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~NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICi::. 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

THE NRO STAFF March 7, 1969 

HANDLE VIA 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

SUBJECT: BOB Study, "Defense Intelligence Program Management" 

This document arrived in the mail with no covering communication. I called Mr. Sorrels and learned that it was given to Mr. 

Packard by Dr. James Schlesinger during a recent discussion. Mr. 

Sorrels has nothing further on this item. 

Colonel, USAF 

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 

MANAGEMEN·r 

The purpose of this paper is to describe the problems of 

management in the intelligence programs of the Department of 

Defense; current efforts to improve the system; and possible 

additional actions which could be taken. 

rhe National Context 

Roughly 90 percent of the total resources in the United 

Stat,es intelligen_ce ~£fort are und~r the clirect review and .~ . . .~ .. 

control of the Secretary of Defense and his designated staff 

:>fficers. This program effort totals and is 

livided into six major entities with 1969 budgets as follows: 

1. National Reconnaissance Program {NRP) 

Development, production and operation 

of high perfon,1ance aircraft and satellite reconnaissance systems 

2. Consolidated cryptologic Program (CCP) 

Development, deployment and operation 

of facilities and forces to collect, 

process and disseminate information 

from foreign comrrmnications and other 

electronic signals 

3. Consolidated Intelligence Proqram (CIP) 

Development, deployment and operation 

of most of the intelligence forces of 

.the military services exclu,ding those 

deployed in organizations at the theater 

level and belo..,,, 

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FY 1969 

($ in millions) 
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.. 4.. Manned Orbital Laboratory (MOL) 

Development of a very high resolution 

manned reconnaissance satellite for 

the collection of technical intelligence 

5 .. SR-71 Reconnaissance Aircraft 

6. ~upporting Research and Development Programs 

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In addition to these entities "tactical" military intelligence programs to provide direct support to military forces 

cost about $1 billion per year. ~ '.j;, f -~ _,.._~ 

For all of the above activities, the Secretary of Defense 

is the focal point of decision-raaking. In the case of the_NRP, 

the Secretary has " .... the ultimate responsibility for the management and operation of the NRO and the NRP: ••• " and " .•• the 

final power to approve the-NRl? budget; ••• " (Agreement for 

Reorganization of the NRP, August 1965.) In the case of the CC?, 

"The Secretary of Defense is designated as Executive Agant of . i 

the Government for the conduct of CO.MINT (communications intel-

' 

ligence) and ELINT (electronics intelligence} activities 

~and for the maintenance and operation of the National Security 

Agency." (National Security Council Intelligence Directive 

No. 6. 1958.) In the case of the CIP and the other miscellaneous_ 

activities, the Secretary is the final authority short of the 

President for the management of the military departments. 

Priorities of national intelligencie objectives are actually 

determined-more by the hard decisions in the Secretary of 

Defense's program and budget revie~ processes than by the United 

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States Intelligence Board (USIB) which is fonnally charged with 

establishing intelligence requirements. This is because the 

choices of allocating limited resources must be made by the 

§_ecretary of Defense but do not have to be addressed by the 

USIB. 

Defense Intelligence Programming systems 

The NRP, CCP and CIP provide the only overall management· 

capability at the Departmental.level for Defense intelligence 

.activities and they have made a valuable 'contribution O The O •• 

C:~P and CIP. are subject tq a detailed review in the spring and 

again in the budget review in the fall. The whole NRP budget 

is reviewed once in the fall by the National Reconnaissance 

Office staff with infonnal DDR&E and BOB staff participation 

-- and finally, in the budget process by the Executive· CowJUittee 

of the National Reconnaissance Program, made up of the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense {Chainnan) and the Director of Central ': 

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Intelligence and the President's Science Advisor (voting members}. 

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This Committee "advises" the Secretary of Defense and, in affect, • 

makes many of the decisions. 

· There are major inadequacies with the present DOD review 

and management operations. They are: 

(a) the three program areas are reviewed on what is 

essentially an independent and compartmentalized basis without 

systematic comparison: 

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(bl the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

do not have a centralized staff to assist them in making comparisons of competing intelligence objectives and alternative 

program methods and cross-erogram review is done on a selective basis by staffs of the Assistant Secretaries of D~fense 

for Administration and Systems Analysis, the Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering and the Bureau of the Budget. 

Each of these groups has a dif£:erent P¥rs_pective and _a diff-. t :,,· --:- ~ ~ ~;:· - . .~ ~ 7 ·~ -~ ~- .. - ·- - -

erent degree of access to information: 

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(c) the three programs and the other Defense intelligence resources are not classified in a common program structure 

and, therefore, are not understood in relation to mutual target objectives or, more importantly, in relation to the information needs of major Defense programs (i.e., Strategic Offensive 

Force.s, etc.): 

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(d} the consolidated program reviews tend to be diffused 

across many detailed questions with a resulting lack of emphasis 

on major policy issues: 

(e) a substantial portion of defense intelligence 

resources are not included in any one of the three proqrarn reviews (i.e., the NOL, the SR-71, and many military intelligen,::::e 

units at theater level and below); 

' (f) there is not a clear or·cfose relationshio between 

:the s6-cal.ie~ "progr_~m ~•-. r~vie\:, decisions and the budget de.c_isions where the dollar resources are determined. 

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More detailed criticisms of the three program review 

processes and proposed ·remedial actions are available in a 

separate.paper. 

Needed Actions 

The question is how to provide the Secretary and Deputy 

Secretary of Defense with support mechanisms to deal with the 

highly fragmented and complex defense intelligence programs. 

The greatest need is to have a decision~makiBg process in 

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Defense which will integrate the review of all Defense intelligence activities, assets, and objectives (CCP, CIP, NRP and 

others) in the context of Defense program.information needs; 

USIB guidance and CIA capabilities. 

The following steps seem to be the most promising. 

1. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense fo~ 

·,;I:ntelligence (ASD/I) • The role of the ASD/I would have to be 

i 

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·carefully defined. He should not be in the line of command 

authority between the operating agencies and the Secretary of 

Defense, nor should be replace the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 1 as the substantive intelligence adviser to the 

Secretary of Defense. To do so would produce a conflict of 

interest between what we know and what resourc_es are needed to 

improve or check that knowledge. 

2. A Defense Intelliqence Proqra.m Staff. The critiqa 

.ingredient for the success· of ·an -ASD/I--and · for comprehens'i-ve 

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and integrated decision-making for Defense intelligence resources 

is the development of a strong, independent analytical staff· 

for intelligence serving the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

jor Intelligence. It could be a small (5 to 10 professionals) 

staff office reporting directly to the ASD/I. There are this 

mi:.lny professionals now working separately within the offices 

of Systems Analysis, DDR&E and ASD/Administration. 

Together, the ASD/I and tb.e staff could providE:. the fo·l- .. ' - ,, > •• -;~ ..,. • 

lowing needed functions: 

R p DO 

,aring together in a single integrated focus, 

..s,,11 of the competing program ideas and resource 

demands of the SIGINT, photographic and other 

intelligence programs for the Secretary. 

advise the Secretary of Defense on intelligence_ 

priorities and required resources and help him 

detennine the appropriate level of DOD program 

response to Defense-related infonnation needs 

and to the United States Intelligence Board 

requirements and guidance. 

pe the Defense Secretary's intermediary with 

the DCI and his NIRB and NIPE staffs. 

provide an overview ana analysis capability 

·, 

with respect to DOD-generated intelligence - . . . 

r~guirements~ .. The working. responsibility for·' • ... 

this function could be left with the Director, 

DIA. 

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3. A Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program Review. 

The operational direction and control of the SIGINT, overhead, 

and general Defense intelligence,activi~ies should probably 

continue to be delegated to the NSA, NRO and DIA, respectiV~!ly. 

However, in order to overcome the problems noted above, the 

review of intelligence programs at the level of the Secretary 

of Defense should be carried out as a single review under the 

ASD/I, primarily against the criterion of Defense program and~ ~ -·~ ~- 1⁄4'-" _..:._ .;;;- -;· ~~ ➔~ T1- ~ ·--·· ·-· '· ➔ 

foreign policy related information ne.eds and not as aggregations 

of effort by technique employed. This review should be carried 

out through the use of a common program structure which is also 

capable of displaying the CIA programs in a consistent manner 

for the purpose of subsequent interagency review. This review 

should be the culmination of reviews by the CIP and CCP Review 

Groups and the NRP Executive Comnlittee, which should have the 

primary responsibility in their respective program areas, for 

conducting the functional reviews under a common structure and 

-instructions. Major questions and choices identified in these 

reviews should be the main focus of the consolidated review by 

the Assistant Secretary. 

Defense Intelligence Organiz~tion 

There are two important organizational relationships within 

the Defense intelligence coITu-u.unity which contribute to a dif~usion 

of management authority and make very qif~icult, the ,ef,fective . . : . ~ . . . : . . .· . . ~ ~ . . . . .. . . ' 

and efficient allocation of intelligence program resources. 

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In the signals intelligence area, the National_ Security 

Agency was established in 1952 by the National Security Council 

as a result of the Brownell Committee report to consolidate 

management authority for communications intelligence (COMINT). 

In addition, NSA was given certain management responsibilities 

over a part of the national electronics intelligence (ELINT) 

resources in 1958. Since that time, a number of CO.MINT and 

ELINT operations and management functions have been undertaken :.- - __ :- :;_ _ 1 ,-:;. ·-: - .t:;:·· _· :. _i -;.'· .? -:.."7:,; -:·.:..~ _...., · J :__:_.;,. - ·.:: 

by other organizations. Most notable are: 

(a} extensive BLINT collection and processing 

conducted by military commands; and· 

(b) COMINT and ELIN'r collection using earth 

satellites by-the National Reconriaissance 

Office. 

Also, the management authority of NSA over the service cryptologic agencies has been limited to technical control or tasking 

of military service assets and does not extend to effective 

-control of which assets will be deployed to specific areas or 

theaters. This problem is discussed in greater detail in a 

separate paper on "Management and Organization of United States 

SIG INT Programs." However,· within the context of Defense intelligence program management, the following three steps should be 

taken: 

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1. The Director, NSA, should pre;-:-~re a single 

program and _budget for all C0.L"1INT and ELnn activities and 

costs of the Department of Defense including the COM.INT and 

ELINT activities now carried in the National Reconnaissance 

Program and the Consolidated Intelligence Program. Based upon 

a review of this program and budget by the CCP Review Group, 

the major issues and alternatives should be submitted to the 

Assistant ~ecx;,E:tary of D~,fe~se \n the sonspli9ate_d Ds;fen.~e Ip- ~ - . ~ 

telligence Program Review. 

2. To further implement the concept of a unified 

management authority for COMINT and ELINT there should be created 

immediately an inteqrated Oper2.tional and Planning Staff in NSA 

composed in part of the operational and planning components and 

personnel of the three service cr;.,-ptologic agencies. For operational and planning functions of NSA and the service cryptologic 

agencies, the integrated staff would be responsible directly to 

the Director, NSA. 

3. Research and development, payload design, and ground 

collection activities of the SIGINT Satellite Reconnaissance 

Program should be deleqated to the Director, NSA, by the Executive Committee of the National Reconnaissance Program. The 

Director, NRO, should continue to be responsible for payload 

integration, launch and on-orbit control of the spacecraft sys- .. . . 

tern~ o_f COIV!:IN'r and EL!N:T sate;J..lit.es .. Ho_weve;-_, s~ch activiti~$.. 

should be planned, developed and implemented by the Director, NSl\, 

after careful comparison with and as necessary supple;nents to 

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or substitutes for other ground, sea and airborne COMINT and 

ELINT collection operations. 

In the Defense general intelligence area, the Defense 

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Intelligence Agency was established by the Secretary of Defense 

in 1961. Three principal functions were assigned to the 

agency: 

the production of all DOD finished intelligence; 

the management and control of all DOD intelli- ~ .. , -~ . ~· 

gence resources assigned to DIA; 

-·the review and coordination of all intelligence 

functions retained by the military departments. 

In connection with the last two respOnsibilities, the DIA is 

charged by DOD Directive 5105e21 with: "Obtaining the rnaximu~n 

economy and efficiency in the allocation·and management of 

DOD intelligence resources." In 1963, the Consolidated Intelligence .Program review was established with the.·Director, DIA, 

as its chairman, to provide a mechanism for central program 

review and analysis by DIA and other review elements such as 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, 

and the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. 

However, from the beginning, two factors have worked to 

severely limit the management prerogatives and capabilities of 

DIA. 

-· The Di~ector, DIA, was~ speci~.i.':_a.lly subordi_natE?d. 

by the founding directive to the cornrnand of the 

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Joint Chiefs of Staff whose individual programs 

he was to analyze and review. (JCS has subsequently directed DIA to assis~ the Unified and 

Specified Commands to strengthen their intelligence 

capabilities.} 

The Director, DIA, now serves as both the chainnan 

of the program review group and as the principal 

~ - pro_gram manager and advocate. 

