N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ IN RE: THERMOLIFE INTERNATIONAL LLC, Appellant

______________________

2018

- 2189

______________________ Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No s . 90/011,394, 90/011,869.

______________________

Decided: January 10, 2020

______________________

R OBERT J. G AJARSA , Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by G ABRIEL B ELL

.

F RANCES L YNCH , Office of the Solicitor, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for appellee Andrei Iancu . Also represented by T HOMAS W. K RAUSE , J OSEPH M ATAL , M AUREEN D ONOVAN Q UELER

.

______________________

Before P ROST , Chief Judge

, T ARANTO and S TOLL , Circuit Judges

. P ROST , Chief Judge

.IN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 2

ThermoLife International LLC appeals a decision from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“ Board ” ) from two merged ex parte reexamination proceedings of U.S. Patent No. 7,777,074 ( “ the ’074 patent ” ). The Board found that claim 6, which was added during reexamination, is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)

. 1 For the reasons below, we affirm

. I
The ’074 patent claims priority to an application filed in 2007 and is directed to various amino acid compounds

. As relevant to this appeal, the ’074 patent discloses nitrates of amino acid compounds. T he specification teaches that “N itrates are a class of compounds that are salts of N itric A cid (HNO 3 ) and at least comprise one Nitrogen atom and three O xygen atoms (NO 3 ).” ’074 patent col. 6 ll

. 45

– 47.
Claim 6, which was added during ex parte reexamination of the ’074 patent and is the only claim on appeal

, is directed in part to nitrates of creatine. Claim 6 recites : 6. A Compound having the structure of:

wherein Y is selected from the group consisting of a Nitrate and a Nitrite.

1 Because the claim at issue in this case have effective filing dates prior to March 16, 2013, we apply pre

- AIA § 102(b).IN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 3

J.A. 44.

Creatine is a nonessential amino acid or amino acid derivative that is naturally occurring in the human body and is commonly used in nutritional supplements. ’074 patent col. 4 ll. 11

– 19. At the time of filing , i t was known that

c reatine is capable of forming a number of salts by reaction with a number of acids. Claim 6 recites one such salt, creatine nitrate. See ’074 patent col. 6 ll. 45

– 47

. The ’074 patent teaches that creatine nitrate may be prepared by “combining nitric acid and Crea tine, mixing with water, and leaving to crystallize.” ’074 patent col. 9 ll

. 19

– 21. T he specification does not state the chemical formula or the structural formula for creatine nitrate . The specification does, however, identif y the structural formula of creatine

, which reveal s that the chemical formula of creatine is C 4 H 9 N 3 O 2

. See ’074 patent col. 4 ll. 1– 9; see also id. at J.A. 44 (claim 6).

B

T he ’074 patent issued in 2010 with two claims . T wo separate requests for ex parte reexamination were subsequently filed. The se requests were merged into a single ex parte reexamination proceeding , d uring which the original claims of the ’074 patent were cancelled and other claims, including claim 6 , w ere added

. Though all other newly added claims were allowed, claim 6 w as finally rejected as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) over a prior art publication Barger

. Barger is a compendium of bases, and in relevant part, describes creatine and its structure. See J.A. 3809 –8 15, 5063

. Barger specifically teaches “[c]ompounds of creatine,” including “[t]he nitrate, C 4 H 9 O 2 N 3 · HNO 3 ,” andIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 4

further describes creatine nitrate’s properties. 2 J.A. 3812. Barger does not describe the structure of creatine nitrate or a method of making it.

T he rmoLife appealed the examiner’s rejection of claim 6 to the Board

. See In re ThermoLife Int’l LLC

, No. 2015

- 006203 , 2016 WL 406381 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 1, 2016 ) (“ Board Decision I ” ). ThermoLife argu ed that Barger is ambiguous and also that Barger is not enabl ing because it does not teach a method of preparing creatine nitrate. T he Board disagreed

, b ut nonetheless identified additional evidence to demonstrat e that Barger is enabl ing

