'-' 11 Nnt.r. Vi/\' 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938,, _ / -vu,-. 1 !=' 

I Up SECRt I .. .. . . ·

1 -·- --c ~ti I H,,!_ 2,,\'S'!'f. Vi .~.'1LY 

;,e;f NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 

1 r OCT 1:-:GJ 

Dear Bob, 

Upon recommendation and indorsement of the 303 

Committee, President Nixon recently approved the continuation of the NRP as a covert program. I have attached an 

extract from the "Annex to the Space Task Group Report -

The National Reconnaissance Program" that briefly outlines 

the national policy which supports the NRP and establishes 

the security environment in which it functions. 

As the Director of the National Reconnaissance 

Office, I am solely and directly responsible to Mr. Laird 

for implementing those security policies established by 

the DCI for the protection of the NRP as a covert organization. These policies differ considerably from those 

prescribed for other DOD intelligence collectors -- the 

fundamental difference being the NRP and NRO are totally 

covert -- the NSA and DIA are not. The NRP does not 

exist outside the BYEMAN or TALENT-TALENT KEYHOLE security 

control systems. Therefore, association between NRO cover 

designations such as SAFUS, SAFSP, SAFSS and the intelligence community must be handled within the specially 

established security channels. 

The policy is based upon the avoidance of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union or 

third party nation as to the legality or propriety of 

satellite reconnaissance. One of the key elements of the 

policy is the requirement that no responsible official 

will either confirm or deny the fact that the United 

States ; engaged in intelligence collection by satellite. 

A--·~I two weeks ago you asked how material leaked to 

the press cJncerning our satellite reconnaissance activities. 

The majority of these articles are of a speculative nature, 

using historical SAMOS and MIDAS releases coupled with 

advances in general technology, and information contained 

in the U.N. Space Registry, flavored with out-0f-context 

WORKING PAPERS 

:JNTROl ,o BYE 13248-69 

iOP SECRET (:UP'Y ~ ,/:i; ___ ... 0.-,[S, 

E:XCLUOEO -rAOM AUTOMATIC REGRADING P,G£ .1' OF 2 PAGES 

000 01RECllVE 5200 10 DOES NOT APPlY CJ /0 --://tJ -- tJt1? 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938 
Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938 ·-· ···. · 

I ur ~ttl(t I ,,'' ", ( 

BYEMAN 

COHtROl 5,YSftM 

quotations. This was the case in the Aviation Week article. 

On certain other occasions, we have determined that new 

sensitive information has been leaked as a result of innocuous or careless statements confirming suspected activities. 

These leaks can be damaging and are regrettable because, 

in most cases, they could have been avoided. When such 

leaks occur, investigations are conducted by the OSI or CIA, 

as appropriate, to determine the source of the disclosure 

and insure that positive corrective action is taken. 

I am concerned that your draft memorandum "Development 

of the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program" could 

result in a similar type revelation, since it asserts that 

I am responsible for a major intelligence collection program 

equivalent to DIA's or NSA's. There is no unclassified 

explanation as to what that program might be; consequently, 

my covert role could be threatened by such association. 

This is particularly dangerous when a document is subjected 

to little or no control under an "Official Use Only" restriction. 

While you have every right to question the efficacy 

or necessity of the established security policy supporting 

the NRP, it is imperative that you discuss all aspects of 

the program within the prescribed security rules until the 

DCI sees fit to change the rules. If you feel that this 

creates serious problems within your organization, I would 

suggest we discuss the matter with Mr. Laird. 

1 Atch 

Extract 

Sincerely, 

·h,,,/ L 

John L. McLucas 

Honorable Robert F. Froehlke 

Assistant Secretary (Administration) 

WORKING PAfJl'.M§ 

EARPOP IDEALIST 

BYEMAN TOP SECRET CXClUO[D FROM AUTOMATIC RCGJU.OIHG 

000 OIA[CTIV[ 5Z00.10 DOCS NOT APPlY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938 

CONTROL NO BYE 13248-69 

COPY i.,. ,(j'F ___ ,:vP1(S 

PAGE 2.~·~·2_.,.··· Of 

/"' 
''\Nn!,- "IA Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938 , . ·_ : , . , _ I ur .)[.IJI\L I ! • ' ·. 

EXTRACT FROM "ANNEX TO THE SPACE TASK GROUP 

REPORT - THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM" 

JULY 15, 1969, CONFIRMED AS POLICY BY 

PRESIDENT NIXON, SEPTEMBER 30, 1969 

"Policies Supporting the Program 

_. , L.Y 

BYEMAN 

COlllffllOl 'SV'$Ttlllll 

"When the first U-2 photography of the USSR was produced (in 1956), President Eisenhower directed that it be 

protected -- as an ultra-sensitive espionage product --

in a special security 'system. In 1960, when the first 

satellite reconnaissance photographs were produced, President 

Eisenhower directed that they be similarly protected and 

placed them in a compartment of the same special security 

system. 

"Daring 1961 and early 1~62, the Soviets made a number 

of private overtures to the U.S. protesting the use of 

satellites for reconnaissance. In 1962, the question of 

the legitimacy of satellite reconnaissance began to appear 

as an important pre-condition to international negotiations 

on disarmament and on the peaceful uses of outer space. 

In respo~se to increasing pressure, the President asked a 

Committee of Principals, acting under the leadership of 

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, to formulate a national policy 

which would (1) maintain United States freedom of action to 

conduct reconnaissance satellite operations unilaterally, 

(2) prevent foreign political and physical interference with 

those operations, (3) prevent accidental or forced disclosure 

of the details of the operations or end-products of the United 

States reconnaissance program, and, at the same time, (4) 

permit the United States to continue to work toward disarmament and international cooperation in space. 

"A national policy supporting these goals was recommended by this Committee, approved by the President on July 

10, 1962, and issued in NSC Action 2454. Essentially, the 

policy enjoins the United States to (1) operate its reconnaissance satellites with great discretion, (2) work toward 

developing tacit acceptancelof these operations, and (3) 

avoid embarrassment to our allies or confrontation with our 

enemies. 

"As a result of careful satellite reconnaissance policy 

planning, the United States is enjoying, at this time, an 

international political situation which provides all the 

~dvantage~ of t~cit acceptance w~thout th~ haz~r~s AM~~'tpAPERS 1n open d1scuss1on or confrontation. I~ 1s cr1t1c y 

EARPOP IDEALIST como,•o BYE, 13248-69 H.l."-Ol£ W,_, 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

1-!ANDL?::: VIA 

T P ~- [:f\fT .. KEY~-~O[ __ ,t:: TOP SECRET EXCLUDED F'AOM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

000 DIRECTIVE $200,10 DOES NOf APPl't' 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938 
( 

I-' /IN-,, ~· • tT /( 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938 , . . 

IOI ~tbKtl . 

HANOI t ., ,.., 

BYEMAN 

important to nourish the conditions which contribute to such 

n~ atmosphere, for reconnaissance satellites require a permissive environment -- political and physical -- for successful 

operatjons. Lacking such an environment, their operation could 

be challenged on the floor of the United ~ations or in the 

skies of any nition which desired to ~emonstrate against space 

espionage." · 

"Long Term Goals of the NRO 

"The NRO plans to continue to: 

1. Conduct a covert program to collect intelligence 

through the overflight, of denied territory. 

2. Seek methods to reduce the cost of such 

collection. 

3. Improve the responsiveness of collection systems 

to intelligence needs. 

4. Advance satellite reconnaissance techniques in 

order to improve collection capabilities and respond to new 

collection needs." 

WORKING PA~•eft§ 

EARPOP IDEALIST BYE 13248-69 riAN(H.C Vl,ft, 

BYEMAN HANOL:: VIA 

Tr 1 _:]H-K :YL'.CU: TOP SECRET £XCLUD(O fROM AUTOMATIC R(GtltAOING 

000 OIR[CTtV[ !200.10 OOES NOfAPPLY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111938 

/