In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-19-00313-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 415th District Court

Parker County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR17-0059

Before Birdwell, Womack, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

MILES WESLEY KENNEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Miles Wesley Kenney appeals his conviction and resulting seventeenyear sentence for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. In three points, Kenney 

argues (1) that the trial court erred by not including his requested deadly weapon

instruction in the jury charge, (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, 

and (3) that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing on his motion for new 

trial. We affirm. 

II. BACKGROUND

Based on a warrant, police officers arrested Kenney on January 11, 2017, for 

the offense of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle because of events that 

occurred on November 12, 2016. According to Kenney, prior to trial, the State 

offered him a sentencing and charge plea wherein his conviction would not contain a 

deadly weapon finding, and he would receive fifteen years’ incarceration. On the 

advice of counsel, Kenney rejected the plea. Later, Kenney entered a plea of guilty to 

one count of evading arrest or detention, pleaded true to the State’s enhancement 

paragraphs, and, without a sentencing recommendation from the State, elected to 
3

have a jury assess his punishment. At trial,

1

the State offered evidence regarding the 

issue of whether Kenney had used his vehicle as a deadly weapon. 

A. Deputy Calvin Bradley Chane

Deputy Calvin Bradley Chane, a field training officer for the Parker County 

Sheriff’s Office, testified at the trial. Chane said that he was patrolling with Deputy 

Anthony Sheridan on November 12, 2016, around 7:30 a.m., when he observed a 

white car parked partially on the shoulder and partially on the gravel area of a road in 

Parker County. Kenney was sitting in the car. Chane called dispatch and reported he 

would be participating in “a motorist assist.” According to Chane, as he exited his 

vehicle to make contact with Kenney, he noticed “a lot of movement from the driver” 

who “appeared . . . slumped over the steering wheel.” As Chane approached the car, 

its brake lights came on and off, and then the “vehicle took off.” Chane testified that 

Kenney entered nearby Interstate Highway 20 at a high rate of speed. 

As he pursued Kenney, Chane learned from dispatch that the vehicle had been 

reported stolen. Chane described Kenney’s driving as constantly being at a high rate 

of speed, disobeying traffic laws, exiting and entering the interstate at high rates of 

speed, “blowing through a lot of stop signs,” and possessing a total disregard for any 

other motorists. 

1When a defendant pleads guilty, the defendant is not eligible for a bifurcated 

trial, so there is no per se punishment phase. There is, instead, a unitary trial. Carroll v. 

State, 42 S.W.3d 129, 131–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
4

By Chane’s account, because the high-speed chase stretched from Parker

County into Tarrant County, he received assistance from officers of other 

jurisdictions in his pursuit. As the chase occurred, Sheridan continuously relayed 

information to dispatch regarding the chase’s locations. Eventually, Kenney exited 

the interstate for a final time, raced through a residential neighborhood, crashed his 

car onto an embankment in front of an apartment complex, left his car, and took off 

running. Kenney then jumped a fence, and Chane was unable to apprehend him. 

According to Chane, he then searched the car. One of the things Chane 

noticed while searching the car is that the vehicle’s identification number did not 

match all parts of the car. He also found a number of tools, including a set of large 

bolt cutters that Chane testified were used in crimes involving entering a gate or 

cutting a chain, fence, or bolt. Chane said that he also found a disassembled bicycle in 

the trunk. 

Regarding the chase overall, Chane confirmed that Kenney had driven at 

approximately 110 miles per hour at times. Chane further testified that as the chase 

ensued, he could see Kenney “trying to reach and put things under the floorboard and 

grab a hold of things in the passenger’s side and a lot of movement in the vehicle.” 

Chane described Kenney’s movements in the car as “definitely . . . dangerous.” When 

asked whether the vehicle that Kenney was driving, given the manner in which he had 

driven it, could have caused death or serious bodily injury to Kenney or somebody 

else, Chane agreed that it could. 
5

On cross-examination, Chane said that his normal routine if a pursuit becomes 

dangerous to himself or others is to end the pursuit. Although Chane said that 

Kenney did appear to run someone off the road, he also said that in his opinion no

one was in danger. On redirect, however, Chane agreed that he did not know at any 

given time what Kenney would do, including not knowing if Kenney would cut in 

front of one of the many 18-wheelers he passed, if he was going to sideswipe another

vehicle, if he was going to clip the back of a vehicle and make it turn around, if he was 

going to hit a sign pole as he darted across lanes of traffic, or if he was going to hit 

somebody when he ran through a stop sign or red light. Chane acknowledged that 

each of those actions was dangerous on Kenney’s part. 

