IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0260

Filed February 19, 2020

SHAWN SHELTON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

THE TRUST CREATED BY THE JOINT TRUST AGREEMENT OF LARRY E. 

SHELTON and KATHERINE SHELTON, MARY JOLEEN PAVELKA, ANN 

JETORA MUELLER f/k/a JETORA ANN MUELLER, and JAN MARIE GWINN,

Defendants-Appellants.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David May, Judge.

Defendant beneficiaries, individually and in their capacity as co-trustees of 

their parents’ trust, appeal the district court’s ruling denying their motion for 

summary judgment against their plaintiff brother, Shawn Shelton. REVERSED 

AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

Drew J. Gentsch of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Shawn P. Shelton, Ft. Madison, pro se appellee.

Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ. May, J., takes 

no part.
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DOYLE, Presiding Judge.

Defendant beneficiaries, individually and in their capacity as co-trustees of 

their parents’ trust, appeal the district court’s ruling denying their motion for 

summary judgment against their plaintiff brother, Shawn Shelton. They contend 

the district court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment because 

Shawn’s claim is time-barred and should have been dismissed. Because we 

agree, we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling and remand to the 

district court for entry of summary judgment for the Defendants.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 1991, Shawn Shelton was convicted of first-degree murder and

sentenced to life in prison. See Shelton v. State, No. 08-1962, 2011 WL 441932, 

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). In 1999, Shawn’s parents, Larry and Katherine, 

executed an agreement that established a joint trust as part of their estate 

planning. The trust identified Larry and Katherine’s five children—including 

Shawn. The trust provided that, after Larry and Katherine’s deaths, the trust’s 

assets were to be divided into five equal shares, with all the children but Shawn 

receiving one-fifth of the trust’s assets. The remaining one-fifth portion was to be 

divided in half, with fifty percent to be distributed to Shawn’s child and the 

remaining fifty percent to be held in trust for Shawn “until he is released from prison 

or is no longer incarcerated.” Shawn’s father passed away in 2016, and his mother 

passed a year later on June 15, 2017.

On July 12, 2018, Shawn petitioned for declaratory judgment and 

accounting against his parents’ trust and his three sisters, Mary Pavelka, Ann 

Mueller, and Jan Gwinn. Shawn acknowledged an affidavit had been filed in 
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district court on or about July 12, 2017, affirming an “Initial Notice to Beneficiaries 

of Non Court Supervised Trust” had been mailed to Shawn’s three sisters. The 

notice letter, dated June 28, 2017, stated it was being provided to “each qualified 

beneficiary” of Larry and Katherine’s joint trust agreement “dated October 29, 

1999, in order to comply with the notice provisions of the Iowa Trust Code [section] 

633A.4213” (2017). The notice reflected Shawn’s sisters had previously been 

provided with a copy of their parents’ 1999 trust agreement “and also the Second 

Amendment to the Trust Agreement of November 5, 2007.” The notice then 

explained that the trust’s remaining assets would be distributed to Shawn’s sisters 

“[u]nder the above trust provisions.” 

The first trust amendment stated it was made October 12, 2007, and 

purported to amend three articles of Larry and Katherine’s 1999 trust. Among 

other things, the amendment changed the trust’s beneficiaries—removing Shawn 

and his son from the trust, as well as Shawn’s brother. It also changed the 

distribution of the trust’s assets from five equal shares to four shares, with two 

shares allocated to one sister and the other two sisters receiving one share each. 

The signatures of Larry and Katherine as trustees appear on the amendment, but 

they are difficult to make out because of the poor quality of the photocopy in our 

electronic record. 

The second trust amendment, dated November 5, 2007, purported to be 

Larry and Katherine’s second amendment to their trust agreement. The second 

amendment consists of four pages, including an affidavit. The amendment makes

several changes to the prior trust and revokes altogether “the unnumbered 

Amendment . . . dated October 12, 2007.” In the second amendment, the trust’s 
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provisions relating to the residual beneficiaries and the distribution of the assets to 

them was deleted and a new paragraph was substituted. Like the first amendment, 

Shawn, Shawn’s son, and Shawn’s brother were not named as beneficiaries in the 

second amendment. Instead of four shares, the second amendment divided the 

trust assets into three equal shares, with one share each going to each one of 

Shawn’s sisters. 

In his declaratory-judgment petition, Shawn alleged the second amendment 

to his parents’ trust was “either an outright fabrication and forgery and/or is 

otherwise legally ineffective and void in its attempt to name [his sisters] as 

beneficiaries of the Trust.” Shawn requested the district court determine whether 

the second amendment was valid. If the court found it was valid, Shawn asked the 

court to determine “his status as a beneficiary,” among other things. 

In November 2018, Shawn’s sisters, individually and in the capacity as cotrustees of their parents’ trust (collectively the Defendants), moved for summary 

judgment asking the court to dismiss Shawn’s petition with prejudice. They 

asserted Shawn’s petition was not timely filed under Iowa Code section 

633A.3108, which requires proceedings “to contest the validity of a trust . . . be 

brought no later than one year following the death of the settlor.” Because Shawn 

filed his suit July 12, 2018, more than one year after his mother’s death, the 

Defendants asked the court to enter summary judgment as a matter of law finding 

Shawn’s filing untimely and dismissing his petition. 

Shawn’s argument in response was twofold. First, he argued the five-year 

statute of limitations in section 614.1(4) was the applicable statute of limitations, 

not section 633A.3108. Second, he maintained he “was not properly served with 
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legal notice of the same as contemplated by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 13 which 

is intended to put an incarcerated person on equal footing with other civil litigants 

not under the impediment of incarceration.” 

Following a hearing, the district court entered its ruling denying the 

Defendants motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned:

The court is not convinced that Kerber [v. Eischeid, No. 15-

1249, 2016 WL 1696929, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2016) (applying 

section 614.1(4) in a similar case)] is “on point.” In Kerber, the court 

of appeals only determined that the five-year limitation period applied

to a specific tort claim, namely, an “action for breach of fiduciary 

duty.” Here, [Shawn] has not pled any tort claims. Although [Shawn]

suggests that someone may have engaged in “fabrication and 

forgery,” he does not specify who.

Even if Kerber does not govern, though, it is still not clear that 

section 633A.3108 does. The meaning of our statutes depends on 

the words chosen by the legislature. Iowa Const. art. III, § 1. 

According to its plain words, section 633A.3108 can only apply if 

[Shawn] is “contest[ing] the validity of a trust.” But it is not clear that 

[Shawn] is contesting the “validity” of the 1999 “trust” under which he 

hopes to recover. Instead, it appears [Shawn] is only questioning a 

subsequent amendment, specifically, the Second Amendment. And 

the court sees no reason to think that, if the Second Amendment 

were proven to be invalid, then the entire trust would become invalid. 

The parties have not cited, and the court has not found, any authority 

suggesting it would.

So, on the current record, the court cannot conclude that 

section 633A.3108 applies. Therefore, summary judgment cannot 

be granted on that basis.

The court did not address the notice issue raised by Shawn.

The Defendants then filed a notice of appeal, which the Iowa Supreme 

Court determined should be treated as an application for interlocutory appeal. The 

court granted the Defendants’ application and transferred the matter to this court 

for disposition. 
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II. Standard of Review.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). Our 

review is for correction of errors at law. See Konrardy v. Vincent Angerer Tr., 

Dated March 27, 1998, 925 N.W.2d 620, 623 (Iowa 2019). The record is viewed

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, granting to that party all 

legitimate inferences supported by the record. See Honomichl v. Valley View 

Swine, LLC, 914 N.W.2d 223, 230 (Iowa 2018). If the issue only pertains to the 

legal consequences of undisputed facts, summary judgment is appropriate. See 

id. “Even if facts are undisputed, summary judgment is not proper if reasonable 

minds could draw from them different inferences and reach different conclusions.” 

Walker Shoe Store v. Howard’s Hobby Shop, 327 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Iowa 1982).

III. Discussion.

On appeal, the Defendants contend the district court should have found 

section 633A.3108 was the applicable statute of limitations and granted their 

motion for summary judgment. Shawn asserts the court correctly applied section 

614.1(4)’s statute of limitations because section 633A.3108 “is not applicable to 

the claim of interference with a bequest.” We disagree.

