(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

No. 04–905. Argued October 31, 2005—Decided January 10, 2006 

Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (Reeder), an authorized dealer of heavy-duty 

trucks manufactured by Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. (Volvo), 

generally sold those trucks through an industry-wide competitive 

bidding process, whereby the retail customer describes its specific 

product requirements and invites bids from dealers it selects based 

on such factors as an existing relationship, geography, and reputation. Once a Volvo dealer receives the customer’s specifications, it 

requests from Volvo a discount or “concession” off the wholesale price. 

Volvo decides on a case-by-case basis whether to offer a concession. 

The dealer then uses its Volvo discount in preparing its bid; it purchases trucks from Volvo only if and when the retail customer accepts 

its bid. Reeder was one of many regional Volvo dealers. Although 

nothing prohibits a Volvo dealer from bidding outside its territory, 

Reeder rarely bid against another Volvo dealer. In the atypical case 

in which a retail customer solicited a bid from more than one Volvo 

dealer, Volvo’s stated policy was to provide the same price concession 

to each dealer. In 1997, after Volvo announced plans to enlarge the 

size of its dealers’ markets and to reduce by almost half the number 

of its dealers, Reeder learned that Volvo had given another dealer a 

price concession greater than the discounts Reeder typically received. 

Reeder, suspecting it was one of the dealers Volvo sought to eliminate, filed this suit under, inter alia, §2 of the Clayton Act, as 

amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. §13, alleging that 

its sales and profits declined because Volvo offered other dealers 

more favorable price concessions. At trial, Reeder presented evidence 

of two instances when it bid against another Volvo dealer for a particular sale. In the first, although Volvo initially offered Reeder a 
2 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDER-

 SIMCO GMC, INC. 

Syllabus 

lower concession, Volvo ultimately matched the concession offered to 

the competing dealer. Neither dealer won the bid. In the second, 

Volvo initially offered the two dealers the same concession, but increased the other dealer’s discount after it, rather than Reeder, was 

selected. Reeder dominantly relied on comparisons between concessions it received on four occasions when it bid successfully against 

non-Volvo dealers (and thus purchased Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions other successful Volvo dealers received in bidding 

processes in which Reeder did not participate. Reeder also compared 

concessions Volvo offered it on several occasions when it bid unsuccessfully against non-Volvo dealers (and therefore did not purchase 

Volvo trucks), with more favorable concessions accorded other Volvo 

dealers who gained contracts on which Reeder did not bid. Reeder 

did not look for instances in which it received a larger concession 

than another Volvo dealer, but acknowledged it was “quite possible” 

that such instances occurred. Nor did Reeder offer any statistical 

analysis revealing whether it was disfavored on average as compared 

to other dealers. The jury found a reasonable possibility that discriminatory pricing may have harmed competition between Reeder 

and other Volvo dealers, that Volvo’s discriminatory pricing injured 

Reeder, and that Reeder’s damages from Volvo’s Robinson-Patman 

violation exceeded $1.3 million. The District Court awarded treble 

damages on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, and entered judgment. 

Affirming, the Eighth Circuit, among other things, noted the 

threshold requirement that Reeder show it was a “purchaser” within 

the Act’s meaning; rejected Volvo’s contention that competitive bidding situations do not give rise to Robinson-Patman claims; held that 

the four instances in which Reeder purchased trucks following successful bids rendered it a purchaser under the Act; determined that a 

jury could reasonably decide Reeder was in actual competition with 

favored dealers at the time price differentials were imposed; and held 

that the jury could properly find Reeder had proved competitive injury based on evidence that (1) Volvo intended to reduce the number 

of its dealers, (2) Reeder lost one contract for which it competed with 

another Volvo dealer, (3) Reeder would have earned more profits, had 

it received the concessions given other dealers, and (4) Reeder’s sales 

declined over time. 

Held: A manufacturer may not be held liable for secondary-line price 

discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of a 

showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell its product to the same retail customer. The Act does 

not reach the case Reeder presents. It centrally addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for resale of the purchased product. Competition of that 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Syllabus 

character ordinarily is not involved when a product subject to special 

order is sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding process. 

Pp. 7–15.

1. Section 2 was enacted to curb financially powerful corporations’ 

use of localized price-cutting tactics that gravely impaired other sellers’ competitive position. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 

543, and n. 6. Augmenting §2, the Robinson-Patman Act targeted the 

perceived harm to competition occasioned by the advent of large 

chain stores able to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller buyers 

could demand. Robinson-Patman does not ban all price differences 

charged to different purchasers of similar commodities, but proscribes only “price discrimination [that] threatens to injure competition,” Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 

U. S. 209, 220. Of the three categories of competitive injury that may 

give rise to a Robinson-Patman claim, secondary-line cases, like this 

one, involve price discrimination that injures competition among the 

discriminating seller’s customers (here, Volvo’s dealerships). Reeder 

has satisfied the Act’s first two requirements for establishing secondary-line injury: (1) The relevant Volvo truck sales were made in interstate commerce, and (2) the trucks were of “like grade and quality,’’ 15 U. S. C. §13(a). Because Reeder has not identified any 

differentially-priced transaction in which it was both a “purchaser” 

under the Act and “in actual competition” with a favored purchaser 

for the same customer, see e.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505, 

518–519, Volvo and amicus United States maintain that Reeder cannot satisfy the Act’s third and fourth requirements—that (3) Volvo 

“discriminate[d] in price between” Reeder and another purchaser of 

Volvo trucks, and (4) “the effect of such discrimination may be . . . to 

injure, destroy, or prevent competition” to the advantage of a favored 

purchaser, i.e., one who “receive[d] the benefit of such discrimination,” ibid. Absent actual competition with a favored Volvo dealer, 

Reeder cannot establish the competitive injury the Act requires. 

Pp. 7–10.

2. The injury to competition targeted by the Robinson-Patman Act 

is not established by the selective comparisons Reeder presented at 

trial: (1) comparisons of concessions Reeder received for four successful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with larger concessions other successful Volvo dealers received for different sales on which Reeder did 

not bid (purchase-to-purchase comparisons); (2) comparisons of concessions offered to Reeder in connection with several unsuccessful 

bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater concessions accorded 

other Volvo dealers who competed successfully for different sales on 

which Reeder did not bid (offer-to-purchase comparisons); and (3) 

comparisons of two occasions on which Reeder bid against another 
4 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDER-

 SIMCO GMC, INC. 

Syllabus 

Volvo dealer (head-to-head comparisons). Pp. 10–14. 

(a) Because the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase comparisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to Reeder’s 

“competitors,” those comparisons do not support an inference of competitive injury. See Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 

460 U. S. 428, 435. Both types of comparisons fall short because in 

none of the discrete instances on which Reeder relied did it compete 

with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer. 

Nor did Reeder even attempt to show that the compared dealers were 

consistently favored over it. Reeder simply paired occasions on which 

it competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer A with instances in which other Volvo dealers competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer B. The compared incidents were tied to no 

systematic study and were separated in time by as many as seven 

months. This Court declines to permit an inference of competitive injury from evidence of such a mix-and-match, manipulable quality. 

No similar risk of manipulation occurs in cases kin to the chain-store 

paradigm. Here, there is no discrete “favored” dealer comparable to a 

chain store or a large independent department store—at least, 

Reeder’s evidence is insufficient to support an inference that such a 

dealer exists. For all that appears, Reeder, on occasion, might have 

gotten a better deal vis-à-vis one or more of the dealers in its comparisons. While Reeder may have competed with other Volvo dealers 

for the opportunity to bid on potential sales in a broad geographic 

area, competition at that initial stage is based on a variety of factors, 

including the existence vel non of a relationship between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, and reputation. Once the 

customer has chosen the particular dealers from which it will solicit 

bids, the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and demands 

of the particular end user, with only a handful of dealers competing 

for the sale. Volvo dealers’ bidding for sales in the same geographic 

area does not import that they in fact competed for the same customer-tailored sales. Pp. 11–12. 

(b) Nor is a Robinson-Patman violation established by Reeder’s 

evidence of two instances in which it competed head to head with another Volvo dealer. When multiple dealers bid for the business of the 

same customer, only one dealer will win the business and thereafter 

purchase the supplier’s product to fulfill its contractual commitment. 

Even assuming the Act applies to head-to-head transactions, Reeder 

did not establish that it was disfavored vis-à-vis other Volvo dealers 

in the rare instances in which they competed for the same sale—let 

alone that the alleged discrimination was substantial. Reeder’s evidence showed loss of only one sale to another Volvo dealer, a sale of 

12 trucks that would have generated $30,000 in gross profits for 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Syllabus 

Reeder. Per its policy, Volvo initially offered Reeder and the other 

dealer the same concession, but ultimately granted a larger concession to the other dealer after it had won the bid. In the only other instance of head-to-head competition, Volvo increased Reeder’s initial 

discount to match the discount offered the other competing Volvo 

dealer, but neither dealer won the bid. If price discrimination between two purchasers existed at all, it was not of such magnitude as 

to affect substantially competition between Reeder and the “favored” 

Volvo dealer. Pp. 12–13. 

3. The Robinson-Patman Act signals no large departure from antitrust law’s primary concern, interbrand competition. Even if the 

Act’s text could be construed as Reeder urges and the Eighth Circuit 

held, this Court would resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition. 

There is no evidence here that any favored purchaser possesses market power, the allegedly favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores or chain operations, and the supplier’s selective price discounting fosters 

competition among suppliers of different brands. By declining to extend Robinson-Patman’s governance to such cases, the Court continues to construe the Act consistently with antitrust law’s broader policies. Pp. 13–14. 

374 F. 3d 701, reversed and remanded. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and O’CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and BREYER, JJ., 

joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., 

joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–905 

VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC., PETITIONER v. REEDER-SIMCO GMC, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[January 10, 2006] 

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case concerns specially ordered products—heavyduty trucks supplied by Volvo Trucks North America, Inc. 

(Volvo), and sold by franchised dealers through a competitive bidding process. In this process, the retail customer 

states its specifications and invites bids, generally from 

dealers franchised by different manufacturers. Only when 

a Volvo dealer’s bid proves successful does the dealer 

arrange to purchase the trucks, which Volvo then builds to 

meet the customer’s specifications.

Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. (Reeder), a Volvo dealer located in Fort Smith, Arkansas, commenced suit against 

Volvo alleging that Reeder’s sales and profits declined 

because Volvo offered other dealers more favorable price

concessions than those offered to Reeder. Reeder sought

redress for its alleged losses under §2 of the Clayton Act, 

38 Stat. 730, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Price 

Discrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. §13 (Robinson-Patman Act or Act), and the Arkansas Franchise 

Practices Act, Ark. Code Ann. §4–72–201 et seq. (2001). 

Reeder prevailed at trial and on appeal on both claims. 
2 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

We granted review on the federal claim to resolve the 

question whether a manufacturer offering its dealers 

different wholesale prices may be held liable for price 

discrimination proscribed by Robinson-Patman, absent a 

showing that the manufacturer discriminated between 

dealers contemporaneously competing to resell to the same 

retail customer. While state law designed to protect franchisees may provide, and in this case has provided, a 

remedy for the dealer exposed to conduct of the kind 

Reeder alleged, the Robinson-Patman Act, we hold, does 

not reach the case Reeder presents. The Act centrally 

addresses price discrimination in cases involving competition between different purchasers for resale of the purchased product. Competition of that character ordinarily 

is not involved when a product subject to special order is 

sold through a customer-specific competitive bidding 

process. 

I 

Volvo manufactures heavy-duty trucks. Reeder sells 

new and used trucks, including heavy-duty trucks. 374 

F. 3d 701, 704 (CA8 2004). Reeder became an authorized 

dealer of Volvo trucks in 1995, pursuant to a five-year 

franchise agreement that provided for automatic one-year 

extensions if Reeder met sales objectives set by Volvo. 

Ibid. Reeder generally sold Volvo’s trucks through a 

competitive bidding process. Ibid. In this process, the 

retail customer describes its specific product requirements 

and invites bids from several dealers it selects. The customer’s “decision to request a bid from a particular dealer 

or to allow a particular dealer to bid is controlled by such 

factors as an existing relationship, geography, reputation, 

and cold calling or other marketing strategies initiated by 

individual dealers.” Id., at 719 (Hansen, J., concurring in 

part and dissenting in part). 

Once a Volvo dealer receives the customer’s specifica-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

tions, it turns to Volvo and requests a discount or “concession” off the wholesale price (set at 80% of the published 

retail price). Id., at 704. It is common practice in the 

industry for manufacturers to offer customer-specific

discounts to their dealers. Ibid.; App. 334, 337. Volvo 

decides on a case-by-case basis whether to offer a discount 

and, if so, what the discount rate will be, taking account of 

such factors as industry-wide demand and whether the 

retail customer has, historically, purchased a different 

brand of trucks. App. 348–349, 333–334.1 The dealer then 

uses the discount offered by Volvo in preparing its bid; it 

purchases trucks from Volvo only if and when the retail 

customer accepts its bid. Ibid. 

Reeder was one of many Volvo dealers, each assigned by 

Volvo to a geographic territory. Reeder’s territory encompassed ten counties in Arkansas and two in Oklahoma. 

374 F. 3d, at 709. Although nothing prohibits a Volvo 

dealer from bidding outside its territory, ibid., Reeder 

rarely bid against another Volvo dealer, see id., at 705; 5 

App. in No. 02–2462 (CA8), pp. 1621–1622 (hereinafter 

C. A. App.). In the atypical event that the same retail 

customer solicited a bid from more than one Volvo dealer, 

Volvo’s stated policy was to provide the same price concession to each dealer competing head to head for the same 

sale. 4 C. A. App. 1161–1162; 5 id., at 1619, 1621. 

In 1997, Volvo announced a program it called “Volvo 

Vision,” in which the company addressed problems it faced 

in the market for heavy trucks, among them, the company’s assessment that it had too many dealers. Volvo 

projected enlarging the size of its dealers’ markets and 

reducing the number of dealers from 146 to 75. 374 F. 3d, 

—————— 

1To shield its ability to compete with other manufacturers, Volvo 

keeps confidential its precise method for calculating concessions offered 

to dealers. 374 F. 3d 701, 704–705 (CA8 2004); App. 337–338. 
4 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

at 705. Coincidentally, Reeder learned that Volvo had 

given another dealer a price concession greater than the 

concessions Reeder typically received, and “Reeder came to 

suspect it was one of the dealers Volvo sought to eliminate.” Ibid. Reeder filed suit against Volvo in February 

2000, alleging losses attributable to Volvo’s violation of the 

Arkansas Franchise Practices Act and the RobinsonPatman Act. 

At trial, Reeder’s vice-president, William E. Heck, acknowledged that Volvo’s policy was to offer equal concessions to Volvo dealers bidding against one another for a 

particular contract, but he contended that the policy “was 

not executed.” 4 C. A. App. 1162. Reeder presented evidence concerning two instances over the five-year course of 

its authorized dealership when Reeder bid against other 

Volvo dealers for a particular sale. 374 F. 3d, at 705, 708– 

709. One of the two instances involved Reeder’s bid on a 

sale to Tommy Davidson Trucking. 4 C. A. App. 1267– 

1268. Volvo initially offered Reeder a concession of 17%, 

which Volvo, unprompted, increased to 18.1% and then, 

one week later, to 18.9%, to match the concession Volvo 

had offered to another of its dealers. 5 id., at 1268–1272. 

Neither dealer won the bid. Id., at 1272. The other instance involved Hiland Dairy, which solicited bids from 

both Reeder and Southwest Missouri Truck Center. Id., at 

1626–1627. Per its written policy, Volvo offered the two 

dealers the same concession, and Hiland selected Southwest Missouri, a dealer from which Hiland had previously 

purchased trucks. Ibid. After selecting Southwest Missouri, Hiland insisted on the price Southwest Missouri had 

bid prior to a general increase in Volvo’s prices; Volvo 

obliged by increasing the size of the discount. Id., at 1627. 

