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J,fi1'( NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

IVASHINGTON, D.C. 

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TH2 NRO STAFF 18 MAR 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BERG 

SUBJECT: NRO Responsibilities for NRP Air Vehicle Reconnaissance 

Projects 

Problem. 

'Ihis memorandum is responsive to your memorandum to Colonel 

Sweeney of 28 August 1968 and is addressed to two problem areas: 

a, The de facto division of management and operational 

contl·ol of aircraft and drone overflight reconnaissance activities which 

now exists between the DNRO and the JCS/JRC, and 

b, The question. of how best to exercise the DNR01 s overall 

supervisory responsibilities for these activities through the NRO Staff 

mechanism. 

Backaround. 

The DNRO's basic authority and responsibility for management 

and control of all overflight activities are clearly stated in DOD Directive 

5103,23, March 1964, and in the DOD/CIA Agreement of August 1965. 

DOD Directive 5105. 23 (Tab A) assigns the DNRO responsibility 

for the "consolidation of all DOD satellite and air vehicle over:flignt projects for intelligence, geodesy and mapping photography and electronic 

signal collection into a single program, defined as the (TS} National 

Reconnaissance Program, and £or the comulete management·and conduct 

of this Program in accordance with policy guidance and decisions of the 

Secretary of Defense, 11 (Underscoring supplied,} He is fu1·ther told to 

"establish appropriate interfaces between the (S) National Reconnaissance 

Office and the USIB, the JCS, the DIA, and the NSA." Further, he is 

specifically delegated authority to assist the Secretary of Defense in the 

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~ 

Tab C describes a proposal advanced by the DNRO (Dr, McMillan) 

in 1963, which, in essence, would have placed in the JRC the responsibility £or ~upervising NRO aircraft operations and the NRO Satellite 

Operations Center. This met opposition from CIA and, after several 

attempts during June, July, and August 1963 to obtain DOD/CIA agreement on setting up an NRO/ JRC aircraft operational center, the action 

was abandoned, 

The JRC Director's responsibilities for military aerial reconnaissance were discussed in February and March 1968 in two memoranda 

signed by Mr, Nitze and addressed to the Chairman, JCS; Director, NRO; 

Director, DIA; and Director, NSA. The key provisions of these memoranda 

(Tabs D and E) were Mr, Nit:.1e 1s (a:o.d Mr, Mc:N'amara 1 s): 

a. Decision that the JCS will maintain cognizance and control over all military aerial, surface {land and sea), and submarine 

reconnaissance operations, 

b, Request tnat the forecast oi reco=aissance operations 

conducted under the overall direction of the DNRO be transmitted to the 

303 Committee in the JCS forecast binder. (However, it was made clear 

by the Deputy Secretary of Defense 1s Office that this was intended to be 

a courier service only and not intended to altei· the DNR01 s authority for 

NRP overflights and their approval by the 303 Committee, 

c, Request that the JCS prepare appropriate management 

directives to govern the conduct of all r;:1ilitary aerial, surface, and submarine reconnaissance operations, including JCS responsibilities for 

advising and seeking the approval of higher authority in all military 

reconnaissance operations of a sensitive or potentially sensitive nature. 

Discussion, 

The two memoranda referred to above (Tabs D and E) clearly are 

intended to strengthen JCS control over military reconnaissance operations 

of all types, It is probably no coincidence that they followed closely on 

the lieizini of the':Pueblo". ! do not read inrn them an interpretation that 

the DNRO is not ultimately responsible:, for managing and conducting the 

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supervision of aircraft, drone and satellite reconnaissance, 1napping and 

geodetic matters, includinrr both photographic and electronic signal projects, and be his direct representative on those matters both within and 

outside the Department of Deiense," (Underscoring supplie9-.) 

The DOD/CIA Agreement (Tab B) recnforces the DNRO 1s charter, 

making him responsible "for the development, management, control, and. 

operation 0£ all projects, both current and long range, £or the collection 

of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through 

overfiightll (excluding peripheral re'-'onnaissance operations), 11 EXCOM 

is told to "asi;ign operational responsibility for various types of manned 

overflight missions to CIA or DOD subject to the concurrence of the 303 

Committee. 11 Drones are not specially mentioned, whether by accident 

or choice, However, the DOD Directive refers to "all, •• air vehicle 

overflight projects" (which would unquestionably include drone projects) 

as being within the NRP. (Underscoring supplied,) 

While DNRO thus very clearly has been assigned the responsibility 

for all overilights, inclu<iing air vehicles, his control over air vehicle 

overflights of de11ied territory is now a1nbiguous, particularly where JRC 

aircraft and drone ope:-ations are concerned, 

The erosion of the DNRO control over JRC aircrait and 147 and 

154 drone overflights has come about gradually over the iast six years 

during periods of international crisis when aircraft reco~naissancB w;;s 

~and low-level Cuban ovc:::ilights and_ I 

~were the first examples of "delegation" of DNRO 

operational authority to the JRC. These transfers of operationa: authority 

were tacit, and were done informally cumentation can be fo _tQ...___,...,__ 

-1he.s~-!.~~sfe!s o~.....".:-.ui:ho __ management agree 

TAGBOARD drone assign~ ~RS operational control of this 

set, management control invested in the DNRO ,-.~•-- ·-·"· ······· .................. -~·----

Approval for JRC overflight missior,s is solicited from the 30 3 

Committee in the NRO Monthly Forecast and also separately by the JRC 

in ite monthly forecast of military aerial, surface, and subm,.rine reconnaiiuance operations. As the latter forecast goes from the JRC direct to 

the 303 Comniittee and 303 Com1nittee approvali;, in turn, go direct to the 

JRC, the NRO Sta.ff finds itself at a disadvantage in 303 Committee staff 

actions related to JRC-operated overflight activities, 

~.-.•ou i,u Inte:::-nal 

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NRP, however, regardies,; of whether DOD or CIA air vehicle assets are 

employed, The fact that DOD air vehicle assets collect against both military and national (COMIREX/USIB) targets, and the fact that these targets 

are often identical, obviously blu1·s the issue somewhat. The SR-71 covert 

overflights of North Vietnam, like the OXCART A-12 overflights, are 

responsive to theater req,lirements £or military intelligence. Nevertheless, 

the implementation o! this overflight program was directed by the highest 

national authority for clearly national objectives. These objectives are 

stated in COMIREX documents--COMOR D-25/220 of 23 May 1967, rcvi!ed 

by COMIREX D-25, 3/2, dated 20 November 1967; and COMOR D-25/207, 

dated 4 March 1966, They include a search £or evidence of the possible 

introduction of offensive missiles and other new weapon systems into North 

Vfotnam and provide for the coverage of North Vietna.me11e milita.:::y insta> 

lation.s and lines of communications. 

Another pertinent example is provided by GLASS LAMP U-2 mission.s over Cuba which are responsive to national targeting priorities 

established by USIB, They fly over a denied area>:, and arc the responsibility 

of the DNRO, 

Further, the "forecast of reconnaissance operations conducted ur.der 

the overall direction of the Director, NRO", referred to in Mr. Nitze's 

memorandum of 3 February 1968 (Tab D), includes the air vehicle programs 

0£ the JRC which are involved in overflight missions. A copy of the March 

1969 NRO Monthly Forecast and a copy of the JRC input to this forecast are 

included as Tabs F and G. As they specifically include GIANT SCALE 

(SR-71), GLASS LAMP (U-2), GIAL~T DRAGON (U-2), and BUMPY ACTION 

(Drone) missions carried out under the ope rational control ot'. the JCS/ JRC, 

it would seem clear that Mr. Nitze 1s memorandum affirms, at least implicitly, the DNR01s overall management re:opon:;ibihty for these programti. 

Our Staff problem is that the :::)ircctor, JRC, does not appear to similarly 

interpret the DNRO 1s overall supervisory a'J.thority in this area, 

The remainder of this paper discusses in some detail the current 

status of our relationships with the JRC, CIA/ OSA, and COMIREX regarding 

aircraft and drone operation:;. F.:..rther, it offor.i for your consideration 

recommendations for a course 0£ action we should attempt to carry out in 

,:<DCID No. 1/13 defines denied area a;;: "all territo1·y and territorial watert1 

claimed by Communist nations, as well as such other areas of priority intelligence interest as may be det.:!rmined by t;SIB," 

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executed w:th- lit:ie or no d:s:u;)t:..0:1 ta cu.r:te::1.t J~-<.C and O~A o~Jerat:ion-~11 

proce-rlurcs fox cor.Ldu.c:ir .. g ai:· ,.,eehi.::L:~- :~rojt_c_:c::s} bu: ~,s/oi.llCL ::::e\~e1~tL.ele2s., 

pruvide us the 3ufficie:::t datz. do a rr~o::e e:ff(:Ctiv.~ Stafi j-)b ::his ~.:u·e-;i. 

l'C!spr.,n .. ~bilit:_,~ io:~ :J 0\l'Cr£~igL: i:,1;cg::.:·a:.--.c._s --'-·:.::_·:c.cd. ;1.,t ac::c:i;::vcn:..e~·:.t u,:.· ::>~:I<:? 

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cont:;:o~ ov;.; r ;lJa cc::·lc{uct .:;i ~hese o:.:,r.; 1/atior ..i ~ Il"~e o:r1l \~ 

eie,nen:. of direct control i, t,1z.t the DL·ect.:i:r, JRC, a,ieit grud~ingly, 

s·1bm:.ts to :he :-)NRO his rr:od:tly fore,cast 1£ n-,iiit:s.ry cd:·cl'aft ar,d d:•o.1e 

00-c-rations ·,,,,,rhic:h req·TL.~e app:'.:"'c,v-~.1 c"'.f t:-:e 3 C,::,-mr:'"li-;;tt::e A-: t'.1e p:~(:s,~n"·; 

tirr.,c) t>.csc i:1C1..'cJ.dc l': ?. ,/::_'.),:~y;::·bor O'\."","', C 1b,'t; l.~Lc,:;, ;;,TJ.C'! c::r, 

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:('(:)l'~j_(.:l,tt,to b,;:i-01·e S\;Orc1.i;~t:_ri,.s t'~.;l-~---"(l. t:.:i th\~' :3.:; c.:;0:.::r::;1xl.tt:,2,:t:::, b, __ t; ;_~l-:..:t-J 

ha..-.s r;.o-t occurred... ln ic...c;1 th_e D1rc.c-::o.:."', i{C, has on at ieas_t os::.e occc,sic:;,'l 

cri:alle-nged t:he requirer.c1.ent t~·;.at he rr,..ust SL°t::E~:dt his :fore.:asts 

the NRO. ·'hat he does so new is t,1e re;;u·. of a treaty wo~·kecl out abcut 

t"-..VO ;re2-rs 2gc .. Ho\T..rcvs;:;r 1 

t:lc 303 Comn:"J.:tt-2~e) i::r.-:~:c· 

2-lvt:S 3C3 C:..:lr;tll-r:i~_t:::,2 a.:-/p·, .. ::.•.~ -,:·t 

11isa1.~, he a~n1.ost: cerb0,·:r1ly l·s.;.;,.,1.;;.h.:l~ L10 Xl~_;) :-llor .. th:y· 

as c1 1·eciunda.r;;.t and ~Ll"l<.:;c0;;: ;:;.;a1' / .;;;,tc.p,. 

Anc:her problern area, D: -::;1•cbz,bcy mo:·e ir:-,portance tha11 t:1at 

d .. ~sc:tibeC~ above, i3 thot :he I-..fFz.C, l:~:ts i:o :;'c,~~r~1.a- :ncc-ha~1isrn. :o::.~ 1-,::c;.:pin~ 

2,_7.:_'.:-:rL~ea ir. M. T'ect.-1.-ti.n."H~ '\V8'." nf v.1'.1ar J.RC-c-,".'lr:t1~,J11er1 fH 

i .. 1-:1ce: ... v ... :-1y, ·Jr c-oYn:tlet-,23." :::::J_cci::~s o:~ :~~,.T;.tis ~ 

obt;:~:~nc(: 1J)'" pc'.t:.--::0:1;;1' ":·i:;1.":.'.s :;6 t>e JT~ .. C Ly· rr.,~r~""1l."2: 

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Approved for Release: 2020.'02/07 COS 114976 

i-:Jl' tLe Si..~J?--3l'Vi~iO.i: o·.:' ~-1v::;-~,_)Ail:J,'0Lt:::.::;. ,,vc;:;:.r~i:~s;~L-s ci~niec Le;_·1,:·i;.:o .. ::y.; ..,s, 

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exercirse: of r .... 1-a:aage:r:r:e:-:t aL:.:h;irit:r ~:;,nd -:::cntl:"ol oi s;_~c·:=1 over.fligi1t.s_, as 

the in:e::·:fa.ce \vi-::h U3l3iC,:)l---1IR:.::x rcq1c-:i":.·emcn:s i-o.r th.e .~ligl:ts er 

cith•-~r c;:>erc.,.tior._a.l r.;_1-acti:::rs 

::i:r:.g a ·('rr: :::,£ ::he ~;'JF_C, 

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iUl'·-2:C&&'' Qi, ;;iJ.(;_°J.. 

;.:,n,rerflifh::s is tn..1brr1itted ~or C◊r~11~~itte~: app:::_,o·:, . .-a__. 1 

Cor:c,rai:tee a;)p:cov .. i 1s, in ;;u:rr,, p:rovic,ed ~c tr.e D>JRC. a1ore v\·e:c·-

1.2...:,ts ou~ t}:.2 ;::,rc.poS<:.C r,.::~.--:::e -::h,:'. ta::.-,:.::ts ~-:, b,_; ccr-~c:-.2t:l:. 1 t;:-:d ,~o 1J::·.~ 

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Onlv t:1e DCI or n:s d.c,p_,ty cZL1 "P'::iro-.·e U-i peripher;,;.l rr_1s 5ior.s 

v.rhich ;z.,lso are schedul2d IJSI3 reot:.i:::-exn-ents.~ T:Ue prccedu.ret: 

for 

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DOD/CIA Agreement of August 1965. 'These clearly make the DNRO 

responsible £or conducting the interfaces with USIB in NRP matters and, 

further, specifically give him "authority to require that he be full) and 

completely informed by all Agm:.cies and Departments of the Government 

of all programs and activities undertaken as part of the NRP," (Emphasis 

added.) The charter is clear. The real question is whether the NRO can 

reassert management authority in the community in aircraft and drone 

activities in the face of the erosion of this authority that has occurred, 

particularly with respect to JRC-run operations. 

As the interface with OSA is reasonably good in operatim,al matters, it could be relatively easy for the NRO representatives to COMIREX 

and SORS to take over the spokesman function on OSA operational matters, 

assisted as needed by OSA personnel. This would need to be worked out 

with the Chairmen of COMIREX and SORS and the CIA members of these 

Committees. It should be done and it may not be too difficult politically. 

The same should be done for JRC airc1·ait and drone operations that are 

conducted as a part of the NRP, This, too, would neec to be worked ou;; 

with the Chairmen of CO~IREX and SORS and the DIA members. Such a 

propo3al would strike a more sensitive nerve, for :.t would inject the NRO 

into the middle of the JRC /DIA link, and well known JRC sensitivities 

would quickly, and, no doGbt, forcefully be made apparent. However, if 

a rea.sonable handle is to be achieved on NRP aircraft and drone 

operations by the NRO Staff, this action is important and should not be 

sidestapped. 

The NRO should carry out its charter to be the representative on 

all N RP matters in the community. This wLl carry with it foe necessity 

to be "fully and completely" informed on OSA and JRC activities. I 

believe this can be achieved reasonably easily wi;:h OSA. The JRC problem, experience shows, would be toughe1·, as JRC has been operating 

quite independently of the NRO for a lon6 '.:imc, However, if the NRO is 

to acquire even a limited management control of JRC operations conducted 

for the NRP, it must set up for:mal information and reporting procedures, 

adhered to by the JRC, which would provide sufficient information to 

allow the NRO Staff to be the focal point to provide an effective interface 

with the community on NRP aircraft and drone operational matters, As an 

illustration of the diapa.rity between the NRO rel11.tion11hip with COMIREX 

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0~1 <J.,1.:::- vehiclcs 1 o~JPD-E'3c 

COr.if:RTT):- {and p:rc:}:Jab1-~r .'~GR(;i 

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s,3e,ns ~o tall princ:.p2Jly :o S':i- 7 :'r:,r:-, a E~t,fLn,:; standpoint. 'L1c prcb~e:-.. , 

ma,"•/' originate at the -;;ro.grarr" oif~c-cj AiT' Sta,:'f,. or I)C)I)~ Ctn tl:e ot~7.cr 

h:.,nd:/ SS (Coit:)r,cl 1.) h:tS c.":·u tle ·;t_st-

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Steakley, In accordance with Mr. Nitze 1 s instn1ctions, copies of the 

Forecasts are delivered to JRC for transmittal to the 303 Committee 

members, The purpose of th.is procedure is to ensure that all fore 

casted reconnaissance activities, i.e., ;;;-RO, JRC aircraft, ships, 

and submarines, get to the 303 Committee simultaneously for review 

and approval. JRC has no authority to review or tinkei· with the NRO 

Forecast; they provide a messenger service only, 303 Committee 

action on the NRO Forecast is transmitted back to the NRO Staff (SS-5) 

and a copy provided the DDKRO. However, 303 Committee actions on 

the JRC forecast go direct to the JRC, not via the NRO. 

(2.) Operational Stu.dies. SS-5, for example, did a 

study in May 1968 of "The Employment of NRP Assets Against South 

China, 11 Another special study, done abo·..it a year ago for the Survey 

Applications Coordination Committee and for Dr. Steininger, PSAC, 

compared the costs per square mile of obtaining essentially cloud-free 

photography with the KH-4 system and the U-2.R. This, too, was done 

in SS-5, with a great deal o:C assistance from the SOC for data and 

methodology to cost out the KH-4 coverage. U-2 data used in the study 

was obtained mainly from Program D and OSA. 

(3) Assembling Data on OSA and JRC NRP Operations. 

This is essentially unsatisfactory, in that most data concerning aircraft 

and drone operations conducted as part of the NRP is obtained "after the 

£act." 

Information on OSA O})erations is fafr, as they 

routinely send messages to Program D and the SOC advising oi scheduled 

flights, the general area of intended operations, and mission cancellaiions 

or slippages, These messages do not provide information on intended 

targets, however, and post-ilight data on results accomplished are 

obtained informally by telephone from NPIC, and on occasion from postmission summaries in COMTREX documents. 

The situation with respect to JRC operations is 

significantly worse. There are no messages received irom JRC concerning 

their opera.tiona, Such information as is obtained is solicited by perlional 

viaits to the JRC by the Director, SOC, and it is an understatement to say 

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that the JRC response to this arrangement has been less than enthusiastic, JRC unquestionably rega.rd6 NRO requests for data. as an 

encroachment and theil· cooperation is, at best, grudgingly given. 

Possible Courses of. Action. 

The possible courses oi action are listed below: 

;;,; ; _,,,;,· ... \ 

(:Ohfll::O., ',UO:~t 

a. Establish an NRO Aircraft and Drone Operational 

Center. This would be the ideal solution from the NRO standpoint. IL 

would provide a focal point for NRO aircraft and drone operations 

similar to that now existing for satellite operations. Furthei·, it would 

enable the NRO to carry out iti charter as the re6ponsible agent for 

all NRP aircraft and drone operations. It would insert the NRO squarely 

into community tasking and control of actual overflight operations; 

provide the means to establish a data bank of coverage results, and, 

probably of no little importance, p~rmi: better correlation of satellite 

and air vehicle operations to satisfy USIB requirements. 

While an "ideal" solution, an NRO operations center 

for aircraft and drones is not a practical solution, JRC and OSA already 

provide this type of facility for their operations, and any attempt to 

establish an NRO center would be attacked strongly by the JRC and 

probably by the CIA, Further, with the gradual reduction in the importance of aircraft and di·one operations to satisfy USIB reconnaissance 

requirements, it would seem unnecessary to attempt such an ambitious 

undertaking, particularly in view of ti1e working space, p<!.rsonncl 

staffing, and budge1ary requirements it would spawn, and, especially, 

£or an around-the-clock operation. 

b. Use the JRC OpeTations Center as a Joint JF:C/NRO 

Center, This solution, which was proposed in 1963 and strongly opposed 

by the CIA at that time, would seem on th0 face o:f it to be a reasonable 

way to solve the NRO problem, as most of. the NRP aircraft and drone 

activity is now operated from the Joint Rcconnais6ancc Center. The 

history of JRC/NRO relations over the past several years, howeve1·, offo1·s 

little hope that such an arrangement would be more satisfactory than the 

cur1·ent situation. It woultl, in effect, promise to cornplete the erosion of 

DNRO control over NRP aircraft and drone activities that has already 

occurred. It would solidify the center of gravity over these activities in 

the JCS, whatever r.ame would be given to such an operations center. 

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Further, it is dubious, at best, that CIA would receive such 

a proposal with any more equanimity than they received the 1963 proposal, 

particularly in view of their recent loss of the OXCART Program. More 

over, it would introduce new security problems by mixing CIA 13YEMAN 

controlled operations with JCS non-BYEMAN operations, and would, in 

fact, cover the CIA civilian overflight capability with a military umbrella. 

c, Improve the SOC Gap bilit to Staff the Aircraft and Drone 

Operational Problem. This solution would have more limited and p:::-obably 

more realistic objectives designed to: 

(l) Gradually reassert DNRO management authority to 

at least a limited extent, in all NRP airc1·aft and drone operational matters, 

(2) Make the SOC the NRO Staff information focal point 

on N'RP aircraft and drone capabilities and operations to keep the Directo1·, 

NRO Staff and the DNRO informed and to maintain a requirements and 

coverage data base to enable comparison and correlation with satellite 

requirements and operations and for special studies and repo·.cts. More 

importantly, perhaps, this iciormation data base would permit the NRO 

Staff to study alternative approaches to special collection requirements of 

COMIREX and SORS involving aircraft and drones and make appropriate 

recommendations to the DNRO as to how best to satisfy them, 

(3) Make Director, SOC, and his designated representatives the official spokesmen for NRP aircraft and drone operational 

matters in COMIREX and SORS, This would further insure NRO Staff 

knowledgeability of NRP aircraft and drone activities and capabilities, and 

enable better utilization of KRP aircrait and drone assets. 

I believe approach (c) is both feasible and necessary, and that it 

would provide the NRO Staff with an adequate knowledge of NRP aircraft 

and drone capabilities and operations to enable it to carry out th3 spirit 

of the DNR01s charter in these matters, if not the precise letter. The JRC 

Director's grip on certain NRP aircraft and drone operations is too strong 

to wrest it back without a ma.jor--and prooably unnecessary--confrontat:.o:.:i. 

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Re commendation, 

Establish in the SOC a staff informationa: and operational focal 

point for all airc,raft and drone activities conducted within the NRP, 

Implement this recommendation through the following steps: 

a. Immediately obtain an additional person, preferably 

at foe Lt Colonel/ Colonel or GS-14/ 15 level to be the Special Assistant 

for Air Vehicle Operations to the Director, SOC. (See proposed job 

description at Tab H,) An attem;:,t should be made to get a qualified person from the Air Staff, .JRC, or OSA. I I Air 

S~~~s singularly capa.ble _for adminis enng hl.s func · on, 

b, Negotiate with the Director, JRC, to establish a genuine 

working interface and formal reporting mechanism so that JRC provides 

to the SOC their day-to-day schedule of intended missions, targets to 

be obtained and postflight reports of results. They should also provide 

vehicle inventory reports on a regular basis and reports and briefings 

as requested by the SOC on aircraft and drone technical characteristics 

and capabilities. 

c. Negotiate with the Director, OSA/CIA, to increase their 

formal reporting to the SOC to provide similar information on their activities, inventories, and vehicle technical cha.:racteristics and capabilitie6. 

d, Make SOC the responsible Staff element fol· preparing 

such special studies and :reports, as may be required, which arc principally concerned with aircraft and drone operational and coverage matters, including the study of alternative operational approaches to meet 

COMIREX and SORS requirernents, and to make recommendations on these 

matters to the DNRO, 

e, Establish and maintain an intelligence data base in foe 

SOC on aircraft and drone coverage of COMIREX and SORS requirements, 

similar to that done for satellite operations, 

£, Negotiate with the Chairmen, COMIREX and SORS, and 

the DIA and CIA members of those Committees, to establish the NRO 

representatives on those Conm:1ittees as foe community spokesmen for 

NRP ai:rcra£t and drone activities. 

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g. l:J:.J..c~ the .::'CSj-JOHs·~bili~y icx p:,.epa;;·i.t1g t.:10 1--.:-I(O }.,.Ivr:~Li} 

.F"c:.tecast i:1. the S-CC_, and .i.-~a1~ SC)\: be tl·;.c Sia:£ local po.i1:i::.: ior JO 

Co:::nrn1ttee it:edback a::::::d folL,w-up act~o:u; on ,,ii·craiL anti di·oae rnacters. 

h. Place the respO-ns::.b:li::y on SCC to be the reci~>ier,t of 

C>S.,\ 1'black book11 ov,2 rf1} g':-_t p1·cp-osa} s an-r; tn clo any r~~{'fr.1i 1.~e d 3taf{ ·,7.tc-::-k 

before they go to DNRG «rid ~hcc 303 Comrr:.ittee for apj,roval. 

Ccr ... te:1· 

Jf} 11~x1p_lu1·a~nL all rt.~cunur1e~J.t:.at:..o.::us \);.:iti:1 :he ,e:xce?tion. oi a_~ 

above :o achieve and acceptable resu'.ts within the ,-,ext 

lZ rr,onths. We can start by hav'.-..-i.e; the DKRO send the attached merncra:cdun,s r:•a:,s I a:1d J:, t;:, ,he Di,-ector, JR.C a:ci.d the DirectoT, CIA 

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0 ~ Q 

Ma·.::'ch 27, 196,: 

NUMDER TS 5105, 

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:·.--_.-.:;c Department o:f Defense Directive 

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7,i~No.tionol Roco.1naioo~co O£.Cico 

Ro:£0:renco (a):·· DoD Di::octivo TS 5105. Z3~, ~uhjqc~ i:,.a nbovo, 

. da.tod Juno l-1, 19 62 (irn:roby cancollod) . :,::: . . ;t 

J?urauant to tho a\:.fo.oi:i~y vested in tho Secrotary 0£ Do!onso 

and ~e proviaionD o: tho National Securit:(. Act of. 1947, ;;.o 

·amc:i):dcd, including tha Dopa.rtmont of Dc:fonao Roorganizatio::. 

of 1958, a.~National Rcco=aioaanco 0££icc is noroby. 

ostablished a!l = o;:>oi:a;ine age.:.cy of tho J:lapartment 0£ 

Defor.ao, undo.· foo ilir.octio:a. =d ouporvisfon. of. ~o 

of DefenlHl, ' ' 

Tho pr National Recon.nais sanco Offico will be o.:1;anized 

separa~ely within the Dcpa.::t:-:.1.cnt of Defonao under aJ;ir{' 

Dh-ector, National Rcco1:.:.~;;.:::;::;z.nco Oiiice, appoL:itcd by 

:·::: .. the Secretary oi De::enoc. 'i'i,o Diroctor wi!l be rooponsiblc. 

