Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

°FF 

I 

c E ° F TH E 

5 

E c Pc- TA 1m1rn111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 

----- 14 000791080 

MEMORANDUM 

August 1, 1969 

Dr. McLucas 

Attached for your signature is the 

memorandum for the Vice President which 

transmits our Annex to the STG report. I 

have revised paragraph 4, per your instructions, to include the necessary caveats 

on the handling of the report once it is received in Mr. Agnew's office. 

I have also attached the copy of the 

Annex which we plan to forward Mr. Agnew. 

Your noted change to page 12, line 17, has 

been made. 

We would appreciate your signature 

on the letter and your approval to dispatch. 

WILLIAM R. YOST 

Lt Colonel, USAF 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 
rl./l lL;'rl./11 IU JI 1,1111 I rut 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 

. : rrJ \J ,: · ·: t:~ :1':.1 (r: ,~r 

July 3, 1969 

FOR DR. McLUCAS 

These comments from the DCI on 

our NRP Annex to the STG Report are 

very constructive and will cause us no 

problem. 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 
~ tl ii r _ ·,,l ~ , I \ I i 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 

:11'' l " \ 

lllllll\111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 14 00079112D 

• ~~ I j_i 1 ', j :~ (l 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 

2 July 1969 

BYE-7458-69 

Copy / 

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

SUBJECT 

REFERENCE 

National Reconnaissance Program Annex 

to Space Task Group Report 

BYE-12893-69, dated 4 June 1969, Same 

Subject 

-· . - . ':/'""' 

1. Our respective staffs have exchanged minor corrections 

or modifications to the Annex Report, as noted in the attachment. 

2. While it may be beneficial for NASA to engage in 

readout technology to satisfy requirements peculiar to the NASA 

mission, this should in no way deter the NRP from moving 

vigorously in pursuit of a readout system to meet our intelligence 

requirements. It may be appropriate for you to cite NRP1 s 

intentions in this regard in order to demonstrate our specific 

interest in this field. 

3. The portion of the Annex dealing with the NRP1 s 

relationship with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

should be modified to reflect that the Intelligence Community, 

in using the NRP as one of its resources, will have a major 

responsibility in verification of arms control compliance. 

4. Should you desire, I will gladly make available appropriate members of this Agency to assist the NRO Staff in the final 

preparation of the NRP Annex. 

Attachment: 

As Stated 

£ fl a..,.""L•+Vf 

R~ E. Cushman, Jr. 

Lieutenant General, USM 

Acting Director 

9L7 /- t,},:7- <t)C~-

Si\l\lOl"f" \/111, 

t:cn,1·r-nc .. c ::3VSY21'v1 O'NLY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 
Approv~C!f?r R~~§~E:_:_ ~020/02/07 C05111858 

Attachment to: 

BYE-7458-69 

The following suggested modifications were made by the 

Office of Special Projects to Colonel Paul Worthman of the NRO 

Staff: 

a. While aircraft offer an attractive and economic 

means of satisfying some earth resources requirements, 

satellites may indeed be more cost effective if broad area 

coverage is a requirement. 

b. We do envision a major role for the Intelligence 

Community in the verification of arms control compliance. 

c. Page 3, line 8, insert ''and surveillance" 

between "search" and "photography''; line 13, insert 11 and 

surveillance" between II search" and fl system. If 

d. Page 3, last line, change 11 5000 11 to 11 3000. 11 

e. Page 5, paragraph 2, delete 11monitoring the 

French (Pacific) Nuclear Test Site,'' (Most information 

is from COMINT and overt sources.) 

£. Pages 9 and 11, delete or rephrase paragraphs 

on MOL. 

g, Page 11, line 18, suggest wording such as 

11 ••••• satellites on orbit; with their extensive space 

surveillance network, the Soviets could easily accomplish 

nuclear kill of U. S. satellites with any number of Soviet 

launch vehicles. With their existing ABM facilities and 

hardware, U. S. reconnaissance satellites could be 

neutralized by means of non-nuclear warheads, 

Despite these apparent capabilities, National Intelligence 

Estimates conclude that it is extremely unlikely the 

Soviets would take hostile action against our reconnaissance satellites in any circumstances other than as a 

prelude to general war. While China probably now has 

HANDLE VIA 

TOP SECRET CON T'Rl)L SYSTEM ON!.Y 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 
Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858 ~It •.~ 

a marginal capability to interfere with our satellites 

through the use of nuclear weapons, no fully developed 

Chinese anti-satellite capability, either nuclear or 

non-nuclear, is anticipated £or some time. 11 

h. Page 13, line 5, change 11 an inter-agency" to 11 a USIB. 11 

i. Page 13, line 16, after DOD, insert between 

parens "as executive agent £or the Intelligence Community. 11 

(Or change DOD to NRO.) 

j. Page 14, paragraph 1, delete last sentence and 

insert following: "As a follow-on to these studies, requirements £or photography to meet the needs of the nonintelligence departments and agencies are being programmed 

whenever feasible on NRP satellite missions." 

k. Page 21, under the Data Appendix, we also 

suggested consideration be given to the use of a CORONAtype camera £or earth resources needs. 

Attachment to: 

~----~ BYE-7458-69 

,Page Two H, A".11~ .. ,1"' v11.\ 

~·

1

tfCQupl-~~jrl\~'_iP.1-r'2f\::f.EiT:...---- ;m.:-~K(;~_ :wsrEM ONLY 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111858