19-2624

Ye v. Garland

BIA

Poczter, IJ

A208 921 347

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 16th 4 day of August, two thousand twenty5 one.

6

7 PRESENT:

8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,

9 MICHAEL H. PARK,

10 WILLIAM J. NARDINI,

11 Circuit Judges.

12 _____________________________________

13

14 JIN HUI YE,

15 Petitioner,

16

17 v. 19-2624

18 NAC

19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

21 Respondent.

22 _____________________________________

23

24 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York, 

25 NY.

26
2

1 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 

2 Attorney General; Melissa Neiman 

3 Kelting, Assistant Director; 

4 Christopher Buchanan, Trial 

5 Attorney, Office of Immigration 

6 Litigation, United States 

7 Department of Justice, Washington, 

8 DC.

9

10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

11 AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of 

12 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.

13 Petitioner Jin Hui Ye, a native and citizen of the 

14 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 1, 2019

15 decision of the BIA affirming a January 16, 2018 decision of 

16 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for 

17 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 

18 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jin Hui Ye, No. 

19 A208 921 347 (B.I.A. Aug. 1, 2019), aff’g No. A208 921 347

20 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Jan. 16, 2018). We assume the parties’ 

21 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

22 We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. 

23 See Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). The 

24 applicable standards of review are well established. See 

25 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 

26 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).

27 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 
3

1 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

2 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of 

3 the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s

4 . . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal 

5 consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of 

6 such statements with other evidence of record . . . without 

7 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

8 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other 

9 relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer 

10 . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the 

11 totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable 

12 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” 

13 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); 

14 accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Substantial evidence 

15 supports the agency’s determination that Ye was not credible 

16 as to his claim that police detained and beat him for 

17 practicing Christianity in an unregistered church in China.

18 The agency reasonably relied on Ye’s unresponsive and 

19 scripted demeanor. On direct examination, Ye’s attorney 

20 frequently had to ask repetitive or leading questions to 

21 elicit responsive answers about Ye’s Christian practice. 

22 This supports the IJ’s demeanor finding, which we afford 
4

1 particular deference. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 

2 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).

3 The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistent 

4 statements about who introduced Ye to Christianity and paid 

5 a fine for his release. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 

6 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might 

7 preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to 

8 find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude 

9 even more forcefully.”). First, Ye’s application identified 

10 one coworker who invited him to attend church, but he 

11 testified about two. The IJ was not required to credit Ye’s 

12 explanation that he was in a fight with the second because Ye 

13 submitted an affidavit from that second individual. See 

14 Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (“A petitioner must do more than offer 

15 a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to 

16 secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact17 finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal 

18 quotation marks omitted)). Second, Ye testified that his 

19 brother paid the fine to secure his release from jail; but 

20 his brother’s affidavit stated that Ye paid the fine. Ye had 

21 no explanation for this inconsistency. The lack of reliable 

22 corroboration further undermined Ye’s credibility. See Y.C. 
5

1 v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally 

2 defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded 

3 an applicant’s documentary evidence.”); Biao Yang v. 

4 Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s 

5 failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

6 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general 

7 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has 

8 already been called into question.”).

9 Given these inconsistencies and the demeanor finding, 

10 substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility 

11 determination, which is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 

12 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on 

13 the same factual predicate of Ye’s alleged beating and 

14 detention for attending an unregistered church. See Paul v. 

15 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).

16 Nevertheless, the IJ assumed in the alternative that Ye 

17 was seeking relief based on a well-founded fear of future 

18 persecution on account of his practice of Christianity in the 

19 United States. The IJ reasonably rejected such a claim 

20 because Ye did not provide evidence that Chinese authorities 

21 were aware of, or were likely to become aware of, his 

22 Christian practice in the United States. See Hongsheng Leng 
6

1 v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2008). And the IJ 

2 reasonably rejected a claim of a pattern or practice of 

3 persecution of Christians because Ye’s supporting evidence—a 

4 State Department report and six news articles—did not 

5 establish heightened restrictions for Christians in his home 

6 province. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 & n.1 (2d 

7 Cir. 2009); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 149–50, 

8 169–70 (2d Cir. 2008).

9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

10 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

11 stays VACATED.

12 FOR THE COURT: 

13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

14 Clerk of Court

15