UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 07-4876

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

ASHLEY TERRELL BROOKS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. 

Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:06-cr-00115-RJC) 

Submitted: September 30, 2008 Decided: October 14, 2008 

Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Ronald Cohen, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Adam Morris, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Ashley Terrell Brooks pled guilty without a plea 

agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The 

district court sentenced Brooks to 180 months in prison. Brooks 

timely appealed. 

 Brooks first contends that his guilty plea was not 

knowing and voluntary because, at his plea hearing, both the 

Government and defense counsel misinformed him regarding his 

status as an armed career criminal. In order to enter a knowing 

and voluntary guilty plea, a defendant must know the direct 

consequences of his guilty plea. Brady v. United States, 397 

U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 

1364, 1365 (4th Cir. 1973). “Direct consequences” are defined 

“as those having a ‘definite, immediate and largely automatic 

effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.’” Bryant v. 

Cherry, 687 F.2d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting Cuthrell, 475 

F.2d at 1366). Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(I), a defendant 

must be informed of any mandatory minimum penalty for his 

offense. 

 Although the Government and defense counsel expressed 

belief at the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing that Brooks was not an 

armed career criminal, both defense counsel and the magistrate 

judge noted that it was a possibility and the magistrate judge 

took great pains to ensure that Brooks understood that he might 

2 
qualify as an armed career offender and, if he did, he faced a 

mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison. Brooks 

stated at the plea hearing that he understood the situation and 

he is now bound by his statement. See Beck v. Angelone, 261 

F.3d 377, 395-96 (4th Cir. 2001) (absent “clear and convincing 

evidence” to the contrary, defendant is bound by statements made 

under oath at Rule 11 hearing). We therefore find that Brooks’ 

guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. 

 Brooks also argues that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to advise him that he qualified as an armed career 

criminal and therefore faced an enhanced penalty. Claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable 

on direct appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th 

Cir. 1997). Rather, to allow for adequate development of the 

record, a defendant must bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. 

§ 2255 (West Supp. 2008) motion. Id.; United States v. 

Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that his attorney’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 

and that counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy 

the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in the context of a 

guilty plea, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable 

3 
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill 

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 

 Here, the record does not conclusively show that 

Brooks was denied effective assistance of counsel. Assuming 

arguendo that counsel was or should have been aware at the time 

of Brooks’ guilty plea that Brooks qualified for the armed 

career criminal designation and should have so advised his 

client, Brooks was not prejudiced by the alleged error. The 

magistrate judge warned Brooks at the plea hearing that he might 

be subject to the armed career criminal enhancement and, even 

with this knowledge, Brooks elected to plead guilty. Because it 

does not appear conclusively from the record that counsel was 

ineffective, Brooks’ claim is not cognizable on direct appeal. 

 Brooks also asserts that the district court failed to 

adequately state the reasons for the sentence imposed or to 

sufficiently consider mitigating circumstances. We find this 

claim to be meritless. 

 This court reviews the sentence imposed by the 

district court for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 

128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 

468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). The appellate court must first ensure 

that the district court committed no “significant” procedural 

errors, such as “failing to calculate (or improperly 

4 
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as 

mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting 

a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 

adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an 

explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 

128 S. Ct. at 597. 

 If the appellate court concludes that the sentence is 

“procedurally sound,” the court then considers the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence. Id. “Substantive 

reasonableness review entails taking into account the ‘totality 

of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from 

the Guidelines range.’” Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473 (quoting Gall, 

128 S. Ct. at 597). 

 In this case, the district court correctly calculated 

the guideline range, treated the guidelines as advisory, and 

considered the § 3553(a) factors before imposing a sentence at 

the bottom of the guideline range and at the statutory mandatory 

minimum. Because the sentence was within the guideline range, 

we afford it a presumption of reasonableness which Brooks has 

failed to rebut. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 (4th 

Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 

(2007) (upholding presumption of reasonableness for withinguidelines sentence). Therefore, we are satisfied that the 

5 
6 

sentence was reasonable and the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing it.1 

 For these reasons, we affirm Brooks’ conviction and 

sentence.2 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED

 1

Brooks also cursorily asserts that his sentence enhancement 

under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1) 

(West 2000 & Supp. 2008), violates the Sixth Amendment because 

his prior convictions were not submitted to a jury, proved 

beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by him. We have 

previously rejected this argument. United States v. Cheek, 415 

F.3d 349, 352-54 (4th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. 

Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2005). 

2

We grants Brooks’ motion to file a pro se supplemental 

brief and find the claims therein to be without merit.