Filed 4/23/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

LAUREN PINTER-BROWN,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THE REGENTS OF THE 

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 

Defendant and Appellant.

B290086

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC624838)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Michael Linfield, Judge. Reversed. 

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Barbara A. Fitzgerald, Kathryn 

T. McGuigan, Jason S. Mills; Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe and 

Eric A. Shumsky, Jeremy Peterman, Jessica Perry, Elizabeth 

Moulton and Evan Rose for Defendant and Appellant.

Shegerian & Associates, Carney R. Shegerian and Jill P. 

McDonell for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

INTRODUCTION

Dr. Lauren Pinter-Brown sued The Regents of the 
2

University of California for gender discrimination based on a 

series of events that took place while she was a Professor of 

Medicine at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). 

The jury found in favor of Dr. Pinter-Brown and awarded her 

upward of $13 million in economic and noneconomic damages.

Unfortunately, the trial court committed a series of grave 

errors that significantly prejudiced The Regents’ right to a fair 

trial by an impartial judge.

First, the court delivered a presentation to the jury 

highlighting major figures in the civil rights movement, and told 

the jury their duty was to stand in the shoes of Dr. Martin Luther 

King and bend the arc of the moral universe toward justice. 

Second, the court allowed the jury to hear about and view a long 

list of discrimination complaints from across the entire 

University of California system that were not properly connected 

to Dr. Pinter-Brown’s circumstances or her theory of the case. 

Third, the court allowed the jury to learn of the contents and 

conclusions of the Moreno Report, which documented racial 

discrimination occurring throughout the entire UCLA campus. 

Finally, the court allowed Dr. Pinter-Brown to resurrect a 

retaliation claim after the close of evidence despite having 

summarily adjudicated that very claim prior to trial.

These errors were cumulative and highly prejudicial. They 

evidence the trial court’s inability to remain impartial and 

created the impression that the court was partial to Dr. PinterBrown’s claims.

We must reverse.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. The Complaint, Summary Adjudication, Motion in 

Limine, and Dr. Pinter-Brown’s Theories of Liability

On June 22, 2016, Dr. Pinter-Brown filed a complaint 

against UCLA, The Regents of the University of California, Dr.

Sven de Vos, and Does 1 to 100 alleging: (1) discrimination on 

the basis of gender in violation of the Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (FEHA); (2) harassment on the basis of gender in 

violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation for complaints of discrimination 

and/or harassment on the basis of gender in violation of FEHA; 

(4) discrimination on the basis of age in violation of FEHA; 

(5) harassment on the basis of age in violation of FEHA; 

(6) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; (7) violation of the 

Equal Pay Act; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 

(9) defamation.

On September 21, 2016, Dr. Pinter-Brown dismissed the 

eighth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress. On June 12, 2017, the parties stipulated to dismissal of 

the seventh cause of action for violation of the Equal Pay Act. On 

August 7, 2017, Dr. Pinter-Brown dismissed Dr. de Vos from the 

action without prejudice.

On August 17, 2017, the trial court granted UCLA’s1

motion for summary adjudication of the second, third, sixth, and 

ninth causes of action (harassment on the basis of gender; 

1 The record and appellate briefing refer to defendants and 

appellant as UCLA and The Regents. We refer to them as UCLA 

throughout this opinion, as Dr. Pinter-Brown was employed by 

UCLA and the acts of discrimination she alleged all occurred at 

UCLA.
4

retaliation for complaints of discrimination; violation of Labor 

Code section 1102.5; and defamation). Jury trial therefore 

proceeded on the remaining three causes of action for 

discrimination on the basis of gender, discrimination on the basis 

of age, and harassment on the basis of age. The jury found in 

favor of UCLA on the age discrimination claims and Dr. PinterBrown does not appeal these verdicts. Accordingly, we omit 

discussion of the facts underlying these claims and the theories 

upon which both parties argued them.

Dr. Pinter-Brown proceeded on two theories with respect to 

her gender discrimination claim. She argued she was subjected 

to an adverse employment action and/or constructively 

discharged. Under both theories, she was required to prove she 

was employed by UCLA; her gender was a substantial motivating 

reason for the constructive discharge and/or the adverse 

employment action; she was harmed; and UCLA’s conduct was a 

substantial factor in causing her harm. To prove she was 

subjected to an adverse employment action, Dr. Pinter-Brown 

had to prove UCLA took an action or engaged in a course or 

pattern of conduct that, taken as a whole, materially and 

adversely affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of her 

employment. To prove constructive discharge, Dr. Pinter-Brown 

had to prove UCLA, through its officers, directors, managing 

agents or supervisory employees, intentionally created or 

knowingly permitted working conditions so intolerable a 

reasonable person in her position would have no reasonable 

alternative except to resign.

On December 19, 2017, UCLA filed a motion in limine 

seeking to exclude “me too” evidence, that is, evidence, testimony, 

or reference to alleged mistreatment of employees other than Dr.
5

Pinter-Brown by UCLA, “including evidence and testimony 

referencing other claims, lawsuits, investigations, complaints, or 

grievances” involving UCLA or its employees. The court denied 

the motion on January 16, 2018.

II. The Court’s Remarks to the Prospective Jurors

Jury trial commenced on January 29, 2018. As the 

prospective jurors sat in the courtroom, the trial court stated: 

“The arc of the moral universe is long. Dr. Martin Luther King 

said these words in 1965. The arc of the moral universe is long, 

but it bends toward justice.” The court welcomed the jurors, 

saying, “[i]f you are selected as a juror in this case, your job will 

be to help bend that arc toward justice.” He then told the jurors 

Martin Luther King stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in 

1963 and gave his famous “I Have a Dream” speech. “In there,” 

the court continued, “he spoke of his dream that someday we 

would live in a society where people were judged by the content of 

their character and not by the color of their skins.” The court 

then proceeded to play a video (not part of the record on appeal) 

and continued to give the prospective jurors a presentation about 

various noted civil rights leaders standing up for justice 

throughout history. A verbatim transcript of the court’s remarks 

is attached to this opinion as Appendix A, starting on page 70. 

What follows here is a summary of the court’s remarks.

The court discussed segregation, people being denied the 

right to vote, and the tens of thousands of people who 

demonstrated for equal rights for African-Americans in the 

march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama during the civil 

rights movement. The court discussed Rosa Parks and her arrest 

and conviction for sitting in the front of a bus, which led to a 

widespread community response in protest. The court told the 
6

jury that Parks’s attorneys filed a lawsuit that went up to the 

United States Supreme Court, which held segregation on buses 

illegal.

The court talked about Elizabeth Jennings, who refused to 

disembark a trolley in New York City in 1854 after the driver 

told her to wait for a car for non-white people. The court told the 

jurors that her attorney took her case to an all-white jury, which 

found the trolley car company had mistreated Jennings and 

awarded her one year’s salary. The court then informed the jury 

that the young attorney who represented Jennings went on to

become the President of the United States 27 years later.

The court told the jury how Susan B. Anthony voted in a 

national election before women won suffrage, was arrested, and 

then acquitted and ordered to pay a $100 fine. “So she stood up 

in court and said she would never pay a penny of that unjust fine, 

and she died 25 years later. She still hadn’t paid the fine, but 

women still didn’t have the right to vote.” The court then 

mentioned the first woman elected to Congress, Jeannette 

Rankin, and the first demonstration in front of the White House 

for women’s suffrage. “[F]inally, 1920, the next year,” the court 

continued, “Congress passed the 19th Amendment. It was 

ratified by the States and women gained the right to vote. That 

arc is long, it does bend toward justice.”

The court then told the jury about Japanese internment 

camps during World War II and Fred Korematsu, convicted for 

resisting internment. The court discussed the Supreme Court’s 

initial affirmance of his conviction, the eventual reversal of that 

conviction, Congress’s decision to award reparations to interned 

Japanese-Americans, and Ronald Reagan’s proclamation 
7

apologizing for the internment. Again, the court stated, “[t]hat 

arc is long, it does bend toward justice.”

The court told the jury about Dolores Huerta and Cesar 

Chavez who, the court stated, “appeared . . . directly in this court 

many times” and brought attention to “the plight of the poorest of 

the poor here in California, the Mexican-American and FilipinoAmerican farm workers who were being denied their basic rights 

under the law.” The court told the jury that Huerta and Chavez 

sometimes appeared as plaintiffs and sometimes as defendants, 

“each time seeking justice for people just like you sitting here on 

a jury.”

The court told the jury about Harvey Milk, the first openly 

gay public official in the United States, and his assassination by 

a member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. “He didn’t 

get to see that just . . . two and a half years ago, our Supreme 

Court ruled that discrimination against gays and lesbians was 

unconstitutional, that gays and lesbians, like everyone else, had 

the right to marry and raise a family.”

The judge told the jury he was honored to sit before “the 

people who are going to be bending that arc.” The court then 

clarified: “Now, why do I talk to you about Dr. King and bending 

the arc? Is the plaintiff in this case a Dr. King or a Rosa Parks or 

Elizabeth Jennings? No. Is the defendant in this case a Dr. King 

or Susan B. Anthony or Cesar Chavez? No. But you as jurors in 

this case are going to become Dr. King. It’s going to be your job to 

help bend that arc toward justice by rendering a verdict based on 

the law and the evidence that you are going to be hearing in this 

case.”
8

The court then concluded its presentation by reciting a 

passage from Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird in which 

attorney Atticus Finch tells the jury, “a court is only as sound as 

its jury, and a jury is only as sound as the men and women who 

make it up.” The court then swore in the members of the jury 

panel. Attorneys for each party then briefly introduced 

themselves to the panel and jury selection began.

After a break, UCLA requested a mistrial, noting the 

court’s presentation “lauded this country’s struggle with 

discrimination on the basis of a number of protected bases, 

including gender, through the highlight of individuals who stood 

up for themselves against others including governments and 

institutions.” UCLA expressed its concern that the presentation 

created a “great risk” that the prospective jurors were 

“preconditioned” to a determination of the facts. “I think the 

suggestion of an arc of justice,” UCLA argued, “in this particular 

case, [is] not appropriate for [an] individual who’s going to argue 

that she stood up against an institution and a bunch of men and 

somehow she was harmed and wronged and this is her day on the 

bus or in the suffragette movement, what have you.” UCLA 

stated it did not believe any admonition could cure the problem, 

and asked the court to pull another jury panel.

The court denied the motion. The judge stated he gives the 

presentation before all the trials in his courtroom, and that 

“sometimes justice is done by the jurors ruling on behalf of the 

plaintiffs,” and “sometimes justice is done by the jurors ruling on 

behalf of the defendants.” The judge said his presentation was a 

correct statement of the law and that he did not believe the 

presentation prejudiced the jury.
9

III. The Trial

Dr. Pinter-Brown argued UCLA discriminated against her 

based on her gender from 2008 to 2015. During those years, she 

argued, one of her colleagues continually harassed, disrespected, 

and intimidated her, obstructed her ability to do clinical research, 

and physically intimidated her. She argued the people to whom 

she went for help behaved as sexists, refused to investigate her 

complaints, and denied any of her problems were due to her 

gender. Instead, she alleged, these powerful doctors framed the 

issue as an interpersonal conflict between two colleagues. Dr.

Pinter-Brown argued that after she complained about the 

discrimination, her superiors began to nitpick and insult her 

before they ultimately suspended her research privileges, 

obstructed her research trials, blamed her for mistakes that were 

not her fault, removed her as Director of UCLA’s Lymphoma 

Program, and then gave that title to the very man who had 

harassed and intimidated her for years.

We provide an overview of the testimony and evidence 

provided by both parties at trial.

A. Dr. Pinter-Brown Encounters Problems with Dr. de 

Vos and Her Supervisors Do Not Help.

In June 2005, Dr. Pinter-Brown was hired by the UCLA 

School of Medicine as Clinical Professor of Medicine and Director 

of the Lymphoma Program in the Division of HematologyOncology. At the time of her appointment to UCLA, Dr. PinterBrown had built an international reputation as an expert in Tcell lymphoma. There were two other doctors in the Lymphoma 

Program: Dr. Sven de Vos and Dr. John Timmerman. Dr.

Herbert Eradat joined the Program one year later.
10

1. Dr. Pinter-Brown’s Testimony

According to Dr. Pinter-Brown, Dr. de Vos frequently called 

her and came to her clinic during her first three months directing

the Lymphoma Program. Eventually, she had to tell Dr. de Vos

she was busy and did not “have time for that.” Dr. PinterBrown’s relationship with Dr. de Vos then became “acrimonious.” 

Dr. de Vos became “oppositional,” “disrespectful,” and disruptive 

at meetings, even screaming at her a few times. Dr. de Vos

would refuse to make eye contact with Dr. Pinter-Brown, talk 

over her, and interrupt her to the point where she could not 

finish a sentence. At some meetings, Dr. de Vos would tap his 

foot rapidly, keep looking at the clock, and stare at his phone 

“like [Dr. Pinter-Brown] was wasting his time.” At one meeting, 

Dr. de Vos turned his chair around so that Dr. Pinter-Brown 

faced his back across the table.

Dr. de Vos would not follow the instructions Dr. PinterBrown gave to the Lymphoma Program doctors to prepare for 

meetings. And, although all the doctors were supposed to vote on 

which clinical trials to undertake, Dr. de Vos would commit to 

doing trials without clearing it with the other doctors.

Dr. de Vos started trying to humiliate Dr. Pinter-Brown at 

monthly meetings that he ran for approximately 50 to 60 doctors. 

Because she had so many patients, Dr. Pinter-Brown testified, 

she always arrived late and would come into the meeting with 

her food. As she would ascend the stairs to find a seat, Dr. de Vos

would ask, “Lauren, what do you think about this case,” even 

though she had been absent during the presentation of the case. 

“I’m trying to sit in a seat,” Dr. Pinter-Brown testified, “and 

everybody would turn around, and it got to be kind of a running 

joke. They would titter and giggle and it was humiliating. I was 
11

trying to establish myself in this institution as somebody that 

should be respected because I know about lymphomas, and I’m 

trying to create a program with my colleagues. It was like I was 

the butt of a joke.”

Dr. de Vos called her by her first name at large conferences 

with doctors, but referred to male doctors by their doctor title and 

last name. Dr. de Vos did not behave with male doctors the way 

he behaved with her. Instead, he was “totally engaged” with the 

other doctors in the Lymphoma Program, and would look them in 

the eye when he spoke with them. Dr. de Vos was “deferential” 

and “ingratiating” with Dr. Dennis Slamon, and Dr. John Glaspy, 

the Chief and Assistant Chief, respectively, of the Division of 

Hematology and Oncology.

Approximately 18 months into her directorship, Dr. PinterBrown complained to Drs. Slamon and Glaspy about Dr. de Vos. 

She told them he was harassing her, repeatedly challenging her 

authority, and interfering with her ability to lead the Lymphoma 

Program. In a meeting with Dr. Glaspy, she offered to resign 

from the directorship or to break off from the group and work on 

T-cell lymphoma on her own, but he dissuaded her. He also told 

her it was not her job to “boss the guys around.” Both Dr. Glaspy 

and Dr. Slamon told her if she were a better leader, Dr. de Vos

would not act the way he did.

In early 2011, six years into her directorship, Dr. PinterBrown came into the lymphoma clinic and proceeded to sit at an 

open desk to work on some charts. Dr. de Vos, who was sitting 

nearby, turned to her and said, “You can’t sit there. I want the 

fellow to sit there.” This alarmed Dr. Pinter-Brown because she 

was the Director of the Lymphoma Program. This behavior was 

“very unusual” because academic medicine is “a little, tiny bit 
12

like the military,” in where members are expected to act 

according to rank. She could not imagine herself, she testified, 

asking an attending physician or faculty member to get up for a 

fellow to sit down.

In March 2011, Dr. Pinter-Brown noticed that somebody 

was putting her stacks of patient charts, which she placed on a 

desk in a small office of the clinic, on the floor in a different order. 

Because Dr. Pinter-Brown had back problems, she would have to 

ask for help picking up the charts from the floor. After asking 

the other doctors whether they moved her charts, Dr. PinterBrown deduced Dr. de Vos had been moving her charts to the 

floor. Dr. Pinter-Brown approached Dr. de Vos one day in the 

small clinic office and asked why he was moving her charts. He 

replied he needed to use the desk where she placed the charts to 

set up a printer. Then, Dr. de Vos suddenly whipped around in 

his chair, pointed his finger in her face, and aggressively 

questioned her about whether she completed a physical exam on 

a trial patient. After Dr. de Vos turned his back to her, Dr.

Pinter-Brown decided she wanted to leave the room. She picked 

up her purse and tapped Dr. de Vos’s shoulder to let him know 

she was leaving. Dr. de Vos then stood up with his mouth and 

fists clenched in a “menacing position” and said, “don’t touch me 

like that.” Dr. Pinter-Brown then said, “this is the last time you 

are going to harass me,” and ran out of the office.

Dr. Pinter-Brown then called Ms. Sherri Simpson, a senior 

administrative analyst at the Department of Medicine and asked 

for advice on how to handle a situation she found “increasingly 

hostile.” Ms. Simpson suggested Dr. Pinter-Brown contact Dr.

Slamon or Dr. Glaspy. Dr. Pinter-Brown spoke with Dr. Glaspy,

who asked her if she wanted to break off from the group and 
13

work on T- and B-cell lymphoma on her own. She explained that 

option was no longer viable because she had become nationally 

known in her field and did not feel she should have to take on a 

lesser job because of the situation. Dr. Glaspy referred Dr.

Pinter-Brown to Dr. Jan Tillisch, whom Dr. Glaspy identified as a 

Title IX officer. Dr. Tillisch told Dr. Pinter-Brown to stay away 

from Dr. de Vos, and he set up a meeting with her for five to six 

days later.

In the meantime, Dr. Pinter-Brown wrote a statement 

detailing her history with Dr. de Vos and emailed it to Dr.

Tillisch. Dr. Pinter-Brown laid out the above-described 

complaints, admitted that sometimes their discussions at 

program meetings were “quite heated,” and stated she abruptly 

discontinued meetings several times when she thought the 

discussion was out of control. Dr. Pinter-Brown concluded the 

statement by saying she felt her situation was “pervasive, . . . 

chronic, recurring and cumulative, culminating in an episode that 

made me feel that I was in an increasingly hostile work 

environment and in a situation where I felt fearful and unsafe.” 

Dr. Pinter-Brown stated she had to work for six years with a 

colleague from whom she perceived “a pattern of intimidation 

[and] opposition,” in which she was “demeaned and not treated in 

a collegial manner.”

When she arrived at the meeting with Dr. Tillisch, he told 

her she had a reputation as an “angry woman.” Dr. Tillisch 

related to Dr. Pinter-Brown an incident where they had a patient 

in common and Dr. Tillisch had not liked “what [she was] doing” 

with the patient. Dr. Tillisch told Dr. Pinter-Brown she did not 

acknowledge him, appeared to not know who he was, and treated 

him “like a medical student.” Dr. Pinter-Brown clarified that she 
14

did know who he was because she lived across the street from 

him at some point in the past. She offered some details about 

their families, indicating she knew who he was. Dr. Tillisch then 

“chang[ed] his tune,” and stated, “[w]ell, you’re right. If you were 

a man, we would just say your behavior is assertive.” Dr. Tillisch 

then told her his daughter was a physician at UCLA and faced 

discrimination there. “He understood that it’s hard to be a 

woman.” Dr. Pinter-Brown further testified Dr. Tillisch told her 

male doctors referred to his daughter by her first name, but 

referred to male physicians by their doctor title.

Dr. Pinter-Brown then asked Dr. Tillisch to put her in 

touch with two female physicians if he felt she did not know how

to handle herself, in the hope they could show her how to do “a 

better job.” At the end of the meeting, Dr. Tillisch again told Dr.

Pinter-Brown to stay away from Dr. de Vos. When Dr. PinterBrown stated that was not a good idea since they worked 

together, Dr. Tillisch told her he would speak more with Dr.

Glaspy and Dr. Slamon and try to develop a better solution. At 

some point during the meeting, Dr. Tillisch took Dr. PinterBrown’s written statement, dropped it into the bottom drawer of 

his desk, said “no one needs to know about this,” and closed the 

drawer.

After 10 days had passed without hearing from Dr. Tillisch, 

Dr. Pinter-Brown called him. He did not return her call. She 

eventually had two more brief meetings with Dr. Tillisch. He

ultimately told her there was no solution to the situation, and she

should keep avoiding Dr. de Vos. At some point during her 

communications with him, Dr. Tillisch told Dr. Pinter-Brown, 

“Just because you’re a diva doesn’t mean you can act like one.” 

Dr. Pinter-Brown attempted to avoid Dr. de Vos as much as 
15

possible from that point on, but he continued to “give [her]

attitude” and “rage” on occasions when they did interact. Dr.

Pinter-Brown stated Dr. de Vos would “parade past [her] area” in 

the clinic even though there was a shorter way to get where he 

was going and ask her questions while she was in the middle of 

seeing patients.

Dr. Tillisch did not do anything to help resolve her 

problems with Dr. de Vos. Dr. Pinter-Brown complained again to 

Dr. Glaspy and Dr. Slamon, but they “shut [her] down.” At a 

salary negotiation meeting, for example, Dr. Pinter-Brown told 

Dr. Slamon: “I don’t think you understand. I’ve worked for the 

County of Los Angeles for 25 years. I saw murderers in the jail 

ward. I know what people look like when they are out of control. 

And I am very hard to intimidate. When I tell you that I was 

frightened, I really mean it.” Presumably, Dr. Pinter-Brown was 

referring to the March 2011 incident in the small office with Dr.

de Vos. Dr. Pinter-Brown tried multiple times to get Dr. Slamon 

to take her seriously. During one conversation, Dr. Slamon told 

Dr. Pinter-Brown, “I don’t need to hear this story from you. I 

already heard it from de Vos. Sometimes I am in meetings where 

people don’t like me and I don’t like them and you just have to 

suck it up.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown testified that in at least half of her 

annual salary negotiation meetings, and in additional individual 

meetings, she told both Dr. Glaspy and Dr. Slamon that she felt 

harassed by Dr. de Vos. At one of the meetings, Dr. Glaspy told 

Dr. Pinter-Brown, “Everyone hates you.” Dr. Slamon told Dr.

Pinter-Brown she was not a team player and, without 

investigating the issue first, accused her of not putting patients 

on other people’s protocols. When Dr. Pinter-Brown asked Dr.
16

Slamon whether he could substantiate the claim she was not 

putting patients on other physicians’ protocols, Dr. Slamon 

replied, “No, but we are going to, and if I find out that you are not 

putting people in other people’s protocols, I will isolate you.” Dr.

Slamon also criticized Dr. Pinter-Brown’s leadership skills and 

told her that if she were a better leader, “Dr. de Vos wouldn’t act 

up that way.”2

Having no success with Dr. Slamon or Dr. Glaspy, Chief 

and Assistant Chief of her division, Dr. Pinter-Brown approached 

Dr. Jonathan Hiatt, Dean of Faculty. The problems were still 

occurring with Dr. de Vos and staying away from him was not 

tenable for her. When she and Dr. Hiatt met in March 2012, Dr.

Hiatt told her she came to the right person and he would do 

everything he could to help her. Dr. Pinter-Brown told Dr. Hiatt 

it was ironic Dr. Tillisch, a Title IX investigator, made sexist 

comments calling her an angry woman and a diva, and telling her

she would be treated differently if she were a man. Dr. Hiatt 

stated the first step was for him to call Dr. Fogelman, Chief of 

Medicine. At some point thereafter, Dr. Hiatt told Dr. PinterBrown he had spoken to Dr. Fogelman, who stated he would start 

an investigation.

In June 2012, Dr. Tillisch notified Dr. Pinter-Brown he had 

scheduled a meeting for her with two female faculty: Dr. Currier 

and Dr. Pregler. Dr. Pinter-Brown again sent Dr. Tillisch the 

2 Dr. Pinter-Brown provided conflicting testimony about the 

date of this interaction with Dr. Slamon. Early in trial, she 

testified this interaction took place in the last 18 months before 

she left UCLA in December 2015. Toward the end of trial, 

however, she testified this occurred during a 2011 salary 

negotiation meeting.
17

statement she prepared for her first meeting with him, along 

with a follow-up about what had occurred in the meantime, and 

asked Dr. Tillisch to pass the statements along to those who 

would be at the meeting so they would understand her concerns. 

When Dr. Pinter-Brown arrived at the meeting, Dr. Currier and 

Dr. Pregler said they had received no statements. Dr. Pregler 

suggested Dr. Pinter-Brown contact the ombudsman about her 

concerns with Dr. de Vos in part to determine whether the 

ombudsman had received similar complaints from others about 

Dr. de Vos. Dr. Pinter-Brown replied she would be surprised if 

anybody else at UCLA would go through the process of trying to 

get help because it was so “demeaning and hurtful.” Dr. Tillisch 

told everyone at the meeting not to call the ombudsman. He 

asked Dr. Pinter-Brown to leave while he and the other two 

doctors discussed the issue. Dr. Pinter-Brown followed up twice 

in the coming weeks to inquire about the investigation. Dr.

Tillisch told her if she “really wanted to know, the bottom line”

was Dr. Slamon should have told Dr. Pinter-Brown what her 

duties were as the director.

2. Ms. Sherri Simpson’s Testimony

Sherri Simpson worked at the UCLA Medical School for 

approximately 40 years and retired in 2013. Ms. Simpson was 

the administrator of a fellowship program and handled faculty 

salaries. She was present at Dr. Pinter-Brown’s yearly reviews 

and salary negotiation meetings. Also present were Dr. Slamon 

and Dr. Glaspy. Dr. Pinter-Brown was consistently lauded as an 

outstanding doctor. She had earned an international reputation 

as a leader in the field of lymphoma.

As the years went by, Ms. Simpson heard Dr. Pinter-Brown 

raise concerns in her review and salary negotiation meetings 
18

about harassment by Dr. de Vos. Ms. Simpson described her own 

early interactions with Dr. de Vos, before Dr. Pinter-Brown joined 

UCLA, as unpleasant. He was very forceful and wanted Ms. 

Simpson to support his view of how his salary should be handled. 

Ms. Simpson felt he was misogynistic and expected women to be 

submissive to men. Ms. Simpson heard Dr. Pinter-Brown raise 

similar concerns about how Dr. de Vos treated her, specifically 

that Dr. de Vos was “ignoring her directives” and her 

“supervisory authority,” and was “undermining her work.” 

According to Ms. Simpson, Dr. Slamon and Dr. Glaspy told Dr.

Pinter-Brown they would talk to Dr. de Vos and take care of the 

problem, but they never did anything. Ultimately, Ms. Simpson 

testified, she saw Dr. Glaspy and Dr. Slamon fail Dr. PinterBrown in preventing the discrimination and harassment she 

faced.

Ms. Simpson observed Dr. Slamon and Dr. Glaspy 

reprimand Dr. de Vos, telling him, “you have to cut out this shit.” 

