# Uradni list C 245/2011

| | ISSN 1725-5244
  doi:10.3000/17255244.C_2011.245.slv |
| --- | --- |
| Uradni list
  Evropske unije | C 245 |
| | |
| Slovenska izdaja | Informacije in objave | Zvezek 5424. avgust 2011 |

ISSN 1725-5244

doi:10.3000/17255244.C_2011.245.slv

Uradni list

Evropske unije

C 245

Slovenska izdaja

Informacije in objave

Zvezek 5424. avgust 2011

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| Obvestilo št. | Vsebina | Stran |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Sporočila |
| | SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2011/C 245/01 | Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6298 – Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Obvestilo št.

Vsebina

Stran

II   Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

2011/C 245/01

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji (Zadeva COMP/M.6298 – Schneider Electric/Telvent) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informacije |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE |
| | Svet |
| 2011/C 245/02 | Obvestilo za osebe in subjekte, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi, določeni v Sklepu Sveta 2011/273/SZVP, kot se izvaja z Izvedbenim sklepom Sveta 2011/515/SZVP, in Uredbi Sveta (EU) št. 442/2011, kot se izvaja z Izvedbeno uredbo Sveta (EU) št. 843/2011 o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Siriji | 2 |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2011/C 245/03 | Menjalni tečaji eura | 3 |
| | INFORMACIJE DRŽAV ČLANIC |
| 2011/C 245/04 | Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova | 4 |
| 2011/C 245/05 | Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova | 5 |
| 2011/C 245/06 | Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova | 6 |
| 2011/C 245/07 | Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova | 7 |

IV   Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Svet

2011/C 245/02

Obvestilo za osebe in subjekte, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi, določeni v Sklepu Sveta 2011/273/SZVP, kot se izvaja z Izvedbenim sklepom Sveta 2011/515/SZVP, in Uredbi Sveta (EU) št. 442/2011, kot se izvaja z Izvedbeno uredbo Sveta (EU) št. 843/2011 o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Siriji

2

Evropska komisija

2011/C 245/03

Menjalni tečaji eura

3

INFORMACIJE DRŽAV ČLANIC

2011/C 245/04

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

4

2011/C 245/05

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

5

2011/C 245/06

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

6

2011/C 245/07

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

7

| | V   Objave |
| --- | --- |
| | UPRAVNI POSTOPKI |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2011/C 245/08 | Razpisi za zbiranje predlogov – Program ESPON 2013 | 8 |
| | POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE |
| | Evropska komisija |
| 2011/C 245/09 | Državna pomoči – Združeno kraljestvo – Državna pomoč SA.18859 – 11/C (ex NN 65/10) – Olajšava za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem (ex N 2/04) – Poziv k predložitvi pripomb na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (
  1
  ) | 10 |
| 2011/C 245/10 | Državna pomoč – Nemčija (Členi 107 do 109 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije) – Državna pomoč MC 15/09 – LBBW Deka divestment (
  1
  ) | 21 |

V   Objave

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropska komisija

2011/C 245/08

Razpisi za zbiranje predlogov – Program ESPON 2013

8

POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

2011/C 245/09

Državna pomoči – Združeno kraljestvo – Državna pomoč SA.18859 – 11/C (ex NN 65/10) – Olajšava za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem (ex N 2/04) – Poziv k predložitvi pripomb na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije (
  1
  )

1

10

2011/C 245/10

Državna pomoč – Nemčija (Členi 107 do 109 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije) – Državna pomoč MC 15/09 – LBBW Deka divestment (
  1
  )

1

21

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Besedilo velja za EGP |

---

(1)   Besedilo velja za EGP

1

| SL | |
| --- | --- |

SL

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II Sporočila

SPOROČILA INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Evropska komisija

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/1

---

Nenasprotovanje priglašeni koncentraciji

(Zadeva COMP/M.6298 – Schneider Electric/Telvent)

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2011/C 245/01

Komisija se je 9. avgusta 2011 odločila, da ne bo nasprotovala zgoraj navedeni priglašeni koncentraciji in jo bo razglasila za združljivo s skupnim trgom. Ta odločitev je sprejeta v skladu s členom 6(1)(b) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 139/2004. Celotno besedilo odločitve je na voljo samo v angleščini in bo objavljeno po tem, ko bodo iz besedila odstranjene morebitne poslovne skrivnosti. Na voljo bo:

| — | v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij, |
| --- | --- |

—

v razdelku o združitvah na spletišču Komisije o konkurenci (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Spletišče vsebuje različne pripomočke za iskanje posameznih odločitev o združitvah, vključno z nazivi podjetij, številkami zadev, datumi ter indeksi področij,

| — | v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32011M6298. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronski obliki na spletišču EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sl/index.htm) pod dokumentarno številko 32011M6298. EUR-Lex zagotavlja spletni dostop do evropskega prava.

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IV Informacije

INFORMACIJE INSTITUCIJ, ORGANOV, URADOV IN AGENCIJ EVROPSKE UNIJE

Svet

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/2

---

Obvestilo za osebe in subjekte, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi, določeni v Sklepu Sveta 2011/273/SZVP, kot se izvaja z Izvedbenim sklepom Sveta 2011/515/SZVP, in Uredbi Sveta (EU) št. 442/2011, kot se izvaja z Izvedbeno uredbo Sveta (EU) št. 843/2011 o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Siriji

2011/C 245/02

SVET EVROPSKE UNIJE

Osebe in subjekte, navedene v Prilogi k Sklepu Sveta 2011/273/SZVP, kot se izvaja z Izvedbenim sklepom Sveta 2011/515/SZVP (1), in v Prilogi II k Uredbi Sveta (EU) št. 442/2011, kot se izvaja z Izvedbeno uredbo Sveta št. 843/2011 (2) o omejevalnih ukrepih proti Siriji, obveščamo o naslednjem:

Svet Evropske unije je sklenil, da je treba osebe in subjekte iz navedenih prilog vključiti na seznam oseb in subjektov, za katere veljajo omejevalni ukrepi iz Sklepa 2011/273/SZVP in Uredbe (EU) št. 442/2011 o omejevanih ukrepih proti Siriji. Razlogi za vključitev teh oseb in subjektov so navedeni v ustreznih rubrikah teh prilog.

Zadevne osebe in subjekte obveščamo, da lahko pri pristojnih organih zadevne države članice oziroma zadevnih držav članic (glej spletne strani, navedene v Prilogi III k Uredbi spletne strani, navedene v Prilogi III k Uredbi (EU) št. 442/2011) zaprosijo za dovoljenje za uporabo zamrznjenih sredstev za nujne potrebe ali natančno določena plačila (glej člen 6 uredbe).

Zadevne osebe in subjekti lahko zahtevo za ponovno preučitev odločitve o vključitvi na navedeni seznam skupaj z dokazili pošljejo Svetu, in sicer na naslov:

| Council of the European Union |
| --- |
| General Secretariat |
| DG K Coordination |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175 |
| 1048 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Council of the European Union

General Secretariat

DG K Coordination

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 175

1048 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Obenem zadevne osebe in subjekte tudi obveščamo, da lahko odločitev Sveta izpodbijajo pred Splošnim sodiščem Evropske unije v skladu s pogoji iz členov 275(2) ter 263(4) in (6) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.

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(1)  UL L 218, 24.8.2011.

(2)  UL L 218, 24.8.2011, str. 1.

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Evropska komisija

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/3

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Menjalni tečaji eura (1)

23. avgusta 2011

2011/C 245/03

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Menjalni tečaj |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | ameriški dolar | 1,4462 |
| JPY | japonski jen | 110,72 |
| DKK | danska krona | 7,4498 |
| GBP | funt šterling | 0,87600 |
| SEK | švedska krona | 9,1046 |
| CHF | švicarski frank | 1,1410 |
| ISK | islandska krona | |
| NOK | norveška krona | 7,8080 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | češka krona | 24,417 |
| HUF | madžarski forint | 271,78 |
| LTL | litovski litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | latvijski lats | 0,7095 |
| PLN | poljski zlot | 4,1499 |
| RON | romunski leu | 4,2574 |
| TRY | turška lira | 2,5783 |
| AUD | avstralski dolar | 1,3771 |
| CAD | kanadski dolar | 1,4260 |
| HKD | hongkonški dolar | 11,2766 |
| NZD | novozelandski dolar | 1,7360 |
| SGD | singapurski dolar | 1,7414 |
| KRW | južnokorejski won | 1 558,38 |
| ZAR | južnoafriški rand | 10,3816 |
| CNY | kitajski juan | 9,2513 |
| HRK | hrvaška kuna | 7,4740 |
| IDR | indonezijska rupija | 12 355,53 |
| MYR | malezijski ringit | 4,2894 |
| PHP | filipinski peso | 61,206 |
| RUB | ruski rubelj | 41,8255 |
| THB | tajski bat | 43,140 |
| BRL | brazilski real | 2,3111 |
| MXN | mehiški peso | 17,7768 |
| INR | indijska rupija | 65,9830 |

Valuta

Menjalni tečaj

USD

ameriški dolar

1,4462

JPY

japonski jen

110,72

DKK

danska krona

7,4498

GBP

funt šterling

0,87600

SEK

švedska krona

9,1046

CHF

švicarski frank

1,1410

ISK

islandska krona

NOK

norveška krona

7,8080

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

češka krona

24,417

HUF

madžarski forint

271,78

LTL

litovski litas

3,4528

LVL

latvijski lats

0,7095

PLN

poljski zlot

4,1499

RON

romunski leu

4,2574

TRY

turška lira

2,5783

AUD

avstralski dolar

1,3771

CAD

kanadski dolar

1,4260

HKD

hongkonški dolar

11,2766

NZD

novozelandski dolar

1,7360

SGD

singapurski dolar

1,7414

KRW

južnokorejski won

1 558,38

ZAR

južnoafriški rand

10,3816

CNY

kitajski juan

9,2513

HRK

hrvaška kuna

7,4740

IDR

indonezijska rupija

12 355,53

MYR

malezijski ringit

4,2894

PHP

filipinski peso

61,206

RUB

ruski rubelj

41,8255

THB

tajski bat

43,140

BRL

brazilski real

2,3111

MXN

mehiški peso

17,7768

INR

indijska rupija

65,9830

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(1)  Vir: referenčni menjalni tečaj, ki ga objavlja ECB.

