NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-1668

___________

LYNNE THOMPSON,

Appellant

v.

BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE (PENNSYLVANIA); 

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; HEATHER HILDENBRANDT, Parole Agent; 

MR. DOUGLAS, Hearing Examiner; JUDGE RANDAL B. TODD; 

JEREMY STEWART, SCI-Cambridge Spring(s), Parole Supervisor; 

MS. TORMA; DR. RICHARD LEARN; ET AL.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:16-cv-01161)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Maureen P. Kelly

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

on May 11, 2020

Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 20, 2020)

____________________________________
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___________

OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

Lynne Thompson appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint. For the 

reasons below, we will affirm.

Thompson has multiple convictions for theft. Several of these convictions have been 

the grounds for revocations of parole and probation. In January 2016, Thompson filed a 

complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County alleging that in August 

2014, she had been wrongfully arrested by a state parole agent and had a detainer placed 

on her. Appellees removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 

Pennsylvania and filed motions to dismiss. A magistrate judge, sitting by consent of the 

parties, granted the motions to dismiss, determining that appellee Judge Randal Todd was 

entitled to judicial immunity and that Thompson’s remaining claims were barred by 

Heck v. Humphrey. See 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (to recover damages for allegedly 

wrongful imprisonment, plaintiff must demonstrate that the confinement has been found 

unlawful). Thompson filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. 

She then filed a notice of appeal.

Appellees argue that the notice of appeal was untimely filed and that this Court lacks 

jurisdiction over the District Court’s final order. However, because the magistrate judge’s 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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November 2, 2017 order did not comply with the separate-document rule, see Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 58(a),1the judgment was deemed entered for purposes of Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a) on the date when 150 days had run from entry of the order on the civil 

docket. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Thus, Thompson’s notice of appeal dated March 

22, 2018, was timely filed with respect to the November 2, 2017 order, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

On appeal, Thompson makes several generalized assertions regarding her claims, but 

we can discern very few comprehensible, specific arguments in her brief that challenge the 

District Court’s judgment. We will address those that we have found.

In her notice of appeal, Thompson argues that Appellees violated a stay order entered 

by the District Court when they detained her during the District Court proceedings. Thompson misunderstands the scope of the District Court’s stay order. That order simply 

1 An order is considered a separate document if (1) it is self-contained and separate from 

the opinion; (2) it notes the relief granted; and (3) it omits (or at least substantially omits) 

the court’s reasons for disposing of the claims. See Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. 

Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Local Union No. 1992 v. Okonite Co., 358 

F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 241 

(3d Cir. 2006). Here, the order was not self-contained and separate since it was attached to 

the District Court’s opinion, was paginated consecutively to the opinion, and was not docketed separately. See Leboon, 503 F.3d at 224 (“To be independent of the court’s opinion, 

an order must be separately titled and captioned, not paginated consecutively to the opinion 

or memorandum, not stapled or otherwise attached to the opinion, and must be docketed 

separately.”). 
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suspended the civil proceedings in the District Court; it did not limit appellees’ actions in 

her state-court criminal proceedings or proceedings before the parole board.

In her brief filed in September 2018,2 Thompson challenges the dismissal of the claims 

against appellee Judge Todd, a state-court judge overseeing one of her criminal proceedings. However, by order entered May 29, 2019, we granted Todd’s motion for summary 

action and summarily affirmed the District Court’s judgment with respect to the claims 

against him. The District Court correctly determined that he was entitled to judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 

F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

Thompson argues in her brief that she was wrongfully incarcerated from March 8, 2017,

until August 25, 2017. This period of incarceration, however, was already the subject of a 

lawsuit and appeal to this Court. In September 2019, we held that Thompson’s claims of 

wrongful detention regarding this time period were barred by Heck. See Thompson v. Pa. 

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 777 F. App’x 589, 590 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam). She also complains in her brief of being in custody starting on May 17, 2018. But at that time, the District 

Court had already dismissed her complaint. Thus, that allegation was not before the District 

Court.

The few allegations Thompson makes in her brief against individual appellees are 

vague or conclusory. She asserts that Agent Tawnya Peek asked her to sign a paper and 

Agent Heather Hildenbrandt wrongfully placed her in jail. Thompson also makes 

2

In September 2019, Thompson was given the opportunity to file an amended brief. After 

receiving several extensions of time, Thompson failed to do so.
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conclusory statements of a conspiracy against her. Thompson, however, does not set forth 

any challenges of merit regarding the District Court’s judgment.

For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Appellees’ motion 

to supplement the record is granted. Thompson’s motion for an extension of time is denied.