1 The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, Chief J udge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 09-1608

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Franz Joseph Grey, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: December 18, 2009 Filed: March 1, 2010

___________ Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Fra nz Joseph Grey pled guilty to aiding and abetting another by knowingl y possessing, with the inte nt to defraud, over fifteen unauthorized access devices (credit cards and bank account numbers) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a)(3) and 2. In the plea agreement, Grey reserved the right to appeal the district court’s 1 earlier denial of his motion to suppress. Although Grey’s sentencing range under the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or-2- Guidelines) was 10 to 16 months imprisonmen t, the district court sentenced Grey to 26 months imprisonment. On appeal, Grey argues the district court erred in (1) denying Grey’s motion to suppress, (2) denying his motion for an investigator and a continuance, (3) limiting the cross examination of one of the government’s witnesses, and (4) imposing an unreasonable sentence.
The district court properly denied Grey’s motion to suppress. “We review the district court[’s] factual findings for clear error, but its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was violated is reviewedde novo.” United States v. Morgan , 270 F.3d 625, 630 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Allegree , 175 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1999)). Grey admits he was sp eeding when he was stopped, seeUnited States v. Rodriguez-Lopez , 444 F.3d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Under the Fourth Amendment, any traffic violation constitutes probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.”), and our review of the record re veals no clear error in the district court’s finding the search of the ve hicle was consensual, see United States v. McGill , 125 F.3d 642, 644 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding consent valid ates a subsequent search if voluntarily given). This lawful stop and consensual s earch did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Grey’s other arguments also lack merit. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grey’s motion for an investigator and a continuance, see United States v. Obasi , 435 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2006) (sta ndard of review), or in limiting cross examination to avoid confusion of th e issues or marginally relevant testimony,
see United States v. Drapeau , 414 F.3d 869, 875 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Trial judges retain ‘wide latitude’ to impose ‘reasonable limits on . . . cross examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’” (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986))). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sent encing Grey above his advisory Guidelines range because the district court properl y found the Guidelines range inadequately reflected the extent and seriousness of th e crime, Grey’s need for drug abuse and-3- mental health treatment and society’s need for protection from potential future crimes by Grey. Cf. United States v. Feemster , 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (affirming a below-Guidelines sentence b ecause it “rest[s] on precisely the kind of defendant-specific determinations that are within the special co mpetence of sentencing courts”).
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

______________________________