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### S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

**C O U R T O F A P P E A L S**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee, UNPUBLISHED August 8, 2017

v No. 334002 Chippewa Circuit Court

GERALDINE GALBRAITH TAECKENS, LC No. 15

- 001694

- FH

Defendant

- Appellant.

Before: S AAD

, P .J., and S ERVITTO and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Defendant appeals as of right her jury

- trial convictions of six counts of health care fr aud, MCL 752.1003(1). The trial court departed upward from the recommended sentencing guidelines range of 0 to 17 months’ imprisonment and sentenc ed defendan t to serve concurrent
terms of two to four years’ imprisonment for each of her convictions . We affirm.

The jury found that defendant improperly billed Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan for numerous purported psychotherapy sessions

. Evidence at trial revealed that defendant billed for occasions when she accompanied a patient to a community pool and when she took a therapy group out to dinner. Defendant also diagnosed the family members of several autistic children, who were part of a peer

- activity group she hosted, with mental health disorders without their knowledge, and then billed them for individual therapy. S he also billed for giving massages.

At sentencing , t he trial court explained that it found defendant’s actions “incredibly shocking and remarkably disturbing” and concluded that the recommended minimum sentencing guidelines range did not account for defen dant’s a buse of trust, th e fact that the crimes involved

the systematic and intentional exploitation of children and their families, or th e fact that defendant intentionally misdiagnosed children for financial gain. The trial court ultimately

concluded th at the duration of the fraud, the amount of money obtained, the inten tional nature of the misdiagnose s, the calculated nature of the crime s , and the sustained impact on the victims justified a sentence of two to four years’ imprisonment.

On appeal, defend ant argues that her departure sentence was unreasonable because the trial court’s rationale supporting the departure was inappropriate and the extent of the departure was disproportionately lengthy. We disagree.- 2

- We review a trial court’s decision to depart upward from the sentencing guidelines for

reasonableness under an abuse

- of

- discretion standard. People v Steanhouse , ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2017) (Docket Nos. 152671, 152849, 152871, 152872, 152873, 152946, 152946, and 152948); slip op at 14, 20. “The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes or when it erroneously interprets or applies the

law.” People v Lane , 308 Mich App 38, 51; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (citations omitted)

. In the sentencing context, a trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes a sentence that is not proportional under the standard set forth in People v Milbourn , 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Steanhouse , ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 14

- 16, 20.

A sentencing court must take into account the guidelines range when imposing a sentence and must justify the sentence imposed. People v Lockridge , 498 Mic h 358, 392; 870 NW2d 502 (2015). “ A sentence that departs from the applicable guidelines range will be reviewed b y an appellate court for reasonableness. ” Id . A reasonable sentence is one that satisfies the “principle of proportionality” test articulated in Milbourn , 435 Mich at 634

- 636. Steanhouse , ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 20.

In a nutshell, Milbourn ’s princip le of proportionality requires a sentence to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and

the offender. Milbourn instructs that departure sentences are appropriate where the guidelines do not adequately account for important factors legitimately considered at sentencing so that the sentence range calculated under the guidelines is disproportionate, in either direction, to the seriousness of the crime.

The extent of the departure must also satisfy the principle of pr oportionality. [ People v Masroor , 313 Mich App 358, 374; 880 NW2d 812 (2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by People v Steanhouse ___ Mich ___ (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Under Milbourn , the trial court may re weigh gu idelines variables and “remove the distortions induced by a classification system that is, by necessity, overly simplistic.” People v Houston

, 448 Mich 312, 327; 532 NW2d 508 (1995).

Defendant first argues that the trial court should not have imposed an upward

- departure

sentence because the sentencing guidelines already accounted for the repeti tive nature of her

conduct . We disagree.

Defendant’s argument implicates prior record variable (PRV) 7 and offense variable (OV) 13. PRV 7 involves “subsequent o r concurrent felony convictions.” MCL 777.57(1). The trial court in this case assessed 20 points under PRV 7, which is appropriate if a defendant has “2 or more subsequent or concurrent convictions.” MCL 777.57(1)(a). OV 13 involves a “continuing patte rn of criminal behavior.” MCL 777.43(1). The trial court assessed 5 points under OV 13, which is appropriate if the sentencing offense “was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more crimes against property.” MCL 777.43 (1)(f).

Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the trial court did not base its departure

rationale on the number or amount of crimes defendant committed, but rather on the duration of

defendant’s fraudulent conduct. Neither PRV 7 nor OV 13 accounts for the length of time over- 3

- which the fraudulent conduct took place. Evidence presented at trial revealed that defendant fraudulently billed patients for over three years . We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by cons idering the duration of defendant’s fraud ulent conduct because the sentencing guidelines did not account for this factor

.

Defendant next argue s that the trial court inappropriately considered her failure to pay

restituti on and the fact that she intentiona lly misdiagnosed patients . Defendant has abandoned

these arguments by failing to provide any legal authority in support of her position. People v

Matuszak , 263 Mich Ap p 42, 59; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). We nonetheless note, however, that the record is replet e with evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that defen dant intentionally misdiagnosed the family members of autistic children for her own financial gain.

Finally, defendant argues that her sentence was disproportionate because , comparing her

s entence to the sentencing grid, she was sentenced as if she were a much more serious offender. The purpose of proportionality in sentencing is to “protect[] against unjustified sentence disparity

betwe en similarly situated offenders [

. ] ” Milbourn , 435 Mic h at 6 36 . Even when a departure is appropriate, the extent of the departure may violate the principle of proportionality. Id . at 66 0.

In this case, the trial court supported its decision to depart from the sentencing guidelines

range by considering the duration of defendant’s conduct and by finding that the crimes involved the systematic, intentional exploitation of children and their families . The trial court found that the sentencing guidelines did not account for the victimization of the families. I t also found that defendant’s lack of criminal history was not mitigating because the fraud took place over a long period of time. These circumstances, supported by the record evidence, are both traits of the

offense and the offender. See Milbourn , 435 M ich at 636. The trial court’s decision to treat defendant as though she were an offender with a more serious criminal history was consistent with the trial court’s rationale for an upward departure

. 1 We conclude that the trial court’s decision to depart upward from defendant’s recommended guidelines range by seven months fell

within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.

Affirmed.

/s/ Henry William Saad

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Michael F. Gadola

1 We note that a minimum sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment is within the sentencing ranges applicable to class F offenses, but is below the greatest minimum sentence applicable to a non

habitual offender for a class F offense, which is 30 months’ imprison ment. See MCL 777.17d;

MCL 777.67.