J-S20040-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: D.S.H. AND B.R.H., MINORS

APPEAL OF: R.A.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1795 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Decrees November 2, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 1751 of 2017, 

1752 of 2017

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 03, 2018

Appellant, R.A.H. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered in the 

Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Orphans’ Court Division, which 

granted the petition of the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social 

Services Agency (“Agency”) for involuntary termination of Father’s parental 

rights to his minor children, D.S.H. and B.R.H. (“Children”). We affirm. 

In its opinion, the Orphans’ Court fully and correctly set forth the 

relevant facts and procedural history of the case.1 Therefore, we have no 

reason to restate them. 

Father raises the following issues for our review:

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING FATHER’S

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1 This appeal is related to the appeal listed consecutively at No. 1847 MDA 

2017 (J-S20041-18). 
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AND MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS?

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 

EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY ESTABLISHED 

THAT FATHER AND MOTHER HAD, BY CONDUCT 

CONTINUING FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, EVIDENCED A 

SETTLED PURPOSE OF RELINQUISHING PARENTAL CLAIM 

TO CHILDREN AND HAD REFUSED [OR] FAILED TO 

PERFORM PARENTAL DUTIES?

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE

EVIDENCE CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY ESTABLISHED 

THAT THE REPEATED AND CONTINUED INCAPCITY, 

NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF FATHER AND MOTHER HAD 

CAUSED CHILDREN TO BE WITHOUT ESSENTIAL PARENTAL 

CARE, CONTROL AND SUBSISTENCE NECESSARY FOR 

THEIR PHYSICAL AND MENTAL WELL-BEING AND THAT THE

CONDITIONS AND CAUSES OF THE INCAPACITY, NEGLECT 

OR REFUSAL CANNOT OR WILL NOT BE REMEDIED BY THE 

PARENTS?

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 

LANCASTER COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH AGENCY HAD 

MET ITS BURDEN IN PROVING THAT FATHER’S AND 

MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS SHOULD BE TERMINATED 

WHEN THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT MOTHER HAD BEEN 

ACTIVELY WORKING ON AND COMPLETING THE GOALS OF 

HER CHILD PERMANENCY PLAN?

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

TERMINATING FATHER’S AND MOTHER’S PARENTAL 

RIGHTS WOULD BEST SERVE THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF 

CHILDREN?

(Father’s Brief at 11).2

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2 Pennsylvania law on common law standing provides that a person can invoke 

the jurisdiction of a court to enforce private rights or maintain an action for 

the enforcement of such rights, only if that person has in an individual or 

representative capacity some real interest in the legal right that is the subject 

matter of the controversy. In Interest of G.C., 673 A.2d 932, 935 (Pa.Super. 

1996). See generally In re T.J., 559 Pa. 118, 124, 739 A.2d 478, 481 
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Appellate review of termination of parental rights cases implicates the 

following principles: 

In cases involving termination of parental rights: “our 

standard of review is limited to determining whether the 

order of the trial court is supported by competent evidence, 

and whether the trial court gave adequate consideration to 

the effect of such a decree on the welfare of the child.” 

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115 (Pa.Super. 2010) (quoting In re I.J., 972 

A.2d 5, 8 (Pa.Super. 2009)). 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. ... We must employ 

a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order 

to determine whether the trial court’s decision is 

supported by competent evidence. 

In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 (2004) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Furthermore, we note that the trial court, as the finder 

of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of 

witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be 

resolved by the finder of fact. The burden of proof is 

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(1999) (stating: “In determining whether a party has standing, a court is 

concerned only with the question of who is entitled to make a legal challenge 

and not the merits of that challenge”; “the purpose of the ‘standing’ 

requirement is to insure that a legal challenge is by a proper party”). Here, 

Father filed a notice of appeal from the November 2, 2017 decrees terminating 

his parental rights. Mother also filed a notice of appeal from the November 2, 

2017 decrees terminating her parental rights. Mother and Father each 

improperly filed only a single notice of appeal from those decisions. The 

subject decrees reflected the separate docket numbers and separate decisions 

as to each child. The decrees were entered on each docket. Father should 

have filed separate notices of appeal from each of the November 2, 2017

decrees entered on separate dockets. In any event, Father has no standing 

to raise issues related to Mother or on Mother’s behalf. 
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on the party seeking termination to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for 

doing so. 

In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super. 

2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

standard of clear and convincing evidence means testimony 

that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable 

the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re 

J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa.Super. 2002). We may 

uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for 

the result reached. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 

(Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc). If the court’s findings are 

supported by competent evidence, we must affirm the 

court’s decision, even if the record could support an opposite 

result. In re R.L.T.M., 860 A.2d 190, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 

2004). 

In re Z.P., supra at 1115-16 (quoting In re Adoption of K.J., 936 A.2d 

1128, 1131-32 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 718, 951 A.2d 1165 

(2008)). 

Agency filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Father’s 

parental rights to Children on the following grounds: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General Rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused 

or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 
J-S20040-18

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subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will 

not remedy those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of 

the child within a reasonable period of time and 

termination of the parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement 

with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). “Parental rights 

may be involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) 

is satisfied, along with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” 

In re Z.P., supra at 1117. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his... parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under 

the standard of best interests of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

Termination under Section 2511(a)(1) involves the following:

To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence 

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to the 

filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled 

intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if 

the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties. 

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, 

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the 

parent’s explanation for his... conduct; (2) the postabandonment contact between parent and child; and (3) 
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consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights 

on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). 

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted). Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination 

petition:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations 

offered by the parent facing termination of his... parental 

rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of 

the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination. 

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 

718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 

2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not 

limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those grounds may include 

acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re A.L.D.,

797 A.2d. 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002). “Parents are required to make diligent 

efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities.” Id. at 340. The fundamental test in termination of parental 

rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was long ago stated in the case of In re 

Geiger, 459 Pa. 636, 331 A.2d 172 (1975), where the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court announced that under what is now Section 2511(a)(2), “the petitioner 

for involuntary termination must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, 
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abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; 

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied.” In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa.Super. 

1998). 

“Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires that: 

(1) the child has been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) 

the conditions which led to removal and placement of the child continue to 

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re Z.P., supra at 1118. 

“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following 

factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from 

parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist;

and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa.Super. 

2003). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12–month time frame for a parent to 

remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re 

A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12–month period has 

been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that 

led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith 

efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time. Id. Termination under 
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Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current 

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions which initially caused placement

or the availability or efficacy of Agency services. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 

835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa.Super. 2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra.

Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination 

will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 

(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability 

are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The 

court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying 

close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.” 

Id. Significantly:

In this context, the court must take into account whether a 

bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and

beneficial relationship. 

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, 

Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted).

“The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines 

certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide 

for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements 

within a reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be 

considered unfit and have his...rights terminated.” In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 
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1007, 1013 (Pa.Super. 2001). This Court has said:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. 

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental 

obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance. 

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child. 

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent exert [himself] to take and maintain 

a place of importance in the child’s life. 

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with 

good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his... ability, even in difficult circumstances. A 

parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable 

firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental rights 

are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities 

while others provide the child with his or her physical and 

emotional needs. 

In re B.,N.M., supra at 855 (internal citations omitted). “[A] parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his...child is converted, upon 

the failure to fulfill his...parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper 

parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, 

safe environment.” Id. at 856. 

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 
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applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Thomas B. 

Sponaugle, we conclude Father’s issues merit no relief. The Orphans’ Court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Orphans’ Court Opinion, dated December 18, 2017, at 1-8)

(finding: Father failed to complete his objectives; initial evaluation of Father 

showed Father lacked capacity to parent; evaluator diagnosed Father with 

host of issues including, but not limited to, parent-child relationship problem, 

relationship distress with spouse, high expressed emotion level within family, 

and spousal violence; evaluator recommended minimum of 26 weeks’ 

individual counseling as well as couples’ counseling; Father did very little 

towards completing his counseling; Father participated in couples’ counseling 

but did not “satisfy” evaluator’s recommendation; after re-evaluation, 

evaluator concluded Father still lacked motivation to parent; Father failed to 

meet objective of obtaining and using good parenting skills; Father has not 

progressed beyond one hour weekly supervised visits with Children; Father 

did not complete objective of financial and housing stability; Father has 

struggled to maintain clean home; home was disheveled and unsanitary when 

CYS first became involved in case and there have been only slight 

improvements since then; parent educator reported that home was dirty and 

unsafe; mental health evaluator stated Father lacks motivation to do what is 

necessary to have Children returned to him; Father struggles with boundaries 

and disciplining Children; Father cannot resolve his significant issues within 
J-S20040-18

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reasonable time; Children are in loving and healthy foster home that is 

potentially permanent resource; Children have bonded with foster family; 

Children cannot wait indefinitely for Father to reach his goals; involuntary 

termination of Father’s parental rights was proper). Accordingly, we affirm 

based on the Orphans’ Court opinion. 

Decrees affirmed. 

Judge Kunselman joins this memorandum.

Judge Ott concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/3/2018
Circulated 04/13/2018 02:34 PM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

IN THE INTEREST OF: SUPERIOR COURT NOS.: 1795 MDA 2017 

1847 MDA 2017 

D.S.H., a Minor ( & Docket No.: 1751-2017 

B.R.H., a Minor Docket No.: 1752-2017 

APPEAL of: J.N.H., Mother, and R.A.H., Father. 

OPINION SUR APPEAL 

Procedural History 

This matter was initiated on May 24, 2016 when the Lancaster County Children and Youth 

Social Services Agency ("Agency") petitioned and received physical custody of D.S.H. 

and B.R.H. On May 26, 2016, R.A.H. ("Father") and J.N.H 

("Mother") waived a Shelter Care Hearing without admitting any of the allegations set forth in the 

Agency's petition for custody. An Adjudication and Disposition hearing was held on June 16, 

2016, finding the children dependent. The Court approved Child Permanency Plans ("CPP") 

containing objectives for both parents. On August 10, 2017, the Agency petitioned to terminate 

the parental rights of Father and Mother to D.S.H. and B.R.H. pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. 

§2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). A hearing on the termination petition was held on October 19, 2017, 

and completed on November 2, 2017, resulting in the Court issuing a decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother's and Father's rights to D.S.H. and B.R.H. On November 27, 2017, Father 

filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and Mother filed an appeal the 

following day. 
Factual History 

The Agency accepted Father and Mother for services on December 11, 2015 due to ongoing 

concerns for the condition of their home, hygiene of their children, and the sexualized behaviors 

and physical aggression demonstrated by D.S.H. N.T., 10/19/17 at 71. While receiving services, 

Father and Mother continued to have difficulty maintaining their home and proper sanitation. Id. 

at 73-75. The Agency received ongoing reports of improper supervision of the children. Id. at 72. 

On March 4, 2017, the Agency received a report that D.S.H. completely disrobed at school in front 

of staff and other students. Id. On March 9, 2017, an Agency caseworker made a scheduled visit 

to the residence and found extremely unsanitary conditions. Id. at 73. On May 23, 2016, an 

unannounced visit to the residence was made and once again the residence was found in poor 

condition. Id. at 74. On May 24, 2016, the agency received a report of suspected child abuse 

regarding D.S. H's highly sexualized and aggressive behavior and tantrums in the school setting. 

Id. at 75. It was also reported that D.S.H had not received her psychotropic medication for the 

past month because Mother had lost the prescription and was unable to obtain a replacement 

prescription. Id. There have been physical altercations between Father and Mother. One resulted 

in Mother needing stiches in her hand. Id. at 8,9. 

Issue I 

Whether termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights is legally appropriate when 

neither parent has completed their CPP in the eighteen months since the children's placement, and 

the children have bonded with a potentially adoptive family? 

Analysis 

The termination of parental rights is governed by 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511. The relevant 

sections of that statute provide as follows: 
a. General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental 

duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot 

or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or 

assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time 

and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child. 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a 

voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 

removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 
continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

(b) Other considerations. --The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found 

to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy 

the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice 

of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) 

The party seeking the termination of parental rights bears the burden of establishing clear 

and convincing evidence to support the petition. In Re C.MS., 832 A.2d 457 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Clear and convincing evidence is testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue." In Re Adoption of J.MM, 782 A.2d 1024, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2001), citing In Re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2000). In a termination proceeding, the focus is on the 

conduct of the parent, and whether that conduct justifies a termination of parental rights. In Re 

B.,N.M, 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004). Though the Agency's petition asked for 

termination under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) only one of the sections is necessary for 

termination. In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 851 (Pa. Super. 2015), citing In re B.L. W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). When assessing the Agency's case for termination under 23 Pa. 
C.S.A. §2511(a)(1) and (8), this Court may not consider efforts to remedy the problem initiated 

after the giving of notice of the filing of the termination petition. 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511(b). "[This 

provision of §2511(b)] furthers the compelling state interest of providing dependent children with 

permanency, as it prevents unwilling or incapable parents ...from continuing to delay the adoption 

of their children with last-minute attempts at reunification." In re. Adoption of C.JP., 114 A.3d 

1046 (Pa. Super. 2015). The parents' parental obligation to their child is a "positive duty that 

requires active performance." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting In re 

B., KM, 856 A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). A merely passive interest in the 

development of the child is not sufficient. Id. 

Despite the children being in Agency custody for eighteen months, Mother has failed to 

complete her plan's objectives. N.T., 10/19/17 at 87. As part of Mother's mental health objective, 

she received an evaluation and it was determined she did not have the capacity to parent at that 

time. Mother was diagnosed as having a parent -child relational problem; relationship distress with 

spouse or intimate partner; high expressed emotion level within the family; spouse or partner 

violence, physical, confirmed, initial encounter. Id at 25. Mother was described by the evaluator 

as having a casual relationship with the truth. Id at 26. The evaluator requested that Mother 

complete at least twenty-six (26) individual, weekly, one hour therapy sessions, in addition to 

couples counseling, medication management, and work with a parent educator, then be reassessed 

for her parenting capacity. Id at 75. Mother stopped attending her counseling sessions on March 

16, 2017. Id. at 78. She has not completed the required 26 sessions. Id. Mother did not participate 

in the type of couples counseling that was recommended and the counseling was occurring 

infrequently. N.T.,11/2/17 at 5. Despite not completing the mental health goals set out in her 
initial evaluation, Mother was re-evaluated to see if she had gained the capacity to parent. It was 

concluded she had not. N.T., 10/19/17 at 33. 

