The Att0rne.y General of Texas 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General 

September 25, 1985 

Supreme Court Building 

P. 0. Box 12546 

Austin, TX. 76711. 2546 

5121475-2501 

Telex 9101674-1367 

Telecopier 51214750266 

Eonorable Neal Birmingham 

District Attorney 

P. 0. Box 555 

Linden, Texas 75563 

Opinion No. ~~-354 

Re: Whether the exception of section 

56). article 6701d-11, V.T.C.S., 

applies to pulpwood or logs being 

transported to a mill 

714 Jackson, Suite 700 

Dallas, TX. 75202.4506 

2141742.6944 

4624 Alberta Ave., Suite 160 

El Paso, TX. 79905.2793 

9151533364 

1001 Texas. Suite 700 

Houston, TX. 77002-3111 

713/223-5666 

606 Broadway. Suite 312 

Lubbock, TX. 794013479 

6W747-5236 

4309 N. Tenth. Suite 6 

McAllen, TX. 76501-1685 

5121662-4547 

200 Main Plaza. Suite 400 

Ssn Antonio, TX. 76205-2797 

512lUM191 

Dear Mr. Birmingham: 

You request an interpretation of the statutory provision which 

creates a forestry exception in article 6701d-11, section 5(b), 

V.T.C.S. Specificztlly, you ask whether the exception applies to the 

hauling of logs or pulpwood from a wood yard to a lumber mill or to a 

paper mill. Section 5(e) of article 6701d-11 makes it unlawful to 

operate on the public highways a commercial motor vehicle, trucktractor, trailer, or semitrailer having a weight in excess of the 

specified weight l:imitations. In 1983, the legislature added section 

5(b), which further, provides that 

(b) No person shall load, or cause to be 

loaded, a vehicle for operation on the public 

highways of this state with the intent to violate 

the weight: limitations in Subsection (a) of this 

section. Intent to violate those limitations is 

presumed if the loaded vehicle exceeds the applicable groE,s vehicular *eight limit by 15 percent or 

more. This subsection does not apply to the 

loading ;? causing to be loaded of an agricultural 

or a forestry commodity prior to the processing of 

the commc~~ (Emphasis added). 

Your question is not whether the operator of an overloaded truck 

An Equal OppOrtUnityI 

Affirmative Action Employer 

violates article 6701d-11, but whether the owner or operator of a vood 

yard has loaded or caused to be loaded a vehicle for operation on the 

public highways in violation of section 5(b). 

You advise us that wood, after being cut in the forest, is first 

transported to a wood yard and then transported from the wood yard to 

a mill. The wood may be transported to a mill on the same truck that 

hauled it to the wood yard without being unloaded and reloaded at the 

wood yard. It may be unloaded, stacked, and subsequently reloaded for 

p. 1618 
Honorable Neal Birmingham - P;age 2 (JM-354) 

hauling to the mill. It my be unloaded, stacked, and subsequently, 

at the option of the wood yard, sold to a saw mill for lumber or cut 

into lengths suitable for pll:lpwood and hauled to a paper mill. Even 

when there is no provable c.l.teration of the wood itself at the wood 

yard. there may be a change: of ownership. The issue in question is 

whether the logs or pulpwood leaving a wood yard have been processed 

within the meaning of the statute so that the forestry exception no 

longer applies, or whether i:hey remain "a forestry commodity prior to 

the processing of the commodity," in which case the owner or operator 

of the wood yard is protected from criminal charges under section 5(b) 

of article 6701d-11. We conclude that the legislature did not intend 

the forestry exception to apljly to a vehicle hauling logs or pulpwood 

from a wood yard to a lumber, mill or paper mill. 

What constitutes "processing" is a complex question. See 

Commonwealth v. Babcock Lumbser Company, 272 A.2 522, 526 (Pa. 1971). 

The Texas Legislature did &t define "processing," and we have not 

found it defined by a court i:n this context. It is well settled that 

an ambiguous statute must be construed consistent with legislative 

intent. Newsom v. State, 3":! S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963). 

We assume that the legislature intends words used in a statute to be 

understood in their ordinary sense except where they are given a 

different meaning in the act:. See Markowsky v. Newman, 136 S.W.2d 808 

(Tex. 1940); Attorney Genera1 Opinion JM-106 (1983). There are times 

when it is necessary to ,:onsult a dictionary to ascertain the 

appropriate meaning of a word in a statute. See Board of Insurance 

Commissioners v. Duncan, L‘14 S.W.2d 326, 328(Tex. Civ. App. - 

Amarillo 1943, writ ref'd); Attorney General Opinion E-1277 (1978). 

According to Black's L.ar Dictionary at page 1084 (5th ed. 1979), 

one meaning of process is "to prepare for market or to convert into 

marketable form." Supreme courts in other states have frequently 

found the term, in analogous contexts in other statutes, to mean the 

preparation of a product for market or conversion of a product into 

marketable form. In Moore v. Farmers Mutual Mfg. & Ginning Co., 77 -- 

P.2d 209, 211 (Aria. 1938). the Supreme Court of Arizona stated the 

following: 

The word 'process' is given several definitions 

by Webster's New International Dictionary, the 

standard authority for the meaning of the words of 

the English langu;sge. The one which obviously 

applies to an opezrttion like the ginning of cotton 

is as follows: 'to subject (especially raw 

material) to a process of manufacturing, development, preparation for the market, etc.; to convert 

into marketable form, es livestock by slaughtering, grain by mjllling, cotton by spinning, milk 

by pasteurizing, fruits and vegetables by sorting 

p. 1619 
Ronorable Neal Birmingham - Page 3 (JM-354) 

and repacking.' It will be seeu that the 

essential portion c'f the definition is to 'prepare 

raw material . . , for the market. . . .' 

See also State v. Four States Drilling Co., 177 So.2d 828, 831 (Ala. 

--(quoting the same definition from Webster's New International 

Dictionary); Employment Sf:curity Commission of Arizona v. Bruce 

Church, Inc., 507 P.2d 108,111 (Ariz. 1973) (cooling of lettuce is 

incident to preparation fcr market though it does not change its 

nature or form); Bay Boti:!Led Gas Co. 

74 N.W.2d 37, 4(7 (Mich. 

v. Michigan Department of 

Revenue, 1955) (processing is refining, 

development, preparation, or converting of material, especially in a 

raw state, into marketable form); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. State, 

73 So.2d 731, 735 (Ala. 1953) (process is synonymous with preparation 

for market and conversion l.nto marketable form); Colbert Mill & Feed 

co, v. Oklahoma Tax Comm:~l~, 109 P.2d 504, 506 (Okla. 1941) 

(definition of process quested from Webster's New International 

Dictionary shows it is synoilymous with preparation for the market). 

Your inquiry relates to logs and pulpwood leaving a wood yard. 

Logs and pulpwood do not have fixed definitions in the law, but 

clearly they are forestry commodities. Decisions of the supreme 

courts of other states have found that a log is the trunk of a tree, 

cut down and stripped of it!; branches. or the trunk of a tree cut into 

different lengths-: See Bishop v. DiBose. 113 S.E.2d 309, 313 (N.C. 

1960); State v. Addiagtx; 27 S.E. 988, 990 (N.C. 1897). Other 

decisions have described pulpwood as wood logs, peeled or unpeeled, 

usually cut in lengths suL,table for manufacturina into wood oulo. 

which coumonlv is used in mskiun paper. Dead Rive< Co. v. Assesso& 

of Houlton, 103 A.2d 123, 129 &.' i953). Cf. State v. International 

163 So.2d ,507 (Ala. 1964)(wood chips not same as 

You indicate thst the pulpwood in question is a tree that 

has been cut down, trimmed: and cut into five to seven foot lengths. 

Even if wood is transported to a mill on the same truck without its 

being unloaded, it has been visually inspected and sorted and 

determined to be in suitable condition for transportation to a mill. 

Recently, a Texas Court of Appeals determined the meaning of 

timber as used in a motoc carrier certificate of convenience and 

necessity issued by the Tecas Railroad Commission. The court stated 

that 

We hold that the word 'timber', as used in 

appellant's certificate . . . includes only trees 

not worked upon 'beyond their being felled and 

subjected to such other processing as may be 

reasonably neces&y to facilitate their transportation by mOtor carrier, for example, removing 

limbs from the faL:Len trees and sawing the logs to 

p. 1620 
Bonosable Neal Birmingham - Page 4 (JM-354) 

lengths suitable for transport by motor carrier. 

(Emphasis added). 

Kinner Transp. 8 Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 644 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 

APP. - Austin 1982, writ rei'd n.r.e.). The court found that "timber" 

as used in the certificate has a meaning virtually synonymous with 

logs. 

By the time logs anil pulpwood leave a wood yard, they are 

products that have been prepared for market or converted into marketable form by the trimming of: branches, by sorting, by reloading, or by 

cutting into appropriate lt.ngths, and may already have entered into 

channels of commerce. 

It is an established ri:Le of construction that an exemption from 

the general terms of a stab&e is strictly construed. See Attorney 

General Opinion M-507 (1969:. It is our opinion that, inthe event of 

a judicial interpretation of the exception for a forestry commodity 

prior to the processing of the commodity, the exception would not be 

extended to the hauling of l.ogs or pulpwood from a wood yard under the 

facts presented to us. 

In addition, it is cur opinion that if the legislature had 

intended motor vehicles loathed with logs or pulpwood to be exempt from 

the provlsions of article 6701d-11, section S(b), the legislature 

would have expressly so provided as it did in article 6701d-11, 

section 6(b), when it exeqlted motor vehicles loaded with timber or 

pulpwood from the provisions1 of subdivision 1 of section 6 of the same 

statute. The latter provi;xLon requires the operator or owner of a 

motor vehicle to unload the vehicle to the extent necessary to reduce 

its weight to the lawful ,maximum before further operation of an 

overweight vehicle on the public road, unless the load consists of 

livestock. Subdivision 6 oE section 6 was enacted six years prior to 

the enactment of section 5(h) and provides that 

Notwithstanding: Subdivision 1 of Section 6 of 

this Act. the ooa:cator or the owner of a motor 

vehicle loaded with timber or pulp wood or agricultural products-in their natural state being 

transported from rhe place of production to the 

place of market or first processing, the operator 

or owner of a vehicle crossing a highway as 

provided by Section 5-l/3 of this Act, or the 

operator or owner ,of a vehicle crossing a highway 

as provided by Section 5-213 of this Act, is not 

required to unload any portion of his load. 

(Emphasis added). 

p. 1621 
Eonorable Neal Birmingham - 'Page 5 (JM-354) 

Unlike the exception in sect:Lon S(b). the exemption to subdivision 1 

of section 6 expressly applLes to a vehicle loaded with timber or 

pulpwood prior to any processing of the timber or pulpwood. 

This opinion is lim:.t:ed to your request for a statutory 

interpretation and does not address any additional issues. 

,SUMMARY 

The statutory exception in section 5(b) of 

article 6701d-11, V.T.C.S., for a forestry commodity prior to 1:be processing of the commodity 

does not apply t,D a vehicle hauling logs or 

pulpwood from a ,alDod yard to a lumber mill or 

paper mill. 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

TOM GREEN 

First Assistant Attorney General 

DAVID R. RICHARDS 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

ROBERT GRAY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Nancy Sutton 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Rick Gilpin, Chairman 

Colin Carl 

Susan Garrison 

Tony Guillory 

Jim Moellinger 

Nancy Sutton 

Sarah Woelk 

p. 1622