule of Completeness

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request to admit the 

entire video recording of his statement to police, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 

106, after the State questioned Defendant about what he said in portions of that interview. 

Defendant contends that the trial court’s ruling allowed the State to “create an inaccurate 

impression of Defendant’s statements” and that the entire video recording should have 

been admitted to “put Defendant’s statements in proper context.” Defendant argues that 

only by watching the entire video-recorded statement could the jury see “Defendant’s 
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speech impediment, his youthfulness, his extreme emotion, the officers continuously 

coming and going from the interview room,” and the officers’ changing from one 

question and subject to another “without allowing complete answers to their questions, all 

of which played a role in the responses Defendant gave to any given question, thereby 

giving context to what was said during the interview as a whole.” The State responds 

that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Defendant’s request to play 

the entire video recording when the State’s questions about Defendant’s prior 

inconsistent statements “were not so extensive as to require admission of his entire 

statement to provide context for the minor inconsistencies addressed in the State’s 

questions.” 

Tennessee Rule of Evidence 106, sometimes referred to as the rule of 

completeness, provides:

When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced 

by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any 

other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in 

fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.

Tenn. R. Evid. 106. Our supreme court has stated that Rule 106 is “intended to ensure 

that the jury can assess related information without being misled by considering only 

portions of an item of evidence.” State v. Quintis McCaleb, --- S.W.3d ---, 2019 WL 

3940922, at *6 (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2019) (citing State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 61 (Tenn. 

2001)). Rule 106:

reflects a concern for fairness and is designed to let the jury assess related 

information at the same time rather than piecemeal. This should help the 

jury avoid being misled by hearing only partial information about a writing 

or recorded statement. Moreover, it will assist the jury in assessing the 

weight to be given to the written or recorded statement by permitting the 

jury to consider at the same time other relevant writings and recordings.

Neil P. Cohen, et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 1.06[2][a] (6th ed. 2011) (footnotes 

omitted). 

Regarding the impact of Rule 106 on the State’s use of a defendant’s statement, 

our supreme court has explained:

In our view, Rule 106 reflects the concern for fairness found in cases 

such as Espitia [v. State, 288 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tenn. 1956)]—that the trier 

of fact be permitted to assess related information without being misled by 
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hearing only certain portions of evidence. Accordingly, it appears that 

where the prosecution introduces a statement made by the defendant, the 

trial court may in the interest of fairness order that the remainder of the 

statement be admitted as well under Rule 106. Indeed, it would not be 

consistent with fundamental fairness to allow the prosecution to introduce 

only the most incriminating portions of a defendant’s statement without 

regard to the overall context or relevant exculpatory portions found in the 

same statement. As Espitia indicates, the jury is to determine which 

statements to accredit.

State v. Keough, 18 S.W.3d 175, 182 (Tenn. 2000) (citation omitted).

When Rule 106 is invoked, the controlling question is “whether the jury’s accurate 

understanding of the evidence already admitted requires the admission of this additional 

evidence.” State v. Vaughn, 144 S.W.3d 391, 407 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). 

Accordingly, evidence admitted under Rule 106 must: “(1) explain[] the already-admitted 

proof; (2) place[] the admitted proof in context; (3) avoid[] misleading the trier of fact; or 

(4) ensure[] a fair and impartial understanding of the already-admitted proof.” Id. 

The trial court is granted broad discretion to determine whether the rule of 

completeness should result in the admission of evidence, and this court therefore reviews 

the trial court’s decisions in this matter under an abuse of discretion standard. Keough, 

18 S.W.3d at 183; see also Vaughn, 144 S.W.3d at 407. The abuse of discretion standard 

of review is a less rigorous review of a trial court’s ruling and envisions “a decreased 

likelihood that the decision will be reversed on appeal.” Quintis McCaleb, 2019 WL

3940922, at *5 (quoting Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010))

(internal quotation marks omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when it (1) applies

an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaches an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) bases

its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence and thereby causes an 

injustice to the complaining party. Id. Appellate courts must review a trial court’s 

discretionary decision to determine: “(1) whether the factual basis for the decision is 

properly supported by evidence in the record, (2) whether the [trial] court properly 

identified and applied the most appropriate legal principles applicable to the decision, and 

(3) whether the [trial] court’s decision was within the range of acceptable alternative

dispositions.” Id. (alterations in original). 

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request 

to admit the entire video recording of Defendant’s statement to police. After taking an 

hour-long recess to review the issue, the trial court allowed the introduction of the first 

thirty-six minutes and twenty-five seconds of the video recording, explaining that the 

State cross-examined Defendant about prior inconsistent statements and that, in fairness, 
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the jury should see “in context why [Defendant] said what he said to the police.” The

trial court found that this portion of the video recording would allow the jury to see that 

Defendant subjected himself to police interrogation; that he gave a statement initially 

denying any contact with the victim; and that, after his mother left the room, Defendant 

acknowledged that he lied because his mother was there and he was embarrassed. The 

trial court found that this portion of the video recording would also allow the jury to see 

Defendant crying and his display of extreme emotion throughout the interview. After this 

portion of the video recording was played for the jury, the State cross-examined 

Defendant on four additional prior inconsistent statements that were contained in the next 

three pages of the transcript of the police interview. In response to the State’s questions, 

Defendant was able to explain those inconsistencies. 

The factual basis for the trial court’s decision is supported by the evidence in the 

record. The first thirty-six minutes and twenty-five seconds of the video recording show

the victim’s emotion, his youthfulness, and his speech impediment; it also showed the 

officers’ style of questioning and the interruptions by officers during the interview. 

During this portion of the video recording, Defendant explains that he initially lied to 

police because of his mother’s presence in the room and because he was embarrassed. 

The trial court properly considered that, in the interest of fairness and to put Defendant’s 

statement to police in context, this portion of the video recording should be admitted as 

evidence. 

Defendant asserts that Rule 106 required that the trial court admit the remaining 

portion of the video recording.2 We conclude, however, that the trial court’s decision to 

show only the first thirty-six minutes and twenty-five seconds of the recording was 

“within the range of acceptable alternative dispositions.” Quintis McCaleb, 2019 WL 

 

2 We note some apparent confusion at trial regarding the exhibits that relate to this issue. Exhibit 

138 is a disc that contains the entire video recording of Defendant’s statement, which is one hour and 

twenty-nine minutes in duration. Exhibit 138 was admitted for ID purposes only. Exhibit 139, which 

was also admitted for ID purposes only, is a complete transcript of the video recording of Defendant’s 

statement. The transcript is forty-six pages long. Exhibit 140 is a disc that contains a redacted portion of 

the video recording. It spans pages twenty-five through thirty-seven of the transcript and is thirty-six 

minutes and twenty-five seconds long. 

Although Exhibit 140 was admitted into evidence, it is not the portion of the video recording 

presumably shown to the jury. The trial court ruled that only the first twenty-five pages of the transcript,

which corresponded with the first thirty-six minutes and twenty-five seconds of the recording, would be 

shown to the jury. Exhibit 140—the redacted recording—was created by the State after Defendant 

testified and after the first portion of the video recording was shown to the jury. Thus, it appears that the 

jury viewed the first thirty-six minutes and twenty-five seconds of the video recording during Defendant’s 

testimony and then had the opportunity to view the next thirty-six minutes and twenty-five seconds of the 

statement through Exhibit 140 and that only approximately seventeen minutes of the video recording was 

not submitted to the jury. 
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3940922, at *5. That portion of the video recording was sufficient to show that 

Defendant was answering questions in a highly emotional state while officers were 

coming in and out of the room and asking him a variety of questions. Moreover, the four 

additional questions asked by the State about Defendant’s prior inconsistent statements 

were not so extensive as to require the admission of the entire video recording to put 

them into context. See State v. Rodney E. Howard, No. M2009-02081-CCA-R3-CD, 

2010 WL 3774544, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2010) (concluding that the State 

did not question the witness to an excessive degree about her preliminary hearing 

testimony such as to require the admission of the transcript of her preliminary hearing 

testimony into evidence pursuant to Rule 106), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 10, 2011);

State v. Christopher Shane Harrell, No. E2005-01531-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 595885, 

at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2007) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it declined to enter the defendant’s entire pretrial statement into 

evidence), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 25, 2007). The jury did not need to see the 

entire video recording of Defendant’s statement to police in order to ensure a fair and 

impartial understanding of the proof. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and 

Defendant is not entitled to relief. 

B. Self-Defense Instruction

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to instruct the 

jury on self-defense after it was fairly raised by the proof at trial. Defendant argues that, 

when he tried to disengage from the consensual sexual contact with the victim, the victim 

grabbed his testicles and would not let go, and Defendant became the victim of an 

assault. Defendant asserts that, when he hit the victim and pulled the victim down 

several cement stairs, he was defending himself and attempting to get away from the 

victim. The State responds that the trial court properly denied Defendant’s request for a

self-defense jury instruction because the facts of the case did not fairly raise the issue of 

self-defense. The State asserts that the struggle and the victim’s resulting injuries were 

“outside the scope of the indictment and [could not] form the basis of a self-defense 

claim.” 

