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REPORT ON TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL

CONSIDERATIONS OF MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY EARTH SENSING

The Department of Defense believes that there should be

a clarification of NASA and DOD efforts so that civil programs

will not adversely impact the continued protection of the

classified reconnaissance program or otherwise cause our

adversaries to receive space acquired information which would

be of military or general intelligence value. A review of the

technical and political earth sensing environment was accomplished by a committee from NASA, DOD, CIA and NRO.

The current national policy is contained in the Report

of the NSAM 156 Committee on the "Political and Security

Aspects of Non-Military Applications of Satellite Earth

Sensing," 11 July 1966. The recommendations of this report

are attached. In general, the report recommended a continuation of political And security protection of the classified

national reconnaissance program and a pursuance of an earth

resources survey program by NASA.

NASA, has undertaken a broad range of earth resources survey activities. LANDSAT I, the first dedicated earth resources

satellite, has been active since 1972. Both satellites have

a multi-spectral image resolution of about 80 meters. The

civil program has proven to be fruitful in terms of generating

considerable interest in earth resources technology. Data

acquired in the civil program are routinely distributed to

all who desire to purchase copies. Release of all NASA acquired

data to the public domain is a result of a conscientious U.S.

policy established to blunt concerns about potential unfair

U.S. exploitation of .the data. NASA also has been encouraged

by an apparent utility of LANDSAT data to improve U.S. government estimates of domestic and overseas food stuff production.

LANDSAT II is routinely acquiring international grain yield

information principally from the Soviet Union. NASA hopes

in the future to improve its quality of earth looking sensors

and current plans call for an operational earth resources

satellite system by the 1980s.

The U.S. satellite reconnaissance program has become a

critically vital asset since there are no other dependable

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means of acquiring strategic intelligence data from within

the heartland of the Soviet Union and China. Extraordinary

security measures are employed to provide protection to the

U.S. reconnaissance program from internationally imposed

political constraints and from revelation of its technical

capability and limitations.

In assessing the current environment, the committee

identified three sets of issues which require resolution.

Although no third party has had a diplomatic

basis to challenge the U.S. or Russian satellite reconnaissance

activities, the principle of remote sensing from space has

recently bedome a subject of discussion in the United Nations.

The Defense Department believes that there is a strong possibility of a challenge being presented by inference to its

military space activities through the debate on unconstrained

U.S. civil activities. NASA, on the other hand, believes that

a growing foreign investment in ground stations for earth

resource's data will mandate for global acceptance in that

military activity will not become 'a serious issue.

The technical guidelines used by NASA and the'

NRO were originally defined in 1964. For the past several

years, the mechanism for overseeing a joint technology exchange has fallen into disuse. At the same time, the technology

relationship between DOD, NRO and NASA has become more complex.

The Defense Department believes that there has been a growing

convergence of NRO and NASA technology and its use of high

quality earth sensing technology has broadened beyond the scope

of the guidelines to include non-photographic sensor development,.

large optic and highly sophisticated space platforms, and a

desire from the NRO industrial base to market reconnaissance

developed technology for civil use. NASA believes that its

programs have been appropriate and in accordance with existing

national policy.

A recent study conducted by the DOD indicated that

in the absence of a more sophisticated space intelligence program, NASA's current and proposed programs are potentially of

high military intelligence use to adversary nations. On the

other hand, much of the same information is of use to U.S.

civil agencies and .the private sector. The Department of

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Defense believes that a better control of data release of space

acquired data should be exerted. NASA believes, on the other

hand, that trade offs need to be established so that the data,

even if of potential intelligence value, might be used by

appropriate civil and private organizations.

CONCLUSIONS: The committee has concluded that while the spirit

of the 1966 NSAM 156 Committee report has been followed, the

environment has changed sufficiently to warrant a restatement of

national policy. It is clear that there has not been total global

acceptance of carte blanche U.S. remote earth sensing. At the

same time, the value of the classified reconnaissance program

to the nation has increased. It is also apparent that openly

conducted space "reconnaissance" programs would not likely be

internationally acceptable in accordance with existing UN

treaties or developing UN doctrine. The committee also concluded that civil programs should also not become a "reconnaissance" activity of serendipitous benefit to other governments.

The committee recommends the following:

a. The 1966 NSAM 156 Committee guidance should be reaffirmed with respect to the following:

Continue to protect the classified national reconnaissance program by carefully assessing unclassified earth

sensing activities prior to their authorization.

Continue to extend the U.S. civil space program to

maximize overseas political capital and to gain economic payoff

for the U.S.

Continue to apply limitations on the civil program

as established between NASA and NRO.

Continue to apply the limiting guidelines for use

by all other interested government agencies.

(5) Continue to seek ways by which the intelligence

community can facilitate the application of reconnaissance product to civil use while safeguarding the security of the recon-.

naissance program.

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b. The 1966 guidance should be amended as follows:

Because of political uncertainties a more cautious

pace should be employed for the openly conducted civil earth

observation programs from space. NASA should take the lead in

establishing domestic and international emphasis on aerial

surveys to permit use of satellites and aerial composites for

earth surveys, thereby reducing the need for high resolution

satellite pictures.

The guidelines for civil earth observation from

space should be amended to establish a 60 meter threshold for

imaging any point on the earth's surface. Any system operating

at orbital altitudes capable of equaling or bettering this

resolution should not image the earth. The 60 meter threshold

applies to the achieved resolution on the ground relative to

the. best or operationally planned imaging access of the earth

by the platform sensor involved. In addition, no civil space

program should undertake acquisition of electronic frequency

data from the earth.

c. There should be a close coordination of the overall

unclassified mission plans and programs, and release of unclassified spate-acquired data to the public domain. In order to

accomplish this, a Program Review Committee should be established

which would be chaired by the ODS6T of CIA with membership of

NASA, DOD and NRO. Political and technical judgments on openly

conducted remote sensing would be made by this Committee. There

should be two subcommittees of the Program. Review Committee.

One, a Technology Release Committee, would review the propriety

of release of technical data from the classified programs to

the public domain. This subcommittee would be chaired by the

NRO, and NASA and DOD would be members. The second, a Data

Release Subcommittee, would evaluate the potential gain'to our

adversaries should they acquire the openly released data.. This

subcommittee would be chaired by DOD, and NASA and CIA would

be members. The overall goals of the Program Review Committee

would be to assist NASA so that NASA's undertakings do not become reconnaissance oriented, and to suggest ways in which

NASA could meet its objectives by alternative means if a conflict becomes evident. The State Department would advise the

Committee and judgments of the Committee would be made known

to the National Security Council.

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