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MEMORANDUM FOR: 303 Committee 

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SUBJEC.T: Recommendation for Retention oi the CLA IDEALIST Program 

l. The Agency U-2 program provides the u .. S. a :flexible 

overhead reconnaissance system with unique capabilities for high 

resolution (9 inch) photography, elint collection, and sensor airdrop. 

The system can react rapidly to world-wide crisis situations cheaply, 

effectively, and at little political risk to the U.S. Government, 

especially in cases wherein third country bases and aircrews are 

utilized: 

2. The AgE-ncy h~s developed a specialhed organization an0; 

methodology for t-ffectively carrying out covert U-Z operations 

unattributable to U.S. Goverrunent sponsorshif•· Agreements for 

joint operations are now in effect with the Republic of China a.nd the 

United Kingdom. With the. cooperation of th·e Navy they can also be 

launched and recovered :£:rom carriers anywhere on the high seas. 

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This U -2 capability can be utilized on short notice with a reaction 

time of approximately fifty hours anywhere in the world. The current 

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improved version of the U-2 has an ·average survivability better than 

92. 5% over a single SAM site, even ii it .flies directly overhead, and 

a eurviva.bility of about 99, 6% if atta.cked by MIG-21 1 s, The ac:tua_l 

mission survivability can be made even higher by programming the 

flight path to avoid SAM installations. Direct costs are approximately 

$15,000 per operational mission. 

3. This program provides the U.S. Government with a low cdst 

option for meeting future .crisis situations in areas other than the more 

heavily defended areas of the Soviet Union. The vulnerability of 

satellites makes such an option especially desirable, particularly 

when it is recognized that neutralization of these vehicles would deny 

this country a high percentage of its strategic intelligence. During 

non-crisis periods this asset is being used to collect ChiCom 

intelligence as well as to bolster US/GRG and US/UK political 

relationships. All responsible U.S. officials in Taipei feel that 

removal of the U-2 detachment would have serious political repercussions and might adversely affect other important joint intelligence 

projects. The program assets {airplanes, major equipment and 

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!acilities).-a:re.now paid for. The Agency program as now enYisioned· 

is projected to cost approximately 

and CIA funds. 

including NRO 

4. Agency U-2R1s have a mission altitude capability of 74, 700 · 

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feet and a maximum range of 5850 miles, at a speed of . 7 Mach. 

The standard camera configuration provides for a swath width of 

63 n. m. with 2300 n. m. of coverage in the flight direction. They have 

a full complement of electronic sigint sensors and defensive equipment 

capable of operating successfully against all threats outside of the 

Soviet Union. They are the only covert reconnaissance vehicles in 

the NRO inventory. SAC aircraft of similar type do not now have 

adequate sensors for all missions and lack the defensive equipment to 

operate in a hosti:.e environment. The SAC U-2 1 s do not afford this 

government the option of non-attributability. 

5. It is the opinion of CIA that ~he availability of this flexible, 

quick reaction capability for covert reaction to world-wide crises 

more than justifies the cost of .retention. It is recognized that broad 

U.S. policy considerations must govern U-2 operations and decisions, 

especially a& ::ar as overflights of China are concerneC: And it is true 

· that for the f,:i.t:t few years ,ve have been refocti:l.nt to al:j.,:w overflights 

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·even with covert manned aircraft: · However, it·is importan:t to ·note 

thatin times of crisis our attitude in this re~ard can change r~pidly. 

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It is fo:r such contingencies that a covert capability like the U-2 would 

become very important to the President. If we terminate this program 

now, this option will be lost. 

6. It is therefore :recommended that Project IDEALIST be 

continued. 

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