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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Special Assistant to the President for 

Science and Technology 

SUBJECT: APOLLO Applications Program 

As presently being conceived and planned, the NASA Apollo 

Applications Program appears to pose a serious threat to the 

security of the NRP - both from the standpoint of protecting 

the level of the sensor technology associated with NRP systems, 

and with reference to the need {or continuance of an international climate which permits the conduct of U. S.overhead 

reconnaissance activities. 

Neither repeated expressions of concern: 9Y myself and by 

my predecessor to Various senior officials of NASA, nor 

correspondence between the Secretary of Defense and the 

Administrator of NASA, appear to have had substantial influence 

on NASA planning and preparations for the Apollo Applications 

Program. I am continuing to work with representatives of NASA 

and DDR&E on the Manned Spaceflight Policy Committee in our 

attempt to resolve the difficulties which we have encountered. 

However, the basic lack of agreement with NASA on fundamental 

premises compels me to doubt that our problems can be solved 

by that.means. I believe it now is timely, therefore, that 

the NRP ExCom review this matter and deter,mine what action 

should be taken. . .... , 10 ... ' .... " 

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To provide background for an ExCom discussion, the NRO 

Staff has summarized and documented the situation in -the 

attached study. The study su~~arizes the NASA activities 

and planning in, the APOLLO App+ications Program and NRO 

concerns and actions relative to the program; more detailed 

supporting material and references are provided in the 

attachments. 

With your'concurrence, I will schedule an ExCom 

meeting at an early:date on this subject. 

Atch als 

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Alexander H. Flax 

Director 

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THE APOLLO APPLICATIONS PROGRAM 

AND THE. 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM 

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INTRODUCTION 

Over the past year, NASA has been preparing detailed plans 

for the Apollo"Applications Program (AAP) for:"remote sensing 

of the earth". The program plan envisages the use of those 

Apollo spacecraft and Saturn launch capabilities which may 

prove excess to the lunar program; it may also involve the 

procurement of additional spacecraft and boosters. 

Two elements having possible impact upon the National Reconnaissance Program are reflected in the NASA plans: (1) the 

use of polar orbits in order to achieve maximum coverage of the 

earth's surface and (2) the use of a wide variety of earth 

sensing devices of advanced technology, the results of which 

will be of reconnaissance or near reconnais.~ance quality relative 

to NRP standards. 

NASA planned activities in terrestrial sensing stem from 

such fields as geodesy, geology, oceanography, agriculture, 

and forestry. There can be no question that there are legitimate 

civilian pUrpO?"3s in these fields which could be served by 

earth sensing from satellites. 

There is a conflict between NASA's planned earth sensing 

activities and the National Reconnaissance Program: (1) with 

respect to security, (2) in terms of competition for the 

nation's" available optical sensor fabrication and photographic 

exploitation assets, and (3) in terms of the need for effective 

and economic use of national technical assets. .,. .. , '"'... -.... ~ . 

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Security practices under the NRP, through which the U. S. 

has endeavored to preserve an international environment 

conducive to the successful continuation of this intelligence 

collection activity, are designed to prevent official confirmation of the mission under other than the most considered 

,and controlled circumstances, and to effect protection o£ 

the extent and success of the program through rigid ~ontrol 

of both the technological state-of-art and the resultant 

intelligence. products. Efforts by the NRO, to date, to impose 

, 

a degree of similar restriction to these NASA activities, which, 

from the standpoint of applicable technology, parallel the NRP 

in many areas, have not been notably successful. In this 

regard, there is a question as to correct interpretation of 

.. existing national policy related to such activities. 

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There are available in the U. S. somewhat limited industrial I 

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and governmental assets to provide for fabrication of satellite 

optical equipment and exploitation of resultant satellite 

photographic products. Most of these assets are heavily 

commi tted in support of this intelligence mission. Any uncontrol:1 

led competitive effort among separate departments of the 

U. S. government, would tend to dilute the National capabilities 

to an unsatisfactory level. 

In addition, there is currently available, under TALENT/ 

.... KEYHOLE 'controls, considerable material which could be used to 

satisfy many of the requirements toward which the NAS)i, p::og:;ram is "'" 

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directed. Further, when examined in terms of cost effectiveness, 

many of the tasks planned under AAP could probably be better 

accomplished by NRO systems either in being or under development. 

