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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49029

STATE OF IDAHO, )

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, )

 ) Boise, May 2023 Term 

v. )

) Opinion Filed: August 30, 2023

JARED LYLE HEAD, )

) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

Respondents. )

____________________________________)

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State

of Idaho, Oneida County. Javier L. Gabiola, District Judge. 

The district court’s order is affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, attorney for Appellant.

Kimberly Coster argued. 

Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent. 

Kacey Jones argued.

________________________________

BEVAN, Chief Justice. 

This appeal arises from the district court’s denial of Jared Head’s motion to strike certain

evidence supporting a restitution order. Jared and his wife, Teresa, worked as onsite managers at 

the Village Inn Motel in Malad City, Idaho. Following an investigation by the Oneida County 

Sheriff’s Office, Jared and Teresa were separately charged with grand theft. After pleading guilty 

to grand theft, Jared was ordered to pay $24,535.23 in restitution for allowing people to stay at the 

motel without paying, and for accepting rent payments that he did not relinquish to the motel 

owners.1 Relevant to this appeal, some of the State’s evidence supporting the restitution amount 

related to a specific hotel guest–S.G.2Just before resting its case at the restitution hearing, the State 

disclosed that S.G. had been found incompetent to stand trial in an unrelated criminal case several 

1 This opinion will refer to Jared and Teresa by their first names so as to be clear who filed what pleadings. 

2 Based on the confidential nature of the information provided, this opinion will not disclose S.G.’s name.
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months earlier. Jared then sought to strike any testimony, exhibits, and statements related to S.G., 

arguing the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights under Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation 

under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The district court denied Jared’s motion after 

concluding that his due process claim was moot because Brady did not apply to restitution

hearings, which the district court couched as civil proceedings. Jared timely appeals, arguing that 

the district court erred in applying an incorrect legal standard to deny his motion to strike. For the 

reasons below, we affirm the district court’s decision. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 26, 2018, the State of Idaho filed criminal complaints charging Jared Head with 

grand theft, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Jared’s

wife, Teresa,

3 was also charged with grand theft. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges and waived 

their preliminary hearings. Their cases were bound over to district court. 

The district court held change of plea hearings for both, and the parties discussed their 

individual plea agreements on the record. At the hearing, Jared pleaded guilty to one count of grand 

theft, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The State filed a nonbinding plea 

agreement with the district court under Idaho Criminal Rule 11(f)(1)(B). That agreement stated 

that if Jared pleaded guilty to grand theft and possession of drug paraphernalia, the State would 

dismiss a felony possession of a controlled substance charge. The State agreed to concur with the 

recommendation made in the presentence report (PSI) unless it recommended imposition of a 

prison sentence, in which case it would ask for no more than retained jurisdiction. Jared also agreed 

to pay any restitution that the district court imposed in its discretion, and the parties were free to 

argue all other terms.

On August 16, 2019, Jared was sentenced to a unified term of seven years, with three years 

fixed and four years indeterminate. The district court retained jurisdiction for 365 days, ordering 

that Jared complete a rider. Jared returned from the rider on June 23, 2020, and was placed on 

probation for four years. The State moved for restitution, and a restitution hearing (to be held 

jointly with Teresa) began after multiple continuances, on November 20, 2020. 

3 Teresa is not a party to this appeal, but Teresa filed the motion to strike and argued in support of the motion, which 

Jared joined. 
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Due to its length, the hearing was extended to January 15, 2021, at which time the district 

court heard additional testimony from two of the State’s witnesses. After which, the following

colloquy occurred:

[PROSECUTOR]: So – and I forgot right before this hearing I had been –

somebody asked if I had subpoenaed [S.G.], and I had not, which makes me assume 

that maybe he has been subpoenaed. So I guess my – the thing that I realized that 

maybe the parties should understand, and now that this [S.G.’s] become a 

significant topic of conversation with the sheriff too, I’m just now thinking of this. 

So [S.G.] has been charged with a DUI. It was, I think, late this last year. 

And in – I can’t remember the exact dates. But ultimately we have recently, over 

the last months, couple months, had to be trying to deal with his case through this 

board of guardians and stuff, because ultimately [his counsel] had asked for a 

competency evaluation, and the competency evaluation came back that he was not 

competent to testify. So that was just recently in the last couple months. 

