* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 00-41335

Summary Calendar

_____________________

JOHNNIE Y. ROBERTS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:99-CV-632

_________________________________________________________________ October 31, 2001

Before JOLLY, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Johnnie Roberts filed the instant Title VII action against her

former employer, the Texas Department of Human Services (“DHS”),

alleging racial d iscrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work

environment. The district court dismissed most of Roberts’ claims

on the basis of res ju dicata. As to the remaining claims, the

district court grant ed summary judgment for DHS because Roberts

could not establish a prima facie case of retaliation and had notpresented sufficient evidence of a host ile work environment.

Finding no error, we affirm.

I

Johnnie Roberts began working as a Medicaid Eligibility worker

at DHS in 1981. She was promoted in 1986 and again in 1988.

In 1995, after filing a charge with the EEOC, Roberts filed a

Title VII action in federal court, alleging race discrimination and

retaliation. The district court granted partial summary judgment

for DHS. The case proceeded to trial in 1998, and a jury returned

a verdict for DHS on all remaining claims.

Roberts continued to work at DHS, but her relat ionship with

her co-workers began to deteriorate in late 1998. As the district

court noted, Roberts was disciplined for not following instructions

from her supervisor, sending derogato ry e-mail messages, and

angrily confronting co-workers and a hospital administrator.

Finally, in June 1999, Roberts’ employment was terminated.

Roberts filed this Title VII action in November 1999. In

October 2000 the district court granted DHS’ unopposed motion for

judgment on the pleadings, leaving only Roberts’ cl aims of Title

VII retaliation and a hostile work environment. The district court

then gr anted DHS’ motion for summary judgment on these remaining

claims. Roberts has appealed the summary judgment order only.

II

A

Roberts alleges that she experienced a hostile workenvironme nt. To establish a prima facie case of a hostile work

environment that violates Title VII, Roberts must cr eate a fact

issue on each eleme nt: (1) racially discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule and insults; (2) that are sufficiently severe or

pervasive; (3) so as to alter the conditions of employment; and (4)

create an abusive working environme nt. W alker v. Thompson

, 214

F.3d 615, 625 (5th Cir. 2000).

As noted by the district court, most of Roberts’ claims of a

hostile work environment either were or could have been litigated

in her first lawsu it. Res judicata prohibits either party in a

prior action from raising any claimor defense in a later action

that was or could have been raised in support of or in opposition

to the cause of action asserted in the prior action. Res judicata

insures the finality of judgments , conserves judicial resources,

and protect s litigants from multiple lawsuits. U nited States v.

Shanbaum

, 10 F.3d 305, 310 (5th Cir. 1994). Res judicata has four

elements: the parties in a later action must be identical to (or

at least be in privity with) the parties in a prior action; the

judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction; the prior action must have concluded with

a final judgment on the merits; and the same claim or cause of

action must be involved in both suits. Id

.

In the instant lawsuit, the parties are the same as those in

the prior lawsuit. The court which tried the first lawsuit was a

court of competent jurisdiction. The lawsuit ended in a final4

judgment on the merits for DHS. Finally, most of Roberts’ hostile

environment allegations involve incidents that occurred prior to

the trial of her 1998 lawsuit. These claims were or could have

been tried in Roberts’ prior lawsuit, and are therefore barred from

retrial by res judicata.

Roberts has on e remaining claim that involves incidents

subsequent to her first lawsuit. She alleges that she was subject

t o demeaning statements by whites about blacks, and that she

complained to her super visor Deason about this but Deason did

nothing. In order to establish a claim for hostile environment

harassment, Roberts must demonstrate that the harassment was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her

employment and to create an abusive working environment. Meritor

Savings Bank v. Vinson

, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Sporadic racial

comments during casual conversation do not establish the necessary

elements for a prima facie case. H icks v. Gates Rubb er Co. , 833

F.2d 1406, 1412 (10th Cir. 1987). Roberts must prove more than

j ust a few isolated incidents of racial enmity. S ee Snell v.

Suffolk Co.

, 782 F.2d 1094, 1103 (2d Cir. 1986); Gilbert v. City of

Little Rock

, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied

, 466

U.S. 972, 104 S.Ct. 2347, 80 L. Ed.2d 820 (1984). It is only a

violation of Title VII when the workplace is so “heavily polluted

with discrimination as to destroy the emotional and psychological

stability of the minority [employee].” R ogers v. EEOC

, 454 F.2d5

234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied , 406 U.S. 957 (1972).

Roberts has pointed to only two incidents when other employees

made derogatory remarks. In the first instance a clerk and

subordinate of Roberts’ claimed that Roberts hired only black

employees. In the second instance, Roberts alleges that an

employee in her unit said she heard other employees state that

Roberts only hired black employees and the employee was asked how

she could work in a black unit. These incidents did not so

“heavily pollute” the work environment and were not so severe or

pervasive as to alter the conditions of Roberts’ employment or to

create an abusive working environment, as to constitute a violation

of Title VII. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on this claim.

B

Roberts alleges that her discharge was retaliatory. The first

two elements of Roberts’ prima facie case are uncontested -- that

she participated in a protected activity and that she suffered an

adverse employment action. DHS contends, however, that Roberts

failed to established a causal connection between the two.

On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, this court views

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Lee v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.

, 249 F.3d 362 , 364 (5th Cir.

2001). Roberts was fired by her supervisor, Deborah Deason.

Roberts has failed to adduce any evidence that would prove that6

Deason knew of Roberts’ 1995 EEOC claim when Deason fired Roberts.

Further, Roberts has presented no evidence that links her EEOC

charge and her subs equent discharge. Her subjective belief that

she was subject to discrimination is not alone sufficient to

support her claim. S ee Price v. Marath on Cheese Corp. , 119 F.3d

330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997). It does not help Roberts’ case that four

years passed between the filing of her complaint and her discharge.

See Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network

, 14 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir.

1994) (passage of ten months time between complaint to supervisor

of age discrimination and discharge “suggests that a reta liatory

motive was highly unlikely”). Thus, Roberts has failed to produce

evidence that would establish a causal link between her EEOC charge

and her termination, and has not met her prima faci e burden of

establishing retaliatory discrimination. We therefore affirm the

grant of summary judgment to DHS on Roberts’ retaliatory

discrimination claim as well.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the distri ct court’s

grant of summary judgment to DHS and the district court’s dismissal

of Roberts’ complaint.

AFFIRMED