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GAMBIT/DORIAN 

HEXAGON . • . . 

.. " , .,.,., .. ~ ..... ~ .. ,,...;:;,,,. 

September 1968 

Colonel Worthman - ACDA 

Comments: 

I. As I understand the politics of spying, a nation 

never admits it. Exceptions have been unpleasant and 

should not establish a precedent. In this case making 

the fact of spying. unclassif.ied is unnecessary since: 

a. The Russians need not be convinced of 

our experience in "national verification" 

only our!" inti~r,g~ofI'ce to accept . it. 

b. The Congress and our Allies can be convinced 

at T-KH level, selectively, and at a military 

security level pertinent to technology, capability but not "fact" of spying. 

c. The public can be convinced by statements 

of capability based on extensive military 

R&D. 

FUrther releasing the "fact"of spying opens the possibility 

of political reaction {rom the Soviets. 

a. It might actually be counterproductive to 

the negotiation if the Soviets felt obliged to say something ' 

nasty. 

b. It could provide evidence for the Soviets to 

say arms limitations can't be trusted since we hide big 

programs anyway. 

c. If the nego t iations became acrimonious, the 

Soviets might find it necessary to say - "we will cease talk 

and we will no longer tolerate your spying." (I, personally, 

seem to be the only nut around who is continually frightened 

by this prospect and the facts of a good Soviet anti-satellite 

capability - a terribly vulnerable recce program becoming 

much more so - and zero U.S. anti-satellite capability), 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C05106845 

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Approved fQrJ3.elease: 2019/05/02 C051 06845 

GAMBIT/DORIAN 

HEXAGON 

The Soviet might do these things anyway - whether the "fact" 

is released or not - but releasing the "fact" only gives 

them more options and this is bad from the point of view of 

the negotiations and the mandatory goal of maintaining our 

recce capability. The release is obviously hazardous - the 

only issue is how much and do the benefits justify it. These 

benefits do not relat~to the negotiations - only to raising 

our credibility with citizens and allies. 

2. Therefore, I believe it is essential that the "fact" 

remain T-KH. The negotiators, should be instructed to say that 

the U.S. has conducted extensive space R&D - civilian and 

military which leads us to confidence in'cu.racceptance of 

national verification. This testing has involved space flight-

.,;., the civilian portion no 'overflight _The military R&D is 

classified. No comment as to overflight. 

3. The remaining issue is how to establish our credibility with allies and citizens. It is amazing to me that 

"Chip" obviously fears this point far more than reaching 

agreement with the Soviets. The U.S. is in a bad way if 

its prestige is so low that the Soviets will accept a treaty 

(we appear to offer from weakness?) but our own people and 

friends will not believe we know what we are doing. But 

releasing the "fact" 'doesn I t help this situation - it only 

confirms our duplicity. I think too much is made of the 

technology hidden behind T-KH and BYEMAN. The hidden capability relates to experience, contractor base, production 

rate and other factors relating to the magnitude and history 

of the technical effort. Contrary to egotistical, self-deluding 

views, the "art" is not in the security system. The biggest 

and best Cer-Vit mirror will be done for Chile - the most 

precise large optics flown have been in stratoscopes and OAO. 

Aden Meinel makes 90" precision pieces on the adjacent machine 

in an open shop that he :ffui.ffies 58" stereo, etc., etc . . I am sure I can go to Boeing,.NAA:;· .. ·American Optical, 

Kollsman, etc., and get a white competitive proposal on 

GAMBIT-CUBED or HEXAGON systems, which will be almost as . creditable ±i=l Qr out of taQ oygtelll41~ those underway - The doubts would relate to - they may underestimate schedule 

and costs - or,~why bring AO up to a production capability 

like EK - or I would hate to go through that early G failure 

history again - but these are management arguments not 

feasibility - credibility arguments. 

TOP, SECRET HANDLE VIA BYfMA~J 

2 CUNmOt SYSiEiYl 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C051 06845 
• ;Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C051 06845 GAMBIT/DORIAN 

HEXAGON 

Congress and Allies at T-KH level - Ok. Otherwise, 

release at military classification whatever is felt neces~ary to be believable. A large extensive military 

R&D effort - no specifics - but show Dayton 80" system, 

P&E 36" stratoscope and OAO, bring C-V and ULE into it - consider surfacing follow~on optics as a recce system test 

by CRL. - use SR-7l optics - if necessary, surface most of 

our R&D through the Recce· Lab - none of that hurts the 

BYEMANsystem. 

If the U.S. still is not trusted by friends and citizens - release DORIAN - military R&D - impressive resolution - but 

not part of NRP. There is plenty of technology to be made 

white - BYEMAN TKH were never really intended to protect 

that - but we must not give up on "facts" of spying. 

Approved for Release: 2019/05/02 C051 06845 

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