J-S75032-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

TRICIA A. KLINGER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

EDWARD R. GEIGER, JR., :

:

Appellant : No. 1073 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered March 7, 2016 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,

Domestic Relations Division, No(s): DR-116715 PACSES 14510478

BEFORE: BOWES, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2016

Edward R. Geiger, Jr. (“Geiger”), appeals from the March 7, 2016 

Order (hereinafter the “Support Order”), which made final a prior Order 

requiring him to pay child support, in the amount of $232 per month, to 

Tricia A. Klinger (“Klinger”), the mother of Geiger’s minor child. We affirm.

The trial court thoroughly set forth the relevant factual and procedural 

history, which we adopt herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 

5/26/16, at 1-8.

In this timely appeal, Geiger presents the following issues for our 

review:

A. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion 

and/or error of law by failing to enter a written order 

consistent with the trial court’s specific decision stated at 

[the] conclusion of the [January 27, 2016] de novo hearing 

[(hereinafter “the de novo hearing”)], including that the 

support matter would be dismissed, the trial court would 

direct [Domestic Relations Office (“DRO”)] case workers to 

contact [Klinger], and if [Klinger] intended to pursue the 
J-S75032-16

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matter, the case would be relisted for a conference/hearing, 

and[,] instead, denied [Geiger’s] de novo request for [a] 

hearing?

B. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion 

and/or error of law by failing to deny and dismiss the support 

Petition in response to the multiple and cumulative arguments 

of [Geiger,] where [he] argued that the support matter was 

improperly commenced[,] in violation of Pa.R.C.P. [] 1910.3; 

that there was no evidence of a substantial change in his 

earning[] capacity; that, absent such evidence of a change, 

res judicata barred the re-litigation of his earning[] capacity; 

and further, that the trial court should have compelled 

[Klinger’s] attendance (in some form) at the [de novo] 

hearing?

C. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion 

and/or error of law by failing to conduct a full and fair de 

novo hearing as required by Pennsylvania law and the Rules 

of Civil Procedure?

D. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion 

and/or error of law by making findings and conclusions of law 

where no testimony or facts of record exist to support the 

trial court’s determinations regarding [Geiger’s] and 

[Klinger’s] earnings, as well as [Geiger’s] support obligation, 

and further, by disregarding the prior, uncontradicted findings 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County regarding 

[Geiger’s] earning[] capacity and support obligation?

Brief for Appellant at 5 (capitalization omitted).

A parent’s financial obligation to his children is absolute, “and the 

purpose of child support is to promote the child’s best interests.” Morgan v. 

Morgan, 99 A.3d 554, 557 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). We review 

a child support order for an abuse of discretion. J.P.D. v. W.E.D., 114 A.3d 

887, 889 (Pa. Super. 2015); see also Style v. Shaub, 955 A.2d 403, 406 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that “[t]he trial court possesses wide discretion as 
J-S75032-16

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to the proper amount of child support and a reviewing court will not interfere 

with the determination of the court below unless there has been a clear 

abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted)). Additionally, “[t]he fact-finder is 

entitled to weigh the evidence presented and assess its credibility[.]” Samii 

v. Samii, 847 A.2d 691, 697 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

In his first issue, Geiger argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion “where the trial court stated its decision to grant [Geiger’s] 

request at the de novo [] hearing, and further, where all counsel agreed with 

the trial court’s decision, and yet, the trial court then issued [the] directly 

contradictory [Support O]rder denying [Geiger’s] request.” Brief for 

Appellant at 11.1 According to Geiger, at the de novo hearing, “the trial 

court [judge] plainly and unequivocally stated that the existing support case 

would be dismissed, [and] Northampton [County] DRO would contact 

[Klinger] to determine whether she wished to proceed with a claim for 

support against [Geiger.]” Id. at 12. Geiger further asserts that “at the 

conclusion of the ... [de novo] hearing, the trial court [] stated that [Klinger] 

would need to file a new petition for support[, to] which [Geiger’s] counsel 

 

1 To the extent that Geiger presents other, unrelated arguments under the 

same subheading of his first issue, see Brief for Appellant at 15-16, 19-21, 

these arguments are not fairly suggested by the Statement of Questions 

Involved section of Geiger’s brief, nor did he raise them before the trial 

court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (stating that “[n]o question will be considered 

unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly 

suggested thereby.”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that a claim cannot be 

raised for the first time on appeal). Accordingly, these arguments are 

waived. See id.
J-S75032-16

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and [Klinger’s] counsel agreed.” Id. at 13. Pointing to the purportedly 

“contrary” Support Order, however, Geiger challenges “the trial court’s 

failure to adhere to its own decision[, i.e., at the de novo hearing,] as well 

as the agreement of counsel ....” Id. at 14.

In its thorough Opinion, the trial court addressed Geiger’s claims and 

determined that they do not entitle him to relief. See Trial Court Opinion, 

5/26/16, at 12-17. The trial court’s cogent reasoning is supported by the 

record and the law, and we therefore affirm on this basis as to Geiger’s first 

issue. See id.

In his connection with his second issue, Geiger asserts several subissues, which he summarizes as follows: 

i. [] [T]he support matter was improperly commenced[, i.e., 

purportedly by Northampton County DRO,] in violation of 

Pa.R.C.P. Rule 1910.3; 

ii. [] the matter was barred by operation of Res Judicata due to 

the prior determination by the Carbon County Court of 

Common Pleas’ [] regarding [Geiger’s] earning[] capacity; 

iii. [] the matter was barred by operation of Res Judicata and 

[Klinger’s] abandonment of her prior case in Carbon County; 

iv. [] despite [Geiger] requesting a de novo hearing, and the 

hearing notice requiring both parties to appear, [Klinger] 

failed to appear. [Geiger’s] counsel asserted that [Klinger] 

abandoned her appeal, and in the alternative, [requested] 

that the trial court compel [Klinger] to appear; 

v. [] alternatively, there was no evidence of a change in 

[Geiger’s] earning[] capacity from the prior [O]rder of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County; [and]
J-S75032-16

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vi. [Geiger] also notes that he may have raised additional 

arguments had the court conducted a proper de novo 

hearing[, i.e., had the court stated at the de novo hearing its 

intention to “dismiss” Geiger’s claim]. 

Brief for Appellant at 22; see also id. at 22-28 (expounding upon these 

claims).

The trial court thoroughly addressed Geiger’s second issue in its 

Opinion, set forth the relevant law, and determined that the issue and each 

sub-issue lacked merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/16, at 18-27. The 

trial court’s cogent reasoning is supported by the record and the law, and we 

therefore affirm on this basis concerning Geiger’s second issue. See id.

In his third issue, Geiger argues that the trial court erred and 

prejudiced him by failing to conduct a full and fair de novo hearing. See

Brief for Appellant at 29-32. Specifically, Geiger asserts that 

by filing for de novo review, [Geiger] did not request that the 

trial court simply review the findings of the hearing officer to 

determine whether such findings were appropriate; to the 

contrary, ... [Geiger] wanted a full reconsideration (i.e.[,] a new 

hearing) of his case. Yet, the trial court did not conduct a full 

hearing.

Id. at 31 (citing Warner v. Pollock, 644 A.2d 747, 750 (Pa. Super. 1994) 

(stating that “[a] de novo hearing is full consideration of the case anew. The 

reviewing body is in effect substituted for the prior decision maker[,] and 

re[-]decides the case.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see 

also Brief for Appellant at 31 (pointing out that [Klinger] did not appear at 

the de novo hearing, and asserting that the trial court improperly thereafter 
J-S75032-16

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“issue[d] an [O]rder directly and inexplicably contrary to its own decision 

announced in open court[,]” which, Geiger argues, deprived him of a full de 

novo review. (emphasis omitted)).

The trial court addressed Geiger’s third issue in its Opinion, set forth 

the relevant law, and determined that he was, in fact, afforded a full and fair 

de novo hearing. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/16, at 28-30; see also id.

at 24-25. We agree with the trial court’s rationale and determination, and 

thus affirm on this basis as to this issue. See id. at 28-30.

Finally, Geiger asserts that,

as argued throughout this [brief], ... the trial court committed an 

error of law and/or abuse of discretion by making findings and 

conclusions of law where no testimony or facts of record exist to 

support the trial court’s determinations, and further[,] by 

disregarding the prior, uncontradicted findings of the Court of 

[C]ommon [P]leas of Carbon County regarding [Geiger’s] 

earning[] capacity and support obligation.

Brief for Appellant at 33.

In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Geiger’s final issue, correctly 

observed that it is “essentially a restatement of several aspects of the 

previous issues raised[,]” and determined that the issue did not entitle 

Geiger to relief. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/26/16, at 30-31. We agree with 

the trial court’s rationale and determination, and thus affirm on this basis 

concerning Geiger’s final issue. See id.
J-S75032-16

- 7 -

Accordingly, because we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion 

by the trial court in conducting the de novo hearing, or entering the Support 

Order, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/5/2016
lAllll nllTC· nc:ne:..r1n1 ~ 

Geiger, at $120.00 per month plus $25.00 for arrears. See. Order of 

ORIGINAL TO DOCKETING 5/26/2016 

SUPERIOR COURT OF PA 

HONORABLE PAUlAA. ROSCIOLI 

1 JOSEPH V. SEBELIN JR .. ESQ. 

PLAINTIFF 

RUTH VEGA-VELEZ (DRS DIRECTOR) 

Order of Court setting child support for one (1) child, Shawnee D. 

Section (hereinafter the "Carbon County Court") entered a Modified 

2011, the Carbon County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations 

August 2010, when it was transferred to Carbon County. On Ju!y 28, 

remained in Schuylkill County, through several modifications, until 

for the support of one (1) child on June 27, 2007. The matter 

and dates back to 2007. Plaintiff, Tricia Klinger, filed her Complaint 

The instant matter originated in Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania 

Edward Geiger's appeal of our Order of Court dated March 7, 2016. 

This matter is currently before the Superior Court on Defendant 

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

following statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. No. 1925(a): 

AND NOW, this 26th day of May 2016, the Court issues the 

PASCES No.: 145101478 

} Docket No.: DR-116715 

} 

) 

) 

) 

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} 

} 

Defendant ) 

EDWARD R. GEIGER, JR. 

v. 

Plaintiff 

TRICIA A. KLINGER, 

Sup. Ct. No.: 1073 EDA 20:m 

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PENNSYLVANIA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 1925(a) 

STATEMENT 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

DOMESTIC RELATIONS SECTION 

Circulated 11 /02/2016 04:01 PM 
2 

Court, 7/28/2011, Klinger v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon 

County). Arrears as of that date were set at $0.00. Id. In calculating 

the support amount, the Carbon County Court utilized a monthly net 

income for Defendant of $1,146.04 and Plaintiff's net monthly income 

of $1,247.57. Id. 

On March 2, 2015, Defendant filed a Petition for Modification of 

Child Support. See, Domestic Relations Office Hearing Officer's 

Report, 6/2/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon 

County). On March 23, 2015, the Carbon County Court entered an 

Order terminating support without prejudice, effective 2/26/2015, 

based upon the fact that Defendant's unemployment benefits had run 

out, that Defendant was unemployed, and Defendant had no income or 

assets to warrant a support obligation. See, Order, 3/23/2015, Klinger 

v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon County). The Court also noted 

that Defendant would be placed in the DRS Job Search program. Id. 

Finally, the Court noted that, "[a]s neither parties now reside in 

Carbon County, defendant's portion shall be transferred to 

Northampton County." Id. Also on March 23, 2015, the Carbon 

County Court entered an "Order - Work Search and Report" requiring 

Defendant to participate in the Work Search Program requiring 

Defendant to report to DRS, as required by DRS, with a list of potential 

employers he had contacted, submit applications to prospective 
3 

Id. 

The financial obligation is to be 

reviewed/Conferenced for further 

determination upon the Defendant attaining 

employment, income or assets that are 

available to pay support. The Defendant is 

ordered to immediately report to the Domestic 

Relations Section any changes in his/her 

employment, income, and assets, or Medical 

capability to return to work. If incarcerated, 

the defendant must report to the Domestic 

Relations Section within one week of released 

from incarceration for further determination of 

ability to pay support. 

Court indicated as follows: 

without prejudice as of February 16, 2015. Id. The Carbon County 

136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon County). Any arrears were remitted 

Suspended Order/ Non-Financial Order, 3/23/2015, Klinqer v. Geiger, 

Defendant will be able to pay in the foreseeable future." See, 

income or assets and there is no reasonable prospect that the 

2/16/2015 because the Defendant was "unable to pay, has no known 

indicated that Defendant's financial obligation was set to zero effective 

a "Suspended Order/ Non-Financial Order" in which the Court 

Id. Additionally on March 23, 2015, the Carbon County Court entered 

Defendant's first report was due to DRS no later than April 17, 2015. 

3/23/2015, Klinger v. Geiqer, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon County). 

seven days of acquiring a job. See, Order - Work Search and Report, 

employers as required by DRS, and to notify DRS in writing within 
4 

As all the pending matters have been resolved, 

this case is currently open as an N FOB (NonFinancial Obligation). The defendant is under a 

Work Search and Report Order dated 

03/23/2015 as the defendant was found to 

have no income, at that time, to warrant a 

support obligation. 

As neither parties reside in Carbon County, and 

per the defendant's written consent, this child 

support case #145101478, Docket#l36DR11 

an Order stating as follows: 

Carbon County). On July 30, 2015, the Carbon County Court entered 

Office.'' See, Order, 6/2/20151 Klinger v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. 

shall be transferred to Northampton County Domestic Relations 

the "matters pending before this Court have been resolved. The case 

based upon Hearing Officer Diehl's recornmendatlon, indicating that 

at p, 2. On June 2, 2015, the Carbon County Court entered an Order, 

child [support] order which may be entered between the parties." Id. 

the Defendant resides. This should aid in enforcement of any future 

County, the case shall be transferred to Northampton County where 

in her Findings of Fact that "[a]s neither party resides in Carbon 

March 23, 2015 Orders on the record. Id. Hearing Officer Diehl noted 

parties on May 29, 2015. Id. Plaintiff withdrew her appeal of the 

(Com. Pl. Carbon County). A short de novo hearing was held with the 

Hearing Officer's Report, 6/2/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 

County Court's March 23, 2015 Orders. See, Domestic Relations Office 

On April 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a timely appeal of the Carbon 
5 

Relations, Ruth Vega-Velez1 filed a Petition for Review of the instant 

on October 13, 2015, the Director of Northampton County Domestic 

After acceptance and registration of the Carbon County Order, 

Northampton County). 

Confirmation, 10/1/15, Klinger v. Geiger, DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. 

the Court of NORTHAMPTON County. See1 Order of Registration and 

$0.00 as of August 141 2015, is hereby registered and confirmed by 

became effective February 15, 2015, and in which there are arrears of 

pay $0.00 per month for Shawnee D. Geiger born 02/17 /99 which 

the state of Pennsylvania, whereby the Defendant has been directed to 

Support Order Number 136DR11 issued by the Carbon County Court in 

an Order of Registration and Confirmation indicating that the Foreign 

Northampton County). On October 1, 2015, the undersigned entered 

Registration Statement, Kl Inger v. Geiger, D R-116 715 (Com. Pl. 

and the matter was docketed at the instant docket number. See, 

the Registration Statement from Carbon County on August 19, 2015 

The Northampton County Domestic Relations Section received 

County). 

See, Order, 7/30/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon 

from Carbon County shall be transferred to 

Northampton county Domestic Relations 

Section. 

Upon acceptance of the transfer from 

Northampton County, the Carbon County case 

will be closed. 
6 

matter on behalf of Domestic Relations Section to review the nonfinancial obligation dated 3/23/15 and the prior support award dated 

7/28/11. See, Petition for Review, 10/13/2016, Klinger v. Geiger, DR0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton County). On October 13, 2015, upon 

consideration of the Petition, the Court agreed that the circumstances 

warranted review. Id. 

The parties were ordered to appear for a modification conference 

scheduled for November 16, 2015. On that date, Defendant appeared 

with his counsel before Conference Officer Nicole Lockhart (hereinafter 

"Lockhart"). See, Summary of Trier of Fact, November 16, 2015, 

Klinger v. Geiger, DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton County). 

Plaintiff was not required to appear in person, but submitted 6 months 

of pay stubs and an income and expense statement. Id. Plaintiff's 

adjusted monthly net income was determined to be $1,797.00. Id. At 

the conference, Defendant reported that he was unemployed and that 

he last worked in 2011 for a temp agency doing full time, seasonal 

work earning $12.00 per hour. Id. Defendant reported that he had 

collected unemployment following his last job, but that those 

payments terminated in 2012. Id. Defendant reported that he sees a 

physician every 2 months, but did not report when the last 

appointment had occurred and produced no medical documentation or 

physician verification form as set forth in the conference notice. Id. 
7 

Defendant indicated that he had not filed for Social Security Disability 

benefits following his 2011 employment. Id. 

Lockhart recommended that Defendant be assessed an earning 

capacity from the PA Occupational Wage Survey as a laborer with an 

annual salary of $19,530.00. As a result, Defendant was determined 

to have an assessed earning capacity resulting in an adjusted monthly 

net income of $1,355.00. Id. Lockhart determined that Defendant's 

support obligation for the one child at issue would be $317.00 per 

month, however, after considering Defendant's multiple family 

obligation, and including that in the calculation of support, the 

guideline support amount totaled $193.00 per month. Id. 

On November 16, 2015, the undersigned entered an Order in 

accordance with Lockhart's recommendation. See, Order, 11/16/2015, 

Klinger v. Geiger, DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton County). 

Defendant was ordered to pay monthly support in the amount of 

$232.001 allocated $193.00 for basic support and $39.00 for arrears. 

Id. Plaintiff was ordered to provide medical insurance coverage and 

Defendant was held responsible for 43°/o of unreimbursed medical 

expenses. Id. The Order specificaHy took into account the multiple 

family calculation for Defendant. Id. On November 30, 2015, 

Defendant filed a written demand for a de novo hearing, which was 

scheduled for January 27, 2016. 
8 

On January 27, 2016, Defendant and his counsel appeared 

before the undersigned. Plaintiff was represented by Title IV-D 

counsel Stephen Mowrey, but did not personally attend. See, Notes of 

Transcript (N.T.), De Novo Hearing, 1/27/2016, Klinger v, Geiqer, DR0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton County). On March 7, 2016, we 

entered the Order currently before the Superior Court. Our March 7, 

2016 Order provided that, following the January 27, 2016 hearing, and 

"after a full review of the record" the November 16, 2015 Order of 

Court was made final. See, Order, 3/7/2016, Klinger v. Geiger, DR0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton County). The March 7, 2016 Order 

specifically noted that the Carbon County Order was registered 

effective 10/1/15 and that the Carbon County Court had terminated 

the financial obligation but had placed Defendant in a non-financial 

obligation status. Id. The March 7, 2016 Order noted that the 

Northampton County Domestic Relations Section had petitioned the 

Court to review the matter upon accepting the registration of the 

Order and that, as was set forth in the November 16, 2015 Order, it 

was appropriate to assess Defendant an earning capacity. Id. 

On April 1, 2016, Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal of the 

March 7, 2016 Order. Also on April 1, 2016, Defendant filed a 1925(b) 

Statement. See, Defendant/Appellant Edward Geiger's 1925(b) 

Statement, 4/1/2016, Klinger v. Geiger, DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. 
9 

1. This Honorable Court committed an error of 

law and/or abuse of discretion by failing to 

enter a written order consistent with the Order 

that this honorable Court stated at the time of 

the hearing. Specifically, on the date of the 

hearing Defendant intended to present multiple 

arguments regarding Plaintiff's support case 

against Defendant. In particular, Defendant's 

counsel asserted the following: 

i. That the support matter was 

improperly commenced in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 

1910.3; 

il. That the matter was barred by 

operation of Res Judicata due to the prior 

determination by the Carbon County Court of 

Common Pleas' decision regarding Defendant's 

earning capacity; 

iii. That the matter was barred by 

operation of Res Judlcata and the Plaintiffs 

abandonment of her prior case in Carbon 

County; 

iv. That despite Defendant requesting a 

de novo hearing and the hearing notice 

requiring both parties to appear, Plaintiff failed 

to appear. Defendant's counsel asserted that 

Plaintiff abandoned her appeal and in the 

alternative asserted that the trial court compel 

Plaintiff to appear; 

v. That, alternatively, there was no 

evidence of a change in Defendant's earnings 

capacity from the prior order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Carbon County. 

Upon Defendant raising these arguments and 

the Honorable Trial Court reviewing the Order 

of the Court of Common Pleas, the Trial Court 

stated that the support matter would be 

dismissed the Court would direct DRO case 

workers to contact the Plaintiff and if Plaintiff 

intended to pursue the matter, the case would 

be re-listed for a hearing. Nonetheless, the 

follows: 

Northampton). Defendant raised four ( 4) alleged errors, stating as 
10 

4. In the alternative, that the trial court 

committed an error of law and/or abuse of 

discretion by making findings and conclusions 

3. In the alternative, that the trial court failed 

to afford Defendant a full and fair de nova 

hearing as required by Pennsylvania Law and 

the Rules of Civil Procedure. 

2. In the alternative, the trial court committed 

an error of law and/or abuse of discretion by 

failing to consider Defendant's arguments 

raised at the de nova hearing, including the 

following: 

i. That the support matter was 

improperly commenced in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 

1910.3; 

ii. That the matter was barred by 

operation of Res Judicata due to the prior 

determination by the Carbon County Court of 

Common Pleas' decision regarding Defendant's 

earning ca pa city; 

iii. That the matter was barred by 

operation of Res Judicata and the Plaintiffs 

abandonment of her prior case in Carbon 

County; 

iv. That despite Defendant requesting a 

de novo hearing and the hearing notice 

requiring both parties to appear, Plaintiff failed 

to appear. Defendants counsel asserted that 

Plaintiff abandoned her appeal and in the 

alternative asserted that the trial court compel 

Plaintiff to appear; 

v. That, alternatively, there was no 

evidence of a change in Defendant's earnings 

capacity form the prior order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Carbon County; 

vi. Defendant also notes that he may 

have raised additional arguments had the court 

conducted a proper de nova hearing. 

Trial Court failed to enter an order consistent 

with these terms stated by the Trial Court at 

the time of the conclusion of the hearing. 
11 

Koller, 481 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. 1984). The role of an appellate 

upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. Id., citing, Koller v. 

793, 794 (Pa. Super. 1985). A finding of abuse will be made only 

discretion in fashioning the award."' Id., quoting, Fee v. Fee, 496 A.2d 

there· is insufficient evidence to sustain it or the court abused its 

appeal, a trial court's child support order will not be disturbed unless 

quoting, Ritter v. Ritter, 518 A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. Super. 1986). "'On 

be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id., 

determine the amount of a support Order, and its judgment should not 

1317 (Pa. Super. 1988). It is within the trial court's discretion to 

limited in child support cases. See, Haley v. Haley, 549 A.2d 1316, 

It is well established that the Superior Court's scope of review is 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Defendant are without merit. 

We respectfully submit that each of the issues raised by 

4/1/2016, Klinger v. Geiger, DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton). 

See, Defendant/Appellant Edward Geiger's 1925{b) Statement, 

of law where no testimony or facts of record 

exist to support the trial courts determinations 

regarding Defendant's and Plaintiff's earnings, 

as well as Defendant's support obligation, and 

further, by disregarding the prior 

uncontradicted findings of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Carbon County regarding 

Defendant's earning capacity and support 

obligation. 
12 

dismissed, the Court would direct DRO case workers to contact Plaintiff 

Pleas, the Trial Court stated that the support matter would be 

honorable Trial Court reviewing the Order of the Court of Common 

states that "[u]pon Defendant raising these arguments and the 

Defendant lists a series of arguments that counsel asserted, then 

of the hearing." See, Defendant's 1925(b) Statement at ,i 1. 

consistent with the Order that this Honorable Court stated at the time 

abused our discretion when we "failed to enter a written Order 

Defendant first arques that we committed an error of law or 

A. It was not an error of law or abuse of discretion to enter 

the March 7, 2016 Order which was inconsistent with 

what was stated at the time of hearing. 

2016 Order. 

commit an error of law or abuse our discretion in entering the March 7, 

each of the alleged errors are without merit and that we did not 

sub-issues. Upon review of the record, we respectfully submit that 

his 1925(b) Statement. The second of those issues contains several 

As set forth above, Defendant raises four (4) alleged errors in 

DISCUSSION 

Leedom, 504 A.2d 353 (Pa. Super. 1986). 

cttinq, Hartley v. Hartley, 528 A.2d 233 (Pa. Super. 1987); Shindel v. 

discretion should not be made lightly. Hayley, 549 A.2d at 1317, 

court in support proceedings is limited and a finding of an abuse of 
13 

Here's what I think is the most appropriate 

thing to do: we're going to reach out to the 

Plaintiff and inquire as to whether or not she is 

looking to pursue support at this time against 

Mr. Geiger. If she is, we're going to direct that 

she file a new petition and at that point in time 

I will hear testimony and determine whether I 

think it should be retroactive ... because of 

whatever her understanding was ... Or 

whether or not it she's even interested it 

should go from this day forward. 

the record as follows: 

In the course of the de nova hearing, the undersigned stated on 

with merit. 

courtroom, this does not, in and of itself, instill Defendant's appeal 

Order of Court was not consistent with the statements in the 

dismissed. Id. While Defendant is correct that our March 7, 2016 

no time did we state on the record that the support matter would be 

Geiger, DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton County). Additionally, at 

the hearing. See, N.T., De Novo Hearing, 1/27/2016, Klinger v. 

Initially, there was never an Order placed on the record at the time of 

Upon review of the record, Defendant misstates several issues. 

conclusion of hearing." Id. 

consistent with these terms stated by the Trial court at the time of the 

stating that "[n]onetheless, the Trial Court failed to enter an order 

listed for a hearing." Id. Defendant concludes his first alleged error 

and if Plaintiff intended to pursue the matter, the case would be re- 
14 

N.T., De Novo Hearing, 1/27/2016 at 10: 11-11: 1, Klinger v, Geiger, 

DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton). 

While not included in the transcript of the de novo hearing, the 

full domestic relations file was made part of the record for the de nova 

hearing without objection. Following the presentation of argument by 

Defendant's counsel at the hearing, the undersigned conducted a 

detailed review of the Domestic Relations file. As was discussed at the 

hearing, a Domestic Relations representative did, in fact, contact 

Plaintiff and she indicated that she was still seeking support from 

Defendant. Furthermore, upon review of the file, the Court learned 

that a full and complete conference had already been held and 

therefore no remand was needed, or appropriate. The Court 

determined the assessment of income for Defendant was appropriate. 

Upon review of the file, it was noted that the July 28, 2011 

Order from Carbon County, the last Order that included a financial 

obligation by Defendant, had included a net monthly income for 

Defendant of $1,146.04. See, Order of Court, 7/28/2011, Klinger v. 

Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon County). As discussed above, on 

March 23, 2015, the Carbon County Court terminated the July 28, 

2011 Order without prejudice and entered the "Suspended Order/ 

Non-Financial Order". That Suspended Order I Non-Financial Order 

provided that the financial obligation was to be reviewed/conferenced 
15 

per review case to be scheduled for conference 

on drs petition for review. case was nfob'd 

notes that the case was reviewed and stated verbatim, as follows: 

PACSES - Production - Note dated October 8, 2015 at 1: 12 p.m. that 

The Northampton County Domestic Relations file includes a 

you should be held in contempt of court." Id. 

initiation of additional proceedings against you to determine whether 

comply with any of the provisions of this Order may lead to the 

Pl. Carbon County). That Order specifically notes that ''[f]ailure to 

See, Order - Work Search and Report, 3/23/20151 _136 DR 11 (Com. 

first form reporting his job search efforts no later than April 17, 2015. 

instructed by Domestic Relations and required Defendant to submit his 

required Defendant to comply with the Job Search Order until further 

also entered the "Order - Work Search and Report". That Order 

may be reinstated." Id. On March 23, 2015, the Carbon County Court 

to comply with any provision of this order, the prior order and arrears 

misrepresented his/her income or assets, and/or if the defendant fails 

that defendant has committed fraud or otherwise materially 

Pl. Carbon County). That Order also noted that "[i]f it is determined 

/ Non-Financial Order, 3/23/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. 

employment, income, assets or ability to work. See, Suspended Order 

immediately report to domestic relations any changes to his 

for determination upon a list of events and required Defendant to 
16 

defendant was placed on a work search program in March 2015 

Carbon County that was set to a non-financial obligation and 

Id. Lockhart noted that the "parties were under a support obligation in 

doctor of any disability and did not have a physician verification form. 

terminated. Id. Defendant did not present any documentation from a 

Social Security Disability benefits since his unemployment benefits 

unable to work. Id. Defendant reported that he had not filed for 

that he sees a physician every 2 months, but did not state that he was 

unemployment benefits that ceased in 2012. Id. Defendant indicated 

at that job. Id. Defendant reported that he had received 

work in warehouses. Id. at 2. He had been earning $12.00 per hour 

had last worked in 2011 for a temp agency doing full time seasonable 

Geiger, DR-116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton). Defendant reported he 

employment. See, Summary of Trier of Fact, 11/16/2016, Klinger v. 

had been working or that he had even attempted to locate new 

prepared by Lockhart does not include any indication that Defendant 

DR-116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton). The Summary of Trier of Fact 

See, PA PACSES - Production - Note, 10/8/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, 

March 2015 due to deft having no income. 

Unknown if deft is employed or what efforts 

have been made to secure employment. 

Additionally, last monetary order addressed 

summer visitation which may have changed. 
17 

wherein he was required to actively seek employment and provide 

updates regarding his efforts." Id. at 3. 

Based upon these facts, Lockhart recommended Defendant be 

assessed an earning capacity, which we deemed appropriate. 

Defendant was assessed an earning capacity of $19,530.00 per year 

as an entry level "Laborer & Freight, Stock and Material Mover" as set 

forth in the Pennsylvania Occupational Wages survey for the 

Northampton County labor market area. That income for Defendant 

was utilized to run the support calculations using the formula set forth 

in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-1 et seq. Defendant also received the 

benefit of the multi family calculation provided for in Pa.R.C.P. No. 

1910.16-7. 

Based upon the above, it was not an error of law or abuse of 

discretion to enter the March 7, 2016 Order making the November 16, 

2015 Order final despite what was said at the de nova hearing. 

Counsel for Defendant was permitted to present argument to the Court 

and those arguments, as will be discussed below, were considered. 

The record as a whole, including the Domestic Relations file, made it 

clear to the Court that the November 16, 2015 Order was properly 

entered and that Defendant should be assessed an earning capacity for 

the calculation of child support. Therefore, it is respectfully suggested 

that the first alleged error raised by Defendant is without merit. 
18 

(a) An action may be brought 

(1) by a person, including a minor parent or a 

minor spouse, to whom a duty of support is 

owing, or 

(2) on behalf of a minor child by a person 

having custody of the child, without 

appointment as guardian ad !item, or 

(3) on behalf of a minor child by a person 

caring for the child regardless of whether a 

court order has been issued granting that 

person custody of the child, or 

(4) by a public body or private agency having 

an interest in the case, maintenance or 

as follows: 

violation of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.3. That rule provides, in relevant part, 

Defendant's assertion, this matter was not improperly commenced in 

commenced in violation of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.3. Contrary to 

First, Defendant argues that this matter was improperly 

in turn. 

address each of the arguments Defendant asserts we failed to consider 

considered in the course of entering our March 7, 2016 Order. We will 

we allegedly failed to consider, however, each of these issues was 

his 1925(b) Statement, Defendant raises five (5) specific arguments 

Defendant's arguments raised at the de nova hearing. As set forth in 

Defendant's second alleged error is that we failed to consider 

B. Each of Defendant's issues raised at the de nova hearing 

were considered in entering our March 7, 2016 Order. 
19 

conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the 

issue was essential to judgment, the determination on that issue is 

and determined by a valid final judgment, and determination of the 

issue preclusion, when an issue of fact or of law is actually litigated 

capacity, as argued by Defendant. "Under the doctrine of res judicata 

prior determination by Carbon County regarding Defendant's earning 

Secondly, this matter is not barred by Res Judicata due to the 

of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.3 and this issue is without merit. 

19103. The instant matter was not improperly commenced in violation 

party and permitted to file a support action under Pa.R.C.P. No. 

primary physical custody of the child. Clearly, Plaintiff is a proper 

mother of the child subject to the support order and that Plaintiff has 

Northampton County. It is not disputed that that Plaintiff is the 

was transferred to Carbon County then subsequently transferred to 

in 2007 by Plaintiff, Tricia Klinger, in Schuylkill County. The matter 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.3(a). The instant support matter was commenced 

assistance of a person to whom a duty of 

support is owing, or 

(5) by a parent, guardian or public or private 

agency on behalf of an unemancipated child 

over eighteen years of age to whom a duty of 

support is owing, or 

(6) by any person who may owe a duty of 

support to a child or spouse. If the person to 

whom a duty of support may be owed does not 

appear, the action may be dismissed without 

prejudice for the petitioner to seek further 

relief from the court. 
20 

same or a different claim." McNe;t v. Owens-Corning, 680 A.2d 1145, 

1147-48. (Pa. 1996). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in McNeil 

noted that 11[w]e have interpreted the 'modern doctrine of res judicata' 

as incorporating both claim preclusion, or traditional res judicata, and 

issue preclusion, or traditional collateral estoppel." Id. at fn. 2. The 

traditional doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "holds 

that when a particular issue has already been litigated, further action 

on the same issue is barred." Id. 

In the instant matter, the Carbon County Court entered the 

March 23, 2015 Orders set forth at length above. The Carbon County 

Court determined that Defendant had no known income or assets and 

that there was no reasonable prospect that Defendant would be able to 

pay in the foreseeable future. See, Suspended Order/ Non-Financial 

Order, 3/23/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon 

County). That Order, however, specifically provided that the financial 

obligation could be reviewed/conferenced for further determination in 

the future. Id. The Order also specifically provided that if Defendant 

failed to comply with any provision of the order, the prior Order and 

arrears could be reinstated. Id. The Carbon County Court also 

specifically required Defendant to participate in a Work Search 

Program. See, Order - Work Search and Report, 3/23/2015, Klinger 

v. Geiger, 136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon County). The goa! of the work 
21 

search program was obviously to help Defendant obtain employment 

so that the case could then be reviewed and Defendant could pay 

support for his child. The Order - Work Search and Report entered by 

the Carbon County Court specifically noted that failure to comply with 

any provisions of the order may lead to the initiation of additional 

proceedings. Id. Pursuant to the Order - Work Search and Report, 

Defendant was required to comply with the job search order until 

further instructed and was required to submit his first form to 

Domestic Relations by April 17, 2015. 

There was no issue preclusion or claim preclusion in any of the 

Orders entered by the Carbon County Court. To the contrary, those 

Orders dealt with the status of the case as of March 23, 2015 and 

specifically put Defendant on notice that his financial status could and 

would be reviewed in the future. Upon receipt of the file and 

acceptance of the transfer of the file under the Intrastate Family 

Support Act ("IFSA"), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 8101 et seq., Northampton 

County Domestic Relations specifically noted in the file that there was 

nothing in the record regarding Defendant's employment or the efforts 

made by Defendant to secure employment under the Carbon County 

Order requiring him to seek employment. See, PA PACSES - 

Production - Note, 10/8/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, DR-116715 (Com. Pl. 

Northampton). Northampton County Domestic Relations also noted 
22 

that the last monetary Order had addressed summer visitation, which 

may have changed in the interim since that Order. Id. Given that we 

had no documentation that Defendant had complied with the Work 

Search Order from Carbon County, it was clearly within our purview to 

conference the matter and determine the status of the case. Once the 

matter was scheduled for a conference, Defendant and his counsel 

appeared before Ms. Lockhart for the conference. Defendant provided 

no documentation as to any disability and gave no explanation as to 

why he could not work. Under the circumstances it was clearly 

appropriate, particularly given Defendant's failure to comply with the 

Work Search Order from Carbon County, to come to the conclusion 

that Defendant was capable of working and assess him an earning 

capacity. 

Thirdly, the matter was not barred by Res Judicata and the 

Plaintiff's abandonment of her prior case in Carbon County. Contrary 

to Defendant's assertion, the record does not reveal that Defendant 

abandoned her case in Carbon County. Counsel for Defendant noted 

several times during the de nova hearing that Plaintiff had withdrawn 

her support claim or withdrawn her appeal. See, N.T., De Novo 

Hearing, 1/27/2016 at 5:13-15; 6:2; 6:8; 7:15-20; 7:24-8:2; 8:20. 

There is a critical distinction to be made between Plaintiff withdrawing 

her support claim and Plaintiff withdrawing her appeal. The Findings 
23 

of Fact prepared by Carbon County Hearing Officer Diehl are critical, 

and instructive on this point. As noted by Ms. Diehl, on April 91 2015, 

Plaintiff filed a timely appeal of the March 23, 2015 Orders. See, 

Domestic Relations Office Hearing Officer's Report, 6/2/2015 at ,i 4, 

Klinger v. Ge;ger, 136DR11 (Com. Pl. Carbon County). Plaintiff 

withdrew her appeal of the March 23, 2015 Orders on May 29, 2015. 

Id. at ,i 8. Given that neither party resided in Carbon County, the case 

was to be transferred to Northampton County, which "should aid in 

enforcement of any future child order which may be entered between 

the parties." Id. at ,i 9. Plaintiff did not withdraw her claim for 

support or discontinue the support action. Plaintiff merely withdrew 

her appeal of the March 23, 2015 Orders which placed Defendant into 

a non-financial obligation status and required him to enter the job 

search program. The July 30, 2015 Order from the Carbon County 

Court specifically notes that "this case is currently open as an N FOB 

(Non-Financial Obligation)." See, Order, 7/30/2015, Klinger v. Geiger, 

136 DR 11 (Com. Pl. Carbon). That Order noted that the Defendant 

was under a Work Search and Report Order and the matter was to be 

transferred to Northampton County. The claim for support was never 

abandoned and never discontinued. The case was never closed and 

was not resolved. Defendant was under an ongoing non-financial 

obligation and was still required to comply with the work search order 
24 

until directed otherwise. At no point did Plaintiff abandon her claim, 

therefore, this issue is without merit. 

The fourth argument raised by Defendant is that "despite 

Defendant requesting a de novo hearing, and the hearing notice 

requiring both parties to appear, Plaintiff failed to appear. Defendant's 

counsel asserted that Plaintiff abandoned her appeal, and in the 

alternative, asserted that the trial court compel Plaintiff to appear." 

See, Defendant's 1925(b) Statement at~ 2 (iv). As discussed above, 

Plaintiff did not abandon her support claim. Furthermore, despite 

Defendant's claim, Plaintiff was not required to attend the hearing. 

Pursuant to IFSA, specifically 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 8311, entitled "Special 

rules of evidence and procedure", "[tjhe physical presence of the 

petitioner in a responding tribunal is not required for the 

establishment, enforcement or modification of a support order or the 

rendition of a judgment determining parentage." See, 23 Pa.CS.A. § 

8311(a). The de nova hearing was for the enforcement or 

modification of a support order. Plaintiff was not required to be 

present. The Title IV-D attorney, Steve Mowrey was present and 

represented the interests of Plaintiff and the Domestic Relations 

Section. The undersigned specifically explained to Defendant and 

counsel that Plaintiff was not required to be present. See, N.T., De 

Novo Hearing, 1/27/2016 at 2:10-13; 2:23-24. We did, however, 
25 

specifically give Defendant and his counsel the option to continue the 

hearing so that Plaintiff could be available to testify by telephone. Id. 

at 3:2-9. Defendant, through his counsel, chose to proceed with the 

hearing. Id. at 3:10. 

Based upon the above, the fourth argument raised by Defendant 

that we allegedly failed to address, is without merit and does not 

require any form of relief. Plaintiff was not required to be present for 

the hearing, Plaintiff never abandoned her appeal, and Defendant 

chose not to continue the hearing despite the Court's offer to do so. 

The fifth argument Defendant alleges we failed to consider ts 

that there was no evidence of a change in Defendant's earning 

capacity from the prior order of the Carbon County Court. This issue is 

without merit. The Carbon County Court indicated that as of March 

23, 2015, Defendant did not have any assets and did not have a job. 

The Carbon County Court required defendant to look for a job and 

submit reports to the Court regarding that search. The record is 

devoid of any evidence that Defendant looked for a job or in any way 

complied with the Order to engage in a job search. Defendant told our 

Conference Officer, Ms. Lockhart, that he was not employed, that he 

had not worked since 2011, had not received unemployment since 

2012 and had not applied for any form of Social Securtty Disability. 

See, Summary of Trier of Fact, November 16, 2015, Klinger v, Geiger, 
26 

established that "[c]hild support is a shared responsibility requiring 

failed to obtain or maintain appropriate employment". It is well 

Upon review of the record, it is clear that Defendant has "willfully 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-2. 

( 4) Earning Capacity. If the trier of fact 

determines that a party to a support action has 

willfully failed to obtain or maintain appropriate 

employment, the trier of fact may impute to 

that party an income equal to the party's 

earning capacity. Age, education, training, 

health, work experience, earnings history and 

child care responsibilities are factors which 

shall be considered in determining earning 

capacity. In order for an earning capacity to be 

assessed, the trier of fact must state the 

reasons for the assessment in writing or on the 

record. Generally, the trier of fact should not 

impute an earning capacity that is greater than 

the amount the party would earn from one fulltime position. Determination of what 

constitutes a reasonable work regimen 

depends upon all relevant circumstances 

including the choice of jobs available within a 

particular occupation, working hours, working 

conditions and whether a party has exerted 

substantial good faith efforts to find 

employment. 

for support purposes. That section provides as follows: 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-2 governs the calculation of net income 

verification regarding his inability to work. 

present any medical evidence and failed to submit a physician 

had medical issues and saw a doctor regularly, Defendant did not 

DR-0116715 (Com. Pl. Northampton County). While he indicated he 
27 

both parents to contribute to the support of their children in 

accordance with their relative incomes and ability to pay." Portugal v, 

Portugal, 798 A.2d 246, 249-250 (Pa. Super. 2002), quoting, Kersey 

v. Jefferson, 791 A.2d 419, 423 (Pa.Super.2002). "Where a party 

willfully fails to obtain appropriate employment, his or her income will 

be considered to be equal to his or her earning capacity." Id. (Internal 

citations omitted). 

Since 2011, Defendant has not worked and the record is devoid 

of any documentation of Defendant even attempting to find work, 

despite the Carbon County Court's Order requiring him to do so. 

Defendant failed to submit any reports regarding his job search to 

Carbon or Northampton County. Defendant also failed to submit any 

medical documentation or physician verification establishing a 

disability that would preclude him from working. When he did last 

work, Defendant worked in a warehouse earning $12.00 per hour. 

Working 40 hours per week at $12.00 per hour would result in a gross 

annual income of $24,960.00. Therefore, we actually assessed 

Defendant at a lower income than he had previously received. 

Based upon the above, Defendant was properly assessed an 

earning capacity. 

C. Defendant received a full and fair de novo hearing. 
28 

D'Arciprete v. D'Arciprete, 470 A.2d 995, 996 (Pa. Super. 1984, 

substituted for the prior decision maker and red ecid es the case." 

consideration of the case anew. The reviewing body is in effect 

(Pa. Su per. 19 94). "De nova review entails, as the term suggests, fu II 

nova and not limited in scope." Warner v. Pollack, 644 A.2d 747, 751 

his/her day in court should it be desired ... that hearing shall be de 

"Under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.11 a litigant has an absolute right to 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.ll(i). 

If a demand is filed, there shall be a hearing de 

nova before the court. The domestic relations 

section shall schedule the hearing and give 

notice to the parties. The court shall hear the 

case and enter a final order substantially in the 

form set forth in Rule 1910.27(e) within sixty 

days from the date of the written demand for 

hearing. 

Lockhart's recommendations. Rule 1910.1 l(i) provides as follows: 

Court entered the November 16, 2015 Order in accordance with 

following the November 16, 2015 conference with Ms. Lockhart, the 

matters in Northampton County. In accordance with Rule 1910.ll(e), 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.11 provides the procedure for child support 

merit. 

Defendant's 1925(b) Statement at~ 3. This argument is without 

required by Pennsylvania Law and the Rules of Civil Procedure." See, 

court failed to afford Defendant and full and fair de nova hearing as 

The third alleged error raised by Defendant is that "the trial 
29 

counsel for Defendant and conducted a thorough review of the record 

Following the hearing, we considered the arguments made by 

assessing Defendant an earning capacity. Id. at 9:6-15. 

circumstances was required to enter the November 16, 2015 Order 

at 8: 20-9: 6. Counsel also raised the argument that a change in 

Counsel was also permitted to address his res judicata argument. Id. 

- 

position that the matter had been withdrawn. Id. at 5:2-8:20. 

3: 10. Counsel for Defendant was then permitted to present his 

argument regarding the Carbon County proceedings and Defendant's 

1/27/2016 at 2:23-3:6. Counsel declined that opportunity. Id. at 

Plaintiff to appear via telephone. See, N.T., De Novo Hearing, 

gave Defendant the opportunity to continue the hearing and to require 

counsel for Defendant that Plaintiff was not required to be present, we 

Plaintiff's representative was present. After the Court informed 

counsel were present for the January 27, 2015 de nova hearing and 

nova hearing following Defendant's demand. Defendant and his 

The parties in the instant matter were provided notice of the de 

recommendation. Id. 

determining whether to accept, reject or modify the master's 

discretion in the de nova hearing to consider all the facts in 

1983). Under the procedures of Rule 1910.11, the lower court has 

quoting, Commonwealth v, Gussey, 466 A.2d 219, 222 (Pa. Super. 
30 

included 6 months of statements establishing Plaintiff's income, 

submitted by the parties for review. Those documents submitted 

conference on November 16, 2015 along with all of the documents 

included in the record, lncludlnq the testimony presented at the 

this matter. There are significant facts of record and testimony 

Northampton County Domestic Relations file is part of the record in 

several aspects of the previous issues raised. As set forth above, the 

Defendant's final alleged error is essentially a restatement of 

See, Defendant's 1925(b) Statement at ,i 4. 

the trial court committed an error of law 

and/or abuse of discretion by making findings 

and conclusions of law where no testimony or 

facts of record exist to support the trial court's 

determinations regarding Defendant's and 

Plaintiff's earnings, as well as Defendant's 

support obligation, and further, but 

disregarding the prior, uncontradicted findings 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon 

County regarding Defendant's earning capacity 

and support obligation. 

Defendant's final alleged error is as follows: 

D. The record was sufficient to justify the March 7, 2016 

Order. 

dismissed. 

Order. Defendant's third alleged error is without merit and should be 

considered all of the facts of record in entering the March 7, 2016 

March 7, 2016. Defendant received his day in Court and we 

including the Domestic Relations file. We then entered the Order of 
31 

Plaintiff's income and expense statements and Defendant's income and 

expense statements. Defendant appeared at the conference on 

November 16, 2015 and provided significant testimony to Conference 

Officer Lockhart. See, Summary of Trier of Fact, 11/16/2015. 

We also reviewed the documents transferred to Northampton 

County by the Carbon County Court. As discussed above, the Carbon 

County Court's findings regarding Defendant's earning capacity and 

support obligation were made as of that date. The Carbon County 

Court clearly anticipated that Defendant's status, earning capacity and 

support obligation would be reviewed and reconsidered in the future. 

In fact, Carbon County specifically required Defendant to look for a job 

and submit reports regarding his job search so that Defendant's 

support obligation could be reevaluated. 

Based upon the above, Defendant's final alleged error is without 

merit. There was a significant factual record to support our March 7, 

2016 Order. 

CONCLUSION 

It is respectfully submitted that Defendant's appeal of our March 

7, 2016 Order is without merit. After this matter was transmitted to 

Northampton County, pursuant to !FSA, Northampton County 

Domestic Relations filed a Petition to Review the non-financial status of 

the case. The matter was conferenced with Conference Officer 
32 

BY THE COURT 

Lockhart and Defendant and his counsel appeared at the conference. 

Testimony was taken and documents were received. Based on the 

record, Defendant was assessed an earning capacity and the 

November 16, 2015 Order was entered. After Defendant's demand, a 

de nova hearing occurred. Following that hearing, and a thorough 

review of the record, we entered the March 7, 2016 Order making the 

November 16, 2015 Order final. 

Although the March 7, 2016 Order was not consistent with the 

informal discussion that occurred at the de nova hearing, following a 

thorough review of the entire record, it was determined that the March 

7, 2016 Order was appropriate. Defendant was given a full and fair 

opportunity to present his arguments through counsel and, 

alternatively, Defendant was afforded the opportunity to request a 

continuance. Defendant and his counsel chose to proceed with the 

hearing. In entering our March 7, 2016 Order, each of the arguments 

raised by Defendant was considered, however, none of those 

arguments were persuasive. Defendant received a full and fair de 

nova hearing and the proper findings of fact and conclusions of law 

were reached to enter the March 7, 2016 Order. 

It is respectfully submitted that Defendant's appeal is without 

merit and should be denied. 
33 

fo;,Ja... A~uf2.-, 

PAULA A. ROSCIOLI, J.