J-S20035-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM SCOTT RITTER JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3333 EDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 6, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0002238-2009

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J. and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2017

William Scott Ritter, Jr., appeals, pro se, from the order entered 

October 6, 2016, in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas dismissing 

his first petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Ritter seeks relief from judgment of sentence of an 

aggregate term of 18 to 66 months’ imprisonment imposed October 26, 

2011, following his jury conviction of, inter alia, indecent exposure and three 

counts of unlawful contact with a minor, based upon sexually explicit 

communications he had with a police detective who was posing as a 15-

year-old female. On appeal, Ritter contends the PCRA court abused its 

discretion when it failed to consider newly discovered evidence that would 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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have precluded the Commonwealth from presenting evidence of Ritter’s prior 

arrests for similar crimes in New York state. Because we conclude Ritter is 

no longer eligible for PCRA relief, we affirm.

The facts underlying Ritter’s arrest and conviction are well known to 

the parties, and were summarized by a panel of this Court in the 

memorandum decision affirming Ritter’s sentence on direct appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Ritter, 91 A.3d 1273 [975 EDA 2012] (Pa. Super. 

2013) (unpublished memorandum). Therefore, we need not reiterate them 

herein. The following facts, however, are relevant to the issues raised on 

appeal:

Prior to trial, the Commonwealth uncovered information, 

via a Google search, of Ritter’s prior arrests from online sex sting 

operations in New York. The public internet search yielded news 

articles reporting that, in April 2011, Ritter communicated online 

in a chat room with an undercover police officer posing as a 14–

year–old female and arranged to meet the “girl” at a local 

business in Albany. Ritter arrived at the designated location and 

was questioned by the authorities; however, he was released 

without any charges being filed. Two months later, Ritter was 

again caught in the same kind of sex sting after he tried to lure 

what he thought was a 16–year–old female to a fast food 

restaurant. Ritter was subsequently charged, but the Albany 

District Attorney placed the case on hold.

Upon discovery of the publicly available articles regarding 

Ritter’s prior engagement in internet sex stings, the 

Commonwealth requested and later received copies of those 

records from the Albany County District Attorney’s Office. The 

Commonwealth provided Ritter with copies of the records in 

compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 573. Unbeknownst to the 

Commonwealth, the New York state records were sealed at the 

time they were forwarded to the Commonwealth, prompting the 

Commonwealth to return the records to the Albany County 

District Attorney’s Office. A petition to unseal the records was 
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subsequently filed and granted by the trial court in Albany 

County[.]1

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1 Ritter filed a motion to vacate the order entered unsealing the 

record in Albany County which was denied. Ritter then appealed 

that decision to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, 

Appellate Division.

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Thereafter, the Commonwealth filed a notice of prior bad 

acts as well as a motion in limine seeking to introduce the New 

York arrest records at trial. In response thereto, Ritter filed a 

motion for dismissal/change of venue as well as a motion in 

limine seeking to preclude this evidence. The trial court held a 

hearing on the motions. At the hearing, the Commonwealth’s 

exhibits, consisting in part of the New York arrest records, were 

admitted under seal. After the hearing, the trial court entered 

an order and accompanying opinion granting the 

Commonwealth's motion in limine, permitting evidence of 

Ritter's prior bad acts in New York to be admitted at trial.

Following a jury trial, Ritter was found guilty of all but one 

count. Prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court of the State 

of New York, Appellate Division reversed and vacated the 

order of the Albany County court unsealing Ritter’s 

records. Ritter then filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to 

Rule 704(B) or in the alternative to postpone sentencing. The 

trial court sentenced Ritter on October 26, 2011. At the time of 

sentencing Ritter made an oral motion for extraordinary relief. 

After extensive argument regarding the New York records, the 

trial court denied Ritter’s request for a new trial and sentenced 

Ritter to an aggregate period of 18 to 66 months’ imprisonment. 

Ritter filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. 

Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

As noted supra, Ritter’s judgment of sentence was affirmed on direct 

appeal. On appeal, Ritter argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in 

failing to grant a new trial when the Supreme Court of New York Appellate 

Division reversed the Albany County court’s order unsealing Ritter’s arrest 
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records. See id. at *3. The panel determined the information regarding 

Ritter’s prior arrests for internet sex crimes was relevant and its “probative 

value outweighed any prejudicial effect to Ritter.” Id. Moreover, because 

the records were “unsealed at the time of their production to the 

Commonwealth ... and at that time of Ritter’s jury trial[,]” the panel 

concluded the trial court did not err in permitting the Commonwealth to 

admit the records into evidence. Id. (emphasis in original). Subsequently, 

on May 21, 2014, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Ritter’s petition 

for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Ritter, 92 A.3d 811 (Pa. 

2014). 

