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is) QUILL 

f8j Radar In Orbit 

Robert L. Perry 
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SB€R&I'JRl&:IJNeFeRNIlKl 
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t9l1f'K) This comprehensive history of the first radar imaging satellite describes the progr&m's 

evolution from need to concept to program to launch and evaluation while stressing its experimental . 

nature: "the feasibility system was to be that and nothing more; no consideration would be given to 

making the demonstration equipment the basis of an operational system." Robert L. Perry's Quill 

history bring interesting contractual, administrative, and financial minutiae as well as technical 

details. He provides a vivid sense of Bradburn's management style as well as the Cold War setting 

of the time. 

(U)RobertL. Perry (May 10, I 92S-September7, 1990) majored injoumalism at Marshall University, graduating in 1947. He went on to a master's degree in history at The Ohio State University. 

From 19S 1 to 1964. Bob Perry worked for the Air Force-first at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 

Ohio, then as chief of the History Office at Air Force Systems Command, E1 Segundo. He was a 

retired USAF reserve officer who also taught or lecture at Ohio State, Wittenberg University, the 

University of Dayton1 the Air Force Academy, the Air University, California Institute of Technology. and the Rand Graduate Institute. He also wrote ex.tensively on Air' Force system development 

programs. chiefly aircraft and missiles. In October 1964 Bob Perry joined the Economics Department of the Rand Corporation, where his list of publications includes more than 2S technological 

case histories, studies of R&D policy. analyses of system cost trends, examinations of test program 

structures. and comparisons of U.S. and foreign technologies and R&D institutions. He also served 

on numerous outside panels and gave testimony to sevenil congressional committees. 

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XVI QuaL: RADAR IN ORBIT 

In'the first 20 years of reCozmai8~I1D~e satelllte program. actinty 

in. the United State •• Quill was the only program that substantially 

conformed to initial coat. .chedule. alld performance e.timates. aDd , . 

the omy .atellit~ progr~ 01 any Dature to proceed frOID start to 

fiDlsh with a perlect record in launch.. orbital operations. ,readout, 

and recovery. . 

Quill had ita iDunec:U.ate origin in a propoaal JGlntly QOJ1COc;ted- ' - ' . 

by Lockheed :Mi. riles and SPace Company and the Goodyear Aeroapace 

Corporation early in 19&. ~ Stitriulatedby riaiDg tntere.' ill postatrike recozmal •• ance capabilitie ... those contractor a a1lllesteclthat 

a aynthetic aperture side-looldlli radar be mstalled i.D aD Agena lpacecraft for a ••• ument 01 weapons eUects in a post-nuclear-strike settiDg. 

The radar aet was to be a moc1ilied version of One being built tor the 

RF-.ll0 (which subsequently reverted to ita oriainal R..F-f nomenclature). 

A Loc:kb.eed briefing team that iDcluded Ooodyear repl'e.entative. 

exposed the Dotion to a variety of interested audience. in:the middle 

months of 196~. Air Force Undersecretary Joseph V. Charyk. who 

also headed the atill-.ecret National RecoDl18.iss8Jlce Of1lce. was one 

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of tho.e who listened. Major General Robert E. Greer a. Directorate 

of Special Projects (the West Coast element of the NRO) provided 

another audience. 

The idea of using orbiting radar for bomb damage .. sse •• Jnent 

wu scarcely novel iD 1962.. It hac:lfirst Mel mentioned .spart of 

Rand IS bdti.a1 s~e. of satellite teasibility and applications betW8en 

19<18 and 19SZ, iUld had reappeared periodically during the next decade. 

Stra.tegic Air Coxnmand interest in .atellite-bas.d. post-strike 

recOJ,1Dab8anee. prODOUDeed for several year., was heqhteDed by 

the 1961-1962 cancellation of the on.,inal photo-readout Samos s.tel ... 

lite program. (E .. l and E-2.), which until that time had been som~t 

UlU'ealt.ti.cally cOUllted on to provide retargetiDg data. In 1960 there 

was a brief .flurry of iDtere~t in the idea ot a comb1nation bomb-ciamaleassesamellt and weather recODnai.saace radar satellite, but like other 

ambitioUB proposals of the time it ezpired 01. fuIub darvatioD aDd 

technology ehortcomiD,s. Neverthele ••• such di.&ua8ioD.8 encOUl"aged 

Lo~kh •• d to propo •• the Dear-term. develap!m nt of .. I'adar-cil.n-yin, . 1. 

recOJlD&i •• a.nc~. sate1Ute that. used on-tha.,sb.lf componenta. 

• Source citation. are to be found at the end of each chapter. 

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Greer, With C"haryIt'. support, aaked his PlauChie!, Captain 

Frank Gorman (USN) to examine capabUltle. and. needs. Concurrently, 

Colonel of Greer'

• staff established a workiDg relationship with the Strate pc Air Conunand'. requirements group in the hope 

of clarifyillg SAC'. post-strike reconnaialucerequire121.n.ta. _ 

leuDed little that was new: SAC waDted a .ateWte-born.e.po.t-.tz'ike. 

all-weather a ••••• meDt capability in near-1'ea1··tlnle. 001'121&11. 

reached the iDitial conclu8101l that any .ystem " ••• r4tquUbaa :l:efJ.ectecl 

light can:aot be cODdderod a lood .olutio!) to a problem where reaction. 

time is paramOUDt as u the situation for 'initial a •• e •• ment.·.. In 

Gorman', judgemeDt, the only effective teclmique would be CD8 providiDg 

"all weatber/Uabt conditi~s" sensitivity. Kia iecommendatioD. to 

Oroer: uA high-re.olution radar deve1~ent lIhould be iDitlated 

wrnedlately if an. effective POlt.strike recoDDaissa.nc:e capability 18 

to axlat. tt And he concluded that .readout ....... e ••• "tial.·· iBysical recovery 

of payload., he argued, had been "a me&llB of circum.veDtiDa the band-

~ 

width problem. " All of which was true. but in the ab.ence of ad&ptable technology. was alBO largely irrelevant. 

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Nevertheless. the several elements nece.aary to the establish .. 

ment of a funded research and development effort that could lead by 

one route or another to an operational radar-iI'l-orblt syatezn were 

in being by the late BUmI'Iler of 19&. A requirement of IOn. had 

been acknowledged, though DO formal statement of national need for 

radar recozmai.~anco from orbit had yet emeraod. The approach 

• 

defined by Lock:1Jeecl, and Goeclyear. U 1t coulcl be accepted at face 

value.. repre •• ntecl a techaologi.oally achi.vable ca-pabWty that could be 

.. cq~recl" at ... r"ela.ttnly mod. at coat. Tho iD.,Jt~t. of a syatePl I . 

exiated III the form 4£ in-developmeot iteDJ8 if not in operationally 

ready equipDJen't. " 

: In lUll. 196~. Cha.ryk. directed that Oreerls organtzaUcm evaluate 

the possibility of addI.Dg apecial sensors "such al iuha-l"ecl and radar" 

to tho payload of the heavy-lift Titan-m vehicle then bein, conaidel'od 

a. a luCcessor to the Atlas booster us.d for mOlt space launches. 

The slight prospect that the Titan-m would actually be u •• cl in the 

satellite recotma! •• ance progruu for .everal years prompted Gre.r 

to suggest consideratioD of a more direct approach. In October Charylt 

. .,. .... } 

- ,~.(tc.~1;~4-",Or.flr·. w...~." and,fonna.lly .utb.ozi,~ed. an e~WltiOJ1 of the II 

ICc 

Other contractors had similar proposals. but all required 

some extended period of vehicle or seuor development. 

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Lockheed-Ooodyear propo.&1. hu.d OD uae of aThol' ,booster aad 

3 

readUyavailable Alena hardware. 

What belaD in the summer of 196Z a. an eva1uatlcm becam.e a 

source lelection proe.... It ha.cl two upecta. ODe iDvolYlDc a DOnnal 

COlDpetitioD £01" the de!,eloplllellt of a radU' let. boaters, readout 

equipment suited to extu.ded operatiol1l. and the other- an ap.rlmeat 

using the Lockbeed~oodyear propo'.! as 1&8 bale. Major David D • 

• 

BradburD. a mez:nbel' of the .tz-znan study croup. .... eated tbat the 

most direct &lid effective way of.ati.fyiDg ·Charyk·.,zequelt,for an 

early demoD.8tration of raclu-in-orbit fealibility wa. to buy a few let. 

of on-tb.e-Ib. .. lf equipment. modify the hardware 11Ifficiently to permit 

its operation Ullder orbital CCDditiODil. aDd. test the result in a real 

operation. Th. group', head, Colonel Yr1lliam O. Itm,. Jr. ,wal 

wbolly tn favor of that approach but bavina recut aDd patDfol expel'-

ie~e with optlmi.tic coatractor predf.cti.oa, that coW" Dot be tzo .. slated 

• The Ittudy.roup. he.Cled by Colonel O. !tba. Jr •• meWe" 

Lieutenant Colcm.el. J olm C,opley alMi BracJbUrn, 

Major Charl.e Red.wiDe, ami Captain all of Greer I, 

,taB. sn al.o .ipLed Ueuteunt 

Colonel who wu Oreer" lela! .pt ... a~ .... Weut.DUlt 

_III_'ll'''' of the SP Plan. staff, aDd 

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into operatioual performance. • declc1ed t.o verlty the aUeled perlormance capabUf.1iea of the propo.ed systaln by checJdDc w1th AU Force 

rac1ar reccmDaiasance ezpertll at Wrllbt Field. 

The entire .ix-man study team. viaited file RecOJmai..sUlce 

Laboratory. an element of the A'eromautical S,.tema DlmlOD at 

Wright-Patter'OD Air Force Base, early in October. Theproject 

officer for the AN/APS-73 radar as.ured his 

ri.itorl that the .et coulel do What had been ~0ID1.ed foJ:' it &Del that 

DO other item of avaU.ble equipment could reaUau.caUy be .-.titutod • . The questiOD. of what resolatiOA could be expected ..... DOt as re~y 

resolvable. Coloael 

ColODel. XiDg that if suitable Itz.aquiremeatlllt coaleS be i •• ued it 

would be po .. ible to obtain cOZIipari8011 raclu and photographic bnaaery 

of exiatiDg bomb crater. at Frellchman'lI Flata (the Nevada teat site) 

in foUl' to .ix mODth,. KiD&. who p1aJmed to Wl'ltebU't'baal report 

later that month, said mild! y that he bad a better idea. ODe of bb 

team. mem.bers who b.e .. the problem iutlmately wa. Capta1D. _ 

_ ~ said. CaptaiA _ coulel adequately repre.eDt the 

• kiDl had maDaled the Samoll E-I and E .. 2 prOlramll. hael beeD 

involved with aatellite recoDnab.ance work lince 1955, and ...... the 

final program manager for the wholly inadequate Surk mia.Ue. 

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study group in superintendinl an immediate effort, say in three or 

four days. He would fiy aboard the photo airplane. 

after a moment'. reflection, eareeel that the teat 

exerebe could indeed. be co.mpleted in three or four da)'IJ. It wu, 

following week •. They demonstrated. that rac1a:r imalery co'Gld readily 

distiDpiah the priDc:ipalfeatures of bexnb craters of various 1ci.1uU, 

although the limitations of the test pbotosrapby excluded any firlXl CODelusions about the ,round resolUtion obtainable from. space by .tele100ldDg radar. "However, n KiD,'s JToup eventually C:QDCluded, "it 

fa obvious that craters and surface clUferences of the silles ideD'tiAecl 

in the accompanyhJa photolrapb a can eun y be aeen With a radar that 

haa a p-ound resolution poorer than 50 feet. II • 

* The craters photoFaphed rallied iD diameter &om a ·mfnilDUQ). 

of 80 feet to a maximum of 850 feet. Photographs were lakeD ami a 

Ilx-1rM:h foeallezigtil T-ll aedal camera loaded with PI1D:-X fUm.. the 

combination prmc:U.na a ~O-1ine.-per-mU1tmeter resolution .at the 

fihn plane. The radar was an AN/APQ-55. with a slx-loot, slottedroU, side-1ooldna antenna, 4S kilowatts of power. aDd. a frecp eney of 

34.86 kUomegacycle.. An electro-optical photo m.ultiplier tube, 

an.lndium antimony infrared detector. aDd the radar operated a. put 

. of a development system. being inveatiaated by the Reconnab8auce 

Laboratory. They were flown ~,200 feet above the craters iD a C-131 

aircraft. 

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. Having coDfirmed their preliminary judgement that radar 

in orbit could adequately perform bomb damage a •• es.ment (If it 

could be made to operate wbUe in space), the study ,roup had to 

confront the ciueltiO~ of what to recommend to General Greer and 

ultimately to Undersecretary Charyk. Several contractor. had 

provided c.opies 'of earlier uuoUclted prOPOlalS ancl had briefed 

group meDlber.. In the eDel the study grouplettled on a recommended 

approach which wal characterized as fl ••• not ••• "the ODly feaan.le 

or beet concept; .... [bu~ merely ••• one concept haviDa lOIn. 

plausibUity--a balh from which the Board may proceed.· ff The member. 

were agreed that they would have satisfied the requiremeuts of their 

charter if they provided (a) a conceptual fomulation. and operative 

reCODmleDdaticm. ior proc:eedin, with a radar feasibility demon.ltration. 

and (b) guidance for the conduct of further studieB and aualy .... 

The fiual report laid candidly, "we have asBumed that au 

instruction. limit u. to .ho-trina the feasibility of developing a ... teUlteborne radar capable of aenalog iDlonnation of jvlf1cleDt intelliJence 

value to allow lome dama,e aSBeBsment. The more .ubtle problem 

of BhowiD, the feasibility of an overall post .trlke l'ecozmaisl&Dce 

.yatem mu.lt be fully analysed concurrently with any raduo demonauation. 1f 

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The study pro,ram was intended to analyse the operational· 

applicationa of high-resolution radar for bomb darnage a •• e.srne'llt 

ill a post atdke en.viromn.mt. a.stlminl quick-l'eaction., all-..eather 

capabUlty for acquiring "the relatively coarse detail" obtainable 

from satelUte-carried radar. • 

The foa8ihility dem.onstratio. was seen aa a process that 

should be ccmducted quickly aDd with the mt"h:num outlay 01. fund.s 

needed to .... ure .ucce... J'ol!owiD, the lin.s of BradburD.·s suggestl.OD 

ths Jl"oup ursed teltlDJ olf-tIle-shell radar It •.•• capable of providiDa 

wormatioD which can be eztrapolated (at mlnhnum risk) mto dedp 

information required for an operaticma1 radar ••• 11 The object of the 

demonstration. would be to establiahthat II ••• physical phenom.ena. 

do not eld.t which would preclude development of high resolution. II 

• Although the study group report did mt explicitly ao state, 

group members were convinced that the analysis should be performed 

outsi.de the Special Projectl directorate. preferably by the Strate,ie 

Air Command. The participation of Rand Corporation specialista 

was explicitly proposed. however. In the event. the lIaNdies and 

8.1lal.,.ian aspect of the total QuW. pro,ram did not develop .a the 

study group had proposed. Cbaryk never directed (ireer'. o1"gaDl.-

z,atloD to do the anal,..l.. Rand did perionn SODle relevant research, 

but SAC coDtim.Jed to submit advocacy recommendations which, 

generally. were coa..idered. by .enior defeAse officials to be insufficiently supported by objectlve analysis. The feaaibUlty demon8trati~ aspect of Quill became, by a. process of inaction. el •• where, 

the dominant: element of the prograan. 

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To those end., the study group recommended that an APS-73 Dlodel 

radar be integrated with a Thor booster. an Asena-D orbit:lDg vehicle, 

a Coroma recovery capsule, a readout aystem chosen frO!!). ezta1:t.Dg 

hardwa.re. * au available ground processor. and the orbital control 

and CommumcatiOb.8 net then hem, uaed by the National. RecoDllaiasaDce 

Program. It was a 80mewhat 1e •• ambit10u variant of the LockheedGoodyear 'approach~ but devoi4 of operational objectives • 

.coDClucUng tba t~D1y.tJa.e '.8Cl1IipmeDt.com'DiD8tion,p&ef.!.;, .I,~>!l· '" . 

~. '" .. ~ ~"~' ..... ' >1I~~l .'~ •• ~~ .• ,: ."" ~. ;r: 

an immecllat'e.tart of'Wor~ 118m, a sole-source procure-

• Relitive1: y little was said about readout in the final report, 

which. however, included a senez.a1 discussion of principles aDd 

techDlquea and an aBBeSBment of readout tim.e requirem.eJlta. As, 

for feasibility. somethins of 'the groupie vie .. coald be ,Wqed from 

the proridOl1 of a recovery eap.u1e. an acees.ory that pre.umabt.y 

would Dot fiDd a place in any operatioDal .ysleDl. A brief ba.t e1oqu.eat 

comment on the readout problem appeared toward the m.id.d1e 01. the 

report: "Airborne 8DC;l ground equipment. to provide bandwidths 01 

six ~:J~ltae.~_aJ ........ e.mlr·a1aG-.-fbetteeAttbnically feaslble. Theil' xeliabWty leavee IJOmethiDg to be de.ired. rr 

And, after a cUecU8sion which eDded with the obaervatioD, flOur 

problem ie not in senahag iA detail. but ••.• iB retrievAl of the 

infortll&tioll, If the report .Sleeted the ''broad .. aumption'· that 

n ••• blformatiOD of a modest detaU level. which can be handled may 

be uaeful for an liDitial a .. eS8ment. lit (Underlbtng in the origiul 

text., 

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* 

meilt approach. The evaluation grou.p cODcluded that a three-fliaht 

demonstratiOlL effort could be conducted at a cost 

but that a teD-percent .contingency fee shoulel be pl"arideci to protect 

aaaiDst UDfores~en development problems. (Should a five-fliaht 

pZ'ogram be approved, required fUIld8 would total 

J"iAally. the ,roup recommead.cl that tho exlatmg 

houae the 

feasibility demonstration. aDd that Major Bl"acibuD, ''probably 

the moat kDowledaleable radar specialist at SAFSP. flbe named ._ ............. - .......... _--_. 

* That somewhat UDUSUal course--setectiDg contractors 

. during an evaluation of pro'ramfe .. ibility--.... ,iuatified by Charyk'. 

requirement for the quickest possible demoastratiDD. which me .. 

use of oU-the-shelf equipment. The Agena-D was the omy avallable orbital vebicle. ~e Thor the omyappropriate booster previously mated to an AI.... ad. tile APS-73 wU ''the near •• ' tb.lma 

to aD off-the-ehelf item that could be a.d 1n the fe.sibUlty demOD-

'tratioD. • • It 1D the formal op1Di.oD of Caloael_ bee ..... 

0D1 y Oooclyear mad. that radar ,t. • • it would be a ,1'088 waste 

of tbne and zncm.ey to·.tart another IDuufacturel' bailcU.u.c it in 

lieu of havbag Goodyear malte the Dec.uary minimum modifications 

in it. eziatl.ag product. It" . 

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progrun 2%u1I1a,er. * In a statement that Bra.dburn waa to mnpha.aize 

frequently thereafter, the .~oup ob8erved that the orbital teat program 

was n ••• the aUnple8t and quieke.t approach to demollftratiq 

the feasibility of the radar 8ellaOI', tI that quick completioll 01 tile teat 

would malte po.sible a decidoll OIl a later operatiOllal .}'1Jtem,but 

that tt ••• the launch vehicle aDd radar coDfiluratioll proposed. for 

orbital test are not considered adaptable for operational test ... 

In 80 many word., the feaslbility demollstratlon wa.a to be that and. 

nothing lUore; no conalderation would be given to maldug the demonatration equipment the baai. of an operatlonal system.·· 

• CQui11.-w.ruc&. Pl'wlii.tM1d'i.to .be-.. ~Ja.or,t~tena pr~srazn ·,ot'.bi~ 

tei.+nin. ·mtereat,q ,wo.ekllb1t _f8ttIr..iflie "irojec.'to4Jl&D.a;tiY Br&dburn 

tald·KiDc,he:;aitibq;riul with hi.arjt1:atl', .... ipm.at!-a.-...... ""fty douJ.t,;you·~.m., .. pro}ec~ofI'D:e~u:~tti:r.tc:r .. ,o • .puI'Ii •• I'llyou. 

lSiralrli'.tb. il>.4uicld, Dqrchaply azuL,~! ~jzptechft. ~ all 

tbeE4'eJDbele wa.«nipt,-.ullhfdjoiN1Ut ... tboUghliJllL'lh~ ;id$a. 

(If 'the idea. 

** A poat .trike bomb damage aaaeaamentsystem. as cODCelved 

then and later , \VaS a •• wned to mvol ve requirementl for multiple 

launches from hardeDed aites. The use of a Minuteman boo.ter was 

geDerally believed to be a pr.e"req~s1te for opeJ'atloual utility, that 

being the priDclpalland-based ballilti.c JIll •• Ue ill the U.S. inventory. 

The October 1962. att.uly postW.attsd-ti'nDeU"-aimultaneous launches. 

with five orbital radar systems maldDg parallel-path pas.es over 

the priDcipal Soviet targets. Obviously .. a sott. Uquid-fUe1 TboZ' was 

wholly inappropriate for such an operaticm, Age;ua could not be accomm.odated ill a MiDuteDlaD eUo. aM the APS-73 raclar promieed to 

have definition and I'esolu~on iDappropriate for an opel'aticmal appllcatiOD.. 
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The report of the study group, thereafter mo'Wll as the "King 

Report, tI went to General Oreer on 30 October. Its one-word title, 

S 

01'eer approved the findings and recommended that Major 

Bradburn. the board's nombaee for project leader, present them to 

Charyit for review. Thre. days after Bradburn'. 7 November 196Z 

presentation. Charyk authorized him to begin work. Funding leyels, 

as first approved. re1l.ected the premiaes of the Lockheed-Goodyear 

proposal. Bradburn's plan. called for five lliaht-qaaHfted payloads, 

of which three were actually to be launched. Lockheed was to be 

a •• igned liystem engineering aDd teehmcal direction responsibUiti •• 

and re.pOlUIibUity for orbital vehicles, system integration. and launch 

8er~es. ~oodyear Aircraft was to de~e1op ~. radu payloads ••• 

• Qai11 was aunested by Colonel Joseph W. Ruebill... .At West Point, 

the tenu ........ QuUl List" was uaed.to. identify the weekly listing of cadet 

demeribl--the diacipliDe liat. To be "on Quill" was, therefore, a 

hilhly undesirable assignment. That was Dot the way the eventual 

Quill participant. viewed their aasiJDlllent, 01 COUl'se • 

..- Loc.kbeed was to perform system integration, caglneeriD, and 

fabrication of structural modification tor three orbital vehicle •• anteDD& 

design and fabrication, provide special batteries and other payloadpeculiar vehicle equipxnent; and do teet plaDDins, in-~ans aDd launchba.e checkout .ervices. Goodyear was to be responsible for engineering. 

fabrication. qualification and deUvery ol five fliaht-qualified aatellite 

radars. one qualification test radar substantially identical to a flight 

article. ODe thermal equivalent t •• t model. one mock-u.p, air-to"lr~ 

equipment for checkout at Goodyear and lor system checks at Lockheed. 

and pad checkout equipnlent at Vandenberg AFB. including test beacons 

and apparatus for blockhou.e checks of radar operation during countdown. 

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had agreed to provicle engineerills consu1tins 

.ervices for the radar experiment and to develop an optical correlator 

lor final proces sing 01 radar data. Cienera! Electric COftlpaDY was to 

build the reentry vehicle and Douglas Aircraft the thru.t-au.meDted 

Thor 'boosters. The project 10 ala included phyaical recovery aDd 

electronic data readout _t _ around reaolutioll of 100 leet or better. 

Real-time electronic readout over olle UDited State ... tattOD would 

be acceptable. The projec.t--white name ''P-401l--waa to operate 

with a m;uimum of JUodiJ1cat1ou to aU off-the-shelf systems. inc1udiDJ 

the Goodyear radar, and was to be conc:lw:lecl •• rapidlyaa posaibl •• 

Time on orbit aDd data quantities were not con8idered critical items.· 

However, Charyk wanted to be wormed immediately 1£ there were 

&Dy queatiOil of rneetina the 100-100t resolution requirement •. He 

alao lnsisted that contractors be clearly informed that the demoD8tl'atiOD ~s of an experimental nature only and was Dot a device for 

As Creer had .ugaesteel, ChuyX directed that the demon8tratioo 

project be conducted uncleI' a 'fblaclt .. cover. He authorized the DOtification of choaen contractors and the release 01 ill fi.cal 

1963 funds to cover initial costs. ~ additional would 

be provided for fiscal 1964. 

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Charyk alao app1'oved the conduct of more refhied experimental 

work iD advanced radar teelmiques. Designated ''Phase .Alpha." 

that aspect of the total project was to be .aparately cla •• ified tlwhi~" 

but with strict "need to know" security. U~er Special Projects 

Office auspices, competitive propola1a were to be blued .-tiba 

lor deaip studle. lookina toward orbital te.ts and deJ!loMtratiOD of 

the feaalbility of radar senaors with electromc readout and stora,e 

capabUit1es (recovery was Dot aD excluded option, however). Acceptable IZ'O\IDd resolutloD was to b~ specified at 10 to 50 leet. All COD6 

carned expected Phue Alpha to take longer than the P-40 c1emODltratiOD. 

tau.~ AI.JI "Ol"e.l'IQrPPtt._fCb~ ~11'~.Ulitelt~!l,, __ ai'" 

&ell~oLt$~...u~t94 l~" ~tb.e;n..ac.,.s.-:w..IlIIIO.foota the 

~Z.M!oJ'Wlj~ • .ulk~~_t G~31~~~IGk • 

• r-epreaentativea at SUDDyvale. .. froD;l ~ockh •• d hacl 

been uked.to be ready-to present &aain the proposal he bad •• rUer 

ma.de to King', group ~ to briD, eosDlzant Goodyear people wi~ .. 

him. 

• Att8Ddee. included Colonel Robert W. Yundt, who had luceeeded 

Vi. G. King as Bradburn'. immediate 8upedor for B!!!!. 

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Bradburn informed the contracto:n that the Air Force was 

. going to proceed: with a minimum satellite radar dem0D8tratlon, 

generall y alODg the lines of the Lockheed-Ooodyear proposal. but on 

an ... ociate-contractor basb. Although Lockheed had favored a 

primary contractor-subcoDtractor framework, the Air Force had 

decided that direct ace ••• to the major contractors involved would 

limit schedule and coat overruns aDd thereby eDhaaee the probability 

of aD, early firat fli,ht. Lockh.ed; Ooodyear and_would 

all have direct communication lines to Bradburn. Bzadbura ezplained 

that be WUlted to exploit eziBUn, contracts as much u possible. Dot 

only for administrative ease bu.t also far purpose. of maintaintn. 

security. 

The project framework, as laid out by Bradb~ iz1.clud.d 

procurement of five flipt-qua.Ufied payloads to support three 4lgJ:ata 

at two-month intervals with the first flilht targeted for ,January 1964. 

The ,oal would be to·obtain a high-r •• olution,raclar pictu:re from. 

aDd:~m,;Dtmmir:morlifi~<of!_~hD.NH"ftware. 

(Aeropbyaicl Division of Goodyear) briefed 

the meeting on the radar system. then being developed by Ooodyear 

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for the R.F-110 aircraft. Capable of produciDg 50-foot groU11d reaolutiOD. the bulc radar covered two 3G-mUe .watha. QJ1e em either aide 

of the airplane. The bdliaht recorder and dUpl.ay equipment permitted 

dbplay of two ten-mile swathl 'Which, could ~ selected as desired 

withiD the coverage limit.. The all-up weilht 01 the radar was 450 

powada (iDcludlD, anteDD&, recorder. tranamiUer ancl receiver). 

_ foreaaw the need for three principal. changes to adapt 

the m.ting APS-73 radar for satellite use. The pulae repetition 

frequeDcy (prf) and. the average power would have to be increased. 

the trusmitterrmodulator (aDd perha~ other components) which 

used refrileration coolbc would have to be repackaaed to prori4e 

for Ccmdu.ctiOD or rac1iatloD cooling, aDd the recorder would have to 

b. modified to accommodate a. large film supply and to provide for 

. aatellite-derived data iAput.. 

Existiag development .chedules called for initial beach teatiDg 

of the first complete RF-110 racial' in. AprU 1963 anc:l delivery of the 

first flight teat item to Ec1wa.rd. Air Force Baa~ in July. However, 

there was all"eady some indication of slippage and_cautioned 

that .fli.ht te.ta might Dot begin untll September or October. 

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described the operating principlea of 1IIe optical 

corre1ator. _could achieve an azimu.th cOIUpreadoD ratio 

of 1000 to 1 with avallable production-type proceasor.. (The aaimuth 

resolution in the final. pictue wculd be 1000 times finer thaD the 

physical diaum.ions of beaDl width.) With laboratory-type de!D.onatration equipment. the best obtainable asimuth compre.sion 2:atio 

was about 5000 to 1. In the proposed .atellite experiment, azimuth 

resolution would be limited primarUy by ionospheric distortions. 

U all worked well, the overall system. might produce azimuth resolution 

of 15 l •• t or better. At any rate, the optical proceasor would not 

b. the Ibnit1ng factor. 

During the enlineering eli.cu.,ion. that afternoon. Bradburn 

specified that the payload cODfigurationa would be identical from fliaht 

to fll,ht--there would be no ,roWth chan,e •• He emphasiHd the" 

ttminimwn modlficad.on, as-ahort-a-time-span-as-possible" phUoaophy 

which wu to guide Quill. He abo restated hi, determill&tioa to adhere 

closely to the primary ,oal of showing feaaibUity, not developiDa 

operatioul prototypes. One couequeDCe was that the radar anteDDa 

would not be ateerable. Concerned with acquiring a lood pictare at 

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acceptable groUDd resolution and not With vtewina specific tarlote. 

Bradburu foresaw no Deed to develop aiming capability; the swath 

would be wholly dependent on the orbital path of the vehicle. 

Although recovery of the expoled fil.J:n lIIOuld be the pritnary 

data retrieval method. simultaneous readout of the radar data would 

provide a COzo.pariSOD in picbh-e qualityaind reveal what data cJeterloradon was caused by the tran.miaslon lbk. Rea.c!out would aleo 

provide a backup systalD in case the recovery I~tem failed. 

Lockheed agreed ~o provide w1thiD Z. hours aD initial co.t 

figure 10 fUDela could. be ad.ded at once to an on-gom, Air Force c:omrac:t 

A work etatwm.eat was to be ready by. Zl November 

and a full COlt proposal within. the month. Contract aelodations, 

to bep in ,January 1963, were scheduled to lead to a defiDitive 

contract by ZS January 1963. BradbU1'll. scheduled a meetiJ:la with 

Goodyear for the week of 18 November, in Phoerd.x. to cWtcuas a 

draft work statement. propo.ed contract arrangern.ents, aJld procuremellt Ichedules. Meetings with 

were .et for early December. * 

• The principal contractor. were in a state of finaDcialne&rshock when Bradburn told them that Greerls organisation had accepted 

their premil.s and promises and proposed to proceed with the prolram 

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Bradburn. emphasized the need for tight. ecurity. Each 

employee wor~1 on the projed would have to be approved by the 

Air Force •• ip a security agreement, anel bave' a. final .ecret 

c:1earance. BradburD requested that he approv~ theae name. in 

advance, aD arranaement he later chaDged to allow for atter-thefact notiflcatioD to the lhxait. of a quota for each com~Dy. 

Bradburn &180 stre •• ed the need to hold docwaentatioll to 

a minimum, both for security reasonal and to le •• en paperwork. 

Each company woul4 deal directly with his office, 10 a lJ1ultiplicity 

of reports would be a waste of time as well as a potential. security 

risk. He empharised that he intended to participate in moat of the 

monthly engineering aucl.tecJmical review meett.n,. aDd that he 

expected all program puticipiults to u.e them. al a primary moaua 

of ~~uWait a1I·,ccmce.r.b",.:part~lIa ·of ·teclmlca..l$ece.·~ ecbtad.-un. 

7 1 

d.ta.iJaJ,.ing .matter 8. 

*(coDUnued) pretty lDuch a8 they had briefed it--and at about the price 

they bad proposed. As later became plain, aacl a. everYODe concerned 

privately ackr&owi.daed at the .tart, the fiDaucial esdmat.s orlpally 

attac¥d to the Lockheed-Goodyear proposal were aalea figurea, UDderstated by about half. ID the usual way of things, the contractor. 

would have "recovered" their understated cost. by charging for 1'edesign and refinement needed to s&tidy 'pecificatiOD. aad requirements 

that.varied 8ubstantially from tho.e a.sumed fer the proposal. 

Bradburn's uaeceptancelt of the maiD. e1emeDt8 of the origlDal propoaal 

meaDt that there was little occasion for such maneuvermg.and that 

in a tlles8' cost" direction, for the most part. 

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To that point all had ione rather smoothly. But between 

Charyk aDd the Secretary of Defense there intervened one major 

renew flChelon, and on 15 November Bradburn learned that a potentially troublesome objection to B!!!.!l had surfaced during the flIla1 

project review aDd approval proees. iD the Penta,on. Dr. Z1llene 

FubiniJ theD .erving as semor technical advisor to Def •• e Secretary. Robert McNamara, had held up the rele&se of program. funds 

on the Foun«!. that "we;(tbe Natlow aecomaai.s&DCe OffIce] intend 

to pay too r:nuch for the radar. II LieuteJlaDt Colollel E. J. Istvan, 

Bradburn·s chief CODtaCt on the NRO .taff. reported Fubinir

• protest 

that f1APS-73 cost. (only),'a few hundred K.lt Fublrd aaked that the 

APS -73 project officer at be solicited 

for a ."'more reallaUc" COlt estimate. 

From FublDi,l. viewpoint. COllcerll leemed warrauted. The 

program CO~ e.tlzr1ate thit.t reached Fubbd included a provision for 

APS-73 radar sets then on procuremellt· schedules. But, as BradburD pointed out. ~-73 was not being bought per 8e. altho. modifications were to be beld to the minimum needed to qualify the "quip. 

ment for space llight. they would nonetheless be comparatively 

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expensive. The cost e8timates Fubini. had objected to, Bradburn 

observed mildly, had in fact been both prepared and validated by 

_ and although the was charged as "radar payload" 

costa, it actually inclu.ded engineering, fabricaticm. checkout, and 

launch tervie.t at.oeiated with the payload. Until firm bids became 

available, probably in January 1963, DO better estbnate could be 

e 

compo.ed. 

The .respOllse sa~.fied Fubini's objectiOllsi DO more was 

heard from that quarter. and funds were released on schedule. 

That problelQ dbpo.ed of, Bradburn lIlet 'With Goodyear 

people at Phoemx on ZO November. Althouih the company had had 

no satellite experience, virtually all its contracts were with the 

USAF or the Na.vy'a Air arm. Org&l'lizationally. 

head of the Goodyear Arisona Division. reported directly to T. A. 

KllOwle., prelldent of the Goodyear Aircraft Company (llame baaed 

in AkroD, Ohio), a subsic:H.ary of Ooodyear Tire and Rubber Compaay. 

The Navy was responaible for lDduatrlal security aDd quality a •• urllllce 

at PhoeDix (Coll.'lmaDder was the re.ident Navy 

repre •• ntative) and the Air Force Procurement Office at Sky Harbor 

Airport in Phoenix handled audlting and accounting t-equirer:r;t.ont •• 

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UDlike Lockheed. Goodyear had very limited experience with 

the special security arrangements that eharaeteriBed work OIl. satellite recoD:D&iss&DCe. Brac:iburA Iloted at the ODset 01 the Phoenh 

dbculions that three aspecta of the prolr8D). were extremely aueitive: that a version of the R.F-<&C radar was heiD, packa.ed fOr 

aatellite use. tliat Goodyear and Lockheed were worldrla together 

OD a sa.tellite radar project 'With Ail' Force functsn., aDd. tbat Goodyear 

had an Air Foree contract to build a satellite radar. Iadttally. only . . 

50 people in Phoenix could be briefed. In hopes of keeping expos1ll"e 

miDlmal, Bradburn d.eeided that Commander_.howel not be 

iDfo:rm.ed of this Ilew activity. (As evat. later d.ictated. bb asaistance 

became necessary a.!ld. he had to be briefed.) Documeat control aDIl 

visit requests 'Walld receive exceptioDal haDdlm,. MaD wa.s to be 

SeDt to post offlce bozea 8.Ild picked up by briefed indi'tidu.aJs. Uzale •• 

other busme8s provided a .uf1icient Covel', vi.l1:8 to PhoeDix by the 

AIz Force _el Lockheed people would be arranged through cU.:rect 

contact with Ooodyearla Administrative EDgineer. 

Visible project activity was to be covered by the story that it involved 

proprietary work called KP D--Knowles Project Number Two. 

(Goodyear bad soznewhat earlier performed work under a senaitive 

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contract covered by the prOprietary deserlptioD,'tt(p I.It) Such 

a cover weald abo ease procurement problema--radar components 

could be purchased "whiten a. commercial iteme--or so it was 

iDitiallyasawned. altboUSh there too problema were to develop 

subsequently. 

Goodyear'. draft work statement indicated a need foradditioual' 

detailed technical specifications from the Air Force and Lockheed 

before lDaZIpOw.er and coat estimates could be refined. For the 

mom.ent, an e8tialate of expeDditu.re8 for the lirst 60-day period 

9 

was the be at that could be provided. 

SectlrUy rules for Lockheed. were 4eflDed. the toUowin. day,. 

Lockheed's white contract would not mention !'radartl or tlGoodyear '-: 

the black verdon would b. correlated by pazagraph numbers to the 

white and would be ape~ifi.c.· Inasmuch as Lockheed had been 

doing "black" work of ODe sort or another for a decade, few new 

problems were likely to appear. 

* The first .ec1U'ity problem of QuW. &rO._ in the circumstance 

that Lockheed's QP,tnal racbj..r •• te1UtenOtion hadbeen·.· .. !e£6d" ~Y. 

before it ''went black. tt In mid-November. the Strategic Air Command 

asked Lockhe_d to provide additional iDformation re.ard:ina the 

Lockheed-Goodyear radar proposal. Bradburn vetoed the trip &Del 

got word to a witting SAC officer to "layoff. II 10 
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work for the due 

for routine contractual extension in March 1963, appeared euily 

exploitable to coyer Dew activity. Funcb could be readily u&D8ferred 

from. the program. office to • with DO Deed for .eparate fbumcial. 

accountability. The .contract would be white, though with a 

valUe work statement, but to in.ure that priority would be ,iven 

the new paperwork. the~cbnical project officer am possibly 

the responsible procurement oft,'icer would have to be briefed. 

Dr40D(,aeld work. coated at aD eatim.ated 

_ im:luded dealgn of the synthetic-array radar experiment, 

cODSiderm, in detail what radar pazameter. 'Were required to obtaln 

a successful demonstration. 8Jld preparing specificationa for critical 

radar components. _w~. to be respozdible for dotermbju. 

what azimuth resolution actually was obtained on the radar map. 

generated by the system and for azualysbg factors aifectiDg resolution. 

The also to develop and cou.truct a breadboard optical 

proce •• or capable of achieviDa "the larseat attainable compre •• ioa 

ratio." U the theoreticillly predicted azimuth com.pre •• ion ratio 

anticipated 10. the experiment were not attainable. the laraeat tecJmically atta.i.Da.ble (probably 2.000 to 1) would be the key factor in the 
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design.· The proce8sor was al80 to be designed to process' data 

which miabt be obtained under conditions wbien were departures 

from the plaDned experiment. a.s miaht occur during actual orbit. 

Primarily, those diaerepancie8 were to include departure from the 

intended orbit of the vehicle aDd from the intended orientatiOA of 

the playaical beam. 

In add1t1oD to proce88iD& the radar data. _proposed 

to liDk tbe around recorcU.ng s,..tom totheoptlcal. display COAYerto:n. 

Tbe laboratory also sUllested developmg aDd prOCUl"inl J:Ric%owave 

beacons to o~erve and. record .mblitiolnhi'ktori •• l.S .U.tl1h~the 

proposed designing a teat to determiDe the limitation OIl 

compresslODratio imposed by the camera drives iDthe radar system. 

a,reed to send to Bl'acJburnby m¥-December. 

two work .tatemeJlt.: draft. to be approved for content and security. 

ODe would be completet:ae. secoD.clr-:wD~d ~ ttp.,itisefl"._ am;#'1", 

any ruere8Ce to actoal .atelllte GpeZ'ations 01' satellite derived. data. 

• Accordint to_ 811 early objective of th. prolram 

was to place empbast. on o'bta1nins fiDe a.tmuth resolution. to ~e 

greatelt possible eztent--optim.ally ten feet--whUe ahnhlS for a 

more Z'eadUy predictable SO feet in range resolution. All factors 

determining ranle resolution were generally well understood, it 

was desirable to the experiment and potential future project. to 

determine whether adequate compre.sfon of aliimuth~se histories 

of target. could be reaUzec:l.ll . 
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any refereDCe to. Goodyear. Lockheed. Special Projects Office. or 

the deliYeryof report. on "DelilD. of Experiment". The problem of 

coDductiDg covert work ~settiDa was not as easy as 

with Goodyear and Lockheed, but the basic procedures were much 

the same. As ~1:b _in Pho 

security officer, was not to be bri.ted we.s it became unavoidable 

at 80m.e later time. * Uncleared personnel were not to be aware 

of the exi8tence of aD orbital radar experiment. •• that satellitederived data ba4 been or would be processed or that 

createcl.a worldng relationsbip with Lockheed, 

Oooclyeu, Space SY8tem.s Div1alo~ or SAFSP. U 

In mid-Decem.ber, Bradburn learned would be able 

to revise ita ontraet to iDclude Quill work before the contract 

- expired in Warch. 

• It did. lDdi,naDt that hetd been left out of the loop,_ 

~troDJI him. to drop inq,uirie. into security cleara.n<:es at 

_for .9!!!!.! work. He fiAally was briefed in April 19M. U 

•• Best laid plal18 bad a way of being stepped OD by idiots. _ 

_ secure phone system, essential to hi. operations. was iutalled 

~y in the dead of Dight aDd in a maDDer that was dedgned to be 

wholly On the fo1lowing day til. local telephone people 

asbel tIley- wanted to h biU .. d fo"-ean tLfi special 

alii:Q~4Itm.Dg: several' ac:b:rd;rdatratzi..,. 'people to the fact· 

had a spedal phone and was a consultant to the Air 

spooky operation. 

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A few days later, Goodyear's draft work .. tatemea,t. 

specificatioDs summary, and deliveryscl?edule.appeared.. Not surpriaiDgly, April 1964 rather thaD January 196. had become the tarset 

for first fligbt. A formal Oo04year price proposal still was lacld.ng, 

but Br~ privately expected that it too would depart from. the 

eatimates earUerfOJ"Wal'ded. WhenQuW. had first been approved, - foUl' IDOI'lths earlier, Major BradbuzoD had very lntormally observed. 

to Major J'ohn Pietz, with whom he then sbared an office. that he 

expected the forma! COst propasals to exceed prelimiDary estimatea 

by a factor of two or more, and that his past experience with the 

aeveral aspecta of Samoa led him to conclude that schedule revision 

would immediately lollow the opeDing of negotiations for firm contracta. 

named project manaler, Bradburn had eUcited an ironic .mUe aacl 

in reque.tina program approval from Charyk. rather thaD aome 

moc:leat variation on the propoaal estimates first received from 

4X:kheed ancl Goodyear. Lockheed's proposal of mid-196~bad 

postulated a cost a five-mi .. ion program; Bradburn 

calcub.ted probable .costs 01 lor three launches. but only 

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if he could keep program objectives substantially unchanged from 

. those approved by Charyk in Hovember:-.,·;There was DO·oth.e~ way of 

preventing the cost growth that had characterized 80 many venturesome Air Force prop-am. of the past decade. Concern for COIU 

largely explained Bradburn's continued reiteration of primary procram 

goals in discwasiolls with contractors. He wanted all concerned. to 

understand that in no circum.8taD.ce8 would he couider incorporaUn, 

either work additional to or technology newer tban that origiDall y 

contemplated. • 

* In eUly 1963; Gellera! Greer'. organization was battJ.iDg a 

series of COlt gl.'owtb problema. virtually aU of them. haying originated 

in faulty initial eltimates by cOlltractorl and UIlcritical acceptance 

of optimistic projections by various pro,raJD managers. Bradburn. 

who had by thell speDt nearly two years in Oreer's plans and policy 

group. was fully aware of ezbting cost control problems and. their 

origins. Colonel King. under whose ,uidance the QQUl program. 

had progressed from proposal to initial approval. wu- aDOther whose 

skepticism about the validity of contractor pro po_alB w... prOD01lJlCed 

aDd who .bared with Bradburn°the convictioll that hilh-t8chnica1~risk 

prolrams entrusted to large management groups with complex reporting 

channels were sure to overrun. Qu.111 aDd th. P-35 (project 4:17) 

weather satellite progrlLll).s were the fir atSAFSP undertakin.s whlcb 

conformed to tho Gre.r-Km,' philosopby, altboqh a_bit ~s recoDfipred to that moclel in 1963 after Kiac became GarAblt p2'ogl'&D1 

ma.D;8ler: The azchetype of amall-stii.1f. ~ect-ma.DaI.ment, riskminhnization was CorOAa. as originally crg~~ed. The mOl!lt succe •• ful cOmD1.r~ial practitioner wa·. C. L. John80n, Lockh.ed', 

leading aircraft deal_n manager, _ 0 •• p:roduct4 included the original 

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In accepting the .chedule revision, Bradburn pressed Goodyear 

to _,ree to build the tran.mitter~m.odu1ator UD.it in Phoeulz rathv 

thaD Akron as originally plarmed. A.lele from dahtenina secUrity. 

that move would ."bance engineerma control over the s.ificlUltly 

critical unit. whi.cb was going to .req~e estenaive r.ed.esipl for 

radiation coolhig. Although proteetina that by persODl1e1 would have 

14 

to be moved from Altro~ Goodyear asreed. 

By early January 1963, the status 01 the ~ bwltet was 

becoming clearer. COlt propo.als from contractors at this point 

in time were ali.hlly underrw:miDg the tentative budget approved'by 

NaO comptroller, the previous Novelnher. Ooodyear 

waa estimating coab of for fiacal 1963, 

for 196 .. , &Dd for 1965.black tUDela. White moade. to 

Lockheed'a-800 contract were estimated to be for 1963, 

for 196'" aDd.. for 1965. White funds transferred 

to were expected to total_ in fiscal 1963, 

the same in 1964, aDd _ in filcal 1965. PropOsed total CORS 

for the 9!!:!! contracts for fiscal 1963 were 

approved bldget of fiecal19M, _ 

approved), and_ in fiscal 1965. Total costs for all three 

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contract. were e.t1mated to 

budget 

November'. -approved 

BradbvZl had estimated total program coat. of at 1ea .. _ 

plus boo.ter., launchea, IIld orbital operations. 

The three TAT/Agena D's with. modificatlona. launch lerviee., 

aDd three reentry capsule. were additl.o1ial COlt. to be funded UDder 

AgellA D plus la\IDCh probably would total; TAT -plus 

launch- telemetry. trac:ld.Jll and commaud (vehicle)--

and -operation8- TOlethar. theee ack1ed 

aDO the price of the ,prog-ran leI; .. grand. tc)ta1 

enpneer in charia of the contract at 

in January. Bradburn approved the ~ -

and black Vel' aloll8 of 

but deleted 80me of the task. ~ad earlier pr9POleci. He 

badd&\cidecl that the raw radar film. .h~d be developed by the Satellite 

Photop-aphic Proces8ing Labol'atory. at We.tove~ Au Force 

Baae. Massachusetts, rather than 

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-'-", ......... prcwide engineering Uabon serrice.. The czo1U1clbased photo recorders (for use with the readout mode of data retrieval) 

would be ~plied by Goodyear rather than_. LutlYt ~ockheed 

rather than_would btdlcI the microwave beacODs. 

Under the circumstances. Bradburn decided that no fonnal 

black contract need b.e written for the troup. smc.e most 

of the very sensitive work: had been as.iped ebewhere. The .hite 

contzac:t with.wou14 therefore become the ODly biDding al~eem8Dt. 

Bradburn felt the motivation was so hi,h at_and hie contact. 

with them 10 freqllent that any black .tatement assilDlna eleac11.iDes 

for the report. that comprised mOlt 01 the remaimnl black eItort 

there would be extraneous. 

It appeared that eHlort: would cod 

The total included _ for system delign and analyaia of parameter.: _ for the data analylis anel fiDal report;_ 

to design and build the optical correlator and another _to 

operate it;_to collect and analyze radar and beacon alguall; 

and_to design and operate tho camera drive evaluator. Of 

the total, _ would be .pent in fiscal 1963 and _iza fhcal 

16 

1964. 

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Baeic arranlemcntl having been made, Major Bradburn 

briefed Dr. Brockway McMillan in March and agaiD ia May 1963 

(Mc).fUlan had replaced Charyk aa Director, National ReccmDai88aDCe 

Office. early in March). de.cribhal the re1haed parameter. for the 

QuW. ex.perbneat ... then deaiped and brimgiag him up to date on the 

statua of QuW contracts, budget,and techDology. It was Bradburn'. 

first opportunity lor describing fully the content of the program h. 

had just created. 

A. defined in May 1963, the radar payload cOlllponenta of 

Quill consi8ted of (I) a transmitter-modulator whieh was basically 

a high-power radar frequency (ltF) pulle amplifier; (2) aD RF-lF 

unit. which generated a low-power 1lF pulse for the transmitter iUld 

received aDd compressed the reflected radarpul..e; (3) a reference 

, computer which generated timing and coDtzool .ignab (aDd trlUUJnU •• lora 

pulses) and synchronously demodulated the received interm.ediate 

frequency to provide video data; (4) a power control unit which cODtrolled 8.!ld .Witched power and generated re,wa.ted volta,e. necesaary 

for the radar; and (5) a recorder which recorded the received video 

from the reference computer on fihn by expo.ve from the face of a 

cathode ray tube. 

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Goodyear bad estimated 1hat in its operating mode the radar 

system would CODS\1me Z700 watts of power. (Radiated effective peak 

power was 450 kilowatts, actual peak tranall'litter power 30 kUowatta. 

average traJlllmiUer power Z50 watts.) Th. length 01 the uU8mitte 

pulse wae 0.9 lIliCrOHCOll.cIa. By the use of pulae compr ••• ioll.tedlDique., thU waa reduced to aD eff.~tive.pu1 •• width of .06 micro-

.ecollda. Pul •• repetition frequ.eney (PR!') had a li-step variable 

rllDle from 8116 to 8736 tne,acycl... The radar operated OIl a Ire. 

qUeD.cy of 9S00 megacycles per aecOIlei.' Citva such parametera, 

Bradburn .stimated that slant-range resolution would b. SO f.et and 

azimuth resolutlon 50 feet or better. 

The AleDa ..... to be iDjected iDto a near-circular orbit of 

130 nautical mJl ••. (plus or mmus 13 m1l.s) at aD mcli:Aation of 70 

de,r •• s. Precis. attita.de stabilisation of the .ehicle would orient 

the radar antemla sO that the maiD lobe of the radar beam would be 

at a fixed depre •• lou of 55 degreee from the horizontal. In that 

attitude, the radar would map a .1ant.,ranaeillter'ftl of 5.9S nautical 

mile., or about,ten miJ.eaa1oq the' ground. 

.Active radar operation was to b8 conlmecl within the limits 

of the ccmtinental United Stat.a--and within the limit. of control of 

the VaD<leDberl (Califorlrl.a) and. New Boston (New Hamp.hire) trackillC 

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stations. * The data obtained frolll the payloa.d would be in the form 

of target echoes which would be synchronously demodUlated to preaerVe both phaae and amplitude upecta of the Signals. The rNmt1Da 

raw radar map data (a doppler history of the Wuminated terralD). 

would be recorded photographically OD fUm in the recovt!rabl. capsule 

aboard the satellite. Simultaneoully, the data signals would be tranamUted over the wide-band data link to tracking atations, where they 

would be recorded both on photographic film and on wide-band Tnapidic 

tape recorders. After mlilioa completion. the film record in the 

satellite would be recovered near Hawaii by air catch of the reentry 

capsule. 

The radar a.nteana, beiDa buUt by Lockheed. W&8 a two .. 

1iDi.formly illuminated in both directions.. The hip.power output 

* One of the principal doctriDal proble-me of conducting a radarin-orbit ezperime.nt was ~~enaiDt1' about the reaction of the Soviet 

Umon. AlthoUJh there were varioua juatlflcatioDI for using radAr 

seD80rs for oTer1light recozmaillance--all-weather, all-leaBon, 

all-BUD polition capabUity encomp.s8m, moet of them--aDd 11.0 wholly 

ratloDal r ... oia for concluding that active radar iD orbit would be 

more objectionable to a target .tate thaD photolZ'aphy. the selUlitivities 

caused by the U .. ~ affair of May 1960 still were evident in 1963. 

The arauments againat active radar surveillance of tbe Soviet 

Union fell into two categories. One had to do wlth the prembe that 

nobody could object to surveillance if the:re were DO demonetrable 

evidence of it. Becauae photography was wholly passive. there was 

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• (continued) (in theory) no way of provicU.ng incontrovertible 

evSdeDCe'that aurv.WaDce wa. iD. prolr ••• --unl.a., of cour •• , the 

owner of the recODDai •• anc:e vehicle acJmowledaed wbat he was doiDa. 

or aomehow phyaical evtde1u:e of the. activity feU imo t&Dfrtec11y 

haacla. Putting the entire l'8CoaDaia.ance aatellite Pl'ol1'&Ul beldIul 

deue security barriers late in 1960 effec:tively precluded the fil'st 

of thos. circumstancea; the United State. neither deDied nor coDftz'med 

that it waa flylDc recolmai.aazace .atellite. over Ru.ala, althou.p 

that iDtelltlcm bad be .. loudl.,.. proclaiDaecl OD several oc.culCliDa betweea 

19S8 aDd 1960. The posaibility tbat the J'tu.a8~ milht 801Dohow 

recover a camera-equipped U.S. satellite, or eaough of ODe to 

prove tbat it was a racODDais.aac::e veJdcle, had worried pZ'O.ram 

IDaDaiers dace 1.be lUet CoroDa lauacl:da J'UDe 1959. Pl-ecaQtloD8 

alaiDat iDad't'erteDt de.eem of either capaul •• or camera .eetl.ol.ut 

witbiD. reach of Soviet recovery force. were exteaaive, and for 

.e.eral ,au. they were believed to be eflective. At leaat once lD 

Corona experieDce, however. a largely iDtact capaule left a decay 

orbit aDd .arvivecl r8Ddom reentry, aDd late m the 1960. sizeable 

sharda ot a Gambit mb-ror pl~ ...... :rioua bit. aDd pte~ ... 01 ita electromc 

sub.yatems .urvived atmoepheric reentry auad were recovered iD 

EDgIIlDd.. Eraougb capsulea and orbital vehicle. 'Weat .. tray iD the 

1960. to .upport realoDable ,pecvlatioD. that lome could have fallq 

iDw lluslliaD haDds--but nothiDi was ever .aiel by the Soviete to ..... t 

that had bapp .... d. . 

. By ita very Dature, however, a radar latellite radiated recordable 

esridence of it. purpo.e. That e'\ficleDce might be aufficlent to IUPPOJ:t 

a demand for a ce •• ation of latellite over1'.U.ght operaUoD. shou1c1 ,the 

Sonet UDlon--or aay other nat1on--make an la.ue of the matten thu. 

the reluctazace to cODIider use of radar recOI2D&1aaance m aatellite 

overfU.pt of c:leDied U' .. as. 

But there waa aaother r .... on for luch cautio.D~ Photographic 

.atellit •• of the early 1960. were incapable of provldml Dear-realtime information. They were superb in.truments for doiDg tu-aetUag. 

for tec1mi.cal iatelligellce, for force .tructuz ..... a1uation. aad for 

vari0U8 other ta.k. with m1litary IigDiflcaDce. But ODly a radar 

.atellite could cODc.ivably do wide-swath bomb damage a ••••• m.at 

without concern for leason. cloud cover. or tim.e of day. AI no radar 

satellite could provide the detaU of photography, it followed. then, 

that one subltantial justification for operatiDg a radar aatellite of 

1963 vintage (limited in definition aud re.olution) could be to baYe 

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pulse of the radar was tranamitted tbl'OlIP the llat, phased-al'l'a.,. 

atdellDa mounted on the· .ide of the Agena, with the beam orieDted 

perpe.nclicular to the vehicle's lODgitudinal axi. but depres.ed S5 

de,rees be1Bw horizoutal. :rho beam was .36 clegre.·s wiele in the 

.Bhnllth directioD and Z.9 de,rees wicH in the vertical direction 

17 

at the half-power points. 

Some 01 the early premiaes had to be altered early in the 

development proll'am.. researchers le&l:lI.ed, 

for inetauee, that bias errors leDerated by tJ. AIena's attitude chauges 

durina Bigbt wel'e too large to be accommodated by the radar beunwidth. To onsure that tlzerO doppler" direction in asim.uth would. 

re.1I1t, a clutterloek or electronic beam ateerer had to be de.igDed 

. within the reference computer. Althoqh the clutterlock oscillator. 

output could conceivably de.rade date return., 

• (continued' eometh.iDa in position for immediate bomb damaae 

asse8sment-- whicb (accordin, to the reaeoDing then current) could 

be interpreted to mean that a surprise nucleu strike wae Imminent. 

It was highly UDlikely that aDy America pre8ident would ol'de1" a 

preemptive nuclear attack solely on the atrellith of iDformatlon that 

the Soviet. were operatiDg a racial' eate1l1te. but there was no 8uch 

confideDce in Soviet reaction. wez-e the United State. to do a. mllCh. 

There were other reaeoDS for reatrictiDg OIl-orbit ra~ 

operationa to the l1m~t. of the continental Uaited States, the· de.ire 

to keep the capability secret being ODe. but in the councUs of Washington 

uncertainty a.bout Soviet reaction was the principal callS. of caution. 

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predicted that no serious delradation would occur except at initial 

lock-on. 

McMiuan was concerned about the ... vanee of obblt'Dt"1 

qualitative c1ata to support evaluation of radar performance. He 

therefore directed that around resolution tu.ete be provided so that 

a direct measure of radar resolution could be obtained from analysts 

of a finish.ed radar map_ He also sug,ested incorporation. of 'an alt1f;ude 

rate chaDge recorder in the vehicle. (CballIea in altitwle rates would 

delrade the aslm.utb resolution; if accurate rate data .. ere available 

during evaluation, delradation from that s01U"ce could be more 

18 

reacU1y l.d.eDti.fied. ) Br~n made _r.sponsible for 

resolution measurements and aabel Loc:kheed. to evaluate the feaaibUlty of iDcoZ'poratlng a rat. recorder. 

Bradburn also allked Lockheed to reverify reference computer 

specificatiOJls. Electronically, the mOlt. complicated component of 

.9!!!!1. the computer: .. u ezpedenc1ns severe vibr&tioD problenls 

QuUl proaram. apeci.8.caticms required testing at 7.5 Os; the original 

coftlputer. designed for aircraft use. had f.neel at 3 G •• 

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Leas threateDina but equally trouble.ome problems appear eel 

in the procurem.ent area in April. Goodyea~ belan experieDcinl 

dUficulty in buyiug ,oyermnent-ifttpected parts UI1der commerclal 

auspic ••• A tentative 801utiou bad been iDiti.ally worked out by 

haviDa the . local Air Force' procurement 8p'cialiat. 

verbally approve ... IICODtractin, Office:r" Goodyear's request. for 

the delivery of hiah-reliability com.ponena. The ratlODal.· ... e rnl,ht 

sell it to the ,ovenunent" was ued to ju.t1fy the Implled u.e 01 

govermnent-approved items in what was represented. to be an Itin._ 

hOWie, fI company· sponsored pr'ogram. That tODUou.8 aetworK collapsed 

in early May when a govermnent iDapector. who had ,been "ofAcially" 

asked to release parts hom a boDded warehoue for whichh. was 

responaible. ~ .. u..v. Goodyear's 

security officer. to coDfirm that the commercial purch .. e oreler 

he had received actually supported a ,overmnent contract. :aoutblely 

attempting to confirm that the listed parts wculd be uaed in work 

for the government.. _ fell into the local cover atory--that they 

were aeeded to support a pro~:rietary contract. Convinced that he had 

.tUlnbled mto something unsavory, _imrnecli.ately blocked the 

purchase. An alarmed Ooodyear executive hurriedly notified_ 

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who called_to verify that the work waa indeed Air Force .pODsored. _still sensing somethiq h1Jhly irregular, said stiffly 

that he was obliged to notify his superiors in the Navy procureznent 

ch.a.1D. Seeing visions of a total collapse of securlty, ~urriecny 

alerted Bradburn, who inittructed him to 1188 some excuae--any excuae--

to stall until program office persODDe1 couletget 

to Phoenix. _ grudgingly acceded to_ plea to postpcme 

a,D.Y action until the followlDg Mo~c1.ay. (It was then Friday alterDOOA. 

and Bradbu:rn appreciated that a delay until Pentalon closing tbne 

would represent two days of grace.) 

Colonel Ruebel and Major Brad~D flew to Phoellbt CD SUIlclay 

and em oiled who agreed to support the project. 

They agreed that all future requests for verification of goverzmumt 

interest in commercial purchase orders would be referred to. 

directly aDd that_ would cc:mfirrn their validity. _alSQ 

agreed to assume the function of acting as co,mal.Dt security officer 

over the clo.ed areas of the plant. No other Naval persozmel were 

19 

to be briefed or mad. cogDizant 01 any special requirement.. 

/ . The potentially more troublesome problem of arraza,q. tlu'ouah 

. 

1 

the CIA., for General. Electric to buUet azad deliver three CorOlla- \ 

configured recovery cap.wes for use m the Quill experiment 

was reaolyed in the early Spring also. As with LUlyard aDd 

\ 

Gambit, CtA peraoD.1lel were apprehensive about a. security leak. \" 

/ ~ 

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pi.CUlaiOIl8 between SAFSP and CIA security spec:ialbta in a leries 

of meeUna_ led to agreement on 9 April 1963 that the procurement 

could proceed. The three capsules would be handled wuler C01':ODa 

security procedures until their delivery to Swmyvale &Dei would thereafter be handled UDder.9!!!:!! procedures. III ODee that hurdle hacl been 

pal.ed, the c~Dtr .. cdnl azad funding arrangements were quickly re.olv.d. ~O 

The first .erious threat to Icheclllling expectatioDil and Quill 

811cce .. occurred 1D early JUDe 1963. Dr. McMillan had earlJer 

~re .. ed concerD to Braclb1U"D. that arems in hiah-YOltage power 

supplie. might become a problem. The original Goodyear specifi-

- cation. approyed by Lockheed had •• tablished a level of .001 1bilHmeter. of mercury .s the highelt pre •• ure in which the payload would 

operate. Hilh-voltaa. areing would Dot occur if that a ••••• meDt were 

correct. Bradburn, nudged by McMillu, dec1ded toius1st on veri- . 

ticatioD of Goodyear" estimate and asbd Project 

MUlLger for Lockheed, to cover that item during the next moD.thly 

prosram review in late June. Although be cUd not fully ahare MCMillan.'s 

concern, Bradburn asked lor a complete review of design .coulderatioDe, 

part. qua11f1catiOD,8 bbto1'Y~ and qualification to.tiDa for Lockheed- and 

Goodyear-furllbhed hi,h-voltage supplies aDd any circuit polnta where 

high voltage ezlated. 

• The clifferences were entirely academic. 

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Not until ~7 July was the Lockheed teun able to present its 

initial report, .but the partial study was enough to indicate that a 

serious problem existed. Aetual measurement revealed that pressures in and around the payload boxes could pos.ibiy be 10 to 100 

time. htaher tbaA anticipated. T~egroa.ter molecular density thua 

suggested made it highly probable that high-voltaae arciDa would occur. 

.During tIa DaD several weeks, and Dr._ _ of Lockheed .valuated red.sip a1te~~tives. conaidered 

t •• ting difficultie., and weight penalti,es, aDd e.~ted the effeet 

of ·the unforeseen rework on laUJ;lCh schedules. There were, fundamentally. tJuee feasibi. zoe'paDeeS to the arciq problem: pre •• urization, to driVll molecular deD8itie. above the crlticallevel.; ventma. 

to helppr ••• ur •• sufficiently low; and illsu1a.ttcm by the use of a pottiDs coznpound. Goodyeal' .tl'on,ly reco1'nQ1ended that the tranamitter 

be pree.urued (as bad beem done in the llF-4C ver.iou) aDd maiDtahed 

that & pre •• ur. ve •• el could be desi,ned and te.ted on .the same time 

seal •• a a potting program, favored by Lockheed. Concerned by the 

eonflict of opiDioD8. Bradburn pressed the Lockheed mvestiaators for 

more details and learn.ed that Lockheed too would have recommended 

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program. He immediately ordered that preparatioJls be made to pressurise the transmitter and any other modules th8.t looked critical. . 

By tho end of August it had been decided to pot and pre •• urize 

the transmitter, to use only Pottin& compoUDd iD the recorder, and to 

provide for a bac:lt-up pres8u.risation system. that coulcl be re-evaluated 

for need by mid-September. All concerned co~eded that the tr~.-

mitter-m.odulator and the recorder would pre.eDt the moat complex 

inaulating problem.a. but that the hish-voltage pOwer supply being 

developed by Lear Sieper for Lockheed aDd tbe,RF-lF unit might 

allo be troublesome. Arcm, problema ill the contrOl unit and the 

reference computer seemed to be controllable. t.bzougbtbe application 

Zl 

of a void-ireeiD8ula&g conformal coatin,. But it appeared that 

redesip and rework would caua. a progrun slippa.e. 

~ a,8Bociated difficulty appeared clu.rina the late Bummer oi 

1963. Colonel John Martin,- head of the NItO Wasbi.ngtOD staff. 

adviaed General Greer that fiscal 1964 fund, might be insufficient 

to cover currODtly projected 9!!!!! coatll. He directed that the third 

B!:!!! fllsht be deleted from the launch schedule and con.laDed as 

a payload spare. Requestina program re-costin& by 10 August. 

Martin advised that although ~ was authorized to spend at previously approved rates through the first quarter of the Dew fiscal 

year, the program office should be prepared for a possible ten percent 

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cutback thereafter. Martin assured Creer that he waa proceeding 

"through OSD cbBllDehu to overcome the deficiency aad that should 

22 

tho •• :measure. fail he would be notlfied immediately. 

At.tbe end of Auguet it wa. clear that Goodyear was eight 

week. behind its original scbedule and that offieiallaunch dates 

should be slipped by two month.. Bradburn attributed ODe month 

of the slip to Goodyearls engineerm, and parts delivery problema 

aDd olle month to the high-voltage redesign requirem.enta. He estimated 

that the delay would ca,.e coate at Goodyear to So up 80ftl.,.at~ . * 

On the whole.Braciburn informed Creer on 30 Auguet. Goodyear 

appeared to be doms a good job and Lockheed, although somewhat 

23 

sloppy in systems engine e rina, ',wa. improvm,. 

By late Septenber, the launch sUppage had been officially 

confirmed and a DeW da~:1or first flight--5 Aueuat 1964--had been 

targeted. Negotiation. lor the deletion of the third Qu.Ul flight were 

- completed t:ha.t month: the third Agcma D vehicle aDd. the Thor were 

cancelled, aa we~e all Lockheed efforts on the third payload beyoM 

* It will be recalled that Braclburnls ac:hedule and co.1: esdm.ate. 

were 1 •• a optUnistic than thoa. proposed by the contractors and 

formally incorporated in contractor program pu... 

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the installatiOD of the radar compoDents in the payload~uppol'tiDg 

structure. The third ~ wa. DOW treated aa a spare payload that 

could be readied for launch within five to six. month. after the fir.t 

.9!!!!111ight. Bradburn recommended that any further action 011 

number three be deferred until the results of the first Qu1ll flight 

~4 ---

could be evalWltec1. 

Early October 1963 .aw a De" cle.ign. problem. Goodyear. 

attemptiDa to lDeet the .triDaent vibration requiremeDbof the prolram.. 

concluded that the rigid payload rack m01lDting. oripnally called 

for could cause payload performance degradatiOD and called on Lockheed to provide vibration-re8istant ahock mounts. The iDitial approach. 

a simple substitution of moun'tiJ18., proved inadequate. Payload 

racks in manufacture were stopped for redesign, a proce. I that 

promised to take a month or more. A new interior dist:ribution 

plan for the component equipment was ca11~d for. plus modification 

of the • ecouclary barrel structure to provide the required structU:ral 

stiffne... Lockheed's program manager anticipated the rack. could 

be delivered by early December. AlthouSh that schedule 'WO'Uld be 

tight, overall program scheduling should not be affected. 

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Goodyear and the .p~cia1 Lockheed high-voltage .team w~re 

not eDjoying slmUa.r suc~ess. Telts of the potting design. ~ September 

and October. had been dbappoi.nting. Poor surface preparatioll and 

improper c::leanb:la and prhner appUeation techniques were blamed. 

But .ven after potting compound adhesion problems were dilposed 

ot, altitude testina disclosed tho appearance ot corona arotID.d potted 

compoueDb and cables. Lockheed recommended the ul. of llghtweight closed-cell polyurethane loam. a. a countermeasure to eoro:na 

generation in. the Rl'-IF box. ExteJl8ively us.d to inlulate aDd 8llpport . . 

hip .. frequency cOQlponents, several such foam s,..tems had been 

used by Lockheed on ~actor multtpliers aimUar to that Goodyear 

was building. The expedieut worked, 81imjnating corona. ud break .. 

doWD in the unit. 

Elsewhere, however, foam as a corona ,uppre.s8.Ilt was not 

luccessful owing to the lack of a prbner that would act .a an adhesive 

between the foam and the ,Uieone-insulated lead wire, aDd bigbvoltage components. External corona problema could alao be ellmiDated by potti.ng high-voltage component. mmetal cans, and eveDtually Goodyear decided to combine that expedient with the use of 

braid-shielded hi&b~voltale cables and a conductive epoxy to lDterCOUllcct th~ components. 

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For a time it appeared that the solution was working. Then ODe 

of the cylindrical can. containing the thyraton cOInponent burst 

at the .eam beeauee of pottinl' expansioD caused by the heat 01 

component operation. Goodyear adopted a lIquare can configuration 

taallow for bwgmg durf.ns th.n:na1 expansion and began to ezp82"iment 

with expandable..top ~ane. Such lUeuure'l. 'when supplemented by 

the addition 01 an aluminum. sling lD. the 8DOde area (to reduc:e the 

bulk of the pottiDi.). proved .ucce •• ful. No furtberproblema were 

experienced with thyratron pottiDg. althoUCh repeated faU~e. were 

to occur in latel' teatins :ir0lU othel' causes • 

.As a further precaution .,ainst high-volta •• breakdown aDd 

corona. Lockheed resorted to venting of the payload bozes. one-inch 

Z5 

diameter screened vent holes bemg cut on thl'ee aides on each boz. 

that the high-voltage problem was under controL Arcing and corona 

phenomena in 1he transmitter-modulator had been eUminated. The 

badcup pre88urisadiOn-:Yes,el could be cancelled. The RF-IF UDit, 

reference COlUPUteJ'. control unit and recorder had all been succe88-

fully potted. Teata on the anteD.D.a model had indicated it would DOt 

need pres8udsing. 

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Payload qualification te.tm. waa 8che4u1edto cOIDlUezace iD 

Surmyvale in .JanlLU'y and Goodyear wu to deliver the £hst fliIht 

payload for acceptance testing ill February. Pa.yload final assembly 

and checkout would continue through April; full-scale system te.ts 

would bepn ill April azul contlnue throqh .JUDe. A 5 Aqust laUDch 

Z6 

date sun .eemed to be achievable. 

The uncertainties of funcliAl that had appeared several mODtb. 

earlier continued to be irritating but cIid Dot yet represent aeriolUl 

problems. Lockheed'. Qu1ll work.till was beiDa fuDded under sup- - plemental asreoment to aDotb.er contract and Bradburn antici~ DO 

chaDse in that dtuation for the Dear term. .A8 expected. Goodyear'. 

need for acldi.tional money had to be acbowledsed in February. aDd 

fund. for sufficient only to .upport 1IiIork there through 

September--if expenditures were continued at the rate oriJina1ly 

that 

in all likelihood no more than _ additional could.:be made 

a..uab1ethrough the end 01 the year. which 1Oe&l)t that the_ 

would have. to .tretch.i:z month. of contract doUar. to cover DiDe 

months ofIwork. No major ~eelmica1 problems were irDmecliately 

apparent, although corona effects had again occurred in the high48 
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vOltage power supply and there were minor but troublesome cti.fficultlea with transmitter power aDd transmitter-modulator UDits iD 

Feb1'WU"y and March. For the moat part the r.sponse of prop ... 

manalera was to increu. the tempo of teatlD&. All of the radar UDita 

were scheduled to emerse from the ma:a.afactur~ procea. in March. 

and other priDcipal dem.eDu ot the paylolUl were OIl .c:hed.w... A 

still-millor conflict of launch-pad ac:hedulina cau.ed BradburD 

80me concern in March, but h. did not anticipate that it would become 

serious. (He planned to us. a NASA lantry 'to mate payload. and. 

booster elements of Quill. and. NASA had iDformallyiDc11cateCl apo.aibl. 

need for theequipmeot at about the tUne 9!!!! was due to 10 mto 

Z7 

orbit.) 

From. the time Of propam approval through lUrch 1964. 

only five months short of the acheduied fil-at rusht date, Quill had - been mana,ed almost entirely by BradbUl'J1, for the.Ail' Force, and 

the three principal contractor project leader.: _ (Lockheed). 

_ (Goodyear), and Altb.oulh 

he had reported frequently to Oreer, and periodically to M.cUUlan, 

Draelburn had. for practical purposes exercised com.plete and Dearexclusive control of the proaram. In March, Oreer decided, a8 he 

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told Bradburn. to call in 80me non-participating experts for a detaUed 

overview of the work and of the operational readiness of Quill. 

- In advising bb contractor associates of the prospect, Major Br~dbuna 

emphasised that the review was "not an iDquieitionli :and did not indicate 

dissatisfaction with any aspect of the effort thus far. But he observed 

~8 

that they could ~ct a "thorough aCl'ubbiDg. II 

The review had some undercurrents of interest that escapod 

the notice .of. thole who =erely read the eventual review report. It 

had begUD. as Bradburn recalled. with Greer I a usual report to 

McMillan, "Brad'. doing fine, II followed bY9''wait a minute. How 

do! know he's doing fine. Hela the one who's tallln, me." The 

"Tiger Teamlt to review Quill was Greerls rejoinder to Ids self, 

remi.nder. 

That the review would be thorough was paranteed by the 

composition of the review te~ .'!I-e~9IyO~_IM1::B1Lii1fH,DJIOllt ocme 

of Oeneral Greerls most. capable aezdor maDaler8. it was composed 

largely of Aerospace Corporation specialists in reconnaia sance 

radar. UnhlrppUy for their state of temper, they had become "Ipecialistatt mostly through involvement in the "P-ZZIt proJect-- the rtnitetr 

program. conducted in part to provide a screen of·cover lor Qbill. 

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P-22 participants had 8enerally believed, until beiDg sudc1eDly briefed 

On QuW. that 'What they were doms was an extremelytmportaDt - prelude to what might eventually become a radar-on-orbit system. 

At the time of the briefing they learned that the radar-OIl-orbit .,..tem 

was not an abstraction but was in being--actually only about five 

months ahort of scheduled launch. They were, iD Bradburn's recollection, "somewhat upset to learn there was a ~ radar expe:rimeat goq OA. tl Tbey deve10pecl wbat Braclbunl described .s nan 

29 

inteDae intereltt

' in the quality of Quill. 

- The sp ecially appointed Aerospace team headed by _ 

_ (which included several Air Foree people) bad i.D:structi0D.8 

to look at payload and vehicle system desi&ns: at qualiftcation test 

hlBtory Ol1lLew components. at power gl'OUlld equipment dest,n, 

availability and placement; at prefli&ht checkout philosophy and the 

adequacy of test planning; at operational effect. of recovery system 

chaD,e.; atcompeteAce.of trac1dn, statioa.. aIld STC personnel to 

support the musiom; aDd at traeld.n& station equipm.ent reac!lll •• s. 

Briefed first by Bradburn, the team studied project doeumentatiOll 

generated by the contractors before begtmdng· meeting. with Lockheed, 

Goodyear and pel.BODlll:U in early Apr.i1 1964. 

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The briefiDss concluded on 7 May and the report was forwarded 

to Greer .hortly after. 

Overall. the Aerospace group waa optimistic that ~ 

would accomplbh ita main objeetive: obtain a. high-resolution radar 

terrain map from aD orbldDg satellite within the designated sh9rt 

span of time. Neverthe1 .... they were 1~8 •• ure the eXperiment 

would contribute .lg'llificantly to secondary objectives encouraging 

an operational future for an orbiting radar satellite. Secondary' 

objectives had been stated as (1) evaluate the resolution potentlal. 

and limitations of satellite..oorne, ground-mapping radar; (Z) evaluate 

the capability to retrieve the mapping information in real time by 

readout over a wide-band data link; (3) evaluate the feu1bUltyof 

usinc sateUiteooborne radar for terrain recODlla1 •• ancei (.) obtain 

sufficient engineedng information to determiDe the cau.e of a failure 

to achieve the primary mission, or portiona thereof; and(S) itnprove 

future system design. AcbowledciILJ that useful' informatioD would 

probably be obtained to .upport evaluation of the "resolution poteutial 

and limitations'l of orbital radars, the teaDl anticipated that the fli,hts 

would not produce finding. of greater .isz:aifieanee. The tellor' of the 

report was to recolrunend for the second and third flight' a restructuring 
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of miuion objectives and emphasi.. Inherent ill th~.e cdticis •• 

was dista.te for the de.ip philo.ophy that had ga1cled 0aUl hom it. - ouet: uae •• many oU-tbe-aheU compoDel1t. aIId. u little modUleatioD 

a. ab.olutely required. Perhaps no le •• could be expected of a ,roup 

that until a few weelt. earlier had. considered itself to be leadtD& the 

way to the fir.~ orbitinc radar ,ystem. 

The.grou.p azauecl that ''the uae ofa wUle .. band 1iDk tor 

the retrieval of syndl.etic array radar data cannot be fully evalQ8.ted 

from. the .9!!!Y experimen.t. Nelative re.ults will not be cGDCluiaive 

siDee the link was not enpneered for this application. Positive 

results will not be conclusive siDce the qu.a11ty of the Quill data ia - n.ot repr.satattv. of a high-quaUty radazo."· And elaewhere: "Siftce 

much bettel' lDapping pel'formanc. than the ~ radar wUl provlcJe 

ia technically pollibl.. thit program will not fully evaluate the 

potential of orbital radar 101' higb-quality terrain mappiDg." The 

. group cOllCluded rather tepidly, that at ita leaat the experiment 

30 

would determine the cause of Ucatastrophic faUures. tt 

• Italics added. 

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The fir.t two recommendation. of the report CODeerned work by 

.66 .. 'o;J ....... II;I"" to define the lources of flna1 ima,e degradation. The 

reviewers urgec1 'that data be col1't1Dua11y updated throughout the program. 

with equal cODSideraticm. for data retrieval from the capsule and via the 

wide-band data 11_. aDd to poat .. 1llght anal.,..ia of the ftDal map prochid. 

Bradburn &ll'e84 that the I'esearchers .hould devi •• both 

analysis and evaluation plaD. to satisfy the l'ecommendation.. But he 

did not accept UIlcriticaUy a recommenclation focuss.d on the .ecOlDdary 

objecti.Tes of the mia.ion. The Aerospace team felt that consideration 

should be given to flying Quill in a lower orbit (which would nomiDally 

improve the stpal-to-noise ratio) and in a .JDChrODOUs orbit (wbJ.cb 

would permit QWll to overfly. the .a.m.e target on succe •• iVe daya). WhUe - the pl&llDed orbit aeomed to .atisfy the primary objective of the uperimeat, the team felt it ''marginal for the purpoae. of the aecoDClary 

objectives. " 

Poilltins out that a lower orbit would decrea.e ~e swath width 

and the payload operatlDg times and thereby decreale the probability 

of .eeing the resolution tarlab. Bradburn'. people argued 1bat 

"marginal enhancement" wa. I10t a sufficient Justification for . 

