C Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290' .., .. : .. ::· . \.. 

21 11arch 1969 

8''.J3J=:CT: Additional Special Sec .. ~:::·i ty Of:ficers 

~-. 1"13.;r has condi tio::.:;lly :..:.s·r:~:ov3d our recmest for 

·:1r •... ,:,;:.tional special scc:.::;:ity o~iicers for t!10 S1'1.FSP/ 

i11;..:r_;t::.•ial security proG:~;;,..m. '.'!hat is now required is 

::1e::·.--:..-:::~~dLL'!l from your office to the c:mo requesting the 

"'-·· 3Ci~·:.:.c positions you want (grade, AFSC), when yo1.;; 

:.· .::.:,ui:;:·o th-::: personnel, and your plan for their utilization, 

A copy of our memorac.::::-~::.:1 to Dr.· Flax is enclor:::.ed for 

·~ar _:.·~Zci":.,ation. 

.r:~tchs 

as 

R.AYii!OND D. ROSE 

Captain, USAF 

Dep Asst for Security 

N:1.0 Staff 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

/ 

BYE 12655-69 

CA ?. C)- 7, 1·2- d l (/ 
Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290' .....,, 

February 19, 1969 

FOR DR. FLAX 

Captain Rose speaks from experience and 

conviction. I've discussed his proposal 

with Colonel Ford and General Martin's 

security officer. They concur heartily in 

this proposal. So do I. 

~W' 

PAULE. WORTHMAN 

Colonel, USAF 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 
A ~ \ Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 • I UI -.1111..UIIII. I ' 

)$f' NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

HANOl C VIA 

BYEMAN 

COl'lr.OL SY JT[M 

THE NRO STAFF 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. FLAX 

SUBJECT: Special Security Officers 

PROBLEM: 

12 February 1969 

Due to insufficient number of qualified, experienced 

NRO Special Security Officers, the security programs of 

both NRO Program A and SAFSL are in jeopardy, This is 

due to two factors: 

1. Insufficient number of special security 

officers. 

2. Extensive non-productive period of on-thejob tra\ning required for replacement personnel 

assigned to these positions since there is no 

outside source of trained qualified personnel, 

This memorandum is intended to inform you of those 

prudent actions recommended to resolve this problem. 

BACKGROUND; 

An NRO Program Director operating within a covert 

environment must assume complete responsibility for the 

integrity of his security system. This includes not only 

the decision making process as to what procedures and 

methodology will be used, but the inspection and guidance 

necessary to enforce its management on a day-to-day basis. 

When the original special security program was 

established for SAFSP, it was under the control of three 

portion 

officers 

of 

who 

CORONA 

managed 

security. 

the GAMBIT, 

They 

EARPOP, 

were responsible 

and the Air 

for 

Force 

ten 

~ 

covert industrial facilities and some five thousand industrial personnel, While inexperienced in covert methodology 

GAMBIT, EARPOP, CORONA, DORIAN HAHOl f' '\/IA 

TOP SECRET lXClUOlD FROM -.utQlll;ATIC i:tE'"'-1:iJ\DUUi 

OQO Oll'll:CTl'\I• UQ0.10 QO[S )j(ll ,-.f'PL'r' 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

CQNTRQLNO INTERNAL 

COl'l ___ OI" C:Ol'fU, 

,.,,.., __ 1_ o,----;f .... --- ,,.,,,s 
m,r.~.-.. '<'. U.c ......... l,i.,. 

co;nnot 5':''!.rc,.. 

0Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

I YI iiJIILUHIL I 

they were able to formulate an effective comprehensive 

covert program through imagination, skill, and learning 

experience. One of the fundamental strengths of the 

program was the close liaison between the government 

special security officer and his industrial counterpart. 

CURRENT SITUATION: 

Today the five officers assigned to the Special 

Security Office at SAFSP and the two assigned to SAFSL 

are responsible for managing security within sixty BYEMAN 

industrial facilities, and have responsibility for 46,000 

personnel, representing some 135 different contractors. 

BYEMAN 

The rapid growth of the BYEMAN industrial base is expanding 

beyond the capability of tho current security staffs to 

provide adequate management. As the result of this disproportionate allocation of work load, there has been a 

reduced surveillance of covert activities and increased 

reliance on contractors' ability to manage their security 

program. This is particularly dangerous since many of the 

contractors are new in the covert environment and are not 

qualified to accept complete responsibility for managing 

a covert program. If this situation continues, only deterioration of the program and eventual compromise can result, 

This problem has been compounded by an unusually severe 

turnover of personnel within the SAFSP and SAFSL security 

offices, resulting in the loss of our most experienced 

personnel. 

The problem of replacing personnel is extremely 

difficult because of the unique knowledge and qualifications 

they must possess in order to effectively fulfill their 

covert security role, (see TAD-A), 

RECOMMENDATION: 

With your concurrence, we will seek authorization for 

four additional special security officer spaces for the 

SAFSP/SL security program. Rather than be assigned in 

residence to the program office, they will be located 

at key industrial facilities. They will be responsible for 

the day-to-day security at the facility assigned, its 

sub-contractors and other facilities within the geographic 

area. By assigning these officers the responsibility for 

handling the more limited aspects of security, they should 

be able to be productive after an initial training period 

TOP SECRET UICU,10l0 fRO"' Al,IT0JIIO,TIC ltcli••o1wc 

000 DLflCCTli't SlOO l O oors hOT •nvr 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

rn•Too, •o_JJ'.iTERN AL 

COPY ___ ar ___ COPlH 
0 I""-\ HAMOI ( Vl.'I 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 ~- -} 

IUI"" .JL.IIJIU:.I BYEMAN 

in their assigned tasks while gathering experience for 

overall future program responsibilities. When a position 

within the program office is vacated there will be a 

continuing resource pool of qualified personnel from which 

a selection may be made. 

COIHFIOt SYS rFM 

The concept of this proposed action has been discussed 

with and concurred in by both Maj Gen Martin and Maj Gen 

Stewart. Your concurrence is requested. 

v.~ 

OND D, ROSE 

Captain, USAF 

Dep Asst for Security 

NRO Staff 

TBP SECRET EJIClUOfO FRO• A:UTO~ATIC RfGAADJl'IC'i 

DOD OIRECTl\1£ 5200 10 DOF.5 MOT ,l,l"l"ll' 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

GONCROL NO INTERNAL 

co,r ___ or ___ co,iH 

f"A~r. _ __,,3'--_0r_-=3;___ PAGES 
rApproved for Release: 2020/02/07 C051142901"""" 

* I OR JLUI\L I \ BYEMAN 

PROGRAM OFFICE SECURITY OFFICERS 

CONCEPT: 

The Special Security Officer must insure the security 

of the NRO without hindering the development or production 

of the program. There is no "real" set of rules that may 

be used. Only his knowledge of covert methodology, and 

the particular clements involved can permit him to make a 

rational, fairly reliable decision in the world of WHITE/ 

BLACK and shades of gray. Each case must b~ .•. dete ned 

on its ow11 factors, since the modus operan'cti ·at Do las 

would spell disaster at Eastman Koda}{, {.,. 

QUALIFICATIONS: 

The covert program security officer must have a: 

Comprehensive Knowledge of: 

BYEMAN security concepts 

Why a BYEMAN system 

How it works 

Why it works 

Its limitations 

Covert Methodology 

What a covert operation is 

How it works 

Its strengths and weaknesses 

Legal limitations 

Covert techniques 

Clandestine vs covert 

f,:ONTRm SVSH'.M 

cottmocno INTERNAL 

TOP SEeRET l!XCLVlllO ntON .-.•,.now .. TtC llt[(;IIIIAtmH:i. 

0()0 01111:,crivr '$20(1.10 OOf~ ltOT .. ,.l'ILV 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

COl"Y ___ o, ___ ,o~IU 

,.,..~u __ l __ or __ 4 __ ~••as 
mp:-""tJI U,~,dMll 

-.'.O~TROL 'SV!tll,M 

npproved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 ~ 1t11 :111:tmc1 

Industrial Roles and Responsibilities 

Types of contracts 

Securit;y clauses 

Government/company roles and relationships 

Sub-contractor and associate relationships 

Interagency Roles and Responsibilities 

Security aspects of associations 

Basic responsibilities 

Communications Capabilities 

Working Knowledge of: 

DOD Industrial Security Program 

Clearance procedures 

Strengths and weaknesses 

Conflicts with covert operations 

Compatibilities with covert operations 

Interfaces with covert operations 

Air Force Security Programs 

Strengths and weaknesses 

Cover benefits and techniques 

Covert interfaces 

Other Compartmented Programs 

Techniques used 

Resources (personnel, technical information, 

and facilities available) 

Current cover arrangements 

Obligations not to reveal other programs 

BYEr;1AN 

CO.TOOL ,o INTERN AL 

T9P SE6RET UCLt.JOEO ri;io.w o\UT01111.-.11c IIIEG.AD11'4'-

DOO OIIHC.TIVE sioo.10 00[5 "OT Af'P'l .. 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

COPY ___ OF ___ COPiCS 

P4QI 2 OF 4 
r"'- Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C0511429V 

\ • I UI ,.H.,\IHU., r---- "-

Other Compartmented Systems 

Jurisdictions and responsibilities 

Clearability standards 

Interface capabilities 

Responsible agencies 

System Specification and Goals 

Types of systems 

How used 

Capabilities 

Applications 

Threats and vulnerabilities 

Management Techniques 

Utilization of Resources 

Impact of access authorization delays 

Control of access and alternate access means 

Concept of realistic operations 

Contracts 

Types in use 

Impact on security and security impact on 

costs 

How to use 

Importance to security of contracting officer 

Contracting Structure 

Sensitivity of funding levels 

BYEMAN 

CONnl◊l SYSTl':M 

co.r•o, •o INTERN AL 

TOP SE6RET CJ;CLUDED fAOM AllTOlolATIC lt[liR:A01'°'' 

corr ___ o, ___ Cl'.)Jl'll!JS 

P•Gr;_J __ o,-_4 __ PAGES 

000 Ollltt'.Clll/f ,too., 0 001• 1'101 .. ,.l"L'( 

Apprnved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 
CONTROi.. S'l'STEM 

C' ~ Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 · 

• I UI .JL\.iinLI ' BYEMAN 

Security Threats 

Foreign association and travel 

Hosi:age cases 

Personality disorders 

General attitude toward security 

Marketing operations 

Physical security concepts 

Sino/Soviet domestic operations 

Communication security 

Public statements 

Be Familiar with: 

Technical language 

Industrial techniques 

Union operations 

DCASR/AFRRO functions 

Union operations and attitudes 

For a single individual to have the capabilities as 

stated may be a totally unrealistic goal. But it is not 

only realistic to expect this knowledge in degrees from 

all our security officers, but it must be available within 

the program security office, To maintain this capability 

CONTROL SYSTEM 

it is desirable that incoming personnel be from engineering, 

research, and security career fields, 

TOP SECRET liXCLUD[D FROM .WTOM.',TIC IH~RA0IH(; 

POO OIRECTlVE 5200.10 DOES NOT APPI.Y 

Approved for Release: 2020/02/07 C05114290 

CONTROL NO INTERN AL 

COPV ___ o, ___ co,JU 

••••-~4 __ o, 4