For many of these tasks, the presence of man aboard the 

Apollo vehicle appears to be unnecessary, and existing or planned 

unmanned systems would accomplish the desired objectives at 

lower cost. 

There would appear, therefore, to be justification for 

examination of both programs from a total national viewpoint to 

resolve areas of overlap, redundancy, and conflict. 

THE NASA PROGRAM:' 

NASA has recently outlined in some detail its plans for 

satellite-borne image-forming sensors of the"earth's surface in 

conjunction with the Apollo Program (Tab 1). The development 

of this program will require experiments with image forming 

sensors aboard earth orbiting vehicles; therefore, NASA has 

actively solicited proposals for imagery experiments from the 

scientific community, civil government agencies, and Department 

of Defense agenci'es to achieve maximum utilization of these 

v'ehicles. 

The photography obtained from the Mercury and Gemini progral::s 

and experiments, involving a wide ~rray of teres trial sensors 

conducted from aircraft, have proven the potential for application 

of this type of material to many scientific problems and current 

'. ... ...... ~ . 

Fed~ral government programs such as those being c6nduct-e~ by. "1. '. 

the Geological Survey, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of 

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Agriculture, and even the Census Bureau. The technical personnel and engineers responsible for the proposals made to 

NASA realize that much improvement can be achieved with systems 

designed for use in space and have, theTefore, recommended senso.r 

pTograms requiring high resolution and considerable geometric 

stability. While only a portion of the experiments require 

photographic quality comparable to that utilized in the NRP, 

all experimenters, by natuTe, will desire greater resolution 

and less distortion as their Tesearch progresses. Polar orbits 

are required, of course, to achieve maximum potential for 

covering the entire earth's surface. 

The latest proposal for an Integrated Group of Photographic l 

Experiments for Manned Earth Orbital Missions (Apollo Application tFlights) , dated December 1, 1965, (Tab 2) llsts the types ·of 

sensors to be flown and states that photographic experiments 

based on scaled-down or simulated Apollo camera systems, will 

be flown on late Gemini 01' early Apollo flights. If these 

systems aTe to be flown as indicated, the following kind of 

schedule generally will have to be met: 

Specify functional requiTements 

Define mission payload specifications 

Issue an RFP to the optical industry 

for the development of necessary 

earth senSOl~S 

Evaluate proposals from industTY 

AW~Td hardware development contracts 

and publicly announce the award 

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WinteT 1965/66 

Spring 1966 

Spring 1966 

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Obtain Manned Space Flight Evaluation 

Board approval 

Conduct validation tests for photographic 

sensor '~rformance 

Make spatial mock-up available to news 

media 

Commence final mission planning and 

choose orbital inclinations 

Complete plans fOT data collection, 

reduction, and processing 

Publicly announce.flight objectives 

Release mission profile to news media 

Distribute public information (press) 

plan . 

Commence astronaut training 

Deliver hardware to spaceclaft contractor 

for integration 

Integrate payload 

Checkout spacecraft (payload) systems 

Define complete detailed system performance characteristics 

Summer 1966 

Fall 1966 

Spring 1967 

Spring 1967 

Summer 1967 

Summer 1967 

Fall 1967 

Winter 1967/68 

Winter 1967/68 

Spring 1968 

Spring 1968 

Spring 1968 

Spring 1968 

The camera systems proposed by NASA to meet the needs of 

the scientific community and civil government a.gencies are 

contained in Table 1, appearing on page 4, Tab 2. 

A comparison of these camera characteristics with those 

used in the NRP shows that, in many respects, they are similar. 

This is to be expected in that, while the purposes of the two 

programs differ, the data required to solve their problems 

is very similar. Nor is it surprising to find that. there' is . - .' .... , ... ' .,. . ........... , ' .• '\.. 'tt 

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considerable overlap between the AAP and the NRP with respect 

to that category of personnel who serve as expert advisers, 

both in and out of government. It is undoubtedly true that the 

technology developed in the NRP is reflected in the proposed 

NASA systems. 

THE SECURITY PROBLEM: 

Security as practiced within the NRP under the general 

policy guidance of the DCI, has been strict and is both sound 

and realistic in light of the purpose for which it was intended; 

namely, the protection of probably the most important Single 

U. S. intelligence source and the maintenance of an international 

environment cjnducive to continuation of this covert program~ 

Under this system of security, the intellfgence product, the 

fact of the activity, and that technological state-of-art, 

which might reveal the ext~nt and relative success of the program, 

are tightly controlled. 

It has its basis: (1) in a Presidential memorandum dated 

26 August 1960 directing that the products of satellite reconnaissance, and information of the fact of such reconnaissance 

revealed by the product be afforded security protection within 

the TALENT/KETI10LE Security System; (2) in NSC Action 2454 which 

recommended national policy related to U. S~ satellite reconnaissance activities; and (3) in covert or near covert security 

methods which were an outgrowth of security methods used in 

the CIA U-2 program. "'" ~ '. 

The NASA program, on the other hand, is intended for 

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scientific purposes, for the benefit of the world at large. 

It is difficult, and, in most instances, inappropriate to 

invoke strict security controls with respect to such 

activities. However, in terms of international image, as 

Communist nations would choose to portray the U. S., there 

is a refusal to acknowledge the existence of two national 

space programs: a "militarytl program, the primary preoccupation 

of which, to date, has been the acquisition of intelligenge; 

and a "peaceful" U. S. space. prog:L~am under NASA. 

The security problem exists now, because as pointed out 

earlier, NASA's requirements for earth sensing technology 

parallel tho~~ of the NRP, the limited domestic assets to 

provide such technology are those which have been heavily 

engaged· in the NRP. Unless strict control is exercised, 

the NASA program, during its re~earch and development phases, 

will' gradually bring about the exposure of NRP technology 

and consequently the NRP. Further, the present program planning 

discussions, which are unclassified, and the imminent program 

definition activities will soon result in a very considerable 

disclosure of National reconnaissance capabilities. 

The security problem, in terms of international reaction 

may grow as NASA provides to the public more and more knowledge 

concerning its plans under AAP. 

The security problem will farther increase at such 

time as NASA obtains photographic products under AAP. _' .Wi thin . '. :-,"' '~.-:.. .. ... . .... "'. ~ " .. \. '. 

the present terms of reference, it is difficult to envisio~ 

any form of strict security control of such materials. 

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At the time of the "DOD/CIA/NASA Agreement on NASA 

Reconn2..issance Program" dated 28 August 1963 (Tab 3), the 

mapping and survey m;i.ssion of Apollo was envisioned as being 

designed to provide NASA with lunar surface mapping in addition 

to high resolution photography of specific lunar areas, necessnry to effect tho Apollo lUnar l~nding. It was antioipateci 

that an advance earth orbital mission for system checkout 

purposes might also be required. A Supplemental Agreement 

and Security !1dendum (Tab 4), specifically designed for this 

set of circumstances, was prepared and work proceeded toward 

system definition with the ultimate selection of the GAMBIT 

" 

and the improved FCIC stellar index camera combination as the 

photographic equipment to be used for the Apollo M&S mission. " .-

Whereas the Security Addendum to the Agreement was 

designed to afford continued security protection to the NRP, 

while at the same time renaering full assistance to the NASA, 

it was a negotiated agreement, with Section G of the Addendum 

representing something less than what would be hoped for were 

security the only consideration. Section G states: 

"l. Lunar photography as initially processed 

2. Sanitized lunar photography (i.e., remove 

fiduciaries and enlarge) 

3. Earth photography, if any 

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SECRET 

UNCLASSI 

TOP SE C:ftET / 

TALENT KEYHOLE" 

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Under the above criteria, following a successful luna:::' 

Apollo IvI&S mission, from resulting cartographics and photography of the moon I s surface l~anging from UNCLASIFIED to 

SECRET, it will in all probability be feasible to technically 

transpose the results in terms of an estimated earth surveillance capability. The result at that time (mid-1969) will 

be a presumption of an earth capability to map gross areas with 

resolution on the order of 90-100 ft and specific area 'high 

resultion survey capability on the order of 3-5 ft. 

The agreement and the security addendum, however, are not 

sufficient to meet pl~oblems resulting from the expanded Apollo 

program concept which includes earth sensing missions, since 

these were apparently not contemplated at .t~e time the agreement 

was arrived at. Subsequent correspondence (See Tabs 5 thru 9) 

and negotiatio~s involving the Secretary of Defense and the 

Director, National Reconnaissance Office, with NASA resulting 

in establishment of technical criteria to be considered in 

terms of NASAnhotographic sensing requirements. These are: 

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(IlAn image forming sensor having an angular resolution 

of 0.1 milliradian 0:::' finer (approximately 60.8 ft ground 

re$olution at 100 nm from lens to photographed object) or 

an optical 0:::' infrared image forming system with a physical 

aperture (diameter) greater than 30 cm (11.8 in.) and an 

o~:)tical figure controlled to better than 1/4 wave ler~gthlt. 

"Development or test of pointing, tracking, and 

stabilization techniques or systems to be used with satellites bearing such sensors, in Which pointing accuracy 

is better than 20 microradians or the unstabilized rate 

is less than 20 microradians per second.") -', . I, ... " ... ~ • 

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A tlu~ee-man ad hoc NASA committee was established with the ' 

agreement of DNRO. This group was to have been kept'fully 

informed with respect to NRP technology for the purpose of 

reporting to the Associate Administrator/NASA, instances wherein 

NASA's requirements or plans involve technology falling within 

the above criteria, which could then result in a joint DNROAssociate Administrator/NASA consideration of the matter or 

unilateral action by the latter to discontinue the activity. 

However, the committee's actions to date appear to have had 

little effect i n restraining NASA public and contracting 

acti vities in areas affecting the NRP. 

Di sagreement is also reflected in the correspondence 

between Mr. Webb and Mr. McNamara related to this subject, ." ." 

however, in that Mr. Webb considered activities proposed under 

AAP as within'the intent of NBC ,Action 2454, whereas Mr. McNamara 

had indicated concern. Furthermore, Ml~. Webb did not agree 

to a proposal made by Mr. McNamara that NASA designate the 

Air Force as its agent to conduct all studies potentially 

involving technical requirement s which could be reasonably 

construed to be of reconnaissance quality, to include a blanket 

de l egation to the Air Force of responsibility for all testing 

in earth orbit. 

The existence of and the rationale in support of such 

document s as the DOD/CIA/NASA Apollo IvI&S agreement, correspondence 

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majority of those associated with the NASA program. They, by 

and large, observe terrestrial sensing activities planned 

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under AAP as being well within the confines of eXisting 

international law and in no way contradictory to U. S. international commitments (See Tab 10). The security requirement 

that NRP intelligence products be sanitized from the standpoint of satellite attribution prior to dissemination outside 

TALENT/KEYHOLE controls has no application to NASA's terrestrial 

sensing activities. NASA's solicitation of testimonial 

support from military services and civilian federal agencies 

has therefore been on an open and, in most instances, totally 

unclassified basis (See Tab 11). NASA's solicitation of 

reqUirements from military services concerned with such fields 

as oceanography and mapping, charting and geodesy, in this 

manner, was sufficiently at cross-pul'poses, wi th NRP obj ecti ves' 

as to cause the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 30 August 1965 

to direct that all such requirements be cleared first with 

the NRO (See Tab 12). 

The general tenor of NSC Action 2454 was one of proceeding 

with considerable caution toward obtaining international 

acceptance of such activity with Point 5 stating that, "NASA 

should study urgently the possibilities of accelerating 

bilateral international cooperation to develop non-military 

space activities involving space observation perhaps includL~g 

photography." There, can be no doubt that TIROS and GEMINI 

photography have obtained a degree of international acceptance 

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for activities of this type. Activities such as those planned 

under AAP, might provide a further step in this direction _ 

or they might precipitate international confrontation of such 

order as to prejudice the NRP. There is not available a 

sufficient basis in intelligence to assess the impact. It is 

0xtl~emely difficult to envision circumstances under which the 

nation would be able to continue indefinitely control of tech~ 

nology associated with sensing of the earth's surface from 

satellites, particularly when such devices of necessity represent 

the best potential for lunar and planetary exploration and 

study. On the other hand, a flaunting of such technology at a 

time when the U~ S~ can reasonably be presumed to be engaged 

in a major program of satellite reconnaissance, might prove 

provocative and might well provide the basts for considered 

counteraction by the Soviets. 

Nor is the danger that the NASA program may compromise 

satellite reconnaissance technology limited to the field of 

optics. Undoubtedly both radar and infra-red imagery have as 

yet relatively unexplored potential for this mission. Whereas 

there is as yet no formal USIB requirement for a satellite high 

resolution radar system, there certainly is a requirement for 

such an all-weather, all-illumination sensor if one can be 

developed that has practical application to the mission. 

fact, the DIA in presenting the MC&G requirements to COMOR have 

stated the need for anall~weather capability. 

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TI~E PROBLE~/I OF LI~1ITED DOlvIESTIC ii.SSETS: 

The domestic industrial base which supports the NRP camera 

program inclues the Eastman Kodak Corp, Itek' Corp, FCIC, and, 

to a ~esser extent, Perkin-Elmer Corp and Hycon Corp~ Collectively, 

they represent virtually all of the domestic capability in this 

field. The impact of the MOL optical work on the heavily-taxed 

facilities of Eastman Kodak Corp was considered at some length 

at the time of that programTs approval and it was deemed essential 

then that another satellite reconnaissance camera program at EK 

be curtailed and assumed by another corporation. 

The photographic exploitation facilities of the U. S. 

Government have been forced by and large to concentrate their 

activities on priority military intellige~c~ targets. Undoubtedly 

a great deal of material, contaL1ed in existing photography, 

still awaits exploitation in terms of economic intelligence 

contained therein. 

It would appear, therefore, that unless some effort is 

made to coordinate the drain of these two programs upon the 

available domestic assets, a prejudice to one or the other, 

or both, programs could result .. 

CONSIDERATION OF ECON'OMICAL UTILIZATION OF NATIONAL ASSETS. 

·The third area of apparent conflict is related to overall 

national economy. If exploited to this end, photography currently av::::.ilable within TALENT/KEYHOLE might satisfy to a .... ',. . , .... ~ 

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considerable degree, those civilian requirements to which 

the AAP is intended to respond. Ideally, full utilization and 

r.:.r·",....···::.;·::~~ •.• ev-aluation of these m.aterials should be accomplished pl~ior to 

and operation of new systems. 

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Furthermore, the resolution and geometric characte:l.~istics 

of the camera systems under consideration by NASA bear a considerable similarity to NRP hardware, all of which is currently 

flown in unmanned satellites. This suggests that the overall 

effort should be examined to prevent unnecessary duplication 

and insure cost effect~veness. 

For example, the photographic products from cur:rent NRP 

programs are being exploited to meet many DaD mapping, charting, 

and geodesy requirements. Future NRP satellite missions will 

provide additional materials to meet the needs of mapping, 

charting, and geodesy. The work done on map revision, ice 

flows in the polar cap regions, and new map compilation at 

small and medium scale prove that current' NRP programs can 

produce the type and quality of photography for which NASA 

desires to develop new systems; 

Furthermore, if the photog:raphy of the ocean areas is 

important enough to justify additional launch costs, they could 

be photographed in color or infra-red starting in July or 

August 1966 with the existing CORONA system. The total cost to 

cover the ocean areas with 90 per cent cloud-free photography 

by current NRP Systems i$ considerable less than the development 

and launch costs of new systems. using Saturn boosters. The 

same requirement could be met with the improved follow-on 

search system providing still greater photographic resolution 

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if such improved resolution is indeed needed. -.,"" ..... ~.;',. .. ," .. " .. ,.- ..... : .. '\. '. ' 

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SOLUTIONS: 

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Methods related to security currently practiced by NASA, 

within its planned earth surveillance activities under AAP, are 

not reconcilable with security methods used under the NRP. Both 

appear to have basis in current national policy. The expense 

of program development and operation coupled with the limited 

domestic technical and indust~ial base available to support 

satellite imagery programs suggest that a single coordinated 

program should be considered. 

In order to arrive at p~ssible solutions to this problem, 

the rationale supporting the covert nature of the present U. S. 

satellite reconnaissance program needs to be examined in terms 

of the probable international environment related thereto in 

the 1969 and post 1969 periods. It has beeR"conclusively 

established that a Soviet satellite reconnaissance program is 

in operation today. A French photo~raphic satellite is in the 

foreseeable future. There is a possibility that the Japanese 

could also embark on such a program. 

However, notwithstanding the remarks of the now deposed Mr. 

Khrushchev, the Soviets have so far indicated an intention to 

observe a practice of secrecy with respect to such activities. 

Sufficient information does not presently exist upon which to 

forecast what will be the French a~d Japanese policies applicable 

to such practices. Whereas the U. S. in the future may be able to 

- take relief from any public disclosures these three nations may 

choose to mal{e related to their activities , it would,"be -unwise;: . 

to take precipitous action at this time. 