. Specifically, the Board cited the prior art publica tion Dessaignes

, 3 which predates Barger, for its disclosure of a method for preparing creatine nitrat e. The Board additionally cited another prior art publicati on Gmelin 4 for a similar disclosure. Dessaignes teaches methods of preparing the “nitrate of cr eatine ,” identifying the salt with the chemical formula “C 8 H 18 N 6 O 4 , N 2 H 2 O 6 .” See J.A. 4150. In one of these methods, Dessaignes states that creatine nitrate may be produced by “dissolving 1.057 gr. of crystallized creatine in nitric acid containing 0.447 gr. of N 2 H 2 O 6 , and evaporating

2 Barger, G., THE SIMPLER NATURAL BASES, R.H.A. Plimmer & F.G. Hopkins (eds.), “Monographs on Biochemistry,” Longmans, Green & Co., London (1914).

3 M. Dessaignes, “Scientific and Medicinal Chemistry: Examination of some Products of the Transformation of Creatine,” 12 (279), THE CHEMICAL GAZETTE OR JOURNAL OF PRACTICAL CHEMISTRY, 201

– 04 (June 1, 1854).

4 Leopold Gmelin, “Creatine,” HANDBOOK OF CHEMI STRY, Vol. 10: Organic Compounds Containing Eight and Ten Atoms of Carbon, pp. 249

– 55, Henry Watts, trs., printed for the Cavendish Society, London (1856).IN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 5

at 86° F.” J.A. 4150. Dessaignes does not teach the structural formula of creatine nitrate.

The Boar d determined that “ the sal t described in Bar ger was conventionally made by dissolving crystallizedcreatine in the requisite quantity of nitric acid and allowing to crystallize by evaporation of the water, as evidence d by Dessaignes and Gmelin, identically to that described in the ’074 patent.” Board Decision I , at *6. The Board therefore concluded that Barger’s teaching of creatine nitrate did not require a citation to, or a description of

, how to make the salt. Id. (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigita l Tech. Corp. , 121 F.3d 1461, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Because the Board had relied on new evidence to support its affirmance, it entered new grounds of rejection for claim 6 : claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by : (a ) Barger, as evidenced by Dessaignes and Gmelin, and (b) Dessaignes or Gmelin. 5
ThermoLife elected to reopen prosecution as to the new grounds and submitted additional declarations and argument purporting to show that all three references, Barger, Dessiagn es, and Gmelin, are ambiguous and not enab ling

. The examiner, however, disagreed and finally rejected claim 6 on all grounds. ThermoLife again appealed to the Board.

In its second decision on appeal , the Board stated that the issue was whether “based on a preponderance of the evidence, has [ThermoLife] shown that the Examiner erred in maintaining the new grounds of rejection in light of

5 In Board Decision I

, the Board expressly adopted all findings of the examiner in the final rejection and the examiner’s answer in that appeal. Board Decision I , at 4.The Board’s decision has not been vacated or otherwise reversed. The analysis and conclusions therein remain part of the prosecution history.IN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 6

further arguments and evidence of record . . . ?” See In re ThermoLife Int’l LLC , No. 2018

- 001029

, 2018 WL 2335128

, *3 (P.T.A.B. May 21, 2018) ( “ Board Decision II ” ). The Board answered in the negative, again reject ing ThermoLife’s arguments that the references are ambiguous and not enabl ing . First, as to ambiguity, t he Board found that each of the references , including Barger and Dessaignes, unambiguously identify creatine nitrate and disclose its chemical formula and other physical properties. The Board expressly refuted ThermoLife’s argument that Dessaignes teaches the incorrect chemical formula for creati ne nitrate by doubl ing the number of atoms of each element in the formula

. The Board stated that Dessaignes’s formula “co nverts” to the correct formula

. Id. at *8. The Board alsostated that “[w]ithout sufficient evidence to support a finding of clear e rror, we are unwilling to find the express teaching of a nitrate of creat ine in four separate references to be ambiguous.” Id

. The Board also expressly rejected ThermoLife’s argument tha t Dessaignes is ambiguous due to potential inaccuracies in its disc losure or because of differences between the method of preparing creating nitrate taught in Dessaignes and the method taught by the ’074 patent

. The Board found that the method in Dessaignes is “substantially identical to that described in the ’074 patent.” Id.
at *10

. Next, t he Board found that ThermoLife had not met its burden to show that the asserted prior art is not enabl ing

. See i d. at * 10

– 17 (citing In re Antor Media Corp. , 689 F.3 d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Specifically, the Board found that the record demonstrated that a skilled artisan as of the ’074 patent’s application in 2007 could h ave made creatine nitrate from Dessaignes’s teaching without undue experimentation. The B oard also rejected ThermoLife’s argument that Dessaignes did not, in fact, make creatine nitrate, because as an initial matter, actual manufacture is not required to satisfy enablement. The Board furtherIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 7

rejected ThermoLife’s argument based on its finding that ThermoLife has not “conclusively shown” that Dessaignes’ s mixing process does not produce creatine nitrate, or that the findings of Dessaignes are “necessarily inaccurate.” Id.
at * 16, * 17

. ThermoLife appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

II
Anticipation is a question of fact that considers whether a single reference describe s the claimed invention

“ with sufficient precision and detail to establish that the subject matter existed in the prior art.” Wasica Finance GmbH v. Continental Automotive Sys., Inc. , 853 F.3d 1272, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc. , 311 F.3d 1116, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ); see also In re Hyatt , 211 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)

. A s a matter of law, an ambiguous reference cannot anticipate a claim. Wasica Finance , 853 F.3d at 1284.

O nce an examiner has shown a prima facie case of anticipation, becaus e “a prior art printed publication cited by an examiner is presumptively enabling,” the burden of proving that the prior art is not enabl ing shifts to the patent owner

. Antor Media , 689 F.3d at 1288. Whether a prior art reference is enabled is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re Morsa , 803 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015)

. We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Morsa , 803 F.3d at 1376.
On appeal, ThermoLife argues that the cited prior art does not anticipate claim 6 of the ’074 patent because the prior art does not expressly and unambiguously disclose the claimed invention. ThermoLife also argues that the cited prior art does not enable the claimed invention. We address each argument in turn.IN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 8

A
ThermoLife argues that the prior art does not anticipate claim 6 of the ’074 patent because each reference fails to expressly and unambiguous ly disclose the claimed invention. According to ThermoLife, the references do not teach anything relevant to the claimed creatine nitrate compound because they are designed to produce compounds with different formulas. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that claim 6 is anticipated by at least Barger as evidenced by Dessaignes and by Dessaignes alone

. Because we affirm with respect to th ese ground s , we do not reach ThermoLife’s remaining arguments related to Gmelin.
Barg er teaches the “nitrate” of creatine recited by claim 6. Barger further correctly report s the chemical formula of creatine nitrate (C 4 H 9 N 3 O 2 · HNO 3 )

, which consistent with claim 6

, identifies the chemical formula for creatine nitrate as creatine with nitric acid

. Compare J.A. 3812 (Barger) with ’074 patent col. 4 ll. 1

– 10, col. 6 ll. 45

– 47 and J.A. 44 (claim 6). Further still, Barger describes the properties of creatine nitrate, a nd Barger discloses the correct chemical formula and structur al formula for creatine

, one of creatine nitrate’s starting material s. 6

6 To the extent that ThermoLife argues t hat the Board’s anticipation decision should be reversed becausethe Board copied the incorrect chemical structure of creatine from Barger into the body of the decision, we are not persuaded that this constitutes reversible error. The Board’s statement th at “Barger provides a chemical structure for creatine” is correct. Board Decision II , at *5; s ee also J.A. 5063

. Additionally, throughout reexamination, the correct creatine structure from Barger was repeatedly cited by the examiner and those citations w ere adopted by the Board

. See e.g.

