No. 417 August 16, 2023 485

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF OREGON

Cody JOHNSON,

Elysia Johnson, Thomas Vogel, 

Shealene Vogel, and Lane County,

Respondents,

v.

LANDWATCH LANE COUNTY 

and 1000 Friends Of Oregon,

Petitioners.

Land Use Board of Appeals

2022066

KIMBERLY O’DEA, 

John O’Dea, Bernard Perkins, 

Theresa Iverson-Perkins, Thomas Vogel, 

Shealene Vogel, and Lane County,

Respondents,

v.

LANDWATCH LANE COUNTY 

and 1000 Friends of Oregon,

Petitioners.

Land Use Board of Appeals

2022067; A180799

Argued and submitted April 26, 2023.

Sean T. Malone argued the cause and filed the brief for 

petitioners.

Gregory S. Hathaway argued the cause for respondents Kimberly O’Dea, John O’Dea, Bernard Perkins, and 

Theresa Iverson-Perkins. Also on the brief was Hathaway 

Larson LLP.

Zachary P. Mittge argued the cause for respondents Cody 

and Elysia Johnson. Also on the brief was Hutchinson Cox.
486 Johnson v. Landwatch Lane County

Matthew A. Martin, T. Beau Ellis, and Vial Fotheringham 

LLP filed the brief for respondents Thomas and Shealene 

Vogel.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and 

Pagan, Judge.

MOONEY, J.

Affirmed.
Cite as 327 Or App 485 (2023) 487

MOONEY, J.

This land use case concerns the revocation by Lane 

County of a legal lot verification1

 (LLV) that it had approved 

approximately ten years earlier. The county approved John 

and Kimberly O’Dea’s application for an LLV in 2012, followed by a series of property line adjustments and forest 

template dwelling2

 approvals. In 2022, the county invoked 

Lane Code (LC) 14.090(8)(a)(iv)3

 to revoke the 2012 LLV4

because it concluded that the LLV had been secured by 

false or misleading information. A county hearings official 

upheld the revocation, concluding that the “[c]ounty has a 

duty to enforce the provisions of its land use code” and that 

“ignoring the egregious violations that have occurred in 

this case” was not a “viable option.” The Land Use Board of 

Appeals (LUBA) reversed the decision of the hearings official, concluding that the county’s use of LC 14.090(8)(a)(iv) 

to revoke the LLV was improper under the circumstances. 

Intervenors Landwatch Lane County and 1000 Friends of 

Oregon (collectively referred to as Landwatch) petitioned for 

judicial review of LUBA’s final opinion. The county did not 

seek review and does not appear before us. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to ORS 197.830. 

Landwatch challenges LUBA’s final opinion and order as 

“unlawful in substance” under ORS 197.850(9)(a). We, thus, 

review “whether LUBA correctly applied the law.” Coopman 

v. City of Eugene, 327 Or App 6, 10, ___ P3d ___ (2023). In 

1 Lane Code (LC) 13.140 provides the process, submittal standards, and criteria for legal lot verification. Here, the O’Deas sought and received verification 

for three legal lots within their Springfield property.

2 An application for a “forest template dwelling” is, essentially, a request for 

permission to build a home on a parcel of land located within a forest zone. See

ORS 215.705 (criteria for forestland dwellings).

3 LC 14.090 provides, as relevant:

“(8)(a) The Director may suspend or revoke a decision issued in accordance with this chapter for any reason listed in subsection (8)(a)(i) through 

(iv) below. * **

“**** *

“(iv) The approval was secured with false or misleading information.”

4 The county also revoked seven other land use decisions that were based, at 

least in part, on the 2012 LLV. When we refer to the revocation of the 2012 LLV, 

we are referring to all eight revocations.
488 Johnson v. Landwatch Lane County

particular, Landwatch challenges LUBA’s interpretation of 

the law and alleges that it exceeded its authority when it 

reversed the revocation decision. We review LUBA’s interpretation of the law for legal error. Id. Our review is confined to the record that was before LUBA, and we do not 

substitute our judgment for that of LUBA’s as to any factual issue. ORS 197.850(8); Central Oregon LandWatch v. 

Deschutes County, 285 Or App 267, 276, 396 P3d 968 (2017). 

The pertinent facts are drawn from the record and, unless 

otherwise noted, are undisputed.

THE 2012 LEGAL LOT VERIFICATION

In December 2011, the O’Deas filed an application 

with the county seeking verification that three lots had 

been lawfully created within their Springfield property.5

Kimberly O’Dea was an attorney who practiced land use law 

regularly in Lane County and with whom county staff were 

familiar because of that practice. In support of their application, the O’Deas submitted several deeds and property 

description cards to demonstrate that three discrete units 

of land had been established within their property in the 

early 1960s. The deeds that the O’Deas submitted did not, 

however, match the official deeds with the corresponding 

unique recording number on file with Lane County Deeds 

and Records. There were also multiple versions of the Lane 

County Assessment and Taxation department’s property 

description cards (PDC) included with the application and 

materials.6

 The county did not notice the discrepancies in 

the deeds or the PDCs when it went through its verification 

process. Had county personnel compared the deeds submitted by the O’Deas with the county’s deeds of corresponding recording numbers, the discrepancies would have been 

apparent. The county approved the application and issued 

its formal LLV in 2012, along with its notice of appeal rights. 

5 The ability to demonstrate that a unit of land was lawfully created is generally needed to obtain approval to build a home on that unit of land. 

6 The PDCs maintained by the county’s tax department identify property by 

tax lot number. Each PDC contains the legal description of the represented tax lot 

and a list of the deeds by which the property was conveyed over the course of time. 

Those deeds are listed on the PDC by the unique recording number assigned to 

each deed when recorded by Lane County Deeds and Records. The PDC is, thus, 

a source of information that can be used to identify and pull deeds relevant to the 

verification process.
Cite as 327 Or App 485 (2023) 489

There was no appeal, and the LLV became final. Several lot 

adjustments and two applications to build forest template 

dwellings related to one or more of the legal lots verified 

by the county in 2012 were subsequently approved. Those 

subsequent land use decisions were not appealed, and they 

likewise became final.

THE 2022 REVOCATION PROCEEDING

The county learned of the discrepancies in the 

deeds and PDCs about ten years after the LLV was issued. 

It confirmed through forensic analysis that the deeds submitted by the O’Deas in support of their LLV application 

had been subjected to “cut and paste fabrications.” At that 

point, the statutory period of ultimate repose to appeal the 

2012 LLV had run.7

 The county concluded that the LLV had 

been obtained “with false or misleading information” and, 

therefore, it revoked the 2012 LLV under LC 14.090(8)(a)(iv).

The O’Deas and others with property interests that 

were affected by the revocation requested a hearing on the 

county’s decision. The assigned hearings official upheld the 

revocation after the hearing, noting that “[f]ake deeds were 

used to obtain approval of two more dwellings than would 

have been lawfully allowed,” and emphasizing the importance of protecting “the integrity of the County’s land use 

system, in particular the regulations prohibiting constructing dwellings on properties that were not lawfully created.” 

The hearings official granted the property owners’ request for 

reconsideration but ultimately reaffirmed the county’s revocation decision. The landowners, in turn, appealed to LUBA.

THE LUBA APPEAL

On appeal before LUBA, the landowners assigned 

error to the revocation decision, arguing that the county had 

misconstrued the law or exceeded its jurisdiction because 

7 ORS 197.830 provides, as relevant:

“(6) The appeal periods described in subsections (3), (4) and (5) of this 

section:

“(a) May not exceed three years after the date of the decision, except as 

provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection.

“(b) May not exceed 10 years after the date of the decision if notice of 

a hearing or an administrative decision made pursuant to ORS 197.195 or 

197.797 is required but has not been provided.”
490 Johnson v. Landwatch Lane County

the decision to revoke was an impermissible collateral 

attack against the 2012 LLV.8

 They argued that the county’s decision to revoke was inconsistent with the statutory 

preference for finality of land use decisions. According to 

the county, however, the doctrine prohibiting the collateral 

attack of land use decisions does not apply here because 

this was a direct attack against the 2012 LLV through a 

“revocation proceeding” initiated to annul the original land 

use decision as having been secured by false or misleading 

information. LC 14.090(8)(a)(iv). Landwatch agreed with the 

county, arguing that under LUBA’s own case law, revocation 

proceedings are “akin to” enforcement proceedings and, as 

such, are direct challenges to prior decisions and not impermissible collateral attacks.

LUBA reversed the decision of the hearings official 

and, thus, the revocation decision. It highlighted the importance of finality in land use decisions, pointing to the state’s 

policy that such matters be expeditiously and consistently 

decided according to sound principles of judicial review, codified in ORS 197.805:

“It is the policy of the Legislative Assembly that time is 

of the essence in reaching final decisions in matters involving land use and that those decisions be made consistently 

with sound principles governing judicial review. It is the 

intent of the Legislative Assembly in enacting ORS 197.805 

to 197.855 to accomplish these objectives.”

LUBA specifically reasoned that:

“Short deadlines for decision-making and appeal 

throughout the process, including expedited review of land 

use matters by local governments, LUBA, and the Court of 

Appeals, implement the policy.”

In LUBA’s view, it was improper for the county to 

use LC 14.090(8)(a)(iv) to revoke the 2012 LLV because, in 

doing so, the county effectively granted itself an unlimited 

8 A collateral attack “is an attempt to impeach the decree in a proceeding 

not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying the 

decree” or enjoining its execution. Morrill v. Morrill and Killen, 20 Or 96, 101, 25 

P 362 (1890). Collateral attacks are not permitted because the court or other tribunal having jurisdiction over parties and subject matter “has a right to decide 

every question arising in the case, and, however erroneous its decision may be, it 

is binding on the parties until reversed or annulled.” Id. at 102.
Cite as 327 Or App 485 (2023) 491

period of time in which to challenge a final land use decision. 

Finality is an established and important feature expressly 

incorporated into Oregon’s land use laws. LUBA found that 

the revocation was impermissible because it was directly at 

odds with that state policy. LUBA stated that “the county 

may not use its revocation procedure to grant itself a ‘second 

bite at the apple’ [to] undo its error in approving the 2012 

LLV.” LUBA reversed the revocation as an “impermissible 

attack” on the 2012 LLV.

THE ARGUMENTS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW

On review, Landwatch contends that LUBA erred 

by reversing the LLV revocation. It argues that the revocation was not an impermissible collateral attack against 

the 2012 LLV, but was instead a direct attack, “akin to an 

enforcement proceeding,” and, as such, was permitted under 

LC 14.090(8)(a)(iv).9

 It argues further that, even if the county’s revocation of the LLV can be properly characterized as 

a collateral attack, it was nevertheless permissible, because 

the county has an overriding interest in combating fraud in 

the land use application process. According to Landwatch, 

that interest outweighed the state’s interest in the finality 

of land use decisions.

Respondents on review are the O’Deas and several 

others with current ownership interests in lots verified, or 

affected, by the 2012 LLV (collectively referred to as the 

landowners). The landowners appear in three groups, each 

separately represented. Although the groups have somewhat nuanced arguments on review, they are unified in their 

argument that the LLV revocation contravened Oregon’s 

express statutory policy favoring finality in land use decisions. The landowners argue that the revocation upended a 

10-year-old land use decision that set in motion the undoing 

of other land use decisions upon which they had each relied 

in making important and costly decisions in their personal 

lives. The landowners assert that LUBA’s final opinion and 

order is lawful in substance because the county exceeded its 

authority when it used LC 14.090(8)(a)(iv) to revoke a final 

9 As we will explain, LUBA did not conclude that the revocation was an 

impermissible collateral attack against the 2012 LLV.
492 Johnson v. Landwatch Lane County

land use decision, made 10 years earlier, that had never 

been appealed.

ANALYSIS

Oregon’s comprehensive land use laws were adopted, 

generally, to address threats posed to the environment and 

to the health, safety, prosperity, and welfare of Oregonians 

by the uncoordinated use of lands within the state. 

ORS 197.005(1). Our land use laws promote the coordinated 

use of lands through a system of comprehensive land use 

goals and plans adopted throughout the state with a clear 

process for compliance review. ORS 197.005(2).

As noted, the legislature has expressly declared that 

“time is of the essence in reaching final decisions in matters 

involving land use and that those decisions be made consistently with sound principles governing judicial review.” 

ORS 197.805. That policy applies to land use matters generally. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. LCDC (Clatsop Co.), 301 Or 

622, 628 n 4, 724 P2d 805 (1986). Finality brings certainty. 

Certainty in this context allows private and public entities 

as well as ordinary people to make important decisions 

about whether to sell or purchase real property and whether 

and how to develop and use that property. LUBA was correct when it stated that a primary “purpose of [the land use 

statutes] is to provide certainty in matters involving land 

use for local governments, developers, opponents, and those 

who hold an interest in land.” There are many policies that 

no doubt play an important role in Oregon’s legal land use 

system. Discouraging the fraudulent submission of information is surely among those. But speed and finality are 

the policies selected and expressly named by the legislature 

as “objectives” it intended “to accomplish” through the legal 

framework it established for land use decisions. Id.

LUBA was created as part of the comprehensive 

land use system and was delegated exclusive jurisdiction to 

review “any land use decision *** of a local government[.]” 

ORS 197.825(1). “By creating LUBA and giving it exclusive 

jurisdiction, the legislature created a body with particular 

expertise to review land use decisions * **. Quick disposition 

of disputed issues is also central to the statutory scheme.” 
Cite as 327 Or App 485 (2023) 493

Simon v. Board of Co. Comm. Of Marion Co., 91 Or App 487, 

489, 755 P2d 741 (1988). “[R]eaching final decisions” is also 

central to the statutory scheme. ORS 197.805. LUBA was 

statutorily designed as a specialized tribunal with the ability and capacity to render efficient and conclusive reviews of 

local and statewide land use decisions. Its design serves the 

statutory preference for speed and finality simply because 

it makes it possible for LUBA to quickly and conclusively 

deliver sound reviews of land use decisions.

We turn to Landwatch’s arguments on review. 

Landwatch argues that the county’s revocation of the LLV 

was a direct attack “akin to an enforcement proceeding[,]” 

and not an impermissible collateral attack on the LLV. The 

parties allocated much of their arguments to the task of 

characterizing the 2022 revocation as either a collateral 

attack or a direct attack against the 2012 LLV. As already 

mentioned, a collateral attack would not be permitted and, 

if LUBA had reached that conclusion, that would be the 

end of the inquiry. And yet LUBA did not decide whether 

the revocation proceeding was a collateral or direct attack, 

instead stating that “[w]hether a revocation proceeding constitutes a direct or a collateral attack is a distinction without a difference with respect to the policy of finality of land 

use decisions.” We address the argument because LUBA 

rejected it as irrelevant, and our review of the lawfulness 

of LUBA’s opinion would fall short if we did not consider the 

arguments the parties placed before it—and us—on that 

question.

As we understand Landwatch’s argument, it does 

not analogize the revocation proceeding to an enforcement proceeding—a direct attack—to suggest that LUBA 

exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing the county’s decision 

to revoke the LLV. We note that under ORS 197.825(3), the 

circuit courts retain jurisdiction to enforce LUBA’s orders, 

but LUBA has exclusive jurisdiction to review land use decisions. Importantly, the circuit courts do not have jurisdiction over issues that could have been “resolved through the 

[county’s] land use decision and through an appeal to LUBA 

from that decision.” Doney v. Clatsop County, 142 Or App 

497, 502, 921 P2d 1346 (1996) (internal quotation marks 
494 Johnson v. Landwatch Lane County

omitted). Given that Landwatch asserts that we have jurisdiction to review LUBA’s final order under ORS 197.850(3)(a), 

which provides for judicial review of land use decisions under 

ORS 197.830, we infer that it does not contend that LUBA 

was without authority to review the decision to revoke the 

LLV.

In its final opinion and order, LUBA acknowledged 

that its review of the hearings official’s order was not “an 

appeal under ORS 197.830(3), (4), or (5)” and that, therefore, 

“the periods of ultimate repose in ORS 197.830(6) do not 

apply.” It nevertheless considered the time limitations set 

forth in ORS 197.830(6) as a guide when it applied the principle of finality to the facts before it. The analogy is logical. 

If 10 years is the ultimate time limitation for reviews of land 

use decisions made without a hearing or where the decision is 

so different from the proposal described in the notice that the 

notice is ineffectual,10 then such a time limit would seem to 

fit here where the decision being revoked had been settled for 

over 10 years. The fit is exceptionally good here where it was 

the decision-maker who changed its mind without advance 

notice, based on information that, as we will explain, it had 

in its possession when it made the original decision and 

throughout the 10 years that had since passed.

It is clear that when the county initiated the revocation proceeding against the 2012 LLV in 2022, its attack 

was direct. See Morrill v. Morrill and Killen, 20 Or 96, 101, 

25 P 362 (1890) (describing a “collateral attack” as “any 

proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying such a decree,” or enjoining its 

execution) (emphasis added). But the fact that the county’s 

attack on the LLV was direct, rather than collateral, does 

not mean that LUBA’s conclusion that the county may not 

use LC 14.090(8)(a)(iv) to revoke the final LLV was unlawful 

in substance. LUBA’s final order and opinion addressed the 

argument when it stated that its decision did not hinge on 

the distinction between the attack as collateral or direct.

In discerning whether the county’s revocation of the 

LLV in 2022 was permissible, LUBA considered whether 

10 See ORS 197.830(3), (4), and (5) for the description of the types of hearings 

to which the periods of limitations defined in ORS 197.830(6) apply.
Cite as 327 Or App 485 (2023) 495

the reason for the attack concerned an issue that could have 

been raised during the original LLV process in 2012. That 

is because “[a] land use dispute must be raised at the time 

of the land use process, not later in the guise of another proceeding.” Flight Shop, Inc. v. Leading Edge Aviation, Inc., 277 

Or App 638, 649, 373 P3d 177 (2016). LUBA found that the 

“altered deeds were in the record” during the 2011-2012 LLV 

proceeding and that the “authenticity” of those deeds “could 

have been decided” in that proceeding. The record supports 

that finding and the parties do not challenge it. LUBA then 

concluded that the county “may not use its revocation procedure to grant itself a ‘second bite at the apple’ ***.” We 

understand that to be a colloquial expression of LUBA’s conclusion that the county’s ability to resurrect a final decision, 

and change it, is limited by the passage of time, and that 

the maximum amount of time allowed is informed, at least 

in part, by whether it could have addressed the issue back at 

the time of its original decision.

Landwatch does not agree with LUBA’s characterization of this as a case of county error or mistake. Instead, 

Landwatch characterizes this as a case of fraud—“where 

a well-known land use attorney meticulously orchestrated 

a fraud upon the County[.]”11 In support of that assertion, 

Landwatch relies on a finding by the hearings official that 

the “doctoring” of the deeds and PDCs “was so well done” 

that it was not discovered until years later. Ultimately, 

Landwatch argues that LUBA incorrectly weighed the 

importance of finality against the importance of allowing a 

direct attack on a prior decision that was based upon fraud. 

One problem with that approach is that there has been 

no allegation, or finding, of fraud here. The hearings official expressly disagreed that “this case is akin to a fraud 

case,” and LUBA did not conclude otherwise. In fact, LUBA 

concluded that “[w]hether the county’s error in approving 

th[e LLV] application was based on mistake or fraud is not 

material.”

The code provision invoked by the county to revoke 

the LLV authorizes revocation of a decision where it is 

11 The attorney referred to is Kimberly O’Dea, but as we explain, there has 

been no finding of fraud with respect to her or anyone else on this record.
496 Johnson v. Landwatch Lane County

established that the decision was secured on the basis of 

false and misleading information. There is certainly undisputed evidence that the deeds submitted by the O’Deas in 

2011 had been altered by someone and that they did not 

match the official deeds that were on file with the county 

at that time. But there are questions about who created 

those deeds, and it is not clear on this record why the inaccurate deeds were submitted with the LLV application. The 

county had in its possession the materials submitted by the 

O’Deas, and it had access to the recorded deeds in its Deeds 

and Records office. The county apparently did not compare 

those records as it processed the LLV application.12

Fraud was neither alleged nor proved, and the 

county did not verify the accuracy of the deeds against its 

own records before verifying that the property described 

in those deeds had been lawfully created through the conveyances documented by those deeds. Discouraging fraud 

in the filing or submission of documents to a governmental 

agency is surely a valid public policy. But, unlike finality, 

it is not one expressly incorporated by the legislature into 

the land use laws as a specific objective of the statutory 

scheme. LUBA was statutorily bound to enforce and prioritize finality as it applied the law to the facts before it. We, 

thus, reject the argument that LUBA incorrectly weighed 

the importance of finality against the value of combating 

fraud in land use cases.

When the LLV application was approved in 

2012, the Lane County code required the county’s land 

12 We infer from the hearings official’s view of the county’s role in reviewing 

application materials in the verification process that, in fact, the county did not 

review the property descriptions and deeds submitted with the application for 

accuracy before verifying the legality of the lots as requested:

“Before this appeal came before the Hearings Official, the Hearings 

Official never would have imagined that anyone would consider doing what 

has been done in this case. One can only assume the same is true of County 

staff, then and now. If County staff were called upon to check every deed presented with an application against the deeds recorded in deeds and records, 

the County would be unable to conduct business. And the Hearings Official 

sees no way for County staff at the time to have discovered that the deeds 

were doctored other than comparing every deed presented against the deeds 

recorded at Deeds and Records.”

While the record supports a finding that the county did not compare the deeds 

in question, it does not support the determination that the county could not have 

done so because of work volume or any other reason.
Cite as 327 Or App 485 (2023) 497

management director to “make, or cause to be made, an 

investigation * ** to ensure that the action on each application” meets the criteria established for legal lot verification. 

LC 14.050(4) (2010).13 That general process has not changed. 

See LC 13.140; LC 14.030(1) (2020).14 LLV applications “will 

be approved if the subject property is a lawfully established 

unit of land[.]” LC 13.140(3). Here, the county had the same 

information in 2022 as it had in 2012. The county’s ability 

to verify the legality of the property was as feasible in 2012 

as it was in 2022. LUBA’s conclusion that the revocation 

proceeding was an improper attack on the LLV because the 

issue raised in 2022 could have been raised in the 2012 LLV 

proceeding was not unlawful in substance.

Landwatch relies on a series of LUBA cases in which 

LUBA affirmed a local government’s decision to revoke an 

existing permit or an earlier land use decision to support its 

view that LUBA’s reversal of the county revocation here was 

unlawful in substance. But those cases are distinguishable 

because they concern revocations based on violations of conditions of approval and not on the propriety of the approval 

itself. See, e.g., Woods v. Grant County, 36 Or LUBA 456, 

aff’d, 164 Or App 177, 991 P2d 65 (1999) (affirming the county’s revocation of a final zoning decision because the landowner did not follow conditions of approval when building 

a guest house); Howard v. City of Madras, 41 Or LUBA 122 

(2001) (affirming city’s revocation of approval for a site plan 

due to failure to comply with conditions of approval).

Landwatch also relies on ORCP 71, by analogy, to 

support its argument that a direct attack on a final decision 

on the ground of fraud is permissible, even after the time for 

appeal or review has passed. Landwatch focuses on ORCP 

71 C which provides, in part, that “[t]his rule does not limit 

the inherent power of a court to ** * set aside a judgment for 

fraud upon the court.” First, LUBA was correct that this “is 

not a civil proceeding, and ORCP 71 C is not applicable.” See 

Pfeifer v. City of Silverton, 146 Or App 191, 195, 931 P2d 833 

13 In 2020, the county amended and replaced chapter 14 of its Code. See

Ordinance No. 20-05.

14 See, e.g., LC 14.030(1)(a)(iii) (“*** the Director will review the application for compliance with all applicable land use standards and regulations and 

adopted plans”).
498 Johnson v. Landwatch Lane County

(1997) (explaining that, although the ORCPs may be instructive, they do not bind LUBA). Second, because LUBA is not a 

court, reliance on ORCP 71 C to support an inherent authority argument is misplaced. Finally, as already explained, 

the revocation proceeding did not allege fraud. Questions 

about inaccurate and altered deeds certainly exist on this 

record, but even under ORCP 71, a motion to set aside a 

judgment for mistake, neglect or fraud has time limitations. 

LUBA’s rejection of the analogy was not unlawful.

Finally, to the extent that Landwatch makes a deference argument under Siporen v. City of Medford, 349 Or 

247, 243 P3d 776 (2010), the question of whether the county 

could use its own code provision to raise an issue that 

could have been raised in the original land use proceeding 

involves the interpretation of state land use laws to which no 

local deference is owed. And, in any event, the county’s final 

decision was issued by a hearings official, whose interpretation of local law is not entitled to deference. Gage v. City of 

Portland, 133 Or App 346, 349-50, 891 P2d 1331 (1995) (no 

“deferential weight” is accorded to an “interpretation by a 

local entity other than the governing body.”)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

LUBA concluded that the county’s reliance on LC 

14.090(8)(a)(iv) in 2022 to revoke the LLV was an impermissible attack on that LLV because it contravened the express 

policy objective of finality in land use decisions given the 

passage of time. The county’s challenge to the LLV was a 

challenge to the propriety of the decision to verify the legal 

lots in the first place. LUBA determined that, on this record, 

the county’s decision to revoke the LLV more than 10 years 

after it had first approved it violated the statutory preference for finality of land use decisions. And, further, LUBA 

clarified that the county’s use of its own local code provision to accomplish that which would have been barred under 

state land use laws as untimely was improper. Indeed, the 

county’s decision to revoke the LLV was not only inconsistent with finality, but it also worked against finality. LUBA’s 

order is not unlawful in substance.

Affirmed.