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I.

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CURRENT U.S. INFORMATION NEEDS DERIVABLE FROM NRP SYSTEMS

Political 4.

The information and execution of U.S. foreign policy •

requires information which will support the negotiation of cease--

fires, treaties, and other agreements and compliance with their

provisions; information related to the production and distribution

of illegal drugs destined for the U.S.; and information on aimed

conflict not involving U.S. forces.

Military 

The formulation and execution of U.S. military

policy requires information which will provide warning of attack

involving the U.S.; the size, disposition, and capabilities of

opposingmilitary strategic and tactical forces and their support

facilities; the military production capacity and output of opposing

countries; and the production of maps and strategic target locations

Science and Technology 

Formulation of U.S. military, education, economic,

and energy policy requires information on the technical/scientific

characteristics of existing and prospective opposing military

systems, and on the status of foreign nuclear and other applied

science. Among other purposes, such information is needed for

policy formulation to prevent technological surprise which could

adversely impact any facet of modern life.

Economic 

The formulation and execution of U.S. economic

policy requires the monitoring of agricultural, manufacturing,

trade, exploration, and business trends worldwide.

TAB A

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NATIONAL VS. TACTICAL

I. Introduction 

Purpose 

Define the basic difference and similarities between

National Intelligence and the Military Tactical Intelligence.

Further identify the key issues arising from these differences

and similarities and their impact on current NRP planning.

Approach 

Develop a strawman definition of the terms "National"

and "Tactical", define the basic issues involved beginning with

the high level policy and terminating with issues relative to

existing or planned NRP systems.

II. Development of Definitions 

A, Current U.S. Information Needs Derivable From NRP 

Systems:

The current U.S. information needs fall characteristically within four broad categories: political, military,

science/technology, and economic. These are described within

Tab A.

B. Formulation of Definition

From the description of the U.S. information needs,

one could define a National and a Tactical role for the NRP as:

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ETNational Role 

The support of U.S. national security policy

(foreign policy + military policy) in such areas as indications 

andvtaxing4 Larninsin.sza monitoring international agreements

and compliance with their provisions; development of economic

assessments; monitor changing military posture, force strength,

and introduction of new weapons systems.

Tactical Role 

The support of U.S. military operations . requiring

timely indications and warning of attack; the size, disposition,

and capabilities of opposing strategic and tactical forces.and

their support facilities; and the production of maps for military

purposes.

III. Discussion of Policy Issues 

A. National Policy-Level Issues 

Within the context of the defined role of National and

Tactical as provided above, there exists no difforrem-^ 

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basic application. Within this context, the following key

issues must be addressed:

1. Vulnerability and Survivability 

Satellite systems may be more or less survivable

than the terrestrial alternatives, depending on scenario, but

are vulnerable to a technically sophisticated enemy. The NRP,

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as the National Means of verification,

upon the level of conflict to be supported, it may be possible to

sufficiently increase NRP survivability within programmatic

realities. The space system threat environment should be

established for the level of conflict under consideration. A

reassessment of National Policy would then be required, specifically a revision of NSDM 242, which states:

"To insure that nuclear forces are responsive

to the National Command Authorities. . .planning

should provide for. . .adequate support for decisionmaking and flexible use of nuclear forces in attempts

to control escalation in local conflicts. Employment

planning for this function may assume that...

associated sensors supporting the National Command

Authorities are not subject to direct attack."

The key to the process will be a clear statement from the services of realistic vulnerability and survivability requirements.

2. Military Tactical Usage,

With the advent of near-real-time intelligence

satellite capabilities, U.S. military forces will begin

receiving valuable intelligence to support military operations.

The availability of such information under wartime

conditions could also provide extremely valuable tactical intelligence. However, in this instance, U.S. forces may not be

guaranteed a flow of information because of the vulnerability

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of current and planned intelligence satellite systems. This •

is dependent upon the military scenario considered, for example,

it would be highly doubtful that actions would be taken against

satellites supporting a non-nuclear tactical conflict such as

South East Asia or a limited NATO conflict. A rational plan

is required to assert the dependence or non-dependence of U.S.

military forces upon national intelligence satellites for war 

fighting capabilities.

The consequences of a decision for the combined

use of NRP satellite data in conjunction with tactical commanders

organic capabilities would pose certain issues. The political

consequence of such a direction and its impact upon our current

National means of verification would need to be reassessed.

Current fiscal directions at both the national executive and

congressional level would tend to force trade-offs between

organic tactical intelligence assets and the new policy of

dependency upon national satellite intelligence resources.

. The military war plans would need to be developed using the

most effective balance of organic and National resources.

Ultimately, a key issue would tend to revolve around the question

of relative ability and capability of the National system to

provide such a flow of information to U.S. military forces as

compared to organic forces. The importance of this issue and

its resolution to the entire future planning of our national

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program can not be minimized. It is also a key element of the •

current national/tactical intelligence interface dialogue.

3. Crisis Management/Indications and Warning.

The area of primary overlap between the National

role and the Tactical role occurs within crisis management/

indication and warning. The National Command authority, the

CINCs and the military field commander are all vitally interested

in these data. The action taken by each level may be different

but the basic information needs are common. It is this area

of commonality which also raises basic issues, such as; who

will control the satellite tasking and under what crisis condition.

The DIA is presently developing a central DOD tasking capability

whereas the present systems are being designed for tasking

through the National mechanism. The compatibility of these

two approaches may well be an area of future Congressional •

criticism.

4. Transition to Space Transportation System (Space 

Shuttle)

As tactical dependence and international political

and military strategy become more dependent on the availability

of real-time intelligence, the operational capabilities of the

Space Shuttle become a key factor. The potential disruption of

worldwide satellite coverage, due to technical problems or concern

for crew safety during launch operations or hostilities, could be-

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of extreme importance to the Nation's posture during crisis.

The fundamental decision must be made as to whether the U.S.

•

can accept the-potential loss of satellite intelligence on a

calculated risk basis and whether a backup launch capability is

to be maintained beyond the period of transition to the Space

Shuttle.

B. NRP Issues 

The NRP has in the past directed little effort toward.

direct military support. However, it has expended considerable

effort in crisis monitoring, which isi of equal interest nationally and tactically. Recently, the NIP has been greatly influenced by the tactical needs and this has resulted in the

rising expectations of the services. This can be seen from the

following:

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. NRP Support of Tactical 1ilitart Exercises

The NRP systems have supported military exercises

in order

to develop expertise in Army, Navy, and Air Force tactical units

for the development of tactical doctrine of employment of NRP

systems in support of tactical forces. There are presently

operational concept inadequacies due to the lack of developed

tactical doctrine. The reaction to these exercises by the

military field commanders is very favorable. The potential

application to their immediate problems is evident to them. The

result is a growing pressure for the expanded use of the National

systems in support of tactical operations.

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6. Non-NRP Intelligence Collectors 

Within the so called "white" Air Force there

exists other intelligence collectors such as the DSP, early

warning system; and DMSP, the military meterological satellite.

The DSP is truely national in its mission and is in fact

11111111111111111111111 The DMSP satellite is both National •

and Tactical in character. It provides the basic weather data

for programming our NRP imaging system and at the same time

transmits directly to the tactical field commanders. These

non-NRP systems along with other collectors such as the SR-71

and U-2 support both a National and a Tactical role and must

be considered in any overview of the total National vs Tactical

issue.

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IV. Summary . •

To the degree that satellite systems can support tactical

intelligence, it should be funded and developed within the NRP,

For this reason, the NRP is actively moving toward a posture of

providing support to the tactical community. , In meeting the•needs

..as defined by the National role, the NRP system-can meet many of

the tactical-commanders t-needs with the exception of timeliness and

frequency. Within the context of the defined National role,

timeliness is not as critical a parameter in comparison to data

quality, as driven by a science and technology mission to identify

new weapon systems._

The basic issue yet to be squarely addressed by the Community

is -- What degree should the NRP modify its current and projected

efforts in support of tactical requirements, and what would be

the resultant organizational and funding implications?

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