* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30153

Summary Calendar

DAVID BRATTON

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION PENSION PLAN

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette

Case No. 6:06-CV-1747

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and STEWART and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff David Bratton appeals the summary judgment in favor of

Defendant Schlumberger Technology Corporation Pension Plan. Bratton argues

that he has established genuine issues of material fact for each element of his

ERISA estoppel claim. We affirm.

As an employee of Schlumberger Technology Corporation, David Bratton

participated in the Pension Plan. Bratton was terminated on February 4, 1999,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 12, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30153

1 Bratton argues that his reliance upon the SABL statements was reasonable because

the Summary PlanDisclosure stated,“Youcan find information on the Pension Plan (including

your accrued pension benefit) 24 hours a day, seven days a week on SABL . . . .”

2

and began receiving pension benefits in November 1999. Bratton sued

Schlumberger in October 2000 and settled on confidential terms in October 2001.

Schlumberger reinstated Bratton on November 1, 2001. During the period

between his termination and reinstatement, Bratton received $40,098.25 in

pension payments from the Plan. When he retired from Schlumberger and

began receiving pension payments from the plan in February 2007, his benefits

were reduced because of the earlier payments.

Bratton sued the Plan, arguing that estoppel prevents this reduction

because he relied upon the Plan’s statements that his benefits would not be

reduced. Bratton asserts that he relied upon statements in the Summary Plan

Description1 and the Schlumberger Automated Benefits Link (“SABL”), an

electronic benefits information system, in settling his 2001 lawsuit. The district

court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Bratton appeals.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standards as the district court. Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d

243, 248 (5th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper when the movant can

demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). On review

of a grant of summary judgment, all facts and inferences must be construed in

the light most favorable to the non-movant. Kirschbaum, 526 F.3d at 248.

To establish an ERISA estoppel claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a

material misrepresentation, (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance upon the

misrepresentation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances. Mello v. Sara Lee

Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc.,

532 F.3d 364, 374 (5th Cir. 2008); High v. E-Systems, Inc., 459 F.3d 573, 579 (5th
No. 08-30153

3

Cir. 2006). Because ERISA estoppel poses a legal theory and not interpretation

of the plan’s terms, this Court reviews the Administrative Committee’s decision

to reduce benefits de novo. Mello, 431 F.3d at 444.

This discussion is limited to whether Bratton reasonably and

detrimentally relied upon the SABL statements in settling his lawsuit. Bratton

introduced no evidence that he accessed SABL in the period between his

termination and reinstatement, when he decided to settle his suit. Bratton did

not submit any printouts of SABL statements dated before the settlement, and

his affidavit does not assert that he used the system during this period.

In an affidavit, Suzanna Newell, the Administrative Support Manager for

the Plan for the past twelve years, stated, “An active employee’s pension benefit

estimate first became available on SABL as of February 1, 2002. Before that

date, individual pension benefit estimates were not available on SABL.” She

further explained that only active employees can obtain this information through

SABL—Bratton was inactive between his termination and reinstatement. In

light of Newell’s affidavit, Bratton’s conclusory assertions, “I periodically

downloaded SABL’s statements of my accrued pension balances both before and

after my settlement of my lawsuit” and “In reliance upon . . . SABL’s statement

of my accrued pension balance, I settled my lawsuit,” do not establish a genuine

issue of material fact. See Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 376

n.33 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[C]onclusory statements in an affidavit do not provide facts

that will counter summary judgment evidence . . . .”) (internal citation omitted).

Even if a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Bratton

accessed SABL in the period between his termination and settlement, no issue

exists as to whether that reliance was reasonable. See Mello, 431 F.3d at 447

(finding reliance unreasonable). The SABL statements submitted by Bratton

clearly state, “This is only an estimate and is not a guarantee of a benefit. Your

personal data in SABL is taken from many different sources and is subject to
No. 08-30153

4

correction.” If Bratton intended that the settlement have a particular effect on

his pension benefits, then he was unreasonable unilaterally to rely upon an

informal estimate of pension benefits instead of negotiating for this result.

Bratton asserts that in settling, he intended that his later retirement

benefits would not be reduced by the benefits received during this period,

effectively allowing him to receive the same benefits twice. Even if Bratton had

gained access to the SABLestimates, it was unreasonable for him to assume this

outcome, rather than negotiating for it as part of the settlement. This

assumption is particularly unreasonable in light of the Plan’s terms: “Any

distribution . . . shall, to the extent of any such distribution, fully release and

discharge the Trustee, the Administrator and the Employer from any and all

claims of the Participant.” While this provision does not prevent Bratton from

pursuing an ERISA estoppel claim, it does mean that Bratton was unreasonable

in his belief that he could collect the same benefits twice.

Because no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Bratton

reasonably and detrimentally relied upon the SABL statements, the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plan is AFFIRMED.