Dr. de Vos did not seem to take the admonishment seriously and 

maintained an attitude that he would do what he wanted. Ms. 

Simpson also observed Dr. de Vos behaving obsequiously toward 

Dr. Slamon and Dr. Glaspy in salary negotiation meetings, which 

she found inappropriate.

Ms. Simpson believed Dr. de Vos’s sexism had something to 

do with the fact that he is German. She testified she is German 

and some of her male relatives do not think women belong in the 

work force and should be submissive to men. Dr. de Vos, she 

testified, had a similar manner about him. Ultimately, Ms. 

Simpson came to like Dr. de Vos despite her early unpleasant 

interactions with him. By the time she left UCLA in 2013, he 

had changed his behavior, for which she was grateful.
19

Ms. Simpson described Dr. Slamon as a “very, very nice 

man” who “made all of the people in the administration offices 

feel like they were part of something.” She also testified she had 

a high opinion of Dr. Glaspy, whom she described as very nice. 

Ms. Simpson also stated she was on a first-name basis with all 

the doctors in the Hematology and Oncology Division.

3. Dr. Glaspy’s Testimony

Dr. Glaspy, Assistant Chief of the Hematology and Oncology 

Division, testified that the Lymphoma Program’s directorship 

was a responsibility rather than a power. Dr. Glaspy stated the 

director’s job is to organize the group’s meetings, oversee the 

business of the clinical research, and help the group decide which 

clinical protocols to undertake, which requires a consensus 

among the group’s doctors. 

Dr. Glaspy testified Dr. de Vos and Dr. Pinter-Brown 

frequently complained to him about each another. Although 

there were periods when everything seemed fine, there were also 

times they each complained the other was disrespectful and 

hostile. Dr. Glaspy testified Dr. Pinter-Brown complained about 

Dr. de Vos looking at his cell phone or turning his chair around at 

meetings and Dr. de Vos complained Dr. Pinter-Brown would not 

approve his protocols.

Dr. Glaspy testified Dr. Pinter-Brown complained about Dr.

de Vos two to three times between 2008 and 2012. Dr. Glaspy 

communicated Dr. Pinter-Brown’s complaints to Dr. de Vos as of 

February 2011. Dr. Glaspy stated Dr. Pinter-Brown told him 

about the March 2011 incident in which Dr. de Vos yelled at her. 

He believed it was Dr. Pinter-Brown who mentioned Title IX. Dr.

Glaspy asked if she wanted to pursue her complaint as a Title IX 

issue and referred her to Dr. Tillisch. Dr. Glaspy learned both 
20

Dr. de Vos and Dr. Pinter-Brown had been in contact with Dr.

Tillisch, so he did not investigate the issue any further. In his 

view, Dr. Pinter-Brown and Dr. de Vos simply did not get along.

Dr. Glaspy testified Dr. Pinter-Brown also complained to 

him about two other male faculty members at UCLA. She 

complained one of the doctors was disrespectful; when Dr. Glaspy 

spoke to the doctor, the doctor stated Dr. Pinter-Brown had been 

disrespectful and dismissive of him. Dr. Pinter-Brown also 

complained about another male doctor who was “gruff.” The 

other doctor said the same about Dr. Pinter-Brown. Dr. Glaspy 

stated she and the other doctor did not have a collegial 

relationship.

4. Dr. Slamon’s Testimony

Dr. Slamon, Chief of the Division, also testified about the 

nature of the directorship of the Lymphoma Program. He stated 

Dr. de Vos was not Dr. Pinter-Brown’s subordinate, even though 

Dr. Pinter-Brown led the program. Dr. Slamon stated directors 

serve the group, the group does not report to them, and directors 

do not have the authority to decide the direction of the program. 

Nor is the director supposed to give orders to the members of the 

group. Rather, the director organizes group meetings, engages 

the group, and facilitates group discussions about what direction 

the program should take. The director does not have the 

authority to tell the group members what to do or give them 

orders. “This is not a military organization,” Dr. Slamon 

testified; rather, the group was instructed to make decisions by 

consensus.

Dr. Slamon testified he did not recall Dr. Pinter-Brown 

using the word “harassment” or characterizing her problems with 

Dr. de Vos as gender-specific when she complained about Dr. de 
21

Vos. Dr. Pinter-Brown and Dr. de Vos had a very poor 

relationship and he admonished both of them individually. Dr.

Slamon was very disappointed with their behavior. “I found that 

I had two faculty members,” Dr. Slamon testified, “highly-paid, 

highly-educated faculty members who were behaving like 

preschoolers.” Dr. Slamon stated he confirmed with other 

members of the Lymphoma Program that Dr. Pinter-Brown 

displayed the same behaviors as Dr. de Vos: she was 

argumentative and behaved inappropriately in making program 

decisions. After the group would reach a consensus about one of 

Dr. de Vos’s proposed trials, for example, she would continue to 

argue his ideas were not valid. Other members of the group 

approached Dr. Slamon and told him this made them 

uncomfortable.

Dr. Slamon also testified he calls all his faculty by their 

first name and asks them to call him by his first name.

5. Dr. Timmerman’s Testimony

Dr. Timmerman, a member of the Lymphoma Program, 

testified Dr. Pinter-Brown and Dr. de Vos did not get along. He 

stated they often bickered and contradicted each other, which 

was disruptive to the functioning of the group. Dr. Timmerman 

also corroborated Dr. Glaspy’s and Dr. Slamon’s testimony that 

the director of the Lymphoma Program is not in a supervisory 

position over the other members of the group. Each doctor 

functions individually and the director’s role is to facilitate the 

administrative details that help the group run smoothly and help 

faculty members reach their goals. Being a director is a “loose”

title; there is no hierarchy within the Lymphoma Program. Dr.

Timmerman also noted although Dr. Pinter-Brown was a great 

clinician and doctor, the administrative role was not her “forte.”
22

6. Dr. de Vos’s Testimony

Dr. de Vos testified that, about a year into her directorship, 

Dr. Pinter-Brown began opposing trials he would try to bring into

the Lymphoma Program. They had heated discussions when 

they disagreed, he would become irritated at the tone of the 

discussions, and it became known they did not like each other. 

Dr. de Vos complained to Dr. Glaspy, Dr. Slamon, and another 

doctor that he was irritated with Dr. Pinter-Brown’s efforts to 

stop him from doing the trials he wished to undertake.

7. Dr. Hiatt’s Testimony

Dr. Hiatt, Dean of Faculty, testified he met with Dr. PinterBrown once, had several telephone conversations with her, and 

had an extended email exchange with her over a period of 

months. Over the course of these communications, Dr. Hiatt 

stated, she never alleged harassment, discrimination, or 

retaliation to him directly. He did acknowledge that according to 

his notes from his face-to-face meeting with Dr. Pinter-Brown, 

Dr. Pinter-Brown told him Dr. Tillisch had admitted there were 

“different standard[s] for a man regarding behavior.” Dr. Hiatt 

also testified Dr. Tillisch was not a Title IX officer but became 

aware that some people in the Department thought he was.

Dr. Hiatt was asked why he did not refer Dr. Pinter-Brown 

to the true Title IX officer, knowing Dr. Tillisch told Dr. PinterBrown there were different standards for men and woman. He 

reiterated Dr. Pinter-Brown did not frame her issues as genderspecific and stated he did not know at the time that Dr. PinterBrown was told Dr. Tillisch was a Title IX officer. Dr. Hiatt 

testified Dr. Pinter-Brown’s chief complaint was that she was 

being retaliated against for complaining about Dr. de Vos in 

2011.
23

8. Dr. Pregler’s Testimony

Dr. Pregler testified Dr. Tillisch reached out to her and 

another senior female faculty member, Dr. Currier, to help him 

evaluate Dr. Pinter-Brown’s issues. Dr. Pregler stated the 

normal procedure would have been for Dr. Tillisch to complete 

the investigation himself and move forward with a decision. 

Since this issue involved a female faculty member, however, Dr.

Tillisch thought speaking with senior female faculty members 

would help Dr. Pinter-Brown express any gender-related 

concerns.

Dr. Pregler testified she and Dr. Currier met with Dr.

Pinter-Brown for approximately one hour. Exhibits indicate the 

meeting occurred sometime between March 2011 and July 12, 

2012. After Dr. Pinter-Brown described her concerns, Dr. Pregler 

asked her specifically whether she felt any of it was related to her 

gender, and whether she thought her concerns should be taken 

outside the department to the ombudsman, who dealt with 

gender discrimination issues. Dr. Pregler recalled very clearly 

that Dr. Pinter-Brown said she did not feel her issues were 

related to gender, things were improving, and she did not feel

that reaching out to the ombudsman “regarding gender issues 

was appropriate or something that she wanted to do.” Dr.

Pregler left the meeting believing Dr. Pinter-Brown was not 

concerned she was being treated differently because she was a 

woman.

Dr. Pregler testified she was aware Dr. Pinter-Brown had 

felt physically intimidated by Dr. de Vos, which was why she 

pressed Dr. Pinter-Brown on the gender issue to make sure she 

did not want to go to the ombudsman. Dr. Pregler also stated 

when she went to the meeting, she was “very open to the 
24

possibility” that Dr. Pinter-Brown’s complaints could be gender 

related because throughout her career she felt strongly about 

fighting gender discrimination. Dr. Pregler testified she 

respected Dr. Pinter-Brown as a colleague and accepted as true 

Dr. Pinter-Brown’s statements that the issues with Dr. de Vos

were not related to her gender.

9. Ms. Venegas’s Testimony

Ms. Yanina Venegas was the Assistant Director of the 

Division of Hematology and Oncology, responsible for all 

administrative and financial matters. She worked directly under 

the Chief Operating Officer of UC Health. Ms. Venegas attended 

all of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s salary negotiation meetings, along with 

Ms. Simpson. When asked whether Dr. Pinter-Brown ever 

claimed that she was being harassed by Dr. de Vos, Ms. Venegas 

replied, “Absolutely not.” She recalls discussions about 

disagreements the two doctors had about clinical studies, but 

never got the impression Dr. Pinter-Brown felt she was a target 

of discrimination. Had Dr. Pinter-Brown made such a claim, Ms. 

Venegas testified, “that is something that we would have 

addressed immediately.”

B. UCLA’s Oversight of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s Research

Most of the meetings and events described above occurred 

no later than the end of 2012. Dr. Pinter-Brown argued at trial 

that UCLA retaliated against her for complaining about Dr. de 

Vos by subjecting her to audits of her clinical trials, which 

ultimately led to the temporary suspension of her research 

privileges and the loss of her title as Director of the Lymphoma 

Program. UCLA countered Dr. Pinter-Brown’s allegation by 

presenting evidence of what it considered significant, ongoing 
25

problems with Dr. Pinter-Brown’s research and clinical trial 

activities.

1. How UCLA Oversees and Monitors Clinical Trials

Before discussing the evidence presented at trial about the 

audits of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s clinical trials and the resulting 

consequences, an overview of the process by which UCLA 

monitors its clinical trials is warranted.

As part of its health campus, UCLA has a Jonsson 

Comprehensive Cancer Center (Cancer Center). The doctors at 

the Cancer Center conduct clinical trials. A clinical trial is a 

research study that explores whether a new medication is safe 

and effective for humans. It is led by a “principal investigator” 

who is responsible for everything that happens as part of the 

study. Clinical trials are closely controlled as they are 

experiments, which often involve a treatment that is new and 

unproven. For each clinical trial, a “protocol” is established 

which must be strictly adhered to. The protocol establishes a 

plan for treating participants safely, including exacting detail 

about the amount of medication to be administered and 

instructions for adjusting the dosage where necessary. If “serious 

adverse events” occur, the protocol typically requires the 

principal investigator to report the event to the trial sponsor 

within 24 hours.

A quality assurance team within the Cancer Center 

monitors and audits the Lymphoma Program’s clinical trials. 

Monitoring of clinical trials by the quality assurance team 

happens in real time; as the trial is progressing, the team looks 

at the data, compares it to the research protocol to make sure 

everything is on track, and makes sure there are no deficiencies. 

Each trial has its own schedule to determine how often the trial 
26

is monitored. There should be no significant deviations from the 

protocol because the resulting data would be meaningless. 

Monitoring reports are generated and given to the principal 

investigators of the trials, who are expected to resolve any issues 

by the time of the yearly audit.

Audits are a routine part of clinical trial research, and their 

purpose is to identify potential mistakes and problems. Audits 

occur yearly. The ultimate goals are patient safety and data

integrity. Audits are also conducted to make sure the FDA does 

not find significant issues with the conduct of clinical trials 

because if it does, it can bar an investigator from doing research. 

The FDA can also put a hold on the entire institution and bar the 

institution from conducting more trials.

If there are issues identified in monitoring reports that are 

not resolved by the time of the yearly audit, a clinical monitor 

will sit down with the principal investigator, go through all the 

findings, and give the investigator time to resolve the problems. 

Anything that is not resolved by the end of the audit then gets 

put into an audit report. The report is sent to the principal

investigator, who is expected to address point by point each issue 

not resolved by the time of the audit. 

UCLA has two committees responsible for oversight of 

different aspects of clinical trials. For clinical trials initiated by a 

faculty member and not sponsored by a pharmaceutical company 

(which sends its own monitors), these monitoring and auditing 

activities are overseen by UCLA’s Data and Safety Monitoring 

Board (DSMB). The DSMB oversees the data acquisition in 

clinical trials with a focus on patient safety. The DSMB meets 

regularly to process “adverse event” notifications – the disclosure 

that a principal investigator must file for each event (such as a 
27

side effect) involving patient safety. It also reviews audit 

problems and ensures principal investigators respond to them. 

During the period at issue here, the DSMB consisted of about 

20 doctors, nurses, statisticians, and administrators. Dr. de Vos

had been Chair of the DSMB since 2007.

The second committee is the Internal Scientific Peer 

Review Committee (ISPRC), set up by a mandate from the 

National Institutes of Health to closely review protocols for all 

clinical trials funded through a federal cancer center grant. It 

approves clinical studies and controls faculty research privileges. 

The ISPRC ensures the protocols make sense mathematically and 

patient risk is kept to a minimum. The ISPRC has at least 

10 members representing various divisions within the 

Department of Medicine. It has broad representation from all 

the clinical departments that treat cancer. Between 2010 and

2012, it had about 20 members.

Audit reports are sent to the DSMB and the ISPRC; the

reports list where a researcher fell short. There are always 

deficiencies and discrepancies found in clinical trial audits. One 

of the most important issues is how the principal investigator 

responds to the identified issues. When the ISPRC receives audit 

reports, it looks for whether there are repeated problems that 

were identified in the past but are not resolving. The ISPRC 

then decides whether more action is necessary. Sometimes the 

ISPRC will assign a proctor to a researcher who is repeatedly 

making the same mistakes; other times it may suspend a faculty 

member’s research privileges.
28

2. Audits of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s Clinical Trials, 

Temporary Suspension of Her Research Privileges, 

and Loss of Her Title as Director of the Lymphoma 

Program

Dr. Sujna Raval-Fernandes oversaw clinical trials for the 

Cancer Center from 2007 to 2017 and conducted numerous audits 

of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s trials. She testified there were no concerns 

about the audits of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s trials prior to 2010. In 

2008, for example, Dr. Raval-Fernandes found significant issues 

with one of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s trials, but Dr. Pinter-Brown 

adequately addressed the issues.

Dr. Meghan Brennan, Director of Research in the Clinical 

Research Unit, testified that in December 2010, UCLA began to 

have concerns about Dr. Pinter-Brown’s clinical trials. Dr. Judy 

Gasson and Robert Duwors, Director and Deputy Director, 

respectively, of the Cancer Center, recommended that the ISPRC

review Dr. Pinter-Brown’s audits. Among the concerns were Dr.

Pinter-Brown was “extraordinarily delayed” in responding to 

serious questions about medication dosages, and her response to 

their question about a dose reduction was nonsensical. Another 

serious concern was that Dr. Pinter-Brown had instructed her 

staff not to wait for insurance authorization before seeing a 

patient which, as discussed further below, is a serious violation of 

UCLA policy.3

3 The record includes an email Dr. Pinter-Brown sent to her 

staff on November 10, 2011, which includes the following 

sentence: “PLEASE DO NOT WAIT FOR INSURANCE 

AUTHORIZATION . . . I will see the patient for free.”
29

On February 1, 2011, the DSMB convened a meeting and 

discussed, among other things, Dr. Pinter-Brown’s October 27, 

2010 response to an audit of one of her clinical trials. The DSMB 

concluded it needed more information about a medication dose 

reduction that was done contrary to protocol because Dr. PinterBrown’s initial response was unclear, conflicting, and incomplete. 

The DSMB also indicated it wanted Dr. Pinter-Brown to provide 

assurances that she reported the violations to UCLA’s 

institutional review board. 

Dr. Raval-Fernandes was at the DSMB’s February 1, 2011 

meeting. She testified she had conducted the audit under review 

at the meeting and found treatment delays and drug dose 

reductions contrary to protocol. She stated a change in drug 

dosage contrary to the study’s protocol is very significant because 

it compromises both patient safety and data integrity. Dr. RavalFernandes presented her findings about the September 2010 

study to the ISPRC because there were “major issues” with the 

clinical trial that Dr. Pinter-Brown did not adequately address.

Dr. de Vos testified he was at the meeting, but would have 

recused himself during the discussion of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s 

audits. Dr. Glaspy also testified Dr. de Vos would have been 

excluded from the room during this discussion because, as a 

member of the Lymphoma Program, he would have been 

considered a co-investigator or “sub” principal investigator. Dr.

Raval-Fernandes testified she recalled Dr. de Vos was present 

throughout the entire meeting.

Terra Hughes, Administrative Director of the Cancer 

Center, drafted a letter from the DSMB to Dr. Pinter-Brown 

asking her to respond to these concerns and provide additional 

information. Her initial draft of the letter included Dr. de Vos’s 
30

electronic signature, and she sent it to him for his approval on 

February 4, 2011 at 9:22 a.m. At 9:36 a.m., she sent a revised 

version of the letter to Dr. Glaspy, which contained his electronic 

signature in place of Dr. de Vos’s. In her email to Dr. Glaspy, she 

stated she was asking Dr. Glaspy to sign the letter since Dr. de 

Vos was “a conflict on the study” and Dr. de Vos felt he should 

not sign the letter.

On February 9, 2011, Dr. Robert Elashoff, Chair of the 

ISPRC, wrote a letter to Dr. Pinter-Brown informing her it had 

convened a meeting on February 1, 2011 and reviewed her 

clinical research history, including audit and monitoring reports. 

The committee “expressed concern regarding patterns of 

violations and missing regulatory documents in [her] clinical 

trials” overseen by the DSMB. Dr. Elashoff informed her that 

because of these concerns, the ISPRC requested additional audits 

of two of her trials not overseen by the DSMB. 

On February 11, 2011, Dr. Raval-Fernandes followed up 

with Dr. Pinter-Brown about the audit the DSMB discussed at its 

February 1, 2011 meeting involving unauthorized drug dose 

reductions and inadequate responses. Dr. Raval-Fernandes

testified it took Dr. Pinter-Brown over four months to respond. 

And, Dr. Pinter-Brown’s responses to the dose reduction issue 

were contradictory and did not make sense. Additionally, Dr.

Pinter-Brown attributed some of the dose reductions to a 

misunderstanding on the part of the study coordinator—an 

unsatisfactory response because the principal investigator is 

expected to take responsibility for patients receiving the study 

drugs. Overall, therefore, Dr. Raval-Fernandes found Dr. PinterBrown’s responses unsatisfactory.
31

In July 2011, the ISPRC determined Dr. Pinter-Brown’s 

research conduct as a principal investigator was “lacking with 

regards to oversight and management.” Specifically, the ISPRC

found continuing problems with informed consent and Dr. PinterBrown’s “incomplete and unclear” responses to the audit findings. 

As a result, the ISPRC assigned Dr. Pinter-Brown a mentor to 

provide her with guidance, support, and re-training for six 

months.

On January 12, 2012, the ISPRC wrote Dr. Pinter-Brown a 

letter documenting its concerns about an audit of another one of 

her clinical trials. Dr. Pinter-Brown had blamed delayed study 

visits and evaluations on “insurance issues.” The ISPRC warned

her it was a “major violation” for a researcher to register a 

patient for a study without insurance because doing so could 

impede the patient’s “unfettered access to physicians and 

treatments for medical problems that arise while on clinical 

trials.” The ISPRC also told Dr. Pinter-Brown her responses 

regarding another patient were “very concerning” because she 

placed blame for a protocol deviation on her subordinate research 

staff. “It is a fundamental principle regulating clinical research 

that the investigator is ultimately responsible for all study 

procedures and adherence to protocol in all its respects,” stated 

the letter. The ISPRC further explained attributing a deficiency 

to subordinate staff “in effect means that you failed to provide 

adequate oversight of study personnel on this patient.” The 

ISPRC went on to admonish Dr. Pinter-Brown that: “This 

principle of investigator responsibility has been made clear, in 

writing to all . . . investigators, including yourself in the past. 

This breach of your duty to supervise and your apparent failure 

to understand that it is your duty, is especially disconcerting, 
32

given that it occurred during a period in which you were already 

on probation for prior breaches of investigator duty, with 

oversight for consent procedures by another faculty member.” 

The ISPRC asked Dr. Pinter-Brown for a “detailed action plan” to 

ensure the deficiencies noted during the audit will not recur. “In 

crafting your response,” the letter stated, “be aware that the 

committee believes that there are safety issues for patients 

arising out of these most recent violations and seeks to be 

convinced that protocols you supervise will be rigorously 

followed.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown was mentored for six months. On 

January 24, 2012, about two weeks after the ISPRC letter 

requesting a “detailed action plan,” Dr. Pinter-Brown’s assigned 

mentor, Dr. Bartoaz Chmielowski, submitted a detailed report to 

the ISPRC documenting his oversight of her research activities. 

He concluded she proved she would be a “skilled and responsible 

principal investigator.” Dr. Chmielowski indicated Dr. PinterBrown went through a thorough consenting process with the 

patients, maintained complete notes, regularly communicated 

with staff, and addressed problems as they arose. He 

recommended the ISPRC allow Dr. Pinter-Brown to research 

independently without a mentor.

One month later, in February 2012, ISRPC found an 

additional problem with a clinical trial for a pharmaceutical 

company. A serious adverse event occurred with one of the 

patients in a Pfizer study and Dr. Pinter-Brown failed to report it 

within the required 24 hours. On February 24, 2012, Dr. PinterBrown was told she needed to report the adverse event within the 

required time-frame; she submitted an incomplete report three 

business days later. The full report was not submitted to Pfizer 
33

until March 29, 2012. The company therefore “shut down” the 

trial.

On April 3, 2012, the ISPRC met with Dr. Pinter-Brown. 

She explained she had written up the adverse event form 

promptly and took pains to make sure it was accurate. She 

stated it had taken three days to finish the report. She stated 

she had given the report to her staff to submit and did not know 

it had been submitted so late. Dr. Glaspy therefore read the 

paragraph from the ISPRC’s January 12, 2012 letter (discussed 

above) detailing the importance of a principal investigator being 

accountable and taking personal responsibility for protocol 

deviations rather than blaming subordinate staff.

Dr. Glaspy then asked Dr. Pinter-Brown whether there had 

been significant protocol violations in her studies; she 

acknowledged there were, but disagreed any had occurred since

she completed her mentoring. Additionally, the minutes from the 

meeting reveal the ISPRC and Dr. Pinter-Brown could not agree 

on whether her failure to ascertain whether the adverse event 

report had been submitted timely constituted a breach on her 

part. Finally, at the April 3, 2012 meeting Dr. Pinter-Brown 

stated it was “not clear” from the January 12, 2012 letter that she 

was expected to provide the committee with a detailed corrective 

action plan. She apparently felt there was “room for reasonable 

minds to differ” about the meaning of a paragraph in the letter in 

which the following sentence appears: “In your response to this 

letter, please provide a detailed action plan for ensuring that the 

deficiencies noted during the audit will not recur in the future 

and that you understand and accept that you are personally 

responsible for the execution of your studies.”
34

Dr. Sara Hurvitz, a breast cancer physician at UCLA, is a 

voting member of the ISPRC and was present at the April 3, 2012

meeting. She testified that early in her career, she had a lot of 

problems with a clinical trial on which she was the principal 

investigator. She discovered multiple protocol deviations and 

was called in to the ISPRC. She was expected to explain herself 

at the meeting. She asked for guidance from more experienced 

physicians, began a clinical research course, changed her 

behavior, and was ultimately asked to sit on the ISPRC. She also 

began training new physicians and retraining more seasoned 

investigators who ran into the types of problems she did.

Dr. Hurvitz testified that, in preparation for the April 3, 

2012 meeting, she learned Dr. Pinter-Brown had repeated 

mistakes in executing the protocols on her trials and there was 

not an action plan to correct the problems. Despite being given 

multiple chances—she had at least seven audits and a 

mentorship—Dr. Pinter-Brown’s patient care in clinical trials 

was still “alarming,” particularly because Dr. Pinter-Brown did 

not report the significant adverse event to Pfizer and to UCLA’s 

ethics committee in a timely manner.

Dr. Brennan was also present at the April 3, 2012 meeting. 

She testified Dr. Pinter-Brown was not honest at the meeting 

about what transpired with respect to the adverse event. Dr.

Brennan testified that although Dr. Pinter-Brown told the 

committee the adverse event had been reported, Dr. PinterBrown had actually told Dr. Brennan she did not believe the 

event needed to be reported so she did not report it. According to 

Dr. Brennan, Dr. Pinter-Brown gave a “variety of responses that 

were not . . . consistent.”
35

There were eight doctors at the April 3, 2012 meeting, not 

including Dr. Pinter-Brown. At the end of the meeting, Dr.

Pinter-Brown was asked to leave the room so the committee could 

vote on how to proceed. Dr. Brennan had to leave the meeting at 

this point, so she did not cast a vote. The remaining seven

committee members were offered three options: (1) restore Dr.

Pinter-Brown to unsupervised principal investigator status; 

(2) provide Dr. Pinter-Brown with six more months of proctoring 

and only allow her to be involved as an investigator in clinical 

trials; and (3) revoke Dr. Pinter-Brown’s privileges to participate 

in any clinical trials for at least one year, allowing her to do 

extensive training on research methods and reapply for privileges 

in the future. None of the members voted for the first option. 

Four members voted for the second option, and three voted for 

the third.

Dr. Glaspy prepared the minutes of the meeting and sent 

them to Dr. Brennan and other members of the ISPRC. In his 

email to Dr. Brennan, he wrote: “Vote was 4 for purgatory, 3 for 

hell. Both Bob E [Robert Elashoff, ISPRC Chair] and I voted for 

the death penalty. She missed the firing squad by one vote.” In 

one of her replies, Dr. Brennan expressed frustration that Dr.

Pinter-Brown was not forthcoming about not reporting the 

adverse event and she stated, “I should have stayed and split the 

vote!”

Dr. Brennan told Dr. Glaspy she wanted to cast her vote. 

Dr. Glaspy, Dr. Gasson, head of the Cancer Center at the time, 

and Sandra Binder, a registered nurse and the Director of 

Qualify Research at UCLA, allowed Dr. Brennan to vote because 

she had been present for the entire meeting. Dr. Brennan asked 

Dr. Gasson if additional committee members who were not 
36

present at the meeting could vote; the answer was no. Dr.

Brennan voted to suspend Dr. Pinter-Brown’s privileges. Dr.

Brennan testified she asked to register her vote because she had 

been “present for all of this, and [she] had an opinion,” and she 

wanted her opinion to be heard. “I was concerned,” she testified.

Because the vote ended in a tie, which had never before 

happened in the ISPRC, Dr. Glaspy sent their findings to Dr.

Slamon at the Hematology Division and to the Cancer Center. 

The issue was brought to Dr. Fogelman, Chief of Medicine, who 

sent the findings to Dr. Michael Roth, the Department of 

Medicine’s Compliance Officer, for an independent review. Dr.

Glaspy emailed Dr. Fogelman on April 9, 2012 to let him know he 

thought it was an excellent idea to have Dr. Roth review the 

matter. Dr. Glaspy testified he thought it was an excellent idea 

because it allowed a “fresh set of eyes” to look at the issue and 

“give more due process in this tough situation.”

Dr. Roth concluded “corrective actions” would be “more 

likely to result in a positive outcome” than the complete 

suspension of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s privileges.

On July 3, 2012, the ISPRC met again and voted 

unanimously, 9-0, to suspend Dr. Pinter-Brown’s research 

privileges for one year due to “problems with the informed 

consent process, missing source documentation, dosing errors, 

repeated protocol violations, lack of responsiveness to the 

Committee (including providing misleading information), and a 

general lack of study oversight and management.” Dr. Glaspy 

recused himself from the vote on the recommendation of Dr.

Hiatt, Dr. Gasson, and Sandra Binder. The ISPRC informed Dr.

Pinter-Brown she would be able to continue to see subjects 

currently enrolled in her trials with the oversight of a mentor, 
37

and she was required to undergo additional training through 

UCLA’s Clinical Research Unit.

After reviewing the findings from the ISPRC, and the 

correspondence between the ISPRC and Dr. Pinter-Brown, Dr.

Slamon wrote Dr. Pinter-Brown notifying her that Dr. Jonathan 

Goldman would mentor her during the one-year suspension 

period. Dr. Slamon told Dr. Pinter-Brown Dr. Brennan would 

assist her in meeting the ISPRC’s expectations and he “st[oo]d 

ready” to assist her in meeting their requirements and to 

facilitate her coming into compliance with the ISPRC rules and 

regulations. Dr. Slamon also informed Dr. Pinter-Brown he 

would be naming an Acting Director for the Lymphoma Program 

during Dr. Pinter-Brown’s suspension because he felt it would be 

a significant challenge for her to “adequately and appropriately 

represent the Lymphoma Program in its critical mission of 

clinical/translational research with outside sponsors and 

regulatory bodies as well as co-operative groups and collaborators 

both within UCLA and at outside institutions.” Dr. Slamon 

assured this decision would have no impact on her academic 

rank, merit actions, or salary.4

4 By contrast, Dr. Pinter-Brown testified she attended a 

meeting in which Dr. Slamon threw a book containing all her 

ISPRC audits on the table, and said, “we don’t want someone like 

you representing the UCLA lymphoma program. From this 

moment forward, you are no longer the director.” Dr. PinterBrown’s testimony does not specify the date of this meeting. Dr.

Pinter-Brown also testified this meeting had been set up after 

she reached out to speak with the ombudsman. Dr. Pinter-Brown

testified she told the ombudsman she wanted a one-on-one 

meeting with Dr. Slamon. The ombudsman told her, “Dennis is 

very candid and he only wants to have a meeting about going 
38

Dr. Slamon appointed Dr. de Vos Interim Director of the 

Lymphoma Program. Dr. Glaspy testified he “didn’t really have a 

say-so” in the decision, but he “agreed reluctantly.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown implemented a corrective action plan to 

improve her research capabilities. Her assigned mentor, Dr.

Goldman, informed the ISPRC on February 18, 2013 she fulfilled 

her informed consent responsibilities, was “generally excellent 

regarding timely review of laboratory and radiology results,” and 

“promptly identified study deviations.” Dr. Goldman concluded 

Dr. Pinter-Brown was an excellent lymphoma doctor, 

recommended she continue to participate in clinical trials, and 

stated he believed she had the capability to be a principal 

investigator.

forward.” Dr. Pinter-Brown testified it made her uncomfortable 

when the ombudsman called Dr. Slamon “Dennis” because it 

made it sound “like they were buds.” Dr. Pinter-Brown testified 

the ombudsman set up the meeting at her request but when she 

arrived it was in a room with glass walls on three sides, had been 

catered, and included not only Dr. Slamon, but also Dr. Glaspy, 

Dr. Brennan, and the ombudsman. She testified she was told she 

was not allowed to discuss what happened with Dr. de Vos and 

that the meeting was only about her research issues going 

forward. Dr. Pinter-Brown testified she had to leave the room 

momentarily because she began to cry and had to pull herself 

together. At some point after she returned, Dr. Slamon threw the 

book on the table and told her she could no longer be the director. 

Although Dr. Brennan, Dr. Glaspy, and Dr. Slamon testified at 

trial, no testimony was elicited from any of them about this 

meeting.
39

On October 30, 2013, the ISPRC returned Dr. Pinter-Brown 

to her principal investigator status on a limited number of 

studies. Dr. Glaspy testified he was present at the ISPRC 

meeting when this decision was made and “everybody agreed” to 

the partial restoration of her research privileges.

On April 15, 2014, Dr. Slamon and Dr. Glaspy named Dr.

de Vos Director of the Lymphoma Program. Dr. Glaspy testified 

that, at that point, he did not have any reservations about Dr. de 

Vos directing the program.

In July 2014, Dr. Pinter-Brown called Sandra Binder and 

asked her to review a patient’s chart because she was concerned 

about a possible chemotherapy overdose. Ms. Binder looked at 

the chart and was “devastated” because the patient received a 

dangerously high dose. Dr. Hurvitz was alerted about the 

incident. She testified Dr. Pinter-Brown gave the patient 

12 weeks of a highly toxic chemotherapy in four consecutive days. 

As a result, Dr. Pinter-Brown was asked to complete training on 

how to appropriately place patients on chemotherapy orders.

Dr. Pinter-Brown testified she was not responsible for the 

chemotherapy overdose. She testified UCLA had put in new 

software to write chemotherapy orders and that Sandra Binder, 

who “was supposed to be helping us with it,” often did not return 

calls because “there was so much going on.” When Dr. PinterBrown’s nurse practitioner asked her if he could write the 

chemotherapy order, she testified, she told him he could write it 

but not to sign it before showing it to her. When he showed her 

the order, Dr. Pinter-Brown saw he had written a very confusing 

order. She spent 40 minutes with him and worked on the order 

with him until it looked correct. “And then we signed them,” she 

testified, “and the patient got his chemotherapy without any 
40

problem. It was perfect.” When the next round of chemotherapy 

came up for this patient, her nurse practitioner asked her if he 

could write the order. She agreed, but only if he copied and 

pasted what they wrote in the previous order into the new one.

He agreed to do so, but “for reasons that I do not understand,” Dr.

Pinter-Brown testified, he “wrote different orders.” Dr. PinterBrown also testified she allowed her nurse practitioner to write 

the second order because, a year earlier, Dr. Slamon had told her 

to stop “micromanaging” her nurse practitioner. When asked 

directly whether she signed the order, she replied, “I don’t believe 

so. I think [the nurse practitioner] signed it.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown notified Sandra Binder, Dr. Glaspy, and 

others about the chemotherapy dose. When her counsel asked if 

“the powers that be” attempted to blame her for this incident, Dr.

Pinter-Brown replied, “Yes.” She testified Dr. Slamon convened 

an emergency meeting of the Division and began the meeting by 

telling everybody about the history of the division, how proud he 

was of it, and that “one person in the division would being the 

entire division down by making a chemo error.” “It was 

humiliating,” Dr. Pinter-Brown testified. Dr. Pinter-Brown 

testified she and her nurse practitioner were then required to 

take a class on how to write chemotherapy orders.

Despite the chemotherapy overdose, the ISPRC decided on 

October 20, 2014 to fully restore Dr. Pinter-Brown to principal 

investigator status without limitations. In its letter, the ISPRC 

stated it “appreciates the efforts [Dr. Pinter-Brown] made to 

further clinical research at UCLA.”

In January 2015, Dr. Hurvitz requested a meeting with Dr.

Pinter-Brown because there was another problem with a patient’s 

chemotherapy order. Dr. Hurvitz testified there were issues with 
41

Dr. Pinter-Brown’s orders and notes, which “didn’t make sense,” 

causing the patient to have to wait 12 hours in the ward being 

hospitalized without receiving chemotherapy while the order was 

sorted out. At the meeting were Dr. Hurvitz, Sandra Binder, Dr.

Slamon, and Dr. Rosen, the director of the inpatient practice. 

According to Dr. Hurvitz, the meeting was cordial. Dr. PinterBrown was offered resources to help her avoid another 

“chemotherapy order mishap.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown testified that, overall, she believed the 

audits of her clinical trials were initiated in February 2011 in 

retaliation for complaining about Dr. de Vos. Although she did 

not complain about Dr. de Vos until March, 2011, she notes that 

Dr. Glaspy had confirmed he received complaints from her as 

early as 2008. She testified there were never any serious 

problems with the audits of her clinical trials before 2011. Dr.

Hiatt, Dr. Glaspy, and Dr. Raval-Fernandes, who oversaw clinical 

trials for the Cancer Center from 2007 to 2017, confirmed none of 

Dr. Pinter-Brown’s audits were problematic before 2011. Dr.

Pinter-Brown testified she was suddenly subjected to “random 

audits” in April 2011, and she found it “very odd, the timing of it,” 

that she was suddenly being audited one month after 

complaining after Dr. de Vos, considering he chaired the DSMB.

Dr. Pinter-Brown testified Dr. Slamon, Chief of 

Hematology, failed an FDA audit, a very serious event because it 

attracts the government’s attention to the institution, which can 

lead to clinical trials being shut down. Yet, he never suffered 

adverse consequences. One of Dr. Eradat’s clinical trials was 

suspended after an audit in 2011 or 2012, as was one of Dr.

Timmerman’s around the same time. Both are on the Lymphoma 

Program team. Yet, they did not suffer adverse consequences. 
42

Dr. Pinter-Brown stated she knew of only one man who lost 

research privileges because of negative audit findings.

Dr. Glaspy testified at least five male doctors had research 

privileges removed by the ISPRC.

Finally, according to Dr. Pinter-Brown, even after her 

research privileges were fully restored, she did not have as many 

clinical trials. She stated Dr. de Vos continued to prevent her 

from talking at meetings and, on several occasions, would not 

allow a sponsor to visit the institution, which is a prerequisite for 

initiating some clinical trials. She continued to complain to Dr.

Glaspy about Dr. de Vos to no avail.

Dr. Pinter-Brown also testified she had far fewer teaching 

fellows assigned to her after Dr. de Vos assumed the directorship. 

Dr. Sarah Larson, the Director of the Fellowship Program, joined 

the Lymphoma Program in 2013 and is responsible for assigning 

fellows to clinics. She testified assignments are made based 

entirely on prospective fellows’ requests. She stated neither she 

nor anyone else ever decided not to pair a fellow with Dr. PinterBrown. Additionally, Dr. Timmerman testified that, around this 

time, there was a shift in how fellows were distributed to clinics. 

Many fellows were being sent to rotations in community practices 

to experience “bread-and-butter oncology” rather than deal with 

the “more esoteric” cases the physicians saw at UCLA. Dr.

Timmerman testified that, as a result, he did not have many 

fellows in his clinics even though he won a teaching award; he 

also testified all the physicians in their clinics had less support 

from fellows.

Dr. Pinter-Brown testified she was still called by her first 

name after her privileges were restored whereas male doctors 

were addressed as “Doctor.” Dr. Larson testified it was common 
43

for doctors in the Lymphoma Program to refer to each other by 

first name in “most settings.” In front of patients, she testified, 

they would use the title “Doctor.” In other settings, including 

some formal settings, they would “usually say ‘Lauren,’ ‘Sven,’ 

[or] ‘Dennis.’ ”

On November 23, 2015, Dr. Pinter-Brown filed a complaint 

with the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing (DFEH), and resigned from UCLA effective December 

31, 2015. She accepted a position at UC Irvine beginning January 

1, 2016.

C. Motion to Amend the Complaint, Verdict, Damages

On February 5, 2018, in the middle of trial, Dr. PinterBrown filed a motion for leave to amend her operative complaint 

according to proof, asking the court to permit her to add a cause 

of action for retaliation. Dr. Pinter-Brown attached a proposed 

complaint adding a cause of action for “retaliation for opposing 

discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of gender in 

violation of FEHA.”

On February 13, 2018, after both sides had presented all 

their evidence to the jury, the court heard argument on the 

motion. UCLA argued the claim had already been summarily 

adjudicated against Dr. Pinter-Brown. Dr. Pinter-Brown argued 

the “substance was different” than how she originally pled 

retaliation in the complaint and that they were pursuing a 

retaliation theory under different subsections of FEHA. UCLA 

argued strenuously that Dr. Pinter-Brown was not alleging new 

facts or new legal theories beyond what was included in the 

original complaint and that allowing her to re-allege retaliation 

at this late stage after the court had summarily adjudicated it in

UCLA’s favor caused UCLA undue prejudice.
44

Both complaints assert a cause of action for retaliation 

under Government Code sections 12900 et seq. and 12940 et seq. 

There are no different or additional subsections pled in the 

amended complaint. The trial court allowed Dr. Pinter-Brown to 

add the retaliation claim. It did not state its reasoning for 

resurrecting a cause of action it had already adjudicated other 

than to say, “I . . . don’t think it makes a particular amount of 

difference. I would indicate a couple of things: if the jury comes 

back with a finding for the plaintiff on all of the causes of action, 

I am not sure the amendment makes any difference at all. If they 

find for discrimination and harassment and also retaliation, it 

becomes superfluous because the jury will be instructed they 

can’t award duplicative damages. [¶] If the jury were only to 

come back on the retaliation claim as opposed in any of the other 

claims, I assume there will be a motion for J.N.O.V. and the court 

will consider that issue. So I am not sure that it’s dispositive one 

way or the other at this point.”

The jury was given a general verdict form. On February 

15, 2018, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Dr. Pinter-Brown 

on the discrimination and retaliation claims. The court then 

polled the jury, which had voted 10 to 2 on each claim.

On March 22, 2018, the jury awarded Dr. Pinter-Brown a 

total of $13,011,671 in damages: $635,612 in past economic loss, 

$2,376,059 in future economic loss, $7 million in past noneconomic loss, and $3 million in future non-economic loss.

D. Appeal and Motion to Strike

UCLA timely appealed, alleging: (1) Dr. Pinter-Brown did 

not prove she suffered an adverse employment action within the 

statute of limitations; (2) judgment should be entered for UCLA 

as a matter of law because neither discrimination nor retaliation 
45

was a substantial motivating reason for any adverse action; (3) a 

new trial is warranted because the court framed the case in 

grossly prejudicial terms, then admitted allegations of unrelated 

discrimination; (4) the court improperly submitted Dr. PinterBrown’s retaliation claim to the jury months after summarily 

adjudicating that claim in UCLA’s favor.

During the pendency of this appeal, Dr. Pinter-Brown filed 

a motion to strike portions of UCLA’s opening brief. She first 

asks that we strike a paragraph that cites factual assertions in 

websites that were never admitted or seen by the trial court. 

After reviewing the record, we have determined the trial court 

record does not include the material on these websites. 

Accordingly, we strike the paragraph of UCLA’s brief referring to

these websites. “[A]ppellate review is limited to the record that 

was before the trial court.” (Preserve Poway v. City of Poway

(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 560, 567, fn. 2; See also C.J.A. Corp. v.

Trans-Action Financial Corp. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 664, 673.)

Dr. Pinter-Brown also asks us to strike references to parts 

of Exhibit 69, which is a 233-page exhibit documenting UCLA’s 

audits and oversight of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s clinical research. Dr.

Pinter-Brown alleges the exhibit was not admitted in its entirety 

and UCLA relied on portions of the exhibit that were “never 

published or discussed with the jury.” We find no evidence to 

support this assertion. 

Before trial, the parties stipulated to admitting Exhibit 69; 

Dr. Pinter-Brown did not ask for any limitation on the 

document’s admissibility. On January 30, 2018, the court 

entered Exhibit 69 into evidence without limitation or exception. 

On February 1, 2018, UCLA first presented the exhibit to the 

jury; the transcript reflects the exhibit was admitted into 
46

evidence. Finally, the record reflects the full exhibit was marked 

as admitted. At no point did the court indicate only portions of 

Exhibit 69 had been admitted. We therefore decline to strike any 

portions of UCLA’s brief referring to or relying on Exhibit 69.

DISCUSSION

We conclude the court erred by framing the case at the 

outset in prejudicial terms, allowing the jury to hear evidence of 

racial discrimination at UCLA, allowing into evidence a list of all 

types of discrimination complaints against the entire University 

of California system and its ten campuses, and allowing Dr.

Pinter-Brown to re-allege a cause of action for retaliation despite 

summarily adjudicating the same issue prior to trial. These 

errors were cumulative and highly prejudicial.

Accordingly, we reverse. Because we reverse on these 

bases, we do not address UCLA’s allegations that Dr. PinterBrown did not suffer an adverse employment action or 

constructive discharge; that neither discrimination nor 

retaliation were substantial motivating factors for UCLA’s 

actions; that all claims are barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations; and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury.

I. Trial Court Comments

“Trial judges ‘should be exceedingly discreet in what they 

say and do in the presence of a jury lest they seem to lean toward 

or lend their influence to one side or the other.’ ” (People v. 

Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237–1238.) A judge’s conduct 

must “ ‘ “ ‘ “accord with recognized principles of judicial decorum 

consistent with the presentation of a case in an atmosphere of 

fairness and impartiality,” ’ ” ’ ” and “ ‘ “[t]he trial of a case should 

not only be fair in fact, . . . it should also appear to be fair.” ’ ” 
47

(Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th

994, 1002.) “Jurors rely with great confidence on the fairness of 

judges, and upon the correctness of their views expressed during 

trials. For this reason, and too strong emphasis cannot be laid on 

the admonition, a judge should be careful not to throw the weight 

of his judicial position into a case, either for or against the

defendant.” (People v. Mahoney (1927) 201 Cal. 618, 626–627.)

Indeed, the third canon of our Judicial Code of Ethics 

admonishes us to “perform judicial duties without bias or 

prejudice,” and to refrain from engaging in speech that would 

reasonably be perceived as bias or prejudice. (Cal. Code Jud. 

Ethics, canon 3B(5).) Additionally, standard 10.20 of the 

California Rules of Court’s Standards of Judicial Administration 

instructs us to “preserve the integrity and impartiality of the 

judicial system” by ensuring courtroom proceedings “are 

conducted in a manner that is fair and impartial to all of the 

participants.” (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., std. 10.20(a) & (a)(1).)

Here, the trial court’s remarks to the jury violated these 

principles and gave the appearance that the court was partial to 

Dr. Pinter-Brown’s causes of action. (The court’s remarks are 

attached to this opinion as Appendix A, post, starting on page 70.) 

In conjunction with the other errors discussed below, the court’s 

introductory presentation rendered the trial fundamentally 

unfair to UCLA.

The court framed this case as part of a centuries-long fight 

against discrimination and inequality. The court not only 

invoked the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, one of our nation’s 

most respected and revered civil rights leaders, it also quoted one 

of the most well-known lines from Dr. King’s famous and 

venerated “I Have a Dream” speech. At the apogee of the civil 
48

rights movement, Dr. King told the world that the “arc of the 

moral universe bends toward justice.” Here, the judge told the 

jury it was their job to be Dr. King and to help bend that arc. 

When UCLA objected to the court’s lengthy recitation of our 

country’s history of fighting discrimination and its description of 

the heroism of the individuals who led those efforts, the court 

insisted its presentation was not improper or prejudicial because 

the prospective jurors were told that the lauded civil rights 

figures were sometimes plaintiffs and sometimes defendants. We 

are not persuaded. Regardless of whether Rosa Parks, Elizabeth 

Jennings, Delores Huerta, or any of the other civil rights icons 

highlighted in the court’s presentation were plaintiffs or 

defendants, the message was clear: each of them was fighting to 

right the grave and historic wrong of discrimination. By telling 

the jurors they were Dr. King, the court told them they were also 

there to right a wrong. Each case cited by the court was another 

step in the right direction: toward equality and away from 

discrimination. The court’s message was clear: the jury’s job was 

to continue in that great, noble, and moral tradition of pushing 

society toward equality.

We appreciate the difficulties faced by trial courts in 

putting together juries of 12 impartial and willing people. The 

difficulties are compounded by prospective jurors who are openly 

loathe to serve not because they cannot be impartial, but because 

jury service otherwise interferes with their lives. It is 

exceedingly difficult to be gracious to those potential jurors who 

enjoy the benefits of living in our free society of, by, and for the 

People, but who won’t embrace the civic responsibility, one of 

only a few, that underpins our democracy. It is remarkable that 

our trial courts, in the face of such daily recalcitrance to serve, 
49

not only remain gracious, but enthusiastically promote the 

opportunity to serve by touting to prospective jurors the 

importance of the court’s call to duty. 

However, the remarks of the trial court here were not an 

impartial call to duty; they were a resolute and stirring call to 

action which stacked the deck against UCLA. It was a grave 

error for the court to begin a gender discrimination trial with a 

presentation highlighting the great achievements our nation’s 

civil rights leaders have made toward creating a world free of 

discrimination and telling the prospective jurors they were 

carrying on that quest. Although particularly prejudicial in a 

discrimination case, we believe the court’s comments and call to 

action are inappropriate in any case. This error was but one of a 

series of errors that prejudiced UCLA and rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair.

II. “Me Too” Evidence

Throughout trial, the court allowed Dr. Pinter-Brown to 

present the jury with unrelated claims of discrimination at 

UCLA. First, it allowed Dr. Pinter-Brown to introduce evidence, 

through witnesses, of a report detailing the findings of a 2012 

investigation into incidents of racial discrimination at UCLA. 

The court also admitted into evidence a list of all DFEH 

complaints against the entire University of California system 

from July 1, 2012 to August 17, 2017.

This type of evidence—evidence that an employer waged 

the same type of discrimination against other employees as is it 

did against a plaintiff—is called “me too” evidence. As discussed 

below, “me too” evidence can be admissible only to prove intent 

and motive, among other things, with respect to the plaintiff’s 

own protected class. Additionally, the admissibility of “me too” 
50

evidence hinges on how closely related the evidence is to the 

plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case. “Me too” 

evidence is never admissible to prove an employer’s propensity to 

harass. Yet, that is exactly what the court allowed Dr. PinterBrown to do.

A. The Moreno Report

On October 15, 2013, retired California Supreme Court 

Justice Carlos Moreno submitted to UCLA a report entitled, 

“Independent Investigative Report on Acts of Bias and 

Discrimination Involving Faculty at the University of California, 

Los Angeles.” The Executive Summary makes clear the report is 

the culmination of an investigation into “racial and ethnic bias 

and/or discrimination” at UCLA, not gender discrimination or 

bias. The report concluded UCLA’s policies and procedures for 

responding to incidents of racial and ethnic bias, discrimination, 

and intolerance were inadequate, and provided recommendations 

for improvement.

Although the court did not allow the report into evidence, it 

permitted Dr. Pinter-Brown to ask multiple witnesses about the 

report and impermissibly allowed the contents of the otherwiseinadmissible report to come in through these testifying witnesses.

During Dr. Glaspy’s testimony on February 7, 2018, Dr.

Pinter-Brown asked, “[a]re you familiar with a public report 

published in late 2013 investigation, in particular, UCLA’s bad 

policies involving antidiscrimination claims that they sweep 

under the rug and deeming these interpersonal conflict?” The 

court sustained UCLA’s objection to the question. Dr. PinterBrown then asked, “[a]re you familiar with the fact that there 

was an independent investigation done about [UCLA] in 

particular, of all the [UC] schools, in 2013 about how it handles
51

discrimination claims?” The court sustained UCLA’s objection as 

assuming facts not in evidence and stated, “[y]ou can certainly 

ask him if he’s familiar with the Moreno report.” Dr. PinterBrown asked Dr. Glaspy, “[a]re you familiar with an 

investigation that occurred at [UCLA] in to [sic] how the 

University handled discrimination issues,” to which Dr. Glaspy 

replied, “No.”

Then Dr. Hiatt, Dean of Faculty, was asked about the 

report during his testimony on February 7, 2018. Dr. Hiatt 

admitted familiarity with the Moreno report. Dr. Pinter-Brown 

asked him whether, in the report, “the policies that were applied 

to Dr. Pinter-Brown by [UCLA] were condemned as ineffective.” 

UCLA objected under Evidence Code section 352 and on hearsay 

grounds; the court sustained UCLA’s hearsay objection.5 Dr.

Pinter-Brown moved to have the report admitted into evidence, 

UCLA objected, again on section 352 and hearsay grounds. The 

court replied, “not under [section] 352, but as to hearsay, the 

court will sustain the objection.” Dr. Pinter-Brown then 

prompted Dr. Hiatt to state the Moreno report was prepared by a 

retired justice from the California Supreme Court.

Proceeding apace, Dr. Pinter-Brown then asked Dr. Hiatt, 

“the findings of this report were very damning to the

discrimination going on at [UCLA]; correct?” Dr. Hiatt replied, 

“[w]ell, it certainly identified opportunities for improvement.” 

5 Under Evidence Code section 352, the court may exclude 

evidence if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the 

probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue 

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
52

Dr. Pinter-Brown then stated, “[f]irst of all, it concluded that 

‘UCLA’s nondiscrimination,” at which point UCLA interrupted

with an objection to Dr. Pinter-Brown reading from the 

document. The court sustained the objection.

Shortly thereafter, Dr. Pinter-Brown started to ask, “the 

report concluded that [UCLA] was labeling discrimination and 

bias as interpersonal conflicts,” at which point UCLA objected as 

leading and hearsay. The court overruled the objections. “The 

very language we heard from Dr. Glaspy,” Dr. Pinter-Brown 

continued, “that they were labeling discrimination and 

harassment and retaliation as interpersonal conflicts; correct?” 

Dr. Hiatt replied he did not remember that level of detail. Dr.

Pinter-Brown then attempted to get a paragraph of the Moreno 

report in as a party admission; the court denied the request. Dr.

Pinter-Brown therefore paraphrased the paragraph by stating, 

not in the form of a question, “[i]t identifies a tendency to treat 

reports as interpersonal conflicts, and other things that it lists.” 

UCLA objected again to Dr. Pinter-Brown reading from the 

document. “Sustained,” the trial court replied, “if you’re reading 

from the document.” Dr. Pinter-Brown then said, “I’m not 

reading from the document.” The court replied, “Okay.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown continued, “[i]t lists two things. It says, 

in essence, [UCLA] is misclassifying discrimination, harassment, 

retaliation as, number one, interpersonal conflicts; or, number 

two, some issue with regards to promotion and career 

advancement; correct?” Dr. Hiatt replied, “It says that.” “And 

what we see in here,” Dr. Pinter-Brown continued, “has been 

what UCLA’s playbook defensive mode has been in these lawsuits 

over the years; correct?” Dr. Hiatt replied, “I can’t comment on 

lawsuits over the years.”
53

Later in Dr. Hiatt’s testimony, Dr. Pinter-Brown asked, 

“So, sir, the conclusions of that investigation – and this was an 

actual independent investigation report on acts of bias and 

discrimination involving faculty at the University of California 

Los Angeles. [¶] That was undertaken by [UCLA’s] attorneys 

and retired Justice Carlos Moreno, among other people; correct?” 

Dr. Hiatt replied, “Back to the Moreno report?” to which Dr.

Pinter-Brown replied, “Yes. The Moreno Report.” Dr. PinterBrown stated, “[a]nd that Moreno Report highly criticized the 

written policies at [UCLA]; correct?” Dr. Hiatt replied, “Correct.” 

“It said that they failed to define discriminatory conduct;

correct?” Dr. Hiatt replied, “I would have to look at it in detail, 

but I accept your reading of it.” Dr. Pinter-Brown continued, 

“[t]ake a look at page 16. There are eight bullet points there. 

After the words ‘specifically, the review team concludes that,’ and 

there [are] eight bullet points. [¶] Do you see that?” Dr. Hiatt 

replied that he did. “Okay. Second-to-last bullet point says 

‘[UCLA]’ ” at which point UCLA objected to Dr. Pinter-Brown 

reading from the document. Dr. Pinter-Brown replied, “[i]t’s 

cross-examination, your Honor.” The court replied, “It is crossexamination, but the document has not been admitted into 

evidence.” Dr. Pinter-Brown continued, “[t]his report criticized 

the investigations allegedly done by [UCLA] into complaints of 

discrimination, harassment, retaliation; correct?” Dr. Hiatt 

replied, “Correct.” Dr. Pinter-Brown asked, “[t]his report 

criticized how [UCLA] swept under the rug complaints of 

discrimination, harassment, retaliation; correct? [¶] We can use 

the exact words to quote it, but that’s what they’re saying, in 

essence; correct?” Dr. Hiatt replied, “I agree with that.”
54

Dr. Pinter-Brown asked, “[t]his report criticized [UCLA’s] 

commitment to diversity in the workplace basically saying, yeah, 

you have these words and these policies at this great university, 

but you don’t mean them, faculty; right, Dr. Hiatt? And I’ll try 

not to quote the report, but that’s what they’re saying to 

everybody.” Dr. Hiatt replied, “You know what? That’s a rebuke, 

and I accept the fact that the report was a stern rebuke.” Dr.

Pinter Brown continued, “[a]nd that rebuke most significantly 

included sweeping under the rug real discrimination and 

harassment that occurred in the workplace; correct?” UCLA 

objected as asked and answered; the court overruled the 

objection. Dr. Hiatt replied, “I think that’s correct.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown then went on to paraphrase portions of 

the Moreno Report that she characterized as indicating UCLA 

was protective of doctors and professors who brought in large 

amounts of grant money and would look the other way if they 

were accused of harassment. More than once during this line of 

questioning, Dr. Pinter-Brown emphasized that the Moreno 

report was authored by a retired Supreme Court justice.

On February 8, 2018, Dr. Pinter-Brown filed a motion 

asking the court to take judicial notice of the Moreno Report. The 

court denied the motion, stating it was not going to take judicial 

notice of the report or allow it into evidence. The court did say, 

however, it would “allow defendant to argue it, but . . . I think it’s 

hearsay. I think you certainly could have or might have been 

able to designate former Justice Moreno as an expert witness on 

this, but he wasn’t and he is not here to testify. I don’t believe 

the report would be proper to admit into evidence, although I will 

indicate I am not sure it matters to either side. There has been 

enough discussion as to what the general direction of the report 
55

was, which is in evidence, and either side can argue it.” UCLA 

then stated, “just for the record . . . the Moreno Report talks 

about or arises out of incidents of perceived bias, discrimination, 

intolerance at [UCLA] involving faculty of color, not gender.” The 

court replied, “[w]e don’t need to argue it. I am not allowing it 

into evidence.”

On February 13, 2018, Dr. Pinter-Brown filed an amended 

trial brief seeking to admit the Moreno Report into evidence. She 

argued the report was admissible as an adoptive admission, an 

admissible party admission, an authorized admission, and for the 

non-hearsay purpose of “proving defendant’s state of mind.” The 

record before us does not provide the court’s ruling on this 

request. Our review of the transcript does not reveal any oral 

argument or ruling on Dr. Pinter-Brown’s attempt to put the 

Moreno Report before the jury via a trial brief, nor have the 

parties submitted any orders by the court ruling on the 

arguments raised in the trial brief. We also note that in her 

respondent’s brief on appeal, Dr. Pinter Brown does not argue the 

Moreno Report is an exception to the hearsay rule because it 

could have been properly admitted as evidence of Dr. Hiatt’s state 

of mind. We therefore treat as controlling the court’s February 8, 

2018 ruling declaring the Moreno Report inadmissible hearsay.

B. DFEH Complaints

Before Dr. Hiatt’s testimony, UCLA informed the court it 

anticipated Dr. Pinter-Brown would seek to introduce evidence of 

gender discrimination in UCLA’s Neurology Department. UCLA 

argued it was an entirely different department, was not in the 

School of Medicine, was on a different campus, and operated 

under entirely different leadership than Dr. Pinter-Brown’s 

department. UCLA asked the court to exclude this evidence. Dr.
56

Pinter-Brown stated she did wish to bring in this evidence. She 

stated Dr. Hiatt was quoted as saying publicly that this type of 

environment compromised research, teaching, and patient care. 

She argued this evidence was directly probative to her 

constructive termination because it showed how this working 

environment affected her. The trial court noted that “me too” 

evidence is admissible, but the issue was how far “me too”

evidence extended. “I think that bringing in me too evidence, 

that is going on at, you know, U.C. Davis because it’s still the 

Regents of the University, is too far afield in this case if we are 

talking about people who are in the medical department at 

[UCLA], even though it’s a different facility.” UCLA reiterated 

that the Neurology Department is not within the Department of 

Medicine. The court stated it would not bar the evidence but 

would entertain objections if UCLA believed it went too far afield.

On direct examination, Dr. Pinter-Brown asked Dr. Hiatt, 

“I presume you are concerned with gender discrimination that at 

times has raised its head at [UCLA] over the years, correct?” Dr.

Hiatt replied, “I wouldn’t necessarily concede [it has] raised its 

head at [UCLA] over the years, but I am absolutely concerned 

about it.” Dr. Pinter-Brown replied, “Not only has it raised its 

head,” at UCLA, “you have had approximately 50 some-odd 

department complaints against [UCLA] based on gender 

discrimination; isn’t that true?” Dr. Hiatt replied, “I am not 

aware of those numbers.”

Later in Dr. Hiatt’s testimony, Dr. Pinter-Brown marked 

for identification a list of discrimination complaints filed with the 

DFEH against the University of California system as a whole. 

Dr. Pinter-Brown then asked, “[I]t shows that gender complaints 

had been rampant in particular with defendant?” UCLA objected 
57

as argumentative, lack of foundation, and hearsay. The court 

overruled the objection. Dr. Pinter-Brown then asked, “You can 

see . . . 198 complaints filed” with the DFEH, “89 of them against 

defendant having to do with gender; right, sir?” UCLA objected 

again and the court sustained the objection “as to counsel 

testifying.” The court then told Dr. Pinter-Brown she was 

welcome to ask Dr. Hiatt if the list refreshes his recollection “or 

other questions based upon it.”

On cross-examination, UCLA asked Dr. Hiatt how many of 

the 198 charges identified in the DFEH disclosure involved the 

UCLA campus, to which Dr. Hiatt replied, “13.” UCLA elicited 

testimony from Dr. Hiatt that the list contained only four 

complaints involving gender, the list did not distinguish whether 

the complainant was faculty or staff, and the list did not indicate 

whether the complaints had any merit.

On redirect, Dr. Pinter-Brown asked Dr. Hiatt, “198 people 

came forward and said, ‘I was discriminated, harassed and/or 

retaliated against’ based upon various protected activities, 

correct?” Dr. Hiatt replied, “I believe that is correct, yes.” Dr.

Pinter-Brown than asked, “And there are 89 . . . that list out 

gender discrimination, harassment and/or retaliation?” UCLA 

objected for lack of foundation and assuming facts not in 

evidence. The court overruled the objection. Dr. Pinter-Brown 

then moved to admit the entire list of DFEH complaints into 

evidence. UCLA objected on “hearsay and also [Evidence Code

section] 352” grounds. The court replied, “There’s been enough 

testimony about it from both sides. I will allow it into evidence.”

Dr. Pinter-Brown went on to challenge Dr. Hiatt in eight 

pages of the transcript as to how Dr. Hiatt concluded there were 

only four complaints of gender harassment at UCLA, prodding 
58

him to admit that there were a total of 89 complaints against the 

entire University of California system based on selected portions 

of the exhibit. On re-cross, UCLA had Dr. Hiatt clarify that only 

13 complaints took place in Los Angeles and, of those 13, only 

four involved gender.

C. It Was Error for the Court to Permit the Jury to Hear 

Evidence of The Moreno Report and DFEH 

Complaints

On appeal, Dr. Pinter-Brown argues UCLA did not properly 

object to the testimony about the Moreno Report and that the 

Moreno Report did in fact address gender discrimination. She 

also argues UCLA “opened the door” to the admission of the 

DFEH complaints. We disagree.

As for the contention UCLA did not sufficiently object to 

the admission of testimony about the Moreno Report, we have 

listed above the multiple objections UCLA lodged. Furthermore, 

UCLA filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of 

mistreatment by other employees at UCLA. The court denied the 

motion. Generally, once a motion in limine is denied, no more is 

needed to preserve the record on appeal. (People v. Morris (1991) 

53 Cal.3d 152, 190, disapproved of on other grounds in People v. 

Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830 fn. 1.) Accordingly, we find 

UCLA properly preserved the issue on appeal.

Additionally, Dr. Pinter-Brown’s contention the Moreno 

Report addressed gender discrimination at UCLA does not alter 

our analysis. She cites to four sentences within a 25-page report 

that briefly mention incidents of gender discrimination but which 

are not included in the ultimate analysis and findings. 
59

Finally, at oral argument, Dr. Pinter-Brown argued she 

used the Moreno Report not for the truth of the matter asserted 

or as propensity evidence, but for the non-hearsay purpose of 

proving Dr. Hiatt’s state of mind. She argued she submitted a 

motion specifically asking the court to allow the Moreno Report 

into evidence to prove Dr. Hiatt’s state of mind. We presume she 

is referring to the February 13, 2018 trial brief she submitted, in 

which she argued in part that the Moreno Report be admitted to 

show the defendant’s state of mind. Yet, as indicated above, she 

provides us with no record that the court ever ruled on the issue.

Furthermore, Dr. Pinter-Brown did not sufficiently raise 

this argument in her respondent’s brief. She referenced her 

request to have the Moreno Report admitted only in a brief 

footnote, in which she complains UCLA excluded from its 

appendix the trial brief “regarding the Report’s admissibility as 

an authorized admission,” not as evidence of the defendant’s state 

of mind. Dr. Pinter-Brown provided no legal argument or 

authority in her brief addressing whether the Moreno Report was

admissible to prove Dr. Hiatt’s state of mind. Nor did she furnish 

us with a record or a citation to the record indicating whether or 

how the court ruled on her request to admit the Moreno Report as 

non-hearsay evidence to prove Dr. Hiatt’s state of mind. As 

stated above, the court’s ruling that the Moreno Report was 

inadmissible hearsay is therefore controlling on this issue.

In any event, Dr. Pinter-Brown cannot raise this issue for 

the first time at oral argument. In their briefing, parties to an 

appeal must support their points with argument, case authority, 

and citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) When legal argument is not supported by 

citation to legal authority on a particular point, “we may treat the 
60

point as forfeited and pass it without consideration.” (Allen v. 

City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) And, when a 

party does not tell us if or how the court ruled on an issue, the 

party has forfeited appellate consideration of the issue. (Atempa 

v. Pedrazzani (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 809, 831.) Dr. Pinter-Brown 

has therefore forfeited review of her assertion that the contents of 

the Moreno Report were admissible to prove Dr. Hiatt’s state of 

mind.

UCLA did not open the door to the DFEH complaints. As 

discussed above, Dr. Pinter-Brown initiated the subject by 

marking the list of DFEH complaints for identification and then 

asking Dr. Hiatt if he was familiar with any of the complaints. 

After the jury learned about the 198 DFEH complaints, it was 

entirely appropriate for UCLA to use the list to clarify that only 

four of those complaints involved gender discrimination at UCLA.

In any event, the reports should not have been admitted.

“[E]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her 

character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of 

reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) 

is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a 

specified occasion.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a). Evidence of a 

crime, civil wrong, or other act is not prohibited, however, when 

relevant to prove some other fact such as motive, intent, 

knowledge, absent of mistake, and the like. (Id., subd. (b).)

Courts have sanctioned the use of “me too” evidence, which 

is evidence of an employer’s alleged gender bias “in the form of 

harassing activity against women employees other than the 

plaintiff” in certain circumstances. (Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 

198 Cal.App.4th 87, 92 (Pantoja).) Where evidence of workplace 

discrimination is proffered to cast doubt on an employer’s stated 
61

justification for an adverse employment action, for example, “me 

too” evidence can be admissible to show intent or motive, which 

could establish that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext. 

(Johnson v. United Cerebral Palsy/Spastic Children’s Foundation 

(Johnson) (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 740, 760.) The “me-too” 

doctrine, however, does not permit a plaintiff to present evidence 

of discrimination against employees outside of the plaintiff’s 

protected class to show discrimination or harassment against the 

plaintiff. (Hatai v. Department of Transportation (2013) 

214 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1297–1298, disapproved of on other 

grounds in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire District

(2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 115.) Although “me too” evidence can be 

admissible to prove intent, motive, and the like with respect to 

the plaintiff’s own protected class, it is never admissible to prove 

an employer’s propensity to harass. (Pantoja, at p. 111.)

In other words, Dr. Pinter-Brown told the jury that because 

the entire UCLA campus – not just the medical school – failed to 

protect racial and ethnic minorities from discrimination, the 

UCLA medical school failed to protect Dr. Pinter-Brown from 

gender discrimination. The Moreno Report served only to 

convince the jury that the Medical School had a propensity to 

harass, and Dr. Pinter-Brown used it explicitly to tell the jury 

that they did the exact same thing to her.

There is no question the court allowed Dr. Pinter-Brown to 

use the Moreno Report to paint UCLA as a hotbed of 

discrimination and harassment. During closing argument, Dr.

Pinter-Brown quoted “[e]xactly what Justice Carlos Moreno 

stated in his 34-page conclusions . . . : ‘We don’t investigate. We 

don’t educate. We don’t take seriously antidiscrimination laws 

here. And in fact, when we are dealing with a professor or 
62

someone who brings a lot of money into [UCLA], we, as a 

practice, sweep it under the rug.’ That is what that independent 

investigation into discrimination, bias and retaliation at [UCLA] 

concluded.” Dr. Pinter-Brown described the Moreno Report as 

“the very blueprint[] of what goes on and what has gone on by a 

neutral, as it’s phrased, an independent investigation.” Dr.

Pinter-Brown described the report as “condemning how they 

operate with regard to this particular issue.”

Toward the end of closing argument, Dr. Pinter-Brown 

argued, “The Moreno Report – and you don’t have that in 

evidence, but you have testimony about it specifically – in other 

words, the document will not be in the jury room, but you have 

testimony from a few witnesses, including Dr. Hiatt, about it. [¶]

And what that report concluded was that a major problem we 

have here is when there is actual discrimination going on, it gets 

just whitewashed as an interpersonal conflict. There is no 

investigation – real investigation. H.R. is not involved. 

Shocking. Title IX doesn’t get involved. Shocking. Same thing 

we had here. And we just call it an ‘interpersonal conflict’ and 

sweep it under the rug. That is exactly what the report 

concluded and that is exactly what defendants in their play book 

[have] tried to portray what this case is about.”

The trial court would not admit the Moreno Report because 

it was hearsay. This, however, was wholly insufficient because 

Dr. Pinter-Brown was able to coax the content and conclusions of 

the Moreno Report out of multiple witnesses. Secondary evidence 

of a document that is hearsay is “no more admissible” than the 

document itself, “which is to say, not at all.” (Pajaro Valley Water 

Management Agency v. McGrath (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 

1093, 1108.) The court abandoned its duty to ensure UCLA 
63

received a fair and impartial trial when it allowed the contents of 

the irrelevant and highly prejudicial Moreno Report—which dealt 

with discrimination outside of Dr. Pinter-Brown’s protected 

class—to come in through a series of leading questions by her 

attorney and the answers thereto.

With respect to the DFEH complaints, the question the 

court must consider in deciding whether to admit evidence of 

discrimination raised by other employees is “ ‘fact based and 

depends on many factors, including how closely related the 

evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the 

case.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 767, citing 

Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn (2008) 552 U.S. 

379, 387.) In Johnson, for example, the plaintiff claimed she was 

wrongly terminated for being pregnant. (Johnson, at p. 744.) 

The appellate court held the trial court should have admitted 

declarations of four employees who worked at the same office and 

under the same three supervisors as the plaintiff, and who also 

alleged they were fired for being pregnant.. (Id. at pp. 767–768.)

Unlike Johnson, there is no evidence whatsoever about who 

the alleged victims were in the list of DFEH complaints, whether 

they complained to the medical school, whether the complaints 

had merit, whether complainants were supervised or even had 

any contact with Dr. Hiatt, Dr. Glaspy, Dr. de Vos, Dr. Slamon,

or any of the other actors Dr. Pinter-Brown claimed had wronged 

her. There was simply no evidence establishing the relationship 

between these anonymous complaints and Dr. Pinter-Brown’s 

circumstances or the theory of her case. The only purpose those 

complaints served was to, again, paint UCLA as rife with 

unchecked gender discrimination.
64

“[Eighty-nine] governmental charges of gender 

discrimination against the defendant here in the last five years, 

since 2012 to 2017,” Dr. Pinter-Brown told the jury during closing 

argument. “[Fifty] of them at [UCLA] in particular.” Later, she 

argued, “[t]hese people here . . . these are women who worked for 

the Regents and experienced, from their perception, gender 

discrimination . . . so on and so on and so on, sex, gender. These 

aren’t just a statistic to say, ‘you are messing up, [UCLA].’ These 

are people whose lives have been affected, from their perception 

at least. [¶] These are women not trying to manipulate any 

system, as defense counsel has pointed to my client so many 

times in this trial, trying to paint her to be some manipulative 

whatever. These are people who just want to work in a fair 

environment that wasn’t presented to them, and who obviously 

didn’t get [redress] or any remedy within [UCLA] because now 

they have gone to the state government and complained. That is 

what this is about. [¶] . . . These are women alleging gender 

discrimination to the state government saying who they 

represent is not fair to women.”

The jury had no information about the factual scenarios 

underlying the DFEH complaints submitted to the jury. Nor did 

they have any information about which departments employed 

the complainants or who their supervisors were. This “me too” 

evidence, therefore, was far from the type contemplated in 

Johnson and Pantoja, as Dr. Pinter-Brown proffered no evidence 

that the DFEH complaints “ ‘set[] out factual scenarios related by 

former employees of defendant that [were] sufficiently similar” to 

the one Dr. Pinter-Brown presented. (Pantoja, supra,

198 Cal.App.4th at p. 114, quoting Johnson, supra, 

173 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) Instead, the court allowed Dr. Pinter-
65

Brown to use this laundry list of anonymous, undefined 

allegations of discrimination at UCLA to convince the jury Dr.

Pinter-Brown’s own complaints were legitimate. This is nothing 

more than run of the mill propensity evidence, which should have 

never been presented to the jury.

III. Retaliation Cause of Action

As discussed above, the trial court allowed Dr. PinterBrown to place a cause of action for retaliation before the jury 

even though the claim had been adjudicated against her before 

trial. This was an inexplicable error.

Summary adjudication of a cause of action “is a judicial 

determination that the issue is not subject to further 

controversy.” (Abadjian v. Superior Court (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 

363, 370.) Summary adjudication of an issue is binding. (Ibid.). 

Following a grant of summary adjudication in a defendant’s 

favor, the cause of action is deemed “established” and the parties 

may not relitigate the issue. (Raghavan v. Boeing Co. (2005) 

133 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1136; St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier 

Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1249.)

Dr. Pinter-Brown argues California liberally allows 

amendments to the pleadings to conform to proof at trial. While 

this is true, that it is not at all what happened here. The 

“amended” cause of action was nothing more than the original 

retaliation complaint with the phrase “Retaliation for 

Complaining of Gender Discrimination and/or Harassment” 

changed to “Retaliation for Opposing Gender Discrimination 

and/or Harassment.” (Italics added.) It was not a request for 

amendment according to proof, it was plainly an attempt to get a 

second bite of the apple.
66

As summarized by our Supreme Court, amendments 

according to proof “ ‘have been allowed with great liberality “and 

no abuse of discretion is shown unless by permitting the 

amendment new and substantially different issues are introduced 

in the case or the rights of the adverse party prejudiced.” ’ ” 

(Garcia v. Roberts (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 900, 909, quoting 

Trafton v. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d 17, 31.) Amendments of 

pleadings to conform to proof should not be allowed, however, 

“ ‘ “when they raise new issues not included in the original 

pleadings and upon which the adverse party had no opportunity 

to defend.” ’ ” (Ibid., italics added.)

The court did not state its reasoning for allowing the 

retaliation claim to come in at the conclusion of evidence, and we 

cannot surmise why it would force UCLA to defend against a 

cause of action it disposed of before trial. The court merely stated 

reviving the claim would be harmless. We disagree.

The purpose of summary adjudication is to “dispose of one 

or more issues before trial so that the parties may focus on the 

questions remaining.” (Conway v. Bughouse, Inc. (1980) 

105 Cal.App.3d 194, 202.) When the trial court adjudicated the 

retaliation claim, the judgment as to that issue was final and 

could not be revived. We can imagine few things more prejudicial 

to UCLA than to have that judgment nullified at the close of 

evidence, forcing UCLA to argue an issue it could not have 

reasonably been expected to defend.

Additionally, retaliation is an egregious offense. It is 

entirely separate from the issue of whether there was indeed 

discrimination and is proven by different acts and events. It 

necessarily implies UCLA sought revenge against Dr. PinterBrown when she complained. To subject an employee to 
67

disparate treatment on account of gender is one thing. To punish 

her for standing up for herself is quite another – it requires a 

certain amount of calculated hostility that a jury could easily find 

worthy of very harsh punishment.

The court had already adjudicated the retaliation issue. To 

put it before the jury at the eleventh hour constituted an ambush. 

Dr. Pinter-Brown took advantage of this ambush when, on 

rebuttal, she argued to the jury: “There is no reference by the 

defense, one iota, about retaliation claims specifically because 

with the retaliation claim, Dr. Pinter-Brown, she doesn’t have to 

prove that discrimination actually occurred. She doesn’t have to 

prove that harassment actually occurred. She just has to prove 

that she reasonably believed that is what was going on and that 

she complained about it and that she was retaliated by it.” (Sic.)

It was contrary to law and manifestly unfair to UCLA to 

allow Dr. Pinter-Brown to argue retaliation to the jury after the 

issue was summarily adjudicated, and then to imply UCLA’s 

failure to defend against the retaliation claim during oral 

argument was itself evidence of retaliation.

IV. UCLA Was Prejudiced by the Cumulative Errors

“Where mistakes on the part of the trial court abound and 

touch not only the charge to the jury but also rulings on evidence, 

it cannot be assumed that defendant has had a fair trial and that 

no miscarriage of justice has resulted.” (People v. McGee (1947) 

31 Cal.2d 229, 245 (dis. opn. of Carter, J.).)

The errors in this case were cumulative: (1) the court’s 

charge to the jury that they stand in the shoes of Dr. King and 

bend the arc of the moral universe toward a future free of 

discrimination; (2) allowing the contents and conclusions of a 

report documenting racial discrimination at UCLA, authored by a 
68

retired Supreme Court justice, to be used as propensity evidence 

to show UCLA’s Medical School discriminated against Dr. PinterBrown on the basis of gender; (3) allowing the jury to view and 

hear testimony about a long list of anonymous unadjudicated 

discrimination complaints not properly connected to Dr. PinterBrown’s particular circumstances or her theory of the case; and 

(4) resurrecting after the close of evidence a retaliation claim 

previously adjudicated against Dr. Pinter-Brown.

We conclude this was a reasonably close case. The evidence 

suggested Dr. Pinter-Brown was treated poorly by Dr. de Vos and 

her supervisors at UCLA. The timing of the audits after five 

years of problem-free clinical research could create suspicions 

about UCLA’s motives and intent. The immediate reaction that 

this was just a personality clash between her and her colleagues 

is a common employer theme. Additionally, Dr. Glaspy and Dr.

Slamon, Dr. Pinter-Brown’s immediate supervisors, could have 

done more to help her and to take her genuine distress more 

seriously.

On the other hand, there was ample evidence there were 

legitimate reasons for the audits; Dr. Pinter-Brown did not 

sufficiently respond to the audit reports; she received the support 

she needed to regain her privileges as a principal researcher 

without a loss in pay; and she herself did not feel the harassing 

and dismissive actions of her colleagues were gender-based.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, we cannot 

conclude the cumulative errors identified here were harmless. 

(See Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 976.) 

Because the evidence was closely balanced, with two jurors 

finding in favor of UCLA, we believe it is reasonably probable a 

result more favorable to UCLA would have been reached in the 
69

absence of these errors. (See Menchaca v. Helms Bakeries, Inc.

(1968) 68 Cal.2d 535, 545.)

The court’s errors constituted a miscarriage of justice and 

created an atmosphere in which UCLA did not receive a fair trial. 

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. Costs are awarded to 

Appellant Regents of the University of California.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

STRATTON, J.

We concur:

GRIMES, Acting P. J.

WILEY, J.
70

Appendix A
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