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OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE

PRESIAM FOR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

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REPORT OF A SPECIAL PANEL ON

SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

August 25, 1960

The concept of an artificial satellite orbiting around the

earth has been associated, from the outset, with the thought

that such a vehicle could be used to maintain a continuous reconnaissance and surveillance over any desired part of the globe.

The original plan was to install a kind of television camera

in the satellite and to transmit its images by radio techniques

to a ground station Where the signals would be reassembled into

a photograph. With such equipment, a systematic search was to

be made of the Eurasian land mass for airfields and other

military installations large enough to be detected with the

limited resolving power of such a system. By repeSted observations it was hoped that changes would be detected with sufficient

reliability to provide warning of imminent attack.

The appeal of this fundamentally straightforward approach

lies in its relative political unobtrusiveness; in the apparent

power of television techniques for making observations almost

instantly available; in the prolOnged utilization of satellites

in their orbits; and in the freedom from the logistic intricacies

of recovery techniques. At first sight, this "electronic readduer

appears to be the fully modern approach to reconnaissance. It

has deserved, and indeed has had the most careful study. As a

result, we have now arrived at a clear understanding of the

technological problems which remain to be solved. The initial

SAMOS development project was aimed at the electronic solution

of these problems; we shall shortly discuss the difficulties.

Several years ago, it was realized that orbiting satellites

might be used for the detection of ballistic missile attack in a

much simpler and more direct method than television or photographic

Observation. While the hostile missile is being launched, its

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engine is a very powerful source of infrared radiation, and

this radiation can be detected, above the atmosphere, from

satellites many hundred nibs' away. The exploitation of this

early-warning scheme is going forward as Project MIDAS; it has

been separated from the reconnaissance .project ISAMOS) and will

not be discussed further in this paper. As a consequence of

this separate development, the warning function is no longer

a primary requirement for SANDS.

Meanwhile, a much more urgent reconnaissance need has been

pointed out by the U. S. Intelligence Board. The overriding

intelligence requirement at the present time is information

II on the operational status of Soviet missile launch sites.

This requires photographs of very high resolution--high enough

to enable a skilled photoftinterpreter to recognise and identify

the objects of interest in a missile launch site.

The exact resolution performance required for this purpose

need not be discussed here. Mnstechnical specification is

complicated and often controversial. One must realise, for oxample, that a system which will resolve 20 feet on the ground

will not permit a photo-interpreter tdescribe, an object 20

feet in length.

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Up to now, there has been only one source for highresolution photographs of the Soviet missile installations, and

that miree has been eliminated with the grounding of the U-2 •

aircraft. Can We substitute a satellite as the observing

vehicle and obtain comparable results? More specifically, can

we look to SAMOS to yield results of the necessary quality

within a short time?

Unfortunately, as far as electronic readout is concerned,

the answer is NO.

The essence of the problem is that a photograph which contains the amount of detail that is required to know the state

of readiness and kind of activity at a missile site must be

made up of a fantastically large number of bits of information--

a number so large that there is not time enough to transmit all

of these bits of information from satellites to earth While the

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—Tep-sEettersatellite is over our own or friendly territory. It ill to be

expected during the -next ten years that the elaboration of

satellite technology, the ease . of keeping many satellites in

orbit, and improvements in our electronic arts, will ultimately

make it feasible electrically to transmit detailed information

about a given point on the earth. But what we must emphasize

here today is that it is not feasible now, and it is not likely

to be feasible in time to give our country the kind of reconnaissance it needs at once. Therefore, while we recommend

continued research on those electronic readout programs, and

the occasional orbital flights which are now planned, we must warn

that we cannot rely on the electronic readout approach for

military purposes and urge that higher operational priority be

given to other Air Force developments which we are about to

discuss.

Physical recovery, in the air or in the sea, of a satellite

that has completed a number of revolutions in orbit has become

feasible. The improvement of recovery techniques is going

forward in the DISCOVERER project. One can therefore consider

the possibility of using advanced photographic techniques Which

are capable of very high resolution, and of recovering the

exposed photographic film on or near the surface of the earth.

The subsequent processing and evaluation of the film can then

be performed under the same favorable conditions that are used

in the best aerial photography.

While this approach may superficially appear clumsy and

pedestrian when compared with electronic readout, a detailed

analysis will show its performance to be distinctly superior

in providing the kind of detailed information that is required

for the study of operational missile sites. In fact, we are

convinced that this primary objective of satellite reconnaissance

can be realized most promptly and most effectively by the

physical recovery of film exposed in a high-resolution convergent stereo camera system. The principles and techniques

of this kind of photography are now well understood. Therefore,

if timely action is taken, we can expect to have an adequate

photographic payload by the time we have mastered the techniques

for recovery.

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a year

in our reconnaissance ability. And we can

expect useful performance in 1962 only if we clearly establish

high resolution photography as the first goal of the U. S.

satellite reconnaissance program.

We are not unmindful of other objectives associated with

RAMOS. Photographic surveys of broad areas, in which extensive

coverage isobtained at the expense of reduced resolving power,

have important uses. The detection and recording of electromagnetic transmissions by means of the proposed "7" payloads

will provide valuable information, especially in areas of technical

intelligence, of new aspects in 41mmunication links, in missile

defense systems, in navigational aids.

But we do not consider these objectives comparable in

importance to the task of getting, at the earliest possible

date, high-resolution photographs that will provide information

about the operational status of missile sites, with detail

nearly as good as that from the U-2. We therefore recommend a

carefully planned program, with simplified management, and with

primary emphasis on:

High-resolution stereo photography

Recovery techniques

Mindful of the urgency of this need for detailed photography,

the Air Force has greatly modified the initial SAMOS development

plan. A number of well conceived photographic recovery systems

are now under study and. evaluation. These designs fall into

two distinct categories:

A system to achieve maximum coverage with ground

resolution adequate to identify missile sites under construction, and

A system capable of photographing a large number

of selected installations with the higher resolution required

for evaluation of the operational status of a missile site.

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We are convinced that with straightforward good management in

the utilisation of-components and technology now potentially

available, the first of these systems could be placed in

operation by late 1962; the higher resolution system becoming

Operational about one year later. We therefore urge a resolute

concentration of effort on these two systems and a clear

decision to assign to this task a higher priority than to all

other aspects together of the SANDS program.

Since we must now rely upon the physical retrieval of

satellite photographs it is necessary that increased efforts

be made to improve the reliability of recovery techniques.

Recent achievements in the DISCOVERER program are most encouraging. An alternative procedure, unproven operationally, but

most appealing in concept, involves the use of a drag brake

mechanise to effect reentry. The applicability of this technique to the SANDS recovery operation should receive serious

consideration.

Until recently, the operational aspects of recovery have

been greatly complicated by the obvious requirement for safety

Ft- to restrict these activities to the ocean areas. As a result

ci of our increased confidence in the precision of the recovery

operation, the Air Force is now studying the feasibility of

effecting recovery over land. Since this would significantly

Li increase the probability of suedes' of the recovery operation,

we heartily recommend the support of Airforce efforts in this

area.

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PROCESSING AND EVALUATION

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The reconnaissance "take" of the proposed systems is

recovered as a set of latent images on photographic film. The

intelligence yield that will be extracted from these latent

images is critically dependent on quality factors in the

chemical processing of the film and in the subsequent analysis and

interpretation of the finished photographs. We cannot emphasise •

too strongly that much of the detailed information captured in

the latent image can be irretrievably lost unless first-rate

work is done in the processing laboratory and in the interpretation

center.

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' In the purely technical doMain, we must point out that

the achievement of optimum image-quality calls for the closest

possible interaction between individuals concerned with emulsion

design and manufacture and individuals concerned with processing

techniqUes. If these two activities were to be organized as

separate and independent enterprises it is most unlikely, in

our view, that the results would be the best obtainable.

A full awareness of these factors led to the special

organization of processing and evaluation that was used in the

handling of the U-2 films. Our experience with the superior

results obtained under that arrangement leads us to recommend

firmly that the same pattern Be followed in preparing the output

of the proposed satellite reconnaissance systems. We further

recommend that this output be distributed by a centralized

community laboratory.

WEATHER

In aerial photo-reconnaissance operations, the state of

the weather over the target has long been a primary'consideration.

For satellite reconnaissance operations, the sensitivity to

weather is in some respects even worse. If the target is

obscured by clouds on the first pass, the satellite may have

later opportunities to observe the target. But the times of

subsequent passes over the target are fixed by the orbit

. parameters, and the situation is less flexible than the scheduling

of aircraft. Moreover, the weather over the great majority.of

Soviet targets is very bod indeed, and the opportunities for

good photography are scarce.

The program outlined in this discussion can succeed only

if it is closely integrated with the weather services that will

be associated with the TIROS project, with the Air Force's

433-L system, and with other sources of weather data that may

come into existence. Because of the short reaction intervals that

are necessary here, these arrangements will be difficult to

establish, and'we recommend early attention to planning.

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Our analysis of the investigations already carried out by

the Air Force leads us to the conclusion that from the array

of importaht studies a few can now be :extracted and integrated

into a single simple and powerful program to give us the

reconnaissance we need. Therefore, our recommendation is that

the following selected components of the AirForce satellite

reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very

high priority.

A recoverable satellite-payload for high

resolution convergent stereo photography.

To be recovered for the time being at sea.

To be recovered as soon as feasible on land.

To carry in some of the satellites camera and

film competent to identify , with certainty

missile sites both in construction and after

completion.

5. To carry in other satellites camera and film

competent to study the state of readiness, type

of activity, and type of missiles.

We recommend emphasis on the development of more advanced

recovery techniques, particularly for land recovery.

We recommend that electronic readout techniques be given

lower priority but be continued as a research project and that

the extensive program for a ground-based electronic readout

system be cut back very substantially and promptly.

Also, the so-called "F" payloads for gathering electromagnetic intelligence should be given lower priority than that

assigned to photography.

We further recommend that this program be managed with the

directness that the Air Force has used on occasion, with great

success, for projects of overriding priority. We suggest that

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. • —Tet-sEestetthis can beat be accomplished by a direct line of command

from the Secretary-of the Air Force to the general officer in

operational charge of the whole program, with appropriate

boards of scientific advisors to both the secretarial level and

to the operational level. The general officer in command would

look to associated military boards for support in the execution

of his plans. We recommend this extraordinary type of organization to execute the program because we are convinced that the

situation presents an unusual combination of urgency and

inherent amenability to a direct approach.

In addition, we recommend that the same organization as was

used in the handling of the U-2 films be used for chemical

processing of the recovered film and that the output. be distributed by a central community facility.

We also recommend that this program be closely integrated

with the weather services that will be associated with the

TIROS project, with USAF's 433-L system and other sources of

weather data.

PANEL ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE

J. R. Killian, Jr.

Edwin H. Land )

William 0. Baker

Richard Bissell

Carl F. J. Overhage

Edward M. Purcell

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Dr.

Dr.

Dr.

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Dr.

Dr.

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SWIM Sesonmeleseess erlllts Mgr=

1. Ths Netiseel Security flonsefl and she etzester, BOOM, of

the Swdget, or the Special MSC meting •hugest 2S, 11111. took the

following anions:

ii. Meted and MacairmdGleillt pseeeetattekby the Sepait•

neat of Defense end the fates of the Special Moistest to the

Presidia for Scions. ad Smerrologh prepared mourn to Ut•

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.. rere from the President &stodgiest 12, MO, as the Ineomneissame Seto/lite Proms, with @Wing rofersown to IdNOS, ts•

clutter

The dowelepnent plan and oeperinestel beside.

