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RECOMMENDATION 15: ( ~) 

That, to enhance our photographic collection capability in the 

Chicom-Southeast Asia area) review be made to determine whether the 

present supply of U-2 aircraft is sufficient to meet anticipated 

needs. 

The present national inventory of U-2 aircraft is twenty-four. Of 

these) four are assigned to the Air Force Systems Command for high alti-· 

tude research and development activities and test support missions. Major 

modifications would be required to ready these aircraft for operational use. 

Of the twenty operational aircraft) nine are assigned to CIA. Each of these 

aircraft is powered by the J -75 engine, cruises above 70, 000 feet, carries 

either of two high resolution caraeras or an infra-red camera, and is equipped with defensive ECM equipments for protection against SA-2's and fighter 

interceptor X-band radar. ~wo of the aircraft are modified for carrier 

operations; several are equipped for aerial refueling. The remaining eleven 

U-2 1 s are assigned to the Strategic Air CoD1~and. Tnese aircraft are powered 

by the J-57 engine, cruise approximately 5,000 feet lower than the CIA ty:pe 

aircraft, carry the high resolution 11B" camera, and are equipped with defensive ECM equipment. Two aircraft are configured for in-flight refueling. 

In October, 1965, approval was given to modify seven of the SAC aircraft to 

the U-2C confiti,u.ration. Authority was provided to include a contract option 

for the remaining four aircraft. Thus, it is anticipated that all twenty 

U-2 aircra~ will be of similar configuration. 

On the basis of the past nine years of experience, the current world 

situation, and the expectations of world developments over the foreseeable 

future (two-to-three years), it is reasonable to expect continuing requirements for U-2 photographic reconnaissa.~ce under a number of different areas 

of the world. These requirements can be grouped into three general categories: 

(a) Strategic covert reconnaissance of areas not heavily defended 

by surface-to-air missiles. Included in this category are certain areas of 

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Approved for Release: 2017 /01 /25 C05096690 

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Com.'Ilunist China, the Sino-India.~ border, Indonesia, the French Nuclear 

Test facility, the Congo, Algeria, Egypt, and Venezuela. 

(b) Prompt e0verage cf cril'lie situations where defenses permit. 

Included in this category are situations previously experienced in areas 

such as Cyprus, India-Pakistan, and Cuba. Included in the crisis management program is the capability to monitor the course of developments on 

a frequent basis with rapid exploitation of the collected photographic 

intelligence. 

(c) In support of tactical reconnaissance in situations such as 

Laos and North Vietna.in where the U-2 can be used to get the basic photographic coverage, keep abreast of developments, and provide intelligence 

support supplementing reconnaissance conducted by friendly forces actually 

engaged :L.~ tactical operations. 

Through long experience, the U-2 has proven to be an economical means 

to obtain high resolution photographic recor.naissance on a prompt basis. 

Because of the aircraft altitude and range performance capabilities, it can, 

in certain situations, permit sufficient flexibility in flight planning to 

accommodate U.S. political restraints while still achieving the objective. 

In addition, the range of the aircraft and the flexibility of the ground 

support system, make it possible to conduct orderly reconnaissance on relatively short notice and with a minimum of political difficulties. 

The need for U -2 operations, however, must be evaluated as a part of 

the overall reconnaissance capability posture. Included in the family of 

reconnaissance vehicles are satellites, other aircraft, and drones. Both 

present and projected capabilities must be weighed in determining whether 

or not additional U-2's are required. 

Satellite photography bas proven to be extremely valuable. However, 

satellites have inherent limitations not encountered by aircraft. Specifically, satellites cannot alter course to avoid bad weather, lack rapid response time in meeting crisis situations, and are unable to get repetitive 

coverage of' a specific area within a short time frame. It is extremely 

costly to obtain satellite coverage in a generally East-West direction. 

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The U-2 and A-l2 families of aircraft provide a complementary team 

making it possible to conduct reconnaissance by manned aircraft in wide 

range of situations. Specifically, the A-12 is designed to cover areas 

defended by surface-to-air missiles; and the U-2 can cover areas not 

defended by such missiles in situations where rapid deployment and repetitive coverage is important. 

The drone systems presently available also complement the satellite 

and U-2 systems. 'I'he drones are r;:ot a substitute for the U-2 in that they 

have a more limited photographic capability, are more vulnerable than the 

U-2, a.'1d are less reliable than a manned system. The drones provide a 

most important capability for reconnaissance against heavily defended targets, are politically acceptable in some areas where manned aircraft are 

not, and can be used in decoy type of operations at relatively little 

expense. 

Beyond the next two-to-three year time period, however) the need for 

the U-2 is less clear. Tne Adva.Dced GA'IBIT satellite (with ground resolution of approximatel~ill be launched in 1966 and should be fully 

operational in 1967.-~ search/surveillance satellite should be operational in mid-1968. The TAGBOARD drone should be operational late l966 

or early 1967. A follow-on subsonic drone with increased performance and 

photographic capabilities may be available fa mid-1968. 

T'ne need for U-2 aircraft in the anticipated reconnaissance capability 

environment beyond three years from now was considered in depth in mid-1965. 

The factors involved were reevaluated :L.'1 November 1965. 'I~e conclusion, at 

that time, in light of the expected attrition rate (2.5 aircraft per year), 

the decision to update the SAC aircraft, the size of the CIA-SAC inventory 

and the lead time to procure new U-2 1 s (12 to 14 months for a one/month 

production rate), was that the decision could and should be deferred until 

,mid-1966. There is no new evidence which indicates that this decision 

should be changed. 

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