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~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

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IIIIIIIIIHUlll\11111 111111!1111111111 

THE NRO STAFF November 20, 1969 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS 

SUBJECT: November 12 Meeting of the 303 Committee 

Attached at the right are the minutes of the November 12, 1969 

meeting of the 303 Committee. {Tab A) 

We believe that these minutes highlight two significant problem 

areas concerning the roles and responsibilities for aircraft overflight 

of denied areas. First, we consider it inappropriate for the JRC to 

report on the results of the TAGBOARD test mission. TAGBOARD 

is an NRP asset, managed, tasked and funded by the NRO. SAC is 

an operating agency only; under JRC control. We believe that this 

reporting is clearly a usurpation of NRO authority and responsibilities 

with regard to TAGBOARD. 

The second issue is also concerned with the roles and responsibilities for aircraft overflight. You will note that in paragraph 2d 

General Steakley advocated approval of the four additional 147T missions proposed for November. The discussion thereafter centered on 

the intelligence requirements and expectations from further drone 

missions. 

It is evident from the previous 303 Committee meetings that the 

justification for the resumption of 147T flights was based on the fact 

that satellite missions were not obtaining the requisite photography 

of high priority targets. You will recall that on October 7, 1969 you 

forwarded a memorandum to Mr. Packard concerning requirements 

and the selection of resources for overflight of South China (Tab B). 

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Mr. Packard responded by stating that the technical and operational 

considerations in selecting the appropriate asset would certainly be 

based on your advice (Tab C). 

The minutes from the November 12 meeting indicate that Dr. 

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Kissinger has requested Mr. Packard to furnish a paper on the 

intelligence requirements and expectations from further drone missions. We believe that such a paper should be prepared by the NRO, 

working with COMIREX, in consonance with Mr. Packard's previous 

comments and the NRO authority and responsibilities for all overflight 

of denied areas. 

Conclusions: 

1. The issue of NRO/ JRC / OSA relationships with regard to 

aircraft overflight of denied areas must be clarified. We are preparing 

a memorandum to forward to you describing the background, status and 

recommended actions concerning aircraft overflight. 

2. The study concerning requirements for overflight of South 

China should be performed by the NRO and COMIREX. Such a study 

would then address all national requirements, however generated, 

and all overflight systems, manned aircraft, drones and satellites. 

Recommendation: . 

That you discuss the issue of South China requirements and 

overflight assets with Mr. Packard and request his concurrence 

with our proceeding with a joint NRO/COMIREX study. 

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. 14 November 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303. Committee, 

12 November 1969 

PRESENT: Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, 

and Mr. Helms 

General Ralph D. Steakley and Mr. Wymberley DeR. Coerr 

were present for Items land 2. 

' 

1. Loss of TAGBOARD Drone 

a.. General Steakley briefed the Committee on the loss of the 

TAGBOARD drone on its first operational test mission which was 

launched against targets in South China. Thus far, analysis of the 

reason for loss indica~es that TAGBOARD flew its programmed flight 

path, but a probable beacon f~ilwre as it approached the rec~very 

area precluded retrieval of the camera p~ckage by the recovery 

aircraft; It is presumed to have descended to the automatic destruct 

altitude and destroyed itself over water . 

. b. Further analysis is_proceeding to more firmly establish 

·cause of loss and to take corrective measures where indicated. When 

this is completed a new proposal for a second operational test mission 

will-be presented fer consideration by the Committee. 

c. Mr. Packard expressed some reservation over the use of the 

TAGBOARD capability for general collection purposes and commented 

that once its true operational capability is established, perhaps it 

should be held in reserve for certain high priority targets. 

Discussion of October and November 1969 Drone Overflights 

a. General Steakley briefed the Committee on the three 147T 

drone missions fl0u1n over South ·china during October. The first 

mission was nonproductive due to camera malfunction. The second 

obtained some photography and met some initial requirements. The 

third was shot down by the Chinese, but it is not certain whether 

by MIG-21 fighter aircraft or by a miss!le from a previously unknown 

SAM site. 

BYE 106,276-69 

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b. There was no known North Vietnamese reaction to the 

drone overflights of portions of their territory. The Chinese 

propagandized their shootdown of the 147T drone over radio and 

in the press, but this has thus far been .ignored by the U.S. 

media. 

c. General Steakley stated that if, tn fact, the drone had 

been shot d_own by MIG-21 fighters this might indicate a capability 

of these aircraft to operate at a 68,000-70,000 foot altitude, a 

capability with which we do not now credit them. Questioning on 

this point by Mr. Mitchell elicited the fact that quite aside from 

photographic intelligence, further drone flights might serve to 

determine the MIG-21 operational altitude capability. This information is highly lmpo-rtant in order to establish the survivability 

expectations of both drone and U-2 reconnaissance platforms. 

d. General Steakley advocated approval of the four additional 

147T drone missions proposed for November. He was supported by 

Messrs. Mitchell, Packard and Helms . • 

e. Mr. Johnson opposed further drone flights. He did not 

believe'that the political and material costs were worth the 

intelligence to be expected. He pointed out that the U.S. is 

slowly attempting to better relations with Communist China and 

the drone overflights are provocative and tend to strengthen the 

position of the elements in Peking who are more hostile to the U.S. 

