Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1505-JT-481 | December 28, 2015 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John T. Wilson

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Abigail R. Recker

Deputies Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of R.W. and E.W.(Minor 

Children) and M.C. (Mother);

M.C. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 28, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

33A01-1505-JT-481

Appeal from the Henry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Mary G. Willis, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

33C01-1411-JT-11 and

33C01-1411-JT-12
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 33A01-1505-JT-481 | December 28, 2015 Page 2 of 11

May, Judge.

[1] M.C. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to 

R.W. and E.W. (collectively, “Children”). As the Department of Child 

Services presented sufficient evidence termination was in the best interests of 

Children, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] R.W., born January 20, 2007; and E.W., born January 23, 2010, were born in 

Maryland. Children’s biological father died in 2012. In 2013, Children and 

Mother moved to Indiana after Mother met and married R.C. (“Stepfather”). 

On January 30, 2014, DCS filed petitions to adjudicate Children as Child in 

Need of Services (CHINS) based on an allegation they were exposed to 

unnecessary medical care, including approximately seventy-eight doctor and 

emergency room visits in a year. The trial court held an initial hearing on the 

petitions the same day and removed Children from Mother and Stepfather’s 

home.

[3] The trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS on February 21, 2014, after 

Mother admitted Children were in need of services. On March 14, 2014, the 

trial court entered its dispositional decree requiring Mother to participate in 

reunification services including participation in: home-based counseling and 

case management; parenting assessment and completion of all 

recommendations; substance abuse assessment and completion of all 

recommendations; psychological assessment and completion of all 
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recommendations; random drug screens; and supervised visitation with 

Children.

[4] On June 6, 2014, the trial court held a compliance hearing and found while 

Mother was adequately participating in some reunification services, she was not 

completing services related to her parental obligations. Around the same time, 

one of Mother’s home-based counselors had to discontinue services. The 

counselor and Mother were concerned for their safety if Stepfather discovered 

Mother had disclosed incidents of domestic violence to the therapist. 

[5] On October 6, 2014, DCS filed a motion to discontinue reunification services, 

and Mother contested that request. The trial court held a hearing and found 

Mother was no longer compliant with reunification services; there was domestic 

violence between Mother and Stepfather; and Mother was “unable to 

understand her personality order, . . . [had] pursued inordinate emergency room

visits, . . . [was] unable to handle her own medication for her psychiatric 

concerns and medical care, . . . [and was] unable to adequately manage 

[Children’s] medical care and basic parenting needs.” (DCS Ex. 24 at 2.) 

Children’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) also recommended 

suspending reunification efforts.

[6] On November 5, 2014, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to Children. The trial court held a permanency hearing on January 23, 

2015, and changed the plan for Children from reunification to adoption and 

began termination proceedings. The trial court held fact-finding hearings on the 
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termination petitions on February 4, 2015, and April 7, 2015. The trial court 

issued an order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children on April 27, 

2015.

Discussion and Decision

[7] We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., D.S., 

& B.G., 750 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh 

evidence or judge credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. In deference to the 

juvenile court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a 

judgment terminating a parent’s rights only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 

717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied

534 U.S. 1161 (2002).

[8] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine first 

whether the evidence supports the findings and second whether the findings 

support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the 

record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen 

v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences 

support the juvenile court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 

208. 
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[9] “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is 

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In 

re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A trial court must 

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child, however, when 

evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 

at 837. The right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely 

because there is a better home available for the child, id., but parental rights 

may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her 

parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.

[10] To terminate a parent-child relationship, the State must allege and prove:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least 

six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 

that reasonable efforts for family preservation or 

reunification are not required, including a description of 

the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner 

in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has 

been under the supervision of a county office of family and 

children or probation department for at least fifteen (15) 

months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, 

beginning with the date the child is removed from the 

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in 

need of services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
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(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof 

of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g 

denied. If the court finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must 

terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8. 

[11] The trial court’s conclusion that termination is the best interests of Children was 

not error.

1

 In determining what is in the best interests of children, the trial court 

is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to consider the 

totality of the evidence. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In 

 

1 Mother argues DCS did not prove the conditions that resulted in Children’s removal would not be 

remedied. She does not contest the trial court’s findings supporting its conclusion the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Children. DCS does not have to prove both a 

reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal will not be remedied and a reasonable 

probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and Children posed a threat to 

the well-being of Children. The statute is written in the disjunctive, and DCS must prove either by clear and 

convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4. Therefore, we need not address that argument.
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so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of 

the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are harmed irreversibly 

before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Recommendations of the 

case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence the 

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children’s best interests.

Id. A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable environment, along with 

current inability to do the same, supports finding termination of parental rights 

is in the best interests of the children. Lang v. Starke Cnty Office of Family &

Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[12] The trial court found:

18. Between January 2013 and January 2014, when [R.W.] was 

in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], [R.W.] visited a doctor 45 

times:

a. Some of these visits included hospitalizations,

b. This culminated with an ultimately unnecessary surgery 

that inserted pins into [R.W.’s] legs, and from which at the 

time of the fact-finding hearing, [R.W.] was still 

recovering,

c. To contrast the number of visits while in Indiana, 

[R.W.] only made 27 visits (7 of which were for necessary 

eye exams) in the first five years of his life in Maryland 

while he was only under the care of his Mother and 

biological Father, and
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d. While in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], [R.W.] 

visited medical professionals 18 more times in one year, 

than he had the entire first five years of his life;

19. [E.W.] also endured excessive medical visits:

a. Between January 2013 and January 2014, when [E.W.] 

was in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], she visited the 

doctor 29 times[,]

b. To contrast the number of visits while in Indiana, 

[E.W.] only made 11 visits in the first three years of her 

life in Maryland while she was only under the care of her 

Mother and biological Father, and

c. While in the care of Mother and [Stepfather], [E.W.] 

visited medical professionals 18 more times in one year, 

[sic] than she had the entire first three years of her life;

20. The DCS determined [Stepfather] was an unsafe individual 

to care for the Children;

* * * * *

25. With an exhibited and clear safety risk in the way of 

[Stepfather] living in the home, DCS did not recommend placing 

[Children] back with Mother while she was still living with 

[Stepfather] for the following reasons:

a. [Stepfather] failed to show significant and substantial 

improvement through the utilization of the services offered 

to him,
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b. [Stepfather] never showed a significant commitment to 

improvement, let alone actual improvements and the 

Court authorized the DCS to cease efforts towards 

reunification with Mother and [Stepfather];

26. Throughout the life of the underlying CHINS matter, 

Mother remained insistent on living with [Stepfather]:

a. She would state to DCS that she did not understand 

why she had to choose between her marriage and her 

children;

b. DCS informed Mother that the only decision she had to 

make, was that to ensure the safety of her children,

i. This was a topic of conversation and explanation 

in the many visits between Mother and FCM 

Amanda Harris discussed earlier in this Order;

c. Mother was also informed by her many service 

providers that the safety of [Children] could not be ensured 

while she still lived with [Stepfather], but she never made 

any significant attempts to live without [Stepfather];

i. This was exhibited most clearly when Mother 

informed her home-based case worker Heather 

Morrow that it would be “pointless” to go to a 

women’s shelter because she would always go right 

back to [Stepfather]; 

d. On the date of the fact-finding [hearing], Mother was 

still living with [Stepfather] at a hotel in New Castle, 

Indiana;
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* * * * *

32. The foster placement of the children has since provided 

support, care, guidance, and supervision in the absence of the 

same from the Mother for approximately the last six months (and 

[Children were] in a therapeutic foster home the ten months 

before that);

33. The Children are bonded with the placement family;

34. The Children are currently doing well in the care of [their] 

foster family;

35. The foster placement is willing and able to provide a loving, 

stable home[.]

(App. at 78-84.) Based on these and other findings of fact and evidence to 

support them from service providers and Mother, the trial court concluded 

termination was in the best interests of Children. Mother’s argument to the 

contrary is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. 

See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or 

judge the credibility of witnesses).2

 

2 Mother argues:

The procedural problems in the CHINS proceedings deprives Mother of her procedural 

due process with respect to the termination of her parental rights. Here, the Henry 

County Department of Child Services disregarded its mandate under I.C. 31-34-21-5.5 to 

provided [sic] reasonable efforts. The DCS failed to provide services that met with 

requirements of Mother’s psychological evaluation. The DCS did not follow through 

with providing services that were concrete, hands on and repetitive due to Mother’s 

“cognitive impairment and illiteracy.” The only thing DCS focused on was Mother 
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Conclusion

[13] The DCS provided sufficient evidence termination of Mother’s parental rights 

was in the best interests of Children. Accordingly, we affirm.

[14] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Riley, J., concur.

 

leaving her husband, and when she was not willing to do that, they [sic] proceeded to 

terminate her rights.

(Br. of Appellant at 10-11.) These arguments appear to be related to services offered as part of the 

CHINS adjudication, which we cannot consider as part of a termination appeal. See In re H.L., 

915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“failure to provide services does not serve as a basis 

on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law”).