J-A15040-24 & J-A15041-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.T.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.D.-J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 201 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 10, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2023-0140a

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.Y.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.D.-J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 202 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 10, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2023-0168a

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.T.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.J.C., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 205 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 10, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2023-0140a
J-A15040-24 & J-A15041-24

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IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.Y.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: R.C., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 206 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 10, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

2023-0168a

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2024

In these consolidated cases, S.D.-J.C. (“Mother”) and R.J.C., Jr. a/k/a 

R.C., Jr. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal from the January 10, 2024 

decrees that granted the petitions filed by the York County Office of Children 

Youth and Families (“CYF” or “the Agency”) and involuntarily terminated their

parental rights to their biological son, J.T.C., born in December 2018, and 

their biological daughter, S.Y.C., born in February 2023 (collectively, the 

“Children”).1 After careful consideration, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We have consolidated these cases sua sponte pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513 

(“Where there is more than one appeal from the same order, or where the 

same question is involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the 

appellate court may, in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all 

particulars as if but a single appeal.”). Instantly, Parents have raised identical

claims concerning the same factual and procedural events.
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We glean the relevant factual and procedural history of the abovecaptioned cases from the certified record. Initially, we note that Parents are 

not married and have been in an “on and off relationship” since 2018, which 

has been largely characterized by mutually abusive behavior and a history of

escalating arguments. See CYF Exhibit 9 at 3-5. Since it is relevant to our 

disposition, we also preliminarily note that Mother also developed a “close 

relationship” with another individual, J.J., beginning in February 2021. See 

id. at 3. As discussed further infra, Mother’s relationship with J.J. has also 

been marred by similar allegations of troubling domestic violence.

CYF became involved with Parents’ family shortly after January 14, 

2021, when the Agency received a referral that J.T.C. had been found alone 

and crying at 1:30 a.m. in a hallway of the hotel where Mother and her mother 

(“Maternal Grandmother”) were then residing. Subsequent investigation by 

the police revealed that Mother had left J.T.C. unsupervised while Maternal 

Grandmother was sleeping in their shared hotel room unaware that Mother 

had left. This was the second incident in which J.T.C. had been discovered 

unattended in the public spaces of the hotel. In February 2021, Mother was 

charged with endangering the welfare of a child (“EWOC”) in connection with 

these events. The Agency also learned that Mother was previously indicated 

as a perpetrator of sexual abuse while she was still a minor.

Contemporaneously, CYF’s investigation revealed that Father was 

incarcerated at SCI Greene due to a parole violation with an anticipated 
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release date in July 2021. Given the breadth of Father’s criminal history, it is 

difficult to parse the precise nature of his incarceration at the inception of the 

Agency’s involvement. Specifically, Father pled guilty to a litany of crimes

between 2011 and 2018, including, but not limited to, EWOC and seven 

separate possessory offenses with respect to narcotics and paraphernalia.

J.T.C. initially remained in Mother’s care after the Agency accepted them 

for services. However, Mother did not appropriately engage in the services 

offered by the Agency. Specifically, she was unsuccessfully referred to

numerous parenting and therapeutic programs between February 2021 and 

June 2021, including Justice Works, Pressley Ridge, and Healthy Moms 

Healthy Babies. See Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 10/31/23 at 63.

On June 30, 2021, CYF filed a dependency petition with respect to J.T.C. 

On July 16, 2021, CYF sought and was awarded emergency protective custody 

of J.T.C. and he was immediately placed in kinship care with P.R. (“Paternal 

Grandmother”). The same day that J.T.C. was placed in kinship care, Mother 

appeared at Paternal Grandmother’s home and began “banging on the door 

and screaming for her to open up.” Shelter Care Order, 7/19/21 at 2. Paternal 

Grandmother was eventually forced to call both the Agency and the police for 

assistance, although we discern that Mother departed before either 

organization could respond to the location. See id. Following this incident, 

Mother also began sending harassing text messages to Paternal 
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Grandmother’s daughter. See id. J.T.C.’s placement was confirmed at a 

shelter care hearing three days later.

The court established J.T.C.’s initial permanency goal as reunification 

with Parents.

2

 Parents were respectively ordered to, inter alia, undergo a 

psychiatric evaluation, follow the resulting mental health recommendations, 

and engage with parenting classes. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 40. Parents began 

participating in regular supervised visits with J.T.C., with Mother’s 

participation being fairly consistent while Father’s was sporadic, at best. A 

number of different organizations were involved in supervising these 

interactions including, inter alia, Catholic Charities.

Also in July 2021, Father was released from prison and briefly began 

residing with Mother at her apartment in York, Pennsylvania. He was 

imprisoned again, however, from December 2021 until April 2022 in 

connection with new criminal charges related to an incident wherein he

attempted to strangle Mother. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 41-43.

Between September 2021 and December 2022, Mother completed a 

parenting class, progressed to weekly overnight visitations with J.T.C., and 

began mental health counseling at Commonwealth Clinical Group (“CCG”). 

Accordingly, the court restored physical and legal custody of J.T.C. to Mother 

on December 22, 2022, although J.T.C.’s dependency was not discharged. 

____________________________________________

2

 In May 2023, J.T.C.’s permanency goal was to include a concurrent goal of 

adoption. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 67. Parents did not appeal this finding. 
J-A15040-24 & J-A15041-24

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Following his release from incarceration, Father’s whereabouts during 

this same time period were largely unknown and the court determined that 

his compliance with the existing permanency plan was minimal. Specifically, 

Father was unsuccessfully discharged from Catholic Charities in both 

November 2021 and June 2022 due to failure to engage. See N.T., 10/31/23 

at 20-21, 61. He was also charged with simple assault and unauthorized use 

of a motor vehicle in connection with an incident that occurred in July 2022.

Contemporaneously, Mother’s relationship with J.J. continued. In 

October 2022, Mother and J.J. were involved in an incident of domestic 

violence that led to J.J. being charged with simple assault and harassment. 

See Orphans’ Court Opinion (“O.C.O.”), 3/6/24 at 9 (“According to police . . . 

[J.J] physically attacked Mother during an argument inside a vehicle, 

ultimately grabbing her by the hair, dragging her out of the vehicle, and 

leaving her on the side of the road.”). These charges were, ultimately,

withdrawn after Mother refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth’s efforts 

to prosecute J.J. See id. The certified record indicates that this was the “sixth 

or seventh time” that Mother had filed such charges, only to subsequently

withdraw them. See id. at 10.

In February 2023, Mother gave birth to S.Y.C. and Father was released 

from prison shortly thereafter. On April 9, 2023, a violent domestic dispute 

occurred between Parents during an attempt to permit Father to visit with the 

Children following his release from incarceration. This rendezvous occurred 
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on the side of an unidentified public roadway, where Parents met after driving 

separately. See N.T., 1/10/24 at 83-84. Father arrived at the meeting under 

the influence of alcohol and with the smell of beer on his breath. See id. at 

16. Mother attempted to prevent him from transferring the Children to his 

vehicle. See id. at 16. A physical struggle ensued, which culminated in Father 

successfully placing the Children into his automobile and attempting to depart

despite Mother’s attempts to physically prevent him from doing so. See id. 

Mother struck Father’s rear window as he was driving away, which caused it 

to shatter. See id.

CYF sought and was awarded emergency protective custody of the 

Children the following day and a shelter care hearing occurred on April 25, 

2023. The Children were placed in kinship care with their paternal aunt 

(“Paternal Aunt”). Safety concerns quickly arose, however, due to Mother’s 

threatening behavior towards Paternal Aunt. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 53. 

Consequently, the trial court ordered that the Children be transferred to thirdparty foster care and directed that Parents be provided with no identifying 

information regarding the Children’s foster parents (“Foster Parents”). See 

id. On May 3, 2023, S.Y.C. was adjudicated dependent and her initial

permanency goal was established as reunification.

3

____________________________________________

3

In August 2023, S.Y.C.’s permanency goal was amended to include the 

concurrent goal of adoption. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 67. No appeal was taken 

by Parents with respect to this determination. See id.
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Of note, the trial court ordered Father have no contact with the Children 

on April 25, 2023. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 50. Between May 2023 and June 

2023, Father was again incarcerated as a result of a new charge of terroristic 

threats. See id. at 42. Mother’s issues with domestic violence with J.J. also 

continued. In July 2023, she was arrested and charged with simple assault 

and terroristic threats after she was alleged to have “stabbed” J.J. during an 

argument. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 43; N.T., 1/10/24 at 73-74. As a result, 

Mother was incarcerated from July 15 through August 1, 2023.

On August 16, 2023, CYF filed a petition seeking to terminate Parents’ 

parental rights to J.T.C. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). 

On August 29, 2023, the trial court reduced Mother’s visitations with the 

Children to one hour of supervised contact per month. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 

50. On September 20, 2023, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate 

Parents’ parental rights to S.Y.C. under Section 2511(a)(2), (3), and (b).4

On October 25, 2023, Mother filed a petition requesting a bonding 

assessment be performed by a “neutral third party” at the “expense of the 

County of York.” Petition for Bonding Assessment, 10/25/23 at 1-3. 

____________________________________________

4 For the purposes of compliance with 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), we note that the 

orphans’ court appointed Thomas L. Kearny, IV, Esquire, to serve as the 

Children’s guardian ad litem and separately appointed Brandy G. Hoke, 

Esquire, to serve as the Children’s legal interest counsel. Thus, we observe 

no structural error with respect to the Children’s legal representation. See 

generally In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1234-1236 (Pa. 2020)
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Concomitantly, Mother also requested that the termination proceedings be 

continued until the requested assessment could take place. See id. at 2-3.

The orphans’ court held consolidated hearings on all three pending

petitions on October 31, 2023, and January 10, 2024, at which time J.T.C. 

was approximately five years old, and S.Y.C. was just shy of her first 

birthday.

5

 At the beginning of the first hearing, the orphans’ court denied 

Mother’s request for a neutral bonding assessment. Thereafter, the Agency 

adduced testimony from CYF supervisor Heather Sterner and Catholic 

Charities’ family advocate David Kasberg. Additionally, we note that CYF 

advanced an oral motion to incorporate the records of the Children’s 

dependency proceedings, which was granted without objection.6 See N.T., 

____________________________________________

5

 During the October 31, 2023 hearing, Father left without explanation during 

a recess in the middle of the proceedings. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 87. The 

day after the first termination hearing, Father was taken into custody on a 

new parole violation. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 13. He testified that he expected 

to be released in approximately May 2024. See id.

6

 CYF originally requested that the orphans’ court simply take judicial notice 

of the underlying records in J.T.C.’s dependency proceedings. See Motion for 

Judicial Notice, 8/16/23 at 1-33. The orphans’ court granted this request in 

an order filed on August 28, 2023. On September 20, 2023, a similar request 

for judicial notice was advanced with respect to the records concerning 

S.Y.C.’s dependency proceedings. Our review indicates that the orphans’ 

court never formally ruled on this petition. This procedure was not proper.

This Court’s persuasive precedent establishes that “the presence of evidence 

in the juvenile court does not excuse an agency from admitting that evidence 

into the orphans’ court record during a termination hearing.” In re T.B., 266 

A.3d 609, 2021 WL 4551600, at *7 (Pa.Super. 2021). Thus, “a court may not 

ordinarily take judicial notice in one case of the records of another case, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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10/31/23 at 12. Mother and Father each appeared and testified upon their 

own behalf. Additionally, the Children’s maternal grandfather, W.C., and 

Mother’s paramour, J.J., also testified during the proceedings.

On January 10, 2024, the orphans’ court filed decrees terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2),

and (b). The court filed separate decrees terminating Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). On February 5, 2024, Mother filed 

timely notices of appeal along with concise statements of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On February 8, 

2024, Father similarly filed timely notices of appeal along with concise 

statements. Thereafter, the orphans’ court authored and filed a responsive 

and thorough opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii).

Parents have respectively challenged the evidentiary sufficiency of the 

orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to, inter alia, Section 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

See Mother’s Brief at 6-7; Father’s Brief at 5. Mother has also advanced a 

challenge to the orphans’ court’s denial of her request for a third-party 

bonding assessment. See Mother’s Brief at 6-7. 

Our standard of review in this context is well-established:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of 

parental rights, appellate review is limited to a 

____________________________________________

whether in another court or its own, even though the contents of those records 

may be known to the court.” Id. As noted above, however, CYF later 

advanced an appropriate motion to incorporate the dependency records into 

the termination proceedings sub judice. Thus, we observe no error.
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determination of whether the decree of the 

termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate 

court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and 

credibility determinations if they are supported by the 

record. Where the trial court’s factual findings are 

supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not 

disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned 

an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion or the facts could support an opposite 

result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, 

or ill-will. This standard of review reflects the 

deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe 

the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, 

a trial court must balance the parent’s fundamental 

right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, 

and control of his or her child with the child’s essential 

needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. 

Termination of parental rights has significant and 

permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires 

the moving party to establish the statutory grounds 

by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence 

that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to 

enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in 

issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-830 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon 

the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant 

termination. Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the 
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orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for 

termination under one of these subsections by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” the court then assesses the petition pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs 

and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court need 

only agree with the orphans’ court’s determination as to any one subsection 

of Section 2511(a), in addition to Section 2511(b), in order to affirm 

termination. See M.E., 283 A.3d at 830 (citing In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc)).

Our analysis in this case will focus upon Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), 

which provides at the statutory level, as follows:

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.—The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis 

of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 
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furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found 

to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) 

or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of 

notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

In order to satisfy Section 2511(a)(2), the petitioning party must 

establish: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa.Super. 2021). Grounds for 

termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), however, “are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct, but concern parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied.” Id. (citing In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010)). 

Of particular note to the instant appeal, while a parent’s incarceration is not 

automatically dispositive with respect to termination, it is a relevant and 

potentially determinative factor to consider pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2):

[I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for 

termination, can be determinative of the question of 

whether a parent is incapable of providing ‘essential 

parental care, control or subsistence’ and the length 

of the remaining confinement can be considered as 

highly relevant to whether ‘the conditions and causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent,’ sufficient to 

provide grounds for termination pursuant to [Section] 

2511(a)(2)
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In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012). Overall, we emphasize 

that “[p]arents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably 

prompt assumption of full parental duties.” A.H., 247 A.3d at 443.

If a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination pursuant to 

Section 2511(a), we then turn to Section 2511(b), which requires that the 

court “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Our 

Supreme Court has generally outlined this inquiry, as follows:

[C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s 

perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the 

parent.

Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare must be made on a case-by-case basis. We 

have observed the law regarding termination of 

parental rights should not be applied mechanically but 

instead always with an eye to the best interests and 

the needs and welfare of the particular children 

involved. Thus, the court must determine each child’s 

specific needs.

Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare 

include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, 

and stability. As further guidance, we have identified 

factors, i.e., specific needs and aspects of the child’s 

welfare, that trial courts must always consider. The 

courts must consider whether the children are in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond 

with their foster parents. And, if the child has any 

bond with the biological parent, the court must 

conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not always 

an easy task.
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Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105-1106 (Pa. 2023) (cleaned up). 

The extent, however, of the “bond-effect analysis necessarily depends 

on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 

A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up). Rather, it is within the province 

of the orphans’ court to “consider the totality of the circumstances when 

performing a needs and welfare analysis.” M.E., 283 A.3d at 839 (cleaned 

up). This Court has clarified that it is “within the discretion of the orphans’ 

court to prioritize the safety and security” of children “over their bonds with 

their parents. Id. We will not disturb such an assessment if the orphans’ 

court’s factual findings are supported by the record. Id.

We will begin our analysis by reviewing the orphans’ court’s findings 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). As to the first element of this subsection, the 

orphans’ court concluded that both Parents suffered from repeated and 

continued parental incapacities. See O.C.O. at 21-23. Specifically, the 

orphans’ court found that Father’s long history of felonious and violent 

behavior, coupled with his regular periods of extended incarceration, 

constituted a “sufficient basis” for this finding. See id. The court aptly 

summarized its findings with respect to Mother, as follows: “As to Mother, 

her behavior has been erratic, violent, irresponsible, and inconsistent . . . . 

Her judgment is poor. Her insight is limited. It is clear that she lacks the 

protective capacity necessary to provide a healthy, safe, nurturing 
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environment for children.” Id. at 23. Our close review of the certified record 

reveals ample support for the orphans’ court’s findings.

