F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v.

E R I C Q U I N N F R A N K L I N , Defendant-Appellant. No. 17-30011

D.C. No. 3:11-cr-05335-B HS-1

OPI N I ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the W e stern District of W ashing ton B e njamin H. Settle, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted May 14, 2018 Seattle, W a shing ton

F iled September 13, 2018

B efore: Marsha S. B erz on, Stephanie Dawn Thacker, * and Andrew D. Hurwitz
, Circuit J udg es.

Opinion by J udg e B e rz on

* T h e H o n orab le Step h an ie Daw n T h ack er, Un ited States Circu i t J u d g e f o r th e U.S. Co u rt of A

p p eals f o r th e Fo u rth Circu it, sittin g b y d esig n atio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 2

SUMMARY * *

Crim inal Law

Vacatin g a sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm and r emanding for resentencing
, the panel held that W a shing ton’s accomplice liability statute rende r s i ts d rug trafficki ng law broader than g eneric federal drug trafficking laws unde r t h e Armed Career Criminal Act, a nd W a shing ton’s drug trafficking law is thus not categ o rically a “serious drug

offense” under the ACCA.

COUNSEL

Davina T. Chen (arg ued ), Glendale, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael Sy

ming ton Morg an ( arg ued) and Greg ory Gruber, Assistant U nited States Attorney s; H ellen J

. B runner, F irst Assistant U nited States Attorney ; Annette L

. Hay e s, U nited States Attorney ; U nited States Attorney ’s Office, Seattle, W a shing ton; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 3

OP INION

B ERZ ON, Circuit J udg e :

W e c onsider whether W ashing ton’s broad accomplice liability statute renders an offense under its drug trafficking law categ orically b r o a d e r than a “serious drug offense,” a s that term is defined in the Armed Career Criminal A ct (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A).

I.

I n September 2013, a jury convicted Eric F r anklin o f being a felon in possession of a f irearm, 18 U .S.C. § 922(g ), and committing several drug traffi c king crimes. F ranklin appealed his convictions and sentence. This court a f f i r med F ranklin’s c onvictions b u t r emanded f o r resentencing
, holding that the d istrict c ourt h ad n ot g iven F ranklin an adequate self-representation advisory under F a r e tta v

. California , 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

The district court r esentenced F ranklin t o f ifteen y ears’ imprisonment on the felon-in-possession offense. 1 The court calculated that sentence as t h e statutory minimum under the ACCA. I t reasoned that Franklin had “three previous

c o nvictions

. . . for a

. . . serious drug offense,” 18 U .S.C. § 924(e)(1), because he was convicted in W a shi n gt on state court of three counts of unlaw fu l d e livery of a controlled

1 T h e d istrict co u rt also im p o sed a f

iv e- y ear s en ten ce as to h is

rem ain i n g co n

v ictio n s. Fran k lin h as n ot ch allen g ed th at sen ten ce on ap p eal.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 4

substance, W ash. Rev. Code § 69.50.40 1

. 2 F ranklin timely appealed.

II.

W e start—and e nd—with F rankli n’s claim that W a shing ton accomplice liability is a mismatch f or th e accomplice liability

incorporated into the ACCA.

A

.

The ACCA imposes a fifteen-ye ar m andatory minimum
sentence o n individuals convicted of being felons in possession of a firearm who have three prior convictions for “a violent felony o r a serious d r ug offense, or b oth.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A “serious drug offense” is

(i) an offense under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 e t s eq.), the Controlled Substances I mport and Ex port Act (21 U.S.C. 951 e t seq.), or chapter 705 of title 4 6
, for which a max imum term of imprison m ent o f ten y ears or more is prescribed by law; or

(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing
, distributing
, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled S u bstances A ct (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a max imum term

2 In p ertin en t p art, th at statu te p ro v i d es th at “ it is u n law f u l fo r an y p erso n to m an u f

actu r e , d e l i v er, o r p ossess w ith in ten t to m an u f actu re or d eliv er, a co n tro lled su

b stan ce.” W ash . Rev . Co d e § 6 9 .5 0 .4 01 (1 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 5

of imprisonment o f ten y ears or mor e is prescribed by

law . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A).

F ederal courts c onduct a categ orical inquiry into whether

a prior state conviction qualifies as an A CCA predicate under § 924(e). M

athis v. United States
, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247–48 (2016); Taylor v. United States
, 495 U .S. 5 7 5, 60 0 (1990). Under that a p p ro a ch, “A prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if, after c omparing the elements of the
statute forming the ba s is of the defendant’s conviction with the e l e m e n ts of the g eneric crime—i.e., the offense a s commonly u nderstood[ —] the statute’s elements are the same as, o r narrower than, those o f the g eneric offense.” United States v. Jones
, 877 F .3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal alterations a

nd quotation marks omitted). I f the elements o f the state c rime are broader than those o f the g eneri c crime, there is no categ orical match a nd, absent appli c ation of the modified categ orical approach, 3 the state crime cannot serve

as a predicate conviction under the ACCA. See United States v. Strickland , 860 F .3d 1224, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2017).

Under the categ orical approach, we consider accomplice liability as a

n element when comparing the r e a ch of state crimes and g eneric crimes. A s the Supreme Court ex p lained in Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez
, “one who aids or abets a [ crime] f alls, like a principa l
, w i thin the scope of th[ e]
g eneric definition” of that crime. 549 U.S. 183, 189 (2007). To take theft as an ex ampl e , “ t h e criminal activities of

. . .

3 No p arty arg u es th at th e s tatu tes b ef o re u s are d iv isib le, so w e d o n o t ad d ress t h e m o dif ied categ o rical ap p ro ach

. S ee Un ited S t

a tes v. Ma rtin ezLo p ez , 8 6 4 F.3 d 1 0 3 4 , 1 0 3 8– 3 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 7 ) (en b an c).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 6

aiders and abetters of a g e neric thef t must themselves fall within the scope of the term ‘theft’ in the federal statute.” Id.
at 190. I f a state’s a ccomplice liability has “something special” about it, and thus “c r iminaliz es conduct” that the comparable g eneric accomplice liability and the u nder l y i n g crime, taken tog ether, d o n ot, there is no categ orical match. Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted).

B.

W e r ecently considered, in United S t a t e s v. ValdiviaFlores
, 876 F .3d 1201 ( 9th Cir. 2017), whether W ashing ton’s accomplice liability statute r ender s i ts drug trafficking law categ oric a l l y broader than a federal drug trafficking equivalent. Valdi v i a

- Flores held that the W ashing ton accomplice liability law wa s too broad, and thus that a conviction under W ash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 does not categ orically constitute a

n “illicit trafficking ” offense a nd is
not an “ag g ravated felony ” under the I mmig ration a nd N ationality Act (“I

N A”), 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B ). 4 Valdivia-Flores , 876 F .3d at 1210.

To g ive shape to what c onstituted aid i n g and abetting “illicit trafficking ” under the I NA, Valdivia-Flores looked to federal criminal law. Id. a t 1207. Specifically
, it adopted the fede r a l aiding and abetting standard, which r equires the
g overnment to prove an a ccomplice has “ specifi c intent to facilitate the c o m m i s sion of a crime b y someone else.” Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia
, 400 F .3d 816, 819 (9th Cir.

4 A s relev an t h ere, “ [t]h e term ‘ ag g rav a t e d felo n y ’ m ean s

. . . illicit traf f i ck in g in a co n tro lled su

b stan ce (as d ef

in ed in [2 1 U.S.C. § 8 0 2 ] ), in clu d in g a d ru g traf

f ick in g crim e (as d ef

in ed in sectio n 9 2 4(c) of T itle 1 8 ).” 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 0 1 (a)(4 3 )(B ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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A N K L I N 7

2005)). Washing t o n l a w , by contrast, requires only that the
g overnment prove a person “ [ w] ith knowledge t h a t it will promote or facilitate the commission of the cri m e , . . . solicits, commands, encourag es, or requests [ the principal] to commit it; or a ids or ag rees to aid [the principal] in planning

or c o mmitting it.” W as h

. Rev. Code § 9A.08.020(3)(a)(i)–(ii) (emphasis added).

Specific intent and knowledg e are distinct in this contex t.

“ Intentionally abetting the commission of a crime involves a

more cu lpable state of mind than k nowingly doing so, and it is unlikely that Cong ress intended the generic ‘drug trafficking ’ listed in the I NA t o reach the less culpable conduct that the W ashing ton statute criminaliz e[ s] .” United States v

. Verduzco-Rangel
, 8 84 F .3d 918, 92 3 n.3 ( 9 th Cir. 2018). So, V

alidivia-Flores h eld, “[ b] ecause the W ashing ton

s t atute d oes criminaliz e conduct that would not constitut e a drug offense under federal law—due to the distinct aiding a nd abetting definitions—it is o verbroad.” 876 F .3d at 1 209 n.3.

Valdivia-Flores c ut s o u r path here. I n that case, we reiterated that accomplice liability is woven into the f abric o f all g en e ri c c r imes. Id. a t 1 2 07. W e looked to federal criminal law’s concept of accomplice liability —including the required intent mens rea—to sketch the contours of a g eneric drug trafficking crime. Id. And we held that it is possible to violate the Washing ton statute as an accomplice w i t h knowledg e but not intent c onc e r n ing the perpetrator’s criminal activity

. Id.

F ranklin maintains that the same conclusion follows with
reg ard to whether the same W ashing ton statute at is s u e in Valdivia-Flores is a categ orical match for the ACCA “serious drug offense,” i.e.
, “ an offense under State law, involv i n gU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 8

manufacturing
, distr i buting
, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U .S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A). So our questio n i s : I s there any pertinent difference between the “serious drug offense” description in the A CCA and the g eneric “i l l i cit trafficking ” described in the statute analy

zed in V a ldivia-Flores that y ields a different result here on the categ orical match issue?

The g overnment puts forth a var i ety of arg uments as to why Valdivia-Flores does not control F r anklin’s case. None is persuasive.

C.

The g overnment f

irst contends w e should not look to federal law to define the g eneric crime of aiding and abetting

a “ serious drug offense.” I t maintains that Valdivia-Flo r e s took its definition of accomplice liability from fed er a l law only because the g e neric crime as defin e d in the I NA arose out of a federal criminal statute, and that, he r e , a “serious drug offense” arises only

out of state law.

Valdivia-Flores was not so limited. I t re l i e d on federal law to supply accomplice liability e lements for the entire “ag g ravated felony ” definition at issue—a de f i n i tion that refers both to federal drug crimes and to state law drug crimes that constitute “ illicit trafficking .” S ee 8 U .S.C. § 1101(a)( 43)(B ) (defining a drug trafficking ag g ravated f e l ony as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance ( a s d efined in section 802 of Title 21), including a d ru g trafficking crime (as defined i n s e c t ion 924(c) of Title 18)” (emphasis added)); see a l so Verduzco-Rangel
, 884 F .3d at 921 (describing the “two possible routes for a state d rug felony to qualify as a drug trafficking ag g ravated felony ”).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 9

Nowhere did Valdivia-Flores sug g est that i t s holding was limited to one portion of this definition. Rather, ValdiviaFlores held repeatedly a nd without limitati o n that the W a shing ton drug trafficking s tatute “does not qualify as an ag g r avated felony under the categ orical a pproach.” 876 F .3d at 1210; see also id. at 1203, 1206, 1209.

M o re over, under the established methodolog y for apply ing the c ateg orical approach to recidivism statutes, analog ous f

ederal law is alway s at least one a sp e ct of the inquiry into the meaning of the description of a state offense in a f e d eral statute. Here, that description is “serious d rug offense,” which, a s D u e n a s

- A l v a r e z h e l d
, and Valdivia-Flores reiterated, necessarily includes both principal and accomplice liability

. So, as is usual, United States v. Garcia-Jimenez
, 807 F .3d 1 079, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2015), we look to a variety of sources—including f

ederal statutes and case l a w, as w ell

as treatis e s and any majority state law approach—to determine the g eneric federal c rime, here, the f e deral definition of accomplice liability

. 5

I n fact, when apply ing the categ orical approach, we have recently looked principally to f ederal c riminal law to supply definitions of g eneric inchoate crimes in both the Sentencing Guidelines and the I

N A, althoug h those statutes themselves do not refer to specific federal crimes. U nited States v

. Brown
, 879 F .3d 1043, 1047–50 (9th Cir. 2018), for ex ample, lo o k e d to federal conspiracy law to interpret the Sentencing Guidelines’ g e neric definition of a “controlled substance

5 “ Gen eric f

ed eral crim e” h as beco m e th e t erm u sed in th is co n tex t f or

w h at is essen tially a task o f statu to ry in terp retatio n

— i.e.
, th e tas k of d ecid in g w

h at t h e fed eral statu te m ean s w h en it u ses certain lan g u ag e to d escrib e a p rio r o f

f en s e. T h at is h o w

w e u se th e term

h ere.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 10

offense” 6 ; after doing so, B rown conc l u d e d that W ashing ton’s drug conspiracy law w as broader than federal conspiracy law. And, of course, V

aldivia-Flores took the same approach. I n fact, the g overnment has itself sug g e s t ed that the p a nel look
to f ederal criminal law to define other p ortions of the “serious d rug offense” statute h e r e at issue. So we need not , a n d d o not, a vert our ey es from federal accomplice liabili t y when defining the scope of the ACCA’s ge n e ric accomplice liability

.

F u r t h e r , if we were to look to other sources as well to supply a g eneric aidin g an d abetting definition for “serious d r u g o f fenses,” we would reach the same result as did Valdivia-Flores w hen c onsidering only f ederal law. L ike the federal definition incorporated in V aldivia-Flores
, g e n e ral principles of accomplice liability establish that “[ a] person is

an ‘accomplice’ of another in committing a crime if, with the intent to promote or f

acilitate the commission of the crime,” he commits certain acts; “a person’s

. . . knowledg e that a crime is b e ing committed or is about to be committed, without more, doe s not make him an accomplice.” 1 W h arton’s Criminal L aw § 38 (15th e d.) (emphasis a d d ed). The Model Penal Code is similar: “A p e r son is an accomplice

. . . if

. . . with th e p u r

p o s e of p romoting or facilitating the commission of the o ffense
, h e” commits certain acts. § 2.06(3) (emphasis added).

6 “ T h e term ‘ co n tro l led su b s t a n ce o f f en s e’ m ean s an of

f en se u n der f ed eral o r state law
, pu n ish ab l e b y i m p riso n m en t f

o r a term ex ceed in g on e y ear, th at p r o h ib its th e m an u f actu re, i m

p o rt, ex p ort, d istrib u t io n , or d isp en s in g o f a co n tro l led su b stan ce (o r a c o u n t erf

eit su b stan ce) o r th e p o ssessio n o f a co n tro lled su b stan ce (o r a co u

n terf eit su b stan c e) w i th in ten t to m an u f

actu re, im p o rt, ex p o rt, d istrib u

te, o r d isp en se.” U.S.S.G. § 4 B 1 .2 (b ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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A N K L I N 11

F ederal law also comports with most other s t ate definitions of accomplice liability

. Fr anklin’s brief calculates, with supporting documentation, that “W ashing ton is one o f a t most five jurisdictions that r equires o nly a mens

rea of knowledg e for accomplice liability .” The g overnment has not disputed this summary nor provided any confl icting information.

So, if we also look outside f ed e r a l law to define g eneric aiding and abetting liability for purposes of th e ACCA, we reach the same result a s under Valdivia-Flores ’ s n ar r ower, federal-law-centered, approach.

D.

The g overnment’s second arg ument as to why t he W a shing ton accomplice liability standard is not a categ orical match f or the I NA’s “illicit traffick i n g, ” b ut is for the ACCA’s “serious d

r ug offense,” is that, if we look to the tex t

o f the ACCA’s “serious drug offense” definition, we’ll discover that we need not incorporate a ccomplice liabilities into our categ orical approach at all. 7 Not so.

7 T h e g o v ern m en t f

irst d ev elo p ed th is set o f arg u m en ts in its

s up p lem en tal b rief

in g , f o llo w in g th e issu an ce o f Va ld ivia -Flo res , n o t in its p rim ary an sw erin g brief

. Fran k l i n m ain tain s th e arg u m en ts are th eref o re f o rf eited

. W e d eclin e to f

in d f orf eitu re. T h e g o v ern m en t’ s categ o rical ap p ro ach arg u m en ts larg ely arise o u

t o f th e co n seq u en ces of Va ld ivia -Flo res , issu ed af ter th e g ov ern m en t s u

b m itted its an s w e rin g b rief

. S ee Lo u isia n a -Pa cific Co rp

. v. AS ARCO In c. , 2 4 F.3 d 1 5 6 5
, 1 5 8 3 (9 th C i r

. 1 9 9 4 ). In an y ev en t, Fran k l in h ad a f u ll o p p o rtu n ity to resp o n d
to th e g o v ern m en t’ s arg u m en t s in h is su p p lem en t al b rief

. S ee En g qu ist v. Or. Dep ’t o

f Ag ric.
, 47 8 F.3 d 9 8 5
, 9 9 6 n

. 5 ( 9 th Cir. 20 0 7 ) (b ecau s e arg u ab ly w aiv ed “ issu es [w ere] pu rely leg al an d w ere f u lly b rief ed b y [th e

o p p o sin g p arty ]

. . . w e e x ercise[d ] o u r d i scretio n to co n sid er th e[]
arg u m en ts).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

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A N K L I N 12

The g overnment makes two tex tual arg uments, one with vast implications for application of the categ orical approach
to a wide r ang e o f statutes, and one somewhat narrower. Most b roadly
, the g ove r n m e nt sug g e sts that, b ecause the ACCA defines a “serious drug offense” as “an offense u nder State law, involving man u f acturing
, distributing
, o r possessing with i n t e n t to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” 18 U .S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) (emphasis added), w e need not define a g eneric c ri m e a t all

. I nstead, the g overnment maintains, we simply look to see if the state la w includes the words “manufacturing
, distributing
, o r possessing ,” and, if so, we are finished.

To apply t h i s ex pansive v ersion of the g overnment’s theory would be to toss out all but the name of the categ orical approach. At its c ore, the c ateg orical approach is the comparison o f the defendant’s cri m e of c onviction to a g eneric version of that crime—that is, a version that contains all of the ing redients Cong ress has identi f i ed
, to which we g ive content using our f

ull p anoply of statutory interpretation

resources. B y so doing —“[ b] y focusing on the leg al question of what a conviction n ecessarily e s tablished[ —] the categ orical approach ordinarily w orks to promote e fficiency
, fairness, a

nd predi c t a b i lity .” Mellouli v

. Lynch
, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1987 (2015); see Taylor , 495 U.S. at 590–92.

Put more simply
, “ [ t] his categ orical approach req u i res courts to choose the r ig ht categ ory

. ” Chambers v

. U n ited States
, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009), abrogated o n other grounds by Johnson v. Un i t e d S t ates , 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). No
matter h ow a statut e i s drafted, courts have applied the categ orical approach to some g en e r ic—that is, some consisten t a

nd identifiable—criminal offense, with a definition a

nd elements and limits. And, as Duenas-AlvarezU N I T E D S T A T E S V

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A N K L I N 13

ex p lained, “one who a i d s o r abets a [ crime] falls, like a principal, within the scope of th[ e] g eneric defini t ion” of a crime. 549 U.S. a t 189. The g overnment’s words-only approach to inclusion o f s t ate laws in federal recidivism statutes is therefore dead on arrival.

