Filed 2/2/24 P. v. Meneses CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JESSE DANILO MENESES,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D081553

 (Super. Ct. No. RIF2100963)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, 

Matthew C. Perantoni, Judge. Affirmed.

Robert F. Somers, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters and Charles C. Ragland, 

Assistant Attorneys General, A. Natasha Cortina, Christine Bergman and 

Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

Following a bench trial, Jesse Danilo Meneses was convicted of assault 

against peace officers (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (c); counts 2, 3, 5, and 6),

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
2

making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); counts 8, 9), and attempting to 

deter, prevent, and resist officers from performing their duties (§ 69, subd. 

(a); counts 11-16).2 The court sentenced Meneses to a suspended six-year 

eight-month prison term, consisting of a four-year midterm on count 2, and 

one-third the midterms on the other counts: a consecutive 16-month term on 

count 3, concurrent 16-month terms on counts 5 and 6, a consecutive eightmonth term on count 8, a concurrent eight-month term on count 9, a 

consecutive eight-month term on count 11, and concurrent eight-month terms 

on counts 12 through 16. The court placed Meneses on probation for 24 

months. 

Meneses contends insufficient evidence supports his convictions for 

criminal threats and assault against peace officers, in part because the 

deputies were assertedly not lawfully performing their duties, his arrest was 

unlawful, and one officer was not present during his pursuit and 

apprehension. He further contends the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress evidence from his assertedly illegal detention and arrest. 

We reject the contentions and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Events of March 6, 2021

In March 2021, Meneses became angry and aggressive after one of his 

stepsisters, M.R., removed a copy of a news article about another family 

member’s death that Meneses had posted on a wall of the house in which 

they all lived. The incident resulted in his other stepsister, K.R., making a 

2 The court found Meneses not guilty of an attempted murder charge 

(§§ 664, subd (e), 187, subd. (a); count 1) and a charged criminal threat in

count 10 against his mother. The People had earlier dismissed another 

assault charge in count 4 against one officer, Deputy Jardinas, and a criminal 

threat charge in count 7.
3

911 call to police. Multiple sheriff’s deputies and a sergeant responded to the 

call. As captured by responding officers’ body-worn cameras, M.R., K.R. and 

Meneses’s mother all related that Meneses said he was going to burn the 

house down. M.R. told officers Meneses also said he would “kill everybody” 

and “kill the cops [¶] . . . [¶] . . . if they came.” She said Meneses “was 

threatening to burn the house down. He was threatening to kill the cops if

they came. He was threatening our family.” M.R. told one deputy that K.R. 

called police and they locked themselves in a room with their dog “because we 

knew that if he got in, he would probably, I don’t know, try to do something.” 

M.R. and K.R.’s brother, S.R., described to officers how he intervened 

between M.R. and Meneses during the incident. He told a deputy that M.R. 

was “shaking, crying, and trembling,” then “started throwing up” once 

Meneses had returned to his room after the altercation. 

K.R. told an officer “we’ve all been feeling unsafe” because they had 

seen Meneses multiple times in the past starting fires outside and letting 

them burn while he walked away. M.R. also agreed that Meneses had “habits 

or behaviors of lighting fires” and another family member agreed he engaged 

in that behavior “[j]ust recently.” K.R. said they did not feel safe at the house 

with him living there. She told officers that “we see him, like, making a 

spear, and he’ll bring it up and he’ll look very angry like and so we feel like 

he’s just going to hurt us, um, like in the middle of the night, um, so we’re 

scared.” In the past, Meneses had threatened to kill K.R. with a large pocket 

knife, leading family members to lock K.R. in a bathroom. 

After deputies arrived at the scene, some of them attempted to speak

with Meneses from the bottom of a stairwell at the entryway. Meneses was 

at the top of the stairwell on a landing. He was agitated and yelling 

profanities, holding a tall, sharpened stick. Meneses at one point threatened 
4

to slash his own neck and kill himself rather than submit to police. Some of 

the other family members were in upstairs bedrooms next to the stairway, 

and the supervising sergeant became concerned for their safety. Another 

deputy considered the stick a deadly weapon. 

When officers finally got upstairs to Meneses, he threw a 40-ounce

glass beer bottle at them, missing them, and swung at two officers with his 

knife. Meneses was ultimately detained and handcuffed. After he was taken 

away, one of the deputies discovered a cut in his shirt near his abdomen; the 

knife had cut through to the Kevlar in his body armor vest. 

