MEMORANDUM TO: 

SUBJECT 

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 

,WASHINGTON 

DOD 

ACDA 

CIA 

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White House 

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State 

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9 September 1968 

- Mr.·#'aul C. Warnke 

.;Dr. Alexander 1I. Flax 

Mr. Adrian S. Fisher 

- Mr. Carl Duckett 

- Mr. Spurgeon Keeny 

- Mr. Ch~rles E. John~on 

- Mr. Ed~ard C. Welsh 

- Mr. Thomas O. Paine 

- Mr. Thoma.s L. Hughes .;~ . 

• Meeting of NSAM 1561"'cc:llnmittee 

Attached is a draft report which I wish to submit for 

considerat ion of the NSAM 156 Commi ttee. I have rescheduled 

the meeting for Monday, September 16, at 3:30 p.m. 

Charles E. Bohlen 

Enclosure; 

"Disarmament Aspects of 

Satellite Reconnaissance Policy" 

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DISARMAMENT ASPECTS OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE POLICY 

THE PROBLEM 

The United States Government is prepared to enter negotiations with 

the USSR with the aim of reaching an agreement to limit strategic arms. 

The United States will propose that the agreement ~ould be enforced by 

llaxiUlUlD, or, if necessary, exclusive, reliance on national means of 

verification, meaning all types of observation satellites, as well as other 

surveillance activities carried out by one side 1..- either unilaterally 

or in conjunction/with its allies -- outside the territ()ry or territorial 

waters of the other side. 

The problem is to permit.such Negotiations to proceed on this basis, 

and, at the same time, develop a policy which will sustain; if riot reinforce 

two basic objectives in regard to United States reconnaissance programs: 

(1) The maintenance of our freedom of action unilaterally 

to conduct reconnaissance satellite operations; and 

(2) The prevention of foreign political and physical int~rference with the conduct of these operations.!! 

DISCUSSION 

Introduction: The President has approved a United States position for 

negotiation with the Soviets on limiting strategic arms, which includes the 

!! Soo "Report on Political and I nformAtionnl Aspocts· of Satellite 

Reconnaissanco Policy," NSAM 156 Committee, June 30, 1962. 

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following provision:· 

"VIII. VERIFICATION 

I'The limitations described in paragraphs I through V 

are proposed to be verified by external [national] means." 

In other documents detailing the United States negotiation position, it 

is provided that efforts be made to obtain Soviet assent to "supplementary 

means" (Le., limited on-site inspections) of verification. However, given 

the traditional Soviet opposition to on-site inspections, the United States 

must be prepared -- and is prepared --f to rely exclusively on national means 

of verification if there is to be,an agreement in the vital field of strategiC 

arms limitations. 

Indeed, it is only the development of such means which has made a realistic 

consideration of a limitation on strategic arms possihle. Asirle from likely 

Soviet objections to provision for on-site inspections, national means of 

verification, in particularobservation satellites, provide the only fe_sible 

means of policing an agreement of the type and scope the United States has 

in mind. Briefly put, the United States proposal would prohibit the initiation 

of further construction of fixed land-based offensive strategic missile 

launchers and sea-based carriers, would lim! t the further censtruction of ABMs 

to a set and equivalent number on each side, and would ban altogether landbased mobile launchers, both offensive and defenSive, ~nd sca-bnsed ABMs. It 

is apparent that on-site inspections could only playa supplementary rolc in 

the verification of such an agreement • 

. At the same time, it is vital to United Statos security interests to 

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preserve the full -integri ty of its intelligence operations, particularly, 

in this instanee, tho unimpedod operation of observation satellito.. Tho 

unique value of observation satellUes in this regard has been amply 

demonstrated in recent years, and needs no further elaboration. 

Since its inception in 1962, this Committee has established policy and 

information guidelines which, it is believed. have effectively accomplished 

this purpose. 1I0wever , it is evident that these gui~elines will have to be 

altered if the United States is to pursue the significant undertaking of 

reaching an agreement -o~ limiting strategic missiles. We will have to discuss 

,"national means of veri fication" with the Soviets. Congress 

and our Allies will havo to be convinco\\ that rollnnce on such means can 

effectively verify an agreement and thus safeguard Western socurity interests. 

And the American publiC and press will have to be given similar, though less 

explicit. assurances. 

Formal Security Procedures. While not essential to the conduct of 

the disarmament talks, it would be highly desirable to downgrade the fact that 

the United States conducts reconnaissance satellite operations- from its present 

classification of "TOP SECRET - TALENT KEYIIOLE" to "UNCLASSIFIED". This action 

would greatly faciIi tate consultations with our Allies and with Congress; would 

ease the conduct of the negotiations! themselves (e.g., in the preparation of 

reporting cables and the transmission of instructions); would simplify the 

preparation and dissemination of intelligence analysis; and would be necessary 

at some stage in pres'enting tho proposod agreement to the pross and public. 

The disclosure will hardly come as a surpriso to roadors of tho Amorican press. 

as this fact is becoming common knowlcdgc. 

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Otherwise, no change in the present T-KH and related classification 

systems is recommended. The information on the results of reconnaissance 

satel1~,~,e, operations, and information relating to those operations, should 

continue to be subject to the restrictions of existing classification systems, 

except where departures from these restrictions are presently permitted. It 

is important to preserve the present degree of secrecy concerning the 

effectiveness, e.g., the degree of photographic resoll,ltion, of observati{)n~ 

satellites. And while the fact of observation satell1!e operations is common 

knowledge in the'press, it is equally important to safeguard the secrecy of 

certain aspects pf operations. 

Negotiations'with the USSR. In previous reports, the recommendations 

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of'~his C~~mittoo have l)con hased on one ovor-riding tqcticnl consideration: 

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to avoid an open ,confront.ation with the Soviets over the issue of roconnaissance 

satelli tes. .It has been reasoned that if the Soviets, who have knowledge of 

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our satel1:iE operations, were not forced publicly to challenge these operations, . 

they would be more inclined tacitly to accept them. This has so far proven to 

. be the case. 

The danger of a confrontation has also been diminished by the development 

by the Soviets of their own,· extensive, observation satellite program. 

Even so, it is still sound policy to avoid a confrontation. There is 

some evidence that the planned disarmament talks, while they will involve an 

exchange of views, will not undercut this policy; indeed, they could enhance 

the political and physical security of the United States observation satellite 

program. 

': . In tho first instance; the United States has repeatedly communicated to 

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the Soviets its'intention to place "maximum reliance on national means of 

verification." The Soviets must be fully aware of the meaning of this phrase, 

'" and have given no indication th~t they object to the proposition. Secondly, 

the talks, if they result in an agreement, would have the effect of formalizing 

Soviet acceptance of the US program (and vice versa). No agreement would be 

possible without such acceptance. 

.. Leaving aside, for the purposes of this report, the ques tion of how we 

handle tactically possible supplementary means of inspection. the Delegation 

is authorized, at a time of its choosing, to indicate to the Soviets that the 

tem, "national means of verification." includes the use of observation 

satellites. No furthor effort should he mado to define this tenn withollt 

instructions from Washington. The Delegation should establish a negotiating 

history to the effect that our Willingness to conclude an agreement of this 

scope with maximum reliance on natinnal means of verification is based on the 

assumption that one side will not impede the operation of the other's observation satellites. In discussing the withdrawal article, the Delegation should 

emphasize that any action hy one party which interferes significnntlywith the 

other's verification capability or otherwise affects the capability of the 

other party to verify compliance with the agreement would constitute one of the 

grounds for withdrawal. While all of these points should be made in the 

course of discussions, the Delegation should hear in mind the desirability 

of avoiding an unnecessary confrontation and should proceed with appropriate 

caution. 

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In discussing our proposal with the Soviets, the Delegation should 

avoid revealing the effectiveness of our satellite photography. This applies 

both to discussion of verification per se as well as to the elaboration of 

our proposal which, in certain aspects, could reveal indirectly more than we 

would wish to regarding our capabilities. The matter will be blurred somewhat by the introduction of proposals for on-site inspection in regard to 

certain gray areas, such as ABM radars. And the ~oviets can readily deduce 

a great deal concerning our excellent capabilities from numerous statements 

by United States officials concerning Soviet strategic forces. But this is . 

. a problem to which the Delegation will have to give careful attention. The 

best approach 'WOUld be: (1) confine discussion of our positive capabilities 

for unilateral verification to generalities; and (2) limit discussion of 

. details concerning our verification capabilities to those areas of the proposed 

agreement where there is some doubt as to full effectiveness of unilateral means 

, and c'oncerning which we might want to propose supplementary means of verification. 

Consultation. It will be important to assure our most important 

· Allies (NATO members, Japan) that the proposal we are advancing will protect 

United States and Allied security intere~tsJ in regard to both the substance 

of the proposal .and the capability to verify effectively adherence to an 

agreement through national means. In consultations with our Allies, we should 

· initially not volunteer an explanation of the meaning of "national means of 

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verification" (this should be self-evident to our Allies, anyway),as these 

consultations should occur before the talks begin. We should also not 

initially indicate our willingness to accept, as a fall-back position, 

exclusive reliance on such means. However, once we have explored the~----

question of verification with the Soviets, we should make our position 

explicit in regard to the first point. 

The same considerations apply to consultations with Congress, and even 

IT\ore so. I~ will be important to hold these consultations at an early date, . , ,",'~ ,." -','.J 

fUl'd on a more candid basis than with our Allies. Otherwise the proposed talks 

could create misunderstanding and possible controversy. However, the precise 

timing. and scope of these consultations is a matter to be decided by the 

Secretary of State. 

Prcsumnblythc briefing on our approach to, and the prohlem of, verifi~ation would be limited to a group of key members of Congress, and would take 

place within the context of a general discussion of our disarmament proposal. 

The briefing could inClude 'a general review of the findings of SNIE 11-13-68. 

These members of Congress should be advised not to reveal publicly our 

approach to verification until a clearer picture of Soviet attitudes emerges 

from the talks. 

Statements to the Press and the Public. Although the likelihood of 

publicly provoking the Soviets into a confrontation over the operation of 

observation satellites should diminish once talks begin, it would still be 

desirable to maintain initially, if possible, a discreet silence in public 

on this subject. The problem of verification will be the object of secret 

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negotiations for some time to come, and, as indicated above, we will want 

to sound out Soviet attitudes before publicly commenting on the verification 

issue. 

Accordingly, we initially should not volunteer statements to the press 

concerning means of verification of a strategic arms limitation agreement. 

Our st(JJldard.response to press inquiries should be that lithe problem of 

verification is a matter currently under negotiation with the Soviet Union." 

.. Eventually, however, information concerning our negotiating position 

will probably leak to the press. At this stage, we should be prepared to 

acknowledge that "the United States is prepared to place maximum relianceon national means of verification." If, by this time, it is clear that no 

adverse Soviet reaction would be expected, we should also acknowledge that 

"national means" includes the use of sate llitc photography. 

Any public statements by United States officials on this subject , "",.", ·'.I.J· 

S~ou1d foliow the same guidel·ines set forth above for the press. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The Committee recommends the following: 

1. That the fact the United States is conducting operations of 

observation satellites be classified as "UNCLASSI FlED". I f this recommendation is accepted, the present report should be downgraded to a classification 

of "TOP SECRET" in order to faciIi tate its use as an instruction to our 

Delegation-in the strategic arms limitation talks and to Government spokesmen. 

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2. That the present classification system remain in effect in regard 

to the acquired intelligence, capabilities, and operations of observation 

satellites. 

3. That the Delegation explain to the Soviets th~t we understand 

"national means of verification" 'to include the use of observation satollites 

but avoid a more complete definition of the term. At the same time, the 

Delegation shoulq avoid disclosing information which .would reveal the full 

capabilities of pur observation satellites. 

4. That the Delegation, while avoiding a confr~ntation. establish a 

negotiating history to the effect that our willingnes~ to conclude an agreement of the type contemplated is based on the assumption that one side will 

not impede the operation of the other's observation satellites. The Delegation should emphasize that any such effort by one side which significantly inter~ 

feres with the other's verification capability would give the latter grounds 

for withdrawal from theagreemen t • 

5. That we initially inform NATO only in general terms of our 

negotiating position on verification. Further disclosure will be necessary 

as th~ talks progress. 

6. That key members of Congress be given a briefing on our position 

on' verification and our capabilities for verifying the proposed agreement 

through national means. They should be advised not to divulge publicly the 

information until soundings with the Soviets indicate that this is advisable. 

7. That we initially maintain as discreet a position as possible in 

response to pross inquiries and in puhlic statements hy Unitod States officials. 

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Our initial standard response, or statlHflCnt, :;hould bo that "the problem of 

verification is a mattor currently under negotiation with the Soviet Union". 

Eventually, we should be prepared to acknowledge that "the United States is 

prepared to place maximum reliance on national means of verification," and 

that such means includes the use of satellite photpgraphy. 

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