r 

t 

.... 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

lUI "LunLI 

~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASH INGTON , D.C. 

HANDLE VIA 

BYEMAN 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

THE NRO STAFF 

HANDLE VIA 

September 27~ 1968 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

SUBJECT: ACDA Proposed Guidance on the Handling of Satellite 

Reconnaissance Policy with Regard to the Strategic 

Missile Talks 

A ttached is a copy of the ACDA 's proposed guidance paper~ on 

the above subject. which Mr. Foster has forwarded to the Executive 

Committee of the Committee of Principals for consideration. 

We are reviewing the paper and will provide our comments for 

your use~ as appropriate. in discussing the subject with Mr. Nitze. 

v1v~1L. WILLIAM R. YOST 

Lt Colonel. USAF 

CONTROL NO _ ____ _ 

BYEMAN TOP SECREf COPY ___ OF _ __ COPIES 

CONTROL SYSTEM EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATtC REGRADING 

DOD D:RECrIVE 5200.10 DOES NQTAPPLY 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

PAGE. ___ OF ___ PAGES 

i I 

I 

! 

~ 

! 

j 

I 

i 

f ! 

I 

r 

r 
-

0)0 n OW' C'~'Pi Mii\ 

WASHINGTON 

., ~. 

.. " ~ ~ 

. . .. '. '.' ....... :.'7' ../ , . ,~)~ j 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

\ UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY '. I , 

September 19) 1968 

r~J~90}tNP:tJJ1 .. J"_QrL~n~Ilt_~XEC'pTIVE. COMY,lI'rrrEE .Oli' ,THE. COVli\1I1'TEE 

o ~~J)nJNC;:r:.? ALS 

SUBJECT: ~.t.ga.t.?g~cJvl:issiJc:Talks; Related Aspects of 

Q.0.~G_g)l,:ij~_E:_.Fte.9. Q,LJ Del} ~~arl:g~"~l):L: :'3c)o§urE? ".p..oI:f..:6" y_ 

I 

'.l:ran smi t ted he revTi th :(),.r..yg~:r._,.G9.ns:Lcle:r'at ion .. ::i., s.a. Stra.tegiQ ... M.:i.,ss,ile. 1'all{s.pap9r.,con:t;aining propo sed .. gu.:i,dange 

oD_ ... h.ElrldJ,JnKcertai n.aspectsof . the,u .. S .sa.tel1;L te 

r_e"p.o.nnaissance . disclosure. polic~r •.. 

The NSf-I.M 156 Committee revie'i'?ed this subject at its 

meeting on September 16) 1968 and agreed that it should 

be brought to the aJetention of the Executive Committee of 

the Committee of Principals. 

Your approval of these guidelin.e sVJ;LI1J::Je._reqlJ.~sted 

a1._~ .. :ClJ.Jil!:~?·r.(ie-~_ffl1g:·.9.r·~iih~L.~~_~9:~~~tY~~:¢?inm~.:t.t.e~"g.f ... tQ~ .... _.. . C~Q.l11r(d"j~t~.e_.9J~ ... 1?r~n_c;i,J).9;.l s • 

William C. Foster 

REF - TCS-38709/68' 

TOP BEe~1' 

. 4. P __ ". 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

i 

-
.... 

. DnA F '1' 

. 18 September 1968 . Hi\ 1\rm.R ITT f1 rf1f1 T T;''hTfTl trL'vHOLE CHANNELS 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS 

JU~LNl'ED ~~~E:,C,fl'S 011 SNf'ELL.ITE I1ECONNAIJ3SANCE DISCLOSURE POLICY 

DISCUSSION 

Introduction: The approv~d United States position for 

, 

negotiations witb the Soviets on limiting strategic arms includes 

the following provision: 

"VIII. VERIFICATION 

"rr'he limttations described in paragraphs I 

I 

through V are proposed to be verified by external 

[na t~~onal] mean s. II 

In other documents detailing the United States negotiating 

posLtion J it is provided that efforts be made to obtain Soviet 

assent to "supplementary means\! (i.e., limited on-site inspections) 

of verification. However, given the trad! tionaJ. Sov:i.et opposi tion 

to on-site inspections, the United States must be prepared --

and is prepared -- to rely ex61usively on national means of 

"-

verification if there is to be an agreement in the vi tal field 

of strategic arms limitations. 

It is only the development of' sUch means which has made a 

realistic consideration of a limitation on strategic arms possible. 

