Filed 3/16/21 In re D.H. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re D.H., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

2d Crim. No. B304277

(Super. Ct. No. YJ39756)

(Los Angeles County)

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.H.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

D.H. appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward 

of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602). The juvenile court found 

true the allegation he committed second degree robbery. (Pen. 

Code,1 § 211.) It placed D.H. home on probation. 

1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal 

Code. 
2

D.H. contends there was insufficient evidence he 

aided and abetted the robbery. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Incidents

D.H. drove J.S., T.K., and J.B. to Dick’s Sporting 

Goods in Thousand Oaks. The manager of the store saw J.S., 

T.K., and J.B. enter the store together. They began grabbing 

Nike items. As they walked toward the front of the store with

“more than 20 items” each, they pushed an employee away. The 

manager asked one of the other employees to call “911.” One of 

the three said “it’s not worth it.” They dropped all the items on

the floor and left the store. One employee saw the three walk 

toward a blue car in the parking lot.

The same day, D.H. drove his three friends to a 

second Dick’s Sporting Goods in Oxnard. While D.H. remained in 

the car, his friends attempted to go into the store, but they were 

not allowed inside.

Later the same day, J.S. approached a woman, V.C.,

in a parking lot at a market in Oxnard. J.S. asked V.C. for 

money several times. He then tried to grab her purse. The two 

fought over the purse, and V.C. fell to the ground. The purse 

strap broke; J.S. grabbed the purse; and he ran away. V.C. and 

bystanders chased J.S., but he got into a car that had stopped in 

the middle of “the driveway area.” The “moment [J.S.] jumped in, 

[the car] took off.” V.C. described the car as a “dark car” with a 

paper license plate.

Investigation

Ventura County Sheriff Deputies received three calls

regarding the incidents at the two Dick’s Sporting Goods and the 

market in Oxnard. The calls reported “multiple suspects” driving 
3

in a dark blue Chevy with Cerritos paper plates. Patrol deputies

stopped a car which matched the description. D.H. was driving 

the car. T.K. was in the front passenger seat, and J.S. and J.B. 

were in the back seat. 

D.H. told a deputy that they planned to go to an 

“unknown beach” in Ventura, but they decided not to go because 

they did not have proper clothing. D.H. said he “had not stopped 

anywhere else in Ventura County . . . between the beach and the 

traffic stop” and “there was nothing else that had happened.”

An Oxnard police officer interviewed V.C. at the 

market and drove her to D.H.’s location for an in-field

identification. V.C. identified J.S. as the person who grabbed her 

purse. She also identified the Chevy as the car that J.S. “jumped 

into” at the market parking lot. She identified her makeup 

brushes in the backseat of the Chevy. 

Another police officer found V.C.’s purse near the 101 

South highway on-ramp. V.C.’s wallet, cash, and car keys were 

missing. 

At a later interview, D.H. said he was the only person

who drove the Chevy that day. He said he drove from Los 

Angeles County to Ventura to go to the beach. When asked 

which beach, he said he was not sure. He admitted driving to

Dick’s Sporting Goods to buy swim trunks. He said no one 

bought swim trunks because his friends were not allowed into the 

store. He denied driving to the market in Oxnard. 

Defense

D.H. testified that he drove from Los Angeles to 

Ventura County to go to the beach. He admitted driving to both 

Dick’s Sporting Goods so that his friends could get swim trunks, 

but he stayed inside the car. When his friends did not get swim 
4

trunks, he began driving back to Los Angeles. They never went 

to the beach. 

D.H. admitted stopping at the Oxnard market. He 

said he stopped at the market because J.S. wanted to use the 

bathroom. He testified that he did not know J.S. stole the purse 

until the police pulled them over. 

DISCUSSION

D.H. contends there was insufficient evidence he

aided and abetted the robbery of V.C. We disagree. 

We review the juvenile court’s true finding for 

sufficiency of evidence. We review “the whole record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses 

substantial evidence—that is evidence that is reasonable, 

credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact 

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In 

re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605.) “‘Substantial 

evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable 

inferences drawn from that evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 943.) 

A person who aids and abets a crime is guilty of that 

crime. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) To prove 

a person is an aider and abettor, the prosecution must show that 

the defendant “‘acted “with knowledge of the criminal purpose of 

the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of 

committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the 

offense.” [Citation.] When the offense charged is a specific intent 

crime, the accomplice must “share the specific intent of the 

perpetrator”; this occurs when the accomplice “knows the full 

extent of the perpetrator’s criminal purpose and gives aid or 

encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the 
5

perpetrator’s commission of the crime.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” 

(Id. at p. 1118.) 

In People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165 

(Cooper), our Supreme Court held under similar circumstances 

that a getaway driver may be liable for robbery as an aider and 

abettor if they formed an intent to facilitate commission of the 

robbery “prior to or during the carrying away of the loot to a place

of temporary safety.” There, the defendant drove his two

codefendants to a parking lot of a shopping center. (Id. at p.

1161.) While the defendant was in the car, his codefendants

forcefully stole a wallet from a shopper. The codefendants then

fled to the car, which was moving with two of its doors open. 

(Ibid.) After the codefendants “jumped inside, defendant

hurriedly drove away.” (Ibid.) The defendant argued the

evidence was insufficient to show he had prior knowledge or

intent to aid in the robbery; but rather, the evidence, at best,

showed he was an accessory after the fact. (Id. at p. 1162.) The

court disagreed.

The court reasoned that for the purpose of

determining aider and abettor liability, the robbery continues

“until all acts constituting the offense have ceased.” (Cooper,

supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1164.) Robbery requires an act of

asportation or “carrying away the loot.” (Id. at p. 1165.) 

Asportation is not “confined to a fixed point in time” and may

continue “as long as the loot is being carried away to a place of

temporary safety.” (Ibid.) Therefore, “a getaway driver who has 

no prior knowledge of a robbery, but who forms the intent to aid 

in carrying away the loot during such asportation, may properly 

be found liable as an aider and abettor of the robbery.” (Id. at p. 

1161.)
6

Here, there is sufficient evidence to show that D.H. 

formed an intent to facilitate in the robbery prior to or during the 

commission of the crime. After J.S. grabbed the purse from V.C., 

D.H. stopped his car in the middle of “the driveway area” of the 

market parking lot and D.H. “jumped in.” The “moment [J.S.] 

jumped in” the car, D.H. “took off.”

Moreover, there is other evidence to support a finding 

that D.H. knew about and intended to aid the robbery. “Among 

the factors which may be considered in making the determination 

of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, 

companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.” (In re

Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.) Earlier the same 

day, D.H. drove his friends from Los Angeles to a Dick’s Sporting 

Goods in Thousand Oaks, where his friends attempted to steal 

items. When their plan failed, D.H. drove his friends to a second 

Dick’s Sporting Goods in Oxnard. A juvenile court could 

reasonably infer that D.H. and his friends shared a common plan 

to steal with D.H. acting as the getaway driver. 

After the robbery, D.H. lied to law enforcement 

officers. He first told a deputy that he drove from Los Angeles to 

Ventura County to go to an unknown beach and that he had not 

stopped anywhere else in Ventura County. Later, during an 

interview, D.H. told a deputy that he went to Dick’s Sporting 

Goods, but denied going to the Oxnard market. Then at trial, he 

admitted he went to the market. D.H.’s false or inconsistent 

statements reflect his consciousness of guilt. (See People v. Flores 

(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 216, 221 [giving false statement to the 

police is a relevant factor to determine consciousness of guilt].) 

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s true finding. 
7

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Irma J. Brown, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 

Assistant Attorney General, Stacy Schwartz and Eric J. Kohm, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.