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LOEFFLER v. LOEFFLER

Cite as 31 Neb. App. 93

Lawrence E. Loeffler and Patricia K. Loeffler, 

appellants and cross-appellees, v. 

Robert J. Loeffler, appellee 

and cross-appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed June 14, 2022. No. A-21-546.

1. Actions: Trusts: Equity: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Actions to 

declare a resulting trust are in equity. In an appeal in an equity action, 

it is the duty of an appellate court to try issues of fact de novo upon the 

record and to reach an independent conclusion thereon without reference 

to the findings of the district court.

2. Trusts: Property: Title: Equity: Proof. A court, sitting in equity, will 

not impose a constructive trust and constitute an individual as a trustee 

of the legal title for property unless it be shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual, as a potential constructive trustee, had 

obtained title to property by fraud, misrepresentation, or an abuse of an 

influential or confidential relationship.

3. Trusts: Conveyances: Presumptions: Intent: Words and Phrases. A 

resulting trust is one raised by implication of law and presumed always 

to have been contemplated by the parties; the intention of the resulting 

trust is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed 

in deed or instrument of conveyance.

4. Trusts: Property: Consideration. Where a transfer of property is made 

to one person and the purchase price or consideration is paid by another 

person, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person who made the payment or provided consideration.

5. Trusts: Proof. A resulting trust will not be declared upon doubtful and 

uncertain grounds; and the burden is upon the one claiming the existence of the trust to establish the facts upon which it is based by clear 

and satisfactory evidence.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

06/21/2022 01:05 AM CDT
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6. Trusts: Words and Phrases. Where the alleged trust relationship is 

just as consistent with that of a gift or loan, courts will not ordinarily 

impress a resulting trust.

7. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an 

analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy 

before it.

Appeal from the District Court for Boone County: Rachel 

A. Daugherty, Judge. Affirmed.

David A. Domina, of Domina Law Group, P.C., L.L.O., for 

appellants.

Jennifer D. Tricker and Spencer R. Murphy, of Baird Holm, 

L.L.P., for appellee.

Riedmann and Welch, Judges.

Riedmann, Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Lawrence E. Loeffler (Larry) and Patricia K. Loeffler appeal 

the order of the district court for Boone County which denied 

their claim for quiet title, partition, constructive trust, conversion, and accounting. Robert J. Loeffler cross-appeals. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s decision.

BACKGROUND

Larry and Patricia, the appellants, filed a complaint on 

February 1, 2019, alleging that Larry and Robert formed a 

land purchasing joint venture in 1999 in order to purchase the 

family farm from their mother. According to the complaint, 

Larry’s name was not included on purchase documents or the 

mortgage so that Robert would be in the best position to buy 

Larry’s interest in the event of Larry’s death, without Robert’s 

having to do business with Patricia. Regardless, the farm 

would be owned by Larry and Robert as tenants in common, 

each owning a one-half interest. Larry and Patricia asserted 

that Robert held their portion of the land in a constructive 

trust and sought an order from the court directing him to 
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convey their portion to them, quieting title in their names, and 

thereafter partitioning the land.

Robert filed an answer, asserting that he was the sole owner 

of the farm and that Larry had no ownership interest in the 

property. He also asserted various affirmative defenses, including the statute of frauds. Trial was held on February 9, 2021, 

and the following evidence was adduced.

Undisputed Evidence.

Walter Loeffler and Lenore Loeffler had five children; in 

birth order, they are Marcine Jacobson, Larry, Robert, Marla 

Loeffler, and Mark Loeffler. The land in dispute is farmland 

located in Boone County, Nebraska. It has been in the Loeffler 

family since 1886. Walter predeceased Lenore, leaving her as 

the sole owner of the farm. Sometime after Walter died, Lenore 

expressed a desire to sell the land.

Lenore sold the farm in 1999, and Robert’s name was on 

all the closing documents. Lenore retained a life estate, continuing to live on the farm until approximately 2010. Both 

prior to and after the sale, the farmland was leased to a tenant 

who paid cash rent. In 2012, Robert began farming approximately 70 acres of the farm, and the other half became part 

of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation Reserve 

Program (CRP).

Robert maintained a ledger in which he kept track of farming expenses. According to the ledger, in years that the farm 

operated at a deficit, from approximately 1999 through 2011, 

Larry paid half of the operating deficit and Robert paid the 

other half. In years there was a profit, Robert wrote “I owe” in 

the ledger.

Other undisputed facts include that Larry and Patricia were 

married at the time Lenore sold the land in 1999, although they 

did eventually divorce in 2006. Lenore passed away in 2013.

Robert’s Version of Events.

According to Robert, he purchased the farm from his 

mother, Lenore, in 1999, with the intent to pass it on to his 
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son. Larry did not offer to purchase the farm with Robert, nor 

would Robert have accepted such an offer. The farm’s purchase price was $134,000, with a $10,000 downpayment paid 

by Robert. He described a document written by Lenore prior 

to her passing that stated, “‘Bob bought. Signed papers July 

31st, 1999.’”

Since 1999, Robert has managed the farm. He was the one 

who dealt with the farm tenants and negotiated the agreements 

with them. He also has been the one responsible for upkeep 

on the farm, including fixing fences, placing tin on the roof of 

the house, jacking up the foundation, adding a stair rail on the 

house stairs, removing trees, mowing the grass, and removing 

the snow. Larry did not help with any of this. Robert was also 

the one responsible for making all payments on the land, which 

included paying the mortgage, insurance, and taxes.

Regarding the deficit payments received from Larry, Robert 

stated that those payments were loans. According to Robert, 

prior to selling the farm, Lenore asked Robert if his two 

brothers, Larry and Mark, would be willing to loan Robert 

money if the farm operated at a deficit. Mark declined to loan 

Robert the money because Mark had just bought an acreage. 

Larry, however, agreed that he would loan Robert one half of 

each year’s deficit. Larry agreed to this because he could get 

better interest from Robert than he could at the bank and he 

did not want Patricia to know he had that money. No interest 

rate was agreed to by Larry and Robert, nor was a promissory 

note signed, but the agreement was to pay back 100 percent 

of the loans with a reasonable interest rate. The loan became 

due once the farm was paid for in full; the farm was paid off 

in 2020.

Robert maintained a ledger for three reasons: to show profits and losses, for tax purposes, and to track how much 

Larry had loaned him. Robert started the ledger in September 

1999, and the final year accounted for was 2015. The first 

page indicates “Pd 10,000 down - July - 1999.” The ledger 

tracked loan payments, taxes, insurance, rental income from 
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the tenant, farm repair receipts, et cetera. After calculating 

expenses and income, Robert determined what the deficit or 

profit would be for the year. For example, in 2000, the farm 

operated at a deficit of approximately $4,361. Larry loaned 

him $2,200 to help pay expenses on the farm, including the 

mortgage. Robert was responsible for the ledger, and he kept it 

at his house. In the ledger, Robert used words such as “Larry 

paid,” “Larry owes,” “[a]piece,” and “I owe” regarding how 

much each brother would be responsible for that year.

Regarding the CRP, Robert testified he got the idea to enroll 

in the program after attending a party. Robert sat across the 

table from the manager of the office that “control[s] the CRP 

and . . . grasses.” The manager explained the benefits of the 

CRP, and she invited Robert to the office to fill out paperwork and see the price per acre that Robert could get under 

the program. After filling out the paperwork, the price per 

acre was $134. To comply with the CRP, Robert had to sow 

the land with specific seeds, and Larry helped procure those 

seeds through his lawn care business connections. According 

to the ledger, Robert repaid Larry $5,125 for purchased CRP 

seed. Robert rented the equipment necessary to plant the seed 

and proceeded to do so. It was necessary for Robert, instead 

of the previous tenant, to start farming the other section of 

land because otherwise half of the CRP proceeds would go to 

that tenant.

The first time Robert became aware that Larry was claiming 

an ownership interest in the farm was in 2014 when Robert 

was advised by the CRP office staff that Larry had called, 

demanding that his name be added to the CRP contract. That 

began a series of conversations between Larry and Robert in 

which Robert tried to repay the loan. When that failed, Robert 

made some settlement offers in order to avoid litigation.

Larry’s Version of Events.

According to Larry, he purchased the farm with Robert as 

co-owners. Robert had requested the farm be in his name, 
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so Robert signed the closing statement, the promissory note, 

and the mortgage and he received the deed. Larry was present at the closing. Larry paid half of the downpayment, but 

was unable to state in his deposition how he paid the $5,000; 

however, at trial, he testified that he recalled paying $5,000 in 

cash to Robert days after the closing. Robert never asked Larry 

to loan him money, nor did he discuss an interest rate, repayment terms, repayment date, or any particulars of a loan. In 

contrast, in 2006, Larry loaned between $28,000 and $30,000 

at 6 percent interest to Lenore, with the remaining balance paid 

by Lenore’s estate upon her death.

Larry testified that he performed maintenance work on the 

farm and house, repairing the foundation on the barn, rebuilding the cellar door, cleaning up trees on the property, screwing 

down the tin roof on the barn, fixing the roof on the house, and 

laying linoleum in the kitchen. Sometimes this work was done 

with Robert, and sometimes Larry completed it by himself. 

Both prior to and after the 1999 sale, Larry stored personal 

property in the barn.

Larry determined that the rent paid by the cash tenant was 

low and that the farm could make more money by participating 

in the CRP. Larry “did the foot work” on the CRP to identify 

the requirements to participate in the program. Larry’s handwriting is throughout exhibit 29, a series of documents involving enrollment in the CRP, even though Robert is the one who 

signed the documents. Larry purchased approximately $5,000 

worth of seed to comply with the requirements of the CRP, and 

he was paid back by the farm. Half of the farm was placed in 

the CRP, and half was farmed by Robert by agreement between 

the brothers. Robert agreed to pay the same rent as the CRP 

allowed per acre, resulting in the farm paying for itself.

When the farm started making money, Larry stated, “I 

asked to get — to be paid back for it for what the extra money 

that was coming in, and [Robert] always had a reason. He 

didn’t have his checkbook with him.” The first time Larry 

heard of a loan versus a partnership was when he received 
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a letter from Robert’s attorney offering to pay him $20,000 for 

the money he had loaned Robert.

The brothers engaged in a series of email communication 

in 2016, in which they discussed the price of the farm for 

purposes of one of them “buying the other one out.” Despite 

Larry’s claim of ownership, when he took out a mortgage on 

an acreage in 2013, he did not list the farm as an asset in his 

application materials, nor did he include it as owned property 

during his divorce proceedings in 2006.

Marla’s Testimony.

The only other witness to testify was Marla, called by 

Robert’s attorney. She testified that after their father, Walter, 

passed away, Robert helped manage the farm and house. She 

referred to him as “Mom’s right-hand man.” According to 

Marla, around the time that Robert purchased the farm, Larry 

told her that he was loaning money to Robert. She was uncertain of the amount, but stated Larry’s reason for doing so was 

because he could get better interest from Robert and he did 

not want Patricia to know he had that money. The better interest rate was the same reason that Larry loaned Lenore money 

while she was alive. The first time Marla heard Larry claim 

ownership in the farm was in 2015.

District Court Decision.

Following the trial, the district court issued an order finding 

that Larry and Patricia “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Robert] obtained the title to the property 

by fraud, misrepresentation, or an abuse of an influential or 

confidential relationship.” The district court, therefore, denied 

Larry and Patricia’s request for the imposition of a constructive trust.

The court further noted in its order that Larry and Patricia 

argued in their written closing argument that the parties 

intended to create a resulting trust. It rejected this argument, stating that “[a]s to the allegation of a resulting trust, 

even if the [c]ourt were to accept Larry’s version of events, 
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the evidence is that the brothers had an oral agreement to 

transfer property. Under the circumstances, this oral agreement does not withstand the statute of frauds.” Based on the 

district court’s findings that no trust, constructive or resulting, 

should be imposed and that Larry and Patricia have no ownership interest in the farm, the remaining causes of action were 

denied. Larry and Patricia timely appealed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

The appellants assign that the district court erred in (1) failing to recognize that fraud at the outset is not required to prove 

a resulting trust and failing to find that a resulting trust was 

proved, (2) disregarding Patricia’s interrogatory answer testimony without a basis to do so, (3) dismissing the complaint, 

and (4) failing to award rents and profits to the appellants. 

Robert cross-appeals, assigning that the district court erred in 

failing to dismiss the case because the allegations in the complaint are time barred by the statute of limitations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Actions to declare a resulting trust are in equity. Malousek 

v. Meyer, 309 Neb. 803, 962 N.W.2d 676 (2021). In an appeal 

in an equity action, it is the duty of this court to try issues of 

fact de novo upon the record and to reach an independent conclusion thereon without reference to the findings of the district 

court. Id.

ANALYSIS

Oral Contract for Land and Resulting Trust.

The appellants assign that the district court erred in failing 

to recognize that fraud at the outset is not required to prove a 

resulting trust and in failing to find a resulting trust was proved. 

In their complaint, the appellants proceeded under a theory 

of constructive trusts. However, following trial, but before 

written closing arguments were due, the Nebraska Supreme 

Court released Dreesen Enters. v. Dreesen, 308 Neb. 433, 954 

N.W.2d 874 (2021).
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[2] In Dreesen Enters. v. Dreesen, supra, the Supreme Court 

held that a court, sitting in equity, will not impose a constructive trust and constitute an individual as a trustee of the legal 

title for property unless it be shown, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the individual, as a potential constructive trustee, 

had obtained title to property by fraud, misrepresentation, or an 

abuse of an influential or confidential relationship. Because the 

movant in Dreesen Enters. knew that the property would not 

be titled in her name and voiced no objection, she was unable 

to meet her burden of proof and the court refused to impose a 

constructive trust.

Apparently recognizing the obstacle that the Dreesen Enters. 

opinion posed, the appellants argued in their written closing 

argument that a resulting trust was formed. The district court’s 

order addressed constructive trusts, resulting trusts, and oral 

contracts for land. The district court found that the appellants 

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Robert 

obtained the title to the property by fraud, misrepresentation, 

or an abuse of an influential or confidential relationship. Thus, 

a constructive trust was not formed.

As to the allegations of a resulting trust, the district court 

found that even if it accepted Larry’s version of the events, the 

evidence established an oral agreement to transfer the property, which would be precluded by the statute of frauds. To 

the extent that the district court viewed the statute of frauds 

as a bar to a resulting trust, we disagree with its analysis. See 

Reetz v. Olson, 146 Neb. 621, 20 N.W.2d 687 (1945) (resulting 

trusts are exempt from statute of frauds). However, in our de 

novo review of the record, we determine that Larry failed to 

establish the existence of a resulting trust by clear and convincing evidence.

As an initial matter, we find that the appellants have abandoned their claim regarding constructive trusts, and we do 

not address the district court’s order in regard to this claim. 

Additionally, we find no merit in the appellants’ assertion 

that the district court required fraud at the outset to prove 
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a resulting trust. The district court’s discussion of fraud is 

clearly relating to its analysis of constructive trusts and is an 

accurate application of Dreesen Enters. v. Dreesen, supra. We 

now turn to the issue of a resulting trust.

[3-6] A resulting trust is one raised by implication of law 

and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties; the intention of the resulting trust is to be found in the 

nature of their transaction, but not expressed in deed or instrument of conveyance. Malousek v. Meyer, 309 Neb. 803, 962 

N.W.2d 676 (2021). Where a transfer of property is made to 

one person and the purchase price or consideration was paid 

by another person, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person who made the payment or provided consideration. Id. The 

court will impose a resulting trust when the circumstances surrounding a conveyance make it clear that the parties intended 

such a result. Id. A resulting trust will not be declared upon 

doubtful and uncertain grounds; and the burden is upon the 

one claiming the existence of the trust to establish the facts 

upon which it is based by clear and satisfactory evidence. 

Biggerstaff v. Ostrand, 199 Neb. 808, 261 N.W.2d 750 (1978). 

Where the alleged trust relationship is just as consistent with 

that of a gift or loan, courts will not ordinarily impress a 

resulting trust. Id.

In Malousek v. Meyer, supra, the trial court found that an 

estate’s special administrator had not met his burden of showing a resulting trust for a boat. On appeal, the Supreme Court 

reversed, recognizing its duty to try issues of fact de novo to 

reach a conclusion independent of that of the trial court. The 

evidence was undisputed that the decedent had paid for the 

boat, that she had another person sign the purchase agreement, and that she had a third person sign the title. The trial 

court found that the special administrator failed to establish 

the elements of a resulting trust and had not rebutted the presumption that it was a gift to the title owner. On appeal, the 

Supreme Court explained that the decedent titled the boat in 

the name of another for reasons that benefited her and that she 
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paid all the major expenses associated with boat ownership. 

Id. Consequently, the court determined that the title owner 

held the boat in a resulting trust for the decedent’s estate.

Conversely, here, the appellants failed to prove by clear 

and satisfactory evidence that Larry and Robert intended to 

create a resulting trust. Unlike Malousek v. Meyer, supra, Larry 

produced no evidence that having the land titled in Robert’s 

name was beneficial to Larry. Rather, Larry testified that he 

and Robert decided they would put the farm in Robert’s name 

“as [Robert] requested” and that they would “move forward 

from there.” Larry later explained that Robert did not want to 

have to deal with Patricia in the event something happened to 

Larry. Furthermore, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence 

that Larry paid half of the downpayment. Robert contends that 

Larry did not pay any of the downpayment, and the ledger does 

not reflect any part of the downpayment being made by Larry. 

Larry testified in his deposition that he paid half of the downpayment, but he could not remember if it was paid by cash or 

check; however, at trial, he testified that he remembered producing cash.

Larry relies heavily upon the notations Robert made in his 

ledger to prove that each brother paid half of the funds necessary to buy the farm; however, equal contributions also support 

Robert’s position that Larry agreed to loan him half of each 

year’s deficit and the ledger was a method of keeping track of 

this amount. Keeping in mind that the intention of the resulting trust is to be found in the nature of the transaction, we find 

the nature of this transaction does not support a finding that a 

resulting trust was intended. See, e.g., Malousek v. Meyer, 309 

Neb. 803, 962 N.W.2d 676 (2021) (resulting trust found where 

decedent had boat titled in name of another for purposes bene

ficial to decedent and decedent continued to pay costs associated with boat); Reetz v. Olson, 146 Neb. 621, 20 N.W.2d 687 

(1945) (resulting trust found in favor of person paying cost of 

school lease where lease was put in name of another because 

payor was ineligible to bid on lease).
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Resulting trusts arise most frequently in situations in which 

one party pays the consideration for a purchase and title is 

taken in the name of another. Reetz v. Olson, supra. Here, 

however, there is no dispute that Robert paid consideration 

for the purchase of the land and title was taken in his name. 

The question is whether Larry’s financial contributions were 

intended to be an investment or a loan. The burden was on 

Larry to produce clear and satisfactory evidence that a resulting trust was intended. Putting aside the conflicting testimony 

of Larry and Robert, our de novo review of the record does 

not provide clear and satisfactory evidence that the parties 

intended a resulting trust. The alleged reason for placing the 

property in Robert’s name, Robert’s management of the farm, 

Larry’s failure to include his ownership interest as an asset on 

subsequent financial documentation, and Marla’s testimony all 

cast doubt on whether Larry and Robert intended to create a 

resulting trust. Consequently, Larry failed to produce clear and 

satisfactory evidence that a resulting trust was created. The district court did not err in denying the appellants’ claim, although 

we reach that determination on a basis other than relied upon 

by the district court. See Doe v. Board of Regents, 283 Neb. 

303, 809 N.W.2d 263 (2012) (appellate court will affirm lower 

court’s ruling that reaches correct result, albeit based on different reasoning).

Patricia’s Interrogatory Answers.

The appellants assign that the district court erred when it 

disregarded Patricia’s interrogatory answers without a basis 

to do so. The district court’s order states, “Patricia . . . neither 

appeared at trial nor testified. Written discovery signed by 

Patricia was offered and received as Exhibit 11, but the Court 

has no ability to judge Patricia’s credibility by these documents 

and gives them little to no weight.”

The appellants argue that State ex rel. Wagner v. Amwest 

Surety Ins. Co., 274 Neb. 121, 738 N.W.2d 813 (2007), supports their assertion that “[o]n de novo review, an appellate 
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court appraises the credibility of affidavit evidence in the light 

of other evidence but does not disregard it because it was not 

given as live testimony.” Brief for appellants at 25. Our reading 

of State ex rel. Wagner, however, supports the district court’s 

decision to give little to no weight to this evidence.

In State ex rel. Wagner, the court determined that the affidavit in question was not credible and was “simply too lacking 

in specificity and foundation” and untimely to contradict the 

other evidence. 274 Neb. at 130, 738 N.W.2d at 820. Although 

Patricia’s interrogatory answers were not untimely, they do 

lack in specificity and foundation to weigh equally to the 

live, cross-examined testimony of Larry, Robert, and Marla. 

Patricia, a named party to the case, was not present at trial and 

did not testify. The answers to the interrogatories did not identify the foundation upon which Patricia’s answers were made. 

And if, in fact, the purpose of omitting Larry’s name on the 

deed was to preclude Patricia from having any interest in the 

land, we find it curious that she would have firsthand knowledge of the transaction. Furthermore, the discovery responses 

offered only self-serving affirmations of evidence already presented at trial by Larry; therefore, even if any error was committed, it was harmless. We find no merit in the appellants’ 

assigned error.

Remaining Assignments of Error 

and Cross-Appeal.

The appellants assign that the district court erred when it 

dismissed their complaint. The assignment references and reiterates arguments addressed under the previous two sections. 

For the reason set forth above, we reject this argument.

The appellants assign that the district court erred in failing 

to award rents and profits to them. Based upon our determination that the appellants do not have an ownership interest in the 

farm, they are not entitled to its rents and profits.

[7] Based on our disposition of the above assignments of 

error, we need not address the error raised on cross-appeal. 
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An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis 

that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy 

before it. Doty v. West Gate Bank, 292 Neb. 787, 874 N.W.2d 

839 (2016).

CONCLUSION

The appellants failed to prove their claim for a resulting 

trust by clear and satisfactory evidence. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s order, albeit for a different reason.

Affirmed.

Moore, Judge, participating on briefs.