The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

Dear Mr. President: 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

August 14, 2014 

In accordance with Section 651 (d) of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Public Law 1 09-58), 

I am providing the enclosed report documenting the efforts of the Radiation Source Protection 

and Security Task Force (Task Force). The Task Force is chaired by the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) and includes members from 14 Federal agencies and the 

Organization of Agreement States, which represents all State governments that regulate the use 

of radiation sources. 

The Energy Policy Act charged the Task Force with 1) evaluating and providing 

recommendations relating to the security of radiation sources in the United States from potential 

terrorist threats , including acts of sabotage, theft, or diversion for use in a radiological dispersal 

device; and 2) providing , within one year of enactment of the Act and not less than every four 

years thereafter, reports to the President and Congress, with recommendations, including 

recommendations for appropriate regulatory and legislative changes. 

On August 15, 2006, the Task Force submitted its first report. While the Task Force 

found no significant gaps that were not already being addressed, it did identify a number of nearterm actions planned or underway to further strengthen regulatory controls and made several 

additional recommendations to enhance the overall security of risk-significant radioactive 

sources. On August 11 , 2010, the Task Force submitted its second report, which provided an 

update on the progress made since the 2006 Task Force report and proposed additional 

recommendations for improving the security of risk-significant radioactive sources in the United 

States. 

The 2014 Task Force report identifies important progress that continues to be made in 

fostering and tracking the completion and closeout of the remaining recommendations from 

previous Task Force reports. Eleven of the 2006 Task Force recommendations and actions and 

six of the 2010 recommendations have been completed and closed out over the last four years. 

This report describes the activities, accomplishments, and challenges related to securing 

Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive sources, the most risk-significant sources listed in the 

International Atomic Energy Agency's Code of Conduct (2004). Three new recommendations 

with regard to these risk-significant sources are introduced in the latest Task Force Report, 

including topics covering cybersecurity; disposition/disposal financial planning or other 

mechanisms; and the transition to effective alternative technologies. 
- 2 -

Largely, the report reflects a consensus position from the Task Force. However, some 

Task Force member agencies differed on some limited text in the report, principally as a 

reflection of the variation in the missions of the agencies represented on the Task Force. The 

most notable difference is in the area of non-radioactive technologies as replacements for sealed 

sources. Several member agencies believe that public perception and cost represent the major 

challenges to a wider acceptance of alternative non-radioactive technologies. The NRC has 

concluded through its public policy-making process 1 that, in addition to the often higher cost of 

new technologies, the comparable efficacy of these replacement technologies has not yet been 

demonstrated. Regardless of this difference, all members support efforts to further reduce 

security risks by developing alternative technologies as replacements for, in particular, cesium 

chloride. The Task Force is confident that Chapter 3 of the report, "Progress in the Area of 

Alternative Technologies," provides a balanced discussion of this matter. The Task Force will 

continue to monitor developments and to address this important issue. 

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me. I may be reached by phone at 

(301) 415-1750. 

Enclosure: 

Radiation Source Protection and 

Security Task Force Report 

Respectfully, 

Allison M. Macfarlane 

1 See Chapter 3, page 49, for a discussion on the NRC's policy statement on protection of 

cesium-137 chloride sources. 
Identical letter sent to: 

The President 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20500 

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 

President of the United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

The Honorable John Boehner 

Speaker of the House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

The Honorable John Shimkus 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Environment 

and the Economy 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

cc: Representative Paul Tonko 

The Honorable Barbara Boxer 

Chairman, Committee on Environment 

and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

cc: Senator David Vitter 

The Honorable Fred Upton 

Chairman, Committee on Energy 

and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

cc: Representative Henry A. Waxman 

The Honorable Ed Whitfield 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy 

and Power 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

cc: Representative Bobby L. Rush 

The Honorable Sheldon Whitehouse 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Clean Air 

and Nuclear Safety 

Committee on Environment and Public Works 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

cc: Senator Jeff Sessions 
The Honorable Thomas R. Carper 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Washington , DC 20510 

cc: Senator Tom Coburn 

The Honorable Mike McCaul 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security 

United States House of Representatives 

Washington, DC 20515 

cc: Representative Bennie G. Thompson 

The Honorable Mary L. Landrieu 

Chairman, Committee on Energy 

and Natural Resources 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

cc: Senator Lisa Murkowski 

- 2 -

i 

Key Accomplishments, Challenges, and Recommendations 

Established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) [EPAct 2005], the Task Force on Radiation 

Source Protection and Security (Task Force) presented its initial report to the President and 

Congress in 2006 [NRC 2006]. The report detailed specific recommendations relating to the 

security of radioactive sources in the United States (U.S.) from potential terrorist threats, 

including acts of sabotage, theft, or use of a radiation source in a radiological dispersal device 

(RDD) or radioactive exposure device (RED). In 2010, the Task Force presented its second 

report to the President and Congress [NRC 2010b], noting many accomplishments achieved 

between 2006 and 2010, including the completion and closeout of a number of significant 

recommendations from the 2006 Task Force report. This third report to the President and 

Congress describes the activities and accomplishments of the Task Force since 2010, and 

follows the same general format as the 2010 Task Force report. As was the case with the 

previous reports, the scope of this report is limited to issues relating to the security of the 

Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive sources listed in the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of 

Conduct) [IAEA 2004], which are considered the most risk-significant and have been the focus of 

Federal and State efforts to place tighter controls for security. The report does not address 

issues relating to unsealed radioactive material, high-level radioactive waste, or spent nuclear 

fuel. 

Key Accomplishments between 2010 - 2014

Since the 2010 Task Force report, a number of key accomplishments have been made in the 

area of radioactive source security: 

 

√ Expanded disposal capacity: The initiation of operations at the Waste Control Specialists 

commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facility licensed by the State of 

Texas in 2012 has provided commercial disposal access to sealed source waste 

generators in the 36 States that had been without a commercial disposal pathway since 

2008. Therefore, disposal options for many commercial Class A, B, and C sealed 

sources are now available to LLRW generators in all 50 States. Progress has been made 

in addressing ongoing challenges regarding the transportation of sealed sources that 

exceeds current commercial disposal activity limits. These efforts include public and 

private sector engagement on the revision of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) guidance regarding commercial disposal of sealed sources, development of new 

transportation containers to facilitate the recovery of high-activity sources and devices, 

and progress toward a final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the disposal of 

greater-than-Class C (GTCC) LLRW. 

√ Increased physical protection: In March 2013, the NRC published a final rule in the 

Federal Register in which security requirements for the use and transport of Category 1 

and 2 quantities of radioactive material were incorporated in a new Part of Title 10 of the 
ii 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR): 10 CFR Part 37, “Physical Protection of 

Byproduct Material” [NRC 2013f]. The rule sets revised requirements for: background 

investigations; access controls; security plans; immediate detection, assessment, and 

response to unauthorized access; tracking of shipments; security barriers; and other 

requirements. All NRC licensees subject to the rule were required to comply with the final 

rule by March 19, 2014, and the Agreement States1

 are required to adopt compatible 

requirements by March 19, 2016. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Energy/National 

Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) continues to provide voluntary security 

enhancements and specialized training to holders of such sources through its Global 

Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) at sites that use Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. 

Entities that participate in these programs must first meet all regulatory requirements. 

Both appropriate facility personnel and local law enforcement agencies are eligible for 

GTRI training programs. 

√ Enhanced tracking and accounting: In August 2012 and May 2013, the NRC deployed 

two key software systems, the Web-Based Licensing System (WBL) and the License 

Verification System (LVS), respectively. The WBL supports the entry of licensing 

information that enables the NRC and Agreement States to manage the licensing life 

cycle from initial application through license issuance, amendment, reporting, and 

termination. In addition to its use by the NRC, the WBL can be used as a licensing 

system by those Agreement States that choose to use it. The LVS is a web-based 

system designed to enable licensed users to electronically verify the validity of a license 

issued by the NRC or an Agreement State. Any licensee transferring Category 1 or 2 

quantities of radioactive sources to another licensee, prior to conducting such transfer, 

must verify with the LVS or verify with the applicable regulatory agency that the 

transferee's license authorizes the receipt of the type, form, and quantity of radioactive 

material to be transferred. The WBL and the LVS, along with the National Source 

Tracking System that was deployed in 2009, are the three key systems that make up the 

Integrated Source Management Portfolio, which support the Radioactive Materials 

Security Program and related radioactive materials licensing and tracking activities of the 

NRC. 

√ Increased preparedness and communication: Public education efforts and coordination 

amongst the Federal, State, and Tribal Government organizations in the area of 

radioactive source security made significant strides. For example, one of the seven 

projects within the Public Education Action Plan developed by the interagency Public 

Education Steering Committee for the 2010 Task Force report was completed in 2013 

and can serve as a foundation for a guide for communicating with the public following 

RDD events. This would complete a triad of communications guides for radiological and 

 

1

 Agreement States are those States that have entered into formal agreements with the NRC, pursuant to 

Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) (Public Law 83 703), to regulate certain quantities of 

AEA material at facilities located within their borders. Under the Act, NRC relinquishes to the States portions 

of its regulatory authority to license and regulate byproduct materials (radioisotopes), source materials 

(uranium and thorium), and certain quantities of special nuclear materials. Currently, there are 37 Agreement 

States. 
iii 

nuclear events: nuclear power plant accidents, improvised nuclear devices, and now the 

third, RDDs. 

√ Improved transportation security coordination: In 2014, a final draft of the Transport 

Security Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the NRC, the U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Transportation, which serves as a 

foundation for cooperation in the establishment of a comprehensive and consistent 

transport security program for risk-significant sources, was completed and signature is 

expected in Calendar Year 2014. The MOU is aimed at ensuring that the transportation 

of radioactive sources in the U.S. and across U.S. borders is carried out in a manner that 

protects the public health and safety and does not impact the common defense and 

security of the U.S. The MOU addresses, among other things, issues relating to risk 

assessments, strategic planning, inspections and enforcement, technical support, 

coordination during an emergency response, information sharing, background 

investigations, and cooperative research programs. 

√ Heightened international activity and visibility: At the 2012 and 2014 Nuclear Security 

Summits, held in Seoul and The Hague, respectively, the security of radioactive sources 

received high-level attention. In particular, the U.S. sponsored a Joint Statement at the 

2014 Summit that was signed by 22 other countries that expresses the countries’ intent to 

secure Category 1 sources within their territories by 2016. In addition, the U.S. continued 

to support IAEA efforts to encourage nations to make a political commitment to work 

toward following the guidance in the Code of Conduct [IAEA 2004]. To date, 122 nations 

have made this political commitment, marking an increase of 22 nations since 2010. The 

U.S. also took an active role in assisting the IAEA with organizing the 2013 International 

Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Maintaining Continuous 

Control Throughout the Lifecycle in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Further, the U.S. 

was instrumental in periodically convening the 10-member ad hoc group of countries that 

are major suppliers of radioactive sources to continue a dialogue on ways to improve 

implementation of export controls for radioactive sources and develop best practices for 

the repatriation of legacy sources. 

Key Challenges and Recommendations

In addition to the many accomplishments, the Task Force has identified the following three 

challenges that require additional attention and has developed the following recommendations to 

address them: 

(1) Security and control of radioactive sources 

Challenge: Cybersecurity is one of the most serious economic and security-related challenges 

facing the U.S. and the world today. Cybersecurity threats are becoming increasingly 

sophisticated, as evidenced by the number of attacks on industries and facilities each year. The 

NRC has used a risk-informed approach to assess cybersecurity vulnerabilities in its regulated 

community. In this approach, the NRC prioritized, by taking consequences into consideration, 

implementation of security assessments and has identified effective countermeasures and 

mitigation measures to protect specific targets or radioactive sources. With regard to Category 1 

and 2 quantities of radioactive sources, current protective measures focus primarily on access 

control, detection, assessment, and response to unauthorized access events and work is 

ongoing to assess specific cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The cybersecurity landscape for 
iv 

Category 1 and 2 radioactive source licensees varies greatly due to the diversity of operating 

environments. An NRC-led working group, including Agreement State representation, was 

formed in 2013 to examine the potential threats to information systems of Category 1 and 2 

radioactive material licensees’ facilities and control systems. To further address this challenge, 

the Task Force makes one new recommendation and is continuing its efforts on three previous 

recommendations. 

New recommendation: The Task Force recommends that U.S. Government agencies assess the 

adequacy of and coordinate strategies for preventing and mitigating cybersecurity vulnerabilities 

related to Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources [2014 Recommendation 1]. 

Ongoing recommendations: The Task Force has made significant progress in the area of 

security and control of radioactive sources (see Chapter 1). It has completed 13 

recommendations and actions and continues to work on recommendations that propose that (1) 

the U.S. Government agencies should reevaluate their protection and mitigation strategies to 

protect against significant RDD and RED attacks using both potential severe, immediate or shortterm exposure and contamination consequences to public health, safety, and the environment as 

the consequences of concern [2010 Recommendation 2]; (2) a Transport Security MOU be 

developed to serve as the foundation for cooperation in the establishment of a comprehensive 

and consistent transport security program for risk-significant sources [2006 Recommendation 

5-1]; and (3) the U.S. Government should encourage suppliers to provide arrangements for the 

return of disused sources and examine means to reduce regulatory impediments that currently 

make this option unavailable [2006 Action 10-2]. 

(2) Recovery and disposition of radioactive sealed sources

Challenge: Despite the development of new disposal capacity for radioactive sealed sources 

since 2010, challenges remain. Commercial disposal options are still unavailable for many 

Category 1 and 2 sources. In addition, the availability of certified Type B containers necessary 

for the transport of many of these disused sources is limited, and the design, testing, 

construction, and certification of new transportation containers is a lengthy and expensive 

process. Furthermore, LLRW generators currently lack significant incentive to dispose of sealed 

source waste rather than keeping the waste in storage. In addition, a disposal capability for 

GTCC LLRW still does not exist. DOE continues to work on a final EIS for the disposal of such 

waste. The Task Force makes one new recommendation and is continuing its efforts on four 

previous recommendations.

New recommendation: The Task Force recommends that the NRC evaluate the need for sealed 

source licensees to address the eventual disposition/disposal costs of Category 1 and 2 

radioactive sources through source disposition/disposal financial planning or other mechanisms. 

Disposition costs should include the cost of packaging, transport, and disposal (when available) 

of these sources [2014 Recommendation 2]. 

Ongoing recommendations: The Task Force has made significant progress in the area of 

recovery and disposition of radioactive sealed sources (see Chapter 2). It has completed two 

recommendations and continues to work on recommendations and actions that propose that (1) 

the U.S. Government support short and long-term research and development of certified Type B 

containers for use in domestic and international source recovery efforts [2010 Recommendation 

8]; (2) the U.S. Government and States continue to evaluate waste disposal options for disused 

radioactive sealed sources [2010 Recommendation 4]; (3) DOE continues its ongoing efforts to 

develop disposal capability for GTCC LLRW, subject to required Congressional action [2006 
v 

Action 9-1]; and (4) Federal and State Governments investigate options such as providing 

short-term secured storage of sources recovered from U.S. owners that contain foreign-origin 

americium-241 radioactive material so these sources can be recovered now and increase efforts 

to investigate options for disposal of these sources [2010 Recommendation 5]. 

(3) Alternative technologies

Challenge: While there have been advancements in the development and application of 

alternative technologies for several common sealed source devices since 2010, challenges in 

widespread application of alternative technologies remain. For example, blood irradiators using 

x-ray technologies instead of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources are now commercially 

available in both domestic and international markets. Nonetheless, replacement of sealed 

sources with non-radioactive technologies continues on a case-by-case basis and the process is 

challenged by a lack of awareness by users, the often higher cost of new technologies and 

efficacy of replacement technologies. As efforts to develop and promote effective replacement 

technologies continue, Federal, State, and private sector organizations could play an important 

role in addressing the challenges that are hindering progress and setting an example for others 

to follow. With that in mind, the Task Force makes one new recommendation and is continuing 

its efforts on a previous recommendation. 

New recommendation: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, as appropriate,2

investigate options such as voluntary, prioritized, incentivized, programs for the replacement of 

Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources with effective alternatives. The Task Force further 

recommends that U.S. Government agencies, where appropriate, lead by example in the 

consideration of and transition to alternative technologies that meet technical, operational, and 

cost requirements [2014 Recommendation 3]. 

Ongoing recommendation: The Task Force has made progress in the area of alternative 

technologies (see Chapter 3). It has completed two recommendations and continues to work on 

a recommendation that proposes that the U.S. Government enhances support for short-term and 

long-term research and development for alternative technologies [2010 Recommendation 9]. 

The Task Force’s previous recommendations that focused on the replacement of cesium chloride 

(CsCl) radioactive sources with alternatives [2010 Recommendations 3, 10, and 11] are now 

considered complete with the publication of the “Policy Statement of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission on the Protection of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources” on July 25, 2011 (75 FR 44378) 

[NRC 2011a] that sets forth NRC’s policy on the secure use of sealed sources containing CsCl. 

The Policy states that the NRC recognizes that near-term replacement of devices or CsCl 

sources in existing blood, research, and calibration irradiators is not practicable or necessary due 

to implementation of the additional security requirements and lack of a disposal capacity. In the 

event that changes in the threat environment necessitate regulatory action, the NRC, in 

partnership with the Agreement States, will be ready to issue additional security requirements to 

apply appropriate limitations for the use of CsCl, as necessary. 

 

2

 NRC’s statutory mandate precludes it from promoting one technology over another for non-safety or security 

reasons. The NRC would review in accordance with its procedures any new license application for new 

technologies. 
vi 

The Task Force will continue to maintain and update an implementation plan for all of these 

recommendations and actions. The implementation plan was developed as a living document 

following the issuance of the first report. The implementation plan includes timelines for 

completion and tracks achievements towards completion of these activities. In its development 

of the first implementation plan update following the issuance of this report, the Task Force plans 

to outline its strategic plan to more effectively and efficiently track open recommendations and 

actions via other mechanisms. These other mechanisms, such as other routine interagency 

coordination groups or developments of agreements with applicable agencies that have the 

responsibility and authority to carry out the recommended initiatives, may better foster timely 

completion of some of the initiatives. 
vii 

Contents 

Key Accomplishments, Challenges, and Recommendations ................................................... i

Background .................................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter 1 Advances in the Security and Control of Radioactive Sources ............................. 4

I. Coordination and Communication Improvements .............................................................. 4

Accomplishments ............................................................................................................... 4

Table 1-1: Radionuclides that Warrant Enhanced Security and Protection ...................... 6

II. Reevaluation of Radioactive Source Lists .......................................................................... 7

Accomplishments ............................................................................................................... 7

Table 1-2: Applicable Agencies’ Status in Addressing 2010 Recommendations 1 and 2 . 9

III. Security Measures and Initiatives .................................................................................... 11

Accomplishments ............................................................................................................. 12

2014 Recommendation .................................................................................................... 13

IV. Improvements to the Licensing Process .......................................................................... 15

Accomplishments ............................................................................................................. 15

V. Tracking of Sources ......................................................................................................... 18

Accomplishments ............................................................................................................. 18

VI. Transportation Security .................................................................................................... 20

Accomplishments ............................................................................................................. 20

VII. Import and Export Controls .............................................................................................. 22

Accomplishments ............................................................................................................. 23

Chapter 2 Status of the Recovery and Disposition of Radioactive Sealed Sources ........... 26

I. Management and Disposal of Commercial Disused Sources .......................................... 26

A. Background ............................................................................................................... 26

B. Progress in Commercial Sealed Source Management and Disposal Since 2010 ..... 28

 1. Generator Access to Class A, B, and C Commercial Sealed Source Disposal ... 28

Table 2-1: Commercial Sealed Source Disposal Options: Timeframe and Activity 

Limits .................................................................................................................... 30

 2. Revised Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging ....................... 30

C. Public and Private Roles and Responsibilities .......................................................... 31

II. Ongoing Challenges in Commercial Sealed Source Management and Disposal ............ 32

A. Timely Disposal of Disused Sealed Sources ............................................................. 32
viii 

 1. Financial Assurance or Similar Requirements for the Disposition of Disused 

Sources ................................................................................................................ 33

 2014 Recommendation ........................................................................................ 34

 2. Disused Sealed Source Identification and Storage ............................................. 35

 3. Clarification and Communication of Potential Liabilities ...................................... 37

 4. Type B Packages for Sealed Sources Disposition .............................................. 37

 5. Stakeholder Engagement on Sealed Source Management and Disposal........... 38

B. Disposal of Disused Sources Exceeding Current Disposal Facility Limits ................ 39

 1. High-Activity Class B and C Sealed Sources ...................................................... 39

 2. Disposal of Sealed Sources Classified as GTCC LLRW ..................................... 40

 3. Sealed Sources Containing Foreign-Origin Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 ......... 41

III. Summary .......................................................................................................................... 41

Chapter 3 Progress in the Area of Alternative Technologies ................................................ 43

I. Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 43

Table 3-1: Category 1 and 2 Sealed Source Applications and Devices .......................... 44

II. Background and Accomplishments .................................................................................. 44

A. Background ............................................................................................................... 45

B. Accomplishments Since 2010 ................................................................................... 46

C. Technical Challenges ................................................................................................ 47

III. 2010 and 2014 Recommendations .................................................................................. 47

2014 Recommendation .................................................................................................... 49

Summary Table of 2006 and 2010 Recommendations and Actions and New 2014 

Recommendations ......................................................................................................... 52

References.................................................................................................................................. 66

Appendix A Acronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................. 70

Appendix B Glossary ................................................................................................................. 72
1 

Background 

Sealed sources are used routinely for peaceful purposes in a wide variety of medical, industrial 

and research applications globally. Given the enduring threat of terrorists seeking radioactive 

sources for malicious purposes, the United States (U.S.) Government continues its efforts to 

enhance radioactive source protection and security. The ability of terrorists to carry out such an 

attack has been of particular concern because of the widespread availability of radioactive 

sources. The loss or theft of such materials could lead to their malicious use in a radiological 

dispersal device (RDD) or a radiation exposure device (RED). 

The Energy Policy Act of 

2005 (Public Law 109-58) 

[EPAct 2005], hereafter called 

the EPAct, established an 

interagency task force on 

radiation source protection 

and security (hereafter 

referred to as the “Task 

Force”) under the lead of the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) to 

evaluate and provide 

recommendations to the 

President and Congress 

relating to the security of 

radiation sources in the U.S. 

from potential terrorist threats, 

including acts of sabotage, 

theft, or use of a radiation 

source in an RDD or RED. 

The EPAct named 12 Federal 

agencies to the Task Force 

and named the NRC 

Chairman (or designee) as its 

chair. The NRC invited the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy to participate on the Task Force. A representative from the 

Organization of Agreement States3

 was also asked to participate as a non-voting member. The 

EPAct mandated that not later than 1 year after the date of the legislation’s enactment, and not 

less than once every 4 years thereafter, the Task Force shall submit to the President and 

 

3

 Agreement States are those States that have entered into formal agreements with the NRC, pursuant to 

Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) (Public Law 83 703), to regulate certain quantities of 

AEA material at facilities located within their borders. Under the Act, NRC relinquishes to the States 

portions of its regulatory authority to license and regulate byproduct materials (radioisotopes), source 

materials (uranium and thorium), and certain quantities of special nuclear materials. Currently, there are 37 

Agreement States.

Members of the Task Force 

• Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(Chair) 

• Secretary of Homeland Security 

• Secretary of Defense 

• Secretary of Energy 

• Secretary of Transportation 

• Attorney General 

• Secretary of State 

• Director of National Intelligence 

• Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 

• Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency 

• Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

• Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency 

Other Invited Agencies

• Department of Health and Human Services 

• Office of Science and Technology Policy 

• Organization of Agreement States (non-voting member)
2 

Congress a report providing recommendations, including possible regulatory and legislative 

changes, on several specific topics related to the protection and security of radiation sources. 

The Task Force provided its first report to the President and Congress on August 15, 2006 

(hereafter referred to as the “2006 Task Force report”) [NRC 2006]. The Task Force concluded 

in the 2006 Task Force report that there are no significant gaps in the area of radioactive source 

protection and security that are not already being addressed. However, it did identify areas that 

warranted focused attention. As a result, the Task Force proposed ten recommendations that 

would either require a policy, rule, or procedural change to implement, or require additional 

evaluation or study before a final recommendation could be made. The Task Force also 

identified 18 actions that did not rise to the level of recommendations because they were 

underway or planned in the near term, but that were important to track and complete. 

Following the issuance of the 2006 Task Force report and in an effort to continue the 

cooperation and coordination among Federal and State partners, the Task Force met 

periodically to discuss topics of interest, receive updates on activities being conducted by 

member agencies, and obtain status reports on the implementation of the recommendations 

and the actions listed in the 2006 Task Force report. In addition, the Task Force formed specific 

subgroups to address a number of recommendations and actions outlined in the 2006 report, 

including five studies in the areas of public education, alternative technologies, financial 

assurance for disused sources, feasibility of phasing out cesium-137 chloride salt, and 

reevaluation of radionuclides and threshold levels warranting enhanced protection. These 

analyses were used to form the basis for many of the new recommendations and legislative 

changes proposed in the next quadrennial report to the President and Congress, which was 

published in 2010 (hereafter referred to as the “2010 Task Force report”) [NRC 2010b]. 

The 2006 Task Force report presented detailed background information providing the basis for 

efforts that were established to address and resolve the issues it raised. The 2010 Task Force 

report was developed to provide an update on the progress made since the 2006 Task Force 

report and to propose new recommendations, including possible legislative and regulatory 

changes, in an effort to continue to improve the security of radioactive sources in the U.S. 

Eleven new recommendations were proposed in the 2010 Task Force report. This 2014 Task 

Force report follows the same general format as the 2010 Task Force report, offering a concise 

summary of activities, accomplishments, and new recommendations since the Task Force 

began its activities. Similar to its process for developing the previous reports, the Task Force 

formed subgroups to evaluate progress made and to identify any new recommendations in each 

of the topic areas specified in the EPAct. 

This 2014 Task Force report is divided into three main topical areas, which make up the report 

chapters: (1) advances in the security and control of radioactive sources, (2) status of the 

recovery and disposition of radioactive sealed sources, and (3) progress in the area of 

alternative technologies. Within each of the topical areas, accomplishments and/or challenges 

since 2010 are highlighted and a status of the recommendations and actions from the 2006 and 

2010 Task Force reports for each of the ten topics identified in the EPAct are provided. 

Stakeholder interactions have played a key role in the Task Force’s analysis and development 

of certain recommendations and actions, and the report highlights them when applicable. 

Lastly, a summary table at the end of this report compiles the open and new recommendations 

and actions from all the Task Force reports. As the summary table indicates, 11 of the 2006 

recommendations and actions and 6 of the 2010 recommendations have been completed these 

past 4 years. The Task Force intends to continue to meet to implement and monitor the 
3 

progress of the remaining recommendations and actions and to identify any additional gaps that 

may arise in the years to come. 

 
4 

Chapter 1 

Advances in the Security and Control of Radioactive Sources 

I. Coordination and Communication Improvements

Since 2006, coordination efforts among Federal agencies, State governments, and international 

partners have continued to improve in assessing security programs and making risk-significant 

radioactive sources4

 more secure and less vulnerable for use by terrorists. A number of Federal 

and State agencies established forums or have bolstered their efforts in fostering 

communication and good working relationships on radioactive source security issues. The 

enhanced interagency relationships have allowed for the successful implementation of a 

number of activities.

Accomplishments

√ The Task Force has been an important vehicle for advancing issues relating to the 

domestic security of radioactive sources from potential terrorist threats. Over the past 4 

years, the Task Force has routinely met, at least twice a year, to monitor and discuss the 

progress made on the recommendations and actions presented in the 2006 and 2010 

Task Force reports [NRC 2006, NRC 2010b]. 

√ The Task Force continues to support progress and maintains awareness of 

developments in the area of public education, outreach, and communication initiatives 

related to radiation and other hazards. One significant achievement in this area is the 

completion of one of the seven projects within the Public Education Action Plan 

developed by the interagency Public Education Steering Committee for the 2010 Task 

Force report. It was completed in 2013 and can serve as a foundation for a guide for 

communicating with the public following radiological dispersal device (RDD) events. 

This would complete a triad of communication guides for radiological/nuclear events: 

nuclear power plant accidents, improvised nuclear devices, and now the third, RDDs. 

The purpose of this effort was to engage the public in a discussion of radiation and risk 

in the context of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action 

Guides. The product of this effort is intended to increase readiness for the radiological 

terrorism threat and to reduce the impacts of an incident if one were to occur. 

 

4

 The Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive sources listed in the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (Code of Conduct) [IAEA 2004] 

are considered the most risk-significant and have been the focus of Federal and State efforts to place tighter 

controls for security. Unless otherwise noted, throughout this report, the terms Category 1 and 2 sources 

refer to the 16 radionuclides listed in Table 1-1. Note that the table provides the associated Category 2 

quantities for the radionuclides. The Category 1 quantities are 100 times the quantities listed in the table. 
5 

√ The senior management of the “trilateral agencies” (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)), with 

additional support and participation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

continue to meet periodically with the goal of enhancing coordination on overarching 

technical and policy issues related to source security. 

√ In cities and communities across the nation, U.S. Government agencies, Tribes, first 

responders, law enforcement personnel, and health agencies continue to coordinate and 

participate in exercises to test, evaluate, and improve their ability to investigate and 

respond to terrorist attacks, including those involving nuclear/radiological materials. 

Thousands of Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and local responders engage in these 

types of exercises as part of a robust, full-scale, simulated response to a multifaceted 

threat. On a smaller scale, exercises at selected facilities, which are co-sponsored by 

the FBI and NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), provide no-fault, 

site-specific scenarios where senior managers from various Federal, State, and local 

organizations can practice their crisis and consequence management skills in response 

to a simulated terrorist incident. 

√ In coordination with the NRC and Agreement State regulatory bodies, the FBI has 

continued its visits across the Nation to certain possessors of Category 1 and 2 

radioactive sources. These visits establish communications and give the FBI an 

understanding of the current security arrangements at licensee sites and how and when 

law enforcement should be engaged if there were to be a threat or event at these sites. 

√ Agencies have conducted public meetings and outreach efforts since 2006 on major 

topical areas addressed in this report, such as the Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) Part 37 rulemaking and the Integrated Source Management Portfolio 

(ISMP). 
6 

Table 1-1: Radionuclides that Warrant Enhanced Security and Protection: 

Radionuclide

IAEA Category 2 

Threshold 

(TBq) (Ci) 

Americium-241 (Am-241) 0.6 16 

Am-241/Beryllium (Am/Be) 0.6 16 

Californium-252 (Cf-252) 0.2 5 

Curium-244 (Cm-244) 0.5 14 

Cobalt-60 (Co-60) 0.3 8 

Cesium-137 (Cs-137) 1.0 27 

Gadolinium-153 (Gd-153) 10.0 270 

Iridium-192 (Ir-192) 0.8 22 

Promethium-147 (Pm-147) 400.0 11,000 

Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) 0.6 16 

Plutonium-239/Be (Pu/Be) 0.6 16 

Radium-226 (Ra-226) 0.4 11 

Selenium-75 (Se-75) 2.0 54 

Strontium-90 (Yttrium-90) (Sr-90 (Y-90)) 10.0 270 

Thulium-170 (Tm-170) 200.0 5,400 

Ytterbium-169 (Yb-169) 3.0 81 

2006 Recommendation 4-2: The Task Force recommends that the Federal agencies and 

States continue efforts to improve coordination and communication of their ongoing activities in 

the area of radiation protection and security for Category 1 and 2 sources. 

Status: Complete. 

As stated above in the list of accomplishments, significant improvement in Federal, State, Tribal, 

and stakeholder communication and cooperation has been achieved. There are a number of 

groups that continue to meet and forums that are held in order to continue addressing policy 

and programmatic issues. Specifically, some of these groups and forums include: 

• The Nuclear Government Coordinating Council and the Nuclear Sector Coordinating 

Council, established through the DHS under the auspices of the Critical Infrastructure 

Partnership Advisory Council, which provides a forum for Federal Government partners as 

well as public-private sector interactions on various issues, including those pertaining to 

sealed source security. 

• The trilateral agencies which routinely meet to allow for senior management of respective 

agencies to discuss the status of their source security programs and high-level initiatives. 

• The annual Organization of Agreement States (OAS) meeting which provides an opportunity 

to discuss topics that are of mutual interest to the Agreement States and the NRC, including 

programmatic issues related to source security. 

• The Task Force continues to coordinate interagency issues and monitor other cooperative 

efforts, as previously mentioned. Specifically, as directed by the EPAct and its own charter, 

the Task Force is able to evaluate and provide recommendations on the security of 
7 

Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources from an overarching perspective, including 

manufacture, import/export use, transportation storage, and disposal. As a result, the Task 

Force is able to assess areas in which there may not be actions underway or programs in 

place that could benefit from further attention. 

• The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, an interagency body 

consisting of 20 departments and offices from various Federal agencies, meets regularly to 

develop and coordinate policy guidance for Federal radiological incident management 

activities. It also provides policy guidance for activities in support of State, Tribal, and local 

government radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. 

• The National Operations Center (NOC) provides real-time situational awareness and 

monitoring of the homeland, coordinates Federal incidents and response activities, and, in 

conjunction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issues advisories and bulletins 

concerning threats to homeland security, as well as specific protective measures. The NOC 

– which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year – coordinates information 

sharing to help deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts and to manage domestic incidents. 

In discussing communication and coordination efforts during this cycle of analysis, the Task 

Force focused on coordination specifically in relation to emergency response. As a way to 

improve upon communication amongst the Federal Government and State partners, the Task 

Force plans to utilize its current communication distribution method to inform and coordinate on 

emergency-response related events. 

II. Reevaluation of Radioactive Source Lists

In the 2010 Task Force report, the Task Force reevaluated the list of sources and associated 

thresholds that are to be used by the U.S. Government as the appropriate framework for 

considering which sources warrant enhanced security and protection and concluded that no 

changes should be made to the list of existing 16 radionuclides and associated threshold 

quantities. For this 2014 Task Force report, the Task Force considered whether a full 

reevaluation was necessary based upon review of key factors such as: changes in the threat 

environment and gathered intelligence, changes in isotope production, changes in isotope 

usage, and changes in primary consequences of concern. Although the Task Force determined 

a full reevaluation was not necessary at this time, the Task Force formalized its review process 

by making changes to the Task Force and Radiation Sources Subgroup charters to document 

the above factors that will be considered for each subsequent reevaluation. Formalizing the 

reevaluation process for this and future work allowed the Task Force to close 2006 

Recommendation 3-1, which recommended the periodic reassessment of the source list and 

threshold levels, as this requirement is now contained within, and directed by, the Task Force 

Charter. 

Accomplishments 

2006 Recommendation 3-1: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government 

periodically reevaluate the list of radioactive sources that warrant enhanced security and 

protection to assess their adequacy in light of the evolving threat environment [and consistent 

with current National consequences of concern in order to provide a consistent level of 

protection with other critical infrastructure]. 
8 

Status: Complete; periodic reassessment of the source list and threshold levels will be directed 

by the Task Force, in accordance with the Task Force Charter. 

In preparation for the 2014 Task Force report, the Task Force reviewed information from the 

intelligence community regarding the current threat of terrorist organizations using radioactive 

sources or other radioactive materials against the U.S., along with isotope production and usage 

information, in order to determine whether changes to the radioactive sources list or threshold 

levels were needed. Although the U.S. still faces a general, credible, threat of terrorism utilizing 

radioactive materials, the Task Force is not aware of any specific threat leveled against a 

specific target. In addition, the global use of radioactive sources has remained stable both in 

species and quantity such that the addition of novel radionuclides or changes in thresholds for 

the existing list is not justified at this time. 

2010 Recommendation 1: The Task Force recommends that U.S. Government agencies use 

the radionuclides and the associated Category 2 threshold quantities in Table II, “Radionuclides 

that Warrant Enhanced Security and Protection” (as shown on page 11 of the 2010 Task Force 

report), as the appropriate framework for considering which sources warrant enhanced security* 

and that they adopt the definitions for a significant RED and a significant RDD (as shown on 

page 8 of the 2010 Task Force report) for prioritizing and allocating resources to eliminate, 

control, or mitigate risks of malevolent radiological incidents. *By warrants enhanced security 

and protection is meant enhanced in comparison to the security and protection applied to 

radioactive sealed sources before September 11, 2001. 

Status: Complete; refer to Table 1-2 with respect to the individual agencies’ status in 

addressing the recommendation. 

2010 Recommendation 2: The Task Force recommends that U.S. Government agencies 

should reevaluate their protection and mitigation strategies to protect against significant RED or 

RDD attack using both potential severe immediate or short-term exposure and contamination 

consequences to public health, safety, and the environment as the consequences of concern. 

Agencies should use the Task Force-endorsed definitions, radionuclides, and thresholds for a 

significant RED and RDD and the associated assumptions and parameters as common 

guidance in the assessment of risk and management of homeland security activities. 

Status: Ongoing; refer to Table 1-2 with respect to the individual agencies’ status in addressing 

the recommendation. 

For the 2010 Task Force report, the Task Force developed definitions of a “significant radiation 

exposure device (RED)” and “significant radiological dispersal device (RDD)” in order to better 

evaluate the source list and threshold levels consistently across U.S. agencies and carry out 

2010 Recommendations 1 and 2. Each agency within the Task Force was then expected to 

determine how best to apply both recommendations to their respective missions. The results of 

this application to agencies with a specific mission or guidance are as follows: 
9 

Table 1-2: Applicable Agencies’ Status in Addressing 2010 Recommendations 1 and 2 

Agency/Office 2010 Recommendation 1 2010 Recommendation 2 

NRC (and 

Agreement States 

that NRC has 

relinquished 

certain regulatory 

authority to) 

Complete - While the 

definitions of a significant 

RED and RDD are not used 

in NRC’s regulatory 

framework, the Category 1 

and 2 radionuclides and 

threshold quantities are used 

in: 

• Security orders 

• 10 CFR Part 20 

• 10 CFR Part 37 

• 10 CFR Part 73 

• 10 CFR Part 110 

• NUREG-1556 and 

other guidance 

Complete - The NRC reevaluated its 

protection and mitigation strategies. The 

NRC’s Security Assessment decisionmaking framework designated prompt 

fatalities as the primary consequence of 

concern. Using land contamination or other 

economic consequences is a significant 

change in NRC’s underpinning assumptions 

for safety and security. Accordingly, the 

agency has completed a preliminary study 

of potential vulnerabilities, actions, and 

impacts, and evaluated the results. It was 

concluded that the current protection and 

security framework and posture is also 

adequately protective against the 

consequences in the definitions adopted in 

2010 Recommendation 1, based upon 

current available information. 

Department of 

State (DOS) 

Complete - In bilateral and multilateral forums, DOS urges countries to 

establish and maintain effective lifecycle controls for Category 1 and 2 

radionuclides, consistent with the Code of Conduct [IAEA 2004]. 

