If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

September 19, 2024

v No. 367094

Wayne Circuit Court

RAMIREZ DEMARCO DEWBERRY, LC No. 15-000848-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and GARRETT and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted1the order denying defendant’s motion for 

relief from judgment. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the kidnapping and sexual assault of an eleven-year-old victim. 

Defendant was charged with kidnapping, MCL 750.350; first-degree criminal sexual conduct 

(CSC I) (person under 13, defendant 17 or older), 750.520b; second-degree criminal sexual 

conduct (CSC II) (person under 13, defendant 17 or older), MCL 750.520c; felonious assault, MCL 

750.82; and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 

750.227b. 

On June 11, 2015, a competency hearing was held and defendant was found competent to 

stand trial. The trial court judge, Judge Qiana D. Lillard, told defendant, based on the evidence of 

the case, he was very likely to be convicted by a jury. Judge Lillard stated, if defendant is 

convicted: “[W]hat I will do, I assure you, I very, very, very, will, will, will. I’ll sentence you 

consecutively.” Judge Lillard told defendant, if he pleads guilty, he can avoid being imprisoned 

for the rest of his life. Judge Lillard reiterated, during a July 17, 2015 final conference, that she 

 

1 People v Dewberry, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 14, 2023 

(Docket No. 367094).
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would impose consecutive sentences if defendant were found guilty by a jury. During a June 28, 

2015 plea hearing, Judge Lillard again stated she would sentence consecutively if defendant is 

found guilty, and additionally stated she would likely impose sentences above the minimum 

guidelines. 

Defendant pleaded no contest to kidnapping, CSC I, CSC II, felonious assault, and felonyfirearm. Defendant was sentenced to 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment for kidnapping; 25 to 40 years’ 

imprisonment for CSC I; 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment for CSC II; one to four years’ imprisonment 

for felonious assault, and two years’ imprisonment for felony-firearm. Defendant’s sentences for 

kidnapping, CSC I, CSC II, and felonious assault were concurrent, with a consecutive two-year 

sentence for felony-firearm. 

On July 8, 2020, defendant moved for relief from judgment, arguing there was no 

affirmative showing defendant’s plea to kidnapping was voluntary. The trial court denied 

defendant’s motion, and defendant filed for leave to appeal in this Court. In lieu of granting leave 

to appeal, we vacated and remanded the trial court’s October 21, 2020 order,2reasoning: “The 

trial court should have considered whether defendant was entitled to relief from judgment under 

MCR 6.508(D). The trial court also erred by determining that defendant abandoned his claim that 

the trial court coerced him into pleading guilty.” People v Dewberry, unpublished order of the 

Court of Appeals, entered October 28, 2021 (Docket No. 357629).

On remand, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for relief from judgment. The trial 

court concluded: “Defendant has failed to establish good cause for failure to raise the grounds for 

relief on appeal.” The trial court explained defendant’s plea, by itself, was not good cause for 

defendant’s failure to raise issues on appeal. Defendant provided no supporting authority, and 

named no external factors, preventing him from raising issues on appeal. We granted leave to

appeal to determine whether defendant demonstrated good cause and actual prejudice to support 

his claims for relief, and whether defects in proceedings render defendant’s no-contest plea to be 

involuntary, such that it would be manifestly unjust to uphold his convictions. People v Dewberry, 

unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 14, 2023 (Docket No. 367094).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of 

discretion and its findings of facts supporting its decision for clear error.” People v Swain, 288 

Mich App 609, 628; 794 NW2d 92 (2010). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision 

falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. A trial court necessarily abuses its 

discretion when it makes an error of law.” People v Grant, 329 Mich App 626, 634; 944 NW2d 

172 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Clear error is present when the reviewing 

court is left with a definite and firm conviction that an error occurred.” People v McChester, 310 

 

2 The order also denied defendant’s August 10, 2021 “motion for reconsideration” as moot, 

reasoning: “Defendant seeks reconsideration of an order dismissing this appeal for failure to cure 

defects. However, no such order was entered, and thus, there is no order to reconsider.” People v 

Dewberry, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 28, 2021 (Docket No. 

