1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### WATSON ET AL


### . v . PHI L IP MORRIS COS., INC., ET AL


### . CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 05–1 28 4. Ar g u ed Apr i l 25, 200 7—D e c i ded Ju n e11, 2007 Petition er s fil e d a st ate-c o u r tsu it c l aim i n gth at r e spon den t s (Ph ili p

Morris ) viola t ed Arka ns a s unfa i r b u s i nes s pra c t i ce la ws b ya dvert is

ing certain ci garette brands as “light” when, in fact, Philip M o rris h a d man i pu la ted test in gr e su lts to r e gi st erlow e r lev e l s of taran d nicot i ne in t h e a dvert is ed c i ga ret t e s t h a nwould b edelivered t ocon s u mers . Philip Morris removed t h e ca s et oFedera l D i s t rictCourt under the fed eral officer re moval statute, which permits removal of an action against “any officer (or any pe rso n actin g

un de r that officer) of the United States or of any agencyth er eof,” 28 U. S. C. §144 2(a)(1 ) (empha s is a d ded). The fede r a lcourtuphel dt h e remova l, rulingt h a t the complain t at tacked P h ilip M o rris’ use of the Gover n ment ’ s method of test ing cigarettes and thus that petitioners ha d sued Philip M o r r i s for“ac tin gu n d er” th e Feder al Tr ad e Comm iss i on . Th e Eigh th Circuita ffirmed, empha s izing t h e FTC ’s det a iled s u pervis ion of t h e ciga ret t et e s t ing pro c es s a n d likening t h e ca s et oot h e rs in which lower cou r t s permit t e d remova l b yheavily s u pervis ed Government cont ra ct ors . Held: Th e fac tth at a feder alag en c ydir e c t s, su perv ises, an d mon i tor s a

c o mpan y ’ s ac tiv i ties inc o n s ider able deta i ldoes n o t br in gth at c o m pan yw i th in§144 2(a)(1)’s sc ope an d th er e b yper m it r e m o v a l. Pp. 3 – 14.

(a) Sec t ion14 42(a)( 1 )’s w o r d s “ a c t in gu n der” ar e br oa d, an d th e s t at ut e must b e“ l ib era l ly cons t rued.” Coloradov. Symes , 286 U. S. 510, 51 7. But br oad lan g uag eis n o t limitles s . An d aliber al c o n s t ruct ion non e t h eles s ca n find limit s in at e xt ’s la ngua ge, cont ext , h i stor y , an d pu r p oses. Th e statu te’s h i s t or yan d th is Cou r t ’s c a ses demon s tr ate t h at it s b a sicp u r p ose is to p r otec t th e Fed e r a l G o v e r n men tfr om th e in ter fer en c ew i thits “ope r ation s” th at w o u l d en su e2 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Sy llabu s

w e r e a State able, forex am ple, to “ar r e s[ t]” an d br in g“to tr ia l in a Sta t e c o u r [ t] foranalleg e d o ffen s e ag ain s t th e lawof th e Sta t e,” “offi

c e r s an d ag ents” of th e G o v e r n m en t “ac tin g. . . w i th in th e sc ope of th eirau th or ity

. ” Willi ngha m v. Mo rgan , 395 U. S. 40 2, 406 (in t er n a l qu otationm a r k s omit ted). Sta t e-c ou r tproc eedin g s mayr e flec t “loc a l prej udice” a g a i ns tunpopula rfedera l la ws or officia l s , e. g., Marylan d v. Soper , 270 U. S. 9, 32, an d St ates h o sti l e to th e G o v e r n m en t may impede enforcement of feder al law, see, e.g., Te nn ess eev. Davis , 100 U. S. 257, 2 63, ordepr iv e feder al offic i als o f a feder a l for u m inw h i ch to asser tfeder al immu n i tydefen s es, see, e. g . , Willi ngha m, sup ra , at 407. Th e r e mov a l s tatu te applie s to pr iv ate per s on s “w h olaw f u lly assist” a feder al officer “in the per formance of his official duty,” Davis v. Sout h Carol i na , 107 U. S. 597, 6 00, bu t “ o n l y” if th e pr iv ate par t ie s were “authorized to act with or fo r [federal officers or agents] in af

firma t ively execut ing dut i es under .

. . fe dera l la w,” City of Gre en woodv. Pe a c oc k , 384 U. S. 808, 824. Pp. 3–7.

(b) The relevant relationship he re i s t h at of apriv at e pers on “ act

ing under” afederal “officer” or “agen cy.” §1442(a)( 1 ) (emphasi s a dded). In t h is cont ext , “ under” mus trefer t o wha tt h e dict iona ries desc r ibe as a r e lation sh ip i n v o lv ingac tin gina c e r tain c a pac i ty , c o n sidered in relation to one holding a superior position or office, and t y pica lly includes s u bj ect i on, guida nce, orcont rol. Pre c edenta n d sta t u t or ypu rpose also m a k ec l earth at th e pr iv ate person ’s “ac tin g under” must involve an effo rt to assist , orto help carry out, th e fed

eral superior’sduties or tasks. See, e. g. , Davis v. Sou th Carolina, su

pra , at 600. Such aid does notin clude s i mply complying w i thth e la w. When a compa n y complies wit ha regula t o ry order, itdoes not or din a r ilycr eate a sig n ific an t r i sk of state-c ou r t“pr eju dic e .” Cf. Soper, sup ra , a t 3 2

. A st ate-courts u itb r oughta g a i ns t s uch acom pany is not lik ely to disable federa l officials from taking necessary ac

tion designed to enforcefede ral law, cf. Te nne sse ev. Dav i s, supra , at 262 –2 63, n o r to den ya fede r al for u mto a nin div i du al e n titled to as s e rtafedera l immunit yclaim, s e e, e.g. , Willingham, supra , at 40 7. Thus , aprivat e firm’s complia nce (or noncomplia nce) wit hfederal law s , r u l es, an d r e gu lation s does n o t byit self fall w i th inth e sc ope of the statutory phrase “acting unde r” a fed eral “official,” even if the r e g u lationis h i gh lydetailed an d ev enif th e pr iv ate fir m ’s ac tiv i tie s a r e highlys u pervis ed a n d monit o red. A cont ra ry det e rmina t i on w o u l d ex pan dth e st atu te’s sc ope c o n s ider ably , poten t i a llybr in gi n g w i th init sta t e-c ou r tac tions filed ag a i n s t pr iv ate fir m s inman y h i gh ly r e gu lated in du str i es. Noth in g inth e statu te’s la n g u a g e , h i s tor y , orpur p ose in dic ates a c o n g r e ssion al in ten tto do so. Pp. 7–9.

(c) Philip M o rris’ two arguments to the contrary are rejected. First, itcont ends tha tif clos e supervis ion is s u fficientt ot urn aGov

-3 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Sy llabu s ernmentcont r a ct or int o a priva t e firm “ a c ting under” aGover n ment “agency” or “officer,” as lo wer courts have held, it is sufficient to tr an sfor m ac o mpan ysu bjec t e d to in ten s e r e g u lation

. Th e an sw ert o th is ar g u men tis th at th e assist an c eth at pr iv ate c o n t r a c t or s pr ov ide federal officers goes beyond simple comp liance with the law and helps the officers fulfill other basic gove rnment a l tasks. Second, Philip Morris a r gues t h a titis “ a c ting u n der” FT C officers w h e nitcond uct s c i g a r e tte testi n gbec a u s e, afterin itiallyte stin gc i g a r e ttes fortaran d nicot i ne, t h e FTC delega t ed authori t yfor th at ta sk to t h e tobac c oin

du str yin198 7 an d h a s th e r eafterex ten s iv elysu perv ised an d c l osely monit o red t e st ing. This a r gumentcont a i ns afa ta l flaw of omis s i on. Alth ou ghit uses th e w o r d “deleg ati on,” there is noevi d ence of any deleg ationof l e g a l au th or ityfr om th e FTC to th e tob a c c oin du str yto undertake testing on the Go vernment a g e ncy ’s b e ha lf, or eviden ce of a n y cont ra ct , pa yment , employer/e mployee relationship, or princi

pal/ag en t ar r a n g emen t. The ex isten c eof detai led FTC r u l es in di

c ates r e g u lati on , n o t deleg a tion

. Th e u s ual r e g u lator/r e g u lated r e la

tionship cannot be construed as bringing Philip M o rris within the sta t u t e’s ter m s. Pp. 9–14. 420 F. 3d 85 2, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

B REYER , J ., delivered t h e opi n ion forauna nimous Court

._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 05–1 28 4 

### LISA WATSON, ET AL 

### ., PETITIONER S v. PHILIP MORRI S COMPANIES, INC., ET AL


### . ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT [Ju n e11, 2007 ] 

### J USTICE 

### B RE YE R

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. The federal officer removal statute permits a defendant to remove to federal court a state-court action brough t against the “United S t a t es or any a g ency there o f or any officer ( or any personactin g

un der th at of ficer) of the United States or of any agency ther eof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act un der color of such of

fice . . . .” 2 8U. S. C. §1442(a)(1) (emphasis a dded). The question before us is whether the fact th at a federa l regulatory agency dir e cts, supervises, and monitors a company’s activities in considerable detail brings th a t company within the scope of the italicized lan guage (“ ac t

ing under” an “ officer” of the United States) and thereby permits removal. We hold that it does not. I Lisa Watson and Loret t a Lawson, the petitioners, filed a civil lawsuit in Ar kan s as state c o urt claiming tha tth e Philip Morris Companies, the respondents, violated state laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive business practices

.2 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### The complaint focuses upon advertisements a n d pack ag ing that describe certain Ph ilip Morris brand cigarettes (Marlboro and Cambri dge Lights) as “light,” a term indi

cating lowe r tar and n i cotine levels than tho s e present in other cigarettes. More specific ally, the complaint refers to the designand performance of Philip Mor r is cigarettes that are tested in accordance wit hthe Cambridge Filter Method, a method that “the tobacco industry [uses] to ‘measure’ t a r and ni cotine leve ls in cigarette s.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a–64a. The complaint charge s that Philip Morris “manipulat[ed] the design” of its cig a rettes, and “employ[ed] techniques that” woul d cause its cigarettes “ t o register lower levels of tar andnicotine on[the Cambridge Filter Method] than would be delivered to the consumer s of the product.” Id. , a t63a–65a. The complaint adds that the Philip Morris ciga rettes deliv ered “greater amounts of tar and nicotine when smoked under actualconditions” than the a d jective “light” as usedin its advertising indi

cates. Id. , at 65a. In view of these and other related practices, the complai n t concludes that Philip Morri s’ behavior was “decepti ve and misleading” un der Arkans as law. Id. , at 64a, 66a. Philip Morris, referring to the federal offic e r removal statute, re moved the case to Fe deral Distric tCourt. T hat court, in turn, held that the statute authorized the re

moval. The court wrote that the complaint attacked Philip Morris’ use of the Governmen t ’s method of testing ciga

rettes. For this reason (and others), it held t hat the peti

tioners had sued Philip Morris for “act[s]” ta ken “under” the Federal Trade Commission, a federal agency (staff ed by federal “officer[s]”). The Distric tCourt cer t ified the question forinterlocu

tory review

. And the United Sta t es Court of Appeals for the EighthCircuit aff i rmed. Like the Distr i ct Court, i t emphasized the FT C’s detailed supervision of the ciga ret t e testing process. It also cite d lower court cases permitting3 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### removal byheavily su pervised G o vernment contractors. See 420 F. 3d 852, 857 (2005); Wi nters v. Diamond Sham

rock Chemi c al Co., 149 F. 3d 387 (CA5 1998) (authorizing removal of a tort suit against pri v ate defense contracto rs that manufactured Agent Orange )

. The Eigh th Circuit concluded that Philip Morris was “actin gun der” federa l “officer[s],” namely the FTC, w i th respect to the chal

lenged conduct. 420 F. 3d, at 854. We granted certiorari. 549 U. S. ___ (2007). And we now reverse the Eighth Ci rcuit’s de termination. II The federal statute permits removal only if Philip Mor

ris, in carr ying out th e “act[s]” th at are the subject of th e petitioners’ complaint, was “ac t ingunder” any“agency” o r “officer” of “the Unite dSta t es.” 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1). The words “acting under” are b r oad, and this Court has made clear that the s t a t ute must b e “liberally construed.” Colorado v. Symes , 286 U. S. 510, 517 (1932); see Arizona v. Manypenny , 451 U. S. 232, 242 (1981); Willingham v. Morgan , 39 5 U. S. 402, 406–407 (1969). But broad lan

guage is not limitless. And a liber al construction non e the

less canfin dlimits in a text’s language, context, history, and purposes. Beginning with history, we note that Con gress enacted the originalfederal off i cer removal statute ne ar the end of the War of 1812, a war that was not popular i nNew Eng

land. See id

. , at 405. Indeed, shi p owners from that region filed many state-court claims against federal customs officials charged withenfo rcing a trade embargo wi th England. See Wiece k , The Reconstructio nof Federal Judicial Power, 1863–1875, 13 Am. J. Legal Hist. 333, 337 (1969). Congress responded with a provision that permit

ted federal customs officers and “ any other p erson aidin g or assi stin g

” those officers to rem o ve a case filed against them “in any state cour t” to federal court. Cus t oms Act o f4 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### 1815, ch. 31, §8, 3 Stat. 198 (emphasis added). This initia l removal statute was “[o]bviously .

. . an attem p t to p r otec t federal officers from interferen ce by hostile state courts.” Willingh am , 395 U. S., at 405. In the earl y 1830’s, South Carolina passed a Nullifica

tion Act de claring federal tariff la ws unconstitutional and authorizing prosecution of the federal agents who collected the tariffs. See ibid. C o ngress then enacted anew sta t ut e that permit ted “any officer of the United Stat es, or ot her person” to r e move to federal co urt a lawsuit fi led against the officer “for or on account of any act done under the revenue laws of the United State s .” Act of Mar. 2, 183 3, ch. 57, §3, 4 Sta t . 6 33 (emphasis added). As Sena tor Daniel Webster explained at the time, where state courts might prov e hostile to federal law, and hence to those who enforced th at law, th e removal statute would “give a chance to the [federal] officer to d e fend hims elf where t h e authority of the law was recognised.” 9 Cong. Deb. 461 (1833). Soon after the Civil War, Congress enacted yet another officer removal statut e, permitting remova l of a sui t against any revenue officer “o n account of any act do ne under color of his office” by the r e venue officer and “ an y person acti ng under or by authority of any such officer. ” Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, §67, 14 Stat. 171 (emphasis added). Elsewhere the statute restrictedthese latter persons to those eng a ged in acts “for the collection of taxes.” §67, id., at 172. In 1948, C o ngress again revised the statute, dropping its limitation to the rev e nue context. An d it i n cluded the rewritten s t atute withi nits 1948 recodification. See Act of June 25, 19 48, ch. 646, §1442(a), 6 2 Stat. 938, 28 U. S. C. §1442(a). It is this version of the statute that, with the exception of a modific a tion in response to t h is Court’s decision in Interna t ional Prima t e Protection Leagu ev. Administr a tors of Tula ne Ed. Fun d , 500 U. S. 72 (1991), is5 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### now before us. Whil e Congre ss expanded the statute’ s coverage to include all federa l officers, it nowhere indi

cated anyi n tent to ch ange the s c ope of wo rds, sucha s “acting under,” that describe d the triggering relationship between a private entity and a federal officer. Turning to precedent, we point to three cases, all involv

ing illegal liquor, whichhelp to illustrate the n eed for, and the workings of, the pre-1948 removal statutes. In 1878, a federal revenue officer, James Davis, raided an illeg a l distillery inTenness ee; was ambu shed by several armed men; returned the am bushers’ gu nfire; and s h ot one of his attack ers dead. See T e nnesse ev. Davis , 100 U. S. 257, 2 61 (1880). Tennessee ind i cted Davis for murder. The Court held that t h e statute permitted Davis to re move the case to federal c o urt, reasoning that t h e Federal Government “can act only throughits officers and agents, and the y must act w i thin the S t ates.” Id. , at 263. Removal, the Court foun d, would h e lp to prev ent hostile States f r om “paralyz[in g]” the Federal Gove rnment and its initiatives

. Ibid. About the same time, a U. S. Ar mycorporal (also called Davis, Lemuel Davis) along with several other soldier s helped a federal revenue office r try to arrest a distiller for violating the internal-revenue laws. The soldiers su r rounded th e house; th e distiller escaped thro ugh a hole in a side wall; Corporal Davis shot the suspect; and South Carolina indicted Davi s for mu rd er. Da vis removed th e case, and t h is Court u p held the r e moval. The Court a c knowledged that, altho u gh Da vis was not a revenue offi

cer, he was a person “who lawfully assist[ed]” a revenue officer “in t h e performance of his official duty.” Davisv. South Caro lina , 107 U. S. 597, 600 (1883). In the 1920’s, Marylan dcharged a group of prohibition agents and a private person acting as their driver with a murder co mmitted du ring a distil lery raid. See Maryland v. Soper, 2 70 U. S. 9 (1926). The prohibitionagents and6 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### their drive rsought to remove the state murder trial t o federal court. This Court ultimately rejected their re

moval efforts for reaso n s not re levant here. But in doin g so it point e d out that the private person acting “as a chauffeur a n d helper to the four officers under their orders and .

. . direction” had “the same right to th e benefit of” the removal provision as did the federal agents. Id. , at 30. Apart from demonstrating the da ngers associated with working in the illegal alcoho l bus in ess, thes e t h ree cases— Tennesseev. Davi s , Davisv. South Carolina , andMary

land v. Sop e r —illustra te that the removal statute’s “basic” purpose is to protect the Fe deral Government from the interference with its “operations” that would ensue were a State able, for example, to “a rres[t]” and bring “to trial in a State cou r [t] for an a lleged offen s e against the law of th e State,” “offi cers and agents” of the Federal Government “acting

. . . within the scope of th eir authority.” Willingham , 395 U. S., at 406 (internal qu otation marks omitted). See also ibid. (noting that the “purpose” of the statute “is not hard to discern”). State-cour t proceedings may reflect “local preju d ice” again s t unpop ular federal laws or federal officials. So p e r , supr a , at 32; see Manypenny , 451 U. S., at 242 (noting that removal permits trials to occur free from “local .

. . prejudice”). In addition, States hostile to the Federal Government may impe de through delay federal revenue collection or t h e enforce ment of other federal law. See Tenne s seev. Dav i s , sup ra, at 263; cf. Findleyv. Satterfi e ld , 9 F. Cas. 67 , 68 (No. 4,792) (CC ND Ga. 1877 ). And States may deprive federal off i cials of a federal forum in which to assert federal immunity defenses. See Inter

national Pr imate Pro t ection Lea g ue, supra, at 86–87; Willingh am , supra, at 407 (“[O]ne of the most important reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of official immunity tri ed in a federal court” ); Jefferso n Countyv. Acker , 527 U. S. 423, 447 (1999 ) (S CALIA 

### , J., concurring i npart and dissenting in part) (noting that “th e7 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### main point” of the federal officer removal statute “is to give officers a federal forum in whi c h to litigat e the merits of immunit ydefenses”). Where a private person acts as an assistant to a federal official in h e lping that officialto enforce federal law, some of these sa me considerations may apply. Regardless, i n Davis v. So uth Carolin athe Courtwrote that the removal statute applies to private pers ons “w ho lawfully assist” the federal officer “in the performan c e of his official duty. ” 107 U. S., at 600. An d in Ci ty of Gr een woodv. Pea c ock, 384 U. S. 8 08, 824 (19 66), in interpretinga related re

moval provision, the Court repeated that the statute authorized removal bypriva t e pa rties “only” if theywe re “authorized to act withor for [federal officers or agents] i n affirmatively executing duties under .

. . federal law.” All the Court’s relevant post- 1948 federal officer removal cases that we have found reflect or are consistent with th is Court’s pre-1948 views. See M esav. Californi a , 489 U. S. 121 (1989); Manypenn y , supra; Willingh am , supra; Pea

cock , supra . III With this history and precedent in mind, we return to the statute’s language. The re levant relationship is that of a private person “ actin g

und er” a feder a l “officer” or “agency.” 28 U. S. C. §1442(a)(1 ) (emphasis added). In this context , the word “ under” mus trefer to w hat has been described as a relationship t hat involves “acting in a cer

tain capacit y , considered in re lation to one holding a supe

rior position or office.” 18Oxford English Dictionary 948 (2d ed. 1989). That rel a tionship typically involves “subjec

tion, guidance, or control.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 2765 (2d ed. 1953). See also Funk & Wagnalls New Stan dard Dictionary of the English Language 2604 (1942) (defining “under” as meaning “[s]u b ordinate or subservient to,” “[s]ubj ect to guida n ce, tutors hip, or direc

-8 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### tion of”); 18 Oxford English Di ctionary, supra, at 9 49 (“[s]ubject t o the instruction, direct ion, or guidance of”). In addition, precedent and statutory purpose make clear that the private person’s “acting under” must involve an effort to assist , ort o help c a rry out, the duties or task s of the federal superior. See, e.g. , Davisv. South Carolina , supra, at 600; see also supra , at 5–7. In our view, the help or assistance necessary to bring a private person withinthe scope of the stat ute does no t include simply complyi n g

withthe law. We re cognize tha t sometimes an English speaker m i ght sayth at one who complies with the law“helps” or“assists” g o vernmental law enforcement. Taxpayers who fill out complex federal tax forms, a i rline passengers who o b ey federal regulations prohibiting smoking, for thatmatt er well-behaved federal prisoners, all “help” or “assist” f e deral law enforcement authorities in some sense of those words. B u t thatis n o t the sense of “help” o r“assi st” that canbri n g a priva t e action with in the scope of this statute. Tha tis in parta matter of language. One would usually des cribe the be

havior of the taxpayers , air line pa ssengers, and prisoners we have de scribed as compliance with the la w (or acquies

cence to anorder), notas “acting under” a fe deral official who is giving an order or enforcing the law. It is also in part a matter of the history and the precedent we have discussed. See supra , at 3–7. Finally, it is a matter of statutory purpose. When a company s ubject to aregulatoryorder (ev e n a highly complex order) complies with the order, it d oes not ordi

narily creat e a significant risk of state-court “prejudice.” Cf. Soper , 2 70 U. S., at 32; Manypenny , supra , at 241–242. Nor is a st ate-court lawsuit brought against such a com

pany likely to disable federal offic i als from t a king neces

sary ac tion designed to enforce fed e ral law. C f

. Tenn ess ee v. Davis , 1 00 U. S., at 262–263. Nor is suc ha lawsui t likely to de ny a federa l forum to an individual entitled to9 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### assert a fed e ral claim of immunity. See, e. g. , Willingh am , 395 U. S. , at 407. The upshot is that ahighly re gulated firm ca nnot find a statutory b a sis for removal in the fact of federal regulation alone. A private firm’ s compliance (or noncomplian c e) with federal laws, rules, and regulations does not by itself fall within t h e scope of the statutory phrase “acting under” a federal “official.” And that is so even if the regulation is highly detailed and even if the priv ate firm’s a ctivities are highly supervised and monito red. A contrar ydetermina

tion would expand the scope of the statute considerably, potentially bringing wi thin its scope state-court actions filed agains t private firms in ma ny highly regulated in

dustries. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fu ngicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U. S. C. §136a (2000 ed. an d Supp. IV) (mandating disclosure of testing results in the context of pesticide registration). Neither la nguage, nor history, nor purpose lead us to b e lieve that Congress intended any such expansion. IV Philip Morris advances two important arguments to the contrar y . First, it points ou t tha tlower cou rts have held that Go ver n ment cont ractors fall within the terms of th e federal offic e r removal statute, at least when the relation

ship between the contractor andthe Government is an unusually close one inv o lving detailed regulation, monitor

ing, or supe rvision. Se e, e.g., Winters, 149 F. 3d 387. An d it asks wh y, if close supervision is sufficient to turn a private contractorinto a pri v ate firm “a cti ng under” a Government “agency” or “office r,” does it notdo the same when a company is subjected to intense regulation. The answer to this q u estion lies in the fac tthat the private con tractor in such cases is helpingthe Govern

ment to produce an item thatit needs. The assistance that priva t e contracto rs provide federal officers goes be

-10 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### yond simple compliance with the law and h e lps officers fulfill other basic governmental tasks. In t h e context of Winters , for example, Dow Chemi c al fulfilledthe terms of a contractu al agreement by prov iding the Governmen t with a prod uct that it used to help conduct awar. More

over, at least arguably, Dow perfo r med a job that, in the absence of a contract with a pri v ate firm, th e Government itself would have had to perform. These circu mstances distinguish W i nters from this case. For present purposes t hat distinct ion is suffic i ent. And we need not further examine here (a case where private con tractin gis not at issue) whether and when particular circumstan c es may en able privat e contrac t ors to invo ke the statute. Second, Philip Morris argues that its activities at issu e here did not consist simply of co mpliance w i th regulato ry laws, rules, and orders. It contends that the FTC, after initially tes t ing cigarettes for tar and nicotine, “ delegated authority” f o r that tas kto an industry-fina nced testin g laboratory in 1987. E.g

. , Brief fo r Responde nts 31 (em

phasis added). And Philip Morris asserts that (along with other cigarette companies) itwas acting pursuant to that delegation. It adds tha tever since this initial “delegation” the FTC has “extensive[ly] .

. . supervis[ed]” and “closely monitored” the manner in wh ich the laboratory tests cigarettes. Id. , at 37, 30, 39. Philip Morris co ncludes that, given all these circumstances, just as Dow was “ac t ing under” offi cers of the Depar t ment of Defense when it manufactured Agent Orange, see Winters , su pra, at 399 , so Philip Morris is “acting under” officers of t h e FTC wh en it conducts cigarette t e sting. See Brief for Respondents 38. For argume nt’ s sak e we shall overlookthe fact that the petitioners appear to challenge the way in which Philip Morris “des igned” its ci gare ttes , not the wayin whichit (o r the industry laboratory) condu cte d cigarette testing. We11 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### also shall assume the following testing-related facts that Philip Morris sets forth in its brief: (1) In the 1 950’s, the FTC ordered tobacco companies to stop advertising the amount of t a r and nicotine con

tained in their cigarett es. See id., at 3. (2) In 1966 , the FTC altered course. It permitted cigarette c o mpanies to advertise “tar and nicotine yields” provided that the company had substantiated its statement through use of th e Cambridge Filter Method, a testing method developed by Dr. Cl yde Og g, a Departme n t of Agricu lture employee. Id. , at 4–5. (3) The Cambridge Filter Method uses “a smok ing machine that ta kes a 3 5 milliliter puff of two seconds’ duration on a cigarette every 60 seconds until the cigarette is smoked to a specified b u tt length.” FTC v. Brown & William s on Tobacco Corp. , 778 F. 2d 35, 37 (CADC 1985). It thenmeasures the amount of tar and nicotin e that is delivered. Th at data, in turn, de

termine whether a cigarette ma y be labeled as “light.” This method, Dr. Ogg has testifi e d, “will not tell a smoker how much tar and nicotine he will get from any given cigarette,” but it “will i n dicate” whether a smoker “wi ll get more from one than from another cigarette if there is asignificantdifference between the two and if he smok es the two in the same man

ner.” Brief for Respo n dents 5–6 (internal quotation marks omit ted). (4) In 1967, the FTC b e gan to use its own laboratory to perform these tests. See id. , at 6. And the Cam

bridge Filter Method began to be referred to as “the ‘FTC Metho d .’ ” Id. , at 4. (5) The FTC publishedthe testingresults per i odically and sent th e results annually to Congress. Se e id. , a t 7. (6) Due to cost considerations, the FTC stop ped test

