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'fBP SEBRE'f YEMAN 

.J@'1'"NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

June 23, 1971 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. MCLUCAS 

SUBJECT: 11Fact oi.' 11 Satellite Reconnaissance 

Reference your 22 June 71 memo on this subject, which requested my 

views as to what effect downgrading or declassification might have on 

our budget and budgetary processesa 

Your statement 110ne of the arguments presented against continued 

compartmented protection is the cost involved in maintaining the compartmented systems u is a minor budget consideration in our case 5 We speci.fically 

identify $560K for security at Eastman Kodak, less than $200K for guards at 

Area 51, and periodically will buy soma security vaults. There are costs 

at contractor plants for security, but these are a small portion of the 

bs.si-0--eon-tracts, and unless there is a complete declassification of the 

program would undoubtedly continue. 

The main dangers of downgrading or declassification from a budget and 

funding standpoint are: 

1. There are a number of people in the Air Staff and OSD who would 

seize on the first opportunity to change the NRP to 11normal 11 operations, 

which would have several significant impacts -- {a) program a..--1d budget 

responsibilities would be fragmented thru.out the Air Staff and the field, 

with different groups involved in development, procurement, operations, 

program planning, maintenance, supply, etc. Jmy of these groups could 

cause extensive decision delays and be a weak link in the chain from the 

standpoint of adequate budgeting or funding, (b) :i.n a...'1 11 open11 budget atmosphere, the NRP funding in the procurement appropriations would have to 

change from incremental funding to f'ull .f'uJ1ding, result:ing in extreme 

fluctuations between fiscal years, and significant increases in the first 

year of adoption ( there a.re many reasons wh.y incremental funding is best 

for us), and (o) we would automatically reduce in .Air Force priority, when 

contending with the proponents of the B-1, F-15, AWACS, A-X, IMI, etc. 

2 .. In addition to the internal Air Force-DOD problems, there would 

be outside considerations, such as reviews by four full Congressional 

committees, open floor debate potentials, GAO reviews, inclusion in SAR1 s 

to Congress, :fragmented reviews and recommendations in 0MB, press publicity, 

etc. 

BYEMAN tBP SE6RET octuorn ,aoo< •UIOMHO< "~••"'"° ooo o,o,c11v, o,oo ,o ~on~"'"""" 

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lBP 9ECREl BYEMAN 

3~ 11Streaml:ined management 11 tec!'.niques would probably disappear, and 

be replaced by requirements to comply 'With AFR 375 series regulations, 

CSCSC techniques, different contracting approaches, limiting Secretarial 

Determinations and FL"l.dings, many fund reprogramming actions, etcs 

4. The principal concern in these illustrations is that flexibility, 

responsiveness, and priority would disappear in relation to our programs. 

We have seen specific instances of this 'With respect to (a) the SR-71 

tranSferred to the Air Force, which was one of the first budget cuts made 

'o-'.r USAF, and W'ith no single manager to defend it, (b) the Data Relay 

Satellite, budgeted by USAF, which has been exposed to arbitrary Air Staff 

cuts for FY 1972, and will undoubtedly be subject to cut attempts in future 

years (this also illustrates a priority change -- when the Air Staff felt 

that DRS would be useful to the Air Force, it was carried in Priority I 

as about the s:i.r'"uh item; now that it would be primarily dedicated to Zaman, 

it has unquestionably dropped considerably in priority). Exposure to 

11norroal II methods would unquestionably add one to two years in effecting 

any major decision. 

5. There could be a number of problems 'With respect to Agency 

involvement in our programs, suoh as (a} exposure to many more reviewers 

in functional areas, (b) changed funding techniques, as well as accountability and a"cl.diting, and (c) built-in rooontment by the Air Sta.ff toward 

the Agency spending sizeable a.mounts of Air Force dollars .. 

-The- -preceding connotations may represent an extreme not contemplated 

in the downgrading or declassification considerations, but I can state 

categorica.lly that 'With the first sign of security lessening there are 

many people·in high positions who would attempt .to 11normalize 11 the program. 

Comptroller 

BYEMAN fBP SEBRET ::::·" INTERNAL 

UINtaoc n,n,. """ o,.,n,H 1100 ,- DQO ""' ..... 

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