Filed 4/26/21 In re Ashley R. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re ASHLEY R.,

a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B308754

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP04168)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FRANCISCO R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Robin Kessler, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.

John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________

Francisco R. (Father) appeals from the juvenile court’s 

assertion of jurisdiction over his daughter Ashley R. under 

Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b)(1), as 

well as the subsequent dispositional order removing her from 

Father. The juvenile court found that Father’s substance abuse 

created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to Ashley. 

Father denies that his substance use rises to the level of abuse 

necessary to exert jurisdiction and remove Ashley from his care. 

He also argues that the removal order was improper because the 

Department of Child and Family Services (the Department) did 

not make or document any reasonable efforts to prevent removal, 

and the juvenile court did not consider other available means 

that could have protected Ashley.

We affirm the juvenile court’s orders. The record, which 

includes Father’s admission of regular methamphetamine use for 

at least two years, supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

Father had a substance abuse problem. Additionally, the 

juvenile court did consider whether means other than removal 

could have adequately protected Ashley from Father’s substance 

abuse, and properly determined that removal was necessary.

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory citations are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Family

Father had one daughter, Ashley, with Maria O. (Mother) 

in 2006. When Ashley was two years old, Mother abruptly left 

the family home. At that time, Ashley went to live with Father in 

the paternal grandmother’s home. Mother attempted to reclaim 

Ashley a year-and-a-half later, but Father ultimately won full 

custody. Neither Ashley nor Father have had further contact 

with Mother.

In 2016, Father began living in Mexico. While he was gone,

Ashley continued to live with her paternal grandmother. Father 

returned in October of 2019, and moved back into the family 

home.

B. Initial Petition for Jurisdiction as to Mother 

On July 30, 2020, the Department received a report that 

Mother had tested positive for amphetamine after giving birth to 

her youngest daughter, H.R.

2 H.R. later tested positive for 

amphetamine.

On August 7, 2020, the Department filed a section 300 

petition alleging jurisdiction over Ashley and her half-siblings, 

Andrew and H.R., on two counts. Count b-1 alleged that 

Mother’s drug use caused H.R. to be born with amphetamine in 

her system, unreasonably exposing her to serious physical harm. 

Count b-2 alleged that Mother’s history of substance abuse 

rendered her incapable of adequately supervising and protecting 

the children.

2 Mother also has another child, Andrew B., born in 2010. 

Mother, Andrew, and H.R. are not parties to this appeal.
4

At the detention hearing on August 12, 2020, the juvenile 

court detained Ashley from Mother, and released her back to 

Father’s custody. The Department was ordered to assess case 

closure for Ashley.

C. First Amended Petition for Jurisdiction as to Father

When a social worker initially contacted Father on 

August 4, 2020, he denied any drug use or criminal history, and

agreed to take a drug test the next day. However, he failed to 

return any of the social worker’s calls to arrange the test.

On review of Father’s criminal history, the social worker 

discovered he had a 2008 misdemeanor conviction for possession 

of a controlled substance; a 2015 felony conviction for possession 

of marijuana for sale, which was later reduced to a misdemeanor 

after Father completed probation; and a 2016 felony conviction

for carrying a dirk or dagger.

When asked whether Father used any substances, the 

paternal grandmother denied ever seeing Father drink alcohol or 

use drugs.

The Department later learned that Father had a history of 

methamphetamine use. When confronted with this during a 

subsequent interview on September 9, 2020, Father claimed he 

had been “clean and sober” for two years. He admitted he 

continued to use marijuana to regulate his sleep and alleviate

back pain.

Father submitted to a drug test on September 15, 2020, 

after he got off from work. He tested positive for 6321 nanograms 

per milliliter (ng/ml) of methamphetamine, 1686 ng/ml of 

amphetamine, and 769 ng/ml of marijuana. Additionally, his 

blood alcohol level measured 0.04. After receiving the test

results, Father admitted to a social worker that he had used 
5

methamphetamine “at least” once a month for two to three years. 

He also stated that he smoked marijuana three to four times a 

week and drank alcohol twice a week. Father told the social 

worker that he knew that he “messed up,” that he had “a 

problem,” and that he was willing to do anything it took to get 

sober. He agreed to move out of the family home that day to 

ensure that Ashley could remain in the family home. Later that 

day, the paternal grandmother reiterated that she did not know 

that Father was using drugs.

On September 28, 2020, the Department filed an ex parte

application to alter the court’s prior detention order, pursuant to

section 385. The Department recommended that the juvenile 

court terminate its prior order releasing Ashley to Father’s 

custody, and instead place Ashley in the custody of her paternal 

grandmother. The juvenile court granted the application on 

October 2, 2020.3

Father took a second drug test on October 13, 2020. He 

tested positive for 350 ng/ml of marijuana, but tested negative for 

methamphetamine and other substances.

On October 19, 2020, the Department filed a first amended 

section 300 petition.4 In addition to the two counts concerning 

Mother, the amended petition alleged jurisdiction over Ashley

3 In this and subsequent orders, references are made to 

Ashley’s placement “in Shelter Care under the supervision of 

[the] Department.” However, the reporter’s transcript indicates 

that Ashley remained in her paternal grandmother’s home 

throughout the proceedings.

4 This petition was later interlineated to reflect a 

settlement between the Department and Mother. Father’s count 

b-3 was unaffected.
6

pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based on Father’s 

substance abuse. Count b-3 alleged that Father “has a history of 

substance abuse and is a current abuser of methamphetamine 

and amphetamine which renders . . . [F]ather incapable of 

providing [Ashley] with regular care and supervision . . . 

endanger[ing] the child’s physical health and safety and plac[ing] 

the child at risk of serious physical harm.” The Department did 

not prepare a separate jurisdiction report regarding these 

allegations.

D. Jurisdictional and Dispositional Hearing

On November 6, 2020, the juvenile court held a combined 

jurisdictional and dispositional hearing to consider the 

allegations in the first amended petition. During the hearing, 

Father’s counsel suggested that Father’s drug use did not rise to 

the level of substance abuse warranting dependency jurisdiction, 

especially since Father had tested negative for 

methamphetamine three weeks prior to the hearing. Father’s 

counsel also argued the Department could not demonstrate any 

nexus of harm to Ashley.

The juvenile court found that the number of drugs present 

in Father’s system in “substantial” amounts at his first drug test, 

together with his admission that his regular drug use was a 

problem, indicated a serious substance abuse problem that posed 

a substantial risk to Ashley’s safety. The juvenile court noted 

that Ashley “had only been in [Father’s] care for a short period of 

time when the testing happened,” and that it did not have to wait 

until the child was actually harmed by Father’s substance abuse 

to exert jurisdiction. Accordingly, the juvenile court sustained 
7

count b-3, and asserted jurisdiction over Ashley under section 

300, subdivision (b)(1).5

Next, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that removal from Father was necessary. Father’s 

counsel argued that Father should be allowed to return to the 

family home and resume custody of Ashley. His counsel 

maintained that other relatives living in the home, including the 

paternal grandmother, could protect Ashley now that they knew 

about Father’s substance abuse. The juvenile court rejected 

Father’s argument, stating that it “[found] it difficult to believe 

they had no idea he was using.” The court further noted that 

Father “tested positive for alcohol at a .04 sometime in the 

middle of the day knowing that he had to drug test,” raising 

further concern that the other family members “knew, but did not 

protect themselves.”

Ashley was placed with her paternal grandmother. The 

juvenile court ordered monitored visitation with Father, to be 

modified to unmonitored visits in the family home once he had 

four consecutive clean drug and alcohol tests.

Lastly, over Father’s objection, the juvenile court ordered 

Father to participate in a full drug and alcohol program for a 

minimum of six months, random counseling, a 12-step program, 

and individual counseling. The court also ordered the 

Department to conduct unannounced visits to ensure compliance 

with the case plan.

Father timely appealed.

5 Pursuant to the Department’s settlement with Mother, 

the court dismissed count b-1, but sustained an amended count b2 as to Mother.
8

DISCUSSION

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

Father alone appeals the jurisdictional and dispositional 

orders issued in this case. The failure of both parents to appeal a 

finding of jurisdiction requires that we ensure appellate review is 

appropriate.

Dependency jurisdiction under section 300 is over the child, 

not the parents, as a result of the harm or risk of harm to the 

child. (See, e.g., Kern County Dept. of Human Services v. 

Superior Court (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 302, 310.) Because the 

juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over the child, not over the 

parents, jurisdiction may exist based on the conduct of one parent 

alone. (See § 302, subd. (a); In re John S. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 

1140, 1143.) “For this reason, an appellate court may decline to 

address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional 

findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by 

the evidence.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492.)

However, we may exercise our discretion and reach the 

merits of a single parent’s challenge to any jurisdictional finding 

when the finding serves as the basis for dispositional orders that 

are also challenged on appeal. (See, e.g., In re Alexis E. (2009)

171 Cal.App.4th 438, 454.) Father contends this principle applies 

in this case, and we agree. He also argues the outcome of this 

appeal is the difference between a finding that he is an 

“offending” parent versus a “non-offending” parent. Such a 

distinction may have far reaching implications with respect to 

future dependency proceedings in this case and Father’s parental 

rights. We have exercised our discretion to reach the merits of a 

single-parent appeal for this reason before, and we do so here. 

(See, e.g., In re Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613.)
9

B. Substantial Evidence Supports Dependency 

Jurisdiction over the Child

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“Section 300, subdivision (b), allows a child to be adjudged 

a dependent of the juvenile court when ‘[t]he child has suffered, 

or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious 

physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of 

his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect 

the child . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to 

provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or 

guardian’s . . . substance abuse.’ ” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 

225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215; see § 300, subd. (b)(1).)

“[T]here are three elements for jurisdiction under section 

300, subdivision (b), namely, (1) neglectful conduct or substance 

abuse by a parent in one of the specified forms, (2) causation, and 

(3) serious physical harm to the child, or a substantial risk of 

such harm.” (In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 724-

725.)

In deciding whether there is a substantial risk of serious 

physical harm, courts evaluate the risk that is present at the 

time of the jurisdiction hearing. (In re Christopher R., supra, 225 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1215-1216.) “While evidence of past conduct 

may be probative of current conditions, the question under 

section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing

subject the minor to the defined risk of harm.” (In re Rocco M.

(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.) Thus, “[a] parent’s ‘ “[p]ast 

conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason 

to believe that the conduct will continue.’ [Citation].” (In re 

Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.)
10

We review the trial court’s jurisdictional findings for 

substantial evidence. (In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 

1022.) Under this standard, “ ‘we must uphold the . . . 

[jurisdictional] findings unless, after reviewing the entire record 

and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing 

all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we 

determine there is no substantial evidence to support [them].’ ” 

(Ibid.)

2. Discussion

Father argues that substantial evidence does not support 

the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, namely, that Father

abused substances and that any drug use harmed, or risked 

harm, to Ashley.

We disagree. It is true that dependency jurisdiction “must 

be based on substance abuse; mere substance use is not sufficient 

for jurisdiction. [Citation.] However, the law is not in agreement 

on when substance use reaches the point of substance abuse.” (In 

re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046, citing In re Drake M.

(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) Despite this lack of agreement, 

as we explain, the facts support the juvenile court’s assertion of 

jurisdiction based on Father’s admitted methamphetamine use

and positive drug test.

After equivocating about his past and present drug use,

Father tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and 

marijuana. During the jurisdictional hearing, the Department’s 

counsel characterized Father’s drug test results as “extremely 

high,” and the juvenile court characterized the amount of drugs 

in his system as “substantial.” Father did not dispute these 

comments about the quantity of drugs in his system. Only after 

the results were received did he admit to using
11

methamphetamine at least once a month for two to three years, 

in addition to weekly marijuana and alcohol use. This 

longstanding and regular drug use provides substantial evidence 

to support the trial court’s finding of substance abuse. (See In re 

Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 1218 [finding the 

mother’s repeated use of cocaine, including while she was 

pregnant, was indicative of substance abuse]; cf. In re L.C. (2019) 

38 Cal.App.5th 646, 652 [evidence that the parent used 

methamphetamine seven times during a period of 10 months was 

insufficient to support allegations of substance abuse].) This 

conclusion is further supported by Father’s criminal history, 

which includes a 2008 misdemeanor conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance, and a 2015 felony conviction for possession 

for sale of marijuana. (See In re Christopher R., supra, at p. 1218 

[noting that “recurrent substance-related legal problems” can be 

indicative of abuse].)

Despite a finding of parental substance abuse, “it does not 

always follow that such a finding means that the parent or 

guardian at issue is unable to provide regular care resulting in a 

substantial risk of physical harm to the child.” (In re Drake M., 

supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 766.) A juvenile court also must find 

that the parent’s substance abuse would cause a substantial risk 

of physical harm to the children. (In re Rebecca C., supra, 228 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 724-725.)

Additional evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that Father’s substance abuse gave rise to a substantial risk of 

physical harm to Ashley. Father initially denied any use of 

illegal substances, and then claimed he had stopped using 

substances and had been clean for two years. When confronted 

with his drug test results, he admitted he had regularly used 
12

drugs for years. He claimed to appreciate the risks posed by his 

substance abuse, readily agreeing to move out of the family home 

while he “got help” for his substance abuse “problem.”

However, during the adjudication hearing just six weeks 

later, Father asserted that he had “already resolved” his 

substance abuse issues, even though he had not participated in 

any drug treatment services and had tested positive for 

marijuana three weeks prior to the hearing. Father argued that

he should not have to attend any kind of sobriety support 

program, and should be allowed to continue using marijuana to 

regulate his sleep and back pain. The juvenile court reasonably 

concluded that Father’s initial denial of a drug abuse problem, 

his unsubstantiated claim that the issues were “resolved,” and 

his failure to acknowledge the need for treatment created a 

substantial risk of physical harm to Ashley. (In re Gabriel K.

(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem 

one fails to acknowledge”]; see also In re R.R. (2010) 187 

Cal.App.4th 1264, 1284 [finding a substantial risk of physical 

harm by exposing the child to the parent’s substance abuse, 

“ ‘thus impliedly approving such conduct and even encouraging 

[the child] to believe that it is an appropriate or necessary means 

of coping with life’s difficulties’ ”].)

Father argues that his drug use alone does not pose a risk 

of harm to Ashley because she “has been well-cared-for in 

Father’s custody for over 12 years—a long enough period of time 

to be a good indicator of how things are likely to be in the future.” 

We disagree, as the record shows that Ashley had not been in 

Father’s continuous care for “over 12 years.” Although Father 

won sole custody when Ashley was two years old, she has

continuously lived with Father in the paternal grandmother’s 
13

home. Ashley herself stated that she was “used to [Father] being 

in and out of [her] life because he used to go to jail and then come 

out.” Additionally, Father admitted that he had used drugs 

regularly for the past two to three years. Of those two to three 

years, Father resided with Ashley for less than one year, as he 

lived in Mexico from 2016 until October of 2019. In light of these 

facts, Father appears to claim that his current drug use does not 

pose a substantial risk to Ashley because her paternal 

grandmother has taken good care of her for the majority of her 

life, including during his extended absences, and because Ashley 

has not yet been harmed by Father’s drug use. This argument is 

disingenuous.

We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s finding of 

jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), as to Father in 

count b-3.

C. The Removal Order Was Proper

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review 

To remove a child from parental custody, the juvenile court 

must find by clear and convincing evidence that one of five 

grounds exists pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c). (In re 

V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.) Of relevance here, “[o]ne 

ground for removal is that there is a substantial risk of injury to 

the child’s physical health, safety, protection or emotional wellbeing if he or she were returned home, and there are no 

reasonable means to protect the child.” (Ibid., citing § 361, subd. 

(c)(1).)6

6 Section 361, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “A dependent 

child shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her 

parents . . . with whom the child resides at the time the petition 
14

“A removal order is proper if based on proof of parental 

inability to provide proper care for the child and proof of a 

potential detriment to the child if he or she remains with the 

parent. [Citation.] ‘The parent need not be dangerous and the 

minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is 

appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the 

child.’ [Citation.]” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169-

170.)

The clear and convincing evidence standard “ ‘requires a 

finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to 

leave no substantial doubt.’ ” (In re V.L., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 154.) “ ‘[W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been 

proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the 

appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains 

substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could 

have found it highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent 

with well-established principles governing review for sufficiency 

of the evidence, in making this assessment the appellate court 

must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may 

have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in 

the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the 

was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing 

evidence of any of the following circumstances . . . : (1) There is 

or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the 

minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means 

by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without 

removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical 

custody. . . .”
15

evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 155 [applying the standard of review 

articulated in conservatorship matters to a dependency 

proceeding], quoting Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 

989, 995-996.)

2. Discussion

Father raises two challenges to the removal order. First, 

he argues that because his substance abuse was insufficient to 

establish jurisdiction over Ashley, it was necessarily insufficient 

to warrant removal. Having rejected Father’s jurisdictional 

arguments, we find that he has not raised a cogent argument 

about the sufficiency of the evidence of his substance abuse. 

Moreover, removal is appropriate where, as here, a parent with a 

longstanding drug abuse problem demonstrates resistance to 

substance abuse treatment. (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 

293 [affirming removal order due to the mother’s failure to 

acknowledge her longstanding drug abuse problem and “the risks 

to which she was exposing the minor”]; see In re J.C. (2014) 233 

Cal.App.4th 1, 6-7 [affirming removal notwithstanding the 

father’s participation in treatment where his treatment provider 

reported his participation was “ ‘sluggish,’ ” he missed two drug 

tests, and had a long history of substance abuse].)]

Second, Father argues that both the Department and the 

juvenile court failed to consider whether reasonable alternatives 

to removal were available to protect Ashley from his substance 

abuse.

Before ordering removal, the juvenile court must determine 

if “reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the 

need for removal.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) To assist the juvenile court, 

the Department must describe “the reasonable efforts [it] made to 

prevent or eliminate removal.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
16

5.690(a)(1)(B)(i).) Although the juvenile court found the 

Department made reasonable efforts, the Department concedes it 

failed to report on the reasonable efforts it made to prevent 

removal. Thus, the trial court’s ruling that the Department 

complied with this obligation was erroneous. (In re Ashly F.

(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 803, 809.)

However, this error alone does not warrant reversal. The 

failure to make the required findings under section 361, 

subdivision (e) is deemed harmless if “ ‘it is not reasonably 

probable such finding, if made, would have been in favor of 

continued parental custody.’ [Citations.]” (In re Jason L. (1990) 

222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1218.)

The Department’s obligation to make and report its 

reasonable efforts to prevent removal, as well as the juvenile 

court’s obligation to make findings about those efforts, serve as

“safeguards” against the “danger” that a department’s reports 

“can become merely a hollow formula designed to achieve the 

result the agency seeks,” preventing actual analysis of available 

protective measures. (In re Ashly F., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 810.) This danger is not present where, as here, substantial 

evidence shows that means other than removal could not have 

adequately protected the child.

After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the 

juvenile court found that Father “was . . . unable to fully 

appreciate the harm he could have caused by his own drug use 

with his child.” This finding is supported by Father’s 

inconsistent attitude regarding his drug use. Initially, he tried to 

conceal his drug use from the Department. When confronted 

with irrefutable evidence of recent drug use, Father admitted 

that he had been using drugs regularly for years and expressed a 
17

willingness to “get help” to avoid losing his daughter. Three 

weeks later, Father tested negative for methamphetamine but 

positive for marijuana. Three weeks after that, Father insisted to 

the court that his drug use did not affect his ability to care for his 

daughter and resisted any requirement to participate in drug 

treatment programs.

This starkly contrasts with the attitude of the mother in 

Ashly F., who expressed remorse for her abusive conduct and 

promptly enrolled in a parenting class. (In re Ashly F., supra, 

225 Cal.App.4th at p. 810.) This court determined that the 

mother’s willingness to seek out and comply with parenting 

services suggested that regular family maintenance services 

could have adequately protected the child. (Ibid.) Here, Father 

demonstrates no such willingness.

Additionally, the juvenile court in the present case 

considered alternative means to protect Ashley from Father’s 

substance abuse. At the disposition hearing, Father argued that 

the paternal grandmother and relatives, who had only recently 

learned of his drug use, could protect Ashley from any threat 

posed by his presence in the home. The juvenile court rejected 

this argument. The juvenile court noted that Father’s first drug 

test revealed he had a blood alcohol level of .04 percent in the 

middle of the day, even though he knew he was required to report 

for testing, as well as “substantial” amounts of 

methamphetamine and amphetamine. The juvenile court 

reasonably concluded that this type of substance abuse probably

would be difficult to conceal from other adults in the family home, 

raising a concern that the other family members would not be 

sufficiently protective of Ashley. Accordingly, the juvenile court 
18

reasonably rejected the proposed alternative of returning Father 

to the house under familial supervision.

Under these circumstances, we find it improbable that the 

juvenile court would have made a different decision on the 

question of removal, even if it had made all the factual findings 

required by section 361, subdivision (e). Therefore, the juvenile 

court’s error was harmless. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45,

60 [“We have interpreted [the state Constitution] as permitting 

reversal [under the harmless error standard] only if the 

reviewing court finds it reasonably probable the result would 

have been more favorable to the appealing party but for the error. 

[Citation.] We believe it appropriate to apply the same test in 

dependency matters.”].)

For these reasons, we affirm the removal order.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s November 6, 2020, jurisdictional and 

dispositional orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

FEDERMAN, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. BENDIX, J.

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.