IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-41565

LEILA HERNANDEZ, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

GUY BAILEY; HAVIDAN RODRIGUEZ; DAHLIA GUERRA; THE 

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS – PAN AMERICAN; THE UNIVERSITY OF 

TEXAS SYSTEM; THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS RIO GRANDE VALLEY, 

 Defendants – Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:15-CV-410

Before DAVIS, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In the latest wrongful termination dispute arising out of the legislative 

abolition of the University of Texas–Pan American (“UTPA”) and the 

University of Texas at Brownsville (“UTB”), Leila Hernandez (“Hernandez”) 

appeals the district court’s order denying her motion for leave to file an 

amended complaint and granting Defendant-Appellees’ Federal Rule of Civil 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 3, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Procedure 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because Hernandez, in 

both her original and proposed amended complaints, failed to state a plausible 

claim for relief, we AFFIRM.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As this Court has already recited many of the relevant facts in an earlier 

opinion,1 the following summary of the case is slightly abridged. In 2003, 

UTPA hired Hernandez as a graphic design Associate Professor. Hernandez 

served in that role until September of 2008 when she was awarded tenure and 

promoted to Assistant Professor. As a tenured faculty member, Hernandez 

was entitled to continuing employment at UTPA “until retirement or 

resignation unless terminated because of abandonment of academic programs 

or positions, financial exigency, or good cause.”2

In early 2013, the Texas legislature passed Senate Bill 24, which

abolished UTPA and UTB and created a consolidated university in southern 

Texas later named the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (“UTRGV”).3

Senate Bill 24 guaranteed that all students “admitted to or enrolled at” UTPA 

or UTB on the date of abolition were “entitled to admission” at UTRGV, but it 

merely instructed the University of Texas System Board of Regents (“Board”)

to “facilitate the employment at [UTRGV] of as many faculty and staff of the 

abolished universities as is prudent and practical.”4 Other than this mandate, 

the bill left the hiring procedures at UTRGV up to the Board’s expertise and 

discretion. 

In fulfilling its responsibilities, the Board developed a bifurcated hiring 

process. Details of the process were disseminated by a document entitled,

 

1 See Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 290–91 (5th Cir. 2017).

2 Id. at 290.

3 Act of May 22, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 726, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1846.

4 Id. (emphasis added).

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“Hiring of Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Members to The University of 

Texas Rio Grande Valley Frequently Asked Questions” (“FAQ”). Phase I was 

limited to tenured and tenured-track faculty members from UTPA and UTB 

who met criteria delineated by the Board’s official hiring policy. According to 

the policy, if, in addition to satisfying seven other requirements, a tenured 

UTB or UTPA faculty member had not received “a disciplinary action” from 

UTB or UTPA in the last seven years, UTRGV’s President was required to 

“recommend that the Board of Regents grant tenure [at UTRGV] to” that 

individual in Phase I. If a UTPA and UTB faculty member was not hired in 

Phase I, she could then apply in Phase II alongside members of the general 

public.

Hernandez applied for Phase I hiring on September 4, 2014. Guy Bailey, 

UTRGV’s President, rejected her application via e-mail on October 6, 2014. In 

the e-mail, Bailey explained that Hernandez was ineligible for Phase I hiring 

because she had been disciplined by UTPA in 2011. Hernandez, Bailey, and 

multiple UTPA administrators subsequently exchanged several e-mails 

regarding the 2011 disciplinary action, but UTRGV ultimately upheld its

rejection of Hernandez’s Phase I application. Hernandez then applied in Phase 

II. On May 18, 2015, UTRGV rejected her Phase II application, specifically 

noting that her position was “closed” and would “remain[] unfilled.”5

Hernandez’s employment and tenure at UTPA officially terminated on August 

31, 2015. The next day, UTRGV commenced operations.

On August 28, 2015, Hernandez sued Guy Bailey, Havidan Rodriguez, 

Dahlia Guerra, UTPA, the UT System, and UTRGV (collectively, “Appellees”)

in Texas state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging violations 

 

5 The hiring policy required that a Phase I applicant’s desired academic program “exist 

at the inception of ‘UTRGV’” and that UTRGV’s budget allow for the hiring of the particular 

position.

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of procedural and substantive due process. She also sought a declaratory 

judgment pursuant to Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 

Code. Appellees timely removed the suit to federal court under 28 U.S.C. §

1331 and filed a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hernandez 

filed a response, or in the alternative, a motion for leave to amend pleadings. 

Hernandez then filed an amended motion for leave to amend her complaint

and attached a copy of her proposed amendments. In the proposed 

amendments, Hernandez included a variety of additional factual allegations 

as well as two new constitutional claims: an equal protection claim and a voidfor-vagueness claim. The district court denied Hernandez’s amended motion 

for leave, finding that her amendments would have been futile. The district 

court simultaneously granted Appellees’ Rule 12(c) motion, holding that 

Hernandez failed to state a plausible claim for relief on procedural and 

substantive due process grounds and that Hernandez was not entitled to 

declaratory judgment because the state entity defendants enjoyed sovereign 

immunity. This appeal ensued.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

1. Standard of Review

This Court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(c) 

motion for judgment on the pleadings.6 The standard we apply is the same 

standard we apply in reviewing dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 

state a claim.7 “[The] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”8

 

6 See Edionwe, 860 F.3d at 291.

7 See id.

8 Id. at 291 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

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2. Analysis

Our recent decision in Edionwe forecloses many of the issues presented 

by Hernandez’s appeal of the district court’s Rule 12(c) dismissal. In that case, 

the plaintiff (Edionwe) was a tenured faculty member at UTPA.9 Although he 

missed the deadline for applying for a position at UTRGV during Phase I 

hiring, he submitted a timely application during Phase II.10 However, 

Edionwe was subsequently informed that the position he applied for would not 

be filled, and his employment and tenure at UTPA terminated on August 31, 

2015.11

Edionwe then filed suit under §§ 1983 and 1988 against the same 

defendants Hernandez sued herein.12 He asserted that the defendants violated 

his constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process by 

terminating his property interest in continuing employment.13 We 

determined, however, that Edionwe “had no constitutionally protected interest 

in employment or tenure at UTRGV or the UT System at large.”14 We further 

determined that Edionwe was afforded procedural and substantive due process 

with respect to the termination of his employment at UTPA.15

Hernandez similarly asserts that she had a constitutionally protected 

property interest in continuing employment at UTRGV. Like Edionwe, she

contends that the following sources gave rise to a reasonable expectation of 

continued employment at UTRGV: (1) her length of service and tenure at 

 

9 See Edionwe, 860 F.3d at 290.

10 See id.

11 See id. at 290-91.

12 See id. at 291. There is one additional defendant present in this matter, Dahlia 

Guerra.

13 See id. at 292.

14 Id. at 293 (footnote omitted).

15 See id. at 293-94.

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UTPA, (2) the legislation16 requiring employment of as many faculty from

UTPA and UTB “as is prudent and practical,” (3) the public statement by 

UTRGV’s President that UTPA and UTB were merging, (4) the hiring policy 

adopted by the UT System for UTRGV tenured faculty members of UTPA, and 

(5) the UTRGV FAQ Statement on Hiring tenured UTPA faculty members. We 

addressed these same factors in Edionwe and determined that none of them 

created a constitutionally protected interest in employment or tenure at 

UTRGV or the UT System at large.17 Consequently, Hernandez’s arguments 

on these issues are foreclosed. Hernandez’s arguments that she was not 

afforded procedural or substantive due process with respect to the termination 

of her employment at UTPA are also foreclosed by Edionwe.18

The only argument we did not specifically address which Hernandez 

raises is whether the fact that UTRGV tenured and tenure-track faculty were 

given credit for years of service at UTPA created a constitutionally protected 

property interest.19 Such action, however, still does not establish that “UTRGV 

itself, through the board of regents, adopted a policy that guaranteed 

employment for all faculty from UTPA.”20 Therefore, Hernandez’s argument 

on this issue is unavailing.

Because Hernandez had no constitutionally protected interest in 

employment at UTRGV or the UT system at large, and she was afforded 

procedural and substantive due process with respect to the termination of her 

 

16 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1853 (West).

17 See Edionwe, 860 F.3d at 292-93, 295-96. 18 See id. at 293-94.

19 See id. at 293 n.1 (declining to address certain allegations and external documents 

because they were not included in Edionwe’s complaint or incorporated by reference).

20 See id. at 293.

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employment at UTPA, the district court did not err in granting the Appellee’s 

Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.21

B. Motion for Leave to Amend

1. Standard of Review

Motions to amend made before trial are governed by Federal Rule of 

Federal Procedure 15(a)(2), which instructs district courts to grant leave to 

amend “freely . . . when justice so requires.”22 “[I]n order to take advantage of 

the liberal amendment rules . . . , the party requesting amendment, even 

absent a formal motion, need only ‘set forth with particularity the grounds for 

the amendment and the relief sought.’”23 Because Rule 15(a) “evinces a bias 

in favor of granting leave to amend,” the district court must have a “substantial 

reason” for denying the motion.24 District courts are empowered to deny a 

motion to amend for, inter alia, “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on 

the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 

allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of [the] amendment.”25 We have

interpreted futility “to mean that the amended complaint would fail to state a 

claim upon which relief could be granted.”26

 

21 Because we conclude that Hernandez failed to allege a constitutional violation, we 

need not address whether any defendant was entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, 

we exercise our discretion and decline to consider Hernandez’s claim for declaratory 

judgment. See Edionwe, 860 F.3d at 294 n.2.

22 Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(a)(2)).

23 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Doe v. Dow Chem. Co., 343 F.3d 325, 330–31 (5th 

Cir. 2003)). 

24 Hermann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 566 (5th Cir. 2002) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

25 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

26 Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000). 

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We generally review the denial of a motion to amend for abuse of 

discretion;27 however, where the district court bases its denial of leave to 

amend solely on futility grounds, a de novo review applies.28 This review is 

“identical, in practice, to the standard used for reviewing a dismissal under 

Rule 12(b)(6).”29 Under the 12(b)(6) standard, well-pleaded facts are viewed 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.30 However, the plaintiff must still 

offer specific facts, not mere conclusory statements.31 The claims advanced 

must be plausible.32

Even though the district court failed to address, specifically, how 

Hernandez’s additional proposed claims—an equal-protection claim and a 

void-for-vagueness claim—would have been futile if amendment were 

permitted, we may affirm the district court’s dismissal “on any grounds 

supported by the record.”33 First, we turn to Hernandez’s proposed equalprotection claim.

2. Equal-Protection Claim

Hernandez argues that the district court erred by denying her the 

opportunity to amend her complaint to include an equal-protection claim. An 

equal-protection claim is not futile, she contends, because she alleged in her 

proposed amended complaint that UTRGV’s failure to hire her resulted from a 

“class-based decision treating distinct groups of individuals categorically 

different.” She submits that distinguishing between these classes of former 

 

27 Thomas, 832 F.3d at 590 (citing Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 

347 (5th Cir. 2008)). 

28 See id. 

29 See City of Clinton v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148, 152 (5th Cir. 2010). 

30 See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). 

31 Stripling, 234 F.3d at 873.

32 In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010).

33 See City of Clinton, 632 F.3d at 153 (quoting Hosein v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 401, 403 

(5th Cir. 2006)).

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UTPA professors on the basis that some, but not others, were disciplined 

within the last seven years, is not rationally related to the State’s interest in 

promoting quality public education.

Appellees counter that Hernandez’s proposed amended complaint failed 

to adequately plead an equal-protection claim because: (1) discretionary hiring 

decisions in the public-employment context do not yield a “clear standard” by 

which to evaluate an equal-protection claim; and (2) Hernandez has not carried 

her burden of negating all rational bases for the decision not to hire those 

professors who were disciplined within seven years of the decision.

We need not address the arguments concerning Hernandez’s ability to 

bring this claim in the public-employment context because UTRGV’s decision 

to hire only those professors who have not been disciplined within the last 

seven years is patently rationally related to a legitimate public interest. 

The fundamental directive of the Equal Protection Clause is that 

similarly-situated persons should be treated alike by government actors.34 

However, “[u]nless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is 

drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions,” the classification need only bear 

a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest to survive judicial 

scrutiny.35 Courts are bound to uphold differential treatment if any 

“reasonably conceivable state of facts” gives rise to a rational basis for the 

classification.36

 

34 See Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist. of Harris Cty., 836 F.32d 921, 932 (5th Cir. 1988). 

35 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see also Apache Bend Apts., 

Ltd. v. United States, 964 F.2d 1556, 1560–61 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[C]lassifications of any sort 

that are not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest are unconstitutional. 

Equal protection is not concerned exclusively with archaic stigmas.”).

36 Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197, 202–03 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Madriz-Alvarado 

v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2004)). 

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Because the classification at issue here does not infringe upon 

fundamental constitutional rights, we apply rational basis review.37 Here, the 

requirement that professors not have any disciplinary record within seven 

years of application is, at a minimum, rational. It is reasonable to conclude 

that professors’ overall fit with UTRGV would be better, and thus the quality 

of the teaching higher, if professors eligible for employment at UTRGV were 

limited to those without a recent history of disciplinary actions.38 Because an 

amendment to include such a claim would have been futile, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of Hernandez’s motion to amend her complaint on equal 

protection grounds.39

3. Void-for-Vagueness Claim

Hernandez also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant 

her leave to amend her complaint to add a void-for-vagueness claim 

challenging Senate Bill 24. She argues that such a claim is not futile because 

persons of common intelligence must necessarily “guess at” the meaning of the 

phrases “as many” and “prudent and practical” in the subsection of the bill

providing that “the board of regents shall facilitate the employment at 

[UTRGV] . . . of as many faculty and staff of the abolished universities as is 

prudent and practical.” Consequently, she argues, Senate Bill 24 is 

unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as-applied to Hernandez. 

Appellees counter that an amendment to include Hernandez’s void-forvagueness claim in her complaint would have been futile because: (1) 

 

37 See City of New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303.

38 Though Hernandez vigorously disputes the existence of a disciplinary action against 

her at all in making her substantive and procedural due process claims, for the limited 

purpose of her equal-protection argument, she accepts—as she must—that she belongs to 

that purported class of professors who had been disciplined within the seven years before the 

UTRGV hiring decisions were made. 

39 See City of Clinton, 632 F.3d at 153.

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intragovernmental mandates like that at issue in Senate Bill 24 are not 

susceptible to vagueness challenges; and (2) the portions of Senate Bill 24 that 

she challenges do not regulate private behavior and therefore are not amenable 

to a void-for-vagueness challenge. 

In the public employment context, the government has “significantly 

greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it 

brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.”40 Indeed, the 

government, as employer, is endowed with much the same “broad discretion 

that typically characterizes the employer-employee relationship” in other 

contexts.41 

Here, Senate Bill 24 effectively delegated to the Board the power to 

choose, “prudent[ly] and practical[ly],” the UTB and UTPA professors to hire 

at UTRGV.42 Because Hernandez’s property interest in her tenured position 

at UTPA was extinguished by way of legislation, the State then had “broad 

discretion” in deciding whether to hire her anew as a professor at UTRGV.43

Though the context differs substantially from that at issue here, we find

instructive the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Beckles v. United States.44 

There, a defendant challenged the career criminal enhancement recommended 

in the Sentencing Guidelines as unconstitutionally vague.45 The Court found 

that the Guidelines were not subject to a vagueness challenge because the 

Guidelines “d[id] not fix the permissible range of sentences” available to a 

 

40 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 599 (2008). 

41 See id. at 605.

42 Act of May 22, 2013, 83d Leg., R.S., ch. 726, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1846.

43 See id. See supra for an analysis of Hernandez’s property interest.

44 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017). 

45 See id. at 890.

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district court, which has “unfettered” discretion, but “merely guide[d] the 

exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence.”46

Here, the State, as an employer, had inherently broad discretion to make 

its own hiring decisions.47 Senate Bill 24 merely provided the Board light 

guidance in exercising that discretion.48 Indeed, it is difficult to see how 

legislative guidance regarding how the Board should undertake its 

responsibilities could be vague without undermining the intragovernmental 

relationships that facilitate the exercise of state governmental power. Because 

amending Hernandez’s complaint to allege either a facial or as-applied 

vagueness challenge would thus be futile, we affirm the district court on this 

issue as well.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we agree that Hernandez failed to state a plausible 

claim for relief and therefore AFFIRM.

 

46 Id. at 892.

47 We do not and need not find here that the discretion accorded a State in its hiring 

decision-making is so broad as to be “unfettered,” but the State’s discretion is broad enough 

that the kind of guidance mandated by the statute is constitutional. 

48 Accord. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 894–95.

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