Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 10, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

___________________

NO. 14-10-00438-CR

___________________

CLARENCE GREEN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 228th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1163776

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Clarence Green appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery, arguing that the 

evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court reversibly erred in 

overruling his objection to the State’s allegedly improper jury argument. Because the 

evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction and any error in overruling 

appellant’s objection to the State’s jury argument was harmless, we affirm.
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Myong Soon Lee owns and operates a beauty supply store in southwest Houston. 

On February 19, 2008, Lee was behind the register when two individuals, one male and one 

female, came into the store pointing guns and yelling “get down.” Both robbers were 

wearing “hoodies” (hooded sweatshirts) and had their faces covered. The woman, who 

wore a gray hoodie and a bandanna over her face, ordered Lee’s employees to a back room 

while the man, who wore a black hooded jacket and had his face covered with a stocking 

mask, held a gun to Lee’s head and demanded all the money in the register. Lee gave the 

man all the cash she had, about $600–$700 in total. After the robbers left, Lee activated 

an alarm in her store that contacts the police in the event of a hold-up, and Officer Bob

Conley of the Houston Police Department responded to the scene. According to Officer 

Conley, Lee described the female as black but gave virtually no description of the male

except that he was wearing a hoodie around his face. The description Officer Conley 

recorded read “[u]nknown male, unknown age, didn’t really give a height or weight.” 

None of Lee’s employees were able to give any further description of the male robber. 

The store has 16 security cameras, one of which captured images of two people 

approaching the store through an adjacent alley moments before the robbery. One of the 

people, who appears to be female, is shown wearing jeans and a gray hoodie and is 

depicted looking down, with her face not visible. The other, who is identifiably male, is 

shown wearing what appears to be a green hooded jacket over a black shirt or hoodie. The

male’s face is visible at a distance. Seconds later, internal cameras recorded the same 

woman, her face covered with a bandanna, pointing a gun at store employees and forcing 

them to the back of the store, while the register camera recorded a man wearing a black 

hooded coat holding a gun to Lee as she took cash from the register. In this recording, the 

man is looking down and his face is not visible.

About two months after the robbery, the police received a tip from an informant 

named Ashley Hudson. Hudson testified that on the night of the robbery, she, appellant, a 

female named Dishekaer Smith, and a male identified only as “Jahree” were driving 
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around the area near Lee’s store when, “in the spur of the moment,” they decided to rob it. 

Hudson pulled the car into an apartment complex and parked next to a wall adjoining the 

shopping center in which Lee’s store is located. According to Hudson, appellant, Smith, 

and Jahree pulled on hoodies and wrapped bandannas around their faces, and appellant 

handed out guns. Appellant took a .38 caliber revolver with a silver barrel and light brown 

handle. Smith took a .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol, while Jahree took a black “Tech 

9” automatic weapon. Appellant, Smith, and Jahree climbed over the adjoining wall 

while Hudson waited in the car. The three were gone less than fifteen minutes. When 

they returned, they carried a bag full of money. Back at appellant’s apartment, the crew 

divided up the money. Hudson’s share, which she estimated to contain less than those of 

the other robbers, came to something less than $200. At trial, Hudson identified the man 

shown in the external surveillance video as appellant and the female as Smith.

The police began to look for appellant and found that he was wanted under a number

of outstanding municipal warrants for traffic violations. The police spotted appellant’s 

car and pulled him over. Appellant was driving, with Smith in the front passenger seat. 

Appellant consented to let the police search his car, and they found a black knit stocking 

cap or ski mask in the back cargo area along with three baseball hats, cellular phones, and 

other personal items. The police asked appellant for permission to search his apartment, 

which he granted. In a bedroom, they found several guns, including a .25 caliber 

semiautomatic pistol and .38 caliber revolver with a light brown handle and silver barrel. 

They also found more cellular phones, bandannas, and a number of black hoodies. 

The police contacted Lee and asked her to view a live lineup consisting of appellant 

and five other black males of similar descriptions. The men were told to wrap bandannas

around their faces and say “get down.” Lee, who speaks broken English, was 

accompanied by her son. Lee’s son interpreted as the officers read Lee instructions and 

asked her to identify a suspect. Lee brought footage from her store’s security cameras to 

the lineup and looked at it periodically to aid in identifying the robber. Lee identified 

appellant as the robber and appellant was charged with aggravated robbery. 
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Before trial, appellant moved to suppress all “evidence of identification by any 

witness from any third party witness who may have been present at any show-up or line-up 

proceeding or photograph identification proceeding.” The trial court denied this motion. 

At trial, before Lee identified appellant in court, an identification hearing was held outside 

the jury’s presence. Lee testified at the hearing without an interpreter. She stated that 

although the male robber wore a black hoodie and his face was covered with a stocking 

cap, Lee could tell he was black because of “his voice, dress and complexion, his figure” 

and added that “[b]ecause the stocking mask was so thin, I could see his face. I could tell 

very clearly the man and I could tell between man and woman.” She further noted that she 

had told the police that the robber was “skinny” and carried a small silver-colored gun. 

Lee also discussed the lineup she had attended some two months after the robbery. Her 

testimony about this lineup is riddled with contradictions and appears to suffer from the 

lack of an interpreter. Asked if she had been told that the suspected perpetrator might not 

be in the lineup, Lee responded “No,” but she later said that the officer administering the 

lineup “might have said, but I would not understand him.” Lee stated that she had 

understood she was “to pick out the most closest one.” When asked, “did you believe that 

was the person who robbed you?” she replied, “Yes.” But when asked, “So, in other 

words, you’re not sure if [appellant] is the suspect?” Lee responded that she was “not quite 

certain” appellant was the robber, adding that she believed he was “because [she] saw it 

through the camera” she had brought to the lineup and “his complexion is very close.” 

Officer John Varela, who administered the lineup, also testified at the identification 

hearing. Officer Varela stated that he had read Lee the standard instructions for such 

lineups, which he read into the record as follows:

In a moment you’re going view a live lineup. The persons in the lineup may 

or may not be the person or persons who committed the crime now being 

investigated. Keep in mind that hairstyles, beards and mustaches may be 

easily changed. And also the lineup may not always depict the true 

complexion of a person. It may be lighter or—it may be lighter or darker. 

When you’ve seen the entire lineup, tell me whether or not you see the 
5

person or persons who committed the crime. Do not tell other witnesses 

that you have or have not identified anyone.

The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress Lee’s in-court identification. 

The next day, Lee testified before the jury, this time with the aid of an interpreter. 

She identified appellant, without objection, as the robber. 1 Regarding the line-up 

identification, Lee stated that she had discussed her prior testimony with her son and now 

recalled that she had not been told to identify “the closest one” but rather “the very one” 

who had robbed her. She added that because of the lack of an interpreter the day before, 

she “was confused with the translation a little bit.” The following exchange then took 

place:

[APPELLANT]: Now, was this the same son that you talked to last night that 

took her to the identification hearing or to the lineup?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So, now, you remember yesterday saying that you were not 

certain that [appellant] was the suspect?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were testifying truthfully yesterday, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So, your testimony is then that you were not certain that this is the 

suspect.

A. Right.

 

1 On appeal, appellant does not challenge the admissibility of Lee’s in-court or pretrial identifications.
6

Q. Okay. Now, when you came into the courtroom today, you saw 

[appellant] sitting at the counsel table, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And he was seated next to me.

A. Yes.

Q. And you knew that you would be asked to identify this person, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And there’s —‘cause there’s no one else—there’s no other black male 

sitting at counsel table, is there?

A. Correct.

Q. So, it’s obvious then that he would be the person you would select, 

correct?

A. Yes.

. . . .

Q. Now, the bottom line is, ma’am, you don’t really know who the robber 

was; is that correct?

A. No, that’s not the case.

Q. But you’re not certain that it was [appellant]?
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A. Because I saw him through the video camera, that’s why I said I'm not 

quite certain.

Q. You’re not certain. All right. So, you think it might be him, but you’re 

not certain?

A. Because it’s a video camera.

Q. What?

A. The video—the video image is not clear. That’s why I said it’s not clear 

on him.

Q. Right. So, you’re not certain that—what you’re agreeing then is it could 

be somebody else?

A. I can’t answer to that question.

At closing argument, appellant emphasized the problematic lineup at which Lee had 

identified appellant:

Now, what this lady—this was a very nice lady. What does she want to do? 

She wants to please people. And that’s normal. She’s a nice lady. And 

what happens? She goes down to the police station. And I’m sure—just 

use your common sense. She had to be told in some way we’ve got a 

suspect. The suspect may be there. We think we know who he is. I’m 

sure that was communicated to her in some way. But an officer is not going 

to come in here and say they didn’t follow the rules correctly. The 

means—the end justifies the means. I mean, they’re going to—of course,

they’re going to say we just read it out to her the correct way and that was it. 

But just think, not only did she have trouble with English, her son was down

there translating for her. So, I’m sure she felt she had to answer questions a 

certain way or pick somebody. I mean, just common sense.

