NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 13-3563

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CURTIS L. MCKEITHAN,

 Appellant 

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-00-cr-00278-001)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

December 27, 2013

Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 14, 2014)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Curtis L. McKeithan, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United 

States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. We will affirm the District 

Court’s order.

McKeithan was convicted by a jury in 2001 of drug trafficking and was originally 
2

sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 420 months. After a number of unsuccessful 

post-conviction motions, McKeithan filed a motion in May 2012 to reduce his sentence 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), referring to the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), and 

“[t]he retroactive Amendment 706 [that] went into [e]ffect on November 1, 2012 [sic] 

and listed under [United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”)] § 1B1.10, replacing 

Amendment 706.” The District Court denied relief, noting that the FSA did not apply 

retroactively, but on appeal, we construed McKeithan’s motion as raising a claim for 

reduction of sentence under Amendment 750, which does apply retroactively, per 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). We remanded to the District Court to consider the merits of 

McKeithan’s Amendment 750 argument. See C.A. No. 12-2919.

On remand, the District Court ordered briefing. The Government conceded that 

McKeithan was eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 750, but 

opposed McKeithan’s attempts to raise other issues1in connection with his sentence. The 

District Court agreed with the Government’s position. It reduced McKeithan’s sentence 

to 352 months’ imprisonment, but found that his other sentencing claims were not 

cognizable in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. McKeithan timely appealed.

The District Court properly determined that the scope of its resentencing was 

limited to any changes that would result from application of the retroactive amendment, 

 

1 McKeithan sought to raise claims that: (1) the courts should apply a 1:1 crack-to-powder 

cocaine ration; (2) there was a problem with the “use prong” of his conviction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c); (3) he should not have received a sentencing enhancement for his managerial 

role as the issue was not submitted to the jury; and (4) his criminal history should be adjusted 

from level III to level II.
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here, Amendment 750. United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 615-16 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Section 3582(c)(2) “does not authorize a resentencing, ” but only “permits a sentence 

reduction within the narrow bounds established by the [United States Sentencing] 

Commission.” Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2694 (2010).

Thus, the District Court lacked the authority to address any of McKeithan’s claims that 

were unaffected by the Commission’s amendment. Id.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.