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1SWTIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 15 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, OASD (C3I)

SUBJECT: PRM 11 Task 3 Inputs

De

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I appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the

questions regarding the position of the NRO in the reorganized intelligence community. The questions from your

memorandum are italicized below, followed by my comments:

ARO (How should it be organised and who should

ultimately be in charge?)

Is the present management structure

adequate?

Our successes over the past 17 years attest to the utility

of the fundamental principles embodied in the present internal

management structure. However, the external management of the

program has been in a constant state of flux due to the numerous reorganizations within the DOD and the /ntelligence

Community in the past several years. This has been particularly true since the issuance of E.O. 11905 in January 1976. I

consider the need to formulate a clear policy concerning the

external management arrangements of the NRP, extremely important if the integrity of the program is to be maintained. A

single, high-level review authority for the program is essential,

especially in light of the current level of Congressional oversight on the NRP and other intelligence-related efforts. Conued review by multiple organizations can only bring confusion

delays in programmatic decisions. Additional staffing within

NRP has already been assessed to be necessary if we are to

tain our primary mission and at the same time respond to the

titude of review requirements levied by other organizations.

It is essential that a new charter for the NRO be

eifinitized as soon as possible.

Should it (the NRO) be: PY

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Reconstituted as an integrated,

operational organisation jointly staffed by the

three military services, CIA, and NSA with the DNRO

being the line manager of the various NRP programs?

Under whose authority?

This option appears% to be quite similar to leaving the

organization as is. Under the current structure, the NRO is

operational and jointly manned, and exercises considerable

management authority over NRP program managers in the development, acquisition and operation of satellite systems. However, improvements can always be made. A possible improvement

would be to modify the organization to emphasize the DNRO's

line authority over all segments of the program, thereby

eliminating any real or perceived instances of conflicts of

organizational interests, particularly in the cases of the NRP

programs managed by the CIA and the Navy where NRO program

managers have other line responsibilities within their parent

organizations.

If the executive authority for the NRP were to remain the

Secretary of Defense and the organization under the cover of

Air Force management, then the very practical matter of adequate logistical and material support for the NRP would be

assured. This is a major (and perhaps overwhelming) advantage.

Established as an autonomous

agency, similar to NSA (is NSA autonomous?).

This option would greatly increase internal, non-mission

related management requirements. In general, the NRP currently obtains most administrative, general, and some mission

related support from other organizations. If the NRP were

made.autonomous, these non-mission related requirements would

have to be assumed within the program structure. Existing

external support is satisfactory and does not require NRP

management to Spend significant time on non-mission related'

administrative and personnel problems. Thus such additional

requirements. would detract management attention from the important job of executing successful hardware programs.

(3) Be abolished with its activities

assigned to other intelligence entities (CIA, Al', NSA,

etc.).

Abolishing the NRP and assigning its activities to other

intelligence entities could jeopardize the viability of the

total program. Such normalization of a program would perhaps

lead to more average performance as opposed to the unusually

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successful program achieved under the streamlined NRO management system. It is questionable whether the "national means

of verification" could continue to be adequately achieved if

the intelligence satellite programs were distributed piecemeal to various agencies. Additionally, separation of developer-producer-operator from the product user community is a

particularly effective mechanism for preventing advocacy and

duplication of capability. Further I believe it would be

hard for anyone to argue convincingly that any management

structure that has been as successful over the years as the

NRO should be suddenly abolished.

(4) Or left as is?

My overall assessment is that the current internal NRP

management structure has resulted in extremely successful programs and therefore should be retained as is. I base this

assessment on the fact that over the past 17 years we have

improved significantly the intelligence collection capabilities of our systems in terms of quality, quantity, timeliness,

and system lifetimes, and have been able to develop and successfully operate, in response to Community requirements, new

generation systems while maintaining a fiscal expenditure at a

relatively constant level. In addition, in all of the recent

reviews of intelligence organizations, the NRO has repeatedly

been singled out as an exemplary model.

The current external management environment, however, is

one of flux and ill-defined roles for the various high-level

staffs vis-a-vis the NRP. As such, a permanent organizational/

management structure to replace the 11 August 1965 charter is

essential.

c. Are there elements (programs) of the

NRP that are more appropriately transferred to the

DOD principally for military use as "tactical"

assets?

The NRP's unique success in the technological development

of satellite systems would imply that it would be more advantageous to continue the development of "intelligence gathering

satellites" under a single organization, regardless of the

specific mission. Further effort does need to be devoted,

however, to defining the scope of support that "tactically

capable" satellites should provide in support of operational

requirements. A policy determination on this issue is essential prior to dedicating NRP assets to a tactical mission.

Regardless of the specific application of the product, the

systems should continue to be built by the NRP.

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d. Res-the-pregram-ebseured major programmatic choices (been obscured) into incremental

improvement issues, submerging substantive intelligence justification in favor of technological

alternatives?

I am not aware of any effort to submerge substantive

intelligence requirements in favor of technological alternatives. In fact, the EXCOM/CFI/PRC(I) decision process is a

vehicle for insuring that programmatic decisions are made in

support of intelligence needs. The NRP responds to collection requirements established by the Intelligence Community.

While options are presented by the NRP for the satisfaction

of these requirements, resource allocation is made by the

PRC(I) which is a distinct, separate resources allocation

authority which bases its decisions on the intelligence value

of the options presented.

Intelligence Community Staff --

With regard to questions pertaining to the Intelligence

Community Staff, I feel that the IC' Staff should have an

important role to play with regard to the overall National

Foreign Intelligence Program, in an overall coordinating and

support role but not in a line management or an intervening

role. In this regard, it is important to recognize that the

NRP, as compared to programs such as the GDIP and CCP, is

unique in several ways and does not require the same type of

management oversight that is applied to these programs. The

NRP consists of a very limited number of programs and efforts

that are relatively easy to understand at the program option

level. The program does, however, involve very substantial

funding levels. Since the issuance of E.O. 11905, there has

been a significant increase in the scope and depth of IC

Staff involvement in the NRP on studies and issues. Whereas

the IC Staff can perhaps play an important role in resolving

a multitude of low-level and cross program issues not requiring

top-level management attention within other programs such as

the GDIP and CCP, their involvement in the major decisions of

the NRP which are ultimately addressed at the highest level,

only adds inefficiency to the bureaucratic process. The

results of such involvement have been delays in the decision

process, significantly increased staffing requirements for the

NRO, and clouding of issues resulting from the presentation of

data, programs and options by an intermediary staff.

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