T he H o no rable Sara Li o i , U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct Jud ge f o r t he N o rt hern D i st ri ct of O hi o , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. * NO T REC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0402n.06 No. 08-1791 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee , ) ) v. ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED J ERRY MI KOWSKI , ) STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE ) WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

)

Before: SUTTO N and GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges; LIOI, DistrictJudge. * SARA LIOI. District J udg e. Def endant J err

y Mikowski (“Mikowski”) pled guilty to one count o f d i s t ributing c hild pornog raphy . The district judg e imposed a se ntence of 192 months—which repr esente d a down w a r d varia nce of 48 months from the guideline ra ng e—followe d by a lif e tim e of su pervi sed re le a se . M iko ws ki s e e ks a re mand fo r r e se nte nc ing , a

rguin gthat hi s sentenc e wa s both procedur ally and substantively

unrea sonable unde r the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Ame ndment. For

the re asons that follow, we AFF I RM the sentence

.

I. On Marc h 29, 2007, ag ents executed a sear ch wa

rra nt at which time they

seized a laptop belong ing to Mikowski. (PSR ¶ 15.) A fore nsic examination of the laptop reve aled 2,065 imag es and 41 movies conta ining c hild pornog raphy ; at least 38 of the imag es depicted children who wer eT h e g u i del i n e s en t en ci n g r an g e wa s 262 t o 327 mon t h s . H owe v er , be ca u s e t h e max i mu m t er m of i mpr i s on men t f

or 1 d i st ribu t i o n o f

ch i l d p o rno gra p hy i s 2 4 0 m o nths, 1 8 U .S.C

. § 2 2 5 2 (b )(1 ), t he guid eli ne ran ge b ec am e 2 4 0 m o nths. T he t er m “ gr oo mi ng ” r ef er s t o an a dul t f

ormi ng a r el at i ons hi p wi t h a mi nor f or pur po s es of

us i ng t he mi nor f

or s exu al 2 pur po s es i n t he f

ut ur e. 2 bound, and some c ontained imag es of p re pubesce nt children e ng ag ing in se x acts. (PSR ¶ 16; Transc ript of Plea He aring28-29.) Mikowski was cha

rg ed with one count of distribution and one c ount of possession of imag es of minors eng ag ing in se x ually expli cit content. (R. 6-9.) Pursuant to a plea a g ree ment, the United States dismis sed the possession count a nd Mikowski pled guilty

to distributi on. (R. 10-15.) The pre- sentenc e re port indicated a g uideline sentenc ing r ang e of 240 months, followe d by five year s 1 to life of super

vised rele ase; it rec ommended 240 months’ imprisonment a nd supervised r elea se for li f e . ( PS R ¶

¶ 7 7 , 8 0

. ) M ik o w s k i f

il e d a mo ti o n f

o r a d o w n w ar d v ar ia

n c e , w h ic h in c luded as a n at t ac h m en t a for ensic psycholog ical prof ile evaluation by

Dr. Steven R. Miller, Ph.D. ( S e e, e . g. , Transc ript of SentencingHea ring13 (her einaf

ter “ Tr.”) .) At the sentenc ing he aring , defe nse counse l a nd the district judge enter ed into the following exchang e: Mr. Kar fonta: . . . [T] here is simpl y no evidenc e of a

ny g rooming or a ct i n g o u t or

2 talking a bout actingout of any

nature in this case. Th e Court : A nd

Ia pp re c iate that is th e stat e of the re c or d, but th e re is a lso his—come bac k at me if you disag ree —isn’t there c lear evidenc e that lef

t unappre hended that that’s wher e Mr. Mikowski was he aded? Mr . K arf on ta : We ll, the re is s ub sta nti a l f e e li ng th at that’ s w hat th at me ans , b ut I c ome to my

pr of e ssi on lik e Ms. Woo ds c ome s to hers, and I ’m a hu g e be lie ve r i n second c hance s, and I

just—I ’m not seeingit in thi s case . (Tr. 25.) Shortly

there afte r, def

ense c ounsel stated that ther e we re “ [n] o indications of any acting out by Mr. Mikowski, no indications he was heade d in that direction, other tha n the fa ct that he wa s3

viewingthese im ag es, and if y ou take that as a g ener ality , then y ou would have to c onclude that.” (Tr. 26.) Mikowski then addre ssed the cour t on his own behalf ( Tr. 27-28), afte r which the district judge proce eded to se ntencing

. The district judg e noted that he must “impose a sentenc e suff icient but not g reater than nece ssary to comply

with the purposes of se ntencingset forth in 18. U.S. Code 3553(a) ,” and he cor re ct ly listed the § 3553(a) fac tors. (Tr. 29- 30.) Thoug h acknow ledg ing that

“ the g uid e lin e s are a dv iso ry to the C ourt ,” the dis tr ic t ju dg e ann ounc e d th at he ha d “ take n [th e m] into account a s an initial benchmar k or a star ting point when se ntencingin this case.” ( Tr. 29.) The district judg e noted that Mikowski had a long history of alc ohol abuse that led to a string of under ag e possession convictions and o n e co n v i ction for impaire d driving . (Tr. 30- 31.) That being s ai d , t h e district judg e also found that Mikowski “did reasona bly well in school,” ha d “eng ag ed in sig nificant e mploy ment pursuits” since his ar rest, and ha d complied with the terms of h i s b o n d r e l e a s e . ( T r . 3 1

. ) T h e d i s tr i c tj u d g e th e nw e n to nt o s ay: I ’m also—I

was a lso very

impressed, a s I ’ve indicated brief ly befor e, very

impressed with Dr. Miller’s rep o rt

. I t seeme d—it’s one of the most thoroug h and bala nced re po rt s th at I

have se e n in

my tim e on

—my sh or

t time on the fe de ra l be nc h, but a lso my much long er pe riod of time on the state be nch.

. . . . . . This report ha s some very troubling a spects to it, but it clearly als o s h ows that Mr. Mikowski has a sig nificant c hance that once r elea sed fr om pr ison that he will not eng ag e in this activity

befor e [sic]

. My interpre tation of t he report i s that, howeve r, is that Mr . M iko ws ki w a s w e ll o n h is w ay to m uc h mo re signif

ic ant c ri min a l a c tiv ity left un-a pprehe nded. And Mr. Mikowski impre sses me as be ing a n individual who is c on tr i t e n o w , an d t o th e e xt e n t th at h i s a p p r e h e n s i o n p r e v e n t e d h i m f r o mwh a t I thi nk he wa s g oin gto b e , b a se d on my re vie w of the re po rt , an d I thi nk thi s is c le arl y a potential conclusion, and the conclusion t hat I drawfrom the r eport, is that left unappre hended, Mr . Mik o ws k i was goingto harm somebody . But that’s not the c ir c ums tanc e that w e have in f ro nt of us he re tod ay , for

tun ate ly fo r Mr . M iko ws ki, othe r w is e , w h il e my s e n te n c e is g o in g to b e a s ign if ic an t o n e h e r e , he would be fa c ingmuc h mo re tim e un de r t ho se c ir c ums tanc e s. (Tr. 31- 32.)U n d e r th e S e n te n c in g G u id e line s, e a c h vid e o c o n ta inin g c h ild p o rn o g ra p h y is eq u iva le n t t o 7 5 im a g e s o f ch ild 3 p o rnograp hy

. U

. S.S. G

. § 2 G 2

. 2 , C o m m ent ary 4(B )( i i ). M i ko w ski aske d t he d i st rict co urt t o i m p o se the m i nim um senten ce o f f i ve years. 4 4 The district judg e noted that Mikowski had more than 5,000 imag es of c hild pornog raphy

on his c omp ute r (T r. 32 ), wh ic h wa s the larg e st numbe r of ima g e s he ha d se e n ( Tr . 2 7) . O f t ho se 3 imag es, the district judge found, at least thirty -eig ht de picted bondag e. (Tr. 33.) He also found that Mikowski’s “looking for toddlers refe renc e is one that is extremely difficult for this Court, and it’s

a signif ic ant a g g ra

vatin gfa c tor .” (T r. 32 .) Th e dis tr ict ju dg e state d th at c hil d p or no g ra phy is considere d an extremely

serious off

ense that cre ates a “victimization” of and “continuing harm [to] these youngchildren,” and that the sentenc e neede d to se rve the intere sts of “g ener al deter renc e of others who would c ont empl ate e ng ag ing in the tr adingof pornographic materia ls of this nature involving childre n.” (Tr . 33-34.) In light of the se fac ts, the district judge conclude d that the mandator y minimum sentenc e of fi ve y e ars wa s “ wh oll y

ina pp ro pr iate .” (T r. 35 .) Ho we ve r, the dist ri ct judg e fo un d it “ e xtre me ly important” that Mikowski did not mol est any children or

eng ag e in g rooming activity , and

acc ording ly

he g rante d in part Mikowski’s motion for a downwa

rd var iance

. (Tr. 32, 35- 36.) The

4 district judge sentenc ed Mikowski to 192 months’ imprisonm ent followed by a lifetime of supervised r elea se. (Tr . 36-37.) Upon pronounc ement of the sentenc e, the distric t j u d ge aske d if there wer e “[a]ny leg al objections to the sentenc e imposed,” to whic h defe nse counse l r eplied: “Ye s, as stated.” (Tr. 38- 39.) This appea l followed. II. Un de r t he po st-Bo ok

e r advisory

g uidelines scheme , we r eview a defe ndant’s s entence for

r e a s o n a b le n e s s. Ga l l v. United States , 1 28 S. Ct . 5 86 , 5 94 (2 00 7) . T his inc lud e s r e vie w f or bo th5

proce dural and substantive rea sonablene ss. Id. at 597. Mik ow sk i ar g ue s th at hi s se nte nc e is b oth proce durally

and substantively

unrea sonable. A. F or any se nte nc e , whe the r wit

hin or outsi de of the g uid e lin e ra ng e , a n a pp e llate c ourt

mus t first deter mine whether

the district c ourt committed a “sig nificant proc edura l error , such as f ailing t o c a l c u l at e ( o r

i mp r o p e r l y c a l c u l at i n g ) th e G u i d e l i n e s r an g e , tr e at i n g th e G u i d e l i n e s a s m an d at o r y, failingto consider the § 3553( a) f actor s, selectinga sente nce ba sed on clearly err oneous fa cts, or failingto adequately

explain the chosen sentence —including an ex planation for any deviation from the Guidelines ra

ng e.” Id. W h er e a district court has committed a sig nificant proc edura l error , rema nd for resentenc ing is necessa ry . See, e .g. , United States v. Garc ia-Robles , 5 62 F .3 d 7 63 (6 th Cir. 2009) (vac atingsentenc e as pr ocedur ally unrea sonable a

nd rema nding f or re sentenc ing)

. Mikowski argues that his sentenc e was proce durally unrea sonable be cause the district court substantially

based his sente nce upon a clea rly err oneous finding of fa ct—namely , that if “left una pp re he nd e d, Mr . Miko ws ki wa s g oin g to harm so me bo dy .” (T r. 32 .) In ord e r to pr e se rv e a c la im of proc edura l err or for appellate revie w, a defe ndant m ust object to the allege d proce dural e rror at the sentenc ing he aring

. U n ite d S ta te s v . V onner , 5 1 6 F.3d 382, 385 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc). Whe re a de fe nd ant i s g ive n a

n o pp or tun ity to o bje c t but f

a ils to do so, the pr oc e dura l r e a so na ble ne ss of his sentenc e is revie wed f or plain er

ror. Id. at 386. Other wi se, it is reviewe d for a buse of discretion. Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 597. Mik ow sk i ur g e s that his c ouns e l ob je c te d to the a lle g e dly c le arl y e rr on e ous s tat ement , wh e re a s th e g ov e rnme nt a rgue s th at he did no t. We ne e d no t a dd re ss thi s iss ue be c a

us e re g ard le ss of the standard of review, the rec ord is clea r that the district judg e did not “sele ct[] a sente nce ba sed on” the statement. Id. at 597. Indeed, upon a cknowledg ing his view“that lef t un-appre hended, Mr

.6

Mikowski was g oing to ha rm somebody ,” the district judg e immediately added: “ But that’s not the circ umstance that we have in front of us her e today , fo rt u n at el y for Mr. Mikowski, other wise . . . he would be f

acingmuch more time . . . .” (Tr. 32.) This expl anation i n d icates that the district judge disavowed a

ny relianc e upon his afor esaid stateme nt in selectingMikowski’s sentence

. As if that w e re no t e no ug h, the dis tr ic t ju dg e late r n ote d th at he fo un d it “ e xtre me ly important” that “the re w as no g rooming [and] there was no victimiz ation of youngchildren be y ond the use of the pictures,” and ac cordingly he g rante d a downwa

rd var iance . (Tr. 35.) The district judge also conc eded tha t t he “thor oug h and bala nced” and “ve ry

impress[ive] ” Miller Report “cle arly . . . shows that Mr. M ikowski has a sig nificant c hance that once r elea sed fr om prison that he will not eng ag e in this activity [as] befor e.” ( Tr. 31-32.) He determined, however, that “the more imp or tant n atur e of

de te rr e nc e he re is the g e ne ra l de te rr e nce o f othe rs wh o w ou ld c on te mpl ate eng ag ing in the tr adingof pornographic materia ls of this natu re i n v o l v i n gchildren.” (Tr. 33- 34.) Th e se state me nts sh ow that th e dis tr ic t ju dg e did no t ba se Mik ow sk i’ s se nte nc e on the po te nti a l th at, if left unappr ehende d, he may have c aused ha

rm to othe rs

— i n fa ct , the district judge g rante d a downwar d varia

nce prec isely beca

use he found that Mikowski’s only wrong ful conduc t was shar ing ill e g a l im a g e s. In short, the re cord shows that the district judge did not s elect Mikowski’s sentence , even in part, base d up o n clearly err oneous finding s of fa ct. Ther efor e, Mikowski’s sentenc e wa s proce durally

rea sonable.W h e the r M iko w sk i o b je c te d to the su b sta n tive u n re a so n a b le n e ss o f h is se n te n c e d u rin g the h e a rin g is irre le v a n t t o this 5 a n a lysis, as he w a s n o t o b liga te d to d o so in o rd e r to p re se rv e the issu e fo r re v ie w . V on ner , 516 F. 3d a t 389. T hi s argum ent s eem s m o re app rop ri at e f o r a proc ed ural reas o nab l eness chal l enge t han a subst ant i ve o ne. H o wever, 6 s i nce M i kows ki o nl y rai s es t hi s arg ument as ju s t i f i cat i on f or a cl ai m of

su bst ant i ve un r eas onabl ene s s , we wi l l cons i der it a c c o rd ing ly. 7 B. Once a re view i n g court has determined tha t a district court c ommitt ed no sig nificant p r o c e d ur a l e r r o r , it th e nmu s t c o n s id e r

w h e th e r th e s e n te n c e w a s s u

b s ta n ti v e ly r e a s o n a b le. Gall , 5 128 S. Ct . at 597. “A sentence is substantively unrea sonable if the district court selec ts the sentence

arb itr ari ly , b a se s th e se nte nc e on imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, fa ils to c on sid e r p e rt ine nt § 3553(a) fac tors or gives an unrea sonable amount of weight to any pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. Kirchhof

, 5 0 5 F. 3 d 4 0 9 , 4 1 3 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d Sta te s v . H us e in , 478 F.3d 318, 332 (6th Cir. 2007)). As “ appellate revie w of sente ncingdecisions is limi ted to deter mining wh et her they are ‘re asonable ,’” w e re view the substantive r easona blenes s o f a s en t ence under a n abuse of discretion standa

rd. Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 594, 597. This case is somewhat unusual in that Mikowski challeng es a downwar d variance a s

su bs tanti ve ly

unre a so na

ble be c a us e , in his vi ew, it w a s n ot l arg e e no ug h. Thus , “ thi s c ourt mus t deter mine whether

the consider ations based upon § 3553( a) a re so co m p elling a s to nece ssitate a shorter sentence .” Kirchhof , 505 F.3d at 414-15. In revie wingthe sentenc e, we “must g ive due defe renc e to the di strict court’s decision that the § 3553(a) fa ctors, on a whole, justify the extent of the var iance .” Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 597. Mikowski argues g ener ally that the district judge “fa iled to identify the cha rac t er i s t ics peculiar to this Def

endant that justified this sentenc e.” (B rief of Appellant at 23.) A re view of the 6

rec ord shows that Mikowski is wrong

. As detailed in S ection I , su pra , th e dis tr ic t ju dg e tho ro ug hly considere d the totality

of the fa cts in the ca se—includingall the mitigatingfac ts that Mikowski8

reha shes in his briefingto this C o urt—and c raf ted a se ntence , below the guideline ra ng e, that he believed a

ppropriate ly

took into account the § 3553(a) fac tors. There is no indication that Mikowski’s sentenc e was arbitra ry , based upon impermissible fac tors, or due to the district judge ’s failure to consider a pertinent § 3553(a) fac tor or the unrea sonable we ightingof a pa rticular f actor

. Kirchhof , 5 05 F .3 d at 41 3. F ur

the r, tho ug h Mik ow sk i may have sh own th at th e dis tr ic t ju dg e c ou ld

re a so na bly have g ra nte d a n e ve n g re ate r d ownw ard va ri anc e , he ha s not sho wn

that th e fa c ts o f t

his

case “ar e so compe lling as to ne cessitate” as much. Id. at 41 4- 15 ; se e als o G all , 128 S. Ct . at 597 (“Th e f a c t th at th e a

p p e ll ate c o urt mi g h t r e a s o n a b ly h av e c o n c lu d e d th at a d if f e r e n t s e n te nce w as appropr iate is insufficient to jus tify reve rsal of the di strict court.” ). We there fore find no abuse of sentenc ing disc retion. Mik ow sk i su g g e sts that hi s se nte nc e sh ou ld b e ov e rt ur ne d b e c a us e anoth e r d e fe nd ant, in United States v. Grossman , 513 F.3d 592 ( 6th Cir. 2008), rec eived a shorter se nt en ce fo r conduct

a lle g e dly mor e e g re g iou s th an h is o wn . T his argume nt i s unava ili ng . F ir st, the ne e d to avo id sentenc ing dispa

rities under Sec tion 3553(a)( 6) conc erns “ nat ional disparities,” not disparities betwee n specific case s. United States v. Simmons , 501 F.3d 620, 623 ( 6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Roc hon , No

. 0 7 -5 4 2 9 , 2 0 0 9 W L7 9 2 8 9 3 , at* 3 (6 thC i r. M ar . 2 7 , 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. H o u s ton , 529 F.3d 743, 752 ( 6th Cir. 2008)). “The ref ore, this cour

t’s revie w of substantive

rea sonablene ss ‘starts with the sentenc ing e stimate provided by the Sentenc i ngCommi ssion,’ not the sentenc es rec eived by other individual defenda nts.” Kirchhof

, 505 F.3d at 416 (citation omitted). Wit hin-guidelines sentenc es ar e pre sumed to be substantively rea sonable. United States v. Higgins , 5 5 7 F. 3 d 3 8 1 , 3 9 8 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Vonner , 516 F.3d at 389-90). H oweve r, whe re, a s here , a defe ndant rec eives a below-guidelines sentenc e and the g overnme nt doe s not a ppeal, the de fenda

nt must make the g reater showingthat “the considerations based upon § 3553(a) are so compelling asM iko w sk i no te s, b a se d up o n the 2 0 0 7 S e n te n c in g C o m m issio n S o u rc e b o o k , t h a t “3 3 p e rc e n t” (a c tua lly 3 4 p e rc e n t) 7 of ch i l d po r nogr aphy def endan t s r ece i ved s ent enc es bel ow t he gu i del i nes r ang e. H owever , M i kows ki ’ s i nt i mat i on t hat t hi s demo ns t r at es t hat t he chi l d po r nogr aphy gu i del i nes ar e f at al l y f l awed i s not conv i nci ng . Fi r s t , M i kowski i gn ores t h e ot h er e dg e of

