(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

PLUMHOFF ET AL. v. RICKARD, A MINOR CHILD,
 

INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS SURVIVING DAUGHTER
 

OF RICKARD, DECEASED, BY AND
 

THROUGH HER MOTHER RICKARD,
 

AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

No. 12–1117. Argued March 4, 2014—Decided May 27, 2014 

Donald Rickard led police officers on a high-speed car chase that came

to a temporary halt when Rickard spun out into a parking lot. Rickard resumed maneuvering his car, and as he continued to use the accelerator even though his bumper was flush against a patrol car, an

officer fired three shots into Rickard’s car. Rickard managed to drive 

away, almost hitting an officer in the process. Officers fired 12 more 

shots as Rickard sped away, striking him and his passenger, both of 

whom died from some combination of gunshot wounds and injuries

suffered when the car eventually crashed. 

Respondent, Rickard’s minor daughter, filed a 42 U. S. C. §1983 

action, alleging that the officers used excessive force in violation of 

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court denied 

the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, holding that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment

and was contrary to clearly established law at the time in question. 

After finding that it had appellate jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit held

that the officers’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. It affirmed the District Court’s order, suggesting that it agreed that the

officers violated clearly established law. 

Held: 

1. The Sixth Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 

U. S. C. §1291, which gives courts of appeals jurisdiction to hear appeals from “final decisions” of the district courts. The general rule 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Syllabus 

that an order denying a summary judgment motion is not a “final decision[n],” and thus not immediately appealable, does not apply when

it is based on a qualified immunity claim. Johnson v. Jones, 515 

U. S. 304, 311. Respondent argues that Johnson forecloses appellate 

jurisdiction here, but the order in Johnson was not immediately appealable because it merely decided “a question of ‘evidence sufficiency,’ ” id., at 313, while here, petitioners’ qualified immunity claims

raise legal issues quite different from any purely factual issues that

might be confronted at trial. Deciding such legal issues is a core responsibility of appellate courts and does not create an undue burden 

for them. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372. Pp. 5–7.

2. The officers’ conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Pp. 7–15.

(a) Addressing this question first will be “beneficial” in “develop[ing] constitutional precedent” in an area that courts typically consider in cases in which the defendant asserts a qualified immunity

defense, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 236. Pp. 7–8.

(b) Respondent’s excessive-force argument requires analyzing the 

totality of the circumstances from the perspective “of a reasonable officer on the scene.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396. Respondent contends that the Fourth Amendment did not allow the officers to 

use deadly force to terminate the chase, and that, even if they were 

permitted to fire their weapons, they went too far when they fired as 

many rounds as they did. Pp. 8–12.

(1) The officers acted reasonably in using deadly force. A “police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase

that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the 

Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk

of serious injury or death.” Scott, supra, at 385. Rickard’s outrageously reckless driving—which lasted more than five minutes, exceeded 100 miles per hour, and included the passing of more than two 

dozen other motorists—posed a grave public safety risk, and the record conclusively disproves that the chase was over when Rickard’s 

car came to a temporary standstill and officers began shooting. Under the circumstances when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable officer could have concluded from Rickard’s conduct was that he 

was intent on resuming his flight, which would again pose a threat to 

others on the road. Pp. 9–11.

(2) Petitioners did not fire more shots than necessary to end 

the public safety risk. It makes sense that, if officers are justified in

firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety,

they need not stop shooting until the threat has ended. Here, during 

the 10-second span when all the shots were fired, Rickard never 

abandoned his attempt to flee and eventually managed to drive away. 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Syllabus 

