The Honor able J. Ronni e Gr eer , United States Dist ri ct J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0552n.06 No. 08-5898 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, )

P laintif f-App ellee, ) ) v. ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE ) UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T ) COURT F OR THE WE STE RN ) DISTRICT OF K ENTUCKY TYRONE MONTGOM ERY, )

Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) OP IN ION Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; WHITE , Circuit Judge; and GREER, Distric t Judge. * GREER, District Judge . Def endant- Appellant, Ty

ron e M ontgome ry

(“Montg omery”),

a pp e a ls h is c on vic tio ns fo r d istri bu tin g c ra c k c oc a ine and fo r pos se ssi ng wi th the int e nt t o d istri bu te

c ra c k c oc a ine and po wd e r co c a ine

. Mo ntg ome ry argue s tha t the dis tr ic t court e rr e d b y de nyinghis motion to di smiss t he indictment on Speedy Trial Ac t gr ounds and that the district cour t erred by fa ili ngto s up pr e ss e vid e nc e . M on tg ome ry a lso ra ise s c la ims of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. For the re asons that follow, we AFF I RM the judgme nt of the district c ourt, and we decline to r eac h Montgome ry ’s claims of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l, without prejudice to Montg omery ’s rig ht to raise the c laims in a proce eding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

2 I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound On Fe bruar

y 26, 2007, a confidential informant named Steven Auber ry (“Auberr y ”) c alled Montgome ry

to set up a cr ack c ocaine deal. On F ebrua ry 27, Auber

ry , using mone y

provided by

the Drug Enforc ement Administration ( “DEA ”) and the Har din County Kentucky Drug T as kForce, purcha sed approximately three ounces of cra ck coca ine from Montgome ry . The purcha se took place at Montg omery ’s re sidence at 1117 Plum Run Road in Ba rdstown, Kentuc ky

. On Marc h 13, Auber

ry called Montgome ry

to arra ng e an a dditional purchase of four ounces of coc aine. Auber

ry was instructed by Montgome ry to come to the Plum Run R oad addr ess. B efor e Auber ry arr ived at Montg omery ’s re sidence , surveillance ag ents observe d Montgom ery sitti ng on the porch at the Plum Run Road house, appar ently waiting for Auber ry . When Au b er ry

ar rived, Montgome ry g ot in the passeng er side of Aube rry ’s truck a nd they left. Montg omery

told Auberry that he did not have a

ny cra ck coca ine at the Plum Run Road addre ss and had to g o to another pla ce to ge t it. L aw e nforc ement off icer s followed Mon t go m er y and Aube rry

to a sec ond house at 106 Guiness Court in Bard s t o wn . Whil e Aube rry waited in the truc k, Montgome ry went inside the house. Off

icer s then watc hed Montg omery return to the tr

uck and M o n t go mery

and Aube rry

r e tu r n e d t o 1 1 1 7 P l u m R

u n R o a d

. M o n t g o m e r

y d e l i v e r e d

1 1 1

. 6 g r a m s o f

c r a c k c o c a i n e t o A u

b e r r y. Shortly afterw ar d s , M ontgome ry left the Plum Run R oad house a nd was stopped a

short d i s tance awa

y by a Ne lson County

Sheriff’ s deputy . Montgome ry was re turned to the Plum Run Road house whe re a

sear ch wa

rra nt issued by

Kentucky

C i rc u i t C o u rt J udg e Charle s Sim ms was execut ed. Ag ents found the money paid by Auber ry for the pur chase of the four ounces of

cra ck

coca ine in a bed ro o m clos et. Afte r the sea rch, D etec tive Serg eant Thoma s R. Roby , J r., the lea dNo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

3 inv e sti g a tor , r e tur

ne d to Judg e S im ms t o o bta in a se arc h w arr ant f

or the Gu ine ss C ourt

a dd re ss wher e Montg omery

had bee n taken to re trieve the cra ck coc aine. Dur ing that searc h, ag ents found 45.2 g rams of c rac k coca ine and 334.7 g rams of pow der c ocaine in a bedroom closet, along with a

se t of sc a le s. Montgome ry

was intervie wed a fter the sear ch by DEA Spec ial Ag ent Du an e S tandaf er. Stand a fe r ad

vis e d Mon tg ome ry

of his Miranda ri g hts and , a ft e r w a ivi nghis ri g hts , M on tg ome ry tol d Standafe r that he w as re nting the Plum Run Road house b u t re fu s ed t o identify the owner

. Montgome ry

also disclosed that, althoug h he did not live at the Guiness Court house, he stay ed ther e

on occa sion and kept clothing there

. Montgome ry

was c harged b y crimi nal complaint on Marc h 14, 2007, and made an initial appea ranc e on the same date. Cou n s el wa s appoint ed and a preliminary

hear ing a

nd detention h ea ri n g we re s ch edu l ed fo r Ma rc h 1 6

. M o n t go m ery s u b s eq u en t l y wa i v ed a p re l i m i n ary h ea ri n g, was orde red de tained, and his a rra ignme nt was sche duled for A pril 17. Montgome ry

was indicted

on April 2, 2007, by a fede ral g rand jury and char g ed with two c ounts of possession with the intent to d istri bu te and

dis tr ibutin g 50 g ra

ms o r mor e of c ra c k co c a ine and on e c ount o f p os se ssi on wi th the intent to distribute both c rac k and powde r coc aine. Montg omery was a rra igne d on April 17, and trial was se t for June 18. On May 23, a joint motion t o continue the trial date w as filed. The district court g rante d the motion on J une 11 and f urther pr ocee dings w ere schedule d for July 30. On J uly 15, Montgome ry

filed a motion to suppress evide nce seized during both the Plum Run Roa d a nd the Gu ine ss Court se arc he s. Th e g ov e rnme nt’ s re sp on se wa s d ue July 30 . O n July 27 , th e g ov e rnme nt m ov e d f or an exte ns ion of tim e to re sp on d to the mot ion to s up pr e ss. On Au g us tNo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

4 3, the district court orde red that Montgomer y supplement the motion to suppre ss by Aug ust 13, that the g overnme nt respond by Aug ust 27, and that Montgome ry ’s reply be filed by September 10. O n Aug ust 13, Montgome ry filed a suppleme ntal brief in support of his moti on to suppress. The g ov e rnme nt r e sp on se wa s fi le d on Se pte mbe r 18 , a ft e r an e xten sio n o f t ime wa s g ra nte d. No re ply was filed by Montgome ry . The g overnme nt f iled a supplement to its response , without objection,

on Oc tob e r 3 . O n O c tob e r 2 2, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e mot ion to su

pp re ss. No ne w tri a l date was set. On J anuar y 15, 2008, Montgome ry filed a motion to dismiss for violation of the Spee dy Trial Act. The g overnme nt responded to the motion to dismiss on Fe bruar y 4 and the district cour

t denied the motion on March 5, setting Mont g omery ’s j ury trial for March 24. On Ma rch 17, Montg omery filed a motion for r econside ration of the c ourt’s Mar ch 5 orde r and a m o t ion to continue the trial date. A n e v id e n ti ar

y h e ar in g o n M o n tg o me r

y ’ s mo ti o n to r e c o n s id e r w a s h e ld o n M ar c h 1 9. On Marc h 2 4, the dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e mot ion

to r e con sid e r a

nd the mot ion

to c on tin ue the tr ia l. Mo ntg ome ry ’s jur

y tr ia l be g an a s sc he du le d and , on Ma rc h 2 6, Mo ntg ome ry

wa s c on vic te d o n a ll counts of t he indi ctment. Montgome ry was sentenced to 288 months of i mprisonment on J une 27. II. Analysis an d Discussi on A. The Spe e dy Tr ialAc t C lai m We l oo k f ir st to Mon tg ome ry ’s c la im of vio la tio n of the Spe e dy Tr ia l A c t, s inc e if

tha t c la im is m e ri tor iou s, we wo uld

no t ne e d to a dd

re ss a ny oth e r a ssi g nme nts of e rr or . T his is a lso the mos t difficult of the issues prese nted by Montgome ry , the one to w hich the majority of the brie fing was

a dd re sse d, and

the on ly iss ue a dd re sse d b y Mo ntg ome ry ’s c ouns e l a t or a l argume nt.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

5 We review de novo the district court’s inter pretation of the Speedy Trial Act and its fa ctual finding s for c lear

err or. United St ates v. Mark s , 209 F.3d 577, 586 (6th Cir. 2000)

. A finding of fa ct by the di strict court is clea

rly err oneous whe n, “althoug h there may be some e vidence to support the finding , the re viewing court on the entire evidenc e is left with the def inite and firm convic tion that

a m i s t ak e has be en committed.” Un ite d S tat es v . Ca rro ll , 2 6 F

. 3 d

1 3 8 0 , 1 3 9 0 ( 6 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 4) (q u o t i n g Anderson v. City of Besse mer , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)) ( internal quotations marks omi tte d) . T he Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t, 1 8 U .S. C. § § 3 16 1- 74 , r e qu ir e s th a t: [i ]n any case in which a plea of not guilty is e ntere d, the trial of a defe ndant cha rg ed in an information or indictment with the commission of an offe nse shall commenc e within seventy

day s from the filing date ( and ma k i n g public) of the inf ormation or indictment, or from the date the defe ndant has appea red befor e a judicial off

icer of the c ourt in whic h s uc h c ha

rg e is p e nd ing , w hic he ve r d a te la st o c c ur s. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) . Section 3161(h) e x cl udes ce rtain pre trial delay s from the seve nty day pe ri od , w hic h h a ve the e ff e c t of sto pp ingthe sp e e dy

tr ia l c loc k. I f t

he de fe nd ant is not br ou g ht t o trial within seventy

non-excludable da

y s, the indictment on which he is charg ed “sha ll be dismiss ed on motion of the defe ndant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (2). The pa rties ag ree that the spee dy trial clock be g an to run on Apr il 2, 2007, the date of Montgome ry ’s indictment. The parties also ag ree that the clock r an for a per iod of 50 day s until t he May 23 rd fi ling of the pa rt ie s’ joi nt m oti on

to c on tin

ue . T he y dif fe r, ho we ve r, on

wh e n th is excludable period ended. The g overnme nt a rg ues that the excludable per iod ended whe n the district court’s or der g ranting the m otion to continue was filed; Montgome ry argues t hat t he per iod ended

on June 6 w he n th e dis tr ic t c ourt he ld a te le ph on ic he a

ri ng on the mot ion to co nti nu e . We a g re e wi th the g overnme nt on this i ssue. “[D]elay resulting from any

pretria l motion, fro m the filing of theNo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

A t the ti m e pe rt in en t t o th is c as e, th is s ec ti on w as num be re d as § 3 16 1( h) (1 )( F ). 1 A t the ti m e pe rt in en t t o th is c as e, th is s ec ti on w as num be re d as § 3 16 1( h) (1 )( J). 2 Altho ug h the g ov ernm ent argues that the exclud able period ended on J une 12, 20 07, the district 3 co urt’ s do ck et

s he et in di ca te s th at th e or de r w as s ig ne d on Jun e 11 , 2 00 7, b ut

e nt er ed in to th e di st ri ct

c ourt ’s electronic dock eting sy stem on June 12

. The date of d isposition is thus June 1 1. Mo ntgom er y ar gues for the f ir st time on appe al that ther e is a peri od of non- exc lud abl e ti me 4 be t we e n t he f

i l i ng of th e m ot i on to su pp r e s s an d i t s di s po s i t i on on Oc t ob e r 22 . He fi r s t ar gue s th a t ei ght da ys betw een Septem

ber 1 0, the d ate set for the g ov ernm ent’s respon se to the m otion to su ppress, and

Se ptem ber 6 mot ion thr ou g h th e c on c lus ion

of the he ari ngon , o r o the r p ro mpt dis po sit ion

of , s uc h mo tio n” is clea rly ex cludable, 18 U .S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D ) , as is any delay “duringwhich any

proce eding 1

conce rning the def

endant is a ctually under advisement by the court.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)( H)

. 2 Th us , t h e d e l ay f

r o m M ay 2 3 t h r o u g h t h e d a t e o f t h e c o u rt ’ s o r d e r g r an t i n g t h e j o i nt m oti on to continue, June 11, 2007, is ex cludable. See U nited States v. Savoc a , 739 F.2d 220, 223 ( 6th Cir. 3 1984). The district cour

t’s J une 11 orde r set the case for further proce eding s on J uly 30, finding that the time period “ betwee n J une 18, 2007 and July 30, 2 0 07, is ex cludable time in the inter est of jus tic e in o rd e r t o p e rm it the de fe nd ant t o p re pa re fo r tr ia l.” Th e pa

rt ie s a g re e that the e xclu da ble time runs throug h J uly

30 and the g overnme nt conce des that the time between the J une 11 orde r and J une 18 (six day s) is non-excludable. Thus, to this p o i n t in the calc ulation, a total of 56 day s are non-excludable. I n the meantime, Montg omery filed his motion to suppress on J uly 15 and the district cour t proper ly found the pe riod betwe en the f iling of the motion and its disposit ion on October 22 to be excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (D). That bring s us to the major point of contention 4No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

18, the date th e g ov ernm ent’s late respo nse was actually filed, is non- exclud able. He also arg ues for the first tim e that the g ov ernm ent’s filingof a su pplem ental re spon se to the m otion to su ppress on Octo ber 3 cre ates a pe riod o f no n- exclud able tim e, althoug h h e does not dev elop an arg um ent in supp ort of his position

. Sin ce Montg om ery

did not m ak e thes e arg um ents in the district court, our rev iew wou ld be for pla in erro r onthese issues. United

States v. O liver , 3 97 F. 3d 36 9, 37 5 ( 6t h C i r . 2 00 5) ; Fe d. R. Cr i m. P. 5 2 ( b) . M on t gomer y, how ev er, does not arg ue th at there is p lain erro r. We, th erefore, are not re quired to ad dress these issues. Even i f w e re v ie w ed

th e cl ai m s on

th e m er it s, h ow ev er , w e w ou ld f in d th em la ck in g . Th e st at

ut e it se lf a nd o ur c as e la w in te rp re ti ngit a re c le ar th at th e ti m e be tw ee n th e fi li ngo f th e m ot io n an d it s di sp os it io n is e xc lu da

bl e. 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 3 16 1( h) (1 )( F ); United States v. Tin klenber

g , 5 79 F.3 d 5 89, 59 4- 95 (6th C ir. 2 009) (holdin g , in te r al ia , th at th e d a y o f t he filingof the p retrial m otion throug h the day the continu ance dispos es o f it is exclud ed fro m the speed y

trial p eriod). I n ad dition, Montg om ery offers no authority , e ither b ased on the lan g uag e of the statute or case law, w hich supp orts h is arg um ent th at the filing of the g ov ernm ent’s supp lem ental respon se som ehow created non- exclud able tim e. Our research, lik ewise , has rev ealed no leg al auth ority for his p osition. 7 and disag ree ment betwee n the parties–the 85 day period be tween O ctober

22, 2007, and January

15, 2008. I f t he ti me i s not excludable, t hen there i s a viol ation of t he S peedy Trial Act. I n the district court a nd here , Montgome ry

argues that these da

y s are non -e x cl u d ab l e. The g overnme nt, on the other hand, argues that the day s are excludable beca use plea ne g otiations were ong oing dur ing that pe ri od of tim e . T he dis tr ic t c ourt , in de nyingMo ntg ome ry ’s mot ion , a g re e d w iththe g ov e rnme nt, holding that the pa

rties were eng ag ed in plea ba rg aining from Oc tober 22, 2007, throug h J anuar y 15, 2008, and the 85 da

y period wa s excludable under the Speedy Trial Ac t. As no te d a

bo ve , a lth ou g h th e Spe e dy Tr ia l A c t r e qu ir e s tr ia l w ith in 7 0 d ay s o f i nd ic tme nt, the Act e x cludes c erta in pr et ri al d el ay s from the 70 da y period. Unde r the Ac t, “[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proce eding s conce rning the defendant” is excluded from the c alculation. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). Subsec tions (A) throug h (J) of § 3161(h)( 1) l ist a number of e x amples of these proc eeding s for whic h the time is ex plicitly excluded. Id . (2008). The listed procee dings a re “only examp le s o f

d e la y ‘ r e s u lt in g f

r o m o th e r p r o c e e d in g s c o n c e r

n in g th e d e f

e n d an t’ an d

ar e notNo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

At the h earing on

the m otion to r e c on s i de r t he district court’s denial of h is m otion to dis m iss, 5 Montg om ery ’s counsel s tat e d t ha t t he motion to reco nsider “does no t challen g e an y of the co urt’s leg al conclu sions or reas oning ,” only “ the fac tual underp inning o f t he c ou rt’s ruling .” Se e Tr. o f Mot. Hrg ., March 1 9, 2008 , p . 6 6. 8 i n t en d ed to be exclusive.” Un ite d S tat es v . B owe rs , 8 3 4 F

. 2 d 6 0 7 , 6 1 0 ( 6 th

Ci r . 1 9 8 7 )

