NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LYNNE HULSEY,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant

- Appellee. No. 18

- 15549
D.C. No. 2:16

- cv - 03057

- AC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Allison Claire, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted November 15, 2019 San Francisco, California Before: WARDLAW, W. FLETCHER, and LINN, * * Circuit Judges. Lynne Hulsey appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment , which
affirm ed the Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Richard Linn, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

FEB 19 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Hulsey’s disability insurance benefits and su pplemental security income

. 1 Because the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm

. See Tidwell v. Apfel , 161 F.3d 599,601 (9 th Cir. 1999).
1. Under Step 4 of the disability analysis, the C ommissioner asks whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant work.
Barnhart v. Thomas , 540 U.S. 20, 25 (2003) ; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a )(iv), (e)

– (f ). Hulsey, as the claimant, bears the burden of showing her inability to perform past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)

. Past relevant work is “work that you have done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted
l ong enough for you to learn to do it. ” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1). Hulsey argues that neither her employment as a gambling cashier nor as a phlebotomist lasted long enough for her to learn the job and meet the durational requirement to qualify as past rel evant work

. 2 Although this durational issue is the heart of Hulsey’s argument on appeal, she d id not raise it before the agency
. In her
benefits request to the a gency, she argued only a lack of residual functional capacity

w ith regard to S tep 4

. The du rational requirement argument is therefore waived.

1 For purposes of this case, the analysis of eligibility for Supplemental Security Income under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and for Disability Insurance Benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) is identical. We cite only one set of statutes and associated regulations in our analysis, but the analysis applies to benefits under both statutory schemes. 2 We need not an d do not add ress whether Hulsey’s past employment as a cashier

- checker or bank teller constitute past relevant work under Step 4.3

See Meanel v. Apfel , 172 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9 th Cir. 1999). Moreover, Hulsey made no argument at all with respect to her past work as a gambling cashier , and this argument, too , is waived.
2. S ubstantial evidence supports the finding of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) that Hulsey retained sufficient residual functional capacity to perform “light” work under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)

. Hulsey conten ds that her residual functional capacity does not allow for constant over - head reaching or fingering, as required of a gambling cashier , or for frequent over - head reaching , as required of a phlebotomist , according to the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational
Titles ( “ Dictionary ”). This co ntention is misplaced. First, with respect to fingering,
the Dictionary requires only “frequent” fingering for the CASHIER, GAMBLING occupation. Dictionary , 211.462

- 022, 1991 WL 671843. Because Hulsey can perform frequent fingering with both hands, there is no apparent conflict between
Dr. Amos’ s testimony an d the Dictionary

. Although t he Dictionary notes that both the phlebotomist and gambling cashier occupations generally require frequent reaching, it does not indicate that those occupation s require frequent overhead reaching or overhead reaching with the non

- dominant arm. Id.; id . 079.364

– 022, 1991 WL 646858 (“Phlebotomist”). Thus, there is also no apparent conflict with the expert’s testimony and the Dictionary with respect to Hulsey’s n on - dominant

- hand overhead reaching ability. See Gutierrez v. Colvi n , 844 F.3d 804, 806

– 08 (9th Cir.4

2016) ( holding that there was no apparent conflict between a vocational expert’s testimony that plaintiff could perform the job of cashier despi t e her inab ility to reach
above her shoulder and the Dictionary categorization as requiring frequent reaching because “not every job that involves reaching requires the ability to reach overhead,” and “[c]ashiering is a good example.”).
The ALJ and the district cour t did not err in failing to apply the medical vocational guidelines (“grids”). Our caselaw requires application of the grids “at the fifth step of the analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.” Lounsbury v. Barnhart , 468 F.3d 1111, 111 4 (9th Cir. 2006) (empha sis added)

. The ALJ never reached Step 5, and Hulsey cites no authority requiring application of the grids at step 4. Hulsey makes several arguments a lleging error in the ALJ’s finding that her mental impairments were non

- sever e under Step 2 . These arguments have been carefully considered but have no merit.
AFFIRMED
.