J-S27032-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

SARA ALVISO 

 Appellant No. 1539 WDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 4, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County 

Criminal Division at Nos: CP-33-CR-0000587-2010, 

CP-33-CR-0000449-2012, 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2014 

Appellant, Sara Alviso, appeals from the judgment of sentence the 

Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County entered September 4, 2013, 

after revoking her probation/parole. Appellant argues the sentencing court 

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence and for 

failing to adequately state its reasons for the sentence.

1

 Upon review, we 

affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 In her statement of questions involved on appeal, Appellant seems to 

challenge only the length of the sentence; in the argument section, however, 

Appellant raises an additional claim, not mentioned or suggested in the 

statement of questions involved (i.e., trial court’s failure to adequately state 

the reasons for the sentence). Counsel is encouraged to more carefully 

review Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (no question will be considered unless stated in 

statement of questions involved or fairly suggested thereby), and the 

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The underlying factual and procedural facts of this matter are not at 

issue here. Briefly, following probation/parole violations (i.e., failure to 

report and failure to make required payments), Appellant was resentenced 

to, inter alia, a term of 1 to 2 years in a state correctional institution at 

docket number CR-587-2010, and a consecutive sentence of 11⁄2 to 3 years 

in a State Correctional Institution, at docket number CR-449-2012. 

Appellant argues the trial court imposed an excessive aggregate 

sentence given the nature of the parole/probation violations and the original 

offenses.2

 Appellant’s Brief at 8. Specifically, Appellant contends “the 

consecutive sentences imposed by the lower court, which aggregate to two 

and one-half (21⁄2) to five (5) years in a State Correctional [Institution] are 

excessive.” Id. Appellant also argues the “[trial c]ourt failed to state

adequate reasons for the severity of the sentence.” Id. Appellant argues 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

consequences generally resulting from failing to adequately state the issues 

involved in the statement of questions involved. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Fremd, 860 A.2d 515, 523-24 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“In 

his brief, appellant also argues that the police conduct was so outrageous as 

to bar conviction even if entrapment is not found. Appellant failed to raise 

this issue in the ‘Statement of Questions Involved’ portion of his appellate 

brief and it is, therefore, waived.”).

2

 At docket number CR-587-2010, Appellant pled guilty to theft by unlawful 

taking (M2), and sentenced to a term of incarceration of 30 days to a 

maximum of 1 year in the Jefferson County Jail; at docket number CR-449-

2012, Appellant pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking (M1), and sentenced 

to two years’ probation. 
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the sentences should be vacated and the case remanded for more 

appropriate sentencing. Id. We disagree. 

Appellant’s issues challenge the trial court’s sentencing discretion. To 

preserve a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 

must file timely notice of appeal, preserve the argument in a timely postsentence motion or orally at sentencing, include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) 

statement in the appellate brief, and raise a substantial question. 

Commonwealth v. Dewey, 57 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here, 

it is undisputed Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, timely filed a postsentence motion raising the discretionary issues, and included a 

Pa.R.A.P.2119(f) statement in his brief. The only issue is whether he raised 

a substantial question for our review. 

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question 

must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See 

Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A 

substantial question exits only when the appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were 

either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the 

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. 

Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation and

quotation marks omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

 Appellant merely states the aggregate sentence is excessive 

considering that the original “charges” were both misdemeanors and that the 

parole/probation violations were “not so serious.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. 

Appellant fails to articulate “the existence of a substantial question by 
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advancing a colorable argument that the sentencing court’s actions were 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code or violated a 

fundamental norm of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. 

Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289-90 (Pa. Super. 2008). We conclude,

therefore, Appellant’s claim of excessiveness does not raise a substantial 

question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 

1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[A] bald claim of excessiveness due to the 

consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial question.”) 

(citation omitted). 

 Even if we were to conclude Appellant raised a substantial question for 

our review, the claim is nonetheless without merit. Our standard of review 

of a sentencing challenge is well-settled: 

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. 

Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, 

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, 

exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias 

or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted). 

The trial court, contrary to Appellant’s contention, did explain, on the 

record, and in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the reasons for the sentence 

imposed. 
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[T]he [c]ourt did indeed explain its reasons for the sentence, 

including why it believed [Appellant] could benefit from 

motivational boot camp. . . . Prior to sentencing, the [c]ourt 

reviewed a presentence investigation report prepared by the 

Jefferson County Probation Department, and was adequately 

informed about [Appellant]. . . . The [c]ourt was also aware that 

her violation, while technical in nature, was a reflection of her 

general disregard for authority. . . . Having concluded that 

[Appellant]’s obstinance [sic] was occasioned at least in part by a 

lack of discipline and not merely a criminogenic mindset,

however, the [c]ourt by including a boot camp recommendation 

at both cases, also afforded her the opportunity to remediate her 

sentence. The recommendation was wholly contrary to her 

current claim that the [c]ourt’s sentence was manifestly 

unreasonable or evidenced partiality, bias, prejudice or ill-will. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/13, at 1-2 (citations omitted).3

____________________________________________ 

3

 The trial court, in its opinion, quoted from the notes of testimony of the 

sentencing hearing, where the court stated: 

It’s kind of one of those revocations where it doesn’t – you did 

not commit new charges this time. . . . However, it is partially 

because you never complied while you were there. I know you 

said you had financial reasons, but you didn’t do the call track. 

You didn’t pay. So I think those violations would happen again 

and then since, I as I see it, you were kind of cut a break initially 

to do this, to go to Arizona. It’s to vindicate the authority of the 

[c]ourt and so we don’t have any more violations. 

Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/13, at 1-2. The trial court also cited Section 

9771(c) of the Sentencing Code, which in relevant part provide: 

(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.--The court 

shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation 

unless it finds that: 

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or 

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he 

will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or 

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 In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in fashioning Appellant’s sentence, and adequately explained on 

the record the reasons for the sentence imposed. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of sentence. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/7/2014 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the 

court. 

42 Pa.C.S.A § 9771(c).