1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

LUCAS WALL,

Plaintiff, 

v.

RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE 

INSURANCE CO., et al.,

Defendants.

Civ. Action No. 20-2075

(EGS/GMH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Lucas Wall (“Mr. Wall”), proceeding pro se,

brings this lawsuit against Reliance Standard Life Insurance 

Company (“Reliance”) and Dr. Tajuddin Jiva, M.D. (“Dr. Jiva”) 

(collectively, “Defendants”), seeking damages following the 

termination of his disability benefits. Second Am. Compl., ECF 

No. 32;1 Wall v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. CV 20-2075 

(EGS), 2021 WL 2209405, at *12 (D.D.C. June 1, 2021). As 

relevant here, Mr. Wall alleges one count of medical malpractice 

against Dr. Jiva. See Wall, 2021 WL 2209405, at *12.

On February 1, 2022, the Court referred this case to a 

magistrate judge for full case management, see Minute Order 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of 

the filed documents.
2

(Feb. 1, 2022); and the case was randomly assigned to Magistrate 

Judge G. Michael Harvey, see Docket Civ. Action No. 20-2075. Dr. 

Jiva thereafter moved for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss 

the count against him. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Mot. J. 

Pleadings Dismiss Count VII of Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73. On 

July 5, 2022, Magistrate Judge Harvey issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R. & R.”) recommending that the Court grant Dr. 

Jiva’s motion. See R. & R., ECF No. 83.

Pending before the Court are Mr. Wall’s Objections to the 

R. & R., see Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate’s R. & R. on Def. Tajuddin 

Jiva’s Mot. J. Pleadings (“Pl.’s Objs.”), ECF No. 84; and Mr. 

Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order, 

see Pl.’s Mot. Vacate Part of Ct.’s June 1, 2021, Order & 

Reinstate Counts II & IV of Second Am. Compl. Against Def. 

Tajuddin Jiva (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 85. Upon careful 

consideration of the R. & R., the objections, and opposition 

thereto; the motion and opposition thereto; the applicable law; 

and the entire record herein, the Court hereby ADOPTS Magistrate 

Judge Harvey’s R. & R., see ECF No. 83; GRANTS Dr. Jiva’s Motion 

for Judgment on the Pleadings, see ECF No. 73; and DENIES Mr. 

Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order, 

see ECF No. 85.
3

II. Background

A. Factual

The background of this litigation was set forth in the 

Court’s prior opinion and will not be repeated here. See Wall, 

2021 WL 2209405, at *1. In short, Mr. Wall alleges that Reliance 

underwrites and administers his long-term disability benefits 

through a policy for the employees of the American Association 

of State Highway & Transportation Officials, by whom he was 

employed from June 2008 until March 2012. See Second Am. Compl., 

ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 1-2. In March 2012, Mr. Wall became “Totally 

Disabled” due to Non-24-Hour Sleep/Wake Disorder. Id. ¶ 1. He 

received long-term disability benefits until January 29, 2020, 

when Reliance notified him that it was terminating his benefits. 

Id. ¶ 11. 

On April 30, 2020, Mr. Wall appealed Reliance’s termination 

decision. Id. ¶ 15. He alleges that Reliance then commissioned a 

“peer review” by Dr. Jiva and that he submitted a rebuttal to 

Dr. Jiva’s report. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Reliance denied his appeal on 

July 29, 2020. Id. ¶ 20. Thereafter, Reliance had Mr. Wall 

undergo an Independent Medical Examination, after which the 

termination of his benefits was reversed. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. 

B. Procedural

On April 5, 2022, Dr. Jiva moved for judgment on the 

pleadings. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Mot. J. Pleadings 
4

Dismiss Count VII of Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73. Mr. Wall 

filed a brief in opposition on April 24, 2022, see Pl.’s Opp’n 

Def. Tajuddin Jiva’s Mot. J. Pleadings, ECF No. 75; and Dr. Jiva 

filed his reply brief on May 2, 2022, see Def. Tajuddin Jiva, 

M.D.’s Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Dismiss Count 

VII, Pl.’s Medical Malpractice Claim, from Second Am. Compl., 

ECF No. 77. On July 5, 2022, Magistrate Judge Harvey issued his 

R. & R. recommending that the Court grant Dr. Jiva’s motion. See

R. & R., ECF No. 83.

On July 19, 2022, Mr. Wall submitted Objections to the R. & 

R. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84. Dr. Jiva filed an opposition 

brief on August 2, 2022. See Def., Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Resp. 

Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s R. & R. (#83) on Def.’s Mot. J. 

Pleadings (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 87.

Mr. Wall also filed a Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s 

June 1, 2021 Order on July 20, 2022. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85.

Dr. Jiva filed his opposition on August 2, 2022. See Def., 

Tajuddin Jiva, M.D.’s, Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. (#85) Vacate Part of 

Ct.’s June 1, 2021 Order (#26) (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 86.

The objections and the motion are now ripe and ready for 

adjudication.
5

III. Legal Standard

A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R. & R.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party 

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has 

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(2). 

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended 

disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C) (“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.”). A district court “must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition 

that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or general 

objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the 

Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for clear error.” Houlahan v. 

Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous 

standard, the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great 

deference” and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire 

evidence the court is left with the definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia, 

No. CV 16-1920 (CKK), 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 

2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Graham v. 

Mukasey, 608 F. Supp. 2d 50, 52 (D.D.C. 2009)).
6

Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the 

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made 

and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections 

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the 

magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected to’ and are 

therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991 

F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Astrue, No. 

08-2133, 2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009)). The 

Court reviews Mr. Wall’s objections de novo.

B. Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

“[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay 

trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(c). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriately 

granted when, at the close of the pleadings, “no material issue 

of fact remains to be solved, and [the movant] is clearly 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montanans for Multiple 

Use v. Barbouletos, 542 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2008) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

When evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

under Rule 12(c), courts employ the same standard that governs a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. 

Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35–36 (D.D.C. 2004). A court must 

treat the factual allegations in the complaint as true, “even if 
7

doubtful in fact,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007); but it need not accept as true legal conclusions set 

forth in a complaint, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). Accordingly, a court must accept the plaintiff’s wellpleaded factual allegations to the extent that “they plausibly 

give rise to an entitlement to relief,” id. at 679; and “may 

thus only grant judgment on the pleadings if it appears, even 

accepting as true all inferences from the complaint’s factual 

allegations, that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts 

entitling him to relief,” Lans v. Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg 

LLP, 786 F. Supp. 2d 240, 265 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing In re United 

Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F. Supp. 914, 

915 (D.D.C. 1994)).

C. Motion to Vacate Order

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs Mr. Wall’s

Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 2021 Order, ECF No. 

85, because the Court has not entered a final judgment. Shapiro 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. CV 13-555 (RDM), 2016 WL 3023980, at 

*2 (D.D.C. May 25, 2016) (applying Rule 54(b) to a motion for 

reconsideration “[b]ecause the Court ha[d] not entered final 

judgment”). Under Rule 54(b), “the Court [may] revisit any order 

that adjudicates ‘fewer than all the claims or rights and 

liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . at any time 
8

before’ the entry of final judgment.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 54(b)). 

The standard for determining whether or not to grant a Rule 

54(b) motion is the “as justice requires” standard. Jud. Watch 

v. Dep’t of Army, 466 F. Supp. 2d 112, 123 (D.D.C. 2006). Under 

this flexible standard, the Court considers “whether the court 

patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the 

adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to 

consider controlling decisions or data, or whether a controlling 

or significant change in the law has occurred.” In Def. of 

Animals v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 543 F. Supp. 2d 70, 75 

(D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Montgomery v. Internal Revenue Serv., 356 F. Supp. 3d 74, 79 

(D.D.C. 2019), aff’d, 40 F.4th 702 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[T]here 

must be some ‘good reason’ to reconsider an issue already 

litigated by the parties and decided by the court, such as new 

information, a misunderstanding, or a clear error.”).

The moving party has the burden of demonstrating “‘that 

some harm, legal or at least tangible, would flow from a denial 

of reconsideration.’” In Def. of Animals, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 76 

(quoting Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 540 (D.D.C. 

2005)). “[E]ven if justice does not require reconsideration of 

an interlocutory ruling, a decision to reconsider is nonetheless 

within the court’s discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
9

omitted). However, this discretion is “limited by the law of the 

case doctrine and ‘subject to the caveat that where litigants 

have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither 

be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it 

again.’” Id. (quoting Singh v. George Wash. Univ., 383 F. Supp. 

2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005)).

D. Pro Se Litigants

“[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in 

all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress, 

No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5, 

2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The 

pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally 

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per 

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even 

so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 

F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply 

with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239; 

Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2. 
10

III. Analysis

A. New York Law Governs Mr. Wall’s Medical Malpractice 

Claim

Mr. Wall objects to Magistrate Judge Harvey’s conclusion 

that New York substantive law should govern this dispute and 

argues that District of Columbia substantive law should apply 

instead. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 7-10. For the reasons 

that follow, the Court concludes that New York law applies to 

Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim and ADOPTS this portion of 

Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R.

To resolve Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim against Dr. 

Jiva, the Court first must determine whether New York or 

District of Columbia law governs the dispute.2 Magistrate Judge 

Harvey resolved the dispute in favor of New York law on two 

grounds: (1) New York law applies because the parties implicitly 

agree that New York law applies, see R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 6-7; 

and (2) New York law applies because New York has a greater 

interest in applying its law to this dispute, see id. at 8-12. 

Mr. Wall objects to both conclusions, see Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 

84 at 7-10; and the Court addresses each objection in turn.

2 As Magistrate Judge Harvey explained in the R. & R., New York 

and District of Columbia law are the only options to resolve 

this choice-of-law question. See R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 6 & n.4. 

The medical malpractice claim involves Dr. Jiva, who is a 

resident of New York, and Mr. Wall, who is a resident of the 

District of Columbia. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 at 2.
11

1. The Parties’ Agreement

Mr. Wall first argues that he did not agree—implicitly or 

otherwise—that New York law governs this dispute. See id. at 7-

8. He contends that, as a pro se litigant, he did not waive or 

forfeit any choice-of-law arguments because he “ha[s] no concept 

of ‘choice of law’” and is “therefore entitled to deference in 

raising these arguments now.” Id. at 7. For further support, he 

points to his briefing on Dr. Jiva’s motion and reasons that his 

reference to the law of other jurisdictions—including, for 

example, Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, 

Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, and 

Virginia—confirms that he did not understand the choice-of-law 

question. Id. at 7-8 (citing R. & R., ECF No. 83 at 7). Dr. Jiva 

responds that Mr. Wall waived any argument that District of 

Columbia law applies here because he did not raise that argument 

in his Rule 12(c) opposition briefing. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 87 

at 2 (citing Essroc Cement Corp. v. CTI/D.C., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 

2d 131, 138-39 (D.D.C. 2010); Am. Civ. Constr., LLC v. Fort Myer 

Constr. Corp., 296 F. Supp. 3d 198, 203-04 (D.D.C. 2018)). He 

further argues that Mr. Wall’s ignorance of choice-of-law 

principles is no excuse. See id.

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey’s analysis 

and conclusion. In deciding a choice-of-law question, a court 

may apply the law of the jurisdiction that the parties agree 
12

governs the dispute. See Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 

591, 626 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (applying Delaware law where 

parties agreed to apply Delaware law); Am. Civ. Constr., LLC, 

296 F. Supp. 3d at 204 (applying District of Columbia law to 

contract dispute where parties “appear[ed] to implicitly agree” 

that District of Columbia law should govern). The parties’ 

agreement also serves as waiver of any objection to the court’s 

application of that law. See Perry Cap. LLC, 864 F.3d at 626 

n.24. Here, the parties—including Mr. Wall—have agreed that New 

York law should govern the medical malpractice claim. Dr. Jiva 

argued that New York law should apply in his Motion for Judgment 

on the Pleadings. See Mem. in Supp. of Def. Tajuddin Jiva, 

M.D.’s Mot. J. Pleadings Dismiss Count VII, Pl.’s Medical 

Malpractice Claim, from Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 73-1 at 4-6.

Mr. Wall accepted that New York law would govern this claim in 

his opposition brief. See Pl.’s Opp’n Def. Tajuddin Jiva’s Mot. 

J. Pleadings, ECF No. 75 at 3 (“There are four basic elements of 

a compensable medical malpractice claim in New York.”); id. at 4 

(“Dr. Jiva ignores that New York law defines medical misconduct 

as including ‘Practicing the profession with gross negligence on 

a particular occasion’ and ‘Practicing the profession with gross 

incompetence.’” (quoting N.Y. Educ. Law § 6530)); id. at 8 

(“There is no distinction in New York between malpractice 

insurance available to doctors performing independent medical 
13

exams than to those practicing medicine in more traditional 

contexts.” (citing Bazakos v. Lewis, 911 N.E.2d 847 (N.Y. 

2009))). Mr. Wall did not suggest that the law of any 

jurisdiction other than New York should apply to this claim, 

thereby conceding that New York law governs. See Buggs v. 

Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 141 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is 

understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an 

opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain 

arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those 

arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” 

(citing FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 

Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2002))).

Mr. Wall’s status as a pro se plaintiff does not change the 

Court’s conclusion. True, the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff 

are “subject to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers.’” Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. 

Cir. 2002) (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520). Nevertheless, the 

Court cannot ignore the fact that Mr. Wall failed to address Dr. 

Jiva’s specific argument that New York law applies to the 

medical malpractice claim. See Boritz v. United States, 685 F. 

Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.D.C. 2010) (treating argument as conceded 

where pro se plaintiff failed to respond to it despite 

submitting an opposition brief). Nor can it avoid Mr. Wall’s 

specific references to New York law. See supra. The Court is 
14

therefore satisfied that Mr. Wall agreed that New York law

governs his medical malpractice claim. 

2. Choice-of-Law Analysis

Mr. Wall also objects to Magistrate Judge Harvey’s choiceof-law analysis. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 8-10. He 

concedes, as he must, that Magistrate Judge Harvey relied on the 

appropriate legal standard. Id. at 8-9. That is: a federal court 

sitting in diversity must “apply the choice-of-law rules of the 

jurisdiction in which they sit.” Ideal Elec. Sec. Co. v. Int’l 

Fid. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lee v.

Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1278–79 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).

District of Columbia law requires that the Court first determine 

whether a “true conflict” exists between the laws of the 

jurisdictions. See Margolis v. U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 

2d 91, 100 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Estate of Doe v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2011); 

Sloan v. Urban Title Servs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 2d 123, 132 

(D.D.C. 2010); GEICO v. Fetisoff, 958 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir.

1992)). Where, as here, there is a true conflict, the Court 

applies the District of Columbia’s “‘modified governmental 

interests analysis which seeks to identify the jurisdiction with 

the most significant relationship to the dispute.’” Id. (quoting 

Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 180 (D.C.

2006)). Under this approach, the Court considers four factors:
15

(1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the 

conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile or place 

of business of the parties, and (4) the place where the parties’ 

relationship is centered. See Drs. Groover, Christie & Merritt, 

P.C. v. Burke, 917 A.2d 1110, 1117 (D.C. 2007) (citing 

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145). “As a rule, 

‘the state with the most significant relationship should also be 

the state whose policy is advanced by application of [its] 

law.’” Id. at 1118 (quoting Hercules & Co. Ltd. v. Shama Rest. 

Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 41 n.18 (D.C. 1989)).

Mr. Wall objects to four points in the R. & R. See Pl.’s 

Objs., ECF No. 84 at 8-10. First, he argues that Magistrate 

Judge Harvey incorrectly determined that the first factor—the 

place where the injury occurred—weighs in favor of New York. See

id. at 8. He contends that the injury occurred in the District 

of Columbia because that is “where [he] reside[s] and was forced 

to do without half [his] income after [his] long-term disability 

benefits were revoked as a result of Dr. Jiva’s shoddy peer 

review.” Id. Dr. Jiva does not specifically address this point 

in his opposition briefing. See generally Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 

87. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey 

that this factor does not support either jurisdiction. See R. & 

R., ECF No. 83 at 11-12. As the Court explained in its prior 

Memorandum Opinion, Mr. Wall’s medical malpractice claim “is not 
16

related to the denial of benefits, but rather alleges that Dr. 

Jiva’s conduct breached the applicable standard of care.” Wall, 

2021 WL 2209405, at *11. This point is essential: Mr. Wall’s 

medical malpractice claim survived because it did not conflict 

with the provisions or object of ERISA. See id. The claim did 

not conflict with ERISA because it focused on an injury other 

than the denial of benefits. See id. As such, the Court is 

persuaded that the injury for this claim must have occurred when 

Dr. Jiva transmitted his report to Reliance, not when Mr. Wall 

was denied his benefits. See id. Because Dr. Jiva transmitted 

his report from New York to Pennsylvania, New York does not have 

a strong claim on this factor. Further, because the transmission 

of the report did not involve the District of Columbia, the 

District of Columbia does not have a claim on this factor 

either. The Court therefore concludes that Magistrate Judge 

Harvey correctly determined that the first factor does not 

support application of the law of either jurisdiction.

