1 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

Per Curiam



## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC., ET AL

. 11–391 v. CLAYTON BROWN ET AL

.

CLARKSBURG NURSING HOME & REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC, DBA CLARKSBURG CONTINUOUS CARE CENTER, ET AL

. 11–394 v.

SHARON A. MARCHIO, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
PAULINE VIRGINIA WILLETT

ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

Nos. 11–391 and 11–394. Decided February 21, 2012

P ER C URIAM

. State and federal courts must enforce the Federal Arbi

tration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq. , with respect to all arbitration agreements covered by that statute. Here, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, by misreading and disregarding the precedents of this Court interpreting the FAA, did not follow controlling federal law implement

ing that basic principle. The state court held unenforceable all predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal injury or wrongful death against nursing homes. The decision of the state court found the FAA’s coverage to be more limited than mandated by this Court’s previous cases. The decision of the State Supreme Court of Appeals must be vacated. When this Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a stat e court may not contradict or fail to implement the rule so established. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2.2 MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER v. BROWN

Per Curiam

I
This litigation involves th ree negligence suits against nursing homes in West Virginia. The suits were brought by Clayton Brown, Jeffrey Taylor, and Sharon Marchio. In each case, a family member of a patient requiring ex

tensive nursing care had signed an agreement with a nursing home on behalf of the patient. The relevant parts of the agreements in Brown’s case and Taylor’s case were identical. The contracts included a clause requiring the parties to arbitrate all disputes, other than claims to col

lect late payments owed by the patient. The contracts included a provision holding the party filing the arbitra

tion responsible for paying a filing fee in accordance with
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association fee schedules. The agreement in Marchio’s case also included a clause requiring arbitration but made no exceptions to the arbitration requirement and did not mention filing
fees. In each of the three cases, a family member of a patient who had died sued the nursing home in state court, alleg

ing that negligence caused injuries or harm resulting in death. A state trial court dismissed the suits by Brown and Taylor based on the agreements to arbitrate. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia consolidated those cases with Marchio’s, which was before the court on

other issues. In a decision concerning all three cases, the state court held that “as a matter of public policy under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concern

ing the negligence.” Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp.

, No. 35494 (W. Va., June 29, 2011), App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 11–391, pp. 85a–86a (hereinafter Pet. App.). The state court considered whether the state public policy was3 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

Per Curiam

pre-empted by the FAA. The state court found unpersua

sive this Court’s interpretati on of the FAA, calling it “ten

dentious,” id. , at 51a, and “created from whole cloth,” id.

, at 53a. It later concluded t hat “Congress did not intend for the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to personal injury or wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive from a written agreement that evidences a transaction affecting interstate commerce, particularly where the agreement involves a service that is a practical necessity for members of the public,” id. , at 84a. The court thusconcluded that the FAA does not pre-empt the state public policy against predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims of personal injury or wrongful death against nursing homes. The West Virginia court’s interpretation of the FAA was

both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the precedents of this Court. The FAA provides that a “written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transac

tion involving commerce to se ttle by arbitration a contro

versy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. §2. The statute’s text includes no exception for personal-injur y or wrongful-death claims. It “requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to
arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd , 470 U. S. 213, 217 (1985). It “reflects an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” KPMG LLP v. Coc

chi , 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. , 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985); internal quota

tion marks omitted). As this Court reaffirmed last Term, “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitrati on of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep

-4 MARMET HEALTH CARE CENTER v. BROWN

Per Curiam

cion , 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 6–7). That rule resolves these cases. West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury orwrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage
of the FAA. See ibid. See also, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer , 552
U. S. 346, 356 (2008) (FAA pre-empts state law granting state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide issue the parties agreed to arbitrate); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. , 514 U. S. 52, 56 (1995) (FAA pre

empts state law requiring judicial resolution of claims involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas , 482 U. S. 483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts state-law requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for wage dis

putes); Southland Corp. v. Keating , 465 U. S. 1, 10 (1984) (FAA pre-empts state financial investment statute’s prohibition of arbitration of claims brought under that statute).

II
The West Virginia court proposed an “alternativ[e]” holding that the particular arbitration clauses in Brown’s case and Taylor’s case were unconscionable. Pet. App. 89a–91a, 94a. See also id. , at 98a (not addressing the question whether the arbitration agreement in Marchio’s case is unenforceable for reasons other than public policy). It is unclear, however, to what degree the state court’s alternative holding was influenced by the invalid, categor

ical rule discussed above, the rule against predispute arbitration agreements. For example, in its discussion of the alternative holding, the state court found the arbitra

tion clauses unconscionable in part because a predispute arbitration agreement that applies to claims of personal injury or wrongful death against nursing homes “clearly violates public policy.” Id., at 91a.5 Cite as: 565 U. S. ____ (2012)

Per Curiam

On remand, the West Virginia court must consider whether, absent that general public policy, the arbitrationclauses in Brown’s case and Taylor’s case are unenforceable under state common law principles that are not spe

cific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA.

* * *
The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is vacated, and the cases are remanded for proceedings not incon

sistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.