IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

)

v. ) ID. No. 1312014951

)

)

JEROME MADISON )

Submitted: February 3, 2015

Decided: March 10, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

Upon Defendant Jerome Madison’s Rule 47 Motion,

GRANTED, in part.

Upon Defendant Jerome Madison’s Motion for Recusal,

Motion for Removal of Counsel, and Motion to Vacate Judgment/Motion for 

Judgment of Acquittal

DENIED.

Karin M. Volker, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 

Wilmington, Delaware, for the State of Delaware.

James A. Natalie, Jr., Esquire, Woloshin, Lynch, Natalie & Gagne, P.A., 

Wilmington, Delaware, for Defendant Jerome Madison.

Jerome Madison, II, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, 

Delaware.

WALLACE, J.
2

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 2014, this Court found Defendant Jerome Madison guilty of 

eleven charges. Mr. Madison and his counsel, James A. Natalie, Jr., Esquire, have 

had a difficult relationship since prior to trial. Mr. Natalie’s pre-trial and post-trial 

motions to withdraw as counsel were denied, as was Mr. Madison’s mid-trial 

request to terminate Mr. Natalie’s representation. Mr. Madison now brings yet

another motion to dismiss his counsel. In addition, Mr. Madison seeks my recusal 

from the case and claims that my previous supervisory relationship with the 

Deputy Attorney General assigned to this case is grounds to vacate the judgment or 

for judgment of acquittal. Mr. Madison’s most recent application is a Rule 471

motion to participate in his defense. Mr. Madison’s Rule 47 request is GRANTED

only to the limited extent that it permits the Court to address the removal of 

counsel and recusal issues that permeate his post-trial complaints. All of Mr. 

Madison’s motions raising those claims are DENIED for the reasons set forth 

below.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Madison was arrested on December 24, 2013, and later charged with: 

three counts of Rape in the First Degree, two counts of Kidnapping in the Second 

 1 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 47 (“The court will not consider pro se applications by 

defendants who are represented by counsel unless the defendant has been granted permission to 

participate with counsel in the defense.”).
3

Degree, Home Invasion, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission 

of a Felony (“PDWDCF”), two counts of Assault in the Second Degree, and two 

counts of Terroristic Threatening. The Public Defender represented Mr. Madison 

at his January 10, 2014 preliminary hearing and February 18, 2014 arraignment.

Mr. Madison then retained Mr. Natalie to represent him, and Mr. Natalie 

entered his appearance on March 21, 2014. Mr. Natalie represented Mr. Madison

at his March 24, 2014 and June 16, 2014 case reviews.

Mr. Madison’s case was first assigned to a different judge on April 21, 

2014.2

 And his trial was initially scheduled for June 24, 2014. At Mr. Madison’s 

June 16, 2014 final case review, Mr. Natalie mentioned a potential mental illness 

defense and a suppression motion. Counsel was given a week to file any pre-trial 

motions.

On June 23, 2014, at Mr. Madison’s insistence, Mr. Natalie requested a 

continuance and filed four motions: 1) a motion for reduction of bail; 2) a motion 

to suppress; 3) a motion for a full psychological examination; and 4) a motion to 

withdraw as counsel. 3

 The motions were not docketed until June 24, just before 

trial was scheduled to start. The then-assigned judge denied all four motions in a 

 2 See Order of Assignment of Case, State v. Jerome Madison, ID. No. 1312014951 (Del. 

Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 2014) (D.I. 9). 

3 See Continuance Request Form, State v. Jerome Madison, ID. No. 1312014951 (Del. 

Super. Ct. June 23, 2014) (D.I. 22). 
4

June 27, 2014 order. That order briefly addressed the merits of Mr. Natalie’s 

request to withdraw as counsel, noting that the judge appreciated that Mr. Natalie 

had “not been paid recently,” and that Mr. Madison had “become obstreperous” 

and possibly intended to testify untruthfully.4

 But the motion was denied because 

“[d]ifficult and dishonest clients are nothing new to seasoned defense attorneys.”5

The Court held a status hearing on July 1, 2014 for an “airing of 

grievances,”6 at which the Court further addressed the four motions. At that 

hearing, Mr. Madison expressed that he was “not 100 hundred percent 

comfortable” with Mr. Natalie continuing to represent him, but that he did not want 

to represent himself. Mr. Madison ultimately decided that he wanted Mr. Natalie 

to represent him at trial. 

This judge was assigned on September 23, 2014, when the assigned judge 

became unavailable to preside over Mr. Madison’s trial. On that date, the Court 

informed Mr. Madison wished to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a 

bench trial. Mr. Madison engaged in the required colloquy, and the Court found 

that each party voluntarily waived its jury trial right, both verbally and in writing.

7

 4 State v. Madison, 2014 WL 3706308, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 27, 2014).

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 See Stipulation of Waiver of Jury, State v. Jerome Madison, ID. No. 1312014951 (Del. 

Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2014) (D.I. 41). See also Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 23(a).
5

Trial began on September 24, 2014. After the prosecution had already 

presented four witnesses, Mr. Madison informed the Court that he no longer 

wished to be represented by Mr. Natalie and was interested in any then-available 

plea agreement the State would offer. Because Mr. Madison stated he had no 

substitute counsel and was not prepared to go forward by himself, his mid-trial 

request to terminate Mr. Natalie’s representation was denied. The Court then took 

a recess to allow the parties to engage in plea negotiations. When trial resumed, 

Mr. Natalie had obtained for Mr. Madison a revised plea offer.8

During the ensuing plea colloquy, Mr. Madison told the Court that he could 

not admit guilt to the rape allegations, although he did after some encouragement 

from Mr. Natalie. He was then queried on his plea to the home invasion count. 

Again, Mr. Madison resisted answering. He then said that his lawyer advised him

as to a different charge. Without question – when accounting for the answers he 

would give, his complaints of insufficient counsel, and his demeanor throughout 

the attempted plea process – Mr. Madison was not knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily accepting the charges in the plea agreement and relinquishing his right 

to trial. The Court, therefore, could not accept the plea agreement and the trial 

proceedings resumed.

 8 See Ct. Trial Ex. No. 1.
6

Trial concluded the next day, September 25, 2014. And the Court recessed 

for several days to consider the evidence and deliberate on its verdict. On October 

1, 2015, based on careful consideration of all the parties’ evidence and witnesses,

and the applicable law, the Court found Mr. Madison guilty of eleven crimes 

beyond a reasonable doubt: Rape First Degree, Attempted Rape First Degree, 

Unlawful Sexual Contact in the First Degree, Home Invasion, PDWDCF, two 

counts of Kidnapping First Degree, Assault Third Degree, Assault Second Degree, 

and two counts of Terroristic Threatening. Mr. Madison is scheduled to be 

sentenced on March 13, 2015.

After the trial, Mr. Madison continued to correspond with Mr. Natalie, 

demanding that he file several motions, including a motion to set aside the verdict, 

a motion to vacate the judgment or for judgment of acquittal, and a motion for Mr. 

Natalie to withdraw as counsel.9

 Mr. Madison’s correspondence contains 

allegations of, inter alia, an appearance of impropriety based on my years-ago

supervision of the trial prosecutrix, and Mr. Natalie’s alleged ineffective assistance 

at trial.

On October 21, 2014, Mr. Natalie filed his second motion to withdraw as 

counsel, citing the above correspondence. At a November 5, 2014 hearing, the 

Court denied Mr. Natalie’s motion, without prejudice; Mr. Natalie could withdraw 

 9 See D.I. # 46, State v. Madison, I.D. No. 1312014951 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2014).
7

as counsel if, and only if, Mr. Madison secured substitute counsel who was 

prepared to take over representation before, and without causing further delay of, 

sentencing.10

Since that motion, Mr. Madison has docketed a number of pro se filings. On 

November 13, 2014 he docketed a motion to recuse me as judge, and a motion to 

dismiss Mr. Natalie as counsel.11 Mr. Madison also wrote to the Court in January 

2015, where he mentioned having submitted the recusal motion and the motion to 

remove counsel; he also mentioned applications – a Rule 47 motion and a motion 

to vacate judgment/motion for judgment of acquittal – that he had not yet made.

12 

On February 3, 2015, Mr. Madison docketed a motion to vacate judgment/motion 

for judgment of acquittal and a Rule 47 motion to participate in his defense.13 Mr. 

Madison’s sole argument in his motion to vacate judgment/motion for judgment of 

acquittal is that this judge should have recused himself from the trial.

 10 See Order Denying Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw, State v. Jerome Madison, ID. No. 

1312014951 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2014) (D.I. 47).

11 See D.I. # 48 and # 49, State v. Madison, I.D. No. 1312014951 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 

2014).

12 See D.I. # 53, State v. Madison, I.D. No. 1312014951 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2014).

13 See D.I. # 54 and # 55, State v. Madison, I.D. No. 1312014951 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 

2015).
8

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Madison’s recent motion to participate and his numerous and repetitive 

post-trial entreaties devolve to two core grievances: 1) that I should have recused 

myself from his trial; and 2) that Mr. Natalie should be dismissed as counsel. The 

Court will address Mr. Madison’s Rule 47 motion first.

Mr. Madison asks this Court to allow him to participate with Mr. Natalie in 

his defense until Mr. Natalie is permitted to withdraw. The Court may not 

consider a represented defendant’s pro se motions unless the defendant is granted 

permission to participate with counsel in his defense under Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 47.

14 This Court has, however, considered pro se filings under Rule 

47 in rare and particular circumstances.15 Here, given the procedural posture of 

this case and the issues involved – this judge’s and Mr. Natalie’s continued 

 14 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 47; In re Johnson, 2013 WL 2405293, at *1 n.2 (Del. May 30, 

2013) (Superior Court may not consider represented defendant’s pro se motions unless defendant 

is granted permission to participate with counsel in his defense). Because of possible confusion 

or delay, defendants should be permitted to act as co-counsel only in exceptional situations. See 

Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 n.1 (Del. 1992) (citing United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 

119, 123 (8th Cir. 1976)). Defendants who are not permitted to act as co-counsel must decide to 

continue with his or her current counsel or proceed pro se. See id. at 107. Mr. Madison has 

never wanted to do the latter.

15 See State v. Lewis, 2014 WL 3706551, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. June 17, 2014) 

(acknowledging represented defendant’s pro se motions were filed out of order but addressing 

them because they “bear mention”); State v. Stallings, 2014 WL 4948261, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. 

Aug. 25, 2014) (addressing pro se filings where “submissions suggest it is better not to ignore 

[defendant’s] DIY filing”).
9

participation – the Court grants Mr. Madison’s Rule 47 motion only so as to allow 

the Court to resolve his judicial recusal and removal-of-counsel claims. 

A. Recusal Based Solely on a Previous Supervisory Relationship Is 

Unwarranted.

Mr. Madison contends I should recuse myself because I supervised the trial 

prosecutrix at some point during my time with the Delaware Department of Justice 

(“DelDOJ”) before coming to the Court in January of 2013.16 Citing only a 

provision of the judicial conduct code, he claims this past professional relationship 

raises an appearance of impropriety.

Rule 2.11 of the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct describes the 

circumstances in which a judge must recuse him- or herself from trial.17 Judges 

may not preside over matters involving a law firm or lawyer acting as counsel 

where the judge was associated in the practice of law within the preceding year.18 

The Rule also includes broad “catchall” language requiring a judge to disqualify 

 16 I practiced in the DelDOJ for nearly twenty-four years. Specific to this claim, I was the 

State’s Chief of Appeals from 2008 to 2013, was Chief Prosecutor for New Castle County from 

2005 to 2008, and served in various supervisory and “line prosecutor” roles from 1989 to 2005. 

17 See generally DEL. JUDGES’ CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2, Rule 2.11 (listing 

circumstances in which a judge “should” disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding). 

18 Id. at 2.11(A)(4)(a) (“A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in 

which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to 

instances where . . . the judge was associated in the practice of law within the preceding year 

with a law firm or lawyer acting as counsel in the proceeding.”). By long custom, this Court has 

analogized the DelDOJ to a “law firm.” And so for one year after assuming the bench, I presided 

over absolutely no criminal matters that came before the Superior Court; nor did I preside over 

any civil actions in which the State was a party.
10

himself or herself in any proceeding in which “the judge’s impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned.”19

A judge considering whether his or her impartiality could reasonably be 

questioned must apply the Los v. Los two-step analysis:

First, he must, as a matter of subjective belief, be 

satisfied that he can proceed to hear the cause free of bias 

or prejudice concerning that party. Second, even if the 

judge believes that he has no bias, situations may arise 

where, actual bias aside, there is the appearance of bias 

sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge’s partiality.20 

The judge must also consider the “duty to sit”21 and disqualify himself or herself 

only if genuinely convinced of the need for recusal.22

 19 Id. at 2.11(A).

20 Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384-85 (Del. 1991) (promulgating two-step analysis to 

determine if a personal bias or prejudice requires judicial recusal); see Butler v. State, 95 A.3d 

21, 40 (Del. 2014) (judge is required to undertake Los two-part test when addressing a claim of 

personal bias or prejudice). See also State v. Wright, 2014 WL 7465795, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. 

Dec. 16, 2014) (extending Los test to the general catchall provision in Rule 2.11). 

21 State v. Desmond, 2011 WL 91984, at *8-12 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) (describing 

history of “duty to sit” doctrine in Delaware).

22 Id. at *12 (“Delaware’s approach reflects an obvious tenet: that there is a duty incumbent 

on judges ‘not to unreasonably burden fellow judges by recusing in response to a weak argument 

for disqualification.’”); see Edelstein v. Goldstein, 2011 WL 2791270, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 

13, 2011) (discussing judges’ duties to decide and to sit); see also Reeder v. Delaware Dept. of 

Ins., 2006 WL 510067, at *17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2006) (“The [Delaware] Supreme Court also 

has noted that there is a compelling policy reason for a judge not to disqualify himself or herself 

unnecessarily, and in the absence of genuine bias, a litigant should not be permitted to ‘judge 

shop.’ . . . [I]t is also recognized that judges who too lightly recuse shirk their official 

responsibilities, imposing unreasonable demands on their colleagues to do their work and risking 

the untimely processing of cases.”).
11

First, after a careful examination of the record, I am satisfied, as a matter of 

subjective belief, that I could and did proceed to hear this matter free of bias or 

prejudice concerning Mr. Madison. Prior to my assignment of this trial in 

September 2014, I was wholly unfamiliar with Mr. Madison, the other parties, and 

the allegations involved here. And, for the reasons explained below, under these 

circumstances no objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about 

my impartiality.23

Absent involvement or a direct supervisory role in the instant proceedings, 

there is no per se rule requiring disqualification in a case where a judge’s former 

subordinate appears as counsel.24 As one court noted, “it is unreasonable to 

question the impartiality of a judge simply because many years ago he was a 

colleague and supervisor to an attorney who is presently involved in the litigation 

before him.”25 A judge who formerly served as a prosecutor may preside “over 

 23 See generally RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATIONS: RECUSAL AND 

DISQUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGES § 8.9 at 225-29 (2d ed. 2007).

24 See United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 1988) (judge is not required 

to recuse himself or herself from cases tried by U.S. Attorney’s Office if not previously involved 

in case while employed with office). Cf. Edelstein, 2011 WL 2791270, at *4 (judge should have 

disqualified herself because the judge “served in governmental employment (as a Supervisor of 

the Chief Deputy) that arguably directly concerned the proceedings and which appear to be the 

source of Defendant’s (unpaid) legal fees” – and so, an objective observer might question the 

judge’s impartiality). 

25 Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. U.S., 26 Cl. Ct. 215, 219 (1992); see also United States v. 

Occhipinti, 851 F. Supp. 523, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that judge is not required to 

disqualify him or herself if former law clerk appears before the court). 
12

cases involving former colleagues who are still prosecutors, provided [the judge] 

had no involvement in the cases while [he or she] was a prosecutor.”26 The 

appearance of a judge’s former law firm associate or colleague does not 

automatically raise an inference of partiality,27 nor does the appearance of a 

judge’s former subordinate or colleague in a government law office.28

Viewing the circumstances as a reasonable person with knowledge of all 

salient facts would, I find there is no objective appearance of partiality here.29 

Applying the strictest possible interpretation of Delaware’s Rule 2.11, I did not 

preside over any matters in which the State of Delaware was a party (and, 

therefore, the DelDOJ was counsel) for one year after coming to the bench. Now 

 26 United States v. Oluwafemi, 883 F.Supp. 885, 892-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying the 

ABA Code of Judicial Conduct and noting the commentary to the rule does not consider 

government attorneys “associated” in the same manner as lawyers in a firm). Delaware’s Code 

of Judicial Conduct has not adopted this comment, however. See DEL. JUDGES’ CODE OF 

JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2, Rule 2.11(A)(4)(a). Thus, there is this Court’s tradition of a oneyear recusal period. See supra note 11.

