Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Denise L. Turner

DTurner Legal LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Alexis Flynn,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 11, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1958

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Lawrence Superior Court

The Honorable William G. Sleva,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

47D02-1810-F5-1600

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] Police responded to a domestic disturbance at Alexis Flynn’s apartment on 

October 1, 2018. While there, officers conducted a protective sweep of the 

apartment for the purpose of confirming that it was safe and that any threat to 

Flynn was abated. Once inside, they observed contraband sitting in plain view. 

The officers immediately exited the apartment and obtained a search warrant. 

After obtaining a search warrant, the officers re-entered and conducted a search 

of the apartment, finding drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and 

marijuana. The State subsequently charged Flynn with Level 5 felony 

possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, Class B 

misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of 

paraphernalia. Prior to trial, Flynn moved to suppress the evidence recovered 

during the search of her apartment. This interlocutory appeal follows the denial 

of Flynn’s motion to suppress. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 1, 2018, members of the Indiana State Police and the Mitchell 

Police Department, including Mitchell Police Sergeant Michael Williams,

responded to a domestic disturbance at Flynn’s apartment. Upon arriving at 

the apartment, Sergeant Williams made contact with Flynn. Flynn indicated 

that she “and her male half had gotten into an argument.” Ex. Vol. p. 7. Flynn 

“didn’t know where the male was located. She thought he could possibly be in 

the residence, and then she said he might not be and she kept going back and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 3 of 7

forth on her answers.” Ex. Vol. p. 7. Sergeant Williams approached the 

apartment and noticed that “the door was cracked open slightly.” Ex. Vol. p. 7. 

He could hear a television on inside. Sergeant Williams “knocked on the door 

and made an announcement” identifying himself and the other responding 

officers as police officers. Ex. Vol. p. 7. The officers “then went into the 

residence to perform a protective sweep to make sure that the individual was 

not in the residence.” Ex. Vol. p. 7. During the sweep of the apartment, the 

officers observed, in plain view, “two methamphetamine smoking pipes” and 

what appeared to be a scale in the living room. Ex. Vol. p. 7. 

[3] The officers immediately exited the apartment, and Sergeant Williams 

requested permission from Flynn to search the apartment. Flynn declined, so 

Sergeant Williams obtained a search warrant. During the subsequent search, 

the officers recovered the above-mentioned paraphernalia and found 

methamphetamine and marijuana as well. 

[4] On October 2, 2018, the State charged Flynn with Level 5 felony possession of 

methamphetamine, Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, Class B 

misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of 

paraphernalia. On January 3, 2019, Flynn filed a motion to suppress “all 

statements made by [Flynn] and any evidence collected as a result of” the 

search of the apartment. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 28. The trial court 

conducted a hearing on Flynn’s motion on July 2, 2019. On August 14, 2019, 

the trial court denied Flynn’s motion to suppress. At Flynn’s request, the trial 

court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 4 of 7

Discussion and Decision

[5] Flynn challenges the denial of her motion to suppress. “In reviewing a trial 

court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we determine whether substantial 

evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court’s ruling.” Duran v. 

State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ind. 2010). “We do not reweigh the evidence and 

consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.” Id.

[6] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens 

from state intrusions into their homes. The Fourth Amendment reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

“The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure 

has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weis v. 

State, 800 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[7] The United States Supreme Court has said that the physical entry 

of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 

Fourth Amendment is directed. The fundamental purpose of the 

Fourth Amendment is to protect the legitimate expectations of 

privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes and 

their belongings. Thus, searches and seizures inside a home 

without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 5 of 7

Id. (internal quotations omitted). “However, on occasion the public interest 

demands greater flexibility than is offered by the constitutional mandate of the 

warrant requirement.” State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001) (internal quotation omitted). “Accordingly, there are some carefully 

delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” McDermott v. State, 877 

N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “One exception allows police to 

dispense with the warrant requirement in the presence of exigent 

circumstances.” Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ind. 2006). “The warrant 

requirement becomes inapplicable where the exigencies of the situation make 

the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 

objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 936–37.

[8] “Among the well-known exigent circumstances that have justified a warrantless 

search or seizure are entries (1) to prevent bodily harm or death; (2) to aid a 

person in need of assistance; (3) to protect private property; and (4) to prevent 

actual or imminent destruction or removal of incriminating evidence before a 

search warrant may be obtained.” McDermott, 877 N.E.2d at 474. 

A 911 call generally details emergency or exigent circumstances 

requiring swift police action. In these cases, the officers are 

responding to rapidly changing or escalating events, and their 

initial response is often based on limited information. The 

officers cannot properly assess the complaint and the dangers to 

those threatened without some limited access to the involved 

parties. It is unrealistic to expect officers to wait for threats to 

escalate and for violence to become imminent before intervening.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 6 of 7

Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind. 2011), adhered to on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d 

473 (Ind. 2011).

[9] In Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), police 

responded to two 911 calls for a domestic disturbance. When officers arrived, 

they were informed by the alleged victims that Lundquist, the perpetrator, was 

thought to be hiding on the property. Id. at 1068–69. Given the nature of the 

emergency calls, officers completed a protective sweep of the property in an 

attempt to locate Lundquist. Id. at 1069. While conducting this sweep, officers 

found marijuana plants growing near the house. Id. Upon review, we noted 

that “[a]lthough [the officers] invaded the curtilage of Lundquist’s residence, 

[their] intention in doing so was not to search for marijuana, but merely to find 

Lundquist. Moreover, the deputies reasonably believed Lundquist was hiding 

on the property.” Id.

[10] Similarly, in this case, when the officers entered Flynn’s apartment, their 

intention was not to search for drugs or contraband, but merely to ensure 

Flynn’s safety by finding the co-participant in the domestic disturbance, who 

they reasonably believed could be hiding in the apartment. Again, the officers 

responded to Flynn’s apartment because of a reported domestic disturbance. 

When they arrived, they were informed that the co-participant in the domestic 

disturbance “could possibly be in the residence” but “he might not be.” Ex. 

Vol. p. 7. Reasonably believing that Flynn’s co-participant in the dispute could 

be inside the apartment, the officers conducted a protective sweep of the 

apartment. They entered the apartment for the sole purpose of confirming that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 7 of 7

the apartment was safe and that any threat to Flynn was abated. Once inside 

the apartment, the officers observed contraband in plain view. They then 

immediately stopped their protective sweep, exited the apartment, and obtained 

a search warrant. Only after obtaining the search warrant did officers re-enter 

and search the apartment. 

[11] We believe that the officers acted reasonably in their efforts to protect Flynn 

from potential harm. The facts of this case created an exigent circumstance

sufficient to justify the officers’ warrantless entry into Flynn’s apartment. As 

such, we conclude that substantial evidence of probative value exists to support 

the trial court’s ruling and affirm the trial court’s denial of Flynn’s motion to 

suppress.1

[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur. 

1

 We are unconvinced by Flynn’s claim that officers may only conduct a protective sweep following an 

arrest. While a protective sweep may, under some circumstances, be an acceptable way to ensure public and 

officer safety following an arrest, in this case, the protective sweep was intended to ensure Flynn’s safety after 

she was reportedly involved in a domestic disturbance. Requiring officers to refrain from attempting to locate 

the co-participant in the domestic disturbance until an arrest has been made would be impractical and 

contrary to the general public policy of ensuring the safety of individuals involved in such disturbances.