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POApproved~ for Release: 2018/02/01 C05101958 D . DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORi.. \ Cl-A:-'\ 

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

MEMORANDUM 111111/1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 

General Berg 

!C~lonel Worthman 

Mr. Schadegg 

April 25, 1967 

14 00024412D 

For your information, the attached 

paper, was prepared as background material 

for the DCI. It will not go to the USIB. 

Reber 

Attachment 

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TCS-0038-67 Subj: Decontrol 

and Downgrading of Satellite 

Photography. 

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24 April 1967 

.N1EMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 

SUBJECT: Decontrol and Downgrading of 

Satellite Photography 

REFERENCES: a. USIB-D-41.12/25 (COMOR'-D-7/56). 

27 Mar 67 

. . b. USIB-D-41.12/26 (COMOR-D-7/57), 

6 Apr 67 

c. USIB-D-41.l2/22 (COMOR-D-7/49). 

·29 Jul 66 

l. Thin ln0l1101'.IIUllllll 1:UllHl1:11'izo/J the ilrgunlcnts in 

1.:tV0:t' of and against downgl'ading satellite photography and releasing 

it from the TALENT Control System. It also summarizes the issues 

involved in these arguments and the probable effects of alternative 

plans by which the decontrol and downgrading might be accomplished. 

2., The principal arguments in fa'¢"or of downgrading 

s?'tellite photography are as follows: 

a. Recognize Reality. The Soviets are aware 

that we are conducting a satellite reconnais sance program 

and there has been widespread speculation in the public 

press concerning the results that we have achieved. 

b. Improve Security. It is argued that some 

officials in the U. S. Government who have not been 

briefed on the U. S. reconnais sance program, but who 

are aware of the public speculation, may inadvertently 

comment on the U. S. satellite reconnaissance program 

in an improper manner; whereas if the existence of the 

program could be discussed at the SECRET level they 

could be made properly awa~e of its importance and the 

need for circumspection in referring to it. 

TCS-0038-67 

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c. Improve Utility. It is argued that if the 

results of our satellite reconnaissallce program were 

known at the SECRET level the U. S. position in disarmament and other negotiations would be improved 

and that it would be pos sible to apply the information 

to a wide range of problems of interest to the scientific 

community and to government agencies not directly 

involved in intelligence. 

d. Forestall Duplication of Effort:. It is 

argued that if the results of our satellite reconnaissance 

program were available at the SECRET level it would . 

help to make unnecessary the plans currently advocated 

by NASA and other government departments for the 

creation of unclas sified satellite photographic systems 

to be us ed in the solution of scientific problems. 

e. Improve Confidence. If the results of our 

satellite reconnais sance program were available at the 

SECRET level it would improve the confidence of our 

customers in intelligence judgments generally. 

3. The principal arguments advanced against decontrol 

and downgrading are as follows: 

a. Reduce Current Security. Downgrading 

of satellite photography to SECRET would greatly increase the nu,;mber of people who have access to the 

information and would increase the risk of leaks 

concerning the scope and results of the program. It 

might even result in such a flurry of leaks as to cause 

the Soviet Union to feel that it was forced to react 

publicly against our satellite reconnaissance program. 

b. Reduce Future Security. It is argued that 

any relaxation of controls at this time would tend to make 

it more difficult to maintain a residual security in the 

future. Specifically. it is argued that the downgrading 

of KH-4 photography at this time would make it difficult 

ior us to retain the results of KH-9 photography in a 

security compartment after the KH .. 4 is replaced by 

the KH-9. 

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c. Control. Under present control procedures 

the information contained in the TALENT C~ntrol System 

can be denied, releas ed, or manipulated by the DCI and 

the USIB in such a way as to achieve specific conscious 

ends. If the information is releas ed at the SECRET level 

no such centralized control will exist. Decisions con· 

cerning the purposes for which the material will be used 

will be made by thousands of officials throughout the 

U. S. Government. 

d. Stimulate Enemy Countermeasures. It is 

argued that if the Soviet Union or others became aware 

of our successes, either through increased leaks or 

through easier penetration of U. S. intelligence organizations as a result of downgrading, thos e officials who were 

concerned with countering U.S. intelligence might be 

provided with support in their arguments to push countermeasures against our satellite reconnaissance program. 

These countermeasures might include political action, 

physical countermeasures, improved camouflage, or 

concealment of small obj ects. 

e. Stimulate Enemy Developments. There 

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is somepos sibility that if the Soviet Union or other nation 

with appropriate capabilities became aware of our successes,' 

they might be stimulated or as sis ted to develop improved 

satellite reconnais sance capabilities to us e against the 

U.S. and its allies. 

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f. No Real Need for Downgrading. It is argued 

that the TALENT Control System is sufficiently widespread 

and sanitization procedures sufficiently liberal to make, it 

possible to use the results of our satellite reconnaissance 

program for all of the main purposes for which they are 

needed. 

4. The various arguments for and against downgrading 

appear to 'focus on four main is sues.: These are: 

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a. True Security. Whereas the security 

system was originally established to deny to the Soviets 

knowledge of the existence of a satellite reconnaissance 

program they are now aware that it exists. The 

questions are, therefoie, what is it that we actually 

need to protect by security measures, and what security 

measures should be adopted that are appropriate to 

those ends? These are questions that might be answered 

dif'ierently by those who argue for and against downgrading. 

In my opinion we need to protect the following: 

(1) The U. S. program still has a 

technical superiority over the Soviet satellite 

reconnais sance program. The advantage is 

primarily in large optics but also involves 

other operational factors. Both the existence 

and the nature of the technical advantage 

should be protected. 

(2) We should avoid any relaxation" >,> 

of security which would inadvertently cause a.', .. ,', ... :·:.;.' 

confrontation with the Soviet Union or others 

on the issue of U.S. reconnaissance. 

(3) We should continue to deny to 

the Soviet Union information concernin,g the 

scope and degree of success that our program 

has achieved in solving intelligence problems. 

b. Control. Should the intelligenc e community 

continue to maintain control over the use and exploitation 

of satellite photography? The inhibiting effects of control 

should be weighed against the advantages of controlling 

the uses to which satellite photography is applied. 

c. New Uses. Should KH photography be applied 

to new uses on a large scale? As a result of studies conducted 

during the past year or two, both inside and outside the intelligence community it is obvious satellite photography can 

be used for a wide number of uses for which it has not been 

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used in the past, Most of these uses relate to studies 

of various aspect s of the earth and its environment, 

It is p140bably possible to develop procedures to apply 

satellite photography to many of thes e uses within the 

TALENT Control System but full us e for thes e purpos es 

can probably not be achieved unles"s the photography is 

downgraded to at least the SECRET level. In fact, it 

cannot be used for some purposes until it is completely 

declas sHied. The importanc e of thes e new us es cannot 

be :fully deto;l.":o::d,ned at this time but should be k.ept unde:r 

continuous study • 

d. New Users. Should new users of satellite 

photography be encouraged in large ntuTIbers? A s a 

consequence of the new uses for satellite photography 

that have become apparent a number of agencies of the 

U. S. Government are interested in using satellite 

photography. For example, we have just authorized 

the creation of a TALENT-KEYHOLE center in the 

U. S. Geological Survey. If all of the agencies that 

are interested in using satellite photography are 

accommodated it would be necessary to arrange additional expansions of the TALENT Control System or to 

downgrade the photography to make it accessible to 

government. agencies ,v.rho 'do not participate in the 

TALENT Control System. 

5. Based on the fact that the charge on the Ad Hoc Group 

was to study the problems involved in decontrol and downgrading and 

not to make specific recommendations, the paper submitted to USIB 

set forth four alternative ways to decontrol and downgrade T -KH 

material. (The four alternatives are attached if you wish to go over 

them in detail.) In describing the alternatives it is recognized that 

each could be varied in a number of ways. A fifth alternative would 

be to maintain the status quo •. This fifth alternative would not mean 

that all present TALENT control restrictions are set in concrete. 

To be realistic the system must be viable and I would expect many 

ad hoc changes can be made to meet specific situations as they arise. 

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6. The first three of the alternative plans call for the 

downgrading of KH photography its elf in varying amounts. The 

fourth plan would retain the photography in its original format in 

the TALENT Control System but would permit the publication of 

PI reports and other reports based on them at the SECRET level. 

Such reports could contain specially prepared photographic 

illustrations which would not reveal technical details of the 

camera systems. 

7. In my opinion the first three alternatives would 

jeopardize true security, eliminate intelligence community control 

" over much satellite photography, and only partially satisfy the 

problems of new uses and new users, The fourth alternative would 

involve a minimum increaqe in risk to security and would retain 

control over the use of the photography itself. It would permit wider 

use of the information obtained from photography but would require 

that new uses and new users be incorporated into the TALENT Control 

System~ All of the alternatives presented are broad statements of 

policy, not detailed plans. If any of the four are adopted, COMOR 

should be instructed to develop a detailed plan for the implementation 

of that alternative. 

8. In spite of some obvious advantages in liberalizing 

contl'ol, the study conducted so far has not made a convincing case 

to show that the interests of the U. S. would suffer in any important • 

way if the intelligence community continued to handle satellite 

photography within the T-KH system. There is a risk of overall 

duplication and inefficiency as well as some risk to seGurity if NASA 

is allowed to develop unclassified satellitel photographic systems 

duplicating capabilities of the NRP, On the other hand if the NASA 

program is developed in careful coordination with the NRP there 

should be a minimum of duplication and increase in security risk, 

and the existence of a NASA program could provide good cover for 

extensive sanitization.of T-KH products. It would appear therefore 

that it would be unwise to rush into a downgrading program at this 

time because of the pressure generated by NASA is reconnaissanceoriented activities. 

9. In summary, the status of satellite reconnaissance 

in the U.S. Government hasc.~anged considerably over the years, 

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and many of the reasons for the establishment of current controls 

no longer exist in their original form. On the other hand, the. 

arguments for decontrol and downgrading are enticing 'but not.:·: 

convincing. On balance, I recommend the following: ' ' 

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a. That the TALENT Control System 

continue to govern satellite photography and that 

COMOR be instructed to identify and propose to 

USIB solutions to specific problems involving the 

us e of satellite photography and derived information outside of the TALENT Control System. 

especially those problems related to the use of 

T-KH material in support of military operations. 

b. That COMOR be directed to provide 

an annex to the Sanitization Manual providing for the 

use of sanitized TALENT-KEYHOLE information, 

supported by illustrations. in current intelligence 

publications designed for high level audiences. 

c. That COMOR report to USIB in six 

months as to how' effective a and b have been in 

meeting problems and what further steps along the 

lines of alternative four should be considered if 

problems still exist. 

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William A. Tidwell '\V"fj\\V· :,<, 

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