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INFORMACIJE DRŽAV ČLANIC

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/4

---

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

2011/C 245/04

V skladu s členom 35(3) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1224/2009 z dne 20. novembra 2009 o vzpostavitvi nadzornega sistema Skupnosti za zagotavljanje skladnosti s pravili skupne ribiške politike (1) je bila sprejeta odločitev o zaprtju ribolova, kot prikazuje preglednica:

| Datum in čas zaprtja | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trajanje | 18.7.2011–31.12.2011 |
| Država članica | Nizozemska |
| Stalež ali skupina staležev | HKE/571214 |
| Vrsta | oslič (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Območje | VI in VII; vode EU in mednarodne vode območja Vb; mednarodne vode območij XII in XIV |
| Vrste ribiških plovil | — |
| Referenčna številka | — |

Datum in čas zaprtja

18.7.2011

Trajanje

18.7.2011–31.12.2011

Država članica

Nizozemska

Stalež ali skupina staležev

HKE/571214

Vrsta

oslič (Merluccius merluccius)

Območje

VI in VII; vode EU in mednarodne vode območja Vb; mednarodne vode območij XII in XIV

Vrste ribiških plovil

—

Referenčna številka

—

Spletna povezava na odločitev države članice:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_sl.htm

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(1)  UL L 343, 22.12.2009, str. 1.

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| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/5

---

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

2011/C 245/05

V skladu s členom 35(3) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1224/2009 z dne 20. novembra 2009 o vzpostavitvi nadzornega sistema Skupnosti za zagotavljanje skladnosti s pravili skupne ribiške politike (1) je bila sprejeta odločitev o zaprtju ribolova, kot prikazuje preglednica:

| Datum in čas zaprtja | 18.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trajanje | 18.7.2011–31.12.2011 |
| Država članica | Nizozemska |
| Stalež ali skupina staležev | HKE/2AC4-C |
| Vrsta | oslič (Merluccius merluccius) |
| Območje | vode EU območij IIa in IV |
| Vrste ribiških plovil | — |
| Referenčna številka | — |

Datum in čas zaprtja

18.7.2011

Trajanje

18.7.2011–31.12.2011

Država članica

Nizozemska

Stalež ali skupina staležev

HKE/2AC4-C

Vrsta

oslič (Merluccius merluccius)

Območje

vode EU območij IIa in IV

Vrste ribiških plovil

—

Referenčna številka

—

Spletna povezava na odločitev države članice:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  UL L 343, 22.12.2009, str. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/6

---

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

2011/C 245/06

V skladu s členom 35(3) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1224/2009 z dne 20. novembra 2009 o vzpostavitvi nadzornega sistema Skupnosti za zagotavljanje skladnosti s pravili skupne ribiške politike (1) je bila sprejeta odločitev o zaprtju ribolova, kot prikazuje preglednica:

| Datum in čas zaprtja | 9.7.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trajanje | 9.7.2011–31.12.2011 |
| Država članica | Francija |
| Stalež ali skupina staležev | COD/5BE6A |
| Vrsta | trska (Gadus morhua) |
| Območje | VIa; vode EU in mednarodne vode cone Vb vzhodno od 12° 00′ zahodne zemljepisne dolžine |
| Vrste ribiških plovil | — |
| Referenčna številka | 792761 |

Datum in čas zaprtja

9.7.2011

Trajanje

9.7.2011–31.12.2011

Država članica

Francija

Stalež ali skupina staležev

COD/5BE6A

Vrsta

trska (Gadus morhua)

Območje

VIa; vode EU in mednarodne vode cone Vb vzhodno od 12° 00′ zahodne zemljepisne dolžine

Vrste ribiških plovil

—

Referenčna številka

792761

Spletna povezava na odločitev države članice:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  UL L 343, 22.12.2009, str. 1.

---

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/7

---

Informacije, ki jih sporočijo države članice glede zaprtja ribolova

2011/C 245/07

V skladu s členom 35(3) Uredbe Sveta (ES) št. 1224/2009 z dne 20. novembra 2009 o vzpostavitvi nadzornega sistema Skupnosti za zagotavljanje skladnosti s pravili skupne ribiške politike (1) je bila sprejeta odločitev o zaprtju ribolova, kot prikazuje preglednica:

| Datum in čas zaprtja | 2.8.2011 |
| --- | --- |
| Trajanje | 2.8.2011–31.12.2011 |
| Država članica | Portugalska |
| Stalež ali skupina staležev | WHB/8C3411 |
| Vrsta | sinji mol (Micromesistius poutassou) |
| Območje | območja VIIIc, IX in X; vode EU območja CECAF 34.1.1 |
| Vrste ribiških plovil | — |
| Referenčna številka | — |

Datum in čas zaprtja

2.8.2011

Trajanje

2.8.2011–31.12.2011

Država članica

Portugalska

Stalež ali skupina staležev

WHB/8C3411

Vrsta

sinji mol (Micromesistius poutassou)

Območje

območja VIIIc, IX in X; vode EU območja CECAF 34.1.1

Vrste ribiških plovil

—

Referenčna številka

—

Spletna povezava na odločitev države članice:

http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/index_en.htm

---

(1)  UL L 343, 22.12.2009, str. 1.

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V Objave

UPRAVNI POSTOPKI

Evropska komisija

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/8

---

Razpisi za zbiranje predlogov – Program ESPON 2013

2011/C 245/08

ESPON je Mreža za spremljanje evropskega prostorskega načrtovanja. Podpira razvoj politike v zvezi s kohezijsko politiko EU. ESPON sofinancira Evropski sklad za regionalni razvoj na podlagi cilja 3 za evropsko teritorialno sodelovanje in 31 držav (27 držav članic EU ter Islandija, Lihtenštajn, Norveška in Švica).

V okviru programa ESPON 2013 so zdaj objavljeni razpisi za zbiranje predlogov. Možni upravičenci so javni in zasebni organi iz 31 držav (27 držav članic EU ter Islandija, Lihtenštajn, Norveška in Švica). Raziskovalci in raziskovalne ustanove, univerze, znanstveniki, strokovnjaki in akademske skupine so povabljeni k predložitvi prijav. Razpis za transnacionalne mrežne dejavnosti je namenjen institucijam, ki so potrjene kot kontaktne točke ESPON.

| 1. | Razpis za zbiranje predlogov za projekte aplikativnih raziskav:






  — | Evropske sosednje regije (proračun 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Razpis za zbiranje predlogov za projekte aplikativnih raziskav:

—

Evropske sosednje regije (proračun 750 000 EUR)

| — | Mala in srednje velika mesta v njihovem funkcionalnem teritorialnem kontekstu (proračun 650 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Mala in srednje velika mesta v njihovem funkcionalnem teritorialnem kontekstu (proračun 650 000 EUR)

| — | Ozemeljska razsežnost revščine in socialne izključenosti v Evropi (proračun 750 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ozemeljska razsežnost revščine in socialne izključenosti v Evropi (proračun 750 000 EUR)

| — | Gospodarske krize: prilagodljivost regij (proračun 759 153 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Gospodarske krize: prilagodljivost regij (proračun 759 153 EUR)

| 2. | Razpis za zbiranje predlogov za ciljne analize na osnovi prijave interesa zainteresiranih strani:






  — | Poli rasti v Jugovzhodni Evropi (proračun 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Razpis za zbiranje predlogov za ciljne analize na osnovi prijave interesa zainteresiranih strani:

—

Poli rasti v Jugovzhodni Evropi (proračun 360 000 EUR)

| — | Glavni kazalniki za teritorialno kohezijo in prostorsko načrtovanje (proračun 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Glavni kazalniki za teritorialno kohezijo in prostorsko načrtovanje (proračun 360 000 EUR)

| — | Bivalne krajine za trajnostni teritorialni razvoj (proračun 379 796,09 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bivalne krajine za trajnostni teritorialni razvoj (proračun 379 796,09 EUR)

| — | Krajinska politika za park treh dežel (proračun 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Krajinska politika za park treh dežel (proračun 360 000 EUR)

| — | Severno morje – razširjanje transnacionalnih rezultatov (proračun 340 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Severno morje – razširjanje transnacionalnih rezultatov (proračun 340 000 EUR)

Navedene teme za ciljne analize bodo vključene v razpis pod pogojem, da bo podpisan sporazum z zainteresiranimi stranmi z zamislimi za projekte. Teme bodo torej potrjene šele z dnevom objave razpisa, 24. avgustom 2011. Teme, ki bodo vključene v razpis, bodo na voljo na spletišču ESPON http://www.espon.eu

| 3. | Razpis za zbiranje predlogov v okviru znanstvene platforme ESPON:






  — | Sistem EU za teritorialno spremljanje in poročanje (proračun 598 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Razpis za zbiranje predlogov v okviru znanstvene platforme ESPON:

—

Sistem EU za teritorialno spremljanje in poročanje (proračun 598 000 EUR)

| — | Atlas ESPON za evropske teritorialne strukture in dinamiko (proračun 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Atlas ESPON za evropske teritorialne strukture in dinamiko (proračun 150 000 EUR)

| — | Opredelitev teritorialnih možnosti in izzivov (proračun 350 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Opredelitev teritorialnih možnosti in izzivov (proračun 350 000 EUR)

| — | Paketi „teritorialnih učinkov“ programov ESRR (proračun 500 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Paketi „teritorialnih učinkov“ programov ESRR (proračun 500 000 EUR)

| — | Spletno kartografsko orodje ESPON (proračun 150 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Spletno kartografsko orodje ESPON (proračun 150 000 EUR)

| — | Teritorialno upravljanje v evropski makro regiji – preskus za regijo Baltskega morja (proračun 360 000 EUR) |
| --- | --- |

—

Teritorialno upravljanje v evropski makro regiji – preskus za regijo Baltskega morja (proračun 360 000 EUR)

| 4. | Razpis za zbiranje predlogov za transnacionalne mrežne dejavnosti, objavljen s strani mreže kontaktnih točk ESPON:






  — | Dejavnosti mreže kontaktnih točk ESPON v zvezi s kapitalizacijo na transnacionalni ravni (proračun: 600 227 EUR) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Razpis za zbiranje predlogov za transnacionalne mrežne dejavnosti, objavljen s strani mreže kontaktnih točk ESPON:

—

Dejavnosti mreže kontaktnih točk ESPON v zvezi s kapitalizacijo na transnacionalni ravni (proračun: 600 227 EUR)

Rok za predložitev predlogov je 20. oktober 2011.