I – that’s something I know that I don’t believe the other parties do, and so 

I think that they should be aware of that. I’m not aware of that being an issue. In 

the evaluation there’s no issue there in regards to two years ago. But at least at that 

point two months ago, that did come back, that competency evaluation. 

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. [prosecutor]. 

[PROSECUTOR]: I just thought it important to mention. Sorry. 

(Emphasis added).

The district court then inquired of defense counsel for both defendants regarding the 

revelation about S.G. Counsel for Jared then stated: 

Your Honor, I’ve been in contact with [S.G.], and – well, I think you can 

probably tell how my conversation went, because I asked about the mental 

problems. I obviously did not know that he had been deemed incompetent. So yes, 

I did send him a subpoena. I was – well, I was concerned whether he would show 

up. Certainly had some concerns about what he would say, based on my 

conversation. 

So what – and obviously this evaluation kind of changes things. I mean, I 

would . . . I don’t want to drag this out, but I would – what I would ask the [c]ourt 

is to . . . that I be provided with that and so I can maybe raise some issues about his 

competency and maybe even going back. I mean, I know what [the prosecutor] said, 

but you know, I mean, who knows how long, you know, this mental condition has 

been going on. So that makes me even more concerned about just calling him as a 

witness now without really knowing what exactly he has going on, and I would like 

to know that. 
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[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I accidentally misspoke. He wasn’t deemed 

incompetent to testify. He was deemed incompetent to stand trial, which basically 

is the same thing. I just misspoke.

(Emphasis added).

Counsel for Teresa joined in the request for the evaluation, asserting that “it seems to me 

like a Crawford problem . . . .” Counsel added, “without [the evaluation], we can’t make an 

informed decision on whether or not we need Sheriff Jones further.” The prosecutor then replied:

If they feel they need to review that, I absolutely understand. That’s why I brought 

it up. I didn’t want it to be a surprise. So – in fact, I had not even thought about it 

until just – when I found out they were going to call [S.G.] to testify. 

So I don’t object to a continuance. My hope is if we can get all of the evidence on

[today], then ultimately if the – if either party decides to not call [S.G.] to testify or 

to bring anything up that’s put in the competency evaluation, then maybe we can 

just move on to the [c]ourt’s decision that way . . . .

After the prosecutor’s revelation and this discussion, both Jared and Teresa testified. At the 

close of their testimony, the district court continued proceedings to allow defense counsel time to 

review S.G.’s evaluation. A few weeks later, Teresa moved to strike all testimony and exhibits 

related to S.G. that the court might rely on to make a restitution decision as well as statements S.G. 

made to the police. Counsel for Jared filed a “Motion to Join the Motion of Co-Defendant.” Both

argued that all evidence relating to S.G. should be excluded because the State withheld exculpatory 

evidence in violation of Jared’s and Teresa’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The 

State countered that the untimely disclosure of evidence did not result in an incurable violation of 

due process. Following a hearing on the motion, the district court issued its memorandum decision 

and order denying defendants’ motion to strike testimony, exhibits, and statements. 

On May 28, 2021, the district court held the final restitution hearing. At the final hearing, 

Jared rested his case without submitting any other witnesses or evidence. Thereafter, the district 

court entered its decision, holding that Jared and Teresa were jointly and severally liable for the 

restitution amount of $24,535.23. Jared timely appealed. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, we will defer to the trial court’s 

factual findings unless those findings are clearly erroneous.” State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 

331, 347 P.3d 175, 179 (2015) (citing State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142, 176 P.3d 911, 914 
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(2007)). However, this Court exercises “free review over the trial court’s determination as to 

whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.” Id. 

“'[W]hether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court’s discretion 

and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19-5304(7).’” State v. 

Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919, 393 P.3d 576, 579 (2017) (alterations original) (quoting State v. 

Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011)). 

To determine whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court evaluates “‘whether 

the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 

boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 

specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.’” State v. 

Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591, 448 P.3d 1005, 1019 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The district court’s decision denying Jared’s motion to strike is affirmed. 

Jared’s argument on appeal is based on the motion to strike that Teresa filed, in which he 

joined. Jared argues that the State improperly withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and maintains that the district court should have stricken the 

evidence as a sanction against the State. From Jared’s perspective, the district court abused its 

discretion in concluding that restitution is a civil issue, and no matter the nature of the proceedings, 

due process requires that a defendant be allowed the opportunity to contest the information on

which the restitution award is based. As discussed below, we disagree with the district court 

characterizing the delayed disclosure as moot, but still agree that Brady was not relevant to the 

restitution hearing. 

