(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2007 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 06–9130. Argued October 29, 2007—Decided January 22, 2008 

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of torts committed by federal

employees, see 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), but, as relevant here, exempts 

from that waiver “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or

collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any . . . property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement 

officer,” §2680(c). Upon his transfer from an Atlanta federal prison to

one in Kentucky, petitioner noticed that several items were missing

from his personal property, which had been shipped to the new facility by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Alleging that BOP officers had lost his property, petitioner filed this suit under, inter alia, 

the FTCA, but the District Court dismissed that claim as barred by

§2680(c). Affirming, the Eleventh Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that the statutory phrase “any officer of customs or excise or 

any other law enforcement officer” applies only to officers enforcing

customs or excise laws. 

Held: Section 2680(c)’s text and structure demonstrate that the broad 

phrase “any other law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement

officers. Petitioner’s argument that §2680(c) is focused on preserving 

sovereign immunity only for officers enforcing customs and excise

laws is inconsistent with the statute’s language. “Read naturally, the 

word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 

1, 5. For example, in considering a provision imposing an additional

sentence that was not to run concurrently with “any other term of 

imprisonment,” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1), the Gonzales Court held that, 

notwithstanding the subsection’s initial reference to federal drug

trafficking crimes, the expansive word “any” and the absence of re-
2 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Syllabus 

strictive language left “no basis in the text for limiting” the phrase

“any other term of imprisonment” to federal sentences. 520 U. S., at 

5. To similar effect, see Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 

578, 588–589, in which the Court held that there was “no indication 

whatever that Congress intended” to limit the “expansive language” 

“ ‘any other final action’ ” to particular kinds of agency action. The 

reasoning of Gonzales and Harrison applies equally to 28 U. S. C. 

§2680(c): Congress’ use of “any” to modify “other law enforcement officer” is most naturally read to mean law enforcement officers of

whatever kind. To be sure, the text’s references to “tax or customs 

duty” and “officer[s] of customs or excise” indicate an intent to preserve immunity for claims arising from an officer’s enforcement of tax

and customs laws. The text also indicates, however, that Congress 

intended to preserve immunity for claims arising from the detention

of property, and there is no indication of any intent that immunity for

those claims turns on the type of law being enforced. Recent amendments to §2680(c) restoring the sovereign immunity waiver for officers enforcing any federal forfeiture law, see §2680(c)(1), support the

Court’s conclusion by demonstrating Congress’ view that, prior to the 

amendments, §2680(c) covered all law enforcement officers. Against

this textual and structural evidence, petitioner’s reliance on the canons of statutory construction ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis 

and on the rule against superfluities is unconvincing. The Court is 

unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt to create ambiguity where the 

statute’s structure and text suggest none. Had Congress intended to 

limit §2680(c)’s reach as petitioner contends, it easily could have 

written “any other law enforcement officer acting in a customs or excise capacity.” Instead, it used the unmodified, all-encompassing 

phrase “any other law enforcement officer.” This Court must give effect to the text Congress enacted. Pp. 3–13. 

204 Fed. Appx. 778, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and SCALIA, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed 

a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, SOUTER, and BREYER, JJ., 

joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., 

joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–9130 

ABDUS-SHAHID M. S. ALI, PETITIONER v. FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF PRISONS ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[January 22, 2008] 

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case concerns the scope of 28 U. S. C. §2680, which

carves out certain exceptions to the United States’ waiver

of sovereign immunity for torts committed by federal

employees. Section 2680(c) provides that the waiver of

sovereign immunity does not apply to claims arising from

the detention of property by “any officer of customs or 

excise or any other law enforcement officer.” Petitioner 

contends that this clause applies only to law enforcement

officers enforcing customs or excise laws, and thus does

not affect the waiver of sovereign immunity for his property claim against officers of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). We conclude that the broad phrase “any other 

law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement officers. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of

Appeals upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s claim. 

I 

Petitioner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali was a federal prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, from 2001 to 2003. In December 2003, petitioner was

scheduled to be transferred to the United States Peniten-
2 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Opinion of the Court 

tiary Big Sandy (USP Big Sandy) in Inez, Kentucky.

Before being transferred, he left two duffle bags containing his personal property in the Atlanta prison’s Receiving 

and Discharge Unit to be inventoried, packaged, and 

shipped to USP Big Sandy. Petitioner was transferred, 

and his bags arrived some days later. Upon inspecting his

property, he noticed that several items were missing. The 

staff at USP Big Sandy’s Receiving and Discharge Unit 

told him that he had been given everything that was sent, 

and that if things were missing he could file a claim.

Many of the purportedly missing items were of religious 

and nostalgic significance, including two copies of the 

Qur’an, a prayer rug, and religious magazines. Petitioner 

estimated that the items were worth $177. 

Petitioner filed an administrative tort claim. In denying

relief, the agency noted that, by his signature on the receipt form, petitioner had certified the accuracy of the 

inventory listed thereon and had thereby relinquished any 

future claims relating to missing or damaged property. 

Petitioner then filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C.

§§1346, 2671 et seq. The BOP maintained that petitioner’s

claim was barred by the exception in §2680(c) for property

claims against law enforcement officers. The District 

Court agreed and dismissed petitioner’s FTCA claim for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioner appealed.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court’s interpretation of §2680(c). 204 Fed. Appx.

778, 779–780 (2006) (per curiam). In rejecting petitioner’s

arguments, the Court of Appeals relied on this Court’s 

broad interpretation of §2680(c)’s “detention” clause in 

Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 854–859 (1984), on

decisions by other Courts of Appeals, and on its own decision in Schlaebitz v. United States Dept. of Justice, 924 F. 

2d 193, 195 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that United

States Marshals, who were allegedly negligent in releas-
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

ing a parolee’s luggage to a third party, were “law enforcement officers” under §2680(c)). See 204 Fed. Appx., 

at 779–780. 

We granted certiorari, 550 U. S. ___ (2007), to resolve 

the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to the 

scope of §2680(c).1 

II 

In the FTCA, Congress waived the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of torts committed by 

federal employees. See 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1). As relevant here, the FTCA authorizes “claims against the 

United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of 

property . . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or 

omission of any employee of the Government while acting 

within the scope of his office or employment.” Ibid. The 

FTCA exempts from this waiver certain categories of

claims. See §§2680(a)–(n). Relevant here is the exception

in subsection (c), which provides that §1346(b) shall not 

apply to “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment 

or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of

any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of 

customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.”

§2680(c). 

—————— 

1The Eleventh Circuit joined five other Courts of Appeals in construing §2680(c) to encompass all law enforcement officers. See Bramwell 

v. Bureau of Prisons, 348 F. 3d 804, 806–807 (CA9 2003); Chapa v. 

Dept. of Justice, 339 F. 3d 388, 390 (CA5 2003) (per curiam); Hatten v. 

White, 275 F. 3d 1208, 1210 (CA10 2002); Cheney v. United States, 972 

F. 2d 247, 248 (CA8 1992) (per curiam); Ysasi v. Rivkind, 856 F. 2d 

1520, 1525 (CA Fed. 1988). Five other Courts of Appeals reached the 

contrary conclusion, interpreting the clause as limited to officers 

performing customs or excise functions. See ABC v. DEF, 500 F. 3d 

103, 107 (CA2 2007); Dahler v. United States, 473 F. 3d 769, 771–772 

(CA7 2007) (per curiam); Andrews v. United States, 441 F. 3d 220, 227 

(CA4 2006); Bazuaye v. United States, 83 F. 3d 482, 486 (CADC 1996); 

Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F. 3d 594, 598 (CA6 1994). 
4 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Opinion of the Court 

This case turns on whether the BOP officers who allegedly lost petitioner’s property qualify as “other law enforcement officer[s]” within the meaning of §2680(c).2 

Petitioner argues that they do not because “any other law

enforcement officer” includes only law enforcement officers

acting in a customs or excise capacity. Noting that Congress referenced customs and excise activities in both the

language at issue and the preceding clause in §2680(c),

petitioner argues that the entire subsection is focused on 

preserving the United States’ sovereign immunity only as 

to officers enforcing those laws. 

Petitioner’s argument is inconsistent with the statute’s

language.3 The phrase “any other law enforcement officer” 

suggests a broad meaning. Ibid. (emphasis added). We 

have previously noted that “[r]ead naturally, the word 

‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some 

indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. 

Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third 

—————— 

2We assume, without deciding, that the BOP officers “detained” Ali’s

property and thus satisfy §2680(c)’s “arising in respect of . . . detention” 

requirement. The Court of Appeals held that the “detention” clause

was satisfied, and petitioner expressly declined to raise the issue on

certiorari. See 204 Fed. Appx. 778, 779–780 (CA11 2006) (per curiam); 

Brief for Petitioner 10–11, n. 9. 3We consider this question for the first time in this case. Petitioner 

argues that this Court concluded in Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 

848 (1984), that the phrase “any other law enforcement officer” is 

ambiguous. Reply Brief for Petitioner 4. In that case, the Court 

construed a portion of the same clause at issue here, but the decision

had no bearing on the meaning of “any other law enforcement officer.” 

465 U. S., at 853–862 (holding that “detention” encompasses claims

resulting from negligent handling or storage). Indeed, the Court 

expressly declined to reach the issue. Id., at 852, n. 6 (“We have no

occasion in this case to decide what kinds of ‘law-enforcement officer[s],’

other than customs officials, are covered by the exception.” (alteration

in original)). Petitioner’s reliance on the footnote as concluding that the

phrase is ambiguous reads too much into the Court’s reservation of a

question that was not then before it. 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

New International Dictionary 97 (1976)). In Gonzales, we 

considered a provision that imposed an additional sentence for firearms used in federal drug trafficking crimes

and provided that such additional sentence shall not be

concurrent with “any other term of imprisonment.” 520 

U. S., at 4 (quoting 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (emphasis deleted)). Notwithstanding the subsection’s initial 

reference to federal drug trafficking crimes, we held that

the expansive word “any” and the absence of restrictive

language left “no basis in the text for limiting” the phrase

“any other term of imprisonment” to federal sentences.

520 U. S., at 5. Similarly, in Harrison v. PPG Industries, 

Inc., 446 U. S. 578 (1980), the Court considered the phrase 

“any other final action” in amendments to the Clean Air 

Act. The Court explained that the amendments expanded 

a list of Environmental Protection Agency Administrator

actions by adding two categories of actions: actions under

a specifically enumerated statutory provision, and “any 

other final action” under the Clean Air Act. Id., at 584 

(emphasis deleted). Focusing on Congress’ choice of the 

word “any,” the Court “discern[ed] no uncertainty in the

meaning of the phrase, ‘any other final action,’” and emphasized that the statute’s “expansive language offer[ed] 

no indication whatever that Congress intended” to limit 

the phrase to final actions similar to those in the specifically enumerated sections. Id., at 588–589. 

We think the reasoning of Gonzales and Harrison applies equally to the expansive language Congress employed in 28 U. S. C. §2680(c). Congress’ use of “any” to

modify “other law enforcement officer” is most naturally 

read to mean law enforcement officers of whatever kind.4 

—————— 

4Of course, other circumstances may counteract the effect of expansive modifiers. For example, we have construed an “any” phrase

narrowly when it included a term of art that compelled that result. See 

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115–116 (2001)

(construing “any other class of workers engaged in . . . commerce,” 9 
6 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Opinion of the Court 

The word “any” is repeated four times in the relevant 

portion of §2680(c), and two of those instances appear in 

the particular phrase at issue: “any officer of customs or 

excise or any other law enforcement officer.” (Emphasis

added.) Congress inserted the word “any” immediately

before “other law enforcement officer,” leaving no doubt 

that it modifies that phrase. To be sure, the text’s references to “tax or customs duty” and “officer[s] of customs or

excise” indicate that Congress intended to preserve immunity for claims arising from an officer’s enforcement of tax

and customs laws. The text also indicates, however, that 

Congress intended to preserve immunity for claims arising 

from the detention of property, and there is no indication

that Congress intended immunity for those claims to turn

on the type of law being enforced.

Petitioner would require Congress to clarify its intent to

cover all law enforcement officers by adding phrases such 

as “performing any official law enforcement function,” or

“without limitation.” But Congress could not have chosen

a more all-encompassing phrase than “any other law 

enforcement officer” to express that intent. We have no 

reason to demand that Congress write less economically

and more repetitiously. 

—————— 

U. S. C. §1, narrowly based on the Court’s previous interpretation of “in 

commerce” as a term of art with a narrower meaning). We also have 

construed such phrases narrowly when another term in the provision

made sense only under a narrow reading, see United States v. AlvarezSanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357–358 (1994) (limiting “any law-enforcement

officer” to federal officers because the statute’s reference to “delay”

made sense only with respect to federal officers), and when a broad 

reading would have implicated sovereignty concerns, see Raygor v. 

Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U. S. 533, 541–542 (2002) (applying the

“clear statement rule” applicable to waivers of sovereign immunity to

construe the phrase “all civil actions” to exclude a category of claims,

“even though nothing in the statute expressly exclude[d]” them). None 

of the circumstances that motivated our decisions in these cases is 

present here. 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Recent amendments to §2680(c) support the conclusion 

that “any other law enforcement officer” is not limited to

officers acting in a customs or excise capacity. In the Civil 

Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Congress added

subsections (c)(1)–(c)(4) to 28 U. S. C. §2680. §3(a), 114 

Stat. 211. As amended, §2680(c) provides that the 

§1346(b) waiver of sovereign immunity, notwithstanding 

the exception at issue in this case, applies to: 

“[A]ny claim based on injury or loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession of 

any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, if— 

“(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law providing 

for the forfeiture of property other than as a sentence 

imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense;

“(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;

“(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or

mitigated (if the property was subject to forfeiture);

and 

“(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for

which the interest of the claimant in the property was

subject to forfeiture under a Federal criminal forfeiture law.” 

The amendment does not govern petitioner’s claim 

because his property was not “seized for the purpose of 

forfeiture,” as required by paragraph (1). Nonetheless, the 

amendment is relevant because our construction of “any

other law enforcement officer” must, to the extent possible, 

ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 340 

(1997) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 

U. S. 235, 240 (1989)). The amendment canceled the 

exception—and thus restored the waiver of sovereign 

immunity—for certain seizures of property based on any 
8 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Opinion of the Court 

federal forfeiture law. See 28 U. S. C. §2680(c)(1) (excepting property claims if “the property was seized for the

purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law

providing for the forfeiture of property” (emphasis added)). 

Under petitioner’s interpretation, only law enforcement

officers enforcing customs or excise laws were immune 

under the prior version of §2680(c). Thus, on petitioner’s

reading, the amendment’s only effect was to restore the 

waiver for cases in which customs or excise officers, or 

officers acting in such a capacity, enforce forfeiture laws.

This strikes us as an implausible interpretation of the 

statute. If that were Congress’ intent, it is not apparent

why Congress would have restored the waiver with respect 

to the enforcement of all civil forfeiture laws instead of 

simply those related to customs or excise. Petitioner’s 

interpretation makes sense only if we assume that Congress went out of its way to restore the waiver for cases in

which customs or excise officers, or officers acting in such

a capacity, enforce forfeiture laws unrelated to customs or

excise. But petitioner fails to demonstrate that customs or 

excise officers, or officers acting in such a capacity, ever 

enforce civil forfeiture laws unrelated to customs or excise, 

much less that they do so with such frequency that Congress is likely to have singled them out in the amendment.5 It seems far more likely that Congress restored the 

—————— 

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY’S dissent (hereinafter the dissent) argues that, 

during border searches, customs and excise officers “routinely” enforce 

civil forfeiture laws unrelated to customs or excise. Post, at 12–13. But 

the examples the dissent provides do not support that assertion. The 

dissent maintains that a customs officer who seizes material defined as 

contraband under 49 U. S. C. §80302 et seq., is one such example. Post, 

at 12–13. But a customs officer’s authority to effect a forfeiture of such 

contraband derives from a specific customs law. See 19 U. S. C. 

§1595a(c)(1)(C). Similarly, the dissent suggests that a DEA agent 

“assisting a customs official” in a border search who seizes drug-related

contraband under 21 U. S. C. §881 is acting in a “traditional revenue

capacity.” Post, at 12–13. But that argument is based on the assump-
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

waiver for officers enforcing any civil forfeiture law because, in its view, all such officers were covered by the 

exception to the waiver prior to the amendment. 

Against this textual and structural evidence that “any

other law enforcement officer” does in fact mean any other

law enforcement officer, petitioner invokes numerous 

canons of statutory construction. He relies primarily on 

ejusdem generis, or the principle that “when a general 

term follows a specific one, the general term should be 

understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with 

specific enumeration.” Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train 

Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 129 (1991). In petitioner’s

view, “any officer of customs or excise or any other law 

enforcement officer” should be read as a three-item list, 

and the final, catchall phrase “any other law enforcement 

officer” should be limited to officers of the same nature as 

the preceding specific phrases.

Petitioner likens his case to two recent cases in which 

we found the canon useful. In Washington State Dept. of 

Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 375 (2003), we considered the clause 

“execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal 

—————— 

tion that an officer who assists in conducting a border search acts in a

customs capacity even if he is not a customs officer and is not enforcing 

a customs law. That assumption, far from self-evident, only underscores the difficulty that would attend any attempt to define the contours of the implied limitation on §2680(c)’s reach proposed by petitioner and embraced by the dissent. “Acting in a customs or excise

capacity” is not a self-defining concept, and not having included such a 

limitation in the statute’s language, Congress of course did not provide 

a definition. Finally, the dissent points out that a customs or excise

officer might effect a forfeiture of currency or monetary instruments

under 31 U. S. C. §5317(c). Post, at 12–13. But §5317(c) is hardly a

civil forfeiture law unrelated to customs or excise. See §5317(c)(2)

(authorizing forfeiture of property involved in a violation of, inter alia, 

§5316, which sets forth reporting requirements for exporting and 

importing monetary instruments). 
10 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Opinion of the Court 

process” in 42 U. S. C. §407(a). Applying ejusdem generis, 

we concluded that “other legal process” was limited to 

legal processes of the same nature as the specific items 

listed. 537 U. S., at 384–385. The department’s scheme

for serving as a representative payee of the benefits due to

children under its care, while a “legal process,” did not 

share the common attribute of the listed items, viz., “utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism . . . by 

which control over property passes from one person to 

another in order to discharge” a debt. 537 U. S., at 385. 

Similarly, in Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481 (2006),

the Court considered whether an exception to the FTCA’s 

waiver of sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the 

“‘loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or 

postal matter’” barred a claim that mail negligently left on 

the petitioner’s porch caused her to slip and fall. Id., at 

485 (quoting 28 U. S. C. §2680(b)). Noting that “loss” and 

“miscarriage” both addressed “failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail in a timely manner to the right address,” 546 U. S., at 487, the Court concluded that “negligent transmission” must be similarly limited, id., at 486– 

489, and rejected the Government’s argument that the 

exception applied to “all torts committed in the course of 

mail delivery,” id., at 490. 

Petitioner asserts that §2680(c), like the clauses at issue

in Keffeler and Dolan, ‘“presents a textbook ejusdem 

generis scenario.’” Brief for Petitioner 15 (quoting Andrews v. United States, 441 F. 3d 220, 224 (CA4 2006)). 

We disagree. The structure of the phrase “any officer of

customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer”

does not lend itself to application of the canon. The phrase

is disjunctive, with one specific and one general category,

not—like the clauses at issue in Keffeler and Dolan—a list 

of specific items separated by commas and followed by a

general or collective term. The absence of a list of specific 

items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

generis that Congress remained focused on the common

attribute when it used the catchall phrase. Cf. United 

States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 615 (1995) (SCALIA, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the

canon’s applicability to an omnibus clause that was “one of 

. . . several distinct and independent prohibitions” rather

than “a general or collective term following a list of specific items to which a particular statutory command is 

applicable”).

Moreover, it is not apparent what common attribute

connects the specific items in §2680(c). Were we to use the 

canon to limit the meaning of “any other law enforcement

officer,” we would be required to determine the relevant

limiting characteristic of “officer of customs or excise.” In 

Jarecki v. G. D. Searle Co., 367 U. S. 303 (1961), for example, the Court invoked noscitur a sociis in limiting the 

scope of the term “‘discovery’” to the common characteristic it shared with “‘exploration’” and “‘prospecting.’” Id., 

at 307. The Court noted that all three words in conjunction “describe[d] income-producing activity in the oil and

gas and mining industries.” Ibid. Here, by contrast, no 

relevant common attribute immediately appears from the

phrase “officer of customs or excise.” Petitioner suggests

that the common attribute is that both types of officers are

charged with enforcing the customs and excise laws. But 

we see no reason why that should be the relevant characteristic as opposed to, for example, that officers of that

type are commonly involved in the activities enumerated 

in the statute: the assessment and collection of taxes and 

customs duties and the detention of property.

Petitioner’s appeals to other interpretive principles are 

also unconvincing. Petitioner contends that his reading is

supported by the canon noscitur a sociis, according to

which “a word is known by the company it keeps.” S. D. 

Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Environmental Protection, 547 

U. S. 370, 378 (2006). But the cases petitioner cites in 
12 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Opinion of the Court 

support of applying noscitur a sociis involved statutes with 

stronger contextual cues. See Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 

250, 254–258 (2000) (applying the canon to narrow the

relevant phrase, “any election,” where it was closely surrounded by six specific references to gubernatorial elections); Jarecki, supra, at 306–309 (applying the canon to

narrow the term “discoveries” to discoveries of mineral 

resources where it was contained in a list of three words, 

all of which applied to the oil, gas, and mining industries 

and could not conceivably all apply to any other industry).

Here, although customs and excise are mentioned twice in

§2680(c), nothing in the overall statutory context suggests 

that customs and excise officers were the exclusive focus of 

the provision. The emphasis in subsection (c) on customs 

and excise is not inconsistent with the conclusion that 

“any other law enforcement officer” sweeps as broadly as

its language suggests.

Similarly, the rule against superfluities lends petitioner 

sparse support. The construction we adopt today does not

necessarily render “any officer of customs or excise” superfluous; Congress may have simply intended to remove any 

doubt that officers of customs or excise were included in 

“law enforcement officers.” See Fort Stewart Schools v. 

FLRA, 495 U. S. 641, 646 (1990) (noting that “technically 

unnecessary” examples may have been “inserted out of an

abundance of caution”). Moreover, petitioner’s construction threatens to render “any other law enforcement officer” superfluous because it is not clear when, if ever, 

“other law enforcement officer[s]” act in a customs or

excise capacity.6 In any event, we do not woodenly apply 

—————— 

6As an example of “other law enforcement officer[s]” acting in an 

excise or customs capacity, petitioner cites Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. 

United States, 777 F. 2d 822, 823–824 (CA2 1985) (holding that the

seizure of a vehicle still in transit from overseas by Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) agents who searched it for drugs was “sufficiently akin to the functions carried out by Customs officials to place 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

limiting principles every time Congress includes a specific 

example along with a general phrase. See Harrison, 446 

U. S., at 589, n. 6 (rejecting an argument that ejusdem 

generis must apply when a broad interpretation of 

the clause could render the specific enumerations 

unnecessary). 

In the end, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt 

to create ambiguity where the statute’s text and structure 

suggest none. Had Congress intended to limit §2680(c)’s

reach as petitioner contends, it easily could have written

“any other law enforcement officer acting in a customs or 

excise capacity.” Instead, it used the unmodified, allencompassing phrase “any other law enforcement officer.”

Nothing in the statutory context requires a narrowing

construction—indeed, as we have explained, the statute is 

most consistent and coherent when “any other law enforcement officer” is read to mean what it literally says.

See Norfolk & Western R. Co., 499 U. S., at 129 (noting 

that interpretive canons must yield “when the whole

context dictates a different conclusion”). It bears emphasis, moreover, that §2680(c), far from maintaining sovereign immunity for the entire universe of claims against 

—————— 

the agents’ conduct within the scope of section 2680(c)”). But it is not 

clear that the agents in that case were acting in an excise or customs 

capacity rather than in their ordinary capacity as law enforcement 

agents. It seems to us that DEA agents searching a car for drugs are

acting in their capacity as officers charged with enforcing the Nation’s

drug laws, not the customs or excise laws. 

Similarly, the dissent notes that 14 U. S. C. §89(a) authorizes Coast

Guard officers to enforce customs laws. Post, at 5-6. But the very next

subsection of §89 provides that Coast Guard officers effectively are 

customs officers when they enforce customs laws. See §89(b)(1) (providing that Coast Guard officers “insofar as they are engaged, pursuant to

the authority contained in this section, in enforcing any law of the

United States shall . . . be deemed to be acting as agents of the particular executive department . . . charged with the administration of the 

particular law”). As a result, a Coast Guard officer enforcing a customs

law is a customs officer, not some “other law enforcement officer.” 
14 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

Opinion of the Court 

law enforcement officers, does so only for claims “arising

in respect of” the “detention” of property. We are not at 

liberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem

more desirable.7 Instead, we must give effect to the text

Congress enacted: Section 2680(c) forecloses lawsuits

against the United States for the unlawful detention of

property by “any,” not just “some,” law enforcement

officers. 

III 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is 

Affirmed. 

—————— 

7Congress, we note, did provide an administrative remedy for lost

property claimants like petitioner. Federal agencies have authority

under 31 U. S. C. §3723(a)(1) to settle certain “claim[s] for not more 

than $1,000 for damage to, or loss of, privately owned property that . . . 

is caused by the negligence of an officer or employee of the United

States Government acting within the scope of employment.” The BOP 

has settled more than 1,100 such claims in the last three years. Brief 

for Respondents 41, n. 17. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–9130 

ABDUS-SHAHID M. S. ALI, PETITIONER v. FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF PRISONS ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[January 22, 2008] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, 

JUSTICE SOUTER, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. 

Statutory interpretation, from beginning to end, requires respect for the text. The respect is not enhanced, 

however, by decisions that foreclose consideration of the 

text within the whole context of the statute as a guide to

determining a legislature’s intent. To prevent textual 

analysis from becoming so rarefied that it departs from

how a legislator most likely understood the words when he 

or she voted for the law, courts use certain interpretative 

rules to consider text within the statutory design. These 

canons do not demand wooden reliance and are not by

themselves dispositive, but they do function as helpful 

guides in construing ambiguous statutory provisions. Two 

of these accepted rules are ejusdem generis and noscitur a 

sociis, which together instruct that words in a series 

should be interpreted in relation to one another. 

Today the Court holds, if my understanding of its opinion is correct, that there is only one possible way to read

the statute. Placing implicit reliance upon a comma at the

beginning of a clause, the Court says that the two maxims

noted, and indeed other helpful and recognized principles 

of statutory analysis, are not useful as interpretative aids

in this case because the clause cannot be understood by

what went before. In my respectful submission the 
2 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

Court’s approach is incorrect as a general rule and as 

applied to the statute now before us. Both the analytic

framework and the specific interpretation the Court now 

employs become binding on the federal courts, which will

confront other cases in which a series of words operate in a

clause similar to the one we consider today. So this case is 

troubling not only for the result the Court reaches but also

for the analysis it employs. My disagreements with the 

Court lead to this dissent. 

I 

A 

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows those who

allege injury from governmental actions over a vast sphere

to seek damages for tortious conduct. The enacting Congress enumerated 13 exceptions to the Act’s broad waiver 

of sovereign immunity, all of which shield the Government 

from suit in specific instances. These exceptions must be

given careful consideration in order to prevent interference with the governmental operations described. As 

noted in Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 853, n. 9 

(1984), however, “unduly generous interpretations of the 

exceptions run the risk of defeating the central purpose of

the statute.” 

As the Court states, at issue here is the extent of the 

exception for suits arising from the detention of goods in

defined circumstances. The relevant provision excepts 

from the general waiver 

“claim[s] arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of

any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement

officer.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(c). 

