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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

WASHINGTON 

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, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECFIIETAFIIY 

April 30, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM REBER AND B/GEN. BE~ 

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Land Panel and Related Issues 

When I met with the Land Panel on Friday, April 25, it 

was very apparent that they think that the NRO has lost some 

of its old drive in being able to get on quickly with advanced 

systems at reasonable cost. They think we- have become a big 

bureaucracy which can only do things in the standard multibillion dollar way over a period of several years. 

I do not know to what extent their views are justified. 

Certainly they were overstated for the purpose of·emphasis and 

of course Land himself is much more extreme in these views than 

many of the other Panel members. In any case, I think it is· 

partially justified and that we should try to go as far as we 

can to streamline our operation and then get in a position to 

move· quickly on advanced systems. 

At the same time we are caught in a tight budget year, with 

several very large programs which have huge appetites for money 

leaving us very little flexibility and very little free money 

for R&D activities. But I think we must be responsive in some 

fashion. There are a few things that we can do. First of all, 

we can be more hardnosed about letting the large systems contractors come in and ask for a new supply of money everytime 

they find they have a problem; second, we can be more aggressive 

in setting up a good R&D program and funding it accordingly; 

third, we can do more keen analysis in our office which will 

obviate the need hopefully for so many systems starts and might 

even turn up some possibilities of combining existing systems 

to reduce cost. I think there is considerable question about 

whether we might not be doing too much collection work and ~---

certainly we have not critically examined the impact of ~~~~ 

~--------

On existing collection activity. Although it 

has been done once, I am not sure that the proper amount of 

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the 949 and requirements. 

~,is ~olnt up the need to organize quickly a good analytical 

st~ff in our office. More important is the choice of topics to 

assign to this staff, and I would hope that Bob Naka could begin 

to devote some attention to this problem in advance of his 

arrival. The Staff Director's recently published memorandum 

shows how we are reorganizing to provide a better analytical 

capability. At the same time, we should re-examine the ongoing 

studies which I am not nearly as familiar with as I ought to be 

to see whether they are broad enough in scope and whether they 

cover all the problem areas which we ough~ to be covering. 

Another ques1:=ion to be examined is whether. the solid. state 

array work can be expedited by spending a few million do·11ars 

each with a few good contractors and whether we ought to initiate 

some systems work leading toward a camera based on solid state 

arrays somewhat along the llnes that"-----c-------~is proposing 

in connection with the CBS camera system. 

//ti\ L 

John1L: McLucas 

TOP SECit[T 

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).sf NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE: 

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR May 19, 1969 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 

SUBJECT: Meeting with Don Steininger, May 15, 1969 

Purpose of the meeting was to review Land Panel report 

to the President. 

Recommendations and conclusions as I remember them: 

A. I I reconnaissance. 

1. We should get on with the development of a ~---~ reconnaissance system which would be useful for both 

crisis and general surveillance. 

2. Allocate~---~ year (1970) and enough next year 

to keep program going at full speed. 

3. This year initiate systems studies as well as push 

technological developments of critical components. 

B. MOL. 

1. Continue camera development. 

2. Cut back overall program eliminating man. 

3. Review other potential high resolution system, e.g. 

HEXADOR and upgraded GAMBIT. 

4. Reallocate $SOM of savings to system. 

HEXADOR/GAMBIT/DORIAN 

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Steininger also said that he hoped we would come up with 

a management plan which was simple. He seemed to be saying 

that one agency should manage the whole thing. I suggested 

that I agreed in principle but felt that it would be a mistake 

for example to let the CIA build its own Vandenberg. He agreed. 

/L~ 

John • McLucas, 

HEXADOR/GAMBIT/DORIAN 

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