09- 3717- pr

C a rr io n v. S m ith UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T AM EN DE D SU M M AR Y O RD ER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO SUMMA R Y O R D E R S F I L ED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PR O C EDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A S U M M A RY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a s t at ed Term of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of New York, on the 11 day

of F ebrua

ry , two thousand ten. th Pr e se nt: P IE R R E N
. LE V A L,

CH ES TERJ . S TRAUB, RI CHARD C. W ESL EY,

Cir c uit J ud ge s.

______________________________________________________ CARL OS CARR I ON, Petitioner-Appellee , - v. - No. 09-3717-pr J O S E P H S M IT H , S u

p e r i n t e n d e n to f

S h aw an g un k

C o r r e c t i o n a l F a c i l i ty, Re sp on de nt- Ap pe lla nt.

______________________________________________________ FOR THE PETI TI ONER-APPEL L EE: M ARJ ORI E M. S MI TH , Piermont, NY ( on the brief , Michae l W. M artin, L au ra D eRossi (L eg al Intern), L ani M e din a

(L ega l Inte rn ), F or dh am U niv e rs ity School of L aw, Ne w York, N Y). FOR THE RESP ONDEN T-APPEL L ANT: M AR Y C. F AR R I NGTON , Assistant District Attorney ( on the brief

, Morrie I
. Kleinbar

t, Special Assistant District Attorney

), for Cy rus R
. Va n ce, Jr., District Attorney , New Y ork County , New Y ork, NY.2

AF TER ARGU MENT AND UP ON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREB Y ORDERED, ADJUDG ED, AND DECREED that th e jud g me nt o f t he Di str ic t Co ur

t is AF F IRM ED
. Respondent-Appe llant appea ls from an Opi n io n a n d O r d e r o f the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ( Shira A. Scheindlin, Judge ), date d August 12, 2009, gr anting Petitioner-Appellee ’s Petition for habea s corpus re li ef on the basis of ineff ective a ssistance of counsel, va catingPetitioner’s sever al convictions, with the except i o n o f criminal possession of a controlled substanc e in the first de g ree , and orde ring that Petitioner’s t er m of imprisonment be reduc ed fr om 125-y ear s-to-life to ten- y ear s-to-life. Car rio n v . S mi th , 644 F. Supp. 2d 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). We assume the par ties’ familiarity

with the underly

ing f acts a nd proce du ra l h i s t ory

of the
case , as well as with the issues on appea l. Over sevente en y ear s ag o, Petitioner was cha rg ed in New York state c ourt with one count of cr iminal possession of a controlled substanc e in the first de g ree , ten counts of attempted murder in the f irst deg re e, t en co u n ts of attempted murde r in the sec ond deg ree , one count of criminal use of a fire arm in the fir st deg ree , two counts of cr iminal possession of a we a po n in the thi rd de g re e , an d one c ount o f r e c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt i n th e fi rs t de g re e . T he se char g es stemmed fr om Petiti oner’ s purcha se of a larg e amount of c ocaine and an e nsuing gun fig ht wi tht h e p o l i c e . D u r i n g h i s a t t e mp tt o e v a d e ar r e s t , P e t i t i o n e r

f i r e d h i s g una tth e p o l i c e o f

f i c e rs , shooting one of the off

icer s in the arm. Petitioner was e ventually shot severa l times by

the offic ers and wa s rende red a

para pleg ic as a

result of the injuries he sustained that day
.3

After he wa s indicted, the prose cuti o n o ff er ed Petitioner a plea

deal. Althoug h the exact terms of the plea offe r are uncer tain, it is clea

r that the offe r would have allowed Petitioner to plead g uilty to criminal possession of a c ontrolled substance, either in the first deg ree or sec ond deg ree , and allocute to the entire indictment in exchang e for an indeter

minate sentenc e of imprisonment of ten y ear s to life. Petitioner declined the offe r and pr ocee ded to trial. On Oc tober 19, 1993, the jury convicted Petiti oner of five counts of attempted murder and the re maining c harg es. On De cembe r 10, 1993, the s tate court sentenc ed P etitioner t o an aggreg ate indeterminate prison ter m of 125 y ear s to life. On Fe bruar

y 8, 2004, Petitioner filed this Petition f or habea s corpus relief

alleg ing, inte r a lia , ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l in

c onne c tio n wi th th e ad

vic e his de fe ns e c ouns e l pr ov ide d h im
re gar d i n g t h e p ro s ec u t i o n ’s p l eao ff er . T h e D i s tri ct C o urt re fe rr edt h e m at t er t o M agi s tra t e J u d ge Fr ank Maa s, who held an e videntiary hear ing on Fe bruar

y 6, 2006. Petitioner testified at the he aring that his defense counsel fa iled to advi s e h i m o f h is sentencingexposure if convicte d at trial or provide a ny other a dvice r eg ardingthe plea deal, other than stating its ter ms a nd that it was a “ g ood” offe r. Se e Car

rio n v . S mi th , 549 F.3d 583, 586 (2d Cir. 2008)
. Petitioner’s defe nse counsel testified that he had no specific r ecollec tion reg ardingwhat he told Petitioner in conne ction with the plea d e a l, b u t h is g e n e r a l p r a c ti c e w a s to a dv is e h is c li e n ts o f th e ir s e n te n c in g e xp o s ur e if

c o n v ic te d

at trial. See id. at 586-87, 588-89, 590. On J anuar y 25, 2007, the Mag istrate Judge issued a Report & Re commendation (“ R&R”) , concludingthat Petition er rec eived e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel in connec tion with the plea advice . I n doing so, the Mag istrate Judge c redited the testimony of4

Pe tit ion e r’ s d e fe ns e cou ns el re g ard inghis g e ne ra l pr a c tic e ov e r t hat of Pe tit ion e r r e g ard inghis specific rec ollection of what his counsel had advise d him. See id. at 590. On Febru ary 22 , 200 8, th e Di st ri ct Co urt rej ect ed the fi nd in gs in th e Magi st rat e J ud ge’s R &R
a nd c on c l u d e d

t h a td e f e n s e c o u n s e l w a s i nf

a c ti n e f f e c t i v e b e c a

u s e h e d i d

n o ta d e qu a t e l y

a dv ise Petitioner reg ardingthe pl ea o ffer. Car rio n v . S mi th , 537 F. Supp. 2d 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
. Respondent appe aled, a

nd in an opinion dated Dec ember 8, 2008, we va cate d the District Court’s de c isi on , r e a so nin gthat “ in d e te rm ini ngtha t [defens e c ouns e l] di d n ot a dv ise [Pet iti on e r] o f h is sentenc ing e x posure, [the District Court] necessar ily cre d ited [P etitioner’s] testimony .” Carrion , 54 9 F .3 d at 58 8. We h e ld t hat this w a s e rr or

be c a us e the Di str ic t Co ur

t ma de its “ ow n c re dib ili ty finding s contrar

y to those made by

the mag istrate judg e without hear ing the witnesses [it] self.” Id.
a t 59 0. We e xpla ine d, “For th e distr ic t c ourt , u po n r e mand , to a dh e re to i ts o wn c re dib ili ty
c on c lus ion s, a s o pp os e d to tho se fo un d b y th e magi st ra te jud g e , th e dis tr ic t c ourt wo uld ne e d to conduct a rene wed he aringto appra ise the cr edibility of the witnesse s.” Id. Acc ording ly , we va cate d the Dis trict Court’s judgme nt and remanded for i t “either to enter judgme nt in acc ordanc e with the mag istrate judg e’s findings, or to conduct a new hearing as a basis for whatever finding s the court may then make.” Id. I n acc ordanc e with our re mand instructions, the District Court held an evide ntiary hear ing wher e sever al witnesses testified, including Petitioner and his de fense counsel. The District Court ultimately

conclude d that defe nse counse l rende red ine ffe ctive assi s ta n c e o f c o u n s e l b y n o t p r o v iding Pe tit ion e r w itha de qu a te a dv ic e re g ard ingthe ple a de a l. Re sp on de nt tim e ly a pp e a le d to thi s Co ur

t.5

“ We r e vie w a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on

to gra nt o r den y a ha

be a s p e tit ion

de no vo and

its finding s of fa ct for c lear

err or.” Hemstree t v. Greine r , 491 F.3d 84, 89 ( 2d Cir. 2007), cert. de nied , 128 S. Ct . 962 (2008). Unde r Strickland , to establish ineffe ctive as s i s t ance, Petitioner “must (1) de mon str a te that hi s c ouns e l’ s p e rf or manc e fe ll b e low

an o bje c tiv e sta

nd ard of r e a so na

ble ne ss i n light of preva iling professional norms; and (2) aff irmatively

prove pr ejudice a

rising f rom counsel’ s alleg edly d ef

i cient represe ntation.” Carrion , 549 F.3d at 588 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). “To satisfy

the first prong

–the per formanc e prong

–the re cord must demonstrate that ‘counse l made
err ors so serious that counse l was not functioningas the “ counsel” g uara nteed the de fenda

nt by the Six th Amendment.’” W

ilson v. Mazzuca , 5 7 0 F. 3 d 4 9 0 , 5 0 2 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “ Such err ors include ‘ omissions [t hat] cannot be e x plained
c on vin c ing ly

a s r e su lti ngfr om a

so un d tr ia l st

ra te g y , but ins te a d ar os e fr om ove rs ig ht, c are le ssn e ss, ineptitude, or laziness.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Eze v. Se nkowski , 321 F.3d 110, 112 ( 2d Cir. 2003)). I n t h e c o n t e xt o f a d e f

e n s e c o un s e l ’ s a dv i c e s ur r o un d i n g a p l e a o f

f e r , “ [a ] l aw y e r

sh a ll explain a matter to the extent reasona bly nece ssary

to permit the client to make informe d decisions reg ardingthe re prese ntation.” Purdy v. U nited States , 208 F.3d 41, 45 ( 2d C i r. 2 000) (inter nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) (1995)) . “The de c isi on wh e the r to p le a d guil ty or c on te st a c ri min a l c ha

rg e is o rd ina

ri ly the mos t im

po rt ant s ing le decision in a c riminal case . . . [and] counsel may and mus t g ive t he client the be nefit of c ounsel’s profe ssional advice on this cr ucial dec ision.” Boria v. Keane , 99 F.3d 492, 496- 97 (2d Cir. 1996) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) (q

uo tin g An tho ny G. Am ste rd am, Tr ia l Ma nu a l 5 f or the De fe ns e of Criminal Cases (1988)) , cert. de nied , K e a n e v . Bo ria , 521 U. S. 1 11 8 ( 19 97 ). “ As pa rt of thi s6

a dv ic e , c ouns e l mu st c omm un ic a te to the de fe nd ant the te rm s of the ple a of fe r, and sh ou ld u su a lly inform the def

endant of the streng ths and wea

knesses of the case ag ainst him, as well as the alternative sentenc es to whi ch h e wi ll most likely be exposed.” Purdy , 208 F.3d at 45 (internal citations omitt ed). “ [K] nowledg e of the compar ative sente nce e x posure between standing tria l and
acc epting a plea offe r wil l often be cruc ial to the decision whe ther to plea d g uilty .” U.S. v. Gordon , 156 F.3d 376, 380 ( 2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citation and internal quotation ma rks omitted). To satis fy

the pr e jud ic e pr on g , “ [t]he de fe nd ant m us t sh owtha

t th e re is a

re a so na ble probability

that, but for counse l’s u

n p r ofessional e rror s, the result of the pr ocee ding w ould have be en differ ent. A re asonable probability i s a p ro b ab i lity

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 69 4. “ [A] si g nif ic ant s e nte nc ingdis pa

ri ty [be tween wha t is pr ov ide d f

or un de r a ple a a g re e me nt a

nd the se nte nc e imp os e d a ft e r t ri a l,] i n com bi nati on

wi th de fe nd ant’ s st a te me nt o f h is i nte nti on [that he wo uld h ave pl ed gu ilty ] is s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a prejudice finding .” Pham v. U.S. , 3 17 F .3 d 1 78 , 1 82 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 ); se e als o M as k v . M c Gi nn is , 233 F.3d 132, 141 ( 2d Cir. 2000), cert. de nied , 534 U.S. 943 (2001). “AED PA, however , require s more than a conclusion that counse l’s perf ormanc e wa s constitutionally

inadequate.” Carrion , 549 F .3 d at 59 1 n .4 ; see also Schriro v. Landrigan , 5 50 U. S. 465, 473 (2007). “[P] etitioner must identify some incre ment of incorr ectne ss bey ond err or in order to o bta in h a

be a s r e lie f. Th a t inc re me nt, ho we ve r, ne e d not be g re a t; o the rw ise ha be a s r e lie f w ou ld be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark a s to sugg est judicial incompetenc e.” Jones v. W est , 5 5 5 F
. 3 d

9 0 , 9 6 ( 2 d

Ci r . 2 0 0 9 ) ( c it a ti o n s an d inte r n a l q u o tati o nma

r k s o mi tte d). Neve rtheless, “ beca

use the Strickland

standard is a

g ener al standar d, a state c ourt has eve n more7

latitude to rea sonably

deter mine that a def

endant h as n o t s atisfied that standa rd.” Knowles v. Mirzayance , 129 S.Ct . 1411, 1420 (2009). Her e, it is clear

that it would be an unre asonable appli cation of Strickland to rejec t Petitioner’s claim assuming that (1) defense counsel failed t o advise him of hi s sentencingexposure i f co n v i ct ed at t rial, and ( 2) had Petitioner known of his sentencingexposure, he would have
acc epted the ple a dea l. I ndee d , P et i t i o n er ulti mately rec eived a

sentenc e of 125 year s to life afte r beingconvicted at trial, and def ense c ounsel admitted that he recog nized at the time of repr esentation that “bar ring some miracle from God,” Petitioner would b e convic ted at lea st of the drugchar g e, which would alone car

ry a mi nimum of fifteen y ear s to life, m ore than the t en year s to life offe red in the plea de al. Under

these c ircumstance s and assumingthose fac ts, the leg al deter mination that habea s relief

should be g rante d is corre ct. See Pham , 31 7 F .3 d a t 18 2; Ma sk, 233 F .3 d at 14 1; Purdy , 208 F.3d at 44-45, 47; Cullen v. United States , 1 94 F .3 d 4 01 , 4 04 (2 d Ci r. 19 99 ); Gordon , 156 F.3d
a t 38 0; Bo ria , 99 F.3d at 496-97. Re sp on de nt a

rgue s, ho we ve r, that th e Di str ic t Co ur t’ s f a c tua l f ind ing s und e rl yingits conclusion that def

ense c o u n s el wa s ineffe ctive ar e cle arly err oneous. “Afinding of fa ct is not clea rly err oneous unless ‘the review ing court on t he entire evidenc e is left with the def inite and firm conviction that a mistake ha s been c ommitt ed.’” Krieger v. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods., a Div. of Nat’l Gypsum Co. , 8 6 3 F. 2 d

1 0 9 1 , 1 0 9 8 (2 d

C i r. 1 9 8 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. United States Gy psum Co. , 3 33 U. S. 3 64 , 3 95 (1 94 8) ); see also Drak e v. P ortuondo , 553 F.3d 230, 239- 40 (2d Cir. 2009). “In revie wing findi n gs fo r cl ear err or, we are not allowed to sec ond-guess either the trial cour

t’s
cre dibilit y

assessmen ts or its choice be tween pe rmissible competinginfere nces.” Amalfitano v.8

Ro se nb e rg , 5 3 3 F. 3 d

1 1 7 , 1 2 3 (2 d

C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( i n t ern al qu o t at i o nm a r k s o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Ce ra so
v . M oti v a E nte rs. , LLC , 3 26 F .3 d 3 03 , 3 16 (2 d Ci r. 20 03 )) ; se e als o Anderson v. City of Besse mer City , 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Respondent ar g ues that with respe ct to Strickland ’s def iciency prong , t h e Di strict Court committed clear

err or in finding that defe nse counse l did not advise Petiti oner a s to his sentencing
e xpos ur e if

c on vic te d at tr ia l. We dis a g re e be c a us e the D istri c t Co ur

t’ s f ind ingin t

his re sp e c t is based upon e vidence in the rec ord and its own c redibility deter minations. S pecif

ically , the District Court c re dit e d Pe tit ion e r’ s te sti mony on thi s to pic , in c lud ingthat de fe ns e c ouns e l di d n ot a dv ise him that the minimum s entenc e for t h e drug c harg e wa s fiftee n y ear s to life and that his conviction on that count was virtua lly

inevitable. Carrion , 6 4 4 F. Supp. 2d at 460, 467. Although the r ecor d
reve als that defe nse counse l “re mem b ere d, in ge nera l terms, a discussion ‘as to the substantial sentenc e that [Petit ioner] could rec eive if he wer e convic ted,’” id. a t 46 1 ( qu ot i n g t r a ns c ri pt a va ila ble
a t JA 2 70 -7 1) , d e fe ns e c ouns e l tes tif ie d r e pe a te dly

that he ha d n o s pe c if

ic re c oll e c tio n o f h is discussions with P etitioner conc er n ing the sentenc ing r ang es for the var ious counts with which Petitioner was cha

rg ed, id. Def

ense counsel could only testify to his ge nera l prac tice. The District Court re c og nize d th a t de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s g e ne ra l pr a c tic e te sti mony was prob a tiv e , p art ic ula

rl y in light of the signific ant lapse of time since the r epre sentation, but found Petitioner’s testimony more
cre dible. Carrion , 644 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (“Althoug h this testimony is self-ser ving, I find it credible, espec ially g iven his dem ea n o r i n testifying a nd Carrion’s othe r cor

roborating testimony

that he la c ke d the so ph ist ic a tio n to inve nt. ” ); see also Cullen , 194 F.3d at 407 (e x plaining that although a ha be a s p e tit ion e r’ s te sti mony is o ft e n s e lf

-s e rv ing , “it o ug ht n ot t o b e re je c te d s ole ly

on thi sRespo n d en t also argues that the District Court er red in c oncluding that, under the 1 circ u m s t ances of this case , defe nse counse l’s failure to advise Petitioner to take the ple a dea l was constitutionally

defic ient, even if

defe nse counse l had advised Petitioner r eg arding his sentenc ing exposure if convicte d at trial. Carrion , 644 F. Supp. 2d at 468-70. We ne ed not r eac h this question beca use, as e x plained, we hold that the District Court d i d n o t commit clear err or in finding that 9 a c c ount” ). At

bo tto m, t

he Di str ic t Co ur

t c re dit e d Pe tit ion e r’ s te sti mony re g ard inghis sp e c if

ic
rec ollections over that of d efe nse counse l’s testimony reg ardinghis ge nera l prac tice. The re is no basis in this recor d to disturb this cre dibilit y finding
. See, e .g. , Anderson , 470 U.S. at 575 ( “[W ]hen a trial judg e’s f

indi ng is based on his dec ision to credit the testimony of one of

two or more witnesses, ea ch of whom has told a cohe rent a nd fac ially

plausible story

that is not contradicted by extrinsi c evide nce, that finding, if not inter nally incons istent, can virtually never be cle ar e rror .”). Wit h respe ct to Stri ckland ’s pre judice prong , Respondent ar g ues that the District Court
c omm itt e d c le ar e rr or

in f ind ingthat “ ha d [Pet iti on e r] kn ow n of the c on se qu e nc e s o f g oin g to t ri a l, he wo uld have a c c e pte d th e ple a

of fe r” and tha t he wa s not inf

lue nc e d in dec idi ngno t to ple a d guil ty by the prospec t of a re cover

y in a civil suit ag ainst the C ity
. Carrion , 644 F. Supp. 2d at 460, 471- 72 ; see also Cull en , 194 F .3 d at 405 (“ the de te rm inatio n of t he lik e lih oo d th a t [th e pe tit ion e r] w ou ld have a cce pted the plea

barg ain if he ha d been fully informed of its ter ms a nd acc urate ly

advised of the lik e ly se nte nc ingra

ng e s und e r t

he pl ea ba

rg a in a nd up on c on vic tio n a ft e r t

ri a l w a s, lik e a ll predic tions of what might have bee n, a fa ctual issue, albe it a hy pothetical one.” ). B ut this finding is also supported by

the re cord a

nd based on the District Court’s cre dibilit y deter minations. Carrion , 644 F. Supp. 2d at 471. Acc ording ly , the Dis trict Court’s finding s are not clear ly err oneous. See, e.g. , Anderson , 470 U.S. at 5 7 3 -74 (“Where ther e ar e two per missibl e views of

the evidenc e, the fac tfinder’ s choice betwee n them cannot be clea rly err oneous.”)
. 1de fe ns e c ouns e l di d n ot a dv ise Pe tit ion e r o f h is se nte nc inge xpos ur e if c on vic te d at tr ia l, a

nd it would be unre asonable to hold that, under the c ircumstance s of thi s ca se, this failure doe s not amount to ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. 10 Fi n al l y , we h o l d

t h at t h e D i s t ri ct C o urt d i d n o tex ce edi t s al l o wab l e d i s cr et i o ni ncr af t i n g a
reme dy . “We review t he dis trict court’s choice of [a habea s] remedy . . . for a n abuse of discretion.” Gordon , 156 F.3d at 381 (explaining that district courts have “c onsiderable discretion in fa shioning
a re m ed y ” wh er e a S i x t h Am en dm en t v i o l at i o n o cc urr ed(q u o t i n g United States v. Day , 969 F.2d 39, 47 (3 d Ci r. 19 92 )) ; se e als o Hilton v . B ra un sk ill , 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987). “ [W ]here ther e has be en a findingof ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel in a [habeas] proce eding , the re medy ‘should be tailore d to the injury

suffe red f

rom the constitutional violation and should not unneces s ar i l y i n fring e on competinginterests,’” Gordon , 1 5 6 F. 3 d at3 8 1 (q u o t i n g United States v. Morrison , 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981)) . “That reme dy is one that as much a s possible restores the defe ndant to the circ umstances that would have exis ted had there been no c onstitut ional err or.” U.S. v. Carmichae l , 216 F.3d 224, 227 ( 2d Cir. 2000). Her e, Petitioner wa s sen t en ced to a much har sher ter m of imprisonment as a re sult of not
acc epting the plea de al (125 y ear s to life). I n fashioningits remedy , the District Court focuse d on reduc ing Petitioner’ s sentence to that contemplated by the orig inal plea of

fer (ten y ears to life). Respondent ar g ues that this was an a buse of discr etion beca

use the terms of the plea

offe r re quired that Pe tit ion e r a llo c ute to t he e nti re ind ic tme nt. I t argue s th at th e c ourt wa s r e qu ir e d to va c a te Petitioner’s convictions in the ir entirety , to allow him to plead g uilty to criminal possession in the
secon d d e g re e and

to a llo c ute to t

he re ma ini ngc ha

rg e s o f t he ind ic tme nt, and

on ly the n c ou ld Petitioner be appr opriately rese ntence d. We disa g ree . Although there may be cir cumstance s where11

a c ourt ’s re fu sa l to imp le me nt c on dit ion s o f a ple a ba rg a in t hat r e ma in e a sy

to per fo rm

wo uld constitute an abuse of discretion, the fac ts of this c ase do not support such a conclusion. The r emedy thus “restore s the defe ndant to the c i rc u m s tance s that would have e x isted had there been no
co n s t itutional error,” Carmichael , 2 1 6 F
. 3 d a t 2 2 7 , b u tc o n c o m i t an t l y

“ [d o e s ] n o tun n e c e s s ar ily infring e on compe ting inter ests,” Gordon , 156 F.3d at 381. We do note that the District Court, s u a s p o n te , o rdered that Petitioner “immediate ly be summoned to the Parole Boa rd to de termine whe ther he is eligible f or re lease . . . .” Carrion , 644 F. Su p p . 2 d a t 4 7 4
. We d o n o t r e a d th a t a s p e c t o f th e D is tr ic t Co urt’ s d e c is io n to d ir ect that Petitioner be entitled to procedu re s o r t reatment with respec t to the decision of the Par ole B oard other than that require d under N ew Yor k law. SeeN.Y. E XEC . L AW § 259, et seq. (McKinne y ’s 2009). Fur

thermore , while the District Court stated that the Parole B oard w ill determine Petitioner’s elig ibilit y for parole “in light of his newly imposed sentence ,” Carrion , 644 F. Supp. 2d at 474, we do no t r e a d thi s a sp e c t of the c ourt ’s or de r to a br og a te , or in any wa

y a lte r, the fa c tor s that the Paro le Boa rd is entitled to consider in adjudicating the parole decision of an elig ible inmate. Under New York law , the P arole Boa rd will have a cce ss to Petit ioner’s c riminal rec ord and the circ umstances of his crime, a s well as var ious other re cord materials that will allow it to make an informe d decision
as t o wh et h er , and whe n, the Petitioner is fit for par ole. See N.Y. E XEC . L AW § 259, et seq . Al tho ug h Pe tit ion e r i s e lig ible fo r r e le a se , th e de c isi on to a c tua lly g ra

nt h im p aro le re ma ins wi thi n the dis c re tio n o f t

he Pa ro le B oa rd . Inmate s in Ne w Yo rk have no lib e rt

y int e re st i n p aro le be c a

us e12

under N ew Yor

k law ther e is no entitlement to relea se. Se e Ba rn a v . Trav is , 239 F.3d 169, 171 ( 2d Cir. 2001). We h av e co n sidered Re spondent’s re maining a rguments on appea l and find them to be meritless. Acc ording ly , we AF FI RM the District Court’s Opinion and Orde r.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk