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The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-1608

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

 v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Franz Joseph Grey, *

* [UNPUBLISHED] 

Appellant. *

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Submitted: December 18, 2009

Filed: March 1, 2010

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Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Franz Joseph Grey pled guilty to aiding

and abetting another by knowingly possessing, with the intent to defraud, over fifteen

unauthorized access devices (credit cards and bank account numbers) in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(3) and 2. In the plea agreement, Grey reserved the right to

appeal the district court’s1

 earlier denial of his motion to suppress. Although Grey’s

sentencing range under the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or
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Guidelines) was 10 to 16 months imprisonment, the district court sentenced Grey to

26 months imprisonment. On appeal, Grey argues the district court erred in

(1) denying Grey’s motion to suppress, (2) denying his motion for an investigator and

a continuance, (3) limiting the cross examination of one of the government’s witnesses,

and (4) imposing an unreasonable sentence. 

The district court properly denied Grey’s motion to suppress. “We review the

district court[’s] factual findings for clear error, but its conclusion that the Fourth

Amendment was violated is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Morgan, 270 F.3d

625, 630 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.

1999)). Grey admits he was speeding when he was stopped, see United States v.

Rodriguez-Lopez, 444 F.3d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Under the Fourth

Amendment, any traffic violation constitutes probable cause to stop the driver of the

vehicle.”), and our review of the record reveals no clear error in the district court’s

finding the search of the vehicle was consensual, see United States v. McGill, 125 F.3d

642, 644 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding consent validates a subsequent search if voluntarily

given). This lawful stop and consensual search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Grey’s other arguments also lack merit. The district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Grey’s motion for an investigator and a continuance, see United

States v. Obasi, 435 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review), or in limiting

cross examination to avoid confusion of the issues or marginally relevant testimony,

see United States v. Drapeau, 414 F.3d 869, 875 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Trial judges retain

‘wide latitude’ to impose ‘reasonable limits on . . . cross examination based on

concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the

witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’”

(quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986))). Finally, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Grey above his advisory Guidelines

range because the district court properly found the Guidelines range inadequately

reflected the extent and seriousness of the crime, Grey’s need for drug abuse and
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mental health treatment and society’s need for protection from potential future crimes

by Grey. Cf. United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)

(affirming a below-Guidelines sentence because it “rest[s] on precisely the kind of

defendant-specific determinations that are within the special competence of sentencing

courts”).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

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