Filed 2/23/24 Verceles v. Cal. Commission on Teacher Credentialing CA2/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JUNNIE VERCELES,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA COMMISSION 

ON TEACHER 

CREDENTIALING,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B323426

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 22STCV02113)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County. Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.

Junnie Verceles, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Chris Knudsen; Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Kelsey Linnett, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Paloma Carrero, Deputy Attorney General 

for Defendant and Respondent.

__________________________________________
2

Junnie Verceles, a teacher, was fired by the Los Angeles 

Unified School District (LAUSD) for mistreating his students. 

He sued the California Commission on Teacher Credentialing 

(CCTC), the state credentialing agency, for imposing a 14-day 

suspension of his teaching credential based on LAUSD’s 

investigation. The trial court dismissed Verceles’s lawsuit. 

Verceles appealed, representing himself. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. LAUSD’s Termination of Verceles and Report to

the CCTC

Verceles was a middle school teacher for LAUSD in 2015, 

when allegations of misconduct were raised against him.1 

Verceles reportedly threw a book at a student, hit a student with 

an iPad, and used force against a student. Verceles was removed 

from his school and reassigned pending an investigation.

Following the investigation, LAUSD suspended and/or 

terminated Verceles for misconduct and reported its adverse 

action to the CCTC.2

B. The CCTC and Its Investigating Arm

The CCTC is an independent state agency that determines 

the professional standards for obtaining teaching credentials in 

California public schools. (Ed. Code, § 44225, subd. (d).) The 

CCTC has jurisdiction to investigate and, if warranted, to take 

1 Verceles currently holds a California teaching credential 

that is valid until April 1, 2025.

2 The date of Verceles’s termination from LAUSD is not 

clear from the record.
3

disciplinary action against credential holders. (Ed. Code, §§

44242.5, 44421.) The CCTC is authorized to privately admonish 

or publicly reprove a credential holder, or revoke or suspend a 

teaching credential for immoral or unprofessional conduct, 

refusal to obey school district regulations, or unfitness for service. 

(Ed. Code, §§ 44421, 44440.)

The CCTC appoints the Committee of Credentials 

(Committee) to investigate allegations of misconduct by 

credential holders, and, if necessary, to recommend any adverse 

actions to be taken. (Earnest v. Commission on Teacher 

Credentialing (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 62, 70 (Earnest).)

The Committee’s investigation may consist of three phases: 

“ ‘the preliminary review [citation], the initial review [citation], 

and the formal review.’ ” (Earnest, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 68.) If the investigation continues to the initial review phase, 

the credential holder is given notice that his or her fitness to hold 

a teaching credential is under review and an opportunity to 

provide written materials for the Committee’s consideration. (Id.

at p. 69.) If the investigation proceeds to the formal review 

phase, the credential holder may appear at the hearing, answer 

questions under oath, and the Committee may call witnesses to 

testify. (Id. at p. 70.) If the Committee finds probable cause, the 

credential holder may request an adjudicatory hearing before the 

Office of Administrative Hearings. (Ibid.) Otherwise, the 

Committee reports its probable cause findings and 

recommendations of any adverse actions to the CCTC, which may 

or may not adopt them. (Ibid.)
4

C. The CCTC’s Suspension of Verceles’s

Teaching Credential

According to Verceles’s first amended complaint, after 

learning of LAUSD’s adverse action, the CCTC notified Verceles 

that he was the subject of an initial review of his fitness to hold a

teaching credential. The notice included LAUSD’s reports of the 

three incidents of alleged misconduct.

Verceles provided material to the CCTC “to clear his name” 

and advised that LAUSD’s information “was biased against him,” 

and “include[ed] incidents that were not thoroughly investigated, 

the omission of dates and names of witnesses making allegations, 

and student statements that were illegible or were not signed 

under penalty of perjury.”

The Committee reviewed Verceles’s responses, set a formal 

review, and “required” him to travel to Sacramento for a hearing. 

Prior to the hearing, the Committee “attempted to intimidate” 

Verceles by informing him of the potential adverse actions if the 

misconduct allegations were found true. Verceles submitted 

additional information, which he maintained supported his 

claims that both LAUSD and the CCTC engaged in corrupt and 

discriminatory practices.

At his formal review on September 11, 2019, the Committee 

failed to discuss “any of the exculpatory evidence or inaccuracies 

of the investigation that [Verceles] wanted [Committee members] 

to address and explain.”

On September 20, 2019, the Committee recommended that 

Verceles’s teaching credential be suspended for 14 days. Verceles 

requested the suspension be reconsidered; he never sought an 

adjudication hearing before the Office of Administrative 

Hearings. The Committee reviewed and upheld its suspension of 
5

Verceles’s teaching credential, which the CCTC enforced from 

March 8 through March 21, 2020.

II. Procedural Background

Verceles timely filed an administrative complaint of 

employment discrimination against the CCTC with the 

Department of Fair Employment and Housing. He received a 

right-to-sue notice. Verceles also filed a civil suit against 

LAUSD.

Representing himself, Verceles sued the CCTC for 

damages. His verified first amended complaint alleged 11 

separate causes of action against the CCTC: Five causes of 

action for discrimination/retaliation in violation of the California 

Fair Housing and Employment Act (FEHA), one cause of action 

for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and various 

violations of the Education Code, California Constitution, the 

Bagley-Keene Act, and 42 United States Code (USC) sections 

1981 and 1983.

The CCTC demurred to the first amended complaint in its 

entirety and to the separate causes of action. Following a 

hearing, the trial court sustained the demurrer on all grounds 

raised by the demurrer. The court dismissed the first amended 

complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Verceles contends the trial court erred in sustaining the 

demurrer to his first amended complaint without leave to amend.

I. Standard of Review

“In reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer

without leave to amend, we must ask (1) whether the demurrer

was properly sustained, and (2) whether leave to amend was

properly denied.” (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12
6

Cal.App.5th 1331, 1335.) The first question requires us to

“independently evaluate whether the operative complaint states

facts sufficient to state a cause of action” (Alborzian v. JPMorgan

Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 29, 34), and in so doing,

we accept as true “all material facts properly pled” in that

complaint (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th

148, 152). “The second question ‘requires us to decide whether

“ ‘ “there is a reasonable possibility that the defect [in the

operative complaint] can be cured by amendment.” ’ ” ’ ” (Schep,

supra, at p. 1335, quoting McClain v. Sav-On Drugs (2017) 9

Cal.App.5th 684, 695, affd. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 951.) Because 

Verceles proffers no suggestion on how to further amend his 

complaint and because we perceive no viable way to do so, the 

propriety of the dismissal order in this case turns entirely on 

whether his complaint states one or more viable causes of action.

II. The First Amended Complaint Was Properly

Dismissed

We independently agree with the trial court that Verceles’s 

first amended complaint was properly dismissed on demurrer.

A. Statutory Immunity

1. Government Code section 818.4

Government Code section 818.4, which the trial court 

concluded was the basis of the CCTC’s immunity, provides that a 

“public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance, 

denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to 

issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, license, certificate, 

approval, order, or similar authorization.” (Gov. Code, § 818.4; 

Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 983, 997.) 

The statute applies to discretionary, not mandatory decisions. 

(See Corona v. State (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 723, 733.) It is 
7

undisputed the CCTC’s determination of the status of a teaching 

credential is a discretionary act. The first amended complaint 

alleges neither a lack of immunity nor a mandatory duty the 

CCTC failed to discharge. All 11 of Verceles’s claims arise from 

the CCTC’s suspension decision and thus fall within the scope of 

immunity conferred by Government Code section 818.4. They 

were properly dismissed on demurrer.

2. Government Code section 821.6

All of Verceles’s claims are also barred by Government 

Code section 821.6. That statute provides that a public employee 

is not liable for injury caused by the employee’s instituting or 

prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the 

scope of the employee’s employment, even if the employee acts 

maliciously and without probable cause. (Gov. Code, § 821.) This 

immunity has been extended to public entity employers. (Gov. 

