Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices: Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly 

# Opinion

Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

FILED JUNE 21, 2006 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 129269 DELORES MARIE DERROR, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ ______________ PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v No. 129364 DENNIS WAYNE KURTS, Defendant-Appellee.

________________ _______________ BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH CORRIGAN, J. In these consolidated appeals, we are called upon to de termine whether 11

- carboxy-THC, a “metabolite” or byproduct of metabolis m created when the body breaks down THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) , the psychoactive ingredient of marijuana, is a schedule 1 controlled substance under MC L 333.7212 of the PublicHealth Code. We hold th at it is. Thus, a person ope rating a motor vehicle with 11-carboxy-THC in his or her system ma y be prosecuted und er MCL 257.625(8), which prohibits the operation of a motor ve hicle with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in the body. Additionally, in Docket No. 1292 69, we clarify our decision in People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418; 703 NW2d 774 (2005), and hold that, in a prosecution under MCL 257.62 5(8), a prosecutor is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defend ant knew that he or she might be intoxicated. Rather, the prosecutor need only prove that the defendant ha d any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his or her body. Accordingly, we revers e the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand both cases to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND In Docket No. 129269 , defendant Delores M. D error was driving east on snow- and slush-covered M-72 when she crossed into on coming traffic and collided with another vehicle, killing the front-seat passenger, paralyzing two children in the rear seat, and injuring a third child. The accident occurred at approximately 6: 00 p.m. Derror admitted that she had smoked marijuana, at 2:00 p.m., earlier that day. Tw o blood samples were taken, one at approximately 8:00
p.m. and one at approxima tely 11:00 p.m. The firs t blood sample reflected 38 nanograms of 11-carboxy-THC per milli liter, and the second contained 31 nanograms of 11-carboxy-THC per milliliter. Derror wa s charged with operating

2a motor vehicle with the p resence of a schedule 1 co ntrolled substance in her body, causing death and seri ous injury, under MCL 257.625(4), (5), and (8). Derror was also charged w ith possession of marijuan a, MCL 333. 7403(2)(d). In Docket No. 129364 , defendant Dennis Ku rts was stopped at approximately 9:00 p.m. fo r driving erratically. The officer smelled the odor of alcohol on Kurts. Kurts also had gl assy, bloodshot eyes. Kurts admitted consuming two beers. Duri ng a pat-down search, the officer found a marijuana pipe in Kurts’ pocket. Kurts then adm itted that he had smoke d marijuana a half

hour earlier. A blood sample was take n at approximately 10:00 p.m. Tests revealed that his blood contained eight nanograms of 11-carboxy-THC per milliliter and 0.07 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters. Kurts was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxi cated, third offense , MCL 257.625(9); operating a motor vehicle w ith the presence of a sche dule 1 controlled substance in the body, MCL 257.625( 8); and operating a vehicl e with a suspended or revoked license, MCL 257.904(3)(a). Pretrial evidentiary hearings were he ld in both cases in which expert testimony regarding the characteristics of marijuana, THC, and 11-carboxy-THC was introduced. The Court of Appeals summarized this expert testimony as follows: The experts agreed that carboxy THC is a “metabolite,” or byproduct of metabolis m, created in the human body during the body’s biological process of co nverting marijuana into a water

soluble form that can be excreted more easily. Its presence in the blood conclusively proves that a p erson ingested THC at some point

3in time. However, carboxy THC it self has no pharmacological effect on the body and its level in the blood correlates poorly, if at all, to an individual’s level of THC-related impairment. In fact, carboxy THC could remain in the blood long after all THC has gone, as THC quickly leaves the blood and enters the body’s tissues. [ People v Derror (On Reconsideration) , 268 Mich App 67, 71-72; 706 NW2d 451 (2005).] The prosecution expert in Derror , Dr. Michelle Glinn, further testified, without dispute: THC is taken up into the brain an d into fat cells and into other tissues, and it leaves its effects on the brain and central nervous system for quite a while after it’s not detectible in the blood any further. The effects of—it causes chemical changes in the brain, basically, that persist for quite a while. And you can document defects in lab studies of THC beyond the time when it’s no longer detectible in the blood. In discussing the structural differen ces between THC a nd 11-carboxy-THC, Dr. Glinn explained, also without dispute, that THC and 11-carboxy-THC are identical except that in 11-carboxy-THC, two oxyg en atoms are added to, and three hydrogen atoms are rem oved from, the eleventh carbon to make it more water soluble and easier to excrete. Following the evidentiary h earings, the trial courts in both cases determined that the Legislatu re did not intend to include 11-carboxy-THC as a schedule 1 controlled substance because it has no ph armacological effect on the human body. The trial courts, however, reached divergent results regarding the effect of this conclusion. In Kurts, the trial court granted Kurts’ s motion to dismiss the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a schedule 1 controlled

4substance in violation of MCL 257.625(8) on the grounds of insu fficient evidence.
In Derror , however, the trial court ruled that, although 11-carboxy-THC is not itself a schedule 1 controlled substance, evidence of 11-carboxy -THC in Derror’s blood at the time of testing may be presen ted to the jury as circumstantial evidence to establish that Derror had THC in h er blood at the time of driving. The prosecutors in both cas es appealed to the C ourt of Appeals, which consolidated the appeals and affirmed th e trial courts’ rulings that 11-carboxyTHC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance. 1 In Kurts , the Court of Appeals also reversed the trial court’s dismissal of th e MCL 257.625(8) charg e, concluding that although only 11-carboxy-TH C was found in Kurts’s bl ood, evidence existed from which a jury could conclude that Kurts ha d THC in his blood at the time that he was driving. 2 The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion because Kurts admitted that he had smoked marijuana on e half-hour before he was arrested, and because the expert testimony revealed th at the presence of 11-carboxy-THC in a person’s body conclusively establis hes prior ingestion of THC. The prosecutors in both cases applied for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals determination that 11-carboxy- THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance within the meani ng of MCL 257.625(8). In Docket No. 129269, the

1 People v Derror (On Reconsideration) , 268 Mich App 67; 706 NW2d 451 (2005).

2 Id

.

5prosecutor also sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals determination that, in a prosecution involving MC L 257.625(8), a prosecuto r must prove that the defendant knew he or she mi ght be intoxicated. We gr anted both app lications and ordered that the cases be submitted together. 3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether 11-carboxy-THC is a schedule 1 contro lled substance under MCL 333.7212 of the Public Health Code fo r the purpose of MCL 257.625(8) is a matter of statutory interpreta tion. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed by this Court de novo. People v Schaefer , 473 Mich 418, 427; 703 NW2d 774 (2005), citing People v Moore , 470 Mich 56, 61; 679 NW2d 41 (2004), and People v Babcock , 469 Mich 247, 253; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). When interpreting statutes, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by applying the plain language of the statute. People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). Whether, in a prosecution involving MCL 257.625(8), the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the d efendant knew that he or she might be intoxicated is also a question of law that we review de novo. Schaefer, supra at 427.

3 474 Mich 886 (2005); 474 Mich 887 (2005).

6III. 11-CARBOXY-THC IS A SCHE DULE 1 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNDER MCL 333.7212(1)(d) MCL 257.625(8), whic h both Kurts and Derro r were charged with violating, prohibits the operation of a vehicle while a controlled substance is present in the body. It pr ovides, in relevant part: A person . . . shall not operate a ve hicle . . . within this state if the person has in his or her bo dy any amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule 1 under section 7212 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7212 , or a rule promulgated under that section . . . . MCL 333.7212(1)(c) specifica lly lists marijuana as a schedule 1 controlled substance, except for certain exceptions not applicable to these cases. The term “marijuana” is defined in MCL 333.7106 (3) as follows: “Marihuana” means all parts of the plant Canabis [sic] sativa L., growing or not; th e seeds thereof; the re sin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufactu re, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. In addition to specifically listing mar ijuana, MCL 333.7 212(1)(d) and (e) provide that the following substances also qualify as sc hedule 1 controlled substances: (d) Except as provided in subs ection (2), synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of cannabis and synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemi cal structure or pharmacological activity, or both, such as the following, are incl uded in schedule 1: ( i ) ∆ 1 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers.

7( ii ) ∆ 6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers. ( iii ) ∆ 3,4 cis or trans tetrahydroca nnabinol, and their optical isomers. (e) Compounds of structures of substances referred to in subdivision (d), regardless of numerical designation of atomic positions, are included. The Court of Appeals held that 11-carboxy-THC was not a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212(1)(c) because it is not expressly listed in the statute. The Court of Appeals, however, failed to consider other provisions of the Public Health Code in reaching its conclusion; speci fically, the provision that defines marijuana. While MCL 333 .7212(1)(c) does not sp ecifically list 11

- carboxy-THC as a schedule 1 controlled s ubstance, it does list marijuana. As stated above, the Public Health Code in cludes within the d efinition of marijuana every compound and derivative of the plant or its seeds or resin. THC is the main psychoactive substan ce found in the cannabis plant. 11

- carboxy-THC is a metabolite of THC in that it is produced when the body metabolizes THC. See Stedman’s Online Medical Dictionary , which defines “metabolite” as “[a]ny product or subs trate (foodstuff, intermediate, waste product) of metabolism, especially of catabolism.” 4 The question presented before us is whether 11-carboxy-THC is also a derivative of THC.

4 <http://www.stedmans.com/section. cfm/45> (accessed March 8, 2006).

8We hold that the term "derivative" en compasses metabolites. We construe “all words and phrases . . . according to the common and appr oved usage of the language,” but give terms of art and “technical words and phrases” any “peculiar and appropriate meaning” ascribed by the Legislature or acquired in common usage in the absence of legisl ative definition. MCL 8.3a; Schaefer, supra at 435. In the context of this case, the term “derivative” is a sc ientific term, definable only by reference to scientific dictionaries. Medical dictionaries have defined th e term “derivative” in a variety of
ways. Stedman’s Online Me dical Dictionary defines a “derivative” as “[s]omething produced by modificati on of something preexisting,” or “[s]pecifically, a chemical compound that may be produced from another compound of similar structu re in one or more steps, as in replacement of H by an alkyl, acyl, or amino group.” 5 Under the first part ofthis definition, 11-carboxyTHC qualifies as a derivative because it is produced when th e body breaks down or naturally modifies THC. 11-carboxy-THC also qual ifies as a derivative under the second part of this d efinition because it is a ch emical compound produced when the body metabolizes TH C, which is a compound of similar structure. It is undisputed that THC and 11-carboxy-THC are identical except that in 11-carboxyTHC, two oxygen atoms are added to and three hydrogen atoms are removed from the eleventh carbon to make it more water soluble and easier to excrete.

5 <http://www.stedmans.com/section. cfm/45> (accessed March 8, 2006).

9Merriam-Webster’s Online Medical Dictionary defines a “derivative” as “something that is obtained from, grows out of, or results fro m an earlier or more fundamental state or conditio n,” or “a chemical substan ce related structurally to another substance and theore tically derivable from it,” or “a substance that can be made from another substance.” 6 The first and third part s of this definition are as broad as the one from Stedman’s and would include 11-carb oxy-THC because it is produced from THC; it results from the metabolization of THC. The second of the three parts of this definition, however, is more limited in that it includes only “a chemical substance related structurally to another substance . . . .” 11-carboxyTHC also fits within this defin ition because, as stated above , it has an identical chemical structure to THC except for the eleventh carbon atom. Defendants agree that 11-carboxy-THC pote ntially qualifies as a derivative under the above definitions, but contend that defining the term “derivative” broadly under the Public Health Code wo uld produce nonsensi cal results because it would include almost ev ery chemical substance, including carbon dioxide, which is also a metabolite of THC. We ag ree that most of the above definitions of “derivative” would encompass metabolites suc h as carbon dioxide. Not all of the above definitions, however, do so . The second part of the Merriam-Webster’s Online Medical Dictionary describes a “derivative” as a “chemical substance

6 <http://www2.merriam -webster.com/cgi-bi n/mwmednlm> (accessed March 8, 2006).

10related structurally to another substance and theoretically derivable from it.” This definition seems to include 11-carboxy-THC as a derivati ve of THC because it is related structurally to THC, but the definition is not so broad as to include other metabolites such as carbon dioxide. Given these divergent definitions, we must choose one th at most closely effectuates the Legislature’s intent. Stanton v Battle Creek , 466 Mich 611, 618; 697 NW2d 508 (2002). 7 In doing so, we apply the definition of the term

7 The dissent criticizes our choice of th e definition of deri vative that most closely effectuates the intent of the Legi slature, claiming that because more than one definition exists, the term is ambiguous. Contrary to the dissent’s contention, however, a word is not ambiguous merel y because different dictionary definitions exist. Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp , 469 Mich 524, 535 n 6; 676 NW2d 616 (2004), citing Koontz v Ameritech Services, Inc , 466 Mich 304, 317-318; 645 NW2d 34 (2002). Moreover, in Stanton , Justice Cavanagh used the very principles we use today to define “motor vehicle,” a term in which varying dictionary definitions existed. He stated: It is possible to find varying di ctionary definitions of the term “motor vehicle.” For example, the Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001) defines a “motor ve hicle” as “an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven co nveyance,” a d efinition that does not include a forklift. In our view, this defin ition appropriately reflects the commonly understood meaning of the term. The American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed), on the other hand, defines “motor vehicle” as “self-pr opelled, wheeled conveyance that does not run on rails,” a definition, which would arguably include a forklift. Given these divergent defi nitions, we must choose one that most closely effectuates the Legislat ure’s intent. Fortunately, our jurisprudence under the governmental tort liability act provides an answer regarding which definition shoul d be selected. As previously noted, it is a basic principle of our state’s jurisprudence that the immunity conferred upon governmental agencies and subdivisions is to be construed broadly and that the stat utory exceptions are to be (continued...)

11“derivative” as defined in the second part of the Merriam-Webster’s Online Medical Dictionary . As stated above, this defi nition includes 11-carboxy-THC as a derivative of THC because it is related structurally to TH C, but is not so broad as to include other metabolites such as carbon dioxide. Moreo ver, this definition is consistent with the purpose of the Public Health Code to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people of this state. 8 The Court of Appeals furt her held, and the dissentagrees, that 11-carboxyTHC was not a schedule 1 controlled su bstance because it has no pharmacological effect on the human body. Contrary to th e Court of Appeals holding and the

(...continued) narrowly construed. Th us, this Court must a pply a narrow definition to the undefined term “motor vehicle.” [ Stanton, supra at 617-618 (citation omitted).] In choosing which definition of the t erm “derivative” is most appropriate here, we do not use our ow n “personal beliefs,” as su ggested by the dissent. Rather, we use the plain language of the st atute to divine the Legislature’s intent.

8 The dissent contends that we c onclude that 11-carboxy-THC is a derivative of THC because both substances lo ok similar in structure. It further contends that we reach our conclusion by relying on an area of science in which experts do not even agree inst ead of relying on the plain la nguage of the statute. To the contrary, we conclude that 11-car boxy-THC is a deriva tive of THC because it is related structurally to THC and is derivable from THC. See Merriam

Webster’s Online Medical Dictionary . We do not rely on expert testimony in reaching our conclusion. Rather , we rely on the plain lang uage of the statutes in question. Specifically, we rely on MCL 333 .7212(1)(c), which lists marijuana as a schedule 1 controlled substance, and MCL 333.7106(3), which defines "marijuana" as includ ing derivatives of the plant. Also, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, although the exp erts do not agree on all issues in this case, the experts do not dispute that 11-carb oxy-THC and THC are nearly id entical in structure and that 11-carboxy-THC is derived from the b reakdown of THC.