t h e s wor d: t h at t wo- t h i r ds of c h i l d por n og r aph y de f end ant s r ec ei v ed wi t h i n - g u i del i n es s en t en ce s or u p w a rd d e p a rtu re s. M o re o v e r, the 3 4 p e rc e n t b e lo w -gu id e line s ra te fo r c h ild p o rn o g ra p h y o ff e n se s is no t sub sta n tially d iff e re n t fro m the b e lo w -gu id e line s ra te s fo r m a n y o the r fe d e ra l cr im e s, su c h a s a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, U .S .S .G . § 2 A 2 .2 (2 7 % ); o b stru c ting o r im p e d ing o ff ic e rs , § 2 A 2 .4 (3 0 % ); thr e a te n ing /ha ra ssin g c o m m u n ic a tio n s o r h o a x e s, § 2 A 6 .1 (2 8 % ); b u rg la ry, § 2 B 2 .1 (3 9 % ); ro b b e ry, § 2 B 3 .1 ( 3 4 % ); o ff e rin g , giv ing , so liciting , o r re c e ivin g a b rib e , § 2 C 1 .1 9 to nece ssitate a shorter

sentenc e.” Kirchhof

, 505 F.3d a

t 414-15. Mikowski has provided no indication that, in light of defe ndants acr oss the nation with r ecor ds and conduct similar to his own, the § 3553(a ) fa ctors compe l an eve n g reater downw ard va rianc e than what he re ceive d. In any event, Grossman does n o t p re s ent such a n unwar rante d disparity . In that case , the defe ndant re cei v ed a 66-month prison term f ollowed by

10 y ear s of supervise d rele ase f or p o s s es s i o no f c h i l d

p o rn o grap h y , wh i ch re p re s en t ed a d o wn wa rdd ep arture fr o mth e gu i d el i n e r an ge of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by 10 y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Grossman , 513 F.3d at 5 9 4 -95. Ther e is no indication that the def endant in Grossman h a d a “ s im il ar r e c o r d[] ” or w as “found guilty

of similar conduc t [ ] ” to Mikowski with respec t to other fac ts in thi s case . See 18 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(6) . Indeed, the defe ndant in Grossman was c onvicted of a l esser offe nse than Mikowski, and it does not appea r t hat t he defenda

nt in Grossman po sse sse d 5, 00 0 ima g e s o f c hil d pornog raphy , had a pr ior criminal re cord, ma de a “ lo o k i n g 4 toddlers” r efe renc e, or r eporte d

ma sturb ator

y fa nta sie s o f s e x with

pr e -p ub e sc e nt g ir ls. Finally , analog izi ngthe child pornog raphy g uidelines t o th e c r ack- coca ine guidelines at issue in Kimbrough v . United States , 128 S. Ct . 558 (2007), Mikowski argues t hat t he child pornography gu i d eli nes ar e base d predominantly on statutory

mandatory

minima and not empirical support or national experienc e, and, the ref ore, the y g ener ally “fa il[ ] t o satisfy

the p u rp o s es of § 3553(a) a nd yie ld[] a se nte nc e that is g re ate r t ha n n e c e ssa ry .” (B ri e f o f A

pp e lla nt at 32 .) To su

pp or t hi s c la im, Mikowski cites the 2007 Sentencing C o m mission S ource book and a ha ndful of ca ses upholding 7( 58 % ) ; ga mb l i ng / ani mal f i gh t i ng of

f ens es , § 2E 3. 1 ( 40 % ) ; promo t i ng a com merc i al s ex act or prohi bi t ed s exu al conduc t wi t h a not her adul t , § 2G 1. 1 (40% ) ; obst r uct i on of j us t i ce, § 2J1. 2 ( 49 % ) ; un l awf ul l y r emai ni ng or ent er i ng i n t he U ni t ed St at es , § 2L1. 2 ( 41% ) ; of f en s es invol vi ng fi sh , w i l dl i f e, or pl an t s , § 2Q 2. 1 ( 43% ) ; s t r u ct u r i n g t r an s ac t i on s t o e v ade r epor t i n g r equ i r eme n t s , f ai l i n g t o r epor t t r an s ac t i on s , or k n owi n g l y f i l i n g f al se f i nanc i al r epor t s , § 2S1. 3 ( 41% ) ; or m i sp ris i o n o f

f elo ny, § 2 X 4 .1 (3 1 % ), am o ng o t he rs. T he cas es ar e Uni t ed St at es v. Row an , 5 3 0 F .3 d 3 7 9 (5 th C ir. 2 0 0 8 ); G r os s m an , 513 F. 3d a t 592; a n d Uni t ed St at es v. 8 B each , 2 7 5 F

