1 Filed 5/27/15 In re M.A. CA1/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. CHERRY N., Defendant and Appellant. A143370
(City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. JD13-3310)

Mother appeals the termination of reunifi cation services at the six-month review hearing regarding her then two-year-old da ughter. She asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s findi ng that there was no substantial probability that child may be returned to her within the time remaining in the statutory reunification period. We affirm. Factual and Procedural History On November 18, 2013, th e San Francisco Human Servic es Agency (the agency) filed a petition alleging, among other things , the daughter was at risk of harm under
Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 300, subdivisions (b), due to her mother and father abusing drugs. The petition alle ged further that mother had mental health problems, was homeless and unable to provide for her daughter.

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 At the November 19, 2013 detention h earing, the daughter was detained and placed with a relative, who also has cust ody of mother’s six-year-old daughter. At the February 21, 2014 contested jurisdiction/dispos ition hearing, mother and father submitted to jurisdiction under sectio n 300, subdivisions (b). The court sustained the allegations regarding the parents’ substan ce abuse, mother’s mental health problems, her homelessness and inability to provide for her daughter. Mother and father were granted reunification services. Mother was orde red to participate in counseling, parenting education and complete a substance abuse assessment and follow any recommendations for treatment and was granted supervised visits. On August 1, 2014 , the agency filed a status report in advance of the six-month review hearing recommending termination of services. The agency reported that mother
remained homeless and had not used the housing service refe rrals offered to her by the agency. She had scheduled a number of thera py appointments but had failed to attend the appointments. Mother did not attend paren ting classes arranged by the agency, or complete a substance abuse assessment. Mother also failed to maintain regular contact
with the child. The social worker had been unable to ob serve mother w ith the child because mother had not set up any visits at th e visitation center. Moth er had visited with her daughter just twice in the five and half months since disposition—both times supervised by the relative care giver in the relative’s home.
A contested six-month revi ew hearing was held on Sept ember 29, 2014. The social worker testified mother had not begun c ounseling or completed a substance abuse
assessment. Mother had informed her that sh e started a parenting program a week before the hearing but the social work er had no evidence to supp ort mother’s claim. Mother began visiting her daughter afte r the status report was issued and had regularly visited the
child twice a week for th ree hours each visit. Mother acknowledged that she did not appl y herself with respect to completing her case plan, although she made numerous attempts to start various programs. She explained that she struggled w ith homelessness which made it diff icult for her to comply with3 services. She found stable housing two weeks prior to the hearing a nd had started seeking help to comply w ith services through The Ho meless Prenatal Program. The court expressed its “continuing co ncerns about mother’s substance abuse issues and challenges, and mental health cha llenges that remain in need of assessment
and treatment” and observed that the extent of progre ss made by mother towards alleviating or mitigating the causes necessita ting placement has been minimal. The court found by clear and convincing ev idence that mother failed to participate regularly in her case plan and that there was not a substantial probability that the child could be returned
to mother in the next six months. The cour t terminated mother’s reunification services
and ordered that her visits remain supervised. Father’s reunification services were
extended an additional 12 months. On October 22, 2014, mother filed her notice of appeal.
Discussion “The status of every dependent child in fo ster care shall be reviewed periodically as determined by the court but no less frequently th an once every six months. . . .” (§ 366, subd. (a)(1).) “The third paragraph of s ection 366.21, subdivision (e), requires a specialized inquiry at the six- month review for children . . . who are ‘under the age of three years on the date of the initial removal’ and are not being return ed to the custody of their parents at that time. For such dependent children, if ‘the c ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatment plan, th e court may schedule a hearing pursuant to [s]ection 366.26 within 120 days. If, however, the court finds there is a substantial probability that the child . . . may be returned to his or her parent or legal guardian within
six months or that reasonable services have not been provid ed, the court shall continue
the case to the 12–month permanency hearing.’ (§ 366.21, subd. (e).)” ( M.V. v. Superior
Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166 , 175, italics omitted.) In M.V. the court explained that a finding of a “substantial probability the child may be returned” requires a determination of “whether there is a strong likelihood of a possibility of return (not simply a strong
likelihood the return w ill in fact occur).” ( Id. at p. 181.) The court may consider the three4 factors set forth in section 3 66.21, subdivision (g)(1 ) (maintaining consistent and regular contact with the child, making progress in addressing the issues that led to dependency, and demonstrating the potential to be a good parent) “along with any other relevant evidence (such as extenuating circumstances excusing noncomplia nce with the three factors) in considering whether there is subs tantial evidence of a possible return to the mother by the 12–month hearing.” ( M.V. , p. 181.) An order terminating services is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( Kevin R v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 676, 688.) “In making this determination, we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’ s determinations and draw all
reasonable inferences from th e evidence to support the fi ndings and orders. [Citation.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence or exer cise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to s upport the findings of the trial court.’ ” ( Id . at pp. 688-689.) Mother does not challenge the trial court’s findings that return of the child to her custody would be detrimental, or that she failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in a court-ordered treatme nt plan. She asserts, however, that the
evidence showed a substantial possibility that her daughter might be returned to her
within the five months rema ining until the 12-month review hearing. She argues that despite being only 21 years old and strugg ling with homelessness and mental health issues, she had maintained consis tent visits in the two months prior to the hearing and had begun arranging for services. Mother also note s that “[d]enying reunification services did not serve to expedite the implementation of a permanent plan for [her daughter]” because the court granted additional reunifi cation services to the father. In this case, given mother’s complete lack of participation in the services provided and apparently untreated drug abuse and mental health issues, we find that the record amply supports the court’s termination of serv ices. Contrary to mother’s argument, her recent interest in visitation is not enough to es tablish a strong likelihood that the daughter may be returned to her car e within the time allotted. While mother’s youth and homelessness undoubtedly contributed to her l ack of participation in services, they are5 not “extenuating circumstances excusing noncompliance.” ( M.V. v. Superior Court,

supra , 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 1 81.) Her homelessness is likely a byproduct of her
untreated substance abuse and mental hea lth issues for which she has not begun treatment. Likewise, while the court was free to consider the fact that services were extended for father in deciding whether to terminate services for mother, it was not required to extend services for both parents. ( In re Jesse W . (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 60 [at six-month review hearing involving ch ild under the age of three, court is not required to continue services for one parent when reunification effo rts continue for the other parent and court does not set a secti on 366.26 hearing].) The court reasonably rejected mother’s argument that there would be no harm in extending her services along
with father’s extension of services. The co urt explained that mother still has access to services in the community but that the burden was on her to avail herself of those services
and convince the court to reconsider its ruli ng. Accordingly, we shall affirm the order terminating services. Disposition The order terminating reunifica tion services is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Pollak, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ McGuiness, P. J.

_____________ ____________ Jenkins, J.