[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as West v. Bode , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5473.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -5473
W EST ET AL ., A PPELLEES , v. B ODE ET AL ., A PPELLANTS
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as West v. Bode , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5473.]
Marketable Title Act

— Dormant Mineral Act

— No irreconcilable difference
between the two acts

— Judgment affirmed. (No. 2019-1494—Submitted July 8, 2020—Decided December 2, 2020. )
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals fo r Monroe County, No. 18 MO 0017,
2019-Ohio-4092.

_____________________ F RENCH , J. {¶ 1} This appeal concerns the interplay between the Ohio Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq., and the subsequently enacted Ohio Do rmant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56, which is itself part of the Marketable Title Act. We specifically consider the continued viability of the Marketable Title Act as it relates to interests in oil and gas that have been severed from the interests in sur face property. Appellants, John L. Christman, Kath erine Haselberger, and Charl otte McCoy, asS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 well as amici curiae Ascent Resources-Utica, L.L.C., and Gulfpo rt Energy Corporation, urge this court to hold that the Dormant Mineral A ct supersedes and controls over the original Marketable Title Act due to a confli ct between the two

acts. {¶ 2} An express purpose of both the Marketable Title Act and the Dor mant Mineral Act is to “simplify[] and facilitat[e] land title trans actions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title.” R.C. 5301.55. Th e acts operate in different ways to individually achieve that purpose. We acknow ledge at the outset, however, the concerns expressed by amici Ascent Resources-Utica , L.L.C., and Gulfport Energy Corporation that joint application of the acts to severed oil and gas interests brings about the uninte nded consequence of complicati ng determinations of ownership of those interests. But because we discern no irr econcilable conflict between the Dormant Mineral Act and the Marketable Title Act, w e must apply them as the General Assembly wro te them—as indepe ndent, alterna tive statutory mechanisms that may be used to reunite severed mineral interest s with the surface property subject to those interests. Facts and procedural background {¶ 3} As with most mineral-interest cases, this one presents facts th at defy easy recitation. {¶ 4} In 1902, George L. and Charlotte Parks sold to C.J. Bode and Ge orge T. Nalley one-half of the royalty interest in the oil and gas u nderlying about 66 acres of land in Monroe County (the “severed royalty interest”) , as evidenced by a recorded sale of royalty. In 1916, through multiple recorded t ransactions, the severed royalty interest was tra nsferred to E.J. Wichterman, Cl ara Thompson, and
M.M. Mann. {¶ 5} George Parks transferred the surface property to Lettie West in 1929 by way of a warranty deed that st ated, “The one half royalty is reserved by grantor in aforesaid tracts as sold to C.J. Bode and George T. Nalley.” Following LettieJanuary Term, 2020

3 West’s death in 1959, the property was transferred to George E. West by way of a
recorded certificate of transfer. The certificate of transfer confirmed that the property was the same as that conveyed in the 1929 deed to Lett ie West, but it did not mention the severed royalty interest. In 1996, George E. W est and his wife transferred the property—again de fined as the same premises tha t George Parks conveyed to Lettie West in January 1929—to appellee Wayne West, subject to “all * * * reservations of record.” In 2002, Wayne West and his wif e conveyed a portion of the property to appellee Rusty West, “[s]ubject to all * * * reservations * * * of
record.” {¶ 6} In February 2017, appellees Wayne and Rusty West (“the Wests”)
filed this action in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas fo r a declaratory judgment that the Marketable Title Act had extinguished the sev ered royalty interest and had vested that prev iously severed interest in the Wests. They named as defendants Bode, Nalley, Thom pson, Wichterman, Mann, and Man n’s predecessor in interest, A.D. McVey, as well as their unknown h eirs, devisees, executors, administrators, relic ts, next of kin, and assigns. Service by publication was made on defendants, none of whom filed an answer. {¶ 7} Appellants filed a motion to int ervene and to file a countercla im, which the trial court granted. A ppellants claim they are the o wners of a portion of the severed royalty interest. In their counterclaim, they seek a declaration that they are the owners of 1/16 of the royalty interest in oil and gas u nderlying the subject property, as well as an order quieting their title to that inte rest. Appellants’ claimed
interest stems from a 1944 auditor’s deed that transferred 1/16 of the royalty interest in oil and gas underlying the subject property to Nova A. Chris tman. The auditor’s deed identified the subject property and its owner, Lettie West , as well as the recorded 1902 sale of royalty interest from George L. and Charl otte Parks. Nova
and Dollie W. Christman recorded a notice of claim of their int erest in 1977, citing R.C. 5301.51 and 5301.52—provisions of the Marketable Title Act that provide forS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 preservation by notice. A certificate of transfer recorded wit h the Monroe County
Recorder in 2007 establishes that Nova A. Christman’s mineral i nterest had been conveyed to appellants upon his death. {¶ 8} Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, in which they argued that the Wests had faile d to state a valid claim under t he Marketable Title Act because the more specific pr ovisions of the Dormant Mineral Act supersede the general provisions of the Marketable Title Act. The Wests responded by filing their own motion for summary judgment. They argued that the se vered royalty interest had been extinguished by operation of law pursuant to the Marketable Title Act, in part because neither the Wests’ 1959 root of title (tha t is, the transfer from Lettie West to George West) nor any recorded document transferr ing the surface property during the following 40 ye ars mentioned the severed ro yalty interest. {¶ 9} The trial court granted appellants’ motion for summary judgment and declared them the owners of a 1/16 royalty interest in oil and gas underlying the subject property. It held that the Dormant Mineral Act irrecon cilably conflicts with the general provisions of the Marketable Title Act and that the more specific
Dormant Mineral Act controls. {¶ 10} The Seventh District Court of App eals reversed the trial court’ s judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to adjudicat e the Wests’ claim under the Marketable Title Act. 2019-Ohio-4092, 145 N.E.3d 119 0, ¶ 63. It held
that the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act “are co-extensive alternatives whose applicability in a particular case depends o n the time passed and
the nature of the items existin g in the pertinent records.” Id. at ¶ 47. {¶ 11} This court accepted a discretionary appeal to decide whether th e Dormant Mineral Act supersedes the Marketable Title Act with re spect to severed
mineral interests. See 157 Ohio St.3d 1535, 2020-Ohio-122, 137 N.E.3d 1196.January Term, 2020

5 Analysis
R.C. 1.51 {¶ 12} The heart of appellants’ position—that the Marketable Title Act does not apply to severed interests in oil and gas, because the more specific Dormant Mineral Act supersedes it—aris es from R.C. 1.51, which sets out the familiar specific-over-general rule of statutory construction. R.C. 1.5 1 states:

If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construe d, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcila ble, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the gene ral provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption a nd the
manifest intent is that th e general provision prevail.

{¶ 13} In other words, courts should construe conflicting statutes in a way that gives effect to both. Id. A specific statutory provision will prevail over a general one only when the provisions irreconcilably conflict. Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino , 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 234, 754 N.E.2d 789 (2001), citing United Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach , 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643 N.E.2d 1129 (1994). {¶ 14} The validity of appellants’ argument depends, then, on the exis tence of an irreconcilable conflict between the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant
Mineral Act. We examine each in turn.
The Marketable Title Act {¶ 15} “The General Assembly enacted the Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq., in 1961, Am.H.B. No. 81, 129 Ohio Laws 1040, t o extinguish interests and claims in land that existed prior to the root of title, with ‘the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing personsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 to rely on a record chain of title.’ ” Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. , 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 17, quoting R .C. 5301.55. The Marketable Title Act provides th at a person who has an unbroken chain of title of record to any interest in land f or at least 40 years has a “mar ketable record title” to the interest. R.C. 5301.48. Except as stated in R.C. 5301.49, a marketable record title “operates to extinguish” all interests and claims that ex isted prior to the
effective date of the root o f title, R.C. 5301.47(A), and those preexisting interests are “declared to be null and void,” R.C. 5301.50. The Marketab le Title Act extinguishes property interests by operation of law after 40 ye ars from the effective date of the root of title unless a saving event has occurred. Corban at ¶ 18 (lead opinion) and ¶ 75 (Kennedy, J., c oncurring). An interest that has been extinguished by operation of the Marketable Title Act cannot be revived. See R.C. 5301.49(D). {¶ 16} R.C. 5301.49 sets out circumstances in which a marketable recor d title will remain subject to interests that existed prior to th e root of title. Those exceptions “ ‘serve as a shield to protect’ ” the excepted inte rests from extinguishment. Spring Lakes, Ltd. v. O.F.M. Co. , 12 Ohio St.3d 333, 335, 467 N.E.2d 537 (1984), quoting Heath v. Turner , 309 N.C. 483, 493, 308 S.E.2d 244 (1983). We have referred to those exceptions as “saving event[ s].” Corban at ¶ 18. In part, R.C. 5301.49 provides that a marketable record title remains subject to an interest that predates the effective date of the root of title when (1) the preexisting interest is specifically identified in the muniment s that form the record chain of title, (2) the holder of the preexisting interest has recorded a notice claiming the interest, in accordance with R.C. 5301.51, or (3) the preexisting
interest arises out of a title transaction that was recorded su bsequent to the effective
date of the root of title. R.C. 5301.49(A) , (B), and (D). {¶ 17} As originally enacted in 1961, the Marketable Title Act did not apply to mineral interests. Former R.C. 5301.53(E), 129 Ohio Laws at 1046. The General Assembly amended the act in 1973, however, “ ‘to enable propert y owners to clearJanuary Term, 2020

7 their titles of disused mineral interests.’ ” Corban at ¶ 18, quoting Am.S.B. No. 267, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 942-943. That amendment included a grace period, through the end of 1976, that afforded mineral-interest holders more than three years in which to preserve their interests and avoid extinguish ment of those interests by the Marketable Title Act. Former R.C. 5301.56, Am .S.B. No. 267, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 943. Thereafter, “the Marketable Title A ct extinguished oil and gas rights by operation of l aw after 40 years from the effe ctive date of the root
of title” unless one of the savi ng events set out in R.C. 5301. 49 applied. Corban at ¶ 18. {¶ 18} This court first addressed application of the Marketable Title Act to
a severed mineral interest in Heifner v. Bradford , 4 Ohio St.3d 49, 51, 446 N.E.2d 440 (1983). Heifner involved competing claims to the mineral rights underlying real property owned by William H. and Shirley S. Waters. The W aterses argued
that the Marketable Title Act ha d previously extinguished the s evered mineral interest by operation of law because neither their root of titl e—a 1936 deed—nor any subsequent document in the surface estate’s chain of title mentioned a preexisting mineral reservation. Id. at 49-51. Affidavits of transfer of the reserved mineral rights were recorded in 1957 as part of a chain of titl e independent from
that of the surface estate. Id. at 51. {¶ 19} The Waterses held an unbroken chain of record title to the surf ace estate for more than 40 years, which extinguished prior claims and interests, except as provided in R.C. 5301.49. Id . The Waterses argued that the 1957 affidavits of
transfer did not constitute “title transactions” under R.C. 530 1.49(D) that would preserve the severed mineral interest because they did not appe ar within the same
chain of title as that under which t hey were claiming marketabl e record title. Id. {¶ 20} For guidance in evaluating the Waterses’ argument, this court l ooked
to the Model Marketable Title Act , upon which the General Assem bly based the Ohio act. We cited a comment in the model act, which stated th at a conveyanceS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title preserves a preexisting
interest “ ‘both whe re there are claims under a single chain of title and where there

are two or more independent chains of title .’ ” (Emphasis added in Heifner .) Id. at 52, quoting Simes & Taylor, Mode l Title Standards 32 (1960). I n line with the model act, this court rejected the Waterses’ argument and inste ad held that a marketable record title remains “subject to an interest arising out of a ‘title transaction’ under R.C. 5301.49(D) which may be part of an inde pendent chain of title” from the surface property. Id

. at 52-53. Because the recorded 1957 transfer of the mineral rights was a title transaction under R.C. 5301.4 9(D), the Marketable Title Act did not extinguish t he mineral interest. Id. at 53.
The Dormant Mineral Act {¶ 21} The General Assembly enacted the Dormant Mineral Act as a component of the Marketable Title Act in 1989 “ ‘to provide a m ethod for the
termination of dormant mineral i nterests and the vesting of the ir title in surface owners, in the absence of certain occurrences within the preced ing 20 years.’ ”
Corban , 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, at ¶ 19, quoting Sub.S.B. No. 223, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 981. The Dormant Mine ral Act provided
a mechanism to facilitate the r eunification of abandoned minera l interests with surface interests in order “to clear title and promote the use of the mineral rights for development and production.” Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell , 144 Ohio St.3d 490, 2015-Ohio-4551, 45 N.E.3d 185, ¶ 25. {¶ 22} The 1989 Dormant Mineral Act stated:

“Any mineral interest held by any person, other than the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest, shal l be deemed abandoned and vested in the owner of the surface,” unles s (a) the mineral interest was related to coal, (b) the interest was held by the United States, the state of Ohio, or another political b odyJanuary Term, 2020

9 described in the statute, or (c) one or more of the * * * savin g events [listed in former R.C. 5301.56(B)(1 )(c)] had occurred within th e preceding 20 years.

{¶ 23} Corban at ¶ 20, quoting former R.C. 5301.56(B)(1), Sub.S.B. No. 223, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 986. When it enacted the Dorman t Mineral Act, the General Assembly did not amend the general provisions of the Ma rketable Title Act to once again exclude interests in oil and gas. Nor did it include language to indicate that the Dormant Mineral Act was the exclusive remedy for clearing title
to severed mineral interests. {¶ 24} The General Assembly amended th e Dormant Mineral Act in 2006, in part to require a surface owner to initiate a notice procedu re, as set out in R.C. 5301.56(E)(1), before a mineral int erest could be deemed abando ned and vested in the surface owner. Sub.H.B. No. 288, 151 Ohio Laws, Part III, 5960, 5966. Unlike the 1989 version of the act, however, the 2006 Dormant Mineral Act afforded a mineral-interest holder the opport unity to preserve that intere st, even after the passage of 20 years without a saving event, by filing a notice of preservation within 60 days after the surface owner serves notice of intent to decl are the mineral interest
abandoned. Dodd v. Crosky , 143 Ohio St.3d 293, 2015-Ohio-2362, 37 N.E.3d 147, ¶ 27, 34, citing R.C. 5301.56(H). {¶ 25} Both as enacted in 1989 and as amended in 2006, the Dormant Mineral Act operates differently than the Marketable Title Act. It does not extinguish interests by operation of law; interests are instead “ ‘deemed abandoned
and vested in the owner of the surface.’ ” Corban , 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, at ¶ 21, quoting former R.C. 5301.56(B)(1), Sub.S.B. No. 223, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, at 986, and ¶ 29, quoting former R. C. 5301.56(B), Sub.H.B. No. 288, 151 Ohio Laws, Part III, at 5966. Based on t he General Assembly’s use of the phrase “ shall be deeme d abandoned,” we he ld that the 1989S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 Dormant Mineral Act was not self-executing but instead “created a conclusive presumption” of abandonment—an “evidentiary device” that a surf ace owner may use in a quiet-title action to eliminate a dormant mineral inte rest. Id. at ¶ 25, 26. The 2006 Dormant Mineral Act uses the same operative language a nd likewise creates a conclusive pr esumption of abandonment. {¶ 26} A surface owner who sought to reunite a severed mineral interes t with the surface estate under th e 1989 Dormant Mineral Act was required to commence a quiet-title action for a decree that the mineral int erest was deemed
abandoned. Id. at ¶ 28. But the 2006 act created an extrajudicial mechanism t o effectuate reunification of sev ered mineral interests. Upon co mpliance with its terms, which include not only the notice procedures under R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) but also the recording of a notice of abandonment under R.C. 5301.5 6(E)(2), the 2006 Dormant Mineral Act operates “t o establish the surface owner’s marketable record
title in the mineral estate.” Corban at ¶ 30. See also R.C. 5301.56(H)(2) (“Immediately after the notice of failure to file a mineral int erest is recorded, the
mineral interest shall vest in t he owner of the surface of the lands formerly subject to the interest * * * ”). There is no irreconcilable conflict be tween the Marketable Title Act and the
Dormant Mineral Act {¶ 27} Appellants acknowledge that R.C . 1.51 requires an irreconcilabl e conflict between specific and gene ral statutes before the speci fic will prevail as an exception to the general. In support of their assertion of an irreconcilable conflict here, appellants identif y several differences between the Dorma nt Mineral Act and the general provisions of the Marketable Title Act, including t hat the acts contain different lookback periods, that t he Dormant Mineral Act does n ot automatically extinguish interests, and that the Dormant Mineral Act contains saving events and notice requirements that are not p art of the original Marketabl e Title Act. While differences indisputably exist , they do not demonstrate an irre concilable conflict.January Term, 2020

11 {¶ 28} As we stated in our discussion of the acts individually, the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act operate differ ently and after different periods of time. The Marketable Title Act extinguish es property interests after 40 years without a saving event, measured from the effect ive date of the surface owner’s root of title; the Dormant Mineral Act provides a mechanism that a surface owner may use to have a severed mineral interest deem ed abandoned and vested in the surface owner after a shorter, 20-year period. O ne commentator has
stated:

In general, a dormant mineral act provides a mechanism, similar to a marketable title act, to erase the ambiguity creat ed by ancient claims, but it does so more aggressively. In other wor ds, ancient claims do not need to be so ancient to be quickly dismi ssed by the function of a dormant minerals act-if such claims pose a threat
to the marketable title of natural resources.

