The Honor able R. L eon Jordan, Senior United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District * of Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0753n.06 Filed: Oc tober 23, 2007 No. 06-3414 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA , Plaintif f, Appellee On Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Sou the rn

Di str ic t of

Oh io v. D ANNY E. B U RKE , Defendant, Appe llant ______________________________/

BEF OR E: BOG G S, C hie f Cir c uitJudg e , K EN NE DY , C ir c uitJudg e , a nd JORDAN, Distr ict Judge. * KENN EDY, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endant Da nny E. Bur ke appe als his senten c e o f

tw enty -four

m o n t h s o f i mp r i s o n m e n tan d

t h r e e ye ar s o f

s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e f o r p o s s e s s i o no f

c h i l d p o r n o g r a p h y. He a rg ues that the district judg e (1) eng ag ed in impermissible judi ci al fa ct -f inding in violation of his Si x th Amendment rig hts, (2) er red in findingspecific offe nse cha rac teristics that supp orted enhanc ements under

the SentencingGuidelines, (3) improperly imposed a sex offende r re g istration

re qu ir e me nt a s a c on dit ion of his su pe rv ise d re le a se , and (4 ) e rr e d in de nying his mot ion to s up pr e ss. Be cause we f

ind that the district court did not er r an d t h e sentence imposed is re asonable , we AF F IRM

. BACK GR OUND2

Def endant Da

nny E. Bur ke plea ded g uilty

to possession of child pornog raphy on April 26, 20 05 . Awr itt e n p le a

a g re e me nt w a s a c c e pte d b y the c ourt and a State me nt o f F a c ts w a s r e a d in to the re cord at the plea he aring . Bur ke ac knowledg ed that this statement was acc urate

. J .A. at 122-26. The Statement of F acts re flec ts that on J anua ry 9, 2004, fede ral a g ents sear ched B urke’ s

re sid e nc e un de r t

he a uth or ity of a se arc h w arr ant i ssu e d o n p ro ba ble c a us e that B ur

ke po sse sse d c hil d pornog raphy

in the home. B urke re t u rn ed to his residence while the ag ents wer e conduc ting the

sear ch and a g ree d to be interview ed. When s h o wn t wo child pornog raphic imag es that had be en used in the sea

rch warr ant affidavit, Bur

ke ac knowledg ed see ing the imag es on his computer. B urke stated that he star

ted collec ting child pornog raphy with pe er- to-pee r softwa re in F ebrua

ry 2003. He also admitted that he possessed por nog raphic movie files in which the se x ual pene tration of childre n is plainly visible. Burke ’s c o m p u t er s wer e seized and se nt to a fore nsic fac ility wher e they

wer e

e xami ne d b y ane xp e rt

. T h e an a l y s i s r e v e a l e d 3 1 4 i m a g e s o f

m i n o r s e n g a g e d

i ns e xu a l l y

e xp lic it conduct, including minors under the a g e of twe lve. J .A. at 124-25. On Dec ember

15, 20 0 4 , Bu rk e was c harg ed with three counts of tra nsportation and possession of child pornog raphy . On April 26, 2005, B urke ple aded guilty to Count 2, P ossession of Child Pornogra

phy in violation of 8 U. S

. C

. § 2252(a) (4)( b) and § 2252( b)(2) . The re maining

c ha rg e s w e re dis mis se d und e r t he wr itt e n p le a

a g re e me nt. The United States Probation Offic er c onducted a prese ntence investigation and submitt ed a Presentenc e Report (“PSR”) to the court. To avoid ex post fac to issues, the PS R applied the 2003 Edition of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual to c alculate a total of fense level of 24 and a

criminal his tor y c a te g or y of I . T he PSR re c omm e nd e d a g uid e lin e imp ri so nme nt ra ng e of 51 to 6 3 mo nth s. J.A. a t 14 1- 45 . T he PSR in c lud e d e nh anc e me nts to t he ba se of fe ns e le ve l fo r the fo llo wi ngsp e c if ic3

offe nse cha

rac teristics: imag es involving a prepube scent minor or minor under the ag e of twelve, the use of a com p u t er t o co mmit t he off ense, imag es portra

y ing sa distic or masochistic conduc t, and imag es more tha

n 300 but less than 600 in number. During a sente ncing hear ing on F ebrua ry 9, 2006, Bur

ke objected to the inc lusion of eac h of the spec ific off

ense c hara cter istics, ex cept f or his use of a

computer in the of

fense . After

considering the evidenc e, the district cour t made finding s consistent with the P SR. The dist rict court considere d the sentenc ing f

