### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 13, 200 4

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . LARRY HUNT

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 00-12639-41 C hris Craft, Jud ge

No. W2003-01738-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Septem ber 14, 2004

The ap p e ll a n t, L arr y H u n t, w a s c o n v ic te d b y a ju r y in th e Sh e lb y Co u n ty Crim in a l Cour t of one

co u n to f a ggra v at ed ra p e, o n e co u n t o f aggr av at ed ro b b er y , an d o n e co u n t o f a ggra v at ed k i d n ap p i n g. Following a hea

ring
, the t rial court sentence d the appe llant to twenty -five y ear s incarc eration for the ag g ravated ra

pe convic tion, twelve y ear s incar cer ation for the ag g ravated robbery conviction, and twelve y ear s incarc eration for the ag g ravated kidnapping conviction. The tria l court orde red the
sentenc e for

ag g ravated ra

pe be se rved c onsecutively to the remaining sente nces, f or an e ffe ctive thi rty -se ven y ear s e nte nc e . O n a pp e a l, the app e lla nt c ha lle ng e s th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to support his conviction of ag g ravated rape and the i mpositi on of consecutive sentencing

. I n light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in B lakely v. Washington,

__ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct . 2531 (2004), we modify

the appe llant’s sentenc e for ag g ravated ra

pe to twenty -t wo y ear s and the
sentenc es for

ag g ravated robbe ry

and ag g ravated kidnapping to ten y ear s, for a n eff ective se ntence of thirty -two y ear s incarc eration

. W e al s o v acate the judg ment of convic tion for count two of indictment number 00-12640 , which judg ment was e ntere d in error . We otherwise a ffirm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Cr im ina l C our t a r e Va c at e d in P ar t a nd A ffirm e d as M odi fie d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

W. Ma rk War d ( on app e a l) a ndTr e nt H a ll ( a t tria l) , A ssi sta nt P ub lic De fe nd e rs , M e mp his
, Te nn e sse e , f

or the app e lla nt, L arry

Hu nt.

Pa ul G. Sum me rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L . B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Stephe n J o n es , As sistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

I n the ea rly morning hours of May 15, 2000, the vi ctim was working alone as a nig ht auditor at a Holiday

I nn in Memphis. The hotel was e quipped with a “fake” sec urity came ra. A t

app ro xima te ly

1:0 0 a. m., the vic tim “ pu t the c omp ute r s y ste m in to the a ud it p ro g ram” a ndwe nt t o the re stroom. When the victim came out of the r estroom, she wa s startled by the appellant standing at the door to the of

fice . The victim rec og nized the appellant, a forme r employ ee w ho had tra ined her a s night auditor approximately one month prior to these of fense s. The vic t i m “jumped bac k, closed [her] ey es,” a nd told the appellant he ha d frig htened he r. Howe ver, w hen she ope ned her

e y e s, the app e lla nt h a d a

g un po int e d in he r f

a c e . T he vic tim de sc ri be d the g un a s “ a sil ve r g un wi th an off -white ha ndle.”

The a ppellant told the victim to open the door to the office , and the victim complied. Upon
entering the office , the appe llant ordere d the victim to r etrieve the ca sh drawe r fr om the front desk. The drawer contained a

pproxi mately

two to three hundr ed dollars. Ag ain, the victim complied. The appellant took the money

from the dr awe r and pla ced it in his pocket. The rea fter, the appellant a sked the vic tim

fo r the ke y s to the nig ht de po sit bo x. Th e vic tim re pli e d tha t she did no t hav e the ke y s. The a ppellant then asked the victim f or her purse and identification. The a ppellant explained that he wa nted her

addre ss in the event that she reported him to police. The victim told the appellant that she did not have he r purse or her identification.

