Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111902 

February 6, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: JCS Paper 2150/284-1, "Program Concept"(for Assuming 

Responsibility for TAGBOARD] 

On 4 February, the attached JCS paper was referred to us for 

coordination by a member of the Air Staff. We recognized at once 

that we were going to have serious problems with the paper, since 

it outlined a total assumption of TAGBOARD by the JCS. 

Ever since the beginning of the NRO, we have failed to form a 

clear concept of just how our aircraft reconnaissance is to be conducted when the operator is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our charter 

spells out NRO responsbilities clearly: we are to be the federal 

manager of any operation involving overflight of denied areas. In 

practice, however, we have permitted the JCS to move closer and 

closer to a complete takeover of all assets we furnish to them. The 

Cuban episode, of October 1962, was the beginning of an odd arrangement between the NRO and JCS. Thus, when SAC flies U-2 aircraft 

over Cuba, the operation is conducted without a clear understanding 

of JCS and NRO roles. Vietnam hostilities have confused the situation 

even more; the JCS operates U-2 aircraft and drones in that theater, 

and occasionally in areas contiguous to that theater, without a clear 

definition of JCS and NRO responsibilities. 

The NRO Staff members have believed for some time that they 

should clarify relationships with the JCS. The best resolution seems 

to be one in which there is an understanding that the JCS has total responsibility for all peripheral overflights and for all flights in a theater 

of conflict. The NRO, on the other hand, should have management 

responsibility for all flights of bona fide denied territory. Since the 

NRO is not capable of exercising operational responsibility (this would 

require an Aircraft Operations Center equivalent to our Satellite Operations Center), it is sound pragmatism to delegate operational responsibility to the JCS. 

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4 
We have edited the JCS paper to reflect this distinction, our 

comments taking the form of strikeovers and add-ons. Every change 

on the attached paper is a change proposed by the NRO Staff. 

During the afternoon of 4 February, General Berg persuaded 

General Steakley to have the JCS paper withdrawn from scheduled 

consideration on 5 February. During the morning of 5 February, 

General Berg and I met with General Steakley and Captain Stuart to 

discuss our proposed changes. General Steakley accepted all of the 

changes except for a paragraph in which we specify the DNRO as the 

person who will obtain approval for TAGBOARD missions. General 

Steakley indicated that this change would cause heated debate in the 

JCS. He said that by "higher authority, 11 in his text, he had specifically meant the DNRO. He assured us that if we allowed his original 

sentence to stand, he would adhere to the letter of our present approval arrangement. When General Berg pointed out that both he and 

General Steakley would be gone "one of these days, " and the next 

participants might not know about this arrangement, General Steakley 

advised him that upon such occasion the new principals would have a 

heavy backlog of precedent to guide them. 

On the afternoon of 5 February, General Steakley called me to 

his office to review a new draft and I found it to be exactly in accordance with the agreements he had made with General Berg that morning. 

I believe that these innocent-looking changes are an important 

milestone in NRO aircraft reconnaissance policy. Now, for the first 

time, we have a formal statement of roles for the JCS and the NRO, 

built around the definition of "management responsibility" and 

"operational responsibility. 11 

~ 

PAUL ~WORTHMAN 

Colonel, USAF 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05111902