Filed 3 / 16 / 21 In re D.H. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re D.H., a Person Coming

Under the Juvenile Court

Law. 2d Crim. No. B304277

(Super. Ct. No. YJ39756)

(Los Angel es County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D.H. appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward

of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602)

. The juvenile court found

true the allegation he committed second degree robbery. (Pen.

Code, 1 § 211.) It placed D.H. h ome on probation.

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal

Code.2 D.H. contends there was insufficient evidence he

aided and abetted the robbery. We affirm.

FACT UAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Incidents

D.H. drove J.S., T.K., and J.B. to Dick’s Sporting

Good s in Thousand Oaks

. The manager of the store saw J.S.,

T.K., and J.B. enter the store together

. The y began grabbing

Nike items

. As they walked toward the front of t he store with

“more than 20 item s ” each , they pushed an employee away

. The

manager asked one of the other employees to call “911.” One of

the three said “it’s not worth it

. ” T he y dropped all the items on

the floor and left the store. One employee saw the three walk

toward a blue car in the parking lot.

T he same day, D.H. drove his three friends to a

second D ick’s Sporting Goods in Oxnard. While D.H. remained in

the car, h is friends attempted to go into the store, but they were

not allowed inside.

Later the same day, J.S. approached a woman

, V.C.,

in a parking lot at a market in Oxnard. J.S. asked V.C. for

money several times. He then tried to grab her purse. The two

fought over the purse, and V.C. fell to the ground. The purse

strap broke ; J.S. grabbed the purse ; and he ran away

. V.C. and

bystanders chased J.S. , b ut he got into a car that had stopped in

the middle of “the driveway area

. ” The “moment [J.S.] jumped in,

[the car] took off.” V .C. described the car as a “dark car ” with a

paper license plate.

Investigation

Ventura County Sheriff Deputies received t hree call s

regarding the incidents at the two Dick’s Sporting Goods and the

market in Oxnard

. The calls reported “multiple suspects” driving3

in a dark blue Chevy with Cerritos paper plate s

. P atrol deputies

stopped a car which matched the description

. D.H. w as driving

the car. T.K. was in the front passenger seat

, and J.S. and J.B.

were in the back seat

.

D.H. told a deputy that they planned to go to an

“unknown beach” in Ventura , but they decided not to go because

the y did not have proper clothing. D.H. said he “had not stopped

anywhere else in Ventura County

. . . between the beach and the

traffic stop” and “there was nothing else that had happened

. ”

An Oxnard police officer in terviewed V.C. at the

market and drove her to D.H.’s location for an in

- field

identification. V.C. identified J.S. as the person who grabbed her

purse

. She also identified the Chevy as the car that J.S. “jumped

into” at the market parking lot

. She identified her makeup

br ushes in the backseat of the Chevy.

An other police officer found V.C. ’s purse near the 101

South highway on

- ramp

. V.C.’s wallet , cash, and car keys were

missing.

At a later interview, D.H. said he was the only person

who drove the Chevy that day. He said he drove from Los

Angeles County to Ventura to go to the beach. When asked

which beach, he said he was not sure. He admitted driving to

Dick’s Sporting Goods to buy swim trunks

. He said no one

bought swim trunks because his friends we re not allowed into the

store. He denied drivin g to the market in Oxnard.

Defense

D.H. testified that he drove from Los Angeles to

Ventura County to go to the beach. He a dmitted driving to both

Dick’s Sporting Goods so that his friends could get swim trunks

, but he stayed inside the car. When his friends did not get swim4

trunks, he began driving back to Los Angeles. They never went

to the beach.

D.H. admitted stopping a t the Oxnard market. He

said he stopped at the market because J.S. wanted to use the

bathroom. He testified that he did not know J.S. stole the purse

until the police pulled them over.

DISCUSSION

D.H. contends there was insufficient evidence he

aided and abetted the robbery of V.C

. We disagree.

We review the juvenile court’s true finding for

sufficiency of evidence. We review “the whole record in the light

most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses

substantial evidence

— t hat is evidence that is reasonable,

credible and of solid value

— from which a reasonable trier of fact

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ” ( In

re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605.) “ ‘Substantial

evidence includes circum stantial evidence and any reasonable

inferences drawn from that evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”

( People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 943.)

A person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that

crime. ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 11 17.) To prove

a person is an aider and abettor, the prosecution must show that

the defendant “ ‘acted “with knowledge of the criminal purpose of

the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of

committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commissio n of, the

offense.” [Citation .] When the offense charged is a specific intent

crime, the accomplice must “share the specific intent of the

perpetrator” ; this occurs when the accomplice “knows the full

extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose an d give s aid or

encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the5

perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”

( Id. at p. 1118.)

In People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165

( Cooper ), our Supreme Court held under similar circumstances

that a getaway driver may be liable for robbery as an aider and

abettor if they formed an intent to facilitate commission of the

robbery “

prior to or during the carrying away of the loot to a place

of t emporary safety .” There, the defendant drove his two

codefendants to a parking lot of a shopping center. ( Id. at p.

1161.) While the defendant was in the car, his codefendants

forcefully stole a wallet from a shopper

. The codefendants then

fled to the car, which was moving with two of its doors open.

( Ibid. ) After the codefendants “jumped inside, d efendant

hurriedly drove away.” ( Ibid. ) T he defendant argued the

evidence was insufficient to show he had prior knowledge or

intent to aid in the robbery; but rather, the evidence

, at best,

showed he was an accessory after the fact

. ( Id. at p. 1162.) The

court disagreed.

The court reasoned that f or the purpose of

det ermining aider and abettor liability, the robbery continues

“ until all act s constituting the offense have ceased .” ( Cooper

,

supra

, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1164 .) Robbery requires an act of

asportation or “ carrying away the loot .” ( Id. at p. 1165.)

A sportation is not “ confined to a fixed point in time” and may

continue “as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of

temporary safety.” ( Ibid. ) Th erefore, “a getaway driver who has

no prior knowledge of a robbery, but who forms the intent to aid

in carrying away the loot during such asportation, may properly

be found liable as an aider and abettor of the robbery. ” ( Id. at p.

1161. )6 Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that D.H.

formed an intent to facilitate in the robbery prior to or during the

commission of the crime. A fter J.S. grabbed the purse from V.C.,

D.H. stopped his car in the middle of “the driveway area” of the

mar ket parking lot and D.H. “jump ed in.” T he “moment [J.S.]

jumped in ” the car , D.H. “took off

. ”

Moreover, there is other evidence to support a finding

that D.H. knew about and intended to aid the robbery. “Among

the factors which may be considered in making the determination

of aiding and abetting are : presence at the scene of the crime,

companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” ( In re

Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.) Earlier the same

day, D.H. drove his frie nds from Los Angeles to a Dick’s Sporting

Goods in Thousand Oaks, where his friends attempted to steal

items. When their plan failed, D.H. drove his friends to a second

Dick’s Sporting Goods in Oxnard. A ju venile court could

reasonably infer that D.H. an d his friends shared a common plan

to steal with D.H. acting as the getaway driver.

A fter the robbery, D.H. lied to law enforcement

officers. He first told a deputy that h e drove from Los Angeles to

Ventura County to go to an unknown beach and that he h ad not

stopped an ywhere else in Ventura County. Later, during an

interview, D.H. told a deputy that he went to Dick’s Sporting

Goods, but denied going to the Oxnard market. Then at trial, he

admitted he went to the market. D.H.’s false or inconsistent

s tatements reflect his consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Flores

(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 216, 221 [giving false statement to the

police is a relevant factor to determine consciousness of guilt].)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding

.7 DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.Irma J. Brown, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Tonja R. Torres , under appointment by the Court of

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,

Assistant Atto rney General, Stacy Schwartz and Eric J. Kohm,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.