Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 73A04-1507-JT-806 | March 2, 2016 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Adam C. James

Shelbyville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

J. C.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 2, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

73A04-1507-JT-806

Appeal from the Shelby Superior 

Court

The Honorable Raymond K. 

Apsley, Judge

The Honorable Chris Monroe, 

Senior Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

73D01-1501-JT-1 and 73D01-1501-

JT-2

Altice, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 73A04-1507-JT-806 | March 2, 2016 Page 2 of 9

Case Summary

[1] J.C. (Father) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his 

children. Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

termination of his rights.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Father and A.C. (Mother)1 were married and had two children together, Pa.C. 

(Daughter), who was born in 2005, and Pe.C. (Son), who was born in 2006

(collectively, the Children). On September 10, 2013, the Department of Child 

Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging Daughter was a Child in Need of 

Services (CHINS) because she had been diagnosed with Type I diabetes and 

celiac disease, and Mother and Father had failed to ensure that her medical 

needs were met. Specifically, they had failed to take her to medical 

appointments, keep weekly blood sugar logs as directed by her physician, or

supply her school with necessary medical supplies. An initial hearing was held 

on September 13, 2013, at which Mother and Father denied the allegations. 

Shortly thereafter, Father was arrested. On October 11, 2013, Daughter was 

 

1 Mother consented to the termination of her parental rights and does not participate in this appeal. 

Accordingly, we limit our recitation of the facts to those relevant to Father’s appeal.
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adjudicated a CHINS upon Mother’s admission. The Children were not 

removed from the home at that time. 

[4] On October 21, 2013, DCS filed a petition alleging that Son was a CHINS 

because Father was still incarcerated and Mother was addicted to drugs. On 

November 7, 2013, the trial court issued an order requiring Mother to 

participate in services, but allowed the Children to remain in her care. The next 

day, Mother was arrested for theft. Because both Mother and Father were 

incarcerated, the Children were placed in foster care. 

[5] Father was released from jail and began participating in home-based services 

with counselor Becky Holland in November 2013. At a hearing on December 

9, 2013, Father admitted that the Children were both CHINS, and they were so 

adjudicated. Father was ordered, among other things, to maintain stable 

housing and income, submit to random drug screens, participate in home-based 

counseling and case management, and complete parenting, substance abuse, 

and domestic violence assessments and follow all recommendations.

[6] For several months thereafter, Father continued home-based services with 

Holland, who supervised visits with the Children and assisted Father with 

finding employment, securing housing, and understanding Daughter’s health 

conditions. In August 2014, Father’s supervised visitation was suspended 

because he had missed counseling appointments. Holland agreed with the 

suspension of Father’s visitation because of “the stress both children [were] 

experiencing due to the instability of their parents and lack of progress.” Exhibit 
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Volume, Father’s Exhibit B at 169. Home-based services were also terminated 

after Father missed three consecutive appointments with Holland. 

[7] At the time DCS became involved, Father was on probation for class D felony 

theft. Father also had previous convictions for theft, resisting law enforcement, 

and domestic battery on Mother in the presence of a child under sixteen years 

old. On November 20, 2014, Father’s probation was revoked and he was 

ordered to serve six months in the Department of Correction.

[8] On January 1, 2015, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights to the Children. Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental 

rights on February 20, 2015. The trial court held a hearing on the petition to 

terminate Father’s parental rights on May 8, 2015. The trial court issued an 

order terminating Father’s parental rights on June 12, 2015. Father now 

appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

[9] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 

265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence 

and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to 

the trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its

judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 

In re L.S., 717 N .E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Thus, if the 

evidence and inferences support the decision, we must affirm. Id.
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[10] The trial court entered findings in its order terminating Father’s parental rights. 

When the trial court enters specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we 

apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & 

Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings 

support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the 

record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen 

v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). A judgment is clearly erroneous 

only if the findings do not support the court’s conclusions or the conclusions do 

not support the judgment thereon. Id. 

[11] We recognize that the traditional right of parents to “establish a home and raise 

their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 

Constitution.” In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. 

Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for 

the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet 

their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those 

of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In 

re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating 

parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children. Id.

[12] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, DCS 

is required to allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence, among other 

things:
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(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services[.]

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). DCS must also prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(C).

[13] On appeal, Father argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

involuntary termination of his parental rights. Father first challenges the trial

court’s findings as to subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). We note that DCS was 

required to establish only one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) 

by clear and convincing evidence before the trial court could terminate parental 

rights. See In re L.V.N., 799 N.E.2d 63, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Here, the trial

court found that DCS presented sufficient evidence to satisfy two of those 

requirements, namely, that there is a reasonable probability the conditions 

resulting in the Children’s removal or continued placement outside Father’s 

care will not be remedied and that the continuation of the parent-child 
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relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being. See I.C. § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i), (ii). We focus our inquiry on the requirements of subsection 

(b)(2)(B)(i)—that is, whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a 

reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal or 

continued placement outside Father’s care will not be remedied. 

[14] In making such a determination, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to 

care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512

(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The court must also evaluate the parent’s 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child. Id. In making this 

determination, the court may consider the parent’s history of neglect and

response to services offered through DCS. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). “A pattern of 

unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those 

providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a 

finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will 

change.” In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 210.

[15] Father’s challenge to the trial court’s finding that there is a reasonable 

probability that the conditions leading to the Children’s removal and continued 

placement outside Father’s care will not be remedied is nothing more than a 

request to reweigh the evidence. Father has a significant criminal history and 

he has been incarcerated repeatedly throughout the Children’s lives. In 
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November 2014, shortly before the termination petitions were filed, Father’s 

probation was revoked and he was ordered to serve six months in the 

Department of Correction. Father was still incarcerated at the time of the 

termination hearing in May 2015. It is well settled that “[i]ndividuals who 

pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop 

positive and meaningful relationships with their children.” Castro v. Ind. Office of 

Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Matter of 

A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)), trans denied. Additionally, 

Father has not demonstrated an ability to provide stable housing for the 

Children. During the CHINS proceedings, Father lived in multiple residences, 

including two relatives’ homes, a motel, and two apartments. 

[16] As for Father’s argument that he made significant progress in therapy, we note 

that Father’s therapist testified that he made progress for a time, but that “things 

did seem to fall apart[.]” Transcript at 85. Similarly, Father’s participation in 

home-based services with Holland was short-lived, and services were 

terminated when he began missing scheduled appointments in August 2014. 

Around the same time, Father’s visitation was suspended because he had 

missed counseling appointments and failed to make progress in services. This 

evidence, taken as a whole, was more than sufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to the 

Children’s removal and continued placement outside Father’s care will not be 

remedied. 
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[17] Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination of his rights 

is in the Children’s best interests. In determining whether termination of 

parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look 

beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. 

In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In so doing, the trial court 

must subordinate the interest of the parent to those of the child, and the court 

need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parentchild relationship. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 199. 

[18] In support of his argument that DCS failed to prove that termination is in the 

Children’s best interests, Father argues that he loves the Children and the 

Children love him. We do not doubt the truth of this claim, but in this case, it 

is simply not enough. Throughout these proceedings, Father has been in and 

out of jail and unable to provide stable and adequate housing and supervision. 

He had made no lasting progress toward these goals at the time of the 

termination hearing. The Children cannot wait forever; they need stability and 

permanency now. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 

(explaining that “a child’s need for permanency is an important consideration 

in determining the best interests of a child”). For all of these reasons, we 

conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding that termination was in the Children’s best interests.

[19] Judgment affirmed.

[20] Robb, J. and Barnes, J., concur.