United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 04-2091

JOHN OGOBODO EZE,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZÁLES,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Boudin, Chief Judge,

Torruella and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Stephen A. Lagana and Lagana & Associates, on brief for

petitioner.

John D. Williams, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney

General, and Douglas E. Ginsburg, Senior Litigation Counsel, on

brief for respondent.

February 23, 2007
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. At issue here is whether the

Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") erred in determining that

petitioner, John Ogobodo Eze ("Eze"), was properly served notice of

the Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") (formerly the

Immigration and Naturalization Service) termination of his

temporary resident status. The regulation governing notice of

termination of an alien's temporary resident status is codified at

8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(u)(2)(i). The regulation provides in relevant

part:

[T]ermination of an alien's temporary resident

status . . . will be made . . . only on notice

sent to the alien by certified mail directed

to his or her last known address, and to his

or her representative, if any. The alien must

be given an opportunity to offer evidence in

opposition to the grounds alleged for

termination of his or her status. Evidence in

opposition must be submitted within thirty

(30) days after the service of the Notice of

Intent to Terminate.

Id.

The BIA determined that Eze received proper service of

the DHS's notice through personal delivery of the notice, rather

than notice by certified mail, as described in the regulations. On

appeal, Eze challenges this determination, arguing that only

service by certified mail -- and not by personal delivery --

complies with the governing regulation, and that the government's

failure to comply with the governing regulation in this case

violated his due process rights. Because the BIA's determination
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that Eze received proper notice was based on its interpretation of

immigration regulations, the issue is a legal one but our review is

subject to principles of deference, Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d

392, 396 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.

415, 424-25 (1999)); of course, we review de novo any determination

of the contours of the due process clause, see Albathani v. INS,

318 F.3d 365, 372 (1st Cir. 2003).

Under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(a)(2), the general regulations

concerning immigration, personal service includes both "[d]elivery

of a copy personally" and "[m]ailing a copy by certified or

registered mail." Neither form of service is considered superior.

Id. Indeed, there is little practical difference in the two forms

of service. Certainly, personal delivery is at least as likely as

delivery by certified mail to ensure that notice is received.

Moreover, there is no evidence on record that Eze was

prejudiced by personal delivery of the notice of termination of his

temporary resident status. The record indicates that the well

established principle of "notice and opportunity to be heard" was

fulfilled. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,

542 (1985) (stating that notice and an opportunity to be heard

together comprise an "essential principle of due process"); Oakes

v. United States, 400 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2005) (same). In fact,

Eze admits that he received and signed the notice of termination of

his temporary resident status. Furthermore, the notice
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specifically orders the termination of his status, and provides

Eze's appeal rights and the requisite appeal form. This not only

confirms that Eze received the notice, but that he also had the

opportunity to be heard on appeal. Clearly, the personal delivery

of the notice adequately notified Eze.

Affirmed.