12dissent’s contention, neither MCL 257.625(8) nor MCL 333.7212 requires that a substance have pharmacol ogical properties to constitute a schedule 1 controlled substance. Nor does MCL 25 7.625(8) require that a defen dant be impaired while driving. Rather, it punishes for the op eration of a motor vehicle with any amount of schedule 1 controlled substance in the body. 9 The Legislature expressly listed marijuana as a schedule 1 controlled su bstance. The Legislature expressly included the term “derivative” within the definition of "m arijuana." It is not our place to second-guess the Legisl ature’s intent when the la nguage in the statute is plain and unambiguous. 10 Koonce, supra at 518. The Legislature undoubtedly has

9 The dissent relies on MCL 333.7211 in concluding that schedule 1 controlled substances must have a pharm acological effect on the human body. It states: The administrator shall place a s ubstance in schedule 1 if it finds that the substance has high potential for abuse and has no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision. [MCL 333.7211.] This statute, however, is silent with regard to the pharm acological effects of a substance. Rather, it mandates the placemen t of a substance in schedule 1 if the substance has a high potential for abuse. It does not pr ohibit the inclusion of other substances in schedule 1. In any event, we note that marijuana has been expressly listed as a schedule 1 controlled substan ce. Because 11-carboxy-THC is included within the definition of "m arijuana" as a derivative, it too constitutes a schedule 1 controlled substance.

10 The dissent contends that our cons truction of Michigan’s definition of “marijuana” as including 11 -carboxy-THC is contrary to and inconsistent with years of federal law. We first note that no federal court has specifically excluded 11-carboxy-THC from the defin ition of "marijuana." Moreo ver, the dissent itself points out that the federal c ourts that have dealt with similar issues have reached (continued...)

13the power to, and often does, criminalize activity that is not itself necessarily dangerous or illegal because it is closely rel ated to activity that is dangerous or illegal. 11 The Court of Appeals also held that 11-carboxy-THC was not a schedule 1 controlled substance under MC L 333.7212(1)(d) because it is a natural, rather than a synthetic, byproduct of THC. Reg ardless of whether MCL 333.7212(1)(d) applies to synthetic substa nces only, 11-carboxy-THC qualifies as a schedule 1 controlled substance under MCL 333.7212 (1)(c) and, thus, we need not apply subsection 1(d). Because 11-carboxy-THC qualifies as a derivativ e, and since derivatives are included within the d efinition of marijuana, which MCL 333.7212(1)(c) specifically lists as a schedule 1 contro lled substance, we hold that 11-carboxy

-

(...continued) their conclusions by interp reting the legislative histor y, rather than the plain language of the analogous federal statute. We are not bound by federal precedent in interpreting state law, Continental Motors Co rp v Muskegon Twp , 365 Mich 191, 194; 112 NW2d 429 (1 961), and we decline to ad opt the federal precedents the dissent cites when th ey do not comport with th e actual words that our Legislature used to convey its meaning. Additionally, the Legislature has directed that the statute sh ould not only be construed consistently with applicable federal law, but also “liberally construed for the protection of the health, safety, an d welfare of the people of this state.” MCL 333.1111(2). The definition employed by the majority m eets both directives.

11 See, for example, MCL 257.624a, in which the Legislature has made it illegal for a driver or passenger of a motor vehicle to transport or possess alcoholic liquor in an open contain er, regardless of whether the persons in the car actually drink the alcoholic beverage.

14THC is a schedule 1 controlled substa nce under MCL 333. 7212(1)(c) for the purpose of MCL 257.625(8 ). We, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals judgment that held that 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance, and remand both cases to the trial courts for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IV. MCL 257.625(4), (5), and (8) DO NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF A DEFENDANT’S KNOWLEDGE OF HIS OR HER INTOXICATION In Docket No. 12 9269, defendant Derror was ch arged with violating both MCL 257.625(4) and (5), in addition to su bsection 8. Subsecti ons 4 and 5 provide for an enhanced sentence for causing de ath or serious impairment of a body function while operating a motor vehicle w ith any schedule 1 controlled substance in the body. MCL 257.625 states, in relevant part: (4) A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (1 ), (3), or (8) and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes the deat h of another person is guilty of a crime . . . . (5) A person, whether licensed or not, who operates a motor vehicle in violation of subsection (1 ), (3), or (8) and by the operation of that motor vehicle causes a seri ous impairment of a body function of another person is guilty of a felony . . . .
* * * (8) A person, whethe r licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle . . . if the person has in his or her body any amount of a controlled substance listed in sche dule 1 under sec tion 7212 of the public health code . . . . In interpreting the above pr ovisions, the trial court held that the prosecutor had to prove that Derror’s intoxication wa s a proximate cause of the accident. The

15Court of Appeals originally affirmed this holding, relying on People v Lardie, 452 Mich 231, 256; 551 NW2d 656 (1996), in which this Court held that MCL 257.625(4) “requires th e people to prove that a d efendant, who kills someone by driving while intoxicated, act ed knowingly in consuming an intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance, and acted volunt arily in deciding to drive after such consumption.” Id. at 256. The Lardie Court further noted th at “the statute must have been designed to p unish drivers when their drunken driving caused another’s death.” Id. at 257 (emphasis in original). We, however, subsequently overruled portions of the Lardie case in the companion cases of People v Schaefer and People v Large, 473 Mich 418; 703 NW2d 774 (2005). In these companion cases we held:
Section 625(4) plainly requires that the victim’s death be caused by the defendant’s operation of the vehicle, not the defendant’s intoxicated operation. Thus, the manner in which the defendant’s intoxication affected his or her operation of the vehicle is unrelated to the causation elemen t of the crime. The defendant’s status as “intoxicated” is a separat e element of the offense used to identify the class of persons subj ect to liability under § 625(4). [ Id. at 433 (emphasis in original).] We further held: [T]he prosecution, in proving OUIL causing death, must establish beyond a reasonable doub t that (1) the defendant was operating his or her motor vehicle in violation of MCL 257.625(1), (3), or (8); (2) the de fendant voluntarily decided to drive, knowing that he or she had consumed an intoxicating agent and might be intoxicated; and (3) the defendant’s operation of the motor vehicle caused the victim’s death. [ Id. at 434, citing MCL 257.625(4).]

16The Court of Appeals granted reconsideration in the Derror case in light of our decision in Schaefer , and held that the prosecu tion need only prove that Derror’s driving, not her intoxication, was the proximate cause of the accident. 12 The Court of Appeals further held that Schaefer applied to both MCL 257.625(4) and (5), although Schaefer analyzed subsection 4 only. 13 We agree with the Court of Appeals application of Schaefer in this case to hold that the prosecu tion need only prove that Derror’s driving, not her intoxication, was the proximate cause of the accident. MCL 2 57.625(8) does not require intoxication or impairment—it si mply requires that a person have “any amount” of a schedule 1 controlled substan ce in his or her body while driving. We further agree that Schaefer’s holding applies to subsec tions 4 and 5 alike. The Court of Appeals stated, an d we agree, that no reason exists to interpret the identical language of MC L 257.625(5) differently from MC L 257.625(4). We take this opportunity, however, to modify Schaefer to the extent that its holding is inconsistent with the plain language of MCL 257.625(4) , (5), and (8). MCL 257.625(4) and (5) punish for the operation of a motor vehicle causing death or serious impairment of a body function in viola tion of subsections 1, 3, and 8. Here, Derror operated a motor vehicle causing death and serious impairment of body function in violation of subsection 8. Schaefer would seem to

12 268 Mich App 82.

13 Id . at 81.

17require the prosecution to prove that Derro r voluntarily decided to drive, knowing that she had consumed an intoxicating agent and might be intoxicated . The plain language of MCL 257.625(8) does not require the pros ecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defen dant knew he or she mi ght be intoxicated. MCL 257.625(8) does not require intoxication, impairment, or knowledge that one might be intoxicated; it simply requires that the person have “any amount” of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his or her body when operating a motor vehicle. We thus clarify Schaefer and hold that, in prosecution s involving violations of subsection 8, the prosecuti on is not required to prov e beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew he or she might be intoxicated. Because subsections 1 and 3 are not at issue in this case, we do not disturb our holding in Schaefer with regard to these subsections.
V. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT The dissent claims that the majority ’s interpretation of MCL 257.625(8) is unconstitutional because it: (1 ) fails to provide notice about what conduct is prohibited, (2) is vague an d provides potential for arb itrary and discriminatory enforcement, and (3) is not rationally relat ed to the objective of the statute. First, the only constitutional issue raise d by defendant in his Statement of Questions was that the “expa nsion” of the d efinition of “mariju ana” rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Neitherparty raised the first and third constitutional concerns pose d by the dissent. That the justices inqui red at oral argument regarding the Legislature’s power to enact the statute in question does

18not preserve these constitutional issues as th e dissent suggests. In his dissent in Mack v Detroit , 467 Mich 186; 649 NW2d 47 (200 2), Justice Cavanagh strongly criticized the practice of rai sing issues that have neve r been argued or properly briefed by the parties. He stated:
In reaching its holding, th e majority disregards the foundational principles of our adv ersarial system of adjudication. As protectors of justice, we refrai n from deciding issues without giving each party a full and fair oppo rtunity to be h eard. But not for this concern, the judicially created doctrine of standing would be discarded, as it ensure s “concrete adversene ss which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination . . . .” However, th e majority has di sregarded such considerations, misconstruing the pr oper scope of its authority, by making dispositive an issue never ar gued or briefed by the parties. Neither of the parties has had the be nefit of sharing with this Court their thoughts on the effect of the tort immunity act on this case, though the implications of the majority's holding are vast. Never before have I witnesse d such overreaching cond uct from members of this Court. [ Id. at 213 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting ) (citation omitted).] Nevertheless, we will address these unpreserved constitutional issues. First, the dissent claims that our interp retation of the statut e does not provide an ordinary person with noti ce of prohibited conduct. To the contrary, the plain language of the statute is clear and una mbiguous. MCL 257. 625(8) prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle with any amount of a schedu le 1 controlled substance in the body. In essence, the statute pr ohibits a person from driving after smoking marijuana. It is irrelevan t that an “ordinary ” marijuana smoker allegedly does not know that 11-carboxy-THC could last in his or her body for weeks. It is also irrelevant that a person might not be able to drive long after any possible

19impairment from ingesting marijuana has worn off. The us e of marijuana is classified as a misdemeanor under current law, MCL 333. 7404(1) and (2)(d). The Legislature’s prohibition of the operation of a motor vehicle with any amount of marijuana, which explicitly includes deriva tives of marijuana, in the body provides more than adequate notice reg arding the prohibited conduct. The corollary of this prohibition is that once the schedule 1 subs tance is no longer in the body, one can resume driving. It is irrelevant that the “ordinary person” cannot determine, without drug testing, when the schedule 1 substance is no longer detectible in the body. The dissent next argues that our interpretation of the statute is unconstitutionally vague b ecause it provides the po tential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Specifically, it claims that our interpretation of the statute makes criminals of persons who ha ve merely inhaled m arijuana or people who are no longer under the infl uence of marijuana. As previously stated, MCL 257.625(8) does not require that a person be under the influence of a schedule 1 controlle d substance to violate the statute. It merely requires that a person have any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in the person’s b ody. It is irrelevant that a person who is no longer “under the influence” of mar ijuana could be prosecuted un der the statute. If the

20Legislature had intended to prosecute on ly people who were un der the influence while driving, it could have written the statute accordingly. 14 Moreover, if the general cl ass of offenses to which th e statute is directed is plainly within its terms, th e statute will not be struck down as vague, even though doubtful cases could be hypothesized. See United States v Petrillo , 332 US 1, 5-8; 67 S Ct 1538; 91 L Ed 1877 (1947). In Petrillo , the United States Supreme Court stated: The Constitution has e rected procedural safeguards to protect against conviction for crime except for violation of laws which have clearly defined conduct thereafter to be punished; but the Constitution does not require impossi ble standards. The language here challenged conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more. [ Id. at 7-8.] In this case, both defe ndants admitted smoking mar ijuana just hours before driving. No question exists that that statute proscribes their conduct. Moreover, the statute sufficiently conv eyed that operating a vehi cle after smoking marijuana is illegal. Because a hypothetical case could be posed where doubts might arise does not render the statute unc onstitutionally vague. The statute, as applied to these defendants, is constitutional.

14 The Legislature has included an “u nder the influence” requirement in other sections of MCL 257.625. See subsec tions 1 to 3. Thus, if the Legislature had also intended to include the same requirement in subsection 8, it would have done so.

21Finally, the dissent contends that our plain language in terpretation of the statute does not pass muster u nder the rational basis test. Initially, we agree that rational basis review is appropriate becau se the statute is social legislation 15 enacted under the state’s traditional police power to regulate public safety, public health, morality, and law and order. 16 Further, under this highly deferential standard of review, the legislation must be upheld unless the challenger can show that it is “‘“arbitrary, and wholly unrelated in a rational wa y to the objective of the
statute.”’” 17 We reject the dissent’s assertion that the statute is not rationally related to its objective. The dissent claims that the statute’s objective is to p revent people from driving under the influence of a controlled substance. Not so. The statute’s stated objective is to prev ent persons from driv ing with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in the body, whether or not the su bstance is still influencing them. This is clearly a legitimate exercise of the Legislature’s police power since

15 See Phillips v Mirac, Inc, 470 Mich 415, 434; 685 NW2d 174 (2004).

16 Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 32; 75 S Ct 98; 99 L Ed 27 (1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and ord er—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the t raditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illust rate the scope of th e power and do not delimit it.”).

17 Phillips, supra at 433, quoting Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 259; 615 NW2d 218 (2000), quoting Smith v Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231, 271; 301 NW2d 285 (1981); see also Harvey v Michigan, 469 Mich 1, 7; 644 NW2d 767 (2003).

2211-carboxy-THC is indisput ably only present in th e body after someone has ingested marijuana, i.e., done something illegal. Nevertheless, assuming that the stat ute’s objective is to prevent persons from driving under the influence of mari juana, the statute passes constitutional muster. While the dissent seemingly con cedes that preventin g people from driving under the influence of marijuana is a le gitimate government objective, it asserts that, under our interpretation, the statute is not rationally related to that objective because 11-carboxy-THC has no pharmacol ogical effect and, therefore, cannot influence the person’s driving. That the statute might apply to some persons who are not actually under “the influence” of marijuana does not render the statute unconstitutional. Rather, u nder the rational basis sta ndard of review, our only inquiry is whether any conceivable set of facts, either known or that can reasonably be assumed, even if they are de batable, might support the Legislature’s judgment that making it a crime for p ersons to drive with any amount of 11

- carboxy-THC in the body w ill prevent them from drivin g under the influence of a controlled substance. 18 Such a conceivable set of facts certainly ex ists in this case. It is undisputed that the presence of 11-carboxy -THC conclusively proves that a person, at some point, ingested THC, which is an ingredient in marijuana and which does have a

18 Muskegon Area Rental Ass’n v Muskegon , 465 Mich 456, 464; 636 NW2d 751 (2001); Harvey, supra at 7.

23pharmacological effect on th e body. It is also undisputed that THC itself begins to break down and l eave the bloodstream shortly after entering the body , but that its effects can last long after it is no longer det ectible in the blood. It is thus conceivable that the Legislat ure enacted this statute to further the objective of preventing persons from drivin g under the influence of marijuana by enabling the prosecution of persons who might be und er the influence of THC, but for whom only traces of 11-carboxy- THC, and not THC itself, are still present in the body. Moreover, under the rational basis test , we do not consider the wisdom of the Legislature’s choice, or whether th at choice was made with mathematical nicety, or whether it is most narrowly drawn to obtain its objective, or whether it may be inequitable when put into practice. 19 In short, we do not consider the effects of the statute or its consequences, only its purpose. 20 As long as the Legislature’s objective is legitimate, th e means that it chooses to obtain that objective is not rendered unconstitutional m erely because it may be overinclusive.
In New York Transit Auth v Beazer, 440 US 568; 99 S Ct 1355; 59 L Ed 2d 587 (1979), the United States Supreme Court upheld a st atute applying the rational basis standard. The Beazer case involved a challenge to the New York Transit Authority’s refusal to employ persons wh o used methadone, a drug used to cure

19 Phillips, supra at 434; Muskegon Area Rental, supra at 464; Harvey, supra at 7.

20 Phillips, supra at 435, quoting Duke Power Co v Caro lina Environmental Study Group, 438 US 59, 83-84; 98 S Ct 26 20; 57 L Ed 2d 595 (1978).

24heroin addiction, under a general safety-oriented polic y against employing persons who use narcotic drugs. Id. at 570-573. The plaintiffs , participants in state

regulated methadone treatment programs who had been denied employment with the transit authority, cha llenged the blanket exclusion as overinclusive. Specifically, they asserted th at the exclusion, at least as applied to them, did not further the policy’s goal of safety because methadone administered in such treatment programs does not produce eup horia, is an effectiv e cure for heroin addiction, and frees the majority of person s involved in such programs from illicit drug use. Id . at 573-577. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ cha llenge. After concluding that the transit authority’s blanket exclusion was probably br oader than necessary to achieve its goal of ensuring safety, id. at 592, the Court stated that “it is of no constitutional significance that the degree of rationality is not as great with respect to certain ill-defined subparts of the classi fication as it is with respect to the classification as a whole.” Id. at 593. The same is true here. The goal of the legislation is legitimate. That the Legi slature could have conceivably enacted a more perfectly precise statute does not re nder the current statute constitutionally invalid. 21

21 Contrary to the dissent’s conten tion, we are not “ignor[ing] [our] mandate to reasonably construe a statute to ensure that it is cons titutional . . . .” Post at 16 n 5. Our construction of the stat ute, which is consistent with the plain (continued...)

25VI. CONCLUSION We hold that 11-carboxy-THC is a sc hedule 1 controlle d substance under MCL 333.7212(1)(c) of the Public Health Code for the purpose of construing MCL 257.625(8) of the Mich igan Vehicle Code. Acco rdingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding this issue, and remand both cases to the trial courts for further proceedings co nsistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. We reaffirm our holding in Schaefer that the prosecution need only prove that a defendant’s driving, not his or her intoxication, was a proximate cause of the accident. Further, Schaefer’s holding applies to both MCL 257.625(4) and (5). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of th e Court of Appeals regarding this issue in Docket No . 129269. We also modify Schaefer to hold that, in a prosecution involving MCL 257.625(8), the prosecutor need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he or sh e might be intoxicated.
Maura D. Corrigan Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman

(...continued) language of the statute, does not render the statute unconstitutional. Thus, we need not construe th e statute differently.

26________________ _______________

________________ _______________ S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 129269 DELORES MARIE DERROR, Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 129364 DENNIS WAYNE KURTS, Defendant-Appellee.

CAVANAGH, J. ( dissenting ). Today, the majority holds that 11-carboxy-tetrahyd rocannabinol (11

- carboxy-THC) is a schedule 1 controlled substance and th at a person violates the law if he drives with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his body. The full import of this decision can only be understo od by recognizing that the majority’s interpretation means that a person can no longer legall y drive a car if scientifictesting can detect any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his sy stem. This means that weeks, months, and even years after marijuana was ingested, and long after any risk of impairment has passed, a pers on cannot drive a car without breaking the law if a test can detect the presence of 11-carboxy-THC. Beca use I believe that this interpretation disregards the statutor y language chosen by the Legislature and results in an interpretati on that violates the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution, I respectfully dissent.

11-CARBOXY-THC IS NO T A SCHEDULE 1 CONT ROLLED SUBSTANCE BECAUSE IT IS NOT A DE RIVATIVE OF MARIJUANA This case involves an issue of statut ory interpretation, and the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The first step is to review the language of the st atute. If the statutory language is unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning expressed in the statute, and judicial c onstruction is not permissible. In re MCI Telecom Complaint , 460 Mich 396, 411; 5 96 NW2d 164 (1999). Ho wever, when a statute is ambiguous, “so that reasonable minds c ould differ with respect to its meaning, judicial construction is appropria te to determine the meaning.” Id

. MCL 257.625(8) states in relevant part: A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place ope n to the general public or generally accessible to motor vehi cles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state if the person has in his or her body any amount of a controlled s ubstance listed in schedule 1 under section 7212 of the public health code , 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7212, or a rule promulgated und er that section . . . . [Emphasis added.]

2Marijuana itself is a schedule 1 cont rolled substance. MCL 333.7212(1)(c). “Marijuana” is defined as follows: “Marihuana” means all parts of the plant Canabis [sic] sativa L., growing or not; th e seeds thereof; the re sin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufactu re, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. It does not include the mature stalks of the plan t, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound manufacture, salt, derivative, mixtu re, or preparation of the mature stalks, except the resin extracted th erefrom, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the pl ant which is incapable of germination. [MCL 333.7106(3).] Further, MCL 333.72 12(1)(d) states that the fo llowing are also schedule 1 controlled substances: Except as provided in subsection (2), synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plan t, or in the res inous extractives of cannabis and synthetic substan ces, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure or pharmacological activity, or both, such as the following, are included in schedule 1: ( i ) ∆ 1 cis or trans tetrahydroca nnabinol, and their optical isomers. ( ii ) ∆ 6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers. ( iii ) ∆ 3,4 cis or trans tetrahydroca nnabinol, and their optical isomers. Notably, when construing MCL 333.7212 as part of the Public Health Code, the provisions are “intended to be consistent with ap plicable federal and state law and shall be constr ued, when necessary, to ach ieve that consistency.” MCL 333.1111(1). Mi chigan’s definition of “mar ijuana” is identical in all

3relevant portions to the federal d efinition. See 21 USC 802(16). 1 Yet no federal court has held that 11-carboxy-THC is a sc hedule 1 controlled substance. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated , “The legislative history of the [Controlled Substances] Act indicates th at the purpose of banning marijuana was to ban the euphoric effects produced by THC.” United States v Sanapaw , 366 F3d 492, 495 (CA 7, 2004). Signi ficantly, as every expert wh o testified in these cases acknowledges, 11 -carboxy-THC has no pharmacological effects on a person. Further, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that “the definition of marijuana was intended to include those parts of marijuana which contain THC and to exclude those p arts which do not.” United States v Walton , 168 US App DC 305, 307; 514 F2d 201 (1 975). Numerous courts have also long he ld that the statute is intended to outlaw all species of marijuana containing tetrahydrocannabinol . See, e.g., United States v Lupo , 652 F2d 723, 728 (CA 7, 1981) (emphasis added). Therefore, cons truing Michigan’s definition of

1 The federal statute states: The term “marihuana” means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether grow ing or not; the seed s thereof; the resin extracted from any part of su ch plant; and ev ery compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixtu re, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produ ced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any ot her compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature st alks (except the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the st erilized seed of such plant which is in capable of germination. [21 USC 802(16).]

4“marijuana” to include 11-carbo xy-THC is contrary to and inconsistent with years of federal law. While the majority subtly criticizes the federal courts for using legislative history to reach their conclu sions, as opposed to the “plain language” of the statute, the majority itself is guilty of ignoring the plai n language of MCL 333.1111(1) to reach its conc lusion. In MCL 333.1111(1), the Le gislature states that provisions of the Public Hea lth Code are intended to be construed consistently with applicable federal la w. The Legislature did not state that the clear mandate to construe provisions consis tently with federal law can be ignored when the majority believes that the fed eral courts have not properl y decided the cases before them. Further, the majority’s seemingly minor critique of the use of legislative history is actually quite remarkable when one considers that the statutory language at issue in this case—as well as the langua ge in the federal statute—is certainly not plain and unambiguous, no matter how much the majority tr ies to convince a reader that it is. This is be st illustrated by reviewing th e majority’s approach to interpreting this “plain” language. To decide this case, th e majority recognizes that the term “derivative” needs to be defined, so it consulted scientif ic dictionaries to do so. The majority found that there were “d ivergent” definitions of “deri vative” to such a degree that the members of the majority had to choose the one they believed would best effectuate the Legislature’s intent, usi ng nothing to guide them except their

5beliefs. 2 Notably, the majority even states that it decided not to follow “most” definitions. Instead, the majo rity chooses to ignore most definitions because these definitions would not suppor t the majority’s outcome, a nd the majority ultimately settles on the one definition that would a llow it to best support its position. Simply, contrary to the majority’s bold assertions, there is nothing plain or unambiguous about a statute th at uses a term with defi nitions that are so diverse that they can support two totally different outcomes. In fact, this is the very meaning of the term “ambiguous.” A statute is ambiguous when “reasonable minds could differ with respect to its meaning . . . .” In re MCI , supra at 411; see also Perez v Keeler Brass Co , 461 Mich 602, 610; 608 NW2d 45 (2000) (In a unanimous opinion from this Court, th e term “refuses” was deemed ambiguous because it could reasonably be construed narrowl y or broadly, resulting in two different meanings and two different outcomes .). And in cases in which statutory language is ambiguous, such as the case before us, and the cases involving similar language before the federal courts, use of legislative histor y to try and best effectuate the intent of the Legislature when interpreting unclear and ambiguous statutory language is a better method than an analysis that atte mpts to divine the

2 The majority consulted medical dicti onaries. A further review of various chemical dictionaries indicates exactly what the majority has stated—there are widely divergent definitions of “deri vative” and “metabolite,” such that a definition alone cannot resolve this issue. See, e.g., Grant & Hackh’s Chemical Dictionary (5th ed); Glossary of Chemical Terms (2d ed); Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary (12th ed).

6Legislature’s intent using nothing more than th e personal beliefs of those in the majority. 3 Moreover, not only does th e majority ignore federal law in its analysis, it also ignores other relevant statutory pr ovisions. To support its outcome, the majority merely cites various sources fo r the definition of “derivative” and notes that these sources offer diverg ent definitions. However, the majority resolves this ambiguity by ultimately sel ecting a definition that describes a derivative as a “‘chemical substance related structurally to another substan ce and theoretically derivable from it.’” Ante at 10, quoting Merriam-Webster’s Online Medical Dictionary . The majority does this because it believes that this definition most closely effectuates the intent of the Legislature. But the majority ignores other statutory provision s that indicate that 11

- carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled s ubstance. Contrary to the majority’s

3 I note that the majority attempts to create an in consistency in my position when none actually exists. Ante at 11 n 7. The majo rity references a prior case that I wrote— Stanton v Battle Creek , 466 Mich 611; 647 NW 2d 508 (2002)—and states that I used the same principles that I criticize the majority for using in this case. However, the majority should read my opinion in Stanton more closely. In Stanton , I recognized that there were divergent definitions of the term “motor vehicle” and that one should be select ed that most closely effectuates the Legislature’s intent. I furt her stated, “Fortunately, our jurisprudence under the governmental tort liability act provides an answer re garding which definition should be selected .” Id . at 618 (emphasis added). In direct contrast to my analysis in Stanton , the majority has not used jurispr udence to guide its decision; instead, those in the majority have solely used their personal beliefs about what the outcome of this case should be to guide th eir decision. As su ch, the majority has ignored the rules of statutory construction in its effort to arrive at its desired result.

7position, MCL 333.7212 does not plainly and unambiguously classify 11-carboxyTHC as a schedule 1 controlled substa nce. 11-carboxy-THC is not listed anywhere in the statute. Th e majority rests its entire argument on th e use of the word “derivative” in the statut e, but this analysis is fl awed because the majority reaches a result that dismissively igno res the fact that 11-carboxy-THC has no pharmacological effect on a person. While MCL 333.7211 does not explicitly require that a substance have a pharmacolo gical effect to constitute a schedule 1 controlled substance, the stat ute does explicitly state that a substance is classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance if it has a high potential for abuse, which naturally requires a pharmacological effect. Our Legislature has stated that a substance is placed “in schedule 1 if [the administrator] finds that the substance has high potential for abuse and has no accepted medical use in treatment in the Un ited States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervis ion.” MCL 333.7211 (emphasis added). But there is no dispute th at 11-carboxy-THC has no pharmacological effect. All the experts—including experts Dr. Michelle Glinn, who is the supervisor of the toxicology laboratory of the Michigan State Police Crime Lab, and Dr. Felix Adatsi, both called to testify by the prosecution—admit that 11-carboxy-THC has no pharmacological eff ect on a person whatsoever

. Other factors listed by the Legislature to consider in making a determination about the classi fication of a substance are: (a) The actual or relative potential for abuse.

8(b) The scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known. (c) The state of current scien tific knowledge regarding the substance. (d) The history and current pattern of abuse. (e) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. (f) The risk to the public health. (g) The potential of the subs tance to produce psychic or physiological dependence liability. (h) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under th is article. [MCL 333.7202.] None of these factors that are used to de termine if a subs tance should be classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance applies to 11-carboxy-THC. 11

- carboxy-THC has no pharmacological effect on a pers on, and, therefore, it has no potential for abuse or potential to produce dependence. Fu rther, as expert witness Dr. Michael Evans testified, it is impo ssible to take 11-carb oxy-THC and make it into THC; therefore, it is not an imme diate precursor of a substance already classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance. Our Legislature selected these factors and the wo rds “high potential for abuse” for a reason—they cannot be ignored by the majority m erely because they cannot be reconciled with the majority’s rationale. “It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that provisions of a statute must be construed in light of the other provisions of the statute to carry out the apparen t purpose of the Legislature.” Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc , 442 Mich 201, 209; 501 NW2d

976 (1993). “To that end, th e entire act must be read, a nd the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.” City of Grand Rapids v Crocker , 219 Mich 178, 182-183; 189 NW 221 (1922). The majority’s analysis ignores the very reasons that a substance is classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance, and it reaches a result that completely disregards other relevan t provisions of the statute. Further, the majority makes pronoun cements such as 11-carboxy-THC is a derivative “because it is a chemical compound produced when the body metabolizes THC, which is a com pound of similar structure.” Ante at 9. The majority then states that “THC and 11-carboxy-THC are identical except that in 11-carboxy-THC, two oxygen atoms are a dded to and three hydrogen atoms are removed from the eleventh carbon atom to make it more water soluble and easier
to excrete.” Ante at 9. But merel y because a compound looks similar in its basic chemical formula does not mean that it is a compound of similar structure for the purposes of controlled substance classi fication methods. Water and hydrogen peroxide look similar—H 2 O and H 2 O 2 —but they are, of c ourse, very different substances. One is a substa nce you must drink to surviv e; the other will kill you if you drink it. Instead of tr ying to delve into areas of science in which the experts do not even agree, the major ity should simply refer to the statutory language and the fact that when considering the factors selected by the Legislature, there is no rationale to classify 11-carboxy-THC as a schedule 1 controlled substance.

10Incredibly, the major ity attempts to present the expert testimony as being in agreement. See ante at 12 n 8. Yet this inaccurate representation is not supported when one actually read s and considers the full testimony of the experts. The experts are not in agreement about whether 11-carboxy-THC is a derivative of marijuana and, therefore, a schedule 1 cont rolled substance. While the experts may be in agreement over some scientific principles, they disagree over the key issue in this case, and it is misleading to present this in any other manner. Notably, Dr. Daniel McCoy and Dr. Evans both testified that 11-carboxy-THC was a metabolite, but it was not a deriva tive and, therefore, 11-carboxy-THC was not a schedule 1 controlled substance. As Dr. McCoy expl ained, under the interpretation adopted by the majority “every thing is a derivativ e, every chemical on earth can be derived from so mething else.” He further explained that, using the majority’s interpretation, if THC is burne d, “we will develop a lot of chemicals, including carbon dioxid e, to the extent a derivative is something that comes from and has similar chemical structure to some part, carbon dioxide would be scheduled material . . . . .” Dr. Evans testified, “It [11-carboxy-THC] is not a derivative. . . . To call carboxy THC a derivative of THC would be like—carbon dioxide is a metabolite of THC. You’ll ge t that when you exhale or take in a breath. . . . If you were to call carboxy THC a derivativ e, you would have to call carbon dioxide a derivative of THC . . . .” In short, Dr. McCoy and Dr. Evans disagreed with the majority’s interpretation because the rationale that would support classifying 11-carbox y-THC as a derivative woul d also apply to carbon

11dioxide; therefore, a person could be guilty of viola ting MCL 257.62 5(8) with carbon dioxide in his system—a result that ev en the majority finds to be insupportable. Further, th e majority even highlights the scientific disagreement when it refers to the divergent definitions for “deriva tive” and states “that most of the above definitions of ‘derivative’ woul d encompass metabolites such as carbon dioxide. Not all of the above definitions , however, do so.” Ante at 10. Thus, it is false to suggest that this case is one in which the experts agree that 11-carboxyTHC is a derivative of marijuana and, theref ore, a schedule 1 controlled substance. As it pertains to MCL 3 33.7212(1)(d), the Court of Appeals properly held that the statute was enacted to deal with substances that were produced synthetically. The statute refers to “s ynthetic equivalents” and “synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chem ical structure or pharmacological activity . . . .” MCL 33 3.7212(1)(d). Synt hetic substances are substances that were altered , sometimes in minor ways , but that can still have pharmacological effects on a p erson. However, 11-carboxy -THC is a metabolite; it is a natural substance that occurs wh en a person’s body b reaks down THC, and it is not a synthetic substance. Therefore, 11-carboxy-THC is also not classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance by MCL 333.7212(1)(d). Moreover, in Hemp Industries Ass’n v Dr ug Enforcement Admin , 333 F3d 1082, 1089 (CA 9, 2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpre ted a regulation with language similar to that used in MCL 333.7212(1)(d) and held that this regulation was enacted because THC was being produced synthetically and should be controlled.

12Likewise, the comparable statute at issue addresses substances produced synthetically and not those produced naturally through metabolism. Finally, the Legislature knows how to use the term “metabolite” when it wants to. In MCL 722.623a, the Legi slature specifically uses the term “metabolite” in discussing child abus e reporting requirements. The statute specifically refers to “a metabolite of a c ontrolled substance.” The Legislature is presumed to be aware of all existi ng statutes when it enacts another. Walen v Dep’t of Corrections , 443 Mich 240, 2 48; 505 NW2d 519 (1993). The fact that the Legislature specifically chose not to include the word “metabolite” is further indication that 11-carboxy-THC should not be classified as a schedule 1 controlled substance under the language selected by the Legislature. Thus, the majority’s interpretation that 11-carboxy-THC is a schedule 1 controlled substance is flawed for numer ous reasons. Namely, the interpretation ignores federal case law, the statutory la nguage chosen by our Legislature, and other relevant statutory provisions, as well as the basic tenets of statutory construction. Notably, the majority’s unsupportable theo ry results in an interpretation that is not just analyti cally flawed but is also unconstitutional.
THE ISSUE WHETHER THE MAJORITY’S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTION AL IS PROPERLY PRESERVED

The issue whether the ma jority’s interpretatio n of the statute is unconstitutional has been properly raised and preserved. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the constitutiona l issue has not been properly preserved,

13defendant Derror did suffici ently raise this issue. Defendant Derror’s first question presented states, “IS CA RBOXY THC, A METABOLITE OF
MARIJUANA WITH NO PHARMACOL OGIC EFFECTS, A SCHEDULE 1 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE? ” One of the reasons that defendant Derror argues 11-carboxy-THC is not a schedule 1 controlled subs tance is that such an interpretation would be unconstitutional. Thi s is explicitly exp ressed in one of the subheadings addressing this issue, which states, “The Definition Of Marijuana In MCL 333.7106 Does Not Include Carb oxy THC. The Unprecedented Expansion Of This Definition, Originally Adopted By The U.S. Cong ress In 1937, Is Contrary To The Plain Languag e Of The Statute, Legisl ative Intent, And Renders The Statute Constitutionally Vague And Overbroad.” Further, defendant Derror’s second question presented states, “CAN MCL 257.625(4), (5) AND (8) BE INTERPRE TED TO CREATE ST RICT LIABILITY
CRIMES WITHOUT VIOLATING DEFENDANTS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS?” In addressing this issue, defendant Derror further explains why classifying 11-carboxy-THC as a schedul e 1 controlled substance would violate a person’s due process rights. Nota bly, the prosecutor in Derror responded to these arguments in his brief, specifically arguing that Michigan’s statute is constitutional because there is a legitimate state int erest in proscribing the use of any amount of certain controlled substa nces. Not only was this issue briefed, but Chief Justice Taylor specifi cally questioned the parties about the constitutionality of the statute during oral argument, as did Justice Young and

14Justice Markman. Accordingly, the majo rity’s contention th at I have strongly criticized the practice of raisi ng issues that have never been argued or briefed by the parties is an accurat e statement, but it is wholly inapplicable to this case . The parties not only had th e opportunity to address the c onstitutional issue in this case, but they indeed did so . The majority mi srepresents the record in this case and quotes from a prior opinion that I wrote to try and conjure up an inconsistency in my position when indeed no such inco nsistency exists. The issue of constitutionality has been properly raised an d preserved, and, as such, I find the majority’s interpretation of th e statute to be unconstitutional.
THE MAJORITY’S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL It is indisputable that due process requires that citizens “be apprised of conduct which a criminal statute prohibits.” People v Turmon , 417 Mich 638, 655; 340 NW2d 620 (1983). 4 “The constitutional requi rement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contempl ated conduct is forbi dden by the statute.” United States v

4 The Fifth Amendment of the Unite d States Constitu tion provides in relevant part: No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . . [US Const, Am V.] The Michigan Constitution pr ovides in relevant part: No person shall be . . . depriv ed of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. [Const 1963, art 1, § 17.]

15Harriss , 347 US 612, 617; 74 S Ct 808; 98 L Ed 989 (1954). No person “shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he coul d not reasonably understand to be proscribed.” Id . For a criminal statute to be constitutional, it “must define the criminal offense ‘with sufficient d efiniteness that ordi nary people can understand what conduct is prohibited an d in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discrimina tory enforcement.’” People v Lino , 447 Mich 567, 575; 527 NW2d 434 (1994), quoting Kolender v Lawson , 461 US 352, 357; 103 S Ct 1855; 75 L Ed 2d 9 03 (1983). Moreover, if the ge neral class of offenses affected by a statute “can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, [a court] is under a duty to give the statute that construction.” Harriss , supra at 618. 5 The majority’s interpre tation of the statute is unconstitutional for three reasons. First, the majority’s interpreta tion of the statute do es not provide an ordinary person with notice about what conduct is prohi bited. MCL 257.625(8) prohibits driving with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in a person’s body. However, the majority interprets the stat ute in such a way as to provide no guidance to an ordinary person about when he can legally drive given the scientific testimony that 11-carboxy- THC can easily be fo und in a person’s

5 I note that the majority does not refer to this ru le of law, instead only stating that a statute will not be struck down as vague even though doubtful cases can be imagined. See ante at 21. The majority’s choice to ignore its mandate to reasonably construe a statute to ensure that it is constitutio nal is central for it to reach its decision today.

16system for weeks after marijuana was ingested. This means that long after any possible impairment from ingesting marijuana has worn off, a person still cannot drive according to the ma jority’s version of the statute. It also means that whether a person is deemed to have any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in his system depends on whatever cutoff standard for detec tion is set by the la boratory doing the testing. 6 This lacks any sort of guidance to give a person fair notice of when he can legally drive a car. Further, as expl ained by Dr. McCoy, as tests become more sophisticated, scientists will ultimately be able to determine if a person ever actively or passively ingested marijuana. Under the major ity’s theory, no one could legally drive a car if he ever inhaled marijuana. The ma jority states that it is “irrelevant” that a person cannot lega lly drive until long after any possible impairment from ingesting marijuana has worn off, even if this is weeks, months, or years. Further, the ma jority deems it “irrelevant” that a person cannot determine without clinical drug testi ng when 11-carboxy-THC can no longer be detected in a person’s system. The major ity believes all this is constitutional, and a person is on notice that driving may be indefinitely prohibited because ingesting marijuana is a misdemeanor. MCL 333. 7404. But the penalty for ingesting marijuana under MCL 333.7 404(2)(d) is “imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both .” The penalty for violating this

6 For example, cutoff sta ndards have been reported at 100, 50, 20, and 5 nanograms. Huestis, Cannabis (marijuana) – Eff ects on human behavior and performance , 14 Forensic Sci Rev 15, 26-27 (2002).

17misdemeanor statute is not being prohibited from possibly ever driving a car again. Thus, there is nothing in MCL 333.7404 that serves to put a person on notice that ingesting marijuana may v ery well mean that he cannot drive indefinitely or even permanently. The majority’s interpretation now cri minalizes a broad range of conduct and makes criminals out of people who have no knowle dge of the conduct that they must now seek to avoi d. The majority’s interpret ation even makes criminals out of people who have inhaled marijuana smoke merely through passive inhalation. Dr. Evans, who testified in a hearing regarding defendant Kurts and who has worked with num erous agencies, including the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, stated, “You can ge t up to levels of five, eight, or ten nannograms [sic] per mil of carboxy THC in the blood by pa ssive inhalation.” 7 The prosecutor’s expert in the Derror case, Dr. Glinn, adm itted that Dr. Marilyn Huestis is one of the top experts on can nabis and its metabolites in the area of toxicology and chemistry. In an ar ticle written by Dr. Huestis, she states: “Environmental exposure to cannabis smoke can occur through passive inhalation of side-stream and exhaled smoke by non-users. Several research studies have indicated that it is possible to produce detectable concentra tions of cannabinoid

7 The prosecutor in the Kurts case argued to the cont rary at oral argument and cited an article that he stated supp orted his position. Wh ile this article was never admitted into the record , a review of the article indicates that it does not stand for the blanket proposition that the prosecutor argued.

18metabolites in the urine and plasma after passive inhalation of cannabis smoke.” Huestis, Cannabis (marijuana) – Effects on human behavior and performance , 14 Forensic Sci Rev 15, 32 (2002). There is scientific evidence that 11 -carboxy-THC can ind eed get into a person’s body through passive inhalation. This is contrary to the majority’s assertion that 11-carboxy-THC is only present in a person ’s body after they have “done something illegal.” Ante at 23. Scientific evidence of 11-carboxy-THC being present after passive inhalation means that a person who attends a concert or a gathering where someone is smoking mariju ana and passively i nhales this smoke will have 11-carboxy-THC in his body. W ith no standard in place to use as a cutoff, it does not matter what level of 11-carboxy-THC this in halation results in because, under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, it is now illegal for that person and any person wh o has ever ingested mariju ana to drive if 11-carboxyTHC can be detected. As the trial court in the Derror case correctly noted, under the majority’s theo ry, “as long as we can iden tify [11-]carboxy-THC in [a person’s] system, apparently they can’t be on the highway and, as science progresses, that could be for years.” While such an argument may at first s eem far-fetched, it is the logical result of the majority’s interpretation of the statut e. The majority’s interpretation is only limited by the scientific testing used in a particular case. If a test can detect 11

- carboxy-THC from marijuan a that was ingested one year ago, ten years ago, or 20 years ago, it is now a crime to dr ive, according to the majority.

19Because of the tremendou s potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in chargin g Michigan citizens with a crime under the majority’s interpretation, the statute is unconstitutional for this s econd reason as well. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a critical aspect of the vagueness doctrine is “‘the requirement that a legi slature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” Kolender , supra at 358, quoting Smith v Goguen , 415 US 566, 574; 94 S Ct 1242 ; 39 L Ed 2d 605 (1974). Ot herwise, a criminal statute would permit enforcement on the basis of the whims of police officers and prosecutors. The majority’s belief that it is a crime to operate a vehicle with any amount of 11-carboxy-THC in a pers on’s body means that a pr osecutor can choose to charge a person found to have 0.01 nanog rams of 11-carboxy-THC in his system if the prosecutor chooses. In the Kurts case, the trial court also discussed the possibility that a person coul d be charged weeks after inge sting marijuana, stating that “maybe you can test positive [for 11-carboxy-THC] three weeks later, but there isn’t any evidence that you could be under the influence of it.” The prosecutor responded that it was a question for the jury, but, “ hopefully, our office wouldn’t even charge such a case.” But the reality is that under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, a prosecutor could charge in that case and many others

20because of the majority’s improper interpretation of the statute, leaving Michigan citizens unsure of what conduct will be deemed criminal. 8 Third, and finally, the majority’s interpretation of the statute is unconstitutional because it is not rationally re lated to the objective of the statute.
See Harvey v Michigan , 469 Mich 1, 7; 6 64 NW2d 767 (2003). Fo r a statute to be deemed unconstitutional under rational-basis review, it must be shown that the legislation is “arbitrary and wh olly unrelated in a rationa l way to the objective of the statute.” Smith v Employment Security Comm , 410 Mich 231, 271; 301 NW2d 285 (1981). Simply put, the statute at issue seeks to preven t a person from operating a vehicle while under the influence of drugs. But 11-carboxy-THC has no pharmacological effect on a person, and ther efore cannot affect a person’s driving. While 11-carboxy-THC does indicate that a person ha d THC in his system at some point in the past , there is no indication of when the THC was in the person’s system. Dr. Glinn admitted that the le vels of 11-carboxy-TH C do not indicate whether the effects of the p arent drug—marijuana—are s till present. She stated,

8 Unlike the pros ecutor in the Kurts case, the pros ecutor in the Derror case noted that a charge was a very real possibility, as i ndicated by the following exchange during a hearing. The trial court stated to the prosecutor, “[I]t seems like what you are saying now is that it’ s your position that we could assume hypothetically that the c onsumption of this marijuana had absolutely no effect, whatsoever, on this lady’s driving, but the penalty s hould still be enhanced from two to 15 years.” The pros ecutor replied, “That is the po sition of the People, Your Honor . . . .”

21“You can’t correlate the levels with the effects very well.” Further, no expert testified that a person who had ingested marijuana days and we eks ago would still be impaired. To the cont rary, Dr. Glinn testified that the effects may be seen “up to 24 hours . . . .” The scientific ev idence is irrefutable that 11-carboxy-THC stays in a person’s system far past the point of any impairment. There is simply no rational reason to charge a person w ith 11-carboxy-THC in his system weeks after marijuana was originally in gested when a person can no longer be impaired from the effects of the marijuana. Plainly, there is no rational reason to charge a person who passively inhaled marijuana smoke at a rock concert a mont h ago and who now d ecides to drive to work. There is no rational reason to ch arge a person who inhaled marijuana two weeks ago and who now decides to drive to the store to pi ck up a gallon of milk. While I certainly agree with the Legisl ature’s position that a person should be punished for driving while under the infl uence of a controlled substance because of the potential for tragic outcomes, the majority’s int erpretation of the statute is arbitrary and wholly un related in a rational way to the objective of the statute. To say that driving while a p erson’s system contains any amount of a substance that has no pharmacological effect is a crime—given that u nder the most conservative estimates offered by the pros ecution, the current scien tific testing can find evidence of the substance for at least four weeks—is not permissible under the Constitution. It is this Court’s role to construe statutes to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality, see Harriss , supra at 618, yet today the majority has ignored

22this longstanding principle. A reasonable construction of the statutory language is possible—for example, finding that 11-carboxy-THC ma y be used as circumstantial evidence of a statutory violati on—yet the majority has chosen a position that is contrary to the Constitution and the rights of our citizens.
CONCLUSION Because the majority interp rets the statutory provisions at issue contrary to the express wording chosen by the Legislature, as well as contrary to the intent of the Legislature, I must res pectfully dissent. Today’s holding now makes criminals of numerous Michigan citizen s who, before today, were considered law-abiding, productive members of our communities. Now, if a person has ever actively or passively ingested marijuana and drives, he drives not knowing if he is breaking the law, because if any amount of 11-carbox y-THC can be de tected—no matter when it was previously i ngested—he is committing a crime. The majority’s interpretation, which has no rational relationship to the Legislature’s genuine concerns about operating a ve hicle while impaired, viol ates the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constituti on. Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly

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