1

Personally 

identifiable 

information 

(PII) should 

not be submitted to the NRC unless 

it is required by NRC regulations 

or necessary for a requested 

review. PII is information that can 

be used to identify or contact a 

person uniquely and reliably or 

can be traced back to a specific 

individual. Also, PII is any other 

information that is linked or 

linkable to an individual, such as 

medical, educational, financial, and 

employment information.

Moreover, PII is a person’s name, in 

combination with other information 

that could make the person’s 

identity easily traceable, such as 

relatives’ name, postal address, 

home or cellular telephone number, 

home e-mail address, date or place 

of birth, social security number, 

mother’s maiden name, personal 

characteristics, bank account 

information, driver’s license number, 

or credit card information. If such 

information were to be obtained and 

used maliciously, significant harm 

could be done to individuals whose 

PII was released. It is important to 

note that personal identity is distinct 

from an individual’s professional 

identity (i.e., employee’s name, title, 

work telephone number, official 

LICENSEE NEWSLETTER

NUREG/BR-0117, No. 10-02 Summer 2010

O	ce of Federal & State Materials &

Environmental Management Programs

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

Protecting Identifiable Information 

From Public Disclosure........................1

Proposed Rule for Distribution of 

Byproduct Material...............................1

Welcome and Farewell ........................2

From the Desk of the FSME 

Director.....................................................3

Distribution of Source Material 

Proposed Rule.........................................4

New Proposed Rule – Part 37 – 

Physical Protection of 

Byproduct Material...............................4

Safety Culture Meeting 

Announcement......................................7

Protection of Cesium Chloride 

Source Meeting Announcement.......7

Significant Enforcement Actions.....8

Generic Communications Issued..... 10

Significant Events...............................10

Selected Federal Register Notices... 14

Protecting Personally Identifiable Information

from Public Disclosure

work location, and work e-mail 

address). PII is not information 

related to the workplace. 

When PII is necessary, any 

documents submitted to the 

NRC must be clearly identified as 

containing sensitive information to 

avoid public disclosure in the NRC’s 

Agency-wide Documents Access 

and Management System (ADAMS). 

Specifically, documents should be 

marked on the top of the first page 

and the top of each page containing 

PII with language substantially 

similar to “Withhold from public 

disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390.” 

In addition, the basis (i.e., Personal 

Privacy Information) for withholding 

the information from public 

disclosure should be provided for 

each document at the top of the 

page, if the entire page is affected 

or adjacent to the information if less 

than a page is affected.

Additional information on this 

topic can be found in the NRC 

Regulatory Issue Summary 

2007-04, “Personally Identifiable 

Information Submitted to the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission” 

(http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

doc-collections/gen-comm/regissues/2007/ri200704.pdf).

(Contact: Marc Ferdas, NRC Region 1, 

DNMS, 610-337-5022 or 

e-mail: Marc.Ferdas@nrc.gov)

PROPOSED RULE FOR

DISTRIBUTION OF

BYPRODUCT MATERIAL

On June 24, 2010, the NRC 

published a notice of proposed 

rulemaking 

on the 

distribution 

of byproduct 

material in 

the Federal 

Register (75 FR 36211) for public 

comment. The proposed 

rulemaking would make the 
2

Dr. Josephine M. Piccone

The FSME staff is delighted to

welcome Dr. Josephine M. Piccone

as Director, Division of 

Intergovernmental Liaison and 

Rulemaking, which was effective 

on June 20, 2010. 

Since joining the NRC in 1985, 

Dr. Piccone has held positions 

of increasing responsibility. 

Dr. Piccone served in a number of 

senior management positions in 

the Office of Nuclear Material Safety 

and Safeguards (NMSS) and as 

Deputy Director, Office of State and 

Tribal Programs. In 2005, she was 

selected by former Commissioner 

 Mr. Mark Shaffer

The FSME staff would like to 

congratulate Mr. Mark Shaffer, 

the former Director of the 

Division of Intergovernmental 

Liaison and Rulemaking, for his 

requirements for distributors 

of byproduct material clearer, 

less prescriptive, and more riskinformed and up to date. Also, 

the proposed rulemaking would 

redefine the categories of devices 

to be used under exemptions, 

make the regulations more explicit 

regarding the sealed source and 

device registration process, and 

add flexibility to the licensing 

of users of sealed sources and 

WELCOME

FAREWELL

devices. The proposal includes a 

new class exemption for industrial 

devices and associated distributor 

requirements. Primarily, this 

rulemaking is intended to make the 

licensing processes more efficient 

and effective. These changes 

would affect manufacturers and 

distributors of sources and devices 

containing byproduct material 

and future users of some products 

currently used under a general or 

specific license.

The rule is posted at 

http://www.regulations.gov

under Docket ID: NRC-2008-0338. 

The public comment period ends 

on September 7, 2010.

(Contact: Catherine R. Mattsen, 

FSME, 301-415-6264 or e-mail: 

Catherine.Mattsen@nrc.gov)

Peter B. Lyons as his Chief of Staff 

and Executive Assistant.  Dr. Piccone 

earned a bachelor’s degree in 

chemistry from Daemen College, 

and a master’s degree in health 

physics and a doctor of philosophy 

in medical radiation physics from 

Temple University. 

The FSME staff is looking forward to 

working with Dr. Piccone. 

recent appointment as the new 

NRC nuclear safety attaché at 

the U.S. Mission to International 

Organizations in Vienna, Austria. 

In his new position, Mr. Shaffer will 

serve as the nuclear safety issues 

and programs expert and provide 

programmatic and policy oversight 

to the International Atomic Energy 

Agency’s (IAEA) safety program on 

behalf of the United States. 

Mr. Shaffer joined the NRC staff 

in 1991 and held positions of 

increasing responsibility. In 2008, 

Mr. Shaffer became the Director of 

the Division of Intergovernmental 

Liaison and Rulemaking in FSME. 

Additionally, Mr. Shaffer has 

extensive international experience, 

including a 6-month assignment 

at IAEA as Acting Head of the 

Standards Applications Unit. 

Mr. Shaffer earned a bachelor’s 

degree in nuclear medicine from 

Incarnate Word College.

The FSME staff will miss 

Mr. Mark Shaffer, and we wish him 

much success in his new position.
3

One of the reasons why I enjoy coming to work every day is that 

FSME is never a boring place. Our office manages such a broad 

range of issues and programmatic responsibilities. Usually, I get 

the chance to meet with staff and counterparts to discuss nuclear 

materials safety, security, waste management, environmental 

projects, rulemakings, and corporate issues - all within the 

course of one business day. Internal NRC statistics nearly always 

show that FSME has the highest number of items being sent to 

the Commission for policy decisions, even though we are only 

considered as a medium-sized office. 

In addition, as I mentioned in the previous edition of this 

Newsletter, FSME and our issues continue to receive attention 

in the Commission meetings. Whether you hold an NRC or 

Agreement State license, I am certain that one or more of these Commission meetings has, or will, cover a topic 

of interest to you. 

In early June, FSME took part in a 3-hour briefing to the Commission that presented NRC staff, State regulators, 

industry, and a public interest group’s perspectives on a complex technical issue related to the blending of lowlevel nuclear waste. This multi-panel format seems to be gaining momentum and is likely to be used more 

frequently in the future. The Commission seems to favor a broader range of viewpoints to make better-informed 

regulatory decisions.

In July, FSME conducted a briefing on medical events and brachytherapy regulations in 10 CFR Part 35. Later 

in the month, I briefed the Commission on a multi-agency Radiation Source Security Task Force report that we 

will send to the President and Congress. In August, the Organization of Agreement States and the Conference 

of Radiation Control Program Directors will take their seats before the Commission. In October, our Advisory 

Committee on the Medical Use of Isotopes and other stakeholders are scheduled to cover a broad range of 

medical topics. 

Chairman Jaczko and the new Commissioners have been quick to act on FSME-related issues. Periodically, I meet 

with them individually to exchange thoughts on how best to achieve our programmatic goals of safe and secure 

operations, and environmental protection by 20,000 nuclear materials users under NRC or State regulatory 

purview. Each of the Commissioners has at least one staff member in his or her office with nuclear materials or 

waste management expertise. As you are aware, the Commissioners are often busy travelling across the country 

to visit some of your facilities. The visits allow them the opportunity and experience to see and hear, first-hand, 

the issues in the real world, and to better understand the impacts of our regulatory decisions on stakeholders. 

Of course, none of us is ever likely to feel that the regulatory climate is perfect. Some will always believe that 

there are unnecessary regulatory burdens. Others may believe that the NRC and FSME are not going far enough 

to protect people and the environment. Those viewpoints are understandable. As a regulator, I understood 

a long time ago that my job was not to make everyone happy. My job is to open our regulatory and decisionmaking processes to allow for all reasonable viewpoints to be expressed and considered. With this exchange, 

I am able to provide the Commission with the most complete and technically-sound recommendations 

developed by the FSME staff. 

As always, I thank you for your attention to safety, security, and protection of the environment. 

Charles L. Miller, Director

from the desk 

of the fsme

director
4

Distribution of 

Source Material 

Proposed Rule

On July 26, 2010, the NRC published 

a proposed rule on the Distribution 

of Source Material in the Federal 

Register (75 FR 43425) for public 

comment. The comment period is 

scheduled to close on November 

16, 2010. Associated draft guidance 

for the proposed rule will be made 

available prior to the close of the 

comment period. 

This proposed rule would amend 

the regulations governing the 

distribution of source material in 

10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 70, 170, and 171. 

The NRC proposed amendments 

would add new specific licensing 

and reporting requirements, and 

fees for the initial distribution of 

products and materials containing 

source material for receipt under an 

exemption or the general license 

in 10 CFR 40.22, “Small quantities 

of source material.” In addition, 

the proposed amendments modify 

the existing possession and use 

requirements for the general license 

in 10 CFR 40.22 to better align the 

requirements with current health 

and safety standards. Moreover, 

the proposed amendments revise, 

clarify, or delete certain licensing 

exemptions (also known as 

“unimportant quantities”) in order 

to make the requirements for those 

exemptions more risk informed. 

The proposed amendments are 

intended to better ensure the 

protection of the public health and 

safety in the future; provide the NRC 

and Agreement States with more 

complete and timely information 

on the types and quantities of 

source material distributed for use 

under exemption or by general 

licensees; modify the requirements 

for possession of certain products 

under exemptions; and remove 

obsolete exemptions. These 

changes may affect licensees who 

initially distribute source material 

to exempt persons and general 

licensees, or use source material 

under general license. 

(Contact: Andrew Carrera, FSME, 

301-415-1078 or e-mail:

Andrew.Carrera@nrc.gov)

New Proposed Rule – 

Part 37 - Physical 

Protection of 

Byproduct Material

The NRC is proposing to amend 

its regulations to establish 

security requirements for the use 

and transport of category 1 and 

category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material, which the NRC considers 

to be risk-significant and therefore 

to warrant additional protection. 

Category 1 and category 2 

thresholds are based on those 

established in the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

Code of Conduct on the Safety 

and Security of Radioactive Sources 

which NRC endorses. The objective 

of this proposed rule is to 

provide reasonable assurance of 

preventing the theft or diversion 

of category 1 and category 2 

quantities of radioactive material. 

The proposed rule addresses access 

authorization, security during use, 

and security during transport. 

The proposed requirements would 

apply to NRC or Agreement State 

licensees (after Agreement State 

adoption) that are authorized to 

possess category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material. 

This includes a wide range of 

licensees, including pool-type 

irradiator licensees; manufacturer 

and distributor licensees; medical 

facilities with gamma knife devices; 

self-shielded irradiator licensees 

(including blood irradiators); 

teletherapy unit licensees; 

radiographers; well loggers; 

broad scope users; radioisotope 

thermoelectric generator licensees; 

and licensees that ship or prepare 

for shipment category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material. Nearly 1,400 licensees are 

implementing the various orders 

issued by NRC and the Agreement 

States and are the entities that 
5

would be impacted by this 

proposed rule. In addition, some 

fuel cycle and reactor licensees 

that possess sources at these levels 

would be impacted. 

Access Authorization 

Those licensees that permit 

unescorted access to category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material would be required to 

establish and implement an 

access authorization program. 

The primary component of the 

access authorization program is 

the background investigation. The 

background investigation is a tool to 

determine whether individuals are 

trustworthy and reliable and could 

be permitted unescorted access

to category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material. 

It is essential to ensure that 

individuals seeking unescorted 

access to radioactive material 

are dependable in judgment, 

character, and performance, 

such that unescorted access to 

category 1 or category 2 quantities 

of radioactive material by that 

individual does not constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the public 

health and safety or common 

defense and security. A background 

investigation includes several 

components: fingerprinting and 

an FBI identification and criminal 

history records check; verification of 

true identity; employment history 

evaluation; verification of education; 

credit history evaluation; criminal 

history review; and character and 

reputation determination. 

Another key element of the access 

authorization program is the use of 

a reviewing official who will make 

the determination of whether 

an individual is to be granted 

unescorted access to category 1 and 

category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material. The reviewing official will 

also need to undergo a background 

investigation and will have his/

her fingerprints reviewed by the 

NRC or Agreement State. Other 

elements of the access authorization 

program include use of procedures, 

protection of information, the 

informed consent of the subject 

individual, personal history 

disclosure by the subject individual, 

and the individual’s right to correct 

and complete the information 

on which the decision to grant 

unescorted access is based. 

Security Program 

The proposed rule would require 

affected licensees to establish, 

implement, and maintain a security 

program. The objective of the 

security program would be to 

monitor, and without delay detect, 

assess, and respond to any actual or 

attempted unauthorized access to 

category 1 or category 2 quantities 

of radioactive materials. A licensee’s 

security program would include a 

written security plan, implementing 

procedures, training, use of security 

zones, protection of information, 

coordination with the local law 

enforcement agency (LLEA), testing 

and maintenance of security-related 

equipment, security measures, and a 

program review. 

The purpose of a security plan is 

to establish the licensee’s overall 

security strategy to ensure that all 

of the required security measures 

work effectively and are integrated 

in all facilities and operations 

where category 1 or category 2 

quantities of radioactive material 

will be used or stored. The plan 

would, among other things, include 

a description of the measures and 

strategies to implement the security 

requirements and describe any sitespecific conditions that affect how 

the licensee will implement 

the requirements. 

Security Zone 

A security zone would be any area 

established by a licensee to provide 

physical protection for category 1 or 

category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material at a licensed facility. 

All category 1 and category 2 

quantities of radioactive material 

at the facility would have to be 

used and stored within a security 

zone. The purpose of security 

zones is to isolate and control 

access to the material to protect 

it more effectively and deter theft 

or diversion by providing, among 

other things, more time for licensees 

and LLEAs to respond. Isolation 

measures would protect category 

1 or category 2 quantities of 
6

weekly physical checks, tamper 

indicating devices, actual usage of 

the material, or other means.

Transportation Security 

In the area of transportation 

security, the proposed rule 

requires any licensee transferring 

category 1 and category 2 quantities 

of radioactive material to a licensee 

of the NRC or an Agreement State 

to verify that the transferee’s license 

authorizes the receipt of the type, 

form, and quantity of radioactive 

material to be transferred. For 

transfers of category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material, the transferring 

licensee would also be required to 

verify that the licensee is authorized 

to receive radioactive material 

at the address requested for 

delivery. These verifications would 

be conducted with the license 

issuing authority, i.e., the NRC or 

the appropriate Agreement State 

or by using the license verification 

system. (The license verification 

system is a new web-based system 

that NRC is developing that may 

be used to verify the validity of 

a license issued by either NRC 

or an Agreement State.) The 

proposed rule would require 

preplanning and coordination 

of shipment information for 

shipments of category 1 quantities 

of radioactive material. The 

radioactive material by allowing 

access to security zones only 

through established access control 

points. Access control measures 

would allow only approved 

individuals to have unescorted 

access to the security zone, and 

ensure that other individuals with 

a need for access are escorted by 

approved individuals. A security 

zone effectively defines where the 

licensee will apply these isolation 

and access control measures. 

Monitoring and Detection 

A licensee would be required 

to establish and maintain the 

capability to continuously monitor 

and detect all unauthorized entries 

into its security zone(s). Monitoring 

and detection would be performed 

by either a monitored intrusion 

detection system that is linked to an 

onsite or offsite central monitoring 

facility; electronic devices for 

intrusion detection alarms 

that would alert nearby facility 

personnel; visual monitoring by 

video surveillance cameras; or visual 

inspection by approved individuals. 

A licensee would also need the 

capability to detect unauthorized 

removal of the radioactive material. 

For category 1 quantities of 

radioactive material, a licensee 

would need to immediately detect 

any attempted unauthorized 

removal through the use of 

electronic sensors linked to an alarm 

or continuous visual surveillance. 

For category 2 quantities of 

radioactive material, a licensee 

would need to verify the presence 

of the radioactive material through 

shipping licensee (licensee 

sending the licensed material) 

would be required to coordinate 

the departure and arrival times, 

including the no-later than 

arrival time, with the receiving 

licensee (licensee receiving the 

licensed material). The licensee 

would also need to preplan 

and coordinate the shipment 

information with the State(s) 

through which the shipment 

will pass and to provide advance 

notifications of the shipment. For 

shipments of category 2 quantities 

of radioactive material, the 

proposed rule would require that 

the shipping licensee verify the 

shipment no-later-than arrival time 

and the actual arrival time with the 

receiving licensee. 

The proposed rule would require 

that any licensee that ships 

category 1 quantities of radioactive 

material by road either establish or 

use a carrier that has established, 

movement control centers that 

maintain position information 

from a location remote from the 

activity of the transport vehicle or 

trailer. The control centers would be 

required to monitor shipments on a 

continuous and active monitoring 

basis (24 hours a day, 7 days a week), 

and have the ability to communicate 

immediately, in an emergency, with 

the appropriate law enforcement 

agencies. For shipments of 

category 2 quantities of radioactive 

material the proposed rule 

would require that a licensee 

maintain constant control and/

or surveillance during transit and 

have the capability for immediate 
7

communication to summon 

appropriate response or assistance. 

The proposed rule also has 

requirements for investigations of 

missing shipments and reporting of 

missing material.

The category 1 transportation 

security requirements would also 

apply to shipments of irradiated 

reactor fuel weighing 100 grams 

or less in net weight of irradiated 

fuel, exclusive of cladding or other 

structural or packaging material, 

which has a total external radiation 

does rate in excess of 1 Sv (100 rem) 

per hour at a distance of 0.91 m (3 ft) 

from any accessible surface without 

intervening shielding. 

Requested Input 

The NRC is specifically seeking

 input in the following areas: 

(1) fingerprinting of reviewing 

official; (2) background investigation 

elements; (3) protection of 

information; (4) LLEA notification 

at temporary jobsites; (5) reporting 

requirements; (6) disabling vehicle 

exemption; (7) license/address 

verification for transfer; and (8) 

NRC-approved monitoring plan for 

railroad classification yard. These 

issues are discussed in the proposed 

rule Federal Register Notice.

On June 15, 2010, the NRC 

published the proposed rule in 

the Federal Register (75 FR 33902) 

for a 120-day public comment 

period. The comment period ends 

on October 13, 2010. The Federal 

Register notice lists several methods 

for submittal of comments. 

The NRC is also issuing draft 

implementation guidance for 

public comment. On July 14, 2010, 

the draft guidance document was 

noticed in the Federal Register

(75 FR 40756) for a 120-day public 

comment period. Comments on 

the draft guidance are due 

November 12, 2010. 

Public Meetings

 The NRC is planning to hold two 

public meetings on the draft 

implementation guidance in 

September 2010. The first meeting 

will be on September 1, 2010, 

in Austin, TX and the other 

on September 20, 2010, in 

Rockville, MD. Information on the 

meetings will be posted at 

http://www.regulations.gov under 

Docket ID NRC-2010-0194, and 

posted on the NRC’s public meeting 

listing on the NRC website at 

http://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/

public-meetings/index.cfm.

(Contact: Merri Horn, FSME, 

301-415-8126 or e-mail: 

Merri.Horn@nrc.gov)

SAFETY CULTURE Meeting 

Announcement

On September 28, 2010, the NRC is 

planning to hold a 1-day meeting on 

safety culture at the NRC’s hearing 

facility in Las Vegas, Nevada to 

discuss the proposed draft final safety 

culture definition. The meeting will 

be simultaneously broadcasting to 

a location inside NRC Headquarters. 

The objective of the meeting is to 

obtain consensus on the revised 

draft safety culture policy statement 

which was developed from the 

public, February workshop, and 

additional comments that have 

been provided to the staff at the 

various outreach activities. Also, the 

meeting will provide an opportunity 

for stakeholders to offer their 

comments on the proposed draft 

final safety culture definition, traits, 

and policy statement that will be 

published in the Federal Register

prior to the meeting for a 30-day 

public comment period. Additional 

information on this event or other 

scheduled workshops can be found, 

at http://www.nrc.gov/publicinvolve/public-meetings/index.cfm 

or http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/

regulatory/enforcement/safetyculture.html. 

(Contact: Maria Schwartz, FSME, 

301-415-1888 or e-mail: 

Maria.Schwartz@nrc.gov)

Protection of 

Cesium Chloride

Source Meeting 

Announcement

Tentatively on November 8, 2010, 

the NRC is planning to hold a 

2-day meeting at The Universities 

at Shady Grove Conference Center 

in Rockville, Maryland to solicit 

public comments on the draft policy 

statement on the protection of 

cesium-137 chloride (CsCl) sources. 

The objective of the meeting is to 

solicit public input on the major 

issues associated with NRC’s policy 

involving CsCl to reduce the risk 

to individuals, society, and the 
8

review of the export activity as 

required by 10 CFR 110.41(a)(9). 

Medical

Department of Veterans Affairs 

(EA-10-023)

On June 2, 2010, the NRC issued a 

Notice of Violation and Proposed 

Imposition of Civil Penalty in 

the amount of $14,000 to the 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

for two Severity Level III violations 

identified as a result of a medical 

event that occurred at the San 

Diego Healthcare System facility.  

The medical event resulted when 

iodine-131 was injected into the 

wrong port of the gastrostomy 

feeding tube (g-tube) resulting in an 

underdose to the patient’s thyroid 

and an unintended dose 

to the patient’s stomach.  

Specifically, the licensee’s written 

procedures did not include 

directions for administering 

byproduct material through 

a g-tube to ensure that the 

administered dose was in 

accordance with the written 

directive as required by 

10 CFR 35.41(a)(2).  Additionally, 

two nuclear medicine 

technologists had not been 

instructed on administering 

byproduct material through a 

g-tube prior to performing the 

administration in order to ensure 

that the administered dose was 

in accordance with the written 

directive.  The second Severity 

Level III violation involved the 

SIGNIFICANT 

ENFORCEMENT 

ACTIONS

The NRC issued significant 

actions to licensees and an 

individual for failure to comply with 

a regulation.

City of South Bend, Indiana

(EA-10-014)

On March 10, 2010, a Notice of 

Violation was issued to the City 

of South Bend for a Severity Level 

III violation involving Condition 

11.B of the facility’s license which 

authorized a named individual 

to fulfill the responsibilities of 

the Radiation Protection Officer.  

Specifically, as of January 19, 2010, 

the named individual was no longer 

employed by the company.  The 

licensee failed to appoint a new 

Radiation Protection Officer and had 

not amended the license.  

Troxler Electronic Laboratories, 

Inc. (EA-09-082)

On March 9, 2010, the NRC 

issued a Notice of Violation 

for a Severity Level III violation 

involving the failure to 

implement 10 CFR 110.20(a)(2) 

and 10 CFR 110.41(a)(9).  Specifically, 

on November 21, 2008, Troxler 

Electronic Laboratories, Inc., failed 

to apply for a specific license and 

exported byproduct material listed 

in Appendix L (a moisture density 

gauge containing Am-241) to an 

embargoed country (Iraq) listed in 

10 CFR 110.28.  Further, this failure 

to apply for a specific export license 

prevented an Executive Branch 

environment. The NRC will publish 

the final date and location of the 

public meeting in the Federal 

Register, along with an Issue Paper 

which will serve as a framework for 

the discussion of the major issues in 

the meeting. Additional information 

on this topic and event can be found 

at http://www.nrc.gov/materials/

miau/licensing.html#cc. 

During the public meeting, the 

NRC will conduct roundtable panel 

discussions, with the opportunity 

for audience participation, on 

issues identified in the draft policy 

statement. The NRC is seeking 

names of individuals interested 

in participating in these panels. 

Nominations by interested 

individuals or organizations 

should include the name of the 

proposed panel member, the issues 

they are interested in discussing, 

view point(s) on the issue(s), and 

affiliation, if any. Roundtable panel 

participants will be selected with 

the goal of providing balanced view 

points on each of the various issues. 

Please submit nominations by e-mail 

to CesiumDraftPolicy@nrc.gov by 

October 8, 2010. Also, the 

Commission encourages 

participants to pre-register at 

CesiumDraftPolicy@nrc.gov, in order 

to properly plan for the conference 

facilities. However, pre-registration 

is not required and registration will 

be available at the meeting. 

(Contact: Dr. John P. Jankovich, 

FSME, 301-415-7904 or e-mail: 

John.Jankovich@nrc.gov or 

Dr. Cynthia Jones, NSIR, 301-415-0298 

or e-mail: Cynthia.Jones@nrc.gov)
9

licensee’s failure to notify the NRC 

Operations Center no later than the 

next calendar day after discovery 

of a medical event as required by 

10 CFR 35.3045(c).  Specifically, on 

September 23, 2009, the licensee 

had sufficient information, based 

on patient survey data and the 

image from the nuclear medicine 

department, to report the medical 

event and did not notify the NRC 

until September 26, 2009.

Yale-New Haven Hospital

(EA-10-063)

On May 21, 2010, the NRC issued 

a Notice of Violation to Yale-New 

Haven Hospital (YNHH) for a 

Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure to develop and maintain 

written procedures to provide high 

confidence that each administration 

was in accordance with the 

written directive, as required 

by 10 CFR 35.41. Specifically, 

YNHH’s written procedures did 

not require a physical verification 

of the automatic position system 

coordinates against the electronic 

coordinates prior to initiation of 

gamma stereotactic radiosurgery 

(GSR) treatment and did not 

specify how hospital personnel 

should respond to unexpected 

GSR treatment console errors.  

These procedural inadequacies 

resulted in a medical event, when 

YNHH personnel did not verify 

that the automatic position system 

coordinates were in accordance with 

the written directive, during the 

treatment of a patient undergoing 

GSR on August 5, 2009.

SSM St. Clare Health Center

(EA-10-025)

On April 19, 2010, the NRC issued a 

Notice of Violation to SSM St. Clare 

Health Center for a Severity Level 

III violation involving the failure to 

implement written procedures to 

provide high confidence that each 

administration was in accordance 

with the written directive as required 

by Title 10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR), Section 35.41.  

Specifically, between November 

19, 2008, and September 23, 2009, 

the licensee failed to follow its 

procedures which required the 

preparation of final computerized 

treatment plans for two patients 

whose prostates had been implanted 

with radioactive seeds. The seeds 

were implanted on October 22, 2008, 

and their computed tomography 

(CT) studies were performed on 

November 19, 2008.  However, 

the licensee still had not prepared 

the final treatment plans for these 

patients at the time of the inspection.   

Individual Actions

Lawrence Grimm (IA-09-068)

On March 1, 2010, an Order was 

issued to Mr. Lawrence Grimm, a 

former radiation safety officer at 

the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 

National Institute of Standards 

and Technology facility in Boulder, 

Colorado (NIST-Boulder), prohibiting 

him from involvement in 

NRC-licensed activities for a period 

of 1 year. This enforcement action 

is based on Mr. Grimm’s deliberate 

failure to provide complete and 

accurate information to the NRC 

in a February 15, 2007, license 

amendment application requesting 

authorization for NIST-Boulder 

to possess and use source and 

special nuclear material, including 

plutonium.  Specifically, Mr. Grimm 

stated that the doors to the 

laboratory where the sources 

were to be stored were equipped 

with a key-card locking system 

when, in fact, the laboratory had 

no key-card locking system, was 

considered an open laboratory, 

and was typically not locked.  

Mr. Grimm also provided inaccurate 

information regarding internal 

monitoring of occupationally 

exposed workers and the use of 

dosimetry for frequent users of 

the laboratory, who didn’t actually 

work with the material but who 

worked in the same laboratories 

where the materials were stored and 

used.  This represents a violation of 

10 CFR 30.10(a)(2), which, in part, 

prohibits licensee employees from 

deliberately submitting information 

to the NRC that the person knows to 

be incomplete or inaccurate in some 

material respect.

The NRC’s enforcement program can 

be accessed at http://www.nrc.gov/

about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/

current.html under Recently Issued 

Significant Enforcement Actions. 

Documents related to cases can 
10

be accessed through the NRC’s 

Agencywide Document Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

adams.html. Help in using ADAMS 

is available by contacting the 

NRC Public Document Room staff at 

301-415-4737 or 1-800-397-4209 or 

by sending an e-mail to 

PDR.Resource@nrc.gov.

(Contact: Michele Burgess, FSME, 

301-415-5868 or e-mail: 

Michele.Burgess@nrc.gov)

GENERIC

COMMUNICATIONS 

ISSUED

The following are 

summaries of 

NRC generic 

communications 

issued by FSME. If any of these 

documents appears relevant to 

your needs and you have not 

received it, please call one of the 

technical contacts listed below. 

The Internet address for the NRC 

library of generic communications 

is http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

doc-collections/gen-comm.

Bulletins: 

None.

Generic Letters: 

None.

Information Notices: 

None.

Regulatory 

Issue

Summaries

The NRC’s regulatory issue summary 

(RIS) is an informational document 

used to communicate with the 

nuclear industry on a broad 

spectrum of matters having generic 

applicability. It does not involve a 

request for action or information 

unless the request is voluntary.

The NRC issued RIS 2010-04, 

“Monitoring the Status of Regulated 

Activities During a Pandemic” on 

May 25, 2010. This RIS was issued to:

• all holders of operating licenses 

for nuclear power reactors and 

research and test reactors 

under the provisions of 

Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations 

(10 CFR) Part 50, “Domestic 

Licensing of Production and 

Utilization Facilities,” except 

those that have ceased 

operations and have certified 

that fuel has been permanently 

removed from the reactor vessel 

and have no spent fuel stored 

on-site; 

• all NRC fuel cycle facilities 

licensed under 10 CFR Part 40, 

“Domestic Licensing of Source 

Material” or 10 CFR Part 70, 

“Domestic Licensing of Special 

Nuclear Material” and gaseous 

diffusion plants certified under 

10 CFR Part 76, “Certification of 

Gaseous Diffusion Plants”; 

• all holders of site-specific 

licenses for independent 

spent fuel storage installations 

(ISFSIs) under the provisions 

of 10 CFR Part 72, “Licensing 

Requirements for the 

Independent Storage of 

Spent Nuclear Fuel, Highlevel Radioactive Waste, and 

Reactor-related Greater than 

Class C Waste,” and all holders 

of 10 CFR Part 50 licenses with 

ISFSIs under the general license 

provisions of 10 CFR Part 72; 

and 

• all NRC materials licensees 

authorized to possess Category 

1 or Category 2 quantities of 

radioactive materials, under the 

provisions of 10 CFR Parts 30, 

“Rules of General Applicability 

to Domestic Licensing of 

Byproduct Material,” 40, and 70. 

(Technical Contacts: 

Milton Concepcion, FSME, 

301-415-4054 or e-mail: 

Milton.Concepcion@nrc.gov; and 

Yanely Malave, FSME, 301-415-1519 

or e-mail: Yanely.Malave@nrc.gov) 

(General Contact: 

Angela R. McIntosh, FSME, 

301-415-5030 or e-mail: 

Angela.McIntosh@nrc.gov) 

Significant Events

Event 1: 

Radioiodine 

Administration 

to Patient 

Determined to be 25 Weeks 

Pregnant

Date and Place: May 1, 2007, 

Maryville, Illinois 

Event Details: The Illinois 

Emergency Management Agency 

recently learned that a patient 

was administered 3.81 GBq 

(102.9 mCi) of I-131 as a treatment 

for reoccurring cancer associated 

with a previous thyroidectomy 

that was conducted in 2006. On 

May 1, 2007, the patient was treated 
11

The mistakes were believed to be 

caused by inputting the wrong 

parameters into the program 

(human error). Corrective actions 

included improving the review of 

paperwork and data prior to the 

start of patient treatment. Both 

patients and their doctors were 

notified.

Event 3: Incorrect Catheter 

Measurement Results in 

Overdose to Patient During High 

Dose Rate Remote Afterloader 

Brachytherapy Treatment 

Date and Place: January 18, 2010, 

Wilmington, Delaware

Event Details: The licensee reported 

a medical event involving a high 

dose rate remote afterloader 

brachytherapy treatment to a 

patient’s left breast. The procedure 

involved an HDR unit (Nucletron 

Model 105.999, Serial #31503) and 

a 247.5 GBq (6.7 Ci) Ir-192 source. 

The 5 day treatment commenced 

January 18, 2010, and was 

completed January 22, 2010. 

On February 22, 2010, the patient 

complained of skin reddening 

outside the MammoSite® catheter 

insertion site. It was determined 

that a measurement error of a 

multi-lumen catheter caused the 

licensee to place the radioactive 

source 10 cm short of the intended 

position. Using a dummy source 

wire, the physicist had measured 

the distance to the tips of the 

catheters as 115.2 cm. During the 

measurement, two representatives 

from the manufacturer were 

present. The measured distances 

that contained an Ir-192 source 

(AEA Technologies Model 105.002, 

Serial #D36C-0609). The Ir-192 

source used during the first patient’s 

treatment contained 361.1 GBq 

(9.8 Ci). The Ir-192 source used 

during the second patient’s 

treatment contained 320.4 GBq 

(8.7 Ci). It was determined on 

February 14, 2010, that the source 

in both cases was positioned 

approximately 2 to 2.5 cm 

proximal to the correct patient 

treatment sites. Both patients 

were prescribed to receive 

340 cGy/fraction for 10 fractions. 

For Patient A, approximately 

25 to 50 % of the planned volume 

received the prescribed dose 

A large volume outside the 

prescribed treatment volume 

exceeded the prescribed dose. The 

maximum proximal skin dose was 

approximately 220% greater than 

the prescribed dose. Patient A’s 

treatments had been completed in 

January 2010 before the error was 

identified.

Patient B was given 8 of 10 

fractions prior to the discovery of 

the error, but the last 2 fractions 

were delivered correctly. Patient 

B received at least 50% of the 

prescribed dose to about 50% of 

the correct treatment volume. 

Some areas of the planned volume 

received greater than 700%. Also, 

several areas surrounding the 

treatment site received a 300% to 

400% greater dose than anticipated. 

The proximal skin received about 

125% more dose than prescribed. 

The Florida Bureau of Radiation 

Control investigated the incident. 

a second time with I-131and it was 

later determined that the patient 

was 25 to 27 weeks pregnant during 

the second treatment. 

The licensee 

physician 

stated that he 

interviewed 

and 

counseled the patient. The patient 

asserted in an interview and 

signed a statement that she did 

not believe she was pregnant, 

but no confirmatory test was 

conducted. The Illinois Emergency 

Management Agency calculated 

the patient’s exposure by following 

ANSI Standard N13.54-2008, 

which resulted in an estimated 

dose to the fetus of 86 cGy (rad). 

The child was delivered after a 

full term pregnancy without a 

thyroid, and is receiving thyroid 

hormone therapy. For corrective 

actions, the Illinois Emergency 

Management Agency is considering 

rulemaking that will require 

licensees to conduct a pregnancy 

test for radiopharmaceutical 

administrations which require a 

written directive.

Event 2: Wrong Site Treatment 

Involving Two MammoSite® 

Brachytherapy Patients 

Date and Place: February 14, 2010, 

Tampa, Florida

Event Details: The licensee reported 

that two patients received doses to 

the wrong sites during MammoSite® 

treatments. The procedure involved 

a high dose rate remote afterloader 

unit (Nucletron Model 105.999) 
12

were entered into the plan as the 

position of the first dwell position 

of the source for each catheter. 

Later, the physicist was informed 

of the patient’s skin reaction and 

immediately began an investigation. 

The physicist determined that 

the actual distance to the tips of 

the catheters was 125.2 cm. The 

patient received an average dose 

of 1,700 cGy (rad) to approximately 

100 cc of the unintended breast 

tissue. About 7.5 cc of the skin 

and underlying tissue received a 

maximum dose of 6,800 cGy (rad). 

Approximately 35 cc of the intended 

site received an average dose of 

340 cGy (rad) or 10% of the total 

prescribed dose. Recommendations 

for corrective actions include: 

the physicist should make a list 

of treatment distances for all 

standard applicators, a therapist 

or nurse should be included in the 

patient measurement process and 

double check the measurements, 

a new source position simulator 

assembly and set of transfer tubes 

should be acquired, and a second 

measurement of the treatment 

distance for all patients’ catheters 

should be made prior to the first 

treatment.

Event 4: Incorrect Seed Placement 

During Prostate Brachytherapy

Date and Place: January 21, 2010, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Event Details: The licensee reported 

a medical event involving a patient 

treated for prostate cancer. The 

treatment included implantation of 

sixty-five (65) I-125 brachytherapy 

seeds (Bard Brachytherapy Model 

STM 1251), containing a total 

activity of 0.8 GBq (22 mCi), for a 

prescribed therapeutic radiation 

dose of 14,500 cGy (rad). The seeds 

were implanted on January 21, 2010, 

using real time dosimetry under 

the ultrasonic guidance. On 

February 23, 2010, the patient 

returned to the facility for a 30-day 

post implant CT scan. The scan 

showed that the implanted seeds, 

although in an appropriate pattern, 

were placed outside the intended 

target. The licensee determined 

that the dose to the prostate was 

only about 500 cGy (rad), and an 

unintended dose to the penile bulb 

of approximately 16,100 cGy (rad) 

was administered,

During the week of March 1, 2010, 

the Pennsylvania Bureau of 

Radiation Protection performed 

a reactive inspection. Initially, a 

malfunction of the ultrasound 

unit was suspected, however, 

the unit was re-evaluated and 

determined to be working properly. 

The cause was attributed to 

human error. Corrective actions 

included changes to the prostate 

brachytherapy protocol to 

incorporate an additional step to 

ensure the urologist and radiation 

oncologist can clearly identify the 

prostate gland and the surrounding 

anatomy. In the future, treatments 

will be cancelled if the prostate 

gland and surrounding anatomy 

cannot be adequately visualized. 

The radiation oncology group has 

determined that an additional 

quality assurance review is 

warranted, and the Radiation 

Oncology Department has 

suspended prostate brachytherapy 

treatments.

Event 5: Overdose to Ear During 

Brachytherapy with High Dose 

Rate Remote Afterloader Unit

Date and Place: March 11, 2010, 

Coral Springs, Florida

Event Details: The licensee reported 

that on March 11, 2010, a patient 

received approximately nine times 

the intended dose during the 

second of 14 high dose rate (HDR) 

fraction treatments to the ear. An 

HDR surface applicator (Nucletron 

Model MicroSelecron V2) and 210.9 

GBq (5.7 Ci) Ir-192 source was used 

during the treatment. The therapist 

accidently pushed the “auto 

radiography” button rather than 

the “treatment” button. 

Consequently, approximately 

2,250 cGy (rad) was administered 

instead of the intended 250 cGy 

(rad). Corrective actions included 

deactivating the autoradiograph 

function and providing training to 

technicians concerning the incident. 

The patient and doctor were 

notified of the incident.

Event 6: Improper Handling of Br76 Resulting in Overdose to Finger

Date and Place: February 4, 2010, 

Saint Louis, Missouri

Event Details: The licensee reported 

that a technician’s left hand ring 
13

badge indicated a dose of 11.9 cSv 

(rem). The technician’s right hand 

ring badge dose was 4.0 cSv (rem). 

The licensee received the 

Landauer dosimetry report 

on March 9, 2010. Following 

interviews with the technician and 

reconstruction of the event, the 

licensee believes that the individual 

may have received a dose between 

50 and 400 cSv (rem) over a 10 cm2

area of his fingertips. The exposure 

to the fingertips was calculated 

using the Varskin computer 

code. Between February 4 and 

February 5, 2010, the technician 

handled 1.2 GBq (32 mCi) vials 

of Br-76. Normally, the vials are 

handled using a long-handle tool 

with shielding. Due to perceived 

operational pressures that the 

technician deemed took precedence 

over as low as reasonably achievable 

(ALARA) principles, the technician 

directly handled the vials on several 

occasions. The technician had not 

experienced any observable effects 

from handling the vials. The whole 

body deep dose badge reading 

for the period in question was 

0.25 mSv (25 mrem). Corrective 

actions included retraining radiation 

workers on proper handling 

techniques and removing the 

technician from work involving 

licensed material. 

Event 7: Catheter Kink Resulting 

in High Dose Rate Remote 

Afterloader Treatment to Wrong 

Location

Date and Place: March 23, 2010, 

Olmstead, Minnesota

Event Details: The licensee reported 

an administration of two fractions 

to the wrong location during 

treatment with a high dose rate 

(HDR) afterloader unit. The patient 

was prescribed four fractions 

of 400 cGy (rad) for a biliary 

HDR treatment. The HDR unit, a 

Varian Model VariSource IX(t)® 

Serial #VS 437; contained a 

329.5 GBq (8.9 Ci) Ir-192 source 

(MS Nordion Model VS 2000, 

Serial #02-01-0219-001-03101). 

The catheter had been placed and 

imaged. A dummy source was 

pushed into the catheter until it met 

resistance, which was assumed to 

be the end of the catheter. In fact, 

the resistance was actually a tight 

bend approximately 17 cm short 

of the end of the catheter. This 

incorrect distance was used for the 

treatment distance and the patient 

was subsequently treated. The 

following day before administering 

the treatment, a dummy source was 

again inserted into the catheter. 

That dummy source was extended 

beyond the programmed distance. 

For the first two fractions, the HDR 

source was 17 cm from its intended 

location. This resulted in the tumor 

receiving only 30% of the prescribed 

fractional dose and an unintended 

location, the duodenum, receiving 

1,000 cGy (rad). An additional 

fraction was completed to provide 

a total tumor dose that was within 

90% of the prescribed dose. The 

patient was informed of the incident 

on March 24, 2010. Corrective 

actions included implementing a 

new procedure that requires that 

prior to administering the first 

fraction on each biliary HDR patient 

that an image must be taken with 

the measurement cable in place. 

Event 8: Improper Shift of 

Implanted Volume During 

Prostate Brachytherapy

Date and Place: March 12, 2010, 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Event Details: The licensee reported 

that a patient being treated for 

adenocarcinoma of the prostate 

gland received less than 50% of 

the prescribed V100 dose during a 

brachytherapy implant performed 

on March 12, 2010. The patient also 

received a dose to an unintended site. 

The patient was implanted with 

ninety-five (95) I-125 brachytherapy 

seeds that contained an activity of 

12 MBq/seed (322 uCi/seed). The 

prescribed dose was 14,500 cGy 

(rad). The radiation oncologist along 

with the assistance of the urologist 

inserted the needles through the 

appropriate holes in the needle 

template. The radiation oncologist 

used the ultrasound to help guide 

the needle placement. However, 

while implanting the needles, the 

oncologist and 

ultrasound 

technologist 

had difficulty 

clearly 

visualizing the 

balloon location (which indicated 

the prostate base) on the sagittal 

view of the ultrasound. The patient 

may have moved during the 

procedure, which may have caused 

the balloon and ultimately, the 

base plane to shift. The radiation 

oncologist suspected a variance 

after reviewing the post implant 
14

seed count x-ray. To confirm the 

implanted seed locations, the 

patient was asked to return for 

an early post-implant CT on 

March 22, 2010. Using those 

images, a treatment plan was 

constructed using the treatment 

planning system’s post-plan 

software. Based on that plan, 

the entire implanted volume 

was estimated to have shifted 

approximately 3 cm inferiorly, 

resulting in a D90 dose of 1,288 cGy 

(rad). The patient was informed 

and supplemental treatment was 

recommended. The Louisiana 

Department of Environmental 

Quality is tracking the incident.

Event 9: Radioiodine 

Administration to Pregnant 

Patient

Date and Place: March 16, 2010, 

Durango, Colorado

Event Details: The licensee 

administered 1.1 GBq (30 mCi) 

of I-131 to a pregnant patient on 

March 16, 2010. A serum blood 

pregnancy test was performed 

prior to the administration and 

the results were negative. On 

April 26, 2010, the patient took a 

home urine pregnancy test and 

discovered that she was pregnant. 

On April 27, 2010, a blood serum 

test confirmed the pregnancy. 

The patient’s OB/GYN physician 

estimated that conception occurred 

on March 13, 2010. The patient 

was notified. The fetal dose was 

estimated to be approximately 

8 cSv (rem). The Colorado 

Department of Health is 

investigating the incident. The 

licensee stated that all procedures 

to prevent this incident were 

followed. Human chorionic 

gonadotropin (Hcg) does not detect 

a pregnancy until 7 to 12 days 

post conception. The licensee is 

considering including additional 

questions during the screening 

process. 

Event 10: Erythema to Thighs 

Resulting from High Dose Rate 

Remote Afterloader Treatment

Date and Place: May 4, 2010, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Event Details: The licensee 

reported that a patient treated 

for endometrial carcinoma of the 

vaginal cuff received radiation 

erythema to her thighs. The patient 

was prescribed to receive three 

fractions of 700 cGy (rad) each at a 

distance of 0.5 cm from the surface 

of the applicator. The dose to the 

skin of the thighs occurred during 

the third fraction, performed on 

May 4, 2010. The treatment 

involved a high dose remote 

afterloader unit (Varian model 

VariSource, Serial #VS220) and a 

129.7 GBq (3.5 Ci) Ir-192 source 

(Alpha-Omega Services Model 

VS2000, Serial #02-01-0053-001-

010810-10419-81). On May 11, 2010, 

the patient noticed two dark spots 

on each thigh. On May 18, 2010, 

the patient reported the somewhat 

painful dark spots to the licensee. 

On May 19, 2010, the patient was 

examined by the licensee. The 

prescribing physician did not 

diagnose the spots as radiation 

erythema. The patient was asked 

to return on May 24, 2010. At 

that time, the physician identified 

two circular areas with a diameter 

of approximately 1 cm. On 

May 26, 2010, the spots were 

determined to be radiation 

erythema. The licensee believes 

that the patient may have moved in 

a manner that caused the catheter 

to shift and/or workers may have 

moved the catheter while trying 

to better align the stretcher with 

the treatment device. The average 

skin dose to the patient’s thigh was 

calculated to be 3,060 cGy (rad). 

The thigh dose at a depth of 

2.5 cm was calculated to be 

408 cGy (rad). Corrective actions 

included procedure modifications to 

assure that the catheter is correctly 

positioned prior to the start of 

treatment. In addition, a special 

in-service will be held to address the 

procedure updates.

(Contact: Angela R. McIntosh, FSME, 

301-415-5030 or e-mail: 

Angela.McIntosh@nrc.gov)

SELECTED FEDERAL

REGISTER NOTICES

Notice of Issuance and Availability 

of Regulatory Guide 6.9, Revision 

1, ‘‘Establishing Quality Assurance 

Programs for the Manufacture and 

Distribution of Sealed Sources and 

Devices Containing Byproduct 

Material,’’ (NRC–2009–0418), 75 FR 

20399, April 19, 2010.

(Contact: Jack W. Foster, FSME, 

301- 415-6250 or e-mail: 

Jack.Foster@nrc.gov)
15

In our attempt to keep the FSME Licensee Newsletter relevant, we welcome useful and informative feedback on 

the contents of the newsletter. If you would like to suggest topics, please contact Vanessa Cox or Gwendolyn 

Davis, from FSME Rulemaking Branch A. Ms. Cox may be contacted at 301-415-8342 or Vanessa.Cox@nrc.gov. 

Ms. Davis may be contacted at 301-415-8165 or Gwendolyn.Davis@nrc.gov. In addition, to ensure proper delivery 

of the FSME Licensee Newsletter, please report any address changes to Ms. Cox to prevent any interruption of 

service at FSME_Newsletter@nrc.gov. 

Please send written correspondence to the following address: 

Vanessa Cox, Editor 

FSME Licensee Newsletter

Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Two White Flint North, Mail Stop: T-8-F42

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Notice of Issuance and Availability 

of Draft Regulatory Guide 

(NRC–2010–0158), 75 FR 20645, 

April 20, 2010.

(Contact: Gregory C. Chapman, 

NMSS, 301-492-3106 or e-mail: 

Gregory.Chapman@nrc.gov)

Unified Agenda of Federal 

Regulatory and Deregulatory 

Actions, 75 FR 21959, April 26, 2010.

(Contact: Cindy Bladey, ADM, 

301-492-3667 or e-mail: 

Cindy.Bladey@nrc.gov)

NRC Region II Address and Main 

Telephone Number Changes 

(NRC–2010–0083), 75 FR 21979, 

April 27, 2010.

(Contact: Judy G. Coleman, 

NRC Region II, 404-562-4824 or 

404-997-4824 or e-mail: 

Judy.Coleman@nrc.gov)

Draft 2010 Report to Congress on 

the Benefits and Costs of Federal 

Regulations; Notice of Availability 

and Request for Comments, 

75 FR 22630, April 29, 2010.

(Contact: Darcel D. Gayle, OMB, 

202-395-3741)

List of Approved Spent Fuel 

Storage Casks: NUHOMSR HD 

System Revision 

(NRC–2009–0538), 75 FR 24786, 

May 4, 2010.

(Contact: Jayne McCausland, 

FSME, 301- 415-6219 or e-mail: 

Jayne.McCausland@nrc.gov)

Notice of issuance and availability 

of Regulatory Guide 6.7, Revision 2, 

‘‘Preparation of an Environmental 

Report to Support a Rulemaking 

Petition Seeking an Exemption for a 

Radionuclide-Containing Product.’’ 

(NRC–2009–0492), 75 FR 27599, 

May 17, 2010.

(Contact: Catherine R. Mattsen, 

FSME, (301- 415-6264 or e-mail: 

Catherine.Mattsen@nrc.gov)

Notice of Issuance and Availability 

of Draft Regulatory Guide, DG–3039, 

‘‘Standard Format and Content for 

Emergency Plans for Fuel Cycle 

and Materials Facilities,’’ 

(NRC–2010–0181), 75 FR 28073, 

May 19, 2010.

(Contact: Kevin M. Ramsey, NMSS, 

301- 492-3123 or e-mail: 

Kevin.Ramsey@nrc.gov)

Physical Protection of Byproduct 

Material,(NRC-2008-0120), 

75 FR 33902, June 15, 2010.

(Contact: Merri Horn, FSME, 

301-415-8126 or e-mail: 

Merri.Horn@nrc.gov)