· ::: ;; for conaolidation of 2,ll De;,artr.;:;.ont oi Do:fonao aa.tolli::o 

· ;] t and air vehicle ov;;;;fligl-.t project;:; for intolligonco, 

.. :·.,/ :ruid mapping photography a.ad oloctronic A· 11 al col:cction 

,.'. }";°-into.' a single. 'pr.:ig:::am, dofinod ao fuo ) National Rocon-

·"'•'.i.naia sance ?rogrim, a.:.d io:: the comploto rn::magcmont arid 

\;,- conduct of this l?.:o;p:am in a.ccordancG with pol.icy !tuiu..w.t..o 

\i('a.::id .docis_ionil 0£ th.3 Soc;:cta.ry oi DcioMo,:.:::. · ,: · ·. 

~)}:: III.\ RELA TIO.NSHIPS ,1 \ .::r/::,: ·. , , ·. . · ;;'.:;; &. · I:i. ca.:rrying .. or..t hia rosponsibilitioa £or tho'.~ · · 

·,·, :·. :.'_ :i-ia:tiol'.laj. Roco=a~s1;a,.-'lco .:?ror;::am, th~jif ~i::oc.:or, 

.,Natiorui.l Rcc.onnaiooanco 0.uico oha.11;; .. i,""·" • ;,\': 

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Other autho~·ities 

Director, 

ta.ry of 

to thio directive. 

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S:£CURITY 

'A.,: 'l~ho ))J'J' D1:r-'octo1·,. N..1.tional Rccor~;l.rd:; ot ... io.co 0!1ico ,...-ill 

cot:i.blioh tho aoci:,rity 1:i~·occdm:cG to bo .followod fol' 

matt~ra oi. tho ~ Nation.~l Rocc;~ .. na.it.tit..nco -Prog.rar..1-., 

including ouitablo =claosificd n::.moo .:u:.tl !unctioao to 

protoct a:u· olomcn!a a£ tho ,Yi National .R.oco~aiuoanco 

0.£1".ioo, · 

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,All corrunu.:iica:;ior.s pel·taini..J.g to n)a!toi:s undo;. tho 

~":[a.tion.al Rocor..r..aiar.::.nco P:;:oar .. m will bo 1mbjcct ::o 

· opoci;il i;y.s~cmo of oocu:rity control undor th?-· cogdz:inco 

·of th<!. Di:::e;c:or, DefonGo I:::.tc:.lir;c:ico Agency, oxcc:,,t in , 

thooo ~ot.:-.ncco r;poci.fically oxcm:,tod by oithor )Bf Diroc~o;i:, 

·, National B.econna.issance Office or the Secrot:i.ry o.:'. Dc.ior..:;.:,. , ~:,. '" ~ " < .. With trie single exception. of this directive, no mon.tio:i. 

will bo made of the .~cllowi:lg titles or thei:.: a.bb::.·,:iviationo 

in an.y documeat wnich ia uo: co:itrolled undor tho a;,ccial 

5ecu.rity control ;;yijtem(s) refe::-red to in B, abovc:J,:iN!"( 

Na.tiona.1 Recoru:.. .. i.:;a...:..cu Program; ~Natioilal J.-1.,cc,o,=.i.i,1, 

.. ·Oi!ice. Whero ;.'::);;olutoly :1CC0663.l'Y to :re.for to tho rrs, 

; National Rcccnr.-.2..iccaLca Pi1 orrxz..rn in. con.11-r1~cd-~iouc. ;iot 

trolled under.tho p:rosc:.·ibod opecfal soe·.,.:.-ity. oy!lt,:;rru;, Gu.Cb. 

· re!erence will bo m.::.c.o by u:;e 0£ foo terminology: 

under tho purview o{ · · · · 

hi£> Directivo io 

ANCELLA'.:'l 

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AC'IIBEME~T FOR REOR.9.0.'N'I.ZA.'..'.'ION OF TiiE. . 

NATIONAL RECON;:{A!.SS.t;.N'CE PR9CRAlf it. 

A. The National Reconnaissance. Pi.-00:1·,1.n 

L Tho NRP is a sing::.a progra:n, natiot1.al in ch.::ir.o.ctar, 

t:o :.,,eet: the. intellige::-:.ce nae::is of tne Goverru.ie,,t u:'.1der a 

strong national le.:i.der::.hip,. for tha development, man~ge:mcn::, «·, 

control and operation of all proj~cts, both current ~nd long 

range for the collection of intelligenc8 and of mapping and 

gcocetic information obtained through overflights (e.xc,ludi:,6 . 

peripheral reconnaissance o?e~ations). The potentialities of . 

. /·-u. s. technology and all Oc)e:::z..tion.::.l :.:esources and facili::i.:as . 

m.:s t be aggressively .. nd ~,aginacively exploiced to· develop 

\.' .;.:· • '· .a::,d operate syst:e.ms for t::i.a colleciio::.1 of intallige~;,c'e wnich 

2.ra fully responsive. to t:ne Government's intelliger,ce needs 

and· obj ectivas. 

2, The National :r-:.ecor.naissance. ?:.::ogrmn shall be. :::es:ior,siv<.: 

: _di::ect:FJ-ar:~<[_s9le.fi=t-i=-=-~e=J~}:jfl):.f.ge._ifc-i:10:1_1.~_c:1:fon~raqui:i:ciifrfrii~ 

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._Board~ __ Targeting re.q\:.ire..ients a_r.._d p:;::_iori.:ies and desired_ 

' 'fre.~ue.ncy of coverage of both .satelli~e. and ma,.ned ai::cr~ft 

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E. The Secretary of Defense will: 

l. Establis:-. che i\RO as a sep.:n:ate agency of the DoD ana 

will have. tha ultimate res?ons:.b:.lit:y. £or the manage:nent ::i.r,d ·• .. 

o;,eration of the NRO ii.nd t:-.. e:. NR?; .; ··. 

2. Choose a Director ·of ::he. 1'"R0 .who will raport co n:i.'"ll 

a:-.d ba responsiva~··t:o hiiii fais.t::::;:uct~oi::i,s ·. • •,l• • •,•,• 

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~ NATIONAL RECONNAISSA,"lCE OFFICE 

WAShlNGTON., =:.C. 

September 8, 19G7 

MEMORANDUM FOR GEKERAL BERG 

Sti":BJECT: NRO-JCS Relationships on Aircraf~ Reconnaissance oi 

Denied Areas 

PROBLEM: At i;he present time there is a lack of understanding, or, 

at best, an ill-defined understanding between the NRO and JCS-JRC 

with regard to responsibility for aircraft reconnaissance of denied 

areas. There is no clear i,tatement of (1) responsibilities during 

peacetime/ crises/ active hostilities, (2) definitions of peripheral 

area {limitations)/ denied territory, (3} responsibility for operational 

planning and analysis, (4) ownership of resources, (5} utilization of 

resources, and (6} responsibility for repor~ing status and results. 

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM: The Director of the Nationa~ 

Reconnaissance Office is responsible "ior the development, management, control and operation of all projects, both current and long 

range, for the collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic 

information obtained through overflights. 11 At the pr-esent, however, 

for a variety of reasons w)::·.ich will be discussed, the DNRO does not 

exercise his authority for all such overflights. Yet, he remains 

responsible for all overflights, whe~her 01· not he elects to control 

them, and is uniquely responsible for :::.ny difficulties or cdses which 

may result from them. ' · 

How did this si:ua:ion come to be? 

FACTORS CONTRlBlJTI::JG TO THE PROBLEM; There are a number 

of factors which have combined to produce the present problem. Chief 

among them are the following: 

1. During international crises cal:ing for the use of aircraft 

overtlight resources, the NRO has yieldGd its operational authority 

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to the Joint Chiefs of S:aff. The U-2 and low-level Cuban overflights 

and~---------------~were the first examples or 

this "delegation. 11 11.csponsibility, in these cases, was transferred 

to the JCS-JRC. At fii•st, to be sure, operations were carried out 

under close DNRO supervision; however, before long this direct contact softened and the operations moved completely outside his domain. 

Once this pattern was set, ~t became a powerful precedent !or all 

crisis situations. 

2. In e .. ch case of tacit 1.ransfer of authority, the arrangement 

appears to have been made informally and never confirmed by documentation. 

3, The Director o! the JRC ha::i moved enthusiastically and aggressively toward broadening his scope of activity from the reco:maissance of carefully-defined perip,1eriea to foll-fledged ovedlight of 

denied areas. He now asserts a responsibility for missions "required 

to support assessments of CHICOM threoJ.ts to the GRC" or those 

"required to maintain curren~ air, ground, electronic, naval and AAA 

orders of battle" (see n.eference A), He expresses the conviction that 

any aircraft carrying a mi:itary insignia or tail number ~s the propc"·ty 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ',o do with as :hey see fit, He has assumed 

jurisdiction over the 147 drone operations and has recommended them 

to the Deputy Secretary of Defense as a JCS asset for the overflight of 

China, vice WILD RICE. 

4. There is already a tacit acceptance of JCS-JRC ownership anc. 

control of SR-71 covert overflights, following the phase-out of OXCAH.'.:' 

aircraft. 

5, The 303 Committee has come to recognize JCS-JRC as the 

national aircraft reconnaissance agency. This development is --

illustrated by the fact that although ,he DNRO submits all aircraft 

overilight schedules to the 303 Cmnmittee (including those "delegated" 

to the JCS-JRC), the 303 Commit~ee sends the approval of JCS-JRC 

flights directly to the JRC and not to the D:N"RO. · 

6. The NRO is developing a primary cssociation, in the intelligence community, with satdlite reconnais::;;ance, not aircraft reconnaissance. There ia a growing custom of referring to the NRO as the 

National Satellite Reconnaissance Office. 

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7. Because of this ge:.eral sitt:.ation, the NRO Staff has never 

attempted to assume control of aircraf-:: overflight operations. 

a. The Staff has r.ever'been in a position to do more than 

after-the-fact tracking of uirc::-aft operations. 

b. It has provided little more than a processing service 

in the "staffing" of aircraft matters. 

c. It has not established an Aircraft Operations Center 

{paralleling the SOC) from which appropriate control could be 

exercised. 

HOW THE PROBLEM WP.S ALMOST SOLVED; The problem of stcppin;:; 

up to his aircr:,,ft overflight obliga,ion was rccogn~zed by Dr. McMillan 

{then the DNRO} in mid-April 1063, when he advised the Deputy Secretary of Defense that a clar:.fication of the policy with regard to the operational ,aspects of the NRO was in order. Specifically, he expressed concern about: 

l. The definitior. of denied area overflights 

2. NRO respor.sibilities during active military hostilities 

3. NRO capabi:ity for c,perations planning and analysis 

On Item l, the DNRO was procaeding on the basis that c.enied area 

overflights were any overf" ts of sovcreig'n lerritory for which specific 

permission had to be o')t&ined the 5~12 Specfal Group latP.r the :,\)3 

Committee) or high0r aufr.01·i:y. 

As to Item 2, the D::-JRO w<'.s rccommei:ding a policy which wo~ld 

state that aircraft overflight responsibility would be transferred from 

the Director, NRO, to the appropriate military commander upon dc:cision of the Secretary of Defense (or highc,r authority) that the area in 

question had becorr.e an active thea;;er of military hostilities. 

In regard to Item 3, Dr. McMillan proposed the establis:,ment of 

an KRO Aircraft Operations Center so ,hai: he might carry out his 

assigned responsibilities for aircraft reco:maissance of denied areas, 

Iris two proposed possibili:ics: 

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1. The establishment, within the NH.O, of a new office having 

an aircraft operations c,,pability, which woD.ld transmit all instructions to the U&S commands throug-h the JCS-JRC. 

Or, as a preferr'ed solution, 

2. The establishment of an organizational arranger::i.ent unde1· 

the existing JCS-JRC to serve the needs of both the NRO and JCS. 

Under thi::, arrangement, tl.e JRC woulc serve as the NRO Aircraft 

Operai:ions Center (AOC) and the Chief, JRC, would be the ::JRO 

Staff Deputy for Opero.tions, responsible for supervising bo.:h the 

NRO SOC and the new NRO AOC. 

In addition to insuring formal coordination between tho periphers.l 

activities of the JCS and the overflight activities of the :N'RO, Dr. 

McMillan felt that Solution No. 2 would :'o!·malize the coorciination by 

the JCS of the resources o: the U&S commands which would certainly 

be required in support o: )[RO overflight activities. 

Tbe CIA, and particu:arly Dr. Scoville, objected to the McMillan 

propos.:.1 cin the basis that it was cumbersome and involved certain 

fundamental managemer.'; weaknesses (could the JRC serve two 

masters: The JCS and the DNRO? ). CL-\ recommended the establishment of an NRO Program E to achieve ,he desired objective and to 

provide the NRO with sooe means of exerc::.sing its authority over all 

overflight activities. The Chief, JRC, could be the Director, :-l"RO 

Program E, and could be charged wifa pr·csenting plans to the DNH.0 

for all overflights .:.ssigned to his responsibility. 

The JCS {General Lc,May, Actir:.g Chairman} concurred in Dr. 

McMillan's proposal and recommi.!ndcd its approval to foe Secr1;:tary 

of Defense. While ,he JCS had some qu:,:rr.s about the la.ck of a 

precise definition of "der:.ied area ovei•flight" and a distinction betwc"cn those flight,:; which would remain the sole responsibility of the 

NRO and those ior whkh the responsibility had been, or would be, 

delegated to the JCS, it co;1ch.:.ded that Dr. McMillan's recommended 

arrangement might well elimin.:.te the, requ:rement for absolutely precise terms, The JCS was ready to prc1)are, in collaboration with th<l 

NRO, a letter of agreement bet\veen fr:e Ct.airman, JCS, and the DNRO 

which would outline in detail the means by which the Chief, JRC, 

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F 0Lcv1::lg" a pe:~·.sot::.:J.!. cdit: . .l·:g· by 1Vl'i:. '.i\'f<:~anl::..·::·a ol tte ?roposed 

';T,. ;-·--~s of .~·~ef.'.':!re.ace' for ·:t• :::;,::~t)/ uCS i~i'ccraft Oper{~tions C-::1Y ... cr, 

: .)Ut} ·)ecret:,1.::-:: of D::·:f2nse .:-~.r.nouncec·_ his ag'reenient i:1 nr'.:J1cil>.!.(:: 

.•.·". )/I·.:;lViillan 1 d l'G:(:o~-,unc~1c .. :d 0.::g·~;1izat.:.\1nal arrange-;.1--.. en: 2nd 

~~o-~· f~nal JCS/1)-:::JRC; ccnclU'x',:;;:ca ir• t!1.is ~natter. Of .fu:t!:h1.::--

·,:·:t.s~1c1~ the ·ocputy S2c:.~ctary o,.' ~Oe:::'c::/1.sc agr~ed '\Vith tl"-.,: ;;;pc .. ~.: :ic 

: -.:nCJ '-.;n,- ation that the ~::i.O r•::: ~; ;Jo::sib~.15:ty for aircraft ove;.--fJigtd s 

~:'.:i:~1 t~1t;~:~~~itf:jci t /1~"-~:~:-2°,~~~~;'~t;e;(::,:~c~o:~:~~:-::,~ts-~jr.Chc JCS corH~uz~:""·i!d ir. t:ne Ter~ns -0:.: ~:~~:i:'t:1"<::nce and, in res_?,)l~St; ::y 

·~:;2 D..:!;J"nty St~cr-2·;2.ry r:/' ·o(:ft:tt~~c, tl--,·~t f;,e Torw:Ji of I-~t~.:~Qr-E·r::.-:f.; 

\V,)~.Jd for-r:1 t:1e b~~.::.:i.::: fc..-· a revi.s08 JCS-211C ~hart~r . 

.. r,he CL.A bC:1,·.: to tc.s p1:·cvic-i.:5 ~,.de\\' tl·:2."t the proposed ,Jrg:::~·lz:-:...·.;J, · 

v:, . .:; ·..2nl,v:1.::~ci.y <Lr...d 1:,;;,::fly cG:-lc:.::iv;:;:;C.~ ~.:.dd:ng t~:·10.! M'.wt~e DCI \VC ·.l~~ di.~:, 

1.:,;-..1 s~.1b}3ct pe:. .. s0nali ;,t -,-:i•·:l~ 1\,fr ~ lv:2:~-r arc:.~\~-~:, I-/[r t J\/J cCo:. e C:t'.r;s . · ,J· • ..:; r~ 

1·~·-0 n-::·cess~·a:;y x·or 1 ·co;.:·:.\::.::c;:,,:i~g the .i1rc1 a,fteement :)) injc.::::L~_. ~-((; 

\p.,:~ ?··tl~:r) th£::: oorri .. plicati:.:1g 'Iactot· :Jf 1::1c .. ;cs-J-RC. 11 ..:\~1·hcJ1.!;Jh :.~c. ~., 

.fr~.L-'~'.l of a::--rs.:r~gr.";::(.e':lt !i:ig::·: :40 if"l c·:·der -::o for1n&iiZC the r~ ~:'C) :·. 

__; f'.(J r(:la:t~onsbip1 speciiic:2l1y 0::1 C1.:J;>on overflight r~:1d J:3O\V··'!'r:·. 

·r·.cic:.--;~) ,)~eratio~lf":>,. hi~ ,:.:pi:..::1::: ::b.:= .. t tt.is co1..;J.d be.· ar::·a11geC '.·1y ·1·,-: 

io:~~t .. et~ a~;::--e2n1e:it. Ti:(: last pcis: ... agr-apl1 of !'.::.ii let(e:. ·i~<~~..::~ 

\v01.1i~·: 1-"~ .;,. r:1·:;;<~s:::i; ·c :-... ~~;.k.1 :..ts bro::.:d 2. change as th2 

i::· .. 20,:iu~tion cf r.f_-~, JI~(; i'.'.1\ ·ol Vt.:~ 2" '~7 ::~i.s is net -:c .;:;s,y, 

Lr .... v·BY"(:r, ih8.t 1.i' ··.t.:-. }"_;/NP .. ()~~ .. :,/} 1~1.::· T)e~;,.~t:/ \Vish to c3.H 

:)nth~: Jh.C 1;0 ~)::2~u·~(: i.::-~o.s~ ,:r:.~e :c::_::) ::.st.=:5.g.o~d ·:o ~;:1t! 

Dc·1Jar,2 .. ::.;E:J.1t uI 2:;:,:·'.::r1,::--r-; ft1 . .:.::1: ,:,0 v:c.,1:~j be pe~--r'e~tly 

::,,i::-(':r~c.olt.1 't,.,; . "'"-. F:c: ."-~.,_·,;:· iJ. ·1-;\:.::::t ':,e re;;-.:o:~:nt~e:.."i \hat 

:,,:.;,6li ::.g "!'' .. !C,:•"":·,n~-~.:;:-,:u:.:·;,:; 

::rad::;.:,:-.()n4" .. J ·::.c.~-._,::.r ... ~·~-- 1·11rv: 

ex:: .. : tCJ.1t 0i.:-:.d (~npai:,:,.: 

.:_~,:· O':: :·::1.e L:::'.r1::.~11.:"•"1(. c,t ., ::.::,.::-. 

~ ·~-... 3i,:: ~_,hi} usv~-fr!./ c.: 

, ~\-,; i::,.,·_ ~;e~" .t"·:..tory i;_ ti:.: 

-::~··.,'":ilit:.i~S \.Vhich ·:.r12: 

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense responded to the DCI that it w::i.s 

not his intention to sugges, any change in the basic policy of handling 

reconnaissance over fo w' ; r- ·ccptions --

overflights of Cuba and~--------------~-- were being 

carried out by th0 CIA. He still considered it important to have a 

clear-cut and well-understood interrelationship between the DOD 

elements concerned, specifically the NRO and the JCS-JRC. The 

Deputy Secretary of Dc:ensc belic:ved tl:c:;:;; interrelationships to be 

functioning effectively in ,he absence of formal agreements, but considered it necessai;:y to s.;:iell out in written form the procedures 

needed to insure the contir,uance o: ',hat state oi affairs. He agreed 

that it 1;1hould be possible to achieve this objective with simpler documentation and accordingly asked Drs. Jlr.:cMillan and Fubini to join thEl 

JCS in preparin~ a less Gbborate paper, 

After several unsuccessful attempts at such a paper during June, 

July, and August 1963. the action was abandoned. 

The CIA's reaction to the OSD's proposal in 1963 very likdy 

stemmed in part from un uneasiness H was experiencing over lhc 

ac,ions of the newly-established NRO. In January 1963, the DKR.O 

had directed the transfer of the CIA',. Satellite Operations Center to 

the NRO Staff, creating a new operations facility in the basemcm of 

the Pentagon. CIA middle-management, still smarting from this 

"loss:• undoubtedly lool<ed on the OSD aircraft proposal as another 

step in the pattern: first the SOC, now the AOC. There is certain 

to be some CIA recollection of both of ;;hese occasions and the NRO 

would do well to make it emphatically clear, in any new neg-otia-<;ions, 

that it has no desire or intention to impact the CIA's AOC in any 

manner. 

ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO US TO::)AY; 

1, We can allow the present cou::·sc u:' events to continue. 

Advantages: 

.... We conserve NRO resources. 

b, We accm:i:nnodate to-lhe present quai.i~wartime situation. 

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c. We avoid a confrontation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

d. We capitalize on demonstr2..ted JCS-JRC experience and 

capability, 

Disadvantages: 

a, Continued disinterest and "delegation" will result in 

all NRO aircraft/ drone rcsourc,es passing to the JCS. 

b. The DNRO w~ll continue to be responsible for aircraft 

overflights but will not be able to control their conduct. 

c, Two 11 national11 rcconnu:ss;:mce authorities on o.ircrilf, 

overflight will be dealing with the 303 Committee, 

2. We can set up a stroni NRO Aircraft Operations Center. 

Advantage;;: 

a. We will be centralizing aircraft overflight operations 

in a single authority. 

b, We will be respo,1sive to the mission assigned to us 

in the 11 August 1965 DOD/CIA Agreement. 

c. The DN'RO wiJ.l have aircraft overflight authority 

commensurate with his responsibility. 

Disadvantages; 

a. We will not be able to avoid what promises to be a 

stormy confrontation with the JCS. 

b. We will lose the JCS-JRC's proven capability to operate 

reconnaissance aircraft, 

c. We will immediately fac0 the requirement for increased 

manpower and more floor space for an l:\RO Aircraft Operations Center 

(shade s of SOC !) • 

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d. We will still have no provision for a smooth transition 

to JCS control of all :iircraft rcconnaiss2,nce in wartime. 

3. We can set up a ,ioint NRO-JCS Aircraft Operations Center 

under the DNH.O. 

Advantages: 

a. This will give us a sin::;le, strong, national aircraft 

overflight reconnaissance authority. 

b. The DNRO will re-capture aircraft overflight authority 

commensurate with his assigned responsibility. 

c, The nation will have "' single agency responsible foralloting developmer:.tal and operational resources for aircraft overflight activities. 

d. We will be capitalizing on the JCS-JRC's proven 

capability to conduct reconnaissance activities, 

e, We will have one clean line of control to the U&S 

commands, 

f. We will conserve manpower and floor space resources. 

g. We will have a simple, clearly-defined mechanism for 

transferring aircraft overflight resources and operations during periods 

of tension and war. 

h. We will avoid a confrontation with the JCS. 

Disadvantages: 

None that one can envision at this time. 

CONCLUSION: This seems to be a good time to reopen discussions o::-. 

the concept of an NRO-JCS Aircraft Operations Center. There arc 

impressive advantages and no oi)v:oc:.s disadvantages in following this 

course of action. The CIA objections of four years ago should be 

substantially softened and possibly ab::rcd by now. 

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liae s ,;:..n~, n4.~ v.L1b kl'..at appr·ova:, th;:.t 

pei~E:ional discussions w::..1,h G,:;_r~c;r;:..l bu:di!-~g ci.ose:ly -~v 

of :n.e 

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FUNCTIONS AND RESPOi\l'SIBiLITIES OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT 

FOR AIR VEHICLE OPERATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR, SOC 

1. Responsible for handling all correspondence received by the DNRO 

concerning air vehicle operational matters and for preparing replies or 

directives concerning air Y<:>hicle ope:c-a.tions £or the DNRO's signature. 

.:::o.f'.rn.:i.:.1.n.101 

Z. Represents the DNRO, as appropriate from an ope rational standpoint, 

on air vehicle study groups and panels in accoi·dance with DNRO intcr;;;st 

and reipOniibilities. 

3. Maintains current knowledge of NRP air vehicles for overfl~ght 

opera.tion6, to include inventory, technical status, and location. 

.... Mainta.in6 current and cmnuia.tive da.ta en all NRP air veh~cle overflight operations, to bclude scheduled op3rations, flights conducted or 

cancelled, hours ilown, a-raa. covered, a::-,d a data base o.C COMIREX 

target coverage. 

5, Maintains close a.nd con:inuing liaison with those organizations which 

carry out and support air vehicle operations for the DNRO, particularly 

the JRC/ JCS, OSA/ CIA, and the P:rogram D Office. 

6, Prepares the Monthly Fo:reca.sts of NRO Overflight Activities for 

approval by the DNRO anci review by the 303 Committee, He is the 

1·csponsible Sta££ officer for 303 Committc>e review actions which require 

Sta££ support, 

7. Establishes and maintains a complete fil.;; of documen;ation, co1·rcspondence and working papers necessary for the accomplishment of the res:,onsibilities herein described. 

/• 

8. Maintains a close working relationship with SS-7 (R&D),so that h~ is 

knowledgeable of air vehicle R&::J efforts and coordinates 11iG functions wit:l 

SS-7 (R&D) Sta.ii officers as a.pprop:::-iate, 

Ai:r vehicle means all aerodynamic VGhicl.;s employed in the NRP, whethcl' 

man.""l.ed or unmanned • 

...... ,,, ... 

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I• TH5 DDl/TY S~CR5i'AR'! OF DErENSS i 

WASHiNGTON. D. C, 20JOI 

.3 February 1968 . WORICfff() P.PE,ii·'. ., .· 

¥EMORANDUM FOR Chai.r~an, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

· · · Director, National Reconnaissanco O!ficc (NR.0) 

·, 

Director, De!ense. Intelli.i;:ence.Agcnoy (DIA) 

.' Direetor, N.o.tional Socu.r.!.ty Agency (NSA) , 

... ;.·. I wish to r·ea££irm Sec~eta.ry McNama.r~1 s a.nd rny desire tha.t tne Joint 

i . · .. : L ,, Chiefs ~ Sta£! maintain cogni:t ... nee and control over .all military aerial, 

i .:·. _) .... surface and submarine reconna.issa.nce operations. We look to tbe .Joint _'. >:1- · Chiefs 0£ Sta.££ to submit recommendations for all such opera.ti.ODs and £or 

' reporting on the status 0£ approved missions. • · J, · . . ~ ~\:) 

· The ;recomn-1endati.cns of. the Joh1~ CcJ.e£1, oi. Sta!£ on a.ll 'reconnaissa.nce 

oporation• should include assessments 0£ ( 1) tho intelligence objectives to be . 

achieved,! {Z) the technical and operational feasibility 0£ proposed missions., 

and (3) ~e risks involved. The .Directors of DIA and NSA will. providi:: w:1atever a.ss1-sta.nce the Joint Chiefs ,o! Sta.ff require in the devel?l:)ment oi their 

recom.ryxenda.tions. . - . . . · 

6omrnencing with the.Joint Chiefs 0£ Sta.ff submission o£ the March 11968 

· monthly forecast for peripheral. reconnaissance 3-ctiviti.es• th() £ollowi.ng t.wo 

.,:aupplemeutal section!'> will be included in the sa.m.e binder: 

(l) A forecast oi all sub1-:t1a.rine recor,:;:;caissa.nce missio?-s, a.11d 

(Z) A io::ecast 0£ iccoli~a.issa.nce .opera.~ions conducted under the overall direction 0£ the Director, NRO, · (Tb.is supj_)lement will be prep_;i.:.-ed by the 

Directo:i: 1 NRO,} 

The Joint Chiefs of Sta££ a're requested to submit for my review and 

approval the appropriate ma.nagel'Xl.ent directiv~s they develop for governing 

the condu.ct c£ all milita.ry aerial, surface, a.nd submarine te,eonnais sa~c2 

opera.tions, 1n these directives, provision .,:;.ould speei!ica.lly be );Xla.de f.ol· the 

special '!unctions the Deputy Dire.:to:r £0-;: .Reconnaissance, J'-3, discharges on 

behalf o! the Secreta.ry o! Defense e.nd the J o.:.n, Chiefs 0£ Sta.ft', 

c:,CIU? l , . · . , , ' ,. 1 

'::'-:.l~~cd ltom auwr.~Llc ~ -::;:;:::::, ()_ • I,. ""'\ •z- ,. :,_,,,, .. ~ d1cimilic~tion -\ ~~-.. '3⁄4, •·. \i Q.):f·-\ cJ-

, . .,..,,.,......... ... q 

Copie's to~ . ' By E - 7 7 s's 9 -. 6 8' . Under .Secrctar,,• of State ._ . ·. .. 0 ~-7':"J ~.1 ~, I •. . .• !IA,'!Dl.£ VI' N•'.;,; ·,:.i,: .: . .. ,. Director o! Cent:'al Intelligence . . .11 .. J -"'· •• , 

•Special A-anfot.."'..nt to the Pres;d~!~t 'for ! 1?.t:A.\11~.~·~~~is · f,1::rr~: [,,r;,: 

.... ,, .... , ........... ,. ......... .'., . _ {1 )( '. .•_·~I _J_'_. _; .. _,_·.:::;i,i/.~:\.• ·, _' : .,,-·~ .. ::._~_ .. : . ,· ·: ....... i !<~; ,J 

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I . 

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'• 

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I 

II 

I 

11 

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yr::; D~?UTY s:;cRITARY 0~ DEFENSE 

w;,,;.;,:;l'~Oi'ON, 0. C. 20:J.01 

21 March 1968 

,: ) -•----("N,, '·1 . . . i 

I.E;!Jitt1j~I{tJ ~ MlliMO!"'...ANPUM :irar~ CILII.Ir.?viAN, JblN'l' OHil.iW't:i Olr ::lJTAV:;;' 

SUBJECT: Reconna.is sance Ope ,:at~ons -(U) 

Re!e·;~mces: {a) "Memo for DepSe~De£ from Dir, 'Jt Staff, Subj: 

"Peacetime Rcconnaiii sance Operatio£'s in Sensi-, ·, 

tive A:;:eas (U), 11 dtd 29 F_eb 68 

· (b) SM Z4-68, Subj: "Sensitive Peacetime Reconnais -

sance Operarions_, 11 dtd 11 Jan 68 (forwarded by 

Reference (a) above) · 

(c) D'epSecDef multi-;:;.ddressee memo, Subj: "Reconnaissanc<; Operations (U)," _<ltd 3 Feb 68 

Having carefully reviewed Reforenc;es (a) and (b) which set fo:.:-th 

foe general manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan to in:1plement 

·,he requirements of Reference (c), r vvish to reiterate my decisior. that 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff will maintain coenizance and control over all 

military aerial, surface {land and sea) and submarine reconnaissance 

operations. This is not to say that in developing a system for dis char;; 

ing this rellponsibility the Joir..t Chiefs a£ Sta££ are constrained from 

delegating to the Unified and Specified (U&S) commanders specific 

iunctions and responsibilities in the reconnaissance field (e, g., 

routine aerial, surface, a~-i.d submarine r0connaissance associated 

with task force operations or, the high seas; ground reconnaissance 

patrols in the Korean DMZ), nor are the U&S commanders conatrain,;d 

from subdelegating reconnaissance functions delegated to them. I 

should like, however, to be kept apprised of those operations for which. 

approval authority is dckgated by the JCS to the U&S commz:.nders 01· 

xetained by the JCS. In determining thosa reconnais sa.nce ope rations 

which the JCS are obliged to submit to higher authority for a9proval, 

those £or which the JCS decide to retc...in approval authority, and these 

for which the JCS delegate approval ;;.cshotity to U8,S commanders, in 

iina.l a.na.lysis I must rely on ·che good judgment o! the Joint Chiefs of 

Stai! since all situations which could become politically or militarily 

,impoxtant to higher authority ca_n!'co·~ be arbitrarily defined in a'dvanc.:i. 

1n this regard, I fou.c'ld the Appe:r,dices to Reference (b) in the main 

u,geful doC:).l.:tnents but believe they ::'.nay :reqci:-e mo:re substantive 

::evision than Refe:rer:.cc (a) sug~ests, I a:,::iume that in addition 

you will de".'elop management g\l.ip.ance memoranda for OJCS use • 

· ·,,,./ . ·,J~OG? t •;,,_,;/,f,:f.;, f,.,,,,., ,.,.,.1,..4.•H•tlf•: Tt ll 1 t. r 

. ;s:-c3'110// 

Co::,y No._!/:_ cf _/_/_ Co;:iio:i· 

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! > 

\J 

As a general rule, in the development of Y.our, new managcn'lcnt dircctiy;;, c, 

please keep-in mind my desire that all submarine: surface vessel, a.::.d · 

z.ircra£t reconnaissance operations which are specifically tasked to collect 

intelligence against foreign countries~antl tho ·milit.ary !oi•ee a, e4uipr,~c:d:J, 

and operations thereof, a.re to be reported. 

~Al,10 please include in your. new reconnaissance mauagement' 

directives, as requested by Refor.;ncc (c), the £ollowini;: points. 1 • ' ~ -

First, in consonar.ce with the discussion of sensitive 

peacetime reconnaissance' operations as contained in the 

Appendices to Reference (bl, cn,-plicit provision should be 

made to establish the responsibility of the ,JCS for a.dYising, 

--., and obtaining approval from, high<;>r authority 0£ all 5en5itive 

peacetime reconnaissance operations: 

' 

Second, prOvlston should be made £or promptly advii:.i::i.g 

higher authority of any geographic area, reconnaissance 

:function, or :::-eccnnaissance platfo:::-m, which is designated 

or considered "se~·.shive," and the reasons therefor, by the 

JCS or U&S comm,,.nders. Similarly, provision shoulcl be 

ma.de to report any cb,.nges in such desig.:ia.tions to higher 

authority. In thls context, I believe that your new manage~ 

:r:.i.ent directives should include specific provision :for qcickly 

, deeignating areas, operation:;, or functions as sensitive in· 

which. pclitical or military t;v:;::its ;;:uddenly emerge (e.g., 

the recent developrr,er.ts in Korea) which generate concern 

or interest by highe:;- authority. 

Third, I believe that the new managernent directives 

should also contain the p:rincipd instructions and poUcies for 

tl:.e conduct of all sensitive military ::econnaissance operations . 

. I noted that in Reference (b) citations a i:e included to some sb:: 

other JCS management directives. Fo:r example, DoD policies 

~- governing the conduct o:f sensitive submarine and surface vcssd 

reconnaissance operatior.s are not set forth. in Re::crence (b), 

. I 

. ··r ?~ ~ 

'• 

but are embodied in a.notb.er JCS c.irective·. · GovernLng directiveii 

ab.ould clearly require the JCS to review and approve each of 

these operations, Since S\:Ch ope :.:ations arc to be fr,cludcC:. in 

the monthly fo:recast submitted by the JCS, they \vill be 

::eviewed and evz.lu.ated in tb.e same ·manner as any other 

11cnsltive reconnaissance opcr~ti'on • 

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·.--:··· .'·· .... 

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Fourth, specific provi~ion sho;.tld also be ma.de to report . 

to higher a.uthorlty those military operations. which, while not. -

primarily reconnaissance in pu.-pos.e or. objecti,ve, probably 

would provoke the same type oLforeign reaction as would 

reconnaissance opera.ti.ens undertaken in the same geograp9ic 

a.re.i."s. Such. military operations will be submitted to higher 

--autj:lority for approval in the ·same manner a.s proposed sensitive reconnaissance operations since a. mechanism exists for 

obtaining approval expoditiously. 

''> :": ·:·-s:. · Finally, the new ir.a.na.gement directives should include· 

- -' , .-;,) '.· · :< ·.:·.':a. provis_ion which states tha.t any subseq~ent ameodments or 

_ '..-.· ·.·' '-,. , · /changes will .be submitted to 'the Secretary, Of Def&J;1.se £or 

.· :_ ,'.; ./.: ·'. •. ,'. 'appr.ova.l before they a.re promulgated. 

I • . . .· . . . • . . <:'.. \ ' --f.;_ • • f{~ '.'\-::::::-~ 

·'; Copies to: 

·.~' . • Assistant Secretary of Defe:i:u,e {Adrninistra.tion). 

Director, National Reconnaissance Office 

· ·.•Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 

, Director, Na.tional Security Agency . . . 

... ·,. 

3 

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'· 

,,, ·•1,·:1 
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__.l,81'NAT!ONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHIMGTON, O.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECT.OR February 24, 1959 

MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Assistant to the President for National 

--. Security Affairs 

Deputy Under Secretary 'of State (Political Affairs) 

Executive Secretary, 303 Committee 

SUBJECT: Forecast of NRP Aircraft and Satellite Activities for 

March 1969 

Attached is the forec~st of National Reconnaissance Program 

overflight activities for the month of March 19.69. 

Alexander H. Flax 

Approval 

303 Committee Principal 

\ 

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i 
PROJECT 

~j ~ivlis sions '\" 

~ lVi:issio,,s* 

_,;, A rpq;1irPd~·· 

CI/l~T s:~rrr.: 

1:f' 1:C: ,.TL:. 10:'i':.: 

CL\i,S LAi,;L' 

:1-f, fJL;s~o,u; 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114976 

vrmcu-;; 

U.,2 

U-2 

lJ-?. 

Drone 

TYPI: 

Photo 

'ELINT 

Photo 

P11ntr, 

1-:;, 1 1\t,arch 

1-31 Marcil 

1-31 JVTf'tl'CL 

1-31 Ivlarc, 

c:bina 

China 

S,, Chha 

:rvN 

-NYl'~· /1 ,:}cJ;:-; 

C:ui'.,c.J:1 

NVN 

HJX;ff, f1 •~T 1J Ni' 

'~\ PPrtO'."C:) n ': 

USlb 

usrn 

usm 

JCS 

JCS 

,JCS 

1t/1.TB 

t.rP_:lOVE:J 

28 J:,n 6,, 

20 Sr·p 65 

17 l'V~'l.r fS 

l',,:,:!.iicl.i,,u,;. H (J\'1,:1fLg.;L uf C::ir:a (:'.)ll',lJ.U•,: ;,_,, 1.1,,: "'·l.)•.:t,: (;,)V,H, f.Jl;uwl.:g :,,,,li,,d,,lL: ::c; p:·u;,o:,( :1: lj I·l,nt,,/;;l r:<T 

l·.iis;;ioat tu; t:,,1,l.l;. 20 u,ih-:, u;r Jd C.:Ltt,ec ;·,;.,i:1LuJ. 'i.'L:o (.:.,tL'\L !Lb l<., lits. jJ:'tbtlll :n;: ( O),ll.lLl, e :·ts(r.id,o:,::, v' 

aμproachr:g ::ic, ck;:;e,· trur: 2J rn:li:'s ·.o U:e c:1ha r,.-;_a,a'a1d. 

--·~1-lli'fv1P'{ AC'.'rTOK r,-,i.'.':s;nns ff/e,- C:\--h ,i :,re F<·,-.h'p,-t tn f':'"'~i'i, 1>1i. 0:s'rq :-:p·)r'1v:~J n::d:>r p:·pc:,-pt 3J~ C0i-1n,~tf/> 

·: ':-tr-i r: i ,,r :~, 

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Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114976 

.• ' 

FOilECAST OF NRP SATELLITE ACTIVITIES FOR MARCH 1969 

PROJECT VEHICLE 

CORONA 

1 Mission THOR (SLV-2A) 

CORONA RESER\-:81.: 

1 Mission THOR (SLV-2A) 

GAMBIT 

1 Mission Titan IIIB (SLV-5B) 

GAMBIT RESER\7E* 

li~ARPOP 

None 

EARPOP RESERVE~' 

Kone 

-::,Back-up used only if required. 

r 

I,;'r:ite: Sub-satellEes are net listed. 

CORONA./ GAMBIT/ El. R FOP 

TYPE 

PHOTO 

PHOTO 

PHOTO 

AREA 

Eurasian Communist Countries (Primary) 

World-wide Mapping and Charting (Secondary) 

Eurasian Communist Countries {Primary} 

World-wide Mapping and Charting {Secondary) 

Eurasian Communist Countries (Primary) 

World-wide Mapping and Charting {Secondary) 

BYE 12Gl0-69 

Page 3 of 3 

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TH:': JOt;-..:T CHl::rs OP S,AFF 

WASHlNO':ON~ 0.,. '20:i.Ol 

13 February 1969 

XEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIO~AL RECONNAISSANCE 

OFFICE STAF~ 

.Attention: 

Subject: 

Reference: 

SAFSS-6 

JCS Controlled Overflights, Forecast 

for March 1969 

NRO .Me:norandum B/00284, 3 Jan 64 

l. -f&t In accordance with t-he request in reference, 

a forecast of JCS controlled ove:cflights for March 1969 

is submitted. 

2. ('a'cii/B) Actual date of flights indicated be:ow will 

depend upon weather. All of the following have a priir,ary u,ission ot photography. 

Number Sorties Vehiclos 

3-6 U-2 

15-20 U-2 

35-45 Dror.e 

10-12 SR-71 

~--------... 

• GROUP 1 l Ext:lu.tad from iutoJflttie 1 

~Os)o~r.d,r.~ •nd l 

docl•ssil,wion I 

. 

Program Name Country 

G:i:.P,SS LAMP Cuba 

GIAXT DRAGON 1"VK/Laos/Camoodiu 

BUY..?Y ACTION NVN 

GIANT SCALE i'VN 

«~~;v.--~ -~~7 

RALPH D. STEAKLEY 

Brig Generali USAF 

Deput!' Directo_r 

:er R:::onmuss.::nce 

Oper:i!o1~·s Directorate .. 

BYE-77873-69 

Pi•;,·,•ni ~11~'.,,m · . /:.l.'l.~l ~~~,,. {t'-~'"''·'.• .. '.,,.,-.•·~:•~t':...,, 

f i i' / f 

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Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114976 

FUNCTIONS A.c'\fD RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTA.c"\'T 

FOR. AIR. VEHICLE OPERATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR, SOC 

l. Responsible for handling all correspondence received by the DKRO 

concerning air vehicle operational matters and £or preparing replies 01: 

directives concerning air vehicle operations for the DNR01s signature. 

2. Represents th.a DNRO, as appropriate from an ope:rationa: standpoint, 

on air vehicle study groups and panels in accordance with DNRO interest 

and responsibilities. 

3. Maintains current knowledge of NRP air vehicles for overflight 

operations, to include inventory, technical statua, location, and ope1·a~ 

tional capabilities. 

4. Studies alternative operational approachs to meet COMIREX and SORS 

requirements, when appropriate, in order to make recommendations ;;o 

the DNRO on the most suitable platform to use in particular situations. 

5. Maintains current and cumulative data on all NRP air vehicle over 

£light operations, to include scheduled operations, £lights conducted ol· 

cancelled, hours flown, areas covered, and a data base of COMIREX 

target coverage. 

6. Maintains close and continuing Eaison with those organizations which 

carry out and support air vehicle operations for the DNRO, particul2.rly 

the JRC/JCS, OSA/CIA, and the Progril.m D Office, 

7. Prepares the Monthly Forecasts of NRO Overflight Activities for 

approval by the DNRO and review by the 303 Committee. He is faa 1·esponsible Staff officer for 303 C,::,mmittee review actions which require Staff 

support. 

8, Establishes and maintains a complete file of documentation, correspondence and working papers necessary for the accomplishment of the re sponsibilities herein described, 

9. Maintains a close working relationship with SS~ 7 (R&:D) and Progro.rn 

D so that he is knowledgeable of air vc,-.iclc R&D efforts and coordinates 

hi6 £unctions with SS- 7 (R&:D) and Program D Staff officers as appropriate. 

Air vehicle means all aerodynamic vehicles employed in the NRP, whether 

manned or unmanned, 

HAltOlt W'IA 

r~, , ,: ~.::) 

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' 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114976 

As you know, a Sta.ff :c-epre11entative stops by the JRC each 

morning now to pick up an operations summary of the subject programs, 

generally covering activities of the previous day. I will request' General 

Berg to work out with you and the Director of CIA Recom,aissance 

Programs the most suitable procedures for transmitting the additional 

da.ta required and to provide more details on the specific supplementary 

data the NRO Stan will need to carry out this new function. 

Alexander H, Flax 

... _ .......... _., ..... ----·-.. --,..---"·-· 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114976 
Approved for Release: 2020.'02/07 COS 114976 

focal point in ti,e N RO 3tzc:J:: t;; :::.rovide ::ne so::n,nvhcct g::ea.ter in 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 COS 114976 
.. t, 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114976 

·"':,, ". "•=-

.!.,;,_ '.>.:, .; A,~;. a 

data he will need to carry out this new function. As OSA already provides 

a good deal of data on their operations, I do not believe this new requirement viill significantly increase their reporting workload, 

Alexander H. Flax 

....... -------~------------·······-------------

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114976