U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory 

Commission

Office of Nuclear 

Material Safety

and Safeguards

NUREG/BR-0117

No. 01-2

June-July 2001

enforcement policy for the loss, abandonment, 

improper transfer, or improper disposal of sealed 

sources and devices containing NRC-licensed 

material. The change increases the likelihood of a 

civil penalty and the amount of a civil penalty 

for these types of violations. The intent is to 

better relate the penalty amount to the costs 

avoided by improper disposal. The new penalties 

apply to violations that involve a sealed source 

or device regardless of use or type of licensee.

Please note: If a licensee complies with all 

regulatory requirements and the source or 

device is still lost (i.e., a thief cuts a chain 

and steals a device), there is no violation 

and no enforcement action. This policy 

applies only where a requirement has 

been violated.

TABLE 1A--BASE CIVIL PENALTIES

1. Sources or devices with a total activity 

greater than 3.7 x 104 megabecquerels 

(1 curie), excluding hydrogen-3 (tritium)

............................................................. $45,000

2. Other sources or devices containing 

the materials and quantities listed in

10 CFR 31.5(c)(13)(i).......................... $15,000

3. Sources and devices not otherwise 

described above..................................... $6,000

NMSS Licensee Newsletter

(June - July 2001)

Contents Page

1. New Enforcement Policy for Sealed

Sources and Devices ................................. 1

2. Orphan Sealed Sources and DOE’s 

Offsite Source Recovery Project ............... 2

3. NRC Publishes a Quarterly Report

Summarizing Data Received on

Radiation Accidents/Incidents

Involving Nuclear Materials ...................... 2

4. Plutonium Fuel Plant Application .............. 3

5. Consolidation and Updating of NMSS’ 

Decommissioning Regulatory Guidance ... 4

6. Radioactivity of Radioiodine Packages ..... 4

7. Correction of Regulatory Guide 8.39 

on NRC Web Site ...................................... 4

8. Generic Communications Issued 

(February 1, 2001-April 30, 2001) ............ 5

9. Selected Federal Register Notices 

(February 1, 2001- April 30, 2001) ........... 5

10. Significant Enforcement Actions ............... 7

11. Significant Events ...................................... 9

NEW ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR 

SEALED SOURCES AND DEVICES

Effective February 16, 2001, the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) changed its 

NMSS Licensee Newsletter
TABLE 1B--BASE CIVIL PENALTIES

Severity Base Civil Penalty Amount

Level (Percent of amount listed in Table 1A)

1. ..................................................................... 100

II. ..................................................................... 80

III. ..................................................................... 50 

As provided in the enforcement policy, NRC may 

increase or decrease a civil penalty based on the 

merits of a specific case. In doing so, NRC 

may consider information concerning the actual 

expected cost of proper disposal and the actual 

consequences of the case. The new policy was 

published in the Federal Register on December 

18, 2000 (65 FR 79139). It is available on 

the Internet at www.nrc.gov/OE/rpr/enfman/policy/

fedreg/fr12182000policy.pdf. 

(Contact: Kevin Ramsey, 301-415-7887; e-mail: 

kmr@nrc.gov)

ORPHAN SEALED SOURCES AND DOE’S 

OFFSITE SOURCE RECOVERY PROJECT

Public Law (PL) 99-240, The Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 

establishes the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) 

responsibility for disposal of commercial low-level 

radioactive waste (LLW) exceeding U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) limits for Class-C 

LLW, known as greater than Class C (GTCC). The 

Offsite Source Recovery (OSR) Project’s primary 

focus is to manage a single type of GTCC, consisting 

of radioactive sealed sources. An estimated 18,000 

sealed sources are obsolete, or will become excess 

and unwanted, by 2010. Many are abandoned or 

uncontrolled. There is no legal option for disposing 

of the GTCC sealed sources. Some sealed source 

custodians are no longer NRC-licensed and/or can 

no longer properly maintain sealed sources in their 

possession. 

The OSR Project’s purpose is partially to fulfill 

DOE’s PL 99-240 responsibilities by recovering the 

backlog of unwanted GTCC sealed sources. 

2

Through an agreement with NRC, DOE/

Albuquerque (AL) and Los Alamos National 

Laboratory (LANL) have recovered individual 

sealed sources, based on emergency requests, since 

1993. Starting in December 2000, however, the 

project began routine sealed source recoveries under 

the project priority of recovering as many unwanted 

GTCC sealed sources as possible.

In December 2000, LANL staff deployed its first 

routine sealed source recovery team to package 61 

plutonium-238 (Pu-238) pacemakers at a medical 

firm in Pennsylvania. The pacemakers were packed 

into 13 containers, and shipped for storage at 

LANL. Another 610 Pu-238 items were packaged 

from facilities in Minneapolis and Chicago in 

January 2001. Further recoveries took place 

through April, resulting in a total of over 1500 

unwanted radioactive sealed sources being removed 

from the public domain.

 Future OSR Project activities include expanding 

recovery and storage activities to include Pu-239 

and americium - 241 sources. These activities are 

subject to completion of safeguards reviews for 

storing material at LANL. Additionally, DOE/AL 

is supporting Headquarters in preparing assessments 

to select a site for interim storage of large 

non-actinide sealed sources. These sources are 

known as radioisotope thermoelectric generators, 

and were used in various applications where 

small but reliable electric power supplies were 

required in remote locations.

For more information about the OSR Project, 

visit the new DOE OSR Project website at 

http://www.doeal.gov/wmd/OSRP/OSRP.htm, or the 

companion LANL Project website at the Los Alamos 

National Laboratory, http://osrp.lanl.gov/.

(Contact: Joel Grimm, 505-845-5463; 

e-mail:jgrimm@doeal.gov)

NRC PUBLISHES A QUARTERLY REPORT 

SUMMARIZING DATA RECEIVED ON 

RADIATION ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 

INVOLVING NUCLEAR MATERIALS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

maintains a database, the Nuclear Materials Events 
3

Database (NMED) of incidents and accidents 

(events) involving the use of radioactive material. 

NRC’ s material licensees and Agreement States 

report the events to NRC. Agreement States 

receive reports of events from their licensees and 

subsequently submit event reports to NRC so that 

data can be aggregated on a national level. One 

reason for NRC collecting event data is to identify 

safety-significant events, determine the cause of the 

events, and feed back the information to industry 

and the regulatory community. NRC uses a number 

of Generic Communications, such as Bulletins, 

Circulars, Generic Letters, and Information Notices, 

to alert licensees and others in the industry to 

actual or potential problems arising from the uses 

of radioactive material. To supplement this effort 

and make information more readily available to the 

industry and the public, NRC has begun publishing 

a quarterly report (NMED Quarterly Report) that 

summarizes data reported by quarter and shows 

the trends in reporting of radiation incidents and 

accidents involving nuclear materials. The NMED 

Quarterly Report can be accessed via the NMED 

web page at http://nmed.inel.gov. Hard copies of 

the Quarterly Report can be obtained by contacting 

Samuel Pettijohn (see below).

The Quarterly Report contains data on: (1) personnel 

overexposures; (2) medical misadministrations; (3) 

releases of material (contamination); (4) loss 

of control of material; (5) leaking sources; 

(6) equipment problems; and (7) transportation 

problems. Data in the NMED Quarterly Report 

are presented for the current quarter and for a 

18-month period (trends), including the current 

quarter. Data are aggregated by the cause of the 

event and the type, event, or activity. The 

NMED Quarterly Report also includes a section 

that contains observations on cause and corrective 

actions for a selected number of events determined 

by NRC review to be ranked as significant 

from a health and safety perspective.

(Contact: Samuel Pettijohn, 301-415-6822; e-mail: 

slp@nrc.gov)

PLUTONIUM FUEL PLANT 

APPLICATION

The Department of Energy (DOE) is working on 

several projects to dispose of plutonium that has 

been declared surplus to the U.S. nuclear weapons 

program. The DOE plutonium disposition plan 

involves a “hybrid” approach, in which three new 

facilities are proposed for the Savannah River 

Site in South Carolina. A Pit Disassembly and 

Conversion Facility is proposed that would convert 

metallic weapons pits to plutonium oxide powder. 

A uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) Fuel 

Fabrication Facility would convert approximately 

25 metric tons (27 tons) of the plutonium oxide 

into MOX fuel for use in Duke Power’s four 

reactors at the Catawba and McGuire stations. A 

Plutonium Immobilization Facility would convert 

approximately 8 metric tons (8.7 tons) of the 

oxide powder into ceramic cylinders that will 

be encapsulated in vitrified high-level waste. 

However, in March 2001, DOE announced that 

it would suspend funding for the immobilization 

facility, to reduce the anticipated future-year 

peak funding requirements.

In 1999, DOE selected Duke Cogema Stone & 

Webster (DCS) to design, construct ,and operate the 

MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility. In accordance with 

the provisions of 10 CFR Part 70, DCS submitted 

an Environmental Report to NRC in December 

2000 and a Construction Authorization Request in 

February 2001. The Environmental Report supports 

NRC’s development of an Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS). A draft EIS is scheduled to be 

completed in February 2002. The Construction 

Authorization Request is currently being reviewed 

by NRC staff. The staff’s review of the 

Construction Authorization Request is scheduled 

to be completed in September 2002.

More information on NRC’s involvement in 

this project can be found at

 http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/NMSS/MOX/index.html.

You may also request a copy of NRC’s quarterly 

newsletter on the MOX licensing activity, the 

“Mixed Oxide Xchange,” by sending your request 

to subscribe@nrc.gov.

(Contact: David Brown, 301-415-5257; e-mail: 

ddb@nrc.gov)
4

CONSOLIDATION AND UPDATING OF 

NMSS’ DECOMMISSIONING 

REGULATORY GUIDANCE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

(NMSS), Division of Waste Management, plans to 

consolidate and update the policy and guidance for 

NMSS’ decommissioning program. 

The initial scope of this effort covers all the 

decommissioning policies and guidance that 

implement the NMSS decommissioning regulations. 

Three NUREG volumes have been identified for 

development, which would review and, to the 

extent practicable, update/consolidate all existing 

NMSS decommissioning guidance documents. The 

project will also include decommissioning technical 

assistance requests, decommissioning licensing 

conditions, and all decommissioning generic 

communications issued over the past several 

years. The NMSS decommissioning policy and 

guidance documents will be grouped into the 

functional categories of: 1) “The General Materials 

Decommissioning Process”; 2) “Characterization, 

Survey, and Determination of Radiological Criteria”; 

and 3) “Financial Assurance, Recordkeeping, and 

Timeliness.” The three NUREG volumes will follow 

these functional categories.

This guidance consolidation project will follow 

the guidance consolidation and updating techniques 

used for the NUREG-1556 series. The goal is 

to produce consolidated NMSS decommissioning 

guidance that allows the NRC staff to evaluate 

information submitted by licensees in a timely, 

efficient, and consistent manner that protects public 

health and safety. The project plan was published 

in the Federal Register on May 1, 2001, with 

a 45-day public comment period, and a public 

meeting to discuss the plan with stakeholders 

was held June 1, 2001, at NRC Headquarters.

NMSS has identified a goal of completing drafts 

of the NUREG volumes by the end of September 

2002. To achieve this goal, NMSS plans to begin 

developing the first NUREG volume in the June/July 

2001 time frame. The overall project is scheduled 

to be completed by the end of September 2003. The 

updated, consolidated guidance will be available 

to all users in hardcopy and/or electronic media. 

Since regulators and licensees will have access to 

the same guidance, the expected results are more 

complete license documents that will expedite the 

approval process for both applicants and reviewers.

(Contact: Jack D. Parrott, 301-415-6700, e-mail: 

jdp1@nrc.gov)

RADIOACTIVITY OF RADIOIODINE 

PACKAGES

The City of New York Office of Radiological Health 

issued the following Information Notice 2001-02 

on February 28, 2001. It is reprinted here to 

inform the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 

Agreement State licensees of the issue.

TO ALL LICENSEES USING

RADIOIODINE CAPSULES

All users of radioidodine capsules must 

be aware that the desiccant capsules or 

packets of crystals, packaged with 

radioiodine capsules to absorb moisture, 

also absorb iodine and, in turn, 

become radioactive.

Volatilization of radioiodine from capsules is 

significant. Approximate data show that the 

radioactivity absorbed by the dessicant can be on 

the order of several percent of the activity of the 

radioiodine capsules themselves. Desiccant capsules 

or crystals from radioiodine packages must be 

treated as radioactive waste. They can only 

be discarded as ordinary waste after a survey 

shows them to be nonradioactive and 

indistinguishable from background.

(Contact: Richard Borri, City of New York Office 

of Radiological Health, 212-676-1583; e-mail: 

nydh33@rcm.com)

CORRECTION OF REGULATORY GUIDE 

8.39 ON NRC WEB SITE

Users of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) Regulatory Guide 8.39, “Release of Patients 

Administered Radioactive Materials,” April 1997, 

recently identified two errors in the document that 

is posted on the NRC web site. In Appendix 

B, Equation B-5 and the corresponding workedout example (Example 2, “Thyroid Cancer”) are 
5

both incorrect. When the document was initially 

posted on the web site it was entered by retyping 

the original publication. However, this process 

introduced the two errors noted above. To 

rectify this matter, NRC has now replaced the 

defective version with a direct scan of the original 

publication to ensure the integrity of the document.

(Contact: Stewart Schneider, 301-415-7765; e-mail: 

sxs4@nrc.gov) 

GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED

(FEBRUARY 1, 2001 - APRIL 30, 2001)

Note that these are only summaries of U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic 

communications. If one of these documents appears 

relevant to your needs and you have not received it, 

please call one of the technical contacts listed below. 

The Internet address for the NRC library of generic 

communications is -- www.nrc.gov/NRC/GENACT/

GC/index.html. Please note that this address is casesensitive and must be entered exactly as shown.

Information Notices (INs)

IN 2001-01, “The Importance of Accurate Inventory 

Controls to Prevent the Unauthorized Possession 

of Radioactive Material,” was issued on March 

26, 2001. This notice was issued to all material 

licensees to alert them to potential hazards associated 

with inaccurate inventories. In one case, an unsealed 

source created a significant contamination problem 

at a small university.

(Contact: Kevin G. Null, Region III, 630-829-9854, 

e-mail: kgn@nrc.gov)

IN 2001-02, “Summary of Fitness-for-Duty Program 

Performance Reports for Calendar Years 1998 and 

1999,” was issued on March 28, 2001. This notice 

was issued to all nuclear power reactors and all 

licensees authorized to possess formula quantities 

of strategic nuclear material. The notice provides 

lessons learned and summarizes the data submitted 

by licensees.

(Contact: Garmon West, NRR, 301-415-1044, 

e-mail: fitnessforduty@nrc.gov)

IN 2001-03, “Incident Reporting Requirements for 

Radiography Licensees,” was issued on April 6, 

2001. It was issued to all industrial radiography 

licensees to provide them with updated guidance on 

reporting requirements. 

(Contact: Brian W. Smith, NMSS, 301-415-5723, 

e-mail: bws1@nrc.gov)

IN 2001-04, “Neglected Fire Extinguisher 

Maintenance Causes Fatality,” was issued on April 

11, 2001. It was issued to all reactor and fuel 

cycle licensees to alert them to the danger of 

corrosion in fire extinguishers. On August 25, 

2000, an individual in the Netherlands was trying 

to extinguish a small fire when the fire extinguisher 

exploded and killed the individual.

Contacts:

(Naeem Iqbal, NRR, 301-415-3346, 

e-mail: nxi@nrc.gov);

(Peter Lee, NMSS, 301-415-8111, 

e-mail: psl1@nrc.gov);

(Paul Lain, NMSS, 301-415-2346, 

e-mail: pwl@nrc.gov);

(Charles Petrone, NRR, 301-415-1027, 

e-mail: cdp@nrc.gov).

(General Contact: Kevin M. Ramsey, NMSS, 

301-415-7887, e-mail: kmr@nrc.gov)

SELECTED FEDERAL REGISTER

NOTICES

(February 1, 2001 - April 30, 2001)

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: NACUMS Revision (Direct final rule; confirmation of 

effective date),” 66 FR 10569, February 16, 2001.

(Contact: Keith K. McDaniel, 301-415-5252 ; 

e-mail: kkm@nrc.gov)

 “List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: TN-32 

Revision (Direct final rule; confirmation of effective 

date),” 66 FR 10569, February 16, 2001.

(Contact: Roger W. Broseus, 301-415-7608; 

e -mail: rwb@nrc.gov)
6

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

VSC-24 Revision (Direct Final Rule).” 66 FR 13407, 

March 6, 2001.

(Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov)

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

HI-STAR 100 Revision (Direct Final Rule).” 

66 FR 14483, March 13, 2001.

(Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov)

PROPOSED RULES

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

VSC-24 Revision,” 66 FR 13459, March 6, 2001. 

(Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov)

“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 

HI-STAR 100 Revision,” 66 FR 14503, March 13, 

2001.”

(Contact: Stan Turel, 301-415-6234; e-mail: 

spt@nrc.gov)

“Changes to Adjudicatory Process,” 66 FR 19610, 

April 16, 2001.

(Contact: Gary S. Mizuno, 301-415-1639; e-mail: 

gsm@nrc.gov)

OTHER NOTICES

“Prairie Island Coalition; Denial of Petition for 

Rulemaking,” 66 FR 9605, February 6, 2001.

(Contact: Gordon Gundersen, 301-415-6195; e-mail: 

geg1@nrc.gov)

“Notice of Availability of final NUREG-1556, 

Vol. 20, ‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials 

Licenses: Guidance about Administrative Licensing 

Procedures.’” 66 FR 9393, February 7, 2001. 

(Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov)

“Notice of Availability of final NUREG-1556, 

Vol. 16, ‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials 

Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance about 

Licenses Authorizing Distribution to General 

Licensees.’” 66 FR 9393, February 7, 2001. 

(Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov)

“Notice of Availability of final NUREG-1556, 

Vol. 12, ‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials 

Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance about 

Possession Licenses for Manufacturing and 

Distribution.’” 66 FR 9393, February 7, 2001. 

(Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov)

“Notice of Availability of final NUREG-1556, 

Vol. 10, ‘Consolidated Guidance about Materials 

Licenses: Program-Specific Guidance about Master 

Materials Licenses.’” 66 FR 9394, February 7, 2001. 

(Contact: Carrie Brown, 301-415-8092; e-mail: 

cxb@nrc.gov)

“United Plant Guard Workers of America; Denial 

of Petition for Rulemaking,” 66 FR10839, February 

20, 2001.

(Contact: Merri Horn, 301-415-8126; e-mail: 

mlh1@nrc.gov)

“Proposed Revision of the NRC Enforcement 

Policy,” 66 FR 14224, March 9, 2001.

(Contact: Nick Hilton, 301-415-2741; e-mail: 

ndh@nrc.gov)

“Issuance of Regulatory Guide 3.72, “Guidance for 

Implementation of 10 CFR 72.48 Changes, Tests, 

and Experiments,’’ 66 FR 17586, April 2, 2001.

(Contact: C.P. Jackson, 301-415-2947; e-mail: 

cpj@nrc.gov)

“Gammatron, Inc.; Denial of Petition for 

Rulemaking (PRM-30-64),” 66 FR 20099, April 

19, 2001.

(Contact: Clark Prichard, 301-415-6203; e-mail: 

cwp@nrc.gov)
7

constant surveillance of licensed material [a 

portable gauge containing 296 megabecquerel 

(8 millicuries) of cesium-137 and americium-241] 

in an unrestricted area.

Medical

Central Michigan Community Hospital, Mt. 

Pleasant, Michigan, EA 99-005

On April 2, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued 

for a willful Severity Level III violation involving 

the use of byproduct material (technetium-99m) by 

an unqualified individual who was not under the 

supervision of an authorized user.

Sibley Memorial Hospital, Washington, DC, EA 

00-245

On February 26, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

failure of the licensee’s quality management program 

to include an adequate written procedure to meet 

the objective that each administration of byproduct 

material or radiation from byproduct material is in 

accordance with a written directive.

Biomedical Scanning Services, Inc., St. Louis, 

Missouri, EA 00-288

On February 21, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $8800 was issued for a Severity Level II problem 

involving deliberate violations. These included: (1) 

delivery of byproduct material without an authorized 

individual present; (2) delivery of byproduct material 

to an address not authorized on the license; and 

(3) providing inaccurate and incomplete information 

to NRC.

Medical X-Ray Center, P.C., Sioux Falls, South 

Dakota, EA 01-018

On February 15, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to control and maintain constant surveillance 

of licensed material (Iridium-192 brachytherapy 

sources) that was in a controlled or unrestricted area 

and not in storage.

“American College of Nuclear Physicians and 

the Society of Nuclear Medicine; Denial of 

Petition for Rulemaking (PRM-35-16),” 66 FR 

20214, April 20, 2001.

(Contact: Catherine Haney, 301-415-6825; e-mail: 

cxh@nrc.gov)

“Standard Review Plan for the Gaseous Diffusion 

Plants, NUREG-1671; Notice of Availability for 

Review and Comment.” 66 FR 20694, April 

24, 2001.

(Contact: Bill Gleaves, 301-415-5848; 

e-mail:bcg@nrc.gov)

(General Contact: Paul Goldberg, 301-415-7842; 

e-mail: pfg@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Detailed information about these enforcement 

actions can be accessed via the U. S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) homepage 

[http://www.nrc.gov/OE/]. Click on “Enforcement 

Actions.” Cases are listed alphabetically. To access 

the complete enforcement action, click on the 

highlighted text after the name of the case.

Gauge

Moisture Protection System Analysis, Inc., 

McLean, Virginia, EA 98-213

On April 2, 2001, an Order Imposing a Civil 

Monetary Penalty in the amount of $5500 was 

issued. The action was based on a Notice of 

Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty 

(Notice), in the amount of $5500, that was 

issued on April 30, 1998, for failure to maintain 

licensed material, facilities, and records available for 

inspection as required by 10 CFR 30.52. 

Gilmore & Associates, Inc., New Britain, 

Pennsylvania, EA 01-010

On February 13, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the licensee’s failure to maintain control and 
8

District Health Partners, L.P., Washington, DC, 

EA 01-020

A Notice of Violation was issued on March 22, 

2001, for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure of the licensee’s quality management 

program to include a written procedure to ensure that 

brachytherapy applicators were adequately secured, 

during treatment, so that the intended treatment site 

received the prescribed exposure treatment and other 

sites received the planned dose.

Radiography

Alaska Industrial X-Ray, Inc., Anchorage, 

Alaska, EA 01-015 and EA 01-016

On April 25, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for two Severity Level III violations. The first 

violation involved the deliberate failure to assure that 

two qualified radiography personnel were present 

during radiographic operations. Although a civil 

penalty would normally be proposed for this case, 

NRC exercised enforcement discretion in accordance 

with Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy 

and refrained from issuing a civil penalty because 

the violation would not have been identified had 

the involved radiographer not voluntarily provided 

information during the investigation. The second 

violation involved the failure of a radiographer’s 

assistant to wear an alarm ratemeter while involved 

in radiographic operations.

Bayou Inspection Services, Inc., Amelia, 

Louisiana, EA 00-297

On April 2, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $5500 was issued for a Severity Level III 

problem involving a willful failure to notify NRC 

before conducting industrial radiography operations 

in offshore waters (i.e., failure to file NRC Form 

241) and a willful failure to obtain an exemption 

from NRC for the use of pipeliner radiography 

devices in offshore waters.

Gulf Coast International Inspection, Inc., Houma, 

Louisiana, EA 00-293 and EA 00-294

On March 27, 2001, a Notice of Violation and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $5500 was issued for two Severity Level III 

violations. The first violation was assessed the full 

civil penalty and involved the licensee’s willful 

failure to post radiation and high- radiation areas, as 

required, before conducting radiographic operations. 

The second violation involved the failure of a 

radiographer to wear an alarming ratemeter when 

conducting radiographic operations.

Global X-Ray & Testing Corporation, Morgan 

City, Louisiana, EA 00-272

On March 8, 2001, a Notice of Violations and 

Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 

of $5500 was issued for two Severity Level 

III violations. The first violation (assessed the 

full penalty) involved the failure to use pipeliner 

radiography devices in a manner described in a 

1999 exemption granted by NRC. The second 

violation involved the failure to perform radiation 

surveys, after radiographic exposures using pipeliner 

radiography devices.

Law Engineering and Environmental Services, 

Inc., Dorado, Puerto Rico, EA 00-302 and 

EA 00-304

On January 24, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III problem and a 

Severity Level III violation involving an event that 

occurred during a radiography source exchange. The 

Severity Level III problem involved: (1) failure 

to survey; (2) failure to follow procedures in 

accordance with manufacturer’s instructions; (3) 

failure to receive proper training before use; and 

(4) failure to perform required visual and operability 

check before using the source changer. The Severity 

Level III violation involved the Radiographer’s and 

Radiation Safety Officer’s failures to stop activities 

and read the survey meter on the sourcing of the 

alarm ratemeter.

Accurate NDE & Inspection, LLC, Opelousas, 

Louisiana, EA 00-300

On January 11, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the failure of Accurate NDE & Inspection, a 

licensee of the State of Louisiana, to file NRC 

Form 591, “Report of Proposed Activities in NonAgreement State,” before conducting radiographic 
9

operations using iridium-192 on off-shore oil/gas 

platforms in waters off the Gulf of Mexico in areas 

of Federal jurisdiction.

Well-Logging

Perf-O-Log, Inc., Lafayette, Louisiana, EA 01-060

On April 10, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued 

for a Severity Level III violation based on Perf-OLog, Inc., a State of Louisiana Licensee, conducting 

well logging operations using americium-241/

beryllium sealed sources in offshore waters without 

filing a Form 241, “Report of Proposed Activities in 

Non-Agreement State,” with NRC.

Weatherford International, Inc., Houma and 

Broussard, Louisiana, EA 01-030

On February 5, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure of Weatherford International, Inc., a licensee 

of the State of Louisiana, to file NRC Form 241, 

“Report of Proposed Activities in Non-Agreement 

State,” before conducting well logging operations 

using americium-241/beryllium sealed sources in 

offshore waters in areas of Federal jurisdiction.

Other

Griffith Electric Company, Trenton, New Jersey, 

EA 01-114

On May 4, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued 

for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

transfer of licensed byproduct material (EXIT signs 

containing tritium) without a specific license.

Idaho State University, Pocatello, Idaho,

EA 01-081

On April 5, 2001, a Notice of Violation was issued 

for a Severity Level III violation involving the 

failure to control and maintain constant surveillance 

over licensed material [55 megabecquerel 

(1.5 millicuries) of iodine-125] that was in a 

controlled area.

Republished from previous issue with 

addendum

National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, 

Maryland, EA 01-001

On January 17, 2001, a Notice of Violation was 

issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 

the licensee’s failure to make surveys that were 

necessary to assure compliance with the regulations 

that limit radiation exposure to the skin of a minor 

to 50 millisievert (5 rem). The violation resulted 

from an August 8, 2000, contamination incident, 

at the facility, that resulted in an unplanned 

exposure to a minor who was a student working 

at the National Institutes of Health as an intern. 

Addendum: Although the regulatory limit was not 

exceeded in this case, a substantial potential for an 

overexposure existed.

(Contact: Sally Merchant, 301-415-2747; e-mail: 

slm2@nrc.gov)

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

is providing summaries of these events to inform 

licensees of conditions they may encounter and of 

actions that may be taken to deal with them.

Event 1: Possible overexposure to a radiographer 

from Quality Inspection Services, Inc.

Date and Place: February 16, 2001; Jacksonville, 

Florida. 

Nature and Probable Consequences: The licensee 

reported a possible overexposure to a radiographer. 

After a radiography shot, the source was reeled into 

what was thought to be a locked, shielded, and fully 

retracted position. The radiographers were using an 

AEA Technology camera (model 660-B) with an 

iridium-192 source containing an activity of 2.15 

terebecquerels (58 curies). The radiographers failed 

to perform an adequate survey of the camera. The 

two radiographers involved proceeded in front of the 

camera to set up the next shot, taking less than 5 

minutes. When they went to unlock the source, they 

realized that it was not locked and noticed the survey 

meter was off scale. They exited the area and fully 

retracted the source. Both pocket dosimeters were 
10

off scale. One radiographer’s alarming ratemeter was 

turned off and the other radiographer’s alarming 

ratemeter had a low battery and did not give an 

audible alarm. Film badges for the two radiographers 

showed exposures of 2.9 and 39.2 centigray (rad). 

The individual whose badge showed the highest 

exposure has had blood drawn for analysis and 

results are pending. In addition, the licensee 

conducted a re-enactment of the event. The Florida 

Bureau of Radiation Control has discussed the event 

with the licensee and has suggested the use of 

cytogenetic testing for evaluating the radiographer’s 

exposure. The company that processes the dosimetry 

has been asked to recheck the film badge results.

Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence

State Agency: The Florida Bureau of Radiation 

Control conducted an on-site investigation to verify 

the circumstances of the event, the cause for the 

event, and the actions taken by the licensee. This 

event is currently under review.

Event 2: Unintended dose to an embryo/fetus, 

involving the administration of iodine-131(I -131) 

to a pregnant female patient at Waterbury Hospital, 

Waterbury, Connecticut.

Date and Place: August 30, 2000; Waterbury 

Hospital; Waterbury, Connecticut.

Nature and Probable Consequences: The licensee 

reported that a female patient who had been 

administered 0.45 gigabecquerel (GBq)(12.15 

millicurie) (mCi) of iodine-131, for 

hyperthyroidism, on August 30, 2000, had been 

pregnant at the time of administration. The patient 

was asked before the administration whether she 

was pregnant, and she stated that she was not. On 

January 18, 2001, the licensee was notified by the 

patient’s family physician that the patient had in 

fact been pregnant at the time of the administration. 

An ultrasound performed on January 26, 2001, 

determined that conception had occurred on or 

about June 17, 2000. The licensee had followed 

its Quality Management Program (QMP) procedures 

with respect to asking the patient if she were 

pregnant. The QMP procedures did not require a 

pregnancy test at the time of the administration. The 

licensee calculated that this event resulted in a dose 

of 3.2 centigray (cGy)(rad) to the fetal whole body 

and 10,300 cGy (rad) to the fetal thyroid gland. 

The licensee also calculated a dose of 2 milligray 

(200 millirad), to the fetal whole body, from an 

administration of 0.32 GBq (8.6 mCi) of I-131, that 

occurred on June 8, 2000. The licensee referred 

the patient to the University of Connecticut Health 

Sciences Center OB/GYN and Genetic Counseling 

Center. NRC contracted a medical consultant to 

review this event and provide an assessment of the 

radiation dose received by the embryo/fetus. The 

consultant stated that the licensee’s dose estimates 

are within the expected range of values. Because 

of many uncertainties and unknowns, the consultant 

was unable to state specific deterministic effects to 

the fetus from this event. The baby was born on 

March 16, 2001, and tests indicated that the baby is 

not hypothyroid at this time.

Actions Taken To Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: On December 14, 2000, the licensee’s 

Radiation Safety Committee revised the QMP to 

establish a policy of administering a pregnancy test 

to all female patients between the ages of 10 and 55 

years old within 24 hours before the administration 

of all therapeutic radiopharmaceuticals, including 

diagnostic quantities of I-131 in excess of 7.44 

megabecquerel (200 mCi).

NRC: NRC conducted an inspection on February 8, 

2001. The inspection was limited to a review of the 

administration of iodine-131 to the pregnant patient. 

Within the scope of this inspection, no violations 

were identified.

Event 3: Skin contamination incident involving 

yttrium-90 at PerkinElmer Life Sciences, 

Billerica, Massachusetts.

