UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ELAINE WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMPLETE CARE SERVICES,

INCORPORATED,

 No. 01-1092 Defendant-Appellee,

and

PLEASANT LIVING CONVALESCENT

CENTER, INCORPORATED,

Defendant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Benson E. Legg, District Judge;

Walter E. Black, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CA-98-4203-B)

Submitted: September 25, 2001

Decided: October 16, 2001

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Kieran J. Sharpe, Jr., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. William C.

Sammons, James J. O’Neill, III, TYDINGS & ROSENBERG, L.L.P.,

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Elaine Williams, an African-American female whose nation of origin is Guyana, sued Complete Care Services, Inc. (CCS), alleging discriminatory treatment on the basis of race and national origin in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e

to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001), breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Williams appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

CCS; its grant of motions in limine to CCS concerning certain witness

testimony; and its denial of Williams’ motion in limine and request

for sanctions concerning alleged destruction of evidence. We affirm.

We review an award of summary judgment de novo. Higgins v. E.I.

Dupont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988).

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of

material fact, given the parties’ burdens of proof at trial. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-49

(1986). In determining whether the moving party has shown that there

is no genuine issue of material fact, we assess the factual evidence

and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. Id. at 255. 

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. To set forth a prima facie case of discrimination based on race and national origin in the absence of direct

evidence of discrimination, Williams must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she

was qualified for her job and was performing it to CCS’ legitimate

expectations; (3) in spite of her qualifications and performance, she

was fired; and (4) the position remained open to similarly situated

qualified applicants after her dismissal. See McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

2 WILLIAMS v. COMPLETE CARE SERVICES
CCS offered Williams’ unsatisfactory job performance as its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Because Williams

failed to produce sufficient evidence that the legitimate reason offered

by CCS was pretextual or motivated by discriminatory animus as

required by McDonnell Douglas, we affirm the dismissal of her discrimination claim. 

We further affirm the dismissal of Williams’ claims for breach of

contract and fraudulent misrepresentation in light of the disclaimers

and discretionary provisions regarding performance evaluations and

salary increases provided in Williams’ offer and employee handbook,

as well as the lack of fraud. See Swinson v. Lords Landing Village

Condominium, 758 A.2d 1008, 1016 (Md. 2000); Adler v. American

Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 467 (Md. 1981). We further affirm the

dismissal of Williams’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress based on the lack of extreme and outrageous conduct by CCS.

See Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 614 A.2d 1021, 1034-35

(Md. 1992); Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977). 

We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s gatekeeping

decision to exclude the testimony of Williams’ human resource and

labor relations consultant and nursing care expert, finding the proffered opinions are unreliable. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). We also find no abuse of the trial

court’s discretion in excluding the testimony of Williams’ religious

counselor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). 

Finally, we affirm the district court’s denial of Wess’ motion in

limine and for sanctions, requesting an adverse inference for CCS’

alleged destruction of employment records because no evidence indicates any notes relevant to Williams existed or were destroyed. 

We affirm the orders of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of CCS, granting CCS’ motions in limine, and denying

Williams’ motion in limine and for sanctions. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

WILLIAMS v. COMPLETE CARE SERVICES 3