F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

M O N T A N A E N V I R O N M E N T A L I N F O R M A T I O N C E

N T E R ; S I E R

R A C L U B , Plaintiffs-Appellants
,

v

.

T R A C Y S T O N E -M A

N N I N G , in her official capacity

as Director of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality
,

Defendant-Appellee
,

and

S P R I N G C R E E K C O A L C O M P A

N Y L L C; G R

E A T N O R

T H E R N P R O P E R T I E S L I M I T E D P A R

T N E R S H I P ; C R

O W T R I B E O F I N D I A N S ; I N T E R N A T I O N A L U N I O N O F O P E R

A T I N G E N G I

N E E R S , L O C A L 400; W E S T E R

N E N E R G Y C O M P A N Y ; W E S T M O R

E L A N D R E S O U

R C E S , I N C .; N A T U R A L R E S O U R

C E P A R T N E R S L

. P., Intervenor-Defendants–Appellees

. N o. 13-35107

D.C. No. 6:12-cv-00034- DL C

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Dana L . Christensen, Chief District J udg e, PresidingMEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 2

Arg ued and Submitted

May 12, 2014—Seattle, W ashing ton

F iled September 11, 2014

B efore: Diarmuid F . O’Scannlain, Andrew J . Kleinfeld, and Marsha S. B erz on, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by J udg e O’Scannlain

SUMMARY *

Environm ental Law / Ripeness / Standing

The panel affirmed the dismissal for lack o f subjectmatter jurisdiction of a citiz en suit claiming that the D irector of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality would

v i o late duties imposed by the Surface Mining Control a nd Recl amation Act by approving a pending application f o r a mining permit.

The panel held that the pla i n tiffs lacked standing
, a nd their c laims for declaratory a nd injunctive relief were not ripe. The pane l c o n cluded that the plaintiffs’ alleg ed injury

was not imminent because, even assuming arguendo that the Director would not do a proper cumulative hy drolog ic impact

a ssessment under the Act, the plaintiffs’ alleg ations did no t establish a substantial r isk that the Dir ec t o r would g rant the permit application at all. W ithout deciding whether the f irm

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 3

prediction rule applied under the circumstances of this c ase, the panel held that the rule’s standards for ripeness were not
met b ecause the panel could not make a firm prediction that the Director would g r ant the mining permit application.

COUNSEL

W a lton D. Morris, J r., Morris L a w O ffice, P.C., Charlottesville, Vi r gi n i a, arg ued the cause on behalf o f plaintiffs-appellants. Meg a n Anderson O’Reilly
, W estern E nvironmental L aw Center, Taos, New Mex ico, filed t h e opening b rief. W ith h er o n the opening brief were Morris a nd Shiloh Hernandez
, W estern Environmental L aw Center, Helena, Montana. Hernandez filed the reply brief. W ith her on the reply

brief were O’Reilly

and Morris.

Dana David, Department of Environmental Quality
, Helena, Montana, a

rg ued the cause and filed the brief o n b e h a lf o f defendant-appellee.

J ohn C. Martin, Crowell & Moring L L P, W ashing ton, D.C.,
arg ued the cause on behalf of defendants-intervenorsappellees. Sherrie A. Armstrong
, Crowell & Moring L L P, W a shing ton, D .C., filed the b rief. W ith her on the brief were Martin; Kristen L

. N athanson, Crowell & Moring L L P, W a shing ton, D .C.; Andrew C. Emrich, Holland & H art L L P, Greenwood V illag e , Colorado; Patrick R. Day
, Holland & Hart L L P, Chey enne, W y oming ; and W illiam W

. Mercer, Holland & Hart L L P, B illing s, Montana.

Chri s t o p h e r B

. Power, Dinsmore & Shohl L L P, Charleston, W e st Vi r g inia, filed the brief for Amicus Curiae I nterstate Mining Compact Commission, in support of the defendants-MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 4

intervenors-appellees. W ith him on the brief were Robert M. Stones t reet, Dinsmore & Shohl L L P, Charleston, W e st Virg inia, and Greg ory E. Conrad, I nterstate Mining Compact Commission, Herndon, Virg inia.

Ashley B r own, Alaska Department of L aw, An c h orag e , Alaska, filed the brief for Amicus Curiae State of Alaska, in support of defendants-intervenors-appellees. W ith h er on the brief was M i ch a el C. Gerag hty
, Alaska Department of L aw, Anchorag e, Alaska.

