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DEPARTMENT OF S'fATE 

WASHINGTON 

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14 000605750 

HAUDLE VIA BYENAN CONTROL SYST31{ 

SUBJZCT: Disclosure of U. S. Sat9llitc Reconnaissnnce • 

. · 

In accordance ':·ri th yol~r req1:est, a corr.C!ittee composed of 

U .. Alexis Johnson, Am'oassndor Llei:ellyn Thor..pso:i, Cyrus Vance, 

Richard Helms and General A:-:dreH Good paste:::" has prepared the 

attached ~emorandum comr.:enting on the proposal on the foregoing 

·subject su):mitted to :rou by Hr. Il.ostow on ::ay 27. 

You will note that, entirely apart from inportant security 

considerations, it was the cor:clusion of the group that, on the 

basis of ·political considerations alone, it would not be desirable 

at this ti~e to disclose publicly or to the Soviet leaders our · 

classified r..atio:1al satellite reconnaissar.ce progra"'Tl. :·!hi.le 

Secretary Rusk did not have an opportunity to review the attached 

memorandum, he is also in accord •·:ith its conclusion, as am I. 

You will note th.:it the "1e:::.o~·ar.du;n recometends that we shocld 

nevertheless keep this possibility in m:L."1d if and "Hhen ·we have· a 

disarr.i.awent pro::-osal .for ':·thich a publicly acknowledged satellite 

surveillance c::~ability HouJ.d for::i 02.n indispensable part. 

This matter has not baen discussed with ~·Fr. Clark Clifford. 

George 

Acting Sec~etary· 

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Disclosure of US Satellite Reconnaissance 

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Dramatic disclosure of our satellitd photo~raphic 

capability would have significant political and secu~ity 

consequem::es -- 30:::1~ adverse, and sone advantageous. The 

discussion below sets aside the.question of what degree of disclosure would so reveal technology that it would 

seriously contribute to Soviet capability in this field, 

and assu~es that a~tual cam8ras and other classified 

components of the system ·would not need to be declassified. 

If a decision m::!re to be rr.a.de to carry out a policy of 

disclosure the foregoing security questions would require 

careful examination. In part this e~c.:mination is noi-1 being carried out by the NSA!·I 156 Corr...:"'.1.i ttee in conn0ction with 

1ts study of proposed l·IASA ·satellite earth-sensing proera!::ls. 

It nl.3.Y be useful to begin by noting the reasons why ·. this system has to date been highly classified. Eirst, 

it originally provided us a crucial source of intelligence 

presumably not knmm to the Soviets. Second,, and .relz.ted, 

was the avoidance of counter;:ieasures. Even after the 

Russians, early in the garr.e, lear~1ed that ~·re were conducting, 

satellite photography, uncertainties about the de:;::~ of 

our capability -- and probably a lag ana underestir.~ta of 

it -- has made various active and passive countermo;asu:res 

less likely er less effective. T'n1rd, •~·hile the Soviets 

have chs.rged the United States with space spying in their 

propaganda media and in international forums, they have not 

made a direct challe~~e. It h~s also been felt that an, 

openly avowed US disclosure of the activity and insistence 

on the right to continue could provoke a serious confrontation between ourselves and the Soviets on the issue. 

At present, the situation in this regard is considered 

to be quite satisfactory; any proposal which would precipitate 

the issue of satellite surveillance thus requires strong 

jus tifica t1on on political grou.11ds. 

