IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

VANESHIA OLIVER, A/K/A VENESHIA 

LANETTE OLIVER, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Res ondent. 

No. 83276 

FILED 

AUG 1 1 2022 

ELIZABETI-1 A. BROWN 

CLERKpF p4PREME COURT 

BY 

DEPUlY CLERK 

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, 

VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING 

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a 

jury verdict, of robbery, coercion, possession of a debit or credit card without 

cardholder's consent, possession of burglary tools, two counts of fraudulent 

use of a credit or debit card, three counts of burglary of a business, four 

counts of theft, four counts of attempted fraudulent use of a credit or debit 

card, five counts of conspiracy to commit burglary, five counts of conspiracy 

to commit larceny, five counts of residential burglary, and five counts of 

invasion of the home.' Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; 

Michael Villani, Judge. 

A jury found appellant Vaneshia Oliver and a codefendant 

guilty of perpetrating a series of burglaries that involved Oliver and the 

codefendant prying open hotel room doors while the guests were away and 

stealing various items, including electronics and credit cards. First, Oliver 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(0(4 we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted. 

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argues that she is entitled to the guilty plea agreement that the State 

withdrew after her codefendant rejected the package plea offer. We 

disagree because a defendant has no right to a plea bargain, and the 

prosecutor is not obliged to negotiate a case if she prefers to go to trial. See 

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). The State offered a guilty 

plea agreement that was "contingent upon both defendants accepting the 

negotiation." Oliver's codefendant chose to defend against the criminal 

charges at trial, and the State withdrew its offer. Oliver's argument that a 

conditional guilty plea offer based on the decision of a third party is 

fundamentally unfair is without merit as the weight of authority refutes her 

contention. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 827 F.3d 1134, 1164-65 

(D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining that "a plea deal contingent on a co-defendant's 

guilty plea" did not violate defendant's due process rights); United States v. 

Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

"package deal" plea offer would not violate defendant's constitutional 

rights); United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1426 (3d Cir. 1992) 

("Package deal plea bargains, in which a prosecutor makes an agreement 

with one defendant contingent upon a co-defendant also pleading guilty, are 

permissible provided that the defendant's decision to forego a trial is 

otherwise voluntary."), superseded by statute for other reasons as stated in 

United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. 

Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to declare 'packagedeal' plea bargains" per se impermissible). Therefore, we conclude that 

Oliver has not shown she is entitled to relief. 

Next, Oliver argues that the district court erred in denying her 

motion to sever her trial from her codefendant's because her codefendant's 

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counsel acted as a "second prosecutor" against her during closing argument. 

After reviewing the record, we disagree. A district court has discretion to 

sever a trial and its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless the 

appellant shows that the court abused its discretion. See Marshall v. State, 

118 Nev. 642, 646-47, 56 P.3d 376, 379 (2002). "[M]isjoinder requires 

reversal only if it has a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict." Id. 

at 647, 56 P.3d at 379. While Oliver points to codefendant's counsel telling 

the jury that surveillance video depicted Oliver using stolen credit cards, 

counsel qualified the comment by stating, "or whoever it was." 

Furthermore, Oliver's codefendant did not testify or present evidence to 

exonerate himself and inculpate Oliver in any of the other crimes. Thus, to 

the extent that Oliver and her codefendant presented antagonistic defenses, 

she has not shown that the joint trial had a substantial and injurious effect 

on the verdict. See id. at 648, 56 P.3d at 379 (explaining that "antagonistic 

defenses are a relevant consideration but not, in themselves, sufficient 

grounds for concluding that joinder of defendants is prejudicial"). 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Oliver's motion to sever.2

Next, Oliver argues that her sentence constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishrnent because it exceeds the sentence conterriplated in the 

2Likewise, Oliver has not shown that the district court abused its 

discretion in not granting her related request for a mistrial based on the 

argument of codefendant's counsel. See Rudin v. State, 120 Nev. 121, 142, 

86 P.3d 572, 586 (2004) ("The trial court has discretion to determine 

whether a mistrial is warranted, and its judgment will not be overturned 

absent an abuse of discretion."). 

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withdrawn guilty plea agreement. The district court has wide discretion in 

its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 

1379 (1987). Regardless of its severity, "[a] sentence within the statutory 

limits is not cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing 

punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably 

disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience." Blume v. State, 

112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

Here, Oliver was sentenced for victimizing multiple individuals 

and businesses. The parties agree that Oliver's sentence for coercion is 

outside the statutory range and thus illegal. See NRS 207.190(2)(a). We 

agree and therefore vacate the sentence for coercion and remand to the 

district court for resentencing and to recalculate the aggregate sentence.3

The other sentences imposed are within the parameters provided by the 

relevant statutes. See NRS 193.130; NRS 193.140; NRS 193.153; NRS 

199.480; NRS 200.380(2); NRS 205.060(2)(c)-(d); NRS 205.067(2); NRS 

205.080; NRS 205.0835; NRS 205.220(1); NRS 205.690; NRS 205.760(1). 

Oliver neither alleges that those statutes are unconstitutional, nor has she 

shown that the sentences were disproportionate to the crimes committed. 

Therefore, Oliver has not shown that the sentences constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment. 

31n entering an amended judgment of conviction, the district court 

must also correct clerical errors that omitted counts 1, 2, 9, 10, 19, 20, 26, 

27, 31, 32, and 37 from the charges for which the jury found Oliver guilty. 

Additionally, count 36 must be corrected to reflect that the jury found Oliver 

guilty of violating NRS 205.690 not NRS 205.465. 

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Parraguirre 

r.. 

Silver 

Finally, Oliver argues that cumulative error warrants relief. 

We disagree because Oliver has shown only one error in her sentence; thus, 

there is nothing to cumulate. See Lipsitz v. State, 135 Nev. 131, 139 n.2, 

442 P.3d 138, 145 n.2 (2019) (concluding that there were no errors to 

cumulate when the court found only a single error). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED IN PART AND 

VACATED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the district court for the 

entry of an amended judgment of conviction consistent with this order.4

cc: Chief Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court 

Department 17, Eighth Judicial District Court 

Law Offices of Martin Hart, LLC 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

4The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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