NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. O.C.

THE NM STA rr 19 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

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SUBJECT: Disclosure of "the fact of" Satellite Reconnaissance

On 16 June 1967, 

Gen11111Prr. 

Reber, and I met with

Dr. Flax to discuss, once age , recent UM action to allow

disclosure of "the fact of" satellite reconnaissance at the Secret

level.

Mr. Reber presented a new try at a memorandum to the

DCI (see attached). After a brief discussion, it became clear

that (1) Dr. Flax's conditions for the memorandum make it

very hard to write and (2) it would be much more effective to

talk about the problem than to write about it. Mr. Reber volunteered to visit the DCI and discuss this matter, setting up

a subsequent visit by Dr. Flax. Dr. Flax concurred in this

proposal.

THMAN

Colonel, U3 F

Attachment

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T June 16, 1967

Dear Dick:

i an writing to discuss with you my concern regarding

the impact of the United States Intelligence Board's recent

agreement to "acknowledge under a SECRET classification the

fact that a satellite photographic reconnaissance program

existed" and actions related which will permit reference

in SECRET and TOP SECRET intelligence publications to satellite reconnaissance as a source of information published

therein. I had not anticipated the Board would take an

' action whose effects would be as sweeping as I believe this

to be.

' The impact of this action on operational security

(th10111111pystem) bears directly on my obligation to you.

It is extremely difficult to assess exactly the impact

which I anticipate. However, I will try to do that and to

explore the possible measures which we might take at the

beginning to ameliorate adverse effects.

Three major problem areas have occurred to me. The

first has to do with the operation of the .existin

System. In spite of the ready association of the

System with hardware, it is a fact that its major

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been to protect the'fact of satellite reconnaissance.

Phase I briefings are, by definition, confined to "disclosure that the United States Government is engaged in a

highly sensitive program." Perhaps eighty percent of our

'industrial effort is conducted under a security system

where "the fact of" is the essential element of compartmenteflon. Phase II briefings do essentially the same thing

as Phase I, except that the codeword name of a program is

revealed, as well as a one-sentence statement of "the fact

of." Phase III briefings--the general Governmental level

of access--consist of a Phase II briefing plus the option

to learn details on a need-to-know basis. Very frequently

this option is not invoked. Unless the application of the

Board's action is carefully regulated, we will immediately

find ourselves in a position where tho sands of specially

investigated individuals are un th regarding

sensitive information which their co e es are acquiring

under the relatively relaxed standards of. SECRET. It is

quite likely that Phase I of the presentie System could

no longer be effectively administered.

Next, I am concerned that a wide variety of Federal

agencies will be offered the right to expose the fact of a

satellite reconnaissance program. Almost certainly such

information at the SECRET level in NASA, Commerce, Interior,

and Agriculture, among others, would find this information

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under the SECRET classification would be moving to people

who have no interest except curiosity. We can expect as a

commonplace a situation in which a SECRET-cleared person

will make the disclosure to another. A standard response

is predictable; the person being briefed will automatically

raise more questions: Who does the reconnaissance? Where

is it done? How is it done?..What does it look like?

Where may I pee it? I see no way to prevent these questions

being raised. A logical response n is not to answer. I find

no way to ameliorate this anticipated situation given the

premise that "the fact of" will be made SECRET under present

United States Government regulations.

The foregoing presents an ever-widening audience. The

news of official confirmatiOn of a satellite reconnaissance

program will diffuse very rapidly, bringing the existence

of the program to the attention of literally thousands of

new people. Each of these persons will feel strongly the

right to kno4 more, the right to ask questions, and the

right to "contribute." These individuals, as we all know

from experience, can exert irresistible pressures to

"normalize" whatever they touch. Up until now much of the

vigor of the PRP has derived from its built-in protection

against such normalization.

Let me now turn to the paper currently before the Hoard

for action by vote slip, "Decontrol and Downgrading of Satellite Photography" (USIB-D-41.12/28), I feel that the guidance

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in paragraph . I.B. as •amplified in paragraph . V.B. permitting

attribution "when it is necessary to indicate the degree

of confidence associated with the intelligence" will be

construed loosely and the attribution will become a familiar

footnote in intelligence publications. Since photo inter-

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pretation reports referred to in paragraph Vol, normally.--

can be expected to be sore attractive to the reader when

illustrated, I would anticipate that such illustratiOni.

will appear when really not necessary. By virtue of the

amount of information, supplemented by drawings and photographic illustrations even with the ten-foot on a side

restriction, it will be possible for one who wishes to get

a very good appreciation of the scope of our intelligence

collection--at least in terms of subject matter and ofgeographic extent.

In paragraph Y.G. is an invitation to be precise on

the date of a mission to the extent permitted by the language.

The connection with specific missions is readily identifiable

inasmuch as there is public information with regard to

launches. The launch schedule being maintained could be

extrapolated without too such difficulty.

I realize, though perhaps not fully, the pressures

which have been building up to reduce the security compartmentation surrounding our satellite activities. These

pressures range from pleas of inconvenience and more importantly financial cost of compartmentation to the desires

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for the application of satellite reconnaissance for peaceful uses including detection related to disarmament. I

make no pretense of sitting in judgment as to the validity

and critical importance of claims tor downgrading which are

related to these pressures. I would prefer that they be

net as we have in fact thus far met them through an effective sanitization policy and procedure. If this approach

is no longer tenable, we should mak very reasonable effort

to preserve the integrity of th ystea.

Perhaps after you have had an opportunity to consider

my observations you would like me to visit you so.that "we

could discuss this matter at greater length. I would be

pleased to do so. •

Sincerely,

Alexander H. ?lax

Honorable Richard Helms

Director of Central Intelligence

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D. C.

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June 16, 1967

TAB 2

The effect of the foregoing is to permit a recognition

at the SECRET classification level that the United States

has a satellite photographic reconnaissance program and

that, because it is a very valuable national security asset,

details are kept highly classified and are not available to

personnel without special clearances. Furthermore, all

participants are reminded that it is the national policy

that the fact of such a program is not to be discussed

publicly by officers of the United States Government.

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