Father has also failed to complete his plan's objectives. He was evaluated to see if he 

possessed the capacity to parent and it was determined he did not. Father was diagnosed as having 

a parent -child relationship problem, by history; relationship distress with spouse or intimate 

partner, by history; high expressed emotion level within the family, by history; spouse or partner 

violence, physical, confirmed, by history; child psychological abuse, suspected, by history; child 

neglect, confirmed, initial encounter, by history, unspecified housing or economic problem by 

history; intermittent explosive disorder, by history; and unspecified depressive disorder. Id. at 18. 

The evaluator recommended a minimum of twenty-six (26) weeks of counseling and couples 

counseling. Father was to be re-evaluated. Id. at 14-15. Father did very little towards completing 

the 26 weeks of counseling. Id. at 15-16. As stated above, Father participated in couples 

counseling but this recommendation was not considered satisfied. After re-evaluation, it was 

concluded Father still lacked the motivation to obtain parenting capacity. Id. at 20-21. 

Mother and Father failed to complete their objectives of obtaining and using good parenting 

skills. Mother began working with the parent educator in December 2016 and Father began 

working with the same evaluator in March of 2017. Id. at 109,110. Neither parent has completed 

this program. They have a few more lessons in the curriculum and they have not started the 

practical portion of the program because parents had not progressed beyond one hour weekly 

supervised visits with the children. Id. at 109, 110, 117. 

Neither parent has completed the objectives of financial and housing stability. Despite 

both parents reporting that they work full-time and not having paid for housing since January 2015, 

and receiving financial help from a church, the parents are still financially unstable. N.T., 11/2/17 
at 39, 58. Mother testified that, after moving into an apartment in August 2017, they were unable 

to pay for the rent beyond the first two weeks. Id. at 52-53. When evicted from that apartment, the 

parents moved back into their foreclosed home. Id. at 5-6. Parents further showed their financial 

instability when they requested moving the location of their session with their parent educator 

because they did not have enough gas money to go home and then back to work later that evening. 

N.T., 10/19/17 at 199. The parent educator questioned the parents' ability to budget and save. Id. 

at 123. 

Mother and Father have continued to struggle in maintaining a clean home. The house was 

disheveled and unsanitary when the Agency got involved and there have only been slight 

improvements since. Id. at 83-85. When the parent educator began working with Mother it was 

seven months after the children were taken into agency custody. Id. at 109. The parent educator 

reported that the house was dirty at that time: the kitchen table was sticky and had debris and food 

crumbs on it; cigarette butts were on the floor; the carpet and furniture were stained and not in 

good condition; bags filled with trash piled in the kitchen; and chip bags and bags of old food lay 

around the bedroom. Id. The parent educator spent the first month helping the parents clean the 

house and educator continued to work on this issue with the parents. Id. at 110. Her last home visit, 

the home continued to not be safe or livable. Id. at 122. 

Mother and Father both had an objective to maintain commitment to their children. The 

mental health evaluated stated, Father seemed to lack the motivation to do what was necessary to 

have his children returned to him. Id. at 21. The caseworker observed during the visits, the parents 

struggle with maintaining boundaries and disciplining the children. Id. at 92. 
The best interests of the children are served by remaining in foster care and being adopted. 

They have been in care for eighteen (18) months. The Court is convinced the parents will not 

resolve their significant issues in a reasonable amount of time. The children remain in a loving 

and healthy home which is a potentially permanent resource. Id. at 94-95. They have bonded with 

their foster family. Id. at 9. D.S.H. and B.R.H. cannot wait for an indefinite period of time for the 

stability and care of a permanent family in the hope that their biological parents will drastically 

change their behavior and accomplish their goals. The Guardian ad litem supports the termination 

of parental rights. N.T.,11/2/17 at 66. 

Conclusion 

Based on the above, the Agency has sustained its burden under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a) (1), 

(2), (5), and (8). The Court properly terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights to D.S.H. 

and B.R.H and acted in the best interests of the children. 

The Clerk of Courts is directed to transmit the record to the Superior Court. 

AVem. 

LaucTheauusli 

DATED: December 18, 2017 

Copies to: 

H. Allison Wright, Esquire 

Andrew E. Spade, Esquire 

Courtney J. Restemanyer, Esquire 

Cynthia L. Garman, Esquire 

BY THE COURT: