## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Taliani v. Herrman n , 2011 IL App (3d) 090138

Appellate Court Caption STEVEN A TAL I ANI
, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Ap p ell ant, v. PATRI CK J

. HERRMANN, as State’s Attorney for Bur eau C o u n ty , I llinois , Def

endant- Appellant and Cross- Appellee

.

District & N o. Third District Docke t No. 3-09-0138

Filed Rehea ring denied Aug ust 19, 2011

September 29, 2011

Held (Note : T

his syl lab us

con st it ute s n o par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Rep o rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) An orde r awa rding plaintiff attorney fee s for the w ork per formed by his counsel in obtai n i n g g rand jury transcr ipts from defe ndant’s 1994 crim i n al t rial pursuant to the Free dom of I nformation Act was rever sed

on the ground that the Act is not the p ro p er vehicle for obtaining gra nd jury transcr ipts.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from t h e Circuit Court of Bur eau County
, No. 07-MR-30; the Hon. Eug ene P. Da

ug herity , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and vac ated in par t.Counsel on

Appea l Patrick J

. Her rmann (ar g ued), State’s Attorney
, of Prin ceton, for appellant.

Robert L . Caplan (a

rg ued), of Clarendon Hills, for a

ppellee.

Panel J USTI CE SCHMI DT delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustice Holdridg e conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.
J ustice L y tton dissented, with opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 I n an action under the I llinois Fr eedom of I nformatio n Ac t (t h e Act) (5 I L CS 140/1 et seq. (West 2008)), the trial court order ed the defe ndant, Patrick J

. Her rmann, in his capa city

as Bur eau County State’s Attorney
, to provide the plaintiff, Steven A. Tali an i
, with
transcr ipts of g rand jury proce eding s from Taliani’s 1994 crimin al ca s e. Taliani then petitioned for an awa

rd of attorney fee s pursuant to the Act. The petition included a reque st for fee s for time spent by Taliani’s attorney to prepa re and arg ue the fee petition (commonly called “ fee s on fee s”). The trial court a war ded Ta liani attorney

fee s in an amount less than he reque sted and denied his reque st for fee s on fee s. Her rmann appea ls the awa

rd of attorney fee s; Taliani cross-a

ppeals the denial of his petition for fee s on fee s. We reve rse and vacate the orde r g ranting Taliani attorne y fee s.

¶ 2 FACTS ¶ 3 T al i ani is curr ently serving a 70-y ear sentenc e for murder and a 30-y ear sent en ce fo r ag g ravated battery with a firea rm, both from convictions in 1994. I n J une 2007, he filed a pro

se complaint for decla

ratory and injunctive relief under the Act. I n hi s complaint, Taliani alleg ed that the Bur eau County circ uit court cler k denied his reque st for “a copy of Gra nd J ury Transc ripts from the case of People v. Taliani
, Case No. 94-CF- 37.” Taliani also stated that pursuant to section 10 of the Act (5 I L CS 140/10 (West 2008)), he appea led the cler k’s denial to Her

rmann. I n response , Her

rmann sent Taliani a letter which stated, in part, “Tha t Gra nd J ury Transc ript was provided to y our attorney prior to trial. You should c ontact him
to rec eive a

Gra nd J ury Transc ript if y ou do not have it.” ¶ 4 Taliani then wrote a letter to his criminal trial lawy er asking for the g rand jury transcr ipts. I n a responsive pleading
, Taliani stated that his criminal trial attorney failed to respond to his
reque st f or the transcr ipts. Subsequently
, Her rmann sent Taliani a letter stating that he was denying T aliani’s fr eedom of information reque st “ [b] eca use the proce eding s of the Gra nd J ury are conducte d in secr ecy , matters other t h an d eliberations and the vote cannot be

-2-disclosed by the State’s Attorney with only limit ed exceptions. The dissemination of Gra nd J ury proce eding s is covere d by 725 I L CS 5/ 112-6.” ¶ 5 Robert Caplan enter ed his a ppear ance as Taliani’s counsel in the matter; Taliani filed a two-count amende d complaint. I n count I I
, Taliani named Her rmann, in his officia l capa city

as Bur eau County State’s Attorney
, as the defe ndant. Taliani asser ted that Her

rmann denied his request for

the g rand jury

transcr ipts and attache d the letter f rom Her rmann. ¶ 6 Her

rmann fi l ed a motion to dismiss count I I of Her rmann’s complaint. Taliani filed a
response to Her

rmann’s motion and then a motion for judgme nt on the pleading s. The court denied Her

rmann’s motion to dismiss and g rante d Taliani’s motion fo r judgme nt on the pleading s, order ing H err

mann to provide the g rand jury transcr ipts to Taliani. ¶ 7 Taliani submitt ed a peti t i o n co n t en d i n g t h at u nder section 11(i) of the Act (5 I L CS 140/11(i) (West 2008)), he was entitled to attorney fee s. I n the petition, Taliani asser ted that Caplan’s hourly rate was $250. Taliani attached bil ling sheets from C aplan indicating that Caplan had worke d on the matter for 85 hours and 8 minutes, for a total bill of $19,951.50. The billing sheets deducte d $2,000 for work Caplan had done on count I of the c omplaint, for a final total reque st of $17,951.50. ¶ 8 The court held a hear ing on Taliani’s petition for attorney fee s; at t he beginning of the hear ing, Taliani submitt ed a supplemental petition for attorney fee s, seeking fee s on fee s for the time he spent prepa

ring and litigating his orig ina l f e e p e ti tion. Attorney Randolph Gordon testified as a witness for Taliani. Gordon opined that a $250 hourly rate was rea sonable g iven Caplan’s work on the case , his experience and what other judge s in the circ uit have approve d

as an hourly rate in civil case s. Caplan testified that a $250 hourly rate was rea sonable based

on his responsibility in the case , his many y ear s of experienc e and the hourly rate s for lawy ers in civil matters in seve ral of the surrounding counties. ¶ 9 At the conclusion o f the hear ing, the court reduc ed the total hours from 85.1 to 57.86. The court also reduc ed Caplan’s hourly rate from $250 to $162.50, finding that $162.50 was

a rea sonable hourly rate in the are a based on its experience

. The court awa rded Taliani fee s of $9,361.62. The court ref used to awa

rd Taliani any fee s on fe es re q u ested in his supplemental petition. ¶ 10 Her

rmann appea ls the trial court’s awa rd of attorney fee s to Taliani. Tal ia n i c r o s s-appe als the trial cour

t’s denial of the fee s on fee s.

¶ 11 ANAL YSI S ¶ 12 The Act require s public bodies make “ava ilable to any person for inspection or copy ing all public rec ords, except as other wise provided in Sec tion 7 of this Act.” 5 I L CS 140/ 3(a) (West 2008). Public rec ords are broadly define d under the Act. 5 I L CS 140/2(c) (West 2008). S ection 7 of the Act exempts cer tain rec ords from its rea ch, notably
, “[i] forma t i o n specific ally

prohibited from disclosure by fede ral or State law.” 5 I L CS 140/7(1)(a ) (West 2008). ¶ 13 Section 112-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedur e of 1963 (the Code) (725 I L CS 5/100-1
et seq. (West 2008)) is a state law that prohibits the disclosure of g rand jury transcr ip ts

-3-without a court order and thus exempts them from the Act. 725 I L CS 5/112-6 (West 2008).

Her rmann would have violated state law had he provided Taliani the reque sted documents without a court order to do so. The Code indicates that g rand jury proce eding s are secr et and only open to the “State’s Attorney
, his repor ter and any other person authorized by the court or by law.” 725 I L CS 5/112-6(a) (West 2008); People v. DiVincenzo
, 1 8 3 I l l

. 2d 239, 254 (1998); People v. Sampson
, 406 I ll. App. 3d 1054, 1057 (2011). Taliani was only entitled to

a co p y o f t h e g rand jury transcr ipts pursuant to section 112-6(c )(3) of the Code. I t states: “Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this Section of matters occur ring befor e the Gra

nd J ury may also be made when the court, preliminary to or in connec tion with a judicial proce eding
, direc ts such in the interests of justice or when a l aw s o d irec ts.” 725 I L CS 5/112-6(3)( c) (West 2008). ¶ 14 Taliani was only entitled to a copy of the g rand jury transcr ipts pursuant to the Code and the Code does not allow him to rec over his fee s. I t was err or for the trial court to awa rd fee s to Taliani in this matter. ¶ 15 Contrary to the dissent’s asser tion s , i n b o t h t h i s court and the trial court, He rrmann arg ued that it was improper to aw ar d fee s beca use a law other than the Act controlled his ability to disclose t he transcripts to Taliani. Thus, he ra ised an is sue of law that this court 1 revie ws de novo

. Corral v. Merv is Industries, Inc.
, 217 I ll. 2d 144, 153 (2005). No doubt the Act’s attorney fee s provision is to dissuade public officia ls from ref using to disclose public

rec ords t hat t he Act require s them to disclose. That is, the Act provides, in essenc e, that if

a public officia l r equire s one to hire a lawy er and file suit to obtain that which should ha ve been ha nded to him, the person who ul timately preva ils in obt aining the re cords should be entitled to rec over attorney fee s. This commonsense provision promotes the purposes of the Ac t

. On the other hand, it would be absurd to construe the statute to forbid a g overn m en t body from disclosing cer tain rec ords without a court order and then require it to pay the applicant’ s attorney

fee s in securing the cour t order.

Wi th al l due re spe ct , the dis sen t m is con st rue s bot h the re cor d and the m aj ori ty opi nio n. T he 1 ef fe ct of the tr ia l cou rt ’s ord er of August 8, 2008
, was to o r der the tur nover of the grand j ury tr ans cr ipt s. Her rmann complie d wit h tha t ord er and
, the re for e, it is a fai t acc ompl i

. T he is sue of
pro vidin g the re cor ds to T al ia ni is m oot

. Her rmann doe s not at ta ck the August 8 ord er and we do not

re verse tha t ord er

. We dis cus s the bas is of the ple adi ngs bec aus e the y ar e re le vant to the J anu ar y 22, 2009
, ord er awar din g at tor ney fe es. I n ess enc e, the tr ia l cou rt got the ri ght re sul t on August 8 for the

wron g re aso n. I t was onl y wit h re spe ct to the J anu ar y ord er awar din g fe es tha t it bec ame import ant tha t the tr ia l cou rt ord er ed the dis cl osu re of the grand j ury tr ans cr ipt s unde r the Act

. T hat is
, had the
tr ia l cou rt den ie d the awar d of at tor ney fe es, the re woul d have bee n not hin g for Her rmann to app eal

. We do not ra is e an is sue sua s p o n t e a s a l l eged by the dis sen t. Rat her
, we add re ss an is sue tha t Her rmann has ra is ed fr om the beginn ing. Once Her rmann had a cou rt ord er re qui ri ng the dis cl osu re of the grand j ury tr ans cr ipt s, exc ept wit h re spe ct to the at tor ney f ees is sue , it m at te re d not to him

w h e t h e r the ord er was is sue d pur sua nt to the Code
, the Act
, or any oth er st at ute

. We add re ss the
pro pri et y o f the Act cou nt now bec aus e it goes to the very he ar t of the at tor ney fe es is sue and the J anu ar y 22, 2009, ord er whic h Her rmann ap pea ls . Cont ra ry to the di sse nt’ s a sse rt ion , th is opi nio n

re verse s t he J anu ar y 2009 or der awar din g fees and onl y that or der

.
-4-¶ 16 We hold that, as a matter of law, the Act is not the proper vehicle for obtaining g rand jury

transcr ipts. As Her

rmann originally advised Taliani, disc l o s u re of g rand jury transcr ipts is
g overne d by section 112-6(c )(3)

. 725 I L CS 5/112-6(c) (3) (West 2008). The order of the trial
court awa rding fee s to Taliani is revers ed

. Gi ven our resolution of this issue, we need not addre ss Taliani’s cross-a

ppeal. Our holding that Taliani is not entitled to any fee s rende rs the fee s on fee s issue moot. ¶ 17 For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the circ uit court of Bur eau County is rever sed and vac ated with re g ard to the g ranting of attorne y fee s.

¶ 18 Reverse d and vac ated in par t.

¶ 19 J USTI CE L YTTON, dissenting : ¶ 20 I dissent. The issue decide d by the majority was never raised in th e t ri al co u rt or on app ea l. The only issue on appea l was the attorney fee s awa rd. Thus, the order g ranting Taliani’s Fr eedom of I nformation Act (F OI A) complaint is not at issue in this appeal. This
court should be revie wing the only issue proper ly befor e it, which is the trial court’s attorney fee s awa rd. I would aff

irm the trial cour

t’s awa rd of attorney fee s to Taliani but rema nd to deter mine the prope r amount of f ees, inc luding f

ees on f ees.

¶ 21 I ¶ 22 I llinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)( 2) provides that a notice of appea l “shall specify the judgme nt or part there of or other order s appea led from and the relief soug ht from the revie wing court.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 3 0 3 (b )( 2 ) (e ff. J une 4, 2008). Pursuant to Rule 303(b)( 2), when an app ea l is taken from a specifie d judgme nt, the appellate court acquir es no jurisdiction to revie w other judg ments or par ts of judgme nts not spec ified or inferr ed from the notice of appea l. Neiman v. Economy Preferred Insurance Co.
, 357 I ll. App. 3d 786, 790 (2005). Where a notice of appea l does not mention a specific order
, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review that orde r. See id. at 791. ¶ 23 I ssues not r aised in the trial court are forf eited on appea l. Rojas Concrete, Inc. v. Flood Testing Laboratori es , Inc.
, 406 I l l. App. 3d 477, 482 (2010). Simi larly
, all arg uments not raised in an opening appellate br ief a re f orfe ited. Jordan v. Civil Servic e Comm’n
, 246 I ll. App. 3d 1047, 1048 (1993). ¶ 24 I t i s i m p ro p er fo r courts of revie w to raise issues sua sponte

. Our supreme c ourt explained: “I llinois law is well settled that *** ‘a revie wing court should not normally sear ch the rec ord for unarg ued and unbriefe d rea sons to reve rse a trial court judgme nt.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v . Givens , 237 I ll. 2d 311, 323 (2010) (quoting Saldana v. W irtz C artage Co.
, 74 I ll. 2d 379, 386 (1978))

. The United States Supreme Court has articula ted the rea sons for this policy : “I n our adver sary sy stem, in both civil and criminal case s, in the first instance and on appea l, we follow the principle of party pre s en t at i o n

. T hat i s, we rely on the parties to fra me the issues for decision and assig n to courts the role of neutra l arbiter of matters the

-5-parties prese nt. *** [A]s a g ener al rule, ‘[o] ur adver sary sy stem is de signe d around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advanc ing the fa cts and a

rg uments entitled them to relief.’ [C itation.] As cog ently explained: ‘[Courts] do not, or should not, sally forth eac h day looking for wrong s to rig ht. We wait for case s to come to us, and when they do we normally decide only q u es t i o n s prese nted by the parties. Counsel almost alway s know a g reat deal more about their

case s than we do.’ [ C itation.] ” Gree nlaw v. United States
, 554 U.S. 237, 243-44 (2008). ¶ 25 Her e, Taliani filed a FOIA reque st to obtain his g rand jury transcr ipts. Her rmann denied Taliani’s re quest with a letter sta ting:
“Tha t Gra nd J ury Transc ript was provided to y our attorney prior to trial. You should
contac t him to receive a Gr and Jury Transc ript if y ou do not have it.
725 I L CS 5/12-6 prohibits any further disclosure of the Gra nd J ury Transc ript to y ou or any one else .”
Her rmann never asser

ted that the transcr ipts wer e exempt from FOIA, as he was require d to do upon denial of Taliani’s FOIA reque st. See Illinois Education Ass’n v. Illinois State Board of Education
, 204 I ll. 2d 456, 46 3 -6 4 (2003) (whe n a public body rec eives a reque st for information under FOIA, it m u s t comply with that reque st or provide written notice specify ing the particula

r exemption, set forth in section 7 of FOIA, claimed to authorize the denial). ¶ 26 Taliani fil ed a co mplaint for decla ratory judgme nt and injunctive relief
, alleg ing tha t Her rmann violated FOI A. Herrmann filed a mot ion to dismiss the complaint, alleg ing tha t the Code of Criminal Procedur e of 1963 (Code) (725 I L CS 5/112-6(b) (W es t 2008)) prohibited disclosure of Taliani ’ s g r a n d jury transcr ipts. Ag ain, Her rmann never asser

ted that the transcr ipts wer e exempt from FOIA. There afte r, Taliani filed a motion for judgme nt on the pleading s. On Aug ust 8, 2008, the trial court g rante d T al i an i ’s m o tion and enter ed an order g ranting Taliani the relief he reque sted in his complaint. On J anuar y 22, 2009, the trial
court e ntere d an orde r g ranting Taliani attorne y fee s.

¶ 27 A. Notice of Appea l ¶ 28 Her

rmann filed a

notice of a

ppeal, whic h provided:
“P at ri ck Her

rmann *** here by appea ls the order *** enter ed on J anuar y 22, 2009

awa rding attorney ’s fee s in the amount of $9,361.62. The appellant seeks the reve rsal of the order enter ed J anuar

y 22, 2009 awa

rding the attorney ’s fee s to the plaintiff, appellee
, Steven Taliani.” The notice of appea l made no ref ere nce to the trial court’s Aug ust 8, 2008, order g ranting Taliani judgme nt on his FOI A complaint nor did it seek reve rsal of that order
, which did not become appea lable until the trial court ruled on the attorney fee reque st. See Hamer v. Lentz
, 155 I ll. App. 3d 692, 695 (1987). Since the notice of appe al did not mention the Aug ust 8,

-6-2008, order , we lac k jurisdiction to consider it. 2

¶ 29 B. Tr ial and Appe al Recor d ¶ 30 Additionally
, it wa s i m p roper for the majority to rule that FOIA was “not the prope r vehicle for obtaining g rand jury transcr ipts” beca use that issue was never raised by Her rmann in the trial court or on appea l. Supra ¶ 17. I n the trial court, Her rmann arg ued that the Code did not authorize disclosure of the t ransc ripts. He never a rg ued that F OI A did not apply to T ali ani’s reque st for his g rand jury transcr ipts or that the transcr ipts wer e exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Thus, He rr m ann forf eited revie w of the trial court’s decision that FOIA require d disclosure of the transcr ipts. See Rojas Concrete, Inc.
, 406 I ll. App. 3d at 482. ¶ 31 Fur

thermore
, on appea l, Her rmann did not challenge t h e t ri al court’s order g ranting Taliani’s mot ion for judgment on the pl eading s. The only “I ssue[ ] Presented for R ev i ew” by Her rmann in his ope ning br ief wa s “[w] hether the trial cour

t e rre d in a

war ding attorney fee s

. ” Be ca use the sole issue Her rmann prese nted to this court was the propriety of the attorney fee s awa

rd, the trial court’s decision g ranting judgme nt to Taliani in the FOIA action is not reviewa

ble by this court. See Jordan , 246 I ll. App. 3d at 1048. ¶ 32 Her e, the majority sua s p o n t e raised the issue of whether Taliani’s underly ing F OI A complaint was proper. Bec ause that iss u e wa s not raised by the parties in the t rial court or on appea l, the majority

should not have dec ided it. See Givens , 237 I ll. 2d at 323.

¶ 33 I I ¶ 34 T h o u gh I need only speak to the majority ’s opinion, I think the substantive issues, the only issues
, ra i s ed by the parties should be addre ssed, that is (1) whether the trial court proper ly g rante d attorney fee s to T aliani’s attorney , and (2) whether Taliani’s attorney was entitled to fee s on fee s. I would answe r both questions in the aff irmative.

¶ 35 A. Entitlement to Fee s ¶ 36 The only prer equisite to a n awa rd of attorney fee s under F OI A is that the party seeking the information “substantially preva il[ ] in a proce eding .” 5 I L CS 140/11(i) (West 2 0 0 8 ) ; Ca l l inan v. Prisoner Rev iew Board
, 371 I ll. App. 3d 272, 277 (2007). I n orde r t o substantially preva il in a FOIA claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the prosec ution of the action could rea sonably be reg arde d as nece ssary to obtain the information, and (2) the action substantially cause d delivery of the information. People ex rel. Ulrich v. Stukel
, 294 I ll. App. 3d 193, 202 (1997). ¶ 37 I n deter

mining a rea sonable fee
, the court may consider the fee arr ang ement betwee n the

T he maj ori ty cont end tha t the y ar e not re viewin g the t ri al cou rt ’s August 8, 20 08, o rde r. 2 However, it is the pro pri et y of tha t o r d e r t h a t l e a d s the m aj ori ty to con cl ude tha t no at tor ney fe es sho uld have been all owed in thi s case . The m aj ori ty fi nd tha t at tor ney fe es wer e imprope r bec aus e the tr ans cr ipt s fa ll wit hin an exc ept ion unde r FOI A. T he pro ble m is tha t Her rmann never ra is ed tha t is sue at tr ia l o r a ppe al . T hus , it sho uld not be dec ide d by thi s c our t.

-7-attorney and the client. Renk en v. Northern Illinois W ater Co.
, 191 I ll. App. 3d 7 4 4
, 7 5 1 (1989). Other fac tors to consider are : (1) the skill and standing of the attorney ; (2) the nature of t he cause a

nd the novelty

and difficulty of t he is sue; (3) the amount and the importance of the subject matter; (4) the deg ree of responsibility involved in manag ing the case ; (5) the time and labor require d; (6) the usual and customary rate char g ed in the community ; and (7) the benef it to the client. Blankenship v. Dialist International Corp.
, 209 I ll. App. 3d 920, 927 (1991). A trial court is fre e to use its own knowledg e and experience to evalua te the attorney fee s soug ht. McH

enry Savings Bank v. Autoworks of W auconda, Inc.
, 399 I ll. App. 3d 104, 113 (2010). ¶ 38 The rec ord shows that in 2007, T al i an i re q u es t ed h i s gra n d j ury transcr ipts from Her rmann throug h a FOIA reque st. Her rmann ref used to turn over the transcr ipts to Taliani. Only afte r Taliani instit uted his FOIA action and the trial court order ed Her rmann to provide the transcr ipts did Her

rmann fi n al l y t u rn them over. Taliani substantially preva iled in his FOIA ac tion. See Stukel , 294 I ll. App. 3d at 202. ¶ 39 Taliani’s attorney , Caplan, provided s u ff i ci en t information supporting his reque st for attorney fee s. Caplan’s fee petition contained a detailed list of the service s Caplan perf ormed

on Taliani’s behalf, the time spent on those servic es and the hourly rate he charg ed for his work. Ca p l an also testified to his time and work product. Taliani’s expert testified to the
amount of work Caplan perf ormed in the case , Caplan’s experience
, and the customary rate char g ed by attorney s in the community

. The trial court considere d this evidenc e to deter mine the fee’s reasona

bleness, apply ing the Blankenship fac tors. See Blankenship
, 209 I ll. App. 3d at 927. Additionally
, the court proper ly relied upon its own knowledg e and experience in deter mining th e fee s. See McH enry Savings Bank
, 399 I ll. App. 3d at 113. The trial court proper ly deter mined that Taliani wa s entitled to attorney fee s.

¶ 40 B. F ees on F ees ¶ 41 The question of whether the I llinois FOIA’s provision for attorney fee s includes fee s on fee s appea

rs to be a matter of first impression. Howeve r, I llinois courts have permitted fee s

on fee s reque sts in other contexts. See Rack ow v

. Human Rights Comm’ n , 152 I ll. App. 3d 1046, 1064 (1987) (allowing fee s on fee s under Human Rights Act); In re Estate of Marks
, 74 I ll. App. 3d 599 (1979) (trial court approve d attorney fee s for time spent prepa ring petition for attorney fee s in contested probate case ). We ag ree with this conce pt and believe it should apply

in FOI A ca ses.

-8-¶ 42 Courts ha ve allowed fee s on fee s under simil ar state statutes, fede ral FOIA, and other 3 4 fede ral fee -shifting statutes. The denial of fee s on fee s attenuate s the prac tical eff ect and the 5 intent of fee-shifting statutes. See In re Southern Calif ornia Sunbelt Dev elopers, Inc.
, 608 F. 3 d at 463 (“[I ]t would be inconsistent to dilute a fee s awa rd by ref using to co m p en s at e attorney s for the time they rea sonably spent in establishing their rig htful claim t o the fee.” (I nterna l quotation marks omitted)). ¶ 43 The primary purpose of the I llinois FOIA’s attorney fee provision is “t o p re v en t the

s o me times insurmountable barr iers prese nted by attorney fee s from hindering an in d iv id u a l’ s reque st for information and from enabling the g overnme nt to esca pe co m p l i ance with the law.” Duncan Publishing, Inc. v. City of Chicago
, 304 I ll. App. 3d 778
, 786 (1999). The
purpose and intent of the I llinois FOIA’s attorney fee s prov i s i on can only be fully

acc omplished if fee s on fee s are allowed. I would find that the t ri al co u rt err ed in deny ing Taliani’s re quest for f

ees on f ees.

See Cour i e r N

e w s v

. Hunt erd

on Count y Pros ecu tor ’s Off

ic e , 876 A.2d 806, 811 (N.J

. 3 Supe r

. C t

. App. Div. 2005 ) (t ime spe nt pre par ing a fe e pet it ion compensa ble unde r New J er sey’s Open Reco rds Act (N.J . Stat

. Ann. § 47: 1- 6 (W est 2002 )) ); Holl en v. Hath away Ele ct ri c, Inc

. , 584 S.E.2d 523 (W

. V a. 2003 ) (pl ai nti ff ent it le d to fe es for ti m e spe nt pre par ing and ar guing an at tor ney fe es pet it ion unde r the We st V ir ginia Wa ge Paym ent and Coll ect ion Act (W

. V a. Code § 25- 5- 1 et seq

. (2 000) ))

.

See Ral ph Hoa r & Ass oci ate s v . Nat ion al High way T raf fi c Saf et y Admi nis tr ati on , 985 F. 4 Supp . 1 ( D.D.C. 19 97)

.

“ ‘I n st at uto ry fe e cas es, fe der al cou rt s *** have uni for m ly hel d tha t t i me s p e nt in 5
est abl is hin g t he ent it le m ent to and amount of the fe e is compensa ble .’ [Ci ta ti on.] ” In re Sou t h e r n Cali for nia Sunb el t Deve lop ers , Inc

. , 608 F.3d 4 5 6
, 4 6 3 (9t h Cir

. 2010 ); see , e.g. , Ameri can Fede rat ion of Gove rnme nt Empl oye es, AFL- CIO, Loca l 3882 v. Fede ral Labo r Rel ati ons Aut hor it y , 994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir

. 1993 ) (Ba ck Pay Act ); Ma res v. Cred it Bure au of Rat on , 801 F.2d 1197 (10 th Cir

. 1986 ) (T rut h- in-Lendi ng A c t , Fai r Cre dit Repo rt ing Act and Fai r Debt Coll ect ion s Pra ct ic es Act ); Sie rra Clu b v. Envi ron ment al Prot ect ion Agen cy , 769 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir

. 1985 ) (Cl ean Air Act ); Ins ti tut ion ali

zed Juv eni le s v. Sec ret ary of Publ ic W el far e , 758 F.2d 897 (3d Cir

. 1985 ) (Ci vil Rights Att orn e y’ s F e e s A w ar ds Act of 1976 ); In re Nuco rp Ener gy, Inc

. , 764 F.2d 655 (9t h Cir

. 1985 ) (Ba nkrupt cy Re for m Act ); Pran din i v. Nati onal Tea Co.
, 585 F.2d 47 (3d Cir

. 1978 ) (Ci vil Rights Act of 1964 ); Ameri can Canoe Ass ’n v. Unit ed Sta te s Envi ron ment al Prot ect ion Agen cy , 138 F. Sup p. 2d 722 (E. D. V a. 2 001) (Cl ean Wa te r Ac t a nd En dan gered Spec ie s Ac t)

.
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