MEMORANDUM 

RM·5037-PR 

JUL.Y 1966 

PRI<JFARFD FOR. 

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:B'lJTURE rrIIREA TS rro SA TELI.,ITES 

AND POSSIBLE REAC'I.1IONS (U) 

T. M. Parker and .J. H. Rosen 

I SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED 

I NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS 

l

j ·'The information <cntained in this dornrnent will 

not be disclo$ed lo fornign nationals or their 

I_ __ reprnsen!aliv_es_." __ 

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PROJECT RAND 

11 

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ME.rv10RANDUM 

RM-5037-PR 

JULY 1966 

FUTURE THREATS TO SATELLITES 

AND POSSIBLE REACTIONS (U) 

T. M. Parker and J. H. Rosen 

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-iiiPREFACE 

This Memorandum is the text of a talk for presentation at the 

Satellite Survivability Session of the Eleventh Symposium on Space 

and Ballistic Missile Technology at the U.S. Air Force Academy, 

Colorado Springs on July 6-G, 1966. It explores a range of possible 

conflict situations from cold war to general war in which incidents 

of space warfare might occur and suggests some implic3tions for future 

space operations and satellite survivability planning. 

This Memorandum draws upon The RAND Corporation's continuing 

studies of military space operations and space warfare. 

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-vSUMMARY 

In the current political-military relationship between the United 

States and the Soviet Union, each nation seems willing to tolerate the 

other's space activities in order to preserve its own freedom of operation in space. This situation could change quite suddenly in the future. 

Incidents of space warfare could occur in connection with escalation of 

limited wars and crises, changes in national space policies, the resumption 

of nuclear weapon testing in space, and the development and deployment of 

space systems for general war operations, especially any containing nuclear weapons. These possibilities have many implications for future 

space operations and policy. 

In situations short of general war, a variety of measures could 

be taken to protect space systems. In some situations. hardening and 

decoys might be effective. In others, satellite survival may depend 

on indirect measures such as deterrence and coercion. To react quickly 

requires good technical intelligence information on Soviet space activities and anti-satellite capabilities. Also needed are contingency 

plans for limited space warfare, including provision for the assessment of the threat (tactical intelligence), for the employment and 

improvisation of various countermeasures, and for measures to maintain 

secure space operations. 

Space systems with general war missions could face very difficult 

survival problems prior to and at war outbreak. Although the destruction 

of the Soviets' anti-satellite system at war outbreak could help to ensure the survival of some systems in orbit during general war, a great 

deal of space warfare could occur in a crisis prior to war initiation. 

Satellite survival in this period may depend on the effectiveness of 

such countermeasures as attack warning, maneuvers, and decoys, which 

must be included in the design of the satellite system. Some systems 

might be kept on the ground for launch in a crisis or at war outbreak. 

While this procedure would avoid some space survival problems, these 

systems could be destroyed on the ground prior to launch or during 

launch. 

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-viTl1c r;:inze of threats to be considerer.'. [or general war space operations inclu~es various ground-based and space-based anti-satellite 

systems, boost-phase intercept systems, and the destruction of ground 

support facilities. Effective reactions to these threats may require 

the integrated use o[ many systems, including strategic offense, antisatellitc, surveillance, and intelligence, in addition to the direct 

use of various satellite survivability measures. 

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-viiCONTENrs 

PREFACE........................................................ iii 

SUMMARY... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . v 

DISCUSSION..................................................... 1 

THE CURRENT SPACE ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . . ... ... . . . . 1 

SATELLI'1'E SURVIVABILITY IN SITUATIONS SHURT OF GENERAL WAR... 2 

Space Operations and Limited Conflicts..................... 2 

Nuclear Weapon Testing in Space............................ 3 

Nuclear Weapon Deployment in Space......................... 4 

Space Systems Designed for Use in General War.............. 5 

SATELLITE SURVIVABILITY IN GENERAL WAR....................... 7 

Destruction of Ground Support Facilities................... 7 

Boost-phase Interception................................... 8 

Sa tel lite Interception..................................... 9 

Some Implications for Satellite Survivability in 

General War.............................................. 10 

CONCLUDING REMARKS............................................. 12 

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DISCUSSION 

Levels of conflict in which space systems might be involved provide 

a context for considering future threats to satellites and possible 

reactions. This talk is intended to explore possible conflict situations 

ranging from cold war to general war, and to suggest some implications 

for space operations and satellite survivability planning. 

THE CURRENT SPACE ENVIRONMENT 

Space operations to date have encompassed many activities--lunar 

and planetary exploration, manned spaceflight, space research, commercia 1 connnunications, military support, etc. Other than the Starfish 

incident in 1962, there have been no satellite survivability problems. 

Incidents of space warfare have not occurred even though both the United 

States and the Soviet Union presumably have anti-satellite capabilities. 

At this time, there is a mutual toleration of each other 1 s space operations and a mutual deterrence of interference. When general war is an 

unlikely prospect, as it is at present, the potential political-military 

gains from initiating space warfare are highly questionable. 

The apparent similarity between the U.S. and Soviet space programs 

suggests a basic reason for mutual toleration. On the military side, 

both have emphasized observation and other support operations. Both 

have agreed not to station nuclear weapons in space, although future 

space weapon systems are presumably being considered. While the open:i.-

tions of some systems are important factors in maintaining the strategic 

balance, they are generally regarded as peacetime operations and not as 

"threats" to be eliminated. 

In addition to their unmanned military programs, both the United 

States and the Soviet Union have huge investments in manned spaceflight 

programs. The military or national security aspects and potentials of 

the latter programs are widely known. The possibility that a space 

warfare incident might involve these programs would seem to be a strong 

deterrent to anti-satellite actions. Furthermore, in some situations 

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it may not be possible to differentiute between military and other 

space activities. 

Al thoug11 the United States and the Soviet Union dominate current 

spnce activities, other notions 3re beginning both national and multinational space programs. 1'1any nations already share in the ownership 

of COMSAT. Other joint cornrncrcia 1 vcntures may fol loH. Thus, the 

preservation of free access to space and of noninterference with 

space activities is of growing concern to many nations and anti~ 

satellite actions would have a worldwide effect. 

The rrcscnt situation c~oes not imply that there will be no S.'.ltellitc survivability problems. Many aspects of the current sp3ce environment could change, short of general war, ancl give rise to various 

inciucnts of space uarfarc. Some possibilities will be discussed in 

the next section. 

SATELLITE SURVlVM>ILITY IN SITU,\TIONS SHOTI.T OF GEl.'ERt'\L WAR 

The world situation today includes a war in Vietnam, growing 

apprehern; ion of a future Chinese nuclear threat, and strained relations 

wi.th the Soviet Union. Space systems could be involved in future confrontations, lir:J.ited wars, and crises short of general war, National 

systems in su;iport of defense objc~c· ives ma:-' expand, and ">1cc systL·us 

may be deployed to perform vital stratl'~~ir- ,_,;:,,,;,,!'", T''u.:lear weapons 

may be tested and stationed in space, If military space activities 

expand, space surveillance and intelligence operations 1;;ill also 

e::pand. Systems may be deployed in space to monitor enemy space 

activities. These possibilities have many implications for space 

operations and satellite survivability. 

Space Operations and Limited Conflicts 

Space systems could provide various support capabilities for limi tcd conflicts. In fact, conmmnication sa tel lites currently link 

Vietnam and the United States. Tactical corJiaunications, weather 

observation, and navigation satellite systems may be used in the 

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future. As long as the Soviet Union is engaged in space activities, 

it should be possible to deter attacks on such U.S. satellites by 

the threat of retaliation against Soviet satellites. In addition, 

most support missions can also be performed by non-space systems, so 

that destruction of a satellite or an entire satellite system probably 

would not stop the support mission. Communications can be routed by 

HF and cables, conventional navig~1tion systems can be used, etc. Such 

bnckup capabilities would presumably be available. Furthermore, in a 

limited conflict the enemy may gain more by intercepting and using the 

readout of space systems than by interfering with them. There is the 

obvious example of communications; but in addition, weather pictures 

tnmsmittcd to a theater commanJ could be equally useful to the enemy. 

Such interception or "leakage" could be of greater concern to spacesystem planners and operators than satellite survivability. 

Nuclear Weapon Tcstina in Space 

The current test ban treaty may be broken or nations that are 

not party to it, e.g., China, may test in space. If the United States 

rcsumeu testing in space, various measures could be taken to minimize 

the chances of collateral damage to its satellites. In addttion to 

careful placement of bursts to avoi~ Sdtcllitcs, both satellite design 

and component selection could significantly decrease the nmge at 

which S3tcllitcs may be damaged by direct nuclear effects. Cumulative 

nuclear effects could be minimized by using orbits that avoid the 

radiation belts. 

Little can be done to protect a satellite from a test detonation 

placement by tLe U S. capability to respond in kind; however, a 

Probably only unr:1anned s<itcllitcs would be involved. If such "tests" 

or att3cks were not halted by diplomatic means, various countermeasures 

could be employed (if provisions for their use had been incorporated 

* In some situations, a diplomatic protest may not be wise since 

it would provide clamnge assessment information to the Soviet Union. 

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in the system design). 

Knowledge of 

the kind of space surveillance and missile systems used in the "test 11 

program would provide a basis for the selection of the best countermeasure. A very difficult low altitude survival problem would arise 

if the Soviet Union were testing ;_in exo-atmospheric anti-ballistic 

missile (ABM) system, using the acquisition radars to detect the U.S. 

tnrget S3tellitc and the ABM interceptor to loft the warhead. In this 

C;\SCr some missions could be 

suspended ~1cn tests are expected. 

In the case of a satellite kill by a Chinese nuclear test, a 

response~ in kind may not be avaibble--thc Chinese may have no satellites in orhit. Other responses would be needed to deter further 

attacks. 

Nuclear Weapon Dc~filoyment in ppacr~ 

The United States <.md the Soviet Union have agreed not to station 

nuclear weapomi in space. If this agreement were broken, the whole 

character of space operations could change. All spacecraft large 

enough to carry weapons might be considered hostile until known to be 

otherwise. The activities of Lnge, manned space stations would be 

of special concern. The nation deploying the weapons, even if only 

for environmental testing, would try to prevent the other side from 

knowing about its activities and interfering with them. The other 

would be trying, perhaps with special spacecraft, to determine the 

nature of the weapon deployment. These activities could lead to 

dttacks on tlw satellites :Lnvolvcc1. Consider the following situation: 

A :Ls t sting military systems in a manned space station. 

B scnc::; u;> a manned interceptor to rendezvous with the 

space s Lilt ion and keep i l u:1Jer survei 1 Lmcc. Tile interceptor closes to within 3 mile of t11e sriace station and 

then sends 3 remote maneuvering uni.t wi lii a TV camera 

3nd ELIHT receiver to cirbit the space : Lt lion at a c'.istance 

of a few feet. The interceptor returns to earth but leaves 

the remote maneuvering unit to keep the space station under 

continuous surveillance. Pictures and ELINT arc transmitted 

from the remote maneuvering unit to the ground. 

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Does A tolerate the surveillance? How close should B send the remote 

maneuvering unit? w'hat if it collides with the space stG.tion? 

Answers to such questions have many implications for survivability 

of botb space station am! interceptor. An incident between the two 

could also lead to attacks on other satellites. 

The deployment of nuclear weapons could also lead to a reevaluation of space policy. Should "freedom in space" also cover weaponcarrying spacecraft? In addition to threat assessment, surveillance, 

and gathering intelligence information, should anti-satellite activities be initiated? Certainly the nation deploying the weapons would 

have ccntin[>;cncy reaction plans. It might threaten retaliation against 

other satellites to deter direct interference. Of course, if the 

United States were to initiate anti-s<1tellite actions, it must be 

prepan:d for possible retaliatory attacks against its own satellites. 

This has obvious implications for s~itellitc survivability. 

lf strate?;ic systems arc deployed in space, the best course may 

be simply to ohs0rvc their operation and to plan for their <lcstruction when th0 outbreak of z,cneral war appears imminent. 

The maintenance of an assured destruction capability in order to 

deter a deliberate nuclear attack is currently a prime basis for 

structuring general war forces. Accordingly, the United States has 

dc'ployed forces to make 0uch an attack highly unlikely. If future 

planning were to emphasize other general war continr;encies such as 

the escalation of a limited war, small attacks, and extended counterforce operations, the potential capabilities of space systems would 

receive more attention. In wars that develop slowly and do not 

suddenly escalate to a spasm e;:clianp,c, s2tellites could be used for 

a variety of important operations: law1clt-point clctermina ti on, 

* /\ f;encral Wilr is defined here as one that involves the use of 

nuclear weapons against the U.S. or Soviet homeland. 

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missile trajectory prediction, bomb damage assessment, mobile target 

detection, aircraft location, communications, boost-phase interception 

of missiles, satellite interception, space surveillance, and weapon 

basing. In many of these operations, space systems would complement 

other systems; in some, they would provide unique capabilities. 

When, in times of crisis, the outbreak of general war appears 

imminent, the vulnerability of space systems with general war missions 

would perhaps be even more critical than in an extended general war 

wherein it may be possible to destroy the Soviets' anti-satellite 

system. Systems that are maintained in orbit could be vulnerable 

to attack because the enemy would have had an opportunity to observe 

their operation and to prepare means for attacking them. Systems 

maintained other ways might have a better chance of being available 

when needed at war outbreak. For example, some satellites could be 

alert for launch a crisis or at war initiation. 

In the event satellites are attacked during a crisis, survivability measures could be used, if 

provision for them had been incorporated in the satellite design. 

Their effectiveness would depend on the kind of anti-satellite system 

used against them and the duration of the crisis. In a grave crisis, 

either side may be willing to pay a very high price to eliminate a 

particular space system. The fact that the cost to destroy a satellite may be much greater than the cost to deploy the satellite may 

not be relevant when general war outbreak is imminent, and the satellite has a vital mission to perform. 

If survivability measures are not effective in protecting satellites, there are a variety of other actions short of initiating general war. If elements of a Soviet anti-satellite system were based 

outside of the USSR, they could be destroyed. A nonnuclear attack 

on key anti-satellite system elements in the Soviet Union might be 

carried out. Although such attacks could lead to further escalation, 

they might be the only way to ensure the survival of some space 

systems. 

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Attacks on U.S. satellites in a crisis could trigger reactions 

other than those just discussed. For example, if satellite reconnaissance fHghts were not possible, high-performance aircraft might be 

used. If weapon-carrying spncecraft were nttacked, the United States 

might retaliate with ASW operations against Soviet missile-carrying 

submarines. Also, Soviet spacecraft could be attacked in retaliation. 

Of course, a corollary implication is that if the United States initiates space warfare in a crisis, it must be prepared for retaliatory 

attacks against its satellites and also for possible attacks against 

other forces, especially those not based in its homeland. 

If a crisis were to escalate to general war, i.e., nuclear 

weapons used against the U.S. or Soviet homeland, nuclear attacks 

could be launched against the Soviet anti-satellite system. This 

possibility will be discussed in the next section, which considers 

satellite survivability in general war. 

SATELLITE SURVIVABILITY IN GENERAL WAR 

Since incidents of space warfare may well precede war outbreak, 

as discussed previously, much of the discussion in this section also 

applies to satellite survivability in times of crisis prior to war 

outbreak. Except for the outbreak characterized by a sudden, massive 

nuclear attack, transition into general war could include many military confrontations and incidents, some of which could involve space 

systems. Space is a likely environment for such actions since it is 

far removed from the U.S. and Soviet homelands. This section considers 

a range of future threats to satellites (including their ground support facilities) and discusses some possible reactions. 

Destruction of Ground Support Facilities 

The survivability of satellite ground support facilities can be 

just as important as that of the satellites. The tracking, readout, 

and control stations presently in operation are very vulnerable to 

direct nonnuclear attack. Island facilities may be destroyed prior 

to war outbreak. The destruction of facilities in the United States 

could be expected in a general war. 

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Mobile or redundant facilities could be deployed in the United 

States to sustain space operations during general war. Some satellites might carry on-board navigation systems to remove their dependence on ground tracking facilities. Of course, secure command and 

control must be maintained. 

Some space systems for general war operation might be kept on 

ground alert for launch in times of crisis or at war initiation. These 

could be deployed on soft sites in the United States. While they would 

be very vulnerable to attack, the enemy might be deterred from such 

attacks in the early stages of a crisis. Other systems might be deployed in hardened shelters for post-attack launch. These must have 

a good chance of surviving an enemy first strike, although in some 

situations they could be launched on warning. The hardened shelters 

could be mixed in with ICBM sites to prevent selective targeting. 

Boost-phase Interception 

Boost-phase interception is a possible threat to satellite 

launchings in times of crisis or at war initiation. It could be 

very effective when many satellites are carried on a single booster. 

Also, it might be the best way to kill satellites that would otherwise be difficult to find or intercept after they reach orbit. Overwater launchings from the Eastern and Western Test Ranges would be 

especially vulnerable to attack during boost. The Titan III booster 

travels about 2000 n mi downrange during its nominal 15 min powered 

flight. Sea- or space-based interceptors could be used. Launch 

detection and boost-phase tracking could be performed from high 

altitude surveillance satellites or ships. 

To counter this special anti-satel 1i te system, prior information 

of Soviet capabilities must be obtained. If ships were used, they 

could be kept under surveillance and destroyed if they attempted to 

interfere with any satellite launchings. At the first use of spacebased interceptors, the remaining interceptor-carrying satellites 

could be attacked by short-burning, anti-satellite interceptors to 

remove that threat to subsequent launchings. Such reactions to a 

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boost-phase intercept threat illustrate the need for integration of 

certain naval, anti-satellite, intelligence, and surveillance systems 

with satellite launch operations. 

Satellite Interception 

If the Soviet anti-satellite system consists of a few soft 

space surveillance sensors and interceptor sites, these elements 

could easily he knocked out by a nuclear missile attack. While 

such a system could easily be dt'signed to kill an entire satellite 

population in a few hours, its usefulness at the start of a general 

war could be greatly limited if the United States detected the launch 

of the interceptors, maneuvered satellites subject to attack, and then 

destroyed the anti-satellite system. The interceptors could be 

tracked by high altitude surveillance satellites. All satellites 

that might be attacked could be warned to change orbits. Satellites 

at synchronous altitude would receive at least an hour's warning. 

Most of those at low altitudes would receive at least fifteen min11tes warning. However, those over or near the Soviet Union probably 

would be killed in this attack.] 

A missile attack could destroy the remainder of the anti-satellite 

system so that the satellites surviving in orbit could not be attacked 

for the duration of the war. 

If in the future the Soviet Union deploys an area ABM system 

consisting of a number of hardened radars and many hardened interceptor sites, such a system might have a first-pass intercept capability against satellites that overfly the Soviet Union at altitudes 

up to a few hundred miles. Hardened ICBMs having an anti-satellite 

capability could raise the intercept altitude to a few thousand 

miles. This kind of anti-satellite system could defend itself 

against a missile attack. If it were to survive and operate in a 

general war, satellites would need to avo:Ld it or to penetrate it; 

both options may be diff:Lcult. While high a]titude satellites may 

be beyond the reach of the interceptors and low altitude satellites 

in low inclined orbits may not come within detection range of the 

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radars and thus avoid interception, missions that require many low 

altitude overflights of the Soviet Union may be diffLcult tu perform 

if faced with such an auti-sate1lite system. 