The chief political gains wh1ch might come from public 

disclosure are: 

(l) a d:vamatic de::a!'lstration that we no-;·; live 

in an open wc:::>ld) <:c.d th?.t the adva!lce of 

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science a~d tecr.nology has mada rr~ny 

traditior.al iceas of military secrecy and security obsolete; 

(2) a reaff1r~3ticn of US military superiority 

and revel2tion of a basis for confidence 

(3) 

(4) 

{5) 

(6) 

in US kno•11ledge ot Soviet mil1 tary stt>ength.s and weaknesses; 

removing any restraints on non-military 

uses of satellite photo3~aphy, and de~onstrating r:.ajor potential peaceful uses of 

this techr.ique such as natural resources 

surveys, r.~ppinc, and the like; 

providing a ne'r ~~sis for arms control a:id 

disari:.amant agree:::::nts where the surveillance 

capability of satellites would meet essential veri~ication requ1re~ents; 

rnaking known, and potentially avail~'ble, an 

overseeing eye to keep ~·ra tch over regional 

local confrontations, such as in Kashmir or 

the Near East; and 

gaininz ~ore open acceptance of satellite 

surveillance, thus too defusing possible 

future controversies over ~-lOL. 

The ID.3.jor political d:!.s:;:.dvJ.nt~[;es which could resul~ 

trom such disclosure are: 

(l) 

(2) 

- ~ ' .. ' . -~. . ' 

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th.::. .,-.,....-~-1·0..;1-1+-1r 0-40 P""""'"i"'it.,,.i..i,.......,. ~ '""""JO.,.. ~ ~v~~- k--~~ ~ ·---~ ~u-~~0 a ,.~ -

confrontation) if the Sov~et Goverr..=:;;ent 

should feel cor::p:;;lled to cr.alleno;e s tron;;ly. · the.right of th~ US to ferret out its 

military secrets by satellite surveillance; 

a possible intensification of the ar~s ·racej 

if the USSR felt cocv~lled to rr:.ake clail:l.3 (tMu~ ow e~?~~~~~~~A·o- ~~1se) a~out 1 ts ~i;i:~~y- "a··;~~~;~~;:~ :~·i~c~ could p-o:ot · ..... ---Lt~.!. v :;;.;-u ..... ...-..-t...--v ••·• ,...., - .r.. , ..... _ 

d(.;i?'..:?.nds for' !:':::i:'e e:·:t-::ns i ve US military prog~a~s to ~~~t ~~~20 alleged Soviet 

th:-eats; 

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(3) undercutting the present substantial 

degree of HOrld s~pport for US insistence 

on necessary ve~ification weasures for disarmam~nt asree~entn; 

(4) stimulation of suspicion and concern among parties to local reg1on~1 con£ront~t1ons, 

such as India and Pa!dsta.n, and Israel and 

the UAR, that the other party is being given inforrr~tion on its secret military activities; and 

(5) general psycholo3ical reaction against the . loss of privacy and sovereignty, especially 

z ince i 'c is . the t".'ro super;io:·rers irho would 

be revealed ~s th3 e~0iters of disclo~ure; 

even total disclo3u.re 2nd publicity would 

not dispel suspicio~s tr-nt there mizht be 

soaathing more hidden, and in any c~se 

general disclosu:'e without advance approval 

would of course coopro~isa sovereien control 

over access to infor.ma.tio~. 

A nu~ber of these points are obverse sides of the sa=e 

coins •. T'nus, the advantc.ges of an open ;·:orld would be 

weighed e~ainst the disadvantages, and the balance of judgment would surely vary fro~ cou~try to count~y. By and 

large, most countries 1·:ould p:::obc.bly acce::;Jt and r:.any i'lou.ld 

welco?:J.e a general dis closure of this cap2bili ty whe:-e t~1e 

results "'e,..."" a11"' i r. - ~ C:.--1 a~"'le l...I th ,i.-'..J.. .... on~h ... _ ,., n ~ ~"!'"\~ .,.., ... ; .., 1 int-e""'n~ tion"l 0 ..... (;...,.., -i·--""-J.. v_c;._ - ...., 4 -- .1. (...;,, ~ 

organization~ a~d es~2cially ~f th0 em?hasis hed been 

placed on pe~ce:'i.:l scientific c.~d econocic purposes. There 

r·:ould, ho~·;z·1er ,- ~2 p::-2 ss1..::i2 s for ::nte::~1c. tional r:,a,n2ge~:=n. t 

