1

The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, United States District Judge

for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.

_____________

No. 95-2691

_____________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Juvenile Male C.L.O., *

*

Defendant - Appellant.*

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Submitted: December 11, 1995

 Filed: February 28, 1996 _____________

Before HANSEN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. _____________

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

C.L.O., a juvenile who resided on the Red Lake Indian

Reservation, appeals an adjudication of delinquency pursuant to the

Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42, following the

district court’s1 determination that C.L.O. was guilty of

committing voluntary manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1112.

On appeal, C.L.O. contends the evidence was insufficient to support

the adjudication. He also urges us to hold that the Juvenile

Delinquency Act is unconstitutional because it does not provide

juveniles with a jury trial. We affirm but remand for entry of a

corrected dispositional order.
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 I.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, see

United States v. F.D.L., 836 F.2d 1113, 1118 (8th Cir. 1988), the

evidence establishes the following facts. C.L.O., then age 15,

stabbed another juvenile, P.C., in the neck, severing an artery and

causing P.C.'s death. The incident occurred at about 3:00 a.m. at

a third party’s house, where the juveniles were drinking alcohol in

the basement. C.L.O. had in his possession a knife, which he had

obtained after an earlier scuffle with P.C. C.L.O. and P.C. were

sitting together when P.C. said something that angered C.L.O.

C.L.O. cut P.C. in the leg, penetrating through the skin into the

muscle tissue. In response, P.C. retrieved a baseball bat from the

upstairs and hit C.L.O. twice on the head with it. C.L.O. began to

swing the knife, cutting or stabbing P.C. in the hands, thigh,

shoulder, chest, and back, and eventually landing the blade at the

base of P.C.'s neck. P.C. proceeded upstairs and died in the

hallway at the top of the stairs. 

 

C.L.O. was charged with voluntary manslaughter as a juvenile,

and the case proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing before a United

States district judge. The district judge found C.L.O. guilty,

returned an adjudication of delinquency, and sentenced C.L.O. to

probation until the age of 21, one condition of which was placement

in the custody of the Attorney General for a term of 42 months.

C.L.O. appeals.

II.

C.L.O. first argues that the government did not produce

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did

not act in self-defense. C.L.O.'s claim of self-defense rests on

an assumption that the incident resulting in P.C.’s death began

when P.C. returned to the basement with the baseball bat and used

it to hit C.L.O. on the head. Given that assumption, C.L.O. argues
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reasonable doubt exists as to whether C.L.O. acted out of selfdefense. 

When reviewing for sufficiency of evidence, we reverse a

district court’s adjudication of delinquency based on the district

court’s finding that the juvenile is guilty of a criminal offense

only when no reasonable fact-finder could have found guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. United States v. W.T.T., 800 F.2d 780, 781-82

(8th Cir. 1986). We view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the government, giving the government the benefit of all

reasonable inferences. Id.; F.D.L., 836 F.2d at 1118.

We conclude that the district court properly rejected C.L.O.’s

self-defense theory. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, we believe a reasonable fact-finder

could determine that the incident leading to P.C.'s death began

when C.L.O. cut P.C.'s leg. Because C.L.O. was the aggressor and

set in motion a series of events culminating in P.C.’s death, he

has no right to a consideration of self-defense. Rowe v. United

States, 164 U.S. 546, 556 (1896); see United States v. Goodface,

835 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (8th Cir. 1987); Devitt, Blackmar, &

O’Malley, 2 Federal Jury Practice and Instructions § 38B.11, .15

(4th ed. 1990). Moreover, a reasonable fact-finder could easily

have found that C.L.O. used more force than necessary to defend

himself. See United States v. Walker, 817 F.2d 461, 463 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863 (1987); Devitt, Blackmar, &

O’Malley, supra, § 38B.14. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient

to support the district judge’s finding of guilt.

In his second argument, C.L.O. urges us to declare that a

juvenile possesses a constitutional right to a jury trial in a

delinquency proceeding. Based on his view that such a right should

exist, he contends the Juvenile Delinquency Act, which permits a

juvenile to choose between being tried as an adult with the right

to a jury trial and as a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding with
 2

The changes, according to C.L.O., include that juveniles

are now fingerprinted, that their pictures are taken, and that

the scope of federal jurisdiction over juveniles has changed. 

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no jury, is unconstitutional. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032, fourth

undesignated paragraph.

As C.L.O. acknowledges, the settled law is clearly against

him. The Supreme Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania that a

juvenile has no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 403 U.S.

528, 545 (1971). Furthermore, in Cotton v. United States, our

court rejected an argument that the Juvenile Delinquency Act is

unconstitutional as a violation of the right to a jury trial. 446

F.2d 107, 110-11 (8th Cir. 1971) (relying on McKeiver). 

Notwithstanding these precedents, C.L.O. argues that juvenile

trials have changed significantly since the Supreme Court decided

McKeiver in 19712

 and urges that these changes have undermined the

rationale for the McKeiver decision. We disagree. More than a

decade after the McKeiver decision, the Supreme Court cited

McKeiver approvingly and explained:

[T]he [C]onstitution does not mandate elimination of all

differences in the treatment of juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (no right

to jury trial). The State has "a parens patriae interest

in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,"

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982), which makes

a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an

adult criminal trial. 

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984). We believe the

considerations enumerated in McKeiver, see 403 U.S. at 545-50, ring

as true today as they did when the case was decided. We therefore

find not only the holding but also the reasoning of McKeiver to be

authoritative.

 
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Accordingly, we affirm the adjudication of delinquency made by

the district court. As a postscript, we note that the district

court inadvertently entered an adult "Judgment in a Criminal Case"

rather than a juvenile dispositional order. We remand for entry of

a written dispositional order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5037

containing the same substantive provisions.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.