MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 9 ME 14 6 Docket: Yor

- 19

- 147 Submitted

On	B riefs : September	10,	2019 Decided: September	17,	2019 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN,	JABAR , and HJELM, JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF KATHERINE	C.

PER	CURIAM [¶1] Katherine	C.	appeals	from	a	judgment	entered	by	the	District	Court (Biddeford, Sutton , J .)	terminating	her	parental	rights	to	her	child. See 22	M.R.S. §	4055(1)(B)(2)(a) ,	(b)(i)

- (ii), (iv) (2018). She argues	that	the	court	erred by finding that	she	is parental ly unfit	and that termination i s	in	the best	interest	of
the	child. We affirm	the	judgment. [¶ 2 ] “ [ I ] n	 order	 to	 terminate	parental rights [ , ] the	court	must	 find , by clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 four	 statutory	 grounds	 of parental	unfitness.” In	re	Children	of	Anthony	M. ,	2018	ME	146,	¶	8,	195	A.3d
1229 (alterations	in	original) (quotation	marks	omitted)

. We	will set	aside	a finding	 of	 parental	 unfitness “ only	 if	 there	 is	 no	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the record	to	support	it,	if	the	fact

- finder	clearly	misapprehends	the	meaning	of	the evidence,	or	if	the	finding	is	so	contrary	to	the	credible	evidence	that	it	does	not represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.” Id

. (quotation	marks	omitted)

. “We2 review	the	court’s	factual	findings	related	to	the	child’s	best	interest	for	clear error,	 and	 its	 ultimate	 conclusion	 regarding	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest	 for	 an abuse	of	disc retion,	viewing	the	facts,	and	the	weight	to	be	given	them,	through the	trial	court’s	lens.” In	re	Children	of	Christopher	S .,	2019	ME	31,	¶	7,	203	A.3d 808	(quotation	marks	omitted). [¶ 3 ] C ompetent	 evidence	 supports	 the	 court’s	 determination	 that	 the
mother	is parentally unfit. Among	the	lines	of	reasoning	set	out	in its judgment, the court	 explained with	 support	 in	 the	 record that	 the mother has	 a long

- standing	history	of knowingly enterin g	into	domestic	relationships	with men	who	pose	a	substantial	threat	to	the	child.		The	mother	was	aware	that	one of	those	men	was	abusing her child	even	before	the	child	disclosed the	abuse , but	 she	 refused	 to	 acknowledge	 it

. Even	 now,	 the	 mother	 does	 not	 have	 a proper	understanding	of	the	effects	of	the	abuse	perpetrated	on her child,	and she	persists	in	her	belief	that her child	should	not	have	been	removed	from	her care.		Because	the	mother	is	unwilling	or	unable	to	recogniz e	the	threat	that	her choices	create	for her child	and is	unwilling	or	unable	to protect	her	child	from that	danger,	the	court	properly	concluded	that	she	is	parentally	unfit. [¶ 4 ] Further,	 the	 court	 committed	 no	 error	 by	 determining	 that
termination	is	i n	the	child’s	best	interest .		The court issued	supported	findings ,3 among	othe rs , that	the child	feels	unsafe	with	her	mother	and	that	the child ’s trust	in	her	mother	has	been	“broken”	because	the	mother	did	not	protect	the child	from	being	abused. Indeed, although	the	child	had	been	in	departmental custody	 for	 two	 years at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 termination	 hearing,	 the	 mother’s
contact	with	the	child	still needed	to	be supervised	because	even	short	periods of	unsupervised	contact had create d an	unusual	and	damaging	level	of	stress for	the	child. Because	of	the	mother’s	emotional	and	psychological challenges , the	mother	is	not	presently	capable

— nor	will	she	be	capable	anytime	soon

— of engaging	in	safe	and	productive	therapy	with her child to	r epair	their	damaged relationship

. Furthermore,	the	mothe r’s	inability	to	answer	difficult	questions , especially	related	to	her child’s	abuse, demonstrates that	she is	unable	to	“stand up”	for	her	child

. Given	the	court’s	proper	findings	of	the	child’s	ne ed	for	safety, security,	 and	 permanency,	 and	 the	 mother ’s	 established	 failure to have met those	 needs , the	 court	 did	 not	 err	 or	 abuse	its	 discretion	 by	 concluding	 that termination	is	in	the	best	interest	of	the	child and	that	she	should	be	freed	for adopti on . The	entry	is: Judgment affirmed.4 Valerie	A.	Randall,	Esq.,	Hanly	Law,	Portland,	for	appellant m other Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta , for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human Services

Biddeford	District	Court	docket	number	PC

- 2017

- 3 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY