NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRED DEVINE,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.
PHOENIX FIRE DEPARTMENT, Named as Phoenix Fire Department, et al.; et al.,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 23

- 15192

D.C. No. 2:19

- cv
- 05745

- SMB

MTM

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 26, 2024 * *

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.
Fred Devine appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v.
Chung
, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAR 29 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 23

- 15192

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Devine failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants used excessive
force in arresting him. See Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396

- 98 (1989)
(setting forth objective reasonableness standard for excessive force
determinations); see also Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (an assertion
that is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it” will not create a genuine dispute o f material fact at summary judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Devine’s motion to
preclude the officer body camera videos because Devine failed to establish that the

evidence was inadmissible. See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA , 285 F.3d 764, 773
(9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard for review and explaining that a court can
consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Devine’s motion to
defer ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Devine failed
to show that allowing further discovery would have precluded summary judgment.
See Fam. Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. , 525 F.3d 822,

827

- 28 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and required showing for
granting a continuance on a motion for summary judgment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Devine’s motion for
sanctions because Devine failed to establish that defendants’ counsel made any3 23

- 15192

misstatements to the court. See Anheuser

- Busch, Inc. v. Nat. Beverage Distribs.
, 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995) (setting forth standard of review and discussing a
court’s inherent power to sanction parties).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). We do not
consider documents not presented to the district court. See United States v. Elias
, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
Devine’s motion to supplement the record (Docket Entry No. 9) is denied.

AFFIRMED.