### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE Se pte m be r 20, 200 5 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. DA VID BA RTL EY BELL
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Rutherford Coun ty No. M- 55859 Jam es K . Clayton, Jr., Judge

No. M2005- 00081-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Novem ber 8, 2005

A Rutherfor d County Gr an d J ury indicted the def

endant, Da vid Ba

rtley Be ll, of driving unde r the inf lue nc e , th ir d off

e ns e , an d viol a tio n of the imp lie d co ns e nt l a w. Th e de fe nd a nt f ile d a mot ionto suppress evide nce f

rom the traf

fic stop, ar g uing the stop was not based on r easona ble suspicion. After a suppre ssion hearing , the trial cour t dismi ssed the cha

rg es against the defendant because the arr e sti ng of

fi c e r w a s not pr e se nt to tes tif y
. On app e a l, the State arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in dismiss ing the char g es against the defendant. After our review, we reve rse the or der of the trial court a ndre ma ndfo r f

urthe r p ro c e e din g s.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of the Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded
J.C. M C LIN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
F rank M. F ly a ndKe rry

Kn ox, M ur fr e e sb or o, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e llant, Da vidB art le y B e ll.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B re nt C . Ch e rry , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam C. W hite s ell, J r., District Attorney Gene ral; and Thoma s S. S antel, Jr., Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION
BACK GR OUND The following evidenc e wa s prese nted at the s u p p ression hearing . On Octobe r 11, 2003, Offic er Tommy

Massey of the Murfre esboro Police Depa rtment noticed the de fendant driving on the wrong side of an unlined stre et. Off icer Massey followed the de fendant to his residence wher e he initiated a traf

fic stop. Ed Gorham, a DU I en fo rc em ent officer, a lso arrive d at the sce ne and c on du c te d s e ve ra l f

ie ld so brie ty te sts on the de fe nd a nt. Af te r the de fe nd a nt f

a ile d th e fi e ld s ob ri e ty tests and re fused to s u b m it to a test of his blood alcohol content, Off icer Gorha m arre sted the-2-

d e f e n d a n t. T h e g r a n d ju r y r e tu r n e d a n in d ic tm e n t a g a in s t th e d e f e n d a n t f o r d r iv in g u nder the inf lue nc e a ndvio la tio n o f the imp lie d c on se nt l a w. The defe nd ant fi le d a mot ionto s up pr e ss a ll e vid e nc e a dd uced a ft e r h e wa s p ull e d o ve r b y Of fi c e r M a sse y , in c lud ing the fi e ld s ob ri e ty te sts conducte d by Offic er Gorha m. I n his motion, the defe ndant ar g ued that Of fice r Massey

did not have rea sonable suspicion to conduc t the initial traffic stop.
At the suppression hearing, the State prese nted the testimony of Off icer Massey , the offic er wh o in iti a lly

sto pp e d th e de fe nd a nt. Af te r the State ’s dir e c t e xami natio n o f O ff ic e r M a sse y , d e fe ns e counsel informed the court that Office r Massey was not the offic er w ho obtained the wa rra nt and arr ested the defe ndant. Def ense c ounsel arg ued that Of fice r Gorham must be present be cause he wa s theof fi c e r w ho g e ne rate d th e e vid e nc e so ug ht t o b e su pp res sed . The tria l c ou rt , su a s po nte , dismiss ed the c harg es ag ainst the defe ndant bec ause the State failed to produc e both office rs at the he ari ng . H ow e ve r, thetr ia l c ou rt sig ne d tw o or de rs of dis mis sa l, o ne dis mis sin g the c ha rg e s w ith prejudice and the other dism issing the char g es wit hout prejudice

. The S tate filed a reque st for the court to cla

rify its orde r. The trial court conducte d a hearing on the State’s re quest to clarif y afte r the State had a lrea dy

filed i ts notice of appe al. At the hea ring , the trial court stated that it intended that th e dis mis sa l bewi tho ut p re jud ic e , b ut that th is C ou rt c ou ld d e c idetheiss ue be c aus e the State ha d a lr e a dy

fi le d a n a pp e a l.
AN AL YSI S On appe al, the State asse rts that the prim ar y i s s u e to be determined by the trial court was wh e the r O ff

ic e r M a sse y fo rmulate d r e a so na ble su sp ic ionto s top the de fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le . T he State arg ues that the trial c ourt err ed by diverting fro m t h e s u b s t ance of the motion, and dismissing the c ha rg e s a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt. We beg in our analy sis by noting that “[t] he decision whe ther to dismiss an indictment lies wi thi n th e dis c re tio n of the tr ia l cou rt [,]” su bje c t to a n a bu se of dis c re tio n r e vie w. State v. Ha rris, 33 S.W .3d 767, 769-70 (Te nn. Crim. App. 2000). “ The a buse of discr etion standard c ontemplates that befor e re versa l the rec ord must show that a judge ‘applied an incorre ct leg al standar d, or re ache d a decision which is a g ainst logic or rea soning that cause d an injusti ce to the party co m p l ai n i n g.’” State v. Coley , 32 S.W .3d 831, 833 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)); see also State v. Shuck, 953 S.W .2d 662, 6 69 (Tenn. 1997) . Appellate c ourts “may not interfe re w ith a ruling made within the discre tionary power s of the trial court absent c lear abuse.” State v. Street, 768 S.W.2d 703, 709 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). T h er efore, abse nt an abuse of discretion, we will not dis turb the finding s of the trial c ourt. Har ris, 33 S.W .3d at 770. Upon re view, we note t hat t he defenda nt’s motion to suppress cha lleng ed Of fice r Massey ’s rea sonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. In part, the motion stated that “D efe ndant moves the Court to s up pr e ss a ll e vid e nc e re su lti ng fr om h is O c tob e r 1 1, 20 03 , tr a ff ic sto p b y Of fi c e r M a sse y

be c aus e Offic er Ma ssey

lacke d rea sonable suspicion to perf orm the stop. ” We have thoroug hly examined the re cord and we do not see any finding s as t o whether there was re asonable suspicion for the stop. The trial c ourt appe ars to havedismiss ed the indictment be cause both office rs wer e not pre sent atT he d efend ant ’ s argum ent s u g g e sts that t he t ri al co urt grant ed t he m o t i o n t o s up p res s and dis m i ss ed t he 1 i ndi ct ment

. H owever , we can not f i nd an y t hi ng i n t he r ecor d t o s how t he t r i al cour t r ul ed on t he s uppres s i on i s s ue.

-3- the hea ring and failed to rule on t h e s u p pression issue. Although the trial court doe s have the 1 discretion to dismiss an indictment, the trial court cannot abuse that discr etion.
We conclude that the trial court a bused i ts discretion by dismiss ing the indictment without addre ssing the me rits of the def endant’s motion t o suppress. Whether thestop was base d on rea sonable suspicion will dictate whe ther the stop and e nsuing a rre st were leg al. Such a finding by the trial court is a nece ssary prec ursor to any further determination reg arding the suppression of the e v i d e n c e a n d d i s m i s s a l o f t h e i n d i c t m e n t

. M o r e o v e r , t h e i n i t i a l s t o p w a s m a d e b y O f f i c e r M a s s e y, wh o w a s a va ila

bleto t e sti fy . A c c or din g ly , it wa s a n abu se of dis c re tio n fo r the tr ia l c ou rt to d ism iss the indictment without addressing the rea sonable suspicion issue as the State was pre pare d to present with Office r Massey ’s testimony . We the ref ore reve rse the order of the trial court, dismiss ing the indictment ag ainst the defe ndant, and rema nd for the trial court to make findings of f act r eg arding the re asonable ness of the stop. I f the trial c ourt finds the stop w as not based on r easona ble suspicion, then the motion to suppress should be g rante d and cha rg es dismissed. See S t at e v
. P hillips , 30 S.W .3d 372, 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (noting the substantive e ffe ct of the tria l court’s de cision to gr ant a motion to suppress is di s m i s s al of the indictment). I f the trial c ourt finds the stop was ba se d o n r e a so na

blesu sp ic ion , th e n th e mot ionto su pp res s sh ou ld b e de nie d a ndthe c a se sh ou ld proc ee d

. Because we have de termined that the tria l court abuse d its discretion in dismi ssing the indictment without first ad d re s s i ng the merits of the de fendant’s motion to s uppress, we need not addre ss whether

the dismissal should be with or without prejudice.

CO NC LU SION
Ac c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e theor de r o f the tria l c ou rt a ndre ma ndfo r f

urthe r p ro c e e din g s.

___________________________________ J .C. McL IN, J UDGE