FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT J UNE 3, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [ P U B L I S H ]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ N o. 07- 1160 3

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00089 -CV -JOF -1 JAC QUELYN R. CRAWFORD, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us BARBARA CARROLL, KATHERINE JOHNSTON, ind ivi dua lly

and i n he r of

fi ci al c ap ac ity

a s V ic e Pr es ide nt of Fin an ce an d Ad m in is tra ti on , BOA RD OF RE GENT S O F T HE U NI VE RSIT Y S YS TE M OF GEORGIA/GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY,D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ Appe al f ro m the U nit ed

S ta te s D istri ct

Co urt fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ (J un e 3, 200 8) Before BIRC H and FAY , C ircuit Judg es, and ROD GE RS, * District Judge. * Honora ble Marg are t C. Rodger s, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of Florida , sitti ngby

desig nation.2

ROD GE RS, District Judge: Jacquelyn R. C raw ford appeals the district court’ s grant of summ ary j udgm en t i n f

av or of he r fo rm er

e m plo y er , the Bo ar d of

Re ge nts of

the U niv er sity Sy stem of G eorgia/Ge orgia State University (G SU ), and two of her form er superviso rs, GS U off

icers Barbara Carr oll and Katherine Johnsto n. A fter r eview an d or al arg um en t, w e re ve rs e an d r em an d f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs, havin g determ ined that genu ine issues of m aterial f act exist that preclude sum m ary j u d g me n to n C r a w f

o r d ’s T i t l e V I I r e t a l i a t i o n an dr a c e d i s c r i mi n a t i o n c l a i ms ag ai ns t GSU an d h er 4 2 U.S.C. § 19 83 race di sc riminat io n c la im ag ai ns t Ca rro ll . W e af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t t o Jo hnst on o n Cr aw fo rd ’ s § 1 983 ra ce dis cr im inatio n c la im be ca use Joh nst on i s e nti tle d to qu a l i f i e di mm un i t y. I. S tandard of R eview W e re vie wadis tr ic t c ourt' s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t de novo . Brooks v. Co unt y Co m m ' n of J ef fe rso n C ount y, A la ., 446 F.3d 1160 , 1161-62 (11th Cir. 2006 ) . A t summ ary

j udgm ent we consider all evidence and reasonable fac tual in fere nc es dra wn t he refr om in a li gh t m os t fa vo rab le to th e n on -m ov in g p art y . R oja s v . F

la. D ep ' t of B us. & Prof

' l R egula tio ns Pari -M

utu al , 285 F . 3d 1 339, 1341 -42 (11th Cir. 2002) ( pe r c uri am ) (ci ta ti on an d q uo ta ti on s o m it te d) .At summary judgme nt we view the fac ts in the light most favora ble to the nonmoving 1 party . See A dicke

s v. S.H. Kress &Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L .Ed.2d 142 (1970). We ther efor e do so her e, dra wingthose fac ts from the plea dings, de positions, and other evidentiar y materia ls on file. Neve rtheless, we observe that what ar e stated a s "f acts" here in for purposes of summar

y judgme nt reviewmay

not be the ac tual fac ts nor are all of the fa cts. See Mo nto un t v . Ca rr , 114 F.3d 181, 182 ( 11th Cir. 1997). 3 Sum m ar y j udgm en t i s a

ppr opr ia te if

the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, answ er s to int er ro ga tor ie s, and a dm iss ion s onf ile , tog ethe r w iththe a ff

idavit s, if any , sho w the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and that the m ovi ng p ar ty is en tit le d to j udgm en t a s am atte r of law . F ed . R. Ci v. P. 56( c) ; W il so n v . B/E/ Ae rosp ace, Inc. , 376 F. 3d 10 79, 1085 (11t h Cir. 2004 ). II. Background 1 Cr aw fo rd , w ho i s A fr ic an -A m er ic an , be gan w orkin g inthe pe rs onne l f ie ld in 1 987. S he hol ds a

m as te rs de gr ee in publ ic a dm ini str at ion , w ithaspe ci al iz at ion in hum anr es our ce s m an ag em en t. I n 19 92 G SUhir ed Cr aw fo rd

to se rv e as the wa ge and salary

adm inistrator in its hum an resources departm ent. C raw ford wa s pr om ote d inD ec em

be r 1997 to the pos iti on o f m an ag er of c la ssi fi catio n and co m pe ns at io n, h er job at t he ti m e th e ev en ts gi vi ng ris e to th is cas e o ccu rred . Carr oll w as G SU ’ s a ssi stant v ic e pr es ide nt o f hum anr es our ce s f ro m Marc h 19 99 until August 200 4. S he supervised Craw ford’ s posi tion as well the higher level posi tio ns o f dir ec tor

of hum anr es our ce s, dir ec tor of hum anr es our ce s in fo rm at ion sy stem s, and director of payroll. Johnston cam e to GS U in July 2000 to serve as4

its vic e pr es ide nt o f fi nanc e an d a dm ini str at ion . I n th at c ap ac ity she dir ec tly supe rv ise d C ar

ro ll. Joh nst on w as a lso r es pons ibl e fo r ove rs ee ing the sup er vis ion of appr oxi m at el y

e igh t hundr ed

oth er G SUe m plo y ee s, inc lud ing tho se in the hum an resources, budg et, phy sical plant, fa cilities planni ng, cam pus m aster plannin g, and cam

pus po lice departm ents. Both Car roll and Joh nston are Ca uc as ian. In ear ly 2000 Crawf

ord was a bsent from

work per iodically

due to her m oth er ’ s se ri ous ill ne ss; he r m oth er die d inF eb ru ar

y 200 0. I n M ar ch200 0 C ar ro ll fo rm al ly r ep ri m an de d C raw fo rd

f or m isu se of

the de partm en t’ s le av e pol ic y , in part ic ular its be re av em en t l eave pol ic y w hic h C ar

ro ll state d pe rm itt ed

onl y up t o thr ee day s’ abse nc e in c onne ct ionw iththe de ath of af amily m em be r. C ar ro ll as se rt ed that C raw fo rd

ha d m iss ed

e igh te enf

ull or part ia l day s of

w ork pr ior

to and following her m other’ s death without giv ing prop er notice or obtaining prop er authorization. In re spon se, C raw ford filed a grie vance in which she protested that the r ep ri m an d w as f

ac tua lly inc or re ct a s w el l a s c ult

ur al ly ins en sit ive . A cc or din g to C raw fo rd , Carr oll did

not und er stand tha t the f

une ra l pr ac tic es of

A fr ic an Am ericans require m ore than three day s of leave. When Carr oll failed to withdraw the r ep ri m an d C raw fo rd

appe al ed to G SU ’ s pr ovos t and v ic e pr es ide nt f or academ ic aff

airs, who re versed the reprim and and ins tructed that it be rem oved5

from Crawf ord’ s file, partly

on the groun d it contained errors of fa ct. Crawf ord m aintains that su bsequent to the reversal of the reprim and Carr oll too k retaliatory ac tio n a ga ins t he r by

m ak ing ne wand unr ea sona ble j ob d em an ds and b y

se ndi ng her an incre ased num

ber of e- m ail m essages, m any of w hich Craw ford felt w ere un fai rly crit ic al of h er wo rkpe rfo rm an ce. InApr il 2001 Cr aw fo rd

w ro te to Carr oll to m ak e sta ff ing r ec om

m en da tio ns fo r th e cl as si fic at io n a ndco m pe ns at io n d iv is io n. Ad di ti on al ly, ba se d o n h er o wn an al y sis of

int er na l and e xte rn al m ar

ke t data , Cr aw fo rd

a ske d C ar

ro ll to i nc re as e he r annua l sa lary

of $50 , 960 to the r an ge of

$54 , 565 to $ 56, 202 in o rd er to be com m ensurate w ith oth er position s of sim ilar re spon sibili ty . Carr oll respond ed that sh e w oul d no t a ddr es s C raw fo rd ’ s r eque sts unt il a ne wpos iti on, that of dir ec tor of c la ssi fi catio n and e m

plo ym en t, ha d be enf

ill ed . T his pos iti on w oul d be res po ns ib le forsupe rv is in g c la ss ifi cat io n d iv is io n fu nc ti on s, i.e. , those perf orm ed by Cr aw fo rd ’ s de partm ent su cha s a ssi gni ng p ay c la ssi fi catio ns and d ev el opi ng j ob descriptio ns, as w ell as functions related to the em ploym ent divis ion, such as posti ng vacant pos ition s and accepting and reviewing j ob appli cations. Cr aw ford tho ught she w as e lig ibl e to r ec ei ve an " in- pla ce " p ro m oti on t o th e ne wpos iti on be ca use oth er e m plo y ee s ha d be engiv enpr om oti ons in s im ilar ci rc um stanc es but the j ob w as not

of fe re d to he r; ins te ad , the pos iti on w as a dve rt ise d inAugus tAn “ in p la c e ” pr omo tio n is on e that r e su lts fr om a n e mpl oye e ’s be ingre c la ssi fi e d in 2 job titl e and sa lary

without posti ngthe new position for c ompetitive rec ruitment. In this appeal Crawf ord does not cha lleng e the district cour t’s holding that he r cla im of beingwrong ly denied an “in- place ” promotion is time-barr ed. Carr oll se rv e d o n th e pa ne l, a s d id t

wo human r e so ur c e s d e pa rtme nt d ir e c tor s, Me lis sa 3 Br ennama

n (the dire ctor of huma

n resour ces f

or information sy stems) and Da wn Davis (the d i r e c t o r o f p ayr o l l ) . B r e nn am an

an d D av i s ar e C a

u c a s i an . A d d i t i o n a l l y, e mp l o ye e s S o nya Richburgand Paula Gome s, both of whom are Afric an-America n, wer e pane l members. 6 2001 . 2 A f ive-m em ber panel com

prised of GS U m anagem ent and staff w as form ed to s cr ee n th e ap pli cants f or the ne wpos iti on and r ec om m en d ac an did at e to John sto n, w ho w oul d in te rv ie wthe c an did at e. Joh nst on, w iththe appr ova l of 3 L ind a N el son – th e dir ec tor of G SU ' s O ff

ic e of A ff irm at ive A ct ionand D ive rs ity Pr ogr am s ( O A A D P) – w oul d th enm ak e the f ina l se le ct ion . C raw fo rd

appl ie d f or the ne wj ob and w as c hose n f or an in te rv ie w . I t w as c ondu ct ed by Carr oll and the ot he r pa ne l m em

be rs in th e ear ly fall of 2 00 1. Carr oll favored hiring Nancy Strasner , a

Caucasian f

em ale, for the new posit ion. Mae Okw andu, an E qual Opportunit y specialist at GS U who reviewe d the qualifications o f the applicants during the selection process, fe lt that Craw ford wa s th e mos tqu al i fi edap p l i ca n t . Ne l s o n th o u g h tCr aw fo rd ’s an dSt ra s n er ’s qua lif ic at ion s w er e “ som ewha t e qua l, ” w ithCr aw fo rd havin g gr eate r expe ri en ce in the com pensation field and less in the em ploym ent area , and Strasner’ s experienceCrawf ord maintains this is a refe renc e to her prior complaint of discr iminatory 4 treatment reg ardingher be rea vement leave. 7 be ing the r ev er se . U lti m at el y , N el son de sc ri be d C raw fo rd a s th e “ be st s uit ed ” candidate and sligh tly

prefe rred her

because she w as alrea dy em ploy ed by GS U and was f am iliar w ith its o perations. Johnsto n testified that she interviewed Strasner, at Car

roll’ s request, but thoug ht Strasner lac ked sufficient experience an d t he refo re –to Carr ol l’s d is pl eas ur e – de cl in edto en do rs e St ras ne r fo r th e job . No o th er ca nd id at es were p ro po se d t o h er s o J oh ns to n i nt erv ie wedno ne . InD ec em be r 2001 Cr aw fo rd

f ile d an in te rn al c om

pla int of r et al ia tio n w ith the O A A D P. I n th e co m

pla int Cr aw fo rd

a lle ge d th at

Carr oll ha d su

bj ec te d he r to inc re as ed , unf

ai r sc ru tiny

of he r j ob p er fo rm an ce and m ish an dle d th e re cr uitm en t pr oc es s f or the ne wpos iti on o f dir ec tor of c la ssi fi catio n and e m

plo ym en t. In January

2002 Ne lson is sued a determ ination letter annou ncing th at there ha d be enno c onse nsus r ea ch ed r eg ar din g w hom

to hir e fo r the ne wpos iti on and th atth e job th eref

or e wou ldno t b e fi ll edat t ha t t im e. No o th er re as on was g iv en . In a deposition Ne lson s tated that John ston to ld her that she did no t wish to hire any one given Nelson’s viewthat Craw ford rather than Strasner w as the best suited candidate, N elson’s c oncern there w as no real need f or the new posit ion, and her co nc er n ov er “ oth er inc ide nts in the pa st. ” Whe n a ske d to ide nti fy the pa st 4The re cord is uncle ar a s to whether, in a ddition to C raw ford, ther e we re a ny other 5 applicants for

the position at this t ime. Crawf ord under stood that no interviews we re c onducted beca use the proc ess had stalled, but she w as unaw are of the spec ific re asons for the inaction. 8 inc ide nts , N el son re spon de d, “ [s ] om e of the iss ue s th at

Ms . Cr aw fo rd

br ough t up regarding com

m unication that occurred betw een Ms. Car roll and Ms. Cr aw ford an d, y ou know , tho se ty

pe s of thi ngs. ” W iththe ne wpos iti on unf ill ed , Carr oll tem porarily assigned so m e of its duties to Brennam an, who had been em ploy ed at G SUf or appr oxi m at el y

tw en ty y ears and w as the n e ar

nin g asa lary

of approxim ately

$70,000 p er y ear. InJanuary

or F eb ru ar y 200 2 th e posi tio n of

dir ec tor of c la ssi fi catio n and em plo ym en t w as pos te d f

or ase co nd t im e. C raw fo rd a ga in a ppl ie d bu t no ap pli cants w er e se le ct ed

f or int er vie w s. 5 I n Apr il 2002 Carr oll w ro te , and J ohns tonappr ove d, ane ga tiv e ev al ua tio n of Crawf ord’ s job perf

orm ance f

or the period from

Marc h 200 1 throug h March 2002 . C raw fo rd

le ar ne d inMay

200 2 th at

a s ar es ult

of the poo r ev al ua tio n sh e wou ldno t b e el ig ib le to rece iv e a m eri t p ay in crea se du e in Octo be r 20 02 . In May 2002 Crawf

ord subm itted a com

plaint to Johns ton allegin g that Carr oll ha d r et al ia te d and d isc ri m inate d a ga ins t he r. A m ong oth er m atte rs , Cr aw fo rd ’ s c om

pla int a ddr es se d C ar

ro ll’ s ne ga tiv e pe rf

orm an ce r ev ie w( an d Cr aw fo rd ’s re s u l t i n g l o s s o f e l i g i b i l i t y fo r am er i tp ay i n cr ea s e) , C ra wf o rd ’s9

co nte nti on tha t sh e suf

fe re d r ac ia lly

dis parate tr eatm en t i n th e te rm s and co ndi tio ns o f he r em

plo ym en t c om

pare d w ithBr en na m anand o the rs , and Cr aw fo rd ’ s no nse le ct ionf or the ne wpos iti on o f dir ec tor of c la ssi fi catio n and e mp l o ym e n t . J o h n s t o n metwi t h C r a w f o r di n J u l y 2 0 0 2 f

o r ap p r o x i mat e l y fo rt yfi ve m inu te s to dis cu ss the c om pla int , the n late r de nie d it . A cc or din g to Joh nst on, she vie w ed

the te nsi on b etw ee n C raw fo rd and C ar ro ll as e sse nti al ly

ase ri ous pe rs ona lity

c onf lic t be tw ee n tw o stro ng- m ind ed w om enw ithm aj or

dis ag re em en ts ov er h ow t he hu m an res ou rces de pa rtment’s wo rksh ou ldbe pe rfo rm ed . As John sto n “ w as not

c onvi nc ed

that [ the pr obl em s w er e re la te d to ] dis cr im inatio n and retaliation,” she sim

ply counseled Craw ford to work towards im proving her re la tio nshi p w ithCarr oll . Joh nst on a lso te sti fi ed that sh e too k no ind ep en de nt a c t i o n r e g a r d i n g C r a w f

o r d ’s a l l e g a t i o n s b e c au s e J o h n s t o n b e l i e v e dth e c l a i ms w er e be ing inv es tig at ed

ind ep en de ntl y

by the O A A D P. C raw fo rd

c ont en ds John sto n w as hos til e dur ing the ir m ee tin g, a cc usi ng h er

of havin g an a tti tud e pr obl em , be ing to blam e fo r the f ri ct ionbe tw ee n C ar

ro ll an d he rs el f, and a cc ep tin g Carr ol l’s v ers io n o f ev en ts wit ho ut ad dr es si ng Crawfo rd ’s con cern s. Cr aw fo rd appe al ed Joh nst on’ s de nia l of

he r co m pla int to G SUpr es ide nt Carl P atton. Cr aw ford also filed a com plaint with the OA AD P, which hired i n d ep en d en ti n v es t i g at o r A rt h u r R o g er s t o co n du ct an i n qu i ry i n t o Cr aw fo rd ’sThis was the sec ond draf t of Roge rs’ re port. Crawf ord conte nds that Nelson aske d 6 Roge rs to rewrite his repor t beca use she f ound the first one to be excessively critica l of the human r e so ur c e s d e pa

rtme nt. 10 al le gatio ns. R oge rs sub m itt ed af ina l r ep ort i n O ct obe r 2002 in w hic h he re co m m en de d th at

"a c au se de te rm inatio n be iss ue d in dic at ing avio la tio n of T itl e V II oc curr ed

in re gard s to r ac e, and r et al ia tio n a s th ey pe rt ai n to e va luatio n m er it pay , pr om oti on o ppor

tun ity and d isp ar at e tr eatm en t. " N el son ac ce pte d R oge rs ' 6 fi ndi ngs an d r ef

er re d C raw fo rd

to John son fo r fo llo w -u

p. A ddi tio na lly , a lth ough the OA AD P did not its elf for m ally investig ate Cr aw ford’ s com plaints, the issues he r co m pla int s r ai se d w er e dis cu sse d in te rn al ly w ith in the O A A D P by

N el son an d her staff , a s well a s with Johns ton and p erhaps the provost. Ne lson con cluded the re w er e Ca

usa sian e m

plo y ee s inthe hum anr es our ce s de partm en t, nam el y Brennam an and another worker , Angela Bourque, w ho had been m oved forwar d at a fas te r pa ce t ha n h adAfric an -Am eri can em pl oyees. InS ep te m

be r 2002 Cr aw fo rd

w ro te to Patto n a ga in r eg ar din g th e ap pe al of he r co m pla int . S he r eque ste d th at she be giv enaf

our pe rc en t m er it inc re as e in sa lary , that the r equir em en ts o f he r posi tio n be out lin ed in a de ta ile d j ob description, and that the classification and com pensation divisi on be assign ed an ad dit ion al ana ly st b ec au se it w as und er sta ff

ed . P attonr es pond ed

that a "d es k au dit " o f pla int if

f' s po sit ion , sa lary , and r es pons ibi lit ie s w oul d be pe rf orm ed and11

th atif c ha ng es were warr an te d t he y wou ldbe m ad e. InO ct obe r 2002 Carr oll pos te d th e ne wpos iti on o f dir ec tor of c la ssi fi catio n an d e m plo ym en t f

or athi rd ti m e. Joh nst on w ish ed

to br oa de n th e pool of

tho se en ga ge d inthe se le ct ionpr oc es s, so C ar ro ll es ta bli she d af

our -m em be r sc re en ing co m m itt ee to ev al ua te the appl ic an ts. T he c om m itt ee c onsi ste d of

tw o in div idu al s fr om G SU ’ s f inanc e an d a dm ini str at iondiv isi on, one f ro m an a ca de m ic div isi on on c am pus, and o ne f

ro m anon -a ca de m ic div isi on. F ir st, ar ec ru ite r in the em plo ym en t of

fi ce r ev ie w ed

the r és um és of

the one hun dr ed

te n a ppl ic an ts, narr ow ing the f

ie ld t o f if ty -f our c an did at es , inc lud ing Cr aw fo rd . N ex t, the f our screening com

m ittee review ers individually listed the five to eight app licants each tho ught sho uld be int er vie w ed . A ft er

br ie fl y c onsu lti ng w ithJoh nst on, Carr oll de ci de d to li m it the gr oup of int er vie w ee s to the thr ee c an did at es w hom thr ee of the pane lis ts h ad

c hose n. C ar

ro ll did not inf orm Joh nst on o f the nam es of tho se se le ct edforin te rv ie ws b ut rat he r si m pl y th e res ul t o f th e m et ho d e m pl oyed. Cr aw fo rd w as se le ct ed

by onl y tw o of the sc re en ing c om

m itt ee m em

be rs and thus wa s not am ong th ose includedin the final group of three. Tw o of these candidates ag re ed to be int er

vie w ed f or the pos iti on, w iththe c om m itt ee ult im at el y re co m m en din g th at