{¶ 29} Stewart, When the Shale Gale Hit Ohio: The Failures of the Dorm ant Mineral Act, Its Heroic Interpretations, and Grave Choices Faci ng the Supreme Court, 43 Cap.U.L.Rev. 435, 440 ( 2015). But the fact that the two acts operate differently, toward different ends, does not mean that they are irreconcilably in conflict. Indeed, it s uggests the contrary. {¶ 30} Appellants correctly point out tha t the Dormant Mineral Act inc ludes saving events that are not included as saving events under the Marketable Title Act. But it is neither surprising nor an indication of an irreconcil able conflict that in light of their differing operations, the two acts contain different s aving events. The
Dormant Mineral Act is concerne d with abandonment—a fact that, at common law, would have required proof of t he owner’s subjective intent. See Corban , 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, at ¶ 25, citing Beer v. Griffith , 61S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 Ohio St.2d 119, 121, 399 N.E.2d 1227 (1980). Saving events und er the Dormant
Mineral Act therefore tend to be relevant to the question of th e owner’s intent; they
include the existence of title t ransactions, production of mine rals, use of the interest for underground gas storage, issuance of a permit with respect to the interest, claims of preservation, and the issuance of a separate tax parcel numb er for the mineral
interest. See R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(a) through (f). Application of the Marketab le Title Act, on the other hand, is not concerned with abandonment and therefore does not call into question the owner’s subjective intent. Because the acts affect mineral interests differently, it is only reasonable that they contain different saving events, and we may not disregard the General Assembly’s policy determin ations in support of the statutory differences i n the guise of construction. See Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C. , 125 Ohio St.3d 280, 2010-Ohio-1029, 927 N.E.2d 1092, ¶ 35, quoting Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 2008-Ohio-546, 883 N.E.2d 377, ¶ 212 (“ ‘It is not the role of the courts ‘to establish legislative policies or to second-guess the Ge neral Assembly’s policy choic es’ ”). {¶ 31} Appellants express concern that because of the differences betw een saving events under the two acts, a mineral-interest holder may succeed in preserving an interest under the Dormant Mineral Act but nevert heless face extinguishment of that interest under the Marketable Title Act. True enough, but as with the other differences between the acts, that possibilit y is not dispositive. First, a mineral interest extinguished by operation of law purs uant to the Marketable Title Act no longer exists to be saved under the Dormant Minera l Act, and it cannot be revived. R.C. 5301.49(D). Further, even in the hypothetica l scenario in which a saving event under the Dormant Mineral Act occurs before the 40-year period under the Marketable Title Act has elapsed, the fact that the i nterest will not be
“deemed abandoned” under the Dorma nt Mineral Act does not precl ude the General Assembly from prescribing “extinguishment” of the interest unde r the Marketable
Title Act.January Term, 2020

13 {¶ 32} There is nothing in the statutory language of either act to pre clude a mineral-interest holder from ensuring compliance with both the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act. Each statute sets out simple actions that a holder of a mineral interest may take to perpetually preserve that int erest. The differences between the acts do not create any obstacle to giving effect to both, which is what
R.C. 1.51 directs us to do. {¶ 33} Amici curiae Ascent Resources-Utica, L.L.C., and Gulfport Energ y Corporation cite In re Petition to Annex 320 Acres to S. Lebanon , 64 Ohio St.3d 585, 597 N.E.2d 463 (1992), to argue that a specific statute an d a general statute irreconcilably conflict when the y provide separate mechanisms o r standards. That case involved a challenge to t he Warren County Board of County Commissioners’ resolution approving a landowne r-initiated petition to annex la nd to the village of
South Lebanon. Id. at 586, 587. {¶ 34} Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., which owned property within the area to be annexed, opposed the annexation. Id. at 587-588. It sought to challenge the
board’s resolution under two statutes: R.C. 2506.01 and former R.C. 709.07, Am.S.B. No. 151, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 409, 410. R.C. 2506.01 provides for a direct appeal to the court of common pleas of “every final orde r, adjudication, or decision” of a political subdivision. In an R.C. 2506.01 appea l, the court must consider whether the board’s order is “unconstitutional, illega l, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance o f substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.” R.C. 2506.04. On the other hand, former R.C. 709.07(A) provided for a petition to the court of common pleas “for an injunction restraining the auditor or clerk from presenting the annexation petition and other papers to the legislative author ity.” The complaining party in an action under
former R.C. 709.07 had to establis h “by clear and convincing ev idence that the board’s decision [was] unreasonable or unlawful or that there w as some error in the proceedings.” In re Petition to Annex at 591, citing former R.C. 709.07(D).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 {¶ 35} In determining the applicability of those remedies, this court was “confronted with two statutes which appear[ed] on their face to apply two different remedies in challenging decisions made by boards of county comm issioners approving annexations of territory.” Id. at 594. One issue before the court was “whether the General Assembly provided for two distinct remedie s for disappointed parties in landowne r-petitioned annexation proceedings.” Id. at 591. We answered that question in the negative. Id. at 597. Of particular concern was the fact that the two prescribed actions involved different standards of review. An appeal under
R.C. 2506.01 involved a “virtual de novo examination of the record,” whereas an action for injunctive relief under former R.C. 709.07 was “high ly deferential to the
board.” Id. at 594

. This court held that “due to th e differing standards of review, * * * R.C. 2506.01 appeals cannot be reconciled with R.C. 709.0 7 injunction actions as applied to” a board ’s decision on landowner-initiate d annexation petitions. Id. {¶ 36} In contrast to the provisions at issue in In re Petition to Annex , the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act do not provide different and conflicting mechanisms to evaluate the same action, even though they may both ultimately affect the continued viability of a severed mineral interest. The acts ask different questions and provide for different results. In ligh t of those differing inquiries and consequences, the f act that joint application of the acts may result in a mineral interest being preserved under one but not under the other does not
demonstrate a conflic t between the acts. {¶ 37} In perhaps tacit acknowledgement t hat there is no irreconcilabl e conflict between the language of the Marketable Title Act and t he Dormant Mineral Act, appellants turn to notions of legislative purpose and argu e that the two provisions cannot be harmonized b ecause application of the Mark etable Title Act to severed mineral interests would frustrate the legislative in tent of the Dormant Mineral Act. Specifically, they a rgue that application of the Marketable Title ActJanuary Term, 2020

15 to severed mineral interests would be contrary to the legislati ve intent to promote
reliance on record chains of title. Appellants’ a rgument is mi splaced. {¶ 38} The legislative purpose upon whic h appellants rely—“simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain
of title”—is central to both the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act. R.C. 5301.55. According to appellants, the Dormant Mineral Act serves that purpose by providing for recorde d notices of preservation and a ffidavits of abandonment. They argue that extinguishment of mineral interes ts under the Marketable Title Act, which does not require similar recordings , would frustrate that purpose. But that argument overlooks that the General Ass embly drafted the Marketable Title Act to operate that way in service of the very purpose appellants
now claim is frustrated. {¶ 39} Appellants’ argument is really a broader, general critique of t he Marketable Title Act, rather than a specific critique of its ap plication to severed mineral interests. Extinguishment of all interests—whether in minerals or not— occurs the same way under the Marketable Tile Act and relies he avily, if not exclusively, on the record chain of title. Determination of th e act’s applicability begins with a review of the record chain of title to determine whether any interest predating the effective date of the root of title is identified there. The General Assembly drafted the Marketable Title Act to provide for exting uishment of old interests by operation of law in service of its purpose to enco urage reliance on a record chain of title. We therefore presume that operation of the Marketable Title Act satisfies that goal. {¶ 40} Our reading of R.C. 5301.49(D) in Heifner , 4 Ohio St.3d 49, 446 N.E.2d 440, did give rise to the possibility that a title trans action outside the surface
owner’s chain of title would leave a marketable record title su bject to a mineral interest that predates the effective date of the root of title, but the surviving interest
will nevertheless be accessible in the recorded property record s. SomeS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 commentators have suggested that Heifner was an impetus for the enactment of the Dormant Mineral Act, s ee Stewart, When the Shale Gale Hit Ohio, 43 Cap.U.L.Rev. at 440, fn. 46, but there is no indication in the statutory lan guage that the General Assembly enacted the Dormant Mineral Act to remedy an inadequac y in the Marketable Title Act’s service of its codified legislative purp ose. Notably, the General Assembly did not amend the Marketable Title Act in resp onse to Heifner
to define the subset of title transactions that could constitut e a saving event as those appearing within the chain of title upon which record marketabl e title was based. A more reasonable explanation is that the legislature intended the Dormant Mineral Act to provide surface owners an additional mechanism to accomplish reunification
of dormant mineral interests with the surface estate in order t o promote the use of natural resources when those interests could not be extinguishe d under the
Marketable Title Act. {¶ 41} Less than two years ago, this court decided a discretionary app eal
that involved claims that a severed mineral interest had been b oth abandoned under the Dormant Mineral Act and extinguished under the Marketable T itle Act. See
Blackstone v. Moore , 155 Ohio St.3d 448, 2018-Ohio-4959, 122 N.E.3d 132. The
claim under the Marketable Title Act hinged on R.C. 5301.49(A), which states that marketable record title remains subject to interests that are i nherent in the chain of title, “ ‘provided that a general reference * * * to * * * inte rests created prior to the root of title shall not be sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification
be made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates s uch * * * interest.’ ”
Blackstone at ¶ 11, quoting the statute. The court of appeals held that reservation language in a 1969 deed that appeared in the surface owner’s ch ain of title preserved
the mineral interest under that provision. The issue before th is court was the meaning of “specific identifi cation” in R.C. 5301.49(A), as the surface owner argued that the reference i n the 1969 deed was not sufficiently specific to preserve the mineral interest. We rejected that argument. But we did n ot question thatJanuary Term, 2020

17 severed mineral interests may be extinguished under the Marketa ble Title Act, despite the concurrent applicability of the Dormant Mineral Act

. {¶ 42} Justice DeGenaro concurred separately in Blackstone to emphasize what she viewed as “the narrow scope” of the holding. Id. at ¶ 19 (DeGenaro, J., concurring). She characterized the holding as not “hing[ing] o n the nature of the interest” and cautioned against reading the opinion “to implici tly hold that the more general Marketable Title Act continues to apply to mineral inte rests following the
enactment of the Dormant Mineral Act.” Id. While appellants seize on that concurring opinion to argue that Blackstone is irrelevant to the question now before this court, the concurring opinion is not binding precedent. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Peshek , 143 Ohio App.3d 839, 843, 759 N.E.2d 411 (2d Dist.2001). Furthermore, we may not ignore that, in Blackstone , a majority of this court expressly affirmed a judgment tha t a severed mineral interest h ad been preserved
under the Marketable Title Act. Appellants have not preserved a due-process argument {¶ 43} Appellants state in their merit brief that an owner of a severe d mineral interest is entitled to due process of law before the o wner can be deprived of that interest. They do not, how ever, develop any specific a rgument with respect to due process, nor does it appear that they did so in either t he trial court or the court of appeals. It is well settled t hat a party who fails to raise an argument in the court below waives or forfeits the right to raise it here. Niskanen v. Giant Eagle, Inc. , 122 Ohio St.3d 486, 2009-Ohio-3626, 912 N.E.2d 595, ¶ 34, citin g State ex rel.
Zollner v. Indus. Comm. , 66 Ohio St.3d 276, 278, 611 N.E.2d 830 (1993). But even if appellants had raised the ques tion below, any suggestion tha t continued application of the Marketable Title Act to severed mineral inte rests violates due process is beyond the proposition of law this court accepted fo r review, and we
decline to consider it. See New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc. , 157 Ohio St.3d 164, 2019-Ohio-2851, 133 N.E.3dS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 482, ¶ 32; Wesolowski v. Broadview Hts. Planning Comm. , 158 Ohio St.3d 58, 2019-Ohio-3713, 140 N.E.3d 545, ¶ 28.
Conclusion {¶ 44} Because there is no irreconcilable conflict between the general provisions of the Marketable Title Act as applied to severed mi neral interests and the Dormant Mineral Act, both acts retain effect. The Marketab le Title Act and the
Dormant Mineral Act afford inde pendent procedures, either of wh ich may be used to effect the termination of a severed mineral interest, depend ing on the circumstances of the case and the time that has elapsed. We th erefore affirm the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which revers ed the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas’ entry of summary judgment, and we remand this
matter to the trial court for cons ideration of the Wests’ claim under the Marketable
Title Act. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and D E W INE and S TEWART , JJ., concur.
K ENNEDY , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by D ONNELLY , J.
F ISCHER , J., dissents.

_________________ K

ENNEDY , J., dissenting. {¶ 45} Because the 1973 amendment to the Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47 et seq., is substantively i rreconcilable with subsequen t amendments to the statute enacted by th e Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56, the p rocedures of the Dormant Mineral Act control in determining whether a severed in terest in oil and gas has been reunited with the surface estate. I therefore dis agree with the majority’s holding that the Marketable Title Act and the Dorman t Mineral Act create independent, alternative st atutory mechanisms to deprive a mineral-interest holder of private property. For these reasons, I dissent and w ould reverse the judgment of the Seventh Dis trict Court of Appeals.January Term, 2020

19 The Marketable Title Act {¶ 46} The General Assembly enacted t he Marketable Title Act in 1961 with “the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating l and title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title.” R.C. 5301.55. It sought to accomplish this purpose by providing that marketable record tit le—an unbroken chain of title to an interest in land for 40 years or more, R.C . 5301.48—“shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims, or charges whatsoever, the exis tence of which depends upon any act, transaction, event, or omission that occurred pri or to the effective
date of the root of title.” R.C. 5301.50. The existence of ma rketable record title “operates to extinguish” all other prior interests, R.C. 5301.4 7(A), which “are hereby declared to be null and void,” R.C. 5301.50. {¶ 47} The Marketable Title Act also provided that the existence of marketable title did not extinguish a prior interest if a savin g event preserving that interest appeared in the record chain of title—i.e., the intere st was specifically identified in the muniments of title in a subsequent title tran saction, the holder recorded a notice claiming the interest, or the interest “[aros e] out of a title
transaction which has been record ed subsequent to the effective date of the root of
title.” R.C. 5301.48 and 5301.49. {¶ 48} The General Assembly amended the Marketable Title Act in 1973 “to enable property owners to clear their titles of disused min eral interests,” excluding coal rights. Am.S.B. No. 267, 135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 942-943. However, the shortcomings of this statutory mechanism to termin ate unused
mineral interests s oon became apparent. {¶ 49} Our decision in Heifner v. Bradford, 4 Ohio St.3d 49, 446 N.E.2d 440 (1983), highlighted how the Mar ketable Title Act failed to extinguish all
dormant severed mineral interests. Heifner involved claims to oil and gas arising from two independent chains of title. A 1916 deed transferred the surface estateS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 while reserving the oil and gas rights. The surface owner tran sferred the property in 1936 through a deed that did not mention the reservation, wh ich came to exist in a separate chain of title through affidavits of transfer record ed in 1957. The surface
owner had unbroken title to the property—including the oil and gas rights—from the 1936 root of title. However, we held that the oil and gas reservation was not extinguished by operation of the Marketable Title Act, because “a ‘marketable title,’ as defined in R.C. 5301.47(A) and 5301.48, is subject t o an interest arising out of a ‘title transaction’ under R.C. 5301.49(D) which may be part of an independent cha in of title.” Id. at 52-53. {¶ 50} This court’s interpretation of the Marketable Title Act to sust ain an oil and gas interest that was created before the root of title but existed outside the surface owner’s chain of title “was ‘[t]he impetus for the crea tion of the [Dormant Mineral Act],’ ” R.C. 5301.56. Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. , 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part), quoting Wendt v. Dickerson, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2014 AP 01 0003, 2014-Ohio-4615, ¶ 21. As one comment ator has explained, after Heifner , “it
became obvious that the Ohio Mar ketable Title Act would not be an effective mechanism for clarifying or terminating title to ancient minera l claims.” Stewart,
When the Shale Gale Hit Ohio: The Failures of the Dormant Mineral Act, Its Heroic Interpretations, and Grave Choi ces Facing the Supreme Court , 43 Cap.U.L.Rev. 435, 440 (2015), fn. 46.
The Dormant Mineral Act {¶ 51} The 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act provided that a
severed mineral interest was “d eemed abandoned and vested in th e owner of the surface” if none of the following applied: (1) the mineral inte rest was in coal or was coal-related, (2) the mineral interest was held by the United S tates, the state, or any other political body, or (3) a saving event occurred within the statutorily providedJanuary Term, 2020

21 20-year period. See former R.C. 5301.56, Sub.S.B. No. 223, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 981, 985-988. {¶ 52} The saving events provided by the statute were:

(i) The mineral interest has been the subject of a title
transaction that has been filed or recorded in the office of th e county recorder of the county in whi ch the lands are located; (ii) There has been actual production or withdrawal of minerals by the holder from the lands, from lands covered by a lease to which the mineral interest is subject, or, in the case of oi l or gas, from lands pooled, unitized, or i ncluded in unit operations, un der sections 1509.26 to 1509.28 of the Revised Code, in which the mineral interest is participating, provided that the instrument or order creating or providing for the pooling or unitization of o il or gas interests has been filed or recorded in the office of the c ounty recorder of the county in which the lands that are subject to t he pooling or unitization are located; (iii) The mineral interest ha s been used in underground gas storage operations by the holder; (iv) A drilling or mining permit has been issued to the holder, provided that an affidavit that states the name of the permit h older, the permit number, the type of permit, and a legal description of the lands affected by the permit has been filed or recorded, in accordance with section 5301.252 of the Revised Code, in the of fice of the county recorder of the count y in which the lands are loc ated; (v) A claim to preserve the interest has been filed in accordance with division ( C) of this section;S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 (vi) In the case of a separated mineral interest, a separately listed tax parcel number has been created for the mineral inter est in the county auditor’s tax list and the county treasurer’s duplic ate tax list in the county in whic h the lands are located.

Id . These saving events are now c odified at R.C. 5301.56(B)(3). {¶ 53} “In enacting the 1989 law, the General Assembly sought to help clear title to dormant mineral interests and to encourage the develop ment of Ohio’s mineral resources by allowing parties to rely on a record chain of title to them. See
R.C. 5301.55.” Corban, 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, at ¶ 27 (lead opinion). {¶ 54} However, some of the saving even ts provided in the 1989 statute could occur only outside the chain of title, and a majority of this court concluded
in Corban that the General Assembly did not intend for the Dormant Miner al Act to be self-executing when it provided for qualifying mineral in terests to be “deemed
abandoned.” Id . at ¶ 27-28 (lead opinion); id . at ¶ 43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). “Because ‘deemed’ means only that the mineral interest is presumed abandoned, judicial action, typically by way of a quiet-title a ction, was required by
the surface owner for a conclusive determination that the miner al interest was
abandoned and vested in the surface owner.” Albanese v. Batman , 148 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-5814, 68 N.E.3d 800, ¶ 18. {¶ 55} The General Assembly’s use of “abandoned” in the Dormant Mineral Act instead of “extinguis hed” as in the M arketable Titl e Act was essential to this conclusion. At common law, a severed mineral interest was not extinguished or terminated by the owner’s failure to produce oil and gas, bu t it could be abandoned upon proof that the owne r intended to relinquish it. See 1A Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas, Section 8.4, at 139 (3d Ed.2004); Beer v. Griffith, 61 Ohio St.2d 119, 399 N.E.2d 1227 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabu s. The mere lapseJanuary Term, 2020

23 of time without using the propert y could be probative of that i ntent but was not by itself sufficient to prove that abandonment occurred. See Junction RR. Co. v. Ruggles, 7 Ohio St. 1, 10-11 (1857). “Abandoned” therefore had a speci fic meaning at common law, and “ ‘where a statute uses a word which has a definite meaning at common law, it will be presumed to be used in that s ense and not in the loose popular sense.’ ” Thompson v. Community Mental Health Ctrs. of Warren Cty., Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 194, 195, 642 N.E.2d 1102 (1994), quoting Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 372-373, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964). For this re ason, we have recognized that the General Assembly did not intend to extinguish dormant mineral interests outside the chain of title—and beyond discovery in a title search— automatically and by operation of l aw regardless of the intent of the holder; rather, the 1989 law required a judicial f inding that the mineral inter est was abandoned
and deemed vested in the surface owner. Albanese at ¶ 18; Corban at ¶ 28 (lead opinion); id. at ¶ 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). {¶ 56} Therefore, under the 1989 law, the General Assembly intended fo r dormant mineral interests to be terminated within the chain of title and with minimal procedural protections for the mineral-interest holder. {¶ 57} The legislature provided even m ore protections to the mineralinterest holder against an invol untary abandonment when it amen ded the Dormant
Mineral Act in 2006 to enact t he current version of R.C. 5301.5 6(E), which provides:

Before a mineral interest becomes vested under division (B)
of this section in the owner of the surface of the lands subjec t to the interest, the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest shall do both of the following: (1) Serve notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each holder or each holder’s successors or assignees, at the lastS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

24 known address of each, of the own er’s intent to declare the min eral
interest abandoned. If service of notice cannot be completed t o any holder, the owner shall publish not ice of the owner’s intent to declare the mineral interest abandoned at least once in a newsp aper of general circulation in each county in which the land that is subject
to the interest is located. The notice shall contain all of the information specified in di vision (F) of this section. (2) At least thirty, but not later than sixty days after the da te on which the notice required unde r division (E)(1) of this sect ion is served or published, as applicable, file in the office of the c ounty recorder of each county in which the surface of the land that i s subject to the interest is locat ed an affidavit of abandonment that
contains all of the information specified in division (G) of th is
section.

{¶ 58} The mineral-interest holder has 60 days from the date of servic e or publication of the surface owner’s intent to declare the minera l interest abandoned
to file either a c laim to preserve the min eral interest or an a ffidavit that identifies a saving event that has occurred within the 20 years immediately preceding the date on which the notice was served. R.C. 5301.56(H)(1). Only afte r the mineralinterest holder has failed to respond can the mineral interest finally be deemed
abandoned and vested in the surface owner. R.C. 5301.56(H)(2). The Conflicting Amendments {¶ 59} Having reviewed the text and legi slative history of the Marketa ble Title Act as amended by the Dormant Mineral Act, we consider th e question presented by this case: do the Marketable Title Act and the Dor mant Mineral Act establish independent, alternativ e means to terminate severed m ineral interests, orJanuary Term, 2020

