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HANDL E vIA 

BYEMAN 

CONHlOl ~,YS1EI>1 

£.8'1 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D,C. 

THE NRO STAFF 4 June 1971 

:'vl EMO RA N D tr:VI F'O 11'---________ ~ 

SUBJECT: TAGBOARD Collection Satisfaction 

In order to provick an evaluation of the potential application 

of any future TAGBOARD rnissions, Dr. Naka has requested that a 

staff study be prepared for presentation to Dr. 1vfcLucas. The study 

should evaluate potential need foy--and contributions to be expected 

from--potentlal TACBOARD missions. Dr. IvfcLucas \\'oulcl use this 

as a backgruunc! or p()ssible justification of continued T AGBOARD 

development and in his dlscussions with EXCOI\1. 

You arc encouraged to discuss the subject with Col Hartley In 

Pro).!ral11 1), 

Please give rnc an indication of when you could complete this 

tcvaluatiotl of thl~ pos:oible contribution of TAGBOARD to collection 

sa ti s fa c tj Ll 11. 

Cy for: 

TAGDOAHD 

BYEMAN 

cO~JrI<OL SY$!tM 

TOP SEGRET f/i .l!L'fO 'HOM '\l;lnMil[;( iifGRA.O!I<tG 

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TOP SECRET 

POTENTIAL APPLICATION 

OF 

TAGBOARD DRONE MISSIONS 

T AGBOARD GAMBIT HEXAGON HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN· TALENT ·KEYHOLE CONTROL SVST£MS JOINTLY 

Tap SECRET £JtCLUO(O F'ROM ~UTOM"TlC R£GIUOING 

boO OIlHCTlV£ uno 10 DOES NOT APPt.Y 

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BYEMAN· TALENT ·KEYHO.lE CONTROL. SYSTEMS JOINTLY 

CONTROL 1<0 In te rna 1 

COpy or: ___ COP1£S 

.. GE. ___ or ___ '~G{5 
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Tep SECRET BYEMAN -r ALENT ·KEYHOLE CONTROL !$VSTEM:5 JQJNTI,.Y 

POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF T AGBOARD DRONE MISSIONS 

The greatest potentials of future TAGBOARD missions is the vehicle's ability to operate without a human pilot at the controls; its 

capability to photograph denied areas of impending crisis, and to supplement satellite photography in bad weather areas such as South China, 

and North Korea during those short periods when the weather conditions 

are favorable for overhead photography. 

The recent USIB study "Intelligence Requirements for Crisis 

Response Satellite Imagery FY 1973 - FY 1975 Time Period, 11 reports 

that there are approximately three to five critical situations occurring 

annually, of which two generally occur simultaneously at two separate 

parts of the world; that a crisis response capability is necessary to 

provide cove rage on a daily ba sis for a s long as a month, and sometimes longer, and that the greatest number of intelligence requirements 

involve installations or small areas demanding imagery readout of 2-3 

.feet ground resolution. The study also indicated that buildup time to a 

crisis extends from two to greater than 190 days, and critical periods 

extend from four to 45 days. 

Past experience with photo satellites show that there have always 

been some areas of intelligence interest (China-South China, North 

Korea, etc.) not successfully photographed because of orbital or carnera 

constraints, or as in most cases, poor weather conditions. The combination of these constraints has sometimes resulted in low satisfaction of 

USIB requirements. For example, a typical GAMBIT mission would 

access Wuchai SSM launch site approximately every 6th or 7th day. A 

I-{EXAGON Inission would access Wu-chai approximately every 7th or 

8th day. Although an area may be acr::essed sufficiently, the fixed 

orbital path and the poor weather conditions as shown in Table I may 

prohibit the area from being successfully photographed during an entire 

satellite mission. Since crisis periods extend from four to 45 days, 

according to the USIB study, the events could have terminated or exploded beyond control before satisfactory satellite photography could 

be obtained and read out. Also, the quarterly satellite launch schedule, 

and the long crisis response time to launch a GAMBIT (up to 25 days 

depending on vehicle status), and currently nO crisis response capability for the HEXAGON, may cause the perishable product of current 

intelligence and the opportunity of the moment to be lost forever. 

TAGBOARD GAMBIT HEXAGON 

BYEMAN-TALENT ·KEYHOLE CONTROl.. -SY'5.T£MS JiHNTt..,V 

Tap SECRET [XCtUO£'O rRO~ Auro.tAllC R[oGRAtHNG 

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Most crises involve installations or small areas, and are of 

short duration. Their photographic explr)itation is dependent on 

favorable target \ilcather and the capability to react in sufficient time. 

Although the U -21<. and SR-71 aircraft and T AGBOARD drones are effected by the same weath.er conditions as satellites, their quick reaction times enable them to better exploit short periods of good weather 

conditions to meet crisis requirements, or fil1 intelligence gaps in 

satellite photography. 

Frorn Table II, the response tirnes of the SR-71 and U-2R aircraft, both of which produce the recomrllcnded photo imagery of Z ~ 3 

feet ground resolution, arc currently the best platforrns for crisis 

responsc o These platfo:cn;:" h.(;wever, place a human pilot in possibl.e 

jeopa in the event of Htij jjCltlon by the country of concern. IJ.1tely 

there have been both diplomatic (North Korean protests and threats of 

retaliation again~)L future GIANT SCALE shallow and. deep penetration 

overflights), and aggressive reaction (Soviet defense fighters vectored 

against GIANT SCALE missions south of Vladivostolc over tb.e Sea of 

Japan.) Considering all the ramifications that could occur in the event 

or a United States reconnaissance pilot being captured in denied territory, the' T AGBOARD drone appears to be the most suitable platform 

(current five-day launch capability and reliability notwithstanding) for 

operation against crisis response and outstanding USIB requirements 

until such time as NRT satellites are available. 

HANOl..£VIA. 

BYEMAN· TALENT ·KEYHOLE CONTROL SYST£MS JOINTLY 

Tap SECRET HCUJO£O FROM A.UrOMATlC RE(.RA.!HNG 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200 10 DOES Nor APPly 

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TABLE I 

PROBABILITY OF SEEING A POINT TAPcGS1' 

AT 1200 HOURE3 LOeA.L TIMS 

COUNTRY BEST l'IONTH WORST HONTH ANNUAL 

South China 38.2 (Dec) 19.8 (May) 29.6 Q 

China (Other) 54.2 (Dec) 33.7 (riaY) 41+.2 

North Korea 63.1 (Jan) 21.0 (Jul) 43.6 

North Vietnam 29~4 (Dec) 18.1 (Mar) 23.7 

Middle East 93.8 (Jul) 62.1 (Dec) 75.1 

E. European Bloc 43.8 (Jul & 18.5 (Dec) 33.0 

Sep 

Note: * As of 30 June 1971. Does not include HEXJ'.GON Mission 1201. 

TABLE II 

RESPONS E T D1ES 

PRCGRfl.M RESPONSE TIME 

GAMBIT * Up to 25 Days 

BE XAG ON* None at this time 

SR-71 56 Hours Worldwide 

24 Hours from Oil 

U-2R 50 Hours Worldwide 

24· Hours from O/L 

TAG BOARD 5 Days 

U0_ -"IP ..\...-.',")~ ('I\TI':: ;1'Ai1' Tni': C:l1, \ '1M' ....... ....J_ ~""'.J "Lv~'i ; ... / \..._ 

NATIONAL CONIREX TAE?J':;l~T::;* 

QUARTERLY SE..11I-Af,;11UAL 

31 43 

48 65 

38 84 

70 90 

25 39 

43 52 

24 Hours on Extended Hold 

Note: * Assumes no system on orbit at the time 

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