, Board Decision I , at *2. Moreover, asIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 9

Though ThermoLife acknowledges that Barger’s express disclosure of creatine nitrate “appears like it could match the claimed compound,” ThermoLife nonetheless argues that the disclosed chemical formula “could just as easily refer to creatinine nitrate monohydrate or any other number of compounds.” See Appe llant’s Br. 34 ; see also id. at 3 . As the Board found, ThermoLife’s argument is undermined by the clear description in Barger, which specifically identifies the disclosed chemical formula as being that of creatine nitrate and not an o ther compound. Board Decision II , at *7. S ubstantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Barger unambiguously discloses creatine nitrate as recited by claim 6.
Like Barger, Dessaignes expressly teaches the “nitrate of creatine,” which is the combination of creatine and nitric acid

. J.A. 4150

. Dessaignes identifies creatine nitrate with the chemical formula “C 8 H 18 N 6 O 4 , N 2 H 2 O 6 ,” and Dessaignes specifically teaches a method for preparing creatine nitrate by mixing creatine and nitric acid. Id.

ThermoLife , however, argues that the Board erred in finding that Dessaignes’s reported chemical formula, which doubles the number of each of the atoms, “converts”
to the correct chemical formula. Board Decision II , at *8

. According to ThermoLife, such conversion h as “no place in chemistry.” Appellant’s Br. 50

– 51. But Thermo Life’s argument lacks evidentiary support. See id. In contrast, the Board’s conclusion is supported by testimony offered by ThermoLife’s own expert, Dr. Richard Chamberlin , with respect to an other statement in Dessaignes. He stated that “[o]ne would assume that the ‘N 2 H 2 O 6 ’ would mean two equivalents of nitric acid.” See J.A. 3927, ¶ 23. Indeed, the

Barger has otherwise clearly identified creatine nitrate, it is not required to disclose its structure or the structure of its starting material in order to anticipate. See In re Baranauckas , 228 F.2d 413, 415 (C.C.P.A. 1955).IN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 10

chemical formula for creatine nitrate in Dessaignes is consistent with the correct ratio of one mole of creatine to one mole of nitric acid. See J.A. 4045. S ubstantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that Dessaignes unambiguously discloses the correct chemical formula for creatine nitrate.

ThermoLife’s remaining arguments that the Board erred in finding the prior art unambiguous are similarly unpersuasive. ThermoLife , for example, argues that while the prior art may disclose creatine nitrate, there “ is no way to know whether the ‘creatine’ that the ref erences refer tocreatine as it is known today.” Appellant’s Br. 37. ThermoLife supports this argument with expert testimony by Dr. Trevor H. Levere, a chemistry historian, w hich the Board discounted because Dr. Levere is not capable of determining wheth er a chemist in 2007 would have been able
to perform Dessaignes’ s mixing method without undue experimentation. Board Decision II , at *17 . Citing Dr. Chamberlin, the Board also found that as of the time of the ’074 patent’s alleged invention in 2007, the art of salt formation was well

- known, and that mixing crystallized creatine and nitric acid as described in Dessaignes would have required no more than routine experimentation. Id. We credit the Board’s fact finding and determine that it is supported by substantial evidence

. ThermoLife also briefly argues that the Board legally erred in determining that the prior art is not ambiguous because in its view, the Board required ThermoLife to prove that the prior art was ambiguous by clear error, rather than by preponderant evidence

. ThermoLife ’s only evidence that the Board applied an incorrect standard is the Board’s lone state ment that “[w]ithout sufficient evidence to support a finding of clear error , we are unwilling to findthe express teaching of a nitrate of creatine in four separate references to be ambiguous.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). Contrary to ThermoLife’s suggestio n, t his statement does not apply to the Board’s ultimate findingIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 11

regardin g whether the cited prior art unambiguously anticipates the prior art . I nstead, the Board’s statement is made in respons e to ThermoLife’s specific argument that the prior art is ambiguous because it disclose s incorrect chemical formulas, or otherwise cont ain s errors, render ing the prior art ambiguous

— the same argument considered above

. See id

. T he Board ’s decision shows that it correctly consideredthe ultimate question of whether the prior art unambiguously teaches the claimed invention. The Board frame d theissues on appeal by asking whether the examiner’s anticipation rejections should be maintained “based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at *3

. Then the Board correctly applied the law. The Board explained that it was “unwilling to find the express teaching of a nitrate of creatine in four separate references to be ambiguous,” because ThermoLife attempted to “undermine an express teaching [of the prior art] with no more than conjecture.” Id. at *8. We agree.