See also id., at 1483–1488; 374 F. 3d, at 720 (Hansen, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

Reeder dominantly relied on comparisons between 

concessions Volvo offered when Reeder bid against non-
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Volvo dealers, with concessions accorded to other Volvo 

dealers similarly bidding against non-Volvo dealers for 

other sales. Reeder’s evidence compared concessions 

Reeder received on four occasions when it bid successfully

against non-Volvo dealers (and thus purchased Volvo

trucks), with more favorable concessions other successful 

Volvo dealers received in connection with bidding processes in which Reeder did not participate. Id., at 705–706. 

Reeder also compared concessions offered by Volvo on

several occasions when Reeder bid unsuccessfully against 

non-Volvo dealers (and therefore did not purchase Volvo 

trucks), with more favorable concessions received by other 

Volvo dealers who gained contracts on which Reeder did 

not bid. Id., at 706–707. 

Reeder’s vice-president, Heck, testified that Reeder did 

not look for instances in which it received a larger concession than another Volvo dealer, although he acknowledged 

it was “quite possible” that such instances occurred. 5 

C. A. App. 1462. Nor did Reeder endeavor to determine by 

any statistical analysis whether Reeder was disfavored on 

average as compared to another dealer or set of dealers. 

Id., at 1462–1464. 

The jury found that there was a reasonable possibility 

that discriminatory pricing may have harmed competition 

between Reeder and other Volvo truck dealers, and that 

Volvo’s discriminatory pricing injured Reeder. App. 480–

486. It further found that Reeder’s damages from Volvo’s 

Robinson-Patman Act violation exceeded $1.3 million. Id., 

at 486.2 The District Court summarily denied Volvo’s 

motion for judgment as a matter of law and the company’s 

alternative motion for new trial or remittitur, awarded 

—————— 

2The jury also awarded Reeder damages of $513,750 on Reeder’s 

state-law claim under the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act. No 

question is before us respecting that claim, which trained on Volvo’s 

alleged design to eliminate Reeder as a Volvo dealer. See supra, at 4. 
6 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

treble damages on the Robinson-Patman Act claim, and 

entered judgment.

A divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The appeals court noted that, “as a threshold 

matter[,] Reeder had to show [that] it was a ‘purchaser’ 

within the meaning of the [Act],” 374 F. 3d, at 708, i.e., 

that “there were actual sales at two different prices[,] . . . a 

sale to [Reeder] and a sale to another Volvo dealer,” id., at 

707–708. Rejecting Volvo’s contention that competitive 

bidding situations do not give rise to claims under the 

Robinson-Patman Act, id., at 708–709, the Court of Appeals observed that Reeder was “more than an unsuccessful bidder,” id., at 709. The four instances in which 

Reeder “actually purchased Volvo trucks following successful bids on contracts,” the court concluded, sufficed to 

render Reeder a purchaser within the meaning of the Act. 

Ibid. 

The Court of Appeals next determined that a jury could 

reasonably decide that Reeder was “in actual competition” 

with favored dealers. Ibid. “[A]s of the time the price

differential was imposed,” the court reasoned, “the favored 

and disfavored purchasers competed at the same functional level . . . and within the same geographic market.” 

Ibid. (quoting Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F. 2d 578, 585 (CA2 1987)). The court 

further held that the jury could properly find from the 

evidence that Reeder had proved competitive injury from 

price discrimination. Specifically, the court pointed to

evidence showing that (1) Volvo intended to reduce the 

number of its dealers; (2) Reeder lost the Hiland Dairy

contract, for which it competed head to head with another 

Volvo dealer; (3) Reeder would have earned more profits, 

had it received the concessions other dealers received; and 

(4) Reeder’s sales had declined over a period of time. 374 

F. 3d, at 711–712. The court also affirmed the award of 

treble damages to Reeder. Id., at 712–714. 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

Judge Hansen dissented as to the Robinson-Patman Act 

claim. “Traditional [Robinson-Patman Act] cases,” he 

observed, “involve sellers and purchasers that carry inventory or deal in fungible goods.” Id., at 718. The majority,

Judge Hansen commented, “attempt[ed] to fit a square peg 

into a round hole,” ibid., when it extended the Act’s reach 

to the marketplace for heavy-duty trucks, where “specialorder products are sold to individual, pre-identified customers only after competitive bidding,” ibid. There may

be competition among dealers for the opportunity to bid on 

potential sales, he noted, but “[o]nce bidding begins, . . . 

the relevant market becomes limited to the needs and 

demands of a particular end user, with only a handful of 

dealers competing for the ultimate sale.” Id., at 719. 

Violation of the Act, in Judge Hansen’s view, could not be 

predicated on the instances Reeder identified in which it 

was a purchaser, for “there was no actual competition 

between” Reeder and another Volvo dealer at the time of 

Reeder’s purchases. Ibid. “Without proof of actual competition” for the same customer when the requisite purchases were made, he concluded, “Reeder cannot demonstrate a reasonable possibility of competitive injury.” Ibid. 

We granted certiorari, 544 U. S. ___ (2005), to resolve 

this question: May a manufacturer be held liable for secondary-line price discrimination under the RobinsonPatman Act in the absence of a showing that the manufacturer discriminated between dealers competing to resell 

its product to the same retail customer? Satisfied that the 

Court of Appeals erred in answering that question in the 

affirmative, we reverse the Eighth Circuit’s judgment. 

II 

Section 2, “when originally enacted as part of the Clayton Act in 1914, was born of a desire by Congress to curb 

the use by financially powerful corporations of localized 

price-cutting tactics which had gravely impaired the com-
8 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

petitive position of other sellers.” FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, 

Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 543, and n. 6 (1960) (citing H. R. Rep. 

No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1914); S. Rep. No. 698, 63d 

Cong., 2d Sess., 2–4 (1914)). Augmenting that provision in 

1936 with the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress sought to 

target the perceived harm to competition occasioned by 

powerful buyers, rather than sellers; specifically, Congress 

responded to the advent of large chain stores, enterprises 

with the clout to obtain lower prices for goods than smaller 

buyers could demand. See 14 H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust 

Law ¶2302, p. 11 (2d ed. 2006) (hereinafter Hovenkamp); 

P. Areeda & L. Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis ¶602, pp. 908– 

909 (5th ed. 1997) (hereinafter Areeda). The Act provides, 

in relevant part: 

“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different 

purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, 

. . . where the effect of such discrimination may be 

substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a 

monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such 

discrimination, or with customers of either of 

them . . . .” 15 U. S. C. §13(a). 

Pursuant to §4 of the Clayton Act, a private plaintiff may 

recover threefold for actual injury sustained as a result of 

a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. See 15 U. S. C. 

§15(a); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 

U. S. 557, 562 (1981). 

Mindful of the purposes of the Act and of the antitrust

laws generally, we have explained that Robinson-Patman 

does not “ban all price differences charged to different

purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,” 

Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

509 U. S. 209, 220 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); rather, the Act proscribes “price discrimination only 

to the extent that it threatens to injure competition,” ibid. 

Our decisions describe three categories of competitive 

injury that may give rise to a Robinson-Patman Act claim: 

primary-line, secondary-line, and tertiary-line. Primaryline cases entail conduct—most conspicuously, predatory 

pricing—that injures competition at the level of the discriminating seller and its direct competitors. See, e.g., id., 

at 220–222; see also Hovenkamp ¶2301a, pp. 4–6. Secondary-line cases, of which this is one, involve price discrimination that injures competition among the discriminating seller’s customers (here, Volvo’s dealerships); cases 

in this category typically refer to “favored” and “disfavored” purchasers. See ibid.; Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 

496 U. S. 543, 558, n. 15 (1990). Tertiary-line cases involve injury to competition at the level of the purchaser’s 

customers. See Areeda ¶601e, p. 907.

To establish the secondary-line injury of which it complains, Reeder had to show that (1) the relevant Volvo 

truck sales were made in interstate commerce; (2) the 

trucks were of “like grade and quality’’; (3) Volvo “discriminate[d] in price between” Reeder and another purchaser of Volvo trucks; and (4) “the effect of such discrimination may be . . . to injure, destroy, or prevent 

competition” to the advantage of a favored purchaser, i.e., 

one who “receive[d] the benefit of such discrimination.” 15 

U. S. C. §13(a). It is undisputed that Reeder has satisfied 

the first and second requirements. Volvo and the United 

States, as amicus curiae, maintain that Reeder cannot 

satisfy the third and fourth requirements, because Reeder 

has not identified any differentially-priced transaction in 

which it was both a “purchaser” under the Act and “in 

actual competition” with a favored purchaser for the same 

customer. 

A hallmark of the requisite competitive injury, our 
10 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

decisions indicate, is the diversion of sales or profits from 

a disfavored purchaser to a favored purchaser. FTC v. 

Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505, 518–519 (1963) (evidence 

showed patronage shifted from disfavored dealers to favored dealers); Falls City Industries, Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428, 437–438, and n. 8 (1983) (complaint “supported by direct evidence of diverted sales”). 

We have also recognized that a permissible inference of 

competitive injury may arise from evidence that a favored 

competitor received a significant price reduction over a 

substantial period of time. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 

334 U. S. 37, 49–51 (1948); Falls City Industries, 460 

U. S., at 435. Absent actual competition with a favored 

Volvo dealer, however, Reeder cannot establish the competitive injury required under the Act. 

III 

The evidence Reeder offered at trial falls into three 

categories: (1) comparisons of concessions Reeder received 

for four successful bids against non-Volvo dealers, with 

larger concessions other successful Volvo dealers received 

for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (purchaseto-purchase comparisons); (2) comparisons of concessions 

offered to Reeder in connection with several unsuccessful 

bids against non-Volvo dealers, with greater concessions 

accorded other Volvo dealers who competed successfully 

for different sales on which Reeder did not bid (offer-topurchase comparisons); and (3) evidence of two occasions 

on which Reeder bid against another Volvo dealer (headto-head comparisons). The Court of Appeals concluded

that Reeder demonstrated competitive injury under the 

Act because Reeder competed with favored purchasers “at 

the same functional level . . . and within the same geographic market.” 374 F. 3d, at 709 (quoting Best Brands, 

842 F. 2d, at 585). As we see it, however, selective comparisons of the kind Reeder presented do not show the 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

injury to competition targeted by the Robinson-Patman 

Act. 

A 

Both the purchase-to-purchase and the offer-to-purchase 

comparisons fall short, for in none of the discrete instances 

on which Reeder relied did Reeder compete with beneficiaries of the alleged discrimination for the same customer. 

Nor did Reeder even attempt to show that the compared 

dealers were consistently favored vis-à-vis Reeder. Reeder 

simply paired occasions on which it competed with nonVolvo dealers for a sale to Customer A with instances in 

which other Volvo dealers competed with non-Volvo dealers for a sale to Customer B. The compared incidents 

were tied to no systematic study and were separated in 

time by as many as seven months. See 374 F. 3d, at 706, 

710. 

We decline to permit an inference of competitive injury 

from evidence of such a mix-and-match, manipulable 

quality. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34–35, 55. No similar risk of 

manipulation occurs in cases kin to the chain-store paradigm. Here, there is no discrete “favored” dealer comparable to a chain store or a large independent department 

store—at least, Reeder’s evidence is insufficient to support 

an inference of such a dealer or set of dealers. For all we 

know, Reeder, on occasion, might have gotten a better deal 

vis-à-vis one or more of the dealers in its comparisons. 

See supra, at 5. 

Reeder may have competed with other Volvo dealers for

the opportunity to bid on potential sales in a broad geographic area. At that initial stage, however, competition

is not affected by differential pricing; a dealer in the competitive bidding process here at issue approaches Volvo for

a price concession only after it has been selected by a 

retail customer to submit a bid. Competition for an opportunity to bid, we earlier observed, is based on a variety of 
12 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

factors, including the existence vel non of a relationship 

between the potential bidder and the customer, geography, 

and reputation. See supra, at 2.3 We reiterate in this 

regard an observation made by Judge Hansen, dissenting 

from the Eighth Circuit’s Robinson-Patman holding: Once 

a retail customer has chosen the particular dealers from 

which it will solicit bids, “the relevant market becomes 

limited to the needs and demands of a particular end user, 

with only a handful of dealers competing for the ultimate 

sale.” 374 F. 3d, at 719. That Volvo dealers may bid for 

sales in the same geographic area does not import that 

they in fact competed for the same customer-tailored sales. 

In sum, the purchase-to-purchase and offer-to-purchase 

comparisons fail to show that Volvo sold at a lower price to 

Reeder’s “competitors,” hence those comparisons do not 

support an inference of competitive injury. See Falls City 

Industries, 460 U. S., at 435 (inference of competitive 

injury under Morton Salt arises from “proof of a substantial price discrimination between competing purchasers 

over time” (emphasis added)). 

B 

Reeder did offer evidence of two instances in which it 

competed head to head with another Volvo dealer. See 

supra, at 4. When multiple dealers bid for the business of 

the same customer, only one dealer will win the business 

and thereafter purchase the supplier’s product to fulfill its 

contractual commitment. Because Robinson-Patman 

“prohibits only discrimination ‘between different purchas-

—————— 

3A dealer’s reputation for securing favorable concessions, we recognize, may influence the customer’s bidding invitations. Cf. post, at 3, 

n. 2. We do not pursue that point here, however, because Reeder did 

not present—or even look for—evidence that Volvo consistently disfavored Reeder while it consistently favored certain other dealers. See 

supra, at 5. 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

ers,’ ” Brief for Petitioner 26 (quoting 15 U. S. C. §13(a); 

emphasis added), Volvo and the United States argue, the 

Act does not reach markets characterized by competitive 

bidding and special-order sales, as opposed to sales from 

inventory. See Brief for Petitioner 27; Brief for 

United States as Amicus Curiae 9, 17–20. We need not 

decide that question today. Assuming the Act applies to 

the head-to-head transactions, Reeder did not establish 

that it was disfavored vis-à-vis other Volvo dealers in the 

rare instances in which they competed for the same sale— 

let alone that the alleged discrimination was substantial. 

See 1 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 478–479 (5th ed. 2002) (“No inference of injury to

competition is permitted when the discrimination is not

substantial.” (collecting cases)). 

Reeder’s evidence showed loss of only one sale to another Volvo dealer, a sale of 12 trucks that would have 

generated $30,000 in gross profits for Reeder. 374 F. 3d, 

at 705. Per its policy, Volvo initially offered Reeder and 

the other dealer the same concession. Volvo ultimately 

granted a larger concession to the other dealer, but only 

after it had won the bid. In the only other instance of 

head-to-head competition Reeder identified, Volvo increased Reeder’s initial 17% discount to 18.9%, to match 

the discount offered to the other competing Volvo dealer; 

neither dealer won the bid. See supra, at 4. In short, if 

price discrimination between two purchasers existed at 

all, it was not of such magnitude as to affect substantially 

competition between Reeder and the “favored” Volvo 

dealer. 

IV 

Interbrand competition, our opinions affirm, is the

“primary concern of antitrust law.” Continental T. V., Inc. 

v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 51–52, n. 19 (1977). 

The Robinson-Patman Act signals no large departure from 
14 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

Opinion of the Court

that main concern. Even if the Act’s text could be construed in the manner urged by Reeder and embraced by 

the Court of Appeals, we would resist interpretation 

geared more to the protection of existing competitors than 

to the stimulation of competition.4 In the case before us, 

there is no evidence that any favored purchaser possesses 

market power, the allegedly favored purchasers are dealers with little resemblance to large independent department stores or chain operations, and the supplier’s selective price discounting fosters competition among suppliers 

of different brands. See id., at 51–52 (observing that the 

market impact of a vertical practice, such as a change in a 

supplier’s distribution system, may be a “simultaneous 

reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of 

interbrand competition”). By declining to extend Robinson-Patman’s governance to such cases, we continue to 

construe the Act “consistently with broader policies of the 

antitrust laws.” Brooke Group, 509 U. S., at 220 (quoting 

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U. S. 69, 80, 

n. 13 (1979)); see Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. 

FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 63 (1953) (cautioning against RobinsonPatman constructions that “extend beyond the prohibitions of the Act and, in doing so, help give rise to a price 

uniformity and rigidity in open conflict with the purposes 

of other antitrust legislation”).5 

—————— 

4The dissent assails Volvo’s decision to reduce the number of its dealers. Post, at 2, 5. But Robinson-Patman does not bar a manufacturer 

from restructuring its distribution networks to improve the efficiency of 

its operations. If Volvo did not honor its obligations to Reeder as its 

franchisee, “[a]ny remedy . . . lies in state laws addressing unfair 

competition and the rights of franchisees, not in the Robinson-Patman 

Act.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. 5See also 14 H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2333c, p. 109 (2d ed. 

2006) (commenting that the Eighth Circuit’s expansive interpretation 

“views the [Robinson-Patman Act] as a guarantee of equal profit 

margins on sales actually made,” and thereby exposes manufacturers to 

treble damages unless they “charge uniform prices to their dealers”). 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–905 

VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC., PETITIONER v. REEDER-SIMCO GMC, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[January 10, 2006] 

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

dissenting. 

Franchised dealers who sell Volvo trucks, like those who 

sell automobiles, farm equipment, washing machines, and 

a variety of other expensive items, routinely engage in 

negotiations with prospective purchasers. Sometimes the 

prospect is simultaneously negotiating with two Volvo 

dealers, sometimes with a Volvo dealer and a dealer representing another manufacturer, and still other times a 

satisfied customer who is generally familiar with the 

options available in a competitive market may negotiate 

with only one dealer at a time. Until today, the RobinsonPatman Act’s prohibition of price discrimination1 would 

have protected the dealer’s ability to negotiate in all those 

situations. Today, however, by adopting a novel, transaction-specific concept of competition, the Court eliminates 

—————— 

1Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by §1 of the RobinsonPatman Act, provides in relevant part that: 

“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . 

where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 

competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 

injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either 

grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with 

customers of either of them.” 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526, 

15 U. S. C. §13(a). 
2 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

that statutory protection in all but those rare situations in 

which a prospective purchaser is negotiating with two 

Volvo dealers at the same time. 

I 

Setting aside for the moment the fact that the case involves goods specially ordered for particular customers 

rather than goods stocked in inventory, the case is a 

rather ordinary Robinson-Patman suit. Respondent

Reeder alleged a violation of the Act; the parties submitted 

a good deal of conflicting evidence to the jury; the trial 

judge properly instructed the jurors on the elements of 

price discrimination, competitive injury, and damages; 

and the jury returned a verdict resolving all issues in 

Reeder’s favor. The Court of Appeals found no error in 

either the instructions or the sufficiency of the evidence. 

374 F. 3d 701 (CA8 2004).

Two issues of fact bear particular mention. 

First, Volvo does not challenge the jury’s finding of price 

discrimination. Reeder’s theory of the case was that Volvo 

sought to cut back its number of dealers and deemed 

Reeder expendable. To avoid possible violations of franchise agreements and state laws, Volvo chose to accomplish this goal by offering Reeder worse prices than other 

regional dealers.

Reeder introduced substantial evidence of this theory. 

It showed that Volvo had an explicit business strategy, 

known as the “Volvo Vision,” of “fewer dealers, larger 

markets.” App. 34. It showed that Volvo could afford to 

lose sales as it squeezed dealers out, since the boom years 

of the late 1990’s left Volvo with about as many orders as 

it could fill. Id., at 256–257. And it showed that Volvo 

frequently gave worse prices to it than to other regional 

dealers. On at least four occasions, Volvo sold trucks to 

Reeder at significantly higher prices than to other dealers 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

buying similar trucks around the same time.2 To give one

example, in the spring of 1998 Volvo sold 20 trucks to 

Reeder at a 9% concession, but sold similar trucks to a 

Texas dealer at a 12.3% concession. Id., at 132–134. This 

left Reeder paying $2,606 more per truck. Id., at 134. 

Although the Court chides Reeder for failing to perform

statistical analyses, see ante, at 5, 11, the jury clearly had 

a sufficient basis for finding price discrimination. It could 

infer that Volvo’s pricing policies were comparable to a 

secret catalog listing one set of low prices for its “A” dealers and a higher set for its “B” dealers like Reeder, with an 

exception providing for the same prices where an “A” 

dealer and a “B” dealer were engaged in negotiations with 

the same customer at the same time. 

Second, the jury found that the favored dealers at issue 

in these comparisons were competitive players in the same 

geographic market as Reeder. This conclusion is implicit 

in the jury’s finding of competitive injury, since the jury 

instruction on that element required Reeder to prove 

“a substantial difference in price in sales by defendant 

to plaintiff and other competing Volvo dealers over a 

significant period of time. This requires plaintiff to

show that it and the other Volvo dealer(s) were retail 

dealers within the same geographic market and that 

the effect of the price differential was to allow the 

other Volvo dealer(s) to draw sales or profits away 

from plaintiff.” App. 480, Instruction No. 18. 

Volvo does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to 

support the jury finding that Reeder and the favored 

—————— 

2Additionally, on more than 12 other occasions, Volvo offered worse 

deals to Reeder than it gave to dealers who made comparable purchases. Arguably due to Volvo’s stingy concessions, Reeder failed to 

close with its customers in these instances and thus never ended up 

buying the trucks at issue from Volvo. 
4 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

dealers operated in the same geographic market.3 Volvo’s 

restraint is wise, as Reeder offered evidence that truck 

buyers are unsurprisingly mobile, that it delivered trucks 

to purchasers throughout the region, and that customers 

would sometimes solicit bids from more than one regional 

Volvo dealer. 

II 

For decades, juries have routinely inferred the requisite 

injury to competition under the Robinson-Patman Act 

from the fact that a manufacturer sells goods to one retailer at a higher price than to its competitors. This rule 

dates back to the following discussion of competitive injury

in Justice Black’s opinion for the Court in FTC v. Morton 

Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37 (1948): 

“It is argued that the findings fail to show that respondent’s discriminatory discounts had in fact 

caused injury to competition. There are specific findings that such injuries had resulted from respondent’s

discounts, although the statute does not require the

Commission to find that injury has actually resulted. 

The statute requires no more than that the effect of 

the prohibited price discriminations ‘may be substantially to lessen competition . . . or to injure, destroy, or 

prevent competition.’ After a careful consideration of 

this provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, we have 

said that ‘the statute does not require that the discriminations must in fact have harmed competition, 

but only that there is a reasonable possibility that 

they “may” have such an effect.’ Corn Products Co. v. 

Federal Trade Comm’n, 324 U. S. 726, 742. Here the 

—————— 

3Similarly, and despite its selective discussion of the extensive evidentiary record, ante, at 2–5, the Court does not question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Volvo engaged 

in price discrimination against Reeder relative to other regional Volvo 

dealers for a significant period of time. 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

Commission found what would appear to be obvious, 

that the competitive opportunities of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent 

substantially more for their goods than their competitors had to pay. The findings are adequate.” Id., at 

45–47 (footnote omitted). 

We have treated as competitors those who sell “in a single, 

interstate retail market.” Falls City Industries, Inc. v. 

Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U. S. 428, 436 (1983); cf. Tampa 

Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U. S. 320, 327 (1961). 

Under this approach—uncontroversial until today—

Reeder would readily prevail. There is ample evidence 

that Volvo charged Reeder higher prices than it charged to 

competing dealers in the same market over a period of 

many months. That those higher prices impaired Reeder’s 

ability to compete with those dealers is just as obvious as 

the injury to competition described by the Court in Morton 

Salt. 

Volvo nonetheless argues that no competitive injury 

could have occurred because it never discriminated 

against Reeder when Reeder and another Volvo dealer 

were seeking concessions with regard to the same ultimate 

customer. In Volvo’s view, each transaction was a separate market, one defined by the customer and those dealers whom it had asked for bids. For each specific customer 

who has solicited bids, Reeder’s only “competitors” were 

the other dealers making bids. Accordingly, if none of 

these other dealers were Volvo dealers, then Reeder suffered no competitive harm (relative to other Volvo dealers)

when Volvo gave it a discriminatorily high price.

Unlike the Court, I cannot accept Volvo’s vision. Nothing in the statute or in our precedent suggests that “competition” is evaluated by a transaction-specific inquiry, 

and such an approach makes little sense. It requires us to 

ignore the fact that competition among truck dealers is a 
6 VOLVO TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA, INC. v. REEDERSIMCO GMC, INC. 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

continuing war waged over time rather than a series of 

wholly discrete events. Each time Reeder managed to 

resell trucks it had purchased at discriminatorily high 

prices, it was forced either to accept lower profit margins 

than were available to favored Volvo dealers or to pass on 

the higher costs to its customers (who then might well go to 

a different dealer the next time). And we have long indicated that lost profits relative to a competitor are a proper 

basis for permitting the Morton Salt inference. See, e.g., 

Falls City Industries, 460 U. S., at 435 (noting that to overcome the Morton Salt inference, a defendant needs “evidence breaking the causal connection between a price differential and lost sales or profits” (emphasis added)). By

ignoring these commonsense points, the Court gives short 

shrift to the Robinson-Patman Act’s prophylactic intent. 

See 15 U. S. C. §13(a) (barring price discrimination where 

“the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to

lessen competition” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Morton Salt, 334 U. S., at 46. 

The Court appears to hold that, absent head-to-head 

bidding with a favored dealer, a dealer in a competitive 

bidding market can suffer no competitive injury.4 It is 

unclear whether that holding is limited to franchised 

dealers who do not maintain inventories, or excludes 

virtually all franchisees from the effective protection of the 

Act. In either event, it is not faithful to the statutory text. 

—————— 

4 Indeed, if Volvo’s argument about the meaning of “purchaser,” see 

ante, at 12–13, ultimately meets with this Court’s approval, then the 

Robinson-Patman Act will simply not apply in the special-order context. 

Any time a special-order dealer fails to complete a transaction because 

the high price drives away its ultimate customer, there will be no 

Robinson-Patman violation because the dealer will not meet the “purchaser” requirement, and any time the dealer completes the transaction 

but at a discriminatorily high price, there will be no violation because 

the dealer has no “competition” (as the majority sees it) for that specific 

transaction at the moment of purchase. 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

III 

As the Court recognizes, the Robinson-Patman Act was 

primarily intended to protect small retailers from the 

vigorous competition afforded by chainstores and other

large volume purchasers. Whether that statutory mission 

represented sound economic policy is not merely the subject of serious debate, but may well merit Judge Bork’s 

characterization as “wholly mistaken economic theory.”5 I 

do not suggest that disagreement with the policy of the 

Act has played a conscious role in my colleagues’ unprecedented decision today. I cannot avoid, however, identifying the irony in a decision refusing to adhere to the text of

the Act in a case in which the jury credited evidence that 

discriminatory prices were employed as means of escaping 

contractual commitments and eliminating specifically 

targeted firms from a competitive market. The exceptional quality of this case provides strong reason to enforce 

the Act’s prohibition against discrimination even if Judge

Bork’s evaluation (with which I happen to agree) is completely accurate.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 

5R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 382 (1978).