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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEWGENCE 

WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 

COpy I 

BYE 4588-64 

23 July 1964 .. 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dirp.ctor, National Reconnaissance Office 

SUBJECT Review of FY 1965 ~NRP 

1. I have reviewed the material you sent me for use in our 

discussion on Monday on the FY 1965 program. In order that you may ~ 

have the benefit of my preliminary review, I make the following commenttl. 

Unfortunately the information available to me is limited and any constructive 

suggestions on my part will require more detailed information which. I ' 

assume, you will make available. Nevertheless, my comments are 

intended to be helpful to you in further discussions of this FY '65 National 

Reconnaissance Plan and will indicate specific areas in which I need 

considerably more clarification and details. 

GENERAL 

One thing that strikes me .. s lTIost interesting is the fact that 

the Program A and Program D funding under the President's budget was 

fully authorized in the NRO tentative program, and in fact Program A 

was increased Contrasted with this, Program B funding 

indicates remaining to be justified. This gives me cause 

for concern since ogram B is an operational responsibility of elements 

of the Centrallntelligence AgAn- over which I have direct control. 

My views on GAMBIT-3 and the FULCRUM program are 

covered in my letter of July 23rd to Secretary Vance, a copy of which I 

attach for your information and reference. Furthermore, I expect that the" 

COMOR study which will be presented to USIB on July 29th will throw 

further light on the desirability of new photographic reconnais sance systems 

to improve our reconnaissance inventory and I presume that USIB's desires 

will serve as guidance to NRO for its program in Fiscal Year '65 and 

subsequent years. 

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2. My subsequent specific comments are designed to point out 

areas in which 1 think we must take a very close look to determine whether 

or not the Programs are in fact necessary and whether or not the funds 

presently designated for them should not, perhaps, be reassigned to higher 

priority programs designed to meet the more critical needs of the intelligence community. 

SPECIFIC 

Program A. 

CORONA J -- While this amount appears reasonable, our discussion 

yesterday indicated that beyond those funds presently contracted for by 

Program B, no procurement of payloads by Program B is contemplated for 

the latter part of FY '65. This appears to prejudge a decision that the 

CORONA Program will be transferred in toto to Program A. 1 anticipate 

further discussions with reference to contracting responsibilities for 

Program B. You are familiar with my views which were expressed in a 

memorandum to Secretary McNamara commenting upon the PFIAB report 

which memorandum, 1 am sure, you have seen. With respect to introduction 

of Aerospace in the CORONA Program, I have given this serious thought and 

have concluded that such a move would be most undesirable and would risk 

serious damage to the Program and hence bequest through this memorandum 

that the present arrangement, which was continued by letter contract through 

July, 1964, be put on a permanent basis. Any other action would be confusing 

and would seriously risk this important intelligence collecting asset. 

ARGON - - This figure appears reasonable and I have no comment. 

CORONA OCV -- 1 understand the original purpose of proposing 

the use of the expensive GAMBIT Orbital Control Vehicle (OCV) as a 

carrier for the CORONA cameras was to provide some degree of competition 

and therefore incentive to Lockheed for better performance. It seems to me 

that this move will introduce a whole new set of reliability problems and 

will increase the launch costs from per launch as we from 

Thor Agenas to Atlas Agenas. This would be in addition to the 

tentatively budgeted. I am not convinced that this is either a necessary or 

desirable move. In view of General Greer's statements, 1 invite further 

discussion concerning the advantages of using the Atlas Agena for the CORONA •. 

GAMBIT -- This schedule looks about right and the tentative 

financing appears adequate. As indicated in my letter, it appears that 

developmental activities necessary to bring the GAMBIT resolution down t~ 

2' as indicated by Eastman Kodak representatives on Monday would be 

desirable. 1 would recommend that these activities be funded promptly. r"''1',- ·"t. -"·-"~·.I (IIV"",,~~: ~}t>, "' .- ~ .. ·'.l.'WI~L·. I..i~'.;.' 

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GAMBIT-3 -- Note recommendations in my letter to 

Secretary Vance. 

QUILL - - Although we have never been briefed in any detail on 

this program, I understand it is a satellite-bearing, side-looking radar 

and is primarily a research and development item concerning the 

feasibility/utility of such an all-weather approach. I would like further 

information on this Program. 

417 -- These weather satellites contribute to weather planning 

for NRO missions and I therefore am in support of them. In the future, 

if we have problems as to the size of the NRO budget, we might consider 

transferring the satellites out of that budget and possibly to the Air 

Force Systems Command. This is not an item of importance at the 

moment, however, and the amount funded seems adequate. 

SIGINT -- I have never been fully briefed on the intelligence 

requirements for this Program, or whether or not it is providing information of real value meriting this sizable expenditure. I would like a 

comprehensive analysis and briefing prior to making commitments of 

this magnitude. 

NEW GENERAL SEARCH -- I do not have any information as to 

what is contemplated under this line item and will need full justification 

for it. 

SA TELLITE CONTROL FACILITIES - - I do not have any information 

as to what is contemplated under this line item and will need full justification 

for it. 

APPLIED RESEARCH/ADVANCED TECHNOLOOY -- I do not have 

any information as to what is contemplated under this line item and will 

need full justification for it. 

AFSSPL -- I have no way to judge the adequacy of the funds provided 

for the Air Force film processing at Westover. However I would like to 

discuss with you the use and the relative contributions of the governmentfinanced film processing facilities at Eastman Kodak which were established 

some time ago by CIA and those of the Air Force facilities at Westover. 

Opinions have been expressed to me that the former facUities are not being 

used productively with the result a very considerable amount of Eastman's 

knowledge in the field of film processing is being sacrificed. I would 

appreciate an opportunity to discuss this matter with you at your early 

convenience. This is the first time that I have noticed the budget for Air 

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Force film processing at Westover as a line item in the NRO budget. I am 

interested in knowing whether this has previously been included in the NRO 

budget. It appears to me that now is the time to establish just what the 

separate or supplementary roles of our facilities at Eastman Kodak and the 

facility at Westover should be. I would like a briefing as to what your plans 

are in this regard. 

- - I am most concerned over the level of 

effort in the area of As you know this 

responsibility was assigned to the Air Force through NRO by the Special 

Group. CIA feels that there is a considerable that the 

Soviets will come with an 

must be given a very high priority, 

competence. 

MISCELLANEOUS - - I do not have any information as to what is 

contemplated under this line item and will need full justification for it. 

Program B. 

The Program B submissions for FY 1965 budget 

These submissions were made on 20 September 1963. On '0 December 1963 

the D/NRO furnished an ed OSD FY '65 budget estimate of _ 

_ including for KEDLOCK. Subsequent advices from 

D/NRO and as to et submissions have resulted in the directed 

figure of of whi of this figure appears to be 

withheld for further justification or consideration as an addendum item. The 

reasoning behind all of these adjustments and the very tentative nature of the 

commitments requires further explanation. 

OXCART -- The tentative program is significantly lower than the 

President's budget or the recommendations of Director, Program B, and 

I would predict a year-end deficit situation, particularly if operational missions 

are called for this year. It would appear that funds from KEDLOCK and 

TAGBOARD (in Program D) should probably be recaptured in magnitude 

sufficient to restore the Director-recommended OXCART funding. 

IDEALIST -- The matter of additional U-2's for the U. S. inventory 

should be decided now. As discussed on Monday, two courses of action are 

open. The first is to build up the CIA inventory by modifying SAC U-2's 

on the assumption that such planes are available without impairing SAC's 

capabilities to fulfill its assigned missions. I have been told this situation 

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might result if B-57F1 s are substituted for U-Z's for certain atomic 

energy missions. The alternative is the building of new U-ZLls. 

These would be better planes than the converted U-Z1s; however they 

would be more costly and furthermore to make it worthwhile to open up 

the production line, an order for Z5 aircraft is indicated. I think we 

should confer and reach a decision on this matter at an early date. 

COUNTERMEASURES -- In view of the OXCART supermarket 

program, it appears that all of ation 

should be furnished to Director, Program B, particularly since this 

Program was not in sight when the Presidential budget was set at_ -. -- These funds appear adequate to do the job. 

PHOTOGRAPHIC -- These funds appear adequate to do the job. 

ADVANCED SYSTEMS STUDIES -- This funding is adequate to 

determine FULCRUM feasibility and program definition during the first 

six months of the fiscal year but is not adequate to on into the 

second phase. The funding is adequate to determine feasibility 

as well as initial funding for financing_ during the second half of 

FY 165 if the first half looks good. Money should also be made available to 

continue preliminary design studies of the advanced aircraft and 

which is now funded out of FY 164 funds. 

FULCRUM -- My views are set forth in my letter to Secretary Vance. 

been approved and if the 

Program is succes , the additional 

required is available in the Advanced Systems Studies fund of 

proposed. 

AKINDLE -- Subject to Special Group encouragement, which I 

understand you will elicit at the Special Group meeting on July Z3rd, no 

further action appears necessary at this time. 

ProgramD 

R-IZ EARNING -- The amount tentatively programmed 

less than Director, Program D recommendation and does not appear 

to prevent slippage. It appears to me that such a reduction would cause 

slippage or possible supplemental request. This, however, seems to be 

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an Air Force problem. In fact, I wonder if the time is not approaching 

for the R-lZ to betaken from the NRO budget and transferred to the 

Air Force. 

KEDLOCK -- I notice no reduction in the KEDLOCK programming 

although most of the OXCART items have been seriously reduced. The 

question here is which comes first. 

TAG BOARD - - I think it is now time for us to take a real hard 

look at TAGBOARD. My tentative conclusion is that this is a marginal 

program of unlikely utilization as an NRO operation and we might better 

divert the funds to other programs of greater promise over the long run. 

DRAGON LADY -- Funds appear adequate. 

SUMMARY 

- Funds appear adequate but, in any event, could be 

that order of magnitude. 

To summarize. I need much more information in considerably 

greater depth on those questions I have raised above and suggest that 

we continue these budget discussions at your earliest opportunity. In the 

meantime, major commitments of FY '65 funds in those controversial 

areas noted above should be held in abeyance until Secretary Vance a~d I 

can agree on a FY '65 NRP. 

Attachment: 

cc: Secretary Vance 

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McCONE 

Director