J-S16020-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAYMARR DAQUAN ALFORD 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1626 MDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001969-2012

BEFORE: OTT, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 09, 2019

Raymarr Daquan Alford (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing 

his timely petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On July 9, 2012, just five days shy of his 18

th birthday, Appellant shot 

and killed Kevan Connelly at Flanagan Park in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. 

Appellant was charged with murder and related crimes, and on April 30, 2014, 

a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, possessing 

an instrument of crime, recklessly endangering another person (REAP), and 

firearms not to be carried without a license. On November 10, 2014, the trial 

court sentenced Appellant, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1) (Sentence 

of persons under the age of 18 for murder), to 50 years to life imprisonment. 

On his remaining convictions, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

consecutive terms of 91⁄2 to 40 years for criminal conspiracy, 1 to 2 years for 
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REAP, and 2 to 7 years for firearms not to be carried without a license. 

Appellant’s aggregate sentence was 621⁄2 years to life imprisonment.

On December 16, 2015, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Alford, 475 MDA 2015 (Pa. Super. Dec. 

16, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). On August 3, 2016, the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

On June 13, 2017, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. On 

August 30, 2017, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant 

during PCRA proceedings. In his petition, Appellant asserted that his trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to file a decertification petition to transfer 

his case for disposition in juvenile court, and his sentence was illegal because 

his 50-year to life sentence for first-degree murder was an unconstitutional

de facto life sentence.

On August 27, 2018, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss 

Appellant’s PCRA petition pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 

907. On September 20, 2018, the PCRA court formally dismissed Appellant’s 

PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed. On October 1, 2018, the PCRA 

court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On 

October 8, 2018, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement.

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
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1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

decertification motion that, if successful, would have transferred 

his case to the juvenile court system.

2. Whether Appellant received a de facto sentence of life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution when he 

received a sentence of 50 years for a homicide offense committed 

as a juvenile.

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

We review the denial of PCRA relief by “examining whether the PCRA 

court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of 

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the effectiveness of trial counsel. In 

deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we begin with the 

presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. 

Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. 2014). To overcome that presumption, 

the petitioner must establish: “(1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; 

(2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) 

the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice 

measured by whether there is a reasonable probability that the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citation omitted). To 

demonstrate prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “the 
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petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Commonwealth v. King, 57 A.3d 607, 613 (Pa. 2012). If the 

petitioner fails to prove any of these prongs, the claim is subject to dismissal. 

Bomar, 104 A.3d at 1188.

Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

decertification motion to transfer his case to juvenile court. Appellant 

maintains that, based on his difficult upbringing and mental health issues, he

is amenable to treatment, supervision and rehabilitation as a juvenile, and 

that consequently, the trial court would have granted the decertification 

motion.

The PCRA court, who also sat as the trial court, rejected this claim, 

explaining:

When deciding whether to transfer a criminal case to juvenile 

court, there are several factors that must be considered. As 

noted, “[u]nder the current statutory framework, a juvenile who 

commits first or second-degree murder must be charged as an 

adult. A Petitioner can then request that his or her case be 

transferred to the Juvenile Division[.]” Commonwealth v. 

Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 428 (Pa. Super. 2018). Petitioner has the 

burden of proof and must show that transferring his first-degree 

murder case would serve the public interest. In determining

whether such a transfer serves the public interest, 42 Pa.C.S. § 

6355 provides the following factors for a court to evaluate:

(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims;

(B) the impact of the offense on the community;

(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual 

posed by the child;
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(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly 

committed by the child;

(E) the degree of the child’s culpability;

(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives 

available under this chapter and in the adult criminal, justice 

system; and

(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision

or rehabilitation as a juvenile [. . .]

In this case, the impact on the victim and community is severe. 

[Appellant] murdered the victim in front of the victim’s younger 

brother, and the grief and suffering of the victim’s family is 

immeasurable. Furthermore, [Appellant]’s actions have created 

tension and unease within the community. This brazen shooting 

of the victim in a popular public park has made local residents fear 

for their own safety and that of their children. Given the level of

sophistication and planning involved as well as the violent and 

deadly nature of [Appellant]’s offenses, this [c]ourt does not 

believe [Appellant] could prove that the transfer would have 

served the public interest. Although [Appellant] may be amenable 

to treatment, the gravity of the other factors outweighs this 

consideration. This [c]ourt would not have approved the transfer 

of this case to juvenile court. Therefore, this [c]ourt cannot find 

that [Appellant] has established that [trial counsel] was ineffective 

merely because he did not file the decertification motion, since 

that Motion would have most likely been unsuccessful. “A chosen 

strategy will not be found to have lacked a reasonable basis unless 

it is proven ‘that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for 

success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.’” 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (Pa. 

1998)). Since there was no guarantee of success had trial counsel 

filed a decertification petition, this issue has no merit.

PCRA Court Opinion, 8/27/18, at 3-4.

Based upon our review of the record and applicable authority, we agree 

with the PCRA court’s disposition of this issue. As the PCRA court recognizes, 
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whether a defendant is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation 

as a juvenile is but one consideration when a court determines whether it will 

transfer a case to juvenile court. See id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355).

1

In this case, the PCRA court referenced the other statutory factors, such 

as the impact of the offense on the victim, the impact of the offense on the 

community, the threat to the safety of the public posed by Appellant, the 

nature and circumstances of the offense committed, and the degree of 

Appellant’s culpability. The PCRA court determined that given the horrific 

nature of the crime, it would not have transferred Appellant’s case to juvenile 

court had trial counsel filed a motion for decertification. Id. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, as trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to 

request relief that the trial court would not have granted. See

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1115 (Pa. 2012) (“Counsel will not 

be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.”).

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1 Although 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355 applies to transfer to criminal proceedings 

from juvenile court, and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322 prescribes transfer from criminal 

proceedings to juvenile court, Section 6322 instructs, “In determining whether 

the child has so established that the transfer [to juvenile court] will serve the 

public interest, the court shall consider the factors contained in section 

6355(a)(4)(iii) (relating to transfer to criminal proceedings).” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6322.
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In his second issue, Appellant challenges the legality of his sentence.

Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his claim that his 50-

year sentence for first-degree murder was unconstitutional and created a de 

facto life sentence. Appellant emphasizes that he will be approximately 80 

years old after he completes his minimum aggregate sentence of 621⁄2 years.

We have previously summarized the applicable authority: 

In Miller, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a 

juvenile convicted of a homicide offense could not be sentenced 

to life in prison without parole absent consideration of the 

juvenile’s special circumstances in light of the principles and 

purposes of juvenile sentencing. Subsequently, in Montgomery, 

the Court held that the Miller decision announced a substantive 

rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively.

Commonwealth v. Bebout, 186 A.3d 462, 472 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(citations omitted). 

Section 1102.1, which the General Assembly enacted in the wake of the 

Miller decision, prescribes sentencing for those who commit first-degree 

murder while under the age of 18:

(a) First degree murder.--A person who has been convicted 

after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree, first degree 

murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement 

officer of the first degree and who was under the age of 18 at 

the time of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced 

as follows:

(1) A person who at the time of the commission of the 

offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to 

a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of 

imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 35 

years to life.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1).
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In Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416 (Pa. Super. 2018), we held 

that “a trial court may not impose a term-of-years sentence, which constitutes 

a de-facto [life-without-parole] sentence, on a juvenile offender convicted of 

homicide unless it finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he or she is 

incapable of rehabilitation.” Id. at 431. However, we “explicitly decline[d] to 

draw a bright line . . . delineating what constitutes a de facto [life without 

parole] sentence and what constitutes a constitutional term-of-years 

sentence.” Id. at 438. Similarly, we “decline[d] to set forth factors that trial 

courts must consider when making this determination.” Id. We further 

explained: 

There are certain term-of-years sentences which clearly constitute 

de facto [life without parole] sentences. For example, a 150-year 

[minimum] sentence is a de facto [life without parole] sentence. 

Similarly, there are clearly sentences which do not constitute de 

facto [life without parole] sentences. A sentence of 30 years to 

life falls into this category. We are unaware of any court that has 

found that a sentence of 30 years to life imprisonment constitutes 

a de facto [life without parole] sentence for a juvenile offender. 

Even the study with the shortest life expectancy for an offender in 

[the a]ppellant’s position places his life expectancy at 49 years, 

i.e., beyond 30 years. 

Id. 

Including Foust, there have been numerous published opinions of this 

Court analyzing whether a sentence fashioned by a trial court amounted to a 

de facto life without parole sentence for a juvenile offender. See, e.g., Foust, 

180 A.3d at 438 (holding that a sentence of 30 years to life did not constitute 

a de facto life sentence, where the defendant was charged with two counts of 
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first-degree murder and received consecutive, 30-year-to-life sentences at 

each conviction); Bebout, 186 A.3d at 469-70 (holding that a sentence of 45 

years to life did not constitute a de facto life without parole sentence); 

Commonwealth v. White, 193 A.3d 977, 986 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding a 

sentence of 35 years to life did not constitute a de facto life without parole 

sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Elliott, 1769 WDA 2017, 2018 WL 

3764983 at *4 (Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 2018) (unpublished memorandum)2

(holding that a 50-year to life sentence was not a de facto life sentence where 

the juvenile offender would be eligible for parole at age 70 and thus possessed 

a “meaningful possibility of parole”).

Instantly, Appellant contends that we should consider the entirety of his 

sentence (621⁄2 years to life) in determining whether he received a de facto

life without parole sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 36-38. In Foust, however,

we held that “when considering the constitutionality of a sentence, the 

individual sentences must be considered when determining if a juvenile 

received a de facto [life without parole] sentence.” Foust, 180 A.3d at 434 

(emphasis added). Consequently, we must analyze Appellant’s 50-year

sentence for first-degree murder separately from the sentences he received 

for his other convictions. 

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2 As an unpublished decision, we cite Elliott for its persuasive value.
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The trial court sentenced Appellant to a minimum term of 50 years of 

incarceration for his first-degree murder conviction. According to the 

sentencing order, Appellant’s sentence began to run on September 20, 2012, 

when Appellant was 18 years and 2 months of age. See Sentencing Order, 

11/10/14. Thus, the minimum tail of Appellant’s 50-year sentence for his 

first-degree murder conviction will conclude when he is 68 years old. We 

acknowledge that because of his aggregate sentence, Appellant will still be 

serving time for his other convictions. Nevertheless, he may obtain parole. 

Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we cannot conclude 

that Appellant’s 50-year to life sentence for his first-degree murder conviction

constitutes a de facto life without parole sentence. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

second issue does not merit relief.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/09/2019