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18 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: NSAM 311 - KB-6 and overage of Cuba

Reference: Colonel Worthman's MFR, same subject, dtd 14 Jan 65

On 15 January 1965, I met with Dr. McMillan and Mr. Fkiedznan

of ASD/ISA to discuss the results of Dr. McMillan's meeting with

Mr. Vance (earlier this week) concerning the idea of revitalizing the

KH-6 system for use against Cuba.

Dr. McMillan's comments: of"

411 g Mr. Vance not too enthusiastic - KEI-6 imme nos stereo4would

take a year to develop. Despite obvious advantages, KB-6 is not

"instant joy" -- still much work required to establish operational

capability.

Politically, some risk (embarrassment) might evolve if we

make a positive statement that KH-6 could be made to do this job --

some of the embarrassment would certainly accrue to Secretary of

Defense.

Cuban requirements are unrealistic -- Dr. McMillan 6814(

Under Secretary of Defense wanted restatement.

Mr. Vance does not believe Cubans will "do anything. " If

missiles are re-introduced we would know this -- thru existing

reconnaissance and/or agent reports.

5. Mr. Vance does not want to "do anything about KH-6 now. "

His idea: "Continue using KH-4 to locate gross activity of interest "

-- use a glirspecifically designated as a Cuban standby for closer

looks.

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Mr. Friedman's observations:

6. We would be deficient in not calling to attention of the President capability of KH-6 for this job.

r. Vance's proposal -- this would start a

ery time we coWld a situation in Cuba

ylaunch a "stan specifically against

Cuba.

Consideration should be given to koat and availability factors

in weighing "7-8 standby (suspicious)' against X number of

KH-6's.

Dr. McMillan: 

Have you made this speech to Mr. Vance yet? Friedman

indicated that he had not.

Advised that he already had a contractor looking at problems

involved in giving K11-6 a stereo mode.

Said he knew CIA was not in favor of KH-6 -- or use of any

other satellites over Cuba.

Asked if we had taken a look at coverage of individual targets

in China with KH-6 launched at 24 and 34°, I advised we had taken a

look only at broad coverage there -- not individual targets. He asked

that we look at individual target coverage in China. ACTION ITEM.

Conclusions 

Mr. Friedman said he thought that the Secretary of Defense

should advise the President that "we are going ahead with maximizing

existing KH-4fpOprograms against Cuba -- and are also working to

revitalize the -6 program for this purpose. "

14. Dr. McMillan said he had no objection to Friedman's trying

to interest Mr. Vance, however, he wished to reiterate that this was

not an AMA solution and wished to impose some "safeguards" on any

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Vance/Friedman discussion on KH-6 -- he wanted to be sure that a

program was defined and that Mr. Vance understood there was work

to be done before an operational ICI-6 capability could be realized.

15. After the meeting, Mr. Friedman asked that Colonel

Worthman and I follow up on the item in par. 12 above and that we

work up a paper showing definitively what, how much and how long

is involved in re-establishing a KH-6 launch capability. He would like

to see such a paper by next Tuesday -- 19 January 1965.

Lt Colonel, USAF

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