25 is the Dormant Mineral Act the s ole statutory means to reunite such interests with
the surface estate? {¶ 60} R.C. 1.52(B) guides us in answer ing this question and provides, “If
amendments to the same statute are enacted at the same or diffe rent sessions of the legislature, one amendment without reference to another, the am endments are to be harmonized, if possible, so that effect may be given to each.” It further states, “If the amendments are substantively irreconcilable, the latest in date of enactment prevails. * * * Amendments are irreconcilable only when change s made by each cannot reasonably be put i nto simultaneous operation.” {¶ 61} By using “abandoned” rather than “extinguished,” by creating distinct saving events under the Marketable Title Act and the D ormant Mineral Act, and by enacting a notice provisi on to protect the mineral-inter est holder’s property rights, the General Assembly created a specific statutory mecha nism to terminate
dormant mineral interests that conflicts with and therefore mus t supersede the
Marketable Title Act. {¶ 62} The Marketable Title Act does not consider the intent of the mi neralinterest holder but rather purpor ts to extinguish a qualifying mineral interest even
if the owner intended to maintain it—and even if the mineral-in terest holder is actively producing oil and gas from it. In contrast, the Dorma nt Mineral Act
focuses on the mineral-interest holder’s intent to abandon the unused interest, as manifested by the holder’s res ponse or failure to respond to th e surface holder’s
service of its intent to declar e the mineral interest abandoned

. {¶ 63} And while the saving events preserving property interests from extinguishment under the Marketable Title Act must appear in th e county land records, the Dormant Mineral Act provides saving events that oc cur wholly outside those records, including the act ual production of oil or gas or the use of the mineral interest in underground-gas-storage operations. R.C. 5301.56(B )(3)(b) and (c). These saving events also functi on differently. If both acts ap plied to oil-and-gasS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

26 interests, a severed mineral int erest could be extinguished und er the Marketable Title Act absent a saving event after the root of title, yet no t be abandoned under the Dormant Mineral Act because a saving event listed in R.C. 5 301.56(B)(3) occurred within the preceding 20 years. Or a mineral interest could survive under
the Marketable Title Act because it was mentioned in the munime nts of title subsequent to the root of title but nonetheless be deemed aband oned due to the lack of a saving event during a subsequent 20-year period. {¶ 64} Lastly, the Dormant Mineral Act protects the property rights of mineral-interest holders by requi ring the service of notice bef ore that interest may
be deemed abandoned and vested in the surface owner. R.C. 5301 .56(E). In contrast to the Marketable Title Act, which provides no such pr otection, see R.C. 5301.48, the Dormant Mineral Act pr eserves mineral interests wh en the owner simply signals its intent to retain them—for example, by exploi ting the mineral interest by producing oil and ga s or by filing a notice of that intent, see R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(b) and (e). In addition to circumventing these p rocedural protections, applying the Marketable Title Act and the Dormant Mineral Act simultaneously can create needle ss confusion among mineral-inte rest holders and surface owners alike regarding who retains the oil and gas righ ts. The General Assembly enacted the Dormant Mineral Act to encourage the devel opment of Ohio’s oil and gas resources by clearing title to unused minera l interests while preserving the holder’s private property. See Stewart, When the Shale Gale Hit
Ohio , 43 Cap.U.L.Rev. at 440-441. Hol ding that the Marketable Titl e Act may be used to extinguish oil and gas interests would do nothing more than frustrate the legislature’s purposes in enac ting the Dormant Mineral Act. {¶ 65} For all these reasons, the amendments enacted in the Dormant Mineral Act are substantively i rreconcilable pursuant to R.C. 1 .51 with the 1973
amendment to the Marketable T itle Act and cannot reasonably be put into simultaneous operation with it. Further, the Dormant Mineral A ct is the moreJanuary Term, 2020

27 recent of the amendments. The General Assembly enacted the Mar ketable Title Act in 1961 and made its provisi ons applicable to oil-and-gas i nterests in 1973. The
Dormant Mineral Act amended th e Marketable Title Act in 1989 an d 2006. As the more recent provision, the Dormant Mineral Act controls over th e Marketable Title Act and provides the sole statutory mechanism to terminate seve red mineral
interests in this state. {¶ 66} Here, the surface owners sought a declaratory judgment that the
severed mineral interest had been extinguished by operation of law under the Marketable Title Act. However, even if we assume that there ha s been no saving event under the Dormant Mineral Act, the surface owners may not reunite the severed mineral interest with the surface estate unless they fi rst comply with the notice and service provisions o f R.C. 5301.56(E). There is no evidence that the
surface owners have done so here. {¶ 67} Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment in favor of the mineral-in terest owners. Because the majority does not, I dissent.
D ONNELLY , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ Yoss Law Office, L.L.C., and Ryan M. Regel, for appellees. Charles H. Bean, for appellants. Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Gregory W . Watts, and Matthew W. Onest, urging affirmance for amici curiae Cassan dra Ridenour, Senterra, Ltd., David Cain, Juli a Cain, Peppertree Farms, L.L.C ., Paines Run, L.L.C., Paul E. Morrison, and Vesta G. Morrison. Theisen Brock, L.P.A., and Daniel P. Corcoran, urging affirmanc e for amici curiae Allen B. Miller, Matilda J. Miller, Craig M. Miller, Tin a E Miller, Brenda D. Thomas, Kevin M. Thomas, Kerry R. Hartline, Mary E. Hartline , Doris Craig, Paul Craig, Eleanor Craig, Nina Ice, Terry Ice, Sheila Stollar, Roger Stollar, LisaS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

28 Meyer, Kenneth Meyer Jr., Helen Craig, Evelyn Craig, Carissa R. Baker, Corey A. Stollar, Shelba Wills, Donald Carl Baker, Debra Kay Bowen, Ruth Ellen Workman, Donna J. Baker Hughes, Ronald Eug ene Baker, Linda B. Wilcox, Ja mes D. Baker, Lana S. Baker, William Stevens, Danny Offenberger, Jeffrey Stev ens, Ricky Allen Baker, Randy Lee Baker, Diana Bohn, Kathy Sue Rainer, Gary Dale Baker, Danny Ray Baker, and Shari Siddle. Thomas A. Hill and Joseph N. Spa no, urging affirmance for amicu s curiae Eric Petroleum Corporation. Jackson Kelly, P.L.L.C., Clay K. Keller, and Andrew N. Schock, urging
reversal for amici curiae Ascen t Resources-Utica, L.L.C., and G ulfport Energy Corporation.

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