PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 19-3705

______________

SOTERO MEJIA ROMERO,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

______________

On Petition for Review of a

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(A075-294-346)

Immigration Judge: John P. Ellington

______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

March 23, 2021

______________

Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and BIBAS, 

Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: May 5, 2021)
2

Marcia B. Ibrahim

Law Office of Marcia Binder Ibrahim

222 South Broad Street

Lansdale, PA 19446

Counsel for Petitioner

Jeffrey Bossert Clark

Emily Anne Radford

David Schor

United States Department of Justice

Office of Immigration Litigation

P.O. Box 878

Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

______________

OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Sotero Mejia Romero seeks review of the order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal 

of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his 

application for withholding of removal. In addition to adopting 

and affirming the IJ’s decision denying withholding of 

removal, the BIA also rejected Mejia Romero’s challenge to 

the IJ’s jurisdiction over his case. Before us, Mejia Romero 

only appeals that jurisdictional issue. Finding no jurisdictional 

defect, we will deny the petition for review. 
3

A. Background

On September 25, 1997, Mejia Romero, a native and 

citizen of Guatemala, was granted voluntary departure after 

having entered the United States without being admitted or 

paroled. When Mejia Romero failed to leave the United States 

as provided in that order, a removal order was entered on 

March 25, 1998. That order was executed on May 27, 2011,

when Mejia Romero was removed from the United States to 

his home country of Guatemala. He returned almost 

immediately to the United States. When he was taken into 

custody on May 17, 2018, the Department of Homeland 

Security (“DHS”) notified Mejia Romero of its intent to 

reinstate his prior removal order, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1231(a)(5). 

In response, Mejia Romero “express[ed] a fear of 

returning to the country of removal,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(a), and 

as required he was referred to an asylum officer for a 

reasonable fear interview, 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). The purpose 

of the reasonable fear interview is to give the alien an 

opportunity to “establish[] a reasonable possibility that he or 

she would be persecuted on account of his or her race, religion, 

nationality, membership in a particular social group or political 

opinion, or a reasonable possibility that he or she would be 

tortured in the country of removal.”1 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c). 

1 Faced only with a jurisdictional challenge, we need not 

discuss the facts underlying Mejia Romero’s fear of 

persecution or torture. 
4

Finding that Mejia Romero had “a reasonable fear of 

persecution or torture,” the asylum officer referred the matter 

to an IJ, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e). A.R. 455. The 

Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge2 provided the place of 

the hearing before the IJ but noted that the date and time were 

“To Be Determined.” A.R. 456. However, Mejia Romero

subsequently received a Notice of Withdrawal-Only Hearing 

that included the date, time, and place information. After his

hearing, the IJ denied the application for withholding of 

removal. Mejia Romero appealed to the BIA. 

Before the BIA, Mejia Romero raised several 

arguments, including a challenge to the IJ’s jurisdiction. Citing

Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), Mejia Romero 

argued that “[a] notice of referral to [an] immigration judge is 

an analogous document to a notice to appear and must contain 

a location and a date and time for a removal hearing in order to 

create jurisdiction for an immigration court.” A.R. 14. He 

further argued “[a]ccording to the plain language of the 

regulations in question here, jurisdiction of an immigration 

court ‘vests’ only ‘when a charging document is filed with the 

Immigration Court.’” A.R. 15 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.143). A

Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge is a charging 

2 The Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge is a form 

I-863.

3

In part, § 1003.14(a) provides that “[j]urisdiction 

vests, and proceedings before an Immigration Judge 

commence, when a charging document is filed with the 

Immigration Court by the Service.” 
5

document. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13.

4

 

The BIA rejected Mejia Romero’s jurisdictional 

challenge for three reasons. First, the BIA noted that it lacked 

the authority to grant the relief Mejia Romero sought –

termination of the proceedings – in a withholding proceeding. 

Second, the BIA observed “that Pereira applies to the statutory 

scheme for removal proceedings, not withholding-only 

proceedings as are at issue here.” App. 25. Third, even if 

Pereira “could apply in some context to withholding-only 

proceedings,” the BIA’s prior decision in Matter of BermudezCota, 27 I&N Dec. 441 (B.I.A. 2018), and our decision in 

Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied 

sub nom. Nkomo v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2740 (2020), foreclosed 

his arguments. Id. at 26. 

Mejia Romero filed a timely petition for review. 

B. Discussion

The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 

§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1208.31(e). We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). “Ordinarily, Courts of 

Appeals review decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(BIA), and not those of an IJ.” Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 

4 Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13, “[c]harging document 

means the written instrument which initiates a proceeding

before an Immigration Judge. . . . For proceedings initiated 

after April 1, 1997, these documents include a Notice to 

Appear, a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge, and a 

Notice of Intention to Rescind and Request for Hearing by 

Alien.”
6

196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 

266, 271 (3d Cir. 2002)). We review the IJ’s opinion only 

when “the BIA has substantially relied on that opinion.” Id.

Because the BIA did not summarily affirm the IJ’s order but 

instead issued a separate opinion, we review the BIA’s 

disposition and look to the IJ’s ruling only insofar as the BIA 

deferred to it. Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d 

Cir. 2006). 

“Because [the] jurisdictional challenge is a purely legal 

one, our review is plenary.” Nkomo, 930 F.3d at 132 (citing 

Ku v. Att’y Gen., 912 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2019)). 

Before us, Mejia Romero renews his Pereira-based 

argument. He asserts that “the IJ and the BIA should not 

initiate withholding only proceedings unless the charging 

document (i.e., Form I-863, Notice of Referral to Immigration 

Judge) contains the information required by the regulations 

including the date and time of the first hearing.” Pet’r’s Br. 9. 

Citing to Pereira, he further argues that “[a] notice of referral 

to [an] immigration judge is an analogous document to a notice 

to appear and must contain a location and a date and time for a 

removal hearing in order to create jurisdiction for an 

immigration court.”

5

 Id. at 11 (citing Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 

5 While Mejia Romero asserts that a Notice to Appear 

and a Notice of Referral are “analogous document[s],” nothing 

in the statutes or regulations indicates they have analogous 

requirements, beyond both of them being defined as charging 

documents in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13. Indeed, unlike a Notice to 

Appear, the requisite contents of which are set forth in both a 

statute and a regulation, no statute or regulation defines the 

contents of a Notice of Referral. 
7

2110). Since the Notice of Referral Mejia Romero received 

lacked date and time information, Mejia Romero asserts that 

neither the IJ nor the BIA had jurisdiction over his case. 

Mejia Romero’s arguments misread both the 

regulations and the holding in Pereira. The regulations Mejia 

Romero cites – 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(c)(3)(ii) and § 1208.2(c)(3)(ii)

– do not require that the time and place be included in a Notice 

of Referral to Immigration Judge. Instead, those regulations 

state as to “[n]otice of hearing procedures . . . . The alien will 

be provided with notice of the time and place of the 

proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.2(c)(3)(ii). Mejia Romero’s Notice of WithholdingOnly Hearing included that information. Since that notice

included the information required by the regulations, no 

violation of the regulations occurred. 

To the extent Mejia Romero’s jurisdictional challenge 

is premised on the argument that Pereira required that, in order 

to vest jurisdiction in an IJ pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14, a 

Notice to Appear – the charging document involved in that case

– must include the location, date, and time information of the 

initial hearing before the IJ, our decision in Nkomo squarely 

rejected it. Nkomo, 930 F.3d at 133-34.

In Nkomo, we refused to extend Pereira’s narrow 

holding “beyond the § 1229b(d)(1)(A) stop-time rule context.”

Id. at 133. We explained that § 1003.14, the jurisdictionvesting regulation, did not cross-reference 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), 

which required a “notice to appear” to include time and place 

information. Id. And “time and place are conspicuously 

absent” from the rule that sets out what must be included in a 

Notice to Appear under § 1003.14. Id. at 134; see 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.15(b), (c).
8

Here, the charging document enumerated in 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.13 commencing Mejia Romero’s case before the IJ was

the Notice of Referral to the Immigration Judge, rather than the

Notice to Appear involved in Nkomo. And, as discussed above, 

no regulation specifies the content of a Notice of Referral, 

much less requires that it contain time and place information. 

Yet, Mejia Romero insists that because a Notice of Referral to 

the Immigration Judge is analogous to a Notice to Appear, 

Pereira dictates that the IJ lacked jurisdiction over his removal 

proceedings where the Notice of Referral did not include the 

date and time information. We have already held in Nkomo

“that Pereira’s holding is not readily transferable to 8 C.F.R. § 

1003.14.” Nkomo, 930 F.3d at 134. We reaffirm that position 

here. We therefore now hold that the IJ is not deprived of 

jurisdiction under § 1003.14 over removal proceedings 

commenced by a Notice of Referral to an Immigration Judge 

lacking time and place information.

C. Conclusion

Finding no support in the statutes, regulations, or case 

law for Mejia Romero’s arguments, we will deny the petition 

for review.