Ths proposed strealined rarest strutters for

the 11411011 . prooraiwithis the Ooperbmeat of Spfeese.

It. Sneed the Preeidsnt4 approval of the lel/seise roses

vendettass sebsitted is the joist pleopootettent

(1) That the followies molested esepeaents of dada

from satellite resinsissaneprigram he nee assembled into

peepers et way b1 Warier % •

(i) A reseverable sotellitelpsylood for high reon• Wales esnwergest seam phstagearby.

(h) Sobs romeiegoi fie the tem being et sea..

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(s) To M resemened es soma se f000Lii• oft load.

(d) le smarty in eras of the satellites caner. end

film meets* to *auk viii oertaietY sifts

both is conntreeties and after seenletten.

(o) low, is ether ostellArs• senora sod film

sempotame a atm* she elite oftindlmeoe, type of alai •

eivity, at doodles.

•
That emphebis be plased oe the development of more

advanced recovoty techniques particularly for land.recovory.

•

That electronic :mahout techniques be gives low

priority but be costimood as a research project. sad that

the ezteneive program for grossa•basoll eleatresic read-out

system be cur back very embetamtially and progeny.

(A) That the se salted I' payloads for whorls& elec•

tremegmetia iatelligemme ahasti is gives lower priority than

that assigned to phetegtophp.

(6) That WA pews to maw! mit% the dirccteese

that the Air Fetes has used an osessiss, with great emcees.,

for project. of evetridimo eriaritp. This cam but be wear

plished by s direct limo of comemmd Soo the Secretary of the

Air Peres to the gamoral officer is operational charge of the

whole pregame, with oposrstato beards of sciestiflc advisers

to both the socreterial level eed to the operational level..

The semeral Dittmar is emagendmenld lest to associated mil•

leery boards for support is the o geostias of his plans.

That the some ergamimitiem an wee used is the band.

lisp of the 1• films be used far chomieal processing of the

recovered film, mad that the emir* be fistrthotod by a free• •

tral community twilit,.

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That this program be closely fossiratod with the

weather services that will be associated with the 71106 pro•

Sect, with VAMP 433•1. eyetem and other aemrcee of weather

data.

(S) Met the first a/- de emperimeetal lan nehimg of

6006 take place devise September 1966.

2. The above actions, se approwed this date by the ?midget. are

trammel:cud hermits foe appropriate laplamistia. though.

JANOS S. 1.117, Jt.

• • aristbre Secretary

cc: The Secretory of State

the Streeter of Comers& latallimiNs

OM Spatial dasiatast so ths Pssadint

for Belomes sod !ashram,.

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12 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

The attached Summary Review of the National Reconnaissance Office, dated 25 February 1963, was prepared by the first

Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Joseph V.

Charyk, at the time of his departure from this position. The

review summarizes the history of the NRO from its earliest

inception up to the time of Dr. Charykis departure, including

accomplishments as well as problems.

31.744.1

John L. Martin, Jr.

Colonel, USAF

Director, NRO Staff

1 Atch

36-page summary

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February 25, 1963

A SUMMARY REVIEW OF THE

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

INTRODUCTION

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This document is intended to summarize the development

of the National Reconnaissance Office and to review some of

the considerations relative to its establishment, its organiza

tional arrangement, accomplishments, present status and to

indicate problem areas that have been encountered. Pertinent

recommendations for resolution of such problem areas are also

included.

2. ORGANIZATION

a. Background

The essential background of the present National Ream-.

naissance Office began in June 1960 with a Presidential request•

for a special review of the satellite reconnaissance program. •

rl . : After numerous meetings and discussions, this effort culminated

with a special meeting of the National Security Council on

25 August 1960. As a result of this review, the Department of

Defense was directed to re-orient the overt satellite reconnaissance

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project known as SAMOS and to establish special management

structure and procedures for this project.

As a. result, the SAMOS projectiles removed completely

from normal channels. The responsibility for conducting the

development and operation was assigned to a General Officer

inL2 field, who, in turn, was assigned directly to the Secre-

,,

tary of the Mr Force and reported to the Secretary with no

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intermediate supervision or review. A small special staff

(seven officers) was established within the Office of the Sacra-

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tary to accompliah all Washington staff work required by the

Secretary and the Project Director. In practice, from the out-

, • or.,

.. LI set, the Secretary's responsibilities for the SAMOS Project were

,., delegated to the Under Secretary, who reported directly to the

Secretary of Defense concerning the SS Project.

te The revised procedures included the stipulation that the

SANDS Project would be responsive only to requirements stated by

the United States Intelligence Board. The revised procedure

11 also excluded any overt association of the SACS Project with

a! any military operational command, and placed all aspects of the

project management and operation within a research and develop-

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Li went environment.
Immediately. after establishment of the new SAMOS

management structure in early September 1960, the Under

Secretary of the Air Force placed of the CORONA

and ARGON projects within the special SAEDS management struc•

tire, insofar as Air Force actions and authority were concerned.

In addition, he established direct liaison with the responsible

CIA. official, at that time the Deputy Director (Plans), resulting in a greatly improved arrangement for these covert projects.

b. Establishment of the NRO

In the spring of 1961, initial consideration was given

to further revisions to the special management structure. The

existing structure was effective only for the specific SAMOS, .

CORONA and ARGON projects; it had no relation to other projects,

existing. or proposed, Furthermore, the arrangement did not

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provide for the degree of management effectiveness warranted

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by the national importance of satellite reconnaissance. The

result of discussions extending over the rummer of 1960 was

the formalising of the previous arrangement into a national

office, with its charter expanded to include not only all satellite

mapping, geodesy and intelligence gathering projects, but all

aircraft and drone overflight projects as well.
st,

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Col. ...Lug.

The resulting National Reconnaissance Office was

formally established by the CIA-DOD Agreement of 6 September

1961. In this Agreement, the Under Secretary of the Air Force

and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the CIA, were designated as

Co-Directors of the NRO. Their initial steps toward formal

office organization were interrupted almost immediately by

rejection of the Co-Director provisions of the Agreement by

the NSC 5412 Group, on the basis that the reconnaissance provaginas too important nationally to be conducted under divided

management; enmplete responsibility for management of the entire

prograox should be assigned unequivocally to a single person.

Discussions of such revision of the CIA-DOD Agreement were

carried out over the next seven months, intermittently interrupted for various reasons. During this period, essentially

no progress was possible toward the formal organizing of the

IRO; the previous arrmegatent was continued under the new name,

with the Deputy Director (Research) replacing the Deputy Director

(Plans) due to Internal CIA organisational changes. Anew CIADOD Agreement was signed on 2 Nay'1962 establishing a single

Director of the NRO,, responsible directly to the Director of
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Central. Intelligence . and the Secretary of Defense for management of the entire National Reconnaissance , Program. Concur..

rent associated documents provided for the establishment of

the National Reconnaissance Office as an operating ngancY,

and designated the Under Secretary of the Air Force as the

Director.

a. Organization of the NRO

In May 1962, after the documentation concerning the

new Agreement had been issued, the Director of the MR0 convened

Ei a special two-day conference to discuss the organization and

procedures to be established under the new charter. This con..

ference was attended by the Deputy Director (Research), CIA,

E: and several key members of staff, along with several memP7 bars of the special staff of the Under Secretary of the Air

Force. During this conference, general agreement was reached .

Di on the basic organization and method of operation to be

followed.

Subsequently, on the basis of this conferences the basic

organization of the present NW was established by memorandum of

23 July 1962 from the Director, NRC to the Program Directors and

the Director, NRO Staff. This memorandum establiahed internal r

NRC structure and responsibilities, consistent with the basic
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darter. The Director also arranged for additional parti•

cipation within the NRO by the CIA, MPIC, NSA, the Navy and

the Army through provision of qualified personnel from these

Agencies and Services to serve full time tours on an interagency exchange basis. The ORO organization is outlined in

the attachment hereto.

d. Modus Operandi

The basic approach followed by the Director in =semizing and managing the present NRO has been based upon the

following rationale:

Cl) The clear intent behind the present EMO is

for the Director actually to manage the entire National

Reconnaissance Program, not simply to arrange for coordination of the several projects.

(2) To accomplish this task, he has authoritative

responsibility for all aspects of the Program, subject only

to the basic provisions of the 2 May 1962 CIA-DOD Agreement

and associated charter documents, and to guidance he receives

from the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary

of Defense (in addition, of course, to all applicable provisions of public law.)

I.
• ••••••• •

In accordance with this rationale, tha Director has

issued directives and instructions through correspondence

on numerous aspects of the NRO and its program. In matters

which are somewhat involved, or inclined to be controversial,

he has elected to employ several specific written agreements

as a basic management procedure.

In regard to the various projects under NRO management,

his actions have been based upon the view that all such projects are MO projects, not CIA or DOD projects, that the MO

171

should literally fuse the formerly distinct and separate

rY. efforts of separate Agencies and Services into a single national.

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program under close and effective management of the Director.

a. Since the NRO is a classified organization with a sensitive mission, all written directives to field elements of the

Department of Defense have been issued through appropriate

established Department of Defense channels. For exa=ple, during

the Cuban crisis, NRO instructions to military units in the

field were sent either through the Defense Intelligence Agency

g

or the Joint Reconnaissance Center.

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3. ACHIEVECNTS --

a. Management

Before noting achievements of the 10 in the development And operation of specific projects, some accompliemnts

of the Office should be considered from an over-all management

viewpoint.

The management of similar and related satellite

projects has been consolidated within a single streamlined,

responsive structure. In this process, formerly overlapping

and conflicting responsibilities of the several Agencies and

Services involved have been replaced with clear, non-conflicting

assignment of responsibilities.

Theo has provided a single, responsible focal

point for the national managwant of all overflight of denied

areas, and for effective coordination between all satellite,

aircraft and drone matters in this regard.

(3) The BIRO has employed management structure and

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procedures uniquely tailored to the zcari tude, importance end

4 special conditions affecting the national task. Management

P1 responsibility has been defined clearly and centered in the

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smallest possible units composed of selected personnel of
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highest qualifications. However, full use has been made of

the existing materiel and personnel resources of the several

Agencies and Services involved in providing the bulk of the

support to the over-all program. By use of streamlined procedures, elimination of all intermediate reviews between the

field Program Directors and the Director of the =0, substitution of personal attention of a few selected individuals for

all normally repetitive management documents and reports, and

establishment of special conmunications arrangements, it has

been possible to manage effectively a total national program

involving approximately three quarters of a billion dollars

in FY '63 with an RRO technical staff of approxt..... "^tely fifteen.

The management system thus developed has made it possible to

carry out this gigantic task under the conditions imposed by

special security requirements.

