Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT John R. Worman Evansville, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Lauren A. Jacobsen Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### I N T H E 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

R.P. , Appellant

- Respondent,

v. 

### State of Indiana , Appellee

- P etitioner. July 17, 2019 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 19A

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- 329 Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, Judge The Honorable Renee A. Ferguson, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No s
. 82D04

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- 2051 82D04

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- 2094 82D04

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Pyle , Judge
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### Statement of the Case

[1] R.P. (“R.P.”) was adjudicated to be a delinquent child for committing acts that would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement; 1 Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct; 2 and two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting 3 if committed by an adult

. The trial court awarded wardship of R.P. to the Department of Correction (“the DOC”). R. P. ’s sole argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by committing her to the DOC. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court.

[2] We affirm.


### Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by committing R.P. to the DOC.



### Facts

[3] In November 2018, fourteen

- year - old R.P. admitted to committing acts that would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement; Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct; and two counts of Level 4 felony child

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. 2 I.C. § 35

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3 I.C. § 35

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molesting if committed by an adult. R.P. speci fically admitted that she had: (1) forcibly resisted a Vanderburgh County Deputy Sheriff; (2) engaged in fighting and / or tumultuous conduct; and (3) fondled or touched two children with the intent to aro u se or satisfy her sexual desires. The two children lived with R.P. in her guardian’s home. One of the children was nine years old and the other was eleven years old.

[4] The trial court found R.P. to be a delinquent child and order ed her to stay at the Indiana Youth Care Center (“the IYCC”) for an evaluation pending the disposition of her case

. During her stay at the IYCC, R.P. hit a corrections officer in the face and kicked her in the back. R.P. subsequently admitted committing acts that would be Level 6 felony battery of a public safety officia l if committed by an adult.

[5] At the January 2019 disposition hearing, Mr. Cook (“Cook”) from the Vanderburgh County Probation Department recommended that R.P. be placed in a “sexually maladaptive youth program.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). According to Cook, Giba ult was the only Indiana facility that offered such a program for females and it had a waiting list that was “a few months out.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). Apparently, the DOC has such a program as well, and Cook recommended that R.P. “be committed to [ the DOC ] to receive the treatment that she needs for the [ sexually maladaptive youth] treatment [.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). According to Cook, the typical DOC program for sexually maladaptive youth takes six to nine months to complete , and if R.P. had to wait five m onths for a bed at Gibault , that could double the amount of time that she would beCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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detained. Cook also explained that she could not return to her guardi ans pending the availability of treatment at Gibault because two of her victims lived in the guardians’ home. The State asked the trial cour t to follow Mr. Cooks’ recommendations. Defense counsel responded that R.P. did not wa n t to go to the DOC because there was “a certain s t igma associated with that

. ” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 32). R.P. had also “made it very cl ear [to defense counsel] that she [did] not want to wait at [the IYCC] for five months not getting any treatment.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 33). Defense counsel essentially asked the trial court to release R.P. until a bed became available at Gibault.

[6] The trial co urt explained that it did not want R.P. “to sit at the [ IYCC ] not receiving the appropriate treatment.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34). The court further explained that DOC’s program for sexually maladaptive youth was the same as Gibault’s program and that there was no reason to delay R.P.’s treatment. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order granting wardship of R.P. to the DOC. R.P. appeals her commitment to the DOC.



### D ecision

[7] R.P. ’s sole argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by committing her to the DOC. The purpose of the juvenile process is vastly different from the adult criminal justice system. R.H. v. State , 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Specifically, the goal of juvenile proceedings is “ rehabilitation so that the youth wil l not become a criminal as an adult.” Id . (emphasis in original). To facilitate this goal, courts have a number of options available for juvenileCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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placemen t , including, a private home in the community, a licensed foster home, a local juvenile detention c enter, and State institutions

. Jordan v. State , 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987).

[8] To assist juvenile courts in selecting amongst the available placement alternatives, the Indiana Legislature has provided guidance regarding the option selected for any parti cular child: If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that: (1) is: (A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and (B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child; (2) least interferes with family autonomy; (3) is least disruptive of family life; (4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child’ s parent, guardian, or custodian; and (5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
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- 6. Within those parameters, a juvenile court has discretion in choosing the disposition appr opriate for each juvenile delinquent. D.E. v. State , 962 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We review a court’s disposition for an abuse of discretion. Id . at 97. An abuse of discretion occurs if the court’s decision is clearly against the logic and e ffect of the facts andCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A

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circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id

.

[9] Here, our review of the record reveals that the State recommended that R.P. be placed in a sexually maladaptive youth treatment p rogram. The DOC program was available immediately, and t he Gibault program was not. In light of R.P.’s serious history, which included sexual a cts committed against young children who lived with her, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it f ound that that was no reason to delay R.P.’s treatment and awarded wardship of her to the DOC. 4 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s commitment of R.P. to the DOC.

[10] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.

4 The trial court also stated that its dispositional order was entered, in part, because R.P. had already participated in inpatient and outpatient services in Arkansas

.