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--Al-NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. 0.0

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LATIMER, OSD

SUBJECT: Intelligence Review Topics for the

White House Working Committee

Attached are NRO inputs on the intelligence review

problems identified for comment to the White House Working

Committee. These inputs are in response to your tasking.

Also attached, is a copy of our Organization and Management

Paper which we forwarded earlier. It contains additional

comments on our views toward the intelligence community

structure above us, budgetary considerations, and some

additional thinking on necessary security to protect the

sensitive advanced technological development incorporated

in our reconnaissance satellites. We also have attached

a paper covering the "fact of" issue which has also been

provided to the NSC Space Policy Committee. This paper

may be helpful in analyzing that important issue.

J. W. Plummer il'"(

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3 Attachments

NRO Inputs

Organization and

Management Paper

3. "Fact Of Paper

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Identified Item 1.5

SUBJECT: The Rol • of the PFIAB

Over the years, the PFIAB has reviewed the NRO structure

and was instrumental in establishing the present configuration.

By establishing the NRO as a centralized management entity,

the PFIAB demonstrated a unique ability to recommend an impartial

and unbiased framework. This structure has served well to incorporate the DOD and CIA interests in space reconnaissance.

Because of the individual talent of its membership, the PFIAB

has brought much experience and impartiality to bear in viewing

the intelligence community components.

We believe that the PFIAB should continue this role in the

future with a goal of maintaining a non-parochial viewpoint.

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Identified Item 4.3

SUBJECT: Structured Versus Ad Hoc Requirements

With respect to reconnaissance satellite development and

acquisition, structured requirements emanating from the USIB

have enabled the NRO to focus the longer range needs for,program planning and acquisition purposes. By having a single

source of requirements, the process is made less ambiguous

and more straightforward. Annual updates of a structured

five-year SIGINT plan, for example, have been beneficial in

permitting a realistic application of scarce resources against

reconnaissance satellite initiation or updates. For the near

term, ad hoc requirements in terms of mission guidance should

emanate from a sufficiently flexible central tasking mechanism

so that time or situation dominated requirements can be satisfied. Of most significance to reconnaissance satellite

tasking is the obtaining of a single set of community prioritized

tasking levies. Ad hoc inputs from many sources would require

that the satellite system operators set the priorities which

might not be in the best interests of the community. For overall optimum development, acquisition and operation of reconnaissance satellites, a structured approach is most important

in the longer term and extreme flexibility within a structured

mechanism is most important in the shorter term.

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• Identified Item 5.1 through 7

SUBJECT: Secrecy and Compartmentation

There is a distinct tradeoff which must be made when

considering the amount and ease of satellite product dissemination. Most of the satellite reconnaissance systems have a

unique capability for data collection which cannot be replaced

by another intelligence collection source. Therefore, inherent

in a decision to relax dissemination security is an increase in

risk of compromise of the function and th e

concerning , the

fact remains that the capabilities and limitations of our reconnaissance satellite systems have been protected, some for almost

a decade. This degree of protection has been made possible only

because of a highly conservative security policy and a psychological desire on the part of those knowle

The intelligence community should carefully consider the

level of dissemination required of the raw intelligence product

vis-a-vis information derived from the intelligence product.

Utmost care should be maintained to preclude inadvertent or

careless confirmation as to the capabilities and limitations

of the satellite reconnaissance systems.

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ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

OF THE

SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM

HISTORY 

Early in the 1950s it became apparent that the U.S. would

experience increasing difficulty in mounting classical intelligence collection operations against the Soviet Union. The

development of a Soviet nuclear capability significantly increased the urgency of the requirement for information concerning

Soviet strategic forces. It was decided that overhead reconnaissance represented a feasible means of obtaining the essential strategic intelligence information.

Therefore, on 4 August 1955, after months of negotiations,

the CIA and the USAF agreed to jointly sponsor and conduct the

U-2 developmental and operational program. It was recognized

that although the U-2 was initially highly survivable, the

Soviets would eventually be capable of interdicting U-2 and

other airborne overflight missions, thereby denying us the

primary source of strategic intelligence.

Faced with the eventuality of losing our airborne reconnaissance capabilities, the USAF began the overt development

of a reconnaissance satellite system in September 1956. This

development became the SAMOS program.

As development activity on satellite reconnaissance systems

progressed, it became apparent that openly operating a satellite

espionage system would be inconsistent with the stated U.S. "space

for peace" policy. In recognition of the potential international

sensitivity to reconnaissance operations, satellite vehicles notwithstanding, the USAF and the CIA were made joint sponsors of a

covert satellite reconnaissance program. Thus began the CORONA

program under the cover of the DISCOVERER research project.

The incentive for development of an alternative reconnaissance capability heightened when on 1 May 1960 Gary Powers' U-2

was shot down on a mission targeted against Plesetsk. The

President's decision to terminate overflights of the Soviet

Union following the Powers incident essentially shrouded the

Soviet Union until 19 August 1960 when the first intelligence

photography was returned from space. Although the mission lasted

only one day and returned comparatively poor quality imagery

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(about 35 feet ground resolution versus the 2-3 feet for the

U-2), a capability was demonstrated.

An NSC meeting had been scheduled for 25 August 1960 to

review the management of the SAMOS program. The photography

from the first successful CORONA satellite mission lent substantial evidence to the potential of satellite reconnaissance

systems. The President directed the Air Force to reorient the

SAMOS project along lines similar to the CORONA project••and

to institute special streamlined management procedures.

A week later the Secretary of the Air Force delegated the

management authority for satellite reconnaissance to the Under

Secretary of the Air Force. It became increasingly apparent,

however, that the importance of satellite reconnaissance products dictated that the collection program be conducted at a

national level.

In September 1961, the Secretary of Defense and the Director

of Central Intelligence signed an agreement establishing the

National Reconnaissance Program. The agreement established the

Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans),

CIA, as co-directors of the NRO. While this agreement laid the

groundwork for succeeding NRP agreements, the NSC 5412/2 Group

(now the 40 Committee) recommended against the co-directorship

concept and in essence the agreement never operated.

On 2 May 1962, a second agreement was signed which established a single Director of the NRO and developed specific

responsibilities and relationships governing requirements,

project assignments, resources, and security.

On 6 July 1962, the NSC 5412/2 Group and the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board non-concurred in the May

1962 Agreement and directed the development of a more definitive

permanent documentary basis for the National Reconnaissance

Office." •

On .13 March 1963, a third agreement was signed by the Deputy

Secretary of Defense and the DCI. This agreement very clearly

established the authority and responsibilities of the DNRO.

While this agreement was more specific than the two previous

attempts and was concurred in by the PFIAB, the agreement was

considered unworkable by the CIA. During this period and until

1965, CIA and DOD relationships were at a very low ebb. Finally,

in May 1964, following an intensive study, the PFIAB sent a

memorandum to the President recommending that he approve a

directive establishing a framework for the National Reconnaissance

•

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Office. In response to the President's direction in 1964,

the current "DOD/CIA Agreement for Reorganization of the

NRP" was signed on 11 August 1965. This agreement, which'

currently charters the NRF is directly responsive to the

concerns expressed by the PFIAB in 1964.

The Agreement recognized the need for a single, national

program to meet the intelligence needs of the U.S. Government

(as opposed to DOD needs only). The Agreement established the

NRO as a separate agency of the DOD. The Secretary of Defense

was designated as the executive agent for the NRP.

The Agreement also recognized the varied roles of the

Director of Central Intelligence as senior U.S. intelligence

advisor, co-sponsor of the NRP and the Chairman of the USIB.

The statutory responsibility for protecting intelligence sources

and methods and Presidentially-directed responsibility for protecting satellite reconnaissance activities were noted.

Of particular significance in this Agreement was the establishment of an NRP Executive Committee very similar in composition to that recommended by the PFIAB in 1964. In essence, the

ExCom would act as a board of directors for the NRP. It was

composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI as cosponsors of the program, while the President's Science Advisor

represented the White House.

In practice, the ExCom acts for the Secretary of Defense

to review the NRP and provide guidance to the DNRO on the conduct and execution of the NRP. The existence of the ExCom and

its composition were directed by the President in 1964 to replace the system of DOD and CIA NRP monitors which was chartered

in the 1962 and 1963 agreements. The individual agency monitor

concept interfered with the direct chain of command envisioned

for the NRP.

The President's Intelligence Reorganization Directive of

November 1971 caused the DCI to become Chairman of the NRP ExCom

in early 1973. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligenc

was then named to represent the Secretary of Defense on the ExCom.

At about the same time, the President's Science Advisor's Office

was abolished and therefore the Executive Committee has been a

two-man board in recent years. In 1974, President Nixon requested

the PFIAB to examine the structure of the NRO to determine an

appropriate configuration for addressing the tactical support

problem. Because of intervening events, such as Watergate and

the present intelligence investigations, the PFIAB has never

concluded its study. The NRO has in draft an updated charter

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which reflects several changes in the management structure

such as the two-man ExCom, the enhanced role' of NSA in the

development of SIGINT reconnaissance satellites, and the

removal of aircraft reconnaissance from the NRP. Program D,

the aircraft program, was disbanded as of October 1974.

PRESENT SITUATION

There are several current factors at issue which affect

the organization and management of the NRP.

The Tactical Support Problem. The President has

placed the responsibility for providing national asset support

to the military field commanders in the hands of the DCI. •

However, the intelligence community structure has not met this

problem head on. There is a great deal of ambiguity relating

to the definitions and the actual satisfaction of local com

mander requirements by the traditional nationally oriented

reconnaissance satellites. There is a great desire, on the

part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the DIA for example, to

control the National Reconnaissance Program assets in the

time of war. The current community structure makes this a

difficult problem in terms of assuring that Defense priorities

prevail in the time of war or crises.

CIA Involvement in the NRP. A significant characteristic of the NRP is the marked difference between the two major

program offices of the NRP--CIA Reconnaissance Programs under

the DDS&T and the Air Force Special Projects Office under a

General officer. The CIA Program Office is very close to the

intelligence community and has an excellent understanding of

intelligence priorities and requirements. The CIA, while it

recognizes the ultimate authority of the DNRO with regard to

management of the NRP and his resource control, has tended to

operate its programs nearly independently. The DCI and the

DDS&T are continually involved in intelligence matters at every

level of Government and with many agencies. Thus, the collection

projects' for which the CIA is responsible may receive attention

in many discussions outside the NRO and beyond ExCom. This influence tends to restrict the options for the program decisions

open to the DNRO.

Conversely, the Air Force Program Office is solely

responsive to DNRO direction, since it reports in a direct

line to the DNRO. This office is by geographic location (Los

Angeles) and composition, however, removed from the intelligence

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community and must look to the NRO Staff to interface with the

appropriate USIB committees and the rest of the intelligence

community.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, among

others, has raised a specific issue with regard to the CIA

level of effort in the program management of reconnaissance

satellites. Part of the discussion is focused on the nature

of the DDS&T, his involvement in the total community and his

unique position in influencing the requirements, the concept

formulation, the acquisition, the operation and the evaluation

of the satellites. There have been discussions which indicate

that perhaps the role of the DDS&T in reconnaissance satellite

activities should be diminished.

Resource Availability and Control. Traditionally,

since 1965, the Executive Committee has established a level

of effort for the NRP which has then been reviewed by the

Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees.•

The level of effort has then been forwarded to the Congress

within the President's budget but has not been subject to

direct competition with other Defense priorities because of

its prior special treatment and apeciarnature. Recently,

however, the process has been made more normal because of

actions on the part of the Defense Department and the Congress.

During the FY 76 budget approval process, elements of the NRP

budget were placed in direct competition with other high

priority Defense items. There is also an issue as to the •

location of the NRP budget, that is, whether or not it should

be separated from the Defense budget and sponsored by the DCI

as a part of a National Foreign Intelligence Program which

would be appropriated to the DCI.