Second, Mr. Wall contends that the second factor—the place 

where the conduct causing the injury occurred—favors application 

of District of Columbia law. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 9-

10. Specifically, he argues that Dr. Jiva’s conduct “directly 

led” to his injuries. Id. at 10. This argument is unpersuasive. 

The inquiry is where Dr. Jiva’s conduct occurred. Because Dr. 

Jiva acted in New York, this second factor points in favor of 
17

New York law. See Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 ¶ 256 (stating 

that Defendant Jiva “practices in New York”); Ex. 22, ECF No.

21-22 at 2 (stating that Dr. Jiva’s “[r]eport was written in New 

York state”).

Third, Mr. Wall argues that the fourth factor—the place 

where the parties’ relationship is centered—should weigh in 

favor of District of Columbia law. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 

at 9. He does not explain this objection. See generally id.

Because the Court detects no error in the R. & R., the Court 

agrees with Magistrate Judge Harvey that the parties’ 

relationship is centered in New York. See Houlahan, 979 F. Supp. 

2d at 88 (“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or 

general objections, . . . the Court reviews the [R. & R.] only 

for clear error.”). 

Fourth, Mr. Wall contends that the District of Columbia has 

the stronger interest in having its law applied to this claim. 

See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 9. He points to: (1) “the general 

public policy interest of ensuring that D.C. residents receive 

adequate medical care and are not injured by physicians who are 

sworn to help people”; (2) the “special concern” that people 

with disabilities “receive[] the disability benefits to which 

[they are] entitled”; and (3) the financial harm the 

jurisdiction suffers when people with disabilities who are 

denied disability benefits become public charges. Id. Mr. Wall 
18

has misconstrued the caselaw here. The Court of Appeals for the 

District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has explained that 

“‘[t]he state where the defendant’s conduct occurs has the 

dominant interest in regulating it,’ . . . particularly so 

where, as here, it is impossible meaningfully to separate the 

injury from the tortious conduct, and where other factors—such 

as the residence or place of business of the parties—do not 

point in the opposite direction.” Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 

639, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Biscoe v. Arlington Cnty., 

738 F.2d 1352, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Restatement (Second) of 

Conflict of Laws § 146). Here, Dr. Jiva’s conduct occurred in 

New York. Further, the fourth factor also weighs in favor of 

application of New York law, and the first and third factors do 

not favor application of the law of either jurisdiction. See

supra. Accordingly, New York has the stronger interest in having 

its law applied to this medical malpractice claim. See also Drs. 

Groover, Christie & Merritt, 917 A.2d at 1118 (“As a rule, ‘the 

state with the most significant relationship should also be the 

state whose policy is advanced by application of [its] law.’” 

(quoting Hercules, 566 A.2d at 41 n.18)).

The Court therefore concludes that New York law governs Mr. 

Wall’s medical malpractice claim and ADOPTS this portion of 

Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R.
19

B. The Court Will Not Permit Mr. Wall to Pursue His 

Previously Dismissed Negligence and Bad Faith Claims 

Against Dr. Jiva 

Mr. Wall asks the Court to “reinstate” his negligence and 

bad faith claims against Dr. Jiva. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 

at 1-7; Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1-8. He admits “uncertainty as 

to how the Court must achieve th[is] result,” Pl.’s Objs., ECF 

No. 84 at 6; and provides two routes: (1) reject Magistrate 

Judge Harvey’s recommendation that the Court grant Dr. Jiva’s 

motion and instead convert the medical malpractice claim into a 

negligence claim, see id. at 1-7; or (2) vacate the Court’s June 

1, 2021 Order dismissing Counts II and IV of the Second Amended 

Complaint and reinstate those claims against Dr. Jiva, see Pl.’s 

Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1-8. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES

Mr. Wall’s motion.

1. Magistrate Judge Harvey Appropriately Considered 

Only Mr. Wall’s Medical Malpractice Claim Against 

Dr. Jiva

Mr. Wall first argues that, upon concluding that a 

physician-patient relationship did not exist, Magistrate Judge 

Harvey should have reinstated his negligence and bad faith 

claims against Dr. Jiva instead of granting Dr. Jiva judgment on 

the pleadings. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 1-7. He reasons 

that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate because the 

Second Amended Complaint contains material facts that Dr. Jiva 

did not dispute. See id. at 2-3. He further contends that 
20

Magistrate Judge Harvey erred by failing to consider whether the 

medical malpractice claim could be converted into negligence and 

bad faith claims given the caselaw in New York permitting the 

latter two claims to proceed without the existence of a 

physician-patient relationship. See id. at 3-6.

The Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Harvey 

appropriately recommended that Dr. Jiva be granted judgment on 

the pleadings. As explained supra, Magistrate Judge Harvey 

correctly determined that there was no physician-patient 

relationship between Mr. Wall and Dr. Jiva. The facts Mr. Wall 

discusses in his Objections to the R. & R. go to the elements of 

a medical malpractice claim. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 84 at 1-7. 

But because “‘[l]iability for medical malpractice may not be 

imposed in the absence of a physician-patient relationship,’” 

Blau v. Benodin, 140 N.Y.S.3d 576, 579 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021) 

(quoting Thomas v. Hermoso, 973 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (N.Y. App. 

Div. 2013)); Dr. Jiva did not need to establish anything else to 

succeed in his motion.

The only appropriate action for the Court to take, then, is 

to grant Dr. Jiva judgment on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(c). Magistrate Judge Harvey had no occasion to consider 

taking any other action, including reinstating claims that this 

Court previously dismissed, because Dr. Jiva’s motion was the 

only motion before him. See Docket for Civ. Action No. 20-2075. 
21

Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Harvey’s 

recommendation that the Court grant Dr. Jiva judgment on the 

pleadings. 

2. The Court Agrees with Its Prior Decision to 

Dismiss Mr. Wall’s Negligence and Bad Faith 

Claims Against Dr. Jiva

Mr. Wall has also filed a motion asking the Court to vacate 

the part of its June 1, 2021 Order dismissing his negligence and 

bad faith claims against Dr. Jiva. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85. 

The Court construes the Motion to Vacate as a motion for 

reconsideration under Rule 54(b). See Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Just., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 n.8 (D.D.C. 2002) (noting that Rule 

54(b) supplies the appropriate standard where a party asks the 

court to alter or amend an interlocutory judgment). Rule 54(b) 

provides that an order or decision which “adjudicates fewer than 

all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all

the parties” is subject to revision “at any time before the 

entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the 

parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A Rule 

54(b) motion for reconsideration should be granted “as justice 

requires.” Cobell, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 539. What “justice 

requires” depends on the circumstances. Id. For example, justice 

may require revision of a prior opinion and order when the Court 

“has patently misunderstood a party,” has made a decision 

outside the scope of the issues presented by the parties, “has 
22

made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension,” or where 

there has been a significant or controlling change in the law or 

facts since the issue was submitted to the Court. Id. (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has broad 

discretion in ruling on a Rule 54(b) motion for reconsideration.

Id.

As a preliminary matter, Dr. Jiva argues that Mr. Wall’s 

Motion to Vacate is untimely. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 86 at 3, 5-

6. He contends that “[t]here is significant undue delay [in Mr. 

Wall’s] request, as the matter has been pending for almost two 

years and Defendant Jiva’s Motion for Judgment has been pending 

for approximately four (4) months.” Id. at 5 (citing Smith v. 

Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1135 (4th Cir. 1997); Molovinsky v. 

Monterey Co-Op, Inc., 689 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C. 1996)). He also 

compares this motion to a motion for leave to amend a complaint 

after summary judgment has been granted and points to the 

caselaw denying such motions to amend where, as here, “the 

[p]laintiff has waited many years before seeking amendments or 

summary judgment has already been granted.” Id. (citing Gillard 

v. Gruenberg, 302 F. Supp. 3d 257, 273 (D.D.C. 2018)).

The Court declines to find Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate to 

be untimely. The Federal Rules do not establish a deadline for 

filing a Rule 54(b) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Court 

finds no occasion to impose a deadline here. Dr. Jiva’s 
23

citations are unpersuasive: Smith involves a federal habeas 

petition, Smith, 111 F.3d at 1128, 1135; and Molovinsky involves 

state court rules on amending a complaint, Molovinsky, 689 A.2d 

at 533-34 (discussing D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 15). This 

motion is also unlike a motion for leave to amend a complaint; 

Mr. Wall is instead asking the Court to revise its prior

Memorandum Opinion and Order so that he may pursue claims he has 

already attempted to add to his complaint. See Second Am. 

Compl., ECF 32. The Court therefore will proceed to the merits 

of the motion.

Mr. Wall contends that the Court must allow him to pursue 

his negligence and bad faith claims because it “is not in the 

interest of justice” for him to be left without a remedy against 

Dr. Jiva. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 1. As to the negligence 

claim, he first argues that “the Court did not offer any 

analysis of the claim specifically against Dr. Jiva” and instead 

determined that ERISA preempted the negligence claim against 

Reliance. Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 2 (citing Wall, 2021 WL 

2209405, at *9). He reasons that, like his medical malpractice 

claim, his negligence claim against Dr. Jiva does not “relate 

to” an ERISA plan. Id. at 5 (citing Padeh v. Zagoria, 900 F. 

Supp. 442, 445, 447 (S.D. Fla. 1995)). Mr. Wall has misread the 

Court’s prior Memorandum Opinion. There, the Court specifically 

considered his negligence claims against Reliance, Dr. Brodner, 
24

and Dr. Jiva. Wall, 2021 WL 2209405, at *9. The Court determined 

that none of these claims would survive a motion to dismiss 

because the claims “ask the Court to review the manner in which 

the termination decision was made” and thus seek to “supplement[ 

] . . . the ERISA civil enforcement remedy.” Id. (quoting Aetna 

Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004)). The Court 

agrees with its previous reasoning that the negligence claim 

against Dr. Jiva is preempted. Because a preempted claim would 

not survive a motion to dismiss, the Court correctly denied Mr. 

Wall’s motion for leave to amend his complaint to add this 

claim. See James Madison Ltd. By Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 

1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Courts may deny a motion to amend a 

complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not 

survive a motion to dismiss.” (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 

178 (1962))).

Mr. Wall further argues that the Court failed to consider:

New York caselaw permitting negligence claims when plaintiffs 

cannot pursue medical malpractice claims, the allegations he has 

made against Dr. Jiva, and the elements of a negligence claim.

See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 2-6. The Court does not need to 

consider any of these arguments. A plaintiff may not maintain a 

state-law claim where, as here, it is preempted by ERISA. See

Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. 312, 319-20 (2016).
25

The Court therefore DENIES Mr. Wall’s motion as to his 

negligence claim.

As to the bad faith claim, Mr. Wall accuses the Court of 

dismissing the claim without citing any authority or explaining 

its reasoning. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 85 at 6. He contends that 

he “state[d] [his] case for bad faith” in the Second Amended 

Complaint and that he incorporated his bad faith claim from his 

New York State Department of Health complaint into the Second 

Amended Complaint. Id. at 5-6 (citing Second Am. Compl., ECF No.

32 ¶¶ 119, 176, 177-83). He also argues that the Rule 15(a)(2) 

standard requires that the Court allow him to maintain this 

claim. Id. at 8 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). 

Again, Mr. Wall has misread the Court’s prior Memorandum 

Opinion. There, the Court explained: “As to his claims for ‘bad 

faith’ against . . . Dr. Jiva, Mr. Wall has presented no 

authority supporting a common law cause of action for ‘bad 

faith’ under District of Columbia law based on the allegations 

in the Amended Complaint, and the Court is aware of none.” Wall, 

2021 WL 2209405, at *6. Having reviewed the Second Amended 

Complaint and incorporated materials again, the Court agrees 

with its prior analysis. In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. 

Wall discusses bad faith claims—but only against insurance 

companies. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 119-174. He does not 

provide any legal authority for his claim against Dr. Jiva, see
26

id. ¶¶ 176-77; and the papers he incorporates do not supply that 

authority either, see Ex. 22, ECF No. 21-22 at 24-25. By failing 

to cite any legal authority, Mr. Wall failed to provide a theory 

of liability and therefore failed to state a claim to relief. 

See Young v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. CV 17-02428 (JDB), 2018 WL 

3941948, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2018) (dismissal was warranted 

where complaint did not include the specific causes of action 

under which the plaintiffs were suing). Accordingly, the Court 

DENIES Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate as to his bad faith claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS 

Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R., see ECF No. 83; GRANTS Dr. 

Jiva’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, see ECF No. 73; and 

DENIES Mr. Wall’s Motion to Vacate Part of the Court’s June 1, 

2021 Order, see ECF No. 85. An appropriate Order accompanies 

this Memorandum Opinion.

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan

United States District Judge

March 27, 2023