With respect to Father, his lengthy criminal history and repeated periods 

of incarceration are undisputed and largely a matter of record. In addition to 

his extensive criminal background prior to the birth of J.T.C. and the Agency’s 

involvement with his family, Father has also continued his criminal activities 

throughout these proceedings. Ms. Sterner testified that Father was arrested 

and imprisoned from December 2021 until April 2022 after he attempted to 

strangle Mother. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 41-43. Ms. Sterner also detailed that 

Father was charged with simple assault and unauthorized use of a motor 

vehicle following an incident in July 2022. See id. at 61. Thereafter, Ms. 

Sterner explained that Father was arrested and jailed in connection with a 

charge of terroristic threats from May 2023 to June 2023. See id. at 42. 

Finally, the day after the first termination hearing, Father himself explained 

that he had been taken into custody due to an undescribed parole violation. 

See N.T., 1/10/24 at 13. Father averred that his expected release date for 

this latest period of incarceration was sometime in May 2024. See id.

There is similar, overwhelming evidence in the certified record 

documenting Mother’s lack of concern for the Children’s safety and her 

aggressive, violent behavior. Specifically, Mother has engaged in a consistent

pattern of aggressive behavior towards service providers and kinship 

resources. J.T.C.’s dependency records indicate that Mother acted 
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aggressively towards Paternal Grandmother the same day that she became a 

kinship care resource to J.T.C. See Shelter Care Order, 7/19/21 at 2. Along 

similar lines, Ms. Sterner testified that Mother engaged in menacing behavior 

targeting Paternal Aunt after J.T.C. was placed in her care. See N.T., 

10/31/23 at 53 (“Mother had been calling the cops on [Paternal Aunt] and 

driving by the house and just being aggressive towards [Paternal Aunt]. We 

felt that the [C]hildren were not safe in the [Paternal Aunt’s] home, and we 

had requested that they be moved to foster care.”). This ultimately led to the 

Agency placing the Children in their third placement, the identity of which 

remains anonymous due to safety concerns related to Mother. Finally, Mr. 

Kasberg detailed another incident wherein Mother had attempted to physically 

confront a Catholic Charities’ therapist at the organization’s offices after one 

of Mother’s scheduled visitations was cancelled due to her use of aggressive 

and threatening language. See id. at 21-25, 33-34.

In addition to these incidents, Mother has been implicated as both a 

perpetrator and a victim of domestic violence at multiple junctures during

these proceedings. Specifically, Ms. Sterner testified regarding the incident in 

December 2021, wherein Mother was allegedly strangled by Father. See N.T., 

10/31/23 at 41-43. There are also indications that Mother was a victim of 

domestic violence perpetrated by J.J. on at least one half-dozen instances, 

including an episode in October 2022 when J.J. dragged Mother out of a 

vehicle by her hair. See Amended Status Review Order, 12/21/22 at 2-3. 
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Then, on Easter Sunday of 2023, Mother was involved in the roadside 

altercation, which Parents described in their respective testimony. See N.T., 

1/10/24 at 16, 21, 83-84. Finally, the testimonies of Mother and Ms. Sterner 

revealed that Mother was arrested and imprisoned between July 2023 and 

August 2023 after she was accused of stabbing J.J. during another domestic 

incident. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 43; N.T., 1/10/24 at 73-74.

The above evidence indicates that both Parents suffer from continued 

and persistent incapacities, namely, their inability to curb their lawless 

behavior, the ease and frequency with which they resort to intimidation and 

physical violence, and their lack of concern for the Children’s safety. The first 

prong of Section 2511(a)(2) is satisfied in the above-captioned cases.

Furthermore, the certified record also supports the orphans’ court’s 

conclusion that Parents’ incapacities have caused the Children to be without 

essential parental care, control, and subsistence. As a mere demonstration, 

the records of the underlying dependency proceedings speak to the 

circumstances of the Agency’s initial involvement, wherein Mother left J.T.C. 

in the care of her subconscious mother, which resulted in J.T.C. wandering in 

the public spaces of a hotel in the early morning hours unattended. See Order 

of Adjudication and Disposition, 9/10/21 at 2-3. More pointedly, Ms. Sterner 

generally opined that Mother’s lack of self-awareness and inability to control 

her behavior raised significant concerns regarding the Children’s safety in her 

care. See id. at 70-71. Indeed, both of the Children were exposed to a risk 
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for physical harm during Parents’ fight on April 9, 2023, as Father conceded 

during his testimony at the termination hearing. See N.T., 1/10/24 at 22. 

With specific respect to Father, we also note that he has been a virtual 

stranger to the Children as a result of his long periods of incarceration and 

transient existence. At the time of the termination hearing, Ms. Sterner 

averred that Father had not had any contact with J.T.C. for over nine months. 

See N.T., 10/31/23 at 51. She also testified that Father had only interacted 

with S.Y.C. on one occasion, i.e., the incident on April 9, 2023. Id. 

Based upon the foregoing, we also conclude that the second element of 

Section 2511(a)(2) has been established in the above-captioned cases.

Finally, we turn to the final prong of Section 2511(a)(2), which considers 

whether Parents’ respective incapacities cannot, or will not, be remedied. See 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). Once again, the certified record definitively 

supports the orphans’ court’s holding.

With respect to Mother, Ms. Sterner testified that she lacks any 

awareness of the extent of the seriousness of her parental incapacities. See 

N.T., 10/31/23 at 70-71 (“Mother has refused to even begin to acknowledge 

the safety concerns and reasons that have brought the [C]hildren into care.”). 

Along similar lines, a parenting assessment indicated that Mother has “poor 

judgment” and avoids “accepting responsibility for her behavior.” CYF Exhibit 

9 at 5. Although Mother was enrolled in mental health and domestic violence 

treatment with CCG from April 2022 through April 2023, Ms. Sterner testified 
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that she was unsuccessfully discharged around the same time the Children 

were removed from Parents’ custody for a second time. See N.T., 10/31/23 

at 63. Mr. Kasberg similarly testified that Mother was unsuccessfully 

discharged from Catholic Charities’ program in June 2023 after the abovedescribed incident when she attempted to instigate a physical confrontation 

with one of the organization’s therapists. See id. at 21-25, 33-34.

Furthermore, Ms. Sterner reported that Mother had expressed her desire 

to cease participation in all services offered by the Agency. See id. at 71 

(“Mother, at the last court hearing, had reported that she didn’t want to work 

with anymore services from the [A]gency.”). Indeed, Mother averred that she 

did not want to continue cooperating with CYF. See id. at 13 (“Anything that 

CYS is saying, I’m not accepting anything, because I’ve got nothing but 

disrespect from these people and low blows from these people.”).

With respect to Father, his record of improvement is even more 

lackluster. Mr. Kasberg and Ms. Sterner both reported that Father had been 

unsuccessfully discharged from Catholic Charities’ services in both November 

2021 and June 2022 due to his “noncompliance” with the services being 

offered. N.T., 10/31/23 at 20-21, 61. Additionally, Ms. Sterner explained that 

Father has failed to complete various assessments, including a threat of harm 

evaluation, a drug and alcohol evaluation, and a parenting fitness appraisal. 

See id. at 61-62. Owing largely to his frequent periods of incarceration, 

Father did not participate in any additional services prior to October 2023, 
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when he participated in a preliminary referral to Pressley Ridge and was 

assigned an advocate by the program. See id. at 62, 89-90. Moreover, 

Father was slated to be incarcerated until at least May 2024.

This evidence clearly evinces that Parents are neither in a position to 

address or ameliorate their underlying incapacities, nor is there any 

meaningful prospect that they will be in the future. Accordingly, we also find 

that the third prong of Section 2511(a)(2) has also been satisfied. 

Overall, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of law in the orphans’ 

court’s findings pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). As set forth above, there is 

competent evidence that supports the court’s relevant findings.

Having concluded that there are sufficient grounds for termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(a), we now turn to an examination of the orphans’ 

court’s findings pursuant to Section 2511(b). As noted above, this inquiry 

requires the orphans’ court to “give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare” of the Children. 

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The orphans’ court found that there was “no 

clear bond” between Mother and J.T.C. See O.C.O. at 28. In general, the 

orphans’ court found that reunification would not serve the needs and welfare 

of the Children. See id. at 21-28. We must agree.

With respect to the bonding analysis mandated by our Supreme Court, 

we preliminarily note that Ms. Sterner testified that S.Y.C. is too young at this 

point to exhibit clear signs of parental bonding with either Parents or Foster 
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Parents. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 58-60. Mother echoed this sentiment in her 

own testimony, wherein she averred that there had not been enough time and 

contact for her to establish any manner of bond with a newborn child. See 

N.T., 1/10/24 at 43. It is well-established that, “[i]n cases where there is no 

evidence of any bond between the parent and the child, it is reasonable to 

infer that no bond exists.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super.

2008). Accordingly, we conclude that no evident bond exists between S.Y.C. 

and either Parents or Foster Parents.

As to J.T.C., the record indicates that he has a negative bond with 

Mother. Specifically, Ms. Sterner testified that J.T.C. exhibits troubling 

behavior towards Mother during supervised visits. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 54-

55 (“[H]e would yell at her, he would call her a fucking bitch, he would tell her 

to shut the fuck up, he would just yell, jump, and scream on furniture and just 

cuss.”). At the time of these incidents, J.T.C. was four years old. See id. at 

55. Notably, Ms. Sterner also testified that she had never seen J.T.C. display 

similar behavior towards any other adults in his life. See id. at 96. 

With respect to a parental bond with Father, there is no evidence that 

J.T.C. shares one, inasmuch as he had not seen Father in at least nine months

at the time of the termination hearing. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 51.

In sharp contrast, Ms. Sterner testified that J.T.C. shared a strong bond 

with Foster Parents, which was substantially stronger than any bond he shared 
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with Parents. See N.T., 10/31/23 at 57. She also stated that J.T.C. views 

Foster Parents as his primary parental figures. See id. at 58. 

With particular respect to J.T.C., we note that there is also substantial 

evidence suggesting that further contact between him and Parents would not 

be in his best interest. Ms. Sterner testified that visits with Mother had a 

negative impact upon J.T.C., as follows: “[T]here would be behaviors with 

him before visits. He would be very hyper, not want to listen, just not taking 

direction after visits. More recently after visits, there have been concerns of 

him urinating and defecating himself sometimes. He struggles with being able 

to regulate after visits, listening, being hyper.” id. at 55-56. Specifically, Ms. 

Sterner relayed that J.T.C. had soiled himself immediately after at least one 

supervised visit with Mother. See id. at 84. Ms. Sterner also explained that 

J.T.C. was triggered by memories of his Parents’ struggles with law 

enforcement and would react with trepidation whenever he saw police 

vehicles. See id. at 56 (“He would be afraid that the police officers were 

coming . . . and that someone was in trouble.”).

Based upon the foregoing evidence, we find no abuse of discretion or 

error of law in the orphans’ court’s finding that terminating Parents’ parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs of 

the Children. Accordingly, we hold that termination was also warranted 

pursuant to Section 2511(b) in the matters sub judice.
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Finally, we conclude our analysis by addressing Mother’s claim 

concerning the orphans’ court’s denial of her request for a neutral, third-party 

bonding assessment. Mother argues that “the Agency’s witnesses were biased 

against her and having a neutral third-party, especially an expert witness, 

would [be] helpful in affirming her position that she had a bond, at least with 

[J.T.C.], and that severing that existing bond/relationship would have been 

beneficial to the needs and welfare of the child.” Mother’s Brief at 35. 

We emphasize that, “[i]n analyzing the parent-child bond, the orphans’ 

court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding 

evaluation be performed by an expert.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis added). Furthermore, “Section 2511(b) does not 

require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 328 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned up). Indeed, Mother’s own discussion of this issue

acknowledges that there is no concrete legal support for her position. See id.

at 35 (“[T]here is no requirement . . . that a bonding assessment be completed 

by an expert witness or otherwise.”). As discussed above, we observe no 

abuse of discretion or error of law with respect to the orphans’ court’s findings 

pursuant to Section 2511(b) based upon the evidence of record.

Mother has provided no citations to persuasive and on-point legal 

authorities in support of her contention that she was entitled to the benefit of 

an independent bonding assessment at the County’s expense. This Court has

rejected arguments identical to Mother’s due to a dearth of apposite legal 
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authority. See In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa.Super. 2005). As such, 

we conclude that this claim lacks merit. See id. (“Given Mother’s failure to 

cite apposite legal authority, . . . we find no error in the trial court’s denial of 

Mother’s request for the court to provide a psychological evaluation of [the 

child] using public funds.”). No relief is due.

Thus, we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating Parents’ parental 

rights to J.T.C. and S.Y.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 09/06/2024