and contro2. of' th·:: S2.telli te s·...:::.;·;2i:::..lc.:1ce sys ten, and for 

concentr.;.tio:-i. or. :pe;).ceful uses a::..d even fo:!'." the exclusio:i.i 

of military intellis~nce-g3therin~ activities. Noreover, 

there might be g:'eatly inflated expectations that the r;;.ajor 

powers -- and abova all the United States -- ";'iOUld provide funds to exnloit the unveiled n~tural rasources of underdeveloped c~untries. Finally, there would be ezceptions, and they could be significant; sc:::~ countries t·rould op:pose 

unauthoriized su:.""'"'1.3Y end p·:..:i.blic2tio;1 of infcr;:~tion O?:l their 

Co•nnt,..1-""'S. ana· ...... "\ ..... :--,..., ..... ~ -:::~.-;:> C7-. "'-"'.---.-. .,.,,,, •.• .,,,,,, ....... o~'::I T,•orla" o'""J"'-Ct \oti..I. - ....... J .. .L .:...1- ........ -~:J vv-.. - ,_ l.· ... a·- ... -'If ··- v..L t ....... ,, l...L .._, ~ 

on pr1r..ciple to 1::-:.:'r1.::.:;c::-.::::!"t o"!: -::::-.e::..::: !"-2ce::tly acquired 

sovera1gnty. r:ot e;:cr_J·-..:;~:~ J .::·..-2:: :.:::-.::-:-~~ =-~cn-con:=u.r:is t countries, wants an open t-iorld. 

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In general, from the standpoints of an "open world", 

and especially of eco~o~ic advances, it would ~eern possible and prefer~ble to launch neH unclassified programs, 

unilateral or international, rather than surfacing the 

classified n:?.tional US reconn2..issance program.3. This would 

avoid, or at 18ast reduce, pressures for internation3lization 

and 11de-militarization" o:f the US reconnai.s.:sance program, 

since that progro:n ~·1ould rer.:ain c~assified (though no doubt 

much speculation and probably so~e further leakage about it 

would occur). · 

Effects in the disa:rr:'.3.ll:Gnt field would be r;iixed. 

Current US disz.rn~8.r.;ent proposals are already fre.med with 

an un3.wareness of, c.r::d scrr.e reliz.nce o~, our unil&teral 

intelligence collection c2.p·&.oilities, inch:dine satellite 

reconnaissance. T~:e ch2.i:1ge ~·;ould; t:ierefo:~e, be lir.11 ted 

to public explanation of the basis for US readiness to 

accept given levels and forms of for~al verification. A 

dramatic disclosure of satellite surveillance capabilities, 

especially a full disclosure of :KH-7 and mor>e advanced futu:.."e 

sustcr:is, would almost certainly lead :-:any countries to be 

less sy;;ipath~tic to US i~sistence on the need for :t:l?.ny fcr~s 

of extensive, znd more visible aDd intrusive, verification . -- little matter how ?;ell justified our :position 1·rould be. 

Needless to say, it would be h:.irwful to US security intarests 

to become involved in public de~ate over the li~it~tions to 

satellite raconnaissance and other f'orms of US intelli,'.)~nce, 

which is wh2. t such a debate on ve:c·ifica tion could beco::e. 

On the other hand, public kno~1ledge of '.::he US satellite 

surveillance c2pr.!::>ili ty co~ld cf co~:i::o provide a better 

basis for natio~al consan3us in this country in s~pport of 

any disarrr;a~ent 2sra~~ent hin3ing stron3ly on this capa- bility for ul""l::la te'.::'2.l v.:;::-::..fic.:; 'cicn. On b.::::!..c.nce, 1 t ~:ould 

appear that fro::: t?l.e star:.d;i0int .of disarr:-2:.-:.::nt policy it 

·would be prefe:'abla to see a Grad~al increase in world 

public awareness of the general capability of satellite 

surveillance rat::-~er' than a disclosure of the unilateral US 

military reconnaissance progr~m. There might, of cqurse, 

be a need at sor.;e tir:e ·to disclose publicly the fact that 

the US 1s cz.u3ole of monitorins so~e r::iven disarl:!".2.ment ~.,..ee.....,.,,......,._ b,,: .,""'~ 1!'!+"""....,~1 -=--=>-~ 1 ~ci ,.,.,,'7nr:- "'"'t=-111--"' .... ,,.,..veil- o• .... ...,, .... t,,, "' ~ ...... --....;. ..,,, .......... '--- '"-•·---·:::)) -D .. ~---.J.. ... ...:::> &.;>~ ""' - "'- .w~ 

lance, but without necessa~ily o~ening up the classified 

prograr.i itself. 

It 1s difficu'l t to ::..:; i.i;h t:·:= r:;o.s.s ible ir.:~a.ct of 

disclosure on the ~1litc.:-r ~it;;.::::~ion •:1th confidence. In 

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the first instance, public disclosure --even thoush with 

Soviet forekn0i·:ledse and tacit acquiescence -- could trigger 

Soviet cotmter:::easures Hhich would reduce the effectiven~ss 

of our sm:iveille.nce, and thus requira larger US milit2ry 

progJ:•ams to heC-:::;e against geratar uncertainties with :respect 

to the Soviet 111ili tc.ry postur8. \·Ihile the Soviets are 

already aware of our satellite surveillance and probably its 

general prese!'":t level of effectiveness, they have not 

instituted m.s.ny direct passive (and active) counter~easures 

of which they ara capable. In general, the Soviet nolitical 

and military leaders, already privatel,:,,- a1·1a!'e of our su.rveil:... 

lance, would presu,:.ably not be prom9ted to radically different 

approaches s ir.iply because of sudden public a-v:areness of US 

surveillance. It is, however, not easy to judge their 

reaction. F...avin.:; placed such very [;:'&3 t eD_phc.sis on vigila~ce 

and secrecy 2.~ vit2l ele~=~ts of ~2tional security, they 

might feel co::-:?0lles to i.:r;.de2:'t:::.~:e :r:ot only poli'cic~1l re<:icticr:.s 

but even so~e pas3ive counter~caaures such as larie-Ecale 

camouflage efforts in order to offset the sudden impact on 

their general public and ar~ad forces personnel in particular. 

(Moreover, counterseasures which the Russians !:light undertake 

for politic.al and norale reason3 might in :fact li:n1 t iJS 

acquisition in ways which the Soviet leade~s had failed to 

ciate; ~M~ 

More bro2dly, public disclosu:ra could p!'ompt any of a 

wide variety of de~onatrative, declarato~y, or even actual 

military moves by th-e Sovie::t i.in:J..on d=;:;.1gr!.ed to ;.·;e.v.ken the 1mpressio~ in the wo:::ld (ar:d at ho;;:a) that the united Stz.tes 

had in fact peeled c.:·:s:y .s ign:Lf'ic2::-it l:::.ye:::i3 of Soviet mili tc:.r,::r 

secrecy and securit;;·. S0r::~ ouc:;. clair.,s, d0u.onst:•ations, or 

prograr.is cot<.ld prQ:::;,Jt eithe:o :p.::ri:.tlc.?.:' or pe.rti.sa:i pressure 

for unjustified ~ore extensive US military progrc.ms, or 

conceivably could in fact i:'aquire neH pro6rar::s. By and lar,se, 

as 1n the case of counter~easuries, p:oasent Soviet rn~lit2ry 

programs have presttt:.3.bly been decided upon ~dt~1 knowledge of 

the US surveillance capability, so that significant new 

additions would not be ex~ected. Even Soviet claims, however, 

tor exa:-n::;>le ~-:ith resp3ct i:;o :r..0:-;:.ie stratac;ic missiles undetecta~le or u~locatab:e by cvar~aad reconnaissance, could 

