J-S24031-19

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

L.P.

v.

J.B. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2613 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 31, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s): 

2010-05595

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 02, 2019

Appellant, J.B., appeals from the July 31, 2018, judgment of sentence 

ordering him to pay a $300 fine, plus costs, after the court found him to be in 

indirect criminal contempt of a final order entered pursuant to the Protection

From Abuse (“PFA”) Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. We affirm.

The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, as 

follows:

By way of background, on December 4, 2017, a 3-year, final nocontact PFA was issued against Defendant [hereinafter “J.B.”]. 

[Plaintiff, “L.P.”, with whom J.B. has two minor children, filed a]

contempt petition [dated] June 21, 2018, and a separate 

contempt petition [dated] on June 26, 2018. A hearing was held 

on July 16, 2018, on both petitions. The petition filed on June 21, 

2018, was granted, and the June 26, 2018, petition was denied. 

J.B. was sentenced to pay a $300 fine, plus costs. J.B. filed a 

Post-Sentence Motion on July 26, 2018, which was denied on July 

31, 2018. J.B. filed a Notice of Appeal on August 20, 2018 and on 

August 30, 2018, [the trial court] ordered J.B. to file a 1925(b) 
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statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days. On 

September 13, 2018, J.B. filed a timely 1925(b) statement.

In his statement, J.B. contends that the evidence was insufficient

to hold him in indirect criminal contempt because his actions were 

de minimus and without [the] wrongful intent [necessary to a 

finding of criminal contempt].

. . .

Here, J.B. sent [white lilies] anonymously to [L.P. at her place of 

business] along with an unsigned, cryptic note that read, “Hope 

you are okay. And, remember, eventually, this will all be a 

memory.” N.T., 8/2/18, at 7. L.P. testified that because of the 

past history (of domestic violence) and pending criminal charges 

against J.B. for burglary and assault of her boyfriend, which led to 

the issuance of the final PFA, that [her] receipt of the note kept 

her in “a state of constant fear.” N.T. at 8.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/18, at 1-2.

Finding that evidence proved J.B.’s wrongful intent beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the court entered judgment of sentence on the charge of indirect 

criminal contempt. Id. This timely appeal followed. In its subsequent Rule 

1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained, “[g]iven the history of domestic 

violence and the nature and extent of the violent assault J.B. is alleged to 

have perpetrated against L.P.’s boyfriend, it is easy to understand L.P.’s fear 

of J.B.” TCO, at 3. 

Herein, J.B. contends the evidence against him was insufficient to prove

the requisite element of wrongful intent. Our standard of review is wellsettled.

We review a contempt conviction for an abuse of discretion. We 

rely on the discretion of the trial court judge and are confined to 

a determination of whether the facts support the trial court's 

decision. In reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to 
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support the conviction, “we must determine whether the evidence 

admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn from that 

evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact 

finder to conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” In applying 

the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for the fact-finder. Finally, the trier of fact while passing 

upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

This Court has repeatedly stated that the purpose of the PFA Act 

is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who 

perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance 

prevention of physical and sexual abuse. Where a PFA order is 

involved, an indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek 

punishment for violation of the protective order. A charge of 

indirect criminal contempt consists of a claim that a violation of 

an order occurred outside the presence of the court.

In order to establish indirect criminal contempt, the 

Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, 

clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the 

conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) 

the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 

4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.

Commonwealth v. Felder, 176 A.3d 331, 333–34 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). 

J.B. asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he acted with wrongful intent to violate the PFA order when his 

actions were de minimus and non-threatening, and where he did not intend 

his actions to be threatening. In support of this claim, J.B. points to his 

testimony explaining that he sent the lilies and the anonymous note to L.P. 

because he had just learned she had been arrested for an altercation with her 

boyfriend. He insisted that both his identity and good will should have been 
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immediately apparent from the note because he frequently had used the 

expression “this will soon be a memory” to calm L.P. and their children during 

difficult times in the past. N.T., 7/16/18, at 18. 

In this regard, J.B. likens his behavior to that of the alleged contemnor 

in Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174 (Pa.Super. 2005), in which this 

Court reversed a conviction for indirect criminal contempt of a PFA order. We 

find Haigh clearly distinguishable on its facts.

The PFA order in Haigh prohibited the defendant Haigh from having any 

contact with his estranged wife of 31 years. See id., at 1177. The

contact/communication in question occurred during an indirect criminal 

contempt hearing based on previous allegations that Haigh attempted to call 

and write his wife from prison in violation of the PFA order. During the 

hearing, a shackled Haigh shuffled toward his wife, leaned over, asked if she 

was “alright” after her surgery to remove a mass from her breast, and urged 

her to keep in touch. Id. at 1175-76. The deputy sheriff immediately pulled 

Haigh back and charged him with indirect criminal contempt for his actions.

At the ensuing contempt hearing, both the deputy sheriff and Mrs. Haigh 

testified that Haigh had not said or done anything threatening toward Mrs. 

Haigh, nor did Mrs. Haigh feel threatened by Haigh’s conduct. The trial court, 

nevertheless, convicted Haigh of indirect criminal contempt. 

On appeal, we reversed despite acknowledging our deferential standard 

of review requiring “much reliance” upon the discretion of the trial court. Id. 

at 1176. The “peculiar circumstances” involved in the case, we reasoned, 
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could have led a reasonable person in Haigh’s position to believe the “PFA 

order was relaxed to some extent in the courtroom context, especially where 

[the appellant] was shackled and the victim was protected by an armed deputy 

sheriff.” Id. at 1177. Also, we noted, Haigh “had been brought into a form 

of contact with his wife[, and] both [he] and Mrs. Haigh had the opportunity 

to speak at the hearing. Id. 

The testimonies regarding Haigh’s courtroom conduct at issue1 also 

pointed to the absence of both a threatening intent and effect. The appellant 

testified that he did not believe he was threatening Mrs. Haigh, and neither 

she nor anyone else testified that the appellant threatened her verbally or 

physically at the time in question. In fact, Mrs. Haigh testified explicitly that 

she had not felt threatened by the appellant’s actions and words.

Consequently, we discerned no wrongful intent from the evidence, which 

otherwise revealed an infraction that was both de minimis and nonthreatening. Accordingly, we vacated the order entering judgment of 

sentence of indirect criminal contempt.

Unlike in Haigh, the circumstances in the case sub judice supplied no 

reason for J.B. to believe the strict no-contact provisions of the PFA order 

governing his conduct were relaxed. In fact, a reasonable person in J.B.’s 

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1 This Court recognized that Haigh’s act of addressing Mrs. Haigh while in the 

courtroom did not fit within the definition of indirect criminal contempt, which 

involves contemptuous actions outside the presence of the court. Id. at 1177 

n. 4. This fact does not diminish Haigh’s relevance to our inquiry into whether 

the trial court properly found J.B.’s actions at issue reflected a wrongful intent.
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position would have understood that his prior acts of physical aggression 

against both L.P. and her boyfriend—with the latter instance forming the basis 

for J.B.’s pending criminal trial on charges of attempted homicide, at which

L.P. was scheduled to testify—essentially precluded the possibility of an

exception to the order. Moreover, the trial court found L.P. credible when she 

testified that the anonymous sending of white lilies with a cryptic note to her 

place of employment caused her fear and trepidation, a fact further 

distinguishing the present matter from Haigh. 

In sum, we find the trial court properly inferred wrongful intent from 

J.B.’s anonymous and cryptic communication made in disregard of a final PFA 

“no-contact” order. Sent in the immediate wake of L.P.’s own unrelated 

domestic and legal difficulties, the flowers and unsigned note had an obviously 

invasive and menacing quality to them. It also should have been apparent to 

J.B. that a furthering negative effect upon L.P. would likely follow when she

predictably contacted the florist and discovered he was the sender, as his 

history of violence toward her and his interest in preventing her adverse 

testimony at his pending criminal trial could only add to the intimidating 

environment created. Presented with this record, the court reasonably 

disbelieved J.B.’s testimony expressing a benevolent intent behind the 

communication. 

Under such circumstances, therefore, we discern no error with the 

court’s conclusion that J.B. was guilty of indirect criminal contempt when he 

contacted L.P. in contravention of the final PFA order in effect. See id.
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(holding judges should use common sense and consider context and 

surrounding factors in making determination as to whether violation of a PFA 

is truly intentional). As J.B.’s issue merits no relief, we affirm judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/2/19