1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 07 Sy llabu s
N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s yllab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s yll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

Sy llabu s ALI v . FE DERAL BU R EAU OF P R ISONS ET AL

. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVE NTH CIRCUI T No. 06–9 13 0. Ar g u ed Oc tober29, 200 7—Dec i ded Jan uar y22, 2008 The Federal Tort Claims Ac t (FTCA) waiv es the UnitedState s ’ sover

eig nimmunityforc l aims a r isingout of tor t s c o mmit t e dbyfeder a l employees, se e 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1 ), bu t , as r e lev a n th e r e , ex empts fr om th at waiv er“[a]n yc l aim ar isin g in respect of the a ssessment or collect ion of a n y t a x or cus t o m s dut y , or the detention of any . . . prop erty by any of ficer of customs or excise or any othe r law enforcement offic e r , ” §2680 (c ). Uponh i s t r an sferfr om a nAtlan t a fede r a l pr isont o one in Kentucky, petitioner notice d th at s e v e r a l item s w e r emissin g from his personal property, which had been shipped to t h e new facil

ity by the Fed e ral Bureau of Prison s (BOP). Alleging that BOP offi

cers had lost his property, peti tioner file d this sui tunder, int er alia , the FTCA, bu t the Distr i c t Cour t dismi s s e d that c l ai m as b a r r e d by §268 0(c )

. Affir m in g , th e Elev en th Circuit rejected petitioner’s argu

ment that the statutor yphrase “anyofficer of customs or e x cise or a n y ot her la w enforcem e nt officer” a pplies only t oofficers enforcin g cus t oms or exc i s elaws

. Held: Sec t ion268 0(c ) ’ s tex t an d str u c t u r e demon s tr ate th at th e br oa d

phra s e“ a ny other la w enfor c e m e ntofficer” covers a ll la w enforcem e nt offic e r s . Petiti oner ’ s ar gument that§2680( c) is focused on preserving s o vereign im m unit yonlyf o r office rs enf o rcingc u s t oms a n d excis e laws is inconsistent with the sta t ute’s la ngua ge. “Rea d na tura lly, the wor d‘ a n y ’ h a s anex pan s iv e mean in g , th at i s , ‘ o n eor some in di s criminately of whatever kind.’ ” Unit ed S t atesv. Gonzales , 520 U. S. 1, 5. Forex ample, inc o n s ider in ga pr ov i s ionimposin ganaddition a l s e ntence tha twa s not to run con c u rrent ly with “a ny other term of impr ison men t , ” 18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1), th e Gonzales Court held that, notwithstandi n gthe subsec tion’ s initialr e fer e nc e to feder a l dr ug tr affic k ingc r i mes, the ex pa nsiv e wo rd “any” and the absence of re

-2 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Sy llabu s strictive language left “no bas is inthe t e xt for limitin g” the phras e “an yoth e rter mof im pr ison men t” to feder a l sen t en c e s. 520 U. S. , at 5

. To s i m ila r effect , s ee Ha rriso nv. PPGIndu str i es, In c. , 446 U. S. 578, 58 8–5 89, inwh ic hth e Cou r t h e ld th at th er e was “ n o in dic a tion whatev erthat Congr e ss int e nded” to l i mi t the “ex p ans i v elang uag e ” “ ‘a ny other fina l a c tion’ ” to par t ic u l arki n d s of ag en c yac tion

. Th e reasoning of Gonzalesan d Harri sonapplies equal l y to 28 U. S. C. §268 0(c ) : Congr e ss’ use of “ a ny” to mo dify“otherlaw en for c e ment of

ficer” is m o s tna t u ra lly re a dt om e a nla w enfor c em entofficers of whatever kind

. To be s u re, the te xt ’s references t o“t a x or cus t om s duty” and “offic e r [ s] of c u st oms or ex c i se” indic a te an i n tent to pr e s e rve im m unit yfor cla i m s a r is ing froma nofficer’s enfor c e m e ntof t a x an d c u stoms l a w s . Th e text also in dic a te s, h o w e v e r , that Con gr e ss intended to pr eserv eimmunityforc l aims ar isingfr om the detention of property, and there is no i n dicati on of a n yintent that immunityfor those c l aims t u r n s on the type of la w b e ing enfo rced. R e centa m end

ments to §26 8 0 (c ) r e stor ing the sov e r e ig n immunitywaiv erforoffi

cers enforci ng anyfederal fo rfeiture law, see §2680(c)(1), support th e Cour t’ s c o nc lusion bydemonstr ating Congr e ss’ v i ew that, pr ior to the amen dmen ts, §268 0(c ) c o v e red all law enforcement officers. Against this textual a n d structural evidence , petitioner’s reliance on thecan ons of s t a t utory co ns tructio n eju s dem ge neri san d no scitur a so ciis and on the rule against sup e rfluitie s is unconvincin g. The Court is unpersuaded by petitioner’s atte m p t to c r e ate am big u it ywh er e th e sta t u t e’ s str u c t u r e an d tex t su g g e st n o n e . Had Con gr e ss in ten d ed to limit § 2 6 80(c ) ’ s r e ac has petition ercontends , it ea s i ly could have written “any other law enforcement officer acting in a cu stom s or ex cise capacity .”Instead, i t used the unmodified, al l- encompassing phra s e“ a ny ot her la w e n for c e m e ntofficer.”This Cou r t m u s tgive ef

fec tto th e tex tCon gr e ss en a c ted. Pp. 3–13. 204 Fed. Appx . 778, affir m ed

.

T HOMAS , J., d e livered the opinion of the Court, in whi c h R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALIA , G IN SB U R G , an d ALITO , JJ., joined. K E NNEDY , J., filed a dis s enting opinion, in which S TEVENS , S OUTER , and B REYER , JJ., joined. B REY ER , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which S TEVENS , J., join ed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–9 13 0
ABDUS- S HAHID M. S. ALI, PETI TIONER v. FEDERAL BUR EAU OF PRISON S ET AL

. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Jan u a r y22, 2008] J USTICE T HOMA Sdelivered the opinion of the C o urt. This case concerns the scope of 28 U. S. C. §2 680, which carves out certain exc e ptions to the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed by federal employees. Section 2680(c) provi d es that the waiver of sovereign immunity does not ap ply to claims arising fro m the detention of property by “a ny officer of customs or excise or any other law enforce ment officer.” Petitioner contends that this clause applies only to law enforcement officers enforcing cust oms or excise laws, and thus doe s not affect t h e waiver o f sovereign immunity f o r his prop

erty claim against officers of the Federal Bu reau of Pris

ons (BOP). We conclu de that the broad phrase “any oth e r law enforcement officer” covers all law enf o rcement offi

cers. Accor d ingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s claim. I Petitioner Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali was a federal pris

oner at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Geo r gia, from 2 001 to 2003. In Decem b er 2003, petitioner was scheduled to be transferred to th e United States Peniten

-2 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Opinion of theCourt tiary Big Sandy (USP Big San d y) in Ine z , Kentu c ky. Before bein g transferred, he left two duffle bags contain

ing his pers onal property in the Atlanta prison’s Receiving and Discharge Unit to be inventoried, packaged, an d shipped to USP Big Sandy. Peti tioner was transferred, and his bags arrived some days later. Upon inspecting hi s property, h e noticed that several items were missing. The staff at USP Big Sandy’s Re ceiving and Di scharge Unit told him that he had b een given everything that was sent, and that if things we re missing he could file a claim. Many of th e purported l y missing items were of religious and nostalgic significance, including two copies of th e Qur’an, a prayer ru g, and religious magazines. Petitioner estimated that the items were worth $177. Petitioner filed an administrative t o rt claim. In denying relief, the agency noted that, by his signature on the re

ceipt form, petitioner had cer t if ied the acc u racyof th e inventory listed thereon and had thereby relinquished a n y future claims relating to mi s s ing or damaged property. Petitioner then filed a complaint alleging, inter alia , vi ola

tions of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FT CA) , 28 U. S. C. §§1346, 267 1 et seq. Th e BOPmaintained tha tpetitioner’s claim was b a rred by the exception in §2680(c) for property claims against law e n forcementofficers. The Distric t Court a gre ed and dis m issed petitioner’s FT CA claim for lack of subject-matter j u risdiction. Petitioner appealed. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the Dis

trict Court’s interpretation of §2 680(c). 204 Fed. Appx. 778, 779–780 (2006) (p er cu riam)

. In rejecting petitioner’s arguments, the Court of Appeal s relied on this Court’s broad interpretation of §2680(c)’s “detention” clause in Kosakv. United S t ates , 465 U. S. 848, 854–8 59 (1984), on decisions b yother Courts of Appe als, and on its own deci

sion in Schlaebitzv. U n ited S t atesDe pt. of Ju stic e , 924 F

. 2d 193, 19 5 (1991) (per curi am )(holding that Unite d States Marshals, who were allegedly negligent in releas

-3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt ing a parolee’s luggag e to a third part y, were “law en

forcement officers” under §2680(c)). See 20 4 Fed. Appx., at 779–780. We granted certiorari, 550 U. S. ___ (2007), t o resolve the disagreement among the Cou rts of Appe als as to the scope of §26 80(c). 1 II In the FTCA, Congress waived the United States’ sover

eign immunity for clai ms arisin g out of torts committed by federal em ployees. See 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1). As rele

vant here, the FTCA authorizes “claims against the United States, for mon e y damages . . . for inj u ry or loss of property . . . caused b ythe negligent or wrongful act or omission of any emplo y ee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or e m ployment.” Ibid. The FTCA exempts from this waiv er certain categories of claims. See §§2680(a)– ( n). Relevant here is the exception in subsection (c), which provides that §1346(b) shall not apply to “[a ] ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property b yany officer of customs or excise or any other l a w enforce ment officer.” §2680(c).

——————

1 The Eleventh Circuit joined five ot her Cou r ts of Appeals in cons tru

in g§2680(c ) to en c o mpass a ll law en for c e men toffic e r s . See Bramwell v. Bureau of Prisons , 348 F. 3d 804, 80 6–8 07 (CA 92 003); Chapav. Dept. of Ju sti c e , 339 F. 3d 388, 39 0 (CA5 200 3) (per cu r i am ); Hattenv. White , 275 F. 3d 120 8, 121 0 (CA10 20 02); Cheneyv. Uni t ed S t ates , 972 F. 2d 247, 2 4 8(CA8 19 92) (per c u riam ); Ysasiv. Rivk ind , 856 F. 2d 152 0, 15 25 (C A Fed. 1 988). Fiv eoth e rCou r ts of Appe als r e ac h e d th e cont ra ry con c lus i on, int e rpret i ng t h e cl a u s ea s lim ited t oofficers performing customs or ex ci se functions. See ABC v. DEF , 500 F. 3 d 103, 1 07 (C A2 200 7); Dahler v. Unit ed Sta t es , 473 F. 3d 769, 7 7 1 –77 2 (CA7 20 07) (per cu riam ); And r ew sv. United States , 441 F. 3d 220, 227 (CA4 2 006); Baz u a y ev. Unit ed Stat es , 83 F. 3d 482, 486 (CADC 199 6); Kurinskyv. Un i t e d S t a t es , 3 3 F. 3d 594, 59 8 (CA6 1 994).4 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Opinion of theCourt This case t u rns on wh ether the B O P officers who alleg

edly lost p e titioner’s property qualify as “ o ther law en forcement officer[s]” within the meaning of §2680(c). 2 Petitioner argues that they do not because “any other la w enforcement officer” includes on ly law enforcement officer s acting in a customs or excise capa city. Notin gtha tCon

gress referenced customs and excise activities in both the language at issue andthe preceding clause in §2680(c), petitioner a r gues that the enti re subsection is focused on preserving the United States’ sove reign immunity only as to officers enforcing tho s e laws. Petitioner’s argument is inconsist e nt with th e statute’s language. 3T h e p h r a s e “ anyother law enforcement officer” suggests a broad meaning. Ibid. (emphasis added). We have previ o usly noted that “[r]ead natura lly, the wo rd ‘any’ has a nexpansive meaning , that is, ‘o ne or some indiscriminately of whatever k i nd.’ ” Uni t ed S t a t esv. Gonzales , 5 20 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third

——————

2 We assume, without dec i ding , that the BOP offic e r s “detained” Ali’ s pr oper tyan d th u s sati sfy§2 680(c ) ’ s “ a r i si n ginr e spec t of .

. . deten t ion” requirement. The Court of Appeals heldthatthe “de t ention” c l ause w a s sa tisfie d, an d petiti one rexpressly de clined to raise the issue on c e r t ior a r i

. See 204 Fed. Ap px . 778, 779 –7 80 (CA 11 2 0 0 6) (per cu riam ); Br ief forPetition er10–11, n

. 9.

3 We consider this question for the fi r s t t i me in this c a s e . Petitioner argues that t h is Court concluded in Kosakv. United States , 465 U. S. 848 (1 984), t h at th e ph r a se “an yoth e r law en forc emen t offic e r” is ambig u ou s. ReplyBr ief forPetition er4. Inth at c a se, the Cour t c o nstr ued a por t ion of the s a me c l ause atissue her e , b u t the dec i sio n ha d no b e a r in g onthe mea n ing of “a ny other la w e n for c e ment officer. ” 465 U. S., at 853 –8 62 (h old i n gth at “det en tion” en c o mpasse s c l aim s resulting fro mnegligent handling or storage). Indeed, the Court expressly declined to reach the issue. Id. , at 8 52, n

. 6 (“We h av en o occa s i on in t h is ca s et o decide wha t kinds of ‘la w -enforce m e ntofficer[s ] ,’ ot her t h a n cu s t oms officia l s, a r e co vered by the exception.” (alteratio n in original)). Petitioner ’s reliance on the f ootnote as concluding that the ph r a se is am b i g u ou s r e ads too mu c hin to th e Cou r t’ s r e serv ationof a question that was not then befor eit.Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) 5 Opinion of theCourt New Intern ational Dictionary 97 (1976)). In Gonzales , we considered a provision that impo sed an additional sen

tence for firearms used in federal drug traffi cking c r imes and provided that such additional sentence shall not be concurrent with “any other term of imprisonment.” 52 0 U. S., at 4 (quoting 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) (19 94 ed.) (em

phasis deleted)). Notwithstandi n g the subsection’s initial reference to federal dr ug t r afficki n g c r imes, we held th a t the expansive word “a ny” and th e absence of restrictiv e language left “no basis in the text for limitin g” the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” to federal sentenc e s. 520 U. S., a t5. Similarly, in H a rris o nv. PPG Industries, Inc. , 446 U. S. 578 (1980), the Court considered the phrase “any other final action” in amendments to the Clean Air Act. The Court explained that th e amendments expanded a list of Environmental Protection Agency Ad ministrator actions by adding t w o categories of actions: actions under a specifically enumerated st atuto r y pro vision, and “any other final action” und er the Clea n Air Act. Id., at 584 (emphasis deleted). Focusing on Congress’ c h oice of the word “an y ,” the Court “discern[ed] no uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase, ‘any other final action,’ ” and em

phasized that the statute’s “expa n sive language offer[ed] no indication whateve rthatCon gress intended” to lim it the phrase to final actions similarto those in the specifi

cally enumerated sections. Id., at 5 88–589. We think the reasoning of Gonzalesand Harrisonap plies equa lly to the expansive language Congress em

ployed in 2 8U. S. C. §2680(c). Congress’ use of “any” to modify “other law enforcementofficer” is most naturally read to mean law enforcement officers of whatever k i nd. 4

——————

4 Of co urs e , ot h e r circ um s t a n ces m a y count era c tt h e effectof expa n s ive modifiers. For exa m ple, we have cons trued a n“a ny” phra s e na rrowly whe nitincluded at e rmof a r tt h a tcom p elled tha tres u lt

. S e e Circuit City Stores, Inc

. v. Adam s , 532 U. S. 105, 1 15– 11 6 (20 0 1 ) (cons t ruing “ a ny ot her cla s s of workers e n ga ged in . . . com m e rce,” 96 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Opinion of theCourt The word “any” is repeated four times in th e relevant portion of §2680(c), and two of those in stances appear in the particul a r phrase at issue: “ anyofficer of customs or excise or an yother law enforcement officer.” (Emphasis added.) C o ngress inserted the word “an y” immediatel y before “other law enforcementofficer,” leaving no doubt that it mod i fies that phrase. To be sure, the text’s refe r ences to “tax or customs duty” and “officer[s] of customs or excise” indicate thatC o ngress intended to pr eserve immu

nity for claims arising from an officer’s enforcement of tax and customs laws. The text also indicates, however, that Congress intended to preserve im munity for claims arising from the detention of property , an d there is no indication that Congr e ss intended immunity for those claims to tur n on the type of law being enforced. Petitioner would require Congre ss to clarify its intent to cover all law enforcement office rs by adding phrases such as “perform ing any offi cial law enforcement function,” or “without limitation.” But Co ngress could not have chosen a more all-encompassing phrase than “an yother la w enforcement officer” to expre ss th at intent. We have n o reason to demand that Congress write less economically and more repetitiously.

—————— U. S. C. §1, na rrowly based on the Co ur t’ s pr ev ious interpr e tation of “i n c o mmer c e ” as a ter mof ar t with a nar r o wermeaning)

. We also hav e cons trued s u c hphra s e s na r r owly whe na n other term in the provis ion m a de s e ns e only u n der an a rrow rea d ing , s ee United S t atesv. A l varezSanchez , 511 U. S. 350, 357 –35 8 (199 4) (li m itin g“an ylaw-en forc ement officer” t ofedera l officers b e ca us e t h e st a t ut e’s reference t o“ d ela y” made sense o n lywith r e spec t to fe dera l officers ), a n d when ab r oa d reading woul d have implicatedsovereignty concerns, see Raygorv. Regents of Univ. of Minn. , 5 34 U. S. 5 33, 541 –5 42 (2 00 2 ) (apply i n gth e “c learstate m e n t r u le” applic able to waiv er s of sov e r e i gn immunityt o cons t r ue t h e phra s e“ a ll civil a c t i ons ” t o exclude aca tegory of cla i m s , “ev e n though nothingin the statute expressly exclude[d]” them). None of the c i rc um stanc e s that motiv a te d our decisions in these cases is present here.7 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt Recent amendments to §2680(c) support the conclusion that “an yo t her law en forcement officer” is no t limited to officers acting in a customs or excise capacity. In the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Congress added subsections (c)(1)–(c)(4 ) to 28 U. S. C. §2680. §3(a), 11 4 Stat. 211. As amended, §268 0(c) provides that the §1346(b) waiver of sovereig n immunity, notwithstandi n g the exception at issue in this case, applies to: “[A]ny claim based on injury or loss of goods, mer

chandise, or other pro p erty, while in the poss ession of any officer of customs or excise orany other law en

forcement officer, if— “(1) the pro p erty was s e ized for the purpose of for

feiture under any provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property other than as a s e ntence imposed upon conviction of a criminal offense; “(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited; “(3) the interest of the c l aimant was not remitt ed or mitigated (if the property wa s s ubject to forfeiture); and “(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the i n terest of t h e claimant in the prop erty was subject to f o rfeiture under a Fed e ral criminal forfei

ture law.” The amen dment does not govern petitioner’s claim because his property was not “seized for th e purposeof forfeiture,” as required by para graph (1). Non e theless, the amendment is relevant because our construction of “any other law e n forcement officer” mu s t , to the ext e nt possible, ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consis

tent. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U. S. 337, 340 (1997) (citi n g Uni t edSta t esv. Ron Pair En t e rpr i se s , 4 89 U. S. 235, 240 (1989)). The am endment canceled the exception—and thus restoredthe waiver of sovereign immunity—for certain seizures of property based on any8 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Opinion of theCourt federal forfeiture law. See 28 U. S. C. §2680(c)(1) (except

ing propert yclaims if “the prope rty was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any provision of Federal la w providing fo r the forfeiture of property” (emphasis added)). Under petit i oner’s interpre tation, only law enforcemen t officers enforcing cust oms or excise laws were immune under the prior version of §2680(c). Thus, on petitioner’s reading, th e amendment’s only effect was to restore the waiver for cases in w h ich customs or excise officers, or officers acti ng in such a capa cit y , enforce forfeiture laws. This strike s us as an implausible interpret a tion of the statute. If that were Congress’ intent, it is not apparen t why Congre ss would have restored the waiver with respect to the enforcement of all civil forfeiture laws instead of simply those related to customs or excise. Petitioner ’s interpretati on makes sense only if we assume that Con

gress went out of its way to restore the waiver for cases i n which customs or excise officers , or officers ac ting in such a capacit y , enforce forfeiture laws unrelated t o customs or excise. But petitioner fails to demonstrate tha tcustoms or excise officers, or offic e rs actingin such a c a pacity, e v er enforce civil forfeiture laws unrelat ed to customs or excise, much less that they do so with such frequency that Con

gress is lik ely to have singled them out in the amend

ment. 5It seems far more likely th at Congress restored th e

——————

5 J US TI CE K ENNEDY’ S dissen t(hereinafter th e di ssent) argues that, during b o rde rs e a rches , cus t om s a n d excis eofficers “r out i nely” enfor c e civil forfeit u rela ws unrela t ed to customs or excise. Po st , at 12– 13. Bu t the examples the dissent pr ovides don o t su ppor tth at asser t ion

. Th e dissen t main t a in s th at a c u stom s offic e rw h o seizes ma ter i al defin e d as c o n t r aban d u n der49 U. S. C. §8030 2 et s e q . , is one such e x ample. Post , a t12

– 1 3

. But acus t om s officer’s a u t h orit yt oeffectaforfeit u re of s u ch c o n t r aban d der iv e s fr om a spec ificc u stoms l a w. S ee 19 U. S. C

. §159 5a(c )(1)(C ). Similar l y , th e dissen tsu g g e sts th ata DEA ag ent “as s is tin ga c u stom s offic i al” ina bo rder search who seizes drug-related c o n t r aban d u n d er21 U. S. C. §88 1 i s ac t i n gina “ t r a d i tion alr e v e n u e ca pa cit y .” Post , at 12 –13. B u t th at ar g u men tis ba sed o nth e assu mp -9 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt waiver for officers enforcing anycivil forfeiture law be

cause, in its view, all such officers were cov e red by th e exception to the waiver prior to the amendment. Against thi s textual and structural evidence that “an y other law e n forcement officer” does in fact me an any othe r law enforcement officer, pe titioner invok e s numerou s canons of s t atutory construction. He relies primarily on ejusdem generis , or the principle that “wh e n a general term follows a specificone, the g e neral term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enu m eration.” Nor f

olk & W e st er n R. C o . v. Trai n Disp atch ers , 499 U. S. 117, 129 (1991). In petitioner’s view, “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” should be read as a three-item list , and the fin a l, catchall phrase “an yother law enforcement officer” should be limited to officers of the same nature as the preceding specific phrases. Petitioner likens his c a se to two recent case s in which we found the canon useful. In Washin gtonSta t e Dep t

. of Social and Heal th Se rvs. v. Guar dianship Es ta te of Kef f

e ler , 537 U. S. 371, 375 (2003), we considered the clause “execution, levy, attach ment, garnishment, or other legal

—————— tionth at anof fic e rwh o assists inc o n d u c tin ga bor d ersear c hac ts ina cus t om s ca pa cit yeven if he is not acus t oms officer a n d is notenforcing a c u stoms la w. Th at ass u mption , fa r from self-evident, only und er sc or es the diffic u ltythat would attend anyattemp t to define the c o n tours of the i m pliedlim ita t ion on §2 680(c)’s reach proposed by peti

tioner and embraced by the dissent. “Acting in a customs or excise ca pa city” is not as e lf-defining co ncept, a n d not havingincluded s u c h a limita t ion in the s t a t ute’ s langua ge , Congr e s s of cours edid not provide adefinition. Fina lly, the dis s e nt po int s out that a c u stoms or excis e officer m i ghteffectaforfeit u re of cu rren c y or m o net a ryins t rum e nt s u n d er31 U. S

. C. §5317(c )

. Post , at 12– 1 3

. But §5317(c) is hardly a civil forfeiture law unrelated to cu stoms or excise. See §5317(c)(2) (authorizing forfeiture of proper ty involve din a viol atio n of, inter alia , §5 3 1 6 , which s e ts fort h r e port ing req u irem ent s for export ing a n d importing monetary instruments).10 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Opinion of theCourt process” in 42 U. S. C. §407(a). Applying eju s dem ge neri s , we concluded that “other legal p r ocess” was limited to legal processes of the same nature as the specific items listed. 537U. S., at 384–385. The department’s scheme for serving as a representative payee of the benefits due to children under its ca r e , while a “legal proc ess,” did n o t share the common attribute of the listed items, viz., “utili

zation of some judicial or quasi-ju dicial mech anism .

. . by which control over property passes from one person to another in order to dis c harge” a debt. 537 U

. S., at 385. Similarly, in Dolanv. PostalServ ice , 546 U. S. 481 (200 6), the Court considered whether an exception to the FTCA’s waiver of s o vereign immunity for claims arising out of the

“ ‘loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter’ ” barred a claim that mail negligently left on the petitioner’s porch c aused her t o slip and fall. Id., at 485 (quoting 28 U. S. C. §2680(b)). Noting that “loss” a n d “miscarriage” both addressed “failings in the postal obliga

tion to deliver mail ina timely manner to the right ad

dress,” 546 U. S., at 487, the Court concluded that “negli

gent trans mission” must be simil a rly limited, id. , at 486– 489, and rejected the Governme nt’s argum e nt that the exception applied to “a ll torts committed in t h e course of mail delivery,” id. , at 4 90. Petitioner asserts that §2680(c), like the clauses at issue in Keffelerand Dolan , ‘ “presents a textbook ejusdem gene rissce nario.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 15 (quoting An

drewsv. Unit e dSta t es , 441 F. 3 d220, 224 (CA4 2006)). We disagree. The structure of the phrase “ any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” does not len ditself to application of the canon. The phrase is disjunctive, with on e specific and one general categor y , not—lik e the clauses atissue in Keffeler and Dolan—a list of specific items separ a ted by commas and followed by a general or c o llective term. The abs ence of a list of specific items undercuts the inference embodied in ejusdem11 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt gene ris tha tCongress remained focused on the common attribute when it used the cat c h a ll phrase. Cf. Uni t ed Sta t esv. Aguilar , 515 U. S. 593, 615 (1995) (S CALIA , J

. , concurring in part an ddissenting in part) (r ejecting the canon’s applicability to an omnibus clause that was “one of

. . . several distinct an d independent prohibitions” rath er than “a general or collective term following a list of s p e cific items to which aparticularstatutory command is applicable”). Moreover, it is not apparent wh at common attribute connects the specific items in §268 0(c). Were we to use the canon to limit the meaning of “any other law enforcement officer,” we would be require d to determine the relevant limiting characteristicof “officer of customs or excise.” In Jarecki v. G. D. Sea r l eCo. , 367 U. S. 303 (1961), for ex am ple, the Court invoke d noscitur a sociisin limiting t h e scope of the term “ ‘disc o very’ ” to t h e common charac teris

tic it share dwith“ ‘ex p loration’ ” and “ ‘prosp ecting.’ ” Id. , at 307. Th e Court noted that all three words in conjunc

tion “describe[d] income-produci ngactivity inthe oil and gas and mining industries.” Ibid. Here, by contrast, no relevant common attribute immediately appears from the phrase “officer of customs or excise.” Petitioner suggests that the co mmon attribute is that both types of officers are charged wit henforcingthe custom s and excis e laws. Bu t we see no reason why that should be the relevant cha r ac teristic as opposed to, for exam ple, that officers of tha t type are commonly involved in the activities enumerated in the statute: the assessment and collection of taxes and customs duties and the detention of property. Petitioner’s appeals to othe r interpretive pri n ciples are also unconvi ncing. Petitioner cont ends that h i s reading is supported by the canon noscitura sociis , according t o which “a word is known by the company it keeps.” S. D. War ren Co. v. Main e B d . of Enviro nmental Protection , 547 U. S. 370, 378 (2006). But the cases petitioner cites in12 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Opinion of theCourt support of applying noscitur a sociis involved statutes with stronger contextual cues. See Gutier rez v. Ada , 528 U. S. 250, 254–258 (2000) (applying the canon to narrow th e relevant phrase, “any election,” where it was closely sur

rounded by six specific reference s to gubernatorial elec

tions); Jarecki , supra, at 306–309 (applying the canon t o narrow the term “disc o veries” to discoveries of miner a l resources where it was contained in a list of three words, all of which applied to the oil, gas, and mining industries and could not conceivably all ap ply to any ot her industry). Here, although custom s and excis e are mentioned twice i n §2680(c), nothing in the overall statutory context suggests that custom s and excise officers were the exclu s ive focus of the provision. The em phasis in s ubsection (c) on customs and excise is not inc o nsistent with the conclusion that “any other law enforcement officer” sweeps as broadly as its language suggests. Similarly, the rule against superfluities lends petitioner sparse support. The construction we adopt today does not necessarily render “anyoffice r of customs or excise” super

fluous; Con gress may have simpl yintended to remove a n y doubt that officers of customs or excise were included in “law enforcement offic e rs.” See Fort Stewa r t Schoolsv. FLRA , 495 U. S. 641, 646 (1990) (noting that “technically unnecessary” exam ples may ha ve been “inserted out of a n abundance of caution”). Moreov er, petitioner’s construc

tion threatens to render “anyother law enforcement offi

cer” superf luous because it is n o t clear when, if ever, “other law enforcement officer[s]” act in acustoms or excise capacity. 6In an y event, we do not woodenly apply

——————

6 As an examp l e of “other law enfo rcem e ntofficer[s ] ” a c t i ng in a n excise or customs capacity, petitioner cites Form ula On e Motors, Lt d. v. United Stat es , 777 F. 2d 8 2 2 , 823 –8 24 (C A2 1 985) (h oldin gth at th e seizure of a ve hicle still in transit from overseas by Drug Enforcement Adminis t r a tio n(DEA) ag ents who searc h ed it for drug s was “suffi

ciently akin t othe functions carriedout by Customs of ficials to pl ace13 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008) Opinion of theCourt limiting principles every time Congress includes a specif ic example along with a general phrase. See Harrison , 44 6 U. S., at 5 89, n. 6 (rejecting an argument that ejusdem ge ne ris m u st appl y whe n a broad i n te rpretatio n of the clau se coul d re nde r the specifi c e nume r a t io ns unne cessa ry). In the end, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s attemp t to create ambiguity where the st atute’s text and structure suggest no ne. Had Congress intended to limit §2680(c)’s reach as pe titioner contends, it easily could have written “any other law enforcement officer ac ting in a cus t oms o r excise c apa city .” Instead, it used the unmodified, al lencompassing phrase “any othe r l a w enforce ment officer.” Nothing in the statutory context requires a narrowin g constructio n—indeed, as we have explained, the statute is most consistent and coherentwhen “any other law en

forcement officer” is re ad to mean whatit lit erally says. See Norfolk & WesternR. Co. , 49 9 U. S., at 129 (noting that interp retive canons must y i eld “when the whole context dict ates a different conclusion”). It bears empha

sis, moreover, that §2 680(c), far from maintaining sover

eign immunity for the entireun iverse of claims again s t

—————— th e ag en ts’ c o n d u c t with inth e sc ope of sec t ion2680(c ) ”)

. Bu t it is n o t clea r t h a t t h e a g ent s in t h atca s ewere a c t i ng in a nexcis eor cus t oms ca pa cit yra t h er t h a nin t h eir ordina ry c a pa cit yas law enfor c em en t ag en ts. Itsee m s to u s th at DEA ag en ts s e ar c h in ga c a r fordr u g s ar e a c t i ng in t h eir ca pa cit ya s officers cha r gedwit henforcin gt h e Na t i on’s drug laws , not the cus t oms or ex cis elaws

.

Simi lar l y , the dissent notes that 14 U. S. C. §89(a) au th or izes Coas t Gua r d officers t oenforce cus t om s la ws . Po st , at 5- 6. Bu t th e v e r yn e x t subsection of §89 prov ides that Coast G u ard officers effectively are cus t om s officers when t h ey e n force customs laws. See §89(b)(1) (provid

in gth at Coa s tGu ar d offic e rs “in s of aras t h eyar e en g a ged, pu r s u a n tto the author ityc o ntained in this sec t ion, in enforcing any law of th e United States shall .

. . be de emed tobe ac tin gas ag en ts of th e par t ic u larex ec utiv e depar tment .

. . char g e d with the administr a tion of the par t ic u l arlaw ” ). As a r e su lt , a Coa s t Gu ar d offic e ren forc in ga c u stoms la w is acus t om s officer, nots o m e“other law enforcement officer.”14ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS Opinion of theCourt law enforcement officers, does so only for claims “arising in respect of” the “detention” of property. We are not at liberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable. 7I n s t e a d , w e m u s tgi v e e f f e c tt o t h e t e x t Congress enacted: Se ction 2680(c) forecloses lawsuits against the United States for th e unlawful detention of property b y “an y ,” n o t just “so m e,” law enforcement officers. III For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is Affirmed.

——————

7 Congr e ss, we note, did pr ov ide an a d mini str a tiv er e me dyforlost property claimants like pe titioner. Federal agencies have authority u n d er31 U. S

. C. §3723(a)( 1 ) to sett le c e r t ain“c laim[ s ] forn o t more th an$1,0 00 fo rdamag eto, o rloss of, privately owned property that .

. . is caused by the negligence of an office r or employeeof the United Sta t es Gov e r n ment ac tingwithin th e scope of employment.” The BOP h a s se ttledm o r eth an1,10 0 su c hc l aim s inth e la stth r ee y e ar s. Br i e f forRespon dents 41, n

. 17._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–9 13 0
ABDUS- S HAHID M. S. ALI, PETI TIONER v. FEDERAL BUR EAU OF PRISON S ET AL

. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Jan u a r y22, 2008] J USTICE K ENNEDY , with who mJ USTIC E S TEVEN S , J USTICE S OUTER , and J USTICE B RE YER join, di ssenting. Statutor y interpretati on, from beginning to end, re

quires respect for the text. The respect is not enhanced, however, by decisions that foreclose cons ideration of t h e text within the whole context of the statute as a guide to determining a legisla t ure’s in tent. To prevent textu a l analysis from becoming so ra refied that it departs from how a legisl ator most li k e ly understood the words when he or she vote d for the law, cour ts u s e certain i n terpretati ve rules to consider text within the statutory d e sign. These canons do not demand wooden reliance and are not b y themselves dispositive , but they do function as helpf u l guides in co nstruing ambiguous statutory provisions. Two of these accepted rules are ejusdem generisan d noscitu ra sociis, which togethe rinstruc t that wor d s in a series should be interpreted i nrelation to one another. Today the Court holds, if my understanding of its opin

ion is correct, that there is only one possible way to rea d the statute. Placing implicit reliance upon a comma at the beginning of a clause, the Court sa ys that the two maxim s noted, and indeed other helpful a n d recognized principles of statutory analysis, are not useful as interpretative aids in this case because the cl ause ca nnot be un derstood b y what went before. In my respectful submission th e2 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting Court’s ap proach is incorrect as a general rule and as applied to the statute now befor e us. Both the analytic framework and the specific interpretation the Court now employs become binding on the federal courts, which will confront other cases in which a series of words operate in a clause similar to the one we consid er today. S o this case is troubling n o t only for t h e result th e Court reaches but als o for the ana lysis it em ploys. My disagreements with the Court lead t o this dissent. I A The Federal Tort Claims Act (FT CA) allows those who allege injury from governmental actions over a vast sphe re to seek damages for t o rtious conduct. The enacting Con

gress enumerated 13 exceptions to the Act’s broad waiver of sovereignimmunity, all of which shieldthe Government from suit i nspecific i n stances

. These exceptions must be given caref u l consideration in order to p r ev ent interfer

ence with the govern mental operations described. As noted in Kosakv. Uni t ed S t a t es , 465 U. S. 8 48, 853, n. 9 (1984), however, “undu l y generous interpreta tions of the exceptions run the ris kof defeati n g the cent ral purpose of the statute.” As the Court states, at issue here is the extent of the exception for suits ari s ing from the detentio n of goods i n defined circumstances. The relevant provi s ion excepts from the general waiver “claim[s] ar ising in respect of the assessment or collec

tion of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or ot her property b yany offi

cer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(c). Both on fir s t reading and upon f u rther, clos e considera

tion, the plain words of the statut e indicate that the exc e p -3 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting tion is concerned only with customs and taxes. Th e provi

sion begins with a clau se dealing exclusively with custo m s and tax duties. And the provision as a whole c o ntains fou r express references to customs and tax, making revenue duties and customs and excise officers its most salien t features. Cf. G u t i er rez v. Ada , 528 U. S. 250, 254–25 5 (2000). This is not to suggest that the Court’s readingis wholly impermissible or without some gramma tical support. After all, d e tention of goods is not stated un til the outset of the secon dclause an d at the end of the sa me clause th e words “any other law enforcementofficer” app e ar; so it can be argued that the first and second clauses of the provision are so separate that al l detentions by all law enforcemen t officers in whatever c a pacity the ymight actare covered. Still, this ought not be the preferred reading; for between the beginning of the second clause and its closing refer

ence to “any other law enfo rcement officer” appears an

other reference to “officer[s] of customs or excise,” this time in the context of property d e tention. This is quite sufficient, in my view, to continue the limited scope of the exception. At the ver yleast, the Court errs by adoptinga rule which simply bars all consideration of the canons of ejusdem ge neris and noscitur a sociis. And when those canons are consulted, togetherwith other common princi

ples of inter p retation, the casefor limiting the exception to customs and tax more than overcomes the position main

tained by the Government and adopted by the Court. The ejusdem generi s canon provides that, where a s eem ingly broad clause constitutes a residual phrase, it must be controlled by, and defined with reference to, the “enu

merated cat e gories .

. . which ar e r e cited just before it,” so that the clause encompasses only objects similar in na

ture. Circu it City S t ore s , Inc. v. Adams , 532 U. S. 105, 115 (2001). The words “any other law enforcement officer” immediatel y follow the statute’s reference to “officer[s] of4 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting customs or excise,” as well as the first clause’s reference to the assess ment of tax and customs duties. 28 U. S. C. §2680(c). The Court counters th at § 2680(c) “is disjunctive, with one specificand one ge neral category,” rendering ejusdem gene ris inapplicable. Ante , at 10. The canon’s applicabil

ity, howeve r, is not lim ited to those statutes that include a laundry list of items

. S ee, e.g., Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dis p atch ers , 49 9 U. S. 117 , 129 (1991) (“[W]hen a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to th e one with specific enumeration”). In addition, ejusdem gene risis of ten invokedin conjunct i on with th e interpreta

tive canon nos c i t u r a soc iis , which provides that words are to be “ ‘kno wn by thei r companions.’ ” Wa sh ington S t a t e Dep t . of Social and He alth Se rvs. v. Guardi a n ship Es ta te of Keffeler , 537 U. S. 371, 384 (2003) (quoting Gu tier rez, supra, a t2 55). The ge neral rule is that the “meaning of a word, and, consequently, the intention of the legislature,” should be “ascertained by reference to the con t ext, andb y considering whether the word in question a n d the sur

rounding words are, in fact, ejusdem generis , and referable to the same subject-ma tter.” Nealv. Cl ark , 9 5 U. S. 704, 709 (1878) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A proper reading of §2680(c) thus attributes to the last phrase (“any other law enforce ment officer”) the discrete characterist ic shared by the preceding phrases (“officer[s] of customs or excise” a n d “assessment or collection of any tax orcust oms duty”). See also Nortonv. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance , 54 2 U. S. 55, 62–63 (2004) (applying ejusdem generisto co nclude that “ ‘failure to act’ ” mean s “failure to take an agency action” (emphasis in original)); Washin gtonStateDep t

. of Sociala nd He alth Serv s. , sup r a, at 384–385 (holding that the phrase “other legal process” in 42 U. S. C. §407(a) refers onl yto the utilization of a judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism, the common attri b

-5 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting ute shared by the phrase andthe statutory enumeration preceding i t). Had Congress intended otherwise, in all likelihood it would ha ve drafted the section to apply t o “any law enforcement officer, including officers of customs and excise,” rather th an tacking “any other law enforce

ment officer” on the end of the enumerated categories as i t did here. The common attribute of officers of customs and excise and other law enforcement officers is the performance of functions most often assigned to revenue officers, includ

ing, inter al ia, the enforcement of the United States’ reve nue laws and the conduct of border searches. Although officers of customs and officers of excise are in most in

stances the only full-time staff charged with this duty, officers of other federal agen cies and general law enforce

ment officers often will be called upon to act in the tradi

tional capacity of a revenue offic e r. For example, Drug Enforcement Administr a tion (DEA) or Federa l Bureau of Investigation (FBI) a g ents freq uently assist custom s officials inthe execu t ion of b o rder searches. See , e.g., UnitedSta t esv. Gurr , 471 F. 3d 144, 147–149 (CADC 2006) (FBI involved in search of financial documents a t border); United Statesv. Boumelhem , 339 F. 3d 414, 424 (CA6 2003) (“FBI had been coopera t ing with Customs as a part of a joint task force”); Formula One Motors , Ltd. v. United States , 777 F. 2 d822, 824 (CA2 1985) (DEA agents were performing func tions traditionally carried out b y Customs officials whe r e they se ized and s e arched an automobile that had been shipp e d from ab road and was still inits shipping container). Cf. United Statesv. Schoor , 597 F. 2d 1303, 1305–1306 (CA9 1979) (upholding constitutionality of cooperation amongst federal agencies in border s e arches). Similarly, 14 U. S. C. §89(a) gran ts the Coast Guard ple nary autho rity to sto p and board American vessels to ins p ect for obvious custom s violations. See, e.g., U n ited S t a t esv. Gil- Carmona , 497 F. 3d 52 (CA16 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting 2007) (Coast Guard ass i sted an Immigration and Customs Enforcement patrol aircraft in interdicting a v e ssel off th e coast of Puerto Rico). To the extent they d e tain good s whose poss ession vio l a t es customs laws, the Coast Guard officers—while not “officer[s] of customs o rexcise,” 28 U. S. C. §2 680(c)—are without doubt engaging in th e enforcemen tof the United States’ revenue la ws. The same is true in th e tax conte x t. Under 26 U. S. C. §6321, a delinquent taxpayer’s pro p erty is subj ect to forfei

ture, see Gl ass City Ba nkv. Unit ed St at es , 3 26 U. S. 26 5 (1945), and may be seized by any federal agent assistin g the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in executing the forfei

ture, cf. Unit e dSt at esv. $515,0 60.42 in United States Curren cy , 1 52 F. 3d 4 91, 495 (CA6 1998) (IRS and FBI jointly seized currenc y). Thus, the final phrase “any other law enforcement officer” has wo rk to do and m a kes consid

erable sens e when the statute is li mited in this way. B The Court reaches its c o ntrary con c lusion by c o ncentrat

ing on the word “an y” before the phrase “ot h er law en

forcement officer.” 2 8U. S. C. §2680(c). It takes th is single last phrase to extend the st atute so that it covers a l l detentions of property by anylaw enforcement officer in whatever capacity he or she acts. There are fundamental problems with this approach, in addition to the ones al

ready mentioned. First, the Court’s analysis cannot be squared with the longstanding recognitio n that asingle word must not b e read in isolation but instead defined by reference to its statutory context. See King v. St. Vincen t’s Hospi t al , 5 02 U. S. 215, 221 (1991) (“[T]he m e aning of statutory lan

guage, plai n or not, de pends on context”); Dol a nv. Posta l Servi c e , 54 6 U. S. 481, 486 (2006) (“A word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its defini

tional possibilities. In terpretatio nof a word or phras e7 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting depends upon reading the whole statutory te xt, consider

ing the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform th e analysis”). This is true even of f a cially broad modifiers

. The word “any” can mean “different things depending upon th e setting,” Nixonv. Missouri Municipal Leagu e , 541 U. S. 125, 132 (2 004); see also Small v. United S t a t es , 544 U. S. 385, 388 (2005) (citing cases), and must be limited in its application “to those objects to which the legislature in

tended to a p ply them,” United Sta t es v. Palm er , 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818). In G u t i e r rez, 528 U. S., at 254–255 , for exampl e, we held that the p h rase “in a n y election” in the Or ganic Ac tof Guam, 48 U. S. C. §1 422, does not refer b r oadly to a l l elections bu t only to th e el ection o f Guam’s Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The Court explained that the refer

ence to “any election” is pr eceded by two references to gubernatorial elections and follow e d by four more refer

ences. In the context of such “rel e ntless repetition,” the Court concl u ded that the phrase must be “known by [its] companions

. ” 528 U. S., at 255. Likewise, in United Sta t esv. Al varez-Sanc h ez , 511 U. S. 350, 357 (1994), the Court addressed a phrase similarto the statutory provi

sion we interpret toda y. Th e Cou rt noted th at the respon

dent erred in “placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory reference to ‘any’ law enforcement officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute,” and consulted instead “ ‘th e context in which [the phrase] is used.’ ” Id., at 358 (q uoting Deal v. UnitedStates , 50 8 U. S. 129, 132 (1993); alteration in original). As already mentioned, the context of §2680(c) suggests that, in accordance wi th thes e precedents, the statutory provision should be interprete d n a rrowlyto apply only to customs and revenue duties. Its first clause deals exclu

sively with customs and tax du ties and, between the first and second clauses, itrefers two more times to customs8 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting and tax. See Guti err ez , supra, at 2 54–255; A-Mark, Inc . v. UnitedSta t esSe cre t Serv. De pt. of Tr easu r y , 593 F. 2d 849, 851 (CA9 1978) (Tang, J., concurring) (“The clauses both dwell exclusively on customs and taxes, except for th e final reference to other la w-enforcement offic e rs”). Further, §2680(c) provi d es that there will be immunity only where there has been a “detention” of goods, mer

chandise, or property. “[D]etenti on” is defined by legal and nonlegal dictionaries alike as a “compulsory,” “forced, ” or “punitive” containment. Black’s Law Dictionary 4 59 (7th ed. 1999) (compulsory); Ameri c an Heritage Dictionary 494 (4th ed. 2000) (forced or punitive). The is sue whether petitioner’s property was “detained” within th e meaning of the statute was not ra ised in this case; and so the Court leaves for another day the exception’s applicability to these facts. See ante, at 4, n. 2. It is importa nt, however, to bear in mind that, in the context of detention of goods by customs and tax ag ents, it will be the rare case when property is voluntarily tu rned o v er, ra ther than forcibly appropriate d ; indeed, customs and tax agents are in the regular business of seizing and forfeiting pro p erty, as are law enforcement agents acting in the capacit yof revenue enforcemen t

. See Dept. of H o mel and Security, U. S. Cus

toms and Border Pro t ection and U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mid-Year FY 2007—Top IPR Commodities Seized (M ay 2007), online at http://www. cbp.gov /linkhandler /cgov /import/commerci al_enforcemen t/ ipr / seizure / 07_ mi dyr_ seizures.ctt / 07_ mi dyr_ seizures.pdf (all Internet materials as visited J an. 10, 200 8, and avail

able in Clerk of Court’s case file) (by midye a r 2007, cu s toms officials had executed 7,245 commodity seizures, worth a to tal of $110,198,350); GAO, Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesse s in Traveler Inspections Exist at Ou r Na tion’s Ports of Entry 17 (GAD–08– 219, Nov. 2 007), http://www.gao.go v/new.items/d08219.pdf (“Ac cordingto [U. S. Customs and Border Protection] CB P,9 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting in fiscal year 2006, CBP officers

. . . seized more tha n 644,000 pounds of illegal drugs, intercepte dnearly 1.7 million prohibited agri cultural ite m s, and seized over $155 million in i llegal commercial merchandise, such as coun

terfeit footwear and h andbags” (footnote omitted)). In other contexts, however, the word “detenti on” may or may not acc u rately describe the nature of the Governmen t action. A prisoner’s voluntary decision to deliver property for transfe r to another fac ility, for example, bears a greater similarity to a “bailment”—the delivery of personal pro p e r ty afte r being held by the priso n in trus t, se e Ame r i c an He rit a ge Di ctio n a r y , supra, at 13 4— th an to a “ d ete n tion. ” Not a single federal st atute mentions the Federal Bu

reau of Prisons in the context of property de tention. O n the other hand, the majority of the nine fed e ral statutes other than §2680(c) containing a reference to the detention of goods, merchandise, or othe r property a r e specific to customs and excise. Compare 19 U. S. C. §1499(a) (au

thorizing customs agents to examine and det a in imported merchandise); §1595a(c)(3) (autho rizing cus t oms officials to detain merchandise introdu ced contrary to law); 2 6 U. S. C. §5 311 (authorizing in ternal revenue officers to detain containers containing distilled spirits, wines, or beer where there is rea s on to b e lie ve applicable taxes have not been paid); 50 U. S. C. App. §2411(a)(2)(A) (authori z ing customs officials t o seize anddetain goods at ports of entry in th e enforcement of war a n d national defense); 22 U. S. C. §46 4(authorizing customs agents to detain armed vessels and any property found th ereon); with 18 U. S. C. §981(e) (“The Attorney General, the Secre tary of th e Treasury, or the PostalService, as the case m a y be, shal l ensure the equitable transfer purs uant to pa ragraph (2) of any forfeited proper ty t o the appro p riate State or local law enforcemen tagency . . . . The United States shall not be liable in an y action ari s ing out of the seizure, detention,10 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting and transfe r of seized property to State or local officials”); 28 U. S. C. §524(c)(1) (2000 ed. an d Supp. V) (appropriat

ing a special fund for the purpo s e of property detention under any law enforced or administered by the Depart

ment of Justice); 31 U. S. C. §9703(a)(1)(A) (establishing a Departmen t of Treasury Forfeiture Fund to pay the ex

penses of property detention); 16 U. S. C. §§1540(e)( 3 ), 3375(b) (authorizing the detent ion of goods and packa g es for inspection where there is rea s on to be lie ve there has been a violation of l a ws governing fish, wildlife, and plants). This would seem to indicate that C o ngress contemplated that the statutory provision considered here would appl y only in those narrow ci rcumstance s where the officer is i n the regular business of forfeiting property, n a mely reve

nue enforcement. At t h e very least, it demonstrates th at “detention” will be a difficult conce p t to apply case-by-cas e under the majority’s interpretation of the statute—a problem alleviated by limiting the statute to customs and tax. Second, the Court’s construction of the phrase “an y other law enforcement offi cer” runs contrary t o “ ‘our dut y “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” ’ ” Duncanv. Walke r , 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001 ) (quoting United Statesv. Menasche , 348 U. S. 528, 53 8– 539 (1955)). The Court’s readi n g renders “officer[s] of customs or excise” mere surplusage, as there would have been no need for Congress to have specified that officers o f customs and officers of excise wer e immune if they indee d were subsumed with in the allegedly all-encompassing “any” officer clause. S ee Circuit City Stor es, 532 U. S., a t 114. Third, though the final reference to “any other la w enforcement officer” does resu lt i nsome am biguity, the legislative history, by virtue of its exclusive reference to customs and excise, confirms that Congress did not shif t11 Cite as: 55 2 U

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K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting its attention from the context of revenue enforcement when it used these words at the end of the statute. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 3 (1946) (in discussing 28 U. S. C. §2680(c) referring only to “the de

tention of goods by customs officers”); A. Holt zoff, Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claim s Bill 16 (1931) (noting that the property-dete n tion exception was added to the legislation t o “include immunityfr om liability in respect of loss in connection with the detention of goods or merchan

dise by any officer of customs or excise”). Indeed, the Court’s co nstruction reads the exception t o defeat the c e ntral purp ose of the statute, an interpretati ve danger the Court has warned against in explicit terms. See Kosak , 465 U. S., a t854, n. 9 (the Court must identify only “ ‘thos e circumst ances whic h are with in the wor d s and reason of the exce ption’—no l e ss and no more” (quot

ing Dalehi tev. United Sta t es , 346 U. S. 15, 31 (1953)). It is difficult t o conceive that the FT CA, which was enacte d by Congres s to make the tort liability of the United States “the same as that of a private person under lik e circum

stance[s],” S. Rep. No. 1400, at 32, would allow any officer under any circumstan ce to detainpropert y without being accountable under the Act to those injured by his or he r tortious conduct. If Co ngress wan t ed to say t hat all law enforcement officers may deta in property without liabi lity in tort, including whenthey perfor m general law enforce

ment tasks, it would h ave doneso in more express terms ; one would expect at le ast a re ference to law enforcement officers out s ide the cus t oms or excise context either in th e text of the statute or in thelegi slative his t ory. In th e absence of that reference, the Court ought not presume that the liberties of the person who owns the property would be so lightly dismissed and disregarded.12 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting II A The 2000 a m endments do not req u ire a contrary conclu

sion. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), as applicable here, limits the operation of §2680(c)’s exception. See §3(a), 11 4 Stat. 211. The limita

tion ( i.e. the exception to the exception) applies where there has been an injury or loss of goods and “the property was seized for the purpose of forf eiture unde rany provi

sion of Fed e ral law.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(c)(1). Inmy view the amendment establishes thatofficers of customs and excise, and law enforcement o fficials performing functions traditionally reserved for reve nue officers, shall be liable in tort for damage to the prop erty when the owner’s inter

est in the goods in the end is not f o rfeited (an dwhen other conditi o ns apply). And this is so regardless of whether the officer acted under the revenue laws of the United States or, alternatively, anothercivil or criminal forfeitur e provision. The majority’s reading of CAFRA f o r a contrary proposi

tion is premised on t h e assumption that there is no ci r cumstance in which a c u stoms or excise officer, or a officer acting in such a capa city, wo uld“enforce civil forfeiture laws unrelated to customs or excise.” Ante, at 9. Bu t customs and tax officials, along with law enforcement officers per f orming cu stoms and tax duties, routinely d o just that. See, e.g., Customs and Border Protection, Sei

zures and Penalties Links, http://www. cbp.gov/xp/c go v/ too lb o x/legal/autho rity_e nforc e/se iz ur es_p enalti e s .xm l (CBP has “full au thority to .

. . seize m e rchandise for violation of CBP laws or those of o t her federal agencies that are en

forced by CBP”). Indeed, the customs laws expressly contemplate forfeitures and seizures of property under nonrevenue provisions. See, e.g., 19 U. S. C. §1600 (“The procedures [governing seizures of propert y] set forth i n [§§1602–16 19] shall a p ply to seizures of a n y property13 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting effected by customs officers under any law enforced or administered by the Customs Service unless such law specifies dif f erent procedures”). By way of example, a customs o rexcise official might effect a civil forfeiture of currency or monet a ry instru

ments under the Ban kSecrecy Act, 31 U. S. C. §5317(c) (2000 ed., Supp. V); or of counterfeit instruments, illeg a l music recordings, or fi rearms under the Contraband Act, 49 U. S. C. §80302 et s e q . Similarly, a DEA agent assist

ing a customs official in a border search (and thus actin g in a customs capacit y) might ef fect a civilforfeiture of vehicles orgoods ass o ciated with the drug trade under federal dru glaws. See 21 U. S. C. §881; see also, e.g., Formula One Motors, 777 F. 2d, at 822–823. Though acting pu rsuant to a ci vil forfeiture law that i s not specific to customs and taxes, the D EA agent would be covered by §2680(c)’s exception to the exception because he or she would be acting in a traditio nal revenue capacity—that o f conducting a routine search of persons and effects of per

sons crossin gan international bou n dary. The Court counters that the Bank Secrecy Act, 3 1 U. S. C. §5317(c), is n o t “unrelated to customs or excis e ” because it cross-references a requirement for exportin g and importing monetary instruments, §5316. See ante, at 8, n. 5. But §5316, despite bein g “[r]elated” to customs duties, is part of the f e deral Curr ency and F o reign Tran s actions Reporting Act, see §531 1 et seq. (2000 ed. an d Supp. IV), not the United States’ customs laws. The Court also notes that customs agents have the authority to seize con traband un der the cu stoms laws, particularly 19 U. S. C. §1595a(c)(1). I do not dispute th at customs agents often act under customs laws when seizin g property. My point, which goes unrefuted by the Court, is that it was reasonable for Congres s to have s p ecified that customs an d excise offi cers wo uld be covered by the e x ce p tion to the exception even whenacting pursu ant to federal14ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting laws more generally. For instance, §1595a(c)(1) applies only where “[m]erchan dise .

. . is introduced . . . into the United Sta t es contrar yto law,” which appe ars to targ et the import ation of pr operty subj ect to dutyor entr y r e strictions. Title 28 U. S. C. §2 680(c), by contrast, was amended in 2000 to en compass not only the detention of “goods or m e rchandise” but the detention of all “property.” §3(a), 114 Stat. 211. In circumstances not involving im

ported “me rchandise,” then, the customs official would be acting pu rsuant to law enforce ment authority derived n o t from the customs laws but, inter al ia, the Contraband and BankSecrecy Acts. The same is true of non c ustoms offi

cers acting i na customs capacity. At the very least this renders the Court’s reliance on the views of a subsequentCongress suspect. We have said “subsequen tacts can shape or focus” the m e aning of a statute. FD Av. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 5 29 U. S. 120, 143 (2000). There is no indication, however, that b yad ding a forf eiture exception to th e exception , Congress intended to broaden the scope of the original immunity. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Res e ar ch Bure au , Inc. , 375 U. S. 180, 199–200 (1963). B Though th e Court do es not much rely onthe point, perhaps it has concerns resp ecting suits lik ethe on e no w before us. Petitioner sues for lost property va lued at about $177. La w enforce ment officers in the federal prison system must take inventory of the property they store, and with just under 200,000 persons in the federal prison population, see Federal Bureau of Prisons, We ek ly Population Report, online at http://www.bop.gov/news/ weekly_report.jsp (reporting 199,342 federal inmates as of January 7, 2008), the burden onthe Government to a c count for missing item s of little v a lue could be a sub s tan

tial one.15 Cite as: 55 2 U

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K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting There are sound reasons, though, for r ejecting th is concern in interpreti ng the statute. To begin with, as already discussed, if it were a congressional objective to give a com p rehensive exception t o all officer s who detai n property, C o ngress most likel y would have written a spe

cific provision to address the point, quite apart from th e special con c erns it ha d with customs and revenue. Th e exception as the Court now inte rprets it extends not only to trivial detentions, not only to prison officials, not only to those in cus t ody, but to all detenti o ns of prop erty of what

ever value held by all law enforcement officia l s, a readin g that simply does not comport with the p l ain text and context of the statute. Second, as the Court observed when interpreting an

other excep t ion that ra ised th e concern of numerous frivo

lous claims, liability for negligent transmission “is a risk shared by a n y business [involved i nmanagement of deten

tion faciliti e s],” including the Government. Dolan , 5 46 U. S., at 49 1. Third, there are already in place administrative proce

dures that must be exhausted before the suit is allowed, diminishing the numb e r of frivolous suits that would be heard in federal court. See 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with resp ect to prison conditions under secti on 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other corre c tional facility until su ch administrative remedies as are available a r e exhausted”). Under 28 CFR §543.31(a) (2007), the “owner of the damaged or lost property” firs t must file an FTCA claim with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regional office; the BOP, in turn, is authorized by statu t e to settle administrative cl aims for not more than $1,000, see 31 U. S. C. §3723(a), which li kely encom p asses mos t claims brought by federal prisoners. Only if the prisoner is “dissatisfied with the final agency a ction” may he or s h e file suit in an “approp riate U. S. District Court.” 28 C F R16 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
K ENNEDY , J., di s s e nting §543.32(g). * * * If Congress had intended to give s w eeping immunity to all federal l a w enforcement o fficials from liability for the detention of property, it would not have dropped thi s phrase onto the end of the statutory clause so as to appear there as something of an afte rthought. The seizure of propertybyan officer raises serious concerns for the lib

erty of our people and the Act should not be read to permit appropriati o n of property witho u t a remedy in tort b y language so obscure and indirect. For these reasons, inmy view, the judgment of the Court of Ap peals ought to be reversed._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 2 U

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B REYER , J., diss enting 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 06–9 13 0
ABDUS- S HAHID M. S. ALI, PETI TIONER v. FEDERAL BUR EAU OF PRISON S ET AL

. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ELEV ENTH CIRC U I T [Jan u a r y22, 2008] J USTICE B REYER , wit hwhom J USTICE S T E VENSjoins, dissenting. I agree with J USTIC E K ENN E DY that context makes clea r that Con gress intended the ph ra se “any other law en

forcement officer” to apply on ly to officers carrying out customs or excise duties. See 28 U. S. C. §2680(c). But I write sepa rately to e m phasize, as J U S TI CE K EN NEDY’s dissent itself makes clear, t hat the relevant context ex

tends well beyond Latin canons and other such purely textual devi ces. As with ma ny questions of statutory interp ret a tion, the issue here is not the mean in g of the words. The dictionary meaning of each word is well k n own. Rather, the issue is the statute’s scope . What boundaries did Congress intend to set? To what cir c umstances did Congress intend the phrase, as used in this statutory provision, to apply? The majority an swers this question by referring to an amend

ment that creates an exceptio n for certain forfeitures and by emphasizing the s t atutory word “any.” As to th e amendment, I find J U S TICE K EN NEDY’s counterargume nt convincing. See ante , at 11–13. And, in my view, the word “any” provi d es no help whatsoever. The word “any” is of no help bec ause all sp eakers (in

cluding writers and legislators) who use general words such as “a ll,” “any,” “never,” an d “none” n o rmally rely upon context to indicate th e li mits of ti me and pl ace2 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
B REYER , J., diss enting within whic h they intend those words to do th eir linguistic work

. And with the possible exception of the a ssertion of a universal truth, say by a mathematician, s c ientist, phi

losopher, or theologian, such limits almost always exis t. When I call out to my wife, “There isn’t any butter,” I do not mean, “T here isn’t any butter in town.” The context makes clear to her tha tI am tal k ing about th e contents of our refriger ator. That is to say, it is context, not a diction

ary, that s e ts the boundaries of time, place, and circum

stance within which words such as “any” will apply. See UnitedS t atesv. Palm er , 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (Mar

shall, C. J.) (“[G]eneral words,” su ch as the word “ ‘any’,” must “be limited” in their application “to those objects to which the l e gislature intended to apply them ”); Smallv. United States , 544 U. S. 385, 388 (2005) (“The word ‘an y ’ considered alone cann ot answer” the question “whether the statuto r y referenc e ‘convictedin anycourt’ includes a conviction entered in a foreigncourt”); Nixonv. Missour i Municipal Leagu e , 541 U. S. 125, 132 (20 04) (“ ‘[A]n y ’ ” means “different things depending upon the setting”); United S t a t esv. Alv a rez-San ch ez , 511 U. S. 350, 3 5 7 (1994) (“[R]espondent errs in placing dispositive weight on the broad statutory refe rence to ‘any ’ l a w enforce ment officer or agency without considering the rest of the statute”). Context, of course, includes the words immediately surrounding the phrase in question. And canons such as ejusdem generisand n o scitur a so ciisoffer help in evalua t

ing the significance of those surrounding words. Yet that help is limi t ed. That i s bec ause other contextual features can show that Congre ss intendeda phrase to apply more broadly th an the immediately surrounding words b y themselves suggest. See Circui tCity S t ore s , Inc. v. Ad

ams , 532 U. S. 105, 13 8–140 (200 1) (S OUTER , J., dissent

ing) (finding “good reasons” not to apply eju s dem generis because the statute’s history and purposes ma ke clear tha t3 Cite as: 55 2 U

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B REYER , J., diss enting the words “ any other c l ass of workers” in the phrase “sea

men, railro a d employe e s, or any other class of work ers” refer, not j u st to oth e r transpor t ation workers, but to workers of all kinds including retail store clerks). It is because canons of construction are not “co nclusive” and “are often countered .

. . by som e maxim pointing in a different direction.” Id ., at 115 (majority opinion). And it is because these particular canons simply crystallize what English speakers already know, namely, that lists often (but not always) grou p together items with similar charac

teristics. (That is wh y we cannot, without comic effect, yoke radica lly different nouns to a single verb, e.g. , “He caught th ree salmon, t w o trout, a n d a cold.”) In this case, not only the immediately surroundin g words bu t also every other conte x tual featu r e supports J USTICE K ENNEDY’s conclusion. The textual context in

cludes the location of the phrase within a pr ovision that otherwise exclusively concerns customs and revenue du

ties. And the nontextual context i n cludes several features that, takentogether, indicatethat Congress intended a narrow tort-liability exceptio n re lated to customs and excise. First, d r afti ng historys h ows that the relevant portion of the bill that became the Federal Tort Claims Act co n cerned only customs and excise. Initially, t h e relevant provision of the bill exempted only claims “arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or cu s toms duty. ” See, e.g. , S. 4377, 71 st Cong., 2 dSess., p. 4 (1930). In 1931, a Special Assista n t to the Attorney Gen

eral, Alexander Holtzo ff, wrote additional draft language , namely, “or the detenti o n of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enfor c e ment officer .” Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 2 (1931) (emphasis added). Holtzoff, in a report to a congressional agency, said that the expanded language sought “to include immunity fro mliability in respect of4 ALI v. FEDERAL BURE AU OF PRISONS
B REYER , J., diss enting loss in connection with the detention of goods or merchan

dise by any officer of customs or excise.” Id., at 16. Holt

zoff explained that the language was suggested by a simi

lar British bill that mentioned only customs and excise officials. Ib id. (referring to the bill proposed in the Crow n Proceedings Committee Report §11(5)( c), pp. 17–18 (Apr. 1927) (Cmd. 2842) (“No proceedin gs shall lie under this section .

. . for or in respect of the loss of or any deteriora

tion or damage occasioned to, or any delay in the release of, any goods or merchandise by reason of a n ything do ne or omitted to be done by any officer of customs and excise acting as s u ch”)); see Kosakv. Unit e dSt at es , 465 U. S

. 848, 857, n. 13 (1984) (While “the ideas expressed [in Holtzoff’s report] should not be given great weight in determining the intent of the Legislature,” at least in some circumstances, “it seems tous s e nseless to ignore entirely the views of [the pr ovision’s] drafts man”). And Members of Congress repeatedlyreferred to the exception as encompassing claims involving custom s and exci se functions. See, e.g ., H. R. Rep. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess., p. 5 ( 1940); S. Rep. No. 119 6, 77th Con g ., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10 (1942); H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6 (1945); S. Rep. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 33 (1946). Second, insofar as Congress sought, through the Act’s exceptions, to preclude tort suits against the Government where “ade quate remedies were already avail able,” Kosak , supra , a t8 58; see S. Rep. No. 1400, supra, at 33; H. R. Rep. No. 1287, supra, at 6 (setting forth th at purpose), a limited exception mak e s sense; a broad exception does not. Other statutes already provid edrecovery f o r plaintiffs harmed by federal officers en forcing customs and tax laws but not for plaintiffs harmed by all other federal officers enforcing most other laws. See Bazuayev. Un ited S t a t es , 83 F. 3d 482, 485–486 (CADC 199 6) (detailin g history). Third, the practical di fference between a lim ited and a5 Cite as: 55 2 U

. S. ____ (2008)
B REYER , J., diss enting broad interpretation is considerable, magnifying the im

portance of the congressiona lsil e nce to which J USTI C E K ENN E DY points, see an te , at 11. A limited interpretati on of the phra se “any oth e r law enforcement officer” would lik ely encompass only those law enforce ment officers working, sa y, atborders and help ing to enforce custom s and excise laws. Th e majorityinstead interprets th is provision to include the tens of thousands of officers per

forming unrelated task s. The Justice Department esti

mates that there are more than 100,000 la w enforcement officers, not including members of the armed services. See, e.g. , Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Federal Law Enforce ment Officers, 2004, p. 1 (July 2006). An d although the law’s history contain s much that indicates the provisi o n’s scope is limited to customs and excise, it contains nothing at all suggesting an intent to apply the provision more broadly, indeed, to multiply th e number of officers to whom it applies by wh at is lik ely on e or moreo r ders of magnitude. It is thus n o t the Latin canons, ejusdem gen eri sand nosci tur a sociis , that shed light on the applic ation of the statu t ory ph rase but J USTI C E S CALI A’s more pertinent and easily remem

bered English-language observation that Co ngress “does not .

. . hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whi t m a nv. Am eri

can Trucking Assn s., Inc. , 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001). For these reasons, I di ssent and I join J UST I CE K EN

NEDY’s dissent.