PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6355

GARY WALL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

JAMES WADE, Food Services Manager, ROSP; ROBERT ROWLETTE, 

Assistant Warden of ROSP; T. RAY, Warden of ROSP; 

J. STALLARD, Counselor of ROSP,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

C. SELYERS, Food Services Supervisor, ROSP; 

CAPTAIN K. MCCOY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT C. GILBERT, 

Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. ADAMS, Investigator of ROSP; 

CORPORAL D. LEE, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. FARMER, 

Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL PHILLIPS, Employee of ROSP; 

K. CROWDER-AUSTIN, Western Regional Grievance Ombudsman for 

VADOC; LIEUTENANT J. FANNIN, Employee of ROSP; 

LIEUTENANT S. DAY, Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT T. HALE, 

Employee of ROSP; SERGEANT UNKNOWN, Employee of ROSP; 

CORPORAL BARROWMAN, Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL GIBSON, 

Employee of ROSP; CORPORAL D. VANDOVER, Property Officer of 

ROSP; CORPORAL UNKOWN, Employee of ROSP; R. MULLINS,

Grievance Coordinator of ROSP; JOHN GARMAN,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior 

District Judge. (7:11-cv-00191-JLK-RSB)

Argued: December 11, 2013 Decided: February 3, 2014
2

Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote 

the opinion, in which Judge Davis and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Elizabeth Scott Turner, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM & MARY, 

Williamsburg Virginia, for Appellant. Earle Duncan Getchell, 

Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Tillman J. Breckenridge, 

Washington, D.C., Robert M. Luck III, REED SMITH LLP, Richmond, 

Virginia; Patricia E. Roberts, WILLIAM & MARY LAW SCHOOL 

APPELLATE AND SUPREME COURT CLINIC, Williamsburg, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General of 

Virginia, Michael H. Brady, Assistant Solicitor General, 

Patricia L. West, Chief Deputy Attorney General, 

Wesley G. Russell, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
3

GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we review the application of a state 

prison’s policy conditioning an inmate’s request for a religious 

accommodation on his possession of physical indicia of faith. 

We also address whether the inmate’s claims for equitable relief 

were mooted after the prison abandoned the policy. We vacate 

the district court’s summary judgment order granting the 

defendants qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s claims for 

monetary relief. We also vacate the district court’s decision

that the prison’s abandonment of the policy mooted the claims 

for equitable relief. We remand to the district court for such 

further proceedings as may be appropriate.

I.

The plaintiff, Gary Wall, is a state prisoner housed at Red 

Onion State Prison (“ROSP”) in Pound, Virginia. As a member of 

the Nation of Islam, in 2008 and 2009 Wall was allowed to 

observe the holy month of Ramadan while in state custody. To 

accommodate Ramadan observance, prison officials provide 

participating inmates with special meals served before and after 

sunset. While at ROSP, Wall also received “common fare” meals, 

which satisfied his religious beliefs.

Prior to 2010, Muslim inmates at ROSP simply had to sign up 

to participate in Ramadan. In 2009, approximately half of the 
4

inmate population signed up. ROSP staff later determined that a 

significant number of the participating inmates were not, in 

fact, practicing Muslims. As a result, ROSP devised a new 

eligibility policy for 2010: in addition to signing up, inmates 

had to provide some physical indicia of Islamic faith, such as a 

Quran, Kufi, prayer rug, or written religious material obtained 

from the prison Chaplain’s office.1

 ROSP inmates who did not 

have such materials or refused to acquire them were deemed 

insincere in their religious beliefs and were prohibited from 

participating in Ramadan.2

Wall was one of the inmates who was not allowed to 

participate. After initially signing up, Wall was asked by 

defendants James Wade, C. Selyers, and J. Stallard to provide 

physical evidence of the sincerity of his beliefs in accordance 

with the new policy. Wall stated that all his belongings, 

including his articles of faith, had been lost during his 

 1 This policy was somewhat unique among Virginia Department 

of Corrections (“VDOC”) facilities. Most prisons maintain a 

“religious pass list,” which keeps track of which inmates 

participate in specific religious services. However, because 

most ROSP inmates are in long-term administrative segregation, 

ROSP does not offer group religious services. Consequently, 

ROSP does not keep a religious pass list.

2 In 2010, with the new policy in place, only 176 of the 360 

inmates who signed up to participate provided the necessary 

materials. The other 187 inmates were prohibited from observing 

the fasting hours.
5

transfer to ROSP. He showed Wade a state court judgment against 

the Commonwealth as proof that VDOC had lost his possessions.3 

Wall also produced documents showing that he was receiving

common fare meals in accordance with his faith, and he informed 

the officers that he had observed Ramadan in 2008 and 2009. 

Despite this, Wade responded, “that don’t mean anything,” and 

instructed Stallard and Selyers to remove Wall from the Ramadan 

list. J.A. 139.

Wall then filed an informal complaint, again explaining 

that his religious materials had been lost and requesting to be 

allowed to participate. In a memo in response to the complaint, 

Wade reiterated ROSP’s new policy, stating:

[ROSP] does not have religious services so the 

following rules apply to this institution. You are 

required to have religious material such as ([ku]f 

[i], [Qu]r[a]n, prayer rug or religious pamphlets that 

pertain to the Ramadan month long fasting.) Food 

service went to every inmate[’]s cell to inspect the 

above religious material. Either you had no religious 

material or refused to present material[.] [T]his is 

why you were removed from the Ramadan pass list.

J.A. 42.

On August 11, 2010, the first morning of Ramadan, Wall did 

not eat breakfast and concealed a portion of his meal in his 

 3 Although the judgment itself does not reference the nature 

of Wall’s underlying claim, he later received a letter from the 

Virginia Attorney General’s office explaining that it was in 

response to “founded grievances regarding . . . lost property 

. . . .” J.A. 126.
6

cell to save until after sunset. ROSP staff found the food and 

threatened to charge him with possessing contraband. Faced with 

choosing between starvation and sanctions, Wall ate during the 

day and violated his religious beliefs.

On August 15, Wall filed a formal grievance, which was also 

denied. Six days later, he had a conversation with Wade and 

Assistant Warden Robert Rowlette, in which Rowlette asked if he

would like to be put back on the Ramadan list provided it could 

be verified that he had truly lost his belongings. According to 

Wall, he responded that he still wanted to participate, but that 

he also wanted an explanation for why he was taken off the list 

in the first place. Rowlette replied, “[o]kay,” and then walked 

away while Wall shouted “I want to participate in Ramadan! I 

want my Ramadan, Rowlette!” J.A. 140. According to the 

defendants, however, Wall refused Rowlette’s offer to be put 

back on the list, saying, “[n]o, I’m going to pursue this in 

court.” J.A. 93. Ultimately, Wall was not allowed to 

participate in Ramadan in 2010.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Wall filed 

suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 

Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. In an amended complaint, Wall alleged violations of 

RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, in 

addition to several related state law claims. The amended 
7

complaint sought “[a] declaratory judgment, nominal damages, 

unspecified joint and several compensatory damages, $10,000 in 

punitive damages from each defendant, and any additional relief 

this court deems just, proper, and equitable.” J.A. 32-33.

Shortly after the suit was filed, Wall was transferred out 

of ROSP to a lower-security facility. Subsequently, the 

district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment, finding that any claims for equitable relief were moot 

following Wall’s transfer, and ruling that the defendants were 

entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s claim for 

damages.

Following the district court’s ruling, Wall was transferred 

back to ROSP. The defendants claim that ROSP has since 

abandoned its policy of requiring prisoners to possess physical 

indicia of faith in order to participate in Ramadan or other 

religious observations. The new policy, adopted in a September 

13, 2011 memo by VDOC’s Chief of Corrections Operations,4 states 

that inmates in segregation facilities, such as ROSP, may 

demonstrate sincerity by showing that they have in the past 

borrowed religious material such as DVDs, CDs, or literature 

 4 The memo was not submitted as evidence in this case and is 

therefore not part of the record, but it was referenced in a 

related case involving the same policy. DePaola v. Wade, No. 

7:11-cv-00198, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44340, *7-10 (W.D. Va. Mar. 

30, 2012).
8

from the Chaplain’s office. The memo states that the change was 

made following an investigation by VDOC’s Inspector General, 

which concluded that “it is not appropriate to require inmates 

to buy something which is related to exercising First Amendment 

[r]ights.” Following the policy change, Wall and other inmates 

who were prohibited from observing Ramadan in 2010 were allowed 

to participate in a “make-up” Ramadan in April 2012.

II.

We review two issues in this appeal: whether the district 

court correctly determined that Wall’s equitable claims under 

RLUIPA and the First Amendment were moot following ROSP’s 

decision to abandon the 2010 Ramadan policy; and whether the 

district court correctly granted the defendants qualified 

immunity on Wall’s First Amendment claim for damages.5

 Both 

issues are questions of law which we review de novo. See Green 

v. City of Raleigh, 523 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(mootness); Johnson v. Caudill, 475 F.3d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 

2007) (qualified immunity). We address the issues in turn.

 5 We note at the forefront that Congress did not authorize 

damages claims against state officials under RLUIPA. See

Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1658-59 (2011) (prohibiting 

damages claims against state officials in their official 

capacity); Rendleman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 189 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(same for individual capacity). Therefore, the plaintiff’s only 

potential remedies under RLUIPA are equitable.
9

A.

In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

the district court found that Wall’s transfer to another 

facility mooted his request for equitable relief.6 Although 

Wall’s subsequent return to ROSP rendered this justification 

obsolete, the district court also ruled that in such an event 

Wall’s claims would remain moot in light of VDOC’s decision to 

terminate the 2010 Ramadan policy.

It is well established that a defendant’s “voluntary 

cessation of a challenged practice” moots an action only if 

“subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly 

wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” 

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 

U.S. 167, 189 (2000); see Knox v. Service Employees Intern. 

 6 As an initial matter, the defendants argue that, to the 

extent Wall has a justiciable claim for equitable relief, his 

amended complaint failed to request injunctive relief in 

particular. While it is true that his original complaint was 

more specific than the amended complaint, we are comfortable 

reading Wall’s prayer for any relief deemed “just, proper, and 

equitable” as encompassing a claim for injunctive relief. An 

appropriately liberal reading of the amended complaint indicates 

that Wall sought to prevent the defendants from wrongfully 

limiting his observance of Ramadan in the future through the 

issuance of an injunction. See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 

520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[Courts must] afford liberal 

construction to the allegations in pro se complaints raising 

civil rights issues.”). We also note that the district court, 

while not explicitly ruling on the issue, referred to Wall’s 

claim as a request for “injunctive relief.” J.A. 142.
10

Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) (“The voluntary 

cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily render a 

case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permit a 

resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is 

dismissed.”). Were it otherwise, “courts would be compelled to 

leave ‘[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.’” 

City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10 

(1982) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 

632 (1953)). “The ‘heavy burden of persua[ding]’ the court that 

the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up 

again lies with the party asserting mootness.” Laidlaw, 528 

U.S. at 189 (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate 

Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).

We have no difficulty concluding that the defendants failed 

to meet their “heavy burden” of establishing that it is 

“absolutely clear” the 2010 Ramadan policy will not be 

reinstated. Id. Unsubstantiated assurances in their appellate 

brief aside, the defendants have failed to put forth even a 

single piece of evidence establishing that the practice of 

requiring physical indicia of faith has been terminated once and 

for all. The September 13, 2011 memorandum describing VDOC’s 

purported change in policy –- which was only submitted in a 
11

different case7 –- also fails to establish that VDOC will not 

reinstate the policy following completion of this lawsuit. We 

have previously held that when a defendant retains the authority 

and capacity to repeat an alleged harm, a plaintiff’s claims 

should not be dismissed as moot. Town of Nags Head v. Toloczko, 

728 F.3d 391, 395 n.3 (4th Cir. 2013); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 

307, 316 (4th Cir. 2013); Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, 

Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800 (4th Cir. 2001). Nothing in the memo 

suggests that VDOC is actually barred –- or even considers 

itself barred -- from reinstating the 2010 Ramadan policy should 

it so choose. To the contrary, the fact that at least three 

separate policies have been utilized at ROSP since 2009 

indicates some degree of doubt that the new policy will remain 

in place for long.

The defendants invite us to adopt an approach employed by 

several of our sister circuits, in which governmental defendants 

are held to a less demanding burden of proof than private 

defendants. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of 

Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1116 (10th Cir. 2010) (“In practice 

. . . , Laidlaw’s heavy burden frequently has not prevented 

governmental officials from discontinuing challenged practices 

 7 While we are confident in our authority to take judicial 

notice of the memorandum, we note that litigants do themselves 

no favor in relying on our willingness to do so.
12

and mooting a case.”); Sossamon v. Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th 

Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts are justified in treating a voluntary 

governmental cessation of possibly wrongful conduct with some 

solicitude, mooting cases that might have been allowed to 

proceed had the defendant not been a public entity.”). However, 

even if we were to adopt this approach, a question which we 

expressly do not decide, we would have no trouble determining 

that the defendants’ near total failure to provide the Court 

with information regarding the change would remain insufficient 

even under a lesser standard. In short, bald assertions of a 

defendant –- whether governmental or private –- that it will not 

resume a challenged policy fail to satisfy any burden of showing 

that a claim is moot.8

 We therefore vacate the district court’s 

dismissal of the plaintiff’s equitable claims.

 8 Nor do we find any merit in the defendants’ contention 

that the voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply in this 

case because the change in policy was unrelated to the 

litigation. See ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of Catholic 

Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) (“[T]he voluntary 

cessation doctrine does not apply when the voluntary cessation 

of the challenged activity occurs because of reasons unrelated

to the litigation.”) (quoting M. Redish, Moore’s Federal

Practice, § 101.99[2]). It is undisputed that the September 13, 

2011 memo was issued after the plaintiff’s original complaint 

was filed; and, as noted above, the change was made in the midst 

of a separate lawsuit filed by another ROSP inmate challenging 

the same policy. The timing strongly indicates that the change 

was at least somewhat related to the two pending lawsuits.
13

B.

Turning to the plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages under 

the First Amendment, the district court ruled that the 

defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.9 Qualified 

immunity protects government officials performing discretionary 

functions unless: “(1) the allegations underlying the claim, if 

true, substantiate the violation of a federal statutory or 

constitutional right; and (2) this violation was of a clearly 

established right of which a reasonable person would have 

known.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 

292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

we conclude that the defendants have failed to establish as a 

matter of law that the 2010 Ramadan policy, as applied to the 

plaintiff, did not violate his First Amendment rights. We also 

hold that their alleged actions violated the plaintiff’s clearly 

established rights, and that they are therefore not entitled to 

qualified immunity.

 9 The plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief are not 

affected by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which “has no 

application to suits for declaratory or injunctive relief.” 

South Carolina State Bd. of Dentistry v. F.T.C., 455 F.3d 436, 

446-47 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 

1326, 1331 (4th Cir. 1974)).
14

1.

“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids 

the adoption of laws designed to suppress religious beliefs or 

practices.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 656 (4th Cir. 

2001). This encompasses policies that impose a substantial 

burden on a prisoner’s right to practice his religion. Lovelace 

v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 198 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2006). “Under . . . 

the Free Exercise Clause . . . , a prisoner has a ‘clearly 

established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . . 

religious scruples,’ including proper food during Ramadan.” Id.

at 198-99 (quoting Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 597 (2nd Cir. 

2003)). The defendants concede that denying Wall the 

opportunity to observe Ramadan imposed a substantial burden on 

his religious freedom.

However, free exercise restrictions that are “reasonably 

adapted to achieving a legitimate penological objective” are 

permissible. Id. at 200. In other words, then, prison 

officials may restrict an inmate’s religious practices subject 

to a “reasonableness” test that accords substantial deference to 

the professional judgment of correctional officers. See Overton 

v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).10

 10 This differs from the test utilized under RLUIPA, which 

requires that restrictions be narrowly tailored to a compelling 

government interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Thus, in the 

(Continued)
15

A prison regulation is reasonable and thus permissible if 

it satisfies the four factors established in Turner v. Safley, 

482 U.S. 78 (1987). That test asks: (1) whether there is a 

“valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation or 

action and the interest asserted by the government, or whether 

this interest is “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or 

irrational”; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the 

right . . . remain open to prison inmates”; (3) what impact the 

desired accommodation would have on security staff, inmates, and 

the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether there exist 

any “obvious, easy alternatives” to the challenged regulation or 

action. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 200 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 

89-92).

As a preliminary matter, “prison officials may 

appropriately question whether a prisoner’s religiosity, 

asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is 

authentic.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n. 13 

(2005); see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971) 

(“[T]he ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question; rather, the 

 

prison context, the First Amendment affords officials greater 

latitude than RLUIPA. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 199 n. 8. (“RLUIPA 

adopts a ‘more searching standard’ of review than that used for 

parallel First Amendment claims, strict scrutiny instead of 

reasonableness.”) (quoting Madison v. Ritter, 355 F.3d 310, 314-

15 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003)).
16

question is whether the objector’s beliefs are ‘truly held.’”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Accepting that prisons may 

limit religious accommodations to sincere believers, the 

question in this case is whether ROSP’s specific means of 

testing Wall’s sincerity was permissible; that is, whether ROSP 

was allowed to require him to possess specific, physical items 

of Islamic faith as proof of belief.

We hold that under the current record, the defendants’ 

application of the 2010 Ramadan policy fails an analysis under 

the Turner factors.11 First, demanding specific physical items 

as proof of faith will rarely be an acceptable means of 

achieving the prison’s stated interest in reducing costs. 

Strict application of such a rule fails even a rational 

connection requirement. Although we recognize that prison 

officials must make determinations of who is entitled to 

accommodations, it exceeds their authority to decide which, if 

any, religious relics are sufficiently important as to 

 11 With limited exceptions, much of the material facts 

regarding the defendants’ actions are undisputed. However, for 

the plaintiff to ultimately succeed on remand, he must still 

prove that the defendants’ actions were intentional. Lovelace, 

472 F.3d at 194-95, 201-02 (holding that suits under both RLUIPA 

and the First Amendment require a showing of “conscious or 

intentional interference” with the plaintiff’s rights). In 

evaluating the legality of the policy in this section of the 

opinion, we focus on the largely undisputed allegations of the 

defendants’ actions, and not their as yet unproven intent.
17

constitute an appropriate gauge of faith. This Court has held, 

albeit under RLUIPA’s more exacting standard, that prison 

administrators may not assume that a “lack of sincerity (or 

religiosity) with respect to one practice [of a given religion]

means lack of sincerity with respect to others.” Lovelace, 472 

F.3d at 188. Thus, the fact that Wall did not have, for 

example, a prayer rug in his possession is not a sufficiently 

reliable indicator of whether he is a practicing Muslim. A 

prison may not condition an inmate’s constitutionally protected 

rights on so narrow a set of grounds without “render[ing] the 

policy arbitrary or irrational.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.

Indeed, the circumstances of Wall’s case highlight exactly 

why such an unyielding policy is unreasonable. Despite Wall’s 

other outward manifestations of faith, most notably his past 

participation in Ramadan and common fare diet,12 he was 

prohibited from observing the fast solely because he did not 

possess any of the approved items. The defendants also ignored 

Wall’s perfectly believable explanation, later verified, that he 

did not have the items only because VDOC had lost all of his 

 12 The defendants note that members of a number of different 

faiths receive the common fare diet, making it an over-inclusive 

test. However, Wall’s amended complaint states that he 

presented Selyers with his common fare signup form, which 

specifically notes his Islamic faith as the justification for 

participating in the diet.
18

belongings during his transfer to ROSP. Nor was Wall’s attempt 

to store food in his cell on the first day of Ramadan enough to 

convince ROSP officials that he was sincere in his desire to 

observe the fasting requirements. Wall also continued to pursue 

the issue after his initial denial, filing several grievances 

and requesting to be placed back on the list. The defendants 

rejected these requests and simply reiterated their policy 

without further consideration of Wall’s circumstances. Finally, 

at least according to Wall, on August 21, 2011, Rowlette offered 

to place Wall back on the participation list provided he could 

verify that Wall’s belongings had actually been lost. Rowlette 

then rescinded the offer once Wall stated that he intended to 

pursue a formal adjudication of the matter regardless. Taking 

this fact in the light most favorable to Wall, it indicates that 

the officials were more interested in protecting their earlier 

decision than in honestly discerning whether Wall should be 

permitted to participate.

In short, Wall has alleged that the defendants ignored 

numerous signs that he is a practicing Muslim who was merely 

seeking to exercise his genuinely held beliefs. By applying the 

policy in so rigid a manner, the restriction lost whatever 
19

“valid, rational connection” to the government’s stated interest 

that might have existed at the time it was adopted.13

An analysis of the remaining Turner factors also supports 

the plaintiff’s claims. The second factor asks whether 

“alternative means of exercising the right . . . remain open to 

[the] prison[er].” 482 U.S. at 90. It is clear that Wall was 

absolutely precluded from observing Ramadan because of the 

defendants’ actions. When he attempted to adhere to the fasting 

requirements on his own by storing food in his cell, he was 

threatened with disciplinary action. The only alternative means 

proffered by the defendants is that had Wall obeyed the policy, 

he would have been allowed to participate. This suggestion, of 

course, it is not an “alternative means” at all, it is merely a 

 13 We note our disagreement with the defendants’ suggestion 

that the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Lone v. Estate of 

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987), is controlling. In O’Lone, 

the Court examined a prison’s policy of prohibiting inmates 

assigned to outside work duty from returning to the prison 

during the day in order to attend Jumu’ah, an Islamic 

congregational service held on Friday afternoons. Id. at 349. 

The Court deemed that the policy was logically related to the 

prison’s legitimate interest in maintaining “institutional order 

and security” by relieving overcrowding, easing “congestion and 

delays at the main gate,” and lessening the pressure on the 

guards who previously had to evaluate individual return 

requests. Id. at 350-51. While the O’Lone decision certainly 

supports the general proposition that courts should be 

deferential to the decisions of prison administrators, the case 

does not examine the relevant issue in this case -- the 

reasonableness of a sincerity test –- and is therefore largely 

inapposite.
20

reiteration of the same rigid requirements Wall was unable to 

meet.14

We also believe that the third Turner factor, which 

examines the impact the requested accommodation would have on 

the prison’s efficient operation, also supports the plaintiff’s 

claim. 482 U.S. at 92. We are not satisfied that the 

defendants have sufficiently explained how a less restrictive 

policy would have imposed a significant burden on prison 

resources. The defendants contend generally that Ramadan is 

expensive because participants require special meals, and the 

schedules of both inmates and guards must be rearranged to 

accommodate pre-dawn and post-sunset meals. However, the record 

is void of any specific information regarding these purported 

costs, and we are not content to permit a prison to deny an 

inmate’s constitutional right in the face of such generalized 

 14 We recognize that in O’Lone the Supreme Court interpreted 

the concept of alternative means broadly, asking not only 

whether a particular religious practice has been impeded, but 

instead addressing “all forms of religious exercise” of the 

prisoner’s faith. 482 U.S. at 352. However, such an 

interpretation is unduly restrictive with respect to Wall’s 

case. Ramadan, unlike Jumu’ah, is one of the five pillars of 

Islam, and its observance is integral to all practicing Muslims. 

Moreover, we have previously held that “a prisoner has a clearly 

established . . . right to a diet consistent with his . . . 

religious scruples, including proper food during Ramadan.” 

Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198-99 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We decline to read O’Lone, decided before 

Lovelace, as conflicting with the latter’s holding.
21

concerns. This is especially so in light of the negligible 

costs associated with adding one additional inmate to an already 

existent program. Nor have the defendants presented a 

convincing argument why an individualized interpretation in 

Wall’s case would have been unduly burdensome. To the contrary,

Wall presented the officials with significant evidence of his 

Muslim faith, which the defendants could have accepted without 

the need to conduct any further investigation on their own.

Finally, we are satisfied that there existed “easy[] [and] 

obvious alternatives” to the challenged regulation. Id. at 93. 

This is most plainly seen in the fact that ROSP ultimately 

changed its policy, which has since allowed Wall and others to 

observe Ramadan without incident. Additionally, a VDOC guidance 

document issued June 25, 2010 addressed how inmates who were not 

on an institution’s designated religious pass list could 

demonstrate eligibility for Ramadan observance. One 

consideration utilized was past involvement in Ramadan fasting. 

ROSP, which does not maintain religious pass lists due to its 

status as a segregation facility, could have utilized the same, 

less restrictive criterion for determining eligibility.

In sum, viewing the current record in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants’ application of the 

2010 Ramadan policy to Wall was unconstitutional. The 

defendants relied exclusively on a narrow set of parameters 
22

while ignoring obvious indications of the sincerity of Wall’s 

beliefs. The First Amendment demands a more reasoned approach, 

even within the difficult confines of a prison environment.15

2.

Having established a claim for a constitutional violation, 

we must now ask whether the defendants transgressed law that was 

“clearly established” at the time of the violation. Ridpath,

447 F.3d at 306. We conclude that, given Wall’s circumstances, 

his right to participate in Ramadan was clearly established, and 

the defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.

As noted, we have previously held that under “the Free 

Exercise Clause . . . a prisoner has a clearly established . . . 

right to a diet consistent with his . . . religious scruples, 

including proper food during Ramadan.” Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 

198-99 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Further, “[a] prison official violates this clearly 

established right if he intentionally and without sufficient 

 15 To be clear, we do not decide that prisons may never 

require some tangible evidence of faith in support of a 

religious accommodation. Rather, our reasoning merely restricts 

prisons from requiring specific physical indicia of faith in the 

face of significant alternative evidence that an inmate’s 

beliefs are sincere. Nor do we mean to suggest that bright line 

rules have no place in governing religious accommodation 

requests, but only that prison officials may not turn a blind 

eye to obvious justifications for exceptions when they present 

themselves so plainly.
23

justification denies an inmate his religiously mandated diet.” 

Id. at 199. We take these statements to mean quite exactly what 

they say: that Wall’s right to participate in Ramadan was 

clearly established, and when the defendants abridged this right 

without first satisfying Turner’s reasonableness test, they 

subjected themselves to the potential for liability. As 

expressed above, the defendants’ application of their policy to 

Wall was unnecessarily strict. They overlooked (at best) 

significant evidence that Wall was, in fact, a practicing Muslim 

who was entitled to participate in Ramadan. We cannot conclude 

that a reasonable official in the defendants’ position, giving 

proper consideration to our statement in Lovelace that the right 

is clearly established, and to Turner’s objective reasonableness 

test, would have felt it permissible to apply the policy in so 

strict a fashion.

The defendants attempt to avoid this rather straightforward 

result by arguing that there is a lack of case law elucidating 

exactly how prisons may utilize sincerity tests in determining 

eligibility for religious accommodations. While it may be true 

that we have never specifically evaluated a sincerity test,16

 16 Although not directly on point, we believe the result in 

Lovelace is relevant for reasons beyond its general affirmation 

that inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations. 

In that case, we reviewed a prison’s policy of removing inmates 

from its Ramadan list if they were observed breaking the fast 

(Continued)
24

this argument overlooks the broader right at issue: that 

inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations absent 

a legitimate reason to the contrary. As we have previously 

stated, clearly established “includes not only already 

specifically adjudicated rights, but those manifestly included 

within more general applications of the core constitutional 

principle invoked.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th 

Cir. 1992). In light of our unequivocal statement in Lovelace

that inmates are entitled to religious dietary accommodations, 

we need not to have previously passed judgment on the 

appropriateness of particular sincerity tests in order to demand 

that prison officials act reasonably in administering that 

right. An expectation of reasonableness in this context is not 

a high bar, and does not punish officials for “bad guesses in 

gray areas.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 

1992). To the contrary, it offers only a minimal level of 

 

even a single time. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 181. We held that, 

under RLUIPA’s more demanding standard, the policy was not the 

least restrictive means of furthering the government’s interest 

in efficiently running the prison. Id. at 190-94. Although the 

policy was intended as a disciplinary measure and the inmate’s 

sincerity was never in question, id. at 187 n. 2, the case 

remains an example of how a harsh and unyielding policy may be 

unlawful in the context of clearly protected individual rights. 

It thus provided at least some degree of guidance to the 

defendants in this case, if not enough to be dispositive.
25

protection to inmates seeking to exercise their constitutionally 

protected rights.

Having found that the plaintiff has established a claim for 

a violation of his clearly established First Amendment rights, 

we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the 

plaintiff’s First Amendment claim for damages.

III.

For the reasons explained above, we vacate the district 

court’s decision concluding that (1) the plaintiff’s equitable 

claims are moot, and (2) the defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s First Amendment damages 

claim. In so doing, we necessarily find that the plaintiff’s

claim under RLUIPA survives summary judgment as well, as such 

claims are evaluated under the same factors, but subject to a 

less demanding standard of proof. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 

190. Accordingly, we remand this action to the district court 

for further proceedings as appropriate.

VACATED AND REMANDED