[Cite as Smith v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-299.]

 COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

KEVIN SMITH, 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee/ 

 Cross-Appellant, : 

Nos. 110214, 110245, 

 : and 110274 

 v. 

 : 

CSILLA E. SMITH, 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant/ 

 Cross-Appellee. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 3, 2022 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. DR-17-366276 

 

Appearances: 

Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, and Nicole A. 

Cruz, for appellee and cross-appellant. 

Rosenthal | Thurman | Lane, L.L.C., and James L. Lane, 

for appellant and cross-appellee. 

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.: 

Defendant-appellant/cross-appellee, Csilla Smith (“Csilla”), appeals 

from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic 
Relations Division, adopting the magistrate’s decision primarily regarding 

distribution of marital assets, as modified. Plaintiff-appellee/cross-appellant, Kevin 

Smith (“Kevin”) also appeals the judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Procedural History and Substantive Facts 

The parties were married on June 9, 1984, shortly after they both 

graduated from The Ohio State University. Four children were born as issue to the 

marriage, all of whom are emancipated adults, and all of whom obtained their 

college education with the financial assistance of their parents. 

In 1986, after the parties’ first child was born, Csilla obtained a law 

degree and passed the bar exam in 1987. Csilla initially worked as a law clerk but 

gave up attempts to be employed full-time as an attorney because of the high cost of 

childcare. During the underlying proceeding, Csilla was employed full-time as a 

Quality Assurance Manager with Yes MLS at an annual salary of $56,000, plus 

benefits. 

Kevin, who holds a college degree in agriculture, initially worked in 

the insurance industry, teaching agents how to sell health insurance. Kevin held a 

variety of sales and marketing jobs, but later acquired a minority interest in several 

business entities. Kevin did not acquire his minority interest with cash 

contributions, but instead through his labor and knowledge of running the daily 

operations of these entities. During the underlying proceedings, Kevin’s income was 

approximately $155,000. 
The parties acquired two homes in Northeast Ohio, one located in 

Broadview Heights and the other in Medina. They also acquired a home in 

Columbus, Ohio, so that their children could live rent free, while attending The Ohio 

State University. In addition, the parties acquired a condominium in Florida, where 

they vacationed once or twice each year. Apart from the real property purchases, 

the parties did not spend a lot of money during the marriage, choosing instead to 

focus on paying for their children’s college education.

On November 23, 2015, the parties mutually separated, and Kevin left 

the marital residence. Following their separation, the parties attempted to amicably 

divorce through mediation and then through a collaborative process but were 

unsuccessful. 

On March 22, 2017, Kevin filed his complaint for divorce. On May 3, 

2017, Csilla filed her answer and counterclaim, wherein she sought a temporary 

support order. On August 2, 2017, the magistrate issued a support order that 

required Kevin to pay Csilla $2,500 per month in temporary spousal support.

 The matter was heard before the court magistrate on March 6-7, 

2018, June 12-13, 2018, February 25-26, 2019, May 28-29, 2019, and July 8, 2019, 

respectively. The magistrate heard testimony from Csilla and Kevin, as well as their 

respective business valuation experts Lewis Baum (“Baum”) and Bernard Agin 

(“Agin”). 

On February 26, 2020, the magistrate issued the decision. The 

decision addressed the issue of (1) the duration of the marriage, (2) marital value of 
the minority interests in corporate entities, (3) marital value of the Columbus, Ohio 

student housing rental property proceeds of sale, (4) recommendations involving 

other real and personal property, (5) receivable for loan to the parties’ son and 

receivable from WSKS, (6) Self-Employee Pension (“SEP”) in Kevin’s name, (7) 

remaining marital property and payments, (8) property division chart, and (9) 

Csilla’s request for spousal support. 

On March 9, 2020, Csilla filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

On June 15, 2020, Csilla filed supplemental objections, numbered I, II, III, IV, V, 

VI, VII, VIII, IX and X.1 

1 I. The magistrate erred by making multiple findings of fact which were inaccurate 

and unsupported by the evidence. 

 II. The Magistrate erred by determining that the parties’ duration of marriage 

lasted only until November 23, 2015. 

III. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion by failing to award Defendant 

her reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses. 

IV. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion when he awarded Defendant 

only $1,000 per month in Spousal Support. 

V. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion by requiring Defendant’s 

spousal support to terminate upon her remarriage or cohabitation. 

VI. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion by failing to properly value 

marital property owned by the parties and by giving Plaintiff ten years to equalize the 

division of marital property with monthly payments made to Defendant and failed to 

award her statutory interest. 

VII. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion by failing to retroactively 

modify temporary spousal support pursuant to Civ.R. 75. 

VIII. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion by refusing to include the 

loans receivable owed to the parties in the marital estate. 

IX. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion by failing to properly value the 

marital assets in his handwritten property division chart. 

X. The Magistrate erred and abused his discretion by failing to award Defendant 

her separate property and awarding separate property to Plaintiff which was marital in 

nature. 
On December 14, 2020, the trial court issued a journal entry, which 

overruled objections II, III, VII, VIII and IX. The trial court sustained objections V 

and VI, plus sustained, in part, objections I, VI, and X. In addition, the trial court 

ordered that Kevin pay Csilla $2,066.98 per month, plus statutory interest to 

equalize the division of property. The trial court further ordered Kevin to pay Csilla 

$1,500 in spousal support per month for 108 months or until the death of either 

party. The trial court retained jurisdiction to modify the amount and duration of the 

spousal support, noting that remarriage or cohabitation of Csilla may be grounds for 

modification of the spousal support. 

Kevin also raised objections to the magistrate’s decision, numbered I 

and II, which the trial court overruled.2

 On January 20, 2021, the trial court issued a judgment entry of 

divorce. The entry incorporated the unmodified provisions of the magistrate’s 

decision and the trial court’s previous judgment entry that ruled on the parties’ 

respective objections to the magistrate’s decision. 

On January 7, 2021, Csilla filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s 

December 14, 2020 judgment entry. On January 22, 2021, Csilla filed a notice of 

appeal of the trial court’s January 20, 2021 judgment entry of divorce. On 

2 I. The Magistrate failed to allocate as marital debt due from the proceeds: a loan 

from Plaintiff’s father for part of the down payment; a debt owed the parties’ oldest son 

for a contribution to the purchase; and reimbursement to each of the parties’ children for 

management and maintenance of the property. 

II. The remaining proceeds from the sale of the Columbus property should be 

divided equally. 
February 5, 2021, Kevin filed a cross-appeal of the trial court’s judgment entry of 

divorce. Subsequently, we sua sponte consolidated the respective appeals for 

briefing, hearing, and disposition. 

In the now consolidated appeal, Csilla assigns the following errors for 

review: 

 Assignment of Error No. 1 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it determined that 

the de facto termination date of the parties’ marriage was 

November 23, 2015. 

Assignment of Error No. 2 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it awarded 

appellant only $1,500 per month in spousal support for a definite 

period of 108 months. 

Assignment of Error No. 3 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to award 

appellant her reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses. 

Assignment of Error No. 4 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to properly 

value marital property owned by the parties and by giving appellee ten 

full years to equalize the division of marital property with monthly 

payments made to appellant. 

Assignment of Error No. 5 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to retroactively 

modify temporary spousal support pursuant to Civ.R. 75. 

Assignment of Error No. 6 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by refusing to include 

the loans receivable to the parties in the marital estate. 

 
Assignment of Error No. 7 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to properly 

value the marital assets in the magistrate’s handwritten property 

division chart. 

Assignment of Error No. 8 

The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to award 

appellant her separate property and awarding separate property to 

appellee which was marital in nature. 

In his cross-appeal, Kevin assigns the following error for our review: 

Cross-Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by 

failing to allocate marital debts due and owing to the parties’ adult 

children. 

Law and Analysis 

For ease of discussion, we will address the assignments of error out of 

sequence or simultaneously, where appropriate. 

Preliminarily, Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides in relevant part that “the 

[trial] court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to 

ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and 

appropriately applied the law.” This “independent review” requires the court to 

‘“conduct a de novo review of the facts and an independent analysis of the issues to 

reach its own conclusions about the issues in the case.”’ Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108854, 2020-Ohio-5080, ¶13, citing In re I.R.Q., 8th Dist. 
Cuyahoga No. 105924, 2018-Ohio-292, ¶ 23, quoting Radford v. Radford, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 96267 and 96445, 2011-Ohio-6263, ¶ 13. 

“The trial court must decide ‘whether the [magistrate] has properly 

determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law, and where the 

[magistrate] has failed to do so, the trial court must substitute its judgment for that 

of the [magistrate].”’ Id., citing Gobel v. Rivers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94148, 

2010-Ohio-4493, ¶ 16, quoting Inman v. Inman, 101 Ohio App.3d 115, 118, 655 

N.E.2d 199 (2d Dist.1995). It is generally presumed that the trial court properly 

conducted an independent review of the magistrate’s decision unless the party 

asserting the error affirmatively shows otherwise. Id., citing Hartt v. Munobe, 67 

Ohio St.3d 3, 615 N.E.2d 617 (1993) (“An appellate court reviewing a lower court’s 

judgment indulges in a presumption of regularity of the proceedings below.”). 

A. Standard of Review 

We review a trial court’s determination in domestic relations cases for 

an abuse of discretion. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541 N.E.2d 1028 

(1989). 

Since it is axiomatic that a trial court must have discretion to do what 

is equitable upon the facts and circumstances of each case, * * * it 

necessarily follows that a trial court’s decision in domestic relations 

matters should not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision involves 

more than an error of judgment. 

Id., citing Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348, 355, 421 N.E.2d 1293 (1981). 

An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of law or 

judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or 
unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

(1983). And where there is some competent, credible evidence in the record to 

support the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion. Trolli v. Trolli, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101980, 2015-Ohio-4487, ¶ 29, citing Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94456, 2011-Ohio-2255, ¶ 24. 

B. De Facto Termination Date of Marriage 

In the first assignment of error, Csilla argues the trial court erred and 

abused its discretion when it determined that the de facto termination date of the 

marriage was November 23, 2015. 

Normally, the date of the final hearing in a divorce proceeding is 

presumed to be the termination date of the marriage, unless the court determines 

that the use of that date would be inequitable in determining marital property. 

Kobal v. Kobal, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105921, 2018-Ohio-1755, ¶ 19; R.C. 

3105.171(A)(2). If the court determines that a de facto termination of the marriage 

occurred earlier in time, and that using the date of the final hearing as the 

termination date would be inequitable, the court may, in its discretion, select a date 

it considers equitable. Saks v. Riga, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101091, 2014-Ohio4930, at ¶ 8, citing Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 321, 432 N.E.2d 183 (1982). 

Generally, a trial court uses a de facto date for termination of 

marriage “only in cases where the parties have separated; have made no attempts to 

reconcile; and have continually maintained separate residences, separate business 
activities, and separate bank accounts.” Id., citing Gullia v. Gullia, 93 Ohio App.3d 

653, 666, 639 N.E.2d 822 (8th Dist.1994). 

This court “has cautioned that a de facto date should not be used 

unless the ‘evidence clearly and bilaterally shows that it is appropriate based upon 

the totality of the circumstances.’” Brown v. Brown, 2014-Ohio-2402, 14 N.E.3d 

404, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.), quoting O’Brien v. O’Brien, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89615, 

2008-Ohio-1098, at ¶ 41. The trial court has broad discretion in choosing the 

appropriate marriage termination date, and this decision should not be disturbed 

on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Berish at 321. 

In the instant matter, after independently reviewing the magistrate’s 

reasoning, the cases cited by the parties, and the transcript, the trial court found, as 

the magistrate had, that the de facto termination date of the marriage was 

November 23, 2015. Among the factors influencing the decision are as follows: 

The evidence was clear that * * * the parties finally separated when 

Plaintiff moved out of the marital residence on November 23, 2015 and 

the Plaintiff began voluntarily paying at least some of Defendant’s 

monthly expenses. While the parties did try to resolve their dispute 

using the collaborative process before this case was filed; they had 

separate bank accounts, lived separately, and were not intimately 

involved in any manner before the filing of the complaint in this case. 

Magistrate’s decision pg. 7. 

The record also established that the parties began filing separate tax 

returns in 2015, the year Kevin moved out of the marital residence, and continued 

this practice in the ensuing years. Notwithstanding, Csilla argues there was 

continued financial entanglement following the date Kevin moved out of the marital 
residence. However, this is not borne out by the record and is even contradicted by 

the record. At trial, Csilla acknowledged that the only remaining joint bank accounts 

were closed or had minimal balances after the parties separated. Apart from the cost 

of medical insurance, Csilla testified that she could not think of any other expense 

that Kevin was paying on her behalf. 

It is well settled that when testimony is in dispute, we defer to the trier 

of fact’s credibility determination. Calanni v. Kolodny, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 

105269 and 105271, 2018-Ohio-1289, ¶ 11, citing Fanous v. Ochs, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 98649, 2013-Ohio-1034, ¶ 18. The trier of fact “is best able to view the witnesses 

and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these 

observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal 

Co., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273. Consequently, the reviewing court is 

“guided by a presumption that the findings of the trier of fact were indeed correct.” 

Id.

Moreover, the record indicates that during the five-plus years since 

the parties’ separation, they ceased to vacation together, did not socialize together 

or attend business events together. Noteworthy, the parties made no attempts to 

reconcile, but instead, bilaterally attempted to terminate the marriage, first through 

mediation, and then through a collaborative divorce process, both of which were 

unsuccessful. These actions underscore that the parties lived separate lives after 

their separation. 
Based on the above considerations, we conclude November 23, 2015, 

represents the final pivotal date in the status of the parties’ marital relationship. As 

of that date, the parties were no longer contributing to each other for their mutual 

benefit. Based on this record, it would have been inequitable to choose the date of 

the final hearing as the termination date of the parties’ marriage. As such, we find 

the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it used November 23, 2015, 

as the de facto termination date of the parties’ marriage. 

Accordingly, we overrule Csilla’s first assignment of error. 

C. Spousal Support 

We will address assignments of error two and five together because 

they both challenge, in some respect, the trial court’s decision regarding spousal 

support. Collectively, therein, Csilla argues the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion when it ordered only $1,500 per month in spousal support for period of 

108 months and by failing to retroactively modify temporary spousal support. 

As a prefatory note, the trial court has broad discretion in 

determining whether an award of spousal support is proper based on the facts and 

circumstances of each case. Wojanowski v. Wojanowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

99751, 2014-Ohio-697, ¶ 43, citing Kunkle v. Kunkle, 51 Ohio St.3d 64, 67, 554 

N.E.2d 83 (1990). Therefore, we will not disturb a spousal support award absent 

an abuse of discretion. Id. 

When determining whether spousal support is appropriate and 

reasonable, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). 
Kaletta v. Kaletta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98821, 2013-Ohio-1667, ¶ 22. These 

factors include, but are not limited to 

(1) the relative earning abilities of the parties; (2) the ages and 

physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties; (3) the 

retirement benefits of the parties; (4) the duration of the marriage; 

(5) the standard of living of the parties established during the 

marriage; (6) the relative education of the parties; (7) the relative 

assets and debts of the parties, including but not limited to any 

court-ordered payments by the parties; (8) the time and expense 

necessary of the spouse seeking support to acquire education, 

training, or job experience; (9) the tax consequences for each party 

of an award of spousal support; and (10) any other factor that the 

court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable. 

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). 

The goal of spousal support is to reach an equitable result. Hloska v. 

Hloska, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101690, 2015-Ohio-2153, ¶ 10, citing Kaechele v. 

Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 96, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988). And while there is no set 

mathematical formula to reach this goal, the Ohio Supreme Court requires the trial 

court to consider all 14 factors of R.C. 3105.18(C) and “not base its determination 

upon any one of those factors taken in isolation.” Id. at ¶ 11. 

In the instant matter, the trial court stated that it reviewed the factors 

set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) and, except for the factor of income of the parties, 

agreed with the magistrate’s analysis. Specifically, the trial court stated, “As to R.C. 

3105.18(C)(1)(a), the Court finds that, after including ‘phantom income’,3 [Kevin’s] 

income is $768,000 per year and [Csilla’s] income is $57,000 per year.” 

3 The term “phantom income” is used colloquially when a taxpayer receives taxable 

income but does not presently receive cash or other tangible economic benefits. 
The trial court then ordered Kevin to pay spousal support in the 

amount of $1,500 per month for a period of 108 months, an amount and duration 

Csilla deems insufficient. Specifically, Csilla contends the award of spousal support 

should have been $20,000 per month for an indefinite period. We are not 

persuaded by Csilla’s contention. 

Our review of the magistrate’s decision reflects a thoughtful and 

lengthy analysis, which encompassed each of the enumerated statutory factors. 

Directly pertinent, in considering the income of the parties, the magistrate found 

that both parties testified credibly concerning their income. Regarding Kevin, 

whose income had historically been derived from his minority shareholder status in 

several closely held businesses, the magistrate found that Kevin’s tax return showed 

income that he did not receive as part of a pass-through process that had been 

largely driven by Walter Senney (“Senney”), the majority shareholder of these 

businesses. Consistent with this finding, the magistrate found that Kevin and Csilla 

never lived a lifestyle that suggested the income shown on the tax return was real. 

The magistrate specifically found that 

[t]he parties experienced a moderate standard of living during the 

marriage. Both parties testified credibly that most of their income was 

spent on their children’s education, and most of their savings was in the 

form of equity in the marital residence and in the IRA divided above. 

This factor weighs slightly against [Csilla’s] request for spousal 

support. [Kevin’s] testimony was credible in that he stated the parties’ 

plan for the future was for the business entities to become more 

valuable over time as their cross collateralized loans were paid down, 

so that they could either be sold at substantial profit, or so that the 

shareholders could take a larger annual distribution. 
Nothing in the magistrate’s well-reasoned analysis remotely suggests 

that Kevin would be able to comply with an order to pay $20,000 per month in 

spousal support. Reliable evidence established that the parties’ income throughout 

the marriage never rose to the level that would have supported the order Csilla 

contemplates. In addition, the record indicates that the trial court awarded Csilla 

the fair market value or all the equity, totaling $325,000, in the marital residence, 

where Csilla had continued to reside during the five-year span while the divorce was 

pending. 

Further, to be discussed in further detail in the fourth assignment of 

error, in reconciling the business evaluation of Kevin’s minority interest, the trial 

court awarded Csilla the sum of $248,038.50 as a property division, payable in equal 

monthly installments of $2,066.98. Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the amount of spousal support the trial court ordered. 

With respect to Csilla’s argument that the 108-month duration of 

spousal support is too short and, instead should have been indefinite, appears to rest 

solely on the length of the marriage. While the duration of the marriage was a factor 

that could weigh in favor of a longer period of spousal support, this cannot be viewed 

in a vacuum. Factors that must also be considered as to whether Csilla would have 

resources to be self-supporting are her being awarded the fair market value of the 

former marital residence ($325,000), the entire value of her Huntington Bank 

Account, one half of Kevin’s SEP retirement account ($176,000), and the entire 

proceeds from the sale of the Columbus, Ohio house ($116,000), where their 
children lived rent free, while attending college. Thus, the court reasonably 

concluded that the length of spousal support was equitable and appropriate under 

the circumstances. 

Here, the record reflects that the trial court considered the statutory 

factors outlined in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n). The judgment entry also contained 

sufficient details for this court to determine that the spousal support award was fair 

and equitable. Moreover, as previously noted, the trial court retained jurisdiction to 

modify the amount and duration of the spousal support. As such, the award is 

upheld. See Gentile v. Gentile, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97971, 2013-Ohio-1338, ¶ 44, 

citing Daniels v. Daniels, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-709, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 

772 (Mar. 4, 2008). 

We now address Csilla’s contention that the trial court erred and 

abused its discretion in failing to retroactively modify the temporary spousal 

support order. 

Civ.R. 75(N) governs the award of temporary spousal support 

“[w]hen requested in the complaint, answer, counterclaim, or by motion served with 

the pleading.” Simultaneously with the request for indefinite spousal support in the 

amount of $20,000 per month, Csilla requested an award of temporary support in 

the same amount retroactive to May 3, 2017. 

In earlier addressing Csilla’s contention that she should have been 

awarded $20,000 per month for an indefinite period, we found no justification or 

support in the record for that level of a support order. Further, the record indicates 
that during their respective trial testimonies, the parties presented detailed budgets. 

Csilla’s budget indicated that her living expenses were mostly covered by Kevin’s 

compliance with the $2,500 per month of temporary spousal support. 

Finally, speaking to this request, the trial court stated: 

The Magistrate specifically found that [Csilla] testified that she was 

able to meet her monthly expenses during the pendency of the litigation 

from the ordered temporary support of $2,500 per month. Moreover, 

she has income from employment of $56,000 plus benefits. The record 

supports these findings. 

Again, in light of the foregoing, we cannot find any error or abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s decision not to retroactively award temporary spousal 

support to Csilla. The trial court’s judgment contains sufficient detail demonstrating 

that the decision is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law. 

Accordingly, we overrule Csilla’s second and fifth assignments of 

error. 

D. Property Valuation 

In the fourth assignment of error, Csilla argues the trial court erred 

and abused its discretion by improperly valuing the marital property and by giving 

Kevin ten years to equalize the division of property. 

To begin, R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) mandates an equal division of marital 

property, or “if an equal division is inequitable, the court must divide the marital 

property equitably.” Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 2011-Ohio3831, ¶ 37, citing Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio St.3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 

434. Thus, in order to determine what is equitable, the trial court must consider the 
factors outlined in R.C. 3105.171(F). Id. Such factors include, among others, the 

duration of the marriage, the assets and liabilities of the spouses, tax consequences 

of the property division, and any retirement benefits of the spouses. R.C. 

3105.171(F)(1)-(10). Moreover, the trial court must take into account the parties’ 

marital debt when dividing marital property. Kehoe v. Kehoe, 2012-Ohio-3357, 974 

N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). 

With the above principles in mind, we first address Csilla’s contention 

that the trial court erred when it determined that Kevin’s business interests had a 

value of $1,005,000. 

Valuing property involves factual inquiries, requiring an appellate 

court to apply a manifest weight of evidence standard of review. Bradley v. Bradley, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109792, 2021-Ohio-2514, ¶ 105, citing Wright v. Wright, 4th 

Dist. Hocking No. 94CA02, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5207 (Nov. 10, 1994). Therefore, 

a trial court’s valuation of an asset will not be overturned if it is supported by some 

competent, credible evidence. Id., citing Seasons Coal Co., 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 

N.E.2d 1273 (1984), and Haynes v. Haynes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92224, 2009-

Ohio-5360. 

In the instant matter, both parties hired an expert to determine the 

fair market value of the minority interests Kevin held in various business entities. 

Kevin’s business valuation expert, Agin valued the assets in the respective 

companies at $1,005,000. Agin testified that closely held corporations, such as 

those in question, were difficult to sell, especially in light of Kevin’s fractional 
interest in the companies. Agin testified that he utilized a discounted cash flow, 

emphasizing the uneven income stream and expenses that always trended upward. 

In addition, Agin testified that the companies carried a high amount of debt, 

approximately $13,000,000, which would negatively impact Kevin’s ability to sell 

his minority interests. 

Csilla’s business valuation expert, Baum, valued the assets at 

$2,370,000 utilizing a market-based method, which considered recent sales of 

companies in similar industries. Baum opined that Agin’s opinion was too 

pessimistic, noting that the capital accounts of some of the entities were increasing 

annually, that debts were being paid in a timely manner, and that the entities were 

generally profitable. Csilla contends Baum’s valuation was more credible and 

should have been adopted. 

However, in determining a business’s value, the trial court has 

discretion to weigh the testimony offered by the parties’ valuation experts. Hoag v. 

Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100951, 2014-Ohio-4090, ¶ 11, citing Brown, 2014-

Ohio-2402, 14 N.E.3d 404, at ¶ 32, citing Gentile, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97971, 

2013-Ohio-1338, at ¶ 62, and Bryan v. Bryan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97817, 2012-

Ohio-3691. The trial court is not required to adopt any particular methodology in 

determining a business’s value. Id. 

In assessing the credibility of parties’ experts, the magistrate found 

that 
[Csilla’s] expert understated the effects of the complicated corporate 

agreements that define [Kevin’s] minority interest, the cross 

collateralization of the various entities, and the personal liability 

undertaken by the partners and their spouses, when rendering an 

opinion with regard to the marital value of these corporate entities. 

* * * 

The court finds [Kevin’s] and [Agin’s] testimony regarding the 

complexities involved if the companies were to be wound down or put 

up for sale (which would decrease the value) to be most credible. 

Furthermore, the lifestyle of the parties during the marriage, to which 

both testified credibly, never suggested that the companies were as 

profitable as [Csilla] now contends. 

The above snapshot of the magistrate’s reasoning regarding the 

propriety of accepting Agin’s evaluation over Baum’s is supported by competent 

credible evidence. At trial, Kevin provided an example of the tenuous nature of the 

business relationship based on the complicated corporate agreements attendant to 

his minority ownership interest. Kevin stated: 

We bought Smart Sonic of Ohio for a million, four. There were three 

partners: Myself, Wally and Kevin Kleinsmith. Kevin Kleinsmith was 

a friend of Walter Senney, and he wanted to go into business with Mr. 

Senney. So the three of us bought the business with Kevin Kleinsmith 

being — he was going to run the business, do all the sales, and that’s 

how it started. He decided he didn’t like doing this, so he wanted to get 

out of the business. So, Mr. Senney told me one day that, “I’m buying 

him out.” It wasn’t, “Kevin, would you like to buy some too?” It was, 

“I am buying him out.” 

The above testimony provides a glimpse, which comports with the 

magistrate’s finding that the complex nature, the cross-collateralization, and high 

debt would negatively impact Kevin’s ability to wind down or sell his minority 

interest in respective entities. 
A trial court is free to ascertain and apply a statutorily compliant 

valuation protocol to achieve an equitable result. Katz v. Katz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 103715, 2017-Ohio-4290, ¶ 55, citing Chattree v. Chattree, 2014-Ohio-489, 8 

N.E.3d 390, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.), citing James v. James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668, 681, 656 

N.E.2d 399 (2d Dist.1995). To underscore, “when determining the value of marital 

assets, a trial court is not confined to the use of a particular valuation method but 

can make its own determination as to valuation based on the evidence presented.” 

Id. 

Based on the foregoing, Csilla’s contention that the trial court erred 

in pegging the value of the business entities at $1,005,000 is not well-taken. 

We now address Csilla’s contention that the trial court erred when it 

gave Kevin ten years to pay out Csilla’s share of the business entities. Csilla relies on 

this court’s decision in Woyt v. Woyt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107321 and 107322, 

2019-Ohio-3758, to support her contention that her marital share should be paid 

out immediately. Csilla’s reliance misses the mark, because Woyt is distinguishable 

from the facts of the instant matter. 

In Woyt, the trial court determined that husband’s law firm capital 

account had a value of $132,817.53 and wife was entitled $66,409. The trial court 

ordered husband to pay wife “50 percent of any distribution if, and when, he 

received it until the total of $66,409 was paid in full.” Id. at ¶ 32. There, the terms 

of the distribution were determined entirely by husband’s law firm in which he 
maintained a partnership interest. As such, we found it inequitable to subject wife 

to an indefinite term of distribution. Id. at ¶ 33-34. 

Here, unlike Woyt, the trial court properly noted that Kevin’s 

minority interest in the closely held corporation is illiquid and specifically found that 

“[f]orcing [Kevin] to sell his interest — or one-half his interest — would likely result 

in a lower price, less proceeds to divide.” Unlike Woyt, the trial court then affixed a 

period certain for Csilla to receive her share of the business. In addition, in 

consideration that Csilla would not be receiving an immediate share, the trial court 

found that interest was due on these payments. 

Again, R.C. 3105.171 requires a trial court to equitably distribute 

marital property. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105095, 2017-Ohio7886, ¶ 13. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s decision regarding 

both of Csilla’s contentions was equitable. As such, we find no abuse of discretion. 

Accordingly, we overrule Csilla’s fourth assignment of error. 

In the seventh assignment of error, Csilla argues that the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion by failing to properly value the marital assets in the 

magistrate’s handwritten chart. Csilla broadly asserts that “the trial court mixed 

and matched valuation dates to make up for a lack of evidence of asset values on the 

de facto termination date of the marriage, and by so doing, deprived [her] of 

hundreds of thousands of dollars in marital funds that were improperly awarded to 

[Kevin].” 
It is worth remembering that a domestic relations court enjoys broad 

discretion in fashioning a division of marital property, and its decision will not be 

reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 

95, 518 N.E.2d 1197 (1988). Further, a reviewing court may not substitute its 

judgment for that of the trial court unless, considering the totality of the 

circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion. Holcomb v. Holcomb, 44 Ohio 

St.3d 128, 131, 541 N.E.2d 597 (1989). 

In the instant matter, the referenced handwritten property division 

chart indicates a compendium of the items the trial court found to be marital assets 

and awarded to each party. The chart is comprised of values provided by the parties 

through their respective testimonies or that of their business valuation experts. 

As reflected therein, and as previously discussed, the trial court 

awarded to Kevin his minority business interest in the various companies totaling 

$1,005,000, plus the value of a health savings account of $21,000 for a total of 

$1,026,000. On the other hand, the chart reflected that the trial court awarded 

Csilla the fair market value or the entire equity in the marital residence of $325,000; 

Csilla’s Huntington Bank Account of $34,000; 401(K) of $2,200; Progressive stock 

of $2,258; Escrow Funds of $116,465; Fidelity Account of $8,000; Citibank Account 

of $18,000, and Kevin’s Huntington Bank Account of $24,000 for a total of 

$529,923. 

The chart revealed that the sum attributed to Csilla of $529,923 was 

subtracted from the sum of $1,026,000 attributed to Kevin, resulting in the sum of 
$496,077 that needed to be divided equally to arrive at an equitable division of the 

parties’ marital estate, or $248,038.50. When recharacterized, Csilla and Kevin 

each received the sum of $777,961 as an equitable distribution of the marital estate. 

Here, despite Csilla’s broad assertion, there exists sufficient 

information in the referenced chart and elsewhere in the record for us to determine, 

under the totality of the circumstances that the property division herein was fair, 

equitable, and in accordance with the law. As such, Csilla’s assertion is not welltaken. 

Accordingly, we overrule Csilla’s seventh assignment of error. 

E. Loan Receivables / Repayments 

In the sixth assignment of error, Csilla argues that the trial court erred 

and abused its discretion by refusing to include loan receivables in the marital estate. 

When distributing property in a divorce proceeding, the trial court 

must first determine what constitutes marital property and what constitutes 

separate property. Herrera v. Phil Wha Chung, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109793, 

2021-Ohio-1728, ¶ 37, citing Comella v. Comella, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90969, 

2008-Ohio-6673, ¶ 38, citing R.C. 3105.171(B). A trial court’s characterization of 

property as marital or separate property is a mixed question of law and fact that will 

not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Saks, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101091, 2014-Ohio-4930, at ¶ 35, citing Williams v. Williams, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95346, 2011-Ohio-939, ¶ 8. As such, this court will not 
disturb the trial court’s distribution of separate property absent an abuse of 

discretion. Id.

At issue within this assignment of error are two loans Kevin made. 

The first, to the parties’ son, Nicholas, in December 2017, in the amount of 

$200,000. The second, to WSKS Property Management (“WSKS”), in August 2016, 

in the amount of $238,000. Csilla contends that the receivables or repayments 

flowing from both loans are marital property and should be divided equally. 

Pertinent to our resolution here is R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i), which 

provides that marital property includes “[a]ll real and personal property that 

currently is owned by either or both of the spouses * * * that was acquired by either 

or both of the spouses during the marriage.” Id. Of particular importance is the 

term “during the marriage,” the parameters of which we addressed at length in the 

first assignment of error. There, we concluded that the trial court did not err or 

abuse its discretion when it found November 23, 2015, to be the de facto termination 

date of the parties’ marriage. 

 In the instant matter, the trial court found that the loans were nine 

months and 25 months respectively, after the de facto termination date of the 

marriage. In so finding, the trial court specifically stated that 

the evidence shows that during the interval between the de facto 

[termination] and the loans, the parties maintained separate financial 

lives (except for court-ordered temporary spousal support.) The court 

finds the loans were made from [Kevin’s] separate, post-marital assets. 
Again, in resolving the first assignment of error, we discussed in detail 

how separately, financially, and socially the parties lived after the focal date of 

November 23, 2015. 

Based on the foregoing, and in particular our conclusion regarding 

the de facto termination date of the marriage, we find that the trial court did not err 

or abuse its discretion in finding the loans to be nonmarital property. Because the 

determination was supported by competent credible evidence that Kevin made both 

loans after the de facto termination of the marriage, with post-marital assets, the 

receivables or repayments flowing therefrom were properly classified as separate 

property. As such, Csilla was not entitled to share in these nonmarital assets. 

Accordingly, we overrule Csilla’s sixth assignment of error. 

F. Separate Property 

In the eighth assignment of error, Csilla argues the trial court erred 

and abused its discretion when it failed to award her a separate property interest in 

the Royalton Road residence and by finding the Medina residence Kevin’s separate 

property. 

 In determining whether assets are marital or separate, the trial court 

is governed by R.C. 3105.171. Marital property generally includes all property 

acquired by either party during the marriage as well as the appreciation of separate 

property due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contributions of either party during 

the marriage. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i) and (iii). Generally, property acquired 

during a marriage is presumed to be marital property, unless it can be shown to be 
separate. Victor v. Kaplan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108252, 2020-Ohio-3116, ¶ 34, 

citing Johnson v. Mills, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102241, 2015-Ohio-4273, ¶ 18. 

Within this assignment of error, Csilla contends that she has a 

separate property interest in the former marital home on Royalton Road, Broadview 

Heights, in the amount of $35,000. 

In the instant matter, the evidence established that the parties 

purchased the former marital home in 1994. At trial, Csilla testified her mother died 

in December 2011, and she inherited the sum of $54,000, of which $35,000 was 

deposited into a joint account, with the understanding that Kevin would utilize it to 

pay off the mortgage. In support of this claim, Csilla introduced Exhibit Y, copies of 

three distributive checks from her mother’s estate. Csilla testified that she recalled 

receiving notice that the mortgage had been canceled shortly after receiving the 

inheritance. 

In declining to award Csilla a separate property interest in the former 

marital residence, the trial court found that 

[Csilla] did not produce any evidence that the mortgage on the 

Royalton Road home has been paid off; no cancelled check from the 

joint account to the mortgage holder; no satisfaction of the mortgage; 

etc. [Csilla] has shown that she received an inheritance from her 

mother. [Csilla] has not shown that she contributed that inheritance to 

the value of the marital home. 

Indeed, the party seeking to have certain property classified as 

“separate property” has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, in 

tracing the separate property. Kaplan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108252, 2020-Ohio-
3116, ¶ 34, citing Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 2011-Ohio-3831 

at ¶ 49, citing Peck v. Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734, 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th 

Dist.1994). 

Critically, separate property commingled with marital property 

remains as separate property unless it becomes no longer traceable. R.C. 

3105.171(A)(6)(b). Thus, traceability becomes the focus in determining whether 

separate property has lost its character after being commingled with marital 

property. Lichtenstein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108854, 2020-Ohio-5080, ¶ 21, 

citing Peck, 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734, 645 N.E.2d 1300 (12th Dist.1994). 

Further, it is important to remember that a party seeking to establish 

the separate property has the burden of proof only by a preponderance of the 

evidence. “Preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of evidence that 

is necessary to destroy the equilibrium.” Lichtenstein, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

108854, 2020-Ohio-5080, ¶ 28, citing Reed v. Reed, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-63, 

2010-Ohio-4550, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102, 512 N.E.2d 

598 (1987). 

Here, not only has Csilla failed to trace the separate property, but also 

failed to put forth evidence that would destroy the equilibrium. As such, Csilla’s 

contention is not well-taken. 

Within this assignment of error, Csilla also contends that the trial 

court should not have awarded the Medina property separately to Kevin. 
It is necessary to note that, although Csilla asserts that the Medina 

home was awarded to Kevin as his separate property, that is not borne out by the 

record. To the contrary, the record indicates that the trial court found that the 

Medina home was presumptively marital property because it was purchased in April 

2015, seven months prior to the de facto termination date of the parties’ marriage. 

In the matter, despite the recharacterized claim that the trial court 

should not have awarded Kevin a separate property interest in the Medina home, 

Kevin produced the requisite evidence to establish his separate property interest. To 

that end, Kevin testified at trial that he used an inheritance from his father to make 

the down payment on the subject property. In support of this claim, Kevin 

introduced a gift letter substantiating this, along with a check reflecting payment 

from his father’s trust to the title company in the amount of $113,000. 

Here, unlike Csilla’s claim of a separate property interest of $35,000 

in the former marital residence on Royalton Road, Kevin was able to trace his 

separate property interest in the new residence, although presumptively found to be 

marital in nature. Thus, Kevin satisfied his burden of proof by a preponderance of 

the evidence. As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision. 

Accordingly, we overrule Csilla’s eighth assignment of error. 

G. Attorney Fees 

In the third assignment, Csilla argues the trial court erred and abused 

its discretion by ordering each party to pay their own attorney fees and litigation 

expenses. 
 We also review a postdecree award of attorney fees for an abuse of 

discretion. Wojanowski v. Wojanowski, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103695, 2017-

Ohio-11, ¶ 15, citing Cutter v. Cutter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96375, 2012-Ohio-358, 

¶ 26. Postdecree motions for attorney fees are governed by R.C. 3105.73, which 

provides in relevant part as follows: 

(B) In any post-decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an action 

for divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment of marriage or 

an appeal of that motion or proceeding, the court may award all or part 

of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to either party if 

the court finds the award equitable. In determining whether an award 

is equitable, the court may consider the parties’ income, the conduct of 

the parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate, 

but it may not consider the parties’ assets. 

Id. 

This statute gives a trial court broad discretion to award attorney fees 

and litigation expenses if it finds the award equitable. Wojanowski at ¶ 15; Cutter at 

¶ 26; Phelps v. Saffian, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106475, 2018-Ohio-4329, ¶ 45. The 

decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. O’Brien 

v. O’Brien, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89615, 2008-Ohio-1098, ¶ 71; Layne v. Layne, 

83 Ohio App.3d 559, 568, 615 N.E.2d 332 (2d Dist.1992). 

In the instant matter, the trial court aptly noted that attorney fees are 

primarily the responsibility of the party who retains the attorney. See Farley v. 

Farley, 97 Ohio App.3d 351, 358, 646 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.1994). The trial 

court also noted: 

The record shows that [Csilla] has earned income of $57,000; has 

received temporary spousal support during the pendency of this action; 
will receive post-decree spousal support; and, will receive assets of 

significant value. The Court finds that it is equitable that each party 

bear their own attorney fees and litigation. 

Under the facts and circumstances here, we decline to say that the 

trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate’s decision and denying 

Csilla’s request for attorney fees and litigation expenses. As previously discussed, 

while addressing the issue of spousal support, Csilla received assets of significant 

value. The trial court’s decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. 

 Accordingly, we overruled Csilla’s third assignment of error. 

H. Marital Debts 

In Kevin’s sole cross-assignment of error, he argues the trial court 

erred and abused its discretion by failing to allocate as marital debt funds owed to 

one or more of their adult children. 

 A trial court must also take into account the parties’ marital debt 

when dividing marital property. Turner v. Davis-Turner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

106002, 2018-Ohio-2194, ¶ 10, citing Kehoe v. Kehoe, 2012-Ohio-3357, 974 N.E.2d 

1229, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). Marital debt includes any debt that is incurred during the 

marriage for the joint benefit of the parties or for a valid marital purpose. Stratton 

v. Stratton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107798, 2019-Ohio-3279, ¶ 41, citing Rossi v. 

Rossi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100133 and 100144, 2014-Ohio-1832, ¶ 62, citing 

Cooper v. Cooper, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2013-02-017, 2013-Ohio-4433, ¶ 18. 

In the instant matter, Kevin contends that the proceeds from the 

sale of the house in Columbus, Ohio, which the parties purchased in 2009, for the 
benefit of their children, who were attending The Ohio State University, and sold in 

2018, was not properly allocated. The trial court awarded the entire sale proceeds 

to Csilla. 

Instead, Kevin insists the allocation should have been (1) $18,000 

as repayment for a loan from his late father for the down payment, (2) $8,000 to 

their eldest son, for his contribution to the purchase price, and reimbursement to 

each child for management of and maintenance of the property, and (3) the 

remainder to be divided equally. 

In declining to allocate the proceeds in accordance with Kevin’s 

wishes, the trial court stated that 

[Kevin] testified that he received a loan from his late father to cover the 

down payment. However, he has not presented any documentation of 

that loan: no loan documentations, no promissory note, etc. 

* * * 

[Kevin] testified that at the time of purchase, their oldest son 

contributed $8,000, variously described as a “credit” or a “tax rebate.” 

There is no documentation of this purported contribution in evidence. 

* * * 

Each of the parties’ children in turn lived at the Columbus house rentfree while attending college. Plaintiff contends each should now be 

reimbursed for “managing” the property when it was rented to others, 

or for “sweat equity” contributed to the house. [Kevin] offers no legal 

authority for the proposition that this constitutes a “marital debt.” 

Here, without any records to substantiate receipt of the loan from 

father or documents regarding the tax credit the eldest son received, the trial court 

was not obligated to pay the alleged debts from the marital estate. In addition, as it 
relates to repaying the children for maintaining and managing the property they 

lived in rent free, while attending college, the trial court could have arguably 

concluded that the children have already benefited sufficiently. 

Finally, as it relates to dividing the remainder equally between 

Kevin and Csilla, we have concluded previously that the record demonstrates that 

the trial court’s division of the marital property was fair, equitable, and in 

accordance with law. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion. 

Accordingly, we overrule Kevin’s sole cross-assignment of error. 

 Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee/cross-appellant recover from appellant/crossappellee costs herein taxed. 

 The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR