J-A04039-15 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

BETHANY L. NOTARO, 

 Appellant 

v. 

WILLIAM C. PFAFFLE, 

 Appellee 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

 No. 1060 WDA 2014 

 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 27, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Civil Division at No(s): AR 12-002473 

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED APRIL 02, 2015 

 Bethany L. Notaro (Notaro) appeals from a judgment entered after a 

jury awarded her no damages in a car accident case. We affirm. 

 Notaro was stopped in her vehicle, waiting to merge into traffic, when 

a vehicle driven by William C. Pfaffle (Pfaffle) rear-ended her. Notaro filed a 

complaint against Pfaffle wherein she claimed that Pfaffle caused the 

accident and that she suffered injuries as a result of the accident. At the 

jury trial, Pfaffle conceded that his negligence caused the accident. The jury 

found that Pfaffle’s negligence was a factual cause in bringing about harm to 

Notaro; however, the jury did not award Notaro any damages. 

 Notaro timely filed a post-trial motion wherein she sought a new trial 

based upon a claim that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the 
J-A04039-15 

- 2 - 

evidence presented at trial. The trial court denied the motion, and a 

judgment was entered. 

 Notaro timely filed a notice of appeal. The trial court did not order her 

to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but the court did issue an opinion in 

support of its decision to deny the post-trial motion. In her brief to this 

Court, Notaro asks us to consider this question: 

Whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion in 

denying [Notaro’s] post-trial motion in a case where the jury 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence, bore no 

reasonable relationship to the evidence and created an 

inconsistent verdict where negligence [was] admitted and 

causation [was] found by the jury[?] 

Notaro’s Brief at 4. 

Appellate review of weight of the evidence claims is limited. It is 

well-settled that: 

[a]ppellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial 

court’s] exercise of discretion, not of the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity 

to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court 

will give the gravest consideration to the findings and 

reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial 

court’s determination that the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for 

granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against the 

weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be 

granted in the interest of justice. 

In re Estate of Smaling, 80 A.3d 485, 490 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). 
J-A04039-15 

- 3 - 

 Notaro claims that the trial court erred by denying her post-trial 

motion for a new trial. According to Notaro, the jury’s verdict was contrary 

to the weight of the evidence because the jury did not award her damages 

despite the facts that: Pfaffle conceded that he caused the accident; the jury 

found that Pfaffle’s negligence was a factual cause of harm to Notaro; and 

Notaro presented the jury with “uncontested evidence of injuries[.]” 

Notaro’s Brief at 12. 

 In support of her argument, Notaro relies heavily on a case she 

captions as “Anastasi v. Old Forge Borough.” Notaro’s Brief at 12-16. 

Notaro does not provide a citation to this case. Notaro attached the case to 

her post-trial motion. Based upon our review of that attachment, it appears 

that Anastasi is an unreported, non-precedential memorandum opinion of 

the Commonwealth Court. We further observe that, even if the 

Commonwealth Court would have published Anastasi, “decisions rendered 

by the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this Court.” Beaston v. 

Ebersole, 986 A.2d 876, 881 (Pa. Super. 2009). Because Anastasi is of no 

precedential value, it provides no basis upon which to grant relief to Notaro. 

Notaro also contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in Neison v. 

Hines, 653 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1995), supports her claim that the trial court 

erred by denying her post-trial motion for a new trial. We disagree. 

 While driving a pickup truck, Hines rear-ended an automobile driven 

by Neison. Hines admitted liability at trial; the jury was asked to determine 
J-A04039-15 

- 4 - 

how much in damages Hines should pay Neison. The jury awarded no 

damages to Neison. Neison filed a post-trial motion seeking a new trial 

based upon a claim that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the 

evidence presented at trial. The trial court granted the motion; however, 

this Court reversed that decision on appeal. 

The Supreme Court granted Neison’s petition for allowance of appeal 

and ultimately reversed this Court’s decision. The Supreme Court explained, 

in part, as follows. 

In the instant case, uncontroverted evidence establishes 

that Neison was involved in a violent automobile accident caused 

by Hines, and due to her negligence, which was conceded at 

trial. The accident caused Ms. Neison’s head to shatter the rear 

window of the car. The impact produced trauma in the form of a 

large lump on the back of Neison’s head. As a result of the 

collision, the rear end of Ms. Neison’s car had been “wiped out” 

and the car looked like “an accordion.” Her car was struck with 

such force that the glasses which Neison was wearing prior to 

the accident were found by a volunteer firemen on the trunk of 

the vehicle. In fact, the force of the collision caused the trunk to 

crack and split. The record also shows that Ms. Neison went 

immediately to the hospital for treatment of the head injury. 