Aside from likely Soviet objections to provlsion for on-site 

inspections, national means' of verification, in particular 

TCS-3870ff/68 

Draft #1 

Copy (:, of '2 '=> 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

( 

I 

r 

[-

t 

[ 

. r::: 

I 

r 

1 

! 

t 

r 
'0 

Approved for RE3~~~e"~_ ?019/05/21 C051 06070 

_20:'-'- • 

observation satellib~s, provide the only feasible means of 

policing an agreement of the type and scope the United states 

has in m:Lnd. 

At the same time, it is vital to United, States security 

interests to preserve the full integrity of its intelligence 

operations .. particularly .. ln this instance, 'the unimpeded opeI'a- " 

tion of observation satellites. The unique value of observation 

and other intelligence-gathering satellites in this regard has 

been amply demonstrated in recent years, and needs no further 

elaboration. 

: 

The United states Government has established policy and 

information guidelines which, have effectively accomplished this 

purpose. Hm'lever, it is evident that these guidelines will have 

to be adjusted.if the United states is to pursue the signifiQant . 

undertaking of reaching an agreement on limiting strategic missiles. 

vie will have to discuss Itna tlonal means of verificaticnlf with 

1f~ , ~ the Soviets. Congress and our Allies will have to be convinced 

~at reliance on such means can effectively verify an agreement 

''---. 

and thus safeguard We stern securi ty interests. And the American 

public and press will have to be given similar, though less 

explicit, assurances. 

~ This paper 

~classification, 

relating to our 

does not address the question of downgrading the 

or declassifying altogether, certain information 

reconnaissance satellite program -- i.e., the 

simple fact that the United States conducts such opera.tions. 

TCS-38700//68 

Dra.ft III 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

I ,. 

I 

( 

, 

'I 

t 

o 
t£OP £Reg.g,:::, ------ Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

POSI~'ION 

Eegotjj~at.Lo~i th the USSH. one over-r:Lding tac tical 

Qonr;;ld@rat:Lon has i?~uidcd th@ Dni ted States in regard to 

reconnaissance satellites: to avoid an open confrontation with 

the Soviets over this issue. It.has been reasoned that if the 

SoVi~ts, who have knowledge of our satellite operations) were not 

forced publicly to challenge these operatlops) they vlOuld be more 

inclined tacitly to accept them. 

Thi s has so far proven to be the case. ' The danger of a 

confrontation has also been diminished by the development by the 

Soviets of their own, extensive, observation sa~ellite program. 

Even so, it is still sound policy to avoid a confrontation. 

There is some evidence that the planned arms control talks, while 

they will involve an exchange of views, will not undercut this 

po l icy; indeed, they could enhance the security of the United 

states information-gathering satellite program. 

In the first instance) the United states has communicated 

to the Soviets its intention to place llmaximum reliance on national 

mean s of v"erifica tion. 11 . 1'he Soviets must be fully a1'lare of the ~--

meaning of this phrase, and have given no indication that they 

object to the proposition. Secondly, the talks, if they result 

• 

in an agreement, would have the effect of formalizing Soviet 

acceptance of the US program (and vice versa). No agreement 

would be possible without such acceptance. 

TOP inWI&T 

TCS-387?fj/68 Draft III 

Approved for Release: 2019/05121 C051 06070 

.. 

-
.... 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

----:1]:.---

In keeping \'d·th tbese considerations, the Delegation is { . authorized, at a time of its choosing, to indicate to the Soviets 

that; the tierm, IIna tIonal mean s of ver:Lfic a.t:Lon, II inc lude s the 

use of Ilinfo:r:'mation-gat11ering satelli te;; II. No further effort 

should be made to define this term vri thout instruc t:Lons from 

Wasl1ingt;on. 

In the course of the talks, the DeJ.ega,t:Lon should establish 

a negotiating history to the effect that our willingness to 

conclude an agreement of th i s scoP9_.w)J~b.-Anaximum reliance on 

national means of verification is based on tlle assumption that· 

one side will not impede the operation of the o~herls informationgathering satellites. 

Finally, in discussing the VJi thdrawal article, the Delegation 

should point out that any action by one party which interferes 

significantly with tIle other 1 s verification capability or otherwise affects the capability of the other party to verify 

cornpli anc e 'i'li tll th e agreement would consti tute one of the grounds 

for vJi thdrawal. 

While' all of these points should be made in the course of 

---.,-

discussions, the Delegation should bear in mind the desirability 

of avoiding an unnecessary confrontation and should proceed with 

appropriate caut:Lon. Furtller, the Delegation shoUld avoid 

revealing the effectiveness of our satellite intelligence systems . 

This applies both to discussion of verificatton per se as Vlellas 

to the elaboration of our proposal vIhich, in certain aspec ts, 

9?OP £BGRB'±' 

TCS-3870f}/68 

Draft #1 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 
..... 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

-5-

could reveal indirectly more than we would wish to regarding 

our capabilities 0 rrhe matter will be b11.1rrcd somevihat by the 

introduction of proposals for on-site inspection in regard to 

certa:Ln gray areas. But thi sis a problem to which the 

Delegation will have to give careful attention •. The best approach 

would be: (1) confine discussion of our pos:Ltive capabilities 

for national verification to generalities;~nd (2) limit. 

disc~ssion of details concerning our verification capabilities 

to those areas of the proposed agreement where there is some 

doubt as to full effectiveness of national means and concerning 

which .... le might want to propose supplementary means of vorifica- . I 

tion. 

Consultation. It will be important to assure our most 

important Allies (NATO members" Japan) that the proposal vie are 

advancing will protect United states and Allied security 

interests, in regard to both the substance of the proposal and 

the capabili ty to verify .effec ti vely . adherence to an agreement 

through national means. In conSUltation with our Allies within 

the NAC, W~ should at least not initially volunteer an explana-

----- tion of the meaning of "na tional means of verification" (thi s . 

. should be self-eVident to our Allies). We should also not 

initially indicate our willingness. to acciept" as a fall-back 

posi tion" exclusive reliance on such means. Hovlever" we should 

brief the heads of selected NATO governments concerning our means 

and capability of verifying the arms limitation agreement which 

we have in mind. 

The same consideration applies to consultation with selected 

TOP SFCP1J:T 

r:ecs-387ct;/68 

Draft 1/1 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

-

... 
..... 

-Approved !9.!:.-Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

-bmer:"Jbe:cs of congress .. and even rnore ~;o. It will '00 :Lrnporto.nc to 

hold these consultation at an early date, and on a more candld 

baDi s th':-Ulvli t;h our A11ie s.. otho;,;>vl;Lse thQ proposed talles CG)"u.lcl 

create misunderstancUng and possible controversy. 11be briefing 

on our general approach to., and the problem of, verification 

should be restricted to a limited number of key members of 

Congress., and should take place within the ?ontext of a general 

discussion of our arms control proposal. The briefing could 

. 

include a general review of the findings of'SNIE 11-13-68. 

These members 01' Congress should be adv:l,sed not to reveal publicly 

our approach to verification until a clearer pic~ure of Soviet 

attitudes emerges from the talks. 

The precise timing and further details regarding the scope 

of these consultations are matters to be decided by the Secretary 

of state, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense) Dir~ctor 

of CIA~ and Director of ACDA. 

Statements to the Press and the Public. Al thOUgll the 

likelihood of publicly provoking the Soviets into a confrontation 

over the operation of observation satellites may diminish once 

---"" talks begin, it would still be desirable to maintain initially 

a di::>creet silence in publ:lc on this subject. '1'he problem of 

verification \Hill be the object of secret negotj.atLons for somo 

time to com~, and, as indicated above., we will want to sound out 

") 

Soviet attitudes . 

Accordingly) we initially should not volunteer statBmehts 

to the press concernihg means of verification of a strategic 

':I? 0 P S:C ORB'}' 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

TCS-3870~/68 

Draft /11 
.... 

lE\.l~lJL.l:' V It\: lAlJl.!..lfI hl.'..'UiOLh G1J1\l";!"Ji't,L.5 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

fllU±t Lj~~Ului.l 

arms lim:Lta.tion aGreement. Our standard r8 spon se to press 

;tnqu;lrios .. \ onoe tl1Q talks beg;i.n~ shQuld be that llwe \u'e~ of 

course, aW3X'O of the need to" have adequate means of verifying 

compliance \Ili th such an agreenlent". 11 

Eventually, however, information concerning our negotiating 

position will probably leak to the press. At this stage~ we . should be ready to acknovHedge that lithe United states is 

prepared to place maximum reliance on national means of verification.t1 If asked by journalists to explain this term, press 

spokemen may, on a background basis, say that the neVismen are ; 

free to dX'aI'l their own conclus:Lons. 

Any public statements by United states officials on this 

subject should follOI'i the same guidelines set forth above for 

the press. 

. . 

