Opinion issued March 24, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

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NO. 01-18-00935-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF A.P., G.P., AND T.P., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 408th Judicial District Court

Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2012-CI-02330

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court issued a order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. 

Appellant, the Father in the suit affecting the parent-child relationship, attempts to 

appeal a subsequent judgment which: (1) granted, in part, Father’s motion to enforce 

against Mother, and (2) sua sponte appointed a parenting facilitator. In a single point 

of error, Father asserts that “[t]he trial court erred in appointing a parenting facilitator
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with [sic] the confines of an enforcement action.” We dismiss the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. Although we grant appellant’s alternative request to consider the appeal 

as a petition for writ of mandamus, we deny the petition.

Background

The trial court rendered a final order in Suit to Modify Parent-Child 

Relationship on April 19, 2018. Mother and Father were designated as joint 

managing conservators of their three children. Among other things, the order 

required that Mother and Father (1) communicate through a co-parenting website 

program “with regard to all communication regarding the children, except in the case 

of an emergency or other matter” and (2) “timely post all significant information 

concerning the health, education, and welfare of the children.”

Father filed a motion seeking (1) “enforcement of the Order in Suit to Modify 

Parent-Child Relationship,” alleging eight violations by Mother of the order 

requiring information to be posted on the co-parenting website program, and (2) 

confirmation that his child support arrearages had been satisfied. Regarding 

enforcement, Father requested the trial court hold Mother in contempt, assess a fine 

of up to $500 per violation, and order Mother to attend counseling. Father also 

sought attorney’s fees. Mother filed a general denial and requested attorney’s fees

incurred in defending against the motion to enforce.
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A trial was held on June 5, 2018. Mother’s counsel opened by asserting that 

the enforcement issues arose, at least in part, from the parties’ failure to 

communicate and suggested the appointment of a parenting facilitator:

And then the violations, there is a reason for every one of them that we 

can figure out what it was. Two of them we don’t even – we can’t even 

identify what was the problem, and I think part of our problem with 

these two litigants is that they probably need some help learning how 

to communicate. They were doing a really good job until the new wife 

entered the picture and then the communication just deteriorated.

So I’m thinking they probably need a parenting facilitator even though 

that’s not pled for. It would just help matters and solve all of these 

problems, but for every one of the enforcement issues that they are here 

today, there is a good reason why everything happened. So we are 

looking forward to showing you that.

The trial court, on the record, granted Father’s enforcement motion in part (as to 6 

counts), and denied it in part (as to 2 counts); assessed a fine of $1,500; and denied 

both parties’ request for attorney’s fees. The trial court further ordered the 

appointment of a parenting facilitator. No objections were raised at trial to the 

appointment of a parenting facilitator.

On June 19, 2018, the trial court issued its Order of Enforcement, Order 

Denying Confirmation of Child Support Arrearages, and Order Appointing 

Parenting Facilitator. In the order, the court appointed a parenting facilitator and 

ordered the parties to equally split the cost.

Father filed a Motion to Modify/Reform Judgment on July 19, 2018, 

challenging the appointment of a parenting facilitator and the denial of his request 
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for attorney’s fees. Among other things, Father asserted that the court “was without 

authority to appoint a parenting facilitator within the confines of an enforcement 

action” and “appointment of a parenting facilitator did not comply with notice and 

hearing requirements.” The court denied the motion on August 28, 2018. Father filed 

a notice of appeal on September 13, 2018.

Jurisdiction

This Court generally has jurisdiction over appeals from final orders arising 

under the Texas Family Code unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal. See

TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(b) (“An appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from 

a final order rendered under this title.”); cf. TEX.CIV. PRAC.&REM.CODE §§ 51.012, 

51.014(a) (listing appealable interlocutory orders); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 

S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011) (“Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal, 

appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction over appeals from final 

judgments.”).

Appellant asserts that the trial court appointed a parenting facilitator in a 

proceeding to enforce a final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. 

But orders enforcing a final judgment, such as contempt orders, are not themselves 

final, appealable orders. See Cline v. Cline, 557 S.W.3d 810, 812 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“Decisions in contempt proceedings cannot be 

reviewed on direct appeal because contempt orders are not appealable, even when 
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appealed along with a judgment that is appealable, as here.”); In re B.A.C., 144 

S.W.3d 8, 11–12 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.) (overruling its previous holding 

that contempt order is final, appealable order, citing 20 appellate court decisions, 

and bringing its prior opinions on the issue “back into accord with the Texas 

Supreme Court and the other courts of appeals”); see also In re Office of Att’y Gen. 

of Tex., 215 S.W.3d 913, 915–16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, orig. proceeding) 

(explaining why contempt orders are not appealable and must be attacked by petition 

for writ of habeas corpus or writ of mandamus).

A final, appealable judgment is one that actually disposes of all claims and 

parties then before the court. Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex.

2001). “Contempt proceedings, whether the court grants or denies the motion for 

contempt, are not appealable because they ‘are not concerned with disposing of all 

claims and parties before the court, as are judgments; instead, contempt proceedings 

involve a court’s enforcement of its own orders, regardless of the status of the claims 

between the parties before it.’” Hooper v. Hooper, No. 14–09–01024–CV, 2011 WL 

334198, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) 

(quoting In re Office of Att’y Gen. of Tex., 215 S.W.3d at 915-16). The trial court’s 

appointment of a parenting facilitator “with[in] the confines of an enforcement 

action” similarly is not a final appealable judgment because it does not dispose of 

any claims; rather, among other things, it seeks to facilitate compliance with its 
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orders. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.6061(a) (providing that duties of parenting 

facilitator may include “monitor[ing] compliance with court orders”).

Our decision in Cline is instructive. In Cline, appellant appealed from an order 

determining child support arrearages and holding appellant in contempt for failure 

to pay child support. 557 S.W.3d at 811-12. Explaining that decisions in contempt 

proceedings cannot be reviewed on direct appeal, our court dismissed appellant’s 

contempt-based complaints in the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 812. 

However, because appellant’s challenge to the arrearage judgment was unrelated to 

the contempt proceeding, our court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the 

issue and affirmed the arrearage portion of the order. Id. at 812-13; see also In re 

E.H.G., No. 04-08-00579-CV, 2009 WL 1406246, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

May 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“If a motion to enforce includes a request for 

both a contempt finding and a money judgment for child support arrearage, an 

appellate court has jurisdiction to address the arrearage judgment because it is 

unrelated to the contempt order.”).

We recognize that when a proceeding in a suit affecting the parent-child 

relationship is statutorily designated as a new suit, a determination of that proceeding 

is a final appealable order. See Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 86 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2002, no pet.). But the applicable statutes in this case do not support 

considering appellant’s motion to enforce to be the equivalent of a new suit. 
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Although the Family Code provides that a motion to enforce a divorce decree is the 

equivalent of a new suit, there is no similar statute providing that a motion to enforce 

a final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship is a new suit. See TEX.

FAM. CODE § 9.001(b) (providing that suit to enforce divorce decree is governed by 

rules of civil procedure applicable to filing of original lawsuit). Motions to modify 

in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship are considered new suits, but the 

legislature did not statutorily designate motions to enforce an order in a suit affecting 

the parent-child relationship as a new suit. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 156.003 (“A 

party whose rights and duties may be affected by a suit for modification is entitled 

to receive notice by service of citation.”); 156.004 (“The Texas Rules of Civil 

Procedure applicable to the filing of an original lawsuit apply to a suit for 

modification under this chapter.”). Unlike an enforcement order, the entry of a final 

order in a modification proceeding concludes those proceedings and each subsequent 

filing of a new motion to modify requires issuance of citation and observation of the 

formalities of due process. See id.; Rose v. Rose, 117 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2003, no pet.) (distinguishing motions to enforce existing judgments from 

motions to modify in suit affecting the parent-child relationship).

Accordingly, the clerk of this court sent appellant a notice of intent to dismiss 

the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Appellant filed a response asserting that our court 

has jurisdiction because (1) appellant “not only sought contempt, but also sought 
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judicial confirmation that he satisfied his child support obligation for May 2012;” 

(2) “[u]nlike Cline, appellant does not raise the issues of contempt or child support 

arrearages in this appeal, but only challenges the appointment of a parenting 

facilitator;” and (3) “[t]he record is not clear whether the trial court appointed the 

parenting facilitator in response to the contempt proceeding or the proceeding to 

adjudicate child support arrearages.” Alternatively, appellant requests that, if we 

conclude that the appointment of the parenting facilitator is not appealable, we 

consider his appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus.

Appellant’s response fails to demonstrate that we have jurisdiction over the 

appeal. We consider the response in two parts. First, appellant attempts to distinguish 

Cline by asserting that his appeal does not raise issues of contempt or child support 

arrearages and only challenges the appointment of a parenting facilitator. Even if 

Cline could be distinguished on this basis, appellant still fails to provide any 

authority demonstrating that the appointment of a parenting facilitator—the sole 

issue in this attempted appeal— is an appealable issue. Second, appellant asserts that 

the record is not clear as to whether the order was issued in response to a contempt 

proceeding or a proceeding to adjudicate child support arrearages. Appellant notes 

this ambiguity but makes no attempt to argue, much less demonstrate, that the 

parenting facilitator was appointed in a proceeding to adjudicate child support 

arrearages rather than contempt. Instead, appellant acknowledges that the 
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appointment appears “more logically related” to the contempt proceeding and that it 

may be inferred that the trial court was attempting to facilitate compliance with its 

order. Nevertheless, appellant argues that our Court has appellate jurisdiction 

because “the record is not expressly clear under which portion of the case the 

appointment of the parenting facilitator was made.” But we cannot assume our 

jurisdiction, particularly when the record suggests that we lack jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the appointment of the parenting facilitator is not 

appealable and that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.

Although we lack appellate jurisdiction to review the appointment of the 

parenting facilitator, we grant appellant’s alternative request that we consider the 

appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. See Jones v. Brelsford, 390 S.W.3d 486, 

497 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“[I]n an appropriate case, 

we may treat an appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus and an appellant who 

specifically requests that [the] appeal be treated as a mandamus petition invokes this 

Court’s original jurisdiction.”). Considering the appeal as a petition for writ of 

mandamus, we deny the petition for the reasons discussed below.

Standard of Review

Most orders arising from a suit affecting the parent-child relationship will not 

be disturbed on appeal unless the complaining party can demonstrate a clear abuse 

of discretion. In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
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Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion by acting 

arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In 

re R.T.K., 324 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. 

denied). The failure to analyze or apply the law correctly also constitutes an abuse 

of discretion. In re C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 215.

Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226

(Tex. 2004). 

Discussion

The underlying case is a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, over 

which the trial court, after rendering a final order, retains continuing, exclusive 

jurisdiction over matters related to the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 101.032(a)

(defining “Suit affecting the parent-child relationship” as suit requesting 

conservatorship, access to or support of child, or establishment or termination of 

parent-child relationship), 155.001(a) (with certain exceptions not applicable to this 

case, court acquires continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over suit affecting parentchild relationship matters on rendition of final order), 155.002 (court with 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction retains jurisdiction over parties and suit affecting 

parent-child relationship matters). There is no dispute that the trial court was the 
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family court of continuing jurisdiction—the court rendered the final order and 

thereby retained jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the order.

Section 153.6051 of the Texas Family Code governs the appointment of a 

parenting facilitator. Section 153.6051(a) provides that “[i]n a suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship, the court may, on its own motion or on agreement of the 

parties, appoint a parenting facilitator . . . .” TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.6051(a). Section 

153.6051(b) provides that

The court may not appoint a parenting facilitator unless, after 

notice and hearing, the court makes a specific finding that:

(1) the case is a high-conflict case or there is good cause 

shown for the appointment of a parenting facilitator and the 

appointment is in the best interest of any minor child in the 

suit; and

(2) the person appointed has the minimum qualifications 

required by Section 153.6101, as documented by the person.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.6051(b).

On appeal, appellant challenges the trial court’s appointment of the parenting 

facilitator as (1) being outside of a “suit affecting the parent-child relationship” and 

(2) failing to provide notice. We address these challenges below.

A. Trial Court’s Authority to Appoint Parenting Facilitator

Appellant argues that the appointment of the parenting facilitator was not part 

of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Specifically, appellant asserts that 

“[t]he trial court erred in appointing a parenting facilitator with[in] the confines of 
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an enforcement action” because his enforcement action did not affect the parentchild relationship; rather, according to appellant, it sought to enforce the provisions 

of an existing court order in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship.

In his motion to modify, appellant asserted that he “filed the enforcement suit 

under Chapter 157, Texas Family Code, which is not, in and of itself, a suit affecting 

the parent-child relationship, but rather, is merely a suit to enforce prior orders of 

the Court.” Appellant further asserted that “[w]hile the underlying order [he] sought 

to enforce was within a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the instant 

enforcement action is not, and therefore, the Court cannot sua sponte appoint a 

parenting facilitator.” We disagree with appellant’s arguments that the enforcement 

action was outside of the suit affecting the parent-child relationship.

The applicable statutes demonstrate that an action to enforce under Chapter 

157 is filed within the suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Chapter 157’s 

enforcement provisions are located within Title 5(b) of the Family Code, which 

governs suits affecting the parent-child relationship. Section 157.001 of the Family 

Code authorizes the filing of a motion for enforcement of a final order in a suit 

affecting the parent-child relationship. TEX. FAM.CODE § 157.001(a) (“A motion for 

enforcement as provided in this chapter may be filed to enforce any provision of a 

temporary or final order rendered in a suit.”). The section further provides that the 

court “may enforce by contempt any provision of a temporary or final order” and 
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requires that motions for enforcement be filed in the court of continuing, exclusive 

jurisdiction. See id. at 157.001(b), (d). Consistent with these statutes, the record 

demonstrates that appellant filed his motion to enforce in Cause No. 2012-CI-02330, 

the same cause number as the underlying suit affecting the parent-child relationship.

Appellant cites Tucker v. Thomas, 419 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. 2013) for the general 

proposition that modification and enforcement proceedings merit different 

treatment. On this basis, appellant asserts that “Chapter 157 sets forth a specific 

process and provides for specific remedies related to enforcement of court orders in 

family cases; but, Chapter 157 does not incorporate, or even mention, any provision 

of Chapter 153 (containing statutes for the appointment of a parenting facilitator).” 

But both enforcement and modification proceedings fall under the chapter of the 

Family Code governing suits affecting the parent-child relationship. Appellant 

attempts to read into the statutes a limitation that a parenting facilitator cannot be 

appointed in an enforcement proceeding and can only be appointed when a 

modification of parental rights is sought. We decline to read such a limitation into 

the statutes. Cases involving frequent actions to enforce prior orders demonstrate the 

necessity of appointing a parenting facilitator to minimize future enforcement 

actions. One of the statutory considerations in finding a “high-conflict case” for the 

appointment of a parenting facilitator is whether the parties engage in an unusual 
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degree of “repetitiously resorting to the adjudicative process.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 

153.601(2)(A).

Accordingly, the trial court was authorized to consider the appointment of a 

parenting facilitator because the enforcement motion was filed within the original 

suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Appellant also asserts that the trial court 

lacked authority to appoint a parenting facilitator because “[n]either party sought 

appointment of a parenting facilitator in any of their pleadings.” We reject this 

argument because the statute expressly allows the trial court to appoint a parenting 

facilitator “on its own motion.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.6051(a).

B. Notice Requirements

Appellant argues that even if his enforcement action is as a suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship, the trial court’s appointment of a parenting facilitator did 

not comply with notice and hearing requirements. The statute provides that a court 

“may not appoint a parenting facilitator unless, after notice and hearing, the court 

makes a specific finding that: (1) the case is a high-conflict case or there is good 

cause shown for the appointment of a parenting facilitator and the appointment is in 

the best interest of any minor child in the suit; and (2) the person appointed has the 

minimum qualifications required by Section 153.6101, as documented by the 

person.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.6051(b). Appellant does not dispute the trial court’s 

findings that the case is a high-conflict case and that the appointed parenting 
15

facilitator meets the required qualifications; instead, appellant asserts that notice was 

insufficient for the trial court to appoint the parenting facilitator. Specifically, 

appellant asserts that “[t]he record lacks any indication the court was contemplating 

appointing a parenting facilitator” and the trial court’s order setting the June 5, 2018 

hearing “was silent regarding anything to do with a parenting facilitator.” 

The record demonstrates that the trial court informed appellant at the June 5, 

2018 hearing on the enforcement motion that it was ordering the appointment of a 

parenting facilitator. Appellant was represented at the hearing but did not object to 

the appointment of a parenting facilitator. Nor did appellant object to the 

appointment during the two weeks between the hearing and the trial court’s issuing 

its written order on June 19, 2018. Instead, a month after the order was issued, 

appellant filed a motion to modify/reform the judgment on July 19, 2018. The trial 

court ordered the motion set for hearing on August 8, 2018, and subsequently denied 

the motion by docket entry on August 18, 2018.

Based on the record, we conclude that appellant was notified at the hearing 

that the court intended to order the appointment of a parenting facilitator. Appellant 

was given a reasonable opportunity to object at the hearing—and prior to issuance 

of the written order two weeks later—but failed to do so. But even if this notice was 

insufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 153.6051(b), any error is rendered 

harmless by appellant’s filing of a motion to reconsider the appointment of the 
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parenting facilitator and the court’s consideration of the motion. See, e.g., Holland 

v. Alker, No. 01-05-00666-CV, 2006 WL 1041785, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] Apr. 20, 2006, pet. denied) (“Assuming without deciding that notice and 

hearing were required before the issuance of a turnover order, we hold that the trial 

court did not violate appellants’ due process rights by ruling on appellees’

supplemental request for turnover because, among other things, the trial court held 

a hearing on appellants’ motion to reconsider.”). Accordingly, the trial court 

provided appellant with sufficient opportunity to voice his objections to the court’s 

sua sponte appointment of a parenting facilitator.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss appellant’s appeal of the order 

appointing a parenting facilitator for want of jurisdiction. Considering the appeal as 

a petition for writ of mandamus, we deny the petition.

Sarah Beth Landau

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Lloyd, Landau and Countiss.