DOE/Office of 

Environment, 

Health, Safety and 

Security 

Complete - The list of 

isotopes of greatest concern 

for potential use in an RDD or 

RED with associated 

threshold values, are utilized 

in the following DOE 

directives: 

• DOE O 231.1B, 

Environment, Safety, 

and Health Reporting 

• DOE O 462, Import 

and Export of 

Category 1 and 2 

Radioactive Sources 

Aggregated Quantities 

[DOE 2008b] 

• DOE 470 series 

(safeguards and 

security) 

While the definitions of 

‘significant RDD’ and 

‘significant RED’ in the 2010 

Task Force report are not 

Ongoing - DOE’s safeguards and security 

graded security protection policy framework 

designates prompt fatalities (lethality) as 

the primary consequence of concern. 

Using land contamination or other 

economic consequences for the DOE 

security policy framework would be a 

significant change for DOE’s underlying 

assumptions and parameters for 

safeguards and security policy. DOE is 

reevaluating its current strategy for 

protecting against a ‘significant RDD and 

RED’ event, with consideration of a broad 

spectrum of controls and protection 

measures afforded radioactive materials. 
10 

specifically used within DOE 

directives, the agency would 

support, respond to, and 

participate in a National RDD 

or RED event, as appropriate. 

NNSA/GTRI Complete - The list of 

radionuclides and associated 

Category 2 threshold 

quantities are used as a 

factor for considering which 

sources warrant enhanced 

security under NNSA/GTRI’s 

voluntary security 

enhancement program. 

NNSA/GTRI also supports 

the definition of a ‘significant 

RDD and RED’ and 

encourages consideration of 

the significant economic 

consequences of an RDD. 

Complete – NNSA/GTRI’s voluntary 

security enhancement program mitigates 

the risk of a ‘significant RDD or RED’ by 

working with licensees to enhance their 

security posture beyond regulatory 

requirements. NNSA/GTRI does this by 

addressing the risk of an insider, by 

installing in-device delay kits that increase 

the amount of time needed to access the 

source, and by training alarm responders. 

DHS/Domestic 

Nuclear Detection 

Office (DNDO) 

Complete - The definitions and activity levels defined by the Task Force are 

used by DNDO to craft scenarios for operational models and risk analysis. 

They were used to specify threat objects used to build the U.S. Coast Guard 

Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model Radiological/Nuclear Enhancement 

module, and are also used in the standardization of threat objects for RDD 

activities for aviation pathways. Specifically, the definitions form the basis 

for the choice of RDD source activity level appropriate planning purposes. 

DHS/Infrastructure 

Protection 

Complete – The radionuclides and associated threshold values are used to 

inform discussions, decision-making, and collaborations with the 

interagency DHS Nuclear Government Coordinating Council (NGCC) and 

DHS NGCC Radioisotope Subcouncil. 
11 

III. Security Measures and Initiatives

Radiological security efforts at the Federal and State Government levels have made significant 

progress in further enhancing the security of civilian Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive 

sources. The NRC continues to work with the Agreement States in regulating nearly 1,400 

licensees that are authorized to possess at least Category 2 quantities of radioactive sources. 

The NRC and Agreement State regulators continue to routinely inspect licensees to ensure they 

are meeting security requirements that provide adequate protection against sabotage, theft, or 

diversion of these radioactive sources in the U.S. Today, these measures protect approximately 

80,000 sources used in medical, commercial, and research activities. The NRC recently 

updated and expanded these security requirements, adding them to a new section of NRC 

regulations — 10 CFR Part 37, “Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of 

Radioactive Material.” 

The security requirements include: 

• Background investigations and fingerprinting to ensure that people with access to 

radioactive materials are trustworthy and reliable; 

• Controls on who can access areas where radioactive materials are stored or used; 

• Security plans and procedures to monitor, detect, assess, and respond to unauthorized 

access attempts; 

• Coordination and response planning between licensees and local law enforcement; 

• Coordination and tracking of radioactive materials shipments; and 

• Security barriers to discourage theft of portable devices. 

FBI Complete – As part of its 

Radiological Outreach Initiatives, 

the FBI utilizes the list of 

radionuclides and associated 

Category 2 threshold quantities of 

concern as one of the factors in 

determining which manufacturers, 

transporters, and licensed users of 

radionuclides should be prioritized 

for outreach to provide additional 

security awareness and establish 

lines of communication. 

Complete – The FBI’s Radiological 

Outreach Initiatives were implemented 

with the goal of mitigating the risk of 

one of the radionuclides of concern 

being used as an RDD or RED in any 

type of malevolent incident. This is 

accomplished by providing security 

awareness briefings and material on 

both domestic and international 

threats and establishing local points of 

contact to ensure information is 

relayed to the affected FBI field office 

concerning any suspicious incidents. 

EPA Complete - While the definitions of ‘significant RDD’ and ‘significant RED’ in 

the 2010 Task Force report are not specifically used in EPA response 

policy, the agency would support, respond to, and participate in a National 

RDD or RED event, as appropriate. 
12 

NNSA/GTRI implements voluntary enhancements to augment the security posture of nuclear 

materials and radioactive sources beyond regulatory requirements. Licensees who meet NRC 

or Agreement State security requirements can voluntarily work with NNSA/GTRI to put 

additional security enhancements in place on a cost-share basis. 

 

Accomplishments 

√ In 2010, the NRC initiated a security rulemaking to replace various security orders. In 

developing the proposed rule, the NRC considered the various security orders, lessons 

learned from implementation of the orders and inspection against the orders, 

recommendations from the NRC’s Independent External Review Panel (IERP) and the 

Materials Program Working Group (MPWG), public comments on the proposed rule, and 

a petition for rulemaking filed by the State of Washington. The objective of the rule was 

to provide reasonable assurance of preventing theft or diversion of Category 1 and 

Category 2 quantities of radioactive sources. It also contains the security requirements 

for the transportation of small quantities of irradiated fuel (<100 grams). Conforming 

changes were made in other parts of the CFR as well. The final rule was published in 

the Federal Register on March 19, 2013 (78 FR 16922) [NRC 2013f]. The new 10 CFR 

Part 37 became effective on May 20, 2013; and NRC licensees had to comply with the 

requirements by March 19, 2014. Agreement States will have until March 19, 2016, to 

issue compatible requirements for their licensees. NRC published implementing 

guidance with the final rule [NRC 2013e]. 

√ The 10 CFR Part 37 rule supersedes the Increased Controls, Fingerprinting orders [NRC 

2005, NRC 2007a] and security orders (i.e., Irradiator, Manufacturing and Distribution, 

and Shipment of Radioactive Materials in Quantities of Concern) issued to NRC 

licensees. The NRC issued a letter to NRC licensees, dated April 10, 2014, rescinding 

these orders and the licenses that have license conditions to implement the orders will 

be amended through future license renewal or amendment processes. The NRC will 

rescind security orders issued to Agreement State licensees concurrent with the 

implementation of compatible Agreement State legally binding requirements. Additional 

information pertaining to these and other orders can be found at 

http://www.nrc.gov/security/byproduct/orders.html [NRC 2013g]. 

2006 Action 6-1: The NRC should expeditiously complete its implementation of the 

fingerprinting provisions of the EPAct for those applicants for and licensees with Category 1 and 

2 quantities of radioactive material. The NRC should place a high priority on completing the 

EPAct Section 652 rulemaking. As part of the rulemaking, the NRC should require fingerprinting 

for any individual who could have access to Category 2 or above quantities of radioactive 

materials. The NRC should also require periodic reinvestigations of such persons. 

Status: Complete. 

The completion of 10 CFR Part 37 provides the fingerprinting requirements for Category 1 and 2 

licensees. It requires that anyone with unescorted access to Category 1 or Category 2 

quantities of radioactive sources undergo a background investigation that includes fingerprinting 

and a criminal history records check along with other elements. The background investigation 

must be complete before an individual may have unescorted access to the material. The initial 

background investigation must encompass at least the 7 years preceding the date of the 
13 

background investigation or since the individual’s eighteenth birthday, whichever is shorter. The 

background investigation includes the following elements: fingerprinting and FBI criminal history 

records check; verification of true identity; verification of employment history; verification of 

education; and determination of character and reputation. A periodic re-investigation is required 

every 10 years and is limited to the fingerprints and an FBI identification verification and criminal 

history records check. 

2006 Action 6-2: The NRC should evaluate the feasibility of establishing a national database 

for materials licensees that would contain information on pending applications and information 

on individuals cleared for unescorted access. 

Status: Complete. 

The NRC completed a two-part analysis to evaluate this recommendation. The analysis 

concluded that the first portion of the action related to pending applications was addressed by 

WBL, which was deployed by the NRC on August 31, 2012. WBL supports the entry of 

licensing information and license images that enables the NRC and Agreement States to 

manage the licensing life cycle from initial application through license issuance, amendment, 

reporting, and termination. WBL is used by the NRC and can be voluntarily used as a licensing 

system by any Agreement State. WBL provides a mechanism in which applicants for a license 

and authorized licensees can electronically apply for licenses, amend licenses, or track the 

status of their licensing actions. 

The NRC conducted a feasibility assessment on the second portion of the action related to a 

system that would contain information on individuals cleared for unescorted access and 

determined that it is not feasible at this time to implement a National database for materials 

licensees that contains “information on individuals cleared for unescorted access.” Staff 

involved in the development of the implementation guidance for the new 10 CFR Part 37 

rulemaking conducted scoping activities with various interested industry groups to confirm that 

the development of such a database was not feasible at this time. 

Overall, such a government-sponsored system that would contain information about individuals 

that is retrieved by the individual’s name or other personal identifier (e.g., social security 

number) would be considered a Privacy Act system of records. Such a system would fall under 

this category due to the fact that the system would be at least searchable by individuals’ names 

to determine their unescorted access privileges to Category 1 or Category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material. A significant challenge regarding developing such a system is that being a 

U.S. Government Privacy Act system of records there are requirements for protection of 

sensitive privacy information, which would defeat the purpose of such a system. 

2014 Recommendation 

2014 Recommendation 1: The Task Force recommends that U.S. Government agencies 

assess the adequacy of and coordinate strategies for preventing and mitigating cybersecurity 

vulnerabilities related to Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. 

Cybersecurity is one of the most serious economic and security-related challenges facing the 

U.S. and the world today. Cybersecurity threats are becoming increasingly sophisticated as 

evidenced by the increase in the number of attacks on industries and facilities each year. The 

increased access of the internet exposes vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to potentially 
14 

cause economic and physical harm to the U.S. As the nation increasingly relies on the internet 

to conduct business, ensuring the security of this component of the nation’s critical infrastructure 

has become a very important issue for the Federal, State, and local Governments; Congress; 

and industry. On February 12, 2013, the President issued an Executive Order (EO) 13636, 

“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” and Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21, 

“Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,” designed to enhance physical and cybersecurity 

and resilience for critical infrastructure. 

Specifically, the EO directs improved cybersecurity information sharing between the Federal 

Government and the owners and operators of critical infrastructure – certain vital systems and 

assets to the U.S. – and the development by the Federal Government, in collaboration with 

critical infrastructure stakeholders, of a framework to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure. 

Under the PPD, the critical infrastructure-related functions, roles, and responsibilities across the 

Federal Government for implementing the EO are delineated. The PPD identifies 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors and designates “Sector-Specific Agencies” responsible for each sector. 

√ The NRC has used a risk-informed approach for assessing cybersecurity vulnerabilities 

of its regulated community. In this approach, the NRC prioritized, by taking 

consequences into consideration, implementation of security assessments and has 

identified effective countermeasures and mitigation measures to protect specific targets 

or materials. Specific to the nuclear materials sector and consistent with their risk 

significance, cybersecurity requirements have been in place for commercial reactors 

since 2009. Because cyber threats are dynamic and multidimensional due to the 

continuously evolving capabilities of potential adversaries and emerging technologies, 

the NRC continues to coordinate with Federal partners and international stakeholders on 

cybersecurity issues through a variety of technical meetings, working groups, 

workshops, and conferences. The NRC formed a cyber assessment team to provide a 

consistent process for evaluation and resolution of issues with cybersecurity-related 

implications for all NRC licensees. With regard to Category 1 and 2 quantities of 

radioactive sources, current protective measures focus primarily on access control, 

detection, assessment, and response to unauthorized access events and work is 

ongoing to assess specific cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The cybersecurity landscape for 

these licensees varies greatly due to diversity of operating environments. An NRC-led 

working group, including Agreement State membership, was formed in 2013 to examine 

the potential threats to information systems of Category 1 and 2 radioactive source 

licensees’ facilities and control systems. The working group has developed a set of 

self-assessment tools to gather information from a sample group representing a variety 

of Category 1 and 2 radioactive source licensees. Cybersecurity assessments focus on 

the following areas: 

• Devices that use software-based control systems, such as irradiators and medical 

radiosurgery devices; 

• Access control, intrusion detection, and assessment systems that may allow an 

adversary to gain access to material and avoid detection; and 

• Computer systems that licensees use to track source inventories. 
15 

The overall goal of the working group is to assess potential vulnerabilities and identify 

the potential consequences that may occur from loss of control, or if the availability, 

integrity, or confidentiality of the data contained in the system were compromised. 

The NRC will continue to coordinate this and similar NRC assessments with its Federal 

Government and State partners. The Task Force will leverage, as appropriate, and not 

be duplicative of the efforts of on-going Federal initiatives such as EO 13636 and PPD21. 

IV. Improvements to the Licensing Process

Since 2010, the NRC has worked with the Agreement States to ensure the continued 

implementation of actions to address identified vulnerabilities involving the licensing, 

possession, and use of radioactive materials. Vulnerabilities in the licensing process were 

initially identified in 2006-2007 when the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

completed a covert operation, wherein GAO posed as a legitimate company and applied for and 

received an NRC materials license using falsified information [GAO 2007]. Following this event, 

the NRC undertook immediate corrective actions to address the vulnerabilities and developed a 

comprehensive action plan to address the recommendations made by GAO and the Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations regarding the needed changes in the process for issuing 

licenses for radioactive materials [NRC 2007b, NRC 2007c]. The NRC established three groups 

to assist in implementing the action plan and developing additional recommendations for 

improving the materials regulatory infrastructure: (1) the Pre-licensing Guidance Working Group 

(PLGWG); (2) the IERP; and (3) the MPWG. 

The PLGWG concluded its effort in 2008 with the issuance of the revised pre-licensing guidance 

[NRC 2008c]. Efforts by NRC staff to ensure that the continued implementation of the revised 

pre-licensing guidance continues to provide a basis for confidence that radioactive materials will 

be used as intended and specified on the radioactive materials license. Agreement States must 

implement the essential objectives of the revised pre-licensing guidance. The performance of 

the Agreement States and NRC Regional offices is periodically evaluated using the Integrated 

Materials Performance Evaluation Program (IMPEP). Agreement State and NRC Regional 

office implementation of the pre-licensing guidance is reviewed during IMPEP. 

The NRC has continued to make steady progress in addressing the recommendations of the 

IERP and MPWG. These recommendations included: eight recommendations made in March 

2008 by the IERP regarding the licensing process and the need for security aspects to be 

further incorporated into NRC’s radioactive materials program [NRC 2008b]; and several 

strategies identified in October 2008 by the MPWG to mitigate the identified security 

vulnerabilities [NRC 2008a]. 

Accomplishments 

√ Continued and ongoing implementation of the 2008 revised pre-licensing guidance by 

NRC and the Agreement States to: (1) provide a basis for confidence that radioactive 

materials will be used as intended and specified on the radioactive materials license; (2) 

perform site visits for “unknown” applicants and for all requests for authorization to 

possess Category 2 and above quantities of material; (3) investigate the legitimacy of all 

applicants through readily available means, such as internet searches and business 
16 

listings forwarding suspicious applications to the appropriate authority for follow-up; and 

(4) identify those licenses that require additional security requirements. 

√ The NRC developed and implemented the ISMP. The ISMP is a set of integrated 

information technology tools that supports the Radioactive Material Security Program 

and related radioactive materials licensing and source tracking activities of the NRC. 

The key systems that comprise the ISMP include the National Source Tracking System 

(NSTS), the WBL, and the License Verification System (LVS). Integrating these three 

systems provides the following benefits: 

• Making national radioactive source authorization, possession, and transaction 

information available, as appropriate, to other government agencies with a role in the 

protection of the Nation from nuclear and radiological threats. 

• Providing licensees with a secure automated means to verify license information and 

possession authorization prior to initiating radioactive source transfers. 

• Enabling users to monitor the location, possession, transfer, and disposal of their 

applicable Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources throughout the country. This 

information can also be utilized by NRC and Agreement State regulators to identify 

Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources possessed by licensees in their jurisdictions.

• Improving source accountability and gives better information to decision-makers, and 

it will detect and alert regulators to tracking discrepancies.

• Modernizing NRC licensing and inspection management and tracking systems. 

√ Based on a recommendation made by the IERP, in January 2012, the NRC completed 

actions to establish maximum possession limits on all licenses, with limited exceptions, 

that apply to short-lived unsealed radioactive materials used in diagnostic medicine. 

These possession limits serve several practical purposes with respect to the disposition 

of unwanted or unused radioactive sources and also help prevent unnecessary 

possession of radioactive sources that could lead to potential security vulnerabilities. 

The Agreement States were notified of the need to implement a policy for establishing 

maximum possession limits for radioactive materials on specific licenses. The 

implementation of this effort is being reviewed during the IMPEP reviews of the 

Agreement States and NRC Regions. 

√ In June 2010, the NRC began a significant effort to revise its licensing guidance 

contained in the NUREG-1556 series, “Consolidated Guidance About Materials 

Licensees” [NRC 2014a]. The 21-volume series of documents provides licensing 

guidance for applicants and license reviewers for various types of licensed activities 

(e.g., industrial radiography, well logging, manufacturers and distributors, service 

providers). Prior to the revision effort, a risk-informed analysis was performed to identify 

measures to improve the thoroughness and security of the licensing process. The 

revisions to the NUREG-1556 series of documents are being performed by a working 

group consisting of NRC and Agreement State representatives. Revisions are ongoing 

and scheduled to be completed in 2015. 
17 

√ In 2012, the NRC revised its training course for license reviewers, “Licensing Practices 

and Procedures” (G-109), to include additional focus on the risk-informed aspects of 

licensing, more discussion of security as it relates to licensing, and additional practical 

training on the 2008 revised Pre-licensing Guidance. 

√ Revisions were made to the comprehensive training programs for NRC license 

reviewers and inspectors. Several IERP and MPWG recommendations involved the 

incorporation of security into the training requirements for NRC materials licensing and 

inspection staff. The revised NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 1248, “Formal 

Qualifications Program for Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management 

Programs” [NRC 2013b] and revised qualification journals for Materials Health Physics 

License Reviewers [NRC 2013c] and Materials Health Physics Inspectors [NRC 2013d] 

were published in April 2013. The revisions to the training programs incorporate security 

into the NRC’s licensing and inspection culture by providing training on the available 

tools for use by the NRC staff to make risk-informed inspection and licensing decisions 

that address security, as well as health and safety, and environmental protection. In 

addition, the revised qualification program requires that individuals with involvement in 

the materials security program must take focused training on the NRC’s security 

requirements or be able to demonstrate that they have the equivalent training or 

experience. To achieve qualification as an NRC license reviewer or inspector, 

individuals must demonstrate that they master the techniques and skills needed to 

collect, analyze, and integrate information using a safety and security focus to develop 

supportable regulatory conclusions. The revised qualification journals are a matter of 

compatibility for Agreement States and implementation of the revisions will be reviewed 

during IMPEP. 

2006 Action 4-1: The NRC should consider imposing additional measures to verify the validity 

of licenses, before transfer of risk-significant radioactive sources, on all licensees authorized to 

possess Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material. 

Status: Complete. 

In order to make requirements generally applicable to all licensees and allow for public 

participation, the NRC initiated a rulemaking in which security requirements for use of 

Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material were incorporated in a new Part of the CFR: 

10 CFR Part 37, “Physical Protection of Byproduct Material” [NRC 2013f]. All NRC licensees 

subject to the rule were required to comply with the final rule on March 19, 2014. The 

Agreement States have until March 19, 2016, to adopt compatible 10 CFR Part 37 

requirements. Agreement States will accomplish this through the use of legally binding 

requirements, such as a regulation, order, law, or license condition imposed on the applicable 

licensees. 

The license verification requirement in 10 CFR Part 37 addresses this action, (i.e., 10 CFR 

37.71). Any licensee transferring Category 1 or 2 quantities of radioactive sources to an NRC or 

Agreement State licensee, prior to conducting such transfer, shall verify with the NRC's LVS or 

the license issuing authority, that the transferee's license authorizes the receipt of the type, 

form, and quantity of radioactive sources to be transferred. The LVS was deployed in May 2013 

and is a part of the ISMP. The LVS is a web-based NRC system designed to enable users to 

verify electronically the validity of a license issued by the NRC or an Agreement State. If the 
18 

verification is conducted by contacting the license issuing authority rather than utilizing the LVS, 

the transferor shall document the verification. For transfers within the same organization, the 

licensee does not need to verify the transfer. Because Category 1 quantities of radioactive 

sources are of greater concern than Category 2 quantities, the transferor must also verify that 

the licensee is authorized to receive radioactive sources at the location requested for delivery 

for Category 1 quantities of radioactive sources. 

V. Tracking of Sources

Since 2004, the NRC has maintained an interim inventory of nationally tracked radioactive 

sources, which was a voluntary annual accounting of licensees’ Category 1 and 2 sources. The 

EPAct required establishment of the NSTS, which superseded the interim inventory. The NSTS 

was deployed for licensee and regulator use in January 2009. This computer system tracks the 

possession and transfers of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources from the time they are 

manufactured or imported through the time of their disposal or export, or until they decay below 

Category 2 thresholds. The NSTS enhances the ability of the NRC and Agreement States to 

conduct inspections and investigations, determine which licensees and sources may be affected 

when responding to emergencies, communicate information to other government agencies, and 

verify legitimate possession and use of nationally tracked sources. The deployment of the 

NSTS is a major accomplishment in strengthening the accountability for Category 1 and 2 

sources. 

Licensees were required to report their initial inventories of Category 1 and 2 sources, as 

defined in Appendix E, “Nationally Tracked Source Thresholds,” to 10 CFR Part 20, “Standards 

for Protection against Radiation,” by January 31, 2009. The NRC’s regulation in 10 CFR 

20.2207, “Reports of Transactions Involving Nationally Tracked Sources,” requires licensees to 

do the following: 

• Report all related transactions (manufacture, transfer, receipt, disassembly, or disposal of 

Category 1 and 2 sources) to the NSTS by close of the next business day.

• Correct any error in previously filed reports or file a new report for any missed transaction 

within 5 business days.

• Annually verify the inventory in the NSTS and reconcile that information with their records.

Licensee compliance with the NSTS reporting requirements is verified by inspection.

Accomplishments 

√ The NRC has continued conducting extensive outreach with Agreement States and 

licensees to ensure adherence to reporting requirements. Outreach included speaking 

at industry meetings, conducting a customer satisfaction survey to assess improvement 

areas for future outreach activities, posting information to the NSTS website and blog, 

and developing and distributing a variety of NSTS informational materials. 

√ Licensees have reconciled their inventories with the NSTS five times since the 

deployment of NSTS. 
19 

√ NSTS Version 2 was deployed in May 2011. Version 2 included functionality 

enhancements designed to broaden the system capabilities for all system users. 

Enhancements included event-triggered alerts, extended licensee functions, automated 

system interfaces, full reporting and query capabilities, and the ability to download data 

for other Federal agencies. 

√ In September 2011, the NRC reevaluated the NSTS security categorization and the 

electronic authentication risk assessment to determine if the Level 4 authentication 

assurance level first established for the system was still appropriate [NRC 2011b]. The 

Commission approved the staff recommendation to reduce the authentication assurance 

level of NSTS from Level 4 to Level 3 for all users [NRC 2011c]. Due to the 

implementation of physical security measures, the information in the NSTS was less 

sensitive than when the system was initially deployed. The NRC has implemented One 

Time Password (OTP) devices for Level 3 access to NSTS to replace the Level 4 smart 

card credentials. The implementation of OTP devices significantly reduced the 

certificate collection challenges experienced by some users and encourages licensees 

that currently use manual methods such as faxing/e-mailing to use the online system. 

√ In 2010, DOE initiated the reporting of Category 1 and 2 radioactive source transactions 

between DOE and the NRC and Agreement State licensees, exports, and imports to the 

NSTS. Annually, DOE has completed the verification and reconciliation of DOE 

inventory information in the NSTS. DOE policy (DOE Order 231.1B) [DOE 2011] was 

approved in 2011, which assigns roles and responsibilities for the reporting of certain 

Category 1 and 2 radioactive source information by DOE to the NSTS. DOE Order 

231.1B replaced DOE Notice 234.1 [DOE 2008a]. Reporting and documenting Category 

1 and 2 radioactive sealed source transactions between DOE and the NRC licensees or 

Agreement State licensees in the NSTS as transactions occur has strengthened the 

accountability for high-activity radioactive sources throughout each of the lifecycle 

stages – manufacture, shipment, receipt, disassembly, and end-of-life disposal. 

2006 Action 11-2: The NRC should consider programming the NSTS to provide automatic 

daily information to [U.S.] Customs [and Border Protection] on import/export shipment 

notifications. 

Status: Complete. 

In 2011, staff reevaluated the NSTS security categorization and the electronic authentication 

risk assessment to determine if the Level 4 authentication assurance level was still appropriate. 

It was determined that import/export notifications would negatively impact the security and 

corresponding access level permitted for users of the system due to the sensitive nature of the 

shipment information, and therefore, the feature was not fully implemented in NSTS Version 2, 

which was deployed in May 2011. Instead, it was determined that DHS/U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) may better meet their objectives and needs by accessing the WBL 

System when import/export licensing is included in WBL. WBL was deployed for use in August 

2012; the import/export licensing is planned to be included in a future maintenance release of 

WBL. NRC plans to include input from DHS/CBP about its needs for accessing licensing 

information at a National level. 
20 

VI. Transportation Security

Since 2010, a number of initiatives have been completed or are well underway to improve the 

transport security of radioactive sources. 

Accomplishments 

2006 Recommendation 5-1: The Task Force recommends development of a Transport 

Security Memorandum of Understanding to serve as the foundation for cooperation in the 

establishment of a comprehensive and consistent transport security program for risk-significant 

sources.

Status: Ongoing. 

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the secure transport of radioactive material was 

completed and signature is expected in Calendar Year 2014. The parties to the MOU are the 

NRC; U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; Federal Aviation Administration; 

Federal Railroad Administration; DHS’ Transportation Security Administration (TSA); U.S. Coast 

Guard; and CBP. The MOU’s scope was expanded to include all radioactive materials that 

have applicable security requirements. The MOU includes the following 12 elements: Risk 

Assessments; Strategic Planning; Standards; Regulations, Guidelines, Advisories, Orders and 

Directives; Inspections and Enforcement; Technical Support; Sharing Information During an 

Emergency Response; Legislative Matters; Budget; Communication, Intelligence and 

Information Sharing; Background Investigations; and Cooperative Research Programs. The 

goal of this MOU is to ensure that the transportation of radioactive material in the U.S. and 

across U.S. borders is carried out in a secure manner that protects the public health and safety; 

and in a manner that does not impact the common defense and security of the U.S. 

2006 Recommendation 5-2: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government evaluate 

the feasibility of using new and existing technologies to detect and discourage the theft of 

risk-significant radioactive material during transport. The evaluation should include the findings 

of operational testing of existing technologies offering enhanced security of motor carrier 

shipments of hazardous material; shipment tracking, including communication systems; 

radio-frequency identification; vehicle disabling technologies; and mobile and stationary 

radiation detection systems.

Status: Complete. 

The Tracking of Radioactive Sources Focus Group completed a report on June 30, 2010, titled 

“Tracking of Radioactive Sources Focus Group White Paper” [TRSFG 2010]. The report 

provides the pros, cons, and availability of technologies that may be used for tracking 

conveyances, packages, or individual radioactive sources. Advances in technologies with 

respect to tracking of radioactive sources will continuously be monitored by DHS’ Government 

Coordinating Council. 

In October of 2010, DNDO completed a study that evaluated tracking Category 1 and 2 

well-logging and radiography sources. The study contained Official-Use-Only information and 

was titled, “DNDO Feasibility Study of Electronically Tagging and Tracking Portable Radiation 
21 

Radiography and Oil Well Logging Sources, SAND2010-6905” [DHS 2010]. The study 

determined that due to many technological hurdles, tagging and tracking of the source was not 

feasible with then commercially available technology. Additionally, it was found the adversary 

could defeat any of the suggested solutions easily. DNDO continues to work with Federal, 

State, local, and Tribal stakeholders to develop and enhance mobile and stationary detection 

systems to detect and report on radiological and nuclear materials that are out of regulatory 

control. 

In 2013, NNSA/GTRI began mobile source security projects, in partnership with key industry 

stakeholders, to enhance the security of the most common high-activity mobile sources in the 

U.S. NNSA/GTRI's early program focus was on the highest priority and highest activity sources 

in commercial or industrial uses, which are generally used in geographically fixed operations. In 

order to enhance the security of mobile sources in a holistic manner, NNSA/GTRI intends to 

address the security of the sources during all phases of transport and use including source 

distribution, source storage, source transport to job sites, and operational field use. 

Although different, NNSA/GTRI's approach complements what DNDO studied in 2010. 

NNSA/GTRI’s design focuses on tracking the device and detecting the source presence through 

integrated radiation detection. NNSA/GTRI’s mobile source security projects are initially 

focused on the security of high-activity sources used in the oil field service industry for 

well-logging applications and certain radiography devices used in the nondestructive testing 

industry. The goals of these projects are to provide the mobile source users immediate 

notification of potential source loss or theft through the integration of tracking technologies with 

device tamper and radiation detection sensors on the source containers. Industry partners in 

the oil field service and radiography industries are engaged in the design effort and will assist 

the program in field testing and validation of prototype units. NNSA/GTRI expects to have 

detailed designs transferred to vendors for manufacturing and sale by mid-2015. NNSA/GTRI is 

also working closely with industry and professional organizations to promote the technologies 

and encourage the adoption of these tracking systems by mobile source users in these 

industries. 

The systems developed for the well-logging industry and specific radiography devices have the 

potential for use in several additional source transport or mobile device security applications, 

which will be investigated after the successful validation of the initial mobile source security 

projects. In addition, NNSA/GTRI plans to work with mobile device manufacturers to 

incorporate these security technologies into future product designs, and with other domestic and 

international partners to expand and promote the use of these technologies in other industries 

both domestically and overseas. 

2006 Recommendation 5-3: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government 

immediately develop a strategy and take actions to address the security of international 

shipments of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources that transit or are transshipped through the 

land territory of the United States.

Status: Complete. 

The Task Force conducted a series of meetings with CBP and TSA in 2013 to specifically 

address transshipment issues. The group was able to conclude from a comparison of CBP 

Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material transshipment data to Category 1 and 2 

quantity domestic, import, and export shipment data tracked in NSTS for a certain timeframe 
22 

that CBP is tracking all the Category 1 and 2 radioactive material transshipments. It was 

concluded that the majority of Category 2 shipments are shipments of Ir-192 sources. 

Assuming that all of the Ir-192 and Se-75 Category 2 shipments are being shipped by air 

because of their short half-life and that all of the other reported non-Ir-192 Category 2 shipments 

of Am-241, Am/Be, Co-60, and Cs-137 are shipped by air, then a very small percentage of 

these shipments are being shipped by non-air modes of transport and even a smaller amount of 

these are transshipments. Based on the results of the analysis that confirmed the accuracy of 

the transshipment data captured by CBP, and which also revealed that there are a small 

amount of transshipments that are being conducted, the group discussed whether or not it is 

necessary to pursue adding security measures on Category 1 and 2 transshipments. It was 

agreed that despite the fact that there appears to be visibility of the majority of these 

transshipments through voluntary reporting to the NRC (i.e., reporting of Category 1 shipments), 

the Task Force proposed further engagement with DOT and CBP to address possible 

implementation of security requirements, policies, or procedures regarding these types of 

shipments, such as adopting similar security requirements from the new 10 CFR Part 37 

rulemaking into the revalidation certifications for Type B packages that may contain 

transshipped material. Some of these actions can be considered in the development of the 

applicable separate supplementary documents to the Secure Transport of Radioactive Material 

MOU. 

2006 Action 5-1: The Transportation Security Subgroup should review the findings and 

conclusions of all research conducted on securing “high hazard” hazardous materials transport 

to determine if any of the measures should be applied to transport of risk-significant radioactive 

sources. 

Status: Complete. 

The completion of 10 CFR Part 37 provides security requirements for licensees who transport 

Category 1 and 2 sources. In developing these requirements, various transport requirements 

applicable to “high hazard” materials were considered. Guidance was also issued in support of 

the new regulation in February 2013 and is titled, “Implementation Guidance for 10 CFR Part 

37, Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material, 

(NUREG-2155)” [NRC 2013e]. 

VII. Import and Export Controls

The U.S. Government continues to fulfill its G-8 Summit commitments and its political 

commitment to the IAEA Director General to act in accordance with the IAEA “Guidance on the 

Import and Export of Radioactive Sources” (Import/Export Guidance), issued March 2005 [IAEA 

2005]. The U.S. Government was not only instrumental in developing the 2005 Import/Export 

Guidance, which represents the only international export control framework for radioactive 

sources, but also is a leader in encouraging its implementation globally. Promoting the 

successful implementation of the Import/Export Guidance is a U.S. priority because it provides 

the basis for improving the security of legitimate cross-border transfers of sources and 

preventing the diversion of materials potentially usable in an RDD. 
23 

Accomplishments 

2006 Action 10-1: The U.S. Government should continue the efforts to promote international 

harmonization of import and export controls for Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. 

Status: Complete. 

Since the 2010 Task Force report, the U.S. has continued to support IAEA efforts to strengthen 

and harmonize application of export controls for radioactive sources. Part of this effort was 

aimed at encouraging nations to make a political commitment to work towards following the 

IAEA Import/Export Guidance, a document that is supplementary to the Code of Conduct, 

published in 2005. To date, 89 nations have made a political commitment to follow the 

Import/Export Guidance and of these nations, 31 made this commitment since 2010. 

In 2011-12, the U.S. took a major role in the IAEA process to review and revise the 

Import/Export Guidance document in order to update and clarify its provisions. In particular, the 

Annex of the Import/Export Guidance was rewritten to more adequately assess an importing 

State’s ability to appropriately manage sources. The revised Import/Export Guidance was 

approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2012. 

The U.S. supported IAEA efforts to develop a non-binding Code of Conduct for the 

transboundary movement of scrap metal and other products contaminated with radioactive 

material. This Code of Conduct would be aimed at preventing incidents of imported 

contaminated scrap metal and products - a problem that continues globally. 

The U.S. was instrumental in convening the 10-member ad hoc Group of countries that are 

major suppliers of radioactive sources, to continue a dialogue on ways to improve harmonized 

implementation of the Import/Export Guidance so as not to undercut suppliers. The U.S. 

co-leads the drafting of the document entitled “Best Practices for the Import and Export of 

Radioactive Sources,” that is currently being developed by the Group. 

The Task Force agencies will continue to engage with the international community on 

harmonized application of import/export controls of Category 1 and 2 materials, as directed by 

the Task Force Charter. 

2006 Action 10-2: The U.S. Government should encourage suppliers to provide arrangements 

for the return of disused sources and examine means to reduce regulatory impediments that 

currently make this option unavailable. 

Status: Ongoing. 

Since the 2010 Task Force report, some recent positive developments include: 

• The U.S. took an active role in assisting the IAEA with organizing the International 

Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Maintaining Continuous 

Control Throughout the Lifecycle, October 2013 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The 

U.S. was instrumental in developing one of the key findings of the Conference: that the 

IAEA should develop additional guidance at the international level which may be 
24 

supplementary to the Code of Conduct dedicated to end-of-life management of radioactive 

sources, including guidance on the return of disused sources; 

• On August 28, 2013, the NRC published a “Branch Technical Position (BTP) on the Import 

of Non-U.S. Origin Radioactive Sources” (78 FR 53020) [NRC 2013a] to provide additional 

guidance on the application of a 2010 NRC rule on the export and import of radioactive 

sources. The BTP recognizes the difficulty importers may have in making a determination 

on the country of origin of a radioactive source and it provides greater flexibility for what is 

deemed to be of U.S.-origin for purposes of the exclusion to the definition of “radioactive 

waste” in the 2010 rule. As such, the BTP facilitates the return of sources to the U.S. under 

a general license and, in doing so, supports U.S. policy to prevent sources from being 

orphaned overseas where regulatory programs may not exist or function to an optimal level; 

• The U.S. has continued to meet periodically with other major source exporting countries to 

discuss best practices associated with the repatriation of legacy sources without viable, 

commercially available reuse or recycle options; 

• Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development and the DOE are in 

discussions with the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission to collaborate on a 

tripartite project to remove Canadian- and U.S.-origin disused high-activity sources from 

Brazil. It is contemplated that the U.S.-origin sources would be repatriated to the U.S. and 

the Canadian-origin sources would be shipped to another country for recycling; 

• Under an MOU with the IAEA, France repatriated five French-origin sources from 

Madagascar, Costa Rica, Sudan, Lebanon, and Morocco. Projects are underway to 

repatriate two sources from Cameroon and five additional sources from Morocco; 

• Russia changed its law to allow for the repatriation of disused Russian and Soviet-era 

sources pending the resolution of technical issues by the National Operator; and 

• India successfully repatriated Indian-origin sources from Uruguay and Sri Lanka. 

2006 Action 10-3: The Task Force suggests the use of education and the creation of 

incentives to discourage the export of used Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources as an 

alternative to disposal. 

Status: Complete. 

Updates to export control regulations for radioactive sources have allowed for considerable 

progress on this action by permitting the NRC and regulatory bodies in other countries greater 

ability to screen sources to ensure that they are not being exported abroad as an alternative to 

disposal. Specifically, under the NRC’s export licensing program, the importing country must 

consent to the import of a Category 1 source or device before shipment; pertinent 

documentation is required to be provided to the importer regarding the age and activity of the 

source; and the NRC regulations exclude disused sources that are being returned to an 

authorized entity from the regulatory definition of radioactive waste. This facilitates their return 

to the U.S. supplier at the end of their useful life (thereby reducing the probability of them being 

retransferred to another country as a means of disposal). 
25 

2010 Recommendation 3: Contingent upon the availability of alternative technologies, the 

Task Force recommends that the NRC evaluate whether the export licensing for Category 1 and 

2 CsCl sources should be discontinued, taking the availability of disposal capacity and the threat 

environment into consideration. 

Status: Complete. 

The NRC issued the “Draft Policy Statement on the Protection of Cesium-137 Chloride Sources” 

and held a public meeting on November 8-9, 2010 [NRC 2010a], to solicit comments on it. The 

public meeting included technical sessions with panel presentations, followed by a facilitated 

discussion. The meeting was attended by the general public, users, representatives from health 

and industry associations, source and device manufacturers, alternate technology 

manufacturers (x-ray and Co-60), and Federal and State Government agencies. 

The majority of the comments supported the draft Policy Statement. All of the written and oral 

comments were considered when finalizing the Policy Statement. None of the comments 

resulted in changes to the basic principles that are in the Policy Statement. 

The Final Policy Statement was published in the Federal Register on July 25, 2011 (76 FR 

44378) [NRC 2011a]. Specifically, with respect to regulatory actions, the Final Policy Statement 

indicates that the NRC monitors the threat environment and maintains awareness of 

international and domestic security efforts. In the event that changes in the threat environment 

necessitate regulatory action, the NRC, in partnership with the Agreement States, would issue 

additional security requirements, if necessary, to apply appropriate limitations for the use of 

CsCl in its current form. In addition, the NRC believes that, for the near term, it is more 

appropriate to focus on continued enforcement of the U.S. security requirements and to mitigate 

risk through cooperative efforts and voluntary initiatives of industries that currently manufacture 

and use CsCl sources. 
26 

Chapter 2 

Status of the Recovery and Disposition of Radioactive Sealed 

Sources 

I. Management and Disposal of Commercial Disused Sources5

Significant progress has been made to address the commercial sealed source management and 

disposal challenges identified in the 2006 and 2010 Task Force reports [NRC 2006, NRC 

2010b]. Disposal options for many commercial Class A, B, and C6

 sealed sources are now 

available to low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) generators in all 50 States, including the 36 

States which had been without such an option when the 2010 Task Force report was published. 

Progress has also been made in addressing ongoing challenges regarding both the 

transportation and disposal of the highest activity sealed sources. 

Despite this progress, challenges remain. Although disposal options for many sealed sources 

are now available, there are currently few incentives for generators to dispose of their disused 

sealed sources in a timely fashion. In addition, commercial disposal options are still unavailable 

for many Category 1 and 2 sources, and there remains a shortage of certified Type B shipping 

containers required for their transport. To address these challenges, the Task Force is making 

one new recommendation to encourage timely disposal of disused sources, and has identified 

additional initiatives that stakeholders can take to improve sealed source management and 

disposal. 

A. Background 

Sealed sources are used thousands of times each day in the U.S. in a wide variety of medical, 

industrial, and research applications. The service lives of the most commonly used sealed 

sources generally range between 10 and 30 years, after which a source becomes disused.7

 

 

5

 A disused sealed source is defined as “a radioactive source that is no longer used, and is not intended to be 

used, for the practice for which an authorization has been granted” [IAEA 2004, page 3]. To meet this 

definition, a licensee or owner for the sealed source must be clearly identifiable. Disused sealed sources 

should not be confused with abandoned or “orphan” sources, which are sources identified by regulatory or 

other authorities for which there is no determinable responsible party. The challenges with regard to orphan 

sources often overlap with, but are not identical to, the challenges (and solutions) addressed in most of this 

chapter. 

6

 Radioactive source categories defined by the IAEA Code of Conduct and NRC waste classes defined in Title 

10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 61 are not directly correlated. Explanations of the 

differences between IAEA categories and NRC waste classifications are detailed in the 2006 Task Force 

report.

7

 While some disused sealed sources may have the potential for recycle (i.e., sold or transferred to a new 

licensee for continued use), the vast majority are either decayed below the point of utility or for other 

reasons are not amenable to further use. A sealed source may also become disused before the end of its 

service life, if the licensee determines not to use it further and does not sell or transfer it to another licensee. 
27 

The radioactivity of commonly used sealed sources ranges from microcuries (μCi) to kilocuries 

(kCi) for the largest sources used in industry and medicine. 

When sealed sources reach the end of their service lives, many remain radioactive and of 

concern from the perspective of National security, public health, and safety. Thousands of 

sources become disused and unwanted every year in the U.S. and must be safely and securely 

stored pending final disposition. Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive sources, whether in 

use or in storage, are subject to security requirements. However, while secure storage is a 

temporary measure, the longer sources remain disused or unwanted, there is a higher 

probability that they will become unsecured or abandoned [NRC 2010b, GAO 2005]. 

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (LLRWPAA) [LLRWPAA 

1985] makes States responsible for the disposal of Class A, B, and C LLRW generated within 

States’ borders (except for certain waste generated by the Federal Government).8

 The 

LLRWPAA further authorizes States to enter into Compacts for the establishment and operation 

of regional LLRW disposal facilities and authorizes Compacts to impose certain restrictions on 

disposal of LLRW generated outside the Compact region. Pursuant to the LLRWPAA, the 

Federal Government is responsible for the disposal of greater-than-Class C (GTCC) LLRW 

generated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Agreement State licensees, 

including sealed sources classified as GTCC LLRW. 9 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is 

the agency responsible for GTCC LLRW disposal. Section 631 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 

(EPAct) [EPAct 2005] provides that before DOE can make a final decision on a disposal 

alternative(s) for GTCC LLRW, it must first submit a report to Congress describing the disposal 

alternatives under consideration and await Congressional action. The NRC or Agreement 

States are responsible for licensing and regulating the use of commercial radioactive material, 

including sealed sources, pending final disposition.10

 

8

 The Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-573), subsequently amended by the LLRWPAA, first 

introduced the concept of LLRW State Compacts. 

9

 Pursuant to the LLRWPAA, the Federal Government is also responsible for disposal of LLRW owned or 

generated by DOE, LLRW owned or generated by the U.S. Navy as a result of the decommissioning of 

vessels of the U.S. Navy, and LLRW owned or generated by the Federal Government as a result of any 

research, development, testing, or production of any atomic weapon. The Task Force did not consider 

challenges related to disposal of this Federal Government waste. The challenges discussed in this chapter 

relate to disposal of commercial Class A, B, C, and GTCC LLRW. 

10 States may assume NRC regulatory authority under Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 

amended (AEA) [AEA 1954], which provides a statutory basis under which the NRC relinquishes to the 

States portions of its regulatory authority to license and regulate sealed sources and certain other materials. 

The mechanism for the transfer of NRC's authority to a State is an agreement signed by the Governor of the 

State and the Chairman of the Commission, in accordance with section 274b of the Act. States that develop 

and maintain such a regulatory program are called “Agreement States.” 
28 

B. Progress in Commercial Sealed Source Management and Disposal Since 

2010 

As described in the 2010 Task Force report, commercial LLRW generators in 36 States were 

unable to dispose of any sealed sources following the July 2008 closure of the EnergySolutions

Barnwell, South Carolina (“Barnwell”) disposal site to all but three States.11 The lack of 

commercial sealed source disposal access has contributed to a substantial increase in the 

number of disused sealed sources in storage.12 The 2010 Task Force report concluded that 

“[b]y far the most significant challenge [to sealed source security] identified is access to disposal 

for disused radioactive sources.” The report also identified the lack of sealed source disposal 

options as one of two major challenges that require attention at higher levels of government 

[NRC 2010b, page iii]. Since 2010, Federal, State, and LLRW Compact stakeholders have 

increased the number of LLRW generators with disposal options for commercial Class A, B, and 

C sealed sources, and have made progress toward increased disposal access for higher activity 

sources. 

 

1. Generator Access to Class A, B, and C Commercial Sealed Source 

Disposal 

In April 2012, Waste Control Specialists (WCS) began operations at its newly-licensed LLRW 

Compact Waste Facility in Andrews County, Texas. The primary purpose of the WCS facility is 

to serve commercial generators in States with membership in the Texas Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Disposal Compact (Texas Compact), currently Texas and Vermont (party States). 

However, in accordance with Federal and State legislation, and rules approved in 2011 by the 

Texas Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact Commission (Texas Commission), WCS may 

also accept waste from generators in States that are not members of the Texas Compact 

(non-party States). Each shipment of non-party waste to WCS must be approved by the Texas 

Commission prior to transport. 

WCS license requirements establish a 30 Ci Class C limit for disposal of cesium-137 (Cs-137), 

one of the most common types of sealed sources used in industry and medicine, and 

particularly important from a risk-reduction perspective. In accordance with current NRC 

guidance on waste classification and other regulatory requirements, WCS also applies a 30 Ci 

 

11 EnergySolutions/Barnwell facility continued to serve the Atlantic Interstate Compact, comprised of 

Connecticut, New Jersey, and South Carolina. The U.S. Ecology site in Richland, Washington (“Richland”) 

continued to serve both the Northwest Interstate Compact (“Northwest Compact”), comprised of Alaska, 

Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, and the Rocky Mountain Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste Compact (“Rocky Mountain Compact”), comprised of Colorado, Nevada, and New 

Mexico. 

12 The precise number of disused sealed sources in storage, either before or after 2008, is unknown because 

licensees that use sealed sources are not currently required to identify or report when their sealed sources 

have become disused. 
29 

Class C limit to other common sealed sources.13 None of the currently operating commercial 

disposal facilities in the U.S. accept sealed sources above the 30 Ci limit. 

The licensing and development of the WCS facility is a significant achievement. It is the first 

LLRW Compact site to open since the Compact system was established in 1980, and the Texas 

decision to accept non-party waste provides a commercial disposal option for many sealed 

sources to generators in the 36 States, which had been without such an option since 2008. 

Table 2-1 summarizes the changes in commercial sealed source disposal access since the 

initial Task Force report was published in 2006. 

In addition, the Texas Commission from the outset has recognized the importance of disused 

sealed source disposal for the protection of National security, public health, and safety. In 2011, 

the Texas Commission adopted administrative procedures to ensure that disused sealed 

sources from small generators (such as hospitals, universities, and industrial licensees, which 

generate the vast majority of disused sealed sources) are allocated disposal capacity within the 

annual non-party volume and curie limits set by Texas legislation.14 

In its initial year of operations, the Texas Commission procedures to accommodate disposal of 

sealed sources proved to be important. The Texas Commission was able to accommodate all 

the requests for non-party sealed source disposal that would be deemed eligible. Even with the 

procedures adopted by the Texas Commission, the potential volume and curies represented by 

sealed source waste (relative to non-sealed source waste from large generators) are highly 

unlikely to have an impact on when WCS reaches its lifetime operational capacity limits. 

 

13 The WCS facility license requires that LLRW be classified in accordance with NRC’s 1995 “Final Branch 

Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation” [NRC 1995]. However, the WCS license 

also identifies specific limits for Cs-137 sources and several other common sealed source types. 

14 In 2013, the annual non-party disposal capacity limit was set at 50,000 cubic feet and 100,000 Ci. In 

addition, non-party commercial waste disposed at WCS during its operational lifetime may not exceed 30 

percent of its total licensed capacity, which currently stands at 2,310,000 cubic feet and 3,890,000 Ci of 

radioactivity. 
30 

Table 2-1: Commercial Sealed Source Disposal Options***: Timeframe and Activity 

Limits 

Years Compact 

# of 

States 

Class C 

Limit* Disposal Option 

Pre2008 

Northwest and Rocky Mountain Compacts 11 30 Ci Richland 

Atlantic Compact 3 10 Ci Barnwell 

All Other States/Compacts 36 10 Ci Barnwell 

2008-

2012 

Northwest and Rocky Mountain Compacts 11 30 Ci Richland 

Atlantic Compact 3 10 Ci Barnwell 

All other States/Compacts 36 No Disposal Options 

2012-

Present 

Northwest and Rocky Mountain Compacts 11 30 Ci Richland 

Atlantic Compact 3 10 Ci/30 Ci Barnwell/WCS** 

Texas Compact and all other 

States/Compacts*** 36 30 Ci WCS 

* The cited Class C limits are for Cs-137. Significant limits are often applied to other commonly used sealed 

sources, including cobalt-60 (Co-60), another risk-significant sealed source type. 

** Atlantic Compact generators may dispose of Cs-137 and other common sources up to 10 Ci at the Barnwell 

facility; these generators may dispose of Cs-137 between 10 Ci and 30 Ci at WCS. 

*** Commercial disposal options for sealed sources above 30 Ci remain unavailable. 

An additional disposal option for certain commercial Class A sealed sources was made 

available for 1 year at the EnergySolutions LLRW disposal facility located near Clive, Utah 

(“Clive”) beginning in 2013. This effort was originally initiated in 2011 before WCS became 

operational and was specifically intended to address the National security, public health, and 

safety concerns surrounding the number of sealed sources in storage since 2008. The Clive 

facility historically had been prohibited from accepting sealed sources due to site characteristics 

that had since changed. Upon the request of the DOE/National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (NNSA/GTRI), EnergySolutions engaged 

Utah regulators and other stakeholders to develop a 1 year license variance for disposal of 

certain commercial Class A sealed sources at Clive. Under the terms of the variance, only 

sources identified and collected through the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 

(CRCPD) Source Collection and Threat Reduction Program (SCATR) [CRCPD 2013] were 

eligible for Clive disposal. Although outside the scope of the Task Force, the effort facilitated 

the recovery and disposal of thousands of Class A sources in the States that lacked access to 

commercial disposal access for sealed sources after 2008. 

2. Revised Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging 

Commercial LLRW generators must classify waste as Class A, B, C, or GTCC prior to shipping 

the material for disposal. In order to do so, the radioactivity of the waste must be averaged over 

its volume. The NRC’s 1995 “Final Branch Technical Position on Concentration Averaging and 

Encapsulation” (1995 BTP) [NRC 1995] provides guidance to generators on the calculation of 

these averages given the physical and radiological characteristics of the waste. It also provides 

‘generic’ class limits for commonly disposed types of LLRW, including sealed sources. All of the 
31 

States which regulate commercial disposal facilities (South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and 

now Texas) require LLRW generators to use part or all of the 1995 BTP. 

While the 1995 BTP recognizes that alternative approaches may be used for concentration 

averaging based on the actual (and not generic) waste and waste facility characteristics, those 

sections have been generally interpreted in a way which has prevented deviation from the 

generic limits provided in the 1995 guidance document. As a result, the generic Class A, B, and 

C limits for sealed sources described in the 1995 BTP have effectively become the upward limit 

for each waste class, such as the 30 Ci limit for Cs-137 and other common sealed sources. The 

radioactivity of commercially disposed sealed sources is thus a fraction of the class limits 

specified in the NRC waste classification regulations at 10 CFR 61.55.15

In 2010, the NRC Commission directed the NRC staff to update certain sections of the 1995 

BTP to reflect the risk-informed and performance-based approach characteristic of the NRC’s 

overall policy for regulation. After receiving this direction, NRC staff restarted its task to revise 

the 1995 document in its entirety. Following extensive public and stakeholder engagement, 

including submission and consideration of written comments, the NRC released a final draft 

revised BTP in May 2012 (revised BTP) [NRC 2012]. 

The draft revised BTP provides updated guidance for determining classification of commercial 

LLRW, including sealed sources. The NRC plans to publish the final revised BTP in late 2014 

with few, if any, substantive revisions to the sections addressing sealed source disposal. The 

generic sealed source disposal limits under each waste class in the draft revised guidance are 

based on an updated ‘intruder scenario’ for determining the activity limits that apply to sealed 

source waste under generic conditions for each class of waste. 

Consistent with the draft BTP, the NRC expects the generic Class C limits for the disposal of 

Cs-137 sealed sources to increase from 30 Ci to 130 Ci. The revised BTP should also provide 

greater latitude for the disposal of additional sealed sources containing radioactive quantities of 

concern. In addition, the revised BTP is expected to include more detailed ‘alternative 

approach’ provisions that could be used by regulators to review proposals for disposal of sealed 

sources that exceed the revised generic radioactivity limits. The significant positive impact that 

these changes could have on the disposal of disused sources is described in Section II of this 

chapter, which addresses ongoing challenges in commercial sealed source disposal. 

C. Public and Private Roles and Responsibilities 

Legislation governing the management and disposal of LLRW, including the Atomic Energy Act 

(AEA) [AEA 1954], the EPAct, and LLRWPAA, envisions distinct roles and responsibilities for 

government and the private sector. Federal and State Governments are responsible for the 

 

15 In addition, waste acceptance criteria at licensed commercial disposal facilities may be lower than the 

generic limits described in the BTP. For example, in lieu of the 1995 BTP generic Class C limit for Cs-137 

sealed sources of 30 Ci, the Barnwell license agreement establishes a 10 Ci Class C limit for Cs-137 and 

similar sources. 
32 

regulation of commercial radioactive material use, transport, and disposition, including support 

for the development and licensing of commercial LLRW disposal facilities. Responsibility for 

disposal of commercial Class A, B, and C LLRW, including sealed sources, lies with the private 

sector (i.e., the appropriately licensed businesses, hospitals, research institutions, and other 

organizations that use radioactive materials). Pursuant to the LLRWPAA, the Federal 

Government is responsible for the disposal of GTCC LLRW. 

National security concerns after September 11, 2001, and the reduction in commercial disposal 

options following the closure of Barnwell to non-compact States, resulted in increased 

government involvement in commercial sealed source management and disposal. There is 

general agreement, however, that as commercial disposal options increase, government 

involvement should decrease accordingly. Sealed source disposal arrangements between 

private entities (such as licensed users, brokers, transporters, and disposal facilities) should 

function efficiently and effectively without government involvement beyond the regulatory 

frameworks and supporting activities that ensure the security, health, and safety of licensees 

and the public. 

II. Ongoing Challenges in Commercial Sealed Source Management and 

Disposal

While initiation of operations at WCS and the increased generic limits expected in the revised 

BTP are important accomplishments, significant commercial sealed source disposal challenges 

remain to be addressed. Disused sealed sources with commercial disposal pathways may 

remain in storage longer than necessary unless generators have the proper incentives to 

dispose of them in a timely manner. In addition, the most risk-significant sealed sources 

commonly used in medicine and industry, still present disposal challenges once they become 

disused and unwanted. These disused sources are generally classified as Class B, C, and 

GTCC LLRW for the purposes of disposal. Furthermore, the recovery and disposition of these 

sources is severely constrained in both time and cost by a limited supply of certified Type B 

transportation containers required for transport. 

A. Timely Disposal of Disused Sealed Sources 

Current NRC regulations provide only limited incentive for LLRW generators to dispose quickly 

of sealed source waste. Unlike many types of non-sealed source LLRW, disused sealed 

sources require only limited storage space or in-storage maintenance. In addition, commercial 

disposal of sealed source waste is costly: both time and funding are required for packaging, 

transportation, and burial at a licensed commercial LLRW disposal facility. Without greater 

incentives, licensees that use sealed sources may delay these efforts. Furthermore, as 

described in the 2006 Task Force report, licensees are less likely to keep track of disused and 
33 

unwanted sources than sources that are still in use.16 Disused sources in storage are more 

likely to become lost, stolen, or abandoned than those still in use.17 With commercial Class A, 

B, and C disposal options now widely available for many disused sealed sources that previously 

had no disposal pathway, including Cs-137 and Co-60 sources, a significant remaining 

challenge is to encourage generators to dispose of these sources in a timely fashion. 

To address these challenges, the Task Force recommends that NRC formally consider 

supplementing existing requirements for licensees possessing Category 1 and 2 quantities of 

sealed radioactive sources to address the disposition costs of these sources through source 

disposition/disposal financial planning or similar requirements. In addition, the Task Force has 

identified several further initiatives that it believes will encourage timely disposal of disused and 

unwanted sealed sources and improved sealed source management and disposal practices. 

 

1. Financial Assurance or Similar Requirements for the Disposition of 

Disused Sources 

The nuclear industry has long used financial assurance requirements to effectively manage 

facilities that require extensive or costly end-of-life decommissioning, including LLRW 

disposal.18 However, there are currently no NRC requirements aimed at the funding of LLRW 

disposal prior to facility closure. Rather, current NRC financial assurance requirements in 10 

CFR 30.35 are intended to specifically address site decommissioning.19 As a result, there is 

little direct correlation between NRC financial assurance requirements and the Category 1 and 2 

sealed sources of greatest concern from a National security standpoint. 

As a result, the Task Force concluded in 2006 that existing NRC financial assurance 

requirements may not sufficiently address sealed source management and disposal. The 2006 

Task Force report noted that, “[n]ot all possessors of sealed sources need to have financial 

 

16 In its discussion of storage time limits, the Task Force noted that “such a requirement could make 

licensees more aware of the source’s existence, trigger an evaluation of the adequacy of storage conditions, 

and encourage the use of sound business and regulatory principles that would lead to the removal of 

sources which should not remain in storage” [NRC 2006]. 

