### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

PO II STEVE TOPASNA , Guam Police Department ; DOES 1
- 100, Petitioners

- Appellants ,


### v. GOVERNMENT OF GUAM; LOURDES LEON GUERRERO in her capacity as Governor of Guam ; CAPT. STEVEN IGNACIO , in his capacity as Chief of Police , Guam Police Department ; MR. EDWARD BIRN, in his capacity as Director , Guam Department of Administration ,

Respondent s
- Appellees

.
Supreme Court Case No.: CVA20

- 014 S uperior Court Case No.: SP0064

- 20



### OPINION

Cite as: 2021 Gu am 23

Appeal from the Sup erior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on May 21, 2021 Via Zoom video conference

Appearing f

or Petitioner s
- Appellant s : Thomas J. Fisher , Esq. Fisher & Associates 167 E. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 101 Hagåtña, GU 96910 Appearing f or Respondent s
- Appell ee s : Jordan Lawrence Pauluhn , Esq. Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Litigation Division 590 S. Marine Corps Dr. , Ste. 802 Tamuning, GU 96913Topasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 2 of 12

BEFORE: F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Chief Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Associate Justice; KATHE RINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.

CARBULLIDO , C. J.: [1] Petitioner

- Appellant Police Officer II Steve Topasna appeals from the Superior Court’s
denial of his P etition for a Writ of M andamus. Topasna argues the Superior Court misinterpreted
Rule 8.406 o f the Department of Administration’s Personnel Rules and Regulations in holding
that he and similarly situated government employees were not entitled to release from their work
duties , with pay and with out charge to leave , during the State of Emergency dec lared in response
to the novel coronavirus (“ COVID

- 19 ”)

. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND [2] I n 1996, the then

- g overnor of Guam promulgated the Department of Administration (“DOA”) Personnel Rules and Regulations (“ Personnel Rules”) by ex ecutive order

. See Exec.
Order No. 19 96

- 24 at 2 . The Personnel Rules “apply to all employees occupying classified positions employed by the departments and agencies under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Administration. ” DOA Pers. R. & Regs. 1.000( A) (1996)

. [3] In March 2020, the Governor of Guam declare d a public health State of E mergency in response to COVID

- 19. See Exec. Order No. 2020

- 03

. The Governor later enacted several

measures by executive order to reduce public exposure to the virus, including limitation s on certain “non

- essential” government operations. See Exec. Order No. 2020

- 04 at 1 (closure of

non
- essential government operations ) ; Exec. Order No. 2020

- 05 at 2 ( clarifying operational status of agencies)

. Executive Order No. 2020

- 05 announced that , until further notice, some government agencies would be “ completely closed , ” other agencies would be “ operational but closed to public access , ” and still other agencies would remain “ fully operational, includingTopasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 3 of 12

public access. ” Exec. Or der No. 2020

- 05 at 2. Many government employees were ordered to report for duty at their work facility only if so requested by their supervisor

. See i d

. By contrast, Topasna avers that he was not ordered to refrain from reporting to work. [4] In May 202 0, Topasna , a Police Officer I I with the Guam Police Department (“GPD”) , filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus with the Superior Court of Guam . Topasna sought, under Rule 8.406 of the Personnel Rules (“DOA Rule 8.406”), to be released from his work
dut i es with pay and without charge to leave during the S tate of E mergency , or to be compensated at double his regular rate for the essential work he performed during the S tate of E mergency
. 1 Topasna named the Government of Guam, the Governor, the Director of DOA, and the Chief of
GPD (collectively, “ the Government ”) as respondents. The Superior Court denied Topasna’s
p etition , holding that mandamus would not lie because Topasna had failed to prove a ll predicate
conditions for relief under DOA Rule 8.406. The Superior Court entered its judgment , and Topasna timely appealed

.

1 Rule 8.406 provides: Natural Disasters and Other Emergency Conditions A. Excused absence with pay and without charge to leave shall be granted to employees when natural disasters or other emergency conditions create unsafe working conditions. B. Excused absence, for natural disaste r or other emergency conditions, may be granted only when there has been an official proclamation of the hazardous conditio ns by Executive Order, or an equivalent announcement by the Governor. C. When the Governor declares a State of Emergency, the appointing authority shall determine whether affected facilities or portions thereof, which are located in the area covered by the Ex ecutive Order or proclamation, are to be closed. 1. Except for those employees determined by the appointing authority to be necessary fo r providing essential services, employees shall be released from duty with pay, without charge to leave, for the period the facility is closed. 2. Those employees, required to remain on duty to provide essential services , shall be paid at double the regular r ate, or granted compensatory leave credits for the hours worked during the period the facility is closed and the other employees are on excused leave. D. Employees who are on annual or sick leave status when an emergency condition is declared by Executive Ord er, or announcement by the Governor and are not required to report to duty, shall be considered as released from duty with pay without charge to leave for the period the work facility is closed. DOA Pers. R. & Regs. 8. 406

.Topasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 4 of 12

II. JURISDICTION [5] This court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments rendered by the Superior
Court o f G u a m . 48 U.S.C.A. § 14 24

- 1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 11 7

- 57 (202 1 )); 7 GCA §§ 3107(b), 3108(a) (2005). The appealed decision denying Topasna’s petition i s a final judgment “because it adjudicates all the claims and all rights and liabilities of all parties, in
accordance with 7 GCA § 3108(a) (2005).” Agana Beach Cond o. Homeowners ’ Ass’n v. Mafnas , 2013 Guam 9 ¶ 10.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW [6] “The Superior Court’s decision to deny a writ of mandamus will not be reversed absent a finding of abuse of discretion.” Dep’t of Agric. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n (Rojas ), 2009 G uam 19 ¶ 8 (citing Carlson v. Perez , 2007 Guam 6 ¶ 15). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings or an incorrect legal standard.” Carlson , 2007 Guam 6 ¶ 15 (quoting Fallini v. Hodel , 783 F.2d 1 343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986)). However, “[t]he trial court’s conclusions of law, such as whether the legal requirements for mandamus are met and issues of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo .” Agana Beach , 2013 Guam 9 ¶ 11 (citing Rojas , 2009 Gua m 19 ¶ 8). Further , interpreting an agency rule or regulation is
reviewed de novo

. See , e.g. , Port Transp., Stevedore, & Terminal Emps. v. Guam Civil Serv.
Comm ’ n (Port Auth. of Guam) , 2018 Guam 18 ¶ 28; Fleet Serv s ., Inc. v. Dep ’ t of Admin. , 2006
Guam 6 ¶ 11; Doe v. N.H. Dep ’ t of Safety , 999 A.2d 362, 365 (N.H. 2010).
IV . ANALYSIS
A. The Superior Court’s A nalysis of DOA Rule 8.406 Was N ot an A buse of D iscretion [7] Topasna raises only one issue on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion “whe n it ignored and misinterpreted sections of [DOA Rule 8.406]

. ” Appellant’s Br. at 1 (Nov.Topasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 5 of 12

24, 2020). In the Superior Court, Topasna argued for one of two outcomes: to be released from his work duties with pay and without charge to leave (hereafter, “ paid leave ”) under DOA Rule 8.406( A ), or to receive pay at double his regular rate or compensatory leave credit ( hereafter , “double pay”) under DOA Rule 8.406( C ). The Superior Court’s Decision and Order mainly focused on Topasna’s double pay claim. The Super ior Court held that mandamus would not lie
because Topasna did not prove two predicate conditions for double pay under DOA Rule 8.406( C )(2 ) : that Topasna’s work facility, GPD , was “closed” and that other GPD personnel

were placed on excused leave while Top asna had to report to work

. See RA, tab 11 at 8

- 10 (Dec.
& Order , June 4, 2020 ). [8] Topasna a rgues the Superior Court’s construction of DOA Rule 8.406 was erroneous because it failed to give pro per effect to DOA Rule 8.406( A ). In Topasna’s view, subse ction ( A ) creates an entitlement to paid leave with only a single predicate condition: a gubernatorial proclamation of a State of Emergency. Appella nt’s Br. at 11. Thus, Topasna argues the Superior Court erred in denying his paid leave claim for lack of evidence that his work facility was closed. To resolve his claim, we must determine whether work facility closure is a predicate condition for paid leave under DOA Rule 8.406.
1. We apply the same canons of construction for interpreting statutes to interpre t administrative rules [9] Although this court has often been called to interpret statutes, Topasna’s argument requires the interpretation of a DOA agency rule. We have not opined whether the same canons of construction applicable to statutory interpreta tion also apply to interpreting administrative agency rules. After reviewing case law from other juri sdictions, we conclude the same canons of construction apply in both circumstances. See, e.g. , Black & Decker Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue , 986 F. 2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Regulations, like statutes, are interpreted according toTopasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 6 of 12

