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3 May 1965 

25 May 1965 

25 May 1965 

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On behalf' of Admiral Raborn. Mr. Bross calledMr. Vance with respect to funding of FULCRUM 

activities for the month of May. Mr. Vance 

agreed to a minimum sustaining basis for May, 

. but indicated that he wanted to "wind the matter 

· up by May 30th." Mr. Vance left it up to Mr. 

Bross to work out the details for a minimum sustaining basis and indicated he would accePt Bross" 

· determination that it had been done on that basis. 

(Tab 290) 

In a letter to Admiral Raborn. Dr. McMillan presented a very complete and detailed report of background and status of NRO activities on a new.satellite system for genera'! search. - (Tab 291) . 

In a reply to Dr. McMillan's letter of 3 May dealing with the status of development 01 . satellite .en-

· eral search systems. ,Admiral Raborn indicated that 

he considered it "a ·matier of great impbrtance and 

urgency." 

Admiral Raborn attached a copy of his . letter to Mr. 

Vance and indicated that he proposed to mo~ qUickl)' 

to review the competitive prop-ams and establish 

procedures for meeting the USIS requirement. 

(Tab 292) 

In a letter to Mr. Vance, Admiral Raborn indicated 

that CIA was continuing sustaining ,contracts on the 

FULCRUM system and had undertaken a.re-evaluation of the. basic ITEK. design. The costs tor this 

e or. w c a een approve y r. cone. 

amounted t_for April. Admiral Raborn 

stated that ~ewed and substantially cut 

the costs 01 the F ct, which were P:r<>-' 

jected for May at 

He suggested that he and Mr. Vance meet at Vance'. 

early convenience to review all competitive programs 

and to estabUsh procedures for. aele'ctiDg the design 

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best calculated to meet the usm requirement. 

(Tab 293) 

In a letter to Admiral. Raborn, Dr. McMillan 

. the several NRP program.directors were being 

analyzed and note'd some elements of the CIA' 

request and some of the problems they posed in 

settling on a financial plan. 

", t : ~ not infor new 

Admir.al Raborn confirmed a telephone cooversa-

. tiollof 2· June in which he had informed Mr •. Vance 

that he felt the need of 'special technical advice on 

the results of a review of the FULCRUM camera 

in relation with· the selection of a new general· 

search. system as a follow-on to CORONA. 

Admiral Raborn had talked with Dr. Hornig who 

indicated that he would refer the question to the 

President's Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) . 

Reconnaissance Panel of which Dr. Land was the 

Chairman. Admiral Raborn considered this an 

ideal solution in view of J).r. Land r s previous 

connection with the problem. 

Dr. McMillan had advised Admiral Raborn that 

. the NRO was funding projects by Eastman Kodak 

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( 

and also by ITEK in the general se~rch category. 

Admiral Raborn stated that Dr. McMWan had 

also indicated that in view of the Land Panel report on FULCRUM, the project, in his opinion, 

was no longer a candidate for conside~ation. 

Admiral Raborn remarked that it was not hi~ 

understanding that any definitive decision, had 

been made to e1imlnate the FULCRUM design, 

but on the contrary, that there had been agreement that no final decision either to accept or 

reject any of the competitive proposals in this 

field could be, taken until final reorganization of 

the NRO. . 

Admiral Raborn suggested "that appropriate representatives of OlJr respective offices prepare 

terms of reference to serve as general guidance" 

to facilitate the work of the PSAC in the review 

of all of the designs for a new system. 

(Tab 295) 

In a letter to Admiral H..born, Dr. McMiJlanreferred to the August 1964 agreement between 

Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone to certain chBDges 

in the contract structure of the CORONA Pl'Ogram affecting the conduct of systems integration 

and systems engineering; specifically that Aerospace Corporation would be given responsibility 

tor over-ail systems engineering and that the, 

. Director, Program A, would establish a systems 

integration contract with Lockheed. 

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Dr.' McMlllan indicated, that, unfortunately, none 

'of the terms of the agreement had been ft11ly complied with by the CIA and eXplained',. in detail, the 

events that had.ince occurred. ,Dr. McMillan informed Admiral Raborn that he was taldng the 

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following actions: 

a. InstDucting Mr. Kearton, of Lockheed~ to 

sign the contract he had negotiated so that 

the Government could legally pay the contractor for the work that had beeD accomplished. 

b. Instructing the Director, Program A, to 

initiate a continuation· of the contract for 

FY 1986. 

Dr. McMillan. assured Admiral Raborn that, if 

ch~es in the over-all structure were la~er agreed· 

upon, this particular contract with Lockheed would 

be adjusted accordingly. 

(Tab 296)" 

ments should be. made to protect the deploYment option 

of OXCART aircraft to Okinawa in the f~ll of 1965, and 

indicated that such actions had already been initiated 

within the DOD. 

Mr. Vance had directed the construction of the required 

support .faci1it~a and had authorized the 

expenditure .of_or that purpose. 

Mr. Vance suggested an in-depth review of program 

status prior to charting a future course of action •. 

(Tab 297) 

. Admiral Raborn called General Stewart regarding 

Dr. McMillan'S ·14 June letter and requested that 

the Lockheed contracts not. be signed until he had 

. discussed the matter with Mr. Vance in a meeting 

scheduled for 18 June· 1965. 

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Admiral Raborn indicated that "we shouldn't do 

something that might have to be undone later.... . 

not that I·feel anything would have to ~ Un ~/ 

General Stewart advised Mr. Vance of Admiral 

Rabo~n' s call of 17 June and his request that the 

Lockheed contracts not be signed pen~g the out.-

come of his discussion with Mr. Vance. 

General Stewart indicated further that he had talked 

with General Martin and had learned that nelotia~ 

tions could continue but that he should not sign the. 

contracts without specific approval to do so froin 

Dr. McMillan. 

CIA had called Lockheed. stating that the DCI did 

not want them to sign the contracts in qUestion I' at this time. II 

(Tab 298) 

Dr. McMillan commended· General RUland for a 

fine effort in the review of ISINGLASS. 

General Ritland's conclusions: \}'( 

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1. ISINGLASS needed a total vulnerability study .. ~/ 2 • Vehicle and engineering schedules· and costs 

. wereo;ptimistlc. 

3. Supporting information for proper eval11ation 

was unavailable. 

4. Lack of performance ~equirements criteria 

limited evaluation. 

5. Major and costly problems were evident in 

. operational and support areas. 

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10 July 1965 

13 July 1965 

19 July 1965 

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Dr. McMillan considered the identification and 

recommendation of' specific technology proposals 

related to hypersonic vehicle,s both timely and 

worthwhile. 

(Tab 299) 

The President announced the nomination of 

Norman S. Paul as Under Secretary of the Air 

Force, succeeding, Dr. Brockway McMUlan, 

whose. resignation the President accepted 

effective 30 September' 1965. 

(Tab 300)' . 

In a memorandum for Mr. Vance and Admiral 

Raborn, Dr. McMWan provided a status report 

on NRO activities toward meeting satellite search 

and surveillance requireme'nts in the 1967 and 

subsequent time period. 

Dr. McMillan' indicated that in-house NRO analy ...... 

in conjunction with competitive contractor parametric study arid technology investigatioDs. had progressed to a point that permltted de~isions to be 

made with a high confidence about the over-all system co~igUration. He stated. further. ~at the 

NRO.was now in a position to proceed with an orderly program toward a first launch of a Dew system in the last quarter of FY 1967. 

The memorandum described the major elements . of the system. . 

(Tab 301) 

Admiral Raborn forwaided for Mr. V~ce's~oDsideration a new proposed draft of an agreement 

"to govern our relations OD the NRO." 

Admiral Raborn outline. several basic principles' 

which he felt should apPly. to any agreement: 

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1. The necessity for the existence of an Executive Committee consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and .the DCI to provide 

policy guidance and supervision and to allocate responsibilities under the program as a 

. whole. Adopting a recommendation by Mx-. 

McNamara, .Admiral Raborn proposed that 

the President's Special Assistant for Science 

and Technology join such a committee when 

research and development matters were 

discussed. 

2. The DCI, in order to be responsive to USIB 

requirements, should maintain the responsibility of providing specifiC program guidance 

to ensure optimum exploitation of satelllte 

reconnaissance missions for intelUgence pur-

. poses. Admiral Raborn suggested that the 

function and basic personnel incorporated in 

the NRO Satellite Operations Center be returned to CIA and renamed the Satellite Reconnaissance Programming Office . 

. 3. The potentialities of all agencies of the Government for the design and invention of new concepts and techniques for the acquisition of intellipnce through overhead reconnaissanc~. 

should be encouraged and exploited t.o the maximum. 

4. The engineering development, testing and pro-_ 

duction of new systems is normally the responsibility of contracting firms respoll8ible for the 

design of these systems. Supervision of. these 

contractors should logically' b,' undertaken by the 

agency with the best facilities andeatabUshed 

competence and experience iii dealing. with these 

contractors. 

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5. To a large extent, programs of the NR'P are 

financed with confidential funds expended under 

the authority of the DCl and Public Law 110. 

Suitable provision should be made to safeguard 

the DCI's obligation for ensuring, appropriate 

, control and accounting for, such funds,. ' 

(Tab 302) 

In a memorandum for Mr. McNamara, Admiral 

Raborn confirmed that he had instructed the 

appropriate committee of the usm to examine 

the intelligence requirements for very high,'resolution photography of the character envisaged for 

acquisition by' the MOL. 

(Tab 303) 

Admiral Raborn iDformed Mr. Vance that he had 

had an indication that the DNRO might already be 

planning to decide on a specific new satellite 

search/ surveillance system., 

Admiral Raborn recalled'for Mr. Vance their 

agreement that any decision should await the 

technical advice of the Land Panel of PSAC and, 

suggested that such an agreement coDformed to , 

Mr. Vance's understanding of how, they planned 

to proceed. 

(Tab 304) 

Dr. Land's (Reconnaissance) Panel 01 the psAC 

reviewed the P-E, EK and lrEK work on high 

,resolution search systems. 

Its conclusions: 

"1. There is no technical basis for sel~ctfng for 

development at this time one system over anY 

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other, nor did the Panel s.ee an urgency for 

making a selection now rather than, say, 

. six months from now. 

2. Each system bas intrinsic merits which are 

attractive but# at the same time, each exhi~ 

bits eertain problem areas ofconcerri to the 

Panel. . 

3. The efforts of all three contractors should 

be continued in order to better define the . 

advantages and disadvantages of each system. tI 

The· Panel strongly recommended that all three 

contractors be funded for an additional three 

months and that their efforts be focused on the 

further definition at the unique and special features of systems design and on such analyses, 

tests and demonstrations which would further 

. substantiate performance claims. 

(Tab 305) . 

Dr. Wheelon passed the following note to Dr. 

McMillan during a PSAC l'anel meeting: 

"Brock 

I know that you' would want us to 

clarify the last minute reSponsibility for holding the MOL baby 

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affirmative. Surely you didn't. 

mean to imply this------". 

(Tab 306) 

Mr. Vance (Deputy Secretary of Defense) and 

Admiral Raborn (DCI) signed an "Agreement for 

Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance 

Program. fI . 

. The NRP was def~ed as "a single program, 

national in character, to meet the intelligence 

needs of the Government under a strong national 

leadership, for the 'development, manageme~~, 

control and operation .of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information 

obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations)." 

The Agreement stated that the NRP "shall be 

responsive dire~tly and solely to the lntelU.gence 

collection requirements and priorities established 

. by the usm" and that targetiDl' requirements and 

priorities and desired frequency of coverage of 

both satellite and manned aircraft missions over 

denied areas "shall continue to be the responsibility of USIB, subject to the operational approval 

of the 303 Committee. " 

The Agreement ch.arged responsibUities as 

follows: . 

a. The Secretary of Defense will: 

1. E stabUsh the NRO as a separate agency 

of the DOD and will have the ultimate 

responsibility for the management and 

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operation of 'the NRO and the NRP. 

2. Choose a DNRO who will report to him 

and be responsive to his instructioQs. 

3. Concur in the choice of the Deputy DNRO 

who will report to the,DNRO and bc;t responsive to his, instructions. 

4. Review and have the final power to approve 

the NRP budget. 

5. Sit with members of the Executive Committee, 

'when necessary, to reach decisions on issues 

on which committee agreement could not be 

reached. 

b. ,The Director of Central Intelligence will: 

1. Establish the collection priorities and requirements for the targeting of NRP ,operations and the establishment of their frequency 

and coverage. 

2. Review the results obtained by the NRP and 

recommend, if appropriate, steps for 1mproving such results. 

3. Sit as a member of the' Executive Committee. 

4. Review and approve the NRP budget ~ach 

year. 

,5. Provide security ,policy guidance to maintain a uniform system in the 'whole 'NRP 

area. 

The Agreement established an NRP Executive 

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Committee, consisting of the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, the DCI, and the SPecial Asil-istarit 

, to the President for Science and, Technology to 

guide and participate in the formulation of the 

NRP through the DNRO. (The DNRO was uamed 

, Ex Officio to the Executive Committee. ) 

The NRP Executive Committee would: 

1. Recommend 'to the, Secretary of Defense an 

appropriate level of effort for the NRP in 

response to reconnaissance requirements 

provided by usm and in the light of te'chnic~l capabilities and fiscal1imit~tions. 

2.' Approve or modify the consolidated NRP and 

, its budget. 

3.' Approve the, allocation of responsibility and 

the corresponding 'funds for researcb and 

exploratory, development for new systems. 

Funds were to be, adequate to ensure the 

achievement and maintenance of a vigorous 

effort by both DOD and CIA. 

4. Approve the allocation of 'development responsibilities and the correspondiDI funds for specific 

reconnaissance, programs with a view to ensuriDg , 

that the development, testing and production of 

new systems were accompl ished with maximum 

efficiency by the component Of the Government 

best equipped with facilitie's, experience and 

competence to undertake the assignment. The 

Executive Committee would also estabUsh ~delines tor collaboration between departments and 

for mutual support where appropriate. Assignment of responsibility for engineering development,of sensor subsystems would be made to 

either CIA or DOD components. 

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5. Assign operational responsibility for various 

types of manned" overflight missions to" CIA 

or DOD subject to the concurrence of the 303 

Committee. 

6. Periodically revi~w the essential fe"atures of" 

the major progra~ elements of the NRP •. 

The Agreement stated "that, subject to the direction 

and control of the Secretary of Defense and the 

guidance of the Executive Committee, the DNRO 

would: 

1. Manage and execute" the NRP. 

2. Have the authority to initiate, approve, modify, 

redirect or terminate all research and develop· 

ment programs in the NRP. 

3. Ensure, throulb appropriate recommendations 

for the assignment of research "and deVelopment 

responsibilities and the allocation of funds, that 

the full potentialities of the agencies of the Govern-

"ment were realized for the invention, 'improvement 

and development of reconnaissance systems to meet 

usm requirements. . 

4. Have authority to require that he be kept fully 

and completely informed by all agencies and " 

departments of the Government at all prop-8ms 

and activities undertaken as part of ~e NRP. 

5. Maintain and provide, to the Executiv~Committee, records ot the atatus of all projects, 

programs and activities ot the NRP'in research, 

development, production and/or operational 

plans. 

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1liiIE III BYEIM .,. SYmI 

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6. Prepare a comprehensive budget for· all 

~,pects of the NRP. 

7 . Establish a fiscal. control and accounting 

procedure to ensure that all funds expended 

in'support of the NRP were fully accounte·d. 

for and appropriately utilized by the agencies 

concerned. In particular, the budget would 

.show separately the lunds applied to research 

and exploratory design development, systems 

deve.lopment, procurement, and operational 

activities. Funds expended or obligated under 

the authority of the DCI (Public Law. 110) woUld 

~e administered' and ~ccounted for by CIA. 

8. Sit with' the USIB for matters aftect~ the N~P. 

The Agreement provided for a Deputy DNRO, to be 

~ppointed by the DCI with the concurrence of· the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, who wbald s~rve full 

time in a line position directly under the DNRO.. The 

~puty DNRO would act for and exercise powers of 

the DNRO during his absence or disability . 

. The NRO would b~ jointly staffed in such a way as 

to reflect the best talent 'available from the CIA, 

the three military departments and other Government agencies. The NRO Staff would report to the 

DNRO and Deputy DNRO and would. maintain no 

allegiance to the originating agency or department. 

The responsibility for existing prosrams of the 

NRP was to be allocated as indicated in an annex 

to the Agreement. These were: 

1. CIA to develop improvements' in CORONA optical sensor subsystems. 

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25 August 1965 

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2. CIA to develop optical sensor subsystems 

for the advanced general search system. 

3. Air Force (SAFSP) to develop GAMBlT-3 

4. Air Force (SAFSP) to develop optical sensor 

subsystems (manned and unmanned) for the ' 

MOL program. ' " 

(Tab 307) 

Referring to an earlier memorandum to Mr. 

Vance and " ve e,arly 

attention to a project' 

along the lines 

Admiral Raborn stated that. in light of the new 

he felt it proper that the 

lslon should be shared and soliI s views on the matter before 

the contractors were notified of the selection 

decision. 

Admirallllposed to draw from an unobligate emainder of Phase I monies 

,to suppo . a su ,a ing effort with the designated ~ 

major contractors and other important related 

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30 August 1965 

2 September 1965 

15 September 1965 

1965 

24 September 1965 

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investigations which he felt would permit direction 

and continuity of the program pending a system 

procurement decision. 

(Tab 308) 

Dr. Flax, Acting DNRO, torwarded to Mr. Vance 

a proposed memorandum to Admiral Raborn re- <I ... (.. 

garding a stop"work order on all spacecraft .and ~.Cl) 

RV activities for the new search system. \,.~ (, ~ : 

(Tab 309) 

Mr. James Q. Reber was appointed Deputy Director, 

NRO. Mr. Reber moved to an office in the NRO Staff 

area, Room 4CI000, The Pentagon. 

Dr. McMillan informed Mr. Vance that his recommended NRO ·financial plan tor FY 1966 and budget 

for FY 1967 contained DO money ex]pl14~1'J 

Dr. McMlllan indicated that he bad initiated more 

critical comparative analyses and was convinced 

that these would show the concept to be worthless. 

Dr. McMillan added that, . if the analyses did not 

prove the concept worthless, ·"further, more 

penetEatlng, more time consuming, and more 

costly studies" could be undertaken with tully 

sufficient funds iii the FY 1966 plan lor even "an 

orderly initiation of the project. " 

(Tab 310)· . 

Mr. Vance concurred in 

25 August ·to announce th 

selection and to fund a co 

tory to program decision. 

(Tab 316) 

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oDtractor 

rt preparaIn a note to Dr. McMillan, General Stewart advised 

that nothing along the lines of the stop-work memorandum proposed.for Mr. Vance's sipature on 30 AuguSt 

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27 September 1965 

30 September 1965 

,IIIIII'·,BYEIAN 

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1965 had been sent to Admiral Raborn. 

General Stewart added his understanding that 

CIA had closed out A veo; had GE working at a 

formation to P-E; had STC doing over-all 

analyses (perhaps akin to the Aerospace role 

in SAFSP); and had ,P-E working on' camera 

design. 

The total expenditure at P-E~TL was 

~to be running about_to 

_per month. , ' 

(Tab 311) 

In a message for the DNRO, General Ledford 

reported: ' 

"Due to the establishment of an Office 

of Special Projects within the DD/S& T, , 

CIA along with a corresponding realignment,of functions. I, as Director of 

Program B, NRO, or as Director of the 

Office Of Special A~tivities. DD/S&T. 

CIA, no longer have authority or control 

over the satellite programs funded to 

Director, Pr~gram B, from your atfice. 

Therefore, I can no longer assume any. 

responsibility for these programs." ' 

(Tab 312) 

'Upon retiring as DNRO, Dr. McMUlan proVided Mr. McNamara a report on the status 

of the NRO and NRP. 'The report highlighted 

significant events 8nd changes that had taken 

place since February 1963 and included several 

personal judgments with respect to the', program 

and the job of the DNRO. 

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Dr. McMillan des.cribed his tenure as beginning. 

with the Gilpatric-McCone Agreement of 13 

March 1963,. defining the structure, authorities 

and responsibilities of the NRO. He pointed out 

that, within a few wee~ of the signing of that 

Agreement, the .DCI had challenged its terms and 

by July 1963 had openly repudiated portions of it. 

Dr. McMillan stated that at no time after that 

was there' a satisfactory agreement as to the 

authorities or responsibilities of the DNRO, or 

as to the structure of the NRO; that there were 

many disagreements on substance and no satisfactory or agreed-upon means to settle them. 

Otparticular Significance were Dr. McMillan's 

comments on the "Agreement for the Reorganization Of the National Recoilnaissance Program" 

signed on 11 August 1965 by Mr. Vance and 

Admiral Raborn to replace the Agreement of 

13 March 1963. Dr. McMillan felt that the 

Agreement. went less far in defining the structure 

of the NRO ~han did.the 13 March 1983 Agreement. . He considered it to be le88 definitive 

about the authorities of the DNRO, circumscribing those which it did define. While' the new 

agreement was evident~y intended to palliate 

some of the frictions :which were charged to the 

prior agreement, Dr. McMillan felt it had· . 

weakened considerabw the structure provided 

by the prior Agreement and had introduced.a . 

number of potential further sources of friction. 

Three specific weaknesses of the Agreement 

were described by Dr. McMillan: 

1. It was quite ambiguous, in fact, about the 

authorities'. of the Executive Committee. 

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1 O~tober 1965 

1 October 1965' 

.. IE III BYEMAN .. SYSTEI 

2. It almost completely omitted reference to 

, responsibUities of the DNRO in connection 

, with reconnaissance operations ~ , 

3. It imposed no obligation upon the CIA, or 

upon anyone other' than the ~ecretary of 

Defense,to provide any focus of responsibilities for actions undertaken in the'NRP. 

In general, Dr. McMWan considered the Agreement to have a "trucial character." It scarcely 

touched on the substance of the NRP, but rather 

, set up procedures for negotiating the kinds of 

dispute that had marked the recent past. 'Ita 

. emphasis, on the procedural and on the dichotomy 

between ClA and DOD, its inordinate emphasis 

specifically on procedures for allocating responsibilities tor research and,development, and, its 

failure to provide any basis for an operatiDe organization left the way fully open for extensive 

further negotiation on all of the important substantive problems facing the ,DNRO. 

(Tab 313) 

The'Deputy Secretarl of Defense appointed ~r. 

Alexander H. Flax al Director, NatioD81 

Reconnaissance Office (DNRO), in addi~ioD'to 

his duties as Assistant Secretary of the 'Air ' 

Force (R&D). ' 

(Tab 314) 

In a letter to Dr. Flax, Mr. Helms reported 

, the consolidation of all CIA elements 8Upporting , . 

of CIA'Reconnaissance Programs, Mr" Huntington' 

Sheldon, who would report to the, DD/S&T. All 

activities (CORONA, FULCRUM, 

other projects as required) 

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would be placed in an Office of Special Projects 

under Mr. John·Crowley. Manned reconnaissance alrcraft development and operation. would 

be 'the responsibility of the Office of Special 

manage the U-2 and OXCART.programs.· The 

development of airborne electronic equipment 

. would be accomplished by the Office of ELINT 

under Mr. George Miller, who would report to 

General Ledford. A Special Operations Division 

W01111a handle the NR~funded' 

Referring to Mr. Vance's memorandum of 23 

September, Admiral Raborn indicated general 

agreement with Mr. Vance's identification of·the 

key elements of importance for an Executive 

Committee de.eision about 1 December. Admiral 

con$idered the PSAC Reconnaissance 

Panel as the appropriate organization to advise 

. technical feasibiUty of the 

satellite design. and suggested that 

be' asked to undertake such an 

examination. 

Admiral Raborn suggested further that the PSAC 

Reconnaissance Panel be 

of a cost effectiveness study 

suggested that he and Mr. Vance e a 

qualified individual to form a two-man team to 

do the st~dy. 

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6 October 1965 

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Admiral Raborn iterated the CIA proposal that 

launching support. Admiral Raborn considered this proposal 

to be compatible with the new NRO Agreement 

and asked that the proposal be conside.red in the 

review of recommendations from the DNRO 

concerning management of the ·program. 

(Tab 316) 

The first meeting of the "new" NRP Executive 

Committee was held. 

Members present: 

Mr. Vance' 

Admiral·Raborn 

Dr. Hornig 

. Dr. Flax (Ex Officio) 

Mr. Reber (Ex Officio) 

Others present: 

Mr. Helms (DDCI) 

Mr. Crowley (CIA) . 

Mr. Dirks (CIA) 

Dr.· Lauderdale (CIA) 

Mr. Sheldon (CIA) 

Colonel Carter (NRO Staff) 

Dr. Steininger (PSAC) 

On the new search system, the Executive Committee was presented a ahort review of the three 

camera systems under study for the satellite 

photographic search funct·ion· and of t~eir contr~ct 

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status. Mr. Dirks briefed the P-E proposal. 

Colonel Carter briefed on th~ EK and ITEK 

cameras. Dr. Flax descrilled his pla~ to 

establish a technical task group to be composed 

chairmanship of the NRO to prepare a statement of system operational requirements. to 

recommend the selection of a system configura .. 

tion, to formulate plans for contractor selection~ 

and to recommend a program plan mcluding . 

schedule . Dr. Flax indicated that he planned 

also to establish a task group to define project 

management structure. The Executive Committee 'concurred in the actions indicated by \ 

Dr. Flax. 

Dr. a 

schematic presentation of 

satellite s stem and the on- 0 work as 

a~thorized subsequent to the briefing of the 

Executive Committee in late September. Dr. 

Flax stated that he planned a technical evalua-

. tion by an independent 

Dr. Flax also 

AjllreEtmt"Dt indicated that. 

as new programs come along, avallable DOD 

assets should be employed and that he felt 

there should be an opportunity for Air Force 

familiarization witlt the spacecraft in 'order 

that, if the Air Force were aBsigned that function 

under the management plan, no time would be 

lost in familiarization at a later date. Dr. . Flax' . 

indicated that he believed all parties were in 

agreement that a cost-effectiveness study should 

be made. Accordingly ,he proposed to appoint 

a small task force. acceptable to CIA,' to complete such a study by:15 November 1985. Dr. 

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Flax also stated that he 'planned to establish a 

task 'group to consider and recommend mauage- . 

ment arrangements fo_ The. Execu,:,," 

tive Committee concur~ions pro~ posed by Dr. Flax. 

(Tab 317) 

Dr. Flax assured Mr. Helms that the new CIA 

organizational· arrangements for support of the 

NRP would be appropriately reflected in the 

near future in NRO documentation implement:lDg 

the new NRP Agreement. 

Dr. Flax indicated that he would be pleased to 

work directly with Mr. Sheldon'in his new 

capacity and agreed that formal proerams 

approvals and instructions, budget matters.' 

as well as any request,or direction which had 

a significant effect on' the total or relative 

allocation of CIA personnel and resources to 

the NRP, should go·throUlh this single authoritativepoint of contact. At the same time. ~. 

Flax pointed out •. the need for a close day-to.-

day relationship between the vax-iou8 working 

levels of the CIA, DOD and the NRO Staff 

must be recognized. 

Dr. Flax stated his intent to maintain over-all 

project. directors for systems in the NRP. and 

to identify subsystem directors when the latter 

were part of an organization other ~an the oDe 

charged with over-all project management. 

Where systems or major sub8.1stems were 

assigned to the CIA, the system or major sub-

. system director would have free arid' direct 

access to Dr. Flax and the NRO Staff. and vice 

versa. Dr. Flax stated that specific ·arr&Jllementswouldbe made for those cases wherein 

, the CIA served in a support relationship ·to' an 

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15 October 1965 

_IIA BYEMAN .. smu 

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NRP project .whose director was not located in 

CIA. 

Dr. Flax assured every effort would be· made to 

develop the most effective and·harmonious 

arrangements possible. 

·(Tab 318) 

DNRO Action Memorandum No. 1 directed the 

development of a proje.ct management plan 

assigning responsibilities and authorities and 

defining management channels for the new 

photographic search and surveillance system. 

