If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re N. R. FISHER, Minor. July 21, 2022

No. 359677

Macomb Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2020-000044-NA

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights 

to the minor child, NF. The court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist), (i) (parental rights to 

a sibling have been terminated due to abuse or neglect), and (j) (reasonable likelihood the child 

will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home). We affirm.

This case arises from the removal of NF days after her birth because she was born testing 

positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and respondent’s parental rights had been terminated to 

her other children. Petitioner filed an initial petition for termination at adjudication; however, the 

trial court denied the petition because it found that termination was not in NF’s best interests. 

Respondent was therefore offered a parent-agency treatment plan and referrals for services. 

Despite being given time to comply and benefit from services, respondent did not participate or 

complete several aspects of her treatment plan, and petitioner filed a supplemental petition to 

terminate parental rights. The trial court found statutory grounds existed to terminate, and that 

termination was in the child’s best interests. Respondent now appeals the order terminating her 

parental rights. 

Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found statutory grounds existed to 

terminate her parental rights. We disagree.

To terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one statutory ground 

under MCL 712A.19b(3) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss, 301 

Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s finding 

whether a statutory ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. 

MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and 
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firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 

161 (1989). 

The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (i),

and (j), which permit termination of parental rights when the following conditions are satisfied:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated 

due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has 

failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights.

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the 

child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of 

the parent.

The trial court did not clearly err when it terminated respondent’s parental rights under these 

grounds.

It is undisputed that respondent’s parental rights to three other children were previously 

terminated because attempts to rehabilitate respondent were unsuccessful. MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). 

Respondent admitted that she used marijuana during all of her pregnancies and that all of her 

children, including NF, tested positive for THC at birth. 

Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to the 

adjudication of NF and the conditions that led to the termination of respondent’s parental rights to 

her other children continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that they would be 

rectified within a reasonable time considering NF’s age. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The principal 

conditions that led to NF’s adjudication and the termination of respondent’s parental rights to her 

other children were respondent’s mental health issues and domestic violence. Respondent had 

been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, cannabis use disorder, and borderline intellectual 

functioning. A psychologist and psychiatrist who evaluated respondent recommended that she 

participate in outpatient therapy for mental health treatment and explore the possible use of 

medication to address her social anxiety, paranoia, and emotional instability. Respondent also had 

a significant domestic violence history with her former partners.

Respondent’s caseworker in her prior case and her present caseworker both testified that 

respondent failed to comply with recommendations for mental health, domestic violence, and 

substance abuse counseling. In her prior Oakland County case, respondent refused to participate 

in mental health counseling, drug counseling, and domestic violence counseling. Respondent 
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submitted approximately five drug screens in two years. Whenever the caseworker addressed 

domestic violence counseling with respondent, she denied that there was any domestic violence in 

her relationship, despite the many complaints to Child Protective Services because of police calls

to respondent’s home, including one occasion when respondent stabbed her former partner during 

a domestic violence incident. 

The present caseworker’s testimony was much the same. Respondent completed the 

required assessments, but did not follow through with any of the recommendations. She did not 

participate in mental health, domestic violence, or substance abuse counseling. She also did not 

submit to any of the 45 requested drug screens. While respondent provided documentation of 

employment on several occasions, she never provided verification of her income. 

Respondent testified that in September 2021, a year after adjudication, she began to follow 

the directives contained in her parent-agency agreement. Although respondent understood that 

she was required to document and verify her compliance with her caseworker, she decided that she 

wanted to prove to the court that she could do it on her own. Respondent explained that she did 

not participate in the required drug testing because she believed the main focus should have been 

on anger management and domestic violence. Respondent offered one certificate of completion 

of an anger management class as evidence of her compliance with the parent-agency agreement. 

She did not provide any other verification of the services that she said she had been participating 

in since her release from jail two months previously. Clearly, the court did not find respondent’s 

testimony that she had independently begun complying with the parent-agency agreement to be 

credible. This Court gives due regard to the special opportunity of the trial court to assess the 

credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it. In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 227; 894 

NW2d 653 (2016).

The testimony of the foster care workers, along with respondent’s own testimony, clearly 

demonstrated that respondent did not adequately address the issues that led to the termination of 

her parental rights to three of her other children, and to the adjudication and removal of NF from 

her care. More significantly, the evidence established that respondent understood what was 

required of her to avoid termination of her parental rights, but she chose not to comply. In the 

final hearing, respondent repeatedly stated that she did not comply with the parent-agency 

agreement by communicating and documenting her progress with the caseworker because she was 

focusing on herself and choosing the requirements that she thought were important. Under these 

circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that respondent did not rectify the 

conditions that led to the prior termination of her parental rights or that led to NF’s adjudication, 

that she was not reasonably likely to rectify those conditions within a reasonable time, and that 

there was a reasonable likelihood that NF would be harmed if returned to respondent’s care. MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (j). 

Respondent argues that the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights violated a 

provision of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act, MCL 333.27951 et seq.

MCL 333.27955(3) provides:

A person shall not be denied custody of or visitation with a minor for 

conduct that is permitted by this act, unless the person’s behavior is such that it 
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creates an unreasonable danger to the minor that can be clearly articulated and 

substantiated.

Contrary to respondent’s argument that a person can never be denied custody or visitation for 

marijuana use, this statute provides that a person can be denied custody or visitation if the person’s 

behavior creates a clearly articulated and substantiated unreasonable risk to a minor. Although 

respondent asserts that she had a medical marijuana card and only used marijuana for medicinal 

purposes, there is no evidence in the record that supports this argument. Respondent testified that 

she did not have a medical marijuana card. She said that she had one in the past, but it had expired 

and she did not know when it expired. Respondent never articulated a medicinal purpose for her 

marijuana use. 

The caseworker testified that during respondent’s prior Oakland County case, the main 

emphasis became respondent’s mental health, and he relaxed his requirements for other services 

so that respondent could focus on counseling. The caseworker in this case told respondent that if 

she participated in substance abuse counseling and the counselor concluded that she did not have 

a substance abuse issue, he would mark that referral as completed and she would not have to drug 

test or attend substance abuse counseling. Respondent’s parental rights were not terminated 

because of her marijuana use, but because she failed to address any of the issues that brought her 

child into care or led to the termination of her parental rights to her other children. Respondent 

also refused to participate in substance abuse treatment or drug screens, which could have ruled 

out any concerns that her marijuana use was creating “an unreasonable danger to the minor that 

can be clearly articulated and substantiated.” MCL 333.27955(3). 

Respondent also argues that too much was made of her lack of a bond with NF considering 

the circumstances. However, her lack of a bond with NF was just another example of respondent’s 

failure to put her child’s needs before her own. Respondent was only afforded a two-hour visit 

with NF once a week. Yet respondent asked to end visits early because, in her own words, NF

“was crabby, she didn’t feel good, she was congested, she wanted to go.” Respondent also missed 

a whole month of visits because she was serving a jail sentence for assault and battery. Considering 

all of the evidence, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that statutory grounds for 

termination of respondent’s parental rights were established under MCL 712A.19b(c)(i), (i), and 

(j).

Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her parental 

rights was in NF’s best interests. We again disagree. 

The trial court’s determination regarding a child’s best interests is also reviewed for clear 

error. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). Once a statutory ground for 

termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must terminate

a respondent’s parental rights to a child if a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record 

establishes that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); 

In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. 

To determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, 

the court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include “the child’s 

bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, 
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stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.”

The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the 

parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history 

with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of 

adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (footnotes omitted).]

There were a variety of factors that supported the trial court’s finding that termination of 

respondent’s parental rights was in NF’s best interests. Respondent failed to meaningfully engage 

in services. Her participation and compliance with the parent-agency agreement consisted of 

participation in several psychological, psychiatric, and domestic violence assessments, but she 

failed to follow through with any of the recommendations that resulted from the assessments. 

Respondent had a long history of domestic violence with former partners that involved 

police visits to her home. While respondent argued that she had not been involved with law 

enforcement for approximately eight months to a year, she was still dealing with the consequences 

during this case. Respondent missed a whole month of visitation with NF while she was 

incarcerated in August 2021, for a misdemeanor assault and battery conviction. 

While NF enjoyed her visits with respondent, NF needed an accountable and reliable 

parent. NF looked to her foster parent for her needs and comfort during her visits with respondent. 

The foster parent expressed interest in adopting NF. When considering a child’s best interests, the 

trial court may consider the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, the advantages of 

a foster home over the parent’s home, and the possibility of adoption. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich 

App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). According to the caseworker and the foster parent, NF is 

a happy, talkative child, and her placement with her foster parent will provide her with an 

opportunity to continue to thrive, grow, and meet her milestones. The trial court did not clearly 

err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

/s/ Noah P. Hood