[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-14069

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20259-CMA-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RENET BLANC, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(September 21, 2016)

Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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After pleading guilty, Renet Blanc appeals his total 82-month sentence for 

conspiracy to use unauthorized access devices with intent to defraud, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2) (Count 1); trafficking and use of counterfeit access 

devices with intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) (Count 2);

and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (Count 5). 

After review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

According to the undisputed facts, Blanc and his brother, Ronet Blanc, 

conspired with each other to traffic in and use personal identifying information, 

including social security numbers, to file false claims for federal unemployment 

benefits and Social Security retirement benefits and false tax returns. As a result of 

false claims generated by both Blanc and his brother, unemployment insurance 

funds were deposited into bank accounts controlled by the brothers. The brothers 

also withdrew funds from these bank accounts. 

During a search of the residence the brothers shared, federal agents found: 

(1) in Blanc’s bedroom, papers, ledgers, and other documents containing the 

names, dates of birth, and social security numbers of over 50 individuals that he 

was not authorized to possess, and Internal Revenue Service wage and tax 

statements, patient records, and handwritten personal identifying information for at 

least 20 individuals; and (2) in his brother’s bedroom, a computer containing the 

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names, social security numbers, and dates of birth for over 3,000 individuals that 

he was not authorized to possess. In all, the agents found personal identifying 

information for at least 4,250 victims. 

II. GUIDELINES ISSUES

On appeal, Blanc challenges several of the sentencing court’s guidelines 

calculations as to Counts 1 and 2, including the loss amount and number of victims 

attributed to him and the denial of his request for a minor role reduction.1

 For the 

reasons that follow, we find no error in these guidelines rulings.2

The district court did not clearly err in concluding that the full intended loss 

was reasonably foreseeable and thus attributable to Blanc as relevant conduct. See

United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 974 (11th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Huarte 

v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 268 (2015); U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), 2B1.1 cmt. 

n.3(A). Although the district court did not make individualized findings regarding 

the scope of Blanc’s participation in the conspiracy, the undisputed facts in the 

 

1

Blanc also argues that the district court erred in increasing his offense level by two 

levels under the vulnerable victim enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1), but the district court 

did not impose this enhancement. 

2

We review the district court’s factual findings under the Sentencing Guidelines for clear 

error and its legal interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 

1231, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2003). The district court’s determinations as to the loss amount, the 

number of victims, and the defendant’s role are factual findings reviewed for clear error. See

United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. 

Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). 

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presentence investigation report (“PSI”) support the district court’s attribution of 

loss. See United States v. Petrie, 302 F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002). 

The undisputed facts in the PSI established that Blanc’s co-conspirator was 

his brother, with whom he shared a residence. The materials from the conspiracy 

were found in both brothers’ bedrooms. Furthermore, the funds generated by the 

conspiracy, regardless of which brother was submitting the claim, were deposited 

into accounts controlled by both brothers, and both brothers withdrew funds 

generated by the conspiracy from at least one shared bank account. Under the 

circumstances, the district court did not err in concluding that Blanc should be held 

accountable for the full intended loss amount. 

For similar reasons, the district court did not err in concluding that Blanc 

was accountable, as relevant conduct, for the full number of victims, including 

those whose identifying information was found in his brother’s bedroom. Blanc 

did not dispute the statements in his PSI that: (1) “at least 4,250 victims’ [personal 

identifying information was] found during the search” of the brothers’ shared 

residence; and (2) “there were at least 4,250 victims whose personal identity was 

compromised as a result” of the brothers’ actions although “they did not suffer any 

monetary loss.” As mentioned above, materials for the brothers’ conspiracy were 

found in the brothers’ shared residence, regardless of which specific room the 

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material was found. Each type of fraud that was part of the conspiracy was 

committed by both brothers, conspiring together. 

While Blanc argues (for the first time on appeal) that the victims did not 

suffer “substantial financial hardship,” the 2014 version of § 2B1.1’s 6-level 

multiple victim enhancement used to calculate Blanc’s offense level merely 

requires “250 or more victims,” and does not require the victims to have suffered

substantial financial hardship. See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.11(a), 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) & cmt. 

n.4(E)(ii) (stating that in cases involving means of identification, a victim includes 

“any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without 

authority”).

The district court also did not err in concluding that Blanc did not qualify for 

a minor role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Blanc had the burden to prove he 

was entitled to the reduction, see United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340, 

1343 (11th Cir. 2006), but failed to show he was substantially less culpable than 

his brother. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A), n.4 & n.5. Both brothers used the 

personal identifying information of others to submit false claims electronically. 

The funds received by the conspiracy, regardless of which brother submitted the 

false claim, were deposited into accounts controlled by both brothers. And both 

brothers withdrew funds using ATM cards. The fact that Blanc had less personal 

identifying information in his bedroom and withdrew less money does not prove 

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that his role was minor. See United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 944 (11th 

Cir. 1999) (en banc) (explaining that it is possible to have no minimal or minor 

participants in a conspiracy). In the absence of any other information, we cannot 

say that the district court erred in its ruling on the role issue. 

III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the deferential abuse of 

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 

(2007). We look first at whether the district court committed any significant 

procedural error and then at whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable 

under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 

1190 (11th Cir. 2008).3 We will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm 

conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing 

the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the 

range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1191 

(quotation marks omitted).4 The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to 

 

3

Apart from the guidelines calculation issues already addressed, Blanc does not claim any 

procedural error occurred at his sentencing or argue that his sentence is procedurally 

unreasonable.

4

The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 

to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for 

deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed 

educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the 

Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; 

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show that it is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 

1189.

At sentencing, the district court calculated an advisory guidelines range of 

70 to 87 months’ imprisonment as to Counts 1 and 2. The district court, after 

considering the § 3553(a) factors, imposed concurrent 58-month sentences on 

Counts 1 and 2, below that advisory guidelines range. The district court explained 

that Blanc had received the 12-month downward variance to avoid having the same 

prison sentence as his brother and cited the mitigating facts that Blanc profited less 

from the scheme than his older brother and had less of the personal identifying 

information in his bedroom.5

 As to Count 5, the district court imposed the 

mandatory minimum 24-month sentence, required by statute to be served 

consecutive to Counts 1 and 2. 

Blanc does not challenge his mandatory minimum consecutive 24-month 

sentence on Count 5. Thus, Blanc’s substantive reasonableness argument pertains 

solely to his concurrent 58-month sentences on Counts 1 and 2, which were the 

result of a 12-month downward variance. Specifically, Blanc contends that for 

 

(9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution 

to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

5

The district court sentenced both brothers on the same day, and initially sentenced Blanc 

to a 60-month sentence on Count 1, a concurrent 70-month sentence on Count 2, and a 

consecutive 24-month sentence on Count 5, for a total sentence of 94 months. However, when 

the district court next sentenced Blanc’s brother and realized the two brothers had the same 

advisory guidelines range for Counts 1 and 2, the district court decided to re-sentence Blanc to 

concurrent 58-month sentences on Counts 1 and 2 to reflect the mitigating facts noted above. 

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Counts 1 and 2, he should have received a downward variance to a sentence 

between 35 and 38 months, the advisory guidelines range he would have had if the 

district court had sustained all of his guidelines objections. 

We conclude that Blanc’s concurrent 58-month sentences on Counts 1 and 2 

are substantively reasonable. As the district court noted, Blanc’s crimes involved 

taking “thousands upon thousands” of dollars from government-run organizations 

that provide social benefits. The district court explained that South Florida has an 

epidemic of identity theft crimes and that Blanc’s sentence needed to deter not only 

Blanc, but others as well, which ordinarily requires a sentence within the advisory 

guidelines. However, to avoid Blanc receiving the same sentence as his older, 

more-culpable brother, the district court gave Blanc a 12-month downward 

variance. Specifically, the district court stressed that, while Blanc was not entitled 

to a minor role reduction, he was the younger brother (only 20 years old at the 

time), had profited less than his older brother, and his older brother’s computer had 

“far more information than” was found in Blanc’s bedroom. Under the totality of 

the circumstances, we cannot say the district court’s refusal to vary further 

downward was an abuse of discretion. 

AFFIRMED.

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