Ap

-48P-3E6RETHANDLE VIA • •

i •

10° 0, V4 1 we

i

i IfIS PEP' StYT! IN PIE i

THE NRO STAFF

----SI-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. nw

•

April 11, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL GRANGER, OSD(ISA)

SUBJECT: NSAM 156 Committee Talking Paper

Mere is a talking. paper on the NUM 156 Committee and

also one on the NSSM 72 effort, as of the first of this year.

I believe that they dovetail. I would like to answer your

questions should you have any. We are holding on any discussion with Mr. Plummer pending your and General Schoning's

desires.

n

ro

achment

800-74 Cy 1

"rned11111111.1". 901111111

NW 11•6•11.011

toeseft*assos mai sassamomme COPY OM OPIES

CONTR 0 7i

*la 1 eztf:Fe

liggiALEENTKEYHOLE
TOP SECRETIIIIIIIIINEtcg!toLED

NMI 156 COMMITTEE 

o Formed in May 1962 by President Kennedy to form a U.S.

position on National Reconnaissance which avoids dangers

of restricting ourselves in international negotiations

on disarmament and peaceful uses of outer space, compromising highly classified programs, or providing assistance

of significant military value to Soviet Union.

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State .

Nitze OSD

Charyk DNRO

Seamans - NASA

Wiesner - White House

Karen - White House

Scoville - CIA

Fisher ACDA

NSCA 2454 issued in July 1962 with 18 points of policy

vis-a-vis U.S. Reconnaissance Programs which would:

Maintain freedom of action unilaterally to conduct

reconnaissance satellite operations.

Prevent foreign political or physical interference

with operations.

Prevent accidental or forced disclosure of details

of program. •

Avoid situation in the context of reconnaissance

program which would be embarrassing.

Facilitate resolution of conflicts which arise

between technical and security requirements and

international commitments and foreign policy objectives.

•

•

n•

ANIMA VIA

ATHEYTROLE Man

11001111. 111,0A

MIAMI

INOI•11011
111.114A0101.6 VIA

o In February 1963 studied disclosure policy on U.S. satellite

reconnaissance capability pursuant to NSAM 216.

MEMBERS: Johnson - State

Thompson - State

Cline - CIA

Nitze OSD

Byroads - ACDA

Clay - JCS

Charyk - DNRO

Enema - State

Recommend against disclosure since it is of doubtful and

declining value in crises.

o In January 1964 studied possible disclosure of satellite 

reconnaissance.

MEMBERS: Johnson - State

McMillan - NRO

Scoville - ACDA

Wheelon - CIA

Cline - CIA

Thompson - State

Chayes - State

Hughes - State

•

REPORTED TO: Rusk - State

&Male= OSD

*Cone - CIA

Fisher - ACDA

Bundy • White House

Wiesner - White House

Welsh - White House

Johnson - White Reuse

Webb - NASA

Morrow - USIA

Concluded that no additional action to disseminate more

knowledge of the program beyond the level already

disseminated in summer of 1962, e.g., all NATO heads of

government, Foreign Ministers, and MAC Permreps were

told officially of the reconnaissance satellite program...

the fact, that we had it, that it was developing well and

NOLA VIA

YSTEMSJOINTLY

IMOD

1111114111‘ OP I.M. 1111111WVIONMO Erantioassimen 1111114. Oaf •

CONTROL N

.44:6 3.±1111111!crl

TALENT-KEYHOLE

01. SYSTEMS JOINTLY
al•

me OD

•

a OP

a MP

.• COW ilLpy

' COPT OR COPIES •

PAGE OP PAGES

01.1 VIA

LENT-KEYHOLE

TRO MUMS JOINTLY

mm mmm

mmmmmmmm

sommummammumem.

•

• • •

tur Ural

 L11111L. sfeRilKla LENT-KEYHOLE NO

was directLy benefiting the alliance, and finally that

the U.S. must maintain it at all costs.

In July 1966 studied political and security aspects of nonmilitartapplication of satellite earth-sensing -- requested

by OMB and OST.

MEMBERS: Johnson - State

McNaughton OSD

Flax - DNRO

Fisher ACDA

Sheldon - CIA

Teeny - White House

Johnson - White House

Welsh - White House

Seamans - NASA '

•

Concluded that 1962 policy valid. Also recommended that •

the U.S. should:

Continue to protect NRP

Consider a major political initiative advancing concept

of advancing economic betterment through space activities.

Allow NASA to proceed with tentative experimental

program subject to limitations established between

NASA and NRO.

Encourage NASA to consider relative merits of aircraft

over satellites.

Ask USIB to review compartmentation. .

Permit non-military programs to profit from achievements

of NRP.

In September 1968 through May 1969 studied disarmament aspects 

of satellite disclosure policy.

- MEMBERS: Bohlen - State

*Lemke - OSD

Flax - DNRO

Fisher - ACDA

Duckett *- CIA

feeny - White House

•
IIIIP

FNT-KEYHOLE

SYSTEMS JOINTLY

VIA

cow OPIES

PAGE OP PAGES

I •

--TerSECRETHOLE VIA

sittai-..1!!.11.1,OLE

Johnson - White House

Welsh - White House

Paine - NASA

Hughes - State

Draft paper advocated declassification of fact of and

forthright discussions with Russians - State.

ACDA supported this view seeing it a necessary step.

Final position stated that term "national means of

verification" only should be used in the negotiations

with no public statements or press announcements to

amplify and that Washington should guide.

This paper was forwarded to NSSM 28 Committee, e.g., the

progenitor of the Verification Panel. This position was

adopted for SALT I.

o In September 1971 studied SKYLAB earth terrain camera use --

request of NASA.

•

MEMBERS: JohnsOn - STATE

Farley - ACDA

Helms - CIA

Packard - OSD

McLucas - NRO

Low - NASA

David - White House

Eissinger - White House

Approved 190-B camera for use as an exception to guidelines

established 1966 and subject to final review prior to

mission.

Subcommittee reviewing on-going mission at request of

40 Committee.

o In January - April 1972 studied impact of SALT ratification 

on NIP secyritv -- request of NRO.
.

TOP SECRET iilialliA-KEYHOLE

- MEMBERS: Johnson - State

Farley - ACDA

Nelms - CIA

Rush - OSD

McLucas - NRO

Fletcher - NASA

. David - White House

Kissinger - White House

Similar disputes on need to disclose as seen in May 1969

paper on guidance.

- Disclosure question turned over to Verification Panel.

Inspite of sentiments about the imperative to disclose,

Kissinger decided that it wasn't necessary. This decision

proved sound.

HOLE VIA

LENT- KEYHOLE

YIITEINS JOINTLY

•

cer4 C0P41#18it:° . Cpo• Aatases7V.
• • • • Mr11.116.i. V III

: •n • ----IP-SECRET-- 11111!E, SP,9LE

NSSM 72 COMMiTTEE

o Directed in September 1969 as an•d Roc Group an international

'space cooperation. •

To prepare report on possible forms of international

cooperation with friendly countries and Soviet Union.

Paralleled President's remarks to the UN.

Reports through under secretaries committee mechanism.

Studies undertaken by NSSM 72.

•

Cooperation between U.S. and USSR in space activities -

NSDK 70, July 1970.

Sensitive technology listing - NSDK 71, November 1970.

International space cooperation, technology and launch

assistance, NSDM 181, August'1972.

Opportunities and prospeCts for international cooperation

in space science and exploration - status not known.

International cooperation in outer space activities

communications - status not known. •

International cooperation in outer space activities,

technology developments and flight operations - status

not known.

Practical applications - data from ERS - under present

consideration as "The ERS Problem and Our Options".

o The ERS Problem and Our Options Study.

Paper has bone through several versions - over 18 months

or so was being done without specific terms of reference,

as an "initative" by the group -- studied organization,

acquisition and dissemination options for ERS data.

1111pu. VIA ENT-KEYHOLE

mit. SYSTEMS JOINTLY

CON

COPY

FAGS

NW WWW NO W sommal samPesemme

INPRIINIMmmlonmeromou
-.•.

--TOP-SECRET'

NOLA VIA

1;*ASJ

LENT-KEYHOLE

JOINTLY

•

Appeared to be insensitive to reconnaissance policy.

"Right to observe" a big issue here - CRS is an acknowledged

overt program which is drawing criticism as well as praise.

NSC pointed out lack of statement of U.S. goals and lack

of reference terms in paper.

Study is stopped pending NSC/Interior/RASA statement of

terms.

The Fletcher to Shultz letter in part may have been an

attempt to foreclose some options.

o (An unresolved issue - when does ras activity begin to

resemble reconnaissance activity?)

•

•

•

labliNTKETHOLE

•

COZT

COPY COPIES

PAGE PAGES