Both of these factors have made it very difficult, if not 

impossible, for DIA to rigorously review the programs and 

budgets of the intelligence programs of Defense units and 

activities. This problem extends to the point of stro~g resistance on the part of DIA to- including important military intelligence activities within those programs to be reviewed. 

Two corrective steps should be taken: 

1. The DOD Directive (5105.21) should be chanqed so 

that the Director, DIA, would report to the Secretary of Defense 

through the Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelligence for 

program and budget review. 

2. The Director, DIA, should prepare a single program 

and budget for all Defense intelligence activities other than 

COM.INT and ELINT activities. Based upon a review of this program 

and budget by the CIP Review Group, the majo~ issues and ~lter- .. . 

··. ·-natives should--be-.sub:f.\1itted · tb the Assistant- Secretary -of Defense·· 

in the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program Review. 

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pngoing Improvements 

During the past year, a number of special community-wide 

management efforts have been initiated in the intelligence 

comm~nity. These cut across agency and program lines and point 

toward an integrated comprehensive program decision process in 

Defense. However, none of these efforts have. been adequate to 

meet the need. The projects currently in process are: 

1. Tarqet Oriented Display of Intelligence Resources 

which ·is a tool for classifying the fiscal and rnanpo·wer resources of the U.S .. intelligence programs (including CIA) by 

target country and for the u.s.s.R. and Communist China by 

target subject {i.e., type of forces 1 etc.). It will give 

trends by fiscal year and will show target distribution of 

_organizational units and activities. It is being developed 

by a joint DOD/CIA/BOB task force. Based upon the first year's 

effort the TOD Corr.mittee is recommending a further refinement 

of objective categories for classifying resources from geographic 

and subject targets to infonnation needs relevant to pending 

defense program "intelligence missions." 

2. The Eaton Panel on U.S. SIGINT Organization and 

Management. The Director of Central Intelligence has appointed 

a four-man com:nittee to providG recommendations to the President 

' . th;-ough the S':cretary o.f Stat€: and Secretary of Defense, on 

u .s.. SIGHlT. organization. · The .. final report $tates that, . '.'Tl,1.ere ,, -. 

is a need for a point of central review within the Department 

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of Defense where all .intelligence programs 1 including COMINT 

and ELINT, are looked at as a whole." (italics added) 

3. The Photoqraphic Satellite Requirements and 

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Resources Revie\,1 is a study which has been directed by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense. In the internal DOD charter the 

study has been broadened to include all satellite photography 

requirements and the value of the "required" information in 

terms of U .s •,:_ force .•. structure and posture. 

4. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Target Studv is a 

project begun under the direction of the Director of Central 

Intelligence in September 1967. In view of the plethora of 

collection resources being directed against and developed for 

this target entity, it seemed to be a necessary effort to detennine essential elements of information needed on the Soviet 

· ABM force and an inventory of the collection resources being 

·allocated to that target. The study is being conducted cooperatively by OSD and CIA staff elements under the chairmanship 

of CIA. It should be available within two or three months. 

5. The National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) 

was established in May 1968, by the Director of Central Intelligence by agreement with the Secretary of State and the Secretary 

of Defense. It consists of the Deputy Director of Central 

Intelligence (Chairman); the Director of the Defe_nse .Intelli-

.. ge11·ce Agency; .and the Director- of. Intelligence and Research,. 

Department of State. According to its charter, the board 

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"., .. owill develop advice regarding the relative value to the 

national intelligence effort of projects and activities included in the Consolidated Intelligence Program, consolidated 

Cryptologic Program, National Reconnaissance Program and CIA 

program. Such advice will be intended to assist the DCI in 

arriving at recommendations as to the most effective allocation 

of those resources which are applied to or proposed for the 

· .fulfillment of national intelligence needs." ,The- basic weakness ~ • ~ ' •,:- ' • !. ; ·.'"" .:. "" ; ' • 

of this board's structure is that the Defense representative 

does not have resource or revie·w responsibility for more than 

one-third of the Defense progrmns and does not have overall 

intelligence program management responsibility for the Secretary 

of Defense. However, it does provide an interagency forum for 

raising community-"1.·1ide program evaluation que'stions as a 

·supplement to the office of the Deputy to the Director of 

Central Intelligence for National Intelligenc2 Program Evaluation (NIPE). This board has not been in existence long enough 

to provide a basis for judgment as to its effectiveness. 

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