snur calls in th2 US fv!' J.E::·· ··:::,.., -- ::::d n:i..:-2.llel -- P ... --::~ric2.n • - -.. ~".'YI!~· Tf6 ~·-_,. --~;"\-.. ~"'.--~-~· ..:.,.,....,..""":! ..... :-.;:.~~ ·- '""i .. "".:'.'.l. ,-~ .. -..a....O.~- pro.:::,r.am:::;. •'·o ........ o ... ·r, .._,_ t::.:...;..:.·J~-";:; -···-.;:;.;::. ........ '"' p;:i.s.., ...... c...., __ ........... Iileasu.,..,"'S ''"°'""""' US'"'..:: "'"~"' S ~-' ...,.·-.... ·., ''"'0-"" a V""'.l.~"' ri ""'A,..,U"'..., "'-.::.'.'"1+- J. l!'i;O 1'.t;;..i..v ....... u, V••• -·..!...~··'-' _.:-_._ -~ o. J..\,.; .... -'l.. _ ... c ... ~.._:.. .... v ..... 

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The effects of disclosure in countries other th~n the 

USSR has net received mu.ch past atten'vioi::.. As earliernoted, the effects ::ight b8 .favo:."'able, m:favorab::!..e, 6r 

most 11kel.::r -- varying. On t!1e whole, it seer.!.s likely t.h.a t 

there would be initial adverse ~eections in a few cases, 

and general acceptance without enthusiasm. I..ridia, and 

especially Pakistan, would probably e~ch be suspicious of 

what inforrr2.tion on its mil:!.t3ry activities we L'11ght be 

providing to the other. The UAR Hould pro'b~bly be suspicious 

that we were u~coverins its milit~~Y secrecy a~d that the _ ·inform.a tion would be :?:ec..ching Isr~el ei thar officially, or 

otherwise. In short, ,from the st2.ndpoint o.f re3ional confrontations, particularly of non-alizned or. se~i-aligned 

p01.rnrs, 1 t is not cle~r t!:iat a?:'!. 110~2n ~·;o:::-ld 11 necessarily 

would be a core stabla worl~, if for no other reason than 

that some o.f the cou~tries co~c~=-n~d ~iz~t act on the b~sis 

of their o:m suspicio:ls t:!J.::-..t it l·:.:..s not. It is,, o.f cou:ise, 

quite possible tr.at sorr;.e res10~21 conflicts could be detc;rred 

by knowledge of,, or da.:npened do;;~1 by knouledge gained from, 

satellite surveillance. B":J.t there 1;ould still be c~ses of 

conflicting versions of the truth in which satellite surveillance -- and its limitations -- =i3ht even be taken into 

account by an a,:;;gr"essor. For e;ca:::.ple, satellite surveillance 

could not be counted upon to detect infiltrato:::'.s, but :•1ould 

detect rr.obil1z2. tion prompted in th~ defending cm.u1tz:'y --

which the aggressive :party mig.'-'lt then use as justi.f'ication 

for escalation. Thus the United States, as the possesso~ of 

this surveillance techu.ique, could be put on the spot to 

pronounce on disputes on ~rhic!1 .sa tell:!. te !:::urveill2nce r:igl"1t 

not apply it\;.Ja:rtially to the t~·;o sic~3, and knowled,ge of 

this fact could even play into the hands of the aggressor. 

Moreover, even in cases to which t~is consideration did not 

pertain, the 7.J~i t~d S".;:;. tas cculd be draim into dis:;:i,.i.te~ in 

which we did not wish to ~aco~s involved. Auto:2tic general 

disclosu.::e of inf'o:;;:a::::.tion ';[01.lld' clso n:e.ke it r..:.:.rd<:r> for a 

pacifistically-inclined govern~9nt to ignore certain actions 

by an aggressive neighbor than would be the case if 1t could 

choose to overlook and isno~e such actio~s. Finally, the 

Soviets could em'barrass us by dra~·;ing atter..tion to sensitive 

US installations in third areas, particularly in ne~tral 

countries, but zlso for e7.a=ple in ?~kistan. 

We co::::e no:·i to th:: i:oir..t t::.c: "t t::.s usually b;;;en considerS::::t 

the mai:i ~r~t::-::3:::t :=.s·~:!..::s t c:::.~ ~l·: ~·-::~:::: ... the So~;ie~ re;-oti~n. 

Tc.e Soviel; ~.J'!,te::'~;::~rl i;, :::·:)~~ 2c~:~ :....~ ~~;~:-:~:.r in t.ne ~==e zcr:e~:­

Xosygin period th=tn 'b;;::i'd:'e, 1-~e.s c.;.r·c.:\1lly avo:!..ce:d any e.:-:plici "= 

reference to or appron:.l of :c. t::.:lli.t;;; r2c·::H!r-.a:!..sz2:::ce. 

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Khrushchev's occasional private re:r2rks (ar..d those o,f his 

now demoted son-in-12:'1 Adzhubei) su.ssestlns 2.cquiescence 

1n mutual unpublicized unilaterc..l satellite su.rveill8nce 

were never printed in the Soviet press, nor have they been 

even infor~':2.lly repeated by the present Soviet leaders. 

Since 1963 the Russians have not 1nsi3ted on br~ncling 

8atellite raconnaissance as il!e~al in international space a::.'.iraements that they have das1r8d, but they have ·not 

stopped l'efer:::>ing to. such activities dire~ted against military objectives as espio~2~e and ill~zal. Clearly, tha 

Soviet le&ders are willing tacitly to acquiesce in secret 

US and Soviet reciprocal surveillance. It is not, hoHever., 

possible to drew fro~ this fact the conclusion that they 

would agree to, or even acQ~~asce ~n, public revelation of 

this activity. 

In our. jud::;went, the .Soviet le<;.ders would react shar:ply 

against the idea of public disclosure of this US activity, 

and if we unilaterally disclosed it th8y t·:ould feel co::pelled 

at the least to launch a vi~o;;;ous ch~rge that the US H2.s 

engaging in reprehensible, da~~ero~s, and illegal ~ilitcry 

intelligence collection, ar..d thz. t the USSR ;:as not. In this 

event, while they :rould probably ::-iot ins.ti tu.te overt and 

extrema active counter~easures such as shooting at a US reconnaissa~ce satellite, even th2t possibility cannot be 

excluded. It is ou:r judgr.:,;mt th3.t the Soviet leaders Hould 

not be prep~red to join or to acquiasca in a disclosure 

which adr:titted to th.3 ?.L!SSian people a::1d c::.rr:;~d forces thct 

'an eno· '"""OU<"! '"'Or·.._; "'n o"" +-'...,r:;-;,... .. ~u.,.....-'-.=..r1 ~i.,C,..."'CY h:--.d lc"'c- "hcien ... ..... .:.i 1..i .&-" v .... -....,,. J.. \.l.:.J.--- v ............ v-- Jj.- .... - ....... .....:.~ 4.,)....-..; 

an open bool-::: to the United St;.;.t:::s -- and that they knei:1 it .. Nor could they feisn not havin.:; lcr..o:n.i. it, since this would 

1r::!ply that th2y h2d b22n c:=. 1is;ht vnlr..e:i.::.ble. And it ~yould 

be highly e::ba:-::::2.ss in;; to ~·:os cc·:: -vo s tnnd ch3.I'3ad 'by Pel.:ing ... it'n collusion ... ; ... •,, ''~"''n-'-..,. ..... o,.., i"'' c-'...,,., ...... in~ e~ch o"'-i...o.,..s C!'U;l{.- n • 'i•-V.!.A. ~J,;,.;......,a, J...!!Q'-' .... •• UJ.~~· J. .. ~ ....., 4. \./J.•....,J. ~ - '-l 

1n intruding on the sovereig~ty of cany o~her countries. 

There would also appear to be a p:;;ioble:n in deciding 

whether to disclose all our capabilities, includins future 

improvemants, or only the less detnilad ones w1.th which the 

Soviets :prob=.~ly ere di. t us. 3'c:::' e:-:s.::.9le_,. if we did not disclose our full c~pability 2nd this f2ct ~ere lats~ sc=a~~r 

revealed, we could b~ accused cf '.ri -:;l:;.;.oldin:; 1.n ordar to 

·claim require:-::2::.ts. f:o::i vs.::i:'..'::,:.::. t:'.. :on i::. th~ d isa!'•::L:.c·~n t fi.e ld. 

On the other ::a::d if. u2 di:::) ::e :·::.:.::.c :;.ot only azsist the 

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If', nr3vertheless, a positive decision in principle was 

made, two specific questions of tactics are raised by the 

:Me::norandum of K~y 27. First, ue believe the sug.sestion of 

a private approach to ?·:oscc:1 by a special Presidenti~l 

Miss ion vr.:mld reouire car.efu.l further consideration. It 

would prob2bly b~ preferable to alert the Soviet leaders 

to our intention than to .fece th..::m w1t:t a .oudden nublic 

fait accor:nli, and it would give us tbe opportunity to test 

out the intensity of the negative Soviet reaction before 

finally decidir . .:; on a public diGclosure. It might, h0i•:ever, 

be better to take a preli~inary sounding in low-key rather 

than raise the issue suddenlj with the Soviet leaders 

through a high-level Prasidential emissary (whose presence in the <:Jovic.t ·unio11 •··on-:"' t"O.,..·"''"'-'"'"" .,... 0 i.J -- • ,, __ ... i, .... _ ....... v" ....... -> -"-1..J. ,...,u-ir - -0 e"'"D,".:'>"""tion) J'• ... -L....:..<:.;. - ..... • 

We believe that it is very.u::-ilizcly that the Russi2~s uould 

.favor or join in i'i!<J.kir::.s such a disclo::::u.re) and th2y ~·rould 

of course 'be able to r:-..ars.hal their nosition for an ordered 

public counteraction if :1e did act unyway. The second 

tactical question is the possible role of the 1.nr. Assuning 

our intention to keep our unilateral recon~aissance proz~a~, 

a hostile Soviet reaction~ and ~~xed and varying reactions 

elsewhere in the world, it ~·;ould seem undesirable to bring 

the matter into the U)! or the l:JN into the rr:atter. Photography could be offered to one oi ;;:o:"'e app:-opri2 t.:: Uli or 

other specialized interna~ional agencies, but the modalities 

(and practical purposes) of such sh~~ing need further 

consideration@ · 

_The general conclusion of t:-:is analysis is that it would 

not be desirable -:o sur-fa.c.~ 011..::' clc.ssified national satellite reconnaiss~nca pro6r~~ on politic2l ~rounds, even ap~rt fro~ 

questions of nili tary sect::.ri ty. Par.haps) hoi.·:aver 3 r:1any of 

the advant2::;es co:.::.lG be ~ained_, :-:1th considerably :fe~·:er 

disadvantages_,_ by r::ovin:; for:·:ard witl1 paaceful appl1cationa 

of space observatio:i.. T:"lis su0ject, which requires careful 

consideration, is presently under interdepartnental study 

by the NSAf~ 156 Comnittee. 

At the sa~e time, the bal~nce of advantage znd disadvantage might be som3what different if a:::.d i·rhen ;re had a new 

disari:'!.a::ent pro;:os<:.l in ;·::1icl1 :.n sc1-:no:rled.:;3d satellite 

surveillance cc.pability i:·:o'..!ld f'o:;_';:i an indispensz.ble :part. 

We should keep S'..lch a po.ssi'bilit.:r in mind. 

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