IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

VANESHIA OLIVER, A/K/AVENESHIA LANETTE OLIVER, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Res ondent. No. 83276 

# FILED AUG 1 1 2022
ELIZABETI-1A.BROWN CLERKpFp4PREMECOURT BY DEPUlYCLERK ORDERAFFIRMING INPART, VACATINGINPARTANDREMANDING This is an appeal from a judgment ofconviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, ofrobbery, coercion, possession ofa debit or credit cardwithout cardholder's consent, possession ofburglary tools, two counts offraudulent
use of a credit or debit card, three counts of burglary of a business, four counts oftheft, four counts ofattempted fraudulent use of a credit or debit card, five countsofconspiracy to commit burglary, five counts ofconspiracy to commit larceny, five counts of residential burglary, and five counts of invasion of the home.' Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael Villani, Judge.

A jury found appellant Vaneshia Oliver and a codefendant guilty of perpetrating a series of burglaries that involved Oliver and the codefendant prying open hotel room doors while the guests were away and stealingvarious items, including electronics and credit cards. First, Oliver

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(0(4 we have determined that oral argument is not warranted.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) I947A se*,argues that she is entitled to the guilty plea agreement that the State

withdrew after her codefendant rejected the package plea offer. We disagree because a defendant has no right to a plea bargain, and the prosecutor is not obliged to negotiate a case ifshe prefers to go to trial. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). The State offered a guilty plea agreement that was "contingent upon both defendants accepting the negotiation." Oliver's codefendant chose to defend against the criminal charges at trial, and the State withdrew its offer. Oliver's argument that a conditional guilty plea offer based on the decision of a third party is fundamentallyunfairiswithout merit astheweight ofauthorityrefutesher contention. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 1134, 1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (explainingthat "a plea deal contingent on a co-defendant's guiltyplea" did not violate defendant's due process rights); United States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that a "package deal" plea offer would not violate defendant's constitutional rights); United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1426 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Package deal plea bargains, in which a prosecutor makes an agreement withone defendant contingent upon a co-defendant alsopleadingguilty, are permissible provided that the defendant's decision to forego a trial is otherwise voluntary."), superseded by statute for other reasons as stated in United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to declare 'packagedeal' plea bargains" per se impermissible). Therefore, we conclude that Oliver has not shown she is entitled to relief.

Next, Oliver arguesthat the district court erred in denyingher motion to sever her trial from her codefendant's because her codefendant's

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A 2counsel acted asa "second prosecutor"against her duringclosing argument.

After reviewing the record, we disagree. A district court has discretion to
sever a trial and its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant showsthat the court abused itsdiscretion. SeeMarshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 646-47, 56 P.3d 376, 379 (2002). "[M]isjoinder requires reversal only ifit has a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict." Id. at 647, 56 P.3d at 379. While Oliver points to codefendant's counsel telling the jury that surveillance video depicted Oliver using stolen credit cards, counsel qualified the comment by stating, "or whoever it was." Furthermore, Oliver's codefendant did not testify or present evidence to exonerate himselfand inculpate Oliver in any ofthe other crimes. Thus, to theextentthat Oliver and her codefendantpresented antagonisticdefenses, she has not shown that thejoint trial had a substantial and injurious effect
on the verdict. See id. at 648, 56 P.3d at 379 (explainingthat "antagonistic defenses are a relevant consideration but not, in themselves, sufficient grounds for concluding that joinder of defendants is prejudicial"). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denyingOliver's motion to sever.2

Next, Oliver argues that her sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishrnent because it exceeds the sentence conterriplated in the

2Likewise, Oliver has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in not granting her related request for a mistrial based on the argument ofcodefendant's counsel. See Rudin v. State, 120 Nev. 121, 142, 86 P.3d 572, 586 (2004) ("The trial court has discretion to determine whether a mistrial is warranted, and itsjudgment will not be overturned absent an abuse ofdiscretion.").

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) I947A cs420., 3withdrawn guilty plea agreement. The district court has wide discretion in

itssentencingdecision. SeeHouk v. State, 103Nev. 659, 664, 747P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Regardless of its severity, "[a] sentence within the statutory limits is not cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense asto shock the conscience." Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Oliver was sentenced for victimizingmultiple individuals and businesses. The parties agree that Oliver's sentence for coercion is outside the statutory range and thus illegal. See NRS 207.190(2)(a). We agree and therefore vacate the sentence for coercion and remand to the district court for resentencing and to recalculate the aggregate sentence.3 The other sentences imposed are within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes. See NRS 193.130; NRS 193.140; NRS 193.153; NRS 199.480; NRS 200.380(2); NRS 205.060(2)(c)-(d); NRS 205.067(2); NRS 205.080; NRS 205.0835; NRS 205.220(1); NRS 205.690; NRS 205.760(1). Oliver neither alleges that those statutes are unconstitutional, nor has she shown that the sentences were disproportionate to the crimes committed. Therefore, Oliver has not shown that the sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

31n entering an amended judgment of conviction, the district court must also correct clerical errors that omitted counts 1, 2, 9, 10, 19, 20, 26, 27, 31, 32, and 37 from the charges for which thejury found Oliver guilty. Additionally, count 36mustbe correctedtoreflect thatthejuryfound Oliver guilty ofviolating NRS 205.690 not NRS 205.465.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
(0) I947A 4Parraguirre

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Silver Finally, Oliver argues that cumulative error warrants relief. We disagree because Oliver has shown only one error in her sentence;thus, there is nothing to cumulate. 

### See Lipsitz v. State, 135 Nev. 131, 139 n.2, 442 P.3d 138, 145 n.2 (2019) (concluding that there were no errors to cumulate when the court found only a single error). Accordingly, we

ORDER thejudgment ofconviction AFFIRMED INPARTAND VACATED INPARTANDREMAND thismattertothe districtcourtfor the entry ofan amendedjudgment ofconviction consistent with this order.4

cc: ChiefJudge, Eighth Judicial District Court Department 17, Eighth Judicial District Court Law Offices ofMartin Hart, LLC Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

4The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision ofthis matter under a general order ofassignment.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1947A .400 5