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12 1&rch 1963 

MEMORANDUM FOR ~ECORD 

The attached Summary Revievi of the National Reconnaissance Office, dated 25 February 1963, was prepared by the first 

Director of the National.Reconnaissance Office, Dr. Joseph V. 

Charyk, at· the time of his departure from this position. The 

review summarizes the history of the NRO from Jts earliest 

inception up to the t1meof Dr. Charyk's departure, including accomplishments as \vell as problems.. . .. 

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36-page summary 

j obB L. l\-tartin,' lr. 

'. Colonel, USA.F 

Director. NRO'Staff 

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February 25, 1963 

A sm-!"IARY REVIEW OF Tr.E 

NATIONAL RECONNAISSAr~CE OFFICE 

1. INTRODUcnON 

. \. This document i8 intended to sU1'tJnl8r1ze the development 

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of the National Reconnaissance Offi.ce and 'to review some of 

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the considerations relative to its Ostal.>11sbment, its organizational arrangement t accomplis'bments, 'present. status and to " 

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indicate probleDl areas that have been, encountered. Pertinent • 1". • 

recamneDdatioDS for resolutiOll of such problem areas are also 

.' included. 

2.' ORGANIZATION 

- The esseDtial background' of the present Nationa~ kecon-: 

naid\sance Office began in ~une 1960 with 'a Presidential request 

. , ~. , for a special review of the satellite recoanaissanee'program. I 

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,,,' .I After numerous meetiDgs and 'discussions, this effort culm11lated 

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with a 'specia~ ~etiDg of. the National Security CoUncil on 

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2S August 1960. 'As a result ofth1s review, the Department o~ 

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Defense was directed' to re-orient, the overt satellite 'reconnai~sance 

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project known as SAMOS' and to establish special management 

'structure and procecur~s for this project. 

As a'result, the" SAl10S project t~t1S removed, completely' 

from Dormal channels. The responsibility for conducting the 

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developme.nt and operation was.assigned to a'General Officer, 

in \Cl:~ field, who·) il?- turn, was assigned directly to . theSecretary of the Air Force and reported to the Secretary with no 

intermediate supervision' 0t- review. 'A small. special staff' 

(seVen officers) was established within the Office of the Secretary to accomplish all, l-lasbingtOD staff work required by', the 

Secretary and the Project Director'. In practice, from the out- , 

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set, the Secretary's responsibilities for· the SAMOS ,Projec.t were 

delega~edto the Under Secretary, who ~eported' directly to the 

~ecretary of Defeuse concerning the SAl«)S Proj eet. 

'!he revised procedures included the stipulation that the , 

S&105 'Project would be responsive only torequ1rementa stated by 

the United Statealntelligence Board. The revised' procedure 

also excluded any' overt association of ·the BAHlS ProJect with 

any military operatioDal'cQmmand,and placecl all ,aspects of' the 

proj ectmanagement and operation within a research and· development envirODmeDt. 

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Immediately after establishment. of the new S~l'IDS . 

management .tructure in early September 1960 I . the Unde.r . 

Secretary of the Air For·ce placed management of the CORON4 

and .ARGON projects within the special ·SMiDS management strue-

"ture, insofar as Air Force actions and authority were concerned. 

In addition. he established direct liaison with the responsible 

. CIA official., at that" time the Deputy Director (Plans). re8ult~ 

iDg in a greatly improved arrangement for these covert projects. 

b. Establishment of the NRO 

"In the spring of 1961, initial consideration· was given. 

to fuZ"ther revisions. to the· 8pec~al management structure.· The I . 

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existiDsstructure was effect1veonly for the specific SAMOS* 

CORONA and ARGON projects; it .~d no relation t~· other projects,· 

existing" or proposed. Furthermor.e. the arrangement did n~t : 

provide for· the degree of management effectiveness warrant~d 

by the national imp~rtance· of satellite recolUlaissance." The 

result of discussions extendmg over, the summe~ of 1~60 was 

,the £o~l1z111g of the previous arrangement into· a national '.' ... ' ,', .... ,' ! , ... ~. 

of£lce J with ita charter expanded to include DQt only all satellite, 

mapping, geodesy and intelligence' gatheriD8 projec;ts~ hut all . 

air~raft: and drone overflight projects as we,ll. 

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,the resulting National Reconnaissance Office w~ 

formally established by the CIA-DOD'Agreement of 6 September 

1961. in this Agreement, the" Under Secretary of the Air Force 

and the Deputy Director (Plans) of the CIA were designated as 

Co-Directors of'the ERO. The1r initial steps toward formal 

office organization were interrupted a~st ~ediate,ly by 

rejection of the Co-Director provisions of the Agreement by 

the me 5412 Group, all the basis that the reconnaissance proo:-

gram was too important nationally to be cou'ducted under divided . .: .. 

~gement; complete resp~nlibi11ty f9r man4g~ent of the entire 

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program should be assigned unequivocally to 'a single, person~" 

Discussioaa'of such revision of the CIA-DOD Agre~eDt"wer~ 

,carried out over the nut soven 12;Onths ,intermittently' ~terrupted for' various reasons., During this period,· essentially 

DO progreS8 was possible toward the ~or.mal organizing of the 

NRO; the 'previous arrangement waScontin1.1ed under tb~ new nmne, 

with the Deputy Director (Research) replacing the Deputy :~1rector 

(Plans) due to internal CIA organizational changes. A new' CIADOD AgreeDlent was signed on' 2 )fay"1962 establishing a, single 

Direccor of the BRO." responsible directly to the Director of', . . . . 

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Central Intel11gence and the Secretary of D~fense for management of the entire National Reconnaissance Program. Concurrent associated documents provided for tl1e establishment of 

the National Reconnaissance Office as an operating agenc:y i ' 

and designated the' Under Secretary of the Air Fo~ce as the 

\ Director. 

c. Organization of the NRO· 

In May 1962, after the documentation .ccncernillg the 

Dew Agreement: had b~'issued, the. Director of the NRO convened 

a special two-day conference to discu8s the organization and 

proeedures, to be established UIlder ,the new charter., This, con- '. i .' 

ference waa attended,by the Deputy Director (Research), CIA, \ 

and several key member. 'of h~ staff, along'with several m~ , . . 

bers of the special staff of ~e Un~erSeeretary of the i.:ir 

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,Force. ,DUring -this conf~rence~ general agreement was reached· 

. o~ tbebaslc erganlzatiOll auc method of operation ~~ be 

. folloWed. 

Subsequently, On the ~18. of,'this conference,', the"basic , ' 

organization, o~ the present EO was established by memoranduin of· .. 

23 July 1962.from the Director,· NROto the Program Directors and . , . 

the Director'i1tRO Staff. This· memorandum established 1n~erD4l, 

NRO· structure and reapoD81bll~ti:ea, couistent with. the basic, '. 

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LTRO Cllarter. The Director also arr~sed for additional participation within the.NRO by the CIA. NPIC, liSA, ehe ·l~avy and 

the ~ through provision ·of qualified personnal from these 

Agencies and Services to serve full time tours. on' an inter .. 

agency· exchange basis. The NRO organization 1s outlined in 

the attacbuent hereto.· 

d. Modus OPerandi 

the basic approach folLowed by. the DirectQr in organi-

~ing . and managing the present NRC) bas been b'ased upon the 

f~llow1ng rationale: 

(1) the clear intent behind the p~esent t~o is 

for the. Director actually to manage the entire National 

Reconnaissance Progrant not· simply· to arrange for coordination of the several projects • 

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(2) To accomplish this task, he has authoritative 

respoulb111ty for all aspects of the Program, subject only 

to the basic provisions of. the 2 )1ay 1962 ,!IA-DODAgreement:. 

aQG associated charter documcuits, and to guidance he· receives 

from th~ Director of Central 'In1:elligence and·'the SecretarY· 

of Defense' (10 addition. o.f cQUrse,to all applicable prov1s1oosof·pub11c law.) 

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In accordance with this rationale, the Dtrector has 

issued directives and instructions through correspondence. 

·on numerous aspects of the NRO and its program. In matters' 

which are somewhat "involved, or inclined to be controversial, 

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he has elected to employ several specff+c written agreements ·.f 

as a basic management ·procedure. 

In regard to the'various projects "tinder NRO management, 

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his actions have been based upon the v1~w that a~l such.proj-

. ects are NRO 'projects, not CIA or roD projects,· that the NRO 

should literally fuse the for.merly distinct and,separate 

efforts of separate Agencies· and Services into a single national ' A . 

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program under close and· effective manaSement· of the Direc~or. 

- Since the NaO is • classified org4D1~atloD with, a sensitive' mission, all written directives to fielde·lements of the 

Department of Def~e bave been issued through appropriate 

est;ap11shed Department of Defense ~banne18. For example, during , \ .' , ' . ,- , 

the' CUban cr1a~8t NllO iDstructiona to mil:ltarl units -in ,the 

field were sent either through the ·.~fense IllteU~gence Agency " , ' . . ...... . .. ..,.....'. ., ~'" ~ ..... ' 

or the Joint bconnai8sance Center. 

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3. ACHIEVEMENTS , , 

a. Mnna!?b(ll..ment 

Before noting achievements of the NRO tn· the develop· 

ment 4nd operat~on of specific. projects, ,some accomp11sr~enta 

of the Office should ·be considered from an over-all management· 

viewpo1ilt •.. 

. , (1) the management of s~ilar and related' satellite 

projects bas. been consolidated within a single streamlined, 

re8ponsiv~ structure. In this process, formerly overlapping 

, aid conflictiDg responsibilities of the several J...gencies and· 

Services involved have been replaced wit:b clear, non-conflicting . i ,. 

assignment ofrespous1b11itles. 

(2) The HRO has provided a single, responsible focal 

po1Dt fo~ the· national management of all overfligllt of denied 

areas, and for effective coordination ~etween all satellite,· 

aircraft and drone matter'!·:In this regard. 

(3) . The NRC) baa employed management stPlcture arid 

,procedUres uniquely tailored· to the magnitude J importance and· . " '" I,., ..... . .' . 

s,pectal conditions affeetiDs the national task. Management ,"' . 

responsibility bas been defined clearly and centere.d in the' 

smalles~ possible units canpose~ of selected'personnel of 

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'. bighest qualifications. liOl'1eVer, full use has. been made of· 

dle existing materiel a~d person.~el resources of the 'several 

Agencies and .Services involved in providing .. tbe bulk of the , , 

support to the over-all program. By use o~ lltrea.mlined pro-

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cedurea , el1m1Datlon of al~ intermediate reviews be~'leen the 

field Program D~ectors and the Director of the NRO, substitution of ~ersonal atte~t1~ of a few selected individuals ~~r 

- ,all normally repetitive management' documents and reports" and \ ' " . ' 

·establishment 'of special' commu~1cations. arrangements, it, has' 

been'possible' to manage effectively a totalnationa! program . , 

1Dvolving app:.;ox:1ma:te1y f 

in FY ~63 "lth an NRO technical s·taff' of approximately fifteen.' . ..' 

" the management' systCD.thus deVeloped hao- made . it· possible .to 

carry outthls gigantic ,task under the, conditions impos,ed by 

special security requirements •. 

(4) 'Tbe NRO ~as provided' thetniti~tive and conceptual , .' 

basis for the establishment of Department of ,Def~nae'poVcY and8ecur1~ directives' designed to prQVidethe"maXimum possible 

protection to ·the Nat~a1 Reconna:Lsslmce Program. By eliminating 

all mission associated' project IUlmeS', and by e11m1na~ing such. 

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items'as cODfirmatlOil ,of the·total payload err·mission of any' , , 

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specif.ic launch, or the total pa.yloads devoted to any s'pec,ific 

mission, it bas been possible to establish a pub11e'1nfo~tion 

posture from which almost all provocative comm~lt.on satellite , ' 

reco~iS8ance bas \: disappeared, while at the same time it baa 

not been necessary to withhold any ,data essential to any of the 

"unclassified projects and ex~eriments within the over-all space 

program. In addition, this' policy has eliminated tbe' serious 

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political embarrassment which the U. S. would face under the' 

previous ,policy 1f the Soviet.,bloc shOuld accidentally recover 

'a satellite reconnaissance fiLm capsule. Under 'the former 

policy. th~ ,U'. S. in statmgtbe misSion, of~acb launch· iJ.:1 

,advance" and,in"some detail. represented the launch as other 

than reconnaissance mission; under the present policy. wbile 

the U.S. continUes to admit to tbeexistenee of satellite 

.effort directed towm:dthe rec,onnaiss8neefield, there is . 

, never any' misrepresentation .~Y' sta~enient or implication' or· , 

process of el1m1nat1on~ since no mis,sions ,are' stated'· for any 

launches. ' .. ' -' .. ' .-...... " ,',,- . , 

(5) Procedures have been .es,tablished which permit all 

Ag~cies and· Services concerned with . the results of, the National 

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Reconnaissance Program to make adequate preparation for·exploitation of these results while maintaining the necessary'secur1ty. 

~echnical data essential tQ the exploitation commun1tY,hns been 

released from' the operational security structure into the. exploitation structure by means of specific planning'documents 

and conferences. In addtiion, f~41 points have been established· . 

wi thin each S~rvice and Agency t ~ith responsibility for exploi- , 

tation preparation, and with all security' clearances and information required for this t~k. 

(6) Direct NRO l:1.a1son has been established "lith the, 

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Department of State and with the Arms Control and Disarmament 

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Agency. This arrangement has insured that the U. S. policy in 

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United Nations matters'is determined with fullconsiderat1on of , 

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the.possible fmpact on the Nat~onalReconna1ssance,Prcgram, 

while. at ~ same ·time, all' potential contl:'ibutions of this 

effort toconstructlve natbal policy are·fully'consldered. 

(7) ',Previously uncoor~ted. and dupl~catory. effort 

has been consol1dated1n 8eve~al :Important areas: 

. (a>' 'lhe separate. CIA' and Air Force covert photograpb1c~e8s:l.n81aboratories at the Eastman Kodak Comp811y. 

in Rochester tN. Y. t· have: btlen cODsol:Ldated and. cQordinated 

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with the Air Force Satellite Photosraphic'Pro~Qssing Labora-· 

tory (SPPL) at t-lestover Air Force Base, t,.!casac.h'UsettG. 'The 

obsolete CIA covert laboratory is being phased out, the 

newer Air Force covert laboratory is be1ug expanded, and 

the contract resp~s1bi11ty for'this laboratory bas been 

. assigned to the CIA. Procedures have been established whereby the workload between the Eas'tmiin Laboratory and the SPPL 

will be assigned 80 as to permit maximUm use of .the Eastman 

facility for: original" pro~esaing, wi.th the SPPL accomplisbing, 

most of the requ1red production while providing ~·alterns.te 

or baCk-up or1StDal processing capability_ . . . (b).' NRO .responsibilities fo~ the research and development: of proce"sa1ng and printing techniques an4 equipment 

have been consolidated and placed under s"ingle. point management. ID additiOn to a program of specific items, a level of 

effort contract has been 'established w1~h .the. Eastman Xodalc. .', 

Company to' insure that max.1mtmi advantage ~ -taken of the 

unique experience provided .by. this eovert"laboratoxy for 

advanctag the state of the process1ngand printing urt. 

(~) A single, c·onsol1.4ated, jointly-staffed llRO 

satellite operatiOWJ center. has been established in the basementof' thO Pentagon. This center;"wi~. replace the several 

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sat~11ite operations formerly conducted separately and 

provide for effect~ve centralized control of all such 

operations under the close supervision of the Director. 

(8) . During the Cuban crisis, the NRO e~tablished 

additional photographic processing ~apability on an emergency 

basis and, in coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

maintained continuou's supervision of the film processing and 

delivery to the Rational· Photographic.lnterpretation Center~ 

(3) Development of ·the ThruG~ Augmented TlIORj with o. .~. ••• •• '. • .-

option £or use wlthor without strap-on solld rockets, providing significant extension of the capability of '!'HOR boosted . . . 

projects and greater flexibility. ft?r·. the National Rec~aissance Progr ••. 

Gontrrd System. 
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(4) Exploitation of the basic SM·10S.E-5 'c~era 

development into the sfmpler and less expens~ve T}IOR boosted 

LANYARD project, as an interim, earlier approach tOvlard 

photography· of. technical 'intelligence quality. 

(5)- initiation of development of the COROl{A-J 

vers·ion, of the basic CORONA-It{ project, successful conclusion 

of which will Provide ~o photographic missions from ,~e 

launch of' a single camera system. . After the first mission 

bas been recovered, the satellite will remain inactive 'for 

up to three weeks. after wbicil it will be're4l\lC1ctivated, 

another photograp~c mission a~complisbed, and tbe film 

recovered in a second recovery capsule. 

(6) Pevelopmentof an tnterchangeablepaylosd con- - . . ' '~ . 

cept for i'liOR boosted projects, giving much greater potential 

fleXibility to the over-all program •. 

(7) Development and . successful, operation Of. a small 

Stellar/IQdexdnnera' of' high geometricfidl~ity Which, in 

addition to· serving 'as an indexing aid for· exploitation of 

ree~ss~e photography, offers the. potential of making 

each reconnaissance mission concurrently useful as a mapping . 

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and charting miSSion •. witll 8ubst_tial potential savings 

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over the separate .development a."ld operating of systems 

designed exclusively for such purposes •. 

(8) Development an~ highly successful operation of 

Project,417, a secret-meteorological satellite ·in·a sun ... 

synchrOnous orbit positioned so as to proVide'daily' weather 

coverage of the So'V1et Un1on~ Tl11$project bas and .~ill 

c;ontinue to be· eXtremely valUable in programmii'lg and opeta .. 

t1ng all photographic reconnaissanc~. 

(9) Complete re-or1entat1on of' the SAl10S AtLAS· 

boosted SIGlNT effort into a 'tHOR. boosted proje~t of 

(10) Incorporation. 'of the previous pi8~-ba.cl; POPPY.' 

project into tho n10B. boosted. program with ~tiple payload 

.. . units in each launch·provid1ng·tncreased reliability and 

location accuracy •. . . 

(l~) Development·and.operation. of'~'wiGe fam~ly of 

for use on vehicles. within 

and without the National 'Reconua1ss~ce Program.' 

(l2) Development of a coordinated nat!onal'SIGINT 

'satellite program. 

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(13) lnlt iat ion of such vulnerability measures as 

appear feasible. to provide reasonable protection of reconnaissance satel,lites against, some possible Soviet countermeasures.' 

(14) Development of advanced compOnents ·which are 

available 1f ;required for futUre use, such as the eight 3611 

focal length cameras d~veloped, under Project 722 •. now dis- , . 

continued in view of improvements in the CORONA-M aystetll 

and the expenae1Dvolved in coxnpleting the development ~ 

origblally. planned.:: 

(15) Init:l.at:lon of advanced state-of-the·e.rt' work . . in areas' vital to future program cevelopn;ents,. 

(16) 'Development of the FIRE FL1t drone capabUity 

" for photographic) employment aga1ns~ Cuba, if 

circumstances shOuld warrant. , 

(17), ~elopment of 'the A-12,alrc'raft to the flight' 

test Plu:tse.' througll management, and8upervls~on' by ,the 'CIA 

and support by the Air Force .' "' " .,.' 

" ,(18), ~nt1.Dued emplo~ent' of ,U-2 aircraft in Buccess-: 

ful ove~fl~ght of: deD1e~ areas t through ,Air '. Force operation 

over Cuba and C~ operation with Air Force support o.lsewhere. 
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(19) Initiation-of deve~opment of the A~12 drone· 

to provide inereased future flexibility and opt~ons. in 

covert reconnaissance by aircr~ft. 

(20) Initiated actions to provide increased protection to U-2 aircraft for optional future use against'areas 

defended bY8urface-to-alr missiles. 

(21) Initiated organization of ~OProgram D for the 

develo~nt of the R-12 on a basis compatible with'th~" ' 

security required for the related A-12 project. 

(22) !gena-D ~provemeDts for both NRO and other space 

applications. 

4. PROBLEtJJS 

A·review of the experience to date indicates that there are 

several outstanding' problems which ~equire resolut1on~' ·It is 

believed essential to,insure that they are resolved in the: . . ~, .,. , 

establishmmlt of the new chart~r'for the·org~ization which is ' 

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now in preparation. The critical.problem aresft Cal "e ·summarized ; ..' 

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a.There appears to have been misunderstanding or .misinterpre~tioD in some quarters as to. the fundsmental nature of the 

NRO. ·Spec1.fically, the question. 1s ~ether ~e office 1s an 

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operating agency with direct men3g~ent responsibility for a 

sl.ngle national program or whether it's rw""lcticn is as a . 

coordinating office responsible for lia1son and coordination. 

between related projects which are the management respons1bili~ 

of various agencies and departments. 

I hav~ opera·ted· on the basis that the former arran~emen1: 

is . the correct one. In order for this fUl"lc.tion· to be properly 

exercis·ed, it 1s essential that the Dl-m.O bave available to him 

all of the management tools necessary for the accomplisl~ent 

,. 1 . of· the responsibility. A cr~tical missing· element has been 

the ~i:;:_e~t control over funds for, the entire· pro~am.. . . f· • 

Without 

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contro·l over the· allocation and redistribution of funds as 

dictated by program and .requirement consideratiol~s3 it 1s my 

judgment that .the r~sponsibility c~t be effectively dis.charged. 

It appears clear th~t the office has always been envisaged 

as . an operating agency. It is . clearly reflected in the various 

. DOD ·charter docUments supporting the basic- CIA-POD Agreement of 

2 May 1962 •. It· ,,,aa outlined in detail by. the mmo in the lfil~· ~ . ..~.' .. ."". ...... . . 

organizational conferenc·e in late May 196~ and include~ in the . 

organization ~o11cy statement of· 23 July 1962 issued to· the NRO 

program directors· and the Director of~ the NRC Staff. 7b~.poGition 
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may be stated as follows: 

Within the limits of applicable public la-w J within. 

the provisions 0.£ the' CIA-DOD Agreement· of 2 May 1962, and 

subject to the guidance-he receives from the Director of 

Centrallntelligence and the Secretary of Defense, the 

Director of the hlWis responsible for the actual ~nagement 

of all projects of the National :Reconna1ssance Progr~ and . 

has the authority to carry out this task without the neces-· 

. stty of reaching agreemento~ each and every aspect of th~ 

Management actions involved. . In tbe ·CIA~. under the terms 

of the 2 May Agreemeqt, the responsibility of the Deputy 

Director (a~se~rCh)1n-8ee1ng that the terms of the Agreement 

are carried out within 'the CL~ obviously includes theresponsibility to see that th~ instructions, an~ directions of the·' 

Dir~ctor of the NRO are carried out. WithtD. the· DOD,' the " . 

authority of the Direc:tor is contain~d. til DOD Directive .. < 

ts 5105.23, dated 14 .Tune 1962. 

.. 7beagreement r~ached 1n,the-organizat1onal conference -

in late May 1962 and confirmed in the 23 July 1962 memoran~1lm, 

clearly 8pel1.·o~t that the DNRObas ~~ect managemen~ resp~~sib.11ity, f.or .all elements of the program. The ~pecif1c program . . . 

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responsibilities are divided between several progrem d1~·ectors. 

In the ibsenceof,the D~mO, each of these directors is responsible for· decisions in his program area. In eve~J sense,. 

therefore, the program directors are depu~ directors of the· 

NRO for their ow~ program areas. 

Despite·.the basic CIA~DOD'Agreement,' the agreement at 

the organizational conference and the basic organizational 

documents,' this arrangement has never been accepted by the 

Deputy Director (Research) J C.lA. Ratb~r than seeking a resolution of his concern through proper channels and arriving at a.· 

new agreement with accompanying revised organiz~tionaldocuments, 

. the: ~ppar~nt'procedure has. been one of.resisting the func~i~ning 

,> of· the organization along the. lines established in the basic 

Agreement and in the organizational documents. This is a' £unda-· 

mental point.which requires clarit'ication. 

Effective 1inplementation of decisions .affecting Agency 

act't"ities bas been difficult. if not 1mpoSSib~e. if· the Deputy. 

Director (R~sear~h) W8snot completely' sympathetic to the action 

propose.d. The direct management responsibility of the DNRO over 

CIA· activities needG to be re-examtDed. 

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It is significant to note that although the DOD· elements " • •. I 

of the·NRQ have undergone ra~er drastic changes, no 'substantial 

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change from pre-NRC procedures has been affected in the CIA 

~~cept possibly in 'the writing of security policy and ~he 

extension of a few communications 11nJ:'~,.. Completfely harmonious and effective inter-actions bett.,reen the. NSA~ DIA, Army) 

Navy and Air Force exist. Efforts to mold the CL-\ activities 

into 4 un1f1edprogram have bee~ resisted vigorously_ The 

apparent concept has been 9ne of considering the DNRO as a 

coordinattDg official'but not 'as one. havingd1rec:t operational 

authority over CIA programs •. 

, b. USIB-NRO relations. USIB has been quite slaw in revising 

the' intelligence requiremeilts against which the NRO must matte . , . 

long lead 'ttme dec1sio~s. In addition, USIa has attempted on 

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occasion to vary the satellite launcbings~hedule on' tl1eshort 

range basis, .with which it ~eal$ with aircraft schedules. Work 

is Dow under way on·revised statements of longer range requirements and recent NRO efforts to bring.USIB to a closer undersf:and-, 

ing of satellite scheduling are producing bettet' -unders.tanding. 

c. NRO security policy. an~. :z::~form·. Much worZt remains to 

make the over-a~l NRO'securit,y policy effective. the clearance 

billet structure 1s badly in need of revision. In a.ddition, 

security reform .1s "·'Deeded· to reduce' the number of individual' 
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code word clearances wbich are neceGsary under the· CUr7:ellt 

policy. Work is under way to accomplish these objectives. 

5. RECm:!M2NDATIOt~S 

It should De noted-that although the problems currently 

facing the NRC originated some tilne ago, they bave not prevented 

,substantial accomplishment. However, it should be noted a~o 

that these problems have ·become·acute only recently. with'the 

imp'aSile 'rea~ed in late December 1962 and, early January 1963. ' 

that these difficulties must.be resolvedp~cmptly in order to· 

prevent serious degradation 1s evident. 

ExperIence to date would suggest that two ,steps are required. ",..,,' 

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. The basic CIA-DOD Agreement: .and related NRO charter .documents 

should be'.·rev1sed to clarify the desired· natur~ of the NRO and 

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the responsibility and author~ty of ·the Director of the ImO. 

In 'addition, measures shoulcJ· be taken to es~ablish and' support 

the internal organizational d18c1pl~e essential to the r~pair 

of· the present difficulties and the continuance of a high. degrE;!G, -

of effectiveness., . Each -,of· these steps should. ·include certain 

spec1fiq provisions which are,outlined separately 'below.. 

a. In reg~d to!the revision, it should be noted that 

the, present Agreement, while indicative· of .epp~ent barmony in . . .... . 

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May 1962, has proven inadequate as a ,charter in little 

tnore than, half a,' year. The numerous drafts .of prop9sed 

agreements which p1;eceded the 2 ~1ay 1962 A6reemel1t~ the 

many ,discussions required to reach this .Agreement, the 

repeated refinement of phras~ology,w~ichwas necesaary~ 

and ~e extended tiIne penod required for completion of' 

this process would,suggest the presence of semantic masks 

in the final document; subs~quen~ experience bas verified 

, 

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'the presence of DfO types •. The first is phraseology suffi-

~ . c~ently flexible to cover diffe~ent'potnts of view,'representins agreement IlC)t· reached in actuality and 'requl~1ng • t 

only a matter of time to \ produceprobl_ • The additional I, 

use of vague and generalized language to dcscr1bethe responsibilities ,and 1nf~rthe author+ty oftJ;he Director also give 

the 8tat1.1:8 of apparen~ agreement 'to matters shown by,subSeqUent experience woo ~ett~ed. l't would, seem. the:z;.efore, 

that to the process of revision of theAsr~ement, clari~ 

8Qould be preferred to diplomacy, and the 'major questions 

which have. 'arisen in thec:ourse of operat~on under the pres,ent. 

Agreemen~ should 'he dealt with"clearly and unequivocally in 

enough detail to insure understanding by all cpncerned. In 

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part1culart the follow~g points '''should' be included:' 
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(1) lhe revised Asre~nt should reaffirm and 

clarify that the NRO is intended to be an oper~ting 

agency, with actual management responsibility for all 

. projects of the Nlltiori~l Recor.4..'"laissance Program. rather 

than a mechanism of coordinatiQn between agencies 

Director of Central latel11gence~ is responsible for 

providing policy and program guidance .and for mn!;ing 

\ . final determinations in ·connection theretri.th which do -

not requ1rethe exercise of h.igher authority. The 

D1rectDr ·of Central Intelligence ~as ·asreed. that the 

Secretary of Defense shall act as Exe~tor of the NaPG .•.. 

respOnsible for. implementing plans and. policies d~veloped 

bytbe NRPG. 

The Director of Central Intell!--sence ~d th.e 

SecretarJof Defense have agreed to delegate responsibility 

for their respective Agencies'. participation in the proJects < • 

of the National·Reconnaissance Program •. The Sec~c~ary· of '. 

Defense has delegated the necessary. Department of De~ense . 

'. authority to the Director of the HRD·. The Director of 

,.' .. 1;, -. t·,/,~·,,~~tral Intelligence ha~· agreed· to and made necessary L' ......... '~ "., .. w .. _,.ili' .. .. . .. . &. C: : ~ . .. 1._ ~ ~.. ._ 

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arrangements fo-r the Director of the llRO to GJtercise 

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necessary authority within the CL1\. The .Director of 

Central lntelligence~ in aeceptL~g the (revised) CL\-

DOD Agreement establishing the NnO, ba.s agreed to require 

,CIA compliance with the LTlstruct,ions ,~f the Directo~ of 

the' NRO issued ,in "the course 0'£ discharging his 'responsi-· 

'b111ties outlined tn the ter.msof the Agreement, and has 

designated in the ~eement.a senior CIA official charged' 

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with the '~xplicit responsibility to see that the terms 

and condit'ions of'the .Agreement are carried out 'tV'ithin 

the CIA~ including '8u~h~struct:ions as may be issued by 

the Direetor ,of the NRO'. The Dir~ctor of the' '","RQ will I 

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keep the Director of Central Int,ll~gence informed of all 

such action, and the Director of Central, Intelligence will ' 

~ure that he is satisfied with the actions taken by the 

Director of the BRO insofar as the basic .respons1b1~it:1es· 

of the ~lrec'tor of Central. Intelligenc~ are concerned, , and 

'wil,l provide all appropriate guidance directly' to -the ' 

Director of the NRO. 

The IRQ' ~s to accompll,h its management tasle . 

tbrou8h.~~ utilization of applicable existing resources' 

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and personnel of the CIA and the Department of Defense. 

SuCh resources and person~el wi~l be placed under directives· of their respective agencies which mn1,e the~ directly 

responsive to the Director of the ~1RO or his designated 

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subordinate officials within the mo. The Director of 

the NRO will manage all.projects of the Nationsl ReconnaiS8aDCe Program by means. <:»f streamlined management 

struc~re and procedures.· 

(2) The revised ~~e~nt. should state the essential 

responsibilities and authority of the Directol: of the NRO 

as" follows:· Within the limits of epplicable public ~l-l, 

witbin the provisions of the C~~OOD.Agreement establishing. . ,., 

the NRO •. and subject to continued 1nstr..u:tions and guidance 

received ~rectly from ebe Director. of Central Intel~1genee 

and the. Secretary of Defense, the" Director"of the liRO is' 

re8pons~ble for. the ·actual management of all 'projects asslgtl~d 

to th~ NRO and ~as'been delegated the authority necessary to . '. 

carry out this task. His decisions end dir~ct1.ve8 are binding. 

on . all . applicable CIA and DOD elements unless and. until. be 

chauges . them. In the event that either the Director of 

Central' Intel~igeDce or the Secretary of ·Defense desire sucb 
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cllang~s I they will inform the Direc·tor of the lm.O ,,;ho will 

issue the necessary instructions to CIA and/or DOD elemen~s. 

wnile the Director of the NRO may elect to use specific 

~greements as management tools in controversial or involved' 

problems, he is not cOllstrained by implication orotbe~ise 

to limit his management actions t·o matters upon which he has 

been able . to reach and/or' ma,1.ntait\. agreement. 

The Director will budget for the entire National 

Reconnaissance Program and willde£end theprogrsm before all 

revieli's necess,ary to secure its approval. SubJect to the 

over-all limitations affecting his . authority, described above, 

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he is authorized tb transfer funds fro~ one . .,rojec:t of the . . 

NItO program to .another, as.7 be required. to conduct the 

over-all program ~1tb1i1 available funds. and in accordanCe' 

~ith sound management prinCiples, and to take any other action 

necessary to esta.blish and mai1'l~a1n a str~ and effective .. 

centralized manageme~t of' the over~all program. 

(3) In' the revision of the Jagrecmel1t. 'consiceratiol1 could. . , 

be given to the addltlon"'of's single· Deputy Director of the liRO. 

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Under the present org8Dizat1on~ the three' Program Directors ... 

also serve as·.Deputies. with the Director: of the NRO Staff 

responsible to notify and ~ss1st .. the approprie.t~ Progr~ 

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Director to the resolution of any problem in his are~ 

which '~'eurs during ~e absence of tbe Director ·.of tIle 

L"RO. Thus, for L'"lS tance, the Director of Program B 

(presently the Deputy Director (Research), CIA) is 

ac~lly Depu~ Director for all ~~o matters ~hich pertain to ~be CIA, with the D1reetor, ~rograrn A (M/Gen. Gre~r) 

and the Director» Program C, (Til Adm. Lowrance) ·llsviilg 

8~lar respODS1b111t1es for all l~O work under their 

jurisdiction. '.this arrangement 1143 worked quite. 8uceess~ . 

ful.ly except in. the case' of Program B •. 

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However. if 4 Deputy Director of theNRO 1s estab- • f 

lished, it is essential ~o spell. cut his. duties in .de~a11. 

It .w~ulc:t. certaiDly be appropriate that such a Deputy be ~om 

the CIA. However. bia duties 10 ~egard to. the NRC should be 

. assigned· so·as to avoid inadvertent continuance 'of the CIADOl)· dichotomy. In particular, he should not have' tbe tasks ~ 

exp11c:i.t or implied,' of nlookin3 out after the interests of . . 

the-CIA- or of representing th~ Director of Central.Inteiligenceto ~e Director 'of the NRO. TheD1rector. of Cen~ral 

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. Intelligenc~ should hold tbe Director re8pons1b~e . for lceepL~8 

him. properly' informed as well, as for. response to' his guidance •. 

Handle via' 8\tMAfI 

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It would seem appropriate' for ,the: normal t,~r~o 

~1uties of the Deputy to be centered 01.'1 tI'1C N~O .. t;S!r; i~1terface and on the NRO~~:;ploitation c~~-IDity1nterf~cc. In 

addition, in the absence of the Director of the '~mo" the . . 

,Deputy could. of course, act for him on any metter. 

In view of the responsibilities assigned to the 

Director and the obvious effect of a harmonious Director/ 

Dap~ty D1rectot; relationship in the successful carrying cut 

of these responsibilities, le,ia essential'that personnel 

selecti~D be made on s"ch a basis that they will function 

as an eff~ct1ve working team rather t~~ as representatives t . 

of the DOD and the' CIA. 

,b. Recognition must be given to the fact 'that revision'of 

the qIA-DOD, Agreement is, a necessary but ~sufficient ~onditiOD to resolve the problems facing the laO. In addition to 

a clear charter, effective mtanagemcnt of such 4 joint office 

, requires the continued support. 'of the Director of Central 

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liitelligence and . the Secretary of .Defense in order'that t~e . . ~ ':"'"'"". . " 

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Director of the NItO may establisb and maintain essential 

',jnternal ~fi'ce discipline. , Since the Director 1s from'the 

,~partment of Defense J the main burden, for this support falls' 

upon: the Director of Central Intelligenc·e. 

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In particular, each of ti1cse officials sr~uld deal. 

directly" with . the Director" of the ZI!RO for all ,;mo matteru, 

rather than through intermediate fmO personn<t!l .. ~f their. 

respective agencies_ ,This 13fund~cntal to the maintenance 

"of internal NR.Oorgan1zat~onal d!seipline. 

The Director of Central Intelligence end the Secre~ 

~ of Defense also should ~ake "appropriate action from time " 

to ttme to support the thesis that the projects of' the National. 

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B.econnaisa~ce Progr~ are neither CIA nQr DOD proj ects '. they 

are mo projects, part of a single national program, elements 

of which are supported by the resources ·of the CIA and the . t 

. several Services of the DOD. 

c. DuriDg the. course of revision o.f tllc present· Agreement, 

it may be well' to give carefui· consideration to en additional 

question raised by the, CIA during the past year. Th~s qu~st:ion 

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concerns the intent. of the Congress in the establisl~ent of 

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CIA privilege, and has been,raiseddur1ng dlscuss1o~ ·as t~ 

the deslrab1.~1ty 'of the CIA 'holding all covert· contracts of , • ., ." 4.~ ~." • • , 

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the !ntO. as . intended. by ~e present CIA-DOD Agreement. 

The.·CIA pres~tly holds covert contracts for 8everal~' 

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projects of the National Reconna1s~ance Progr_. The. Departnlent 

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. of Defense elements 0;· the l<mo a.lso hold sc:v-eral covert 

cont~acts) the most.significant of which are those for 

the G.A1~IT atellite projects. At the ~~O 

organiz~t1onal conference, held in late !'.Y 1?62 J . agree... . 

ment . was reached to transfer these covert contracte fr~ 

tbeDOD elements of the NRO to the CU4a' wnen· ~he agreement 

was not carried out durin.g ~he following '8~r J it was 

reaffirmed' by discussion bett·;cen the Director.of the ·}ntO . 

and the Director of Central Intelligence on 1 October 1962. 

However, subsequent instructions from the Director. of the , . 

NR(). to the CIA atUl were not carried out. . The Deputy 

Director (Research) ~ CIA has repeatedly 8t4ted,befo~e .and 

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after the 'discussion between the Director of. the NItO' and the 

Director.o~ Central Intelligence •. that such 4, course,of action , , 

. was _undesirable 8:ince it might const1~ute cicubtfuluse' of tht) 

~as1c CL~ pr1.v11eg~ by ~~volv1n~l' that priv:tleg~ ¥iact1ons 

which.ifi:oot -actuali~ illegal, at least might cAceed', the . .' '. . 

actual ~tent of COQgr':8~. ~. regard, to the proper use of osuch.' 

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priVilege., ~8 ,8ame objection had been stated repeatedly: by 

b:l the' Deput,., oDlrec~ Oleaearcb) .d other CL\. personnel during' 

dle sUmmer of 1962. 

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It, ,is most desirable. of cot."t"se, that tha basic 

intent of the Congress in establishing the privileges of 

However t in view of the fact that the CIA hClS over-all 

se~ity responsibility for all projects'of the National 

Reconnaissance 'Program, regardless of' the "~ency or Serv1c~ 

~v1ng responsib11ity ~or contract administration or technical management; and ~n view of the fact tl1at the establish-

, ,1Iient of the National Rec:oml4iss.ance Office has bean reviaied 

and 'approved at the highest, national le~l, it is not' appa:rent , . 

that there ,is anything fundamentally wrong "~ith ,",sing ~he CIA 

to do cODtract~ for NaO projects £or which tecr~icalmanage~ 

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ment respo~1b111~ 1s assigned to l~ elements of the Depart-

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~nt of Defense. 

In fac,t~ in the'light of prevailing circumstances. 

such, service, to the NRO. wOuld seem to be the only juat1f'icatiotl 

far the CIA to continue to hold the prosent ... CIA contracts for 

satellite rec~1s,sance' projects. insofar as' tl'1e basic Con- ,.. . ... , . 

sressional intent fo~ 'the U8e~ o;f CIA priv11egeis concerned. 

This s1tua.tien· i8 out;lined briefly berOw~ 

The CIA cotltracta for the' cORONA satellite reeonna1.s- -

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covert project, with unimpeachable cQvcr for ~ll ~ub11cly 

observable actions. At that time, the Si~I::DS' and MIDl~ 

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projects were aC!Olml1ec1ged,' fun~cd prOjects requiring 

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future ,launches of large numbers of ATLAS boosted AGE!U\ 

vehicles" and, the AG~lA was a, ,.netl ,,' undevelopodvchicle 

required for these large projects; consequently ita development and the pe;fection o~ associa.ted tec~ic,.ues ahoard , , ~ 

the che,aper T.BOR booster was an entirely credible story for 

the 'DISCOVERER project, an!! :perfect cover for COR.Ol~A. T"ne 

ancil~~ recovery of vari~us ligh~leigbtrese4rch experimenta provided" addit;ional diversiol'l.&rY material. liaii1cvcr, 

with the ,p4SS~g of ,time~ this cover has completely disappeare~~ 

Over ninety percent of all ,DOD space launcl"'~s are no~" re.connaissance missions. Without ~e protection of the currc~t, 

DOD policy concerning space launches, it is difficult to 

conceive of reach tog the current'date w1thout.wld~spread 

public, discussion of the' fac,t tbat' the T1..!OR boosted R.GEl-L.'\s 

in 'polar orbits are now and proQab~y 'have eltlsys ',b~on c,onducting reconnai8s~ce m1ss~ona. There is s1luply no other 

,rational concluslonwhich an acute' observer could reach ill 

view of tile cumulative total of TIiOR'lmmcheain polar orbits, , 

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the obviously successful development of , the 'J .. GEIU.~ vehicle 

and pbysical recovery techniques, the use of the AGE1!f.:. 

vehicle on,tbe ATLAS and in'~~A projects, the ct1~llative 

Ol."Pense of the mOR launched AGu~ in"polar orbit) and such 

. '~. . . other factors as the THOR launch rate of three per month 

during the summer of 1962 and the' re-arrangement of T'~..oR. 

launch schedulea to:?crmit.extra'lauUches foilovdng the 

Cubail crisis in the fall of 1962. Starting from a bona fide. 

covert project, CORONA is today, at best"not 'a covert ,but 

simply a highly classified project:J identical in this regard 

to other satellite reconnaissance projects under contract for 

several years to DOD elements of the ,z.m.O. The same is, true 

, . of the 'LANYARD projeet. 

Under these circumstances, it would seem tha.t contiaued use of CIA contracting for ~eae projects would be 

. highly. questionable insofar as the' basic Co~gressiot"~~l. intent 

for the ~e of CIA priv~lege is concerned, w~re it not for 

. , 

, , the fact that the CIA performs 'this action D.S' a 'service to ... ~.- .. ~~ 

the NRO. 

The, 'revised Agreement shoul~ include clear resolution, 

of this, fundmaental_ point in order -that the seve.ral different 

" " . ': - 1 

34TOP3EeREf 
NRO"APPROVED FOR RELEASE' 

DECLASSIFIED BY: C/IART . 

DECLASSIFIED ON: 1 OCTOBER 2012 

contracting methods now in use within the ~~o m~y be 

. consolidated \d.thill a more uniforf.l and cecure procedure 

under the 'CIA, while still permitting the assignment of 

technical manag~nt responsibility to the most experienced 

slld.best qualif1ed,elements of the NRO. 

\ 

_ ••• ~ •• ' _ ':yo' ..... , .... ".4.' 

35 

TOP SECRET, 
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[ DCI. I 

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W . u: 

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W 0 ..J~ .... W.I(O 0:_0 

o:O~ 

Director, I~C1t tonal ftecollur-lsst:nce Gffice 

(Dr. Ioseph V. Cr~l"yk, Under SecI·et:il'Y 

of the A 1:: Force) 

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C EDO 

woo 

~YAYA o:!!::!!:: 

a., (1)(1) 

a., (I) (I) 

Dll'~·ctOl"t l',lHO Stnff 

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~~~ 

{Col. J .. L. r~~{:U"Un, J'r. J 

Dil~Gctor, Office of Space: 

zoo . Syet.erus, CtSl)Fl 

loint .Alt', At N, CIA. 

N.PIC, {;; NSA Stl'If . 

Director, Progr~.m A 

'(Maj G en 11. E. Greel", . . IJil'cctOl' of E~lleci21 Proj-. 

ecta, GSA }a~, El Segundo, 

~aliforllla) 

}:~ey Staif anti 

Project Directors 

i.ractor) l:)z-ogralll B 

• H. Scoville, lr., 

elluty Director / 

.B esenl"ch, CIA) 

Key Stzff and 

Projec~ Directors 

Progr~m C 

13m V. L. Lowrnnce, 

Director of l'Iaval 

Inta1l1ge~ce) 

Key Staff and 

Pl'oject Dlrector~ 

... £l;ctor~ P;og;ar; D --' -, 

(Col Leo P. Geary, . • 

,special.Assistant to f 

Ii F In...~ecto~ General) 

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~t.Ch 1 --iStl-i&tional r~ecollnalssanceOffice ., • Be~ established . , 

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