1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

________________________________ 

 )

NEWTON GREGORIO, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 16-782 (EGS) 

 )

STANLEY K. HOOVER, and )

CHESAPEAKE DISTRICT OF THE )

WESLEYAN CHURCH, )

 )

Defendants. )

________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Newton Gregorio, co-founder of the Capital Wesleyan Church 

(“Capital”), brings this action individually and as the Pastor 

and Minister in Charge of Capital against the Chesapeake 

District of the Wesleyan Church (“Chesapeake”) and Stanley K. 

Hoover, Chesapeake’s Superintendent. Mr. Gregorio asserts claims 

of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, wrongful eviction, 

defamation, and age discrimination. Defendants have moved to 

dismiss Mr. Gregorio’s complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. Upon consideration of 

the motion, the response and reply thereto, the applicable law, 

and for the reasons discussed below, defendants’ motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2 

I. Background

The facts alleged in the complaint are as follows. In 1995, 

Newton Gregorio and his wife, Lynette Gregorio, co-founded the 

Capital Inner City Outreach Ministry, which they later 

incorporated as the Capital Wesleyan Church. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 

¶ 6. Capital adopted and affiliated itself with Wesleyan 

religious doctrines and principles but retained its 

organizational, administrative, and pastoral independence vis-àvis the national Wesleyan Church and the national Church’s midAtlantic regional subsidiary, the Chesapeake District of the 

Wesleyan Church. Id. ¶¶ 6-8. 

 Despite that independence, Chesapeake procured a loan in 

the amount of $110,000 from the Wesleyan Investment Foundation 

(“WIF”) to be used for the purchase of property at 3831 14th 

Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., and Capital and Chesapeake 

co-signed the promissory note related to that loan. Id. ¶ 7. The 

Deed of Trust, however, was in Chesapeake’s name only, and 

Chesapeake holds title to the property. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. At some 

point, Capital and Chesapeake “entered into an agreement” 

related to the 3831 14th Street property that provided that 

Chesapeake would secure and arrange the financing to purchase 

the property; that Capital would be responsible for repaying the 

loan; that Chesapeake would hold title to the property while the 

loan was in repayment “to protect against Capital’s default on 
3 

the loan”; and that, when the loan was repaid, Chesapeake would 

“relinquish the title to the property to Capital free and clear 

of any encumbrances.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 21. By 2005, Capital, using 

“the funds of the Capital membership without any contribution 

from Chesapeake,” had fully repaid the loan, but since that time 

Chesapeake has refused to transfer title to Capital. Id. ¶¶ 9, 

16, 19, 21. 

 Chesapeake also obtained financing to purchase an adjacent 

property at 3829 14th Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C. and 

entered into a “special arrangement” with Capital “whereby the 

property would be owned by Chesapeake, but Capital would be 

responsible for payment of the [p]romissory [n]ote on the 

property.” Id. ¶¶ 17, 31.1 Thus, Mr. Gregorio “raised the funds 

to pay for” the 3829 14th Street property. Id. ¶ 10. Those 

payments were made until Chesapeake took action in the spring 

and summer of 2015 to remove Mr. Gregorio from his positions as 

Pastor and Minister in Charge of Capital. See id. ¶ 31. 

 Mr. Gregorio had held those positions along with his wife 

until she passed away in 2011. See id. ¶¶ 7, 10. After Mr. 

Gregorio’s wife’s passing, Stanley K. Hoover, the District 

Superintendent for Chesapeake, formally appointed Mr. Gregorio 

 

1 Mr. Gregorio’s complaint has two consecutive paragraphs 

numbered “17.” To avoid confusion, the Court will construe both 

paragraphs to constitute a single paragraph 17. 
4 

as Minister in Charge of Capital. Id. ¶ 10. Although Mr. 

Gregorio maintains that Mr. Hoover and Chesapeake had no 

authority to determine who was Minister in Charge of Capital, 

Mr. Gregorio accepted the appointment and, concurrent with it, 

accepted a stipend of $1,500 per month. See id. ¶¶ 10-11. Mr. 

Gregorio stopped receiving that stipend in October 2012. Id. ¶ 

11. 

 On April 29, 2015, Mr. Hoover informed Mr. Gregorio that it 

was time for Mr. Gregorio to retire because Chesapeake had 

“younger people” capable of taking his place and that his last 

day as Minister in Charge would be May 31, 2015. Id. ¶ 12. Mr. 

Gregorio, however, continued to assert his authority to act as 

Minister in Charge. Id. Chesapeake and Mr. Hoover responded by 

changing the locks to the buildings on the 3829 and 3831 14th 

Street properties without notice to Mr. Gregorio. Id. ¶ 13. On 

June 26 and July 2, 2015, Chesapeake and Mr. Hoover sent a 

letter to law enforcement authorities in the District of 

Columbia and Maryland stating that Mr. Gregorio “had made 

illegal and unauthorized entry onto the properties” and informed 

Mr. Gregorio that he would be subject to arrest if he attempted 

to enter them again. Id. ¶¶ 14, 38, 40. 
5 

 Mr. Gregorio, individually and as Pastor and Minister in 

Charge of Capital,2 alleges six counts against Chesapeake and Mr. 

Hoover: (1) breach of contract based on defendants’ failure to 

convey title to the 3831 14th Street property to Capital 

pursuant to the agreement to carry out such a transfer upon 

Capital’s repayment of the WIF loan, id. ¶¶ 17-22; (2) loss of 

wages based on defendants’ failure to pay the promised monthly 

stipend of $1,500 starting in October 2012, id. ¶¶ 23-26; (3) 

unjust enrichment based on defendants’ retention of the title to 

the 3831 14th Street property despite Capital’s repayment of the 

relevant loan, and unjust enrichment based on defendants’

acceptance of Capital’s payments on the loan pertaining to the 

3829 14th Street property, id. ¶¶ 27-31; (4) wrongful eviction 

based on defendants changing the locks to the buildings on the 

properties in order to prevent Mr. Gregorio from accessing them, 

id. ¶¶ 32-26; (5) defamation based on the letter defendants 

disseminated to law enforcement authorities that stated that Mr. 

 

2 In a footnote and without citation to any legal authority, 

defendants argue that Mr. Gregorio “lacks the capacity to sue as 

the pastor of Capital.” See Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 7-1 at 6 n.1. This Court “‘need not consider 

cursory arguments made only in a footnote.’” Alsawam v. Obama, 

864 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Hutchins v. District 

of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 539 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc)). 

Accordingly, the Court declines to consider defendants’ 

footnoted, unsupported argument concerning Mr. Gregorio’s 

capacity to bring claims on behalf of the entity that he cofounded and incorporated. 
6 

Gregorio had illegally entered onto the properties, id. ¶¶ 37-

41; and (6) age discrimination based on Mr. Hoover forcing Mr. 

Gregorio to retire from his position at Capital because younger 

people were able to take his place. Id. ¶¶ 42, 45-47. 

 Defendants removed the case to this Court, see Notice of 

Removal, ECF No. 1, and have moved to dismiss the claims against 

them because, they argue, this Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction or, in the alternative, because Mr. Gregorio has 

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 

generally Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7. Defendants’ motion 

is now ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.

II. Legal Standards 

 A. Rule 12(b)(1) 

“A federal district court may only hear a claim over which 

[it] has subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, a Rule 12(b)(1) 

motion for dismissal is a threshold challenge to a court’s 

jurisdiction.” Metro. Washington Chapter v. District of 

Columbia, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014). To survive a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

Moran v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 820 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 

2011) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 

(1992)). Because Rule 12(b)(1) concerns a court’s ability to 

hear a particular claim, “the court must scrutinize the 
7 

plaintiff’s allegations more closely when considering a motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) than it would under a 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. U.S. 

Capitol Police Bd., 826 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D.D.C. 2011). In so 

doing, the court must accept as true all of the factual 

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the plaintiff, but the court need not “accept 

inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions 

that are cast as factual allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. 

Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001). In reviewing a motion to dismiss 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the court “may consider such 

materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to 

resolve the question whether it has jurisdiction to hear the 

case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F. Supp. 

2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. 

FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 

 B. Rule 12(b)(6) 

 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 

Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A 

complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give 

the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
8 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

plaintiff need not plead all of the elements of a prima facie 

case in the complaint. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 

506, 511-14 (2002). 

 Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion 

to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially 

plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow the court 

to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to 

a “probability requirement,” but it does require more than a 

“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss [pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the 

factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Atherton v. 

D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted), and the court must give the 

plaintiff the “benefit of all inferences that can be derived 

from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 

1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Even so, the court need not “accept 

inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are 

unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint” or “legal 
9 

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Id.

Further, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not 

sufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

“In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the 

court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents 

attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which 

it may take judicial notice.” Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 

F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Among the documents subject to judicial notice on a 

motion to dismiss are “public records.” Kaempe v. Myers, 367 

F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

C. First Amendment Religious Entanglement Doctrines 

Relying on two doctrines rooted in the First Amendment’s 

Religion Clauses——the ministerial exception and the 

ecclesiastical abstention doctrine——defendants argue that Mr. 

Gregorio’s claims are inextricably intertwined with religious 

matters such that this Court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), does 

not have subject matter jurisdiction over them. See Defs.’ Mem. 

in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem. Supp.”), ECF No. 7-1

at 6-7. Although both of these doctrines can warrant dismissal 

of claims on First Amendment grounds, the ministerial exception 

“operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable 

claim, not a jurisdictional bar.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
10 

Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195 n.4 (2012). 

Accordingly, defendants’ ministerial exception arguments are 

properly analyzed under a Rule 12(b)(6), rather than a Rule 

12(b)(1), lens. See Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin, 700 

F.3d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 2012). However, without definitive 

guidance otherwise from the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit, 

the Court will analyze defendants’ arguments under the 

ecclesiastical abstention doctrine——which is “related” to but 

“distinct” from the ministerial exception, see Kavanagh v. 

Zwilling, 997 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)——under a 

Rule 12(b)(1) lens, as that approach is consistent with the 

long-standing practice of treating questions of ecclesiastical 

entanglement as jurisdictional. See id. 

 The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine is grounded in a 

“long line of Supreme Court cases that affirm the fundamental 

right of churches to ‘decide for themselves, free from state 

interference, matters of church government as well as those of 

faith and doctrine.’” EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 

455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas 

Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 

(1952)). Accordingly, the doctrine “limit[s] the role of civil 

courts in the resolution of religious controversies that 

incidentally affect civil rights,” Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 

v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976), and “severely 
11 

circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving 

church property disputes.” Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth 

Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 

Even so, “not every civil court decision as to property claimed 

by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the 

First Amendment.” Id. Thus, “a State may adopt any one of 

various approaches for settling church property disputes so long 

as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether 

the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.” Jones 

v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The District of Columbia has adopted the neutral 

principles approach to resolve church property disputes. Family 

Fed’n for World Peace v. Hyun Jin Moon, 129 A.3d 234, 249 (D.C. 

2015). Under that approach, a court “relies exclusively on 

objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law 

familiar to lawyers and judges,” thereby keeping it free “from 

entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and 

practice.” Jones, 443 U.S. at 603. As long as its analysis 

avoids judicial entanglement with religious doctrine, a court 

under the neutral principles approach can appropriately assess 

various documents, including deeds, corporate charters, and 

church constitutions. See Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of 

God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 367-68 

(1970) (holding that a court’s resolution of a church property 
12 

dispute did not involve an inquiry into religious doctrine when 

the court had assessed the language in deeds, the terms of 

corporate charters, and the terms of a church’s constitution).

