In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: October 1, 2024

S24A0616. NAJARRO v. THE STATE.

 BETHEL, Justice.

Following a jury trial, Sylvia Marie Najarro was convicted of 

felony murder and related crimes in connection with the shooting 

death of Jamun El Winslow during a drug deal.1 The trial court 

denied Najarro’s motion for new trial, and Najarro appeals,

1 The crimes occurred on February 5, 2020. In October 2022, a Gwinnett 

County grand jury indicted Najarro and co-indictees Jaime Manuel Jimenez 

and Jayce Thayleen Villafana-Diaz for felony murder predicated on aggravated 

assault (Count 1), felony murder predicated on criminal attempt to commit

robbery (Count 2), felony murder predicated on criminal attempt to purchase 

marijuana (Count 3), aggravated assault (Count 4), criminal attempt to

commit robbery (Count 5), and criminal attempt to purchase marijuana (Count 

6). Najarro was tried alone before a jury from November 7 to 15, 2022. The jury 

returned verdicts of not guilty on Counts 2 and 5 but guilty on all remaining 

counts. The trial court sentenced Najarro to serve life in prison on Count 3 and 

a consecutive term of five years in prison on Count 4. The remaining counts 

merged or were vacated by operation of law. Najarro filed a timely motion for 

new trial, which she amended twice through new counsel. Following a hearing, 

the trial court denied Najarro’s motion, as amended, on December 26, 2023. 

Najarro filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this 

Court’s April 2024 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 
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contending that her trial counsel rendered constitutionally 

ineffective assistance. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

1. The evidence presented at trial showed as follows. On the 

night of the crimes, El Winslow drove to a Gwinnett County gas 

station, where he met Najarro and her co-indictees Jaime Manuel 

Jimenez and Jayce Thayleen Villafana-Diaz to sell them marijuana. 

Surveillance video that was introduced into evidence at trial showed 

Najarro and Villafana-Diaz enter El Winslow’s vehicle after he 

parked outside the gas station. A short time later, Najarro exited

the vehicle and entered the gas station where a Spanish-speaking

eyewitness overheard Najarro tell Jimenez in Spanish, “Hurry up, 

he’s about to leave.” While Najarro waited inside, Jimenez exited the 

gas station, approached and attempted to enter El Winslow’s 

vehicle, and then brandished a gun. El Winslow attempted to drive 

away, and Jimenez fired his gun at El Winslow, striking him in the 

upper back. Responding officers found El Winslow deceased in his 

vehicle, along with a bag of marijuana.

Investigators identified Najarro and her co-indictees after
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reviewing the surveillance footage from the gas station. Najarro was 

identified from distinctive tattoos on her face and neck, which are 

visible on the surveillance video. Fingerprints lifted from the 

passenger-side door of El Winslow’s vehicle were matched to 

Najarro. And a text message sent from Najarro’s phone after the 

crimes stated, “We shot her homeboy. We need to go.”

2. Najarro’s sole contention on appeal is that her trial counsel 

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in four respects. To 

prevail on this claim, Najarro bears the burden of demonstrating 

both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that she was 

prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 

687 (III) (B) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To show deficient 

performance, Najarro “must demonstrate that [her] attorney 

performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering 

all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” 

Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 683 (4) (872 SE2d 722) (2022) (citation 

and punctuation omitted). To show prejudice, Najarro must 

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, in the absence of 
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counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the trial would have 

been different.” Id. “The failure to demonstrate either deficient 

performance or resulting prejudice is fatal to a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel and obviates the need even to consider the 

other.” Bradley v. State, 318 Ga. 142, 144 (2) (897 SE2d 428) (2024). 

We address Najarro’s claims in turn.

(a) Najarro’s first claim of ineffective assistance concerns the

admission of body camera footage showing a police officer’s 

interview with the Spanish-speaking eyewitness who overheard 

Najarro speak to Jimenez just before the shooting, as well as the 

admission of a transcript of the interpretation of that interview from 

Spanish to English, which was prepared by a court-certified 

interpreter. During the interview, which took place shortly after the 

crimes, the eyewitness communicated with the assistance of his son, 

who acted as an interpreter. The eyewitness and the police officer to 

whom the eyewitness made his statement both testified at trial, and 

their testimony was, in some respects, inconsistent with the 

eyewitness’s prior statement. Thereafter, the State sought to 
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impeach both the eyewitness’s and the police officer’s trial testimony 

by introducing the body camera footage and transcript of the 

interpreted interview. Trial counsel objected to the admission of the 

body camera footage on the basis that the eyewitness’s son, who did 

not testify at trial, inaccurately interpreted portions of the 

conversation, but the trial court admitted the footage over counsel’s 

objection. The transcript of the interview was admitted without 

objection. 

Now, on appeal, Najarro argues that trial counsel was deficient 

in failing to raise a hearsay objection to the admission of the body 

camera footage. She further asserts that the eyewitness’s statement 

amounted to a prior consistent statement, that the State improperly 

bolstered the eyewitness’s trial testimony with that prior consistent 

statement by introducing the body camera footage into evidence, and 

that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object on that basis.

Najarro also contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to 

raise a hearsay objection to the admission of the transcript. Our 

review of the record, however, reflects that counsel’s decision not to 
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raise further objections was part of a reasonable trial strategy. See 

Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 486 (807 SE2d 350) (2017) 

(“[R]easonable decisions as to whether to raise a specific objection 

are ordinarily matters of trial strategy and provide no ground for 

reversal.”). And “[a] defendant who contends a strategic decision 

constitutes deficient performance must show that no competent 

attorney, under similar circumstances, would have made it.” Gittens 

v. State, 307 Ga. 841, 847 (2) (e) (838 SE2d 888) (2020) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). Najarro has not made that showing.

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel emphasized 

that he does not make objections simply because such objections are 

available, explaining that he does not “just say, oh, that’s hearsay, 

objection” because his practice is not to object “to those things that 

don’t go directly to inculpatory or exculpatory evidence as to [his] 

client’s guilt[.]”Trial counsel elaborated that he may decide to forgo 

an objection because the evidence at issue “may create an 

opportunity . . . in the trial later on to make an argument about 

something that is not necessarily obvious,” especially if the evidence 
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does not speak directly to his client’s guilt or innocence. And the 

record reflects that counsel employed this strategic approach here. 

When the trial court overruled trial counsel’s objection to the 

admissibility of the body camera footage, counsel shifted his 

attention to mitigating the impact of the son’s inaccurate 

interpretation and, with input from the trial court, reached an 

agreement with the prosecutor as to how the body camera footage 

and the transcript of the interview’s interpretation would be 

admitted into evidence and presented to the jury. Later, when the 

transcript was admitted during the testimony of the interpreter who 

prepared the transcript, trial counsel extensively cross-examined 

the interpreter regarding the inaccuracy of the son’s interpretation, 

with the interpreter agreeing that the son’s interpretation was 

“terrible.” And during closing argument, trial counsel argued at 

length that the State’s shifting accounts of the crimes — as 

evidenced by the testimony of the eyewitness and the police officer, 

the body camera footage, and the transcript of the interview —

undermined the credibility of the eyewitness and the soundness of 
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the State’s investigation and theory of the case. In light of these 

circumstances, we cannot say that, by failing to raise hearsay or 

bolstering objections to the body camera footage and transcript of 

the interview’s interpretation, trial counsel pursued an objectively 

unreasonable strategy, and Najarro makes no effort to demonstrate 

otherwise. See Harrison v. State, 309 Ga. 747, 751-752 (2) (848 SE2d 

84) (2020) (no deficient performance where trial counsel’s failure to 

raise hearsay and bolstering objections arose from trial counsel’s

strategic decision to forego objection in favor of using testimony to 

support theory of defense); Sawyer v. State, 308 Ga. 375, 386 (2) (c) 

(839 SE2d 582) (2020) (“In light of trial counsel’s testimony, trial 

counsel’s decision to use the detective’s testimony in support of a 

defense strategy — and not to object to it on hearsay grounds — was 

not so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have 

chosen to forgo an objection to this testimony.” (citation and 

punctuation omitted)); Mitchell v. State, 290 Ga. 490, 492 (722 SE2d 

705) (2012) (“The decision not to object to certain hearsay or to 

leading questions is often the result of reasonable trial strategy.
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Because Appellant has not made a contrary showing, he has failed 

to show deficient performance.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 

Najarro therefore has failed to carry her burden of proving that she 

was denied the effective assistance of counsel.

(b) Najarro also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to raise two additional hearsay objections. Specifically, she 

complains that two officers who were not present during her arrest 

were permitted to testify without objection that she was arrested in 

a hotel room where weapons, drugs, and her cell phone were also 

found.2 She also argues that a hearsay objection was warranted 

when the State moved to admit body camera footage showing an 

interview with a witness who was on the phone with El Winslow 

during the shooting and stated that he heard El Winslow’s car crash 

and El Winslow yell at him to call 911. 

At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel was asked 

about his decision not to object to the admission of this particular 

2 One officer obtained the arrest warrant for Najarro, though he was not 

present for her arrest. The other officer obtained and executed a search 

warrant for the hotel room in which Najarro was arrested. 
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evidence. And again trial counsel’s testimony demonstrates that 

counsel made the strategic decision not to object. To that end, 

counsel explained that he did not view this particular evidence, 

which in no way connected Najarro to the crimes, as prejudicial to 

Najarro’s defense because the evidence did not go to the ultimate 

issue of Najarro’s guilt. Though trial counsel agreed that the 

evidence at issue constituted hearsay, he emphasized that, if 

evidence is not “in some way[,] shape[,] or form going to circle back 

and burn [his] client as to the ultimate issue . . . , [he is] not just 

objecting just to be objecting.” Trial counsel’s decision not to object 

to evidence that did not speak directly to Najarro’s guilt “was a 

legitimate trial strategy that falls within the range of reasonable 

professional conduct.” Durham v. State, 292 Ga. 239, 242 (4) (a) (734 

SE2d 377) (2012); see also Gittens, 307 Ga. at 847 (2) (e) (failure to 

object to evidence not prejudicial to defendant does not support 

finding of deficient performance); Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 410 

(9) (811 SE2d 399) (2018) (same). Accordingly, this claim fails.

(c) Finally, Najarro argues that trial counsel was ineffective by 
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failing to move for sanctions under OCGA § 17-16-6 after the State 

sought to admit a transcript of the English interpretation of the 

eyewitness interview discussed above on the basis that the 

transcript was not produced before trial. In particular, Najarro 

argues that trial counsel should have moved to exclude the 

transcript, one of the remedies specified by OCGA § 17-16-6 (to 

remedy a discovery violation, “the court may order the [S]tate to 

permit the discovery or inspection, interview of the witness, grant a 

continuance, or, upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit 

the state from introducing the evidence not disclosed or presenting 

the witness not disclosed, or may enter such other order as it deems 

just under the circumstances”). To demonstrate that trial counsel 

performed deficiently by failing to move to exclude the transcript 

pursuant to OCGA § 17-16-6, Najarro must establish not only that 

a discovery violation actually occurred but also that the trial court 

would have granted a motion to exclude the evidence under OCGA 

§ 17-16-6 had counsel actually made the motion. See Mims v. State, 

304 Ga. 851, 858-859 (2) (c) (823 SE2d 325) (2019) (“[T]rial counsel 
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cannot be deficient for failing to file a meritless motion[.]”).

Here, assuming that a discovery violation occurred such that 

the trial court would have been authorized under OCGA § 17-16-6 

to fashion a remedy for that violation, it is not at all clear that 

exclusion of the transcript necessarily would have been warranted. 

As we have explained, “[e]xclusion of evidence pursuant to OCGA § 

17-16-6 is a particularly harsh sanction that should be imposed only 

where there is a showing of bad faith by the party that has failed to 

comply with its discovery obligation and prejudice to the other 

party.” Parker v. State, 309 Ga. 736, 742-743 (4) (848 SE2d 117) 

(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Najarro’s conclusory 

argument on this point, unsupported by citation of authority, falls 

far short of demonstrating either the requisite bad faith or resulting 

prejudice to support the transcript’s exclusion under OCGA § 17-16-

6. Moreover, the record reflects that trial counsel requested and was 

given time to review the transcript of the interview’s interpretation

before it was introduced at trial. Though trial counsel did not ground 

his request for time to review the transcript in the provisions of 
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OCGA § 17-16-6, a continuance is one of the remedies contemplated 

by that statute. And trial counsel effectively obtained the benefit of 

a continuance here. In short, Najarro has wholly failed to establish 

that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to seek to exclude 

the transcript under OCGA § 17-16-6. See Mims, 304 Ga. at 858-859 

(2) (c). As such, this claim, like the others, fails.3

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

3 Najarro argues in passing that the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s 

deficiencies should be considered. We have neither assumed nor identified any 

instance of deficient performance, however, so there are no errors to aggregate, 

and Najarro’s claim of cumulative error also fails. See Blocker v. State, 316 Ga. 

568, 583 (5) (889 SE2d 824) (2023).