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Dr. McM handcarried original only to

-"Mr. Vance. There was no one in SAP-SS to

control it, so I put a little sli . on face

of memo "BYEMAN." Have made

Mr. McNamara; also there's Dr.

Fubini, if he should get one; for

Gen Stewart's file.

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pEPARTIMENTOFTHEAHRFONCE

WASHINGTON

cornea 0? 114C %MOM SCCRETARY

March 5, 1965

lei`r411.:ANYISI FCC TNC DEPUTY SECRETARY OP DEFENSE

This cemoratdue summarizes the status of four setters

in convection with the menagpment and operation of CORONA

that have been discussed in the past at EmCon or with you.

0 .neerina

As you recall, at the wan meeting of August 11, 1964, it 1ms agrees: that a contract for general systems engineering

zt!thnical direction on the CORONA system wctld be established

kerospece Corporation, that the CIA contracts on CORONA

would be ameueed to recognise the role of Aerospace, that

syatmos etwinearing contract SE 1928 with Lockheed (MSC) would

ot allowed to rut out, mad that General d r would substitute

ior it a co tract with MSC for systems integration.

a the present time, the states of actions on these matters.

ie icl:cws:

e. Acontract with .fierospace Corporation for general

e.,1 ztecz engineer.ng an': technical direction is in force.

The required changes have been made in one C1A, contract, •

thct with ITS.11.

c. Cla contracts with LM SC and with General Electric

Lave uot been changed.

C. s4 i928 with INSC has evired.

e. GenereI Greer has eegotiated n systems integration

contract with LKAC, to continue that part of the effort previously •

covered 4y SE 1928 which in rewired for detailed tystems

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f. The CIA has directed not to sign the systems

integration contract with General Greer, and this contract is

not signed.

As a consequence of this situation, LNIC is sot under.

contract to perfamatumesary engineering functions, and Aerospace

Corporation has annoy occasions been explicitly denied

technical information developed under CIA contracts, or pertaining to work on those contracts, that is necessary to the

task of general systems engineering.

At the time of directing; INSC not to sign the systems

integration contract noted above, the CIA stated an objection

to the security practices called for in that contract. At

your direction, I established a committee, including a CI4

security expert, to review the problem. The committee found

that the security practices followed by USC under their contracts

to the CIA did not meet the standards imposed upon the ]SAO by

the CIA security Wide under which the NR0 is obliged to operate.

The committee unanimously recommended that the security'

procedures followed by the LNIC on their C/A. contrasts be

brought up to the standard of the CIA security guide. In a

memorandum of November 16, 1964, General Carter agreed to this

change. The change has dot yet been effected.

.draiamsken, Ori

As you know, during orbital operations all commends to

the vehicle and payload are issued to the tracking statics*,

for relay to the vehicle, from the Air Toros Satellite Test

Center (STC) at Sunnyvale, California. Telemetry reports from

the vehicle are reported in from the tracking stations to the

STC, either by direct real-time relay, or in summarised form

during or immediately after contact of the tracking station

with the vehicle. In the past, representatives of the =who

were knowledgeable of the camera end other payload items covered

by CIA ccntracts, have regularly been present at the STC diaries

2 .ANIY...E VIA BYE

SYSTEM ON

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operations. , sod bevy badwith thee all data necessary to decode

and interpret the telemetry pertaining to the payload and payload

section of the vehicle. Tbese people supplied their data to

and participated in all analyses of vehicle condition, and

contributed their reccemendations to decisions mode about the

operation or the health of the orbital system.

Since last August, this practice has gradually been discontinued, to the point that on mission 1015, in December, I

felt compelled to direct that a representative of the CIA

organisation be physidally present at the STC during the mission.

This was complied with on that mission.

On mission 1016, in January, a CiArepreseptativo was

present at the STC part of the time. On the current mission,

1017, the CIA has been represented at the STC only during periods

when the vehicle was over the U. S. and test operations were

being performed.

On missions 1015, 1016, and 1017, the CIA explicitly

refused to release to the 1StO CORONA Program Officer, who by

delegation from me is in charge of mission control at the STC,

any of the calibration data or decoding information that would

permit him independently to decode or interpret the telemetry

that pertains to the payload or payload section of the vehicle.

On missions 1016 and 1017, the Mhos denied this

SRO Program Officer soy decoded telemetry data pertaining to

the payload or to the payload section of the vehicle. The only

information they will release to him is their summary judgment,

whether the payload is in good health or not.

As a result of this denial of information, the officer to

whom I delegate responsibility for insuring the health of the

system oa orbit, and for protecting the intelligence already

gathered should the status of the vehicle indicate the need

for an early recovery, is without the full information necessary

to discharge his duties.

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Standard'operiting procedures on CORONA call for transmission of earners instructions from the MR0' Operations Center

to the covert CIAriockbeed facility at Sunnyvale. Prior to

last August, there was also a teletype terminal at the STC, in

a =controlledarea which brought shard copy of these

instructions in to th: STC. These instructions are converted,

by a CIA representative or contractor employee, into "vehiCle

language," and given to a CORONA program office representative

who conveys them to the vehicle controllers for relay to the

appropriate tracking and control station.

Since August, the CIA, has discontinued use of their

teletype terminal at the STC. At present, they relay commends

to the STC by commercial telephone frms.their covert location.

In December, after observing this practice in connection. with

mission 1015, I directed that a secure teletype channel be

installed to permit these commends to be relayed by a coemunication of record. The CIA has refused to allow the necessary

teletype equipment to be installed in their covert facility.

As a result of the lent two matters mentioned, I am

presently without communications of record to verify the

instructions given my deleged representative at the STC, and

without the calibration data at the STC which permits an

independent check that the commode to the vehicle are valid

translations of those requested by the MR0 Operations Center..

The possibilities of human error are increased, and the possiii

bility of assigning responsibility is negated.

Siftnet

Brockway licitillan

Director

national Reconnaissance Office

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