alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Mair, Appellant, vs. Schultz, Respondent.

*December 7, 1927*

January *10, 1928.*

*Frauds, statute of: Oral agreement to extend note: Consideration: Interest paid in advance.*

1. An agreement for the extension of the time for payment of a note under which the maker was to pay one per cent, additional interest annually is void where it is not in writing, because it is not to be performed within one year and is not based on an executed consideration, p. 579.

2. Such agreement is not based on an executed consideration so as to take it out of the statute of frauds, where, though the interest was in fact paid before it was due, there was no showing that such payment in advance was the consideration for the extension, p. 579.

Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Columbia county: Chester A. Fowler, Circuit Judge.

*Affirmed.*

Suit upon a note by *T. H. Mair*against *Otto Schultz,*an accommodation maker. From a judgment for the defendant the plaintiff appeals.

The note was a judgment note which contains an express consent “that time of payment may be extended without notice thereof to any of the sureties of this note.” A judgment on cognovit was entered more than six years after the date when the note became due. This judgment was vacated and the defendant was permitted to come in and defend.

/. /. *McManamy*of Madison, for the appellant.

*Henry A. Gunderson*of Portage, for the respondent.

Stevens, J.

(1) The liability of the defendant *Schultz*turns on the question whether recovery is barred by the six-year statute of limitations. That in turn depends on the question whether there was a valid extension of the time of payment.

The finding of the trial court that the maker and the plaintiff agreed that the time of payment should be extended *579in consideration of the agreement on the part of the maker to pay one per cent, additional interest annually is supported by the greater weight of the evidence. Basing his decision upon *Braasch v. Bonde,*191 Wis. 414, 421, 211 N. W. 281, the trial court correctly held that such agreement for an extension of time was void because the agreement was not in writing and was not to be performed within one year and was not based upon an executed consideration.

(2) Appellant’s chief contention is that the extension was based upon an executed consideration, that is, the payment of interest in advance. Interest was in fact paid before it was due. Had the parties agreed that the time should be extended in consideration of the payment of interest in advance, that would have constituted an executed consideration thát would have taken the agreement out of the statute of frauds. *Grace v. Lynch,*80 Wis. 166, 49 N. W. 751. But the record is barren of any proof that payment of interest in advance was the consideration for the agreement to extend the time of payment.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                       7,612,057
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  508,550
<ALLOWANCES>                                    94,908
<INVENTORY>                                    887,749
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,991,109
<PP&E>                                         757,382
<DEPRECIATION>                                 480,205
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,405,634
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,011,934
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        10,408
<OTHER-SE>                                  16,226,364
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,405,634
<SALES>                                        970,260
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,611,932
<CGS>                                          687,993
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  687,993
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,564,009
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,411,773
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,411,773
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,411,773
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .36
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .36
        

</TABLE>
August 2023

Natural Resources Conservation Service

Helping People Help the Land 

USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer, and lender.

Conservation Practice Overview

Watering Facility (Code 614) 

A watering facility is a means of providing drinking water to

livestock or wildlife. 

Practice Information 

A watering facility is used to provide livestock and/or wildlife

with drinking water to meet their daily needs. Proper

location of a trough improves animal distribution and

vegetation associated with the watering facility. A watering

facility is sometimes installed to keep livestock out of

streams and other surface water areas where water quality is a concern. 

This practice applies to all land uses where there is a need for a watering facility for livestock and/or

wildlife, where there is a source of water that is adequate in quantity and quality, and where soils and

topography are suitable for a facility. 

The water source may be a well, spring, stream, pond, municipal water supply, or other source,

including water hauled from offsite, in some situations. A tank can be installed to store water to supply

the trough. A watering ramp can be used to provide controlled access to a pond or stream. 

This practice has a minimum expected life of 10 years. Operation and maintenance of the watering

facility includes cleaning, repair or replacement of damaged components, ensuring adequate inflow

and outflow, and winterizing. If a portable trough is used,operation and maintenance includes moving

the trough and monitoring the condition of the associated vegetation. 

Common Associated Practices 

Watering Facility is commonly used with other NRCS Conservation Practice Standards such as Water

Well (Code 642), Livestock Pipeline (Code 516), Spring Development (Code 574), Fence (Code 382),

Trails and Walkways (Code 575), Pond (Code 378), Heavy Use Area Protection (Code 561), and

Prescribed Grazing (Code 528). 

For further information, contact your local NRCS field office.
# C_2005057EN.01000901.xml

| 5.3.2005 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 57/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.3.2005

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 57/9

---

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Second Chamber)

of 20 January 2005

in Case C-296/03 (reference for a preliminary ruling by the Conseil d'État): Glaxosmithkline SA v État Belge (1)

1

(Directive 89/105/EEC - Medicinal products for human use - Application for entry on a positive list - Nature of the time-limit for responding - Mandatory nature - Consequences of exceeding the time-limit where a decision refusing entry is annulled)

(2005/C 57/16)

Language of the case: French

In Case C-296/03: reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC by the Conseil d'État (Belgium) by decision of 27 June 2003, received at the Court on 8 July 2003, in the proceedings Glaxosmithkline SA v État Belge – the Court: (Second Chamber), composed of C.W.A. Timmermans, President of the Chamber, R. Silva de Lapuerta (Rapporteur), C. Gulmann, P. Kūris and G. Arestis, Judges; A. Tizzano, Advocate General, M. Múgica Arzamendi, Principal Administrator, for the Registrar, has given a judgment on 20 January 2005, the operative part of which is as follows:

| 1. | The time-limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Council Directive 89/105/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance systems is a mandatory time-limit which the national authorities are not entitled to exceed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The time-limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Council Directive 89/105/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to the transparency of measures regulating the pricing of medicinal products for human use and their inclusion in the scope of national health insurance systems is a mandatory time-limit which the national authorities are not entitled to exceed.

| 2. | It is for the Member States to determine whether the fact that the time-limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 89/105 is exceeded precludes the competent authorities from formally adopting a new decision when the previous decision has been annulled in court proceedings, although such a possibility can be exercised only within a reasonable time which may not in any event exceed the time-limit laid down in that article. |
| --- | --- |

2.

It is for the Member States to determine whether the fact that the time-limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 89/105 is exceeded precludes the competent authorities from formally adopting a new decision when the previous decision has been annulled in court proceedings, although such a possibility can be exercised only within a reasonable time which may not in any event exceed the time-limit laid down in that article.

---

(1)  OJ C 213 of 06.09.2003.

1

---
#### Loesing, Respondent, vs. Muhs Baking Company, Appellant.

For the appellant: *G. E. Ostrander*of Sheboygan.

For the respondent: *Werner & Clemens*of Sheboygan.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
Argued and submitted July 27,

affirmed as modified September 21, 1983

#### In the Matter of Lesslie Lessaos, a child, STATE ex rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF POLK COUNTY, *Respondent, v.*LESSAOS, *Appellant.*

(J-3480; CA A26598)

669 P2d 339

Lane P. Shetterly, Dallas, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Shetterly, Irick & Shetterly, Dallas.

William F. Nessly, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and William F. Gary, Solicitor General, Salem.

Before Gillette, Presiding Judge, and Warden and Young, Judges.

PER CURIAM.

*627PER CURIAM

Appellant, a juvenile, appeals from a juvenile court order committing him to the Juvenile Training School. He assigns as error, *inter alia,*that portion of the court’s order that requires him to pay restitution. He contends that the juvenile court has no authority to require him to pay restitution when it also commits him to the Juvenile Training School. We agree. The pertinent statute, ORS 419.507(l)(a),1 authorizes an order of restitution “as a condition of probation.” Commitment to the Juvenile Training School is not probation. *Accord, State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Kreinbring,*64 Or App 630, 669 P2d 340 1983.

Order modified by deleting requirement of restitution; affirmed as modified.2

1

 ORS 419.507(l)(a) provides:

> “(1) A child found to be within the jurisdiction of the court as provided in ORS 419.476(1), may be made a ward of the court. Where a child has been found to be within its jurisdiction, and when the court determines it would be in the best interest and welfare of the child, the court may:

> “(a) Place the child on probation or under protective supervision. The court may direct that the child remain in the legal custody of his parents or other person with whom he is living or may direct that the child be placed in the legal custody of some relative or some person maintaining a foster home approved by the court, or in a child care center or a youth care center authorized to accept the child. The court may specify particular requirements to be observed during the probation or protective supervision consistent with recognized juvenile court practice, including but not limited to restrictions on visitation by the child’s parents, restrictions on the child’s associates, occupation and activities, restrictions on and requirements to be observed by the person having the child’s legal custody and requirements for visitation by and consultation with a juvenile counselor or other suitable counselor. Restitution for property taken, damaged or destroyed by the child may be required as a condition of probation.”

2

 Appellant’s other assignment of error was not raised before the juvenile court and does not involve an alleged error so egregious we would consider it although it was not presented.
HomeNRC LibraryDocument CollectionsNUREG-Series PublicationsPublications Prepared by NRC Staff

# Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems (NUREG-1536)

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, March 09, 2021
```

[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1811 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1811

To amend the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to prohibit 
 the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security 
for the procurement of uniforms not manufactured in the United States, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             March 30, 2017

Mr. Taylor (for himself and Mr. Correa) introduced the following bill; 
        which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to prohibit 
 the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland Security 
for the procurement of uniforms not manufactured in the United States, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland Production Security Act'' 
or the ``HOPS Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION RELATING TO PROCUREMENT OF UNIFORMS NOT 
              MANUFACTURED IN UNITED STATES.

    Section 604 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(6 U.S.C. 453b) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``manufactured,'' after 
        ``reused,''; and
            (2) in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following 
        new paragraph:
            ``(2) Uniforms of the Department of Homeland Security and 
        the materials and components thereof.''.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2004168EN.01000203.xml

| 26.6.2004 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 168/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.6.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 168/2

---

Action brought on 22 April 2004 by the Commission of the European Communities against the Italian Republic

(Case C-188/04)

(2004/C 168/04)

An action against the Italian Republic was brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities on 22 April 2004 by the Commission of the European Communities, represented by K. Wiedner and G. Bambara, acting as Agents.

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Declare that, since ANAS S.p.A. awarded the concession for the construction and management of the ‘Pedemontana Veneta Ovest’ motorway to the Società per l'autostrada Brescia-Verona-Vicenza-Padova p.a., by direct concession by means of a contract signed on 7 December 1999 without prior publication of a notice, and where the requirements for such a concession were not met, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Council Directive 93/37/EEC (1) of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procedures for the award of public works contracts and in particular Articles 3(1) and 11(3), (6) and (7) thereof; |
| --- | --- |

—

Declare that, since ANAS S.p.A. awarded the concession for the construction and management of the ‘Pedemontana Veneta Ovest’ motorway to the Società per l'autostrada Brescia-Verona-Vicenza-Padova p.a., by direct concession by means of a contract signed on 7 December 1999 without prior publication of a notice, and where the requirements for such a concession were not met, the Italian Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Council Directive 93/37/EEC (1) of 14 June 1993 coordinating the procedures for the award of public works contracts and in particular Articles 3(1) and 11(3), (6) and (7) thereof;

1

| — | Order the Italian Republic to pay to the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Italian Republic to pay to the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments:

According to the Commission, ANAS's concession relating to the construction and management of the ‘Pedemontana Veneta Ovest’ motorway without prior publication of a notice does not comply with Directive 93/37/EEC and in particular with Articles 3(1) and 11(3), (6) and (7) thereof.

Article 3 of the Directive provides for the application of certain advertising rules at Community level where the contracting authorities conclude a public works concession contract if the value of that contract exceeds EUR 5 million. In particular, under Article 11(3) of the directive, contracting authorities wishing to award a works concession contract must make known that intention by means of a notice to be sent, pursuant to Article 11(7) of the directive, to the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Since the contract for the construction and management of the ‘Pedemontana Veneta Ovest’ motorway is worth approximately EUR 350 million, it clearly should have been the subject of publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Official Journal of the European Communities

---

(1)  OJ L 199 of 9.8.1993, p. 54.

1

---
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Eagle Oil & Gas Co., * From the 238th District

 Court of Midland County,

 Trial Court No. CV-46,196

Vs. No. 11-11-00290-CV * October 31, 2013

TRO-X, L.P., * Opinion by McCall, J.

 Dissenting Opinion by Wright, C.J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 McCall, J., and Hill, sitting by

 assignment)

 AND (Willson, J., not participating)

TRO-X, L.P.,

Vs. No. 11-11-00290-CV

Eagle Oil & Gas Partners, LLC,

 This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion:

We reverse that portion of the trial court’s judgment wherein it held that Eagle Oil & 

Gas Co. had breached the New Prospects Agreement as found by the jury in 

Question Nos. 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c). We render judgment that TRO-X, L.P. take 

nothing in that regard from Eagle Oil & Gas Co. We affirm the judgment that 

TRO-X take nothing from Eagle Oil & Gas Partners, LLC. We render judgment 

that TRO-X recover the sum of $379,788.80 ($1,064,789.45 due to TRO-X less 

$685,000.65 in expenses due to Eagle Oil & Gas Co.) as shown by the accounting. 

We reverse the award of attorney fees and render judgment that TRO-X take nothing 

in this appeal for attorney fees.
----

CORRIGENDA

Corrigendum to Special Report No 2/2004 concerning pre-accession aid: ‘Has Sapard been well managed?’ together Commission’s replies

(Official Journal of the European Union C 295 of 30 November 2004)

In the contents, on the cover page:

for:

‘Special Report No 2/2004 concerning pre-accession aid: “Has Sapard been well managed?” together Commission’s replies’,

read:

‘Special Report No 2/2004 concerning pre-accession aid: “Has Sapard been well managed?” together with the Commission’s replies’.

----
June 25, 2015 

Mr. Chris Shuttlesworth 

8383 Clairmont Drive South 

Semmes, AL 36575 

Dear Mr. Shuttlesworth: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption from 

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we can not process your 

request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your June 12, exemption request into the public docket (No. FAA-2015-2252), 

but we are unable to process your request any further. The information you sent does not 

comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any 

further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 
2 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure
<PAGE>
                                                                               .
                                                                               .
                                                                               .

                                   EXHIBIT 11

                        COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                               Year Ended December 31,
                                        2004             2003              2002
                                       -----            ------            ------
                                         (In thousands, except per share data)
<S>                                    <C>              <C>               <C>
BASIC

Net Income                             $2,207           $2,105            $1,810
/ Weighted Average Shares               2,829            2,796             2,753

Basic Earnings Per Share               $ 0.78           $ 0.75            $ 0.66
                                       ======           ======            ======

DILUTED

Net Income                             $2,207           $2,105            $1,810
/ Weighted Average Shares               2,896            2,847             2,780

Diluted Earnings Per Share             $ 0.76           $ 0.74            $0.65
                                       ======           ======            ======
</TABLE>

Per share data has been retroactively adjusted for stock dividend.

Notes:

   - Where applicable, diluted share computations include the effects of
     outstanding stock options.