ORIGINATOR

DIAXX -3A1

DATED

12 Mar 65

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DESCRIPTION OF MATERIAL:

UE46238/659 cy 1 Mil Atch, Proposed Letters, 5 pass 1 cy

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OFFICE COPY DATE/ TIME .

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DIA FORM 13 MARCH 1963 I. 9 26 DIA ROUTING and CONTROL RECORD DIAR 12.19

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CONTROL No. BYE 36238-65 

REFERRED TO

OFFICE

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RECEIVED RELEASED TEEM NY

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SIGNATURE DATE TINE DATE TIME ' NANO et OFFICE SYMBOL. DATE

Dr. Fubi2i

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Ayes: to this document will be restricted to those persons

cleared for the specific projects;

Handle Via Indicated Controls

BYEMAN •

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MAR 1 1 /965

14-rw-L to

This decumbent contains information effecting the notionel security el the United States within the mord

of the sapient'," laws U. S. Code Title 111. Sections 793 elVd 794. The law prohibits its transmissive

the revelation of its contents in any arenner to en unauthorised person, es well es its use in any manner

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

to.

OFFICE OF TIE MIER SECIETAIN

MEMORANDUM

• . 10 March 1965

Dr. Fubini

The attached represents my ideas for

a .possible letter to Mr. McCone from

Mr. Vance regarding the continuing NRO/CIA

management problems. It is entirely consistent with the proposals you made to

Mk.- Vance recently Wes not include,

however, at this time, a redo of the Staff).

Dr. McMillan suggested I "try it out"

on you.

If the attached is not a good approach,

we will put on the "thinking caps" and try

again... In any event, I think we should

try something.

1 atch

draft

COL SYSTEM ONLY 

—.1)1ROJR"4431.

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D1AXX-3A CONTROLLED

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s T. Stewart

rigadier General, USAF

Director, NRO Staff

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Dear John

1-.;-.14'..*L"-: VIA BYEMA:i

CONTROL ONLY

For the past several monthi, it appears to me that you

and I have had to devote an unreasonable amount of time to

management matters in the CORONA Program. I suggest that wet

resolve this and any related management problems without

further delay and, henceforth, focus our ExCom attention to

significant policy aspects of the National Reconnaissance

Program.

I have given considerable thought to the various CORONA

differences and believe that diametrically-opposed management

philosophies in the CIA and NRO are a basic cause of all of

the problems. In my opinion, these two approaches are not

amenable to a harmonious operation wherever individual

project responsibilities are split between Program Directors,

As . I see it, the CIA management philosophy is one of

almost completely centralized technical management and operational

control. The DNRO, on the other hand, delegates responsibility

and authority for complete projects to the appropriate NRO

Program Director in the field. The two philosophies work well

on projects such as IDEALIST, OXCART, GAMBIT, 417,, etc, but

clash head-on in the split-responsibility of the CORONA Program.

The only workable solution appears to be the assignment of

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total responsibility for complete projects to the appropriate

Program Director.

With regard to the CORONA Program, I have reviewed most

carefully the contributions of the DOD and the CIA to its

prosecution. I find that the CIA performs some covert contracting

services, manages "software" support by the IMSC AP Facility, pro1

vides some computer support to the NRO Staff, and has a very

small CORONA technical staff at Langley. I find that the

DOD, on the other hand, also provides contracting services,

does overall system engineering and technical direction,

operates the launch facilities, command and control networks,

and recovery forces, and has a great many people involved (both

technical and operational).

In view of the above, the only logical solution is to

assign total responsibility for the CORONA Program to Gen Greer.

I understand he can assume the covert contracting function

without difficulty. I assume that you will desire to assign

the experienced technical people on your staff to him and

station them in Los Angeles; this would permit the best

possible utilization of these CIA skills. Computer support

of the NRO Staff can continue as in the past.

This action will clarify the responsibility for all

satellite programs by consolidating them under the appropriate
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Program Director. In the space reconnaissance area, your

staff probably should direct their attention only to studies

and science/technology efforts as a part of the total NRP.

In analyzing the overall NRO, I find that the bulk of the

aircraft technical and operational management assets are either

CIA employees or AF personnel assigned directly to the CIA.

With one exception--TAGBOARD--operational and advanced aircraft

projects are now the total responsibility of the Director, Program

B. In view of the close relationship of the TAGBOARD and

OXCART projects, it would appear prudent to assign them both to

Fl Program B in lieu of the present arrangement.

This adjustment of aircraft programs would then complete

the realignment of responSibilities, with complete satellite

Cr1 r,

sc projects assigned to Program A, and complete/related aircraft

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- pft projects to Program B. This assignment of responsibilities would

permit a harmonious operation even with the differing management

L) philosophies.

r' In line with all of the preceding, therefore, I propose

that the following Arfalgaler decisions and actions be effected

1 April:

a. Responsibility for existing CIA-let CORONA contracts

with Itek, MSC, and GE be reassigned to the Director, Program A.

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The Director, Program A, station qualified

technical representatives at all of these facilities.

CORONA technical personnel on your staff, who

you feel can be spared, be reassigned to Director, Program A,

and stationed in Los Angeles.

Computer support by CIA to the NRO Staff be

continued.

Responsibility for TAGBOARD be reassigned to the

Director, Program B.

The CIA staff support the NRO in space matters

with appropriate studies and science/technology efforts that

are an integral part of the total NRP.

Future space system projects be assigned to the

Director, Program A.

h. Future aircraft system projects be assigned to '

the Director, Program B.

The above appears to be completely compatible with the

13 March 1963 CIA-DOD agreement re the NRP. However, I feel

that document does suffer somewhat by not spelling out, in

more definitive terms, the roles and missions of the participants.

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In that vein, an addendum might be in order. I suggest,

therefore, that we establish a small ad hoc group under

General Stewart to prepare.a proposed annex for our approval.

Please let me have your views within a few days. I feel

it is most urgent that we settle these management problems

at once and get on to more pressing affairs.

Sincerely,

• -•-•24.).

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;• Cyrus Vance

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