27 See United States v. Tanner, 24 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh'g

(Aug. 8, 1994) (finding “the mere fact of a prior supervisory relationship does not disqualify a 

judge from presiding over a case in which a former employee is an attorney”); Smith v. Pepsico,

Inc., 434 F. Supp. 524, 525 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (where trial judge was former law partner of a firm 

appearing before court, recusal not required). Cf. United States v. Tompkins, 2014 WL 4802867, 

at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2014) (opinion of court on reconsideration) (military judge 

was not required to recuse himself based on prior supervisory relationship with the detailed trial 

counsel); United States v. Davis, 20 M.J. 61, 64 (C.M.A. 1985) (no partiality in military court 

context where defense counsel was investigating officer’s subordinate).

28 See also State v. Small, 693 So.2d 180 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (“The coincidental presence 

of a judge on the criminal bench with a former co-worker as the prosecuting attorney is, without 

more, insufficient to require the judge’s recusal.”).

29 Compare Fritzinger v. State, 10 A.3d 603, 613 (Del. 2010); Edelstein, 2011 WL 

2791270, at *3. 
13

that that year has passed, there is no presumptive conflict with any prosecuting 

attorney appearing before me. 

Moreover, because the crimes alleged here did not occur until December 

2013, I was not, and could not possibly have been, involved in this case in any way 

prior to coming to the bench – either directly or in a supervisory capacity. 

Although I did, at one time, supervise the trial prosecutrix – from 2000 to 2005 as 

her direct supervisor and from 2005 to 2008 more indirectly as Chief Prosecutor of 

New Castle County – we did not and could not have worked together on Mr. 

Madison’s case. The events giving rise to his charges took place almost a year 

after I took the bench. Having no subjective belief of bias, and given the lack of an 

objective appearance of partiality, I find that I need not recuse myself from Mr. 

Madison’s case solely because I once supervised the prosecutrix in his case.

Mr. Madison’s motion to recuse me, and his motion to vacate the judgment 

or for judgment of acquittal (which is based on the allegation that I should have 

recused myself) are therefore DENIED.

B. Mr. Natalie Will Not Be Removed as Counsel Without Proper 

Substitution of Counsel at an Appropriate Point in the 

Proceedings.

The disquiet between Mr. Madison and Mr. Natalie began well prior to 

trial’s start in September, 2014. Mr. Natalie attempted to withdraw as counsel 
14

earlier on, which the then-assigned judge denied in his June 27, 2014 ruling30 and 

expounded upon at the “grievance” hearing on July 1, 2014. One day into trial, 

Mr. Madison attempted to have Mr. Natalie cease representing him. The Court 

denied that request, given its disruptive nature and because Mr. Madison stated he 

was unprepared to proceed with the trial pro se. Mr. Natalie then filed a post-trial 

motion to withdraw as counsel, which the Court denied for the same reasons. The 

Court noted then that Mr. Madison could proceed either with Mr. Natalie or pro se, 

unless Mr. Madison secured substitute counsel. With no substitute counsel 

proffered at any point, Mr. Madison now seeks, once again, to dismiss Mr. Natalie 

as his counsel prior to his sentencing.

As this Court has previously ruled both during trial and upon Mr. Natalie’s 

post-trial motion to withdraw, Mr. Madison may either discharge his counsel and 

proceed pro se or continue with substitute counsel. As Mr. Madison has made it 

clear at all relevant times that he does not wish to proceed pro se, his options have 

been to go forward to sentencing with Mr. Natalie or to obtain substitute counsel 

prepared to proceed in a timely manner on his behalf.31 No such substitute counsel 

has ever been secured, however.

 30 State v. Madison, 2014 WL 3706308, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. June 27, 2014).

31 See Carletti v. State, 2008 WL 5077746, at *5-6 (Del. Dec. 3, 2008) (other interests may 

outweigh defendant’s request for delay or disruption to obtain new counsel of his choosing).
15

Additionally, to reach the opposite conclusion and grant Mr. Madison’s 

removal of counsel motion either at trial or now would be to undermine the 

reasoned decision made by a previous judge in this case. A successor judge 

overruling a decision of a predecessor judge of the same Court is strongly 

disfavored.32 Such a situation is guided by the doctrine of the law of the case so as 

to promote “fundamental fairness and . . . judicial efficiency.”33 Unless there are 

demonstrated changed or extraordinary circumstances warranting a reconsideration 

of a decision that was clearly wrong,34 the Court will not revisit a prior ruling. 

This ensures that the parties are not “entrapped by varying philosophies of 

different judges of the same Court in the case.”35

 32 Frank G.W. v. Carol M.W., 457 A.2d 715, 718 (Del. 1983) (“[W]e want to emphasize 

that we take a dim view of a successor judge in a single case overruling a decision of his 

predecessor.”). It is well-settled that once a decision is rendered by the same court that decision 

should stand. May v. Bigmar, Inc. 838 A.2d 285, n.8 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The ‘law of the case’ 

doctrine requires that issues already decided by the same court should be adopted without 

relitigation, and once a matter has been addressed in a procedurally appropriate way by a court, it 

is generally held to be the law of that case and will not be disturbed by that court unless 

compelling reason to do so appears.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

33 Zirn v. VLI Corp., 1994 WL 548938, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 23, 1994); Frank G.W., 457 

A.2d at 719 (“Considerations of courtesy and comity are particularly relevant in Delaware where 

it is not unusual for our Superior Court to have various judges involved at different stages of 

protracted cases.”). 

34 Gannett Co., Inc. v. Kanaga, 750 A.2d 1174, 1181 (Del. 2000) (emphasis in original); 

Frank G.W., 457 A.2d at 719 (citing Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Coleman, 298 A.2d 320, 322 

(Del. Super. Ct. 1972)) (a successor judge should only depart from the general rule “in 

extraordinary circumstances”).

35 Frank G.W., 457 A.2d at 719.
16

The originally assigned judge found no merit to Mr. Natalie’s first motion to 

withdraw as counsel, and no changed or extraordinary circumstances have arisen 

since that warrant a change in that ruling. While the relationship between client 

and counsel here may have been strained – in part, due to the blunt advice 

grounded in reality that Mr. Natalie had to deliver, but that Mr. Madison did not 

want to hear – there is no evidence that Mr. Natalie failed to put forth the efforts 

expected of effective counsel. “While a defendant has a right to counsel, he does 

not have a right to counsel who will not disagree with him about how best to 

proceed with his case.”36 That is all that we have now, and have always had in this 

case.

There are, therefore, no extraordinary circumstances present to either allow 

or require Mr. Natalie’s withdrawal as counsel now. Mr. Natalie may, under this 

and our Supreme Courts’ normal procedures, seek substitution after sentencing and 

discharge of his duties under Supreme Court Rule 26. 37 Mr. Madison’s motion to 

dismiss Mr. Natalie as counsel now, however, is presently DENIED.

 36 Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 763 (Del. 2006). See also Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 

3-4 (1983)(citations omitted) (The United States Supreme Court in describing the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel has held that it does not guarantee “a right to counsel with whom 

the accused has a ‘meaningful attorney-client relationship.’”).

37 See generally, Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44 (defendant to be represented from initial 

appearance through appeal); Del. Supr. Ct. Crim. R. 26(a) (trial counsel has continuing 

obligation through docketing of direct appeal).
17

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS, in part, Mr. Madison the 

limited permission to participate in his defense under Rule 47 so that his recusal 

and removal arguments may be considered. Mr. Madison’s recusal motion (and 

motion to vacate the judgment/motion for judgment of acquittal which is grounded

on the same basis) is DENIED. The bare assertion that I once supervised his trial 

prosecutrix at the DelDOJ – which has no relation to Mr. Madison or his case – is 

no ground for recusal. Finally, Mr. Madison’s motion to dismiss counsel is 

DENIED as he is unprepared to proceed pro se and has no substitute counsel.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Paul R. Wallace

PAUL R. WALLACE, JUDGE

Original to Prothonotary