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Ut.t"AK I Mt.N I ut- I. _ AIR FORCE 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

MEMORANDUM 

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DEPARTMENT OF Tk._ AIR FORCE 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

MEj)'iORANDUM , 

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May 9, 1967 

MEMORANDUM 

SUBJECT: Security and Space Reconnaissance 

1. This country needs a very critical review 

of our policy and security regulations related to 

space satellite systems. Recent and continuing 

developments in our manned and unmanned satellite 

technology including boosters, payloads, space 

vehicles, recovery and data handling now allows us 

to perform almost any earth oriented mission we 

wish to accomplish from space. NASA and DOD have 

been working exceedingly hard to design credible 

new satellite systems. Both agencies are evolving 

their satellites to a point where their future 

sophisticated system requirements appear in many 

cases to be identical. NASA is currently working to 

define the requirements and system parameters needed 

to establish the program plan that will meet the 

future needs of natural resources and astronomy 

missions. These two missions have many technology 

developments similar to those planned and needed 

for the future SAFSP/CIA missions. 

2. Many statements are currently being made 

that tend to compromise the U.S. security position 

for space surveillance and reconnaissance, both for 

mili tary and nonmilitary missions. Below are some 

typical recent examples: 

a. President Johnson is reported to 

have disclosed in Tennessee that satellite 

reconnaissance may have lessened the guesswork regarding military capability of potential 

aggressors. See New York Times, 17 March;, 

Washington Post, 18 March; and Washington 

Star, 17 Marc·h. 

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b. NASA has stated in official 

publications* that its postulated Observation 

Program in near earth orbits could see 

objects smaller than Soviet missiles. ~ASA 

stated that objects can be identified as 

small as two to ten feet by 1970. 

c. Two specific statements below were 

made in the recent Air Force/Space Digest, 

May 1967:. 

o Mr. Johnson said, "They let me 

know how many missiles the enemy 

has." He went on to say that, by 

providing detailed information on 

the armaments actually possessed 

by Communist nations, the satellites 

are taking the guesswork out of a 

President's most important decisions. 

o NASA explanations of its projected 

manned observation-satellite program 

make it clear that the U.S. can now 

"see,1I from orbital altitudes of 

150 to 200 miles, objects that are 

considerably smaller than the Soviet 

missiles Mr. Johnson mentioned. 

Objects as small as three fe~t in 

diameter, such as garbage-can lids, 

probably are picked up on a routine 

basis. 

3. Space reconnaissance has assisted the 

President and all of the Free World to maintain a 

balance of power and has minimized the threat of surprise 

attack by any nation which could plunge the world into 

another major waT. Accepting this fact, it would 

appear that at least three specific approaches to our 

satellite reconnaissance security seem worthy of investigation. These approaches are listed below: 

a. U.S. should hold to a very hard and 

extremely selfish position that space surveillance 

for military and nonmilitary uses should be 

conducted exclusively for the advantage they 

*NASA CR 586 - Peaceful Uses of Earth Observation 

Spacecraft 

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offer to the U.S. The U.S. should refuse 

to take part in any world discussion that 

would bring any other Nation of the world 

up to the sophistication of our established 

overt and covert satellite capability. 

b. The U.S. should officially state we 

plan to conduct space reconnaissance for 

both the military and nonmilitary missions. 

However, the U.S. would work closely and 

seek agreement with all of the Free World 

(especially with the under-developed nations) 

to assist them in the assessment and development of their natural resources. Specific use 

will be established for both spacecraft and 

aircraft reconnaissance where they can be 

economically and effectively deployed. 

c. U.S. should plan a very careful 

series of releases designed to extend the 

existing gap or advantage we have over the 

Russians. The covert release plan should be 

based on a very thorough assessment of the 

competitive capability of the Russian 

Reconnaissance Satellites. Once the plan is 

established all Government Agencies should be 

forced to adhere. Control of the security plan 

should be placed in the hands of the ExCom. 

4. Whichever approach proves desirable, it 

is suggested that the U.S. should reevaluate its 

current position and perhaps take a very practical 

and realistic approach to our reconnaissance policy 

perhaps even to the point of officially admitting 

that we have successfully conducted space reconnaissance 

and will continue to conduct space reconnaissance at 

ground resolutions of 3 feet to 10 feet. This would 

free-up much necessary data and satellite capability 

needed to successfully pursue our National Resources 

Satellite Program. The 3 foot or lower limit would 

be more than adequate for all of the current and 

planned NASA, Department of Agriculture, Department 

of Interior or Department of Commerce missions. 

Perhaps the 10 foot limit may well prove adequate for 

most of these nonmilitary missions. 

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5. There has been considerable work done 

in NASA to identify the useful parts of the spectrum 

and resolution required to conduct natural resources, 

weather, climate, and geodetic flights for all of 

the free nations of the world. These studies have 

continually run into the Intelligence Community's 

defined covert need to keep our capability and data 

secure. At the present time there is a study team: 

in OST with selected access to three foot G and C 

Corona data whose objective is to define the data 

requirements for the Natural Resources Satellite 

Program. The selection of the proper operational 

mix of airplanes and satellite systems to perform 

these future missions should be determined following 

this effort. Many of the postulated missions and 

coverage requirements can best be obtained by aircraft 

properly stationed around the globe. 

6. It is further suggested that any release 

of current intelligence information on film or tape . 

should continue under the most careful control. 

Detailed statements that identify the state of our 

reconnaissance technology should be carefully controlled. 

Perhaps we can select and release our existing space 

reconnaissance capability to mislead the Russians 

and the Chinese. We could use the release of the 

three-foot capability to establish a very credible story 

that might well serve as cover for our current . 

capability and future teChnology plans. The Russian 

higher resolution systems probably have not attained 

the disclosed 3 foot ground resolution. They probably 

have two systems that cover the range of 5 feet to 

30 feet based on our most recent evaluations. 

7. The proposed cover story could be based on 

the three foot resolution capability reportedly 

released by the President and would suggest that the 

U.S. needs no additional capability, For example, 

three to four-foot stereo coverage allows for the 

photo interpreter to determine whether a vehicle 1s 

a truck or a jeep, will let him distinguish between a 

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landing craft and small pleasure boat, and also 

identify the missiles or booster on the pad. 

8. It would seem that the basic security 

problem lies in keeping covert the details and 

schedules of our sophistication, i.e. ,! 

a. The fact we will be conducting the 

most advanced search and surveillance missions 

employing the newly designed HEXAGON system 

with exceedingly wide stereo coverage at 

resolutions of 2.7 feet. 

b. The fact we will be conducting manned 

and unmanned technical intelligence missions 

with the Dorianl I system. 

c. The fact that we are currently congucting 

technical intelligence missions with the 6 

I pne foot) camera system. 

d. The fact that thr limit of the 

atmosphere appears to be Iwith a 

50% probabili tyl f "---------~ 

9. As we perform search and surveillance or 

technical intelligence missions to determine the 

capability of the Chinese and Russians, we find 

we need both stereo jDd mO;O_DbrtOgraPhiC coverage and 

very high resolution_ _ _ but of relatively 

small areas (! to 10 miles as well as less sophisticated 

resolution (2 ft. to 15 ft.), stereo photographic 

coverage of wider areas (50 to 150 miles) to determine 

Defense Condiction (DEFCON) or order of battle. 

Each of these two missions, however, requires a new 

or improved satellite spacecraft, camera, and data 

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recovery subsystem. Both systems are under develop-

. ment through the Air Force SAFSP/MOL(D) Program and 

the joint SAFSP/Air Force and CIA (H) Program, 

. respectively. These efforts must go forward rapidly 

to maximize our ability to make credible and timely 

decisions with the full knowledge of the Chinese/ 

Russian technology and order of battle deployment of 

forces. 

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Summary 

1. President Johnson is reported to have 

disclosed that we have a three ft. satellite space 

reconnaissance capability which has provided detailed 

information on the communistic nations' armaments. 

2. Space Reconnaissance is an instrument of peace 

which has assisted the President and the Free World to 

maintain a balance of power and has minimized the threat 

of surprise attack that could plunge the world into another 

major war. 

3. Official U.S. disclosure of a 3 foot to 10 foot 

capability would probably improve our country's credibility 

gap. 

4. The present security control is becoming more 

and more restrictive to our "Peaceful Uses of Space!! 

Program. 

5. Disclosing the 3 foot to 10 foot reconnaissance 

capability would probably be more than adequate to meet 

all of the current and future needs of the National 

Resources Satellite Program. 

7. Careful official discussion of our 3 foot to 

10 foot could mislead the Chinese and the Russians and 

might very well serve as a cover story for other developments planned by the United States Intelligence Community. 

Recommendation 

o The Vice President should create an Ad Hoc 

Group at the highest level to carefully review 

the total political and technological problem 

and establish a firm usable National Security 

Policy for Military and Non-Military Space 

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Missions. 

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o The Ad Hoc group should include ExCom and 

selected representatives from state, Defense, 

NASA, Commerce, Agriculture, and the CIA. 

o There should be a critical reassessment of 

the Sino/Soviet reconnaissance capability 

and political position for manned and unmanned satellite overflight which will be 

made available to the Ad Hoc Committee during 

their deliberations. 

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