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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTHONY JOHN BRUNO, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1639 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 5, 2017,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0011115-2016.

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 31, 2019

Anthony John Bruno appeals from the judgment of sentence, imposing 

incarceration of 11 months and 29 days to 23 months and 29 days in the 

Allegheny County Jail. This sentence followed a bench trial where the judge 

convicted Bruno of attempted robbery,1 conspiracy to commit robbery,2

carrying a firearm without a license,3 and possessing instruments of a crime.4 

Bruno challenges only the denial of his suppression motion. We affirm.

The Commonwealth charged Bruno along with his two accomplices –

Michael Allan Yots and Michael Thomas – and it consolidated their cases. Yots

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).
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filed a motion to suppress the Commonwealth’s evidence, which police had 

seized following a traffic stop. Primarily, Yots alleged officers had made that 

stop without reasonable suspicion. Bruno orally joined in the motion, which 

the suppression court denied that same day.

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the judge made the

following findings of fact:

The Court finds that . . . Officer Greg Bauman received 

information from a gentleman by the name of Regis Zlacki. 

The information [was] . . . that within the next five hours or 

so, an actual robbery and potential homicide was going to 

be committed against an individual by the name of Scott 

Hiwiller.

Mr. Zlacki indicated that he does know Mr. Hiwiller, and 

he does know Mr. Hiwiller to be involved in, potentially,

drugs, marijuana. He indicated that the motive of the 

robbery was for purposes of money – the Court could draw 

the inference – Mr. Hiwiller allegedly would have obtained 

by selling and distributing marijuana.

He gave the police officers specific information with 

regard to the vehicle. He gave specific information with 

regard to the individual that he specifically worked with, and 

that individual was identified as Michael Yots, that they had 

worked together, he had known him, and Mr. Yots was the 

individual that first shared the information with Mr. Zlacki 

with regard to this planned robbery and potential homicide.

Mr. Zlacki gave specific information that another 

individual by the name of Michael was involved. Although 

he did not know his last name, he described him as having

. . . a Brett-Keisel-type beard,

[5] and ultimately, that 

____________________________________________

5 Brett Keisel is a retired, professional football player from the National 

Football League. According to his Wikipedia page, Mr. Keisel “played 12 

seasons for the Pittsburgh Steelers . . . .” WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYLCOPEDIA, 
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individual is [one of] the defendants in this case, a Mr. 

Michael Thomas. 

[Mr. Zlacki] also indicated there was a third individual 

who was to participate in this. I believed he said he was of 

Italian descent, an Italian-looking individual and he may 

have known - - he said he knew the name as either Bruno 

or Dino or something to that effect, but an Italian name.

He gave them a specific description of the car that they 

would be in. He gave a specific description with regard to 

the items that would be in the car. That would include, but 

is not limited to, firearms, duct tape, various items that 

would be needed in order to both rob an individual, bind 

them, gag them and ultimately firearms for both threatening 

the individual, as well as killing the individual.

He gave the specific place that he was to meet them that 

evening. The Shop ‘n Save parking lot in the Russellton area 

is the place where he was to meet them and engage in the 

criminal activity with them.

The officer, based on that information, believed that a 

felony was in the course of being committed, namely, both 

a robbery and potentially a homicide. Officer Bauman acted 

____________________________________________

“Brett Keisel,” available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brett_Keisel (last 

visited 1/10/19). 

Prior to Super Bowl XLV, his beard looked like this:

Id.
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upon that information with the intent to stop the vehicle and 

to prevent an ongoing felonious type act. He obtained other 

officers to be involved. He obtained the Pennsylvania State 

Police to be involved from the standpoint of the potential

victim, Mr. Scott Hiwiller. 

Ultimately, they located a red Jeep Liberty, not a black 

Jeep Liberty, but a newer model Jeep. When he stopped the 

vehicle, three individuals were in the car. He specifically 

described the individuals and where they were sitting in the 

car, and there was a driver that was Michael Thomas in the 

driver’s side seat. He described the front passenger was Mr. 

Anthony Bruno, that the rear-seat passenger . . . behind the 

driver’s side seat, rear seat as Michael Yots, the individual 

[Mr. Zlacki] knew and he worked with and were the 

individuals that he met along the way in the course of

planning this alleged criminal activity.

The officers in clear view - - Officer Bauman testified he 

saw duct tape, one of the things that could be used in the 

commission of a crime on its own. It’s not necessarily a 

criminal act, but if used in a manner as described by Mr. 

Zlacki then obviously [it] can be used for criminal purposes.

He also saw a holster which he was told by Mr. Zlacki they 

would have guns of various type and weapons in the car.

Based on that, clearly, this Court finds that the officer, 

while there was no traffic violation, had more than a 

reasonable suspicion to stop that vehicle. This Court would 

hold that it probably went above reasonable suspicion and 

probably even rose to the level of probable cause for the 

purposes of stopping the vehicle.

Once the vehicle was stopped, based on the items that 

the officer viewed in plain view, he at that point proceeded

with an investigative detention, which he is permitted to do. 