(4) The 11110 has provided the initiative and conceptual

basis for the establishment of Department of Defense poVEy and

security directives designed to provide the maximum possible

protection to the National Reconnaissance Program. By eliminating.•

all mission associated project names, and by aiminaiing such

items as confirmation of the total payload or mission of any
_ •

the U.S..continues to admit to the existence of satellite

advance, and in some detail, represented the launch as other

it,L. than reconnaissance mission; under the present policy, while

specific launch, or- ihe total payloads devoted to any specific

mission, it has been possible to establish a public information

posture from Which almost all provocative comment. on satellite

reconnaissance has disappeared, while at the same time it has

not been necessary to withhold any data essential to any of the

unclassified projects and experiments within the over-all space

program. In addition, this policy has eliminated the serious

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: 7' pi political embarrassment which the U. S. would face under the

previous policy if'the Soviet bloc should accidentally recover

. • .: L a satellite reconnaissance film capsule. Under the former

rt policy, the U. S. in stating the mission of each launch in

• ;• effort directed toward the reconnaissance field, there is

never any misrepresentation by statement or implication . or

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II process of elimination, since no missions are stated for any

p

launches.

(5) Procedures have been established which permit all

Agencies and Services concerned with the results of the National.
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Reconnaissance Program to make adequate preparation for exploitation of these results while m aintaining the necessary security.

Technical data essential to the exploitation community has been

released from the operational security structure into the exploitation structure by means of specific planning documents

and conferences. In addtiion, focal points have been established

within each Service and Agency, with responsibility for exploitation preparation, and with all, security clearances and information required for this task.

Direct NRO liaison has been established with the

Department of State and with the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency. This arrangement has insured that the U. S. policy in

United Nations matters is determined with full consideration of

the possible impact on the National Reconnaissance Program,

while, at the same time, all potential contributions of this

effort to constructive national policy are fully considered.

Previously uncoordinated and duplicatory effort

has been consolidated in several important areas:
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satellite operations center has been established in the base- cant of the Pe

ntagon. This center will replace the several

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sat?llite operations formerly conducted separately and

provide for effective centralized control of all such

operations under the close supervision of the Director.

11 In regard to the development and operation of reconnaissance projects, NO accomplishments include the following:

(1) Development and operation of the highly successE4 ful CORDNIAd system.

17:

(3) Development of the Thrust ate

option for use with or without strap-on solid rockets, providing significant extension of the capability of TEta. boosted

projects and greater flexibility for the motionalRmconnaissauce Program.
1

7,

Exploitation of the basic SAMS E-5 camera

development into the simpler and less expensive THOR boosted

LANYARD project, as an interim, earlier approach toward

photography of technical intelligence quality.

Initiation of development of the CORONA-J

version of the basic CMAILWismject, eucceseful conclusion

of which will provide two photographic Missions from one

launch of a single camera system. After the first mission

has been recovered, the satellite will remain inactive for

up to three weeks, after which it will be re-activated,

another photographic mission accomplished, and the film

recovered in a second recovery capsule.

Development of an interchangeable payload concept for THOR boosted projects, giving much granter potential

flexibility to the over-all program.

Development and successful operation of a small

Stellar/Index camera of high geometric fiditity tihich, in

addition to serving as an indwAing aid for exploitation of

reconnaissance photography, offers the potential of making

each reconnaissance mission concurrently , useful as a mapping

and chertingsdAsion, with substantial potential savings
•• •

• -;71: II

.;u7;--7srura:tover the separate. development and operating of systems

designed exclusively for such purposes.

Development and highly successful operation of

Project 417, a secret meteorological satellite in a sunsynchronous orbit positioned so as to provide daily weather

coverage of the Soviet Union. This project has and will

continue to be extremely valuable in programming and opeiating all photographic reconnaissance.

Complete re-orientation of the SAMS ATLAS

boosted SIG= effort into a Wit boosted project of considerable flexibility with interchangeable antennas, receivers,

etc., and successful operation of this project.

a

a

(12) Development of a coordinated national:SIGINT

satellite program.
Initiation of such vulnerability measures as

appear feasible, to provide reasonable protection of reconnaissance satellites against some possible Soviet countermeasures

Development of advanced components which are

available if required for future use, such as the eight 36"

focal length cameras developed under Project 722, now dies.

continued in view of iteprovw-ents in the *stt ah-14 system

and the expense involved in completing the developmant as

originally planned.

(15) Initiation of advanced state-of-the-art work

in areas vital to future program developments.

circumstances should warr=t.

Development of the Aff12 aircraft to the flight

test phase, thrcragbm=agement and supervisipn by the CIA

and support by the Air Force.

Continued employment of U-2 aircraft in successful overflight of denied areas, through Air Force operation

over Cuba and CIA operation with Air Force support elscMhere.
•

t •

. •

Initiation of development of the AQ-12 drone

to provide increased future flexibility and options in

covert reconnaissance by aircraft.

Initiated actions to provide increased protection to U-2 aircraft for optional future use against areas

defended by surface-to-air missiles.

Initiated organization of NRO Program D for the

development of the R-12 on a basis compatible with the

security required for the related A-12 project.

Agena-D improvements for both MR0 and other space

applications.

ft?

4. PROBLEMS 

A review of the experience to date indicates that there are

several outstanding problems which require resolution. It is

believed essential to insure that they are resolved in the

establishment of the new charter for the organization which is

now in preparation. The critical problem area can be stasmarized

as follows:

a. There appears to have beemminmAcrstanding or misinterpretation in some quarters as to the fundamental nature of the

ERO. Specifically, the question is whether the office is an

1

• ..••• •

• .

•••

Vslt
(In 71"

4.0 L.

operating agency with.direct management responsibility for a

:angle national program or whether it's function is as a

coordinating office responsible for liaison and coordination

between related projects which are the management responsibility

of various agencies and departments. .

I have operated on the basis that the former arrangement

is the correct one. In order for this function to be properly

exercised, it is essential that the DNRO have available to him

all of the management tools necessary for the accomplishment

of the responsibility. Al critical missing element has been

tha eik:oct control over funds for the entire program. Without

control over the allocation and redistribution of funds Zs

dictated by program and requirement considerations, it is my •

judgment that the responsibility cannot be effectively discharged.

It appears clear that the office has always been envisaged

as an operating agency. It is clearly reflected in the various

DOD charter documents supporting the basic CIA-DOD Agree=ent of

2 May 1962. It was outlined in detail by the DNRO in the NCO

organizational conference in late !ay 1962 and included in the

organization policy statement of 23 July 1962 issued to the NRO

program directors and the Director * • ake 120 Staff. The position
•

Z

:

•

. •

. 4

--1404:LeTCLIT.L=7._

C Levi,

may be stated as folldisf

Within the limits of applicable public law, within

the provisions of the CIA-DOD Agreementof 2 May 1962, and

subject to the gUidance he receives from the Director of

Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the

Director of the NRO is responsible for the actual management

of all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program and

has the authority to carry out this task without the necessity of reaching agreement on each and every aspect of the

management actions iuvolved. In the CIA, under the terms

of the 2 May Agreement, the responsibility of the Deputy

Director (Research) in seeing that the terms of the Agreement

are carried out within the CIA obviously includes the responsibility to See that the instructions and directions of the

Director of the LSO are carried out. .Within the DOD, the

authority of the Director is contained in DOD Directive

TS 5105.23, dated 14 June 1962.

The agreement reached in the organizational conference

in late May 1962 and confirmed in the 23 July 1962 monorandum,

clearly spells out that the MO has direct management responsibility for all elements of the program. The specific program

I

1
•.1

..•

*

k%-••"• • •••

responsibilities are divided between several program directors.

In the absence of the DNRO, each of these directors is responsible for decisions in his program area. In every sense,

therefore,.the program directors are deputy directors of the

1a0 for their own program areas.

Despite the basic CIA-DOD Agreement the agreement at

the organizational conference and the basic organizational

documents, this arrangement has never been accepted by the

Deputy Director (Research), CIA. Rather than seeking a resolution of his concern through proper channels and arriving at a

new agreement with accompanying revised organizational documents,

the apparent procedure has been one of resisting the functioning

of the organization along the lines established in the basic

Agreement and in the "organizational documents. This is a fundamental point which requires clarification.

Effective implementation of decisions affecting Agency

activities has been difficult, if not impossible, if the Deputy

Director (Research) was not completely sympathetic to the action

x.

proposed. The diredi management responsibility of the DLTO over

CIA activities needs to be re-examined.

It is significant to note that although the DOD elements

of the•NRO have undergone rather drastic changes, no substantial

g

." • • !.n '.'oe• •••• % Ai •••:g*".116.

. •
•

change from pre-1RO procedures has been affected in the CIA •

except possibly in the writing of security policy and the

extension of a few communications links. Completely harmonious and effective inter-actions between the NSA, DIA, Army,

Navy and Air Force exist. Efforts to mold the CIA activities

into a unified program have been resisted vigorously. The

apparent concept has been one of considering the DEMO as a

coordinating official but not as one having direct operational

authority over CIA programs.

DSIB-NRO relations. MID has bean quite slow in revising

the. intelligence requirements against which the NRO mat make

long lead time decisions. In addition, MID has attempted on

occasion to vary the satellite launching schedule on the short

range basis with which it deals with aircraft schedules. Work

is now under way on revised statements of longer reuse requirements and recent NRO efforts to bring MIN to a closer understanding of satellite scheduling are producing better understanding.

SRO security policy and reform. Much work remains to

make the over-all NRO security policy effective. The clearance

billet structure is badly in need of revision. In addition,

security reform is • needed to reduce the number of individual

•
•

•

'.• • ?-!

'" . t

.4•244.

-tAlti

22

code word clearances.which are necessary under the current

policy. Work is under way to accomplish these objectives.

5. RECMENDATIONS 

It should be noted that although the problems currently

facing the NRO originated some time ago, they have not prevented

substantial accomplishment. However, it should be noted also

that these problems have become acute only recently, with the

impasse reached in late December 1962 and early January 1963.

That these difficulties must be resolved promptly in order to

prevent serious degradation is evident.

Experience to date would suggest that two steps are required.

.The basic -CIA-DOD Agreement and related HMO charter documents /

should be revised to clarify the desired nature of the rao and

the responsibility and authority of-the Director of the NRO..

In addition, measures should be taken to establish and support

the internal organizational discipline essential to the repair'

of the present difficulties and the continuance of a high degree

of effectiveness. Each of these steps should include certain

specific provisions which are outlined separately below.

a. In regard to . the revision, it should be noted that

the present Agreement, while indicative of apparent harmony in

.

•
• • • a

23. " -'

u.

. •

f.

TOP. SECRET is

•

May 1962, has proven inadequate as a charter in little

more than half a ,year. The numerous drafts of proposed

agreements which preceded the 2 May 1962 Agreement, the

many discussions required to reach this Agreement, the

repeated refinement of phraseology which was necessary,

and the extended time period required for completion of

this process would suggest the presence of semantic masks

in the final document; subsequent experience has verified

the presence of two types. The first is phraseology suffi•

ciently flexible to cover different points of view, representing agreement not ruched . in actuality and requiring

only a matter of time to t produce problems. The additional

use of vague and generalized language to describe the responsibilities and infer the authority ofLthe Director also give

the status of apparent agreement to matters shown by subsequent experience to be Unsettled. It would seen, theiefore,

that in the process of revision of the Asrqement, clarity .

should be preferred to diplomacy, and the major questions

which have arisen in the course of operation under the present

Agreement should be dealt with clearly and unequivocally in

enough detail to insure understanding by all concerned. In

particular, the following points should be included:

•

' •

•
t,.I

CJ

•

II (1) The revised Agreesmet should reiffirm and

clarifythat the NRO is intended to be an operating

agency, with actual management responsibility for all

•

. projects of the National Reconnaissance Program, rather

than a mechanism of coordination between agencies

11 separately responsible for parts of this Program.