A passenger’s presence does not bear on whether officers violated

Rickard’s Fourth Amendment rights, which “are personal rights 

[that] may not be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 

394 U. S. 165, 174. Pp. 11–12. 

3. Even if the officers’ conduct had violated the Fourth Amendment, petitioners would still be entitled to summary judgment based

on qualified immunity. An official sued under §1983 is entitled to 

qualified immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a 

statutory or constitutional right that was “ ‘clearly established’ ” at 

the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, 

___. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 201, where an officer shot at 

a fleeing vehicle to prevent possible harm, makes plain that no clearly established law precluded the officer’s conduct there. Thus, to prevail, respondent must meaningfully distinguish Brosseau or point to

any “controlling authority” or “robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al-Kidd, supra, at ___, that emerged between the

events there and those here that would alter the qualified-immunity 

analysis. Respondent has made neither showing. If anything, the 

facts here are more favorable to the officers than the facts in 

Brosseau; and respondent points to no cases that could be said to

have clearly established the unconstitutionality of using lethal force

to end a high-speed car chase. Pp. 12–15. 

509 Fed. Appx. 388, reversed and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, in 

which GINSBURG, J., joined as to the judgment and Parts I, II, and III–

C, and in which BREYER, J., joined except as to Part III–B–2. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–1117 

OFFICER VANCE PLUMHOFF, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
 

WHITNE RICKARD, A MINOR CHILD, INDIVIDUALLY, AND
 

AS SURVIVING DAUGHTER OF DONALD RICKARD,
 

DECEASED, BY AND THROUGH HER MOTHER
 

SAMANTHA RICKARD, AS PARENT AND 

NEXT FRIEND
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 27, 2014] 

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.* 

The courts below denied qualified immunity for police

officers who shot the driver of a fleeing vehicle to put an 

end to a dangerous car chase. We reverse and hold that 

the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In the 

alternative, we conclude that the officers were entitled to 

qualified immunity because they violated no clearly established law. 

I 

A 

Because this case arises from the denial of the officers’ 

motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the daughter 

—————— 

* JUSTICE GINSBURG joins the judgment and Parts I, II, and III–C of 

this opinion. JUSTICE BREYER joins this opinion except as to Part III– 

B–2. 
 

 

2 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Opinion of the Court 

of the driver who attempted to flee. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 

U. S. 537, 543, n. 2 (2007). Near midnight on July 18,

2004, Lieutenant Joseph Forthman of the West Memphis,

Arkansas, Police Department pulled over a white Honda

Accord because the car had only one operating headlight. 

Donald Rickard was the driver of the Accord, and Kelly 

Allen was in the passenger seat. Forthman noticed an 

indentation, “‘roughly the size of a head or a basketball’” 

in the windshield of the car. Estate of Allen v. West Memphis, 2011 WL 197426, *1 (WD Tenn., Jan. 20, 2011). He 

asked Rickard if he had been drinking, and Rickard responded that he had not. Because Rickard failed to produce his driver’s license upon request and appeared nervous, Forthman asked him to step out of the car. Rather 

than comply with Forthman’s request, Rickard sped away. 

Forthman gave chase and was soon joined by five other 

police cruisers driven by Sergeant Vance Plumhoff and 

Officers Jimmy Evans, Lance Ellis, Troy Galtelli, and 

John Gardner. The officers pursued Rickard east on Interstate 40 toward Memphis, Tennessee. While on I–40, 

they attempted to stop Rickard using a “rolling roadblock,” 

id., at *2, but they were unsuccessful. The District Court 

described the vehicles as “swerving through traffic at high

speeds,” id., at *8, and respondent does not dispute that 

the cars attained speeds over 100 miles per hour.1 See 

Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendants’ Motion 

for Summary Judgment in No. 2:05–cv–2585 (WD Tenn.),

p. 16; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 54:23–55:6. During the 

—————— 

1 It is also undisputed that Forthman saw glass shavings on the 

dashboard of Rickard’s car, a sign that the windshield had been broken

recently; that another officer testified that the windshield indentation 

and glass shavings would have justified a suspicion “ ‘that someone had

possibly been struck by that vehicle, like a pedestrian’ ”; and that 

Forthman saw beer in Rickard’s car. See App. 424–426 (Response to

Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in No. 2:05–cv–

2585 (WD Tenn.), ¶¶15–19). 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

chase, Rickard and the officers passed more than two

dozen vehicles. 

Rickard eventually exited I–40 in Memphis, and shortly 

afterward he made “a quick right turn,” causing “contact

[to] occu[r]” between his car and Evans’ cruiser. 2011 WL 

197426, *3. As a result of that contact, Rickard’s car spun

out into a parking lot and collided with Plumhoff ’s cruiser. 

Now in danger of being cornered, Rickard put his car into

reverse “in an attempt to escape.” Ibid. As he did so, 

Evans and Plumhoff got out of their cruisers and approached Rickard’s car, and Evans, gun in hand, pounded 

on the passenger-side window. At that point, Rickard’s 

car “made contact with” yet another police cruiser. Ibid. 

Rickard’s tires started spinning, and his car “was rocking 

back and forth,” ibid., indicating that Rickard was using 

the accelerator even though his bumper was flush against 

a police cruiser. At that point, Plumhoff fired three shots 

into Rickard’s car. Rickard then “reversed in a 180 degree

arc” and “maneuvered onto” another street, forcing Ellis to 

“step to his right to avoid the vehicle.” Ibid. As Rickard 

continued “fleeing down” that street, ibid., Gardner and 

Galtelli fired 12 shots toward Rickard’s car, bringing the

total number of shots fired during this incident to 15. 

Rickard then lost control of the car and crashed into a 

building. Ibid. Rickard and Allen both died from some 

combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered in

the crash that ended the chase. See App. 60, 76. 

B 

Respondent, Rickard’s surviving daughter, filed this

action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983, against 

the six individual police officers and the mayor and chief

of police of West Memphis. She alleged that the officers

used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

The officers moved for summary judgment based on 
 

4 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Opinion of the Court 

qualified immunity, but the District Court denied that

motion, holding that the officers’ conduct violated the 

Fourth Amendment and was contrary to law that was 

clearly established at the time in question. The officers 

appealed, but a Sixth Circuit motions panel initially dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on this

Court’s decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U. S. 304, 309 

(1995). Later, however, that panel granted rehearing,

vacated its dismissal order, and left the jurisdictional

issue to be decided by a merits panel.

The merits panel then affirmed the District Court’s 

decision on the merits. Estate of Allen v. West Memphis, 

509 Fed. Appx. 388 (CA6 2012). On the issue of appellate 

jurisdiction, the merits panel began by stating that a 

“motion for qualified immunity denied on the basis of a

district court’s determination that there exists a triable 

issue of fact generally cannot be appealed on an interlocutory basis.” Id., at 391. But the panel then noted that the

Sixth Circuit had previously interpreted our decision in 

Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372 (2007), as creating an “exception to this rule” under which an immediate appeal

may be taken to challenge “‘blatantly and demonstrably 

false’” factual determinations. 509 Fed. Appx., at 391 

(quoting Moldowan v. Warren, 578 F. 3d 351, 370 (CA6 

2009)). Concluding that none of the District Court’s factual determinations ran afoul of that high standard, and 

distinguishing the facts of this case from those in Scott, 

the panel held that the officers’ conduct violated the 

Fourth Amendment. 509 Fed. Appx., at 392, and n. 3. 

The panel said nothing about whether the officers violated 

clearly established law, but since the panel affirmed the 

order denying the officers’ summary judgment motion,2 

—————— 

2After expressing some confusion about whether it should dismiss or 

affirm, the panel wrote that “it would seem that what we are doing is

affirming [the District Court’s] judgment.” 509 Fed. Appx., at 393. 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

the panel must have decided that issue in respondent’s

favor. 

We granted certiorari. 571 U. S. ____ (2013). 

II 

We start with the question whether the Court of Appeals properly exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§1291, which gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to 

hear appeals from “final decisions” of the district courts.

An order denying a motion for summary judgment is 

generally not a final decision within the meaning of §1291

and is thus generally not immediately appealable. Johnson, 515 U. S., at 309. But that general rule does not

apply when the summary judgment motion is based on a 

claim of qualified immunity. Id., at 311; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 528 (1985). “[Q]ualified immunity is

‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to

liability.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 223, 231 (2009) 

(quoting Mitchell, supra, at 526). As a result, pretrial 

orders denying qualified immunity generally fall within 

the collateral order doctrine. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U. S. 662, 671–672 (2009). This is so because such orders 

conclusively determine whether the defendant is entitled 

to immunity from suit; this immunity issue is both important and completely separate from the merits of the

action, and this question could not be effectively reviewed 

on appeal from a final judgment because by that time the

immunity from standing trial will have been irretrievably 

lost. See ibid; Johnson, supra, at 311–312 (citing Mitchell, 

supra, at 525–527). 

Respondent argues that our decision in Johnson, forecloses appellate jurisdiction under the circumstances here, 

but the order from which the appeal was taken in Johnson 

was quite different from the order in the present case. In 

Johnson, the plaintiff brought suit against certain police 

officers who, he alleged, had beaten him. 515 U. S., at 
 

 

6 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Opinion of the Court 

307. These officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were not present at the time of the alleged

beating and had nothing to do with it. Id., at 307–308. 

The District Court determined, however, that the evidence 

in the summary judgment record was sufficient to support

a contrary finding, and the court therefore denied the 

officers’ motion for summary judgment. Id., at 308. The 

officers then appealed, arguing that the District Court had

not correctly analyzed the relevant evidence. Ibid. 

This Court held that the Johnson order was not immediately appealable because it merely decided “a question of

‘evidence sufficiency,’ i.e., which facts a party may, or may

not, be able to prove at trial.” Id., at 313. The Court noted 

that an order denying summary judgment based on a

determination of “evidence sufficiency” does not present a 

legal question in the sense in which the term was used in 

Mitchell, the decision that first held that a pretrial order

rejecting a claim of qualified immunity is immediately 

appealable. Johnson, 515 U. S., at 314. In addition, the 

Court observed that a determination of evidence sufficiency 

is closely related to other determinations that the trial 

court may be required to make at later stages of the case. 

Id., at 317. The Court also noted that appellate courts

have “no comparative expertise” over trial courts in making such determinations and that forcing appellate courts

to entertain appeals from such orders would impose an 

undue burden. Id., at 309–310, 316. 

The District Court order in this case is nothing like the

order in Johnson. Petitioners do not claim that other 

officers were responsible for shooting Rickard; rather, they

contend that their conduct did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment and, in any event, did not violate clearly 

established law. Thus, they raise legal issues; these issues

are quite different from any purely factual issues that the 

trial court might confront if the case were tried; deciding

legal issues of this sort is a core responsibility of appellate 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

courts, and requiring appellate courts to decide such issues is not an undue burden. 

The District Court order here is not materially distinguishable from the District Court order in Scott v. Harris, 

and in that case we expressed no doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under §1291. Accordingly,

here, as in Scott, we hold that the Court of Appeals properly exercised jurisdiction, and we therefore turn to the 

merits. 

III
 

A 

Petitioners contend that the decision of the Court of 

Appeals is wrong for two separate reasons. They maintain 

that they did not violate Rickard’s Fourth Amendment 

rights and that, in any event, their conduct did not violate 

any Fourth Amendment rule that was clearly established

at the time of the events in question. When confronted 

with such arguments, we held in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 

194, 200 (2001), that “the first inquiry must be whether a

constitutional right would have been violated on the facts

alleged.” Only after deciding that question, we concluded,

may an appellate court turn to the question whether the 

right at issue was clearly established at the relevant time. 

Ibid. 

We subsequently altered this rigid framework in Pearson, declaring that “Saucier’s procedure should not be

regarded as an inflexible requirement.” 555 U. S., at 227. 

At the same time, however, we noted that the Saucier 

procedure “is often beneficial” because it “promotes the 

development of constitutional precedent and is especially 

valuable with respect to questions that do not frequently 

arise in cases in which a qualified immunity defense is 

unavailable.” 555 U. S., at 236. Pearson concluded that 

courts “have the discretion to decide whether that [Saucier] procedure is worthwhile in particular cases.” Id., at 
 

8 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Opinion of the Court 

242. 

Heeding our guidance in Pearson, we begin in this case

with the question whether the officers’ conduct violated

the Fourth Amendment. This approach, we believe, will 

be “beneficial” in “develop[ing] constitutional precedent” in 

an area that courts typically consider in cases in which the 

defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense. See 

Pearson, supra, at 236. 

B 

A claim that law-enforcement officers used excessive 

force to effect a seizure is governed by the Fourth

Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard. See Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 

U. S. 1 (1985). In Graham, we held that determining the 

objective reasonableness of a particular seizure under the 

Fourth Amendment “requires a careful balancing of the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake.” 490 U. S., at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry requires analyzing the totality of the circumstances. See ibid. 

We analyze this question from the perspective “of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 

vision of hindsight.” Ibid. We thus “allo[w] for the fact

that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, 

and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is

necessary in a particular situation.” Id., at 396–397. 

In this case, respondent advances two main Fourth

Amendment arguments. First, she contends that the 

Fourth Amendment did not allow petitioners to use deadly

force to terminate the chase. See Brief for Respondent 24–

35. Second, she argues that the “degree of force was excessive,” that is, that even if the officers were permitted to

fire their weapons, they went too far when they fired as 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

many rounds as they did. See id., at 36–38. We address 

each issue in turn. 

1 

In Scott, we considered a claim that a police officer 

violated the Fourth Amendment when he terminated a 

high-speed car chase by using a technique that placed a 

“fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” 550 

U. S., at 386. The record in that case contained a videotape of the chase, and we found that the events recorded

on the tape justified the officer’s conduct. We wrote as 

follows: “Although there is no obvious way to quantify the

risks on either side, it is clear from the videotape that 

respondent posed an actual and imminent threat to the 

lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to 

other civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the 

chase.” Id., at 383–384. We also wrote: 

“[R]espondent’s vehicle rac[ed] down narrow, two-lane 

roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast. We see it swerve around more than a dozen 

other cars, cross the double-yellow line, and force cars

traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit. We see it run multiple red 

lights and travel for considerable periods of time in 

the occasional center left-turn-only lane, chased by 

numerous police cars forced to engage in the same 

hazardous maneuvers just to keep up.” Id., at 379– 

380 (footnote omitted). 

In light of those facts, “we [thought] it [was] quite clear 

that [the police officer] did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 381. We held that a “police officer’s attempt 

to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that 

threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate 

the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing 
 

 

 

 

 

 

10 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Opinion of the Court 

motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”3 Id., at 386. 

We see no basis for reaching a different conclusion here.

As we have explained supra, at ___, the chase in this case 

exceeded 100 miles per hour and lasted over five minutes.

During that chase, Rickard passed more than two dozen

other vehicles, several of which were forced to alter course. 

Rickard’s outrageously reckless driving posed a grave 

public safety risk. And while it is true that Rickard’s car 

eventually collided with a police car and came temporarily 

to a near standstill, that did not end the chase. Less than 

three seconds later, Rickard resumed maneuvering his 

car. Just before the shots were fired, when the front 

bumper of his car was flush with that of one of the police 

cruisers, Rickard was obviously pushing down on the

accelerator because the car’s wheels were spinning, and 

then Rickard threw the car into reverse “in an attempt to

escape.” Thus, the record conclusively disproves respondent’s claim that the chase in the present case was already

over when petitioners began shooting. Under the circumstances at the moment when the shots were fired, all that 

a reasonable police officer could have concluded was that

Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he

was allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly 

threat for others on the road. Rickard’s conduct even after 

the shots were fired—as noted, he managed to drive away 

despite the efforts of the police to block his path— 

—————— 

3 In holding that petitioners’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, the District Court relied on reasoning that is irreconcilable with 

our decision in Scott. The District Court held that the danger presented

by a high-speed chase cannot justify the use of deadly force because

that danger was caused by the officers’ decision to continue the chase. 

Estate of Allen v. West Memphis, 2011 WL 197426, *8 (WD Tenn., Jan. 

20, 2011). In Scott, however, we declined to “lay down a rule requiring 

the police to allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive so 

recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger,” concluding that 

the Constitution “assuredly does not impose this invitation to impunityearned-by-recklessness.” 550 U. S., at 385–386. 
 

 

 

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Opinion of the Court 

underscores the point.

In light of the circumstances we have discussed, it is

beyond serious dispute that Rickard’s flight posed a grave 

public safety risk, and here, as in Scott, the police acted 

reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk. 

2 

We now consider respondent’s contention that, even if

the use of deadly force was permissible, petitioners acted

unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots. We reject that 

argument. It stands to reason that, if police officers are 

justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe

threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting 

until the threat has ended. As petitioners noted below, “if 

lethal force is justified, officers are taught to keep shooting 

until the threat is over.” 509 Fed. Appx., at 392. 

Here, during the 10-second span when all the shots were

fired, Rickard never abandoned his attempt to flee. Indeed, even after all the shots had been fired, he managed 

to drive away and to continue driving until he crashed.

This would be a different case if petitioners had initiated a 

second round of shots after an initial round had clearly 

incapacitated Rickard and had ended any threat of continued flight, or if Rickard had clearly given himself up.

But that is not what happened. 

In arguing that too many shots were fired, respondent 

relies in part on the presence of Kelly Allen in the front 

seat of the car, but we do not think that this factor 

changes the calculus. Our cases make it clear that “Fourth 

Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not

be vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 

U. S. 165, 174 (1969); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 

128, 138–143 (1978). Thus, the question before us is

whether petitioners violated Rickard’s Fourth Amendment 

rights, not Allen’s. If a suit were brought on behalf of

Allen under either §1983 or state tort law, the risk to 
 

 

12 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Opinion of the Court 

Allen would be of central concern.4 But Allen’s presence in 

the car cannot enhance Rickard’s Fourth Amendment 

rights. After all, it was Rickard who put Allen in danger 

by fleeing and refusing to end the chase, and it would be

perverse if his disregard for Allen’s safety worked to his 

benefit. 

C 

We have held that petitioners’ conduct did not violate 

the Fourth Amendment, but even if that were not the case, 

petitioners would still be entitled to summary judgment 

based on qualified immunity. 

An official sued under §1983 is entitled to qualified 

immunity unless it is shown that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right that was “‘clearly established’” at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. 

al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 3). And a 

defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently

definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s

shoes would have understood that he was violating it. Id., 

at ___ (slip op., at 9). In other words, “existing precedent 

must have placed the statutory or constitutional question”

confronted by the official “beyond debate.” Ibid. In addition, “[w]e have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define 

clearly established law at a high level of generality,” id., at 

—————— 

4There seems to be some disagreement among lower courts as to

whether a passenger in Allen’s situation can recover under a Fourth

Amendment theory. Compare Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F. 3d 1323 (CA11 

2003) (suggesting yes), and Fisher v. Memphis, 234 F. 3d 312 (CA6 

2000) (same), with Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F. 3d 157 (CA4 2001) (suggesting no), and Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F. 2d 791 (CA1 

1990) (same). We express no view on this question. We also note that 

in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U. S. 833, 836 (1998), the Court

held that a passenger killed as a result of a police chase could recover 

under a substantive due process theory only if the officer had “a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.” 
 

 

 

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Opinion of the Court 

___ (slip op., at 10), since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular 

circumstances that he or she faced. We think our decision in Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194 (2004) (per 

curiam) squarely demonstrates that no clearly established 

law precluded petitioners’ conduct at the time in question. 

In Brosseau, we held that a police officer did not violate 

clearly established law when she fired at a fleeing vehicle

to prevent possible harm to “other officers on foot who

[she] believed were in the immediate area, . . . occupied 

vehicles in [the driver’s] path[,] and . . . any other citizens

who might be in the area.” Id., at 197 (quoting 339 F. 3d

857, 865 (CA9 2003); internal quotation marks omitted).

After surveying lower court decisions regarding the reasonableness of lethal force as a response to vehicular 

flight, we observed that this is an area “in which the result 

depends very much on the facts of each case” and that the

cases “by no means ‘clearly establish[ed]’ that [the officer’s] conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.” 543 

U. S., at 201. In reaching that conclusion, we held that 

Garner and Graham, which are “cast at a high level of 

generality,” did not clearly establish that the officer’s 

decision was unreasonable. 543 U. S., at 199. 

Brosseau makes plain that as of February 21, 1999—the

date of the events at issue in that case—it was not clearly

established that it was unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing

driver to protect those whom his flight might endanger.

We did not consider later decided cases because they

“could not have given fair notice to [the officer].” Id., at 

200, n. 4. To defeat immunity here, then, respondent 

must show at a minimum either (1) that the officers’ conduct in this case was materially different from the conduct

in Brosseau or (2) that between February 21, 1999, and 

July 18, 2004, there emerged either “‘controlling authority’” 

or a “robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’” 

al-Kidd, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10) (quoting Wilson 
 

14 PLUMHOFF v. RICKARD 

Opinion of the Court 

v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603, 617 (1999); some internal quotation marks omitted), that would alter our analysis of the 

qualified immunity question. Respondent has made neither showing.

To begin, certain facts here are more favorable to the

officers. In Brosseau, an officer on foot fired at a driver 

who had just begun to flee and who had not yet driven his

car in a dangerous manner. In contrast, the officers here 

shot at Rickard to put an end to what had already been a

lengthy, high-speed pursuit that indisputably posed a

danger both to the officers involved and to any civilians

who happened to be nearby. Indeed, the lone dissenting

Justice in Brosseau emphasized that in that case, “there

was no ongoing or prior high-speed car chase to inform the 

[constitutional] analysis.” 543 U. S., at 206, n. 4 (opinion 

of Stevens, J.). Attempting to distinguish Brosseau, respondent focuses on the fact that the officer there fired 

only 1 shot, whereas here three officers collectively fired 

15 shots. But it was certainly not clearly established at 

the time of the shooting in this case that the number of

shots fired, under the circumstances present here, rendered the use of force excessive. 

Since respondent cannot meaningfully distinguish 

Brosseau, her only option is to show that its analysis was

out of date by 2004. Yet respondent has not pointed us to 

any case—let alone a controlling case or a robust consensus of cases—decided between 1999 and 2004 that could 

be said to have clearly established the unconstitutionality 

of using lethal force to end a high-speed car chase. And 

respondent receives no help on this front from the opinions 

below. The District Court cited only a single case decided 

between 1999 and 2004 that identified a possible constitutional violation by an officer who shot a fleeing driver, and 

the facts of that case—where a reasonable jury could have

concluded that the suspect merely “accelerated to eighty to

eighty-five miles per hour in a seventy-miles-per-hour 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

zone” and did not “engag[e] in any evasive maneuvers,” 

Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F. 3d 1323, 1330–1331 (CA11 

2003)—bear little resemblance to those here. 

* * * 

Under the circumstances present in this case, we hold

that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit petitioners 

from using the deadly force that they employed to terminate the dangerous car chase that Rickard precipitated. 

In the alternative, we note that petitioners are entitled to 

qualified immunity for the conduct at issue because they 

violated no clearly established law.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.