2018 UT App 102

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DESIGN ACADEMY INC.,

Appellant,

v.

NICOLE M. ALBISTON,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20170074-CA

Filed June 7, 2018

Third District Court, West Jordan Department

The Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck

No. 130415822

Michael R. Lofgran and Scott A. Trujillo, Attorneys

for Appellant

Nicole M. Albiston, Appellee Pro Se

JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES KATE A. TOOMEY and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

ORME, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Design Academy Inc. appeals the district 

court’s denial of its motion to suspend Appellee Nicole M. 

Albiston’s driver license and vehicle registration for her failure 

to satisfy a judgment unrelated to owning or operating a motor 

vehicle. We affirm.

¶2 Albiston signed an agreement with Design Academy, 

promising that she would pay tuition and related fees, and in 

return, Design Academy would provide her with the 2,000 

educational hours then required by the State of Utah to become a 

licensed cosmetologist. Less than six months later, Albiston 

withdrew from Design Academy. Shortly thereafter, Design 

Academy sent her a statement indicating what she owed under 
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20170074-CA 2 2018 UT App 102

the agreement. Albiston did not pay any part of the balance due, 

and Design Academy filed a complaint against her to collect it. 

Albiston failed to answer the complaint or make an appearance, 

and Design Academy obtained a default judgment from which 

Albiston did not appeal.

1

¶3 Albiston did not make any payments on the judgment. 

Two years after entry of the judgment, Design Academy filed a 

motion in the district court, requesting that, under section 511 of 

the Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and 

Operators Act (the Act), Albiston’s driver license and vehicle

registration be suspended for failure to satisfy the judgment 

within 60 days. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-511 (LexisNexis 

2014). The district court denied the motion, explaining that to 

trigger the license and registration suspensions, the Act requires 

a judgment arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a

motor vehicle and that the “suspension of a license on an 

unsatisfied judgment applies only to judgments obtained under 

[the Act]” and not to Design Academy’s judgment premised on 

the breach of a cosmetology tuition contract. Design Academy 

appeals.

¶4 Design Academy contends that the district court erred in 

interpreting “judgment” as defined in subsection 103(2) of the 

Act. See id. § 41-12a-103(2). We review questions of statutory 

interpretation for correctness, giving no deference to the district 

court’s legal conclusions. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 

2011 UT 50, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 863.

¶5 Section 511 of the Act permits the suspension of a 

judgment debtor’s driver license and vehicle registration when 

he or she fails to satisfy a judgment within 60 days. Utah Code 

Ann. § 41-12a-511(1)‒(2). The clerk of the court or the judge, 

 

1. Albiston also failed to file a brief in this appeal later taken by 

Design Academy.
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20170074-CA 3 2018 UT App 102

“upon the written request of the judgment creditor or his 

attorney,” forwards a certified copy of the judgment to the 

Department of Public Safety “immediately after the expiration of 

the 60 days.” Id. § 41-12a-511(1). Upon receiving a copy of the 

judgment, the Department of Public Safety “shall suspend the 

license and registration . . . of any person against whom the 

judgment was rendered.” Id. § 41-12a-511(2). The Act defines a 

“judgment” as 

any judgment that is final by:

(a) expiration without appeal of the time within 

which an appeal might have been perfected; or

(b) final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court 

of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the 

United States, upon a cause of action for 

damages:

(i) arising out of the ownership, 

maintenance, or use of any motor 

vehicle . . . .

Id. § 41-12a-103(2).

¶6 Design Academy contends that the Legislature’s “use of 

the coordinating conjunction ‘or’” at the end of subsection 2(a) 

“defines two mutually exclusive alternatives for when a 

judgment is final” under the Act and triggers the suspension 

penalty: “expiration without an appeal” and “final affirmation

on appeal.” Because these alternative definitions are exclusive of 

each other and, unlike with subsection 2(b), no restrictions 

follow subsection 2(a), Design Academy suggests that the 

Legislature “unambiguously demonstrates an intent” to include

all causes of actions for judgments that become final without an 

appeal, while categorizing only judgments that become final by

“affirmation on appeal” as needing to “aris[e] out of the 
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20170074-CA 4 2018 UT App 102

ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle.” See id.

§ 41-12a-103(2)(b). To be sure, the punctuation and organization 

of subsection 2, read in the abstract and taken at face value, 

support Design Academy’s position.

¶7 That said, when interpreting a statute, “our primary goal 

is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature,” and, 

to be sure, the best evidence of that typically “is the plain 

language of the statute itself.” Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 

(quotations simplified). But we will not adopt the plain meaning 

of a statute if doing so “works an absurd result.” Savage v. Utah 

Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242. The absurdity 

doctrine “recognizes that although ‘the plain language 

interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust presumption in its 

favor, it is also true that [the Legislature] cannot, in every 

instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have

meant what it said.’”2 In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 1206 

(quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982) (O’Connor, J., 

dissenting)). And “we apply this canon to reform unambiguous 

statutory language where applying the plain language leads to 

results so overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could 

have intended them.” Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75, 

¶ 46, 357 P.3d 992 (Durrant, C.J., concurring).

¶8 We do not use this tool of statutory interpretation to 

usurp “legislative power through judicial second guessing of the 

wisdom of a legislative act”; instead, we seek to “preserve 

legislative intent.” In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 12. For that reason, 

we recognize that the absurdity doctrine “is strong medicine, not

 

2. This doctrine is not to be confused with the absurd 

consequences canon, a different interpretative tool that resolves 

ambiguities in a statute when the “statutory language lends itself 

to two alternative readings” by selecting “the reading that 

avoids absurd consequences.” Utley v. Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 

UT 75, ¶ 46, 357 P.3d 992 (Durrant, C.J., concurring). 
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20170074-CA 5 2018 UT App 102

to be administered lightly,” Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20, ¶ 71, 345 

P.3d 689 (Lee, J., concurring), and is not to be used to “substitute 

our preferences” for the Legislature’s decisions, id. ¶ 72. “[T]o 

override the plain language under the absurdity doctrine, the 

operation of the plain language must be more than improvident,

it must be so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational legislator 

could have intended the statute to operate in such a manner.” 

Utley, 2015 UT 75, ¶ 48 (Durrant, C.J., concurring). And “[t]his 

standard is satisfied only if the legislature could not reasonably

have intended the result.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28, 387 

P.3d 1000.

¶9 Design Academy contends that the statute is 

unambiguous and plainly means just what Design Academy 

says it means. Reading the statute uncritically, Design 

Academy’s position is sound. First, although the use of “or” runs 

the risk of creating an ambiguity in a statute, see Bryan A. 

Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal Usage 639 (3d ed. 2011), here 

the Legislature’s use of “or” between subsections 2(a) and 2(b) is 

clearly exclusive for the reason that a judgment cannot become 

final without an appeal and also be affirmed on appeal. And 

second, the organizational scheme of section 103(2) clearly states

that the requirement that a cause of action “aris[e] out of the 

ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle” is a

qualifier of subsection 2(b) only—not a qualifier of both 

subsections 2(a) and 2(b). Because subsection 2(a) is exclusive of 

subsection 2(b), this qualifier would not be applicable to 

subsection 2(a), given the organizational scheme of section 

103(2). As a result, a plain reading of the statute suggests that the 

holder of any judgment that becomes final without appeal has 

the right to seek suspension of the judgment debtor’s driver 

license and vehicle registration.

¶10 Obviously, such an interpretation of “judgment” in light 

of the purpose of the Act and its relevant provisions results in an 

absurdity given that license and registration suspensions can 

result from final judgments that are affirmed on appeal only if 
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20170074-CA 6 2018 UT App 102

they arise out of motor vehicle ownership, maintenance, or 

usage, while judgments that become final without an appeal can 

arise from all manner of cases, including divorce, mechanic’s lien

foreclosure, collection, defamation, or eviction.

¶11 Viewed on its own terms, the statutory interpretation 

urged by Design Academy makes no sense. Why would the 

Legislature give more favored treatment to judgment debtors

who appeal and lose than those who simply forgo an appeal? 

And why would the Legislature further burden a civil judgment 

debtor—who already will be dealing with appearances in 

supplemental proceedings, wage garnishments, and execution 

on personal and real property—with the added sanction of 

driver license and vehicle registration suspension (unless the 

judgment debtor had the foresight to appeal even if there were 

no good grounds for appeal, thereby avoiding this added 

sanction)? And if, as Design Academy contends, this loss of 

driving and vehicle privileges applies to all judgments that go 

unappealed, why is there no mention of this civil sanction in the 

statutory provisions dealing with judgments and appeals? 

Instead, the provision Design Academy relies on is found in the 

Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act, 

and it seems absurd that the Legislature would vest unappealed 

civil judgments not related to the subject matter of the Act with 

the added burden of license and registration suspensions.

¶12 In sum, the punctuation of the statute is flawed, but the 

Legislature surely did not mean to enact a bizarre scheme that 

imposes license and registration suspension on those who 

appeal and lose if and only if the judgment is for damages 

“arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor 

vehicle,” Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-103(2)(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2014), 

while imposing the same suspensions across the wide range of 

judgments, including those with no connection whatsoever to 

the “ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle,” see 

id., if the judgment becomes final without an appeal.
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20170074-CA 7 2018 UT App 102

¶13 This, quite clearly, is what the Legislature meant and how 

the provision should be read: 

“Judgment” means any judgment that is final by:

(a) expiration without appeal of the time within 

which an appeal might have been perfected, or

(b) final affirmation on appeal, rendered by a court 

of competent jurisdiction of any state or of the 

United States, 

upon a cause of action for damages arising out of 

the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor 

vehicle . . . .

We interpret the provision accordingly and uphold the district

court’s denial of Design Academy’s motion to suspend 

Albiston’s license and registration.

¶14 Affirmed.