. A p p ’ x 5 2 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ). M i ko w ski al so cit es Un i t ed S t a t es v . B a i rd , 580 F. Su pp. 2d 889 ( D

. N eb. 2 0 0 8 ), whi ch grant ed a do wnwa rd d ep art ure on t he ground s o f a p o licy d i sagr eem ent wi t h t he chi l d po rnograp hy g u id e line s. Id

. at 894- 95. W e n eed n ot deci de t hi s i s s ue i n t he pres ent ca s e, as t he di s t r i ct j udge di d not bas e h i s s ent enc e u po n a pol i cy 9 di s agr eement wi t h t he chi l d po r nogr aphy gui del i nes . T hi s Co ur t ha s not ed ear l i er , howev er , t hat “ [ t ] he ext ent t o whi ch a di s t r i ct cour t m ay o f

f er a w ho l esal e di s agr eement wi t h a gu i del i ne as t he bas i s f or a va r i anc e r emai ns un cl ear af t er Ki m br ough

. ” G r os s m an , 513 F. 3d a t 597. 10 d o w n wa rd v ar i an ce s i n ch i l d p o rn o grap h y ca s es . T h e fl aw i n M i k o ws k i ’s l o gi c is o b v i o u s . In 8 Kimbrough , th e Sup re me Court he ld t hat, be c a us e the c ra c k- c oc a ine g uid e lin e s w e re pr e do min antl y based on statutory

minimum sentenc es and not e mpirical data or national experience , “it would not be an a buse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a particular defenda nt that the crac k/powder dispar ity yields a sentenc e ‘greater than ne cessa ry ’ to ac hieve § 3553( a)’ s purposes, e ven in a mine- run ca se.” Kimbrough , 128 S. Ct. at 575. Howeve r, even if it wer e true that district co u rt s, based on the r easoningof Kimbrough , may impose below-guideline sentenc es for c hild pornog raphy

offe nses solely

based upon policy

disag ree ments with those g uidelines, such 9 d o e s n o te n t a i l th atth e y mu st do so. As the Seventh Circuit re as o n ed wh en confronted with a sim ila r a rgume nt: D e s p ite K

i mb r ough , th e c ra c k guid e lin e s, to whic h [de fe nd ant] s o e ne rg e tic a lly ana log ize s th os e fo r c hild-e xploi tatio n, re ma in v a lid . A nd jud g e s a re no t required to disag ree with the cra ck guidelines; a within-guidel i n es s en tence may be re a so na ble . T he c hil d- e xploi tatio n g uid e lin e s ar e no dif fe re nt: wh ile dis tr ic t c ourt s perha ps have the fre edom to se ntence below the child-pornography g uidelines based on disag ree ment with the g uidelines, they are cer tainly not require d to do so. United States v. Huffstatler , 561 F .3 d 694 , 6 97 -9 8 ( 7th Cir . 2 00 9) (c itatio ns omi tte d; e mph a se s in

or ig ina l) ; see also Kir chhof , 505 F.3d at 414 (reje ctingfac ial challeng e to re asonable ness of11

rec ommended guideline ra ng e for chi l d pornog raphy

case s). We there fore decline Mikowski’s invitation to de facto inv a lid ate an e nti re se c tio n o f t he Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s. Mikowski has offe red no e vidence s ug g esting that his below-guidelines sentenc e wa s arbitra ry or base d upon impermissible factor s, or that the district judge failed to c onsider per tinent § 3553(a) fac tors or g ave a n unrea sonable amount of weig ht to any pertinent fa ctor. The ref ore, w e hold that Mikowski’s below-guidelines sentenc e is substantively rea sonable. III . F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , w e AF F I RM the se nte nc e of the dis tr ic t c ourt

.