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Whereas the utility of those NRP security practices, 

through which NRO attempts to control satellite reconnaissance 

techaology, ne-(;;;ds to be realistically examined against possibJ.e 

prejudice to worthwhile scientific endeavors and in light of 

the fact that the United States no longer enjoys a monopoly 

with respect to such technology, there exists at the present 

time no compelling reason to be magnanimous. To the contrary, 

unnecessary compromise of U. S. satellite reconnaissance 

state-of-art might provide the basis for considered Soviet 

counteraction. 

The alternative solutions suggested below, therefore, 

presume a continued need for a near-covert NRP and provide 

for a contemplated but controlled effort on ~he part of the 

U. S. to obtain international acceptance of earth observation 

from space. POSSible alternative solutions include: 

Alternative #1: Permit NASA to proceed, but initially 

to be restricted to near equatorial orbits (no overflights 

of the Soviet Union). Require a careful screening of NASA's 

senSing equipments against the .1 milliradian criterion and 

establiSh national policy with respect to public release of 

that of NASA's photography covering areas to be defined as 

sensit:"ve. 

Altern2..tive #2: A contemplated program to pennit NASA 

to proceed with satellite earth imagery but at a constant ra~e 

behind NRP technology; i. e., KH-<:: for flight by 1968··;·~-~I{t:':>7·bY·~:·· 

1969-70, etc., with actual hardware to be released at as late 

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a time as will permit program schedules to be met. NASA, 

in coordination with the Department of Defense, to negotiate 

with individual foreign governments, to obtain their agreement 

to undertake such activities in response to their needs as 

well as those of the U. S. scientific community. KH-4 and 

KH-7 and rr:..£ mapping and charting materials could be screc.led 

for their application to scientific requirements and, where 

appropriate, be released in such manner as to be attributable 

to NASA activities. 

Alternative #3: Screen KH-4 and KH-7 and TKH mapping and 

chaTting materials against the scientific requiTements. Where 

appropriate from a cost effectiveness standpOint, task the 

NRP against other scientific requirement5. Initially such 

wOl~k would be limited to TKH controls or disseminated in 

accordance with sanitization procedures designed to protect 

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satellite attribution. If this approach were used in conjunctio~ 

with either Alternative #1 or 1:/2, in time, many of these materiaJcould subsequent ly be released under cover of the NASA proglnam. 

ALTER~,{ATIVE APPROACHES TO SOLUTIONS: 

;\11 of the suggested solutions would necessitate 

i redirectior;~ 

to either or both progrmTIs of such nature as to require the 

intervention of a higher authority to which both are responsive. 

The following are suggested as possible approaches: - ... ' .. 

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~ ", 

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.... "" .. ~ ~ '. " " . ,'. " 

1. Joint DCI/Secretary of Defense negotiati on with 

NASA. 

(This would, in effect, be a further extention of 

earlier CIA/DOD/NASA Agreement). 

2. Space Council consideration and recolTh'11endation to 

tho President. 

3. USIB consideration and recommendation to the 

National Security Council. 

4. FlAB consideration and recommendation to the 

President. 

(Both alternatives #3 and #4 are appropriate to 

.' .~. -/ " .... '-., .. , '. , .. ~ . 

the possible -: .reat to a major U. S. intelligence source brol'-;ht 

about by the current situation and are certain to appropriately 

assess the impact upon the U. S. intelligence miSSion). 

5. Recommendation to National Security Council by 

ad hoc comilli -'etee presently constituted under NSAiYI156. 

(This would represent an appropriate reconsideration 

of NSC 2454 policy which was originated by this group pursuant 

to NSA.7yI 156). 

6. Bureau of Budget recommendation to -President for 

formation of ad hoc committee to consider and make recommendations. 

(The aspect of coordinating overall national expendiL 

, 

'-

- ture suggests this as an appropriate approach. This would 

rep:;.~esent a further step to action taken by BOB in·.,ca:;.~ec:ci:c.·g',;:,. 

the Secretary of Defense to study the ability of DOD mapping 

',,'-TId c::~a:cting facilities and programs - which are, in large 

measure, based upon TKH sources - to meet the :cequirements of 

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--

the civilian agencies. (See Tab 13». 

... •• , >, - ........ 

• • \ .... ~.:'- e.o._ .,. ' ........ ) '" \. 

. .., ~~. 

. ~'. .; .... 19 

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