B. Video and Audio of the High-Speed Chase

The State published the video captured from Chane’s in-car camera, which 

depicted the incident from the time Chane pulled in behind Kenney’s car until after 

Kenney had fled on foot. In the video, Chane can be seen exiting his patrol vehicle, 

and as Chane approached the front of Kenny’s vehicle, the car’s brake lights came on 

and off, and then Kenney abruptly took off and raced onto the interstate. It took 

Chane more than one minute to eventually come up directly behind Kenney. At 

multiple times during the chase, Kenney exited the interstate and drove onto the 

frontage road and through intersections without stopping at stop signs or stoplights

and then reentered the interstate at a high rate of speed. At different times, as 

Kenney would approach traffic, either on the interstate or the frontage road, he 
6

caused multiple vehicles to veer and brake in an attempt to avoid being struck. On 

one occasion, as Kenney reentered the interstate, he drove directly in front of a 

vehicle that was also attempting to enter the interstate, causing the vehicle to brake 

and swerve. During another moment, Kenney drove between an 18-wheeler and 

another vehicle, only to encounter a second 18-wheeler driving directly beside another 

car in the other lane. Trapped by the traffic, Kenney raced onto the lefthand shoulder 

and passed the traffic, forcing all the vehicles in the area to move to the right. He 

repeated similar acts multiple times during the nearly twenty-minute chase. 

At another instance, Kenney raced around the righthand side of a vehicle that 

was obstructing his travel, and the vehicle attempted to move to the right unaware 

that Kenney was going to race around him on that side, which caused the vehicle to 

take evasive action. As the chase continued, one of the officers in the car can be 

heard reporting that Kenney was traveling at speeds in excess of 110 miles per hour. 

Throughout the chase, Kenney drove between numerous vehicles multiple times, all 

the while racing down the interstate. 

Some of the times when Kenney would exit the interstate and drive onto the 

frontage road, his vehicle would strike the grass and gravel, causing debris to fly in the 

air. Roughly eleven minutes into the chase, another police vehicle approached and 

attempted to block Kenney. Kenney’s response was to swerve to the right across 

three interstate lanes and pass several cars using the righthand shoulder. As the 
7

second patrol vehicle again tried to get ahead of Kenney, Kenney feigned he was 

going to exit only to swerve sharply back onto the interstate and accelerate. 

Sixteen minutes into the chase, Kenney exited the interstate for good. As he 

did, he again struck a graveled median and nearly collided with another vehicle on the 

frontage road. Shortly after, Kenney took a right turn onto a main thoroughfare and 

into a business district. Seconds later, Kenney slammed on his brakes, turned into a 

gas station parking lot, crossed the parking lot, and exited the lot into a residential 

area. As he drove down the neighborhood street, Kenney drove in and out of 

oncoming traffic and again ignored stop signs. Roughly nineteen minutes into the 

chase, Kenney crashed his car over a curb and onto an embankment in front of an 

apartment complex, exited his car, and then fled. Later, Chane attempted to turn off 

the car, and he discovered that Kenney had left the car in neutral. Consequently, 

Kenney’s vehicle almost slid back down the embankment and into Chane’s patrol 

vehicle. 

While Chane was on the stand, the State also published an audio recording of 

the communications between Chane and dispatch after Kenney had fled from the car. 

In the audio, Chane stated that Kenney had hopped over a fence and onto another 

property. He described Kenney as having long hair and a goatee and wearing a white 

shirt and black shorts. 
8

C. Kenney’s Prior Criminal History

At trial, the State also introduced ten judgments showing that Kenney had 

previously been convicted of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, two counts of 

burglary of a habitation, two counts of driving with an invalid driver’s license, burglary 

of a building, possession of methamphetamine, theft of a vehicle, criminal trespass of 

a habitation, and evading arrest. The State also elicited testimony from witnesses who 

averred that on December 10, 2017, Kenney was caught shoplifting. Police arrested 

Kenney that day, and while searching him, found a straight razor blade, a syringe,

stolen checks, stolen social security documents, and a partial driver’s license that did 

not belong to Kenney. 

D. Crime Scene Technician Heather Lee Huffman

Heather Lee Huffman, a crime scene technician with the Parker County 

Sheriff’s Office, said that she processed2the vehicle Kenney was driving the day he 

evaded police. As the State introduced pictures that Huffman had taken of the 

vehicle, she described what the pictures portrayed. One of the items Huffman found 

was an eyeglass case that contained two syringes, a tiny mug, a rubber band, and two 

separate pieces of crystallized cotton. Huffman said that the crystal substance found 

in the cotton was methamphetamine. 

2According to Huffman, “processing” a vehicle involves looking “for any 

evidence that will link it to a suspect such as fingerprints, DNA, any items, identifying 

items, things like that.” 
9

E. Kenney’s Testimony 

Kenney testified in his own defense. Kenney told the jury how he had been 

involved in a custody dispute between his parents when they divorced when he was 

four years old. When Kenney was fourteen, his father, whom he lived with, was 

paralyzed in a car wreck, and Kenney had to take care of his father who was then 

confined to a wheelchair. Kenney said that after his father’s wreck, he began to get 

“into a lot of trouble,” do drugs, and run around with the wrong people. 

By Kenney’s account, the first drug he used was marijuana, but his drug use 

rapidly escalated and by the time he was fifteen years old he was “smoking speed and 

snorting coke.” Kenney also started committing crimes and was placed on probation 

for two counts of burglary of a motor vehicle and criminal trespass when he was 

fifteen. Kenney said that the criminal trespass was the result of his failed attempt at 

robbing a store with a gun. Kenney also was charged with evading arrest or detention 

on foot around the same time. According to Kenney, because of the trouble he got

into, he never graduated from high school. In 2005, Kenney was charged with three 

counts of burglary of a habitation and ended up serving time in prison. Kenney said 

he was paroled, but that he broke off his ankle monitor and was eventually arrested 

on the parole violation and sent back to prison. When he was later released, he again 

was arrested for burglary of a habitation and spent several months in the Tarrant 

County jail. Kenney described how, when he was released from jail, he “was doing 

pretty well” for a few years maintaining a steady job and being in a relationship, but he 
10

“started using again,” and in 2014, he was arrested for theft of a vehicle and 

possession of methamphetamine. In 2016, Kenney was arrested for evading arrest on 

foot after he attempted to shoplift some items from a sporting goods store. 

Kenney said that he did not steal the vehicle used in the police chase. Rather, 

by Kenney’s account, he purchased it in front of a game room for “a little bit of drugs 

and a little bit of cash.” Kenney said he suspected that the vehicle had probably been 

stolen. 

Kenney admitted to driving “well over 100 miles an hour” during the chase, 

but he said that he tried neither to ram other vehicles nor to hit them. He also said 

that he passed vehicles on the shoulder because they were blocking him as he 

attempted to flee, but, according to Kenney, he “didn’t feel it was dangerous the way 

[he] passed” the other cars. But Kenney did say that he recognized that he was 

“careless about other people’s safety.” Kenney also stated that he did not crash the 

vehicle, but purposely “ran up on the curb” so that he could flee on foot and scale a 

large fence that he knew was behind the apartment complex. Even though Kenney 

knew that police had his phone and knew who he was, he was not arrested until 

sometime later. 

Kenney averred that he found the checks, social security documents, and partial 

driver’s license in a “flop house” where he stayed sometimes. He also admitted that 

the eyeglass case containing the drug paraphernalia was his, and he was using 

methamphetamine daily at the time of the chase. By Kenney’s account, most of the 
11

tools found in the car belonged to him, and he would use the bolt cutters when he 

would steal. Kenney said that he was open to going to drug rehabilitation. Kenney

stated that he had been in jail since his arrest for evading, had a newfound 

appreciation for law enforcement, and had become a trustee of the jail, which gave

him responsibilities based on his good behavior. 

F. The Jury Charge, Sentence, and Appeal

After both the State and Kenney rested, the trial court discussed the jury charge 

with counsel. At the charge conference, Kenney requested that the following 

instruction be included regarding the jury’s potential deadly weapon finding: 

In order to affirmatively find the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, 

the evidence must demonstrate that:

(1) The vehicle meets the definition of a deadly weapon;

(2) The deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the felony 

offense on trial; and

(3) People other than the defendant were put in actual danger. 

The trial court denied Kenney’s request. Instead, the trial court included the

following language regarding a deadly weapon finding: 

Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Miles 

Wesley Kenney, used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: a motor 

vehicle, that in the manner of its use or intended use was capable of

causing death or serious bodily injury during the commission of the 

offense alleged in the indictment?

A “deadly weapon” means anything that in the manner of its use or 

intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
12

“Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk 

of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or 

protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or

organ.

“Motor vehicle” or “Vehicle” means a device that can be used to 

transport or draw persons or property on a highway.

