Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-329 | July 17, 2019 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John R. Worman

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Lauren A. Jacobsen

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

R.P.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner.

July 17, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JV-329

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier,

Judge

The Honorable Renee A. 

Ferguson, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

82D04-1811-JD-2051

82D04-1811-JD-2094

82D04-1901-JD-78

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-329 | July 17, 2019 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] R.P. (“R.P.”) was adjudicated to be a delinquent child for committing acts that 

would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement;1 Class B 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct;2 and two counts of Level 4 felony child 

molesting3if committed by an adult. The trial court awarded wardship of R.P. 

to the Department of Correction (“the DOC”). R.P.’s sole argument is that the

trial court abused its discretion by committing her to the DOC. Finding no 

abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by committing R.P.

to the DOC. 

Facts

[3] In November 2018, fourteen-year-old R.P. admitted to committing acts that 

would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement; Class B 

misdemeanor disorderly conduct; and two counts of Level 4 felony child 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-44.1-3-1.

2

I.C. § 35-45-1-3.

3

I.C. § 35-42-4-3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-329 | July 17, 2019 Page 3 of 6

molesting if committed by an adult. R.P. specifically admitted that she had: (1) 

forcibly resisted a Vanderburgh County Deputy Sheriff; (2) engaged in fighting 

and/or tumultuous conduct; and (3) fondled or touched two children with the 

intent to arouse or satisfy her sexual desires. The two children lived with R.P. 

in her guardian’s home. One of the children was nine years old and the other 

was eleven years old. 

[4] The trial court found R.P. to be a delinquent child and ordered her to stay at the 

Indiana Youth Care Center (“the IYCC”) for an evaluation pending the 

disposition of her case. During her stay at the IYCC, R.P. hit a corrections 

officer in the face and kicked her in the back. R.P. subsequently admitted 

committing acts that would be Level 6 felony battery of a public safety official if 

committed by an adult.

[5] At the January 2019 disposition hearing, Mr. Cook (“Cook”) from the 

Vanderburgh County Probation Department recommended that R.P. be placed 

in a “sexually maladaptive youth program.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 29). According to 

Cook, Gibault was the only Indiana facility that offered such a program for 

females and it had a waiting list that was “a few months out.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 

29). Apparently, the DOC has such a program as well, and Cook 

recommended that R.P. “be committed to [the DOC] to receive the treatment 

that she needs for the [sexually maladaptive youth] treatment[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 

29). According to Cook, the typical DOC program for sexually maladaptive 

youth takes six to nine months to complete, and if R.P. had to wait five months 

for a bed at Gibault, that could double the amount of time that she would be 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-329 | July 17, 2019 Page 4 of 6

detained. Cook also explained that she could not return to her guardians 

pending the availability of treatment at Gibault because two of her victims lived 

in the guardians’ home. The State asked the trial court to follow Mr. Cooks’ 

recommendations. Defense counsel responded that R.P. did not want to go to 

the DOC because there was “a certain stigma associated with that.” (Tr. Vol. 2 

at 32). R.P. had also “made it very clear [to defense counsel] that she [did] not 

want to wait at [the IYCC] for five months not getting any treatment.” (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 33). Defense counsel essentially asked the trial court to release R.P. 

until a bed became available at Gibault.

[6] The trial court explained that it did not want R.P. “to sit at the [IYCC] not 

receiving the appropriate treatment.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 34). The court further 

explained that DOC’s program for sexually maladaptive youth was the same as 

Gibault’s program and that there was no reason to delay R.P.’s treatment. 

Thereafter, the trial court issued an order granting wardship of R.P. to the 

DOC. R.P. appeals her commitment to the DOC.

Decision

[7] R.P.’s sole argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by committing 

her to the DOC. The purpose of the juvenile process is vastly different from the

adult criminal justice system. R.H. v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2010). Specifically, the goal of juvenile proceedings is “rehabilitation so that the 

youth will not become a criminal as an adult.” Id. (emphasis in original). To 

facilitate this goal, courts have a number of options available for juvenile 
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placement, including, a private home in the community, a licensed foster home, 

a local juvenile detention center, and State institutions. Jordan v. State, 512 

N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987).

[8] To assist juvenile courts in selecting amongst the available placement 

alternatives, the Indiana Legislature has provided guidance regarding the option 

selected for any particular child:

If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of 

the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most 

appropriate setting available; and 

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest 

and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the 

child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and 

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child’s 

parent, guardian, or custodian.

IND. CODE § 31-37-18-6. Within those parameters, a juvenile court has 

discretion in choosing the disposition appropriate for each juvenile delinquent. 

D.E. v. State, 962 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We review a court’s 

disposition for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 97. An abuse of discretion occurs 

if the court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-329 | July 17, 2019 Page 6 of 6

circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be 

drawn therefrom. Id.

[9] Here, our review of the record reveals that the State recommended that R.P. be 

placed in a sexually maladaptive youth treatment program. The DOC program 

was available immediately, and the Gibault program was not. In light of R.P.’s 

serious history, which included sexual acts committed against young children 

who lived with her, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that 

that was no reason to delay R.P.’s treatment and awarded wardship of her to 

the DOC.4 Accordingly, we affirm the court’s commitment of R.P. to the 

DOC.

[10] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur. 

 

4 The trial court also stated that its dispositional order was entered, in part, because R.P. had already 

participated in inpatient and outpatient services in Arkansas.