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CONTROL SYSTEM 

~ATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

THE NRO STAFF October 3, 1969 

HANDLE VIA 

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NOTE FOR DR. McL;,t:s 

SUBJECT: NRP Annex to the STG Report 

In my note of September 23 (copy attached) I relayed Mr. 

Packard's message regarding the 303 Committee rs discussion 

of our Annex to the STG Report. 

Attached, on the right, is a copy of Dr. Kissinger's memorandum to the President on this subject, in which he recommends 

Presidential confirmation of our NRP goals, objectives, and 

capabilities; and his approval to restrict further dissemination of 

the Annex to the STG. 

Dr. Kissinger reported on September 30 that the President 

had accepted both these recommendations. 

Colonel, USAF 

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MEMORANDUM 

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY 

2 October 1969 

Colonel William R. Yost: 

Appended for your information 

and official file is a copy of Dr. 

Kissinger's memorandum to higher 

authority re the NRP Annex to the 

Space Task Group Report. 

Both recommendations submitted 

by the 303 Committee were accepted 

as of 30 September 1969. 

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MEMORANDUM. 

THE WHITE HOUSE 

TOP 3fJ€J:GIU:./BYEHAN WASHINGTON ACTION 

September 26, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRE&I-DEl.'IT.... · . ·--.... --., 

FROM: •· I 

Henr.y A. Kissinger :f::. 

SUBJECT: National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) Annex to the 

Space Task. Group Report 

r 

The atfached Annex to the Space Task Group Report covering the intelligence 

reconnaissance activities of the National Reconnaissance Program has been 

forwarded separately by Hel Laird because of the special security controls 

applied to this aspect of the space program. 

The following are highlights of the annex: 

The National Reconnaissance Program is covert and comprises the 

development, management and operation of satellites, aircraft 

and drones for photographic or electronic overhead (as distinguished from peiipheral) reconnaissance of denied areas of 

the woiid. Emphasis is on satellite reconnaissance and the cost 

is $850 million per year, 93% of the budget being devoted to 

satellite systems. 

The program is responsive directly to the national in6elligence 

collection requirements and priorities established by the United 

States Intelligence Board (USIB) .. Its plans and schedules for 

·both satellite and aircraft overflights are su_6mitte.d to the 

.303 Committee for operational approval. 

Most of this nation's information on USSR strategic offensive and 

defensive systems has been acquired by satellite reconnaissance. 

The same is true of a considerable portion of other important 

intelligence acquired by the United States. Dependence on 

satellite reconnaissance would be magnified further by U.S. 

withdrawal from foreign bases . 

Since reconnaissance satellites require a permissive environment, 

both political and physical, it is critically important to nourish 

the conditions which contribute to the kind of international 

political atmosphere existing today which p~ovides all the advan-

·tages of tacit acceptance of satellite reconnaissance without the 

hazards inherent ih open discussion or confrontation. 

·-........ 

IC5r' SEGRJ",;;"'/3YEMAN 

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T~e~Soviets have a clear.existing capability to destroy a 

r~cDn~aissance satellite if they wish, although National Intelli-

..g~nce E.stimates coriclude that it is extremely unlikely they would 

fake such steps other than as a prelude to general war. The United 

·states has no present;,_.;1-~uclear capability for· intercepting 

Soviet reconnaissance sat"elli;tes. The desirability of acquiring 

· such· a capability wi1Toec·ons-idered in the Department of Defense's 

'.~6ntributions to the main report of the· Space ~ask Group. 

The long-term goals of the National Reconnaissance P~ogram are to 

.continue to: 

l. Conduct a covert program to collect intelligence 

through the overflight of denied territory. 

2. Seek_methods ~o reduce the cost of such collection. 

3. Improve the responsiveness of collection systems to 

intelligence needs. 

4, Advance satellite reconnaissance techniques in order 

to_improve collection capabilities and respond to new 

collection needs. 

RECOMl1ENDATI ON: 

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This Annex recommends on page 21 that you confirm the goals, objectives and 

.capabilities of the National Reconnaissance Program as presente<l in the 

report. With this guidance the Secretary of Defense will continue to mak~ 

program decisions consistent with the needs expressed by the intelligence 

_commu.nity·. i 

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The_ 303 Committee has reviewed this annex and believes 'that because of its 

sensitivity and lack of·general applicability to the basic Space Task Group 

Report it should not be fur_ther disseminated to the full ~embership of the 

Space Task Group and their staffs. 

The 303 Committee also endorses the above recommendation and recommends 

~hc1.t you approv~ __ it. . . 

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