RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1118-16T5

IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL

COMMITMENT OF A.C. SVP 695-15.

______________________________

Submitted July 9, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Carroll and Rose.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP695-15.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Thomas G. Hand, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant 

Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen J.

Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

 A.C. appeals from a March 7, 2016 order of the Law Division, 

continuing his commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU), the 

secure facility designated for the custody, care and treatment of 

sexually violent predators pursuant to the Sexually Violent 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

August 1, 2018
2 A-1118-16T5

Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm. 

 We need not recount in substantial detail A.C.'s prior 

criminal history, which dates back to the early 1960s. In sum, 

A.C. has an extensive criminal history consisting of sexual and 

non-sexual offenses. In 1964, A.C. was charged in Indiana with 

sexual assault and assault and battery. He was convicted of 

assault and battery, but the record is unclear as to the 

disposition of the sexual assault charge. Defendant was thereafter 

twice convicted of attempted rape in Indiana in 1967 and 1970. 

 A.C.'s predicate conviction arose from a November 1979 arrest 

for breaking into the home of a seventy-four-year old woman, who 

he then sexually assaulted. Following a 1980 jury trial, A.C. was 

convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, first-degree 

aggravated assault, first-degree robbery, and second-degree 

burglary, for which he was sentenced to an aggregate forty-fiveyear prison term. 

 A.C. escaped from prison in 1981 and was not recaptured until 

1985. Following a jury trial in 1990, A.C. was convicted of the 

escape, and a consecutive fifteen-year prison sentence was 

imposed. While incarcerated in state prison, A.C. incurred twentyfour disciplinary infractions, including refusal to obey, 

destroying property, possession of gambling paraphernalia, 
3 A-1118-16T5

disruptive conduct, refusing work assignments, threatening bodily 

harm, and refusing to submit to a search. The most recent 

institutional infraction occurred in July 2012. 

 On November 5, 2014, A.C. was committed to the STU under the 

SVPA after serving his sentence. The present appeal arises from 

a periodic review of A.C.'s commitment, which was conducted by 

Judge James F. Mulvihill on February 18 and March 1, 2016. At the 

hearing, the State relied on the expert testimony of psychiatrist 

Roger Harris, M.D., and psychologist Tarmeen Sahni, Psy.D., a 

member of the STU's Treatment Progress Review Committee (TPRC). 

A.C. presented the expert testimony of psychiatrist Michael Kunz, 

M.D., and psychologist Gianni Pirelli, Ph.D. 

 After interviewing A.C. and reviewing previous psychiatric 

evaluations, STU treatment records, and related documents, Harris, 

Kunz and Pirelli prepared reports, which were admitted into 

evidence. Dr. Sahni participated in the TPRC's review of A.C.'s 

progress and treatment and authored the TPRC report, which was 

also admitted into evidence, as were various other treatment notes 

and records. 

 A.C. was born in 1944, and was seventy-one years old at the 

time of the hearing. Notwithstanding A.C.'s age, Dr. Harris 

concluded he met the criteria of a sexually violent predator and 

was "highly likely to sexually re-offend if placed in a less 
4 A-1118-16T5

restrictive setting" because he has not mitigated his risk. Dr. 

Harris further opined that if A.C. were to be released from the 

STU with conditions, he was highly unlikely to comply with those 

conditions. 

 Based on A.C.'s "long history of disregarding the rights of 

others," his failure "to conform to social norms," his 

"irritab[ility,]" "aggressive[ness,]" "profound reckless 

disregard for the safety of others[,]" and "lack of remorse and 

being indifferent to the way he has hurt others," Dr. Harris 

diagnosed A.C. with severe antisocial personality disorder. Dr. 

Harris elaborated that A.C. "maintains the . . . antisocial 

attitudes and behaviors that I believe are the nexus for his sexual 

offending [and are] alive and well today . . . . I don't think 

[A.C.] is that different today at age [seventy-one] than he was 

throughout the [1970s] when [he was] sexually offending." 

 Dr. Sahni testified A.C. had not received "any kind of sex 

offender treatment" that would reduce "his risk to sexually offend 

. . . ." The TPRC recommended promoting A.C. to Phase 2 of 

treatment, which "is considered the beginning phase[] of 

treatment[.]" Dr. Sahni noted A.C. "continues to deny and does 

not take any responsibility for any of the offenses that he's been 

charged with." 
5 A-1118-16T5

 Like Dr. Harris, Dr. Sahni diagnosed A.C. as suffering from 

a severe antisocial personality disorder. Additionally, Dr. Sahni 

made a provisional diagnosis of paraphilic disorder, explaining 

that A.C. "most likely has the disorder, however, there's 

insufficient evidence to fully diagnose [him] with such disorder." 

A.C. scored a four on the Static-99R,1 placing him in the "moderate 

high" risk to sexually reoffend. In accord with Dr. Harris, Dr. 

Sahni opined it was: (1) "highly likely" that A.C. would sexually 

re-offend in the foreseeable future unless he were confined in a 

secure facility for treatment; and (2) "highly unlikely" that A.C. 

would comply if he were to be released from the STU with 

conditions. 

 Dr. Kunz initially interviewed A.C. and prepared a report on 

behalf of the State, but was ultimately subpoenaed to testify on 

behalf of A.C. at the review hearing. Dr. Kunz similarly 

determined that A.C. suffered from antisocial personality 

disorder. In accordance with the State's experts, Dr. Kunz 

 

1 "The Static-99R is an actuarial test used to estimate the 

probability of sexually violent recidivism in adult males 

previously convicted of sexually violent offenses. See Andrew 

Harris et al., Static-99 Coding Rules Revised-2003 5 (2003). [We 

have] explained that actuarial information, including the Static99, is 'simply a factor to consider, weigh, or even reject, when 

engaging in the necessary factfinding under the SVPA.'" In re 

Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 164 n.9 (2014) (quoting In re 

Commitment of R.S., 173 N.J. 134, 137 (2002)). 
6 A-1118-16T5

testified "that [A.C.] has fairly consistently denied having 

committed any sexual offenses, so in that regard he has not 

addressed the offenses."

 A.C. also scored a four on the Static-99R administered by Dr. 

Kunz, "which place[d] him in a moderate high risk for reoffense." 

However, Dr. Kunz noted "the authors of Static-99R advise caution 

when using [it] . . . in the age group of over [seventy] because 

the predictive ability of this instrument is not as good as it is 

in younger age groups." Rather, the advice of the Static-99R 

authors "is that the offenders over the age of [seventy] should 

be assumed to have low risk." 

 In contrast to Dr. Sahni, Dr. Kunz did not diagnose A.C. with 

paraphilia. Dr. Kunz opined A.C.'s "risk for reoffense is low," 

but nonetheless "it would be prudent to impose whatever conditions 

could further decrease [A.C.'s] risk for reoffense." On crossexamination, Dr. Kunz conceded he was unable to state within a 

reasonable degree of medical probability that, if A.C. were 

conditionally discharged, he would be highly likely to comply with 

the conditions of release. 

 A.C.'s expert psychologist, Dr. Pirelli, also concluded A.C. 

suffers from antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Pirelli was 

unable to find A.C. has a paraphilia "at this time," but noted it 
7 A-1118-16T5

was "possible by history given [A.C.'s] offense history that he 

would have likely met [that] criteria in the past." 

 According to Dr. Pirelli, A.C.'s age decreased his chances 

of sexually offending, which he described as an "extremely rare 

event" for individuals, such as A.C., over age seventy. Moreover, 

Dr. Pirelli's evaluation revealed nothing about A.C. that would 

lead him to depart from that statistical analysis. Similar to Dr. 

Kunz, Dr. Pirelli was unable to find, within a reasonable degree 

of medical certainty, that A.C. was highly likely to comply with 

all conditions of release were that to occur. 

 In an oral opinion rendered on March 2, 2016, Judge Mulvihill 

found Dr. Harris to be a "very credible witness." Likewise, Judge 

Mulvihill found Dr. Kunz credible, but disagreed with Dr. Kunz's 

assessment "that the aging process has mitigated [A.C.'s] risk." 

Rather, the judge found A.C. "has antisocial personality disorder 

that's alive and well, and that he's no different than the man he 

was back when he last offended. And he denies all of his offenses. 

He needs treatment to mitigate his risk." Similarly, while Dr. 

Pirelli testified credibly, the judge disagreed with Dr. Pirelli's 

testimony that A.C. was not highly likely to reoffend due to his 

age. 

 After recounting the testimony of all four experts, and 

detailing A.C.'s criminal and disciplinary history and treatment 
8 A-1118-16T5

record at the STU, Judge Mulvihill concluded A.C.'s commitment 

should continue. The judge found 

by clear and convincing evidence [A.C.] has 

been convicted of sexual violent offenses, 

[and] . . . he continues to suffer mental 

abnormality or personality disorder that does 

not spontaneously remit, antisocial 

personality disorder. And also I find that 

there is the paraphilia, at least by history, 

and it should be at least a rule out or 

provisional, and clear and convincing evidence 

that presently he is highly likely to sexually 

reoffend if not confined to a secure facility 

for control, care, and treatment, that the 

antisocial personality disorder affects him 

emotionally, cognitively, volitionally, and 

predisposes him to sexual violence, he has 

serious difficulty controlling his sexual 

violent behavior, and I find that he's highly 

likely to sexually reoffend at the present 

time. 

The judge entered a memorializing order continuing A.C.'s 

commitment, and this appeal followed. 

 On appeal, A.C. argues Judge Mulvihill erred in continuing 

his civil commitment, and finding he was highly likely to commit 

acts of sexual violence in the future. A.C. further contends the 

judge's reliance on the testimony of Dr. Harris and Dr. Sahni was 

not supported by credible evidence, and that in light of A.C.'s 

age, the State's experts failed to prove the required link between 

A.C.'s past crimes and his present danger to sexually reoffend. 

We reject these arguments and affirm. 
9 A-1118-16T5

"The scope of appellate review of a commitment determination 

is extremely narrow." R.F., 217 N.J. at 174 (quoting In re D.C., 

146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "The judges who hear SVPA cases generally 

are 'specialists' and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled 

to 'special deference.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Civil Commitment 

of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 2007)). 

 "The SVPA authorizes the involuntary commitment of an 

individual believed to be a 'sexually violent predator' as defined 

by the Act." In re Commitment of W.Z., 173 N.J. 109, 127 (2002) 

(quoting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28). "The definition of 'sexually 

violent predator' requires proof of past sexually violent behavior 

through its precondition of a 'sexually violent offense . . . .'" 

Ibid. It also requires that the person "suffer[] from a mental 

abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely 

to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure 

facility for control, care and treatment." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 

30:4-27.26). 

 "[T]he mental condition must affect an individual's ability 

to control his or her sexually harmful conduct." Ibid. "Inherent 

in some diagnoses will be sexual compulsivity (i.e., paraphilia). 

But, the diagnosis of each sexually violent predator susceptible 

to civil commitment need not include a diagnosis of 'sexual 

compulsion.'" Id. at 129. 
10 A-1118-16T5

 The same standard that supports the initial involuntary 

commitment of a sex offender under the Act applies to the annual 

review hearing. See In re Civil Commitment of E.D., 353 N.J. 

Super. 450, 452-53 (App. Div. 2002). In either case, "the State 

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual 

has serious difficulty controlling his or her harmful sexual 

behavior such that it is highly likely that the person will not 

control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend." 

W.Z., 173 N.J. at 133-34. 

 As the fact finder, "[a] trial judge is 'not required to 

accept all or any part of [an] expert opinion[].'" R.F., 217 N.J. 

at 174 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting D.C., 

146 N.J. at 61). Furthermore, "an appellate court should not 

modify a trial court's determination either to commit or release 

an individual unless 'the record reveals a clear mistake.'" Id.

at 175 (quoting D.C., 146 N.J. at 58). 

 We are satisfied from our review of the record that Judge 

Mulvihill's findings are supported by substantial credible 

evidence. Based on credible expert testimony, the judge determined 

that A.C.'s disorders, past behavior, and treatment progress 

demonstrated that he was highly likely to engage in acts of sexual 

violence unless confined. The judge was not required to accept 

the testimony of A.C.'s witnesses that his risk of sexually 
11 A-1118-16T5

reoffending was low, especially when both experts were unable to 

state with any degree of probability that A.C. would comply with 

conditions imposed by the court if he were released back into the 

community. Given our limited scope of review, the judge's decision 

to continue A.C.'s commitment, to which we owe the "utmost 

deference" and may modify only where there is a clear abuse of 

discretion, In re J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459 (App. Div. 2001), 

was proper. 

 Affirmed.