She returned two days later complaining of neck and shoulder 

pain, and was told that the pain was a natural result of the type 

of injury that she had sustained. Because of her continuing 

pain, she consulted a specialist, Dr. Lee, who, after examination 

diagnosed her as having post-traumatic myofascitis pain 

syndrome in the neck and scapula, cervical sprain syndrome, 

and a herniated disk. Dr. Lucas also testified that he examined 

Neison, and that she suffered from fibromyalgia, or inflammation 

of the muscle tissue, and cervical strain. He then opined that 

her condition was directly caused by her automobile accident. 

[Hines’] expert, Dr. Mitchell, testified that Ms. Neison “exhibited 

a diagnosis of a healed neck sprain and a healed scapular or 

shoulder blade sprain.” He further testified that recovery from 

soft tissue damage such as Ms. Neison’s usually occurs in three 

to five months. Thus, the uncontested evidence amply 
J-A04039-15 

- 5 - 

demonstrates that Ms. Neison was involved in a violent 

automobile accident and suffered from soft tissue injuries, a 

cervical sprain, and a herniated disk. 

In light of this uncontroverted evidence, we cannot find 

that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. 

Common sense dictates that a collision of this severity caused by 

the negligence of another would lead to severe and painful 

injuries, although the evidence offered at trial left room for 

disagreement as to whether the pain resulting from Ms. Neison’s 

injuries was as severe as she claimed or whether the accident 

was in fact causative. However, the jury’s decision to find for 

Hines and award no damages for pain and suffering bears no 

rational relationship to the evidence produced at trial. The jury’s 

decision to disbelieve all the evidence presented during the trial 

defies common sense and is indeed shocking. 

Neison, 553 A.2d at 637-38 (citations and footnote omitted). 

As to this case, the trial court summarized the evidence presented at 

trial as follows.1

The jury in the instant case could have found the following 

facts by a preponderance of the evidence. On July 11, 2010, 

[Notaro] was stopped at an entrance ramp to a highway. There 

was a passenger in [her] vehicle, a large SUV hatchback. 

[Notaro] was wearing her seat belt and her hands were on the 

steering wheel. [Pfaffle’s] vehicle was stopped about a half of a 

car length behind [Notaro]. 

After observing a break in the traffic, [Pfaffle] assumed 

[Notaro] was merging onto the highway. But when [Pfaffle] 

looked back he discovered [Notaro] had stopped. Although he 

applied his brakes, [Pfaffle] could not avoid the crash. [Pfaffle] 

was travelling three to five miles per hour at impact. His airbag 

did not deploy and he was not injured. 

[Notaro] never lost consciousness. Her head struck

nothing in the vehicle and she was not cut or bleeding. Her air 

bag did not deploy and she exited her vehicle without assistance. 

 

1

 We have reorganized the trial court’s opinion by breaking it up into smaller 

paragraphs. 
J-A04039-15 

- 6 - 

[Notaro] did not complain to [Pfaffle] of any injuries. [Notaro]’s 

vehicle sustained a broken taillight and scratched bumper. 

There was no testimony of record that [Pfaffle]’s vehicle was 

damaged. 

At the scene [Notaro] declined to be taken for medical 

treatment. She and her passenger continued on to their original 

destination, a garden store. [Notaro] did not see her primary 

care physician (PCP), Dr. Santiago, until four days after the 

accident. She complained of pain “in the right side of [her] 

shoulder, going up to [her] head and in [her] neck, going down 

[her] arm, but not very far, and then in [her] left shoulder blade 

and upper back and a little bit into [her] right shoulder blade.” 

[Notaro] testified of swelling in her face and locking of her jaw, 

symptoms she associated with TMJ (temporomandibular joint 

disorder), for which she had previously treated with an 

orthodontist. At her deposition she stated the lockjaw, swelling 

and head pain, symptoms of TMJ, were the same before and 

after the accident. X-rays failed to reveal any broken bones. 

Dr. Santiago prescribed a muscle relaxer and strengthening 

exercises. 

[Notaro] did not miss any work as a result of this accident. 

Although she testified she had trouble doing things with/for her 

young daughter, she also testified she “didn't like feeling dopey 

on medication,” and did not use it because she “wasn't able to 

function in all of the things that [she] had to do.” Other than 

activities related to her daughter, [Notaro] did not testify as to 

specific activities in which she was unable to engage. 

No further medical treatment was sought until November 

18, 2010, when [Notaro] was seen by Dr. Puri, a PCP who 

prescribed a different muscle relaxer. [Notaro] returned on 

December 6, 2010, for a prescription refill. Although Dr. Puri 

suggested physical therapy, [Notaro] attended only one session. 

[Notaro] had begun treating for TMJ with her orthodontist, 

Dr. Purvis, in October or November of 2009. At that time her 

symptoms included locking of her jaw and soreness of her face 

that extended to her ear. [Notaro] returned to Dr. Purvis two to 

four times after the accident. On November 30, 2011, Dr. Purvis 

authored a letter wherein he reported seeing [Notaro] after the 

accident, but noted that the “treatment was not directed toward 

the resolution of any problems associated with recent trauma” 
J-A04039-15 

- 7 - 

and opined that he “doubted that any information [he] could 

provide ... would have any correlation to [Notaro’s] accident.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/6/2014, at 5-7 (citations and footnotes omitted). 

 The court offered the following analysis in support of its decision to 

deny Notaro’s post-trial motion for a new trial. 

At trial, [Notaro]’s counsel conceded that if the jury found 

[Notaro]’s injuries to be de minimus, it would not have to award 

any damages. All of [Notaro]’s complaints were subjective. She 

presented no witnesses, such as her passenger, to corroborate 

her claims. [Notaro]’s two office visits to Dr. Puri were 

essentially related to medication. Neither party presented a 

doctor or a video deposition at trial. Each side referred to 

excerpts from [Notaro]’s medical records. [Notaro] chose to 

forego physical therapy. The jury could have found [Notaro]’s 

alleged symptoms were controlled by medication and, therefore, 

insignificant. 

Even though I would have awarded damages had this case 

proceeded non-jury, the jury’s verdict did not shock my 

conscience. Moreover, the jury’s finding that any injuries were 

so minor as to not warrant compensation did not defy common 

sense or logic. The verdict was not against the weight of the 

evidence. 

l also disagree with [Notaro]’s argument that the verdict 

was inconsistent. “[A] claim of verdict inconsistency is not the 

same complaint as a claim sounding in evidentiary weight. A 

verdict may be perfectly consistent and yet be a shock to the 

losing party, as well as a shock to the conscience of the jurist 

who oversaw the presentation of evidence.” Criswell v. King, 

834 A.2d 505 (Pa. 2003). A true case of verdict inconsistency 

can be found in City of Philadelphia v. Grey, 633 A.2d 1090 

(1993). There the jury answered “no” to a question asking 

whether a defendant driver was casually negligent, but assigned 

25% causal negligence to the same driver in a subsequent 

answer. In the case at bar, the jury found some injury caused 

by [Pfaffle]’s negligence, but believed it was not compensable. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/6/2014, at 7-8. 
J-A04039-15 

- 8 - 

We can discern no error in the trial court’s rationale. Unlike the 

circumstances in Nieson, this case did not involve a violent collision which 

would necessarily and obviously cause a compensable injury. Rather, this 

case involved a relatively minor accident and Notaro’s subjective claims of 

injuries and related pain. 

 As this Court has explained, 

[t]he existence of compensable pain is[] an issue of credibility 

and juries must believe that plaintiffs suffered pain before they 

compensate for that pain. A jury is not required to award a 

plaintiff any amount of money if it believes that the injury 

plaintiff has suffered in an accident is insignificant. 

“Insignificant” means the jury could have concluded that any 

injury plaintiff suffered did not result in compensable pain and 

suffering. While a jury may conclude that a plaintiff has suffered 

some painful inconvenience for a few days or weeks after the 

accident, it may also conclude that the discomfort was the sort 

of transient rub of life for which compensation is not warranted. 

Lombardo v. DeLeon, 828 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations and 

some quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the jury’s verdict slip indicates that they concluded that Pfaffle’s 

negligence caused harm to Notaro and that harm was insignificant and 

unworthy of compensation. The jury’s determination was consistent with the 

record and the law. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion or commit an error of law by denying Notaro’s posttrial motion for a new trial. Consequently, we affirm the judgment. 

 Judgment affirmed. 
J-A04039-15 

- 9 - 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/2/2015