Retention of Streamlined Management. The NRO differs

from an intelligence community element in the sense that the

NRO is a management entity which furnishes the raw data product

to the community for its use. The main rationale for having an

NRO is to afford a central, streamlined management agency for

the development and acquisition of reconnaissance satellites.

The current NRP still retains most of the elements of streamlined management which were established at its initiation. The

present structure permits streamlined management because of the

small number of people involved and the use of special security,

as a management tool. The issue is how to restructure the NRP

without sacrificing the management efficiencies which exist

today. Any new charter for the NRO should contain sufficient

safeguards and prerogatives to afford the continuation of the

special management procedure. Otherwise, there would be a.

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requirement for greater numbers of people and an increase in

the appropriation needed for satellite development and acquisition.

CRITERIA.

With regard to the paragraph immediately above, there are

several essential ingredients which should be imbedded in an

NRO management organization structure. These are:

Single Responsibility. An NRO should have single

governmental responsibility for reconnaissance and surveillance

satellite development, acquisition and on-orbit operation. It

should be located in the Washington, D.C. area for the maintenance of close contact with the intelligence community, resource

managers, and the Congress.

Unambiguous Requirements. An NRO should not be a

direct part of the requirements mechanism and the tasking

authority. It should interface in the mechanism; however,

for coordination and feedback purposes, there should be a

single focal point to provide requirements for the NRO to

satisfy.

Fenced Budget. An NRP should be established at the

Executive level based on defined objectives. An NRO should

maintain direct relationships with the Congress and maintain

internal flexibility for reprogramming monies within the

authorized budget.

Streamlined Decision Making. An NRO should be responsive to a single high level chain of command for its programs and budget. The Director of the reconnaissance satellite

program should have the authority to make day-to-day resource

decisions and call upon the chain of command as necessary.

The Director should have total control over the operation of

the field organizations and the contracting mechanism.

Limited Review. To assure streamlined management,

a special review cycle should be used instead of the normal

governmental review process, so that the normal bureaucracy

does not impede the prograft special activities. On the other

hand, sufficient review should be provided at the higher levels

to assure that the program is responsive to the requirements.

End-to-End Contracting. An NRO should contract for

the total reconnaissance satellite system from concept development

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through on-orbit operation and ultimate failure. Special •

reporting procedures should be incorporated in the contract •

mechanism.

Minimum Manning. An NRO should be kept small and

low profile in its activities. Manning should be stabilized

below the Director level to afford continuity. The organization should be multi-agency manned to provide balance between

the Services and the intelligence agencies. Emphasis should

be focused on maintaining a streamlined SPO concept. •

Self Policing. An NRO should be responsible for

internal controls over its operations and should call upon

conventional audit or inspection agencies as required under

the discretion of the Program Director. Special controls for

audit and inspection should be maintained.

Security. A strong centrally controlled security

system should be maintained in order to afford minimum program

visibility to those outside the resource and user areas. A

stringent access philosophy for the program to protect the

sensitive technology, assets and operations which are inherently

difficult to protect is required for extended periods of time.

ORGANIZATION RATIONALE.

•

The present NRO structure has worked well over time. The

issues which led to the formulation of the combined DOD/CIA

structure existed much in the same form then as they do today.

Should a major change occur to the structure at the expense

of meeting the criteria listed above which are essentially in

effect today, great care must be taken so as not to void the

efficiencies which have existed through the NRO since its

inception.

Placement. The NRO should be a part of the National

Foreign Intelligence Program, but should be responsive as well

to the direct influence of the Secretary of Defense. At the

national level, the NRP should be designated as a part of the

National Foreign Intelligence Program and should be subject to

the level of effort provided by a national ExCom which, as well,

governs all elements of the National Foreign Intelligence

Program. Once the budget level of effort is assigned, the

Secretary of Defense should serve as the senior executive to

assure that the management and execution of the NRP is in accordance with the budget assigned and that the various requirements

are being satisfied. This overall concept is diagramed on Chart 1

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Relationships. In relation to the above, the requirements input to, the NRO should be much in the same fashion as

existing today, that is, through a single requirements apparatus

such as the USIB and its committee structure. An assumption is

made that the national committee apparatus will account for those

needs as stated by the Defense representative which serve the

field commander. The NRO would be responsible for taking the

USIB-generated requirements and translating these requirements

into technical and cost options for the development and acquisition of reconnaissance satellites. The day-to-day operation

of the reconnaissance satellites would follow a similar arrangement, working through a requirements and mission guidance subcommittee apparatus, such as is known today with the Imagery

Collection Requirements Subcommittee and the SIGINT Overhead

Reconnaissance Subcommittee.

Management and Organization Structure. The NRO, as

mentioned above, would be placed within the Secretary of Defense

organization as a separate operating agency. It would be responsive to a high level chain of command for its execution, and •

concentration would be placed on the maintenance of a streamlined decision process. Conceptually, the program elements

which exist today would be merged into a single program structure.

The NRO would continue to be a centralized management entity

drawing upon the best talent existing within the community and

industry.

The Director of the NRO would be a statutory, noncareer, appointee. He would be charged with the overall policy

direction of the National Reconnaissance Program. The Program

would encompass all earth-looking reconnaissance and surveillancelike sensor systems. Project managers of the various system

efforts would report to the Director. Incorporated within the

structure would be direct liaison with the military departments,

and necessary comptroller and staff support for services of common concern to the project managers.

Projects would be grouped in terms of their generic

nature to afford a streamlined management within the project

structure. The project managers could be senior civilians or

military officers selected by the Director.

Limited access security would be incorporated in the

management and contractor structures to afford the maintenance

of compartmented security of the projects and advanced technology,

subject to security policy guidelines established under DCI

statutory authority. Intelligence products, when turned over

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to the community, would be secured at the level judged appropriate by the community. The NRO structure itself would not

be covert but would be classified sufficiently to obscure the

specific details about the reconnaissance systems and their

modus operandi.

The NRO would be staffed by a mix of CIA, NSA, other

agencies and military assignees drawn from their parent organizations. Assignments should be reasonably stable. The total

membership of the NRO would be maintained at a bare minimum

consistent with streamlined management. The NRO would be located

in the Washington area but would

service support, such as with th

as it enjoys today. The NRO wool ave a so e re ponsi y

for the development, acquisition, and operation of reconnaissance and surveillance satellites as a service of common concern to the intelligence community and the military services.

The majority of those individuals assigned to the NRO would

be technically oriented people not necessarily affiliated with

the intelligence career field.

Program and Budget. The Comptroller, working • with the

project managers, would be responsible for program budget matters.

The program budget would be incorporated in the National Foreign

Intelligence Program along side the budgets of CIA and NSA in

relation to the organic Defense Department intelligence budget.

The NRP would be presented to the Congress separately from the

Defense budget; however; the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the DGI would retain the prerogative to adjust budgets

within the NFIP and the overall Defense requirements. Congressional defense of the budget would be the responsibility of the

Director and he would be required to justify those programs

authorized by the Executive Committee. The programs would not

be subject to routine Defense Department review but the Secretary

of Defense would be afforded appropriate visibility into the

execution of the program.

Contracts and Acquisition. Each project manager would

be responsible for the obtaining of hardware through a special

contracting apparatus which allows beginning-to-end contracting

in the same fashion as it exists today. Procurement activities

would be handled in both the open and the covert manner in order

to afford necessary security to the acquisition process. Contract reporting and auditing would follow similar procedures

as well so that the Program Director can maintain sufficient

visibility into the effectiveness of the program management.

Provisions to grant certain waivers to procurement instructions

would be authorized. A dedicated contracting function would be

maintained to facilitate all contracting.

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Operations. Each project manag

▪

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• 

for ground station management. Tasking of the photo

satellites and SIGINT satellites would be in accordance with

a central direction, emanating from focal points consisting

primarily of NSA for SIGINT satellites and CIA and DIA for

photo satellites. Each project manager would be responsible

for the launching of the reconnaissance satellites and assuring

that the product turn-over is in accord with the needs and •

desires of the community.

The rationale outlined above would afford a centralized

streamlined management, assuming that there are proper security

safeguards. It also affords the drawing in to the NRO those

elements of the intelligence community and Defense establishment which are most interested and most expert in reconnaissance satellite development, acquisition, and operation without

vested organizational interest. The environment of the organization permits the resources to be levied at a high national

level and affords the DOD sufficient day-to-day management oversight within the national context. The internal NRO organization would be organized to continue a small level of manning

and reinforce the streamlined decision making capability. With

its civilian direction, proper checks and balances should be

able to be realized so that the NRO provides a service of common need to the intelligence community.

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"FACT OF"

"Should the U.S. Government publicly announce the fact

that it conducts space reconnaissance activities?" The differing opinions regarding the answer to that question generate

what is known as the "fact of" issue.

The proponents for declassifying and acknowledging

officially to the world that the U.S. Government does, indeed,

conduct space reconnaissance operations, have some logical

arguments why the "fact of" should be declassified and released

to the public. Some of the more significant reasons follow.

The "fact of" secret is, in fact, a non-secret. U.S. space

reconnaissance activities have been reported in the world's

press and on U.S. television. The argument is--why not reveal

what is already publicly known to all? Since "fact of" is a

non-secret, keeping it classified can be cited as a prime

example of foolish (over) classification. Declassifying "fact

of" would eliminate this absurdity. This declassification

action would gain credibility' for the government in general

and enhance the intelligence community's image in particular.

Lastly, there is an intuitive belief that overall consequences

resulting fromdeclassificationwould be positive and beneficial.

The opponents of declassification of "fact of" have equally

logical arguments for their views. Some of the more significant

reasons follow. The U.S. has already many times acknowledged its

space reconnaissance role, e.g., the declassification and acknowledgement of the weather satellites and the warning surveillance • • sat se of

the Furthermore, assi 6f adverse

consequences including disastrous ones. Declassification would

create new avenues for initiating actions where there is no basis

for action now. For instance, the Soviets or Chinese could conceivably feel compelled to react to official acknowledgement of

overflight of their state by U.S. espionage satellites. Adverse

worldwide reaction could result in UN or other international

bodies or third world nations making entreaties to the U.S. to

curtail or cease space reconnaissance activities. It could

encourage allies to request removal of ground based intelligence

collectors since space systems collect intelligence that probably

make the ground collectors less useful. The request for ground

site removal alleviates political pressures.

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The spotlight of attention would certainly fall on our

SIGINT satellite effort if "fact of" is approved, even though

proponents for "fact of" re con in the main

•

•

The initial "fact of" declaration does not tell the public

anymore than it does not already know. It is gratuitous information in this sense. However, this initial step has an adverse

impact in that it removes the keystone from the policy that

inhibits public dicussion, and once disclosed, the declaration

of "fact of" is an irreversible step. It could be an opening

wedge for speculation that grows so that pressures build for

more and more information. Maintaining security would be difficult in an environment of increasing disclosures. The current

simple rule of no public discussion would have to be replaced

by more complex security rules. Normal security rules have

rarely been able to preserve secrets for any extended period

of time.

At the minimum adverse impact, the release of "fact of"

does not tell the public anymore than it does not already know.

At the maximum adverse impact, release could pose an eventual

threat to U.S. ability to conduct effective space reconnaissance.

Finally, the present policy works well. There are no

external pressures to admit U.S. space reconnaissance. Therefore, why do it? The present status quo we have with the Russians

maintains the tacit agreement for each side to allow space reconnaissance by the other. Our space intelligence collection is,

in many cases, the only source for such information. Release

of "fact of" could jeopardize this capability and jeopardize

our present unhampered access to space.

•

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