NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

FRANCIS A. COCCHIA, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

ROBERT J. TESTA, JR., et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0392 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2019-013395

The Honorable Lindsay P. Abramson, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

David T. Bonfiglio, PC, Scottsdale

By David T. Bonfiglio

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Maynard Cronin Erickson Curran & Reiter, PLC, Phoenix

By Douglas C. Erickson

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

FILED 3-11-2021
COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Acting Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the 

Court, in which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge David B. Gass joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

¶1 This case involves related litigation in Connecticut and 

Arizona, complicated by various factors, including a father and a son with 

extremely similar names. In this appeal, Robert J. Testa challenges the 

Arizona Superior Court’s determination that he consented to the 

jurisdiction of the Connecticut court and maintains that the resulting 

Connecticut judgment could not properly be domesticated and enforced in 

Arizona. Because the Connecticut judgment currently is on appeal and is 

not yet final, the Arizona court’s order is vacated, and this matter is 

remanded. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In April 2015, Robert and Karen Testa, husband and wife, 

created the Karen M. Testa Separate Property Trust (Trust) and transferred 

an Arizona house to the Trust. Robert and Karen Testa have a son also 

named Robert Testa. For clarity, Robert the elder is referred to as “Father” 

and Robert the younger as “Son.” 

¶3 In March 2016, Francis Cocchia sued Father in Connecticut 

Superior Court. Cocchia alleged that Father defaulted on an indemnity 

agreement and owed Cocchia more than $165,000.

¶4 In April 2017, Father and Karen were killed in a car accident.

Son then became the successor trustee of the Trust.

¶5 In February 2018, Cocchia sought to amend his Connecticut 

complaint to allege that the transfer of the Arizona house to the Trust was 

a fraudulent conveyance. Although Cocchia’s filings with the Connecticut 

court indicate that the amended complaint also sought “to add [as] a 

Defendant” the Trust, neither the Trust nor Son are listed in the caption or 

otherwise appear to be joined as parties. Cocchia apparently never served 

this amended complaint. 
COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.

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¶6 In May 2018, Cocchia filed a suit in Maricopa County Superior 

Court against Father, Mother (both individually and as trustee), the Trust, 

“John Doe, successor trustee,” and “unknown heirs or devisees of any 

deceased defendants.” In February 2019, after Son answered, Cocchia and 

Son stipulated to stay that action pending the outcome of the Connecticut 

case. This first Arizona case remains pending. 

¶7 At about this same time, in Connecticut, Cocchia moved “to 

substitute Robert J. Testa, Jr., Trustee of the [Trust] . . . as the Defendant.” 

Cocchia alleged that no estate for Father had been opened in Connecticut, 

that Cocchia’s first Arizona case was pending, and that “[t]he Defendants 

therein are attempting to avoid the Plaintiff’s debt by claiming the instant 

action in Connecticut is the controlling case or venue.” The Connecticut 

court granted Cocchia’s motion and, in March 2019, Cocchia apparently 

filed an amended complaint asserting breach of contract and fraudulent 

conveyance claims. The caption of that March 2019 complaint lists “Robert 

J. Testa, Jr., Trustee of the” Trust as the sole defendant; Son’s name, 

however, is not “Robert J. Testa, Jr.” 

¶8 Before he was killed, Father had retained counsel in the 

Connecticut case. That attorney later stated he was never served or 

provided any filings in the Connecticut case after the court granted 

Cocchia’s motion to substitute. Cocchia also had not attempted to join Son 

in the Connecticut case before his motion to substitute. Cocchia claims he 

served the March 2019 amended complaint in the Connecticut case by 

personally serving Son in Cave Creek, Arizona. Son, however, did not 

answer or otherwise respond to the March 2019 amended complaint. Son 

later declared that he did not receive actual notice of the Connecticut case

when it was filed nor notice of any effort to default him individually or as 

Trustee.

¶9 In May 2019, the Connecticut court found Son failed to appear 

and “a default for failure to appear was entered.” In August 2019, based on 

information Cocchia provided, the Connecticut court issued a 

“Memorandum of Decision” awarding Cocchia $206,348 and finding that 

the transfer of the Arizona house to the Trust “was fraudulent as to 

[Cocchia] and to the extent of the amount of the judgment.”
COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.

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¶10 In October 2019, Cocchia made filings in this second Arizona 

case to domesticate the Connecticut Memorandum of Decision in Maricopa 

County Superior Court in this case. In December 2019, Son moved to set 

aside and vacate judgment and preclude enforcement, claiming he was not 

properly named, and the Connecticut court lacked personal jurisdiction 

over him. 

¶11 Meanwhile, in Connecticut, Son moved to open, set aside and 

vacate judgment, and filed a motion to dismiss. Additional motion practice 

followed, and the Connecticut court held a hearing, apparently denying 

Son’s motions. Son then filed a motion for clarification. In March 2020, the 

Connecticut court issued an order explaining that (1) substitution of Son as 

trustee as a party was appropriate; (2) Cocchia demonstrated that Son as 

trustee was personally served in Arizona; and (3) entry of default against 

Son was appropriate. No explanation, however, was provided regarding

the denial of Son’s motion to dismiss. 

¶12 Later in March 2020, Son filed a notice of appeal to the 

Connecticut Court of Appeals, arguing the Connecticut court “never had 

personal jurisdiction over” him. From the information provided, it appears 

the Connecticut Court of Appeals has not yet issued a decision in that 

appeal, which remains pending. 

¶13 Six days after Son filed his March 2020 appeal in Connecticut, 

the Arizona court denied Son’s motion to set aside and vacate judgment 

and preclude its enforcement. Although Son asked the Arizona court to take 

judicial notice of various filings from the Connecticut proceedings that are 

part of the record on appeal, Ariz. R. Evid. 201, it is unclear whether the 

Arizona court did so.

¶14 The parties later stipulated to postpone a sheriff’s sale of the 

house, citing Connecticut authority that automatically stays the 

enforcement of a judgment while an appeal is pending. Conn. R. App. P. § 

61-11(a). The Arizona court accepted that stipulation and issued an order 

staying enforcement until the Connecticut appeal is resolved. After denying 

Son’s motion to reconsider its March 2020 ruling, the Arizona court entered 

a final judgment rejecting Son’s challenges in June 2020. This court has 

jurisdiction over Son’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the 
COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.

Decision of the Court

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Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 

12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1)(2021).1

DISCUSSION 

¶15 At its core, Son’s argument is that the Arizona court erred in 

rejecting his claim that the Connecticut judgment was “void and invalid” 

for the same two reasons he argued to the Connecticut court: (1) lack of 

proper service; and (2) lack of personal jurisdiction over Son.

¶16 The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 

Constitution “obliges the states to respect and enforce judgments rendered 

in the courts of their sister states.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. “A duly 

authenticated judgment of a sister state is prima facie evidence of that 

state’s jurisdiction to render it and of the right which it purports to 

adjudicate.” Oyakawa v. Gillett, 175 Ariz. 226, 229 (App. 1993). But such a 

judgment is not binding if it was rendered without jurisdiction over the 

defendant. Phares v. Nutter, 125 Ariz. 291, 293 (1980); Bebeau v. Berger, 22 

Ariz. App. 522, 523 (1974). The challenger of the validity of the foreign 

judgment bears the burden of proof to show it is invalid. Oyakawa, 175 Ariz. 

at 229. 

¶17 “A defendant served with a lawsuit in another state may 

litigate that state’s jurisdiction in that suit, or may let the suit go to judgment 

by default and collaterally attack the jurisdiction when the plaintiff 

attempts to enforce the judgment elsewhere.” Giehrl v. Royal Aloha Vacation 

Club, Inc., 188 Ariz. 456, 458 (App. 1997). The state where domestication is 

sought may inquire into the rendering court’s jurisdiction but may not 

ignore a prior judgment that has determined the rendering court’s 

jurisdiction in a matter; “[t]o do so would violate the Full Faith and Credit 

Clause.” Id. A defendant who appears in the proceedings and litigates the 

jurisdictional issues is “bound on that issue by the doctrine of res judicata.” 

Id. at 457 (quoting Matson v. Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 1981)). 

1Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.

Decision of the Court

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¶18 “Because the judgment of a sister state must be final before 

full faith and credit attaches, [this court looks to Connecticut] law to 

determine when the judgment in this case became final.” See Grynberg v. 

Shaffer, 216 Ariz. 256, 258 ¶ 8 (App. 2007). Under Connecticut law,

[t]he test of finality is whether the rights of the 

parties are concluded so that further 

proceedings cannot affect them . . . The rights of 

the parties, in so far as they were capable of 

being affected by any subsequent proceedings 

connected with the matter then in court, were 

forever concluded. Nothing further remained to 

be decided by the court. The appeal was 

terminated. The issues which it presented were 

all resolved.

Watson v. Howard, 86 A.2d 67, 68–69 (Conn. 1952) (internal citations 

omitted).

¶19 Along with this governing case law by the Connecticut 

Supreme Court, a Connecticut court rule automatically stays “proceedings 

to enforce or carry out . . . judgment[s] or order[s] until the time to file an 

appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed 

until the final determination of the cause.” Conn. R. App. P. § 61-11(a). By 

statute, Arizona has a comparable provision recognizing that a pending 

appeal for a jurisdiction from another state presumptively precludes 

enforcement. “If the judgment debtor shows the superior court that an 

appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay 

of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the 

foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded[.]” A.R.S. § 12-1704(A). 

¶20 Given the pendency of the appeal in the Connecticut case, the 

judgment in that proceeding is not yet final under this authority, meaning 

full faith and credit obligations have not yet attached. Grynberg, 216 Ariz. at 

258 ¶ 8. Accordingly, the Arizona court’s consideration of the issues raised 

here must await final resolution of the Connecticut case. It will be for the 

superior court in the first instance to determine the extent to which Son and 

the Trust have litigated jurisdiction in Connecticut and the impact, if any, 

of res judicata in this case. 
COCCHIA v. TESTA, et al.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶21 The judgment is vacated, and this matter is remanded for 

further proceedings following final resolution of the Connecticut appeal. In 

directing such a remand, this court need not — and expressly does not —

address the differing views expressed by the parties on the validity of the 

Connecticut judgment, recognizing doing so is premature given the 

pendency of the appeal in Connecticut. Each party’s request for an award 

of attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 is denied without 

prejudice pending the final resolution of this matter. Son is awarded his 

taxable costs on appeal contingent upon his compliance with Ariz. R. Civ. 

App. P. 21.