N e x t , t h e ap p e l l a n tf

o r c e d t h e v i c t i mt o a b a c k o f f i c e a n d o r d e r e d h e r t o s i t o n t h e f l o o r

. In the offic e wa s a piec e of lugg ag e that had been left by a hotel g uest. The a

ppellant “r ansac k[ed] ” the lug g a g e , b ut d id n ot t ake a nythi ng . T he app e lla nt the n o rd e re d th e vic tim to s ta nd a ndwa lk w ith him to the rea r of the hote l. The vi ctim testified t hat “[ the appellant] had me in front of him, and he had the g un stuck in my back.” The appellant forc ed the victim to a dark banquet room. Once inside the banquet r oom, the appellant “put his hand with the g un around [the victim’s] neck.” The appellant the n f on dle d th e vic tim ’s br e a sts , put his ha ndint o h e r p a nti e s, a nddig ita lly pe ne tr a te d th e vic tim

.

After war d, the appe llant ordere d the victim into a storag e room and forc ed her to sit on the floor. The appellant pa ced ba ck and f orth, then aske d the victim f or the ke y s to the hotel van. The victim told t he appe llant that the key s wer e at the front desk. The appellant and the victim returne d to the front desk. A s they approa ched the front desk, the y observe d a man talking on the pay telephone in the lobby

of the hotel. Believing that the man wa s the owner of the hotel, the a

ppellant

or de re d th e vic tim

to s it o n th e fl oo r wh ile he wa lke d into the lob by

. Th e app e lla nt r e turne d s ho rt ly there afte r and told the victim that a g uest was at the front desk w aiting to be reg istered.

Whil e the victim re g istered the g uest, the appe llant hid behind the front desk with the g un pointed at the victim. Be cause the computer sy stem was “down [for] the ni g ht audit,” the victim had to manually r e g is te r th e g u e s t. Sh e a s k e d th e g u e s t to f il l o u t a r e g is tr a ti o n f

o r m a n d h a n d ed the g uest a c ard ke y

on which she ha d written, “[C] all the police.” The g uest asked the victim if she was-3-

having a ro u gh n i g ht, and the victim replied that “he didn’t know the half of it.” T he g uest neve r called the police.

After the g uest retire d to his room, the appellant told the victim they “we re fix ing to go .” Howeve r, the victim told the appellant that she “w asn’t g oing any wher e with him” and that “ if he was g oing to shoot [her], he was g oing to shoot [her] in the h o t el wh er e s o m ebody could identify [her].” The appe llant pushed the victim and orde red he r out of t h e h otel. The victim turned a nd

s t ru ckt h e a p p el l an t

. T h e a p p el l an tt h en s tru ckt h e v i ct i mo n t h e h ea d s ev er al t i m es , “k n o ck [ i n g] [her] i n a daze.” After

repe atedly

striking the vic tim, the appellant g rabbe d the victim by the bac k of he r s hirt a nddr a g g e d h e r f ro m th e ho te l.

Ou ts id e , th e ap p e ll a n t f

o r c e d th e v ic ti m in to th e h o te l v a n , o r d e r in g h e r to s it on the floor behind t he driver’s seat. The appellant then climbed into the driver ’s seat and drove away from the ho te l. Th e app e llant dr ov e fo r app ro xima te ly ha lf a n ho ur , sto pp ing oc c a sio na lly on si de str e e ts. Fr om her position, the victim was able to see out the window of the va n, but was unable to signa l for he lp.

Eventually , the appe llant drove to Sheffield Hig h School and parke d in a dar k are a behind the sc ho ol. Th e app e lla nt f or c e d th e vic tim

ou t of the va n a ndto h e r kne e s. He inf orme d th e vic tim that he had to kill her to prevent her from identifying him. The appellant then pointed the wea pon at the victim’s hea d, and the victim beg an to pr ay aloud. The appellant c ocked the g un and told the victim to “ s h u t up.” The a ppellant put the g un to the victim’s head, but did not pull the trigg er. I nstead, the a

ppellant order ed the victim ba ck into the van. The victim complied, and the appellant

a llo we d h e r t o s it i n th e se a t be hin d th e drive r’s seat

. Before drivi ng a way fr om the hig h s c ho ol, “[the appell an t ] t urned a

round and looke d [t he victim] i n [t he] face and told [her] t hat [she] was lucky [she] was a

black woma n with kids.”

After leaving the high school parking lot, the appellant told the victim that when que stioned

abo ut the e ve nts of

that e ve nin g , s he was to say th at a ma n in a sk i ma sk c omm itt e d th e of

fe ns e s. Th e vic tim

a greed. The app e lla nt the n a po log ize d f

or hu rt ing he r anda sk e d if

sh e wa nte d h im t o dr ive he r hom e

. Whe n the vic tim de c lin e d, the app e llant pul le d in to a pa rking lot a ndtol d th e vic tim that “his life was now i n [her] hands.” He r emoved his t-shirt and swe ater , “wiped dow n every thing i n t h e v a n , ” a n d w a l k e d a w a y.

Th e vic tim

re turne d to the ho tel a ndte le ph on e d th e po lic e a ndthe ma na g e r o f the ho te l. Shortlythere afte r, the police arrived. An ambulanc e also a rrived and examined the victim’s head and wrists. The victim’s injuries did not require hospitalization.

Robbery Serg eant B art Rag land and Of f ic er M ikeSh e a

rin o f th eM e mphis P olice De partment

we re involve d in the inv e sti g a tio n o f the of fe ns e s a ndthe arr e st o f the app e lla nt. Th e vic tim i d en t i fi ed the appe llant as the per petrator, and a

war rant for the appe llant’s arr est was issued. There afte r, Serg eant Rag land aske d Offic er Shea rin to assist in locating the a ppellant. Off

icer She ari n q ue sti on e d th e app e lla nt’ s p are nts a t th e ir re sp e c tiv e re sid e nc e s a ndpr ov ide d the m w ith his-4-

c e llu lar t e le ph on e nu mbe r. On Ma y 19 , 2 00 0, the ap pe lla nt t e le ph on e d O ff ic e r S he ari n a ndle ft

a messag e on the voice mail sy stem. L ater that day , Offic er Shea

rin arr ang ed a me eting at the residenc e of the appellant’ s father , Mr. L arry Hunt, Sr.

Offic er Shea

rin and his p ar t n er we nt to Mr. Hunt’s house to meet the a ppellant. At approximately

6:00 p.m., the office rs wer e si t t i n g o n t h e front porc h with Mr. Hunt when the appellant a

rrived in a vehicle driven by one of his acquaintances. As Offic er Shea rin and his partner pla c e d h a nd c uf

fs on the app e lla nt’ s w ri sts, “[ the app e lla nt] i mme diate ly

. . . b e g a n to te ll [th e m]

abo ut the nig ht at th e Ho lid a y I nn .” Th e app e lla nt d e nie d r apin g the vic tim , c la imi ng that he on ly went to the hotel to take the money . The appellant told Office r Shearin that he instinctively pointed the g un a t th e vic tim

a ft e r s he sta

rt le d h im.

Shortly there aft er , Of

fi ce r S h ea ri n co n t ac t ed S er gea n tR agl an d an d t o l d h i mt h at the appe llant had bee n arr ested. Appr ox imately thirty minu t es l ater, Serg eant Rag land ar rived. The appellant ag ree d to provide S erg eant Ragla nd with a st atement, say ing he “wanted to get this off his che st.” Serg eant Ra g la n d r e c o r d e d th e ap p e ll a n t’ s s tate me n t o n a u d io ta p e

. T h e ap p e ll a n t in f

o r me d the office rs that a g un had been i nvolved and offe red to show the officers where he had disposed of the

wea pon, stating that it was “rig ht around the c orner .” Of fice r Shearin, his partner, Ser g eant Rag land, and two uniforme d office rs drove the appellant to the allege d location. Whil e the appellant re mained in the ba c ks e a t of

a pa tr ol c ar, the of

fi c e rs se arc he d th e are a . H ow e ve r, the y we re un able to l oc a te the wea pon.

On O c to b e r 3 1
, 2 0 0 0
, th e Sh e lb y Co u n ty G r a n d Ju r y r e tu r n e d in d ic tm e n ts c harg ing the appellant with two counts of ag g ravated robbe ry , two counts of ag g ravated ra pe, and one count of espec ially ag g ravated kidnapping . At the jury trial in November

2002, the S tate “withdr[e] w” the second c ount of ag g ravated ra pe and pr ocee ded to trial on two coun t s o f aggra vated r obbery , one count of a g g ravated ra

pe, and one count o f es p ec i ally ag g ravated kidnapping . Ba sed upon the evidenc e pre sented a t trial, the j ury convicted the appellant of one count of ag g ravated robbe ry , one count of robbe ry , and one c ount of ag g ravated kidnapping

. Howeve r, the jury was una ble to rea ch

a ver dict as to the cha

rg e of a g g ravated ra

pe, and the trial court de cla re d a m i s t ri al as to the ra pe char g e.
Following a re trial on the ag g ravated ra pe cha rg e, the j u ry convicted the appellant. At
sentenc ing, the trial court mer g ed the r obbery co n v i ct i o n into the ag g ravated robbe ry conviction. There afte r, the trial c ourt sentenc ed the ap p ell ant to twenty -five y ear s incarc eration for the ag g ravated ra

pe conviction, twelve y ear s incar cer ation for the ag g ravated robbery conviction, and twelve y ear s i ncar cer ation for the a g g ravated kidnapping conviction. The tria l court orde red the
sentenc e for

ag g ravated ra

pe be se rv ed conse cutively to the rema ining se ntence s, for a n eff ective thirty -seve n y ear

sentenc e. The appellant now appea ls, challeng ing the sufficie ncy of the e vidence
t o s u p p o rt h i s co n v i ct i o n o f a ggra v at ed ra p e a n d t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f c o n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.-5- II. Ana lys is

A. Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e
When an appe llant challeng es the suff iciency of the c onvicting e vidence , the standard f or revie w is “whe ther, a ft er v i ew i n g t h e evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any
ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.” Jac ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct

. 27 81
, 27 89 (1 97 9) ; T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (e ). B e c a us e a jury c on vic tio n re mov e s the pr e su mpt ion of inn oc e nc e wi th w hic h a de fe nd a nt i s initiallycloake d at trial and r epl ac es i t on appea l with one of g uilt, a convicted de fenda nt has the burden of demonstrating to this court that the evidenc e is insufficient. State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

.

On app e a l, the Sta te is e nti tle d to the str on g e st l e g iti ma te vie w o f the evi den c e a nda ll

rea sonable or le g itimate infere nces w hich m ay be dra wn there from. State v. Cabba g e, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions conce rning the cr edibilityof witnesses a nd the weig ht and value
to be afforde d the evidence, as well as all fac tual issues raised by the evidence, a re r esolved by

the jury as t rier of fac t. State v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997) . Should the reviewing court find particula

r conflicts in the trial testimony
, the court must re solve the conflicts in f avor of the jury verdic t. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d at 914. This court w ill not rew eig h or ree valuate the evidenc e. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d at 659.

Ag g ra va te d r ape is d e fi ne d in pe rt ine nt p art a s th e un la wf

ul s e xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f a vic tim by the def endant or the def endant by the vi ctim when force or coercion is used to ac complish the act and the de fenda nt is arme d with a weapon or a ny article used or f

ashioned in a ma nner to lea d the victim to reasonably

believe it to be a wea

pon. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-502(a )(1) (2003). Sexual pe n e tr a ti o n in c lu d e s “ s e xu a l in te r c o u r s e , c u n n il in g u s , f e ll a ti o , a n a l in te r c o u r s e , o r a nyother intrusion, however

slight, o f an y p ar t o f a per son’s body or of a ny object into the g enital or a nal opening s of the victim’s, the def endant’ s, or any other person’ s body , but emission of semen is not require d.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 501(7) ( 2003).

On appe al, the appe llant asserts that “the only proof that a

sexual offense w as committed [wa s] th e un c or

ro bo rate d te sti mon y

of the v ic tim .” Ho we ve r, the te sti mon y of a vic tim a lon e is suffi c ie n t t o s u p p o r

t a g uiltyverdic t. State v. Ronald Hay nes, No. M2000-00204- CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 589 1 7 4
, at * 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, J une 1, 2001) ( citing State v. Williams, 623 S.W .2d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) ). I n t h e i n s t ant ca se, the victim testified that the a ppellant fo r c e d h e r

a t g u n p o in t i n to a

d ark b a n q u e t h a ll

. I n th e b a n q u e t h a ll
, th e ap p e ll a n t a p p r o a c h e d the victim from behind and placed his hand holding the g un around he r nec k. The a ppellant then f o n d l e d t h e v i c t i m ’ s b r e a s t s a n d d i g i t a l l y p e n e tr a t e d t h e v i c t i m ’ s v a g i n a

. B a s e d u p o n t h i s t e s t i m o n y,

a ratio na l ju ry

c ou ld h a ve c on c lud e d th a t th e app e lla nt w a s g uil ty of a g g ra vate d r ape . T his iss ue is wi tho ut m e ri t.-6- B. Sente ncing

Next, the appellant cha lleng es the imposition of conse cutive sente ncing . When an appe llant challeng es the leng th, rang e, or ma nner of service of a sentenc e, it is the dut y of this court to conduc t

a de no vo re vie w w ith a

pr e su mpt ion that th e de te rm inatio ns ma de by the tr ia l c ou rt

are c or re c t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) (2003). However
, this presumption of correc tness is “conditioned upon the aff

irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the se ntencing principles and all re levant fa cts and c ircumstance s.” State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I f the

rec ord demonstra tes that the trial court failed to consider the sentenc ing principles and the r eleva nt fac ts and circ umstances, r eview of the sentenc e will be pure ly de novo. I d.

I n conducting our re view, this court must consider (1) t he evidence, if any , rec eived at trial and at the se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the p re s en t ence report; (3) the princ iples of sentenc ing and the arg uments of counsel re lative to the sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) the nature and cha rac teristics of the of fe ns e s; ( 5) a ny

mit ig a tin g or

e nh a nc e me nt f

a c tor s; (6 ) a ny

state me nts ma de by

the app e lla nt o n h is own beha lf; and (7) the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35 -1 02 , - 10 3, -21 0 (2 00 3) ; se e a lso As hb y , 8 23 S.W. 2da t 16 8. Th e bu rd e n is on the app e lla nt t o show that the sentenc e is improper. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401, Sentencing Commi s s i on Com me nts

.

T h e ap p el l an twa s s en t en ce d as a R an ge I st an d ar d o ff en d er , fo r w h i ch t h e a p p l i ca b l e r an ge fo r C la ss A fe lon ie s is fi ft e e n to tw e nty -f ive y e ars a ndfo r Cla ss B fe lon ie s is e ig ht t o tw e lve y e ars

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-112( a)( 1) and (2) (2003). The presumptive sentenc e for a Class A felony is the midpoint within the applicable r ang e if ther e are no enhanc ement or mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 35 -2 10 (c ). Th e pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e fo r a Cla ss B fe lon y

is the min imu m w ith in the applica

ble ra ng e if ther e ar e no enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors. I d. I f the trial c ourt finds that

su c h f a c tor s d o e xist, the c ou rt

mus t st art

a t the pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e , en ha nc e the se nte nc e wi thi n t h e r an ge a s ap p ro p ri at e f

o r t h e e n h an ce m en tfa ct o rs , an d t h en re d u ce t h e s en t en ce wi t h i n t h e r an ge as appr opriate f

or the mi tigating f

actor s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(e ). Ther e is no mathematica l formula for

v aluating fac tors to calculate the appr opriate se ntence . State v. Bog g s, 932 S.W. 2d46 7, 47 5 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 6) . “ Ra the r, the we ig ht t o b e a ff or de d a n e xistin g fa c tor

is left to the t rial court’s discretion so long as the trial c ourt complies with the purposes a nd principles of the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct and its finding s are adequately supported by

the re cord.” I d. at 475-76.

I n s e nte nc ing the app e lla nt, the tr ia l c ou rt app lie d th e fo llo wi ng e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s:
(2) The defe ndant has a

previous history

of criminal convictions or criminal beha vior in addit ion to those nece ssary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; (6 ) T he defe nda nt t

re a te d o r a llo we d a

vic tim to b e tr e a te d w ith exceptional crue lty

during the commission of the offe nse;-7- (9 ) T he de fe nd a nt h a s a pr e vio us his tory of un wi lli ng ne ss t o c omp ly

w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a s e n t e n c e i n v o l v i n g r e l e a s e i n t h e c o m m u n i t y; and (21) The defe ndant was adjudicate d to ha ve committed a de linquent
act or acts a s a juven i l e t h at would constitute a fe lony if committed by a n a du lt.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114 (2003). The tria l court af forde d g reat weig ht to enhance ment fac tors (2) a nd (21). The trial court c onsidered as a mi tigating factor that the appellant voluntarily rele ased the victim; howe ver, the trial court found this fa ctor to be outwe ighe d by the applica

ble enha nceme nt fac tors. Acc ording ly , the trial court se ntence d the appe llant to twenty -five y ear s incarc eration for the ag g ravated ra

pe convic tion, twelve y ear s incarc eration for the a g g r a v ate d r o b b e r y c o nviction, and twelve y ear s incarc eration for the ag g ravated kidnapping conviction.

Prior to our revie w on appe al, the appellant filed a motion re questing this c ourt to consider the i mpact on his sentenc e of the United States Supreme Court’s de cision in Blake ly v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), which w as re lease d afte r the submi ssion of brief s in the instant

case

. T h i s court ha s rec og nized that Blake ly “ca lls int o question the continuing validity of our

c u rr e n t s e n te n c in g s c h e me

. ” St a te v

. J ulius E. Sm it h
, N o

. E 2 0 0 3

- 0 1 0 5 9

- CC A

- R3

- CD
, 2 0 0 4 WL 1606998, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, J uly 19, 200 4 ); s ee al so State v. Michael Way ne Poe , N o. E2 00 3- 0 04 17 -C CA -R 3- CD , 2 00 4 WL 16 07 00 2, a t *9 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. a t K no xvill e , July 19 , 2 00 4) . I n B lake ly
, _

_ U .S. a t __ , 1 24 S. Ct. a t 25 37 (c itatio ns omi tte d)
, the Sup re me Cou rt he ld that

the “statutory maxi mum” for Appr endi [v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 1 2 0 S

. C t

. 2 3 4 8 (2 0 0 0 )] p u rp o s es i s t h e m ax i m u m s en t en ce a j u d ge may impose so le ly on the bas is o f th e fac ts re

fle c te d in the jur

y verdic t or admitted by the defe ndant

. I n other words, t h e r el ev ant “statut o ry m axim um” is not the max imum sentence a judge may impose afte r finding additional fa cts, but the maxi mum he may impose without

a ny a dd iti on a l f

ind ing s. W hen a

jud g e inf

lic ts punishment that the jury ’s ver dict alone does not allow, the jury has not f o u n d a ll th e f

a c ts “ w h ic h th e la w ma k e s e s s e n ti a l t o the p u n i s h m e n t , ” a n d t h e j u d g e e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r a u t h o r i t y.

I n a supplementa l brief, the State conce des that the trial court’s a pplication of enha nceme nt fac tor (21) w as i nappropriate in the i nstant case . Moreove r, in light of B lakely , the applica bilityof enhanc ement fac tors (6) and (9) is questionable. Howe ver, the application of e nhance ment fac tor (2), which was based upon the appe llant’s prior convic tions of robbery and sexual battery , does not violate the dictates of B lakely . Acc ording ly , we modify the appe llant’s sentenc e for ag g ravated ra

pe to twenty -two y ear s and the sente nces f or ag g ravated robbe ry

and ag g ravated kidnapping to ten y e ars

.-8-

N e xt , t h e ap p e l l a n t a s s e r t s t h a t t h e tr i a l c o u r t e rr e d b y o r d e r i n g t h e ap p e l l a n t t o s e rv e his
sentenc e for

ag g ravated ra

pe conse cutivel y

to his other sentenc es. Unde r Tenne ssee Code A nnotated

se c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 15 (2 00 3) , a tr ia l c ou rt

ma y imp os e c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s if the de fe nd a nt i s

c on vic te d o f m or e tha n one of fe ns e a nd the tr ia l cou rt fi nd s by a pr e po nd e ranc e of the e vid e nc e that:

(1 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s a

profes siona l c ri min a l w ho ha s k no wi ng ly devoted suc h defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major s o urce of livelihood; (2 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s a n o ff e nd e r wh os e re c or d of c ri min a l a c tiv ity is extensive; (3 ) T he de fe nd ant is a d a ng e ro us me nta lly abn orma l pe rs on so decla red by a compe tent psy chiatrist . . . ; (4) The defe ndant is a dang erous offe nder w hose beha vior indicates littl e or no r eg ard f

or human life, and no hesitation about committing

a crime in which the risk to human life is hig h; (5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving sexual abuse of a minor . . . ; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n o ffe nse committed while on probation; or (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

.

I n imposing conse cutive sente ncing
, the trial court found the appe llant to be a dang erous offe nder. H oweve r, in State v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W .2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995) , our supre me court held that satisfy ing Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115(b)( 4), by itself, was not suffic ient to sustain consecutive se ntence s. I f the de fenda nt i s fo u n d t o be a dang erous of fende r under

the
statut e , th e tr ia l c ou rt

mus t a lso de te rm ine wh e the r these nte nc e s impo se d a re re a so na

bly re la te d to the seve rity

of the offenses and nece ssary to protec t the publ ic from f urther c riminal activity

by the def en d an t , t h e “ W i l k er s o n fa ct o rs

. ” Id. M o re o v er , tri al co u rt s m u s tm ak e s p ec i fi c f i n d i n gs rega

rding these fa ctors bef

ore imposing consec utive sentenc es. State v. L ane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tenn. 1999)

.

I n th e ins ta nt c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt de te rm ine d th a t c on se c uti ve sen tenci ng wa s r e a so na bly related to the seve rity

of t he offenses, finding that “[t] he circumstance s surrounding the commission of the se of fe ns e s w e re a g g ra va te d be c a us e of the a lmo st t ortur e of the vic tim .” Th e tr ia l c ou rt a lso fo un d th a t c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing wa s n e c e ssa ry to p ro te c t th e pu bli c fr om f urthe r c ri min a l a c tiv ity by the appe llant. Specifica lly , the trial court noted the ap p el l an t ’s history of committing sexual offe nses and f

ound,

This man is an ex t re m elydang erous man. . . . I fee l that as soon as [t he appe llant] is relea sed fr om prison, within the next y ear or two he will assault another y oung lady and this time he will kil l her so that she won’t testify

ag ainst him. This i s the kind o f n i gh t m are y oung

man that we rea d about on the news when someone is murdere d and-9- they talk about s ome l enient court y ear s befor e that g ave him a short
sentenc e.

We conclude, a s did the trial co u rt, that the appe llant qualified as a dang erous of

fende r. Ac co rd i n gl y , we af

fi rm t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f c o n s ec u t i v e s en t en ci n g.

C. J udg ment of Conviction as to Second Count of Ag g ravated Rape

Al tho ug h n ot raise d by eith e r p art y , w e no te that a jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n w a s e nte re d in

e rr or on c ou nt t wo of

ind ic tme nt n umb e r 0 0- 12 64 0, wh ic h c ou nt c ha rg e d th e app e lla nt w ith ag g ravated ra

pe ca using bodily i njury . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 502(a) (2). This count wa s withdrawn by the State at the appellant’ s trial on November 21, 2002. Acc ording ly , we va cate the jud g me nt o f c on vic tio n e nte re d b y the tr ia l c ou rt

on thi s c ou nt.

III. Conclusi on

I n light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in B lakely , we modify the appe llant’s
sentenc e for

ag g ravated ra

pe to twenty -two y ear s an d the sentenc es for ag g ravated robbe ry

and ag g ravated kidnapping to ten y ear s, for a n eff ective se ntenc e o f thirty -two y ear s incarc eration. Additionally , we va cate the judg ment of convic tion entere d in error for c ount two of indictment number 00-12640. We other wise af firm the judg ments of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE