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!Jirl' NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D,C:, 

111111111111m111111111111111111110111 m111111m1~11111 14 00090456D 

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR March 15, 1969. 

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (EYES ONLY) 

SUB,TECT: Intelligence Program ~anagement 

The attached discussion is in response to your request for my 

views as to how the management of the intelligence programs of the 

Department of Defense might be improved. Because of my assignment as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) which 

entails the responsibility for management of the National Reconnais-. 

sance Program (NRP), I am of course best informed as to the particulars of that program. As Assistant Secretary for Research and 

Development of a military department, I have also participated in 

various aspects of the management of the other two military intelligence programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP} and 

the Consolidated Intelligence Program (CIP). However, my detailed 

knowledge of the latter programs is by no means complete and my 

comments and recommendations as they affect the latter two programs 

may accordingly have less validity. 

I hope you find this discussion useful and would be glad to talk to 

you further about it if you so desire. · 

Alexander H. Flax 

.I 

Attachments 

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INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 

The DOD Intelligence Programs 

Although the NRP, the CIP and the CCP are all termed "programs, 1_

1 

it is essential to realize the important differences in function, management and command relationships which exist between these several aggregations of activity. 

The NRP has a single integrated organization, the NRO, which is 

responsible for the line management of the program as a whole in all of 

its aspects. On the other hand, the CIP and CCP each includes activities 

which are organizationally much more diverse. The CIP and the CCP 

comprise a large variety of projects and programs under varied manage•· 

ment and command arrangements involving the Services (through the 

Service Staffs, cryptologic, development, procurement and operating 

agencies) as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified and Speci• 

fied Commands. The DIA has the central role in those centralized 

management functions which are exercised for the CIP while the NSA 

has a similar role for the CCP. Budget and program control are exercised through these different chains of command and management and 

no single individual, short of the Secretary of Defense, has direct 

management responsibility for either the total CIP or the total CCP. 

The term "program" is applied in these cases to identify a functional 

program-budget review by a committee which is conduc.ted on primarily 

an annual basis, although there is some monitoring of budget continued 

on throughout the year. 

The NRP on the other hand comprises a program which is also 

subject to integrated program-budget reviews (on a more frequent than 

annual basis) but which is, in addition, centrally managed as a single 

program by the Director, NRO under the guidance of the NRP EXCOM 

and under the direct control of the Secretary of Defense. As stated in 

the DOD/CIA Agreement of August 11, 1965, 1the NRP is a single 

program, national in character, to meet the intelligence needs of the 

Government for the development, management, control and operation 

of all projects, both current and long range for the collection of -intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations)." 

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The scope of CCP and CIP· activities is much broader than that of 

the NRO, in that the NRO is charged only with collection of photographic 

and signal intelligence obtained by covert overflight of areas denied to 

other means of collection. A very limited amount of processing of 

collected information is done by the NRO prior to dissemination of collected information to exploitation, evaluation, analysis and using organizations, but the NRO iteel.:f' hae no assigned reeponsibility for exploitation, 

analysis or the production of finished intelligence. The CIP and the CCP 

on the other hand include activities serving all phases of the intelligence 

process from collection to production of finished intelligence. Requirements for the NRP come from the United States Intelligence Board (USIE) 

only and resources allocated to the NRO serve or:i,ly the purpose of satis- · 

fying these requirements. The CCP and the CIP on the other hand are 

directed toward meeting requirements not only of the USIB but of the JCS, 

the Unified and Specified Commands and Theatre Commanders. These 

differences between the requirements authorities for the NRO, CCP and 

.CIP (which are to a large ·extent made necessary by the differences in the 

needs being met by these organizations) lead to substantial differences in-. 

the management of these programs. For example, the Service cryptologic agencies are under the management of their parent Services and 

their budgets are included in the Service budgets. The need for this 

arrangement arises from the fact that the Service ·cryptologic agencies 

must also carry on COMINT and ELINT related activities for the deployed 

forces of their parent Services which must be responsive to the direction 

of the JCS and the Unified and Specified Commands and lie outside the 

scope of national requirements. The National Security Agency (NSA) has 

overall technical and operational control of those Service activities which 

serve national (USIB) or broad DOD objectives. However, the NSA is not 

responsible for the line management of the collection agencies within the 

Services except as NSA exercises the program budget control through 

participation in the annual CCP review and other program budget actions 

which occur between reviews. Similarly, the DIA does not exercise line 

management of Service intelligence collection and exploitation organizations. The DIA provides DOD-wide guidance and coordinat_ion for intelligence programs but has line management authority and control only of 

those organizations specifically assigned to it, Most of the intelligence 

collection resources are operated by Service components under command 

and control of the Service. Staffs, the JCS, the Unified and Specified Commands and the Theatre Commanders. 

