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MU 9 1960

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is the final report of your Management Study

•

Committee. It is my understanding that this completes the

activities of the Committee.

Sincerely,

Clark B. Milliken

Director

Attadhment

Honorable Dudley C. Sharp

Secretary of the Air Force

Washington 25, D. C.

19 DEC 1985 1-4

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REPORT OF THE

SECRETARY OFTHE AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT STUDY COMMITTEE

Introduction. and General Remarks

Findings

Recommendations

Appendit

1
I. Introdu,..xion and General Remarks. .

• The Committee haareviewed the management of the Air Force ballistic

missile and space systems programs,.as requested by the Secretary of the Air

Force in his letter of 3 September 1959. The Committee examined the high

priority projects on whichipaCe Technology Laboratories (411 2), or its predecessor company, WOrWooldridge sett-airfallitin of technical development, performed systems engineering and.providedtechnicatdireCtion.

Attention was focused'on the unique management-approach•represented by the

creation of the AFBMD/BHC/SAC Mike/STL . conplex and its relationship with

the Air Force and Industry in the management of advanced and complicated •

weapons systems. The Committee sought to evaluate the positive and negative

aspects of this relatiOnship and to determine the extent to which it might

fulfill the longer term needs of the Air Force. •0 its deliberatiOns, the,

Committee heard the views of senior governmental and industry personnel,

including the Associate Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space

Adtinistration, the Commanders of Air Materiel Command and Air Research &

Development. Command, executives of major weepOns systems prime•and subcOntractors, and officersof STL'and Thompson-RatoWooldridge (TRW). Also,

recognizing the fact that . the Air Force had appointed another committee, of

enior . Air Force officers, to consider the broader problem of overall • managesent of. weapons systems in general, the CoMmittee limited its effOrt to •

studying the development management phase.of the Air Force ballistic missile

and space systems programs. (See Appendices "A" . and "B". for Collnittee

Htmbership and schedule of meetings.)

II. Findings

The present management scheme for ballistic missile-development, particularly as it involves STL's role as a CiVilian-idiiier and agent for the

Air Force, was created iS71954 to meet a particular situation. It stemmed

from the realization that neither industry nor the Air Force then had sufficient in-house competence to undertake broad technical management of ballistic

missile weapon systems, and . from the urgency of the military situation which

called for strong measures to expeditithe program.(See Appendix "C" for

historical summary.)

The Air Force response to the-recommendations of the Strategic

Missiles Evaluation Committee, dated 10 February 1954, was rapid; well

thought-oUt and effective. An unusually competent group . of scientists and

engineers, capable of making systems analyses, supervising the research phases

and controlling the experimental and hardware phases of the ICBM program, was

quickly assembled from universities, industry and research laboratories

within the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation.

The consolidation of authority for technical and procurement decision

in the Western Development Division, and its location adjacent to R-W (STL),

accelerated decisions . at working levels. The Ballistic Missile Committees

(established on recommendation of the GIllette'Committee) provided rapid

coordination through the Department of Defense level and insulated the program

•
irom inriuences unich might have retarded it. The priority given these

/. projects by the National Security Council and the Department of Defense

assured adequate and timely funding and facilities.

It is generally conceded and is the conviction of this committee,

that this management device has worked extremely well, both in terms of the

technical quality of the results and the speed with which missile system

development has taken place. The rapid achievement of oPerational status

in the THOR and ATLAS programs is tangible evidence of the outstanding

results attained.

•

Since 1954 there have, however, been a number of c4anges which suggest

a review of the original plan. These include, for example, the achievement

of the first operational capability in the ICBM field, indicating that emphasis should now be placed on the establishment of continuing management instir

rations rather than on an expedient tailored to a pressiag problem. Further,

industry competence has greatly increased, and a number of companies now

appear fully capable of managing the development of weapons systems of

comparable advancement and complexity. On the 'other hand, the Air Force's

"in-house" capability to plan, analyze and procure weapons of this complexity,

while it has increased substantially, has not yet reached a point where the

Air Force can direct the development of such systems without contractual

assistance having high scientific and technical competence.