Trial Testimony

At trial, K.R. testified that when she told police what Meneses had said 

about burning the house down, she was in fear for her safety. But she also 

testified that she did not personally hear Meneses’s threat, she only heard 

about it through M.R. 

M.R. likewise testified at trial that based on Meneses’s anger that 

night, she was worried about her family and her own safety. She admitted 

that Meneses never specifically threatened her that night. She could not 

recall exactly what she told police Meneses said, but said she was “probably 

not” exaggerating. She acknowledged telling police Meneses said he was 

going to kill family members, but could not remember it at trial. 

S.R. testified that he made an audio recording of Meneses’s statement 

about burning the house down. Apparently speaking of M.R., he agreed she

was in fear that night. He testified he heard Meneses make his statement 

that he was going to burn the house down from a baby monitor; he did not 

actually see Meneses make the statement. S.R. was alone in the room when 

he heard it, and Meneses was alone at the time he said it. According to S.R., 
5

M.R. did not hear Meneses’s statement; he was the only one. But he told the 

other family members about it. 

One of the sheriff’s deputies who responded that night, Deputy Eric 

Garcia, testified that when he first walked in the house, he was told Meneses 

was aggressive, fighting with one family member, and said he was going to 

light the house on fire. Upon immediately encountering Meneses, he saw him 

as hostile and carrying a weapon. Deputy Garcia testified that when he was 

informed that Meneses had threatened to burn the house down and kill 

family members, he believed Meneses had committed a criminal threat. He 

interpreted Meneses’s statements to officers as telling them if they went 

upstairs, he would hurt them. Deputy Garcia observed the family members 

in apparent fear. That circumstance, combined with Meneses’s possession of 

a weapon and his statements to officers, led the deputy to conclude it was not 

safe to proceed without detaining Meneses.3 Because he and other deputies 

determined the potential for imminent danger, they formulated a plan to 

3 Deputy Garcia specifically testified that the officers had established a 

crime before making their plan to arrest Meneses: “Now that we established 

a crime in that there was some imminent danger that he had a potential to do, 

we had to figure out a safe tactical plan to try to apprehend him to remove 

him from the house. And I when say safe, safe for myself, my partners, the 

family, him so he didn’t potentially burn this house down hurting or killing 

anybody.” (Italics added.) He explained he knew there might be a struggle 

and wanted to peacefully detain Meneses, so “[t]hat is why we took so long 

talking to him trying to figure out, you know, what we can do to peacefully 

get him down stairs.” It was after this point that the deputy said he called 

his corporal and sergeant. 
6

enter an upstairs room from the outside so as to detain Meneses quickly and 

safely.4

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Standard of Review

“In the context of a criminal case, the substantial evidence standard 

stems from the requirement that a criminal conviction necessitates 

‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 

crime . . . .’ ” (People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 198.) Under this 

standard, “an appellate court retrospectively inquires whether a rational 

trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

based on all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution. ‘Sufficiency review essentially addresses whether “the 

government’s case was so lacking that it should not have even been 

submitted to the jury.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 199.) “ ‘Conflicts and even testimony 

which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a 

judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge [in a court trial] or 

jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the 

facts upon which a determination depends.’ [Citation.] Ultimately, it is 

within the [fact-finder’s] exclusive province to determine whether an 

inference that may be drawn from the evidence is, in fact, the only reasonable 

4 A transcript of a body worn camera recording indicated that at some 

point, Deputy Garcia told Meneses’s siblings that Meneses’s behavior—him 

“being loud, for him scaring you guys”—did not indicate a crime: “Right now, 

just because he’s talking like this, he hasn’t committed a crime. So

technically, there’s no reason for us to go up there and get him and kick him

out of the house. So, that’s what I’m trying to figure out, if there’s a crime

here. Because if this goes sideways and we get into a physical altercation

with him, for what?” After these comments, M.R. told Deputy Garcia that 

Meneses said, “I’ll burn your house down,” and that he had habits or 

behaviors of starting fires. 
7

one, a determination that depends on its resolution of conflicting evidence 

and weighing the credibility of witnesses. . . .‘[F]ounded upon the evidence, 

the [fact-finder] not only is authorized to make any logical and reasonable 

deduction, but [it] is the exclusive judge of the weight and value of the 

inference that may be drawn by it . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 202.) 

We view the evidence in light of the whole record, and do not limit our 

appraisal “to isolated bits of evidence selected by the respondent.” (People v. 

Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141, 1153.) We also “ ‘ “must judge whether 

the evidence of each of the essential elements . . . is substantial; it is not 

enough for the respondent simply to point to ‘some’ evidence supporting the 

finding, for ‘[n]ot every surface conflict of evidence remains substantial in the 

light of other facts.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) At the same time, we keep in mind that a 

trier of fact “ ‘may accept some parts of a witness’s testimony and reject other 

parts.’ ” (People v. Lopez (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 287, 290, quoting People v. 

Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 345.) “ ‘Resolution of conflicts and 

inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.

[Citation.] Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or 

inherently improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a 

conviction.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118; People v. 

Lagunas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 996, 1004.) But the “ ‘mere fact that there 

are contradictions and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness, or that 

the truth of his evidence is open to suspicion, does not render it inherently 

improbable.’ ” (People v. Tereno (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 246, 251; see also 

People v. Moreno (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 334, 336.) 

“ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears 

‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to 

support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ ” (People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
8

II. Sufficiency of Evidence of Criminal Threats Against K.R. and M.R.

Meneses contends the evidence is insufficient to support his criminal 

threat convictions as to K.R. and M.R. because there is no evidence (1) he 

specifically threatened them; (2) he intended to communicate his statement 

to anyone as he was alone in his room; (3) his statements caused K.R. or M.R.

sustained fear for their own or immediate family’s safety (4) a reasonable 

person would have feared he would burn down the house and (5) the threat

was so clear, immediate, unconditional, and specific that it communicated to 

M.R. or K.R. a serious intention and the immediate prospect that it would be 

carried out. 

To prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution must prove “ ‘(1) the 

defendant willfully threatened death or great bodily injury to another person; 

(2) the threat was made with the specific intent that it be taken as a threat, 

regardless of the defendant’s intent to carry it out; (3) the threat was “on its 

face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, 

unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, 

a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution”; (4) the threat 

caused the person threatened “to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety 

or for his or her immediate family’s safety”; and (5) this fear was reasonable 

under the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 

12 Cal.5th 719, 809; see also In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630; 

People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228; People v. Gaines (2023) 93 

Cal.App.5th 91, 136.) The offense “does not require an immediate ability or 

even an actual intention, to carry out the threat.” (People v. Holmes, McClain 

and Newborn, at p. 810.)
9

A. Specific Threats to M.R. and K.R.

As recounted above, the record contains evidence that both K.R. and 

M.R. told deputies that Meneses said he was going to burn the house down. 

This was an unconditional and specific threat made while Meneses was in an 

angry and aggressive state. The trial court as the finder of fact in this bench 

trial was entitled to infer from the transcript of the body camera footage that 

both K.R. and M.R. were present and physically heard Meneses make this

threat, and that this threat, as well as his threat to kill “everybody” and 

“[the] . . . whole family,” were directed at them both. And because both M.R. 

and K.R. acknowledged Meneses had set fires in the past, the court was 

entitled to infer Meneses had the means to make good on that threat and 

intended his words to be taken as a threat. (See People v. Brugman (2021) 62 

Cal.App.5th 608, 633 [all surrounding circumstances, including prior history, 

is relevant to determine gravity and specific intent to make a threat; citing 

cases].) Meneses’s words were not merely an “angry outburst, made in the 

heat of an argument” (ibid.); they conveyed a “gravity of purpose and an 

immediate prospect of execution of the threat” (ibid.) that resulted in K.R. 

hiding and calling police, and M.R. shaking, crying, and vomiting, then 

locking herself and others in a room. K.R. specifically testified that when she 

decided to call 911 she feared for her safety, suggesting her fear continued to 

a point even after Meneses’s threat. M.R. testified based on Meneses’s anger 

that night she was worried for her and her family’s safety. “[A] victim can 

experience sustained fear even if the fear exists only during the incident 

itself, as long as the fear during the incident is more than ‘momentary, 

fleeting, or transitory.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.) The record—viewed in the light most 

favorable to the People—evidences sustained fear on M.R. and K.R.’s part, 
10

which was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, meeting the 

standards of section 422. 