After deliberations, the jury assessed punishment at seventeen years’ incarceration and 

found the deadly weapon finding true. The trial court sentenced Kenney and 

rendered judgment accordingly, and this appeal followed.3

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Jury Instruction on Deadly Weapon

In his first point, Kenney argues that the trial court erred by not including his 

requested instruction in the jury charge—an instruction that tracks caselaw regarding 

evidentiary sufficiency review on a deadly weapon finding. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 

795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The State counters that the “trial court did not err 

by refusing [Kenney’s] request to include non-statutory caselaw pertaining to 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in its deadly weapon instruction.” We agree 

with the State. 

1. Standard of Review

We review a complaint of jury charge error under a two-step process. Kirsch v. 

State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 

3On August 21, 2019, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a mandate 

granting Kenney this out-of-time appeal. 
13

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). First, we determine whether error occurred. Ngo, 

175 S.W.3d at 743. Second, if we find error, we evaluate whether harm resulted from 

the error sufficient to require reversal. Id. (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 

171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)). Jury charge error requires reversal when 

the defendant has properly objected to the charge and we find “some harm” to his 

rights. Id. 

2. The Law Concerning Jury Charges

The purpose of the jury charge is to inform the jury of the applicable law and 

guide them in its application to the case. Beltran De La Torre v. State, 583 S.W.3d 613, 

617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (quoting Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996)). A trial judge must maintain neutrality in providing such information and 

guidance. Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A trial judge 

may not express any opinion on the weight of the evidence or draw the jury’s 

attention to particular facts. Id. at 798, 801. To accomplish this neutrality, Article 

36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a jury charge: (1) must 

be in writing, (2) must distinctly set forth the law applicable to the case, (3) cannot 

express any opinion as to the weight of the evidence, (4) may not sum up the 

testimony, and (5) cannot discuss the facts or use any argument in the charge 

calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury. Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. Ann. art. 36.14. This rule is designed to prevent a jury from interpreting a 

judge’s comments as a judicial endorsement or imprimatur for a particular outcome. 
14

See Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“[A] trial court should 

avoid any allusion in the jury charge to a particular fact in evidence, as the jury might 

construe this as judicial endorsement or imprimatur.”).

As a general rule, a jury charge that tracks the language of a statute is “a proper 

charge on the statutory issue.” See Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994). And a court should normally reject non-statutory instructions as improper 

comments on the weight of the evidence where such instructions are unnecessary to 

clarify the law and they also draw the jury’s attention to a particular type of evidence. 

See, e.g., Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 652 (holding that an instruction defining “operate” in a 

DWI case was an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence because it 

“improperly impinged on the jury’s fact-finding authority by limiting the jurors’

understanding of what evidence could constitute” the element of operating); Brown, 

122 S.W.3d at 796, 802–03 (rejecting an instruction that “intent or knowledge may be 

inferred by acts done or words spoken” because while neutral, it improperly focused 

the jury’s attention on evidence that might support a finding of criminal intent, told 

the jury how to consider certain evidence, and instructed the jury on a rule of 

appellate evidentiary sufficiency review). 

3. Analysis

In this case, the jury charge tracked the statutory language of a deadly weapon 

finding and included statutory definitions of deadly weapon, serious bodily injury, and 

motor vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07(a)(17)(B), (46), 32.34(a)(2). Thus, 
15

the charge was a proper charge on the statutory issue of a deadly weapon finding. See

Riddle, 888 S.W.2d at 8. Moreover, Kenney’s requested charge that would have 

required the jury to find that “[p]eople other than [Kenney] were put in actual danger” 

because of the manner in which Kenney exhibited the vehicle while evading arrest is 

not found in a statute. Rather, it is a definition used by courts in judicial decisions

when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a deadly weapon finding. 

See Drichas, 175 S.W.3d at 798. This added nonstatutory instruction would have been 

an improper comment on the weight of the evidence because it would have indicated 

to the jury that it should focus on Kenney’s testimony that he did not think he was 

endangering anyone and Chane’s testimony that he would have stopped pursuing 

Kenney if the chase had become dangerous to others. See Beltran De La Torre, 583 

S.W.3d at 619 (“By highlighting one particular path to establishing the element of 

possession . . . the instruction focused the jury’s attention on that particular type of 

evidence and impermissibly guided the jury’s assessment of the evidence of 

possession.”). Further, such an instruction was unnecessary to clarify the law of a 

deadly weapon finding. Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 652. We hold that the trial court did not 

err by denying Kenney’s requested instruction; thus, we need not assess harm. Ngo,