The evidence demonstrates that t he Board correctly found that both Barger and Dessaignes expressly disclose creatine nitrate as recited in claim 6, and also that neither Barger nor Dessaignes teach es incorrect formulas for creatine nitrate. These are factual finding s that we review for substantial evidence

. See Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc. v. Bio

Tech. Gen. Corp. , 424 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“What a prior art reference discloses in an anticipation analysis is a factual determination

. . . .”). Because Bargerand Dessaignes do not include the errors alleged by ThermoLife, ThermoLife has not shown that the prior art is ambiguous by preponderant evidence.
On the facts of this case, therefore, we do not think that the Board’s errant statement c onstitutes reversible error. We determine that to the extent that the Board incorrectly stated the preponderant evidence standard in a single
statement , such error was harmless. In re Watts , 354 F.3dIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 12

1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have previously made clear that the harmless error rule applies to appeals from the Board just as it does in cases originating from district courts.”)

. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision that the prior art discloses a prima faci e case of anticipation.

B

Because we determine that the Board correctly found aprima facie case of anticipation, we now turn to ThermoLife’s argument that the prior art is not enabling . Moreparticularly, ThermoLife argues that the prior art lacks enablement because in its view, the prior a rt does not disclose a method of preparing creatine nitrate

. See Antor Media

, 689 F.3d at 1288. With respect to Barger, in its first appeal to the Boardduring reexamination, ThermoLife argued that the reference was not enabling for failure to describe a method of making creatine nitrate . In response

, the Board disagreed that Barger lacked enablement but also cited Dessaignes, among other references, as evidence that “Barger’s teaching of creatine nitrate is the recitation of a material that

was so con ventional to organic chemists at the time of the invention that there was no t need either for citation or for a description of how to make the salt.” Board Decision I

, at *6 (citing Motorola , 121 F.3d at 1472).
On appeal before this court, ThermoLife argues that Dessaignes does not cure the deficiency of Barger because it also is not enabl ing . According to ThermoLife, the preparation of a salt like creatine nitrate is comple x and the method taught by Dessaignes would not teach a person ofordinary skill in 2007 to make creatine nitrate. ThermoLife also argue s that Dessaignes does not teach thesame method as the ’074 patent, but instead discloses a different step for adding water. ThermoLife further argue s that the meth od in Dessaignes may not make creatineIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 13

nitrate at all, and that it is not possible to determine whether creatine nitrate was actually made based on the disclosures in Dessaignes

. The rmoLife made each of these arguments in its second appeal to the Board d uring reexamination. The Board correctly rejected each

. See Board Decision II , at *10– 17

.For example, the Board found that preparing creatine nitrate from Dessaignes would not have been beyond the skillof the ordinary artisan in 2007 because the specific disclosures including the amounts of creatine and nitric acid, aswell as evaporation temperature, would have provided sufficient information to such an artisan to prepare creatine nitrate

. See id. , at *13. Indeed, as the Board found, the directions in the prior art for preparing creatine nitrate are “substantially identical” to the method taught by the ’074 patent. See id. at *12 ; compare ’074 patent col. 9 ll. 19

– 21 (preparing creatine nitrate by “combin ing nitricacid and Creatine, mixing with water, and leaving to crystallize”) with J.A. 4150 (Dessaignes) (preparing creatine nitrate by “dissolving 1.057 gr. of crystallized creatine in nitric acid containing 0.447 gr. of N 2 H 2 O 6 , and evaporating at 86° F” ). The amount of direction included in the ’074 patent’s specification is evidence of the knowledge in the art, and therefore , is also evidence of what a mount of disclosure is required from the prior art to be enabling. S ee Morsa

, 803 F.3d at 1378 (“ T her e is a crucial difference between using the patent’s specification for filling in gaps in the prior art, and using it to determine the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”); see also Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner , 778 F.2d 775, 781 (1985) (noting that appellee’s “own patent application does not undertake to tellanyone how to make the alloy it describes and seeks to patent. It assumes that those skilled in the art would know how”)

. To the extent that the method for preparing creati ne nitrate in the ’074 patent may not be completely identical to the prior art, i.e., mixing with water as compared toIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 14

dissolving, the Board found that there was no evidence in the record to suggest that the difference would be “ critical. ” See Board Decis ion II

, at *12

. I nstead , the Board found that the ’074 patent itself taught that the difference in the methods would not be critical to preparing creatine nitrate. Id. (citing ’074 patent col. 15 ll. 49

– 59 (“[I]t will be understood that such manufacture is not limited to the specific order of steps or forms as disclosed .

. . since many possible manufacturing processes and sequences of steps may beused to manufacture Amino Acid Compound implementations in a wide variety of forms.”). We conclude that t he Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.

ThermoLife also argues that the Board’s decisionshould be reversed or vacated because the Board improperly required it to demonstrate lack of enablement by clear error rather than by preponderant evidence. ThermoLife cites three sentences from the Board’s decision as evidence that the Board applied the wrong standard in determining whether the prior art lacked enablement. First, ThermoLife cites the Board ’s state ment that “[w]ithout sufficient evidence to support a finding of clear error, we areunwilling to find the express teaching of a nitrate of creatine in four separate references to be ambiguous.” Id. at *8

. This is the same statement discussed above. As is clear from that d iscussion, the Board’s statement is not related to whether the prior art is enabl ing , but instead relates to whether the prior art was ambiguous. We are not persuaded that the Board’s statement in the context of ambiguity is relevant to the standard it ap plied during its separate discussion of whether the prior art is enabl ing

. ThermoLife additionally cites two other sentences from the Board’s opinion that relate to enablement , but whichnonetheless fail to prove that the Board committed reversible error. In these statements, the Board explained thatThermoLife has not “conclusively shown Dessaignes’ mixing process does not produce creatine nitrate,” id. at *16

, and that the Board was not persuaded “that the findings ofIN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 15

Dessaignes are necessarily inaccur ate,” id. at *17 (emphasis in original). These statements , however, do not expressly demonstrate that the Board applied an incorrect standard , p articularly where the Board had already correctly framed ThermoLife’s burden for proving a lack of enablement i n the immediately preceding paragraph

. Id.
at *16 (“If Patent Owner can establish, by preponderance of the evidence of record, that the skilled artisan cannot make what is alleged in the prior art using the steps taught in the prior art, only then is a presumed reliable prior art reference deemed to be unreliable and ineligible as an anticipatory reference as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added) ; see also id. at *3

. But e ven were we to assume that by using the words “conclusively” and “necessarily” the Board required more than preponderant evidence, we nonetheless do not find reversible error. Because enablement is a question of law, which we review de novo, on appeal we apply the Board’s findings of fact to determine whether its ultimate legal conclusion is supported by preponderant evidence

. See Morsa

, 803 F.3d at 1376 . B ased on the record of this case, we conclude that it is

. T he Board’s fact finding establishes that the method taught by Dessai gnes would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to prepare creatine nitrate. S ee Board Decision II , at *10– 17 . T he Board further found that based on the knowledge of the ordinarily skilled artisan in 2007

, to the extent experimentation would be r equired to preparecreatine nitrate from Dessaignes’s method (e.g., to determine the concentration of nitric acid to use), such experimentation would have been no more than routine

. S ee id.
at *15, *17 ; see also Morsa , 803 F.3d at 1377; In re Wands

, 858 F. 2 d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

. And to the extent it would have been unclear whether creatine nitrate was in fact made, the Board found that the skilled artisan in 2007 would have had many methods for confirming the product. Board Decision II

, at *15.IN RE : THERMOLIFE INTERNAT IONAL LLC 16

W hen the Board’s findings of fact are taken together, ThermoLife’s argument that Dessaignes’s method would not have enabled an ordinarily skilled artisan in 2007 to prepare creatine nitrate is supported only by mere speculation. Such speculation or conjecture fails to show that

,by a preponderance of the evidence, the prior art is not enabling . Accordingly, to the extent the Board applied the incorrect standard, on this record, such error is harmless and does not warrant reversal. See In re Watts , 354 F.3d at 1369.

We have considered ThermoLife’s additional arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the above described reasons, we affirm the Board’s decision that claim 6 is anticipated.

AFFIRMED

C OSTS The parties shall bear their own costs.