Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the PACIFIC REPORTER. 

Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email 

corrections@akcourts.us. 

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

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VIOLET C., 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMEN

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OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES

Appellee. 

JACK C., 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT

, 

OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES, 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S SERVICES

Appellee. 

Supreme Court Nos. S-17038/17066 

(Consolidated) 

Superior Court No. 3PA-15-00169 

O P I N I O N 

No. 7339 – March 1, 2019 

Superior Court No. 3PA-15-00170 

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Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third 

Judicial District, Palmer, Kari Kristiansen, Judge. 

Appearances: Megan R. Webb, Assistant Public Defender, 

and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for 

Appellant Violet C.; Carolyn Perkins, Salt Lake City, Utah, 

for Appellant Jack C.; Mary Ann Lundquist, Senior Assistant 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Attorney General, Fairbanks, andJahnaLindemuth, Attorney 

General, Juneau, for Appellee. 

Before: Bolger, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maasen, 

and Carney, Justices. 

WINFREE, Justice. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

The superior court terminated a mother’s and father’s parental rights, 

finding their two children were in need of aid based on abandonment, incarceration, risk 

of domestic violence, and substance abuse. The court also determined that the Office of 

Children’s Services (OCS) had satisfied its duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the 

parents and children. The mother and father separately appealed the court’s reasonableefforts determinations, andthemother also appealed the court’s findings that the children 

were in need of aid based on abandonment and domestic violence. We consolidated the 

appeals for consideration and decision. Seeing no reversible error, we affirm the 

superior court’s decision to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights. 

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 

Violet C. and Jack C. are the separated biological parents of Maggie and 

Doug, eight-year-old twins.1 Jack was in a different state for the entirety of the case and 

incarcerated for its majority. 

A. Initial Reports And Removal 

In early August 2015 OCS received a report alleging that Violet was 

addicted to substances and abusing alcohol. An OCS caseworker visited the home, 

found no safety threats, and left without taking action. The caseworker returned a few 

weeks later after receiving renewed reports of harm. During this visit Violet’s 

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the family members’ privacy. 

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grandmother relayed concerns about Violet leaving the home and returning under the 

influence; the grandmother reported that Violet bullied her by beating on the door and 

yelling, and that Violet had once kicked a hole in the door. Violet’s grandmother also 

reported that Violet once “grabbed [Maggie] by the arm and yanked her up and hauled 

her out” of a bedroom. 

The OCS caseworker observed that Violet had sores on her face and legs, 

that she presented with jerky movements, and that she continually paced and turned 

during their conversation. Violet refused to allow OCS to assess the children or create 

a protective action plan, but she agreed to participate in urinalysis and hair follicle tests, 

which later yielded positive drug results. 

OCS assumed custody of the twins in late August and filed for their 

adjudication as children in need of aid shortly thereafter. 

B. OCS’s Case Plan And Early Reunification Efforts 

In September Violet notified OCS that she has hearing and mobility 

impairments; due to her disabilities, she requested transportation funding, patience in 

communication, and prioritization of in-person and email contact. OCS arranged for 

transportation services to visitation, parenting classes, treatment, and drug testing. OCS 

initially provided Violet taxi vouchers through mid-October. Before approving further 

taxi vouchers, it required documentation of her disabilities, which Violet did not provide 

until the following March. In the interim OCS arranged for third-party transportation 

services beginning in December. Violet did not fully utilize these services; testimony 

detailed multiple occasions when she was unavailable for transportation she had 

previously arranged. 

OCS’s November 2015 case plan required Violet to submit to random 

urinalysis tests, obtainasubstanceabuseassessment, followtreatmentrecommendations, 

and participate in parenting classes and mental health services. The case plan made no 

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mention of Violet’s disabilities or accommodation requests, instead noting that she was 

“physically able” and “possesse[d] adequate energy.” 

Violet inconsistently participated in supervised visitation. Visitation 

temporarily ceased in January 2016 due to her “excessive absences.” She maintained 

telephonic contact with the twins, and OCS asked their foster parent to identify each 

voice and ensure they were not on the phone at the same time. 

WhenOCSformulatedJack’s caseplan, hehad recentlybeen released from 

incarceration in Florida and relocated to Texas. He expressed an interest in having 

custody of the children. OCS’s case plan required Jack to complete a substance abuse 

assessment and obtain treatment, participate in parenting classes, and obtain a 

psychological assessment. OCS worked with local providers to arrange the assessments. 

Jack never notified OCS that he had trouble accessing services, and he later 

acknowledged that he “did not participate in these services.” An OCS caseworker 

testified that she was unable to begin the process for placement with Jack under the 

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) because he had only recently 

been released from jail, moved to a new home, and needed to first engage in services. 

After losing contact with Jack, OCS became aware at the adjudication 

hearing of his reincarceration. OCS often had trouble contacting Jack, unsuccessfully 

attempting to contact himat the telephone number he provided, through his attorney, and 

through the jail itself. 

In April 2016 the superior court issued its adjudication order, finding that 

Maggie and Doug were children in need of aid based on Jack’s abandonment and 

incarceration and Violet’s substance abuse. The court found that OCS had provided 

reasonable efforts to Jack but that OCS had not made reasonable efforts to provide Violet 

remedial services and allow the children to return to her care from September 2015 

through February 2016. The court stated that OCS “viewed [Violet’s] documented 

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disabilities with skepticism, required outside verification of her disabilities, formulated 

a case plan not tailored to her needs, failed to accommodate [her] request for important 

information to be conveyed in writing, and cut off transportation and service referral 

funding in response to less-than-perfect performance.” 

But the court also found that OCS had provided Violet reasonable efforts 

since March 2016, “after transportation assistance resumed and [OCS] made better 

efforts to communicate” with her. The court found that around February 2016 OCS was 

able to obtain a transportation grant allowing Violet to attend visitation, a drug 

assessment, mental health appointments, and other services. The court therefore ordered 

the children placed in OCS’s temporary custody. 

C. Post-Adjudication Conduct; Trial 

A new OCS caseworker was assigned to the case in October 2016. This 

caseworker met with Violet in person, ensured that Violet could read her lips, and 

communicated through text messages. By that point Violet had been discharged from 

treatment programs several times for noncompliance. 

As of January 2017 Violet was involved with Sam. Sam has a history of 

both substance abuse and domestic violence, including a conviction for third-degree 

assault against an ex-girlfriend. He has twice violated his probation for failing to engage 

in a domestic violence intervention program and failing to report to his probation officer. 

Violet became pregnant with Sam’s child in mid-2017. Although OCS referred her to 

a sober housing center, she refused to enter because Sam’s domestic violence history 

prevented him joining her. They instead lived in Violet’s often non-drivable van. 

The termination trial took place over three days in February and March 

2018. Although Violet regularly participated in drug tests for a few months prior to trial, 

yielding negative results except for one dilute sample, she earlier had failed to participate 

in urinalysis tests between April and September 2017. She completed a parenting class 

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in April 2017 as required by her case plan, but she still needed to complete the plan’s 

other aspects, including to secure appropriate housing, be consistent in her urinalysis 

tests, complete an inpatient substance abuse and after-care treatment program, and 

demonstrate sustained sobriety for at least six months. 

Between the adjudication order and termination trial, Jack again had been 

released on supervised parole. But by the time of the termination trial his parole had 

been revoked for drinking, failing to report, traveling outside of an approved county, 

failing to perform community work service, failing to pay fines, and failing to complete 

a treatment program. Jack believed, but provided no evidentiary support, that he would 

be released from prison shortly after the termination trial. 

Jack had completed anger management, drug rehabilitation, and parenting 

classes through the Texas Department of Corrections. Jack acknowledged that at the 

time of the termination trial he was not having regular telephonic contact with the twins. 

The foster parent testified to the twins’ difficulty identifying their father and said they 

refer to him by first name rather than “dad.” 

In March 2018 the court issued its order terminating Violet’s and Jack’s 

parental rights, finding the twins to be children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(1) 

(abandonment), (8) (risk of exposure to domestic violence by Sam), and (10) (substance 

abuse) based on Violet’s conduct, and under subsections (1) (abandonment), 

(2) (incarceration), (8) (risk of exposure to domestic violence), and (10) (substance 

abuse) based on Jack’s conduct. 

The court stated that Violet “failed to complete a suitable case plan” and 

that she “inconsistently visits” the twins. The court noted she had “not demonstrated 

sustained stability and sobriety and ha[d] used substances within the past year. [Her] 

ability to parent has been substantially impaired by the addictive or habitual use of drugs, 

resulting in a substantial risk of harm to the children.” 

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The court entered findings regarding OCS’s efforts to provide Violet 

transportation services, written instructions, in-person meetings, referral funding for 

access to services, a peer navigator, and frequent communication. The court found 

specifically that “[w]hen taxi cab vouchers were made available to her, [Violet] chose 

not to use them.” The court found that Violet “often had a working vehicle and friends 

would drive her to appointments.” The court found that Violet had not remedied the 

conduct placing the children at substantial risk of harm and that termination of her 

parental rights was in the twins’ best interests. 

The court found that Jack had not remedied the conduct that put the twins 

at risk, pointing to Jack’s lack of relationship or contact with his children. The court 

found that he also had “not demonstrated sustained stability and sobriety” and had “made 

minimal efforts to communicate and support the children.” The court acknowledged that 

both parents “sincerely love” the children but found that termination was in the 

children’s best interests. 

Violet and Jack both appeal. Violet contends that the court erred by finding 

the twins were children in need of aid under AS 47.10.011(1) (abandonment) and 

(8) (domestic violence) and determining OCS made reasonable efforts to reuniteher with 

her children. Jack contends that the court erred by determining OCS made reasonable 

efforts to reunite him with his children. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Violet’s appeal of fewer than all of the court’s relevant child in need of aid 

findings raises the issue of mootness. “Because it is a matter of judicial policy, mootness 

presents a question of law” to which we apply our independent judgment.2 

2 Jennifer L. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s
 

Servs., 357 P.3d 110, 113 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Peter A. v. State, Dep’t of Health &
 

(continued...)
 

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“ ‘Whether OCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family is a mixed 

question of law and fact.’ For mixed questions, ‘we review factual questions under the 

clearly erroneous standard and legal questions using our independent judgment.’ ”3 

“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if a review of the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the party prevailing below leaves us ‘with a definite and firm conviction that 

a mistake has been made.’ ”4 

IV.	 DISCUSSION 

A.	 Because Violet Does Not Contest The Superior Court’s Finding That 

The Twins Were In Need Of Aid Based On Substance Abuse, We 

Decline To Consider The Court’s Alternative Findings. 

1.	 Violet does not challenge the superior court’s finding under 

AS 47.10.011(10). 

To terminate a parent’s rights and responsibilities, the superior court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that the children havebeen subjected to conditions 

that would qualify them as children in need of aid under one of the subsections of 

AS 47.10.011.5 Violet challenges the court’s findings under subsections 

(1) (abandonment) and (8) (domestic violence). But because only one child in need of 

aid finding is necessary based on our case law — and Violet does not challenge the 

2 (...continued) 

Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 146 P.3d 991, 993-94 (Alaska 2006)). 

3 Kylie L. v. State, Dep’t of Health &Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., 

407 P.3d 442, 448 (Alaska 2017) (quoting Joy B. v. State, Dep’t of Health &Soc. Servs., 

Office of Children’s Servs., 382 P.3d 1154, 1162 (Alaska 2016)). 

4 Barbara P. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s 

Servs., 234 P.3d 1245, 1253 (Alaska 2010) (quoting Brynna B. v. State, Dep’t of Health 

& Soc. Servs., 88 P.3d 527, 529 (Alaska 2004)). 

5 AS 47.10.088(a)(1); CINA Rule 18(c)(1)(A). 

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court’s finding under subsection (10) (parental substance abuse) —we need not consider 

Violet’s challenges to the other findings.6 

2.	 Violet’s challenges to the superior court’s alternative child in 

need of aid findings are moot. 

Violetnonethelessasks us to vacatethesuperior court’s alternativefindings 

under subsections (1) and (8). Although her challenges are moot,7 she urges that we 

address those findings because they “could be used as evidence against her” and “she 

would be precluded from challenging” them in a subsequent child in need of aid case. 

Without citing relevant authority, Violet suggests that the collateral consequences 

doctrine applies. But inability to obtain review of her claims on appeal means that she 

will not be precluded from challenging the court’s findings in a subsequent case.8 We 

6 See Rick P. v. State, OCS, 109 P.3d 950, 956 (Alaska 2005) (noting it is 

unnecessary to consider other findings if record supports one ground for finding children 

to be in need of aid). 

7 See Peter A. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s 

Servs., 146 P.3d 991, 994 (Alaska 2006) (“ ‘A claim is moot if it has lost its character as 

a present, live controversy.’ If the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any 

relief if it prevails, there is no ‘case or controversy’ for us to decide.” first quoting 

Klevan v. Yukon-Koyukuk Sch. Dist., 853 P.2d 518, 523 (Alaska 1993); and then citing 

Ulmer v. Alaska Rest. & Beverage Ass’n, 33 P.3d 773, 776 (Alaska 2001))). 

8 See James G. v. Veronica G., No. S-11762, 2006 WL 204782, at *7-8 

(Alaska Jan. 25, 2006) (noting general rule that case mooted pending appeal cannot be 

given preclusive effect, meaning collateral estoppel cannot be applied to child in need 

of aid finding if appellant cannot obtain appellate reviewof that finding; this rule protects 

the appellant’s right to “obtain meaningful review on any issue that affects his rights” 

citing 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 

PROCEDURE § 4433 (2d ed. 2002))); but see Taryn M. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. 

Servs., Office of Children’s Servs., No. S-16326, 2017 WL 3122387, at *1 n.1 (Alaska 

July 19, 2017) (reviewing moot adjudication finding, without explanation, under 

collateral consequences doctrine). 

(continued...) 

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therefore decline to apply the collateral consequences doctrine in this context. 

3.	 Conclusion 

Because Violet does not contest the superior court’s child in need of aid 

finding under AS 47.10.011(10), and because we hold her challenges to the court’s 

alternative findings moot, we affirm the court’s determination that the twins were 

children in need of aid. 

B.	 The Superior Court Did Not Err By Determining That OCS Made 

Reasonable Reunification Efforts. 

Violet and Jack separately challenge the court’s determination that OCS 

made reasonable reunification efforts. Before terminating parental rights, the superior 

court must find by clear and convincing evidence that OCS has complied with the AS 

47.10.086 provisions governing reasonable efforts.9 That statute requires OCS to “make 

timely, reasonable efforts to provide family support services to the child and to the 

parents . . . that are designed to . . . enable the safe return of the child to the family 

home.”10 OCS’s efforts must be “reasonable but need not be perfect.”11 “A parent’s 

demonstrated unwillingness toparticipatein treatment may beconsidered in determining 

8	 (...continued) 

We also note — without considering its application to this case — the 

Restatement rule that even in cases where litigants fail to appeal, collateral estoppel does 

not apply when multiple grounds are each sufficient to support a judgment. 

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982) (“If a judgment of a court of 

first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing 

independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive 

with respect to either issue standing alone.”). 

9 AS 47.10.088(a)(3); CINA Rule 18(c)(2)(A). 

10 AS 47.10.086(a). 

11 Audrey H. v. State, Office of Children’s Servs., 188 P.3d 668, 678 (Alaska 

2008) (citing Jeff A.C., Jr. v. State, 117 P.3d 697, 706 (Alaska 2005)). 

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the reasonableness of state efforts.”12 

Thesuperior court found that OCSfailedtoprovide reasonableefforts from 

September 2015 through February 2016 but that OCS had made reasonable efforts after 

that time. Violet contends that although “some failings had been cured by the time of the 

termination trial, not all were, resulting in a lack of reasonable efforts toward [her], 

contrary to the court’s findings.” Violet specifically points to OCS’s failure to provide 

consistent transportation services. She argues that transportation issues — including a 

lack of reliable transportation because she lived in a non-drivable van and owned a car 

in need of repairs — made it “difficult to participate in programs, such as the random 

[urinalysis tests].” She argues that if OCS had offered “consistent assistance in 

transportation for services, her engagement level likely would have been more consistent 

and she might have been able to remedy her conduct in a timely fashion.” 

But we are not persuaded that OCS’s failure to provide consistent 

transportation was the reason Violet could not comply with her case plan. The superior 

court found — and Violet acknowledges — that Violet failed to tell OCS about her 

transportation difficulties. Ultimately, although OCS’s efforts to provide transportation 

may not have been perfect, they were reasonable.13 

Inadditiontohergeneralargumentcontesting thecourt’s reasonable-efforts 

finding, Violet contests two specific fact findings: (1) that when “taxi cab vouchers were 

made available to her, [she] chose not to use them”; and (2) that she “often had a 

working vehicle and friends would drive her to appointments.” 

12 Id. (citing E.A. v. State, Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 46 P.3d 986, 991 

(Alaska 2002)). 

13 Id. (citing Jeff A.C., 117 P.3d at 706). 

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In support of the first finding, the court cited a page of Violet’s behavioral 

health records reporting that her “track record of keeping [appointments] even with 

approved cab vouchers is not good — she no-showed for the last two sessions when cab 

vouchers were authorized.” Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to OCS,14 

we are not persuaded that the court clearly erred by inferring that Violet “chose” not to 

use the vouchers when they were available but unused. 

The court supported the second contested fact finding — that Violet “often 

had a working vehicle and friends would drive her to appointments” — by citing 

termination trial testimony in which a friend recalled taking Violet to visitation. The 

friend stated that “if [Violet] needed to go someplace, then yes, I drove her.” Violet 

concedes in her brief that the court did not err by finding she had a working vehicle and 

friends who could transport her: “To a limited extent, then, the trial court was correct 

that Violet was able, at times, to use other sources for help.” We therefore see no clear 

error in the court’s finding on this point. 

Overall the superior court found that OCS provided numerous services to 

the family including transportation, written instructions, in-person meetings, referral 

funding for case management services, a peer navigator, referrals to parenting classes 

and substance abuse assessments, weekly supervised visits, and referrals for housing at 

a local shelter and residential treatment center. In light of these findings, we hold that 

the superior court did not err by determining that OCS made reasonable efforts to reunite 

Violet with her children. 

Nor did the superior court err by determining that OCS made reasonable 

efforts to reunite Jack with his children. He argues that OCS failed to coordinate 

14 See Barbara P. v. State, Dep’t of Health &Soc. Servs., Office of Children’s 

Servs., 234 P.3d 1245, 1253 (Alaska 2010) (stating that we review fact findings in light 

most favorable to party prevailing below). 

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telephonic visitation with his children or start an ICPC process. 

The “practical circumstances” of Jack’s incarceration made it difficult for 

OCS to provide extensive services.15 Testimony detailed that OCS could not initiate an 

ICPC placement during the short time when Jack was not incarcerated because he had 

only recently been released from jail, moved to a new home, and needed to first engage 

in services; his later reincarceration would have rendered ICPC progress ineffectual. 

OCS repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to contact Jack through the 

telephone number he provided, through his attorney, and through the Texas Department 

of Corrections where he was incarcerated. OCS secured some services for Jack within 

his community when he was not incarcerated. And OCS attempted to arrange telephonic 

visitation between Jackandhis children and providehimwith casemanagement services. 

The court’s determination that OCS provided reasonable efforts to reunite Jack with his 

children was therefore not erroneous. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court’s termination of 

Violet’s and Jack’s parental rights. 

15 See A.A. v. State, Dep’t of Family & Youth Servs., 982 P.2d 256, 261 

(Alaska 1999) (holding in ICWA context, where OCS bears higher burden of making 

“active efforts” to promote reunification, that “the practical circumstances surrounding 

a parent’s incarceration . . . may have a direct bearing on what active remedial efforts are 

possible”). 

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