It was suggested previously that satellites could survive at 

war outbreak if they were able to maneuver on warning of interceptor 

launchings and also that they could survive durLng a geneL-al war if 

the ene111y's anti-satellite system could be destroyed. One way the 

Soviets could decrease the available "iv'arr1ing time would be to preposition interceptors in space near U.S. satellites. These spaccbased interceptors might also be able to survive and operate during 

g;eaeral war if a space survei11ance capability alst' survives. Spacebased interceptors could pose a difficult threat to the survival of 

a s.:itellite system at the start of general war. Once an interceptor 

is launched from the satellite, there may be little that can ue done 

to save the target SHtellite, especially if a nllclear warhead is 

used. To plan countermeasures and actions prior to attack, knowledge of the anti-satellite satellite's characteristics and mode of 

ope.ration would be needed- This would be. a space intelligence 

mission. Actions .:tgainst these satellites \vou1d be a mission for 

a U.S. anti-satellite system. This possible threat illustrates the 

need for an integration of satellite, space intelligence, and antisatellite operations_ 

~J!2P_lications for Sa tel lite Sttrvivabi li ty in General War 

Basic future threats to space system operations in general war 

are likely to be 

o destruction of ground-support facilities 

o interceptor versions of ballistic missiles and space boosters 

o area defense deployment of an ABM system. 

l'.1 anticipation of th12se thrcnts, variuns countermeasures and reactions can :10\v be planned. I 

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included in the sotcllitc design; it is not easily ir:1provisec. If 

the Soviet cinti-s'.1tcJ lite c-;ystcm has vi.U1l clements that :ire soft, 

their ('.cstrucUon aftl'r wnr outbrc~ctl: cuuld be pLim1E;d to cn,;ure the 

survivability of rcmclining U.S. satellites. !~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 

could be developed for uth0r satellites Lt the 50X1 

anti-sfltcllite ~;,,stem js c3ifficu1t to destroy, a:; an ADM system ni:,;ht 

be. 

Sonw rc<lctions to and couatcrmecH;urcs against Speice-based interccptors and boost:-ph;1~;c intercept syster:1s would require prior kuoulcd[',e of tLe s stcns, Obscrv:ltjcin of the development ;111<2 testing of 

such systcns is desirnble i.f not c~scntiul to provide sufficient lend 

time to c:cvclop these rcacticms ~-1t1l' CClLltc.rmcasure:s. Sor:ic of them 

prolwb would involve the use uf the U.S. anti-satellite system, 

wLic:li is pn.:sumccl to l:~,vc a variety of cJpobilitics for genend \vJr 

operations, 

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CONCLUDING REMARKS 

This talk has explored some of the contextual factors that I 

feel must be considered to place the technical aspects of satellite survivability in perspective. It also emphasizes the need for 

considering how other military forces would operate in support of 

space operations. 

In the current political-military environment, direct interference with U.S. military support systems appears unlikely. Mutual 

interest in preserving freedom of operation in space implies a toleration of such activities. However, the space environment could change 

quite suddenly in the future. Incidents of "limited space warfare" 

could occur in connection with nuclear weapon testing in space, 

development and deployment of space systems for general war operations, limited conflicts, and crises short of general war. Of prime 

importance in reacting quickly to possible future incidents is good 

technical intelligence information on Soviet space activities and 

anti-satellite capabilities and good tactical intelligence on the 

nature of possible incidents. A corollary implication is the need 

for secure space operations on the part of the United States. 

Survivability considerations should be a central part of planning for space operations in times of crisis and general war. While 

the destruction of the Soviets 1 anti-satellite system may ensure the 

survival of some space systems during general war, satellite survivability in the crisis period prior to general war outbreak will depend 

on the effectiveness of countermeasures 

These must be considered 

in the satellite design. It is here that I feel most of the technical work on satellite survivability is most applicable. 

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