canons of construction

. ”); Price v. Starbucks Corp. , 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 181 (Ct. App. 2011) (“The rules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of regula tions.”); Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeJaynes , 590 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tex. App. 2019) (“[C]ourts shoul d interpret an administrative rule as it would a statute, applying traditional principles of statutory construction.”). [10] We therefore interpret DOA Rule 8.40 6 given our typical canons of statutory construction

. The “starting point” of interpretation is the plain language of the rule. Barrett

Anderson v. Camacho , 2015 Guam 20 ¶ 23 (quoting Aguon v. Gutierrez , 2002 Guam 14 ¶ 6)

. But we need not adhere to the plain language of the rule where doing so “would lead to absurd or impractical consequences, untenable distinctions, or unreasonable results.” Sumitomo Constr., Co. v. Gov’t of Guam , 2001 Guam 23 ¶ 17 ( quoting Bowlby v. Nelson , DCA No. 83

- 0096A, S.C.
No. 69

- 83, 1985 WL 56583, at *2 (D. Guam App. Div. Sept. 5, 1985 ) ). We review DOA Rule
8.406 as a whole, see, e.g. , Macris v. Guam Mem’l Hosp. Auth. , 2008 Guam 6 ¶ 19, and construe those provisions “deal[ing] with the same subject matter” in pari materia with one another , Aguon , 2002 Guam 14 ¶ 13 ; see also Lexin v. Superior Court , 222 P. 3d 214, 241 ( Cal. 2010). Finally, w e interpret DOA Rule 8.406 with the intention “ to give effect to all of its provisions so that no part would be superfluous or insignificant .” Macris v. Richardson , 2010 Guam 6 ¶ 15 (citing Duncan v. Walker , 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).
2. Facility closure is a predicate condition for paid leave under DOA Rule 8.406 [11] We consider de novo whether Topasna’s reading of DOA Rule 8.406 reflects the relevant
canons of construction. See, e.g. , Doe , 999 A.2d at 365. We begin with the plain meaning of subsection (A): “ Excused absence with pay and without charge to leave shall be granted to employees when natural disasters or other emergency conditions create unsafe work ingTopasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 7 of 12

conditions.” DOA Pers. R. & Regs. 8.406(A). Topasna argues this subsection’s use of the word “shall” proves that an employee’s entitlement to paid le ave is mandatory. Appellant’s Br. at 8

- 9. We agree the word “shall” means the ent itlement, when properly triggered, is mandatory rather than discretionary. Cf. Enriquez v. Smith , 2015 Guam 29 ¶ 26. However, the Superior Court held that Topasna failed t o establish the predicate conditions necessary to trigger the rule, not
that the Go vernment may exercise discretion to ignore the rule if properly triggered. See RA, tab
11 at 8

- 10 (Dec. & Order). The salient question is not what “shall” means, but what predicate conditions are necessary to trigger the entitlement. [12] In Topasna’s vi ew, the only predicate condition for paid leave under subsection ( A ) is a gubernatorial declaration of a State of Emergency. Appellant’s Br. at 11. T he State of Emergency requirement is not found in the text of subsection ( A ) ; subsection ( A ) instead

cont emplates “natural disasters or ot her emergency conditions creat[ing ] unsafe work ing
conditions

. ” DOA Pers. R. & Regs. 8.406( A ). Yet DOA Rule 8.406 ( A ) neither defines nor explains the terms “natural disasters , ” “ other emergency conditions , ” or “unsa fe wor k ing
conditions , ” nor does the rule explain who has the authority to determine whether such
conditions exist. Read in isolation, DOA Rule 8.406( A ) would be too ambiguous to create an
enforceable entitlement. [13] But subsections of a rule should not be re ad in isolation; all language of a rule “must be
examine d within its context , ” which includes looking at its related provisions

. Macris v. Guam Mem’l Hosp. Auth. , 2008 Guam 6 ¶ 19 (quoting Aguon , 2002 Guam 14 ¶ 9). DOA Rule 8.406( B ) clarifies subsection ( A ). S ubsection ( B ) provides that “[ e ] xcused absence , for natural disaster or other emergency conditions , may be granted only when there has been an official proclamation of the hazardous conditions by Executive Order, or an equivalent announcement byTopasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 8 of 12

the Governor.” DOA Pers. R. & Regs. 8.406( B ). Reading subsections ( A ) and ( B ) together, th is predicate condition is clear: a gubernatorial declaration is necessary to satisfy the “natural disasters or other emergency conditions” language of subsection ( A ). We therefore agree with Topasna that the declaration of a State of Emergency, or an equivalent announcement by the
Governor , is a predicate condition for paid leave under DOA Rule 8.406. [14] Still, ambiguity remains as to the meaning of “unsafe wor kin g conditions

. ” To understand this phrase, we look to subsection ( C ) , which provides : “When the Governor declares a State of Emergency, the appointing authority shall determine whether affected facilities or portions thereof, which are located in the area covered by the Executive Order or proclamation, are to be closed.” DOA Pers. R. & Re gs. 8.406( C ). We find the plain meaning of subsection ( C ) clear: the appointing authority has the power to determine whether certain work facilities are affected by the c onditions creating the State of Emergency and, if so, to close the work facility.
Th erefore , subsection ( C ) provides that t he appointing authority has t he power to determine whether “unsafe working conditions , ” as contemplated by subsection ( A ), are prese nt

. Subsection ( C )(1) adds that except for certain employees who provide “essential services , ” employees “ shall be released from duty with pay, without charge to leave, for the period the facility is closed.” DOA Pers. R. & Regs. 8.406( C )(1). We find th e meaning of this subsection plain as well: when the appointing authority closes the work facility , the facility’s non
- essential employees must be placed on paid leave while their work facility is closed. As with subsection s ( A ) and ( B ), subsections ( C ) a nd ( C )(1) complement one another. [15] There is a conflict, however, between the plain language of subsection ( C ) (1) and Topasna’s expansive reading of subsection ( A ). In Topasna’s view, an employee is entitled to paid leave under subsection ( A ) solely upon the declaration of a State of Emergency

. SubsectionTopasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 9 of 12

( C ) (1) , however, contemplates paid leave only if

— and only while

— the employee’s work facility
is closed because of the State of Emergency

. Therefore, the grant of paid leave under subsection ( C ) (1) is much narrower than the grant of paid leave under Topasna’s reading of subsection ( A ). Topasna glosses over this distinction, suggesting subsection ( C )(1) merely “reiterates the requirements of [subsectio n] ( A ) and acknowledges the existence of certain essential services
that must be met

. ” Appellant’s Br. at 12. We disagree with Topasna’s assessment

. If Topasna’s reading were correct, then an employee would be entitled to paid leave under subsection ( A )
even if the facility is not closed under subsect ion ( C )

. The language “for the period the facility is
closed” in subsection ( C )(1) would be swallowed by the broader rule of subsection ( A ) and would therefore be superfluous. We are disinclined to read legal texts in this way
. See, e.g. , Bank of Guam v . Del Priore , 2007 Guam 7 ¶ 27 ( disapproving a statutory construction that
would render statute’s express language superfluous). [16] There is a similar conflict between Topasna’s reading of subsection ( A ) and the plain language of subsection ( D ). Subsec tion ( D ) provides that employees already on annual or sick
leave at the time of the State of Emergency declaration “shall be considered as released from duty with pay without charge to leave,” but only “for the period the work facility is closed. ”
DOA Per s. R. & Regs. 8.406( D )

. As above, if Topasna’s reading of subsection ( A ) were correct, then such an employee would be entitled to paid leave under the broad rule of subsection ( A ) despite the narrower and more specific grant of paid leave under subsection ( D ). The “for the period the work facility is closed” language in subsection ( D ) would likewise be superfluous. [17] Topasna proposes no interpretive method to reconcile this conflict; his briefing discusses subsection ( C )(1) only briefly and does not discuss subsection ( D )

. However, a s a general rule ofTopasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 10 of 12

statutory interpretation , when two in pari materia provisions conflict with each other, the more
spe cific provi sion trumps the general: It is an old and familiar rule that, where there is, in the same statute, a particular enactment, and also a general one, which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases wit hin its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 566 U.S. 639, 646 (2012) (quoting United
States v. Chase , 135 U.S. 255, 260 (1890)). This “general

- specific” canon ensur es that “[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one.” Morton v. Mancari , 417 U.S. 535, 550

- 51 (1974). Instead, the more specific statute will operate as an “exception to, or qual ification of, the general statute

. ” Wark v. Wash.
Nat ’l Guard , 557 P.2d 844, 845 (Wash. 1976) (en banc). [18] Here, we perceive no clear intention in DOA Rule 8.406 that subsections ( C )(1) and ( D ) be controlled or nullified by the more general subsectio n ( A ). We therefore interpret these more specific subsections as qualifications to the general policy of paid leave announced by subsection ( A ). We conclude subsections ( C )(1) and ( D ) limit an employee’s entitlement to paid leave to periods in which the employee’s work facility is closed. And because the facility

- closure requirement necessary to subsections ( C ) and ( D ) qualify the general rule established by subsection ( A ), we conclude that f acility closure, like a State of Emergency declaration, is
ther efore a predicate condition for paid leave under DOA Rule 8.406. Thus, the Superior Court’s analy tical approach relying on facility closure was not an error of law, and thus not an abuse of
discretion. [19] Topasna also cites Koji v. Neves , 2016 Guam 36 , for the proposition that a trial court’s failure to perform a required analysis requested by one party is an abuse of discretion. TopasnaTopasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 11 of 12

appears to argue the Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to analyze his paid leave
claim separately fro m his double pay claim

. See Appellant’s Br. at 5 , 9 . However, Koji does not apply to the facts here

. In Koji , the trial court ignored a party’s motion for an inconvenient forum analysis despite Guam’s inconvenient forum statute explicitly providing that a party may raise the issue by motion. See 2016 Guam 36 ¶ 40. Here , the Superior Court did not ignore Topasna’ s request to be placed on paid leave, but properly considered and resolved the issue. The Superior Court ruled that Topasna was ineligible for paid leave under subsection ( C )(1)
because he had been designated as “ essential ” by the Chief of Police and because he failed to
prove that his work facility was closed

. See RA, tab 11 at 7

- 9 (Dec. & Order ). Because subsection ( C )(1) qualifies the rule of subsection ( A ), the Superior Court did not have to perform

a separate analysis under subsection ( A ) ; an analysis under subsection ( C )(1) was sufficient to
resolve the issue. In contrast to Koji , the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by not
pe rforming an unnecessary analysis

. B. We N eed N ot R each the Government’s A lternative G rounds for D efending the J udgment [ 20] The Government proposes several alternative grounds on which to resolve this case. See generally Appellee’s Br. (Jan. 14, 2021). Al though the Government did not cross

- appeal the Superior Court’s judgment, an appellee “may, despite a failure to file a cross

- appeal, defend a judgment on any ground consistent with the record, even if rejected or ignored by the lower
court.” Rahmani v. P ark , 2011 Guam 7 ¶ 68

. Thus, the Government’s alternative theories defending the judgment are proper for our consideration. But because we have resolved the case
based on textual interpretation , it is unnecessary to reach the merits of the se alternative theories

. Cf. Unpingco v. Derry , 2021 Guam 1 ¶ 21.Topasna v. Gov’t of Guam , 2021 Guam 23 , Opinion Page 12 of 12

V. CONCLUSION [21] Because t he Superior C ourt did not abuse its discretion in its analysis of Topasna’s claim for paid leave under DOA Rule 8.406 , we AFFIRM its D ecision and O rder denying Topasna’s pet ition and the resulting judgment.

/s/ /s/ ROBERT J. TORRES KATHERINE A. MARAMAN Associate Justice Associate Justice

/s/ F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO Chief Justice