United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 24-60157

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Alan Giovani Santiago-Garcia, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:23-CR-96-1 

______________________________

Before Jones, Willett, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Alan Giovani Santiago-Garcia pled guilty, pursuant to a written 

agreement with the Government, to being unlawfully present in the United 

States following removal. The district court sentenced him to 27 months of 

imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of supervised release. 

Santiago-Garcia has not yet filed a brief. 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 26, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 24-60157

2

Invoking the waiver of appeal provision in Santiago-Garcia’s plea 

agreement, the Government moves to dismiss the appeal or, alternatively, for 

summary affirmance, asserting that the waiver is valid and enforceable and 

precludes Santiago-Garcia’s sentencing challenge. The motion for summary 

affirmance is DENIED because the summary affirmance procedure is 

generally reserved for cases in which the parties concede that the issues are 

foreclosed by circuit precedent. Cf. United States v. Houston, 625 F.3d 871,

873 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting the denial of summary affirmance where an 

issue was not foreclosed).

Santiago-Garcia argues that his appeal waiver is not enforceable 

because it is unconstitutional, basing his argument on a concurring opinion 

in United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 570–80 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., 

concurring). However, as he apparently concedes, this court has held that 

appellate rights are “statutory, not constitutional,” and that even 

constitutional rights can generally “be waived as part of a [valid] plea 

agreement.” United States v. Keele, 755 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2014); see also 

United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005); Melancon, 972 F.2d 

at 567. Santiago-Garcia does not identify the issues that he would raise on 

appeal or otherwise challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty 

plea or any other aspect of his plea agreement.

The validity of an appeal waiver is a question of law that we review de 

novo. Keele, 755 F.3d at 754. “An appeal waiver bars an appeal if the waiver 

(1) was knowing and voluntary and (2) applies to the circumstances at hand, 

based on the plain language of the agreement.” United States v. Higgins, 739 

F.3d 733, 736 (5th Cir. 2014). The record confirms that Santiago-Garcia read 

and understood the plea agreement, which contained an “explicit, 

unambiguous waiver of appeal.” United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 

746 (5th Cir. 2005). Thus, his waiver was knowing and voluntary. See 

Higgins, 739 F.3d at 736; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). Accordingly, he 

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3

is bound by it unless the Government breached the plea agreement. See 

United States v. Gonzalez, 309 F.3d 882, 886 (5th Cir. 2002).

Santiago-Garcia does not argue that the Government breached the 

plea agreement, and the record demonstrates that, to the contrary, the 

Government complied with each of its promises in the plea agreement. 

Consequently, the waiver is valid and enforceable, see Gonzalez, 309 F.3d at 

886, and it applies to bar Santiago-Garcia’s appeal. See Higgins, 739 F.3d at 

736–37; United States v. Walters, 732 F.3d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2013).

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Government’s motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.

Case: 24-60157 Document: 63-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/26/2024