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Lifr NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

THE NRO STAFF September 8, 1967 

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BERG 

SUBJECT: NRO-JCS Relationships on Aircraft Reconnaissance of 

Denied Areas 

PROBLEM: At the present time there is a lack of understanding, or, 

at best, an ill-defined understanding between the NRO and JCS-JRC 

with regard to responsibility for aircraft reconnaissance of denied 

areas. There is no clear statement of (1) responsibilities during 

peacetime / crises / active hostilities, (2) definitions of peripheral 

area (limitations) / denied territory, (3), responsibility for operational 

planning and analysis, (4) ownership of resources, (5) utilization of 

resources, and (6) responsibility for reporting status and results. 

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM: The Director of the National 

Reconnaissance Office is responsible "for the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long 

range, for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic 

information obtained through overflights." At the present, however, 

for a variety of reasons which will be discussed, the DNRO does not 

exercise his authority for all such overflights. Yet, he remains 

responsible for all overflights, whether or not he elects to control 

them, and is uniquely responsible for any difficulties or crises which 

may result from them. 

How did this situation come to be? 

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBLEM: There are a number 

of factors which have combined to produce the present problem. Chief 

among them are the following: 

1. During international crises calling for the use of aircraft 

overflight resources, the NRO has yielded its operational authority 

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to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U-2 and low-level Cuban overflights 

andl I missions froml I were the first examples of 

this "delegation. II Responsibility, in these cases, was transferred 

to the JCS-JRC. At first, to be sure, operations were carried out 

under close DNRO supervision; however, before long this direct contact softened and the operations moved completely outside his domain. 

Once this pattern was set, it became a powerful precedent for all 

c ris is situa hons. 

2. In each case of tacit transfer of authority, the arrangement 

appears to have been made informally and never confirmed by documentation. 

3. The Director of the JRC has moved enthusiastically and aggressively toward broadening his scope of activity from the reconnaissance of carefully-defined peripheries to full-fledged overflight of 

denied areas. He now asserts a responsibility for missions "required 

to support assessments of CHICOM threats to the GRC" or those 

"required to maintain current air, ground, electronic, naval and AAA 

orders of battle" (see Reference A). He expresses the conviction that 

any aircraft carrying a military insignia or tail number is the property 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do with as they see fit. He has assumed 

jurisdiction over the 147 drone operations and has recommended them 

to the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a JCS asset for the overflight of 

China, vice WILD RICE. 

4. There is already a tacit acceptance of JCS-JRC ownership and 

control of SR-71 covert overflights, following the phase-out of OXCART 

aircraft. 

5. The 303 Committee has come to recognize JCS-JRC as the 

national aircraft reconnaissance agency. This development is --

illustrated by the fact that although the DNRO submits all aircraft 

overflight schedules to the 303 Committee (including those "delegated" 

to the JCS-JRC), the 303 Committee sends the approval of JCS-JRC 

flights directly to the JRC and not to the DNRO. 

6. The NRO is developing a primary association, in the intelligence community, with satellite reconnaissance, not aircraft reconnaissance. There is a growing custom of referring to the NRO as the 

National Satellite Reconnaissance Office. 

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7. Because of this general situation, the NRO Staff has never 

attempted to assume control of aircraft overflight operations. 

a. The Staff has never been in a position to do more than 

after-the -fact tracking of aircraft operations. 

b. It has provided little more than a processing service 

in the "staffing" of aircraft matters. 

c. It has not established an Aircraft Operations Center 

(paralleling the SOC) from which appropriate control could be 

exercised. 

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HOW THE PROBLEM WAS ALMOST SOLVED: The problem of stepping 

up to his aircraft overflight obligation was recognized by Dr. McMillan 

(then the DNRO) in mid-April 1963, when he advised the Deputy Secretary of Defense that a clarification of the policy with regard to the operational aspects of the NRO was in order. Specifically, he expressed concern about: 

1. The definition of denied area overflights 

2. NRO responsibilities during active military hostilities 

3. NRO capability for operations planning and analysis 

On Item 1, the DNRO was proceeding on the basis that denied area 

overflights were any overfli hts of soverei territory for which specific 

permission had to be obtained from the 5412 Spec e 303 

Committee) or higher authority. 

As to Item 2, the DNRO was recommending a policy which would 

state that aircraft overflight responsibility would be transferred from 

the Director, NRO, to the appropriate military commander upon decision of the Secretary of Defense (or higher authority) that the area in 

question had become an active theater of military hostilities. 

In regard to Item 3, Dr. McMillan proposed the establishment of 

an NRO Aircraft Operations Center so that he might carry out his 

assigned responsibilities for aircraft reconnaissance of denied areas. 

His two proposed possibilities: 

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1. The establishment, within the NRO, of a new office having 

an aircraft operations capability, which would transmit all instructions to the U&S commands through the JCS-JRC. 

Or, as a preferred solution, 

2. The establishment of an organizational arrangement under 

the existing JCS-JRC to serve the needs of both the NRO and JCS. 

Under this arrangement, the JRC would serve as the NRO Aircraft 

Operations Center (AOC) and the Chief, JRC, would be the NRO 

Staff Deputy for Operations, responsible for supervising both the 

NRO SOC and the new NRO AOC. 

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In addition to insuring formal coordination between the peripheral 

activities of the JCS and the overflight activities of the NRO, Dr. 

McMillan felt that Solution No. 2 would formalize the coordination by 

the JCS of the resources of the U&S commands which would certainly 

be required in support of NRO overflight activities. 

The CIA, and particularly Dr. Scoville, objected to the McMillan 

proposal on the basis that it was cumbersome and involved certain 

fundamental management weaknesses (could the JRC serve two 

masters: The JCS and the DNRO?). CIA recommended the establishment of an NRO Program E to achieve the desired objective and to 

provide the NRO with some means of exercising its authority over all 

overflight activities. The Chief, JRC, could be the Director, NRO 

Program E, and could be charged with presenting plans to the DNRO 

for all overflights assigned to his responsibility. 

The JCS (General LeMay, Acting Chairman) concurred in Dr. 

McMillan's proposal and recommended its approval to the Secretary 

of Defense. While the JCS had some qualms about the lack of a 

precise definition of "denied area overflight" and a distinction between those flights which would remain the sole responsibility of the 

NRO and those for which the responsibility had been, or would be, 

delegated to the JCS, it concluded that Dr. McMillan f s recommended 

arrangement might well eliminate the requirement for absolutely precise terms. The JCS was ready to prepare, in collaboration with the 

NRO, a letter of agreement between the Chairman, JCS, and the DNRO 

which would outline in detail the means by which the Chief, JRC, 

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would carry out his dual responsibilities. 

Following a personal editing by Mr. McNamara of the proposed 

"Terms of Reference" for an NRO/ JCS Aircraft Operations Center, 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense announced his agreement in principle 

with Dr. McMillan's recommended organizational arrangement and 

asked for final JCS/DNRO concurrence in this matter. Of further 

importance, the Deputy Secretary of Defense agreed with the specific 

recommendation that the NRO responsibility for aircraft overflights 

would shift to the JCS in periods of tension - - such shifts of responsibility to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. 

The JCS concurred in the Terms of Reference and, in response to 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated that the Terms of Reference 

would form the basis for a revised JCS-JRC charter. 

The DNRO advised the Deputy Secretary of Defense of his concurrence with the views of the JCS. 

The CIA held to its previous view that the proposed organization 

was unwieldy and badly conceived, adding that the DCI would discuss 

the subject personally with Mr. McNamara. Mr. McCone questioned 

the necessity for "complicating the NRO agreement by injecting into 

the NRO the complicating factor of the JCS-JRC." Although he felt 

some form of arrangement might be in order to formalize the NRO and 

JCS-JRC relationship, specifically on Cuban overflight andl I 

I I operations, he opined that this could be arranged by the 

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simplest form of agreement. The last paragraph of his letter is quoted 

as follows: 

Hence, until we learn from experience that the presently 

conceived NRO cannot operate satisfactorily, I feel it 

would be a mistake to make as broad a change as the 

introduction of the JRC involves. This is not to say, 

however, that if the D/NRO and his Deputy wish to call 

on the JRC to execute those missions assigned to the 

Department of Defense their doing so would be perfectly 

agreeable to me. However, it must be recognized that 

this doe s not involve a change in the basic philosophy of 

handling reconnaissance over foreign territory in the 

traditional manner through CIA's facilitie s which are 

existent and capable, except, of course, in the case of 

war or the imminence of war. 

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense responded to the DCI that it was 

not his intention to suggest any change in the basic policy of handling 

reconnaissance over foreign territory which, with two exceptions --

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overflights of Cuba and I Iflights froml I -- were being 

carried out by the CIA. He still considered it important to have a 

clear-cut and well-understood interrelationship between the DOD 

elements concerned, specifically the NRO and the JCS-JRC. The 

Deputy Secretary of Defense believed these interrelationships to be 

functioning effectively in the absence of formal agreements, but considered it necessary to spell out in written form the procedures 

needed to insure the continuance of that state of affairs. He agreed 

that it should be possible to achieve this objective with simpler documentation and accordingly asked Drs. McMillan and Fubini to join the 

JCS in preparing a less elaborate paper. 

After several unsuccessful attempts at such a paper during June, 

July, and August 1963, the action was abandoned. 

The CIA's reaction to the OSD's proposal in 1963 very likely 

stem.med in part from an uneasiness it was experiencing over the 

actions of the newly-established NRO. In January 1963, the DNRO 

had directed the transfer of the CIA's Satellite Operations Center to 

the NRO Staff, creating a new operations facility in the basement of 

the Pentagon. CIA middle -management, still smarting from this 

"loss:1 undoubtedly looked on the OSD aircraft proposal as another 

step in the pattern: first the SOC, now the AOC. There is certain 

to be some CIA recollection of both of these occasions and the NRO 

would do well to make it emphatically clear, in any new negotiations, 

that it has no desire or intention to impact the CIA 1 s AOC in any 

manner. 

ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO US TODAY: 

1. We can allow the present course of events to continue. 

Advantages: 

a. We conserve NRO resources. 

b. We accommodate to the present quasi-wartime situation. 

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c. We avoid a confrontation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

d. We capitalize on demonstrated JCS-JRC experience and 

capability. 

Disadvantages: 

a. Continued disinterest and "delegation" will result in 

all NRO aircraft/ drone resources passing to the JCS. 

b. The DNRO will continue to be responsible for aircraft 

overflights but will not be able to control their conduct. 

c. Two "national" reconnaissance authorities on aircraft 

overflight will be dealing with the 303 Committee. I'" "~""'\:J-6V(' 

2. We can set up a strong NRO Aircraft Operations Center.~( 

Advantages: 

a. We will be centralizing aircraft overflight operations 

in a single authority. 

b. We will be responsive to the mission assigned to us 

in the 11 August 1965 DOD / CIA Agreement. 

c. The DNRO will have aircraft overflight authority 

commensurate with his responsibility. 

Disadvantages: 

a. We will not be able to avoid what promises to be a 

stormy confrontation with the JCS. 

b. We will lose the JCS-JRC's proven capability to operate 

reconnaissance aircraft. 

c. We will immediately face the requirement for increased 

manpower and more floor space for an NRO Aircraft Operations Center 

(shades of SOC!). 

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d. We will still have no provision for a smooth transition 

to JCS control of all aircraft reconnaissance in wartime. 

3. We can set up a joint NRO-JCS Aircraft Operations Center 

under the DNRO. 

Advantages: 

a. This will give us a single, strong, national aircraft 

overflight reconnaissance authority. 

b. The DNRO will re-capture aircraft overflight authority 

commensurate with his assigned responsibility. 

c. The nation will have a single agency responsible for 

alloting developmental and operational resources for aircraft overflight activities. 

d. We will be capitalizing on the JCS-JRCrs proven 

capability to conduct reconnaissance activities. 

e. We will have one clean line of control to the U&S 

commands. 

f. We will conserve manpower and floor space resources. 

g. We will have a simple, clearly-defined mechanism for 

transferring aircraft overflight resources and operations during periods 

of tension and war. 

h. We will avoid a confrontation with the JCS. 

Dis advantage s: 

None that one can envision at this time. 

CONCLUSION: This seems to be a good time to reopen discussions on 

the concept of an NRO-JCS Aircraft Operations Center. There are 

impressive advantages and no obvious disadvantages in following this 

course of action. The CIA objections of four years ago should be 

substantially softened and possibly altered by now. 

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RECOMMENDATION: That you request Dr. Flax!s approval of an NRO 

Staff initiative along these lines and, having that approval, that you open 

personal discussions with General Steakley, holding closely to the terms 

of the original 1963 plan (see Reference B). 

WILLIAM R. 

Lt Colonel, USAF 

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