PURPOSE 

\. II aircraft programs for peacetime overflight of denied territory ~ 

with emphasis on the rationale, statements of need, and authority {~i 

which led to their development and operation, as well as the f\: ~ 

management arrangements under which they were carried out. ~ 

The present situation is then reviewed wherein the ISINGLASS l 

effort has been terminated, the OXCART is in the process of 

being phased out, and the U-2 is considered as effective only 

in limited areas away from a Soviet-type defensive environment. 

The future role of manned reconnaissance aircraft systems, or 

even the need for them, when viewed with and compared to the 

rapidly improving capabilities of satellites and drones, then 

emerges as the fundamental issue which is to be resolved. 

BACKGROUND 

:2, During the year 1954, as for some years previous, the 

urgent problem of defense against surprise attack by Soviet 

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Russia continued to occupy the attention of all those in 

Washington who bore the responsibility for the National Security. 

A high level committee, whose membership represented the best 

minds in the country, continually met in Washington to study 

every facet of cold war strategy and to advise the President. 

There was no lack of brain power available for the task, and 

the shortage which was recognized by all concerned came to be 

known as the "Intelligence Gap." 

~ The existence of the iron curtain and the growing hostility 

of Soviet Russia toward the West made it increasingly difficult 

to mount classic intelligence collection operations against the 

USSR. In the summer of 1954, the U.S. intelligence community 

had come around to the view that the only prospect of gaining 

the vital intelligence was through systematic aerial reconnaissance of the USSR. 

l(, The special study group of the Hoover Commission, set up ( 

under the Chairmanship of General James H. Doolittle to investigate CIA's covert activities, in its report of 30 September 

1954, expressed the belief that: "every known technical scheme 

be used and new ones developed to increase our intelligence 

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by high altitude photo reconnaissance and othor means and 

that no price would be too high to pay for the knowledge to 

be derived therefrom." 

G( On 5 November 1954, Dr. Edwin H. Land, Chairman of the 

"Project 3" Technical Capabilities Panel (a subgroup under the 

Office of Defense Mobilizations "Surprise Attack Committee"), 

wrote to Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, proposing a program 

of photo reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union and recommending that CIA, with Air Force assistance, undertake to carry 

out such a program. The Land Panel's proposal, entitled "A 

Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence," recognized 

the risks of provocation toward war that such an intensive program of overflights might run, as well as the danger involved 

should one of our military arms engage in such activity, especially 

in view of the tense political situation vis-a-vis Soviet Russia. 

"On the other hand," the proposal continued, "because it is vital 

that certain knowledge about industrial growth, strategic targets, and guided missile sites be obtained at once, we recommend 

that the CIA, as a civilian organization, undertake (with Air 

Force assistance) a covert program of selected flights." 

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CD}l~lll SYSTEM 

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C. The airplane that the Land Panel had in mind for the 

overflights was the CL-282 (later designated the U-2) which 

Lockheed had proposed to the USAF in 1952 and which the Panel 

came across in 1954 during their search for a technical capability of collecting intelligence_ over the USSR. The Panel 

concluded that the program was feasible and should be pursued 

by the Government. 

7 In Dr. Land's letter to M:r. Dulles submitting the proposal, 

t 

he made it clear on the Panel's belief that the activity was 

appropriate for CIA (always with Air Force assistance) and recommended "immediate action" through the CIA covert means, to produce the aircraft and equipment and set up a task force. He 

stated further that "the opportunity for safe overflights may 

last only a few years because the Russians will develop radars 

and interceptors or guided missile defense for the 70,000 ft. 

regime," and that the aircraft itself was "so obviously unarmed 

and devoid of military usefulness that it would minimize affront 

to the Russians, even1,through some remote mischance it were 

detected and identified." 

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'3⁄4 Dr. Land and Dr, Jim Baker, of the President's Advisory 

Council, had continually reviewed all advances made in the 

optical field for application to the photo reconnaissance overflights. Dr. Baker emphasized that the Air Force was already 

years ahead in the development of suitable camera systems as 

a result of their many years of experience gathered from sponsorship of basic research and development programs; "this is 

particularly true of the electronic computation of optical 

systems. The development of these complicated optical systems 

1NOuld have taken years in Germany by the older met.hods--but 

now is about to be accomplished in 16 working days with our 

IBM/CDC computers." 

q1 In the two weeks following the Land Panel's proposal to 

CIA, discussions took place between the Air Force and CIA as 

to the feasibility of undertaking the recommended program. On 

19 November 1954, a meeting was held in the office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Harold E. Talbott. It was agreed that 

the CL-282 proposal was practical and desirable and should be 

contracted for (along with the modified Canberra recommended 

by the Air Force). It was further agreed that the project 

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should be a joint Air Force/CIA effort and that regardless of 

a source of funds to support it, CIA unvouchered channels should 

be employed for passing the funds. 

/Di Later in November 1954, Mr. Dulles and General John Samford 

(USAF) met, and it was agreed that the DCI would prepare a memorandum seeking Presidential approval for the program. This memorandum, dated 24 November 1954, recommended Presidential approval of a National requirement for the reconnaissance overflights, asked that the Air Force and C~A be directed to implement the development of the aircraft, and requested that the 

overflights be conducted at the earliest possible time. This 

memorandum was approved by the President verbally. 

\\, A face to face meeting of Mr. Dulles and the top Air Force 

officials concerned reached a joint agreement on the organizational and management responsibilities of the program, and on 

3 August 1955, in a memorandum entitled "Organization and Delineation of Responsibility--Program Oil Stone," signed by 

General Twining and Mr. Dulles, responsibility was given for 

general direction and control of the project to the Director of 

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CIA and the Chief of Staff, USAF, to be exercised jointly. 

The agency appointed project director and the Air Force 

appointed deputy project director would be responsible for 

conduct of the project through all its facets, subject to 

guidance from higher authority. The Air Force project group 

(headed by Colonel Russell A. Berg) would act in the name of 

the Chief of Staff, and SAC would perform a supporting (not 

a controlling) role in the training and operational facets. 

The essential guidelines under which the program would be operated were that it would be a clandestine intelligence gathering 

operation to be conducted in such a way, as to minimize the 

risk of detection and of plausible attribution to the U.S. 

Government. 

The first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union took place 

on June 20, 1956, passing directly over Moscow. Several successive flights occurred that same week and, on July 11th, the 

first Soviet protest was delivered to the State Department. 

Requests for subsequent flights were more closely scrutinized 

before receiving final approval. The overflights continued, 

although less frequently, and in ever shrinking areas due to 

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the Soviets improving air defense systems, for four years, 

well past all predictions on longevity. 

J;l., As the CIA/Air Force overflights continued, the Strategic 

Air Command acquired its own fleet of U-2s which were assigned 

the peripheral photo and SIGINT missions. 

On May Day 1960, with the downing of Mr. Powers' U-2 over 

Sverdlovsk, the overflights of the Soviet Union came to an end. 

At that time, a Presidential ban on further manned overflights 

of the USSR was imposed and remains in effect. 

The U-2 has continued, by the addition of electronic countermeasures, the J-75 engine, modification for aircraft carrier 

operation, and a variety of other improvements, to perform a 

successful and useful role in intelligence collection in those 

areas, such as China, Southeast Asia, and Cuba, where its presence 

or even loss, is of less political consequence. 

/3~ With these continuing U-2 operations and the attendant 

attrition, it became apparent that there would be a need to 

replace these losses in order for this vehicle to continue to 

fill its special reconnaissance role and, accordingly, on 21 June 

1965, in a joint memorandum to the NRO, the Director, Program B, 

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and the Director, Program D, recommended that the Air Force 

and CIA, in joint enterprise, initiate a new buy of an improved 

U-2 (U-2R) as a means of realizing the maximum benefit from 

the newer and other reconnaissance systems which could not be 

profitably diverted to those tasks handled by the U-2 and as a 

means of replenishing the U-2 fleet. The U-2R, now in flight 

tests, will be operational by the summer of 1968 and should 

remain a useful intelligence tool at least through the early 

1970's, albeit in the non-Soviet environment. 

N I Early in 1957, while the overflights of the Soviet Union 

were underway with the U-2, and it will be recalled that the 

period during which overflight would be possible was to be 

relatively short-lived, and with the understanding that photographic satellite systems were well into the future, the CIA, 

in reaction to the improved ability of the Soviets to track the 

U-2, and as a means of prolonging the overflights, began research 

in radar camouflage as a means of hiding the U-2 from the radars. 

It quickly became apparent that only limited and temporary success could be hoped for through the application of the passive 

camouflage of an aircraft of conventional structure since the 

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materials themselves were either too heavy or narrow banded, 

and further degraded a 1rcraft p0:r:tot"lnarn::e. Already the Russian 

radar systems were characterized by a consiu.L ":1ble degree of 

frequency diversity. These circumstances sugges~,ct the need 

for a much more radical approach in order to obtain satisfactory 

results. Preliminary consideration led to the conclusion that 

any such radical approach would involve the use of unconventional 

material, structures, and configurations of aircraft and most 

probably a combination thereof. Accordingly, an exploration of 

possible design approaches was set in motion in August 1957. Two 

basic designs resulted from this effort: The GUSTO concept of a 

supersonic vehicle using a drone powered by ram-jet engines launched 

from a B-58 mother aircraft and the other approach, OXCART, for 

an unstaged aircraft with roughly the same performance specifications. On 15 November 1958, the Land Panel, in response to 

the need for such an advanced system, recommended the GUSTO 

system to Dr 0 Killian. Further consideration by those involved 

in carrying out this development program came to the conclusion 

that only the OXCART was technically feasible in the immediate 

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future and, accordingly, in the summer of 1958, members from 

the DOD, Air Force, CIA, and with the President's Scientific 

Advisory Council obtained the necessary Presidential approval 

to implement the OXCART program. A Joint Source Selection 

Board was established which chose the Lockheed proposal over 

the one from General Dynamics. 

During the very early stages of the OXCART design, ra.dar 

cross section goals were chosen which were felt could be achieved 

in an operational aircraft and which would permit a near covert 

penetration of the Soviet radar defense net or at a sufficien~ly 

reduced detection range to permit a safe transit. A program was 

also implemented to assess the OXCART vulnerability. Simultaneously, a special ELINT measurements program was begun to 

assure the vulnerability studies would be based upon actual 

measurements of the Soviet threat radars rather than estimates. 

By 1963, it became apparent from the vulnerability studies, which 

were receiving data on the newer and improved Soviet radars, that 

the OXCART would not be able to covertly penetrate the radar net 

undetected and tracked, and accordingly, recommended the development of a "Supermarket" of electronic countermeasures systems. 

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This ECM program was carried out and produced the variety of 

threat warning and jammer systems now available for operational 

use. 

Although the OXCART achieved its design goals by flying 

at specified altitude and speed 48 months after the contract 

date, it did not receive the necessary authority for overflights 

and in 1966, while being held in a state of operational readiness, and at a considerable cost, came under increasing scrutiny by the Bureau of the Budget. The decision was subsequently 

made to phase out the program by December 1967. Later, however, 

in response to an urgent USIB requirement, the OXCART, as the 

only practical vehicle for the job, was deployed to Okinawa for 

overflights of North Vietnam in search of possible surface-tosurface offensive missile sites. The decision to phase out the 

OXCART has been extended three months to allow additional time 

for the Air Force's SR-71 to prepare to take over these missions. 

/S In 1964 and again in response to the continuing increase 

in the capabilities of the Soviet air defense net against aircraft operating in the OXCART regime, the CIA, in anticipation 

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of a need to develop a more advanced manned reconnaissance 

system, initiated a study which led to the definition of 

the ISINGLASS boost-glide concept. The Agency had set forth 

those performance specifications that would be required to 

successfully penetrate the Soviet environment during the 

next decade. The objective of the ISINGLASS effort was to 

conduct covert photographic reconnaissance of those geographical areas normally denied U.S. overflight. The vehicle 

envisioned relied entirely on its operational characteristics 

for survival; it would enter denied territory at Mach 21 and 

200K ft altitude, and exit at Mach 7 and 120K ft. The proposed launch method was from a B-52 near the periphery of 

the USSR with recovery planned at ZI bases. The program as 

proposed would cost in excess of one billion dollars. 

In March 1967, in recognition of the magnitude of undertaking the ISINGLASS program, and the expense which would be 

required to bring the program to an operational stage, the 

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CONTROL SYSTUl 

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Director of CIA Reconnaissance Programs recommended that this 

effort be terminated. 

/

6r In review, it is seen that the development of the manned 

aircraft reconnaissance systems has been based on deduced need 

and agreement thereto, and has preceded the statement of a 

formal requirement delineating this need. Stated requirements 

against which the manned systems have been targeted have always 

followed. These joint CIA/ Air Force enterprises have worked 

and worked well, reducing duplication while making maximum use 

of each organization's assets and abilities; such as the Air 

Force world-wide operational capabilities and the CIA's "Skunk 

Works" approach to the research and development. 

It is not possible to adequately review manned reconnaissance in proper perspective without going back to another date 

in 1960. In that year, on August 20th, the first photography of 

denied territory from a satellite was successfully recovered 

by the DISCOVERER program which was the forerunner of the present 

CORONA. This initial reconnaissance satellite operated for one 

day, and returned 4000 ft. of film. The photography obtained was 

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monoscopic and had a ground resolution of 20 ft. Since that 

time, about 100 CORONA vehicles have been launched, lifetime 

has increased to 15 days, and 30 to 40 thousand feet of film 

are returned from each mission. Most photography acquired is 

in stereo and resolution has improved to less than 10 feet. 

In addition to the CORONA search capability, spotting systems 

have been developed and are now producing photography of resolution between land 2 feet, 

PRESENT SITUATION 

/7 a The present situation then can be summed up as one in which j' 

satellite photographic resolution is rapidly approaching that 

of present aircraft systems. r-~~~~~~~ te photogr:phi~---:;stems --fo; 

1 

---search and surveillance which will achieve resolutions of 2-3 

feet and will remain on orbit for 30 days or more. The advanced 

technical intelligence systems will remain on orbit an equal length 

of time and should achieve Technology 

for reading out images from satellites in near real time has 

been developed and could be flown in the early 1970' s. 

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At the same time, the operational concepts for advanced 

aircraft are taking on many of the characteristics of satellites. 

To achieve the speeds necessary to survive in denied territory 

such aircraft would operate at very high altitudes well above 

all weather and near the limit of the sensible atmosphere, and 

would provide only minimal maneuverability. Such systems would 

ite~ to operate on the basis of ·a single pass over the target area. 

,---·-,. T~~~;-fundamental issue which must be considered ~-·-· ! \1,,.,.. 

the need for future manned reconnaissance systems and what efforts, 

if any, should be undertaken in this direction at this time. 

------------------------ -----------------.....!.... .. The question arises as to the direction and scope of the 

NRO effort in the area of advanced reconnaissance aircraft. 

Many questions come to mind when considering this issue; not 

the least of which concerns whether satellites (or drones) can 

ever completely replace the manneq system. If overflight by 

either system can be accomplished at will, the manned system is 

in general by far the more cost effective. What are the unique 

attributes of the future manned system when compared with other 

future smsor systems on a cost effectiveness basis? Will the 

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present ban imposed on manned overflights be lifted? If future 

overflights by manned systems are indicated, is it necessary 

that the mission, as in the past, be carried out as a "clandestine 

intelligence gathering operation to be conducted in such a way 

as to minimize the risk of detection and of plausible attribution 

to the U.S. Government" and can such a mission be truly covert? 

Could other organizations, therefore, be called upon to fill 

these future National needs on a more or less overt basis? 

The present situation is also one in which there is concern 

over the vulnerability of the satellite programs as well. During 

the past year the Soviet technical capability to interdict our 

satellites has becomo most clearly defined. The HEN HOUSE radars 

at Sary Shagan and Angarsk are identified as satellite acquisition and tracking radars of a very sophisticated nature. Coupled 

with DOG HOUSE, ABM HEN HOUSE radars and possible modified TALL 

KINGS, the Soviets will have an excellent and rapid orbit capability very soon. The GALOSH missile has the acceleration, 

payload, and accuracy required for intercept, and the TRIAD 

radars are considered adequate for the target and missile tracf'. 

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functions. Although the NRO has e•joyed a considerable 

amount of freedom in the condact of its space programs to 

date, the future is not so certain when weighed against this 

ominous defensive environment. 

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