. We h a ve held that plea ne g otiations are a n example of “other

proce eding s” not specif ically l i s t ed in § 3161(h)( 1) which ma

y be excluded from the Spee dy Trial Ac t calculation. Id

. (c i t i n g United States v. Montoy a , 8 27 F .2 d 1 43 , 1 50 (7 th C ir . 1 98 7) ); see also United States v . Dunbar , 357 F.3d 582, 593 (6th Cir. 2004), vacate d and remande d o no t h e r g r o u n d s b y Dunbar v. United States , 543 U.S. 1099 (2005). Although c ounsel for Montg omery stated at ora l argument that both the district court’s leg al conclusions and f

actua l findings a

re e rrone ous, Montgo m er y ap p ears to conce de that the district court’s inter

pretat i o n of the Spee dy

Trial Ac t is corre ct, arguing r ather that the cour

t’s fac tual 5 finding s are err oneous “be cause no other proc eeding s [pl ea ne g otiations] in reg ard to de fenda nt were ong oing.” [Brief of

Def endant- Appellant, 21]. I n any event, the distric t co u rt proper ly conclude d that pl e a ne g oti a tio ns we re e xclu da ble fr om t he Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t c a lc ulatio n a s “ oth e r p ro c e e din g s” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) . We will therefore fo cu s o u r attention on whe ther the district court’s f actua l finding that plea neg otiations wer e ongoing betwee n October 22, 2007, and January 15, 2008 is clear ly

err oneous. We conclud e t h at the district court’s f actua l finding that plea neg otiations were ong oing duri ngthe 85 da

y pe ri od in q ue sti on wa s n ot c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. Al tho ugh nev e r c omm itt e d to writing or c o n v ey ed as a f ormal off er by either Montg omery

or the g overnme nt, the rec ordNo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

9 establishes that plea

discussions were ong oing e ven b ef o re t he cour

t’s ruling on Montgome ry ’s motion to s uppress. The Assistant United States Attorney (“A USA”) a ssigne d to the case testified th a t h is d is c u s s io n s a

b o u t th e c a s e w it

h d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o n v e y e d to h im th e im p r e s s io n that the motion to s uppress “would be a dispositi ve motion,” a nd that, afte r the c ourt ruled on the suppr ession motion, “the defe ndant was g oing to e nter a plea.” Tr. of Mot. Hr g ., Marc h 19, 2008, 33-34. Mo ntg ome ry ’s c ouns e l te sti fi e d th a t “ [b] ecaus e of th e po ssi bil ity that th e Un ite d St a te s c ou ld f ile two 851 informations ag ainst [t he def enda n t ] , coupled with the fact that he could be se ntence d as

a ca ree r offe nder” and “f

ace d . . . a sig nificant risk of pr olonge d” imprisonment, he did “not doubt that [he] could have left [the AUSA] wit h the impression” that Montg omery would likely

rec onsider the risk of g oing to tria l. Id . at 6. Mo ntg ome ry ’s a tto rn e y a c kn ow le dg e d disc us sio ns wi th t he AU SA “under which [Montgomer

y ] could mi nimiz e his sentenc ing risk by enter ing a

g uilty plea.” Id . at 8. Montgome ry ’s attorne y

acknow ledg ed advising the AUSA that, should Montg omery lose on the s uppression i ssue, he would “advise [Mont g omery ] to consider a rea sonable plea

offe r.” Id

. at 23. Montgome ry ’s attorne y rec alled two conver sations that involved discussions a bout a possible plea ag ree ment afte r the Oc t o b er 2 2 adverse ruling on the motion to suppress. These discussions g ener ally involved the possibi l i t y o f a conditional guilty plea a llowing Montg omery to appea l the denial of his suppre ssion moti on and an a g ree ment b y t h e go v er nment not to file the notices of enhanc ement under 18 U.S.C. § 851, there by allowing Montgome ry

to avoid a possible mandator y life sentenc e. Montgome ry ’s attorne y

acknow ledg ed a f

urther disc ussion with the AUSA during which he inquired whe ther the possibility of a guilty

p l ea “w as s till on t he table.” Id . at 25 . T he AU SANo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

10 re c a lle d r e sp on din g tha

t the po ssi bil ity of a c on dit ion a l gu ilty ple a wa s n o lo ng e r a n o pti on sim ply be c a us e the re wo uld

be no be ne fi t to the g ov e rnme nt fr om that ty pe of a g re e me nt. Th e AU SA d id

su g g e st t o d e fe ns e c ouns e l tha t Mong tom e ry c on sid e r ple a din g g uil ty to t he c ha rg e s a nd , if he did so, the g overnme nt w ould not file the § 851 notices of e nhance ment and Montg omery would be fr ee to argue for

any sentenc e as low a s ten y ear s (the mandatory minimum without the § 851 notices). B oth a tto r

n e y s b e l i e v e d

t h i s l a s td i s c u s s i o nt o h a v e o c c u r r e d i nl a t e D e c e mb e r , b e f

o r e C h r i s t m a s,

a lth ou g h n e ith e r w a s c e rt a in o f t he e xac t date
. Mo ntg ome ry ’s a tto rn e y did , ho we ve r, pe g the date

as one on w hich another

client was being sentenc ed. By ref ere nce to the court’s doc ket shee t for that defe ndant, the district cour t found that date to have been J anuar y 4, 2008. On this recor d, the district

c ourt ’s fa c tua l f

ind ingtha

t plea negotia tio ns oc c ur

re d d ur ingthe dis pu te d p e ri od wa s n ot c le arl y

err oneous. Mo ntg ome ry

fu rt he r argue s that, to the e xten t any de lay is e xclu da ble a s p le a

ne g oti a tio ns , that period of delay ended on J anuar y 4, not January 15, as the district c ourt found. While it is true that the last conver sation betwee n counsel oc curr ed on January 4, it does not logica lly

follow that the excludable dela

y for plea neg otiations ended on that date . That is so beca use the AU SA testified, and def endant’ s counsel could not dispute, that the AUSA expected a r esponse f rom Montgome ry afte r the discussion a

bout the possible ope n plea and the g overnme nt ag ree ment not to file the § 851 notices. While not ex actly the same si t uation as in Bo we rs wh e re a de fe nd ant w a ite d 1 5 d ay s to notify the g overnme nt of his rejec tion o f a tentative ple a ag ree ment, this is, however, the kind of “s andbag[g ing]” a

bout which the Bo we rs court wa s conce rned. Bo we rs , 8 3 4 F

. 2 d a t 6 0 9 . The dis tr ic t c ourt ’s find ingtha t th e pe ri od

of tim e be tw e e n Jan

ua ry 4 a nd Janu ary 15 wa s e xclu da

bleNo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

J anuary 5 and 6, 2008 , w ere a Saturd ay and Sun day

. Lik ewise , January 12 and 13 w ere a Saturd ay 6 a nd Su nd a y.

