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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE NRO STAFF July 22, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PLUMMER

SUBJECT: Discussion with the PFIAB

The memorandum at the right schedules you to meet with

Admiral Anderson, Dr. Baker and his ad hoc study panel at

1100 on July 23. The right hand attachment is Admiral

Anderson's original memo establishing the panel. The PFIAB

has asked that you be prepared to discuss the major contemporary issues facing the NRP as well as your perceptions of the

future of the )n ► p.

The contemporary issues facing the NRP stem from several

factors:

A changing character of the program in terms

of its becoming an operational necessity to the intelligence

community;

The environment of the program in terms of a

move toward normalization and a general relaxation of security;

c. Diluted management authorities within the NRP

structure because of the creation of the ASD(I) and IC Staffs;

d.' Maw vistas for application of NRP collection

largely in the area of support for the tactical commanders.

Since it is apparent that the existing charter document,

the 1965 DOD-CIA Agreement, has been superseded, a likely outcome of the PFIAB Study will be a reformed chartering document,

probably either a new agreement or an NSCID.

For several months this winter and spring I held Saturday

morning sessions with Colonels Wheeler, Blankenship, Hofmann,

and Coyle. Our airms were first to develop a better understanding of the fundamental NRP management and operational

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issues and the factors influencing them; and second, to brainstorm potential NRO positions and develop a philosophy toward

approaching the issues. Indirectly these sessions influenced

the Staff's thinking and approach to the July ExCom Director's

Report, particularly Volume III, and the strewman imaging plan.

The papers at TABS A & B follow directly from these sessions.

TAB A was prepared by Fritz Hofmann and Bud Coyle and provides

good background on the evolution to the current NRP management

environment.

The following are what we see as the broad contemporary

issues relating to the NRP:

Should the NRP be perpetuated as a single• dedicated program structured to accomplish all national satellite

reconnaissance?

How much autonomy should be vested within the

management structure of the NRP under the DNRO?

How much operational responsibility should be

assigned to the DNRO?

How should the NRO be geared to assume responsibilities in non-strategic intelligence collection?

How will the NRO acquire sufficient guidance in

terms of future technology?

What form of security should be used to protect

the necessary classified aspects of the NRP?

We firmly believe that the current philosophy and basic

structure of a dedicated NRP is the best way to prosecute effectively and economically a satellite reconnaissance program

in the future. In 1964, the PFIAB envisioned a high-level

decision process whereby a three-man ExCom would make the

resource allocation decisions unencumbered by advocacy and

bureaucracy. It also envisioned a strong DNRO with sufficient

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clout to manage the DOD/CIA NRP on a streamlined and unencumbered basis. Experience has shown that this approach was

idealistic and has not been implemented in its pure form. A

totally monolithic NRP cannot effectively serve the changing

needs of the nation. Many outside inputs are needed.

On the other hand, we think that if satellite reconnaissance is to continue to be effective and economical in the

future, it must be strongly and authoritatively managed without

normal bureaucratic levels of review and with firm decision

authority vested in a single manager, the DNRO. This aspect

is of key importance since a successful satellite reconnaissanceeffort is of critical importance to the nation and one

which cannot be replaced by substitUtion of another kind of

collection asset.

TAB B is a point paper primarily prepared by Bud Coyle

for your meeting tomorrow. The basic philosophy in the paper

suggests a continuation of the present national structure but

with more clear lines of authority and responsibility.

Although based upon contemporary issues the positions stated

in the paper will permit the U.S. satellite reconnaissance

program in the future to move fully into the near-real-time

environment in support of the tactical commanders while

retaining a streamlined management and cost-effective structure.

Some of the key points are:

Strengthen the Staff's interagency character.

• Maintain the two main Program Office structure.

Control financial matters centrally in the NRO,

accountable to the DCI.

Report directly to the SecDef as executive agent.

e. Expand the present ExCom to include a third

member.

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Brigadier General, USAF

Director

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Clarify the NRO/NSA operational relationship.

Balance operational/intelligence interface.

Refocus the NRO Staff's operational function.

Devote energy to support of the tactical

commanders.

Maintain a strong technology and development

program under NRO control.

Continue use of compartmented security.