17 Stored or disused Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material are subject to physical protection 

requirements imposed by the NRC and Agreement States. In addition, since January 2009, NRC and 

Agreement State licensees have been required by the NRC, per 10 CFR 20.2207, to track their Category 1 

and 2 sources in the National Source Tracking System (NSTS). 

18 Financial assurance, as generally defined, is the demonstration of an ability to fund the expected costs 

associated with specific liabilities. Financial assurance mechanisms are often used in industries such as 

energy and mineral resource development in which there are significant costs related to environmental 

management after the operational (and revenue producing) life of the facility has ended. 

19 Current financial assurance requirements for radioactive materials licensees are aimed at facility 

decommissioning and generally apply only to sealed source manufacturers and distributors, which may 

possess thousands of sealed sources (and unsealed radioactive materials) in inventory. (See 10 CFR 30.35 

Financial Assurance and Recordkeeping for Decommissioning.) 
34 

assurance to cover the costs of disposal or other appropriate disposition of sources, potentially 

resulting in prolonged storage and possible misuse, abandonment, loss, or theft” [NRC 2006]. 

2006 Recommendation 9-2, therefore, urged the NRC to “evaluate the financial assurance 

required for possession of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources to assure that funding is 

available for final disposition of the sources.” 

In consultation with its Federal and State partners, the NRC completed the evaluation of its 

financial requirements in January 2010, thus closing out 2006 Recommendation 9-2 in the 2010 

Task Force report. It also considered a variety of appropriate mechanisms, such as broadening 

the NRC’s decommissioning requirements, assessing a source-specific surcharge on a fixed 

schedule over the life of the source, or imposing a more general surcharge on sealed sources. 

However, due to the lack of commercial disposal and other cost determining factors, such as 

transportation and packaging, it was premature to pursue financial assurance rulemaking at that 

time. 

In addition to the increase in commercial sealed source disposal options since 2012, and the 

potential for disposal of higher activity sealed sources, if the NRC issues the draft revised BTP 

as expected, the Task Force notes that two further challenges to implementing financial 

assurance requirements or similar mechanisms have been mitigated since 2010. First, new 

sealed source transportation containers will soon be available, starting in 2014, as the result of 

both government and private sector efforts. The new containers will help to remove a significant 

obstacle to timely disposition of Category 1 and 2 disused and unwanted sources. Second, 

both the availability of the new containers and ongoing commercial disposal operations at WCS 

can potentially assist regulators and licensees in the identification of likely costs related to 

commercial disposal of sealed source waste. The potential availability of this information 

enables exploration of a broader range of financial assurance requirements or similar 

mechanisms than was the case in 2010. 

With significant progress in addressing the challenges, the Task Force has concluded that the 

NRC should evaluate the need for licensees possessing Category 1 and 2 quantities of 

radioactive sealed sources to address the disposition costs of these sources. The costs 

included in source disposition/disposal financial planning or other mechanisms should reflect the 

expected costs of packaging and transport of the waste, as well as the cost of LLRW disposal, 

when available. 

2014 Recommendation 

2014 Recommendation 2: The Task Force recommends that the NRC evaluate the need for 

sealed source licensees to address the eventual disposition/disposal costs of Category 1 and 2 

quantities of radioactive sources through source disposition/disposal financial planning or other 

mechanisms. Disposition costs should include the cost of packaging, transport, and disposal 

(when available) of these sources. 

A wide range of financial mechanisms are available for NRC consideration in addressing this 

recommendation. For example, financial assurance mechanisms acceptable to the NRC in the 

context of nuclear reactor or complex materials facility decommissioning may provide helpful 

models to determine requirements for Category 1 and 2 quantities of sealed sources. In 

addition, several Agreement States have instituted more stringent requirements to help cover 

the cost of disused and “orphan” sealed source packaging, transport and disposal unrelated to 
35 

facility decommissioning. Illinois, Texas, and Florida are among those with provisions for sealed 

source disposal, although they vary with regard to the precise purpose, mechanisms, and 

activity thresholds for rule application. 

These efforts demonstrate the potential feasibility and effectiveness of such requirements and 

may inform further potential NRC rulemaking activities undertaken to implement the 

recommendation. However, implementation of source disposition/disposal financial planning or 

similar requirements may have to address both Category 1 and 2 quantities of sealed sources 

that are new and have not yet been distributed to a licensed user, as well as those already in 

use. In both cases, the Task Force believes that the integration of stakeholder input throughout 

the rulemaking process will ensure that the new requirements will not place undue burden on 

those affected. Furthermore, the rulemaking process should carefully consider the compatibility 

category assigned to the rule, recognizing the importance of Agreement States maintaining 

flexibility in developing a compatible requirement that meets or exceeds the NRC standard. 

The Task Force believes that source disposition/disposal financial planning or similar 

requirements are likely to have several beneficial impacts, although these impacts may vary 

according to the financial assurance mechanism adopted. First, such requirements are likely to 

decrease the time that commercial sealed sources remain in storage because the funds 

necessary for source disposal will be immediately or quickly available. Without financial 

assurance, generators may have little incentive to dispose of disused sources sooner rather 

than later, particularly for large and infrequent disposal expenses. In any given year, bearing 

the cost of disposal would be optional. 

For similar reasons, requiring licensees to assess and account for the expected costs related to 

disposition of disused and unwanted sources will facilitate broader awareness within licensee 

organizations with regard to the financial and logistical factors associated with the packaging, 

transport, and disposition of Category 1 and 2 quantities of sealed sources. Finally, source 

disposition/disposal financial planning or similar requirements will help to ensure that costs 

related to the use of sealed sources are borne by those who receive the benefits derived from 

the sealed sources prior to disposal. 

2. Disused Sealed Source Identification and Storage 

The 2010 Task Force report, which was published prior to the 2012 expansion of sealed source 

disposal options, recommended that the NRC request additional information from licensees 

about their sealed sources in storage. 2010 Recommendation 6 identified the inspection 

process as a way to obtain the information. 

2010 Recommendation 6: The Task Force recommends that the NRC incorporate procedures 

to review the status, such as the date of, the reason for, and location of sources in long-term 

storage, in the current inspection program. 

Status: Complete. 

The intent of the recommendation was to “ascertain when a source goes from being an 

economic asset to a licensee to being disused and unwanted, with limited or expensive 

disposition options” [NRC 2010b, page 38]. The Task Force is now closing 2010 

Recommendation 6 due to the increase in commercial sealed source disposal options. 

However, the Task Force has also concluded that a practice of sealed source use-status 
36 

information sharing will encourage more efficient sealed source management, as well as the 

timely disposal of disused and unwanted sealed sources which now have a commercial disposal 

pathway. 

The NRC currently requires licensees that possess sealed sources to report annually through 

the NSTS whether or not their Category 1 and 2 sources are still in their possession, have been 

transferred to another licensed user, or have been disposed. However, neither these or other 

licensees that possess sealed sources are required to report to Federal or State regulators the 

‘use-status’ of their sealed sources (i.e., whether or not their sources are in use or have become 

disused). 

The NSTS as currently configured could facilitate the exchange of such ‘use-status’ information 

for Category 1 and 2 sources, and a number of States already have registries to track sealed 

sources below the Category 1 and 2 threshold, should they wish to do so. If a licensee 

identifies a sealed source as ‘in storage pending further use,’ the intended purpose and 

timeframe for reuse would also be both relevant and beneficial information for licensees to 

consider and share through the NSTS and other appropriate tools used by regulators. On May 

12, 2014, the NRC issued Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2014-04 [NRC 2014b] to encourage 

licensees to provide this information through the NSTS or through NRC Form 748 transaction 

reports. This RIS was issued to Agreement State regulators to share with their licensees, as 

appropriate. 

As currently configured, licensees may specify that sources are in “Long-Term Storage.” 

Sharing this information will benefit both the licensees, which provide the use-status and 

planning information, as well as the regulators who receive it. For licensees, such a practice will 

encourage increased awareness of, and attention to, effective disused sealed source 

management, which may include financial and logistical planning for disposal, including related 

transportation costs and challenges. For sealed sources without a commercial disposal 

pathway, planning may involve coordination with source recyclers, including manufacturers, or 

consideration of other options for disposition of disused sources. This type of attention and 

planning will not only facilitate timely sealed source disposition, but also increase licensee 

awareness of the National security, public health, and safety concerns related to keeping 

disused and unwanted sealed sources in storage for longer than necessary. 

For regulators, ‘use-status’ information will increase their awareness of how many sealed 

sources under their purview are disused and in storage, where they are located, and what types 

of disposal challenges their licensees may encounter. It may also enhance the ability of 

regulators to foresee and manage instances in which licensees are unable to dispose of their 

sources before going out of business. For both regulators and licensees this type of information 

sharing will improve the quality and efficiency of sealed source management and disposition, 

which, in turn, can benefit National security, public health, and safety. Furthermore, current 

NRC regulations do not impose limits on the time that licensees may keep disused sources in 

storage, as long as all such sources are counted against license possession limits and properly 

stored in accordance with NRC safety and security regulations. The NRC could examine a 

reasonable timeframe for licensees to plan for and dispose of disused and unwanted sources in 

storage for which a disposal path is available. 

 
37 

3. Clarification and Communication of Potential Liabilities 

One of the primary impacts that could result from a misused or mishandled sealed source is the 

economic cost of contamination, emergency response, and social disruption.20 Depending on 

the type of sealed source involved and the location of the incident, these costs could be 

significant [DHS 2008]. For licensees to make informed decisions on the management and use 

of sealed sources, information on the potential liabilities must be as clear as possible. 

Increased clarity and communication on the liabilities that sealed source licensees may face as 

the result of a lost or stolen source could also function as an incentive to licensees for timely 

disused sealed source disposal. 

State and Federal emergency response cost recovery fees, when applicable, may be expensive 

for licensees in the case of lost or stolen sealed sources, even without significant contamination 

damage. Similar costs on a much smaller scale have resulted from the response and recovery 

efforts involved when sealed sources have been misplaced. None of these cases have resulted 

in significant contamination damage or social disruption, but regardless have been costly to the 

States and localities in which they have taken place. In response to these potential costs, 

Illinois, for example, has passed legislation giving regulators the ability not only to fine licensees 

for any regulatory infractions involved in such instances, but also to charge licensees for the 

cost of the emergency response effort.21 

4. Type B Packages for Sealed Sources Disposition 

While this report addresses a number of sealed source transportation security challenges in 

Chapter 1, the limited availability of “Type B” containers certified to transport high activity 

disused sources (usually Class B, C, or GTCC waste) is a challenge for sealed source 

management and disposition. As a result of 2004 changes in 10 CFR Part 71, certifications for 

a significant number of these containers expired in 2008.22 These packages are necessary for 

the transport of high activity Cs-137 and Co-60 sources, such as those used in irradiator, 

calibration, and cancer treatment devices. NRC RIS 2008-18 [NRC 2008d] provided information 

on what would be considered in requests for extending use of these packages beyond October 

1, 2008. DOT provided a limited number of special permits and authorizations on a temporary 

and case-by-case basis for use of the expired packaging. However, these special permits 

effectively expired in June of 2011. 

 

20 The NSTS tracks 80,000 sources held by over 1,400 licensees. Thefts and losses of Category 1 and 2 

sources have been rare. There has been no theft or loss of Category 1. Since 2005, there have been four 

losses and thefts of Category 2 sources. In this case, three of these were recovered, one source was not. 

21 Illinois Radiation Protection Act of 1990 and 32 Ill. Adm. Code 310.75. 

22 These “specification” Type B packaging certifications expired as the U. S. Department of Transportation 

(DOT) and the NRC aligned with international transport regulations (HM-230: Docket No. RSPA-99-6283). 
38 

Most manufacturers only produce packages licensed to transport devices they are currently 

selling. The result is a significant reduction in the number of multi-use packages needed to 

transport the older sealed sources and devices as they become disused and unwanted. 

2010 Recommendation 8: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government 

enhance support of short-term and long-term research and development of certified Type B 

containers for use in domestic and international source recovery efforts. 

Status: Ongoing. 

Since the 2010 Task Force report was published, NNSA/GTRI has procured vendor services for 

the design, development, testing, and certification of two Type B packages to support the 

recovery and transportation of Category 1 and 2 sources commonly used in irradiators and 

cancer treatment devices. The new containers together will enable shipment of nearly 100 

percent of all commercially used devices containing Cs-137 and Co-60, which are particularly 

significant from a National security, public health, and safety standpoint. However, designing, 

testing, and producing new transportation packages are a multi-year project. The regulatory 

approval process alone for new package designs can be up to 18 months. 

 

The first of the NNSA/GTRI containers under development, the 435B, is an unshielded Type B 

container with a design appropriate for transport of a wide range of relatively common devices 

requiring Type B shipment. NNSA/GTRI expects the container to be certified for use in 2014. 

The second container, the 380B, is currently in the early stages of design and development. It 

will be a more complex shielded container designed for the transportation of a wide range of 

less common devices. NNSA/GTRI expects the 380B to be certified for use in 2016. 

To facilitate private sector utilization of these or similar Type B transport containers in the future, 

the NNSA/GTRI will make the new Type B container designs available without cost to 

companies in the U.S. and abroad interested in using or modifying them to broaden the 

availability of Type B containers for source recovery. The wider availability of these designs 

could also encourage disused sealed source disposition. This recommendation will be 

completed upon the submittal of the second Type B transportation container for certification, 

anticipated in FY 2015. 

5. Stakeholder Engagement on Sealed Source Management and Disposal 

Like 2010 Recommendation 6, the Task Force identified 2010 Recommendation 7 while 

commercial sealed source disposal options were severely constrained. 

2010 Recommendation 7: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, in 

collaboration with responsible State agencies, evaluate and develop a plan to improve, as 

necessary, processes for dealing with unwanted, abandoned, or impounded sources, 

including storage, reuse, recycling, or other disposition method. 

Status: Complete. 

A special interest session was held during the 2011 CRCPD Annual Meeting on May 17, 2011, 

in Austin, Texas to discuss best practices related to storage of ‘orphan’ sources by States. 

Attendees were further encouraged to share best practices and emergency response planning 

information with States that may benefit from it. More importantly, however, the increase in 
39 

commercial disposal options will significantly mitigate the problem. While States may still at 

times keep unwanted, abandoned, or impounded sources in storage, the number of such 

sources is expected to decrease steadily as the backlog and any new sources with a 

commercial disposal pathway are disposed. 

The closure of Barnwell in 2008, to all but three States, significantly increased awareness with 

regard to the National security, public health, and safety importance of sealed source 

management and disposal. While the expansion of commercial options for the disposal of 

disused and unwanted sealed sources has significantly diminished the urgency behind 2010 

Recommendation 7, the collaboration among Federal, State, private sector, and 

non-governmental stakeholders continues and warrants closing this recommendation. 

B. Disposal of Disused Sources Exceeding Current Disposal Facility Limits 

2010 Recommendation 4: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, 

regional compacts, and States continue to evaluate disposal options for disused radioactive 

sources, including options for handling a potentially large number of disused cesium 

chloride sources that may be replaced once viable alternatives are available. 

Status: Ongoing. 

While commercial disposal options for Class A, B, and C sealed sources waste have increased 

since 2010, a large number of challenges remain. There are currently no disposal options for 

disused sealed sources which exceed the generic radioactivity limits specified in the 1995 BTP, 

or for disused sources which are classified as GTCC LLRW. Commonly used sealed sources of 

these types include americium-241 (Am-241), and cesium chloride (CsCl) sources commonly 

used in both industry and medicine, and particularly significant from a National security, public 

health, and safety standpoint. 

1. High-Activity Class B and C Sealed Sources 

The NRC expects the generic sealed source disposal limit specified in the revised BTP to 

increase from 30 Ci to 130 Ci for Cs-137 and to remove the upper limit on Co-60. However, 

sealed sources within the 30 Ci to 130 Ci range for Cs-137, for example, are not nearly as 

common as Cs-137 sources with activities between 130 Ci and the Class C limits established in 

10 CFR 61.55. Although a significant and positive development, the impact that this change 

alone will have on the reduction of sealed sources that must remain in storage may not be 

dramatic. 

The revised BTP, however, also includes detailed guidance on ‘alternative approaches’ for the 

disposal of sealed sources between the limits recommended in the BTP and the Class C limits 

in 10 CFR 61.55. For example, for Cs-137, the BTP limit is 130 Ci and the 10 CFR 61.55 Class 

C limit is 4,600 Ci/m3

. For a 55-gallon drum (0.2082 m3), this results in a total activity of 957 Ci 

(i.e., 4,600 Ci/m3

 x 0.2082 m3 = 957.72 Ci). Under the provisions as currently drafted, licensees 

could request regulatory approval of sealed sources larger than those specified in the BTP, 

based on site-specific features of disposal sites (such as depth of burial or the emplacement of 

intrusion barriers) or the protective design of disposal containers. Several currently operating 

LLRW disposal facilities indicated that these alternative approaches have the potential to 

significantly expand the activity range of sealed sources that they could accept, if approval were 

granted by the Agreement State regulator. 
40 

However, transition to the revised BTP, given the critical role of the 1995 guidance to LLRW 

disposal for nearly two decades, constitutes an important remaining challenge. Discretion with 

regard to the use of the new guidance, including the alternative approaches, will remain with the 

States that regulate commercial LLRW disposal facilities. Transition to the guidance is likely to 

require regulators who wish to adopt it to consider and address a wide range of changes. In 

addition to working with disposal facilities to assess any necessary changes to the facility 

license, adoption of the guidance may require States to develop new rules or procedures. 

In recognition of these challenges, the NRC and other Federal agencies have committed to 

work with States, generators, and other stakeholders to facilitate transition to the new guidance, 

as appropriate. However, from a National security, public health, and safety standpoint, 

adoption of the new guidance, particularly the alternative approaches, would represent 

significant progress. The Task Force supports continued Federal engagement with 

stakeholders on this and other challenging sealed source management and disposal issues. 

2. Disposal of Sealed Sources Classified as GTCC LLRW 

Status: Ongoing. 

Pursuant to the LLRWPAA, DOE is responsible for disposal of GTCC LLRW, including sealed 

sources that are determined to be waste and classified as GTCC LLRW. Common examples of 

such sources include CsCl sources greater than 957 Ci, Am-241, plutonium-238 (Pu-238), and 

plutonium-239 (Pu-239) sources greater than 27 mCi. On February 18, 2011, DOE issued the 

Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Disposal of GTCC LLRW (DOE DEIS) for public 

review and comment [DOE 2014]. The DOE DEIS evaluates disposal options for GTCC LLRW, 

which includes many Category 1 and 2 sealed sources. DOE continues to work on the Final 

GTCC LLRW EIS. 

Before making a final decision on the disposal alternative(s) to be implemented, DOE will submit 

a report to Congress regarding the disposal alternatives considered in the EIS and await 

Congressional action. As required by Section 631 of the EPAct, the Report to Congress will 

identify and describe the alternatives under consideration, the types of waste involved, the 

Federal and non-Federal disposal options, a process for safe disposal of the waste, and any 

statutory changes or new authorities required for implementation.23 The report will also include 

options for ensuring that those who benefit from the activities resulting in waste generation will 

bear reasonable costs for its disposal. 

 

23 Background information about this effort can be found at http://www.gtcceis.anl.gov [DOE 2014]. 

2006 Action 9-1: The DOE should continue its ongoing efforts to develop GTCC [LLRW] 

disposal capability.
41 

3. Sealed Sources Containing Foreign-Origin Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 

Sealed sources manufactured with foreign-origin Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 material present 

unique challenges. Although disposal options under consideration in the DOE EIS may 

eventually address these sources, they are currently without commercial or Federal options for 

disposal. NNSA/GTRI has authority to recover sealed sources that present a threat to National 

security, public health, or safety. However, options for the staging and storage of sources 

without an identified path to disposal, such as the foreign-origin Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 

sources, are limited. 

Based on extensive research and information developed through engagement with sealed 

source manufacturers, NNSA/GTRI has concluded that all of the Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 

sealed sources manufactured in the U.S. after December 31, 2003, contain foreign-origin 

radioactive material exclusively. Because the use-life of these sources is typically 10 to 15 

years, concerns regarding the lack of disposal are increasing. NNSA/GTRI estimates, for 

example, that since 2004 U.S. commercial sealed source manufacturers have imported 

approximately 3,000 Ci per year of Am-241, with between 10,000 to 20,000 sealed sources put 

into use in that period. Because of the 10 to 15 year use-life, experts expect these sources to 

become disused at an increasing rate over the coming decade. Furthermore, as the use-life of 

these sources concludes, the devices in which they are used are generally re-sourced with new 

Am-241 material. The current rate of such re-sourcing is approximately 150 to 300 devices per 

year per manufacturer. 

2010 Recommendation 5: The Task Force recommends that Federal and State 

Governments investigate options such as providing short-term secured storage of sources 

recovered from U.S. owners that contain foreign-origin americium-241 radioactive material, 

so that these sources can be recovered now, and increase efforts to investigate options for 

disposal of these sources. 

Status: Ongoing. 

Since the publication of the 2010 Task Force report, DOE has continued to investigate options 

for disposal of certain waste for which there is currently no identified disposal path, including 

foreign-origin Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239 sealed sources recovered by NNSA/GTRI. 

III. Summary

There have been significant changes in LLRW disposal landscape since 2010 that enhance 

opportunities for safe and secure disposition of radioactive sealed sources, most notably the 

initiation of commercial LLRW disposal operations at the WCS disposal facility in Texas. Its 

addition to the fleet of commercial LLRW disposal facilities suggests adequate capacity for 

disposal of sealed sources for the foreseeable future. However, there remain significant 

challenges related to other aspects of disused source disposition. Despite this capacity, there 

continue to be constraints related to LLRW compact limitations. Further, individual sites have 

waste acceptance criteria that may appropriately restrict disposal of sources within waste Class 

B and Class C limits. While the final revisions to the NRC’s BTP on Concentration Averaging 

may reduce the extent of the challenge, it will not entirely eliminate it. Furthermore, there are 

also challenges related to the transportation containers necessary to facilitate source 

disposition. The fleet of usable Type B containers is limited. Although certification of new 
42 

containers is a lengthy process, NNSA/GTRI continues to make progress in their program to 

increase the number of available Type B transport containers. Finally, there is the challenge of 

licensees pursuing timely disposition of disused and unwanted sources. The challenges noted 

here often translate to disposition costs that many licensees, to date, have been unable or 

unwilling to incur. For this reason, the new recommendation proposed in this chapter is directed 

towards incentivizing licensees to provide for management of disused sources. 
43 

Chapter 3 

Progress in the Area of Alternative Technologies 

I. Introduction

In the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) [EPAct 2005], which created the Task Force, 

Congress emphasized the importance of alternative technology development and 

implementation to reduce the risks posed by radioactive sealed sources. The EPAct directed 

the Task Force to identify and recommend “appropriate regulations and incentives for the 

replacement of devices and processes” which use Category 1 and 2 sealed sources. 

At the time of the EPAct legislation, domestic consideration of alternative technologies had not 

reached the point at which implementation planning could begin on an application-specific 

basis. However, as progress in the technical, operational, and economic feasibility of these 

replacements continues, Task Force consideration of policy options to facilitate implementation 

has become increasingly important. Radiation source replacement continues to be a primary 

focus of the overall Task Force effort “to reduce the risk of terrorist threats, including acts of 

sabotage, theft, or use of a radiation source in a radiological dispersal device” [EPAct 2005]. 

In addition to the Task Force mandate, the EPAct requested two additional examinations of 

design policies and programs aimed at the replacement of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed 

sources and devices: 

• EPAct directed the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to survey “industrial” use of sealed 

sources and to initiate alternative technology research and development activities. DOE 

identified certain International Atomic Energy Agency Category 1 to 3 sealed sources as 

relevant to its study under the directive. DOE submitted its report to Congress in August 

2006. 

• Congress also requested that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) develop a 

comprehensive technical assessment of replacement options and policy approaches to 

guide future efforts. The scope of the study was limited to Category 1 and 2 sources. 

Table 3-1 describes the primary applications and devices that use Category 1 and 2 sealed 

sources. Because of the variation in these applications, the feasibility of replacement 

technologies will depend primarily upon technical, operational, and financial factors related to 

replacement.24 There may also be challenges related to disposal of the radioactive sealed 

 

24 Technical requirements include the performance of the replacement device, including its ability to achieve 

the same or similar results as the radioactive device replaced. ‘Operational’ factors may include the size, 

power requirements, or shape of the device, or challenges related to staff training or device maintenance. 

‘Financial characteristics’ include the cost of device production and use, as well as the characteristics 

related to the market (current or expected) for the device. 
44 

sources replaced by alternatives.25 Consideration of all these factors helps to ensure that 

transition to alternatives does not adversely impact either the quality of services provided or the 

overall risk environment. 

Table 3-1: Category 1 and 2 Sealed Source Applications and Devices 

Application Common Devices Source Types IAEA 

Category

Medical. Cancer 

treatment, blood, and 

research irradiation 

External beam radiation 

therapy, blood and 

research irradiators, 

medical radiosurgery 

devices 

cobalt-60 (Co-60), 

cesium-137 (Cs-137) 

1, 2 

Sterilization. Medical 

instrument and food 

irradiation 

Large irradiators 

(panoramic irradiators) 

Co-60 1 

Geophysical 

well-logging. 

Petroleum and other 

natural resource 

exploration, production, 

and development 

Neutron and gamma-ray 

well-logging devices 

americium-241/ beryllium 

(Am/Be)*, Cs-137 

2* 

Non-Destructive 

Inspection/Evaluation.

Quality assurance, 

defect analysis 

Radiography and fixed 

industrial gauges 

Co-60, Cs-137, Ir-192, 

Selenium-75 (Se-75) 

2 

*Am-241 when mixed with beryllium (Be) can produce neutrons. These neutron sources may be denoted 

as Am/Be throughout this chapter. 

II. Background and Accomplishments

The Task Force concluded in its initial 2006 Task Force report that application-specific 

recommendations regarding replacement technologies should await the outcome of the NAS 

and DOE efforts. However, the report identified “critical concerns” regarding the transition to 

alternative technologies once developed, “including incentives for adoption, collaboration 

between Federal agencies, and disposition of displaced sources” [NRC 2006, page 136]. To 

address these concerns, the report provided guidance on these and related policy challenges, 

concluding that transition efforts must include both “technical and economic criteria as top 

considerations to ensure that the results are practical” [NRC 2006, page 137]. In addition, the 

Task Force requested that its Alternative Technologies Subgroup “evaluate financial incentives, 

research needs for both alternative technologies and alternative designs, including financial 

 

25 Chapter 2 of this report describes in more detail the challenges related to radioactive sealed source 

disposal. 
45 

support; and the cost versus the benefit of potential alternatives for Category 1 and 2 

radioactive sources” to inform the Task Force in the development of the 2010 Task Force report 

[NRC 2006, page 139]. 

A. Background 

NAS completed its study in 2007 and released the public version in January 2008 focusing on 

replacement technologies for Am-241, Cs-137, Co-60, and Ir-192, which together account for 

“nearly all (over 99 percent) of the sealed sources that pose the highest security risks in the 

United States” [NAS 2008]. In accordance with the EPAct directive, the NAS assessed the most 

prevalent uses of these sources, including the technical and economic factors most relevant for 

the development and implementation of alternatives. The study also included specific and 

detailed findings and recommendations [NAS 2008, page 1]. Although the scope of the study 

was limited to the use of Category 1 and 2 sources, the NAS noted that sources that fall into 

Category 3 and lower can be assembled into Category 1 or 2 quantities of radioactive material, 

and that, “it may be the case that some radiation sources near the upper threshold for Category 

3 pose more serious risks than other sources that fall near the lower threshold of Category 2” 

[NAS 2008, page 43, n.1]. While current security requirements address aggregation of 

radioactive sources in that the requirements are applicable to licensees possessing Category 1 

and 2 quantities of radioactive sources as opposed to specific source quantities, there remains 

concern associated with some sources manufactured slightly below the Category 2 threshold. 

The NAS study concluded that while “replacements exist for nearly all applications of the 

radiation sources examined...they may not all now be economically viable or practical” [2008 

NAS, page 1]. 

In its assessment of approaches toward alternative technology implantation, NAS also identified 

several characteristics that may encourage over-use of sealed sources that pose a risk. NAS 

found that neither sealed source licensees nor sealed source manufacturers “bear the full lifecycle cost, including disposal costs, of some of these radiation sources.” Nor do these parties 

“bear the full cost of liabilities related to misuse of Category 1 and 2 radiation sources” [NAS 

2008, pages 9-10]. As a result, the NAS concluded that alternative technologies are at an 

artificial cost disadvantage relative to devices that use Category 1 and 2 sources. To address 

these concerns, NAS recommended that the U.S. Government “adopt policies that provide 

incentives (market, regulatory, or certification) to facilitate the introduction of replacements and 

reduce the attractiveness and availability of high-risk nuclide sources” [NAS 2008, page 10]. 

Additionally, NAS described both generic and application-specific policy approaches that may 

be appropriate as alternative technologies become available. 

In 2008, at the request of the Task Force, the Task Force Alternative Technologies Subgroup 

used the NAS report as a basis for the evaluation of alternative technologies for seven 

commonly used applications using Category 1 and 2 quantities of Am-241, Co-60, Ir-192, and 

Cs-137. The subgroup analysis included life-cycle operational cost estimates for potential 

replacements, and identified financial incentives that would likely be required to facilitate 

adoption of the replacement devices. The subgroup presented its findings to the Task Force in 

2009. As a result, the Task Force concluded in its 2010 Task Force report that while alternative 

technologies existed for some of the applications assessed by the Subgroup, “the viability, 

relative risk reduction, and stage of development of these alternatives vary,” and that “[n]o 

alternative currently exists that is able to meet all user needs for any of the seven applications” 

assessed by the subgroup [NRC 2010b, page 43]. 
46 

In addition, the Task Force concluded that when replacement technologies become available, 

Federal Government policy support is likely to be necessary to preserve the quality of services 

provided by current radioactive sealed sources or devices during the transition process. 

Successful transition to replacements will also depend upon engagement and coordination 

among sealed source licensees’ device manufacturers and vendors, regulators, and 

policymakers on an application-specific basis. Because of these complex technical and policy 

concerns, the Task Force identified the development and implementation of alternative 

technologies as one of two key challenges requiring attention at higher levels of the Federal 

Government26 [NRC 2010b, page iv]. 

B. Accomplishments Since 2010 

Despite the identified challenges, progress has been made in the identification and development 

of alternative technologies for several widely used devices that use Category 1 and 2 sealed 

sources. For example, blood irradiators using x-ray technologies instead of high-activity sealed 

sources are now available commercially in both domestic and international markets. Although 

limited in scope, this example of successful sealed source replacement encourages future 

progress and aids in the overall risk-reduction effort. Additional accomplishments identified by 

the Task Force since the publication of the 2010 Task Force report include:

• A new generation of blood irradiators using x-ray technologies has become available in the 

U.S. The new technologies may meet the technical and operational requirements to replace 

the Category 1 sealed source devices used in large-scale commercial operations. Also, 

foreign irradiator replacement manufacturers with strong sales and reliability records have 

expressed interest in entering the U.S. market pending regulatory approval; 

• The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) applied a risk-based approach to determine if 

alternative technologies can replace radioactive sources to accomplish its mission. One 

initiative has been to convert from Cs-137 based blood irradiators to x-ray based irradiators. 

To date, the x-ray based irradiators have proven to be as effective as the Cs-137 based 

irradiators. The U.S. Army has reduced overall costs by no longer requiring a U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) license and the increased security requirements of 10 Code 

of Federal Regulations Part 37, “Physical Protection of Byproduct Material” [NRC 2013f] due 

to the fact that those requirements do not apply to x-ray based irradiators. The U.S. Army 

now covers the x-ray irradiators under their Army Radiation Authorization process; 

• The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO) supported a project to design, build, test, and evaluate a prototype non-radioactive 

neutron generator for potential replacement of Am/Be sources. The technology design 

criteria included the scale, function, and durability characteristics necessary for well-logging 

applications [GAO 2013]; 

 

26 The other key challenge identified by the Task Force in 2010 was the development of disposal options for 

high-activity sealed sources. Findings and recommendations with regard to disposal of sources is 

considered in Chapter 2 of this report. 
47 

• In 2013, the DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration’s Global Threat Reduction 

Initiative (NNSA/GTRI) established blood irradiation and well-logging experts groups to 

evaluate current alternative technologies for these applications relative to technical and 

operational requirements for replacements; and 

• In October 2013, the NNSA/GTRI supported a World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) 

workshop on Alternative Technologies in order to encourage and support international 

coordination on the use and implementation of alternative technologies. 

As efforts to develop alternative technologies continue, and transition to replacements is 

considered on an application-specific basis, Task Force member coordination on alternative 

technology development and stakeholder engagement will become increasingly important. 

C. Technical Challenges 

A wide range of radiological source replacement technologies are being developed for blood 

irradiation, biomedical research, non-destructive inspection/evaluation, and oil well-logging 

applications. Technology development has been successful in some of these areas, but 

challenges remain that hinder their adoption in other areas. These challenges are the focus of 

ongoing research and development efforts in both the public and private sectors. 

Bulk blood irradiation is an example where newly developed x-ray generators can replace the 

traditional Cs-137 based irradiators. The technical readiness is demonstrated by the successes 

in encouraging and incentivizing conversion of blood irradiators, as demonstrated by the U.S. 

Army efforts. Yet, commercial scale blood irradiation is still often performed using Cs-137 

sources. Conversion to x-ray sources is hindered by past and perceived issues with mechanical 

reliability, efficacy, and complexity as well as required maintenance. These perceptions are 

changing as operational experience with new x-ray sources is demonstrated. Capital cost is 

another hindrance to conversion of existing Cs-137 based facilities. On the other hand, the cost 

and complexity of installing and maintaining the security infrastructure required for the Cs-137 

based irradiators has been a positive incentive for conversion to x-ray systems. 

Other applications with wider breadth of technical requirements have not been as easily 

addressed. Replacement of existing highly specialized irradiators for biomedical research is 

hindered by the very specific technical requirements and the need to compare results to legacy 

data. Non-destructive inspection/evaluation applications are utilizing replacement technologies 

in some cases, but wider conversion will require further miniaturization. Utilization of alternative 

technologies for well-logging has proven to be a particularly difficult task due to packaging and 

legacy data issues. While alternative sources exist, an important challenge lies in correlating 

historical Am/Be data to alternative source data. 

While alternative technologies exist for the replacement of radiological sources for many 

applications, their adoption has been hindered by perceived and real economic and technical 

issues. The technical issues are the subject of ongoing research. 

III. 2010 and 2014 Recommendations 

The 2010 Task Force report included three recommendations to facilitate progress in the 

research, development, and implementation of alternative technologies. Activities under 2010 

Recommendation 9 are ongoing, while the assessment of potential cesium chloride (CsCl) 
48 

phase-out described in 2010 Recommendation 11 is complete. The programs referenced in 

2010 Recommendation 10 remain important and relevant for future efforts. However, the Task 

Force has decided to status as ‘complete’ the 2010 recommendation and include the programs 

it references in a new 2014 recommendation addressing transition to alternative technologies as 

they become available. 

2010 Recommendation 9: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government 

enhance support of short-term and long-term research and development for alternative 

technologies. 

Status: Ongoing. 

Despite the progress and accomplishments since 2010 in the research and development of 

alternative technologies, specific technical and operational challenges remain which prevent 

potential replacements from making the transition from research and development or prototype 

to implementation. DHS/DNDO continues to be interested in and DOE/NNSA and other 

government and non-government partners continue to track and assess these technical 

obstacles. As a result, alternative technology program and funding support is targeted to areas 

in which it can be used most efficiently and effectively in the overall risk-reduction effort. 

Continued research and development is therefore necessary to further develop technologies 

and system components that will be suitable to replace devices containing Category 1 and 2 

sealed sources. A comprehensive approach to the replacement of devices that use Category 1 

and 2 sources with alternative technologies cannot be developed or implemented until progress 

is made in these research and development efforts. In its 2006 and 2010 Task Force reports, 

the Task Force recognized that policy support mechanisms would be essential in the successful 

transition to alternative technologies as they become available. 

2010 Recommendation 10: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, 

contingent upon the availability of alternative technologies and taking into consideration the 

availability of disposal pathways for disused sources, investigate options such as a voluntary 

prioritized, Government-incentivized program for the replacement of Category 1 and 2 

sources with effective alternatives, with an initial focus on sources containing CsCl. 

Status: Complete. 

2014 Recommendation 3 addresses both the development of programs to incentivize adoption 

of replacement technologies identified in 2010 Recommendation 10, as well as the first steps 

toward implementation of replacement technologies as they become available. 

2010 Recommendation 11 of the Task Force identified the potential replacement of Category 1 

and 2 CsCl sources as a high priority. 

2010 Recommendation 11: Contingent upon the availability of viable alternative 

technologies, the Task Force recommends that the NRC and the Agreement States review 

whether the licensing for new Category 1 and 2 CsCl sources should be discontinued, taking 

the threat environment into consideration. 

Status: Complete. 
49 

In 2008, the NRC and Agreement States evaluated progress in the development of alternative 

technologies for medical and industrial applications which currently use CsCl devices. The 

2008 assessment concluded that without sufficient replacement technologies for the medical 

and industrial services provided by CsCl sources, a policy to discontinue CsCl sealed source 

licensing would be premature as also stated by the CsCl Final Policy Statement [NRC 2011a]. 

In addition, the current lack of financial assurance mechanisms and commercial disposal 

options for these high-activity sealed sources may also constitute a significant factor in future 

consideration of CsCl replacement. Similar disposal concerns arise with regard to 

implementation of replacement technologies more generally. The Task Force continues to 

assess the progress of alternative technologies for these sources and devices, as recognized in 

2014 Recommendation 3. The Task Force also continues to monitor progress on sealed source 

disposal challenges. 

2014 Recommendation 

2014 Recommendation 3: The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, as 

appropriate,27 investigate options such as voluntary, prioritized, incentivized, programs for the 

replacement of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources with effective alternatives. The Task 

Force further recommends that U.S. Government agencies, where appropriate, lead by 

example in the consideration of and transition to alternative technologies that meet technical, 

operational, and cost requirements. 

Incentives and Stakeholder Engagement 

In addition to the technical and operational requirements that must be met for alternative 

technologies to be viable, successful transition to replacements also depends on economic and 

other non-technical factors. The NAS study and 2010 Recommendation 10 noted development 

and implementation of appropriate programs and policy mechanisms will be essential to this 

process. Government incentives for adoption of the alternative technologies can encourage 

potential ‘early-users’ in the transition process. Before these incentive programs can be 

implemented, they must be at the appropriate level of government and must balance National 

security concerns with cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Stakeholder and expert groups can 

provide essential support to assist in the evaluation and development of these and similar 

efforts. With respect to CsCl, the NRC published a Final Policy Statement in the Federal 

Register on July 25, 2011 (76 FR 44378) [NRC 2011a]. The NRC is focusing on continued 

enforcement of the U.S. security requirements. 

 

27 NRC’s statutory mandate precludes it from promoting one technology over another for non-safety or security 

reasons. The NRC would review in accordance with its procedures any new license application for new 

technologies. 
50 

Initiatives to increase information sharing regarding device use and performance may also be 

appropriate as alternative technology devices become commercially viable. These efforts can 

facilitate purchaser consideration of alternative technologies at the time of purchase, such as 

helping the purchaser ensure that the quality of services provided by the alternative 

technologies is not diminished in comparison to the use of the sealed source device. These 

engagement, collaboration, and information sharing efforts should include, as appropriate, the 

agencies and organizations which develop, regulate, manufacture, and use the devices 

containing radioactive sealed sources and potential replacements. Other beneficial 

engagement activities include: 

• Evaluation of application-specific technical, operational, and cost requirements for 

replacement technologies and devices; 

• Assessment of application-specific policies that may be effective in supporting technology 

transitions; 

• Prioritization of transition support efforts based on the development status of replacement 

technologies (including technical, operational, and cost factors) and their risk-reduction 

potential; and 

• Engagement with the appropriate stakeholder communities regarding the benefits of 

potential replacements, as well as solutions to overcoming transition challenges. 

In addition, Federal agencies should consider additional activities to support these and related 

efforts, such as: 

• Develop, maintain, and share, as appropriate, an inventory of commercially available 

alternative technologies for both outreach and policy planning purposes; 

• Cost-benefit analyses to assist in the evaluation of replacement technologies as they 

become available; 

• Develop general and application-specific reference standards and best practices to assist 

device users in purchasing decisions when replacement technologies are available; and 

• Evaluate international efforts in the development and implementation of alternative 

technologies, including policy support mechanisms and outcomes. 

NNSA’s Office of Global Threat Reduction and Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and 

Verification Research and Development are working together to support the advancement of 

alternative technologies as replacements for high activity radiological sources. This existing 

partnership will help initiate the effort to facilitate collaboration among the interagency. 

NNSA/GTRI has agreed to take the lead on this effort. 

Transition to Alternatives 

As progress continues in the development of replacement technologies, the Task Force 

believes that it will be important for the Federal Government to lead by example. An example of 

a Federal agency leading the way in assessing their needs regarding alternative technologies is 

the DOD. The DOD through directives, instructions, and service regulations, has made a 

concerted effort to reduce radioactive sources in the DOD where possible. The DOD has 

successfully converted from Cs-137 based blood irradiators to x-ray irradiators, is working to 
51 

transition to non-radioactive luminosity devices and chemical agent detectors, but has 

determined there is a need for radioactive moisture density testers. A range of options are 

available for Federal agencies to encourage the adoption of replacement technologies which 

meet technical, operational, and cost requirements. For example, Federal agencies procuring 

Category 1 and 2 sealed sources and devices could document their assessment regarding the 

replacement of those devices in comparison with available non-radioactive alternatives. If 

shared among agencies, this information could help purchasers become familiar with 

replacement trends and decision factors, and could also be used to assess overall progress in 

conversion efforts. Similar assessment requirements could also be included in Federal 

research grant applications. These assessments would not only encourage consideration of 

potential replacement technologies during purchase and funding decisions, they would also 

serve as an important mechanism to inform stakeholder communities with regard to alternative 

technology options. 
52 

Summary Table of 2006 and 2010 Recommendations and Actions and Ne

Recommendations 

The following table presents the status of the open 2006 and 2010 Task Force recommendations and actions, a2010 Task Force report and the new 2014 recommendations and actions. The recommendations and actions th2010 Task Force report have not been included in this report, nor have they been included in this table. The tab

of action that may be necessary to implement the recommendation—legislative change, regulatory change (thosthat would require a policy, rule, or procedure change or development in order to implement) or neither (those redo not involve a change in law or regulation). The table also indicates the status of the recommendation or actiothe applicable page and chapter in the 2006, 2010, and/or 2014 Task Force reports where the initiative is discus

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

2006 Recommendation 3-1

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government periodically reevaluate the list of radioactive sources that warrant enhanced security and protection to assess their adequacy in light of the evolving threat environment [and consistent with current national consequences of concern in order to provide a consistent level of protection with other critical infrastructure]. 

Complereassesin 2009 2012 as of perioreevaluwith consideof amenbrackettext. Fureevaluperformdirected the TasForce, iaccordawith the 
53 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

Force Charter

2006 Recommendation 4-2 

The Task Force recommends that the Federal agencies and States continue efforts to improve coordination and communication of their ongoing activities in the area of radiation protection and security for Category 1 and 2 sources. 

 Comple

2006 Action 4-1 The NRC should consider imposing additional 

measures to verify the validity of licenses, before transfer of risk-significant radioactive sources, on all licensees authorized to possess Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material. 

 Comple
54 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

2006 Recommendation 5-1 

The Task Force recommends development of a Transport Security Memorandum of Understanding to serve as the foundation for cooperation in the establishment of a comprehensive and consistent transport security program for risk-significant sources.

 Ongoin

2006 Recommendation 5-2

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government evaluate the feasibility of using new and existing technologies to detect and discourage the theft of risk-significant radioactive material during transport. The evaluation should include the findings of operational testing of existing technologies offering enhanced security of motor carrier shipments of hazardous material; shipment tracking, including communication systems; radio-frequency identification; vehicle disabling technologies; and mobile and stationary radiation detection systems. 

Comple

2006 Recommendation 5-3

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government immediately develop a strategy and take actions to address the security of international shipments of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources 

Yes Comple
55 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

that transit or are transshipped through the land territory of the United States. 

2006 Action 5-1 The Transportation Security Subgroup should review 

the findings and conclusions of all research conducted on securing “high hazard” hazardous materials transport to determine if any of the measures should be applied to transport of risk-significant radioactive sources. 

 Comple

2006 Action 6-1 The NRC should expeditiously complete its 

implementation of the fingerprinting provisions of the EPAct for those applicants for and licensees with Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material. The NRC should place a high priority on completing the EPAct Section 652 rulemaking. As part of the rulemaking, the NRC should require fingerprinting for any individual who could have access to Category 2 or above quantities of radioactive materials. The NRC 

 Comple
56 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

should also require periodic reinvestigations of such persons. 

2006 Action 6-2 The NRC should evaluate the feasibility of 

establishing a national database for materials licensees that would contain information on pending applications and information on individuals cleared for unescorted access. 

 Comple
57 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

2006 Action 9-1 The DOE should continue its ongoing efforts to 

develop GTCC [LLRW] disposal capability. 

Possibly Ongoin

2006 Action 10-1 The U.S. Government should continue the efforts to 

promote international harmonization of import and export controls for Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources. 

 Comple
58 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

2006 Action 10-2 The U.S. Government should encourage suppliers to 

provide arrangements for the return of disused sources and examine means to reduce regulatory impediments that currently make this option unavailable. 

 Ongoin

2006 Action 10-3 The Task Force suggests the use of education and 

the creation of incentives to discourage the export of used Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources as an alternative to disposal. 

 Comple

2006 Action 11-2 The NRC should consider programming the NSTS to 

provide automatic daily information to [U.S.] Customs [and Border Patrol] on import/export shipment notifications. 

 Comple
59 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

2010 Recommendation 1 

The Task Force recommends that U.S. Government agencies use the radionuclides and the associated Category 2 threshold quantities in Table II, “Radionuclides that Warrant Enhanced Security and Protection” (as shown on page 11 of the 2010 Task Force report), as the appropriate framework for considering which sources warrant enhanced security*and that they adopt the definitions for a significant RED and a significant RDD (as shown on page 8 of the 2010 Task Force report) for prioritizing and allocating resources to eliminate, control, or mitigate risks of malevolent radiological incidents. *By warrants enhanced security and protection is meant enhanced in comparison to the security and protection applied to radioactive sealed sources before September 11, 2001. 

 Comple

2010 Recommendation 2 

The Task Force recommends that U.S. Government agencies should reevaluate their protection and mitigation strategies to protect against significant RED or RDD attack using both potential severe immediate or short-term exposure and contamination consequences to public health, safety, and the environment as the consequences of concern. 

Possibly Ongoin
60 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

Agencies should use the Task Force-endorsed definitions, radionuclides, and thresholds for a significant RED and RDD and the associated assumptions and parameters as common guidance in the assessment of risk and management of homeland security activities. 

2010 Recommendation 3 

Contingent upon the availability of alternative technologies, the Task Force recommends that the NRC evaluate whether the export licensing for Category 1 and 2 CsCl sources should be discontinued, taking the availability of disposal capacity and the threat environment into consideration. 

Yes Comple

2010 Recommendation 4 

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, regional compacts, and States continue to evaluate disposal options for disused radioactive sources, including options for handling a potentially large number of disused cesium chloride sources that may be replaced once viable alternatives are available. 

Possibly Possibly Ongoin

2010 Recommendation 5 

The Task Force recommends that Federal and State Governments investigate options such as providing 

 Ongoin
61 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

short-term secured storage of sources recovered from U.S. owners that contain foreign-origin americium-241 radioactive material, so that these sources can be recovered now, and increase efforts to investigate options for disposal of these sources. 

2010 Recommendation 6 

The Task Force recommends that the NRC incorporate procedures to review the status, such as the date of, the reason for, and location of sources in long-term storage, in the current inspection program. 

 Comple
62 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

2010 Recommendation 7 

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, in collaboration with responsible State agencies, evaluate and develop a plan to improve, as necessary, processes for dealing with unwanted, abandoned, or impounded sources, including storage, reuse, recycling, or other disposition methods. 

 Comple

2010 Recommendation 8 

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government enhance support of short-term and long-term research and development of certified Type B containers for use in domestic and international source recovery efforts. 

 Ongoin

2010 Recommendation 9 

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government enhance support of short-term and long-term research and development for alternative 

 Ongoin
63 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

technologies. 

2010 Recommendation 10 

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, contingent upon the availability of alternative technologies and taking into consideration the availability of disposal pathways for disused sources, investigate options such as a voluntary prioritized, Government-incentivized program for the replacement of Category 1 and 2 sources with effective alternatives, with an initial focus on sources containing CsCl. 

 Yes Comple

2010 Recommendation 11 

Contingent upon the availability of viable alternative technologies, the Task Force recommends that the NRC and the Agreement States review whether the licensing for new Category 1 and 2 CsCl sources should be discontinued, taking the threat environment into consideration. 

 Comple

2014 Recommendation 1 

The Task Force recommends that U.S. Government agencies assess the adequacy of and coordinate strategies for preventing and mitigating cybersecurity vulnerabilities related to Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources.

 Yes 
64 

Recommendations and Actions

Legislative Change 

Regulatory Change 

Status 

2014 Recommendation 2 

The Task Force recommends that the NRC evaluate the need for sealed source licensees to address the eventual disposition/disposal costs of Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive sources through source disposition/disposal financial planning or other mechanisms. Disposition costs should include the cost of packaging, transport, and disposal (when available) of these sources. 

 Yes 

2014 Recommendation 3 

The Task Force recommends that the U.S. Government, as appropriate,28 investigate options 

such as voluntary, prioritized, incentivized, programs for the replacement of Category 1 and 2 radioactive sources with effective alternatives. The Task Force further recommends that U.S. Government agencies, where appropriate, lead by example in the consideration of and transition to alternative technologies that meet technical, operational, and cost requirements. 

 

28 NRC’s statutory mandate precludes it from promoting one technology over another for non-safety or security reasons. The NRC 

accordance with its procedures any new license application for new technologies.
65 

One of the above recommendations and one of the above actions either highlight or may 

necessitate legislative changes. The following provides further information: 

• 2006 Action 9-1: Pursuant to EPAct Section 631, before the U.S. Department of Energy 

can issue a final decision on a disposal alternative for greater-than-Class C low-level 

radioactive waste, it must first issue a report to Congress describing the disposal 

alternatives under consideration and await Congressional action. Some alternatives 

may require legislative action to implement. 

• 2010 Recommendation 4: The current State compact disposal system, as established in 

the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, is partially working as 

intended, but not providing disposal options for all generators of low-level radioactive 

waste. Potential disposal solutions must be fostered at the highest levels of Federal and 

State Government. 

The Task Force will continue to maintain and update an implementation plan for all of these 

recommendations and actions. The implementation plan was developed as a living document 

following the issuance of the first report. The implementation plan includes timelines for 

completion and tracks achievements towards completion of these activities. In its development 

of the first implementation plan update following the issuance of this report, the Task Force 

plans to outline its strategic plan to more effectively and efficiently track open recommendations 

and actions via other mechanisms. These other mechanisms, such as through other routine 

interagency coordination groups or through developments of agreements with applicable 

agencies that have the responsibility and authority to carry out the recommended initiatives, 

may better foster timely completion of some of the initiatives. 
66 

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68 

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69 

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70 

Appendix A

Acronyms and Abbreviations 

AEA Atomic Energy Act 

Am americium 

Am/Be americium beryllium (containing Am-241) 

Be beryllium 

BTP Branch Technical Position 

CBP Customs and Border Protection, U.S. 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. 

Ci curie 

Co cobalt 

CRCPD Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 

Cs cesium 

CsCI cesium chloride (containing Cs-137) 

DEIS Draft Environmental Impact Statement 

DHS Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DHS) 

DOE Department of Energy, U.S. 

DOS Department of State, U.S. 

DOT Department of Transportation, U.S. 

EIS Environmental Impact Statement 

EO Executive Order 

EPA Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. 

EPAct Energy Policy Act of 2005 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FY Fiscal Year 

GAO Government Accountability Office, U.S. 

GTCC greater-than-Class C 

GTRI Global Threat Reduction Initiative 

G-8 Group of Eight 

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 

IERP Independent External Review Panel 

IMPEP Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program 

Ir iridium 

ISMP Integrated Source Management Portfolio 

kCi kilocuries 

LLRW low-level radioactive waste 

LLRWPAA Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 
71 

LVS License Verification System 

MOU memorandum of understanding 

MPWG Materials Program Working Group 

NAS National Academy of Sciences 

NGCC Nuclear Government Coordinating Council (DHS) 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE) 

NOC National Operations Center 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S 

NSTS National Source Tracking System 

OAS Organization of Agreement States 

OTP One Time Password 

PLGWG Pre-Licensing Guidance Working Group 

PPD Presidential Policy Directive 

Pu plutonium 

Pu/Be plutonium beryllium (containing Pu-239) 

RDD radiological dispersal device 

RED radiation exposure device 

RIS Regulatory Issue Summary 

SCATR Source Collection and Threat Reduction Program 

Se selenium 

Task Force Interagency Task Force on Radiation Source Protection and Security 

TSA Transportation Security Administration (DHS) 

U.S. United States 

U.S.C. United States Code 

WBL Web-Based Licensing System 

WCS Waste Control Specialists 

WINS World Institute of Nuclear Security 

μCi microcuries 
72 

Appendix B

Glossary 

Agreement State 

A State that has signed an agreement with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 

pursuant to section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act, under which the State regulates the use of 

byproduct, source, and small quantities of special nuclear material within that State. There are 

currently 37 Agreement States. 

Compact 

A group of two or more States that have formed business alliance to dispose of low-level 

radioactive waste on a regional basis, as authorized by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 

Amendments Act of 1985, as amended. 

Curie 

One of three units used to measure the intensity of radioactivity in a sample of material. This 

value refers to the amount of ionizing radiation released when an element (such as uranium) 

spontaneously emits energy as a result of the radioactive decay (or disintegration) of an 

unstable atom. Radioactivity is also the term used to describe the rate at which radioactive 

material emits radiation, or how many atoms in the material decay (or disintegrate) in a given 

time period. As such, 1 Ci is equal to 37 billion (3.7 x 1010) disintegrations per second, so 1 Ci 

also equals 37 billion (3.7 x 1010) Bq. A curie is also a quantity of any radionuclide that decays 

at a rate of 37 billion disintegrations per second (1 gram of radium (Ra-226), for example). The 

curie is named after Marie and Pierre Curie, who discovered radium in 1898. 

Disposal 

The emplacement of radioactive sources in an appropriate facility without the intention of 

retrieval. 

Disused Source 

A radioactive source that is no longer used, and is not intended to be used, for the practice for 

which an authorization has been granted. To meet this definition, a licensee or owner for the 

sealed source must be clearly identifiable. 

Greater-than-Class C Radioactive Waste 

Greater-than-Class C (GTCC) radioactive waste is low-level radioactive waste that exceeds the 

Class C limits in 10 CFR § 61.55, “Waste Classification.” This section classifies low-level 

radioactive waste as Class A, B, or C, according to concentration of specific short- and 

long-lived radionuclides; this section also sets varying requirements on waste forms for 

disposal. GTCC LLRW is generally unacceptable for near-surface disposal. 

License 

A permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, allowing an entity to carry on some 

authority subject to regulation by the governmental body. The NRC issues licenses in 

accordance with Title 10 CFR, or an Agreement State issues a license under its equivalent 

regulations. The NRC and Agreement States issue about 21,000 specific licenses for medical, 

academic, and industrial uses of nuclear materials. Reactor and accelerator-produced 

radionuclides are used extensively throughout the United States for civilian and military 
73 

industrial applications, basic and applied research, the manufacture of consumer products, civil 

defense activities, academic studies, and medical diagnostics, treatment and research. The 

regulatory programs of the NRC and Agreement States are designed to ensure that licensees 

safely use these materials and do not endanger public health and safety or cause damage to 

the environment. 

Long-Term Storage 

Storage with little or no limits on its duration. This type of disposition mechanism can be used 

while arrangements are made for final disposition because of (1) a lack of a final disposal 

option, (2) a lack of available funds, (3) a need for time to complete an amended or new 

authorization, or (4) a need for time to establish a new disposition pathway. It can also be used 

while the availability of transportation to a new disposition location is pending. Long-term 

storage can be an effective mechanism to alleviate a health and safety or security risk posed by 

a source. However, long-term storage may not permanently alleviate the risk associated with 

the source. 

Radiation Exposure Device 

An object used to maliciously expose people, equipment, and/or the environment to ionizing 

radiation without dispersal of radioactive material. 

Radioactive Source 

Radioactive material that is permanently sealed in a capsule or closely bonded, in a solid form, 

and which is not exempt from regulatory control. It does not mean material encapsulated for 

disposal, or nuclear material within the nuclear fuel cycles of research and power reactors. 

Radiological Dispersal Device 

The combination of radioactive material and the means (whether active or passive) to disperse 

that material with malicious intent without a nuclear explosion. 

 

Risk-Significant Source 

A risk-significant source refers to Category 1 and 2 sources as defined in the International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Code of Conduct. 

Risk-Significant Quantity 

A risk-significant quantity refers to aggregated radioactive material that together meets or 

exceeds the Category 1 or 2 thresholds from the IAEA Code of Conduct. 

Safeguards Information 

A special category of sensitive unclassified information that must be protected. Safeguards

Information concerns the physical protection of operating power reactors, spent fuel shipments, 

strategic special nuclear material, or other radioactive material. 

Source Collection and Threat Reduction (SCATR) Program

The Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) launched the SCATR 

Program in 2006, based on funding from the U.S. Department of Energy. This program is 

designed to reduce the amount of unused radioactive material stored by radioactive material 

licensees. SCATR provides a financial incentive for licensees to remove unwanted radioactive 

material from long-term storage to proper dispositioning to reduce the threat of these sources 

being used for malicious intent. 
74 

Special Nuclear Material 

Special nuclear material is defined by Title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as (1) plutonium, 

uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the 

Commission, pursuant to the provisions of section 51, determines to be special nuclear material, 

but does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the 

foregoing, but does not include source material. 

Spent Nuclear Fuel 

Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent 

elements of which have not been separated by reprocessing. 

Storage 

The holding of radioactive sources in a facility that provides for their containment with the 

intention of retrieval.