J-S27032- 14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. SARA ALVISO Appellant No. 1539 WDA 2013 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered Septemb er 4 , 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at Nos: CP

- 33

- CR -0000587-2010,

CP

- 33

- CR -0000449-2012,
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, and STABILE, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2014 Appellant, Sara Alviso, appeals from the judgment of sentence the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County entered Sep tember 4, 2013, after revoking her probation/parole. Appellant arg ues the sentencing court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate sentence and for failing to adequately state its reasons for the sentence

. 1 Upon review, we affirm.

____________________________________________ 1 In her statement of questions involved on appeal, App ellant seems to challenge only the length of the sentence; in the arg ument section, however, Appellant raises an additional claim, not mentioned o r suggested in the statement of questions involved ( i.e. , trial court’s failure to adequately state the reasons for the sentence). Counsel is encouraged to more carefully review Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (no question will be consider ed unless stated in statement of questions involved or fairly suggested ther eby), and the (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-S27032- 14

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The underlying factual and procedural facts of this mat ter are not at issue here. Briefly, following probation/parole viol ations ( i.e. , failure to report and failure to make required payments), Appel lant was resentenced to, inter alia , a term of 1 to 2 years in a state correctional instit ution at docket number CR- 587 -2010, and a consecutive sentence of 11⁄2 to 3 years in a State Correctional Institution, at docket number CR- 449 -2012. Appellant argues the trial court imposed an excessive ag gregate sentence given the nature of the parole/probation vio lations and the original offenses. 2 Appellant’s Brief at 8. Specifically, Appellant conten ds “the consecutive sentences imposed by the lower court, which aggr egate to two and one-half (21⁄2) to five (5) years in a State Correct ional [Institution] are

e xcessive.” Id. Appellant also argues the “[trial c]ourt failed to state adequate reasons for the severity of the sentence.” Id. Appellant argues

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ consequences generally resulting from failing to adequat ely state the issues involved in the statement of questions involved. See , e.g. , Commonwealth v. Fremd , 860 A.2d 515, 523- 24 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“In his brief, appellant also argues that the police conduct was so outrageous as to bar conviction even if entrapment is not found. Ap pellant failed to raise this issue in the ‘Statement of Questions Involved’ port ion of hi s appellate brief and it is, therefore, waived.”).

2 At docket number CR- 587 -2010, Appellant pled guilty to theft by unlawful taking (M2), and sentenced to a term of incarceration of 30 days to a maximum of 1 year in the Jefferson County Jail; at d ocket number CR- 449

- 2012, Appellant pled guilty to theft by unlawful ta king (M1), and sentenced to two years’ probation.J-S27032- 14

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the sentences should be vacated and the case remanded for more appropriate sentencing. Id. We disagree. Ap pellant’s issues challenge the trial court’s sentencing dis cretion. To preserve a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sent ence, an appellant must file timely notice of appeal, preserve the argume nt in a timely postsentence motion or orally at sentencing, include a Pa.R. A.P. 2119(f) statement in the appellate brief, and raise a substant ial question. Commonwealth v. Dewey , 57 A.3d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here, it is undisputed Appellant timely filed a notice of a ppeal, timely filed a postsentence motion raising the discretionary issues, and in cluded a Pa.R.A.P.2119(f) statement in his brief. The only issu e is whether he raised a substantial question for our review. The determination of what constitutes a substantial quest ion must be evaluated on a case- by -case basis. See Commonwealth v. Paul , 925 A.2d 825 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exits only when the appellant adva nces a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of th e Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental n orms which underli e the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Griffin , 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotation and quotation marks omitted). Commonwealth v. Austin , 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013). Appellant merely states the aggregate sentence is excessi ve considering that the original “charges” were both misdemea nors and that the parole/probation violations were “not so serious.” Appel lant’s Brief at 8. Appellant fails to articulate “the existenc e of a substantial question byJ-S27032- 14

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advancing a colorable argument that the sentencing court ’s actions were inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code or violated a fundamental norm of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Kalichak , 943 A.2d 285, 289-90 (Pa. Super. 2008). We conclude, therefore, Appellant’s claim of excessiveness does not rai se a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Dodge , 77 A.3d 1263, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[A] bald claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive nature of a sentence will not raise a substan tial question.”) (citation omitted). Even if we were to conclude Appellant raised a substa ntial question for our review, the claim is nonetheless without merit. Ou r standard of review of a sentencing challenge is well-settled: Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed o n appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgme nt. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law , exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, preju dice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. Commonwealth v. Glass , 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). The trial court, contrary to Appellant’s contention, d id explain, on the record, and in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the reasons for the sentence imposed.J-S27032- 14

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[T]he [c]ourt did indeed explain its reasons for the se ntence, including why it believed [Appellant] could benefit f rom motivational boot camp. . . . Prior to sentencing, the [c]ourt reviewed a presentence investigation report prepared b y the Jefferson County Probation Department, and was adequ ately informed about [Appellant]. . . . The [c]ourt was a lso aware that her violation, while technical in nature, was a reflect ion of her general disregard for authority. . . . Having conclu ded that [Appella nt]’s obstinance [sic] was occasioned at least in part by a lack of discipline and not merely a criminogenic mindset, however, the [c]ourt by including a boot camp recommen dation at both cases, also afforded her the opportunity to re mediate her sentence. The recommendation was wholly contrary to he r current claim that the [c]ourt’s sentence was manifestly unreasonable or evidenced partiality, bias, prejudice o r ill-will. Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/13, at 1-2 (citations omitt ed). 3

____________________________________________ 3 The trial court, in its opinion, quoted from the not es of testimony of the sentencing hearing, where the court stated: It’s kind of one of those revocations where it doesn’t – you did not commit new charges this time. . . . However, it i s partially because you never complied while you were there. I kn ow you said you had financial reasons, but you didn’t do the call track. You didn’t pay . So I think those violations would happen again and then since, I as I see it, you were kind of cut a b reak initially to do this, to go to Arizona. It’s to vindicate the a uthority of the [c]ourt and so we don’t have any more violations. Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/13, at 1-2. The trial cou rt also cited Section 9771(c) of the Sentencing Code, which in relevant part provide: (c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.-- The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that: (1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or (Footnote Continued Next Page)J-S27032- 14

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In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in fashioning Appellant’s sentence, and adequ ately explained on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed. Accordin gly, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2014

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court. 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9771(c).