Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 

 and Kinser, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 

WALTER M. ROGERS, JR., ET AL. 

 OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 

v. Record No. 980846 February 26, 1999 

CHARLES EDWARD LEE ROGERS, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 

Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal we consider whether creditors, who 

obtained a judgment against a husband and a different judgment 

against his wife, may compel the sale of real property owned 

by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties with 

right of survivorship to satisfy those judgments. 

 Because this case was decided on demurrer, we will state 

the facts "in accordance with well-established principles that 

a demurrer admits the truth of all material facts that are 

properly pleaded, facts which are impliedly alleged, and facts 

which may be fairly and justly inferred from alleged facts." 

MNC Credit Corp. v. Sickels, 255 Va. 314, 316, 497 S.E.2d 331, 

332 (1998) (quoting Cox Cable Hampton Roads v. City of 

Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991)). 

 Walter M. Rogers, Jr., Ronald A. Rogers, and their 

closely held corporation, Rogers Brothers, Inc., a Virginia 

corporation, filed their amended bill of complaint against 

Charles Edward Lee Rogers (Mr. Rogers), Eleanor P. Rogers 
(Mrs. Rogers), Option One Mortgage Corporation, and Dennis E. 

Burke, trustee. The complainants alleged the following. 

 In November 1991, the complainants obtained a judgment 

against Mr. Rogers entered by a federal bankruptcy court in 

Virginia in the amount of $145,000. The complainants obtained 

a separate judgment against Mrs. Rogers in the amount of 

$200,000 with interest, entered by the Circuit Court of Prince 

William County in June 1995. The circuit court found that 

Mrs. Rogers had participated with Mr. Rogers in a scheme to 

delay, defraud, and hinder the complainants in their attempts 

to collect their judgment against Mr. Rogers. 

 Mr. and Mrs. Rogers own real property as tenants by the 

entireties with the right of survivorship. The real property 

is located in Prince William County. Dennis Burke "has an 

interest in the real property as the trustee under a first 

deed of trust for the benefit of Option One Mortgage 

Corporation . . . ." 

 The complainants further alleged: "The purposeful and 

fraudulent actions of [Mr. and Mrs. Rogers] in attempts to 

avoid Mr. Roger[s'] payment of the debt owed to the 

[c]omplainants constitute a joint action by husband and wife 

which gives rise to the second judgment and establishes the 

[c]omplainants herein as joint creditors of both husband and 

wife." The complainants requested that the circuit court, 

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among other things, order the sale of the real property to 

satisfy their judgments. 

 The defendants filed demurrers and asserted that the 

complainants do not have a cause of action against them 

because real property owned by the husband and wife as tenants 

by the entireties cannot be sold to satisfy "two separate 

judgments, obtained on two separate dates, against two 

separate spouses." The trial court entered a decree 

sustaining the demurrers, and the complainants appeal. 

 The complainants argue that they pled a cause of action 

against the defendants because the joint tortious acts of the 

husband and wife gave rise to related judgments against each 

spouse for the same debt and, therefore, the real property 

could be sold to satisfy the debt. We disagree with the 

complainants. 

 We have stated, clearly and without equivocation, that 

real property held as tenants by the entireties is exempt from 

the claims of creditors who do not have joint judgments 

against the husband and wife. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 

735, 740, 66 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1951). We discussed this 

elemental common law principle in Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 

176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984): 

"It is settled that tenancies by the entirety are 

based upon the same four unities that support joint 

tenancies, that is, the unities of title, estate, 

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time, and possession. However, it is also settled 

that tenancies by the entirety are supported by a 

fifth unity which they do not share with any other 

tenancy: the unity of marriage. That unity 

embodies the legal fiction that husband and wife are 

one. And it leads to the result that neither 

husband nor wife can by his or her sole act defeat 

the survivorship interest of the other spouse. 

Neither spouse can by separate act make an absolute 

disposition of property they hold as tenants by the 

entirety, nor can a judgment lien creditor of one 

spouse subject that property to the satisfaction of 

his lien." 

Accord Pitts v. United States of America, 242 Va. 254, 258-59, 

408 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1991). 

 Applying the aforementioned precedent, we hold that the 

trial court did not err in sustaining the defendants' 

demurrers. The complainants stated in their amended bill of 

complaint that they had obtained one judgment against the 

husband in the federal bankruptcy court for defalcation in a 

fiduciary capacity and another judgment entered by the circuit 

court against the wife in a fraudulent conveyance proceeding. 

These separate judgments do not impose joint liability upon 

the husband and wife. Thus, the complainants do not have a 

cause of action to compel the sale of the real property held 

by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties with 

right to survivorship to satisfy the judgments. 

 The complainants argue that even if they failed to state 

a cause of action under existing law, this Court should 

"expand" its decision in Price v. Hawkins, 247 Va. 32, 439 

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S.E.2d 382 (1994), and create a remedy which would permit them 

to obtain a decree enforcing their judgments against the 

property.* Our decision in Price, however, is simply not 

applicable here. In Price, we considered "whether the trial 

court erred by entering in personam judgments against 

transferees who participated in a fraudulent scheme to delay 

and hinder a creditor by concealing the debtor's assets." Id.

at 33, 439 S.E.2d at 383. Construing Code § 55-80, which 

confers upon a creditor a statutory right to request that a 

circuit court set aside certain fraudulent conveyances, we 

held that an in personam judgment against transferees in the 

full amount of the fraudulent conveyances at issue in that 

case was appropriate under the circumstances. 247 Va. at 37-

38, 439 S.E.2d at 385-86. Here, however, the complainants 

have neither a statutory nor a common law right to satisfy 

 *

 We reject the complainants' contention that our 

decisions in Leonard v. Counts, 221 Va. 582, 272 S.E.2d 190 

(1980), and Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 269 S.E.2d 787 

(1980), cert. denied sub nom., Cross v. Sundin, 452 U.S. 911 

(1981), permit them to enforce their judgments against the 

real property. These decisions have no application here. We 

did not consider in Leonard or Sundin whether a creditor could 

satisfy a judgment obtained against one spouse by requiring a 

sale of real property held as tenants by the entireties with 

the right of survivorship. In Leonard, we considered whether 

a chancellor's decree that a husband and wife held title to a 

parcel of land as constructive trustees was supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. 221 Va. at 587, 272 S.E.2d at 194. 

In Sundin, we held that a husband, who had murdered his wife, 

could not recover her interest in real property that the 

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their separate judgments by compelling a sale of real property 

held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties with 

the right of survivorship. 

 Finding no merit in the complainants' contentions, we 

will affirm the chancellor's decree. 

Affirmed. 

 

husband and wife had acquired as tenants by the entireties 

with survivorship. 221 Va. at 239-40, 269 S.E.2d at 791. 

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