Ru sse ll W ill is, aCa

uc as ian m al e, r ec ei ve the pos iti on o ve r the ot he r fi na li st , an Afr ic an -Am eri can fem al e.12

In De cem ber 2002 Craw ford filed a c harge of discrim ination with the E qual E m plo ym en t O ppor

tun ity Co m m iss ion( E E O C) . S he ide nti fi ed r ac e as the ba sis of he r ch ar ge and c la im ed

a start ing da te in May

200 2, w hic h is w he n sh e le ar ne d sh e w oul d be de nie d am er it pay inc re as e. I n January

200 3 C raw fo rd

sub m itt ed

a w ri tte n pr ote st t o N el son re gard ing the se le ct ionpr oc es s f or the ne wpos iti on and com plainin g of continu ed acts of r ace discrim ination and retaliation by Car roll. I n Fe br uary 200 3 C ar ro ll re co m

m en de d th at

W ill is b e of

fe re d th e posi tio n of

dir ec tor of classification and em

ploym ent. N o offer wa s m ade to W illis, however, based on Nelson’ s advice against filling the positi on while Crawf ord’ s race dis cr im inatio n c la im s w er e pe ndi ng. C ra w fo rd a m en de d he r E E O C c harg e in Apr il 2003 to inc lud e ra ce dis cr im inatio n and r et al ia tio n ba se d onhe r nons el ec tio n fo r the ne wpos iti on o f dir ec tor of c la ssi fi catio n and e m

plo ym en t. Ina cc or danc e w ithP atton ’ s in str uc tio n, and a s r ec om

m en de d by

Joh nst on, anout sid e co nsul tant w as hir ed to pe rf orm af unc tio na l a sse ssm en t of

the of fi ce of hum an resources in January 2003 . The c onsu ltant, Whit Perrin Wright, com pleted he r “ de sk a

udi t” in Marc h 20 03. Wri ght obs er ve d th at m ost uni ve rs iti es do n ot co m bi ne th e fu nc ti on s o f em

pl oym en t an d c la ss ifi cat io n i n o ne job , as GSU h ad . Sh e al so i ndi cate d th at

the dut ie s of

the ne wpos iti on c oul d in ste ad be handl ed

by other hum an resources departm ent staff. Wright further noted that Brennam an's13

posit ion as director of hum an resources f or inform ation sy stem s did no t invo lve as m uc h r es pons ibi lity

a s othe r dir ec tor s' pos iti ons did ; he r j ob a lso appe ar ed to be no greater in depth o r scope to a m anager’ s posi tion anddid no t require that any other em ploy ees directly

report to her. Wright recom m ended that the hum an resources departm ent have a clearer definition of the criter ia used to determ ine titles, pay bands, and p ay

gr ad es . S he a lso c om

m en te d th at

Cr aw fo rd ' s po sit ion , w itha salary of $50,960, seem ed to be paid approxi m ately $400 0 below the benchm ark fo r m an ag er -l ev el j obs, whil e at $73 , 901 Br en na m an ' s di re ct or -l ev el j ob w as pa id atth e m ed ia n o r av erag e le ve l. InMarc h 20 03 J ohns tonde ci de d to a dj ust Cr aw fo rd ’ s pay

gr ad e an d inc re as e he r sa lary

to $54, 740 an nua lly . Joh nst on a lso e lim inate d th e ne wpos iti on of director of e m

ploym ent and classification; according to Jo hnsto n, due to budg et co nstra int s, she w as und er e nor m ous pr es sur e to r ed

uc e expe ndi tur es in the departm ents und er her

supervisio n. Re ly ing on Ne lson’s advice a s well a s Wright’ s report, John ston d eterm ined that the new positio n could b e abolished w ith out “ hurtin g th e or ganiz at ion . ” L at er that m onth Jo hnst on w as r el ie ve d of re spon sib ili ty

f or sup er vis ing the hum anr es our ce s de partm en t. I n O ct obe r 2003 , Jerry Rackliff e, who had assum ed Johns ton’s duties, a dvised Crawf ord by letter that ba se d onWri ght ’ s r ev ie whe r posi tio n ha d be enr ec la ssi fi ed f ro m apay gr ad eThe mag istrate judg e re commended dismissal of the f ollowing c laims in Crawford’ s 7 three -count c omplaint because Crawf ord had a bandoned the m: Titl e VI Iclaims ag ainst J ohnston and Carr oll for ra cial discrimination and r etaliation; § 1981 claims ag ainst all defe ndants for rac ial discrimination and re taliation; § 1983 claims ag ainst GSU for ra cial discrimination; and §1 98 3 c la ims fo r r e ta liatio n a g a ins t G SU a nd John sto n a

nd Carr oll in t

he ir ind ivi du a l c a

pa c iti e s. Wit h respe ct to the re maining c laims, the mag istrate judg e re commended grantingthe motion on Crawf ord’s Title VI Idiscrimination and re taliation claims ag ainst GSU and her § 1983 discrimination claim ag ainst J ohnston in her individual capa city . He r ecommende d denying the motion on C raw ford’ s §1983 discrimination claim ag ainst Carroll in her individual ca pacity . The district court ac cepte d the mag istrate judg e’s r ecommendations of dismi ssal but also dismis sed 14 17 t o apay

gr ad e 18, w ithasa lary

a dj ustm en t t o $5 4, 740 an nua lly . R ac kli ff e al so advis ed Cr aw fo rd

that “ [a ] s an a ct ionto se ttl e y our c om pla int r eg ar din g y our

200 2 Pe rf orm an ce E va luatio n, w e ha ve r etro ac tiv el y a dj ust ed y our sa lary by 4% on t op of y our c la ssi fi catio n a dj ustm en t. T hus, thi s a dj ustm en t w ill m ove y our ba se salary to $56 ,930, r etroactive to O ctober 1, 2002.” In 2004 Crawf ord was pr om ote d to the pos iti on o f as sis tant d ir ec tor of hum anr es our ce s, w ithasa lary of $7 0,0 00 pe r y ear. Cr aw fo rd f ile d th is s uit

in January

200 4, a sse rt ing c la im s purs uant t o T itl e VII o f th e Ci vi l Ri gh ts Act o f 19 64 , as a m en de d, 4 2 U.S.C. § 20 00 e, et se q. , 42 U. S. C. § 198 1, and 42 U. S. C. § 198 3. T he m agistrate j udge to whom the case w as refe rred r ecom

m ended the defendants’ m otion for sum m ary j udgm ent be granted in p ar t and d en ie d inpart . T he dis tr ic t c ourt m odi fi ed and a dopt ed

the m ag istrate j udge ’ s r ep ort, gr an tin g th e de fe ndants ’ m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t i n it s en ti ret y an d d is m is si ng th e co m

pl ai nt wit h p reju di ce. This ap pe al fol lo wed . 7the § 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t Ca rr oll . Crawf ord spec ifically

limit s her a

ppeal to the “ Merits section of the District Court’s 8 Or de r, wh ic h b e g ins on

Pa g e 10 of

the Or de r. ” Ap p. B ri e f at 25 . T hu s Cr awf or d a pp e a ls o nly the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g s o n h e r c la ims ari sin gfr om t he se thr e e e ve nts . In discussing Cra

wford’ s alleg ations that she was de nied a mer it pay incre ase, the 9 district court states that Cra wford “ was notified on Ma rch 12, 2003, tha

t her sala ry would be retroa ctively

incre ased f

our per cent f

rom May 6, 2002. The que stion then becomes whe ther Plaintiff has suffe red a

n adver se employ

ment action bec ause of

the time period be tween Ma y 6, 2002, and Mar ch 12, 2003, whe n she did not have he r incre ase in sala ry .” Unde r the district 15 III. D iscussion T he dis tr ic t c ourt a ddr es se d C raw fo rd ’ s r ac e dis cr im inatio n and r et al ia tio n cl ai m s to ge the r in c onne ct ionw iththr ee e ve nts : “ (1 ) de nia l of am er it inc re as e in O ct obe r 2002 , ( 2) dis cr ep an cy in pay and r es pons ibi lit ie s be tw ee n P la int if f an d Me lis saBr enna m an , and ( 3) de nia l of pr om oti on t o [ d] ir ec tor , [ c] la ssi fi catio n and [e] m ploym ent . . . . ” For e ase of discussion we do m uch the sam e. 8 A . D en ia l of