A task group, ehaired by General Stewart, 

(Director, NRO Staff) was to: 

1. Recommend alternative project management 

arrangements. 

2. Prepare subsequent to DNRO decision/ 

guidance on the first task, a suitable final 

project management directive. 

(Tab 319) 

DNRO Action Memorandum No. 2 directed the 

conduct of those reviews and evaluations es·-

sential to a decision to proceed with the development of a ·new photographic satellite search and 

surveillance system. 

A technical task group, . chaired by Colonel 

David L. Carter (_0 Staff) was to: 

1. Based on applicable USIB requirements, 

prepare a statement of system operational 

requirements for a new satellite phot~-

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21 October 1965 

1lIIIE ItA BYEMAN 

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graphic search and surveillance system which 

defined the essential technical and operational 

criteria which must be' met by the 'system. 

2. Recommend a basic system configuration. 

3. Rec,ommend the' criteria to be used fQr subsystem design and source selection. 

4. Formulate a preliminary master project plan 

(including schedules). 

5. Pr,pare necessary' project directives. 

(Tab 320) 

General Martin provided to D~. Flax his general 

comments on',the over-all subject of CORONA, 

management. 

Key comments: 

1. There ,was no single persoli or element who had 

, effective responsibllity for, over-all system engineering, acquisition, integration and operations. 

Solution of this problem would require not, only 

the deSignation of a responsible person but also 

the delegation· of the authority n~cessary t~ 

exercise this responsibility. 

2. If the basic principle that some one will have 

both responsibility and autborityfor this task 

over CIA and DOD elements and personnel 

could not be reached, then General Martin 

recommended that no CORONA management 

plan be attempted. 

3., In adcli.tion to the designation Of responsibility. 

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26 October 1,965 

_1M BYEMAN --mTQI 

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the necessary authority must include authority 

to determine arid implement. liy direction to 

the CIA and DOD elements involved •. all steps 

necessary to insure that the several aspects 

of the over-all system were integrated into an 

effective· system·in spite of the split mauage:-

ment involved. Such authority. General Martin fe It. must include complete access at any 

. time to· all aspects of the entire system and 

all contractors and installations involved for 

information upon which to bas·e· the over-all 

·system engineerinl and subsequent dir~ction. 

4. With regard to the two unsigned contracts with 

JJilSC." Geileral Martin believed the on-going 

intent should govern the resolution of the existing pre -contractual exposure •. 

. . 

5. The collocation. of CIA personnel with SAF·SP 

was a good· idea only if. the CIA would collocate 

the people actually responsible for .their work 

on CORONA and would delegate the responSibility and authority to them. OtherWise. 

General Martin feared the arrangement to become 'an additional echelon through w:hich one 

must go" but which was unable to actually . 

assist in the work. 

6. General Martin emphasized that the lack of 

·harmony in CORONA management had resulted 

entirely from previous attempts to deal with 

and make arrangements concerning specific 

procedures when there was fundamental disagreement .on basic unde~lying principles. 

(Tab 321) 

. . 

DNRO Action Memorandum No. 3 directed the 

development of a project management plan assign226 

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26 October 1965 

"lEN 8YEMAN 

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ing responsibilities and auth • -:: f' .-

management channels for th - - - . 

ining 

ystem. 

A task group chaired by General Stewart (Director. 

1. . Recommend alternat·ive project management 

arrangements. 

2. Prepare, subsequent to DNRO guidance on 

first task, a suitable final project management 

directive. 

(Tab 322) 

. - . 

IDrC)DOSal as a 

an assessment of the 

f' : • 

An independent task group, chaired by Dr. James 

Fletcher (University of Utah) was to: 

1.· Assess proposed solutions to the 

associated with 

which might be encountered. 

3. Furnish technical information and possible 

alternatives to the Cost-Effectiveness Task 

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Group 

4. Review 

: ,. ,: '-: 

the spacecraft 

:: relevantt~ 

or s~ 

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26 October 1965 

4 November 1965 

4 November 1965 

(Tab 323) 

~ 

DNRO Action Memorandum No. 5 directed the 

of a cost-effectiveness study on the, 

_ystem. 

The task group, chaired by Mr. James Q. Reber 

(DDNRO) was to: 

1. Make a co~ari8on of the tradeoffs of all 

proposed missions with 

existing or p e sys ems which have 

rallel ca abilities, includ cost com ari~ 

sons. 

2. 

(Tab 324) 

Dr. Flax submitted the FY 1967 NRP Budget to 

the DCI for. review preparatory to discussion by 

the Executive Committee. 

Dr. Flax stated his future intent that an earlier 

opportunity for revlew and discussion would 

apply. This opportunity he lelt would be prior 

to submission of the DNRO recommended budget 

to the Secretary of Defense. 

(Tal) 325) 

CIA commented upon the' Task Group'Report on 

alternative management arrangements for the 

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4 November 1965 new search and surveillance system. 

(Continued) 

IIIIlf 1M BYEMAII 

_ISYST£1 

Key comments: 

1. There existed two choices: 

a. how to divide the responsibilities for 

development of the payload 

b. the way in which the Air Force and CIA 

would collaborate in executing assigned 

responsibilities for the program~ 

2. If it were decided that a single project director 

would manage the new project then a decision 

would emerge; namely, whether the CIA or the 

Air Force should have primary responsibility. 

3. The most important factor to be considered in 

carrying forth programs 1BJder the "new'.' NaP 

was the desire of both the DOD and 'CIA' to insure that the full and creative participation ,of 

each organization was totally exercised as 

responsible contributors., 

4. CIA agreed with the Report that it was uDdesir~ 

able to have the new system. managed withba the 

NRO 'Staff. CIA 'also concurred with the rejection 

of an' integrated system project director, which 

narrowed the, choice' betWeen a sm,le system project director or a split responsibility a la 

CORONA. CIA believed there was sufficient 

analogy, between CORONA anf;l'the new system 

which suggested that the new system could be 

, managed successfully on a joint basis. Defined 

roles and responsibilities which heretofore had 

been lackmg. ,in CORONA would materialll a~d to 

comparable success in the new 'search, and surveU'-

lance system. 

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MIlE. BY8tAN 

-SYSlfI 

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5. CIA argued that, if a single organization were 

chosen to have primary responsibility for the ' 

over-all management of the new system. tbe 

case for assigning that responsibility to CIA 

was compelling. The history of the ClA'study 

program dating back to February 1964 was 

, related in support of' this argUment. 

6. CIA added its comments on three apecjfic items 

concerning the assignment of responsibilities: 

a. System engineering and system,' inte'gration--

CIA considered it essential that 'specific constraints be' placed upon the over-all system 

engineers and over-all system integrating 

contractor. CIA felt it important to clearly 

delimit the degree to which the sy8tem ellliDeer- ' 

ing and integration activities impinged upon the 

responsibilities assigned to other Government 

agencies. 

b. Recovery vehicle module--in light of its considerable experience with CORONA. CIA W.8 

strongly persuaded to endorae a ffUDaDim~s 

recommendation" that it be re8ponsible tor 

'sen80r module which. according to the Task 

Group, included the recovery vehicle module. 

CIA did agree that. jf the recovery vehicle8 ' 

were to be employed in other programs ' 

managed primarily bytbe Air ,Force. then a 

good case could be made for Air Force procurement for this program. 

c. Orbit control module contractor--CIA. did not' 

consider of critical importance the Task Group , 

recommendation that the orbital control module. 

contractor also build the 8ensor mode'l structure 

and perform a8 the sy8tem integration contractor. 

CIA surmiseS tbat. when the over-all hardware 

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4 November 1965 

II1II£ II BYEMAN .. sma 

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flow was, examined in detail~ it might weU 

be more economical and expedient to assip 

,the systemsintegrat,ion function to the booster 

contractor. 

While not pleading a particular arrangement,' CIA 

recommended that these determinations be left, 

with DNRO concurrence, to program manage~ent. 

(Tab 326) 

General Martin commented up&n the. Task Group 

report on alternative management arrangements 

for the new search and surveillance system. 

Key comments: 

1. In considera~ion of maD&gement arrangements 

, for any projects, of the NRP, the over-all 

objective 8houl~ be, unequivocally, the strongest, 

most effective management structure possible. 

,General Martin did not believe that any ~voidable 

degradation of this objective could be accepted 

responsibly, in the light of the aationa! importance 

of the projects, nor that the basis of any assign-· 

ment could be, instead, as had been proposed 80 

otten in past disQussion, one of maxinlum utWzation of 'resources, or the equitable distribUtion of 

projects or tasks, or the preservation of separate 

organizational identify and I or preroptives of the 

participating agencies. 

2. Overall project responsibility and cor~sponding 

authority, including respcmsibility and authority 

for over-all system engineering and system inte-· 

gration, must be delepted to a sm,le.person wbo 

is organizationally and geop-aphicallJ located and 

appropriately chartered with respect to.the resources involved, such that he can efte,dlve!y control all such resources as necessary to carry out 

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the -over-all responsibility. 

3. No management responsibility or autbority 

should be retained hy the parent a,ency as 

such (e. g. the Air Force has no management 

responsibility or authority over ~RO projects assigned to SAFSP). 

4. The person ,having over-all res,ponsibility and 

any personnel he designates must have unrestricted ,access to all contractors and facUities 

participating in the project, all information 

concerning all aspects of the project. He must 

have authority to determine nee d-to-know , for 

these personnel, for any information concerning the project, and authority to grant any 

, clearances necessary to personnel he determines , 

to meet published BYEMAN clearabiUty requirements. ' 

'5. For pDojects where divided management is 

directed, the person having the over-all responsibility must be delegated corresponding authority 

over all partiCipants in both alencies, establlshed 

by directives in each agency, to all personnel 

concerned. 

