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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.

GREGORY E. MCLAURIN

(AC 44523)

Alvord, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of several crimes in connection with his role in the robbery of

a restaurant, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the

trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence of his

identification by B, an employee of the restaurant, during a one-onone showup procedure arranged by the police. The defendant and an

accomplice, F, had forced the restaurant’s employees at gunpoint to

give them money from the restaurant’s safe and cash registers before

fleeing on foot across a heavily trafficked road. Within ten minutes after

receiving the call regarding the armed robbery, the police apprehended

F and detained him in the parking lot of a car dealership about 800 feet

from the crime scene, where they had set up a staging area. While the

police continued to search for the defendant, an officer drove B from

the restaurant to the car dealership, which was well lighted, for a oneon-one showup identification during which she promptly identified F

as one of the robbers. After the police apprehended the defendant a

short time later, they drove B from the restaurant back to the staging

area where, without hesitation, she identified the defendant less than

ninety minutes after the robbery. Held that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence

of B’s identification of him, as the one-on-one showup identification

procedure the police conducted was not unnecessarily suggestive in

light of the exigencies of the situation: the police, who had found a gun

in the restaurant, had no way of knowing whether other weapons were

involved in the robbery, it was reasonable for the police to believe that

the suspects remained armed and dangerous, which justified the need

to act quickly, and the officers’ belief that the safety of the public was

at risk was confirmed when they apprehended F with an eight to nine

inch knife on his person while the defendant was still at large; moreover,

the showup identification was justified by the need to quickly confirm

whether the defendant was the second perpetrator or whether the police

needed to continue their search, and, even though there did not appear

to be a risk that B would later become unavailable, the immediacy of

her identification of the defendant ensured that she viewed him while

her recollection was still fresh, and it was particularly important because

the defendant wore a mask during the robbery and B had been able to

see only his clothing, eyes, mouth and portions of his skin; furthermore,

the police did not, as the defendant contended, conduct the showup in

a suggestive place or stage it in a suggestive manner by returning B to

the parking lot where she had identified F about thirty minutes earlier

but, rather, took significant steps to minimize the inherent suggestiveness of a showup identification by transporting B to a neutral location, the car dealership, where the defendant was seated in an ambulance, rather than in a police car, during the identification procedure,

the police did not indicate to B that the person she would be viewing

was the person responsible for the crime, and the fact that the defendant

was handcuffed during the showup did not render the identification

procedure unnecessarily suggestive.

Argued September 15—officially released November 8, 2022

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

four counts of the crime of unlawful restraint in the

first degree and with one count each of the crimes of

robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm,

carrying a pistol without a permit, larceny in the fourth
degree and conspiracy to commit larceny in the fourth

degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial

district of Ansonia-Milford, where the court, Brown,

J., denied the defendant’s motion to suppress certain

evidence; thereafter, the case was tried to the jury

before Brown, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of four

counts of unlawful restraint in the first degree, and of

robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, criminal possession of a firearm,

carrying a pistol without a permit and conspiracy to

commit larceny in the fourth degree; subsequently, the

court, Dennis, J., rendered judgment revoking the

defendant’s probation, and the defendant appealed to

this court. Affirmed.

Daniel J. Krisch, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Nathan J. Buchok, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was Margaret E. Kelley, state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Gregory E. McLaurin,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after

a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree with a deadly

weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a)

(2), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree

with a deadly weapon in violation of General Statutes

§§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (2), criminal possession of

a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217,

carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General

Statutes § 29-35 (a), four counts of unlawful restraint

in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a95, and conspiracy to commit larceny in the fourth

degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and

53a-125. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial

court improperly denied his motion to suppress a oneon-one showup identification. We affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found, and procedural history are relevant to this

appeal. On January 19, 2018, at approximately 8:30 p.m.,

the defendant and another individual, Royshon Ferguson, entered a Smashburger restaurant on Boston Post

Road in Milford. Both men were wearing ski masks,

but their eyes, mouths, and the skin around their eyes

and mouths were visible. The defendant was carrying

a silver-colored, semiautomatic gun in his hand.

There were three employees working at the restaurant that night. Jada Brinkley and Jamal McNeil were

working in the front of the restaurant, and Casey

Deloma, the shift lead, was in the back room, which

was brightly lit and contained a small safe. There were

four customers dining in the front of the restaurant.

When the defendant and Ferguson entered Smashburger, two of the customers attempted to flee. The

defendant pointed the gun at them and told them, ‘‘don’t

run.’’ The defendant then gathered the customers and

employees at gunpoint and directed them to the back

of the restaurant, where Deloma was located.

Once in the back room of the restaurant, the defendant handed the gun to Ferguson, who pointed it at

Deloma and told her to unlock the safe. Deloma

attempted to unlock the safe twice using a code, but it

did not unlock. Ferguson told her, ‘‘I’m going to give

you ten seconds or I’m going to shoot you.’’ Deloma

entered the code again and opened the safe. Ferguson

took the money out of the safe and put it in his pockets.

During this time, the defendant was standing in the

back room, next to Brinkley.

After taking money out of the safe, Ferguson took

Deloma to the front of the restaurant at gunpoint and

directed her to open the cash registers. She opened the

first register, and Ferguson began to take money from

it while she opened the second register.1 The defendant
remained in the back room of the restaurant with the

other victims. The defendant demanded that the victims

give him their cell phones. At that point, one of the

customers, Garfield Stewart, who was lawfully carrying

a concealed firearm, drew his weapon on the defendant,

who immediately took off running. As Stewart gave

chase, the defendant ran into the front of the restaurant,

past Ferguson, and out the front door. Stewart then

pointed his gun at Ferguson, who was bent over a cash

register, and started banging Ferguson’s hand until he

released the gun. Ferguson ran out of the restaurant,

exiting within seconds of the defendant. The defendant

and Ferguson fled in the same direction, turning right

out of the front door and running down Boston Post

Road.

At approximately 8:40 p.m., the Milford Police Department received a high priority call that an armed robbery

was in progress at Smashburger on Boston Post Road.

Three minutes later, Officer Matthew Joy arrived to

a chaotic scene and immediately turned on his body

camera. As the first responding officer on scene, Officer

Joy secured the scene, ensured that no suspects

remained on the premises, and determined that the

employees and customers were uninjured. Additionally,

he located a gun on the floor behind the front counter

of the restaurant. After speaking with the employees

and customers, Officer Joy learned that two suspects

had fled the restaurant on foot, turning right out of the

front door. One suspect, later identified as Ferguson,

was described as ‘‘a black male, about five feet, six

inches, heavyset, wearing jeans and a dark colored . . .

hooded sweatshirt . . . .’’ The other suspect, later

identified as the defendant, was described as ‘‘a black

male, approximately six feet, six foot one, a thinner

build wearing jeans, a red hooded sweatshirt with a

dark colored top coat layer.’’ Officer Joy did not receive

descriptions of the suspects’ faces because he was told

that they were wearing dark-colored ski masks, one

black and one green.