5. In numbers of technical personnel employed, size and type of facilities and expinsion of its field of interest and activity, STL has grown far

beyond what was originally contemplated for it. This growth, most rapid in

the last two or three years, is continuing and appears to be encouraged, or

at least tolerated, by the Air Force. It has been contributed to in part by

the utilization of the STL organization as an available and effective instrument for tasks outside its primary area. It is the basis of widespread

concern that an Air Force "arsenal" for the development and production of

advanced weapons could result.

This undefined growth and uncertainty as to total purpose appear to be

beginning to adversely affect STL's ability to perform its essential functions

with maximum effectiveness. Its continued operation as presently constituted

could tend to restrict the free flow and competition of technical ideas,

thereby denying to the Air Force fully effective access to available technical resources of the nation.

III. Recommendations

1. It has been suggested that the Air Force might wish to-returm.to

earlier methods of weapons system management. The Committee has considered

this pOssibility and has•come to the conclusion that it is not desirable to

make any such over-all return in the large ballistic missile and military

space programs. The urgency of many of these programs is still too great to

allow the disruptions which could follow such a move. -Moreover, in any case,
the proved effectiveness of the present management plan is, for certain

projects, an asset which should be conserved if at all possible.

'2. A reorientation of the role and the mission currently assigned to

STL is urgently required in order to preserlie its capacity to perform its

essential functions and assign to industry and other agencies those functions

which can be performed by them. This Should be programmed immediately and

implemented as rapidly as practicable.

3. The Air Force will tequite fot the fereseeable futute Scientific and

technical assistance in the following areas of the large ballistic missile

and: military space fieldst -

Advanced planning and evaluation of new ideas.

"Broad-brush," initial system design.

Technical evaluation of contractors' proposals.

Technical monitoring of program progress.

In'order to have the requisite top level competence this must be furnished

by a civilian contractor organization occupying a privileged and continuing

position with the Air Force. This organization must be basically non- .

competitive. ("Competition" in this fast moving field must be taken to apply

to experimental systems and new technical approaches as well as to production

hardware.) Recognizing that the monitoring function will inevitably tend

toward considerable involvement in details of current programs, the Air

Force will need to remain continuously alert to the problems of growth control and. of possible excessive direction of contractors.

4. Detailed planning and technical direction of specific projects should

eventually be the responsibility of competitive industry, either of a prime

manufacturing contractor utilizing sub-contractots, or of a non-manufacturing

management engineering company, using the associate . contractor mechanism for

major sub-systems.

'All projects, functions or other work assignments currently performed

by STL should be identifiedand budgeted. Thole which do not conform to the

criteria set forth above should be terminated, phased out or transferred'on

a planned baSis as rapidly as possible. In trinsfetting such projects-special

consideration should be given to those contractors and subcontractors engaged

in the program who haVe-perfOrmed well. The: committee believes that it shOuld

be possible to transfer to industrial weapon-systems contractors the complete

responsibility for the, napagement of THOR and ATLAS projects in the near

future, but that such. transfer of TITAN and MINUTEMAN and current satellite,'

projects cannot,. in all probability, be made fot some time.