In the decision denying the motion to strike, the district court concluded that restitution 

hearings are civil proceedings; thus, the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady did not 

apply. Accordingly, the court held that the issue was “moot.” The district court also explained that 

Jared did not have a constitutional right to confrontation after the trial stage of the case occurred. 

On appeal, Jared abandons both the Brady and Crawford arguments made below, but he maintains 

that “a proceeding to determine criminal restitution is not a civil proceeding[,]” but “a criminal 

proceeding and part of the defendant’s criminal case.” Jared also submits that—whether criminal 

or civil—the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates the opportunity to 
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contest the information on which the restitution order is based. We address these arguments in 

turn. 

1. A motion for restitution is a civil process even though it is ancillary to a criminal 

proceeding. 

First, Jared contends that the district court erred in concluding that, because restitution 

proceedings are civil, the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady is inapplicable. The 

district court held that the issue was therefore moot. While this issue likely turns on the semantics 

involved, the district court’s ultimate conclusion was not erroneous: restitution proceedings are a 

civil process, even though they are ancillary to a criminal proceeding.

“[R]estitution is remedial, not punitive; it serves to compensate victims for their losses.” 

Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 920, 393 P.3d at 580; see also State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 398, 271 

P.3d 1243, 1254 (Ct. App. 2012) (“[C]riminal restitution in Idaho is remedial and compensatory 

in nature, rather than punitive.”); State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. 

App. 2010). The right to restitution is a question of civil law, because the right to recover restitution 

for “[e]conomic loss4shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court[.]”

I.C. § 19-5304(6) (emphasis added); see Hodge for & on behalf of Welch v. Waggoner, 164 Idaho 

89, 93, 425 P.3d 1232, 1236 (2018) (“Proof in a civil case need only be by a preponderance of the 

evidence.”) (quoting In re Eliasen’s Est., 105 Idaho 234, 242, 668 P.2d 110, 118 (1983)). The civil 

nature of such a process is fortified further by the statutory parameters for awarding restitution: 

“Idaho Code [sections] 19-5302, 19-5304, and 19-5305 provide that [a] court in a criminal case 

can enter what is, in essence, a civil judgment for restitution against the defendant.” State v. 

McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806, 87 P.3d 291, 293 (2004).

That said, such civil judgments remain part of the criminal case. As Jared rightly points 

out, we recently held that while a victim has a constitutional right to restitution, see IDAHO CONST.

art. 1, § 22, victims lack standing in a criminal case to independently seek renewal of a judgment 

for restitution. State v. Poe, 170 Idaho 34, 38–39, 506 P.3d 897, 901–02 (2022); see also State v. 

Johnson, 167 Idaho 454, 458, 470 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Ct. App. 2020) (“it is generally understood 

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“‘Economic loss’ includes, but is not limited to, the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, 

lost wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct, 

but does not include less tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress.” I.C. § 19-

5304(1)(a).
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while crime victims are sometimes present and often represented by counsel, the government is 

still the only party to the case, other than the defense, and procedurally, the prosecutor requests 

restitution.”). 

Jared relies on these two decisions to bolster his claim that a restitution hearing is a criminal

proceeding, governed by criminal, rather than civil standards. But Jared’s reliance is misplaced. 

While both cases hold that it is the State of Idaho, through the prosecuting attorney, that must seek 

restitution on a criminal victim’s5behalf, these two cases continue to underscore that a victim’s 

right to restitution, and the rules governing that process, are civil. See Poe, 170 Idaho at 40, 506 

P.3d at 903 (the fact that “we have concluded victims do not have standing to intervene in a 

criminal case has no bearing on their ability to recover the restitution due on a civil judgment.”) 

(emphasis added); Johnson, 167 Idaho at 459, 470 P.3d at 1268 (acknowledging that any economic 

losses awarded as restitution are based on the civil, preponderance of the evidence standard).

