SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4011-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARTI WOODWARD, a/k/a

MARTHA E. WOODWARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted June 4, 2019 – Decided June 20, 2019

Before Judges Fasciale and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 16-11-

1138.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Elizabeth Cheryl Jarit, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant appeals from her conviction for fourth-degree operating a 

motor vehicle during a second or subsequent license suspension, N.J.S.A. 

2C:40-26(b). The judge found aggravating factors three and nine, imposed a 

two-year probationary sentence, which the judge conditioned upon serving 270 

days in jail, with a 180-day period of parole ineligibility. On appeal, defendant 

argues: 

POINT I

FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN INSTRUCTION TO 

THE JURY LIMITING THE JURY'S USE OF THE 

MANY ADMITTED, OUT-OF-COURT 

STATEMENTS BY NON-TESTIFYING WITNESSES 

DENIED [DEFENDANT] DUE PROCESS AND A 

FAIR TRIAL. (Partially Raised Below).

POINT II

RESENTENCING IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE 

COURT DOUBLE-COUNTED AND FAILED TO 

PROVIDE A STATEMENT OF REASONS IN 

FINDING THE TWO AGGRAVATING FACTORS, 

AND BECAUSE OF ERRORS CONTAINED WITHIN 

THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.

A. The trial court's finding of aggravating factor three 

double-counted . . . defendant's "use of alcohol," which 

is an element of the offense, and is otherwise 

unsupported by the record.

B. The trial court failed to provide a statement of 

reasons for aggravating factor nine.
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C. A remand is required to correct the Judgment of 

Conviction, which states that the conviction and 

sentence were the result of a negotiated plea.

We affirm, but remand to correct a typographical error on the judgment of 

conviction. 

An officer was behind a Mazda and decided to do a random license plate 

inquiry. He used his on-board computer system, entered the plate number, and 

learned that the license of the registered owner had been suspended. He pulled 

over the vehicle and, while still in his patrol car, he viewed the driver's license

photograph of the person with the suspended license. He approached the Mazda, 

identified himself, and noticed that the driver of the Mazda – defendant –

matched the photo of the person whose license was suspended.

Defendant gave the officer her credentials, but was unable to locate her 

license. After defendant confirmed she owned the Mazda, the officer checked 

if defendant had any outstanding warrants. He learned that her license had been 

suspended as part of a conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). At that 

time, the officer issued motor vehicle citations to defendant but did not arrest 

her, until after he reviewed her driving abstract. Upon reviewing the abstract, 

he learned that defendant's license had been suspended a second time – for ten 

years – as part of a conviction for refusing to submit to a breath test. 
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The State charged defendant with operating a motor vehicle during a 

period of license suspension for a second or subsequent DWI conviction, in 

violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b), which provides:

It shall be a crime of the fourth degree to operate a 

motor vehicle during the period of license suspension 

in violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:3-40, if the actor's license 

was suspended or revoked for a second or subsequent 

violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50 or section 2 of 

[N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50.4a. A person convicted of an 

offense under this subsection shall be sentenced by the 

court to a term of imprisonment.

To be convicted under the statute, the State must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt:

1. That the defendant knowingly operated a motor 

vehicle;

2. That the defendant's license was suspended or 

revoked for . . . her 

. . . . 

(b) second or subsequent violation of [driving 

while intoxicated] or [refusal to submit to a 

chemical breath test]; and

3. That the defendant knew that . . . her license was 

suspended or revoked.

[Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Driving While 

License is Suspended or Revoked for DWI or Refusal 

to Submit to a Chemical Breath Test (N.J.S.A. 2C:40-

26)" (rev. Apr. 11, 2016).]
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Defendant contends that the judge erred by overruling objections to 

purported hearsay statements that she maintains the State used to prove the 

second and third elements of the offense. She argues further that the judge failed 

to give a related limited jury instruction (which defense counsel never 

requested). We conclude these contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We make the following brief 

remarks.

On appellate review of a trial court's evidentiary ruling, the decision will 

be upheld "absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear 

error of judgment." State v. J.A.C., 210 N.J. 281, 295 (2012) (quoting State v. 

Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)). Thus, to overturn such a decision, the prior 

ruling must have been "so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice 

resulted." Ibid. (quoting State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 484 (1997)). We see 

no such abuse here. 

 The officer referenced three out-of-court statements during his 

testimony. First, that his motor vehicle computer system advised him defendant 

had a DMV violation and her license was suspended. Second, that central 

dispatch advised him they confirmed defendant's license was suspended for a 

DWI conviction. And third, that his on-call sergeant advised him not to arrest 
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defendant until they verified the number of DWI convictions she had. The

statements are not hearsay because the State did not offer them for their truth. 

Rather, the State used them to explain what steps the officer took before 

charging defendant with the offense. 

On appeal, defense counsel argues that the judge should have instructed 

the jury not to consider the statements for their truth. But no such request was 

made to the judge. The officer's reference to what these individuals said is not 

"clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. That is especially so 

because there existed overwhelming evidence of guilt, as evidenced by the 

State's documentary evidence consisting of three items to which the judge took 

judicial notice. 

As to the first suspension, the judge admitted into evidence S-1, which is 

defendant's municipal court DWI conviction. S-1 verified defendant's DWI 

conviction, a two-year license suspension, and a disposition date of August 

2013. As to the second suspension, the judge admitted into evidence two 

documents. S-2, which is the municipal court refusal conviction; and S-2A, 

which is a related court order and certification. S-2 verified defendant's refusal 

conviction, a ten-year license suspension, and a disposition date of June 2014. 

S-2A, which defendant signed, reflects that defendant received written and oral 
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notice as to the penalties for subsequent convictions for driving on the revoked 

list. 

For these documents, the judge charged the jury that "you may but are not 

required to accept as established any fact which has been judicially noticed." As 

part of the full model jury charge, which the judge gave, on the subject of how 

to consider defendant's prior motor vehicle violations, the judge charged the 

jury:

Normally, evidence of a defendant's prior motor vehicle 

violations is not permitted under our Rules of Evidence. 

This is because our rules specifically exclude evidence 

that a defendant has committed prior motor vehicle 

violations when it is offered only to show that she has 

a disposition or tendency to do wrong and, therefore,

must be guilty of the present offense. However, our 

rules do permit such evidence when the evidence is 

used for some other purpose. In this case, the evidence 

has been introduced for the specific purpose of 

establishing an element of the present offense. You 

may not use this evidence to decide that defendant has 

a tendency to commit crimes or that she is a bad person;

that is, you may not decide that[,] just because the 

defendant has committed prior motor vehicle 

violations[,] she must be guilty of the present crime. 

The evidence produced by the State concerning the 

prior motor vehicle convictions for driving while 

intoxicated or refusal to submit to a chemical breath test 

is to be considered only in determining whether the 

State has established its burden of proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the present offense.
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Defendant does not focus on this documentary proof. Instead, she focuses on 

the non-hearsay statements.

"Appellate review of sentencing decisions is relatively narrow and is 

governed by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 

297 (2010) (citing State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 401 (1989)). We consider 

whether the trial court has "appl[ied] correct legal principles in exercising its 

discretion." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 

(1984)). As part of our review, we must determine whether "the aggravating 

and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon 

competent and credible evidence in the record[.]" State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 

70 (2014). We will affirm the sentence if: "(1) the trial court followed the 

sentencing guidelines; (2) its findings of fact and application of aggravating and 

mitigating factors were 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;'

and (3) 'the application of the guidelines to the facts' of the case does not 'shock[] 

the judicial conscience.'" State v. A.T.C., 454 N.J. Super. 235, 254 (App. Div. 

2018) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 

(2014)).

We are convinced that the judge adhered to the sentencing guidelines, 

there was no double counting, and that the record supports the judge's findings. 
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The sentence imposed is well within the judge's sentencing discretion and does 

not shock our judicial conscience.

We affirm the conviction, but remand to correct the judgment of 

conviction to reflect that this was a jury trial, not a guilty plea. We do not retain 

jurisdiction.