General Martin added several practical factors, 

vis-a-vis his CORONA and GAMBIT experiences, 

which h~ considered pertin8nt to the question of ' 

'management of the new 'system. 

General Martin consldered that the range' of the 

Task Group's'excursion into management approaches, 

some of which were excluded by the NRP Agreement, ' 

and the, inconsistencies between, the Task Group stated 

conclusions and supporting rationale was such as to ' 

render 'the fact of Task Group agr~ement, and its 

recommendations" per se, of questlona~le value. 

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5 November 1965 

TOP SECRET 

He summarized, in his judgment, the relative 

strength-and weakness of the alternate plans 

considered by the Task Group. . 

(Tab 327) 

General Stewart summarized NRO Staff views 

and reactions and described his personal views 

on the Task Group· Report on alternatwe management arrangements for the new search and surveUlance system. 

NRO Staff views: 

1. The casual discarding of the fully integrated 

SPO because" •... the Agreement ·reflects an 

obvious desire to maintain organizational 

identity and responsibility •.. " was "deplorable" 

and "distressing." This approach to management 

was the only valid. one for ·a complex system 

development, and all alternatives proposed, were, 

in effect~ committee-management with all inherent weaknesses. 

2. There must be 2l single, authoritative, responsive 

.ystem project director. 

3. There should be established a fully-integrated 

SPO (which collocated all necessary CIA-DOD 

engineering, procurement and security people 

in one office, and empOwered these people to 

speak auth~ritatively lor their "sponsors"). _ 

4. Although the overwhelming management capability 

to do the. job is in SAFSP, total system assignment to CIA would be vastly more ettective than 

the t'idealistic but impractical social venture" 

proposed in the Task Group report. 

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-IMBYEIM 

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General Stewart's views: 

1. . Strongly desire the fully integrated SPO 

approach~ but recommend against its -selection 

in view of the apparent intent and .specifics of 

the NRP Agreement. 

2. Recommend selection of the so":'called segregated 

SPO approach, with over-all system responsibility-

(and SPD) assigned to SAFSP. 

3. SAFSP is the only logical choice for over-all 

system responsibility and for providing the SPO 

on the basis of personnel skills and experience, 

and personnel resources availabl& 

No firm convictions on the -matter of colloeation; 

no question about the necessity for collocation of 

a "line" DSPD. 

CIA-OSP should be charged with the sensor 

module. This would enhance the Government's 

ability to hold the camera contractor responsi- -

ble for key factors associated with -proper 

camera functioning. 

6. Recommend against inclusion of camera subsystem and a combuied sensor/BV module in 

the sensor source selection. 

7 • Recommendation that the OCV contractor also 

build the sensor module -shell and BV module 

and be the system intepator is most significant. 

8. An early selection of the system engineer (regardless .. of management approach) is vital to the work 

of the three source selection task groups. -

(Tab 328) 

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9 November 1985 

... -BYEMAN ... smOl 

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In a letter to Mr. McNamara, Admiral Raborn 

stated.that the failure of the KH-7 vehicle .recently 

launched, the fourth in the past five missions, 

underscored the fact that a critical inte,lligence 

gap now existed in high resolution coverage of the 

Soviet Union and China. 

Admiral Raborn related his earlier impression that 

reconnaissance assets could be made available to 

fill the growing intelligence gaps, but added that 

further inquiry left him pessimistic. 

Admiral Raborn closed by stating "if we must live 

wlth this dilemma, it·would appear to me all the 

more important. to move forward expeditiously to 

develop the follow-on search system which has the 

promise of both high resolution and broad swath 

width." . 

(Tab 129) 

In a memorandum for ·Mr. Sheldon, Dr. 'Wheelon 

advised that the Air Force, in the person of Colonel 

Lew Allen, had approacheciWIIIIIIOffer1ng a sole . 

in the am~approxim~ months to adapt_ 

desips to the MOL mission. 

COI,onel Allen had similarly 

Dr. Wheelon stated that this samei.sue had arisen 

"during the McMillan regim~" and ~t he had raised 

the subject with Dr. McMillan, who seemed unwillm, 

to discuss it with the CIA and preferred to' keep his 

dialogue directly with his contractor's <I Dr. Whee Ion , 

added that. the impropriety of this approach was discussedseveral times with General Carter and Mr. 

McCone, -but had never been'brought to bear. 

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9 Nov~mber 1965. 

13 November 1965 

_'III BYOWI .... sma 

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Dr. Wheelon had adVise~to call Colonel 

Allen to advise of their interest in participating 

in MOL and to ask Allen to pr'oceed thr9ugh . 

the CIA for release of appropriate. 

Dr. Wheelon alerted Mr. Sheldon to such an 

inquiry stating that it should be dealt with on its 

. merits when it appeared.' Wheelon felt that if no . 

such request were received, it probably represented 

"an interesting indication of the cur'rent implementation process. " 

(Tab 330) 

Dr. Brown delegated full directive authority over 

all SAFSS and SAFSP activities to Dr .. Flax as 

Director, National Reconnaissance' Office. 

Dr. Flax was also delegated the authority to act 

for Dr. Brown on all Air Force matters-.. ineluding personnel, materiel~ and fiscal resources--

associated with the NRO,and/ or within the purview 

of the NRP, including the MOL reconnaissance payloads. ' 

(Tab 331) 

Referring to Admiral Raborn's 9 'November letter 

to Mr. McNamara, Dr. Flax advised Mr. Vance 

concerning the possible acceleration of futUre 

GAMBIT launches. 

Dr. Flax strongly recommended against· a slight 

acceleration of the December and January launches 

at the cost of reducing desirable test and qualification. 

Dr. Flax proposed that the NRO embark. on a plan 

for GAMBIT in 1966'which would: 

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18 November 1965 

_. BYEMAN - _lSYSTEI 

1. Insure that at least 15 system~ were available 

for launch. 

2. Schedule seven systems in each six month 

period, with the seventh optional depending on 

the results of its six predecessors. ' 

, 3. Not delay scheduled launches for any reason 

other than technical difficulties encountered 

in countdown. 

4. In case of a mission failure, launch the next 

vehicle as soon as possible. 

Dr. Flax attached a proposed reply to Admiral I 

Raborn for Mr:. McNamara's signature. 

(Tab 332) 

Admiral Raborn commented upon the DNROrecommended budget for' FY 1967, submitted to 

him on 4 November by Dr. Flax. 

, Admiral, Raborn generally accepted the' level of funda 

which Dr. Flax had proposed. He expressed' concern, 

however, that adequate funds may not have been provided to' insure that new concepts ,were "appropriately 

and energetically pursued. " ' 

Key comments: 

1. He accepted the CORONA line itein, but 

cautioned that a deferred decision on the 

follow-on, search system might require 

purc,hase of additional CORONAs. 

2. He felt the ,recommended budget for the'new 

general search satellite was adequate. 

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3. He was CODcerned:M!l no explicit 

provision made fo in the event 

the Executive Committee deci ed to move 

forward with the program. 

4. He found no provision for deve1Mtudies and/0!Mch projects a (preViousl nor "seed corn money for . 

basic researc . and development of advanced 

photographi~ and imagery techniques. 

5. He generally agreed with the recommendations 

for airc·ralt ·and support programs except for 

the·fact that no funds were .provided tor either 

ISINGLASS or photo .balloons. 

On the non-CIA line items Admiral·Raborn commented 

as follows: 

1. He was. c once med over the recent run of GAMBIT 

technical fallures and judged GAMBlT-3 to be a 

more difficult technical challenee. Be proposed 

a thoro. review before. proceeding with an 

expenditure which h~' described as representing 

almost one-quarter of the total NRP ~dget. 

2. He suggested that the 

line item allocated against the 

~eleaSed unill the whole que . 

ateWte effectiveness had been. clarified 

and reviewed in the Executive Committee. 

3. m the absenc~ :of a usm requirement for an 

advanced cartographic system, he requested 

that such funds'be reproerammed to a high 

priority program. 

4. He noted that the SCF line was larp and should 

therefore be carefully examined :t>y the ·B;Eecutive 

CommitttM!. 

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16 November 1965 

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5. He noted that AppUed Research was presumably a fund for supponing research, development and engineering on new satellite rec~nnalLssanc:e s:vatemLs, and suggested that the 

divided between CIA 

6. He 

(Tab 333) 

The NRP Executive Committee met to review the 

NRP budget for FY 1967. 

viewed the budget, calling attention 

The following were resolved: 

1 .• -2 bu. It was agreed to remove the_ 

which had·been included in the NRP . 

u get or the possible purchase 01 new U-2s 

in FY 1967. 

2. 

3. ISINGLASS.' Mr. Vance felt that a much more 

modest 'scale of effort in the analytical field 

was in order. He further believed that the 

. money for this work could come trom general 

R&D funds. It was agreed that Mr. Vance's 

approach should be followed, although specifiC 

funds for FY 1966 and 1967 were not agreed to. 

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The NRO, with the CIA, was to,prepare for 

the ExCom ~n examination ,of whether ,the' 

ISINGLASS concept had a place in the NRP. ' 

cussions with CIA in regard to joint preparation of threat models and associated analyses. 

5. Advanced' Cartogra~stem. It 

was agreed that the_originally 

included should be removed trom the NRP 

budget. 

this program. A 

e stablished~ , 

indicated that BOB 

~Iltl,onau money for' 

position was 

'The. following were discussed inconclusively and 

.... 

Countermeasures 

General R&D 

Other than principals and ex officio members, the, 

following attended: 

I!!IIER&E) 

RO Comptroller} , 

Genera ewart (Director, NRO st8tt> 

Mr. Sheldon (CIA) 

(Tab 334) 

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1 

The NRP Executive Committee met to continue 

its review of the budget. It. dealt with the items 

remaining for consideration, taking into account 

a 20 November BOB memorandum. to Mr. Vance. 

The .Executive Committee. heard further ~omments 

on OXCART from Dr. Foster. who proposed that: 

four of the OXCART air_ on blocks 

pending an actual need. _explained 

the savings. The E.xec.uti~roved 

the NRP budget proposal o_for. 

OXCART. . . 

Mr. Sheldon reported the impact 

on pr0fiil¥.iilam of the DDR&E/BOB p~~for 

a tentative in FY 1988 an~ 

. _in FY 1 7. The Executi 

approved the proposal to reserve 

... II ,\ .. 

. ... .. - .. , : .. in FY 1987 for this purpose. 

Dr. Foster emphasized the Jmportance of pushlng 

&head on the countermeasures problem in light of 

its critical importance to the survivability of the 

aircraft in which considerable funds had been invested. The Executive Committee approved a 

figure of_or countermeasures to be 

.allocatedOntheba:ra of specific justifications •. 

Dr. Hornig reported on 'percentages of total funds 

employed by NASA and DOD in general· research 

and CoounlUee 

for d research and 

agreed. in so approving. se were 

not being allocated in spe,cific amounts by apncy 

but rather would be allocated after specific' MD 

projects were submitted by the agencies andapproved by the. DNRO. 

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_If 1M BYEMAN 

CIIIIIlsmm· 

: TOP SEeRET 

General Stewart· briefed the Exe01tive Committee 

on the present and near-future schedule of 

CORONA and GAMBIT. capabWtles in ··relation to· 

anticipated operational dates for the new search 

m proposed th~t the six additional CORONAs be considered for delivery in late FY 1968 and launching in FY 1969; and a buy of six additional 

GAMBITs beyond those budgeted for delivery in· 

.the spring· and summer of 1987 •. 

The E_cutive Committee d1scu88e~ and viewed that this capability be retained. 

. Considerable discuss 

~alto 

_for new· _ .... A ... a 

_l"·ltf1'1UJ' the 

of a reVised 

•• JIl .. "h in FY 1988 

against FY 1987 !"'J. .J}..t: I e- ...................... " t , I , 

@

eweneralSearChandthatifleSSthanthe_ 

",ere required for FY 1966; the d1tference 

e avai able for additional GAMBIT and CORONA 

requirements, since any· slowdown in the new 

general search development would be reflected in 

the need for additional CORONA and GAMBrr 

vehicles. The Committee agreed. 

Other than the members and ex officio. members, 

the meeting was attended by: . 

Dr •. Foster (DDR~E) 

GeJ1er:aJ ~i~._·JIl"'" (NRO Stalf) 

Mr. W"&' ...... \oILV"" 

Mr. Bross (CIA) 

MEeY(ctA) 

CIA) . 

Dr. e r·(.PSAC) 

Mr. Thomas (BOB) 

(Tab 335) 

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DNRO Action Memorandum No. 6 directed· the 

activity of a task group to review the status of. 

effort on the photographic sensor subsystem 

for a new search/surveillance system. 

The task group, chaired by Colonel DaVid L. 

Carter (NRO Staff), was to provide iDtormatlon 

to assist the DNRO in determining actions at 

the camera contractors both before and during 

source selection. The present and projected 

status of the effort on each ot the designs of a 

photographic sensor subsystem under consideration for a new satellite search and survelllance 

system would be determined. 

(Tab 336) 

To insure compliance with the policy that all . 

CORONA technical dire·ctives be approved by 

the DNRO or his Deputy, Dr. Flax requested 

a joint SAFSp/CIA presentation concerniDI 

the proposed recovery vehicle wiring, heat 

shield, and battery modifications and any proposed o~bital tests of these modifications. No 

hardware was to be committed to flight prior to 

the presentation. 

(Tab 3·37) 

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Referring to an SAFSP request for status information 

on the clearances of. several ·Aerospace personnel, 

CIA advised the DNRO that it would continue to withhold clearance·s for. any personnel whose purpose 

would be to work in the CORONA payload area outside CIA's direction·until advised by the· DNRO to 

follow other than the "traditional" responsibilities 

for CORONA agreed to by Mr. Vance and General 

Carter (as DDCI) in late 1964. 

(Tab 338) 

In a memorandum for Mr. Sheldon, Mr. Reber· 

addressed the relationship of the Eastman ·Kodak 

Company to the NRP. Mr. Reber suggested a visit 

by Mr. Sheldon and the ·DCI to Eastman Kodak. The 

memorandum offered an explanation Of the factors 

which had contributed over the years to the. apparent 

"strained relations. tf Included were the foll~w1Dg: 

a. The understandable preoccupation of Mr ~ Bissell 

with the U-2 ·aircraft as opposed·to· film and tUm 

processing. 

b. The CIA's unfavorable attitude toward the 

GAMBIT program. 

c. A series of unfortunate circumstances surrounding 

the New: Search System (specifically the affects of 

certain personalities). 

d.. The· difficulties experienced by BKC in getting 

decisions from the CIA in those cases. in which it was 

involved. 

e. The lack of understanding by components· of the CIA 

of· certain basic principles which EKC telt were 

critical to its relations with the Government. . 

(Tab 339) 

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Dr. Flax forwarded copies of his package proposal 

on the new general search and surveillance satellite 

system to Mr. Sheldon, General Martin and Dr.' 

Steininger for their information and 'advance perusal. 

Dr. Flax's proposed memorandum reviewed the 

activity of the NRO Staff, CIA and' SAFSP in the 

careful evaluation. of' all aspects of the proposed 

new system. Specifically, it discussed one of the 

more difficult problems - - to devise a technique 

which would permit the equitable competition of 

three camera designs (designed _inst varied 

technical and operational requirements) all of 

which were at different stages of analysis, design 

and demonstration of critical technology. ' ' , 

Dr. Flax described further the general system 

configuration, on which the NRP participants had 

agreed and which he was,recommendlng for,adoption. ',' 

Dr. Flax was also recommending a mauagement 

approach which would make the CIA-OSP responsible for the entire sensor sub-system and SAFSP 

responsible for the remaining system elements'. 

1f.be Director, SAFSP would be designated as the 

System Project Director, responsible for over-all 

system engine~ring, ' system inteeration and integrated project management. Dr. Flax had COncluded that this assignment of responsibilities --

generally in accordance with the normal aSSignments describedtn the AUlUst 1985 NRP Agree- , 

ment would best meet the, conditions imposed by 

the specific requirements of the Agreement and the 

requirement for sound and effective system project 

management. " , ' 

Dr. Flax intended to send the package ~o the NaP 

Executive Committee during the week of April 4 

and solicited the advice of the addressees on any 

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. 5 April 1966 

7 April' 1966 

... ·BYElWI 

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factors which ,they felt might impact on the package 

proposal. 

(Tab 339A) 

General Martin commented on Dr. Flaxrs proposed 

memorandum for the NRP Executive Committee on 

the new general search and surveillance .satellite 

system. Key comments: . 

1. Regardless of the specific assignment of responsibilities in the split management structure, 

full collocation of the working elements of the . 

project offices of both organizations will result . 

in maximum coordination and best possible 

working relationships and cooperation. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

Liaison officers are highly undesirable at any 

location. 

Contetnplated schedules . leave no alteruative 

but to employ letter contracts -- unquestionably 

accentuating the problems inherent in the spUt 

management concept. 

The role of the· system progr~m director in the 

over-aIISE/TD functions imposes. restrictions, 

which appear most unrealistic 'and UDDecess~ry. 

5. L~ngua,e describing system program director 

authority during an operational m.ission is inappropriately restrictive. 

(Tab 339B) 

Mr. Sheldon, in response to Dr. Flaxrs proposed 

memorandum· for the Executive Committee on the 

new general search and surveillaDce sateWte system, 

stated that the proposed plan for m&nalement and 

organizational responsibilities' "raises. a problem of 

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11 Apri11966 

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such magnitude that it must be resolVed before other 

. aspects of the program can be meaningfully reviewed. U 

Mr. Sh~ldon cited specifically his concern over "the 

problem of interlace between the responsibilities 

assigned to SAFSP (Air For,ce) and CIA. II 

Mr. Sheldon pointed out that with the CIA's in-house 

technical personnel' and its relationships with contractors built up over the years, "the· CIA possesses 

a capability of program management which, iil all 

modesty, is at least commensurate with ~t of 

SAFSP .... Therefore, I c~ot accept your statement that SAFSP is the only NRP component of the 

NRO possessing the pe'rsonnel, facilities, operational resources~ experience. and technical competence to be designated as 8PD for the new general 

search and surveillance system. " . 

(Tab 339C) 

Dr. Flax prepared two papers for consideration by 

the DOD/NASA Manned Space Flight Policy Co;mmittee 

(MSFPC):· . 

1. DOD Areas of Concern Relative to NASA Satellite 

Sensor Pro~ams 

2. Guidelines tor DOD/NASA Committee on 

Reconnaiasance Sensors 

The two papers presented criteria and an organizational mechanism for identifying NASA activities of 

co~cern .to the DOD. because of their potential im- . 

pact on the NRP. 

Dr. Flax cautioned the MSFPC that the papers did 

not contain a formula for, resolVing the basic problem's --

those that stemmed from the lack of·a policy or raUon&1e 

agreed to and followed by all government agencies with 

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22 April 1966 

I11III111 BYOIAN -sma 

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reg~rd to pr~grams involving the use of high-quaHty 

reconnaissance sensors. 

(Tab 340) 

In a memorandum for the Executive Committee, Dr. 

Flax discussed the CORONA management problem 

and recomQlended several actions for its resolution. 

Dr. :Flax considered the several specific problems 

associated with CORONA management to have stemm.ed 

.from the lack of clearly established and/or· agreed-to 

management responsibilities and relationships. Be 

viewed the most serious to be: . 

1. Other than the DNRO, there was no sm,le person 

or· NRP participant accepted by all concerned as 

clearly responsible for over-all system engineeriDg, 

definition and ~pecifications, integration, a master 

project plan, over-all system facilities, integrated 

funding requirements and on-orbit. operations. 

2. Since mid-1984,LMSC had worked without benefit 

of signed contracts in two areas: over-all systems 

integration and the· qualiti<;ation,. test and integration of the ISIC.· 

3. . The final phase of the CORONA Improvement . 

Program had been extended becaUse authorization 

had not been given to contr~ct for aU· the elements. 

Dr. Flax recommended: 

1. The issuance of suitable management directi~s 

to SAFSP and·CIA~ . 

2. Directing CIA to sign the ISIC integration contract 

. . with LMSC from inception throUlh completion 

(so that LMSC could bill :the Government for services already rendered). 

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. 22 April 1966 

(Continued) 

22 April 1966 

3. Directing CIA to negotiate a new contract 'With 

LMSC for qualification testing and integration 

of the DISIC. 

4.: Directing CIA to amend appropriate contracts 

. to ~nable Aerospace access to . data and iDformatioD. 

5. Directing SAFSP to sign the system integration 

contract with LMSC .from July 1984 through 

current date (so that LMSC 'could bill for . services already rendered) •. 

6. Directing SAFSP to negotiate a new contract 

with LMSC for system integration reflecting 

the new assignment's of. responsibllity. 

7. Authorizing CIA to negotiate new' contr.actsfor 

'work on the remaining elements of the CORONA 

Improvement Program. 

(Tab 341) 

Dr. Flax ,ubmitted for Exe'cutive Committee consideration 

a package. proposal for the new general search and 

surveillance satellite system. The package included: 

1. a System Operational Requirement setting forth 

the desired and/ or mi.niDium technical and operational criteria tor the entire system; 

2. a Request for Proposal for the sensor subsystem 

to be issued to the two competing contractors as 

the basis for their proposals; 

3. a management plan for the development, 'prQduction, 

and operation of the new system, includiDg the . 

assignment ot responsibilities to CIA-OSP and 

.. SAF'SP; . 

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(Continued) 

25 April 1966 

26 April 1966 

"-BYBtAN 

-sm&I 

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4. a series 01 live papers which explained the 

ratio~le for the most significant portioDs 

of ·the SOR, RFP and' management plan and 

which briefed requirements, ,system life 

considerations, recovery vehicles, the 

technique ,for measuring system effectivene~s, 

and system .management; 

, 5. a schedule of plannedNRO actions for the near 

. term. 

Specifically. Dr. Flax requested Executive Commlttee 

approval for the proposed management plan and tor 

the system conqepts and, fundamental principles set 

forth in the SOR and RFP. 

Dr. Flax noted the codewo~d deSignator BELa 

which he had proposed for the new system, 

supplanting the old designators FULCRUM (in 

CIA) and 8-3 (in 8AF8P). 

(Tab 342)' 

In a separate memorandum to ,Mr. Vance, Dr .. Flax 

1. advised of the reactioDs he had received OD bis 

package proposal to the Executive Committee 

lor' the new general search and survell18nce 

system 

2. discussed the issues likely to be brougi'tUp at 

the Executive Committee, meeting. 

(Tab 343) 

Dr. Flax recommended to the E:x:ecut 

a specific plan for proceeding with th 

program. 

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26 April 1966 

IIIIU IA BYOtAN . · ... sma 

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Dr. Flax explained that the criteria used in arri~ 

at the recommended program 

Dr. Flax proposed that 

1. the System Project Director 

. designated witb~ the CIA; 

2. all elements of the on-orbit vehicle, as well as 

over-ali systems engineeriDg, be assigned to 

CIA-OSP; 

3. responsibility for booster procurement and 

launch operations, qua1ification, and operation 

of launch facilities, and on-pad system integraDr. Flax assessed the program 

(Tab 344) 

~ '. 

The NRP Executive Committee met to consider 

three items: 

1. New Search and Surveillance Satellite SY8tem 

2. CORONA Management 

3. 

Mr. Vance proposed at the out8et that, atter8uch 

discussion and briefing' a8 was nece8sary, Admiral 

Raborn, Dr. Hornig and he meet in executive 8e88ion 

to make the required decisions. Admiral Raborn' 

and Dr. Hornig agreed. 

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On Item I. Dr. Flax'referred to his 22 April 

package proposal. Admiral Raborn stated he had 

onw one major recommendation to make on the , 

proposed management for the system-- that the 

subsystem definition be modified to assign to CIA 

the responsibility for the structure which enclosed 

the sensor subsystem. as well as the responsibWty 

for development# production and integration of the' 

stellar index camera. 

Prior to closing discussion on Ite~ I. Mr. Sheldon 

suggested that there be further, discus 8ion of possible 

difficulties which CIA felt m'ight result from the proposed procedure for handling security in this program. 

namely. that both the SAFSP aild CIA project offices 

were authorized to grant HEXAGON clearances' and 

each was bound to honor need-to-know determinations 

on the .part of the other. (HEXAGON was the newly 

proposed BYEMAN codeword for the program. The 

original selection -- HELIX -- was found to have .' 

been assigned in the past to another iDte1l1g8nce effort) 

Mr. Sheldon and Dr. Flax were asked to pursue further 

the question of sec~ity clearances. 

Subsequent to the meeting of the three principals in 

executive 'session. Mr. Vance advised Dr. Flax that 

the Executive Committee had approved his HEXAGON 

,program proposal as submitted. . 

i 

i 

.. -alEMAN .... SYSTDI 

On Item '2, . the Executive Committee approved Dr. 

Flax's proposed (22 Apr111988) CORONA m __ ,e-. 

ment" arrangement &ad assipments of system re- ' ' 

sponsibillties with the understanding that the aasignment of the DISIC procurement responslbi1i~y to the 

SAFSP 'would carry with it the instruction that there 

be DO change in the' specifications without the concurrence of the CIA Payload Subassem"ly Project 

Office. 

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On Item 3, Dr. Flax distributed his draft' memo -

randum (see Tab 344)- for -Executive Committee 

_ study and action. He, explained tut his proposal 

1 

.J IAIII£ II BYEMAN --smfI 

would limit (at least, -

success, decrease the ,probability 

of schedule slippage and reduce program cost •. He,-

Dr()~.11~~~ mcluded 

Pending consideration of the proposal, the Executive 

Committee agreed that a revised project pian should 

be prepared and costed in line with Dr. Flax'x 

recom~endation. The Executive Committee also 

agreed to-the recommended CIA~NSA stud,. and 

suggested -it be completed within six t~ eight weeks. 

As an additional item, Admiral Raborn expressed 

his feeling that it was very important to the, success 

of the NRP that CIA people be _ ass~d to SAFSP 

and to the NRO Statf. Mr. Vance concurred in his 

views. 

Other than the principals and ex officio members, 

the following were in attendance: 

Dr. Foster 

Mr. Sheldon -

Mr. Bross 

Mr.' C~owley 

Dr. Steininger 

General Stewart 

(Tab 345) 

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-CIA 

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Director, NRO 

Staff 

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22 June 1966 

. II1II£ ItA BYEMAN 

-.neISYSTEII 

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Admiral Raborn departed the CIA. Mr. Richard McG. 

Helms was appointed Director of Central Intelligence. 

Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor was appointed.Deputy 

Director of Central Intellilence •. 

In a memorandum for M:r. Sheldon and General 

Martin .. Dr. Flax set forth the CORONA management arrangements and assignments of system 

responsibilities which were approved by the NRP. 

ExecutiVe 'Committee o~ 26 AprU 1966. Keyarrangements and assignments were: - . . 

1. The Director.. SAFSP.. was designated as the 

CORONA Syste:rn Project Director (SPD). He 

would estabUsh a CORONA System Project . 

. Office (SPO). 

2. The Director of Recoimaiss8nce .. CIA, would 

direct and supervise the development and 

production of the CORONA Payload ~b-Assembly, 

reporting directly to the DNRO. Be would es- -

tabUsh a- CORONA Payload Sub-Assembly ProjectOffice (PSAPO) and designate ~ Director thereof,.:. 

.. " 

3. The Director, SAFSP .. as SPIJ would be responsible for: over-all system engineering and system 

integration; . over-all system m.ster pl.alu.Ung, 

programmiJig and budgeting; assembly and .checkout of the system at the launch pad; launch- and 

mission operations; capsule recovery; -and de1i~ery 

of film to DNRO-des1gnated processiDg facilities_. 

4. The Director .. PSAPO, would be responsible 

through the Director of ReconnalsaaDce, CIA, to 

the DNRO for the total payload sub-assemblY 

development, pl!oduction, assembly and test; 

oper-ation of the LMSC-A-/P FacWty; tor adherence to master system specificatioDs, interface specifications and master pr9ject plana; and 

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"1£ 1M BY8tAN 

-SYSlfI 

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the provision of software support to the NRO SOC 

before, during and after missions. 

5. The SPD ~ould operate. a CORONA Operations 

Command Post at the ST.C, Sunnyvale. The PSAPO 

would station appropriate personnel and. contractor 

. repres·entatives there and at the LMSC AlP Facility. 

The SOC would deal principally with the CORONA 

Command Post and the LMSC Alp FacUity, as 

appropriate. . 

. . 

6 •. The SPo would be the final field authority during 

a mission operation from launch through recovery. 

7. The ·SPO woUld utilize Aerospace in a general 

systems· engineering role.· 

(Tab 346) 

FY 1967 NRO Financial Program. 

Key acl1oDs: 

1. U-2R Program: A buy of eight was authorized 

with the understanding that in approximately six 

months a decision and fUlid authorization by the. 

Executive Committee would be required for any 

additional buy. 

2~ _FY 196'1 ltiids were deferred. The 

. ~o consult the ·usm on whether the program should be continued. 

3. ISINGLASS: The DNRO would recommend to the 

Executive Committee a course of action OD this . 

program. 

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(Continued) 

1lIIIE III BYEMAN 

cai.smm 

TOP SECRET4. he Executive 

• g • =. • ' 0 sh.ould proc~ed 

with- development. and approved the program as 

presented. 

5. Readout: The -Executive Committee concurred 

in the DNRO's decision to carry the CBS and BTL: 

teams untU Januar~ 1967 unless an earlier decision were made to termiriate the effort or undertake system development. 

6. GAMBIT-CUBED: TbeExecutive Committee 

agreed with the addition of a second recovery 

vehicle as well as other changes toward mcrease.d on-orbit lifetime. --

7. 

program approval was awaitiDI completio~ of costing studies on_~riou8 program opti~Ds. 

The FY 1987- NRO -Fillmcial Prop-am-was approved 

as modified by the above actions. 

GAMBIT and GAMBIT-CUBED la~chiDgs for FY 1987-

were discussed. 

Mr. Helms raised the question of the continuation of 

-TAGBOARD. Dr. Flax proposed to report his f1Dcl1Dga 

to the Executive Committee for its examination. 

In addition to the principals and ex-officio mem~r8 .. 

the following -were in attendance: 

Dr. Foster 

Mr. Sheldon 

Mr. Bross 

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17 August 1966 

(Continued) 

1· September 1966 

2 September 1966 

_II BYEMAN 

aRlSYml· 

(Tab 347) 

CIA 

PSAC Staff 

BOB 

NRO Comptroller 

Director NRO 

Staff 

Dr. Flax advise.d Mr. Vance that he bad received 

_ d most detailed CIA estimate ·for· . 

and that. although it considerably excee e s 6 April tentative proposal to the . 

Executive Committee. he had recommended going 

ahead with the revised program. 

(Tab 348) 

Dr. Flax presented to the NRP Executive Committee, 

~OJnplarlablle costs by fi.aal year for 

Dr. Flax on 26 AprU,· and as revised 

by the CIA on 1 September. 

Dr. Flax considered the revised.CIA est~ate to .. '. ~ . . :. alistic an assessment of the cost of 

program (over a five year pe·riod) 

as c·ould be arrived at at that time. 

Dr. Flax recommended_~ot . tho 

program on the basis _for 

program cost, with an FY 67 allocation at 

(Tab 349) 

I. .: 

I __ :_ . __ -

2 September recommendation on th 

program. 

(Tab 350) 

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10 October 1966 

.. IE III_ BIEMAN 

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In a memorandum for Mr. -Vance, Dr. Flax 

summarized his FY68 budget proposals-fo-r the 

NRP. 

1. Procurement of eight additional U-2Rs 

2. Development of a readout system 

3. T AGBOARD (decision to proceed with cqnversion to B-52 launch) -

4. Flight test of vulnerability reduction devices 

Significant increases in on-going programs and 

new initiations included: 

1. 

2. 

3. - full pr~gram go-ahead 

4. GAMBIT-CUBED -- cost increases and 

mOdification for longer life 

(Tab- 351) 

Dr. Flax granted initial program approval on th~ 

HEXAGON sensor subsystem: 

1. Perkin-Elmer was the selected source tor the 

sensor. 

2. Launch scheduleplaniling was to be on the basis 

ot two in FY 1969 and tive per year in FY 19'10 

- through 1973. 

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(Continued) 

31 October 1966 

3 November 1966 

21 November 1966 

23 November 1966 

-- BYEMAN CIITIIlsmm 

- -

-3. Plannmg for reserve systems was to be on 

the basia of one delivery in FY 1970 and a 

second in FY 1971. --

4. Approval of TRW systems engiDeertng tasks 

was withheld pending further stu~y and delineation of responsibilities. 

(Tab 352) 

Referring to· the initiBl program approval tor the 

HEXAGON sensor, -Dr. Flax furnished Mr. Sheldon 

his reactions to the TRW systems engineering and 

technical support tasks, specifically on MTS. 

(Tab 353) . 

Mr. Sheldon responded to Dr. Flax's 31 October 

memorandum on TRW tasks for HEXAGON staUng 

that "certain aspects (of the memo) -cause us 

serious concern. II Mr. ·Sheldon indicated he 

would like to meet as soon as possible with Dr.-

·Flax on the matter. 

(Tab 354) 

In a letter to Dr. Flax, ¥r. Tidwell stated that he 

had been directed to inform him that, pending completion of COMOR taSks in a review of requirements, 

. Dr. Flax should usefo~ planning purposes· a-level of 

seven successful search and seven successful high 

resolution (either -KS -7 or' KH -8) miss.ions per year 

to satisfy requirements. 

(Tab 355) 

The NRP Executive Committee _met to cODsider the 

FY 1968 NRO Budget . 

Key actions taken: 

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(Continued) 

28 November 1966 

30 November 1966 

--BYEMAN 

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1. A-12 OXCART:- .. Consideratio~ postponed in 

light of BOB requested study. 

2. Purchase of Eight U-2Rs: ·Ap..,oved purchase 

sideration to keeping production line ''hot.'' 

.3. TAGBOARD: Final consideration postponed 

pending review of DNRO paper by Dr. Horni,. 

CORONA and HEXAGON: Budgets approved. 

GAMBIT and GAMBlI'-CUBED: Approved for purposes of President's Budget. 

~ 

_·Approved as· pre 

$.dditional funds 

R&D: Approved as presented with the exception of 

. GA-MBrr-CUBED Readout. -

GAMBrr -CUBED Readout: Disapproved. 

(Tab 356.) 

In a memorandum for the record, Generai·Stewart 

summarized an incredible series of events and actions 

attendant to Mr. Tidwell's letter of 21 ~ovember .• 

(Tab 357,) 

In a memo for Dr. Flax, Mr. Sheldon expressed 

his concern over the "new set of problems and 

potentlai advantages to the intelligence consumer" 

posed by the possibility of obtaininl hllh re8olu~ 

tion satellite photography on a continuous and real 

time basis. He indicated that, -since this question 

had never· been examined comprehensively, the 

DCI had -recently directed a study to -

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20 December 1966 

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1. determine if, in fact, an intelligence requirement existed for the development of 

a real tiine readout system for overhead 

. photography 

2. . evaluate the impact which such. a .system 

might have on· the exploitation resources 

of the intelligence community 

Mr. Sheldon considered it desirable to push forward with certain engineering studies and systems. 

analyses on the technical state of the art of real 

t.ime readout, concurrent with the study of lntel';' 

ligence factors. He added that this approach 

seemed particularly appropriate in light ot the 

NRP Executive Committee de·cision to drop development of near real time r.eadout. 

Mr. Sheldon su sted that Dr. Flax hear a 

, brief." .. Crowley on lithe present status 

of th roject as well as .•. certain proposals or ec ical and engfneeriilg. studies" 

. which CIA felt should be pursued at the time. 

(Tab 358) 

Mr. Helms advised Mr. Schultze of two significant 

fincUngs in CIA's review of the A-12 to SR-?1 transi-· 

tlon problems: 

1. SR~71 altitude and range ,performance when 

compared to the proven capabUity of the A-12 

was of real concern to Mr. Helms in attempting to relate the performance of 'the SR-?1 to the 

CIA missions,. 

2. Mr. Helms indicated he had misgiviDls about 

the electronic warfare systems .ltuation. 

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(Continued) 

22 December 1966 

"-BYElMN -sma 

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In view of these findings, Mr. Helms w~s reconsidering his previ9us position and asked that he have' untO 

1 January 1987 to examine the matter' in mo~e detaU. ' 

(Tab 359)' , 

In a response to'Mr. Sheldon'S memo of 30 November~ 

Dr. Flax assured that he did not intend to place an ' 

overly restrictive interpretation on the Executive 

Committee decision r'egarding readout systems. Dr." 

Flax regarded the decision as one of not' proceediDg 

with an operational readout system for GAMBITCUBED. 

Dr. Flax remarked on the apparent lack of appreci8-: 

tion in the intelligence community.s to the' benefits 

that could be derived from such a system, and, in 

this light, indicated that the NRO should not move 

in the direction, of further or enlarged system 

oriented efforts pending, clarification of the objectives an~requirements. 

Dr. Flax did not cODsider related studies and advanced technology efforts to be affected by' the ' 

Executive Committee's .ction, except for an overall limitation on the f:eaction of NRO resources 

which could be allocated'to such effort. 

(Tab 360) . 

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