UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 

GEORGE DIMITRIOS SKRETTAS,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

CH-0752-15-0099-I-1

DATE: August 7, 2015

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

George Dimitrios Skrettas, Ann Arbor, Michigan, pro se.

Kristi Glavich, Detroit, Michigan, for the agency.

BEFORE

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

dismissed his appeal based on the doctrine of res judicata. Generally, we grant 

petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision contains erroneous 

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous 

 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to 

the facts of the case; the judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or 

the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an 

abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or 

new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the 

petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See Title 5 

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). 

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, and based on the following 

points and authorities, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any 

basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we 

DENY the petition for review. However, we VACATE the initial decision

dismissing this appeal as barred by the doctrine of res judicata and instead 

DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

¶2 Effective August 12, 2011, the agency terminated the appellant from his 

Registered Respiratory Therapist position for unsatisfactory performance during 

his probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 4. The appellant filed 

an appeal with the Board challenging his termination, and the administrative 

judge issued an October 24, 2011 initial decision dismissing the appeal as 

withdrawn pursuant to the parties’ October 18, 2011 settlement agreement, which 

was not entered into the record for enforcement purposes. IAF, Tab 7 at 7-8; see

Skrettas v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-11-0789-

I-1, Initial Decision (Oct. 24, 2011). The initial decision in that appeal became 

the Board’s final decision on November 28, 2011, after neither party filed a 

petition for review by that date. IAF, Tab 7 at 8.

¶3 On November 18, 2014, the appellant filed an appeal with the Board 

claiming that his 2011 termination was in retaliation for reporting “unethical, 

illegal and dangerous practices as a whistleblower.” IAF, Tab 1 at 1. The 

administrative judge issued a timeliness order and an acknowledgment order, 

ordering the appellant to file evidence and argument to show good cause why his 
3

appeal should not be dismissed. IAF, Tab 2 at 2, Tab 3. In the acknowledgement 

order, the administrative judge explained the doctrine of res judicata and noted 

that the appellant appeared to be raising a claim that he already had adjudicated 

before the Board, which was resolved in a decision issued on October 24, 2011, in 

accordance with a settlement agreement. IAF, Tab 2 at 2. The appellant 

responded by arguing the merits of his appeal, and the agency filed a motion to 

dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction or untimeliness. IAF, Tabs 4, 7. The 

administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal based on the 

doctrine of res judicata, without deciding the timeliness issue. IAF, Tab 8, Initial 

Decision (ID) at 1 & n.1. The appellant filed a petition for review reasserting his

claim of whistleblower retaliation and arguing, in pertinent part, that res judicata 

does not apply. 2

 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-4. 

¶4 Although the administrative judge found below that res judicata barred this 

appeal, we disagree. As a preliminary matter, res judicata is a basis for 

dismissing a claim over which the Board has jurisdiction, and the administrative 

judge who dismissed the appellant’s termination appeal as settled in 2011 did not 

find that the Board had jurisdiction over the underlying appeal. IAF, Tab 7 at 

1-2; see Hicks v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 M.S.P.R. 232, ¶ 12 (2010). In addition, 

the Board has held that, when an appeal has been settled, the merits of the 

agency’s action have not been examined, and the doctrine of res judicata cannot 

be applied. Besemer v. U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 260, 264 (1998). Thus, 

we find that the administrative judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s 2014 

appeal based on the doctrine of res judicata.

 2 The appellant raises additional claims on review, including but not limited to, 

retaliation for protected equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, gender 

discrimination, and due process violations in connection with his termination. PFR 

File, Tab 1 at 2-3. The appellant also asks the Board to reopen his appeal based on new 

evidence consisting of a January 18, 2008 agency directive describing the types of 

adverse events that must be disclosed. Id. at 4-5.
4

¶5 For the reasons stated below, however, we dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction because the appellant waived his appeal rights in the October 2011

settlement agreement. 3

 IAF, Tab 7 at 13-17. Once a settlement agreement 

resolves a basic controversy regarding a discharge, “there is no case or 

controversy touching the discharge and over the merits of which” the Board might 

exercise jurisdiction. Asberry v. U.S. Postal Service, 692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed.

Cir. 1982). The parties’ October 2011 settlement agreement resolved “any and all 

rights and claims arising from the facts of” the appellant’s Board appeal 

challenging his August 11, 2011 termination “in any other forum including but 

not limited to . . . the Merit Systems Protection Board.” 4

 IAF, Tab 7 at 13-14. 

We find that the broad waiver in the settlement agreement encompasses the

appellant’s current claims challenging his termination and divests the Board of

jurisdiction over his appeal. See Laity v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 

61 M.S.P.R. 256, 263 (1994) (determining that a provision stating that the 

agreement “fully resolves any and all” matters and issues leading to the 

suspension was broad enough to support a finding that the appellant waived the 

whistleblower reprisal claim stemming from that action). 

¶6 A waiver of appeal rights in a settlement agreement is enforceable and not 

against public policy if the terms of the waiver are comprehensive, freely made, 

and fair, and execution of the waiver was not the result of duress or bad faith on 

the agency’s part. Lawrence v. Office of Personnel Management, 108 M.S.P.R. 

 3 Although the administrative judge did not enter the settlement agreement at issue into 

the record for enforcement, the Board can review the settlement to determine any 

waiver of appeal rights. See Covington v. Department of the Army, 85 M.S.P.R. 612, 

¶¶ 10-12 (2000) (reviewed a settlement with the agency); Sullivan v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs, 79 M.S.P.R. 81, 83-84 (1998) (reviewed a settlement of EEO

complaints); Laity v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 61 M.S.P.R. 256, 261 (1994) 

(reviewed a settlement of a grievance).

4 In addition to the appellant’s Board appeal, the parties’ settlement agreement also 

resolved the appellant’s EEO complaint, Agency No. 200J-506-201104437, and his 

August 27, 2011 Freedom of Information Act request revised on September 6, 2011. 

IAF, Tab 7 at 13. 
5

325, 328, aff’d, 318 F. App’x 895 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A waiver of appeal rights that 

meets these criteria divests the Board of jurisdiction over an appeal. See 

Merriweather v. Department of Transportation, 59 M.S.P.R. 434, 437-38 (1993). 

The plain language of the agreement signed by the appellant specified that he 

understood the terms of the settlement and that he entered into the agreement

knowingly, freely, and voluntarily with no unwarranted duress or undue influence 

from any person or source. IAF, Tab 7 at 14-15. Moreover, the allegations made 

by the appellant on appeal do not challenge the validity of the agreement. Having 

voluntarily accepted the settlement agreement and its benefits, the appellant 

cannot now bring claims that he waived under the terms of that agreement. 5

 We 

therefore deny the petition for review and dismiss this appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. 6

NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING

YOUR FURTHER REVIEW RIGHTS

You have the right to request the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit to review this final decision. You must submit your request to the 

court at the following address: 

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, DC 20439

The court must receive your request for review no later than 60 calendar 

days after the date of this order. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) (as rev. eff. Dec. 

27, 2012). If you choose to file, be very careful to file on time. The court has 

 5 The agency rescinded the appellant’s August 11, 2011 “removal” and converted it to a 

voluntary resignation, in exchange for the appellant waiving “any and all rights and

claims arising from the facts of” MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-11-0419-I-1 and his EEO 

complaint, “in any other forum,” and withdrawing his actions pending against the 

agency. IAF, Tab 7 at 14. 

6 In light of our finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, we need not 

determined whether the appeal is precluded by collateral estoppel.
6

held that normally it does not have the authority to waive this statutory deadline 

and that filings that do not comply with the deadline must be dismissed. See 

Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management, 931 F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

If you need further information about your right to appeal this decision to 

court, you should refer to the Federal law that gives you this right. It is found in 

Title 5 of the United States Code, section 7703 (5 U.S.C. § 7703) (as rev. eff. 

Dec. 27, 2012). You may read this law as well as other sections of the United 

States Code, at our website, http://www.mspb.gov/appeals/uscode.htm. 

Additional information is available at the court’s website, 

www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se 

Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained within the court’s Rules of 

Practice, and Forms 5, 6, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for your appeal to 

the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Merit Systems Protection Board neither endorses the services provided by any 

attorney nor warrants that any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

______________________________

William D. Spencer

Clerk of the Board