-12 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ing cigarettes for tar a n d nicotine in 1987. Simulta

neously, th e tobacco i n dustry ass u med responsibility for cigarette testing, runni ng the tests acco rding to FTC specifi c ations and permitting the FTC to monitor the process closely. See ibid. (7) The FT C continues to publish the testing results and to send them to Congress. See ibid. (8) The tobacco industry has followed the F T C’s re

quirement that ci garette manufacturers discl o se (and make claims about) tar and nicotine content based ex

clusively on the results of this testi n g. See id. , at 8–9. Assuming this timelin e, Philip Morris’ argu ment none

theless con t ains a fatal flaw—a flaw of omission. Al

though Philip Morris uses the word “delegation” or varia

tions many times throughout its brief, we have found no evidence of any delegation of legal authority from the FTC to the industry association to undertake testing on the Government agency’ s behalf. Nor is there evidence of an y contract, a n y paymen t, any employer/employee relation

ship, or any principal/agent arrangement. We have examined all of the docu ments to which Philip Morris and certain sup p orting ami c irefer. So me of those documents refer to cig a rette te sting specifications, other s refer to the FTC’s inspe ction and s u pervision of the indus

try laborato ry’s testing, and still ot hers refer to the FTC’s prohibition of statem ents in cig a rette adve rtising. B u t none of th ese documents establ ish the type of formal delegation that might authorize Philip Morris to remove the case. Several former FTC officials, for example, filed an amicus b r ief in which they state that “[i]n 19 8[7] the FTC delegated t e sting resp onsibility t o the priv ate Tobacc o Industry Te sting Lab (t he ‘TITL’).” Brief for F o rmer Com

missioners and Senior Staff of the FTC 11. But in support of this proposition the brief cites a single source, a lett er13 Cite as: 55 1 U

. S. ____ (2007) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### from the ci garette ma nufacturers ’ law y er to an FTC offi

cial. That letter states: “[M]ajor United State s cigarette manufacturers, who are responsible for the TITL’ s operations and on whose beh a lf we are writing, do not bel i eve that Commissio noversight is needed . .

. . Nevertheless, a s an accomm odation and in the spiri tof coopera t ion, the manufacturers are prepared to permit Commission employees t o monitor the TITL testing program .

. . .” Letter fro m John P. Rupp to Judith P. Wilkenfeld (June 30, 1987), onli ne at http://tobaccodocuments. org/nysa_ti_s1/TI5790 0738.html (as visited June 7 , 2007, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Nothing in this letter refers to a delegation of authority. And neither Congress nor federa l agencies normally dele

gate legal a u thority to private entities without saying that they are doing so. Without evidence of some such special relationship, Philip Morris’ analogy to Gove rnment contracting breaks down. We are left w i th the FT C’s detailed rules abou t advertising, specifications for testi n g, require ments about reporting results, and the like. This sounds to us like regulation, not delegation. If thereis a differe nce between this kind o f regulation and, say, that of Food and Drug Administra tion regulation of prescription drug marketin g and adverti sing (whichalso involve testing requirements), see Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala , 158 F. 3d 1313, 131 6 (CADC 1998), that difference is on e of degree, not k i nd. As we ha v e pointed out, howev e r, differences in the degree of regulatory de tail or supervision cannot by them

selves trans form Philip Morris’ regulatory complianceinto the kind of assistance that might bring the FTC within the scope of the statutory phrase “ acting under” a federa l “officer.” Sup ra , at 8. And, thou gh we find considerable regulatory detail and supervision, we can find nothing14 WATSON v. PHILIP M O RRIS COS. Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that wa rra nts treating the FTC/Philip Morris relationshi p as distinct from the usual re gulator/regulat e d relation

ship. This relationshi p , as we have explained, cannot be construed a s bringing Philip Morris within the terms of the statute. For these reasons, the judgment of the EighthCircuit is reversed, a n d the case is remanded for fu rthe rproceedin gs consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red.