. chaDpg vehicle altitude. U the fl'l'.t &pt were lucceaaM, lower 

flight altituc:le would be considered for follow-on fllsht •• SynchrODOU. 

orbits had been·con8idered early in the program.. but the necessary 

orbit adjust capability had bee;q, discarded becau.e it ran cOUDter to 

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Quill's 'tmiDimum modifications" policy. Bradburn felt that gaiDa 

from overflying selected targets on succeseive days were not worth 

the extra effort.-and cost.-of incorporating orbit adjust capabiUty 

in. the A,ena. 

The cOIDlIlitt .. t• report took Dote of •• veral problem ar_ 

already well boWil to BradburD ancl the cODtractor8 u .• result of 

qualificatioD aDd acceptance testiDl. They 1Dclude4. slnOna other •• 

nth,umplnatt in the tranamitter-moctalator, contiDuecl cracldDg 01 the 

potUag compoUDd after repeated temperature cycling. aDd cath9Cle 

ray tube spot sensitivity Ito vibration effecta. The reviewer. abo . . ", 

express.d concern tha.t aDteDDa testlD, had Dot beeIL sufficiently 

irltensive, urging c0111prehen81ve teat. to verify the characterUtic8 

of an anteDDa they characterised aa . aD advance in the atate-ol-theart..(beC:-auaa,of ita aise and iU required precialC!Jl). On the whole, 

however. the acceptance aDd qualUlcatlOD teetmg Fosram rece1yed 

approbatloD. The review team noted that eyatem teaters .rappeareel 

to be capable of giring the subsyatemsa thoroUlh checkout; tbachedule of retesting after lnajor enviromnental teata waa very 10od • ., 

But· program. reviewers also recommeDdedtbat-.,repare a 

system error bqet to inlu1'e that tolerance margina did DOt become 

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excessive, with a resulting degradation in payload performance. 

In the end, the review tearn cClD(:luded that Uno individual 

factor wa.. lIDcovered which can be expected to prevent accomplisllm.ent of the primary objective of the Quill prolram. It There Were the . - usual injW2Ctiona urain& continued dili,ent system ClngiDeering. analyBle, 

and testing. The only significant remark in that eategory proposed 

"cloler control of overall performance criteria 

eliminate the possibUity of either over-epecifying or under-specifyiDc 

subay.tem requirements. II The committee also felt that the three 

principal contractors insufficiently appreciated the problems of interfact"" such .ubsya.tems as attitude control, data lhalt. aDd the anteDD&. 

But on the whole the review bad to be considered approbatory of program 

31 

cODduct. 

le.thy commentl, . the report w.. nbmitted to General Greer, after 

which the program office aDd the maiD contractors spent much of 

May and June in responlliing by both comment and action. 

lD the meantime. BradburD wal more cODcerned with troublesome faUures of the transmitter-modulator boze. in temperaturealtitude simulation tests. During late March and early April, the 

first such com.plete test had been interrupted by powe~ supply fatlure--

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blamed on a faulty capacitor--and tranemitter·modwator breakdown 

in altitude test. (charged to poor circuit design). After circuit 

redesign, a ae~ond .altutude .. temperature teat of the complete payloa~ 

began on 6 May. Resulb were rever.ed. The transnUtter passed 

altitude testing but duriDs the aea-leYel run the klystron fall.d. 

After l'eviewiDa test status, Bradburn concluded late in Way that 

29 August 1964 was the earlleat possible launch date and that the next 

series of onvironm..ental teaU was likely to uncover more difficulties. 

He reconunended that 29 Augu.t become the new launch da.~ target, 

32 

but that the program office be prepared to accept further deWys. 

In .June the potting problem. drew new attention. Lockheed 

had reported to Bradburn in late May that Goodyear had no written 

procedures or quality control ~Q%t';.tin. procedurelhT" Bradbura's '1'espoue 

wal to notify Goodyear that he wanted ataD.darde written, and also 

to instruct the radar contractor to buUd eigbt of eacb potted item, 

to test all eicht,dissect three, and if all three were good to pa.s the 

remaining :flye. AlthoUJh the rem.a.iDiDg difficultt:el .eem.ed relati'f'ely 

small. the .eh.dule of ma.nutacturiDg and acceptance testing had 

been irreparably affected; in July it was nece. aa1'Y to specify an 

aclditional two-week delay in the Icheduled first launch. Goodyear'. 

hardware delivery problems were the principal cause of the alippage. 

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One of the important residual uncertalDtiol of c:om.ponent: 

iDtorface cmnpatibility wal resolved by late July. In a series of 

tests at its Santa Cruz facUity. Lockheed ran eomparboa te.te of 

a parabolic antenna and the flight antemaa.. both aimed at a corner 

reflector four q¢ a half miles distant. Teat criteria was to compare 

pube tranlhDitt.d aDd received tlu:ough-the horn or parabola. with the 

pulse through array in order to mOallure distortion of radar pulse 

caused by the :flight anteaDa. Third objective wal to meaaure • .,..temrange resolution. Resulta demonstrated that the ~ght antem:aa W1UI 

cOlXapatible with the basic radar generator, that the antenna did not 

caue pube diltortiOD,azad that ranee resolu.d.cm (with. a corner 

reflector aa a target) was better than 2,5 feet. 

For all that reassurmg DeWS. the program incurred another 

schedule slip. Pulse-iorming network recieligD problem8 and klystron 

and plate ch~ke potting failurel in the transmitter-modulator forced 

34 

a re.checlulblg of lUst launch to a4 October. Then 011 8 September. 

one of the klystrons in the transtnltter-modulator Ailed during an 

altitude-temperafure 1bn.u1ation checkout experiment. After replace-

:ment of the damaged element., testing wae resumed. Further com .. 

pODOnt failures in the transmitter-modulator element. early ill 

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October forced Bradburn·(now a LieuteDlDt Colonel) to postpone 

the scheduled firat launch once again, tbla time to mid-November. 

In order to verify confidence in the reliabUity of d:ae first flight .. 

qualified payload. he In_bted on expo_in, the complete UDlt to five 

hour. of .imulated operation. at the te.lnperatures and pre •• ures 

that would be _countered dvbag the mleslon. That representecl 

about ten times as m.uch operation as the equipment would be required 

to produce duriDg its hlitlal flight. but Bradburn was cODvi:nced that 

would s.ti.factoril y demoDlltratetb.e reliabUity of the bouble_ome 

35 

components. 

Goodyear was W1&ble to promise deUvery of a test-qlJaUSed 

trannnitter-modulator unit before the la.t week of November. UDexpected problem. developed in final test. of the fihn.drive umt of 

an orbital. recordiag camera, aDd ccmfldeDCe in the des1p validity of 

the potted, .hielded boxes earlier adopted to prevent blgh-volta,. 

arcblg wu rapidly dimini8hing. (In November, Goodyear bep.D the 

develOpment of a backup deaip which discud.d the ablelding.) 

Althouah nOlle of the problems was balic, aU contributed. to delay 

of delivery and testing schedules. A December firat launch •• emed 

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achievable if technical readiness was the oDly criterion. but the 

c:1auic problem of seasonal holidays introduced new scheclu1i.Dg complications. By mid-November, Bradburn was jugliDg holiday .ch.clGl ••• 

capability) availabUlty in an effort to decide When a laUDCh should 

b. attempted •. If Goodyear succesdullycompleted altitude-temperatuJ'e testl of the critical transmitter-modulator 1III1t em 28 November 

.s promiaed, launc,h could be attempted by 19 Decetnber--tbe last 

possible date lor starting the mi .. ion without encounterinl holiday 

workload pl'oblems that might not succumb to a m.ere pro.ram manaler's 

detennf.nation. After coDfi.rndng hi8 Judgement ill a meetina with Greer, 

Bradburn decided to push for a mid-December laUDch--wbich meaat 

pre •• iDl Goodyear to complete the last of the enviromneata1 test. 

36 

OD. 01' al close al possible to the critlcal28 November deadlbae. 

ADd he had &Dother problem: altbouah the •• sential Yalidity of prolram 

funding remal.:D.ed iDtact. the recurrent dela,.. ill iDltiallaUDCh meant 

that both Goodyear &IlCl Lockheed were spending money that had 

originally been allocated to post-first-launch development and testtng 

activities. (Lockheed calculated that about been 

expended In unprogrammed work in the period between the or~li.D.aUy 

37 

scheduled Ma.:rch 1964- la.WlCb. date aDd the eDd of November 1964.) 

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Late November and euly December were thorouahly cluttered 

to the critical. Nany monthe earlier, Bradburn had arranaed matter •. 

so that no .udden in.flux of Goodyear people at Swmyvale. VaDdeDberg. 

and the trac:.kiD.a atatiODI would a1~rUll"llritting people to the imsuiDence 

of an orbitiag radar experiment, BAd in the event lDatte:u proceeded 

more or le" ... plalmed. * But there wa.. late pre •• ure to put Quill 

- proc:luct. in the Taleat-Xeyh0le cate.ory. which Dleant .-)dn. them 

available to a areat m.aaypeopl.. who bad been exduded tram. any 

. knowled.Je of the NRO'. plan to fly a radar satellite, and Bradburn 

had. to divert biB attentioa from. teclmical to eecurity mAtters. at least 

38 

briefly. to prevent a breakclown of. the oriaiDa.l Icheme. 

* The arruaaemeDt wa. that Goodyear people viaitiw S'UDJayvale 

would. wear Lockheed lcieDtification badge. &Dd. d •• cribe themsely •• 

as self-employed consultants to Lockheed if quellioDed about their 

status. At Va:adeDber, and the trac:kizag ltaticm. they were pven 

eredeDtia18 identifyba 1hem as cODlulta:nta to the Air Force, DO 

corporate aff:W.atlon being IpeclS.ed.. Beca,uae frleDde and famlU .. 

were not permitted 10 bow that airborne radar .peclaUets were 

involved with lpace pro,rams. variOUI cover piau bad to be deviaed 

that would cODeea1 the whereabouta of eDlJlDeerl who while actually 

vlllitIDg ODe of the lpace stations was nomin.n y somewhere else. 

It would be iDterestinl to learn how successful Goodyeao people. 

were in convincm, spouae. that their frequent out-oi-touch trips 

were aa innocent a. represented to be. 

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The tran8mitter-m.odulator test. finally were completed 

succe8sfully aD 2 December, resolviDg the chief remaizdD, uacel'-

tainty of 9!!!!. quali1lcation. Delayed delivery of Philco-produced 

data-liDk equipment to ~e Vuadenbel', tracldn, statlcm. briefly threatened 

postponement of launch pad syatem checkout. but by S December that 

too was settled happily. (Actually, several items of critical equipment 

were delayed in delivery, but Goodyear" transmitter-modulator 

was the paq item through tbe laat three montha of pre-lawu:h 

teatina.) The last really troublesOIDe iuue J,'evolved. aJ,'oaacl the 

preposterous questioD of the high-temperature behavior of that COlDm.OD 

household item called Myatlc tape--aad for a time it threatened to 

'" 

.clelay the 1allDCh one. a,ain. 

''The Mystic Tape Problem" had it. oriJin in the temperature 

sensitivities of the main ~atteries ia the Alena. In the wake of 

several battery fallures aDd Dear failure. in Agena flights .arHer 

in 1964, Lockheed engineers had narrowed the allowable launch 

wiDdow for Alena-payload mi •• ioDS (thua chllDginl the S1m exposure 

characteristics of stalldard mis.tou) and had redesigned the ezternal 

paint pattern of the spacecraft. Black paint was applied to tho.e 

portions of the vehicle where heat absorbence wal desired, aM 

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reflective material el.ewhere. The reflective material eelected 

was adhesive-backed alurnillum tape--UpUc tape. It c:overed 104 

of the 25S square feet of the outer surface of the AaeDA I. forward 

equipment compartment. Two week. before the now-acheduled 

lol December lauDch of Quill, • VBDdenbera tec:hniciaD placed ODe 

of the)4yatlc-t&pecl removable panel a of the Alena under a heat 

lamp_ B blt.tered. Altboup the maD1lfacturer guaranteed that 

the tape would aclhere to ede~a1 areas .ere temperatuzee woulcl 

I. 

Dot exeeeel 750 desr .. s (FareDheit). materiall flpeciali.u a.t Va.Dd.eDbel', quickly determined that molecular outsaMing ill a low-pressure 

ea'riroa.m.ent would c:ause bliltera to form On the UDderaide of a tape 

at temperatures of oaly 300cle,rees. When blisters became larle 

enough to extend to the edge of a piece of tape, the trappec:t gu 

escapeel and the tape collapsed., reattacb1Dg itself to the surface--

1lD1e •• the bliater reached the forwarclec:lge of the tape while there 

was a forceful airilow alon, that edae. In that case, 1t could cOlICelvably 

fold back and tear away in the airatream. I£ enough tape broke away, 

battery overheatiug "Gould re.ult and mi.sioD. .ucc .... would be 

imperUed. It waa a clas.ic bor ••• hoe nail phenonlenen. Happily, 

the vu.1uerabUity came to light before launch rather than iA a poet 

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mortem. Latmch base personnel were instructed to tuck the tape 

over the lea.dlD.1 eclgea of all removable pallet. aDd to cover with. 

stainle.s steel strap all thole edges where there were no rem~va.ble 

panet... Extenaive testl c:onArmed that the reflectance properties 

of the thermal control aurla.ces would remaill within required toler39 

aDcel if that pr.ecaution were taken. 

Simulated la'Ullch and flight teat. and other compatilrility telt. 

at Vandenbera during the first half of December uncovered oDlya 

f ... minor glitehel--a defective bearing in the film. supply ,pool 

in the recorder. transienta..iDon8 'Of-J1he power i.Upp"lyU31ta.am-.. 

them.- -but theae were readily fixea and DO algaUicaDt malfmac:tloDB 

were detected in the into,rated satellite ly-8tem. The completioll of 

the countdown. laUDCh-mlnu8-throe-day. checks. and the horizODtal 

simulated flight operatioll completely revalidated flight vehicles and 

~~y1oad. The only exception to a complete functional check was radar 

U8Jl8mia.ioD through the Bight antezma, which had been validated 

ill earlier to-tint. Every other payload function was exercised in 

the final night configuration. 

On 19 Decem.ber the ,antry was removed aDd because ram 

was falling a protective polythyleue cover was placed over the 

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forward (payload) sections of the Agena.. Higb winds during that night 

caused the cover to repeatedly slap against the newly-taped surfaces. 

When the gantry was repositioned the day before scheduled launch 

and the "protective coveriDg" removed, launch perlOnDel discovered 

that lIlOet of the normally shiny alum.iDum. tape surface had bee~ de~ 

gr&ded to a dull and.ln some. areas ahnostblack.fil;l.bh;..", .. Acldl.t1onally. 

finely divided aluminum had been transferred to adjacent painted 

surfaces. Happily, Lockheed's optical surface c«m1parator was 

still in the gantry, so new measurements could be taken at onee. 

Le •• happUy. the meaBnrements indicated that the solar absorbtivity 

of Mystik tape surface 8 on the cyliDdrical sections of the vehicle 

had been increased by a8 mu.eh as 300 percent! Tape on the eonic:al 

section had not been unacceptably degraded. But deady large sec:tions 

of tape would have to be replaced and painted surfaces cleaned. 

Beginning with the surfaces l'n08t critical to battery temperature., 

tecbDi.eian. replaced approximately 1S percent of the tape earlier 

installed on removable panela aDd cleaned the painted 8m-face. with 

distilled water and a mild abrasive soap. Ten hours before scheduled 

launcb, the rework was completed and the gantry was removed. All 

but about 15 square feet of the degraded tape had been replaced, bnt 

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a8 a further 1naurUlce measure the Dormal two-to-four-hour launch 

window was reduced to 48 minutes at lJllc1day. tbu.a le •• eDiD.g the 

time during wWeb the reflective sections were exposed to direct 

40 

solar radiation. 

On 2.1 December 1964 at ll~OCJ Pacific time, QuW. vehicle Z3SS - wu laUllched f~om VincleDberg Air Fo1'ce Baa. aDd injected lDto au. 

orbit of 70.1 degre •• incliDatioD. with an 89." minute period. All 

8u.bsyatezns fum.ctioned properly. TracldnJ station pe1'.oDDel verified 

the operability of the data-link equipment c:luriD. • .9!!!:!la .eV'eD.th 

radar mappiDl was attempted. All were sl1cceslful. DiaIDO.tiC 

telemetry return. indicated correct tuncaoning of aU payload-compODauts. Both .tatiOll8 recorded vide-o iDformatioD. Operator-. 

di.plays .howed the expected patterns. Ci1'OlIDd rocordiDg equipment 

operatect .cientUtli showed the radar 

u&D.mbdoll to be radiating ~trOD' sipw •. _ reported 

to BradburD that a quick look at readout data frOlll Pasa Eipt OD a 

projector showed &ucceaatul grOUJ1d painting_ A reeonnaia a axe. 

aircraft scheduled to photograph the "painted" Iround .wath ...... 

unable to fly becaus. of poor weather in New England. but otherwise 

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all went perfectly. Recovery wa. planned for 22 or 23 December, tlIe 

final decidon hinging on the higher priority of a CorOlla CJp .ule al.o 

scheduled for recovery on olle of thoae days. 

Report. from the Quill comm,a:nd po.t at Swmyvale OIl 22 . - Deaember indicated contiDud mi •• ion 8Ucces.. _ reported 

that data read C?ut from Pass Eight which at arat .eemed to' be seyerely 

degraded wore susceptible of bnprcwement if the correlator were 

relocus sed by haDd.. He aleo told Bradburn that ~ec.iyer. 

had captured a sllCc ••• fu1 wide-band recordill& of b'antlmitted radar 

pub •• coD.tlnDiAa proper pbu • .and amplitude chuacteriatlce and 

that a mobUe narrow-band recorder poaitioned at 

had verified the correct fanctioniDl of the antmma. 

The payload continued to operate nomiDBlly through orbit Z5. 

uain. 316 feet 01 fUm. Reporting to Greer em .ubaystem acthitie., 

Bradburu iDdicated that radar !requeucy power output and high voltage 

were well within predicted.limlu. Mialor eDI~.,charnber ·pre ... ure fluctuatioi1.? durmg booet thus far. repre.euted the oDl¥..ml •• ien anomaly. 

fieation roll excursioll' when the berison: .b.or. were·turned OD. 

(The horizon aenaor_. provic:JiD:'g .lOl1a-tez.m pitch "and 1'011 ata'Dnica.tion 

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for the vehicle, were Dot uaed duriQg radar operation. Their re.p0D8e 

to cold clouds could co:ncetvably cause instabiliti ... whicb could lead 

to aerious dearadation of uimutb resolution.) 

A lecr:m.d attempt to photograph terrain .s it was beiDl viewed 

by radar ended in another weather-induced f1ilht abort oIt1l,r."'"neci 

aircraft. but sat.nite operations contbmed to be llawleaa. When 

Corona flight controllers decided to cOIa:tiDue their chllDle in orbit 

watil 23 December. Braelburn ordered Quill recovery to be conducted 

~ - one dayearller. 

As with the balance of the mbsiOll, capsule recovery was 

routine. After retrieval and despooliD&. the fUm was dispatched 

to the speci.al processing laboratory at Westover, arrivin, duru., 

the m0rniDa ol2<t Decem.ber 19'-'. 

" .9!!!!!IS radar system wa. operated lor a total 0114 pal.es 

over the continental United Stat.s between Z2 DeceaJ.ber and 26 December. 

Thereafter electrical power and ItabUizatioll gas exhaU8tiOll prevented 

further experiDleDtation and the Ag81la was deliberately de8tabRtsed 

for destructive reentry. It reentered o.e1' the .south AtlaDtic OIl the 

43 

moraing of 11 1anuary. 

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As Ceneral Greer later wrote, uThe flight of the satellite 

when it carne in December 1964 was almost anti-climatic. So clo.e 

was the system performance to that determined ill te.ts. so nominal 

was the operation, 110 prof.,sioDal waa the haDdl.ina of the ,ate1lite 

by the Satellite Control Facility, (that] a participant. had to remind 

him.elf that this was DOt just another rehearsal ••• • The result 

44 

was a 100 percent lucce.aful mission in quality and du.ration. It 

What remained was to evaluate the Quill take aDd to deterznlD.e the - inunediate future of satellite-borne ra.dar .ystems. 

On S January 1965, Bradburn and the chief contractor project 

meager. prelented a P-40 ttQgick LookU briefiD.g lD W-hinatoD. • 

The primary objective. of the mi •• lon had been fully .ad.a.d. 

Initial eValuation of tina1. naap quality, using recovered data. film. 

revealed .slm.llth resolution at 10 to 15 feet and ,round ra.,.e at. 

60 feet, far exeeediD, the project'. reaolution requirernerit 01 100 

feet or better. There had been no vehicle or payload system malfunctions of any siaDifieance. 

Bradburn proposed postpoJdng the la\1Dch of the second Quill 

vehlcle until the several contractors could complete an intensive 

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eupneerina evaluation. a process that would take almost siz weeks. 

Deci.iou on whether or how to operate 'the second and third flipt 

.. system. could be made OD the Itrenctb of the lnitial ~y.ia althouJh 

a c:omprelumslve enameeri.ua analyab would last for thr.e manths. 

WcMi11aza promptly approved both proposals. 

nul repO,l'ts OIl the first Quill mi .. loa involved a qua:atity . - of material anilable lor au.l)'11is fA .ddltloa to the radar maps: 

engineering 8peciflcatiOlls aDd. pre.fli&bt test reeult8 on equipment, 

computer best-fit orbit aDd. attitude history, weather data, &roUDd 

meaaurelJumt of .. !math beam. patterD. ODe-way pube recordiDas, 

results :&om the conaer reB.ctor layout at _poat-fllpt 

.erial photographs of target area, and i'adaJo maps of t.r.et .1' .... 

airborne ra.dar equipmeDt. One of the moat 

critical post-flight evala&tion reports was ~t prepared by_ 

indicating the exteDt to which Quill's primary and •• condary '0al. 

had. been met. R.sponsible for prepariDc "the hip.st pos.iblen final 

radar IlULp. from both recovery and re.dout data, _m.a#U.Z'ed 

range and azumitb. r •• o1utiOlUJ aDd e.timatecl~ system dyaamie r ..... 

That analysis revealed. the relad.ouhip o1tne.sured. ro.1I1t. to the 

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radar design and performanee parameters of Quill, propagation . - conditions, vehicle behavior and data liDk performance. 

The audiellCe in the Pentagon on 5 IaDUary was able to vie .. 

sample. of the Quill output maps in the form of photOiraphic prints - and negative transparencies. Three different sets of maps were displayed. Flrlt· were map. made from the roc'overed data fUm. theD. 

'maps reconstituted from trac:ldnJ station photoaraphs 01 the signals 

!rOIn a ~dc;"Rnd data liDk, and fiDally maps made by playback of 

mapetic tapes 01 the data lizlk slgws. The recovered fiJ.m provided 

the higheat: quality J:J18.ps, anel the mapetic tape playback data the 

poore.t--becau.e both data link and tape recorder eipallCHI.e. were 

involved. But aU ... er. "good. fI * Bradburn was voluble in his prais. 

ot the rapidity and excellence of proce .. 1na of recorded aDd recovered 

materials. 

Althouah there was littl. explicit cllacusioD of when, or if, 

another B!!!!! mle.ion 'WOlld be flown, neither ar.er nor Bradburn 

law uy need for one. Result. had 10 thorougbly exceeded reasonable 

• Sample photography. ext1,"actecl from the fiDal report prepared by 

_ are reproduced in an appelldlx volum. of this hbtory. 

All radar imagery waa impr ••• ive, plCtve. of PhoeDlx, Chlcaao. 

and Richmond (Virginia) heiDI particularly intereatinl fDr the detail 

they contained. Barles, lhips. and railroad trdna were readU y 

ideDtifiahle through' cloud cover, fog. and raiutorma. So were 

fine geographical details: hUb, dam_, streaml, hlchwaya. i.laDdl ••• 

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expectations that there .eemed 210 jUJIti£ication for collectillg additional 

45 

data. 

Neverthelea •• until a decl.ion was anno';IDced the program office 

continued to study modifications that milbt improve the quality .01 

returns frOIQ a later .9!!!! m.ission. ~ contractors urged that a 

second experimental flight carryiDJ rnocU1l.ed equipment be attempted 

in September 1965. BradburD thought the probable gain too .Ught to 

justify the co.t ... and 80 advised Greer. On 11 February, Creer told 

McMillan that the feasibility of radarrecosmaia.ance bad been "amply 

demonstrated" and that aclditionallaunehe. should not be scheduled 

until there ...... agreement on udedred operational use. It He endorsed 

Bradburn·. recommendation that Quill be closed out with the final 

reports due in April and that QuUl hardware be put in storage, the 

- vehicle equipment at Lockheed and all black radar hardware and 

ground equipment at Goodyear. ADy decilion to reactivate equipmeDt. 

for a .ecou.cllaunclL would require a minimum ot Dine-moDtha 1ea4 

time, but Greer felt this break in the continuity of the project was 

ju.tified in view of the "thorough evaluation" that would be liVeD to 

the first Quill'. returns in the rneantiQle. 

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Greer carefully refrained from advocaUll' the tertniDatioll of 

satellite radar _tudie_. but be arlued that Oaill data made it fea_ible 

tg proceed uiD8 aircraft and grOUDCi teltS. laboratoryexperiJDenta, 

and other DOD-specialized satellites. "We have provided a ,ood basia 

for furtber exploration of an operational syatem. Thu work Mould proceed when the cOllc1\Uiona of your evaluatiOll committee are available," 

.6 

he told McMillan. who agreed. 

Although 9!!!! hardware was d.stined for _tor age. either permaneDtly or temporarUy. aDd pi ... for ackUtlonallaunches of the orlgiDal 

gnUl-coafiluzation satellitea had aU but be~D cancelled. there still remai:Ded. the origiDal is aue do whether racia.r satellite bomb-damage .. _essment or crisb maDalement systeDUJ should be developed aDd deployed. 

And still to be fonnally a ••••• ed by intelligence specialists waa what the 

Quill experiment had contributed to a better underata.ncliDa of both require" -

menta aDd technology. Brigadier General James T. Stewart, who succeeded 

Brigadier General Johu L. Martin.a chief of the NRO staff. haa suggested in October 1964 that a formal. evaluation team be immecUately oreamzed 

to deterJDiD.e m.eaDS of "maxlmirdu& the bowledge labaed from the 

* . ~ feasibUity deMonstration." At that point Bradbu1"ll and Greer 

were n'»:ucb m.ore cODCerned with resolving equipment qualification 

~roblems than with pla.nning for the evaluation of results that might 

• Italic:s added. 

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or might not be returned by the nrst--or the second or third--Quill - lUi. sian. Stewart wanted to schedule--and orgcize--a. full-scale 

operational utility analysis. Oreer, in the circumstances, u.rged 

that IDwe should avoid fanfare over this effort, It that QuUl as a .,.tem 

- had absolutely no DOWD operational utility or adaptability and should 

cODtinue to be ~eated as an a.D projeet, and. that the" N1\O should 

wait It. • • until after we have recovered aDd reconstituted someth1Ag 

worth evaluatiDg from all batelligence Yi.ewpob.t ••• If before"setting 

afoot any ela.borate evaluation effort. It was all consistent with his 

position on Gambit and reflected the prapnatlam of experience 

with the wholly UIlSucce .. ful Samos E-5 and Samoa E-6 .y.tenu. 

oDJ.y recently cancelled. Greer convinced Stewart, and the matter 

47 

dropped from sight for several mouths. 

Owbs in part to the ~I'ea.ing acrimony of CIA-MaO relationships ill the early month. of 1965, • evalua 1ion of Quill fincliJlcs - l'emai,ned 80mewhat fragmented until April, beiDa mostly confined to 

participating contractors and to iDforrna1l'eview by various intelligeDce 

community personnel specified by the USIB '. Committee on Overhead 

RacoDDwsance.Bradburn. briefinl senior CIA reconnaissance 

* See Volume V, pales 180 et 8eq. 

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people early iD March. explaiIlecl the Umlte'd eireulatioD of Quill's . - radar bDagery (the NatioDBl Photolraphic lDterpretadoD Center 

bad not yet beeD authorised to view the product) in tel'%l1s of COJlstrainta imposed from USIB. He was advised by Dr. A. D. Wheelon. 

the ClAr

• Deputy Director for Sc:i~DCe and Toelmology. that n ••• 

earUer CIA re.senationa were mainly procedural, aDd [that) there 

had been DO iDteut to delay the evaluatioDttt• --foUowiDs w:Llch aD 

Ad Hoc .9!!!!..lDtelliaence Evaluatlcm Team actually .... formed. 

It met first in AprU, iDcludlDg represeDtatiYelil of the Defe._ 1DtelNllO, aDCl NPIC (which provided the chairman). '" 

of a propo.al for ". • • modifyiDg the existiDa..9!!!! system ilL storage 

to provide ra.nge resolution comparable to aZUnutb resolution ••• 

for a..9!!!!.! mis.ion over t1:ae USSR uaiDg the capeule recovery techD1que 

oDly." bat Uke the several simiJar proposal8 of the early 19608, it 

eventually fiazled into notbinpe8S. Ooodyear was cOD.'ViDced that 

Quill equlpmellt could be modifloc! to produce a s1.a.llt-raale r_ol"doa of 

-

about ZS feet bat nobody ill authority seemed to be much latereeW. "9 

The Strategic Ail' COIImlaDd was the chief prospective customer. 

and all the earlier reasone for avoid.iDs the use of satellite rad.a.r 

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over the Soviet UDion weighed against SAC urgings. A special USlB 

committee that looked into requirements iD. 1967 emphasised again 

that quite apart trom,rather demanding technology, It ••• po •• ibly 

an eVeD Illore critical disadvantage of side-looki11g radar is that it 

actively tranamit8 electronic pubes which will be detec:ted and whicb 

might well bec,ome the basis for diplomatic protests of such serious 

nature that US policy makers would deny permi •• fOll to employ the 

system ira peacetime. n Oiven that tha acqulritiOl'l Clf bade radar 

data needed for the lcmg-tenn support of post-strike, bomb-damage 

assessment Operations "would require n::a.any nn.8iona and lIluch 

activity. • • II there seemed little doubt that uprotest. would probably 50 . 

not be long in coming. 11 

The pr08pec:tive costs of creating a radar 8 .. te1Ute S1etwork 

for po.lible U8e in crisis management operatioJ).8 served .. a a deterrellt 

to the awroval of a fortnal operatiOllal requirement for such ... y.tam. 

It was impouible to evade the realization that a large complex of 

interlinked ground stations supporting a veritable fleet of satellites 

was necessary to perform the sort of dally coverage, near-l'ea1~tlme 

readout that crisis management required. Further, if cruis 

reco~i8sm:tCe were to be an assiimnent of a radar satellite contingent, 

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a comprehensive data base on "relevant installationa" would have to 

be prepared and maintained Iron a current baais, If in. the worda of a 

COMOR (Conunittee OD Overhead Reconnaissance) report assembled 

only month. after Quill results first became available. That. of 

course, implied a requirement for peacetime overl1ipt of dez:ded 

area. by active radar satellites. and the fuDdamental polley objec51 

tiona to that sort of operation-changed little during the 1960 •• 

The basic attribute of side-looking radar due made it attZ'acU"e 

was i1. synthetic aperture mode--but that also r~preseDted its priDclpal ahortcomi.Dg. Side-looldn, radar had a I1m1ted ,round swath 

which cow.d not be ef1'ecti .... ely broadened without cOlDpromilin, wei,bt, 

power, and antezma-size mctors. The system had lhuited fore aDd 

aft viewing c.apability and. an inevitable bliiad spot directly below 

the carrier vehicle. the consequence of baving totlloolttt at an oblique 

angle in order to obtain range resolution. In it. 1967 study (published 

in 1968). USIa e.timated that continuous covera,e from. an altitude 

01200 nautical miles would require Itin exee .. of 3%.000 vehicles. • • 

on- orbit slmulta.D.eoualy"--which also suggested that rather a luge 

number ol readout in.tallation. might be needed to exploit the potential of 32t 000 satellites. Rai.ing operating altitudes reduced the 

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numbers needed to about 6500 but imposed requireme.nta for from 

10 to 1000 times the radiated power required for reCODDaia88.DCe 

from 200 miles, power betna dependent on the phyaical fpertur'e 

of the a.Dte1lD& sy,steDI. Becawae synthetic aperture radar relied 

wholly on antezma D;lotlon for ita aaimuth effecti"eae •• , aide-looldDi 

radar could not be adapted to operate fro= synchrOllou..orbit vehicle •• 

~ had worked. and worked almo.t precisely a8 p'a'QDed. But 

that radar cow.d be eflectlvely operated from. orbit rernalned oldy 

ODe ... pect of a complu problem that iDvol"ed requirement.. aPPlicaIt waa particularly i.ntere.tingthat the feasibility demo.natratioli 

~y coat rougbly or' a 

had eatimated wben fir.t confronted with the project, but that an 

operatlow system would Burel,. have cO.fIt bIlliona. (The 

differ_ce would haye beeD expended had two more mia.lollS been 

flown. of course.) It .... alao interestins that the "Ph •• e Alphatl 

researeb aDd de"elopment project cOMucted in concert with B!!:!! 

telldee. by 1965. to look more and more like a sopbllticatecl 9!!!!. 

When taxed with the NRO'. apparent lack of inter eat in exploiting the 

capabilities ot orbltiDa radar. Dr. A. H. Flax. McMillan'. successor 

78 

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as Director of the National RecOIlnabaance Office, was wont fbst 

to cUe the nPhase Alphall work and ita follow-on as eridence of a 

continui.Dg NllO iDves=.ent in radar satellite reaearch aM developlUent, aDd then--if the iSlue were pre .. ed--to poiDt at QI.dll a • . - evidence that the fundamental feaaibUity work ha.d beeJl very Bucce.sfully conducted. and to sUII.at that requirell1eJlt.~ teebnololY. fuDda. 

and. politics were problema that Ihould be effectively addressed befoJ'e 

53 

new· experiments 'Were uadertaken. 

The Quill program had beeu de.tped to provide data tha.t wo1lld - permit evaluatioJl of the techDlcal ·leasibUity of employing what Ore.r 

called "this valuable Dew mUltary instrument for the furtbel'aJJCe 

of national policy." Although initial plans had a.awned that the relevant data could be obtained by 1965, they had abo assumed that three 

to five miaaiona would be needed to provide the iDformatioD. In thei 

event. the first mission was delayed by seven months. but DO acl4itioAal 

mbliona were needed and the derived data were "of even better quali.ty 

than bad been expected from the mOlt optimbtic estimates." The be.t 

estimate of the co.t of obtaiDiDS those data was 

the result wa. obtained for 

have proved advisable for any rea..OD, fully flight qualified hardware 

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wal available. (Some of the findinas were passed to NASA for Use in 

lunar exploration programs and the hardware was a.8 reaclUy CODYertible to NASA applicatious &8 was the much heralded lunar survey 

cam.era system derived from Samos E-l experience.) 

In Bradburn'. vie ... , the ap ectac,uar .ucce •• of the effort 

wa.s in considerable part a result of the apecia1 circumstances under 

which it had been conducted--tiJht .ecurity bems a principal element 

of those circumstances. Pr ••• ures for wormation, aavice, aDd 

participation by the m.any agencies interested in radar satellites 

would have incredibly complicated what had been a very difficult 

development program. In an epllogic meeting with several of the 

project participants, Bradburn alao attributed progr&D1 lucceaB to 

"iDdividual efforts by individual people, each. • • a specialist in 

hi. area. 1/ And be akirted the treacberous path that ateJ:Qmed hom 

the all-too ... common m.isappreheD.8ion that a succ.es.ful developm.ent 

team and. a successful developm.ent appro~ch could be channeled, 

fundamentally unc.banged, into 80me new and different problem •. 

Proposals for program continuance and 101" newexperimentl with 

modified ~ equipment 81Ul were current when Br~D closed 

out the la.t of the Quill tasks, the final report.. Neither he nor Cireer .. • . - ~ 

DOl" Greel;". successors--ever gave them serious consideration. 

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N. B. NOtwitb8tancU.ng the general reluctance of senior American 

officiah to approve the development of operational radar satellites 

aDd the continuing prel'lli.e that active radar .urveillance miaht be 

politically unacceptable to the Soviet. Union, that nation in 1968 began 

it. own radar satelUte development program and by 1971 had opera ... 

tiona! vehicles. in orbit. They were geDerally .imUar to ~ in 

configuration, employiDg syuthetic-aperture radar and re1yiq on readout 

for data retrieval.. (They entered lemi-equatorial rather tbau polal" 

orbits, however.) But the SOviet late1lites were--at leaat ostensibly--

deeisned and used for ocean 811n'elliance, for BpottlDa aDd 1:1'acJd.J)g 

ahips aDd fleet movements. The radar seemed to be low resolution in 

character. Thus they did not violate th. principle. hODOred by American 

policy tnaker8; operation over Don-Soviet-bloc land mas.es wu D:0t 

atteJnpted. Nonetheless, the apparent capability of the Soviet ocean 

survetllaDce satellites to perform. 80me level of bomb damage 

aeaelsment, or even for low-grade cri8ia management .. ssi,mnents, 

could not be dUguiled. It was real enough. 

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1. 

z. 

3. 

4. 

s. 

6. 

NOTES ON SOURCES • 

Ltr, R.B. Shatz, Chm, WS-117-M Special Studi.s Com., 

to Col W.O. Kina. Jr. Db WS-U7 prgm. 10 Oct 60. 8ubj: 

RecommeDdationa of the WSCC; interview, Maj 1. Pieta, 

SAJ"SP staff, by R. Perry, 15 Mar 63. See also Vol I, 

Cb I. thi. m ••• 

Study, "Poat Strike RecollDaissance .. Technical and EquipGtent ConstcieratioA' and Requirements, If prep by Capt 1\ 

OormaD, USN, 5 Oct 6Z, in DirlSP files (italics in orig1Dal); 

Piets interview, 15 Mar 63. . 

Ltr, Col J. W. Ruebel, Spec A88t;tO Db/SP to_ CIA, 1.Z Jun 6Z, no .abJ. TWX, SAI'SS-J>IR.-M~ 

to Dir/SP. 3 Oct 61.. 

Memo, LtCol LeSal MIt (SP), to MCien It.E. 

Greer, Dir/SP, 1 Nov 6Z. subj: LeSa! S'll1ft.ciency. Atcbmt 

2. to King llpt. 

Rpt, Qt11LL. Col W.G. Xing. et a1 to MOeD. R. E. Greer, 

DlrISP, 30 Oct 62., subj: InitiarRepol't; Bradburn interview 

by ll. Perry. 10 May 74. 

TWX. SAFSS-I-M-2.114, SAFSS to SAFSP (MCien R. E. Greer, 

Dir/SP), 10 Nov 62 •• ubj~ Satellite Radal' Experimenui Twx. 

SAFSP-F-16-11-417. SAFSP to SAFSS. 16 Nov 62. 

7. MFR., prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn. 27 NOY 6Z, 8ubJ: MeetiDS 

at LMSC on 14 Nov 62.. Bradburn's notebook., 1" Nov ~. 

an informal project recol'd book maintained by Maj (LtCol) 

D.D.B;radburn, entry fo~ 14 Nov U. Hereafter cited a. "B~a.dbu:rnl. notebook ... witb. date of entry. that source ...... 

a primary reierellce for the 0ai11 history. It is more nearly 

a project diary than a tlprojectreeord. II eODs18tiDi of 101l1-

hand entries made at the time of, or immedia.telyafter the 

event. it records. 

* With Minor exceptions. mostly noted. the primary sources for 

docament. cited in these notes we~e mea .tored within SAFSP. at the 

reque.t of then-Lieutenant Colonel D.D. Bradburn. in 1965. 

82 

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8. Bradburn's notebook, 1.5 Nov 62; TWX. SAFSP-F-16-11-417, 

SAFSP to SAFSS, 16 Nov 6~. 

9. MFR, prep by Maj D. D. Bradburn, 27 Nov 6Z, Bubj: MeetiDa 

at GAC on 20 Nov 6Z. 

10. Bradburn'. notebook, IS Nov 6Z. 

11. Vol 1. 

12. Bra~·. notebooks, 18-20 Feb 64. 17 Apr 64. 

13. D. D. Bradburn. 10 Dec 62. eubj: MeetlDs 

6-7 Dec 6Z. 

14. MFR., prep by Maj D.O. Bradburn, 7 J'an 63, subj: Trip 

to GAe, 18-19 Dec 6Z; interviews MaJ J' .. Pieu, SP-3, by 

R. Perry, 15 M8.1' 63: LtCol D. D. BradburD, SAPSP, by 

Perry, Z. J'aJl 6'; BGen D. D. Bradburn by Perry, 10 May 74 .. 

IS. Bradburn'. notebook, 7 .Tan 63; Bradbunl interview, 7,J'8.1l 74-

10 14&y 14. 

16. MFll. ~rep by Maj D. D. Brad'burll. 29 to. ~~-Z.4 Jan 63 (nel0dation. with • 

17. Rpt, "Vebid. 2355 System. Report, .. Vol I - StJ1'Qm ary. prep 

by LYSe, 31 Mar 65; briefinl recorda, pres byMaj D.D. 

Bradburn to Dr. B. McMi11sn, D/NRO, 29 Mar 63, ZZ May 63; 

interview, WOen R.E. Greer by R. Perry, l' Nov 63. 

18. MFR, prep by Naj D. D. Bra.dburll, 3 A~ 63. aubj: P-4-0 

Briefine to Dr. McMillan. 29 Mar 63. Brief1Da'recorda. 

pre. by M.aj D. D. Bradburn to Dr. B. McMUlall, D/NRO. 

29 Mar 63, Z2 May 63. 

19. MFR., prep by Maj D.D. Bradburn. 5 Apr 63, Bub;; Tdp to 

OAe, 4 Apr 63; MFR, prep by Bradburn, 20 Way 63, subj: 

Briefing of BuWeps Repre8eDtad.v. at GAe. 

83 
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2.0. 

21. 

2.2.. 

2.3. 

24. 

2.5. 

26. 

2.7. 

Z8. 

30. 

31. 

33. 

Bracl'burn t. DOte.book, 17 -18 J un 63. 

MFll, prep by Maj D.D. Bradbu.zou. 6 Sep 63, aubJ: HiVoltaae Problem; Bradburll's 1l0tebook. 10 JUIl 63. 17 Jul 

63i Rpt, ·'Vehiele 2.355 System Report. n Vol D - EDibleering. 

prep by LMSC. 31 Mar 65. 

TWX. SAFSS-6-U-0166. SAFSS (Col J. Martin) to SAFSP 

(l4Oel1 R. E. Greer). 22 Jul 63. DO IlUbj. 

Bra~ts Datebook, 30 A,. 63. 

-I' 30-9-95", SAFSP (Colll. \V. Yunc1t) to SAnS 

30 'Sept 63, subJ:. OUlLL(P-40). 

Rpt. uVeJ:dc1. 2.355 System. Report, It Vol n - EDgiDoeria,. 

prep by LNSC. 31 Mar 65. 

Brief:i.Da roeor4, pres by MaJ D. D. Brac!.lrurn, Dr. 

to Dr. B. MeMtnau. D/NR.O.· U Jan 64, subj: Statu .lU!!'DOr~­

P-4-0. 

Bradburn-. Datebook, 5 Feb 64. 

Draelburn's Dotebook, 7 Apr 64. 

Draelburn interview, 7 Jan 64. 

ltpt. ttpre-LauDCh Review." Col Paul Heran. SP .. 7 to WGeJl 

R. E. (ireer. IS May 64_ 

Ibid. 

-

BriefiDa recol"d. pres by Maj D. D. Bradbu:&-n to MOen R.E. 

Orear, 2.8 May 6... subJ: P-40 Sta.s Report. 

MsS. _ LtCol D.D. Bradburn 

17 JW.~ailyAC TWX Status Report; mss. 

UCol D. D. Bradburn to 30 Jui 64. 

Mod Accident CD 2.4 Jul 
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34. Brief1DC record, pre. by LtCol D. D. Bradburn to MOen 

R.E. Greer. 11 Aug 64, subJ: P ... 40. 

35. Briefing record, pres by LtCol D.D. Bradburll to Dr. B. 

Me Millan, D/NRO, 7 Oct 64. 

36. BrtefiDg record, pres by LtCol D.D. Bradburn to MOen 

R. E. Oreer, 13 Nov 64. 8ubj: Progress :Report P-40. 

37. Bradburn'a notebook, 30 Oct 64:_ 

38. MFR, prep by Maj D.D. Bradburn, 19 Dec 63, subj: Security 

Procedures for GAC Perscmnel at SUDDyvale, V MIS. VT5, 

and NBS; Bradburn's notebook, ~Z Oct 64. 

39. Rpt. t'Veblcle Z355 System Report, II Vol 11 - EDgiDeermg. 

prep by LMSC. 31 Nar 65. 

40. Ibid. 

41 • 

42. 

•

• e. 

ZZ Dec 64; 

all msss boom Sat Ope Cen to DNRO and 

).(sgs. 

STe to 

Z3 Dec M~ 

A'l'SP. 

Z3 Dec 6"; both 

43. Mas. Z" Dec 6<&. STC to DNRO and SAFSP; 

TWX, Aerospace Test Wing to SAFSP 

(LtCol D. D. Bradburn), lZ Jan 65. 

44. Recommendaticm for Decoration. MOen R.E. Oreer (Dir, 

SAFSP) to USAF MU Pel'S Op, z6 May 65, .ubj~ Legion of 

Merit for LtColD.D. Bradburn. 

45. MFR, prep by LtCol D. D. Bradburn, 12. Jan 65, subj: QUickLook Briefings on P-40 :a. •• ultsi Bradburn lntervle~. 7 Jan 14. 

8S 
.. 

x;.' 

1'~ 

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46. MaenR.E.Oreer, Dir/SP. to Dr. B. 

nbj: Diepo.itio~ of QaW. 

BGeD. .1. T. Stewart. Dir JNRO 

re.r. Dlr/SP. 16 Feb 65. DO subj. 

Hardware; Wa •• 

Staff, to MOen R.. 

Ys S. :ac;en J. T. Stewart,· 

R..E. /SP, 1 Oct 64, mi •• 

Oreer to Baen Stewart. 5 Oct 64; Ws, 

Stewart to MOen Oreer. 12. Oct 64. 

'" -~ aff, to WGeD 

WGen 

Baen 

48. )~bl, BOen J. T. Stewart, D1l' /NRO Staff to MOen 

R. E. /SP. 24 Dec 64, M.FR. prep by LtCol D.D. 

Bradburn. 15 Mar 65, aubj: QUILL Presentations to SAC, 

SA7SL, CIA. DDR.E, ant! NASA. 

M·I. 

21 Apr 11181, 

Bradburn, 11 May 65. aubj: 'Po1I!I'Pftlo'PI'I'I 

Modified KP-n Equipment; mal, 

.to M.Oen Greer. 9 Jun 65. 

!t.lC. are.~. 

to LtCOl D. D. 

~tfDu~te. of 

BGen Stewart 

50. Rpt. USIB/CODllrex Rpt USIES-D-46 ••• S (COMIREX-D-ll. 74), 

''Requirementl for Image Forming Satellite Recormai .. ance 

Responsive to W'al'Ding/lDcti.cationa Neecls, It 5 Jan 68. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

s.. 

Memo, ExSec. COMOR, to COMOR, ~"Jan 66. 

subj: Draft of Subject Paper Looking into Sua,.adODs Made 

at SpecW COMOR Meethlg of 2.. lanuary 1966 • 

Rpt, USIB-D-46. 4. S, 5 Jan 68. 

Bradburu interview, 7 ·Jan 74: aecozmnendatlO'll for DecozoaUoa. 

MOen R. E. Greer to USAF M.ll Pel's Op. 26 May 65. 

Bradburn'. DOtebook., 10 Mar, 28 Way, 8 JUD 65. 

86