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Filed 12/13/23 P. v. Brown CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KENYON DARRELL BROWN,

Defendant and Appellant.

E081583

(Super.Ct.No. FWV18004486)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M. 

Christianson, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

Kenyon Darrell Brown, in pro. per.; and Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by 

the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant and appellant Kenyon D. Brown filed two notices of appeal from 

separate minute orders relating to various pro se petitions and motions, including a 
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purported denial of a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1section 1172.6, as 

well as challenges to his guilty plea based on alleged violations of Senate Bill No. 731

(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), Assembly Bill No. 256 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), and section 

1473. His second notice of appeal purports to be from the trial court’s refusal to strike an 

allegation under the strikes law. His appellate counsel filed a brief under the procedures 

described by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), Anders v. California 

(1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), and People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 

(Delgadillo); Brown has filed two supplemental briefs, with overlapping contentions. 

We have independently reviewed the contentions Brown raised in his supplemental briefs

and conclude none of them has merit. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

We provide a detailed history of this case, which overlaps with other appeals as 

well as petitions filed both in the trial court and this court seeking various types of relief

to ensure nothing is overlooked, due to the confusing background proceedings, replete 

with defendant’s prodigious and repetitive filings in the trial court and notices of appeal. 

On February 19, 2019, an information was filed charging defendant with one 

count of second degree robbery (§ 211), along with an allegation that he had suffered a 

prior serious or violent felony within the meaning of the strikes law, relating to 

defendant’s prior conviction for attempted murder. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 

subds. (a)-(d), 664, 187.) On August 7, 2019, the People filed an amended information, 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
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alleging the same substantive count of robbery with the strike allegation, but adding 

another strike for his prior conviction of animal cruelty with personal use of a deadly or 

dangerous weapon. (§§ 597, 12022, subd. (b).) In addition, the amendment added a 

“nickel prior” (i.e., a five-year enhancement under § 667, subd. (a); People v. Panighetti

(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 978, 1001), enhancements relating to both prior convictions, 

pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and an enhancement allegation relating to a 

prior prison term pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b).

On August 9, 2019, the People made a motion to withdraw the amended 

information in return for defendant’s agreement to plead guilty to count 1 and admit the 

strike allegation, for a stipulated sentence of 10 years in prison. The agreement also 

included a provision by which defendant admitted a violation of probation respecting the 

animal cruelty conviction, for which the agreed upon sentence was for a concurrent term 

of four years in prison.2 Defendant pled guilty pursuant to the plea agreement and was 

sentenced in conformity with the plea bargain. No appeal was taken from this judgment.

On February 9, 2023, defendant sent a letter/petition to the superior court alleging 

that Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) rendered his prior attempted murder 

conviction invalid and asking the court to resentence him on the robbery without the 

effect of the prior strike.

2 The abstract of judgment was amended twice due to a clerical error in recording 

a consecutive one-year term for the deadly weapon enhancement to the animal cruelty 

conviction.
4

On March 6, 2023, defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his robbery 

conviction along with his prior conviction for attempted murder (San Bernardino 

Superior Court case No. FSB701222) alleging a violation of section 1473.6 and that the 

prior conviction for attempted murder was invalid as a strike because an order to show 

cause had been issued on his resentencing petition.3 On March 21, 2023, the trial court 

denied that petition on the ground defendant’s prior conviction for attempted murder had 

not been vacated.

On June 2, 2023, the court issued a ruling on defendant’s February 9, 2023 letter 

petition, denying it because his section 1172.6 petition had been denied, rendering his 

request for resentencing moot. On June 7, 2023, the court considered another pro se 

petition filed by defendant filed on April 26, 2023, that had been ruled on previously in 

connection with defendant’s resentencing petition, which was the subject of another 

appeal.4 The court ruled that because the application was presented under section 1473, 

3 Defendant’s resentencing petition was denied on June 2, 2023, following an 

evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed that judgment (People v. Brown (Nov. 16, 

2023, E081484) [nonpub. opn.]) and we affirmed the trial court’s determination that 

defendant was ineligible for resentencing.

4 This petition was also the subject of defendant’s previous appeal (People v. 

Brown, supra, E081484), where the pro se filing is included in the clerk’s transcript at 

page 30. 
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pertaining to petitions for writ of habeas corpus, it was not properly before that particular 

department.5

Defendant appealed from the March 21, 2023 order on May 12, 2023, and again 

on June 14, 2023, where he also requested a certificate of probable cause to vacate his 

guilty plea in the robbery case, based on multiple grounds, including a challenge to the 

validity of his plea, not cognizable on appeal from a postjudgment proceeding. Those 

notices gave rise to the instant appeal.6 Defendant’s notice of appeal also included 

attachments, in the nature of letters to the clerk, indicating he had objected to expert 

testimony in his mental health proceedings relating to an alleged mental health diversion 

evaluation in the course of his robbery prosecution.7 Another attachment was a letter to 

the clerk dated June 5, 2023, relating to a petition for relief under Assembly Bill No. 

