Order Code RL34601 

Community Acceptance of Carbon Capture and
 

Sequestration Infrastructure: Siting Challenges
 

July 29, 2008 

Paul W. Parfomak 

Specialist in Energy and Infrastructure 

Resources, Science, and Industry Division 
 

 

Community Acceptance of Carbon Capture and
 

Sequestration Infrastructure: Siting Challenges
 

Summary 

Congressional policy makers are becoming aware that a national program of 

carbon capture and sequestration could require an extensive new network of carbonrelated infrastructure. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is a three-part process 

involving a carbon dioxide (CO2) source facility, CO2 pipelines, and a permanent 

CO2 sequestration site. A key consideration in the development of such infrastructure 

is community acceptance, which may ultimately determine whether, where, and how 

anticipated CCS projects may be built. Although the general public is still largely 

unfamiliar with CCS, there are early indications that community acceptance may 

prove a significant challenge to the siting of CCS infrastructure in the United States. 

Recent federal statutes and legislative proposals related to CO2 control have 

only obliquely addressed public acceptance of CO2 infrastructure or related siting 

issues. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) requires 

a report recommending procedures for “public review and comment” and protection 

of “the quality of natural and cultural resources” related to the siting of sequestration 

projects on public land. The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 (S. 

3036) would require a CCS construction feasibility study examining “any barrier or 

potential barrier ... including any technical, siting, financing, or regulatory barrier” 

relating to the development of CO2 pipelines or geological sequestration sites for 

CCS. The Carbon Capture and Storage Technology Act of 2007 (S. 2323) would 

fund CCS demonstration projects in locations that “represent a range of population 

densities” and are “in close proximity to ... utilities and industrial settings.” 

Community acceptance studies in the United States and other developed 

countries are limited and based largely on hypothetical CCS scenarios and 

infrastructure choices. The research available suggests that the public is ambivalent 

towards CCS. At the policy level, this ambivalence may cause concern among 

legislators seeking to promote carbon control strategies that could impose significant 

costs on local communities or the U.S. economy overall. At the project level, this 

ambivalence may become outright opposition as community residents incorporate 

local considerations in their evaluation of a proposed CCS development. 

If carbon control and associated CCS policies were narrowly targeted, or 

expected to have only marginal impacts on the U.S. energy sector, Congress might 

choose to defer consideration of community acceptance issues until CCS 

technologies were more mature and states had more time to work out CCS siting 

problems. But understanding public acceptance of CCS takes on greater urgency in 

light of proposals to curb CO2 emissions quickly and the scale of CCS infrastructure 

required to do so. The most prominent CO2 proposals in the 110th Congress seek 

reductions of nationwide CO2 emissions to 1990 levels or lower by 2030. Given such 

goals for reducing U.S. emissions of CO2, and the potential contribution of CCS to 

reaching them, the issue of community acceptance of CCS infrastructure may prove 

challenging. 
Contents 

Introduction ...................................................... 1
 

Background ...................................................... 2
 

Public Acceptance of CCS Technology ................................. 4
 

Community Acceptance of CCS Infrastructure ........................... 6
 

Power Plants with CO2 Controls .................................. 6
 

Plant Site Area ............................................ 7
 

Hazardous Materials ....................................... 8
 

Chemicals Transportation ................................... 9
 

CO2 Pipelines for CCS ......................................... 10 
 

CO2 Pipeline Safety ....................................... 12 
 

CO2 Pipeline Siting Opposition .............................. 12 
 

Pipelines vs. Power Lines .................................. 14 
 

Carbon Sequestration Sites ..................................... 14 
 

Oil and Gas Property Rights ................................ 15 
 

Compulsory Unitization .................................... 17 
 

Eminent Domain for Natural Gas Storage ...................... 19 
 

Key Policy Issues for Congress ...................................... 20 
 

Community Acceptance and State Statutory Changes ................. 21 
 

Affecting Public Acceptance of CCS .............................. 22 
 

Federal Siting Authority for CCS ................................ 25 
 

Siting Challenges for CCS Alternatives ........................... 26 
 

Community Acceptance of CCS in Perspective ......................... 27 
 
 

Community Acceptance of Carbon Capture 

and Sequestration Infrastructure: Siting 

Challenges 

Introduction 

Congress is considering policies to reduce U.S. emissions of carbon dioxide, a 

major contributor to global warming. These policies include promoting the capture 

and sequestration of carbon dioxide (CO2) from manmade sources such as electric 

power plants and manufacturing facilities. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) 

is a three-part process involving a CO2 source facility, an intermediate mode of CO2 

transportation (pipelines), and a permanent CO2 sequestration site. CCS is of great 

interest because emerging technologies may be able to remove up to 95% of CO2 

emitted from an electric power plant or other industrial source. Power plants are the 

most likely initial candidates for CCS because they are predominantly large, 

single-point sources, and they contribute approximately one-third of U.S. CO2 

emissions from fossil fuels.

 As U.S. carbon policies evolve, congressional policy makers are becoming 

aware that a national CCS program could require an extensive new network of CO2­

related infrastructure. In the 110th Congress, there has been considerable debate and 

legislative activity related to the technical, economic, and regulatory aspects of such 

infrastructure. Another key consideration, however, is public acceptance, which may 

ultimately determine whether, where, and how anticipated CCS projects may be 

constructed. Although the general public is still largely unfamiliar with CCS, there 

are early indications that — similar to the siting of other kinds of energy and 

industrial infrastructure — community acceptance may prove a significant challenge 

to the siting of CCS infrastructure in the United States. 

Recent federal statutes and legislative proposals related to CO2 control have 

only obliquely addressed public acceptance of CO2 infrastructure or related siting 

issues. One provision in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 

110-140), for example, requires a report recommending procedures for “public 

review and comment” and protection of “the quality of natural and cultural 

resources” related to the siting of sequestration projects on public land (Sec. 

714(b)(3)). The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008 (S. 3036) would 

require a CCS construction feasibility study examining “any barrier or potential 

barrier ... including any technical, siting, financing, or regulatory barrier” relating to 

the development of CO2 pipelines or geological sequestration sites for CCS (Sec. 
 

 

 

 

 

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8003(b)(1)).1 The Carbon Capture and Storage Technology Act of 2007 (S. 2323) 

would fund CCS demonstration projects in locations that “represent a range of 

population densities” and are “in close proximity to ... utilities and industrial 

settings” (Sec. 3(d)). Other legislative proposals for carbon control have no apparent 

provisions relating to public acceptance. 

This report discusses the possible role public and community acceptance may 

play in the siting of CO2 infrastructure for CCS. The report reviews what is known 

about public opinion of CCS as an overall strategy to combat climate change. The 

report examines community acceptance of CO2 emissions controls, pipelines, and 

sequestration sites based on analogies, CO2 experience, and focused research. It also 

discusses community acceptance issues related to selected alternatives to CCS 

policies, such as investment in renewable energy infrastructure and nuclear power. 

The report introduces key CCS policy considerations as Congress continues to 

evaluate opportunities and requirements for carbon control. 

Background 

Public acceptance has long posed challenges to energy infrastructure 

development in the United States. A lack of public acceptance is often cited, for 

example, as one reason why no oil refineries have been constructed in the United 

States since 1976, and no nuclear power plants have been ordered since 1973.2 In 

2001, a representative of the National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners (NARUC) testified before Congress that “the main impediment to 

siting energy infrastructure is the great difficulty getting public acceptance for needed 

facilities.”3 Likewise, the National Commission on Energy Policy (NCEP) stated in 

its 2006 report that energy-facility siting is “a major cross-cutting challenge for U.S. 

energy policy,” largely because of public opposition to new energy projects and other 

major infrastructure.4 In 2008, public acceptance remains an overriding concern in 

proposals by energy companies to site electric power transmission lines, liquefied 

natural gas (LNG) terminals, natural gas pipelines, wind farms, and other energy 

facilities in many parts of the country. 

1

 The Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Study Act of 2007 (S. 2144) also contains these provisions 

(Sec. 2(b)(1)). 

2

 Jad Mouawad, “No New Refineries in 29 Years? There Might Well Be a Reason,” New 

York Times (May 9, 2005); Marco Guigni, Social Protest and Policy Change: Ecology, 

Antinuclear, and Peace Movements in Comparative Perspective, Rowman and Littlefield, 

Lanham, MD (2004): 43-45. 

3

 William M. Nugent, First Vice President, National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners, Testimony before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee 

hearing on Federal, State, and Local Impediments to Siting Energy Infrastructure (May 15, 

2001). 

4

 National Commission on Energy Policy, Siting Critical Energy Infrastructure: An 

Overview of Needs and Challenges. (Washington, DC: June 2006): 1. (Hereafter referred 

to as NCEP 2006.) 
 

 

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Faced with substantial public opposition, many energy infrastructure projects 

viewed by policy makers to be in the national interest have been cancelled by 

developers or have failed to win state or local siting approval. Reacting to such 

failures over the years, Congress has occasionally enacted statutes intended to help 

developers overcome community opposition to energy projects. In 1947, for 

example, Congress amended the Natural Gas Act (P.L. 75-688) to grant federal 

eminent domain authority to interstate natural gas pipeline developers seeking to 

secure rights of way from unwilling landowners (15 U.S.C. § 717f(h)). The TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-153) stopped regulatory and 

legal challenges to the Trans-Alaska Pipeline project brought by environmental, 

native American, and community opponents. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 

102-486) streamlined the federal licensing process for new nuclear power plants, in 

part to ensure that community siting concerns would be addressed prior to plant 

construction (Sec. 2801, 2802). Most recently, Congress passed the Energy Policy 

Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58), which increased federal authority to approve interstate 

electric transmission projects (Sec. 1221) and granted federal regulators “exclusive” 

authority to approve the siting of onshore LNG terminals (Sec. 311). 

Notwithstanding federal siting legislation, community stakeholders retain many 

statutory and regulatory avenues to affect energy infrastructure siting decisions. 

These include public input to state permitting under federal statutes such as the 

Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C. 1451 et seq.), the Clean Air Act 

(42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 251 

et seq.), among others. Community groups also have a role in siting reviews such as 

those in P.L. 109-58 which require federal regulators to consult with 

governor-designated state agencies regarding state and local safety considerations 

prior to issuing LNG terminal permits (Sec. 311(d)). Local zoning and land use 

regulations, in particular, have been widely used by communities to influence or 

block energy infrastructure development.5 

Since public acceptance has influenced the development of virtually every 

category of U.S. energy infrastructure, it is logical to consider how the public may 

view future infrastructure specifically associated with CCS. As one analyst has 

stated, 

[t]here is good reason to be concerned over public perception of CCS; lack of 

information will prevent a balanced evaluation of its costs and benefits. It may 

also create exaggerated perceptions of risk which can delay or stop 

implementation of this new technology.6 

Consideration of this issue can be divided into two separate but related dimensions 

— public acceptance of CCS as an overall national policy, and public (or community) 

acceptance of specific CCS facilities. 

5

 See, for example: Michele Morgan Bolton, “Power Plant Fight Spreads,” The Boston 

Globe (January 31, 2008). 

6

 Jeffrey Logan, Andrea Disch, Kate Larsen, and John Venezia, “Building Public 

Acceptability for Carbon Capture and Sequestration” (World Resources Institute: October 

2007): 2. 
 

 

 

 

 

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Public Acceptance of CCS Technology
 

One factor that determines whether community stakeholders accept a new 

energy technology is whether they view it as consistent with broad policy objectives 

they support. For example, residents of Searsburg, VT, have supported local wind 

farm development primarily because they believe wind power does not pollute the 

environment.7 Community groups oppose a proposed coal gasification power plant 

in Edwardsport, IN, because they prefer investments in electricity conservation and 

renewable energy sources.8 Other community groups oppose a proposed LNG 

terminal off the southern California coast, in part, because they believe it would 

increase U.S. dependence on foreign energy supplies.9 In such cases, the nature of 

the proposed technology from a broad policy perspective has been a separate 

consideration from its particular location or operational characteristics. 

Although the 110th Congress has been debating the need for carbon control, 

studies in the United States and other developed countries considering CCS policies 

shows that “the vast majority of the public is not aware of carbon capture and 

sequestration, and even fewer understand the technology and its risks.”10 

Consequently, research on public acceptance of CCS is limited and based largely on 

hypothetical scenarios and infrastructure choices. Nonetheless, policy researchers 

have begun to identify likely attitudes among members of the public who learn about 

CCS technology. Their findings are mixed. A 2007 study in Australia found that, 

although most people believe it is very important to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 

at a national level, many are “neutral” towards CCS as a strategy to do so. This study 

found that approximately 40% of the public believes CCS would be “a quick fix that 

would not solve the greenhouse gas problem.”11 A 2007 study in France found only 

a 38% approval rate for CCS after presenting survey subjects with explanations of 

both CCS technology and its potential adverse consequences.12 A 2006 study in the 

Netherlands reported that “after processing relevant information, people are likely to 

7

 J.F. Palmer, “Public Acceptance Study of the Searsburg Wind Power Project: Year One 

Post-Construction,” Report No. EHWF-TC-5, prepared by Clinton Solutions (Fayetteville, 

NY: December 1977). [http://www.easthavenwindfarm.com/filing/high/ehwf-tc-5.pdf] 

8

 Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, “Public Opposition to Proposed Duke Coal-Fired 

Power Plant,” (Indianapolis, IN: August 31, 2007). [http://www.citact.org/newsite/ 

modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=245&mode=thread&order=0 

&thold=0]. 

9

 No Way on OceanWay Coalition, “Ten Reasons to Oppose LNG,” Web page, (Santa 

Monica, CA: April 4th, 2008). [http://www.nowayonoceanway.org/2.html] 

10 Jeff Logan, et al.(World Resources Institute: October 2007): 2. 

11 Evonne Miller, Lorraine Bell, and Laurie Buys, “Public Understanding of Carbon 

Sequestration in Australia: Socio-Demographic Predictors of Knowledge, Engagement and 

Trust,” Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society (Vol.5, No. 1, 2007). 

12 Minh Ha-Duong, Alain Nadai, and Ana Sofia Campos, “A Survey on the Public 

Perception of CCS in France” (Centre International de Recherche sur l’Environnement et 

le Développement, Nogent-sur-Marne, France: December 21, 2007). 

[http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00200894] 
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agree with large scale implementation” of CCS.13 A 2005 survey of the Canadian 

public reported that respondents overall were “slightly supportive” of CCS in 

Canada.14 A 2004 study in the United States by Carnegie Mellon University found 

that people were significantly less willing to pay for CCS than for any other major 

option to reduce CO2 emissions — including new nuclear power plants.15 A 2004 

study in the United Kingdom found “slight support” for CCS in concept, but also a 

belief that, as a stand-alone policy, “CCS might delay more far-reaching and 

necessary long-term changes in society’s use of energy.”16 Other researchers report 

similarly mixed findings, although specific study methodologies differ so it is 

difficult to draw clear conclusions from the overall body of research to date.17 

Public acceptance of CCS policies is complicated by public views of climate 

change as a global phenomenon. Notwithstanding recent science studies and public 

information campaigns about the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on climate 

change, parts of both the science community and the general population reject 

arguments that global warming is a problem requiring greenhouse gas mitigation.18 

For example, a 2006 survey by MIT found that only 61% of the U.S. public believed 

action should be taken to address global warming.19 Another national survey in May, 

2008, found that while 71% of Americans believe there is “solid evidence” of global 

warming, only 47% believe “the earth is warming because of human activity such 

13 M. de Best-Waldhober and D. Daamen, Public Perceptions and Preference Regarding 

Large-Scale Implementation of Six CO2 Capture and Storage Technologies: Well-Informed 

and Well-Considered Opinions versus Uninformed Pseudo-Opinions of the Dutch Public 

(Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands: 2006): p 249. 

14 Jacqueline Sharp, Mark Jaccard, and David Keith, “Public Attitudes Toward Geological 

Disposal of Carbon Dioxide in Canada,” Report No. 384 (Simon Fraser University, 

Burnaby, BC, Canada: Fall 2005). 

15 Claire R. Palmgren, M. Granger Morgan, Wandi Bruine De Bruin, and David Keith, 

“Initial Public Perceptions of Deep Geological and Oceanic Disposal of Carbon Dioxide,” 

Environmental Science & Technology (Vol. 38, No. 24, 2004): 6448. 

16 Simon Shackley, Carly McLachlan, and Clair Gough, “The Public Perceptions of Carbon 

Capture and Storage,” (Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Working Paper 44: 

January 2004): 2. [http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/wp44.pdf] 

17 See, for example: D.T. Reiner, M. de Figueiredo, H. Herzog, S. Ansolabehere, K. Itaoka, 

M. Akai, F. Johnsson, and M. Odenberger, “An International Comparison Of Public 

Attitudes Towards Carbon Capture and Storage Technologies,” Presented at the 8th 

International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies (Trondeim, Norway: 

June 19-22. 2006). [http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/GHGT8_Reiner.pdf] 

18 See, for example: Sharon Begley, “The Truth About Denial,” Newsweek (Aug 13, 2007); 

Arthur B. Robinson, Noah E. Robinson, and Willie Soon, “Environmental Effects of 

Increased Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide,” Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons 

(No. 12: 2007): 79-90; and Andrew C. Revkin, “Skeptics on Human Climate Impact Seize 

on Cold Spell,” New York Times (March 2, 2008). 

19 T.E. Curry, S. Ansolabehere, and H. Herzog, “A Survey of Public Attitudes towards 

Climate Change and Climate Change Mitigation Technologies in the United States: Analysis 

of 2006 Results,” MIT LFEE 2007-1-WP (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: April 

2007): 16. [http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/LFEE_2007_01_WP.pdf] 
 

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as the burning of fossil fuels.”20 This survey further notes that “[o]pinions about the 

primary cause of global warming have remained stable in recent years.”21 

Taken together, the studies above suggest that the public is ambivalent towards 

CCS as an overall carbon control technology. At the policy level, this ambivalence 

may cause concern among legislators seeking to promote carbon control strategies 

that could impose significant costs on local communities or the U.S. economy 

overall. At the project level, this ambivalence may become outright opposition as 

community residents incorporate local considerations in their evaluation of a 

proposed CCS development. To the extent that members of the public reject 

assertions that human activity is responsible for a rise in global temperature, or that 

such a rise requires intervention by the United States, policy makers may face 

difficulty convincing communities that CCS is necessary to begin with. Projectspecific considerations are further discussed in the following section. 

Community Acceptance of CCS Infrastructure 

Another factor influencing how public stakeholders may view an energy facility 

is their assessment of its potential negative community impacts (e.g., property values, 

environmental effects, safety) balanced against local benefits (e.g., jobs, tax 

revenues).22 In the case of CCS, three main categories of facility may be involved: 

power plants with CO2 capture technology, transportation pipelines, and underground 

sequestration sites. Although it is necessary to integrate these three types of 

infrastructure to implement CCS, they are physically distinct and so present different 

challenges related to siting and community acceptance. Unfortunately, there is 

almost no publicly available research about community attitudes towards these three 

infrastructure categories specifically in the context of CCS. Policy makers must, 

therefore, draw inferences about CCS infrastructure from experience with similar 

infrastructure in applications analogous to CCS. While not perfect comparisons, 

these analogies may offer valuable insights into the potential reactions of affected 

communities to the siting of CCS facilities. 

Power Plants with CO2 Controls 

Community acceptance of electric power plants has been a concern of policy 

makers and plant developers for decades. As early as 1970, one legal analyst 

observed that “[e]lectric power projects across the nation have been attacked by a 

20 Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, “An Increase in GOP Doubt About 

Global Warming Deepens Partisan Divide,” Internet publication (May 8, 2008). 

[http://pewresearch.org/pubs/828/global-warming] 

21 Ibid. 

22 See, for example: “With Sparrows Point LNG Application in Hand, FERC Considers 

Project as Resistance Hardens,” Inside F.E.R.C. (January 15, 2007). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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worried and frustrated public.”23 Community scrutiny of, and opposition to, new 

power plant proposals has evolved since then, along with federal, state, and local 

policy approaches to address them. Detailing these approaches is beyond the scope 

of this report, but they have met with only limited success. Power plant projects, 

particularly coal-fired projects, throughout the United States continue to struggle for 

siting approval, in part because communities where they would be located often do 

not want them.24 

If the public views CO2 capture-capable power plants in the same way it has 

conventional power plants in the past, it seems likely that the former will face the 

same sorts of community acceptance barriers as the latter, and for many of the same 

reasons. The fact that CCS power plants are intended to be “cleaner” may not 

matter. As the National Commission on Energy Policy points out, “new technology 

alone will not alleviate siting problems.”25 Indications to date suggest that this is 

likely to be the case. For example, one prominent community group in Minnesota 

opposes the proposed Mesaba coal gasification power plant, which is intended to be 

CO2 “capture-ready,” because the group believes the facility would “degrade 

recreational lake country,” would pollute air and water, would require 

environmentally harmful coal mining, would be subsidized with public funds, and 

would force private landowners to accept associated network infrastructure (i.e., 

electric transmission lines, railroad connections, pipelines and roads).26 Whether 

these objections are justified or not, they are the same types of objections often raised 

against conventional coal-fired power plants. 

In addition to traditional considerations, the siting of power plants and CO2 

capture facilities under a CCS scheme may face new concerns stemming from 

changes in the physical configuration of power plants, or the processes they employ, 

to make carbon capture possible. While the ultimate characteristics of carboncontrolled power plants have yet to be determined because the capture technologies 

are still in development, new siting-related concerns are already apparent. 

Plant Site Area. Power plants incorporating carbon capture may require a 

significantly larger site area than a conventional plant to accommodate the additional 

process facilities associated with CO2 capture. Such facilities could include CO2 

compressors, scrubbers, oxygen production plants, or other carbon capture 

23 Turner T. Smith, Jr., “Electricity and the Environment — The Generating Plant Siting 

Problem,” Business Law (November 1970): 169. 

24 See, for example: David A. Fahrenthold, “Debating Coal’s Cost in Rural Va.,” The 

Washington Post (June 25, 2008); Michele Morgan Bolton, “Power Plant Will Figure in 

Campaigns,” Boston Globe (May 1, 2008); Susan Moran, “Fight Against Coal Plants Draws 

Diverse Partners,” New York Times (October 20, 2007). 

25 NCEP (2006): 2. 

26 Citizens Against the Mesaba Project (CAMP), “Mission Statement,” Web page, (Grand 

Rapids, MN: June 2, 2008). [http://www.camp-site.info/about.html] 
 

 

 

 

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equipment.27 Depending upon the capture technology employed, the site area 

required for the capture equipment may approach the size of the site area of the 

power generating plant itself.28 This larger site requirement is a particularly 

important consideration for existing power plants. MIT researchers conclude that 

“additional space requirements for the CO2 recovery and compression systems ... may 

cause difficulties for existing plants that do not have space readily available.”29 

Furthermore, if net power production from the site must be maintained, construction 

of additional generating capacity on-site could be necessary to offset power losses in 

the capture process.30 Power plant sites have expanded successfully in the past, for 

example, to add sulfur oxide (SOx) control equipment (scrubbers). Nonetheless, to 

the extent an existing power plant would need to expand into adjacent communities 

or natural areas to add CO2 equipment, such expansions could face community 

resistance. 

Hazardous Materials. Certain carbon capture technologies may use or 

produce hazardous materials in large quantities. For example, a carbon capture 

demonstration project in Pleasant Prairie, WI, employs chilled ammonia to strip CO2 

from power plant combustion gases. At full scale, such a process would require tons 

of ammonia, which is listed as “highly hazardous” chemical under Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations (29 C.F.R. 1910.119).31 

Ammonia in quantities exceeding 100,000 pounds (in aqueous solution), and 

therefore requiring risk management plans to be filed with the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA), is already found in nearly 300 U.S. power plants, where 

it is widely used in selective catalytic reduction (SCR) of nitrogen oxide (NOx) 

emissions.32 The Pleasant Prairie power plant itself has over a million tons of 

ammonia in its NOx control equipment, unrelated to its CO2 control demonstration 

equipment.33 Furthermore, ammonia-based SCR may be required for any new coalfired plants in order to meet federal clean air standards, with or without carbon 

capture. Nonetheless, perceived risks of an uncontrolled ammonia release from 

ammonia-based CO2 capture facilities may increase opposition to the future siting of 

such facilities in populated areas. An early example of such opposition is a 

27 R. Irons, G. Sekkapan, R. Panesar, J. Gibbins, and M. Lucquiaud, “CO2 Capture Ready 

Plants,” International Energy Agency, Report No. 2007/4 (May, 2007): ii. 

28 J. Gibbins, “Making New Power Plants ‘Capture Ready’,” Imperial College, Presentation 

to the 9th International CO2 Capture Network (London, England: June 16, 2006). 

29 Mark C. Bohm, Howard J. Herzog, John E. Parsons and Ram C. Sekar, “Capture-Ready 

Coal Plants — Options, Technologies and Economics,” International Journal of 

Greenhouse Gas Control (Vol. 1, Issue 1: April 2007): 113-120. 

30 R. Irons, et al.(May, 2007): ii. 

31 The threshold quantity to be covered under this standard is 10,000 pounds. 

32 Risk management plans (RMPs) are required under the Clean Air Act, Section 112(r). 

The list of EPA hazardous chemicals and their threshold quantities is found at 40 CFR 

68.130. Plant statistics are derived from CRS analysis of the EPA RMP*National Database 

(with off-site consequence analysis data), February 1, 2008. The EPA database is not 

publicly available. 

33 Ibid. 
 

 

 

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cogeneration power plant proposed in 1984 in Crockett, CA, but blocked by 

community groups, in part out of fear of ammonia release from the facility’s SCR 

process.34 Similar concerns about ammonia release are also reportedly among the 

reasons community groups currently oppose a new peaking power plant proposed in 

Billerica, MA.35 There is at least one recent example of a community group formed 

specifically to oppose the use of a hazardous chemical (hydrogen fluoride) in the 

expansion of a local energy facility (a refinery).36

 Amine-based CO2 capture technologies, another post-combustion CO2 capture 

option, may raise hazardous material concerns of a different kind. Amine-based 

systems may generate wastes in process chemical reclaimers which are “toxic to 

humans and the environment.”37 Among the chemicals found in such wastes are 

vanadium, antimony, and cyanide compounds — all listed as hazardous wastes by the 

Environmental Protection Agency (40 C.F.R. 261).38 Amine-process hazardous 

wastes would need to be transported off-site by truck or rail and disposed of in 

suitable hazardous waste disposal facilities. Although process wastes are also 

generated by existing SOx and NOx emissions control systems, they are generally not 

classified as hazardous waste under federal regulation. Amine-process CO2 capture 

plants may therefore face greater publicly scrutiny and opposition than SOx and NOx 

systems. Amine-based processes may ultimately not be the technology of choice for 

CCS, however, as they are potentially more expensive than ammonia-based or other 

CO2 capture processes. 

Chemicals Transportation. Power plants employing ammonia, amine, or 

other potentially hazardous chemicals as inputs to, or outputs from, their carbon 

capture processes may require new or substantiallyexpanded transportation facilities 

to move those chemicals. 

These include product pipelines to get enormous volumes of ammonia, H2S, and 

other chemical solvents to the new power plants for carbon separation. These are 

chemicals that have either never been used at power plants or never at this 

scale.... Like the creation of a national highway system for surface transportation 

of commodities and people, the new CCS technology at power plants will require 

a very sophisticated infrastructure of chemical products delivered by surface 

34 Arthur O’Donnell, “NIMBY IV: Second Impressions About Crockett Cogeneration,” 

California Energy Markets (October 9, 1992). 

35 Connie Paige, “Proposed Power Plant Faces Delays,” Boston Globe, (February 21, 2008); 

Billerica Watchers Group, “!!Stop the Billerica Power Plant!!,” Internet page (July 2, 2008). 

[http://stopthebillericapowerplant.org/] 

36 See, for example: Stacey Shepard, “Group Forms to Oppose Refinery Chemical,” The 

Bakersfield Californian (Bakersfield, CA: April 8, 2008). 

37 B. Thitakamol, A. Veawab, and A. Aroonwilas, “Environmental Impacts of 

Absorption-based CO2 Capture Unit for Post-combustion Treatment of Flue Gas from 

Coal-fired Power Plant,” International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control (Vol. 1:2007): 

338; A.B. Rao and E. S. Rubin, “A Technical, Economic, and Environmental Assessment 

of Amine-based CO2 Capture Technology for Power Plant Greenhouse Gas Control,” 

Environmental Science and Technology (Vol. 36: 2002): 4467-4475. 

38 Ibid. 
 

 

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shipping, barges and trains to CCS-equipped power plants. Some CCS plants 

may even require construction of chemical delivery pipelines that have 

traditionally only been constructed to serve refineries, natural gas production 

plants or other industrial facilities.39 

While it is too soon to determine the specific nature and capacity of chemical 

transportation needs for future power plants with carbon capture capabilities, the 

safety and security of such transportation has been a prominent concern among the 

public.40 Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) transportation security has also been a 

key concern of Congress, especially since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. 

As the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation stated in a 

2007 report, “[t]he majority of the over 2 billion tons of HAZMAT that move 

annually are transported by trucks, pipelines, and railroads, and such shipments 

present one of the most serious security concerns for the Nation.”41 Given these 

prominent and public concerns, the siting of chemicals transportation infrastructure 

for carbon-capture capable power plants may face potential opposition in 

communities where it is proposed. 

CO2 Pipelines for CCS 

The energy industry has constructed nearly half a million miles of oil and gas 

transmission pipeline across the United States since the early 20th century.42 Since 

the 1970s, the industry has also operated a limited CO2 pipeline network in relatively 

remote areas of the Western United States, primarily to transport naturally-occurring 

CO2 for use in underground injection for enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Experiences 

with natural gas pipelines are relevant to CCS because natural gas pipelines are 

similar in design to CO2 pipelines, and therefore may be viewed in similar ways by 

the public with respect to siting. Furthermore, unlike the existing CO2 pipeline 

network, natural gas pipelines are found throughout the country, including densely 

populated regions where new CO2 pipelines may be needed for CCS. Experiences 

with CO2 pipelines in EOR provide a record of siting in unpopulated areas, as well 

as statistics on network safety specific to CO2. 

As in the case of power plants, pipeline developers have faced local opposition 

to new pipeline development for many years. During the construction of the first 

major interstate oil pipeline in the United States (the Big Inch Pipeline) in 1942, 

developers had to acquire through eminent domain about 300 of the 7,500 properties 

39 American Public Power Association, APPA Comments to NERC on Reliability Impacts 

of Climate Change Initiatives (July 16, 2008): 6. 