Me ri t P ay

I nc re as e Craw ford claim s that her Apr il 200 2 perform ance evaluation wa s retaliatory an d r ac ia lly

dis cr im inator

y and r es ult ed

in he r be ing de nie d am er it pay inc re as e she oth er w ise w oul d have r ec ei ve d. W ithr es pe ct to thi s c la im , the part ie s’ argum ents, and the district court’ s analy sis, center on whether Cr aw ford presented a pri m a fa ci e case of discrim ination or reta liation b y showing sh e suffer ed an adve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion . 9court’s c alculation, Craw ford ther efor e wa s denied a merit pay

incre ase f

or appr ox imately

ten months, even thoug h she wa s not due to rec eive the inc rea se until October 2002. Our re view of the voluminous record in this case reve als only that J ohnston decided on M ar c h1 3 , 2 0 0 3 , to a d

ju s t C r aw f

o r d ' s p ay g r a d e an d

in c r e a s e h e r

s a la r y to $ 5 4 , 7 4 0 annu a ll y . We did not locate a r efe renc e to the four perc ent merit pay

incre ase be ing a

war ded in Marc h 2003. Rathe r, ins of

ar a s w e have be e n a

ble to d e te rm ine , th e me ri t pa y inc re a se wa s n ot a

wa rd e d unti l Oc tob e r 2 00 3, re tr oa c tiv e to O c tob e r 2 00 2. I f t he se c a lc ulatio ns are c or

re c t, C ra wf or d a c tua lly we nt w ith out a

me ri t pa y inc re a se fo r a

pp ro ximate ly

tw e lve months – f

ro m O c tob e r 2 00 2 unti l Oc tob e r 2 00 3 –

e ve n th ou g h th e inc re a se wa s e ve ntu a lly pa id r e tr oa c tiv e ly . Cr awf or d w a s a lso awa re of her ine ligibility

to rec eive the me rit pay

incre ase in May

2002, a per iod of another five months. Additi onally , if it is assumed that Crawfor d was e ntitled to a pay g rade and sala

ry adjustment in April 2001, when she wrote Car roll reque sting a

n incre ase, Cra

wford w ent without a pa y g ra de a dju stm e nt f

or a pp ro ximate ly

tw e nty-t hr e e months (t

his inc re a se a

pp are ntl y wa s f ir st awa rd e d in Marc h 2 00 3 b y

John sto n, the n d ir e c te d in Oc tob e r 2 00 3 b y

Ra c kli ff e to b e pa id retroa ctively

to October

2002). For tunately , it is notnece ssary for us to know the pr ecise number of months involved wi th r e sp e c t to e ith e r t

he de nia l of

the me ri t pa

y inc re a se or

the pa y g ra de a dju stm e nt, wh ic h is rele vant to Crawf

ord’s dispar ate pa

y claim. The pa

rties do not dispute the ten month period identified by

the district court. In any event, r ecognizi ngthat a sig nificant pe riod of time was involved, perha

ps any wher e fr om five to twenty -three months for ea ch eve nt, is sufficient for the purpose of

our ana ly sis here. 16 To m ake out a pri m a fa ci e c as e of r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n apla int if f m ust show( 1) she be lon gs t o apr ote ct ed c la ss; ( 2) she w as qua lif ie d to do the j ob; (3) she w as subjecte d to adverse em ploym ent action; and (4) her em ploy er tre ated si m il arl y si tu at edem

pl oyees o ut si de he r cl as s m or e fav or ab ly. See Knight v. Baptist Hosp. of Miam i, I nc. , 330 F. 3d 13 13, 1316 (11t h Cir. 2003 ) ( pe r c uri am ). T he se e le m en ts a lso appl y to a cl ai m

of r ac e dis cr im inatio n un de r § 19 83 b ec au se the ana ly sis of

dis parate tr eatm en t c la im s un de r § 19 83 i s id en tic al to the ana ly sis un de r Tit le VII whe re t he fact s o n wh ic h t he cla im s re ly are th e sa m e. See A bel v. D ubbe rly , 210 F . 3d 1 334, 133 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( hol din g th at T itl e V II and § 198 317

cl ai m s have the sam e el em en ts whe re the c la im s are ba se d onthe sam e se t of fa ct s) ; Stallworth v. Shuler , 777 F. 2d 14 31, 1433 (11t h Cir. 1985 ) (stating that "[ w ] he re , a s he re , apla int if f pr ed ic at es li ab ili ty

und er T itl e V II on d isp ar at e treatm ent and also claim s liabilityunder sections 19 81 and 19 83, the legal el em en ts o f the c la im s are ide nti ca l . . . [ an d] w e ne ed not dis cu ss p la int if

f' s T itl e VII cl ai m s s ep arat el y

fro m hi s s ect io n 1 98 1 a ndsec ti on 19 83 cla im s." ). Title V II a lso proh ibits retaliation agains t an em ploy ee “because [s] he has oppo se d any

pr ac tic e m ad e anunl aw fu l e m plo y m en t pr ac tic e by

[ T itl e V II ] , or because [s] he has m ade a c harge, testified, a ssisted, or participated in any m anner in an in ve st ig at io n, p ro ceed in g, o r he ari ng [th ereu nd er].” 42 U.S.C. § 2 00 0e -3 (a). A pri m a fa ci e c as e of

r et al ia tio n un de r T itl e V II r equir es the pla int if f to s howthat: (1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title VI I; (2) she suff ered an adve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion ; and ( 3) the re w as ac au sa l c onne ct ionbe tw ee n th e pr ot ect edact iv it y

an d t he ad ve rs e em

pl oym en t ac ti on . P en nin gto n v . Ci tyof H unt sv ill e , 26 1 F .3d12 62 , 12 66 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). Inthe pa st this c ir cu it’ s st an dard f or both di sc ri m inatio n and r et al ia tio n cl ai m s ha s r equir ed

an e m plo y ee to es ta

bli sh an “ ult im at e em

plo ym en t de ci sio n” or m ake som e other showing of subs tantiality in the em ploym ent context in o rder to est ab li sh an ad ve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on . See Sta vr opou los v . F iresto ne , 361Da v is a lso re fe rs to a “ mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e c ha

ng e ” re qu ir e me nt, 24 5 F .3 d at 12 39 , whil e 10 Stavropoulos and Gupta require proof of “ser ious and tang ible” ac t. Stavropoulos , 361 F.3d at 61 6- 17 ; Gu

pta , 2 12 F .3 d at 58 7. Re g ard le ss o f t he dif fe re nt t e rm ino logy

us e d, the a

pp lic a ble standard a

ppear s to be the same. 18 F. 3d 6 10, 616 -1 7 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ; G upta v . F lor ida B oard

of R eg en ts , 212 F . 3d 571, 587 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ; D av is v . T ow n of L ak e P ark , F la. , 245 F . 3d 1 232, 123 9 (11th Cir. 2001). W e defined ultim ate em ploym ent decisions as those “ such as term ination , f

ailure to hire, or dem otion .” Sta vr opou los , 36 1 F .3dat 6 17 . Andwe re qui re d th at

c ondu ct f al lin g sh ort of

an ul tim at e em

plo ym en t de ci sio n m

ust , in som e subs tanti al w ay , “ al te r[ ] the e m plo y ee ' s c om

pe nsatio n, te rm s, c ondi tio ns, or pr ivi le ge s of

e m plo ym en t, de pr ive him

or he r of e m plo ym en t op portun iti es , or adversely aff ect[ ] his or her status as an em ploy ee. ” G upta , 212 F . 3d at 58 7 (quot at ionand c itatio n om itt ed ). Mo re part ic ularl y , w he n de fi nin g th e le ve l of subs tantiality

required for a T itle VI I discrim ination claim , w e re quired an em ploy ee to dem onstrate she suffered “ a se rio us a nd m ate ria l c hange in the te rm s, co nd it io ns , or p riv il eg es of e m pl oym en t” to sh ow an ad ve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on . D av is , 245 F. 3d at 123 9 (em phasis add ed). T he “ serious and m aterial c hange” re qui re m en t ha s a lso be enappl ie d inthi s c ir cu it to T itl e V II r et al ia tio n c la im s. 10 Se e, e . g. , Stav ropo ulo s , 361 F . 3d at 61 7; B ass v . B oard of Co unt y Co m ' rs, O range Co unt

y, F la. , 256 F . 3d 1 095, 111 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ; G upta , 212 F. 3d at19

588; W ideman v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 141 F. 3d 14 53, 1456 (11t h Cir. 1998 ); B en ef ie ld v . F ulton C o. , G a. , 13 0 F ed .App x. 3 08 (11 th Cir . 20 05 ). The district court in this case found that because GS U had aw arded Craw ford a m erit pay

increase, eff

ective re troactively

to October 2002, Cr aw ford could no t establish an adverse em ploym ent action for purposes of either her dis cr im inatio n or

r et al ia tio n c la im s. A cc or din g to the dis tr ic t c ourt, be ca use Crawf or d’s “ job was n ev er i n d ou bt , andsh e n ev er l os t an y of h er b as e sa la ry ,” she did not suf fe r a m at er ia lly

a dve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ionin co nne ct ionw iththe denial of her m erit pay

increase. T he question then is whether the f act that G SU re ve rs ed it s de ci sio n and aw ar de d C raw fo rd he r m er it pay

inc re as e re tr oa ct ive ly som ehow deprives her of the right to pu rsue her c laim s. F or the rea sons given below, we thinkthe answer to that questi on is “ no.” W e fi rs t no te that our de ci sio n in G ill is v . G eo rgi a D ep art m en t of Co rre ct ion s , 400 F . 3d 8 83 ( 11th C ir . 200 5 ) , i s d i re ct l y o n p o i n to n Cr aw fo rd ’s discrim ination claim s. T he district court recognized the relevance of G ill is to the ins tant c as e but

de cl ine d to appl y

that de ci sio n be ca

use it c onc lud ed , a s it

did in connection with Craw ford’ s retaliation claim , that her successful grievance res ul te d i n h er h av in g s uf fere d n o l os s an d t hu s n o a dv ers e em pl oym en t ac ti on . In G ill is the plaintiff, an Afr ican-A m erican fem ale, rec eived a “ m et20

expectations” perform ance evaluation, which resulted in her rece iving a three pe rc en t r ai se , r athe r than an “ ex ce ed ed e xpe ct at ion s” e va luatio n, w hic h w oul d have y ie lde d af

ive pe rc en t r ai se . T he dif fe re nc e be tw ee n th e thr ee pe rc en t r ai se an d th e fi ve pe rc en t r ai se w as le ss than $1 000 an nua lly , and the pla int if f los t no em plo ym en t be ne fi ts a s ar es ult of the e va luatio n. G ill is b ro ught aT itl e V II a ct ion ag ai nst he r em plo y er and f orm er sup er vis or s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t G ill is’ re ce ivi ng a

sm al le r pay

r ai se than sh e w oul d have ha d he r pe rf orm an ce e va luatio n been m ore favorable did no t constitu te an adverse e m ploym ent action and granted sum m ar y j udgm en t f

or the de fe ndants . W e re ve rs ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t on G ill is’ r ac e dis cr im inatio n c la im , hol din g th at apoo r pe rf

orm an ce e va luatio n that di re ct ly

r es ult s inthe de nia l of

apay r ai se of any sig nif ic an ce c le ar ly

a ff ec ts ane m plo y ee ’ s c om

pe nsatio n and thus co nst itu te s an a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion un de r Tit le VII. Id

. a t 88 8 ( ci tin g D av is , 245 F . 3d at 12 40; M cC abe v . Sha rre tt , 12 F . 3d 1 558, 156 4 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ; and G upta , 21 2 F .3dat 5 90 ). W e pe rc ei ve no b as is f

or dis tin gui shi ng the f

ac ts o f the ins tant c as e fr om tho se in G ill is . A s w as tr ue f or the pla int if

f in G ill is , the e vid en ce in thi s c as e show s th at

Cr aw fo rd ’ s po or

e va luatio n and h er

c om pe nsatio n w er e “ ine xtr ic ab ly intertwined.” Id

. a t 88 8. F ro m

O ct obe r 2002 ( w he n C raw fo rd ’ s pay ch ec k di d no t include the four percent m erit pay increase she otherwise w ouldhave rec eived21

absent the poo r evaluation she was given in April 2002) unti l her positio n was re cl as sif ie d inMarc h 20 03 and s al ar y r etro ac tiv el y

inc re as ed

by f our pe rc en t i n O ct obe r 2003 , Cr aw fo rd

suf fe re d an a dve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct iondir ec tly co nne ct ed

to he r co m

pe nsatio n. A lth oughCr aw fo rd r ec ei ve d ar etro ac tiv el y aw arded m erit pay

increase, that raise could not alter the fac t that she had been de nie d th e inc re as e or

e ra se a ll inj ur

y a sso ci at ed

w ithit , spe ci fi ca lly

the los t va lue an d u se of t he fun ds du rin g t he ti m e sh e was no t re cei vi ng th em . See Phelan v. Co ok Co unt y , 463 F . 3d 7 73, 780 ( 7thCi r. 200 6) ( fi ndi ng, f or pur pose s of pla int if f’ s V II ge nde r dis cr im inatio n c la im , that a f our m onth j ob t er

m inatio n co nst itu te d an a dve rs e ac tio n e ve n th oughthe pla int if f w as late r re ins ta te d and aw ar de d ba ck

pay ). T o c onc lud e oth er w ise w oul d pe rm it em

plo y er s to e sc ap e T itl e V II li ab ili ty

by c or re ct ing the ir

dis cr im inator

y and r et al ia tor

y a ct s a ft er the fact . Id. (s ta tin g th at

“ [c ] onsi ste nt w ithT itl e V II ’ s go al of de te rr ing dis cr im inatio n, w e de cl ine to en dor se ar ule that w oul d a llo we m

plo y er s to e sc ap e lia bil ity by m er el y r ei nst at ing [ an ] a ggr ie ve d e m plo y ee m onths a ft er

te rm inatio n, w he ne ve r it be co m es c le ar that the e m

plo y ee int en ds t o purs ue he r cl ai m s in court.") . Following the Seventh Circuit’ s lead, w e too decline to hol d as a m atter of lawthat a re troactive pay raise c an “ undo ” the harm caused by

a discrim inatory or r et al ia tor y a ct be ca use suc h ade ci sio n c oul d pe rm it em plo y er s to e lud e lia

bil ity22

for conduct that otherwise is actionable. W e theref ore find that the district court erre d when it held that Craw ford’ s poor perform ance evaluation, which m ade her ine lig ibl e fo r a m er it pay

inc re as e in O ct obe r 2002 , did not c onst itu te an a dve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on forpu rp os es of h er d is cri m in at io n c la im s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt r el ie d onour de ci sio n in Sta vr opou los v . F iresto ne , 361 F. 3d 61 0 (11th Cir. 2004), to analy ze Cr aw ford’ s allegations o f re taliation. In that ca se an un te nur ed

c oll eg e as sis tant p ro fe sso r cl ai m ed she w as r et al ia te d a ga ins t i n vio la tio n of

T itl e V II w he n, a ft er

she c om pla ine d a bout ahir ing de ci sio n in vol vin g an ot he r pr of

es so r, th e fac ul ty late r twi ce v ot edno t t o re ne w hertea ch in g c on tra ct . O n bo th o cc as ion s, a ft er

the pla int if

f suc ce ssf ull y c ha lle nge d th e fa cu lty ’ s vo te s, her contract w as renew ed before the prior contract had concluded. W e af firm ed sum m ar y j udgm en t i n th e de fe ndants ' f av or , not ing f

ir st tha t no ult im at e em plo ym en t de ci sio ns w er e inv olv ed be ca use the pla int if

f “ did not los e he r j ob o r suffer a lessening o f pay , position, or benefits.” Sta vr opou los , 36 1 F .3dat 6 17 . W e al so c onc lud ed

that the c om

pla ine d- of

a ct s di d no t r ise to a suf

fi ci en t l ev el of subs tanti al ity

be ca use the y ult im at el y

ha d no e ff

ec t onthe pla int if

f’ s e m plo ym en t status . F urthe r, w e de ci de d th at any e m oti ona l di str es s or

c ost s in ci de nta l t o th e plaintiff’ s seeking review of the votes w ere too in subs tantial to be consid ered an adverse em

ploym ent action because the plaintiff’ s challenges ultim ately we re23

su cces sf ul . Id . at 6 18 . O ur de ci sio n in Sta vr opou los hin ge d onw he the r the e m plo y er ’ s a ct ion s ad ve rs el y affe ct edth e p la in ti ff’s em pl oym en t s ta tu s. Se e Sta vr opou los , 361 F . 3d at 617 ( not ing that “ [h ] er e, the a ct s S tavr opou los c om pla ins of ult im at el y

ha d no effe ct on her em

ploym ent status.”). A s previousl y discussed, the plaintiff in that case suffe red no loss in pay or benefits w hatsoever as a r esult of the faculty votes recom m ending that she not be rehired. Stavropoulo s’ contracts in fact we re re ne w ed , w ithno l ap se in em plo ym en t and thus nothin g m or e than an anticip ated loss. W e thus conclud ed Stavropoulos suffere d no tang ible harm as a r esult of an em pl oym en t d eci si on th atne ve r be cam e fi na l. Id . W e thi nk tha t onthe f

ac ts o f thi s c as e the dis tr ic t c ourt m isa ppl ie d th e standard and the hol ding of Sta vr opou los . In Crawf ord’ s case, the decision that she not be awar ded a m erit pay increase wa s a final decision that resulted in her not receiving a m erit pay increase. A s acknowledged by the district court, “ [there is n o di sput e that a s ar es ult of the r at ing Carr oll gave to pla int if f on h er 200 1- 2002 evaluation, Plaintiff did not receive an increase in her sa lary eff ective 2002.” Cr aw fo rd , unl ike S tavr opou los , the re fo re , r ea liz ed an ac tua l los s. A lth oughthe four perce nt m erit pay

increase eventually

wa s awarded retr oactively in October 2003 , a s noted, Craw ford nevertheless wa s deprived of the use or value of herTh e dis tr ic t c ourt inc or re c tly a ssume d th at Cr awf

or d’ s o nly

inj ur y wa s “ havin gto a

wa it 11 the re sults of her appe al bef ore r etroa ctively

rec eivingher me rit increa se.” 24 m eri t p ay fro m th e ti m e it ot he rwis e wou ldha ve be en award edin Octo be r 20 02 . In other wor ds, Crawf

ord suffered an adverse em ploym ent action directly

relate d to h er c om pe nsatio n: the a lle ge d r et al ia tor y pe rf orm an ce appr ai sa l de pr ive d he r of the tangi ble e m

plo ym en t op portun ity

of r ec ei vin g am er it pay

inc re as e an d thus adve rs el y a ff ec te d he r status a s an e m

plo y ee . A ga in, w e thi nk i t i m portant t o 11 em pha siz e that an e m

plo y er c annot und o th e harm

it s a ct ion s have c au se d, and the re by a voi d li ab ili ty , sim

ply by a tte m pti ng t o m ak e the e m

plo y ee w hol e ret ro act iv el y . Se e Phe lan , 463 F.3d at 780. T his case is not, as the district court de em edit , si m

pl y a m at te r of

“ no ha rm , no fou l.” Thus, f or the foregoing reasons, w ith respect to the tem porary denial of a m er it pay inc re as e, w e co nc lud e that un de r the standard s ou tli ne d in G ill is and Sta vr opou los Cr aw fo rd

sho w ed that sh e suf

fe re d an a dve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct ion for purposes of her ra ce discrim ination and retaliation claim s. T he district court th eref or e err edin rul in g o th erwi se . Th e d i s t ri ct co u rt al s o d i s cu s s edb u tch o s e n o tt o ap p l y t h e S up re m e C o u rt ’s de ci sio n in B url ing ton N. & San ta F e R y. Co . v . W

hit e , 548 U . S. 53, 126 S . Ct . 2405 , 165 L. Ed. 2d 34 5 (2006), in which the Court announced a new r ule whichTh e dis tr ic t c ourt c on c lud e d th at th e fa c ts o f C ra wf or d’ s c a se we re mor e c los e ly 12 alig ned with those in Stavropoulos and the re fo re that Stavropoulos should control. The c ourt found it unnece ssary

to decide “ the extent to which Burlington Northern might o ve rr ule Sta v ro po ulo s beca

use the fa ctual cir cumstance s of the two ca ses diffe r substantially and the case s, theref

ore, a re distinguishable.” Burlington also strong ly

sug g ests that it is for a jury to decide whether

any thing more 13 tha n th e mos t pe tty

and tr ivi a l a c tio ns a g a ins t an e mpl oye e sh ou ld b e c on sid e re d “ mate ri a lly adver se” to him and thus constitute adve rse e mploy ment actions. See B urlington , 126 S.Ct . at 2417. 25 re de fi ne s th e standard

f or r et al ia tio n c la im s un de r T itl e V II . F or the r ea sons 12 pr ev iou sly

dis cu sse d, w e ar e co nvi nc ed that un de r thi s c ir cu it’ s pr ior standard the d i s t r i c tc o u rte rr e di n g r a n t i n g s u mmary j u d g me n to n C r a w f o r d ’s r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m. If any doubt r em ai ne d r eg ar din g th e inc or re ctne ss o f the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ng – tho ugh w e fi nd n one doe s – a ppl ic at ionof

the de ci de dly

m or e re la xe d B url ing ton st an da rdto th e fac ts of t hi s ca se m us t em ph at ic al ly dis pe l i t. Under the holding o f B url ing ton , the ty pe of em ploy er c ondu ct considered ac t i o n ab l e h as b ee n b ro ad en edfr o m th at wh i ch ad v er s el y ef

fe ct s th e p l ai n t i ff

’s co ndi tio ns o f em

plo y m en t or e m plo ym en t st at

us t o th at w hic h ha s am at er ia lly adve rs e ef

fe ct on the pla int if

f, ir re spe ct ive of

w he the r it is e m

plo ym en t or w orkpl ac e- re la te d. Se e B url ing ton , 126 S . Ct . a t 24 15. T hus, the 13 B url ing ton Co urt e ff

ec tiv el y r ej ec te d th e standard s a

ppl ie d by thi s c ourt i n bo th Sta vr opou los and G upta that r equir ed an e m plo y ee to showe ith er

an ul tim at e em plo ym en t de ci sio n or

sub stanti al e m

plo ym en t a ct ionto es ta

bli sh an a dve rs eThus the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ob se rv atio n th at Burlington’s “mater ially adver se” standa

rd 14 do e s n ot c on fl ic t w ithour p ri or sta nd ard , whic h r e qu ir e s a

“ se ri ou s a

nd mate ri a l” c ha

ng e in terms, conditions, or privileg es of e mploy ment, is not corre ct. The two standa rds ar e distinct and differ ent and, a s noted, the Burlington s t an d ar d a p p l i e s t o a

w i d e r r an g e o f e mp l o y e r c o n d u c t . It should be noted, howe ver, that while the new sta ndard e nunciated in Burlington a pp lie s to Ti tle VI Ireta liation claims, it has no application to substantive Title VI Idiscrimination claims; the pr ior sta nd ard re ma ins a

pp lic a ble to s uc h c la ims .

26 e mp l o yme n ta c t i o n f

o r th e p u r p o s e o f aT i t l e V I I r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m. See 14 B url ing ton , 126 S . Ct . a t 24 15; Sta vr opou los , 361 F . 3d at 61 6- 17; G upta , 212 F. 3d at 587 . Additionally , the C ourt explained th at in the context of a Title V II retaliation claim , a

m aterially

adverse ac tion “ m eans it we ll m ight h ave dissuaded a re asonable worker f

rom m aking or sup porting a char ge of discrim ination .” B url ing ton , 126 S . Ct . a t 24 15. T his m or e lib er al vie wof w ha t c onst itu te s an a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion accords an em

ploy ee protection from

a w ider range of r etaliatory conduct than w oul d be a va ila

ble und er the standard

appl ie d in Sta vr opou los and Gupta. See Phe lan , 463 F . 3d at 78 1, n. 3 ( statin g th at in B url ing ton the Co urt c onc lud ed “ the Title V II r etaliation provis ion protects an em ploy ee f rom a w ider range of c ondu ct than th e dis cr im inatio n pr ovi sio n do es . ”) . W e the re fo re are pe rs ua de d th at the adverse em

ploym ent action standard previou sly applied in th is circuit to Title V II retaliation claim s is m ore stringent than th e “ m aterially adverse” standardSom e c ourt s h ave su g g e ste d th at Burlington ha s li ttl e a pp lic atio n in

c a se s su c h a s th is 15 one in which the pla intiff alleg es an ultimate e mploy ment action ra

ther than a non-employ

ment-re lated adve rse a ction. See Thomas v. Potter , 202 Fe d.Appx.118, 119 (7th C ir. 20 06 ); Deprado v . City of Miami , 2008 WL269608, *4 n.1 (11th Cir. Fe bruar y 1, 2008). Unde r that view, our pr ior standar d for “ ultimate action” r etaliation claims mig ht simpl y be lef t intact fo r t ho se c a se s th at natur a lly

fi t w ith in i t, l e avin gthe ne w s tand ard to b e a pp lie d s ole ly

to t ho se reta liation cases in which only non-employ

ment-re lated conduc t is implicated. We do not re ad Burlington to l imi t it s h old ingin t hat f a sh ion , h ow e ve r, but r athe r r e a d it a s si g nif ic antl y broade ning the standard f or both employ

ment-re lated and non- employ ment-re lated employer c on du c t. M or e ov e r, we re c ognize that th e a pp lic atio n o f t

wo se pa ra te re ta liatio n s tand ard s c ou ld be unnec essar ily

confusing

and burde nsome. 27 announ ce d in B url ing ton . In the instant case, we have no dou bt but that 15 Cr aw fo rd suf fe re d am at er ia lly

a dve rs e ac tio n inthe f

orm of the unf av or ab le perform ance r eview she r eceived (that af fecte d her eligibilityfor a m erit pay increase) after

she com plained of racial discrim ination . Such conduct byan em plo y er c le ar ly m igh t de te r a re as ona

ble e m plo y ee f ro m pur sui ng a

pe ndi ng ch arg e o f di sc riminat io n o r m ak in g ane w on e. B url ing ton , 1 2 6 S. Ct . a t2 4 1 5 . We therefore conclude that not only wa s district court’ s ruling o n Craw ford’ s Title V II re ta liatio n c la im

w ro ng unde r our

pr ior , narr ow er

standard , but

a lso that i t m ost certa inly is wr ong u nder B url ing ton ’ s m or e lib er al standard . B. D isp ar at e T re atm en t i n T er m s and C ondi tio ns o f E m plo ym en t W ith respect to Craw ford’ s disp arate pay claim , the district court de te rm ine d th at

Br enna m anw as not

apr ope r co m

parator f or pur pose s of astr ai ghtAcc ording ly , any disparate pay

claim ar ising fr om Crawfor d’s alleg ations that her 16 c omp e ns atio n w a s n ot d ir e c tly c omm e ns ur ate wi th B re nn aman’ s c omp e ns atio n, inc lud ingin c onne c tio n w ithCr awf

or d’ s u lti mate pr omo tio n to a ssi sta nt d ir e c tor

of human r e so ur c e s, fa ils . 28 sa lary c om pari son. W e ag re e w iththat c onc lus ion . See M eeks v . C omputer 16 Assocs. Int'l , 15 F . 3d 1 013, 1019 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) ( statin g th at to es ta bli sh a pr ima facie ca se of

dis parate pay , apla int if

f m ust sho wshe oc cu

pie s apos iti on s im ilar to that of ahig he r pa id e m

plo y ee w ho i s no t a

m em be r of he r pr ote ct ed

c la ss) . N ot onlyhad Brennam an been em ploy ed at G SUfor sever al y ears longer than Cr aw fo rd but a lso Br enna m anpos se sse d sp ec ia liz ed and h igh ly

va lue d e xpe rt ise in th e in fo rm at io n s y st em s fi el d t ha t Cr awfo rddo es no t cl ai m . See Mulhall v. Advance Sec urity, Inc. , 19 F. 3d 58 6, 599 (11th Cir. 1994). The district court noted that Craw ford also presented what it ter m ed a “ m ore nuanced pay

claim ,” i.e., that she was not paid at the proper level for her m anager posi tio n w hil e Ca

uc as ian e m

plo y ee s inthe de partm en t, inc lud ing Br en na m an , w er e pa id at the hig h e nd o f the r an ge f or the ir pos iti ons. W ithr es pe ct

to thi s na rro wer cl ai m

th e d is tri ctco ur t ap pa ren tl y acce pt ed , argu en do , that Br ennam an an dth e o t h erempl o yees s o p ai dwe re p ro p erco m p ar at o rs an dth at Cr aw fo rd ’s al le gatio ns c oul d c onst itu te a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion s. A ga in r el y ing on i ts analy sis of Sta vr opou los , h o we v er , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt re as o n edth at Cr aw fo rd ’s s u c c e s s f u l g r i e v a n c e , wh i c h r e s u l t e di n an up w a r da d ju s t men to f

h e r s a l a ry,Crawf ord does not appe ar to c laim that these ac tions were r etaliatory in nature. To the 17 extent she does, we f

ind she has fa iled to make out a pr im a fa c iecase of re taliation. Even if the complained- of terms a

nd conditions of Crawf

ord’s e mploy

ment constituted adver se employ ment actions, the e vidence supports no connec tion between the m and any protec ted ac tivity

in which she eng ag ed. Pennington , 261 F.3d at 1266. 29 re sul te d inno l oss of

sa lary or be ne fi ts and thus she ha d su ff er ed no a dve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on . Fo r e s s en t i al l y t h e s ame r ea s o n s d i s cu s s edp re v i o u s l y re g ar d i n g Cr aw fo rd ’s m er it pay inc re as e cl ai m , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt a lso e rr ed in fi ndi ng that Craw ford failed to show an adverse em ploym ent action in conn ection with her dis parate pay

c la im . A lth oughCr aw fo rd ’ s sa lary e ve ntu al ly

w as a dj ust ed

to 17 $54, 740 (w ith out

the f our pe rc en t m er it pay

inc re as e) , she w as de nie d th e use or benefit of that pay

raise during the tim e it should have been in eff ect. Crawf

ord the re fo re ha s sh ow n th at

she w as sub

j ec te d to ase ri ous an d m at er ia l c hange af fe ct ing he r co m

pe nsatio n th at

w as suf fi ci en t t o c onst itu te an a dve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on forpu rp os es of h er d is pa rat e p ay cla im . Se e D av is , 245 F . 3d at 124 0; Phe lan , 46 3 F .3dat 7 80 . C. D en ia l of

P ro m oti on Fo r the pur

pose of it s di sc uss ionthe dis tr ic t c ourt a cc ep te d th at Cr aw fo rd had establish ed a pri m a fa ci e c as e of dis cr im inatio n and r et al ia tio n f or f ai lur e to prom ote and therefore proceeded to an analy sis un der M cD onne ll D ouglas C

orp.30

v. Gree n , 411 U. S. 792, 93 S.C t. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 66 8 (1973). So doing, the court re j ec te d C raw fo rd ’ s c ont entio ns tha t the de fe ndants ’ pr of fe re d r ea sons f

or not se le ct in g h er an d e ve nt ua ll y eli m in at in g t he po si ti on were p ret ex tu al . O n any T itl e V II c la im

the pla int if

f be ar s “ the ult im at e bur de n of pr ovi ng discrim inatory

treatm ent by

a preponderance of

the evidence.” Earley v . Ch am pio n I nt' l C orp. , 907 F. 2d 10 77, 1081 (11t h Cir. 1990 ). She m ay satisfy her burden bypresenting direct evidence of an intent to dis crim inate or circ um stantial ev ide nc e usi ng McD onnell Dougl as’s bur de n- shi ft ing f ram ew ork. U nde r thi s fram ew ork, if the plaintiff establishes a pri m a fa ci e c as e, the bur de n sh if ts t o th e em plo y er to “ ar tic ulate som e le git im at e, non dis cr im inator y r ea son” f or the a dve rs e em pl oym en t ac ti on . M

cD onne ll D ouglas , 411 U. S. at 802. If the em ploy er does this, the burden shifts b ack to the plaintiff to sho w that the em ploy er' s stated reas on was apre te xt fordi sc riminat io n. Se e id. a t 80 4 ; H oli fie ld v . R en o , 115 F . 3d 1555 , 1565 (11th Cir. 1997) ( pe r c uri am ). T he inquir

y int o pr et ex t r equir es the co urt t o de te rm ine , in vie wof a ll the e vid en ce , “ w he the r the pla int if f ha s c as t suf fi ci en t do ubt

on the de fe ndant' s pr of

fe re d no ndi sc ri m inator

y r ea sons to pe rm it a re as ona ble f ac tf ind er to co nc lud e that the e m

plo y er ' s pr of

fe re d le git im at e re as ons we re not what a ctually

m otivated its conduct.” Co m bs v . P lan tat ion P att erns , 106 F. 3d 1 519, 153 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ( ci ta tio n and quot at ion s om itt ed ). A s w ithTh e re is n o d isp ute that, w ithre sp e c t to he r d isc ri min atio n c la ims , Cr awf or d b e lon g s to 18 a prote cted c lass and wa s qualified to per form the position of direc tor of employ ment and c la ssi fi c atio n. Al so , w ithre sp e c t to he r r e ta liatio n c la im, it i s und isp ute d th at sh e e ng a g e d in protec ted Title VI Iactivity . 31 claim s of subst antive discrim ination , T itle VI I re taliation claim s require that

“ [o ]n ce th e p l ai n t i ff

es t ab l i s h es [a ] pri m a fa ci e case, the em ploy er m ust proffer a le git im at e, non -d isc ri m inator y r ea son fo r the a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ion . I f the em ploy er off

ers such legitim ate re asons for the em ploym ent action, the plaintiff m ust the n de m onstrate that the e m plo y er ' s pr of

fe re d e xpl an at ionis a pr et ex t f or retaliation.” H

oli fie ld , 115 F . 3d at 15 66. Inana ly zi ng C raw fo rd ’ s f ai lur e to p ro m ote c la im , w e as sum e, a s di d th e district court, that Crawf

ord has m ade out a prima facie ca se of r ac e dis cr im inatio n an dre t al i at i o n o n th i s i s s u e. We d i s ag re e, h o we v er , wi t h th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 18 conclusio n that no is sues of fact r em ain with respect to whether Crawf ord has m et he r bur de n of

sho w ing the de fe ndants ’ r ea sons f or f ai lin g to pr om ote he r to the posi tio n of

dir ec tor of c la ssi fi catio n and e m

plo ym en t w er e pr et ex tua l. G ive n th e circum stances surroundi ng the three postin gs for the positi on, and the three failures to hire Cr aw ford or otherw ise fill the positi on, w e find that Craw ford has ca st s uf fi ci en t do ubt

on the pr of

fe re d r ea sons to pe rm it a re as ona ble f ac tf ind er to co nc lu de th atth e rea so ns actua ll y were a p ret ex t fo r di sc riminat io n a ndret al ia ti on .32

Co m bs , 106 F . 3d at 15 38 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ; H oli fie ld , 11 5 F .3dat 1 56 6. Sp ec if ic al ly , ar ea sona

ble j ur y c oul d c onc lud e that a

“ la ck of c onse nsus ” w as a pr et ex tua l r ea son fo r fa ili ng t o hi re Cr aw fo rd the f ir st t im e the pos iti on o f dir ec tor of com pensation and em

ploym ent was a dvertised: the evidence reflec ts that J o h n s t o n ch o s e n o tt o m ak e ah i ri n g d ec i s i o natth at t i m e g i v en Ne l s o n ’s as se ssm en t tha t C raw fo rd w as the be st s uit ed

c an did at e, that N el son ha d do ubt s about th e actual nee d for the newpositi on, and that Nelson had expressed co nc er ns o ve r “ oth er

inc ide nts in the pa st” inv olv ing Cr aw fo rd . A s to the se co nd posti ng, defendants have point ed to no reason whatsoever for f ailing to offer Cr aw fo rd the pos iti on. W ithr es pe ct to the thi rd

ti m e the j ob w as pos te d, and Cr aw fo rd a ga in w as not

pr om ote d, ar ea sona

ble j ur y c oul d qu es tio n w he the r the explanation given for not hirin g her, indeed for not includ ing her in the interview pr oc es s, was a pr et ex t fo r di sc riminat io n a ndret al ia ti on . Fi na lly , r eg ar din g th e de ci sio n to e lim inate the ne wpos iti on, w e ag re e w ith the dis tr ic t c ourt tha t de fe ndants have c om e fo rw ar d w ithsuf fi ci en t e vid en ce , in the f orm of Wri ght ’ s c onsu lti ng r ep ort, to showthat the r ea sons f or the de ci sio n w er e le git im at e an d no n- dis cr im inator y . W e furthe r fi nd tha t, giv enthe circum stances leading up to the decision – in particular the num erous grievances and com plaints Crawf

ord filed – a j ury

question exists on the issue of whether33

de fen da nt s’ reas on s fo r el im in at in g t he job were a p ret ex t fo r ret al ia ti on . Craw ford has not, however , c om e forw ard w ith evidence adequate to create a j ury que sti on o n th e iss ue of

w he the r de fe ndants ’ pr of fe re d e xpl an at ionf

or the de ci sio n inf

ac t w as apr et ex t f

or r ac ia l di sc ri m inatio n. C raw fo rd ha s f ai le d to p ro du ce ev i d en ce s u ff

i ci en tfo r are as o n ab l e ju ry t o co n cl u d e t h at J o h n s t o n ’s s t at edre as o n s fo r w i t h dra wi n g th e p o s i t i o n – wh i ch i n cl u d e r el i an ce o n Wri g h t ’s ind ep en de nt r ep ort and N el son’ s a dvi ce , a s w el l a s th e ne ed to re spon d to the U niv er sity ’ s bu dge t de m an ds – w er e not the a ct ua l r ea sons f

or he r de ci sio n bu t that i nst ea d sh e w as m oti va te d by r ac ia l bi as . A cc or din gly , w ithr es pe ct to Cr aw fo rd ’ s f

ai lur e to p ro m ote a lle ga tio ns, the r et al ia tio n c la im m ay pr oc ee d bu t th e rac ia l d is cri m in at io n c la im s m ay no t. Insum m ar y , a s to Cr aw fo rd ’ s a lle ga tio ns c onc er nin g th e de nia l of

am er it pay inc re as e, dis parate pay , and the f ai lur e to p ro m ote , w e co nc lud e that ge nui ne issues of m aterial f

act exist that preclude sum m ary j udgm ent. W e theref

ore r e v e r s e an dr e man dC r a w f o r d ’s T i t l e V I I r e t a l i a t i o n an dr a c e d i s c r i mi n a t i o n c l a i ms ag ai nst G SUand h er

§ 19 83 e qua l pr ote ct ionr ac e dis cr im inatio n c la im a ga ins t Carr oll f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w iththi s de ci sio n. D . Q ua lif

ie d I m m uni ty Bec au se we co nc lu de th atJo hn st on is en ti tl edto qu al ifi edimm un it y weAs previously noted, the only

claim that re mains ag ainst J ohnston is for rac e 19 discrimination, not retaliation. The mag istrate judg e re commended f inding that Johnston was not subject to liability

under § 1983 on the rac e discrimination claim but that, eve n if she we re, qualified immunity

would shield her. The district court conc luded that Crawf ord had not suffe red a ny constitutional viol ations and that it theref ore ne ed not consider

whether the ind ivi du a l de fe nd ants we re e nti tle d to the de fe ns e of qu a lif ie d immun ity . Ca

rr oll do e s n ot r e ly on qu a lif ie d immun ity

in t his a pp e a l but John sto n d oe s ma ke a ba re a sse rt ion

of e nti tle me nt t o it , to which Crawf

ord not responde d. 34 af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt a s to the j udgm en t e nte re d inhe r favor on C raw fo rd ’ s § 1 9 8 3 e qu a l p r o t e c t i o n r a c e d i s c r i mi n a t i o n c l a i m. 19 Q ua lif ie d im m uni ty m ay pr ovi de c om

ple te pr ote ct ionf

or pub lic of fi ci al s su edin th ei r in di vi du al cap aci ti es . W ill ing ham v . L ough nan , 321 F . 3d 1 299, 130 1 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation s om itted). W here, as in this case, ther e is no disp ute as to th e d is cret io na ry

na tu re o f th e act io ns co m pl ai ne d o f, see H

ollom an e x re l. H ollom an v . H

arland , 370 F . 3d 1 252, 126 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) , w e pr oc ee d to the two-part te st establish ed by the Suprem e Court for e valuating a claim of qualified im m uni ty . T he thr es hol d qu es tio n is w he the r, “ [t ] ak enin the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the party

a sse rt ing the inj ur

y , do the f

ac ts a lle ge d sh ow[ that the of fi ci al ' s] conduct vi olated a constitu tional right ?” Sauc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U . S. 194 , 201 , 121 S. Ct . 215 1, 215 6, 150 L . E d. 2d 2 72 ( 2001 ). I f a co nst itu tio na l r igh t w oul d have been violated un der the plaintiff's ver sion o f the fa cts, the c ourt m ust then determ ine “ whether the right was clearly established.” Id

. “ Fo r the lawto be clear ly established to the point that qualified imm unitydoes not app ly , the law35

m ust have e ar lie r be ende ve lop ed in suc h c onc re te and f

ac tua lly de fi ne d c ont ex t t o m ake it obvio us to all reasonable gov ernm ent actors, in the defendant's place, that what he is doing vio lates feder al law .” R ile y v. Ne wton , 94 F . 3d 6 32, 636 ( 11th Ci r. 199 6) ( quot at ion s om itt ed ). Q ua lif ie d im m uni ty a ff or ds “pr ote ct ionto al l bu t the plainlyincom

petent or those who kno wingly violate the law. ” Malley v . B rig gs , 4 7 5 U.S . 3 3 5 , 3 4 1 , 1 0 6 S. Ct . 1 0 9 2 , 1 0 9 6 , 8 9 L.E d .2 d2 7 1 (1 9 8 6 ). We have noted that “ [i] f the lawdid no t put th e office r on notice that his con duct w oul d be c le ar ly

unl aw fu l, sum

m ar y j udgm en t ba se d onqua lif ie d im m uni ty is appropriate.” V

iny ard v. W

ils on , 311 F . 3d 1 340, 135 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 2) ( quot ing Saucier , 533 U . S. a t 20 2) . “ T he S upr em e Co urt ha s ur ge d us to ap ply the af fi rm at ive de fe nse of

qua lif ie d im m uni ty a t the e ar lie st p oss ibl e sta ge in lit igatio n be cau se th e d efen se is imm un it y fro m su itan d n ot fro m

da m ag es on ly.” Marsh v. B utl er Co unt y, A la. , 268 F. 3d 10 14, 1022 (11t h Cir. 2001 ) ( en ban c ). John sto n’ s li ab ili ty

und er § 19 83 a s C ar

ro ll’ s su pe rv iso r m

ust be ba se d on som ething m ore than the theory of respon de at s upe rio r . B radd y v. F lor ida D ep ’t . of L abor and E m plo ym en t Se cu rit

y , 133 F . 3d 7 97, 801 ( 11th C ir . 199 8) . I n Brown v. Craw ford , 906 F . 2d 6 67, 671 ( 11th C ir . 1990 ), w e obse rv ed that Su pe rv iso r lia

bil ity oc curs e ith er

w he n th e supe rv iso r pe rs ona lly part ic ipate s inthe a lle ge d c onst itu tio na l vi olatio n or w he n th er e is a ca usa l c onne ct ionbe tw ee n a ct ion s of the sup er vis ing of fi ci al and theAs noted, the c omplaint cited, amongother issues, the de nial of Craw ford’ s merit pay 20 incre ase, the disparity

betwee n her pa

y and that of othe rs in her de partment, a nd her nonse lection for the ne w direc tor position. 36 al le ge d c onst itu tio na l de pr ivatio n. T he c au sa l c onne ct ionc anbe es ta bli she d w he n ahis tor

y of w ide spr ea d a

buse put s th e re spon sib le supe rv iso r on n oti ce of

the ne ed to co rr ec t the a lle ge d de pr ivatio n, and he fails to do so . The deprivations that consti tute widespread ab use suf fi ci en t t o no tif

y the sup er vis ing of fi ci al m ust be obv iou s, flagrant, ram

pant, and of continued du ration, r ather than isolated oc curr en ce s. 90 6 F .2dat 6 71 (ci ta ti on s o m it te d) . First, the evidence taken in the ligh t m ost favorable to Craw ford ref lects that John sto n c ur sor ily

appr ove d C ar

ro ll’ s un favor ab le pe rf

orm an ce e va luatio n of Cr aw fo rd . T he e vid en ce a lso r ef le ct s th at dur ing Joh nst on’ s f

orty -f ive m inu te m ee tin g w ithCr aw fo rd

r eg ar din g he r co m

pla int a lle gin g r et al ia tio n and discrim ination Johns ton seem ed indifferent to Crawf ord’ s concerns, and she later iss ue d ar athe r dis m iss ive w ri tte n de nia l of Cr aw fo rd ’ s c om

pla int . I n a ddi tio n,

20 John sto n w as inv olv ed

in the se le ct ionpr oc es s f or the ne wdir ec tor

pos iti on the fi rs t t im e it w as pos te d to the e xte nt s he int er vie w ed but de cl ine d to e ndor se one candi da te and d id n ot i nte rv ie wany oth er c an did at es be ca

use she w as not

a ske d to do s o. U lti m at el y , Joh nst on a gr ee d w ithN el son – w hose appr ova l Jo hnst on te sti fi ed she ne ed ed

be fo re hir ing ac an did at e – th at the pos iti on s houl d no t be fil le d a t t ha t t im e, in pa rt d ue to co nc ern s o ve r Cra wfo rd ’s pen di ng gri ev an ces .37

T he re is no e vid en ce that Jo hnst on w as inv olv ed w he n th e posi tio n w as pos te d a s ec o n dt i m e. Wit h re s p ec tt o th e t h i rdp o s t i n g o f t h e p o s i t i o n , J o h n s t o n ’s inv olv em en t i nc lud ed

te lli ng C ar

ro ll to b ro ad enthe gr oup of se le ct or s, r es pond ing br ie fl y w he n C ar

ro ll inf orm ed Joh nst on tha t sh e ha d narr ow ed the f ie ld o f candidates to three unnam ed persons, and again acce ding to Nelson’ s advice against filling the positi on while Crawf ord’ s race discrim ination claim s wer e pendin g. N one of this evid ence of Johnston ’ s invo lvem ent in the events of which Cr aw fo rd c om pla ins is suf

fi ci en t t o sh owthat Jo hnst on p er sona lly e nga ge d inany conduct th at constitut es a violation of the equal protection clause, which ensures th e ri gh t t o b e fre e fro m

in te nt io na l d is cri m in at io n b as edon race . W illiams v. Co nsol . Ci tyof Ja ck

sonv ill e , 341 F . 3d 1 261, 126 8 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . T he re is no hin t of ar ac ia lly dis cr im inator

y m oti ve in an y

of Joh nst on’ s c ondu ct , the m ost que sti ona ble of w hic h a t w or st r ef

le ct s th e ex er ci se of

poo r pr of

es sio na l j udgm en t rather than gross incom

petence or the intentional comm issio n of constitu tional vio la tio ns. I n sh ort, non e of the a ct ion s inw hic h Jo hnst on w as pe rs ona lly i n v o l v e dr i s e s t o al e v e l s u f f i c i e n tt o d i v e s th e r

o f qu a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. Nor does the re cord suppo rt im posin g liabilityagainst Joh nston for Carroll's al le ge d c onst itu tio na l vi olatio ns b ec au se she w as aw ar e of w ide spr ea d a

buse by Carr ol l an d fa il edto tak e co rrec ti ve act io n. Se e als o G onza le z v . R en o , 325 F . 3dAs noted, the pa rties devote little or no attention in thi s appea l to J ohnston’s claim of 21 entitlement to qualified immunity . We never theless note that Craw ford a rgued below that “cat’s pa w” lia bil ity a pp lie d in thi s c a se be c a

us e John sto n me re ly

“ ru bb e r s tampe d” Carr oll ’s a lle g e dly discriminatory

conduct. Unde r a “ cat' s paw” theory , a non-de cisionmakingemploy ee’ s discriminatory

animus may

be imputed to a neutr al dec isionmaker whe n the dec isionmaker has not independently

investigated alleg ations of misconduct. See Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc. , 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 ( 11th Cir. 1998). “I n such a c ase, the rec ommender is usingthe d ec i s i o n m ak er

as a m er e c o n d

u i t , o r ‘ ca t 's p aw ’ t o gi v e e ff ec tt o th e r ec o m m en d er 's 38 1228 , 123 4 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) . I n th is c as e, e ve n if Joh nst on’ s c ondu ct

in an sw er ing Cr aw fo rd ’ s c om

pla int w as ine ff

ec tua l, ins en sit ive , or

oth er w ise le ss r es pons ive than it m igh t have be en , it

w as not c onst itu tio na lly

ina de quate f

or pur pose s of qua lif ie d im m uni ty . Joh nst on t es tif

ie d th at she did not take any ind ep en de nt ac tio n r eg ar din g C raw fo rd ’ s a lle ga tio ns b ec au se she und er sto od, c or re ct ly a s th e ev ide nc e show s, that the c la im s w er e be ing ind ep en de ntl y inv es tig at ed

by the O A A D P. Mo re ove r, ac om pr eh en siv e de sk a

udi t of Cr aw fo rd ’ s po sit ionand the en t i re h u m an re s o u rc es d ep ar t m en t , a s o rd er edb y Pa t t o n wi t h J o h n s t o n ’s en co ur ag em en t, w as sub se que ntl y c om ple te d by Wri ght . T hus, a s othe r co rr ec tiv e a c t i o n wa s b e i n g t a k e nwi t h r e s p e c tt o C r a w f o r d ’s c o mp l a i n t s , i twa s u n n e c e s s a ry, in fact could have been duplicative or coun terproductive, for John ston to act as we ll at that tim e. Bec ause there is no evidence of the existence of w idespread abuse which Johns ton failed to redress, and thus no causal connection b etwe en John sto n’ s a ct ion s and the a lle ge d vi olatio ns o f Cr aw fo rd ’ s c onst itu tio na l r igh ts, J o h n s t o n s h o u l dn o tb e s t r i p p e do f th e p r o t e c t i o n o f

qu a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. 21discriminatory animus.” Sti mp so n v . Ci ty of T us c alo os a , 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 ( 11th Cir. 1999) ( per curiam ). He re, the evidenc e does not support the c ontention that Carroll exercised undue inf lue nc e ov e r Johns ton . Rathe r, c ontr ary to C arr oll ’s wi sh e s, John sto n d e c lin e d to e nd or se Strasner f or the ne w position the first time it was posted. Also, following Ne lson’s advice but ag ainst Carroll’s re commendation, Johnst on declined to e x tend an of fer to Wi llis on t he job’s thi rd po sti ng . F ina lly , b e c a

us e John sto n r e vie we d Cr awf or d’ s c omp la int

and me t w ithhe r t o dis c us s th e iss ue s it

pr e se nte d –

a lbe it n ot t o Cr awf

or d’ s satis fa c tio n –

Cr awf or d h a s f a ile d to show a c ausal c onnection betwe en Carr oll and J ohnston’s actions pursuant to a “ cat’ s paw” theory of liability . Id. at 1332. 39 IV . C on cl us ion Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , w e RE V E RS E the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of summ ary j udgm ent to GSUon Craw ford’ s Title V II r etaliation and race dis cr im inatio n c la im s and t o C ar ro ll on C raw fo rd ’ s § 1 983 ra ce dis cr im inatio n cl ai m . W e AFFIR M t he di st ric t co ur t’s g ran t o f su m m ary jud gm en t t o J oh ns to n. T his c as e is RE MA

N D E D to the dis tr ic t c ourt f or f urthe r pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt wit h t hi s o pi ni on . REV ERS ED and REMA ND ED IN P AR T; A FF IRM ED IN P AR T.