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The NRO differs in another important way from other DOD collection activities. The NRO is not solely a DOD organization although 

the Secretary of Defense is designated as the Executive Agent for the 

management of the NRP. Under the DOD/CIA Agreement of August, 

1965, the NRO is a single national program including the activities of 

both the DOD and the CIA "for the development, management, control 

and operation of a.11 projects, both current s.nd long range for the 

collection of intelligence and of mapping and geodetic information obtained through overflights (excluding peripheral reconnaissance operations)." Within the DOD, in accordance with DOD Directive TS-5105. 23, 

all project managers report directly to the Director, NRO without intervening layers of Service or Agency staffs and fie_ld command management. 

Arrangements with the CIA provide for similar straight line management 

through the Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs. While there are 

some DOD aircraft collection programs contributing to the NRP which 

have been specifically excepted by the Secretary of Defense from the full 

, application of NRO management authority and which operate under the • 

coordinated control of the NRO and other DOD elements, the only satellite collection program so excepted (presumably only during development) 

is the MOL. 

DOD Directive TS-5105. 23 which deals with the NRO provides that 

"The Director, National Reconnaissance Office will be given support aEi 

required from normal staff elements of the military departments and 

agencies concerned, although these staff elements will not participate in 

these project matters except as he specifically requests, and these projects will not be subject to normal Department of Defense staff review. " 

It further provides that the Director, NRO will "keep the Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) personally informed on a regular basis on the status of 

projects of the National Reconnaissance Program." 

There is a notion often expressed within the DOD that because the 

NRP budget is included in the DOD appropriations, the NRf is really a 

DOD program and should be managed in the same 11 normal" fashion as 

all other DOD programs. Since the CIA budget is also included in DOD ;· 

appropriations, it can be seen that this reasoning is circular. In fact, 

since the NRO was created, the Bureau of the Budget has been systematically moving any funds in the CIA budget (other than personnel) having 

to do with overflight reconnaissance into the NRP budget, This was not 

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done with the aim of excluding the CIA from such activities, but 

rather in order to bring all such activities under the centralized management control of the NRO and the NRP Executive Committee (EXCOM). 

Thus, DOD intelligence activities consist of the NRP, an interagency program responding only to national level (USIE) requirements 

and operated by the DOD as Executive Agent, ancl the CCP and CXP 

which serve both national and other DOD needs and which involve both 

specific management responsibilities at OSD level exercised through 

program-budget review committees, and other management responsibilities exercised by DIA and NSA, and still other management responsibilities exercised by the Services. 

Intelligence Requirements and Program Evaluations 

There appear to be two main areas in which it is generally agreed 

that improved procedures for the management of DOD and National intelligence programs would be desirable. The first of these is in the 

establishment of requirements and the second is in the area of overall 

evaluation of ongoing as well as proposed programs which is essential 

to the translation of requirements into collection and exploitation programs. Neither of these functions is exclusively a DOD responsibility. 

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) assisted by the USIB has the 

central national role in the requirements area and the DCI has a staff 

for National Intelligence Program Evaluation (NIPE). However, since 

there is considerable overlap between the national intelligence requirements as defined by the USIB and DOD requirements, there is no clear 

way to separate these. The DOD contributions to the formulation of 

national requirements is through the DOD membership on the USIB and 

its committees. The DOD members of the USIB are the Director of the 

NSA and the Director of the DIA with the chief Service intelligence officers generally participating in USIB activities as non-voting members. 

The Director of the NRO is invited to sit with the USIB whenever a 

matter of common interest is under discussion but generally the Director 

of the NRO does not concern himself with requirements as" such. The 

NRO as a matter of practice however works with the appropriate Committee of the USIE in providing an interchange of information on potential 

system capabilities and costs in relation to potential requirements. 

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The Director of the DIA is responsible for the assembly, integration and validation of all DOD intelligence requirements and the 

assignment of relative priorities to such requirements in accordance 

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with JCS and other DOD guidance. He is also responsible for cooperating 

with the CIA and other intelligence organizations for mutual support, 

common and combined usage of resources and elimination of duplication. 

