DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DARREN JOSEPH TINKER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D19-3232

[June 8, 2022]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Barbara Anne McCarthy, Judge; L.T. Case No. 18-

005619-CF-10A.

Antony P. Ryan, Regional Counsel, and Siobhan Helene Shea, Special 

Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional 

Counsel, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, 

Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CONNER, C.J.

Darren Joseph Tinker (“Defendant”) appeals his judgments and 

sentences after a jury found him guilty of multiple counts related to an 

alleged scheme involving Defendant and his parents. Defendant raises 

seven issues on appeal. However, because one issue is dispositive and 

requires reversal, the remainder of the issues are moot. We hold that the 

evidence was insufficient to allow the charges to proceed to determination 

by a jury. The trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal.

Background

Defendant, his mother, and his father were charged with multiple 

counts related to an alleged scheme whereby companies created by 
2

Defendant’s father obtained properties via fraudulent deeds.1 Defendant 

was a vice president of Global Management Consulting Group Corp. 

(“Global Management”) for at least some period during which the scheme 

was alleged to have spanned. Defendant’s father was president of Global 

Management and Defendant’s mother was also vice president of the 

company. Defendant’s father and mother were also listed as corporate 

officers of a related corporation, Global Homebuyers LLC (“Global Home 

Buyers”) (collectively, “the Global companies”). The three co-defendants 

lived in one of the properties obtained in the scheme.

The case proceeded to a jury trial with all three co-defendants 

represented by the same attorney. Defendant was charged with multiple 

counts of grand theft of residential properties, criminal use of personal 

identification information of both living and deceased persons, and filing 

false documents or records against real property. The State acknowledged 

that some of the business conducted by the Global companies was 

legitimate. However, it alleged that the Global companies, through 

Defendant and his parents, also perpetrated fraud. During the trial, copies 

of deeds which were signed by Defendant either as a representative of 

Global Management or as a witness were introduced into evidence to show 

Defendant’s participation in the criminal scheme. A power of attorney 

used in the scheme which bore Defendant’s signature as a witness was 

also introduced into evidence, as well as an eviction notice signed by 

Defendant as a representative of Global Management for one of the 

properties which it fraudulently obtained and then rented. Additionally, a 

security visitor log was introduced into evidence from the Broward County 

Governmental Center with Defendant’s name listed on seven dates, which 

the State contended proved multiple instances of Defendant recording 

fraudulent documents as part of the scheme.

Defendant did not contest that the various documents the State entered 

at trial were fraudulent. Instead, Defendant’s theory of defense was that 

he had no knowledge of the fraudulent activity and that the fraud had been 

perpetrated by a rogue employee of Global Management, along with the 

help of several other individuals. 

Defendant was twenty-four years old at the time of trial. His father 

testified that Defendant started working for the family business in high 

1 Defendant’s mother and father also appealed their judgments and sentences. 

Along with this opinion, we also issue a consolidated opinion reversing the 

mother’s and father’s cases and remanding for a new trial. See Tinker v. State, 

4D19-3235 and 4D19-3233 (Fla. 4th DCA June 8, 2022).
3

school, ran errands, and cleaned the office. Additionally, he performed 

limited customer service by answering customer questions. Defendant 

testified he was fired multiple times by his father because he had a terrible 

work ethic. His father made him a vice president of Global Management

to keep the appearance of a family business, but he had no duties as vice 

president. The State presented no evidence to conflict with the testimony 

of Defendant and his parents about his limited role in the family business.

After its initial presentation of evidence, the State rested, and 

Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal. He argued that his name 

came up in the investigation only because he worked for the family 

company; his name on the visitor log at the recording office did not show 

guilt; the State did not prove the purported signatures on documents were 

his; he was only fourteen years old when the alleged fraudulent scheme 

began; and there was no evidence that he knew of a fraudulent scheme or

that information in the documents filed for recording was fraudulent. The 

motion was renewed at the conclusion of all evidence, incorporating the 

same arguments. The trial court denied both motions.

The jury found Defendant guilty of twelve counts of unlawful filing of a 

false document; twenty-seven counts of criminal use of personal 

identification information; thirteen counts of criminal use of a deceased 

person’s personal identification information; and fifteen counts of grand 

theft, for a total of sixty-seven convictions. The trial court granted 

Defendant’s motion for downward departure for sentencing and sentenced 

Defendant to twenty years in prison, followed by twenty years of probation. 

Defendant gave notice of appeal.

Appellate Analysis

“We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” 

Demus v. State, 281 So. 3d 505, 507-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019). “The 

question presented by such a motion is whether, in a light most favorable 

to the State, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the charge.” Bright 

v. State, 191 So. 3d 497, 498 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). In other words, “an 

appellate court must ‘view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

State’ and, maintaining this perspective, ask whether ‘a rational trier of 

fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 200 (Fla. 2020) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 

2019)).

The State also alleged that Defendant acted as a principal. “In order to 

be guilty as a principal for a crime physically committed by another, one 
4

must intend that the crime be committed and do some act to assist the 

other person in actually committing the crime.” Staten v. State, 519 So. 

2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1988).

“In resisting a judgment of acquittal, the state can rely on any evidence 

adduced, even evidence later determined to have been erroneously 

admitted.” Pryear v. State, 243 So. 3d 479, 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) 

(quoting State v. Brockman, 827 So. 2d 299, 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)). “A 

defendant is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal ‘merely because 

evidence that is critical to the court’s finding of sufficiency was improperly 

admitted.’” Id. (quoting Barton v. State, 704 So. 2d 569, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 

1997)).

On appeal, Defendant does not frame his arguments around specific 

counts. Instead, he frames his arguments around various categories of 

evidence, contending that the State was unable to prove that he had the 

requisite knowledge of the “scheme” to support guilt on the counts against 

him.

In response, the State argues on appeal, as it did below, that five 

categories of evidence support Defendant’s guilt: (1) he was a corporate 

officer of Global Management; (2) he physically recorded some of the 

fraudulent instruments; (3) he “sign[ed] and/or witness[ed] various 

fraudulent documents”; (4) he lived with his parents, co-defendants in the 

scheme, in one of the homes that was obtained by Global Management via 

fraudulent documents; and (5) he signed an eviction notice for one of the 

tenants living in one of the properties obtained by fraud. Notably, during 

closing argument, the State admitted that Defendant was guilty to “a lesser 

degree” than his parents.

As to the substantive crimes charged, we address the categories of 

evidence relied upon by the State.

Criminal Use of Personal Identification Information and a Deceased Person’s 

Personal Identification Information

“[T]he elements of fraudulent use of personal identification information 

are: (1) willfully and fraudulently using or possessing with intent to 

fraudulently use; (2) another person’s personal identification information; 

and (3) without that person’s authorization or prior consent.” Sibley v. 

State, 955 So. 2d 1222, 1226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007); see also § 817.568(2)(c), 

Fla. Stat. (2018); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 20.13.
5

Although no case in Florida has addressed or interpreted section

817.568(8)(c), Florida Statutes (2018), the offense of criminal use of a 

deceased individual’s personal identification information, the wording of 

subsection (8)(c) is virtually the same as subsection (2)(c), thus the 

elements are the same, except that the crime of criminal use of a deceased 

person’s identification information requires that the victim is deceased, 

rather than a living individual. Compare § 817.568(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018), 

with § 817.568(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018).

The first element is the only one at issue. As to this crime, “‘[w]illfully’ 

means intentionally, knowingly, and purposely.” Fla. Std. Jury Instrs. 

(Crim.) 20.13, 20.17 (emphasis added). “‘Fraudulently’ means purposely 

or intentionally suppressing the truth or perpetrating a deception or both.” 

Id.

The State’s strongest evidence against Defendant as to the first element 

was that he signed2 certain deeds and a power of attorney. However, for

two reasons, Defendant’s signature on the documents is insufficient 

evidence that Defendant had knowledge of any fraudulent scheme.

First, Defendant’s signature does not appear on any documents as a 

notary. Therefore, his signature was not certifying that he had satisfactory 

evidence that the person signing the document was in fact the person 

whom he or she purported to be. See § 117.05(5), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“A 

notary public may not notarize a signature on a document unless he or 

she personally knows, or has satisfactory evidence, that the person whose 

signature is to be notarized is the individual who is described in and who 

is executing the instrument.”).

Second, Defendant’s signature appears on seven documents admitted 

into evidence by the State as either a witness or signor on behalf of Global 

Management. Two exhibits are duplicates. Of the remaining five 

documents, four are deeds transferring properties between the related 

Global companies. More importantly, no one testified that the signatures 

within the five documents were fraudulent, as the signors were all Global 

Management representatives.

2 Defendant also challenges the State’s evidence that it was his signature on these 

documents. However, although the trial court may have erred in allowing a 

detective who was not a handwriting expert to identify Defendant’s signature, the 

State may still rely on this evidence in combatting Defendant’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal. See Pryear, 243 So. 3d at 484.
6

Despite no testimony of fraudulent signatures, one of the four deeds 

did indicate possible fraud within the document. Specifically, while that 

deed is dated in 2010, Defendant’s mother signed as a notary on the deed 

and her notary stamp reflects that her commission expires in 2017. There 

was evidence that notary commissions are valid for only four years, 

indicating potential fraud within this deed given the discrepancy between 

the date of the document and the date of the expiration of the notary 

commission. However, any fraud regarding the date of expiration of the 

notary’s commission does not support an inference that Defendant had 

knowledge of any fraud with the notarization. We doubt that the average 

citizen pays attention to the expiration date on the notary’s stamp when 

the citizen’s signature as a party is acknowledged by a notary or added as 

a witness to a party signing, particularly because typically the notary signs 

last and typically the notary stamp is applied after the notary signs.

Additionally, Defendant signed the deed with the suspect notary 

expiration date as a subscribing witness. The signature of two subscribing 

witnesses is required on a real estate conveyance. § 689.01, Fla. Stat. 

(2018). However, the signature of a subscribing witness does not certify 

that any information contained within the document is correct, but 

instead, simply vouches for the other signatures on the document. See 

Subscribing Witness, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Someone 

who witnesses the signatures on an instrument and signs at the end of 

the instrument to that effect.”); see also Attesting Witness, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Someone who vouches for the authenticity of 

another’s signature by signing an instrument that the other has signed.”). 

Again, because no one testified that the signatures on any of the deeds 

which Defendant signed were fraudulent, no evidence supports an 

inference that Defendant had knowledge of fraud.

The fifth exhibit was a power of attorney purportedly signed by 

Defendant as an attesting witness. The power of attorney granted Global 

Management powers regarding a specific parcel of real property. While the 

State submitted evidence of fraudulent information in relation to the 

property associated with the power of attorney, the State did not submit 

any evidence that the power of attorney contained any fraud. And the 

State did not submit any evidence that Defendant knew of any fraudulent 

information in relation to the property.

Therefore, although the State submitted evidence that properties were 

obtained by the Global companies through fraudulent documents, the 

State did not submit any evidence upon which a rational juror could find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had knowledge of fraudulent 

activity. Just because Defendant signed or witnessed a deed from one 
7

Global entity to another entity does not provide even circumstantial 

evidence that he knew fraudulent activity was involved in the transaction. 

The State did not submit any evidence that Defendant knew the 

background or substance of any of the documents on which his signature 

appears or he filed for recording.

As to the State’s contention that evidence that Defendant (1) was a 

corporate officer for Global Management during some portion of the years 

the fraudulent activity occurred, (2) recorded some of the fraudulent 

documents, (3) lived in one of the homes that was obtained by fraud, and 

(4) signed an eviction notice for one of the properties, we conclude that 

none of such evidence, singularly or in combination, is sufficient to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew of fraudulent activity to 

effectuate or assist the criminal scheme.

The fact that Defendant was listed as a corporate officer in one of his 

father’s corporations is not sufficient to prove knowledge of criminal 

activity. The State argues a presumption exists that Defendant knew of 

the fraudulent actions of Global Management as a corporate officer, citing 

to United Bonding Insurance Co. v. Dura-Stress, Inc., 243 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 

2d DCA 1971). However, United Bonding is a civil case which concluded 

that a corporate officer’s affidavit was not insufficient because he did not 

state that the affidavit was made from his own personal knowledge. Id. at 

246. The Second District said:

It is generally held that when an officer of a corporation makes 

an affidavit in its behalf, it is not necessary that he should 

state the sources of his knowledge, or information and belief. 

An officer must be possessed of the requisite knowledge, but 

such knowledge on his part is presumed.

Id. (citation omitted). However, regarding presumptive knowledge, a 

distinct difference exists between the scenario of a corporate officer 

executing an affidavit (inherently a statement of facts) and a corporate 

officer signing a document pertaining to a parcel of real property as a party 

or witness, including an attesting witness. Simply stated, United Bonding

does not support the contention that, in a criminal case, each corporate 

officer of a company should be presumed to have knowledge of criminal 

activity charged in relation to corporate acts.

Additionally, the State did not submit any evidence in this case to show 

that Defendant had any responsibilities for or knowledge of fraudulent 

activity because of his position as corporate officer, or that his position 

was anything more than a name on paper. Cf. State v. Petagine, 290 So. 
8

3d 991, 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (finding evidence sufficient to survive a 

motion to dismiss where the defendant was the leader of the executive 

council of a fraternity, directed all fraternity activities, and “had the 

organizational and actual authority to stop all acts of hazing conducted by 

all members of the [f]raternity”).

The fact that Defendant lived with his family in one of the houses which

was obtained through fraudulent documents also does not support that 

he had any knowledge or involvement in a scheme. The State did not 

submit any evidence that Defendant was anything other than a young 

person living in his parents’ house. We doubt that children from high 

school age to age twenty-four necessarily know the intricate details of the 

ownership interest in their parents’ home, particularly if a corporate entity 

owns the home.

Finally, the fact that Defendant recorded some of the fraudulent deeds 

does not provide evidence that he did so with the knowledge or intent to 

defraud. Cf. Watkins v. State, 826 So. 2d 471, 474–75 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) 

(finding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal as principal to a charge of forgery where, although 

there was evidence that the defendant uttered the counterfeit check, there 

was no evidence he “falsely made, altered, forged or counterfeited the

check or that he did some act or said some word that was intended to and 

did incite or cause another individual to counterfeit the check”).

Similarly, the State’s evidence that Defendant signed an eviction 

document does not demonstrate that he had knowledge that the Global 

companies obtained ownership of that property by fraud. These are 

actions which would have occurred in the regular course of business 

handling real properties. The State did not contend at trial that all the 

Global companies’ business involved fraud, and evidence was submitted

that the Global companies engaged in some legitimate business. The

actions which the State alleges support Defendant’s conviction do not 

indicate that Defendant had any knowledge of any fraudulent transactions 

in addition to legitimate transactions. Thus, without more, the evidence 

which the State submitted does not provide a sufficient basis upon which 

a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew 

or intended fraud.

We agree with Defendant that Javellana v. State, 168 So. 3d 283 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2015), a case with analogous facts, is instructive. In Javellana, 

the defendant was charged with financial exploitation of an elderly or 

disabled adult. Id. at 284. The defendant and his wife, a co-defendant, 

were well acquainted with the victim, an elderly woman with “a vast 
9

financial estate.” Id. The wife worked at an investment firm and began 

assisting with the victim’s account in the early 1980s. Id. In the mid1990s, the victim executed a will, including several trusts, which provided 

for long-term care of the victim’s adult children who were incapable of 

independent living. Id. Beginning in 2008, the victim made multiple 

amendments to her estate documents, through an attorney who was a 

“good friend” of the wife. Id. The wife referred the victim to her attorney 

friend. Id. The defendant and the wife also witnessed the victim’s 

execution of some amendments to her estate documents, and the 

defendant would “chauffeur[]” the victim on errands. Id. The amendments 

resulted in the defendant and the wife being residual beneficiaries of the 

victim’s estate. Id. 