Thus, nothing in either case casts doubt on the civil process governing criminal restitution

proceedings. Indeed, both cases show what the State advocates: restitution proceedings, while part 

of a criminal case, are distinct from a criminal sentence and are more appropriately considered to 

be a civil judgment against the criminal defendant. As a result, the civil standard of proof necessary 

to support a restitution judgment applies. Unlike a criminal proceeding, which requires the State 

to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, in a restitution proceeding the trial court must 

base the amount of restitution on the preponderance of evidence. Compare Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1979) (explaining the State must prove each element of a criminal offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt), with Watkins v. Fed. Life Ins. Co., 54 Idaho 174, 178, 29 P.2d 1007, 

1009 (1934) (“civil cases are to be determined in accordance with the preponderance of the 

evidence and need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 

The district court held the Brady question that Jared raised below was “moot” because 

restitution proceedings are civil. “A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer 

live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Smith v. Smith, 160 Idaho 

778, 784, 379 P.3d 1048, 1054 (2016) (quoting Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho 604, 610, 200 P.3d 

5 A criminal victim is defined to include “a person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the 

defendant's criminal conduct.” I.C.§ 19-5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added). 
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1153, 1159 (2009)). “An issue is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy[,] and a judicial 

determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome.” Id. Thus, the district court misspoke 

when it held this issue moot. Instead, the criminal standard requiring disclosure of exculpatory 

Brady material simply does not apply to a restitution proceeding as we explain below.

2. Jared’s due process rights were not violated. 

Though Jared does not frame his due process argument on appeal as invoking Brady, his 

argument below, and revised argument on appeal, necessarily implicate that standard. See Thumm 

v. State, 165 Idaho 405, 423, 447 P.3d 853, 871 (2019) (explaining that whether a defendant was 

prevented from using disclosed materials to prepare a defense is a Brady issue). The State, which 

also characterizes Jared’s due process argument on appeal as a Brady argument, maintains that 

Brady is inapplicable to restitution proceedings because such proceedings do not determine guilt 

or punishment. Brady only applies to exculpatory evidence relative to the defendant’s guilt for the 

underlying crime, or which may mitigate the sentence against him. See State v. Lankford, 162 

Idaho 477, 503, 399 P.3d 804, 830 (2017) (explaining the State’s duty to disclose exculpatory 

evidence under Brady); State v. Campbell, 170 Idaho 232, 247, 509 P.3d 1161, 1176 (2022).

Restitution evidence is neither. State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1128 (2017) (For 

Brady to apply, the evidence must be “material to either guilt or punishment.”). See Moore v. 

Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972) (“The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution’s 

suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is 

favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment.”). 

Jared’s guilt was determined, and his punishment rendered, well before the restitution 

hearings began, and long before S.G.’s competency to stand trial was evaluated for his own 

criminal case in 2020. Thus, we agree with the State that its late disclosure of S.G.’s mental 

evaluation was immaterial to Jared’s guilt or innocence, and therefore does not give rise to a Bradybased due process claim. 

Jared separately argues that, whatever the nature of the judicial proceedings, due process 

requires that a defendant be allowed the opportunity to contest information on which a restitution 

award is based, to present relevant evidence, and to be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 

While Jared is correct in a general sense, even considering his argument under a more broadly 

defined due process paradigm, he has failed to show that his due process rights were violated.
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Procedural “[d]ue process . . . is not a concept to be applied rigidly in every matter.” 

Bradbury v. Idaho Jud. Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001). “It ‘is a flexible 

concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation.’” Id. 

(quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999)).

Thus, the due process requirements applicable to a criminal trial may differ from those applicable 

to restitution proceedings. See Garcia v. State Tax Comm'n of State of Idaho, 136 Idaho 610, 617 

n.3, 38 P.3d 1266, 1273 n.3 (2002). While a defendant in a criminal restitution hearing does not 

forfeit due process rights after a guilty plea, due process is “not a concept to be applied rigidly in 

every matter.” Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72, 28 P.3d at 1015. “The minimal requirements are that 

‘there must be some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in 

violation of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant is 

provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.’” Id. (quoting Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 

Co., 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P.2d at 926). Jared was provided both notice and an opportunity to be 

heard in multiple hearings, including those after the disclosure about S.G.

Jared does not suggest that he was arbitrarily deprived of his rights, nor does he make any 

claim that he did not have notice and an opportunity to be heard at the restitution hearing. More 

importantly, the State’s late disclosure of S.G.’s evaluation did not prevent Jared from using the 

evaluation or its contents to support his position in the restitution proceedings. The State disclosed 

the evaluation at the January 15, 2021, hearing. By the time the district court denied Jared’s motion 

to strike on April 20, 2021, three months had elapsed, giving Jared over 90 days to review the 

evaluation and seek court approval to contact the evaluator. Beyond that, over a month had passed 

between the district court’s order denying the motion to strike and the final restitution hearing on 

May 28, 2020. Thus, Jared had ample time to determine whether and how to use the evaluation in 

his defense and to prepare his case accordingly. The district court noted this at the hearing denying 

Jared’s motion to strike: 

[Y]ou are correct as I read Criminal Rule 16 that disclosure has to occur, and you’re 

entitled to have the State disclose to you all evidence, witnesses, exhibits, those 

sorts of things in a restitution hearing so that you’re adequately prepared.

. . . .

I don’t think there’s a dispute that the disclosure was late. But does that necessarily 

exclude any evidence related to [S.G.] when the [c]ourt could allow you and your 

client additional time in which to prepare your response or any witnesses, you 
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know, the like, so you have adequate time in which to counter what [S.G.] said or 

what the deputies have testified as to what [S.G.] informed them . . . .

The decisions not to call S.G. or the evaluator were made by Jared’s counsel. Thus, he was

not “prevented by the delay from using [S.G.’s evaluation] effectively in preparing and presenting 

[his] case.” See Thumm, 165 Idaho at 423, 447 P.3d at 871. As a result, his argument for an alleged 

violation of his due process rights fails. 

a. Jared failed to articulate how he was materially prejudiced by the State’s late 

disclosure. 

Jared also maintains that the district court’s decision not to strike S.G.’s testimony as a 

sanction was an abuse of discretion. As part of that argument, Jared proposes that the district 

court’s failure to recognize its discretion to sanction the State for its late disclosure results from 

the court applying the wrong legal standards and its failure to exercise reason. But such a sanction 

would be permissible only if Jared had shown prejudice from the State’s late disclosure. He did 

not do so. 

“The trial court’s broad discretion as to the admission and exclusion of evidence will only 

be reversed when there is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ochoa, 169 Idaho 903, 912, 505 

P.3d 689, 698 (2022) (citing State v. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 625, 402 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2017)). “In 

Idaho, two general rules guide a trial court in imposing sanctions. The trial court must [1] balance 

the equities by comparing the culpability of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to 

the innocent party and [2] consider whether lesser sanctions would be effective.” Erickson v. 

Erickson, 171 Idaho 352, 362, 521 P.3d 1089, 1099 (2022) (quoting Noble v. Ada Cnty. Elections 

Bd., 135 Idaho 495, 499–500, 20 P.3d 679, 683–84 (2000)). In criminal cases, “[w]here the 

question is one of late disclosure rather than failure to disclose, the inquiry on appeal is whether 

the lateness of the disclosure so prejudiced the defendant’s preparation or presentation of his 

defense that he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.” State v. 

Guerra, 169 Idaho 486, 495, 497 P.3d 1106, 1115 (2021) (quoting State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 

589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206 (1999)).

The same standard applies to civil restitution within a criminal case. See Brauner v. AHC 

of Boise, LLC, 166 Idaho 398, 410, 459 P.3d 1246, 1258 (2020) (holding that an untimely 

disclosure was not prejudicial when the document was disclosed before the trial and the opposing 

party was given adequate time to prepare a response); City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 

586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006) (holding that the district court “acted within the boundaries of its 
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discretion by weighing the prejudice to the Intervenors resulting from the late disclosure and the 

prejudice to the City[.]”). Thus, “[t]he defendant bears the burden of establishing prejudice by 

showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the late disclosure of evidence, the result 

of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. (quoting State v. Pacheco, 134 Idaho 367, 370, 

2 P.3d 752, 755 (Ct. App. 2000)).

On appeal, Jared does not point to any alleged prejudice flowing from the State’s late 

disclosure that prevented him from receiving a fair hearing. Instead, S.G.’s initial interview with

officers dovetailed with and was corroborated by the hotel’s logs, officers’ observations and 

interactions with S.G., and Teresa’s and Jared’s own statements that acknowledged S.G. stayed at 

the motel. This evidence was sufficient to establish the amount of restitution Jared owed, and 

S.G.’s later incompetency evaluation does not affect the admissibility of evidence surrounding 

S.G.’s stay at the motel two years earlier. As a result, any potential impeachment value from the 

evaluation was so minimal as to show no prejudice. Indeed, the word “prejudice” is conspicuously 

absent from Jared’s brief.

More importantly, Jared cannot show prejudice from the State’s late disclosure since S.G. 

remained available as a witness and the district court was willing to continue the proceedings to 

allow counsel to develop this part of their defense. Teresa’s attorney argued below that S.G. was 

“incompetent to provide his own defense, let alone information about things that took place so 

long ago. So[,] I don’t know if the State wants us to put [S.G.] on the stand to demonstrate his 

incompetence.” This argument, however, misapprehends the relevancy of a witness having been 

found incompetent to stand trial. S.G. gave statements to police on May 23, 2018, and May 29, 

2018. In the competency evaluation from his DUI proceeding conducted on July 30, 2020—over 

two years later, S.G. was deemed incompetent to stand trial in his defense. The State disclosed 

S.G.’s competency evaluation to Jared on January 15, 2021. The final restitution hearing took place

on May 28, 2021—four months after the State’s disclosure. Jared has not shown that the delayed 

disclosure of S.G.’s competency evaluation had any relevance to statements S.G. made to police

nearly two years earlier. 

“All witnesses are presumed competent to testify even if they are ‘feeblemind[ed] or 

insan[e].’” United States v. Cassidy, 48 Fed. App’x. 428, 445 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting United 

States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 1984)). “The only permissible grounds for 

disqualifying a witness as incompetent are ‘that the witness does not have knowledge of the matters 
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about which he is to testify, that he does not have the capacity to recall, or that he does not 

understand the duty to testify truthfully.’” Id. In other words, competency to testify as a witness 

refers to the witness’s ability to understand the questions being asked and to provide accurate and 

reliable testimony. This standard is generally lower than the standard for competency to stand trial. 

Compare Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 677, 227 P.3d 925, 931 (2010) (“The standard to 

determine competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has the capacity to understand the 

proceedings against him and [ ] assist in his defense.”) (quotation marks omitted), with Clark v. 

Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 13, 501 P.2d 278, 281 (1972) (“To be competent to testify, a witness must 

have the ability to perceive, recollect and communicate with reference to the occurrences 

involved.”). S.G. was found incompetent to stand trial on August 7, 2021, by a judge in that 

proceeding. S.G.’s competency to testify as a witness was never evaluated because, despite being 

available and under subpoena from his counsel, Jared did not call S.G. as a witness. No one raised 

the prospect below that S.G. was incompetent to testify as a witness; the only argument made was 

that S.G. was “not competent to stand trial or assist his attorney in his defense.” 

The district court asked whether the defendants planned to have S.G. testify. Jared’s

counsel said he had been in contact with S.G. and asked about mental health problems but he was 

unaware S.G. had been found incompetent and was concerned about what S.G. might say on the 

stand. The defendants requested a copy of S.G.’s evaluation and suggested they might raise an 

issue about his competency preceding the evaluation. The district court permitted Jared to review 

the evaluation and decide how to proceed, and even offered him additional time to do so. But rather 

than call S.G. or the evaluator as a witness, Jared simply joined Teresa’s motion to strike the 

testimony, exhibits, and statements related to S.G. Although the district court denied that motion

to strike, when the restitution hearing resumed, Jared proceeded without calling S.G. or his 

evaluator to testify.

Jared had notice that S.G.’s competency was questioned, and he had the opportunity to use 

S.G.’s evaluation in his restitution hearing, along with the opportunity to call witnesses (including 

S.G.) and present evidence. Jared decided not to present such evidence, other than his and Teresa’s

testimony, even though the record appears to show that S.G. was under subpoena issued at Jared’s 

insistence. Jared had notice and the opportunity to present a defense related to S.G.’s credibility; 

but the record is clear that he chose not to do so. See Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 

133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999) (quoting State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 
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960, 969 (1991) (due process is satisfied when “the defendant is provided with notice and an 

opportunity to be heard.”)).

As a result, the district court declined to analyze whether Jared was materially prejudiced 

after concluding that Jared’s argument was moot because Brady did not apply. As we discussed 

above, Brady was not moot, but it was inapplicable, and the district court reached the correct 

conclusion. While a district court has the discretion to strike testimony as a sanction, the decision 

not to do so here, particularly considering the lack of prejudice, was not an abuse of discretion. 

We conclude that the district court applied the proper legal standard in reaching its discretionary 

decision to deny Jared’s motion to strike. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court’s decision denying Jared’s motion to strike is affirmed. 

JUSTICES BRODY, STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.