Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 1 

Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC., ET AL. 

11–391 v. 

CLAYTON BROWN ET AL. 

CLARKSBURG NURSING HOME & REHABILITATION 

CENTER, LLC, DBA CLARKSBURG CONTINUOUS 

CARE CENTER, ET AL. 

11–394 v. 

SHARON A. MARCHIO, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

PAULINE VIRGINIA WILLETT 

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 

COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
 

Nos. 11–391 and 11–394. Decided February 21, 2012

 PER CURIAM. 

State and federal courts must enforce the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., with respect to all 

arbitration agreements covered by that statute. Here, the 

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, by misreading 

and disregarding the precedents of this Court interpreting

the FAA, did not follow controlling federal law implementing that basic principle. The state court held unenforceable all predispute arbitration agreements that apply to

claims alleging personal injury or wrongful death against 

nursing homes.

The decision of the state court found the FAA’s coverage

to be more limited than mandated by this Court’s previous 

cases. The decision of the State Supreme Court of Appeals 

must be vacated. When this Court has fulfilled its duty to

interpret federal law, a state court may not contradict or

fail to implement the rule so established. See U. S. Const., 

Art. VI, cl. 2. 
 

2 MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER v. BROWN 

Per Curiam
 

I 

This litigation involves three negligence suits against 

nursing homes in West Virginia. The suits were brought

by Clayton Brown, Jeffrey Taylor, and Sharon Marchio. 

In each case, a family member of a patient requiring extensive nursing care had signed an agreement with a 

nursing home on behalf of the patient. The relevant parts

of the agreements in Brown’s case and Taylor’s case were 

identical. The contracts included a clause requiring the 

parties to arbitrate all disputes, other than claims to collect late payments owed by the patient. The contracts 

included a provision holding the party filing the arbitration responsible for paying a filing fee in accordance with

the Rules of the American Arbitration Association fee 

schedules. The agreement in Marchio’s case also included

a clause requiring arbitration but made no exceptions to

the arbitration requirement and did not mention filing

fees. 

In each of the three cases, a family member of a patient 

who had died sued the nursing home in state court, alleging that negligence caused injuries or harm resulting in

death. A state trial court dismissed the suits by Brown

and Taylor based on the agreements to arbitrate. The 

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia consolidated 

those cases with Marchio’s, which was before the court on 

other issues. 

In a decision concerning all three cases, the state court

held that “as a matter of public policy under West Virginia

law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission

agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence 

that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall 

not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the negligence.” Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 

No. 35494 (W. Va., June 29, 2011), App. to Pet. for Cert.

in No. 11–391, pp. 85a–86a (hereinafter Pet. App.). The 

state court considered whether the state public policy was 
Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 

Per Curiam 

pre-empted by the FAA. The state court found unpersuasive this Court’s interpretation of the FAA, calling it “tendentious,” id., at 51a, and “created from whole cloth,” id., 

at 53a. It later concluded that “Congress did not intend 

for the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to personal

injury or wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive 

from a written agreement that evidences a transaction

affecting interstate commerce, particularly where the 

agreement involves a service that is a practical necessity

for members of the public,” id., at 84a. The court thus 

concluded that the FAA does not pre-empt the state public policy against predispute arbitration agreements that

apply to claims of personal injury or wrongful death

against nursing homes.

The West Virginia court’s interpretation of the FAA was

both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in 

the precedents of this Court. The FAA provides that a 

“written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction

. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 

of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. The statute’s text includes 

no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. 

It “requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to

arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 

213, 217 (1985). It “reflects an emphatic federal policy in

favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3)

(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985); internal quotation marks omitted).

As this Court reaffirmed last Term, “[w]hen state law 

prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of

claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule

is displaced by the FAA.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
 

 

 

 

 

4 MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER v. BROWN 

Per Curiam 

cion, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 6–7). That rule 

resolves these cases. West Virginia’s prohibition against 

predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or 

wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of

claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage

of the FAA. See ibid. See also, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 

U. S. 346, 356 (2008) (FAA pre-empts state law granting 

state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide issue

the parties agreed to arbitrate); Mastrobuono v. Shearson 

Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 56 (1995) (FAA preempts state law requiring judicial resolution of claims 

involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 

483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts state-law requirement

that litigants be provided a judicial forum for wage disputes); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10 

(1984) (FAA pre-empts state financial investment statute’s 

prohibition of arbitration of claims brought under that 

statute). 

II 

The West Virginia court proposed an “alternativ[e]” holding that the particular arbitration clauses in Brown’s 

case and Taylor’s case were unconscionable. Pet. App.

89a–91a, 94a. See also id., at 98a (not addressing the

question whether the arbitration agreement in Marchio’s

case is unenforceable for reasons other than public policy).

It is unclear, however, to what degree the state court’s

alternative holding was influenced by the invalid, categorical rule discussed above, the rule against predispute 

arbitration agreements. For example, in its discussion of 

the alternative holding, the state court found the arbitration clauses unconscionable in part because a predispute 

arbitration agreement that applies to claims of personal

injury or wrongful death against nursing homes “clearly

violates public policy.” Id., at 91a. 
 

Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 

Per Curiam 

On remand, the West Virginia court must consider

whether, absent that general public policy, the arbitration

clauses in Brown’s case and Taylor’s case are unenforceable under state common law principles that are not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA. 

* * * 

The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of

the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is vacated,

and the cases are remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.