FILED 


AUGUST 27, 2013 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


Kevin Grudzinski, ) No. 30795-6-111 

) 

Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

Randy Grudzinski and ) 

Nancy Grudzinski, husband and wife, ) 

) 

Respondents. ) 

KULIK, J. - Kevin Grudzinski appeals summary dismissal of claims against his 

brother Randy Grudzinski. The claims stem from Randy dumping demolition debris on 

land that Kevin later inherited. I Kevin alleged that the debris was toxic, devalued the 

land, and clouded title. He sued Randy for relief under the Model Toxics Control Act 

(MTCA), chapter 70.105D RCW, chapter 82.21 RCW; damages for negligent injury to 

property; an injunction ordering Randy to clean up the land; and a declaration quieting 

title. Eleven days before trial, the court dismissed all ofthe claims on summary 

judgment. 

I For clarity, we will refer to Kevin Grudzinski and Randy Grudzinski by fIrst 
No. 30795-6-111 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

We conclude that there was no release of hazardous substances and the court 

properly dismissed the remaining claims. Accordingly, we affirm. 

FACTS 

Elsie Grudzinski was the mother of two sons, Kevin Grudzinski and Randy 

Grudzinski. Ms. Grudzinski owned 57 acres in Walla Walla. Parts of that acreage are 

known as Lots 1,3, and 4. Those lots are at issue here. 

Debris Disposal on Lots 1, 3, and 4 

Randy owned a demolition and excavation company called Randy Grudzinski, Inc. 

(RGI). He planned to use Lot 1 as a base of operations for RGI. 2 He intended to store his 

equipment there. He began dumping debris, which included large pieces of asphalt and 

concrete, on Lot 1. However, the plan to make it a base of operations never materialized. 

While dumping a load of excavation material on·Lot 1, an "end-dump trailer" 

tipped over on its side. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 118. It remained tipped over for several 

months. During that time, fluid leaked out of the trailer and onto the soil. Kevin believed 

that the liquid was hydraulic fluid. The record does not reveal what the fluid was made of 

or whether it was cleaned up. 

name. We intend no disrespect. 

2 The parties submitted evidence on and argued about whether Ms. Grudzinski 

gave Randy permission to use her land and, if so, what the scope ofthat permission was. 

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No. 30795-6-111 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

Later, RGI had an excavation contract with Apollo, Inc. Apollo, Inc. was the 

general contractor on the "Myra Road project." CP at 146. According to Randy, he 

dumped "asphalt, concrete, vegetation, tree stumps and pit-run gravel" on his mother's 

land during the project. CP at 52. He dumped most of the debris on Lot 4, but also 

dumped some on Lot 3. Apollo, Inc. itselfwas dumping debris on Ms. Grudzinski's land. 

She signed a document giving Apollo, Inc. permission to dump dirt and vegetation on her 

land, but not "[m]aterials from Stubblefield property.,,3 CP at 55. 

The "Stubblefield property" refers to the former Stubblefield Salvage Yard. It is a 

hazardous site awaiting clean up by the Department ofEcology. The Myra Road project 

went through a portion ofthe salvage yard. As a result, some of the salvage yard was 

excavated. 

According to Randy, debris from the Stubblefield Salvage Yard was disposed of 

on another part ofthe yard, which Randy and a business partner eventually bought. 

Randy knew that Stubblefield Salvage Yard's debris was there because he saw Apollo 

moving loads of it and there "was truckloads and truckloads stacked that [he] had to deal 

However, Ms. Grudzinski's permission is irrelevant to the issues addressed here. 

3 What land she gave them permission to dump on is unclear. The letter that she 

signed authorizing the dumping $ays that Apollo may dump on "parcel number 

350725220004 at 531 Hatch Street." CP at 55. That parcel number is Lot 4, but 531 

Hatch Street was Ms. Grudzinsk;i's residence, which was on a different parceL 

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No.30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

with" when he bought the land. CP at 187. He indicated that the Environmental 

Protection Agency had tested his portion ofthe yard and concluded that it was not 

contaminated. 

Kevin, however, suggested that Stubblefield Salvage Yard debris ended up on Ms. 

Grudzinski's land. Although he did not actually see debris from the Stubblefield being 

dumped on Ms. Grudzinski's land, he did see Apollo's and RGI's trucks loaded with 

Stubblefield debris and traveling toward Lots 3 and 4. According to Kevin, the debris on 

Lots 3 and 4 included "iron pipe, cast iron manhole covers, cast iron manhole rings, and 

PVC pipe," and a "concrete manhole ring." CP at 118. None of the land was tested for 

the presence ofhazardous substances. 

Ms. Grudzinski's Estate 

Ms. Grudzinski died in 2009 and left her estate to Kevin and Randy. In her will, 

she indicated, 

I am concerned that my children will argue over the disposition of 

my estate and management of my estate after my death .... [S]hould either 

of my children contest the terms of my Will or the manner in which my 

Personal Representative is handling the resolution ofmy estate, said child 

shall receive the sum of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) and otherwise receive 

nothing under this Will. 

CP at 3 1. She devised and bequeathed 60 percent ofthe estate's residue to Kevin and 40 

percent to Randy. The residue included Lots 1,3, and 4. 

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No.30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

The court appointed Thomas Sawatzki personal representative. Instead ofselling 

the land and dividing the proceeds, Mr. Sawatzki divided the land between Randy and 

Kevin. Kevin ended up with Lots 1,3, and 4. 

Mr. Sawatzki knew that those lots had demolition debris on them. He concluded 

that the debris did not reduce the land's value, but got several estimates on the cost to 

clean up the debris. The estimates indicated that it would cost $15,000 to $43,700 to 

remove the debris. Based on those figures, he decided to give Kevin a setoff of $25,000 

worth of additional estate property.4 According to Kevin, rather than giving Kevin 

anything ofvalue, Mr. Sawatzki artificially inflated the value ofpersonal property already 

distributed to Kevin. 

Procedural History 

The Walla Walla County Health Department ordered that Kevin remove the debris 

and properly dispose ofit. Nobody had a permit to dump excavation debris on Ms. 

Grudzinski's land and the dumping was prohibited by a zoning regulation. Nothing in the 

record shows that Walla Walla County has enforced its order. 

4 The record also suggest$ that Kevin may have received $43,700 rather than 

$25,000. However, Randy agre¢d at the summary judgment hearing and in his appellate 

brief that Kevin received $25,00~. 

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No. 30795-6-II1 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

Kevin did not clean up the land, but he did sue Randy for the cost of cleanup. He 

claimed that he was entitled to relief under the MTCA, damages for negligent injury to 

real property, equitable relief ordering Randy to clean up the property, a declaration 

quieting title, and a dech"tration ofthe legal status of an easement for well water. 

On February 16,2012, Randy moved for summary judgment on every claim. The 

summary judgment hearing was set for March 15,2012, which was 11 days before trial. 

Kevin moved to strike the summary judgment hearing as untimely. He argued that it was 

prejudicial because it would be impossible to prepare for the summary judgment hearing 

and trial 11 days later. The court denied the motion. 

At the summary judgment hearing, Kevin conceded that hardened asphalt could 

not support an MTCA claim. Counsel for Kevin explained that the MTCA claim did not 

include Lot 1 "because ofthe nature ofthe material dumped there, which are hardened 

asphalt, large volume oftrees, tree trunks, and tree stumps and concrete, so forth. None 

ofthat is going to be a MTCA claim." Report ofProceedings (RP) at 24. 

The court granted the motion and dismissed every claim except the easementrelated claim. It concluded that there was insufficient evidence of hazardous substances 

to support the MTCA claim, Randy did not owe a duty to Kevin or that Ms. Grudzinski's 

negligence claim did not pass to!Kevin, that the equities did not support a declaratory 

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No.30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

relief, and that there was no cloud on the title. Kevin appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

We review orders on summary judgment de novo. Michak v. Transnation Title 

Ins. Co., 148 Wn.2d 788, 794-95, 64 P.3d 22 (2003). Summary judgment should be 

granted "ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law." 

CR 56(c). We consider all facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 

909,922,296 P.3d 860 (2013). A genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable 

minds could disagree about the facts controlling the outcome of litigation. Wilson v. 

Steinbach, 98 Wn.2d 434,437,656 P.2d 1030 (1982). 

MTCA Claim 

The MTCA's goal is to protect human and environmental health from 

irresponsible use and disposal of hazardous substances. RCW 70.l05D.OIO. The MTCA 

allows the Department of Ecology to recover "all remedial action costs and for all natural 

resource damages resulting from the releases or threatened releases of hazardous 

substances." RCW 70.105D.040(2). Additionally, a landowner liable for clean up costs 

7 

No. 30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

may seek contribution or declaratory relief from other liable parties. RCW 

70.105D.040(l)(a), .080. To support a private MTCA claim, the evidence must show that 

(l) the plaintiff is responsible for clean up costs, (2) the defendant is a liable party, (3) the 

property is a "facility," and (4) there is a release or threatened release of a hazardous 

substance. RCW 70.105D.040(l), .080. Once the court concludes that the plaintiff may 

recover, it determines the measure of recovery using equitable factors and limits the 

recovery to fees and expenses that are the "substantial equivalent of a [Department of 

Ecology]-supervised remedial action." RCW 70.105D.080. 

Here, the parties dispute whether there was a release of hazardous substances, 

whether Randy is a liable party, and whether Kevin is entitled to relief. Because we 

conclude that there was no release of hazardous substances, we do not reach the 

remaining issues. 

Kevin argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was no evidence of 

hazardous substances on the land. "Hazardous substance" is statutorily defined. RCW 

70.105D.020(l0), It includes many substances, but the substances most relevant here are 

"petroleum products" and "extremely hazardous waste." See RCW 70.105D.020(10)(a), 

(d). "Extremely hazardous waste" is any waste "[i]f disposed of at a disposal site in such 

I 

quantities as would present an ettreme hazard to human beings or the environment." 

8 

No.3079S-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

RCW 70.1 OS.O 1O(7)(b). Other hazardous substances include those that are 


highly toxic to or "may affect the genetic make-up of human beings or wildlife," 


RCW 70.l0S.01O(7)(a)(i); have "short-lived, toxic properties that may cause death, 


injury, or illness," are "mutagenic, teratogenic, or carcinogenic," RCW 70.10S.010(1)(a); 


or are "corrosive, explosive, [or] flammable." RCW 70.l0S.010(1)(b). 


Kevin contends that there was evidence of hazardous substances on the land. 

Specifically, he contends that the Stubblefield Salvage Yard debris, hardened asphalt, and 

hydraulic fluid -are all hazardous substances. 

Stubblefield Salvage Yard Material. Kevin contends that there was evidence that 

this material was a hazardous substance because the evidence showed that the 

Stubblefield Salvage Yard was awaiting clean up by the Department ofEcology and the 

debris from the salvage yard was on Lots 3 and 4. From that evidence, he contends the 

court can infer that there are hazardous substances on the land. Randy responds that there 

is no way to know whether hazardous substances are on the land because Kevin failed to 

test the land for hazardous substances. 

The evidence shows that RGI worked on the Myra Road project with Apollo, the 

Myra Road project went througH the salvage yard; RGI and Apollo trucks traveled toward 

! 

I 

Lots 3 and 4 while loaded with ~alvage yard debris; and that the salvage yard was 

9 

No.30795-6-II1 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

awaiting clean up by the Department ofEcology. By all accounts, the debris on Lots 3 

and 4 consisted of asphalt, concrete, vegetation, tree stumps, gravel, cast iron, and PVC. 

Viewed in a light most favorable to Kevin, this court could infer that material from 

the Stubblefield Salvage Yard was on the land. However, this court cannot infer that the 

material is hazardous. Perhaps the material would be hazardous if it was in such a 

quantity as to present an extreme hazard to human beings or the environment. See 

RCW 70.105.010(7)(b). However, there is no evidence to suggest that. Additionally, the 

materials were not tested for contamination from hazardous substances that might be, for 

example, mutagenic, teratogenic, carcinogenic, corrosive, explosive, or flammable. See 

RCW 70. 105.0 lO(1)(a), (b). 

The evidence does not support the conclusion that any debris from the Stubblefield 

Salvage Yard is hazardous. 

Hydraulic Fluid. Next, Kevin argues that hydraulic fluid is a hazardous 

substance. His argument, however, consists only of a conclusory statement that hydraulic 

tluid is a hazardous substance. That statement relies on the assumption that hydraulic 

fluid is a petroleum product. Petroleum products are hazardous substances. 

RCW 70.l05D.020(10)(d). 

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No.30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

The evidence showed that hydraulic fluid spilled onto the soil, but not that the 

fluid was a petroleum product or any other kind of hazardous substance. Indeed, there are 

at least four types of hydraulic fluids and only one type is a petroleum product.5 See U.S. 

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., AGENCY FOR TOXIC 

SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR HYDRAULIC FLUIDS at 

9 (Sept. 1997) (there are mineral oil, organophosphate ester, and polyalphaolefin 

hydraulic fluids);6 Dawn Lyons-Johnson, Biodegradable Plant-Based Hydraulic Fluid, 

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, Nov. 1998, at 9 (there are plant-based hydraulic fluids).7 

Hardened Asphalt. On appeal, Kevin also argues that hardened asphalt is a 

hazardous substance. However, this court may refuse to review issues not raised in the 

trial court. RAP 2.5(a). At the summary judgment hearing, Kevin conceded that 

hardened asphalt could not contribute to his MTCA claim. There, Kevin's counsel 

explained that the MTCA claim did not include Lot 1 "because of the nature of the 

materials dumped there, which are hardened asphalt, large volume of trees, tree trunks, 

5 This court may take judi~ial notice of facts "not subject to reasonable dispute." 

ER 201(b). . 

6 Available at http://wwwfatsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiIes/tp99.pdf. 

7 Available at http://wwwj.ars.usda.gov/is/ar/archive/nov98/0iII198.pdf. I 

I 

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No.30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

and tree stumps and concrete, so forth. None ofthat is going to be a MTCA claim." 

RP at 24 (emphasis added). Because Kevin did not preserve this issue for appeal, we 

need not address it. See RAP 2.5(a). 

In sum, Kevin failed to present any evidence of hazardous substances on the land. 

There being no genuine issue ofmaterial fact on that element, Randy was entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter oflaw. See CR 56(c). 

Negligence 

Kevin next argues that the trial court incorrectly dismissed his negligence claim. 

A plaintiff raising negligence must establish four elements: (l) a duty owed to the 

plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty by the defendant, (3) resulting injury, and (4) proximate 

cause between the breach and the injury. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc y, 124 

Wn.2d 121, 127-28,875 P.2d 621 (1994). Whether the defendant owed a duty to the 

plaintiff is a threshold question. Munich v. Skagit Emergency Commc 'ns Ctr., 175 Wn.2d 

871,877,288 P.3d 328 (2012). If the existence of a duty does not depend on disputed 

facts and the plaintiff does not establish that a duty exists, then summary judgment is 

appropriate. See Hymas v. UAP Distrib., Inc., 167 Wn. App. 136, 150,272 P.3d 889, 

review denied, 175 Wn.2d 1006 (2012) (summary judgment inappropriate when duty 

depends on disputed facts); Jackson v. City ofSeattle, 158 Wn. App. 647,652,244 P.3d 

12 

No. 30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

425 (2010) (burden of establishing duty is on the plaintiff). 

Kevin contends that Randy owed him a duty because Randy owed Ms. Grudzinski 

a duty and now Kevin owns her land. Randy responds that he did not owe Kevin a duty 

because Kevin did not own the land at the time of Randy's alleged negligent conduct. 

While the issue may certainly be framed as one of duty, it might better be framed 

as one of standing: Does Kevin have standing to assert Ms. Grudzinski's negligence 

claim? Standing is a common law doctrine that prohibits a plaintiff from raising the legal 

rights of another. Grant County Fire Prot. Dist. No.5 v. City ofMoses Lake, 150 Wn.2d 

791,802,83 P.3d 419 (2004). Generally, a person has standing to raise a claim for injury 

to real property only if that person owned the real property at the time of the injury. 

Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, Inc., 15 Wn.2d 14, 18, 129 P.2d 536 (1942) ("[T]he 

right of action, if any, respondent's grantor may have had for damages to that property ... 

did not pass to respondent grantee with conveyance of the property, needs no citation of 

sustaining authority."); Scott v. Elliot, 253 Or. 168, 181, 451 P.2d 474 (1969); West v. 

Brenntag Sw., Inc., 168 S.W.3d 327,333 (Tex. App. 2005); Beach St. Corp. v. A.P. 

Constr. Co., 441 Pa. Super. 639, 641-42, 658 A.2d 379 (1995); Frank C. Minvielle, LLC 

v./MC Global Operations, Inc.,:380 F. Supp. 2d 755, 771-72 (W.D. La. 2004). Kevin 

does not have standing to assert Ms. Grudzinski's claim. 

13 
No.30795-6-III 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

Kevin also contends that he is entitled to assert Ms. Grudzinski's negligence claim 

because of this state's survival statute. See RCW 4.20.046(1). Under the survival statute, 

the claim of a decedent survives and passes to the personal representative. Id. The statute 

provides: 

All causes of action by a person or persons against another person or 

persons shall survive to the personal representatives ofthe former and 

against the personal representatives of the latter, whether such actions arise 

on contract or otherwise, and whether or not such actions would have 

survived at the common law or prior to the date of enactment of this 

section. 

Id. (emphasis added). 

There are two problems with Kevin's argument. First, Mr. Sawatzki-not 

Kevin-was Ms. Grudzinski's personal representative. He had the discretion to sue 

Randy, but chose not to do so. See RCW 11.48.010. Second, the record does not show 

that Mr. Sawatzki distributed a negligence claim to Kevin. The claim is not listed in the 

inventory and appraisal of the estate or as an asset to be distributed to Kevin. Kevin 

points out that Mr. Sawatzki did not formally release the claim either and it therefore 

remains an undistributed asset ofthe estate. If so, a trial court may reissue letters of 

administration to dispose of the claim. See RCW 11.76.250. But in the meantime, Ms. 

Grudzinski's negligence claim dbes not belong to Kevin. 

The court correctly dismissed Kevin's negligence claim. 

14 
No. 30795-6-111 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

Equitable and Quiet Title Claims 

Next, Kevin argues that the trial court incorrectly dismissed his equitable and quiet 

title claims. Both claims sought an order requiring Randy to clean up the land to the 

satisfaction of Walla Walla County and Kevin. 

Kevin contends that the trial court erred because he raised a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Mr. Sawatzki adequately compensated him for the cost of 

cleaning up the land. However, that factual issue is immaterial to the court's conclusion 

that Kevin was not entitled to equitable relief. The court observed that Ms. Grudzinski's 

will appointed a neutral third-party personal representative and contained a no-contest 

clause. The court concluded that the will evidenced Ms. Grudzinski's intent to avoid 

conflict between Randy and Kevin. It further concluded that Kevin's suit was an attempt 

to circumvent the terms ofthe will and allowing Kevin to do so would be inequitable. 

Even assuming that Mr. Sawatzki's setoff was inadequate, the court's conclusion would 

apply. There was no genuine issue of material fact that prevented summary judgment on 

this issue. 

Kevin also contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the claims without 

citing to any authority. However, we will not consider arguments that are not supported 

by citations to authority. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Joy v. Dep't o/Labor & Indus., 170 Wn. App. 

15 

No. 30795-6-111 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

614,629,285 P.3d 187 (2012), review denied, 176 Wn.2d 1021 (2013). Because Kevin 

does not cite to any authority to support his argument, this court will not consider it. 

There is no basis to conclude that the court erred by dismissing the equitable and 

quiet title claims. 

Timeliness ofSummary Judgment Motion 

Finally, Kevin contends that the court erred by hearing the summary judgment 

motion untimely. A motion for summary judgment "shall be heard more than 14 calendar 

days before the date set for trial unless leave of court is granted to allow otherwise." 

CR 56( c). An order shortening time between a summary judgment hearing and trial is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State ex ref. Citizens Against Tolls v. Murphy, 151 

Wn.2d 226,236,88 P.3d 375 (2004). Shortening time is an abuse of discretion ifit 

prejudiced the nonmoving party. ld. To demonstrate prejudice, the nonmoving party 

"must show a lack of actual notice, a lack oftime to prepare for the motion, and no 

opportunity to submit case authority or provide countervailing oral argument." ld. at 236­

37. 

In Citizens Against Tolls, the plaintiff argued that a summary judgment hearing 

eight days prior to trial was prejudicial because it had insufficient time to collect evidence 

or file a CR 56(t) motion. ld.; sJe CR 56(t) (the court may refuse to consider a summary 

16 

No.30795-6-II1 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

judgment motion ifthe nonmoving party cannot present affidavit facts to oppose the 

summary judgment motion). The court concluded that there was no prejudice because the 

plaintiff knew about the issues that might lead to summary judgment months before the 

hearing and the uncollected evidence had no value. ld. at 238. 

Here, Kevin argued that shortening time prejudiced him because it would be too 

hard to prepare for summary judgment and then trial 11 days later. On appeal, he further 

explains that he did not have time to file a CR 56(f) motion or conduct more discovery to 

address the issues raised by Randy. However, the record shows that Kevin had more than 

one month to file a CR 56(f) motion, prepare for summary judgment, and then 11 more 

days to prepare for trial. He also never explained what type of evidence he needed to 

obtain through additional discovery. Like in Citizens Against Tolls, he has not shown 

prejudice. 

The court did not abuse its discretion by hearing the summary judgment motion 11 

days before trial. 

17 

No. 30795-6-111 

Grudzinski v. Grudzinski 

We affirm the decision of the trial court. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Kulik, 1. 

WE CONCUR: 


Korsmo, C .. err 


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