The determinations of this panel are crucial to the

management of satellite reconnaissance for the next several

years. Your Reston with the panel can have a major influence

on their findings. These papers should provide a good basis

for your preparing for this meeting. I suggest that you also

spend an hour or more with me and Colonel Coyle prior to the

meeting.

2 Attachments

Crossroads Paper, 22Jul74

Point Paper

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July 22, 1974

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THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

AT THE CROSSROADS

Management Evolution 1960-1974 

The National Reconnaissance Program is a most unusual program--unlike any other. Formally recognized by the President,

it operates under an informal charter that-is in many respects

outdated. Attacked from without and within since its inception,

-it has nevertheless grown to be the single most important intelligence collection program of the United States Government. Its

dual agency composition has been both a source of problems and

provided a sanction from outside intrusion. Today the autonomous

structure of the organization is threatened more than ever before.

Can the NRO survive? Under what arrangements? What must happen

to guide the events that will shape or-reshape the NRO? This

paper addresses the major points of importance to the management

of the NRO.

At the direction of the President on August 25, 1960, the

National Security Council forwarded to the Secretary of Defense

directions to apply streamlined management techniques to the

satellite reconnaissance program. Within DOD., the Secretary

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of Defense directed the Secretary of the Air Force to assume

direct responsibility for satellite reconnaissance, reporting

directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for review and

approval. The Secretary also designated the ODDR&E as the

principal staff agency to assist the Deputy Secretary.

In September 1961 the Secretary of Defense designated the

Under Secretary of the Air Force as his Assistant for Reconnaissance, acting as the Secretary's direct representative both

within and outside the Department of Defense. It was further

directed that the Assistant for Reconnaissance be given any

support he required from normal staff elements, although these

staff elements were not to participate in program matters. This

designation accompanied distribution of the first memorandum of

agreement for the NRP, dated September 6, 1961.

The second NRP agreement was issued May 2, 1962. While.

the 1961 Agreement prescribed a program jointly managed by coequal DOD and CIA Directors, the new document called out only

one Director, from DOD. In June of that year DOD Directive

TS 5105.23 was issued, which formally exempted the DNRO from

unsolicited outside assistance.

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In its report to the President in May, 1964--which ultimately resulted in the 1965 Memorandum of Agreement--the PFIAB

noted that the use of monitors by the Secretary of Defense and

the Director of Central Intelligence to review the NRP interfered with the direct chain of command between the DNRO and

the Secretary of Defense. The 1965 Agreement is written in

terms which specify clear lines of communication between the

DNRO and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the

ExCom. Noticable by its absence is reference to review. by any

other monitoring office.

The NRO prerogatives were tested in March 1966, when the

Director, DDR&E "deferred" NRO funds because

he wanted several questions answered before releasing them.

Following a visit by the DNRO, however, the offending DDR&E

memorandum was withdrawn.

The OSD • Systems Analysis Office made three attempts to

apply normalized DOD management techniques to the NRP--in 1966,

1968 and 1969. In each case their proposals were rejected.

Today we are perhaps faced with greater pressures to change

than ever before. The overall driving force is the need to improve the foreign intelligence, collection effort. The forces

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at work are several and intermingled. The Blue Ribbon Defense

Panel addressed DOD intelligence problems; the President's

letter of November 5, 1971 and the creation of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) have all had an effect.

On April 29, 1969 Secretary Laird signed a memorandum

assigning Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)

Mr. Froehlke the additional duty of Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary and Deputy . Secretary. Any thoughts

that the staff entertained that Mr. Frohlke was not to be

concerned with the NRO were dispelled on May 5, when a second

memo from Mr. Laird announced that Mr. Froehlke's responsibilities

"encompass the NEP." While Mr. Froehlke attacked his assignment

with vigor, his relationship with the NRO worsened until the

issue came to a head in December 1969. In a memorandum to

Mr. Packard, Dr. McLucas said "what Mr. Laird tells me and what

he apparently tells Bob Froehlke puts us in an untendable position--

not knowing whether to respond to ExCom guidance, which our agreement clearly establishes, or whether to respond to Bob Froehlke's

guidance, which is based on the assumption that our office is

just another component of DOD."

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Dr. McLucas' concerns led to a briefing for Secretary

Laird, Mr. Packard and Mr. Froehlke on March 19, 1970. At

that time Mr. Laird clarified that Dr. McLucas worked for

Mr. Packard and the ExCom; that Mr. Froehlke did not need

to review the NRP internally; and that the NRO should provide

data of the sort provided excellently to the ExCom which would

permit Mr. Froehike to examine DOD intelligence issues in proper

perspective. This served to ease the tense relationship, at

least temporarily.

Close on the heels of this confrontation came the report

of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, with an allegetiOn that the

NRO was somehow derelict in its failure to report to Mr. Froehlke.

The influence . of the Blue Ribbon report on subsequent changes

in the intelligence community is not very clear, but it was

certainly detrimental to the concept of an autonomous NRO. ••

During this time--starting in early 1969--Dr. McLucas,

as DNRO, established a pattern of frequent discussions with

Mr. Packard on NRO matters. Mr. Packard had an obvious understanding of the Program and had a strong interest in it. It

is also noteworthy that Mr. Packard's tenure pre-dated the

establishment of the position of Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary, Mr. Packard left in December 1971,

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and Mr. Kenneth Rush became the Deputy Secretary in February

1972. Mr. Rush never had the understanding of the details of

the Program that Mr. Packard had--and perhaps more importantly,

he entered DOD to find an already established ASD(I). We found

that Dr. Hall had a considerably greater influence on Mr. Rush

than had been the case with Mr. Packard, and on occasion found

conflicting guidance on NRO matters coming from the Deputy

Secretary's office.

The President's letter of November 5, 1971, contained the

encouraging words that the management structure of the NRO was

to remain unchanged. This appears to have had little effect,

however, as subsequent events have shown. The letter was also

specific in assigning the DCI the responsibility for chairing

all intelligence community advisory boards and committees;

Dr. Schlesinger clarified with the President that this included

the NRP ExCom. While Mr.•Helms had remained as the DCI the

ExCom operated as it had for the previous several years. But

when Dr. Schlesinger arrived at CIA in early 1973, there was

a fundamental change in NRP management. No longer was the

Deputy Secretary of Defense--by now Mr. Clements--the ExCom

Chairman, and he backed away from active involvement in the

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NRP. Dr. Hall filled the void, attending ExCom meetings as

the DOD member--a role recognized in writing by the present

DCI.

The position of the ASD(I) has becoMe ever stronger in

terms of his influence on the NRP both through ExCom participation and in day-to-day influence. And his staff, also, is

becoming more involved with NRP matters. It is fictitious to

believe that the ASD(I) can operate independently as an ExCom

member from his role as the director of a staff which oversees

all Department of Defense intelligence. The management concept

directed by the President, and reaffirmed by the President,

is being eroded. Two other factors which affect us today are

NSCID No. 6, and the decision to decompartment satellite photography. The former because it gives NSA a role in tasking SIGINT

satellites; the latter because many consider the decision to

decompartment tantamount to normalization of the Program.

The problems we are experiencing today are symptomatic;

the task that needs to be done is to take a comprehensive look

at the national environment today, the role of a National

Reconnaissance Program and Office in that environment, and

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evolve a strategy to cause the changes which need to be made.

The NRP is too vital to the national interest to permit its

management to drift along an uncharted course.

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POINT PAPER

Organizational Structure 

We believe that the NRP should continue as a single

dedicated program responsible for conducting all satellite

reconnaissance in support of United States intelligence needs.

The NRP should continue to be structured as a national

program as opposed to becoming a solely Defense oriented

program..

There should be a strong interagency NRO Staff, manned

with appropriate representation from the military departments

and CIA supplemented by NSA and other agencies which have a

direct interest in the conduct of the NRP, such as the JCS.

There should be a strong Air Force program office

responsive to the interagency NRO entity. SAFSP should

continue to be this organization and should serve as the

primary systems integrator as well as being responsible for

development of satellite reconnaissance payloads and a

technology innovator. A strong CIA program office under

DDS&T should continue. This program office should be oriented

as to be more responsive to the DNRO. It should continue to

pursue a role as an innovator of technology and a developer

of satellite reconnaissance payloads. Its role as an operator

of satellite systems should be deemphasized. At the discretion

of the DNRO.additional program offices may be added or deleted.