Officer Joy promptly relayed a description of the

suspects to his fellow officers over his portable police

radio. A passing motorist flagged down police officers

responding to the scene and reported that he had just

seen two black males run into a wooded area, behind

a car dealership and storage facility, that was located

approximately 800 feet across the street from Smashburger. At that time of night, there was limited pedestrian activity on Boston Post Road, but there was significant vehicular traffic.

Officer Sean Owens, a canine handler, and his partner, Canine Officer Czar, responded to the wooded area

behind the car dealership. It was a cold night, there

was some ice on the ground, and the wooded area was

dimly lit. Officer Owens casted2 Czar into the general

area where the subjects were last seen, and Czar imme-
diately alerted to an apocrine odor, a particular odor

that humans emit when they are emotionally charged

or fearful. Czar began pulling south along the overgrown

grass and wood line that ran between the storage facility

and wooded area. Upon reaching the car dealership

parking lot, Czar displayed a proximity alert3 and then

pulled deeper into the wooded area, toward a marsh, for

approximately twenty-five to thirty yards, when Officer

Owens saw the first suspect, later identified as Ferguson. Officer Owens, and his fellow officers who were

providing backup, gave several verbal commands for

Ferguson to get down on the ground and show his

hands. Ferguson ignored the officers’ commands and

reached for his waistband, which prompted Officer

Owens to give Czar a command to apprehend Ferguson.

Czar subdued Ferguson with a bite to the leg. Once

Ferguson complied with Officer Owens’ commands,

Czar was removed, and Officer Christopher Deida

detained Ferguson.

Officer Deida searched Ferguson, who told him that

he had a knife on his person. Officer Deida located an

eight to nine inch kitchen knife in the front pocket of

Ferguson’s sweatshirt. Additionally, officers found $868

in cash on Ferguson, with many of the bills ‘‘hanging

out of his pockets.’’ Ferguson told Officer Deida that

his friend ‘‘jumped the fence’’ and pointed to a nearby

chain-link fence with barbed wire that ran along the

wooded area. Officer Deida and another officer moved

Ferguson from the wooded area to the parking lot of

the car dealership, where the officers had set up a

staging area. The officers had called an ambulance to

the car dealership, and Ferguson was treated for his

dog bite.

At 8:50 p.m., ten minutes after the police received

the call regarding the armed robbery, Officer Joy, who

had remained on scene at Smashburger, received a

radio transmission informing him that a suspect had

been apprehended. Sergeant Christopher Dunn,4 Officer

Joy’s commanding officer, instructed him to conduct

an eyewitness showup,5 at the car dealership, with a

victim. Officer Joy selected Brinkley because he determined that she had the best view of the robbers. Shortly

thereafter, Officer Joy brought Brinkley to the car dealership where she identified Ferguson as one of the

robbers, without hesitation and within less than one

minute.

Meanwhile, Officer Owens and Czar continued to

search for the second suspect. Officer Owens attempted

to get Czar back on task, which was difficult because

of the excitement surrounding Ferguson’s apprehension and the additional personnel in the area whose

odor began to contaminate the scene. For twenty to

thirty minutes, Officer Owens and Czar continuously

tracked within the wooded area, even rechecking certain areas. Czar continued to return and show interest
in the marsh area, near where Ferguson was found, and

Officer Owens ‘‘felt confident that there was somebody

else in this area.’’ However, Officer Owens became concerned that Czar was getting tired, and that the scene

was overwhelmingly contaminated, so he decided to

end the track and return Czar to his vehicle to regroup.

As they began to walk back to the vehicle along the

back of the storage building, Czar changed his behavior,

hooked his head,6 and pulled Officer Owens toward the

marsh, deep within the wooded area.

Officer Owens found the second suspect about fifty

to sixty yards from where Ferguson was apprehended

and in a location ‘‘where the dog . . . twenty minutes

earlier, wanted to kind of get into . . . .’’ The second

suspect, who was later identified as the defendant, was

‘‘hunkered down in head high thickets . . . well hidden

. . . in close proximity to all the noise and everything

else going on for the first subject.’’ Officer Owens told

the defendant to show him his hands, but the defendant

attempted to flee deeper into the woods and marsh. At

that point, Officer Owens gave Czar the command to

apprehend the defendant, which Czar did with a bite

to the lower leg. As the only officer in the woods at

that time, Officer Owens handcuffed the defendant,

removed Czar, and radioed for backup. Officers took

the defendant to the car dealership parking lot where

medical personnel attended to his dog bite injury.

At 9:42 p.m., Officer Joy received information that a

second suspect had been detained at the car dealership.

Officer Joy was instructed to bring Brinkley back to

the car dealership to conduct the second showup identification. After arriving at the car dealership, Brinkley

identified, without hesitation, the defendant as one of

the robbers.

On January 20, 2018, the day after the robbery, officers returned to the area where the defendant and Ferguson were apprehended to search for additional evidence. Officers recovered one black, knit ski mask, a

black knit glove, and a ten dollar bill Additionally, officers recovered a camouflage jacket, which was located

over the top of a tall chain-link fence with barbed wire

along the top. The jacket was spread out, as though

someone had used it as protection when trying to climb

over the fence.

The defendant was subsequently arrested and

charged with robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to

commit robbery in the first degree, criminal possession

of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a permit, four

counts of unlawful restraint in the first degree, larceny

in the fourth degree, and conspiracy to commit larceny

in the fourth degree.

On June 11, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to

suppress the identification evidence of him as improper,

unreliable, and unnecessarily suggestive. The court held
a hearing on the motion to suppress on July 15, 2019,

prior to the start of trial. During the hearing, the state

presented evidence from Officer Joy and Brinkley. The

defendant cross-examined the state’s witnesses but did

not call any witnesses in support of his motion to suppress.

During the hearing, Officer Joy testified that, seven

minutes after he had arrived at Smashburger, he

received a radio transmission informing him that fellow

officers had detained a suspect, later identified as Ferguson, at a car dealership across the road. Officer Joy

was instructed to bring one witness to conduct a

showup identification. He chose Brinkley because

‘‘[s]he was the employee near the front register closest

to the front of the store [and she had] encountered the

suspects first.’’ Officer Joy testified that he had turned

his body camera on upon arriving at Smashburger at

8:43 p.m. and that he had it recording the entire time

he was on scene.

Officer Joy transported Brinkley to the car dealership

in his patrol cruiser. Brinkley was seated in the rear

driver’s side seat, separated from Officer Joy by a metal

and glass divider. Prior to showing Brinkley the suspect,

Officer Joy read Brinkley the preprinted rules and

instructions form for identification procedures, which

had been provided to him by the supervisory sergeant

on duty that evening. Officer Joy did not communicate

to Brinkley that the police had the person in custody

who was responsible for the robbery. After reading her

the instructions, Officer Joy provided Brinkley with the

opportunity to ask questions. Brinkley did not have any

questions and appeared to understand the instructions.

