IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30491

Summary Calendar

MELISSA G. DURHAM, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ASCENSION PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:14-CV-445

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Melissa Durham, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal

of her claims for age and disability discrimination, and her laundry list of 

additional federal and state violations. We affirm. 

Durham was employed as a science teacher at Gonzalez Middle School.

After approximately six months of teaching, the school principal recommended 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 14, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-30491 Document: 00513306232 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/14/2015
No. 15-30491

2

firing Durham because of unsatisfactory teaching performance, an inability to 

properly manage her classroom, and repeated disregard for school policies. The 

Ascension Parish School Board (“APSB”) superintendent agreed and 

terminated Durham’s employment. Durham filed a complaint with the United 

States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), asserting that

APSB discriminated against her because of her age and “mental disability,” 

and failed to reasonably accommodate her with respect to “extremely 

disruptive and violent students.” The EEOC gave Durham notice of a right to 

sue.

Durham filed suit. The entirety of her complaint consists of the following 

statement: “APSB subjected me to unfair discipline and harassment and 

neglected to provide accomedations [sic] for such. Injured on the job during a 

fight and received a write up and reprimand for students behavior.” The 

district court construed Durham’s claims as arising under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Americans with 

Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”). In a subsequent filing, 

which the court treated as an amended complaint, Durham reiterated her 

ADAA claim and recited a bullet point list of additional violations.1 APSB filed 

a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. Durham timely appealed. 

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Haase 

v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 2014). “To survive 

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

 

1 The district court read Durham’s amended complaint to list violations of the First 

Amendment, the Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act 

of 2002, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, and Louisiana’s 

Teacher Rights. 

 Case: 15-30491 Document: 00513306232 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/14/2015
No. 15-30491

3

544, 570 (2007)). Pro se plaintiffs are held to less stringent standards than 

lawyers, but “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as 

factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Taylor v. 

Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The 

plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 

(5th Cir. 2009). 

Durham asserts that she was discriminated against on account of her 

age in violation of the ADEA, but she fails to provide facts that support her 

claim. She does not allege that she was qualified for the position, that she was 

terminated as a result of her age, or that she was replaced by someone 

younger—factual allegations that are necessary to establish a prima facie 

discrimination case. See Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 378 

(5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that ADEA claims require a showing that, inter 

alia, the plaintiff was “replaced by someone younger, or [] otherwise discharged 

because of [her] age” (citation omitted)). Durham’s assertion of discrimination 

is a legal conclusion that is insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

Durham’s ADAAA claim similarly fails. To make an ADAAA failure-toaccommodate claim, Durham must allege facts demonstrating that she is a 

“qualified individual with a disability,” that her disability and its limitations 

were known to her employer, and that her employer failed to accommodate her 

limitations. Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 2013). 

In her EEOC filing, Durham states that APSB “was fully aware of [her] mental 

disability and continued to put unnecessary requirements on [her],” and that 

APSB denied her requests for reasonable accommodations to assist with 

disruptive students. See Randall D. Wolcott, M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 

 Case: 15-30491 Document: 00513306232 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/14/2015
No. 15-30491

4

757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the 

complaint, its proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint 

by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). But Durham’s allegations are wholly 

conclusory, and amount to purely legal conclusions. She neglects to offer facts 

that set forth the requisite prima facie case. 

In her amended complaint, Durham merely lists additional federal and 

state laws that she believes APSB violated. She offers, however, neither factual 

support nor any explanation for these purported violations. Such bald 

assertions “devoid of further factual enhancement” are entirely insufficient to 

withstand dismissal. Doe v. Robertson, 751 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

Finally, Durham maintains that the district court improperly denied her 

an opportunity to amend her complaint before dismissing her suit with 

prejudice. We review this contention under the abuse of discretion standard.

Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009). Durham’s argument 

is without merit. Durham filed both a complaint and an amended complaint, 

along with two response briefs opposing APSB’s motion to dismiss. The district 

court provided her numerous opportunities to remedy the deficiencies of her 

pleadings, and liberally construed her pleadings and attached exhibits. 

Moreover, on appeal, Durham fails to identify previously pled factual 

allegations that would establish a prima facie case on any of her claims. 

Neither we nor the district court can excuse the dearth of factual allegations 

and Durham’s failure to raise her right to relief “above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The district court properly dismissed her complaint,

and we AFFIRM. 

 Case: 15-30491 Document: 00513306232 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/14/2015