After noting that the defendant was charged as a principal, we 

concluded that the evidence against him was insufficient to support a 

conviction:

While we do not decide whether there was sufficient evidence 

to establish that the defendant’s wife exploited [the victim], we 

find the evidence was insufficient, however, to allow the jury 

to infer that the defendant aided and abetted or otherwise 

willingly participated in any such exploitation. The state 

points to no evidence establishing that the defendant was ever 

aware that [the victim] was amending her estate documents 

to benefit the defendant and his wife. There was no evidence 

that the defendant was involved in arranging the appointment 

for a court-ordered mental competency evaluation or that the 

defendant even spoke to his wife about [the victim’s] estate. 

There was simply no evidence that the defendant knew 

anything about [the victim’s] estate or of any plan by his wife 

to exploit [the victim]; thus, there was no evidence of his 

conscious intent that the crime be committed.

Id. at 285.3

Like Javellana, even if (1) Defendant received a residual financial 

benefit of the fraud because of his position as an officer in Global 

Management; (2) served as a witness on documents (without proof of 

knowledge of fraud); (3) lived in his parents’ house, obtained by fraud; and 

3 In Javellana, our analysis additionally opined that the State’s case did not rebut 

the defendant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 168 So. 3d at 285. This 

additional basis for reversal was under the old special standard for circumstantial 

evidence.
10

(4) his family members were part of a scheme, we hold that such evidence, 

singularly and in combination, is insufficient to support an inference 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had any knowledge that fraud 

was occurring.

Unlawful Filing of Documents or Records Against Real Property

Pertinent to the facts of this case, the crime of unlawful filing of 

documents or records against real property has three elements: (1) the 

defendant filed an instrument; (2) at the time, the defendant had the intent 

to defraud or harass another; and (3) the instrument contained a 

materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation that 

purported to affect an owner’s interest in the property described in the 

instrument. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 

2016-02, 199 So. 3d 234, 239 (Fla. 2016).

On the second element—the intent to defraud and harass another—the 

State’s evidence fails. Although Criminal Standard Jury Instruction 20.22 

does not contain any instructions on the intent to defraud or harass 

element of the crime, clearly a person cannot intend to engage in 

fraudulent activity without knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the 

activity. Cf. Anchor Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Trif, 322 So. 3d 663, 675 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2021) (“Indeed, in jurisprudence, ‘the word “false” implies 

something more than mere untruth: it imports knowledge and a specific 

intent to deceive.’” (quoting State v. Tedesco, 397 A.2d 1352, 1358 (Conn. 

1978))).

Again, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, no

rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had 

any knowledge of fraud, let alone that it was his intent to perpetrate 

deception. No evidence was presented that Defendant signed or presented 

documents to knowingly certify any information he knew to be fraudulent. 

No evidence was presented that he knowingly witnessed a fraudulent 

document. Moreover, for the same reasons discussed above, the State’s 

additional evidence regarding Defendant’s residence, his name listed as an 

officer for his father’s company, and his recording of several fraudulent 

documents, is not sufficient to establish his knowledge, and therefore, his 

intent to engage in unlawful filing of documents or records against real 

property.

Grand Theft
11

Finally, the three foundational elements for a charge of grand theft4 are:

(1) knowingly (2) obtaining or using, or endeavoring to obtain 

or use, property of another (3) with intent to deprive the 

person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom, or to 

appropriate the property to one’s own use or to the use of any 

person not entitled thereto.

Pizzo v. State, 945 So. 2d 1203, 1207 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Donovan v. State, 

572 So. 2d 522, 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)). For the same reasons as with 

the other counts filed against Defendant, the evidence described above 

does not support a finding that Defendant had the requisite knowledge or 

intent.

Conclusion

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

State, a rational juror could not have found the existence of the knowledge 

and intent elements of each of the crimes charged against Defendant 

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Bush, 295 So. 3d at 200. We hold that 

the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of 

acquittal as to all the charges against him, and reverse and remand for the 

trial court to vacate the judgments and sentences entered against 

Defendant and for entry of a judgment of acquittal as to all charges.

Reversed and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal.

GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

4 Defendant was charged with monetary theft, which includes an additional 

element. However, that element is not at issue.