The g overnment’s less ambitious tex tual arg ument starts from the observation that, under the ACCA, a “seri o u s d rug offense” can b e either an offense def i n ed under federal law,
or, as rel ev ant here, “an offense under State law involving manufacturing
, distributing
, o r possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substa n c e

. . . . ” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) (emphasis added). F ocusing on the
state law prong ’s use of the word “involving ,” the
g overnment notes that the statute at issue in Valdivia-Flores does not use the term “involving ,” and arg ues that that word here obviates any

need for comparison to g eneric aiding and abetting liability

. I nstead, the g overnment m a i n t ains, the elements of F ranklin’s state c rime need only be ex a mined to determine whether they “relate to or c o n n e c t with” any act included a s a “serious drug offense” (ag ain, manufacturing
, distributing
, or possessing ). O n this un d e r s t a n ding
, according
to the g overnment, n o inquiry is needed into whethe r t h e aiding and abetting ve rsion of the state crime categ orically matches the g eneric crime of aiding and abetting the enumerated drug

offenses.

Th i s at tempt to escape the result reached in ValdiviaFlores also d oes not work. We beg in b y observing that, as a ling uistic matter, “involving ” does not equate to “relating to

or connecting with.” “ Relating to” is a “broad” a nd “indeterminate” term, M

ellouli
, 135 S. Ct. at 1990, that means that one thing “stands in s ome relation, bears upon, or is associated with” another, United States v. Sullivan
, 797 F .3dU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 14

623, 638 (9th Cir

. 2 0 15) (quoting United States v. Sinerius
, 504 F .3d 737, 743 (9t h C i r. 2 007)). “I nvolving ” d oes not have a sing le, uniform meaning
, but it usually s i gn i fies something narrower than “ r e lating to.” Specifically
, “involving ” o ften connotes “includ[ ing ] (something ) a s a necessary part or result.” New Ox ford American Dictionary 915 (3d ed. 2010).

This narrower meaning of the word “involving ” is the o ne used in Supreme C o u rt cases a nd our cases to connote application o f the n ormal categ orical inquiry —which, as we reaffirmed in Valdivia-Flores
, requires a comparison o f accomplice liabilities. F or ex a mple, the Supreme Court has held that offenses that “ involve fraud or deceit [ are] o ffenses with elements that ne c e ssarily entail fraudulent or deceitful conduct.” Kawashima v. Holder
, 565 U.S. 478, 484 (2012) (internal quotation marks and a lteration omitted). Therefore, Kawashima held, “[ t] o determine whether the Kawashimas’ offenses ‘involv[ e] fraud o r deceit’

. . . we e mploy a categ orical approach.” Id. at 4 8 3 ( ci t i n g Duenas-Alvarez
, 549 U.S. at 186).

The Supreme Court use d a similar approach earlier. I n i n t e rp r e t i n g t h e R a c k e t e e r I nfluenced an d C o r r u p t Org a niz ations Act’s predicate off e n se provision, the Court held that the phrase any “act or threat involving

. . . e x tortion,

. . . which is charge a b le under State law,” 18 U .S.C. § 1961(1) (emphasis added), encompasses o n ly st a t e c rimes “capable of being g enerically classified as ex tortionate.” Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for W o men, Inc.
, 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003). According to S cheidler
, the on l y c r i me that “involv[ es] ex t o rtion” is g eneric ex tortion; the word “involving ” d oes nothing to broaden the scope of that g eneric crime. See id. at 409–10.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 15

Another ex ample: I n Sullivan
, the defendant’ s s tate convictions “relate[ d] to sex ual a b u se” because they criminaliz ed conduct similar to the most important elements of sex ual abuse. 797 F. 3 d a t 6 41. B ut the convictions “involve[ d] a minor o r ward” b ecause the conduct specifically included acts ag ainst a minor or ward. Id. at 640. 8

Notably
, t h e A CCA uses the term “involve” to d escribe both t h e “ serious drug offense” a nd “violent felony ” predicates. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). J ust as a “serious d rug of f e n se” can be “an o ffense under State law, involving ” certain elements, a “violent f elony ” can be an y c r ime that

“ involves use of ex plosives.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(2)(A), (e)(2)(B ) (emphasis added). W e h av e applied the standard categ orical approach—not the broader, looser one envisioned by the g overnment—to the ACCA’s violent felony predicate, including its “involves u se of e x plosives ” p r e dicate. See United S tates v. Mayer
, 560 F .3d 948, 958–61 (9th Cir. 2 009) (describing the categ orical approach’s application to the

ex p losives p rong of the definition o f a v iolent felony ). Thus

a crime “ involves use of ex plosives” where it actually constitutes the use of ex p losive s ; a c rime somewhat like the

use of ex plosives, or a crime relating to the use of e x plosives, does not necessarily

“involve[ ] use of ex plosives.”

There is no reason we w o u l d apply o ne interpretation o f the w ord “involves” to “serious drug offenses” and a different

8 A s n o ted
, S

ulliva n in t erp reted a f

ed eral recid iv ist statu te, th e

m ean in g o f w

h ich h in g ed o n th e b ro ad er term “ relatin g to ”—w h eth er “ th e sp ecif ic state o f

f en ses at issu e [t]h ere

. . . [w ere] categ o rically o f f en ses

‘ rela tin g to ’ ” th e d ef

in ed f ed eral g en eric sex u al ab u se o f f en ses. 7 9 7 F.3 d
at 6 40

. Her e , ag ain
, w e are co n cern ed w ith th e n arro w er term

“ i n v o lv in g ,” w

h i ch
, u n lik e “ relatin g to ” in th e categ o rical ap p ro ach

co n tex t, co n n otes a n arro w er ap p licatio n

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 16

interpretation of th e wo r d to “violent felonies,” as both predicate cr i m e s a r e located in the same section of the ACCA. “Generally
, identical w ords used in different parts o f the same statute are presumed to have the same mea ning

. ” Merrill Lynch

, P i erce, Fenner & S mith Inc. v

. Dabit
, 547 U .S. 71, 86 (2006) ( quotatio n m a r ks and alterations omitted). That principle holds particularly true when, a s h ere, the word “involve” is used in the same section of t h e s a me statute. Cf. Sessions v. D imaya
, 138 S. Ct. 1204
, 1 2 1 6

– 1 7 (2018) (plurality opinion) (ex plaining that the Supreme Court “‘had go od reasons’ for orig inally adopting the categ orical approach, based partly on ACCA’s tex t (which, by the way , u s e s the w ord ‘involves’ identically [ to a provision of the I NA] )” (quoting Johnson , 135 S. Ct. at 2562)). 9

9 T h e g o v ern m en t cites s e v eral d ecisio n s of o th er circu its th at, in in terp retin g t

h is statu te, eq u ate th e tw o term s “ in v o lv i n g ” an d “ relatin g to .” S ee Un ited S ta tes v. Mu lkern
, 8 5 4 F.3 d 8 7
, 9 0 (1 st Cir. 2 0 1 7 ); Un ited S ta tes v. Byn u m , 6 6 9 F.3 d 8 8 0
, 8 8 6 (8 th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ); Un i ted S t a tes v. Vickers
, 5 40 F .3 d 3 5 6, 3 65 (5 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ); b u t see Desa i v. Mu ka sey , 5 2 0 F.3 d 7 6 2
, 7 6 6 (7 th Cir. 20 0 8 ) ( i n t h e co n tex t o f th e INA
, “ [i]f Co n g ress w an ted a o n e- to

- o n e co rresp o n den ce b etw een t h e state law s an d th e f ed eral [g en eric crim e], it w o u ld h av e u sed a w o rd lik e ‘ in v o l v in g ’ in stead of ‘ relatin g to ’ ”). W e n ote t h a t t he cases h o ld in g th at a “ serio u s d ru g o f f en se” co n stitu

tes an y act to “ in ten tio n ally en ter th e h ig h ly d an g ero u s d ru g d istrib u t io n w o rld ,” Byn u m , 6 6 9 F

. 3 d a t 8 8 6 (in tern al
q u o tatio n m ark s o m itted ), m ay co n f l ict w ith M

ello u li ’ s rej ectio n o f a sim ilar ap p ro ach u n d er th e INA

. Mello u li rej ected th e Eig h th Circu it’ s h o ld in g th at th e term “ relatin g to ” in th e INA in co rp o rated an y state crim e

“ i n v o lv in g th e d ru g trad e in g en eral.” 1 3 5 S. Ct. at 1 98 9

.

In an y ev en t , th ose d ecisio n s d o n o t ad d ress h o w th e term “ in v o lv in g ” af f ects th e acco m

p lice liab i lity im

p l ied in t o t h e “ serio u s d ru g o f f en se” d ef in i tio n , n o m a t t e r h ow b ro ad l y t h at g en eric crim e is o th erw ise in terp reted b ecau se o f th e “ in v o lv in g ” p red icate. So n o n e ad d resses th e issu e b ef ore u s o r co n f

licts w i th th e resu lt w e reach

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 17

So, when we compa r e a state crime with a federal predicate “involving ” c ertain crimes (here, certain drug

trafficking crimes), w e do so c ateg orically

. That means we g ive content to the listed crimes—including their impl i ed, inchoate aiding and abetting version—and determine whether elements of the state c rime, including the inchoate versions, match the elements of the federal crime. Valdivia-Flores
eng ag ed in ex actly that approach in determ i n i n g what an “illicit trafficking ” c r ime entails a s a g eneric matter. Nothing about the AC C A ’ s d efinition of a “serious d rug offense,” including its use of the word “ i n v olving ,” requires us to deviate from it.

E.

To address a final g o vernme n t c ontention: Our holding today creates no conflict with the E l e v e nth Circuit’s interpretation of a “serious drug offense” in U nited States v

. Smith
, 775 F .3d 1262, 1 266–68 (11th Cir. 2014). Smith h eld that, unlike the I

NA’s definition of a drug trafficking
ag g r avated felony
, “[ n] o e lement of mens rea with respect to the illicit nature of the controlled s u b stance is ex pressed o r imp l i ed” in the ACCA’s definition of a “serious d rug offense.” Id. a t 1267.

W h ether or not w e ag r ee with Smith ’s interpretation of the ACCA is of no relevance here. I n F ranklin’s c a s e , w e a re concerned not with mens rea as to the illeg al n a t u r e of a controlled substance, but instead with a iding and a bettin g a “serious drug offense,” whatever d rug is a t i ssue. Our

concern as to a cc o m p lice liability
, distinct from the issue in Smith
, is r eq u i r ed by the Supreme Court under DuenasA l v a rez , 549 U.S. at 189–91, and, for the reasons survey e d,
g overned by V

aldivia-Flores

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. F R

A N K L I N 18

III.

I n sum, neither t h e c ateg orical approach, nor ValdiviaFlores ’s conclusion concerning W ashing ton’s broader-thang eneric accomplice liability
, lose force as they cross from o ne statute to another. A c o n v i c tion under W ashing ton’s accomplice liabi l i t y statute renders its drug trafficking law broader than g eneric federal drug traffick i n g l aws under the I NA and, as we hold now, under t h e ACCA. W ashing ton’s drug trafficking law is thus not categ orically a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA.

Be c ause F ranklin’s three convictions under W ashing ton law could not c onstitute “serious drug offenses,” he was not subject to the ACCA ’ s fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). W e thus vacate F ranklin’s
sentence for being a f

elon in posses sion of a firearm a nd remand to the district court f or res e ntencing as to that conviction.

VACATED and REMANDED.