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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

August 8, 2017

v No. 334002

Chippewa Circuit Court

GERALDINE GALBRAITH TAECKENS, LC No. 15-001694-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SAAD, P.J., and SERVITTO and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right her jury-trial convictions of six counts of healthcare fraud, 

MCL 752.1003(1). The trial court departed upward from the recommended sentencing 

guidelines range of 0 to 17 months’ imprisonment and sentenced defendant to serve concurrent 

terms of two to four years’ imprisonment for each of her convictions. We affirm.

The jury found that defendant improperly billed Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan for 

numerous purported psychotherapy sessions. Evidence at trial revealed that defendant billed for

occasions when she accompanied a patient to a community pool and when she took a therapy 

group out to dinner. Defendant also diagnosed the family members of several autistic children, 

who were part of a peer-activity group she hosted, with mental health disorders without their 

knowledge, and then billed them for individual therapy. She also billed for giving massages.

At sentencing, the trial court explained that it found defendant’s actions “incredibly 

shocking and remarkably disturbing” and concluded that the recommended minimum sentencing 

guidelines range did not account for defendant’s abuse of trust, the fact that the crimes involved 

the systematic and intentional exploitation of children and their families, or the fact that

defendant intentionally misdiagnosed children for financial gain. The trial court ultimately 

concluded that the duration of the fraud, the amount of money obtained, the intentional nature of 

the misdiagnoses, the calculated nature of the crimes, and the sustained impact on the victims 

justified a sentence of two to four years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, defendant argues that her departure sentence was unreasonable because the 

trial court’s rationale supporting the departure was inappropriate and the extent of the departure 

was disproportionately lengthy. We disagree.
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We review a trial court’s decision to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines for 

reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v Steanhouse, ___ Mich ___, ___; 

___ NW2d ___ (2017) (Docket Nos. 152671, 152849, 152871, 152872, 152873, 152946, 

152946, and 152948); slip op at 14, 20. “The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision 

falls outside the range of principled outcomes or when it erroneously interprets or applies the 

law.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 51; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (citations omitted). In the 

sentencing context, a trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes a sentence that is not 

proportional under the standard set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 

(1990). Steanhouse, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 14-16, 20.

A sentencing court must take into account the guidelines range when imposing a sentence 

and must justify the sentence imposed. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502

(2015). “A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed by an 

appellate court for reasonableness.” Id. A reasonable sentence is one that satisfies the “principle 

of proportionality” test articulated in Milbourn, 435 Mich at 634-636. Steanhouse, ___ Mich at 

___; slip op at 20.

In a nutshell, Milbourn’s principle of proportionality requires a sentence to be 

proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and 

the offender. Milbourn instructs that departure sentences are appropriate where 

the guidelines do not adequately account for important factors legitimately 

considered at sentencing so that the sentence range calculated under the 

guidelines is disproportionate, in either direction, to the seriousness of the crime. 

The extent of the departure must also satisfy the principle of proportionality. 

[People v Masroor, 313 Mich App 358, 374; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), aff’d in part, 

rev’d in part on other grounds by People v Steanhouse ___ Mich ___ (2017) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Under Milbourn, the trial court may reweigh guidelines variables and “remove the distortions 

induced by a classification system that is, by necessity, overly simplistic.” People v Houston, 

448 Mich 312, 327; 532 NW2d 508 (1995).

Defendant first argues that the trial court should not have imposed an upward-departure 

sentence because the sentencing guidelines already accounted for the repetitive nature of her 

conduct. We disagree.

Defendant’s argument implicates prior record variable (PRV) 7 and offense variable 

(OV) 13. PRV 7 involves “subsequent or concurrent felony convictions.” MCL 777.57(1). The 

trial court in this case assessed 20 points under PRV 7, which is appropriate if a defendant has “2 

or more subsequent or concurrent convictions.” MCL 777.57(1)(a). OV 13 involves a 

“continuing pattern of criminal behavior.” MCL 777.43(1). The trial court assessed 5 points 

under OV 13, which is appropriate if the sentencing offense “was part of a pattern of felonious 

criminal activity involving 3 or more crimes against property.” MCL 777.43(1)(f).

Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the trial court did not base its departure 

rationale on the number or amount of crimes defendant committed, but rather on the duration of 

defendant’s fraudulent conduct. Neither PRV 7 nor OV 13 accounts for the length of time over 
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which the fraudulent conduct took place. Evidence presented at trial revealed that defendant 

fraudulently billed patients for over three years. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by considering the duration of defendant’s fraudulent conduct because the sentencing 

guidelines did not account for this factor.

Defendant next argues that the trial court inappropriately considered her failure to pay 

restitution and the fact that she intentionally misdiagnosed patients. Defendant has abandoned 

these arguments by failing to provide any legal authority in support of her position. People v 

Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). We nonetheless note, however, that the 

record is replete with evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that defendant intentionally 

misdiagnosed the family members of autistic children for her own financial gain.

Finally, defendant argues that her sentence was disproportionate because, comparing her

sentence to the sentencing grid, she was sentenced as if she were a much more serious offender. 

The purpose of proportionality in sentencing is to “protect[] against unjustified sentence disparity 

between similarly situated offenders[.]” Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. Even when a departure is 

appropriate, the extent of the departure may violate the principle of proportionality. Id. at 660.

In this case, the trial court supported its decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines 

range by considering the duration of defendant’s conduct and by finding that the crimes involved 

the systematic, intentional exploitation of children and their families. The trial court found that 

the sentencing guidelines did not account for the victimization of the families. It also found that 

defendant’s lack of criminal history was not mitigating because the fraud took place over a long 

period of time. These circumstances, supported by the record evidence, are both traits of the 

offense and the offender. See Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. The trial court’s decision to treat 

defendant as though she were an offender with a more serious criminal history was consistent 

with the trial court’s rationale for an upward departure.

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 We conclude that the trial court’s 

decision to depart upward from defendant’s recommended guidelines range by seven months fell 

within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.

Affirmed.

/s/ Henry William Saad

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

 1 We note that a minimum sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment is within the sentencing ranges 

applicable to class F offenses, but is below the greatest minimum sentence applicable to a nonhabitual offender for a class F offense, which is 30 months’ imprisonment. See MCL 777.17d; 

MCL 777.67.