On April 6, 2015, Ritter filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, again 

challenging the trial court’s admission of his New York arrest records. Ritter 

argued that a February 5, 2015, decision of the Albany County, New York 

court, precluding any reference to the now-sealed arrest records during his 

New York state Sexual Offenders Registration Act (“SORA”) hearing, must be 

afforded “full faith and credit” in his Pennsylvania proceedings. See PCRA 

Petition, 4/6/2015, at 12-18. By order dated January 14, 2016, the PCRA 

court denied Ritter’s motion without first conducting a hearing.

Ritter filed a timely appeal. However, both the PCRA court and the 

Commonwealth asked this Court to remand the matter because the PCRA 

court failed to provide Ritter with the requisite notice of its intent to dismiss 

the petition without first conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 
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Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On July 12, 2016, this Court entered a per curium order 

vacating the order denying PCRA relief and remanding for further 

proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Ritter, 380 EDA 2016, Order, 

7/12/2016. 

On August 29, 2016, Ritter requested the PCRA court conduct a 

Grazier2 hearing, so that he could continue to proceed pro se. Three days 

later, Ritter filed a pro se petition for an evidentiary hearing. Thereafter, on 

September 9, 2016, the PCRA court conducted a Grazier hearing, and 

entered an order granting Ritter’s request to proceed pro se. Subsequently, 

on September 15, 2016, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its 

intent to dismiss Ritter’s petition without first conducting an evidentiary 

hearing. Although Ritter filed a 44-page response, the PCRA court entered 

an order dismissing Ritter’s petition on October 6, 2016. This timely appeal 

follows.3 

Before we may address the issues Ritter raises on appeal, we must 

first determine if Ritter is statutorily eligible for PCRA relief. Although not 

addressed by the PCRA court or either party, it is well-established that to be 

eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must prove that at the time relief is 

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2 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

3 Although the PCRA court did not direct Ritter to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Ritter, 

nevertheless, filed concise statement on November 2, 2016.
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granted he is “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or 

parole for the crime[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i). “Case law has strictly 

interpreted the requirement that the petitioner be currently serving a 

sentence for the crime to be eligible for relief.” Commonwealth v. 

Plunkett, 151 A.3d 1108, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, ___ A.3d 

___, 2017 WL 2081583 (May 15, 2017).

This Court’s decision in Plunkett is dispositive. In that case, the 

defendant filed a timely PCRA petition while on probation following a 

conviction of theft by deception. See Plunkett, supra, 151 A.3d at 1109. 

The PCRA court conducted a hearing on the issues raised in the petition and, 

in June of 2015, entered an order denying relief. The defendant 

subsequently filed a timely appeal. Thereafter, in January of 2016, while the 

appeal was pending in this Court, the trial court entered an order 

terminating the defendant’s probationary sentence. See id. On appeal, this 

Court determined the defendant was not entitled to relief because he was no 

longer serving a sentence for the conviction at issue. The panel opined: 

“[W]e find the statutory requirement that a PCRA petitioner be currently 

serving a sentence is applicable to the instant circumstance where the PCRA 

court’s order was issued while petitioner was still serving the required 

sentence, but that sentence terminated prior to the resolution of his appeal.” 

Id. at 1113. See also Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754 (Pa. 2013) 

(“Because individuals who are not serving a state sentence have no liberty 
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interest in and therefore no due process right to collateral review of that 

sentence, the statutory limitation of collateral review to individuals serving a 

sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole is consistent with the due 

process prerequisite of a protected liberty interest.”), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 

1771 (U.S. 2014); Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (finding appellant was no longer eligible for relief on DUI 

convictions for which he had completed his sentence, but considering 

collateral claims with regard to conviction of fleeing while DUI), appeal 

denied, 125 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 2015).

Here, Ritter was sentenced to a maximum term of 66 months’ 

imprisonment on October 26, 2011. The sentencing transcript reveals that 

Ritter was taken into custody immediately following the hearing. See N.T., 

10/26/2011, at 225. Although, in his post-sentence motion, Ritter 

requested bail pending appeal, the court denied his request. See Order, 

3/20/2012. Accordingly, Ritter’s sentence expired on April 26, 2017, and he 

is statutorily ineligible for PCRA relief.4 

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4

In fact, Ritter acknowledged this in two prior filings. See Motion for PostConviction Collateral Relief, 4/6/2015, at 5 (stating “Petitioner will complete 

his period of parole on April 2[6], 2017”); Letter to PCRA court dated 

8/25/2016, at 1 (requesting the court “expeditiously process” his petition 

because his “parole expires on April 26, 2017”). 
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Because Ritter is no longer serving a sentence for the convictions that 

are the subject of this PCRA petition, he is not entitled to PCRA relief, and 

we affirm the order on appeal.5

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2017

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5 We note that because Ritter was still serving his sentence at the time the 

PCRA court issued its Rule 907 notice and accompanying opinion, the court 

addressed the merits of the issues raised on appeal. However, it is wellsettled that “we may affirm a PCRA court's decision on any grounds if the 

record supports it.” Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (quotation omitted).