*The Hon. Byron R. White, Associate Justice, Retired, Supreme

Court of the United States, sitting by designation.

_____________

No. 95-1700MN

_____________

Jane Marie Egerdahl, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

* On Appeal from the United

* States District Court

Hibbing Community College; * for the District of

Minnesota Community College * Minnesota.

System; State of Minnesota; *

Myron Schmidt; Anthony Kuznik; *

and Jerry Krause, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: October 19, 1995

 Filed: December 18, 1995

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WHITE, Associate Justice, and

*

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Jane Marie Egerdahl claims that the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota

Community College System, Hibbing Community College ("Hibbing"), and three

Hibbing employees discriminated against her on the basis of race and gender

and, therefore, violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20

U.S.C. § 1681 ("Title IX"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI

of the Civil Rights
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Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"), and the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court dismissed

Egerdahl's suit. We reverse the District Court's dismissal of Egerdahl's

Title IX and Title VI claims, but affirm its decision to dismiss her

§ 1981, § 1983, and equal-protection claims.

I.

During the fall of 1992, Jane Marie Egerdahl, who is part Native

American, enrolled in a chemistry class at Hibbing Community College, a

state-run school that receives federal funds. Egerdahl claims that Jerry

Krause, a chemistry instructor at Hibbing, engaged in a pattern of

discriminatory treatment based on Egerdahl's race and gender. According

to Egerdahl, she reported Krause's conduct to Hibbing's Dean, Myron

Schmidt, and its President, Anthony Kuznik, but the discrimination

continued throughout the fall semester. 

On October 1, 1993, Egerdahl filed charges with the Minnesota

Department of Human Rights, claiming that the defendants had violated the

Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363.03. Egerdahl then

withdrew her charge with the Department of Human Rights and, on June 7,

1994, filed this complaint in federal court, alleging violations of Title

IX, § 1981, § 1983, the Equal Protection Clause, the MHRA, and state tort

law. She later amended her complaint to drop her state-law claims and to

add a claim under Title VI.

The District Court dismissed Egerdahl's suit. It held that

Egerdahl's Title VI and Title IX claims were governed by the MHRA's oneyear statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3, and that this

limitations period had run before Egerdahl filed suit in federal court.

The District Court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Egerdahl's

§ 1981, § 1983, and equal-protection
 The MHRA provides: 1

It is an unfair discriminatory practice:

(1) To discriminate in any manner in the full utilization

of or benefit from any educational institution, or the

services rendered thereby to any person because of race,

color, . . . [or] sex . . .. 

. . . 

Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 5.

Under Title IX,

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or

be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or

activity receiving federal assistance.

20 U.S.C. § 1681.

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claims.

II.

Egerdahl argues that the District Court erred by holding that the

MHRA's one-year statute of limitations governs Title VI and Title IX

claims. She asserts that the appropriate statute of limitations is the

six-year limitations period of Minnesota's personal-injury statute, Minn.

Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5). We agree. 

When, as in the case of Title VI and Title IX, a federal statute does

not contain a limitations period, courts must select "the most appropriate

or analogous state statute of limitations." Goodman v. Lukens Steel

Company, 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987). The District Court relied on its

decision in Deli v. University of Minnesota, 863 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn.

1994), which held that the MHRA's limitations period should apply to Title

IX claims because "[b]oth the MHRA and Title IX proscribe discrimination

in educational institutions on the basis of gender and essentially seek to

make whole the victims of such discrimination." Id. at 962. In addition, 1
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the District Court extended the reasoning that
 Title VI provides: 2

No person in the United States shall, on grounds of race,

color or national origin, be excluded from participation

in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program receiving federal

assistance.

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

 In Minnesota, § 1983 claims are governed by the six-year

3

limitations period of Minnesota's personal-injury statute, Minn.

Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5). Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 77

(Minn. App. 1989).

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it employed in Deli to Title VI claims. It concluded that because Title

VI and the MHRA both prohibit racial discrimination by educational

institutions, the MHRA's one-year limitations period should govern claims 2

under Title VI as well as those under Title IX.

We think that the District Court's decision is inconsistent with

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), which held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims are subject to the limitations period in each state's personalinjury statute. In Wilson, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 3

§ 1983 claims should be governed by the period of limitations in states'

civil-rights statutes. The Court held that § 1983 claims are better

characterized as personal-injury actions because it is unlikely that the

limitations period for personal-injury actions "ever was, or ever would be,

fixed in a way that would discriminate against federal claims, or be

inconsistent with federal law in any respect." Id. at 279. The same

reasoning applies to Title VI and Title IX claims.

Moreover, the District Court's decision fails to take into account

the federal interest in uniformity and certainty. See id.
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at 275. "Title VI is a civil rights statute [that is] closely analogous

to sections 1983 and 1981." Baker v. Board of Regents of State of Kan.,

991 F.2d 628, 631 (10th Cir. 1993). Indeed, a plaintiff suing a federallysupported program for racial discrimination may bring a claim under any one

of these three laws. Because the Supreme Court has characterized both

§ 1983 and § 1981 as personal-injury statutes, see Goodman, 482 U.S. at

661-62, Title VI claims should also be governed by the limitations period

in Minnesota's personal-injury statute. See Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of

Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 890

(1994) (Title VI claims should be governed by the same statute of

limitations that applies to § 1983 claims); Baker, 991 F.2d at 631

(characterizing Title VI claims as personal-injury actions "promotes a

consistent and uniform framework by which suitable statutes of limitations

can be determined for civil rights claims."); Chambers v. Omaha Pub. Sch.

Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 225 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976) (Title VI claims are

"controlled by the same considerations which inhere in . . . § 1981 and

§ 1983 claims.").

