UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

JOHNSON, KRAUSS, and BURTON 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

First Lieutenant TONYA M. JONES-MARSHALL 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20100649 

Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg 

Gary J. Brockington, Military Judge 

Colonel Stephen J. Berg, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Captain Meghan M. Poirier, JA (argued); Colonel Mark Tellitocci, 

JA; Lieutenant Colonel Imogene M. Jamison, JA; Major Laura R. Kesler, JA; 

Captain Jennifer A. Parker, JA (on brief); Colonel Patricia A. Ham, JA; Lieutenant 

Colonel Imogene Jamison, JA; Major Richard E. Gorini, JA; Captain Meghan M. 

Poirier, JA (on brief in response to specified issues). 

For Appellee: Captain Daniel D. Maurer, JA (argued); Major Amber J. Williams, 

JA; Major Ellen S. Jennings, JA; Captain Edward J. Whitford, JA (on brief); Major 

Amber J. Roach, JA; Major Katherine S. Gowel, JA; Captain Daniel D. Maurer, JA 

(on brief in response to specified issues). 

28 March 2012 

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OPINION OF THE COURT 

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KRAUSS, Judge: 

A panel of officers, sitting as a general court-martial, convicted appellant, 

contrary to her pleas, of three specifications of conspiracy to commit larceny, one 

specification of larceny, and six specifications of forgery, in violation of Articles 

81, 121, and 123, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 881, 921, 923 

(2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. Appellant was acquitted of four specifications of false 

official statement and two specifications of fraud against the United States, alleged 

in violation of Articles 107 and 132, UCMJ, respectively. The convening authority 

approved the adjudged sentence to dismissal from the service. 

Appellant’s case is now before this court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. 

She raises two assignments of error asserting that the evidence is legally and 
JONES-MARSHALL—ARMY 20100649 

2

factually insufficient to support her convictions for forgery and that the military 

judge committed plain error by failing to treat the larceny and forgery charges as an 

unreasonable multiplication of charges. In addition, we specified the issue as to 

whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support two of 

appellant’s convictions for conspiracy. 

 BACKGROUND

Appellant, a mobilized reservist, assumed duties at Fort Jackson, South 

Carolina in 2005 and, over the course of the following two years, stole over $50,000 

from the United States by submitting phony rental receipts and rental agreements for 

reimbursement she was not authorized. The government charged appellant with 

submission of false claims as well as larceny and false official statement. The 

government also charged appellant with forgery based on the falsified lease 

agreements and rental receipts she made that also served as the basis for the charged 

larceny and false claims. Indeed, under Article 123, UCMJ, the government charged 

appellant with forgery on the theory that the documents at issue “would, if genuine, 

apparently operate to the legal harm of the United States, in that [they were] used to 

fraudulently submit travel vouchers.” The leases and receipts at issue concerned 

purported agreements and transactions between individual private parties. The 

testimony of several witnesses established appellant’s responsibility for the creation 

and submission of the false documents charged and the receipt of money from the 

United States as a result. 

Appellant also faced charges of conspiring separately with three different 

individuals to steal money from the United States by submitting fraudulent travel 

vouchers in a similar fashion. In relation to the alleged conspiracies, the coconspirator alleged under Specification 1 of Charge I actually testified. The 

government relied entirely upon documentary evidence to prove the two other 

conspiracies alleged under Specifications 2 and 3 of Charge I. 

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

Forgery 

Here the government fell into the trap set by Article 123 for those who 

overlook the legal efficacy requirement necessary to properly prosecute forgery 

under the UCMJ. See United States v. Thomas, 25 M.J. 396, 402 (C.M.A. 1988). 

Article 123 is a narrowly defined statute that is strictly interpreted. United States v. 

Hopwood, 30 M.J. 146, 147 (C.M.A. 1990). While forgery in a general sense may 

simply include false signature to a document or the falsification of another 

document, forgery under the UCMJ includes only those falsified documents that 

“would, if genuine, apparently impose a legal liability on another or change his legal 

right or liability to his prejudice.” UCMJ art. 123(1). In order to properly convict a 

soldier of forgery, the evidence must establish that the false document alleged must 
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itself impose such legal harm. The document in question and extrinsic facts are 

admissible to show whether the document in and of itself possesses this legal 

efficacy required to sustain a proper prosecution and conviction for a violation of 

Article 123, UCMJ. Hopwood, 30 M.J. at 147; Thomas, 25 M.J. at 401–02. Here, 

neither the falsified leases nor the falsified receipts apparently impose a legal 

liability on the United States.

 

Both the leases and receipts purport to reflect agreements and transactions 

between private parties that neither expressly nor implicitly bear any relationship to 

the United States whatsoever. Neither the leases nor the receipts themselves create 

or purport to create any legal right or liability on the part of the United States. The 

leases alleged involve the accused and a Mr. MN as lessee and lessor, respectively, 

and Sergeant First Class KLP and Ms. RN as lessee and lessor, respectively. 

Nowhere is the United States mentioned in either case and the leases in question 

contain nothing that would offer any legal right or impose any legal liability upon 

the United States. The receipts purport to reflect rent paid by individuals in their 

private capacity to individuals in their private capacity. The receipts neither 

expressly or by implication involve the United States in any sense. 

The government argues that when considered in light of the Joint Federal 

Travel Regulation (JFTR), the leases and receipts perfect a mobilized reservist’s 

right to reimbursement from the United States for rent paid and therefore satisfy the 

legal efficacy requirement. See DEF. TRAVEL MGMT OFFICE, JOINT FED. TRAVEL 

REG’S, VOL. 1, ch. 4 (C303, 1 March 2012). However, the JFTR provision relied 

upon does not describe those or any documents as instruments perfecting any claim 

for reimbursement. The JFTR merely allows reimbursement for rent paid by 

mobilized reservists while in a temporary duty status. Nor do the leases and receipts 

in this case purport to create a right to reimbursement or establish an entitlement to 

reimbursement. Testimony rendered by an employee of the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service on the subject establishes that while documents such as a lease 

and receipt for rent paid may serve as part of any package necessary to claim 

reimbursement for rent, additional, separate documents, including orders, that 

establish a reimbursable status, and a travel voucher, are essential before a soldier 

can expect the United States to reimburse for rent paid. Therefore, neither the JFTR 

nor any other extrinsic fact in this case establishes that the alleged receipts or leases 

themselves perfect a right to reimbursement or that those documents, in and of 

themselves, impose a legal harm on the United States. 

 



 While falsified leases and receipts may properly serve as the basis for prosecution 

under Article 123, UCMJ, in other circumstances, they cannot as alleged and 

prosecuted here. 
JONES-MARSHALL—ARMY 20100649 

4

Additional documents in a particular case may constitute extrinsic facts 

relevant to the question of legal efficacy when considered in conjunction with the 

false document. See Thomas, 25 M.J. at 400–02. However, those additional 

documents must actually confer legal efficacy upon the document itself, define the 

document as possessing legal efficacy itself, or establish that, under the 

circumstances, legal efficacy inheres in the document alleged. Additional 

documents that illustrate the alleged false documents as merely preliminary steps 

toward imposition of legal harm or perfection of a legal right, on the other hand, do 

not suffice as proof of forgery. This distinction preserves the statutory requirement 

to prove legal efficacy as defined. Hopwood, 30 M.J. at 147–48; Thomas, 25 M.J. at 

400–02. Because documents that are merely preliminary and necessary steps toward 

perfection of a legal right or imposition of a legal harm cannot, as a matter of law, 

constitute forgeries under Article 123, UCMJ, the forgeries in this case must fail. 

Hopwood, 30 M.J. at 148. 

 While creation and provision of the falsified leases and receipts may 

constitute preliminary steps toward perfecting a false claim against the United 

States, in this case, the lease and receipts themselves neither impose an apparent 

liability on the United States nor apparently perfect a soldier’s entitlement to 

reimbursement for rents paid. Neither do those documents possess that legal 

efficacy when viewed in conjunction with the JFTR. One who submits falsified 

rental agreements or receipts for rent, alone, to finance, will not be reimbursed for 

rent on the basis of those documents alone or by reference to the JFTR. Either taken 

alone or as steps toward perfection of such an entitlement they cannot, as a matter of 

law, constitute forgeries under Article 123, UCMJ. Hopwood, 30 M.J. at 147–48; 

Thomas, 25 M.J. at 400–02. 

The limitation of the law under Article 123, UCMJ, does not prevent the 

government from properly prosecuting a soldier for dishonest dealings in this 

respect. Indeed, this case exemplifies that fact. Appellant was properly prosecuted 

for larceny and false claim based on the same facts used to prosecute the forgery 

offenses and was ultimately convicted of larceny. Hopwood, 30 M.J. at 148. 

Conspiracy

 In response to the issue specified by this court, the appellant argues and the 

government concedes that the evidence is factually insufficient to support 

appellant’s conviction for conspiracy under Specification 2 of Charge IV. We agree. 

After consideration of the record and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we also 

maintain reasonable doubts about whether appellant entered into the agreement 

necessary to support a conviction under Specification 3 of Charge IV, as alleged, 

and find the evidence factually insufficient to support the same. UCMJ art. 66(c). 
JONES-MARSHALL—ARMY 20100649 

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CONCLUSION 

The findings of guilty of Specifications 2 and 3 of Charge I and of the 

specifications of Charge IV and Charge IV are set aside and dismissed. The 

remaining findings of guilty are affirmed. Under the particular facts of this case we 

are confident that reassessment of the sentence is appropriate. Indeed we agree with 

the sense of appellant’s argument, relative to an unreasonable multiplication of 

charges, that the larceny constitutes the gravamen of the misconduct charged, are 

confident that the sentence to dismissal is not inappropriately severe and that a 

dismissal would be imposed by this court-martial even absent charge of the forgery 

and conspiracy offenses here disapproved. Reassessing the sentence on the basis of 

the error noted, the entire record, and in accordance with the principles of United 

States v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986), and United States v. Moffeit, 63 M.J. 40 

(C.A.A.F. 2006), to include the factors identified by Judge Baker in his concurring 

opinion in Moffeit, the court affirms the sentence as approved by the convening 

authority. 

Senior Judge JOHNSON and Judge BURTON concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

 Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: