# U nit edStates C ou rt o f App eal s For th e Firs t C ircu it

No. 04-2091 JOHN OGOBODO EZE, Petitioner,

v . ALBERTO R. GONZÁLES, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before Boudin, Chief Judge, Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

S t e phen A. Lagana and Lagana & Associates, on brief for petitioner. Jo h n D . W i l l i a m s , T r i a l A t t o r n e y , O f f i c e o f I mm i g ration Litigation, Civil Division, Peter D. Keisler, Assis t a n t Attorney General, and Douglas E. Ginsburg, Senior Litigation Counsel, on brief for respondent.

February 23, 2007-2- TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. At issue here is whether the Board of Immigration Ap p eals ("BIA") erred in determining that petitioner, John Ogobodo Eze ("Eze"), was properly served notice of the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") (fo r m erly the Immigration and Naturalization Service) termination of his temporary r e sident status. The regulation governing notice of termination of an alien's temporary resident status is codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(u)(2)(i). The regulati o n p r ovides in relevant part: [T]ermination of an alien's temporary resident

status . . . will be made . . . only on notice sent to the alien by certified m a i l directed to his o r h er last known address, and to his or her representative, if any. The alien must b e given an opportunity to offer evidence in opposition to the grounds alleged for termination of his or her status. Evidence in opposition must be submitted within thirty (30) days after the service of t h e Notice of Intent to Terminate. Id. The BIA determined th a t Eze received proper service of the D H S ' s notice through personal delivery of the notice, rather than notice by certified mail, as described in the regulations. On appeal, Eze challenge s t h i s determination, arguing that only service by certified mail -- and not by personal delivery -- complies with the governing regulation, and that the government's fai l u re to comply with the governing regulation in this case violated his due process rights. Because the BIA's determination-3-

that Eze received proper notice was based on its interpretation of immigration regulations, the issue is a legal one but our review is subject t o principles of deference, Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 396 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999)); of course, we review de novo any determination of the contours of the due process clause, see A l b a thani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 372 (1st Cir. 2003).

Under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a ) ( 2 ), the general regulations concerning immigration, personal service includes both "[d]elivery of a copy personally" and "[m]ailing a copy by certified or registered mail." Neither form of service is considered superior. Id. Indeed, there is little practical difference in the two forms of service. Certainly, personal delivery is at least as likely as delivery by certified mail to ensure that notice is received.

Moreover, there is no evidence on rec o r d that Eze was prejudiced by personal delivery of the notice of termination of his temporary resident status. The record indicates that the well established principle of "notice and opportunity to be heard" was fulfilled. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (stating that notice and an opportunity to be heard together comprise an "essential principle of due process"); Oakes v. United States, 400 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2005) (same). In fact, Eze admits that he received and signed the notice of termination of his temporary resident status. Furthermore , t h e notice-4-

specifically orders the termination of his status, and provides Eze's appeal rights and the requisite appeal form. This not only confirms t h a t E z e received the notice, but that he also had the opportunity to be heard on appeal. Clearly, the personal delivery of the notice adequately notified Eze.

Affirmed.