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22 November 1968 

For Colonel Worthman 

SUBJECT: Initial Thoughts on I Iproposed 

Earth Resources Pape~I'~--------~ 

First, the paper is fundamentally very good - the 

issue is important - the problem is outlined adequately 

and the proposed approach is generally satisfactory. 

However, there are some (hopefully) constructive 

remarks to make: 

1. It is probably not necessary to defend the 

value of overhead reconnaissance to the extent that is 

in the paper. The paper could start with a sentence or 

so asserting that satellite recce has been critically important to the U.S. and is very likely to remain so, 

particularly if arms limitations agreements are considered. 

I doubt that any high official of government would dispute 

the assertion. If it is accepted that satellite recce is 

of critical national importance, it really doesn't matter, 

for this paper, what the details are, or how many flights 

are required or what sort of program it is. So, the paper 

can be much briefer, and need not be a defense of satellite recce. 

2. Similarly, the issue then is not to argue that 

national policy should be to avoid actions which may result 

in a prohibition of the recce - no one doubts that. The 

issue is what policy is best to assure our continued capability. The concern is that, among policy options, there 

are some involving earth resources which may be bad. The 

paper does not elucidate these well, or describe whey they 

may be bad. 

3. The fundamental issue then, not really discussed in the paper, hinges on the allegation that satellite 

recce is of , at best, marginal legality. There is basis 

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for concern that, in an international legal forum, the U.S. 

could not defend its recce activities. One possible national 

policy, therefore, would be to meet the issue head on and 

declare recce legal and establish that legality through open 

and formal procedures. Such an option has always been open 

to us and the only reason for not pursuing it is that the 

best judgements available have indicated that it might not 

succeed. The doubts are particularly strong when one considers that satellites are rather indiscriminate of what 

country they overfly. Any small nation could insist on the 

right to privacy and sovereignty and it may be quite unreasonable to provide assurances that an opposing nation 

could not be overflown and photographed. There have been 

many legalistic essays on this subject and the meat of them 

should be in the paper. 

4. If national policy, therefore, should not be to 

establish legality how can illegal but accepted activities 

best continue! It'is probably not possible or wise to attempt 

to establish an invariant doctrine which is imagined to never 

change. The important thing is to examine every proposed 

action in the light of current policy to see whether it leads 

to comfortable positions. It may be that the future holds the 

promise of international cooperation to include a broadly 

accepted policy of satellite recce for earth resources and 

for arms monitoring perhaps executed under international control. I think all of us dream of such a world and earnestly 

hope that satellite recce could be a key technical contributor to a peaceful world. So, a national policy should not 

be to deny such a hope. But realism dictates that national 

security must be maintained while international agreements 

and understandings are sought. Therefore, there should be 

no attempt to establish legality of recce as an essential 

fIrst part of treaty negotiation. This matter has been 

discussed well in your re-write of the policy for treaty 

negotiations and the meat of that should be in this paper. 

2 

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5. The foregoing therefore starts with fact 

of the value of recce, estab1shes the question of legality 

and concludes that national policy must, for the time being, 

protect the option of continuing recce as a covert activity. 

A conclusion can now be supported that "confrontation" is 

undesirable. So, the heart of the problem is how to conduct 

earth resources without raising the possibility of confrontation. An immediate answer is, Carefully. Any policy must 

involve very careful, deliberate steps by NASA which are 

checked and reviewed continuously. Mechanisms involving DOD 

or DCI must exist and be enforced rigorously. CUrrent policy 

seems to be that open activities are all right if it can be 

demonstrated that the photography is not of military significance. So far, whether there is danger or not, the NASA program has not raised sovereignty questions, so it is reasonable 

to presume the policy is sound. Any relaxation of that policy 

is dangerous and DOD should position itself to oppose any 

deviation. Therefore, the DOD position (and I don't see why 

itdoesn't include DCI, etc.) must include these elements: . 

a. Current guidelines must be maintained. 

b. NASA may discuss an earth resources satellite program, but every program proposal 

and approval must conform to guidelines. 

c. NASA may conduct aircraft programs to 

whatever extent desired permissively. 

d. To provide a basis for future policy decisionextensive use of TK material may be 

made. 

e. With approval of USIB, or additional funding, 

specific TK coverage can be obtained (Hx 

could cover U.S.) 

f. In overlap with aircraft progr~s, TK 

material may be declassified or used for 

charts, etc. 

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6. The plans and policy statements in the paper generally -

do these things but it seems they could be simpler and restricted 

to the points which directly affect national security without 

including points that relate to NASA execution or justification. 

3 

LEW ALLEN, JR. ~ArmtE 

Colonel , USAF 

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