We reject Meneses’s arguments to the contrary, which seek to isolate 

bits of seemingly contradictory evidence or draw inferences contrary to the 

court’s findings. The court was permitted to believe portions of the witnesses’

statements or testimony and disregard contrary portions or other 

inconsistent evidence. For example, Meneses argues the evidence is 

insufficient as to M.R. because M.R. told deputies that he “wasn’t getting 

mad at me” or he did not “exactly” threaten her. When one deputy asked 

M.R. if Meneses threatened to “kill you guys,” she said, “Well, not me exactly 

but them,” then clarified, “My whole family. Everybody.” The court was 

entitled to disregard M.R.’s other statements to law enforcement 

downplaying Meneses’s conduct and her later trial testimony that Meneses 

never specifically threatened her that night.

We also reject Meneses argument that K.R. told deputies that he did 

not “say anything” to her or say he was going to hurt her on the night of the 

incident. At the referenced part of K.R.’s statement, a deputy asks K.R., “So, 

tonight he didn’t specifically say anything to you? He was going to hurt you?” 

She responded, “No because I was hiding in my room.” The court was 

entitled to infer that K.R. was talking about events after Meneses had made 

his initial threat, leading her to hide in fear. 

Meneses says no reasonable person would have been in fear given he 

had “regularly” said he would burn down the house and kill the family or 

himself, but “never hit or kicked any family member or made any attempt to 

burn down the house in the past.” He argues S.R. did not fear Meneses 

would commit arson because S.R. did not leave the house, supporting his 

position about the state of the evidence. But the trial court was entitled to 
11

conclude under all of the circumstances that the fear experienced by M.R. and 

K.R. was objectively reasonable, given Meneses’s prior acts of setting fires 

and the unequivocal words he used on the night of the incident. We note 

further that M.R. told a deputy that Meneses “hates all my family” and did 

not think of them as family. She related there was a history of Meneses’s 

aggressive behavior, saying they “know how he gets,” describing it as “very 

aggressive” and saying, “He’s very violent.” All of these circumstances 

support the court’s finding that their fear was objectively reasonable.

Nor do we agree with Meneses’s assertion that the evidence did not 

show any serious intention on Meneses’s part so as to communicate the 

immediate prospect the threat would be carried out. He again argues his 

statement did not cause any of the siblings to take precautions “such as 

leaving the house or warning family members to leave . . . .” He argues his 

threat was not the siblings’ “main concern” when speaking with Deputy 

Garcia, who had to use “leading questions” to draw out M.R.’s feelings about 

it. These arguments disregard M.R. and K.R.’s testimony about hiding or 

locking themselves in their rooms, evidencing their fear. They also seek to 

draw inferences from the evidence contrary to the court’s findings, which this 

court will not do on our review for substantial evidence.

III. Meneses’s Section 1538.5 Motion to Suppress

A. Background

Before trial, Meneses unsuccessfully moved under section 1538.5 to 

suppress evidence of his actions after his arrest, contending that his initial 

arrest and seizure lacked probable cause. The trial court considered 

arguments on the motion after the People rested their case. In part, the

prosecutor pointed out that he had relied on case law pertaining to exigent 

circumstances, “i.e., threats of violence, a situation that could turn sour in a 
12

moment’s notice, . . . and . . . situations where [there is] an immediate need to 

detain or arrest someone to prevent violence . . . .” The prosecutor asserted 

the People had met their burden to prove reasonable suspicion to detain 

Meneses, and probable cause that a crime had been committed given M.R. 

and K.R.’s sustained fear. He argued, “I think that [Deputy Garcia] had all 

the information that he had at that time to discuss with his partners and the

sergeant to make the determination that an immediate detention needed to 

occur for the safety of everyone in the house. Again, they don’t know if there 

was fire-starting abilities behind that wall. They had no idea because they 

weren’t up there.”

In his argument, Meneses’s counsel pointed to Deputy Garcia’s 

assertions that there was no crime and suggested the officer had goaded the 

witnesses into making their statements about Meneses’s threat from them by 

asking leading questions and improperly interviewing them at the same time. 

He also argued there were no specific articulable facts in Meneses’s threat to 

generate probable cause: “Perhaps if [ ] Meneses said I’m going to burn the 

house down where is my lighter, where is my lighter, that may have been 

enough. If he had a lighter in his hand, I’m going to burn the house down, 

that might have been a fire. Where is the firewood? Where is the firewood? 

Where is gas? I got gas in my house. I’m going to burn this place down.” 

According to counsel, just saying, “I’m going to burn the house down” by itself 

was not enough evidence for the police to enter the house, detain and arrest 

Meneses. Defense counsel argued the law enforcement officers’ presence 

created the exigency, with Meneses becoming upset after seeing their 

presence and their guns, and seeing they were refusing to allow him to leave 

without handcuffing him. 
13

The trial court denied the motion: “[I]t does appear as though the 

police officers were lawfully on the premises. They were invited to the 

premises and invited inside the home by family members. Officers were met 

at the door with a statement from one of the family members indicating that 

their brother threatened to kill them and burn the house down. [¶] We have 

police officers conducting an investigation/operation trying to calm 

everything down during the course of their investigation/operation. It 

appears as though Mr. Meneses was obstructing their investigation by

refusing reasonable requests and making threats to kill the police officers 

along the way. I do think that the People have met their burden of 

establishing probable cause.” 

B. Applicable Law

When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, the Fourth 

Amendment requires that “it must be supported by an arrest warrant or by 

probable cause.” (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.) “Probable cause 

is shown ‘when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade 

someone of “reasonable caution” that the person to be arrested has committed 

a crime.’ ” (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 57.) “ ‘To determine 

whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine 

the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide “whether these historical 

facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, 

amount to” probable cause.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 

195, 237.) “An arrest remains lawful under the Fourth Amendment even 

when the ‘criminal offense for which there is probable cause to arrest’ is 

different from the ‘offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of 

arrest.’ ” (Id. at pp. 237-238.) 
14

Where the underlying facts are undisputed, this court independently 

reviews whether the facts constitute probable cause for an arrest. (People v. 

Zaragoza, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 57.) “ ‘[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—

turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.’ 

[Citation.] It is incapable of precise definition. [Citation.] ‘ “The substance 

of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of 

guilt,” ’ and that belief must be ‘particularized with respect to the person to 

be . . . seized.’ ” (People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673; see also Kaley v. 

United States (2014) 571 U.S. 320, 338 [“Probable cause, we have often told 

litigants, is not a high bar: It requires only the ‘kind of “fair probability” on 

which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act” ’ ”].)

“A defendant may move . . . to suppress as evidence any tangible or 

intangible thing obtained as a result of a . . . seizure” if the seizure “without a 

warrant was unreasonable.” (§ 1538.5.) When a defendant makes such a 

motion, the People have “the burden of proving that the warrantless 

. . . seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.” (People v. Williams

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130; see also People v. Vannesse (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 

440, 444-445.) But the defendant “ ‘must inform the prosecution and the 

court of the specific basis for their motion.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis, 

supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 235; see also People v. Oldham (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 

1, 11-13, 15.) 

On appeal, “ ‘we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or 

implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We 

exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts 

presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment.’ ” (People v. Silveria and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 232; see 

also People v. Vannesse, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 445.) “ ‘ “[T]he power to 
15

judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, 

weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial court.”

[Citation.] Consequently, if an inference is permissible under the evidence 

and it upholds the trial court’s decision, we must presume that the trial court 

drew it. Thus, we must “view the facts upon which the suppression motions 

were submitted in the light most favorable to the People, drawing therefrom 

all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order denying the 

motions.” ’ ” (Vannesse, at p. 445.)

C. Analysis

Meneses contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to 

suppress the statements he made during his assertedly illegal detention and 

arrest. In making this argument, he incorporates by reference arguments he 

makes as to the sufficiency of the evidence relating to his assault and 

interference with an officer charges. He argues the court’s erroneous ruling 

was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus we must reverse his 

convictions of assault and attempting to deter or prevent officers from 

performing their duties. 

Meneses recounts the evidence of his conduct toward the officers and 

eventual arrest in detail. But he acknowledges critical facts: that in response 

to K.R.’s 911 call, deputies contacted K.R. and others upon arrival, and

Deputy Garcia was told Meneses had threatened to light the house on fire, 

causing him to believe a crime had been committed. In her 911 call, K.R. 

reported Meneses, who she thought had a pocketknife on him, was “getting 
16

really aggressive,” trying to fight her brother and threatening her mother.5 

The trial court had heard the People’s evidence, including Deputy Garcia’s 

testimony, before considering arguments on Meneses’s motion and found 

deputies were lawfully present, obtained information that Meneses had 

threatened to kill family members and burn the house down, and found the 

existence of probable cause. The trial testimony and transcripts of the 

recorded body camera footage recounted above support the court’s findings. 

And the court, the sole judge of credibility, credited Deputy Garcia’s 

testimony that he gathered this information and made his probable cause 

determination early on while the deputies were still engaged in a verbal 

confrontation with Meneses, before deputies formulated their plan to reach 

him on the upstairs landing. (See footnote 3, ante.)

On appeal, Meneses argues both that he was illegally detained at the 

top of the stairs, and also unlawfully arrested. But Meneses did not base his 

section 1538.5 motion on a theory of illegal detention, so the prosecutor had 

no reason to adduce testimony on this point and the court had no reason to 

focus its analysis on evidence supporting that theory. This entitles us to 

disregard the illegal detention claim. (People v. Silveria and Travis, supra, 

10 Cal.5th at p. 235; People v. Oldham, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.) But 

even assuming officers detained Meneses, it would be “reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment [if] the detaining officer can point to specific articulable 

facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide 

some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in 

5 Though a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively 

unreasonable, the presumption may be overcome by showing a need to 

protect life or avoid serious injury to persons inside the home. (People v. 

Rodgers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1156; People v. Ormonde (2006) 143 

Cal.App.4th 282, 291.) 
17

criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; People v. Flores 

(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 617, 627.) “The officer’s . . . suspicion must be 

objectively reasonable, and ‘a[ ] . . . detention predicated on mere curiosity, 

rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in 

complete good faith. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] But where a reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity exists, ‘the public rightfully expects a police 

officer to inquire into such circumstances “in the proper exercise of the 

officer’s duties.” ’ ” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.) Under the 

“ ‘totality of the circumstances’ ” (ibid.), we conclude Meneses’s detention was 

not unlawful given the specific information provided to the officers at the 

door about his threat as well as Meneses’s agitated and hostile state, his 

access to weapons, and the presence of other family members upstairs with 

whom he had been reportedly fighting.

Regarding his claim of unlawful arrest, Meneses’ arguments again seek 

to draw conclusions or inferences contrary to those drawn by the trial court in 

denying his suppression motion. He makes an argument similar to one we 

have in substance already rejected, namely, that the fact family members did 

not leave the house demonstrated they were not in fear or consider his threat 

serious. He argues deputies “knew or should have known that no one 

believed [he] was going to burn down the house down or [they] would have 

left.” He argues that upon the deputies’ arrival, they did not ask him about 

any alleged threats, and he had assured them the incident was over. He also 

points out he explained why he was scared of them (a prior incident with 

police in which he was assertedly injured), explaining his actions, and that 

deputies should have concluded there was no reasonable suspicion to detain 

him or probable cause to arrest him. But the court was entitled to consider 

evidence from the deputies of Meneses’s aggressive behavior, the fact he was 
18

wielding a long sharpened stick or pocketknife, and the evidence from M.R., 

K.R. and S.R. relating Meneses’s threats and actions before the incident. The 

argument disregards Deputy Garcia’s specific testimony that he determined 

through Meneses’s family members that before Meneses’s arrest, there 

existed probable cause that Meneses had made a criminal threat, which the 

court credited in denying the suppression motion. We hold the information 

obtained from the siblings would “likely persuade an objectively reasonable 

police officer that [Meneses had made a criminal threat].” (People v. Silveria 

and Travis, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 238.) 

Meneses also points to Deputy Garcia’s statements to the siblings that 

he did not see a crime (see footnote 4, ante). The transcript shows that the 

deputy made these statements before K.R. related Meneses’s threat to burn 

down the house. And again, the argument ignores Deputy Garcia’s trial

testimony that after hearing of Meneses’s arson threat he determined before 

arresting Meneses that a crime had been committed. The court credited that 

testimony, and we will not disturb its credibility determination. 

Meneses refers to trial testimony of the supervising sergeant on the 

scene who agreed with defense counsel’s question that when deputies finally 

accosted Meneses and removed him from the house there was no probable 

cause for an arrest. He misconstrues and isolates her testimony. The 

sergeant later clarified that when Meneses was detained “[a]t that point in 

time” there was not probable cause “that I was aware of, no.” (Italics added.) 

The court was entitled to either reject the sergeant’s testimony in favor of 

Deputy Garcia’s, or interpret it as indicating the sergeant herself was then 

not specifically aware of the same facts as Deputy Garcia had obtained from 

other family members. The sergeant confirmed deputies talked to family 

members before her arrival, then conducted more “in-depth” interviews later. 
19

Meneses misconstrues her statement when he says she testified that after he 

was removed, “deputies decided to interview witnesses to determine if 

probable cause existed to arrest [him].” 

IV. Sufficiency of Evidence of Section 69 and Assault Offenses

Meneses contends there is insufficient evidence to support his assault 

convictions against the deputies, as well as his convictions of attempting to 

deter or prevent officers from performing their duties. He first maintains the 

deputies acted unlawfully in detaining him “after they should have known 

that he did not and would not commit a crime.” He further contends the 

deputies had no probable cause to arrest him and thus were not acting 

lawfully when he allegedly assaulted them. Meneses argues he never 

attempted to deter the deputies’ lawful conduct, which is a separate reason to 

reverse these convictions. 

Section 69, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who attempts, by 

means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from 

performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law, or who knowingly 

resists, by the use of force or violence, the officer, in the performance of his or 

her duty, is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars

($10,000), or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or 

in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and

imprisonment.”

There are two ways of violating section 69. “ ‘The first way of violating 

section 69 “encompasses attempts to deter either an officer’s immediate 

performance of a duty imposed by law or the officer’s performance of such a 

duty at some time in the future.” [Citation.] The actual use of force or 

violence is not required. [Citation.] Further, “the statutory language [of the 

first clause of section 69] does not require that the officer be engaged in the 
20

performance of his or her duties at the time the threat is made . . . .” ’ ” 

(People v. Kruse (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1046, quoting People v. Smith

(2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 241.) The second is where a defendant resists an 

officer “ ‘ “by the use of force or violence,” and it further requires that the 

officer was acting lawfully at the time of the offense.’ ” (Kruse, at p. 1046; see 

also In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 815 [describing it as 

“longstanding rule” that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense 

against a peace officer unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time the 

offense against the officer was committed].) “ ‘The rule flows from the 

premise that because an officer has no duty to take illegal action, he or she is 

not engaged in ‘duties,’ for purposes of an offense defined in such terms, if the 

officer’s conduct is unlawful . . . . [¶] . . . [T]he lawfulness of the victim’s 

conduct forms part of the corpus delicti of the offense.’ ” (In re Manuel G., at 

p. 815.)

Having concluded the officers did not unlawfully detain or arrest 

Meneses, we are left with Meneses’s argument that there is no evidence he 

attempted to deter their lawful conduct. He repeats and incorporates his 

prior argument that “no rational trier of fact could have found that [his]

detention was legal after nine minutes 47 seconds because the deputies had 

or should have had all the information necessary to determine that he had 

not committed a crime and would not commit a crime.” He points out he had 

not verbally or physically threatened any deputy, was “conversing with the 

deputies and answering their questions,” and he was “only threatening to 

resist a future unlawful seizure” which did not violate section 69. 

We cannot agree with Meneses’s characterization of the record, which 

shows he made threats to deputies who were attempting to calm the situation 

and convince him to come down the stairs to them. These threats included 
21

Meneses’s statements that there would be “problems” if deputies came 

upstairs, or that if they did they were “gonna fucking fight or kill each other,” 

or that he would “fucking end you . . . .” These are the sort of remarks plainly 

intended to stop the officers from approaching him to either detain or arrest 

him, or come upstairs to check on the safety of other occupants.

Meneses finally contends there was no evidence to prove he violated 

section 69 as to one of the officers—Deputy Jardinas—because there is no 

evidence showing that officer was present and could hear him when he was at 

the top of the stairs or when deputies apprehended him. He points out the 

People dismissed the assault charge as to Deputy Jardinas (count 4) and

maintains the sole evidence related to Deputy Jardinas’s interview of M.R. 

and their mother after his arrest. Meneses argues that nothing shows the 

deputy was subject to any of his resistance. The People respond that as one 

of the officers there to assess the situation, Deputy Jardinas was the subject 

of Meneses’s threats.

A section 69 conviction may be committed by a “ ‘threat, 

unaccompanied by any physical force’ ” but “to ‘avoid the risk of punishing 

protected First Amendment speech . . . the term “threat” has been limited to 

mean a threat of unlawful violence used in an attempt to deter the officer.’ ” 

(People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 195.) “[A] violation of section 69 

through a threat ‘requires a specific intent to interfere with the executive 

officer’s performance of his duties.’ [Citation.] ‘[A] present ability to carry 

out threats is not required if . . . the target of the threat could reasonably fear 

retaliatory action on some future occasion.’ ” (Ibid.) The “ ‘threats must be 

placed and understood in their context.’ ” (Id. at p. 196.) 

Here, there is no dispute Deputy Jardinas was present that night, as he 

interviewed M.R. and their mother. S.R. testified at trial that while police 
22

were at the bottom of the stairs, he heard Meneses say that if they came he 

would “fuck them up.” And Deputy Garcia testified that he interpreted 

Meneses’s comments to mean “[t]hat if myself or my partners went upstairs 

that he would hurt us.” (Italics added.)6 Under the circumstances, the trial 

court could reasonably infer that Meneses’s threats of future violence if the 

deputies came up the stairs were specifically intended to deter or interfere 

with officers coming up to arrest him or ensure the safety of the other 

occupants. The court could also reasonably conclude that Meneses would 

understand that such threats would be communicated to other officers at the 

scene. It was enough that all of the officers present were the target of 

Meneses’s threats, which were the type of statements intended to deter 

performance of their duties. 

Meneses cites no authority that a threat must be made directly to the 

face of the target, or that the target must somehow confirm he or she heard 

it, if there is otherwise evidence that the threat was directed at and intended 

to deter executive officers from performing duties. In reply, he cites People v. 

Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863 for the proposition that a “defendant must 

intend that the threat be communicated to the target of the threat, which 

may be done through a third party.” But in Hamilton, the court found a 

threatening letter sufficient to support a finding that a defendant violated 

section 69 where the defendant placed the letter directed to prosecutors with 

a deputy sheriff, knowing it would eventually be delivered to the prosecutor’s 

office. (Id. at p. 936.) The court emphasized that the statute did not require 

6 Significantly, M.R. told Deputy Jardinas during her interview that

before police arrived, Meneses said he would “kill the cops [¶] . . . [¶] if they 

came.” K.R. likewise heard Meneses say he was going to kill police. The 

court could reasonably conclude that such a threat was communicated in 

some manner to responding officers.
23

the prosecutors feel threatened, or that the defendant have the present 

ability to carry out the threats. (Ibid.) Rather “[e]vidence that the letter 

contained the threats was sufficient to support a finding that defendant 

violated section 69.” (Ibid.) So too here, evidence that Meneses directed 

threats at officers who were collectively attempting to perform legal duties 

was enough to support the section 69 convictions, including as to Deputy 

Jardinas.

Meneses also cites People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, but that 

case does not assist him. There, the court held substantial evidence 

supported a section 69 conviction where the defendant sent an e-mail to an 

office of the Department of Defense in part complaining about California’s 

Department of Fish and Game unlawfully shooting at mountain lions and 

stating, “I am armed and will now fire on all Sheriff and Fish & Game after 

this e[-]mail so either shut them down or put some boots on the ground to join 

the battle . . . .” (Id. at p. 958.) Observing the offense required specific intent 

to interfere with an executive officer’s performance of duties (id. at p. 967), 

the court found the e-mail “convincingly demonstrates an intent to deter 

officials from patrolling or otherwise performing duties in the Indian Valley 

Open Space Preserve by threatening to ‘fire on’ them if they appeared there. 

Attempts to deter either an officer’s immediate performance of a duty or the 

performance of such a duty at some time in the future constitute a violation 

of the statute.” (Ibid.) The court continued: “That the e-mail was not 

separately or directly sent to the intended victims fails to negate proof of 

either an attempt to deter or prevent an officer from performing a duty or the 

requisite specific intent to interfere with the executive officer’s performance 

of duties. The statute does not require that a threat be personally 

communicated to the victim by the person who makes the threat.” (Id. at pp. 
24

967-968, italics added.) Nishi confirms that Meneses’s threats were not 

required to be made directly to Deputy Jardinas, as long as it is reasonable to 

infer they were intended to deter the performance of his and other deputies’ 

duties and that Meneses expected or should have known they would be 

communicated to the officers at the scene. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.