RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2021; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-0921-MR

BLAINE ANDREW BRAY APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 12-CR-003839-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, JONES, AND KRAMER, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Acting without the assistance of counsel, the Appellant, Blaine 

Andrew Bray, appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court’s July 7, 2020 order denying 

Bray’s renewed motion for a new trial pursuant to RCr1 10.02, renewed motion 

pursuant to RCr 11.42, and renewed motion for relief pursuant to CR2 60.02. 

Having reviewed the record and being otherwise sufficiently advised, we affirm. 

 

1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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I. BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2012, Bray and his caretaker and girlfriend, Carolyn 

Logsdon, met a group of friends at Spectators Bar and Grill in Louisville, 

Kentucky. The evening began peacefully enough. However, at some point, Bray 

and Logsdon became involved in a dispute with some other patrons at the bar. The 

dispute became physical, and ultimately Bray was indicted jointly with Logsdon 

for first-degree assault of Joshua Masingo and indicted alone in the first-degree 

assault of Patrick Kelly. 

Following a jury trial, on July 1, 2013, Bray was convicted of firstdegree assault of Masingo and acquitted of first-degree assault of Kelly. Logsdon 

was convicted of complicity to commit first-degree assault of Masingo. Bray and 

Logsdon agreed to waive their rights to have the penalty phase before the jury and 

to a direct appeal in exchange for a plea agreement and recommendation on 

sentencing by the Commonwealth for twelve years’ incarceration for Bray and ten 

years for Logsdon.3 Thereafter, Bray’s and Logsdon’s separate counsel were 

granted leave to withdraw, and Bray and Logsdon retained new, joint counsel. 

We summarized the somewhat unusual and complicated procedural 

history that followed new counsel’s entry of appearance in our prior Opinion. See 

 

3 As detailed below, Logsdon ultimately pleaded guilty to amended charges of facilitation to 

assault in the first degree, a Class D felony. She received five years, probated. 
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Bray v. Commonwealth, No. 2014-CA-000128-MR, 2017 WL 2713458 (Ky. App. 

Jun. 23, 2017). 

Before sentencing, on September 12, 2013, new counsel 

filed a joint motion for new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02.

Bray and Logsdon argued there was newly discovered 

evidence: (1) Dennis Beavers, a bouncer at Spectators, 

and Rickie Riordan, a patron at the bar, would testify that 

the physical altercation was started by Kelly and not 

Bray, and support Bray’s and Logsdon’s claims that they 

were defending themselves; and (2) the Commonwealth 

did not disclose information that Kelly killed a man in a 

motor vehicle collision by running over his scooter just 

days prior to trial and, thus, had a motive to curry favor 

with the prosecution to avoid being prosecuted for 

homicide. Bray and Logsdon also argued the 

Commonwealth withheld this exculpatory evidence.

The Commonwealth opposed the motion. It 

argued the potential evidence of Beavers and Riordan 

was not newly discovered as trial counsel planned to call 

them to testify at trial but [chose] not to do so after 

learning of negative information their testimony would 

allow into evidence. It also argued the auto accident was 

not exculpatory because no charges were anticipated.

On December 20, 2013, the trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing on the RCr 10.02 motion. Bray and 

Logsdon called Beavers and Riordan to testify.

Beavers testified about Kelly’s reputation for being 

aggressive regarding pool, Kelly being the aggressor in 

the confrontation between Kelly and Bray, and that he 

had to pull Kelly off Bray and was assisted by his cousin 

Riordan in doing so. He and Riordan’s legs became 

tangled and they fell to the floor with Kelly, so he did not 

see the interaction between Bray and Masingo, but he 

heard a man yell something like “get your hands off her 

neck” or “get your hands off her throat” and he heard a 
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woman yell “get the f*** off me.” After the fighting 

ended and Beavers told everyone involved to leave, Bray, 

Logsdon and Kelly left. Beavers testified he told the 

investigating police officer, the bar owner and the 

detective that Kelly was the aggressor and Bray and 

Logsdon were defending themselves. Beavers testified 

that although he was subpoenaed, he never spoke with 

the attorneys representing Bray and Logsdon before the 

trial.

Riordan testified consistently with Beavers about 

Kelly’s reputation, his aggression that night and having 

to subdue him and then falling. Riordan testified he saw 

a small blood spot on Kelly, and Kelly was unaware he 

was hurt until Riordan told him, but that when Kelly 

lifted his shirt the wound was small and did not look like 

a stab wound. Riordan denied telling Bray to get rid of a 

knife. He testified that he also told Bray and Logsdon to 

leave. He testified he was never interviewed by the 

police or the attorneys.

During the hearing, there was discussion about 

when the judge and attorneys became aware of the traffic 

collision involving Kelly. The judge recalled Kelly 

disclosed it himself in a conference with the judge after 

an altercation occurred outside the courtroom between 

him and Bray’s father. The Commonwealth stated the 

defense attorneys were told that another witness 

overheard Riordan having a conversation with the 

defendants about getting rid of the knife and because 

Riordan could be impeached by this testimony, the 

defense attorneys chose not to call him as a matter of trial 

strategy.

On December 26, 2013, the trial court denied 

Bray’s and Logsdon’s joint motion for a new trial and 

sentenced Bray to twelve years’ incarceration and 

Logsdon to ten years’ incarceration in accordance with 

their plea agreements. On January 17, 2014, Bray and 

Logsdon timely filed separate appeals.
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On February 21, 2014, Bray and Logsdon filed a 

joint motion for relief of judgment pursuant to CR 60.02.

They argued the jury instructions were erroneous as to 

Logsdon and this error also prejudiced Bray.

On March 14, 2014, Bray and Logsdon filed a 

joint motion to vacate, set aside or correct their 

judgments pursuant to RCr 11.42. They argued 

numerous errors by trial counsel and also raised the issue 

of the Commonwealth withholding exculpatory evidence.

While the CR 60.02 and RCr 11.42 motions were 

pending, Bray requested and the Court of Appeals 

granted his motion that the appeal of the order denying 

his motion for new trial be held in abeyance.

On June 27, 2014, the trial court held an 

evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion. Mark Hall, 

Logsdon’s trial counsel, testified regarding his conduct in 

defending her including that it was his strategy to 

separate Logsdon’s conduct from Bray’s. While 

Logsdon also struck Masingo with a pool cue in the back 

of the head, the Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. Smock, 

testified this blow could not have caused Masingo’s 

injuries.

[Attorney] Hall testified, once he saw the proposed 

jury instructions, he believed he made a tactical mistake 

in not focusing on defending Logsdon on complicity. He 

believed he could have improved her outcome by 

focusing on also defending Bray’s actions.

[Attorney] Hall also testified regarding issues 

impacting Bray. Bray is severely disabled and his 

previous back injury makes him more susceptible to 

paralysis if he receives additional injury to it. If Bray’s 

medical condition was disclosed to the jury, his counsel 

could argue Bray had a compelling reason not to instigate 

a conflict and, therefore, all his actions were in response 

to the actions of others. [Attorney] Hall and Bray’s trial 
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counsel should have requested disclosure of the 

Commonwealth’s experts regarding serious physical 

injury in order to prepare for their testimony and possibly 

call witnesses to rebut it. An objection should have been 

made when Detective Hedges gave an opinion as to 

serious physical injury on the grounds he was not 

qualified. Counsel should have asked for a missing 

evidence instruction regarding Kelly’s handwritten 

statement which was given to Det. Hedges and then 

never disclosed. Bray’s attorney erred by asking a 

question which would disclose that Bray and Logsdon 

exercised their right to remain silent, there was no basis 

for asking about that and [Attorney] Hall objected and 

received an admonishment for the jury. [Attorney] Hall 

opined that he should have asked for a mistrial, but only 

for Logsdon. It would have been helpful to investigate 

what Beavers could have testified. He did not call 

Riordan because the Commonwealth would have 

impeached him. Beavers was problematic because he 

attended court with counsel due to pending charges 

against him.

The trial court orally denied the RCr 11.42 motion 

as to Logsdon, ruling there was no flaw in [Attorney] 

Hall’s representation of Logsdon which was a matter of 

trial strategy. However, the trial court, after noting that 

the hearing and argument focused on Logsdon’s counsel, 

invited Bray’s current counsel to develop a record on 

ineffective assistance of Bray’s trial counsel at the 

upcoming CR 60.02 hearing and reserved ruling on 

Bray’s RCr 11.42 motion.

On July 25, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on 

the CR 60.02 motion. The argument from counsel 

focused on improper jury instructions as to Logsdon, by 

failing to include a self-defense instruction and allowing 

the jury to convict her of complicity with a reckless or 

wanton state of mind. As to Bray, counsel argued that 

the trial court should assume Logsdon’s erroneous 

instruction was prejudicial to him and, if the jury was 
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deprived of the opportunity to consider whether 

Logsdon’s actions were justified, it may have impacted 

its decision as to Bray and requested that he also receive 

a new trial.

At the conclusion of argument, the trial court 

called a bench conference and urged that counsel find an 

alternative solution as to Logsdon to avoid either a 

lengthy appellate process or a new trial. The 

Commonwealth offered to amend Logsdon’s charges 

down to criminal facilitation to assault in the first degree, 

a D felony, and recommend a five-year sentence, 

probated for five years. 

Logsdon accepted this plea agreement and 

consequently, the trial court granted the CR 60.02 to 

vacate Logsdon’s conviction and Logsdon entered into an 

Alford plea to the amended charge. In accordance with 

the agreement, Logsdon was sentenced to five years, 

probated.

While the trial court invited counsel to present 

evidence on Bray’s RCr 11.42 motion after Logsdon was 

sentenced, his current counsel declined to do so. Counsel 

asked that the motion as to Bray stand as submitted.

On January 6, 2015, the trial court denied Bray’s 

RCr 11.42 motion without addressing his claims 

individually:

While the Court recognizes that trial 

did not turn out well for Mr. Bray, there is 

nothing in the record to suggest that the jury 

found him guilty because of anything that 

trial counsel did at trial as opposed to what 

they believed Mr. Bray did at [Spectators]

bar on the night the prosecuting witness was 

injured . . . all of which was captured on 

high-quality surveillance video for the jury 

to see. The assignments of error culled from 
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the record are, despite current counsel’s 

considerable best efforts, of no consequence. 

There is nothing in the record to reasonably 

suggest that trial counsel committed any 

error that was objectively unreasonable 

under the circumstances presented at trial, or 

that Mr. Bray did not receive a fair trial as a 

result.

In a separate order entered on the same day, the 

trial court denied Bray’s CR 60.02 motion, stating that 

“despite any concerns or reservations the Court may have 

with respect to the jury’s ability to appreciate the legal 

nuances of the instructions for Ms. Logsdon (the coDefendant), the Court is wholly satisfied with the 

relatively straight-forward jury instructions for Mr. 

Bray.”

On January 15, 2016, Bray filed separate appeals 

from the trial court’s orders denying his RCr 11.42 

motion and CR 60.02 motion.

Id. at *1-4 (footnote omitted). 

As part of his first appeal Bray argued: (1) the trial court erred in 

denying him a new trial because the Commonwealth failed to disclose the 

exculpatory evidence that prior to trial, Kelly killed another individual in a motor 

vehicle collision; (2) the trial court should have granted his CR 60.02 motion

because the trial court erred in improperly instructing the jury on complicity and 

self-protection in Logsdon’s jury instructions which prejudiced Bray; and (3) the 

trial court should have granted Bray relief pursuant to RCr 11.42. With respect to 

his RCr 11.42 motion, Bray argued that: 
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(1) trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence 

from favorable eyewitnesses including Beavers and 

Riordan; (2) trial counsel repeatedly promised the jury 

the testimony from the bouncers at Spectators bar and 

then failed to present it; (3) trial counsel failed to request 

proper jury instructions or object to improper jury 

instructions on complicity regarding Logsdon; (4) trial 

counsel failed to present proof to the jury that Bray is 

severely disabled and had fear of reinjuring his back; (5) 

trial counsel failed to request disclosure of the names, 

opinions or bases for the opinions of the expert witnesses 

for the Commonwealth to allow adequate preparation for 

trial and to consider presenting a defense expert witness; 

(6) trial counsel failed to object when Det. Hedges 

testified that in his opinion the injuries to Masingo and 

Kelly constituted serious physical injury; (7) trial counsel 

failed to request a missing evidence instruction after Det. 

Hedges testified that Kelly gave him a written statement 

but he did not recall what he did with it; and (8) trial 

counsel erred by introducing evidence that Bray and 

Logsdon asserted their right to remain silent and 

Logsdon’s counsel erred by failing to request a mistrial.

Id. at *5. 

This Court carefully considered and rejected each of Bray’s 

assignments of error. Id. at *5-8. Thereafter, we affirmed “the Jefferson Circuit 

Court’s orders denying Bray’s RCr 10.02, RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02 motions.” Id.

at *9. Bray’s petition for discretionary review was denied by the Kentucky 

Supreme Court on October 25, 2017.

On June 7, 2020, Bray filed a renewed motion with the trial court 

seeking a new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02, an order vacating, setting aside, or 

correcting his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42, and/or relief from his judgment of 
-10-

conviction pursuant to CR 60.02. By order entered July 7, 2020, the trial court 

denied Bray’s motion as follows:

1. For the reasons set out in the Court’s order of 

December 20, [2013] (entered on December 26, 2013), 

there is no evidence of record which would support 

providing the Defendant with relief pursuant to RCr 

10.02.

2. For the reasons set out in the Court’s order of 

December 23, 2014 (entered on January 6, 2015) there is 

no evidence of record to suggest that counsel’s 

representation fell below any objective standard of 

reasonableness. See Strickland v. Washington, 446 U S 

[668] (1984).

3. The record is entirely sufficient such that no further 

hearings [are] necessary for the Court to rule on the 

Defendant’s motion. 

R. at 559-60.

This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

Bray’s appellant brief is disjointed and difficult to follow. It also fails 

to comply with our appellate rules for briefing in several respects. However, we 

recognize that Bray is proceeding pro se. As such, we have afforded him some 

leniency and have done our best to piece together his various arguments. See 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 416 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Ky. 1967) (“[H]ere we have a 

prisoner proceeding pro se, therefore, we do not impose on him the same standards 

as those applied to legal counsel.”).
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Based on our review of Bray’s brief, it appears his arguments are as 

follows: (1) his trial counsel, Robert Walker, was ineffective where he failed to 

introduce statements Bray’s accusers made in district court concerning the bar 

fight; 4(2) Attorney Walker was ineffective for failing to object to the 

prosecution’s failure to turn over certain exculpatory evidence; (3) Attorney 

Walker was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence showing that the police 

coerced Kelly into saying that Bray was the instigator; (4) Attorney Walker was 

ineffective for failing to prove that the bar surveillance video played by the 

prosecution during trial had been altered; (5) Bray’s new trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to call Attorney Walker to testify during the prior RCr 11.42 

and CR 60.02 hearings before the trial court; (6) Bray’s new counsel was 

ineffective because he had a conflict of interest where he represented both Bray 

and Logsdon; (7) Attorney Walker and new counsel were ineffective in failing to 

move for separate trials and/or post-conviction proceedings of Bray and Logsdon; 

and (8) the Commonwealth violated Bray’s constitutional rights when it failed to 

turn over all exculpatory evidence prior to Bray’s trial. 

“A motion for a new trial based upon the ground of newly discovered 

evidence shall be made within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment or at a 

 

4 Bray repeatedly refers to these statements being made in the “lower court” prior to his case 

being “transferred” to circuit court. We presume he is referring to the Jefferson District Court. 
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later time if the court for good cause so permits.” RCr 10.06(1). Bray’s motion for 

a new trial pursuant to RCr 10.02, his second such motion, was filed over six years 

after entry of his final judgment. Although Bray cites the discovery of “new 

evidence,” he fails to explain why the new evidence he claims entitles him to a 

new trial could not have been discovered within a year of entry of his judgment. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bray’s second 

RCr 10.02 motion for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Carneal, 274 S.W.3d 

420, 432 (Ky. 2008).

Bray’s RCr 11.42 arguments can be broken down into two categories: 

(1) arguments concerning Attorney Walker’s performance during Bray’s trial; and 

(2) arguments concerning Bray’s new counsel’s performance during the prior RCr 

11.42 and CR 60.02 proceedings. 

With respect to the first category, Bray has already made an RCr 

11.42 motion regarding Attorney Walker’s allegedly deficient performance. The 

arguments Bray raised in his subsequent RCr 11.42 motion are all issues that were 

or could have been raised in the prior proceedings. Accordingly, the circuit court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Bray’s successive RCr 11.42 motion. See 

Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Ky. 1983) (“Final disposition of 

[an RCr 11.42] motion, or waiver of the opportunity to make it, shall conclude all 

issues that reasonably could have been presented in that proceeding.”).
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With respect to the second category, while Kentucky recognizes a 

claim premised on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal, 

“there is no counterpart for counsel’s performance on RCr 11.42 motions or other 

requests for post-conviction relief.” Hollon v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 431, 

437 (Ky. 2010). Because Kentucky does not recognize a claim for ineffective 

assistance of post-conviction counsel, the trial court did not err in denying Bray’s 

motion with respect to new counsel’s performance during the prior RCr 11.42 and 

CR 60.02 proceedings. 

Finally, “CR 60.02 does not permit successive post-judgment 

motions.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Ky. 2014). Bray 

previously brought a CR 60.02 motion. His argument concerning the 

Commonwealth’s failure to turn over exculpatory evidence and tampering with the 

video surveillance could have been made as part of Bray’s prior CR 60.02 motion. 

As such, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Bray’s renewed CR 60.02 

motion. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court. 

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Blaine Andrew Bray, pro se

Central City, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Ken W. Riggs

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky