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JlE;XAGON I CORONAl GAMBIT e".BAF A2-

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CENTRAL "INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

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The Honorable Robert P. Mayo 

Director, Bureau of the Bud,et 

Executive Olfice Building 

Washington, D. C. 20503 

Dear Bob: 

11 March 1969 

." i~~ M 

Confirming our telephone conver8ation, Jim Clark mentioned the 

matter of the HEXAGON photographic satellite to me at lunch the" other 

day. The need for this system was also one of the issues in the package 

on intelligence which you 8ent to Mr. Packard on 13 February. 

In my personal judgment, the record of past reviews and analyses 

~ ~f the HEXAGON program clearly demonstrates a concern lor fiscal 

responsibility, a8 well a. for getting the intelligence nece88ary to our 

national sec~rity. 

The need for this system has been the subject of a number of 

8earching reviews in the Intelligence Community, within the Department 

of Defense and by the Budget Bureau Itaff. The initial statement o~ the 

requirement for such a system was set forth" by the U. S. Intelligence 

Board in 1964. The technical implications of a decision to proceed with 

the design and development of HEXAGON, a8 opposed to p088ible 

alternative courses, have been e.-mined on a nmnber of occasions by 

a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee chaired by 

Dr. Edwin H. Land. Dr. Land'8 panel has consistently advised development of HEXAGON. 

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BYE'031-69 

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'l'8P BSSRS'i' 

HEXAGON/CORONA/GAMBIT 

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In the past seven months the Budget Bureau bas twice proposed 

to the Executive Committee of the National Reconnaissance Program 

that tbe project be canceled. In July 1968 the National Intelligence 

Resources Board (NIRB) completed a study of the HEXAGON's 

expected contribution to our national intelligence needs in'tbe light of 

the program's cos t and recommended unanimously that HEXAGON be 

continued. The staff of the Secretary of Defense also analyzed tbis 

i. sue and in Novem1191' 1968 m.ade tAesame ~ocoznmoD.Uon to tbtl 

Seeretary. The deet.toll to eonttftUI HlDXAOON wa. reattirmed at· the 

20 August and 13 November 1968 meeting. of the Executive Committee 

of the National Reconnai.sance Progr,am. 

At the present time, we rely on the GAMBIT -3 satellite for 

detailed photography and surveillanc~ of known targets, and the CORONA 

system for searching out hitherto undiscovered targets. The HEXAOON 

would both replace the search function of the CORONA and, by performing 

much o~ the surveillance function, permit a reduced number of 

GAMBIT-3 missions to be concentrated on detailed photography. 

There are many complicating details involved in a decision to 

cancel or to continue HEXAGON. The number of targets of different 

classes, the frequency of coverage, the resolution of the pbotograpby, 

the number of target looks, the area coverage, the ground 8wath, the 

days on orbit per mis8ion, mono V8. stereo coverage, the factor of 

timeliness, and different cost estimate. ba.ed on different assumption. --

these are but some of the pertinent factors which must be taken into 

account, not individually but in combination as they pertain to the 

HEXAGON and make it so valuable. I refer to tbls complexity by way 

01 pointing out that it is easy to delve into one or another factor to the 

neglect of the whole array of relevant factors and, indeed, to the gut 

issue itself. 

From whe're I sit, the main issue is whether, in terms of all 

intelligence sources -- includink the present GAMBIT-3/CORONA 

combination - - the HEXAGON photography is worth the cos t. When 

the needs for national int.Uigence and U. S. force planning are considered in the light of the co~t differences between the present GAMBIT-3/ 

CORONA aDd the HEXAQ<;lN/GAMBIT-3 mixes, I believe that the outcome 

is stroDgly in favor of cont¥utngHEXAOON. 

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HEXAGON/CORONA/GAMBIT 

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Let' a look firat at the co.t .ide. Accordi,.. to the co.t data 

pre.e·nte~ in your i •• ue paper (Tab C), 

would re.ult ill .avin •• in the FY 1970 

cumulative .av1 .... throulh FY 1974 

however, omit .everal relevallt factor. mu.t be con.ldered. 

One i. the coat of .atisfylnl the mapplnl .aDd ehartilll requiremente 

which ·will be met by the HEXAGON .yetem. The Director, NaO hal 

e.timated the co.t of alterD&tiv~m tlaod. me.tift. thi. mappift. 

and chartlDIIl •• d would be ove throulh J'Y 1974. . 

Another point ia that the Bureau:. e. ma e. iJo l'e)t take into account 

the fact that the manufaCNl'iDI ba.e 101' the CORONA payload bas b •• n· 

pb •• ed out; 80me critical te,URI facilities have been deactivated •• nd 

all camera 8ub-system .uppliers have be.n tenninated. Exteuion 01 

the CORONA prolram - - a nece.sity 1I HEXAGON were canceled - - . 

would involve .ilDiflcant additioaal costs. Further, .ince weare DOW 

.0 far advanced in the HEXAGON pro .• ram. termination co.t. would 

be aub.tanttal. U a deci.loll to caacel were taken at this point th.se, 

termlaation co.t. would have their m.jor impact oa the FY 1970 bud.et. 

(Parenth.tically. I would a180 poiat ou't that cancellatioa would ha~e 

a .eriou. impact on one of the three major U. S. camera producer. --

a co.t to national .ecurity which caBoot be 'fully ••••••• d ill cloUar 

.t.nn •. ) . 

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In _um, I am convinced that the .avial' wblch could be realietically 

anticipated if the HEXAGON program weI'. canceled are significantly 

Ie •• than .tated in the Bureau l •• ue paper, both in terms of the FY 1970 

bud,et aDd cumulatively through FY 1974. 

But I do Dot believe that the matter 01 •• villle f although important, . 

i. tbe m.in point in couiderin. the HEXAGON program. The iBleWlaace 

yield expected from HEXAGON baa b.en exa.mibed· exhau.tively .ince 

la.t .umm.r. I believ" that the CODCluio .. of the Matio_l IDteW.eDCe 

Re.ource. Board aDd the DeIen •• po.itioll paper Oft HEXAGON of 

November 1968 contiD\le to be valid. Put briefly. HEXAGON' ... pecia! 

value lie. in it. capability to comblae lar.e ar •• coverale and hiih 

re.olutioD. Some example. -- lMlt by DO mea_ the whol •• tory -- of 

what HEXAGON wUl pro'ride are: 

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HJ:XAOON/COaONA/OAMBI';f 
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( 1) si,Dilleantly better int~l1t,eDee on Soviet and 

Chineee ground 'forcee, inclucHDI force co~po.Ulon. 

readineas, and redeployment; 

(2) better insi,ht lnto the 10lietic eupport eyeteme of' 

CommuDist bloc countri.e; 

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(3) a marked upgrading in our abU~ty to detect and 

evaluate mobUe mi •• Ue force. in the USSR which we 

anticipate .hortly (ill this connection we mUlt have the 

balis for confident judpnientl that deployment.' have not 

occurred., a. well •• the abUlty to detect once begun); 

. (4) .ilDifieanUy improved inteni,ence on·a wid. range 

.. of other tarsete, .uch al Communi.t bloc radar atationa, 

and thul t.cUitatilll reduction in certain typel of collection 

. activity; 

(5) broad area and bilb relolution coverage of .enaitive 

• 1 • t ., • " , ~ • 

(6) substantial improvement of our capacity .to monitor 

Soviet adherence to or violation of any future arms control 

asreement. 

. . In sum, I am firmly convinced that the HEXAGON program i. wen 

worth ita cost given our intelligence need. regarding the threa.t. which 

the United States face. in today'. world and believe that the additional 

expen.e required to complete aDd. operate the HEXAGON aYltemia 

rea.onable. I a1.0 am mindful of the budletary pr •• lur... Given tbe.e 

pre.,ure •• I atroqly urle that we do our. utmOlt to cut away oblolete 

aDd marlially productiv. actlvitt.1 within th. U. S. intelligence effort, 

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rather --- . than take the easier course of canceling a program 80 close to 

fruition and which will cODtribute 80 much. 

cc: Deputy Secretary of DefeD.e 

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"",.t'" 5 

Sincerely, 

db,~ 

lUchard Helma 

Director 

I 98P _ealll' 

HBXAOON/COBDNA/GAMBI'l' 

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