Iowa Code chapter 633A contains the Iowa Trust Code. See Iowa Code

§ 633A.1101. “As a general proposition, Iowa’s ‘trust code applies to all trusts 

within the scope of this trust code, regardless of whether the trust was created 

before, on, or after July 1, 2000, except as otherwise stated in [the] trust code.’” In 
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re Tr. No. T-1 of Trimble, 826 N.W.2d 474, 483 n.4 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Iowa Code 

§ 633A.1106(1)). Under the trust code, a “trust” is defined as “an express trust, 

charitable or noncharitable, with additions thereto, wherever and however created, 

including a trust created or determined by a judgment or decree under which the 

trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust.” Iowa Code 

§ 633A.1102(18) (emphasis added). Though there are some exceptions to that 

definition in the paragraphs that follow, none apply. See id. § 633A.1102(18)(a)-

(m).

It is true Shawn’s petition does not make any reference to the probate court. 

But that matters not. Here, his declaratory-judgment petition asks the court to 

determine the validity of an amendment to a trust. Section 633A.1102(18) includes

in its definition of “trusts” any additions, however created. Even assuming for the 

sake of argument the amendments were not valid, the matter would still center 

upon Shawn’s parents’ original 1999 trust agreement and the first October 2007 

amendment. Chapter 633A applies.

The period of limitation for bringing a claim is generally set by the 

legislature. See Rathje v. Mercy Hosp., 745 N.W.2d 443, 448 (Iowa 2008); see 

also Schulte v. Wageman, 465 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Iowa 1991). “Statutes of 

limitation establish a reasonable period of time for plaintiffs to file their claims. This 

limitation period essentially exists to ensure a defendant will receive timely notice 

of a potential claim so that the defendant will be protected from the multitude of 

problems that can occur when defending stale claims.” Estate of Kuhns v. Marco, 

620 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Iowa 2000). Stated another way, these statutes “serve to 

provide an adequate time for a diligent plaintiff to bring a cause of action, as well 
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as to punish those parties who sit on their rights.” Romualdo P. Eclavea et al., 51 

Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 5 (2020) (internal footnotes omitted).

Section 633A.3108 of the trust code relates to limitations on the contest of 

revocable trusts:

Unless previously barred by adjudication, consent, or other limitation, 

if notice is published or given as provided in section 633A.3110 within 

one year of the settlor’s death, a proceeding to contest the validity of 

a revocable trust must be brought within the period specified in that 

notice. If notice is not published or given within that period, a 

proceeding to contest the validity of a trust must be brought no later 

than one year following the death of the settlor.

(Emphasis added.)

Here, the first sentence of section 633A.3108 only applies when “notice is 

published or given as provided in section 633A.3110 within one year of the settlor’s 

death.” Id. § 633A.3108. The Defendants do not claim to have provided notice 

“within one year of the settlor’s death.” Instead, they argue the last sentence of 

section 633A.3108 sets forth the applicable period, limiting the time to bring a claim 

to contest a trust’s validity to one year. We agree.1

It is not disputed that the Defendants did not provide notice within the time

set forth in section 633A.3108. So under section 633A.3108, Shawn had one year

following his mother’s death to contest the amendment he now claims is not valid. 

See id. § 633A.3108. This time frame makes sense—the passing of the settlor is 

 

1 The district court did not address the notice issue raised by Shawn, and Shawn 

did not file a rule 1.902(4) motion to ask the court to rule on the issue. As the 

prevailing party, Shawn could raise on appeal his notice claim to save the district 

court’s ruling denying the Defendants summary judgment. See Moyer v. City of 

Des Moines, 505 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa 1993) (“A successful party, without 

appealing, may attempt to save a judgment on appeal based on grounds urged in 

the district court but not considered by that court.”). But for the reasons explained, 

his notice claim lacks merit.
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generally known by the settlor’s beneficiaries. A period of one year balances the 

need for expedience with adequate time for a plaintiff to sue. Although Shawn is 

in prison, he had a year to bring his claims after his mother died. He did not. As 

a result, his claim is barred under Iowa Code section 633A.3108.

IV. Conclusion.

Because Shawn failed to bring his action within one year of his mother’s 

death, his claim is barred under Iowa Code section 633A.3108. The district court 

erred in denying the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue. So

we reverse the district court’s summary judgment ruling and remand to the district 

court for entry of summary judgment for the Defendants.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.