42686 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 138 / Tuesday, July 19, 2011 / Notices 

Item Responses 

(yr) 

Postage 

$ 

Total non-hour 

cost burden 

(a) (b) (a × b) 

(c) 

Statutory Invention Registration ...................................................................................... 5 $1.28 $6.00 

Petition to Review Final Refusal to Publish .................................................................... 1 1.28 1.00 

Petition to Withdraw SIR Publication Request ................................................................ 2 1.28 3.00 

Totals ........................................................................................................................ 8 ............................ 10.00 

There is annual (non-hour) cost 

burden in the way of filing fees 

associated with this collection of 

$8,160, as shown in the accompanying 

table. 

Item Responses 

(yr) 

Filing fee 

$ 

Total non-hour 

cost burden 

(a) (b) (a × b) 

(c) 

.

Statutory Invention Registration (Requested prior to mailing of first office action, 37 

CFR 1.17(n)) ................................................................................................................ 2 $920.00 $1,840.00 

Statutory Invention Registration (Requested after mailing of final office action, 37 CFR 

1.17(o)) ......................................................................................................................... 3 1,840.00 5,520.00 

Petition to Review Final Refusal to Publish (37 CFR 1.295) .......................................... 1 200.00 200.00 

Petition to Withdraw Publication Request (37 CFR 1.296) ............................................. 1 200.00 200.00 

Petition to Withdraw Publication Request (on or after Date of Notice of Intent to Publish (37 CFR 1.296)) .................................................................................................... 1 400.00 400.00 

Totals ........................................................................................................................ 8 ............................ 8,160.00 

The USPTO estimates that the total 

(non-hour) respondent cost burden for 

this collection in the form of postage 

costs and filing fees will be $8,170. 

IV. Request for Comments 

Comments are invited on: (a) Whether 

the proposed collection of information 

is necessary for the proper performance 

of the functions of the agency, including 

whether the information shall have 

practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden 

(including hours and cost) of the 

proposed collection of information; (c) 

ways to enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and (d) ways to minimize the 

burden of the collection of information 

on respondents, e.g., the use of 

automated collection techniques or 

other forms of information technology. 

Comments submitted in response to 

this notice will be summarized or 

included in the request for OMB 

approval of this information collection; 

they will also become a matter of public 

record. 

Dated: July 14, 2011. 

Susan K. Fawcett, 

Records Officer, USPTO, Office of the Chief 

Information Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2011–18092 Filed 7–18–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–16–P 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Department of the Navy 

Notice of Availability of GovernmentOwned Inventions; Available for 

Licensing 

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: The inventions listed below 

are assigned to the United States 

Government as represented by the 

Secretary of the Navy and are available 

for domestic licensing by the 

Department of the Navy. U.S. Patent No. 

7,561,261: LADAR Stream Formatting 

and Processing Method//U.S. Patent No. 

7,616,817: Three Dimensional Shape 

Correlator//U.S. Patent No. 7,948,610 

B2: Combined Coherent and Incoherent 

Imaging LADAR. 

ADDRESSES: Requests for copies of the 

inventions cited should be directed to 

Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons 

Division, Code 4L4000D, 1900 N. Knox 

Road Stop 6312, China Lake, CA 93555– 

6106 and must include the Navy Case 

number. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Michael D. Seltzer, Ph.D., Head, 

Technology Transfer Office, Naval Air 

Warfare Center Weapons Division, Code 

4L4000D, 1900 N. Knox Road Stop 

6312, China Lake, CA 93555–6106, 

telephone 760–939–1074, FAX 760– 

939–1210, E-mail: 

michael.seltzer@navy.mil. 

Dated: July 12, 2011. 

L.M. Senay, 

Lieutenant, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 

U.S. Navy, Federal Register Liaison Officer. 

[FR Doc. 2011–18116 Filed 7–18–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3810–FF–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

DOE Response to Recommendation 

2011–1 of the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, Safety Culture 

at the Waste Treatment and 

Immobilization Plant 

AGENCY: Department of Energy. 

