See T EX . P EN . C ODE § 21.11(a)

. 1 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS
NO. P D-1139-07

AN DREW T YR ON E M c CA RT Y, App e lla nt

v . THE S TATE O F TEXAS ON AP P ELLA NT ’S P ETIT ION F OR DI SCRETIO NA RYRE VI EW IN CA USE NO . 0 6- 06 -0 01 67 -C R F RO M THE SIX TH CO UR T OF AP P EA LS F AN NI N CO UN TY H O L C O MB , J., de liv e re d th eop inio n f or a una nimous C

ourt. O P I N I O N I n this ca s e, we must deter mine whether , under Te x as Rule of Evidenc e 803(2) , the eve nt about which an excited utter ance is ma de has to be the same event that caused t h e d ec l ar an t’s

e xcit e me nt. We h old

that it do e s n ot a

nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls. Back ground Ap pe lla nt A nd re w T y ro ne Mc Cart

y wa s trie d in 2000 on

tw o c ounts of

ind e c e nc y

wi th h is five-year -old step-da

ug hter, but a mistrial was decla red. In 2006, appellant wa s tried ag ain on the 1
same two c ounts of indece ncy with a child and a lso on two additional indictments for ag g ravatedMcCARTY - Pag e 2

T EX . P EN . C ODE § 22.021(a) (1)( B)

. 2 F or e xamp le , T un e te sti fi e d th a t th e c omp la ina nt, up on be ingtic kle d b y

he r “ Un c le 3 Colt,” beg an to cr

y and said, “ Don’t do that. I don’t like beingtouched by boy s and men no more. Andr ew [appellant] pulled up my blouse and wa s tickling my ribs and touche d me.” Tune also testified that the c omplainant stated, “U ncle Colt, don’t -- I don’t like that no more . . . Andre w tickled me a

nd hurt me. Started ticklingme and hur t me.” sexual assault of the child by penetr ation. The re cord shows that, at the sec ond trial, the

2 complainant testified that she reme mbere d nothing about the char g ed off enses. He r testimony

from the pre vious trial was th en re ad i n t o evidence. The State also prese nted the testimony of seve ral oth e r w itn e sse s, inc lud ing tw o outc ry wi tne sse s and the c omp la ina nt’ s g ra ndmot he r, De br a

B a sse tt T u n e. During the course of her testimony , Tune re lated an inc ident, including out- of-c ourt statements by

the complainant, whe n Tune’s young son (“Unc le Colt”) attempted to tickle the complainant. Appellant objec ted to the complainant’ s statements as beinghear say , but the trial

3
court admitted the evidenc e under the excited-utteranc e exception to the hea rsay rule. SeeT EX . R. E V ID . 803(2). The jury found appellant g uilty on both c ounts of indece ncy with a child. The jury

was una ble to rea ch a verdic t on one of the a g g ravated sexual assault char g es, and f ound appellant not guilty on the other a g g ravated sexual assault char g e. The jury assessed a

ppellant’s punishment at ten y ear s’ imprisonment and a $1,000 f ine on ea ch indec ency

with a child conviction. On appe al, appe llant raised thre e issues, only one of which is r eleva

nt to our prese nt review

. Ap p e ll an t c o n te n d e d th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in a dmi tt in g T u n e ’ s te s ti mo n y r e g arding the

c omp la ina

nt’ s o ut- of

-c ourt state me nts wh e n th e un c le tic kle d h e r, arguin g that th os e state me nts did not qualify

as excited utteranc e under the Tex as Rules of Evidence. The c ourt of appe als disag ree d, Mc Car ty v . S tate , 227 S.W .3d 415, 417 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2007), and, ove rrulingall of appellant’ s issues, affir

med the judgm ent of the tria l court. Id. at 419. We g rante d appellant’ sMcCARTY - Pag e 3

petition to review the c ourt of appe als’ holding solely on the excited-uttera

nce issue. Discussion We review a trial cour

t’s decision to admit evidenc e over objection under

an abuse -ofdiscretion standa

rd and w ill not reverse that decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Zuliani v. Sta te , 97 S.W .3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The tr ial court a buses its discretion when the decision lies outside the zone of re as o n ab l e disag ree ment. Can tu v . S tate , 842 S.W .2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Hea rsay statements are not a dmissibl e unless they fall within a rec og nized exception to the hea

rsay rule. T EX . R. E V ID . 802. The excited-utteranc e exception, at issue in the

case befor e us, is one of the rec og nized e x ceptions to the hear say rule a nd applies to “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition ma de while the dec lara nt was under

the stress of e x citement

cause d by the eve nt or condition.” T EX . R. E V ID . 803(2) ( emphasis adde d). Appellant in the pre sent ca se ar g ues that “the event producing the excited utter ance must be the eve nt about which the utter ance is made.” I n other wor ds, he conte nds that the complainant’s statements would have been a dmissibl e only if they wer e about the uncle ’s tickling itself, the event which had pr oduced the complainant’s “ excited utteranc e.” We disag ree . The proble m with appellant’s posi tion is that he is equatingthe re latively strict require ments of Rule 803(1), the prese nt-sense- impression exception to the hearsay rule, with the relati v e ly mo r e li b e r a l r e qu ir e me n ts o f Ru le 8 0 3 ( 2 ) , th e e xc it e d