1076 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), requesting that his prior strike (the attempted murder case) 

be “withheld from disclosure on” the current robbery case. Another letter, also dated 

June 5, 2023, argued the trial court erred by failing to act on his claim of violations of 

5 That petition was considered as a companion to defendant’s appeal (People v. 

Brown, supra, E081484), and was ruled upon in case No. E081705, In re Brown on 

Habeas Corpus.

6 The notice of appeal from March 21, 2023, was included in another appeal 

(Case No. E081190, People v. Brown), but appellate counsel for this appeal and that one 

agreed that the claims from the March 21, 2023, notice of appeal would be briefed in the 

current appeal.

7 There is no record of a mental health evaluation in any of defendant’s cases that 

we have identified, save defendant’s own statements in his various petitions seeking 

resentencing relief.
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Assembly Bill No. 256 and Senate Bill No. 731 in his case, and that his counsel was 

ineffective for not requesting that his prior strike be stricken. He also re-alleged that he 

suffers excessive punishment on his robbery case because his attempted murder 

conviction was invalid by virtue of statutory changes to sections 188 and 189 and

requested a certificate of probable cause.

On June 16, 2023, the court granted a certificate of probable cause as to the 

attempted murder case (San Bernardino Superior Court case No. FSB701222, the 

attempted murder conviction that was still pending a hearing pursuant to section 1172.6) 

but denied the certificate of probable cause as to the robbery conviction (the instant case).

On June 20, 2023, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170, 

subdivision (b) (as amended, effective January 1, 2022), and Senate Bill No. 467.

8 The 

petition alleged that due to changes in the law a hearing was required to apply those 

changes to defendant’s sentence because there was evidence of psychological trauma. He 

further argued there was an issue under the Cunningham case (possibly referring to 

People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 985). On June 27, 2023, the court denied 

this petition, stating defendant was not eligible for resentencing.

On June 29, 2023, defendant sent another letter to the clerk petitioning for relief 

under section 1473.7 and 745, subdivision (a), alleging the trial court erred in using 

8 Senate Bill No. 467 amended section 1473, subdivision (b)(4), to allow a 

defendant to prosecute a habeas petition if false evidence was introduced at a hearing or 

trial; new evidence exists; or “[a] significant dispute has emerged or further developed in 

the petitioner's favor regarding expert medical, scientific, or forensic testimony . . . .”

(Stats. 2022, ch. 982, §§ 1, 1.5, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.)
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hearsay to deny his resentencing petition because the victim’s testimony violated 

Crawford (referring to Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36). He also moved for 

discovery under the Racial Justice Act of 2020, alleging that the expert who evaluated 

him for diversion made false and biased statements that defendant suffered from mental 

illness but not on the date of his arrest.

Defendant wrote another letter/petition addressed to the clerk seeking relief under 

section 1473.6 and Senate Bill No. 467, reiterating claims that a medical expert made 

false statements causing him to be sent to prison instead of receiving diversion. He 

further claimed his prior conviction should not have been used a strike because it was 

more than 10 years old, and that section 1473.6 applied because he had made a prima 

facie showing.

On July 6, 2023, the court issued a minute order indicating, “Court has read and 

considered Request for Further Action to include Notice of Appeal/Request for 

Certificate of Probable Cause filed by Defendant (in Rancho Court) on 06/14/23. Matter 

sent for Court’s review on 06/26/23. [¶] Per Court: [¶] No action required-Case is 

already on appeal. [¶] Court of Appeal # E081190.” On July 27, 2023, the court issued 

another minute order relating to a petition for relief filed by defendant on July 5, 2023, 

denying relief because the section 1473 petition had previously been denied by Judge 

Tavill on June 27, 2023, and that section 1473.7 was inapplicable to defendant as he is 

currently in custody.

On August 10, 2023, defendant again appealed from the June 2, 2023, order, but 

this time indicated that his appeal was based on the trial court’s failure to strike his prior 
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strike under sections 1385 and 1170, subdivision (b) (as amended effective Jan. 1, 2022), 

insofar as his sentence was unauthorized under the amended provisions of section 1170, 

subdivision (b). 

DISCUSSION

Defendant’s counsel filed a brief with this court pursuant to Wende and Delgadillo

and requested an independent review of the record; it included counsel’s declaration that 

defendant had been advised he could file his own brief with this court. The next day, this 

court sent an order to appellant that advised him about the holding in Delgadillo, that 

independent Wende review is not required for appeals from the denial of section 1172.6 

petitions, and further stated: “The appellant is personally granted 30 days to file any 

supplemental brief deemed necessary. If appellant files a supplemental brief, this court 

will evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief in its opinion. (Delgadillo,

supra, 14 Ca1.5th 216].) Failure to timely file a supplemental brief may result in the 

dismissal of the appeal as abandoned.”

Appellant filed two supplemental letter briefs (by our leave) with this court. 

Although the filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not compel an independent 

review of the entire record to identify unraised issues (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

p. 232), we have discretion to do so.

After independently reviewing the record, we are satisfied that all of defendant’s 

claims have either been previously raised in prior appeals or they lack any merit.
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In his first supplemental brief, he argues error in allowing testimonial hearsay at 

his preliminary hearing (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36), and that the trial 

court erred in taking the preliminary hearing testimony as true at the evidentiary hearing 

conducted pursuant to section 1172.6. Although unstated, this claim relates to the 

preliminary hearing that formed the factual basis for the attempted murder conviction, 

which was later alleged as a strike in the current robbery case.

The ruling of the trial court denying relief on defendant’s section 1172.6 petition 

seeking resentencing on his attempted murder convictions has been raised in two earlier 

appeals (People v. Brown, supra, E081484, and People v. Brown, case No. E081190). 

We need not address the claims again in this case. 

He also claimed the prosecutor committed misconduct in the course of the plea 

bargaining process in the current robbery case by telling him that he faced life in prison 

on the changes. He claims that this constituted duress, which, in combination with his 

mental illness, forced him to plead guilty. The matters leading up to the entering of his 

change of plea should have been raised immediately after his conviction as his claims 

constitute attacks on the validity of his plea. That conviction and sentence became final 

in 2019 and may not be challenged on appeal at this late date.

Moreover, there is nothing in the record of any of the proceedings regarding 

defendant’s mental health or inducements to plead guilty. Our review on direct appeal is 

limited to the appellate record. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 952, citing 
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People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1183.) Matters relating to off-the-record 

inducements to enter a plea may not be considered on direct appeal. 

In defendant’s second supplemental brief, he revived a claim that his current 

sentence on the robbery case is unauthorized due to changes in the law effected by 

Assembly Bill No. 124 and Senate Bill No. 567. The claims relating to Senate Bill No. 

567 were raised and addressed in two of his earlier appeals. (People v. Brown, supra, 

E081484, and People v. Brown, case No. E081190.) His claims under Assembly Bill 

No. 256 were raised and addressed in his prior appeal in case No. E081190. We do not 

need to address them here.

Defendant’s second supplemental brief also argues that his counsel was ineffective 

for failing to put on the record that defendant was an outpatient from Arrowhead 

Behavior Health. There is nothing in the record of defendant’s criminal proceedings 

regarding any mental health issues. Without an adequate record of proceedings in the 

superior court, there is no showing defendant’s trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance. (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 201 [“Because we are limited 

to the record on appeal, if the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act 

in the manner challenged, then unless counsel were asked for an explanation and failed to 

provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, we must reject 

the contention that counsel provided ineffective assistance. (People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 

Cal.4th 1027, 1058.)”].)
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Defendant also raises two arguments relating to the fact that the trial court failed to 

take mitigating factors into account in sentencing him and misunderstood its discretion 

pursuant to section 1385 to strike the strike allegation. In this respect, defendant argues 

his plea bargain must be set aside because it is no longer authorized due to the 

amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b). We disagree. 

First, defendant is under the impression that the amendments to section 1170, 

subdivision (b), apply retroactively to judgments that are final but cites no relevant 

authority. We disagree. Senate Bill No. 567’s ameliorative amendments to section 1170, 

subdivision (b), apply retroactively only to cases not yet final as of January 1, 2022. 

(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465, citing People v. Flores (2022) 73 

Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039 & People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308.) 

Defendant’s conviction was final in 2019.

Even if the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), applied retroactively to 

final judgments, it would not affect defendant’s sentence because he entered into a plea 

bargain for an agreed sentence (also referred to as a sentence bargain). When a court 

accepts a plea bargain, it is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain 

and may not modify the terms of a plea agreement without giving the defendant the 

opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty. (§ 1192.5, subds. (a), (b); People v. Mitchell

(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, 1057-1058; see People v. Cunningham (1996) 49 

Cal.App.4th 1044, 1047.) Under these circumstances, the trial court was not required to 
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exercise its sentencing discretion in setting the base term or to strike any allegations 

affecting sentence, such as the strikes law, because of the plea agreement. 

As a related matter, it should be pointed out that even if defendant were able to set 

aside his plea bargain, it would not ensure a more favorable sentence. When a guilty plea 

is invalidated, the parties are generally restored to the positions they occupied before the 

plea bargain was entered. (People v. Aragon (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 749, 756-757, citing 

People v. Romanoski (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 353, 363; People v. Hill ( 1974) 12 Cal.3d 

731, 769, overruled on another point in People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, 

fn. 5.)

In other words, vacating his guilty plea would result in reinstatement of the first 

amended information, under which defendant would face a life term (the amended 

information alleged two strike priors along with two “nickel prior” enhancement 

allegations that could add 10 years to his term). This does not appear to be defendant’s 

goal.

Defendant has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief under any of the 

theories posited in this appeal. 

We have independently reviewed the record for error consistent with Wende and 

Anders. We have not discovered any potentially meritorious issues that would require 

reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has represented Brown on this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ

P. J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

J.

MILLER

J.