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OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE 

PRESIDENT FOR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 

REPORT OF A SPECIAL PANEL ON 

SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

August 25, 1960 

The concept of an artific&al satellite orbiting around the 

earth has been associated, fram the outset, with the thought 

that such a vehicle could be used to maintain a continuous reconnaissance and surveillance over any desired part of the globe. 

The original plan was to install a kind of television camera 

in the satellite and to transmit its ~ges by radio techniques 

to a ground station where the signals would be reassembled into 

a photograph. With such equipment, a systematic search was to 

be made of the Eurasian land mass for airfields and other 

military installations large enough to be detected with the l~ited resolving power of such a system. By r~pe§ted observations it was hoped that changes would be detected with sufficient 

reliability to provide warning of imminent attack. 

The appeal of this fundamentally straightforward approach 

lies in its relative political unobtrusiveness; in the apparent 

power of television techniques for making observations abDost 

instantly available; in the prolOnged utilization of satellites 

in their orbits; and in the freedom from the logistic intricacies 

of recovery techniques. At first sight, this "electronic re.aout'!~' 

appears to be the fully modern approach to reconnaissance. It 

has deserved,and indeed has had the most 'careful study. As a 

result, we have now arrived at a clear understanding of the 

technological problems which remain to be solved., The initial 

SAMOS development project was a~~d at the electronic solution 

of these problems; we shall shortly discuss the difficulties. 

Several years ago, it was realized that orbiting satellites 

might be used for the detection of ballistic missile attack in a 

much s~pler and more direct method than tel~vision or photographic 

observation. While the hostile missile is being launched, its 

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engine is a very powerful source of infrared radiation, and 

this radiation can be detected, above the atmosphere, from 

satellites many hundred miles away. The exploitation of this 

ea~ly-warning scheme is going forward as Project MIDAS; it has 

been separated from the reconnaissance project ~SAMOS) and will 

not be discussed further in this paper. As a consequence of 

this separate development, the warning function is no longer 

a primary requirement for SAMeS. 

Meanwhile, a much more urgent reconnaissance need has been 

pointed out by theU. S. Intelligence Board. The overriding 

intelligence requirement at the present time is information 

on the operationa! status of Soviet missile launch sites. 

This requires photographs of very high reso!ution--high enough 

to enable a skilled photo~interpreter to recognize and identify 

the objects of interest in a missile launch site. 

The exact resolution performance required for this purpose 

need not be discussed here. 1m technical specification is 

complicated and often controversial. One must realize, for example, that a system which will resolve 20 feet on the .ground 

will not permit a photo-interpreter to describe an object 20 

feet in length. 

Up to now, there has been only one source for highresolution photographs of the Soviet missile installations, and 

that source has been e!~inated with the grounding of the U-2 

aircraft. Can.We substitute a satellite as the observing 

vehicle and obtain comparable results? More specifically, can 

we look to SAMeS to yield results of the necessary quality 

within a short t~e? 

Unfortunately, as far as electronic readout is concerned, 

the answer is NO. 

The essence of the problem is that a photograph which contains the amount of detail that is required to know the state 

of readiness and kind of activity at a missile site must be 

made up of a fantastically large number of bits of information--

a number so large that there is not t~e enough to transmit all 

of these bits of information fran satellites to earth while the 

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satellite is over our own or friendly territory. It is to be 

expected during the next ten years that the elaboration of 

satellite technology, the ease of keeping many satellites in 

orbit, and ~provements in our electronic arts, will ult~ately 

make it feasible electrically to transmit detailed infonnation 

about a given point on the earth. But what we must emphasize 

here today is that it is not feasible now, and it is not likely 

to be feasible in t~e to give our country the kind of reconnaissance it needs at once. Therefore, while we recommend 

continued research on those electronic readout programs, and 

the occasional orbital flights which are now planned, we must warn 

that we cannot rely on the electl'onic readout approach for 

military purposes, and urge that higher operational priority be 

given to other Air Force developments which we are about to 

discuss. 

Physical recovery, in the air or in the sea, of a satellite 

that has completed a number of revolutions in orbit has become 

feasible. The improv~ent of recovery techniques is going 

forward in the DISCOVERER project. One can therefore consider 

the possibility of using advanced photographic techniques which 

are capable of very high resolution, and of recovering the 

exposed photographic fiLm on or near the surface of the earth. 

The subsequent processing and evaluation of the fiLm can then 

be perfor,med under the same favorable conditions that are used 

in the best aerial photography. 

While this approach may superficially appear clumsy and 

pedestrian when compared with electronic readout, a detailed 

analysis will shew its perfonnance to be distinctly superior 

in providing the kind of detailed infonnation that is required 

for the study of operational missile sites. In fact, we are 

convinced that this pr~ary objective of 'satellite reconnaissance 

can be realized most promptly and most effectively by the 

physical recovery of fiLm exposed in a high~resolution convergent stereo camera system. The principles and techniques 

of this kind of photography are now well understood. Therefore, 

if tfmely action is taken, we can expect to have an adequate 

photographic payload by the t~e we have mastered the techniques 

for recovery. 

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T~e is short. We should acquire info~ation on Soviet 

missile launch sites while they are under construction, in 

order to counter.the deception and concealment that can be used 

in a completed site. It will take a year and a half at best to 

fill the present gap in our reconnaissance ability. And we can 

expect useful performance in 1962 only if we clearly establish 

high resolution photography as the first goal of the U. S. 

satellite reconnaissance program. 

We are not unmindful of other objectives associated with 

SAMOS. Photographic surveys of broad areas, in which extensive 

coverage is obtained at the expense of reduced resolving power, 

have ~portant uses. The detection and recording of electromagnetic transmissions by means of the proposed "F" payloads 

will provide valuable information, especially in areas of technical 

intelligence, of new aspects in communication links, in missile 

defense systems, in navigational aids. 

But we do not consider these objectives comparable in 

importance to the task of getting, at the earliest possible 

date, high-resolution photographs that will provide information 

about the operational status of missile Sites, with detail 

nearly as good as that from the U-2. We therefore recommend a 

carefully planned program, with simplified management, ani with 

primary emphasis on: 

(a) High-resolution stereo photography 

(b) Recovery techniques 

Mindful of the urgency of this need for detailed photography, 

the Air Force has greatly modified the initial SAMeS development 

plan. A number of well conceived photographic recovery systems 

are now under study and evaluation. These designs fall into 

rwo distinct categories: 

1. A system to achieve max~um coverage with ground 

resolution adequate to identify missile sites under construction, and 

2. A system capable of photographing a large number 

of selected installations with thehlgher resolution required 

for evaluation of the operational status of a missile site. 

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We are convinced that with straightforward good management in 

the utilization of components and technology now potentially 

available, the first of these systems could be placed in 

operation by late 1962; the higher resolution system becoming 

operational about one year later. We therefore urge a resolute 

concentration of effort on these two systems and a clear 

decision to assign to this task a higher priority than to all 

other aspects together of the SAMeS program. 

Since we must now rely upon the physical retrieval of 

satellite photographs it is necessary that increased efforts 

be made to improve the reliability of recovery techniques. 

Recent achievements in the DISCOVERER program are most encouraging. An alternative procedure, unproven operationally, but 

most appealing in concept, involves the use of a drag brake 

mechanism to effect reentry. The applicability of this technique to the SAMOS recovery operation should receive serious 

consideration. 

Until recently, the operational aspects of recovery have 

been greatly complicated by the obvious requirement for safety 

to restrict these activities to the ocean areas. As a result 

of our increased confidence in the precision of the recovery 

operation, the Air Force is nOw studying the feasibility of 

effecting recovery over land. Since this would significantly 

increase the probability of success of the recovery operation, 

we heartily recommend the support of AirForce efforts in this 

area. 

PROCESSING AND EVALUATION 

The reconnaissance "take" of the proposed systems is 

recovered as.a set of latent images on photographic film. The 

intelligence yield that will be extracted from these latent 

images is critically dependent on quality factors in the 

chemical processing of the fiLm and in the subsequent analysis and 

interpretation of the finished photographs. We cannot emphasize 

too strongly that much of the detailed information captured in 

the latent image can be irretrievably lost unless first-rate 

work is.done in the processing laboratory and in the interpretation 

center. L 

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In the purely technical domain, we must point out that 

the achievement of opt~um image-quality calls for the closest 

possible interaction between individuals concerned with emulsion 

design and manufacture and individuals concerned with processing 

techniques. If these two activities were to be organized as 

separate and independent enterprises it is most unlikely, in 

our view, that the results would be the best obtainable. 

A full awareness of these factors led to the special 

organization of processing and evaluation that was used in the 

handling of the U-2 fiLms. Our experience with the superior 

results obtained under that arrangement leads us to recommend 

firmly that the same pattern De followed in preparing the output 

of the proposed satellite reconnaissance systems. We further 

recommend that this output be distributed by a centralized 

community laboratory. 

WEATHER 

In aerial photo-teconnaissance operations, the state of 

the weather over the target has long been a primary consideration. 

For satellite reconnaissance operations, the sensitivity to 

weather is in some respects even worse. If the target is 

obscured by clouds on the first pass, the satellite may have 

later opportunities to observe the target. But the t~es of 

subsequeQt passes over the target are fixed by the orbit 

parameters, and the· situation is less flexible than the scheduling 

of aircraft. Moreover, the weather over the great majority of 

Soviet targets is very bad indeed, and the opportunities for 

good photography are scarce. 

The .program outlined in this discussion can succeed only 

if it is closely integrated with the weather services that will 

be associated with the TIROS project, with the Air Force's 

433-L system, and with other sources of weather data that may 

come into existence. Because of the short reaction intervals that 

are necessary here, these arrangements will be difficult to 

establish, and we recommend early attention to planning. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

Our analysis of the investigations already carried out by 

'the Air Force leads us to the conclusion that from the array 

of important studies a few can now be "extracted and integrated 

into a single simple and powerful program to give us the 

reconnaissance we need. Therefore, our recommendation is that 

the following selected components of the AirForce satellite 

reconnaissance program be now assembled into a program of very 

high priority. 

1. A recoverable satellite-payload for high 

resolution convergent stereo photography. 

2. To be recovered for the t~e being at sea. 

3. To be recovered as soon as feasible on land. 

4. To carry in some of the satellites camera and 

fiLm competent to identify with certainty 

missile sites both in construction and after 

completion. 

5. To carry in "other satellites camera and film 

competent to study the state of readiness, type 

of activity, and type of missiles. 

We recommend emphasis on the development of more advanced 

recovery techniques, particularly for land recovery. 

We reconmend that electronic readout techniques be given 

lower priority but be continued as a research project and that 

the extensive program for a ground-based electronic readout 

system be cut back very substantially and promptly. 

Also, the so-called "F" payloads for gathering electromagnetic intelligence should be given lower priority than that 

assigned to photography. 

We further recommend that this program be managed with the 

directness that the Air Force bas used on occasion, with great 

success, for projects of overriding priority.. We suggest that 

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this can best be accomplished by a direct line of command 

from the Secretary 6f the Air Force to the general officer in 

operational charge of the whole program, with appropriate 

boards of scientific advisors to both the secretarial level and 

to the operational level. The general officer in command would" 

look to associated military boards for support in the execution 

of his plans. We recommend this extraordinary type of organization to execute the program because we are convinced that the 

situation presents an unusual combination of urgency and 

inherent amenability to a direct approach. 

In addition, we recommend that the same organization as was 

used in the handling of the U-2 fiLms be used for chemical 

processing of the recovered film and that the output be distributed by a central community facility. 

We also recommend that this program be closely integrated 

with the weather services that will be associated with the 

TIROS project, with USAF's 433-L system and other sources of 

weather" data. 

8 

PANEL ON SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE 

Dr. 

Dr. 

Dr. 

Mr. 

Dr. 

Dr. 

J. R. Killian, Jr. 

Edwin H. Land 

William O. Baker 

Richard Bissell 

Carl F. J. Overhage 

Edward M. Purcell 

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~ Co-Chairmen