- u tt e r a n c e e xc e p ti o n . A “ p r esent

se ns e imp re ssi on ” is “ [a] s tate me nt describing or explaining an event or condition made while the decla rant was perc eiving the event or condition, or immediately there afte r.” T EX . R. E V ID . 803(1) (empha sis added). Thus, this is the exception under whic h the State, in this ca se, mig ht have be en require d to show that the statement wa s directly related to the uncle’s tickling in orde r for theMcCARTY - Pag e 4

See, e .g., 2 S TEVEN G OODE ET AL ., G UI DE TO THE T EX AS R U LES O F E V I D EN CE § 803.3, 4 at 188 (3d e d. 2002) (“ The subjec t matter re quirement of Rule 803( 2) is signific antly more libera l than that of Rule 803(1) . Rule 803(1) is limited to st atements ‘de scribingor explaining a n event or condition’; Rule 803(2) e mbrac es statements ‘r elatingto a startling event or condition.’”). We note that the Texas Rules of Evidence 803(1) a nd (2) litera lly

trac k the Fe dera l Rules 5 of Evidenc e 803(1) and (2) , respe ctively . We, theref ore, f ind a study

of those fe dera l rules helpful. Our r esea

rch indicates that we w ould have a chieve d the same r esult under those r ules that we a chieve d under our rules, thus lending further support to our dispositi on of the issue befor e us. See, e .g., F ED . R. E V ID . 803 advisory committee’s note ( “Exceptions (1) and ( 2)”) , explaining that the [p] ermissible subject matter of the stateme n t i s l i m ited under Exception (1) [the prese nt-sense- impression exception] to description or e x p l an ation of the e vent or c on dit ion , the a ssumpt ion be ing that sp on tane ity , in the a bs e nc e of a sta rt lin g e ve nt, may extend no far

ther. I n Ex ception (2) [t he excited-uttera nce e x ception], however , t h e s t at em en tn ee d

o n l y “r el at e” t o t h e s t ar t l i n g ev en to r c o n d i t i o n , t h u s af fo rd i n g a broade r scope of subject matter cover ag e. (Alteration in original.) Se e als o K E NN E TH S. B R OUN , M C C O RM I CK ON E V I D EN CE §272, at 260- (continued...) statement to be a dmissibl e. B ut the State did not invoke t his particula r exception, asser

ting instea d that th e state me nt w a s an “ e xcit e d utte ra nc e ,” which is “ [a] s tate me nt relating to a startling event

or c o n d it io n ma d e w h il e th e d e c la r an t w a s u n d e r th e s tr e s s o f e xc it e me n t c a u s e d b y the event or condition.” T EX . R. E V ID . 803(2) ( emphasis adde d). Authors on the subject ag ree that the excitedutteranc e exception is broade r than the pr esent-se nse-impr es s ion exception; and that, under the 4

e xcit e d- utt e ra

nc e e xce pti on , the sta

rt lin g e ve nt m ay

tr ig g e r a sp on tane ou s st a te me nt t

hat r e late s to

a much e arlier

incident. The r ecor d in the presen t case shows that appellant ha d started of f by

mere ly tickling t h e child, but went much further . Thus, the complainant’ s statement about appellant’ s tickling (the “ea rlier incide nt,” id. at 844) “ related to” the unc le’s tickling (the star tling event) , and we see no a

buse of discr etion in the trial court’ s decision to admit the statement under the Rule 803(2) e x cited-utter ance exception to the hear say rule. 5McCARTY - Pag e 5

(...continued) 5 61 (6 ed. 2006): th Fe dera l Rule 803(2) and othe r modern f ormulations of the exception requir e a connec tion between the event a nd the content of

the statement, but def

ine that connec tion broadly

as “r elating to” t he event. This terminology is intended to ext end bey ond mere ly

a description or an explanation of the event. The c ourts have be en quite liberal in applying this re quirement. The formulation us ed by Rule 803(2) ha s the a dv anta g e of

sim pli c ity wh ile a t th e same tim e pr e se rv ingthe tr us tw or thi ne ss g ained by requiringa re lationship between the ex citing e vent or c ondition and the resulting statement. I t also permits clarif ication of the differ ence in the ory betwee n e xcit e d utte ra

nc e s and state me nts of

pr e se nt s e ns e imp re ssi on s. (Emphasis adde d) (c itations omi tted). Appellant also a

rgu es t h at t h e court of appe als err ed in re ly ing on Te ze no v . S tate , 484 S.W .2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), a nd Se lle rs v . S

tate , 588 S.W .2d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), beca use those we re “ pre- rule c ases” involving “disc ussions of the ‘spontaneous utter ance’ rule , which, althoug h simil ar, is not the same as the ‘e x cited utt era nce’ involved in Rule 803(2) of today ’s Texas Rules of Evidence .” Appe llant a sserts that the “sponta neous uttera

nce” rule is “obsolete ,” and cla ims that it was “ re p u d i at ed by adoption of the ne w [rule] and the lang uag e of [the “spontane ous utteranc e”] rule h as bee n streamlined a nd broug ht into focus in the almost twenty y ear s since it was r eplac ed by

curr ent Rule 803(2).” We n ote tha

t a pp e lla nt c ite s n o a

uth or ity fo r t he a bo ve a sse rt ion s. Rathe r, he str uc tur e s h is argument as follows. He first quotes the followi n g l anguag e used in Tezeno and Se lle rs to define the “spontane ous utteranc e” e x ception as one allowing the admission of a stateme nt if: 1

. th e s tate me n t is th e p r o d u c t o f ano c c u r r e n c e s ta rtl in g e n oug h to produce a sta t e o f nervous e x citement which w ould rende r the uttera nce sponta

neous an d u n re fl ec t i n g, 2. the uttera

nce is made befor e ther e is time to c ontrive and misrepr esent, that is, the state of

e xcit e me nt pr od

uc e d by the sta rt lin g e ve nt m

us t st ill do min a te the re flec tive power s of the mind,McCARTY - Pag e 6

See, e .g., K E NN E TH S. B R OUN , su pra note 5, § 272, at 255: 6 F or mul a tio ns of

the e xce pti on

dif fe r, but all ag re e on

tw o b a sic re qu ir e me nts . F ir st, there must be an occ urre nce or event suff

iciently startling to r ender inoperative the normal re flec tive thought pr ocesse s of the obser v er. Second, the statement of the decla rant must have been a spontaneous reac tion to the occurre nce or event and not the re sult of refle ctive thought. These two elements, which define the essence of the e xce pti on , to g e the r w ith a thi rd re qu ir e me nt t

hat th e state me nt “ re late to” the e ve nt, d e t e r m i n e a dm i s s i b i l i t y. 3. the utt e ra

nc e mus t re late to t

he c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he oc c ur re nc e pr e c e din g it. Tezeno , 48 4 S. W.2 d at 37 8; Se lle rs , 588 S.W .2d at 918. He then quotes Rule 803(2), whic h define s

an “ e xc it e d u tt e r an c e ” a s a “ s tate me n t r e lati n g to a s ta rtl in g e v e n t o r c o n d it io n ma d e while the decla rant wa s under the stre ss of excitement cause d by the eve nt or condition.” T EX . R. E V ID . 80 3( 2) . Comp ari ngthe a bo ve -q uo te d la ngua g e fr om Tezeno and Se lle rs with that of Rule 803(2), appellant c oncludes that “ [i ]t is clear that the ‘spontaneous utteranc e’ exception is not the same a s the ‘e x cited-utter ance ’ exception of Rule 803(2) .” We disag ree . The problem with a ppellant’s re asoning is that he is comparingthe succ inct definition of the Rule 803(2) exception with the C ourt’s compre hensive test of what was onc e ca lled the “spontane ous utteranc e” e x ception. An e x amination of the literat u re on the excited-utteranc e exception, however , reve als the s triking simi larity (per haps even a virtual identity , for purposes of the pre sent case ) betwee n the two exceptions. I ndeed, scholars writing about the excited-uttera nce exception often use the te rms “spontane ous” and “ excited” interc hang eably

. See, e .g., 2 S TE VEN G OODE ET AL ., su

pra note 4, § 803.3, at 185 (“ Tex as co u rts have a lway s rec og nized the hear say

e xce pti on fo r e xcit e d utte ra

nc e s or s p o n t an e o u s d e c l ar a t i o n s ” ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. M o r e i m p o r t a nt l y, in ex pl aini ngthe re qu ir e me nts of the e xcit e d- utt e ra

nc e e xce pti on , sc ho lars ide nti fy the same 6

conce rns ar

ticulated by this Court in Tezeno and Se lle rs , as shown in appe llant’s own above -quotedMcCARTY - Pag e 7

excerpt, for

the “spontane ous utteranc e” e x ception. Thus, our c oncer ns i n ap p l y i n g the excitedutteranc e exception continue to be the same a s those we had in applying the spontaneous-utter ance

e x c e p t i o n : t h a t( 1 ) t h e “ e x c i t i n g e v e n t ” s h o u l d b e s t art l i n g e n o u g h t o e v o k e a t r u l y spontaneous

re a c tio n f ro m th e de c lara

nt; (2 ) the re a c tio n to the sta rt lin g e ve nt sho uld be qu ic k e no ug h to avo id the possibilit y

of fa brication; and (3) the resulting statement should be suff iciently “re lated to” the startling e vent, to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of that statement. Compare su pr a no te 6 with a pp e lla nt’ s a bo ve -q uo te d e xce rp t f

ro m Tezeno and Se lle rs definingthe “spontane ous utteranc e” e x ception. Appellant also a

rgues that our de cision in A p o l i n a r v . S tat e , 1 55 S.W. 3d

18 4 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2005), supports his position that “the event producing the excited utteranc e must be the e vent about wh ic h th e utt e ra

nc e is m a de .” (E mph a sis a dd e d. ) H e re a so ns a s f oll ow s: The fact that the Apolinar Court did not utiliz e or r ely upon Se lle rs , Tezeno , [ Hunt v . S tate , 904 S.W .2d 813 (Tex. App.— For t Worth 1995, pet. ref’d) ] and [ Bondurant v . S tate , 956 S.W .2d 762 (Tex. App.— For t Worth 1997, pet. re f’d) ], m akes it cle ar that the rule of Tezeno , a s i n t e r p r e t e d b y Se lle rs , Hunt , Bondurant , and the Court of Appea ls in this case , has bee n repudiated . . . [and the] fact that the Apolinar Court adopted a n interpre tation of Rule 803(2) whic h demonstrates t hat the eve nt giving rise to the ex ci t ed u t t era nce mu st be the e vent about which the excited utteranc e speaks, de monstrates that t he int erpr etation of Se lle rs , Tezeno , Hu nt and Bondurant by the Court of Appe als in Mc Car ty is f a ult y , to sa y the le a st. (Emphasis in orig inal.) We disag ree . First, the f

act that this Court does not “utiliz e or rely upon” a case in deciding an appa rently related ca se, d o es not mean that we have “re pudiated” the case not mentioned. Mo re ov e r, we wo uld

no t ov e rr ule a wh ole lin e of

c a se s, e sp e c ia lly on e de a lin g wi th a c on c e pt s o w e ll established in both Texas and Fe dera l law as the e x cited/spontaneous- utteranc e exception, without

even me n t i o n i n g it. Thus, one may continue to re ly

on Tezeno , Se lle rs , Hunt , and BondurantMcCARTY - Pag e 8

Id. a t 18 6 ( “ We g ra

nte d r e vie w t o d e te rm ine wh e the r t he Court of Ap pe a ls e rr e d in 7 holding that a

hear say statement made four da

y s after a startlingevent c ould be admitted as a n excited utteranc e.”) conce rning the treatment of the pre sent excited-uttera nce e x ception. Second, ther e is nothing in Apolinar , and appe llant himself fails to cite t o an y thing in that op ini on , to su

pp or t his c la im that “ the e ve nt p ro du c ingthe e xcit e d utte ra nc e mus t be the e ve nt about which the utteranc e is made.” (Emphasis adde d.) In Apolinar , one Pelag io J imenez was attac ked and robbe d. He spoke about the incident, but the police could not unde rstand him because he spoke a par ticular diale ct of F ilipino and a small amount of Spanish, but could n o t understand or speak Eng lish. 155 S.W .3d at 185. He was taken to the hospital where he re mained “he avily medicate d, unconscious, or incohe rent,” id. , for four day s befor e he could s peak with his daug hter a nd tell her what had ha

ppened to him. The ma in issue presente d to us in that c ase was to determine whether the statement still qualified as an e x cited uttera nce in spite of t he rather gr eat length of time betwee n the startlin g ev en t (a ttack and r obbery ) and the statement (r ecountingthe eve nt to his daughte r). 7 Thus, we did not eve n addre ss the issue that appellant in the prese nt case claims that we de cided ( that

“ the e ve nt p ro du c ing

the e xcit e d utte ra

nc e mus t be the e ve nt about whi ch t he uttera

nce is made ” (empha sis added)) beca

use, in Apolinar , the state me nt i n question was about the sta rtling e vent itself. Conclusion I n light of our

fore g oing disc u s s ion, we hold that the trial c ourt had c orre ctly admitted the complainant’s state ment as an e x cited u t t er an ce under Te x as Rule of Evidenc e 803(2) . We, the re fo re , a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls. DEL I VERED: J UNE 25, 2008. PUB L I SH