175 S.W.3d at 743. We overrule Kenney’s first point. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

In his second point, Kenney argues that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel when his trial attorney advised him to not take a more favorable plea and that 
16

his attorney failed to properly prepare for trial. We conclude that because the record 

is silent as to Kenney’s attorney’s trial strategies, a direct appeal is the improper 

avenue to bring this claim. 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 10 of the Texas Constitution afford criminal defendants the right to 

reasonably effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, 

§ 10; Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5, 124 S. Ct. 1, 4 (2003); Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 

436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We apply a two-pronged test to ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 

2052, 2064 (1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). First,

an appellant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The record must be sufficiently developed to 

overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided reasonable assistance. Bone v. 

State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 n.13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 

813–14). Second, an appellant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 

the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Further, a claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly grounded and affirmatively supported 

by the record. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814; Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998). When the record is silent as to possible trial strategies undertaken 

by defense counsel, we will not speculate on the reasons for those strategies. See 

Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
17

Here, we are presented with a case demonstrating the “inadequacies inherent in 

evaluating ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.” Patterson v. State, 46 S.W.3d 

294, 306 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d). Although Kenney filed a motion 

for new trial, the motion was overruled by operation of law; thus, no hearing was 

held, and we have no record addressing the reasons for his counsel’s actions. 

Moreover, Kenney’s complaints on appeal regarding his counsel concern actions that 

may or may not be grounded in sound trial strategy, but the record is silent as to his

counsel’s reasons for doing or failing to do the things of which Kenney complains. 

See id. As such, these issues are better raised via an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07; Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“[T]he record on direct appeal will generally ‘not be sufficient 

to show that counsel’s representation was so deficient as to meet the first part of the 

Strickland standard’ as ‘[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s choices often involves facts 

that do not appear in the appellate record.’”). Therefore, we overrule Kenney’s 

second point. 

C. No Hearing on Motion for New Trial

In his third point, Kenney argues that the trial court erred by not conducting a 

hearing on his motion for new trial.4 The State counters that Kenney “failed to 

4There are two motions for new trial in the clerk’s record. The first motion

appears to have been handwritten by Kenney. The second is typed and signed by his

appellate counsel. We focus on counsel’s motion. A defendant has no absolute right 

to hybrid representation, so courts may ignore pro se motions filed by defendants 
18

preserve his claim that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing on his 

motion for new trial because he did not timely present his motion to the court.” We 

agree with the State. 

A defendant must do more than merely file a motion for new trial to preserve 

the arguments made in it. Richardson v. State, 328 S.W.3d 61, 72 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2010, pet. ref’d) (per curiam). The defendant must also present the motion for 

new trial to the trial court within ten days of filing the motion. Tex. R. App. P. 21.6. 

“The purpose of the presentment rule is ‘to put the trial court on actual notice that a 

defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such 

as a ruling or a hearing on it.’” Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009) (quoting Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)). The 

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “consistently has held the filing of a motion for new 

trial alone is not sufficient to show ‘presentment’” and does not preserve an issue for 

appellate review absent a showing that the trial court has seen the motion. Carranza, 

960 S.W.2d at 78; see Navarro v. State, 588 S.W.3d 689, 691 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 

2019, no pet.). Examples of presentment include obtaining the trial court’s ruling on 

the motion, the trial judge’s signature or notation on a proposed order, or a hearing 

date on the docket sheet. Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 79; Burrus v. State, 266 S.W.3d 107, 

with appointed counsel. Pickett v. State, No. 02-19-00090-CR, 2020 WL 2073733, at *1 

n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 30, 2020, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication).
19

115 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). The defendant bears the burden of 

presentment. Burrus, 266 S.W.3d at 115.

Here, while Kenney filed a motion for new trial raising complaints about the

jury charge, jury deliberations, and counsel, there is no ruling on the motion, no order 

containing the trial judge’s signature, no entry on the docket sheet reflecting a hearing 

on the motion, or anything else in the record to indicate that Kenney presented his 

motion to the trial court. Because Kenney did not present his motion to the trial 

court, his complaint that the trial court failed to hold a hearing on his motion is not 

preserved for our review. See Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 79; Navarro, 588 S.W.3d at 691; 

Taylor v. State, No. 02-11-00261-CR, 2012 WL 6196623, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

Dec. 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, we 

overrule Kenney’s third point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled all three of Kenney’s points on appeal, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 4, 2021