IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

20 1 3 WY 98

APRIL TERM, A.D. 20 1 3

August 14, 2013

IVAN LEE SWEETS, SR.,

Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee (Plaintiff). S

- 12

- 0253

Appeal from the District Court of Sweetwater County

Th e Honorable Nena James , Judge

Representing Appellant: Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Wyoming Public

D efender Program. Argument by Mr. Westling.

Represen ting Appellee:

G r egory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Darrell D. Jackson, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Emily Thomas, Student Director; Rives White, Student Intern. Argument by Messers . Racines and White.

B e f o r e K I T E

, C

. J

. , a n d H I L L

, V O I G T

, B U R K E

, a n d D A V I S

, J J

.

N O T I C E : T h i

s o p i n i o n is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.

R e a d e r s a r e r e q u e s t e d t o n o t i f y t h e C l e r k o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t
, S u p r e m e C o u r t B u i l d i n g , C h e y e n n e , W

y o m i n g 8 2 0 0 2

, o f a n y t y p o g r a p h i c a l o r o t h e r f

o r m a l e r r o r s s o t h a t c o r r e c t i o n m a y b e

m a d e b e f o r e f i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e p e r m a n e n t v o l

u m e

.1

H I L L

, J u s t i c e

.

[¶ 1 ] Ivan Sweets was convicted of one count of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of wrongful disposing of that property. He was sentenced to terms of six to eight years on each count, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Sweets challenges the sufficiency of the evide nce to support his conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses, and he contends that the two criminal counts should have merged for purposes of sentencing.

[ ¶ 2 ] W e a f

f i r m a n d

, i n s o r

u l i n g
, w e o v

e r r u l e the “ same fact s or evidence test ” for

evalua ting sentencing merger questions. T he same elements test s h a l l h e n c e f o r t h s e r v e a s

o u r s o l e t e s t f

o r e v a l u a t i n g m e r g

e r q u e s t i o n s

. 1

I S S U E S

[¶ 3 ] Sweets states the issues on appeal as follows:

I

. Did the court err by denying [Sweets’] motion for judgment of acquittal for the reason that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict on obtaining property by false pretenses?

I I

. Did the court err in denying [Sweets’] motion to merge sentences in that both convictions arose from a single act and

a sin gle set of facts?

F A C T S

[¶ 4 ] In April 2010, Sweets approached Mary Froman at her residence in Rock Springs, Wyoming and offered to clean up her property by removing junk iron and parts that he could sell for scrap. Ms. Froman agreed and showed Sweets th e items that she would permit him to remove from her property. Ms. Froman also showed Sweets the items that she did not want removed from her property and that she did not consider junk that could be scrapped. Among the items Ms. Froman told Sweets she d id not want removed were the attachments to a crane that was parked on her property, including the crane ’ s boom, buckets, and dolly.

1 See Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) ( s e t t i n g forth same elem ents test); see also James v. State , 2012 WY 35, ¶ 22, 271 P.3d 1016, 1022 (Wyo. 2012) (Voigt, J., specially concurring and urging abandonment of same facts or evidence test and return to elements test only); Winstead v. State , 2011 WY 137, ¶ 16, 261 P.3d 743, 746 (Wyo. 2011) (Voigt, J., specially concurring); Baker v. State , 2011 WY 123, ¶ 23, 260 P.3d 268, 274 (Wyo. 2011) (Voigt, J., specially concurring); and Najera v. State , 2009 WY 105, ¶ 17, 214 P.3d 990, 995 (Wyo. 2009) (Voigt, C.J., specially concurring)

.2

[¶ 5 ] About a month later, in May 2010, Sweets again contacted Ms. Froman, this time to tell her that he had located a buye r for her crane. Ms. Froman testified as follows concerning the conversation:

A

. H e a s k e d i f h e c o u l d t a l k t o m e a b o u t t

h e c r a n e

a n d I s a i d y e s
, w

h a t i s g o i n g o n

. A

n d h e s a i d I h a v

e a b u y e r f o r y o u r c r a n e

. A

n d I s a i d

, o h

, o k a y

. A

n d h e s a i d t h i s b u y e r is from Pinedale, he wants your crane, but he doesn ’ t want any of the boom, buckets or any of this other stuff, he just

wants the crane. I told him at this time what he could do is he could tell the person that I was willing to sell the crane. I told

hi m the price. But I said, the boom, bucket, all of this goes

with the crane. If he don ’ t want that he has to deal with you, not with me. He has it, he has it, it ’ s lock, stock and barrel, he takes the crane and all the parts. I just didn ’ t want to deal with a whole bunch of people with different things going on. The crane was $30,000 for the boom, buckets, crane and

attachments. Q

. S o i t w a s a p a c k a g e d e a l ?

A

. R i g

h t

. Q

. H e t a l k e d a b o u t a b u y e r f r o m P i n e d a l e

. D i d h e

e v e r t e l l y o u w

h o t h a t w a s ?

A

. N o

. Q

. Did he ever

– did you ever talk to anyone from

Pinedale?

A

. N o

.

[¶ 6 ] Sometime after that conversation, between the months of June and September 2010, Sweets asked Ms. Froman if he could purchase the crane himself. Ms. Froman responded by offering Sweets the same package deal

– $30,000 for the crane and its attachments. Sweets and Ms. Froman had continuing conversations, and during one of those conversations, Ms. Froman agreed to finance the $30,000 purchase price.

Q

. W e r e t h e r e c e r t a i n t h i n g s t h a t y o u t o l d h i m h e

w o u l d n e e d t o d o i n o r

d e r f o r y o u t o a g

r e e t o f i n a n c e t h e

c r a n e ?

A

. Y e s
, I d i d

. Q

. W h a t w e r e t h o s e t h i n g s ?

A

. T h a t h e h a d t o h a v e i n s u r a n c e o n i t

. H e h a d t o h a v e t h e c r a n e i n r

u n n i n g c o n d i t i o n

. H e h a d t o k e e p i t u p

. H e h a d t o s t a y i n

– all of the regulations and everything that

w e n t o n w i t h t h e s t a t e a s f a r a s p e r m i t s
, f

e e s
, e v e r y

t h i n g
, h e3 h a d t o d o
, h e h a d t o g

e t a l l o f t h e s e g

a t h e r e d a r o u n d

. H e h a d

t o h a v e a g o o d m e c h a n i c

. H e h a d t o h a v e a p l a c e t o p u

t i t

w h i l e h e w o r k e d o n i t b e c a u s e m y d r i v e w a y w a s n o t g

o i n g t o b e o p e n t o h i m h a v

i n g a b u n c h o f s t u f

f a r o u n d t h e r e w o r k i n g

o n t h e c r a n e

. H e h a d t o h a v e a p l a c e t o w o r k o n i t

. H e h a d

t o m o v e i t t o t h a t p l a c e
, s o h e h a d t o h a v e e n o u g h m o n e y t o get permits to even move it after he

– Q

. W a s t h e r e a c o n

t r a c t t h a t w a s w r i t t e n a t s o m e

p o i n t r e g a r d i n g y o u f

i n a n c i n g t h e c r a n e f

o r h i m ?

A

. I w r o t e a c o n

t r a c t w i t h h i m t h a t s t a t e d t h a t i f h e

w a n t e d t o b u y t h i s c r a n e
, i t w a s a 4 5

- t o n c r a n e
, i t w a s w i t h

5 1 0 f o o t o f b o o m
, i t w a s f

o u r b u c k e t s
, a d o l l y a n d s o m e j i b

. I f h e w a n t e d t o t a k e t h i s c r a n e a n d h e w a n t e d t o k e e p i t i n

g o o d s h a p e a n d w o r k o n i t

, I w o u l d w o r k w i t h h i m a n d g o

o v e r a t h r e e

- y e a r p e r i o d o f f i n a n c i n g t o $ 3 0

, 0 0 0 f

o r h i m

.

[¶ 7 ] Sometime later, Sweets told Froman that he had made the a rrangements she had requested and had secured: an individual willing to assist him in financing the costs of insurance (James Reinard); a mechanic to help Sweets work on the crane (Randy Shipman); and an auto recycling operation owner who would allow Sweet s to store and work on the crane on his property (Jim Rasmussen). Ms. Froman did not know James Reinard, but she knew and trusted Randy Shipman and Jim Rasmussen, and she

i nstructed Sweets to set up a meeting with each of the individuals so she could veri fy their arrangements with Sweet s . The meetings Ms. Froman requested did not occur, and

the contract remained unexecuted.

[¶ 8 ] In October 2010, Sweets again contacted Ms. Froman, and this time he requested permission to move the crane and its attachments to Jim Rasmussen ’ s business property, 5 Star Auto and Truck Recycling. Ms. Froman testified as follows concerning that

conversation:

A

. W e l l

, h e c a m e t o m e a n d s a i d t h a t h e h a d

s o m e o n e t h a t c o u l d m o v e t h e c r a n e u p t o 5 S t a r a n d t h a t h e

w a s s u p p o s e d t o c l e a n u p t h e i r y a r d i n e x c h a n g e f o r t h e

t r u c k i n g o f m y b o o m a n d b u c k e t s a n d e v e r y t h i n g u p t o 5 S t a r

. Q

. W a s t h e r e a t i m e t h a t y o u t o l d h i m t h a t i t w o u l d

b e o k a y t o t a k e t h e i t e m s u p t o 5 S t a r ?

A

. Only when he

– he called me

– after I said I had

told him I wasn ’ t going to let anything go until we get this contract signed and everything, he came to me, he called me and said the trucking company that is going to move that up there has a contract. They are going to be busy and it / s getting cold. It ’ s getti ng winter, it ’ s g o i n g t o b e h a r d t o t r a v

e l4 a n d e v e r y t h i n g
, c a n I m o v

e t h e b o o m a n d b u c k e t s a n d c r a n e

u p t h e r e n o w

. A

n d I t o l d h i m n o
, n o t u n t i l y o u g e t t h i s

s i g n e d

, n o t u

n t i l w e h a v

e a n a g r e e m e n t o n t h i s

. A

n d h e s a i d

, b u t c a n I j u s t m o v

e t h e b o o m a n d b u c k e t s f o r n o w a n d g

e t

t h e m o n p a l l e t s o u t o f t h e m u d a n d e v e r y t h i n g

. S o I t o l d h i m

y e s
, t h e b o o m a n d t

h e b u c k e t s c o u l d g

o u p t h e r e t o 5 S t a r o n a

p a l l e t

, b u t t h e c r a n e w a s n o t t o g o u n t i l t h e c o n

t r a c t a n d everything

– until he had all his people going. I didn ’ t feel like the boom and buckets could be worked anywhere else expect (sic) on the crane and the crane was stationary in my yard, I could see it. So I thought it was okay to let the boom and buckets be at this place where he was going to start a

busi ness.

[¶ 9 ] On October 13, 2010, Sweets arrived at Ms. Froman ’ s property followed by a truck owned by Legend Trucking. At Sweets ’ direction, the truck driver loaded the

crane ’ s boom and jib. There were several other crane attachments that Sweets wanted

t aken at the same time, but those items would not fit on the truck with the boom and jib. Legend Trucking did not deliver the crane attachments to 5 Star for storage, but instead delivered the items to Pacific Steel, a steel recycling operation, where the items were sold for scrap. Leonard Bartels, the driver, testified:

A

. I t o o k i t d o w

n t o P a c i f

i c S t e e l a n d w e i g

h e d i n

a g a i n
, l i k e I n o r m a l l y d o

. T h e y t o l d m e t o g o g e t i t u n l o a d e d

,

w e n t d o w

n a n d g o t i t u n l o a d e d

. A

n d c o m e b a c k u p o n t h e

s c a l e s a n d g

o t o u t o f t h e t r

u c k

. A n d I v a n [ S w e e t s ] w a s t h e r e and he said I have got it taken care of, and I said all right, I ’ ll talk to you later. And that was it. Q

. S o I v

a n f o l l o w e d y o u d o w

n t o P a c i f i c S t e e l ?

A

. Y e s

. Q

. H o w d i d y o u k

n o w t o t a k e t h o s e i t e m s t o
P a c i f i c S t e e l ?

A

. B e c a u s e h e t o l d m e t o

.

[¶ 10 ] On December 15, 2010, Ms. Froman called Jim Rasmussen to check on the boom and jib and make sure they were not in his way or in a bad place for him. Mr. Rasmussen informed Ms. Froman that none of her crane part s were being stored in his lot, and Ms. Froman immediately contacted the Sweetwater County Sheriff ’ s Office. Sweets did not pay Ms. Froman for the crane parts, and after Ms. Froman discovered that the crane parts

were not delivered to the 5 Star lot for s torage, she did not again permit Sweets on her

property.5

[ ¶ 1 1 ] I n J u l y 2 0 1 1

, t h e S t a

t e f i l e d a n I n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g

i n g S w e e t s w i t h o n e c o u n t o f

w r o n g f u l t a k i n g o r d i s p o s i n g o f p r o p e r t y a n d o n e c o u n t o f o b t a i n i n g p r o p e r t y b y f a l s e

p r e t e n s e s

. A j u r y t r i a l w a s h e l d o n J a n u a r y 9

- 1 1 a n d 1 9

- 2 0

, 2 0 1 2

. O n J a n u a r y 2 0

, 2 0 1 2

, t h e j u r y r e t u r n e d a v

e r d i c t f i n d i n g S w e e t s g

u i l t y o n b o t

h c o u n t s

. O n J a n u a r y 3 1

, 2 0 1 2

, S w e e t s f i l e d a M o t i o n f

o r J u d g m e n t o f A c q u i t t a l a n d a N e w T r i a l

, w h i c h t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r

t
d e n i e d f r o m t h e b e n c h

. O n F e b r u a r y 1 0

, 2 0 1 2

, S w e e t s f i l e d a M o t i o n f

o r M e r g e r o f

S e n t e n c e s
, w

h i c h t h e c o u r

t a l s o d e n i e d

.

[¶ 12 ] On April 11, 2012, the court held a sentencing hearing for the purposes of sentencing Sweets on the two counts at issue in this appeal, as well as on a separate delivery of methamphetamine count. The court sentenced Sweets to six to eight years on each of the two counts at issue in this appeal, to run consecutively. Sweets filed this timely appeal.

D I S C U S S I O N

A

. S u f

f i c i e n c y o f t h e E v i d e n c e

[ ¶ 13 ] Sweets contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses because the evidence shows nothing more than a commercial dispute. Sweets asserts that the promises on which Ms. Froman reli ed were promises to perform acts in the future, namely his promise to execute a contract to purchase the crane and his promise to make payments on that contract, and he argues, such promises of future performance cannot support a false pretenses conviction . We disagree with Sweets ’ characterization of the evidence and conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for obtaining property by false pretenses.

[¶ 14 ] In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim,

we examine and accept as true the State’s evidence and all

reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could hav e reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the

s upporting evidence is direct or circumstantial

.

Craft v. State , 2013 WY 41, ¶ 18, 298 P.3d 825, 830

- 31 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting D awes v. State , 2010 WY 113, ¶ 17, 236 P.3d 303, 307 (Wyo. 2010) (citations omitted) )

.
[¶ 15 ] A person who knowingly obtains property from another person by false pretenses with the intent to defraud that person is guilty of a felony if the value of the prop e r t y i s6

o n e t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s o r m o r e

. W y o

. S t a t

. A n n

. § 6

- 3

- 4 0 7 ( a ) ( i ) ( L e x i s N e x i s 2 0 1 3 )

. T h e

p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d b e l o w t h a t t h e v a l u e o f t h e c r a n e a t t a c h m e n t s a t i s s u e w a s i n e x c e s s o f

o n e t h o u s a n d d o l l a r s

. A s t o t h e r e m a i n i n g e l e m e n t s
, w e h a v e h e l d t h a

t to prove a violation of § 6

- 3

- 407(a), the State must prove: “ (1) the pretenses; (2) their falsity; (3) the fact of obtaining property by reason of the pretenses; (4) the knowledge of the accused of their falsity; and (5) the intent to defraud

. ” Lopez v. State , 788 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Wyo. 1990). “ I ntent to defraud is an essential element of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses that may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and circumstantial

evidence. ” Trevino v. State , 2006 WY 113, ¶ 12, 142 P.3d 214, 218 (Wyo. 2006).

[¶ 16 ] To the extent that the alleged false pretenses relate to a promise of future acts, this

Court has further said:

S p e c i f i c i n t e n t i s a n e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t o f t h e c r i m e o f

o b t a i n i n g p r o p e r t y b y f

a l s e p r e t e n s e s i n W y o m i n g

. I n o r d e r t o

s u c c e e d i n a p r

o s e c u t i o n f

o r a p r o m i s e t o p e r f

o r m f u t u r e a c t s
, t h e S t a t e i s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e t h a t a d e f

e n d a n t h a d t

h e i n t e n t

n o t t o p e r f

o r m a p r o m

i s e a s w e l l a s t h e f

a l s i t y o f t h e

p r o m i s e s / p r e t e n s e s
, t h a

t p r o p e r t y w a s o b t a i n e d b y r e a s o n o f

t h e p r e t e n s e s
, a n d t h e k

n o w l e d g e o f t h e a c c u s e d o f t h e i r f a l s i t y

.

Craver v. State , 942 P.2d 1110, 1113

- 14 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Lopez , 788 P.2d at 1152 ; Miller v. State , 732 P.2d 1054, 1063

- 64 (Wyo. 1987) ).

[¶ 17 ] Sweets was convicted of obtaining Ms. Froman ’ s crane attachments by false pretenses. In e v

aluating the State ’ s evidence that supports this conviction, we disagree with Sweets that the focus is or should be on whether he ultimately intended to execute the $30,000 crane purchase agreement. Instead, our focus is on the representations

Sweets mad e to induce Ms. Froman to release the crane attachments to him. Regarding those representations, the State ’ s evidence, which we accept as true, was as follows:

- - M s

. F r o m a n t e s t i f

i e d t h a t S w e e t s t o l d h e r t h a t h e h a d l i n e d u

p t h r e e i n d i v

i d u a l s
, J a m e s R e i n a r d

, R a n d y S h i p m a n
, a n d J i m R a s m u s s e n
, t o a s s i s t h i m w i t h r e p a i r s t o t h e

c r a n e a n d i t s a t t a c h m e n t s b y p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i n g t o a s s i s t i n t h e c o s t o f i n s u r a n c e a n d

r e p a i r s
, m e c h a n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e w i t h t h e r e p a i r s t h e m s e l v e s
, a n d a l o c a t i o n t o s t o r e t h e

c r a n e a n d i t s a t t a c h m e n t s d u r i n g t h o s e r e p a i r s ;

- - J a m e s R e i n a r d

, R a n d y S h i p m a n
, a n d J i m R a s m u s s e n e a c h t e s t i f

i e d t h a t n o s u c h

a r r a n g e m e n t s h a d b e e n m a d e ;

- - I n p a r t i c u l a r
, J i m R a s m

u s s e n
, o w

n e r o f 5 S t a r A

u t o a n d T r

u c k R e c y c l i n g
, t e s t i f i e d t h a t S w e e t s h a

d n e v e r d i s c u s s e d w i t h h i m t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s t o r i n g t h e c r a n e7

a t t a c h m e n t s o n h i s p r o p e r t y o r s t o r i n g t h e c r a

n e o n h i s p r o p e r

t y w h i l e i t w a s b e i n g

r e p a i r e d ;

- - M s

. F r o m a n t e s t i f

i e d t h a t S w e e t s t o l d h e r t

h a t h e i f s h e a l l o w e d h i m t o t a k e t h e

c r a n e a t t a c h m e n t s
, h e w o u l d m o v e t h e m t o 5 S t a r t o b e s t o r e d a n d p r o t e c t e d f r o m t h e

e l e m e n t s ;

- - M s

. F r o m a n t e s t i f

i e d t h a t s h e a g

r e e d t o a l l o w S w e e t s t o t a k e t h e c r a n e

a t t a c h m e n t s b e c a

u s e s h e b e l i e v

e d h e w a s m o v

i n g t h e m t o t h e 5 S t a r p r o p e r t y f o r s t o r a g e ;

a n d

- - L e o n a r d B a r t e l s
, t h e d r i v e r w h o p i c k e d u p t h e c r a

n e a t t a c h m e n t s
, t e s t i f

i e d t h a t

a f t e r h e l o a d e d t h e c r a n e a t t a c h m e n t s o n h i s t r

u c k

, h e i m m e d i a t e l y d e l i v e r e d t h e m t o Pacific Steel in accordance with Sweets ’ instructions.

[¶ 18 ] The State ’ s evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Sweets misrepresented both existing facts as well as his intended future performance, and that he intended by those false pretenses to defraud Ms. Froman and obtain her property. The evidence showed that Sweets represented to Ms . Froman that he was going to move her property to a better protected location for storage and that she relied on that promise in allowing him to take her property. The evidence further showed that Sweets had not secured a more protected location to store the property and that Sweets instead directed that the property be immediately transported to Pacific Steel where he sold the property

f or its scrap value. From this evidence, the jury could certainly infer Sweets ’ intent to defraud Ms. Froman, and we th us reject Sweets ’ sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his false pretenses conviction.

B

. S e n t e n c i n g M e r g e r

[¶ 19 ] Sweets contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to merge the sentences for his convictions for obtaining property by false pretenses and wrongful disposing of property. We recognize that protection against multiple punishments for the same offense is a protection afforded by both state and federal double jeopardy provisions. James v. State , 2012 WY 35, ¶ 12, 271 P.3d 1016, 1018 (Wyo. 2012). Because sentencing merger presents a constitutional question, we review the issue as

follows:

This Court reviews de novo the question of whether a

defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy

has been violated. Daniel v. State , 2008 WY 87, ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 859, 862 (Wyo. 2008) . We consider protections provided by

t h e f i f t h a m e n d m e n t t o t h e U

n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u

t i o n a n d b y8 a r t

. 1

, § 1 1 o f t h e W

y o m i n g C o n s t i t u t i o n t o b e e q

u i v a l e n t

. I d

. , ¶ 8, 189 P.3d at 862

.

James , ¶ 9, 271 P.3d at 1018.

1

. O v e r v i e w o f M e r g e r A n a l y s i s

[¶ 20 ] The double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Wyoming constitutions afford three distinct protections: “ 1) [P]rotection against a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal; 2) protection agai nst a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and 3) protection against multiple punishments for the

same offense

. ” James , ¶ 12, 271 P.3d at 1018 (quoting Meyers v. State , 2005 WY 163, ¶ 9, 124 P.3d 710, 714 (Wyo. 2005) )

. We are concerned in this case wit h the third protection, that being the protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.

[¶ 21 ] With respect to the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments, the United States Supreme Court has held that the key inquiry is whethe r the legislative

branch intended the defendant ’ s conduct to result in separate offenses and separate punishments

— and if the legislature did so intend, then there is no double jeopardy

violation.

In contrast to the double jeopardy protection against multi ple

trials, the final component of double jeopardy

— protection against cumulative punishments

— is designed to ensure that the sentencing discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the legislature. Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature, United States v. Wiltberger , 5 Wheat. 76, 93, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820) , the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are “multiple” is essentially one of legislative intent, see Missouri v. Hunter , 459 U.S. 359,

366

– 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678

– 679, 74 L.Ed. 2d 535 (1983)

.

O h i o v

. J o h n s o n , 4 6 7 U

. S

. 4 9 3

, 4 9 9

, 1 0 4 S

. C t

. 2 5 3 6

, 2 5 4 0

- 4 1

, 8 1 L

. E d

. 2 d 4 2 5 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ( f o o t n o t e o m

i t t e d )

.

[¶ 22 ] One commentator has summarized the protection against multiple punishments and the Supreme Court ’ s approach to determining the constitutionality of multiple punishments as follows:

T h e D o u b l e J e o p a r d y C l a u s e d o e s n o t l i m i t l e g i s l a t i v e

a u t h o r i t y t o d e f

i n e p u n i s h m e n t

. I

n t h e c a s e o f r e l a t e d

c o n v i c t i o n s
, a l e g i s l a t u r e c a n f i x t h e s e n t e n c e o r s e n t e n c i n g9 r a n g e
, p r o v i d e d o n l y t h a t i t f

a l l s w i t h i n t h e b r o a d r a n g e

p e r m i t t e d b y t

h e c o n s t i t

u t i o n a l p r o h i b i t i o n o n c r

u e l a n d

u n u s u a l p u n i s h m e n t a n d t h e d u e p r o c e s s r e q u i r e m e n t o f

f undamental fairness. Therefore, in evaluating a defendant ’ s multiple punishment claim , the focus is legitimately,

i n evitably, and almost exclusively on legislative intent. The only question is whether the punishment exceeds that

i ntended by the legislature.

A n n e B

. P o u l i n
, A

r t i c l e : D o u b l e J

e o p a r d y a n d M u l t i p l e P u n i s h m e n t : C

u t t i n g t h e G o r d i a n K n o t

, 7 7 U

. C o l o

. L

. R e v

. 5 9 5

, 5 9 7 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ( f o o t n o t e s o m

i t t e d ) ; s e e a l

s o
A l b e r n a z v

. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 4 5 0 U

. S

. 3 3 3

, 3 4 4

, 1 0 1 S

. C t

. 1 1 3 7

, 1 1 4 5

, 6 7 L

. E d

. 2 d 2 7 5 (1981) ( “ [T] he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not

different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. ” ); Whalen v. United States , 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1436, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) (acknowledging that power to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishment “ resides wholly ” in the legislative branch); Brown v. Ohio , 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed. 2d 187 (1977) ( “ Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments [.] ” ).

[¶ 23 ] Consistent with this focus on the legislature ’ s power to define what constitutes a separate criminal offense and authorize separate punishment for se parate offenses, the United States Supreme Court has adopted the following analytical framework f or determining whether a defendant has been subjected to multiple punishments in violation of double jeopardy protections:

A s i n g l e a c t m a y b e a n o f

f e n s e a g a i n s t t w o s t a t u t e s ; a

n d i f

e a c h s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s p r o o f o f a n a d d i t i o n a l f a c t w h i c h t h e

o t h e r d o e s n o t

, a n a c q

u i t t a l o r c o n v

i c t i o n u n d e r e i t h e r s t a t u

t e d o e s n o t e x e m

p t t h e d e f

e n d a n t f r o m p r o s e c u t i o n a n d

p u n i s h m e n t u

n d e r t h e o t

h e r

.

B l o c k b u r g e r , 2 8 4 U

. S

. a t 3 0 4

, 5 2 S

. C t

. a t 1 8 2 ( c i t a t i o n s o m

i t t e d )

.

[¶ 24 ] The Blockburger a nalysis has become known as the “ same elements test, ” and it is essentially a test aimed at determining legislative intent.

The test articulated in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) , serves a generally similar function of identifying congressional intent to impose separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course10 o f a s i n g l e a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n

. I

n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r s e p a r a t e

p u n i s h m e n t m

i g h t b e i m

p o s e d

, B l o c k

b u r g e r r e q u i r e s t h a t

c ourts examine the offenses to ascertain ‘whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’

Id. , at 304, 52 S.Ct., at 182. A s Blockburger a nd other decisions applying its principle reveal ... the Court’s

a pplication of the test focuses on the statutory el ements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the

crimes.

Albernez , 450 U.S. at 337

- 38, 101 S.Ct. at 1141

- 42 (quo ting Iannelli v. United States , 420 U.S. 770, 785, n.17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1293, n.17, 43 L.Ed. 2d 616 (1975) ) ; see also

W halen , 445 U.S. at 691

- 92, 100 S.Ct. at 1437

- 38 ( Blockburger same elements test as rule of statutory construction to determine legislative intent).

[¶ 25 ] Our Court has likewise long applied the Blockburger same elements test for determining whether convictions should merge for sentencing. See, e.g., James , ¶ 12, 271 P.3d at 1018; Howard v. State , 762 P.2d 28, 32 (Wyo. 1988). We have stated:

Federal double je opardy law appears to have been settled in

United States v. Dixon , 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L.Ed. 2d 556 (1993) , with the Supreme Court’s holding that “[i]n both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where t he two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried

cannot survive the ‘same

- elements’ test, the double jeopardy bar applies.” The inquiry under the same

- elements test is

“whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not , they are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.” Id. Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court recognizes and follows the same

- elements test. See,

e.g., Granzer v. State , 2010 WY 130, ¶ 13, 239 P.3d 640, 645 (Wyo. 2010) ; Snow v. State , 2009 WY 117, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 505, 510 (Wyo. 2009) ; and Najera v. State , 2009 WY 105, ¶ 11, 214 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2009)

.

James , ¶ 12, 271 P.3d at 1018 (quoting Rathbun v. State , 2011 WY 116, ¶ 6, 257 P.3d 29, 32 (Wyo. 2011) ).11

[ ¶ 2 6 ] T h i s C o u r t h a s n o t

, h o w e v e r
, l i m i t e d i t s a n a l y s i s o f s e n t e n c i n g m e r g e r q u e s t i o n s t o

a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s a m e e l e m e n t s t e s t

. F o r s o m e t i m e
, w e h a v e r e q u i r e d a n a d d i t i o n a l

i n q u i r y i n t o t h e f

a c t s p r o v e n a t t r i a l

, a n a n a l y s i s w e s h a l l r e f e r t o i n t h i s o p i n i o n a s t h e f a c t s o r e v i d e n c e t e s t

.

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s a m e

- e l e m e n t s t e s t

, t h i s C o u r t h a s a l s o

c o n s i d e r e d a m e r g e r d o c t r i n e t h a t a l l o w s f o r t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

o f o t h e r f a c t o r s :

T h e q u e s t i o n o f m e r g e r a s a b a r t o m u l t i p l e s e n t e n c e s f o r t h e s a m e a c t

, h o w e v

e r
, s u m m o n s a m o r e c o m p l e x

a p p e l l a t e s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w

. A s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r
, i n

a p p e a l s a l l e g

i n g i m p o s i t i o n o f m

u l t i p l e s e n t e

n c e s f o r a

s i n g l e a c t

, t h e f

o c u s n e c e s s a r i l y e x

p a n d s t o e m

b r a c e

t h o s e f a c t s p r o v

e n a t t r i a l

. T h e u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n b e c o m e s w

h e t h e r t h o s e f

a c t s r e v e a l a s i n g

l e c r i m i n a l

a c t o r m u l t i p l e a n d d i s t i n c t o f

f e n s e s a g a i n s t t h e v i c t i m

o r v i c t i m s a n d h e n c e t h e S t a t e

.

James , ¶ 1 3

, 2 7 1 P

. 3 d a t 1 0 1 9 ( q u o t i n g B ilderback v. State , 13 P.3d 249, 254 (Wyo. 2000) ); see also W

instead , ¶ 1 4 , 261 P.3d at 746 ; Najera , ¶ 1 1 , 214 P.3d at 99 4; Rouse v.

State , 966 P.2d 967, 970 (Wyo. 1998); Owen v. State , 902 P.2d 190, 193 (Wyo. 1995);

Rivera v. State , 840 P.2d 933, 944 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶ 27] Th e facts or evidence test requires the following additional analysis to determine whether convictions should merge for sentencing:

I n deciding whether offenses merge, the question is whether the offenses charged “necessarily involve” one another, or

whethe r any additional facts are needed to prove additional offenses once the primary offense has been proven. In deciding merger questions, we focus not only on the

s imilarity of the elements of the crimes, but also, and primarily, on the facts proved at trial, for the question is whether those facts show that in practical effect the defendant committed but a single criminal act

.

Bilderback

, 13 P.3d at 25 5 (quoting Commonwealth v. Whetstine , 496 A.2d 777 , 779

- 80 ( Pa. Super. 1985) ).

[¶ 28 ] Having set forth the general framework for our merger analysis, we next apply the two merger tests, the same elements test and the facts or evidence test, to the offenses for

which Sweets was convicted and sentenced in this case.12

2

. A p p l i c a t i o n o f S a m e E l e m e n t s T e s t

[¶ 29 ] On appeal, Sweets does not appear to contest the district court ’ s conclusion that merger of his sentences was not required under the same elements test. Instead, he argues that the court erred in not finding that application of the facts or evidence test required a merger. Nonetheless, in the interest s of providing a complete analysis, we address the same elements test. In doing so, we conclude that the crimes of obtaining property by false pretenses and of wrongful disposing of property have different elements and that the legislature intended separa te criminal offenses with separate sentences for

each offense.

[¶ 30 ] Again, our inquiry under the same elements test is whether each criminal offense

contains an element not contained in the other

. James , ¶ 12, 271 P.3d at 1018. The jury instructions gi ven below set forth the elements of each criminal offense with which Sweets was charged. Instruction No. 12 defined the elements of obtaining property by false pretenses:

1

. O n o r b e t w e e n t h e 1 s t d a y o f O c t o b e r
, 2 0 1 0

,

a n d t h e 1 5 t h d a y o f D e c e m b e r
, 2 0 1 0

, 2

. I n S w e e t w a t e r C o u n t y , W y o m i n g
, 3

. T h e D e f

e n d a n t

, I v a n L e e S w e e t s
, S r

. , 4

. W i t h i n t e n t t o d e f

r a u d M a r y F r o m a n
, 5

. K n o w i n g l y o b t a i n e d c r a n e p a r t s f r o m M a r y
F r o m a n
, 6

. B y f

a l s e p r e t e n s e s
, a n d

7

. T h e v

a l u e o f t h e p r o p e r t y o b t a i n e d w a s $ 1

, 0 0 0

. 0 0 o r m o r e

.

[¶ 31 ] Instruction No. 13 defined the elements of wrongful disposing of property:

1

. O n o r b e t w e e n t h e 1 s t d a y o f O c t o b e r
, 2 0 1 0

,

a n d t h e 1 5 t h d a y o f D e c e m b e r
, 2 0 1 0

, 2

. I n S w e e t w a t e r C o u n t y , W y o m i n g
, 3

. T h e D e f

e n d a n t

, I v a n L e e S w e e t s
, S r

. , 4

. D i d dispose of Mary Froman ’ s crane parts with a value of $1,000.00 or more,

5

. W h i c h h e k

n e w , b e l i e v

e d o r h a d r e a s o n a b l e

c a u s e t o b e l i e v

e w e r e o b t a i n e d i n v

i o l a t i o n o f l a w

.

[¶ 32 ] The elements outlined in the jury instructions track the statutory language of each

offense. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 3

- 407 (LexisNexis 201 3 ) (Obtaining Property by False Pretenses); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 3

- 403 (LexisNexis 201 3 ) ( W r o n g f u l D i s p o s i n g o f13

P r o p e r t y )

. 2 A comparison of those elements shows that each offense clearly contains a t
l e a s t o n e e l e m e n t t h a t t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t

. O b t a i n i n g p r o p e r t y b y f a l s e p r e t e n s e s r e q u i r e s

t h e s h o w i n g o f a n i n t e n t t o d e f r a u d

, w h e r e a s w r o n g f u l d i s p o s i n g o f p r o p e r t y c o n t a i n s n o

s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t

. S e e Trevino , ¶ 12, 142 P.3d at 218 ( “ Intent to defraud is an essential element of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses [.] ” ); Capshaw v. State , 737 P.2d 740, 744 (Wyo. 1987) (statute proscribing wrongful receipt or disposing of property requires no showing of specific intent). And, wrongful disp osing of property requires a showing that the property was disposed of, whereas obtaining property by false pretenses contains no such requirement. See Miller v. State , 732 P.2d 1054, 1062 (Wyo. 1987) (Crime of obtaining property by false pretenses is com plete upon obtaining property from victim.).

[¶ 33 ] Application of the same elements test illustrates that the legislature intended the crimes with which Sweets was charged and convicted to be separate offenses with separate punishments. Moreover, we have held that “ [w] here independent but

2 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 3

- 407 provides:

(a) A person who knowingly obtains property from another person by false pretenses with intent to defraud the person is guilty of:

(i) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both , if the value of the property is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or more; or

(ii) Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 44, § 3.

(iii) A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if the value of the property is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6

- 3

- 403 provides:

(a) A person who buys, receives, conceals or disposes of property which he knows, believes or has reasonable cause to beli eve was obtained in violation of law is guilty of:

(i) A felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both, if the value of the property is one thousand dollars ($1,000.00 ) or more; or

(ii) Repealed by Laws 1984, ch. 44, § 3.

(iii) A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, if the value of the property is less than one th ousand dollars ($1,000.00).

(b) A person may be indicted under this section in the county where he received or possessed the property, notwithstanding the wrongful taking occurred in another county.14

o v e r l a p p i n g s t a t u t e s a r e d i r e c t e d t o s e p a r a t e e v i l s
, c u m u l a t i v e p u n i s h m e n t s a r e i n t e n d e d

. ”

James , ¶ 14, 271 P.3d at 1019 ( ci ting Nowack v. State , 774 P.2d 561 , 567 (Wyo. 1989) ). With respect to the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses we have observed t hat

“ the g ravamen of the offense is in making the false pretense, and obtaining thereby a person’s property or signature and does not depend upon ultimate loss to the victim [

. ] ”

Anderson v. State , 196 P. 1047, 1051 (Wyo. 1921) (citation omitted). The off ense of wrongful disposing of property, on the other hand, is by its plain terms aimed at the evil of what happens to the property after it is wrongfully obtained. As we explained in

Garcia v. State , 777 P.2d 1091 (Wyo. 1989), the evil the legislature sou ght to address in the wrongful concealing or disposing of property statute does not shield the actual thief from its coverage:

He attempts to shore up this obvious weakness in his

argument by contending that the possessory offenses of receiving and conce a

ling were intended by the legislature to reach only a thief’s accessories after the fact. He cites no cogent authority in support of this position, however, and ignores past decisions of this court suggesting a contrary conclusion. Where evidence strongly indicated the defendant’s involvement in the underlying theft, we upheld his conviction for receiving and concealing stolen oil field drill bits based on his unexplained possession of those bits. Tageant v. State , 673 P.2d 651 (Wyo. 1983) ; see also

C apshaw v. State , 737 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1987)

. Furthermore, we expressly rejected the argument tha t an admitted thief could not be charged and convicted of concealing the stolen property in Pote v. State , 695 P.2d 617, 622 (Wyo. 1985)

. I f we were to adopt appellant’s argument, the State would be required to offer evidence that someone other than the possessor of stolen good s committed the actual theft. This court has repeatedly rejected such a requirement. See

g enerally State v. Callaway , 72 Wyo. 509, 267 P.2d 970 (1954) ; Curran v. State , 12 Wyo. 553, 76 P. 577 (1904)

. A ppellant fails to consider that the evil which the legislature intended to address in this instance may just as well have been the mere wrongful possession and use of stolen

property. The evil character of such possessory acts does not disappear when an unproved thief engages in such acts only to magically reappear when a fence or some other third party engages in similar conduct. Where the thie f can be proven to have committed the lesser offense, we will not permit him to obstruct prosecution by giving partial proof of greater guilt.15 A p p e l l a n t w a s p r o p e r l y c h a r g e d a n d p r o s e c u

t e d f o r

c o n c e a l i n g s t o l e n p r o p e r t y

.

G a r c i a , 7 7 7 P

. 2 d a t 1 0 9 4

.

[¶ 34 ] Application of the Blockburger same elements test reveals a legislative intent to make obtaining property by false pretenses and wrongful disposing of property separate criminal offenses and to impose separate punishments for violation of those offenses. Under the same elements analysis, Sweets ’ multiple punishments did not violate double jeopardy protections and his convictions were not required to merge for sentencing.

3

. A p p l i c a t i o n o f F a c t s o r E v i d e n c e T e s t

[¶ 35 ] As discussed above, our facts or evid ence test focuses not on the statutory elements of the charged offenses, but on the facts proved at trial and “ whether those facts show that in practical effect the defendant committed but a single criminal act

. ”

Bilderback

, 13 P.3d at 25 5. It is on this test that Sweets relies in contending that the district court erred in denying his merger motion. Sweets argues that his acts of obtaining and disposing of the crane attachments occurred together and at once and resulted, in practical effect, in but a si ngle criminal act. Sweets ’ argument has merit under our facts or evidence test. Given, however, that the same elements test reveals such a clear legislative intent to define separate offenses with separate punishments, we decline to require a merger of S weets ’ sentences. Instead, we find that this case highlights the need to reconsider our facts or evidence test, which on close examination, we conclude should yield to the constitutionally

- based same elements test as the sole means to analyze sentencing m erger questions.

[¶ 36 ] We begin our reconsideration of the facts or evidence test by reviewing two cases

in which this Court ’ s application of the test has resulted in findings that convictions must merge for sentencing. We start our analysis here because , although both cases address offenses entirely different from the offenses with which Sweets was charged and convicted, the reasoning in the two cases illustrates how the facts or evidence test must apply to the offenses at issue in the case before us.

[ ¶ 37 ] In Najera , we required merger of a father ’ s multiple convictions for sexual assault

and incest. We reasoned:

In this case



### . . . five of the six sexual assault charges (counts I and III through VI) required proof that Appellant was the

father of the v

ictims and was, therefore, in a position of authority as required by the applicable statute. The incest charges also required the State to prove that Appellant was

t h e f a t h e r o f t h e v

i c t i m s

. A l l s e x

u a l a s s a u l t c h a r g

e s r e q u i r e d16 e i t h e r s e x u a l i n t r u s i o n o r s e x

u a l c o n t a c t

, a n d s o d i d t

h e i n c e s t

c h a r g e s

. I n s h o r t
, i t w o u l d b e i m

p o s s i b l e f o r A p p e l l a n t t o

c o m m i t s e c o n d

- o r t h i r d

- d e g r e e s e x u a l a s s a u l

t b a s e d u p o n

t h e u s e o f h i s p o s i

t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y a s f a t h e r o f t h e v i c t i m s

w i t h o u t a l s o c o m m i

t t i n g i n c e s t

. W e c o n c l u d e t

h a t t h e i n c e s t

c o u n t s V I I

, I X

, X

, X I

, a n d X I I m e r g e
, f o r t h e p u r

p o s e o f

s e n t e n c i n g
, i n t o t h e s e x

u a l a s s a u l t c o u n

t s I

, I I I

, I V

, V

, a n d V I

,

r e s p e c t i v e l y

.

Najera , ¶ 13, 214 P.3d at 994 (emphasis added).

[¶ 38 ] In Bilderback

, we addressed merger of a def endant ’ s convictions for attempted second degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. Applying the

same elements test, we found that no merger was required because the two offenses had

different elements

. B ilderback , 13 P.3d at 254. B u t, in applying the facts or evidence test, we concluded that merger was required, explaining:

It is undisputed that Mr. Bilderback’s only act which caused him to be found guilty of attempted second

- degree murder was the shooting of Officer Parkin. Ob viously, under the facts in this record, that shooting could not have been accomplished without the use of the firearm. The state presents a theoretical argument that not all attempted second

degree murder scenarios necessarily involve the use of a

firearm , and this is certainly true. But that is not the correct analysis. We must carefully examine the facts of this case and

determine whether this defendant’s offenses under § 6

- 1

- 3 0 1 ( a ) ( i ) and § 6

– 2

– 104 could have occurred without the defendant necessarily committing an offense under § 6

- 8

- 1 0 1 ( a )

. T h e y c o u l d n o t

.

B i l d e r b a c k

, 1 3 P

. 3 d a t 2 5 5 ( e m

p h a s i s i n o r i g

i n a l )

.

[¶ 39 ] Our decisions in Najera and Bilde rback illustrate that in applying the facts or evidence test, our inquiry has focused on whether the S tate used the same facts or evidence to prove all elements of the convicted offenses ( Najera ), or whether one of the

convictions subsumes the other

— that i s, whether under the facts in evidence, the only way one of the offenses was committed was by commission of the other ( Bilderback ). Where the answer to either question is in the affirmative, we have required merger of the convictions for sentencing.

[¶ 40 ] Turning then to the present case, the reasoning of Najera and Bilderback requires

that we consider whether either of Sweets ’ c o n v i c t i o n s
, o b t a i n i n g p r o p e r t y b y f a l s e17

p r e t e n s e s o r w

r o n g f u l d i s p o s i n g o f p r o p e r t y , w a s s u b s u m e d b y t h e o t h e r o r w a s b a s e d o n

t h e s a m e f

a c t s

. W e c o n c l u d e t h a

t t h e a n s w e r t o b o t

h q u e s t i o n s i s y e s

.

[¶ 41 ] In arguing the facts or evidence test, Sweets focuses his attention on the wrongful disposing of property offense and asserts that the only way he could have wrongfully disposed of property under the facts proven was through his offense of obtaining property by false pretenses. That is, the wrongful disposing could not have occurred without the first offense. The State argues in response that wrongful disposing of property requi res only a showing that the property was obtained in violation of law and there are any number of ways to prove that

— for example, a third party could have stolen the property and given or sold it to Sweets. The State ’ s observation is certainly true, and u nder the same elements test its argument would be relevant to the inquiry. Under the facts or evidence test, however, we do not consider, as we explained in B ilderback , the theoretically possible ways to prove the elements of the multiple offenses. The f acts or evidence test instead requires that we “ examine the facts of this case and determine

whether this defendant’s [offense under § 6

- 3

- 403 (wrongful disposing)] * * * could have occurred without the defendant necessarily committing an offense under [§ 6

- 3

- 407 (obtaining property by false pretenses)]. ” See Bilderback , 13 P.3d at 255. As in

B ilderback , we conclude that it could not.

[¶ 42 ] I n this case, the facts show that Sweets ’ wrongful disposing of property could not

have occurred without his obtain ing property by false pretenses. That is simply the way it happened in this case. Moreover, while the State certainly can prove the offense of obtaining property by false pretenses without showing that the property was then disposed of, the State in this case placed great emphasis on the fact of Sweets ’ wrongful disposing of the property and relied on that fact to prove his offense of obtaining property by false pretenses

— more specifically, to prove his intent to defraud. In other words, the State argued to the jury: Sweets said he was moving the crane attachments for safekeeping, but instead he immediately sold the property

— and that is evidence of his

f raudulent intent. The State ’ s closing argument to the jury illustrates its reliance on

Sweets ’ action s as one fluid transaction to prove the fraudulent intent element of the obtaining property by false pretenses:

W a s t h e r e a v e r

b a l a g r e e m e n t ? Y e s
, t h e r e w a s

. W h a t

w a s t h e o n l y v

e r b a l a g r e e m e n t t h a t t h e r e w a s ? I v a n c o u l d

t a k e s o m e o f t h e p a r t s a n d p u t t h e m a t 5 S t a r

. T h a t w a s t h e

a g r e e m e n t

. T h a t i s n o t w h a t h a p p e n e d

. T h e f

a c t t h a t I v a n

t o l d M a r y n u m e r o u s t h i n g s i n o r d e r t o m a k e h e r b e l i e v e t h a t
i s w h a t w a s g o i n g t o h a p p e

n a n d t h e n t o o k h e r p r o p e r

t y a n d

d i s p o s e d o f i t a s h e s a w f i t i s w h e r e t h e i n t e n t t o d e f

r a u d i s

.

. . .

. . . .18 I n m y m i n d I c o m

p a r e t h i s c a s e t o a c a s e w h e r e y o u h a v e a v e h i c l e t h a t y o u t a k e f

o r a t e s t d r i v

e

. Y o u t a k e a

v e h i c l e f o r a t e s t d r i v

e
, t h a t y o u a r e s u p p o s e d t o b r i n g i t b a c k

. Y o u a r e s u p p o s e d t o t a k e c a r e o f i t

. Y o u m i g h t b e b u y i n g

t h a t v e h i c l e a n d t

h e c a r c o m

p a n y t h a t y o u p i c k i t u p f

r o m

t h i n k s t h e y a r e g

o i n g t o l e t y o u b o r r o w i t s o t h a t y o u c a n b u y

t h a t

, d o y o u h a v

e p e r m i s s i o n t o g

o d o w n t o P a c i f i c S t e e l a n d

s c r a p i t f o r $ 1 0 0 ? N o
, y o u d o n o t

. I f t h e d e a l i s y o u a r e

g o i n g t o b r i n g i t b a c k a n d y o u a r e g o i n g t o k e e p i t s a f

e
, y o u don ’ t get to scrap the car.

[¶ 43 ] As a practical matter, the facts in this case show that Sweets engaged in and was convicted of a single criminal transaction

— he scrapped property that was entrust ed to him for safekeeping. Under these circumstances, the facts or evidence test instructs that

Sweets ’ convictions should merge for sentencing. We are troubled by this prospect, however, because our application of the same elements test reveals a clear legislative intent to separately punish the crimes of obtaining property by false pretenses and wrongful disposing of property, and under the United States Supreme Court prescribed double jeopardy analysis, legislative intent is the controlling determinant in evaluating the constitutionality of multiple punishments.

F o c u s i n g d o u b l e j e o p a r d y a n a l y s i s o n m

u l t i p l e p u

n i s h m e n t

c o n c e r n s l e a d s i n e x o r a b l y t o d e f e r e n c e t o l e g i s l a t i v

e i n t e n t

. T h e a p p r o p r i a t e p u n i s h m e n t f o r c r i m i n a l c o n d u c t i s w

h a t e v e r

t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d e t e r m

i n e s

. A n y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f d o u b l e j e o p a r d y p r o t e c t i o n t

h a t d i d n o t g i v

e d e t e r m i n a t i v

e w e i g h t t o l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t w o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y a n d i m p r o p e r l y a c t a s a

s u b s t a n t i v

e l i m i t a t i o n o n t

h e p o w e r o f t h e l e g

i s l a t u r e t o d e f

i n e

c r i m e a n d p u n i s h m e n t

.

P o u l i n
, s u p r a , 7 7 U

. C o l o

. L

. R e v

. a t 6 0 6 ( f o o t n o t e s o m

i t t e d ) ; s e e a l

s o G a r r e t t v

. U n i t e d

S t a t e s , 4 7 1 U

. S

. 7 7 3

, 7 7 9

, 1 0 5 S

. C t

. 2 4 0 7

, 2 4 1 1

, 8 5 L

. E d

. 7 6 4 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ( n o d o u b l e j e o p a r d y b a r t o l e g i s l a t u r e p u n i s h i n g s e p a r a t e l y e a c h s t e p l e a d i n g t o c o n s u m m a t i o n o f

t r a n s a c t i o n a

n d a l s o p u n i s h i n g t h e c o m

p l e t e d t r a n s a c t i o n ) ; H

u n t e r , 4 5 9 U

. S

. a t 3 6 8

, 1 0 3 S.Ct. at 679 ( “ Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments, ” and double jeopardy does not preclude legislature from authorizing cumulative punishments un der two statutes for the same conduct.); Brown , 432 U.S. at 165, 97 S.Ct. at 2225 ( “ [T] he Fifth Amendment double jeopardy guarantee serves principally as a restraint on courts and prosecutors. The legislature remains free under the Double Jeopardy Clause to define crimes and fix punishments [.] ” ); Albrecht v. United States , 273 U.S. 1, 11, 47 S.Ct. 250, 254, 71 L.Ed. 505 (1927) (recognizing legislative branch power to punish separate steps in a criminal transaction).19

[ ¶ 4 4 ] T h e d i v

e r g e n t r e s u l t s i n t h i s c a s e b e t w e e n a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s a m e e l e m e n t s t e s t

a n d t h e f a c t s o r e v i d e n c e t e s t b r i n g t o t h e f o r e f r o n t t h e a m

b i g u i t y t h a t t h e f

a c t s o r

e v i d e n c e t e s t h a s i n

j e c t e d i n t o o u r m e r g

e r a n a l y s i s

. W e r e c o g

n i z e t h e n e e d t o a d d r e s s

t h a t a m b i g u i t y , b u t w e a r e a

l s o m i n d f u l t h a t t h i s C o u r t m

u s t a p p r o a c h t h e p r

o s p e c t o f

o v e r r u l i n g p r i o r c a s e l a w w i t h g r e a t c a u t i o n :

We consider the doctrine of stare decisis to be an important principle which furthers the “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal princip les, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Cook v. State , 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee , 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) ).

Nevertheless, we should be willi ng to depart from precedent when it is necessary “to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Id

. When precedential decisions are no longer workable, or are poorly reasoned, we should not feel compelled to follow precedent. Stare decisis is a policy doctrine and should not req uire automatic conformance to past decisions

Brown v. City of Casper , 2011 WY 35, ¶ 4 3

, 2 4 8 P

. 3 d 1 1 3 6

, 1 1 4 6 ( W y o

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( q u o t i n g State ex rel. Workers’ Comp ensation Div. v. Barker , 978 P.2d 1156, 1161 (Wyo. 1999) ).

[¶ 45 ] Giving due respect to the important role of stare decis is , we nonetheless conclude, based on the need to align our merger analysis with the principles of double jeopardy law dictated by the United States Supreme Court, that this Court must overrule the facts or evidence test for evaluating double jeopardy chal lenges to multiple punishments. In addition to our discussion above, other considerations have informed our decision that the time has come to retool our sentencing merger analysis.

[¶ 46 ] First, the United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected the same facts or evidence test as unworkable and contrary to longstanding interpretation of the Fifth

Amendment ’ s double jeopardy protections. The Supreme Court ’ s repudiation of the test came after that court itself deviated from strict application of the Bl ockburger same elements test for evaluating double jeopardy claims and adopted a “ same conduct ” test,
which mirrors the same facts or evidence test. See Grady v. Corbin , 495 U.S. 508, 510, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2087, 109 L.Ed. 2d 548 (1990). Just three years a fter adopting the same conduct test, the Supreme Court overruled itself, characterizing the same conduct test as lacking a constitutional basis and as unstable in its application. United States v. Dixon

,20

5 0 9 U

. S

. 6 8 8

, 7 0 4

- 0 9

, 1 1 3 S

. C t

. 2 8 4 9

, 2 8 6 0

- 6 3

, 1 2 5 L

. E d

. 2 d 5 5 6 ( 1 9 9 3 )

. T h e C o u r t

s t a t e d

, i n p a r t :

We have concluded, however, that Grady must be

overruled. Unlike Blockburger a nalysis, whose definition of what prevents two crimes from being the “same offence,” U.S. Const., Amdt. 5, has deep historical roots and has been accepted in numerous precedents of this Court, Grady lacks

constitutional roots. The “same

- conduct” rule it announced is wholly inconsistent with ear lier Supreme Court precedent and

with the clear common

- l a w u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d o u b l e j e o p a r d y

. S e e
, e

. g

. , G a v ieres v. United States , 220 U.S., at 345, 31 S.Ct.

, at 416 (in subsequent prosecution, “[w]hile it is true that the conduct of the accused was one and the same,

two offense s resulted, each of which had an element not embraced in the other” ).

. . .

. . . .

Having encountered today yet another situation in which the pre

- Grady understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause allows a second trial, though the “same

- conduct” test would not, we think it time to acknowledge what is now, three years after Grady

, compellingly clear: the case w as a mistake. We do not lightly reconsider a precedent, but,

because Grady contradicted an “unbroken line of decisions,” contained “less than accurate” historical analysis, and has produced “confusion,” we do so here.

D i x o n , 5 0 9 U

. S

. a t 7 0 4

, 7 1 1

, 1 1 3 S

. C t

. a t 2 8 6 0

, 2 8 6 4 ( f o o t n o t e a n d c i t a t i o n s o m

i t t e d )

.

[¶ 47 ] We also observe that our own Court, in evaluating double jeopardy claims, has emphasized that the protection relates to “ offenses, ” as defined by statutory elements and not as defined by a defendant ’ s particular actions. See Granzer v. State , 2010 WY 130

, ¶ 16, 2 39 P.3d 640, 646 (Wyo. 2010) (The focus of the Blockburger test is not on the similarity of the evidence relied on to prove the elements of the offenses but on the elements themselves.); Cook v. State , 841 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Blac k’s Law Dictionary 1081 (6th ed. 1990) ) ( “ As used in the Double Jeopardy Clause, ‘ same offense ’ m eans ‘ t h e s a m e c r i m e
, n o t t h e s a m e t r a n s a c t i o n
, a c t s
, c i r c u m s t a n c e s
, o r situation. ’” )

. E v

e n a f t e r a d o p t i n g t h e f

a c t s o r e v i d e n c e t e s t 3 , this Court expressed a

3 It appears that this Court first applied the facts or evidence in 1992 in Rivera

, 8 4 0 P

. 2 d a t 9 4 4 ( “ I n d e c i d i n g m e r g e r q u e s t i o n s
, w e f o c u s n o t o n l y o n t

h e s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f t

h e c r i m e s
, b u t a l s o
, a

n d21

c o n t i n u e d a d h e r e n c e t o a n d e v

e n p r e f e r e n c e f o r t h e s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s t e s t f o r r e v i e w i n g d o u b l e j e o p a r d y c l a i m s r e l a t e d t o m u l t i p l e p u n i s h m e n t s :

T h e B l o c k

b u r g e r t e s t i s t h e o n e c h o s e n t o d e t e r m i n e i f

o f f e n s e s h a v e i d e n t i c a l s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s o r i f t h e e l e m e n t s

o f a n o f f e n s e a r e i d e n t i c a l t o s o m e o f t h e e l e m e n t s o f a

g r e a t e r o f f e n s e i n r e a c h i n g a c o n c l u s i o n a s t o w h e t h e r i t i s a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e

. D i x o n

.

I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e B l o c k

b u r g e r a n a l y s i s p a r a l l e l s t h e

s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s t e s t f o r l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e s

. T h e

a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e B l

o c k b u r g e r t e s t h a s n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h

t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l

. C o r b i n

. A s B l o c k

b u r g e r i s

t r a c e d t h r o u g h C o r b i n

, F e l i x

, a n d D i x o n

, i t i s c l e a r t h a

t i t s

r o l e i s t o b a r a s u b s e q

u e n t p r o s e c u t i o n i f o n e o f t h e t w o

o f f e n s e s i s a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f t h e o t

h e r

. T h a t
d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s m a d e s o l e l y u p o n a c o m

p a r i s o n o f t

h e

s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s

.

Logically, the protection accorded by the double jeopardy clause with respect to multiple punishments should be based upon t he same test. The double jeopardy clause prevents a “sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” M issouri v.

Hunter , 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) . The cumulative punishment analysis must be made in the light of the dichotomy in the a pproach of the Supreme Court of the United States. Historical review of the origin of

the Blockburger test discloses that its use for multiple prosecution and cumulative punishment is consistent.

. . . .

W e a r e s a t i s f

i e d t h e s t a t

u t o r y e l e m e n t s a n a l y s i s

s h o u l d b e u s e d a s t h e f o u n d a t i o n f

o r d o u b l e j e o p a r d y

p r o t e c t i o n i n c o n

n e c t i o n w i t h b o t h m

u l t i p l e p r o s e c u

t i o n s

a n d m u l t i p l e o r c u m

u l a t i v e p u n i s h m e n t s

. O n c e t h e o f f e n s e i s c l a s s e d a s a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e
, t h e n a m

u l t i p l e

p r o s e c u t i o n o r a m

u l t i p l e p u n i s h m e n t i s f

o r e c l o s e d

. A m o r e b r o a d l y

- s t a t e d t e s t t h a

n t h e s t a t u t o r y e l e m e n t s a n a

l y s i s f o r arriving at lesser included offenses such as the inherent

p r i m a r i l y , o n t h e f a c t s p r o v e d a t t r i a l

, f o r t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t

h e r t h o s e f a c t s s h o w t

h a t i n p r a c tical effect the defendant committed but a single criminal act.”).22 r e l a t i o n s h i p s t a

n d a r d s i m p l y i n v i t e s f r e q u e n t q

u e s t i o n s

c o n c e r n i n g d o u

b l e j e o p a r d y v

i o l a t i o n s
, e s p e c i a l l y f

o r

c u m u l a t i v e p u n i s h m e n t

. T h i s r e s u l t s h o u l d b e a v o i d e d

.

S t a t e v

. K e f f e r , 8 6 0 P

. 2 d 1 1 1 8

, 1 1 3 0

- 3 1 ( W y o

. 1 9 9 3 )

.

[¶ 48 ] In a recent decision, we expressed our recognition that federal law is firmly grounded in its reliance on the same elements test for double j eopardy analysis, and we cited our own continuing allegiance to that approach:

Federal double jeopardy law appears to have been settled in

United States v. Dixon , 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) , with the Supreme Court’s holding that “[i]n both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried

cannot survive the ‘same

- elements’ test, the double jeopardy bar applies.” The inquiry under the sa m e

- elements test is

“whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution.” Id

. Like the United States Supreme Court, this Court recognizes and follows the same

- elements test. See,

e.g.

, Granzer v. State , 20 10 WY 130, ¶ 13, 239 P.3d 640, 645 (Wyo. 2010) ; Snow v. State , 2009 WY 117, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 505, 510 (Wyo. 2009) ; and Najera v. State , 2009 WY 105, ¶ 11, 214 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2009)

.

Rathbun v. State , 2011 WY 116, ¶ 6, 257 P.3d 29, 32 (Wyo. 2011).

[¶ 49 ] The case before us illustrates that appl ication of the same facts or evidence test will not always yield results that are consistent with the same elements test. Because the same elements test is the test both mandated by the United States Supreme Court and historically relied on by this Court, and to align our double jeopardy analysis with federal precedent and our own precedent, we hereby overrule the same facts or evidence test. T he

same elements test s h a l l h e n c e f o r t h s e r v e a s o u r s o l e t e s t f

o r e v a l u a t i n g s e n t e n c i n g

m e r g e r q u e s t i o n s

. 4

4 Given the Court’s decision, the term “merger of sentences” has little utility in our jurisprudence. I n t h e

r a r e i n s t a n c e t h a t t w o c r i m i n a l s t a t

u t e s a r e f o u n d t o c o n t a i n t

h e s a m e e l e m e n t s
, t

h e c o n v i c t i o n s u

n d e r

t h o s e s t a t u t e s w o u l d m e r g e f

o r t h e p u r p o s e o f s e n t e n c i n g

. I f o n e c r i m e c a r r i e s a g r e a t e r p e n a l t

y t h a n t h e

o t h e r
, t h a t w o u l d b e t

h e p e n a l t y a p p l i e d

. I n t

h e e v e n t o f s u c h a m e r g e r
, t

h e c o n v i c t i o n s w o u l d a l s o m e r g e

a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t i n q u e s t i o n w o u l d t

h e n c a r r y o n l y a s i n g l e c o n

v i c t i o n f o r w a r d i n h i s o r h e

r r e c o r d

.23 C O N C L U S I O N

[¶ 50 ] Sweets ’ conviction and sentence are affirmed. To the extent our past decisions have applied the facts or evidence test to evaluate sentencing merger, those decisions are

overruled. See, e.g., James , ¶ 1 3, 271 P.3d at 1019; W instead , ¶ 1 4

, 261 P.3d at 746 ; Najera , ¶ 1 1 , 214 P.3d at 99 4 ; Bilderback

, 13 P.3d at 254 ; Rouse , 966 P.2d at 970; Owen

, 902 P.2d at 193; Rivera , 840 P.2d at 944. The same elements test is now the controlling inquiry for evaluating questions of sentencing merger.