No. 84-508 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF 140NTANA 

1985 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

JULIE ANN OSTEEN, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

NARVEN ELBERT OSTEEN , 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROPI: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lincoln, 

The Honorable Robert Holter, Judge presiding. 

CCUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Sverdrup & Spencer; Scott B. Spencer, Libby, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Law Office of David W. Harman, Libby, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 22, 1985 

Decided: April 11, 1985 

Filed: /\Pe ; 1985 

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Clerk 
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , d.elivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Julie Ann Osteen appeals a judgment of the Lincoln 

County District Court which divided the marital property of 

herself and her husband, Narven Elbert Osteen. The court 

adopted verbatim the settlement proposed by respondent 

husband. The sole issue is whether the District Court abused 

its discretion in making that property division. 

We hold that discretion was not abused, and we therefore 

affirm the District Court. 

The parties were married on December 16, 19?8, and the 

marriage was dissolved on October 11, 1P84. The ord.er 

dividing their property was entered on October 23, 1984. 

Both parties were represented throughout the proceedings by 

counsel . Both parties submitted proposed findings of fact 

and conclusions of law. And both parties submitted a 

separate list to the court proposing distribution of the 

property. 

The trial court heard testimony from both parties as to 

their proposed property distribution, and both Julie and 

Warven agreed each item was valued correctly. When 

questioned by her own counsel., Julie testified Narven did not 

have any property which she wanted. She further testified 

she was aware Narven had retirement benefits from his 

employer, and that she was making no claim on those benefits. 

She also testified Narven went on a three-week trip, at which 

time she moved out of the family residence, taking with her, 

all items of personal property she wanted. 

In this appeal, Julie asserts she was supposed to have 

received certain items of property in the division, but those 
were awarded instead to Narven, namely a 1979 Ford pickup 

truck, two wedding rings, and a washer and dryer. 

Specifically, in her proposed distribution, she had sought 

the pickup, but omitted any reference to jewelry and to the 

washer and dryer. Narven, on the other hand, sought all 

those items in his proposed property distribution, and in 

addition agreed Julie should have several items of jewelry 

including three diamond rings, with all the jewelry valued at 

$3,t?OO. 

We are asked to determine whether a property 

disposition, derived from lists proposed by the parties 

represented by counsel, should be set aside because that 

disposition was the one proposed by the respondent; or 

because an exact mathematical division was not made; or 

because both parties sought certain of the same items of 

property. The standard of review announced by this Court 

concerning the disposition of marital property has been 

repeated many times. The District Court has far-reaching 

discretion in resolving property divisions, and its judgment 

will not be altered unless a clear abuse of that discretion 

is shown. Smith v. Smith (Mont. 1981), 622 P.2d 1022, 1024, 

38 St.Rep. 146, 148. 

That discretion is limited by the statutory requirements 

contained in § 40-4-202, MCA. It is unnecessary to set forth 

here, the statute in its entirety. Rather, our review of the 

record discloses the District Court clearly considered and 

applied each of the criteria relevant to this case. 

Our role on review is not to substitute our opinion for 

that of the District Court, but rather to determine whether 

substantial credible evidence supports the lower court's 

ruling. We hold that it does. 
Julie also asserted the District Court erred in adopting 

verbatim, Narven's proposed property settlement. Actually, 

her own proposed property settlement was strikingly similar 

to his. In fact, with the exceptions of the 1979 pickup, the 

rings, and the washer and dryer, she accorded him more items 

of property than he claimed., and suggested a net value for 

all the property she claimed, of $5,000 less than the 

property she proposed for him to have. Even though the court 

awarded Julie $2,000 more than she sought, it awarded Narven 

property valued at approximately $3,000 more. Eut as this 

Court has previously said it is not error for one party to 

receive more property than the other. In re the Marriage of 

Myers (Mont. 1984), 682 P.2d 718, 723, 41. St.Rep. 990, 996. 

And., concerning disposition of that property: 

"Reasonable minds could differ on what would be the 

most equitable distribution of the parties1 

property. That the case may be decided differently 

is not the inquiry on appeal, the question is 

whether the fact determination of the court bel-ow 

is clear1.y erroneous. Rule 52 (a) , M.R.Civ.P. l1 

In re Marriage of Keepers, (M.ont. 1984), 691 P.2d 810, 813, 

41 St.Fep. 2163, 2167. Appellant argues that the court made 

errors in its findings of fact. As we stated in Keepers: 

"Even with the erroneous finding of fact pointed 

out by appellant, we do not find that the District. 

Court clearly abused its discretion." (Id.) 

We find that the District Court complied in all respects 

with 5 40-4-202, MCA, in reaching its judgment. 

We affirm the District Court. 

We Concur: 
Chief Justice