Code, § 815.2, subd. (b).) We agree with the trial court that

because the gravamen of Verceles’s 11 claims are that CCTC’s 

investigations, hearings, and decisions were wrongful, 

discriminatory and/or retaliatory, this immunity applies. (Ross v. 

San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2007) 146 

Cal.App.4th 1507, 1516.) The demurrer was properly sustained 

on this ground.

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Lack of standing

The first amended complaint asserts FEHA claims of age, 

color, race, national origin, sex, and gender discrimination; 

retaliation; and denial of employment due to a history of 

convictions. (See Gov. Code, §12921.) FEHA claims are 

predicated on an employment relationship. (Vernon v. State of 

California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 123.)
8

To demonstrate the requisite employment relationship with 

the CCTC, Verceles first relies on the Ralph C. Dills Act (Dills 

Act) (Gov. Code, § 3512 et seq.) in his first amended complaint. 

The Dills Act established collective bargaining for state 

employees. (Gov. Code, § 3512 [purpose of the Dills Act is to 

“promote full communication between the state and its employees 

by providing a reasonable method of resolving disputes regarding 

wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment 

between the state and public employee organizations”].)

The CCTC, Verceles’s only named defendant, is a state 

agency subject to the Dills Act.3 (Ed. Code, § 44225, subd. (d).) 

Verceles alleges he is a state employee as defined by the Dills 

Act, which provides, in pertinent part: “ ‘State employee’ means 

any civil service employee of the state, and the teaching staff of 

schools under the jurisdiction of the State Department of 

Education or the Superintendent of Public Instruction.” (Gov. 

Code, § 3513, subd. (c).) However, Verceles fails to allege facts 

showing he is, or has ever been employed in a civil service 

position by the CCTC (or any other state agency), or by a school 

“under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Education or 

the Superintendent of Public Instruction.”4 While Verceles was 

3 LAUSD, by contrast, is a public-school employer subject 

to the Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code 

section 3540 et seq., which established collective bargaining for 

California’s public schools (K-12) and community colleges.

4 This language appears to refer to institutions in the State 

Special Schools and Services Division. As a subdivision of the 

California Department of Education, the State Special Schools 

and Services Division furnishes services to deaf, hard-of-hearing, 

blind and visually impaired students in addition to offering 

LEA/district special education programs with assessment 
9

an employee at the relevant times alleged, he was not an 

employee of the CCTC or the State of California.

Nonetheless, the first amended complaint asserts the 

CCTC and LAUSD were Verceles’s joint employers. “ ‘ “Joint 

employment occurs when two or more persons [or entities] engage 

the services of an employee in an enterprise in which the 

employee is subject to the control of both.” ’ ” (Morales v. 22nd 

Dist. Agricultural Assn. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 85, 94, fn. 14.) To 

be a joint employer, an entity must have had the ability “(a) to 

exercise control over . . . wages, hours or working conditions, [or] 

(b) to suffer or permit [the] work, or (c) to engage, thereby 

creating a common law employment relationship.” (Martinez v. 

Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64.)

“ ‘ “There is no magic formula for determining whether an

organization is a joint employer. Rather, the court must analyze 

‘myriad facts surrounding the employment relationship in

question.’ No one factor is decisive.” ’ ” (St. Myers v. Dignity

Health (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 301, 311.) “ ‘Factors to be taken

into account in assessing the relationship of the parties include

payment of salary or other employment benefits and Social

Security taxes, the ownership of the equipment necessary to

performance of the job, the location where the work is performed,

the obligation of the defendant to train the employee, the

authority of the defendant to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or

discharge the employee, the authority to establish work

schedules and assignments, the defendant’s discretion to

determine the amount of compensation earned by the employee,

services, technical assistance and staff development. (See Ed. 

Code, §§ 59001, 59100.)
10

the skill required of the work performed and the extent to which

it is done under the direction of a supervisor, whether the work is

part of the defendant’s regular business operations, the skill

required in the particular occupation, the duration of the

relationship of the parties, and the duration of the plaintiff’s

employment.’ ” “The most important factor is ‘ “the defendant’s

right to control the means and manner of the workers’

performance.” ’ ” (St. Myers, supra, at pp. 311–312, quoting

Vernon v. State of California, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 124–

126.)

Verceles’s first amended complaint alleges: (1) The CCTC 

controls Verceles’s wages: “As [Verceles] holds a clear credential 

issued by the CCTC to get a paycheck, LAUSD also shares 

control over [Verceles’s] wages as it determines when [he] gets 

paid and how much money [he] can earn.” (2) The CCTC controls 

the hiring of Verceles: The CCTC granted Verceles a teaching 

credential allowing him to work for LAUSD; the school district 

will rely on the CCTC’s Web site to confirm Verceles’s credential; 

and the CCTC has “substantial direct and immediate control of 

the hiring, firing, and discipline of teachers.” The “CCTC and 

LAUSD share in the process as an employer of hiring [Verceles.]” 

(3) The CCTC controls the disciplining of Verceles: The “CCTC 

and LAUSD both share the responsibility of disciplining 

employees in order to maintain a standard of good conduct for 

teachers.” Verceles’s discipline history and credential record can 

be viewed on the CCTC’s Web site by prospective employers. 

(4) The CCTC supervises Verceles’s employment: “[Verceles] was 

enrolled in a teacher credentialing program in order to obtain his 

clear teaching credential.”
11

Verceles’s allegations are insufficient to establish the CCTC 

and LAUSD were joint employers of Verceles. First, most of the 

allegations are based on a purported “shared” relationship 

between the two entities over Verceles’s employment. Assuming 

LAUSD was Verceles’s employer, whether the CCTC was 

Verceles’s employer depends upon its relationship with Verceles 

(primarily the CCTC’s right to control Verceles’s work 

performance), not on the CCTC’s relationship with LAUSD.

Second, nothing in the allegations or the record indicates 

the CCTC hired Verceles to teach, set the amount of his 

compensation or actually paid him for his services, provided him 

with on-the-job training, supplies or equipment, determined his 

work assignments, supervised his daily work performance, and 

had the authority to discipline, promote, transfer, or terminate 

Verceles. The first amended complaint fails to allege facts that, if 

true, would show the CCTC to have been Verceles’s employer. In 

the absence of an employment relationship, Verceles lacks 

standing to sue the CCTC. Lack of standing is an appropriate 

basis for sustaining a demurrer. (McKinny v. Board of Trustees

(1982) 31 Cal.3d 79, 90.)

2. Claims subject to Government Claims Act

Pursuant to the Government Claims Act, a plaintiff seeking 

money damages against public entities and public employees 

acting within the scope of their employment is required to file an 

initial claim with the relevant public entity. (See Gov. Code,

§§ 905, 950.2.) Failure to do so precludes the plaintiff from suing

the relevant public entity and public employees and thus

furnishes a ground for sustaining a demurrer. (Gov. Code,

§ 945.4; City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 

737–738.) Here, Verceles’s failure to plead he has complied with
12

the requirements of the Government Claims Act means he cannot

state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and violations of Education Code section 44944, article I,

section 7 of the California Constitution, and the Bagley-Keene

Act.

3. 42 USC sections 1981 and 1983

The trial court properly sustained the demurrer to

Verceles’s alleged violations of 42 USC sections 1981 and 1983. 

Government entities which are an “ ‘arm of the state’ ” are

immune from litigation under those statutes. The reason is such

entities are not persons within the meaning of sections 1981 and

1983. (Mackey v. Trustees of California State University (2019)

31 Cal.App.5th 640, 653–654.)

We have independently concluded the trial court did not err 

in this case.
13

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. The parties will bear their own costs 

on appeal.

LUI, P. J.

We concur: 

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

HOFFSTADT, J.