ACTION: Notice. 

SUMMARY: On June 09, 2011, the Defense 

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board affirmed 

their Recommendation 2011–1, 

concerning Safety Culture at the Waste 

Treatment and Immobilization Plant, to 

the Department of Energy. In accordance 

with section 315(b) of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 

U.S.C. 2286d(b), The following 

represents the Secretary of Energy’s 

response to the recommendation. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, 

views, or arguments concerning the 

Secretary’s response to: Defense Nuclear 


sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 138 / Tuesday, July 19, 2011 / Notices 42687 

Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 

Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, 

DC 20004. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. 

Nick Suttora, Team Lead, Departmental 

Representative to the Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board, Office of Health, 

Safety and Security, U.S. Department of 

Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, 

SW., Washington, DC 20585. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on July 6, 2011. 

Mari-Josette Campagnone, 

Departmental Representative to the Defense 

Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Office of 

Health, Safety and Security. 

June 30, 2011. 

The Honorable Peter S. Winokur, 

Chairman, 

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 

625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700, 

Washington, DC 20004–2901. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) 

acknowledges receipt of Defense Nuclear 

Facilities Safety Board (Board) 

Recommendation 2011–1, Safety Culture at 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization 

Plant, issued on June 9, 2011. DOE views 

nuclear safety and assuring a robust safety 

culture as essential to the success of the 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant 

(WTP) and all of our projects across the DOE 

complex. 

As the Board notes in the introduction to 

this Recommendation, DOE committed itself 

to establishing and maintaining a strong 

nuclear safety culture almost 20 years ago 

through Secretary of Energy Notice SEN–35– 

91, Nuclear Safety Policy. This commitment 

was reiterated and confirmed in February 

2011, in DOE Policy 420.1, Department of 

Energy Nuclear Safety Policy. We agree with 

the Board’s position that establishment of a 

strict safety culture must be a fundamental 

principle throughout the DOE complex, and 

we are in unqualified agreement with the 

Board that the WTP mission is essential to 

protect the health and safety of the public, 

our workers, and the environment from 

radioactive wastes in aging storage tanks at 

Hanford. 

It is DOE policy and practice to design, 

construct, operate, and decommission its 

nuclear facilities in a manner that ensures 

adequate protection of workers, the public, 

and the environment. DOE line management 

is both responsible and accountable for 

assuring that such adequate protection is at 

the core of how we conduct business at our 

nuclear facilities. We hold our contractors to 

the same standard. A strong nuclear safety 

and quality culture is the foundation of our 

work. 

Over the past year, the Department has 

undertaken a broad range of steps to assure 

a strong and questioning safety culture at 

WTP and sites across the DOE complex. We 

will only be successful if we remain 

committed to continuous improvement and 

teamwork. DOE takes all safety concerns— 

whether from our employees, our contractors, 

the Board, or third-parties—very seriously. 

This input is an integral part of the 

Department’s efforts to constantly strengthen 

nuclear safety at our facilities. 

Even though the Department cannot accept 

the allegations without the opportunity to 

evaluate the Board’s full investigative record, 

in the spirit of continual improvement DOE 

accepts the Board’s recommendations to 

assert federal control to direct, track, and 

validate corrective actions to strengthen the 

safety culture at WTP; conduct an extent of 

condition review to assess safety culture 

issues beyond the WTP project; and support 

the ongoing Department of Labor (DOL) 

review of Dr. Tamosaitis’ case. 

Reinforcing and maintaining a strong safety 

culture at WTP and all DOE sites will require 

a wide range of approaches, including 

engagement by senior DOE officials, 

employee input and participation, self 

assessments, independent oversight by the 

Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), 

recommendations from the Board, and an 

open and transparent process to identify and 

implement technical issues and corrective 

actions. 