Mr. Johnson noted that he would generally support missions to obtain 

intelligence on high priority requirements, such· as nuclear and 

missile developments, but was ~ot convinced of the value of the 

intelligence anticipated from the·l47T drone overflights. 

f. Mr. Packard expressed a desire to see an up-to-date 

statement of U.S. policy toward Communist China. He stated that if 

the U.S. is going to make strong efforts toward bettering relations 

with the Communist Chinese then it might be well to review all 

intelligence collection activities including peripheral flights 

directed against the Chinese target. 

g. The Chairman concluded the discussion with a request that 

Mr. Johnson prepare a paper reflecting the eolicy and political considerations supporting State Department objections to further 147T 

drone missions over South China. He also asked Mr. Packard to 

furnish a paper on the intelligence re·quirements and expectations 

from further drone missions. The Chairman stated he would present 

the opposing positions on additional drone overflights of South 

China to higher authority for resolution. 

Distribution 

Mr. Mitchell 

:~;-_ >.::r---> Mr. Packard 

Mr~ Johnson 

"'-:7 . "' '1 f: ' .::.:s~.. M, t_ W-lf'......_ 

Frank M. Chapin \ 

BYE 106,276-69 

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SU3JEC T: Afr Reconnaissance of South China 

REFERE?\CE: Draft Memorandum for the President, suoject as above, 

from Henry A. Kissinger 

The p:.:..-oposcd n:crnorandum to the President has beer:. oroacie::.:ed 

s:ncc I co1:--:.;:-nc~1ted on '.:he ::n·evious craft to :ncludc not only the: ;::;at:.s -

:fz...,ction o: priority tactical intelligence targ.:<:s, b..:t also pr:.ori-.:y st:.:.·at.::;;ic 

i:r1tcllige11cc ta.r6cts. 

Sl1ould tl1c Prcsicien.t autl:o:::·iz.:; ove:;:f~i;r.::~ :o satisi'y Ootl1 t;::..c.;.::.cil 

c..11c st:.~c.:-~egic rec1uirc:rr1ents \vitl1.ol:et :~~rso:r:&:ly cicsi;r ..ati::g w:lic::. c0ll0ction 

p:c..,.i.:::o:t:~: :.s to be used, t1-1c ;.-r:C!r:1orz.[.dun1 :n.o~v states tl:;J..t "'.:1:.::.: 303 Co~'"':il-:".:i.:::0ic 

will ~akc tJ.1c selection. I b_clicvc -~::..z.,t 1::1.e; dciicicr1t i:-~te:::::.~.>~~~ .. c(: ~.vc::. .. ~i;:cr::·.e::n::s shoulc. be p:::oviclecl· to the :\'a;.:ional Reconnaissance: o..:..:~c...; w:::..c:; . .:.:;.en 

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I also 

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:.\forc.o, fr.:<l Oc :,, ~969 (BYE-106, 2.65-693) 

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--t-S-t--NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHiNGTON, O.C. 

THE NRO STAFF October 9, 1969 

tiAr,UL( v,A 

l\,1EMORANDUM FOR COLONEL ALLEN 

SUBJECT: Air Reconnaissance of South China 

Captain Wilson called me with reference to Dr. McLucas' 

memo of October 7 (attached) for Mr. Packard on the subject: 

Air Reconnaissance of South China. 

Captain Wilson indicated that Mr. Packard had reviewed the:: 

memo and had some concern about the substantive recommendation 

(paragraph 2 of Dr. McLucas 1 letter) and had related to Captain 

Wilson his fee lings: Mr. Packard understands Dr. Mc Lucas 1 1·ccommendation and agrees that the technical and operational considerations in selecting the appropriate asset would certainly be 

based on Dr. Mc Lucas I advice. However, Mr. Packard points om 

that such advice is al ways sought by Mr. Packard and is usually 

provided by Dr. McLucas through his direct line (DNRO) responsibility to Mr. Packard. Mr. Packard is concerned that if he we :·c: 

to suggest a modification of the particular option as written, tl,c 303 

Committee might misunderstand the modified option anci cone:·, .. 

that we are attemp:ing to usurp its prerogatives, particularly :, ::e 

there are some 1x~culiar political conside:·2.,:, ',s involved in th::. ..,, 

decision. Mr. Packard feels that the Com,-r.:..~:c:e clearly unclc:1·s1: .. 1.n.ds 

the option as writtc:n and l'(..;·:;..)::-;:,izes the Dr. :v~c-Lucas/Mc. Pac,,;::1rd 

role in such a cl2cision. i: ... :~··cil81', Tvir. Pack;:i:·c: points out that he ::.s 

in a position to :i.r:sure that Dr. McLucas' advic2 in :-;c,ch a selection is 

sought since it would obviously be the basis for his :;, ;::,;ition in lr'18 

Committee deliberations. Accordingly, Mr. :i.-:::iacka1-ci ;:;refers not to 

deal with the proposed modification of the option. He asked that we 

be sure to pass this word to Dr. McLucas. 

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I did have an opportunity to explain to Captain Wilson that we 

· had no intention of becoming involved in the political considerations 

and recognized that they were paramount in the decision on this 

particular item, but that we were simply trying to assure that, 

should a resumption of overflight be authorized, the DNRO' s advice 

in the selection of the appropriate asset would be represented in 

any decision by the Committee or higher o.uthority. AB I understand 

Mr. Packard's comments, we have that assurance without a modification of the option. 

fl ' 

V'v 

WILLIAM R. YOST 

Colonel, USAF 

Copy to Colonel Sweeney 

HA,-,l1L ( ;/IA 

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u ~ L!dJ .. l{~ 

CO,.TA'OL SY$HM 

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