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MEMORANDUM 

SUBJECT: 

IBllllllllll!l l!FllllltiU 

12 March 1971 ··· 

Requirement £or Photographic Reconnaissance 

in the Event US ·aeconnaiasance Satellites are 

Attacked 

l. In the event that the Soviet Union attacked and 

disabled one of our large low-level photo reconnaissance 

satellites the most immediate intelligence requirement, 0£ 

course, would be to determine the reasons for the interference 

and to estimate the courses of action that the Soviet Union 

might be following. 

Circumstances 

2. The recent (July 1970) Special National Intelligence 

.Estimate {SNIE 11-12-70) on this subject concluded that there 

were two situations in which the Soviet Union might attempt to 

interfere with US satellites. They would probably do so in 

retaliation if they believed that the US had deliberately interfered 

with a Soviet satellite, ar~d they would probably see advantage in 

neutralizing the US satellite reconnaissance capability in the 

event of a US~Soviet war, either nuclear or non~nuclear. It wa.s 

judged doubtful that the Soviets would attack US satellites prior 

to the initiation of hostilities because in a period of heightened 

tension which would precede a US-Soviet conflict that act itself 

might be assessed as part of a general attack. 

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3, Other situations where the Soviets :might attack 

US satellites have also been suggested. These range :from 

prolonged intense crises where Soviet motivation might be a 

show of power and denial of intelligence, to quantitative or 

qualitative upgrade of strategic forces where the motivation would 

be denial of all overhead reconnaissance. 

Photo Reconnaissance Requirements 

4. Unless Soviet motivation were clearly attributable 

to some lesser cause, the major immediate post-attack requirement would be to determine if war were imminent, despite the 

estimated improbability of hostile action. In terms of photo 

reconnaissance this would translate into a need to obtain immediate, 

and, if feasible repeated, coverage of at least a limited sample 

(perhaps 100) of key Soviet military installations from among those 

(500) which have been earmarked as warning/indications targets. 

These carefully selected targets are distributed across the USSR 

and include representative installations or bases from all major 

£Orce elements. The purpose of the photography of these 

installations would be to determine the presence or absence of· 

abnormal activity in the forces Which they represent. Photo 

reconnaissance systems would not provide tactical warning of an 

attack in process. 

5. To be of value in determi.-iing if an attack on a 

satellite was an immediate prelude to general war, a follow-up 

US satellite or other photo reconnaissance platform would have 

to be able to react inunediately and provide delivered imagery 

within less than 24 to 48 hours of the attack on the satelfite. For 

these initial purposes the imagery requirements would be limited 

in quantity, would be installation-oriented, two-to-three-foot 

resolution quality would be needed, and a premium would be on 

daily access to targets and rapidity of response. The objective 

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o.f the imagery would be to determine the intention of. the Soviet 

Union, and, short of general war, learn the reasons for interference. The capability would be needed immediately following 

the attack and periodically thereafter £or as long as attacks on 

major systems continued. 

6. In second priority would he the necessity to 

acquire search coverage to uncover new activities which might 

have important military or scientific significance. In terms 

of the intelligence base alone it probably would be acceptable 

to do without search for several months in the same sense that 

such intervals occur between regularly programmed search 

missions. The need to initiate or resume area search, however, 

would depend on the interpretation placed on the course 0£ Soviet 

action as well as the quality .and quantity of the intelligence base 

on the Sino-Soviet area at the outset of a sustained program. to 

deny reconnaissance. Jn any event, the need £or search coverage 

would increase as hostile action continued. 

7. In sum, the requirements for photographic 

reconnaissance in the event US reconnaissance satellites are 

attacked are well understood in relation to each of the various 

situations which might engender such an attack. At the most 

extreme end of the scale~-general war--photographic reconnaissance 

would be aimed against strategic warning /indications targets with 

a premium on timeliness of data return. At the other end of the 

scale, where the motivation might be denial of intelligence on longrange programs related to quantitative or qualitative upgrade of 

strategic forces, the photographic l'econnaissance requirement 

would be to reestablish search and surveillance coverage of the 

quality and quantity now specified in standing requirements. 

8. Interference itself has been estimated to be 

improbable. It clearly is not possible to predict precise 

circumstances under which such might occur, but these will 

dictate the nature of the immediate photo reconnaissance requirements which would follow. 

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