Howellvor, to the O)t!tent 1:hl'l.t thoae roquirem,mts a.re mQlclod with othor 

requirements and promulgated by the USIB as national requirements, 

they flow directly to the NSA and the NRO as well as other Government 

intelligence organizations. All DOD intelligence organizations (DIA, 

NSA and NRO) are required to conduct their activities in accordance 

with the objectives, requirements and priorities established by the USIB; 

However, in general, the collection and exploitation programs established 

to meet USIB requirements are not subject to any detailed USIB control, 

since the collection programs may in fact, in the case of the CCP and the 

CIP, meet DOD objectives additional to those stated by the USIB. The 

DIA and the NSA therefore have responsibilities both for establishing, 

approving or coordinating programs and for contributing to the -establishment of requirements. The CIA similarly, through the USIB, participates 

in the establishment of requirements and in the conduct of programs to 

satisfy those requirements. On the other hand, with regard to national 

programs, these functions are subject to the authority of the DCI for 

national requirements validation and to the Secretary of Defense for pro-:-

grams to meet the requirements. Only the Executive Committee of the · 

NRP brings together for program review the senior management levels 

of the DOD and the DCI in the persons of the DCI himself and the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense so that both the requirements and the program resource questions can be considered simultaneously. 

Since it is obvious that requirements cannot be realistically established without regard to the availability of resources with which those 

requirements can be satisfied, there have from time to time been suggestions that the EXCOM responsibilities be broadened to include authorities similar to what it has over the NRP to CCP and the CIP. Whereas 

most CIP and CCP activity is primarily concerned with annual program 

budget reviews, the NRP EXCOM maintains contact with all areas of the 

NRP from research and development through operations on a continuing 

basis, and meets whenever there is any significant question affecting 

the NRP including all approvals for initiation of new systems at such 

milestone points as review of requirements in relation to preliminary 

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system configurations and costs, initiation of system definition, approval to proceed with full scale development, approval of major procurements, etc. At any. of these reviews the issues of requirements 

versus cost can be considered. 

"Programs which are conducted outside the usual management and 

command chains of the DOD are subject to continuing pressure for 

"normalization." Functional staffs at all levels of management find 

such programs a continuing source of irritation and inconvenience 

whether or not the programs are successful (a subjective and relative 

judgement at best). Within the office of the Secretary of Defense, 

there has been a continuing effort by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) to bring the NRP within the scope 

of Draft Presidential Memoranda (DPM) and Defense Guidance Memoranda 

(DGM). (Present DOD directives exclude the NRP from these.and other. 

standard program review formats.) In considering this, it must be 

borne in mind that the DPMs and DGMs are not simply essays, evalua-

• tions or analyses. They are part of _the program budget management 

system and constitute decision-making mechanisms. The management 

system is such that the authority of the NRP EXCOM to review and 

approve the NRP budget would in effect be pre-empted by the "normal" 

processes. Even the management of the CCP and the CIP in this way 

would pose considerable problems. 

Functional staffs, including the OSD staff, focus on particular aspects of any DOD activity or operation. In the case of forces and 

activities which constitute major concerns of one or another of the 

Services, the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs have broad responsibilities in the formulation of the requirements, the allocation of 

resources, the management of research and development, procurement, 

logistics and the operations of forces and facilities as part of operational commands. Moreover, these officials have direct and frequent 

meetings with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and can 

discuss the pros and cons of any issue with them and with the senior 

OSD staff. Therefore, the Secretary of :Uefense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have available to them on any major issue the judgments 

of persons having both functional and program responsibilities. 

On the other hand, because intelligence organizations and activities 

are managed in the various ways described above with fragmentation of 

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responsibilities for requirements, resource allocations, line manage• 

ment, and operational control there is no straightforward way in which 

the diverse factors bearing upon program decisions and the pros and 

cons of the issues could be brought under direct discussion at the Secre• 

tary of Defense level. No senior official at the Secretarial level of the 

Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense has a major and sufficiently 

encompassing role in the overall intelligence management pro.cess to 

have the time, the motivation or the necessary information to present 

a balanced view. Moreover, unlike the problems associated with the 

force structure decisions which generally relate to operations to be 

conducted in the distant future, the intelligence program decisions even 

when they relate to projects in development are generally intimately con"'.' 

nected with ongoing operations. Since most intelligence programs in the· 

CCP and CIP and all of those in the NRP are directed toward peacetime 

intelligence acquisition rather than those which 'would occur upon the 

outbreak of major hostilities, informed decisions can only be made in the 

light of current problems and current operational experience. 

The chain of participants in deriving intelligence information from 

collection to end use is long and complex. Moreover, the users in DOD 

and elsewhere often see intelligence information in "finished" form only 

with little, if any, indications as to which collection systems made major 

contributions to the end product. This is particularly true with respect 

to information derived from SIG INT. The net result is that evaluation of 

the importance and "value" of collection programs tend to be very subjective and are based on rather narrow and limited considerations, if 

indeed such evaluations are made at all. The feedback from evaluations 

to the development of requirements for new collection systems accordingly 

has the same disabilities and is further corn.plicated by the fact that many 

-DOD developments are undertaken by agencies far removed from either · 

the collection or exploitation of intelligence. 

Recommendations for Improvement of Intelligence Program Management 

There has been much attention given to the subject of improving 

intelligence program management over the past several years. One 

recurring idea which has been discussed has been the expansion of the 

charter of the EXCOM to include review and approval of all DOD intelligence programs. 

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The suggestion that the NRP EXCOM be broadened to include review of all DOD intelligence programs is grossly unrealistic. Aside 

from the fact the differences in management in the CCP and CIP from 

the NRP would pose numerous administrative problems and vastly expand the number of organizations and people involved with the EXCOM, 

there is also the fact that such an expansion of the function of the EX;. 

COM would necessarily change its mode of operations. 

In order for such a committee to function effectively in formulating 

and guiding a major program, it must have and hold the attention of top 

management in the agencies involved. This is the case with the NRP 

Executive Committee and is the key to its success in carrying out its ' 

responsibilities. An expansion of the scope of matters under the cognizance of this committee beyond the area now under its purview would 

only serve to dilute the attention to detail and the depth of understanding with which problems are considered. Adding the CIP and the CCP 

to the EXCOM's charter and expanding its membership to members of 

government departments not directly concerned with the implementation 

of the NRP would submerge the principals in a vast expansion of activity, 

result in increased delegation of responsibility for review and approval 

to lower staff echelons and would in effect "normalize II the operation of 

the NRP: Such action would not gain for other intelligence activities the 

management benefits which are apparently seen in the EXCOM method 

of operation; rather, it would lose such benefits for the NRP. 

There have been numerous oth~r previous recommendations as to 

how Department of Defense intelligence programs could be better 

managed. The rationale for such proposals usually begins by asserting 

that the NRP arrangement is relatively satisfactory, but the proposal 

itself then turns out to consist of a plan which would radically alter the 

method of managing the NRP and would result in a loss of many of the 

benefits of the present method of management, The notion of an ex~ 

panded EXCOM is one example of such a plan. Another plan frequently 

proposed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis is 

simply to put intelligence matters into the same set of management pro- · 

cedures and formats as are used for all other programs; as far as Systems Analysis is concerned, the problem will be solved when intelligence 

programs are covered by DPMs and/or DGMs. Insofar as .the NRP is 

concerned I have repeatedly objected to this approach since it completely 

ignores the interagency character of the program and would establish 

unworkable dual lines of management. The specifics of the arguments 

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against the Systems Analysis proposals are contained in the memoranda 

from the DNRO to Deputy Secretaries of Defense Vance and Nitze in response to initiatives by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems · 

Analysis) (Attachments 1 and 2). 

The SIGINT area in particular has come in for much study and 

critical review. The Eaton Committee, which was established by the 

DCI at the request of the White House, put forward a draft report in 

which it was proposed that authority over the SIGINT programs of the 

NRP be given to DIA and NSA with DIA to be responsible for ELINT 

and NSA to be responsible for COMINT. Aside from the impracticality 

of this suggestion, 

the proposal was very strange in that. it 

would introduce into the NRP the very problems of fragmented manage- ., 

ment, command and operational control which the draft report identified in the CCP and was presumably attempting to correct. The NRO 

comments on the draft Eaton report are contained in Attachment 3. In 

view of these and other comments, the Eaton Committee did not include 

in its final report these recommendations to fragment the management 

of the satellite SIGINT programs. The comments in Attachment 3, however, are of more than historic interest since the Bureau of the Budget 

recently resurrected the very recommendations which the Eaton Com-• 

mittee dropped (BOB Paper of March 3, 1969, BYE 11659/69A). The 

Eaton Committee in its final report did call for more formal and standard 

arrangements for tasking and control of NRO SIG INT operations by NSA. 

NRO comments on this paper are given in Attachment 4 and are substantially to the effect that such working arrangements are formulated in 

detail for each NRO SIGINT program; the programs are different in 

character and nothing would be gained by attempting to standardize these 

arrangements. To the contrary, there would be a considerable loss of 

flexibility and effectiveness. Existing DOD Directives are adequate to 

define the responsibilities of the NSA and the NRO in satellite SIGINT 

programs, 

Management of Intelligence Programs at Secretary of Defense Level 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has during the past hvo :..7.d.mimstrations been the principal senior officer of the DOD concerned with 

overall intelligence program management. However, the amount of time 

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the amount of staff support which he requires depend to a very large 

degree on the division of duties between the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Under Mr. McNamara, Mr. Vance found it possible to 

devote enough of his own time to intelligence program management so that 

very little OSD formal directed staff study was conducted relative to the 

a.:t'fa.irs ot the NRO. Under the working O.l."ro.ngomenta which prov~iled 

when Mr. Clifford was Secretary of Defense, Mr. Nitze found it necessary to increasingly rely on ad hoc staff working groups, particularly 

as the BOB raised major questions in regard to the validity of intelligence requirements. It should be noted that there is no separate review 

of requirements in relation to the resources necessary for their satisfaction conducted within the DOD when DOD requirements are forwarded 

to the USIB to be incorporated as national requirements. Such reviews 

tend to take place only when specific intelligence programs are proposed 

to satisfy the USIB (and internal DOD} requirements. There is considerable room for improvement in the procedures for relating requirements 

to resources even before the DOD inputs are made to the USIB. However, 

short of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, there is no authority within the 

DOD who can maintain a continuing and coordinated overview of such 

matters. This has led to many' suggestions for additional OSD staff including the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 

While such an official could probably make major improvements in intelligence program management within the DOD, it is not at all clear that such 

a function would fit logically into the structure of Assistant Secretaries . 

. For one thing, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence would be 

concerned with a program, and on-going operations, not a staff function. 

For another, it does not appear that the size of the supporting staff required should be allowed to grow to that usually associated with an Assist..; 

ant Secretary of Defense. 

There are adequate staff resources available in the DOD components 

currently engaged in various intelligence matters (DIA, NSA, NRO, 

DDR&E, etc.) to carry out all necessary review, evaluation, analysis 

and coordination of functions if given proper guidance and direction. 

What is needed is an individual (Special Assistant) who for intelligence 

purposes could be alter ego to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. His 

staff should be very small (4 or 5 people at most). His duties and responsibilities would be not only to assist the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

in internal management affairs but also to act as the principal focal point 

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for contacts with the NIPE staff of the DCI, the USIB and the intelligence 

community at large. The Special Assistant for Intelligence could provide 

guidance for the coordination of all DOD intelligence programs in a 

manner consistent with their separate and distinct management relationships. He would also endeavor to establish and improve procedures and 

techniques for overall program evaluation. At the present time, the·, , 

Target Ol"ien.t(:lcl Displo.y (TO:0) ie tho only method in use r'11presenting: a.n 

attempt to accomplish this task. However, the Target Oriented Display 

has a great many weaknesses and great care must be exercised in attempting to draw conclusions affecting specific programs from it. The 

difficulties in drawing conclusions from the Target Oriented Display as it 

affects the NRP are illustrated in Attachment 5 which contains NRO comments on conclusions drawn from the TOD by OASD (Systems Analysis). 

In summary, it appears that the coordination and integration of DOD 

intelligence requirements and programs can best be accomplished by a 

Special Assistant working closely with the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 

His staff should be small and he should rely heavily on tasking the staffs 

of DOD intelligence organizations already in existence for carrying out 

program evaluations, requirements validations and resource allocation 

studies. In the final analysis the management of intelligence programs 

because of their sensitivity, the existing relations with other government 

departments and the President's office, and the need for coordinating 

operations and activities scattered throughout the entire Department of 

Defense, will still require the personal attention of the Deputy Secretary 

of Defense. A Special Assistant for Intellig~nce can, however, make 

important contributions to doing the job more effectively. 

\ 

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