OP INION

O’SCANNL AI

N, Circuit J udg e:

W e must d ecide whether a challeng e to potential approval of a surface mining

permit is ripe for judicial review.

I

Montana Environmen t a l I n formation Center and Sierra Club (collectively
, “MEI C”) sued Tracy Stone-Manning
, the Director of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality
, in her official capaci t y

. MEI C claims that StoneM anning will violate d

u ties imposed by the Surface M i n i n g Control a

nd Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”), 3 0 U .S.C. §§ 1201–1328, by approving a pending application for Area B of the Rosebud Mi n e

. I nvoking the statute’s c itiz en-suit
pr o v ision, 3 0 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(2), MEI C asked for declaratory

and injunctive relief.MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 5

A

SMCRA establishes a “cooperative federalism” reg ime for mining reg ulation. S e e H odel v. V a

. Surface Mining & R eclamation Ass’n
, 4 5 2 U.S. 264, 289 ( 1981). U n d e r SMCRA, Cong ress “offer[ s] S t a t es the choice of reg ulating

. . . according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal r e gu l a t i on.” New Y ork v. United States
, 5 05 U. S

. 1 4 4
, 167 ( 1992) (citing Hodel
, 452 U.S. at 288); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1253.

Montana adopted a reg ulatory prog ram f or non-federal lands, see Mont. Code A n n

. §§ 82-4-201 to -254, with the approval of federal authorities, 30 C.F .R. § 926.10. Montana also “enter[ ed] into a cooperative ag reement w ith [ the federal
g overnment] to provide for State reg ulation of surf a c e coal mining and r e clamation operations on Fe deral lands within the State.” 30 U.S.C. § 1 273(c); accord 30 C.F .R. § 926.30.

B

MEI C arg ued that SMCRA requires Stone-Manning to withhold approval of any p ermi t a p p lication until she finds that a cumul at i v e h y drolog ic impact assessment (“CHI A”) “has been made by the reg ulatory authority and the proposed operation [“ o f a l l anticipated mining in the area”] has been desig ned to prevent material d amag e to hy drolo gi c balance outside permit area.” See 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(3). A ccording
to MEI C, this CHI A duty “effectively impose[ s] ” o n StoneManning three subsidiary duties to: (1) “formulate and a pply meaning ful, objective material damag e criteria that d efine the conditions that w ould c o nstitute ‘material damag e to the hy drolog ic b alance’ outside the propo s ed permit area,” (2) “include among the material d amag e criteria soMEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 6

formulated and applied each Montana water quality standard applicable to each surface or g roundwater resource that the proposed mine may affect,” and ( 3) “rationally a n d reasonably find, before approving any application for a new

or sig n ificantly revised m i ning permit, that the proposed surface coal mining operation has been desig ned to p r e v ent material damag e to the hy drolog ic balance outside the proposed permit area.”

MEI C alleg ed tha t Stone-Manning and her predecessors “have eng ag e d in a pattern a n d practice of approving appl i c ations for permits to conduct surface coal mining a nd

r eclamation operations without” comply ing with t h e subsidiary duties. T his pattern purportedly shows that StoneManning will not foll o w SMCRA when considering Application 184, the pending application for a permit r evision for Area B of the Rosebud Mine. MEI C a s k e d for relief in the form of a d eclarat o r y j u dg ment and “[ a] n order compelling [ Stone-Manning ] to comply with” the subsidiary duties.

C

I n the district court, Stone-Manning moved for d ismissal under F e deral Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). I ntervenors 1 moved for judg ment on the pleading s under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The district court g ranted both motions, r ely ing on four independently

1 T h e d istrict co u rt g ran t ed a m o t io n to in terv en e f iled b y t h e Cro w T rib e

o f In d ian s, Great No rth ern P ro p erties L im ite d P artn ersh ip
, Natu ral Reso u rce P ar t n e r s L .P
., Sp rin g Creek Co al L L C, W estern En erg y Co m p an y , W estm o relan d Reso u rces, In c., an d In tern atio n al Un io n of Op eratin g En g in eers, L o cal 4 00

.MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 7

sufficient reasons, including lack of ripeness. 2 MEI C timely appealed.

I I

MEI C arg ue s o n appeal that the district court erred in ruling that its claims are not ripe. I t invokes the f irm predicti o n rule that o r ig inated in J ustice O’Connor’s

concurrence in Reno v. Catholic S ocial Services
, 509 U.S. 43, 67 (1993) (O’Connor, J

. , c o ncurring in the judg ment). I ntervenors contend that MEI C l a ck s standing to pursue an unripe claim. W e first analy ze the constitutional limitations

on federal jurisdiction and then assess the impact of the f irm prediction rule.

A

1

Article I I I of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction o f federal c ourts to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. I I I
, § 2. To enforce this c o n stitutional l i m i t a tion, the Supreme Court has articulated numerou s d o ctrines that restrict the ty

pes of disputes that federal courts will entertain, including standing and ripeness. 3

2 B ecau se o ral arg u

m en t h as alread y occu rred
, w e d en y MEIC’ s m o tio n to ex p ed ite o ral arg u

m en t as m o o t

.

3 We are co n cern ed h ere w ith t h e co n stitu

t io n al asp ects o f stan d in g an d rip en ess. W e n eed n o t an aly ze p ru d en tial stan d in g o r pru d en tial rip en ess. S e e S u s a n B

. An th o n

y L ist v. Drieh a us , 1 3 4 S. Ct. 2 33 4
, 23 47 (2 0 1 4) (ref u sin g to “ reso l v e t h e co n tin u in g v itality o f th e p ru d en tial rip en ess d o ctrin e”).MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 8

Constitutional standing has three components:

[ A] plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete a nd particulariz ed and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or h y

pothe t i c al; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challeng e d action of the defendant; and (3) it i s likely
, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redres sed by a favorable decision. An

as s o c iation has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their

own rig ht, the interests at stake are g ermane to the org aniz a tion’s purpose, and n either the claim asserted nor the r elief r equested requires the participation of individ u al members in the lawsuit.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Srvs. ( TOC)

, Inc.
, 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000) (citing Luja n v. Defenders of W ildlife
, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992), and Hunt v

. W ash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n , 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).

A d ispute is ripe in the constitutional sense if i t “pres e n t[ s] concrete leg al issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions.” Colwell v. HHS
, 558 F .3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). I n the c ontex t of a declaratory judg ment suit, the inquiry “dep e n d s upon ‘whether the facts alleg ed, under all the c ircumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy , between parties h aving adverse leg al interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance o f a d e c laratory judg ment.’” United States v. Braren
, 338 F .3d 971, 975 ( 9th Cir. 2003) (quotingMEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 9

Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & O i l C o

. , 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).

R i peness and standing are closely r elated because t h e y “orig inate from the same A r ticle I I I limitation.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus
, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 n.5 ( 2 014) (internal quotati o n m arks omitted) (“[ T] he Article I I I standing and ripeness issues in this case boil down to the

same question.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 23 4 5

– 4 6 (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. D ayton Christian Sch., I

nc. , 477 U.S. 619, 625–26 n.1 (1986), a ripeness case, as part of a discussion of stan d i n g)

. A s a result, we have previously r ecog niz ed that “i n many cases, ripeness coincides squarely with standing ’s i njury in fact
prong .” Thomas v. Anchorage Equal R i g hts Comm’n
, 220 F .3d 1134, 1138 ( 9th Cir. 1999) ( e n banc) (“The constitutional component of the ripe n e s s inquiry is often treated under the rubric of standing

. . . . I ndeed, because the focus of our ripeness inquiry is primarily temporal in scope, ripeness can be characteriz ed as standing on a timeline.”).

2

Reg ardless of w h e t her we use the verbal formulations developed for standing or the one s d e v eloped for ripeness, our analy sis is materially

unchang e d

.

a

MEI C a sserts that its members will be harmed by mining activi ty that w ill occur because Stone-Manning will fail to

c omply with her CHI A duty

. MEI C d oes not challeng e t h e approval of past appl i c a t ions; it challeng es only the

a n ticipated a

pproval of Application 184, which is curren t l yMEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 10

pending

. B ecause the alleg ed injury has not y e t occurred
, MEI C is not suing over an “actual” injury

. W e t herefore
must determine whether MEI C’s alleg ed i n j ury is “imminent.”

An injury is imminent “if the threatened injury is ‘certainly impending ,’ or there is a ‘“substantial risk” that the harm will occur.’” SBA List
, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty I

nt’l USA
, 1 33 S. Ct. 1138, 1147, 1150 n.5 (2013)). MEI C e mphasiz es that it alleg ed a p a t t ern o r pr actice of Stone-Manning g ranting a pplications without doing p roper CHI As. A ssuming ar g u endo that those alleg ations establish that Stone-Manning will not d o a proper CHI A for Application 1 84, they d o n o t establish a substantial risk that Stone-Manning w ill g rant the appl i c a tion at all. MEI C’s complaint is devoid of a llega t i o n s about the likelihood of Stone-Manning approving Application 184. 4

Such omissi o n i s of crucial importance. MEI C arg ues that its members will b e injured by mi n i n g operations that have not been subjected to a proper C H I A

. B ut that mining will occur only if Stone-Manning g rants the appl i cation. MEI C’s complaint did not alleg e a “substantial risk” of harm because it did not alleg e a “ subst antial risk” that StoneManning will approve the application.

4 MEIC alleg es th at th e Dep artm en t o f En v iro n m en tal Qu ality ap p ro v ed A p pl i c a tio n s 1 6 1
, 1 6 4
, 1 66
, 1 7 0
, 1 7 2, 1 7 4
, 1 7 5
, 1 7 8
, 1 8 0
, an d 1 8 2
, b u t d o es n ot alleg e an y

t h in g ab o u t th e o th er ap p licatio n s n u m bered b etw een 1 6 1 an d 18 2

. W e d o n o t k n o w w h eth er t h e u n m en tio n ed ap p licatio n s

w ere ap p ro v ed o r ev en w h eth er th ey w ere sim ilar to th e m en tio n ed o n es. T h e m o st th at w e can in f

er, th en , is th at th e d ep artm en t ap p ro v ed at least
t e n o f th e tw en ty

- tw o ap p licatio n s in th at ran g e. Su ch f req u en cy , a b o u t 4 5 p ercen t, d o es n o t su f

f ice to sh o w a su

b s tan t ial risk th at Sto n e- Man n in g

w ill ap p ro v e A p p licatio n

1 8 4

.MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 11

Even if we assume t h a t M EI C can bring this suit on behalf o f its members, see Laidlaw
, 5 28 U.S. at 181, its members do not have standing

. They h ave not su f f e r e d an “actual or imminent” injury in fact. Id. at 180.

b

Analy z ing the sufficiency of MEI C’s complaint under the constitutiona l r i peness standard y ields the same answer for the same reasons. See Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. W alsh
, 714 F .3d 682, 688–89 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2013) (co n s i d e r ing ripeness and stand i n g tog ether because “[ c] onstitutional ripeness

. . . i s really just about” the injury -in-fact requirement). B ecause MEI C does n o t alleg e a substantial risk that Stone-Manning will g rant the application, we cannot characteriz e this dispute as “ a substantial controversy

. . . o f sufficient immediacy and r eality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judg ment.” Braren
, 338 F .3d a t 975. This dispute is more an “abstraction[ ] ” than a n “actual case” because the supposed injury has n ot materi a l i z e d and may

never materializ e

. Colwell
, 558 F

. 3d at 1123; see a lso Alcoa, Inc. v. B onneville Power Admin.
, 698 F

. 3d 774, 793 (9th Cir. 2012) ( “W e have d ismissed claims that are b a sed solely on harms stemming from e vents that have n ot y et occurred, a nd
may never occur, because t he plaintiffs raising such c laims have not suffered an injury that is concrete and particulariz ed
enoug h to survive t h e standing /ripeness inquiry

. ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

B

To counter t h e a

rg ument that its claims are not ripe, M E I C i n v okes the firm prediction rule. I f the case is ripeMEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 12

under the firm prediction rule, MEI C arg ues, then it must also have standing to bring the case.

1

The firm prediction rule orig inated in J ustice O’Connor’s concurring o pinion in Catholic S ocial Services

. I n that c ase, plaintiffs c halleng ed r eg u lations g overning an “alien leg aliz ation prog ram.” CSS
, 5 09 U.S. at 45. I n the contex t o f this “benefit-conferring

rule,” J u stice O’Connor ex plained:

I f it is “inevitable” t h at the challeng ed rule will “operat [ e] ” to the plaintiff’s disadvantag e—if the c ourt c an make a firm predict i o n t h at the plaintiff w ill apply for the benefit, a n d that the ag ency will deny the application by v irtue of the [ challe n g ed] rule—then there may well be a justiciable controversy that the c ourt may find prudent to resolve.

CSS
, 509 U.S. at 69 (O’Connor, J
., concurrin g in the judg ment) (first alteration in orig inal).

Althoug h the Supreme Court did not adopt J u s tice O’Connor’s standard, we did in Freedom to Travel Campaign

v. Newc o mb
, 82 F .3d 1 431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1996) (apply ing th e f irm prediction r

ule to a challeng e to reg ulations
g overning permission to travel to Cuba). See also Immigrant Assistance Project of L.A. Cnty. Fed’n of Labor ( AFL-CIO)

v. INS
, 3 06 F .3d 842, 861–6 2 (9th Cir. 2002) (apply ing the f i rm prediction rule to a challeng e to I NS policies a n d practices g overning illega l immig rants’ applications for leg aliz ation).MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 13

2

W ithout deciding whether the f irm prediction rule applies under the present circumstances, its standards are not met in this case. W e can no more make a firm prediction that StoneManning w ill g rant the application than w e can conclude that there is a substantial risk of her doing so.

Our p recedent has not determine d ex actly how likely an event must be f

or a court to make a firm prediction that it will

occur. Nonetheless, two co n siderations provide some g uidance. F irst, J ust i c e O’Connor, the creator of the test, equated being able to make a firm prediction t h a t a n event would occ u r with that e vent being “inevitable.” CSS
, 509 U.S. at 69 (O’Connor, J
., concurring i n t h e judg ment) (“I f it is ‘inevi table’ that the challeng ed rule will ‘operat[ e ] ’ to the plaintiff’s disadvantag e—if the court can make a firm prediction that the plaintiff will apply f or the benefit, and that the ag ency will deny the application by v i r t u e of the rule

. . . .” (quoting Reg’l R ail Reorganization Act Cases
, 4 19 U.S. 102, 143 (1974))).

Second, our previous cases have made firm p redictions when the plaintiff’s injury w as nearly certain. I n Freedom to Travel Campaign
, for ex ample, the challeng ed reg ulation permitted educational travel to Cuba only if t h e proposed
t r avel plans included at least one of two defined activitie s

. 82 F

. 3d at 1436. B ecause the plaintiff’s “education a l travel plans include [ d ] n either activity and would be therefore summarily rejected[ ,] its claims [ were] ripe under [ the f irm prediction rule] .” Id. Similarly
, in Immigrant Assistance Project
, we described the p ossibility that the g ove r n m ent would deny plaintiffs’ applications on any g round other than the challeng ed rule as “remote.” 306 F .3d at 862.MEI C V

. S T O N E -M A N N I N G 14

W e cannot make a firm prediction about whether or n o t S t one-Manning will g r a

n t the application. MEI C has fail e d
to a lleg e that Stone-Manning ’s approval is inevitable or even particularly likely

. I n deed, it includes no alleg ations at all about the likelihood of S t o n e

- M a n n i n g a p p r o v i ng Application 184. 5

I I I

F or the foreg oing reasons, the district court correc t ly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 6

AF F IRMED.

5 B e c a u se t

h e issu e o f rip en ess is d isp o sitiv e, w e d o n o t ad d ress t h e d istrict co u rt’ s altern ativ e b ases f or d ism i ssal.

6 MEIC h as n o t arg u ed o n ap p eal, an d d id n o t arg u e b elo w , th at it sh ou ld b e p erm itted to am en d i t s c o m p lain t to ad d alleg atio n s th at m ig h t af f ect

o u r rip en ess an aly sis. S

ee Rivera v. P e r i & S o n s Fa rms, In c. , 7 3 5 F.3 d 8 9 2
, 90 1 (9 t

h Cir. 2 0 13 ) (ru lin g t

h at arg u m en ts n o t p resen ted in th e

o p en in g b r i e f a r e w aiv ed ); Reyn ’s Pa sta Bella

, LLC v. Visa US A, In c. , 4 4 2 F.3 d 7 4 1
, 7 4 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 06 ) (ref u sin g to o rd er th e d istrict co u rt to allo w am en d m en t to a p lead in g w h en th e p arty d id n o t req u est l e a v e to

am en d b elo w ). In stead , it lim ited its arg u m en t to ask in g th at w e rev erse

an d rem an d f

o r pro ceed in g s o n th e m erits o f its claim s. W e can n o t d o so

.