. . . .
8

And she thinks well, the police, they developed a suspect and they must have 

the right one.

. . . . 

Now—now, I told you—I talked to you about human nature—human nature. 

People don’t want to look embarrassed. They don’t want to admit mistakes. 

All right. The officers that testified in this case, they don’t want to make a 

mistake—don’t want to admit they made a mistake or didn’t follow the rules 

correctly. They’re always going to say they did the proper thing. We have 

a suspect. 

. . . .

But she wasn’t certain. She picked out somebody she thought looked like 

him. She wanted to help. She wanted—she thought she was doing her 

duty. That’s normal human nature. And the officers, normal human 

nature, helping her. They want to solve the case. They know who he is. 

That’s why it’s better to not have somebody that’s involved in the case do the 

lineup and stuff. Because there won’t be any outside forces, you know,

telling the client or nudging you picked the right one or good or anything. 

There won’t be any question about how valid it was, how fair it was. 

The State responded to this argument in its own closing:

Let’s also talk about this lineup. [Appellant] wants to talk to you about how 

the lineup was misleading and about how, you know, that maybe the officers 

were trying to mislead her, that it has created improperly [sic]. But don’t 

you know that he didn’t want you to see the lineup. He objected to it. And 

don’t you know that if there was something so misleading on that lineup, that 

he would have wanted you to have seen it.

[APPELLANT]: Your Honor, we object to that. That’s outside the record 

and also in bad faith.

THE COURT: Be overruled.

The jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to 99 years 

in prison. In two issues, appellant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his 
9

conviction, and (2) the trial court reversibly erred in allowing the State to improperly 

bolster Lee’s identification by inviting the jury to speculate about matters not in evidence 

in its closing argument.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. 

In evaluating challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 

2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010). If, when viewed in this light, any rational factfinder could have found the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence is sufficient 

to support the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

Before a conviction may rest upon an accomplice witness’s testimony, that 

testimony must be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the accused with the 

crime. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 38.14 (West 2005). “To determine whether an 

accomplice’s testimony is corroborated, we eliminate the accomplice testimony and 

review the remaining evidence to determine whether it tends to connect the defendant to 

the offense.” Nolley v. State, 5 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, 

no pet.) (citing Knox v. State, 934 S.W.2d 678, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). To evaluate 

the sufficiency of the corroboration, we consider each case on its own facts and 

circumstances. Id. (citing Munoz v. State, 853 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). 

The corroborative evidence may be either circumstantial or direct and need not establish 

the defendant’s guilt or directly link him to the charged offense; instead, it is sufficient if it 

“tends” to connect him to the offense. Id. (citing Munoz, 853 S.W.2d at 559, and Gosch v. 

State, 829 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). Although an accomplice witness

may testify to any number of facts corroborated by other evidence, if the corroborated facts 

do not tend to connect the accused with the crime, the corroboration does not satisfy article 
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38.14. Id. (citing Paulus v. State, 633 S.W.2d 827, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). If the 

corroborating evidence fails to connect the defendant with the charged offense, the 

evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Id. (citing Munoz, 853 S.W.2d at 560). 

As in a general sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

jury’s verdict when evaluating the corroborative value of non-accomplice-witness 

testimony. See Lacaze v. State, 346 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2011, pet. ref’d) (citing Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

Although appellant asserts a broad sufficiency challenge, his arguments are heavily 

focused on the non-accomplice-witness evidence. Appellant contends in just one 

sentence that Hudson herself “did not witness the robbery” but “merely drove the car, 

waited there, then later testified as to circumstances that made her believe that [appellant] 

committed robbery.” While we agree that Hudson’s testimony is circumstantial, it would 

nonetheless be sufficient to support appellant’s conviction as long as it was corroborated 

by non-accomplice-witness testimony tending to connect appellant with the charged 

offense. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 

(“Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an 

actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.”). Hudson

testified that appellant suggested that the group rob Lee’s store; handed out guns in the car

(which broadly matched the witnesses’ description of the guns used); pulled on a bandanna 

and hoodie; and returned less than 15 minutes later with a bag full of cash. This 

evidence—assuming it was corroborated by non-accomplice-witness testimony tending to 

connect appellant to the charged offense—is plainly sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction. Appellant does not seriously contest this point. Instead, appellant focuses on

the sufficiency of the remaining evidence to corroborate Hudson’s accomplice-witness 

testimony. 

