NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JASON O., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, T.O., B.O., J.O., Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 18-0354 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County

No. S0900JD201700012 

The Honorable Michala M. Ruechel, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Rigg Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Pinetop

By Brett R. Rigg

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Cathleen E. Fuller

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 2-26-2019
JASON O. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Jason O. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights to his three children. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Sarah D. are the biological parents of T.O., B.O., 

and J.O. (the “Children”).1 Father has an admitted history of substance 

abuse, having used methamphetamine on-and-off since he was 13 years 

old. Father also has a history of domestic violence incidents and was 

convicted of aggravated domestic violence in 2014. 

¶3 In June 2017, Father’s older daughter, who is not a subject of 

this appeal, contacted law enforcement about concerns that Father was on 

drugs and behaving disorderly. Law enforcement responded and arrested 

Father. As a result of the June 2017 incident and an incident in March 2017, 

Father admitted to a probation violation for the 2014 domestic violence 

offense and pled guilty to use of a dangerous drug (methamphetamine) and 

two counts of aggravated domestic violence. In November 2017, he was 

sentenced to concurrent prison terms totaling five years. 

¶4 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took temporary 

physical custody of the Children in June 2017 and two months later the 

juvenile court found the Children dependent as to Father. DCS offered

Father multiple services, including behavioral health services, urinalysis 

testing, substance abuse treatment, parent aide services and parenting skills 

training, and supervised visitation. However, due to his incarceration, the 

availability of services was limited.

 

1 The juvenile court terminated Sarah D.’s parental rights to the 

Children. She is not a party to this appeal.
JASON O. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

3 

¶5 In May 2018, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental rights 

to the Children based on: (1) neglect; (2) a history of chronic substance 

abuse; (3) deprivation of civil liberties due to a felony conviction; and 

(4) out-of-home placement for a cumulative total period of nine months or

longer. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-533(B)(2)–(4), (8)(a). After a 

termination hearing, the juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights 

to the Children. The court found DCS proved by clear and convincing 

evidence the grounds for termination based on neglect, deprivation of civil 

liberties due to a felony conviction, and out-of-home placement. The court 

also found DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination of Father’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests.

Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 8-235(A) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A). 

DISCUSSION

¶6 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must find 

at least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by 

clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 

(2005). The court must also find termination is in the child’s best interests 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. We review the court’s termination 

decision for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless no reasonable 

evidence supports the court’s findings. Mary Lou C. v. ADES, 207 Ariz. 43, 

47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). The juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the 

evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve 

disputed facts.” ADES v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). 

¶7 On appeal, Father does not challenge the court’s finding that 

DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence grounds for termination. 

Rather, he argues the juvenile court erred by failing to place the Children 

with their adult siblings and by denying his motion to consider permanent 

guardianship with his adult daughter, which he filed the day of the 

termination hearing. He further argues the court’s failure to give 

“meaningful consideration” to his permanent guardianship motion and 

request for placement violated his due process rights.

¶8 Father lacks standing to raise these arguments because his 

rights have been terminated. Permanent guardianship is only appropriate 

where the “likelihood that the child would be adopted is remote or 

termination of parental rights would not be in the child’s best interests.” 

A.R.S. § 8-871(A)(4). Once a court determines termination is in a child’s best 

interests and the parent’s rights are terminated, the parent no longer has 

standing to challenge placement. Antonio M. v. ADES, 222 Ariz. 369, 370–71, 
JASON O. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

4 

¶ 2 (App. 2009); Sands v. Sands, 157 Ariz. 322, 324 (App. 1988) (“[O]nce the 

order of severance was issued, the father’s standing as a parent 

terminated.”); see also Audra T. v. ADES, 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) 

(juvenile court does not “weigh alternative placement possibilities” in the 

best-interests analysis). Here, the juvenile court terminated Father’s rights 

after appropriately concluding termination was in the Children’s best 

interests. 

¶9 At the best-interests stage, we “presume that the interests of 

the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the 

existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and 

convincing evidence.” Alma S. v. DCS, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 12 (2018) 

(quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35). The court’s primary concern during 

the best-interests inquiry is the stability and security of the child. Demetrius 

L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15 (2016). “[T]ermination is in the child’s 

best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the 

child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13. 

“Courts must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time 

of the severance determination.” Id. at 150–51, ¶ 13. Whether the current 

placement is meeting the needs of the child is an appropriate consideration. 

Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 12. 

¶10 In making its determination, the juvenile court explained the 

Children “have spent several years of their lives in a home where domestic 

violence has occurred, where at least one parent has come in and out of their 

lives and where siblings have been responsible for their care.” Thus, they

“are in need of stability and security [and] [f]ailure to have that security 

would be detrimental” to their wellbeing. The court then found: “the 

current placements are providing the [C]hildren with a loving and 

nurturing home environment and [they] have been thriving in their care. 

The current placements are potential adoptive placements, which shall 

provide the [C]hildren with the added benefit of stability and 

permanency.” The court further found if the current plan for adoption 

cannot move forward, the Children are adoptable, and that termination 

would benefit the Children and “achieve the permanency and stability that 

an adoption would provide.” Reasonable evidence supports these findings, 

and the juvenile court did not err by finding that termination of Father’s 

rights was in the Children’s best interests. 
JASON O. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court

5 

CONCLUSION

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination of Father’s parental rights.