'Tor 8ECflCt' 

Tcs-387of//68 

Draft til 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

I 

r 
\ ;. 

lOB 

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 

ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE 

COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS 

,,' 

" ' 

. ' 

(1) The Committee of Principals serves as the interagency advisory group to the President and, as required, 

the National Security Council on policy matters relating to 

arms control and disarmament, including a nuclear test ban. 

(2) The Secretary of State will co'ntinue to serve as 

Chairman. The Director, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency will serve as Vice Chairman and will preside in th,e 

Secretary of State's absence. Meetings of the Committee 

will be held when called by the President, the Secretary of 

State, or the Director, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament', 

Agency. Members may suggest to the Secretary of State or 

the Director of ACDA that a meeting be called and list 

.; , subjects for consideration. The Arms Control and Disarma-" 

ment Agency will furnish staff support to the Committee,,~', ,'." ", 

", :, including distribution of substantive papers, agendas, 

'" records of action of meetings, and preparation of lists . , . -, . ~ 

," , , ,of officials invited to attend. ' 

','" 

" (3) ,'The following are regul~r m~mbe:s§..,of the Com .. ',;" 

" mittee:'. ( 1 : ... ,,--- I. " t. ;' " .: ,

', .,<, ',. The Secretary of State, Chairman, 

. ,,~ 

, The Director, ACDA, Vice Chairman 

,The Secretary of Defense 

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

, The Chairman, Atomic Energy Committee 

The 'Director of Central Intelligence 

, ~., 't . f The Special Assistant to the President for' 

National Security Affairs 

The Special Assistant to the President for 

, Science and Technology 

When matters of concern to their agencies are scheduled. 

the following officials will be invited: 

, The Director, U. S. Information Agency 

Th'e Administrator, National Aeronautics and 

" Space Adminis'tration '. ,', 

I,Il\UTEg OF'F'fCtAL aSE' ;-" ... I, . " ,': J'.' ••• ,\' , ".":\ 

-J'" . ". '.; . 

" : 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

, ' , , 

\ " " ,',,: 

_,"f •• 

, " 

. ,\ 

"' .. 

.' ' 

, ,"-

. , 

' J' 

\' , ', 
'" 

" '. 

',' . Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 , , ...• ,._.,._,...,;.~.I ....... ~ .. j·:l 

" 

, LIMITE!}' OFFICIAL USB ;" 

", h 

-2-

As needed, other departmental or agency heads, or 

'their designees, may be- invited to attend if their presence., 

is deemed necessary. 

, (4) The Committee will attempt to reach agreements 

. through consensus of opinion .. As necessary, divergent·, 

views, will be submitted to the President for resolution 

'either directly or through the National Security Council. , " 

,," . '\ '. ' . ", . 

,,' , '(5) As appropriate, the Pre'sident may from time to time' 

" i'meet with the, Committee'.;",' , , , " "" 

::{, " .< :-:t ,: ,I. ' .,/' 

April " 1963 =--,--:---"': 

• NSC Action ---- " " ,.,.", 

........ 

, bIMITED OFFIGIllL USE, " 

,4 "' 

\, 

, ' 

"-;. 

, , ,,',. " ~ - . ,. ,.1, 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

• ,I." 

.; 

I l 

r, : 

, ' 

ii', 

r" 

" 

, ' 

~ . i ' 
" 

, ; 

',' 

f I:' 

, ,..1 

lOB 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

. ! 

MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS , ( ,\. 

,1 

~ ~ 

; ! ' , '. ',I • ~. 1 

The Vice :president' I' 

" 

",1' ." j ' ." :." '~The Secretary of State (Chairman) "',' ., i' ~ \ ' 

. The Secretary of Defense 

The Director of the United States' Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency , !, 

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ;: 

~ 

,l' : 

"The Special Assistant to the President for Science' 

and Technology 

. ' 

The Special Assistant to the President for 

National Security Affairs ", 

, I 

,~ : 

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission , .. ' 

'The, Director of Central Intelligence 

I 

The Director of th~ Unite~ States Infor~ati?n Agency . 

. :: 

, The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and 

, Space Administration~~_L~::-~';;:: " . ,'·"',r>'}·,',< 

1 :.: ",~ _ , 

, ' .. " 

' . ~ . 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/21 C051 06070 

.,.' 

'" 

'., ' ,-" ;. " I :' • 

, . ~ . 

') , 

,';f' 

i , <, 4", , 

I " j .' I 

I' 

"-""""""e~J 

... -

; 'I:!:!!:!