MEViORAi.'WUM FOR THE RECORD 

SLIBJECT: 

PRESENT: 

Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 11 March 1969 

Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Packard, Mr. Mitchell, and 

Mr. Helms 

Brig. General Donald H. Ross, Captain Merriwell W. Vineyard, USN, 

Colonel Alexander Haig, and Mr. William Trueheart were also 

present. 

1. U-2 Photographic Reconnaissance of China (BYE 8666-69) 

a. General Ross provided a briefing on the proposed U-2R photographic 

reconnaissance mission over northeast China and responded to questions concerning the importance of the proposed targets, camera resolution vis-a-vis 

satellite photography, risks involved, cover contingencies and weather 

considerations. 

b. Mr. Helms discussed the intelligence requirements, the recent 

co:t-rIREX study of intelligence priorities and coverages, and the current 

gaps in coverage, particularly with regard to the suspect advance weapon 

relpted facilities (SAWRF). He stated that CIA recommends the proposed 

mission on its intelligence merits. 

c. Mr. Packard initially questioned the intelligence jμstification 

but after further discussion concluded that the hoped-for insight to be 

obtained concerning MRBM construction and deployment might make the 

mission worthwhile. 

d. Mr. Johnson pointed out that satellite photography had covered the 

SAWRF targets as late as December 1968 and that he did not believe that 

advanced weapons developments in China were moving so fast as to justify 

an overflight mission at this time. He also observed that he was motivated 

by the fact that the Chicoms have been quiescent lately and have been withdrawing some of their military units from North Vietnam. He questioned the 

advisability of irritating the Chinese at this time unless there is a strong 

intelligence justification. 

e. Mr. Kissinger raised the question of just what would the Chinese 

think of this mission. He noted that if the U.S. wanted to make a 

politi~al demonstration to the Chinese it should be in the south near the 

border with North Vietnam. 

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f. ~_Helms replied that basically no country enjoyed having 

the aircraft of another country overflying its domain. He expressed 

the view that perhaps the one secret left within the U.S. Government 

is the resolution of U.S. satellite photography--he thought that the 

Chinese just did not have a conception of how good, or bad, it is. 

Therefore, in his estimation, the principal Chinese reaction to this 

proposed overflight mission would be that the new Administration was 

more aggressively engaged in collecting intelligence not immediately 

available to it through satellite photography or other means. . . 

g. The Chainnan ·concludes!,..the discussion with a request that Mr. 

Helms provide a clearer statement of the rationale for this mission 

and the intelligenc~ purposes to be achieved and that Mr. Johnson 

submit a paper expressing State Department reservations concerning it. 

The Chairman will then present the problem to higher authority for 

resolution. 

2. Discussion of Aerial Reconnaissance Policy for South China 

(BYE 77880-69) 

a. Mr. Packard proposed approval of SR-71 flights in varying 

patterns of penetrations up to 200 miles into Communist China in the 

border areas adjoining North Vietnam. He noted recent movements of 

Chinese fighter aircraft into this area and various logistic and 

~upport facilities as intelligence objectives, as well as the fact of 

penetration as a signal or indicator to the Chinese Communists as a 

demonstration of U.S. political concern. 

b. Mr. Johnson questioned whether or not we really need a 

political demonstration against the Chinese at this time. He noted 

that they are currently withdrawing both militarily and politically 

from North Vietnam, and he questioned the advisability of a political 

demonstration under these circumstances. 

c. The Chairman wondered about the reactions in Hanoi when they 

observ~ on their radars that SR-71 flights which have been regularly 

overflying North Vietnam suddenly go on into Communist China. 

d. Mr. Helms commented that certainly Hanoi would be startled; 

they would construe this as foreshadowing some kind of change in U.S. 

policy but would not know what kind of change. He went on to observe 

that he considered the intelligence objectives of the proposed SR-71 

flights over South China to be somewhat lower in priority than the 

objectives outlined in the U-2R proposed mission over northeast China. 

He then drew the attention of the members to the fact that if an SR-71 

should perchance be lost over China for any reason that it is the most 

sophisticated piece of equipment in the world in many varying respects • 

. Neither the Chinese nor the Russians have anything like it.· 

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e. Mr. Packard conceded that perhaps the gains in the proposed 

South China missions were not so great as to warrant risking the loss 

of an SR-71 and he would study this further. 

f. The Chairman, referring back to possible. :reactions in 1-lanoi 

to recognized U.S. overflights of South China, requested Mr. He·lms 

to provide an estimate paper on how Hanoi might react under these 

circumstances. 

g. The discussion then turned to the use of the 147 H/T drones 

for photographic missions over South China. 

h. Mr. Johnson stated that he had no objection to any necessary 

drone missions over China and the others also concurred, although 

recognizing the greater vulnerability of drones to being shot down. 

i. The Chairman stated that he would submit a recommendation to 

higher authority for approval of re-institution of drone flights over 

South China and advise him of the· considerations given to the use of 

other vehicles for this purpose. 

5. SAFSS Forecast for March 1969 

The SAFSS Forecast for March 1969 . by Committee principals on 28 F b was telephonically approved. 

. tions: All overflights of th Ceh~uary ':'ith the following restricdo b e ina mainland co t. d 

wn, ut the proposed Photo and ELINT I n inue to be stood 

were approved with the d DEALIST/TACKLE missions 

l un erstanding that th b 

c oser than 20 miles to th Ch. . ere e no .. approach · e ina mainland. 

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