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DRAFT/JLMCLucas/S March

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE tot-i .

SUBJECT: NRO Charter and NSCID iniuMnrou

Since August 1965 the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

has operated under an agreement between DoD and CIA. This

agreement on the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) was

arrived at after several earlier attempts to evolve a satisfactory modus operandi in an area where both CIA and DoD

(principally Air Force) had ongoing and to some extent compeii

tive efforts. The 1965 agreement has served us well in that

DoD/CIA relations have been smooth and systems have been

conceived, built and operated with a high degree of success.

Recently several factors have called into question the

adequacy of the current agreement. Both the US Intelligence

Board and the National Security Agency operate under NSCID's.

The NSA NSCID (NSCID-6) is of recent date (17 February 1972)

and is felt by some to supersede in some respects the DoD/CIA

agreement on the NRP of 11 August 1965. Whereas.NSCID-6 calls

for joint NSA and NRO tasking of SIGINT satellites, the

DoD/CIA agreement states that NRO is responsible for "development,

management, control and operation" of satellites. A restatement

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40P4EGRETof NRO responsibility for operation of its systems is in order.

While we have been able, in the event, to arrive at ad hoc

arrangements with NSA for system operations, our lot would be

improved if we were negotiating with them as another "national"

organization with a similar charter.

Of perhaps more importance, the presidential directive

of November 5, 1971 (Subject: Organization and Management of

the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community) gives to the DCI

certain responsibilities for control of resources to be allocated

to intelligence, and directs that DCI chair various committees

and boards related to intelligence. While it does not specifically state that DCI should chair the Executive Committee of

the NRO, it certainly is within the implied intent of the

directive.

The November 5 document also directs the "retention of the

present management structure of the NRO." The assumption at

the time of writing the November 5, 1971 document was that since

NRO was operating well, it should be continued in its present

form.

In my view, if the external environment were unchanged,

there would be no reason to change the charter of NRO. But

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because of the changed circumstances cited above, some account

should be taken of these changes. And while we are about it,

I believe it is desirable to eliminate some provisions of the

old agreement which are no longer necessary. Dr. Hall has

proposed that the DCI become chairman of the • ExCom, but that

the 1965 agreement be maintained. Dr. Schlesinger feels that

an NSCID should be written covering NRO operations. I prepared

a draft NSCID which drew heavily on the 1965 DoD/CIA agreement.

Since then Dr. Schlesinger has forwarded to you a CIA draft of

such an NSCID.

I have found that the draft encompasses a considerably

different working arrangement than what I feel is desirable.

Since the new draft proposes more far-reaching changes that I

feel are appropriate, I discussed the subject with Dr. Schlesinger.

He has stated that he concurs in maintaining NRO operations

essentially as presently constituted. Dr. Schlesinger wants to

become Chairman of ExCom but he has said that he has no intention

of getting involved in the day-to-day operations of our program.

Specifically he told me that he wants to redraw the NRO charter

to be more in consonance with the Presidential letter of November 5,

1971, but the operational end of NRO business should continue as

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before. He further stated • that NRO operations had been

first-class and he did not want to upset a good thing. Using

Dr. Schlesinger's stated intentions as a reference point, I

have rewritten his draft NSCID, Attachment (1).

I have also reviewed the situation with the Secretary of •

the Air Force and the Chief of Staff. We three feel strongly

that whatever changes are made in the superstructure of the

NRO, the Director (DNRO) should •be an Air Force official, and

the principal support for the program should continue to be

provided by components of the Air Force, especially the Air Force

Systems Command.

I personally believe that the Under Secretary of the Air

Force is in the best position to be DNRO. I am the third Under

Secretary to be DNRO; on one occasion the DNRO was an Air Force

Assistant Secretary for R&D. In my opinion, this latter

arrangement was sufficiently less effective that it should not

be considered as an attractive alternative. If the NSCID were

set up to require that the Under Secretary of the Air Force be

DNRO, a waiver could of course be obtained from NSC if there

were compelling reasons to do so in a specific case. The DNRO

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needs the "clout" of the Under Secretary position to expedite

NRO matters and prevent this essential program from becoming

bogged down in Pentagon routine.

If we can reach agreement with the DCI along lines similar

to my proposed draft, then I believe having'an NSCID is a step

forward. If we find we cannot eliminate those provisions of

the CIA draft which turn-over effective control of the program

to the CIA, then I would agree with Dr. Hall that we would be

much better off to keep the existing agreement of 1965 and

merely have the DCI appointed as ExCom Chairman. I believe

that one or two sessions with Dr. Schlesinger and his staff

will result in an agreement on all essential points.

John L. McLucas

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