RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1308-MR

JAMES RAMSEY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 22-CR-00077

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: James David Ramsey appeals from the judgment of conviction 

and sentence of the Fulton Circuit Court entered on September 14, 2022. After our 

review, we affirm.

On July 14, 2022, Ramsey was indicted on one count of first-degree 

trafficking in a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. He was charged as a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO I). 

He entered into a plea agreement. In exchange for his unconditional guilty plea to 
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first-degree trafficking and possession of drug paraphernalia, the Commonwealth 

offered to dismiss the PFO I count. The Commonwealth agreed to recommend a 

seven-year sentence for trafficking and a twelve-month sentence for possession of 

drug paraphernalia. Ramsey accepted the plea offer and pleaded guilty. He 

appeared in court by Zoom. Ultimately, the PFO I charge was dismissed, and the 

court sentenced Ramsey in accordance with the Commonwealth’s recommendation 

on September 14, 2022. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Ramsey argues that the conviction and sentence must be 

vacated because his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 

Additionally, he contends that his physical absence from the courtroom invalidated 

the proceedings. 

In the plea agreement, Ramsey expressly waived many constitutional 

rights -- including his right to appeal. Nevertheless, he appeals, arguing that his 

plea failed to meet constitutional standards. He claims that it was not entered 

knowingly because the trial court neglected to ensure that he understood that by 

pleading guilty, he would give up his right not to incriminate himself and his right 

to appeal his conviction. Additionally, he complains that the trial court never 

inquired of defense counsel regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the terms and 

consequences of the agreement. 
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A waiver of the right to appeal a guilty plea does not extinguish all 

issues. See Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. 2010). Some 

questions survive the waiver; i.e., whether the plea was made knowingly and 

voluntarily and in accordance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 

U.S. 238, 244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). We address this issue first. 

We are persuaded that Ramsey’s plea was made knowingly and 

voluntarily. In his motion to enter the guilty plea, Ramsey acknowledged that he 

had reviewed the indictment and discussed with his attorney the facts relevant to 

the charges and any possible defenses. He indicated that he understood that he 

could plead either guilty or not guilty to the charges. Additionally, the motion 

provided as follows:

I further understand the Constitution guarantees to me the 

following rights:

(a) The right not to testify against myself; 

(b)The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at 

which I would be represented by counsel and 

the Commonwealth would have to prove my 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;

(c) The right to confront and cross-examine all 

witnesses called to testify against me;

(d)The right to produce any evidence, including 

attendance of witnesses, in my favor;

(e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court.
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I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these 

rights. 

In the motion, Ramsey indicated that he understood the nature of the proceedings 

and the matters contained in the motion. He declared that his attorney had fully 

explained his constitutional rights to him and that his guilty plea was made “freely, 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” 

The plea agreement that Ramsey executed also shows that he was 

informed of and that he understood his constitutional rights. He and his counsel 

signed the agreement, which provided, in part, as follows: 

4. I understand that I may plead “NOT GUILTY” to any 

charge against me, in which event the Constitution would 

guarantee me the following rights:

(a) The right not to testify against myself;

(b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury at 

which I would be represented by counsel and the 

Commonwealth would have to prove my guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt;

(c) The right to confront and cross-examine all 

witnesses called to testify against me;

(d) The right to produce any evidence, including 

attendance of witnesses, in my favor;

(e) The right to appeal my case to a higher court.

 I understand that if I plead “GUILTY,” I waive these rights.
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 Again, Ramsey indicated that he understood the charges against him, 

the possible defenses to them, the penalties he faced, and the fact that the 

Commonwealth was recommending a sentence in exchange for his plea. 

Additionally, Ramsey acknowledged in the agreement that “no one, including my 

attorney, has promised me any other benefit in return for my guilty plea. . . .” 

Furthermore, Ramsey’s counsel executed a certificate confirming that 

Ramsey “understands the allegations contained in the indictment.” Counsel 

indicated that he had fully discussed with Ramsey the charges against him and any 

possible defenses. He said that he believed Ramsey fully understood. 

Additionally, counsel indicated that he had reviewed the Commonwealth’s plea 

offer with Ramsey -- as well as the motion to enter his guilty plea. Counsel 

certified that he believed Ramsey understood the documents. Counsel represented 

to the court that he had “fully explained” Ramsey’s constitutional rights to him and 

that he believed that Ramsey understood them. Finally, Counsel declared that to 

the best of his knowledge and belief, Ramsey’s guilty plea was made freely, 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 

The trial court confirmed that Ramsey understood that he was waiving 

many of his constitutional rights by pleading guilty. Ramsey notes in his brief that

the court did not specifically reiterate the waiver of the right to appeal or the 

privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Ramsey claims that his plea was invalid 
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because the trial court failed to advise him that he was waiving his right against 

self-incrimination and his right to appeal. However, Boykin “does not require 

separate enumeration of each right waived.” Fontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d 

514, 516 (6th Cir. 1975). Where the defendant has a full understanding of what the 

plea means and its consequences, it is valid. Grigsby, supra.

Ramsey offers no authority for the proposition that the trial court is 

required to inform him specifically that he was waiving his right to appeal and his 

right against self-incrimination. In fact, guilty pleas are routinely upheld even 

where specific rights are not enumerated by the trial court during the plea hearing. 

Id. 

We have reviewed the following factors: the representations that 

Ramsey made in the plea agreement and the motion to plead guilty; the 

certification of counsel concerning Ramsey’s understanding and decision to plead 

guilty; and the trial court’s inquiry during the plea hearing and its express finding 

regarding Ramsey’s understanding of the proceedings. After our consideration of 

these elements of the proceeding, we are persuaded that there is no doubt that 

Ramsey’s plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. Ramsey was clearly aware 

that he was waiving his constitutional rights by entering the plea of guilty and that 

he would be sentenced to seven-years’ imprisonment. In exchange, he knew that 

the Commonwealth would recommend that sentence and dismiss the PFO I charge. 
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This knowledge satisfies the requirements of Boykin. Consequently, his conviction 

and sentence cannot be vacated on this basis. 

Next, Ramsey argues that his conviction must be vacated because his 

physical absence from the courtroom at the time of entry of his guilty plea and 

sentencing rendered the proceedings illegal. He suggests that the trial court’s 

decision to conduct the proceedings remotely rendered them invalid. 

Ramsey concedes that this argument was not preserved for our 

review. Nevertheless, he requests that we consider whether his physical absence 

from the courtroom constitutes palpable error pursuant to the standard established 

by our RCr1 10.26. 

A palpable error which affects the substantial 

rights of a party may be considered by . . . an appellate 

court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or 

preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be 

granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has 

resulted from the error.

Id.

We cannot conclude that manifest injustice has been shown. 

“Manifest injustice is found if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of the proceeding.” McGuire v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 

100, 112 (Ky. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ramsey cannot show and 

the record does not reflect how his physical presence during the proceedings rather 

1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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than his remote appearance would have resulted in a different outcome. See Miller

v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 857 (Ky. 2013); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 60 

S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001). Consequently, Ramsey is not entitled to relief under 

our palpable-error standard.

We affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the 

Fulton Circuit Court. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Sarah D. Dailey

Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky 

Christopher Henry

Assistant Attorney General 

Frankfort, Kentucky