NOT RECOMMENDED F OR P UBLICATION File Na me: 13a0056n.06 No. 12-3525 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

Tere sa Com bs, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. Reliance Stand ard Lif

e Insu rance Com pany, Defendan t-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DI STRI CT OF OH I O

BEFORE: BATCHEL DER, Chief Judge; MERRITT and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

P ER CURIAM . Tere sa C o m b s b ro u g ht an action to rec over benef its under an insurance plan g overne d by ERI SA. She appea ls the district court’s g rant of summary judgme nt for Reliance Standard L ife I nsuranc e Company . We affir m. Combs was a secr etar

y at t he l aw fi rm T aft S tettinius & Hollist er L L P in Columbus and a participa nt in the firm’s L ong Term Disability Plan. She stopped working in J anuar y 2003 and filed

a disability claim based on debilitating back pain. Reliance approve d the claim. Combs underw ent back sur g ery

soon after

and beg an tre atment with a neur osurg eon. Reliance notified Combs in November 2004 that she was no longe r elig i b l e for benef its beca use she was no longe r disabled under the terms of the plan. Her benef its wer e terminated as ofNo. 12-3525

Combs v .Reliance Standard Li fe Ins. Co. September 24, 2004. Combs appea led this decision, but Reliance confirme d the denial in Fe bruar y 2006. Combs filed suit in district c ourt under 29 U.S.C. § 1132, arg uing that Reliance denied her benef its arbitra rily and capr iciously

. The district court revie wed the evidenc e upon which Reliance based its decision, including medical rec ords and a functional-c apac ity evalua tion conducte d in J anuar y 2006. The court deter

mined that the evidenc e s u p p o rted a finding that Combs was not totally disabled. Howeve r, the court was con cer ned that Reliance did not consider evidenc e sug g esting that Combs might be partially disabled, beca use under the terms of Reliance ’s plan a

cover ed person is entitled to benef its if she is partially disabled. The court therefo re d en i ed b oth Combs’s and Reliance ’s motions for summary judgme nt and rema nded t h e ca s e s o that Reliance could consider

whether Combs was partially

disabled. On rema nd, Reliance sent Combs’s medical rec ords t o Dr. Andre a Wagne r for an in d e p e n d e n

t r e v ie w . T h e s e r e c o r d s included all pre- rema nd information and new evidenc e submitt ed by Combs to Reliance

. The new evidenc e included medical rec ords and a favor able decision from the Social Security Administration awa rding Combs disability benef its. Dr. Wagne r deter

mined that Combs could work at a light functional level since Septem b er 2004. I n J anuar y 2010, Reliance notified Combs that, at the tim e h er benef its wer e terminated, she was capa ble of perf

orming the duties of her reg ular occupation and was th er ef o re n either totally nor partially disabled. Reliance also expl a in e d in th e n o ti f

ication why its decision differ ed from the Social Security Administration’s. Combs appea led this decision. She sent Reliance a repor t from Dr. J ohn Cunningha m stating that Combs continued to suffe r back pain. She also included a persona l statement and another copy -2-No. 12-3525

Combs v .Reliance Standard Li fe Ins. Co. of the Social Security Administration’s deter mination. I n response, R el i an ce asked Dr. L y nn Richardson to perf

orm an independe nt medical ex am of Combs. Dr. Richardson deter mined that Combs could return to work. She also rec ommended that Combs underg o a separ ate psy cholog ical examination. R el i an ce s ch ed uled this examination, but Combs did not show up. I n lieu of the

ex amination, Reliance submitt ed Combs’s medical rec ords to Dr. Stuart Gitlow for revie w. He found no impairment base d on medication depe ndence or a psy chiatric disorder. Combs then submitt ed a functional-c apac ity evalua tion conduc ted in J anuar y 2011 and additional rec ords from Dr. Kaly an L inga m, who trea ted Combs in 2010. As a final measure , Reliance sent all medical rec ords to Dr. Amy Hopkins for another medical revie w. The conclusion of Dr. Hopki n s ’s repor

t discussed the results of the 2006 functional-c apac ity evalua tion without

rea ching an expli cit deter mination about Co m b s ’s work capa city

. I t then deter mined that Combs could work at a part-time sedenta ry level from September 2008. Reliance sent Dr. Hopkins’s repor t to a vocational expert, who deter mined that Combs could return to her previous occupation. I n J uly 2011, Reliance rea ffirme d its decision. We will overturn Reliance ’s decision to terminate benef its only if it was arbitra ry or capr icious. See Price v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ind. Laborer’s Pension Fund , 632 F.3d 288, 295–96 (6th Cir. 2011). A decision is not arbitra ry or capr ici o u s i f i t i s “the result of a delibera te, principled

rea soning proce ss a

nd if it is supported by

substantial evidence .” Glenn v. MetLife , 461 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom

. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn , 554 U.S. 105 (2008). Combs first arg ues that Reliance ’s deter mination was arbitra

ry or capr icious beca

use the prerema nd administrative record does not support the decision to terminate her ben ef i t s . She asser

ts -3-No. 12-3525

Combs v .Reliance Standard Li fe Ins. Co. that neither we nor the district court can look t o materia l added to the rec ord on rema nd. But the

case s she submits in support of this arg ument say only that district courts cannot revie w materia l outside the administrative rec ord. See, e.g. , W ilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. , 150 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1998). They do not discuss whether new information can become part of the record when submitted by

both parties af

ter a district court orde rs furthe r administrative proc eeding s. Our Circuit has not spoken on this issue direc tly , b u t we h ave sug g ested that parties can supplement the rec ord with further administrative proce eding s. See W enner v. Sun Life Assurance C o . , 4 8 2 F.3d 878, 885 (6th Cir. 2007) (Rog ers, J ., concur ring in part and dissenting i n p ar t ) (sug g esting that instead of awa rding benef

its beca use of a proce dural err or, the Court should rema nd

to the administrator to supplement the rec ord and make a proper deter mination). Other circ uits have deter mined that parties can supplement the rec ord on rem an d

. See, e.g. , W illcox v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. , 552 F.3d 693, 699 (8th Cir. 2009 ) (a p proving rema nd to the pl an adminis trator to revie w new evidenc e and add to the rec ord); Champion v. Black & Dec ker ( U.S.) Inc. , 550 F.3d 353, 363 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court acte d within its discretion by rema nding to the plan administrator and allowing the claimant to supplement the rec ord). And at least one circ uit has

rema nded a case to the pl an ad m i n i s t rator and ordered it to supplement the record. See W iener v. Health Net of Conn., Inc. , 311 F. App’x 438, 441–42 (2d Cir. 2009). Moreove r, Combs submitt ed additional information, sug g esting s h e u n d erstood that the district court’s order allowed supplementation. She prese nts no compelling rea son wh y we s hould not revie w t he entire rec ord

to d et er m i n e whether Reliance ’s decision was arbitra ry or capr icious. We there fore hold that the

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Combs v .Reliance Standard Li fe Ins. Co. district c ourt was entitled to c onsider both the orig inal administrative rec ord and the supplemental administrative re cord. Combs’s next argu m en t i s that, even if all the evidenc e is considere d, Reliance did not conduct a fu l l and fair revie w of her medical rec ords. She claims that, had it done so, Reliance would have found her disabled under the terms of the pla n. Specifica lly , she ar g ues t hat R eliance improperly deter

mined that she was not cre dible reg arding her complaints of debilitating back pain. “[S] ubjective complaints of back pain by them s el ves do not compel an administrator to g rant disability benef its.” Cooper v. Life Ins. C o. of N. Am. , 486 F.3d 157, 174 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (Sutton, J ., concur ring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Y eager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. , 88 F.3d 376, 382 (6th Cir. 1996)). But a plan administrator must use a “deliber ate, principled rea soning proce ss” to deter

mine how the objective medi ca l ev i d ence rela tes to the plaintiff’s subjective sy mptoms. Id. at 173–74. Reliance us ed a d eli bera te and principled proce ss to deter mine that, despite Combs’s subjective complaints, objective evidenc e supported a find i n g t hat Combs was not disabled. Reliance did not limit its cre dibilit y deter mination to a revie w of the medical rec ords alone. Reliance also schedule d a phy sical examination. See Helfman v. GE Grp. Life Assurance Co. , 573 F.3d 383, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2009) (the administrator made an arbitra ry deter mination about the plaintiff’s pain

co m p l ai n t s b eca

use it did so “without the benef it of a phy sical examination” to support the conclusion). I n addition, Re l i an ce revie wed two functional-c apac ity evalua tions and asked phy si cians to assess Combs’s functional capa city as well. The revie wing phy sicians considere d Combs’s acc ounts of her subjective pain, but they ultimately discounted these acc ounts and provided -5-No. 12-3525

Combs v .Reliance Standard Li fe Ins. Co.

re as o n s for doing so. Specifica lly , Reliance relied on Dr. Richardson’s conclusion that Combs’ s repor ted pain was inconsist en t wi t h the observa tions and phy sical finding s she made during a phy sical examination. Reliance also looked into whether there was a psy cholog ical or medicationdepende nce rea son for Combs’s pain. When Combs did not submit to a psy cholog ical examination, Reliance asked D r. Gitlow to conduct a revie w of Combs’s medica l rec ords. He f ound no serious i s sues. Finally , Reliance asked Dr. Hopkins to conduct a final revie w of all rec ords afte r Com b s

su b m i t t ed additional medical evidenc e. Dr. Hopkins deter mined that Combs could perf orm sedenta ry work. Moreove r, Combs’s rec ords in support of her complaints are mostly equivoca l as to whether

s h e h ad debilit ating pain. I n 2004, Dr. J eff rey Blood, a trea ting phy sician, st ated that Co m b s h ad

some limit ations, but revie w by a vocational specia list showed these to be consistent with the work of a leg al secr etar

y . L etters from Dr. Robert Gewir tz, Combs’s trea ting neurosur g eon, sug g est that Combs’s condition improved in 2004 afte r back s u rge ry . There is a three -y ear g ap in medical

rec ords from 2005 to 2008. While D r. L inga m’s letter states tha t the ty pe of pa in Combs s uffe red could be debilitating, it does not opine specifi cally on whether Combs was disabled. Only Dr. Cunningha m’s letter strong ly supports Combs’s claim that she could not return to work. Howeve r,

an administrator need not cre dit a plaintiff’s evidenc e over conflicting reliable evidenc e, such as that provided to Reliance by other doctors. See Black & Dec ker Disabilit y Plan v. Nord , 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003). Combs also relies on the Social Security Administration’s determination. B ut a plan administrator is not bound by a Social Security Administration deter mi n at i o n wh en revie wing a claim for benef

its under an ERI SA plan. See Seiser v. UNUM Provident Corp. , 135 F. App’x 794, -6-No. 12-3525

Combs v .Reliance Standard Li fe Ins. Co. 799 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Black & Dec ker , 538 U.S. at 832–33). And Reliance explained to Combs why its opini on differ ed fr om the Social Security Administration’s. Over all, nothin g d emonstrates that Reliance used a flawe d proce ss, selec tively revie wed evidenc e, relied on questionable evidenc e in making its deter mination, or lacke d evidenc e to support termination of bene fits. Accor dingly , the judg ment of the district cour t is affirmed.

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