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Per Curiam 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

ROBERT R. TOLAN v. JEFFREY WAYNE COTTON 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 13–551. Decided May 5, 2014

 PER CURIAM. 

During the early morning hours of New Year’s Eve,

2008, police sergeant Jeffrey Cotton fired three bullets at 

Robert Tolan; one of those bullets hit its target and punctured Tolan’s right lung. At the time of the shooting,

Tolan was unarmed on his parents’ front porch about 15 to

20 feet away from Cotton. Tolan sued, alleging that Cotton had exercised excessive force in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment to Cotton, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning 

that regardless of whether Cotton used excessive force, he

was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not 

violate any clearly established right. 713 F. 3d 299 (2013).

In articulating the factual context of the case, the Fifth

Circuit failed to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a 

motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the 

nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 255 (1986). For that reason, we vacate 

its decision and remand the case for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

I 

A 

The following facts, which we view in the light most

favorable to Tolan, are taken from the record evidence and 

the opinions below. At around 2:00 on the morning of 

December 31, 2008, John Edwards, a police officer, was on

patrol in Bellaire, Texas, when he noticed a black Nissan 
 

2 TOLAN v. COTTON 

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sport utility vehicle turning quickly onto a residential 

street. The officer watched the vehicle park on the side of

the street in front of a house. Two men exited: Tolan and 

his cousin, Anthony Cooper. 

Edwards attempted to enter the license plate number of

the vehicle into a computer in his squad car. But he keyed

an incorrect character; instead of entering plate number 

696BGK, he entered 695BGK. That incorrect number 

matched a stolen vehicle of the same color and make. This 

match caused the squad car’s computer to send an automatic message to other police units, informing them that

Edwards had found a stolen vehicle. 

Edwards exited his cruiser, drew his service pistol and 

ordered Tolan and Cooper to the ground. He accused 

Tolan and Cooper of having stolen the car. Cooper responded, “That’s not true.” Record 1295. And Tolan explained, “That’s my car.” Ibid. Tolan then complied with 

the officer’s demand to lie face-down on the home’s front 

porch.

As it turned out, Tolan and Cooper were at the home 

where Tolan lived with his parents. Hearing the commotion, Tolan’s parents exited the front door in their pajamas. In an attempt to keep the misunderstanding from

escalating into something more, Tolan’s father instructed 

Cooper to lie down, and instructed Tolan and Cooper to

say nothing. Tolan and Cooper then remained facedown. 

Edwards told Tolan’s parents that he believed Tolan and 

Cooper had stolen the vehicle. In response, Tolan’s father 

identified Tolan as his son, and Tolan’s mother explained 

that the vehicle belonged to the family and that no crime 

had been committed. Tolan’s father explained, with his 

hands in the air, “[T]his is my nephew. This is my son. 

We live here. This is my house.” Id., at 2059. Tolan’s 

mother similarly offered, “[S]ir this is a big mistake. This 

car is not stolen. . . . That’s our car.” Id., at 2075. 

While Tolan and Cooper continued to lie on the ground 
 

 

 

 

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in silence, Edwards radioed for assistance. Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Jeffrey Cotton arrived on the scene and

drew his pistol. Edwards told Cotton that Cooper and

Tolan had exited a stolen vehicle. Tolan’s mother reiterated that she and her husband owned both the car Tolan 

had been driving and the home where these events were 

unfolding. Cotton then ordered her to stand against the

family’s garage door. In response to Cotton’s order, Tolan’s mother asked, “[A]re you kidding me? We’ve lived 

her[e] 15 years. We’ve never had anything like this happen before.” Id., at 2077; see also id., at 1465. 

The parties disagree as to what happened next. Tolan’s 

mother and Cooper testified during Cotton’s criminal trial1 

that Cotton grabbed her arm and slammed her against the

garage door with such force that she fell to the ground. 

Id., at 2035, 2078–2080. Tolan similarly testified that

Cotton pushed his mother against the garage door. Id., at 

2479. In addition, Tolan offered testimony from his mother 

and photographic evidence to demonstrate that Cotton 

used enough force to leave bruises on her arms and back

that lasted for days. Id., at 2078–2079, 2089–2091. By

contrast, Cotton testified in his deposition that when he 

was escorting the mother to the garage, she flipped her 

arm up and told him to get his hands off her. Id., at 1043. 

He also testified that he did not know whether he left 

bruises but believed that he had not. Id., at 1044. 

The parties also dispute the manner in which Tolan

responded. Tolan testified in his deposition and during

the criminal trial that upon seeing his mother being 

pushed, id., at 1249, he rose to his knees, id., at 1928. 

Edwards and Cotton testified that Tolan rose to his feet. 

—————— 

1The events described here led to Cotton’s criminal indictment in 

Harris County, Texas, for aggravated assault by a public servant. 713 

F. 3d 299, 303 (CA5 2013). He was acquitted. Ibid. The testimony of 

Tolan’s mother during Cotton’s trial is a part of the record in this civil

action. Record 2066–2087. 
 

 

 

4 TOLAN v. COTTON 

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Id., at 1051–1052, 1121. 

Both parties agree that Tolan then exclaimed, from

roughly 15 to 20 feet away, 713 F. 3d, at 303, “[G]et your 

fucking hands off my mom.” Record 1928. The parties

also agree that Cotton then drew his pistol and fired three 

shots at Tolan. Tolan and his mother testified that these 

shots came with no verbal warning. Id., at 2019, 2080. 

One of the bullets entered Tolan’s chest, collapsing his 

right lung and piercing his liver. While Tolan survived, he 

suffered a life-altering injury that disrupted his budding

professional baseball career and causes him to experience 

pain on a daily basis. 

B 

In May 2009, Cooper, Tolan, and Tolan’s parents filed 

this suit in the Southern District of Texas, alleging claims 

under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Tolan claimed, 

among other things, that Cotton had used excessive force 

against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 After 

discovery, Cotton moved for summary judgment, arguing 

that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred the suit.

That doctrine immunizes government officials from damages suits unless their conduct has violated a clearly

established right.

The District Court granted summary judgment to Cotton. 854 F. Supp. 2d 444 (SD Tex. 2012). It reasoned that 

Cotton’s use of force was not unreasonable and therefore 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 477–478. 

The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on a different basis. 713 

F. 3d 299. It declined to decide whether Cotton’s actions 

—————— 

2The complaint also alleged that the officers’ actions violated the

Equal Protection Clause to the extent they were motivated by Tolan’s 

and Cooper’s race. 854 F. Supp. 2d 444, 465 (SD Tex. 2012). In addition, the complaint alleged that Cotton used excessive force against 

Tolan’s mother. Id., at 468. Those claims, which were dismissed, id., at 

465, 470, are not before this Court. 
 

 

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violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it held that 

even if Cotton’s conduct did violate the Fourth Amendment, Cotton was entitled to qualified immunity because

he did not violate a clearly established right. Id., at 306. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit began by 

noting that at the time Cotton shot Tolan, “it was . . . 

clearly established that an officer had the right to use 

deadly force if that officer harbored an objective and reasonable belief that a suspect presented an ‘immediate 

threat to [his] safety.’” Id., at 306 (quoting Deville v. 

Marcantel, 567 F. 3d 156, 167 (CA5 2009)). The Court 

of Appeals reasoned that Tolan failed to overcome the 

qualified-immunity bar because “an objectively-reasonable 

officer in Sergeant Cotton’s position could have . . . believed” that Tolan “presented an ‘immediate threat to the 

safety of the officers.’” 713 F. 3d, at 307.3 In support of

this conclusion, the court relied on the following facts: the

front porch had been “dimly-lit”; Tolan’s mother had “refus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm”; and Tolan’s

words had amounted to a “verba[l] threa[t].” Ibid. Most 

critically, the court also relied on the purported fact that

Tolan was “moving to intervene in” Cotton’s handling of 

his mother, id., at 305, and that Cotton therefore could 

reasonably have feared for his life, id., at 307. Accordingly, the court held, Cotton did not violate clearly established law in shooting Tolan. 

The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. 538 Fed. 

Appx. 374 (2013). Three judges voted to grant rehearing.

Judge Dennis filed a dissent, contending that the panel 

opinion “fail[ed] to address evidence that, when viewed in 

—————— 

3Tolan argues that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly analyzed the reasonableness of Sergeant Cotton’s beliefs under the second prong of the 

qualified-immunity analysis rather than the first. See Pet. for Cert. 12, 

20. Because we rule in Tolan’s favor on the narrow ground that the 

Fifth Circuit erred in its application of the summary judgment standard, we express no view as to Tolan’s additional argument. 
 

 

6 TOLAN v. COTTON 

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the light most favorable to the plaintiff, creates genuine 

issues of material fact as to whether an objective officer in

Cotton’s position could have reasonably and objectively

believed that [Tolan] posed an immediate, significant

threat of substantial injury to him.” Id., at 377. 

II
 

A 

In resolving questions of qualified immunity at summary judgment, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry. 

The first asks whether the facts, “[t]aken in the light most 

favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the

officer’s conduct violated a [federal] right[.]” Saucier v. 

Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 201 (2001). When a plaintiff alleges

excessive force during an investigation or arrest, the 

federal right at issue is the Fourth Amendment right 

against unreasonable seizures. Graham v. Connor, 490 

U. S. 386, 394 (1989). The inquiry into whether this right 

was violated requires a balancing of “ ‘the nature and 

quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 

Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U. S. 1, 8 (1985); see Graham, 

supra, at 396. 

The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis

asks whether the right in question was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 

U. S. 730, 739 (2002). Governmental actors are “shielded 

from liability for civil damages if their actions did not

violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

Ibid. “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of 

the law” at the time of an incident provided “fair warning”

to the defendants “that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.” Id., at 741. 

Courts have discretion to decide the order in which to 
 

 

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engage these two prongs. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U. S. 

223, 236 (2009). But under either prong, courts may not 

resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 

U. S. 194, 195, n. 2 (2004) (per curiam); Saucier, supra, at 

201; Hope, supra, at 733, n. 1. This is not a rule specific to

qualified immunity; it is simply an application of the more

general rule that a “judge’s function” at summary judgment is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the 

truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a 

genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U. S., at 249. 

Summary judgment is appropriate only if “the movant 

shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). In making that determination, a court must view the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & 

Co., 398 U. S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, supra, at 

255. 

Our qualified-immunity cases illustrate the importance

of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant, even

when, as here, a court decides only the clearly-established

prong of the standard. In cases alleging unreasonable 

searches or seizures, we have instructed that courts 

should define the “clearly established” right at issue on

the basis of the “specific context of the case.” Saucier, 

supra, at 201; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 

635, 640–641 (1987). Accordingly, courts must take care 

not to define a case’s “context” in a manner that imports

genuinely disputed factual propositions. See Brosseau, 

supra, at 195, 198 (inquiring as to whether conduct violated

clearly established law “‘in light of the specific context 

of the case’” and construing “facts . . . in a light most

favorable to” the nonmovant). 
 

 

 

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B 

In holding that Cotton’s actions did not violate clearly

established law, the Fifth Circuit failed to view the evidence at summary judgment in the light most favorable to 

Tolan with respect to the central facts of this case. By

failing to credit evidence that contradicted some of its key 

factual conclusions, the court improperly “weigh[ed] the 

evidence” and resolved disputed issues in favor of the 

moving party, Anderson, 477 U. S., at 249. 

First, the court relied on its view that at the time of the 

shooting, the Tolans’ front porch was “dimly-lit.” 713 

F. 3d, at 307. The court appears to have drawn this assessment from Cotton’s statements in a deposition that 

when he fired at Tolan, the porch was “‘fairly dark,’” and

lit by a gas lamp that was “‘decorative.’” Id., at 302. In 

his own deposition, however, Tolan’s father was asked 

whether the gas lamp was in fact “more decorative than 

illuminating.” Record 1552. He said that it was not. Ibid. 

Moreover, Tolan stated in his deposition that two floodlights shone on the driveway during the incident, id., 

at 2496, and Cotton acknowledged that there were two 

motion-activated lights in front of the house. Id., at 1034. 

And Tolan confirmed that at the time of the shooting, he

was “not in darkness.” Id., at 2498–2499. 

Second, the Fifth Circuit stated that Tolan’s mother 

“refus[ed] orders to remain quiet and calm,” thereby “compound[ing]” Cotton’s belief that Tolan “presented an immediate threat to the safety of the officers.” 713 F. 3d, at 

307 (internal quotation marks omitted). But here, too, the 

court did not credit directly contradictory evidence. Although the parties agree that Tolan’s mother repeatedly

informed officers that Tolan was her son, that she lived in 

the home in front of which he had parked, and that the 

vehicle he had been driving belonged to her and her husband, there is a dispute as to how calmly she provided this 

information. Cotton stated during his deposition that 
 

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Tolan’s mother was “very agitated” when she spoke to the

officers. Record 1032–1033. By contrast, Tolan’s mother 

testified at Cotton’s criminal trial that she was neither 

“aggravated” nor “agitated.” Id., at 2075, 2077. 

Third, the Court concluded that Tolan was “shouting,” 

713 F. 3d, at 306, 308, and “verbally threatening” the 

officer, id., at 307, in the moments before the shooting.

The court noted, and the parties agree, that while Cotton 

was grabbing the arm of his mother, Tolan told Cotton,

“[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.” Record 1928. But 

Tolan testified that he “was not screaming.” Id., at 2544. 

And a jury could reasonably infer that his words, in context, did not amount to a statement of intent to inflict 

harm. Cf. United States v. White, 258 F. 3d 374, 383 (CA5 

2001) (“A threat imports ‘[a] communicated intent to 

inflict physical or other harm’” (quoting Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1480 (6th ed. 1990))); Morris v. Noe, 672 F. 3d 

1185, 1196 (CA10 2012) (inferring that the words “Why

was you talking to Mama that way” did not constitute an

“overt threa[t]”). Tolan’s mother testified in Cotton’s 

criminal trial that he slammed her against a garage door

with enough force to cause bruising that lasted for days. 

Record 2078–2079. A jury could well have concluded that 

a reasonable officer would have heard Tolan’s words not as 

a threat, but as a son’s plea not to continue any assault of

his mother. 

Fourth, the Fifth Circuit inferred that at the time of the 

shooting, Tolan was “moving to intervene in Sergeant

Cotton’s” interaction with his mother. 713 F. 3d, at 

305; see also id., at 308 (characterizing Tolan’s behavior 

as “abruptly attempting to approach Sergeant Cotton,”

thereby “inflam[ing] an already tense situation”). The 

court appears to have credited Edwards’ account that at 

the time of the shooting, Tolan was on both feet “[i]n a 

crouch” or a “charging position” looking as if he was going 

to move forward. Record 1121–1122. Tolan testified at 
 

 

10 TOLAN v. COTTON 

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trial, however, that he was on his knees when Cotton shot 

him, id., at 1928, a fact corroborated by his mother, id., at 

2081. Tolan also testified in his deposition that he “wasn’t 

going anywhere,” id., at 2502, and emphasized that he did 

not “jump up,” id., at 2544. 

Considered together, these facts lead to the inescapable

conclusion that the court below credited the evidence of 

the party seeking summary judgment and failed properly

to acknowledge key evidence offered by the party opposing 

that motion. And while “this Court is not equipped to

correct every perceived error coming from the lower federal

courts,” Boag v. MacDougall 454 U. S. 364, 366 (1982) 

(O’Connor, J., concurring), we intervene here because the 

opinion below reflects a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards in light of our precedents. Cf. 

Brosseau, 543 U. S., at 197–198 (summarily reversing

decision in a Fourth Amendment excessive force case “to 

correct a clear misapprehension of the qualified immunity

standard”); see also Florida Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 

147, 150 (1981) (per curiam) (summarily reversing an 

opinion that could not “be reconciled with the principles 

set out” in this Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence). 

The witnesses on both sides come to this case with their 

own perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases.

It is in part for that reason that genuine disputes are 

generally resolved by juries in our adversarial system. By

weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences 

contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below 

neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at

the summary judgment stage, reasonable inferences 

should be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.

Applying that principle here, the court should have

acknowledged and credited Tolan’s evidence with regard

to the lighting, his mother’s demeanor, whether he shouted 

words that were an overt threat, and his positioning 
 

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during the shooting. This is not to say, of course, that

these are the only facts that the Fifth Circuit should consider, or that no other facts might contribute to the reasonableness of the officer’s actions as a matter of law. Nor 

do we express a view as to whether Cotton’s actions violated clearly established law. We instead vacate the Fifth 

Circuit’s judgment so that the court can determine whether,

when Tolan’s evidence is properly credited and factual

inferences are reasonably drawn in his favor, Cotton’s

actions violated clearly established law. 

* * * 

The petition for certiorari and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund’s motion to file an amicus 

curiae brief are granted. The judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is vacated,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

ROBERT R. TOLAN v. JEFFREY WAYNE COTTON 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 

No. 13–551. Decided May 5, 2014

 JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA joins, concurring in the judgment. 

The Court takes two actions. It grants the petition for a

writ of certiorari, and it summarily vacates the judgment

of the Court of Appeals.

The granting of a petition for plenary review is not a

decision from which Members of this Court have customarily registered dissents, and I do not do so here. I note, 

however, that the granting of review in this case sets a

precedent that, if followed in other cases, will very substantially alter the Court’s practice. See, e.g., this Court’s 

Rule 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted

when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual 

findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of 

law”); S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D.

Himmelfarb, Supreme Court Practice §5.12(c)(3), p. 352

(10th ed. 2013) (“[E]rror correction . . . is outside the 

mainstream of the Court’s functions and . . . not among

the ‘compelling reasons’ . . . that govern the grant of 

certiorari”).

In my experience, a substantial percentage of the civil 

appeals heard each year by the courts of appeals present 

the question whether the evidence in the summary judgment record is just enough or not quite enough to support 

a grant of summary judgment. The present case falls into 

that very large category. There is no confusion in the 

courts of appeals about the standard to be applied in

ruling on a summary judgment motion, and the Court of 

Appeals invoked the correct standard here. See 713 F. 3d 
 

2 TOLAN v. COTTON 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

299, 304 (CA5 2013). Thus, the only issue is whether the 

relevant evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, is sufficient to support a judgment

for that party. In the courts of appeals, cases presenting

this question are utterly routine. There is no question

that this case is important for the parties, but the same is

true for a great many other cases that fall into the same 

category.

On the merits of the case, while I do not necessarily

agree in all respects with the Court’s characterization of 

the evidence, I agree that there are genuine issues of 

material fact and that this is a case in which summary

judgment should not have been granted. 

I therefore concur in the judgment.