Za možne upravičence bosta 13. septembra 2011 v Bruslju organizirana informativni dan in pogovor s partnerji.

Vsa dokumentacija v zvezi z razpisi, vključno s postopkom za prijavo, pravili upravičenosti, merili ocenjevanja in obrazcem za prijavo, je na voljo na spletišču ESPON http://www.espon.eu

---

POSTOPKI V ZVEZI Z IZVAJANJEM POLITIKE KONKURENCE

Evropska komisija

| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/10

---

DRŽAVNA POMOČI – ZDRUŽENO KRALJESTVO

Državna pomoč SA.18859 – 11/C (ex NN 65/10)

Olajšava za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem (ex N 2/04)

Poziv k predložitvi pripomb na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2011/C 245/09

Z dopisom v verodostojnem jeziku z dne 13. julija 2011 na straneh, ki sledijo temu povzetku, je Komisija uradno obvestila Združeno kraljestvo o svoji odločitvi, da začne postopek na podlagi člena 108(2) Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije v zvezi z zgoraj navedenim ukrepom pomoči. V skladu s členom 11(1) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 je Komisija Združeno kraljestvo pozvala k predložitvi pripomb glede namena Komisije, da začne formalni postopek preiskave.

Zainteresirane strani lahko predložijo svoje pripombe o ukrepu v enem mesecu od dneva objave tega povzetka in dopisa, ki sledi, na naslednji naslov:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Faks +32 22951242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Faks +32 22951242

Te pripombe se posredujejo Združenemu kraljestvu. Zainteresirana stran, ki predloži pripombe, lahko pisno zaprosi za zaupno obravnavo svoje identitete in navede razloge za to.

POVZETEK

POSTOPEK

Združeno kraljestvo je z dopisom z dne 5. januarja 2004, evidentiranim dne 9. januarja 2004, priglasilo ukrep olajšave za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem. Ukrep je bil priglašen kot sprememba prvotne olajšave za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem (postopna uvedba dajatve), ki ga je Komisija odobrila z odločitvijo N 863/01. Komisija je 7. maja 2004 sprejela odločitev o nevložitvi ugovora v zvezi z ukrepom. Združenje British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd in podjetje David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd (v nadaljnjem besedilu: vlagatelja) sta 30. avgusta 2004 začela pritožbeni postopek zoper zgoraj navedeno odločitev Komisije o nevložitvi ugovora (tožba je bila vpisana pod opravilno številko T-359/04).

Splošno sodišče je 9. septembra 2010 razveljavilo zgoraj navedeno odločitev Komisije. V skladu s sodbo Komisija ni bila pooblaščena za zakonito sprejetje odločitve o nevložitvi ugovora, saj ni proučila vprašanja o morebitni davčni diskriminaciji med zadevnimi domačimi proizvodi in uvoženimi proizvodi iz Irske. Komisija se ni pritožila zoper to sodbo.

Britanski organi so prekinili izvajanje ukrepa s 1. decembrom 2010, in sicer z razveljavitvijo predpisov o dajatvah na agregate (davčne olajšave za Severno Irsko) iz leta 2004.

OPIS UKREPA

80-odstotna olajšava za dajatve na agregate (v nadaljnjem besedilu: dajatev na agregate) se je uporabljala za neobdelane agregate in za predelane proizvode iz agregatov, pridobljene na Severnem Irskem in ki se v tej državi tržno izkoriščajo.

Dajatev na agregate je okoljski davek na tržno izkoriščanje agregatov, uporablja pa se za kamenje, pesek in prod. V Združenem kraljestvu je bila uvedena s 1. aprilom 2002 iz okoljskih razlogov: da bi se čim več uporabljali reciklirani agregati in druge alternative neobdelanim agregatom ter da bi se spodbujala učinkovito pridobivanje in uporaba neobdelanih agregatov, ki so neobnovljiv naravni vir.

Da bi se učinkoviteje dosegli načrtovani okoljski cilji, česar dajatev na agregate ni zagotovila, so britanski organi za olajšavo določili pogoj, da se podjetja, ki želijo imeti od nje korist, formalno zavežejo in spoštujejo sporazume, sklenjene na pogajanjih z organi Združenega kraljestva in na podlagi katerih morajo med trajanjem olajšave sodelovati pri programu izboljšanja okoljske učinkovitosti.

OCENA

Ob upoštevanju sodbe Splošnega sodišča je Komisija ocenila, ali obstaja neločljiva povezava med samim ukrepom pomoči, ki se dodeli v obliki davčne olajšave, in diskriminatornim obdavčenjem uvoženih proizvodov. Ker je bila v tej zadevi ugotovljena takšna povezava, je morala Komisija oceniti, ali je ukrep pomoči pomenil diskriminatorno notranje obdavčenje, ki je v nasprotju z določbo člena 110 PDEU (prej člen 90 ES). Komisija se sklicuje predvsem na sodno prakso glede nacionalnih zakonodaj, ki določajo davčne olajšave za domače proizvode, če so proizvedeni skladno z določenimi okoljskimi standardi. Takšno notranje obdavčenje ni združljivo s členom 110 PDEU, če olajšava ne velja tudi za uvožene proizvode, proizvedene skladno z istimi standardi. Ker to v primeru olajšave za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem ni bilo izpolnjeno, Komisija dvomi, ali je spremenjena olajšava za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem skladna s Pogodbo, zlasti s členom 110 PDEU.

Ti dvomi glede skladnosti s členom 110 PDEU Komisiji onemogočajo, da bi na tej stopnji ukrep razglasila za združljiv z notranjim trgom. Komisija je ob upoštevanju teh dvomov, kar zadeva združljivost ukrepa s pravili o državni pomoči, ukrep ocenila glede na smernice o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja, zlasti glede pravil o pomoči v obliki znižanj in oprostitev okoljskih dajatev. Glede na to, da je pomoč, ki se dodeli v skladu s spremenjeno olajšavo za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem, nezakonita, saj je Splošno sodišče razveljavilo podlago za združljivost ukrepa, je Komisija ocenila ukrep po smernicah o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja iz leta 2001 in od 2. aprila 2008 (tj. dne, od katerega se uporabljajo) po smernicah o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja iz leta 2008.

Zlasti glede ocene po smernicah o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja iz leta 2001 je Komisija ugotovila, da so pogoji iz smernic izpolnjeni, pri čemer je znova poudarila, da ji dvomi glede združljivosti s členom 110 PDEU onemogočajo, da bi na tej stopnji ukrep razglasila za združljiv z notranjim trgom.

Kar zadeva smernice o državni pomoči za varstvo okolja iz leta 2008 je Komisija v predhodni ugotovitvi navedla, da dvomi, ali je izpolnjen pogoj o nujnosti pomoči, in zlasti ali ni mogoče znatnega povečanja proizvodnih stroškov mogoče prenesti na končne kupce brez večjih znižanj prodaje. Komisija ob tem navaja, da, čeprav so se glede na informacije, ki so jih predložili britanski organi, zaradi dajatve na agregate močno povečali proizvodni stroški, zaradi česar bi bilo navadno verjetno, da takšnih povišanj brez večjih znižanj prodaje ne bo mogoče prenesti na kupce, zaradi premalo podrobnih informacij Komisija na tej stopnji ne more ugotoviti, ali je ta pogoj združljivosti izpolnjen.

Tako Komisija na podlagi predhodne analize dvomi o združljivosti ukrepa „olajšava za dajatve na agregate na Severnem Irskem (ex N 2/04)“ s Pogodbo in z notranjim trgom. V skladu s členom 4(4) Uredbe (ES) št. 659/1999 se je Komisija odločila, da bo začela formalni postopek preiskave, in poziva tretje osebe k predložitvi pripomb.

BESEDILO DOPISA

„The Commission wishes to inform the UK authorities that, having examined the information supplied by them on the aid referred to above, it has decided to open the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

1.   PROCEDURE

| 1. | The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The United Kingdom notified the measure at hand by letter of 5 January 2004, registered on 9 January 2004.

| 2. | The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.

The measure was notified as a modification of the original relief from the aggregates levy in the Northern Ireland (1) which was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 24 April 2002 in case N 863/01 (2).

| 3. | On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.

On 7 May 2004, the Commission adopted a no objections decision with respect to this measure (3).

| 4. | On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04). |
| --- | --- |

4.

On 30 August 2004, the British Aggregates Association, Healy Bros. Ltd and David K. Trotter & Sons Ltd launched an appeal against the abovementioned Commission Decision (the action was registered under Case T-359/04).

| 5. | On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment. |
| --- | --- |

5.

On 9 September 2010, the General Court annulled the abovementioned Commission Decision (4). According to the judgment, the Commission was not entitled to adopt lawfully the decision not to raise objections as it had not examined the question of a possible tax discrimination between the domestic products in question and imported products originating from Ireland. The Commission did not appeal this judgment.

| 6. | On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959). |
| --- | --- |

6.

On 15 December 2010 and 21 December 2011, the UK authorities submitted additional information concerning the measure at hand, including documents concerning the suspension of the implementation of the measure as from 1 December 2010 by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004 (S.I. 2004/1959).

| 7. | The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Commission requested additional information by letter of 2 February 2011. The UK authorities submitted further information by letters of 7 March 2011 and 10 June 2011.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The aggregates levy

| 8. | The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity. |
| --- | --- |

8.

The aggregates levy (hereinafter the “AGL”) is an environmental tax on the commercial exploitation of aggregates and is applied to rock, sand or gravel. It was introduced by the United Kingdom with effect from 1 April 2002 for environmental purposes in order to maximise the use of recycled aggregate and other alternatives to virgin aggregate and to promote the efficient extraction and use of virgin aggregate, which is a non-renewable natural resource. The environmental costs of aggregate extraction being addressed through the AGL include noise, dust, damage to biodiversity and to visual amenity.

| 9. | The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom. |
| --- | --- |

9.

The AGL is applied to virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom (5). The rate at the time of the original notification was GBP 1,60 per tonne (6). It does not apply to secondary and recycled aggregates and to virgin aggregates exported from the United Kingdom.

2.2.   The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 10. | In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products. |
| --- | --- |

10.

In its Decision of 24 April 2002 (N 863/01), the Commission considered that the phased introduction of the AGL in Northern Ireland was compatible with Section E.3.2 of the Community Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection (7) (“the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines”). The approved aid took the form of a five-year degressive scheme of tax relief, starting in 2002 and ending in 2007. The original AGL relief in Northern Ireland covered only the commercial exploitation of aggregate used in the manufacture of processed products.

2.3.   The modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland

| 11. | The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there. |
| --- | --- |

11.

The present Decision concerns exclusively the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, which was applied to virgin aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland and commercially exploited there and processed products from aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland commercially exploited there.

2.3.1.   Background

| 12. | The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development. |
| --- | --- |

12.

The UK authorities explained that, since the introduction of the scheme in 2002, the levy put firms in the Northern Ireland aggregates industry in a more difficult competitive position than initially anticipated. After the gradual introduction of the levy in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in illegal quarrying, and an increase in undeclared imports of aggregate into Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland. No aggregates levy was paid in either case. Consequently, the legitimate quarries paying the levy are being undercut by illegal sources operating outside the levy and therefore losing sales to these illegal sources. The findings in a report commissioned by the UK authorities from the Symonds’ Group (specialist consultants in the quarrying/construction sectors) and other evidence available to the UK Customs and Excise authorities, who were responsible for enforcing the levy, confirmed this development.

| 13. | According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded. |
| --- | --- |

13.

According to the UK authorities at the time of the original notification, the Quarry Products Association Northern Ireland indicated over 38 quarries which they considered to be operating illegally. There was also evidence, as set out in the Symonds Report, of a significant volume of unrecorded imports of aggregate from the Republic of Ireland, on which the levy was being evaded.

| 14. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that, while the AGL is having an appreciable positive environmental effect in Great Britain (details below in points 32-36), it has not been working as intended in Northern Ireland, where the availability of levy-free recycled and alternative materials is very limited and localised, and the infrastructure of collecting and processing such materials is almost non-existent.

2.3.2.   Modification

| 15. | In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8). |
| --- | --- |

15.

In order to provide additional time to the aggregate industry in Northern Ireland to adapt and to achieve the intended environmental effects, the original relief scheme (phased introduction of the AGL) was modified. The relief applied to all types of virgin aggregate, i.e. not only to aggregates used in the manufacturing of processed products, as it was the case for the original relief in case N 863/01, but also to virgin aggregates used directly in the raw state (8).

| 16. | The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9). |
| --- | --- |

16.

The relief was set at 80 % of the AGL level otherwise payable, and was intended to be a transitional arrangement. It came into effect on 1 April 2004 and was supposed to continue until 31 March 2011 (i.e. nine years from the start of the AGL on 1 April 2002) (9).

2.3.3.   Environmental agreements

| 17. | In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief. |
| --- | --- |

17.

In order to more effectively achieve the intended environmental objectives, the UK authorities made the relief conditional upon claimants formally entering into and complying with negotiated agreements with the UK authorities, committing the claimants to a programme of environmental performance improvements over the duration of the relief.

| 18. | The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:






  (a) | the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

18.

The key criteria for entry into the scheme were that:

(a)

the requisite planning permission(s) and environmental regulatory permits etc. had to be in place for each eligible site; and

| (b) | the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the site operator was required to “sign-up” to a regime of environmental audits. The first audit had to be commissioned and submitted within 12 months of the date of entry to the scheme and updated every two years thereafter.

| 19. | Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

19.

Each agreement was individually tailored to the circumstances of the quarry, taking into account, for example, current standards and scope for improvement. The areas of performance covered were: air quality; archaeology and geodiversity; biodiversity; blasting; community responsibility; dust; energy efficiency; groundwater; landscape and visual intrusion; noise; oil and chemical storage and handling; restoration and aftercare; use of alternatives to primary aggregates; surface water; off-site effects of transport; and waste management.

| 20. | The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Department of Environment in Northern Ireland was responsible for monitoring these agreements, and the relief is withdrawn for those firms which have significant shortcomings.

2.3.4.   Aggregates production costs, selling price and price elasticity of demand

| 21. | As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

  Table 1


  Selling price







  Type of rock | Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Basalt | 4,21 |
| Sandstone | 4,37 |
| Limestone | 3,72 |
| Sand and gravel | 4,80 |
| Other | 5,57 |
| Weighted average price | 4,42 |

21.

As regards the aggregates production costs, the UK authorities explained that they vary significantly from quarry to quarry and that the same is valid for the prices (10). The average selling price ex-quarry for different classes of aggregates is summarised in Table 1 below (11). Profit margins are again variable, but the industry estimates that 2 % to 5 % is a typical level.

Table 1

Selling price

Type of rock

Price ex-quarry before tax (GBP/tonne)

Basalt

4,21

Sandstone

4,37

Limestone

3,72

Sand and gravel

4,80

Other

5,57

Weighted average price

4,42

| 22. | As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

  Table 2 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 2,9 | 3,1 | 3,5 | 3,4 | 3,9 | 3,6 | 4,3 | 4,3 |
| GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne | 7,9 | 8,4 | 9,0 | 7,7 | 8,8 | 9,7 | 9,2 | 10,9 |

22.

As regards in general the difference in price levels between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the UK authorities explain that suppliers in Northern Ireland have never been able to charge the same price as in Great Britain. The UK authorities illustrated this by the information presented in Table 2 below. The levy at the full rate would therefore represent a much higher proportion of the selling price in an already suppressed market. This inability to pass on costs to customers has been a significant historic factor in the lack of investment in environmental improvement and is explained by economic (fragmentation of the market) and geological factors.

Table 2

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

NI aggregates cost GBP/tonne

2,9

3,1

3,5

3,4

3,9

3,6

4,3

4,3

GB aggregates cost GBP/tonne

7,9

8,4

9,0

7,7

8,8

9,7

9,2

10,9

| 23. | As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic. |
| --- | --- |

23.

As regards the price elasticity of demand, the UK authorities explained, based on a survey of research literature (12), that the price elasticity of demand for aggregates ranges from 0,2 to 0,5. The UK authorities’ examination of aggregates quantity and price data for Great Britain and Northern Ireland suggests that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52. The UK authorities could therefore conclude tentatively that the demand for aggregates in Northern Ireland is relatively inelastic.

2.3.5.   Pass-on and sales reductions

| 24. | As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain. |
| --- | --- |

24.

As regards the pass-on of increased production costs to final customers and potential sales reductions, the UK authorities referred to the abovementioned Symonds Report. According to the UK authorities, the report demonstrates that, following the introduction of the levy in 2002, the average price of aggregate in Northern Ireland had increased by much less than would have been expected if the AGL had been passed on in full, and that this was linked to a fall in legitimate sales, which was proportionally much larger than the fall recorded in Great Britain.

| 25. | Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

  Table 3


  A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland











  Product | 2000-2001
  (million tonnes) | 2001-2002
  (million tonnes) | 2002-2003
  (million tonnes) | Fall,
  2001-2003
  (%) | Fall,
  2002-2003
  (%) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sand and gravel | 2,35 | 2,34 | 1,91 | –18,7 | –8,4 |
| Crushed rock | 7,86 | 7,88 | 7,27 | –7,5 | –7,7 |
| Fill material | 3,00 | 3,89 | 1,71 | –43,0 | –56,0 |
| Total | 13,21 | 14,11 | 10,89 | –17,6 | –22,8 |

25.

Furthermore, the UK authorities explained that the Symonds Report confirmed that the sales of aggregate, and in particular the sales of low-grade aggregate and fill, fell in the year ending 31 March 2003 compared with the levels experienced in the two pre-AGL years. The Symonds Report showed (see Table 3 below) that the production from legitimate quarries in calendar year 2002 was significantly below the established trend in aggregate sales (generally, over the last 30 years, there had been a rising trend in aggregate sales in Northern Ireland). In Great Britain aggregate production fell in 2002 by 5,7 %, compared with a slight increase the previous year (however, trend analysis showed that in Great Britain the production had generally been in a declining trend over the previous 10 years).

Table 3

A summary of Symonds’ assessment of the fall in sales by legitimate quarries in Northern Ireland

Product

2000-2001

(million tonnes)

2001-2002

(million tonnes)

2002-2003

(million tonnes)

Fall,

2001-2003

(%)

Fall,

2002-2003

(%)

Sand and gravel

2,35

2,34

1,91

–18,7

–8,4

Crushed rock

7,86

7,88

7,27

–7,5

–7,7

Fill material

3,00

3,89

1,71

–43,0

–56,0

Total

13,21

14,11

10,89

–17,6

–22,8

| 26. | The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state. |
| --- | --- |

26.

The UK authorities explained in this context that the data provided by Symonds indicated that once the levy had been introduced at GBP/tonne 1,60, the average price of aggregates in Northern Ireland had risen by about 25-30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne. Even allowing for the fact that aggregate used in processed products, which benefited from an 80 % relief under the original 2002 degressive credit scheme in Northern Ireland, is included in that average, that implies that quarry operators in Northern Ireland were having to absorb a substantial proportion of the levy. On the assumption that processed products used half of the aggregate production in Northern Ireland, and that their price was unaffected by the levy in 2002, that still implies according to the UK authorities that, on average, over GBP 1/tonne of the levy had to be absorbed on each tonne of aggregate sold for use in its raw state.

| 27. | As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers. |
| --- | --- |

27.

As regards specifically the manufacturers using aggregates in their processed products, the UK authorities explained in this context that, because of the original relief for aggregate used in processed products (N 863/01), the additional costs fell very largely on Northern Ireland producers of aggregate for use in its raw state. But importantly the original relief (phased introduction of the AGL) was to be withdrawn by stages. Therefore, if the original relief had not been modified in 2004, the processed products sector too would have begun to suffer from the same economic difficulties of loss of demand and inability to pass on the extra levy costs to its customers.

2.3.6.   Other information

| 28. | The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011). |
| --- | --- |

28.

The estimated annual budget (State resources foregone) varied at the time of the original notification between GBP 15 million (2004-2005) and GBP 35 million (2010-2011).

| 29. | As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible. |
| --- | --- |

29.

As regards the number of beneficiaries, it was estimated that approximately 170 quarry operators would be eligible.

| 30. | The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The granting authority of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs.

2.4.   Position of third parties, appreciable positive effects

| 31. | In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue. |
| --- | --- |

31.

In the context of the assessment by the Commission of the original notification of the modified AGL relief in Northern Ireland, the British Aggregates Association (BAA), other associations of producers and individual undertakings contested in their letters that the AGL has an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection. The Commission therefore asked the UK authorities to submit additional information concerning this issue.

| 32. | The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects. |
| --- | --- |

32.

The UK authorities provided in this context empirical information based on the initial assessment of the AGL’s environmental impact using all available data. The submitted information suggested that in Great Britain the aggregates levy had appreciable effects.

| 33. | As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock. |
| --- | --- |

33.

As regards the aggregate production, the UK authorities explained that the amount of virgin material extracted fell significantly in 2002 compared to earlier years and by 5,7 % compared to 2001. In 2002 the production of sand and gravel decreased by 6 % compared to 2001. The production of marine sand and gravel output fell by 5,9 % in 2002 compared to 2001. There was also a gradual decline in the production of crushed rock.

| 34. | As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates. |
| --- | --- |

34.

As for the aggregate costs, it was explained by the UK authorities that the costs of aggregates subject to the levy were significantly higher than the costs of aggregates that were not subject to the levy — by about GBP 1,40 per tonne for crushed rock and just over GBP 1 per tonne for sand and gravel. It therefore appeared that the environmental costs of the supply of aggregates were passed on, to a large extent, to the consumers. This is consistent with the objective of incorporating the negative environmental externalities of the quarrying the aggregates into the cost of those aggregates.

| 35. | With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003. |
| --- | --- |

35.

With respect to the substitution by recycled and alternative materials, the UK authorities mentioned that the scope of the levy is encouraging the substitution of virgin aggregate by recycled or secondary aggregate products. In particular, the sales of slate waste and china clay waste increased, reducing both the demand for virgin aggregates and the tipping of such alternative materials. Aggregates recycling companies reported sales increases for 2002 and 2003.

| 36. | Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Finally, as regards the investments in recycling, the UK authorities mentioned that the AGL had an effect in reinforcing and supporting the active considerations by the construction industry of recycled aggregates in the construction market. A new recycling plant was opened in South Yorkshire and an East Midlands road construction company also opened a new recycling facility.

3.   ASSESSMENT

3.1.   State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC)
   (13)

| 37. | State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

37.

State aid is defined in Article 107(1) of the TFEU as any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever, which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| 38. | The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The AGL relief was granted through State resources, in the form of a tax rate reduction, to companies situated in a defined part of the territory of the UK (Northern Ireland), favouring them by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The recipients of the aid are involved in the extraction of aggregates or in the manufacturing of processed products, which are economic activities involving trade between Member States.

| 39. | Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC). |
| --- | --- |

39.

Accordingly, the Commission concludes that the notified measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC).

3.2.   Lawfulness of the aid

| 40. | Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15). |
| --- | --- |

40.

Despite the fact that the measure at hand was notified to the Commission and put into effect only after the Commission adopted a positive decision, the recipients of the aid cannot entertain any legitimate expectations as to the lawfulness of the implementation of the aid, since the Commission’s decision was challenged in due time before the General Court (14). Following the annulment by the General Court of the Commission’s no objections decision, that decision must be considered void with regard to all persons as from the date of its adoption. Since the annulment of the Commission’s decision put a stop, retroactively, to the application of the presumption of lawfulness, the implementation of the aid in question must be regarded as unlawful (15).

3.3.   Compatibility of the aid

| 41. | It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is a matter of settled case law that although Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU leave a margin of discretion to the Commission for assessing the compatibility of an aid scheme with the requirements of the internal market, this assessment procedure must not produce a result which is contrary to the specific provisions of the TFEU. The Commission is obliged to ensure that Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU are applied consistently with other provisions of the TFEU. This is according to the General Court all the more necessary where those other provisions also pursue the objective of undistorted competition in the internal market (16).

| 42. | Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17). |
| --- | --- |

42.

Furthermore, the General Court recalled that the power to use certain forms of tax relief, particularly when they are aimed at enabling the maintenance of forms of production or undertakings which, without those specific tax privileges, would not be profitable due to high production costs, is subject to the condition that the Member States using that power extend the benefit thereof in a non-discriminatory and non-protective manner to imported products in the same situation (17).

| 43. | The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States. |
| --- | --- |

43.

The Commission refers in this context to the fact that Article 110 of the TFEU (18)
   (19) ensures the free movement of goods between the Member States in normal conditions of competition by the elimination of all forms of protection that may result from the application of internal taxation that discriminates against products from other Member States.

| 44. | As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated. |
| --- | --- |

44.

As set out above, the aid is provided in the form of a tax rate reduction from an environmental tax, the AGL, to companies established in Northern Ireland which have entered into environmental agreements. This provides these companies with an advantage by reducing the costs that they would normally have to bear. The relief was introduced to provide additional time to the aggregate industry of Northern Ireland to adapt, as the introduction of the AGL had put firms in Northern Ireland in a more difficult competitive situation than initially anticipated.

| 45. | Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products. |
| --- | --- |

45.

Aggregate producers established in Ireland may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement and are not otherwise eligible to benefit from the AGL exemption scheme by showing, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements which aggregates producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Since aggregate products imported from Ireland are therefore taxed at the full AGL rate, and this differentiated taxation of the same product results from the AGL scheme itself, there is an intrinsic link between the aid measure, granted by way of a tax relief, and the discriminatory tax treatment of imported products.

| 46. | Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20). |
| --- | --- |

46.

Therefore, in the present case, the Commission considers that it must also assess whether the aid measure complies with the rule laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU. In these circumstances, a violation of Article 110 of the TFEU would preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. As the General Court stated in its judgment of 9 September 2010 in relation to the present case, aid cannot be implemented or approved in the form of tax discrimination in respect of products originating from other Member States (20).

3.3.1.   Compliance with Article 110 of the TFEU

| 47. | According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

47.

According to settled case-law, charges resulting from a general system of internal taxation applied systematically, in accordance with the same objective criteria, to categories of products irrespective of their origin or destination fall within the scope Article 110 of the TFEU. It should therefore be ascertained whether a levy such as the AGL constitutes internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 of the TFEU. In this respect, the Commission notes that the AGL, which is of a fiscal nature, is levied on virgin aggregate extracted in the United Kingdom and to imported virgin aggregate on its first use or sale in the United Kingdom. It applies to imported aggregates in the same way as it applies to aggregates extracted in the United Kingdom. Consequently, a levy such as the AGL amounts to internal taxation, for the purposes of Article 110 of the TFEU.

| 48. | According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect. |
| --- | --- |

48.

According to settled case-law, the first paragraph of Article 110 of the TFEU is infringed where the tax levied on the imported product and that levied on the similar domestic product are calculated in a different manner on the basis of different criteria which lead, if only in certain cases, to higher taxation being imposed on the imported product. It follows that a system of taxation is compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU only if it is so arranged as to exclude any possibility of imported products being taxed more heavily than domestic products and, therefore, only if it cannot under any circumstances have a discriminatory effect.

| 49. | Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements. |
| --- | --- |

49.

Under the AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland, a reduced rate is levied on virgin aggregates extracted there by producers having entered into environmental agreements.

| 50. | Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Virgin aggregates extracted in other Member States are not eligible to benefit from the AGL relief, since aggregate producers established in other Member States may not, under the United Kingdom legislation, enter into an environmental agreement. Producers of such aggregates do not even have the possibility to show, for example, that their activities comply with the environmental agreements that aggregate producers in Northern Ireland may conclude. Accordingly, identical products imported from other Member States are taxed at the full AGL rate.

| 51. | Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements. |
| --- | --- |

51.

Such distinction cannot in the Commission’s view be justified on the grounds that the UK authorities cannot conclude environmental agreements with producers of aggregates established outside the United Kingdom, because those authorities have jurisdiction in the United Kingdom only. The UK legislation might have for example given importers the opportunity to demonstrate that the aggregates imported into Northern Ireland had been produced in a way that they comply with the environmental requirements imposed on beneficiaries in Northern Ireland in the agreements.

| 52. | Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21). |
| --- | --- |

52.

Furthermore in this context, the Commission recalls the case-law concerning national legislation providing tax advantages to domestic products in case they are produced under certain environmental standards. Such internal taxation is not considered compatible with Article 110 of the TFEU if the advantage is not extended to imported products manufactured under the same standards (21).

| 53. | Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment. |
| --- | --- |

53.

Finally, the Commission points out that Article 110 of the TFEU targets the level of taxation imposed directly or indirectly on the products concerned (22), i.e. the tax burden each of the products has to bear. Thus, the focus is on the fact that the tax forms a cost element relevant to the formation of the price, and thus to the competitive position of the product vis-à-vis similar products (23). It follows that the identity of the taxpayer is not at the core of the assessment.

| 54. | Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

54.

Accordingly, the Commission doubts whether the modified AGL relief applicable in Northern Ireland complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 of the TFEU. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market at this stage.

3.3.2.   Compatibility of the measure under the Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 55. | Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Considering the environmental objective of the measure and notwithstanding the doubts expressed above (point 54), the Commission has assessed the compatibility of the measure at hand according to Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU and in the light of the Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection.

| 56. | The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful). |
| --- | --- |

56.

The Commission originally assessed the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. In the meantime, the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been adopted. As noted in point 40 above, the result of the annulment of the Commission Decision of 7 May 2004 is that the measure as it has been applied since that date (and until its suspension on 1 December 2010) must be considered as being unlawful. The Commission has stated that it will always assess the compatibility of unlawful State aid with the internal market in accordance with the substantive criteria set out in any instrument in force at the time when the aid was granted (24). Nothing in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines suggests that this rule should not be applied to the present case. Those Guidelines specify, in point 204, that Commission decisions on notifications taken after the publication of the Guidelines in the Official Journal of the European Union will be based exclusively on that text, even if the notification predates that publication. And point 205 simply restates the position set out in the notice as regards aid that has not been notified (and is therefore unlawful).

| 57. | Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:






  (a) | the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and |
| --- | --- | --- |

57.

Considering that the aid was granted during the period covering the applicability of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines as well as after the publication of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the Commission will assess the measure at hand pursuant to:

(a)

the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines; and

| (b) | the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines as from 2 April 2008.

Ad (a) Compatibility of the measure under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 58. | Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions. |
| --- | --- |

58.

Section E.3.2 of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines concerns rules applicable to all operating aid in the form of tax reductions or exemptions.

| 59. | The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax. |
| --- | --- |

59.

The AGL was introduced in April 2002. That the rate effectively applicable was not 100 % for all operators across all of the United Kingdom does not alter this fact or the principle that the new tax should apply to the entire territory. The Commission will therefore treat the AGL as an existing tax in the sense of the distinction made in the abovementioned section between new and existing taxes. Furthermore, there is no harmonisation at EU level of this type of tax.

| 60. | Point 51(2) provides that:
  “The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:






  (a) | the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection; |
| --- | --- | --- |

60.

Point 51(2) provides that:

“The provisions in point 51.1 may be applied to existing taxes if the following two conditions are satisfied at the same time:

(a)

the tax in question must have an appreciable positive impact in terms of environmental protection;

| (b) | the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the derogations for the firms concerned must have been decided on when the tax was adopted or must have become necessary as a result of a significant change in economic conditions that placed the firms in a particularly difficult competitive situation. In the latter instance, the amount of the reduction may not exceed the increase in costs resulting from the change in economic conditions. Once there is no longer any increase in costs, the reduction must no longer apply.”.

| 61. | Point 51(1) provides that:
  “These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:






  1. | When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:






  (a) | these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.
  These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

61.

Point 51(1) provides that:

“These exemptions can constitute operating aid which may be authorised on the following conditions:

1.

When, for environmental reasons, a Member State introduces a new tax in a sector of activity or on products in respect of which no Community tax harmonisation has been carried out or when the tax envisaged by the Member State exceeds that laid down by Community legislation, the Commission takes the view that exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases:

(a)

these exemptions are conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms whereby the firms or associations of firms undertake to achieve environmental protection objectives during the period for which the exemptions apply or when firms conclude voluntary agreements which have the same effect. Such agreements or undertakings may relate, among other things, to a reduction in energy consumption, a reduction in emissions or any other environmental measure. The substance of the agreements must be negotiated by each Member State and will be assessed by the Commission when the aid projects are notified to it. Member States must ensure strict monitoring of the commitments entered into by the firms or associations of firms. The agreements concluded between a Member State and the firms concerned must stipulate the penalty arrangements applicable if the commitments are not met.

These provisions also apply where a Member State makes a tax reduction subject to conditions that have the same effect as the agreements or commitments referred to above;

| (b) | these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:






  — | where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

these exemptions need not be conditional on the conclusion of agreements between the Member State concerned and the recipient firms if the following alternative conditions are satisfied:

—

where the reduction concerns a Community tax, the amount effectively paid by the firms after the reduction must remain higher than the Community minimum in order to provide the firms with an incentive to improve environmental protection,

| — | where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”. |
| --- | --- |

—

where the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax, the firms eligible for the reduction must nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax.”.

| 62. | With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)). |
| --- | --- |

62.

With respect, first, to point 51(2), the Commission notes that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials (point 51(2)(a)).

| 63. | Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market. |
| --- | --- |

63.

Given that, at the time of the notification of the amendment in 2004, the measure had already been in operation for two years, the UK was able to provide empirical information on the effects of the AGL (described above in points 32-36). It is therefore clear that the AGL has appreciable positive environmental effects in the majority of the territory of the UK in line with the requirement of point 51(2)(a) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines. What is more, the environmental agreements concluded with aggregates companies in Northern Ireland benefiting from 80 % AGL relief clearly have positive environmental effects and do not in any way undermine the objectives pursued by the AGL. On the contrary, they aim to encourage those companies to pay at least a part of the tax and contribute to improving environmental performance, rather than becoming a part of the illegal aggregates market.

| 64. | The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence). |
| --- | --- |

64.

The Commission also notes that the fundamental decision to relieve certain firms in Northern Ireland from the AGL was already taken when the tax was introduced on 1 April 2002 (point 51(2)(b), first sentence).

| 65. | In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

65.

In the light of the above, the Commission considers that the conditions of point 51(2) of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines have been fulfilled.

| 66. | In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent). |
| --- | --- |

66.

In relation to point 51(1), tax exemption decisions covering a 10-year period with no degressivity may be justified in two cases. The UK authorities submitted that both grounds for justification were fulfilled. That said, despite the introduction of compulsory environmental agreements in 2004 (point 51(1)(a)), the arguments of the UK authorities submit focus on the other scenario: the reduction concerns a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax and the firms eligible for the reduction nevertheless pay a significant proportion of the national tax (point 51(1)(b), second indent).

| 67. | In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25). |
| --- | --- |

67.

In the present case, the relief does indeed concern a domestic tax imposed in the absence of a Community tax. The UK authorities proposed to maintain the tax at the level of 20 % of the full rate, which the Commission considers significant (25).

| 68. | For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

68.

For these reasons, the compatibility conditions laid down in the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines may be considered as being fulfilled. However, it is recalled that in view of the doubts expressed in point 54 in relation to Article 110 of the TFEU, the Commission is precluded from finding the measure compatible with the internal market on the basis of the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines at this stage.

Ad (b) Compatibility of the measure under the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines

| 69. | Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159). |
| --- | --- |

69.

Considering the form of the aid (tax rate reduction) granted under the measure at hand, the compatibility assessment basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines is Chapter 4 regarding “Aid in the form of reductions or of exemptions from environmental taxes” (points 151-159).

| 70. | As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes. |
| --- | --- |

70.

As there is no EU harmonisation for taxes such as the AGL, the measure at hand has been assessed pursuant to the rules for non-harmonised environmental taxes.

Environmental benefit

| 71. | Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued. |
| --- | --- |

71.

Pursuant to point 151 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, aid in the form of reductions of or exemptions from environmental taxes will be considered compatible with the common market provided that it contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in the level of environmental protection and that the tax reductions and exemptions do not undermine the general objective pursued.

| 72. | As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials. |
| --- | --- |

72.

As regards the direct effect of the AGL, the Commission notes, as in the case of the assessment under the 2001 Environmental Aid Guidelines, that the tax is levied on activities for reasons of environmental protection. Its aim is to protect the environment by contributing to reducing the extraction of virgin aggregates and encouraging the use of alternative materials.

| 73. | Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Furthermore, with respect to the presence of at least an indirect contribution of the AGL relief to an improvement in the level of environmental protection, the Commission notes that the UK authorities decided to grant the 80 % AGL relief to companies from the aggregates industry in Northern Ireland as due to several factors described above the AGL failed to deliver the planned environmental benefits in Northern Ireland. The UK authorities therefore opted for an alternative approach for Northern Ireland in the form of the conclusion of environmental agreements with the beneficiaries while the AGL continued to be fully applicable in Great Britain. It can be therefore concluded that the AGL relief in Northern Ireland contributes at least indirectly to an improvement in environmental protection and that it does not undermine the general objective pursued by the AGL.

Necessity of the aid

| 74. | According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

74.

According to point 158 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, the three following cumulative criteria should be fulfilled to ensure that the aid is necessary.

(1)   Objective and transparent criteria

| 75. | Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

75.

Firstly, the choice of beneficiaries must be based on objective and transparent criteria and aid should be granted in the same way for all competitors in the same sector if they are in a similar factual situation, in line with point 158(a) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 76. | The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The eligibility for relief is based on certain types of activity (extraction of aggregates and production of processed products from aggregates) and is pre-defined by legislation. The Commission finds that the beneficiaries of the relief are defined using criteria that are objective and transparent.

(2)   Substantial increase in production costs

| 77. | Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Secondly, the tax without reduction must lead to a substantial increase in production costs, in line with point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

| 78. | The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26). |
| --- | --- |

78.

The UK authorities did not provide information on the production costs, but rather on the levels of the ex-quarry selling price for different types of aggregates. Considering that the levels of profit margin was provided, the Commission is able to make an approximate calculation and conclude that the lowest possible share of the full AGL in relation to the production costs is almost 30 % (26).

| 79. | Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

79.

Even these approximate calculations allow the Commission to conclude that the tax without reduction leads to the substantial increase in production costs required by point 158(b) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines.

(3)   Impossibility to pass on the substantial increase in production costs

| 80. | Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned. |
| --- | --- |

80.

Thirdly, according to point 158(c) of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, compliance with the necessity criteria requires that the abovementioned substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions. In this respect, the Member State may provide estimations of inter alia the product price elasticity of the sector concerned in the relevant geographic market, as well as estimates of lost sales and/or reduced profits for the companies in the sector or category concerned.

| 81. | The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland. |
| --- | --- |

81.

The Commission notes in this context that the arguments of the UK authorities that the increase in production costs cannot be passed on without leading to important sales reductions are based on a comparison between the increase in price due to the introduction of the AGL (about 25 to 30 pence/tonne in 2002 compared with 2001 in Northern Ireland, whereas in Great Britain the price had risen by GBP 1-1,40/tonne). As regards the reduction in (legitimate) sales in Northern Ireland, the Commission notes that they varied in total for all types of aggregates between – 17,6 % (2001-2003) and – 22,8 % (2002-2003) and are proportionally much larger that those recorded in Great Britain. The Commission considers that these arguments can be considered as an indication of the difficulties encountered in passing on the increased production costs in Northern Ireland.

| 82. | The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased. |
| --- | --- |

82.

The Commission nevertheless points out in this context that the UK authorities did not provide sufficiently detailed data demonstrating/quantifying the impact on these arguments of the fact that the manufacturers of processed products from aggregates had never paid the full AGL as its introduction in the Northern Ireland was phased.

| 83. | Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007. |
| --- | --- |

83.

Furthermore, with respect to the demonstration of sales reductions, the UK authorities did not provide explanations concerning the development of the aggregates markets in Northern Ireland after 2002. Figure 2 of the QPA Northern Ireland Report to the OFT Market Study into the UK aggregates sector as submitted by the UK authorities shows increase in production as from 2004 to 2007.

| 84. | In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided. |
| --- | --- |

84.

In this context, the UK authorities also stated in their submission that the “costs increase affected operators’ turnover and reduced their profits”. Nevertheless no data supporting that statement were provided.

| 85. | With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided. |
| --- | --- |

85.

With respect to the demonstration of compliance with this compatibility condition, the UK authorities submitted only data on the overall industry level, no representative samples of individual beneficiaries based e.g. on their size were provided.

| 86. | Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers. |
| --- | --- |

86.

Finally, the Commission notes that the UK authorities’ observations suggest that for most types of aggregates the price elasticity ranges from close to zero to about 0,52, i.e. seems to be relatively inelastic, what would in principle mean that the increase in production costs can be passed on to final customers. The UK authorities did not provide any further explanations/calculations concerning specifically the impact of the relative inelasticity as concluded on the arguments provided with respect to (the inability to) pass on the production costs increase to final customers.

| 87. | Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

87.

Although the information provided by the UK authorities shows a very significant increase of the production costs due to the AGL, which would normally make it likely that such increase cannot be passed on without important sales reductions, in the light of the above, in particular the insufficiently detailed information, the Commission at this stage cannot conclude that this compatibility condition is met.

Proportionality of the aid

| 88. | With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:






  (a) | it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers; |
| --- | --- | --- |

88.

With respect to the proportionality of the aid, each beneficiary must according to point 159 of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines fulfil one of the following criteria:

(a)

it must pay a proportion of the national tax which is broadly equivalent to the environmental performance of each individual beneficiary compared to the performance related to the best performing technique within the EEA. The beneficiaries can benefit at most from a reduction corresponding to the increase in production costs from the tax, using the best performing technique and which cannot be passed on to customers;

| (b) | it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it must pay at least 20 % of the national tax unless a lower rate can be justified;

| (c) | it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

it can enter into agreements with the Member State whereby they commit themselves to achieve environmental objectives with the same effect as what would be achieved under points 1 or 2 or if the Community minima were applied.

| 89. | The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax. |
| --- | --- |

89.

The condition of proportionality of the aid is complied with as the beneficiaries of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland still pay 20 % of the tax.

3.4.   Conclusions

| 90. | On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

90.

On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the Commission has doubts as to whether the measure “Relief from aggregates levy in Northern Ireland (ex N 2/04)” complies with the Treaty, in particular Article 110 thereof. These doubts preclude the Commission from finding the measure compatible with the internal market.

| 91. | The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158. |
| --- | --- |

91.

The Commission also has doubts as to whether the measure complies with the necessity condition of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines, in particular that the substantial increase in production costs cannot be passed on to customers without leading to important sales reductions, as required by point 158.

| 92. | Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision. |
| --- | --- |

92.

Consequently, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27) the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure and invites the United Kingdom to submit its comments on that decision.

4.   DECISION

| 93. | In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

93.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the United Kingdom to submit their comments and to provide all such information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests that your authorities forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| 94. | The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

94.

The Commission notes that the United Kingdom has already suspended the implementation of the measure by revoking the Aggregates Levy (Northern Ireland Tax Credit) Regulations 2004. The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

| 95. | The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.“ |
| --- | --- |

95.

The Commission warns the United Kingdom that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month from the date of such publication.“

---

(1)  The phased introduction of the AGL.

1

(2)  OJ C 133, 5.6.2002, p.11.

2

(3)  OJ C 81, 2.4.2005, p. 4.

3

(4)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, judgment of 9 September 2010, not yet reported.

4

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(5)  The AGL is applied to imported raw aggregate, but not to aggregate contained in imported processed products.

5

(6)  On 2 April 2008, i.e. the day from which the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines were applicable, the level of AGL was GBP 1,95/tonne.

6

(7)  OJ C 37, 3.2.2001, p. 3.

7

(8)  The aggregates extracted in Northern Ireland and shipped to any destination in Great Britain were liable to the AGL at the full rate. This was also the case for aggregate extracted in Northern Ireland that was used in the manufacturing of processed products shipped to Great Britain. This ensured that aggregates and processed products from Northern Ireland did not enjoy a competitive advantage in the market of Great Britain.

8

(9)  As referred to above, the implementation of the AGL relief in Northern Ireland was suspended as from 1 December 2010.

9

(10)  The information was submitted by the UK authorities for the purposes of an assessment of the measure on the basis of the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines. DETI Minerals Statement 2009.

10

(11)  Distribution costs depend on haulage distances, with haulage costs in the range of 15 to 20 pence per tonne per mile, with aggregate being delivered within 10 to 15 miles, depending on local circumstances.

11

(12)  Ecotec (1998) Report; EEA Report (No 2/2008) effectiveness of environmental taxes and charges for managing sand, gravel and rock extraction in selected EU countries; British Geological Survey (2008): The need for indigenous aggregates production in England.

12

(13)  The definition of State aid laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU did not change from the one contained in Article 87(1) EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

13

(14)  See Case C-199/06 CELF [2008] ECR I-469, paragraphs 63 and 66 to 68.

14

CELF

(15)  See Case C-199/06 CELF, cited above, paragraphs 61 and 64.

15

CELF

(16)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 91.

16

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(17)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 93.

17

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(18)  “No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.

18

Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”

(19)  The rules for national internal taxation as laid down in Article 110 of the TFEU did not change from those contained in Article 90 EC which was in force when the original notification was submitted in 2004.

19

(20)  Case T-359/04 British Aggregates a. o. v Commission, cited above, paragraph 92.

20

British Aggregates a. o.

Commission

(21)  Case 21/79 Commission v Italy [1980] ECR p. 1, paragraphs 23 to 26; and in particular Case C-213/96 Outukumpu [1998] ECR I-1777, paragraphs 30 et seq.

21

Commission

Italy

Outukumpu

(22)  The identity of the taxpayer as such is therefore of limited importance.

22

(23)  “Thus [Article 110] must guarantee the complete neutrality of internal taxation as regards competition between domestic products and imported products.” (Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR p. 1343, paragraph 24).

23

[Article 110]

Bergandi

(24)  Commission Notice on the determination of the applicable rules for the assessment of unlawful State aid, OJ C 119, 22.5.2002, p. 22.

24

(25)  See for instance Commission Decision on case N 449/01 (Germany) — Continuation of the ecological tax reform (OJ C 137, 8.6.2002, p. 34). Furthermore, this position was confirmed in the 2008 Environmental Aid Guidelines where the payment of 20 % of the tax was explicitly “codified” as a proportionality condition of the aid granted in the form of exemption or reduction from environmental taxes (point 159(b)).

25

(26)  The highest selling price (GBP 5,57/tonne), the lowest profit margin (2 %) and the level of the AGL as originally notified in 2004 (GBP 1,6/tonne) are assumed. If the AGL level on 1 April 2008 (GBP 1,95/tonne) is applied, the share increases to approximately 36 %. Any other combination of price and profit margin necessarily results in the AGL presenting more then 30 % of the production costs.

26

(27)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

27

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| 24.8.2011 | SL | Uradni list Evropske unije | C 245/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2011

SL

Uradni list Evropske unije

C 245/21

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DRŽAVNA POMOČ – NEMČIJA

(Členi 107 do 109 Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije)

Državna pomoč MC 15/09 – LBBW Deka divestment

(Besedilo velja za EGP)

2011/C 245/10

Komisija je Nemčijo z dopisom z dne 14. januarja 2011 uradno obvestila o svojem sklepu sui generis glede pomoči MC 15/09.

BESEDILO DOPISA

„I.   POSTOPEK

| (1) | Komisija je v sklepu z dne 15. decembra 2009 odobrila kapitalsko injekcijo v višini 5 milijard EUR in ukrep pomoči za oslabljena sredstva v višini 12,7 milijarde EUR za strukturiran portfelj v vrednosti 35 milijard EUR v korist banke Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (v nadaljnjem besedilu: LBBW) v zadevi C 17/09 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sklep LBBW) (1). Ta odobritev je bila pogojena z vrsto zavez s strani Nemčije. Ena od zavez je bila, da bo LBBW do (2) [...] prodala svoje delež v banki Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Deka). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Komisija je v sklepu z dne 15. decembra 2009 odobrila kapitalsko injekcijo v višini 5 milijard EUR in ukrep pomoči za oslabljena sredstva v višini 12,7 milijarde EUR za strukturiran portfelj v vrednosti 35 milijard EUR v korist banke Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (v nadaljnjem besedilu: LBBW) v zadevi C 17/09 (v nadaljnjem besedilu: sklep LBBW) (1). Ta odobritev je bila pogojena z vrsto zavez s strani Nemčije. Ena od zavez je bila, da bo LBBW do (2) [...] prodala svoje delež v banki Deka Bank Deutsche Girozentrale (v nadaljnjem besedilu: Deka).

| (2) | Nemčija je 13. decembra 2010 predložila dopis LBBW, v katerem je bilo navedeno, da Deke ni mogoče odsvojiti pred [...]. 21. decembra 2010 je Nemčija navedla, da sta skrbnik (3) in ministrstvo za finance zvezne dežele Baden-Württemberg potrdila, da je LBBW storila vse za zaključek postopka prodaje do navedenega roka. 22. decembra 2010 je Nemčija Komisijo uradno obvestila o zahtevi za podaljšanje roka za odsvojitev do [...]. 5. januarja 2011 je Nemčija poslala dodatne informacije. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Nemčija je 13. decembra 2010 predložila dopis LBBW, v katerem je bilo navedeno, da Deke ni mogoče odsvojiti pred [...]. 21. decembra 2010 je Nemčija navedla, da sta skrbnik (3) in ministrstvo za finance zvezne dežele Baden-Württemberg potrdila, da je LBBW storila vse za zaključek postopka prodaje do navedenega roka. 22. decembra 2010 je Nemčija Komisijo uradno obvestila o zahtevi za podaljšanje roka za odsvojitev do [...]. 5. januarja 2011 je Nemčija poslala dodatne informacije.

| (3) | 22. decembra 2010 je Nemčija Komisijo obvestila, da se zaradi nujnosti izjemoma strinja s tem, da se ta sklep sprejme v angleškem jeziku. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

22. decembra 2010 je Nemčija Komisijo obvestila, da se zaradi nujnosti izjemoma strinja s tem, da se ta sklep sprejme v angleškem jeziku.

II.   DEJSTVA

| (4) | Sklep LBBW temelji na več zavezah. V točki 5(c) uvodne izjave sklepa LBBW je navedena zaveza Nemčije, da bo LBBW do [...] prodala svoj delež v Deki. Sklep ne dovoljuje izrecno podaljšanja tega roka. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Sklep LBBW temelji na več zavezah. V točki 5(c) uvodne izjave sklepa LBBW je navedena zaveza Nemčije, da bo LBBW do [...] prodala svoj delež v Deki. Sklep ne dovoljuje izrecno podaljšanja tega roka.

| (5) | Deka je javnopravna institucija (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts), ki prek svojih odvisnih družb upravlja zasebne naložbene sklade za nemške hranilnice. Ena polovica je v lasti združenja nemških hranilnic (DSGV), druga pa v lasti deželnih bank (Landesbanken) prek holdinške družbe (v nadaljnjem besedilu: holdinška družba). Posredni delež LBBW v Deki je 14,8 %. Lastnika imata predkupno pravico, če želi ena od strani prodati svoj delež. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Deka je javnopravna institucija (Rechtsfähige Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts), ki prek svojih odvisnih družb upravlja zasebne naložbene sklade za nemške hranilnice. Ena polovica je v lasti združenja nemških hranilnic (DSGV), druga pa v lasti deželnih bank (Landesbanken) prek holdinške družbe (v nadaljnjem besedilu: holdinška družba). Posredni delež LBBW v Deki je 14,8 %. Lastnika imata predkupno pravico, če želi ena od strani prodati svoj delež.

| (6) | DSGV je najprej dala ponudbo za delež LBBW v Deki z veljavnostjo do [...]. Da bi prodaja začela veljati, bi jo morale potrditi vse ostale deželne banke z deležem v Deki, pa tudi sama Deka in njena generalna skupščina. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

DSGV je najprej dala ponudbo za delež LBBW v Deki z veljavnostjo do [...]. Da bi prodaja začela veljati, bi jo morale potrditi vse ostale deželne banke z deležem v Deki, pa tudi sama Deka in njena generalna skupščina.

| (7) | Nemčija je Komisijo obvestila, da nameravajo vse deželne banke, ki so lastnice holdinške družbe, prodati svoje deleže DSGV, s čimer bi slednja postala edini lastnik Deke. Zavezujoča odločitev v zvezi s temi prodajami se pričakuje v naslednjih [...], čeprav zaradi kompleksnosti postopka odločanja ni mogoče izključiti dodatnega zaostanka do [...]. Če deželne banke prodajo svoje deleže v holdinški družbi, bo po mnenju Nemčije lažje pridobiti njihovo soglasje za prodajo deleža LBBW v Deki, kar bo olajšalo postopek prodaje. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Nemčija je Komisijo obvestila, da nameravajo vse deželne banke, ki so lastnice holdinške družbe, prodati svoje deleže DSGV, s čimer bi slednja postala edini lastnik Deke. Zavezujoča odločitev v zvezi s temi prodajami se pričakuje v naslednjih [...], čeprav zaradi kompleksnosti postopka odločanja ni mogoče izključiti dodatnega zaostanka do [...]. Če deželne banke prodajo svoje deleže v holdinški družbi, bo po mnenju Nemčije lažje pridobiti njihovo soglasje za prodajo deleža LBBW v Deki, kar bo olajšalo postopek prodaje.

| (8) | Nemčija je Komisijo obvestila tudi o tem, da je DSGV svojo ponudbo za nakup deleža LBBW v Deki podaljšala do [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Nemčija je Komisijo obvestila tudi o tem, da je DSGV svojo ponudbo za nakup deleža LBBW v Deki podaljšala do [...].

| (9) | Kljub zahtevi za podaljšanje roka za odsvojitev Deke Nemčija trdi, da je LBBW storila vse v svoji moči za zagotovitev prodaje. Skrbnik, ki nadzira odsvojitev LBBW, kateri se je Nemčija zavezala v okviru sklepa LBBW, se strinja s to oceno. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Kljub zahtevi za podaljšanje roka za odsvojitev Deke Nemčija trdi, da je LBBW storila vse v svoji moči za zagotovitev prodaje. Skrbnik, ki nadzira odsvojitev LBBW, kateri se je Nemčija zavezala v okviru sklepa LBBW, se strinja s to oceno.

III.   OCENA

| (10) | Ta sklep se nanaša na izvajanje načrta prestrukturiranja, odobrenega v sklepu LBBW. Nemčija zahteva podaljšanje roka za prodajo Deke za tri mesece, [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Ta sklep se nanaša na izvajanje načrta prestrukturiranja, odobrenega v sklepu LBBW. Nemčija zahteva podaljšanje roka za prodajo Deke za tri mesece, [...].

| (11) | Komisija lahko podaljša rok za odsvojitev. Čeprav v Uredbi (ES) št. 659/1999 to ni izrecno določeno, lahko Komisija dovoli podaljšanje roka, če to ne bo oviralo izvajanja sklepa LBBW (4). |
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(11)

Komisija lahko podaljša rok za odsvojitev. Čeprav v Uredbi (ES) št. 659/1999 to ni izrecno določeno, lahko Komisija dovoli podaljšanje roka, če to ne bo oviralo izvajanja sklepa LBBW (4).

| (12) | Komisija ugotavlja, da je LBBW že pričela s postopkom prodaje Deke, saj je pridobila ponudbo DGSV. V tem oziru Komisija upošteva stališče Nemčije in skrbnika, da je LBBW storila vse v svoji moči za izvedbo postopka prodaje. |
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(12)

Komisija ugotavlja, da je LBBW že pričela s postopkom prodaje Deke, saj je pridobila ponudbo DGSV. V tem oziru Komisija upošteva stališče Nemčije in skrbnika, da je LBBW storila vse v svoji moči za izvedbo postopka prodaje.

| (13) | Poleg tega je po mnenju Nemčije zelo verjetno, da bodo tudi deželne banke z deležem v holdinški družbi prodale svoje deleže, kar bi pospešilo celoten postopek prodaje deleža LBBW v Deki. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Poleg tega je po mnenju Nemčije zelo verjetno, da bodo tudi deželne banke z deležem v holdinški družbi prodale svoje deleže, kar bi pospešilo celoten postopek prodaje deleža LBBW v Deki.

| (14) | Obstajajo tudi prepričljivi argumenti za to, da bo postopek prodaje izveden v predlaganem časovnem okviru, najpozneje do [...]. Zlasti se zdi, da [...]. Ta sklep omogoča LBBW, da proda svoj delež v Deki, tudi če bi postopki odločanja deželnih bank o prodaji njihovih deležev v Deki trajali dlje, kot je predvideno. |
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(14)

Obstajajo tudi prepričljivi argumenti za to, da bo postopek prodaje izveden v predlaganem časovnem okviru, najpozneje do [...]. Zlasti se zdi, da [...]. Ta sklep omogoča LBBW, da proda svoj delež v Deki, tudi če bi postopki odločanja deželnih bank o prodaji njihovih deležev v Deki trajali dlje, kot je predvideno.

| (15) | Podaljšanje roka za prodajo za tri mesece ne ogroža izvajanja načrta prestrukturiranja, odobrenega v sklepu LBBW, ki bo trajalo do leta 2014. Prav tako bo LBBW omogočilo, da pridobi potrebna soglasja drugih deželnih bank, da se omogoči prodaja, skupaj ali posamično. Zaradi podaljšanja, ki je časovno omejeno, bo lahko zato LBBW prodala svoj delež v Deki pred [...]. LBBW bo tako lahko ne glede na težave, ki so večinoma zunaj njenega nadzora, dokončala odsvojitev Deke, kot je predvideno v sklepu LBBW. Komisija zato meni, da je relativno kratko zahtevano podaljšanje do [...] upravičeno, zlasti glede na posebnosti pravne strukture Deke. Glede na okoliščine zadeve tako podaljšanje ne pomeni zaostanka glede na prvotno sprejeti časovni razpored, zaradi katerega bi se višina pomoči ustrezno zmanjšala (5). |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Podaljšanje roka za prodajo za tri mesece ne ogroža izvajanja načrta prestrukturiranja, odobrenega v sklepu LBBW, ki bo trajalo do leta 2014. Prav tako bo LBBW omogočilo, da pridobi potrebna soglasja drugih deželnih bank, da se omogoči prodaja, skupaj ali posamično. Zaradi podaljšanja, ki je časovno omejeno, bo lahko zato LBBW prodala svoj delež v Deki pred [...]. LBBW bo tako lahko ne glede na težave, ki so večinoma zunaj njenega nadzora, dokončala odsvojitev Deke, kot je predvideno v sklepu LBBW. Komisija zato meni, da je relativno kratko zahtevano podaljšanje do [...] upravičeno, zlasti glede na posebnosti pravne strukture Deke. Glede na okoliščine zadeve tako podaljšanje ne pomeni zaostanka glede na prvotno sprejeti časovni razpored, zaradi katerega bi se višina pomoči ustrezno zmanjšala (5).

IV.   SKLEPNA UGOTOVITEV

| (16) | Iz zgoraj navedenih razlogov Komisija meni, da je trimesečno podaljšanje v primeru Deke nujno, da se omogoči ustrezno izvajanje načrta prestrukturiranja LBBW, in da to podaljšanje ne ovira izvajanja načrta prestrukturiranja. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Iz zgoraj navedenih razlogov Komisija meni, da je trimesečno podaljšanje v primeru Deke nujno, da se omogoči ustrezno izvajanje načrta prestrukturiranja LBBW, in da to podaljšanje ne ovira izvajanja načrta prestrukturiranja.

V.   SKLEP

Komisija podaljšuje rok za prodajo Deke do 31. marca 2011.“

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(1)  UL L 188, 21.7.2010, str. 1.

1

(2)  Deli tega besedila so izpuščeni, tako da je zagotovljeno, da se ne razkrijejo zaupne informacije. Ti deli so označeni s tremi pikami v oglatih oklepajih in zvezdico.

2

(3)  Skrbnik je bil imenovan v skladu s sklepom LBBW, da bi nadzoroval, ali se zaveze v zvezi z odsvojitvijo izvajajo popolno in pravilno.

3

(4)  Glej sklep z dne 21. decembra 2010 v zadevi MC 8/09 WestImmo.

4

WestImmo.

(5)  Glej Smernice Skupnosti o državni pomoči za reševanje in prestrukturiranje podjetij v težavah, UL C 244, 1.10.2004, str. 2, točka 52(d).

5

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