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-(St NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 11110111111W1

THII HMO STAB .

27 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR D

SUBJECT: Rostow Disc/ostire Initiative

Background: 

On June 17, we furnished you a copy of a draft DOD response to

the Rostow disclosure initiative, as prepared by JCS. DIA, and the

NRO Staff.

Present Status: 

On Tuesday, June 21, Mr. Vance reviewed the draft DOD response,

and approved a memorandum to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson

(see Tab A). As he prepared to sign it (a final typing was required), he

received a memorandum prepared by Mr. Barber and signed by

Mr. Yarmolinsky (see Tab B). After reading this paper, he changed

his outgoing memorandum to what you see in Tab C and returned Tab A

with the note you see in the upper right-hand corner.

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".. • ME DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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ei". 4p:o. oe MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR U. ALEXIS JOHNSON vcor,P# or

SUBJECT: Disclosure of US Satellite Reconnaissance. 4.., aPj"cp1

— '1. (U) With reference to your draft memorandum, responding

to Mr. Rostow's proposal, the following comments, representing the

views of the Department of Defense, are provided for your use in replying to the President.

vs"BD ur draft memorandum represents an excellent

museum e political implications of the proposal. It is our

view that the implementation of the disclosure proposal, even on a

quid pro quo basis, would seriously jeopardize and might completely

preclude continuation of this nation's single most valuable intelligence

collection capability - the National Reconnaissance Prograth (NRP).

In addition, a great deal of technology associated with the NRP would

significantly assist others in developing a like capability. Together,

the-potential-intelligence-los-s-re-the-US-and-the-technologic-ales

which would be gained by other nations as a result of disclosure would

have an adverse impact upon our national security and seriously affect

our national defense posture..

ith respect to the question of technological lofs, ,

th ras could not be disclosed without the most •

se comparatite positions of the United States and all

other nations in the area of satellite reconnaissance technology. On the

other hand, the X11-4 camera could be modified so that it'could be iliaclosed to the USSR without a significant impact upon other NRP technology

or the comparative technical position of the United States and the USSR.

Stated in terms of resolution. presently operational NRP cameras producing photographs with resolutions of 10 feet or greater could be disclosed

without adverse technological impact vis-a-vis the USSR. Cameras pro-

(Lucius resolutions of three to five feet are at the forefront of the stateof-the-art

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d could not be disclosed withoit significant benefits to all ;

nations. • . • ... .• •

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naissance p

coverage o

usable cove

From an intelligence viewpoint, satellite reconwith annual usable .

also provides

surface for

genes, mapping. charting, and target materials purposes. The

kndwledge of communist capabilities in the strategic offensive.

defensive, and nuclear energy fields is largely obtained or confirmed

by satellite reconnaissance and could not be acquired by any other

means except possibly on-site inspections or manned aircraft over-

. flights. Thus, satellite reconnaissance represents a productive and

irreplaceable source to assess more definitively the military threat

against the United States and to determine the nature, character, and

strengths of the US national force structure and the defense posture to

counter these capabilities. These assessments have a direct bearing

on national defense budgetary considerations.

S. -(T l 9:6i Appendices A and B hereto set forth in greater detail.

the effect of the proposal upon NRP technology and intelligence collection

capability.

6.frekacifthe Soviets could initiate an effective program to

reduce detection or observation that would result in a serious reduction

in US intelligence collection assessment capabilities. While increased •

high-resolution stereo coverage could reduce the effectiveness of such .

' a program, such US reaction would take time,• vastly increase collection

costs, and increase photo interpretation/exploitation requirements and

costs.

(TSTIC) Discontinuance of both US and Soviet satellite

reconnaissance activities, due to political action, would result in the .

United States sustaining a more .serious loss than the USSR. Under such

circumstances.. the Soviets could continue reasonably effective conventional intelligence collection in the "open" US society; whereis the US

conventional intelligence collection in the "closed" Soviet society would ‘.

remain largely ineffective and nonproductive of intelligeice needed to

replace that formerly derived from satellite reconnaissance.

ff-Sifit) Disclosure of the US satellite reconnaissance program

could also result in in overestimation of this capability by friendly

nations which now authorise US-manned reconnaissance activities from

their territory. Such overestimation could cause the withdrawal of these

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-privileges, thereby denying the United States the capability to conduct

more conventional operations employing manned aircraft, which are

more flexible, timely, and less costly than satellites, in responding to

and satisfying national and military intelligence requirements. .

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 summary, the Department of Defense believes that the f

NRP is a productive and irreplaceable intelligence collection asset. ' t

1gs4oeure of V.ais capeollity wcnad result fr. 'ale loss 07 degradation i

of this source of information with the attendant effect on the national

defense posture.. Any disclosure initiative should carefully consider • 1

the serious loss to this nation's intelligence collection effort and tech- i

nological advaniage in the satellite reconnaissance field. 1

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. • 10. (7)- Ns believe that the proposal should not be approved. •

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