40 See, for example: Citizens’ Environmental Coalition, Toxic Trains and Public Safety in 

New York State: The Case for Urgent Action (September 2007). 

41 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Surface Transportation 

and Rail Security Act of 2007, S.Rept. 110-29 (March 1, 2007): 8. 

42 Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), “National Transportation Statistics,” February 

2008. [http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/html/ 

table_01_10.html]. In this report “oil” includes petroleum and other hazardous liquids such 

as gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, and propane, unless otherwise noted. 
 

CRS-11
 

required for the pipeline right-of-way.43 Through the 1940s and 1950s unwilling 

landowners along proposed pipeline routes continued to be an obstacle to siting, 

although their influence was limited and their interests usually focused more on 

financial compensation for rights-of-way than broader community concerns. In the 

1960s, however, public acceptance started to have a markedly greater influence on 

the siting of pipelines in parts of the United States, largely due to perceived impacts 

of pipeline construction on the environment.44 The encroachment of cities on 

historically remote pipeline rights-of-way subsequently heightened concerns about 

public safety. While many communities, especially in energy-producing regions, 

continued to support local pipeline development during this period, a gas pipeline 

industry survey in 1991 found that over a third of the public would object to having 

a long-distance pipeline sited in their neighborhood.45 Accidents such as the 2000 

natural gas pipeline explosion which killed 12 campers near Carlsbad, NM, and the 

2006 BP Alaska oil pipeline leaks, which temporarily halted North Slope oil 

production, have aggravated public concern about pipeline safety in recent years.46 

Despite public concerns about environmental impacts and public safety, new 

natural gas and oil pipelines continue to be sited in many parts of the United States. 

Indeed, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), nearly 1,700 

miles of natural gas pipeline in at least 50 separate projects were completed in the 

Lower 48 States in 2007, primarily to serve new gas production areas.47 Nonetheless, 

one result of public opposition has been to prevent new pipeline siting in certain 

localities, and to increase pipeline development time and costs in others. In a 2006 

report, for example, the EIA stated that “several major projects in the Northeast, 

although approved by FERC, have been held up because of public opposition or 

non-FERC regulatory interventions.”48 In the specific case of the Millennium 

Pipeline, proposed in 1997 to transport Canadian natural gas to metropolitan New 

York, developers did not receive final construction approval for nine years, largely 

43 Louis Berger Group, Inc., The Big Inch and Little Big Inch Pipelines, Produced for Texas 

Eastern Transmission Corp. (Houston, TX: May 2000): 19. 

44 For an early example, see Federal Power Commission, Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 

39 F.P.C. 294 (1968): 302. 

45 Roper Organization, “Public Attitudes Toward Natural Gas and Interstate Pipelines,” 

Prepared for the INGAA Foundation, Inc. (New York, NY: May 15, 1991): 20-23. 

46 See, for example: Janet Zink, “Fueling the Resistance,” St. Petersburg Times, December 

16, 2007; W. Loy, “Slope Mayor Questions Leak Detection,” Anchorage Daily News, March 

14, 2006; J. Nesmith and R. K. M. Haurwitz, “Pipelines: The Invisible Danger,” Austin 

American-Statesman (July 22, 2001) 

47 Energy Information Admin., Natural Gas Year-In-Review (March 2008): 6. 

48 Energy Information Admin., Additions to Capacity on the U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline 

Network: 2005 (August 2006): 11. 
 

 

 

 

CRS-12
 

because of community resistance to the pipeline route.49 Numerous other proposed 

pipelines, especially in populated areas, have faced similar community barriers.50 

CO2 Pipeline Safety. CO2 pipelines are built in almost exactly the same way 

as natural gas pipelines, so public acceptance issues related to their construction 

would likely reflect gas industry experiences. With respect to public safety, however, 

CO2 pipelines for CCS could present new or unfamiliar risks. Although it is not 

combustible like natural gas, and so poses virtually no risk of fire or explosion, CO2 

is an asphyxiant listed as a Class 2.2 (non-flammable gas) hazardous material under 

Department of Transportation regulations (49 C.F.R. § 172.101). Furthermore, 

unlike natural gas, CO2 is heavier than air, so its potential to accumulate in low-lying 

or enclosed spaces like basements or tunnels is a safety concern — especially for CO2 

pipelines passing through cities. As the Deputy Administrator of the Pipeline and 

Hazardous Materials SafetyAdministration (PHMSA) has testified before Congress, 

“a large, sudden release of ... CO2 could have catastrophic consequences in a 

populated area.”51 Accordingly, PHMSA applies nearly the same safety requirements 

to CO2 pipelines as it does to pipelines carrying hazardous liquids such as crude oil, 

gasoline, and anhydrous ammonia (49 C.F.R. § 195). 

Based on the limited sample of CO2 incidents to date, analysts conclude that, 

mile-for-mile, CO2 pipelines appear to be safer than the other types of pipeline 

regulated by the federal government.52 Nonetheless, if the network of CO2 pipelines 

expands under CCS policies, analysts suggest that “statistically, the number of 

incidents involving CO2 should be similar to those for natural gas transmission.”53 

Overall, then, although CO2 poses a somewhat different type of risk, CO2 pipelines 

may appear to the general public to pose a similar level of risk as the natural gas 

pipelines with which it may be more familiar. 

CO2 Pipeline Siting Opposition. In remarks during a March 2008 

congressional briefing on carbon control, Senator Jeff Bingaman, Chairman of the 

Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, stated that the development of CO2 

pipeline infrastructure was among his top three concerns in developing CCS policy. 

49 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), “Commission Approves Revised $1 

Billion Millennium Pipeline Project to Bring New Gas Service to the Northeast,” Press 

release (December 21, 2006). See, for example: Randal C. Archibold, “Fighting Plans for 

a Gas Pipeline: Not Under My Backyard,” New York Times (August 7, 2001). 

50 Samantha Santa Maria, “ Energy Projects: Rockies Express Add-on Pipe Projects Face 

Several Obstacles to Building in US Northeast,” Inside F.E.R.C. (October 22, 2007). 

51 Krista L. Edwards, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Hearing on Carbon Capture, Transportation, and Sequestration and Related Bills, S. 2323 

and S. 2144 (January 31, 2008). 

52 John Gale and John Davidson, “Transmission of CO2 — Safety and Economic 

Considerations,” Energy, Vol. 29, Nos. 9-10 (July-August 2004): 1326. 

53 J. Barrie, K. Brown, P.R. Hatcher, and H.U. Schellhase, “Carbon Dioxide Pipelines: A 

Preliminary Review of Design and Risks,” Proceedings of the 7th International Conference 

on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies (Vancouver, Canada: September 5-9, 2004): 2. 
 

 

CRS-13
 

According to Senator Bingaman, “there is a big problem with [CO2] transportation 

in this country.”54 Almost no research, however, examines public attitudes 

specifically concerning CO2 pipelines used for CCS. One relevant study in 2007 

found that CO2 pipeline safety and routing both had the potential to be negative 

drivers of public opinion.55 The study reported “a common perception across 

stakeholder groups that siting CCS facilities, including pipelines, will be a major 

challenge.”56 Energy industry experts have expressed similar concerns that CO2 

pipelines for CCS would face growing public opposition not only in affluent 

communities but across a wide range of socioeconomic groups.57 

Faced with community or landowner opposition, pipeline developers typically 

rely on eminent domain authority to secure pipelines rights-of-way. In the case of 

natural gas, companies seeking to build interstate pipelines must first obtain 

certificates of public convenience and necessity from FERC under the Natural Gas 

Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 717, et seq.). Such certification may include safety and security 

provisions with respect to pipeline routing, safety standards and other factors.58 A 

certificate of public convenience and necessity granted by FERC (15 U.S.C. § 

717f(h)) confers eminent domain authority. 

There is no federal siting authority for oil pipelines, so interstate oil pipeline 

developers must secure rights of way under various state statutes. Likewise, 

interstate CO2 pipelines developed for EOR purposes have been constructed under 

state statutes because federal agencies claim no siting jurisdiction for CO2 pipelines. 

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Surface Transportation 

Board (STB), the two most logical candidates for administering federal CO2 pipeline 

siting authority, disclaimed jurisdiction over CO2 pipeline siting nearly 30 years 

ago.59 It is unclear, however, to what extent state eminent domain authorities would 

extend to CO2 pipelines for CCS if a nationwide network of such pipelines were 

required. The state-by-state siting approval process for CO2 pipelines also could be 

complex and protracted, and could face public opposition, especially in populated or 

environmentally sensitive areas. Consequently, members of Congress have 

54 Senator Jeff Bingaman, Chairman, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, 

Remarks before the Center for Strategic and International Studies briefing “Making CCS 

Work: Economics and Critical Issues” (Washington, DC: March 31, 2008). 

55 International Energy Agency, Public Perception of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: 

Prioritised Assessment of Issues and Concerns: Summary for Policy-Makers (March 23, 

2007): 12. 

56 Ibid: 6. 

57 Joel Kirkland, “Expansive Energy Agenda Hangs on Treatment of Public Opposition, 

Regulatory Hurdles,” Inside F.E.R.C. (March 10, 2008): 16. 

58 18 C.F.R. § 157. 

59 Notwithstanding the ICC’s 1980 disclaimer, other evidence indirectly suggests the 

possibility that interstate CO2 pipelines could still be considered subject to STB jurisdiction. 

For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34307, Regulation of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 

Sequestration Pipelines: Jurisdictional Issues, by Adam Vann and Paul W. Parfomak. 
 

 

 

 

 

CRS-14
 

expressed concern that federal siting authority for CO2 pipelines might be required 

in the future.60 

Pipelines vs. Power Lines. In light of costs and siting requirements for CO2 

pipelines, some analysts anticipate that a CO2 network for CCS will begin with 

relatively short pipelines from CO2 sources located close to sequestration sites.61 

This development approach would place CO2 capture-capable power plants, for 

example, directly atop the largest saline aquifers and would transmit electric power 

to distant urban centers. Such power plants would be conceptually similar to existing 

coal-fired plants located directly adjacent to coal mines (“mine-mouth” plants) 

scattered throughout U.S. coal-producing regions. It is debatable whether CO2 

pipeline costs would generally outweigh electricity transmission costs (including 

capital, operations, maintenance, and electric line losses) in new construction.62 

Nonetheless, any CCS project requiring the construction of extensive new 

transmission infrastructure from remote to populated areas could face concerted 

community opposition to the siting of those transmission lines. Public challenges to 

electric transmission projects have long been considered among the most serious and 

most intractable challenges in the U.S. energy sector.63 Such challenges continue to 

delay or prevent new transmission development in some regions despite the 

provisions in P.L. 109-58 intended to encourage the siting of new transmission lines. 

Carbon Sequestration Sites 

Carbon sequestration sites are similar in many ways to natural gas and oil 

production sites — only operating in reverse. Rather than extracting an underground 

resource, operators of sequestration sites inject CO2 underground using technologies 

originally developed for the oil and gas industries and adapted for long-term 

sequestration and monitoring of CO2. As stated earlier in this report, some oil fields 

already employ CO2 injection to increase oil production. These injections are limited 

in scale and focused on the oil resource, but they may achieve substantial levels of 

permanent CO2 sequestration as a by-product of the oil production process. A key 

difference is that enhanced oil recovery removes and recycles injected CO2 by design, 

whereas a CCS project developed strictly for carbon control would not. Other 

underground injection applications in practice today, such as natural gas storage, 

deep injection of liquid wastes, and subsurface disposal of oil-field brines, may share 

similar characteristics with sequestering CO2. 

60 Senator Lisa Murkowski, Remarks during the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources Hearing on Carbon Capture, Transportation, and Sequestration and Related Bills, 

S. 2323 and S. 2144 (January 31, 2008). 

61 John Deutch, Ernest J. Moniz, et al., The Future of Coal. (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology: 2007): 59. 

62 Jeffrey M. Bielicki and Daniel P. Schrag, “On the Influence of Carbon Capture and 

Storage on the Location of Electric Power Generation,” Harvard University, Belfer Center 

for Science and International Affairs, Working paper (2006). 

63 Shalini P. Vajjhala, “Siting Difficulty and Transmission Investment,”IAEE Energy Forum 

(International Association for Energy Economics: 2nd Quarter 2008): 5-7; North American 

Electric Reliability Council, 2006 Long-Term Reliability Assessment (October 2006): 22-23. 
 

 

 

 

CRS-15
 

Oil and Gas Property Rights. The aspect of oil and gas field development 

— and, by extension, sequestration site development — which most significantly 

depends upon community acceptance is the acquisition of property rights. If an oil 

or natural gas deposit lies beneath private property, developers may need to lease 

mineral rights from hundreds, or even thousands, of landowners distributed across 

a large geographic area in order to produce oil or gas from that deposit.64 

Historically, most private landowners have been willing to lease their oil or natural 

gas rights in return for production royalties. As the American Association of 

Petroleum Geologists has stated, “[p]rivate lands have been largely explored and 

produced.”65 Consequently, some CCS proponents expect that private owners would 

be similarly inclined to lease “pore space” under their property for the purposes of 

permanent carbon sequestration.66 Early indications, however, suggest that this may 

not generally be the case. For example, as the National Commission on Energy 

Policy (NCEP) states in its 2006 report, 

public opposition remains inextricably intertwined with local concerns, including 

environmental and ecosystem impacts as well as, in some cases, complex issues 

of property rights and competing land uses.... In some cases, upstream or 

downstream infrastructure requirements — such as the need for ... underground 

carbon sequestration sites ... may generate as much if not more opposition than 

the energy facilities they support.67 

As with other CCS infrastructure, empirical research specifically about 

community attitudes towards sequestration sites is limited. The 2007 French study 

found that approximately 40% of survey subjects “would be afraid if CCS was to be 

used near their community.”68 A 2007 survey of citizens living near a potential 

sequestration site in the Netherlands found that “[p]eople judge the idea of storage 

in general as slightly positive, but when the technology enters peoples daily lives, as 

in storage nearby, the attitude becomes more negative.”69 A 2006 role-playing 

workshop by the World Resources Institute simulating a public hearing about a 

proposed sequestration site found that community members “were reluctant to be a 

‘guinea pig’” and reached a “consensus ... that the risks outweighed the benefits in 

64 In “split-estates” mineral rights are legally separate from surface property rights and may 

be held by the federal or state government on lands with private surface owners. 

65 Lee C. Gerhard and Carl J. Smith, American Association of Petroleum Geologists 

(AAPG), “An Energy Policy for the United States of America,” Final report of the AAPG 

President’s Energy Policy Summit, (Army Navy Club, Washington DC: April 23, 2001). 

[http://dpa.aapg.org/testimonies/2001/010423_energysummit.cfm] 

66 Who owns pore space (i.e., sequestration rights) has not been established in most states. 

Wyoming statute H.B. 89 which passed in March 2008 assigns pore space ownership to the 

surface landowner. 

67 NCEP 2006: 9. 

68 Evonne Miller, et al. (2007). 

69 Nicole M.A. Huijts, Cees J.H. Midden, Anneleos L. Meijnders, “Social Acceptance of 

Carbon Dioxide Storage,” Energy Policy, (Vol. 35 (5): May 2007): 2788. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

CRS-16
 

the scenario presented.”70 The workshop also reported that “[i]t was clear some 

community representatives perceived CO2 as a waste from the start,” casting an 

overall negative light on the hypothetical carbon sequestration project.71 

A few cases in the United States involving actual sequestration projects or 

related legislation have also demonstrated significant public opposition. In 1998, the 

Natural Energy Laboratory of Hawaii Authority abandoned an experiment to 

sequester CO2 in the deep ocean, in part due to strong public outcry against the 

project.72 Focus groups in 2007 in two California communities where actual 

sequestration sites were considered raised familiar concerns about community 

participation in siting decisions, along with fears that the sequestration projects may 

“risk ... carbon dioxide release, may lower property values, may increase the 

likelihood of natural disasters such as earthquakes, may change the ‘character’ of the 

town, would involve the construction of a pipeline infrastructure, and [would be] 

expensive.”73 

Notwithstanding the community resistance examples described above, some 

sequestration sites in the United States have secured sufficient community approval 

to begin development, at least for the purposes of technology demonstration. For 

example, prior to its restructuring in January 2008, the Department of Energy’s 

(DOE) FutureGen demonstration project in Tuscola, IL, had acquired through 

voluntary agreement contiguous property rights from 42 private landowners in 

Illinois to develop a one square mile sequestration site for the project.74 Some 

analysts caution, however, that the Tuscola sequestration site, while adequate for a 

demonstration project, is perhaps 10 to 100 times smaller than a full-scale, 

commercial sequestration site might need to be to serve a single large coal-fired 

power plant (emitting over 10 million metric tons of CO2 annually).75 Furthermore, 

compensation for these rights, at $1000 per acre of surface land, was at a premium 

and based on existing surface property values rather than a valuation factor linked to 

70 World Resources Institute, “Carbon Capture and Storage Project Siting Role Play 

Scenario Workshop,” Meeting notes (October 20, 2006): 4. [http://pdf.wri.org/ 

ccs_siting_workshop_summary_110806.pdf] 

71 Ibid: 5. 

72 Mark A. de Figueiredo, The Hawaii Carbon Dioxide Ocean Sequestration Field 

Experiment: A Case Study in Public Perceptions and Institutional Effectiveness, Master’s 

thesis, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Laboratory for Energy and the Environment: 

June 2003). [http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/defig_thesis.pdf] 

73 Gabrielle Wong-Parodi, Isha Ray, and Alex Farrell, “Community Perceptions of CCS in 

California’s Central Valley,” Unpublished memorandum to CRS (Energy and Resources 

Group, Univ. of California, Berkeley: April 8, 2008). This study did not report quantitative 

measures of support or opposition to the proposed sequestration sites. 

74 Alta Long, Treasurer and Brian Moody, Office of Economic Development, City of 

Tuscola, Illinois, Personal communication (July 9, 2008). The original concept for the 

FutureGen project was subsequently canceled by the Department of Energy for costs 

reasons. 

75 See CRS Report RL34316, Pipelines for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Control: Network Needs 

and Cost Uncertainties, by Paul W. Parfomak and Peter Folger. 
 

CRS-17
 

CO2 or pore space value. Some analysts have also indicated that local property 

owners were eager to sign pore space contracts in part to ensure the development of 

the power plant complex in their community, which they believed would provide 

direct benefits to community members apart from sequestration payments.76 Due to 

these factors, it is unclear whether the Tuscola sequestration site acquisition would 

be representative of sequestration site development in commercial operations. 

Compulsory Unitization. Oil and gas production reservoirs, and other 

geologic formations into which CO2 might be injected, are typically continuous 

bodies of porous rock that extend beneath large geographic areas deep (1,000 feet or 

more) underground. In addition to the issue of landowners’ willingness to lease 

sequestration rights, developers must also be concerned about the physical 

configuration of the rights they must acquire. The most economically efficient, and 

least environmentally impactful, way to produce oil from a large natural deposit is 

to do so by means of a single operator treating that deposit as a geophysical whole, 

rather than as artificially independent fragments delineated by property boundaries. 

Where an oil deposit is spread out beneath multiple parcels of private land, an energy 

company may therefore seek to acquire the rights to all (or nearly all) such parcels 

to form a contiguous production “unit.” The acquisition and development of a deposit 

in this way is called “unitization,” and has been practiced in the oil industry since the 

1940s.77 

Unitization agreements are typically negotiated as private, voluntarily 

agreements between an operator and multiple minerals rights owners.78 However, 

nearly all oil- and natural gas-producing states also have compulsory unitization laws 

requiring unwilling landowners to join a production unit if a sufficient percentage of 

other potential unit members voluntarily do so.79 The minimum percentage required 

may range from 51% to 80% of unit property owners, depending upon the state.80 

Compulsory unitization laws facilitate the establishment of production units over 

property owner objections, although they do not guarantee them. According to some 

analysts, even with such statutes, “unitization is still an arduous, if not impossible, 

76 R. Lee Gresham, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Dept. of Engineering and Public Policy, 

Personal communication (June 24, 2008). 

77 Steven N. Wiggins and Gary D. Libecap, “Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in 

the Presence of Imperfect Information,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 3 

(June 1985): 368. “Pooling” is a similar arrangement of combining mineral interests for 

production efficiency, but it does not necessarily take into account the geophysical 

configuration of the oil deposit. 

78 Andrew B. Derman, Thomas & Knight, L.L.P., “Unitization,” FindLaw Library (2003). 

[http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Jan/30/132512.html] 

79 One exception is Texas. 

80 Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, IOGCC Model Statute and Fieldwide 

Unitization References (1999): 9. 

[http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/Websites/iogcc/docs/iogcc_model_statute_and_fieldwide_ 

unitization_references.pdf] 
 

 

 

CRS-18
 

task” in states with high threshold percentages.81 Reaching agreement on unit 

contracts, therefore, can be a complex and protracted process, with negotiations 

taking years and often failing to achieve the most efficient unit sizes.82 

Oil and gas industry experience with compulsory unitization is important in the 

CCS context because analysts anticipate “that a similar unitization process will need 

to be developed prior to large-scale injection of CO2 for sequestration in geological 

formations.”83 An Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission task force examined 

this issue in proposing model CCS regulations in 2007. 

The Task Force concluded that control of the reservoir and associated pore space 

used for CO2 storage is necessary to allow for the orderly development of a 

storage project.... The Model General Rules and Regulations propose the 

required acquisition of these storage rights and contemplates use of state natural 

gas storage eminent domain powers or oil and gas unitization processes to gain 

control of the entire storage reservoir.84 

A unitization requirement for CO2 may stem from sequestration efficiency 

considerations, CO2 trespass concerns, or the co-location of pore space and natural 

gas or oil. Trespass may be important because CO2 injected underground could 

spread in unanticipated ways through a geological formation with no way to prevent 

its entering the pore space of any particular landowner located within that formation. 

In locations where a subset of relevant landowners is unwilling to lease its pore 

space, for example, disputes about subterranean CO2 trespass could hamper 

sequestration field development.85 The presence of oil or gas may be important 

because it may require a site to be developed in compliance with long-standing 

mineral statutes, including mineral resource unitization statutes, along with CO2 

statutes. The New Mexico Energy, Minerals, Natural Resources Department’s Oil 

Conservation Division (OCD) has identified these issues as potential barriers to 

carbon sequestration site development. 

81 Jacqueline Lang Weaver and David F Asmus, “Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around the 

World: A Comparative Analysis of National, Laws and Private Contracts,” Houston Journal 

of International Law (March 22, 2006). 

82 Gary B. Libecap, “Unitization,” The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 

(Peter Newman, Ed.), Macmillan Press (London: 1998). 

83 Plains CO2 Reduction (PCOR) Partnership, Plains CO2 Reduction (PCOR) Partnership 

(Phase I) Final Report/July — September 2005 Quarterly Report (January 2006): 34. 

[http://www.undeerc.org/PCOR/products/pdf/finalreport.pdf] 

84 The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC), Task Force on Carbon 

Capture and Geologic Storage, Storage of Carbon Dioxide in Geologic Structures: A Legal 

and Regulatory Guide for States and Provinces, (September 25, 2007): 4. 

[http://www.eei.org/meetings/nonav_2007-10-18-km/CCS_IOGCClegalregulGuideExec 

Summ.pdf] 

85 For legal discussion of CO2 trespass and related property issues, see Mark A. de 

Figueiredo, “Property Interests and Liability of Geologic Carbon Dioxide Storage,” (MIT 

Carbon Sequestration Initiative: September 2005). [http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/ 

deFigueiredo_Property_Interests.pdf] 
 

CRS-19
 

This may prove an unacceptable means of blocking planned sequestration 

projects, as minority interests could refuse to ratify unitization orders, making 

operation of the unit as a sequestration field difficult. Nonunitized interests may 

have available to them legal remedies such as nuisance and trespass actions for 

any provable interference with their mineral production.86 

A further challenge associated with a unitization requirement for CO2 

sequestration sites is the applicability of state compulsory unitization statutes to CCS. 

Because such statutes typically have been enacted specifically for oil and natural gas 

extraction, it is unclear to what extent they could be applied to CO2 injection into 

formations not associated with oil or natural gas, such as deep saline aquifers. For 

example, New Mexico’s oil and gas statutes cover the production of “natural gas” or 

“gas” defined as “any combustible vapor composed chiefly of hydrocarbons 

occurring naturally in a pool.”87 This definition would not seem to apply to CO2. 

Accordingly, New Mexico regulators have concluded that “there exists no clear 

authority for the state to regulate anthropogenic CO2 injection for sequestration 

purposes alone, nor does it have general authority to regulate injection/sequestration 

of CO2 ... into reservoirs other than those that produce oil and gas.”88 

By comparison, West Virginia’s statutes apply to “natural gas and all other fluid 

hydrocarbons not defined as oil,” without defining “natural gas” in a way which 

clearly excludes CO2.

89 The state’s unitization statute applies to a “pool,” defined as 

“an underground accumulation of petroleum or gas in a single and separate natural 

reservoir.”90 The statute appears ambiguous as to whether CO2 is a covered “gas” 

and whether a sequestration site is a “natural reservoir.” In states without any 

unitization statutes, or where existing unitization statues do not clearly apply to CO2, 

community opponents of sequestration projects may therefore litigate to prevent the 

voluntary or compulsory unitization of pore space rights necessary for site 

development. 

Eminent Domain for Natural Gas Storage. Another potential analog to 

CO2 sequestration is underground natural gas storage used by the natural gas industry 

to manage seasonal variations in natural gas demand. Most natural gas storage 

occurs in underground reservoirs. Developers have constructed over 400 such 

storage sites in the lower 48 states, primarily in depleted natural gas fields in 

Appalachia and the south-central states, as well is in aquifers in the Midwest.91 Like 

other categories of energy infrastructure, some proposed natural gas storage projects 

86 New Mexico Energy, Minerals, Natural Resources Department, Oil Conservation Division 

“A Blueprint for the Regulation of Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide in New 

Mexico,” (December, 2007): 36. 

87 New Mexico Administrative Code § 19.15.1.7 N.(1)
 

88 New Mexico Energy, Minerals, Natural Resources Department (December, 2007): 5.
 

89 West Virginia Code § 22C-9-2(a)(8).
 

90 West Virginia Code § 22C-9-2(a)(9).
 

91 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Underground Natural Gas Storage
 

Developments: 1998-2005 (October 2006): 1. 
 

 

 

CRS-20
 

have faced determined community opposition, which has prevented their construction 

or added years to their development time.92 

Although gas storage developers may encounter community opposition, they, 

nonetheless, continue to open new storage facilities throughout the country. 

According to the EIA, at least 26 new storage sites began operation over the last 10 

years.93 Developers have been aided in these efforts by eminent domain statutes at 

the federal or state levels which authorize the taking of private property needed for 

a storage project if regulators deem it in the public interest. For projects involving 

interstate gas trade, eminent domain authority resides with the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission, which approves the siting of natural gas storage facilities 

under Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.94 

Some analysts have proposed applying existing eminent domain statutes to 

secure privately-owned pore space for sequestration sites. However, eminent domain 

is often perceived negatively by the general public, and thus might undermine public 

support for CCS in general if widely invoked. 

Use of ‘public utility’ classifications and eminent domain to ensure construction 

on behalf of unregulated profit-making entities raises significant issues of 

fairness and process. Even in cases where property owners come to terms with 

developers, the community as a whole or other individuals may suffer 

uncompensated and persistent impacts.95 

Furthermore, as in the case of compulsory unitization, it is unclear to what extent 

statutes enacted to support natural gas storage siting could be applied to CO2 

sequestration sites. Ambiguity in state statutes about eminent domain authority for 

CCS projects could lead to costly and time-consuming litigation by community 

opponents. 

Key Policy Issues for Congress 

Congressional consideration of potential CCS policies is still evolving, but so 

far initiatives have focused more on CCS technology and economic mechanisms for 

92 See, for example: Patrick Courreges, “Lake Peigneur Residents Celebrate,” The Baton 

Rouge Advocate (June 19, 2008): 1BA; Avondale — Glen Elder Neighborhood Assoc., 

Application of Sacramento Natural Gas Storage, LLC, for a Certificate of Public 

Convenience and Necessity for Construction and Operation of Gas Storage Facilities and 

Requests for Related Determinations, Protest of Avondale — Glen Elder Neighborhood 

Association, Before the Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, Application 

No. 07-04-013 (January 24, 2008). [http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/efile/ST/83384.pdf] 

93 Energy Information Administration, U.S. Underground Natural Gas Storage 

Developments: 1998-2005 (October 2006): 1. 

94 15 U.S.C. § 717; Application of this statute to natural gas storage is affirmed in Columbia 

Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125, 129 (1985). 

95 Chris Deisinger, “The Backlash against Merchant Plants and the Need for a New 

Regulatory Model,” The Electricity Journal (Vol 13, Issue 10: December 2000): 57. 
CRS-21
 

carbon capture than on public acceptance and siting issues. Specific legislative 

proposals in the 110th Congress appear to reflect a perception that CO2 capture 

represents the largest physical hurdle to implementing widespread CCS, and that CO2 

siting may not present as significant, or immediate, a barrier. While these 

perceptions may be accurate, experience with the siting of other energy infrastructure 

in the United States suggests that, sooner or later, potential community opposition to 

CCS projects may become a factor. Industry and regulatory analysts have already 

identified several key policy issues related specifically to pubic acceptance of CCS 

infrastructure which may require congressional attention. 

Community Acceptance and State Statutory Changes 

Under current statutes, the federal government has limited authority to compel 

the siting of CCS infrastructure should the development of such infrastructure be 

hindered by community opposition. The siting of power plant facilities, pipelines, 

and sequestration sites required for CCS is principally under state jurisdiction. In 

many states, however, the applicability of existing oil, gas, and electric power siting 

statutes (especially public review, eminent domain, and compulsory unitization 

provisions) to CO2 sequestration projects is unclear. Consequently, a 

congressionally-mandated CO2 control policy which involves CCS may be critically 

dependent upon state legislatures to enact new CCS statutes in its support unless 

federal siting authorities are significantly expanded (see section on federal siting 

authority below). 

Although many state policy makers have indicated a willingness to advance 

CCS, there are questions about how quickly, uniformly, or aggressively they will do 

so — in part due to community acceptance concerns. One state that has considered 

comprehensive CCS legislation is California. Proposed in 2007, California 

Assembly Bill 705 would have required the state to develop standards and 

regulations for geologic carbon sequestration. The bill was defeated largely due to 

opposition from citizens groups that asserted that sequestration policies under the bill 

could result in underprivileged communities inequitably bearing the environmental 

costs of carbon control (by being forced to accept local sequestration sites).96 In 

March 2008, Wyoming began to establish a statutory framework for CO2 injection 

and sequestration with the enactment of two carbon sequestration statutes (H.B. 89 

and H.B. 90). The Wyoming statutes passed without significant public opposition — 

but they do not address property rights issues which are potentially contentious. 

Wyoming state legislators subsequently have rejected drafting legislation on eminent 

domain for CCS and have expressed reservations about provisions for “forced 

pooling” of sequestration sites.97 Washington state has issued the nation’s first 

96 California State Assembly, Committee on Natural Resources, Hearing on Assembly Bill 

705, Geologic Carbon Sequestration (Sacramento, CA: April 23, 2007): 6; Jane Williams, 

Executive Director, California Communities Against Toxics, “Carbon Sequestration: 

Injection of Toxic Gases into Poor Communities or the Salvation of the Fossil Fuel Industry, 

or Both?,” California Progress Report, Internet publication (April 22, 2007). 

[http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/2007/04/carbon_sequestr.html] 

97 Wyoming State Legislature, Joint Judiciary Interim Committee meeting minutes (June 2-3, 

(continued...) 
 

 

 

 

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regulatory standards for carbon sequestration sites (under existing environmental 

statutes), but they do not address property rights either.98 

As the examples above show, community acceptance considerations may make 

the passage of state CCS statutes more complicated and potentially contentious than 

they might be otherwise. These complications may be exacerbated when they 

involve regional sequestration projects where CO2 from one state would be 

transported through, or sequestered in, another. Some experts suggest that local 

constituencies, and the government officials representing them, could be less 

supportive of siting and eminent domain policies where in-state communities may 

bear CO2 risks for the benefit of distant populations.99 As Congress continues to 

refine U.S. policies for carbon control, it may wish to consider how community 

concerns may influence the ability of states to pass CCS legislation, and how such 

state legislative processes fit into a possible federal timetable for national CO2 

control. 

Affecting Public Acceptance of CCS 

Because the general public is still largely unfamiliar with CCS, there may be 

opportunities to influence public opinion in a way that could moderate community 

opposition to the siting of CCS infrastructure projects. Numerous commentators and 

stakeholders have called for proactive programs of public education and outreach to 

establish positive public views of CCS while opinions are still being formed. 

Consistent with this view, the seven regional partnerships in the Department of 

Energy’s Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships (RCSP) initiative have each, 

to varying degrees, directed activities towards public acceptance of carbon 

sequestration. As one of these partnerships has stated, “[t]he limited public 

awareness of carbon capture and storage (CCS) offers ... an opportunity ... for 

introducing and presenting the issues related to CCS in a constructive, 

problem-solving mode.”100 To this end, the partnerships have used community web 

broadcasts, focus groups, fact sheets, town hall meetings, and a television 

documentary to convey the science behind carbon sequestration technologies to 

97 (...continued) 

2008). [http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2008/interim/Jud/MINUTES/min0602.htm] 

98 Doug Obey, “Washington Rule May Set State Benchmark For Underground CO2 

Storage,” InsideEPA, (July 9. 2008).

 [http://insideepa.com/secure/docnum.asp?docnum=792008_washington&f=epa_2001.ask] 

99 For a discussion in the context of electric transmission siting, see Ashley C. Brown and 

Damon Daniels, “Vision Without Site; Site Without Vision,” The Electricity Journal (Vol. 

16, Issue 8: October 2003): 23-34. 

100 Battelle, The Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership (MRSCP): Phase I 

Final Report,(December 2005): 214.

 [http://216.109.210.162/userdata/Phase%20I%20Report/MRCSP_Phase_I_Final.pdf] 
 

 

 

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public stakeholders.101 Some of these partnerships have developed specific public 

outreach recommendations as part of their CCS public outreach pilot programs.102 

Some analysts argue that the nature of CCS regulatory frameworks can influence 

the degree of public acceptance or opposition towards the technology.103 The 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is pursuing policies within its jurisdiction 

with such considerations in mind. In proposed rules for underground injection of 

CO2 under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the EPA includes requirements for the 

public notice of pending sequestration site permitting actions via newspaper 

advertisements, postings, or mailings and providing a fact sheet or statement that 

describes the planned injection operation and the principal facts and issues 

considered in preparing the draft permit. The proposed rules would also require 

permitting authorities to provide a 30-day comment period for public hearings on 

specific sequestration projects, and a responsiveness summary for the public 

record.104 In announcing its proposed rules, the EPA also “encourages permit 

applicants and permit writers to use the Internet and other available tools to explain 

potential [geologic sequestration] projects; describe the technology; and post 

information on the latest developments including schedules for hearings, briefings, 

and other opportunities for involvement.”105 

While policy makers may agree as to the importance of public outreach in 

winning public acceptance of CCS, doing so in support of national carbon policies 

may be problematic because different communities may have markedly different 

points of view on CCS infrastructure. 

[T]he task of increasing awareness and knowledge among multiple “publics”... 

who have different degrees of interest, concerns, levels of awareness, and desired 

levels of involvement presents a challenge. An additional challenge is that of 

engaging the public in the topic of CCS when the issues are generic and abstract 

— yet, as the history of facility siting has shown, this situation is likely to change 

when the issues become immediate and close to home....106 

101 J.T. Litynski, S. Plasynski, H.G. McIlvried, C. Mahoney, and R.D. Srivastava, “The 

United States Department of Energy’s Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships Program 

Validation Phase,” Environment International (Vol. 34: 2008): 133. 

102 Sallie E. Greenberg, “Midwest Geological Sequestration Consortium Outreach Working 

Group: Pilot Study Update,” Presentation at the U.S. EPA - Region 5 Midwest Regional 

Sequestration Conference (Angola, IN: March 2007). [http://sequestration.org/publish/ 

greenberg_pilot_update_mar07.pdf] 

103 Hiranya Fernando, John Venezia, Clay Rigdon, and Preeti Verma, Capturing King Coal: 

Deploying Carbon Capture and Storage Systems in the U.S. at Scale, (World Resources 

Institute: May, 2008): 25. 

104 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Requirements Under the Underground 

Injection Control (UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) 

Wells, Proposed Rule, RIN 2040-AE98 (July 16, 2008):137. 

105 Ibid: 138. 

106 Battelle, The Midwest Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership (MRSCP): Phase I 

Final Report,(December 2005): 214. 

(continued...) 
 

 

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In many cases, public education about CCS concepts and analogies may, indeed, 

be enough to win community support for CCS projects. Officials in Tuscola, IL, for 

example, have credited the Midwest Geologic Sequestration Consortium’s extensive 

public outreach efforts with securing community support for the proposed Futuregen 

CCS project — including power plant, pipeline, and sequestration sites.107 In other 

cases, however, some argue that the best way to facilitate broad public acceptance of 

CCS projects may be to prove their safety through near-term demonstration 

projects.108 This appears to be a key motivation for the DOE’s RCSP initiative. 

Nonetheless, according to some research, even successful technology demonstration 

projects may not completely alleviate community concerns about the potential 

negative impacts of CCS. 

Whether focused on risks to the environment, public health, property values, or 

other impacts, scientific assessments of potential risks and impacts are often 

challenged by a lack of trust in both the data and the institutions that develop 

them. Distrust of regulators, lack of confidence in experts, and the possibility of 

accidents caused by human error all contribute to a high level of public concern, 

even in light of low levels of assessed risk.109 

Consequently, even given the history of safe CO2 injection for enhanced oil recovery, 

and even with successful RCSP or other demonstrations, some segments of the public 

may remain skeptical and unsupportive of CCS infrastructure development in their 

communities. Furthermore, a focus on technology demonstrations to win public 

approval carries significant risks if the these demonstrations do not perform as 

expected. An MIT report assessing analogs to CCS infrastructure concluded that 

“significant problems in the early years of a technology’s development affected 

public perceptions and produced regulatory regimes and political battles that took 

decades to reform or resolve.”110 

As federal CCS policies continue to develop, Congress may seek to identify a 

range of options to influence community attitudes toward CCS infrastructure. 

Congress may ensure that the positive operational experiences of federally supported 

CCS demonstrations are communicated transparently and effectively to public 

audiences beyond scientific and regulatory stakeholders. Congress may seek to 

establish structured initiatives for public outreach beyond technology demonstrations, 

106 (...continued)

 [http://216.109.210.162/userdata/Phase%20I%20Report/MRCSP_Phase_I_Final.pdf] 

107 Alta Long, Treasurer and Brian Moody, Office of Economic Development, City of 

Tuscola, Illinois, Personal communication (July 9, 2008). The Futuregen project was 

subsequently canceled by the Department of Energy for costs reasons. 

108 Gregory R. Singleton, Geologic Storage of Carbon Dioxide: Risk Analyses and 

Implications for Public Acceptance, Master’s thesis, Engineering Systems Division and 

Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (June 2007): 97. 

109 Carissa Schively, “Siting Geologic Sequestration: Problems and Prospects,” in Carbon 

Capture and Sequestration: Integrating Technology, Monitoring, Regulation, Elizabeth 

Wilson and David Gerard, editors (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford: 2007): 228. 

110 D.M. Reiner and H.J. Herzog, “Developing a Set of Regulatory Analogs for Carbon 

Sequestration,” Energy (Vol. 29 Nos.9-10: 2004): 1561-1570. 
 

 

 

 

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taking into account social, economic, and geographic differences among communities 

near potential CCS infrastructure sites. As part of this effort, Congress may explore 

potential partnerships with state or local agencies that have relevant siting 

responsibilities and established relationships with potential CCS community 

members. Congress may also seek to evaluate how public education and community 

outreach may affect the timing, scale, and chances of success for future commercial 

CCS proposals. 

Federal Siting Authority for CCS 

If Congress takes action on CO2 reduction, and if states are not able to site CCS 

infrastructure in accord with those federal carbon control policies, Congress may find 

itself facing proposals to strengthen federal siting authorities for CCS. As indicated 

earlier in this report, there are existing models of federal siting authority for energy 

infrastructure offering Congress a range of options to consider for CO2 infrastructure. 

The telecommunications, transportation, and waste disposal industries offer 

additional models. For some CCS infrastructure projects, such as CO2 pipelines, 

existing analogies suggest fairly clear directions for a federal role. Other types of 

CCS projects may require innovative approaches. It is beyond the scope of this 

report to examine the applicability of any existing federal siting models to CCS, but 

they are a source of both legal precedent and siting experience which may be helpful 

in identifying promising approaches to spur CCS deployment. Additional policy 

tools to encourage siting, such as federal economic incentives for communities with 

CCS projects, may also warrant evaluation. 

Apart from the details of potential federal siting authority for CCS projects, a 

general policy question concerns when Congress may need to consider the need for 

such federal authority. In the case of LNG infrastructure, Congress legislated the 

“exclusive” federal LNG siting authority in P.L. 109-58 approximately three years 

after the Hackberry LNG terminal siting application — the first such application in 

25 years — by which time it was already apparent that community and state 

opposition would create significant barriers to a national resurgence in LNG terminal 

development.111 By contrast, Congress has not enacted broad federal siting authority 

for interstate oil pipelines, although the federal government does regulate the rates 

and operations of oil pipelines. 

In the specific context of siting authority for CCS infrastructure, the need for 

federal involvement may be driven fundamentally by Congressional expectations for 

infrastructure deployment. As the FERC chairman testified before Congress in 2008 

with regard to pipelines, 

looking at what Congress did on gas pipeline siting, it started off with state 

siting, and at some point it failed. In the views of Congress, they concluded, 

state siting had failed.... And then Congress came in and changed the law, 

exclusive and federal preemptive siting was the rule. The state siting has worked 

for CO2 pipelines up to this point. But the network is much smaller than the oil 

and gas pipeline networks.... So it really relates to, if this is the path the country 

111 “Congress Begins Debate on FERC’s Jurisdiction over LNG Terminal Siting,” Inside 

F.E.R.C.’s Gas Market Report (April 8, 2005): 13. 
 

 

 

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goes down, how big of a CO2 pipeline network are we going to need, and how 

quickly are we going to need it.112 

Given the legal and regulatory complexities, and taking into consideration 

public ambivalence toward CCS projects, at least some states are likely to struggle 

with the details of state CCS siting authority. Congress may, therefore, seek to 

understand how public acceptance may influence the nature and timing of CCS 

infrastructure regulation by the states and whether state siting efforts are likely to 

satisfy possible Congressional objectives in terms of CCS scale and scope. If it 

appears that state efforts are unlikely to do so, then Congress may examine the 

possibility of a stronger federal role in CCS siting approval. Such a policy could be 

controversial, however, and still might not guarantee success for CCS infrastructure 

siting, as demonstrated by the challenges faced in interstate natural gas pipeline siting 

which has been under federal jurisdiction for over 60 years. As a NARUC official has 

stated, “no matter where siting responsibility falls, with State government or the 

Federal government, siting energy infrastructure will not be easy and there will be no 

‘quick fix’ to this situation.”113 

Siting Challenges for CCS Alternatives 

If public acceptance becomes a significant barrier to CCS infrastructure, 

Congress may consider promoting more aggressively other energy sources — such 

as solar, wind, geothermal, and nuclear power — to meet future energy needs within 

the confines of CO2 emissions limits. Research has shown that parts of the general 

public may prefer some of these power generation options over CCS projects. 

Nonetheless, these other energy sources may still face public acceptance barriers of 

their own. Although the number of renewable energy projects successfully sited in 

the United States has grown significantly, some proposals have been delayed or 

abandoned because local communities have rejected them.114 The Cape Wind Project 

off Cape Cod, MA, is a nationally prominent example of such a project which faces 

concerted community opposition and related litigation nearly eight years after it was 

proposed — and has yet to receive siting approval.115 Nuclear power plants likewise 

face community opposition. The National Commission on Energy Policy has stated 

that “no electricity generating technology is likely to face more formidable challenges 

to the siting of new facilities than nuclear power.”116 Although solar power plants 

appear to face less community opposition than other types of renewable power plants, 

community groups have fought against the electric transmission projects required to 

112 The Honorable Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 

Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources Hearing on 

Carbon Capture, Transportation, and Sequestration and Related Bills, S. 2323 and S. 2144 

(January 31, 2008). 

113 William M. Nugent (May 15, 2001). 

114 Robert D. Kahn, “Siting Struggles: The Unique Challenge of Permitting Renewable 

Energy Power Plants,” The Electricity Journal (Vol. 13, No. 2, March 2000): 21-33. 

115 See, for example: Audra Parker, “It’s Time to Deny Cape Wind, Find Better Alternative,” 

Marblehead Reporter (Marblehead, MA: June 15, 2008). 

116 NCEP (2006): 26. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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bring solar power from remote generation sites to urban centers of electricity 

demand.117 

Although the specific types and locations of CCS, renewable, and nuclear 

energy projects may differ, they present interrelated challenges and opportunities 

with respect to siting and public acceptance. Indeed, the 2004 Carnegie Mellon 

University study suggests that the U.S. public may exhibit a “strong desire to frame 

decisions” about CCS in the context of other carbon control strategies, such as 

developing renewable energy resources or investing in nuclear power.118 

Consequently, it may be constructive for congressional policy makers to consider 

CCS siting as part of a broader, integrated policy debate, including the siting of other 

energy technologies which may help to satisfy national CO2 management objectives. 

It follows that federal siting policies pursued for CCS infrastructure may have 

implications for the siting of other energy infrastructure. 

Community Acceptance of CCS in Perspective 

Some analysts assert that communityopposition to CCS siting may be the single 

most important consideration in carbon control policy: “the gravest threat,” “the 

overriding issue,” or “a potential show stopper.”119 While drawing needed attention 

to the issue, such pronouncements are, perhaps, too extreme. First, while promoting 

CCS as a potentially important means by which to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas 

emissions, it is only one of several policy measures with the potential to do so. 

Congress is also considering policies to promote energy conservation, renewable 

energy, nuclear power, and hydrogen fuel — any of which could also yield major 

reductions in CO2 emissions. Second, while the community acceptance barriers to 

energy infrastructure in the United States are significant, they are also complex, and 

not really amenable to “show stopper” characterizations. The more likely reality is 

that new CCS infrastructure projects, if they are ultimately constructed, will be 

distributed on a continuum of public acceptability, along with other types of energy 

and industrial infrastructure projects. The key question for Congress is not whether 

communities will accept CCS project siting at all, but where and to what degree, 

relative to other energy infrastructure options. So far, there is little research or CCS 

project experience in the United States offering specific insight into these questions 

117 See for example: Community Alliance for Sensible Energy (CASE), Before the Public 

Utilities Commission Of the State of California, In the Matter of the Application of San 

Diego Gas & Electric Company Application (U-902) for a Certificate of Public Convenience 

and Necessity for the Sunrise Powerlink Transmission Project, Pre-hearing Comments of 

Community Alliance for Sensible Energy (CASE), Application No. 06-08-010 (September 

7, 2006). [http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/hottopics/1energy/phc.2.final.pdf] 

118 Claire R. Palmgren, M. Granger Morgan, Wandi Bruine De Bruin, and David Keith, 

“Initial Public Perceptions of Deep Geological and Oceanic Disposal of Carbon Dioxide,” 

Environmental Science & Technology (Vol. 38, No. 24, 2004): 6448. 

119 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, Meeting UK 

Energy and Climate Needs: The Role of Carbon Capture and Storage, Vol. 1 Report HC 

578-II, (February 1, 2006): 41. 

[http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmsctech/578/57808.htm] 
 

 

 

 

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from a comprehensive, national perspective. Consequently, legislators must rely on 

siting analogies and their own judgment to develop policy perspectives on 

community acceptance and CCS infrastructure needs. 

If carbon control and associated CCS policies were narrowly targeted, or 

expected to have only marginal impacts on the U.S. energy sector, Congress might 

choose to defer consideration of community acceptance issues until CCS 

technologies were more mature and states had more time to work out CCS siting 

problems. But understanding public acceptance of CCS may take on greater urgency 

in light of proposals to curb CO2 emissions quickly. The most prominent CO2 

proposals in the 110th Congress seek reductions of nationwide CO2 emissions to 1990 

levels or lower by 2030.120 Some expect CCS, along with conservation, renewables, 

and other energy alternatives, to make a significant contribution to meeting these 

goals. Even with complete public support, however, it would be a challenge to 

commercialize carbon capture technology, establish comprehensive CCS standards 

and regulations, design and finance CCS projects, secure numerous regulatory 

approvals, and physically construct a CCS network of sufficient size to meet such 

CO2 emissions reductions targets. Community opposition could complicate and 

delay each element of CCS implementation, potentially adding years to a national 

CCS deployment. Alternatively, community concerns could lead to a national 

patchwork of CCS projects constructed only in publicly acceptable geographies (or 

on public lands), creating inter-regional disparities and failing to meet congressional 

objectives. If Congress sets goals for reducing U.S. emissions of CO2, the potential 

influence of public acceptance on reaching them suggest that a more proactive 

approach to addressing the latter might be in order. 

An advantage of being in the early stages of CCS policy formation is that 

Congress may have the opportunity to manage public acceptance issues before they 

become intractable. 

While [community opposition] is a frequent impediment to siting, it is not 

insurmountable. Strategies that offer concrete benefits or promote trust in 

affected communities and that remove legitimate arguments as camouflage for 

self-interest can overcome public goods problems. Committing to compensation, 

openness, information sharing, monitoring and enforcement can help diffuse 

legitimate grievances. This strategy will add to the costs and lead to delays, but 

so too will a permitting process where the public feels disenfranchised.121 

As Congress considers CO2 policies going forward it may find significant benefits 

in fully understanding the role of communities in the implementation of those 

policies. Although efforts to do so may require added resources and attention in the 

near term, they may be preferable to waiting for siting failures, as some have 

suggested, and expending far greater effort to address them at a later time. 

120 World Resources Institute, “Comparison of Legislative Climate Change Targets,” 

(Washington, DC: June 18, 2008): 3. 

121 D.M. Reiner and H.J. Herzog, “Developing a Set of Regulatory Analogs for Carbon 

Sequestration,” Energy, (Vol. 29 Nos.9-10: 2004): 1561-1570.