The purpose of the investigative detention is to do further 

inquiry and investigation.

N.T., 5/8/17, at 152-57.

After denying suppression, the court of common pleas proceeded to 

convict and sentence Bruno, as previously mentioned. It denied his postsentence motions, and this timely appeal followed.
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Bruno listed one issue in his appellate brief. He claims that we should 

reverse the denial of suppression, because “the police had neither a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when they performed 

that warrantless vehicle stop, nor probable cause for a warrantless arrest.” 

Bruno’s Brief at 7. Essentially, Bruno challenges the reliability of Mr. Zlacki, 

who reported the impending robbery and murder of Mr. Hiwiller, to serve as 

an informant and give rise to reasonable suspicion to pull over Bruno and his 

accomplices on their way to rob and possibly to kill Mr. Hiwiller.

However, this argument flies in the face of our scope of review. Bruno 

has, for all intents and purposes, asked this Court to reweigh the credibility of 

one the Commonwealth’s witness. This we may not do. See Commonwealth 

v. Smith, 177 A.3d 915 (Pa. Super. 2017).

When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, the appellate court 

may only determine if the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are correct. Id. at 918. We 

may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted, because the 

Commonwealth has won below. Id. Our review of suppression rulings 

includes only the suppression hearing record itself. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 

1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013). 

The suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate 

court; rather, our duty is to determine if the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts. Commonwealth v. Romero, 183 A.3d 364, 377 
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(Pa. 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Because the police 

did not obtain a warrant prior to taking the actions at bar, our standard of 

review is de novo. Id.

Here, the suppression court has already conclusively determined that 

“Regis Zlacki credibly testified at the suppression hearing that a co-worker, 

Mike Yots, asked him to be part of a robbery.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/18, 

at 3 (citing N.T., 5/8/17, at 10-11). After observing Mr. Zlacki in their police 

station or on the witness stand, both the officers and the suppression judge 

believed him. Accordingly, there is no basis for this Court to second guess 

their in-person impressions from the cold record. Bruno’s claim that Mr. Zlacki 

could not be a reliable informant, creating reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause, fails at the appellate level.

Thus, as the learned Judge Philip A. Ignelzi explained in his 1925(a) 

Opinion:

the reasonable suspicion standard is “less stringent” than 

the probable cause standard. Commonwealth v. Cook, 

735 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. 1999). In order to demonstrate 

reasonable suspicion, the police officer must be able to point 

to specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences 

drawn from those facts in light of the officer’s experience. 

Id. at 677.

Likewise, probable cause exists if the facts and 

circumstances within the knowledge of the police officer at 

the time of the arrest are sufficient to justify a person of 

reasonable caution in believing the suspect has committed 

or is committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Rodrigez, 

666 A.2d 292, 295 (Pa. Super. 1995). The Superior Court 

also noted that, “[we] focus on the circumstances as seen 

through the eye of a trained police officer, taking into 

consideration that probable cause does not involve 
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certainties, but rather the factual and practical 

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 

prudent men act.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 736 A.2d 

624 (Pa. Super. 1999), citing Commonwealth v. Romero, 

673 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. Super. 1996) . . .

In this case, the determination of whether reasonable 

suspicion and/or probable cause to arrest exists would be 

based upon the totality of the circumstances as known by 

Detective Bauman at the time the Defendant was taken into 

custody. This includes the information provided to Detective 

Bauman by Regis Zlacki and the other law enforcement 

officers he spoke to . . . 

Using the totality of the circumstances test, Officer 

Bauman, had more than ample reasonable suspicion, as well 

as probable cause, to arrest Bruno. As such, the 

suppression court correctly found probable cause existed for 

the Defendant's arrest. The suppression court’s ruling on 

this matter should be upheld.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/18, at 9-10.

We agree. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to stop the Jeep Liberty and investigate whether its 

occupants were committing or about to commit felonies as the known 

informant had reported. 

Moreover, we reject Bruno’s proposition that the police did not follow 

the vehicle far enough to allow them to stop it, given Mr. Zlacki’s detailed 

report to authorities. See Bruno’s Brief at 15. Bruno’s logic is flawed. There 

is no limit to his wait-and-see defense, unless the police withhold action until 

the Jeep Liberty has parked at the intended victim’s residence. For no matter 

how far the officers might have followed it, there would always be a next,
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theoretical turn where it could have hypothetically traveled away from Mr. 

Hiwiller’s home. 

In fact, even had the officers made this investigatory stop only one block 

short of the planned crime scene, Bruno still could have argued that the Jeep 

Liberty might have driven past the address and thereby negated all reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause. But officers need not wait until they witness a 

crime in process or have prima facie evidence of a crime to acquire reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause. See Rodriquez, supra. And they also need not 

allow felons to come within striking distance of their victims before taking 

investigative action. Thus, we conclude that the police did not need to waitand-see which direction on State Route 28 the Jeep Liberty traveled before 

making this investigatory stop.

Therefore, the order denying Bruno’s motion to suppress the evidence 

against him was appropriate, and his only issue on appeal fails.

Judgement of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/31/2019