Rel: May 5, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

_________________________

CR-21-0291

_________________________

Curtis Lee Johnson 

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Cherokee Circuit Court

(CC-20-900036)

MINOR, Judge.

Curtis Lee Johnson appeals his convictions for two counts of firstdegree sodomy, see § 13A-6-63, Ala. Code 1975, and two counts of sexual 
CR-21-0291

2

abuse of a child under the age of 12, see § 13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975.1

On appeal, Johnson raises five issues arguing: (1) that the circuit court 

erred by granting the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence that 

S.T. was the victim of a prior sexual assault; (2) that the circuit court 

erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude S.T.'s videotaped 

interview; (3) that the jury pool was not made up of a fair cross-section of 

the community because, he says, "the COVID pandemic resulted in the 

systematic exclusion of all African-Americans from the jury panel"; (4) 

that his substantial rights were violated when he received verdicts that 

were not unanimous; and (5) that the State's evidence did not support his 

convictions for sexual abuse of a child under 12. (Johnson's brief, p. 20.) 

For the reasons below, we affirm the circuit court's judgment. But we 

must remand this case to the circuit court for that court to impose postrelease supervision mandated by § 13A-5-6(c), Ala. Code 1975.

1The circuit court sentenced Johnson to 99 years' imprisonment on

each of the sodomy convictions and to 20 years' imprisonment on each of 

the sexual-abuse convictions. The court ordered that those sentences 

were to be served consecutively.
CR-21-0291

3

FACTS

Six-year-old S.T., who was eight years old at the time of trial, 

testified to incidents of sexual abuse involving her mother's boyfriend, 

"Mr. Curtis," or Johnson. (R. 133.) One time, S.T. and Johnson were at 

the "burn pile" outside Johnson's house when Johnson told S.T. to "suck 

his penis." (R. 134.) On another occasion, Johnson told S.T. to get in the 

shower with him and to do the "same thing," which referred to the prior 

oral sex. (R. 135.) S.T. testified that on both occasions Johnson stated 

that "this is what boys will do to you" or that "boys will do this to you." 

(R. 134-35.) 

S.T. recalled another incident in which her mother, C.T., walked 

into the bathroom and saw Johnson touching her "pocketbook."2 (R. 135.) 

S.T. asked, "Did you see that?" and C.T. walked outside and "got her gun." 

(R. 136.) S.T. covered her ears because she was scared that C.T. was going 

to "kill [Johnson]." (R. 136.) Johnson walked out of the bathroom and 

stated, "I just touched her belly" to which S.T. responded, "No, you did 

2"Pocketbook" refers to S.T.'s vagina. 
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4

not." (R. 136.) S.T. also stated that Johnson touched her "boobies." 

(State's Exhibit 8, minute 8:12.3)

In the summer of 2019, C.T. allowed her then-boyfriend Johnson to 

watch her daughter S.T. while she worked as a nurse near Centre. C.T. 

testified that on July 23, 2019, she saw Johnson "grope [S.T.] in her 

private area." (R. 150.) C.T. testified that she "lost it" and yelled, "What 

the fuck did I just see?" (R. 151.) C.T. testified that S.T. stated, "Mom, 

did you see that? ... He touched me down in my pocketbook." (R. 151.) 

C.T. testified that she went to her car to get her gun but that "Johnson 

went flying past [C.T.]" so she said, "[S.T.], let's just get our stuff and go." 

(R. 152.) C.T. testified that before she and S.T. could leave the house, 

Johnson came back to the house and told C.T. to "just let it go" because, 

he said, "we were horseplaying; I took it too far." (R. 153.) C.T. testified 

that she threatened to call Johnson's church and report the incident to 

the pastor and that Johnson responded, "Don't call the pastor. They're 

going to kick me off the deacon board." (R. 153.) C.T. also testified that 

3Nancy Green, Forensic Interviewer at the Talladega County Child 

Advocacy Center ("CAC"), testified that she interviewed S.T. days after 

the incident. The circuit court admitted a recording of the interview. See

State's Exhibit 8. 
CR-21-0291

5

Johnson stated, "Can I pay you? Whatever it is. Just don't call and tell 

nobody." (R. 154.)4 

Johnson, who was 68 years old at the time of trial, testified in his 

own defense. Testifying about the bathroom incident, Johnson explained 

that he pulled S.T.'s shirt so that he could reach for the pliers that S.T. 

held in her hands, and he denied touching her vagina. 

A jury convicted Johnson of two counts of first-degree sodomy and 

two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12. Johnson timely 

appealed.

I. STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE

Johnson argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by

preventing him from questioning S.T. about a prior sexual assault by 

another individual. (Johnson's brief, pp. 26-33.) This issue is not properly 

before this Court for review. 

Before trial, the State moved in limine to prohibit Johnson's use of 

any evidence related to a prior instance of sexual abuse suffered by S.T. 

4T.T., C.T.'s sister, testified that on July 23, she received a call from 

C.T. about S.T. being abused by Curtis. T.T. telephoned and confronted 

Curtis. The circuit court admitted a recording of the telephone 

conversation. See State's Exhibit 7. 
CR-21-0291

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The State argued that the evidence was prohibited by Rule 412, Ala. R. 

Evid.5 Johnson responded in a motion of his own that the evidence was 

essential to explain S.T.'s knowledge of sexual acts and her ageinappropriate language. The circuit court granted the State's motion.

Johnson explicitly argues in his brief that he is challenging the 

circuit court's granting of the State's motion in limine, yet the court's 

ruling preserved nothing for appeal. See Harrington v. State, 858 So. 2d 

5Rule 412, Ala. R. Evid., provides: 

"(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following 

evidence is not admissible in any prosecution for criminal 

sexual conduct except as provided in sections (b) and (c):

"(1) evidence offered to prove that any complaining 

witness engaged in other sexual behavior.

"....

"(b) Exceptions. The following evidence is admissible, if 

otherwise admissible under these rules:

"....

"(3) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the 

constitutional rights of the defendant."

A "complaining witness" is defined as "[a]ny person alleged to be the 

victim of the crime charged, the prosecution of which is subject to the 

provisions of this rule." Rule 412(d)(1), Ala. R. Evid. 
CR-21-0291

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278, 291-92 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (recognizing that it is generally held 

that the granting of a motion in limine can never be reversible error). To 

preserve this issue for appeal, it was incumbent upon Johnson to make 

an offer of proof during trial. Id. at 291. "It is this refusal at trial to 

accept that proffered evidence, not the granting of the pretrial motion in 

limine, that serves as the basis for reversible error." Id. (emphasis 

omitted).

The circuit court, under Rule 412, Ala. R. Evid., was tasked with 

balancing the privacy interests of S.T. with Johnson's right to present a 

defense. Johnson asserted below, as he does on appeal, that the evidence 

was essential to explain S.T.'s knowledge of sexual acts and her ageinappropriate language. All that was before the circuit court when it 

ruled on the State's motion, however, was that S.T. "was molested by an 

11-year-old in Talladega County" the year before Johnson's abuse. (R. 

18.)

"'The primary reason for the offer of proof is that it 

better enables the trial judge to consider further the claim for 

admissibility of such evidence. The secondary reason is that 

the offer of the proposed [evidence] places the same in the 

official record for the benefit of the appellate court called upon 

to decide whether there has been error committed in the 

ruling.'"
CR-21-0291

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Ex parte Harris, 461 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Charles W. 

Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 425.01(1) (3d ed. 1977)). The 

allegations against Johnson were that S.T. performed oral sex on him 

and that he touched S.T.'s "pocketbook" and her "boobies." Given the 

dearth of information before the circuit court, it would have been 

impossible for it to assess whether the prior instance of sexual abuse 

would have been relevant to explaining S.T.'s knowledge of sexual acts or 

her purportedly age-inappropriate language.6 The absence of an offer of 

proof similarly prevents this Court from assessing whether the circuit 

court abused its discretion in granting the State's motion to prohibit the 

evidence.

Because Johnson failed to make an offer of proof regarding the prior 

sexual abuse suffered by S.T., he has failed to preserve this issue for 

appellate review. See Harrington, 858 So. 2d at 292. Johnson is due no

relief on this claim. See Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. 

2003) ("'Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly 

and timely raised at trial.' Newsome v. State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala.

6Johnson did not identify for the circuit court the specific knowledge 

or the language that he believed was age-inappropriate.
CR-21-0291

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Crim. App. 1989).").

II. JOHNSON'S MOTION IN LIMINE

Johnson argues the circuit court violated his Sixth Amendment7

right to confront his accuser when it allowed S.T.'s videotaped interview. 

(Johnson's brief, pp. 40-42.)

As best we can determine, Johnson objected to the videotaped 

interview on the mistaken belief that S.T. was not going to testify. (R. 

25.) After the State confirmed that S.T. would testify, the circuit court 

asked Johnson "[d]oes that speak correctly?" to which Johnson replied, 

"Yes, Your Honor. I mean, we would like to exclude the video. I think the 

law allows it in, but I'm making that objection for constitutional grounds 

there, and we'll stand on that." (R. 25.) Later, when the State moved to 

admit the videotaped interview as State's Exhibit 8, Johnson again 

objected: "Judge, I'd just renew my objection that I made prior to trial, 

which was that they had given notice, and I have objected to the notice of 

7The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, made 

applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: 

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 

confronted with the witnesses against him."
CR-21-0291

10

intent to use it." (R. 194.) The circuit court overruled the objection and 

allowed State's Exhibit 8 to be played. (R. 194.)

Johnson's objection based on his mistaken belief that S.T. was not 

going to testify is moot. Any argument that Johnson now raises regarding 

the video's admissibility considering the circuit court's "Rape Shield 

ruling," was not raised below. "Review on appeal is restricted to questions 

and issues properly and timely raised at trial." Newsome v. State, 570 

So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). Thus, Johnson is due no relief on 

this issue.

III. JURY POOL

On appeal, Johnson argues that the jury pool was not made up of a 

fair cross-section of the community because, he says, "the COVID 

pandemic resulted in the systematic exclusion of all African-Americans 

from the jury panel," thereby depriving him of his constitutional rights. 

(Johnson's brief, pp. 42-49.) 

"'In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 

S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the Supreme 

Court of the United States explained:

" '"In order to establish a prima facie 

violation of the fair-cross-section 

requirement, the defendant must show 

(1) that the group alleged to be 
CR-21-0291

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excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the 

community; (2) that the representation 

of this group in venires from which 

juries are selected is not fair and 

reasonable in relation to the number of 

such persons in the community; and (3) 

that this underrepresentation is due to 

systematic exclusion of the group in the 

jury-selection process."

"'The Duren Court defined systematic exclusion as 

exclusion that is "inherent in the particular juryselection process utilized." Id. at 366; see also

Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir. 

1983) ( "[T]he Duren Court ... defined 'systematic' 

as 'inherent in the particular jury-selection 

process utilized.'"). "[T]he fair cross-section 

requirement ensures only a venire of randomness, 

one free of systematic exclusion. It does not ensure 

any particular venire." Gavin v. State, 891 So. 2d 

907, 945 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted). "Rather than being 

entitled to a cross-sectional venire, a defendant 

has a right only to a fair chance, based on a 

random draw, of having a jury drawn from a 

representative panel." Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). This Court has repeatedly 

held that the random drawing of veniremembers 

from a list of licensed drivers satisfies the faircross-section requirement. See id. at 946–47; 

Carroll v. State, 852 So. 2d 801, 807–08 (Ala. Crim. 

App. 1999); Clemons v. State, 720 So. 2d 961, 972 

(Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Sistrunk v. State, 630 So. 

2d 147, 149–50 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).'

"Gholston v. State, 57 So. 3d 178, 180–81 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2010)."
CR-21-0291

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Jackson v. State, 177 So. 3d 911, 917-18 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014).

During jury selection, Johnson stated that the afternoon jury panel 

had more Black persons on it and requested that that panel be looked at 

to "have a more accurate jury pool of [Johnson's] peers." (R. 88-89.) The 

circuit court responded that there could have been the same number of 

Black persons on the morning panel. The circuit court denied the request. 

(R. 90-91.) 

At a hearing on Johnson's motion for a new trial, the State recalled:

"[A]n objection was raised to the constitution of the panel, 

and a discussion was held on the record then during the trial 

that the panel was randomly selected based upon the driver's 

licenses of the citizens of Cherokee County, and that method 

of constituting jury panels has been litigated time and again 

and held to be constitutional." 

(R. 355.) Later, the circuit court addressed the issue:

"THE COURT: Let me go back to Paragraph 11 on the 

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, the first thing you argued, 

that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right 

based on the makeup of the jury panel.

"Here's my recollection of what happened is that, 

because of COVID, we called juries in two different panels, 

randomly selected. One at 9:00 o'clock. One at 1:30. And the 

9:00 o'clock panel had enough folks on it for us to go forward 

and select a jury. We had other cases for trial that week, and 

so we needed to get it started, and so we did.
CR-21-0291

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"You all raised an objection that there were no AfricanAmericans in the panel at 9:00 o'clock, and I asked then, 'Are 

there African-Americans in the panel at 1:30?' And I don't 

remember that you all said yes or that you even knew.

"As it turns out—and I think it's important for the 

record to contain this—that afternoon when the 1:30 panel 

came in here, there was one. There was one African-American 

in the 1:30 panel. There weren't any at the 9:00 o'clock panel. 

And I think it's important, also, to note for appellate review 

that both the defendant and the victim and the victim's family 

in this case are all African-Americans. So this is not an 

instance in which the victim and the defendant were of two 

different races.

"And then, also, I will ask the same question about 

Paragraph 11 that I've asked you about these others. You 

made allegations here, but what does the law say about this? 

What cases can you cite to me that would support your 

position?

"[Johnson's counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. We're specifically 

arguing—specifically, the Sixth Amendment itself, just the 

right to a fair and impartial trial. I'm not really going under 

Batson [v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),] here in that the 

prosecution struck him. More specifically, that there was 

nobody there. And I get there was only one that afternoon.

"And, also, some statistics, I think there's, you know, 

maybe five percent African-Americans in our county. But we 

just felt like it was not a fair cross-section of his peers and 

that we were only allowed those 24 on that panel."

(R. 360-62.)

In denying Johnson's motion for a new trial on this issue, the circuit 

court held:
CR-21-0291

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"[Johnson] made a variety of unsupported allegations in 

his motion that the Court deems too frivolous to address 

specifically, with the exception of the claim that in the jury 

panel he selected from 'there were no African-Americans on 

the entire panel from which strikes were made. That a panel 

that arrived later in the trial week for other trials had 

African-Americans on it.' The use of the plural 'AfricanAmericans' is inaccurate. As the Court noted at the hearing 

on the motion, when the afternoon panel of jurors arrived, 

there was one African-American that appeared for jury 

service.

"At the time of jury selection, [Johnson] raised the lack 

of African-Americans on the panel as an issue. The Court gave 

him an opportunity to explain how the afternoon panel might 

be better. However, [Johnson] offered no explanation as to the 

makeup (or potential makeup) of the afternoon panel. His 

request to use the afternoon panel was, therefore, speculative 

as he had no information to provide the Court as to the racial 

makeup of the afternoon panel.

"Further, [Johnson] has not presented the Court with 

any information as to the racial makeup of the jurors 

summoned for jury service. It could make a difference if the 

panel of jurors summoned (by the Administrative Office of 

Courts in Montgomery) contained no or only very few AfricanAmericans. However, no such information was provided by 

[Johnson].

"Further, [Johnson] has not supported his argument 

with adequate citation to and explanation of legal authority. 

Merely citing cases and constitutional amendments without 

adequate legal analysis is insufficient.

"Finally, as the Court noted at the motion hearing, 

[Johnson] and the victim and the victim's family are all 

African-Americans. This is not a case in which there is a racial 

difference between the defendant and the victim."
CR-21-0291

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(C. 58-59.)

We agree with the circuit court's holding that Johnson did not prove 

a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement under Duren

v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Thus, Johnson is due no relief on this 

issue.

IV. UNANIMOUS VERDICTS

Johnson argues that his substantial rights were violated when he 

received verdicts that, he says, were not unanimous. Johnson argues that 

an unanimity charge should have been given because, he says, the jury 

could not determine which acts constituted each charge of sexual abuse 

of a child under 12. 

The record shows that the circuit court instructed the jury: "The 

defendant is charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a child less than 

12 years old. ...You must consider each of the two counts independently 

of one other." (R. 320-21.) Following the circuit court's jury charge, 

Johnson's counsel said that he had: "No objection, Your Honor." (R. 331.)

"Generally, Alabama follows a strict-election rule, by 

which the State must elect the offense on which it will proceed 

'[w]here the evidence discloses two or more offenses growing 

out of distinct and separate transactions.' R.L.G. v. State, 712 

So. 2d 348, 355 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), aff'd, 712 So. 2d 372 
CR-21-0291

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(Ala. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the 

strict-election rule does not apply in cases of sexual abuse of 

children by a resident abuser that involve purely generic 

evidence, i.e., 'evidence of sexual abuse perpetrated upon a 

young child so often and in so many locations "by an abuser 

residing with the child ... that the young child loses any frame 

of reference in which to compartmentalize the abuse into 

'distinct and separate transactions,'"' or that involve a 

combination of both specific and generic evidence. Shouldis v. 

State, 38 So. 3d 753, 761 n.4 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting 

R.L.G., 712 So. 2d at 356). In those cases, the either/or rule 

applies: 'The "either-or" rule provides that the prosecution 

must elect which single act it is relying [on] for a conviction or 

else the trial judge must give a specific unanimity instruction.' 

R.A.S. v. State, 718 So.2d 117, 119 (Ala. 1998).

"'[T]he "either/or" rule ... as that rule is modified 

for generic evidence [provides that] where the 

evidence of more than one incident of sexual 

molestation to a child victim by a resident child 

molester is purely generic and where "there is no 

reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to 

particular acts, and the only question [for the jury] 

is whether or not the defendant in fact committed 

all of [the incidents]," the trial court should 

instruct the jury that it can find the defendant 

guilty only if it unanimously agrees that he 

committed all the incidents described by the 

victim.'

"R.L.G., 712 So. 2d at 367 (emphasis omitted). Moreover:

"'In cases ... that involve both generic and specific 

evidence, where evidence of multiple culpable acts 

is adduced to prove a single charged offense, jury 

unanimity must be protected. Therefore, in such a 

case, the defendant is entitled either to have the 

State elect the single act upon which it is relying 
CR-21-0291

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for a conviction or to have the court give a specific 

unanimity instruction. If the State chooses not to 

elect the specific act, the trial court must instruct 

the jury that all 12 jurors must agree that the 

same underlying criminal act has been proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby assuring a 

unanimous verdict on one criminal act.'

"R.A.S., 718 So. 2d at 122 (footnote omitted)."

State v. Kerley, 260 So. 3d 891, 898-99 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017).

Here, because Johnson stated that he was satisfied with the circuit 

court's instructions, any challenge to those instructions is not preserved.8

See, e.g., Shouldis v. State, 953 So. 2d 1275, 1282 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).

Thus, Johnson is due no relief on this issue. 

V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

On appeal, Johnson argues that the State's evidence could not 

support his convictions for sexual abuse of a child under 12.9 Johnson 

8Defense counsel's argument that he ran into a juror who said that 

Johnson had not produced enough evidence that he was not guilty was 

not evidence that the circuit court's unanimity instruction was not 

sufficient. See Johnson's Motion for a New Trial Hearing, R. 358-59. See

Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 937 So. 

2d 1018, 1026 (Ala. 2006) ("Argument of counsel is not evidence.").

9Johnson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his sodomy convictions. Thus, those convictions are affirmed.
CR-21-0291

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argues that the State failed to prove which of Johnson's acts constituted 

the "sexual contact" as defined in § 13A-6-60(3), Ala. Code 1975.

Section 13A-6-60(3), Ala. Code 1975, defines "sexual contact" as 

"[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for 

the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party. The term does 

not require skin to skin contact." "'The test used in determining the 

sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is whether, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder 

of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.'" Nunn v. State, 697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) 

(quoting O'Neal v. State, 602 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App.1992)). 

"'"'[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight or probative force of 

testimony is for the jury to judge and determine.'"'" Zumbado v. State, 

615 So. 2d 1223, 1241 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting Johnson v. Sate, 

555 So. 2d 818, 820 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), quoting other cases). And 

circumstantial evidence can support a conviction, and that question is for 

the jury. See White v. State, 546 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989). 

The State presented sufficient evidence of sexual contact within the 

meaning of § 13A-6-60(3), Ala. Code 1975, when it showed multiple acts 
CR-21-0291

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of sexual abuse, including Johnson's touching six-year-old S.T.'s 

"pocketbook," or vagina, and "boobies." Thus, based on the record before 

us, we hold that there was sufficient legal evidence from which the jury 

could reasonably have found Johnson guilty of two counts of sexual abuse 

of a child under the age of 12. Johnson is due no relief on this issue.

VI. POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION UNDER § 13A-5-6(c) 

Finally, although the circuit court's imposition of 99-year sentences 

on Johnson's convictions for first-degree sodomy was authorized, because 

those convictions are for Class A felony sex offenses involving a child, the 

circuit court also must impose on each conviction "an additional penalty 

of not less than 10 years of post-release supervision to be served upon the 

defendant's release from incarceration." § 13A-5-6(c), Ala. Code 1975. 

That subsection provides: 

"In addition to any penalties heretofore or hereafter provided 

by law, in all cases where an offender is designated as a 

sexually violent predator pursuant to Section 15-20A-19, or 

where an offender is convicted of a Class A felony sex offense 

involving a child as defined in Section 15-20A-4,[10] and is 

sentenced to a county jail or the Alabama Department of 

Corrections, the sentencing judge shall impose an additional 

10"Sex offense involving a child" is defined as "[a] conviction for any 

sex offense in which the victim was a child or any offense involving child 

pornography." § 15-20A-4(27), Ala. Code 1975.
CR-21-0291

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penalty of not less than 10 years of post-release supervision 

to be served upon the defendant's release from incarceration."

See also Bishop v. State, 344 So. 3d 906, 915 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021). Thus, 

we must remand this case for the circuit court to impose the required 

periods of post-release supervision on Johnson's convictions for firstdegree sodomy.

CONCLUSION

We affirm Johnson's convictions for two counts of first-degree 

sodomy and two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of 12, and 

we affirm his sentences for the sexual-abuse convictions. As to Johnson's 

sentences for first-degree sodomy, a Class A felony offense, we remand 

this cause to the circuit court for it to conduct a new sentencing hearing

at which Johnson, represented by counsel, will be sentenced in 

accordance with this opinion. Due return must be filed with this Court 

no later than 56 days from the date of this opinion. The return to remand 

must include a transcript of the proceedings conducted on remand and a 

new sentencing order.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

Windom, P.J., and McCool and Cole, JJ., concur. Kellum, J., concurs 

in the result.