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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

WASHINGTON 25. D. C. 

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'1963' (3,, EP :16 

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MEMORANDUM FOR. The President's Foreign 

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Intelligence Advisory Board 

Attached hereto are the comments submitted on 

' behalf of the Secretary of Defense to the recommenda ; 

tions of your Board with regard to the NationalReconnaissance Office, as transmitted to us with Mr. • McGeorge 

, Bundy's toercorandurs of June 7, 1963.' 

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DeD Res onse to 6/7163 Memorandum from White Muse Re ardiul 

FI"Ai/Rta:rnrraendations Cone° rnin NRO z

In his supervision of and guidance to the NRO, the Secretary of 

Defense has adhered to the provisions of the NRO agreement of March 13, 

1963. In the process of carrying out this agreement, certain problems 

and divergencies of viewpoint have, not surprisingly, occurred and are 

in fact not completely resolved at this time. It should be emphasized. 

however, that where such differences have occurred in the past the issues 

have been frankly discussed and worked out to the benefit of NRO 

operations. 

It is the conviction of the Secretary of Defense that, aside from 

these occasional differences, the over-all operation of the NRO is satiss. 

factory; that the NRO programs are producing, and will continue in the 

future to produce, important intelligence information; and that a smooth, 

steady state, and highly efficient operation of the NRO is beginning to be 

apparent. 

In regard to specific recommendations of the Board, the following 

comments are offered on behalf of the Secretary of Defense: 

Recommendation 

"(a) a clear channel of guidance and authorization flow from the 

policy decisions of the President to the Secretary of Defense and, as 

provided in the agreement, to the Director of Central Intelligence;" 

Comment 

The guidance and authorization received via Presidential policy 

decisions, as expressed in both formal and informal meetings and papers, 

often require rapidly responsive implementing actions on the part of the 

D/NRO. Such decisions, when transmitted to the Secretary of Defense, 

are immediately communicated to D/NRO for incorporation into his 

operating policies. Such communication is effected by the Secretary of 

Defense himself, the Deputy Secretary, or by the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Deputy Director of Research and Engineering). In the opinion 

of the Secretary of Defense, theie already exists the clear channel of 

guidance and authorization reeozamended by the foreign Intelligence 

Advisory Board. 

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Recommendation 

"(b) a clear and effective connection be established between the 

.advance technology and planning of the national reconnaissance program, 

and the development plans for reconnaissance capabilities of the Depart. . 

meat of Defense and the military services;" 

Comment 

Several steps have bean taken to establish a clear and effective 

connection between the advanced technology and planning of the National 

Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and the development plans for reconnaissance capabilities of the Department of Defense and the military services. 

The Secretary of Defense has assigned exclusive responsibility to the 

NRO for the research, development and operation of all reconnaissance 

mapping and geodesy systems, of both photographic and electronic signal 

type, which are developed for and are operated in overflight of denied 

areas. This basic assignment was made initially by a Top Secret Depart. 

meat of Defense Directive* and has been supplemented by further memoranda** which have pointed out that this responsibility includes the 

research and development responsibilities for satellite reconnaissance 

systems to be used in general or limited war, and the operation of such 

systems, to the extent that any development and operation of such systems 

may be approved. The Secretary of Defense has assigned to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff the responsibility for determining, and submitting for Ms 

approval, the military requirements for such capability. 

Provision has been made within the organizational structure of the 

NRO to monitor potentially overlapping areas of NRO and other DoD 

research and development. The Assistant Secretary of Defenses (Deputy 

Director of Research and Engineering) has been given the responsibility 

to monitor all aspects of the NRO on behalf of the Secretary. Re and his 

assistant review non-NRO research and development activities of the DoD 

agencies and services and take appropriate action to re-direct overlapping 

effort. In addition, responsible personnel within key development arras 

have been briefed on the entire NRO development and operational program. 

In some cases, these development areas have provided substantial support 

to the NRO effort, and in others the NRO has provided assistance to nonNRO effort; an example is the area of peripheral reconnaissance. 

* DoD Directive TS 5105. 23, 14 Juno 1962 • 

** SecDel memo for Ch, JCS, 29 San 1963 

DepSeeDef memo for Ch, JCS. and D/NRO, 31 May 1963 

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In addition to the above steps, the Army and Navy have provided 

highly qualified technical officers for full time duty in key development 

billets within the Air Force element of the NRO on a full time basis, and 

the NRO Staff includes full time billets filled by personnel from the 

Arany, Navy, Air Force, CIA, NPIC and NSA. 

Recommendation 

"(c) plans be made to improve the continuity of management of 

the NRO, particularly with respect to career specialists who may be 

heavily taxed in meeting schedules for new satellites, aircraft and other 

reconnaissance instrumentalities;" 

Comment • 

Continuity of management has been provided for by establishing 

direct monitoring of key personnel moves by the Director, NRO. All 

inter-agency billets are filled by D/NRO acceptance of personnel none's. 

noted by Service Secretaries or Agency Directors in response to his 

specific invitation. In addition, a special personnel procedure has been 

established within the Air Force whereby a relatively large number of 

essential support personnel have been identified on special lists for 

which the specific prior approval of the Dm= is required in order for 

any change to be made in duty assignment. 

Recommendation 

Id) pains be taken to ensure consistency between Department of 

Defense directives which guide the national reconnaissance program and 

pertinent directives emanating from higher authority, such as National 

Security Council Intelligence Directives" 

Comment 

Certain of the guidance given by higher authority takes the form of 

recommendations for certain actions, and in other instances takes the 

form of explicit policy guidance. The latter then become part of Defense 

Department operating procedures. Recommendations for certain actions 

are carefully considered by the WNW and the results of this considera-. 

tion passed to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 

Intelligence for further reporting to higher authority and appropriate 

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action. The D/NRO should not be expected automatically to agree to , 

every recommendation for such action, since, for example, after 

consideration of each individual case the implementation of the action 

might require that either the Secretary of Defense or the Director of 

Central Intelligence commit greater resources than are possible within 

the confines of their over-all budget restraints or' technical capabilities. 

There will, in every case, be a prompt report back to tLigher authority 

on the final disposition of such recommendations. 

Department of Defense directives, which the Secretary of Defense 

promulgates as executive agent for the NRP, are consistent with recomreenda,tions and policies emanating from higher authority in the ways 

already indicated. Occasionally situations can arise in which the inter.. 

pretation of a particular directive from higher authority is subject to 

more than one view, However, the Secretary of Defense and Director of 

Central Intelligence are capable of ensuring that their guidance to the 

NRO will be consistent with and responsive to such directives. 

Recommendation 

"(e) within the Department of Defense present and planned relationships be clarified as between the NRO, the Defense Intelligence Agency 

and the National Security Agency." 

Comment 

The D/DIA is kept completely knowledgeable Of all aspects of the 

NRP as requested. In addition, his membership on USIB permits him to 

participate in the formulation of requirements to which the NRP is 

responsive. As the NRP is further carried out and as DIA further builds 

up its capabilities, the relationship between DIA and the NRO will become 

more complete and will allow DIA. to make increasingly effective use of 

its NRP knowledgeability to make possible changes or adjustments in any 

other intelligence programs, which have been assigned to DIA for manage.. 

meat or review responsibility, permitting maximum explicit use of NRP 

capabilities within proper security confines. This will be an evolutionary 

process and will always take account of the fact that the NRP is a program 

responsive to national needs with a direct chain of command between the 

Secretary of Defense as executive agent for the NRP and the D/NRO, and 

that the D/DIA has been assigned the responsibility as the principal 

intelligence advisor for the Department of Defense. 

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In regard to the NSA, the primary interest vis-a-via the NRP 

lies in the non-image forming collection capability developed for the 

NRO. The participation of the NSA in this aspect of the NRO activity 

is now beginning to be fairly complete. The NSA has, for example, 

stationed in the m.o, and responsible to the D/NRO, personnel thorw 

oughly familiar with SIGINT collection and processing problems. In 

addition, the NSA processes, in accordance with existing agreements, 

certain of the data collected from, satellite SIGINT operations conducted 

by the NRO. Further, the D/NSA, in preparing the National ELINT Plan, 

has considered certain aspects ofINTRO responsibilities in the ELINT 

area. Finally, the D/NSA participates in USIB and is, therefore, in the 

position of helping to formulate requirements to which the NRO is 

responsive. 

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In regard to both DIA and NSA these present arrangements are to 

the benefit of both the NSA and DIA. responsibilities, as well as being of 

direct assistance to the NRP. These arrangements will continue to 

improve and be capable of more explicit description as a steady state 

operation of the NRO is achieved in accordance with the March 13th 

agreement. • 

General Comment 

The Secretary of Defense is doing, and will continue to do, in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, his utmost to make 

certain that the resources of both the DoD and CIA are fully utilized and 

efficiently managed by the WNW under the joint guidance of the Director 

of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense. The NRP is a carm 

plea activity and some of the difficulties which have been experienced 

were to be expected, especially in view of the dedication and organizational pride of the individuals concerned. It is reasonable to anticipate, 

however, that the DIRE; as managed by the D/NRO in his capacity as head 

of an operating agency, will meet the full expectations of the Foreign 

Intelligence Advisory Board and the other individuals who have been 

largely responsible for its creation and for the statement of basic 

guidance for the program. 

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