In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1739 

JOVANI CASAS, 

Petitioner, 

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General of the United States, 

Respondent. 

____________________ 

Petition for Review of an Order of the U.S. Department of

Justice Executive Office for Immigration Review

Immigration Court. 

No. A089-353-201

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 8, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 29, 2022 

____________________ 

Before WOOD, HAMILTON, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. After discovering that Jovani Casas had reentered this country without authorization 

after already being subject to a removal order, the Department of Homeland Security reinstated her prior removal order. Eight years and some procedural errors later, DHS finally 

sought to remove Casas, but she claimed she feared returning 
2 No. 20-1739 

to Mexico. An asylum officer determined that Casas did not 

have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in returning 

to Mexico, and the Immigration Judge (IJ) agreed. Casas then 

petitioned us for review. But because Casas cannot show that 

she suffered any prejudice as a result of DHS’s procedural errors, and because the IJ’s reasonable-fear finding is supported 

by substantial evidence, we must deny her petition.

I 

In 2008, DHS removed Casas, a Mexican citizen, from the 

United States pursuant to a valid removal order. Four years 

later, DHS learned she had returned to this country after she 

was arrested by local authorities for driving without a license. 

So DHS sought to reinstate her 2008 removal order. 

The relevant form by which DHS sought to reinstate 

Casas’s 2008 removal order is Form I-871, titled Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order. Despite its title, the 

form actually has three separate sections to be filled out on 

three separate occasions: (1) a large section providing notice 

to the noncitizen of DHS’s intent to reinstate a removal order, 

(2) a section for the noncitizen to acknowledge receipt of the 

notice, and (3) a final section for DHS’s ultimate decision reinstating a removal order.

According to the dates on the Form I-871 Casas received, 

DHS made its decision to reinstate Casas’s removal order 

first, and then gave Casas notice either one day or six months 

late—an inversion of the procedure ordinarily requiring notice to a noncitizen before a final decision is rendered. See 8 

C.F.R. § 241.8. The large notice section at the top of the form 

is dated a day after the decision to reinstate, so DHS purportedly provided Casas with the notice of its intent to reinstate 
No. 20-1739 3

the order at that time. But the middle section of the form 

shows that Casas acknowledged receipt of the notice six 

months after the decision to reinstate the order was made—

suggesting that Casas may not have even seen the form until 

then. Further, in her acknowledgment, Casas did not indicate 

whether she wanted to make a statement contesting the determination. 

After reinstating the prior removal order, DHS released 

Casas on supervision. For seven years, Casas remained on supervision in the United States. Then in March 2020, when 

Casas appeared at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

office for a routine check-in, DHS detained her. After she was 

detained, Casas requested a reasonable-fear interview.

At her interview with an asylum officer, Casas stated that

unknown individuals kidnapped her stepfather and uncle, 

who were on duty police officers, for unknown reasons in 

2013 or 2014. The police took a report of the kidnappings, and 

the investigation is purportedly ongoing. Casas feared that 

she would be the victim of “reprisal[s]” or an act of “vengeance” by the same people. Casas’s mother and sister still live 

in Mexico, afraid of these unknown persons as well. At one 

point, her sister went into hiding but has since emerged. Separately, Casas mentioned that her mother is a member of a 

group that advocates for disappeared people, which led to 

threats from someone unrelated to her stepfather and uncle’s 

kidnappers.

The asylum officer determined that Casas had not shown 

a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. Casas sought 
4 No. 20-1739 

review by an IJ who, after hearing Casas testify to the same 

facts recounted above, affirmed the asylum officer’s decision.1

II

Casas’s petition raises two arguments: (1) the reinstatement of her removal order was facially deficient and did not 

provide her a fair hearing under the Fifth Amendment; and 

(2) the IJ erred in rejecting her reasonable fear assertion. We 

take each argument in turn.

A 

In immigration cases, we review constitutional and legal 

issues de novo. Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 676, 684 (7th 

Cir. 2021). Noncitizens have due process rights in reinstatement proceedings under the Fifth Amendment. Zadvydas v. 

Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). But when regulations provide 

a structure for proceedings, we analyze the government’s actions for compliance with the regulations, rather than compliance with constitutional due process (unless the petitioner 

challenges the regulations themselves as deficient). Silais v. 

Sessions, 855 F.3d 736, 745 & n.6 (7th Cir. 2017) (citated omitted). In addition, the petitioner must show that any errors by 

the government in complying with the regulations resulted in 

prejudice. Id. at 745. 

When someone reenters the United States without authorization after a prior removal, “the prior order of removal is 

reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). In order to 

1 Because this was a negative decision from a reasonable-fear interview, there was no further appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals 

available. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(g)(1).
No. 20-1739 5

reinstate a removal order, the Government must: (1) determine the noncitizen “has been subject to a prior order of removal” and obtain a copy of the order; (2) confirm the identity 

of the noncitizen; and (3) determine whether the noncitizen 

“unlawfully reentered the United States.” 8 C.F.R. 

§ 241.8(a)(1)–(3). Once the Government has made its determination, it must provide written notice and give the noncitizen 

an opportunity to provide “a written or oral statement contesting the determination.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(b). Only after the 

noncitizen is given notice and an opportunity to respond may 

DHS reinstate the removal order. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(c); Johnson 

v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2282 (2021). 

Casas argues that DHS’s decision to reinstate her prior removal order was facially deficient because it predated the notice to her by a full day at least, which shows that DHS decided the removal order before it ever gave her notice or an 

opportunity to respond. She also notes that her acknowledgment was not dated until nearly six months later, which further suggests that she was never given an opportunity to respond before DHS decided to reinstate the removal order. Because of these deficiencies, Casas argues that she was not provided a fair hearing in violation of her due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and the government’s failure to follow its own regulations is inherently prejudicial.

The government concedes the facial deficiencies on the 

Form I-871 Casas received. But Casas cannot prevail because 

she does not provide any evidence of prejudice. Although she

argues for a presumption of prejudice based on the deficient 

Form I-871, our case law is clear that noncitizens must “produce some concrete evidence indicating that the violation of a 

procedural protection actually had the potential for affecting 
6 No. 20-1739 

the outcome.” Silais, 855 F.3d at 745 (citation omitted). Casas 

does not point to anything that would suggest that the outcome of her reasonable-fear interview would have been different had the government complied with its regulations. As 

far as we can tell, DHS’s failure to provide adequate notice 

before reinstating the removal order had no effect on the outcome of Casas’s case: she chose not to contest the findings of 

the reinstatement, and she was able to request and participate 

in a reasonable-fear interview, the outcome of which an IJ 

later reviewed.

B 

Casas’s second argument challenges the IJ’s decision that 

she did not establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. We must first address the standard of review for this 

type of claim, as our circuit has not established one. 

Negative decisions from a reasonable-fear interview are 

distinct from a denial of asylum or other immigration relief 

on the merits, which courts review for substantial evidence. 

Meraz-Saucedo, 986 F.3d at 684–85; see W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 

F.3d 957, 965 (7th Cir. 2018). Reasonable-fear interviews are 

preliminary screening examinations conducted by an asylum 

officer and reviewed by an IJ. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(b)–(c), (g), 

241.8(e). Only after an asylum officer determines that the individual has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture can 

the individual pursue the merits of their claim before an IJ. 8 

C.F.R. § 208.31(e). 

The government suggests that the proper standard of review for a negative decision out of a reasonable-fear interview 

is the substantial evidence test. See Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 

F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 2020) (applying substantial evidence 
No. 20-1739 7

review to reasonable fear determination and rejecting the 

government’s proposed “facially legitimate and bona fide 

reason” standard); Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833–

34 (9th Cir. 2016) (same). The substantial evidence test is a 

“deferential” standard that requires “reversal only if the evidence compels a different result.” Meraz-Saucedo, 986 F.3d at 

684. Casas does not offer a competing view, so we assume 

without deciding that substantial evidence is the proper 

standard for negative decisions of reasonable-fear interviews.

To establish a “reasonable fear of persecution or torture,” 

Casas needed to show a reasonable possibility that she would 

be tortured or face persecution in Mexico on account of her 

“race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group or political opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c). Family membership can be grounds for a reasonable fear, but there must 

still be “a causal link between family membership and the 

persecution” beyond a family member’s experience of harm. 

Meraz-Saucedo, 986 F.3d at 685; see W.G.A., 900 F.3d at 965. 

The evidence before the asylum officer and the IJ was 

threadbare on the nexus between her family membership and 

a fear of persecution. Even before our court, Casas fails to explain the nexus. Casas could not identify the kidnappers, and 

the record does not indicate if they targeted her stepfather 

and uncle for a particular reason or no reason at all. And while 

Casas stated that she feared that she would be the victim of 

“reprisal[s]” or an act of “vengeance” by the kidnappers, she 

does not provide any evidence that the kidnappers have ever 

or would ever target her. At most, she noted that her sister 

went into hiding at some point for some unclear reason, but 

she no longer is. Without more information about who these 

individuals were, why they targeted her family, and why she 
8 No. 20-1739 

feared they would also target her, the IJ’s finding that Casas 

was unlikely to be persecuted on account of her family membership was based on substantial evidence.

III

Because we cannot locate any prejudice in procedure or 

error in the IJ’s reasonable fear determination, we DENY

Casas’s petition for review.