At the dealership, Officer Joy rolled down Brinkley’s

window. The car dealership was well lit by the lights

from the ambulance and streetlamps. Officer Joy’s

cruiser lights were on but did not face toward the suspect. At 9:12 p.m., Brinkley identified Ferguson as the

first suspect, promptly and without hesitation. Following the identification, Officer Joy transported Brinkley

back to Smashburger. He testified that, upon returning

to the restaurant, he obtained written statements from

the employees and customers who were present at the

time of the robbery.

At 9:42 p.m., Officer Joy received a radio transmission

informing him that a second suspect had been detained

at the car dealership. Officer Joy was instructed to

bring Brinkley back to conduct a showup identification.

Officer Joy read Brinkley an identification instructions

and advisement form, which Brinkley signed. He did

not, in any way, indicate to Brinkley that the suspect

she was going to view was responsible for the crime.

Upon arriving at the car dealership, Officer Joy proceeded to the same location where Brinkley previously

had identified Ferguson. As with the prior identification,
Brinkley was seated in the rear driver’s seat and viewed

the defendant out of the rolled down window. The area

remained well lit. The defendant was seated in the back

of an ambulance, approximately two to three car

lengths from Officer Joy’s cruiser. Officer Joy did not

recall whether the defendant was handcuffed at the

time or whether there were officers standing near the

defendant. Officer Joy testified that Brinkley identified

the defendant as the second suspect at 9:56 p.m. and

that she did not hesitate in making the identification.

Officer Joy testified that the exigent circumstances

necessitating a showup identification of the defendant

were ‘‘that an armed robbery had just occurred with a

firearm and the suspects who had left the scene of

the crime on foot, after having one suspect detained,

possibly could still have other weapons on their person.’’ He explained that it was ‘‘exigent to either clear

or positively identify the suspect to make sure that they

aren’t further armed or clear the person who is being

[identified].’’ Additionally, Officer Joy testified that it

was important to eliminate the defendant as a suspect

in the event that the perpetrator remained in the community. Moreover, he testified that, during the course

of the investigation, he learned that Ferguson had been

apprehended with a knife and that he did not know

how many weapons were involved in the incident.

During cross-examination of Officer Joy, defense

counsel introduced a document titled ‘‘Milford Police

Department General Orders—Eyewitness Identification’’ over the objection of the state. Defense counsel

highlighted a portion of the document, which stated

that ‘‘[s]howup identification procedures are employed

soon after a crime has been committed, when a suspect

is detained at or near the crime, or under exigent circumstances such as the near death of the eyewitness

or victim.’’ Officer Joy confirmed that the contents of

the paragraph were accurate and answered in the negative when asked whether anyone was in a near death

state at the time of identification.

Brinkley testified during the hearing that, in January,

2018, she was working as a cashier at Smashburger.

When asked about a night in January, 2018, when two

people came into the restaurant, she testified that she

had no memory of the event or the night in question.

She testified, ‘‘I just got into a car accident. I was unconscious, don’t remember. I smoke weed. . . . I do not

remember this night . . . .’’ The prosecutor showed

Brinkley four clips of footage from Officer Joy’s body

camera wherein Brinkley can be seen and heard identifying Ferguson, identifying the defendant, and discussing the suspects’ physical features and clothing.

Brinkley confirmed that it was her voice and image in

the clips but testified that she had no recollection or

memory of the captured events.

The prosecutor also introduced Brinkley’s written
statement to the police in which she described the

appearance of the robbers. Brinkley confirmed that the

statement was handwritten and signed by her but testified that she had no recollection of writing the statement or the contents of the statement. Additionally,

when shown the eyewitness instructions for identification procedures, which Officer Joy testified that he had

read to Brinkley prior to her identification of the defendant, Brinkley confirmed that she had signed and dated

the document. On cross-examination, Brinkley testified

that she ‘‘[m]ost likely’’ smoked ‘‘weed’’ on the day of

the robbery but ultimately stated that she did not know

if she had done so.

Following the presentation of evidence at the hearing,

defense counsel argued that Brinkley’s identification

should be suppressed on three grounds: (1) law enforcement did not comply with General Statutes § 54-1p,

which requires the use of fillers in lineups and photographic arrays, but that here, the defendant was the

only person presented;7

(2) Milford Police Department

procedure allows for the use of showup identifications

under certain circumstances, which were not present

in this case;8 and (3) Brinkley had no recollection of

making the identification. In concluding his argument,

defense counsel stated, ‘‘the prejudicial effect of this

procedure in identifying the defendant as the person

who perpetrated the crime far outweighs the probative value.’’

In response, the prosecutor argued that the relevant

standard was the two-pronged due process standard,

which required the defendant to prove that the showup

identification was both unnecessarily suggestive and

unreliable, not a probative-prejudicial balancing test.

The prosecutor argued that the defendant had not met

his burden of proof. As to the first prong, the prosecutor

argued that the showup procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive under the circumstances at issue, in

which the two perpetrators had committed an armed

robbery and fled the scene on foot, the police had an

available eyewitness with a fresh memory of the perpetrators and needed to determine whether the defendant

was the perpetrator or whether to continue searching

for the perpetrator to safeguard the public. The prosecutor argued further that, even if the court concluded that

the showup identification procedure was unnecessarily

suggestive, it was nevertheless reliable because of ‘‘the

detail of the description, the accuracy, [and] the quick

identification . . . .’’

The court stated that it had reviewed relevant case

law and then orally denied the defendant’s motion to

suppress the identification evidence. In issuing its ruling, the court stated: ‘‘The court has had an opportunity

to consider the motion to suppress identification, consider the testimony of Officer Joy and the testimony of

Ms. Brinkley as well, and argument by counsel. The
court finds that the identification, given all the facts

and circumstances, was not unduly suggestive.’’9

At trial, Officer Joy testified in a manner consistent

with the testimony he provided at the suppression hearing. He reiterated that, given the nature of the crime

and the fact that a firearm was found on scene, it was

‘‘a priority, probably the main priority, to get out information regarding the suspects’ location, direction of

travel, description . . . as quick as possible, because

you don’t know if they’re still armed. You don’t know

what they could be armed with, how many weapons.

You know, there’s already one weapon found on the

scene prior to them leaving and it’s a public safety issue

as well as a time sensitive issue on, you know, capturing

the subjects.’’ Similarly, Officer Christopher Lennon,

who was flagged down by the passing motorist that

evening, testified that he and his fellow officers ‘‘didn’t

stop to take [the motorist’s] name or information

because we heard that there was a firearm involved in

the robbery so we figured it was more important that

we try to apprehend the suspects.’’

During cross-examination of Sergeant Dunn, who, at

the time of the robbery, was supervising Officer Joy at

Smashburger, defense counsel asked whether there was

an emergency that necessitated a showup identification. Sergeant Dunn responded: ‘‘No, there was a

request from the captain.’’ During cross-examination

of Detective Michael Cruz, who was in charge of the

investigation, defense counsel inquired whether ‘‘there

[was] anything that prevented [the officers] from doing

a photo lineup of [the defendant] with the witnesses

and the employees of Smashburger?’’ Detective Cruz

responded that, ‘‘for this case and my training and experience the showup was appropriate. I believe there is

enough probabl[e] cause on that night to arrest the

two defendants for the robbery.’’ When defense counsel

again asked whether there was anything that prevented

the officers from ‘‘doing a photo lineup’’ with the other

witnesses and restaurant employees, Detective Cruz

responded, ‘‘[n]o.’’ Defense counsel then asked whether

there was anything that prevented the officers from

doing a ‘‘live lineup’’ with the defendant and the other

restaurant employees, and Detective Cruz responded,

‘‘[n]o.’’

Brinkley also testified in a manner consistent with

her testimony at the suppression hearing. She testified

that, as a result of a recent car accident and regular

marijuana use, she has a ‘‘short memory’’ and has no

recollection of what happened on the night of the robbery. On cross-examination, Brinkley testified that she

‘‘most likely’’ smoked weed on the day of the robbery

because she ‘‘get[s] high almost every day . . . .’’ When

asked how she was feeling on the day of the robbery,

however, she stated, ‘‘I don’t remember too much

. . . .’’ Detective Cruz, who spoke with Brinkley on the
night of the robbery, testified that she did not appear

to be under the influence of any drugs that evening and

that he did not have any concern about her participating

in the showup identification on that night.

Due to Brinkley’s lack of recollection, the court

admitted into evidence, under State v. Whelan, 200

Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107

S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986),10 the signed witness

statement Brinkley gave to the police on the night of

the robbery. Brinkley read the statement aloud in its

entirety.11 Additionally, the prosecutor showed the jury

four video clips that were recorded from Officer Joy’s

body camera on the night of the robbery.12 In the first

two clips, Brinkley can be heard identifying Ferguson.

In the third clip, Brinkley can be heard discussing the

mask color of the ‘‘skinny’’ perpetrator. In the fourth

clip, Brinkley can be heard identifying the defendant

at the staging area. When asked if she recognized the

individual’s clothing, she stated: ‘‘Yep, I see. Can you

put some light on his jeans?’’ Once the perpetrator

stands up, Brinkley can be heard saying: ‘‘Yep, that’s

him.’’ When asked how sure she is, she can be heard

saying: ‘‘Yup, I’m sure.’’

The jury found the defendant guilty of all counts,

except for larceny in the fourth degree. The defendant

was sentenced to twenty-five years of incarceration,

execution suspended after eighteen years, and five

years of probation.13

The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the court

improperly denied his motion to suppress the showup

identification on the ground that it was unnecessarily

suggestive and unreliable. In response, the state argues,

inter alia, that the court properly concluded that the

showup identification of the defendant was not unnecessarily suggestive given the exigent circumstances. We

agree with the state.

‘‘The test for determining whether the state’s use of

an [allegedly] unnecessarily suggestive identification

procedure violates a defendant’s federal due process

rights derives from the decisions of the United States

Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–97,

93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972), and Manson v.

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113–14, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L.

Ed. 2d 140 (1977). As the court explained in Brathwaite,

fundamental fairness is the standard underlying due

process, and consequently, reliability is the linchpin in

determining the admissibility of identification testimony . . . . Thus, the required inquiry is made on an

ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first, it must be determined whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is found to have

been so, it must be determined whether the identification was nevertheless reliable based on examination of

the totality of the circumstances . . . .
‘‘With respect to the first prong of this analysis,

[b]ecause, [g]enerally, [t]he exclusion of evidence from

the jury is . . . a drastic sanction, [it] . . . is limited

to identification testimony [that] is manifestly suspect

. . . . [Consequently] [a]n identification procedure is

unnecessarily suggestive only if it gives rise to a very

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.

. . . We have recognized that [ordinarily] a one-to-one

confrontation between a [witness] and the suspect presented . . . for identification is inherently and significantly suggestive because it conveys the message to

the [witness] that the police believe the suspect is guilty

. . . . For this reason, when not necessary, the presentation of a single suspect to a witness by the police (as

opposed to a lineup, in which several individuals are

presented [by] the police, only one of whom is the

suspect) . . . has . . . been widely condemned

. . . .

‘‘It is well established, however, that the use of a

one-on-one showup identification procedure does not

invariably constitute a denial of due process, as it may

be justified by exigent circumstances. . . . Thus, a

showup identification procedure conducted in close

temporal and geographic proximity to the offense may

be deemed reasonable, and, therefore, permissible for

federal due process purposes, when it was prudent for

the police to provide the victim with the opportunity

to identify [her] assailant while [her] memory of the

incident was still fresh . . . and . . . [the procedure]

was necessary to allow the police to eliminate quickly

any innocent parties so as to continue the investigation

with a minimum of delay, if the victim excluded the

defendant as a suspect or was unable to identify him.’’

(Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruiz, 337 Conn. 612, 621–

23, 254 A.3d 905 (2020).

Additionally, ‘‘the entire procedure, viewed in light

of the factual circumstances of the individual case . . .

must be examined to determine if a particular identification [procedure] is tainted by unnecessary suggestiveness. The individual components of a procedure

cannot be examined piecemeal but must be placed in

their broader context to ascertain whether the procedure is so suggestive that it requires the court to consider the reliability of the identification itself in order to

determine whether it ultimately should be suppressed.’’

(Emphasis in original.) State v. Aviles, 154 Conn. App.

470, 477, 106 A.3d 309 (2014), cert. denied, 316 Conn.

903, 111 A.3d 471 (2015).

‘‘To prevail in his claim, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial court erred in both of its determinations regarding suggestiveness and reliability of identifications in the totality of the circumstances.’’ (Emphasis

in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Wooten, 227 Conn. 677, 685, 631 A.2d 271 (1993). ‘‘Fur-
thermore, [w]e will reverse the trial court’s ruling [on

evidence] only where there is an abuse of discretion

or where an injustice has occurred . . . and we will

indulge in every reasonable presumption in favor of the

trial court’s ruling. . . . Because the inquiry into

whether evidence of pretrial identification should be

suppressed contemplates a series of factbound determinations, which a trial court is far better equipped than

this court to make, we will not disturb the findings of

the trial court as to subordinate facts unless the record

reveals clear and manifest error.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Bouteiller, 112 Conn. App. 40,

46, 961 A.2d 995 (2009).

After setting forth his general contention that showup

identifications are ‘‘widely condemned’’ because they

are inherently and significantly suggestive and that exigency is a ‘‘narrow exception,’’14 the defendant argues

that the procedure by which Brinkley identified the

defendant was unnecessarily suggestive for three reasons: ‘‘First and foremost, the police admitted that they

did not need to use a showup’’; ‘‘[s]econd, Brinkley

identified the defendant nearly ninety minutes after the

crime, which belies any exigency’’; and ‘‘[t]hird, the

police conducted the showup in a suggestive place and

staged it in a suggestive manner.’’ In sum, the defendant

contends that ‘‘the unnecessary use of a showup

tempted [Brinkley] to presume that [the defendant] was

the person police suspect.’’15 (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) The state argues, inter alia, that ‘‘the facts

and circumstances of this case fit squarely within the

well established jurisprudence in this state holding that,

where police are engaged in a search for a possibly

armed suspect fleeing from a crime scene, and detain

an individual nearby who matches the description of

the suspect, they are justified in using a showup to

quickly determine if they have the perpetrator or need

to continue searching.’’ We agree with the state and

conclude that the showup identification procedure was

not unnecessarily suggestive because it was justified by

exigent circumstances. We are guided by our Supreme

Court’s decisions in State v. Wooten, supra, 227 Conn.

677, and State v. Revels, 313 Conn. 762, 99 A.3d 1130

(2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1177, 135 S. Ct. 1451, 191

L. Ed. 2d 404 (2015).

In Wooten, two passersby witnessed the defendant

drag the victim across a street to a parking lot, where

he forcibly disrobed the victim and compelled her to

engage in sexual acts. State v. Wooten, supra, 227 Conn.

681. While the victim was being assaulted, another passerby, Jose Hernandez, witnessed the defendant lying

on top of the victim. Id. When the defendant saw Hernandez, he quickly pulled up his pants, approached

Hernandez, and told him that he had paid ten dollars

to have sex with the victim. Id. The defendant abruptly

left the scene and ran down the street. Id. Upon being

led to the scene by the two passersby, the police
obtained a description of the assailant from Hernandez,

who ‘‘then got into a police car with [the officer] to

reconnoiter the area in an attempt to locate the assailant’’ and successfully did so. Id., 682. Approximately

one-half hour after the attack, the police brought the

victim to where the defendant, the person Hernandez

had identified as the assailant, was being detained. Id.,

684. There, after being asked ‘‘to try to identify her

assailant and told not to be frightened,’’ the victim

exited the police car, walked over to a distance of

approximately eight to ten feet from the rear of the

lit police car in which the defendant was seated, and

positively identified the defendant as the person who

had assaulted her. Id., 684–85. During a hearing on the

defendant’s motion to suppress the identification, the

victim testified that, despite being reluctant to attempt

the identification, ‘‘she was absolutely certain that the

person in the police car was her assailant’’ and stated

she had not been coached. Id., 685. ‘‘At the close of

the hearing, the trial court concluded that the victim’s

identification of the defendant, although suggestive,

was not unnecessarily so.’’ Id.

Our Supreme Court agreed that, although the showup

identification was obviously suggestive, it was not

unnecessarily so because ‘‘the exigencies of the situation justified the procedure.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 686. The court concluded that ‘‘[t]he confrontation was not unnecessary because it was prudent

for the police to provide the victim with the opportunity

to identify her assailant while her memory of the incident was still fresh . . . and because it was necessary

to allow the police to eliminate quickly any innocent

parties so as to continue the investigation with a minimum of delay.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. The defendant contended that,

because the victim was emotionally distraught and Hernandez had already made an identification of the defendant, the exigencies of the situation did not warrant a

one-on-one identification procedure with the victim.

Id., 687. The court disagreed and concluded that ‘‘[t]he

immediate viewing enabled the police to focus their

investigation and gave them greater assurance that

innocent parties were not unjustly detained.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Revels,

supra, 313 Conn. 762, is also instructive. In Revels, the

police responded to a shooting, at about 11 p.m., and

discovered the victim lying on the ground, unable to

communicate, with a semiautomatic pistol near his right

hand. Id., 766. While canvassing the area for suspects,

the police were approached by a witness who claimed

to have seen the shooting from her apartment window,

approximately 265 feet away. Id., 767. The police subsequently apprehended a suspect who matched the

description that the witness had provided. Id. Officers

drove the witness to the location where the defendant
was ‘‘standing in the middle of the road, handcuffed

and surrounded by uniformed police officers.’’ Id. When

the officer directed his cruiser’s spotlight toward the

defendant, the witness immediately identified the

defendant, whose clothing matched the description the

witness had previously provided. Id.

Our Supreme Court held that the showup identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive in light

of the exigencies of the situation. Id., 773–74. The court

recognized that it was unclear whether the gun found

near the victim’s body was the murder weapon but

that its location made it reasonable for the police to

conclude that it likely belonged to the victim. Id., 773.

‘‘It was reasonable for the police to believe, therefore,

that the shooter was likely to be on the run, in the area,

and armed. Safeguarding the public from a possibly

armed and dangerous fugitive was an immediate and

pressing need.’’ Id. Additionally, the court concluded

that ‘‘it was necessary to conduct a showup procedure

in order to eliminate [the defendant] as a suspect as

soon as possible so that the police could continue to

search for the shooter and recover the murder weapon.’’

Id., 773–74. Moreover, the court noted that, although

there was no risk that the witness would become

unavailable, the immediate identification ensured that

‘‘she viewed the suspect while her recollection was still

fresh.’’ Id., 774.

Here, as in Wooten and Revels, exigent circumstances

justified the use of a showup identification of the defendant. The officers responded quickly to a high priority

call concerning an armed robbery and learned that the

two suspects had abruptly fled the crime scene on foot

down and across a heavily trafficked road. Although

the officers found one weapon at the scene,16 the officers had no way of knowing whether other weapons

were involved, and it was reasonable for them to believe

that the suspects remained armed and dangerous,

which justified the officers’ need to act quickly. See

State v. Revels, supra, 313 Conn. 775 (‘‘[s]afeguarding

the public from a possibly armed and dangerous fugitive

was an immediate and pressing need’’). In fact, the

officers’ belief that the public’s safety was at risk was

confirmed when they apprehended Ferguson and discovered that he was carrying an eight to nine inch

kitchen knife on his person. Therefore, it was reasonable for the police to assume that the defendant was

‘‘on the run, in the area, and armed.’’ Id., 773.

The officers were justified in conducting a showup

identification, approximately 800 feet from the scene

of the crime and seventy-six minutes after they arrived

on scene, to quickly confirm whether the defendant,17

who matched the description of one of the suspects,

was the second perpetrator or whether they needed to

continue their search. See State v. Ruiz, supra, 337

Conn. 623 (‘‘showup identification procedure con-
ducted in close temporal and geographic proximity to

the offense may be deemed reasonable’’); see also State

v. Wooten, supra, 227 Conn. 686–87 (‘‘[a]n immediate

viewing of the suspect may be justified where it [is]

important for the police to separate the prime suspect

gold from the suspicious glitter, so as to enable them

. . . to continue their investigation with a minimum of

delay’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover,

although there did not appear to be a risk that Brinkley

would become unavailable, ‘‘the immediate identification ensured that [Brinkley] viewed the suspect while

her recollection was still fresh.’’ State v. Revels, supra,

313 Conn. 774. The immediacy of the identification was

particularly important because the defendant was wearing a mask during the commission of the robbery; therefore, Brinkley could only see his eyes, mouth, the skin

around his eyes and mouth, and his clothing. See State

v. St. John, 282 Conn. 260, 279, 919 A.2d 452 (2007)

(given that witnesses observed unmasked robber only

from side and back, ‘‘it was important for the witnesses

to be able to view the defendant as soon as possible

while their memories remained fresh’’).

The defendant contends that there was no‘‘ ‘necessity

or urgency’ ’’ for conducting a showup identification because the ‘‘police admitted that they did not

need to use a showup,’’18 ‘‘Brinkley was unhurt,’’19 and

‘‘the defendant was in custody.’’ Additionally, the defendant cites to three Connecticut cases in which the court

held that a showup identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive due to the lack of exigent circumstances. See State v. Gordon, 185 Conn. 402, 414–15,

441 A.2d 119 (1981) (no exigent circumstances existed

where defendant was in custody, defendant made

incriminating statements, arresting officer testified he

‘‘had no doubt that he had found the assailant,’’ showup

identification did not take place at scene or at earliest

opportunity, and state made no claim lineup was

impractical) (overruled in part on other grounds by

State v. Artis, 314 Conn. 131, 101 A.3d 915 (2014)), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 989, 102 S. Ct. 1612, 71 L. Ed. 2d 848

(1982); State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 373, 438 A.2d

432 (1980) (showup was unnecessarily suggestive

where police informed witness someone had been

arrested, showed witness gun used in crime, took witness to identify handcuffed defendant through one-way

mirror, and there was no claim lineup procedure was

impractical); State v. Anderson, 6 Conn. App. 15, 22–23,

502 A.2d 446 (1986) (officers did not testify that ‘‘there

was a special need to have an immediate identification

made’’; therefore, ‘‘case presented no danger that the

opportunity for an identification would be lost unless

a speedy showup was held’’).

There was extensive evidence regarding the exigency

that necessitated using the showup procedure; thus,

we disagree with the defendant’s contention that the

testimony of Sergeant Dunn and Detective Cruz ren-
dered the showup identification procedure unnecessarily suggestive. As set forth previously, Officer Joy testified in detail regarding the exigency of the situation at

the suppression hearing and during trial. Additionally,

his testimony was supported by that of Officer Lennon,

who testified that, due to the severity of the crime—

an armed robbery in a restaurant—the police did not

gather information from the passing motorist because

it was ‘‘more important that we try to apprehend the

suspects.’’ See State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 552,

881 A.2d 290 (2005) (focus of police investigation was

to apprehend perpetrators; therefore, witness’ ‘‘identification provided additional assurance that the police

had done so’’) (overruled in part by State v. Harris,

330 Conn. 91, 191 A.3d 119 (2018)), cert. denied, 547

U.S. 1082, 126 S. Ct. 1798, 164 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2006).

Moreover, even if police officers testify, after the

fact, that they possibly could have used an alternative

procedure, that is not compelling because our Supreme

Court has upheld the use of a showup identification

under circumstances in which it may have been possible

to conduct a lineup, i.e., when the suspect was in custody. See State v. Revels, supra, 313 Conn. 773–74

(although defendant was in custody, police had not

recovered weapon from him; therefore, showup identification was necessary to eliminate him as suspect as

soon as possible); see also State v. Ledbetter, supra,

275 Conn. 552 (police were not required to place investigation on hold, and not conduct showup identification,

‘‘as soon as they had sufficient evidence to arrest the

suspects’’). The cases that the defendant cites to the

contrary are factually inapplicable to the present case.

Here, officers testified that the severe nature of the

crime necessitated the use of a showup identification

to quickly determine whether the suspects were in fact

the robbers in order to protect the public. Cf. State v.

Anderson, supra, 6 Conn. App. 21 (defendant extensively questioned three officers during motion to suppress hearing, which resulted in ‘‘no indication that

there was a special need to have an immediate identification made’’).

Furthermore, the defendant contends that ‘‘the police

conducted the showup in a suggestive place and staged

it in a suggestive manner’’ because they returned Brinkley to the parking lot where she had identified Ferguson

thirty minutes previously, and she viewed both suspects

in the same manner, ‘‘handcuffed and by the back of

an ambulance,’’ and from the same vantage point.20 We

disagree. The police, far from staging the showup suggestively, took significant steps to minimize its inherent

suggestiveness. First, Brinkley was transported to a

neutral location where the defendant had been taken

after he was apprehended, rather than transporting the

defendant back to the crime scene or conducting the

showup at the police station. See State v. Brown, 113

Conn. App. 699, 704–705, 967 A.2d 127 (2009) (one-
on-one showup at crime scene was not unnecessarily

suggestive because it was justified by exigencies); see

also State v. Gordon, supra, 185 Conn. 414 (‘‘circumstances of the station house showup unnecessarily suggested to the victim that she should positively identify

the defendant’’). Second, the defendant was seated in

the back of an ambulance, not in a police car. See

State v. Wooten, supra, 227 Conn. 686 (confrontation

obviously suggestive where ‘‘[t]he victim must have

realized that the defendant, seated alone in the rear of

a police car, was a person whom the police at least

believed to have had something to do with the crime’’).

Third, Officer Joy testified that, at no point did he indicate to Brinkley that the person she would be viewing

was the person responsible for the crime. See State v.

St. John, supra, 282 Conn. 278–79 (significant factors

in determining showup identification procedure was

not unnecessarily suggestive were that there was ‘‘no

evidence that the police had suggested to the witnesses

that they had to identify the defendant, that the defendant was indeed the person who had committed the

crime or that the police had coerced the witnesses in

any way’’); cf. State v. Ruiz, supra, 337 Conn. 623 n.9

(The ‘‘procedure likely will be considered unnecessarily

suggestive . . . if the police engage in conduct that is

needlessly or gratuitously prejudicial. See, e.g., Velez v.

Schmer, 724 F.2d 249, 250 (1st Cir. 1984) (during oneon-one showup identification procedure, police said to

witnesses, [t]his is him, isn’t it?’’) (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)). Finally, as to whether the defendant

was handcuffed,21 our Supreme Court has recognized

that the use of handcuffs and illumination does not

render an identification procedure unnecessarily suggestive. See State v. Ruiz, supra, 337 Conn. 623; State

v. Revels, supra, 313 Conn. 774. ‘‘A consideration of the

entire identification procedure in light of the factual

circumstances of the case’’22 reveals that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in determining that the

showup identification of the defendant was not unnecessarily suggestive.23 State v. Foote, 122 Conn. App. 258,

268, 998 A.2d 240, cert. denied, 298 Conn. 913, 4 A.3d

834 (2010).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The restaurant manager testified that, upon running sales reports for

the day, $1456 was missing after the robbery.

