J-S19008-18

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARCO MALDONADO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1174 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 31, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0221851-1993

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JUNE 18, 2018

Appellant, Marco Maldonado, appeals pro se from the order denying his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541–9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as 

follows:

On October 5, 1993, [Appellant] pled guilty to second 

degree murder following the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

suppress evidence and the Commonwealth’s agreement not to 

pursue capital murder charges. The Honorable Francis Biunno 

sentenced him to life imprisonment that same day. No direct 

appeal followed.

[Appellant] filed his first PCRA, counseled, on February 21, 

1995. An evidentiary hearing was held on August 3, 1995 where 

trial counsel testified. [Appellant] was to testify at a future 

hearing; however, due to a series of delays, [Appellant’s] PCRA 

petition was not addressed until February 5, 2002, when new 

counsel requested that the evidentiary hearing be completed. The 
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petition was dismissed on July 15, 2004. A subsequent appeal 

was affirmed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court on April 14, 

2005.2

2 Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 876 A.2d 466 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (unpublished memorandum).

The instant petition was filed on November 5, 2009, followed 

by several amended petitions dated December 2, 2010, August 

12, 2011, April 5, 2012, January 16, 2015, April 13, 2016 and 

August 29, 2016. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, this court sent a 

notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely without 

exception on February 7, 2017. In response to this court’s 907 

notice, [Appellant] filed another petition on February 13, 2017. 

This court formally dismissed the [November 5, 2009] petition on 

March 31, 2017.3 [Appellant] timely filed a notice of appeal to the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court on April 5, 2017.

3 The order was issued more than twenty days after 

[Appellant] was served with notice of the forthcoming 

dismissal of his Post-Conviction Relief Act petition. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/5/17, at 1-2. 

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether PCRA Court erred when it dismissed the PCRA petition 

as untimely when there was government interference with the 

presentment of the prison visitor’s log book for a Commonwealth 

v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 576 Pa. 332 (Pa.2003) claim?

2. Whether PCRA court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s PCRA 

petition as untimely when the prison visitor’s log book became 

available as a newly discovered fact pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 593 Pa. 382 (Pa.2007) and 

Commonwealth v. Burton, No.9 WAP 2016[?]

3. Whether PCRA Court erred when it failed to grant a new trial 

and recognize the Brooks claim independently from Appellant’s 

previous ineffective assistance of counsel claim as it was not 

presented on previously litigated evidence?
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4. Whether PCRA Court erred when it failed to review Appellant’s 

fraud on the court claim perpetrated by court-appointed trial 

counsel, Jeffrey Kolansky, in the form of testimony at Appellant’s 

prior evidentiary hearing?

5. Whether PCRA Court erred when it dismissed the PCRA petition 

as untimely when newly discovered facts were presented in the 

form of police misconduct and multi-witness identifications of the 

actual perpetrator of the murder for which Appellant was

convicted?

6. Whether PCRA Court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s PCRA 

petition without the material facts being heard and reviewed at an 

evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa. R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2)?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.1

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 

317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed 

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Id

The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional threshold and may 

not be disregarded in order to reach the merits of the claims raised in a PCRA 

petition that is untimely. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1038 

(Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 

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1 We note that Appellant has failed to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 2119(a). Appellant did not divide the lengthy argument 

section of his brief in coordination with his statement of questions involved. 

Accordingly, our appellate review of Appellant’s claim has been substantially 

hampered. Thus, we could dismiss Appellant’s appeal on this basis. Pa.R.A.P. 

2101. Despite the brief’s defects, however, we address Appellant’s claims to 

the extent we can discern his arguments.
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(Pa. 2000)). Effective January 16, 1996, the PCRA was amended to require a 

petitioner to file any PCRA petition within one year of the date the judgment 

of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence 

“becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3). Where a petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final on or 

before the effective date of the amendment, a special grace proviso allowed 

first PCRA petitions to be filed by January 16, 1997. See Commonwealth v. 

Alcorn, 703 A.2d 1054, 1056-1057 (Pa. Super. 1997) (explaining application 

of PCRA timeliness proviso).

However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to 

the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and 

(iii), is met.2 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within 

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2 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or
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sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the PCRA’s oneyear filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove specific facts that 

demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time frame” under 

section 9545(b)(2). Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651-652 

(Pa. Super. 2013).

Our review of the record reflects that Appellant’s judgment of sentence 

became final on November 4, 1993, thirty days after his sentence was 

imposed and the time for filing a direct appeal with this Court expired. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903. Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence became final prior to the effective date of the PCRA amendments. 

Appellant’s instant PCRA petition, filed on November 5, 2009, does not qualify 

for the grace proviso as it was neither Appellant’s first PCRA petition, nor was 

it filed before January 16, 1997. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently 

untimely.

As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA petition, 

his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three limited

exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. 

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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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§ 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his 

petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be asserted. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

In an attempt to overcome the PCRA time bar, Appellant makes multiple 

claims under these three exceptions. In his first claim, Appellant argues that 

he has met the governmental interference exception under 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(1)(i). Specifically, Appellant maintains that between February 25, 

1997, and April 16, 2002, Appellant attempted to present a copy of the prison 

visitor’s log book during the proceeding on his first PCRA petition. Appellant’s 

Brief at 14-15. Appellant contends that his counsel at the time was advised 

that the log book was destroyed. Id. at 15. Appellant maintains that “[t]his 

information interfered with Appellant’s right to present claims and evidence 

for PCRA relief.” Id. at 16. Appellant further avers that “It was not until 

November 29, 2008, did the Brooks[3] and fraud on the court claims become 

ripe for PCRA review when investigator Wayne Schmidt forwarded a copy of 

the log book to Appellant.” Id. at 17. 

By Appellant’s own assertion, the investigator “forwarded a copy of the 

log book to Appellant” on November 29, 2008. Appellant’s Brief at 17. 

Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on November 5, 2009. Thus, 

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3 Brooks essentially announced the minimum action required by counsel to 

provide what is deemed constitutionally effective representation in capital 

cases: counsel must conduct at least one face-to-face meeting with his client. 

Brooks, 839 A.2d at 249-250.
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Appellant failed to file the petition within sixty days of the date that he could 

have asserted the exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 (b)(2). Accordingly, 

Appellant fails to establish the government-interference exception.

In his second claim, Appellant seeks to invoke the newly discoveredfacts exception to the PCRA time bar. Appellant states that the visitor’s log 

book was not public, and therefore, when it was reported that it had been 

destroyed, Appellant had no reason to further attempt to locate it. Appellant’s 

Brief at 18. Appellant contends: “On November 29, 2008, when Appellant 

received a copy of the log book from investigator Wayne Schmidt, its existence 

became a newly discovered fact that was unknown to him.” Id. at 19. 

Again, Appellant maintains that he received a copy of the log book on 

November 29, 2008. As noted, Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition 

until November 5, 2009. Thus, Appellant failed to file the petition within sixty 

days of the date upon which he could have asserted the exception. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(2). Accordingly, Appellant has failed to establish this exception to 

the PCRA time bar.

We address Appellant’s third and fourth issues together. In his third 

issue, Appellant argues that the “PCRA court erred when it failed to grant a 

new trial and recognize the Brooks claim independently from Appellant’s 

previous ineffective assistance of counsel claim as it was not presented on the 

previously litigated evidence[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 2. In his fourth issue, 

Appellant asserts that the “PCRA court erred when it failed to review 
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Appellant’s fraud on the court claim perpetrated by court-appointed trial 

counsel, Jeffrey Kolansky, in the form of testimony at Appellant’s prior 

evidentiary hearing[.]” Id. at 3. As outlined above, Appellant’s instant 

petition is untimely. In neither of these claims does Appellant assert one of 

the three limited exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. Accordingly, we lack 

jurisdiction to review these claims. Taylor, 933 A.2d at 1038.

In his fifth issue, Appellant maintains that the PCRA court erred when it 

dismissed his PCRA petition as untimely because “newly discovered facts were 

presented in the form of police misconduct and multi-witness identifications 

of the actual perpetrator of the murder for which Appellant was convicted[.]” 

Appellant’s Brief at 3. In these claims, Appellant attempts to invoke the 

exception at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Id. at 17-23. In support of this 

issue, Appellant makes multiple assertions. First, he asserts that Detective 

Michael Cahill, who had been an investigator in his case, was guilty of 

misconduct. Id. at 26-27. Appellant asserts that “Homicide detective Michael 

Cahill #830 has an established pattern of foul play and fabricated an alleged 

confession while Appellant was severely intoxicated.” Id. at 43-44. Appellant 

maintains that he discovered this information when, “Mr. Giovanni Reid 

[(“Reid”)], another SCI-Graterford resident, informed Appellant that he 

possessed material facts of Cahill’s misconduct on December 1, 2008, in the 

institution’s Maintenance corridor.” Id. at 26. Appellant further avers that 

“[o]n December 8, 2008, [Reid] provided Appellant with a copy of a transcript, 
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affidavit, and letter that verified Detective Michael Cahill’s unauthorized visit 

to Tennessee in order to threaten . . . a favorable witness to Mr. Reid’s case.”

Id. at 19-20. 

This Court has set forth the following in considering an exception to the 

PCRA time-bar under the newly discovered-facts exception:

The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts 

upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those 

facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence 

demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his 

own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have 

obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 

This rule is strictly enforced.

Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(internal citations omitted).

4

 

We conclude that Appellant has failed to meet the requirements for the 

newly discovered-facts exception regarding Detective Cahill. Initially, review 

of the information obtained from Reid regarding Detective Cahill’s actions

reveals that the alleged misconduct was in a case unrelated to Appellant’s. 

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4 This Court has addressed the distinction between the newly discovered-facts

exception to the time-bar and the substantive claim of after-discovered 

evidence recognized by the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 

171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“The timeliness exception set forth at Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii) has often mistakenly been referred to as the ‘after-discovered 

evidence’ exception. This shorthand reference was a misnomer, since the 

plain language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require the petitioner to allege 

and prove a claim of ‘after-discovered evidence.’ . . . Once jurisdiction is 

established, a PCRA petitioner can present a substantive after-discoveredevidence claim.”).
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Thus, the information is irrelevant to Appellant’s case and does not establish 

any “newly-discovered facts” as related to Appellant’s case. Furthermore, we 

cannot agree that one report pertaining to Detective Cahill in an unrelated 

case establishes a pattern of misconduct. 

Moreover, presuming arguendo that the information was relevant, 

Appellant did not file the petition within the time required in order to invoke 

the exception. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant asserts that he first 

learned of this information regarding Detective Cahill from Reid on December 

1, 2008, and then on December 8, 2008, he received from Reid documentation 

supporting this information. Appellant’s Brief at 19, 21, and 26. Appellant 

further avers that he received a copy of the report from Reid on October 22, 

2010. Id. at 20. Appellant maintains that his receipt of the documentation 

prompted him to file an amendment on December 2, 2010, and thus, he timely 

invoked the exception. Appellant was first made aware of this information, 

however, on December 1, 2008. Appellant filed his PCRA petition on 

November 5, 2009, and the amendment on December 2, 2010. Because 

Appellant did not file a petition within sixty days of the date upon which the 

petition first could have been filed, here December 1, 2008, when he first 

received this information from Reid regarding Detective Cahill, Appellant has 

not met the requirements of the exception. 

Additionally, Appellant failed to establish that he acted with due 

diligence in obtaining the information he submitted in his supplemental PCRA 
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petition on December 2, 2010. As noted, Appellant maintains that on 

December 1, 2008, Reid made him aware of Detective Cahill’s history of 

misconduct in an unrelated case. Supplemental Exhibit for Motion for Post 

Conviction Relief Dated 11/5/2009, 12/2/01, at 1. Appellant further states 

that on October 22, 2010, Reid informed Appellant that he had in his 

possession an internal affairs report finding Detective Cahill “guilty of 

misconduct in another unrelated homicide case . . . . [Appellant] was 

furnished with a copy of the internal affairs report on October 23, 2010.” Id.

at 2. By Appellant’s own admission, he was made aware of the alleged 

relevant information related to Detective Cahill on December 1, 2008, yet he 

took no action to obtain any documentation or evidence related to this 

information; he simply waited until he was provided a copy of the internal 

affairs report by Reid on October 23, 2010. Again, the information provided 

to Appellant on October 23, 2010, was the same information provided to him 

on December 1, 2008. We cannot conclude that Appellant acted with due 

diligence in his attempts to obtain the information related to Detective Cahill

that he asserts he did not receive until October 23, 2010. Monaco, 996 A.2d 

at 1080. Thus, Appellant has failed to establish the newly discovered-facts

exception regarding his claim as it relates to Detective Cahill.

Also in his fifth issue, Appellant asserts that he has satisfied the newly 

discovered-facts exception by submitting affidavits of Justino Sanchez 

(“Sanchez”) and Frank Lowry (“Lowry”). Appellant attached an “affidavit”
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from Sanchez to his amended PCRA petition filed January 16, 2015. Affidavit 

of Justino Sanchez and Supplement to Amended Petition for Post Conviction 

Relief Pursuant to the [PCRA], and Consolidated Memorandum of Law, 

1/16/15, at 2. The “affidavit” appears to be signed by Sanchez, but is not 

dated or notarized. Id. The affidavit asserts that Sanchez has personal 

information that Appellant was not guilty of the murder of which he was 

convicted, and in fact, that Sanchez knows the true perpetrator, who was his 

brother, Nestor Romero. Id.5 On August 29, 2016, Appellant also filed an 

amendment to his PCRA petition and attached to it a Certification of Witnesses 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1). Appellant included Appellant’s personal 

information and a summary of Sanchez’s proposed testimony in the 

Certification, asserting that Sanchez would testify that Nestor Sanchez6 was 

responsible for the murder. In his brief, Appellant asserts that on November 

22, 2014, Sanchez told Appellant that Sanchez’s brother had committed the 

murder. Appellant’s Brief at 29. 

Section 9545(d)(1) provides as follows:

Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the 

petition shall include a signed certification as to each intended 

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5 Sanchez’s “affidavit” asserts that the perpetrator of the murder, Nestor 

Romero, died in a motorcycle accident in 2011.

6 This name is different than the name used in Sanchez’s “affidavit,” which 

indicated that Nestor Romero was the perpetrator. Affidavit of Justino 

Sanchez and Supplement to Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief 

Pursuant to the [PCRA], and Consolidated Memorandum of Law, 1/16/15, at 

2.
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witness stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and 

substance of testimony and shall include any documents material 

to that witness’s testimony. Failure to substantially comply with 

the requirements of this paragraph shall render the proposed 

witness’s testimony inadmissible.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1). Additionally, Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15) provides: 

“The request for an evidentiary hearing shall include a signed certification as 

to each intended witness, stating the witness’s name, address, and date of 

birth, and the substance of the witness’s testimony.” 

In interpreting these provisions, this Court has concluded that a sworn 

affidavit is not necessary to secure a hearing, and we observed:

the notes from the legislative history pertaining to the enactment 

of this statutory section indicate that the legislature expressly 

considered the question of whether a PCRA petitioner would be 

required to obtain a sworn or notarized statement from a proposed 

witness in order to have the witness testify at an evidentiary 

hearing. A principal architect of the 1995 Legislative Amendments 

to the PCRA, Senator Stewart Greenleaf, spoke on this question 

as follows:

In addition, when we held the hearing there was concern 

about the fact that when you file a petition, we want to make sure 

that it is a meritorious petition, we do not want to have a frivolous 

petition, that there are some witnesses that would be available to 

testify, so the original bill required that each witness had to sign 

a statement and have a notarized, sworn statement at the end of 

the statement indicating that this was a true and correct

representation of what he would testify to at the coming collateral 

hearing. There were objections to that, feeling that that was too 

onerous to require a defendant to go out and obtained notarized 

statements from all of his witnesses, some of which would be 

hostile witnesses, and I agreed with that.

So as a result, this amendment allows a defendant to merely 

present a summary of the statement so we know generally what 

that witness is going to say and merely sign a certification. Either 

the witness, his attorney, the defendant’s attorney, or the 
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petitioner himself, the defendant himself can sign a certification 

saying to his best knowledge that this was an accurate statement 

of what the witness would testify to. So I think it is an effort, 

again, not to take anyone’s rights away from him but also to help 

that defendant in the processing of his appeal and hopefully to 

make it easier for him to obtain a hearing, which we want him to 

obtain.

Pa. Senate Journal, 1st Spec. Sess., June 13, 1995, at 217.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 767 A.2d 576, 582–583 (Pa. Super. 2001). The 

Brown panel then stated, “consistent with this express legislative intent, we 

hold that Appellant was not required to attach sworn affidavits to his PCRA 

petition in support of his request for an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 583. The 

Court further explained, “Nevertheless, . . . in order to have witnesses testify 

at an evidentiary hearing, [the a]ppellant was required to provide a signed 

certification as to each witness.” Id. at 583. Additionally, “the certification 

requirement can be met by an attorney or pro se petitioner certifying what 

the witness will testify regarding.” Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 

626, 642 (Pa. 2014). Brown, 767 A.2d at 583; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1); 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(A)(15).

Thus, an affidavit for Sanchez was not necessary to support Appellant’s 

request for an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, it was of no consequence that 

Sanchez’s “affidavit” was not dated or notarized. Appellant did need to 

support his request for an evidentiary hearing, however, with a Certification 

of Witnesses, pursuant to Section 9545(d)(1). Appellant filed the Certification 

of Witnesses on August 29, 2016, as an amendment to his PCRA petition. 
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Appellant asserted in his brief that he learned from Sanchez on November 22, 

2014, that Sanchez’s brother, Nestor Sanchez, was responsible for the victim’s 

murder. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Appellant failed to file this amendment 

certifying Sanchez as a witness within sixty days of the date on which he could 

have filed his petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Therefore, Appellant has 

failed to meet the requirements for the newly discovered-facts exception to 

the PCRA time bar. 

Appellant also filed an amended PCRA petition on April 13, 2016. 

Appellant attached to that petition an alleged affidavit from Frank Lowry. 

Amended PCRA Petition, 4/13/16, at 8. In the affidavit, Lowry asserts that on 

February 21, 2016, he met with Appellant and told him that Nestor Sanchez 

had confessed to Lowry that Nestor Sanchez had committed the murder at 

issue in this case. Id. The statement appeared to be signed by Frank Lowry, 

but was not notarized or dated. Appellant also certified Lowry as a witness in 

his amended PCRA petition filed August 29, 2016. Motion for Leave to 

Supplement Affidavits of Mr. Justino Sanchez and Mr. Frank Lowry with 

Certification of D.O.B.’s, Addresses, and Content of their Testimony, 8/29/16, 

at 2. In his Certification, Appellant asserts that Lowry would testify that 

Nestor Sanchez admitted to Lowry that he had murdered the victim. Id.

As stated previously in discussion of Sanchez’s “affidavit”, an affidavit 

for Lowry was not necessary to support Appellant’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing. Accordingly, it was of no consequence that Lowry’s “affidavit” was 
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not dated or notarized. Section 9545(d)(1), however, requires the 

Certification of Witnesses to be provided when a petitioner requests an 

evidentiary hearing. Appellant filed the Certification of Witnesses on August 

29, 2016, as an amendment to his PCRA petition, but in Lowry’s affidavit and 

Appellant’s brief, it is asserted that Lowry revealed to Appellant that Nestor 

Sanchez was the perpetrator of the victim’s murder on February 21, 2016. 

Thus, Appellant failed to file this amendment within sixty days of the date on 

which he could have filed his petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). Appellant 

has failed to meet the requirements for the newly-discovered facts exception 

to the PCRA time bar. 

In his sixth issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred when it 

dismissed his PCRA petition without “the material facts being heard and 

reviewed at an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(A)(2).” 

Appellant’s Brief at 3. The PCRA court may dismiss a petition without a 

hearing when the court is satisfied “that there are no genuine issues 

concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction 

collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by any further 

proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2). Commonwealth v Johnson, 139 

A.3d 1257, 1273 (Pa. 2016). As discussed above, Appellant’s petition is 

patently untimely, and he has failed to satisfy any of the three time exceptions 

to that time bar. Because Appellant’s petition is untimely, no legitimate 

purpose would have been served by any further proceedings. Accordingly, 
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the PCRA court did not err in dismissing his petition without a hearing. 

Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1273.

Consequently, because the PCRA petition was untimely and no 

exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims 

presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 

398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear 

untimely petition). Likewise, we lack the authority to address the merits of 

any substantive claims raised in the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. 

Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007) (“[J]urisdictional time limits go to 

a court’s right or competency to adjudicate a controversy.”).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/18/18