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-151.

 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE NRO STAFF August 25, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. McLUCAS

SUBJECT: SALT Ratification Impact

With regard to the ratification of a SAL Treaty,

Agreement or Interim Agreement, there appears to be a

potential risk to the NRO arising from open discussion

of "national technical means of verification" during

the ratification process. According to the ACDA charter,

any form of agreement which results from the SALT talks

requires some form of Congressional hearing and approval.

Almost certainly there will be focus on what is

included in the term "national technical means" and to

what degree should confidence be placed by the US in these

national means. Ensuing open or closed discussions run

the risk of publicly and officially disclosing the fact

of satellite reconnaissance and the relative excellence

of the collection systems.

From what we have been able to determine, no formal

assessment has been made of the potential impact of the

level of hearing given any agreement arising from the Talks.

Furthermore, the SALT people feel that the Soviets plan no

public discussion or evaluation of any type of agreement.

Thus, prolonged detailed Congressional discussion of US

national means may have an adverse political impact

through discussions of comparable Soviet systems and

activities.

We feel that this issue should receive formal attention

by the Verification Panel or the NSAM 156 Committee.

Alternatives should be sought which will minimize the impact

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on the NRP if detailed ratification or review discussions

are held. A possible course of action would be to enlist

the support of the appropriate people in the Congress who

would be reviewing an agreement.

: ...4kt As you are aware, the Verification Panel has provided tet the interagency effort on SALT positions but the NSAM 156

:;•:'''.' Committee has previously dealt with issues of disclosure

—;' and political implications of the conduct of satellite

... 3

.&.114

reconnaissance. For this reason we recommend that the NSAM

S;431 1 tee be requested to review this It

A should be pointed out that an atten nt risk is that the

"fact of" issue could be reopened in this forum with dis-

'!%:- appointing results. We feel, however, that no consideration

at all of the question offers greater risk to the security

of the NRP.

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RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum at the right

to Ambassador Johnson requesting a NSAM 156 Committee review

of the issue.

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