Whether the jury instructions were proper is a mixed question of law and fact, 

which this court reviews de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Smiley, 38 

S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tenn. 2001). Under Tennessee law, a trial court has a duty to provide 

“a complete charge of the law applicable to the facts of the case.” State v. James, 315 

S.W.3d 440, 446 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tenn. 

1986)); see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 30(d)(2). This obligation “extends to general 

defenses, such as self-defense, defense of another, or defense of a habitation.” State v. 

Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Tenn. 2013) (footnote omitted).
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When evidence adequately supporting self-defense is admitted at trial, the 

question of whether an individual acted in self-defense is a factual question for the jury. 

See State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). However, before a trial 

court may submit a defense question to a jury, the proof must fairly raise an issue as to 

the existence of that defense, and the defendant has the burden of introducing such proof. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-203(c), Sentencing Comm’n Cmts. “The quantum of proof 

necessary to fairly raise a general defense is less than that required to establish a 

proposition by a preponderance of the evidence.” Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d at 129. In 

determining whether a general defense has been fairly raised by the proof, a trial court 

must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant and draw all 

reasonable inferences in the defendant’s favor. Id. If the evidence fairly raises the issue 

of self-defense, the trial court is required to submit the instruction to the jury. Id.

Tennessee’s self-defense statute provides, in pertinent part:

[A] person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is in a place where 

the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or 

using force against another person when and to the degree the person 

reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against 

the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b)(1) (2018). 

Here, Defendant requested that the trial court instruct the jury on self-defense 

based upon his testimony that, when he became disinterested in the allegedly consensual 

sexual encounter with the victim, he attempted to stop the encounter but that the victim 

assaulted Defendant by squeezing Defendant’s testicles. Defendant argued that, “to the 

extent that he fought back to end that and get away[,]” he was entitled to an instruction on 

self-defense. We conclude, however, that the proof did not fairly raise an issue as to the 

existence of that defense. 

Defendant was charged with aggravated rape. As relevant here, “[a]ggravated 

rape is unlawful sexual penetration of a victim by the defendant . . . [where] the 

defendant causes bodily injury to the victim[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502(a)(2)

(2014). “‘Sexual penetration’ means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal 

intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of 

any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any other 

person’s body, but emission of semen is not required[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-

501(7) (2014). “‘Bodily injury’ includes a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, 

and physical pain or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, 

organ, or mental faculty[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(2) (2014). 
- 16 -

Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, the 

evidence admitted at trial did not fairly raise the issue of self-defense as it related to the 

offense for which Defendant was on trial. Defendant argues that, when he became 

disinterested in the allegedly consensual encounter and attempted to leave, the victim 

grabbed Defendant’s testicles. Defendant contends that he was then entitled to defend 

himself by hitting the victim and dragging the victim down the stairs. However, the 

events that formed the basis of the aggravated rape charge had already occurred prior to 

the victim’s grabbing of Defendant’s testicles. The victim testified that he was anally 

penetrated by Defendant’s penis, that it was very painful, and that he repeatedly told 

Defendant “no.” Defendant acknowledged that he penetrated the victim and that he did 

not use any lubricant before doing so. Ms. Ammons testified that the victim had a bruise

larger than two centimeters on the anal tissue of his rectum and that this injury was 

consistent with forcible penetration. Thus, the elements of aggravated rape—sexual 

penetration and bodily injury—were established and the offense was completed before 

the victim grabbed Defendant’s testicles, thereby necessitating Defendant’s use of selfdefense. In other words, Defendant’s actions when the victim grabbed his testicles could 

not support a claim of self-defense for the charged offense. 

By his own admission, Defendant was not acting in self-defense when he engaged 

in what he claimed was a consensual sexual encounter with the victim. The struggle that 

occurred and the injuries that the victim sustained after Defendant allegedly tried to end 

the sexual encounter would have been outside the scope of the indictment. Even if the 

jury were to accept Defendant’s version of events, the scope of the indictment would only 

include the contact between Defendant and the victim during the supposedly consensual 

sexual encounter. The struggle that occurred after Defendant purportedly withdrew his 

consent cannot form the basis of a self-defense claim when the conduct was outside the 

scope of the indictment. Defendant was not charged with hitting the victim and dragging 

him down the stairs. Although Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of 

aggravated sexual battery, lesser-included offenses only apply to conduct that is within

the scope of the indictment. Lesser-included offenses cannot encompass behavior that 

would have been outside of the scope of the charged offense. See State v. Burns, 6 

S.W.3d 453, 466 (Tenn. 1999) (stating that lesser-included offenses are “less serious 

versions” of the charged offense). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly 

denied Defendant’s request for a self-defense instruction.

III. Conclusion

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

____________________________________

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE
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