### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3199- 22 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. T.B., Defendant-Appellant.

______________________

Submitted May 7, 2024

– Decided May 21, 2024 Before Judges Enright and Whipple. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FO- 04

- 0290

- 23. Cozen O'Connor PC, attorneys for appellant (Gabriel la Maria Scott and Dexter Ryan Hamilton, of counsel an d on the briefs ). Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew Thomas Spence, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 3199

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Defendant T.B. 1 appeals from the May 16, 2023 order finding him guilty of fourth-degree contempt of an Order of Protection (OP), N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 9( b)(1). We affirm, substantially for the reasons se t forth in the thoughtful oral and written opinion s issued by Judge Charles W. Dortch, Jr.
I. In June 2021, A.M. filed for and obtained an OP in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in Pennsylvania. It i s undisputed defendant was served with a copy of the OP in court. Pursuant to the OP, he was barred from contacting A.M. "by telephone or by any other means ," and from having any contact with the parties' children. The order also provided that if defendant violated the OP, he would be arrested on the "charg e of indirect criminal contempt." The record reflects A.M. requested the OP followin g an incident on September 24, 2022. She alleged that on that date,

[ she ] was traveling on Route 30 West in Somerdale . . . . While at a stop light, she heard someone yelling. When [a] car pulled up next to her, she saw that it was [T.B.]. He continued yelling t hat he wanted to see their [children]. The interaction continued for a couple of minutes until the stop li ght changed. [A.M.] then proceeded through the

1 We use initials for the parties to protect their privacy. See R. 1:38-3(d)(9) and (10).3 A- 3199

- 22 intersection and pulled over at an apartment complex[ ,] at which time she called the police. The police arrived and she was escorted to the police department[,] wh ere she gave a statement resulting in the complaints [against defendant]. Based on this incident, T.B. was charged with conte mpt and harassment,
N.J.S.A. 2C: 33 -4(a). He was tried on these charges before Judge Dortch on May 16, 2023. After finding A.M. testified "credibl[y] in terms of what occurred" during the September 24, 2022 incident "and as to he r desire to" "get away from [T.B.]," the judge found defendant guilty of contem pt, but not guilty of harassment. In Judge Dortch's May 16 oral opinion, he stated it was "significant" the parties had "been in court several times . . . rega rding issues with respect to the [ir] children." Given this history, the judge concluded defendant " knowingly and purposely violated the [OP]," because defendant "obviously understood and knew that the right place to pursue" custody and pa renting time issues was "in court in Philadelphia." In finding defendant guilt y of contempt, the judge also rejected defendant's argument that his contact with A.M. was "de minimis ." Additionally, in a July 21, 2023 amplification letter submitted b y Judge Dortch under Rule 2:5 -1(d), he found that even if defendant's contact wi th A.M. on September 24, 2022 was a "chance encounter, ther e was still absolutely no4 A- 3199

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reason whatsoever for him to start shouting about [ parenting time] issues[,] given the clear prohibition against contact in the [OP]." The judge explained:

The uncontroverted credible testimony and evidence before the [c]ourt leaves no reasonable doubt that [T.B.]'s conduct was not simply trivial or insignif icant. The [OP] was entered to protect [A.M.] from any contact from [T.B.] Beyond a reasonable doubt, [T.B.'s] conduct was a knowing and purposeful[,] cl ear violation of the [OP].
II. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) "the evidence ad duced in the [trial] court . . . was insufficient to support a convictio n for contempt due to the triviality of the alleged encounter"; and (2) "the State did not meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that [T.B.] had the requisite mental state to be found guilty of contempt." These arguments lack merit. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(E). We add the following brief comments. Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limite d. Cesare v. Cesare , 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of its special expertise i n family matters. Id. at 413. Deference is especially appropriate in bench trials "when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (199 7)). A trial judge who5 A- 3199

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observes witnesses and listens to their testimony i s in the best position "to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesse s who appear on the stand." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008). Therefore, we will not disturb a trial court's fact ual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent wi th the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the i nterests of justice." Cesare , 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). However, we review a trial court's legal conclusions de

novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). The purpose of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to - 35 is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Bro wn, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Con sequently, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic viol ence," J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting S tate v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally construe[ t he PDVA] to achieve its salutary purposes," Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400.6 A- 3199

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Contempt of a domestic violence order constitutes a predicate act of domestic violence under the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(17). Moreover, " a person is guilty of a disorderly persons offense [o f contempt] if that person knowingly violates an order entered under the provisions of the [PDVA] or an order entered under the provision of a substantiall y similar statute under the laws of another state or the United States." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b)(2). Guided by these standards, and considering Judge D ortch's factual and credibility findings are well supported by the reco rd, we are convinced the judge rightly found defendant guilty of contempt. Indeed , defendant clearly violat ed an unambiguous no-contact order, and the fact he did not commit a far more serious violation of the OP on September 24, 2022, is of no moment. Accordingly, we affirm the May 16, 2023 order, subs tantially for the reasons outlined in the judge's thoughtful oral and written opinions. Affirmed.