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CONTAOI. SVSHM 

June 13, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 1111111 lllli 11111111111111111111 lllll 1111111111111111111111111111 14 00003772D 

SUBJECT: List of Topics for Discussion with ExCom 

The following topics are suggested for possible discussion 

at the June 20 meeting of the Executive Committee: 

,1. Use of Drones for Peripheral SIGINT in Place of 

Manned Aircraft 

The recent shoot-down of the EC-121 off North Korea 

highlighted our dependence upon manned aircraft for collecting 

COMINT and SIGINT from peripheral stations. Peripheral air-

' borne reconnaissance operations are a necessary adjunct to 

overhead collection. They stimulate the defense system causing reactions which can be collected in the airborne platform, 

or desirably, can be used in a cooperative manner with overhead collectors to obtain more information than possible from 

either one alone. Peripheral missions can collect SIGINT over 

a longer duration than satellite collectors. 

As you know, we decired: m:Eth ago to equip twenty 

147T high altitude drones with~--~~~LINT equipment. The 

data will be received on the groun via a data link. The 

system is expected to be operational in five months. Unmanned 

aircraft were selected because the possible loss of a vehicle 

by shoot-down or operational attrition would be less inflammatory, and because drones are relatively cheap to oper4i~' 

considering all costs including supporting costs for manned 

aircraft. For these same reasons, the JCS now prefers drones 

to manned aircraft for peripheral reconnaissancea The "requirement" is still being processed through DDR&E with assistance of 

JCS and NSA. , 

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3. Manned Aircraft Reconnaissance 

BYEr'~114M CONTIIOl S'f'ST(M 

Based on FY 1971 budget estimate recommendations 

from the NRO Program Directors, it is apparent that the NRP 

FY 1971 total budget will significantly exceed the FY-1970 

budget. Accordingly, it is desirable to initiate critical 

reviews shortly of several on-going programs from a 1 "value 

received" standpoint. One such area is U-2 aircraft support, 

which has been submitted at a $52.1 million cost to the ijRP, 

with added costs to the Air Force and CIA of about' $10 ~ 

million. In contrast to rising costs of this program, the 

total operational hours for U-2's is forecast to reduce in 

FY 1971 by 26.5% from FY 1969. The DNRO proposes that a 

study be initiated of the U-2 progra~, costs, and relationships of drones and other manned aircraft (such as the SR-71) 

to mission requirements, in preparation for the ExCom review 

of the FY 1971 budget. 

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4. Termination of MOL and Initiation of HEXADOR 

The decision to terminate MOL and build an unmanned 

vehicle makes it necessary to add a new item to the NRP 0 

This vehicle, tentatively called HEXADOR, would carry the 

high resolution camera in a new spacecraft. If the spacecraft is the same as the HEXAGON, we might call it HEXADOR; 

however 3 we must look at other possible vehicles. The new 

program obviously impacts the NRP. We will have to make 

difficult program decisions. In short we will be facing a 

major change in overhead photographic collection-from the 

present CORONA-GAMBIT, to a more complex mixture of HEXAGONGAMBIT-HEXADOR. 

5. HEXAGON Overrun and Slip 

The HEXAGON program has suffered a slip and an overrun, which may have serious implications. If further slippage 

occurs, or if there are difficulties in the first flights of 

the vehicle, there may be an undesirable gap in the intelligence collection. To provide for this gapa we may have to 

order three or four more CORONAs. The overrun, now estimated 

to be $60 million in 1970 and another $60 million in 1971, is 

particularly difficult to handle in these tight budget years. 

The overrun is caused by increases in the payload, the Stellar 

Index camera, and the spacecraft. Whil~ some reductions are 

possible immediately, we cannot predict whether new overrun~ 

will occur. 

In order to obtain the best possible evalua~ion of 

the cost and schedule of HEXAGON, I have appointed a committee 

headed by Dr. Robert Naka to conduct a technical review of 

the program. I will have a summary of their findings by the 

date of the meeting. (Dr. Naka will become my deputy on 

July 1.) 

It is difficult to establish the need for the SI 

camera. The Army has a requirement for large scale mapping. 

If the requirement is to be met, satellite photography is 

probably the best collector. The difficulty in establishing 

the desirability of the camera in relation to its cost lies 

in determining what would be lost if we did not have the 

large scale maps, how we make do withou.:: these maps, and.what 

the total cost is. There is now a requirement for developing 

and procuring new cartographic equipment. There will also be 

a need for more personnel despite the claims of more efficient 

map production. The DIA should be asked to examine the 

requirement critically. I will talk to General Joe Carroll 

about this. 

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6. Readout 

In response to the Deputy Secretary of Defense's' -

direction, a team has been set up under Mr~ Bennington, 

ODDR&E, to review the needs for~----~ surveillance and 

the alternate methods of obtaining such a satellite capability. Pending the completion of this review, I have 

structured our initial approvals of FY 70 funding of technology to emphasize sensor development ~hich remains the least 

well developed component of proposed systems. We are 

increasing our support of the CIA technology program based 

on solid state sensors to several times the level identified 

in the President's budget and reducing some other technology 

items accordingly. These initial approvals will permit 

, increased progress in the critical areas of technology, 

pending a possible decision to augment the efforts even more. 

7. High Resolution Radar in Space 

In 1964, experiments with a high resolution radar 

in space were conducted. The experiment was successful. 

Better than 100' resolution was obtained, over a swath width 

of ten miles. NPIC evaluated the imagery, stated it was 

capable of providing useful intelligence, and recommended 

further research and development. 

Technology developments have been identified which are applicable to all of these possible uses. ~he Navy is funding 

development of a high powered transmitter; the NRP will 

support about a $500,000 effort in other components.- ,DDR&,E 

is examining the validity of the potenti~~ uses 3 and their 

report will help determine the need for additional effort. 

8. Anti-Satellite Capability 

One of the questions repeatedly discussed is the 

possibility of the shoot-down of one of our satellite reconnaissance vehicles by the Soviets. We are considering various 

countermeasures in the form of~--------~ In some 

instances these measures seem to be inadequate. 

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I believe that one counter to the possible Soviet 

threat is to possess a satellite shoot-down capability of 

our own. The Soviets will be deterred if they feel that w~ - are able to destroy one of their satellite vehicles in 

retaliation for any hostile action by them 0 

9. Operational Control of Overflight of Denied 

Territory by Reconnaissance Aircraft 

It is the national policy for the DNRO to maintain 

management control of all vehicles which overfly denied 

territory. The actual flights of these aircraft are supervised and conducted either by the CIA (under the auspic~s .of 

the NRO) or by the Joint Chiefs of Staffo Permission for 

these flights is requested by the DNRO from the 303 Committee. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff adhere to this policy but 

believe it should be changeda They fe~l they should have the 

authority to request permission for manned or unmanned drone 

aircraft reconnaissance sorties directly to the 303 Committee. 

According to their view, the DNRO should be concerned,onlY, 

with satellites. The Executive Committee may wish to examine 

this question and perhap6 issue new guidance or recommend 

changes in procedure. 

Recently, the Chairman, JCS, transmitted a memorandum 

to Mr 0 Packard recommending a 303 Committee review involving 

a different but related problem. This involves the coordination procedures for NRO (CIA operated) flights in areas of 

responsibility of the unified and speciiied commands. 

BYEf..~AN /COMINT CONiRCL :!.YSTtM ' 

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10. Comparison of Capabilities and Costs of 

Various Ways of Conducting Crisis Reconnaissance 

Providing the capability to conduct reconnaissance 

in crisis situations has been discussed for a number of years, 

although no firm requirement has been stated. At the present 

time there are several proposed arrangements which appear ·· 

worthy of, further investigation. These includ~: satellite 

vehicles having solid state array sensors with :----------c----:-;--------c_--------" 

s satellite vehicles having film recording with laser 

'~beam~readout, \ 

HA NOLE Vlfl 

I have initiated a study of the capabilities of 

each of the,systems which will provide the advantages and 

disadvantages of the various systems and attached cost 

estimates to each of them. 

John L. McLucas 

) 

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BYE-12944-69, 13 June 1969. 

Memo for Helms and DuBridge 

Subject: List of Subjects for Discussion w/ExCom 

Attachments: BYE-12942-69 and BYE-12941-69. 

Copy 1 

2 

3 I 

Mr. Helms 

Dr. DuBride:e 

BYE~l2943-69, 13 June 1969 

Memo for DepSecDef 

Subject: List of Subjects for Discussion w/ExCom 

Attachments: BYE-12942-.69 and BYE-12941-69. 

Copy 1· DepSecDef 

2 Dr. Foster 

3 

BYE-12943-69, 13 June 1969. 

Memo for DepSecDef 

Subject: List of Subjects for Discus~ion w/ExCom 

Attachments: BYE-12944-69 

BYE-12942-69 (Agenda) 

BYE-12941-69 (M/R: List of Topics for 

Discussion with ExCom)_~ 

Copy 4 

5 Col. Allen, SS-1 (STAR) 

Working Copies 

Capt Geiger sanitized version II " 

Read File I " II 

Col. Yost II " J 

Mr. Reber complete version 

Dr. McLucas - complete version . ,. 

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