actor s in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and ultimately sentenc ed Bur ke to twenty -four

months of imprisonment and three y ear s of super vised rele ase. A s a condition of his supervised r elea se, the district court re quired B urke to re g ister as a sex offender . This timely appea l followed. AN AL YSI S When considering sentenc ing decisions, we revie w the di s t ri ct court' s fac tual finding s for clea r er ror while r eviewingthe district court' s conclusions of law de novo. Un i t ed Stat es v. Hazelwood , 398 F.3d 792, 795 ( 6th Cir. 200 5 ). W e re v i ew the district court' s application of the United States SentencingGuidelines de novo. United States v. Gibson , 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir. 2005). I. Bur ke argu es that the district cour t erre d in determining his Sentencing Guidelines calc ulat i o n . First, he a

rg ues that under United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the district court violated his S i x t h Am en d m en tri gh t s b y b as i n g h i s S en t en ci n g Gu i d el i n es ca l cu l at i o no nj u d gefound fa cts instead of his own a dmissions or finding s by a jury bey ond a re asonable doubt. Second, B ur ke ob je c ts t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t su bs tanti a tin g e nh anceme nts fo r t he sp e c if ic of fe ns e c ha ra c te ri sti c s o f: (1 ) ima g e s invo lvi ng min or s und e r the a g e of tw e lve e ng a g e d in

se xua lly4

expli cit conduct, ( 2) imag es excee d i n g 300 but not more than 600 in number, a nd (3) imag es portray ing sadistic or masochistic c onduct or other depictions of violence . We will address ea ch of his arg uments in turn. A. Judi c ialF ac t F indin g B ur ke ’s argume nt t

hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

e ng a g e d in

imp e rm iss ibl e jud ic ia l f

a c t fi nd ingin violation of Bo ok

e r is without m erit. As an initial matter, Booke r “did not eliminate judicial fac tfinding.” United States v. Coffee , 434 F.3d 887, 898 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Rather, “[i] t is clear unde r the law o f t his Circuit that a district court may make its own fa ctual finding s reg ardingrele vant sentenc ing f

actor s, and consider

those fac tors in deter

mining a defe ndant' s sentenc e.” United States

v. Ga rdiner , 4 6 3 F

. 3 d 4 4 5 , 4 6 1 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 6 )

. “ [W ]h e n a t r i a l j u d g e e xe r c i s e s h i s d isc re tio n to selec t a spec ific sentenc e within a def ined rang e, the defe ndant has no rig ht to a jury deter mination

o f th e f a c ts th a t th e ju d g e d e e ms r e levant.” Booke r , 543 U.S. at 233. I n sum, so long as the sentenc ing g uidelines are treated as advisory and not m an d at o ry , Bo ok e r does not bar the district

c ourt fr om f a c t f ind ing us ing a pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e sta

nd ard fo r s e nte nc ingc a lc ulatio ns . United States v. Mic kens , 453 F.3d 668, 673 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Her e, the r ecor d clea

rly indicates that the district c ourt proper ly considere d the Guidelines advisory . The sig nificant va rianc e in Bur

ke’s a ctual sente nce be low the re commended se ntencing g uideline ra

ng e fur ther indicates that the d i s t ri ct cour t did not consider itself bound by the Gu ide lin e s. B ur ke argue s th a t “ any fa c t (o the r tha n a pr ior c on vic tio n) , w hic h is ne c e ssa ry to s up po rt

a sentenc e excee ding the maxi mum authorized by the fa cts establis h ed b y a p l ea of g uilty or a jury verdic t must be admitted by the def endant or proved to a jury bey ond a re asonable doubt,” Booke r ,Be cause the instant offe nse occ urre d on J anuar y 9, 2004, the 2003 Guidelines Manua l was 1 use d in this case. This sec tion has been renumbe red in the curr ent edition of the Guide lines Manual as § 2G2.2(b) (2). Renumbere d in curre nt Guidelines Manual a s § 2G2.2(b)( 7)(C). 2 Renumbere d in curre nt Guidelines Manual a s § 2G2.2(b)( 4). 3 5 543 U.S. at 244. Whil e this a true s t at ement of the law, the statutory maxi mum for possession of child pornog raphy is ten y ear s of i mprisonment and three y ear s of super vised rele ase. 18 U .S.C. § 2252(b)( 2). B urke w as sentenc ed to only two y ear s of imprisonment and three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. B eca

use the judg e-f

ound fac ts did not i n cr ease Bur ke’s se ntence bey ond “the maximum authorized by

the fa cts established by

a plea of g uilty ,” Booke r , 543 U.S. at 244, i.e., possession of child pornog raphy , they did not need to be proven bey ond a re asonable doubt. Accor dingly , we f ind

no Bo ok e r violation. B. Sp ecific Off

ense Charac ter istics I n calc ulating the advisory g uidelines ra n ge for sentenc ing, the district court adde d

e nh anc e me nts ba se d o n it s d e te rm inatio n o f t he numbe r a

nd natur e of pr oh ibi te d im a g e s f

ound in Bur ke’s possession. F irst, the district court applied the two level enha nceme nt of USSG § 2G2.4(b)( 1) beca

use the offe nse involved imag es of minors under the ag e of twe lve. Second, the 1 dis tr ic t c ourt a dd e d the fo ur le ve l e nh anc e me nt of USS G § 2G 2. 4( b) (5 ) be c a use t he o ffen se 2 involved betwee n 300 and 600 imag es of c hild pornog raphy . Third, the district court incre ased the offe nse leve l by

four unde r USSG § 2G2.4(b)( 4) beca use t he off

ense involved material portr aying 3 sadistic or masochistic a cts or other depictions of violence

. Th e d i s t r i c t c o u rt p r o p e r l y c a l c u l a t e d B u r k e ’ s g u i d e l i n e s r an g e a s t h e f a c t s n e c e s s a r

y to support eac h of the e nhance ments were either a dmitted by Bur ke or found by

a pre pondera

nce of the6

evidenc e by

the distr ict court. B y

aff irming the acc urac y

of the Statement of F acts re ad into the

rec ord at the plea hear ing, B urke a dmitted that he had possessed imag es involving minors unde r the ag e o f t we l ve eng ag ed in sexually expli cit conduct, J.A. at 125-26; he had posse ssed at lea st 314 imag es of minors eng ag ed in sexually expli cit conduct, id. a t 12 5- 26 ; and he ha d poss ess ed chi ld pornog rap h i c m o vie files in which se x ual pene tration was plainly visible. Id. at 124-25. At the sentencing he aring , Bur

ke ag ain af

firmed the a ccur acy

of the Statement of F acts, id. at 63, and further acknow ledg ed that four

of the imag es depic t ed ad u l t males or a nimals penetrating minors under the ag e of twe lve. Id. at 66-67

. T h e P S Rprepa red by the Probation Off

icer also ref lected these fa cts. Moreove r, the Probation Offic er testified at the sentenc ing hear ing that the four imag es de pic tin g se xua l pe ne tr a tio n o f c hil dr e n b y a du lt m a le s o r a

nim a ls w e re sa dis tic or

ma so c his tic in her pr ofessional opinion. Id. at 69. I n h is a rgume nt a g a ins t a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he se nte nc inge nh anc e me nt f or sa dis tic o r

m a s o c his tic imag es, B urke doe s not deny that the imag es depic t th e s ex u al p en etration of children; rather, he argues that the imag es could have bee n altere d by adding adults or animals that wer e not present at the time the photos were taken. We fa il to see, however , why alteration of t he im ag es i n this way would lead to a finding that they do not in fac t por tray sadistic or masochistic co n d u ct o r o ther de pic tio ns of

vio le nc e . B ur

ke do e s n ot a

rgue that the c hil dr e n de pic te d in the ima g e s w e re dig ita lly

cre ated, which would implicate the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. FreeSpeec h Coalit ion , 53 5 U .S. 23 4 ( 20 02 ). No r d oe s h e argue that th e ima g e s of the c hil dr e n a re no t se xua lly

e xplic it. I nstead, B urke a

rg ues that the district cour t cannot prope rly

enhanc e his senten ce u nder U SSG § 2G 2. 4( b) (4 ) u

nle ss i t f ind s b y a prep on deranc e of the e vid e nc e that th e sa dis tic or ma so c his tic7

conduct de picted in the imag e ac tually occur red, i.e ., by

finding that the phot o has not been a ltered. We f ind no su c h r e qu ir e me nt i n th e Gu ide lin e s. Even if such a requirement ex isted, Bur ke’s defense expert mere ly testified at the sentencing hear ing that photos ge nera lly could be altered by

photo editing pr og rams like Adobe Photoshop. J .A. at 71-72. He did not give a n opinion as to whether the specific imag es at iss ue had been a ltered nor did he testify

that he had e ven viewe d them. M er e s p ec u lation is insufficient to cre ate a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Be c a u s e th e f a c ts n e c e s s a

ry to support application of e ach of the enha nceme nts were admitted by Bur ke and substantiate d in the PSR , we f ind that the district court did not clear ly err in calculating Bur ke’s Sentenc ing G uidelines rang e. II. Bur ke also objec ts to the district court’s i mpositi on of sex offe nder reg istration as a c ondition

o f h is s u p e r v is e d r e le a s e b a s e d o n ar g u me n ts o f d u e p r o c e s s an d a

p p li c a ti o n o f

O h io s tate la

w . We revie w imposit ion of a supervised rele ase condition f or abuse of discre tion. United States v. Carter , 463 F.3d 526, 528 ( 6th Cir. 2006). First, B urke a

rg ues that he was denied due process because the reg istration require ment was imposed without notice or an opportunity to be hea rd. We find this arg ument to be wholly without merit. Whil e neither

the pl ea agr eement nor the PSR m ention a sex offende r re g istration require ment, Bur

ke did re ceive adequa

te notice that suc h a condition would be imposed as pa rt of his se nte nc e . A t the tim e B ur ke c omm itt e d the of

fe ns e , an d thr ou g ho ut his se nte nc ing , 1 8 U .S. C. § 3 58 3 r e qu ir e d a

ny pe rs on c onvi cte d of a

se x off e ns e a s d e sc ri be d in

18 U. S.C. § 4 04 2( c )( 4) to reg ister as a sex off

ender as a mandatory condition of supervised rele ase. 18 U.S.C. § 3 5 838

(a me nd e d 1 99 7) . D ur ingthi s ti me , 1 8 U .S. C. § 22 52 (a )( 4) (B ) w a s liste d as a qua lif y ingse x off

e ns e under § 4042( c)( 4). 18 U.S

. C

. § 4042(c) (4)( C) (prior to July 27, 2006 amendment) . There fore , Bu rk e w as o nn o t i ce t h at re gi s t ra t i o nas a s ex o ff en d er co u l d b e i mp o s ed as p ar t o f h i s s en t en ci n g. B ur ke a lso re c e ive d a

he ari ngon

the iss ue . A t th e se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt lis te ne d to B ur ke ’s argum e nt t

hat he sh ou ld n ot h a ve to r e g ist e r a s a se x off e nd e r b e c a

us e the re qu ir e me nt i s discretionar

y under O hio law for t h o s e co nvicted of me re posse ssion of child pornog raphy . The dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s n ot p e rs ua de d a

nd a do pte d th e re c omm e nd a tio n o f t he govern men t. B e c a

us e Bur ke re ceive d both notice and a n opportunity

to be hea

rd on the i m p o s i t i on of a se x offe nder reg istration require ment, we f ind that he was a ffor ded all the process he was due on this sentencing issue. S econ d, Bur

ke argue s th a t O hio state law s ho uld g ov e rn wh e the r h e sh ou ld b e re qu ir e d to

re g ist e r. As B ur

ke wa s convic te d und e r a fe de ra l sta tut e fo r a fe de ra l cr ime , we fa il t o s e e ho w this argument follows. Even if this argument wer e convincing, imposi tion of a se x offe nder r eg istration require ment would still be within the cour t’s discretion. Bur

ke pleaded g uilty

to the sex offense of po sse ssi on

of c hil d p or no g ra ph y . U nd e r t

he 20 03 Se nte nc ing Gu ide lin e s Ma nu a l, r e g ist

ratio n a s a sex offender

was a mandatory condition of supervised rele ase for suc h an off ense. U .S. Sentencing Gu ide lin e s Manu a l § 5D 1. 3( a )( 7) (2 00 3)

. Th e re fo re , we fi nd that the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discreti o n b y

order ing B urke to re g ister as a sex offender

as a c ondition of his supervised rele ase. III . Finally , Bur

ke cha lleng es the district cour t’s denial of his motion to suppress. He a rg ues that the inf or ma tio n c on ta ine d in

the a ff ida vit in s up po rt of the iss ua

nc e of the wa

rr ant f or se arc h o f h is residenc e wa s stale. B urke, how ever , is barre d from ra ising this argument ag ainst his conviction on9

appea l beca

use his g uilty

plea wa s not conditional. Un ite d S tat es v . P ic k

e tt , 941 F.2d 411, 416- 17 (6th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ). Fur

thermore , Bur

ke also a dmitted by

acc epting the Statement of F acts that the

sear ch wa rra nt he now questions was issued based on a showing of proba

ble ca use to believe that he possessed c hild pornog raphy . Thus, we f ind that Burke ’s cha lleng e of the denial of his motion to suppress is barr ed. IV. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s imp os e d s e nte nc e is AF F IR M ED

.