2 Officer Owens testified that ‘‘casting is basically letting the dog engulf

the immediate area in front of you and seeing if he picks up anything, as

opposed to targeting him on say this cup right here where someone touched

and this would be the evidence of I want you to smell this cup and then

start your track. So, casting is more of a general, open, free of getting the

odor that’s right in front of you.’’

3 Officer Owens testified that a proximity alert is a ‘‘change in a dog’s

behavior’’ that signifies to his handler ‘‘that someone is close, that this main

pool of odor is getting stronger for the dog.’’

4 We note that, at the time of trial, Sergeant Dunn had been promoted to

lieutenant.

5 Officer Joy testified that ‘‘[a] showup is when you transport a victim or

witness to the area of where the suspect is detained to conduct an eyewitness
showup where they would identify whether or not that suspect is the one

who, in fact, committed the crime.’’

6 Officer Owens testified that ‘‘[Czar] hooked his head to a direction,

meaning he’s interested in something that’s going on in there . . . .’’

7

In response to defense counsel’s argument on the first ground, the court

stated: ‘‘Well, this was meant as a showup and it wasn’t meant as a lineup,

right? I mean, this was not meant as a lineup, it’s pretty clear. So, is your

argument that showups are impermissible?’’ Defense counsel responded

that no, that was not his argument and moved onto his second point. The

prosecutor addressed defense counsel’s argument, premised on § 54-1p, and

argued that § 54-1p has no applicability to this case because the statute

applies to lineup and photographic array identifications, not showup identifications.

8 Defense counsel pointed specifically to language in the Milford Police

Department General Orders, which states: ‘‘Showup identification procedures are employed soon after a crime has been committed when a suspect

is detained at or near the crime or under exigent circumstances such as the

near death of the eyewitness or a victim.’’ In response to defense counsel’s

argument on the second ground, the court asked: ‘‘Was this not at or near

the crime?’’ Defense counsel responded that it was but asserted that ‘‘there

were no exigent circumstances with regard to why it needed to be done

that way . . . .’’

9 Prior to filing his brief in the present appeal, the defendant filed a motion

for articulation pursuant to Practice Book § 66-5. The defendant presented

several questions for articulation, including, ‘‘[w]hat subordinate findings,

if any, did the trial court make to support its determination that Brinkley’s

identification ‘was not unduly suggestive?’ ’’ The state did not oppose this

particular request for articulation. The court denied the defendant’s motion

for articulation. This court granted the defendant’s motion for review of the

denial of his motion for articulation but denied the relief requested therein.

10 ‘‘In State v. Whelan, supra, 200 Conn. 753, our Supreme Court adopted a

hearsay exception allowing the substantive use of prior written inconsistent

statements, signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the

facts stated, when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to crossexamination.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Russaw, 213

Conn. App. 311, 316–17 n.5, 278 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 902, 282

A.3d 466 (2022). ‘‘Inconsistencies can be found in omissions, changes of

position, denials of recollection or evasive answers. [State v. Whelan, supra],

748–49 n.4.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 6-10 (a), commentary.

11 Brinkley’s recitation of her statement was as follows: ‘‘On this day,

January 19, 2018, at approximately 8:30 I was cleaning tables in the restaurant. As I was getting ready to walk in the back to grab a rag, I saw the

door swing open and then came two black men, heavy set . . . with a dark

blue hoodie, dark skin on and a mask; the other male was skinny, lighter

skin, with a dark green mask, red camouflage coat on. I saw the gun in the

skinny one’s hand and I immediately went to the back to let my coworkers

know what was behind me. I showed him where the safe was, he grabbed

my arm, walked me, me and Casey, Jamal, further to the back where the

safe was located. Then he pulled out the gun again and demanded someone

to open the safe. It was silence. He started pointing the gun at everyone.

Casey asked, do you want me to open it and went to put the code in. She

put it in a couple of times but it didn’t open. The heavy male then said she

had 10 seconds to open it or he was going to shoot her. She put the code

in again and the safe opened. He grabbed the drawer and started taking the

money. Then along came the skinny individual with the four customers.

The heavy set male took Casey back to the front to empty out the registers,

meanwhile the skinny one was taking more money, he noticed one of the

customers moving and before you know it the customer pulled out his gun

and started to chase the robber. Jamal told me to call the police. I stayed

in the back until Jamal came there again, I know it was clear that the robbers

were gone.’’

12 In his appellate brief, the defendant asserts that the court admitted the

clips over defense counsel’s objection. The record reflects, however, that,

prior to the prosecutor publishing the exhibit to the jury, defense counsel

stated, ‘‘[t]here’s no objection. We’ve agreed to the exhibit coming in.’’

13 The court, Dennis, J., subsequently found that the defendant had violated a term of probation, which he was then serving in connection with a

prior conviction under a separate docket number, CR-14-149028-T, as a

result of his having committed the restaurant robbery and sentenced him

to forty months to serve concurrently with the sentence on his conviction
of the criminal charges for the restaurant robbery in docket number CR18-0095601-T. Although the defendant also listed the judgment finding him

in violation of his probation on his appeal form, he has failed to brief any

claim relating to that judgment, nor did he list any claim related to that

judgment on his statement of issues on appeal. We, therefore, dismiss the

appeal to the extent that it purports to challenge the judgment finding him

in violation of his probation. See State v. Bletsch, 86 Conn. App. 186, 188

n.3, 860 A.2d 299 (2004), aff’d, 281 Conn. 5, 912 A.2d 992 (2007); State v.

Gardner, 85 Conn. App. 786, 787 n.1, 859 A.2d 41 (2004); State v. Hannon,

56 Conn. App. 581, 583 n.2, 745 A.2d 194 (2000), cert. denied, 274 Conn.

911, 876 A.2d 1203 (2005); see also Casiraghi v. Casiraghi, 200 Conn. App.

771, 772 n.1, 241 A.3d 717 (2020) (deeming abandoned those aspects of

appeal raised on appeal form and in statement of issues on appeal but not

briefed). Accordingly, our decision in this appeal relates only to the judgment

of conviction in docket number CR-18-0095601-T.

14 Included in his arguments against the use of showup identification

procedures in general, the defendant contends that ‘‘Connecticut courts

view them with a jaundiced eye’’ and cites to ten decisions of our appellate

courts. In parentheticals, the defendant asserts that the ten cases support

the position that the court ‘‘assum[es] procedure unnecessarily suggestive’’

or ‘‘hold[s] procedure unnecessarily suggestive.’’ In its brief, the state

responds to the defendant’s contention and asserts that ‘‘[i]n all but one of

the cases cited by the defendant, however, the court ultimately held that

the showup identification evidence at issue was properly admitted and

there was no violation of the defendant’s due process rights.’’ (Emphasis

in original.)

In several of the cases, decided over the past few decades and relied on

by the defendant, the court ‘‘assum[ed]’’ the procedure was unnecessarily

suggestive as a means to reach the second prong of the analysis, reliability.

See, e.g., State v. Ruiz, supra, 337 Conn. 624 (‘‘even if we were to assume

. . . that it was unnecessarily suggestive,’’ the witness’ identification was

reliable). In one of the cases cited by the defendant, the court concluded

that the identification procedure was not unnecessarily suggestive because

it was justified by exigencies, as in State v. Wooten, supra, 277 Conn. 677.

See State v. Watson, 50 Conn. App. 591, 603–604, 718 A.2d 497, cert. denied,

247 Conn. 939, 723 A.2d 319 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1058, 119 S. Ct.

1373, 143 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1999), cert. dismissed, 255 Conn. 953, 772 A.2d 153

(2001). The sole case, cited by the defendant, in which the court found that

the identification was improperly admitted, is distinguishable on its facts. See

State v. Mitchell, 204 Conn. 187, 202, 527 A.2d 1168 (showup identification

procedure was conducted at nonneutral setting, hospital; victim was wheeled

past defendants twice; and defendants were viewed as pair, not individually),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927, 108 S. Ct. 293, 98 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1987). In the

remainder of the cases cited by the defendant, the court ultimately found

that, although the circumstances did not necessitate a showup identification

procedure, the identification was sufficiently reliable, and therefore, properly admitted. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 187 Conn. 602, 617, 447 A.2d 734

(1982).

15 In support of his argument, the defendant relies on precedent from

several federal circuit courts of appeals and the courts of other states. Given

the availability of controlling appellate authority in our state, we decline

the defendant’s invitation to consider precedent from those courts.

16 The defendant contends that, ‘‘[i]f the perpetrators had more than one

gun, then they would not have had to share a gun during the robbery’’;

however, requiring the officers to make an assumption that the perpetrators

were no longer armed due to this speculation would run contrary to the

police ‘‘duty to protect the public.’’ State v. Revels, supra, 313 Conn. 775;

id. (‘‘[T]he defendant’s argument suggests that the police should have

assumed that no further criminal activity would occur in the immediate

future, and therefore, that quick action was not necessary to protect the

public. Nothing in our case law supports this conclusion, which would

require the police to make assumptions inconsistent with their duty to

protect the public.’’).

17 The defendant contends that the fact that ‘‘Brinkley identified the defendant nearly ninety minutes after the crime . . . belies any exigency’’ and

cites to cases in support of his position that showup identifications are

permissible ‘‘less than an hour’’ after the crime was committed. The state

responds that the one hour ‘‘guideline’’ is one of ‘‘the defendant’s own

creation’’ and notes that the defendant has not ‘‘cited a single case where

a court found a showup identification was inadmissible simply because it

occurred more than an hour after the crime.’’ Additionally, the state argues

that ‘‘both this court and our Supreme Court, as well as courts from other
jurisdictions cited by the defendant, have all concluded that showup identifications occurring well over an hour after the crime were not unnecessarily

suggestive due to exigent circumstances.’’ We agree with the state. See State

v. Hamele, 188 Conn. 372, 377–78, 49 A.2d 1020 (1982) (showup conducted

no more than two hours after incident not impermissibly or unnecessarily

suggestive); State v. Bell, 13 Conn. App. 420, 425, 537 A.2d 496 (1988) (showup

conducted less than two hours after crime was found to be reasonably

necessary).

18 In making his assertion, the defendant appears to rely on the trial

testimony from Sergeant Dunn and Detective Cruz during cross-examination

by defense counsel. In response to defense counsel’s question of whether

there was an emergency that required a showup identification, Sergeant

Dunn replied, ‘‘No, there was a request from the captain.’’ In response to

defense counsel’s question regarding whether there was anything preventing

them from doing a photographic lineup with the other witnesses, Detective

Cruz initially responded that, ‘‘I think for this case and my training and

experience the showup was appropriate. I believe there is enough probabl[e]

cause on that night to arrest the two defendants for the robbery.’’ When

asked again, seconds later, however, Detective Cruz responded, ‘‘[n]o.’’

19 In asserting that ‘‘Brinkley was unhurt,’’ the defendant cites to Sergeant

Dunn’s testimony on cross-examination in which he testified that Brinkley

was not in a near death state, nor in physical distress. Although the defendant

does not elaborate on this point further, he appears to be relying on the

Milford Police Department General Orders, which the defendant introduced

during the motion to suppress hearing, that state ‘‘[s]howup identification

procedures are employed soon after a crime has been committed, when a

suspect is detained at or near the crime, or under exigent circumstances

such as the near death of the eyewitness or a victim.’’ We note that during

argument on the motion to suppress, the court addressed the defendant’s

argument on this point, and stated, ‘‘[w]as this not at or near the crime?’’

Moreover, our Supreme Court has found exigent circumstances exist, even

where an eyewitness is ‘‘unhurt.’’ See State v. Revels, supra, 313 Conn. 767,

770, 773–74 (eyewitness saw murder suspect from window of her apartment

building more than 200 feet away; court found exigent circumstances to

necessitate showup identification).

20 When asked during oral argument before this court whether defense

counsel had found any cases with a similar factual background, i.e., where

the witness was brought to a location to identify a second suspect after

already having identified a first suspect in the same location, defense counsel

stated that he had not.

21 Officer Joy testified that he could not recall whether the defendant was

handcuffed during the showup identification. Officer Lennon testified that

he ‘‘would assume’’ that the defendant was handcuffed at the time that he

was identified by Brinkley ‘‘because he was apprehended in the woods as

a suspect in an armed robbery, [and] it would be our policy to handcuff

that individual.’’ After further questioning, however, Officer Lennon testified

that he did not recall whether the defendant was handcuffed.

22 The factors discussed previously comport with the eyewitness identification instructions from the Milford Police Department General Orders, which

the defendant introduced during the motion to suppress hearing. These

instructions include: (1) ‘‘[s]uspects should not be transported back to the

scene of the crime if avoidable . . . [and] [t]hey should never be transported

to police station absent probable cause to arrest,’’ (2) ‘‘the suspect should

not be viewed when [he] is inside a police cruiser,’’ (3) ‘‘[o]fficers must not

say nor do anything that would convey to the eyewitness that they have

evidence of the suspect’s guilt,’’ and (4) ‘‘[i]f the suspect is handcuffed, [he]

should be positioned so that the handcuffs are not visible to the eyewitness.’’

23 In light of our conclusion that the showup identification procedure was

not unnecessarily suggestive, we need not address the defendant’s claim

that the identification was unreliable. See State v. Revels, supra, 313 Conn.

769 n.5.