MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2019 ME	146

Docket: Yor-19-147

Submitted

On	Briefs: September	10,	2019

Decided: September	17,	2019

Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER,	MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	and	HJELM,	JJ.

IN	RE	CHILD	OF	KATHERINE	C.

PER	CURIAM

[¶1]		Katherine	C.	appeals	from	a	judgment	entered	by	the	District	Court	

(Biddeford,	Sutton,	J.)	terminating	her	parental	rights	to	her	child.		See 22	M.R.S.	

§	4055(1)(B)(2)(a),	(b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2018). She	argues	that	the	court	erred	by

finding that	she	is	parentally unfit	and	that	termination	is	in	the best	interest	of	

the	child. We	affirm	the	judgment.	

[¶2]		“[I]n	 order	 to	 terminate	parental	 rights[,] the	court	must	 find, by	

clear	 and	 convincing	 evidence,	 at	 least	 one	 of	 the	 four	 statutory	 grounds	 of	

parental	unfitness.”	 In	re	Children	of	Anthony	M.,	2018	ME	146,	¶	8,	195	A.3d	

1229	(alterations	in	original)	(quotation	marks	omitted).	 We	will set	aside	a

finding	 of	 parental	 unfitness	“only	 if	 there	 is	 no	 competent	 evidence	 in	 the	

record	to	support	it,	if	the	fact-finder	clearly	misapprehends	the	meaning	of	the	

evidence,	or	if	the	finding	is	so	contrary	to	the	credible	evidence	that	it	does	not

represent	the	truth	and	right	of	the	case.”	 Id. (quotation	marks	omitted). “We	
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review	the	court’s	factual	findings	related	to	the	child’s	best	interest	for	clear	

error,	 and	 its	 ultimate	 conclusion	 regarding	 the	 child’s	 best	 interest	 for	 an	

abuse	of	discretion,	viewing	the	facts,	and	the	weight	to	be	given	them,	through	

the	trial	court’s	lens.”	 In	re	Children	of	Christopher	S.,	2019	ME	31,	¶	7,	203	A.3d	

808	(quotation	marks	omitted).	

[¶3]	 	 Competent	 evidence	 supports	 the	 court’s	 determination	 that	 the	

mother	is	parentally	unfit.	 Among	the	lines	of	reasoning	set	out	in	its judgment,

the court	 explained	 with	 support	 in	 the	 record that	 the mother	 has	 a	

long-standing	history	of knowingly entering	into	domestic	relationships	with	

men	who	pose	a	substantial	threat	to	the	child.		The	mother	was	aware	that	one	

of	those	men	was	abusing	her child	even	before	the	child	disclosed	the	abuse,	

but	 she	 refused	 to	 acknowledge	 it.	 	 Even	 now,	 the	 mother	 does	 not	 have	 a	

proper	understanding	of	the	effects	of	the	abuse	perpetrated	on	her child,	and	

she	persists	in	her	belief	that	her child	should	not	have	been	removed	from	her	

care.		Because	the	mother	is	unwilling	or	unable	to	recognize	the	threat	that	her	

choices	create	for	her child	and	is	unwilling	or	unable	to	protect	her	child	from	

that	danger,	the	court	properly	concluded	that	she	is	parentally	unfit.

[¶4]	 	 Further,	 the	 court	 committed	 no	 error	 by	 determining	 that	

termination	is	in	the	child’s	best	interest.		The court	issued	supported	findings,	
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among	others, that	the child	feels	unsafe	with	her	mother	and	that	the child’s	

trust	in	her	mother	has	been	“broken”	because	the	mother	did	not	protect	the	

child	from	being	abused.	Indeed,	although	the	child	had	been	in	departmental	

custody	 for	 two	 years at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 termination	 hearing,	 the	 mother’s	

contact	with	the	child	still needed	to	be supervised	because	even	short	periods	

of	unsupervised	contact	had	created an	unusual	and	damaging	level	of	stress	

for	the	child.		Because	of	the	mother’s	emotional	and	psychological	challenges,	

the	mother	is	not	presently	capable—nor	will	she	be	capable	anytime	soon—of	

engaging	in	safe	and	productive	therapy	with	her child	to	repair	their	damaged	

relationship. Furthermore,	the	mother’s	inability	to	answer	difficult	questions,	

especially	related	to	her child’s	abuse,	demonstrates that	she is	unable	to	“stand	

up”	for	her	child.		Given	the	court’s	proper	findings	of	the	child’s	need	for	safety,	

security,	 and	 permanency,	 and	 the	 mother’s	 established	 failure to	 have	 met	

those	 needs,	the	 court	 did	 not	 err	 or	 abuse	its	 discretion	 by	 concluding	 that	

termination	is	in	the	best	interest	of	the	child and	that	she	should	be	freed	for	

adoption.	

The	entry	is:

Judgment affirmed.
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Valerie	A.	Randall,	Esq.,	Hanly	Law,	Portland,	for	appellant	mother

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Meghan	Szylvian,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	

of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta, for	appellee	Department	of	Health	and	Human	

Services

Biddeford	District	Court	docket	number	PC-2017-3

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY