Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 -'~~\l. 

HANDLE V[A rJ TOP SEeR ET - 111I11111111111I1II1111~II!ll\lb~~WIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

. '~ATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 7 1 

N WASHINGTON, D.C. 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

THE NRO STAFF JUL 1968 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BERG 

SUBJECT: A Cursory Review of the Evolution of the SOC 

Satellite operations have their real beginnings attached 

to the Sputnik I launch of 4 Oct 1957. During the months 

following the launch, while the national policy was being 

developed with regard to space activities, numerous proposals 

were pursued unsuccessfully for staking out a roles-andmissions assignment by various governmental departments and 

agencies. All DoD space related activities ($157 million) 

were transferred to ARPA upon its establishment in Feb 1958. 

With the writing of the NASA Act in mid-1958 the U. S. announced 

its policy of space activities solely for peaceful purposes. .' F 

This position was recognizable early in 1958 and resulted in 

President Eisenhower accepting a proposal to allow the develop-: 

ment and operation of a covert photographic program for overflight of denied areas by satellite vehicles. 

There was in existence an Operation Center (OpCen) located 

at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. for the detail 

planning and operation of the U-2 program within the DDP/CIA. 

The covert satellite program was begun under the management of 

DDP/CIA and in cooperation with ARPA (to the AF) in the DoD. 

OpCen was jointly manned by CIA and DoD (predominantly Air Force) 

personnel. The procedures, detail mission planning, specific 

actual operations, security, and communications for the satellite 

program were patterned as near as possible after the successful 

covert aircraft program. The overt classified DoD SAMOS program 

was used as a cover for the covert satellite program. A project 

officer within the Air Staff (DCS/R&D) was established to support 

DDP/CIA and ARPA as well as coordinate activities in Washington 

and with BMD. 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VlA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SECRET EXCLUDED PROM AUroMATlC REGRADING 

DOD D(R[CT!V [. '52.00 10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO _____ _ 

COPY ___ O' ___ COPIES 

PAGE 1 OF 12 PAGES 
HAND LE VIA 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 HANDLE VIA 

lOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

Late in 1959 the AF was assigned the DoD responsibilities 

for its space activities. ARPA returned the SAMOS, MIDAS, and 

DISCOVERER Projects to the AF with instructions to submit new 

development plans for approval by ARPA before any program 

modifications could be made. Numerous new plans were submitted 

with no success, resulting in a memo of 10 June 1959 from 

President Eisenhower to SecDef requesting a total satellite 

reconnaissance program review for the National Security Council. 

Dr. Charyk, SAFUS, gave the presentation on 25 Aug 1959-. There I' 

resulted a memo to SecDef establishing a missile and space 

organization within the Air Force, that eventually became the 

NRO, on 1 September 1960. Two other events need noting because 

of the influence on the national policy and internal program 

management: (1) the U-2 was shot down 1 May which terminated 

all covert overhead denied area reconnaissance; until (2) the 

first successful covert satellite operation in Aug 1960. The 

fully established covert aircraft/satellite operations center 

was manned and operated by DDP/CIA with key positions held by 

professional CIA civilian employees and the majority of the 

operations personnel were Air Force assignees to the CIA. OpCen 

moved from 1717 H St. to the new CIA building in McLean upon 

its opening. 

The 1 Sep 60 NSC memo also directed the AF establishment 

of a recoverable satellite payload for high resolution convergent 

stereo photography (the covert GAMBIT Project), overt E-6 project, 

and SIGINT projects. As the flight date for the E-6 and GAMBIT 

projects approached, the DNRO in discussions with the DDP/CIA, 

agreed on the goal of integrating all satellite operations into 

a single center. The DNRO proposed, and got approval from FlAB 

in 1962, that " .•. all satellite projects of the NRP should be 

handled in the same manner by a single operations unit of the 

NRO Staff." The CORONA procedures (similar to U-2 procedures) 

were to be used as a general guide line for the development of 

procedures for other NRO projects which would be operated by 

and from the SOC. The operational authority was clearly understood to lie within the SOC and was best described as an "in 

line" function to be as near as feasible identical to the covert 

aircraft procedures. The satellite branch of OpCen contained 

a CIA branch chief, one AF Ops officer, and approximately six 

Ops NCOs which were eventually transferred to the SOC in the 

Pentagon. While arrangements to transfer the Satellite Operations were being completed and the SOC facility was being 

BYEMAN TOP SEeRET CONTROL NO, _____ _ 

COPY---...--_OF COPIES 

PAGE 2 OF_.12._ PAGES CONTROL SYSTEM E.XCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

Don DIRECTIVE 5200 10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 HANDLE VIA 

lOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONtROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

readied, two officers and three AF NCOs from the NRO Staff 

participated in the CORONA mission planning and on-orbit 

activities at OpCen. 

The move to the Pentagon from OpCen was made in March 1963 

and CORONA mission 9052, Apr 63, was the first mission conducted 

in the SOC. All necessary CPXs and communications procedures 

to insure adequacy and reliability were accomplished. The NRP 

Commo Center was collocated with and assigned to the",Director '\;- i' II 

~, ,/of Operations, NRO Staff. The SIGINT satellite program is an 

I} outgrowth of two separate collection programs initiated by the 

Navy and responsive to Navy requirements and the AF SAMOS (subsystem F) responsive to AFNIN requirements. In Oct 61 they 

were made a part of the NRP and were essentially the POppy 

(TRANSIT) and what remained from the de-emphasis of subsystem F 

portions of SAMOS (698BK). The SIGINT operational procedures, 

requirements, etc., were very much less defined and controlled 

nationally than the photo operations. At the same time that 

the photo satellite projects were transferred to SOC, the NRP 

SIGINT projects and operational responsibilities were defined 

and transferred to the NRO Staff and SOC, respectively. DNRO 

defined NRO organization and function s in July 62 with SOC 

authorized seven officers, four NCOs, and three secretaries. 

The initial SOC operational methodology was centered around 

the "moment of truth." This was a briefing by a project officer 

(PO) to the DECISION MAKER (two people only: Colonel Heron or 

I I for each series of passes. This briefing consisted 

of using JN charts with overlays covering all swath widths over 

the area of interest, annotated in codes that depicted which 

targets were selected (by a computer program at STC for GAMBIT 

and by hand for CORONA), which targets were changed by the PO, 

previous attempts this mission only, weather situations, and 

the priority location and COMOR ID of each of initially some 

six hundred targets for GAMBIT and two general search areas 

for CORONA. In order to prepare for this briefing several POs 

and Ops Sgts spent two to four hours to review a history book 

and the predicted target select or camera operations, make 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VI A 

BYEMAN IOP SECRET - CONTROL NO, _____ _ 

CONTROL SYSTEM EXC LUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRAD I NG 

000 DIRECTIVE 520010 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

co PY_-::--_OF ___ COPIES 

PAGE __ ",,-3_0F 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

r-.1" ." .:' 

proposed changes, prepare the necessary Ops Manual message to 

direct changes which drove the STC software to command the , ~ 

Decision Maker's approved operation. The inftial GAMBIT missions 

were done without the aid of computers and these early operations 

were solely manual. The CORONA with a four-day life and GAMBIT 

with six days from the first four missions were manageable. The 

SIGINT program consisted of a series of special auxiliary payloads with very narrow band widths flown on the short-lived photo 

satellites, separate piggyback (P-ll) payloads with design life 

of approximately three months and 5-100 kc bandwidths, 698BK 

prime payload systems with design life of three to five days 

that provided fragmented coverage of 1600 mcs band width, and 

POppy using its crystal video receivers with life expectancy of 

40 days with approximately 600 mcs coverage. The SIGINT projects were not demanding at this stage. The rapid improvements 

in life, capability, complexity, and frequency of launch of both 

photo and SIGINT systems made it abundantly clear that the SOC 

procedures and capabilities would require updating and automation. 

The photo systems have increased to 15 days and on-orbit 

programmers and the SIGINT systems have lived up to two years 

and at least one system has 167,000 collection mode options for 

on-orbit selection. The SIGINT operations have become formal in 

response to a better defined set of National requirements. The 

collection coverage is now essentially a continuum from 150-

9500 mcs with selected bands to 14,500 mcs. During the period 

Jan 61 to July 68 a total of 84 SIGINT satellite missions have 

been launched; 14 General Search, 20 EOB, 48 Directed Coverage; 

49 have been successful, 14 partially successful, and 21 failures. 

The Director, NRO Staff by memo 9 March 64 defined in detail 

the Staff responsibilities. The salient features of that memo 

for this paper were: 

a. The basic philosophy of the Staff is service. It 

is imperative that all members of the Staff understand that the 

NRO Staff is a staff and not a line element of the NRO. 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HAND LE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

lOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD DIRECTiVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

COkTROL HO, _____ _ 

CDPY_-;--_OF---,~_COPIES 

PAGE 4 OF 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

lOP SECRET HANDLE ViA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

b. Responsibilities of the Deputy for Satellite Operations (SS-4): 

(1) Intelligence Collection Requirements . . . principal 

working interface 

(2) Satellite Operations 

(a) Conducts general pre-mission planning 

and coordination 

(b) Maintains mission following capability 

on 24-hour basis. 

(3) Satellite Missions 

(a) Pre-launch responsibilities 

1, Specifies desired target coverage 

2 Approves orbit 

3 Specifies desired on-orbit target 

program options 

4 Approves target program for each 

photo mission 

5 Approves readin/readout program for 

SIGINT satellite missions 

6 Specifies desired launch time. 

(b) Post Launch Responsibilities: 

1 Maintains mission following 

2 Makes all on-orbit selection of photo 

target options, based on target weather 

or intelligence factors 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SECRET EXC LUDE D FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD DI RECTIVE 5200 I 0 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO _____ _ 

COPY_....-_OF_-:-::-_COPIES 

p,,,,, __ 5_0 • 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HANDLE VIA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONtROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

3 Makes and directs all tasking plans 

for read in/readout operations of 

SIGINT systems 

4 For photo systems which have completed 

the developmental stage and have been 

declared operational, changes the 

mission duration, within the limits 

permitted. 

(c) Post Mission Responsibilities 

1 Monitors the progress of the take 

2 Analyzes degree of success 

(d) Other Responsibilities 

1 Conducts cumulative analyses of take 

and collates with requirements 

2 Supervises operation of NRP commo 

capability. 

It is clear that the NRO Staff was a service staff but that 

the SOc performed "in line" functions with regard to satellite 

on-orbit activities. The series of DOD-CIA agreements support 

this view even to the point of being explicitly included as a 

function of the Staff in the latest agreement. 

1963 ''&~,~ ! ~~lg!~; SUC:~~Sf~~'";~a"rY f~Y;~: sic un;;~ < :ts new 

management within the NRO Staff. By the start of 1964 the SOC· 

was firmly established both in personnel and in operational ! 

procedures. It soon became apparent that the physical space 1J.ri,~1) ... ,,).~.!i. 

was grossly inadequate. All projects were operating out of one ~~)~~I 

restricted open office area. Additional space was obtained by l"'~"'\"»} 

moving some DoD elements from adjacent areas resulting in doubling 

the available space and the space was ready for occupancy in 

Oct 1964. No subsequent additions have been made. 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SEGRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADI NG 

DOD DIRECTIVE 520010 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO _____ _ 

COPY_-,.-_OF ___ COP,tS 

PAGE ~--6 OF 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONtROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

The satellite reconnaissance projects enjoyed a phenomenal 

growth in capability, complexity, and life. The frequency of 

launch, success rate, abundant take, outstanding growth in 

quality, and the simultaneous influence and control of a mushrooming bureaucratic process forced an in-depth review of the 

collection requirements, collection systems, and exploitation 

capabilities throughout the entire governmental structure. The 

effect on SOC was and continues to be extensive. In 1965, a 

contract with GE was initiated to study the SOC functions, 

measure the time and motion activities, conduct over-all analysis of SOC responsibilities and operations, culminating in a 

recommendation for what, how, and when automated capability 

should be introduced into the SOC for the period 1966-70. 

The first significant modification to the first SOC operational methodology described above began in April 1966 and was 

initially applied to GAMBIT. The plotting on IN charts was 

replaced by using the small ASC Series Charts (five for the 

entire world) to depict satellite ground traces and depended 

on primary aim points as the basic bookkeeping unit. Using a 

computer printout, in conjunction with the ASC chart, showing 

all the targets, by COMOR ID, that were accessible and the 

recommended camera Ops (aim points) within the swath, the PO 

selected the operational sequence and directed the STC to execute. For lack of any other automation, two Univac 1005s with 

four tapes each (unique for SOC) were obtained from Commo. 

This beginning in automation was structured for GAMBIT and was 

later applied to the CORONA by breaking the world into area 

cells with a value function for each cell depending on last 

coverage, priority, weather, etc. The software programs have 

continued to evolve into major activities within each project. 

In 1966 by Director, NRO Staff direction, SOC was to assure 

at least one function in the on-orbit operational process 

would always be the sole responsibility of the SOC for all 

projects. This would assure the SOC the capability to exercise 

its assigned functions and responsibilities as well as maintain 

a clear authority line and would diminish the success of any 

proposal to move the SOC out of the Pentagon. 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

toP SECRET - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

000 DIRECTIVE 520010 DOES NOT APPlV 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL "0, _____ _ 

COPY ___ OF_::-::-_COP, ES 

PAGE 7 OF 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA 

- BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

By memo of 28 Apr 66 the Director, NRO Staff outlined the 

responsibilities and functions of the Dep for Ops in six areas: 

collection requirements, satellite operations (general), launch 

schedules, missions, overflight approvals, other. Some of the 

features of this memo that changed the previous memo were: 

a. SS-4 solely responsible for all schedules. 

b. Conducts analyses of collection requirements and 

compares with capability to provide basis for NRO program 

planning. 

c. Coordinates all auxiliary payload assignments. 

d. Removed NRO Commo supervision. 

April 1966 saw the final GE report and recommendations on proposed improvements in the SOC's capability and it was presented 

to Director, NRO Staff. One result was a reorientation of the 

GE contract to provide technical assistance to the SOC in preparing a specific plan to implement some of the recommendations 

in order to cope with the collection capability postulated by 

1970. There resulted a plan known as SOC 70 which received 

DNRO approval but was not implemented. As an interim, the SOC 

was reorganized to include a data branch which provided daily 

direction to the GE contract and concentrated on utilizing the 

available Univac 1005s for automation of many of the SOC operational procedures as well as providing the initial bookkeeping 

and historical data base for SOC operations. 

By memo of 14 Nov 1966 the Dir, NRO Staff updated the responsibilities of the NRO Staff. The changes and emphasis 

provided by this memo re SOC are: 

a. With the exception of SOC in translating USIB 

requirements into operational direction and the scheduling of 

film production, the Staff exercises no line or management 

responsibilities. 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VIA 

fOP SECRET CONTROL NO, _____ _ 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTn.1 EXCLUDED FROM AU TOMATIC REGRADING 

000 DIRECTiVE 5200.! 0 DOES NOT APPl'i 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

COPV_.",........._O F--::--::--_COPI ES 

PAGE._-=-8~OF 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

lOP SECRET HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

b. The NRO Staff has no contracting authority nor does 

it exercise technical direction over contractors. 

c. The normal tour of duty for personnel assigned to 

the NRO Staff is three years. 

d. The SOC is responsible for translating USIB requirements into launch schedules, orbit parameters, and on-orbit 

target programs for both image-forming and SIGINT satellites. 

During the course of each mission, the SOC selects photographic 

and other image-forming sensor target options on the basis of 

weather and/or intelligence factors and directs execution of 

such selections. 

e. The SOC is responsible for the tasking of all nonsynchronous SIGINT satellite systems (management arrangements 

for tasking synchronous SIGINT satellites mayor may not 

directly involve the SOC) on the basis of intelligence needs 

and system factors. 

It should be noted that with respect to (b) above, the SOC/GE 

support contract work statement was written by SOC, a separate 

NRP budget line item was established to fund this effort, SAFSP 

administered the contract, and SOC provided the sole technical 

direction to GE for some two years. It is now proposed that 

Aerospace Corp. replace GE and increase their contract with 

SAFSP but still be under sole direction of SOC for the future 

SOC support. 

Special attention need be drawn to two computer program 

developments in CORONA software during 1967-68. The development by OSP/CIA of an orbit select program to analyze orbits 

for SOC approval in accordance with intelligence criteria and 

status of satisfaction. Previously this was accomplished 

totally by manual techniques and was dependent on seat-of-thepants experience. Also, the OSP/CIA development of a CORONA 

targeting program (CTP) which became necessary with the on-orbit 

commanding capability being included in CORONA and the weighted 

area cell data base. The extensive analysis and operational 

planning by TRW, Itek, LMSC, P-E, and OSP/CIA for the HEXAGON 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDl.E VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL svsrEM 

TOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

000 DIRECTIVE 52.00.10 DOES NOT APPlY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO, _____ _ 

CO py_-:-_oF COPI ES 

PAGE __ 9:::...,.....OF 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SVSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

program was adapted to be compatible with the CORONA operational 

characteristics. The implementation of CTP will provide the 

data base, procedures, communications, debugging, and software 

to completely operate both or either CORONA and HEXAGON in a 

fully automated fashion. This capability is physically located 

at CIA with appropriate displays to be in the SOC when defined. 

Subsequent to the DNRO approval of SOC-70 several oral and 

written exchanges concerning the SOC by Program Directors and 

the difficulties in obtaining the personnel and equipment as 

well as obtaining and modifying physical facilities resulted in 

a further review of the functions and responsibilities of the 

SOC. By personal memo to Dir, SOC from Dir, NRO Staff of 18 Dec 

67, parameters of the additional review were defined. These 

instructions were: 

a. " ... line function is the determination of how, and 

precisely when, something is to be accomplished and staff function is the determination of what and in what period of time 

something is to be accomplished, then in this context, I wish 

the SOC to be a staff function. 

b. SOC is the operational interface between the Intelligence Community and the Program Directors. It is not part of 

either ..•. Once a requirement has been established then SOC must 

translate into operational planning data such as criteria, 

priority, and collection guidance to which the Program Directors 

may be responsive. I believe the SOC shall: 

(1) Review and concur in the Ops plan prepared by 

the operator. 

(2) Follow the mission and provide special guidance 

as necessary ... including weather. 

(3) Establish and maintain a data bank for the 

purpose of comparing collection requirements vs collection 

attempts. 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTf.M 

lOP SECRET EXCLUOED FROM AUTOMATiC R.EGRAOtNG 

DOD DIRECTlV E 5200 10 DOES NOT APPtY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO _____ _ 

COPy---:~_or_-::-::;:-_coPI ES 

PAGE 10 OF 12 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HANDLE VIA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN - CONTROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

(4) Develop and operate, off-line, a mission 

optimization capability. 

(5) .•. additionally, I view these functions as 

internal to the SOC. 

(6) I cannot agree entirely with a concept I see 

emerging that the NRO is in a completely operational role when 

our satellites are spaceborne or on orbit. Reconnaissance 

satellites are never 'operational.' 

(7) •.. the Program Director must always have the 

full responsibility for his vehicles. The SOC will never duplicate his activity by such things as real-time rev-by-rev onorbit control nor ... to ever develop the software for operating 

reconnaissance satellites. SOC software is unique to SOC ..•. II 

Although the functions and responsibilities of the SOC, 

and the most efficient methodology to satisfy these functions 

and responsibilities are still being examined at high levels, 

it seems clear that the SOC will necessarily continue to operate 

as it has in the past until a satisfactory solution to the 

review has been completed. The strong position taken by Dir, 

SAFSP, the capability growing in OSP/CIA for search and surveillance systems, the advent of synchronous SIGINT satellites, 

the major turnover of personnel on the NRO Staff, and the continuing nature of the study of SOC functions and responsibilities 

(almost three years now) will have a profound effect on the 

SOC post-1970. 

Attached is a brief resume of the launch and on-orbit 

history showing growth that has taken place. This does not 

show the impact on the "intelligence community" nor does it 

reflect the growth and complexity of the NRP (Satellite) and 

interface with the community. Having spent some time in preparing this paper, I would suggest that you consider assigning 

Mr. Perry (RAND employee who has been writing our history) the 

task of writing a detailed history of the SOC. Also attached 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VIA CONTRO L NO, _____ _ 

BYEMAN CDPY_"..,.-_ 0 F_,,--_COPI ES 

CONTROL SYSTEM PAGE 11 OF 12 PAGES 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.tO DOES NOT APPl.Y 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

- HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

CORONA GAMBIT 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

are answers to the questions, as appropriate and that were 

not covered in the paper on NRO Staff analysis. 

~C. ~uf&t~ Howard 

Colonel, USAF 

2 attachments 

1. resume 

2. answers to questions 

CORONA GAMBIT HEXAGON EARPOP HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC. REGRADING 

000 DI R£CTIVE 52,0010 DOe"S NOT APPl.Y 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO ______ .

co PY---:::-::-_O F----,=-.:-_CO PI £. S 

PAGE 12 OF 12 PA.GES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

lOP SEeRET 

Attachment 1 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONT.ROl SYSTEM. 

ARGON CORONA GAMBIT 

LANYARD EARPOP 

SOC HIGHLIGHTS AND HISTORY OF MISSIONS 

Year Highlights 

1963 

1964 

Mar - SOC Activated 

Apr - First SOC Mission - 9053 

Jul - First GAMBIT Mission 

Aug - First 2RV CORONA 

Mar - GAMBIT/OCV 

Apr - First GAMBIT 4-day mission 

Nov - First CORONA 9-day mission 

Dec - CORONA "---I ____ ----'1 

1965 Jan - First CORONA la-day mission 

Apr - First GAMBIT 5-day mission 

May - CORONA totally allocated to MC&G 

1966 Jul - First GAMBIT CUBED mission 

Aug - First THORAD launch 

Aug - First CORONA l3-day mission 

1967 Jun - First GAMBIT CUBED la-day mission 

Jun - First CORONA IS-day mission 

Jul - Termination GAMBIT 

Sep - First CORONA J-3 mission 

CORONA GAMBIT ARGON LANYARD EARPOP KANDtE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

lOP SEGRET EXCLUDE.D FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200 10 DOES NOT A.PPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO _ ___ _ 

COPY_...,--Of---,.,._COPIE:S 

PAGE 1 OF 2 - - , PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HA.NOt£: VIA 

fOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONTROl. SYSTEM 

ARGON CORONA GAMBIT 

LANYARD EARPOP 

Year Missions 

C A G/G3 L SIGINT~'( 

Primary/Secondary 

1963 Launches 9 3 4 3 1/9 

Recoveries 7 2 4 1 

Life (days) 31 14 6 3 11/150 

1964 Launches 13 10 3/20 

Recoveries 20 8 

Life (days) 88 17 560/243 

1965 Launches 13 9 2/12 

Recoveries 25 8 

Life (days) 98 23 1421/1716 

1966 Launches 9 12/3 2/13 

Recoveries 16 12/3 

Life (days) 90 73/19 

1967 Launches 9 3/7 2/11 

Recoveries 16 3/6 

Life (days) III 24/58 

* Mission life is not easily determined due to multiple 

payloads, mUltiple frequency bands, partial failures, 

and slow degradatione Trend only is noted in life. 

CORONA GAMBIT ARGON LANYARD EARPOr HANDLE VIA. 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL S VS Tf. M 

lOP SECRET EXCl.UDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DO~ i)lRECTlV E 5200 10 DOES NOT A P PLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO ____ _ 

COPV---:::---O ~:---- COPt £s 

PAGE 2 OF 2 PA.GES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HANDLE ViA 

lOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONtROt SYSTEM 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

Attachment 2 

Requested Analysis 

A. Assess the main trends and policy decisions. 

Until your memorandum removing the "in-line" actions of 

the SOC, the trend from the beginning has been to enhance the 

"in-line" capability by providing data bases, automation, 

maximizing the efficient collection per mission, and maintaining a strong and viable authority line. An accepted and 

understood criteria has been from the beginning (U-2 onward) 

that overhead reconnaissance targeting would be done solely 

in Washington. This grew to include "a nationally oriented 

group within the jointly manned NRP." It is certainly conceivable that this function can be done, with or without an 

NRO Staff, by the "field" Program Directors. 

The HEXAGON ,I 1 and modifications to 

current systems is causing a proliferation of "SOC, Jr's" with 

varying degrees of NRO Staff coordination, concurrence, or 

influence. A conscious and deliberate decision for all active 

participants' guidance needs to be made to enhance whichever 

mode of operation is to be in being for the future. One such 

arrangement was described in the paper done on the NRO Staff 

and forwarded to you earlier. It appears that the arrangement 

included there is still strongly applicable. 

B. Some specific questions about SOC: 

1. SOC Deputy Director. The establishment of a SS-4 

office in the 4ClOOO complex with three deputies reporting to 

the Director, SS-4 is strongly recommended. It is not clear 

I 

if a Vice Director, SS-4 is needed, but if desired then the 

Deputy for Ops Analysis could easily and proficiently accomplish 

that as an additional duty. The three deputies would be for: 

HEXAGON EARPOpl "--------~ 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SEeRET EX"CWO£O FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD OIRE'c.nVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CO~TROl NO _____ _ 

COPY_-=-_OF_--;:--_COP'ES 

PAGE 1 o~_-=6,--- PAGES 
HANDLE VIA 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HANDLE VIA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

Satellite Photo Operations; Satellite SIGINT Operations; Ops 

Analysis. One suggested arrangement could be as follows: 

I 

Photo 

L/c Neuner 

BD944 

D, NRO Staff 

SS-4 

I 

I 

SIGINT 

Col Copley 

Ft. Meade 

collocated 

with SSSC 

I 

I 

Analysis 

L/c Yost 

4CIOOO 

I Other I 

I 

2. The skills required to head the Photo & SIGINT Sections 

are: 

a. Flexibility in managing in a complex bureaucratic 

environment so as to get the job done without creating undue 

stress and strain at the interagency and intradepartment interfaces. 

b. Total familiarity with the requirements to be 

satisfied. 

c. Total familiarity with the operational capability 

of the collection system. 

d. Familiarity with automatic data processing methods 

and techniques coupled with a capability and desire to practice 

invention for improved, less costly, collection capabilities. 

e. Ability to represent NRO at any level, internal or 

external, within his assigned specialty. 

f. A minimum of three years direct association with the 

operation of satellite reconnaissance systems and a Masters 

degree in Science or Engineering. 

BYEMAN TOP SECRET CONTROL 00. ___ __ _ 

COPY_-.,...._OF'_..,--_COPIES 

CONTR OL SYSTEM EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING PAGE. __ 2_ of---,6 _ PAGf:S: 

000 DIRECTIVE 520010 OOE5 NOT APPLY 

. Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HAN OLE VIA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONtRO L SYSTEM 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

I I 

The skills required to head the Ops Analysis Section are: 

a. Tenacious devotion to duty. Technically and intellectually honest and independent. Patience and smooth working 

techniques to allow maximum effectiveness with Program Directors, 

DoD departments and agencies, and other government agencies. 

b. A total familiarity with the history of the NRO, 

the NRO policies and practices in dealing with outside agencies, 

and a demonstrated ability to manage a joint group. 

c. Be a very clear and concise writer and an outstanding 

presentor. 

d. Technically competent to fully analyze requirements 

and collate with achievements. Invent methods and procedures 

to be instantly responsive to questions and status and recommendation for application of resources against requirements. 

e. A minimum of three years direct association with 

the NRO and preferably with detailed knowledge of operations 

and a Masters degree in Math, Science, or Engineering. 

3. Functional Statement. 

Deputy for Photo (SIGINT) Satellite Operations: 

Responsible to Dep Dir, NRO Staff (SS-4) for maintaining 

current knowledge of the status and capabilities of all projects 

assigned and their closely associated support systems through 

liaison with appropriate Program Directors; for translating 

USIB intelligence requirements into operational planning data 

such as criteria, priority, and collection guidance; to review 

and concur in the Ops plan prepared by the operator; for mission 

following; to establish and maintain a data bank to compare 

collection requirements vs satisfactory collection; to develop 

an off-line mission optimization capability; as the NRO Staff 

focal point for the day-to-day liaison with the appropriate 

USIB structure to insure close correlati on between collection 

requirements and satellite operations. 

HE~N~?~ EARPOP "---I ___ _ 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

lOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

000 DI RECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APP LY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

COHrROL NO, _____ _ 

COPY~~_Of' _ _ r-COPIES 

PAGE -':::0...- 3 _ OF _ __ 6 PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HANDLE VIA 

- lOP SEGRET BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

Deputy for Ops Analysis 

Responsible to Dep Dir, NRO Staff (SS-4) for maintaining 

a close relationship with JRC and Program Director D to assure 

current knowledge of the status and capabilities of all aircraft 

and drone systems and closely associated support resources; to 

assist all NRP Program Directors in obtaining DoD support for 

NRP project operations; to analyze for DNRO and subsequent submission to higher approval authority, the best method of obtaining reconnaissance coverage in response to USIB requirements--

all NRP resources; to monitor and assist, as required, the close 

coordination of NRP satellite and aircraft programs and DoD 

programs; to conduct studies and analyses of potential future 

collection requirements to recommend to the Director, NRO Staff 

possible future system development; for all knowledge of and 

determination of schedules in cooperation with NRP Program 

Directors; for support of NRO Comptroller for operational matters 

including recommending numbers of existing resources to satisfy 

requirements and preparing annual budget guidance; to prepare 

and/or assemble a USIB book for the DNRO/DDNRO prior to each 

USIB meeting, covering agenda, references, schedules, and other 

appropriate material; for development of NRO Staff emergency 

actions arising from inadvertent re-entry or crash of NRP reconnaissance vehicles in areas where hostile or undesirable reaction is likely. 

4. Location of the Deputy Director, NRO Staff (SS-4). 

From the above it becomes clear that the Chief, SS-4 would move 

into the 4CIOOO complex. In addition, the Ops Analysis Section 

of SS-4 would also be in that area. The other two SS-4 Deputies 

would be remote (Photo in BD944 and SIGINT at Ft. Meade) and 

through secure commo and frequent meetings with Chief, SS-4 and 

the rather constant interface with the Ops Analysis Section 

will be kept as a part of the family. Response to DNRO and 

Director, NRO Staff should be significantly improved both in 

quality and timeliness. 

HEXAGON EARPOP 1"-----___ ----' HANDLE VIA. 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

- __ 

EXCl.UDED 

~TO[}Pp-SSEfEemRE:r1 FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING ~ 

DOD DIRECTiVE 5200 10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONraOL 110 _____ _ 

COPV-4~- o F--t:::6-COP' £5 

flAG E __ -,--_ Of ___ PAGES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

HANDLE VIA 

TOP SECRET BYEMAN 

CONtROL SYSTEM 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

I 

5. NRO Staff relationships with USIB; A personal rapport 

has been developed that allows outstanding communication and 

cooperation between NRO Staff and the USIB (including its various segments). It is unimportant whether the NRO participants 

are voting members or official observers. It is necessary that 

representation at USIB (DNRO; DDNRO; Dir, NRO Staff; and/or 

Chief, SS-4), COMIREX (and its subcommittees), and SORS be provided by the NRO Staff (SS-4). At all these levels the actual 

business is conducted by DIA, CIA, NSA, State, and NRO representatives. This is a necessary evil in the business of covert 

overflight reconnaissance and we are required to participate, 

however distasteful it may be at times. Additional participation with the USIB structure is not indicated. However, the 

NRO Staff coordination between USIB actions and ExCom actions 

could be improved by periodic Dir, Staff and Deputies meeting 

with DDNRO. The SS-4 (Ops Analysis) could replace the RPG 

activities and maintain a viable, knowledgeable staff that 

could respond to all queries. With the exception of the USIB 

representative, all NRO Staff representation should come from 

SS-4. 

The NRO representation at USIB and its committee 

structure meetings is vitally dependent on the true national 

position of the NRO representation. An alignment in principle 

or practice with anyone organization will destroy the existing 

NRO reputation and high degree of acceptance. 

The Ops Analysis staff could perform an important 

function that is not being performed. A strict follow-up on 

all USIB action items (as well as those from ExCom and RPG 

that are related) to assure high quality, timely, and complete 

response from the NRO. The full-time analyses of requirements 

to determine tasking to collection projects and the subsequent 

degree of satisfaction could materially reduce the expended 

resources for collection. Advice to USIB, ExCom, PSAC, and all 

NRO peers could be measurably improved with a good Ops Analysis 

section on the NRO Staff. 

HEXAGON EARPOp~1 ______ ~ HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPlV 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL NO, _____ _ 

COPY_-::--_OF_.,..--_COPIES 

PAGE 5 Of 6 '-"'---- PA.GES 
Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA, 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

HEXAGON EARPOP 

I 

c. Operations Analysis Section for NRO Staff. 

Questions answered in above discussion and in the earlier 

paper on NRO Staff analysis. 

HEXAGON EARPOP I 

~----~ 

HAND LE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

TOP SECRET EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRAD I NG 

DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C05107901 

CONTROL HO ______ _ 

CO.V---,,,.--_Of_-.,...._COPI ES 

PAGE·. 6 OF 6 P 'GES ---"