The evidence corroborating Hudson’s testimony in this case is as follows:
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The beauty supply store’s external camera recorded a man walking through an 

adjacent alley moments before the robbery. The man is shown wearing a green 

hooded jacket covering a black shirt or hoodie and is accompanied by a woman 

wearing a gray hoodie with a bandanna over her face. The same woman was 

recorded by interior surveillance videos moments later pointing a gun at the store’s 

employees and ordering them to the back of the store. At the same time, the

register camera recorded a man wearing a black hooded coat holding a gun to Lee as 

Lee handed him cash from the register. 

At trial, Lee identified the man in the external video as appellant, though she 

conceded that she was “not quite certain” because the video is somewhat unclear. 

Lee identified appellant at the pretrial lineup about two months after the robbery. 

Lee viewed her surveillance video to help her identify appellant, but also stated that 

she had been able to see through appellant’s mask at the robbery because the mask

was very thin. According to Officer Varela, Lee—with her son interpreting—was 

read a standard lineup instruction indicating that the suspect might not be present 

and that she should identify a suspect only if she believed him to be the perpetrator. 

Although she testified at the pretrial identification hearing that she understood she 

was to “pick the most closest one,” Lee later testified—and was corroborated by 

Officer Varela—that she understood she was to pick “the very one” who had robbed 

her. 

Lee identified appellant in court as the robber, although she seemed at one point to 

accept appellant’s suggestion that she had identified appellant because he was the 

only black man seated at the counsel’s table.

The guns that the police recovered at appellant’s apartment matched the 

descriptions of those used in the robbery of Lee’s store as described by Lee and her 
12

employees in general terms (apart from Hudson’s description of the weapons in 

greater detail). 

Appellant contests the sufficiency of each piece of corroborative evidence in turn. 

With respect to the video recordings, appellant cites Nolley for the proposition that 

“presence at the scene of the crime is not sufficient to corroborate accomplice testimony.” 

But the court in Nolley actually stated that “[a]lthough non-accomplice evidence that the 

accused was in the company of the accomplice at or near the time or place of the offense is

proper corroborating evidence, such evidence alone is not conclusive corroboration.” Id.

at 854 (emphasis added). Rather, “[t]here must be some evidence which, when coupled 

with evidence which places the accused in the company of the accomplice at the time of the 

offense, tends to connect the accused to the commission of the crime.” Id. (emphasis in 

original); see also Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (presence in 

company of accomplice near time of offense not alone conclusive, but important factor for 

corroboration). Here, the male perpetrator’s face is visible on the store’s external 

camera’s recording taken shortly before the robbery. In her testimony, Lee identified 

appellant as the male perpetrator. The male perpetrator is also shown accompanying a 

woman, wearing a bandanna over her face and a gray hoodie, who is shown seconds later 

on an internal camera pointing a gun at Lee’s employees and forcing them to the back of 

the store. At the same time, a male is shown on the register camera holding a gun to Lee 

as she takes cash from the register. In addition, the guns found in appellant’s apartment 

matched the eyewitnesses’ general descriptions of the guns used in the robbery. See 

Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 178 (concluding that evidence was sufficient when it 

showed that appellant was present at the crime scene, had been in possession of a shotgun a 

few months before the robbery similar to that used in the robbery, and fled the scene 

without explanation); Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) 

(“Even evidence that a defendant had a gun which was merely similar to the murder 

weapon may corroborate accomplice testimony.”).
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Appellant argues that “[Lee’s] in-court identification should be discarded outright, 

since [Lee] admitted on cross-examination that she identified [appellant] because he was 

sitting at counsel table.” But appellant did not object to the in-court identification, nor did 

he obtain a ruling excluding it. The jury was not required to discard Lee’s identification 

outright. Instead, the question is one of the weight of Lee’s identification rather than its 

admissibility. Lee did seem at one point to accept appellant’s argument that she had 

identified appellant because he was the only black man seated at the counsel’s table, but 

through most of her testimony, she seemed to maintain that her identification was based on 

her viewing of the surveillance video and her own recollection of appellant’s face as she 

could see it through his stocking mask. While Lee’s identification was clearly not as 

credible as some identifications may be, we are not convinced that it was insufficient as a 

matter of law as tending to corroborate Hudson’s testimony, particularly when taken in 

combination with other corroborative evidence. The issue is not whether Lee’s 

identification independently establishes appellant’s guilt but whether it “tends” to connect 

appellant with the charged offense. In making this determination, as noted above, we 

must take Lee’s testimony in the light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the jury on 

its determination of her credibility. Viewed in this light, we conclude that Lee’s in-court 

identification tends to connect appellant to the robbery and thus is sufficient—particularly 

when combined with the other corroborative evidence—to corroborate Hudson’s 

testimony. See Lacaze, 346 S.W.3d at 113 (holding that eyewitness identification was 

sufficient to corroborate accomplice-witness-testimony where identifying eyewitness was 

“an admitted crack addict” and was able to make only a tentative identification of appellant 

when he viewed a photospread the first time because “we must defer to the jury on the 

credibility determination and assume that the jury found [the identifying witness] to be a 

credible witness in his identification”); see also Brown, 270 S.W.3d at 568 (“The fact that 

the testimony may have been subject to impeachment as coming from an admitted perjurer 

and drug user goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.”). 
14

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the non-accomplice-witness 

testimony and physical evidence in this case “tends” to connect appellant with the charged 

offense. Taking the accomplice-witness testimony, the non-accomplice-witness 

testimony, and the physical evidence together—and viewing them all in the light most 

favorable to the verdict—we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

B. Jury Argument

Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the 

State’s closing argument, in which the State told the jury that

[appellant] wants to talk to you about how the lineup was misleading and 

about how, you know, that maybe the officers were trying to mislead her, that 

it has created improperly [sic]. But don’t you know that he didn’t want you 

to see the lineup. He objected to it. And don’t you know that if there was 

something so misleading on that lineup, that he would have wanted you to 

have seen it.

The law provides for and assumes a fair trial, free from improper jury argument by the 

State. Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Jury argument is 

generally not considered improper if it encompasses one or more of the following areas: (1) 

a summation of the evidence presented at trial; (2) a reasonable deduction drawn from that 

evidence; (2) an answer to the opposing counsel’s argument; or (4) a plea for law 

enforcement. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To determine 

whether a party’s argument falls within one of these categories, we must consider the

argument in light of the entire record. Wilson v. State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996). To constitute reversible error, the argument must be extreme or manifestly 

improper, violate a mandatory statute, or have injected new facts into the proceedings that 

are harmful to the accused. Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2000).

Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s 

objection to the State’s jury argument, the error did not affect appellant’s substantial rights 
15

and was therefore not sufficiently harmful to warrant reversal. See Ortiz v. State, 999 

S.W.2d 600, 605–06 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (argument inviting 

speculation about matters not in evidence is non-constitutional error for purposes of harm 

analysis); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (non-constitutional error that does not affect substantial 

rights must be disregarded). In determining whether appellant’s substantial rights were 

affected, we consider the following three factors: (1) the severity of the misconduct (the 

magnitude of the prejudicial effect), (2) any curative measures taken, and (3) the certainty 

of conviction absent the misconduct (the strength of the evidence supporting the 

conviction). Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Martinez, 17 

S.W.3d at 692–93. 

We first turn to the severity of the State’s alleged misconduct. Appellant 

repeatedly insinuated that the police officers acted improperly in conducting the lineup; in 

effect, he asked the jurors to speculate about misconduct that nothing in the record 

indicated ever took place. While we do not necessarily agree with the State that the 

State’s jury argument was therefore “invited error,” we do agree that the State’s jury 

argument did more to counter appellant’s extra-evidentiary arguments than it did to 

introduce “new facts” harmful to appellant. Viewed against the backdrop of appellant’s 

argument, the severity of the State’s misconduct, if any, was not severe. As a 

consequence of this fact, the lack of curative measures taken in this case is less troubling 

than it may have been had the State’s misconduct been more severe. Turning to the 

certainty of conviction absent the State’s jury argument, as noted above, Hudson’s 

testimony was corroborated not only by Lee’s pretrial identification but also by Lee’s 

in-court identification. It was also corroborated by Lee’s identification of appellant as the 

man shown in the store’s external surveillance camera; appellant’s presence—as shown by 

the same camera—with the woman later shown on an internal camera pointing a gun at 

Lee’s employees; the video recording of a man robbing Lee at the same time that the 

woman seen with appellant seconds earlier was in the store; and appellant’s possession of 

weapons whose descriptions matched those used in the robbery. Taking into account the 
16

severity of the State’s alleged misconduct and the certainty of conviction absent any 

misconduct, we conclude that—notwithstanding the lack of curative measures taken—any 

error by the trial court in overruling appellant’s objection to the State’s jury argument did 

not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Therefore, any such error would not be

sufficiently harmful to require reversal. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

III. CONCLUSION

Having held that the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction and any 

error in overruling his objection to State’s jury argument was insufficiently harmful to 

require reversal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Tracy Christopher

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown, and Christopher.

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).