The C our t not es t hat t he r ecor d i n t hi s cas e doe s not i ncl ude copi es of a ny of t he a gr eement s t hat ar e i nvol ved 1 in th is c a se . T h e sc o p e o f o u r fa c tu a l rev ie w is lim ited to th e c o n te n ts o f th e a p p e llate re c o rd

. R i ch m ond v . Ri ch m ond , 6 9 0 S .W .2 d 5 3 4 , 5 3 5 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 8 5 ). T h e a p p e llan t h a s th e re sp o n sib ili ty to p re p a re a fa ir, ac c u ra te , an d c o m p le te re c o rd o n a p p e a l. J

e n n in g s v . S e w e ll-A llen P ig g ly Wig g ly , 173 S. W

. 3d 710 ( Tenn. 2005)

. I n t hi s cas e, t he a ppel l ant d id n o t en su re th a t a c o p y o f th e a g re e m e n ts w e re in c lu d e d in th e re c o rd b e fo re u s, a n d th e re fo re , t h is C o u rt i s u n a b le t o ad dress t he ex act t erm s of t ho se agreem ents. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT J AC KS ON A pr i l 18, 2007 Ses s i on B E P S E R V I C E S , IN C . v . C A R E F I R S T F O U N D A T I O N , IN C . f/k /a

P ROV I DE NT F OUN DA T I ON, I NC . A D ire ct A pp ea l fr om t he Ch an cer y C ou rt f or Sh elb y C ou nt y No. CH-04-0406-3 The Honorable D. J. Alissandrat os, Chancellor

No. W2006-02059-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 21, 2007

Pl aintif f ap pe als the gr ant of

summ ary judg m ent to de fe nd ants in its s uit fi led on the the ory of equitable subr ogation. The tr ial courtfound that the undi sp ut edfacts es tablishe d that plai ntiff ac te d a s avo lu nt ee r a ndpr ov edno fr au d, ac ci de ntormis ta ke . We a ffi rm. Te nn . R . A pp . P . 3 ; A pp ea l as of Righ t; J ud gme ntof t he Ch an cer y C ou rt A ffi rme d W. F RANK C RAW FORD , P.J., W .S., deli vered the opi nion of the c ourt, in which A LA N E. H I GHERS , J. and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined. Br uc e S . K ram er and

Sc ott A. Kr am er o f M em

ph is, Te nn ess ee f

or A pp ell ant, B EP Se rvi ces , In c. Stephen W. Ragland, Clarence A. W ilbon, and Simon C. Bieber of Mem phis, Tennessee for Ap pe lle e, CareF irs t F ou

nd ati on , In c. f/k/a

/ P rov ide Fo un datio n, Inc

. OP IN ION I. Fa cts an d P ro ced ur e CareF irs t F ound ati on , In c. (“C are Fi rst ,” “D ef en dant, ” “A

pp ellee”) and

BE P S erv ice s, Inc. (“BEP,” “Plaint iff,” “Appellant”) ent er edint o an agreement for BEP to provide managem ent servi ces to a heal th c ar e facility on J uly 29, 1996. The parties agree thatpursuant 1 to that management agreement, BEP agreed to accept cont rol an d re sponsi bility for t he day-today operati ons and managem ent of Arnold Home, a nursing facility owned by CareFir st.-2-

BEP and CareFirst lat er enter ed into a ser ies of contract s. These i nc lu de d a January 2000 Se tt le ment Agreement, an August 2000 Agreement f or Sale and Transfer of Arnold Ho me As set s, an d a

De cem be r 20 00 Ag ree m ent R eg ard ingSa le and Transfer o f Arno ld H om e A sse ts. Th ese ag ree m ents e ff

ect ive ly r esu lte d in

the trans fe r of

owne rsh ip o f t

he Ar no ld H ome fa cil ity and its ass ets fr om C ar eF ir st t o BEP, eff ective Ja nuary 1, 2001. Both parti es agree t hat each of the thr ee 2 00 0 a gre em ents s pe cif ied that th e 1 99 6 M an ag em ent A gre em ent w as t o re m ain in f ull effect until the t ransfer of ownership was complete. Durin g th e ti m e p eri od

in whic h B EP m an ag ed

the Ar no ld Home but befor e it

ass um ed ownership of the facili ty, the Ar nold Home incurred various oper ating expense s, including accounts payabl e to vendors, sa laries and accrued va ca ti on t ime. BEP was aware that pursuant to t he Man ag em ent A gre em ent, B EP wa s n ot r esp on sib le f or o r le ga llyob lig ate d to pay tho se expe ns es. No ne the les s, af ter ass um ing owne rsh ip o f t he Ar no ld H om e, BEP paid

the expe ns es, cla im ing that it

wa s n ece ssary to pay tho se e xp en ses in o rde r to co nti nu e o pe rat ion s an d to encourage vendor s to continue to do business wit h the Arnold Home. On February 27, 2004, BEP filed a Complaint with the chancery court and ass erted two causes of action: a claim for breach of contra ct and a cla im for“ monies due and owing.” On December 21, 2005, CareFirst filed a moti on fo r summary judgm ent on both cla ims. At the he ari ng fo r th at m oti on , th e co urt ag ree d to all owBE P an o pp ort un ityto am end its co m

pla int

. On April 7, 2006, BEP filed its Amended Com plai nt, replac ing its or iginal t wo causes of action wi th c lai m s o f u

nju st e nrichm ent a nd e qu ita ble su bro gatio n. BE P c lai m ed

that it wa s entit led

to rei m burse m ent f

or p ay ingcer

tai n e xp en ses rel atin g to the op eratio ns of the Ar no ld H om e th at i t wa s n ot o bli gated

to m ak e. On

June 9, 20 06 , CareFirst filed a se co nd

m oti on fo r summ ary ju dg ment , a rg ui ng th atBEP co ul d n otsa ti sfy th e n ec es sa ry el eme nt s o f ei th ercl ai m. A hearing was held on CareFirst’ s motion for summary judgm ent on July 21, 2006. At the conclusi on of that hearing, t he trial court sta ted:

As a g en era l pr inci ple , th is C ourt w ou ld t hink und er the rig ht f

act cir cum stanc e o f t

rue ex igen cythat th ere co uld be aneq

uit ab le exception t hat can be re asoned with and bal anced with the hol ding of the Su pre m e C ourt. Ho we ve r, t his is n ot t

hat ca se. For r ea sons bes t known to these pl aintiffs, they did cont ract on the fr ont en d, an d a

pp rop riatel y s o, an d p rot ect the m sel ve s co ntr act ua llyas t o n ot b ein g li ab le t o th ese thi rd- parti es. Th eyde fe nd , h ow ev er, the y w ent on and co mm en ced

to voluntari ly pay, and the Courtcould have envis ioned a n exigent cir cum stanc e in

a short period of

tim e, but th enthe y w ent an d le t tw o y ear s g o b y. Th at i s n ot e xig ent. Th at i s a c alc ulated

bu sin ess de cis ion

on the co st b en ef

it ana lys is of why is i t t hat we want to rush t o the courthous e, and let us t ake-3- some tim e – and because t hat does no t fal l int o a potentia l exigent exception, t he Court, there fore, must follow the basic case la w. Th e C ourt i s o f t

he op ini on

that this is a harsh re su lt. Ho we ve r, i t is the obli gatio n of this Court t o follow the law, since t hat is the first doctr ine in equit y, which is, equit y follows the law. There are ot her insta nces where thi s Cour t ha s been st ripped of equitable discret ion in othermatters as a resul t of ha rsh c ase law, but b e th at a s it

m ay , it is n on eth ele ss t

he law . A cco rdi ng ly, therefore, the motion for summary judgm ent must be granted. On Au gu st 1 4, 20 06 , th e tr ial co urt enter ed its ord er g rantin g C are Fi rst ’s m oti on fo r summ ary judgment on all claims assert ed by BEP. BEP f iled a noti ce of appeal on September 5, 2006. II. Iss ue s BEP Services rais es the following thr ee issues for appe al as sta ted in it s brief: 1. Whe the r th e T ria l C ourt e rre d in granti ng De fe nd ant’s Motion for Summ ary Judgment holding that BEP voluntari ly paid the de bts of CareF ir st, a nd thus is not entit led to e qu ita ble s ub rog ati on

whe re BE P pa id the debt s of Pr ov ide nt o ut of

or p urs uant t o a

leg al d uty fo r pu rpo ses of Tennessee equitabl e subrogati on law. 2. Whether one who pays t he debt of another pur suant to a moral obligation shoul d be considere d a “vol unteer” for purposes of Tennessee equi table subr ogation law. 3. Whe the r on e who pays the de bt o f ano the r in ord er t o pro tec t on es r ep utatio n s ho uld be co ns ide red

a “v olu nte er” for purposes of Tennessee equi table subr ogation law.

III . An aly sis A motion for s um

m ary jud gm ent sh ou ld b e g ranted wh enthe m ov ant de m on str ate s th at the re are n o g enuin e is su es o f m ate ria l f act and that th e m ov ingpartyis e nti tle d to a ju dg m ent as a matter of law. Se eT enn. R

. Ci v. P

. 56 .0 4. Th e m ov ingp arty fo r s um m ary ju dg m ent b ear s the burden of demonstrating that no ge nuine i ss ue o f mater ial fact exi sts. Se e B ain v. Wel ls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). On a motion for summary judgment, the cour t must take the str on ge st l eg iti m ate vie w o f e vid en ce i n f av or o f t he no nm ov ing party , a llo w a ll r eas on ab le in ferences in favor of that part y, and discard a ll counter vailing evi dence. See id. In B y rd v. Hal l , 847 S.W .2d 208 (Tenn. 1993), our Supreme Court stat ed:-4- Once it is shown by the movi ng party thatthere is no genuine iss ue of m ate ria l f

act , th e n onmov ingpartym us t th en de monstrate, byaf

fi davit s o r di sco ve ry m ate ria l, t hat th ere is a genuine, material fact di sp ut e to warra nt a tri al. In thi s regard, Ru le 5 6. 05 pro vid es t

hat th e n onm ov ing partycanno t si m ply rel y upon his pleadi ngs but must set forth sp ecific fact s sh ow ingthat the re i s a g enuin e is su e o f m ate ria l f act fo r tr ial

. Id

. at 2 10 -11 (ci tat ion s o m itt ed ) (e m ph asi s in ori gin al)

. Summary judgm ent is only appropriat e when the fa ct s an d the legal conclusions dr awn from the facts rea sonably per mit only one conclusion. Se e Ca rve ll v . B ott oms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). Bec au se o nl y qu estions of law are involved, ther e is no presumption of correct nes s regarding a trial court’s gr ant or denia l of summ ary judgment. Se e B ain , 926 S. W .2 d at 62 2. Th ere fo re, our rev iewof the tri al c ourt’ s g rant of

summ ary jud gm ent is deno vo on the recor d before this Court. Se e Wa rren v. Es tat e o f K irk , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 19 97 ). Subrogation is de fi ne d a s “t he su bs tit uti on of an oth er p ers on

in t he pla ce o f a

cre dit or, so that the person in whose favor itis exerci sed succeeds t o th e ri gh ts of the cre ditor in r elation to t he de bt. ” Castle man Constr. Co. v. Pennington , 432 S.W .2d 669, 674 (Tenn. 1968) (citat ion omitted). In it s most basic form, subrogation means that party A is subst ituted for party B and part y A can then rais e the right s party B hadagai nst party C. Se e B lan ke ns hi p v . Estate of Bain , 5 S. W .3 d 6 47 , 6 50 (T enn. 19 99 ). L eg al o r eq uit ab le s ub rog ati on

is b ase d u

pon ba sic pri nc ipl es o f e qu ityan d ju sti ce and all ows a p ers on

wh o p ay s th e d eb t of

an oth er t o as su me t he credit or’s plac e with respec t to the debt

. Castleman Constr. Co. , 4 2 3 S

. W

. 2 d at 674. “[I]n the absence of legal c ompulsion to pay t he d eb t of another, volunt ary payment of an oth er’ s d eb t, a

bs ent f rau d, acc ide nt, m ist ak e, or b y c ontract w iththe paye e, do es n ot e nti tle one to subrogatio n. ” Hu bb le v . D yer Nu rsi ng Hom e , 1 88 S. W .3 d 5 25 , 5 38 (T enn. 20 06) (citi ng Wa lke r v. Wa lke r , 200 S.W . 825 (Tenn. 1918). A mere volunteer or s tranger i s not entitl ed to subrogat ion where he pays wit hout an assignment of the debt or a n agreement for subrogation. Id. A “ vo luntee r” o r “s trang er” is “ on e who ha s n o o bli gatio n o r li ab ili ty t o p ay the de bt and

ha s n o inter est

in t he pro pe rtyaf

fe cte d b y the de bt. So m e co m pu lsi on to p ay , s uc h as l eg al p roc ess , is ord inaril y e sse nti al and su ff ici ent to su

pp ort sub rog ati on .” Id. In H ub ble , our S up rem e C ourt f

urt he r expla ine d th at a part y is cons ide red a v olu nte er u nle ss i t m ak es a paym en t be cau se o f a

jud ici al d eci sio n, a co ntr act ua l duty, or s om e o the r le ga llyen fo rce ab le means. Hu bb le , 188 S.W .3d at 538. In this ca se, BEP paid the operat ing e xp en se s at a t ime in which it was the owner of the Arnold Home in orderto ensure t he success of its own business operat ions. BEP does not argue that it m ad e those paym ents p urs uant t o anyleg all y e nf orc eab le m ean s. Rathe r, B EP states that it m ad e th e p aym ents i n o rde r to ind uc e v en do rs t o c ontin

ue to d o b us ine ss w iththe Ar no ld-5-

Ho m e an d in

ord er t o c ontin

ue to k eep the Ar

no ld H om e in

op eratio n. Th ere fo re, BEP m eet s the definiti on of a volunteer for purpose s of subrogation la w. Further, BEP does not all ege any fraud, mistake, or accidentwhich induced thes e payments. Because BEP acted as a vol unteer in making the payments and bec au se BE P do es not all e g e f ra u d , m is tak e , o r a c c id e n t, B E P is n o t e nti tl e d to s u b ro g a ti o nin

th is m a tt e r. Th ere fo re, the tri al c ourt w as c orr ect in g rantin g s um

m ary jud gm ent in

favo r of CareF irs t. BEP cites casel aw from

other ju ri sd ic ti on s to support i ts clai ms that it should not be considered a volunteer be cause i t ac te d pu rsuant to a moral obligation to a ct for the benefit of the Ar no ld H om e re sid ents, be cau se i t ac ted pursuant to a fid

uc iar y d uty that it ha d to its patie nts , and

be cau se i t ac ted

to protect an e co no m ic i nte res t. H ow ev er, the se argum ents dir ect ly c ontra dic t es tab lis he d law i n T enne sse e. Th e T enne sse e Supreme Co urt ha s es tab lis he d that a par ty wh o mee ts the definit ion of a volunteer i s entitl ed to subrogat ion only in the instance of fraud, acci dent, mi sta ke, or by contra ct with the pa yee. Hu bb le , 188 S.W .3d at 538. Th ere fo re, we fi nd

the se argum ents t o b e w ith out m eri t. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing r eas on s, we af fi rm the ord er o f t

he tri al c ourt. Ap pe lle e’s req ue st t o fi nd th is a fr ivo lou s ap pe al is de nie d. Co sts o f thi s ap pe al are a sse sse d ag ain st the App ell ant, BEP Services, Inc., and i ts suret y.

__________________________________________ W . FRANK

CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDG E, W .S.