2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 12-13-2004 

# Re n a r t v . C h a r twel l s P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ocke t N o . 03-4381

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . vi l l a no va . e du . Re c omme nde d C it at ion
" Re n a r t v . C h a r t we l l s " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s . P ape r 85. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/85NOT PRECEDE NTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT
No. 03-4381

CAROL RENAR T, Appellant
v. CH AR TW EL LS , a co rpo rate s ubs idiar y of C OM PA SS GR OU P, a co rp or atio n; COMPASS GROUP, a c orpor atio n; XYZ PART NERS HIP; ABC C ORP; JOH N DO ES, 1 through 10 i nclusi ve, fi ctit ious named defendants, jointly , sever ally and in thealte rnati ve

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNI TED STATES DIST RICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY (Dist. Court No. 01-cv- 01478) District Court Judge: Honorable Joseph E. Irenas
Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

November 1, 2004 Be for e: A LIT O, B AR RY , and FU EN TE S, Circuit Judges (Opinion Fi led: December 13, 2004)
OPINI ON OF THE COURT2

PER CU RIA M : Be cau se w e w rite f or th e pa rties o nly, w e do not set f orth the f acts of th is ca se. Renart ar gues that

the Dist rict Court erred in awardi ng Chartwell s summary j udgment on her claim under theNew Jersey Fami lyLeave Act (FLA) and her impl ied-i n-fact contrac t claim . She f urther argu es that th e Co urt abu sed its d iscretion in den ying her le ave to amend her complai nt to add a clai m under the feder al Famil y and MedicalLeave Act (FMLA) andan e qui tabl e es to ppe l c la im. For th e r eas ons se t f

or th bel ow, we af

fi rm. I. According to Renart’s own ti meline, she began working for Chartwell s on November 4, 1998, t ook leave on October 26, 1999, and was terminated on November 5, 199 9. Th is last date , thoug h ho tly conteste d, is a red herrin g. Lik e its fed eral co unterp art, the F LA focu ses on the em ployee’s status n ot at the time o f term ination but o n the d ate leav e co mm enc es. See N.J. S tat. An n. § 34 :11B -7 (W est 20 00) (re quiring emp loyers to restore emp loyees to p osition s equ ivalen t to thos e held “w hen th e leav e com men ced” ); cf. 29 C .F.R. § 825 .110( d) (20 04) (p rovid ing tha t eligibility for lea ve un der the FM LA shall be determined “as of the date l eave commences”). An individualmust have been employe d for 12 months at the ti me leave commences in order to be e ligible under t he FL A. See N.J. St at. Ann. § 34:11B-3(e) . Renart ’s le ave began on October 26, 1999 – nin e da ys shy o f the ann iver sary o f he r em plo ymen t and the b egin nin g of her eligi bility. Since she was not

eligible for t

hat le ave, she c ould be fre elyterminated for t aking it . The3

Distric t Cou rt did no t err in aw arding Ch artw ells sum mary jud gm ent. Ch artw ells w as a lso e ntitle d to sum ma ry judg me nt o n R ena rt’s c ont ract c laim
. Although the New Jers ey Supr eme Court has found i mplied cont racts in the terms of wid ely dist ribu ted e mp loyee ma nua ls, see Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. , 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J . 1985), the formation of an i mplied cont ract maybe avoided bythe
exe cutio n of an e xpr ess a gre em ent o f at- wil l em plo ymen t. Radw an v. Beecham L abs. , 850 F.2d 147 , 150 ( 3d C ir. 1988 ); Ware v. Prudential I ns. Co. , 531 A.2d 757, 761 (N .J. Super. C t. App. D iv. 1987). R enart execu ted such an agreem ent wh en she sign ed, as part of her employ ment appli cati on, a st atement t hat she “unde rst[ oo]d that my employ ment and compensati on can be terminated wit h or without

cause or notice, at anytime, at the option of e ither

the companyor myse lf.” This st atement, expressl y pr oviding t hat her employment

was at will , more than suffice d to prevent the formation of an i mplied agree men t to the c ontrar y. Since th ere ca n be n o bre ach w ithout a contra ct, Ch artw ells
wa s entitled to sum mary jud gm ent on Ren art’s claim for b reach of co ntract. II. Renart next

argues that theDistri ct Court abused it s discretion i n denyi ng her lea ve to amend her complaint. Once a responsi ve pleadi ng has been served, a partymay amend her plea ding “only

by l eave of court

or by written consent of the adver se party; and leave shallbe freel y gi ven when justi ce so requi res. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) . In deci ding whe ther to grant leave , the court may con sider (1) any undu e delay, bad faith, or dilatory4

mo tives on the pa rt of the mo vant; (2 ) the fu tility of the am endm ent; an d (3) p rejudic e to the o ther par ty. Lak e v. A rnold , 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 200 0). Re nar t wa s pro per ly den ied le ave bec aus e he r pro pos ed a me ndm ents we re fu tile. H er FM LA cla im ha d t o f ail fo r th e s am e r ea so n t ha t h er FL A cla im fa ile d – na m ely, because she was i neligible for l eave. Her equi tableestoppelclai m had to failbecause her
own testimony foreclosed the argum ent that she had relied on any of C hartwells’s repres entations about

her eli gibil ity

for lea ve. Detri mental r eliance is a ne cessary el ement of a claim for equ itabl e es top pel. See, e. g. , Bar one v. Leuk emi a So c’ y of Am. , 42 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 ( D.N.J. 1998) . Renart testifie d that s he took ti me off only because her supe rvisor h ad told her sh e cou ld, not b ecau se she believ ed sh e w as eligib le for f amily leav e or bec aus e he r sup erv isor h ad c har acte rized her leav e as suc h. See Pl.’ s Dep. at 137 (“ It wasn ’t a family le ave . S he j ust to ldme t o t ake a wee k of f an d t ake care of

my problems. ”). Si nce Chartwell s had made no statements about her eli gibil ity

on which she relied, Renart co uld not reco ver on a the ory of equitable estop pel, and the D istrict Court acted with in its discr etion in denying her lea ve to a dd th is claim to her c om plaint. III. Fina lly, Renart a rgue s that the M agistrate Judg e erred or ab used his disc retion in awarding Chartwells $1, 268.51 in attorney’ s fees as a sancti on for a fil ing that was untimel y byone day. Renart’s brief doe s not menti on this issue out side t he statement of issues presented and offers no reason for di sturbi ng the award. We deem the issue5

wai vedandaff

irm. IV. W e ha ve c aref ully co nsid ered Re nar t’s ar gum ents and see no b asis f or re ver sal. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.