Filed 6/9/21 In re M.A. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re M.A., A Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B308171

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No.

20CCJP01992-A

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed.

Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, 

for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________________________
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INTRODUCTION

T.D. (mother) appeals from the court’s disposition order 

declaring her 11-year-old son a dependent of the court under 

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivisions (a) and 

(b). On appeal, mother contends insufficient evidence supports 

the court’s jurisdiction findings that she physically abused her 

son when she slapped him on the face with an open hand causing 

the area around his eye to bruise and swell. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2020, the Department of Children and Family 

Services (Department) received a referral alleging mother struck 

her then 10-year-old son M.A. on the face causing the area 

around his left eye to swell and bruise. M.A. reported to a school 

official that mother slapped him across his face with an open 

hand after he acted out because she wouldn’t allow him to have 

extra food. 

When interviewed by the Department, mother admitted 

she hit M.A. but claimed it was an accident that she struck his 

face. M.A. was acting out and becoming aggressive, so mother 

tried to spank his buttocks. But because he “was moving around 

so much ... she accidentally hit [him] in the face.” Mother 

expressed remorse for hitting M.A. and told the Department she 

would no longer use physical discipline.

M.A.’s father, Charles A. (father), didn’t live with the 

family and wasn’t around when mother struck the child. Father

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code. 
3

didn’t believed mother would purposefully strike her son on the

face or otherwise intentionally injure the child. 

The day after the Department received the referral, the 

Department asked mother to have M.A. examined by a doctor, 

explaining it would aid the Department’s investigation into 

whether she abused her child. Mother refused to take M.A. to a 

doctor because she didn’t have the time and believed it was 

unnecessary for him to be examined because of an “accidental 

injury.” Mother didn’t have M.A. examined by a pediatrician until 

a little more than a month after the incident. The doctor didn’t 

find any evidence of physical abuse. 

In April 2020, the Department filed a petition on M.A.’s

behalf, alleging mother’s physical abuse placed the child at 

serious risk of physical harm (§ 300, subds. (a) & (b); a-1 and b-1 

allegations). The Department also alleged father failed to protect 

the child from mother’s conduct (a-1 and b-1 allegations).

At the detention hearing, the court found the petition 

alleged a prima facie case under section 300, subdivisions (a) and 

(b). The court ordered M.A. to remain in his parents’ custody. 

After the detention hearing, father moved back into the 

family’s home. Mother told the Department that she has only 

spanked M.A. “ ‘1 to 3 times his entire life.’ ” (Italics omitted.)

She uses a rewards system where she takes privileges away from 

the child when he gets in trouble; spanking is only a “ ‘last 

resort’ ” form of punishment. Father and M.A.’s grandmother 

believed mother would never intentionally hurt the child, and the 

grandmother confirmed mother uses a rewards system to help 

control her son’s behavior.

When asked about participating in a voluntary family 

maintenance plan, mother and father stated they didn’t believe it 
4

was necessary to have someone in their home watching over the 

family because of an isolated incident. Mother was willing, 

however, to receive and participate in services. She told the 

Department she would rather attend classes at a facility than 

have a counselor monitor the family inside the home. 

In July and August 2020, mother completed two 4-hour 

online courses focusing on anger management and parenting 

education. The Department couldn’t contact any of the 

representatives from the courses or confirm that any of the 

courses were led by a live instructor, however. The Department 

informed mother that she may need to complete additional 

courses taught by live instructors in the future. Prior to the 

jurisdiction and disposition hearing, mother and father declined 

to participate in a voluntary supervision program under section 

301. 

In October 2020, the court held the jurisdiction and 

disposition hearing. The court struck the language concerning 

father from the a-1 and b-1 allegations and otherwise sustained 

the allegations as pled. In sustaining the petition, the court found 

mother’s explanation for how M.A. was injured was inconsistent

with the nature of the child’s injuries. The court also faulted 

mother for refusing to take M.A. to a doctor when the 

Department asked her to shortly after it received the abuse 

referral. The court declared M.A. a dependent of the court, 

ordered him to remain placed in his parents’ custody, and ordered 

the parents to participate in family maintenance services.

Mother appealed the court’s disposition order.
5

In January 2021, the court terminated jurisdiction over 

M.A. and left him in his parents’ custody.2

DISCUSSION

“ ‘ “A judicial tribunal ordinarily may consider and

determine only an existing controversy, and not a moot question 

or abstract proposition. ...” ’ [Citation.] An important 

requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ 

relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, 

tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.” (In re I.A.

(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1490.) Generally, “an order 

terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an appeal from a 

previous order in the dependency proceedings moot.” (See In re 

C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) A claim on appeal is not 

moot, however, “ ‘if the purported error infects the outcome of 

subsequent proceedings.’ ” (Ibid.) We therefore must determine 

on a case-by-case basis whether an order terminating jurisdiction 

has rendered moot a challenge on appeal to the jurisdiction 

findings and disposition orders. (Ibid.) 

Mother initially challenged the court’s jurisdiction findings 

and its disposition order, including the court-ordered case plan. 

She concedes her challenge to the disposition order is now moot 

after the court terminated dependency jurisdiction. Mother asks

us to still reach the merits of her challenge to the jurisdiction 

findings, relying on In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 

762–763 (Drake M.). Mother’s reliance on Drake M. is misplaced.

2 While this appeal was pending, we granted mother’s request for 

judicial notice of the January 2021 minute order. We also denied the 

Department’s motion to dismiss mother’s appeal as moot following the 

court’s order terminating jurisdiction. 
6

In Drake M., the father appealed only the jurisdiction 

findings and disposition orders against him that were based on 

his use of medical marijuana; he didn’t challenge the jurisdiction

findings based on the mother’s history of drug abuse. (Drake M., 

supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 762.) When the father appealed, the 

dependency case was still pending in the juvenile court. (See id. 

at p. 761–762.) The Court of Appeal reached the merits of the 

father’s claims because a reversal of the jurisdiction findings 

against him would change his status in the case from an 

“ ‘offending’ ” parent to a “ ‘non-offending’ ” parent. (Id. at p. 763.) 

The court explained, “Such a distinction may have far-reaching 

implications with respect to future dependency proceedings in 

this case and father’s parental rights.” (Ibid.) In other words, 

refusing to reach the merits of the father’s claims could have had 

significant repercussions for the father going forward in that 

same case, such as whether he could continue to retain custody of 

the children.

In this case, on the other hand, the juvenile court has 

already terminated dependency jurisdiction and awarded mother 

custody of M.A. Consequently, even if we were to reverse the 

court’s jurisdiction findings and mother were deemed a “nonoffending” parent, that status would not have any practical effect

in this dependency case since it is no longer pending.

Mother also claims a favorable decision would preclude the 

Department from discussing the court’s findings and her

underlying conduct in future dependency proceedings involving 

her children. We disagree. Nothing would preclude the 

Department from discussing the substance of the allegations

against mother in future dependency proceedings even if we were 

to reverse the jurisdiction findings based on those allegations. (In 
7

re Madison S. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 308, 330 [“the substance of 

the spanking allegation would almost certainly be available in 

any future dependency or family court proceeding, regardless of 

any determination on our part as to whether it formed an 

independent basis for juvenile court jurisdiction”].) Because 

mother has not identified any specific adverse consequences that 

could stem from leaving the jurisdiction findings against her 

undisturbed, her appeal does not present a justiciable issue.

In any event, substantial evidence supports the court’s 

assertion of jurisdiction in this case. The court sustained two 

allegations based on mother striking M.A. on the face—one under 

section 300 subdivision (a) and the other under subdivision (b) of 

the same statute. A court may exercise dependency jurisdiction 

over a child under section 300, subdivision (a), if “[t]he child has 

suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, 

serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally ... by the child’s 

parent ... .” A court may also exercise jurisdiction over a child 

under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), if “ ‘[t]he child has suffered, 

or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of 

his or her parent ... to adequately supervise or protect the 

child ... .’ ” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 624, 629, italics 

omitted.)

To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the 

jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere 

speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]”

(In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.) In determining 

whether conduct is likely to recur, courts may consider evidence 

of the parent’s behavior in the past. (In re N.M. (2011) 197 

Cal.App.4th 159, 165.)
8

We review jurisdiction findings and disposition orders 

removing a child from his or her parent’s custody for substantial 

evidence. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.) We will 

affirm the findings if they are supported by evidence that is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (In re R.V. (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) “We do not evaluate the credibility of 

witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or 

determine the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all 

reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record 

favorably to the juvenile court’s order and affirm the order even if 

there is other evidence supporting a contrary finding. [Citations.] 

The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a 

sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or order. 

[Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

Mother doesn’t dispute that she struck M.A. on the face. 

She only disputes whether she did so intentionally and whether 

the physical injury the child suffered was serious. She also claims 

there was no evidence that M.A. faced a risk of harm at the time 

of the jurisdiction hearing.

As for the extent of M.A.’s injury, the school official who 

reported the family to the Department stated that M.A. had a 

“swollen left eye and two purple marks under the left eye.” 

Courts have found swelling and bruising to constitute serious 

physical harm under the dependency statutes. (In re Mariah T.

(2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 439 [ “deep purple bruises” on child’s 

stomach and forearms inflicted by mother’s use of a belt 

constitutes serious physical harm under section 300, subdivision 

(a)]; In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1644 

[combination of bruises, red marks, welts, and broken skin can 

constitute serious physical harm].) Indeed, that mother inflicted 
9

bruising and swelling on her child’s face, a part of his body that is 

much more vulnerable than his buttocks, arms, or abdomen, 

makes the injury all the more serious. Mother also refused to 

take M.A. to the doctor to have his injury examined shortly after 

the family came to the Department’s attention, supporting an 

inference that she tried to conceal the extent of the child’s injury.

On this record, it was reasonable for the court to find mother 

inflicted serious physical harm on M.A.

As to the nonaccidental nature of mother’s conduct, 

whether she intended to hit M.A. on the buttocks and not the face 

is not the dispositive issue. Mother admitted she intended to hit 

M.A.’s buttocks. That she hit M.A. on a part of his body where 

she wasn’t aiming doesn’t negate the fact that she intentionally 

struck her child in a manner that inflicted physical harm. In any 

event, even if it is an important distinction that mother only 

intended to hit M.A.’s buttocks and not his face, the court found 

mother’s explanation was not credible. That finding is supported 

by the record. First, mother’s refusal to take M.A. to a doctor 

shortly after the incident supports an inference that she tried to 

conceal the extent of her conduct. Second, at the time of the 

incident, M.A. was 10 years old. In other words, M.A. wasn’t a 

very young child or a toddler. It was therefore reasonable for the 

court to discredit mother’s claim that in trying to strike the lower 

backside of M.A.’s body, she missed and accidentally struck the 

child’s face. 

There also was sufficient evidence that M.A. faced a risk of 

harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. Although mother 

expressed remorse for hitting M.A., claimed she wouldn’t hit him 

again, and participated in parenting and anger management 

courses, she also tried to minimize her conduct by claiming she 
10

accidentally struck M.A. on the face and by refusing to have 

M.A.’s injury examined by a doctor. A parent’s denial of 

wrongdoing is relevant to determining whether her child faces a 

risk of harm under section 300. (See In re Tania S. (1992) 5 

Cal.App.4th 728, 735, fn. 4; see also In re A.F. (2016) 3 

Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [“ ‘[D]enial is a factor often relevant to 

determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior 

in the future without court supervision.’ ”].) 

In short, substantial evidence supports the court’s finding 

sustaining the a-1 allegation. Because that finding alone is 

sufficient to maintain dependency jurisdiction over M.A., and 

because mother concedes her challenge to the court’s disposition 

order is moot, we need not address her challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s finding 

sustaining the b-1 allegation. (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 

1444, 1452 [a single jurisdiction finding is sufficient to maintain 

dependency jurisdiction over a child].)
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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s disposition order and jurisdiction 

findings are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.