As for Title IX, it is also analogous to § 1983 -- both statutes

prohibit gender discrimination by state-run schools that receive federal

funds. See Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 77-78 (3d

Cir. 1989). Furthermore, "Title IX was patterned after Title VI. . . .

Except for the substitution of the word `sex' in Title IX to replace the

words `race, color or national origin' in Title VI, the two statutes use

identical language to describe the benefited class." Cannon v. University

of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 (1979). Therefore, Title IX should be

subject to the same limitations period that applies to § 1983 and Title VI.

 We hold that the six-year limitations period of Minn. Stat. § 541.05,

subd. 1(5) governs Title VI and Title IX claims. Because this six-year

period did not expire before Egerdahl filed suit in federal court, we

reverse the District Court's dismissal of
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Egerdahl's Title VI and Title IX claims.

III.

Egerdahl also appeals the dismissal of her § 1981, § 1983, and equalprotection claims. We affirm as to these claims.

A.

We first address Egerdahl's argument that Congress abrogated

Minnesota's Eleventh Amendment immunity from Egerdahl's equal-protection

claims. Generally, "in the absence of consent a suit in which the State

or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is

proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Congress may pass legislation under

the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override

states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,

491 U.S. 1, 14-23, 57 (1989); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456

(1976). But Congress must make its intention to abrogate states' immunity

"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Atascadero State

Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).

Egerdahl asserts that 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) overrides states'

immunity from equal-protection claims that are brought in suits that also

allege violations of Title VI or Title IX. Section 2000d-7(a)(1) provides

that 

[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of

the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal

court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 . . ., title IX of the education amendments of 1972 .

. ., the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 . . ., title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . ., or the provisions of any other

Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of

Federal financial assistance.
 Egerdahl cites Sharif by Salahuddin v. New York State Educ. 4

Dept., 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), a Title IX case in which

the court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the

plaintiff from also bringing an equal-protection claim against the

New York State Education Department. See id. at 358. But Sharif

does not provide support for Egerdahl's argument. The plaintiff in

Sharif sought an injunction against the Commissioner of Education.

Sharif is simply an example of the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123

(1908), exception to the Eleventh Amendment, which permits suits

against state officials for "prospective injunctive relief to

prevent a continuing violation of federal law." Green v. Mansour,

474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).

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Although section 2000d-7(a)(1) does abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment

immunity from Title VI and Title IX claims, see Franklin v. Gwinett County

Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992), it does not even mention the Equal

Protection Clause. Section 2000d-7(a)(1), therefore, does not provide

unmistakable evidence of a congressional intent to override states'

immunity from equal-protection claims, whether or not these claims are

brought in suits that also allege violations of Title VI or Title IX.4

B.

Finally, Egerdahl argues that the District Court erred by holding

that her § 1981 and § 1983 claims against Kuznik, Schmidt, and Krause were

barred by the Eleventh Amendment because she failed to sue these defendants

in their personal capacities.

The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent a plaintiff from seeking

damages from a state official if she sues the official in his personal

capacity. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974). In Nix

v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1989), we held that a plaintiff who

wishes to sue a state official in his personal capacity must so specify in

her complaint. Id. at 431. If a plaintiff's complaint is silent about the

capacity in which she is suing the defendant, we interpret the complaint

as including only official-capacity claims. See DeYoung v. Patten, 898

F.2d
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628, 635 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Forbes v. Arkansas

Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir.) (en

banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 500 (1994). Citing Nix and DeYoung, the

District Court held that because Egerdahl's amended complaint did not

indicate that she was suing Kuznik, Schmidt, and Krause in their personal

capacities, Egerdahl sued these defendants only in their official

capacities.

Egerdahl asserts that because the caption and body of her complaint

referred to Kuznik, Schmidt, and Krause by name rather than by official

position, her complaint provided these three defendants with ample notice

that she was suing them in their personal capacities. Egerdahl also points

out that in her response to the motions of Kuznik, Schmidt, and Krause to

dismiss her § 1981 and § 1983 claims, she asked the District Court to

construe her amended complaint as seeking damages from the defendants in

their personal capacities. Egerdahl contends that this request provided

the defendants with sufficient notice. We reject both arguments. Nix

requires that a plaintiff's complaint contain a clear statement of her wish

to sue defendants in their personal capacities. Neither a cryptic hint in

a plaintiff's complaint nor a statement made in response to a motion to

dismiss is sufficient.

Egerdahl also argues that the District Court erred by not permitting

her to correct her omission by amending her complaint a second time. The

decision whether to allow a party to amend her complaint "is left to the

sound discretion of the district courts." Humphreys v. Roche Biomedical

Laboratories, Inc., 990 F.2d 1078, 1081 (8th Cir. 1993). A district court

may refuse to grant leave to amend if the plaintiff had an earlier

opportunity to cure a defect in her complaint but failed to do so. Wright,

Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487, at 643-45 (2d ed.

1990); see, e.g., Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1366 (5th Cir. 1988).

Egerdahl had such an opportunity when she amended her complaint the first

time. Moreover, six days before Egerdahl
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amended her complaint, Kuznik and Schmidt filed a motion to dismiss which

cited Nix and DeYoung and, thus, informed Egerdahl how to sue the

defendants in their personal capacities. In light of Egerdahl's lack of

diligence, we do not think that the District Court abused its discretion

by denying her leave to amend her complaint a second time. 

IV.

For these reasons, we affirm the District Court's dismissal of

Egerdahl's § 1981, § 1983, and equal-protection claims, but reverse its

dismissal of Egerdahl's Title VI and Title IX claims. We remand this cause

to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.