procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual 

prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the 

State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the 

rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2). 

First, relying in part on Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 132 S. 

Ct. 1309 (2012), appellant claimed that he had good cause because he was 

not appointed counsel in the first post-conviction proceedings. We 

conclude that this argument lacked merit. The appointment of counsel 

was discretionary in the first post-conviction proceedings, see NRS 

34.750(1), and appellant failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or 

provide an explanation for why he could not raise this claim earlier. 

Further, this court has recently held that Martinez does not apply to 

Nevada's statutory post-conviction procedures. See Brown v. McDaniel, 

130 Nev. , P.3d , (Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014). 

Thus, the failure to appoint post-conviction counsel and the decision in 

Martinez would not provide good cause for this late and successive 

petition. 

Second, appellant claimed that he had good cause due to 

recent cases, Lafler v. Cooper, 566 US. , 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and 

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), to assert that his 

counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate additional plea offers 

from the State. Appellant's good-cause argument was without merit 

because his case was final when Cooper and Frye were decided, and he 

failed to demonstrate that the cases would apply retroactively to him. 

Even if Cooper and Frye announced new rules of constitutional law, he 

failed to allege facts to support that he met either exception to the general 

principle that such rules do not apply retroactively to cases which were 

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already final when the new rules were announced. See Colwell v. State, 

118 Nev. 807, 816-17, 59 P.3d 463, 469-70 (2002). Moreover, appellant 

merely presumed that there were additional plea offers and provided no 

factual allegation that there were actual plea offers that his counsel failed 

to communicate to him. A bare claim, such as this one, was insufficient to 

demonstrate that appellant was entitled to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 

100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). 

Finally, appellant failed to overcome the presumption of 

prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying 

the petition. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Hardesty 

2, 

, J. 

Douglas ist7'€1 

CHERRY, J., concurring: 

Although I would extend the equitable rule recognized in 

Martinez to this case because appellant was convicted of murder and is 

facing a severe sentence, see Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. , P.3d 

(Adv. Op. No. 60, August 7, 2014) (Cherry, J., dissenting), I concur in 

the judgment on appeal in this case because the State pleaded laches 

under NRS 34.800(2) and appellant failed to rebut the presumption of 

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prejudice to the State. 

cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge 

Ronald Jeffrey Mulder 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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