We agree with the Board that ‘‘federal and 

contract managers must make a special effort 

to foster a free and open atmosphere in 

which all competent opinions are judged on 

their technical merit, to sustain or improve 

worker and public safety first and foremost, 

and then [to] evaluate potential impacts of 

cost and schedule.’’ These expectations are 

clearly articulated in DOE Policy 442.1, 

Differing Professional Opinion; DOE Manual 

442.1–1, Differing Professional Opinions 

Manual for Technical Issues Involving 

Environment, Safety, and Health, and DOE 

Order 442.1A, Department of Energy 

Employee Concerns Program. 

To assure that these issues were being 

appropriately addressed following Dr. 

Tamosaitis’ initial allegations, the Assistant 

Secretary for Environmental Management 

(EM) requested that HSS conduct a 

comprehensive analysis of the safety culture 

at WTP. 

In October 2010, HSS completed its 

investigation, which included interviews 

with more than 250 employees. While HSS 

found that the fundamentals of a robust 

safety culture were present at WTP, the 

report identified the need for improvement in 

key areas, including, among others: more 

clearly defining federal roles and 

responsibilities; identifying mechanisms to 

strengthen trust among the workforce and 

better communicate information to 

employees; and putting in place processes to 

ensure nuclear safety programs remain robust 

and effective during project changes. 

The corrective actions that address the 

recommendations from the HSS report will 

be fully implemented by September 30, 2011. 

HSS will then conduct a follow-on visit to 

assure that these steps were executed 

effectively across the project, as well as to 

perform additional analysis to determine if 

cost and schedule pressures are challenging 

the implementation of a robust nuclear safety 

culture. 

DOE and Bechtel National, Incorporated 

(BNI)—the prime contractor on the WTP 

project—have been engaged in a variety of 

initiatives to strengthen the nuclear safety 

culture at WTP for over a year. Steps that 

have already occurred include completing a 

revision to the WTP Project Execution Plan, 

currently under review, to more clearly 

delineate federal roles and organizational 

responsibilities at WTP and the Office of 

River Protection (ORP), and conducting a 

number of employee forums to ensure that 

employees clearly understand the changes in 

those roles and responsibilities. 

Also in response to the HSS 

recommendations, BNI commissioned a 

confidential survey of more than 300 WTP 

employees to assess if a Nuclear Safety 

Quality Culture (NSQC) gap existed at the 

site and to identify additional areas for 

improvement. As a result, the contractor 

assigned a retired Navy Admiral and former 

nuclear utility executive experienced in 

application of Institute of Nuclear Power 

Operations (INPO) methods as the Manager 

of NSQC Implementation for the project. To 

date, approximately 1,600 people at the site, 

including all senior managers, have received 

training focused on making the workforce 

comfortable with raising issues and 

systematically moving issues through to 

resolution. In addition, over the last 13 

months, BNI has conducted three all-hands 

meetings with DOE project team 

participation to emphasize the importance of 

a robust nuclear safety culture. 

Even while some initiatives are already 

underway, we recognize the need to continue 

improving nuclear safety at WTP and across 

the complex. To that end, DOE has 

developed a comprehensive action plan to 

address the Board’s specific 

recommendations to strengthen the safety 

culture at WTP. Initial steps are discussed 

below: 

• The Deputy Secretary and I will continue 

to be personally engaged in asserting federal 

control to ensure the specific corrective 

actions to strengthen safety culture within 

the WTP project in both contractor and 

federal workforces—consistent with DOE 

Policy 420.1—are tracked and validated. 

Federal control within the WTP project has 

been and will continue to be asserted and 

regularly reinforced through our direct 

involvement. 

• This will include a series of ‘‘town-hall’’ 

style meetings hosted by senior DOE officials 

to highlight for workers the importance of 

maintaining a strong nuclear safety culture at 

each of our sites and to solicit their input. 

These forums across the DOE complex will 

also help improve the direct communication 

of safety issues between senior managers and 

employees. 

• To address the concern regarding extent 

of condition, HSS will independently review 

the safety culture across the entire complex. 

This review will provide insights into the 

health of safety culture within Headquarters 

organizations, different program offices, and 

different field sites. 

• In addition, DOE and BNI are arranging 

Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) 

training for BNI and ORP managers and 

supervisors with a firm that conducts SCWE 

training for the Institute of Nuclear Power 

Operations Senior Nuclear Plant Manager’s 

course. 

• We will also be joining with BNI to 

sponsor an independent, executive-level 


sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
42688 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 138 / Tuesday, July 19, 2011 / Notices 

assessment of the project’s nuclear safety 

culture by a group of nuclear industry subject 

matter experts, who have experience in INPO 

evaluations and/or Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) inspections. 

• At both a site and corporate level, we are 

also taking steps to enhance reporting 

mechanisms for safety-related concerns. At 

the Hanford site, we have combined the 

Employee Concerns Programs for ORP and 

the Richland Operations Office to leverage 

existing resources to both strengthen this 

important program and increase its visibility 

at the site. 

• Within EM Headquarters, we have 

established ombudsmen to act as advocates 

for employees and their concerns. We have 

made it easier for employees to use a variety 

of avenues to raise concerns, including: the 

line management for each project, site 

employee concerns programs, union 

representatives, EM’s Office of Safety and 

Security Programs, HSS, and DOE’s Chief of 

Nuclear Safety. Each office now offers 

employees access to both a hotline number 

and general email inbox, so that workers will 

have the opportunity to ask questions or 

voice concerns either directly or 

anonymously. 

• We will also require that both EM 

Headquarters and field sites assess nuclear 

safety culture and the implementation of a 

safety conscious work environment in their 

annual submittals for Integrated Safety 

Management System (ISMS) declarations. 

The specific criteria will build on the 

existing requirements for the ISMS 

declarations and will be expanded to include 

safety culture principles not only from DOE, 

but also from INPO and NRC. 

• Regarding your final recommendation, 

when the Department became aware of Dr. 

Tamosaitis’ petition to the Board, the 

Assistant Secretary for Environmental 

Management immediately requested the 

Department’s Inspector General to perform an 

investigation into the alleged retaliation 

issues raised by Dr. Tamosaitis. The Office of 

the Inspector General decided not to examine 

the merits of the allegations since they were 

already the focus of an ongoing investigation 

by DOL, which has jurisdiction and expertise 

to review whistle blower claims. The 

Department will fully cooperate with the 

DOL as requested in its investigation. 

Even while DOE fully embraces the 

objectives of the Board’s specific 

recommendations, it is important to note that 

DOE does not agree with all of the findings 

included in the Board’s report. 

Specifically, the conclusions drawn by the 

Board about the overall quality of the safety 

culture at WTP differ significantly from the 

HSS findings and are not consistent with the 

safety culture data and field performance 

experience at WTP. We are concerned that 

your letter includes the October 2010 HSS 

review in the list of ‘‘other examples of a 

failed safety culture.’’ The Department 

disagrees with this categorization and 

believes the HSS report provided an accurate 

representation of the nuclear safety culture— 

and existing gaps—at the WTP. 

As discussed above, the HSS review found 

areas in need of immediate improvement; 

however, most WTP personnel did not 

express a loss of confidence in management 

support, a sense of a chilled environment, or 

a fear of retaliation. 

Additionally, in its report, the Board 

alleges that DOE and contractor management 

suppressed technical dissent on the project. 

The Department rightly takes any such claim 

very seriously. Based on an investigation by 

the DOE Office of the General Counsel, 

however, we do not necessarily agree with 

some of the specific details the Board 

provided. For example, our investigation 

found no evidence that DOE or its contractors 

were aware of and sought to suppress a 

technical report. 

Moreover, the Board’s findings appear to 

rely on a number of accounts describing the 

actions and behaviors of both contractor and 

DOE personnel that we believe may have 

been misunderstood by the Board. The 

Department feels compelled to address these 

for the public record and in fairness to its 

personnel. 

To do so effectively, on June 22, 2011, DOE 

requested the Board’s full investigative 

record, including transcripts, interview 

notes, and exhibits. Per your conversation 

with Deputy Secretary Daniel Poneman 

today, we look forward to continuing to 

engage with you to obtain additional details 

from the Board’s investigation. The Board’s 

investigative record or other supporting 

information will allow us to provide further 

details on specific discrepancies between our 

findings and the Board’s and will be of great 

use in defining the structure and scope of 

follow-on safety culture improvement 

initiatives and actions. 

We look forward to working with the Board 

and its staff as we continue to strive towards 

excellence. It is important for the both the 

Department and the Board to function 

collaboratively and openly as we work to 

further improve the safety culture at DOE. To 

facilitate that objective and in recognition of 

the significance of these concerns, I 

recommend we jointly charter a third-party 

review, such as the National Academy of 

Science, to evaluate how we can strengthen 

our relationship and most effectively work 

together to achieve our shared objective of 

helping DOE to safely perform its mission. 

As additional information becomes 

available from our actions addressing this 

Recommendation, we will make it available 

to you. We hope to continue a meaningful, 

regular, and open dialogue on this and all 

safety matters. 

I am designating Mr. Daniel Poneman, the 

Deputy Secretary of Energy, as the 

Responsible Manager for this 

recommendation. He will be charged with 

reporting to me regularly on the specific 

additional steps we are taking to improve the 

safety culture at WTP and all of our facilities. 

Sincerely, 

Steven Chu. 

cc: 

D. Poneman, S–2 

M. Campagnone, HS–1.1 

[FR Doc. 2011–18084 Filed 7–18–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6450–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

[Docket No. EERE–2010–BT–DET–0030] 

RIN 1904–AC17 

Updating State Residential Building 

Energy Efficiency Codes 

AGENCY: Department of Energy, Office of 

Energy Efficiency and Renewable 

Energy. 

ACTION: Notice of final determination. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE or Department) has 

determined that the 2009 edition of the 

International Code Council (ICC) 

International Energy Conservation Code 

(IECC) (2009 IECC or 2009 edition) 

would achieve greater energy efficiency 

in low-rise residential buildings than 

the 2006 IECC, with site energy savings 

estimated at 14%. Also, DOE has 

determined that the 2006 edition of the 

ICC IECC (2006 IECC or 2006 edition) 

would achieve greater energy efficiency 

than the 2003 edition of the ICC IECC 

(2003 IECC or 2003 edition), with site 

energy savings estimated at 1%. Finally, 

DOE has determined that the 2003 

edition would not achieve greater 

energy efficiency than the 2000 IECC. 

Upon publication of this affirmative 

final determination, States are required 

to file certification statements to DOE 

that they have reviewed the provisions 

of their residential building code 

regarding energy efficiency and made a 

determination as to whether to update 

their code to meet or exceed the 2009 

IECC. Additionally, this Notice provides 

guidance to States on how the codes 

have changed from previous versions, 

how to submit certifications, and how to 

request extensions of the deadline to 

submit certifications. 

DATES: Certification statements by the 

States must be provided by July 19, 

2013. 

ADDRESSES: Certification Statements 

must be addressed to the Buildings 

Technologies Program-Building Energy 

Codes Program Manager, U.S. 

Department of Energy, Office of Energy 

Efficiency and Renewable Energy, 

Forrestal Building, Mail Station EE–2J, 

1000 Independence Avenue, SW., 

Washington, DC 20585–0121. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Michael Erbesfeld, U.S. Department of 

Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and 

Renewable Energy, Forrestal Building, 

Mail Station EE–2J, 1000 Independence 

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585– 

0121, (202) 287–1874, e-mail: 

michael.erbesfeld@ee.doe.gov. For legal 

issues contact Chris Calamita, U.S. 

Department of Energy, Office of the 


sroberts on DSK5SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES