IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA 

EVENDER GENE JACKSON, JR. § 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

APPELLANT 

v. No. 06-15-00151-CR 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

APPELLEE 

STATE'S REPLY BRIEF 

FROM THE I 96TH DISTRICT COURT 

HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS 

TRIAL CAUSE NUMBER 30,536 

THE HONORABLE ANDREW BENCH, JUDGE PRESIDING 

NOBLE DAN WALKER, JR. 

District Attorney 

Hunt County, Texas 

G CALVIN GROGAN V 

Assistant District Attorney 

P. 0. Box441 

4th Floor Hunt County Courthouse 

Greenville, TX 75403 

(903) 408-4180 

FAX (903) 408-4296 

cgrogan@huntcounty.net 

State Bar No. 24050695 

ACCEPTED

06-15-00151-CR

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

12/4/2015 10:01:44 AM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 12/4/2015 10:01:44 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... 2 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... 3 

STATEMENT OF CASE ........................................................................ 6 

ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................... 6 

SUMMARY OF THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS .................................................... 6 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 7 

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR ONE ............................................. 9 

STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................. 9 

EDDIE DEAN'S ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY ............................................ 11 

NON-ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATING EVIDENCE ............................... 12 

HARMLESS ERROR ...................................................................................... 13 

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR TWO ........................................... 14 

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................ 14 

TRIAL COUNSEL'S SOUND STRATEGY .................................................... 15 

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR THREE ....................................... 18 

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................ 18 

EVIDENCE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO PROVE AG ROBBERY ............ 19 

PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 20 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 21 

2 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 

Federal Cases 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 308 (1979) ............................................................ 18 

Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) ......................... 15 

Texas Cases 

Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) .......................... 17 

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ......................... 11 

Baylor v. State, 208 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) ................................... 14 

Brooks v. State, 580 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ........................... 19 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ........................... 18 

Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ........................ 19 

Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ............................ 10 

Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ........................... 10 

Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ........................... 10 

Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ............................ 18 

Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .................... 17 

Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 149-150 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. 

re:fd) ........................................................................................................... 12,13,18 

Hall v. State, 937 S.W.2d 580, 586 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1996, pet. re:fd) .... 12 

Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ............................... 15 

Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ........................ 11-14 

Malikv. State, 953, S.W.2d 234,240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ............................ 18 

Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ................................. 17 

Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ......................... 19 

Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) .................. 13,14 

Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ....................... 18 

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W. 3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ......................... 17 

Zepeda v. State, 819 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991, en bane) ............ 15 

U.S. Const., Texas Const., Texas Rules of Evidence 

TEX. PENAL CODE Sec. 1.07 (Vernon 2014) ......................................................... 14 

TEX. PENAL CODE SEC. 7.02(A)-(B) (Vernon 2014) ............................................ 18 

TEX. PEN. CODE Sec. 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2014) ................................................. 19 

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.14 (Vernon 2014) .............................................. 10 

3 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA 

EVENDER GENE JACKSON, JR. 

APPELLANT 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

APPELLEE 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ No. 06-15-00151-CR 

§ 

§ 

§ 

STATE'S REPLY BRIEF 

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: 

NOW COMES the State of Texas, Appellee, in this appeal from 

Cause No. 30,536 in the 1961

h District Court in and for Hunt County, Texas, 

Honorable Andrew Bench, Presiding, now before the Sixth District Court of 

Appeals, and respectfully submits this its brief to the Sixth District Court of 

Appeals in support of the judgment of conviction and sentence in the court 

below. 

4 
STATEMENT OF CASE 

Appellant was indicted on June 26, 2015, for Aggravated Robbery. 

CR Vol.l.p.14. Appellant was arraigned on July 10,2015. CR Vol.l.p.13. 

A jury found Appellant guilty as charged on August 12, 2015, and 

assessed his punishment at fifty (50) years in the Texas Department of 

Corrections. CR Vol.1.pp. 77, 84. Appellant gave written notice of appeal on 

August 14, 2015. CR Vol.l.p.97. 

ISSUES PRESENTED 

Issue 1. Did Trial Court commit error by not including an accomplice 

witness instruction in the jury charge, and if so was it harmless error 

based upon all the other non-accomplice evidence? 

Issue 2. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failing to request an 

accomplice witness instruction in the jury charge? 

Issue 3. Was the evidence legally sufficient to prove Appellant was guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Robbery? 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

1. While an accomplice witness instruction should have been included in 

the jury instruction since Eddie Dean was an accomplice as a matter-oflaw, it was harmless error based upon all of the other non-accomplice 

corroborating evidence presented by the State. 

5 
2. Although Trial Counsel failed to request a jury instruction for accomplice 

witness testimony, a single instance does not show that Trial Counsel's 

performance was deficient, and it did not affect the final outcome. 

3. The victim's testimony alone was legally sufficient to prove Appellant 

committed Aggravated Robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

On June 15, 2015, Spencer Sweeden had fmished working his night 

shift at the local Taco Bell and decided to walk over to a friend's apartment 

to play video games. RR Vol.3.pp.27, 29. After playing video games, 

Spencer decided to walk horne to his apartment. RR Vol.3.p.29. At some 

point during the walk horne, Spencer noticed two African-American men 

corning towards him in the street. RR Vol.3.pp.29, 32. Spencer had already 

noticed one of the suspects because he was on a bicycle a few blocks before. 

RR Vol.3 .p.31. Spencer was able to describe the other suspect's clothing: 

wearing basketballs shorts and at-shirt. RR Vol.3.pp.32, 39. Spencer also 

said the other suspect had com rolls in his hair. RR Vol.3.pp.39, 114. 

As the two suspects approached Spencer, they began to make 

threatening comments. RR Vol.3 .p.33. Both suspects then proceeded to 

"rush" Spencer, with the Appellant doing the beating and the other suspect 

6 
holding a sawed-off shotgun. RR V ol.3 .p.34. As the assault continued, 

Appellant kept asking Spencer for his personal property. RR Vol.3.p.35. 

Eventually the suspects released Spencer, and he took off. RR Vol.3.p.37. 

Appellant took Spencer's wallet, keys, hat, and a C02 pistol. RR Vol.3.p.35. 

When Spencer got home, he called 911. RR Vol.3.p.38. Once 

Commerce Police quickly responded to Spencer's home, he provided 

descriptions ofboth suspects. RR Vol.3.p.38. Spencer described Appellant's 

clothing as a black vest with lots of pockets. RR Vol.3.pp.38, 95. Spencer 

also described the Appellant as being shorter than the suspect with com rolls 

in his hair. RR Vol.3.pp.39, 97. 

Commerce Police Officer Tyler Oakley met a very traumatized 

Spencer at his home to obtain suspect identification information. RR 

Vol.3.pp.73, 90. Spencer told Officer Oakley that one of the suspects was a 

black male riding a bicycle wearing a vest, and provided the direction he last 

saw the suspects. RR Vol.3 .p. 73. Within two minutes of speaking with 

Spencer, Commerce Police Officers had detained a person matching the 

Appellant's description a few blocks away. RR Vol.3.pp.76, 92, 95. 

Sergeant Marcus Cantera had seen an individual riding a bicycle as he 

was patrolling the area. RR Vol.3.pp.109-10. As Sgt. Cantera gave pursuit, 

he came upon that same individual standing next to the bicycle in a 

7 
driveway. RR Vol.3.p.110. That person was later identified by Commerce 

Police as the Appellant. RR Vol.3.p.90. Within arms-length distance of 

where the Appellant was initially detained were most of Spencer's personal 

property items, including his photo identification. RR Vol.3.pp.77, 93, 110. 

Also within arms-length of Appellant was a bicycle and a vest. RR 

Vol.3.pp.78, 93. Officer Oakley arrested Appellant and transported him to 

the station. RR Vol.3.pp.71, 94. While waiting to be transported, Appellant 

started talking to himself repeatedly. See State Exhibit No.7. 

Spencer recovered most of his personal property at the Commerce 

Police Department later that morning while providing a written affidavit. RR 

Vol.3.pp.36, 39. A few days later Spencer went up to the Commerce Police 

Department and participated in photo lineups of possible suspects. RR 

Vol.3.p.40. Not only did Spencer identify both suspects in the photo 

lineups, but he also testified in court that the Appellant was the suspect 

riding the bicycle. RR Vol.3.p.41. 

ARGUMENT 

1. Accomplice Witness Testimony 

a. Standard of Review 

8 
A conviction cannot stand on an accomplice witness's testimony 

unless the testimony is corroborated by other, non-accomplice evidence that 

tends to connect the accused to the offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 

38.14 (Vernon 2014). An accomplice is a person who participates in the 

offense before, during, or after its commission with the requisite mental 

state. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A 

State's witness may be an accomplice as a matter of law or as a matter of 

fact. Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A 

witness who is indicted for the same offense as the accused is an accomplice 

as a matter of law. Id. At 748. When the evidence clearly shows that a 

witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial judge must instruct the 

jury accordingly. Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1987). Failure to provide such a charge is error. Id. 

The State concedes that Eddie Dean was an accomplice as a matter of 

law, and that a jury instruction on accomplice witness testimony was not 

included in the charge. Trial Counsel did not object to the jury charge. RR 

Vol.3 .p.126. 

If a required accomplice witness instruction is omitted, and Appellant 

did not object to the charge or request submission of the instruction, then the 

appellate court looks at the record to determine if the error caused egregious 

9 
harm. Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); 

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on 

reh'g). 

Under the egregious harm standard, the omission of an 

accomplice witness instruction is generally harmless unless the 

corroborating (non-accomplice) evidence is 'so unconvincing in 

fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly 

and significantly less persuasive. 

Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632. 

b. Eddie Dean's Testimony 

Eddie Dean stood charged with committing the same crime as the 

Defendant. RR Vol.3.p.50. Eddie, a convicted felon, testified that both 

Appellant and he had committed this crime and identified the Appellant in 

open court. RR Vol.3.pp.50, 58. Eddie and the Appellant had known each 

other for quite some time, but had become really close in last few months. 

RR Vol.3.p.57. Prior to the aggravated robbery, Appellant and Eddie had a 

conversation about "jacking somebody." RR Vol.3.pp.52-3. Eddie testified 

that Appellant confronted Spencer in the front of his driveway before he 

came and joined the confrontation. RR Vol.3.p.55. Eddie testified that 

Appellant started robbing Spencer before he arrived. RR Vol.3.p.64. Eddie 

admitting to robbing Spencer on the night of June 15, 2015. RR Vol.3 .p.51. 

Eddie admitted he was the suspect holding the shotgun during the robbery, 

10 
while Appellant did the actual stealing and beating. RR Vol.3 .pp.51-2. 

Eddie also claimed that Appellant did not know he went to his house to grab 

the shotgun during the robbery. RR Vol.3.p.62. 

c. Non-Accomplice Evidence 

In determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, the court 

eliminates the testimony of the accomplice witness and examines all other 

evidence and testimony looking for the reliability and believability as well as 

the tendency to connect Appellant to the crime. Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 

142, 149-150 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref d). To determine 

reliability, the courts look to see if there is non-accomplice evidence, and if 

there is no rational and articulable basis for disregarding the non-accomplice 

evidence. Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 633. Thus, non-accomplice evidence can 

render harmless a failure to submit an accomplice witness instruction. !d. at 

632. "If the evidence clearly warrants conviction independent of the 

accomplice testimony, the court's failure to instruct on the law of 

accomplice testimony is not reversible error." Hall v. State, 937 S.W.2d 580, 

586 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1996, pet. ref d). 

Spencer's testimony alone proved all of the elements of aggravated 

robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Spencer identified the Appellant as the 

suspect who assaulted him while taking his personal property. RR 

11 
Vol.3.p.35. Spencer testified that both the Appellant and Eddie came 

towards him in the street, and Eddie was holding a shotgun. RR Vol.3 .p.34. 

There is no rational and articulable basis for disregarding Spencer's 

testimony that linked Appellant to the crime. Unlike Hall and Saunders, 

where the State's evidence was largely based upon weak circumstantial 

evidence, there was direct evidence from the eyewitness/victim that 

identified Appellant as a suspect. CfHall, 161 S.W.3d at 150; Saunders v. 

State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 

Besides Spencer's testimony, there was other very strong non-accomplice 

evidence. Appellant was initially detained arms-length distance from 

Spencer's personal property that had just been stolen two minutes earlier. 

RR Vol.3.pp.77, 93, 110. There is no reason to doubt the reliability of this 

non-accomplice evidence that connected Appellant to the crime. See Herron, 

86 S.W.3d at 633. 

d. Harmless Error Analysis 

Omission of an unrequested jury instruction applicable to the case 

calls for a new trial only when the defendant was greatly disadvantaged 

thereby. Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692. It is reversible error when the State's 

case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive had they been 

properly instructed. !d. At 693. 

12 
Instead of being disadvantaged by Eddie's testimony, the Appellant 

was helped by his testimony. On the issue of Appellant's criminal intent, 

Eddie may have possibly confused the jury. Although Appellant was 

charged as a party to the offense, Eddie attempted to create a separate 

criminal intent requirement for the use of a deadly weapon when the law did 

not require it. See Baylor v. State, 208 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948). 

A firearm such as a shotgun is considered a deadly weapon per se and there 

is no separate criminal intent requirement. Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE Sec. 1.07 

(Vernon 2014). Eddie's testimony that Appellant never knew he had a 

shotgun during the robbery was helpful. 

The State's case relied exclusively upon non-accomplice evidence. 

Under an egregious harm analysis, this non-accomplice evidence was not 

"so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction 

clearly and significantly less persuasive." Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632. 

2. Trial Counsel's Performance was not Deficient under Strickland 

Standard 

a. Standard of Review 

"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness 

of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's 

representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. The court should recognize that counsel is 

13 
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and 

made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable 

professional judgment." 

Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984). 

"The defendant must also show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 

2068. Texas has adopted the Strickland standard. Hernandez v. State, 726 

S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Counsel must make errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant 

by the Sixth Amendment. Zepeda v. State, 819 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1991, en bane). 

b. Sound Trial Strategy to Have Jury Focus on Eddie's 

Testimony 

There may have been a sound trial strategy for not requesting an 

accomplice witness jury instruction- Eddie Dean's testimony was very 

helpful to the Appellant on one crucial element. Eddie testified that the 

Appellant never knew he grabbed a shotgun during the course of the 

robbery. RR Vol.3.p.64. To highlight for the jury Eddie's credibility issues 

may have undermined Trial Counsel's ability to argue that if his client was 

guilty, he was only guilty of robbery based upon Eddie's testimony. RR 

14 
Vol.3.pp.144-47. Indeed, in Trial Counsel's closing argument he stressed 

that his client if guilty, is only guilty of robbery. RR Vol.3.p.144. 

Eddie Dean's testimony was only supposed to strengthen the State's case, 

even though the State had no way of preparing for his testimony since he 

had neither provided an interview or affidavit before arriving in court on the 

day of trial. See RR Vol.3.p.61. Instead, Eddie's testimony gave hope to the 

Appellant. In its closing argument, the State tried to minimize Eddie Dean's 

testimony. RR Vol.3.p.142. The State emphasized in closing arguments that 

the jury, as factfinder, could decide Eddie was only credible in part of his 

testimony, and not credible in other parts. RR Vol.3.p.142. 

Trial Counsel's strategy also involved impeaching Spencer with 

inconsistent statements, and to show that he was the initial aggressor 

because he was carrying a C02 pistol on him that night. RR Vol.3.p.144. 

Trial Counsel attacked Spencer's credibility by suggesting he knew how 

easy it was to make a complaint in person at the Commerce Police Station. 

RR Vol.3.p.144. 

Based upon Trial Counsel's strategy, his performance cannot be called 

deficient. Normally, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to 

show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical 

or strategic decision making as to overcome the presumption that counsel's 

15 
conduct was reasonable and professional. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). "Appellate courts can rarely decide the issue of 

ineffective assistance of counsel because the record almost never speaks to 

the strategic reasons trial counsel may have considered." Aldrich v. State, 

104 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The proper procedure for 

raising this claim is therefore almost always habeas corpus. Id. at 896 

c. Confidence in Outcome Not Undermined 

For the same reasons as discussed supra, Trial Counsel's jury charge 

omission did not undermine confidence in the outcome. See Section 1.d. 

Any allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel must be firmly founded in the 

record. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

The Appellant has the burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1999). Based upon a single instance found in the record that 

may have actually helped Appellant and been part of sound trial strategy, he 

has failed to meet his burden of proof. 

3. Evidence Was Legally Sufficient 

a. Standard of Review 

16 
When reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence, the Courts review 

all the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine 

whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the 

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 

893,912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319 

(1987). The standard of review is the same for both direct evidence and 

circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991 ). "While each piece of evidence lacked strength in 

isolation, the consistency of the evidence and the reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom, provide the girders to strengthen the evidence and support 

a rational jury's finding the elements beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Although 

the accomplice witness instruction was omitted, legal sufficiency review is 

based upon the hypothetically correct jury charge. Hall, 161 S.W.3d at 148 

citing Malik v. State, 953, S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 

A person may be convicted as a party to an offense if the offense is 

committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another for which he is 

criminally responsible. TEX. PENAL CODE SEC. 7.02 (Vernon 2014). The 

evidence will be held legally sufficient under the law of parties where the 

defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and 

17 
encourages its commission by words or other agreement. Ransom v. State, 

920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Cordova v. State, 977 S.W.2d 

791, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). For a conviction to be upheld, the 

evidence must show at the time of the offense, the parties were acting 

together, each contributing some part towards the execution of their common 

purpose. Brooks v. State, 580 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 

b. Spencer Sweeden's Testimony 

To prove Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon, the State had 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant individually and acting 

together with Eddie James Dean, Jr., did then and there while in the course 

of committing theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of said 

property, intentionally or knowingly threaten or place Spencer Sweeden in 

fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and did then and there use or exhibit 

a shotgun. TEX. PEN. CODE Sec. 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2014). Spencer's 

testimony alone was enough evidence for a rational juror to find Appellant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Robbery. While being 

attacked on cross-examination, having his credibility challenged, and 

accused of initiating the incident, Spencer's response would be enough for 

any rational juror to convict the Appellant of this crime- "Okay, I 

understand that. But why would they take my things." RR Vol.3.p.46. 

18 
c. Commerce Police Officer Testimony 

Commerce Police Officers testified that Spencer was still shaken up 

about the robbery when they met with him. As Sgt. Cantera summarized 

their decision that night to arrest the Appellant for aggravated robbery, "he 

had all the matching descriptors involved and the victim's possessions in his 

possession." RR Vol.3.p.ll2. 

The evidence in this case is legally sufficient to prove Appellant guilty 

of the offense as charged; therefore, his conviction should be affirmed. 

PRAYER 

Appellant's trial was without prejudicial error. The State prays 

that Appellant's conviction and sentence be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted, 

NOBLE DAN WALKER, JR. 

District Attorney 

Hunt County, Texas 

./ 

/ 

G CAL YIN GROGAN V 

Assistant District Attorney 

P. 0. Box 441 

19 
4th Floor, Hunt County 

Courthouse 

Greenville, TX 75403 

State Bar No. 24050695 

(903) 408-4180 

FAX (903) 408-4296 

cgrogan@h untcounty .net 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH T.R.A.P. 9.4(i)(3) 

Relying on Microsoft Word's word count feature used to create the 

State's Reply Brief, I certify that the number of words contained in this brief 

is 3,766 and the typeface used is 14Font. ,",:; ':: .. - l ·' ' ~ 

·~'' ,J ~?~i-, , .. //' 

§ 

G CALVIN GROGAN V 

Assistant District Attorney 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

A true copy of the State's brief has been mailed via first-class mail to 

Jessica Edwards, Appellant's attorney of record, today, December 4, 2015, 

pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

'_" ,.-,. ~-, t_ .. 

,-

/ 

G CALVIN GROGAN V 

Assistant District Attorney 

20