The Air Force should continue 'to develop its own "in-house" capability

to plan, analyze and procure weapons systems in the ballistic missile and

military space areas.
7. The Committee was made sharply aware that the rapidity with which

weapons technology is expanding and the continued competitive threats which

face the nation call for a continuation of the alert, aggressive and highly

responsive attitude which the Air Force demonstrated in meeting the IOM

challenge. It must continue to be receptive to unusual or unorthodox

procedures when emergency situations can beat be met by them.
APPENDIX A 

List of Committee Members 

Professor Clark Milliken

(Chairman)

Dr. Hendrik W. Bode

Mr. Malcolm P. Ferguson

Mr. Robert L. Hamill

Dr. Laurence A. Hyland

Honorable Roger Lewis

General Charles A. Lindbergh

General James McCormack

Profesior Jerome B. Wiesner

Major George G. Troutman

(Secretary)

California Institute of Technology

Bell Telephone Laboratories

Bendix Aviation Corporation

Sanderson and Porter

Hughes Aircraft Company

Pan American World Airways

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

United States Air Force

(Dr. Emanuel Fiore, International Business Machines Corporation,

resigned membership in November 1959 due to personal reasons.

Mr. Hamill was unable to participate in the Committee's last

meeting and final report preparation due to serious illness.)
• .APPENDIX B

Schedule of Meetings

1. 7 October 1959 First Meeting - The Pentagon

Discussions with senior Air Force officials.

. 22 October 1959 Informal meeting in Culver City, California

between Drs. Milliken and Hyland and officials

of Aerojet General and Rocketdyne.

29 October 1959 Second Meeting - Sew York City

Discussions with Dr. C. Stark Draper of MIT

and senior officials of the Burroughs

Corporation, AVCO, General Electric, and

Remington Rand-UNIVAC. (This meeting chaired

by Mr. Lewis in the absence of Dr. Milliken.)

5, 6 November 1959 Third Meeting - Santa Monica, California

Discussions with senior officers of AMC and

AFBMD/BMC, and with senior officials of

Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge, Space Technology

Laboratories, Martin Corp., Convair,

Lockheed Aircraft, Boeing Aircraft, Douglas

Aircraft, and RAND.

3, 4 December 1959 Fourth Meeting - The Pentagon

22 December 1959

Discussions with senior officials from NASA,

and ARDC; Deliberations in Executive Session,

Fifth Meeting - New York City

Deliberations in Executive Session.

7. 12.January 19 60 Sixth Meeting - The Pentagon

Discussions with Deputy Secretary of Defense,

Secretary of the Air FOrce, Assistant Secretary

of the Air Force (Research & Development), Air

Force General Counsel; Deliberations in

Executive Session.
APPENDIX C 

History of the Ori&in of the AFBMD/STL Complex .

The AFZND management complex is a direct outgrowth of the 10.February 1954

von Neumann Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee findings and recommendations.

Important excerpts from this report are:

Part IV, paragraph 1, "...it is the conviction of the Committee that a

radical reorganization of the IDMS project considerably transcending the Convair

framework is required if a militarily useful vehicle is to be had within a

reasonable span of time. Specifically, the Committee believes that the design

must be based on a new and comprehensive weapons systems study, together with

a thorough-going exploration of alternative approaches to several critical

phases of the problem, adequately based on fundamental science. ...new IBi4S

development group, which we propose should be given directive responsibility

for the entire project."

Paragraph 2, "...However, the Committee expects that the new group

referred . to above will within a year be in a position to recommend in full detail

a redirected, expanded, and accelerated progrcm..."

Paragraph 6, "The most urgent and immediate need in the IBMS

program is the setting up of the above-mentioned new IBMS development-management

agency for the entire program, including the Convair effort. This program can

then be subsequently extended and accelerated in some optimum manner, to be

determined by the studies of this new group. The setting up of various parallel

projects as required will then also follow. The nature of the task for this

new agency requires that overall technical direction be in the hands of an

unusually competent group of scientists and engineers capable of making systems

aaalyses, supervising the research phases, and completely controlling the.experimental and hardware phases of the program -- the present one as well as the

subsequent ones that will have to be initiated. The type of directorial team

needed is of the caliber and strength tbat may require the creation of a special

group by a 'drafting' operation performed by the highest-level government

executives on university, industry, and government organizations."

The Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee findings and recommendations

pertaining to the XMAS program were approved by The Secretary of the Air Force

on 19 March 1954. Likewise, on 23 March 1954, the Chief of Staff, USAF

approved the recommendations that (1) "The B-65 (ATLAS) program be reoriented

so as to achieve the early establishment of an optimum intercontinental ballistic

missile system"; and (2) "The field responsibility for initiating the establishment of this system be assigned to the Commander, Air Research and Development

1
Command and he be directed to establish within his organization a militarycivilian group with the highest possible technical competence in this field.

This group should be able within a year to recommend in full detail a redirected,

expanded and accelerated program."

'Headquarters, U. S. Air Force action on this matter was published by letter

directive dated 21 June 1954, Subject: (Uncl) Project ATLAS. Excerpts from this

letter follow:

Paragraph 2, "...The ATLAS program will be reoriented and accelerated to

the maximum extent that technological development will permit."

Paragraph 2,e,."The ARDC will establish a field office on the West Coast

with a General Officer is command having authority and control of all aspects

Of the program. This, responsibility will include the development of recommended

operational, logistic, and personnel concepts."

The West Coast field office was established with operating elements of

Headquarters, ARDC and AMC in Inglewood, California, on 1 July 1954. The initialauthority and responsibilities of the field office commander were spelled out in

a memorandmn dated 29 July 1954 from Lt. General Thomas S. Power, Camnander,

ARDC, to Brig. General B. A. Schriever.

The ATLAS Scientific Advisory Committee, chaired by Professor John von

Neumann, met in Los Angeles on 20-21 July 1934 to discuss additional ways and

means of reorienting and accelerating the ATUS program. In addition to con

sidering technical aspects of the program, the Committee reviewed the

recommended field office organization and the proposed assignment of responsibilities to the field office civilian staff (proposed to be the Ramo-gooldridge

Corporation) and to the industrial contractors. The Committee was unanimously

opposed to the recommended field office organization and proposed assignment

of responsibilities presented at that time. They felt that no aircraft company

was strong enough in scientific-technical depth or experience to successfully.

discharge • systems responsibility for the ICBM. The Committee recommended the

field office organization be studied further and that systems responsibility

be either clearly assigned to the field office or to some organization other

than an aircraft company. This recommendation of the Committee was endorsed

by :tr. Quarles, who was present throughout the meeting. Mr. Quarles stated -

that Ramo-Wboldridge must either be .a small technical staff of the Air Force

and systems responsibility must be assigned to the airframe contractor, or

Ramo-Wooldridge must be placed in a line position and assigned systems

ensineering and technical direction responsibility. In the latter case, RamoWooldridge could not be a small staff but should be whatever size should turn

out to be necessary in carrying out the program in the most expeditious manner.

Following this meeting, General Power, who was also in attendance, directed

the Commander, Western Development Division to restudy the role of RamoWooldridge and the airframe contractor in the Air Force ballistic missile program,.

and to submit to him recommendations on the management organization. This study
entitled "A Study of the Development Management Organization for the Atlas

Program", was completed on 18 August 1954. Following is an extract of a message,

dated • 24 August 1954, from Commander, AYBMD to Commander, ARDC, indicating results

of the study:

"Part 2. Based on study of development-management organization for the ATLAS

program, it is recommended that Ramo-Wooldridge working directly for the USAF

'West Coast Office' (Western Development Division, Headquarters, ARDC, plus

Special Aircraft Project Office-AMC) be made responsible for technical direction

and systems engineering for the IBMS program. Ramo-Wooldridge would remain ineligible as at present for development and production of the missile or any of

its components. Reasons follow:

•

A clear line of responsibility and authority for technical direction

and engineering decision is established. Further, the Scientific Advisory Committee strongly feels that old line aircraft companies would find it difficult

to attract top flight scientists and therefore scientific and technical competence could be established only at the expense of time.

Convair and other aircraft companies have workloads Which will

detract from the qUality and quantity of technical competence necessary for

Atlas.

' l c. Ramo-Wooldridge being a new organization without IBMS production

and sales motive presents a unique opportunity for the USAF. It provides technical objectivity and great organizational flexibility for integration with the

Air Force 'Vest Coast Field Office'. On past record its chief executives have

'proven their competence in technical management of complex systems and currently

demonstrate capability to attract top flight scientific and .n n.g ineering talent.

"d. Summarizing, the recommended approach:appears best suited to..

meet the extraordinary technical problems and time goals established since:

Militarily, policy decisions, operational considerations,

contract administration and broad management control will remain with the US,LF.

At the same time, , Ramo-Wooldridge can provide great fleitibilityAn organizational

arrangement, relationships, and procedures.

Industrially, a broad participation will be provided through

the utilization of associate contractors.

"(3) Scientifically, provision of a top-flight system engineering

capability insures the support of the scientific group. Anumber of eminent

scientists have voiced enthusiasm to participate.

"e. In conclusion, the recommended approach has the widest area of

agreement from the military, the scientist and industry.".
• The study was approved . by the Commanders of Air Materiel Command and Air

Research and Development Command on 3 September 1954, wherein it was recommended

to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Materiel; that Ramo-Wooldridge (in

the chain of. technical control) have systems engineering responsibility for the

ATLAS program. This course of action was approved by the Assistant Secretary of

the Air Force, Materiel, on 8 September 1954.

On 8 September 1955, the ATLAS program was assigned highest national priority.

The attainment of an initial operating capability was directed to be limited

only by technology. On 17 September 1955, the Secretary of the Air Force was

directed by the Secretary of Defense to

Prosecute within his assigned responsibilities the ICBM research

and development program with maximum urgency, and

Recommend to the Secretary of Defense such additional actions or

administrative arrangements as he considers necessary on the part of the

Secretary of Defense to implement this (the Secretary of the Air Force's

responsibility), and

.c. Keep the Secretary of Defense currently informed on the progress

of the program.

In response to this directive, an Air Force Plan for simplifying administrative procedures for the ballistic missile program, dated 21 October 1955,

called the "Gillette Committee Plan", was prepared. The Secretary of Defense

approved the "Gillette Committee Plan" on 8 November 1955, and .directed its

implementation. This same directive included the development of an Air Force

land-based IRBM on a co-equal priority basis with the ICBM.
, • arm ca.terra mums 

_Preface

During its deliberations, the Coramittee studied all aspects of the

AFI•D/STL Management structure. It considered a number of possible detailed

courses of action with the pros and cons of each, and also general Unitations and problems which could be relevant regardless of action taken. While

the thoughts do not represent unanimous Committeeopinion and are not a part

of the Committee's Report, it is felt that they may be of value to the Air

Force as background information in any detailed action it may take with

regard to the management of its ballistic missile and space systems programs.

The thoughts follow,'

Criteria for the Contractual Assistance Which the Air FOrce Will Need

1. Whatever the form of STL or. its successors, the agency or agencies

furnishing technical assistance to MUD should satisfy the following

reauirements:

PoSsess the highest possible level of technical competence,

which implies, under present circumstances, that it should be a civilian,'

non-civil-service organization.

Have the capability of effectiTely assisting.in policy formilation, system planning, proposal evaixation and progrmm monitoring.

c. Have the fur.thercembility of carrying out certain Systems

2ngineerinc and Technical. Direction functions inspacia“asee where

needed.

. • •

d. nave no possible competitive advantage over the industry to which

the Air Force loots for its weapon and space systems and their coMpOnents.

2. The requirements listed above imply:

That the present STL organization which has'so effectively served

the AFDC, should. not'in the future continue in its present fora and must

be replaced by some alternative organization(s).

That the relation between the civilian orolnization(s) performing the functions outlined in Recommdation Eumber 3, and the uniformed

Air Force personnel ( who have the ultimate responsibility for final

iecisions) must be a very close and consistently maintained one.

c. Ary contractor in a nem organizational scheme who enjoys a continutsz mr.lviloced -position vith the ;.ir Force should be completely

ineler?ena-;nt inaustri:= furnishinz harauare in the missile and space aa

3. In an:• snbewe of cccanization the amount of detailed %mak by a

futu:-. 2 contractor can be drastically lezc Vasn tbat nom done by STL.

1
III. Limitations and Problems

1. Regardless of what course of action is finally taken by the Air Force

in rationalizing the menagement problems in the ballistic missile and space

systems procrams, certain limitations and problems were discussed. relating to

any agency set up to assist the Air Force under contract. These are:

Centrol of size and growth - In the case of a non-profit corporatioal —this can only be controlled by the Air Force, which assigns work.

leads. The Air Force must maintain constant vigilance to insure availability to the corporation of only those manpower and resources which are

essential to the carrying out of the assignments. In the case-of a "forprofit" corporation, which assumes responsibiltty for specific projects

under individuil contracts, an automatic and highly effective growth

control mechanism might be found in the negotiated fee formula. Even in

this case, however, it would also be the responsibility of the Air Force

to place suitable bounds on the projects which the corporation is asked

to undertake.

Financial - A Large percentage of STL's present tangible value to

Tau. lies in buildings now owned by. STL and occupied by the ATM management complex. If the Air Force adopted a "two-corporations" route, a major

portion of this problem could be el tea by AF purchasing or taking

lease to the buildings and facilities which would te required by the nonprofit corporation. It could be desirable for the Air Force to purchase or

lease all of the proeerty now occupied by the AMR) management complex.

If this were done, the division of the property between the different

segments of the complex (the military, the non-profit corporation and STL)

must then be the subject of negotiation between the Air Force and SM.

This: negotiation must recogpize STL's proper payment of lease costs if they

occupy property for work on "non-AFBMD" projects. Purchase by the Air

Force of all or part of the present STL facilities would be of particular

importance if a new "for-profit" corporation were established without TRW

ownership interest, since the Air Force has indicated that a public sale of

TRW holdings in STL would be entirely unacceptable, and the magnitude of

the problem of a private transfer of TRW's equity would be much reduced by

the removal of this considerable portion of the facilities from the picture.

c. Compensation and Benefits - The successor organization(s) should. •

consider the present STL classification structure. and compensation rates

Which have been established over a considerable period of time and are set

so as to attract the required high quality of personnel. Relative to a

possible non-profit corporation, consideration should also be given to•the

pension status of existing employees and to the development of a plan to

Credit their past service in . R-W and STL. lurthor, other employee benefit

plans, such as insurance, vacations, holidays, etc., should probably be

Amwkrsed to insure that existing employees might have adevate benefits
under the new orsenization. In addition, some type of deferred compensation or bonus plan should be considered as incentive compensation for

executive employees if a non-profit corporation is organized. Care must

*be exercised in this regard so as not to preclude the corporation from

achieving a tax-exempt status.

IV. The Transition PrOblem.

The follOwing comments were received too late to be coordinated with all

Committee members. At least three of the Members agree with the comments (but

others may not).

"14y principal point of concern with the report now as it goes forward is

that our . recommendations, because they dealwith policy rather than execution,

do not emphasize the importance of a carefully constructed, phased implatentation

program in the reduction of the detail of STL's activities and of the size of the

organization serving IUD as projects are completed or transferred.

"The urgent, present projects in STL, which we do not recommend for early

transfer or termination, require that inter.mted technical supervision continue

without major unsettling change. It is a part of this prdblem that . there will

be pressures inhibiting key STL personnel in choosing, as a career, membership

in an orgsnization . suitable to remain in a privileged advisory capacity to the

Air Forde. It therefore seems to me appropriate to note. that organizational

revision should not be forced in.ways or at a pace which will make theSe career.

decisions of individuals in STL unnecessarily difficult, to the potential

detrement of quality and range of competence of the continuing organizatiOn.

"For example, the present STL organization, properly reconstituted so as

to remove, it from the competitive arena, could qualify, in respect to certain

presently assigned projects, for the role of technical direction covered in*

our recommendation No. 4 as well as for the staff role described in our

recommendation No. 3. Such an arrangement could provide fOr continuity in

endeavors of high importance to the Air Force while allowing turn-around time

for any further degree of separation desired by the Air Force between start

and line functions performed by contractor orr-nizations.

"At least, I would hope that the Air Force does not read our somewhat

terse recommendations as precluding such flexibility in the crucial matter of

implementation."
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 29, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

In line with our discussion, attached is a memorandum of July

29th from Mr. Roy Johnson dealing with the FY 59 National Space

Program and the problem of funding $117 million transfer from the

Department of Defense to NASA.

You will note that Mr. Johnson proposes that $59.2 million

be made up by three ARPA programs and that $4 million of an

accounting credit to ARPA on WS-117L be applied for a total of

$63.2 million. This leaves a total of. $53.8 million. You will recall

the BOB funding total of $71 million space projects in the Air Force

FY 59 program. I realize that the Air Force feels that some substantial part of this would have been taken from the space programs

through the reprogramming processes incidental to firming up of

Air Force plans. After careful consideration, and as discussed with

Mr. Horner and you, it is my conclusion that this $53.8 million (in

addition to the $4 million accounting adjustment on WS-117L) should

be transferred from the Air. Force to the new agency to make up the

balance of the $117 million due from the Department of Defense.

Unless you feel that the matter should be given further consideration, I am asking Mr. McNeil, by copy of this memorandum, to

work out adjustments along these lines with the BOB.

Inclosure

Memo for DepSecDef

dtd 7/29/58 s/Johnson

w/2 incls

cc: Secy McNeil

s

7 0
JUt. 1;.:5% .

mAKE-UP OF PROPOSED FUND TRANSFER TO NASA

(in millions)

From ARPA:

TO complete Scientific Satellite Program $ 13. 6

To reduce DoD MIS Program frm 50. 0 to 10. 0 40. 0

To reduce DoD share of Tracking frill 17. 3 to 11. 7 5. 6 59. 2

From Air Force:

Due ARPA on WS 117L $ 4.0

Super-thrust engines (as shown on attached

listing except the 3 - 400,000 lb Thrust

in amount of $11. 5) 44.9 $ 48, 9

From Undetermined Source: $ 8.9

$117. 0
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

JUL 2 9 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF .DEFENSE

The purpose of this memorandum is to record my understanding of the budget decisions reached at yesterday's meeting

with the President. Briefly, the decisions were:

. (1) The total FY 1959 National Space Program, exclusive

of WS-117L, to be $350 million - $242 million. for NASA and $108

million for ARPA.

The make-up of the $242 million for NASA to be $125

million in new appropriations and $117 million to be transferred

from the DoD.

The concept of joint programs approved.

Man-in-Space to be at a $40 million level divided $10

million ARPA, $30 million NASA.

All programs subject to review by the National Aeronautics and Space Counsel, when operating.

Attached is a listing of the source of the funds, and programs

where applicable, to make up the total of $117 million to be transferred to the NASA. This will leave the DoD space program, other

than WS-117L, of $108 million made up as follows:

Comnaunication,s $ 9.0 .

Navigation 1.0

Cloud Cover Reconnaissance 6. 0
Components Development $ 10. 0

JUNO Vehicles (6) 42. 0

Exploratory Research 10. 0

ARPA Orders ( 4, 5, 6) 2. 6

•MIS 0

Tracking (DoD share) T

Total $108. 0

JUL 2 9 196.

Director

2 axis

a/n. above

High Energy Fuels - Details

cc: ASD(Compt) w/Incls