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Major, USAF

THE NRO STAFF

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1 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C. 11011611111Wal

September 4, 1970.

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR ROSE

SUBJECT: Study on "Utilization of Satellite Photography"

In response to Mr. Ladner's memo of August 27 on this

subject, I am attaching an extract from an internal document

dated September 1, 1969. This extract provides pertinent

thoughts on security which you may find useful as "talking

words" in connection with Paragraph IV. A. and VI, B. of the

Study Group's Terms of Reference.

As I have previously mentioned to you, I feel that the

ultimate test to which all deliberations of the Study Group

must be subjected is the question, "What impact will recommendations/decisions about downgrading the 'fact of have

upon this nation's continued ability to collect vital intelligence information that is obtainable only by satelliteborne sensors?"

Regarding Paragraph II of the Terms of Reference, I

recommend that you consult a chronology in our files (POL-C-3-w)

entitled, "NSAM 156 Committee Activity Related to the Study of

the U.S. Satellite Reconnaissance Capability."

Attachment

Extract

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Security 

Until the summer of 1964, the NRO did not understand why

it had 4IIIIIIIIsecurity system. Prior to that time the NRO

Staff thought it knew, but it was wrong.

When the stem was first instituted in 1962 (before IIIIIIIIF

that a Special Handling procedure was used), the NRO Staff was

convinced that the primary purpose of special security was to

protect a novel technical capability from capture or exposure.

Only the United States knew that 20-foot ground resolutions

could be achieved from altitudes of 100 nautical miles, that a

camera could be flown "ambient" (unpressurized) in space, that

cirrus clouds were usually transparent to orbiting cameras, that

atmospheric radiation was not a serious problem, and most important that a closed society could be laid open by photographic

satellites.

In 1963, it became absolutely clear that we were no longer

alone: the USSR was flying reconnaissance satellites. Now how

much of our technology was highly privileged and unique?

In 1964, Dr. McMillan frequently queried his associates

11111111/11 concerning the reason fo curity, asking, "What are

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you protecting? The lens? The film feed? The emulsion? The

recovery capsule?" It was soon clear to the Staff that while

each of these technical elements of the program was worth protecting, there must be something much more essential that

deserved protection. It was at this point under McMillan's.

rational probing, that the NRO Staff began to understand security

as an essential device for protecting and extending a tacit 

international acceptance of satellite reconnaissance as a 

reasonable governmental venture.

The urge to disclose is very strong in the United States;

U. S. citizens are possibly unique in their distrust of secrecy

and their pathological anxiety to tell. Some people have considered the NRP to be a space program and have followed that

false premise with the corollary that advances in space technology

must be disclosed. The fact is that the NRP is not a space

program; it is an espionage program. Flying through space is

as incidental and unimportant to a reconnaissance satellite as

to a ballistic missile. And when may one safely divulge an

espionage program? Only when he has decided that he is ready

to lose it.

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Today, the the NRO Staff understands the reason for satellite

reconnaissance security. Not many other people do. Even in

the DIA and CIA, most cleared persons think the NRO is using

• 1111111411, security to protect lenses,' film, or, even worse,

a franchise.

The true rationale for special security needs to be explained

111111, to all persons entering th nd TALENT-KEYHOLE security

systems. This is not done now; getting a good start toward this

goal should become a primary objective of the NRO Staffilliffill,

TALENT-KEYHOLE briefing books should be revised (preferably by

the NRO Staff) to establish one main point categorically in the

mind of every participant. Six months later, there should be

a mandatory repetition of the briefing. And the briefers!--we

must insure that highly qualified people (not clerks) give

these briefings in a warmly persuasive manner.

The Directors of the NRO, without exception, have been

bulwarks in support of NRP security, recognizing keenly that

the program is extraordinarily sensitive to confrontation,

either on the floor of the U.N. or in the skies of the overflown country. The DNRO, by tradition, has been a shield and

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refuge whenever questions of clearance and access arise.

Dr. Charyk originated the original test for need-to-know,

i.e., "What specific positive contribution will the candidate

make to the NRP?" This severe but necessary test must be

continued and the results enforced.

It is very easy to go limp on satellite reconnaissance

security and to end lik gram with "rank" briefings,

deia

"rstige" briefings, and "it's easier this way" briefings.

nds in NRP security history as the most outrageously

over-briefed program in th stem. The theme, as

111111P

expressed privately by rw fficials, was "One way to

conform to t ystem and still 'beat it' is to brief

everybody. actically achieved that.

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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, O.C.

THE NRO STAFF

August 27, 1970

SUBJECT: Study on "Utilization of Satellite Photography

The USIB has established a COMIREX Ad Hoc committee,

in response to a request by DIA, involving possible downgrading of the "fact of" satellite photography as well as

the downgrading of the KH-4 product to SECRET. The Ad

Hoc committee is charged by USIB to investigate all aspects

of potential downgrading, and to examine other possible

means to establish wide distribution and utilization of

TALENT-KEYHOLE photography. This promises to be a comprehensive study, and could have a substantial impact on the

NRO.

It is requested that each Deputy Director review the

attached outline and provide comments on Paragraphs I, V,

VI and VII to SS-3 either written or informally by Sentembei

1, 1970

1 Attachment

Terms of Reference

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

(STUDY OUTLINE)

FOR

COMIREX STUDY ON "UTILIZATION OF SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY"

REFERENCE: USIB-D-46.2/14, 12 June 1970

Statement of Problem (Reference)

What problems inhibit the effective utilization within

the various USIB agencies of the materials derived from

satellite photography.

What options are available for increasing the utilization

of such materials and what are their significant advantages

and disadvantages, particularly in terms of security, costs,

and timeliness.

Problem Background and Previous Action 

/COMIREX staff to prepare initialsummarizing

from reference documents listed 55-70,

28 July 19707

III. Volume and Range of Intelligence Materials Derived from 

Satellite Imagery

fe0b,41REX staff to prepare initial draft; illustrative

gross data from ICRS, DBWG, and NPTC/

A. Imagery Collection 

Film volume

. Area/target volume coverage

MC&G

USGS

Other non-intelligence

2

•

259-70

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B. Imagery Exploitation 

First-, second-, third-phase exploitation volume

Targets

Reports, publications (EPDF)

C. Intelligence Production

•

..(Member agency contributions).

IV. Basis and Scope of Present Security Controls and Cornpartmentation

I NWtative Statement of Purpose an

▪

* d Scope of

ystem Controls

B. Authoritative Statement of Purpose and Scope of 

T-Wri System Controls

(Contribution from TSO/CIA)

p

. C. Current Status of T-KH and 

stem Controls 

(Contribution fromb0 CIA/)

MOM OM

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D. Present Extent of T-KH Control System in U. S. 

Government 

Number of Clearances/Billets

By Hqs. and Field components

Trend 1968-70

Number and relative size of' T-KII centers

and repositories

("Member agency TSO contribution) responsive

to formatted questionnaire. Latter to be

developed by CONURE.X staff and TSO/TCI(CIAL/

A.

(ContribUtion froinlitrA)/NRO)
TALENTvLIORP

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E. Status and Description of Current Sanitization 

and Decontrol

(SDWG contribution)

V. Current Problems in Effective Use of Materials Derived from 

Satellite Imagery

(Member agency contribution's, with

estimated cost data where possible;

selected recent "case histories" or

live examples can be used to supplement

or substitute for cost date in both A and

B below)

. A. Administrative Problems 

• Physical Se curity Requirements

Personnel Security Requirement

Classification (e. g.. T-KH

T-KH vs SI/Collateral)

B. Effective Substantive Use 

1. Finished Intelligence Production

Estimates

Current

Basic (Research)

2. Command/Executive Briefing and Support

Policy Formulation/Implementation (Departmental/

National)

Operations 

•

Targeting

Contingency Planning

Joint Planning (3rd country)

Mapping/Geodesy

4 59-70 •

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Guidance in Other Source Collection.

Non-Intelligence /Dome stic 

VI. Range of Potential Alternatives (with assumptions) for 

Increasing Use of Satellite Imagery Materials 

(COMIREX staff to prepare initial draft listing

of possible alternatives for STG review and

augmentation)

A. Assumption: No Change in Classification of Fact of U.S. 

Satellite Imagery Reconnaissance (No REVISION of

Presidential Instruction,. TCS-9784-61-KH)

Alternative 1:

Alternative 2:

Alternative 3:

retcz."7

B. • Assumption: Downgrade to SECRET or Below. 

NOFORN or YESFORN. Fact of U.S. Satellite

Reconnaissance. (Revised Presidential Instruction)

• Alternative 1:

Alternati:ve 2:

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5 INA2259-70

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VII. Assessment of Advantajes/Disadvantages of Alternatives

(Cost-Security-Timelines s 

(Member agency contributions after agreed

formulation of alternatives / VI, above/

/Concept: Inclusive--not Exclusive!

Any agency can address any alternative

and have views included'/

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