357629).
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Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “The 

interpretation of a court rule is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.” Swain, 288 Mich App 

at 629.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues he is not precluded from moving for relief from judgment because he has 

demonstrated good cause for failing to raise grounds in a prior motion and experienced actual 

prejudice. We disagree. 

“A defendant in a criminal case may move for relief from a judgment of conviction and 

sentence.” Swain, 288 Mich App at 629. “[MCR 6.500 et seq.] outline[s] the procedure for how 

a trial court is to consider a motion for relief from judgment, identify the requirements that a 

defendant must establish to be entitled to relief, and limit the number of motions that a defendant 

may file.” Swain, 288 Mich App at 629. “The subchapter is the exclusive means to challenge a 

conviction in Michigan once a defendant has exhausted the normal appellate process.” People v 

Watroba, 193 Mich App 124, 126; 483 NW2d 441 (1992). However, “MCR 6.508 protects 

unremedied manifest injustice, preserves professional independence, conserves judicial resources, 

and enhances the finality of judgments.” People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 378; 535 NW2d 496 

(1995).

Under MCR 6.508(D):

The defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to the relief requested. 

The court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion

(1) seeks relief from a judgment of conviction and sentence that still is subject to 

challenge on appeal pursuant to subchapter 7.200 or subchapter 7.300;

(2) alleges grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in a prior 

appeal or proceeding under this subchapter, unless the defendant establishes that a 

retroactive change in the law has undermined the prior decision; for purposes of 

this provision, a court is not precluded from considering previously decided claims 

in the context of a new claim for relief, such as in determining whether new 

evidence would make a different result probable on retrial, or if the previously 

decided claims, when considered together with the new claim for relief, create a 

significant possibility of actual innocence;

(3) alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which could have 

been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a prior motion under 

this subchapter, unless the defendant demonstrates

(a) good cause for failure to raise such grounds on appeal or in the prior motion, 

and

(b) actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities that support the claim for relief. 

[MCR 6.508(D).]
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“In order to be entitled to relief under MCR 6.508(D)(3), both ‘good cause’ and ‘actual 

prejudice’ must be established.” People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 314; 684 NW2d 669 (2004)

(footnote omitted). The good cause prong of MCR 6.508(D)(3) may be “established by proving 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel . . . or by showing that some external factor prevented 

counsel from previously raising the issue.” Reed, 449 Mich at 387 (citation omitted).

“[R]egardless of whether a defendant files a prior motion in propria persona or with 

representation, he or she is required to fulfill the good cause requirement in MCR 6.508(D)(3).”

People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 254; 732 NW2d 605 (2007).

Defendant argues the Michigan Rules of Court do not require him to appeal his conviction 

before moving for relief from judgment. Further, defendant argues he did not have knowledge of 

claims he could raise on appeal. We find defendant’s arguments lack merit.

Defendant’s arguments “could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and 

sentence or in a prior motion;” thus, he was required to show good cause to be entitled to relief 

under MCR 6.508(D)(3). During defendant’s plea hearing, Judge Lillard informed defendant he 

had the right to request leave to appeal with this Court, and defendant stated he understood the 

availability of appeal. Defendant provided no authority to suggest his lack of knowledge of 

potential grounds for relief is sufficient to satisfy the good cause requirement. 

The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment because 

defendant failed to demonstrate the requisite good cause required for relief under MCR 

6.508(D)(3)(b).3

IV. CONCLUSION

The trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for relief from judgment because 

he failed to establish good cause for failing to raise issues on appeal or in an earlier motion. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Anica Letica 

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

 

3 Because defendant failed to show good cause, it is unnecessary to reach the issue of actual 

prejudice. We note, however, defendant’s actual prejudice argument does appear to have merit.

Actual prejudice is defined, in relevant part, as: “[I]n a conviction entered on a plea of guilty, guilty 

but mentally ill, or nolo contendere, the defect in the proceedings was such that it renders the plea 

an involuntary one to a degree that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the conviction to stand.” 

MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(ii). Defendant likely experienced actual prejudice because Judge Lillard’s 

statements, regarding the imposition of consecutive and upwards departure sentences, were 

violative of People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993) (“To avoid the potential for 

coercion, a judge must not state or imply alternative sentencing possibilities on the basis of future 

procedural choices, such as an exercise of the defendant’s right to trial by jury or by the court”).