 The related ministerial exception “precludes application of 

[employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the 

employment relationship between a religious institution and its 

ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. “The exception . . . 

ensures that the authority to select and control who will 

minister to the faithful——a matter strictly ecclesiastical——is 

the church’s alone.” Id. at 194-95 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The Supreme Court has expressed no view on 

whether the exception bars claims other than employment 

discrimination claims. Id. at 196. In this Circuit, the 

exception does not bar a breach of contract claim when 

resolution of such a claim is “subject to entirely neutral 

methods of proof.” Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of 

United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1359-61 (D.C. Cir. 

1990). 

III. Analysis

 A. Age Discrimination

 Mr. Gregorio alleges that defendants discriminated against 

him on the basis of age because Mr. Hoover forced him to retire 

from his positions as Pastor and Minister in Charge of Capital 

by telling him that he needed “to retire” because there were 
13 

“younger people” to take his place. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 12, 

45. Defendants argue that Mr. Gregorio’s age discrimination 

claim is barred because whether he makes this claim under the 

District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code. § 2-

1401.01 et seq., or the federal Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., he has failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies. Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 

30-31. In response to this argument, Mr. Gregorio maintains that 

his age discrimination claim is not brought pursuant to the 

DCHRA or the ADEA but rather should be “taken in connection with 

his defamation claims and breach of contract claims.” Pl.’s Mem. 

in Supp. of Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp.”), ECF 

No. 11 at 9. Although it is not entirely clear what Mr. Gregorio 

means by his assertion that his age discrimination claim should 

be “taken in connection with” certain of his other claims, it is 

clear enough that Mr. Gregorio has abandoned any stand-alone age 

discrimination claim. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Mr. Gregorio’s age discrimination claim is GRANTED.3

 

3 Even if Mr. Gregorio had not abandoned his age discrimination 

claim, the ministerial exception bars such a claim. Mr. 

Gregorio’s allegation is that Mr. Hoover “forced him to retire 

because of his age,” thereby ending his tenure as Pastor and 

Minister in Charge of Capital. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 45-46. The 

age discrimination claim before the Court thus “is an employment 

discrimination [claim] brought on behalf of a minister, 

challenging [his] church’s decision to fire [him].” See HosannaTabor, 565 U.S. at 196. “[T]he ministerial exception bars such a 

[claim].” See id. That bar is in place because the Court’s 
14 

 B. Breach of Contract to Pay Mr. Gregorio a Stipend

 Mr. Gregorio asserts a claim that he calls “loss of wages,”

Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 23-26, or, alternatively, “lost revenue.” 

Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 11 at 7. This claim is based on the alleged 

promise that was made to Mr. Gregorio to provide him with a 

stipend of $1,500 per month. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 11. Mr. 

Gregorio stopped receiving this stipend in October 2012. Id. 

 Defendants argue that Mr. Gregorio’s claim for loss of 

wages should be barred by the ministerial exception. Defs.’ Mem. 

Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 8-10. Even if the ministerial exception 

poses no bar, defendants argue that the loss of wages claim 

should be dismissed because there is no District of Columbia 

cause of action for loss of wages. Id. at 26-27. And even if the 

Court construes Mr. Gregorio’s claim as one for breach of 

contract, defendants argue that that claim should still be 

dismissed because Mr. Gregorio never alleges that defendants 

agreed to pay him any compensation, which is consistent with his 

 

involvement in assessing the propriety of Mr. Gregorio’s 

termination would improperly entangle the Court in “an internal 

church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church 

itself.” Id. at 190; see also Minker, 894 F.2d at 1356-58 

(affirming the dismissal of a minister’s age discrimination 

claims on the ground that “evaluation of the ‘gifts and graces’ 

of a minister must be left to ecclesiastical institutions”). To 

the extent that Mr. Gregorio’s argument is that he was never 

employed by Chesapeake as a minister such that the ministerial 

exception is inapposite, see Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 11 at 9, 17-18, 

he does not offer any viable non-employment basis for 

maintaining an age discrimination claim. 
15 

repeated assertions that Capital is completely independent from 

Chesapeake. Id. at 27-28. Defendants assert that “the only 

reasonable inference” is that any promise to pay Mr. Gregorio 

was made by Capital, not by Chesapeake or Mr. Hoover. Id. at 28. 

Because a court’s determination of whether a plaintiff has 

stated a claim turns not on “labels and conclusions” or the 

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” see 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, but rather turns on whether a 

plaintiff has alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” 

see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted), 

there is no reason to dismiss a claim merely because Mr. 

Gregorio affixes a misleading doctrinal label to it. See Rose 

Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 93 F.R.D. 

858, 862 (D. Del. 1982) (“[I]f facts are pleaded which establish 

that recovery is warranted, a Court will apply the relevant 

theory even though not pleaded.”). Accordingly, scrutinizing the 

factual allegations rather than the labels in the complaint, the 

Court appropriately construes Mr. Gregorio’s loss of wages claim 

as one for breach of contract. 

 In the District of Columbia, the elements of a breach of 

contract claim are: “‘(1) a valid contract between the parties; 

(2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a 

breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.’” Brown 
16 

v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 

Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009)). 

Defendants argue that there was no valid contract between them 

and Mr. Gregorio because Mr. Gregorio has not specifically 

alleged that defendants agreed to pay him a stipend and that 

“the only reasonable inference” is that Capital made that 

promise of a stipend. Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 27-28. 

This argument is unavailing. Mr. Gregorio alleges that he “was 

promised a stipend/allowance” of $1,500 per month. Compl., ECF 

No. 1-1 ¶ 11. Although it is not entirely clear who made that 

promise, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 

the complaint is construed liberally in Mr. Gregorio’s favor, 

and the Court should grant him the benefit of all inferences 

that can be derived from the facts that have been alleged. See 

Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. Accordingly, at this stage of 

proceedings, the Court infers that defendants promised to pay 

Mr. Gregorio for his services as Pastor and Minister in Charge 

and that they breached their duty to make that payment when they 

withheld payment starting in October 2012. See Compl., ECF No. 

1-1 ¶ 11. 

Defendants’ argument that the ministerial exception bars 

this breach of contract claim is also unavailing. In Minker, the 

D.C. Circuit recognized that a “church is always free to burden 

its activities voluntarily through contracts, and such contracts 
17 

are fully enforceable in civil court.” 894 F.2d at 1359. There, 

the court considered a breach of an oral employment contract 

claim asserted by a minister. Id. at 1359. The court recognized 

that “[i]t could turn out that in attempting to prove his case, 

[the minister] will be forced to inquire into matters of 

ecclesiastical policy even as to his contract claim.” Id. at 

1360. But in recognition of the possibility that “it may turn 

out that the potentially mischievous aspects of [his] claim . . 

. are subject to entirely neutral methods of proof,” the court 

deemed dismissal premature. Id. The same analysis is warranted 

here. If it turns out that resolution of Mr. Gregorio’s claim 

that defendants breached a contract to pay him a stipend 

requires excessive entanglement with religious doctrine, the 

Court can grant summary judgment in favor of defendants. See id.

But because at this early stage it is not entirely clear that 

resolution of Mr. Gregorio’s claim will require anything other 

than “neutral methods of proof,” dismissal on ministerial 

exception grounds is not warranted. See id. Accordingly, 

defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Gregorio’s claim of breach of 

a contract to pay him a stipend is DENIED.

 C. Breach of Contract to Convey Title to Real Property

 Mr. Gregorio also asserts that defendants have breached a 

contract to convey title to the 3831 14th Street property to 

Capital. He acknowledges that “Chesapeake’s name only” is on the 
18 

deed of trust and that “Chesapeake still holds the title” to the 

property in question. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 7, 9. Even so, Mr. 

Gregorio alleges that Capital and Chesapeake “entered into an 

agreement” whereby Capital would repay the loan and Chesapeake 

would hold title until the loan was fully repaid. Id. ¶ 18. Upon 

repayment of the loan, Chesapeake was to “relinquish the title 

to the property to Capital.” Id. ¶ 21. 

 Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over this breach of contract claim. The first 

argument that defendants put under the subject matter 

jurisdiction heading is that because Capital is a component or 

subsidiary of Chesapeake, Chesapeake is the rightful owner of 

any real property in question, and thus Mr. Gregorio’s claims 

related to that property are merely alternative 

characterizations of his underlying employment-related claims: 

i.e., his age discrimination claim and breach of contract claim 

concerning the promised stipend. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 

7 at 11-12. According to defendants, because those underlying 

employment-related claims should be barred due to excessive 

religious entanglement, the claims concerning real property 

should be similarly barred. Id. at 13. 

 This argument is unpersuasive. Even assuming that “Capital 

is a part of the Chesapeake District,” see id. at 11-12, it is 

not clear why Capital’s status as a subsidiary to Chesapeake 
19 

would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to resolve a claim of 

breach of contract brought on Capital’s behalf. See Stamp v. 

Inamed Corp., 777 F. Supp. 623, 628 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (“[A] 

subsidiary surely can sue its parent for breach of contract.”). 

That is, even if Capital were a component of Chesapeake, that 

does not automatically bar claims brought against Chesapeake on 

Capital’s behalf. Thus the claims concerning real property, 

including the breach of contract claim, cannot simply be reduced 

to and dismissed as alternative characterizations of Mr. 

Gregorio’s employment-related claims. To the extent that 

defendants’ argument is that it is impermissible for Mr. 

Gregorio to allege facts resembling an employment relationship 

to support his age discrimination claim and stipend contract 

claim, see, e.g., Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 10 (“Hoover . . . 

appointed [Mr. Gregorio] as Minister in Charge of . . . 

Capital.”), at the same time that he alleges facts suggesting 

Capital’s independence from Chesapeake to support the claims 

concerning real property, see, e.g., id. ¶ 8 (“The only 

assistance Chesapeake gave to Capital was to procure a loan . . 

. .”), that argument is unavailing. The Federal Rules “permit[ ] 

inconsistency in both legal and factual allegations . . . .” 

Indep. Enters. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d 1165, 

1175 (3d Cir. 1997). 
20 

Defendants’ second subject matter jurisdiction argument is 

no more persuasive. Defendants argue that the ecclesiastical 

abstention doctrine poses a jurisdictional bar to the Court’s 

resolution of the breach of contract claim related to the 3831 

14th Street property because, according to defendants, 

resolution of that claim will require the Court “to delve into 

the doctrinal beliefs of both Capital and the Wesleyan Church.” 

Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 13. Specifically, defendants 

explain that the deed concerning the 3831 14th Street property 

states that the property is to be held by Chesapeake in trust 

for the use and benefit of the Wesleyan Church, which is 

“‘subject to The Discipline.’” Id. at 16 (citing Deed, Ex. 1-A, 

ECF No. 7-3). The Discipline is the foundational document of the 

Wesleyan Church. Id. It explains the structure and 

administration of the Church and “sets forth the fundamental 

precepts and doctrinal beliefs to which the Church adheres.” Id.

Because the deed specifies that Chesapeake is to hold the 

property in trust for the benefit of the Wesleyan Church and 

that Church, in turn, is subject to The Discipline, that 

foundational text “control[s] every aspect of [Chesapeake’s] 

ownership” of the 3831 14th Street property. Id. at 16-17. The 

Discipline states that Chesapeake can only convey real property 

“‘as may be deemed necessary or convenient for the purpose of 

[Chesapeake].’” Id. at 17 (quoting The Discipline, § 4120(6), 
21 

Ex. 1-C, ECF No. 7-5). The “purpose” of Chesapeake, in turn, 

“‘shall be religious, benevolent, charitable and educational in 

keeping with the purposes of The Wesleyan Church as set forth in 

its Discipline.’” Id. (quoting The Discipline, § 4120(2), Ex. 1-

C, ECF No. 7-5). Defendants argue that because any conveyance of 

real property by Chesapeake must be consistent with the 

religious “purpose” of the Wesleyan Church, the Court is barred 

from resolving the breach of contract claim on religious 

entanglement grounds. Id. at 18-19. In sum, defendants argue 

that resolution of the breach of contract claim turns on whether 

conveyance of title to Capital would be consistent with the 

Wesleyan Church’s religious principles and because that 

determination would involve a judicial assessment of religious 

doctrine, the Court is barred from resolving the breach of 

contract claim concerning the 3831 14th Street property. 

 Assuming defendants are correct that terms in The 

Discipline are relevant to resolution of a claim that Chesapeake 

breached a contract to convey title to Capital,4 it is still not 

 

4 The relevant deed states that Chesapeake holds the 3831 14th 

Street property in trust for the Wesleyan Church and describes 

the Wesleyan Church as being “subject to The Discipline.” See

Deed, Ex. 1-A, ECF No. 7-3. But defendants have not relied on 

any case law or any other legal authority to support the 

proposition that The Discipline, by virtue of being mentioned as 

a governing document for the Wesleyan Church in the deed, 

necessarily constrains the sort of contracts Chesapeake can make 

concerning the real property. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 

at 15-19. The Court’s own research reveals that at least some 
22 

apparent that resolution of the claim would require the Court to 

assess religious doctrine or policy. The fulcrum of defendants’ 

religious entanglement argument is the provision in The 

Discipline that states that Chesapeake can only convey property 

“as may be deemed necessary or convenient for the purpose of 

[Chesapeake].” The Discipline, § 4120(6), Ex. 1-C, ECF No. 7-5.5

Defendants argue that this provision mandates that any contract 

to convey title must be consistent with the religious “purpose” 

of the Wesleyan Church and the Court, in making that assessment 

as part of the breach of contract analysis, would be 

impermissibly assessing religious doctrine. Not so. The 

provision does not require that any conveyance of real property 

actually be consistent with the Wesleyan Church’s religious 

“purpose.” Instead, it states that any conveyance must have been 

 

other courts have “held that church regulations will be given 

legal effect even if they add to the statutory requirements for 

conveyancing.” See Greater Friendship A.M.E. Church v. Spann, 

336 So. 2d 1087, 1090 (Ala. 1976). In any event, because the 

Court is not convinced that resolution of the breach of contract 

claim concerning the real property will involve impermissible 

religious entanglement even if the terms of The Discipline are 

applicable, the Court assumes that those terms are applicable in 

its analysis. 

5 Mr. Gregorio argues that consideration of materials outside the 

pleadings warrants conversion of defendants’ motion to dismiss 

to a motion for summary judgment. Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 11 at 9-

10. But because a “district court may consider materials outside 

the pleadings in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss 

for lack of jurisdiction,” Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc., 402 F.3d 

at 1253, it is appropriate for the Court to consider The 

Discipline and other materials when assessing defendants’ 

jurisdictional ecclesiastical abstention arguments. 
23 

“deemed necessary or convenient” for that religious purpose by 

the appropriate individuals acting on Chesapeake’s behalf. Id.

(emphasis added). An assessment of whether Chesapeake deemed

conveyance of its property to Capital necessary or convenient 

for its religious purpose is a neutral determination that would 

not involve the Court in determining what the Church’s religious 

principles actually are. Thus, assuming the terms of The 

Discipline are relevant to this breach of contract claim, 

defendants have not demonstrated that resolution of that claim 

will require the Court to undertake an assessment of religious 

doctrine or policy. Again, to the extent that it becomes 

apparent that the Court would be required to make such an 

assessment as this case progresses, the Court at that time can 

grant summary judgment on the ground that resolution of the 

claim would create an excessive entanglement with religion. But, 

at this early stage, with that entanglement not yet apparent, 

dismissal on ecclesiastical abstention grounds would be 

premature. 

 Even if the breach of contract claim concerning the 3831 

14th Street property is not barred on religious entanglement 

grounds, defendants offer various arguments as to why that claim 

should still be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. None of these arguments is 

availing. 
24 

 First, defendants argue that Mr. Gregorio fails to state a 

claim because the deed to the property in question “conclusively 

shows that [Chesapeake] is the sole owner of the property.” 

Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 23. Although the relevant deed 

does indicate that Chesapeake holds title to the 3831 14th 

Street property, see Deed, Ex. 1-A, ECF No. 7-3,6 Mr. Gregorio’s 

allegation is that Capital and Chesapeake entered into an 

agreement whereby Chesapeake would transfer title to Capital 

upon Capital’s repayment of the WIF loan. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 

18-22. That defendants can point to a deed indicating that 

Chesapeake holds title thus does not mean that Mr. Gregorio has 

failed to state a claim that Chesapeake breached a contract to 

convey the title that it holds. 

Second, defendants argue that Mr. Gregorio’s allegations 

are insufficiently specific to state a claim, as they argue that 

Mr. Gregorio’s allegations concerning the agreement to convey 

title to Capital never specifically state that Chesapeake “would 

transfer ownership of the property to Capital.” Id. at 22. This 

argument fails because Mr. Gregorio alleges that defendants 

“have breached their agreement with Capital by refusing to 

 

6 Contrary to Mr. Gregorio’s assertion otherwise, see Pl.’s Opp., 

ECF No. 11 at 9-10, the Court can properly consider a deed——a 

public record——without converting defendants’ motion to dismiss 

for failure to state a claim into a motion for summary judgment. 

See George v. Bank of Am. N.A., 821 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301 n.5 

(D.D.C. 2011). 
25 

relinquish the title to the property to Capital free and clear 

of any encumbrances.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 21. To the extent 

that there is any doubt that this allegation sufficiently 

specifies that, pursuant to their agreement, Chesapeake would 

transfer title to Capital, the Court construes the allegation 

liberally in Mr. Gregorio’s favor to conclude that he has 

alleged an agreement between Capital and Chesapeake whereby 

Chesapeake, as part of its end of the bargain, was to transfer 

title to Capital. See Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. 

 And third, defendants argue that because the alleged 

agreement concerns real property, Mr. Gregorio’s failure to 

allege or produce a writing memorializing the agreement to 

convey title runs afoul of the statute of frauds. Id. at 23-24 

(citing D.C. Code § 28-3502). They argue that that written 

agreement must be produced “at this time.” Id. at 23. Defendants 

are correct that, subject to certain limited exceptions, the 

statute of frauds “mandates that certain agreements, including 

those concerning real estate, must be in writing to guard 

against perjury and protect against unfounded and fraudulent 

claims.” Railan v. Katyal, 766 A.2d 998, 1007 (D.C. 2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). But defendants overlook that 

“[i]n order for an agreement to violate the statute of frauds on 

the face of the complaint, the plaintiff must indicate that the 

agreement is not written.” Pub. Health Equip. & Supply Co. v. 
26 

Clarke Mosquito Control Prods., Inc., 410 F. App’x 738, 741 (5th 

Cir. 2010). Mr. Gregorio’s complaint gives no indication that 

the agreement is not written. Accordingly, it would be premature 

to dismiss the breach of contract claim concerning the 3831 14th 

Street property on statute of frauds grounds. Thus, defendants’ 

motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.

 D. Unjust Enrichment 

Mr. Gregorio also asserts claims of unjust enrichment. He 

alleges that defendants have been unjustly enriched by having 

Capital repay the WIF loan concerning the 3831 14th Street 

property while failing to convey title to that property to 

Capital upon complete repayment of the loan, and by having 

Capital repay the loan concerning the adjacent 3829 14th Street 

property. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 27-31. 

Defendants’ arguments concerning the Court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction as to these claims are the same as those that it 

offers regarding the claim of breach of contact concerning the 

3831 14th Street property. See Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 

11-20. The Court’s response is likewise the same: At this stage, 

it is not apparent that resolution of the claims will involve 

impermissible religious entanglement. See supra Part III.C. 

Accordingly, at the present juncture, the Court can properly 

exercise jurisdiction over the unjust enrichment claims. 
27 

 Under District of Columbia law, the elements of an unjust 

enrichment claim are: “(1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit on 

the defendant; (2) the defendant retains the benefit; and (3) 

under the circumstances, the defendant’s retention of the 

benefit is unjust.” Falconi-Sachs v. LPF Senate Square, LLC, 142 

A.3d 550, 556 (D.C. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Defendants’ arguments as to why Mr. Gregorio has failed to state 

a claim of unjust enrichment based on the allegations that 

Capital repaid the loan related to the 3831 14th Street property 

and Chesapeake retained title to that property are the same 

arguments it offers as to why Mr. Gregorio has failed to state a 

claim of breach of contract concerning that property. See Defs.’ 

Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 22-24. Those arguments are just as 

unavailing in the unjust enrichment context as they are in the 

breach of contract context. Based on the allegations that 

Chesapeake has retained title to a property even though 

Chesapeake promised to convey title to Capital upon repayment of 

the relevant loan, Mr. Gregorio has stated a claim of unjust 

enrichment: Capital has conferred a benefit on Chesapeake that 

Chesapeake has retained and, in light of the agreement to convey 

title to Capital upon full repayment of the loan, it would be 

unjust for Chesapeake to retain the title. Accordingly, 
28 

defendants’ motion to dismiss this unjust enrichment claim is 

DENIED.7

 Mr. Gregorio has, however, failed to state a claim of 

unjust enrichment regarding Capital’s repayment of the loan 

related to the 3829 14th Street property. As defendants 

correctly explain, see id. at 25-26, Mr. Gregorio has failed to 

allege any facts that suggest that defendants’ retention of the 

benefit deriving from Capital’s repayment of the loan concerning 

the 3829 14th Street property is unjust. Mr. Gregorio alleges 

that “Capital and Chesapeake entered into a special arrangement 

whereby the property would be owned by Chesapeake, but Capital 

would be responsible for payment of the [p]romissory [n]ote on 

the property.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 17. While making these 

payments might have entitled Capital and Mr. Gregorio to “use 

and control over the property,” he does not allege that the 

payments entitled them to anything beyond that use and control. 

 

7 Although “there can be no claim for unjust enrichment when an 

express contract exists between the parties,” Schiff v. Am. 

Ass’n of Retired Persons, 697 A.2d 1193, 1194 (D.C. 1997), 

“[c]ourts in this District have found that a plaintiff should be 

permitted to plead both breach of contract and unjust 

enrichment.” The Scowcroft Grp., Inc. v. Toreador Res. Corp., 

666 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2009). Accordingly, Mr. Gregorio 

may go forward with both the breach of contract and unjust 

enrichment claims concerning the 3831 14th Street property. This 

conclusion is in the interest of justice, as concluding 

otherwise could leave him “without any remedy should the factfinder determine at a later stage that there was no express 

agreement between the parties.” See id.
29 

See id. Given that Mr. Gregorio and Capital ceased making the 

payments when they were deprived of use and control of the 

property, id., there does not appear to be any injustice in 

permitting Chesapeake to retain the benefit of the payments that 

were made. That is, payments were made for as long as use and 

control of the property was permitted, and payments ceased when 

that use and control was forbidden. Because Mr. Gregorio has not 

adequately pled the third element of his unjust enrichment claim 

concerning the 3829 14th Street property, defendants’ motion to 

dismiss that claim is GRANTED. 

 E. Wrongful Eviction

 Mr. Gregorio also asserts a claim of wrongful eviction. He 

alleges that defendants wrongfully evicted him when they changed 

the locks on the buildings on the 3829 and 3831 14th Street 

properties such that he was unable to access those buildings. 

Id. ¶¶ 32-36. 

Defendants’ arguments concerning subject matter 

jurisdiction as to this claim are the same as those that it has 

put forth regarding the other real property-related claims, and 

the Court’s response to these arguments remains the same: At 

this stage, it is not apparent that resolution of the claim will 

involve impermissible religious entanglement. See supra Part 

III.C. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, the Court 
30 

can properly exercise jurisdiction over the wrongful eviction 

claim. 

 In the District of Columbia, “[i]n order to establish 

wrongful eviction, a tenant must prove that the landlord 

performed some act of a permanent character with the intention 

and effect of depriving the tenant of the enjoyment of the 

demised premises or a part thereof.” Hinton v. Sealander 

Brokerage Co., 917 A.2d 95, 101 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Moreover, “a landlord is prohibited from using 

self-help to evict a tenant and must proceed instead by using 

the process provided by law.” Id. at 102. This prohibition of 

self-help eviction applies even outside the context of a 

residential tenancy. See Sarete, Inc. v. 1344 U Street Ltd. 

P’ship, 871 A.2d 480, 489-90 (D.C. 2005). Defendants argue that 

Mr. Gregorio has failed to state a claim of wrongful eviction 

because he has not sufficiently established an ownership 

interest or tenancy as to the properties in question. Defs.’ 

Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 24-25. They emphasize that Mr. 

Gregorio “does not allege the existence of a lease or any other 

legal document that would give him a right to use or occupy the 

property.” Id. at 25. 

Defendants’ argument here is unavailing. “[T]he D.C. Court 

of Appeals has left open the possibility that a cause of action 

for wrongful eviction may nonetheless be available to an 
31 

individual who has ‘something less than some sort of tenancy.’” 

Mitchell v. Eastern Sav. Bank, FSB, 890 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 

(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Sarete, 871 A.2d at 494). Thus 

defendants’ argument that Mr. Gregorio’s wrongful eviction claim 

must fail because, according to defendants, he was neither an 

owner nor a tenant does not have much traction at the motion to 

dismiss stage. Mr. Gregorio’s status vis-à-vis the properties in 

question can be more concretely determined following discovery 

and, accordingly, dismissal of the wrongful eviction claim at 

this stage would be premature. See id. at 108-09.

 Additionally, even assuming a tenancy——and not just 

“something less than some sort of tenancy”——is required to 

sustain a District of Columbia wrongful eviction claim, Mr. 

Gregorio has alleged facts that support the existence of a 

tenancy. Whether he and Capital were tenants “depends upon the 

circumstances surrounding the use and occupancy of the 

property.” See Young v. District of Columbia, 752 A.2d 138, 143 

(D.C. 2000). Those circumstances include the existence of “a 

lease agreement, the payment of rent and other conditions of 

occupancy between the parties.” See id. Moreover, “certain 

tenancies may arise by oral agreement of the parties.” Id. at 

142. Defendants point out that Mr. Gregorio has not alleged the 

existence of a lease agreement, Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 

at 25, but, as concerns the 3829 14th Street property, Mr. 
32 

Gregorio alleges that “Capital and Chesapeake entered into a 

special arrangement whereby the property would be owned by 

Chesapeake, but Capital would be responsible for payment of the 

[p]romissory [n]ote on the property.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 17. 

Payment of that note entitled Capital to the “exclusive use and 

control over the property on a day to day basis.” Id. The 

arrangement Mr. Gregorio describes in his complaint sounds very 

much like a landlord-tenant relationship. Defendants seem to 

admit as much when they note that “[o]n the face of the 

[c]omplaint, it seems that Plaintiff allegedly paid [Chesapeake] 

in exchange for use of the property.” Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 

7-1 at 26. Because a wrongful eviction might be sustained based 

on “something less than some sort of tenancy” and because it 

appears that a tenancy may have existed here, defendants’ motion 

to dismiss Mr. Gregorio’s wrongful eviction claim is DENIED.

 F. Defamation

 Mr. Gregorio also asserts a claim of defamation. He argues 

that defendants defamed him when they disseminated a letter to 

law enforcement officers in the District of Columbia and 

Maryland that stated that he “had made illegal and unauthorized 

entry onto the properties.” Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 38; Pl.’s 

Opp., ECF No. 11 at 7-8. 

 Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over the defamation claim under the ecclesiastical 
33 

abstention doctrine because they plan on asserting the defense 

of truth to the defamation claim and, according to defendants, 

determining the truth regarding the ownership of the properties 

in question will impermissibly implicate this Court in matters 

of religious doctrine and policy. Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 

at 20. This argument is unpersuasive. For the reasons already 

stated above, see supra Part III.C, the Court is not convinced 

that resolving the real property-related claims will necessitate 

inappropriate judicial meddling in religious matters. 

Accordingly, at this juncture, the defamation claim is not 

barred on religious entanglement grounds. 

“To state a cause of action for defamation, plaintiff must 

allege and prove four elements: (1) that the defendant made a 

false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) 

that the defendant published the statement without privilege to 

a third party; (3) that the defendant’s fault in publishing the 

statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either that 

the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of 

special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff 

special harm.” Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that Mr. 

Gregorio has failed to state a claim of defamation because their 

statements, having been made to law enforcement authorities, 

were protected by a qualified privilege. Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF 
34 

No. 7-1 at 29 (citing Carter v. Hahn, 821 A.2d 890, 894 (D.C. 

2003)). Defendants argue that, given the applicable qualified 

privilege, their statements can only give rise to a defamation 

claim upon a showing of malice. Id. (citing Carter, 821 A.2d at 

894). They assert that a showing of malice requires that they 

knew the statements they made were false or that they acted with 

reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statements 

that they made. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 

U.S. 323, 327-28 (1974)). Because Mr. Gregorio has not alleged 

facts “sufficient to support a finding of malice,” defendants 

argue that Mr. Gregorio’s defamation claim must be dismissed. 

Id. at 29-30. 

 Defendants correctly explain that “a qualified privilege 

exists when a statement about suspected wrongdoing is made in 

good faith to law enforcement authorities.” See Columbia First 

Bank v. Ferguson, 665 A.2d 650, 655 (D.C. 1995). They also 

correctly explain that the qualified privilege is lost upon a 

showing of malice. See id. at 656. But they misunderstand what 

is meant by “malice.” The actual malice standard that they 

describe——i.e., whether the statements were made with knowledge 

that they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they 

were false or not——“is not to be confused with the common law 

concept of ‘malice.’” Montgomery v. Risen, No. 16-126, 2016 WL 

3919809, at *28 (D.D.C. July 15, 2016). That common law concept 
35 

of malice——“a showing of ill will,” id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted)——is what applies in the context of a District of 

Columbia defamation claim. Columbia First Bank, 665 A.2d at 656 

(describing “malice as it relates to qualified privilege in 

defamation cases” as “ill will”). Thus, defendants’ arguments 

concerning what Mr. Gregorio has alleged about what they knew 

are largely inapposite. Instead, whether defendants acted with 

malice turns on their motivations: If they disseminated the 

statements with reckless disregard as to Mr. Gregorio’s feelings 

such that it could be said that they acted with ill will, then 

they acted with malice sufficient to overcome the applicable 

qualified privilege. See id. 

 Mr. Gregorio has made allegations sufficient to support a 

finding of malice. At this stage, the Court must accept as true 

all of Mr. Gregorio’s allegations. See Atherton, 567 F.3d at 

681. Thus the Court accepts as true the allegation that 

Chesapeake contracted with Capital to convey title to the 3831 

14th Street property to Capital upon repayment of the WIF loan 

but then refused to honor that contract. Compl., ECF No. 1-1 ¶¶ 

17-22. That allegation alone is sufficient to support the 

conclusion that defendants acted with ill will——that is, common 

law malice——when they disseminated a letter to law enforcement 

authorities stating that Mr. Gregorio was illegally accessing 

that property. Thus defendants’ argument that the defamation 
36 

claim must be dismissed on the basis of qualified privilege is 

unavailing. 

Defendants’ other argument——that because they “have 

established the truth of their allegedly defamatory statements, 

[Mr. Gregorio] cannot prevail on his claim for defamation,” 

Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 30——is also unavailing. Based 

on his allegations, Mr. Gregorio has stated a claim that 

Chesapeake breached a contract to convey title to the 3831 14th 

Street property to Capital, see supra Part III.C, so defendants 

have not yet established that they disseminated a truthful 

statement when they told law enforcement authorities that Mr. 

Gregorio was illegally accessing that property. Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Mr. Gregorio’s defamation claim is thus 

DENIED.

 G. Claims Against Mr. Hoover in His Individual Capacity 

 Defendants argue that to the extent that Mr. Gregorio has 

stated claims against Chesapeake, his claims against Mr. Hoover 

in his individual capacity should still be dismissed. Defs.’ 

Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 32-33. Under District of Columbia 

law, corporate officers can be personally liable for wrongful 

acts “‘which they commit, participate in, or inspire, even 

though the acts are performed in the name of the corporation.’” 

Perry ex rel. Perry v. Frederick Inv. Corp., 509 F. Supp. 2d 11, 

18 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Lawlor v. District of Columbia, 758 
37 

A.2d 964, 974 (D.C. 2000)). That individual liability “must be 

premised upon a corporate officer’s meaningful participation in 

the wrongful acts . . . [which] can exist when there is an act 

or omission by the officer which logically leads to the 

inference that he had a share in the wrongful acts of the 

corporation which constitute the offense.” McWilliams Ballard, 

Inc. v. Broadway Mgmt. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants argue that Mr. 

Gregorio “has failed to allege that [Mr.] Hoover meaningfully 

participated in the purported wrongful acts” other than age 

discrimination.8 Defs.’ Mem. Supp., ECF No. 7-1 at 32. Instead, 

Mr. Gregorio’s complaint alleges in generalized fashion that 

“Hoover and Chesapeake” or “Defendants” committed the alleged 

wrongful acts. Id. Accordingly, defendants assert, the breach of 

contract, unjust enrichment, wrongful eviction, and defamation 

claims must be dismissed as to Mr. Hoover in his individual 

capacity. Id. at 32-33. 

 Defendants are correct that Mr. Gregorio has made 

allegations that generally refer to “Defendants” or “Hoover and 

Chesapeake,” rather than making allegations that specify the 

 

8 Because Mr. Gregorio has abandoned his age discrimination claim 

and because, in any event, that claim is barred by the 

ministerial exception, see supra Part III.A, the Court need not 

address Mr. Hoover’s potential individual liability as to that 

claim. That claim is dismissed as to both Chesapeake and Mr. 

Hoover. 
38 

exact acts or omissions of Mr. Hoover. See, e.g., Compl., ECF 

No. 1-1 ¶¶ 26(“The Defendants refusal to compensate Plaintiff 

for his services since 2012 has resulted in a loss of wages . . 

. .”), 38 (“Hoover and Chesapeake . . . circulated a letter 

containing materially false and damaging information . . . .”). 

But this somewhat generalized pleading style does not warrant 

dismissal of the various claims as to Mr. Hoover in his 

individual capacity. Mr. Gregorio need “not prove[ ] [Mr. 

Hoover’s] involvement in the alleged violations” at the motion 

to dismiss stage. See Cooper v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Inv’rs 

Corp., 206 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 2002). Rather, Mr. 

Gregorio is “entitled to offer evidence at a later time to 

support these claims.” See id. Accordingly, the motion to 

dismiss the claims against Mr. Hoover in his individual capacity 

is DENIED. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss 

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Mr. Gregorio’s age 

discrimination claim and the unjust enrichment claim concerning 

the 3829 14th Street property are hereby dismissed. All 

remaining claims shall proceed against both defendants. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 
39 

 United States District Judge 

 February 28, 2017