A Navy program office should be continued with a role to

include all satellite ocean surveillance. Other potential

program offices include: An Army program office responsible

to the NRO entity so that appropriate interfaces may be

developed to accomplish a battlefield surveillance role, and

an NSA program office oriented toward the operational interface

with the NRP and with a dominant role in controlling theao2t

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- The NRO should be characterized as a corporate structure with a high level ExCom composed of the DCI; a designated

representative of the Secretary of Defense; and a third member

representing the President (such as the Deputy Special .

Assistant for National Security Affairs from the White House).

The ExCom would serve as the board of directors and the DNRO

would serve as the chief executive officer for the conduct of

the NRP. The executive agent for the program should continue

to the Secretary of Defense and in that regard the DNRO would

be responsible for frequent reporting directly to the Secretary.

The normal working staffs of the ExCom principals should remain

outside the decision mechanism for the NRP and the DNRO's Staff

should serve as principal working interface with the ExCom

principals.

Management Authorities 

The DNRO should be permitted to optimize the NRP within

a streamlined decision making environment. He should receive

broad guidance from the ExCom with respect to resource allocation and should be held directly accountable to the Secretary

of Defense for the responsiveness of the NRP. The DNRO should

be also the Under Secretary of the Air Force since principal

support for the day-to-day operation of the program is provided

by the Air Force Systems Command and other components of the

Air Force.

The DNRO should be fully responsible

financial control of the NRP budget. In this

be accountable to the DCI for the NRP portion

intelligence budget with freedom to reprogram

necessary within the NRP.

for centralized

regard, he would

of the national

monies as

Outside review of the NRP by normal Government staff

agencies should be limited to only those agreed upon by the

DNRO.

- With respect to the NRP, the DNRO should be a member

of USIB and IRAC as well as principal liaison for NRO technical

briefings to the members of Congress and their staffs.

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Operations 

NSCID 6 should be clarified in terms of sorting out

the operational responsibilities of the DNRO and the DIRNSA.

The DNRO should assure that NRP SIGINT satellites are compatible with the processing requirements of NSA. He should

also assure that tasking levies are commensurate with technical

capabilities of the satellites in order to optimize both collection and lifetimes of the various SIGINT satellite systems.

Mission operations should be accomplished under definitive USIB guidance and at such time as operational pre-emption

is effected, requiring guidance from JCS or another operational

entity, the DNRO should assure that such pre-emption is in

consonance with the continued balancing of standing USIB

requirements and continued health of satellite payloads.

- With the phase-in of ./ p,and

photographic satellites, the principal funct on o e NRO

Staff in the satellite operations area should be reoriented

toward providing a continual focal point for satellite operational status and the monitoring of overall operations with

respeCt to USIB and tactical requirements. The NRO , Staff

should be the non-advocate interface between the reconnaissance satellite operations and the intelligence community.

Applications 

In addition to being responsible for the conduct of

all traditional satellite reconnaissance, the NRO should be

considered as a synthesizer for the blending of satellites

and requirements for the support of the tactical forces.

The DNRO in his dual capacity as Under Secretary of the Air

Force is in a unique position to do this. The NRO should

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continue to perform its role as a non-advocate within the

intelligence community for the optimization of satellite

capability and collection for support of national and also

tactical intelligence.

The NRO should take the lead in assuring that NASA

maintains full cognizance of NRP sensor application as well

as assuring that reconnaissance activities are not duplicated

within the Government.

The NRO should be the major focal point for the IC/

JCS/Military Department interface with respect to the immediate application of NRP satellites to support the national

decision-making in the battle management role.

Technology 

The NRP should continue aggressively and imaginatively

to exploit technology and all operational resources and

facilities to develop and operate systems for satellite collection of intelligence. The DNRO should continue to be the

principal agent responsible for studies and analyses leading

to the application of technology and also the intelligence

application of satellite borne sensors.

Outside technology and application studies relating to

the NRP should be limited to those under the direct purview

of the DNRO.

Security 

Compartmented security should be continued. Maximum

use should be made of compartmented security commensurate with

the needs to protect certain secrets and the awareness that

the normal DOD security system cannot protect secrets for an

extended period of time.

Th security system should be made less accessible to Government officials; that is, limited to only those

having a direct influence on the decision structure of the NRP.

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In this regard, more full use should be made of the data contained within the TALENT-KEYHOLE security system which contains

all pertinent data about satellite systems and their capabilities except for costs, contract structure, and technical

contract specifications.

NRP streamlined management has been enhanced by the

rigorous security systems because of the control of access

to information which is made possible. The program managers

have control of contractor involvement with those outside

the program because of the security systems. Although not

the intent of compartmented security, the management benefits

are large and a better substitute has not yet been suggested.

Utmost care should be taken by our Government to

protect the freedom to conduct satellite reconnaissance.

Although it is generally agreed that Russia is comfortable

with the stabilizing balance of satellite reconnaissance, the

lesser developed countries and China pose a political threat

similar to that posed by Russia in the early 1960s. The solution created for the earlier threat was to maintain an

official national silence about the program. This policy

today seems ludicrous because of the wide-spread knowledge

of the "fact of" the program. However, the policy has actually

served to preclude others from voicing political opinion about

the program. NASA has been experiencing some difficulty in

the international arena because of the publicized ERTS and

SKYLAB activity. The official U.S. position is that we will

continue to conduct earth observations because it helps all

countries so observed. However, this claim could not be made

vis-a-vis satellite reconnaissance. In addition, satellites

are very fragile and vulnerable even under optimum freedom to

operate. Should an irritated nation decide to ne ate one of

our satellites or Russia'sx,i

Furthermore, since our satellites

are t e only means available to collect much needed data, an

ultra-conservative security policy should be developed to

protect the viability of the program.
H14 vsninci-

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

June 26, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: Study of the National Reconnaissance Program

As you know, the President has directed his Foreign Intelligence Advisory

Board to conduct a study of the National Reconnaissance Program and to

report its findings and recommendations to him.

Pursuant to the President's directive, an ad hoc study panel under the

chairmanship of Dr. William 0. Baker will convene in the Board offices,

Room 340, Old Executive Office Building, on Tuesday, July 23 to meet

individually with the principals involved in this program; it is anticipated

the following additional Board members will participate: Admiral George

W. Anderson, Jr. , (USN, Ret); Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. ; Mr. Gordon

Gray; Dr. Edwin H. Land; and Dr. Edward Teller.

A major purpose of this session is to afford the various principals an

early opportunity to:

present their overview of the most important contemporary

management and operational issues together with their estimates of how

these issues will be resolved; and

suggest the kind of program and organiiational structure they

envision 5-10 years hence.

Depending on your assessment of priorities versus available time, any

additional related areas for discussion would be welcomed.

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Confirming earlier notification to your staff, the panel will be pleased

to discuss the aforementioned with you between 11:00 a.m. and 12:30

p.m. on July 23, 1974. For your information, others who have been

invited to participate at different times on this date are:

Mr. William E. Colby

Director of Central Intelligence

Dr. Albert C. Hall

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

Lt General Lew Allen, Jr.

Director, National Security Agency

The Executive Secretary and I would be pleased to render any further

assistance to facilitate your meeting with the panel.

onel H. Olmer

Special Assistant to the

Executive Secretary

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May 13, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense

The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Study of the National Reconnaissance Program

REFERENCE: The President's Memorandum of May 1, 1974 012002/74)

Reference advises addressees of the President's charge to his Foreign

Intelligence Advisory Board to conduct a study of the structure and organization of the National Reconnaissance Program and to report its

findings and recommendations to him within six months.

The NRP study will be conducted during the summer by an ad hoc panel

of the PFIAB under the chairmanship of Dr. William 0. Baker. The

panel will identify relevant and material issues for examination and will

contact appropriate staff offices and personnel to arrange for briefings.

Information will be solicited from Washington-based authorities, fieldlevel intelligence producers, consumers of the NRP product, and from

industrial contractors who participate in NRP activities.

The Board holds the NRP in very high regard as a major contributor to

the intelligence process. Facing, as we are, limitations on intelligence

resources and enormous quantities of data which technology is prepared

to deliver, we believe the Piesident's charge gives us all a unique opportunity to help shape the intelligence contribution which the NRP must continue to make in the future. We look forward to a series of frank and open

discussions and earnestly solicit the views of management at all levels.

•

George W. Anderson, Jr.

fit w. 4414 Si‘m

Admiral, USN (Ret. )

Chairman

cc: Secretary of the Navy

.Secretary of the Air Force

Administrator of NASA

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)

Director, National Reconnaissance Office e

' Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director*, National Security Agency

•