NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GARY JOHNSON, JR., Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0380 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2016-149433-001

The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

The Hopkins Law Office PC, Tucson

By Cedric M. Hopkins

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 2-5-2019
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge James P. Beene and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 This appeal is presented to us pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969). Defense counsel 

has searched the record on appeal and advised us there are no meritorious 

grounds for reversal. Defendant Gary Johnson was given the opportunity 

to file a supplemental brief but did not do so. Our obligation is to review 

the entire record for reversible error, State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 

(App. 1999), viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the conviction and resolving all reasonable inferences against Johnson, State 

v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). 

¶2 A grand jury indicted Johnson for (1) aggravated assault, a 

class 5 felony; (2) indecent exposure, a class 6 felony; and (3) indecent 

exposure, a class 1 misdemeanor. Count one required proof that Johnson 

committed an assault while “knowing or having reason to know that the 

victim [was] . . . a peace officer.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) 

§ 13-1204(A)(8)(a); see also A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) (defining assault as 

“[i]ntentionally placing another person in a reasonable apprehension of 

imminent physical injury”). Counts two and three required proof that 

Johnson exposed his genitals while another person was present and “was 

reckless about whether the other person, as a reasonable person, would be 

offended or alarmed by the act.” A.R.S. § 13-1402(A). Count two also 

required a finding that the victim was under the age of 15. A.R.S. § 13-

1402(C). The following evidence was presented at trial.

¶3 On October 17, 2016, A.T. was driving her elderly mother to 

an office. S.V., A.T.’s then nine-year-old daughter, was riding in the 

backseat of the car. A.T. saw Johnson when she stopped at an intersection

and looked to her right. Johnson made eye contact with A.T. as he rolled 

the top of his shorts down, exposing his penis. S.V. also witnessed Johnson 

rolling his shorts down and it made her “uncomfortable,” although she 

could not remember seeing “anything when he actually pulled them 

down.” A.T. drove away and her mother, who did not see Johnson’s act,
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

3

had the office call the police. When police arrived, Johnson was no longer 

in the area and could not be located.

¶4 The next day, A.T. saw Johnson and called the police again. 

Officer D.M. responded to her call; when he arrived, A.T. informed him

about the incident and identified Johnson as he left a store. D.M. attempted 

to approach Johnson in his marked patrol car, but Johnson evaded his 

approach by zig-zagging across the road numerous times. Eventually,

D.M., who was wearing his police uniform, tried to stop Johnson by exiting 

his patrol vehicle, sticking his arm out to block Johnson from walking past 

him, and saying “Hey, I need to talk to you.” Johnson responded by telling 

D.M. not to touch him and attempted to walk past him again. D.M. grabbed 

Johnson in an attempt to stop him. Johnson became violent, grabbing the 

inside of D.M.’s vest, striking his chest, and struggling with D.M. into the 

south lanes of a busy road. Once in the road, D.M. separated himself from 

Johnson and deployed his Taser twice. D.M. testified that he felt 

“endangered” during this encounter because of “the struggling, traffic, . . . 

and fear for weapons or things that I could not see under [Johnson’s] belt 

or . . . shirt.” 

¶5 The jury found Johnson guilty as charged. At sentencing, the 

court placed Johnson on supervised probation for 3 years as to count one,

10 years as to count two, and 3 years as to count three.1 Johnson timely 

appealed. 

¶6 After a thorough review of the record, we find no reversible 

error. Clark, 196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 50. The record reflects Johnson was 

represented by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings.

2 The 

evidence presented supports the convictions, and the suspended sentences

fall within the range permitted by law. As far as the record reveals, these 

proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure and Johnson’s constitutional and statutory rights. 

Therefore, we affirm Johnson’s convictions and the resulting probationary 

terms. 

 

1 The State sought sex offender registration as a condition of probation 

for count two, but the court deferred ruling on that issue for one year. 

2 Johnson waived his presence at many pretrial proceedings by 

refusing transport, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1, and forfeited his right to be 

present during much of the trial proceedings by engaging in disruptive 

conduct, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.2. 
STATE v. JOHNSON

Decision of the Court

4

¶7 Unless defense counsel finds an issue that may be 

appropriately submitted to the Arizona Supreme Court, his obligations are 

fulfilled once he informs Johnson of the appeal’s outcome and his future 

options. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Johnson has 30 days 

from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro per motion 

for reconsideration or petition for review.