Both on first reading and upon further, close consideration, the plain words of the statute indicate that the excep-
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

tion is concerned only with customs and taxes. The provision begins with a clause dealing exclusively with customs 

and tax duties. And the provision as a whole contains four

express references to customs and tax, making revenue 

duties and customs and excise officers its most salient 

features. Cf. Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U. S. 250, 254–255 

(2000).

This is not to suggest that the Court’s reading is wholly

impermissible or without some grammatical support. 

After all, detention of goods is not stated until the outset

of the second clause and at the end of the same clause the 

words “any other law enforcement officer” appear; so it can 

be argued that the first and second clauses of the provision

are so separate that all detentions by all law enforcement

officers in whatever capacity they might act are covered.

Still, this ought not be the preferred reading; for between

the beginning of the second clause and its closing reference to “any other law enforcement officer” appears another reference to “officer[s] of customs or excise,” this 

time in the context of property detention. This is quite

sufficient, in my view, to continue the limited scope of the 

exception. At the very least, the Court errs by adopting a

rule which simply bars all consideration of the canons of 

ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis. And when those 

canons are consulted, together with other common principles of interpretation, the case for limiting the exception to 

customs and tax more than overcomes the position maintained by the Government and adopted by the Court.

The ejusdem generis canon provides that, where a seemingly broad clause constitutes a residual phrase, it must

be controlled by, and defined with reference to, the “enumerated categories . . . which are recited just before it,” so 

that the clause encompasses only objects similar in nature. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 115 

(2001). The words “any other law enforcement officer”

immediately follow the statute’s reference to “officer[s] of 
4 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

customs or excise,” as well as the first clause’s reference to 

the assessment of tax and customs duties. 28 U. S. C. 

§2680(c).

The Court counters that §2680(c) “is disjunctive, with

one specific and one general category,” rendering ejusdem 

generis inapplicable. Ante, at 10. The canon’s applicability, however, is not limited to those statutes that include a

laundry list of items. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. 

Train Dispatchers, 499 U. S. 117, 129 (1991) (“[W]hen a

general term follows a specific one, the general term 

should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the

one with specific enumeration”). In addition, ejusdem 

generis is often invoked in conjunction with the interpretative canon noscitur a sociis, which provides that words are

to be “‘known by their companions.’” Washington State 

Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate 

of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 384 (2003) (quoting Gutierrez, 

supra, at 255). The general rule is that the “meaning of a 

word, and, consequently, the intention of the legislature,” 

should be “ascertained by reference to the context, and by

considering whether the word in question and the surrounding words are, in fact, ejusdem generis, and referable 

to the same subject-matter.” Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, 

709 (1878) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A proper reading of §2680(c) thus attributes to the last

phrase (“any other law enforcement officer”) the discrete

characteristic shared by the preceding phrases (“officer[s]

of customs or excise” and “assessment or collection of any 

tax or customs duty”). See also Norton v. Southern Utah 

Wilderness Alliance, 542 U. S. 55, 62–63 (2004) (applying 

ejusdem generis to conclude that “‘failure to act’” means 

“failure to take an agency action” (emphasis in original)); 

Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs., supra, 

at 384–385 (holding that the phrase “other legal process” 

in 42 U. S. C. §407(a) refers only to the utilization of a

judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism, the common attrib-
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

ute shared by the phrase and the statutory enumeration

preceding it). Had Congress intended otherwise, in all 

likelihood it would have drafted the section to apply to

“any law enforcement officer, including officers of customs 

and excise,” rather than tacking “any other law enforcement officer” on the end of the enumerated categories as it

did here. 

The common attribute of officers of customs and excise 

and other law enforcement officers is the performance of

functions most often assigned to revenue officers, including, inter alia, the enforcement of the United States’ revenue laws and the conduct of border searches. Although

officers of customs and officers of excise are in most instances the only full-time staff charged with this duty,

officers of other federal agencies and general law enforcement officers often will be called upon to act in the traditional capacity of a revenue officer. For example, Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA) or Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) agents frequently assist customs 

officials in the execution of border searches. See, e.g., 

United States v. Gurr, 471 F. 3d 144, 147–149 (CADC 

2006) (FBI involved in search of financial documents at

border); United States v. Boumelhem, 339 F. 3d 414, 424 

(CA6 2003) (“FBI had been cooperating with Customs as a 

part of a joint task force”); Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. 

United States, 777 F. 2d 822, 824 (CA2 1985) (DEA agents

were performing functions traditionally carried out by

Customs officials where they seized and searched an 

automobile that had been shipped from abroad and was

still in its shipping container). Cf. United States v. 

Schoor, 597 F. 2d 1303, 1305–1306 (CA9 1979) (upholding 

constitutionality of cooperation amongst federal agencies

in border searches). Similarly, 14 U. S. C. §89(a) grants

the Coast Guard plenary authority to stop and board 

American vessels to inspect for obvious customs violations. 

See, e.g., United States v. Gil-Carmona, 497 F. 3d 52 (CA1 
6 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

2007) (Coast Guard assisted an Immigration and Customs

Enforcement patrol aircraft in interdicting a vessel off the 

coast of Puerto Rico). To the extent they detain goods

whose possession violates customs laws, the Coast Guard 

officers—while not “officer[s] of customs or excise,” 28 

U. S. C. §2680(c)—are without doubt engaging in the 

enforcement of the United States’ revenue laws. 

The same is true in the tax context. Under 26 U. S. C. 

§6321, a delinquent taxpayer’s property is subject to forfeiture, see Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U. S. 265 

(1945), and may be seized by any federal agent assisting 

the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in executing the forfeiture, cf. United States v. $515,060.42 in United States 

Currency, 152 F. 3d 491, 495 (CA6 1998) (IRS and FBI 

jointly seized currency). Thus, the final phrase “any other

law enforcement officer” has work to do and makes considerable sense when the statute is limited in this way. 

B 

The Court reaches its contrary conclusion by concentrating on the word “any” before the phrase “other law enforcement officer.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(c). It takes this 

single last phrase to extend the statute so that it covers all

detentions of property by any law enforcement officer in

whatever capacity he or she acts. There are fundamental 

problems with this approach, in addition to the ones already mentioned.

First, the Court’s analysis cannot be squared with the

longstanding recognition that a single word must not be

read in isolation but instead defined by reference to its 

statutory context. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 

U. S. 215, 221 (1991) (“[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context”); Dolan v. Postal 

Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006) (“A word in a statute

may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word or phrase 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 7 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting

any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis”). 

This is true even of facially broad modifiers. The word 

“any” can mean “different things depending upon the 

setting,” Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U. S. 

125, 132 (2004); see also Small v. United States, 544 U. S. 

385, 388 (2005) (citing cases), and must be limited in its

application “to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them,” United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 

610, 631 (1818).

In Gutierrez, 528 U. S., at 254–255, for example, we held 

that the phrase “in any election” in the Organic Act of

Guam, 48 U. S. C. §1422, does not refer broadly to all

elections but only to the election of Guam’s Governor and 

Lieutenant Governor. The Court explained that the reference to “any election” is preceded by two references to 

gubernatorial elections and followed by four more references. In the context of such “relentless repetition,” the 

Court concluded that the phrase must be “known by [its]

companions.” 528 U. S., at 255. Likewise, in United 

States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357 (1994), the 

Court addressed a phrase similar to the statutory provision we interpret today. The Court noted that the respondent erred in “placing dispositive weight on the broad

statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement officer or 

agency without considering the rest of the statute,” and 

consulted instead “‘the context in which [the phrase] is

used.’” Id., at 358 (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 

U. S. 129, 132 (1993); alteration in original). 

As already mentioned, the context of §2680(c) suggests

that, in accordance with these precedents, the statutory 

provision should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to

customs and revenue duties. Its first clause deals exclusively with customs and tax duties and, between the first

and second clauses, it refers two more times to customs 
8 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

and tax. See Gutierrez, supra, at 254–255; A-Mark, Inc. v. 

United States Secret Serv. Dept. of Treasury, 593 F. 2d 

849, 851 (CA9 1978) (Tang, J., concurring) (“The clauses

both dwell exclusively on customs and taxes, except for the

final reference to other law-enforcement officers”). 

Further, §2680(c) provides that there will be immunity 

only where there has been a “detention” of goods, merchandise, or property. “[D]etention” is defined by legal 

and nonlegal dictionaries alike as a “compulsory,” “forced,”

or “punitive” containment. Black’s Law Dictionary 459 

(7th ed. 1999) (compulsory); American Heritage Dictionary 

494 (4th ed. 2000) (forced or punitive). The issue whether 

petitioner’s property was “detained” within the meaning of 

the statute was not raised in this case; and so the Court 

leaves for another day the exception’s applicability to 

these facts. See ante, at 4, n. 2. It is important, however,

to bear in mind that, in the context of detention of goods 

by customs and tax agents, it will be the rare case when

property is voluntarily turned over, rather than forcibly 

appropriated; indeed, customs and tax agents are in the 

regular business of seizing and forfeiting property, as are 

law enforcement agents acting in the capacity of revenue 

enforcement. See Dept. of Homeland Security, U. S. Customs and Border Protection and U. S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, Mid-Year FY 2007—Top IPR 

Commodities Seized (May 2007), online at http://www.

cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import/commercial_enforcement/ 

ipr/seizure/07_midyr_seizures.ctt/07_midyr_seizures.pdf 

(all Internet materials as visited Jan. 10, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (by midyear 2007, customs officials had executed 7,245 commodity seizures,

worth a total of $110,198,350); GAO, Border Security: 

Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry 17 (GAD–08–

219, Nov. 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08219.pdf 

(“According to [U. S. Customs and Border Protection] CBP, 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 9 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

in fiscal year 2006, CBP officers . . . seized more than 

644,000 pounds of illegal drugs, intercepted nearly 1.7 

million prohibited agricultural items, and seized over $155 

million in illegal commercial merchandise, such as counterfeit footwear and handbags” (footnote omitted)). 

In other contexts, however, the word “detention” may or 

may not accurately describe the nature of the Government

action. A prisoner’s voluntary decision to deliver property 

for transfer to another facility, for example, bears a

greater similarity to a “bailment”—the delivery of personal 

property after being held by the prison in trust, see 

American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 134—than 

to a “detention.” 

Not a single federal statute mentions the Federal Bureau of Prisons in the context of property detention. On 

the other hand, the majority of the nine federal statutes 

other than §2680(c) containing a reference to the detention

of goods, merchandise, or other property are specific to

customs and excise. Compare 19 U. S. C. §1499(a) (authorizing customs agents to examine and detain imported

merchandise); §1595a(c)(3) (authorizing customs officials 

to detain merchandise introduced contrary to law); 26

U. S. C. §5311 (authorizing internal revenue officers to 

detain containers containing distilled spirits, wines, or

beer where there is reason to believe applicable taxes have

not been paid); 50 U. S. C. App. §2411(a)(2)(A) (authorizing customs officials to seize and detain goods at ports of 

entry in the enforcement of war and national defense); 22 

U. S. C. §464 (authorizing customs agents to detain armed 

vessels and any property found thereon); with 18 U. S. C. 

§981(e) (“The Attorney General, the Secretary of the

Treasury, or the Postal Service, as the case may be, shall 

ensure the equitable transfer pursuant to paragraph (2) of 

any forfeited property to the appropriate State or local law 

enforcement agency . . . . The United States shall not be 

liable in any action arising out of the seizure, detention, 
10 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

and transfer of seized property to State or local officials”); 

28 U. S. C. §524(c)(1) (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (appropriating a special fund for the purpose of property detention 

under any law enforced or administered by the Department of Justice); 31 U. S. C. §9703(a)(1)(A) (establishing a 

Department of Treasury Forfeiture Fund to pay the expenses of property detention); 16 U. S. C. §§1540(e)(3), 

3375(b) (authorizing the detention of goods and packages

for inspection where there is reason to believe there has

been a violation of laws governing fish, wildlife, and 

plants).

This would seem to indicate that Congress contemplated

that the statutory provision considered here would apply 

only in those narrow circumstances where the officer is in

the regular business of forfeiting property, namely revenue enforcement. At the very least, it demonstrates that

“detention” will be a difficult concept to apply case-by-case

under the majority’s interpretation of the statute—a

problem alleviated by limiting the statute to customs and 

tax. 

Second, the Court’s construction of the phrase “any

other law enforcement officer” runs contrary to “‘our duty

“to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 

statute.”’” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) 

(quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538– 

539 (1955)). The Court’s reading renders “officer[s] of 

customs or excise” mere surplusage, as there would have 

been no need for Congress to have specified that officers of

customs and officers of excise were immune if they indeed

were subsumed within the allegedly all-encompassing 

“any” officer clause. See Circuit City Stores, 532 U. S., at 

114. 

Third, though the final reference to “any other law 

enforcement officer” does result in some ambiguity, the

legislative history, by virtue of its exclusive reference to 

customs and excise, confirms that Congress did not shift 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 11 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

its attention from the context of revenue enforcement 

when it used these words at the end of the statute. See, 

e.g., S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1946) (in

discussing 28 U. S. C. §2680(c) referring only to “the detention of goods by customs officers”); A. Holtzoff, Report

on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 16 (1931) (noting 

that the property-detention exception was added to the 

legislation to “include immunity from liability in respect of

loss in connection with the detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise”).

Indeed, the Court’s construction reads the exception to

defeat the central purpose of the statute, an interpretative

danger the Court has warned against in explicit terms.

See Kosak, 465 U. S., at 854, n. 9 (the Court must identify 

only “ ‘those circumstances which are within the words 

and reason of the exception’—no less and no more” (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). It 

is difficult to conceive that the FTCA, which was enacted 

by Congress to make the tort liability of the United States

“the same as that of a private person under like circumstance[s],” S. Rep. No. 1400, at 32, would allow any officer 

under any circumstance to detain property without being 

accountable under the Act to those injured by his or her 

tortious conduct. If Congress wanted to say that all law 

enforcement officers may detain property without liability 

in tort, including when they perform general law enforcement tasks, it would have done so in more express terms;

one would expect at least a reference to law enforcement

officers outside the customs or excise context either in the 

text of the statute or in the legislative history. In the 

absence of that reference, the Court ought not presume

that the liberties of the person who owns the property 

would be so lightly dismissed and disregarded. 
12 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

II 

A 

The 2000 amendments do not require a contrary conclusion. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 

(CAFRA), as applicable here, limits the operation of 

§2680(c)’s exception. See §3(a), 114 Stat. 211. The limitation (i.e. the exception to the exception) applies where

there has been an injury or loss of goods and “the property 

was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal law.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(c)(1). In my view 

the amendment establishes that officers of customs and 

excise, and law enforcement officials performing functions

traditionally reserved for revenue officers, shall be liable 

in tort for damage to the property when the owner’s interest in the goods in the end is not forfeited (and when other 

conditions apply). And this is so regardless of whether 

the officer acted under the revenue laws of the United 

States or, alternatively, another civil or criminal forfeiture

provision.

The majority’s reading of CAFRA for a contrary proposition is premised on the assumption that there is no circumstance in which a customs or excise officer, or a officer 

acting in such a capacity, would “enforce civil forfeiture 

laws unrelated to customs or excise.” Ante, at 9. But 

customs and tax officials, along with law enforcement 

officers performing customs and tax duties, routinely do

just that. See, e.g., Customs and Border Protection, Seizures and Penalties Links, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/

toolbox/legal/authority_enforce/seizures_penalties.xml (CBP

has “full authority to . . . seize merchandise for violation of 

CBP laws or those of other federal agencies that are enforced by CBP”). Indeed, the customs laws expressly 

contemplate forfeitures and seizures of property under

nonrevenue provisions. See, e.g., 19 U. S. C. §1600 (“The 

procedures [governing seizures of property] set forth in

[§§1602–1619] shall apply to seizures of any property 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 13 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

effected by customs officers under any law enforced or

administered by the Customs Service unless such law 

specifies different procedures”). 

By way of example, a customs or excise official might 

effect a civil forfeiture of currency or monetary instruments under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U. S. C. §5317(c) 

(2000 ed., Supp. V); or of counterfeit instruments, illegal

music recordings, or firearms under the Contraband Act,

49 U. S. C. §80302 et seq. Similarly, a DEA agent assisting a customs official in a border search (and thus acting

in a customs capacity) might effect a civil forfeiture of 

vehicles or goods associated with the drug trade under 

federal drug laws. See 21 U. S. C. §881; see also, e.g., 

Formula One Motors, 777 F. 2d, at 822–823. Though

acting pursuant to a civil forfeiture law that is not specific 

to customs and taxes, the DEA agent would be covered by 

§2680(c)’s exception to the exception because he or she 

would be acting in a traditional revenue capacity—that of

conducting a routine search of persons and effects of persons crossing an international boundary. 

The Court counters that the Bank Secrecy Act, 31

U. S. C. §5317(c), is not “unrelated to customs or excise” 

because it cross-references a requirement for exporting

and importing monetary instruments, §5316. See ante, at 

8, n. 5. But §5316, despite being “[r]elated” to customs 

duties, is part of the federal Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, see §5311 et seq. (2000 ed. and 

Supp. IV), not the United States’ customs laws. 

The Court also notes that customs agents have the

authority to seize contraband under the customs laws,

particularly 19 U. S. C. §1595a(c)(1). I do not dispute that 

customs agents often act under customs laws when seizing 

property. My point, which goes unrefuted by the Court, is

that it was reasonable for Congress to have specified that 

customs and excise officers would be covered by the exception to the exception even when acting pursuant to federal 
14 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

laws more generally. For instance, §1595a(c)(1) applies 

only where “[m]erchandise . . . is introduced . . . into the 

United States contrary to law,” which appears to target 

the importation of property subject to duty or entry restrictions. Title 28 U. S. C. §2680(c), by contrast, was 

amended in 2000 to encompass not only the detention of 

“goods or merchandise” but the detention of all “property.”

§3(a), 114 Stat. 211. In circumstances not involving imported “merchandise,” then, the customs official would be 

acting pursuant to law enforcement authority derived not 

from the customs laws but, inter alia, the Contraband and 

Bank Secrecy Acts. The same is true of noncustoms officers acting in a customs capacity. 

At the very least this renders the Court’s reliance on the 

views of a subsequent Congress suspect. We have said 

“subsequent acts can shape or focus” the meaning of a 

statute. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 

U. S. 120, 143 (2000). There is no indication, however, 

that by adding a forfeiture exception to the exception,

Congress intended to broaden the scope of the original

immunity. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 

Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 199–200 (1963). 

B 

Though the Court does not much rely on the point, 

perhaps it has concerns respecting suits like the one now 

before us. Petitioner sues for lost property valued at about 

$177. Law enforcement officers in the federal prison

system must take inventory of the property they store, 

and with just under 200,000 persons in the federal

prison population, see Federal Bureau of Prisons, Weekly 

Population Report, online at http://www.bop.gov/news/

weekly_report.jsp (reporting 199,342 federal inmates as of

January 7, 2008), the burden on the Government to account for missing items of little value could be a substantial one. 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 15 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

There are sound reasons, though, for rejecting this 

concern in interpreting the statute. To begin with, as

already discussed, if it were a congressional objective to

give a comprehensive exception to all officers who detain

property, Congress most likely would have written a specific provision to address the point, quite apart from the

special concerns it had with customs and revenue. The 

exception as the Court now interprets it extends not only

to trivial detentions, not only to prison officials, not only to 

those in custody, but to all detentions of property of whatever value held by all law enforcement officials, a reading 

that simply does not comport with the plain text and 

context of the statute. 

Second, as the Court observed when interpreting another exception that raised the concern of numerous frivolous claims, liability for negligent transmission “is a risk 

shared by any business [involved in management of detention facilities],” including the Government. Dolan, 546 

U. S., at 491. 

Third, there are already in place administrative procedures that must be exhausted before the suit is allowed, 

diminishing the number of frivolous suits that would be 

heard in federal court. See 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a) (“No

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted”). Under 28 CFR §543.31(a)

(2007), the “owner of the damaged or lost property” first 

must file an FTCA claim with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

regional office; the BOP, in turn, is authorized by statute 

to settle administrative claims for not more than $1,000, 

see 31 U. S. C. §3723(a), which likely encompasses most

claims brought by federal prisoners. Only if the prisoner

is “dissatisfied with the final agency action” may he or she

file suit in an “appropriate U. S. District Court.” 28 CFR 
16 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

§543.32(g). 

* * * 

If Congress had intended to give sweeping immunity to

all federal law enforcement officials from liability for the 

detention of property, it would not have dropped this

phrase onto the end of the statutory clause so as to appear 

there as something of an afterthought. The seizure of 

property by an officer raises serious concerns for the liberty of our people and the Act should not be read to permit 

appropriation of property without a remedy in tort by

language so obscure and indirect.

For these reasons, in my view, the judgment of the

Court of Appeals ought to be reversed. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 06–9130 

ABDUS-SHAHID M. S. ALI, PETITIONER v. FEDERAL 

BUREAU OF PRISONS ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[January 22, 2008] 

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins,

dissenting. 

I agree with JUSTICE KENNEDY that context makes clear 

that Congress intended the phrase “any other law enforcement officer” to apply only to officers carrying out

customs or excise duties. See 28 U. S. C. §2680(c). But I 

write separately to emphasize, as JUSTICE KENNEDY’s 

dissent itself makes clear, that the relevant context extends well beyond Latin canons and other such purely 

textual devices. 

As with many questions of statutory interpretation, the 

issue here is not the meaning of the words. The dictionary

meaning of each word is well known. Rather, the issue is 

the statute’s scope. What boundaries did Congress intend 

to set? To what circumstances did Congress intend the

phrase, as used in this statutory provision, to apply? The 

majority answers this question by referring to an amendment that creates an exception for certain forfeitures and

by emphasizing the statutory word “any.” As to the 

amendment, I find JUSTICE KENNEDY’s counterargument 

convincing. See ante, at 11–13. And, in my view, the word

“any” provides no help whatsoever. 

The word “any” is of no help because all speakers (including writers and legislators) who use general words

such as “all,” “any,” “never,” and “none” normally rely

upon context to indicate the limits of time and place 
2 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

within which they intend those words to do their linguistic

work. And with the possible exception of the assertion of a 

universal truth, say by a mathematician, scientist, philosopher, or theologian, such limits almost always exist. 

When I call out to my wife, “There isn’t any butter,” I do

not mean, “There isn’t any butter in town.” The context 

makes clear to her that I am talking about the contents of

our refrigerator. That is to say, it is context, not a dictionary, that sets the boundaries of time, place, and circumstance within which words such as “any” will apply. See 

United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[G]eneral words,” such as the word “‘any’,” 

must “be limited” in their application “to those objects to

which the legislature intended to apply them”); Small v. 

United States, 544 U. S. 385, 388 (2005) (“The word ‘any’ 

considered alone cannot answer” the question “whether 

the statutory reference ‘convicted in any court’ includes a 

conviction entered in a foreign court”); Nixon v. Missouri 

Municipal League, 541 U. S. 125, 132 (2004) (“‘[A]ny’” 

means “different things depending upon the setting”); 

United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 357 

(1994) (“[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight

on the broad statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the 

statute”).

Context, of course, includes the words immediately

surrounding the phrase in question. And canons such as 

ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis offer help in evaluating the significance of those surrounding words. Yet that 

help is limited. That is because other contextual features 

can show that Congress intended a phrase to apply more 

broadly than the immediately surrounding words by

themselves suggest. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 138–140 (2001) (SOUTER, J., dissenting) (finding “good reasons” not to apply ejusdem generis

because the statute’s history and purposes make clear that 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the words “any other class of workers” in the phrase “seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers” 

refer, not just to other transportation workers, but to

workers of all kinds including retail store clerks). It is 

because canons of construction are not “conclusive” and 

“are often countered . . . by some maxim pointing in a 

different direction.” Id., at 115 (majority opinion). And it 

is because these particular canons simply crystallize what

English speakers already know, namely, that lists often

(but not always) group together items with similar characteristics. (That is why we cannot, without comic effect,

yoke radically different nouns to a single verb, e.g., “He 

caught three salmon, two trout, and a cold.”) 

In this case, not only the immediately surrounding

words but also every other contextual feature supports

JUSTICE KENNEDY’s conclusion. The textual context includes the location of the phrase within a provision that

otherwise exclusively concerns customs and revenue duties. And the nontextual context includes several features 

that, taken together, indicate that Congress intended a

narrow tort-liability exception related to customs and 

excise. 

First, drafting history shows that the relevant portion of 

the bill that became the Federal Tort Claims Act concerned only customs and excise. Initially, the relevant 

provision of the bill exempted only claims “arising in 

respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty.” See, e.g., S. 4377, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 

(1930). In 1931, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Alexander Holtzoff, wrote additional draft language,

namely, “or the detention of any goods or merchandise by 

any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims

Bill 2 (1931) (emphasis added). Holtzoff, in a report to a

congressional agency, said that the expanded language 

sought “to include immunity from liability in respect of 
4 ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

loss in connection with the detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise.” Id., at 16. Holtzoff explained that the language was suggested by a similar British bill that mentioned only customs and excise

officials. Ibid. (referring to the bill proposed in the Crown 

Proceedings Committee Report §11(5)(c), pp. 17–18 (Apr.

1927) (Cmd. 2842) (“No proceedings shall lie under this 

section . . . for or in respect of the loss of or any deterioration or damage occasioned to, or any delay in the release

of, any goods or merchandise by reason of anything done 

or omitted to be done by any officer of customs and excise 

acting as such”)); see Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 

848, 857, n. 13 (1984) (While “the ideas expressed [in 

Holtzoff’s report] should not be given great weight in

determining the intent of the Legislature,” at least in 

some circumstances, “it seems to us senseless to ignore 

entirely the views of [the provision’s] draftsman”). And 

Members of Congress repeatedly referred to the exception 

as encompassing claims involving customs and excise 

functions. See, e.g., H. R. Rep. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3d

Sess., p. 5 (1940); S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 

p. 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10

(1942); H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6

(1945); S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 33 (1946).

Second, insofar as Congress sought, through the Act’s

exceptions, to preclude tort suits against the Government 

where “adequate remedies were already available,” Kosak, 

supra, at 858; see S. Rep. No. 1400, supra, at 33; H. R. 

Rep. No. 1287, supra, at 6 (setting forth that purpose), a

limited exception makes sense; a broad exception does not. 

Other statutes already provided recovery for plaintiffs 

harmed by federal officers enforcing customs and tax laws

but not for plaintiffs harmed by all other federal officers 

enforcing most other laws. See Bazuaye v. United States, 

83 F. 3d 482, 485–486 (CADC 1996) (detailing history). 

Third, the practical difference between a limited and a 
Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

broad interpretation is considerable, magnifying the importance of the congressional silence to which JUSTICE 

KENNEDY points, see ante, at 11. A limited interpretation 

of the phrase “any other law enforcement officer” would

likely encompass only those law enforcement officers 

working, say, at borders and helping to enforce customs

and excise laws. The majority instead interprets this 

provision to include the tens of thousands of officers performing unrelated tasks. The Justice Department estimates that there are more than 100,000 law enforcement 

officers, not including members of the armed services.

See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics

Bulletin, Federal Law Enforcement Officers, 2004, p. 1 

(July 2006). And although the law’s history contains

much that indicates the provision’s scope is limited to 

customs and excise, it contains nothing at all suggesting

an intent to apply the provision more broadly, indeed, to

multiply the number of officers to whom it applies by what 

is likely one or more orders of magnitude. It is thus not 

the Latin canons, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, 

that shed light on the application of the statutory phrase

but JUSTICE SCALIA’s more pertinent and easily remembered English-language observation that Congress “does

not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001).

For these reasons, I dissent and I join JUSTICE KENNEDY’s dissent.