GLD-362 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 13-2372

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JELANI SOLOMON,

Appellant.

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Crim. No. 2-05-cr-00385-001)

District Judge: Terrence F. McVerry

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Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

August 1, 2013

Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 15, 2013)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Appellant Jelani Solomon, a federal prisoner, appeals from an order of the District 

Court dismissing his complaint for the return of real and personal property. For the 

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

Solomon was convicted following a jury trial in the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and murder 
2

during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime. He was sentenced to life 

imprisonment. We affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence, see United States 

v. Solomon, 387 Fed. Appx. 258 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Through two civil in rem forfeiture actions, United States v. Various Parcels of 

Real Property, D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-01498, and United States v. Various Vehicles Titled 

in the Name of Jelani Solomon, D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-00024, the Government sought the 

forfeiture of six parcels of real property and numerous automobiles on the ground that the 

property was traceable to Solomon‟s drug trafficking. In Various Parcels of Real 

Property, the Government moved for a Final Order of Forfeiture after the property was 

arrested, asserting that the complaint and arrest warrant had been served on Solomon, that 

public notice of the action had been published in the newspaper, and that no claims, 

answers or appearances had been filed regarding the defendant property. The District 

Court granted the motion and a Judgment and Final Order of Forfeiture was entered on 

September 8, 2006.1 On September 20, 2006, Solomon, through counsel, sought to stay 

the judicial forfeiture order. Solomon argued in his stay motion that the attorney he had 

retained to defend the property had done nothing on his behalf, and he asked the District 

Court to permit a defense to the forfeiture. The Government responded, arguing that the 

civil action should not be reopened because Solomon had failed to allege any meritorious

defense to the forfeiture. The Government attached as exhibits cover letters indicating 

that the complaint and warrant had been mailed to Solomon, Inmate # FQ8081, at 801 

Butler Pike, Mercer, PA 16137, the address for the State Correctional Institution in 

Mercer (“SCI-Mercer”). In an order entered on October 12, 2006, the District Court 

 

1

The action involving the automobiles was dismissed in part and apparently abandoned 

in part.
3

denied the motion to stay, agreeing with the Government that Solomon had failed to 

allege any meritorious defense. 

On September 14, 2010, Solomon filed a pro se motion in Various Parcels of Real 

Property pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(g) for return of the parcels of real property, 

the automobiles, and certain other items which had been administratively forfeited, 

including $6,480.00 in U.S. currency, a Rolex watch, and a diamond bracelet.

2

 In this 

motion, Solomon argued that these items were no longer required for evidentiary 

purposes and thus should be returned to him. Solomon attached to the motion two 

Notices of Seizure, indicating that notice of the administrative proceedings had been 

mailed to him at SCI-Mercer on February 28, 2006. After the Government submitted a 

response to Solomon‟s Rule 41(g) motion, the District Court denied it in an order entered 

on October 6, 2010. Solomon did not appeal to this Court.

Shortly thereafter, Solomon filed two frivolous motions in Various Parcels of Real 

Property, seeming to challenge the District Court‟s jurisdiction in his criminal case. The 

District Court denied these motions and directed the Clerk not to accept any more filings 

from Solomon without prior authorization from the court.

Notwithstanding the order barring further filings, on April 24, 2013, Solomon filed

another complaint pro se pursuant to criminal Rule 41(g), this time in his criminal case, 

for return of the six parcels of real property, the cash, the Rolex, and the diamond 

bracelet.

3

 In this Rule 41(g) motion, Solomon complained that he did not receive proper 

 

2

The cash, the Rolex, and the bracelet were not seized as an exercise of the court‟s in 

rem jurisdiction. See generally United States v. Howell, 354 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 

2004) (administrative forfeiture bypasses judicial system).

3

In United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664 (3d Cir. 2000) ) (en banc), a criminal case, 

we approved the use of former Rule 41(e) to press a claim of inadequate notice in 
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notice of either the civil in rem or administrative forfeiture proceedings, and thus his right 

to due process had been violated. He asserted that the Government mailed all notices to 

the SCI-Mercer address, but he had been removed from that facility pursuant to a writ of 

habeas corpus ad prosequendum before the notices arrived.4 On April 21, 2006, the Drug 

Enforcement Agency mailed a second round of administrative forfeiture notices to him at 

the Washington County Jail, 100 West Cherry Avenue, Washington, PA 15301, but this 

was nearly three months after the items had been seized. Solomon also argued that 

forfeiture of the property amounted to an excess fine in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment, and that he had a meritorious “innocent owner” defense in that the drug 

trafficking occurred without his knowledge or consent.5

In an order entered on May 3, 2013, the District Court summarily dismissed the 

complaint on the grounds that Solomon “fail[ed] to set forth any additional facts which 

could in any way be construed as a meritorious defense to the forfeiture action or 

judgment” and “fail[ed] to raise any sound legal argument in support of his position or 

any theory not already addressed by the Court.”

Solomon appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Solomon was 

advised that we might act summarily to dispose of the appeal, and was invited to submit 

argument in writing. He has not done so.

 

administrative forfeiture proceedings. See id. at 670 (district court has jurisdiction over 

motion to return property styled as a Rule 41(e) motion, and should treat such motion as 

civil equitable proceeding).

4

To satisfy the Due Process Clause, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 

an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).

5

Solomon attached an affidavit from his sister in support of his “innocent owner” 

defense.
5

We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 

question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. The April, 

2013 motion was Solomon‟s third attempt to reopen the Final Order of Forfeiture entered 

on September 8, 2006, and his second attempt to challenge the administrative forfeiture 

proceedings. As a threshold matter, a Rule 41(g) motion filed in his criminal case would 

not be the proper vehicle for reopening the judgment in the civil in rem action. In any 

event, a party seeking to reopen a judgment long after it has been entered must 

demonstrate the existence of extraordinary circumstances that justify reopening the 

judgment. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008). “But 

extraordinary circumstances rarely exist when a party seeks relief from a judgment that 

resulted from the party‟s deliberate choices.” Id. 

Here, Solomon presented new theories of relief from the forfeitures more than 61⁄2 

years after the Final Order of Forfeiture issued, and 7 years after the administrative 

forfeitures. Because those new theories – that notice of the forfeiture actions was 

constitutionally inadequate, that the forfeitures amounted to an excessive fine, and that he 

has a meritorious “innocent owner” defense – easily could have been pursued in his prior 

attempts to challenge the forfeitures, he has not shown extraordinary circumstances for 

reopening either the civil in rem judgment or the administrative proceedings. After 

carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the District Court that Solomon failed to set 

forth any additional facts or sound legal argument sufficient to warrant reopening at this 

late date. Cf. Budget Blinds, Inc., 536 F.3d at 255 (“If the circumstances of a case are not 

sufficiently „extraordinary‟ to outweigh the interest in the finality of judgments,”

reopening under Rule 60(b)(6) is not warranted).
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For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 

dismissing the complaint for the return of property.