### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry 12, 200 4

WI LLI AM W. YORK v . TENNESS EE BO ARD OF PROBATIO N AN D P AR OLE

Ap pe a l f ro m th e Cha

nc e ry Court fo r D a vid so n Co un ty No. 01-3349-I

I rvin Kilcre ase, Chanc ellor

No. M2003-00822-COA- R3-CV - Filed F ebrua ry 17, 2004

Ap pe lla nt i s an inma te of

the Dep art men t of

Cor re c tio ns se rv ingtw o li fe se nte nc e s f or tw o f ir st deg ree murder c onvictions with sentences imposed in 1978. He beca me elig ible for parole, and on July 3, 20 01 , a

he ari ngwa s h e ld b e fo re the Te nn e ssee Board of Pr ob a tio n a

nd Paro le . H is applic a ti o nf

o r p ar o le w a s d e n ie d

o nJu ly 3
, 2 0 0 1 an d

r e v ie w o f

p ar o le w a s s e t f

o r Ju ly o f 2 0 1 1. Final disposition deny ing pa role wa s entered Oc t o b er 2, 2001. On Octobe r 29, 2001, Appe llant petitioned for a

writ of cert i o ra ri in the Chance ry Court of Davidson County , Tenne ssee, whic h petition was dismissed by the trial cour

t on J anuar

y 10, 2003. We affir

m the trial co u rt Orde r of Dismissal relative to the merits of t he denia l of parole but hold that postponement of parole revie w until J uly of 2011 was an arbitrary exercise of power by the par ole boar d and, ther efor e, re verse the Or de r o f t he tr ia l c ourt

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Reve rsed and Rem anded

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Wil liam W. York, Mountain Ci ty , Tenne ssee, Pro Se.

Pa ul G . Summe rs , Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and Re po rt e r; J. B ra d Sc arb ro ug h, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, T ennesse e B oard of Probation and Parole.

OP IN ION

Appellant, W i l l i am W esley York, wa s convicted on two c harg es of f irst deg ree murder of victims Aubr ey and Alberta Hawkins, whose bodies wer e found near J ellico, Tenne ssee on June 3, 1977. These c onvictions occurr ed in 1978 and r esulted in two life sente nces me ted out to Wi lliam Wes le y Yo rk . H e ha s r e ma ine d in c on tin uo us c on fi ne me nt s inc e his c on vic tio ns a n d be c a me e lig ibl e for pa role c onsideration in J uly of 2001. A parole hear ing was held befor e the Tenne ssee B oard of-2-

Probation and Parole on J uly 3, 2001, and, at the conclusion of the hea ring , parole was de clined on the ba sis that: “ Th e re le a se fr om c us tod y a t th is t ime wo uld

De pr e c ia te the se ri ou sn e ss o f t he c ri me of which the offe nder stands c onvicted or pr omote Disrespe ct of the la w.”

On Oc tob e r 2 , 200 1, his a dmi nis tr a tiv e a pp e a l wa s den ie d, and he fi le d a tim e ly Pe tit ion in the Chance ry

Court of Davidson County for the issuance of a writ of cer tiorari. This Petiti on was

me t by a Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 12 .0 2( 6) Mo tio n to Di smi ss fo r fa ilure to s ta te a c la im

u p o n w h i c h r e l i e f c o u l d b e g r an t e d

. O n Ja n u ar y 1 0
, 2 0 0 3
, t h e t r i a l c o u rt s u s t a i n e d the Mo tio n to Di s m i s s h o l d i n g:

Respondent ar g ues that Petitioner’s Due Pro c e s s a n d Ex Post Facto a ssertions have be e n r e pe a te dly

re je c te d by bo th State of

Te nn e sse e and

F e de ra l c ourt s. Th is Court finds Respondent’s motion meritorious. I n 1978, Petitioner rec eived two life

se nte nc e s f

or tw o f ir st- de g re e mur de r c on vic tio ns

. “ [T]he re pe a l of pa ro le e lig ibi lity standards pr eviously

available to an inmate implicates the Ex Post Fa cto Clause if the eff ect of t h e repeal is to impose a g reater or mor e seve re punishment than wa s proscr ibed by law at the time of the offe nse.” Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W .2d 728, 732 (Tenn.A

pp.1995). Petitioner has only prese nted spec ulative claims such a s he “had an ex p ec t ation of re lease on parole when f irst eligible.” (Pet. Br . at 8) Pe tit ion e r’ s D ue Pr oc e ss a nd Eq ua l Prot ectio n c la ims are a lso wi tho ut m e ri t. Te nn e sse e pr iso ne rs have no li berty int e re sts in p aro le re qu ir ing du e pr oc e ss protec tion. W

right v. Trammel
, 810 F.2d 589, 590 (6th Cir.1987). L astly , Petitioner ha s n ot s ho wn

that pa ro le wa s de nie d ba se d on his me mbe rs hip in a c on sti tut ion a lly
pr ote c te d c la ss.
On appeal, M r. York makes the same asser tions, all of which have been r epeatedly reje cted by the c ourt s in

Te nn e sse e and

e lse wh e re . H e is in muc h th e same po sit ion a s w a s th e a

pp e lla nt i n Dye r v. T ennesse e Board of Parol es , N o. M1 99 9- 00 78 7- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 1 WL 40 15 96 (T e nn .Ct

. App. April 23, 2001) ( appea l denied Sept. 17, 2001). In that case , Mr. Dy er ha d been c onvicted of
two counts of first deg ree murder in 1975 and sentenc ed to death, with those sentence s commuted
to two consec utive life sentences in 1977. I n 1993, and ag ain in 1998, he wa s denied pa role ba sed
up on the same g ro un ds a s p aro le wa s d e nie d to Mr . Y or k. Af te r t he 19 98 de nia l of

pa ro le , h is

rec onsiderat ion was set for November

of 2003. He filed a Petition for Common L aw Cer tiorari making the same a ssertions as ar e now made by Mr. York. This Court held:

The scope of revie w under a common law wr it of cer tiorari is limit ed. The

wr it d oe s n ot l ie to r e vie w the int ri ns ic c or re c tne ss of the tr ia l c ourt

de c isi on , a

nd is

o n l y p r o p e r w h e r e t h e t r i a l c o u rth a s e x c e e d e d i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , o r

a c t e d i l l e g a l l y, fra udulently , or ar

bitrarily

. Arnold v. Tennessee Board of Paroles , 956 S.W .2d 478, 480 (Tenn.1997) . Relief under common l aw ce rtiorar i can be g rante d wher e the i n ferior tribunal has a cted in an unla wful manne r. P o w e l l

v

. P a r o l e E l i

g i bil ity Re v ie w Bo ar

d , 879 S.W .2d 871, 873 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994).-3- As the trial cour

t held the merits of Petitioner’s Application f o r Common L aw C e rt i o r ar i a r e e f

f e c t i v e l y f

o r e c l o s e d b y Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W .2d 728 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995) a

nd Arnold v. T

ennesse e Board of Paroles , 956 S.W .2d 478 (Tenn. 1 9 9 7 ). First of a ll, the trial court prope rly dismiss ed Charle s Traug hber, individually , as neither

he or othe r indiv i d u al m em bers of the Tenne ssee B oard of Paroles ar e prope r par

ties defe ndant under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 27-9- 104.

Se c on dly , in

makin g the a sse rt ion

tha t he sh ou ld be con si de re d f or pa ro le under the law as it existed in 1974, rather than pr esently exis ting law , Mr. Dy er se eks the adva ntag e of a superc eded r

ule which provided: “The Boa rd oper ates unde r the presumption that eac h resident who is e ligible f or par ole is a worthy

candidate and thus the Boa

rd pre sumes that he will be re lease d on parole when he is first eligible.” Tenn.Comp.R. & Reg s. r. 1100-1-1.06 ( superc eded). This is ex actly the position reje cted in Kaylor v. Bradley , 912 S.W .2d 728 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995) w h i ch was applied by

the trial cour

t in this case

.

Pe tit ion e r f

ur the r a sse rt s th a t st a tut e s and re g ulatio ns pa sse d s ubseq uent to 1 9 7 4 h a v e h a d th e e f

f e c t o f d im in is h in g h is p ar o le e li g ib il it y an d th u s c annot be

a p p l i e d e x p o s tf a c t o

. T h e t r i a l c o u rtan s w e r e d t h i s a s s e rt i o np e r s u a s i v e l y: The Court is als o p er s uaded by the re spondent’s ar g ument that the

c ur re nt s ta tut e s h a ve on ly

c ha ng e d the pr oc e dura l f

ra me wo rk wi thi n wh ic h th e B oa

rd e xer c ise s it s disc re tio n to det e rm ine wh e the r e lig ibl e candidates will be parole d. The c urre nt statutes do n o t af fec t the leng th of t he petiti oner’ s life sentences, do not chang e the a pplication of sentenc e re duction cre dits to parole elig ibilit y date a nd do not aff ect elig ibilit y for pa

role c onsideration in any

manner . I n Kaylor
, 912 S.W .2d at 732, the Tenne ssee Court of Appea ls noted that the ex
po st f a c to c la us e is imp lic a te d o nly

if the e ff e c t of the re pe a l is to impose a g reater or mor e seve re punishment than was prosc ribed by law at the time of the offe nse. What the petitioner complains about in the case at bar is that he no longer rec eives the pr esumption that he is a wor thy c and idate fo r p aro le and

that he wi ll b e re le a se d o n p aro le when h e i s fi rstelig ible. The c hang e in that pre sumption i s not imposit ion of a gre ater or m ore serious punishment than as proscr ibed by law at the time of

the offe nse. Petitioner complains that Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-503( b)(2)
, allowing the par ole board to deny parole beca use of the s eriousness of

the offe nse for which he w as convicted, is an ex post facto law. The Code section does not a ffe ct parole elig ibilit y

date or denial of parole , but instead enumer ates one rea son which the par ole boar d may

elec t, in its discretion, to deny parole

.-4- Next, the petitioner claims that use of ‘the seriousness of t he off ense’ rea son fo r d e nyingpa

ro le fo r a se c on d ti me vio la te s d

ue pr ocess and amo un ts t o d ou ble jeopar dy . Such asser

tions have pre viously

been ma d e and rejec ted. See A rnold v. Tennessee Board of Paroles , 956 S.W .2d 478 (Tenn.1997) and Mosley v . Tennessee Board of Paroles , No. 01-A- 01-9604-CH-0016 2
, 1 9 9 6 WL 631477 (Tenn.A

pp. Nov. 1, 1996).

Dye r , 200 1 W L 4 01596, at * 1-2. The re is no mer it to the alleg ations of Appellant attacking the action of the parole board in de ny ing pa role.

Subsequent to the appe al in this case, this Court issued its opini on in Baldwin v. Tennessee Board of Paroles , No. M2002-01428-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 21954199 (Tenn.Ct.App. Aug. 15, 2003). This Court ag ree d with the action of the trial court in di s m i s s i n g Mr. B aldwin’s Petition, which addr essed, in lar g e mea sure, the sa me issues asser

ted by Mr. York. This Court t hen addr essed the a c tio n o f t

he B oa rd of Paro le s in p os tp on inga

re vie w o f M r. B a ldw in’ s a pp lic a tio n f

or pa ro le fo r t we n t y

y ea rs , h o l d i n g:

The g rant of parole is a discre tionary matter, ve sted exclusively in the Boa

rd of Paroles. Doyle v . Hampton , 207 Tenn. 399, 340 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn.1960). De c isi on s of the B oa

rd are no t re vie wa

ble by the c ourt s, if

do ne in a c c or da

nc e wi th the law. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 28 -1 15 (c ); Flowers v. Traughber
, 910 S.W .2d 468 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995) . The question of whether such dec isions are law ful is subject to limi ted re view, howe ver, unde r the c ommon law Writ of Certioriari. (sic)

As we have state d o n ma

ny oc c a sio ns , the sc op e of re vie w u nd e r t he wr it i s limit ed to an e x amination of whe ther t he B oard e x cee ded its jurisdiction, or acted illega lly , fra

udulently or ar bitrarily

. Tu rn e r

v

. Te n n es s e e B o a rd

o f P aroles , 993 S.W. 2d 78 (T e nn .Ct .App .1 99 9) ; Po we ll v . P ar oleEl igi bil ity Re v ie w Bo ard , 879 S.W. 2d 87 1 ( Te nn .Ct .App .1 99 4) ; Y ok ley v. S tat e , 632 S.W .2d 123 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981).

B oth ve rs ion s of the ru le a t is su e state that “ if the c a se is c on tin

ue d o r p aro le denied, a fut ure he aringdate sha ll be specifie d,” with the one y ear require ment de le te d fr om the a me nd e d r ule . T he state ’s argume nt i mpl ie s th a t th e a me nd e d r ule
g rants t h e Bo ar d absolute and unbr idled discretion over the timing of subse quent hear ings. It appea

rs to us, howeve r, t hat t he st atutes re lating to the B oard of Paroles do not support this i nterpre tation.

Tenn.Code Ann. § 40- 28-116(a )(1) establi s h es the rig ht of the B oard of Paroles over prisoner rele ase: “The board ha s the power to cause to be re lease d on parol e an y p e r s o n w h o h a s b e e n d e c la r e d e li g ib le f

o r p ar o le c o n s id e r a ti o n by the board.” Fur

ther, “[i] t is a lso the duty

of member s of the boar d to study the prisoner s

c on fi n e d i n t h e p r i s o n s , w o r kh o u s e s an d j a i l s w h e n t h e y ar e e l i g i b l e f o r pa ro le-5-

consideration so as to determine their ultimate f itness to be parole d.” Te nn.Code Ann. § 40-28-118( d).

The g rounds for pa

role a re se t out in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-28-117, w hich

re a ds in p art , (a) Parol e b ei n g a privileg e and not a rig ht, no prisoner shall be rele ased on parole mere ly as a rew ard for g ood conduct or e ff icient perf ormanc e of duties a ssigne d i n prison, but only if the boar d is of the op ini on that the re is re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that suc h p ri so ne r, if rele ased, w ill li ve and r emain at liber ty without violating the law, and that the prisoner ’s re lease is not incompatible with the wel fa re of society

. . . . Tenn.Code Ann. § 40- 35-503(b)(2 ) an d (3) se t out gr ounds for de clining parole beca

use of the de trimental eff

ects of r elea sing the prisoner “ at the time.” The thr us t of the se statut e s, and

ind e e d o f t

he wh ole c on c e pt o f p aro le , is tha t ov e r t ime people c an cha

ng e, and that even a convicted felon may be able to live in a ccor dance wi th th e la

w , if h e o r s h e is r e le a s e d b e f o r e th e e n d o f h is s e n te n c e

. Fur ther, the deter mination of when a

prisoner is re ady to be rele ased is not an ea sy one, and the provision for per iodic hear ings g ives the B oard the opportunity to re-e valuate its own de c isi on s. F ina lly , Mr. B a ldw in imp lie s th a t pr ivate c on ve rs a tio ns wi th t he vic tim s of his crime, c onducted be fore his parole he aring , had a signific ant impact on the Boa rd’s de cision. We venture to think it possibl e that ev en t h ese vic tims m ay experience a cha

ng e of he art at so m e point, and not insist on his continued incar cer ation.

We note that the seve n Boa rd member s are appointed for stag g ere d six y ear te rm s, a ft e r w hic h th e y

are e lig ibl e fo r ( bu t no t ne c e ssa ri ly e nti tle d to ) r e a

pp oin tme nt. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40- 28-103(c ). Thus the eff ect of the twenty -y ear

defe rra l is not only to prec lude re consideration of Mr. Ba ldwin’s case by the member s of the pane l that de c lin e d to pa

ro le him , o r b y

the oth e r m e mbe rs of

the c ur re nt B oa rd , b ut a lso to preve nt the members of the B oard that may

be sitti n g in the y ear s 2005, 2010, 20 15 or 20 20 fr om e ve n ma

kin g an in iti a l c on sid e ratio n o f wh eth er Mr . B a ldw in could be a

suitable ca

ndidate for

parole . Under

the panel’s ruling
, it is possibl e that the entire membership of the Boa rd ca n completely

turn over mor e than onc e bef ore his case c omes up for de cision once a g ain.

I t appea rs to us that the Boa

rd’s decision constitutes a n arbitra ry withdrawa l of the powe r to parole from future Boa rd member s, and that a twe nty -y ear defe rra l would undermine the very provisions of the parole statutes that empower the B oard to gr ant parole. I n addition, the essential eff ect of the B oard’ s action is to chang e Mr. Ba ldwin’s sentenc e to life without parole , contra ry to what the L eg islature intended. We think Mr. Baldwin ha s stated a cause of action which entitles him to t he wr it of-6-

cer tiorari. The ref

ore, w e re verse the cha

ncellor’ s order dismiss ing his claim that the Boa rd ac ted ar

bitrarily in defe rringthe next consideration of pa role for him for
tw e nty y e ars

.

Ba ldw in , 2003 WL 21954199, at * 4-5.

All one has to do is substitut e ten y ear s for t we n t y y ea rs and we have the same situation relative to its application to Mr. York. As in Dye r , n oth ingproh ibi ts the B oa rd of Paro le s f ro m, ag ain, deny

ing pa role if such would depre ciate the seriousness of the crime of which Mr. York stands convicted. Such a

deter minat i o n i s wi t h i n t he sound discre tion of the Boa rd and not a

matter for jud ic ia l in te rv e nti on . App e lla nt h a s se rv e d mo re tha

n a qu art e r o f a

c e ntu ry of his se nte nc e a nd

is

now elig ible for parole consideration. To ag ain reje ct his a pplication is one thing, but to postpone

a re view of his application for a de cade is, while less arbitra ry than in Ba ldw in , st i l l an ar b i t rary de c isi on . A s to thi s is su e , M r. Yo rk is e nti tle d to the wr it o f c e rt ior ari

.

Since Ba ldw in post-dated the appea l in this case , this iss ue wa s not before the trial cour t, and,

as a g ener al rule, a

n issue not presente d to the trial court will not be conside red by this Court. Re id

v . S tat e , 9 S.W. 3d

78 8, 79 6 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 19 99 ). Ho we ve r, un de r T e nn e sse e Rul e of Ap pe llate Procedur e 13(b) an d

3 6 ( a )
, w e ma

y c o n s id e r s u c h is s u e s in

th e in te r e s t o f

f a ir n e s s an d ju s ti c e. Heatherly

v. Me rrimack M

ut. Fire Ins. Co. , 43 S.W .3d 911, 916 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000).

The Or der of

the trial cour

t denying pa

role to Appellant, insofar

as it dismis ses the Petition on the merits of the he aringbefor e the Parole Boar d of Jul y 3, 2001, is affirme d. The a ction of the Boa rd, howe ver, in de fer

ring the next consideration of pa role for a pe riod of ten y ear s is rever sed,

an d t h e c au s e i s re m an d edt o t h e C h an ce ry C o u rt o f D av i d s o nC o u n t y fo r f u rt h e rp ro ce ed i n gs

c on sis te nt w iththi s o pin ion . Co sts on a pp e a l are ta xed

to t he Te nn e sse e B oa

rd of Paro le s.

___________________________________ WI L L I AM B. CAI

N, J UDGE