F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

L A M Y A B R E W S T E R , individually

and as class representative,

Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

C H A R L I E B E C K , Chief, individual and official capacity ; C I T Y O F L O S A N G E L E S , a municipal corporation; C I T Y O F L O S A

N G E L E S P O L I C E D E P A R T M E N T , a public entity
, Defendants-Appellees. N o. 15-55479

D.C. No. 5:14-cv-02257- J GB -SP

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California J esus G. B ernal, District J udg e , Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J anuary 12, 2017 Pasadena, California

F iled J une 21, 2017

B efore: Alex Koz inski, M. Marg aret McKeown and Paul J . W atford, Circuit J udg es.

O pinion by

J udg e Koz inskiB R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 2

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s d ismissal of an action broug ht under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleg i n g that L os A n ge l e s p o l i c e o f

f i c er s v i o l at e d plainti f f ’ s Fo u r t h Amendment ri gh t s w hen they impounded her v ehicle for 30 day s pursuan t t o California Vehicle Code section 14602.6(a)(1), which authoriz e s impounding a vehicle when the driver has a suspended license.

Plaintiff loaned her veh i c l e to h er b rother-in-law, w ho

wa s stopped b y police officers a nd discovered to be driving without a license. W h e n plaintiff, w ho had a valid driver’s license, a ttempted to r e c over her vehicle, the L o s Ang eles Police Department refused to release the vehicle bef o re t he 30-day holding period had elapsed.

The panel held that the 30-day impound of plaintiff’s vehicle c onstituted a seiz ure that requi r ed c ompliance with the F ourth Amendment. T he panel held that the ex ig ency that justified the initial seiz u re vanished once the vehicle arrived in impound and p laintiff showed up with proof of ownership and a v alid driver’s license. The panel concluded that appellees provided no justification f or the continued impound of plaintiff’s vehicle.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.B R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 3

COUNSEL

Donald W

. Cook ( arg ued )
, L os Ang eles, California; B arrett S. L itt, Kay e McL ane B ednarski & L itt, Pasadena, California; P a u l H o f f m a n a nd Catherine Sweetser, Schonbrun D e Sim o n e Seplow Harris & Hoffman L L P, Venice, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Gabriel S. D ermer (arg

ued) and A dena M. Hopens t a nd, Deputy City Attorney s; Ronald S

. W h itaker, Assistant City Attorney ; Michael N. F euer, City Attorney ; Office of the City Attorney
, L os Ang eles, C a l i f o r n i a ; f or D efendants-Appellees.

OP INION

KOZ I NSKI , Circuit J udg e:

W e consider whether a 30-day impound of a vehicle is a “seiz ure” requiring compliance with the F ourth Amendment.

BACK G ROUND

L amy a B rewster loaned h er vehicle to Yonnie Percy
, her brother-in-law. Percy was stopped by L os Ang eles Police Department (L APD) o f f i c ers who learned that Percy ’s driver’s license w as suspended. The officers then seiz ed the vehicle under California Vehicle Code section 14602.6(a)(1),

w h i ch authoriz es impounding a vehicle when the driver h a s

a suspended license. Vehicles seiz ed under this section must g enerally be held in impound for 3 0 day s. Cal. Veh. Code. § 14602.6(a)(1).B R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 4

Three d a y s later, B rewster appeared at a h earing before the L APD w ith proof that she w as the r eg istered o w ner of the vehicle and her v a lid California driver’s license. B rewster of f e r e d t o pay all towing and storag e fees that had accrued, but the L A PD r efused to release the vehicle before the 30-day holding period had lapsed. 1

B r ewster f

i led a class a ction lawsuit under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 on behalf of all vehicle o wners whose vehi c l e s w e re subjected to the 30-day impound. The complaint alleg es that the 30-day impound is a w arrantless seiz ure that violates the F ourth Amendment. The district court concluded that the 30- day impound is a valid a dministr a t i v e penalty and g ranted appellees’ motion to dismiss.

D ISCUSSION

S e c tion 14602.6(a)(1) of the California Vehicle Code authoriz es police to seiz e a vehicle when the driver’s license has been s u s p e n d ed. “A vehicle so impounded shall be impounded for 30 day s.” Id. Within two b u s iness d ay s o f impoundment, the ag ency that seiz es the vehicle must notify the vehicle’s owner and provide an “opportunity for a storag e hearing to determine the validity of, or consi d e r any mitig ating circumstances attendant to, the s t o r age.” Id. § 14602.6(a)(2), (b). The L APD’s “I mpound Policy ” mirrors section 14602.6.

1 T en day s af

ter t h e i m

p o u n d
, th e L A P D released th e v eh i cle to Su p erio r A u to , th e lien h o ld er an d leg al o w n er o f th e v eh icle. B u t, u n der L A P D p o licy
, Su

p erio r A u to h ad to “ e n s u r e t h at n o o n e, in clu d i n g th e

r e g i s t ered o w

n er

. . . w ill h av e access to th e

. . . v eh icle d u r i n g t h e

rem ain der o f th e 3 0

- d ay im p ou n d m en t p erio d .” A cco rd in g ly
, B rew s ter

w as d ep riv ed o f

h er v eh icle f

o r th e f u ll 3 0 d ay s.B R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 5

The district court found that “the thirty -day impoundment period—desig ned to deter unlicensed drivers or drivers with

a suspended license from driving —is an administrative penalty
, and thus not unconstitutional under the F ourth A m e n d ment.” B ut this is the wrong inquiry

. W hether t h e

s eiz ure is a valid penalty or forfeiture under the Fi f t h a n d F ourteenth A mendments is an interesting questio n b u t n o t o ne that is raised in this case. Plaintif f c l a i m s only that the 30- day impound violates the F ourth Amendment. 2

The F ourth Amendm ent protects ag ainst unreasonable searches and seiz ures. U

. S

. Const. amend. I V. A seiz u re is

a “meaning ful interference with a n individual ’ s p ossessory interests in [his] property .” Soldal v. Cook County
, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (internal quotation marks and c itation omitted). “A seiz ure con d u c t ed w ithout a warrant is per se unreasonable under the F ourth Amendment—subject only to

a few specifically est a b l ished a nd well delineated

ex c e ptions.” United States v. Hawkins
, 2 4 9 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2 001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

I t’s well e stablished that “a seiz ure lawful at its inception

can nevertheless violate the F o urth Amendme n t because its

ma nner of ex ecution unreasonably infring es possessory interests.” United S t a t e s v. Jacobsen
, 466 U.S. 109, 124 & n.25 (1984) (citing United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696,

2 W e ex p ress n o v iew as to w h e t he r t h e 3 0

- d ay im

p o u n d i s a v alid ad m i n istrativ e p en alty u n d er th e Fif t h an d Fo u rteen th A m en d m en ts. S

ee Lee v

. Ci t

y o f C h i c a g o , 33 0 F.3 d 4 56
, 4 74 (7 th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) (W o o d
, J
., co n cu rrin g ) (su g g estin g th at a p ro lo n g ed im p ou n d o f a v eh icle m ay b e an

u n co n stitu

tio n al tak in g u n d er th e Fif th Am en d m en t). On rem an d
, B rew ster s h all b e g iv en leav e t o am en d t h e co m p lain t to in clu d e an y ad d itio n al claim s sh e m ay ch o o s e to b rin g

.B R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 6

707–10 (1983)). F or e x ample, in United S t a t es v. Dass
, officers v alidly seiz ed p ackag es that they suspected contained marijuana. 849 F .2d 4 1 4
, 4 1 4

– 15 (9th Cir. 1988). B ut we held that the length of the w arrantless seiz ures—in that c ase, bet w een seven to twenty -three day s—violated the F ourth Amendment. Id.

The p arties ag ree that t h e L APD could impound—and,
t h e r e f o r e , s e i z e

— B r e w s t er ’ s v e h i c l e u n d e r s e c t i o n 14 6 0 2.6(a)(1) pursuant to the community caretaking

ex c e ption to th e Fo urth Amendment. See United States v. Cervantes
, 703 F .3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) ( discussing
t h e community caretaking ex ception). B ut this ex ception is available only to “ impound vehicles that jeo p ar d i ze public safety and the effici e nt movement of vehicular traffic.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ex ig ency that justified the seiz ure vanished o nce the vehicle a rrived in impound and B rewster showed up w ith proo f of ownership and a valid driver’s license. The q uestion we must consider is w hether the F o urth Amendment required f u r t h er authoriz ation for the L APD to hold the vehicle for 30 day s.

W e have no cases on p oint, but J u dg e H e n derson o f the Northern District of California has addressed the matter in a thoroug h an d well-reasoned opinion, which we find persuasive. S

e e Sandoval v

. County o

f Sonoma , 72 F . Supp. 3d 997 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

B e cause a 30-day impound is a “meaning ful interference with an individual’s possessory intere s t s in [ his] property , ” Soldal
, 506 U.S. at 61 (internal quotation marks and citation omi t t ed), the F ourth Amendment is implicated when a vehicle is impounded under sectio n 14602.6(a). The district court found that s u c h a seiz ure doesn’t present a F ourthB R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 7

A m e n dment problem because “ the state has an importa n t interest in

. . . kee p ing unlicensed drivers f rom driving illeg ally .” B ut that is beside the point. T h e Fourth Am e n d m e nt “is implicated b y a delay in returning the
p roperty , whether the property was seiz ed for a c rimi n al investig at i o n , to protect the public, or to punish the individual.” Sandoval , 72 F . Supp. 3d at 1004.

The F ourth Amendment doesn’t become irrelevant o n c e

an initial seiz ure has run its course. See Jacobsen
, 466 U.S.
at 124 & n.25; Lavan v. City of Los Angeles
, 693 F .3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet
, 137 S. Ct. 911, 914, 920 (2017) (holding that the F ourth A mendment
g overned the entirety of p laintiff’s 48-day detention). A seiz ure is justified under the F ourth Amendment only t o t he

ex tent that the g overnment’ s justification holds force. Thereafter, the g overnment must cease the seiz ur e or secure

a new justification. Appellees have provided no justification here.

The only other circuit to address this specific issue is the Se v e n t h

. See Lee
, 330 F .3d a t 466. There, the City o f Chicag o seiz ed L ee’s v ehicle for evidentiary purposes but failed to return it when it was n o long er n e e d e d

. Id. at 458–59. The parties ag r e e d t hat the initial seiz ure of the vehicle was r easonable. Id. at 460. B ut L ee arg ued that “the continued possession of the property by the g overnment became a meaning f

ul interference with his possessory interest and, thus, must b e i n t e rpreted as a F ourth A mendment seiz ure.” Id. ( emphasis added). The Seventh C i r c uit disag reed, holding that “ [ o ] nce a n individual has been meaning fully dispossessed, the seiz ure of the prope rty is complete, and once justified by probable cause, that seiz ure i s r e as onable.” Id. a t 466. Reasoning that “L ee’s c ar w a sB R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 8

seiz ed when it wa s i m p ounded,” the Seventh Circuit concluded that the City ’s continued p ossession of the vehicle “neither continued the initial seiz u r e n o r beg an a nother.” Id.

To arrive a t its conclusion, the Seventh Circuit disting uis h ed U

nited States v. Place

. L aw enforcement
ag ents seiz ed Place ’ s lug g ag e on suspicion that he mig ht be
carry ing narcotics. 462 U.S. at 6 99. “There [ w as] no doubt that the ag ents made a ‘seiz ure’ of Place’s lugga ge for
purposes of the F ourth Amendment when

. . . the a ge n t t o l d Place that he was g oing to take the lug g ag e to a federal judg e to secure issuance of a w arrant.” Id. at 7 0 7

. B ut it wasn’t this initial seiz ure that c oncerned the Supreme Court. Rather, it was the “ 90-minute d e tention of [ Place’s] lug g a g e [ that was] su f f i c i e nt to render the seiz u re unreasonable.” Id. at 71 0

. W e a

re u npersuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that Place “deal[ t] o nly with the transformation o f

a momentary , investig ative detention into a seiz ure” and “has

n o application after probable cause to seiz e has been established.” Lee , 330 F .3d at 464.

* * *

The 30-day impound of B rewster’s vehicle constituted a seiz ure that required co m

p l i a n c e w i t h t h e F ourth Amendment. Appellees arg ue that this result frustrates the state leg islature’s intent to impose a penalty on unlicensed drivers. W e h ave n o occasion to decide whether this objective is lawful. See s upra p. 5 n.2. The police could impound a

v e h i c l e u n d e r s e c t i o n 2 2 6 5 1 ( p )
, w h i c h a u t h o r i z e s impoundment when the driver d oesn’t h ave a v a lid license.B R E W S T E R V

. B E C K 9

See Cal. V eh. Code § 22651(p). Section 2 2 6 5 1 (p ) d oesn’t have a mandatory 30-day h old period, t h u s avoiding the F ourth Amendment p r obl e m p r esented by section 14602.6(a).

REVERSED.