Date and Place: December 4, 2000; PerkinElmer 

Life Sciences; Billerica, Massachusetts.

Nature and Probable Consequences: The licensee 

reported an event that resulted in one employee 

receiving greater than 50 centisievert (rem) to the 

skin. The event occurred when the employee 

was remotely transferring 3 milliliters (.102 oz) of 

yttrium-90, with an activity of 129.5 gigabecquerel 

(3.5 curies), in a vial, from a shielded dispensing 

container, to a transfer lead container. This transfer 

occurred within a biosafety hood. The remote- 
11

handling device grips the vial by the cap. During the 

transfer, the vial separated from the cap and fell to 

the floor of the biosafety hood, causing the material 

to be splashed on the employee. The employee 

immediately contacted the on-site Radiation Safety 

Officer. The employee then returned to the 

hood and hand-placed the vial into the intended 

transfer lead container. The employee then removed 

protective clothing, further contaminating his/her 

skin. Decontamination efforts were difficult because 

of saturated detectors. The employee was instructed 

to shower, which effected removal of much of the 

contamination. Dose reconstruction and calculations 

for the employee show that the highest affected 

area of skin was located underneath the employee’s 

chin, which received 240 rads (27.2 microcuriehours). The commited effective dose equivalent 

was 50 microsieverts (5 millirem). There were no 

observable effects on the skin.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: All individuals transferring an yttrium-90 

lot will wear a face shield. A movable shield 

and splash protector have been installed inside the 

processing hood. Rubber pads have been installed 

inside the lead-shielding containers to hold the 

lot bottle in place while capping operations are 

performed. An operational step was added to verify 

tightness of vial cap. Staff has been retrained on 

how to ensure that unshielded vials are properly 

handled; how to evacuate from a spill zone; how 

to monitor correctly when high radiation levels 

are present; how to report and document perceived 

defects in operations; and how to initiate personnel 

decontamination before taking any other action. 

The licensee is currently considering long-term 

solutions such as replacing the lot vial and 

redesigning the entire yttrium-90 operation. 

State Agency: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 

Radiation Control Program (MARCP) performed 

special inspections on December 6, 2000, and 

January 24, 2001, to determine the sequence of 

events and to combine eye-witness accounts with 

measurement data. The MARCP determined that 

deficiencies in process and engineering controls had 

not been adequately addressed and has issued a 

Notice of Violation.

Event 4: Industrial radiographer exceeded the annual 

exposure limit at Pacific Technical Industries, 

Bellevue, Washington.

Date and Place: September 27, 2000; Pacific 

Technical Industries; Bellevue, Washington.

Nature and Probable Consequences: The licensee 

reported that an industrial radiographer exceeded 

the annual exposure limit of 5 centisievert (rem). 

The licensee was notified by the dosimetry service 

on September 27, 2000, that the radiographer had 

received 4.3 centisievert (rem) through August 

2000. On October 26, 2000, the State of 

Washington Department of Health mailed copies 

of NRC Information Notice 2000-15, entitled: 

“Recent Events Resulting in Whole-Body Exposures 

Exceeding Regulatory Limits,” to all radiography 

licensees. On receipt of the Information Notice, the 

licensee was prompted to review the radiographer’s 

daily pocket dosimeter records and at that time 

determined that the total dose was already likely 

to be 5.1 centisievert (rem). The radiographer 

was immediately reassigned to non-radiation work; 

the dosimeter was sent for processing; and the 

Department of Health was notified. On December 

7, 2000, the licensee reported the results of the 

dosimetry as received from the dosimetry service. 

The radiographer had received 5.217 centisievert 

(rem). The licensee indicated that the radiographer 

had received more exposure than usual because of 

a heavy workload in confined spaces, such as tanks 

and other vessels, where getting in and out was 

difficult or even hazardous. The relatively short 

exposure times involved led the radiographer to 

remain in the confined spaces, but as far away as 

practical from the source and crank handle. The 

isotope involved was curie amounts of iridium -192.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

Licensee: The licensee’s corrective actions to 

prevent recurrence will include daily tabulation 

of pocket dosimeter readings when the regular 

dosimetry shows the individual is within 20 percent 

of the exposure limit. The licensee will also 

seek opportunities to more broadly distribute the 

radiation- related workload among qualified staff.
12

State Agency: The State of Washington Department 

of Health cited the licensee for failure to control the 

exposure of the radiographer. 

Comments, and suggestions you may have for 

information not currently included, that might 

be helpful to licensees, should be sent to:

E. Kraus

NMSS Licensee Newsletter Editor

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Two White Flint North, Mail Stop 8-A-23

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001