11 The National Reconnaissance Planning Group

(Z LtPG) consisting of the Secretary of Defense and the

Director of Central Intelligence, is responsible for

providing policy and program guidance and for sa!ung

anal determinations in connection therewith uhich do

not require the exercise of higher authority. The

Director of Central Intelligence has agreed that the

Secretary of Defense shall act as Executor of the 1{ PG,

responsible for implementing, plans and policies developed

, . 3

a by the ERN.

M1 The Director of Central Intelligence and the

Secretary of Defense have agreed to delegate responsibility

for their respective Agencies' participation in the projects :

of the National Reconnaissance Program. The Secretary of .

Defense has delegated the necessary Department of Defense .A

authority to the Director of the NW. The Director of

tral Intelligence has agreed to end made necessary

24

...:.- • .1.,

.

. . - • •04•:••••••,.., • • . .

:• • •• • .

•••••.: a R I.
•

r

arrangements for the Director of the L7.0 to exercise

necessary authority within the CIA. The Director of

Central Intelligence, in accepting the (revised) CIADOD Agreement establishing the MO, has agreed to require

CIA compliance with the instructions of the Director of

the IMO issued in the course of discharging his responsibilities outlined in the terms of the Agreement, and has

designated in the Agreement a senior CIA official charged

with the explicit responsibility to see that the terms

and conditions of the Agreement are carried out within

the CIA, including such instructions as may be issued by

the Director of the NUO. The Director of the NRO will

keep the Director of Central Intelligence informed of all

such action, and the Director of Central Intelligence will

insure that he is satisfied with the actions team by the

Director of the NEW insofar as the basic responsibilities

of the Director of Central Intelligence are concerned, and

will provide all appropriate guidance directly to the

Director of the NRO.

The MO is to accomplish its rznagelnent task

through maxi= utilization of applicable existing resources

Cfc't
Tao cF:r7-7.7,-- Ito • Lo 40.1 & a:.

•

and pervmmulad the CIA and the Department of Defense.

Such resources and persomul will be placed under directives of their respective agencies which :sake them directly

responsive to the Director of the ARO or his designated

subordinate officials within the NRO. The Director of

the =will menage all projects of the National Reconnaissance Program by means of streamlined management

structure and procedures.

a) The revised Agreement should state the essential

responsibilities and authority of the Director of the IMO

as follows: Within the limits of applicable public Law,

within the provisions of the CIA-DOD Agreement estab/ishin

the NRO, and subject to continued instructicns and guidance

received directly from the Director of Central Intelligence

and the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the N30 is

responsible for the actual manageraut of all projects assigned

9

to the NRO and has been delegated the authority necessary to

carry out this task. Nis decisions and directives are binding

on all applicable CIA and DOD elan-Nits unless and until he

tl

changes them. In the event that either the Director of

Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense desire such

• :14.1

.2:r
•••••n

P •• • •

*PP P•:1 a,

changes, they will inform the Director of the LW who will

issue the necessary instructions to CIA and/or DOD elements.

While the Director of the NRO may elect to use specific

agreements as management tools in controversial or involved

problems, he is not constrained by implication or otherwise

to limit his management actions to matters upon which he has

been able to reach and/or maintain agreement.

The Director will budget for the entire National

Reconnaissance Program and will defend the program before all

reviews necessary to secure its approval. Subject to the

over-all limitations affecting his authority, described above,

be is authorized to transfer funds from one project of the

NRO program to another, as may be required to conduct the

over-all program within available funds and in accordance

with soundmmagement principles, and to take any other action

necessary to establish and maintain a strong and effective

centralizaimanagement of the over-all program.

(3) In the revision of the Agreement, consideration could

be given to the addition of a sinsle Deputy Director of the NRO.

Under the present organization, the three Program Directors

also serve as Deputies, with the Director of the ^.O Staff

responsible to notify and assist the appropriate Program

• . 1 . • .• •

•
Director in the resolution of any problem in his area

which occurs during the absence of the Director of the

IRO. Thus, for instance, the Director of Program B

(presently the Deputy Director (Research), CIA) is

actually Deputy Director for all MO matters which pertain to the CIA with the Director, Program A OK/Gen. Greer)

and the Director, Program IC, (R/A.dm. Lowrance) having

similar responsibilities for all MO work under their

jurisdiction. This arrangement has worked quite successfully except in the case of Program B.

However, if a Deputy Director of the IRO is established, it is essential to spell out his duties in detail.

It would certainly be appropriate that such a Deputy be fnxn

the CIA. However, bis duties in regard to the N20 should be

assigned so as to avoid inadvertent continuance of the CIADOD dichotomy. In particular, he should not have the tasks,

explicit or implied, of "looking out after the interests of

the CIA" or of representing the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of the MO. The Director of Central

Intelligence should hold the Director responsible for keeping

him properly informed as well as for response to his guidance.
.T. A 2 ••••••n••

U:111 ;IL. • ....a

It would seem appropriate for the normal IMO

duties of the Deputy to be centered on the NRO-DSID interface and on the KIO-expioitation car:amity interface. In

addition, in the absence of the Director of the MO, the

Deputy could, of course, act for him on any matter.

In view of the responsibilities assigned to the

Director and the obvious effect of a harmonious Director/

Deputy Director relationship in the successful carrying cut

of these responsibilities, it is essential that personnel

selection be made on such a basis that they will function

as en effective working team rather than as representatives

of the DOD and the CIA.

b. Recognition must be given to the fact that revision of

the CIA-DOD Agreement is a necessary but insufficient condition to resolve the problems facing the MO. In addition to

a clear charter, effective management of such a joint office.'

requires the continued support of the Director of Central

Intelligence and the Secretary of Dafense in order that the

Director of the 120 may establish and =intain essential

internal office discipline. Since the Director is from the

Dtpartment of Defense, the main burden for this support falls

the Director of Central Intelligence.

. •
In particular, each of these officials should deal

directly with the Director of the NRO for all MR0 matters,

rather than through intermediate NRO personnel of their

respective agencies. This is fundamental to the maintenance

of internal KRO organizational discipline.

The Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense also should take appropriate action from time

to thug to support the thesis that the projects of the National

Reconnaissance Program are neither CIA nor DOD projects, they

are 144M0 projects, part of a single national program, elements

of which are supported by the resources of the CIA and the

several Services of the DOD.

c. During the course of revision of the present Agreement,

it nay be well to give careful consideration to an. additional

question raised by the CIA during the past yer. This question

concerns the intent of the Congress in the establichment of

CIA privilege, and has been raised during discussions as to

the desirability of the CIA holding all covert contracts of

the ERO,Amt . intended by the present CIA-DOD Agreemmt.

The CIA presently holds covert contracts for several

projects of the National Reconnaissance Program. The Department
•-

•

•

7;1

El4.1.•

TO° r"r--.

LI

gat

.' •

of Defense elements of the NRO also hold several covert

contracts, the most significant of which are those for

41111 atellite projects. At the IMO

organizational conference, held in late Nay 1962, agreement was reached to transfer these covert contracts from

the DOD elements of the NRO to the CIA. When the agreement

was not carried out during the follosing ' s==, it was

reaffirmed by discussion between the Director of the ERO

and the Director of Central Intelligence an 1 October 1962.

Nowever, subsequent instructions from the Director of the

IMO to the CIA still were not carried out. The Deputy

Director (Research), =has repeatedly stated, before and

after the discussion' between the Director of tha IMO and the

Director of Central Intelligence, that such a course of action

was undesirable since it might constitute dcubtful use of the

basic =privilege by involving that privilege in actions

which,ifimot actually illegal, at least night exceed the

actual intent of Congress in regard to the proper use of such

privilege. This same objection had been stated repeatedly by

ty the Deputy Director (Research) and other CIA personnel during

the summer of 1962.
• •

: '•

C • •

•

•

It is most desirable, of course, that the basic - •

intent of the Congress in establishing the privileges of

the CIA be respected in all NRO management arrangements.

However, in view of the fact that the CIA has over-all

security responsibility for all projects of the National

Reconnaissance Program, reg=diess of the Agency or Service

having responsibility for contract administration or technical management, and in view of the fact that the establishment of the National Reconnaissance Office has been reviewed

and approved at the highest national level, it is not apparent

that there is anything fteldscentally wrong with using the CIA

to do contracting for N20 projects for which technical management responsibility is assigned to IMO elements of the Departmile of Defense.

In fact, in the light of prevailing cirmmatances,

such service to the =would seen to be the only justification

for the CIA to continue to hold the present CIA contracts for

satellite reconnaissance projects, insofar as the basic Congressional intent for the use of CIA privilege is concerned.

This situation is outlined briefly below.

The CIA contracts for the CORONA satellite reconnalsrZ SAUCe project originally were placed, for an unvestionably

nn•

•
r

- .

•••"".

covert project, with unimpeachable cover for all publicly

observable actions. At that time, the SANS and HIDAS.

projects were acknowledged, funded projects requiring

% •

future launches of large numbers of ATLAS boosted AOENA

vehicles, and the AGEt!A was a. new, undeveloped vehicle

required for these large projects, consequently its development and the perfection of associated tecniques aboard

the cheaper TEOR booster was an entirely credible story for

the DISCOVERER project, and perfect cover for CORONA. The

ancillary recovery of various lightweight research experiments provided additional diversionary =aerial. However,

17.

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rf

1;1

••••"ro
• .

A• 1.1

••• • 4:r.

covert project, CORONA is today, at best, not a covert but

simply a highly classified project, identical in this regard

to other satellite reconnaissance projects under contract for

several years to DOD elements of the ZERO. The 682C is true

of the LAMM project.

Under these circumstances, it would seen that continued use of CIA contracting for these projects would be

highly questionable insofar as the basic Congressiartzl. intent

for the use of CIA privilege is concerned, were it not for

the feet that the CIA perforrs this action as a service to

PT the MO.

The revised Aszeamant should include clear resolution

of this fundamental point in order that the several different

•

a

U
•a ter. '

•••

contracting methods now in use within the }J may be

consolidated within a more uniform and secure procedure

under the CIA, while still permitting the assignmant of

technical management responsibility to the most experienced

and best qualified elements of the NRO.

35

TOP SECRET
Directot, Natio:211 LocoanAssuicd Guise

(Dr. Joseph V. Cbaryk, Ualor ficcrctaly

of the Air Force)

11112:31.1)ENT

I Director, Program A

(Maj on B.: E. Greer,

Director of Special Projects, GSA IP • El Segundo,

' I, Jalifornia)

1

1

• 7 • • .

de ow. • am •n• el. — •••••

!rector, Program I) *

(Col Loo P. Gem,

Asocial Assistant to

fa Inspector General)

I

1

3irector, Program II

:Dr. H. Scoville, 7r.,

deputy Director/

Lesearch, CIA)

Key Staff end

Project Directors

Key ;haft and

Project Directors

Key Staff and

Project Directors

Director, Zift0 Eariff

(Cot. I.. L. Martin, 3'r.,

Director, Office of gpace

Systems, CUP)

Director, Program C

(r.Adai V. L. Lowrance,

Director of Haval

Intalliger.ce)

itch 1- (S) Lecortaissance Office

lar 'Si 11111 EIS UM WO . FLA41 E

*Beim established

' t •

ECI) ei"..:1
Atts. 2

Memo of Understanding

Delegation of Authority

rr

'This z.".1z.-:.; or pftst Top SECRET

OPT NO. __J__ or sopus ---SPEGIAL—HANDLINGDEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

WAIIMINGTON

Owes or THE Utast limatirridev August 7, 1961

.iy

MEMORANDUM POE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

. .•4

. .. ..

.,;:il ii SUBJECT: Management of National Reconnaissance Program (TS)

..':.".t.$

...-:.:

,

il 1 to meIlt7;oeur::::".: 1477, accordance with

to

instructions

-

. -

...'

. "4 enced.subject. I have had further discussions on this •

.. kb

11 °: and Mr. Bissell. The consenaus is that we should proceed

tter with Dr. Killian, Dr. Land, General Taylor, Mr. Vance -

le)

, = ez;

• at the present time to implement What was described as

• :.•

; oposal A in my earlier submission to you.

0

I .4 g

i E A Accordingly, I have prepared the attached Memorandum

ri. I • f Understanding which would be signed by Mr. Dulles and

^ci • ' k

Eati yourself covering the management aspects of this program. • -

It is understood that Mr. Bissell and I, on the basis of

, this agreement, are developing a detailed plan of operation.: • •,,..-

..

I also attach for your signature a memorandum providing • ..,.A

7.1 the delegation of authority insofar as the Department of ,, 44:

-.%

:..: Defense is concerned.
PROM AUTOXATIC REGBAD DOD DM, 5200.10 .

Don 110? APPLY

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING •

gamest of National Reconnaissance

• 4

This agreement relates to a National Reconnaissance Program and

to the establishment of arrangements between. the Department of Defense

and the Central Intelligence Agency for its management and operation.

The National Reconnaissance Program will consist of all

satellite and overflight reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert.

It will include all photographic projects for intelligence geodesy and '

mapping purposes, and electronic signal collection projects for electronic

signal intelligence and communications intelligence.

There is established a National Reconnaissance Office on a

covert basis. The Director of this office will be the Deputy Director of

is Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Deputy Director will be

the Under Secretary of the Air Force who will be delegated full authority

by the Secretary of Defense in this area. The office will include a small

special staff whose personnel will be drawn from the Department of - A

Defense and from the Central Intelligence Agency. This office will have

direct control over all elements of the total program. Implementation of . , decisions will be exercised in the Agency by the Director of the National

Reconnaissance Office and in the Department of Defense by the Deputy

Director of the National Reconnaissance Office under the special authority

• delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense. Within the Department of

Defense, the Department of the Air Force will be the operational agency

for management and conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program,

and will conduct this program through use of streamlined special management procedures involving direct control from the office of the Secretary

of the Air Force to Reconnaissance System Project Directors in the field,

without intervening reviews or approval actions.

A Technical Advisory Group for the National Reconnaissance

Office will be established.

A uniform security control system will be established for the

total program by the National Reconnaissance Office. Products from the

various programs will be available to all users as designated by . the

United States Intelligence Board.

Page 1 of 3 pages.

Copy 2 of 8 copies.

" •I••••• ••
The National Reconnaissance Office will be directly

responsive to, and only.to, the photographic and electronic signal

collection requirements and priorities as established by the United

States Intelligence Board.

The National Reconnaissance Office will develop suitable

cover plans and public information plans, in conjunction with the

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, to reduce potential

political vulnerability of these programs. In regard to satellite

systems, it will be. necessary to apply the revised public information

policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order to insure

maximum protection.

The Director and Deputy Director of the National

Reconnoissance Office will establish detailed working procedures to

insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities within

the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense are

fully and most effectively utilised in the management and conduct of

this program.

Management control of the field operations of various

elements of the program will be exercised directly, in the case of the

Central Intelligence Agency, from the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office to the appropriate field representatives and, in the

case of the Department of Defense, from the Deputy Director of the

National Reconnaissance Office to the designated project officers for

each program. All program elements and the operations of the National

Reconnaissance Office will be reviewed on a regular basis, and as

special circumstances require, by the 5412 Policy Control Board.

!t)

Allen W. Dulles Robert IL McNamara

Director Secretary of Defense

Central Intelligence Agency

 ,its„' -1./..„

I Att

Chart: Single mgmt for

National Recon Prog (TS)

7

Page 2 of 3 pages.

Copy 2 of 8 copies. SPECIAL

or ••,••••

-TOP-SECRETn•:•4n

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!TO ALL USERS IN Ploonstd/ Moseeoment

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ii/S/S (CO ►AR)

:DESIGNATION AND I

Overt ConfrectAtImiablrolita

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Compond LPMt 1 r • •

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"SLACK" "WHITE" •

CONTRACTS CONTRACTS •

• Director is assigned to Seel An

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of OSSA also serves os Vice

Commondor, APSSD.

Page 3 of 3 pages.

Copy 2 of 8 copies.

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DIRECTOR

P ES:DENT

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I PRESIDENT

1FOLICY LOArgOt. SOL

CIA

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DIP ' CIA

SECIY DEF SECY 0 SD

SAFUS STAFF DEP $EC'Y

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SPECIAL TECHNiCAL

STAPP ADVISORY

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WAS4INGTON

SICLUDKD FR= AUTOWATIC RE TRADING; 

DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

OPFICE or TOW UNOCR SECRITAINY

September 5, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The attached is a redraft of a basis of understanding

between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department

of Defense relative to the National Reconnaissance Program.

Secretary Namara signed the original draft but Mr. Dulles

felt that certain changes were desirable and also felt that

he would prefer to have it in the form of a letter rather

than a formal memorandum.

The only substantive change has to do with the designation of Dick Bissell and myself, acting jointly, as responsible for the program rather than the Director-Deputy Director

relationship in the original memorandum which Mk. McNamara

signed. The other changes were all minor.

Secretary McNamara has requested that you sign the new

document, if agreeable. I enclose the original Memorandum

of Understanding for reference should you desire to peruse

it in detail.

Encls.

WHIM

Orig. Memo of Understanding

Proposed ltr to Mr. Dulles

for signature, Watt org. Chart

uucu;-cat ccusIsts of ------ pages

'P7 SD. / o -.IC. copies

7 : -•

SPECIAL HANDLING ••• •
Dear Mr. Dulles: . • •

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The Honorable Allen .W.Dulles

Dir • . o SEP is61 ector of Central faterugenci.-..,•:. 4 • '• • ••: • .••• • ...s.

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Ntotoatipaic—projecrefor Grellfgezce, gioilesy and /napping purposes ,- s•k .

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intelligence and conumunk.ati • cos intelligence resulting tbercfrozzu . zee •:.:' • l• • • ..• -*X

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Air Farce will be the operaticcau. zgency for raer.ageznent and conduct • 4 . .

of the NB?, and v411 conduct this prcrjani throch use of strecmlined 

. special rec=gement prcoedures•involvi4g direct control from the

dfice of the Secretary of the Air Force to ReComissance *stem .•

Project Directors in the Bold, without intervenim reviews or approvals. • .:•••

The /-.zerage=nt and conduct of individual projects or eleamts thereof • •-• •'

requirir4 special covert =mementob aat32the Central •:.• •

•

• "

A Technical Advisory Group for tree National Bee onnaki- . • =near Office will be eobbliaed. • . • ,

A =arm security control system will be established koir :' •

the total wore= by the Ilatic=1 Beconneis' =nee Office., Prc4ucts • .

from the various programs will be avallabls to all Mt= as designated

by the United States Intelligence Board. ••

-• ' • • • •

latelligence Are, lacy as the onerntiosal amcv. r • . • • • -.

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"alraion requiremmes and priorities as esteblisb.ed by the United - . ;.-

States Intellicence Beard.

7. The Na.donal Beco=lasence Office will be directly • " •

respcosIWNW.,.calyjal, the photoverthic md electronic dal • •••

• .

covor plans and public =dim. pia= conjur.ction with the

AssicAont Secro4/..ary of Defe=e, Public Again:, to reStrze potential : . • •s• politica- . 1 vulnerility of these wo7ame. in regard to setellite systems,

8. The rtatio=1 Beccwaissonce Cface will deve/op suitabli ;• .

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it 37411 he necessa..-7 to apply the revised ilublic information policy to • : • -

.

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9. The Directors of the liecon--elszance Mace : • ;••••• • •

/ establish detailed worLdng/arecedures to inzu....e that the particular • • -:••• "

talexa.% epperie=e and capabilities w2.2.1a the 4 of Defense • •• • .. •••

the Con al Intelligence Agercy are fully ami most effectively • • • • ..-••. • •••,. . .

thliaod in this pro=am..

elements of the prop= will be exercised directly, in the cam of the - •• . A

Deimatment of Defense, from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to* '

•• • 1.,

Copy if of 16 copies

. Page 2 of d pages •

o3r non-sensitive sate:We polects in order to tmeme =Imam

protactica.

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10. rutz=zement contra/ of the field opera/me et various -- - , •

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the desiccated project Mears far each pro aman.i, In the case of .

the Central intelligence Agency, from the Deputy Director Mans) to • ..• -1.-

apxoprlate elements of the Central Inte/lig 3ce Agency. Major

program dements and opera 4o;..; of the National Reconnalssmice Office:

will be reviewed on a regular basis and as special drcmcstances •

1 • require by the ci..9.1 Group near NSC 5412.

. • •

It the foregolm is In accord. with your understandize of our •••. •-•••••

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CONCUR:

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C. IA. C213:111,. Gor.ersig USAF

Acting Director

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DEIAELOPED FILM I •

CARDS,TAPES,olt. I

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TO ALL USERS IN

:ACCORDANCE WITH

itala (COMAR)

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'DES/GNAT/ON ANO

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SEC'Y DEF

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STAFF

Support es toptureiti

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SEC'Y A F

UNDER SEC'Y

CHIC F.

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Director is assipned to Sec, An

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DIR. 5200.10 DORS NOT APP

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WASHINGTON

6 SEP 1961

4.

-

SSIICNANDUM FOR in SECRETARY OP TEE ARMY

TIE SECRETARY or THE NAVY

TIE SECRETARY OF TIN AIR FORCE

THE DIRECTOR OF DEMME RESEARCH MW

avoninfamo

TEE =ANWAR or TEE MIT =EFS OF STAFIP

TEE GENERAL COUNSEL

SURIECT: Ambled Jar_-as

Merano the attached Agramseed between the Secretary ol Wow sad the Director d the Ceded bdelligense Agway entitled

,ganegemest et the liellessl itesennabamee Pram"

The Hider Secretary ot the Mr Force is herby designated Tay

Assistant for Receeesissane, ad is delegated MI authority tor

zaaagement td this wpm. la this resod, he will set es say direct

repromentatiot both winds ad abide the Departmed id Debase. lb

will be gives s support that he noires kola sexual stiff elesseds,

abash them stdi elements will ad participate is program MUM

mot IMO he amino* Avesta Re will, horwever, beep pertbeat

key aelelabo hdormed es a realer bads as the states at these promos.

Became el the abeam saisithity et the projects *evolved Is

the National Recomebsense Program, partiodar earivart be takes

to pretest the security et the arrangements described herds. The

edstenee et the Menaced Agreement, its codents, ad the 'egad'snasal implemeataties employed for its execalbs are all claseitled TOP

SECRET. This lib—"un will set be dbelemed to mese to wham

such disclosure is not nundetery is order to carry at actions regdred

by the terms et the retereseed Agreement or by Asslatant Jar

Recomaissance is carrying oat ids respeasibilities is the Mined

Recomaissonee Program.

All Department at Defense satellite a. overflight Photographic

recomaisseases mapping, gado% aid electrode algal allectics

program win be henna to accordance with the rehremeed Agreement,

Pap 1 of 2 peps

Copy pt of COOPS

4i1.411-0.

-TOP SECflE

7-77774.1151,

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resent diseethrea in be revised at the earliest date tlat seek lanai ' can be flora Id& piassibb out apiassamao. Iu"

new peblie relatiam policy kr satellite Imams M. be

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ammaseed as a aeparate AMOS to atintadee political volnerability et

1 Att.

Agreement

Signed

Robert S. Namara

•

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•
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 225.0. C.

.Decezuber 12, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MIL JOHN McCONC

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Office

Attacked are the two memoranda, prepared by Dr.

Charyk. that I mentioned to you over the plume this meraing.

These memoranda set forth a plan of action for the functioning of

NRO which Dr. Charyk recommends and which Mr. McNatoara

and I would like to have you consider.

One of the principal elements in the plan would be the

assignment to the Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of

Defense of the technical management of all national reconnaissance

projects (overt and covert). In view of what you told me this morning, the timing of such • change may not be as urgent as might

otherwise have been the case. In any event. we believe that our

two agencies should review the present hmctiesing of NRO before

the subject is brought up again either before the Special Group,. on

whose agenda it is being held by General Taylor pending further

word from us, or the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board, which postponed consideration of the subject until its next

meeting.

Will you let me know when you are ready to talk about

these enclosures.

Z Enclosures

cc: Dr Charyk

SPECIAL HANDLING
• ff.! _ffesizAL-amezna

777

5 December 1961

Functions and Responsibilities 

of the

National Reconnaissance Office (TS) 

References:

Secretary of Defense TOP SIORNZ memorandum, subject:

ITS) Assistant for Reconnaissance, dated September 6, 1961,

with attached Department of Defense-Central Intelligence

Agency Agreement.

Deputy Secretary of Defense TOP SRC= memorandum,

subject: Space Vehicle Electronics Intelligence Program,

dated October 20, 1961, 'with attachment.

Definitions:

RED - National Reconnaissance Office, as established by

reference (a).

RRP - Rational Reconnaissance Program, as defined by reference

(a) to consist of all overt and covert overflight projects

for intelligence, geodesy, and mapping photography and

electronic signal collection.

DOD/AR - Assistant for Reconnaissance to the Secretary of Defense,

established and delegated to the Under Secretary of the

Air Force by reference (a); Director of the Department of

Defense part of the NRO.
DDP/A - Deputy Director (Plans) of the Central Intelligence Agency;

Director of the Agency part of the NRO.

STC - Satellite Test Center - Air Force operations center at

Sunnyvale, California for the on-orbit control of satellites.

ACC - Aircraft Operations Center - Air Force operations office within

the Pentagon for control of special aircraft operations.

NOG - Mission Operations Croup - Apart of the IRO in the

Pentagon which plans specific missions, determines targets

to be covered by specific missions, and exercises MO operational

control during missions, through the STC or AOC.

Policy:

The following plan outlines basic policy fOr the establishment of

functions and responsibilities within the National Reconnaissance Office

to insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities 'within

the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency are fully

and most effectively utilized in the establishment, management and

conduct of the National Reconnaissance Program.

1. Nanagemeut.

a. The technical management responsibility for all NRP

projects (overt and covert) is assigned to the DOD/AR.

(1) To provide for full use of available capabilities and

resources, and to provide for interface with data exploitation equipment

development by agencies outside the Na), Navy and Army representatives

will be assigned, on a full-time basis, to appropriate positions within

the NRO under the DOD/AR. They will be technically qualified in electronic

2
•

•

signal collection work and in mopping and geodesy, respectively, and have

NE0 project responsibilities in these areas.

(2) A firm liaison Channel between the RHO and NSA will be

established as an adjunct to the technical management structure of signaal

collection projects, and the conduct of such projects carried out in

accordance with the NBA responsibilities described in reference (b).

Planning will encompass maximum utilization of the Navy technical resources

to support the electronic signal collection programs.

(2) With respect to contracts, all NRP project contracts

will be the responsibility of DOD/AR, as a necessary corollary to the

assignment of technical management responsibility to DOD/AR. However,

covert ("black") contracts which provide cover for or enhance the security

of specific projects may be the responsibility of the DDP/A when the

DOD/AR and the DDP/A agree that such action offers a preferable route.

This includes establishment of dummy corporations, etc., to provide cover

for covert operations, and any other contractual action which is necessary

for the NRP and which can be provided in a preferred manner by the Agency.

2. Security. The DDP/A will be responsible for the overall-security

policy for the National Reconnaissance Program. Under this overall policy,

security of the NEP will be administered for DOD by DOD/AR, through control

officers in the JCS, Army, Air Farce, and Navy staffs, the DIA and the NSA.

3

.• •
4. •

a •

For the collection programs, final need-to-Jukovialidation authority will

be the responsibility ofpWAR.

3. Operations:

Scheduling. The mission schedule for all NRP efforts

will be the sole responsibility of DOD/AR, inoluding the obtaining of

appropriate clearances where required.

Mission Operations:

A, member of the DOD/AR office Will be designated as

Chairman of a Mission Operations Group OW which vill have Tri-Service,

NSA and CIA representation on a full-time basis. The 1mG will have available

the complete schedules and technical capabilities of all of the sensor

systems of all REP projects, and accounts of the complete coverage obtained

by all sensor systems of these projects, on a continuous basis. This group

will establish the pre-launch targeting selection for all reconnaissance

projects of the REP, and 'will transmit this information to a secure operations

control room at the STC for satellite missions, and to the AOC for aircraft

missions. The operations control room at the STC will control all satellite

missions, responding to operational decisions from the ROG in Washington,

and engineering decisions from the project director at the STC.

The officer in charge of the operations control room at

the STC or AOC will be sole responsible agent to DOD/AR to assure necessary

actions with the mission vehicle as well as with the ground environment to

maximize the probability of carrying out the mission in conformance with

instructions of the MM. Any required functions relating to vehicle and

4
1

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•

••• • • • • ••••

payload operation during a mission, such as piggy-backs, orbit or route

changes, filters, etc., 11111 be the sale responsibility of the officer

in charge of the STC or AOC control roam.

(3) To provide a basis for the continuous operation of the

NOG, there will be in the Pentagon a comprehensive display so that the

NOG can monitor each mission and make decisions based on all factors

involved, such as weather, target coverage, change in mission situation,

political situation, or new intelligence data. The initial decision as

to which targets to cover with each specific mission will be made by the

MG and will be based on information from this display. The NOG will make

all targeting decisions during satellite missions, and give appropriate

instructions to the project director at the STC in this regard. Decisions

based on engineering factors will be provided by the project director at

the STC or AOC and will override conflicting instructions from the NOG.

Responsibility for all functions of the NOG will rest with the DOD/AR, who

will provide the chairman of the NOG.

c. Ebrmatting. The DOD/AR will be responsible for the formatting

of the collected ARP product as follows:

Photographic formatting Will include the initial

chemical processing, titling, production and delivery to the users as

specified by the US1B.

Electronic signal data formatting will include the

decommutatio% conversion, technical correction and reconstruction of the

collected signal data to yield a usable collection product. DOD/AR

will deliver the formatted colbctionproduct, together with associated data

•

5
. .

I

necessary for exploitation, to the ESA or other user as specified by the USD.

d. 8ngineering AaaLyais. The DOD/AR will be responsible for

engineering analysis of all collection systems to correct the problems that •

exist on the operating graben s& sell as to provide information fbr new systems.

The primary responsibilitor for advanced plans (post CY 1962) for all

NEP projects is assigned to the DOD/AR.

The USIB vill establish or validate all requirements for the REP

and establish broad project and overall target priorities. However, they will

not determine schedules, or determine targets for particular missions. CONDE

will not be involved with the NEO or ARP, except as required to advise USIB

in the determination of NI requirements and broad priorities. Selection of

targets for specific missions and target decisions during conduct of missions

will be made by the NE0 by means of the NOG previously described, using USIB

requirements, priorities and target lists.

L.
SPROIAL-RAI

'Discussion of National Reconnaissance Office

Basic Policy

Reference: TSSR paper entitled Functions and Responsibilities of the

National Reconnaissume Office-Nal... dated December 5, 1961

Objectives:

The basic objective leading to the establishment of the HBO has been

to formally organise certain elements of the DOD and the CIA in a manner

which will insure that the particular talents, experience and capabilities

within these two organizations will be fully and most effectively utilized

in the establishment, management and conduct of the NRP. The objective

of the paper referenced above is to establish basic policy concerning the

functions and responsibilities within the IRO, to assure that the functioning of the Office is based upon the assignment of clear and specific

responsibilities; it provides for joint participation but avoids assignment

of split project responsibilities.

Plan:

The plan of action contemplated is to establish the basic policy

which is descriptive of the eventual functioning of the NRO, without

regard to previously established specific projects which, at present, may

•

not conform to this policy. Following this, it is proposed that the

individual projects not presently in conformance with this policy be

examined separately and decisions made in each case concerning the

transition from the present organization and responsibilities to those set

forth in the referenced policy paper, or to exceptions which maybe

permitted for various reasons. Accordingly, the basic policy is discussed

..10 or 4.0 ULU
11

" P" t" • . .s. .

I

in the following paragraph, followed by a discussion of the transition period

and exceptions which affect' specific projects.

1 Basic Pala: 4.

The basic policy described by the referenced paper represents an eventual

aassignment of functions and responsibilities based upon the inherent capabilities

tl- of the CIA and DOD. It is also based on consideration of present capability of

1.:.:

the DOD in regard to streamlined management of highly sensitive activities,

including the necessary contractual ability to conduct such sensitive projects

under special security. It includes consideration of experience gained by DOD

personnel while assisting the Agency in the conduct of projects initiated prior

to establishment of these DOD capabilities.

The basic policy envisions that the technical management responsibility

should be assigned specifically to the DOD/AR. The Agency should not be

involved in the research and development of projects within the REP or in the

technical management of these projects. Since technical management includes

control of funds and contracts, the responsibility for these is also assigned

to the DOD/AR. Provision is made within the basic policy for some contractual

action by the Agency which provides cover for or enhances the security of

specific projects, when the joint directors of the IRO agree that such action

offers a preferable route. In this manner, the basic policy provides for the

• inclusion in the ARP of any action that is possible under the authorities of

the two agencies concerned, while establishing specific assignment of project

responsibility for the RAP, consistent with the inherent capabilities and

experience of the CIA and the DOD.
• • t

6-11 1

-.441•••:•".?•wat

The DMA will be responsible fbr the establishment of overall security

for the entire MBP. This Sill insure that full advantage is taken of Agency

Ls:

experience in covert and sensitive work.

The Agency and various elements of the DOD will all be involved in

the operations of the MRP; however, since these operations will involve for

the most part DOD personnel, resources, and DOD experience in the planning

and carrying out of operational missions, the specific MBO responsibility for

operations will be assigned to the DOD/AR. The basic policy provides for

the establishment of a Missions Operations Group with membership flea the

interested agencies under the chairmanship of a member of the DOD part of

the MBO. This arrangement insures joint participation while retaining clear

and specific assignment of responsibility.

Exceptions, and Transition of Specific Projects:

The following comments pertain to the transition period for certain

projects to bring them into conformity with the basic policy, and to some

exceptions which should be made in the case of others:

1. Appropriate directives will be prepared to transfer the total

technical responsibility for the ARON, MURAL and CANES (levy) programs to

the DOD/AR. To provide for continuity, and to provide for interface with

data exploitation equipment development by agencies outside the IRO, Remy

and Army representatives will be assigned, on a full-time basis, to appropriate

positions within the ARO under the DOD/AR. They will be technically qualified

in electronic signal collection work and in mapping and geodesy, respectively,

and have EBO project responsibilities in these areas.

3

pet 'wilt

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1.43

ue

Mblloving transfer of technical management responsibilities for

the CANE program, es mentioned above, this program will be managed by

the NE0 using the same Navy technical resources presently engaged in

this program. Contract administration for the CANE program will be

delegated to and remain with the Navy through CY 1962 and formatting

responsibility will remain with NSA and the Navy through the end of CY 62,

by which time this program, as a separate entity, will be completed.

In regard to security, the need-to-know responsibility for

CORONA, MOON, MURAL AND CANES will remain as currently constituted

until detailed phasing program from the existing security system can be

worked out on a project-by-project basis by the security personnel of

the NAO.

The existing ARGON data exploitation fund requirement will be

eliminated as an item of the NEF: The MOON exploitation equipment

and mission will be transferred from the present contractor to Army Nap

Service, under the operational control of LTA.

Since the CORONA program is nearly completed, (two flights

remaining) it is excepted from the basic policy and no change will be made

in the present arrangements in effect for this program.

6. All other existing projects of the ARP will be transitioned into

conformance with the basic policy, at the earliest practicable date, on an

individual project-by-project basis, with the pace and details of the

transition determined by the Directors of the NRO.

4

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•

•

i

liiiitOUNDUI1 OF UNDERSTANDDIO

bkingpment d Miami Reconarliramce Program 

L PURPOSE.

This agreement relates to the eatablishmeot at a Miami

Recennalassne Program and to the establishand at arrangements

Rhin and between the Department el Wane and the Card

inteDigence Agency for its ' — 'ge' —t and emotion in a maw

which will Ware that the particular talents, agrarian and capabilities

within these two organisations will be idly and mart diectivety

in this effort.

U. DEFINMOIS. 

NEP - Nation' itecamaissance Program, cansisthrg el all

overt nod covert ondlight projects for intelligmar, geodesy, and

mapping photography and electronic signal collectios.

NB 0 • National Reconnaissance Office, as established

herein for the purpose el managing the NIP.

C. DOD/AR • Assistant for Remenaissawn to the Secretary of

Defame, established by the attached DOD Medlar No.

Director et the National Reconusdaseace Omen.-

• •

1!•• I :;

- SO tf•F; LC n41/. Sen.

• 4 • 4.
-T013--sEeRET--

•

DDP/A Deputy Director (Pleas) di the Central Iskellipnee

Agency; Deputy Director of the NRO.

DM - Director of tsfl1ts Recamaimeence-(11); the general

officer responsible &sec* to the Director of the NRO Ire all f I'M

managemed end operatics of satellite receendimance projects, The

DER is overtly known all the Director of 'pedal Prolate, Mae el the

Secretary of the Mr Force, for seem* reason.

DAR • Director el Aircraft Ric'a'ssameet a covert position

held by the general officer responsible directly to the NRO for all field

Inangement (encludiag operation) of aircraft and drone overtlight

recoandssence projects. The Director of Abend Recoondsoance

will have a suitable overt title as required by the security ef his projects.

MPG - Mines= Plinnbrg Grow, a part of the NRO which plans

all specific overflight reconaahmaamt Wisdom and determines targets

to be covered by each specific iniadoo.

R. STC - Satellite Test Ceder, Air Force Operations Ceder at

•• •

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Z. AOC - Aircraft Operation Central, a part et the /IRO which

mantises 14110 gestational cembol at an aircraft meallight receonalmanci

missions.

I. RAM POLE!.

Natianatlteccaoaionurie Prolum, The Nationg Recoosaimanee

Program will omelet et all satellite and overnight recosmisionce

projects whether overt or covert. It will include all photographic projects

for intelligence, geodesy and mapping pumas, sod all electronic Idled

collection projects for electrode sired intelligence and conuntodeationi

intelligence.

National Recomaissance Mace. There will be established on

a covert basis a Ratites' Recomaimanes Office to mange this Program:

The Director al the NRO will be the Assistant for Recoaseissance to the

Secretary of Defames ad overt (SECRET) position establiehed by the

attached DOD Directive No. . The Deputy Director cif the D110

will be the Depot, Director (Pleas) et the Central Intelligence Agency.

The office will include a small special staff whose personnel will be

drawn Iron the Department of Defense and the Cain' la teapots Agency.

This dace will have direct cedar' of all elements et the total program..

C. LimmElab In order to more that the Sanctiothei of the

NRO and the casket at the NIP is based upon the assipantemt of clear

and specific respamdbilitins, the total responsibility for the Nathan'
4

.••

. •

40P-SERET- .

.

 •

•

Reconesinsoice Program is hereby debate! W the Bees lazy

Defame and the Director the Central Iritelltparm Agony to the

Assistant for Itesonadn ence to the lienstany oi Defame as Mester

of the National Stecomnaissance poi. Re will fa taxa delegate specific

responsibilities to the Celina letelligeoce Agony and eleesbere sit

required to carry out the terms of this agreemo g. Daniel delegation

reeponsibilities of projects presently =Airway is specified miler

part IV of this agreement.

D. Authority. DecMkos it the National Itecoanalmace Ogles

AVM be implemented and its ammgemeat at the NatWest lisseassismace

Program made effective *Ma the Department at Defense by the exercise

of the authority delegated to the Assistant foe Recomutionance to the

Secretary of Defuse, and within the Central Melligense Agway by the

authority delegated to the Deputy Director (Plans). . .

E. Operational Vinci. Within the Departinest d Dolor e, the . .

Department of the Mr Force will be the epentiatal agency ter mompalot.

and conduct at the National Becoanaissance Program, and will madoct .

this program through we of atreamlined special numegement procedures

involving direct control from the office of the Secretazy of the Air Tomo

to Recoonaboasce Prolog Directors in the field, without lutervadag '

MUMS or *provide. The management and conduct of hilteideal projedi •

or elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements asy be
• Si iLàU.

sniped by the NRO to the Centaid letethgesce Agency as the operation'

7.

adareN

Techsical Advisory Goof. A lachdeal Advisory Grow tee

the National Recomaissmce Moo will be established wider appropriate

security.

O. decarity. A =Norm as matrol system will be establiebed

by the total proven by the Notional Reecomiesmee Office. Products

from the various programswill be sysU to all. users as doilysted

by the UMW States Istellipsee Board.

Beasiremeote. The /Whirl Boonsahoence Mee awn be

directly rasponidve to, sod oily to, the photographic and electrode

signal collection roydrensits esd priorities is establisited by the

Ihdted Slates letelligence Board.

L Piblie Isforaisties. The National Beconsalessam Mee will

develop odtable cover plans sad public latormation phos co4snotkin

with the Assistant Beanbag" el Wore, Mlle Moles, to Mem

potential political vulnerability of Moe programs amid to ahem'

incur* et proram operations.

7• Prollani Itniev• ma*, Produem elements a operations

of the Wetland Recomaionoce Mop will be reviewed on a regular

basis and as special cr.-''s rood:* by the Special Gump lobe

NBC 502.

5 10"

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tie StvRE.

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•
•

streotare at signal collection projects.

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TOP SECRET

••• ..• *.t‘•;••"•7.i.

•

L Tedder& liseigined. The ander parties et teabeissl

auwagemerd et NIP projects la be canted est by the Wester at • •

Satellite Iteeeemahnoree and the Master et Aircraft lieseeeeksaaee,

reportieg direoUr to the National Reemaisnasee Mak Teehaleal , •

amwegealset et 'Rodeo pelts at projects, sub as earlada payiesds

tar imbue, will be delegated to the Cadre lehalligeon amity

Carried eat wader technical personal amedgeed to the C7Agert at the

31110. To provide for tall use of available eapdaillties and reseeroes, •

sad to provide for Weslaco with data altpleitatiee wpdpeaset developed • • .:.•

by *wigs outside the NRO, Navy and Arley represutattvas will be

• •.•

amigeed, oa a 111111-thee basis, to eppropriate makes wilida the zato.

. • They will be teeheicall ► quieted is •lectrode signal collation work

sad ia auggibg and geodesy, respeettvely, sad brat NW project

rempooethilities to these areas. A Arm Ihdies dome between the at) • • P•7

sad NBA will be establidwd as as adjunct to the technical awaegesest • ••••••.;
TOP SEe.RFT . •

rict;

2. Alaska Kroft A Minim Pionahe Group (MPG) will

be established within the Ifit0 to pleat all specific mission d Ns .

program and to deterzaine targets to be covered by seek adisios. The

MPG will have Tri-Bervice, NIA *ND CIA repreesdation an a lauds*

bads, and will be chard by a member d the CIA directly reapousible

to the DDP/A. The *PO will have available the condete aces aid

technical capabilities d an el the senor systems d all *RP projects,

and accounts of the complete colatip *teased by all s moor moms

it these projects, amalgams bads. This Group will esteblish the

pre-Lasoch targeting selection for all recassissance projests of the

NEP, and will traesndt this idarinetion to the Satellite Operations

Cot's' (SOC) for satelitte ndsdass, and to the Aircraft Operations

Central (AOC) fir aircraft ntesions.

2. latellikr Operations. A Satellite Operation Central (IOC)

will be estabakid as a put d the NaolliMMINIMMIN

Tim SOC will be headed

by the Mr Force member it the NRO who wUl have aperatiaael eastrol

over all satellite reconsaisaance missions throughout the otoduti it •

such Wastes& The Read it the 80C will be directly respandble to the

Director of Satellite iteecusaissanco. The SOC will Whale appropxisto

CIA persoaneL

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3. Aircraft amineloes, As Aircraft Cparatlons Coeval (AOC)

will be abblished at saiiiropitala losallsa wider neogmary issurfty

airsaiprawits. The AOC will be headed by a ClA amber at the 11110

who will have operatlemal coin* ow all aircraft sad drone oledUglit

recomaissaace minion throughout the coadact at such aelesbam. The

Bead at lb. A. will be Avec* reepoadble be the WP/A. The AOC 1111

Include epproprbde Mr Farce perammel.

IV. PROZECT 2211P01411111111T1143. The Director et the 1120 Is responsible

kor all Weals et all Preisele eff tie NIP. Is carrying out Ode rapeesis,

bility, be will dekgate medal aspects to the Cl* sad elsewhese,

•

appropriate. Is this regard, the following Initial deleption agplbus to

the major projects presently mar way.

A. COBO1(AMIARAL/A110014: TM Air Force has prboary

espossibUtty tors (/) bands scheduling and bwachke (2) orbit and

'scow! GPIeldialle1 (3) development and procurement of boosters, • • •

orbiting vehicles, and dint payloads. CIA has prbaart respoosIblillty for •

(1) developing* and procurement 01photegraplac payloads sod SOSO cones,

and (2) project security. Is addition, Use CIAatli provide the dolmas

id the MPG witch will plan all missions el these projects, tad wilt harm .

membership Is the WC widish will be headed by an Mr Force wiember

el the 1420 sad which will have opendlimel control at the aidsaless

8

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durthg

B. SAMOS. Tike..tir Ione les primary respossli for BAUM glity

with the CIA is • supporting role is regard to project ascority. Is

addition, the CIA sad the Air Force Woe the same missies plumbs

and operations roles described in A above.

D. e: xcA r r The Air Force will away respasibility

for the technical mac mad of the a ?I c A it r project, with the CIA

renuoing responsible for the recensaismace payloads, project security,

and conduct of operations. Wash= will be planned bir the CIA-chaired

MPG and conducted by the CIA-headed AOC, responsible directly to the

DDP/A. The Air Force will establish as °Mee of the Director et

Aircraft Recommiesance (DAR) to concurrently mange the dewloperest

of c r sod all variation of lids development. The DAB will

be established with can to provide maximum security for this wort

and will be manned with highly qualified pommel whose eaperieuce,

aptitude sad *ally make them 'specie/4 well suited for this teak. Norstal •

Air Force and DOD development and management practimw will at

apply to this project, std the DAB will carry out his entire responsibilities

9

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to appranl by the Assisted for Beannalesesse to the ascretsery of Debase.

E. CANS. Technical nassgenert eftwomfbility tore this project

1.- • • •

miler special marisand procederes appawpriate to the /ably at this .

project sad the sevariti regeired far Its assompliehnest, object only

is delepted to the Navy, object to overall MAIM and approval by the

Director of the NRO. landau plumbs; will be accasolished by the

MPG as for all other satellite projects el the NIP.

V. IMPLEIUNTATION. This agreeneet is effective Immediately

within the Deparbowat at Defense ad the CIA, and supersedss all previous

directives to each agony as the added* disowned harsh. AU eack.

superseded directives will be revised to eadorn with these provident

at the earliest data.

Join A. McCain Rabat 11. McNamara •

Director Secretary el Defers

Central Intelligence Agency

1 Atch •

1 sta Directive No.
•

DIPARTIONT OF DEMISE DitlICTIVE

SUBJECT: --(11)-Aadstant for Reconndssance

In order to consolidate the managonent at closely related

projects to provide for more affective ammgement of this bnportent

area, the responsibility for developmet at all aircraft, drone, and

satellite recommissance, mapplig sod pods,' systems, both

photographic and electronic Opal collectios, is assiped to the

Department at the Air Force. These projects will be numaged withis

the special structure already established within the office of the • • .

Secretary at the Mr Force.

The Sider Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Joseph V. Char" .

Is hereby designated my 0-Assistant for Secomaisomce, and is

delegated tall authority for summoned at these projects. Is this •

regard, he will act as my direct representative both within sod outside

the Departmed at Defense and, in regard to these projects, will be

responsible only to me. Ile will be given mg support that he requires

from normal doff elements, although these staff elements will id •

participate In these project matters except as he specifically requests,

. •

•

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•• • -

. •

•

•••., •

t ft•-:•
-Stigfit- 90- •

aid none of these projects will be subject to say Deportment of Deftest

staff review. Re will, kn waver, keep the Deputy flecretary of Debase

and the Director et Defense Reseuvh and Eigkaortag personally

Informed on a regular basis as the states of these projects, and will

simile* Worn other Department of Defame moose' as I nay

personally direct er as he saw determine necessary in the course of

carrying out specific project matters.

Became of the senaitivity of the projects involved, the ealatence

cd the office of-(R) Assistant for Reconmissence is clemdfied IRCRRT.

This directive is effective immediately and sepersedes all

previous directives an the object projects. These directives will be

revised to conform with the above direction at the earliest.

Robert & McNamara

liscretasy of Defense

2
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ND

• March 30, 1962

MORAWON POR Nit. VANCE •

General Counsel, DOD

I attach a copy of the proposed CIA version of the

Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Central

Intelligence Agency reletive to management of the National

Reconnaissance Program. As we discussed, this appears to be

different in a fundamental fashion from the draft which

Secretary Gilpatric forwarded to Nr. NcCone on January 17th.

We should discuss the matter with Secretary Gilpatric when

he returns next week to determine what steps should be taken

next.

•

•

Joseph V. Charyk

Att. Cy of Proposed Agreement

:*) r• r- r - :I r 7'

"1"....."--". i E!;- "::: -. ea

!.,%1 **E. 5 SOO . 10 :` : -.: : : • :

1 

SPECIAL HANDLING

Cc ----- --

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-- --- Paget. •

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••--777,TiPS

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•Iasi, "0 eft • IP
•

AORICIMIZNT

Management of the National Recomisissence Program

This paper outlines the agreement between the Department Cf Debase and

the Central Intelligence Agency for establishing a National Ineemeissance

Program (NRP)s and for delis& both with the nasaisgement and operation el

this program and the handling of the intelligence product of the program on

a covert basis.

The NILP will consist of ell denied arse overflight and satellite

reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert. It will Include all such

efforts as photographic projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping

purposes. and electronic signal collection projects for electronic siipal

intelligence and communications intelligence resulting therefrom.

There will be established en a covert basis • National Reconnaissance ONice (NRO) to mew this program. The stare shall be

under the direction of a Director and Deputy Director. ass being appointed

by the Department et Defense and the ether by the Central Intelligence

Agency. The Department ol Defense representative shall be the Under

Secretary of the Air Force, and the Deputy Director (Research) (DDift)

shall act for the Central Intelligence Agency. Tb. NtO •

snail special staff whose pommel will be drama from the Department of

Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency and assigned ai a fullitima.

basis to appropriate positions within the office.

3. The ZERO will have responsibility for the planning. development.

and monitoring of all elements and phases of the National Recommissence

Program. Within this program prime responsibility and authority for the

over-ell aspects of each individual project will be specifically assigned to

either the Department of Defense or the Central leteUigesce Agency by the

Secretary of Defeat and the Director at Central Intelligence acting jointly

upon recommeaddiar of the Director and Deputy Director. NRO. Repaid..

bility for various subtesks will likewise be assigned to a specific agency

on an individual project basis. All advance planning and new projects will

be coordinated with both the Director and Deputy Director of the NRO.

___284331131--

Copy No.
••

-3-

Decisions of the National Aecomaisseace Office will be

implemented sad its menagenient of the National Reconnaissance Program

made effedive within the Department of Defense. by the enrolee of the

authority delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Tercet within the

Central Intelligence Agency. by the Deputy Director (Research) in the .

performaace Or his presently assigned duties. The Under Secretary of

the Air Force will be designated Special Assistant for Recoonaissance to

the Secretary of Defense sad delegated full authority in this area.

Within the Department of Debase. the Department of the Air

niece will be the operational agency for maaagoment and conduct of those

projects assigaed by the MAO to the DOM and will coadact those projects

through the use of streamlined special management procedures involving

direct control from tke office of the Under Secretary of the Aix Force to

Recomaissance System Project Directors in the field, without intervening

reviews or approvab.

Within the Central Intelligence Agency the Deputy Director

(Aesearch) will be the operational element responsible for management

and conduct of those projects assigned by the NAO to the CIA. The DD/A.

will conduct this program through the use of special Agency procedures and will

utilise whatever elements of the Agency are required for its successful

prosecution.

A Technical Advisory Group for the NAO will be established.

S. A uniform security control system will be established for the

total program by the NAO. The Central Intelligence Agency shall define

security policy, procedures, and responsibilities for the National

Reconnaissance Office. Products from the various programs will be

available to all users designated by the United States 'intelligence Board.

9. The NAO will be directly responsive to. and only to. the photographic and electronic signal (agina) collection requirements and priorities

established by the United States Intelligence board and will develop the

over-all recennaisseace program to satisfy these requirements. The

National Security Agency will review UM electronic signal (COMINT and

RUNT) requirements and will recommend to the NAO those which, in

NSA's opinion. can best be fulfilled by means of overhead reconnaissance.

• •r'
P it le net

in V •M 1.1; nIa

The National Security Agency will be solely responsible for

the research, development. planahng, and ("scathes for processing of

electronic signal data (COMM? and =Din collected from space vehicle

soluves, taking into coasideratioa the elective utilisation of all processing resources available to the U. L Government. The processing will

include technical feedback to the N11.0 as well as extractioa of intelligence

data, but technical feedback from ether sources may be provided.

The Pilt0 will develop suitable am: plans sad public informs.

ties plans. in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defenses Public

Affairs, to reduce peteatial political vulnerability of these programme. la

regard to satellite systems, it will be necessary to apply the revised

public information policy to other non-sensitive satellite projects in order

to insure namdmum protection.

The Director and Deputy Director of the $10 will establish

detailed working procedures to insure that the particular talents, experience

sad capabilities within the Department of Defense and the Central latelligence

Agency are fully and most effectively utilised in this program.

Management control of the field operations of various elements

oldie program will be exercised directly. in the case at the Departmeat of

Defense, from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to the designated

project officers for each program and. in the case of the Central Intelligence

Agency, from the Deputy Director (Research) to the designated project

officers for each program. Major program elemeats and operations of

the IMO will be reviewed as a regular basis and as special circumstances

require by the Special Group under NBC 5412.

14. This agreement hereby rescinds 6 September l%1 agreement

entitled "Management of the National Reconnaissance Program". signed

by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Acting Director of Central

Intelligence.

JOHN A. McCONIC ILOSKICLL L OLLPATRIC

Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Secretary of Defense

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:••• .... • • • •* • a. ..• ...o. ...ea.... ••••• ...... ••• •••• • .., . r ..... 4 . . . . ....

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TOMATIC REGRADING; II DOD DIR. 5200.10 DOES 0T 1PPLY

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.2 May 1962

Agreement Between

Secretary of Defensiand the Director of Central Intelligence 

aiiiNn

MIME on 11111

MIR Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office 42,8)-

mai Definitions: 11111

MU NRO - National Reconnaissance Office

111116 NRP - National Reconnaissance Program, to consist of all Milli overt and covert satellite and overflight projects for INN . •

EMI intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography and •

electronic signal collection. -• INN

NM . ... .. . DNRO - Director, NatiOnil.Reconnaissance Office OM . :

'1111111

JIIIIII ail= Policy: ''!

San ....•

ENE The following plan outlines basic policy for the establishment of

On= functions •anthresponsibilitiss within the National Reconnaissance Office . •

wan to insure that the- particular talents, experience and capabilities within .

Erni the Department of Defense end the Central Intelligence Agency are fully

saw and most effectively utilized in the establishnient, management and conJERI duct of the National Reconnaissance Program. The DNRO will be designated by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intellf ence •

V 1111116115 and will be respons" fralrectrt-rtreSMIS-Tiriiiagenat an conduct ..:.:

*0

'-4 .,of the .

•

•

.

1.. Requirements and, Priorities:

• Tlie NRO will be irectlal too the

photographic and electronic signal T) collection requirements and

ICA • - Vac

Copr.71-7•7-M5Mit-T4opies

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