Montg om ery

asserts for the first tim e on app eal that there is an additio nal p eriod of n on- 7 exclud able d elay

in this ca se, i.e. from March 6 to March 1 6, 2008 , th e pe riod o f 11 day s be tween the district co urt’ s or de r de ny in g th e m ot io n to d is m is s on S pe ed y Tri al A ct

g ro un ds and the d at e of

Mo nt g om er

y ’s fi li ngo f hi s m ot io n to r ec on si de r th e di st ri ct court ’s den ia l of

his m ot io n to dis m is s. S ee Br ie f of D ef en dant
A pp el la nt , 1 7. M on tg om er y d id no t ra is e th is iss ue in th e di st ri ct c ourt
. O ur

r ev ie w , th er ef

or e, is f or p la in error, but Mo ntg om ery

aga in does not argu e plain error. We need not, as a result, address the issue. S ee n . 4, supra . Ev en if we consid er the 1 1 ad ditional day s as non- exclud able, how ev er, whic h the y app ear to be, that wou ld no t chan g e the result in this case. The effect o f the 11 day s, g iv en o ur rulin g on the period betw een O ct ob er 2 2, 20 07 , a nd

January 1 5, 2 00 8, w ou ld

b e to p ut th e num be r of n on - ex cl ud ab le d ay s at

6 7, s ti ll w it hi n th e re qu ir em en ts o f th e S pe ed y Tri al A ct
. Montg om ery

also raises c ouns el’s failure to claim these 11 day s as n on - e xc l udab le as one of the specific exam

ples a lleg ed b y

him as to the ineffec tiv eness of trial coun sel, an issu e w e do no t add ress. See infra , p. 19. 11 under the se circ umstances is re asonable and not clea rly err oneous, espe cially

wh ere the per iod of de lay inc lud e d o nly

se ve n b us ine ss d ay s. 6 Mo nt g ome ry

make s mu c h in

his argume nt o f h is c ouns e l’ s r e fu sa l to c ha ra c te ri ze t

he se discussions as “plea neg otiations” and the fac t that neither c ounsel eve r made a for mal written off

er for a plea agr ee m en t
. He c hara cter izes the discussions between c ounsel as “g ive and take ,” not amounting to plea

neg otiations. These arguments rea d too much into our Bo we rs decision. Nothing in Bo we rs require s that plea ne g otiations take a particula r form or f

ollow a par

ticular for mat, or that the neg otiations result in a forma l plea ag ree ment which re solves the ca se. This would make ple a

ne g oti a tio ns e xclu da

ble on ly if the e nd re su lt o f t

he pr oc e ss we re a fo rm a l ag re e me nt. An d, wh ile

we a re not c alled upon in this case to de cide e x actly what the prec ise contours are of conduc t which might constitute excludable plea neg otiations unde r the Speedy Trial Ac t, it clearly

includes the kind of “g ive and take ” which c hara cter ized the discussions between c ounsel in this case. 7No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

A t t im es p erti ne nt

to th is c as e, th is s ec ti on

w as num be re d as § 3 16 1( h) (8 )( A ). 8 12 Mo ntg ome ry

ra ises on e oth e r i ssu e c on c e rn inghis Spe e dy Tr ia l A c t c la im w hic h w e mus t addre ss. He ar g ues t h at t h e period betwee n October 22, 2007, and January

15, 2008, “wa s

err oneously

deeme d an excluded period of time due to its being c onsidered a s an ‘e nds of justice’ exclusion warra

nting a continuance for the pur pose of ong oing plea neg otiations.” Br ief of De fendant-Appellant,18. Relying on United States v. Richm ond , 7 3 5 F

. 2 d 2 0 8 ( 6 th Ci r . 1 9 8 4 ), Montgome ry

argues that the district c ourt err oneously g rante d a retroa ctive continuance and did not make its fi n d i n gs as t o the excludability of time until after he had moved f or dismissal of the ind ic tme nt. Montgome ry ’s ar g ument, howeve r, conf uses the re quirements for an “e nds of j u s t ice”

c o n ti n u an c e u n d e r 1 8 U

. S. C. § 3 1 6 1 ( h ) ( 7 ) ( A ) an d th e p e r io d s o f ti me w h ic h are autom ati c all y 8 excludable under

§ 3161(h)( 1), as, a

ppare ntly , did the district c ourt. The district c ourt, in its March 5, 20 0 8 o r d e r f

o un d “ t h a t t h e p e r i o d o f t i m e f r o m O c t o b e r 2 2 , 2 0 0 7 t h r o u g h Ja n u ar y 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 is

e xclud abl e time a s a

pe rm iss ibl e de lay

re su lti ngfr om o the r p ro c e e din g s [pl e a ne g oti a tio ns ]

conce r n in g th e d e f

e n d an t, an d f

in d in g [s ] th a t th e e n d s o f ju s ti c e s e r v e d b y th e c o n ti n u an c e of the matter in lig ht of ong oing ple a neg otiations ou t we i gh s t h e best interest of the public and the defe ndant in a spee dy

trial.” Despite the district c ourt’s inartf ul lang uag e in its March 5 or der, Richmond is i na pp os ite h e re. I n R i ch mond , t h e t ri al co u rt h ado rd er eda c o n t i n u an ce b u th adn o ten t er edt h e f i n d i n gsNo. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

See n. 8, supra . 9 We do note, ho wev er, that this case v iv idly dem onstrates the n ecessity for our warn ing in United 10 Stat es v . H

il l , 1 72 F

. 3d

5 0, 1 99 9 WL 17 64 5 (6 thC ir

. 1 99 9) ( un pu bl is he d ta bl e di sp os it io n)

. W e no te d in that ca se “th at allow ing the s pe e dy trial clo ck

to stop duringplea barg aining m ay lead to oth erwise unjustifiable delay s in derog ation of the Act’s requ irem ents and unde rly ing po licies.” H il l , 1 999 WL 1 7645 at *2, n.3

. As we noted in H il l , t h i s i s s u e wo u l d

n o t b e b e f

o r e t h i s Co u r t i f

t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a d , a t t h e t i me of its Octo ber 2 2, 2007 den ial o f the m otion to su

ppress, hee ded our adm onition to set a tim etable for com pletion of p lea ne g otiations. We once ag ain em phasize “that the e xclusio n fo r plea barg aining 13 require d by § 3161(h)( 8) until the court was fac ed with a motion to dismiss the case for violation 9 of the Spe e dy

Tr ia l A c t. Richmond , 735 F.2d at 210. The district court then made finding s that the continuance satisfied t he ends of j ustice ex clusion. Richmond held that, while a district judg e is not

r e qu ir e d to e n te r h is f

in d in g s a t th e s a me ti me h e g r an ts a c o n ti n u an c e , th e d e c is io n to gr ant the continuance must actually have be en base d on the re asons set out in the judg e’s fi n d i n gs an d the district judge cannot wipe out violations of the Speedy Trial Ac t a fter they have oc curr ed by making the finding s which would have justified a n ends of justice continuance and re troac tively continuing the ca se. Id. at 214-216. T h e difficulty

with Montgomer

y ’s re liance on Richmond is th a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt i nthe instant case did not g rant a continuance of Montgome ry ’s trial retroa ctively based on f indings made subsequent to the g rant of a continuance , althoug h the court’s inartfully draf ted orde r ca

n be re ad

as an attempt to do so. R ather , the district court found that the per i o d betwee n October 22, 2007, and January

15, 2008, was excludable beca use of “ other proc eeding s” involving the defe ndant and the per iod of excludable time is not related to a n “ends of justice” continuance . We do not find that Richmond or any

of the c ases de aling with an “e nds of justice” continuance cited by Montgome ry have a ny application in this case. 10No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

pr oc ee di ng s al lo w ed

u nd er Bow ers sho uld n ot be v iewed as unlim ited, or o therw ise ab used. ” Id

. 14 B. The Search Warr ants F or 1117 P lum R un Road and 106 Guin ess Court I nan ap p ea l o f t h e d en i al o f a m o t i o nt o s u p p re s s , we re v i ew a d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fa ct u al fi n d i n gs fo r c le ar e rr or

and its le g a l de te rm inatio ns de novo

. United States v. Frazier , 423 F .3 d 5 26 , 5 31 (6 th Cir. 2005). A finding of proba ble ca use is a leg al deter

mination, which we r eview de novo

. United Sta te s v . M ar tin , 526 F.3d 926, 936 ( 6th Cir. 2008). Neve rtheless, “[t ]he evidenc e mus t be viewe d in a light most likely

to support the decision of the district c ourt.” Frazier , 423 F.3d at 531. Montgome ry

challeng ed the se arc h war rants at issue in this case on two gro u n ds in the district court. F irst, he ar g ued that the se arc h war rants we re not issued by

a neut ra l and deta ched

ma g istrate be c a

us e the iss uin g state c ourt jud g e ha d p re vio us ly been a state pr os e c uto r w he n h is office prosec uted Montg omery and other

members of

Montgome ry ’s fa m i l y

on felony

drug t r a f f i c k i n g c h ar g e s an d

h a d p e r s o n a l l y p art i c i p a t e d

i nth e p r i o r

p r o s e c u t i o no f

M o n t g o m e r

y. M o n t go m ery

ca n d i d l y ad m i t t ed t o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt , h o we v er , t h at h e h ad “n o ev i d en ce t h at J u d ge Simm s’s extra-judicial opinions or information a b o u t the def endant a ffe cted his dete rmination of pr ob a ble c a us e .” Se c on dly , M on tg ome ry argue d th a t th e a ff

ida vit s in su pp or t of the se arc h w arr ants lacke d probable cause and fa iled to ac cu ra tely descr ibe the pre mises to be sear ched. T he district

c ourt de nie d the mot ion

to s up pr e ss. Mo ntg ome ry ra ise s b oth

c la ims in t

his a pp e a l. We wi ll a dd

re ss them in turn.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

15 1. Neutr al and Det ached Magistrat e I t has long been e stablished that, to be valid under the Four th Amendment, a se arc h war rant must be issued by

a neutr al and de tache d mag istrate. Shadwick v. City of Tampa , 407 U.S. 345, 350, (1972) ( cit i n g Jo hnson v. United States , 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). I n fac t, the Supreme Court has held that “[t] he purpose of a war rant is to allow a neutra l judicial office r to assess whe ther the police have probable cause to make an ar rest or c onduct a se arc h.” Steagald v. United States , 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1991). I n the context of a trial, we h av e refused to a dopt a per se rule that judg es must disqualify them selves whe re the y

prosec uted the def

endant in an e arlier

proce eding and plac e the bur den of showing actua l bia s on the def endant. Corbett v. Bordenkirc her , 615 F.2d 722, 724 ( 6th Cir. 1980); Jenk ins v. Bordenk

ircher , 611 F.2d 162, 167 (6 t h C i r. 1979). The Supre me Court has held that opinions formed by judge s based on what they lear ned in e arlier proce eding s does not qualify as bias or pre judice . Liteky v. U

nited States , 510 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1994). The sea rch w arr ants in this case we re issued by Nelson C o u n t y , Kentucky , Circuit Court J udg e Charle s C. Si mm s , I I I . Prior to his service a s a judg e, Judge Simms was an Assistant C o m m o n we al t h A t t o r n ey fo r N el s o nC o u n t y . As an As s i s t an tC o m m o n we al t h At t o rn ey , J u d ge Simm s participated i n the s tate court prosec ution of Mont g omery on various drug c harg es betwe en 1998 and 2003. J udg e S imms’s last involvement with a prosecution of Montg omery was on May 8, 2003. His office was a lso responsible for the p ro s ec u tion of other member s of Montg omery ’s family on drug char g es. Judge Simms became a circuit court judge on J une 20, 2003. The applications for

sear ch wa

rra nts in thi s case wer e pre sented to Judge Simms on March 13, 2007,No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

16 almost four y ears af

t er his last i nvolvement in the state c ourt prosec ution of Montgomer y . The char g es in this case a

re unr elated to the pr ior prosec ution in which J udg e Simms participated. Montgome ry

has not met his burden of show ing bia s on the part of J u d ge Simms. He has offe red no evidenc e of actua l bia s on the part of the issuing judge and admits that he ha s no evidenc e that J udg e Simms’s prior involvement with, and knowledg e of, Montgome ry had any bear ing on the p ro b ab l e c au s e d et er m i n at i o n . He s i mp l y as k s u s t o s p ec u l at e t h at t h e p ri o r i n v o l v em en to f J u d ge Simm s in the state court prosec ution of Montgome ry

“may have le d [J udg e Simms] to place mor e emphasis on the police’ s opinion reg arding the pre sence of proba ble ca use in a wa

rra nt application beca use he ha d previously

worke d with the police in the prose cut i o n o f the de fenda nt for similar offe nses when he serve d as a prosecutor.” Br ief of Def endant- Appellant, 41. We decline to do so. Mo ntg ome ry

ra ise s an a lte rn a tiv e argume nt t hat the dis tr ic t cou

rt e rr e d whe n it de c ide d h is motion to s uppress without a n evidentiar

y hear ing. A district c ourt is r equire d to hold an evide ntiary hear ing “w h en t h e d ef

en dant has set f

orth contested issues of

fac t that bear

upon the leg ality

of a

sear ch.” United States v. Black , 1 8 1 F

. 3 d

1 0 4 , 1 9 9 9 WL

3 5 7 7 5 9 * 3 ( 6 th

Ci r . 1 9 9 9 ) ( u np u

b li s h ed t ab l e d i s p o s i t i o n , ci t i n g Un ite d S tat es v. M

e jia , 69 F.3d 309, 318 ( 9th Cir. 1995). We review a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on wh e the r to ho ld an e vid e nti ary he ari ng on a mot ion to s up pr e ss f or an a bu se

o f d is c r e ti o n. Uni ted States v. Downs , 173 F.3d 430, 1999 WL130786 *3 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table disposition). We find no abuse of

discretion her e. Montg omery d i d not ask for a

n evidentiar

y hear ing be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt

and he sp e c if ic a lly a c kn ow le dg e d th a t the re we re no c on te ste d is su e s o f f a c t. Under these c ircumstance s, the district court wa s not require d to hold an evidentiar y hear ing.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

17 2. P r oba ble Ca use The F o urth Amendment prohibits sear ch wa rra nts unless they

have be en issued “upon pr ob a ble c a us e , s up po rt e d b y

oath o r a ff

ir ma tio n. ” U. S. Con st. a me nd

. I V. I n or de r t o d e mon str a te probable cause sufficie nt to justify a sear ch war rant, the proponent must submit a n af fi d av i t t h at “indicate [ s ] a fa i r p robabili ty that evidenc e of a

crime w ill be located on the pr emises of the proposed se arc h.” United States v. J enkins , 396 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2005) (interna l citations and quotation marks omitted). I n other words, the aff idavit “ must state a nexus betwe en the place to be

sear ched a

nd the evidenc e soug ht.” United States v. W i l l iams , 544 F.3d 683, 686 ( 6th Cir. 2008 (q u o t i n g United States v. Be thal , 245 F. App’ x . 460, 464 (6th Cir. 2007)). I n re v i ewing the sufficie ncy

of the evidenc e, we are limit ed to e x amining the information conta ined within the four

corne rs of the a ffidavit. Frazier , 423 F.3d at 531. Never theless, when c onsidering that information, we look to the totality

of the c ircumstance s. See I llinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).

a. 1117 P lum R un Road Montgome ry ’s complete a rg ument conce rning probable cause for the se arc h war rant issued for 1117 Plum Run Road is contained in one short par ag raph of his appellate br ief:

. . . conce rning the 1117 Plum Run Road addre ss, the war rant itself provided for

the sear ch of 1197 Plum Run Road. Three of the fir st f o u r h ouses on Plum Run Road a c tua lly fi t th e de sc ri pti on

provi ded

. The wa

rr ant w a s n ot s uf

fi c ie nt a s it

fa ile d to d e s c r i b e t h e l o c a t i o nw i t h s u f f i c i e n tp art i c u l ar i t y. B ri e f o f D e fe nd ant- Ap pe lla nt, 49 . T he g ov e rnme nt c on c e de s, a s it mus t, t hat th e a dd

re ss l ist e d in the sea rch w arr ant as the a ddress to be se arc hed wa s off by one dig it in that it stated the a ddress a s 1197 Plum Run Road instead of 1117 Plum Run Road.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

18 The pa rticularity require ment for a

sear ch warra

nt is met “if the description is such that the office r with a sea

rch w arr ant can, with r easona ble eff ort asce rtain and identify

the place intended.” Steele v . United States , 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). In deter mining wh et h er the desc ription of the pla c e to b e se arc he d is su ff ic ie nt, the inq

uir y is w he the r the pla c e to b e se arc he d is de sc ri be d w ith

su ffi cie nt part ic ula

ri ty “ ‘t o e na ble the e xec uti ngof

fi c e r t o lo c a te and

ide nti fy the pr e mis e s w ith

rea sonable e ffor

t, and wheth er t h er e i s any rea sonable proba

bility that another

premise mig ht be mistakenly

sear ched.’ ” Un ite d S

tat es v . D ur

k , 1 4 9 F. 3 d

4 6 4 , 4 6 5 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Gahagan , 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 ( 6th Cir.1989)). Thus, an incor rec t description o f the pr e mis e s d oe s n ot a

uto ma tic a lly

inv a lid a te the wa

rr ant. We find the particula

rity require ment of the F ourth Amendmen t to have be en met her e. Although the premises a

re r efe rre d to in th e sear ch wa rra nt as 1197 Plum Run Road, the wa rra nt contains a de tailed desc ription of the premises as a “sing le s tory brown bric k residenc e with black

s h utters and white tr im.” The re sidence has a “ shingle sty le roof a nd a conc rete drivewa

y .” The

sear ch wa

rra nt also had pre cise dire ctions to the re s i d en ce and had detailed desc riptions of

a uto mob ile s lo c a te d o n th e pr e mis e s. Atta c he d to the wa rr ant wa s a ph oto g ra

ph of the re sid e nc e to be sea rche d. Under

these c ircumstance s, t h er e wa s no rea sonable proba bility that the executing office r might mistakenly sear ch one of the other three houses on the street that fit the descr iption of the pre mises to be sear ched.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

19 b. 106 Guiness Court As with his arg ument reg ardingthe sea rch w arr ant for 1117 Plum Run Road, Montgome ry state s h is a

rgume nt t hat th e wa

rr ant f or 10 6 G uin e ss C ourt is inv a lid in o ne pa

ra g ra phof his appellate brief: I n the ins tant c a se , a s r e le va nt t o th e 10 6 G uin e ss C ourt a dd re ss, the a ff

ida vit ob ta ine d wa s la c kin g any ind ic ia of pr ob a ble c a us e be c a us e it fa ile d to con ta in su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to e sta

bli shthat th e dr

ug s a lle g e dly

pr oc ur e d b y

the CI , a c tua lly c a me fr om 1 06 Gu ine ss Court . T he a ff ida vit su pp or tin g iss ua nc e of the wa rr ant i s based upon spe culation and unsupporte d by any materia l corra

boration. Br ief of D efe ndant-Appe llant, 49. The g overnme nt responds that the a ffidavit conta ined suffic ient evidenc e to establish proba ble ca use to believe that drug s would be found at 106 Guiness Court. Gi vin g g re at de fe re nc e to t he iss uin g jud g e ’s de te rm inatio n o f p ro ba ble c a us e , a s w e mus t,

we ag ree with the g overnme nt. The aff idavit, sig ned by the lead investigator, Detec tive Roby , stated tha t a c o n f

id e n ti a l in f

o r ma n t h a d p u r c h a s e d thr e e o u n c e s o f c r a c k c o c a in e f r o m M o n tg o me ry

on Marc h 1 3, 20 07 . The CI ha d inf or me d De te c tiv e Rob y that Mont g ome ry ha d lef t his r e sid e nc e wi th

no cra ck coc aine in his possession, had trave led to 106 Guiness Court to obtain the cr ack c ocaine , and then r eturne d to his residenc e wher e the cra ck coca ine was sold to the CI

. The aff idavit rec ites that Mo ntg ome ry

wa s fo llo we d by the of

fi c e r fr om h is r e sid e nc e to 1 06 Gu ine ss C ourt and ba c k to his residenc e, and that he made no othe r stops, corr oborating what the CI had told poli ce. T he information contained in the aff idavit w as sufficie nt to establish probable cause that cra ck coc aine would be found at 106 Guiness Court.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

20 C. Ineff

ect ive Assistance of Counsel Mo ntg om e r

y , wh i l e a c k

n o w l e d g i n g the g e ne ra l r

ule that th is c ourt

wi ll g e ne ra lly

no t e nte rt a in

c la ims of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l on dir e c t app e a l, ne ve rt he le ss u rg e s u s to “ c on sid e r h is claims of I AC as contributing to the un d er l y i ng violation” raised by his direct appe al. The g overnme nt responds that the re cord is ade quate f or us to conclude that Montgome ry ’s claim of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel is without merit, and urg es us to so hold. We r e a c h in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la ims on

direc t a pp e a l on ly

if the re c or d is sufficie ntly develope d to permit us to review the claims. United States v. J ones , 489 F.3d 243, 255 (6th Cir. 2007). The presumption ag ainst resolving an inef fec tive assistance claim on direc t appea l “stems from the f

act that a finding of pre

judice is a pre requisite to a claim for ineff ective a ssistance of counse l, and appe llate courts are not equipped to re solve fac tual issues.” Un ite d S tat es v . B ro wn , 33 2 F .3 d 3 63 , 3 68 -6 9 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 3) . “ [I ]n mo st c a se s a mot ion br ou g ht u

nd e r § 22 55 is p re fe ra

ble to direc t appea l for deciding claims of i neff ective a ssistance.” Massaro v. United States , 5 38 U. S. 500, 504 (2003). We conclude that Montg omery ’s claims of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel are best asser ted in a proc eedingund er 2 8 U.S.C. § 2255. Although many of Montg omery ’s claims of inef fec tive assistance of counsel are premised on claims decide d by us in this di rec t appea l, we believe it better for the matter to be decided after a complete and adequate record on the i ssues has bee n develope d in t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.No. 08-5898

Un ite d S tat es v . M on tgo me ry

21 III. Conclusion For the re asons set for

th above, we find Montgome ry ’s claims of err or by the district court to b e wi tho ut m e ri t and

we the re fo re AFFI RM th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt . We de c lin e to

re a c h h is clai ms of inef

fe c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, w ith ou t pr e

jud ic e to M on tg ome ry ’s ri g ht t o raise the claims in a proc eedingpursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.